

IN SEARCH OF THE FATHER: EXPERIENCES, IDENTITY AND BELONGING OF
SINO-JAPANESE CHILDREN BORN OF THE SECOND SINO-JAPANESE WAR (1937-
1945) WHO 'RETURNED TO THE HOMELAND'

by

KANAKO KURAMITSU

A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History
School of History and Culture
College of Arts and Law
University of Birmingham

29 October 2020

UNIVERSITY OF
BIRMINGHAM

University of Birmingham Research Archive

e-theses repository

This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation.

Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder.

ABSTRACT

This study examines the little-known experiences of children born of Japanese fathers and Chinese mothers who had consensual relationships during and after the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) in China, with a specific focus on those who migrated to Japan after the re-establishment of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972. These individuals, most of whom had been separated from their repatriated fathers after the war, had strikingly similar narratives about their father's country as their 'homeland' and their migration to Japan as their 'return'. Primarily based on oral history interviews conducted with eight individuals in Japan and China as well as on personal documents obtained from a Japanese law firm, this study analyses their experiences in comparison with other 'children born of war' – defined as offspring of local women and members of an enemy, occupation or peacekeeping force or child soldiers – in other historical and geopolitical contexts. The comparative analysis highlights their adversities due to their origin as well as the significance of the (often absent) father. By elucidating the particularities of the circumstances under which they were born and what they experienced in the specific post-war geo-political, socio-political and cultural context of China and Japan, this study probes how they came to construct positive notions of the father and Japan and the significance of the father in the formation process of their identity, belonging and life choices. These long-neglected stories of Sino-Japanese consensual relationships and familial love that transcended the national boundaries defy the rigid historical narratives that made wartime and post-war Sino-Japanese human interactions appear so bleak and narrow.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to first thank all eight participants who have generously shared their extraordinary life stories for this thesis. I have been moved by their resilience and love for their families, and I know their stories will continue to inspire me for the rest of my life. My sincere thanks goes to everyone who spent their precious time to find the participants, including Nakashima Itsuko, Tsuda Tadahiko, Inoguchi Isao, Kato Fumiko, Nakakuma Junko and Sakamoto Taishi. Many valuable sources analysed in this thesis could not have been found without the kind help of many individuals, including Ikeda Sumie, Hironaka Yui, Kawai Hiroyuki, Serizawa Nobuo and Ogawa Katsura. I owe many thanks to Ma Yanrui, Xu Min and Nakao Mie who provided me with translations and transcriptions.

I simply could not have completed this thesis without the generous support and encouragement of my two supervisors. I cannot fully express my gratitude with words for Professor Sabine Lee, for her invaluable academic advice, immense patience and continuous support throughout my PhD life. Professor Lee has been and will always be the inspiration of my life. I have been extremely fortunate to be supervised by Dr Julie Gilson. I profusely thank Dr Gilson for her genuine interest and enthusiasm in my topic and insightful comments that improved this thesis tremendously. I started this project when my daughter was six months old, and balancing research and family life was a constant challenge. Both my supervisors have extended remarkable patience when things did not go well and never failed to extend moral and practical support despite their busy schedule.

This research was made possible thanks to the funding from Horizons 2020 Marie Skłodowska Curie Horizon 2020 Initial Training Network (ITN) of the European Commission. Without this funding, valuable voices of the individuals studied in this thesis would have otherwise remained unnoticed and unheard. As part of ITN's programme, I have had an opportunity to conduct secondment at the Department of Psychology of the University of Leipzig in Germany and at the SOO Foundation in the Netherlands. My sincere thanks go to Professor Heide Glaesmer, Maekawa Kaori and Okuyama Miyuki who kindly accepted my visit and provided me with invaluable knowledge that added key insight to this study. Thanks to the funding, I could also make a short animation film 'Michiko: a child born of war' based on the oral history interview that I conducted with one of the participants. I owe my special thanks to Michiko for narrating her own story for the film and Vivian Zhou for creating a beautiful film with her extraordinary artistic talent. I also would like to thank the Centre for East Asian Studies of the University of Turku for allowing me to work at the centre during the last months of my PhD.

I have been extremely lucky to be supported by the colleagues of the CHIBOW network and friends throughout my PhD life. In particular, I would like to thank Dr Eleanor Seymour for her immense kindness. Her good words always cheered me up, and she provided me with care and support when I most needed it. She has also helped me to proof-read the entire thesis. A special thanks also goes to Dr Lukas Schretter, Nastasia Sersté and Amy Wilkins with whom I have had a privilege to work closely in the CHIBOW network. I owe a debt of gratitude to Harish Chavda and Maya Chavda for their kindness and for bringing me their delicious Indian dishes and chai during the Covid-19 lockdown. I am also deeply grateful for Juliet Clare Bell, Akiko Tokioka, Kristina Gavran, Anton Gavran Anish, Miki Takahashi, Oana Burcu, Hyunjin Jeong, Jelena Obradović-Wochnik, Sara Klingstedt, Heuishil Chang, Nathalie Mrgudovic, Susu Trevelyan, Rieko Ito, Yumi Murata and Satoko Kaminosono, Suwisa Kaewphan for their friendship and encouragement during the most difficult times.

Finally, I would like to thank family. My parents, Koji and Setsuko, as well as my parents-in-law, Michel and Brigitte, for their support throughout my PhD project. I am grateful to my grandmothers, Tokie and Kazue, for their love. Last but not least, Hermann and Hanna, thank you for being by my side throughout my PhD journey, which was not always easy to navigate. Your love and sense of humour always helped me to go on. This thesis is dedicated to you two whom I love from the bottom of my heart.

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Missing from public memory	5
1.3 Contested memories of war in East Asia and Sino-Japanese CBOW born of consensual relationships	12
1.3.1 ‘Memory wars’ in East Asia and children born of a ‘comfort woman’ in China	13
1.3.2 Political explosiveness of nuanced wartime sexual liaisons and the importance of researching children born of consensual relationships	18
1.4 Literature review	22
1.4.1 Children born of war, identity and belonging	22
1.4.2 Return migration and motivations to migrate	28
1.5 Terminology	33
1.6 Contribution and thesis structure	37
CHAPTER 2: SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY	40
2.1 Introduction	40
2.2 Collecting written sources	41
2.3 Identifying participants in China and Japan	46
2.4 Oral history materials, methods and positionality	51
2.5 Methodological and ethical challenges	58
2.6 Conclusion	62
CHAPTER 3: REPATRIATION POLICIES FOR SINO-JAPANESE CBOW	64
3.1 Introduction	64
3.2 Repatriation in the immediate post-war period (1945-1949)	67
3.2.1 Repatriation policies in the post-war geopolitical context	67
3.2.2 Abandoned by the fathers? Ruptures in the family ties after the repatriation	72
3.3 Repatriation of Sino-Japanese CBOW amidst the severance of Sino-Japanese relations (1953-1958)	76
3.3.1 Nongovernmental negotiation on collective repatriation amidst the Cold War	76
3.3.2 Repatriation of Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers as ‘dependents’	80
3.4 Repatriation and resettlement after the normalisation (1972- present)	84
3.4.1 Minimal official and grass-root support	86
3.4.2 Receiving legal approval for the father-child relationship	91
3.4.3 Inconsistencies in the official treatment of elderly Sino-Japanese CBOW	97
3.5 Conclusion	102

4.1 Introduction	104
4.2 Wartime policy towards Sino-Japanese consensual relationships and consequent childbirth	106
4.2.1 Assimilation policies and ‘intermarriage’ in the Japanese Empire.....	106
4.2.2 Wartime debate on Sino-Japanese ‘intermarriage’	112
4.2.3 Literary exploration on identity crisis of children of mixed heritage in colonial Taiwan and Korea	117
4.2.4 Fictional Sino-Japanese intimate relationship in the film <i>China Night</i>	121
4.3 Wartime Sino-Japanese consensual relationships	125
4.3.1 Loving relationships and the mothers passing on paternal lineage to the child.	126
4.3.2 Nuanced Sino-Japanese consensual relationships and patriarchal relations	135
4.4 Post-war Sino-Japanese consensual relationships in China	141
4.4.1 Various Sino-Japanese consensual relationships in post-war China	143
4.4.2 Post-war consensual relationships: Parents of Keiko and Yongyun.....	148
4.7 Conclusion	151
CHAPTER 5: LIFE-LONG SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FATHER IN CONSTRUCTING IDENTITY AND BELONGING	153
5.1 Introduction	153
5.2 Experiences, identity and belonging in the pre-migratory phase: Constructing the absent father and imagined homeland	154
5.2.1 CBOW’s need for constructing desirable notions of the father	155
5.2.2 Adversities in China: Feeling ‘foreign’ in the country of birth and upbringing	158
5.2.3 Constructing idealised notions of the father and the ‘homeland’	162
5.2.4 Various motivations to ‘return’	168
5.2.5 Search for the father and its impact on identity	171
5.2.6 <i>Shūseki</i> procedure and its impact on identity and belonging	177
5.3 Experiences, identity and belonging in the post-migratory phase.....	179
5.3.1 Keiko’s case: Feeling ‘in-between’ in the homeland.....	180
5.3.2 Cases of Koretada and Toshio: ‘Bridge builder’ identity	182
5.3.3 Yuko’s case: Changing concept of the father, identity and belonging	185
5.3.4 Positivity in the narratives about past difficulties.....	189
5.4 Discussion: Dilemmas of being socially invisible	193
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION.....	196
6.1 Key findings and the question of terminology	196
6.2 Impact of research on participants and the researcher.....	199
6.3 Implications for memories of the Second Sino-Japanese War.....	200
BIBLIOGRAPHY	203

Newspaper articles (in chronological order)	222
Magazine articles, blog posts	226
Online sources	227
Film, TV programme (in chronological order)	230
Other sources	230
Interviews with participants	231
Other interviews	231
Unpublished personal documents obtained from a law firm in Tokyo	232
Letters and e-mail correspondence (in chronological order).....	232
APPENDICES.....	233
Appendix 1: List of participants.....	233
Appendix 2: Interview with participants	234
Appendix 3: List of Sino-Japanese CBOW born of marriage whose information was obtained from a Japanese law firm	235
Appendix 4: List of fathers and their occupation	237
Appendix 5: List of fathers, their marital relationship(s) and repatriation.....	239
Appendix 6: A set of questions for the mothers.....	241

ABBREVIATIONS

ANJA	Association of Nikkei and Japanese Abroad (海外日系人協会)
CBOW	children born of war
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CHIBOW	Children Born of War network
JCFA	Japan-China Friendship Association (日中友好協会)
JPLG	Japan Peace Liaison Group (日本平和連絡委員会)
JRCW	Japanese Remaining in China after the War (中国残留邦人)
JRHA	Japan Racial Hygiene Association (日本民族衛生学会)
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda
MHLW	Japan's Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (厚生労働省, 2001-present)
MHW	Japan's Ministry of Health and Welfare (厚生省, 1938-2001)
MOFA	Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (外務省)
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
SCAP	Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers

JAPANESE WORD LIST

<i>Chūgoku zanryūhei</i>	Japanese soldiers who remained in post-war China to serve the Nationalists and/or the Communists
<i>Chūgoku zanryū fujin</i>	Japanese stranded war wives in post-war northeast China
<i>Chūgoku zanryū hōjin</i> <i>Chūgoku zanryū koji</i>	Japanese Remaining in China after the War (JRCW) Japanese stranded war orphans in post-war northeast China
<i>Chūgoku zanryū Nihonjin</i>	Japanese people who remained in post-war China
<i>engokyoku</i>	Japan's Social Welfare and War Victim's Relief Bureau
<i>firipin zanryū Nihonjin</i>	Japanese people who remained in the post-war Philippines
<i>furusato</i>	homeland
<i>hāfu</i>	a child born of mixed heritage (literally, half-Japanese)
<i>kaeru</i>	return, return to one's country
<i>kokyō</i>	homeland
<i>konketsuji</i>	a child born of mixed heritage (literally, a 'mixed-blood' child)
<i>konketsu koji</i>	an orphan born of mixed heritage (literally, a 'mixed-blood' orphan)
<i>kōseirōdōshō</i>	Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare or MHLW (厚生労働省, 2001-present)
<i>kōseishō</i>	Ministry of Health and Welfare or MHW (厚生省, 1938-2001)
<i>koseki</i>	Japanese family register
<i>Nicchū konketsu koji</i>	Sino-Japanese 'mixed-blood' orphan
<i>Nicchū sensō</i>	Sino-Japanese War
<i>Nikkeijin</i>	overseas Japanese and their offspring
<i>ryūyōsha</i>	Japanese civilian workers who remained in post-war China to serve the Nationalists and/or the Communists
<i>sensō no otoshidane/otoshigo</i>	children born of foreign soldiers who were abandoned by their fathers after the war
<i>shūseki</i>	legal means to establish the Japanese family register for individuals who do not possess one to rectify delays or oversights in the registration that was supposed to be established at their birth
<i>sokoku</i>	ancestral homeland
<i>zaigō gunjin kai</i>	pre-war and wartime associations of Japanese veterans

zakkon

‘intermarriage’

zanryū Nihonjin

Japanese people who remained abroad after the war

CHINESE WORD LIST

<i>dongyangren</i>	derogatory term which denotes 'Japanese'
<i>guizi nü'er</i>	Japanese devil's daughter
<i>hanjian</i>	derogatory term which denotes 'traitor to the Han Chinese state'
<i>huiguo</i>	to return to one's country
<i>jizhongying</i>	repatriation camp
<i>laodong gaizao</i>	reform through labour
<i>laodong jiaoyang</i>	re-education through labour
<i>lishi fangeming</i>	historical counter-revolutionary
<i>maiguozei</i>	derogatory term which denotes 'traitor to China'
<i>riben guizi</i>	derogatory term which denotes 'Japanese devil'
<i>ribenren</i>	Japanese
<i>riben yigu</i>	Japanese stranded war orphans in post-war northeast China
<i>waiguoren ziniu</i>	a foreigner's child
<i>xiao</i>	filial piety
<i>xiaoriben</i>	derogatory term which denotes 'Japanese runt'
<i>you dai</i>	preferential treatment
<i>zhongguo kangri zhanzheng</i>	War of Resistance against the Japanese Aggression
<i>zazhong</i>	derogatory term which denotes 'half-breed' or 'bastard'
<i>zougou</i>	derogatory term which denotes 'running dog' or 'traitor'
<i>zuguo</i>	ancestral homeland

A NOTE ON LANGUAGE

- All Chinese and Japanese names in this thesis are written in the order of surname followed by a given name.
- All given names of participants and participants' family members are anonymised unless they had written books and/or appeared in the media.
- Given names are used to indicate participants and their family members.
- Surnames or full names are used to indicate public figures. (e.g. politicians, well-known activists)

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

On 15 August 2020, Japan commemorated its seventy-fifth end-of-war memorial day. It was a day of commemoration of war victims and a day of hope for peace built on the sacrifices of past generations.¹ However, this anniversary has also become a day that reminds us of the fact that many issues related to Japan's wars remain unresolved. This year, too, the Japanese Prime Minister made headlines abroad for not apologising for Japan's wartime hostilities, and Japanese ministers also attracted international media attention for their visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, provoking strong responses from neighbouring countries that view the shrine as a symbol of Japan's past militarism.² On this day of historical significance, a Japanese newspaper published an article about Serikawa Koretada, a seventy-five-year old man living in Saitama, Japan, who just published a novel about a love story about a general of the Imperial Japanese Army and a Chinese nurse in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), followed by a story of their son living in Tokyo in the 1980s.³ However unusual and unfamiliar such a story may sound, Koretada wrote his novel based on his real life. His father, a former army general, fell in love with his Chinese mother amidst the ongoing war. Koretada was born in Suzhou, China, just before the war's end, and he eventually migrated to Japan in the 1980s. Koretada is one of thousands of hitherto-unnoticed children born of Chinese mothers and Japanese fathers who had had consensual relationships during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Their existence points to a missing part in our knowledge and the dominant war narratives of Japanese atrocities of the eight-year war. This thesis explores the experiences of such children born of consensual relationships formed between Chinese women and Japanese men – both military and non-military personnel – during and after the war. It is the first study to investigate this group which I refer to as 'Sino-Japanese children born of war' (hereafter, Sino-Japanese CBOW), and it considers the experiences of this group in the broader context of 'children born of war' as well as in the context of Asian war-related children born of mixed heritage during and in the immediate aftermath of armed conflicts.

¹ “‘Deep remorse’: Japanese emperor marks 75th anniversary of surrender”, *The Guardian*, 15 August 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/15/deep-remorse-japanese-emperor-marks-75th-anniversary-of-surrender> (accessed on 25 October 2020)

² Wang, X. ‘War end anniversary sees no Abe apology’, *China Daily*, 17 August 2020. <https://www.chinadailyasia.com/article/140312> (accessed on 26 October 2020); Ono, T. and Sakamoto, J. ‘4 members of Abe's Cabinet visit Yasukuni on war anniversary’, *Asahi Shimbun*, 15 August 2020. <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13638479> (accessed on 24 October 2020)

³ Fujita, Y. ‘*Gekidō no hansei shōsetsu ni*’ [Publishing a novel about his tumultuous life], *Mainichi Shimbun*, 15 August 2020.; Serikawa, K. 2020. *Yahan no shōsei* [Sound of a bell in the middle of the night]. Tokyo: Ark Communications.

Outside the East Asian context, ‘children born of war’ (hereinafter, CBOW) is a vibrant and growing interdisciplinary research field. While there is an ongoing debate on the definition, CBOW are currently defined as the offspring of local women and members of an enemy, occupation or peacekeeping force or child soldiers.⁴ Some of the earliest most prominent studies in this field focus on children born of German soldiers and local women in German-occupied territories during World War Two,⁵ children born of the Allied occupation forces such as those who were fathered by American soldiers in Britain and Germany⁶ and by Soviet soldiers in Austria,⁷ and children born as a result of sexual violence in war and armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Uganda,⁸ to name but a few. Some of those children are born as a result of rape and sexual slavery, while others are born following love affairs and friendly business arrangements.⁹

CBOW’s mothers are often ostracised due to their sexual liaisons with ‘enemy’ men in post-conflict societies, and the mother-child relationships have been shown to significantly affect CBOW’s childhood and adolescence. At the same time, the question of the absent father has been identified as the core issue for CBOW’s identity and belonging. Irrespective of historical and geopolitical context, many CBOW encounter a so-called ‘wall of silence’ around their biological origin caused by the implicit and explicit taboo within and outside the family around the subject of how these children were conceived.¹⁰ They also share a variety of adverse experiences attributable to having ‘enemy’ fathers, such as stigmatisation and discrimination within and/or outside their family. Under such circumstances, CBOW are left to ask themselves questions around their identity and belonging: ‘who am I?’ and ‘where do I belong?’ CBOW who grow up

⁴ Lee, S. 2017. *Children born of war in the twentieth century*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 24-26.; Delic, A., Kuwert, P., and Glaesmer, H. 2017. Should the definition of the term ‘children born of war’ and vulnerabilities of children from recent conflict and post-conflict settings be broadened? *Acta Medica Academia*, 46(1), pp. 67-69.; Glaesmer, H. and Lee, S. Children born of war: A critical appraisal of the terminology. Forthcoming.

⁵ See, for example, Mochmann, I. C. and Larsen, S. U. 2008. Children born of war: The life course of children fathered by German soldiers in Norway and Denmark during WWII - Some empirical results. *Historical Social Research*, 33(1), pp. 347-363.; Mochmann, I. C., Lee, S., and Stelzl-Marx, B. 2009. The children of the occupations born during the Second World War and beyond - An overview. *Historical Social Research*, 34(3), pp. 263-282.

⁶ Lee, S. 2011. A forgotten legacy of the Second World War: GI children in post-war Britain and Germany. *Contemporary European History*, 20(2), pp. 157-181.

⁷ Stelzl-Marx, B. 2015. Soviet children of occupation in Austria: The historical, political and social background and its consequences. *European Review of History*, 22(2), pp. 277-291.

⁸ See, for example, Carpenter, R.C. 2010. *Forgetting children born of war: Setting the human rights agenda in Bosnia and beyond*. New York: Columbia University Press.; Apio, E. 2016. ‘Children Born of War in Northern Uganda: Kinship, Marriage, and the Politics of Post-conflict Reintegration in Lango society’. PhD thesis, University of Birmingham.

⁹ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, pp. 26-27.

¹⁰ See, for example, Stelzl-Marx, Soviet children of occupation in Austria: The historical, political and social background and its consequences. *European Review of History*, pp. 282-283.; Ezawa, A. 2015. ‘The guilt feeling that you exist’: War, racism and Indisch-Japanese identity formation. In *Race and racism in modern East Asia Vol.II: Interactions, nationalism, gender and lineage*, eds. R. Kowner and W. Demel, pp. 481-502, p. 489. Leiden: Brill.; Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 89.

in the absence of their biological father are more likely to idealise but also, in some cases, demonise the absent father and have a strong desire to search for the father whom they see as the ‘missing piece of the puzzle’ of their identity.¹¹

Previous studies on CBOW have clearly shown that CBOW are not an exceptional phenomenon, limited to particular historical and geographical contexts but are a global phenomenon of conflict.¹² Given the large number of Japanese males in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War, one would expect a very significant number of transnational relationships and consequent childbirths. As a corollary, one might also expect to find substantial information on both children born of wartime sexual violence and of consensual relationships. However, research on Sino-Japanese CBOW has remained non-existent to date. Due to the lack of prior information about these children, this research project started with preliminary questions to establish a baseline knowledge. Therefore, the first key research questions of this thesis are: Who are they? How can we locate them? How do their experiences compare to those of other CBOW groups from other historical and geopolitical settings?

Collecting systematic data with accuracy is often difficult for researchers studying CBOW, and this study was no exception.¹³ While the accurate number of Sino-Japanese CBOW is unknown, it is likely that at least a few thousand were born during and in the immediate aftermath of the Second Sino-Japanese War (see Chapter 3, p. 89). Through the fieldwork which took place between December 2015 and December 2017, I identified and interviewed eight individuals born of Chinese mothers and Japanese fathers during and after the war (see Appendix 1 and Chapter 2). Amongst eight participants, seven of them have acquired Japanese nationality and migrated to Japan after the re-establishment of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972. Through a law firm in Tokyo, I could also obtain unpublished personal documents of twenty individuals who had also acquired Japanese nationality (see Appendix 3 and Chapter 2, p. 43) after 1972. All the above twenty-eight individuals were born of consensual relationships and marriages. I have searched for Sino-Japanese CBOW born of rape and sexual slavery committed by the Imperial Japanese Army (see p. 16), but only one man in China came forward as a child born of the wartime sexual slavery system of imperial Japan known by its euphemism, ‘comfort women’ system. Based on participants and sources that could be found, this study focuses on the experiences of Sino-Japanese CBOW born of consensual relationships and marriage who migrated to Japan after 1972.

¹¹ See, for example, Kaiser, M., et al. 2015. Depression, somatization, and posttraumatic stress disorder in children born of occupation after World War II in comparison with a general population. *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, 203(10), pp. 1-7.

¹² Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 2.

¹³ Grieg, K. 2001. *The war children of the world*. Bergen: War and Children Identity Project.

Similar to studies on CBOW in other historical and geographical settings, some core themes around the absent father and the formation of identity and belonging in the context of transnational heritage emerged during the interviews. Although Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study did not know (and still do not know) each other, their experiences and how they narrate their experiences had striking similarities. Most participants were raised by their mothers as their fathers were repatriated after the war's end. Sino-Japanese CBOW searched for their fathers and migrated to Japan after acquiring Japanese nationality almost simultaneously in the particular historical and geopolitical context of the 1980s and the 1990s – options that were not available for the vast majority of CBOW. Importantly, most of them displayed clear signs of positivity when narrating their past experiences, which defied my preconceptions based on the knowledge of other groups of CBOW. Moreover, they called their migration to the paternal country a 'return' to the 'homeland'.

The preliminary findings about how Sino-Japanese CBOW left China and became Japanese nationals in their mid-life led to a hypothesis that these individuals had constructed an emotional and/or cultural connection to their absent fathers and that their constructed notions of the father influenced how they constructed their identity ('Who am I?') and belonging ('Where do I belong?'). Thus, the second key research question of this thesis is: What is the significance of the constructed notions of the father in the formation process of their identity and belonging? In addition, because Sino-Japanese CBOW actually migrated to and resettled in their paternal country, this thesis will also ask: How did their constructed concept of the father influence their decision to migrate to Japan? This study locates Sino-Japanese CBOW's migration within the studies of return migration and aims to highlight the significance of an emotional and/or cultural connection to an absent family member in developing motivation to migrate to one's 'homeland'.

In sum, this thesis compares the experiences of Sino-Japanese CBOW born of consensual relationships with CBOW in other historical and geopolitical settings and investigates in what ways their perception of the absent father affected their identity, belonging and major life choices. Between November 2015 and November 2018, I was part of the CHIBOW (Children Born of War) network, an interdisciplinary and collaborative research network funded by the European Commission. This research was a project amongst fifteen research projects of various disciplines on CBOW across different historical and geographical contexts.¹⁴ To better understand Sino-Japanese CBOW's experiences, identity and belonging, this study gleans insights from other disciplines, in particular, from previous psychological studies that identified the issues

¹⁴ CHIBOW network was funded by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the MarieF Curie grant agreement between 2015 and 2019.

revolving around the topic of identity as the most fundamental challenges that CBOW face.

1.2 Missing from public memory

As will be discussed in the following chapters, Sino-Japanese CBOW have appeared in policymaking processes and in the media on a few occasions, however, their existence has largely been erased from public memory in contemporary Japan. The existence of these children has been touched upon in a few autobiographies of Japanese soldiers who remained in post-war China as well as a small number of academic works on law and policy related to these children's nationality.¹⁵ Nonetheless, the Japanese public rarely hear about these individuals today. For example, a Japanese television programme broadcasted in August 2019 presented various groups of children who were left behind overseas by their Japanese fathers after the war as 'remnants' (*wasuregatami*) of the Japanese Empire. The programme listed children born of local women and Japanese fathers before, during, and after the Asia-Pacific War in the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and Myanmar. However, Sino-Japanese CBOW were utterly missing from this list of 'remnants'.¹⁶ The group of children that represented the 'remnants of the empire' in China were so-called stranded war orphans (*Chūgoku zanryū koji*) born of Japanese parentage, who were left behind in post-war northeast China. The programme thus presented that China was an exceptional country where, unlike in all other neighbouring countries that were affected by the Asia-Pacific War, no children had been born to local women and Japanese men.

Previous studies on CBOW tell us that CBOW have always been and remain to be a global phenomenon of conflict, however, these children in many societies constitute a 'hidden population', who are difficult to reach, due to the taboo nature of the subject.¹⁷ Many CBOW endeavour to conceal their origin – although it is not always possible

¹⁵ See, for example, Japan Red Cross. 1972. *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6], p. 272.; Fukatani, T. 2014. *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku* [The last soldier that returned to Japan: Fukatani Yoshiharu and his family]. Tokyo: Shueisha.; Kaji, I. 2001. *Chūgoku zanryū hōjin* "no keisei to ukeire ni tsuite [Formation and acceptance of remaining Japanese in post-war China]. In T. Kajita, ed. *Kokusai imin no shindōkō to gaikokujin seisaku no kadai: Kakkoku ni okeru genjō to torikumi* [New trends of international immigrants and challenges in policy towards foreigners in Japan], pp. 271-294.; Okuda, Y. 1996. *Kazoku to kokuseki: kokusaika no susumu naka de* [Family and nationality: Upon advancement of internationalisation]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku Publishing, pp. 176-187.

¹⁶ 'Watashi wa Nihonjin desu: Sensō no "wasuregatami" firipin zanryūkoji [I am Japanese: War orphans in the Philippines, 'remnants of the war']', TV Tokyo, Tokyo, 14 August 2019. <https://www.tv-tokyo.co.jp/zipangu/backnumber/20190814/> (accessed on 12 July 2020)

¹⁷ See, for example, Mochmann, I. C. 2017. Children born of war: a decade of international and interdisciplinary research. *Historical Social Research*, 42 (1), pp. 320-346, p. 326.; Kaiser, M. et al. 2018. Long-term effects on adult attachment in German occupation children born after World War II in comparison with a birth-cohort-matched representative sample of the German general population. *Ageing and Mental Health*, 22(2), pp. 197-207.

especially for biracial CBOW whose physical ‘mark’ of the enemy father is visible – within their communities to avoid stigmatisation and discrimination.¹⁸ Thus, when CBOW are missing from the public memory in a post-conflict society, the right question to ask is not whether or not they exist but rather what prevents that society from remembering them. Why are Sino-Japanese CBOW missing from the public memory today?

The post-war representation of ‘remembered’ war-affected children has been affected by the historiography of post-war Japan in which ‘the empire seems to suddenly disappear on 15 August 1945’.¹⁹ There is a growing number of studies regarding what happened in the peripheries of the Japanese Empire during the long-term process of dismantling the empire.²⁰ However, the war-affected children born of transnational heritage in the peripheries still receive less attention than those who were born in Japan proper and Okinawa or those of Japanese parentage who were repatriated after the war. A book series published in 2014 called *Sensō Koji* (war orphans) written for primary and secondary school children are indicative of groups of war-affected children that are ‘remembered’. The series introduces six groups of children: (1) war-affected orphans in Japan who lost their family due to air raids during the war or to poverty after the war (*sensai koji*), (2) war orphans of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (*genbaku koji*), (3) repatriated orphans (*hikiage koji*) from former colonies of the Japanese Empire, (4) stranded war orphans in post-war northeast China (*zanryū koji*), (5) Okinawan war-affected orphans (*Okinawa no senjō koji*) who lost their family in the Battle of Okinawa as well as who were born of GI soldiers and finally (6) ‘mixed-blood orphans’ (*konketsu koji*) born of Japanese women and occupying soldiers in post-war Japan who were abandoned or entrusted to orphanages.²¹ While the category ‘war orphan’ used here includes some groups of CBOW in post-war Japan and Okinawa (‘mixed-blood’ orphans born of the members of the Allied occupation forces), a large number of children born of transnational heritage in the peripheries of the empire during and after Japan’s wars are utterly forgotten.

¹⁸ Mochmann, *Children born of war: a decade of international and interdisciplinary research*, p. 326.; For biracial CBOW who cannot hide their origin, see, for example, Lee, *A forgotten legacy of the Second World War: GI children in post-war Britain and Germany*, p. 173.; Mochmann, I. C. and Lee, S. 2010. *The human rights of children born of war: Case analysis of past and present conflicts. Historical Social Research*, 35. pp. 268-298, pp. 278-281.; Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, pp. 112-141.

¹⁹ Kushner, B. and Muminov, S. eds. 2017. *The dismantling of Japan’s empire in East Asia: Deimperialisation, postwar legitimisation and Imperial afterlife*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, pp. 1, 4.; Kushner, B. ‘Chinese war crimes trials and Japan – A brief assessment’. Speech, Beijing Forum 2015, Diaoyutai State Guest House, Beijing, 6 November 2015.

²⁰ Kushner and Muminov, *The dismantling of Japan’s empire in East Asia: Deimperialisation, postwar legitimisation and Imperial afterlife*.

²¹ See, Honjo, Y. et al. eds. 2014. *Shirīzu sensō koji: Konketsu koji, erizabesu sandāsu hōmu e no michi* [Series, war orphans: Mixed-blood orphans, how they arrived at Elizabeth Saunders Home]. Tokyo: Choubunsha.

Children born of the Allied occupation forces called *konketsuji* ('mixed-blood children') or *konketsu koji* ('mixed-blood orphans') at the time – currently an outdated and discriminatory term – became part of the national war memories as they were represented as living reminders of Japan's defeat in post-war Japan.²² Norma Field stated, 'the biracial offspring of war [were] at once more offensive and intriguing because they [bore] the imprint of sex as domination'.²³ In contrast, children born of Japanese and a parent from other Asian countries were made socially invisible in post-war Japan. In fact, Japan's Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) and eugenicists in pre-war period and during the war had a keen interest in these Asian 'mixed-blood children' in the process of expanding its territory and implementing assimilation policies in the colonies (see Chapter 3).²⁴ However, after the dissolution of the empire, both MHW and eugenicists switched their focus to the biracial children born of the Allied occupation in post-war Japan. When MHW conducted a survey on school-age 'mixed-blood children' across Japan in 1953, it included biracial children born of occupation and excluded Asian 'mixed-blood children'.²⁵ The relative invisibility of Asian children of mixed heritage continues today. During the period of high economic growth in Japan in the 1960s and 1970s, the term *hāfu* came to replace the term 'mixed-blood children'.²⁶ Since around the 1970s, the term *hāfu* came to be used to indicate entertainers born of Japanese-Caucasian parentage who gained popularity as symbols of physical attractiveness and international competency in the Japanese popular media.²⁷ In this process, the images of biracial 'mixed-blood children' born of occupation receded with the wide use of the depoliticised and dehistoricised term *hāfu*.²⁸ *Ajia kei hāfu* (Asian *hāfu*) are often excluded from the

²² Kumustaka, a non-profit organization that supports immigrants in Japan, criticized the use of the term 'mixed-blood children' in Japanese media in the early 2000s. It claimed that the term 'mixed-blood' has been used to bully children of mixed heritage and therefore its usage should be stopped. Consequently, some newspaper companies officially announced their decision to stop the use of the term. (See, Kumustaka – Association for living together with migrants. http://www.geocities.jp/kumustaka85/20071008_asahi.html, accessed on 24 January 2019.) Kumustaka has been promoting the term *kokusaiji* (international children) to replace the term 'mixed-blood children'. Sino-Japanese CBO have once been labelled as *Nicchū kokusaiji* (Sino-Japanese international children) in a scholarly work (See, Kaji, *Chūgoku zanryū hōjin" no keisei to ukeire ni tsuite* [Formation and acceptance of remaining Japanese in post-war China], pp. 271-294.). However, the term has never gained recognition to date.

²³ Norma Field is an emeritus professor of East Asian Studies, and she is a child born of a Japanese mother and an American civilian employee of the US Armed Forces in occupied Japan. See, Field, N. 1993. *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor: Japan at Century's End*. New York: First Vintage Books, p. 39.

²⁴ Oguma, E. 1997. *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*. Tokyo: Shinyosha, pp. 235-270.

²⁵ Taguchi, L. Y. 2017. The formation of discourses regarding '*konketsu*'/'*hāfu*' and the social consequences: Critical use of 'racial formation' and 'articulation' theories. *Shakaigaku Hyōron*, 68(2), pp. 213-229, pp. 217-218.

²⁶ Kawai, Y. 2014. *Nihon ni okeru jinshu-minzoku gainen to 'Nihonjin' 'konketsu' 'hāfu'* [Concept of race/ethnicity, 'Japanese', 'mixed-blood' and '*hāfu*' in Japan]. In *Hāfu towa dareka: Jinshu konkō, media hyōshō, kōshō jissen* [Who are *hāfu*?: Mixed race, media representation and practice of negotiation], ed. K. Iwabuchi, pp. 28-54, p. 43. Tokyo: Seikyusha.

²⁷ Taguchi, The formation of discourses regarding '*konketsu*'/'*hāfu*' and the social consequences: Critical use of 'racial formation' and 'articulation' theories, p. 219.

²⁸ Kawai, *Nihon ni okeru jinshu-minzoku gainen to 'Nihonjin' 'konketsu' 'hāfu'* [Concept of race/ethnicity, 'Japanese', 'mixed-blood' and '*hāfu*' in Japan], p. 43.

popular images of *hāfu* due to physical similarity with the mainstream population and consequent lack of fascination with them.²⁹ Thus, today the term *hāfu* does not provoke memories of Asian ‘mixed-blood children’ who were considered as tools for empire-building and fruit of assimilation policies in imperial Japan.

The aforementioned ‘remnants of the Japanese Empire’ in Asian countries before, during and after the Asia-Pacific War have started to attract academic and media attention since the late 2000s. However, representations and remembering of these children have been extremely uneven: some attract more media attention and even gained official recognition, whereas others remain entirely forgotten.

A group that currently receives the most media attention is a group of children born of local women fathered by Japanese immigrants before the Asia-Pacific War in the Philippines. In the post-war Philippines, these children encountered significant adversities including being labelled as ‘Japanese mestizo’ or ‘Hapon’ that implied ‘collaborator’, ‘traitor’ or ‘enemy children’. However, when the war trauma gradually receded in the Philippines around the 1970s, these children collectively adopted a label ‘Nikkeijin’, which denotes ‘Japanese who emigrated from Japan and their descendants’, for their empowerment and public recognition. Replacing the derogatory labels with Nikkeijin enabled them to see themselves as members of Japanese descendants who call themselves Nikkeijin in various parts of the world. These Philippine Nikkeijin collectively gained membership in the Association of Nikkei and Japanese Abroad (ANJA), which support overseas Japanese descendants who actively identify as Nikkeijin and form communities.³⁰ One of the milestones of their campaign to be recognised as Nikkeijin and to acquire Japanese nationality was when Japan’s former emperor Akihito and former empress Michiko met about eighty Philippine Nikkeijin during their visit to the Philippines in 2016.³¹ One of the reasons why they currently receive the most media and academic attention is because many of them have been trying to acquire Japanese nationality since the 1990s. Their nationality acquisition project has been led by Nikkeijin associations as well as a support group in Japan led by a well-known Japanese lawyer,

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ One of the important functions of ANJA is to hold an annual convention of Nikkei. The first convention was organised in 1957 by Japanese Diet members who wished to express their appreciation to Nikkeijin in North and South America who sent relief supplies to post-war poverty-stricken Japan. The convention continues to have a strong official and political aspect, which is evident from the regular participation of cabinet members, Diet members, ambassadors as well as members of Japan’s Imperial Family. See, Convention of Nikkei and Japanese abroad, The Association of Nikkei and Japanese Abroad. <http://www.jadesas.or.jp/en/taikai/index.html> (accessed on 19 February 2018)

³¹ ‘*Shūseki, saigo no hitori made: Kokuseki kaifukusha 200 nin o tassei*’ [Let us realise the *shūseki* procedure for everyone: 200 Philippine Nikkeijin regained Japanese nationality], *The Daily Manila Shimbun*, 6 November 2017.

Kawai Hiroyuki. Kawai, who is also a filmmaker, created a documentary film in 2020 on their plight and struggle to acquire Japanese nationality.³²

Another group of ‘remnants of the Japanese Empire’ who are well-documented and remembered are children born between Indisch (Dutch Indonesian) mothers and Japanese fathers who were soldiers, civilian workers for the military and civilians in Indonesia during the Asia-Pacific War.³³ Many of these individuals migrated to the Netherlands after the independence of Indonesia in 1949 as their mothers were married to Dutch stepfather. They also have a collective label as ‘Nikkeijin’ and formed groups to support each other in their search for the father and in coping with their trauma of being abused and stigmatised as enemy children. Their request to the Japanese Embassy for support materialised in the form of a visit to Japan at government expense, although the government did not extend support to their search for the father.³⁴ Another group that gained official recognition is a group of children born of Indonesian women and Japanese soldiers who remained in the Dutch East Indies after the Asia-Pacific War. Some of them also collectively adopted a label ‘Indonesian Nikkeijin’. They became a member of ANJA and have actively promoted the narratives of their fathers who fought for Indonesian independence. Their fathers have been officially recognised as war heroes in Indonesia.³⁵ Indonesian Nikkeijin also gained public recognition in 2007 and 2015 when the then Prime Minister Abe visited the Kalibata Heroes Cemetery where their fathers were buried.³⁶

Children born of Vietnamese mothers fathered by Japanese soldiers, who joined the Việt Minh (the League for the Independence of Vietnam) after the Asia-Pacific War and fought against the French army for Vietnamese independence, have also met with the former Japanese emperor and empress during their visit to Vietnam in 2017.³⁷ Although

³² The support group for Philippine Nikkeijin in Japan is called Philippine Nikkei-jin Legal Support Center. See, PNLSC-Philippine Nikkei-jin Legal Support Center. http://pnlsc.com/index_e.html (accessed on 10 October 2020); ‘*Nihonjin no wasuremono: Firipin to Chūgoku no zanryū hōjin* [What Japanese left behind: Remaining Japanese in the Philippines and China]’, Kawai, H., July 2020.

³³ See, for example, Ezawa, ‘The guilt feeling that you exist’: War, racism and Indisch-Japanese identity formation.; Buchheim, E. 2015. Enabling remembrance: Japanese-Indisch descendants visit Japan. *History and Memory*, 27 (2), pp. 104-125.; Huijs-Watanuki, Y. 2006. *Watashi wa dare no ko?: Chichi o sagashimotomeru Nikkei nisei orandajin tachi* [Whose child am I?: The second generation Japanese-Dutch descendants searching for their fathers]. Tokyo: Nashinokisha.

³⁴ Buchheim, Enabling remembrance: Japanese-Indisch descendants visit Japan, pp. 118-119.

³⁵ ‘*Sengo 70 nen kataru, tou: Kaigai Nikkeijin no sengo*’ [Narrate and question 70 years after the war: Overseas Nikkeijin in the post-war period], Japan National Press Club, 2015. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aSxe7JX6wfE> (accessed on 10 October 2020)

³⁶ Prime Minister visits Indonesia, India and Malaysia: Sunday, August 19 to Tuesday, August 21, 2007, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/abepphoto/2007/08/20indonesia_e.html (accessed on 24 October 2020); Commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the Asian African Conference 1955 (Bandung Conference) and other events: April 22, 2015, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/actions/201504/22article1.html (accessed on 24 October 2020)

³⁷ ‘Emperor meets Vietnamese wives, kin abandoned by Japan’s veterans after war’, *The Japan Times*, 2 March 2017. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/03/02/national/emperor-meets-vietnamese-wives-kin-left-behind-japans-wwii-vets/> (accessed on 12 August 2020)

they share common concerns such as their wish to search for their Japanese father similar to the above-mentioned children born in the Philippines and Indonesia, they only started to receive support from a Japanese non-profit organisation in 2017.³⁸ Very little is known about all other groups of children born of local women and Japanese fathers in other occupied territories of the Imperial Japanese Army including China, Myanmar, French Indochina (current Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.³⁹ The above cases of ‘remnants of the Japanese Empire’ in the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam seem to indicate that the formation of a group as Nikkeijin around their common interests was pivotal in gaining official recognition and social visibility. Sino-Japanese CBOW never had an opportunity to form a group of their own or adopt a collective group label, and the lack of collective identity and narrative is a significant reason why Sino-Japanese CBOW have been forgotten to date.

In the case of the Second Sino-Japanese War, how did war orphans who were left behind in Manchuria come to be remembered as the one and only group of ‘remnants of the Japanese Empire’? While the war significantly affected vast areas of China, Asano Tamanoi stated, ‘Manchuria was and is still a highly contested area’, and ‘it has currently become one of the most “remembered” geopolitical regions of East Asia’.⁴⁰ More than 1.5 million Japanese civilians, including many agriculture settlers, resided in northeast China (former Manchuria) as of August 1945.⁴¹ After the Soviet army entered the war on 9 August 1945, about 179,000 civilians died due to the Soviet attacks, collective suicides, starvation and disease.⁴² Thousands of children born of Japanese parentage were separated from their families in the chaos and were subsequently adopted by Chinese families. The memories of Manchuria and stranded war orphans, however, have been suppressed in post-war Japan. Araragi explained that one of the important reasons for this suppression was because the history of Japan’s colonialism and wars came to be regarded

³⁸ *60 nen ijō hete higan no rainichi* [Their ardent wish finally came true after 60 years], The Nippon Foundation, 20 October 2017. <https://blog.canpan.info/nfkouhou/archive/1063> (accessed on 10 October 2020)

³⁹ For a blog post about a Japanese man who remained in post-war Myanmar and his family, see: Hashimoto, Y. 2011. ‘*Mō hitotsu no biruma no tategoto*’ [Another story of a Japanese man who remained in post-war Myanmar]. *About Myanmar*, 2 November. http://www.yangonow.com/info/history/burma_harp.php (accessed on 10 October 2020); For a testimony of a politician who testified that he heard that about 30,000 children born of Cambodian women and Japanese men upon his visit to Cambodia in 1957, see, The House of Councilors. 1957. *Dai 26 kai kokkai sangiin yosan iinkai dai 2 bunkakai kaigiroku dai 1 gō* [The 26th Diet session of the House of Councilors Budget Committee. The 1st minutes of the 2nd sectional committee.].

⁴⁰ Asano Tamanoi, M. 2005. Introduction. In *Crossed Histories: Manchuria in the age of empire*, ed. M. Asano Tamanoi, pp. 1-24, p. 17. Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawai’i Press.

⁴¹ Yamamoto, Y. 2007. ‘*Manshū no shūen: Yokuryū, hikiage, zanryū*’ [The end of ‘Manchuria’: Internment, repatriation, remaining in China]. In ‘*Manshū*’: *Kioku to rekishi* [‘Manchuria’: Memory and history]. ed. Y. Yamamoto, pp. 4-33, p. 11. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press.

⁴² Yamamoto, ‘*Manshū no shūen: Yokuryū, hikiage, zanryū*’ [The end of ‘Manchuria’: Internment, repatriation, remaining in China], p. 16.; Chan, Y. 2011. *Abandoned Japanese in postwar Manchuria: The lives of war orphans and wives in two countries*. Abingdon, New York: Routledge, p. xix.

as a ‘negative legacy’ (*fu no isan*) in post-war Japan.⁴³ Against the backdrop of Japan’s hostile policy towards China during the Cold War, the Japanese government unilaterally closed the case of stranded war orphans by its declaration of ‘death’ of unreturned Japanese. A law (*Mikikansha ni kansuru tokubetsu sochihō*) that was passed in 1959 pronounced some 33,000 Japanese, who were unreturned from the war including stranded war orphans, as deceased despite the likelihood that they were still alive.⁴⁴ However, after the re-establishment of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, stranded war orphans came to attract national attention as activists and volunteers across Japan lobbied the government to facilitate their repatriation (see Chapter 3). Many of the grassroots activists who supported repatriation and resettlement of stranded war orphans had personal memories of Manchuria and became what Gluck calls ‘memory activists’ who tirelessly lobbied for recognition, compensation, and commemoration of the adversities encountered by stranded war orphans.⁴⁵ The media has also actively covered stories about their search for their Japanese kin and the repatriation of more than 2,500 stranded war orphans and their family members in the 1980s and 1990s.⁴⁶ Consequently, stranded war orphans gained high social visibility through representations of their lives in numerous novels, films, TV programmes and so forth. Issues related to stranded war orphans and their family have also been well-studied in the field of history and sociology. In China, stranded war orphans are also remembered as *riben yigu* (Japanese orphans) through literary and media representations which often revolve around these orphans’ plight and moving stories of their Chinese adoptive parents.⁴⁷ Thus, the memories of stranded war orphans have become part of the national memories of the Second Sino-Japanese War. In contrast, Sino-Japanese CBOW who were born mostly outside Manchuria are entirely missing from the national war memories.

CBOW in various historical and geographical settings are regarded as a taboo subject. Being a ‘taboo’ is predicated on public recognition of a particular subject as a problem in a specific historical and cultural context, and in this respect, the topic of Sino-Japanese

⁴³ Araragi, S. 2007. *Chūgoku ‘zanryū’ Nihonjin no kioku no katari: Katari no henka to ‘katari no jiba’ o megutte* [Narratives from the memory of Japanese remaining in post-war China: Changes in their narratives and ‘social context of their narratives’]. In *‘Manshū’: Kioku to rekishi* [‘Manchuria’: Memory and history], ed. Y. Yamamoto, pp. 212-251, p. 212. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press.

⁴⁴ Effird, R. 2008. Japan’s ‘war orphans’: Identification and state responsibility. *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 34 (2), pp. 363-388, p. 374.

⁴⁵ Gluck, C. 2007. Operations of memory. In *Ruptured histories: War, memory, and the post-Cold War in Asia*, eds. S. Miyoshi Jager and R. Mitter, pp. 47-77, p. 57. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.

⁴⁶ *Chūgoku zanryū hōjin no jōkyō* [Situation of Japanese Remaining in post-war China], Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 30 June 2020. <https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/bunya/engo/seido02/kojitoukei.html> (accessed on 12 July 2020)

⁴⁷ For instance, a TV series about a female stranded war orphan was broadcasted based on a novel Xiaoyi Duohe (2008), written by Yan Geling. As for how stranded war orphans are represented in other types of media, see for example, Liu, J. ‘Xiexie yongyou boda xiongpei de zhongguoren’ [We are grateful to big-hearted Chinese people]. *People.cn*, 2 February, 2018. <http://ydy1.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0202/c411837-29802524.html> (accessed on 11 October 2020)

CBOW has never been a taboo but a ‘non-issue’. Sino-Japanese CBOW remained forgotten in the memories of Japan’s wars that have been shaped in the particular ways discussed above.

1.3 Contested memories of war in East Asia and Sino-Japanese CBOW born of consensual relationships

Intimate relationships between local women and men from the enemy country during and in the immediate aftermath of the war range from brutal coercive relationships to love affairs’.⁴⁸ Lee identified five broad patterns of relationships with a note of caution that boundaries between these patterns are fluid: love affairs, friendly ‘business arrangement’, prostitution, sexual slavery and rape.⁴⁹ However, relationships between local women and men from the enemy country are often popularly perceived to have a direct association with sexualised violence rather than long-term love affairs.⁵⁰ This is not just because sexualised violence has been and still is perpetrated extensively against local women by foreign military personnel during and after conflicts but also because such relationships are much more likely to be documented, for instance, in reports by media, non-governmental and governmental organisations, trial records and scholarly works. One of the first extensive studies on CBOW by Carpenter was focused on human rights and the needs of children born of wartime sexual violence that have been overshadowed by those of their mothers.⁵¹ The field of CBOW was further developed by scholarly works that expanded on various adversities, rights, and identity and belonging issues of children born of the Bosnian War (1992-1995) and Rwandan genocide (1994) in which sexual violence was used as a tool to humiliate the enemy by targeting women and to destabilise the social cohesion of the enemy group.⁵² Moreover, the term CBOW typically refers to children born of sexual violence in the policy sphere.⁵³

The strong association between sexualised violence and intimate liaisons between local women and men from the enemy country is also true for the Second Sino-Japanese

⁴⁸ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 26.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 2.

⁵¹ Carpenter, R.C. ed. 2007. *Born of war: Protecting children of sexual violence survivors in conflict zones*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.; Carpenter, *Forgetting children born of war: Setting the human rights agenda in Bosnia and beyond*.

⁵² Hamel, M. 2016. Ethnic belonging of the children born out of rape in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda. *Nations and Nationalism*, 22 (2), pp. 287-304.; Erjavec, K. and Volčič, Z. 2010. Living with the sins of their fathers: An analysis of self-representation of adolescents born of war rape. *Journal of Adolescent Research*, 25 (3), pp. 359-386. (This thesis is aware of the controversy around the sources of this scholarly work.); Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, pp. 151-186.

⁵³ Glaesmer, H. and Lee, S. Children born of war: A critical appraisal of the terminology.; Commemoration of the International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict. <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/2018/06/commemoration-of-the-international-day-for-the-elimination-of-sexual-violence-in-conflict-children-born-of-war/> (accessed on 10 July 2020)

War. In fact, it is particularly pronounced in this specific context because Sino-Japanese coercive sexual liaisons are situated at the very centre of highly politicised and emotional disputes over war memories in East Asia. Such sexual liaisons are often highlighted in two major contested issues that are directly related to the conflict – namely, the Nanjing Massacre, a campaign of atrocities against local civilians by the Imperial Japanese Army that occurred between December 1937 and January 1938 in the then capital of China as well as the ‘comfort women’ system. As will be explained below, there are ongoing heated disputes surrounding the historical evaluation of these issues. Against this backdrop, the term ‘Sino-Japanese CBOW’ is much more likely to be popularly understood to refer to children born of rape rather than as children born of consensual relationships. Although the focus of this thesis will be Sino-Japanese children born of consensual relationships during and after the war, it is important to reflect on the historiographical and political context surrounding contested war memories in current East Asia, which form the backdrop to this research and within which the analysis of Sino-Japanese CBOW of consensual relations has to be situated.

1.3.1 ‘Memory wars’ in East Asia and children born of a ‘comfort woman’ in China

In post-war East Asia, discussions of various historical issues have been suppressed under the conditions of the Cold War.⁵⁴ Amongst those are the atrocities committed during the Second Sino-Japanese War, including those relating to sexual exploitation, abuse and violence. When the Cold War ended, the topic finally entered the public discourse after decades of silence around these issues in the post-war Asia-Pacific region.⁵⁵ A significant restructuring of the relations between the United States and East Asian countries occurred after the Cold War. This geopolitical shift has led to a revision of the wartime historiography in East Asia, triggering an eruption of ‘memory wars’ amongst and beyond East Asian countries. In these disputes over war memories, sexual liaisons between Japanese soldiers and local women continue to receive considerable attention in China, Japan, and beyond.

The Nanjing Massacre is one of the large-scale atrocities that trigger heightened emotional clashes between China and Japan after the Cold War. The abhorrent acts of cruelty committed against female civilians in the Nanjing Massacre are often brought to the fore in the disputes over the event. During the massacre, Japanese soldiers perpetrated not only genocide of Chinese male citizens but also mass rape, slaughtering, and other acts of brutality against women and girls of all ages. After Iris Chang’s book, *The rape of*

⁵⁴ Araragi, *Rethinking Manchukuo and Japan: A living history of Japanese left-behind in China after WWII*, pp.1-2.

⁵⁵ Morris-Suzuki, T. 2015. You don’t want to know about the girls? The ‘comfort women’, the Japanese military and Allied Forces in the Asia-Pacific War. *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 13(31).

Nanking: The forgotten Holocaust of World War II became the best-selling non-fiction book in 1997, the Nanjing Massacre came to be known as the ‘Rape of Nanjing’.⁵⁶ Disputes around the Nanjing Massacre include various disagreements over the number of Chinese civilians who were killed, the Japanese revisionists’ denial of the massacre as well as the trivialisation of the massacre in history textbooks in Japan.⁵⁷ These disputes over the ‘Rape of Nanjing’ continue to attract the attention of the media and academics. In contrast, there is little awareness of voluntary and consensual intimate relationships between Chinese women and Japanese military and non-military personnel. Therefore, it is important to contextualise clearly the experiences of Sino-Japanese CBOW who were conceived in consensual relationships in the absence of public awareness of their existence.

Another major topic of contention in today’s East Asia that involves sexual violence perpetrated by the Japanese soldiers is the ‘comfort women’ system. The level of coercion involved in recruitment and the magnitude of the violence used in the implementation of this sexual enslavement has been a focal point of debates on memories of ‘comfort women’. The ‘comfort women’ were forced to work in wartime military brothels where they were subjected to repeated rapes. Several scholars have provided varied estimated numbers of ‘comfort women’ in the entire Japanese Empire, and the estimate ranges from thirty thousand to 400,000.⁵⁸ Women and girls were recruited by force or deception not only from Korea but also from many other Japanese-occupied territories as well as from Japan proper.⁵⁹ Su estimates that 200,000 Chinese women were forced to work in the military ‘comfort stations’ from the Japanese army’s occupation of northeast China in 1931 to Japan’s surrender in 1945.⁶⁰

The issue of ‘comfort women’ has become a highly politicised international dispute since the early 1990s. In 1991, a Korean survivor of the ‘comfort women’ system testified publicly about her experiences, spurred by the Japanese government’s denial of its responsibility. Her testimony led to the rise of the redress movement that involved the survivors, scholars, and non-governmental groups engaging in feminist and gender issues as well as legal specialists from South Korea, Japan and other countries. This activism led to a statement issued by then chief cabinet secretary Kono Yohei in 1993, known as

⁵⁶ See, for example, Mitter, *Remembering the forgotten war*, p.19.

⁵⁷ Rose, C. 1998. *Interpreting history in Sino-Japanese relations: A case study in political decision-making*. London and New York: Routledge, p. 1.; Oka Norimatsu, S. 2012. Nanjing Massacre 75th anniversary and the China-Japan island dispute. *The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus*, 10 (54), pp. 1-4. <https://apjif.org/-/Satoko-Norimatsu/4748/article.html> (accessed on 5 March 2020)

⁵⁸ Qiu, P., Chen, L. and Su, Z. eds. 2014. *Chinese Comfort Women: Testimonies from Imperial Japan’s Sex Slaves*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 6.

⁵⁹ Yoshimi, Y. 2002. *Comfort women: Sexual slavery in the Japanese military during World War II*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 91-93.

⁶⁰ Su, Z. 1999. *Weianfu yanjiu* [A study of the comfort women]. Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian Chubanshe, pp. 275-279.; Qiu, Chen, and Su, *Chinese Comfort Women: Testimonies from Imperial Japan’s Sex Slaves*, p. 6.

Kono Declaration, which formally apologised for the Japanese military's serious abuse of 'comfort women'. However, since then, the actions taken by the Japanese government have not been consistent with this statement, and several Japanese politicians have been taking revisionist standpoints instead of building on positive steps taken towards reconciliation during the early 1990s. In 2015, Japanese and South Korean governments agreed on a deal that came with the prime minister's apology and one billion yen (approximately 5.6 million British Pound) as a fund for the elderly 'comfort women'.⁶¹ Although this diplomatic agreement stated that the issue has been resolved 'finally and irreversibly', disagreements amongst various actors continue to cause strained ties between the two countries.⁶²

The memories of Chinese 'comfort women' have remained contentious and politically sensitive since the 1990s. Remembrance of Chinese 'comfort women' still spurs heated debates on issues such as school textbooks, exhibitions, memorials and the Chinese government's request to inscribe the documented evidence of 'comfort women' in the UNESCO's Memory of the World International Register.⁶³ While many attempts have been made by activists and scholars to seek redress for the survivors since the late 1980s,⁶⁴ the concerned parties are yet to achieve a satisfying result, one of the reasons being Chinese and Japanese official measures towards the issue have been affected by domestic politics as well as bilateral, regional and international relations.⁶⁵ Japanese journalists, lawyers, researchers, and citizen group members who work to hold the Japanese government accountable for wartime 'comfort women' systems continue to receive abusive messages including death threats from those who take revisionist views.⁶⁶

Thus, because of the continued extensive attention paid to the sexualised violence against Chinese 'comfort women', the term 'Sino-Japanese CBOW' has the potential to

⁶¹ 'Japan and South Korea agree WW2 "comfort women" deal', *BBC News*, 28 December 2015. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35188135> (accessed on 7 October 2020)

⁶² 'Nikkan ianfu gōi, iken teiso o kyakka, kankoku kenpōsai' [South Korean constitutional court dismissed the lawsuit that claimed the unconstitutionality of Japan-Korea comfort women deal], *The Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 27 December 2019. <https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO53900110X21C19A2EA3000/> (accessed on 7 October 2020)

⁶³ The 'Documents of Nanjing Massacre', submitted by China in 2014, have been inscribed into the Memory of the World International Register in 2015. See, Documents of Nanjing Massacre, Memory of the World, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/memory-of-the-world/register/full-list-of-registered-heritage/registered-heritage-page-2/documents-of-nanjing-massacre/> (accessed on 8 October 2020)

⁶⁴ Qiu, Chen, and Su, *Chinese Comfort Women: Testimonies from Imperial Japan's Sex Slaves*, p. 168.

⁶⁵ See, Hornby, L. 'China's "comfort women"', *Financial Times*, 20 March 2015. <https://www.ft.com/content/b44ae604-cdc1-11e4-8760-00144feab7de> (accessed on 13 March 2020)

⁶⁶ See, for example, Kawabata, T. 'Former Asahi Shimbun reporter says threats against him are getting worse', *The Japan Times*, 29 April 2015. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/04/29/national/crime-legal/former-asahi-reporters-comfort-women-libel-suit-begins/> (accessed on 7 October 2020); 'Japanese court's disappointing ruling in defamation case related to comfort women', *Hankyoreh*, 21 January 2016. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/727243.html (accessed on 7 October 2020); Qiu, Chen and Su, *Chinese Comfort Women: Testimonies from Imperial Japan's Sex Slaves*, p. 172.

be misunderstood as referring only to children born of Chinese ‘comfort women’ system survivors. Many childbirths occurred as a result of the military sexual slavery across wartime China. Testimonies by former ‘comfort women’ indicate that a significant number of women were impregnated due to inconsistent enforcement of the military regulations to use contraceptives.⁶⁷ In many cases, women had abortions either by force or by choice. In the worst cases, pregnant women were killed along with their unborn babies.⁶⁸ Some babies died soon after their birth for various reasons.⁶⁹ Some survivors might have raised their children themselves or entrusted their babies to local people or orphanages.⁷⁰ The children conceived in the so-called ‘comfort stations’ are still shrouded in secrecy and very little information about the numbers of pregnancies, births, or the life courses of children born as a result of this systematic sexual abuse and violence is known or substantiated.

Thus, while it is likely that numerous Sino-Japanese children born of sexual slavery exist, to date, there is only one reported case in China.⁷¹ It was amidst the aforementioned redress movement for former Chinese ‘comfort women’ that a spotlight was shed on Luo Shanxue, a child born of a Chinese victim of the ‘comfort women’ system in 1945 in Guangxi. His mother, Wei Shaolan, was abducted in November 1944 and impregnated as a result of repeated rapes at a military ‘comfort station’ run by the Imperial Japanese Army. In 2007, several Japanese scholars held a press conference and presented evidence of a ‘comfort station’ in Guilin, Guanxi, which was found from the documents presented in the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal convened in 1946.⁷² Subsequently, Shanxue and his mother were interviewed by a media in Guilin and came forward as victims of the ‘comfort women’ system. Shanxue also accompanied his mother to Japan to participate in an international symposium held by several citizen groups in Japan in 2007.⁷³ Shanxue

⁶⁷ Women’s Active Museum. ed. 2014. *Taiwan ‘ianfu’ no shōgen: Nihonjin ni sareta amā tachi* [Testimonies of Taiwanese ‘comfort women’: ‘Ama’ (‘Grannies’ in Taiwanese) who were forced to become Japanese]. Tokyo: Women’s Active Museum, pp. 23-24.

⁶⁸ Qiu, Chen, and Su, *Chinese Comfort Women: Testimonies from Imperial Japan’s Sex Slaves*, pp. 48, 60.

⁶⁹ Women’s Active Museum. ed. 2008. *Aruhi Nihon gun ga yattekita: Chūgoku, senjō deno gōkan to ianjo* [Japanese army came one day: Rape in the combat zone and ‘comfort stations’ in China]. Tokyo: Women’s Active Museum, p. 28.; Women’s Active Museum. *Taiwan ‘ianfu’ no shōgen: Nihonjin ni sareta amā tachi* [Testimonies of Taiwanese ‘comfort women’: ‘Ama’ (‘Grannies’ in Taiwanese) who were forced to become Japanese], p. 18.; E-mail correspondence, a contact person of Taipei Women’s Rescue Foundation, 15 December 2015.

⁷⁰ While it is not a case of a Chinese comfort woman, Howard introduced a case in which a Korean ‘comfort women’ system survivor entrusted her child born of rape to an orphanage in South Korea. See, Howard, K. 1995. True stories of the Korean comfort women. London: Cassell, pp. 83-184.

⁷¹ *Josei kokusai senpan hōtei 10 shūnen jikkōiinkai*. ed. 2011. *Hōtei wa nani o sabaki, naniga kawattaka: seibōryoku, minzoku sabetsu, shokuminchishugi* [What did the court judge? What changed?: Sexual violence, ethnic/racial discrimination, colonialism]. Josei kokusai senpan hōtei 10 shūnen jikkōiinkai: Tokyo, p. 53.

⁷² Kasuya, K. 2007. ‘Rupo: Keirin sansuiga no kanata de’ [Reportage: Behind picturesque Guilin]. *Shūkan kinyōbi*, 661, 6 July, pp. 10-15, p. 10.

⁷³ It was a symposium to revisit and evaluate the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery held in 2000.

and his mother met some Diet members and prefectural assembly members and submitted a petition to the Japanese government to demand an apology towards his mother and himself.⁷⁴ As a result of media exposure, a substantial amount of information about his life experiences can now be found in newspaper articles, TV documentary programmes, documentary films and reports by non-governmental organisations.

The fact that there is only one reported case despite the massive scale of sexual slavery perpetrated in wartime China leads us to question the silence that exists around the topic. Allegedly, some Sino-Japanese children born of former Chinese ‘comfort women’ reside in Shanxi and Yun’nan Province and they are reluctant to come forward.⁷⁵ While the reason why they are reluctant to come forward is unknown, several factors could prevent Sino-Japanese children born of former ‘comfort women’ to publicly share their stories.

Firstly, the most significant reason for the silence is likely to be the community’s stigmatisation and discrimination against these children and their mothers.⁷⁶ This aspect is similar to other groups of CBOW across time and space who have been fearful of prejudices associated with being a survivor of rape or sexual enslavement and therefore prefer to remain silent.

Secondly, some surviving children born of sexual slavery in China may not know about their own origin. In the case of Sino-Japanese CBOW, their association with the enemy father is not visible from their physical features. Just as many CBOW in other historical and geographical settings experienced the ‘wall of silence’ around their origin, Sino-Japanese children born of sexual slavery may not have been told about how they were conceived from their mother or adoptive family.

Thirdly, the silence around children born of former ‘comfort women’ has been reinforced by the Chinese government’s attitude towards the issue, not to mention the lack of Japanese government’s initiative to investigate the issue. According to Tong Zeng, a leading redress movement activist in China, the Chinese government’s attitude towards the campaign against Japan demanding reparations for war-affected individuals has been ‘don’t support, don’t discourage’.⁷⁷ The Chinese government takes firm control over its

⁷⁴ *Josei kokusai senpan hōtei 10 shūnen jikkōiinkai, Hōtei wa nani o sabaki, naniga kawattaka: seibōryoku, minzoku sabetsu, shokuminchishugi* [What did the court judge? What changed?: Sexual violence, ethnic/racial discrimination, colonialism], p. 54.

⁷⁵ See, ‘*Jiaodianrenwu: Weianfu muzi*’ [A comfort woman and her son], Tengxun Xinwen, 2014. <http://news.qq.com/original.drw.j12.html> (accessed on 15 August 2016); ‘Twenty-two’, Guo, K., 2015.

⁷⁶ In a media interview, one of the relatives of Shanxue stated how he and his family were perplexed when Shanxue and his mother started to publicly talk about their negative stories from the past. See, *Wengnuang rensheng: Wo de die shi guizhibing* [A TV series ‘Warmth of Life’: my father is an evil Japanese soldier], v.ifeng.com, 2012. <http://v.ifeng.com/404.shtml> (accessed on 1 March 2017)

⁷⁷ Qiu, Chen, and Su, *Chinese Comfort Women: Testimonies from Imperial Japan’s Sex Slaves*, pp. 165-168.; Hornby, ‘China’s “comfort women”’.

foreign policy towards Japan and does not support the survivors, activists, scholars or citizen groups when their activism interferes with its political agenda.⁷⁸ No official support or funding has been provided to researchers investigating the issue, and many old and vulnerable survivors have since passed away.⁷⁹ The lack of official encouragement of and support for research of the ‘comfort women’ issue also decreased the chances of finding children conceived as a result of rape at ‘comfort stations’.

As mentioned earlier, this study focuses on children of consensual relationships instead of on children conceived in the ‘comfort women’ system or other exploitative or abuse situations during and after the Second Sino-Japanese War in China. This group has received no scholarly attention and therefore provided a good starting point for an original comparative project, exploring the life courses of this group of CBOW with those CBOW from consensual relations in other contexts.

This study provides a comparative analysis of Sino-Japanese CBOW born of consensual relationships with the data and information known from experiences of Luo Shanxue (see p. 16) and his mother. While part of the key source materials, as will be detailed below, consist of oral history interviews, I opted not to request an interview with Shanxue for several reasons. First, ethical decision-making was necessary to prevent his possible re-traumatisation. Some available sources on Shanxue indicated that he had experienced multiple traumatic events, and meeting with a Japanese researcher could negatively affect his mental health. However, it was difficult as a researcher who was unfamiliar with local psychosocial support, to fulfil an ethical obligation to refer him to an appropriate counselling service after the interview. Shanxue had already provided a wealth of information to the media, and so this study relies on already published material instead. Thus, it needs to be noted that the focus of this research on Sino-Japanese CBOW born of consensual relationships does not derive from disregard for his life experiences or those of other children conceived in abusive relations, but from the limited availability of sources on Sino-Japanese children born of sexual slavery other than Shanxue.

1.3.2 Political explosiveness of nuanced wartime sexual liaisons and the importance of researching children born of consensual relationships

A recent heated dispute over the nature of the wartime sexual liaisons between local women and Japanese soldiers started from a book *Comfort Women of the Empire*

⁷⁸ See, for example, ‘Symposium on ‘comfort women’ in China postponed, not cancelled’, *Global Times*, 8 August 2018. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1114478.shtml#:~:text=Gallery-.Symposium%20on%20%27comfort%20women%27%20in,China%20postponed%2C%20not%20cancelled%3A%20source&text=The%20symposium%20was%20originally%20scheduled,to%20attend%2C%20Kyodo%20News%20reported.> (accessed on 8 October 2020)

⁷⁹ Qiu, Chen, and Su, *Chinese Comfort Women: Testimonies from Imperial Japan’s Sex Slaves*, pp. 169-170.

published in 2013 by a South Korean literature professor, Park Yuha.⁸⁰ It evoked a strong reaction from various parties in South Korea, Japan and beyond. What galvanises the disputes over ‘comfort women’ is often the degree of coercion involved in the recruitment and exploitation of these women. The revisionists and the supporters of ‘comfort women’ take diametrically opposed views. The former asserts that they were essentially prostitutes. The latter points to the significant coercion applied on these women by the Imperial Japanese Army that recruited them by deception and deprived them of an option to leave the military brothels in the context of colonialisation, warfare, patriarchy and poverty. Park’s book cast new light on the issue by introducing nuanced sexual liaisons between Korean ‘comfort women’ and Japanese soldiers. Although Park’s book mainly concerns Korean ‘comfort women’, it also has implications for the politicisation of wartime sexual liaisons between local women and Japanese soldiers in China.

Park wrote the book with a clear objective: to explore a new approach to the stalemated debate over the ‘comfort women’ issue between South Korea and Japan by acknowledging the diversity of their experiences and unevenness of conditions under which Korean ‘comfort women’ worked across the Asia-Pacific region.⁸¹ Park questioned the existing dichotomy between the dominant narratives of ‘comfort women’: denialists asserting that they were ‘prostitutes’, whereas support groups for ‘comfort women’ system survivors represent these women as ‘innocent girls’ coerced into sexual slavery.

Based on archival documents and testimonies, one of the controversial claims that Park made was that certain narratives of former Korean ‘comfort women’ who had varied intimate relationships with Japanese soldiers have been suppressed and excluded in the redress movement.⁸² Park wrote that while some were subjected to sexualised violence by Japanese soldiers at ‘comfort stations’, others had more nuanced intimate relationships which she called ‘comrade-like relationships’.⁸³ She introduced several cases of such relationships in which comfort women had love affairs with Japanese soldiers, soldiers asked for ‘comfort’ by chatting with women, soldiers helped the women to recover from their illness or to return to Korea, and so forth. Park asserted that Korean ‘comfort women’ were essentially Japanese subjects mobilised in the name of patriotism for the Japanese Empire to cooperate as ‘comrades’ with the Japanese soldiers. She pointed out that by suppressing and excluding such narratives of actual former ‘comfort women’ in

⁸⁰ Park, Y. 2014. *Teikoku no ianfu: shokuminchi shihai to kioku no tatakai* [Comfort women of the Empire: Colonial rule and memory wars]. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Publications.

⁸¹ Park, *Teikoku no ianfu: shokuminchi shihai to kioku no tatakai* [Comfort women of the Empire: Colonial rule and memory wars], pp. 9-13.

⁸² Park, *Teikoku no ianfu: shokuminchi shihai to kioku no tatakai* [Comfort women of the Empire: Colonial rule and memory wars], pp. 162-176.

⁸³ Park, *Teikoku no ianfu: shokuminchi shihai to kioku no tatakai* [Comfort women of the Empire: Colonial rule and memory wars], pp. 80-83.

the redress movement, the victims are divided. She criticised the main South Korean support group for ‘comfort women’, Chong Dae Hyup, as well as South Korean society in general for not allowing views about the ‘comfort women’ system that were different from the dominant view. She claimed that listening carefully to suppressed voices of former ‘comfort women’ could advance the negotiation towards reconciliation between South Korea and Japan.⁸⁴

Park’s claims including the above assertions spurred intense and extreme reactions. Some Korean and Japanese activists and scholars supporting Korean ‘comfort women’ were enraged over Park’s claims. Nine Korean ‘comfort women’ system survivors filed a defamation lawsuit against Park in both civil and criminal court and sought to ban sales of the book.⁸⁵ She was also indicted for defamation by the South Korean Prosecution Office. Conversely, although Park demanded the Japanese government’s apology for their actions of colonial domination and was critical of Japan’s right-wing extremists in her book, Japanese denialists cherry-picked information from Park’s writing to dismiss the demands made by the survivors.⁸⁶ Consequently, scholars from Japan, South Korea and the United States addressed statements criticising the prosecutors for suppressing the freedom of scholarship and press and requesting the withdrawal of the accusations against Park.⁸⁷ In 2017, the court acquitted Park on defamation charges.

Park’s claim about ‘comrade-like relationships’ was extremely contentious and divisive. On one hand, scholars who supported Park, including historian Bruce Cumings, for instance, praised that Park’s work is a ‘remarkable attempt to dismiss one-sided views of the “comfort women” issue’ and ‘[to comprehend] the multi-faceted aspects of this complicated issue.’⁸⁸ On the other hand, former ‘comfort women’ who filed a lawsuit

⁸⁴ See, Park, Y. 2014. ‘*Soredemo ianfu mondai o kaiketsu shinakerebaikenai riyū*’ [The reasons why we still need to resolve the ‘comfort women’ issue]. *Huffpost*, 9 September. https://www.huffingtonpost.jp/park-yuha/korea-comfort-women-issue_b_5782226.html (accessed on 7 October 2020)

⁸⁵ See, for example, Choe, S. ‘Professor ordered to pay 9 who said ‘comfort women’ book defamed them’, *New York Times*, 13 January 2016. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/14/world/asia/south-korea-park-yu-ha-verdict.html> (accessed on 7 October 2020)

⁸⁶ Maeda, A. ed. 2016. *Ianfu mondai no genzai: ‘Paku yuha genshō’ to chishikijin* [Current issues of ‘comfort women’: ‘Park Yuha phenomenon’ and intellectuals]. Tokyo: Sanichishobo, p. 65-108, p. 108.; Kingston, J. ‘Rightists distort author Park Yu-ha’s views on ‘comfort women’’, *The Japan Times*, 25 July 2015. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/07/25/commentary/rightists-distort-author-park-yu-views-comfort-women/#.XAqitTuLTIU> (accessed on 7 October 2020)

⁸⁷ See, Yoshino, T. “‘Teikoku no ianfu’ Paku Yu-ha kyōju no zaitakukiso ni gakushara 54 nin kōgi seimei’ [54 scholars issued a public statement against the indictment of Park Yu-ha, the author of ‘Comfort Women of the Empire’]. *Huffpost*, 26 November 2015. https://www.huffingtonpost.jp/2015/11/26/park-yuha-charge-remonstrance_n_8659272.html (accessed on 24 March 2020); Professor Bruce Cumings’ Endorsement, 17 January, 2017. <https://parkyuha.org/archives/5757> (accessed on 7 October 2020)

⁸⁸ Professor Bruce Cumings’ Endorsement, 17 January, 2017. <https://parkyuha.org/archives/5757> (accessed on 7 October 2020)

against Park condemned that her description of a ‘comrade-like relationship’ is ‘false’.⁸⁹ Some academics also severely criticised Park for using ‘exceptional’ cases of wartime nuanced intimate relationships between Korean ‘comfort women’ and Japanese soldiers to divert public attention from the grave violations of these women’s human rights. They concluded that her interpretation of ‘comfort women’ is similar to the ones of the revisionists and is a strategy to undermine the long struggles of the survivors and their supporters.⁹⁰ The above dispute demonstrates the political explosiveness of narratives of wartime nuanced relationships between ‘comfort women’ and Japanese soldiers and how its interpretation enters into intensely politicised discursive space.

Although this controversy had primarily affected various groups in South Korea and Japan, the contention around Park’s claims and the political explosiveness of the testimonies of wartime nuanced intimate liaisons have important implications for the interpretation of wartime sexual liaisons between local women and Japanese men in China as well. It is important to consider these implications especially as Sino-Japanese relations have been trapped in a ‘vicious cycle of animosity’⁹¹ since the 1980s due to unsolved historical issues and the tension over the Japan-administered islets in the East China Sea.⁹² Focusing on the experiences of children born of consensual relationships during the Second Sino-Japanese War has the potential to be interpreted as a reflection of the researcher’s political intention to trivialise the experiences and struggles of the victims of the former Chinese ‘comfort women’ or other survivors of wartime sexual violence at the hands of Japanese soldiers or to ignore the possible plight of their children. In fact, in an academic seminar in which I presented my research in 2018, one of the students from South Korea commented that my focus on children born of consensual relationships seemed to him as an attempt of a Japanese researcher to intentionally divert public attention from Chinese ‘comfort women’ and their offspring.⁹³

It is therefore important to be explicit about two points in particular. First, focusing on offspring from consensual relations is not a comment on the magnitude of sexual violence committed during the Second Sino-Japanese War. In this respect it is comparable to the work on children born of consensual relationships between Soviet soldiers and German women in wartime and post-war Germany where the majority of the encounters are known to have been exploitative, abusive or violent, yet some children were offspring

⁸⁹ Yoshino, “‘Teikoku no ianfu’” *Paku Yu-ha kyōju no zaitakukiso ni gakushara 54 nin kōgi seimei* [54 scholars issued a public statement against the indictment of Park Yu-ha, the author of ‘Comfort Women of the Empire’].

⁹⁰ Maeda, *Ianfu’ mondai no genzai: ‘Paku yuha genshō’ to chishikijin* [Current issues of ‘comfort women’: ‘Park Yuha phenomenon’ and intellectuals], pp. 65-108.

⁹¹ Soeya, Y. 2013. A view from the inside on Japan’s perpetual trust gap. *Global Asia*, 8(3), pp. 38-41, p. 38.

⁹² Rose, C. and Sýkora, J. 2017. The trust deficit in Sino-Japanese relations. *Japan Forum*, 29(1), pp. 100-124, p. 101.

⁹³ A seminar at the University of Turku, Finland, on 21 August 2018.

from consensual relationships.⁹⁴ Second, this is a study on Sino-Japanese CBOW, and it focuses on the experiences, identity and belonging of the offspring: it is not an exploration of the intimate relationships of the parents other than as a factor that helps explain the children's life courses.

This consideration leads to a question that has been occupying CBOW research for some time, namely the underlying assumption that the nature of the parental relationship impacts on the experiences of CBOW. The assumption here is that children born of non-violent relationships may not have suffered as much as their counterparts born of coercive relationships and therefore require less scholarly and by implication advocacy attention. However, there is little evidence to support such an assumption. Lee, who explored experiences of CBOW since the Second World War in various historical contexts and regions, pointed out that 'the nature of the parents' relationship has been a poor indicator of the hardships suffered by the children'.⁹⁵ According to previous studies, children born of the enemy and out of wedlock across time and space have experienced considerable childhood adversities irrespective of whether they were born of coercive relationships or consensual relationships.⁹⁶ While this study takes into account the political explosiveness of dealing with wartime Sino-Japanese consensual relationships, it explores different variations of the parents' consensual relationships in conflict and post-conflict settings and investigates the experiences, identity and belonging of Sino-Japanese CBOW without preconceptions of the impact of parental relations on the children's experiences. So far, the memories of Sino-Japanese CBOW born of consensual relationships have not been heard or studied. Thus, this study aims to contribute to a better understanding of the experience of CBOW in the East Asian context in particular and to the debate on CBOW born of various intimate relationships across time and space more generally.

1.4 Literature review

1.4.1 Children born of war, identity and belonging

Owing to intense research activities in the past two decades, 'children born of war' has grown to be a vast interdisciplinary research field. Initial research on CBOW commenced in the mid-1990s when the social consequences of war, particularly on women and children, gained scholarly and advocacy interest. When research around the topic of children born of local women fathered by enemy soldiers started to be published, most works concentrated on those who were fathered by German soldiers in Western and

⁹⁴ Glaesmer et al. 2017. Childhood maltreatment in children born of occupation after WWII in Germany and its association with mental disorders. *International Psychogeriatrics*, 29(7), pp. 1147-1156, pp. 1147-1148.; Mitreuter, S. et al. 2019. Questions of identity in children born of war: Embarking on a search for the unknown soldier father. *Journal of Child and Family Studies*, 28(11), pp. 3220-3229, p. 3220.

⁹⁵ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 6.

⁹⁶ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, pp. 23, 247.

Eastern Europe during and in the aftermath of World War Two.⁹⁷ Various terms such as ‘war children’, ‘war babies’ and other local terms in different languages were adopted in analysing these children’s experiences.⁹⁸ In 2001, an extensive research project was conducted in Norway, which focused on experiences of children born of Norwegian mothers and German soldiers during and shortly after World War Two. After decades of silence, Norwegian-German children themselves actively demanded from researchers that they address their past adversities.⁹⁹ This project triggered a European network of researchers who have been working on the issue of children born of local women fathered by German soldiers in World War Two. Since the beginning of the 2000s, research on such children in other parts of Europe also started to materialise, and children themselves started to carve out a space for their narratives in the public memory.¹⁰⁰ In 2006, a group of researchers agreed on the definition of ‘children born of war’ as offspring of local women and members of enemy forces, occupying soldiers, peacekeeping troops and child soldiers.¹⁰¹ One of the foremost scholars in the field, Charli Carpenter, critiqued the fact that CBOW have been neglected in the global discourses on children, armed conflict and war-affected childhoods. In her landmark research on CBOW in the Bosnian War, she argued that specific needs and interests of children born of wartime sexual violence have been ignored and overshadowed by human rights discourse in support of their mothers.¹⁰² In 2015, the CHIBOW network, an interdisciplinary collaborative doctoral training network on CBOW, was established to further consolidate the empirical evidence base and facilitate interdisciplinary and comparative research.¹⁰³ Scholarly work has been linked to international advocacy, too, and the United Nations, amongst others, have started foregrounding the interests of CBOW, particularly those who were born of sexual violence in conflicts and those who were fathered by peacekeepers.¹⁰⁴ While interest in CBOW in academic research and the policy sphere tended to focus primarily on children conceived by sexual violence, evidence suggests that the circumstances under which these

⁹⁷ Ericsson, K. and Simonsen, E. eds. 2005. *Children of World War II: The Hidden Enemy Legacy*. Oxford: Berg Publishers.; Zagar, M. 2009. Kjersti Ericsson and Eva Simonsen, eds. *Children of World War II: The Hidden Enemy Legacy*. *Scandinavian-Canadian Studies*, 18, pp. 114-117. https://www.scancan.net/zagar_1_18.htm (accessed on 9 August 2020)

⁹⁸ Mochmann, Children born of war: A decade of international and interdisciplinary research, p. 323.

⁹⁹ Ericsson and Simonsen, *Children of World War II: The Hidden Enemy Legacy*, p. vii.

¹⁰⁰ For published personal accounts of children born of Soviet soldiers in the former German Democratic Republic and a book on children born of Indisch mothers and Japanese fathers in Indonesia during the Asia-Pacific War published by a support group member, see, Behlau, W. ed. 2015. *Distelblüten: Russenkinder in Deutschland* [Thistle flowers: Russian children in Germany]. Ganderkesee: Countour.; Huijs-Watanuki, *Watashi wa dare no ko?: Chichi o sagashimotomeru Nikkei nisei orandajin tachi* [Whose child am I?: Japanese-Dutch descendants of second generation searching for their fathers].

¹⁰¹ Mochmann, I. C. 2008. Children Born of War. *OBETS: Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, 2, pp. 53-61, p. 55.; Mochmann, Children born of war: A decade of international and interdisciplinary research, p. 323.

¹⁰² Carpenter, *Forgotten children born of war: Setting the human rights agenda in Bosnia and beyond.*; Carpenter, *Born of war: Protecting children of sexual violence survivors in conflict zones*.

¹⁰³ See, Children Born of War research network. <https://www.chibow.org/> (accessed on 24 October 2020)

¹⁰⁴ See, Commemoration of the International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict. <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/2018/06/commemoration-of-the-international-day-for-the-elimination-of-sexual-violence-in-conflict-children-born-of-war/> (accessed 10 July 2020)

children are conceived – violent or non-violent – does not significantly determine the adversities they encounter in childhood and adolescence.¹⁰⁵

Subsequently, research activity in various disciplines focusing on CBOW born outside Europe has steadily increased. Some of the most prominent studies on CBOW in Africa focus on children born of the Rwandan genocide and the conflict in northern Uganda as well as children born to female child soldiers and fathered by Revolutionary United Front soldiers in Sierra Leone,¹⁰⁶ and research on CBOW in Asia concentrates on children born of the Indochina War and the Vietnam War.¹⁰⁷ As for children born of local women fathered by Japanese soldiers during the Asia-Pacific War, children born of Indisch mothers and Japanese fathers in Indonesia who live in the contemporary Netherlands (see p. 9) are relatively well-researched.¹⁰⁸ It needs to be noted that this group of Indisch-Japanese children were fathered not only by Japanese soldiers but also by civilian workers for the military and civilians and thus does not perfectly fit into the current definition of CBOW.¹⁰⁹ This point is similar to the cases of Sino-Japanese children investigated in this thesis, and I will return to this point in the terminology section (see p. 33). Outside academia, the narratives of these Indisch-Japanese children have been published as ego-documents, photography books, documentary films and TV documentary programmes in the last two decades.¹¹⁰ The only longitudinal academic work in this space of Asian

¹⁰⁵ Glaesmer and Lee, *Children born of war: A critical appraisal of the terminology*.

¹⁰⁶ See, for example, Hamel, *Ethnic belonging of the children born out of rape in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda*, pp. 287-304.; Apio, 'Children Born of War in Northern Uganda: Kinship, Marriage, and the Politics of Post-conflict Reintegration in Lango society'; Kiconco, A. 2015. 'Understanding former "girl soldiers": Central themes in the lives of formerly abducted girls in post-conflict Northern Uganda'. PhD thesis, University of Birmingham.; Seymour, E. 2020. "'You are beaten if you are bad, it is said you woman you have made your husband tired": Conceptualising gender violence in Northern Uganda'. PhD thesis, University of Birmingham.; McKay, S. 2005. Girls as 'weapons of terror' in Northern Uganda and Sierra Leonean rebel fighting forces. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 28, pp. 385-397.

¹⁰⁷ See, for example, Gries, R. 2015. Les enfants d'État: Französische Besatzungskinder in Deutschland [Les enfants d'État: French occupation children in Germany]. In *Besatzungskinder, Die Nachkommen alliierter Soldaten in Österreich und Deutschland* [Occupation children: The offspring of Allied soldiers in Austria and Germany], eds. B. Stelzl-Marx and S. Satjukow, pp. 380-407. Wien: Böhlau-Verlag.; Saada, E. 2012. *Empire's children: Race, filiation, and citizenship in the French colonies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.; Käuper, E. Children born of the Indochina War: National 'reclassification', diversity, and multiple feelings of belonging. Forthcoming.; Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, pp. 112-150.; Ho, B., Bartels, S. and Lee, S. 2019. Life courses of Amerasians in Vietnam: A qualitative analysis of emotional well-being. *VNU Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 5(5).

¹⁰⁸ Ezawa, *The guilt feeling that you exist: War, racism, and Indisch-Japanese identity formation*, pp. 481-502.; Buccheim, E. 2008. 'Hide and seek': Children of Japanese-Indisch parents. In *Forgotten Captives in Japanese occupied Asia*, eds. K. Blackburn and K. Hack, pp. 260-277. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.; Buchheim, *Enabling remembrance: Japanese-Indisch descendants visit Japan*, pp. 104-125.; Dragojlovic, A. 2011. Did you know my father?: The zone of unspeakability as postcolonial legacy. *Australian Feminist Studies*, 26(69), pp. 319-334.

¹⁰⁹ See, Netherlands Foundation for War Victims in the East: Japanese archives and contacts (SOO). s-o-o.nl/warchildren/ (accessed on 18 October 2020)

¹¹⁰ See, for example, Huijs-Watanuki, *Watashi wa dare no ko?: Chichi o sagashimotomeru Nikkei nisei orandajin tachi* [Whose child am I?: Japanese-Dutch descendants of second generation searching for their fathers.]; 'Children's tears: Searching for Japanese fathers', Sunada, Y., 1 October 2014.; Funao, O. 2015. *War-displaced Japanese descendants of the Philippines*. Tokyo: Tosei Publishing.; Okuyama, M. 2015. *Dear Japanese*. Breda: The Eriskay Connection.

transnational children is Ohno's research on children born of Filipino mothers and Japanese fathers in the Philippines known as Philippine Nikkeijin (see p. 8). While Ohno's insights contribute to our understanding of the specifically Asian context of offspring of transnational heritage, the children considered were those of Japanese migrants in the pre-Asia-Pacific War period and thus they are not directly concerned with CBOW.¹¹¹ This study contributes to the broader literature on the experiences of transnational children fathered by men associated with the enemy during and after armed conflict and aims to start closing the knowledge gap surrounding children born of the Second Sino-Japanese war.

In the last decade, CBOW studies in different disciplines have come to agree that the issues of identity and belonging are core elements that profoundly affect the lives of CBOW across time and space.¹¹² Critics of 'identity' as a substantive construct have argued that its definition is too elastic and so the concept lacks theoretical rigour and precision.¹¹³ While there is no consensus on the definition, identity is still considered as a powerful construct that guides people's life paths and decisions and has become one of the most researched constructs in the social sciences.¹¹⁴ Identity has various domains (e.g. personal, ethnic, racial, gender, spiritual, occupational), and some domains relate more strongly to the studies of CBOW than others.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ Ohno, S. 1988. 'Hapon tachi no nagai sengo: Firipin zanryū Nikkei nisei, Nihonjin koji o tazunete' [Long post-war struggles of 'Hapon': Visiting Japanese left behind in the Philippines and Japanese orphans]. *Sekai*, August, pp. 55-66.; Ohno, S. 2007. Regaining 'Japaneseness': The politics of recognition by the Philippine Nikkeijin. *Asian Studies Review*, 31, pp. 243-260.; Ohno, S. and Iijima, M. 2010. *Nihon zaijū firipin Nikkeijin no shiminken, seikatsu, aidentitī: Shitsumonhyō haifu niyoru zenkoku jittai chōsa hōkokusho* [Citizenships, lives and identities of the Philippine Nikkeijin residing Japan: Report on the results of a nationwide questionnaire survey]. Fukuoka: Kyushu University.; Ohno, S. 2015. *Transforming Nikkeijin identity and citizenship: Untold life histories of Japanese migrants and their descendants in the Philippines, 1903-2013*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press.; Ohno, S. 2016. *Nikkeijin kara zanryū Nihonjin e no tenkan: Firipin Nikkei nisei no sengo mondai to shūseki undo o chūshin ni* [Shift from 'Nikkeijin' to 'Remaining Japanese in the Philippines': Concerning issues of second generation Philippine Nikkeijin and their movement to acquire Japanese nationality through *shūseki* procedure]. *Imin Kenkyū Nenpō*, 22, pp. 23-42.

¹¹² See, for example, Lee, A forgotten legacy of the Second World War: GI children in post-war Britain and Germany, p. 173.; Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 245.; Ezawa, A. 2012. *Kodomo to sensō: Nikkei orandajin no kōjutsushi* [Children and war: Oral history of Japanese-Indisch Dutch people]. *The journal of Ohara Institute for Social Research*, 648, pp. 32-52.; Stelzl-Marx, Soviet children of occupation in Austria: The historical, political and social background and its consequences, p. 284.

¹¹³ Brubaker, R. and Cooper, F. 2000. Beyond 'identity'. *Theory and Society*, 29, pp. 1-47.; Rattansi, A. and Phoenix, A. 2005. Rethinking youth identities: Modernist and postmodernist frameworks. *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research*, 5, pp. 97-123.; Jones, P. and Krzyżanowski, M. 2008. Identity, belonging and migration: Beyond constructing 'others'. In *Identity, belonging and migration*, ed. D. Gerard, pp. 38-53, p. 38. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

¹¹⁴ Brubaker and Cooper, Beyond 'identity'. *Theory and Society*, pp. 1-47.; Côté, J. E. 2006. Identity studies: How close are we to establishing a social science of identity? An appraisal of the field. *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research*, 6, pp. 3-25.

¹¹⁵ Vignoles, V. L., Schwartz, S. J. and Luyckx, K. 2011. Introduction: Toward an integrative view of identity. In *Handbook of identity theory and research*, eds. S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx and V. L. Vignoles, pp. 1-27, p. 18. London: Springer.; Kroger, J. 2007. *Identity: The balance between self and other*. London: Routledge.

In the context of CBOW studies, the question of identity is fundamentally concerned with personal identity, which is often defined as a ‘subjective concept of oneself as a person’, which is a response to the question, ‘Who am I?’¹¹⁶ Such personal identity is constructed and reconstructed actively throughout an individual’s life span, involving a complex interplay of cognitive, affective and communication processes within a particular historical and socio-cultural context.¹¹⁷ Many CBOW experience ‘absolute fatherlessness’ due to the taboo around the circumstances under which they were conceived as well as due to the absence of the father’s memorabilia.¹¹⁸ There is a rich literature on the impact of the life courses of children, who experience the permanent absence of one or both parents (e.g. orphans, adopted children); this literature points to the children’s universal need to find out about the absent parent(s) who is/are an essential ‘part of oneself’.¹¹⁹ Being deprived of access to information about the absent father leads to an impaired sense of identity. Historical and psychological studies have shown that CBOW have a strong tendency to regard their absent father as the missing fragment of their ‘identity jigsaw’ and the need for the knowledge about the father can be a lifelong ‘obsession’ for them.¹²⁰ Several researchers have commented on the significance of the absent father for the identity formation of CBOW in patriarchal societies in which the fathers are considered as the provider of personal identity.¹²¹ According to Mitreuter’s psychological research, CBOW who learn about their origin in their adulthood can experience more serious identity crises as their beliefs about themselves become shattered.¹²² Many CBOW have little access to information about the father, and the limited piece of information they can obtain may be a negative one, especially if they

¹¹⁶ Vignoles, Schwartz and Luyckx, Introduction: Toward an integrative view of identity, p. 2.

¹¹⁷ Vignoles, V. L. 2011. Identity motives. In *Handbook of identity theory and research*, eds. S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx and V. L. Vignoles, pp. 403-432, pp. 404-405. London: Springer.

¹¹⁸ Glaesmer, H. and Lee, S. Children born of war: A critical appraisal of the terminology.

¹¹⁹ Pector, E. A. 1999. I found my history - and so much more. *Medical Economics*, 76(7), pp. 113-114.; Ponte, I. C., Wang, L. K. and Fan, S. P. 2010. Returning to China: The experience of adopted Chinese children and their parents. *Adoption Quarterly*, 13(2), pp. 100-124.; Wang, L. K., Ponte, I. C. and Ollen, E. W. 2015. Letting her go: Western adoptive families’ search and reunion with Chinese birth parents. *Adoption Quarterly*, 18(1), pp. 45-66.; Baldassar, L. Missing kin and longing to be together: Emotions and the construction of co-presence in transnational relationships. *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 29(3), pp. 247-266, p. 250.; Jones, K. A. 2007. Assessing the impact of father-absence from a psychoanalytic perspective. *Psychoanalytic Social Work*, 14(1), pp. 43-58.

¹²⁰ Stelzl-Marx, Soviet children of occupation in Austria: The historical, political and social background and its consequences, p. 284.; Mitreuter et al, Questions of identity in children born of war: Embarking on a search for the unknown soldier father. *Journal of Child and Family Studies*, pp. 3220-3229.

¹²¹ Weitsman, P. A. 2008. The politics of identity and sexual violence: A review of Bosnia and Rwanda. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 30(3), pp. 561-578, p. 563.; Hamel, Ethnic belonging of the children born out of rape in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, pp. 287-304.; Erjavec and Volčič, Living with the sins of their fathers: An analysis of self-representation of adolescents born of war rape, p. 381.; Seiger, F. 2017. Consanguinity as capital in rights assertions: Japanese-Filipino children in the Philippines. *Critical Asian Studies*, pp. 1-19, p. 10.

¹²² Mitreuter et al. Questions of identity in children born of war: Embarking on a search for the unknown soldier father, p. 3226.

have been conceived in exploitative, abusive or violent relationships.¹²³ However, various studies suggest that CBOW have a stronger tendency to idealise the absent father in the long run than to demonise him, irrespective of the father's wartime role and how they were conceived.¹²⁴ Schwartz's qualitative study on children born of German mothers raped by the Soviet soldiers, pointed to the correlation between constructing acceptable, if not idealised, images of the unknown father and constructing a meaningful self-identity.¹²⁵ However, still little is known about how and why this idealisation occurs across time and space and how the process of idealisation relates to CBOW's identity and belonging.

Moreover, in her psychological research on children born of local women and occupation soldiers in Germany after World War Two, Glaesmer argued that CBOW's identity development is profoundly affected by their childhood adversities as well as stigma and discrimination.¹²⁶ 'Childhood adversities' and 'stigma/discrimination' of CBOW are often affected complexly through their relationship with the mother, the mother's financial hardships as well as how the mother is perceived in the community (e.g. stigma attached to single motherhood and to sexual liaison with an enemy soldier).¹²⁷ Glaesmer also claimed that these three factors (identity development, childhood adversities and stigma/discrimination) influence each other and have a significant impact on CBOW's long-term psychological well-being.

What is closely linked with CBOW's personal identity is their sense of belonging. Belonging is a basic human need,¹²⁸ and it has been defined as a degree to which an

¹²³ Schwartz, A. 2020. Trauma, resilience, and narrative constructions of identity in Germans born of wartime rape. *German Studies Review*, 43(2), pp. 311-329, pp. 316-323.

¹²⁴ Muth, K. 2008. *Die Wehrmacht in Griechenland – und ihre Kinder* [The Wehrmacht in Greece – and their children]. Leipzig: Eudora Verlag, pp. 73-76.; Schretter, L. 2020. 'Britische Besatzungskinder: Die Nachkommen britischer Soldaten und österreichischer Frauen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg [British occupying children: The descendants of British soldiers and Austrian women after the Second World War]'. PhD thesis, Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, pp. 467-470.; Schwartz, Trauma, resilience, and narrative constructions of identity in Germans born of wartime rape, pp. 320-323.; Denov, M. and Lakor, A. A. 2017. When war is better than peace: The post-conflict realities of children born of wartime rape in northern Uganda. *Child Abuse and Neglect*, 65, pp. 255-265, p. 261.; Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 68.

¹²⁵ Schwartz, Trauma, resilience, and narrative constructions of identity in Germans born of wartime rape, pp. 320-323.

¹²⁶ Glaesmer, H. et al. 2012. Die Kinder des Zweiten Weltkrieges in Deutschland: Ein Rahmenmodell für die psychosoziale Forschung [Children of World War Two in Germany: Framework for psychological research]. *Trauma und Gewalt*, 6, pp. 319-328, p. 323.; Glaesmer et al, Childhood maltreatment in children born of occupation after WWII in Germany and its association with mental disorders, pp. 1147-1156, p. 1148.

¹²⁷ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 247.

¹²⁸ Sedgwick, M.G. and Yonge, O. 2008. 'We're it', 'we're a team', 'we're family' means a sense of belonging. *Rural and Remote Health*, 8(3), pp. 1-12.

individual feels ‘secure, accepted, included, valued and respected’ by a defined group.¹²⁹ Individuals have a huge range of imagined and lived attachments and memberships in their lives,¹³⁰ and it has been argued that individuals have control over to whom or what they choose to belong and the power to develop satisfying reciprocal interactions.¹³¹ Conversely, individuals may have a sense of belonging to a particular group, yet may not be permitted to belong to the group as a result of discrimination or marginalisation.¹³² Not given permission to belong to a group has cognitive, affective and behavioural consequences.¹³³ Lee pointed out that the sense of belonging of CBOW in various historical and geopolitical settings is disturbed by the fact that they have limited access to the father who is presumed to be an ‘enemy’.¹³⁴ Some CBOW may feel excluded from their family and/or community because of their fathers’ ethnicity or their physical features that are different from their half-siblings or the mainstream population.¹³⁵ Käuper’s study on children born of local women and French fathers in the Indochina War residing in contemporary France provides a rare window to how a group of CBOW develops their sense of belonging in their paternal country.¹³⁶ These children born of the Indochina War displayed their multiple and co-existing sense of belonging to the paternal country as well as to the maternal country, and some identified themselves as Eurasian.¹³⁷

This study hypothesises that Sino-Japanese CBOW’s identity and sense of belonging have guided their life courses and in particular their decision to migrate to Japan. Based on this assumption, this thesis explores how formation of identity and belonging of these Sino-Japanese CBOW compare with those of other groups of CBOW, paying special attention to the significance of the absent father.

1.4.2 Return migration and motivations to migrate

Preliminary research into Sino-Japanese CBOW very quickly brought to light that in contrast to many other geopolitical contexts, migration to the father’s home country,

¹²⁹ Mahar, A. L., Cobigo, V. and Stuart, H. 2013. Conceptualizing belonging. *Disability and Rehabilitation*, 35(12), pp. 1026-1032, p. 1031.; Sedgwick and Yonge, ‘We’re it’, ‘we’re a team’, ‘we’re family’ means a sense of belonging, pp. 1-12.; Levett-Jones et al. 2009. The duration of clinical placements: A key influence on nursing students’ experience of belongingness. *Australian Journal of Advanced Nursing*, 26(2), pp. 8-16.; Finn, J. D. 2016. Withdrawing from school. *Review of Educational Research*, 59(2), pp. 117-142.

¹³⁰ Jones and Krzyzanowski, Identity, belonging and migration: Beyond constructing ‘others’, p. 50.

¹³¹ Mahar, Cobigo and Stuart, 2013. Conceptualizing belonging, p. 1031.

¹³² Mahar, Cobigo and Stuart, Conceptualizing belonging, p. 1030.

¹³³ Sedgwick and Yonge, ‘We’re it’, ‘we’re a team’, ‘we’re family’ means a sense of belonging, pp. 1-12.

¹³⁴ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 245.

¹³⁵ Ezawa, ‘The guilt feeling that you exist’: War, racism and Indisch-Japanese identity formation, pp. 489-496.; Lee, A forgotten legacy of the Second World War: GI children in post-war Britain and Germany, pp. 157-181.; Hamel, Ethnic belonging of the children born out of rape in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, pp. 287-304.

¹³⁶ Käuper, Children born of the Indochina War: National ‘reclassification’, diversity, and multiple feelings of belonging.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

Japan, became an option for the group studied here (see Chapter 3). This migration, or as it came to be seen by the participants of this study, the ‘return’ to their ‘homeland’ developed into a significant research focus. There are a few prominent cases in which CBOW elsewhere migrated to the father’s country including: (1) children born of German women fathered by French soldiers during World War Two, (2) children born of Vietnamese women fathered by French soldiers during the Indochina wars and (3) children born of Vietnamese women fathered by American soldiers during the Vietnam War (see Chapter 3, p. 65). However, in those cases, the migration happened as a result of the governments of their paternal countries taking the initiative to claim CBOW as their nationals and arranging their ‘repatriation’.

In the case of Sino-Japanese CBOW, the decision to migrate – though facilitated by a particular political climate in the bilateral relations of the parental countries, China and Japan – was a voluntary one, deeply rooted in the particular sense of identity and belonging developed amongst those CBOW that were expressed through their common narratives about their ‘return’ and their ‘homeland’. Thus, their migration to their father’s country and the process of adaptation in their new environment need to be explored in the context of an understanding of migration in general and ‘return migration’ in particular.

The phenomenon of return migration across time and space has gained significance in the migration studies since the 1980s, and it has been extensively explored in the framework of diaspora.¹³⁸ The term diaspora, which denotes dispersal and scattering, came into use in the late nineteenth century to describe the dispersion of the Jews.¹³⁹ The simplest form of return migration is to ‘return to where one came from’. Some research on the large-scale return migration flows in the second half of the twentieth century was mainly based on an understanding of diasporic groups as those who maintain an ethno-communal consciousness after being dispersed from a central place.¹⁴⁰ Such return migrants included Jewish people migrating to Israel in the framework of the Law of Return and ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe migrating to Germany after World War Two.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ Lados, G. and Hegedűs, G. 2019. Return migration and identity change: A Hungarian case study. *Regional Statistics*, 9(1), pp. 150-167, p. 151.

¹³⁹ Adachi, N. 2006. Introduction: Theorising Japanese diaspora. In *Japanese Diasporas: Unsung pasts, conflicting presents, and uncertain futures*, ed. N. Adachi, pp. 1-22. Abingdon: Routledge, p. 2.

¹⁴⁰ Safran, W. 1991. Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and return. *Diaspora*, 1(1), pp. 83-99, p. 4.

¹⁴¹ See, for example, de Tinguy, A. 2003. Ethnic migrations of the 1990s from and to the successor states of the former Soviet Union: ‘Repatriation’ or privileged migration? In *Diasporas and ethnic migrants: Germany, Israel and Russia in comparative perspective*, eds. R. Münz and R. Ohliger, pp. 100-113. London and Portland: Frank Cass.; Berthomière, W. 2003. Integration and the social dynamic of ethnic migration: The Jews from the former Soviet Union in Israel. In *Diasporas and ethnic migrants: Germany, Israel and Russia in comparative perspective*, eds. R. Münz and R. Ohliger, pp. 315-331. London and Portland: Frank Cass.; Münz, R. 2003. Ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe and their return to Germany. In *Diasporas and ethnic migrants: Germany, Israel and Russia in comparative perspective*, eds. R. Münz and R. Ohliger, pp. 242-252. London and Portland: Frank Cass.

The field of return migration studies has become increasingly diversified, reflecting generational diversity and variegated ways of identifying with one another and with their homeland amongst groups of individuals with shared ancestry.¹⁴² This trend has been reinforced by the debate over the definition of diaspora. Clifford pointed out that defining an ‘ideal type’ of diaspora would exclude numerous diasporic communities because the desire for actual return and the intensity level of attachment to the homeland vary greatly from one diasporic community to another.¹⁴³ Brubaker paid attention to the diversity within communities with shared ancestry and pointed out that the concept of ‘diaspora’ tends to exclude those without diasporic homeland orientation.¹⁴⁴ Building on Brubaker’s point, Yamashiro proposed a concept, global ancestral group, ‘a population that claims shared ancestral ties, dispersed across multiple societies and nation-states, and includes people who are both oriented and not oriented towards the ancestral homeland’.¹⁴⁵ As identities of individuals with shared ancestry are increasingly diverse due to globalisation and different historical and local contexts, the concept of a global ancestral group that does not make assumptions about how members identify with each other or with their ancestral homeland seems to provide a framework with greater inclusiveness and flexibility than the concept of diaspora in exploring various patterns of return migration.¹⁴⁶

Against this backdrop, so-called ‘second-generation return migration’ has come to attract scholarly attention as a particular type of return migration.¹⁴⁷ The ‘second-generation’ includes (1) offspring of parents (first generation) from the same country of origin that initially migrated to the host country, (2) offspring of one immigrant parent and a local parent and (3) offspring of immigrant parents of two different national origins.¹⁴⁸ The second category applies to Sino-Japanese CBOW who ‘returned’ to Japan. Some second-generationers are born and brought up in the country to which their parent(s) migrated, whereas other second-generation children’s lives are divided between

¹⁴² Cassarino, J. 2010. Theorising return migration: The conceptual approach to return migrants revisited. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, 6(2), pp. 253-279.

¹⁴³ Clifford, J. 1994. Diasporas. *Cultural Anthropology*, 9(3), pp. 302-338.

¹⁴⁴ Brubaker, R. 2005. The ‘Diaspora’ Diaspora. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28 (1), pp. 1-19, p. 12.

¹⁴⁵ Yamashiro, J. H. 2017. *Redefining Japaneseness: Japanese Americans in the ancestral homeland*. New Brunswick; Camden: Rutgers University Press, p. 5.

¹⁴⁶ Yamashiro, *Redefining Japaneseness: Japanese Americans in the ancestral homeland*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁴⁷ See, for example, Christou, A. 2006. American dreams and European nightmares: Experiences and polemics of second-generation Greek-American returning migrants. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 32(5), pp. 831-845.; Wessendorf, S. 2007. ‘Roots migrants’: Transnationalism and ‘return’ among second-generation Italians in Switzerland. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33(7), pp. 1083-1102.; King, R. and Christou, A. 2010. Diaspora, migration and transnationalism: Insights from the study of second-generation ‘returnees’. In *Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods*, ed. R. Bauböck and T. Faist, pp. 167-183. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press; King, R., Christou, A. and Ahrens, J. 2011. ‘Diverse mobilities’: Second-generation Greek-Germans engage with the homeland as children and as adults. *Mobilities*, 6(4), pp. 483-501.

¹⁴⁸ King and Christou, *Diaspora, migration and transnationalism: Insights from the study of second-generation ‘returnees’*, pp. 168-169.

two countries by visiting or living in the other country for part of their childhood.¹⁴⁹ Especially for second-generationers who were born and raised in the parental host country, their migration to the parental country of origin is not considered as true ‘return migration’ in migration statistics.¹⁵⁰ Such return mobilities to ancestral and parental homelands have been ignored and excluded from return migration until the 1970s.¹⁵¹ However, the growing number of research on second-generation return migration has shown that it is a widespread phenomenon in which migrants themselves identify with the idea of ‘return’ due to their quest for ‘home’, ‘origin’ or ‘roots’.¹⁵² Christou and King described such return migration of second-generationers who are raised ‘abroad’ as a ‘project of existential return to the ancestral homeland’ with which they came to feel a personal connection through family ties and ethnic ancestry. In a study on Turkish migrants returning from Germany, the Netherlands and France, for instance, research participants described their ‘return’ as a ‘very natural, expected and inevitable part of their migration story and their life in general’ due to their strong sense of belonging, ethnic identity and loyalty to their family and ‘home’.¹⁵³

The motives for return migration are varied and each factor weighs differently for different return migrants. Mohamed and Abdul-Talib pointed to push-pull factors that influence transnational return migration intentions which can be classified into three categories: (1) economic (e.g. differentials in employment opportunities and wages), (2) situational (e.g. marginalisation and discrimination in the host country, security improvement in the home country after the end of a conflict or war, political reforms and regime changes in the homeland) and (3) psychological/emotional.¹⁵⁴ While such classification is debatable as motivational factors of return migrants discussed in recent scholarship are ever more diversified,¹⁵⁵ scholars of return migration seem to agree on the significance of the emotional motivational factors related to return migrants’ ancestral, ethnic and familial ties in the phenomenon of return migration. Emotional motivational

¹⁴⁹ Christou and King, *Imagining ‘home’: Diasporic landscapes of the Greek-German second generation*, p.639.; King, Christou and Ahrens, ‘Diverse mobilities’: Second-generation Greek-Germans engage with the homeland as children and as adults, pp. 483-501.

¹⁵⁰ King and Christou, *Diaspora, migration and transnationalism: Insights from the study of second-generation ‘returnees’*, p. 168.

¹⁵¹ Bovenkerk, F. 1974. *The sociology of return migration: A bibliographic essay*. Publications of the Research Group for European Migration Problems: The Hague.

¹⁵² Wessendorf, ‘Roots migrants’: Transnationalism and ‘return’ among second-generation Italians in Switzerland, pp. 1083-1102.

¹⁵³ Kunuroglu, F. et al. Motives for Turkish return migration from Western Europe: Home, sense of belonging, discrimination and transnationalism. *Turkish Studies*, 19(3), pp. 422-450, p. 441.

¹⁵⁴ Mohamed, M. and Abdul-Talib, A. 2020. Push-pull factors influencing international return migration intentions: A systematic literature review. *Journal of Enterprising Communities*. 14(2), pp. 231-246.

¹⁵⁵ For instance, recent research point to return migrants’ aspiration for idealistic lifestyle in their ancestral homeland. See, King, R. and Christou, A. 2014. Second-generation ‘return’ to Greece: New dynamics of transnationalism and integration. *International Migration*, 52(6), pp. 85-99.; Kılınc, N. and King, R. 2017. The quest for a ‘better life’: Second-generation Turkish-Germans ‘return’ to ‘paradise’. *Demographic Research*, 36, pp. 1491-1514.

factors include their relatives residing in the homeland,¹⁵⁶ a strong sense of ethnic and cultural affinity to the homeland,¹⁵⁷ seeking a sense of belonging or ethnic roots and reclaiming identity,¹⁵⁸ aspiration for retired life in the homeland¹⁵⁹ as well as patriotism and altruism.¹⁶⁰

Moreover, a growing body of research on return migrants' identity and belonging after their 'return' has shown various ways in which return migrants construct and redefine their identity and sense of belonging to the 'homeland' in the process of adjustment and integration in the country of destination.¹⁶¹ Al-Ali and Koser defined transnational migrants' conceptions of 'home' as 'processes involving 'acts of imagining, creating, unmaking, changing, losing and moving homes'.¹⁶² Wessendorf pointed out that it is common for members of the second generation to have nostalgic relations with their parents' country, and some idealise their unseen 'homeland'.¹⁶³ However, actual return to the homeland often brings negative experiences, disillusionment as well as reappraisal of identity and belonging.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁶ Tsuda, T. 1999. The motivation to migrate: The ethnic and sociocultural constitution of the Japanese-Brazilian return-migration system. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 48(1), pp. 1-31, p. 9.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Wessendorf, 'Roots migrants': Transnationalism and 'return' among second-generation Italians in Switzerland, pp. 1083-1102.; Christou, American dreams and European nightmares: Experiences and polemics of second-generation Greek-American returning migrants, pp. 831-845.; King and Christou, Second-generation 'return' to Greece: New dynamics of transnationalism and integration, pp. 85-99.; Tsuda, T. 2013. 'When the diaspora returns home'. In *A companion to diaspora and transnationalism*, eds. A. Quayson and G. Daswani, pp. 172-189. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.; Kunuroglu et al. Motives for Turkish return migration from Western Europe: Home, sense of belonging, discrimination and transnationalism, pp. 422-450.

¹⁵⁹ Mohamed and Abdul-Talib, Push-pull factors influencing international return migration intentions: A systematic literature review, p. 239.

¹⁶⁰ Hassan et al. pointed to the sense of obligation felt by Somali return migrants to contribute to their home community through investment and charity programmes. Hassan, F. et al. 2013. *Mapping of the Somali Diaspora in England and Wales*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. <https://www.councilofsomaliorgs.com/sites/default/files/resources/Mapping-of-the-Somali-diaspora-in-England-and-Wales-2013-IOM.pdf> (accessed 19 October 2020)

¹⁶¹ See, for example, Christou, American dreams and European nightmares: Experiences and polemics of second-generation Greek-American returning migrants, pp. 831-845.; Lados and Hegedüs, Return migration and identity change: A Hungarian case study, pp. 150-167.; King, R. and Kılınç, N. 2014. Second-generation Turks from Germany 'return' to Turkey. *Nordic Journal of Migration Research*, 4(3), pp. 126-133.; Kılınç and King, The quest for a 'better life': Second-generation Turkish-Germans 'return' to 'paradise', pp. 1491-1514.; Tsuda, T. 1999. Transnational migration and the nationalization of ethnic identity among Japanese Brazilian return migrants. *Ethos*, 27(2), pp. 145-179.

¹⁶² Al-Ali, N. and Koser, K. 2002. Transnationalism, international migration and home. In *New Approaches to Migration? Transnational communities and the transformation of home*, eds. N. Al-Ali and K. Koser, pp. 1-14. London and New York: Routledge, p. 6.

¹⁶³ Wessendorf, 'Roots migrants': Transnationalism and 'return' among second-generation Italians in Switzerland, pp. 1083-1102.

¹⁶⁴ King, Christou and Ahrens, 'Diverse mobilities': Second-generation Greek-Germans engage with the homeland as children and as adults, pp. 483-501.; Tsuda, Transnational migration and the nationalisation of ethnic identity among Japanese Brazilian return migrants, pp. 145-179.

This thesis is the first research that links the issues of children born of transnational heritage fathered by ‘enemy’ men to the studies on second-generation return migration. Based on the hypothesis that Sino-Japanese CBOW, who migrated to their paternal country, had constructed an emotional and/or cultural connection to their absent fathers, this study aims to contribute to the field of return migration by exploring how the constructed notions of the absent father and ‘homeland’ motivated their ‘return’.

1.5 Terminology

Since this study group has never been researched, they are currently nameless. As discussed above, CBOW serves as a particularly effective concept to analyse identity and belonging of the study group as the previous studies on CBOW identify them as the central issues in the lives of CBOW. In order to conduct comparative analysis, this study adopts the term CBOW for the study group and call them ‘Sino-Japanese CBOW’ for the research purposes. These individuals, however, were not all born of Japanese soldiers. Some fathers were associated with the war efforts through espionage or working for large companies that were established for Japanese national projects. Others were outright civilians such as small business owners, factory workers and so forth. The term Sino-Japanese CBOW, therefore, needs to be problematised. This section discusses how the term has been adapted for the particular context of the Second Sino-Japanese War to make a meaningful comparison with other groups of CBOW.

Since the research on CBOW gained momentum in the early 2000s, the definition of CBOW has been actively debated.¹⁶⁵ Researchers on CBOW currently agree on the following definition for CBOW: (1) children born of enemy soldiers, (2) children born of occupation soldiers, (3) children born of child soldiers and (4) children born of the United Nations peacekeepers. Based on recent intensive research activities on the subject of CBOW from various historical and geopolitical settings, Glaesmer and Lee also pointed to the significance of including children fathered by enemy soldiers who are citizens of the same country in civil wars as well as children fathered by POWs and children born of female child soldiers.¹⁶⁶ For the purpose of ensuring analytical precision, the current definition excludes children fathered by non-uniformed personnel (civilian workers for the military or peacekeeping force involved in logistics, communications, etc.) and other civilian workers.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ See, for example, Glaesmer and Lee, *Children born of war: A critical appraisal of the terminology*; Delić, A., Kuwert, P., and Glaesmer, H. 2017. Should the definition of the term ‘children born of war’ and vulnerabilities of children from recent conflict and post-conflict settings be broadened? *Acta Medica Academia*, 46 (1), pp. 67-69.

¹⁶⁶ Glaesmer and Lee, *Children born of war: A critical appraisal of the terminology*.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

This study made adjustments to the definition based on the particular historical and geopolitical context of the Second Sino-Japanese War and defines ‘Sino-Japanese CBOW’ as children born of local women and *Japanese military and non-military personnel* during and after the war. I argue below that the consensual relationships between Japanese men and Chinese women in non-combatant zones were conditioned by the existence of a large number of Japanese men in wartime China who often alternated civilian and military jobs as well as by the absence of a non-fraternisation policy.

Unlike in some wars and conflicts that brought about a sudden inflow of foreign male populations, there was already a large Japanese male population in China before the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937. The number of Japanese civilians in China started to increase since the latter half of the nineteenth century, after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty in 1871 between Qing China and Japan, which guaranteed the consular jurisdiction and fixed trade tariffs between the two countries.¹⁶⁸ After Japan won the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Friendship and Trade Treaty of 1871 was rescinded and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, an unequal trade treaty in favour of Japan, was signed in 1896. These treaties that provided protection and privilege to Japanese nationals in China as well as the geographical proximity between two countries facilitated the migration of Japanese civilians from Japan to China.¹⁶⁹ After Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Japan expanded its influence over Manchuria and the number of Japanese nationals increased significantly in Manchuria and in large cities in China.¹⁷⁰

The Second Sino-Japanese War which broke out in 1937 triggered a substantial increase in the number of both Japanese soldiers and civilian workers in China. Kobayashi stated that the number of Japanese residents in China declined temporarily immediately after the war broke out.¹⁷¹ However, as Japan occupied cities along the railways, there was an increase in the number of Japanese civilians who sought business opportunities in the region.¹⁷² Japanese civilian workers who resided in wartime China included: (1) civil servants, (2) civilian workers for the military and (3) employees of large companies established for Japanese national projects (*kokusaku kaisha*) in sectors such as railway,

¹⁶⁸ The Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty was applied until the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). See, Yamamura, M. 2015. Japanese small business in Shanghai and their chauvinism 1916-1942: An analysis on ‘Directory of Japanese Residents in China’ (Part I). *Wakō Keizai*, 47 (2), pp. 1-34.

¹⁶⁹ Soejima, E.1984. *Senzenki Chūgoku zairyū Nihonjin jinkō tōkei* [Figures of Japanese residing in pre-war China]. *Wakayama Daigaku Kyōiku Gakubu Kiyō*, 33, pp. 1-33, p. 1.

¹⁷⁰ Soejima, *Senzenki Chūgoku zairyū Nihonjin jinkō tōkei* [Figures of Japanese residing in pre-war China], p. 33.; Yamamura, Japanese small business in Shanghai and their chauvinism 1916-1942: An analysis on ‘Directory of Japanese Residents in China’, pp. 3, 6.

¹⁷¹ Kobayashi, M. 2016. Japanese residents in North China during the Sino-Japanese War. *NUIS Journal of International Studies*, 1, pp. 103-116, p. 104.

¹⁷² Kobayashi, Japanese residents in North China during the Sino-Japanese War, p. 104.; Yamamura, Japanese small business in Shanghai and their chauvinism 1916-1942: An analysis on ‘Directory of Japanese Residents in China’, pp. 3-4.

resources, electricity and telecommunication¹⁷³ and (4) self-employed workers in small- and medium-scale businesses. According to an official source, the Japanese were the second largest foreign population in China after the Soviet population during most of the period before the Second Sino-Japanese War, but the Japanese became the largest foreign population by 1944.¹⁷⁴ While the male-female breakdown is unknown, it is estimated that 1.7 million Japanese civilians were in China – 1 million in Manchuria, 215,000 in Dalian and 495,000 in the rest of China – at the end of the war.¹⁷⁵ As will be discussed in Chapter 3, a non-fraternisation policy was never implemented to ban intimate relationships between Japanese men and local women in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. While there are many reports about Japanese soldiers in combat zones who committed sexual violence and rape to local women randomly and in ‘comfort stations’, the fact that many Japanese male civilians married and had children with local women during and in the immediate aftermath of the war is less known. This study identified children fathered by Japanese civilians of all types except for civil servants (see Appendix 4).

Japanese civilians in wartime China were not exempt from the military service obligation.¹⁷⁶ According to the military obligation law (*heiekihō*) that was promulgated in 1927, all able-bodied men between the age of seventeen and forty who were registered in the Japanese family register in Japan proper and Sakhalin were obliged to serve in the military. When Japanese soldiers were released from their military service obligation after serving in the armed forces for two years, they were regarded as reservists and therefore were not relieved from future military service obligations. Associations of veterans (*zaigō gunjin kai*) in China played a role in facilitating the labour mobility of Japanese men in wartime China. It provided training and jobs for veterans who were discharged from the army and also drafted Japanese men residing outside Japan proper.¹⁷⁷ Although not all veterans became members of the veterans’ association after demobilisation, there were about 25,600 members in large cities in North China in 1940, and these members took various background roles to support Japanese stationing forces in China.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷³ See, for example, Yamamura, Japanese small business in Shanghai and their chauvinism 1916-1942: An analysis on ‘Directory of Japanese Residents in China’, pp. 6, 17; Kobayashi, Japanese residents in North China during the Sino-Japanese War, p. 104.; *Minami Manshū Tetsudō Chōsabu*. 1939. *Hoku-chūshi, mōkyō ni okeru shinsetsu shuyō kaisha ichiran: Gokuhi* [List of major enterprises in North and Central China and Inner Mongolia: Confidential].

¹⁷⁴ *Daitōashō Sōmukyoku Keizaika*. 2004. *Chūkaminokoku zairyū honpōjin oyobi daisankokujin jinkō gaikēihyō, shōwa 19 nen dai san pō* [Figures of Japanese and foreign population residing in the Republic of China, third edition]. In *Senzenki Chūgoku zairyū Nihonjin tōkei dai 8 kan* [Figures of Japanese residing in China in the pre-war period, Volume 8], pp. 1-33. Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, p. 2.

¹⁷⁵ The figures include the population in Manchuria. (See, Sato, R. 2016. *Sengo Nichū kankei to dōsōkai* [Post-war Sino-Japanese relations and alumni reunion]. Tokyo: Sairyusha, p. 55.)

¹⁷⁶ Kobayashi, Japanese residents in North China during the Sino-Japanese War, p. 114.

¹⁷⁷ Kobayashi, Japanese residents in North China during the Sino-Japanese War, pp. 107-110

¹⁷⁸ Kobayashi, Japanese residents in North China during the Sino-Japanese War, pp. 107, 110.

Some participants' Japanese fathers alternated between civilian and military jobs during the war in China (see Appendix 4). For instance, one of the fathers in this study was first drafted in 1937 and was stationed in Heilongjiang Province.¹⁷⁹ After he was discharged from the army in 1939, he first worked as a security guard of the Central China Liaison Department of East Asia Development Board (*Kōain*) in Shanghai and then managed a company in Shanghai with his friends. After his marriage with a Chinese woman, he served the army again towards the end of the war. In another instance, a Japanese father in this study arrived in China in 1935 to work for a textile company in Shanghai.¹⁸⁰ From 1937, he worked as a translator for the Japanese military for two years. After his demobilisation, he married a Chinese woman in 1939 and had a child. He was then drafted again in January 1944 but returned to his family in China in August 1945 after he was injured in the war. These two examples highlight the fluid labour mobility of Japanese men in wartime China and point to the difficulty in determining the father's wartime occupation as military or non-military.

The analysis of this study also includes children born of Japanese soldiers and civilian fathers in China after the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War. While the inflow of the Japanese male population into China stopped at the end of the war, a large number of Japanese nationals – both soldiers and civilians – remained in China when the Chinese Civil War broke out (see Chapter 3 and 4). Some of these Japanese men also married local women and had children. Considering these particular historical and geopolitical circumstances in wartime and post-war China, this thesis includes children born of civilian fathers in the analysis.

It is also important to explore other terms used by the aforementioned groups of children of transnational heritage fathered by Japanese citizens in the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam (see p. 5) to examine whether these terms can be applied to the study participants and whether a meaningful comparative analysis is possible. These individuals fathered by Japanese men in the Philippines and Indonesia adopted a label 'Nikkeijin' (overseas Japanese and their descendants). However, the study participants cannot be called 'Nikkeijin' because 'Nikkeijin' communities around the world are created and maintained based on their collective identities as Japanese descendants based on various motivations (e.g. cultural identification, empowerment, labour migration).¹⁸¹ Participants in this study have neither self-perception as members of a group that share the same origin and similar experiences nor an identity as 'Nikkeijin'. Moreover, while Japanese descendants (up to third generation) have a legal right to apply for a special

¹⁷⁹ Interview transcript, Momoko, Tokyo, Japan, 23 May 2017.

¹⁸⁰ Unpublished personal documents, Case 1, Tsuneyoshi.

¹⁸¹ See, for example, Kojima, S. 'Nikkeijin teigi no henyō to aidentitī' [Shift in the definition of Nikkeijin and identity]. *The 57th Convention of Nikkei and Japanese Abroad*, pp. 17-20. Tokyo: The Association of Nikkei and Japanese Abroad.

residence permit that enables them to live and work in Japan, not all ‘Nikkeijin’ are entitled to acquire Japanese nationality unless they have a Japanese parent.

Another relevant concept to consider for the study participants is ‘*zanryū Nihonjin*’ (Japanese people who remained overseas after the war) which started to be used by academics in the late 1990s in Japan.¹⁸² This term came to be used by groups of individuals who remained outside Japan after the war for the purpose of their activism. The above-mentioned Philippine Nikkeijin, for instance, adopted a new label ‘*firipin zanryū Nihonjin*’ (Japanese people who remained in the post-war Philippines) to emphasise that they are not just ‘Japanese descendants’ but are ‘Japanese’ who have the birth right for Japanese nationality (see Chapter 3, p. 82).¹⁸³ The quest of the ‘*firipin zanryū Nihonjin*’ to acquire Japanese nationality is similar to that of the study participants. However, the use of the term enables only limited comparative analysis with a few similar groups in the specific context of the Japanese government’s policies. Another problem in adopting the term ‘*zanryū Nihonjin*’ is that the term ‘*Chūgoku zanryū Nihonjin*’ (Japanese people who remained in post-war China) has been used to refer to stranded war orphans and stranded war wives (*Chūgoku zanryū fujin*), Japanese girls and women who married local men to survive in post-war northeast China. I opt for another term for the study participants to avoid confusion with stranded war orphans and wives.

This study adopts the term Sino-Japanese CBOW for academic purposes but with a note of caution. The term Sino-Japanese CBOW does not indicate a bounded substantial group with a collective identity amongst its members. Moreover, while I employ the term ‘children’, it needs to be understood to refer to ‘offspring of biological parents’, independent of age. The study participants are currently in their sixties and seventies, and they have been affected by their parentage well beyond their childhood. In the conclusion of this thesis, I will discuss what impact the above definitional adjustment had for the validity and effectiveness of the comparative analysis of the study group with other groups of CBOW.

1.6 Contribution and thesis structure

This study aims to inform studies on CBOW, return migration and Sino-Japanese history in the following aspects. First, it aims to contribute to a better understanding of the CBOW experience in the East Asian context, more specifically, experiences of

¹⁸² Political scientist Wu Wanhong started to use the term ‘*Chūgoku zanryū Nihonjin*’. Wu, W. 1999. The return of the remaining Japanese in China: The history and types, 1946-1998. *Kobe Law Journal*, 49 (1), pp. 189-245.

¹⁸³ Ohno, *Nikkeijin kara zanryū Nihonjin e no tenkan: Firipin Nikkei nisei no sengo mondai to shūseki undo o chūshin ni* [Shift from ‘Nikkeijin’ to ‘Remaining Japanese in the Philippines’: Concerning issues of second generation Philippine Nikkeijin and their movement to acquire Japanese nationality through *shūseki* procedure], pp. 23-42.

children born of local women and Japanese military and non-military personnel during and after the Second Sino-Japanese War. Secondly, this study aims to inform the debate on CBOW born of various intimate relationships across time and space, particularly on the ways in which the CBOW's perception of the absent father affected their identity, belonging, and life choices. Thirdly, this study adds new insights to the under-researched aspect of return migration, namely, second-generation return migration of offspring fathered by men from an 'enemy' country as well as the emotional attachment to an absent family member as a motivation to migrate. Lastly, the analysis of life stories, identity and belonging of Sino-Japanese CBOW casts light on a neglected chapter in history of Sino-Japanese relations. Their narratives challenge the rigid boundary between national war memories and our understanding on wartime and post-war Sino-Japanese human interactions.

The next chapter is dedicated to sources and methodology to reflect on the process of identifying written sources and participants that fundamentally shaped the resultant data and main focus of this study. It also critically examines the methods employed and ethical considerations for oral history interviews, collected materials as well as how the researcher's positionality impacted on the interview materials.

Most Sino-Japanese CBOW were separated from their fathers due to the repatriation policies after the war, and growing up as a fatherless child had a life-long impact on their identity and belonging. Sino-Japanese CBOW also eventually migrated to their father's country after the re-establishment of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, which is a rare phenomenon amongst other groups of CBOW. Therefore, Chapter 3 investigates official repatriation policies that were shaped by various actors in different post-war periods. By exploring the (lack of) post-war policies for Sino-Japanese CBOW, this chapter reveals that Sino-Japanese CBOW's orientation towards their paternal country was not facilitated by governmental policies. By analysing a legal procedure that Sino-Japanese CBOW took for their nationality acquisition, this chapter also highlights the significance of the mother's role in the process of Sino-Japanese CBOW's migration to the father's country.

Chapter 4 then aims to further clarify the mothers' role in developing children's positive identification with the father in their childhood and adolescence. It first examines the wartime geopolitical, socio-political and cultural context in which Sino-Japanese consensual relationships occurred by exploring wartime debates and literary/cinematic representations regarding transnational marriage and consequent childbirth. It then analyses several cases of actual wartime and post-war Sino-Japanese consensual relationships. The analysis elucidates the significance of the mother's active role in ensuring the physically absent father remained 'present' in the family through their acts such as memorialisation and naming of the child.

Chapter 5 further explores the significance of the father in Sino-Japanese CBOW's life choices as well as in the life-long formation process of their identity and belonging. The first half of the chapter focuses on their experiences and how they constructed their positive notions of the father and 'homeland' from their childhood to adulthood in China. This chapter also examines how these notions of the father and 'homeland' contributed to their motivations to migrate to Japan. The second half of the chapter examines the participants' experiences and the continuing significance of the notions of the father in the ways they construct their narratives about experiences, identity and belonging after their migration to Japan to make meaning out of their lives.

The final chapter provides an assessment of this study's contribution to the field of CBOW and return migration as well as of the validity and effectiveness of the comparative analysis made based on the adjusted definition of CBOW for the particular historical and geopolitical context of the Second Sino-Japanese War. It also examines the impact of this research on both the participants and the researcher and points to future possibilities for research on CBOW particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.

CHAPTER 2: SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the data sources and methodology that shaped the resultant data and research focus for this thesis. When research on various groups of CBOW started around the mid-1990s, systematic and reliable data was often inaccessible across different historical and geographical contexts for several reasons.¹⁸⁴ First, most governments did not conduct systematic investigations of CBOW. Often the social consequences of war, especially on women and children, were regarded as less significant than the political and economic consequences. And sometimes, where data on such consequences existed, but were politically inexpedient, these were not retained or acted on. For example, official documents were destroyed in the case of Lebensborn children, who were born of local women and German men in several German-occupied countries during World War Two as part of the Nazi programme designed to increase the Aryan race.¹⁸⁵ Another obstacle to systematic research has been the sensitivity of the issue: some groups of CBOW try to hide their origins or their families do likewise leading to CBOW themselves not learning about their origin, which poses an accessibility issue of data for researchers.¹⁸⁶ Despite those multiple challenges, today a more significant evidence base is available for CBOW in various historical and geopolitical contexts particularly for those who were born during and after World War Two in Europe.

When this research project on Sino-Japanese CBOW started, the relevant information for this study group was scarce and difficult to locate. Regarding Sino-Japanese CBOW, little information could be found in official documentation as no official investigation has been conducted in the past. While collecting systematic data for this cohort was virtually impossible, I needed to assemble a significant amount of information to consolidate the evidence base of Sino-Japanese CBOW. This data allowed me to analyse their experiences, identity and belonging as well as (lack of) wartime and post-war official policies. The collected data consist of oral history interview materials and written sources, including ego-documents, legal documents and governmental documents.

The purpose of this chapter is to first discuss the process of collecting written sources as well as recruiting participants. This process was crucial in determining the focus of the research and understanding how Sino-Japanese CBOW are perceived by various actors. This chapter also critically examines the attributes of the collected sources and discusses their advantages and limitations as well as the researcher's potential impact on the oral

¹⁸⁴ Mochmann, *Children born of war: a decade of international and interdisciplinary research*, pp. 333-334.; Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 3.

¹⁸⁵ Mochmann, *Children born of war: a decade of international and interdisciplinary research*, p. 333.

¹⁸⁶ Mochmann, *Children born of war: a decade of international and interdisciplinary research*, p. 326.

history materials. Finally, this chapter explores methodological and ethical challenges in the process of collecting data and building participant-researcher relationship during the interview.

2.2 Collecting written sources

The process of identifying sources was complicated by the lack of an established category and official investigation on Sino-Japanese CBOW. The search for sources was primarily conducted in Japan as archival research in China was not fruitful.¹⁸⁷ In most cases, only fragmented pieces of information could be found. For instance, a document of the Japanese Red Cross¹⁸⁸ indicated that some Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers were allowed to ‘repatriate’¹⁸⁹ from China to Japan during the collective repatriation programme implemented between 1953 and 1958. However, the number of Sino-Japanese CBOW who boarded the repatriation boat is unknown because government officials at the time did not deem it necessary to create a category that specifically recorded this group.¹⁹⁰ Communications were sent to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) in April 2017 to inquire about the number of Sino-Japanese CBOW who migrated to Japan and the post-war policies towards them. However, as of October 2020, no answer has been supplied.¹⁹¹

Sino-Japanese CBOW were often categorised as ‘stranded war orphans’ in post-war Japan. As discussed in Chapter 1 (see p. 10), Sino-Japanese CBOW have been in the shadow of the narratives of stranded war orphans. This has been further complicated by the Japanese media who labelled CBOW as ‘stranded war orphans’ (see Chapter 5, p. 186).¹⁹² This labelling disregarded various differences that are apparent between ‘stranded war orphans’ and Sino-Japanese CBOW and complicated the process of identifying Sino-Japanese CBOW that were ‘hidden’ amongst information about stranded war orphans. Between 1974 and 1991, Asahi Shimbun published a series of newspaper

¹⁸⁷ The archival research was conducted at the National Diet Library, the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the National Institute for Defense Studies and Chūkiren Peace Memorial Museum.

¹⁸⁸ Japan Red Cross, *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6], pp. 308-310.

¹⁸⁹ I put the term ‘repatriate’ in quotation marks as their migration to Japan was framed as ‘repatriation’ (*kikoku*) by the Japan Red Cross, but we do not know whether Sino-Japanese CBOW themselves regarded their migration to their father’s country as ‘repatriation’ in the 1950s.

¹⁹⁰ An official document of the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare (*kōseishō*), which indicates the number of people repatriated from China to Japan during that time, categorised civilian repatriates into: (1) ‘Japanese civilians’ (*ippan-hōjin*), (2) ‘non-Japanese’ (*hi-Nihonjin*) and (3) ‘foreigners and others’ (*gaikokujin sonota*). The terms ‘non-Japanese’ and ‘foreigners and others’ are not defined in the document, and we cannot know to in which category the number of Sino-Japanese CBOW was counted. See, *Kōseishō hikiage engokyoku*. 1961. *Maizuru chihō hikiage engokyoku shi* [History of Maizuru Regional Bureau of Repatriation and War Victim’s Relief], p. 57.

¹⁹¹ Letter, Kanako Kuramitsu to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, April 2017.

¹⁹² See, for example, ‘*Futari no tabiji: Nicchū gekidō o ikita kyōgeki fūfu* [A journey of a couple: Beijing opera actress and actor who led a tumultuous life in China and Japan]’, NHK, Tokyo, 1 March 2011.

articles called '*Ikiwakaretamono no kiroku*' (Record of those who parted and lost contact), which provided short biographies of hundreds of stranded war orphans who were searching for their Japanese kin. I systematically analysed the biographies published on '*Ikiwakaretamono no kiroku*' and found five Sino-Japanese CBOW including Yuko, one of the participants of this study.¹⁹³

After searching different Japanese and Chinese online databases using numerous combinations of various keywords for several months, it became clear that newspaper journalists used the term 'Sino-Japanese mixed-blood orphans' (*Nicchū konketsu koji*) for Sino-Japanese CBOW in the 1980s.¹⁹⁴ This term, which was used by newspaper journalists between 1983 and 1986, never became an established term in Japan. The term 'mixed-blood orphan' did not accurately capture Sino-Japanese CBOW as most of them grew up with their biological mother or maternal relatives.¹⁹⁵ The intention of using the word 'orphan' might have been to present Sino-Japanese CBOW as a 'subgroup' of stranded war orphans that were entering into the national spotlight in Japan at the time.¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, their reference to Sino-Japanese CBOW as 'Sino-Japanese *mixed-blood orphans*' arguably linked them with children born of Japanese mothers fathered by the members of the Allied forces in post-war Japan who were referred to as 'mixed-blood children' or 'mixed-blood orphans' (see Chapter 1, p. 7). By creating the term 'Sino-Japanese mixed-blood orphans' to refer to two groups of war-affected children (stranded war orphans and children born of Japanese women and occupying soldiers in post-war Japan), Sino-Japanese CBOW have attracted media attention. However, the media's interest in Sino-Japanese CBOW did not last long, and the specific characteristics and needs of Sino-Japanese CBOW remained largely unreported. Consequently, even Sino-

¹⁹³ See, for example, '*Ikiwakaretamono no kiroku*' [The record of those who parted and lost contact], *Asahi Shimbun*, 8 December 1980. In order to ensure the participant's anonymity, I have excluded the references of the newspaper articles that mention Yuko.

¹⁹⁴ '*Nikushin sagashi watashitachi mo: Sen'nin kosu kataoia to ikiwakare, Nicchū konketsu koji uttae*' [Please search for our kin, too.: More than one thousand Sino-Japanese mixed-blood orphans who were separated from a Japanese father or mother appealed], *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 February 1983.; '*Chichino kuni e: Eijū no michi saguru*' [Returning to the father's country: Searching for ways for his permanent return]. *Mainichi Shimbun*, 4 May 1983.; '*Chichi wa Nihonjin, haha wa Chūgokujin: watashitachi nimo Nihon kokuseki o. Koko nimo zanryūkoji 2,000 nin*' [My father is Japanese, my mother is Chinese: Please give us Japanese nationality, too. There are two thousand more stranded war orphans.], *Mainichi Shimbun*, 16 January 1986.; '*Konketsu koji mo nikushin sagashi: Chūgoku kara shien yōsei, shūseki mōshitata zokuzoku*' [Mixed-blood children are searching for their kins, too: Many applications to establish *koseki* register coming from China], *Asahi Shimbun*, 16 January 1986.; '*Chūgoku koji: konketsuji nimo Nihon kokuseki*' [Stranded war orphans in China: Japanese nationality should also be granted to mixed-blood children], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 31 January 1986.

¹⁹⁵ In Japanese, the term '*koji*' (orphan) can connote 'children without a father'. However, '*koji*' commonly refers to children without both parents.

¹⁹⁶ One of the newspaper articles that featured Sino-Japanese CBOW in 1986, for instance, employed the term 'Sino-Japanese mixed-blood orphans' and stated, 'Another group of stranded war orphans found (*koko ni mo zanryūkoji*)'. See, '*Chichi wa Nihonjin, haha wa Chūgokujin: watashitachi nimo Nihon kokuseki o. Koko nimo zanryūkoji 2,000 nin*' [My father is Japanese, my mother is Chinese: Please give us Japanese nationality, too. There are two thousand more stranded war orphans.], *Mainichi Shimbun*, 16 January 1986.

Japanese CBOW themselves and support groups for stranded war orphans were not aware of or have forgotten that this term existed in the past.

In addition to the written sources mentioned above, unpublished personal documents of twenty Sino-Japanese CBOW born of marriage could be obtained from a Japanese law firm that had helped these individuals acquire Japanese nationality in the 1980s and 1990s (Appendix 3). Interview with these individuals could not be conducted because their whereabouts were unknown. These documents were obtained thanks to the cooperation of *Chūgoku kikokusha Nicchū yūkō no kai* (Sino-Japanese friendship association of returnees from China), one of the largest support groups established for stranded war orphans in Japan that promote the rights and welfare of stranded war orphans. In May 2016, I briefly interviewed Ikeda Sumie, who is a repatriated stranded war orphan herself and a representative of the association, well-known for her activism for stranded war orphans.¹⁹⁷ When I asked whether she knows any Sino-Japanese CBOW, she mentioned that she had assisted about forty Sino-Japanese CBOW to acquire Japanese nationality with a group of lawyers in the 1980s and 1990s (for the concrete procedure, see Chapter 3, p. 92). From a list of individuals who received support from the association, she could identify about thirty Sino-Japanese CBOW whom she had helped two to three decades ago. She then requested their personal documents to the law firm where these documents were kept. Subsequently, the firm's secretary located personal documents of twenty individuals in a storage room. According to the secretary, personal documents are usually discarded after ten years. However, these documents remained safe only because Kawai Hiroyuki, the firm's lawyer well-known for his activism for stranded war orphans since the 1980s, regarded them as historically significant materials. I could briefly interview Kawai, whose name was printed on legal documents of Sino-Japanese CBOW. Interestingly, he did not remember that he had helped Sino-Japanese CBOW in the past. It is most likely due to the fact that the number of Sino-Japanese CBOW was only a tiny fraction amongst 1,250 stranded war orphans who acquired Japanese nationality through his firm.

These personal documents obtained from the law firm turned out to be a gold mine containing a wealth of information about Sino-Japanese CBOW born of marriage who successfully acquired Japanese nationality. As will be discussed later, these documents were compiled to corroborate the parents' marriage and father-child relationship (Chapter 3, p. 94). Most documents consisted of (1) letters (e.g. letters from Sino-Japanese CBOW to the father and vice versa), (2) identification documents, (3) notarised testimonies by the mother, guests invited to the parents' wedding party and the father's former colleagues in China, (4) replies of Sino-Japanese CBOW and the mother to the questions from the law firm, (5) application documents submitted to the Japanese family court including

¹⁹⁷ Interview notes, Ikeda Sumie, Tokyo, Japan, 18 May 2016.

information about the motives of Sino-Japanese CBOW to acquire Japanese nationality and in some cases (6) blood test results to prove the father-child relationship. The total number of documents for one Sino-Japanese CBOW was often in excess of three hundred pages. Sino-Japanese CBOW did not send these documents to the law firm all at once but they were instead sent over a long period of time through several exchanges with the law firm in response to requests for additional information in order to strengthen the credibility of the case.

Using these unpublished personal documents posed several ethical questions as the law firm did not have the contact information of Sino-Japanese CBOW who submitted these documents to the Japanese family court in the 1980s and 1990s. While the lawyer was convinced of the historical value of these documents when he made his decision to store them indefinitely, these documents were produced solely for the purpose of nationality acquisition. He also did not originally ask these Sino-Japanese CBOW for their permission to keep these documents for possible future use for historical research. Thus, there were a broad range of possibilities in how I could have dealt with these personal documents, and many ethical questions had to be addressed in the process of obtaining, reading, selecting relevant parts for this study and quoting the content. Can I read, quote and refer to them without the consent of the individuals in the first place? When and how can we be sure that the interests of the researcher are important enough to use the materials without the consent of the individuals? What are my ethical responsibilities when I decide to quote and refer to the content? ¹⁹⁸

While there are no clear-cut answers to the questions above, I still decided to use these materials by considering the potential harms and gains. The potential harm to Sino-Japanese CBOW and their families could be minimised by anonymising these individuals' names to make it impossible for the readers to identify them. I ensured the protection of the collected personal information by using an encryption software before keeping the scanned documents in a password-protected USB hardware. I also did not keep personal documents such as Chinese identification documents that were irrelevant for the research objectives. I believe that the potential benefits of using these extraordinarily rich written materials are significant to uncover and recover the accounts of Sino-Japanese CBOW's experiences that would otherwise be completely lost. These accounts that could not have been obtained from other written sources or oral history interviews help deepen the understanding of these individuals' experiences of acquiring Japanese nationality in the field of CBOW, return migration and Sino-Japanese relations. The sheer volume of the documents submitted to the family court showed that the procedure to acquire Japanese nationality was extremely time-consuming and required

¹⁹⁸ McKee, H. A. and Porter, J. E. 2012. The ethics of archival research. *College composition and communication*, 64(1), pp. 59-81.

perseverance. Decisions of the Japanese family court showed that Sino-Japanese CBOW fathered by Japanese who had bigamous marriage could acquire Japanese nationality (see Chapter 3, p. 95) – cases that have never been observed amongst CBOW in other geographical and historical contexts. Factual information about the wartime and post-war Sino-Japanese families (e.g. the father's occupation, approximate length of time Sino-Japanese couples lived together after marriage) also considerably strengthened the evidence base of the experiences of Sino-Japanese CBOW (see Appendices 3, 4 and 5). Moreover, Sino-Japanese CBOW in these personal documents referred to their migration to Japan as 'return' to the 'homeland', just like the study participants.

Nevertheless, there were moments in which I felt that I was violating the privacy of Sino-Japanese CBOW and their parents while reading through their words. McKee and Porter stated that the process of doing archival research requires dialogue, interaction, consultation and negotiation with multiple audiences (e.g. offspring of deceased persons, other archival researchers, ethics committee), whether they speak to the researcher in person or via archival materials to make ethical decisions.¹⁹⁹ They also pointed out that a common practical strategy that archival researchers take in addressing tough ethical questions is 'consulting with others, asking questions and listening carefully and respectfully to a variety of interested parties'.²⁰⁰ In the absence of in-person conversation and consent, I tried to have imaginary 'dialogues' with the persons speaking in these documents and treat their words respectfully. I quoted a Japanese father's letter addressed to a Sino-Japanese CBOW about his loving relationship with his Chinese wife (see Chapter 4, p. 132) which defy the common notion that wartime Sino-Japanese intimate relationships were mere 'temporary affairs'. I tried to treat the deceased man who wrote the letter in the same manner as I treated my research participants and had imaginary dialogues with him on the benefits of citing his words for the purpose of deepening our understanding of wartime Sino-Japanese intimate relationships.

This study critically examines how, why and by whom these written sources were produced and investigates the inherent biases.²⁰¹ As for the testimonies regarding the parents' marriage and life experiences of Sino-Japanese CBOW, one needs to be aware that they were written for the purpose of acquiring Japanese nationality. For instance, a participant stated in his written testimony submitted to the Japanese family court that he once attempted to commit suicide by jumping out of a building from the upstairs window where he was placed in confinement during the Cultural Revolution. I asked him about this incident because this episode was missing in his narrative in an interview conducted

¹⁹⁹ McKee and Porter, *The ethics of archival research*, p. 74.

²⁰⁰ McKee and Porter, *The ethics of archival research*, p. 76.

²⁰¹ Maekawa, K. 2006. *Ōraru hisutorī no jissen: Indonesia heiho o meguru katari to rekishi taiken* [Practicing oral history: Narratives and historical experiences of Indonesians who were forced to fight for the Imperial Japanese Army]. *Rekishigaku Kenkyū*, 813, pp. 8-16, p. 11.

earlier. He stated that although he did take great risks to escape from the persecution, he had not meant to kill himself. He wrote that he attempted to commit suicide to emphasise the adversities he suffered as a CBOW to appeal to the Japanese family court judges. Despite the unreliability and lapses of memory as well as possibility of exaggeration, the family court deemed these documents credible because the information presented was particularly detailed and was collected from several people over many years. The family court not only requested that all of the testimonies be notarised in China, but they also cross-checked the information whenever possible. For instance, when a Sino-Japanese CBOW could identify either the father or the father's former Japanese colleagues who were repatriated, the court tried to contact them for verification. Unlike secondary sources that provide little information about Sino-Japanese CBOW, these detailed documents serve as powerful evidence of Sino-Japanese consensual relationships during and after the war as well as of the strong determination of some Sino-Japanese CBOW to migrate to Japan.

In addition to above-mentioned secondary sources and unpublished personal documents, I have also collected memoirs of Japanese men who remained in post-war China, the Minutes of the Diet and legal precedents which included some information about Sino-Japanese CBOW. Consequently, this study identified approximately 230 Sino-Japanese CBOW through written sources. While these unearthed sources may not provide comprehensive evidence of the scale and experiences of a potentially much larger group of individuals, a critical use of a combination of collected sources can consolidate evidence base of wartime and post-war Sino-Japanese consensual relationships and consequent birth of Sino-Japanese CBOW.

2.3 Identifying participants in China and Japan

I have conducted oral history interviews with eight participants for this study (see Appendix 1). For some groups of CBOW in other historical and geographical settings, their support groups play an important part in providing the researchers with access to potential participants.²⁰² However, because no such support group for Sino-Japanese CBOW exists in China or Japan, identifying participants required a considerable amount of time and needed various strategies.

This study originally aimed to find approximately the same number of participants in both Japan and China to compare similarities and differences in their formation of identity and belonging. However, information and means for finding potential participants were extremely limited and challenging in China, and only one participant could be interviewed for this study. In China, several researchers observed that conducting

²⁰² Mochmann, *Children born of war: a decade of international and interdisciplinary research*, p. 330.

fieldwork has become increasingly difficult in the recent years. Since Xi Jinping became president and general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party at the beginning of the 2010s, the state control and repression targeting academics, activists and civil society have increased.²⁰³ In addition, Sino-Japanese CBOW are not currently recognised as a category of individuals, and there is no association in China. It is impossible to identify them by their appearance as their physical features are not visibly different from the majority of the Chinese population. Furthermore, it is likely that some Sino-Japanese CBOW are not aware of their biological origin even in their old age. Their caregivers and neighbours might have managed to keep their origin secret even though the child might have felt odd in the family or in the community.

When I started my search for potential participants in China, efforts such as sending emails to the Chinese Red Cross Society, foreign affairs offices in China and Chinese journalists, were unfruitful. After a long search, Shan Yongyun, who resides in Jinan, Shandong Province, could be identified in online news articles.²⁰⁴ All of my attempts to find her address ended in vain and therefore I still did not know where she lived when I arrived at Jinan airport in January 2017. However, thanks to a Japanese photographer, who had previously taken photos of Yongyun and her father, I learned that her flat was near a surgery where her father used to work. I eventually found her by knocking on doors in the neighbourhood of the surgery, enquiring about her whereabouts. I found out from another participant that one Sino-Japanese CBOW currently resides in Nanjing, but unfortunately this person refused to participate in this research for unknown reasons. Having only one participant in China made a meaningful comparative study of CBOW who remained in China and those who migrated to Japan impossible. Therefore, this study will focus on the experiences, identity, and belonging of Sino-Japanese CBOW who migrated to Japan. However, some information of Yongyun's life such as her parents' relationship and experiences in her childhood and adolescence will be included in the analysis.

To find participants who migrated to Japan, I first contacted 118 support groups for stranded war orphans.²⁰⁵ These support groups were established across Japan mostly in the 1980s and 1990s to help stranded war orphans to acquire Japanese nationality and resettle in Japan. Because most representatives of these support groups were in their old age, many of them were not using emails and therefore letters and participant information

²⁰³ Fuchs, D., Tse, P. F. and Feng, X. 2019. Labour research under coercive authoritarianism: Comparative reflections on fieldwork challenges in China. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 40 (1), pp. 132-155, p. 133.

²⁰⁴ See, for example, '103 sui Shanqi Hong cishi' [103-year-old Shanqi Hong passes away], *Jinan Shibao*, 2 December 2010. <http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2010-12-02/042918425185s.shtml> (accessed on 15 August 2020)

²⁰⁵ I mostly referred to the list of support groups provided by the Support and Communications Centers for People Returning from China. See, <https://www.sien-center.or.jp/fund/volunteer/index.html> (accessed on 15 May 2019)

sheets needed to be sent by mail. The overall response rate of these support groups was forty-nine per cent. It turned out that some groups were nominally existent but were inactive due to health issues or the death of elderly representatives.

This study found five Sino-Japanese CBOW who were registered as members of these support groups for stranded war orphans. In the case of the aforementioned support group *Chūgoku kikokusha Nicchū yūkō no kai* (see p. 43), which supports more than 350 stranded war orphans in Tokyo, the association's Japanese contact person was cooperative because she found the research topic historically significant.²⁰⁶ She identified two participants for this study by asking her Chinese colleague who could communicate in Chinese with the members. Similarly, another support group for stranded war wives and orphans in Tokyo, *Chūgoku kikokusha no kai* (Association of returnees from China) was also cooperative and identified one participant amongst their members. In the case of an association for stranded war orphans that supports their language learning in Kanagawa called *Nihongo Dōjō* (Japanese language training school), the Japanese representative knew a potential participant because the representative could speak fluent Chinese and had a good relationship with the participant.

However, the support groups for stranded war orphans at times played the role of 'gatekeepers' who controlled the access to members of their community.²⁰⁷ When I first contacted these representatives, most of them replied that they were not aware of any Sino-Japanese CBOW amongst their members. However, I eventually learned that most representatives simply did not know about their members' personal information in detail. They usually avoided asking the members about their origin because such questions could evoke traumatic memories. They also could not communicate directly with the members due to linguistic barriers between them and the members.

Thus, my ability to speak Chinese proved useful in recruiting participants. A representative of another support group for stranded war orphans, *Chūgoku kikoku kazoku o shiensuru kai* (Support group for returnees and their families from China) in Chiba at first responded to my letter saying that it is unlikely that they find a Sino-Japanese CBOW in their group.²⁰⁸ Nevertheless, they allowed me to visit their members' weekly event. When I met the Japanese representative and volunteers, they all repeated that Sino-Japanese CBOW do not exist amongst the members. However, one of the stranded war

²⁰⁶ As of 3 July 2019, there were 352 members, and there are at least 1 member who is a Sino-Japanese child born of war who is one of the research participants. https://www.sien-center.or.jp/fund/volunteer/tokyo/tokyo_18.html (accessed on 17 September 2019)

²⁰⁷ McAreavey, R. and Das, C. 2013. A delicate balancing act: Negotiating with gatekeepers for ethical research when researching minority communities. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 12 (1), pp. 113-131, p. 116.

²⁰⁸ The fieldwork in Japan took place in December 2015, May 2016, January 2017, May 2017 and December 2017. The fieldwork in Jinan (Shandong Province) took place in January 2017.

orphans, to whom I could talk about my research in Chinese, introduced me to another member, who knew about a Sino-Japanese CBOW in the group.

Furthermore, some Japanese representatives of support groups for stranded war orphans understood my request to search for Sino-Japanese CBOW born during and after the war as a request to find offspring of male stranded war orphans who married a local woman. Such a misunderstanding was not surprising, given the fact that they were knowledgeable about the history of Manchuria but had no knowledge about Sino-Japanese consensual relationships in different parts of China during and after the war. A support group representative who displayed interest in the subject of Sino-Japanese CBOW stated,

In urban areas of Manchuria in particular, it is hard to imagine that children were born of Japanese men and Chinese women during the war. . . . But come to think of it, there must have been children who were born of Chinese women and Japanese men who remained in post-war China. . . . I wonder whether these children had a choice to live in Japan. I've never thought about why we never hear about their stories.²⁰⁹

However, another representative expressed his frustration and criticised the researcher for having incorrect understanding of the history of Manchuria and stranded war orphans.

You mentioned [in your email] that it has been difficult for you to find those individuals you are looking for. I understand why. It is probably because you don't have a correct understanding of historical circumstances under which stranded war orphans survived. . . . I think it is highly unlikely that children were born of Japanese fathers and Chinese mothers during and after the war exist.²¹⁰

The above support group representative in his old age was not only using his power to control access to potential participants but was also playing the role as a gatekeeper of memory around Manchuria and stranded war orphans based on his personal memories and knowledge about the war. Although I eventually told him that some Sino-Japanese CBOW could be identified through other support groups, he did not offer his cooperation in searching for potential participants amongst his group members. Thus, the number of participants identified through these support groups might have been affected by representatives who decided that wartime Sino-Japanese consensual relationships and the consequent birth of Sino-Japanese CBOW were impossible.

²⁰⁹ E-mail correspondence, a representative of a support group for stranded war orphans in Hyogo Prefecture, 5 September 2016.

²¹⁰ E-mail correspondence, a representative of a support group for stranded war orphans in Nagano Prefecture, 5 March 2016.

Two other participants in Japan were found not through support groups for stranded war orphans but by other means. One participant could be contacted through a Japanese publisher, as the participant had published his autobiography in 2014.²¹¹ Another participant was identified in a newspaper article published in 1983 and was found by contacting his old acquaintances who were members of a theatre company mentioned in the article.²¹² Three Sino-Japanese CBOW whom I identified through various sources had already passed away before this research project started. Five Sino-Japanese CBOW in Japan, whom I identified through one of the participants and support groups for stranded war orphans, refused to participate for unknown reasons. Seiji, one of the participants, asked on my behalf whether two other Sino-Japanese CBOW residing in Japan would be willing to participate in the research, but the request was declined. Seiji stated that the reason why they decided not to participate in the research must be because their lives were considerably more difficult than his.²¹³ As will be discussed in Chapter 5, most participants expressed their sense of satisfaction about their decision to migrate to Japan and their current situation. While the reasons why some Sino-Japanese CBOW refused to take part in the research may be personal and diverse, their rejections point to the fact that the collected oral history materials are not representative of Sino-Japanese CBOW as a group, and that there are potential biases in the commonalities found in the participants' narratives.

Appendix 1 and 2 shows the list of participants interviewed in this study. None of the participants had been interviewed on their experiences in the past.²¹⁴ Five participants (Yuko, Michiko, Koretada, Seiji and Momoko) were born in wartime China before Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration on 14 August 1945. As for three other participants (Toshio, Keiko and Yongyun), they were born after the end of the war and were fathered by Japanese who remained in post-war China. The differences in the circumstances for their parents who had consensual relationships during and after the war will be discussed later in Chapter 4.

Most participants were born and raised in large cities such as Beijing, Nanjing and Shanghai, similar to twenty other Sino-Japanese CBOW found in the personal documents obtained from the law firm (see Appendix 1 and 3). While currently the memory of war-affected children of the Second Sino-Japanese War is closely linked to northeast China,

²¹¹ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku* [The last soldier that returned to Japan: Fukatani Yoshiharu and his family].

²¹² 'Chichino kuni e: Eijū no michi saguru' [Returning to the father's country: Searching for ways for his permanent return]. *Mainichi Shimbun*, 4 May 1983.

²¹³ Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

²¹⁴ Yongyun has received many media interviews in the past, but she was always asked about her father, who was a well-known Japanese doctor in Jinan, Shandong Province, and passed away at the age of 102.

this spread of participants in different areas of China show that this study can shed light on war-affected children in the neglected geographical areas in post-war China.²¹⁵

The recruitment process was considerably more difficult and time-consuming than I had initially expected. Most participants did not know other Sino-Japanese CBOW and therefore snowball sampling was not possible. As oral historian Paul Thompson stated, ‘the far limit of the past recoverable through oral evidence recedes remorselessly through death, day by day’²¹⁶; I felt a sense of urgency in finding elderly Sino-Japanese CBOW. However, I eventually stopped actively searching for participants after recruiting eight participants and exhausting all reasonable means likely to result in the identification of potential participants within the time frame of this doctoral project. The process of recruitment was constantly communicated with my supervisors, and pragmatism about recruitment played an important role in adjusting research strategies and shaping and reshaping the research focus.

2.4 Oral history materials, methods and positionality

Oral history materials constitute an essential part of this study. Narratives that were collected from eight participants turned out to be incredibly informative. This section explores the discussion on oral history materials as well as how I interviewed the participants and how my positionality affected the interviews.

Until the 1970s, discussion on the issues of oral history concentrated on the historical truthfulness and potential unreliability of memory.²¹⁷ However, Frisch asserted that memory itself should become the object of study for oral historians and contributed to shifting of the debate towards subjectivities and strengths of oral history materials.²¹⁸ In his work ‘What makes oral history different’ – originally written in 1979 – Portelli objected to critics of oral history on several points.²¹⁹ For instance, Portelli pointed out that significance of factual verification not just for oral history materials but also for all types of historical sources. He argued ‘the importance of oral testimony may lie not in its adherence to fact, but rather in its departure from it, as imagination, symbolism, and desire

²¹⁵ Only one participant, Keiko, is from Heihe, Heilongjiang Province, in the northeast.

²¹⁶ Thompson, P. 2000. *The voice of the past: Oral history, third edition*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 308.

²¹⁷ Smith, G. Making history: The changing face of the profession in Britain, ‘The making of oral history: Section 1-2’. https://archives.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/articles/oral_history.html#memory (accessed on 18 August 2020); Sugiman, P. 2013. I can hear Lois now: Corrections to my story of the internment of Japanese Canadians—“For the record”. In *Oral history off the record: Toward an ethnography of practice*, eds. A. Sheftel and S. Zembrzycki, pp. 149-167, p. 164. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

²¹⁸ Smith, Making history: The changing face of the profession in Britain.

²¹⁹ Portelli, A. 2015. What makes oral history different. In *The Oral History Reader*, ed. R. Perks and A. Thomson, pp. 48-58. London: Routledge.

emerge'.²²⁰ In an oral history interview, by interacting with a researcher, a participant recalls and selectively shares specific episodes out of countless other episodes in his or her life to 'make sense of the past and give a form to their lives'.²²¹ The very 'unreliability' of memory has been argued as a strength as the shifting and creative nature of memory provides historians with 'new ways of understanding the past, not just in what was recalled, but also with regard to continuity and change in the meaning given to events.'²²²

Such a meaning-making process occurs in the context of participant-researcher relationship. Thus, the researcher's interest in the lives of the participant and positionality is one of the key elements in oral history. Thompson argued that one of the reasons why ordinary people have been given little attention (except for the time of crisis) until the twentieth century was because historians focused on documenting the struggle of power which mattered the most for many historians themselves who belonged to the administering and governing classes.²²³ One of the aims for oral historians has been therefore to shift the focus from a history written from the perspective of the elite to more marginal perspectives with a focus on a 'history from below'.²²⁴ Oral history has given voices to and brought recognition to a wider range of individuals who are normally hidden, invisible and ignored.²²⁵ For this reason, the use of oral history for CBOW studies is particularly suitable as CBOW across time and space, including Sino-Japanese CBOW, are often hidden, invisible and ignored. In the aforementioned CHIBOW network (see p. 4), oral history interviews have also been a principal method of data collection amongst historians. Hershatter, who conducted oral history interviews with elderly Chinese women in rural areas, stated that her participants' life accounts did not by itself allow her to construct a history. Instead, their accounts 'confound and complicate and sometimes derail' our existing knowledge or preconceptions and point to the parts missing from our understanding of history.'²²⁶ This study will be guided by an understanding that the collected narratives are analysed not to reconstruct a comprehensive history of Sino-Japanese CBOW but to pay attention to the shifting meaning in the participants' narratives and be open to narratives that challenge researcher's assumptions that could lead to new ways to understand the past.

²²⁰ Portelli, What makes oral history different, p. 53.

²²¹ Hershatter, *The Gender of Memory: Rural Women and China's Collective Past*, p. 23.

²²² Portelli, What makes oral history different, pp. 48-58.

²²³ Thompson, P. 2015. The voice of the past: Oral history. In *The Oral History Reader*, ed. R. Perks and A. Thomson, pp. 33-39. London: Routledge, p. 34.

²²⁴ Smith, Making history: The changing face of the profession in Britain.

²²⁵ Hershatter, G. 2011. *The Gender of memory: Rural women and China's collective past*. Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 15.; Thompson, *The voice of the past: Oral history, third edition*, p. 8.

²²⁶ Ibid.

What sets oral history sources apart from most written sources is that they offer a potentially wider range of emotional evidence than most written sources.²²⁷ Such emotional evidence is an important component of the subjective meanings of past events and experiences in oral history materials. The process of transcription, however, removes the testimony of some of its most powerful features such as ‘changes in the pace and tone and pitch of the voice, facial expressions, gestures, non-verbal sounds such as laughter and crying, as well as silences’ that carry implicit meaning and social connotations that are absent in written sources.²²⁸ Thus, in analysing oral history transcripts, I listened to the recorded interviews carefully and paid attention to the emotional evidence. The following excerpt is from an interview with Yongyun, fathered by a Japanese man who remained in post-war China as a doctor.²²⁹ It is one example that clearly illustrates the significance of non-verbal information in understanding what a participant really means by their narrative.

Researcher and interpreter: You were called ‘*guizi nü'er*’ (Japanese devil’s daughter)²³⁰ in your childhood. Until which age were you called this way?

Yongyun: Even when I started to work, I was called this way. And even just before my retirement, people still called me *guizi nü'er* from time to time. I used to reply, ‘What? What do you want?’ Well, I was frequently called like this. . . . My colleagues were just joking with me. Some of my colleagues liked to say ‘Hey, *guizi nü'er*!’²³¹

How Yongyun replied to her former colleagues (‘What? What do you want?’) and how her colleagues called her (‘Hey, *guizi nü'er*!’) might be perceived as aggressive exchange of words when we simply read the interview transcript. However, she gave meaning to this episode through her tone of voice, facial expressions, gestures and laughter, most of which are lost from the transcript. She talked about the interactions with her former colleagues playfully and jokingly and ended the episode with a laughter. Although this label stayed with her almost until her retirement, Yongyun wanted to emphasise through this episode that she maintained good long-term relationships with her colleagues and that they called her by the nickname to tease her without any ill intention. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, despite the fact that all participants shared their adverse experiences as CBOW in the interview, I often walked out of the interview venue feeling uplifted because of how positively participants narrated their experiences. Such emotional

²²⁷ Hamilton, C. 2010. Moving feelings: Nationalism, feminism and the emotions of politics. *Oral History*, 38(2), pp. 85-94, p. 86.

²²⁸ Karpf, A. 2014. The human voice and the texture of experience. *Oral History*, 42(2), pp. 50-55, p. 51.; Hamilton, Moving feelings: Nationalism, feminism and the emotions of politics, p. 86.

²²⁹ See for example, <http://news.iqilu.com/shandong/yaowen/2010/1202/372356.shtml> (Available on 15 October 2019)

²³⁰ *Guizi* is a Chinese derogatory term for ‘Japanese’ that evokes images of cruel Japanese soldiers during the war, and *nü'er* means ‘daughter’.

²³¹ Interview transcript, Yongyun, Shandong, China, 12 January 2017.

evidence will be taken into account in analysing the meaning that participants have given to their experiences from today's vantage point.

This study adopted in-depth semi-structured oral history interviews. I generally started the interview by explaining that I was interested in the respondents' overall life experiences in both China and Japan as well as their current situation. Partly informed by non-interfering techniques of biographical narrative analysis, I tried not to interrupt so that the participant could lead the interview and narrate without any questions from the researcher in order to elicit the richest account as possible. I then asked follow-up questions based on a list of detailed points which I wanted to enquire about.²³² However, when the participant was ill at ease with such an interview method or an interpreter was present in the interview, I led the interview by asking questions. I also followed up probing questions where fact-finding was necessary to make up for the scarcity of written sources. Moreover, based on the information I obtained from the completed interviews, I added further questions to those I had prepared before starting the fieldwork. This was necessary because when one conducts oral history interviews, themes and problems can only become clear gradually in the research process.²³³ For instance, I initially did not plan to ask about their legal procedures for acquiring Japanese nationality in detail. However, in the course of conducting interviews, it became clear that it was important to ask about different legal procedures that participants took as these procedures had profound impact on their identity (see Chapter 5, p. 178). Thus, while all participants were asked to narrate their life experiences in China and Japan in general, it was essential to ask about matters that assumed importance in the conducted interviews to ensure equality of information gained from each interview and make points of comparability for the analysis.

The length of the interview and the number of sessions were contingent on not just the schedule of participants and the researcher but also on the participant's stamina and their willingness to share their experiences (see Appendix 2). For some participants, it took around two to three hours to come to a natural stopping point, whereas others could narrate for more than four hours in one interview with short breaks in between. When I could meet a participant more than once over a prolonged period, it generally helped to build rapport and elicit information that the participant did not reveal in the first interview.

Oral history narratives are co-produced in the process of remembering and meaning-making between the participants and the interviewer that takes place in the context of a

²³² See, for example, Schütze, F. Pressure and guilt: War experiences of a young German soldier and their biographical implications (Part 1). *International Sociology*, 7(2), pp. 187-208, p. 190.

²³³ Burawoy, M. 1998. The extended case method. *Sociological Theory*, 16(1), pp. 4-33, p. 11.

unique participant-researcher relationship at a specific juncture of the participant's life.²³⁴ For this reason, it is crucial to reflect on positionality in assessing the collected information as both parties' perception of one another has significant effects on the co-produced narrative. Each time I met a new participant, there was a boundary defined by age, gender, occupation as well as cultural and linguistic background that set me and the participants apart. It was clear that I was an 'outsider' for the participants in many ways. I was an unknown Japanese PhD student who was coming from the United Kingdom, interested in their life experiences. My native language is Japanese, unlike the participants who are fully proficient in Chinese and less so in Japanese due to the fact that they had spent the first three to four decades of their lives in China. Participants categorised me based on their notions of factors such as age, gender, and level of education. This created a particular power relationship between the participants and the researcher. One participant would call me '*sensei*' (teacher) as I belonged to a university.²³⁵ Other participants would praise me for collecting such life stories as a 'volunteer' or for travelling from the UK to Japan as a 'mother' of a small child.

Does being an 'outsider' become a disadvantage or an advantage in producing an oral history narrative? Differences between participant and researcher could have both effects. On one hand, being perceived as knowing little about the interviewee's culture could be an advantage as the researcher can adopt the position of a 'learner'.²³⁶ In such a case, participants may provide a detailed description of certain events. On the other hand, participants often respond more favourably to a researcher who is similar to themselves.²³⁷ When a researcher assumes the position of an 'insider', identifying with the social position, perspective and experience of the participant it may constrain the participant-researcher interaction by shaping the questions, interpretations of responses as well as follow-up questions.²³⁸

Although I was an 'outsider' in many ways, my familiarity with Chinese history, politics, culture and language helped to gain some level of credibility. I had studied and worked in China for five years in the past. My age happened to be close to the participants' children's age and the fact that I was a mother of a small child often helped to break the ice and usually prompted conversations about their family life. Interviewees could narrate in their preferred language: Chinese or Japanese. Consequently, half of the participants spoke in Chinese and the other half in Japanese (see Appendix 2). Providing the choice

²³⁴ Sitzia, L. 2003. A shared authority: An impossible goal? *The Oral History Review*, 30(1), pp. 87-101, p. 95.; Sakurai, A. 2007. Ethical dilemmas in life story research. *Advanced Social Research*, 6, pp. 87-113.

²³⁵ Interview transcript, Koretada, Saitama, Japan, 22 May 2017.

²³⁶ Burgos-Debray, E. ed. 1984. *I, Rigoberta Menchú: an Indian woman in Guatemala*. London: Verso, p. xix.

²³⁷ Fielding, N. 1994. Varieties of research interviews. *Nurse Researcher*, 1(3), pp. 4-13.

²³⁸ Harding, J. 2010. Talk about care: Emotions, culture and oral history. *Oral History*, 38 (2), pp. 33-42, p. 36.; Anderson, K. and Jack, D.C. 2015. Learning to listen: Interview techniques and analyses. In *The oral history reader*, eds. R. Perks and A. Thomson, pp. 179-192. London: Routledge.

of preferred language was important because speaking in a second language may require extra effort for the participants especially when emotional and sensitive topics are involved and may lead to other negative consequences such as participants' increased sense of discontent about themselves and decreased accuracy of the data.²³⁹ Those who chose to speak in Chinese, their native language, seemed at ease in expressing themselves, however, as will be discussed shortly, the participant-researcher relationship was complicated by the presence of an interpreter. As for those who chose to speak in Japanese, my ability to understand Chinese was useful. Whenever they could not express something in Japanese, they could say it in Chinese. Their level of proficiency and confidence in speaking Japanese revealed to some extent the effort they had put in to blend into Japan and manage their lives in Japan after their migration in their mid-life.

Actively making personal links with participants had some disadvantages. When the participants assume that the researcher understands all their stories, there is a risk that participants omit explanations about certain experiences and contexts. Thus, a 'productive tension', as it were, was at times necessary to bridge information gaps between the participant and the researcher. For instance, I needed to ask questions that might have sounded too rudimentary from the participants' point of view, which usually resulted in the participant's disappointment or an astonished look. In an interview with Seiji, I asked him whether he ever considered applying to become a Communist Party member at his workplace during the Cultural Revolution. Although I assumed that it must have been difficult for a Sino-Japanese CBOW to become a party member, I asked the question to test my assumption. Seiji laughed nervously and stated, 'What is the point of doing something that is utterly impossible?'²⁴⁰ By asking questions like this, participants understood the limits of my understanding.

It also needs to be noted that participants may not only perceive the researcher as 'insider' or 'outsider' but also as a preserver of historical accounts. Such a perception evokes stories that they perceive to be of interest for present and future generations.²⁴¹ All participants in this study seemed to be motivated by their desire to put to good use their long-neglected life stories that they may not have shared even with their relatives and friends. As will be discussed in Chapter 5 (see p. 182), some participants in this study emphasised their role as a 'bridge builder' that carries a message of peace and friendship for their paternal and maternal countries. It is likely that these participants shared such an account for the present and future generations given the current political tensions between China and Japan.

²³⁹ Murray, C. D. and Wynne, J. 2010. Researching community, work and family with an interpreter. *Community, Work and Family*, 4(2), pp. 157-171, p. 159.

²⁴⁰ Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

²⁴¹ Yow, V. R. 1995. Ethics and Interpersonal Relationships in Oral History Research. *The Oral History Review*, 22(1), pp. 51-66, p. 51.

The presence of an interpreter influenced the participant-researcher relationship as well as the co-produced narratives in the interview. Although I could understand most of what participants stated in Chinese, my Chinese comprehension becomes limited when a Chinese speaker speaks with a strong accent or frequently uses proper nouns and idioms. For this reason, I asked an interpreter to accompany me when an interview was to be conducted in Chinese. However, the presence of an interpreter posed some challenges. When a loquacious participant with a strong accent spoke for a few minutes without interruption, translation could not be comprehensive and at times affected the researcher's understanding of what was narrated during the interview.²⁴² In another instance, although I clarified the respective roles of the interpreter and the researcher in a briefing session prior to the interview, an interpreter took a more active part in the interview than was desirable and crafted a few questions on her own. Nonetheless, having an interpreter in the interview at times enriched the participant's narrative, too. Keiko's interpreter, Yoshiko,²⁴³ was her Japanese language teacher and a long-time friend. Keiko said she wanted to cooperate for the research precisely because Yoshiko, whom she trusts fully, recommended to take the interview.²⁴⁴ Keiko could have been more guarded in sharing her stories had I interviewed her on my own. As Murray and Wynne pointed out, the interpreters were 'just as much a part of the communicative process and resultant narratives as the participants and the researcher'.²⁴⁵

The dynamics during the interview also changed with the presence of a participant's family member. Three out of eight participants (Seiji, Momoko and Yongyun) preferred or did not mind their spouses to be present at the interview. I did not expect a participant to be accompanied by their family member, and so I had not specifically requested the support groups to arrange a one-to-one interview.²⁴⁶ Presence of a family member in an interview is debatable as an oral history practice. However, it must be acknowledged that once a researcher enters the participant's preferred interview venue, things rarely conform with 'best practices'.²⁴⁷ As Portelli stated, 'little disturbances are an essential part of the experience and provide information about context, relationships, and . . . background',

²⁴² This interview was recorded, and so the researcher could understand everything that was narrated from the interview transcript later.

²⁴³ Yoshiko is a pseudonym.

²⁴⁴ Interview transcript, Keiko, Kanagawa, Japan, 20 May 2016.

²⁴⁵ Murray and Wynne, *Researching community, work and family with an interpreter. Community, Work and Family*, p. 168.

²⁴⁶ Some oral history guidelines recommend to set a project policy that participants will be interviewed one to one and inform participants prior to the interview. See, for example, Introduction to oral history, Baylor University Institute for Oral History, pp. 1-19, p. 9.

<https://www.baylor.edu/content/services/document.php/43912.pdf> (accessed on 17 August 2020)

²⁴⁷ Sheftel and Zembrzycki, *Oral history off the record: Toward an ethnography of practice*, p. 4.

staying flexible and observing the unanticipated situation could help to better understand the participants' lives.²⁴⁸

When a support group volunteer and I were invited into Momoko's flat, her husband was sitting next to Momoko and occasionally took part in the interview.²⁴⁹ It was inappropriate to ask her husband to refrain from participating in the interview because he was in his wheelchair and had nowhere else to be in their tiny public housing apartment. While Momoko seemed perfectly comfortable, it is still possible that her depth of expression declined when narrating a sensitive and emotional topic in the presence of her husband.²⁵⁰ However, in this interview, I could gain information about how the husband played a role in persuading Momoko to acquire Japanese nationality to migrate to Japan and understand her living conditions that partly shape her experience in Japan.

In another instance, Seiji brought his wife to the interview which took place in an office room of a support group for stranded war orphans in Tokyo. Although there were a few troubling moments where his wife disagreed with Seiji and tried to answer my questions on his behalf, it seemed that Seiji wanted his wife to accompany him as his partner who would help him remember certain events from the past. As her level of Japanese proficiency was higher, she also helped Seiji whenever he felt the need to speak in Japanese.²⁵¹ It was Seiji's own will to come to the interview with his wife, and her presence seemed to have contributed to the ease with which he shared his life story with the researcher.

As we have seen above, adjusting interview methods and building participant-researcher relationship were essential in collecting rich accounts in all interviews. To draw out the full implications of the collected oral history materials in the analysis, it needs to be taken into account not only the general advantages and limitations of oral history but also the specific relationships and situations of the interview in which the narratives and non-verbal emotional evidence were produced.

2.5 Methodological and ethical challenges

Ethics was a central element throughout the research process: research planning, data collection as well as data analysis and dissemination. Oral history interviews often delve into participant's life experiences that involve adversities. A host of scholarly works acknowledge that research on a sensitive issue raises methodological, technical, ethical,

²⁴⁸ Portelli, A. 2013. Afterword. In *Oral history off the record: Toward an ethnography of practice*, eds. A. Sheftel, and S. Zembrzycki, pp. 273-286, p. 284. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

²⁴⁹ Interview transcript, Momoko, Tokyo, Japan, 23 May 2017.

²⁵⁰ Murray and Wynne, Researching community, work and family with an interpreter. *Community, Work and Family*, p. 165.

²⁵¹ Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

political and legal problems as well as having potential effects not only on the personal life of participants but also of the researcher.²⁵² This section discusses how I found myself caught in a quandary about methodological and ethical dilemmas as well as how I sought to resolve the problems.

Before starting the fieldwork, I acquired an ethical approval for this study from the ethics committee at the University of Birmingham, and this procedure ensured that I thoroughly considered the risks for participants who are potentially vulnerable and the importance of ensuring participant's anonymity and confidentiality. As one of the measures to minimise possible distress that a participant might experience during and after the interview, the contact information of a mental health helpline available in both Japanese and Chinese was collected. Furthermore, interview questions, a participant information sheet, a consent form as well as a withdrawal of consent form (in Chinese, Japanese and English) were prepared by following legal and ethical guidelines of oral history. As in any oral history interview, there are always limitations to the preparation because participants' emotions – both positive and negative – can be triggered not only by narrating life stories but also in the context of building unique participant-researcher relationships. Despite the preparation, most methodological and ethical challenges that I encountered in the research process were difficult to anticipate before the fieldwork and more complex than I initially expected. To co-produce knowledge in oral history interviews, ethical decision-making needed to be applied flexibly to participants with different expectations and needs.

One of the methodological and ethical challenges I encountered was the refusal to have the interview recorded by two participants. They seemed disturbed about getting their narration recorded by a researcher whom they had only just met. While the reasons were possibly complex, both of them had lived in a state of fear in a surveillance society under Mao, and it may well be that a voice recorder had triggered this conscious or unconscious reaction. One of them, Yuko, had shown other signs of her ingrained fear due to a series of political campaigns that she witnessed in China. For instance, during an interview in a café, she would frequently look around and state 'I fear that people are spying on me'.²⁵³ Methodological studies on data collection agree that collecting data is often a sensitive task in qualitative research and in some cases participants ask the researcher to take notes instead of recording the interview.²⁵⁴ While it was an ethical decision to conduct an interview without recording it and their refusal could be an eloquent evidence of long-

²⁵² Renzetti, C. M. and Lee, R. M. 1993. *Researching Sensitive Topics*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

²⁵³ The venue was appointed by Yuko herself. She could not invite me into her flat as her husband was against taking the interview. Her husband's relatives work as civil servants in China, and he was afraid that the interview might have negative consequences for them.

²⁵⁴ Sixsmith, J. 1999. Working in the hidden economy: The experience of unemployed men in the UK. *Community, Work & Family*, 2(3), pp. 257–278.; Murray and Wynne, Researching community, work and family with an interpreter. *Community, Work and Family*, p. 164-165.

lasting consequences of past adversities, it meant that these interviews will not produce as rich a data set as recorded interviews might have done.

To ensure reliability of the collected data from my scrawled notes, I took different measures to verify my interview notes. As for one of them, Michiko, together with a story artist, I made a short animation film based on her life story as a form of research dissemination.²⁵⁵ I could use this opportunity to show her the script I wrote based on my interview notes and asked her to check the content. However, I did not ask the other participant, Yuko, to ensure the accuracy of the summary of my interview notes. In the first interview, she emphasised how happy and fortunate she has been but held back negative information. As her sense of trust towards the researcher grew, however, she not only shared more information about her complex life story but also her negative emotions including her suicidal thoughts. Because her narratives were in constant flux, had I shown a summary of interview notes, it was likely that she would revise many of the things she had narrated previously. For this reason, instead of showing her the summary, I verified in the ensuing meeting some points that were unclear from the previous interviews.

Another ethical challenge in this project was to deal with expectations from a participant without sufficient psychological, financial and legal support. Social and psychological support for CBOW are often unavailable or insufficient in various historical and geopolitical settings. As a result, researchers of CBOW could be regarded as the 'last resort' to resolve their personal challenges. Oral history interviews could be regarded as a 'therapy' for participants in need of psychological support.²⁵⁶ Previous CBOW studies have shown that there are cases in which researchers were asked by participants to help search for the biological father.²⁵⁷ Ethical absolutist approaches would recommend setting a clear professional boundary between the participant and the researcher by establishing firm principles.²⁵⁸ However, at the same time, oral history methods encourage establishing a trustful relationship with the participant that allows the researcher to delve deeply into the participant's personal stories.²⁵⁹ In reality, very often there are anything but clear-cut guidelines or solutions when encountering ethical dilemmas in the field, and it can be an extremely delicate task to achieve a balance between building a trustful relationship and maintaining a professional distance especially

²⁵⁵ 'Michiko: a child born of war', Zhou, V., 15 May 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvD-z5NaLU> (accessed on 31 July 2020)

²⁵⁶ Rickard, W. 1998. Oral history - 'More dangerous than therapy?': Interviewees' reflections on recording traumatic or taboo issues. *Oral History*, 26(2), pp. 34-48.

²⁵⁷ Schretter, L., Kuramitsu, K. and Sersté, N. Ethical challenges in conducting interviews with children born of war: Reflections on navigating participants' expectations. Forthcoming.

²⁵⁸ Plummer, K. 2001. The moral and human face of life stories: Reflexivity, power and ethics. In *Documents of life 2: An invitation to a critical humanism*, pp. 1-25, p. 21. London: Sage.

²⁵⁹ Oral History Society in the UK, for example, states in its guideline, 'A good interview is only achievable if there is mutual trust and rapport between the people involved.' Oral History Society, 'Is your oral history legal and ethical?'. <https://www.ohs.org.uk/advice/ethical-and-legal/4/#interview-relationship> (accessed on 17 August 2020)

when a vulnerable individual lacks adequate support systems and develops a specific expectation towards the researcher.²⁶⁰ I have taken a practical ethics approach which acknowledges that codes of conduct, protocols, rules and theories are only partially helpful in resolving dilemmas in fieldwork.²⁶¹ Ethical decision-making needed to be made taking into account some priorities in a specific participant-researcher relationship and context.

A case of the aforementioned participant, Yuko, who expressed her suicidal thoughts, posed a specific ethical challenge to the researcher due to a lack of psychological and legal support systems. In the first interview with Yuko, she eagerly shared positive aspects of her life. However, she eventually revealed to the researcher that she was not only struggling with financial, legal and psychological issues but also had little support in terms of legal and counselling services, or family or friends that she could consult. Yuko, who currently relies on welfare benefits, had applied for special welfare benefits for Japanese nationals who remained in China after the Second Sino-Japanese War (see Chapter 3, p. 101). Although some Sino-Japanese CBOW currently receive the same benefits, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare rejected her applications a few times. Although Yuko was suffering from occasional suicidal thoughts, she had never sought psychosocial counselling. While much less stigma is attached to people who seek counselling in Japan these days, people of Yuko's generation are known to resist the idea of seeking mental health care based on a view that counselling is for 'crazy people'.²⁶²

The researcher found dealing with Yuko's case emotionally challenging as Yuko indirectly sought help from the researcher in the process of building participant-researcher relationship. In a letter that she sent to the researcher after the first three interviews, Yuko hinted that she needed psychological and legal support. After several conversations with my supervisors and the CHIBOW network ethics advisors, the researcher sent a letter to Yuko with contact information for a counsellor in Japan, however, Yuko next responded with a letter in which she emphasised that she was still deeply distressed. The researcher then judged that it was a matter of urgency and contacted a Japanese association that could help Yuko access legal aid.

Consequently, Yuko consulted a lawyer about pursuing her claim that she should be eligible for the special welfare benefits, however, this caused yet another ethical conundrum. The lawyer told Yuko that, in order for her to win the case, it was crucial to

²⁶⁰ Yow, *Ethics and Interpersonal Relationships in Oral History Research*, p. 52.

²⁶¹ Johnson, M. 2007. The theoretical and social context of research ethics. In *Research ethics in the real world: Issues and solutions for health and social care*, eds. T. Long and M. Johnson, pp. 29-46. Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone, p. 42.

²⁶² Cheyney, M. 'Mindful care: Changing the perception of mental health in Japan', *Japan Today*, 9 June 2018. <https://japantoday.com/category/features/lifestyle/mindful-care-changing-the-perception-of-mental-health-in-japan> (accessed on 3 August 2020)

submit new evidence to the court of other Sino-Japanese CBOW who are currently receiving the same welfare benefits. It turned out that the researcher was the only person who had collected such information. However, the research ethics committee of the University of Birmingham decided that according to the project's confidentiality agreement, the requested information could not be provided to the lawyer.²⁶³ The lawyer decided not to take the case as a result. However, Yuko eventually decided to consult another lawyer to receive the special welfare benefits.

Yuko's case pointed to the sensitivity and ethics of conducting oral history interviews to participants who potentially lack psychosocial and legal support system. The strict professional boundary between the participant and the researcher may be difficult to maintain when a participant is in dire need of support and the researcher seems to be the only person who can help the participant access the necessary support. It is not always possible to anticipate the specific expectations participants may develop of a researcher in the process of building the relationship necessary for conducting oral history interviews. A researcher caught in an ethical dilemma needs to critically assess the pros and cons of every action as well as the ethical use of collected data.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated how the issues that needed to be addressed in the process of collecting sources shaped the focus of this research and influenced the resultant data. Information around Sino-Japanese CBOW was hard to find mainly due to the absence of a recognised category and an association of their own in both China and Japan. Sino-Japanese CBOW were also 'well-hidden' amongst the members of support groups for stranded war orphans in Japan, primarily because the representatives of these support groups, whom I called 'gatekeepers', were not aware of the existence of Sino-Japanese CBOW. This chapter also highlighted the need for the researcher to constantly react to and reflect on unanticipated challenges that arose during the interviews and in the process of building participant-researcher relationships. While I encountered various ethical and methodological challenges in the process of collecting life stories, these challenges also provided information about the participants' relationships, past adversities and current problems that are essential part of who they are and their meaning-making process, which will be critically analysed in the following chapters.

It needs to be noted that this study has limited generalisability with regard to the group of Sino-Japanese CBOW born of consensual relationships in its entirety. First, based on eight oral history interviews and information from twenty persons obtained through the Tokyo law firm, this study focuses on Sino-Japanese CBOW born of Sino-Japanese

²⁶³ E-mail correspondence, research ethics officer of the University of Birmingham, 8 February 2018.

consensual relationships that resulted in marriage. Sino-Japanese CBOW, whose parents' consensual relationships did not result in marriage are not included in this study as their nationality acquisition procedure required the proof of the parents' marriage. Secondly, the sources collected for this study are concentrated on children born of Sino-Japanese couples that had a married life that lasted four years on average (see Appendix 5). Having a relatively long married life during and after the war had a profound impact on the mothers' recollection of the Japanese husband, which significantly affected the formation process of the child's identity, sense of belonging and motivation to migrate to Japan (see Chapter 4 and 5). This study is biased towards Sino-Japanese CBOW whose mothers (or other caregivers in the absence of the mother) narrated positive aspects of the father to the child and supported the child's decision to migrate to the paternal country. Thirdly, the sources are slightly biased towards those who attracted media attention due to their creative talent or having a famous father. I learned about one of the participants (Toshio) through his book about the life of his father and himself that was published by a major Japanese publisher and another participant (Koretada) whose activity as a Sino-Japanese playwright was taken up by a Japanese newspaper in the 1980s. Two Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study (Yongyun and Makoto) were fathered by a renowned Japanese doctor in post-war China and a well-known intelligence agent respectively. Notwithstanding these limitations of the small and partially biased sample and cognisant of the resultant limitations with regard to generalisability beyond this sample, the study gives some valuable initial insights into identity and belonging of Sino-Japanese CBOW in the context of post-war Sino-Japanese relations.

CHAPTER 3: REPATRIATION POLICIES FOR SINO-JAPANESE CBOW

3.1 Introduction

Watt stated that the dissolution of the Japanese Empire brought about an impulse to match each person within and outside Japan proper with ‘his or her appropriate national territory, by force or by choice’.²⁶⁴ Post-war repatriation to and from Japan was supposed to ‘undo’ the transnational migration of both the Japanese population and the former colonial subjects that took place before and during the war. However, there were numerous matters that could not be ‘undone’ because of countless interpersonal encounters triggered by transnational migration from Japan to Japan-occupied territories and vice versa during the war.²⁶⁵ One such case was that of the children born of Chinese mothers and Japanese fathers who were married in accord with the Chinese customs during the war. Those children were in an ambiguous area with regard to their nationality. According to the Japanese and Chinese nationality law in force at the time, both a Chinese woman married to a Japanese man and their children were entitled to Japanese nationality (see p. 82).²⁶⁶ However, most Sino-Japanese marriages remained unregistered in the family register in wartime China. Whether these women and children were treated as ‘Japanese’ and as a family of Japanese men largely depended on the post-war geopolitical context. What were the post-war repatriation policy for Sino-Japanese CBOW and their family in the post-war period? How did the authorities categorise Sino-Japanese CBOW and decide their eligibility for repatriation? How did the study participants migrate to Japan in the 1980s and 1990s?

CBOW in various historical and geopolitical settings – especially those who were unacknowledged by the fathers – have most often been ignored when political elites formulated repatriation policies after World War Two. Moreover, responses of the government of the paternal country to CBOW and their mothers varied in different countries. For instance, the Soviet Army did not allow children born of local mothers fathered by members of the Soviet occupying forces in post-World War Two Germany and Austria to accompany their fathers upon repatriation.²⁶⁷ In another instance, while many German and Austrian brides migrated to the countries of their American or British partners whom they encountered during the post-World War Two, many unmarried

²⁶⁴ Watt, L. 2009. *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and reintegration in postwar Japan*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, p. 3.

²⁶⁵ Wakatsuki, Y. 1991. *Sengo hikiage no kiroku* [Record of post-war repatriation]. Tokyo: Jijitsūshinsha, pp. 14-19.

²⁶⁶ Okuda, Y. 1996. *Kazoku to kokuseki: kokusaika no susumu naka de* [Family and nationality: Upon advancement of internationalisation]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku Publishing, pp. 171, 177.

²⁶⁷ Stelzl-Marx, *Soviet children of occupation in Austria: The historical, political and social background and its consequences*, p. 280.

partners and their unacknowledged children were left behind with little support in Germany and Austria.²⁶⁸

There are a handful of cases worldwide in which CBOW were repatriated on the initiative of the government of the paternal country. The French government has claimed children born of their occupation soldiers as French citizens. Both children born of German women fathered by French soldiers during World War Two and of Vietnamese women fathered by French soldiers during the Indochina wars were either encouraged or forced to be ‘repatriated’ to France, often separated from their mothers who had not fully consented.²⁶⁹ The French government and its implementing agencies were not motivated by the best interest of these children but were primarily interested in claiming those who were deemed valuable as ‘French’ in the process of nation-building.²⁷⁰ As for the children born of the Indochina wars, the French government was motivated by their interests in removing symbols of loss and failure of its colonial empire and transforming these children into ‘good Frenchmen’ through assimilation and acculturation.²⁷¹

In another instance, the US government facilitated the repatriation of Vietnamese children born of the Vietnam War in the United States in separate initiatives at the end of the War in 1975 and in the 1980s.²⁷² In the US government-led Operation Babylift in 1975, more than three thousand neglected Vietnamese infants were relocated and adopted by families in the United States, Canada, Europe and Australia to address this particular humanitarian crisis.²⁷³ Furthermore, the US government passed the Amerasian Immigration Act and the Amerasian Homecoming Act in 1982 and 1987 respectively to repatriate Vietnamese CBOW. The law passed in 1982 did not allow their mothers to emigrate together, making the children choose between their mothers and their life in the paternal country.²⁷⁴ Lee analysed that such policies were rather driven by political expediency mixed with public pressure as similar repatriation policies were never applied to numerous children born of local women fathered by American GIs that exist in many other countries.²⁷⁵

²⁶⁸ Lee, A forgotten legacy of the Second World War: GI children in post-war Britain and Germany pp. 171-173.; Schretter, ‘*Britische Besatzungskinder: Die Nachkommen britischer Soldaten und österreichischer Frauen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* [British occupying children: The descendants of British soldiers and Austrian women after the Second World War]’.

²⁶⁹ Käuper, Children born of the Indochina War: National ‘reclassification’, diversity, and multiple feelings of belonging.; Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 160.

²⁷⁰ Gries, Les enfants d’État: Französische Besatzungskinder in Deutschland. In *Besatzungskinder, Die Nachkommen alliierter Soldaten in Österreich und Deutschland*, p. 400-402.; Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, pp. 84-85.; Saada, *Empire’s children: Race, filiation, and citizenship in the French colonies*.

²⁷¹ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, pp. 83-85, 173-174.; Käuper, Children born of the Indochina War: National ‘reclassification’, diversity, and multiple feelings of belonging.

²⁷² Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 246.

²⁷³ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 122.

²⁷⁴ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 140.

²⁷⁵ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 246.

The return migration of Sino-Japanese CBOW stands out from the government-led repatriation of the above groups of CBOW because Sino-Japanese CBOW had little if any official backing from the government of their paternal country. Although Sino-Japanese CBOW were scattered in China and did not know each other, they voluntarily migrated to Japan after acquiring Japanese nationality almost simultaneously at a particular juncture of Sino-Japanese history. While their motivations to migrate to Japan will be explored in the subsequent chapters, this chapter chronologically examines repatriation policies that were relevant for Sino-Japanese CBOW at different post-war periods and clarifies the factors and context that (in most cases) separated Sino-Japanese CBOW from the father as well as those that enabled their return migration to Japan.

This chapter divides the post-war period into three phases during which different actors formulated repatriation policies relevant for Sino-Japanese CBOW differently. The first period to be investigated in this chapter is the period in which the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) sponsored the mass repatriation of the Japanese in China in the immediate post-war period until the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.²⁷⁶ In the complex process of demobilisation of Japan's military forces amidst the Chinese Civil War, most Japanese citizens who resided in China at the end of the war were repatriated, while certain categories of individuals voluntarily and involuntarily remained (see p. 78). Because Sino-Japanese CBOW were only infants at the time, whether to live in the maternal or paternal country was entirely dependent on how the authorities categorised them based on factors such as their nationality and age. What could be learned from the collected sources is that most fathers of Sino-Japanese CBOW were forced to be repatriated on their own even if they wished to remain in China or to take their Chinese wives and children to Japan. After the Japanese fathers were repatriated, their Chinese wives who had to provide for their small children usually encountered severe financial hardship and were exposed to risks of political persecution as 'female collaborators'.²⁷⁷ Sino-Japanese CBOW and their families, however, were not passively accepting the authorities' categorisation and implementation of repatriation policies. Rather, they actively negotiated and responded to these policies. The analysis also questions the prevailing assumption that these Japanese men heartlessly 'abandoned' their local wives and children after the war and provides a more nuanced picture of how the rupture of family ties occurred in reality.²⁷⁸

The second period to be discussed is between 1953 and 1958, a period amidst the Cold War in which China and Japan had no official diplomatic relations. During this period,

²⁷⁶ I refer to SCAP as both the chief executive and as his General Headquarters (GHQ) in Tokyo.

²⁷⁷ Xia, Y. 2013. Engendering contempt for collaborators: Anti-hanjian discourse following the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945. *Journal of Women's History*, 25(1), pp. 111-134.

²⁷⁸ See, for example, Chandler, D. and Parker, R. (1946) 'Jap Underground to China' *Collier's*, 19 January, 75, pp 18-19; Kano Mikiyo (2007) 'Konketsuji' mondai to tan'itsu minzoku shinwa no seisei. In *Senryō to sei: seisaku, jittai, hyōshō*. Tokyo: Impact Shuppankai, p. 214.

the Chinese Red Cross and three Japanese nongovernmental organisations including the Japanese Red Cross discussed and organised a collective repatriation for more than 30,000 Japanese nationals remaining in post-war China.²⁷⁹ The Chinese mothers as well as Japanese fathers who remained in post-war China were now at the risk of political persecution under the Communist government that was established in 1949. During the period when the collective repatriation for remaining Japanese nationals took place, Sino-Japanese CBOW who were born before or immediately after the Second Sino-Japanese War were in their teenage-hood, and they experienced the Three-anti and Five-anti Campaigns (1951-1953) and the Anti-Rightist Movement (1957-1959). At this time, the repatriation of Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers was discussed for the first time between these two countries. The number and experiences of those who migrated to Japan during this period remain unknown (see Chapter 2, p. 41), and none of the study participants were repatriated during this period. This section assesses the factors that could have motivated these organisations to take up the issue of Sino-Japanese CBOW as part of the negotiation on repatriation of Japanese nationals remaining in post-war China.

The third period to be scrutinised starts after the re-establishment of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972 when Sino-Japanese CBOW's long-standing wish to search for the father and to go to Japan suddenly became a possibility. While the significant economic disparity between China and Japan in the 1970s and the 1980s became one of the motivations to migrate to Japan, Sino-Japanese CBOW needed to take action carefully, by paying close attention to changing political climate during and after the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).²⁸⁰ Hundreds of Sino-Japanese children had requested that the Japanese government search for their father by 1986, but the total number of those who migrated to Japan after 1972 is unknown.²⁸¹ All seven study participants 'returned' to Japan independently when they were in their thirties and forties. This last section discusses the Japanese government's policy on repatriation and resettlement of Japanese nationals remaining in post-war China and explores how Sino-Japanese CBOW used an existing legal procedure to 'return' to their 'homeland'.

3.2 Repatriation in the immediate post-war period (1945-1949)

3.2.1 Repatriation policies in the post-war geopolitical context

Imperial Japan was keenly interested in children born of a 'Japanese' and a 'non-Japanese' in its empire as tools for empire-building (see Chapter 4). During the Second

²⁷⁹ Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and reintegration in postwar Japan*, p. 8-9.

²⁸⁰ Araragi, S. 2016. Diversifying 'Japanese returning from China': the crossroad of post-colonialism and globalism. *Cosmopolis*, 20, pp. 1-26, p. 8.

²⁸¹ 'Chichino kuni e: Eijū no michi saguru' [Returning to the father's country: Searching for ways for his permanent return]. *Mainichi Shimbun*, 4 May 1983.

Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese government and Japanese eugenicists also paid attention to the traits of children born of Sino-Japanese heritage and discussed whether these children could potentially be beneficial or harmful for the purpose of expanding the Japanese Empire and maintaining the ‘racial superiority’ of the Japanese people as the leading race (see Chapter 4, p. 112). However, after Japan announced its surrender to its people on 15 August 1945, the attention of the war-stricken nation turned inward as if the surrounding empire disappeared over night. Racially and nationalistically motivated attention to these Sino-Japanese children was abruptly replaced by disinterest in a war-affected groups, CBOW, of ambiguous national provenance. Occupied Japan did not have control over the handling of a large Japanese population overseas, let alone these children born of local women fathered by Japanese men in the Japanese Empire and territories that were under Japanese influence during the war. 6.8 million Japanese people – almost ten per cent of the then Japanese population – resided outside Japan proper at the end of the war. Around 1.1 million military personnel and 1.7 million civilians were living in China at the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War.²⁸² On behalf of the Japanese government, SCAP led massive and complicated tasks to repatriate Japanese nationals, mainly in cooperation with the Chinese Nationalists and Communists.²⁸³ Under such circumstances, whether Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers could accompany their Japanese fathers upon repatriation or not entirely depended on decisions taken by SCAP and local administrators.²⁸⁴

While Japanese nationals residing in post-war China consisted of people of different occupation, gender and age, SCAP prioritised the repatriation of male Japanese military personnel overseas for the purpose of demobilisation. The Potsdam Declaration, a statement issued on 26 July 1945 that called for the surrender of all armed forces, stipulated in its Article 9 that ‘the Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with their opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.’ This meant that Japanese fathers of Sino-Japanese CBOW who were military personnel at the end of the war had to be swiftly repatriated.

The Potsdam Declaration however did not touch upon the repatriation of the 3.2 million Japanese civilians overseas, including 1.7 million in China. The Japanese government’s initial policy towards Japanese civilians overseas was to ‘make them

²⁸² The figures include the population in Manchuria. (See, Sato, R. 2016. *Sengo Nicchū kankei to dōsōkai* [Post-war Sino-Japanese relations and alumni reunion]. Tokyo: Sairyusha, p. 55.) According to the most recent statistics on Japanese nationals residing in contemporary China, there were about 120,000 in 2018. This means that there were almost twenty-three times more Japanese nationals living in China at the end of the war, showing how large the Japanese population in China was at the time. (See, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2018. *Kaigai zairyū hōjinsū chōsa tōkei* [Statistics of the number of overseas Japanese]. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/toko/page22_000043.html, accessed on 8 September 2020)

²⁸³ Sato, *Sengo Nicchū kankei to dōsōkai* [Post-war Sino-Japanese relations and alumni reunion], pp. 55-56.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

remain where they are' (*genchiteichaku hōshin*).²⁸⁵ On 14 August 1945, the day Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration, the Minister of Greater East Asia issued an order towards Japanese embassies and other overseas official institutions on *genchiteichaku hōshin*.²⁸⁶ On 31 August 1945, the same policy on Japanese civilians remaining in post-war China was reiterated by Okamura Yasuji, the commander-in-chief of the China Expeditionary Army at the end of the war.²⁸⁷ Okamura stated that Japanese civilians in China should remain and 'contribute to the future prosperity of the Japanese Empire as well as to the reconstruction of East Asia.'²⁸⁸ One of the reasons for this policy were the logistical difficulties associated with repatriation: Japan's desperate shortage of ships and shipping fuel.²⁸⁹ Secondly, war-stricken Japan was experiencing financial constraints and was struggling to meet the basic needs of its people living in Japan.²⁹⁰ Sato however argues that the most important reason for this policy was a political calculation to protect Japan's properties overseas.²⁹¹ At the end of the war, the Japanese possessed numerous companies, factories and farmland overseas. Japanese high-ranking officials wanted to prevent such overseas Japanese properties from confiscation to maintain Japan's influence overseas and secure a foothold for Japan's future revival and development.²⁹²

The Allied forces however regarded the potential influence of Japanese citizens remaining in post-war China as a threat to the new order in East Asia and objected to the Japanese policy of leaving behind their civilians overseas. SCAP set its policy to repatriate the remaining Japanese as quickly as possible by providing US ships.²⁹³ Already by October 1945, the initial policy to make Japanese citizens remain in post-war China was altered to a policy to repatriate Japanese military personnel first and then Japanese civilians by the US ships.²⁹⁴ Japan, a defeated nation, and the Chinese

²⁸⁵ Minami, M. 2016. *Chūgoku kikokusha o meguru hōsetsu to haijo no rekishishakaigaku: Kyōkai bunka no seisei to sono poritikkusu* [Historical sociology of inclusion and exclusion of returnees from China: Engendering border culture and its politics]. Tokyo: Akashishoten, p. 55.; Osawa, T. 2007. The reorganization of the postwar regional order in northeast Asia and the emergence of the war: Displaced Japanese left behind in China. *Sēsaku bunka sōgō kenkyūsho nenpō*, 10, pp. 35-51, p. 37.; Sato, *Sengo Nicchū kankei to dōsōkai* [Post-war Sino-Japanese relations and alumni reunion], p. 56.

²⁸⁶ Osawa, The reorganization of the postwar regional order in northeast Asia and the emergence of the war: Displaced Japanese left behind in China, p. 37.; Sato, *Sengo Nicchū kankei to dōsōkai* [Post-war Sino-Japanese relations and alumni reunion], pp. 56-57.

²⁸⁷ The statement was made in a ministerial committee (*shūsenshori kaigi*) that discussed issues that needed be urgently dealt with upon Japan's surrender. See, Osawa, The reorganization of the postwar regional order in northeast Asia and the emergence of the war: Displaced Japanese left behind in China, p. 37.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁹ Most Japanese ships were damaged during the war, and Japan had little ships that could be used for repatriation and deportation. See, Kato, Y. 1995. Demobilization and repatriation of Japanese armed forces in China. *Kokusai Seiji*, 109, pp. 110-125, p.110.

²⁹⁰ Sato, *Sengo Nicchū kankei to dōsōkai* [Post-war Sino-Japanese relations and alumni reunion], p. 57.

²⁹¹ Sato, *Sengo Nicchū kankei to dōsōkai* [Post-war Sino-Japanese relations and alumni reunion], pp. 57-59.

²⁹² Sato, *Sengo Nicchū kankei to dōsōkai* [Post-war Sino-Japanese relations and alumni reunion], p. 58.

²⁹³ Sato, *Sengo Nicchū kankei to dōsōkai* [Post-war Sino-Japanese relations and alumni reunion], p. 59.

²⁹⁴ General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 1945. *Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government, Policies governing repatriation of Japanese nationals in conquered territory*, 16 October.

Nationalist government that had the backing of the United States had no choice but to agree with SCAP's policy.²⁹⁵ A series of negotiations took place between the United States, the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists in December 1945 to discuss how to swiftly arrange ships for the Japanese remaining in the Communist-occupied areas in northeast China for their repatriation.²⁹⁶ After discussions between the US officials and the Nationalist officials in Shanghai, the Japanese government was notified of the basic repatriation policy on 16 March 1946, and the massive repatriation of Japanese civilians started immediately after that.²⁹⁷ Consequently, the majority of Japanese soldiers and civilians in areas occupied by the Nationalists as well as those in areas occupied by the Communists were repatriated by July 1946.²⁹⁸

SCAP did not announce any specific policy towards repatriation of Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers in relation to the repatriation of Japanese military and non-military personnel. SCAP was keenly aware of the phenomenon of various sexual relationships between local women and foreign military personnel in Japan but was reluctant to address the consequent births of CBOW. In post-war Japan, the members of the Allied forces raped Japanese women from the first day of the occupation. It resulted in the birth of numerous 'mixed-blood children',²⁹⁹ but some occupying soldiers also had various relationships such as love affairs and friendly business arrangements.³⁰⁰ After the amendment of the Soldier Brides Act in 1947, there were forty to fifty thousand Japanese brides of members of the US Armed Forces and between 1947 and 1952 about two thousand children migrated to the US.³⁰¹ However, none of the countries involved in the occupation of Japan granted rights of entry to Japanese wives and children who were not acknowledged by their fathers.³⁰² SCAP also perceived the issue of children born of the Allied occupation as a 'blot' on the integrity of the occupation forces.³⁰³ After the news of the first child born of the Allied occupation was reported via radio in June 1946, SCAP censored news regarding 'mixed-blood children' in the Japanese media.³⁰⁴ SCAP also

²⁹⁵ Sato, *Sengo Nicchū kankei to dōsōkai* [Post-war Sino-Japanese relations and alumni reunion], pp. 59-60.

²⁹⁶ For more detailed account on the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on repatriation of Japanese remaining in northeast China, see Sato, *Sengo Nicchū kankei to dōsōkai* [Post-war Sino-Japanese relations and alumni reunion], pp. 56-70.

²⁹⁷ Sato, *Sengo Nicchū kankei to dōsōkai* [Post-war Sino-Japanese relations and alumni reunion], p. 66.

²⁹⁸ Wakatsuki, *Sengo hikiage no kiroku* [Record of post-war repatriation], p. 85.

²⁹⁹ The term *konketsuji* or 'mixed-blood children' is not an accepted term in the media today. See, Kamita, S. 2018. '*Konketsuji*' no *sengoshi* [Post-war history of 'mixed-blood children']. Tokyo: Seikyusha, p. 21.

³⁰⁰ Hamilton, W. 2013. *Children of the occupation: Japan's untold story*. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press.

³⁰¹ Yasutomi, S. and Ueki, T. 2005. Adaptation of war brides to American society: Between two value systems. *Kaetsu University Academic Repository*, 48(1), pp. 75-97, p. 75.; Hamilton, *Children of the occupation: Japan's untold story*, pp. 75-76.

³⁰² Hamilton, *Children of the occupation: Japan's untold story*, p. 9.

³⁰³ Aoki, *Sawada Miki: GHQ to tatakatta onna* [Sawada Miki: The woman who fought GHQ], p. 56.

³⁰⁴ Aoki, *Sawada Miki: GHQ to tatakatta onna* [Sawada Miki: The woman who fought GHQ], pp. 42-43.; Dower, J. W. 1999. *Embracing defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II*. New York: The New Press, pp. 406, 408.

showed reluctance in laying out a policy to improve the children's welfare.³⁰⁵ Sawada Miki³⁰⁶ established an orphanage for 'mixed-blood orphans' called Elisabeth Saunders Home in 1948, and her policy to raise these children bilingually encountered resistance from SCAP.³⁰⁷ Colonel Crawford F. Sams, the then head of the Public Health and Welfare programme in occupied Japan, told Sawada that these predominantly biracial children should be educated as 'Japanese' in local orphanages as SCAP had no intention to repatriate these orphans to their paternal countries.³⁰⁸ It is unknown whether SCAP was informed about the existence of the potentially large number of children born of local women and Japanese fathers in post-war Asia-Pacific regions. However, even if SCAP had been informed, it was not in their interest to squarely address the issue while carrying out its repatriation operations as SCAP itself was suppressing the issue of children born of occupation.

A memorandum on repatriation issued by SCAP on 7 May 1946 shows that SCAP took into consideration the issue of immediate families of 'non-Japanese'. The memorandum referred to two million Koreans, 56,000 Chinese, 35,000 Taiwanese and 200,000 Okinawans who resided in Japan proper at the war's end.³⁰⁹ It stated that 'insofar as practicable the immediate family group [of those who are non-Japanese] should be considered a unit and should be repatriated as a unit.'³¹⁰ This means that those who were married to 'non-Japanese' and their children were repatriated to Korea, China, Taiwan and Okinawa as a 'unit' while 'non-Japanese' who were married to 'Japanese' and their children residing outside Japan proper were not given any special consideration to be repatriated as a 'unit'. While it is unknown what motivated SCAP to define the 'non-Japanese' and their family as a 'unit', Watt stated that SCAP's 'rationale behind the rush to rid Japan of colonial subjects is less clear' but it was most likely based on 'political expediency and racism'.³¹¹ SCAP's exclusion – intentional or not – of 'non-Japanese' including Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers from the mass repatriation in the immediate aftermath of the war, was in alignment with a dominant discourse about Japan as a 'homogeneous' nation that emerged immediately after the war.³¹²

³⁰⁵ Berrigan, D. 1948. 'Japan's occupation babies'. *Saturday Evening Post*, 19 June, pp. 117-118.; Aoki, F. 2016. *Sawada Miki: GHQ to tatakatta onna* [Sawada Miki: The woman who fought GHQ]. Tokyo: Shinchosha, pp. 43, 54, 58.

³⁰⁶ Sawada Miki (1901-1980) is also known as the granddaughter of Iwasaki Yataro, the founder of the Mitsubishi Zaibatsu conglomerate.

³⁰⁷ Aoki, *Sawada Miki: GHQ to tatakatta onna* [Sawada Miki: The woman who fought GHQ], pp. 54-58.

³⁰⁸ Aoki, *Sawada Miki: GHQ to tatakatta onna* [Sawada Miki: The woman who fought GHQ], pp. 54-55.

³⁰⁹ Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and reintegration in postwar Japan*, p. 2.

³¹⁰ General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 1946. Annex III to Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government, file AG 370.05 (7 May 46) GC (SCAPIN 927), dated 7 May 1946, subject: 'Repatriation', Repatriation to and from Japan, Section I General plan, 5 November.

³¹¹ Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and reintegration in postwar Japan*, p. 4.

³¹² Oguma, E. 2002. *A genealogy of Japanese self-images*. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, p. 299.

3.2.2 Abandoned by the fathers? Ruptures in the family ties after the repatriation

Some mothers of Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study testified to the Japanese family court in the 1980s that their Japanese husbands promised to return to China upon repatriation. However, out of twenty-five Sino-Japanese CBOW whose fathers were repatriated after the war, only four of them (Momoko, Yuko, Katsue and Taro) could successfully reunite with their father after the re-establishment of the Sino-Japanese relations in 1972.³¹³ With regard to wartime non-violent sexual liaisons between local women and Japanese soldiers across the Asia-Pacific region, the prevailing assumption amongst the general public and scholars has been that such relationships were temporary extramarital affairs in which Japanese men regarded their local partners as ‘*genchizuma*’, a local mistress, or ‘*daini fujin*’, a second wife.³¹⁴ It is also commonly assumed that these Japanese men heartlessly ‘abandoned’ their local wives and children after the war.³¹⁵ Consequently, the Japanese press and politicians have referred to children born of the Asia-Pacific War as *sensō no otoshigo* or *sensō no otoshidane* which could be translated as ‘products of men’s wartime affairs who were abandoned after the war’.³¹⁶ However, closer scrutiny of the evidence available about those relationships and repatriations reveals a more nuanced picture.

Evidence shows that local administrators in post-war China prohibited the Japanese fathers from taking their Chinese wives and children to Japan upon repatriation. On 30 September 1945, the Chinese Nationalist government promulgated a law on controlling Japanese nationals remaining in China.³¹⁷ This law stipulated that both Japanese military personnel and civilians scattered all over China should be gathered in designated camps (*jizhongying*) in mostly large coastal cities.³¹⁸ The Japanese fathers were ordered to reside in these camps before their repatriation. Article 12 of the law stated that Japanese men were allowed to live with their ‘family’. However, the on-the-ground officials did not allow Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers to live with the Japanese fathers based on their own notion of ‘Japanese’ and ‘non-Japanese’.³¹⁹ A report of the Wuhan repatriation

³¹³ The fathers of Toshio, Keiko and Yongyun remained in post-war China and therefore they are not included in the twenty-five Sino-Japanese CBOW (see, Appendix 1 and 2).

³¹⁴ See, for example, Nagatomi, H. 1996. *Hakurō no tsumeato* [Traces of a white wolf]. Osaka: Shinpu Shobo, p. 205.

³¹⁵ See, for example, Chandler, D. and Parker, R. 1946. ‘Jap Underground to China’. *Collier’s*, 19 January, 75, pp 18-19.; Kano, M. 2007. ‘*Konketsuji*’ *mondai to tan’itsu minzoku shinwa no seisei* [How ‘mixed-blood’ problem and myth of homogeneity came into being]. In *Senryō to sei: seisaku, jittai, hyōshō* [Occupation and sex: Policy, reality and representation]. Tokyo: Impact Shuppankai, p. 214.

³¹⁶ See, for example, The House of Councilors, *Dai 26 kai kokkai sangiin yosan iinkai dai 2 bunkakai kaigiroku dai 1 gō* [The 26th Diet session of the House of Councilors Budget Committee. The 1st minutes of the 2nd sectional committee.], p. 22.; Honma, T. 1995. *Sensō no otoshigo rarabai* [Lullaby of a child born of war]. Tokyo: Sanichishobo.

³¹⁷ For *Zhongguo jingnei riqiaomin jizhongying guanlibanfa* (中国境内日侨民集中营管理办法), see, Chen, Z. 2010. *Shanghai ni ikita Nihonjin: Bakumatsu kara haisen made* [Japanese who resided in Shanghai: From the end of Edo Period to Japan’s defeat]. Tokyo: Taishukan Shoten, pp. 335-337.

³¹⁸ Sato, *Sengo Nicchū kankei to dōsōkai* [Post-war Sino-Japanese relations and alumni reunion], p. 70.

³¹⁹ Chen, *Shanghai ni ikita Nihonjin: Bakumatsu kara haisen made* [Japanese who resided in Shanghai: From the end of Edo Period to Japan’s defeat], p. 336.

camp written in 1946 stated that more than fifty Japanese men deserted the camp and that the reason for their escape was likely to have been to stay together with their Chinese partners and their children.³²⁰ The participants in this study (Michiko, Koretada and Seiji) and their mothers were also not allowed to live in the repatriation camp with the father but they tried to see each other. Michiko and her mother used to visit the camp to see her father. In the case of Koretada, his father used to come back to the flat where Koretada and his mother lived because Japanese nationals interned at repatriation camps were allowed to go outside of the camp during the daytime.³²¹ As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the participants remembered the stories around the father's repatriation not as 'abandonment' but as proof of the strong bond between the parents and the father's love for the family.

While both the Chinese Nationalist government and the Communists largely followed SCAP's policy that prioritised the repatriation of Japanese military personnel and civilians, this study discovered a few cases in which Japanese fathers attempted to board on the repatriation boat with their wives and children, and a case in which a Japanese father successfully brought his child to Japan. Yu and Tadashi, two brothers born of a Chinese mother and a Japanese father, testified to the Japanese family court in 1986 that their father, Taro, was determined to take his family to Japan. However, they could not go to Japan together because they got separated and lost contact with the father on the way to the port.³²² In another instance, the father of Momoko, one of the participants, attempted to take Momoko to Japan with him upon his repatriation.³²³ Momoko lost her mother and younger brother due to illness in 1945. On the day her father was planning to board on a repatriation boat with Momoko, her Chinese grandmother hid her from the father. The grandmother did not want to lose Momoko, who was the only living relative for her. Consequently, Momoko's father had to leave China alone, and Momoko was raised by her grandmother in Shanghai. A few possibilities are raised by these fathers' attempts to take their Sino-Japanese children and their Chinese partner to Japan. These fathers may not have known that the Chinese administrators at the port would not have allowed them to go to Japan with their Chinese partners and children. It is also possible that some Chinese administrators allowed the Japanese father to take Sino-Japanese CBOW with him upon repatriation because they could not tell whether the child was born of mixed heritage by appearance. In particular, the Sino-Japanese infants who had not started to talk could have passed as 'Japanese' at the border control. This possibility is supported by an episode of Teruo's father, Kenji, who could successfully take his eldest son, Akio, to Japan after September 1945. Kenji only took Akio because his Chinese wife

³²⁰ Kato, K. ed. 2002. *Kaigai hikiage kankei shiryō shūsei 32 Chūgoku hondo hen* [Compilation of documents regarding repatriation from abroad, 32, China mainland]. Tokyo: Yumani Shobo, pp. 369, 386-387, 403.

³²¹ Interview transcript, Koretada, Saitama, Japan, 22 May 2017.

³²² Unpublished personal documents, Case 12, Yu.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 13, Tadashi.

³²³ Interview transcript, Momoko, Tokyo, Japan, 23 May 2017.

was unwell after giving birth to Teruo who was a new-born baby at the time. Akio was only three years old, and Kenji could have declared at the port that Akio is ‘Japanese’ in case declaring a child born of mixed heritage posed problems.³²⁴ In the Philippines where SCAP also controlled the post-war repatriation of Japanese nationals, there are a small number of reported cases in which children born of local women fathered by Japanese military personnel were allowed to accompany their Japanese fathers upon repatriation.³²⁵ It is likely that the permission to let these children accompany their Japanese fathers was given at the discretion of the local administrators.³²⁶

After the father’s repatriation, Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers were left with little possibility to be reunited with the father due to the post-war geopolitical and socio-political context as well as the father’s personal intentions and circumstances upon repatriation. Various factors made it extremely difficult for the repatriated Japanese fathers to return to their families in China. First, because of the Chinese Civil War and the subsequent deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations, it was impossible for individuals to travel back and forth between Japan and China for personal reasons. Secondly, communicating by post between China and Japan became increasingly difficult during the Chinese Civil War and the political campaigns under Mao Zedong.³²⁷ After the establishment of the PRC, exchanging letters with the father in Japan could have raised suspicions of espionage and might have posed a risk to Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers. For instance, after Maki’s father was repatriated, Maki’s mother sent many letters to Japan. Maki’s mother later found out that most of her letters never even left China and were kept in an official dossier that records personal information (*dang’andai*).³²⁸

The issue of the fathers’ personal intentions and circumstances is complex, and it is impossible to determine from the collected evidence whether they made empty promises upon repatriation to their Chinese partners or not. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, Sino-Japanese CBOW were born of diverse patterns of Sino-Japanese consensual relationships, such as loving relationships, marriages of convenience, bigamous marriage and polygamous marriages. Some fathers of Sino-Japanese CBOW were already married to Japanese women in Japan and returned to their wives and children after their repatriation. Appendix 5 shows that half of the twenty-four Japanese fathers of Sino-Japanese CBOW were already married with a Japanese woman before their arrival in China. Other Japanese

³²⁴ Unpublished personal documents, Case 10, Teruo.

³²⁵ Ohno, *Transforming Nikkeijin identity and citizenship: Untold life histories of Japanese migrants and their descendants in the Philippines, 1903-2013*, pp. 95, 227.

³²⁶ Ohno, *Transforming Nikkeijin identity and citizenship: Untold life histories of Japanese migrants and their descendants in the Philippines, 1903-2013*, p. 94.

³²⁷ See, for example, Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku* [The last soldier that returned to Japan: Fukatani Yoshiharu and his family], p. 124.

³²⁸ Unpublished personal documents, Case 7, Maki.

fathers of Sino-Japanese CBOW remarried a Japanese woman shortly after their repatriation.³²⁹ After remarriage, some fathers of Sino-Japanese CBOW kept their wives and children in China secret from their new family in Japan and stopped exchanging letters with their family in China.³³⁰

Mariko's father, Masao, is one of the fathers who remarried immediately after their repatriation. According to the testimony of Meilan, Mariko's mother, Masao endeavoured to stay with her even after Japan's surrender.³³¹ While the reason is unknown, Masao eventually decided to return to Japan. Mariko was born on 6 April 1946, the same day Masao's repatriation boat was leaving the port of Shanghai. Masao told Meilan that he would first return to Japan but would come back to China after five years to bring Meilan and Mariko to Japan. Masao advised Meilan not to pierce Mariko's ears as such custom did not exist in Japan. Upon his departure, Masao, with tears streaming down his face, hugged and kissed Mariko. Masao also told Meilan and his Chinese relatives that he would come back at any cost. However, according to a document submitted to a Japanese family court, Masao married a Japanese woman already in November 1946. After Meilan received Masao's letter that requested a photo of Meilan and Mariko in June 1947, they lost contact with Masao. How did Masao perceive his family in China? What were the factors that led to his remarriage with a Japanese woman almost immediately after his repatriation? Whatever the reasons, this indicates that some Japanese fathers indeed abandoned the idea of reuniting with their families left behind in China soon after their repatriation.

In contrast, there are also a few documented cases in which the repatriated fathers of Sino-Japanese CBOW maintained a strong desire to reunite with their Chinese partners and children. Maki's father waited for an opportunity to return to China, but he eventually gave up his hope of reuniting with his wife and Maki and married a Japanese woman when he turned forty years old in 1959.³³² Michiko's father, who died in 1966, never gave up his hope of reuniting with Michiko and her mother and did not remarry in Japan.³³³ While it is impossible to know the intentions of all Japanese fathers of Sino-Japanese CBOW when they made promises to return to their Chinese wives upon repatriation, their prolonged or permanent separation was not just the result of their personal intentions but also the circumstances following their repatriation as well as the repatriation policy that was formulated and implemented in the post-war context. As will be discussed in later

³²⁹ Unpublished personal documents, Case 8, Mariko.; Court decision (Yuko's case), 5 December 2014, p. 16.

³³⁰ Unpublished personal documents, Case 1, Tsuneyoshi.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 10, Teruo.

³³¹ Unpublished personal documents, Case 8, Mariko.

³³² Unpublished personal documents, Case 7, Maki.; Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 10 May 2016.

³³³ Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 20 January 2017.

chapters, even when study participants found out about the father's remarriage after his repatriation, none of them described the father's repatriation as 'abandonment' of his family in China and maintained a strong emotional attachment to the absent father and a sense of belonging to the father's country.

3.3 Repatriation of Sino-Japanese CBOW amidst the severance of Sino-Japanese relations (1953-1958)

3.3.1 Nongovernmental negotiation on collective repatriation amidst the Cold War

The repatriation policy for Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers was discussed for the very first time in a conference held on 23 February 1953 in Beijing between the PRC Red Cross and three Japanese nongovernmental associations.³³⁴ This section explores how and why the issue of Sino-Japanese CBOW reached the table of this bilateral negotiation in a particular geopolitical context and what impact the negotiation had on Sino-Japanese CBOW.

Most Japanese nationals were repatriated by August 1948 when the repatriation was put on hold due to the worsening of the Chinese Civil War, and the number of Japanese people residing in China in 1952 was estimated to be between 30,000 and 52,000 at the time.³³⁵ Their family members in Japan formed associations and strongly demanded the Japanese government to restart collective repatriation.³³⁶ However, there was no official channel for negotiation on the repatriation of Japanese nationals in China due to the severance of diplomatic relations between China and Japan. After the Communists won the Civil War and established the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, both the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) governed by the Nationalists continued to claim their right to represent China. The PRC government regarded with alarm Japan's role in the Cold War as an ally of the United States. The United States revived Japan's

³³⁴ I use the term the 'PRC Red Cross' here as currently there are the Red Cross Society of China (the People's Republic of China) and the Red Cross Society of the Republic of China based in Taiwan. I requested information about the repatriation policy towards Sino-Japanese CBOW to the PRC Red Cross but could not receive any reply. The Japanese Red Cross provided a copy of its organisation history that included information on the outcome of the negotiations with the PRC Red Cross in Beijing in 1953 but did not reply whether they have the minutes of these negotiations. Also, the Japanese Red Cross stated that it could not provide personal information of repatriated individuals for confidentiality reasons. See, Osawa, T. 2016. *Mō Takutō no tainichi senpan saiban: Chūgoku kyōsantō no omowaku to 1526 mei no Nihonjin* [Mao Zedong's trial on Japanese war criminals: Intentions of the Chinese Communist Party and 1,526 Japanese]. Tokyo: Chuokoron-shinsha, p. 89.

³³⁵ Social Welfare and War Victim's Relief Bureau of the Ministry of Health and Welfare. 1977. *Hikiage to engo 30 nen no ayumi* [Thirty-year trajectory of repatriation and relief]. Tokyo: The Ministry of Health and Welfare, pp. 109-110.; Japan Red Cross, *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6], p. 268.

³³⁶ 'Konketsuji wa kaerenu: Chūkyōgawa de kazai kaiage, yokuryūsha no tayori' [Mixed-blood children cannot repatriate: The letter from a remaining Japanese national says that the Chinese side will purchase the household goods of Japanese who are going to repatriate], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 13 February 1953.

military-industrial complex to contain communism and built the principal US military base in Japan during the Korean War (1950-1953) in which the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and the United States and their allies fought on opposite sides.³³⁷ In 1950, China and the Soviet Union concluded the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance which included the provision that the two countries would protect each other from an attack by 'Japan or any state allied with it'. In the following year, Japan and the United States signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. On 28 April 1952, the American-led Allied occupation in Japan ended as the Treaty of San Francisco came into force. On the same day, Japan signed the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. The treaty marked the formal end of the Second Sino-Japanese War. However, signing the treaty with the ROC signified that Japan officially recognised the ROC as the sole legitimate Chinese government and thus severed the diplomatic relations between the PRC.

Both China and Japan then searched for alternative ways to build unofficial bilateral ties.³³⁸ Mao Zedong adopted the strategy of 'people's diplomacy' under the slogan of '*minjian xianxing, yimincuguan*' which could be translated as 'progress in foreign affairs through people's diplomacy'.³³⁹ The strategy's underlying principle was that Japanese militarists were responsible for the atrocities caused in China but the rest of Japanese nationals were victims of the former – like Chinese people.³⁴⁰ The strategy aimed to prompt Japan to take distance from the United States and assume a more neutral position in the Cold War.³⁴¹ Japan embraced the strategy of separating politics and economics in relation to the PRC, and as a result two countries started to open economic links through trade in the 1950s.³⁴²

The issue of Sino-Japanese CBO was taken up as part of the negotiation on the repatriation of Japanese nationals residing in China in the context of the PRC's 'people's

³³⁷ King, *Reconstructing China: Japanese technicians and industrialization in the early years of the People's Republic of China*, p. 33.; Osawa, *Mō Takutō no tainichi senpan saiban: Chūgoku kyōsantō no omowaku to 1526 mei no Nihonjin* [Mao Zedong's trial on Japanese war criminals: Intentions of the Chinese Communist Party and 1,526 Japanese], p. 88.

³³⁸ King, *Reconstructing China: Japanese technicians and industrialization in the early years of the People's Republic of China*, p. 31.

³³⁹ Osawa, *Mō Takutō no tainichi senpan saiban: Chūgoku kyōsantō no omowaku to 1526 mei no Nihonjin* [Mao Zedong's trial on Japanese war criminals: Intentions of the Chinese Communist Party and 1,526 Japanese], pp. 88-89.; Li, X. 2014. 'State-led people to people diplomacy in China: Where should it go?' Master's thesis, Aalborg University.

³⁴⁰ Osawa, *Mō Takutō no tainichi senpan saiban: Chūgoku kyōsantō no omowaku to 1526 mei no Nihonjin* [Mao Zedong's trial on Japanese war criminals: Intentions of the Chinese Communist Party and 1,526 Japanese], pp. 88-89.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² Li, E. 1997. *Zhongri minjian jingji waijiao, 1945-1972* [Sino-Japanese people's diplomacy on economics, 1945-1972]. Beijing: People's Publishing House.

diplomacy'.³⁴³ The 'nongovernmental' organisations that took part in the negotiations were not free from state control and were *de facto* mediators of two governments in the absence of official diplomatic relations. The PRC Red Cross was directly controlled by the PRC's Central Liaison Department of Foreign Affairs (*zhongyang duiwai lianluobu*).³⁴⁴ The PRC side designated and insisted on the participation of two associations in the negotiation process – Japan-China Friendship Association (*Nicchū yūko kyōkai*, JCFA) and Japan Peace Liaison Group (*Nihon heiwa renraku iinkai*, JPLG) that had strong pro-China dispositions to have a bargaining advantage in the negotiation.³⁴⁵ The representatives of JCFA and JPLG, for instance, lobbied Japanese politicians on behalf of the PRC on issues such as the repatriation of Chinese remaining in Japan.³⁴⁶

On 1 December 1952, the PRC Red Cross announced that it was willing to negotiate and support the repatriation of Japanese nationals residing in China.³⁴⁷ Subsequently, four bilateral conferences on the repatriation of Japanese residing in post-war China took place between 15 February and 5 March in 1953 in Beijing.³⁴⁸ The number of Japanese residing in China was around 30,000 according to the PRC Red Cross and about 52,000 according to the Japanese government.³⁴⁹ The 'Japanese' included in the estimated numbers were civilians and soldiers who remained to serve the Nationalists, the Communists (or both), stranded war orphans, and stranded war wives in northeast China as well as war criminals and POWs.³⁵⁰

³⁴³ Osawa, T. 2002. *Zaika Nihonjin 'senpan' no kikoku: Tenshin kyōtei seiritsu no keii to sono igi* [Repatriation of Japanese 'war criminals' in China: How the Tianjin Agreement was finalised and its meaning]. *Chūō Daigaku Shakaikagaku Kenkyūjo Nenpō*, 7, pp. 165-180, p.167.

³⁴⁴ Osawa, Mō *Takutō no tainichi senpan saiban: Chūgoku kyōsantō no omowaku to 1526 mei no Nihonjin* [Mao Zedong's trial on Japanese war criminals: Intentions of the Chinese Communist Party and 1,526 Japanese], p. 92.

³⁴⁵ Osawa, Mō *Takutō no tainichi senpan saiban: Chūgoku kyōsantō no omowaku to 1526 mei no Nihonjin* [Mao Zedong's trial on Japanese war criminals: Intentions of the Chinese Communist Party and 1,526 Japanese], p. 89.

³⁴⁶ Osawa, Mō *Takutō no tainichi senpan saiban: Chūgoku kyōsantō no omowaku to 1526 mei no Nihonjin* [Mao Zedong's trial on Japanese war criminals: Intentions of the Chinese Communist Party and 1,526 Japanese], p.140.; Red Cross, *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6], p. 274.

³⁴⁷ Japan Red Cross, *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6], p. 268.

³⁴⁸ Japan Red Cross, *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6], pp. 270-273.

³⁴⁹ Japan Red Cross, *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6], p. 268.; Social Welfare and War Victim's Relief Bureau of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, *Hikiage to engo 30 nen no ayumi* [Thirty-year trajectory of repatriation and relief], pp. 109-110.

³⁵⁰ The repatriation of 1,526 Japanese war criminals was discussed between the PRC Red Cross and three nongovernmental organisations from Japan based on a conference in Tianjin that took place from 24 June to 28 June 1956. Their repatriation started on 1 August 1956.; Japan Red Cross, *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6], pp. 170-171.; Social Welfare and War Victim's Relief Bureau of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, *Hikiage to engo 30 nen no ayumi* [Thirty-year trajectory of repatriation and relief], p. 109.

Throughout a series of negotiation on the repatriation of Japanese nationals that took place in the 1950s, the PRC Red Cross emphasised its ‘magnanimous’ attitude to improve its diplomatic relations with Japan and win a respectable position in the international community.³⁵¹ A bilateral memorandum – ‘Memorandum of talks on the repatriation issue’ (*kikoku mondai tō ni kansuru kondan no oboegaki*) – concluded in 1954 showed the PRC’s ‘magnanimous’ treatment of various groups of Japanese residing in China at the time. Concerning the repatriation of war criminals after August 1956, the PRC Red Cross emphasised its ‘magnanimous humanitarianism’ of a victimised country that suffered from atrocities caused by the Japanese imperialism.³⁵² Thus, certain groups of Japanese nationals that were awaiting to be repatriated in post-war China like war criminals had a higher political value as a bargaining tool than others.

While both parties highlighted the humanitarian aspect of the collective repatriation, the entire process of negotiation on the collective repatriation was profoundly affected by diplomatic agendas and conflict between the two countries. The Japanese side was often pushed to compromise in the negotiation with the PRC Red Cross as it was in the position of asking for cooperation of the PRC to repatriate its citizens.³⁵³ The Japanese Red Cross, in close coordination with the Japanese government, had to navigate the demands from China, the Japanese public opinion that demanded swift repatriation of Japanese citizens residing in China, as well as differing opinions of pro- and anti-Communist China advocates in Japan.³⁵⁴ The relations between China and Japan deteriorated after an incident on 2 May 1958, in which a Japanese ultra-nationalist pulled down a flag of the PRC at an exhibition venue in Nagasaki Prefecture, Japan. In June 1958, the PRC Red Cross first announced the suspension of its support for stranded war wives in China who wished to make a home visit to Japan, and subsequently the worsened relations led to a halt in the entire collective repatriation in July 1958.³⁵⁵

³⁵¹ Japan Red Cross, *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6], pp. 306-307.; ‘Zanryūsha wa yaku 6,000 nin: Chūkyō sekijūji no kanbu kataru [A cadre of the PRC Red Cross states about 6,000 remaining Japanese exist]’, *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 July 1956.; Osawa, *The reorganization of the postwar regional order in northeast Asia and the emergence of the war: Displaced Japanese left behind in China*, p. 143.; Kushner, B. 2015. *Men to devils, devils to men: Japanese war crimes and Chinese justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 3.

³⁵² See, for example, ‘Zanryūsha wa yaku 6,000 nin: Chūkyō sekijūji no kanbu kataru [A cadre of the PRC Red Cross states about 6,000 remaining Japanese exist]’, *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 July 1956.

³⁵³ Japan Red Cross, *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6], pp. 273-274.; Wakatsuki, *Sengo hikiage no kiroku* [Record of post-war repatriation], p. 87.

³⁵⁴ See, for example, Secretariat of the House of Representatives. 1953. *Dai 15 kai kokkai shūgiin, kaigai dōhō hikiage oyobi ikazoku engo ni kansuru chōsa tokubetsuinin kaigiroku dai 11 gō* [The 15th Diet session of the House of Representatives. The 11th minutes of the special investigatory committee on repatriation of fellow citizens abroad and relief assistance for their family members], pp. 1-18.

³⁵⁵ ‘Satogaeri enjo senu: Chūgoku sekijūjisha daden [The PRC Red Cross’ telegram: We won’t support stranded war wives to make a home visit]’, *Asahi Shimbun*, 5 June 1958.

3.3.2 Repatriation of Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers as ‘dependents’

At the beginning of the above process of negotiating the collective repatriation, the issue of Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers was discussed for the first time in history in the third bilateral conference that took place in Beijing on 23 February 1953 as follows:

1. Chinese women who married Japanese men can remain in China if they do not wish to go to Japan.
2. Children born of the above-mentioned Sino-Japanese parents who are sixteen years old or older can decide with their own will whether to go to Japan or to remain in China.
3. As for children [born of above-mentioned Sino-Japanese parents] who are below the age of sixteen, parents can decide whether they should go to Japan or remain in China.³⁵⁶

Based on what was discussed at the conference above, a ‘Memorandum of talks on the repatriation issue’ (see p. 79) was exchanged between non-governmental organisation from two countries on 3 November 1954 when the PRC Red Cross representatives visited Japan and met with the family members of Japanese people residing in China.³⁵⁷ This bilateral memorandum is the first and the only ‘official’ document that explicitly touches upon the repatriation policy for Sino-Japanese CBOW. It states:

Children born of Sino-Japanese parentage will be treated as Chinese until they reach sixteen years old. Once they reach sixteen, they need to choose their nationality with their own will and could be returned to Japan if they wish to do so.³⁵⁸

The primary purpose of this repatriation arrangement for Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers seems to be to promote swift repatriation of Japanese men who lived with their Chinese spouse and children in post-war China. Both China and Japan treated the issue of Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers as ‘*saishi no mondai*’ (the problem of wives and children) of male Japanese nationals.³⁵⁹ While the documents of the Japanese Red Cross do not specify which group of male Japanese nationals had Chinese wives and children, it is likely that they were mostly Japanese civilian workers in various fields such as healthcare, mining and railway who remained in post-war China to serve the

³⁵⁶ Japan Red Cross, *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6], p. 272.

³⁵⁷ Social Welfare and War Victim’s Relief Bureau of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, *Hikiage to engo 30 nen no ayumi* [Thirty-year trajectory of repatriation and relief], p. 111.

³⁵⁸ Japan Red Cross, *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6], pp. 308-310.

³⁵⁹ Japan Red Cross, *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6], p. 272.

Nationalists and the Communists for various voluntary and non-voluntary reasons.³⁶⁰ It is estimated that more than 35,000 Japanese nationals worked for the Communists after the establishment of PRC in 1949.³⁶¹ The existing literature shows that Japanese soldiers who remained in post-war China were not permitted to take their Chinese wives and children upon repatriation.³⁶² Both the Nationalists and Communists retained Japanese soldiers after the Second Sino-Japanese War in violation of the Potsdam Declaration (see p. 68) that ordered the swift repatriation of Japanese soldiers. As will be discussed in Chapter 4 (see p. 144), more than two thousand Japanese soldiers in post-war Shanxi Province were even encouraged to marry local women, resulting in the birth of Sino-Japanese CBOW. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) might have tried to minimise the evidence of such violation of the Potsdam Declaration in post-war China by forbidding Japanese soldiers to take their Chinese wives and children upon repatriation.³⁶³

Furthermore, prior to the conferences in the spring of 1953 in Beijing, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) notified the Japanese Red Cross that foreign wives and their children can be repatriated only if they could be 'accompanied by Japanese nationals'.³⁶⁴ By delimiting the repatriation eligibility of Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers, MOFA effectively excluded those whose Japanese husbands/fathers were repatriated or had passed away. Although this criterion to be 'accompanied by their Japanese father/husband' was not stipulated in the above memorandum, it is likely that Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers, who would have lacked valid proof of marriage, could not board a repatriation boat on their own.

It is also noteworthy that the memorandum did not conform to the patrilineal *jus sanguinis* principle of Japanese and Chinese nationality laws and took a flexible approach with regard to the nationality of Sino-Japanese CBOW. At the time of the negotiation,

³⁶⁰ See, King, A. 2015. Reconstructing China: Japanese technicians and industrialization in the early years of the People's Republic of China. *Modern Asian Studies*, pp. 1-34.; Ward, R. 2011. Delaying repatriation: Japanese technicians in early postwar China. *Japan Forum*, 23(4), pp. 471-483.; Horii, K. 2012. The Japanese who were kept working in Tianshui by conscription after the foundation of the People's Republic of China. *Gendai Chūgoku*, 86, pp. 95-106.

³⁶¹ Social Welfare and War Victim's Relief Bureau of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, *Hikiage to engo 30 nen no ayumi* [Thirty-year trajectory of repatriation and relief], p. 109.

³⁶² See, for example, Yonehama, *Nihongun 'sansei zanryū': kokkyō naisen ni honrō saretā yamashita shōi no sengo* [Remaining Japanese soldiers in Shanxi: Lieutenant Yamashita at the mercy of fate during the Chinese Civil War].; Nagatomi, H. 1996. *Hakurō no tsumeato* [Traces of a white wolf]. Osaka: Shinpu Shobo.; Ikeya, K. 2010. *Ari no heitai: Nihonhei 2600 nin sanseishō zanryū no shinsō* [Ant soldiers: Truth about 2,600 Japanese soldiers who remained in Shanxi Province]. Tokyo: Shinchosha; Omata, S. 2003. *Zanryū: Nichū yūkō e no chikai* [Remaining in post-war China: My pledge for Sino-Japanese friendship]. Tokyo: Koyo Insatsu.

³⁶³ Yonehama, Y. 2008. *Nihongun 'sansei zanryū': kokkyō naisen ni honrō saretā yamashita shōi no sengo* [Remaining Japanese soldiers in Shanxi: Lieutenant Yamashita at the mercy of fate during the Chinese Civil War]. Tokyo: Seiunsha, pp. 131-179.; NHK 'ryūyō saretā Nihonjin' shuzaihan. 'Ryūyō' saretā Nihonjin: Watashitachi wa Chūgoku kenkoku o saseta [Japanese who had to remain to 'serve China': We supported the establishment of the PRC]. Tokyo: NHK Book, pp. 142-216.

³⁶⁴ Japan Red Cross, *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6], p. 257.

both Japan and China adopted patrilineal *jus sanguinis* principle for children born of parents with different nationalities.³⁶⁵ However, instead of insisting that Sino-Japanese CBOW born of marriage should be repatriated based on their Japanese nationality, both parties granted a pathway for Sino-Japanese CBOW (and their parents) to choose their nationality. In the negotiation, the PRC Red Cross stated,

Under normal conditions, two governments need to negotiate categorisation of repatriates based on nationality laws . . . However, we have no choice but to handle this issue based on our domestic laws (due to the lack of diplomatic relations between the PRC and Japan).³⁶⁶

Thus, it is likely that they opted for a practical solution for the nationality of Sino-Japanese CBOW to realise a swift repatriation rather than engaging in a complicated affair of comparing laws on nationality, marriage and family registration.

The PRC Red Cross agreed to search for Japanese citizens residing in China. However, it is unknown how the PRC's local governments conducted their search and disseminated information about the Sino-Japanese CBOW's option to be repatriated between 1953 and 1958.³⁶⁷ Neither Keiko nor Yongyun who lived with their fathers in post-war China knew that they had an option to return to Japan in the 1950s. According to Keiko, her father who remained and passed away in post-war China was informed of the option for him to be repatriated in the 1950s. However, it seems that he was not notified of the fact that he would have been allowed to return to Japan with his Chinese wife and children. Keiko stated that her father had to give up on his long-held desire to return to Japan because he did not want to leave his family behind.³⁶⁸ Sino-Japanese CBOW and their families who missed the last repatriation boat in July 1958 had to wait for another fourteen years until the two countries re-established their diplomatic relations that enabled them to see their repatriation plan as a viable possibility.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁵ Until the PRC passed its formal nationality regulations in 1980, the nationality law of the Nationalist government passed in 1929, which adopted patrilineal *jus sanguinis* principle, was unofficially applied to resolve nationality issues. See, for example, Ginsburgs, G. 1982. The 1980 Nationality law of the People's Republic of China. *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, 30(3), pp. 459-498, p. 460.; Shao, D. 2009. Chinese by definition: Nationality law, *jus sanguinis*, and state succession, 1909-1980. *Twentieth-Century China*, 35(1), pp. 4-28, p. 5.

³⁶⁶ Japan Red Cross, *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6], p. 275.

³⁶⁷ 'Kon'nan daga chōsa ni kyōryoku: Zairyū Nihonjin no shōsoku, Chūgoku sekijūjisha ga hōkoku [The PRC Red Cross stated it will cooperate in searching for remaining Japanese despite the difficulty]', *Asahi Shimbun*, 3 September 1957.; Japan Red Cross, *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6], p. 309.; Committee to compile 'The fifty-year history of relief measures' of Social Welfare and War Victim's Relief Bureau, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, *Engo 50 nenshi* [The fifty-year history of relief measures (for remaining Japanese overseas)], p. 47.

³⁶⁸ Interview transcript, Keiko, Kanagawa, Japan, 20 May 2016.

³⁶⁹ Japan Red Cross, *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6], p. 172.

The number of Sino-Japanese children and their mothers who boarded repatriation ships in the 1950s is unknown. All the repatriates from China during that period landed at the port of Maizuru in Kyoto Prefecture, and the official record of the port shows that 32,506 individuals arrived at Maizuru Port between 1953 and 1958.³⁷⁰ As mentioned in Chapter 2 (p. 41), the document does not specify the number of Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers amongst the repatriates. It does state however that 626 ‘non-Japanese’ (*hi-Nihonjin*) and 2,406 ‘foreigners and so forth’ (*gaikokujin sonota*) arrived at the port, and these categories possibly include Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers who were accompanied by their Japanese fathers/husbands.³⁷¹

The issue of Sino-Japanese CBOW emerged on the bilateral negotiation table in the 1950s but was deemed as an issue of minor importance by both Chinese and Japanese sides in the 1950s. For the Japanese government, Sino-Japanese CBOW were mere ‘dependents’ of the Japanese civilian workers whose repatriation needed to be carried out swiftly. For China, Sino-Japanese CBOW had little value in achieving its political and diplomatic goals unlike the issue of repatriating Japanese war criminals. The policymakers in both China and Japan also simply neglected to consider the welfare and well-being of Sino-Japanese CBOW who were not visually different from the mainstream population but could have been subjected to stigmatisation and discrimination in post-war China. The repatriated Japanese fathers could have demanded their repatriation from the Japanese government. However, these fathers remained silent, presumably because most of them had remarried after their repatriation.

The silence around the repatriation of Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers in the 1950s continues to date. When the Ministry of Health and Welfare (*kōseishō*)³⁷² compiled the official history of repatriation and relief measures in 1977 and 1997, the issue of Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers negotiated in the bilateral conference was mentioned

³⁷⁰ I inquired Maizuru Repatriation Memorial Museum about the number of Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers who might have boarded the repatriation boats between 1953 and 1958. However, I have been informed that such information has not been disclosed thus far. See, Osawa, *The reorganization of the postwar regional order in northeast Asia and the emergence of the war: Displaced Japanese left behind in China*, p. 46.

³⁷¹ The official document of Maizuru Port does not define ‘non-Japanese’ and ‘foreigners and so forth’. See, *Kōseishō hikiage engokyoku, Maizuru chihō hikiage engokyoku shi* [History of Maizuru Regional Bureau of Repatriation and War Victim’s Relief], p. 542.; ‘*Konketsuji wa gaijin atsukai: Chūkyō kikansha no nyūkoku* [Mixed-blood children will be treated as foreigners: Entrance of returnees from Communist China]’, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 17 February 1953.

³⁷² *Kōseishō* (Ministry of Health and Welfare or MHW) was a cabinet-level ministry of the Japanese government established in 1938. After it absorbed a governmental agency in charge of demobilization of the military personnel (*fukuinchō*) in 1947, *kōseishō* has been handling matters related to repatriation, military pension, war victims’ relief, etc. It merged with the Ministry of Labour in 2001 and became the *kōseirōdōshō* (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare or MHLW).

in the former but was omitted in the latter.³⁷³ Previous research on the bilateral negotiations on collective repatriation in the 1950s also made no mention of Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers.³⁷⁴ Asano Tamanoi stated that co-existing multiple memories are not remembered equally but certain memories are subjugated and co-opted by others, thereby creating a hierarchy amongst them.³⁷⁵ The issue of Sino-Japanese CBOW has fallen deeper and deeper into oblivion not just because of the limited political importance it had in the ‘people’s diplomacy’ in the 1950s but also because of the continuing lack of awareness regarding the phenomenon of CBOW and the impact of post-war repatriation policies on these individuals.

3.4 Repatriation and resettlement after the normalisation (1972- present)

When China and Japan re-established diplomatic relations in 1972, Sino-Japanese CBOW were scattered in different parts of China and were unaware that other Sino-Japanese CBOW existed. Although they did not know each other, they had a common desire to reunite with the absent father as they learned about their biological origin from the mother or other caregivers early on (see Chapter 5). The 1972 normalisation and the ensuing media reports about Japanese stranded war orphans searching for their relatives in Japan triggered Sino-Japanese CBOW in their mid-life to almost simultaneously take action to trace the absent father’s whereabouts and find ways to ‘return’ to Japan. Their return migration was realised not as a result of a Japanese government’s initiative but on their own volition, based on their strong desire to ‘return’ to the father’s country (see Chapter 5). To date, Sino-Japanese CBOW who migrated to Japan have never formed a group.

The strong urge of Sino-Japanese CBOW to search for the absent father mirrors those of other CBOW groups elsewhere who started tracing their fathers in adulthood, mostly not in an attempt to ‘return’, but in an attempt to find the missing parts in their own biography, to trace possible paternal family and to deal with challenges in their own identity formation due to the absent father.³⁷⁶

³⁷³ Social Welfare and War Victim’s Relief Bureau of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, *Hikiage to engo 30 nen no ayumi* [Thirty-year trajectory of repatriation and relief], p. 111. ; Committee to compile ‘The fifty-year history of relief measures’ of Social Welfare and War Victim’s Relief Bureau, the Ministry of Health and Welfare. ed. 1997. *Engo 50 nenshi* [The fifty-year history of relief measures (for remaining Japanese overseas)]. Tokyo: Gyosei, pp. 45-49.

³⁷⁴ See, for example, Wakatsuki, *Sengo hikiage no kiroku* [Record of post-war repatriation], pp. 85-88.; Hatano, M. and Iimori, A. 2000. Visits of the Red Cross Society of China mission and Japan. *Tokiwa Kokusai Kiyo*, 4, pp. 1-18.

³⁷⁵ Asano Tamanoi, M. 2000. A road to ‘a redeemed mankind’: The politics of memory among the former Japanese peasant settlers in Manchuria. *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 99(1), pp. 163-191, p. 166.

³⁷⁶ See, for example, Mitreuter et al, Questions of identity in children born of war: Embarking on a search for the unknown soldier father, pp. 3220-3229.; GI Trace. <http://www.gitrace.org/> (accessed on 5 June 2020)

At the same time, the dynamics of the search were different in most other countries. Almost always, the lack of progress in the search for the absent father was due to a lack of disclosure from the mothers, maternal relatives and other caregivers. This means that CBOW often only started searching when their mothers passed away.³⁷⁷ Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study were not prevented from learning about their absent father (see Chapter 5, p. 158), but the aforementioned geopolitical circumstances prevented their search for more than a quarter of a century. During a series of political campaigns under Mao and without diplomatic relations between their parental countries, it was impossible for Sino-Japanese CBOW to take a concrete step towards searching for their absent father and for ways to migrate to Japan due to the risk of political persecution. Moreover, CBOW in other countries such as Germany and the UK searched for their fathers by creating a support group or network.³⁷⁸ In the case of Sino-Japanese CBOW they attempted to search for their fathers and ‘return’ to the paternal country individually rather than as a group.

This section explores how their return migration was made possible in the absence of an official repatriation policy. It investigates how some Sino-Japanese CBOW needed to cling onto the support network for a similar but non-identical group, more specifically, the aforementioned stranded war orphans (Chapter 1, p. 10). The stranded war orphans and Sino-Japanese CBOW had both significant differences and similarities. What sets these two groups fundamentally apart is their origin. Stranded war orphans were born of Japanese parentage and were raised by adoptive Chinese families in predominantly rural areas in northeast China. They were adopted by Chinese families and had little memory and knowledge about their biological family which made the search for their relatives extremely challenging. However, they have similar experiences of being subjected to stigmatisation and discrimination as children associated with the former enemy country. They also shared their aspiration to ‘return’ to their ‘homeland’ which intensified after the re-establishment of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972. Their yearning for the ‘homeland’ derives not only from their adversities but also from the Chinese culture in which they grew up. Both groups refer to the Chinese idiom ‘falling leaves return to their roots’ (*luoye guigen*) which means that ‘all people eventually return to their homeland where they spend their final years’.³⁷⁹ Stranded war orphans perceived their ‘roots’ as

³⁷⁷ See, for example, Stelzl-Marx, *Soviet children of occupation in Austria: The historical, political and social background and its consequences*, p. 284.

³⁷⁸ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 87.

³⁷⁹ See, for example, Kataoka, T. 1995. *Ha wa ochite ne ni kaeru: luoye guigen-Chūgoku no yōfubo to Nihonjin zanryūkoji no monogatari* [All leaves return to the roots: Stories of stranded war orphans and their adoptive parents]. Tokyo: Toyoigakusha.; *Futatsu no sokoku no hazamade: Chūgoku zanryūkoji sansedai ni wataru raifusutōri, Chūgoku zanryūkoji kenkyū chō ran shi intabyū* [In between two ancestral homelands: Life stories of three generations of stranded war orphans—interview with Zhang Lang, a researcher of stranded war orphans]. Synodos, 4 September 2017. <https://synodos.jp/society/20400> (accessed on 27 May 2020); Unpublished personal documents, Case 2, Ryotaro.

where both of their parents were from, whereas Sino-Japanese CBOW regarded their ‘roots’ as where their absent father was from.

This section first examines how the issue of Sino-Japanese CBOW came to be subsumed by the issue of stranded war orphans in the face of little official and grass-root support. It then scrutinises the legal procedures that Sino-Japanese CBOW used for the acquisition of Japanese nationality which enabled their ‘return’. Lastly, it investigates how Japanese government handles the issues related to Sino-Japanese CBOW and how it affects participants.

3.4.1 Minimal official and grass-root support

By the 1980s, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) was clearly aware of the existence of Sino-Japanese CBOW but maintained its reluctance in officially extending support to those who expressed their wish to search for the father and to acquire Japanese nationality. The search did not take place right after the 1972 normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations. Most Sino-Japanese CBOW had neither the father’s contact information nor knowledge about how to initiate their search. Even if they had contact information, it was still politically risky to contact someone in Japan amidst the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Since they had no support network, it usually took many years – in some cases more than ten years – for them to find a ‘key person’ who would guide them towards the right direction for their search (see Chapter 5, p. 174). Some Sino-Japanese CBOW requested the Japanese Embassy and the PRC Red Cross to search for the absent father. While a small minority of Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study could identify the father through the Japanese Embassy, others received little support from these institutions.³⁸⁰ Almost ten years after the re-establishment of Sino-Japanese relations, letters of Sino-Japanese CBOW started to reach Japan’s Social Welfare and War Victim’s Relief Bureau (*engokyoku*) of MHW (hereinafter, the War Relief Bureau). By 1986, the War Relief Bureau received hundreds of letters from Sino-Japanese CBOW that requested the Japanese government to search for the absent father.³⁸¹ The War Relief Bureau commented on these requests that it did not plan to take any special measures for Sino-Japanese CBOW on the basis that ‘China is not the only country where children born of local women fathered by Japanese during the war exist’.³⁸² The bureau also stated, ‘It will be *endless (saigen ga nakunaru)* if the government extends support to children

³⁸⁰ Unpublished personal documents, Case 2, Ryotaro.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 3, Yoshio.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 11, Taro.

³⁸¹ ‘*Konketsu koji mo nikushin sagashi: Chūgoku kara shien yōsei, shūseki mōshitate zokuzoku*’ [Mixed-blood children are searching for their kins, too: Many applications to establish *koseki* register coming from China], *Asahi Shimbun*, 16 January 1986.

³⁸² ‘*Nikushin sagashi watashitachi mo: Sen’nin kosu kataoia to ikiwakare, Nicchū konketsu koji uttae*’ [Please search for our kin, too.: More than one thousand Sino-Japanese mixed-blood orphans who were separated from a Japanese father or mother appealed], *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 February 1983.

born of a Japanese mother or father during and after the war (outside Japan).’³⁸³ These comments of MHW revealed that it was keenly aware of the existence of a potentially large number of CBOW fathered by Japanese men in China and other countries and that MHW was reluctant in opening up a Pandora’s box of the issues related to such children. In the 1980s, foreign workers from other Asian countries were increasing rapidly during the economic boom in Japan.³⁸⁴ MHW might have also feared a massive increase in applications for the father search and Japanese nationality from other Asian countries if it extended support to Sino-Japanese CBOW.

Some Sino-Japanese CBOW who originally searched for the father individually eventually depended on the support network of stranded war orphans. The stranded war orphans had a host of dedicated supporters in Japan who exhibited extraordinary devotion in negotiating with the government as well as in helping them to search for their Japanese kin and to acquire Japanese nationality to enable their repatriation. The prominent Japanese activists include Yamamoto Jisho,³⁸⁵ Yamamura Fumiko,³⁸⁶ Sugawara Kosuke,³⁸⁷ Ioriya Iwao,³⁸⁸ Chino Seiji³⁸⁹ and Kawai Hiroyuki,³⁹⁰ to name but a few. Many of the active supporters across Japan were Japanese repatriates from Manchuria who returned in the immediate aftermath of the war and had a first-hand experience of life in Manchuria and repatriation. Many of them lost their family members and friends

³⁸³ ‘*Chichi no kuni e: Eijū no michi saguru*’ [Returning to the father’s country: Searching for ways for his permanent return]. *Mainichi Shimbun*, 4 May 1983.

³⁸⁴ See, for example, Liu-Farrer, G. 2013. Chinese newcomers in Japan: Migration trends, profiles and the impact of the 2011 earthquake. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, 22(2), pp. 231-257, pp. 232-233.

³⁸⁵ Yamamoto (1902-1990), a Buddhist monk, worked as a teacher in Manchuria. After he was captured by the Soviet army, his wife and one of his daughters died in Manchuria. Since the 1960s, he not only searched for his missing daughter but also devoted himself to supporting stranded war orphans and women.

³⁸⁶ Yamamura migrated to Manchuria with her husband in 1942. During the time she fled as a refugee after the war, she lost her one-year-old son. She started to help stranded war orphans to search for their relatives in the 1970s. See, https://www.sakuralaw.gr.jp/info/contribution_01_02.htm (accessed on 18 February 2020)

³⁸⁷ Sugawara (1925-2013) joined the Youth Volunteer Army in Manchuria in 1941 at the age of sixteen. After the end of the war, he was assigned to escort Japanese refugees from Manchuria on a train as a military policeman. He became the head of the national committee of the associations for stranded war orphans in 1987.

³⁸⁸ Ioriya (1918-2012) was born in Shenyang and worked for a Japanese company that operated a coal mine in Fushun. He devoted himself to supporting stranded war orphans since 1976. See, Ioriya, K. 2009. *Chūgoku zanryū Nihonjin shien shisaku no tenkai to mondaiten: Borantia no shiten kara* [Development and problem of policy to support Japanese remaining in post-war China: From a volunteer’s point of view]. In *Rethinking Manchukuo and Japan: A living history of Japanese left-behind in China after WWII*, ed. S. Araragi, pp. 213-254. Tokyo: Bensei, pp. 214-221.; Okubo, M. ‘*Moto Chūgoku zanryū koji mondai zenkoku kyōgikai kaichō ioriya iwao san: motometsuzuketa “chi no kayou gyōsei”*’ [Mr Ioriya Iwao, the former chairperson of national committee of associations for stranded war orphans: A man who continued to demand ‘humane administration’], *Asahi Shimbun*, 18 February 2012.

³⁸⁹ Chino (1925-2014) went to Manchuria at the age of fifteen as a member of the Youth Volunteer Army. See, Okubo, M. 2014 [Obituary of Chino Seiji], *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 January; https://www.sakuralaw.gr.jp/info/contribution_01_02.htm (accessed on 18 February 2020).

³⁹⁰ Kawai (1944-) was born in Manchuria. He is a lawyer well-known for his activism to help stranded war orphans to acquire Japanese nationality as well as to ensure their welfare since the 1980s. See, https://www.sakuralaw.gr.jp/info/contribution_01_02.htm (accessed on 17 February 2020).

after the Soviet army entered the war on 9 August 1945, and they empathised with the stranded war orphans whom they considered as ‘one of us’. The notion of ‘empathy’ – while often not sufficiently distinguished from other emotional concepts such as sympathy and solidarity – has become central to the studies on how individuals identify with a collective past.³⁹¹ Landsberg pointed out that empathy requires oneself to imagine what it was like for that other person given what he or she experienced and entails an intellectual engagement with the plight of the other.³⁹² Kawai, who was born in Manchuria in 1944, stated that ‘I could have been left behind in China’, and his strong empathy became the driving force for his activism for stranded war orphans.³⁹³ Since the mid-1970s, many support groups for stranded war orphans were formed all over Japan, and these associations formed the national committee of associations for stranded war orphans (*Zenkoku Chūgoku zanryūkoji mondai kyōgikai*) to hold the Japanese government accountable for the plight of stranded war orphans as well as to negotiate their repatriation and their welfare after the resettlement. A variety of actions that these ‘memory activists’ (see Chapter 1, p. 11) took include publishing books³⁹⁴ and building monuments led to the emergence of stranded war orphans as public memory since the 1970s.³⁹⁵

This growing number of enthusiastic supporters was critical in motivating MHW to provide official support for the stranded war orphans. The supporters of stranded war orphans condemned the Japanese Kwantung Army for first abandoning the vulnerable Japanese civilians in Manchuria after the Soviet’s attack and held the Japanese government accountable for abandoning the stranded war orphans by unilaterally pronouncing the death of 33,000 Japanese nationals remaining in China after the end of the collective repatriation in the 1950s (see Chapter 1, p. 11).³⁹⁶ The Japanese government however continued to show reluctance in supporting the repatriation and resettlement of stranded war orphans. However, when the supporters of stranded war orphans eventually formed a critical mass and gained visibility in the media, MHW was pressured to offer financial support to search for their relatives as well as for arranging their repatriation and resettlement from the beginning of the 1980s.³⁹⁷

³⁹¹ See, for example, Arnold-de Simine, S. 2013. *Mediating memory in the museum: Trauma, empathy, nostalgia*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.; Landsberg, A. 2009. Memory, empathy, and the politics of identification. *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 22, pp. 221-229.

³⁹² Landsberg, Memory, empathy, and the politics of identification.

³⁹³ ‘Kawai Hiroyuki’, Sakura Kyodo Law Offices. <http://lawyer-kawai.com/humanitarian> (accessed on 3 September 2020)

³⁹⁴ See, for instance, the collection of books that were donated to the Institute of Developing Economies Library by Ioriya Iwao, one of the well-known activists for stranded war orphans. https://d-arch.ide.go.jp/asia_archive/collections/Ioriya/document.html (accessed on 18 February 2020).

³⁹⁵ Asano Tamanoi, Japanese war orphans and the challenges of repatriation in post-colonial East Asia, p. 5.

³⁹⁶ Efir, R. 2008. Japan’s ‘war orphans’: Identification and state responsibility. *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 34(2), pp. 363-388, p. 374.

³⁹⁷ Ioriya, *Chūgoku zanryū Nihonjin shien shisaku no tenkai to mondaiten: Borantia no shiten kara* [Development and problem of policy to support Japanese remaining in post-war China: From a volunteer’s point of view], p. 240.

The number of the stranded war orphans and Sino-Japanese CBOW are arguably comparable. It is estimated that around three thousand stranded war orphans survived the Soviet attack in August 1945.³⁹⁸ According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), the number of recognised stranded war orphans is 2,818, of which 2,557 repatriated at government expense.³⁹⁹ While MHW (predecessor of MHLW) never conducted any investigation on Sino-Japanese CBOW in China, it nevertheless provided an estimated number of Sino-Japanese children in China to newspaper journalists in the 1980s. As mentioned in Chapter 2 (p. 42), major newspaper companies in Japan published articles on Sino-Japanese CBOW between 1983 and 1986. Sino-Japanese CBOW were labelled ‘Sino-Japanese mixed-blood orphans’ and were treated as a ‘subcategory’ of stranded war orphans. Asahi Shimbun reported in 1986 that 1,500 ‘Sino-Japanese mixed-blood orphans’ requested the government to search for the father.⁴⁰⁰ However, this figure included both Sino-Japanese CBOW and the children born of Japanese mothers and Chinese fathers in China, and the breakdown was not made available to the public. In 1983, according to Mainichi Shimbun, MHW stated that there were more than ten thousand ‘Sino-Japanese mixed-blood orphans’ in China.⁴⁰¹ In 1985, Asahi Shimbun reported that there are thousands (*sūsen nin*) of them in China based on an interview with an MHW official.⁴⁰² However, after 1986, the estimated number of the Sino-Japanese children reported in newspapers decreased to two thousand. Mainichi Shimbun article titled ‘My father is Japanese, and my mother is Chinese. Please give us Japanese nationality, too.’ was published in 1986, focusing on Sino-Japanese CBOW. It reported that the number of Sino-Japanese children is ‘estimated to be two thousand – approximately the same number as stranded war orphans’.⁴⁰³ While it is impossible to determine the number of Sino-Japanese CBOW from the above estimated numbers provided by MHW with confidence, my research suggests that the number of Sino-Japanese CBOW is likely to have been in the region of that of stranded war orphans. This study alone identified around 230 Sino-Japanese CBOW through fieldwork (see Chapter

³⁹⁸ Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and reintegration in postwar Japan*, p. 11.

³⁹⁹ The number of stranded war orphans who returned to Japan at their own expense is not included in the official figure. ‘*Chūgoku zanryū hōjin no jōkyō*’ [The situation of Japanese remaining in post-war China], Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.

<https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/bunya/engo/seido02/kojitoukei.html> (accessed on 3 September 2020)

⁴⁰⁰ ‘*Konketsu koji mo nikushin sagashi: Chūgoku kara shien yōsei, shūseki mōshitate zokuzoku*’ [Mixed-blood children are searching for their kins, too: Many applications to establish *koseki* register coming from China], *Asahi Shimbun*, 16 January 1986.

⁴⁰¹ ‘*Chichino kuni e: Eijū no michi saguru*’ [Returning to the father’s country: Searching for ways for his permanent return]. *Mainichi Shimbun*, 4 May 1983.

⁴⁰² ‘*Chichi o sagashitekudasai: Nicchū konketsuji, honsha e tegami*’ [Please find my father: A letter was sent from a Sino-Japanese mixed-blood child to Asahi Shimbun headquarter], *Asahi Shimbun*, 18 March 1985.

⁴⁰³ ‘*Chichi wa Nihonjin, haha wa Chūgokujin: watashitachi nimo Nihon kokuseki o. Koko nimo zanryūkoji 2,000 nin*’ [My father is Japanese, my mother is Chinese: Please give us Japanese nationality, too. There are two thousand more stranded war orphans.], *Mainichi Shimbun*, 16 January 1986.

2, p. 46), which is likely to be only a tiny fraction of the actual total number. Considering a large Japanese male population during and after the war across China (see Chapter 1, p. 34) and similar estimation of CBOW populations in other contexts based on similar proportions of known cases and sizes of non-local male populations, it is plausible that the real number of Sino-Japanese CBOW is indeed in the thousands.

The media's representation of Sino-Japanese CBOW as a 'subgroup' of stranded war orphans needing support seemed to have pressured MHW, which originally refused to handle any requests, to search for their fathers on behalf of Sino-Japanese CBOW. Although information sent from Sino-Japanese CBOW tended to be very detailed, the official search for the father was attended with much difficulty. When MHW received about 1,200 requests from Sino-Japanese children including both Sino-Japanese CBOW and the children born of Chinese mothers fathered by Japanese in 1983, it could identify only about ten percent of Japanese kin of those who sent their search request.⁴⁰⁴ Moreover, only one tenth of identified Japanese kin were willing to contact their Sino-Japanese children in China, presumably because many of them were remarried and feared the financial cost of recognising and supporting their children.⁴⁰⁵

Some activists and volunteers in Japan also extended support in the process of return migration and resettlement of Sino-Japanese CBOW (see Chapter Six). Some of the aforementioned prominent activists who came across the cases of Sino-Japanese CBOW – Ioriya Iwao⁴⁰⁶, Chino Seiji⁴⁰⁷ and Kawai Hiroyuki⁴⁰⁸ – provided support for Sino-Japanese CBOW to acquire Japanese nationality. Chino referred to Sino-Japanese CBOW as 'mixed-blood orphans' in an interview conducted by a journalist in 1986 and emphasised that Sino-Japanese CBOW deserve support as they were 'war victims'.

Stranded war orphans and mixed-blood orphans are essentially the same in a sense that they are both war victims. I think mixed-blood

⁴⁰⁴ 'Nikushin sagashi watashitachi mo: Sen'nin kosu kataoya to ikiwakare, Nicchū konketsu koji uttae' [Please search for our kin, too.: More than one thousand Sino-Japanese mixed-blood orphans who were separated from a Japanese father or mother appealed], *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 February 1983.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid. Some participants in this study (Michiko and Seiji) stated that they had to explain to their Japanese relatives that they did not intend to financially depend on their Japanese kin upon their 'return'. See, Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 20 January 2017.; Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

⁴⁰⁶ Ioriya became a personal guarantor for two Sino-Japanese CBOW to help them repatriate. (See, 'Ioriya Iwao san: Chūgoku zanryūkoji mondai ni torikumu borantia' [Mr Ioriya Iwao: A volunteer tackling the issues of stranded war orphans], *Asahi Shimbun*, 20 November 1998.) A list of several court cases of Sino-Japanese CBOW that he made can be seen on the following website. *Ioriya nōto* [Notes taken by Mr Ioriya]. <https://www.kikokusha-center.or.jp/resource/sankoshiryō/ioriya-notes/ioriya-title.htm> (accessed on 2 September 2020)

⁴⁰⁷ One of the participants, Seiji, received support from Chino in acquiring Japanese nationality. See, Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

⁴⁰⁸ Sino-Japanese CBOW's personal documents submitted to the Japanese family court show that Kawai had helped Sino-Japanese CBOW to acquire Japanese nationality.

orphans suffered even more than stranded war orphans. We plan to cooperate if they request help in acquiring Japanese nationality.⁴⁰⁹

Although Chino attempted to attract attention to the issue of Sino-Japanese CBOW by adopting the ‘war victim’ narrative, the number of supporters for Sino-Japanese CBOW remained considerably smaller than that of stranded war orphans. The life stories of Sino-Japanese CBOW in comparison with those of the stranded war orphans were more difficult to empathise with for the majority in post-war Japan. Firstly, although many studies have been conducted on wartime Japanese populations in large cities in China, Manchuria remains to be the most ‘remembered’ location in the public memories of the Second Sino-Japanese War.⁴¹⁰ Secondly, being born of Sino-Japanese parentage was an obstacle to integration of their narratives into the collective memory of post-war Japan that embraced the discourse of homogeneity. The newspaper articles on Sino-Japanese CBOW’s plea for the father search might have aroused the readership’s sympathy – ‘an understanding and care for the other’s suffering’⁴¹¹ – but not empathy that could have led to contemplation and action for the Other whose set of experiences fall well outside of the readership’s own experiences.⁴¹² The lack of public empathy may have been due to a lack of ability to imagine what led to their birth and what the experiences of Sino-Japanese CBOW have been like. After all, only a small number of stories of Sino-Japanese CBOW were picked up in these newspaper articles which hardly captured their complex life trajectories. The memories of Sino-Japanese CBOW were subsumed by the memories of stranded war orphans, which in addition to a lack of public pressure, played in the favour of MHW allowing them to avoid laying out a specific policy to support Sino-Japanese CBOW.

3.4.2 Receiving legal approval for the father-child relationship

Due to limited official and grass-roots support, Sino-Japanese CBOW who yearned to search for the father and ‘return’ to Japan faced great difficulties in contacting someone who knew how to assist them to realise their goals. However, some Sino-Japanese CBOW residing in China managed to contact some Japanese supporters for stranded war orphans who could assist in realising their wishes. This section explores the specific legal procedure that most Sino-Japanese CBOW took to register themselves to *koseki*, the Japanese family register. This legal procedure deserves attention because registration to *koseki* register was not only a legal prerequisite to acquire Japanese nationality but also provided Sino-Japanese CBOW with the official approval of their father-child

⁴⁰⁹ ‘*Chichi wa Nihonjin, haha wa Chūgokujin: watashitachi nimo Nihon kokuseki o. Koko nimo zanryūkoji 2,000 nin*’ [My father is Japanese, my mother is Chinese: Please give us Japanese nationality, too. There are two thousand more stranded war orphans.], *Mainichi Shimbun*, 16 January 1986.

⁴¹⁰ Asano Tamanoi, Introduction, p. 17.

⁴¹¹ Cambridge Dictionary.

⁴¹² Landsberg, A. 2009. Memory, empathy, and the politics of identification. *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 22, pp. 221-229.

relationship. Such a legal route to acquire the nationality of the paternal country is unprecedented amongst other groups of CBOW in different historical and geopolitical settings.

Both Japan's former nationality law established in 1899 and the new Nationality Act enacted in 1950 adopted patrilineal *jus sanguinis* principle, which meant that Japanese nationality could be passed only from father to child.⁴¹³ However, according to the *koseki* law, the father-child relationship could only be officially confirmed by registering the parent's marriage in the *koseki* register.⁴¹⁴ This study confirmed a few cases in which the Japanese father registered his Chinese wife and Sino-Japanese CBOW to his *koseki* register (see Chapter 4, pp. 126, 148) during the war. The *koseki* registration of the wife and children automatically conferred them Japanese nationality. However, it is likely that the vast majority of Sino-Japanese CBOW remained unregistered for various reasons and thus did not possess Japanese nationality. If a Sino-Japanese CBOW managed to identify the father who was willing to acknowledge the child, a Sino-Japanese CBOW could be entered into the father's *koseki* register. However, if the father had already passed away or refused to acknowledge the child, most Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study resorted to so-called *shūseki* procedure.⁴¹⁵ *Shūseki* procedure, based on *koseki* law (article 110), is a legal means to establish the *koseki* register for individuals who do not possess one to rectify delays or oversights in the registration that was supposed to be established at their birth.⁴¹⁶ These individuals are required to submit to a Japanese family court evidence for the Japanese nationality that they should be granted. The permission from the family court to establish a *koseki* register confers Japanese nationality to an applicant.⁴¹⁷

Some Japanese activists originally started to use the *shūseki* procedure to help stranded war orphans, who could not identify their Japanese kin, with their nationality acquisition. The Japanese government initially stated that stranded war orphans could not be repatriated unless they successfully identified their Japanese kin and registered themselves to their Japanese family's *koseki* register.⁴¹⁸ However, such a policy hindered repatriation of the majority of stranded war orphans because their search for Japanese kin was like 'finding a needle in the ocean'.⁴¹⁹ Many stranded war orphans, especially those

⁴¹³ The Nationality Act was amended in 1984 after Japan signed the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women in 1981. Article 2 of the Nationality Act states that the child will be given Japanese nationality when either parent is a Japanese national at the time of birth.

⁴¹⁴ Tanno, K. 2014. *Kokuseki no kyōkai o kangaeru* [Reflection on the boundary of nationality]. Tokyo: Yoshida Shoten, p. 7.

⁴¹⁵ Efir, Japan's 'war orphans': Identification and state responsibility, p. 376.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ Ohno, *Nikkeijin kara zanryū Nihonjin e no tenkan: Firipin Nikkei nisei no sengo mondai to shūseki undo o chūshin ni* [Shift from 'Nikkeijin' to 'Remaining Japanese in the Philippines': Concerning issues of second generation Philippine Nikkeijin and their movement to acquire Japanese nationality through *shūseki* procedure], p. 32.

⁴¹⁸ Efir, Japan's 'war orphans': Identification and state responsibility, p. 375.

⁴¹⁹ Enari, T. 1984. *Shaohai no manshū* [Children and Manchuria]. Tokyo: Shueisha, pp. 320-321.

who were infants at the end of the war, knew next to nothing about their biological parents. Even when Japanese relatives were identified, some of them refused to acknowledge stranded war orphans for familial and financial reasons.⁴²⁰ It was only in 1984 that the Japanese government allowed stranded war orphans who could not identify their Japanese kin to be repatriated if they had a Japanese guarantor.⁴²¹

The activists for stranded war orphans then formed a group called the Association to Support Acquisition of Japanese Nationality for Stranded War Orphans (*Chūgoku zanryūkoji no kokuseki shutoku o shiensuru kai*, hereinafter, Association to Support Nationality Acquisition) in 1984 and chose the *shūseki* procedure as an effective strategy to help stranded war orphans who could not identify or were rejected by their Japanese kin. They strategically chose this *shūseki* procedure over a conventional procedure to file an administrative lawsuit against the state to make the state recognise the applicant's Japanese nationality (*kokuseki kakunin soshō*).⁴²² Had stranded war orphans filed a lawsuit against the state as a plaintiff, they would have borne the burden of proof and the court would have required oral pleadings. They would have stood little chance of winning if they had failed to submit the necessary evidence or if the submitted evidence had been deemed questionable by the judge.⁴²³ *Shūseki* procedure was also advantageous for stranded war orphans who resided in China because a judge of a family court made a decision based on the submitted documents without oral pleadings.⁴²⁴ Furthermore, in a *shūseki* trial at a family court, a judge comprehensively examined the evidence submitted by stranded war orphans as well as evidence collected by the family court investigators. The claim was likely to be approved as long as the family court judged that the case was reasonable and required legal redress.⁴²⁵ Kawai, the aforementioned lawyer and activist for stranded war orphans, commented that the family court is known as '*ai no saibansho*' (court of love) because it is sympathetic towards those who seek redress.⁴²⁶ He also stated that the activism to help stranded war orphans acquire Japanese nationality would have been far less successful had lawyers chosen to file an administrative lawsuit against the state.⁴²⁷ The Association to Support Nationality Acquisition helped 1,250 stranded war

⁴²⁰ Efrid, Japan's 'war orphans': Identification and state responsibility, p. 375.

⁴²¹ Ibid.

⁴²² '*Chūgoku zanryūkoji kokusekishutoku 1,000 nin tassei no kiroku*' [Achievement of helping 1,000 stranded war orphans to acquire Japanese nationality], Sakura Kyodo Law Offices. <https://www.sakuralaw.gr.jp/contribution/01.htm> (accessed on 3 September 2020).

⁴²³ E-mail correspondence, Yonekura Yoko (lawyer) to Kanako Kuramitsu, 29 August 2019.

⁴²⁴ For information on trial procedures at Japanese family court, see, Courts in Japan. Shinpan tetsuzuki ippan [Trial procedures in general].

https://www.courts.go.jp/saiban/syurui/kazi/kazi_02/index.html (accessed on 18 September 2020)

⁴²⁵ E-mail correspondence, Yonekura Yoko (lawyer) to Kanako Kuramitsu, 29 August 2019.; E-mail correspondence, Yasuhara Yukihiko (lawyer) to Kanako Kuramitsu, 29 August 2019.

⁴²⁶ '*Chūgoku zanryūkoji kokusekishutoku 1,000 nin tassei no kiroku*' [Achievement of helping 1,000 stranded war orphans to acquire Japanese nationality], Sakura Kyodo Law Offices. <https://www.sakuralaw.gr.jp/contribution/01.htm> (accessed on 3 September 2020).

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

orphans to acquire Japanese nationality through the *shūseki* procedure in twenty-five years.⁴²⁸

The *shūseki* procedure turned out to be a suitable solution for Sino-Japanese CBOW who wished to acquire Japanese nationality as well, especially for those who were residing in China. Five participants (Seiji, Michiko, Koretada, Momoko and Keiko) and twenty Sino-Japanese CBOW, whose unpublished personal documents were collected for this study (see Appendix 3), took the *shūseki* procedure to ‘return’ to Japan.

Shūseki procedure required time and perseverance because Sino-Japanese CBOW had to collect a variety of documents to corroborate their parents’ marriage and father-child relationship (see Chapter 2, p. 43) which was imperative in obtaining permission from a family court for *koseki* registration. Although all parents of Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study were married in accord with the then Chinese marriage law and local custom, most of their parents did not have a marriage certificate. Until the marriage registration became mandatory in 1950, marriage was regarded legitimate as long as a couple held an open wedding ceremony with at least two witnesses.⁴²⁹ Besides, during the Cultural Revolution, the father’s photos and other mementos were either confiscated by the Red Guards or had to be discarded or burnt to avoid political persecution.⁴³⁰

As a substitute for a marriage certificate, Sino-Japanese CBOW needed to collect detailed information including testimonies regarding the wedding ceremony from the mother, wedding witnesses as well as the father’s former neighbours, colleagues and friends as evidence of their parents’ marriage and father-child relationship. However, by the time Sino-Japanese CBOW embarked on collecting such testimony, thirty to fifty years have passed since these witnesses were acquainted with the father, and they were all in their old age. Some were deceased, and others could no longer be found at a place where they used to live or work during the war. When Ryotaro searched for his witnesses, he found out that only four out of twenty guests to his parents’ wedding ceremony were alive.⁴³¹ Moreover, these elderly witnesses were required to be present at a notary public office to have an officer’s stamp on their testimonies as notarisation was a procedure required by the Japanese family court to validate their testimonies. It was not easy especially for some elderly witnesses to go to the notary public office. A wartime friend of Kayoko’s father, for example, had to travel from Shanghai to Nanjing for the notarisation procedures.⁴³² Japanese lawyers demanded the testimonies to be as detailed

⁴²⁸ ‘Kawai Hiroyuki’, Sakura Kyodo Law Offices. <http://lawyer-kawai.com/humanitarian> (accessed on 3 September 2020)

⁴²⁹ Okuda, *Kazoku to kokuseki: kokusaika no susumu naka de* [Family and nationality: Upon advancement of internationalisation], pp. 174-175.

⁴³⁰ See, for example, Unpublished personal documents, Case 1, Tsuneyoshi.

⁴³¹ Unpublished personal documents, Case 2, Ryotaro.

⁴³² Unpublished personal documents, Case 6, Kayoko.

as possible to strengthen the credibility of the case. All the evidence could be submitted to a family court only after several exchanges between Sino-Japanese CBOW and their lawyers at the time when exchange by international mail took much longer than today.

Sino-Japanese CBOW's mothers had played a key role in *shūseki* procedure for most Sino-Japanese CBOW. To augment the authenticity of the evidence of marriage and father-child relationship, Japanese lawyers requested the mothers of Sino-Japanese CBOW to answer twenty-two questions on their wedding ceremony and relationship with their Japanese husbands (see Appendix 6). This meant that the mother's consent and support considerably increased the chance for Sino-Japanese CBOW to acquire Japanese nationality. Regardless of how the Japanese father perceived his marriage, the mothers who testified for their children's *koseki* registration did not regard their married life as temporary extramarital affairs. Some mothers probably regarded themselves as 'Japanese' not only because of the then nationality laws in China and Japan that stipulated that women who marry a foreign national acquire her husband's nationality but also based on the patriarchal norms that they had internalised (see Chapter 4).⁴³³ These mothers supported their children's idea of 'returning' to the father's country although it meant that their children needed to renounce their Chinese nationality. In case the mother had already passed away, Sino-Japanese CBOW provided their testimony about the parents' marriage and father-child relationship based on the stories they heard from the mother. Thus, the mother's memory of the relationship with the Japanese partner was an essential element in the process of return migration of Sino-Japanese CBOW.

Through *shūseki* trial, Japanese family courts also recognised marriage and the father-child relationship of diverse patterns of Sino-Japanese unions during the war. This study discovered seven cases in which Sino-Japanese CBOW whose father had a bigamous marriage with his Chinese wife could successfully establish a *koseki* register through *shūseki* trial. Bigamy is prohibited in the Civil Code of Japan (article 732). However, civil codes of both countries also stipulate that a valid marriage cannot be annulled retroactively. Even in a case in which the father of Sino-Japanese CBOW married his Chinese wife without getting a divorce from his Japanese wife, the parents' marriage was considered valid as long as the marriage was based on mutual consent and satisfied the requirements on marriage formalities. Therefore, his child with his Chinese wife was regarded as a child born in lawful wedlock. In the case of Seiji's parents, his father was already married to a Japanese woman before marrying his Chinese wife in 1941 in Nanjing. The Tokyo Family Court ruled as follows:

A (Seiji's father) and B (Seiji's mother) held a publicly-open wedding ceremony with two wedding witnesses, C and D, on 10 April 1941. Their marriage took effect as it conformed to the marriage formalities

⁴³³ 1929 Nationality Law of the Republic of China, Article 10.

of the Republic of China at the time. However, A was married to a Japanese woman, E, in Japan, and so, it could be said that he had a bigamous marriage with B. . . . The Civil Code in both Japan and China stipulates that valid marriage cannot be annulled retroactively. Also, there is no evidence that the marriage was annulled before Seiji was born. Therefore, Seiji was born of his parents' valid marriage and is A's legitimate child. Seiji's father was a Japanese national at the time of his birth, and so Seiji acquired Japanese nationality at birth based on Article 1 of the former Japanese nationality law.⁴³⁴

Such a decision made by the family court – validating the parents' marriage instead of dismissing it as bigamous and invalid – was essential not only for Sino-Japanese CBOW to have legal approval for their father-child relationship but also for their identity as a legitimate child (see Chapter 5, p. 178).

Shūseki procedure was an effective and successful means to acquire Japanese nationality for Sino-Japanese CBOW who managed to access lawyers in Japan and submit necessary evidence. However, it is likely the difficulty of accessing assistance from the Japanese lawyers might have significantly limited the number of Sino-Japanese CBOW who successfully acquired Japanese nationality. Ikeda Sumie, who was a member of the Support Association for Nationality Acquisition, stated that she remembers assisting about forty Sino-Japanese CBOW whereas she assisted more than one thousand stranded war orphans to acquire Japanese nationality. This number is disproportionately low considering that hundreds of Sino-Japanese CBOW demanded MHW to search for their father and grant them Japanese nationality in the 1980s. *Shūseki* procedure has been used by a support group for Philippine Nikkeijin (see Chapter 1, p.8) led by the aforementioned lawyer, Kawai Hiroyuki. Through *shūseki* procedure, more than two hundred Philippine Nikkeijin acquired Japanese nationality since 2006.⁴³⁵ While Kawai himself did not remember that he was involved in *shūseki* procedure of Sino-Japanese CBOW in the 1980s (see Chapter 2, p. 43), the collected evidence shows Sino-Japanese CBOW were the first group of Asian children born of transnational heritage who acquired Japanese nationality through *shūseki* trial in Japan.

Shūseki procedure could be likened to a process of finding missing pieces of their identity as they learned extensively about the father and his relationships that were central to their identity. Having the father-child relationship legally approved was a positive means to break away the ambiguity around their legal status, especially for those who

⁴³⁴ Permission for *shūseki*, Tokyo Family Court to Seiji, 3 March 1987.

⁴³⁵ Philippine Nikkei-jin Legal Support Center. http://pnlsc.com/index_e.html (accessed on 11 September 2020); The Nippon Foundation. 'Shūseki tetsuzuki de Nihon kokuseki shutoku 200 nin ni [The number of those who acquired Japanese nationality through *shūseki* procedure reached two hundred]', 27 July 2017. <https://blog.canpan.info/nfkouhou/archive/1000> (accessed on 14 September 2020)

were born of bigamous or polygamous marriage as well as a means to match their sense of belonging to Japan with nationality.

3.4.3 Inconsistencies in the official treatment of elderly Sino-Japanese CBOW

Three participants (Yuko, Koretada and Keiko) migrated to Japan at their own expense, while others (Michiko, Seiji and Momoko) were advised by the Japanese Embassy to wait until further notice and migrate to Japan at government expense.⁴³⁶ At the discretion of the Japanese Embassy in China, the latter group was entered into the records of bureaucracy as ‘stranded war orphans’ upon their migration to Japan. As will be discussed below, the lack of a coherent policy towards Sino-Japanese CBOW as well as inclusion and exclusion from the official record of Japanese Remaining in China after the War (JRCW; *Chūgoku zanryū hōjin*) had a significant impact on the participants’ resettlement and post-retirement life in Japan. This section explores the official treatment of Sino-Japanese CBOW in their post-migration phase which had various impacts on the participants’ lives. It specifically looks at how the issue of Sino-Japanese CBOW was positioned in the policy for JRCW which was formed in consequence of stranded war orphans’ legal fight against the state over state responsibility for their plight.

After they migrated to Japan in the 1980s and 1990s, participants yet again faced similar problems as stranded war orphans. Both Sino-Japanese CBOW and stranded war orphans who were in their mid-life upon their arrival in Japan needed support in finding accommodation and jobs as well as in receiving language education. Stranded war orphans who were repatriated at government expense were provided with free accommodation for four to six months and received language education and vocational guidance. Only participants who were on the records of MHW as ‘stranded war orphans’ could benefit from these services upon their arrival in Japan.

In their old age, both stranded war orphans and Sino-Japanese CBOW faced similar financial issues due to their insufficient pension. Had they migrated to Japan immediately after the end of the war and started to work in Japan in their twenties, they would have begun paying earlier for employees’ pension (*kōsei nenkin*) or public pension (*kokumin nenkin*). However, Sino-Japanese CBOW migrated to Japan in their mid-life. When they became a pensioner, some participants had to rely on welfare benefits (*seikatsu hogo*) as they received insufficient amounts of pensions due to unemployment or insufficient

⁴³⁶ Toshio migrated to Japan with his family at government expense. However, his case was special because he was accompanied by his father who was imprisoned in post-war China for twenty years on a charge of espionage. The Japanese Embassy arranged a flight for Toshio and his family because it was treated as a diplomatic matter. See, Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku*, pp. 303-304, 309-315.

premium payment since their resettlement in Japan.⁴³⁷ Receiving welfare benefits in Japan is often seen as the last resort that one should avoid at all cost because the recipients are not only socially stigmatised but are subjected to strict restrictions such as a monthly income inspection and prohibition of saving money or travelling abroad.⁴³⁸

To spend the final stage of their lives with dignity, stranded war orphans and their support groups fought against the state from the early 1990s to the late 2000s. Since the beginning of the 1990s, stranded war orphans and their support groups have constantly demanded the MHW to provide sufficient financial support for stranded war orphans who lived under the poverty line. In 1993, a support group in Tokyo submitted a petition with 4,600 signatures to MHW, requesting an increase in the public pension to stranded war orphans.⁴³⁹ In November 1994, the government issued a special measure decree for JRCW (hereinafter the 1994 Assistance Law) to retrospectively compensate for the lack of premium payments, from April 1961 when the pension system began to the time when they started to pay their premiums. Although the state started to compensate for the lack of premium payments, the combined amounts of the public and employees' pensions were insufficient and left elderly stranded war orphans impoverished.

In 2001, a petition movement was organised towards the Japanese parliament, requesting legislation to provide a sufficient post-retirement benefit for stranded war orphans.⁴⁴⁰ However, MHLW did not acknowledge the state responsibility towards the difficulties that stranded war orphans faced in their old age. According to MHLW, the orphans simply needed to 'reform their consciousness' (*ishiki kaikaku*) and see welfare dependency in a more positive light.⁴⁴¹ Further, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party rejected a bill to provide a post-retirement benefit for stranded war orphans, and they argued that all the Japanese people were victims of the war, and therefore, the government should not provide special benefits just to stranded war orphans.⁴⁴² Consequently, 629 stranded war orphans filed a class-action lawsuit in the Tokyo District Court in 2002, requesting government compensation for its negligence in implementing the orphans' early repatriation and resettlement assistance.⁴⁴³ Eventually, the class-action lawsuit filed at the Tokyo District Court developed into a nationwide movement. By July 2005, 2,192

⁴³⁷ Itoh, M. 2010. *Japanese War Orphans in Manchuria: Forgotten Victims of World War II*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 159.

⁴³⁸ See, for example, Okubo, M. 2009. *Chūgoku kikokusha to kokka baishō seikyū shūdan soshō* [Returnees from China and class-action lawsuit against the state]. In *Rethinking Manchukuo and Japan: A living history of Japanese left-behind in China after WWII*, ed. S. Araragi, pp. 285-315, pp. 290-296. Tokyo: Bensei.; Brasor, P. 'The public shame of crying poor', *The Japan Times*, 10 June 2012. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/06/10/national/media-national/the-public-shame-of-crying-poor/> (accessed on 11 September 2020)

⁴³⁹ Itoh, *Japanese War Orphans in Manchuria: Forgotten Victims of World War II*, p. 165.

⁴⁴⁰ Itoh, *Japanese War Orphans in Manchuria: Forgotten Victims of World War II*, p. 166.

⁴⁴¹ Efirid, Japan's 'war orphans': Identification and state responsibility, p. 365.

⁴⁴² Itoh, *Japanese War Orphans in Manchuria: Forgotten Victims of World War II*, p. 167.

⁴⁴³ Itoh, *Japanese War Orphans in Manchuria: Forgotten Victims of World War II*, p. 177.

stranded war orphans (eighty-eight per cent of the total 2,500 repatriated orphans) filed class-action lawsuits in fifteen local district courts in Japan.⁴⁴⁴

Stranded war orphans and their supporters emphasised their victimhood in the class-action lawsuits.⁴⁴⁵ Their claims against the Japanese government was as follows. The post-war Japanese government not only failed to repatriate stranded war orphans but also facilitated registration as ‘wartime dead’ by passing a law in 1959 (see Chapter 1, p. 11). Even after 1972, the government did not expedite their repatriation. Upon repatriation, the government treated stranded war orphans born of Japanese parentage as legal aliens. Based on these arguments, they demanded the government to guarantee a decent post-retirement life, putting an end to their dependence on welfare benefits.⁴⁴⁶ Except for a victory at Kobe District Court in 2006, verdicts at other district and high courts rejected their claims giving a variety of reasons.⁴⁴⁷ However, although the then prime minister Abe and his cabinet members evaded acknowledging the responsibility and a formal apology, they proposed to devise new assistance for stranded war orphans.⁴⁴⁸ In 2007, the Diet passed a bill to revise the 1994 Assistance Law. The revised law to support JRCW which took effect in 2008 (hereinafter the 2008 Assistance Law) pays stranded war orphans and stranded war wives a maximum of 146,000-yen (860 British Pound⁴⁴⁹) monthly stipend – the combined benefit of the full 66,000 yen public pension and the 80,000 yen public assistance benefit – to a single-member household, and higher benefits to larger-member households. As a result of establishing new benefits, the class-action lawsuits that were pending eventually ended through withdrawals of the lawsuits or amicable agreements by 2009.⁴⁵⁰ Furthermore, after the resignation of Prime Minister Abe in September 2007, Prime Minister Fukuda met the representatives of the plaintiffs in the class-action lawsuits in December 2007 and officially apologised to them as a prime minister for the first time.⁴⁵¹

Although Sino-Japanese CBOW had similar financial problems in their post-retirement life, those who belonged to support groups for stranded war orphans were excluded from the above legal actions that led to the 2008 Assistance Law. In an interview conducted with Ikeda Sumie (see p. 43), she stated that the activists for stranded war orphans preferred to exclude a small group of Sino-Japanese CBOW whose narratives did not fit neatly into the narratives of stranded war orphans as ‘abandoned people’

⁴⁴⁴ Itoh, *Japanese War Orphans in Manchuria: Forgotten Victims of World War II*, pp. 183, 222-223.

⁴⁴⁵ Efrid, Japan’s ‘war orphans’: Identification and state responsibility, p. 366.

⁴⁴⁶ Itoh, *Japanese War Orphans in Manchuria: Forgotten Victims of World War II*, pp. 177-178, 189, 194.

⁴⁴⁷ Itoh, *Japanese War Orphans in Manchuria: Forgotten Victims of World War II*, pp. 189-192.

⁴⁴⁸ Itoh, *Japanese War Orphans in Manchuria: Forgotten Victims of World War II*, p.198.

⁴⁴⁹ An average exchange rate of 1 British Pound to Japanese yen in 2008 was about 170 yen.

⁴⁵⁰ Itoh, *Japanese War Orphans in Manchuria: Forgotten Victims of World War II*, pp.199-200.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

(*kimin*)⁴⁵² to criticise the government's negligence that caused long-term suffering and deprived stranded war orphans of the right to live humanly as 'ordinary Japanese'.⁴⁵³ As Minami pointed out, such a victimhood narrative of stranded war orphans overshadowed diverse experiences and voices amongst stranded war orphans, but it served the purpose in passing the 2008 Assistance Law.⁴⁵⁴

However, in the course of the fieldwork, I found out that three participants (Michiko, Seiji and Momoko) who were categorised as 'stranded war orphans' upon their migration to Japan were receiving benefits as JRCW.⁴⁵⁵ In 2008, they received letters from MHLW saying that they were eligible for the special benefits. Seiji, who is an active member of a support group for stranded war orphans, could not be part of the legal actions for the above-mentioned reason. However, he donated 200,000-yen (around 1,400 British Pound) to a law firm that initiated the class-action lawsuit to show his gratitude for being able to enjoy the benefits.⁴⁵⁶

Other participants (Koretada, Keiko and Yuko) who migrated to Japan at their own expense were excluded from the special benefits. Koretada, who returned to Japan at his own expense, was not concerned about the benefits as he became a successful businessman over the years. As for sixty-four-year-old Keiko, who still worked at a Chinese restaurant that she manages with her son at the time of the interview, did not seem to know that other Sino-Japanese CBOW have been receiving the special benefits.⁴⁵⁷ Yuko, who currently receives welfare benefits, however, fought against MHLW on her own to receive the special benefits as JRCW because she learned from a support group for stranded war orphans that some Sino-Japanese CBOW were receiving the special benefits.

The following two cases of seventy-eight-year-old Yuko and another Sino-Japanese CBOW reveal MHLW's current inconsistent handling of Sino-Japanese CBOW. Although Yuko applied for the special benefits as JRCW, MHLW rejected her applications in 2009 and 2012.⁴⁵⁸ Similarly, an application of another Sino-Japanese

⁴⁵² Minami, *Chūgoku kikokusha o meguru hōsetsu to haijo no rekishishakaigaku: Kyōkai bunka no seisei to sono poritikkusu* [Historical sociology of inclusion and exclusion of returnees from China: Engendering border culture and its politics], pp. 17-18.

⁴⁵³ Interview notes, Ikeda Sumie, Tokyo, Japan, 18 May 2016.

⁴⁵⁴ Minami, *Chūgoku kikokusha o meguru hōsetsu to haijo no rekishishakaigaku: Kyōkai bunka no seisei to sono poritikkusu* [Historical sociology of inclusion and exclusion of returnees from China: Engendering border culture and its politics], pp. 204-214.

⁴⁵⁵ Although Toshio is eligible for the special benefits, he does not receive them as he has sufficient income.

⁴⁵⁶ Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

⁴⁵⁷ I did not tell Keiko in the interview that some Sino-Japanese CBOW receive the special benefits as JRCW. Interview transcript, Keiko, Kanagawa, Japan, 20 May 2016.

⁴⁵⁸ Letter, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare to Yuko, October 2009.; Letter, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare to Yuko, December 2012.

CBOW (hereinafter, plaintiff A), whose administrative suit could be found as a legal precedent, was also rejected first by a local welfare bureau and then by MHLW in 2016.⁴⁵⁹ Yuko and plaintiff A sued MHLW in 2013 and 2017 respectively and lost their cases in 2014 and 2019 respectively.⁴⁶⁰ The main argument of MHLW for rejecting their claims was that Yuko and plaintiff A do not fit into the definition of JRCW. More specifically, MHLW stated that: (1) Yuko and plaintiff A were not born of Japanese parentage, (2) they were not registered in their father's *koseki* register as of 2 September 1945⁴⁶¹ and (3) it cannot be confirmed that they were forced to remain in post-war China.⁴⁶² District court judges stated that Yuko and plaintiff A cannot be deemed as Japanese at birth only based on the then nationality law. They strictly applied the *koseki* law and stated that Yuko, plaintiff A and their mothers had to be registered in *koseki* register by 2 September 1945 to be entitled to receive benefits as JRCW. MHLW also claimed that it was not enough to be a Japanese national remaining in China, registered in *koseki* as of 2 September 1945. According to the current MHLW's interpretation, the 2008 Assistance Law did not intend to support and compensate *all* Japanese nationals who remained in post-war China and is intended to support Japanese children who had no choice but to remain in post-war China due to the turmoil after the Soviet attack on 9 August 1945.⁴⁶³ Based on the above two cases, it could be assumed that MHLW will not approve any future applications of Sino-Japanese CBOW to receive the special benefits as JRCW.

The arguments of MHLW contradicts the fact that it recognises and compensates some Sino-Japanese CBOW who are born of Sino-Japanese heritage as JRCW and were not registered in *koseki* register as of 2 September 1945. Seiji and Momoko, who currently receive the special benefits as JRCW, were not registered in *koseki* register until they have taken *shūseki* procedure in the 1980s.⁴⁶⁴ Such a lack of consistency in the official treatment of Sino-Japanese CBOW regarding the special benefits have negative consequences on Sino-Japanese CBOW. Sino-Japanese CBOW who know about the fact that other Sino-Japanese CBOW receive the special benefits will be left with a sense of unfairness. MHLW's rejections have affected Yuko psychologically, however, she lacks legal and psychosocial support system (see Chapter 2, p. 61). Upon learning about MHLW's inconsistent treatment of Sino-Japanese CBOW, I ceased sending an inquiry to MHLW out of ethical concerns. I was planning on sending a second letter to MHLW after receiving no reply to the initial inquiry regarding their policy towards Sino-Japanese

⁴⁵⁹ Courts in Japan. Administrative suit, Legal precedent, Incident *gyō-u* no. 140, 2017.

https://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_jp/detail5?id=88850 (accessed on 5 September 2020)

⁴⁶⁰ Yuko and plaintiff A do not know each other.

⁴⁶¹ It was the date on which the Japanese government signed the Japanese Instrument of Surrender.

⁴⁶² Court decision (Yuko's case), 5 December 2014.

⁴⁶³ Courts in Japan. Administrative suit, Legal precedent, Incident *gyō-u* no. 140, 2017, p. 14. https://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_jp/detail5?id=88850 (accessed on 5 September 2020)

⁴⁶⁴ In the case of Michiko, who currently receives the special benefits as JRCW, her father registered her in his *koseki* register either during or immediate aftermath of the war. See, Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 20 January 2017.

CBOW in April 2017. However, in the interview with Seiji who is one of the recipients of the benefits, Seiji's wife expressed her grave concern that this study could cause MHLW to annul her husband's benefits.⁴⁶⁵ MHLW may have been unaware that some Sino-Japanese CBOW received the benefits as JRCW, as they may be unable to identify Sino-Japanese CBOW in their list of JRCW. Although the potential risk may be small, the consequence of MHLW denying study participants their right to receive the benefits would have been devastating. The lack of a clear and consistent policy towards Sino-Japanese CBOW can be a source of anxiety even for those who currently receive the benefits by being 'accidentally included' as JRCW in the bureaucratic records.

3.5 Conclusion

Throughout the three different post-war periods explored in this chapter, the attitude of different authorities towards Sino-Japanese CBOW has been characterised by indifference and reluctance in investigating and formulating policies. Sino-Japanese CBOW tended to be overshadowed by other groups of individuals that were more important for the policymakers in each temporal context because of the lack of political motivation. In the immediate aftermath of the war, SCAP led the massive project to repatriate Japanese military and non-military personnel. SCAP did not allow Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers to accompany the Japanese fathers although it is highly likely that it was aware of CBOW as an unintended but common consequence of conflict from the past experiences of the US army in various parts of the world. The Japanese government never actively claimed Sino-Japanese CBOW as their citizens, even after the Allied occupation ended in 1952. While the repatriation of Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers was discussed for the first time in the bilateral agreement in 1953, neither the Chinese side nor the Japanese side found these children and their mothers a useful tool in achieving their respective domestic and international political goals. After the re-establishment of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, Japan's MHLW extended little official support for Sino-Japanese CBOW. MHLW's conscious decision to not support or investigate the issue of Sino-Japanese CBOW in the 1980s – despite the estimated number of Sino-Japanese CBOW that was comparable to stranded war orphans – made it considerably more difficult for Sino-Japanese CBOW to access supporters and information to search for the father and acquire Japanese nationality. MHLW also claims that elderly Sino-Japanese CBOW are not eligible for benefits for JRCW based on their interpretation of the 2008 Assistance Law. Little official and grass-roots interest in and support for Sino-Japanese CBOW generated the impression that the number of Sino-Japanese CBOW is negligible and they disappeared from the public discussion. Thus, the analysis of post-war repatriation policies shows that the orientation of Sino-Japanese CBOW towards the paternal country was never encouraged by SCAP or the Japanese

⁴⁶⁵ Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

government and that Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study voluntarily decided to 'return' to Japan. The process in which they developed their strong sense of belonging to Japan will be discussed in the following chapters.

Nevertheless, for a small number of Sino-Japanese CBOW who managed to contact Japanese lawyers for stranded war orphans, *shūseki* procedure opened up a legal route that was essential in realising their 'return' to the father's country. Although wartime Sino-Japanese consensual relationships were diverse and ambiguous, Japanese family court validated Sino-Japanese marriages based on a comprehensive examination of Chinese and Japanese laws at the time of the marriage as well as on testimonies collected by Sino-Japanese CBOW. The analysis of *shūseki* procedure revealed that how the mother remembered the relationship with her Japanese partner and supported the child's wish to 'return' to Japan was pivotal in legally establishing the father-child relationship. The circumstances under which wartime and post-war Sino-Japanese consensual relationships were formed and how the mother's role influenced the identity of Sino-Japanese CBOW will be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4: WARTIME AND POST-WAR SINO-JAPANESE CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIPS AND THE MOTHER'S INFLUENCE ON THE CHILDREN'S IDENTITY

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed *how* Sino-Japanese CBOW migrated to Japan, in other words the process by which they acquired Japanese nationality and then migrated. Both this chapter and the next chapter investigate the question of *why* Sino-Japanese CBOW developed a strong connection to the father and his country and migrated to Japan. This chapter specifically investigates Sino-Japanese consensual relationships during and after the war and explores the mothers' role in the development of children's positive identification with the father.

Previous studies on other groups of CBOW in different historical and geopolitical contexts have pointed to the significance of the child's relationship to the mother in their childhood. How women conceive a CBOW (e.g. rape, friendly business arrangement, love affairs) as well as how women experience being a mother of a CBOW in a particular socio-political and economic circumstance both affect the mother-child relationship. Women who conceived the child as a result of wartime rape often cannot help but seeing the child as a child of the enemy, and they often struggle with the fact that the child represents the perpetrator of their violation.⁴⁶⁶ Those who are unable to cope with such a traumatic conception of the child sometimes put the child in an orphanage or, in the worst cases, commit infanticide.⁴⁶⁷ The mothers of CBOW tend to suffer from economic insecurity and poor physical and mental health due to adversities they encounter during and after a conflict.⁴⁶⁸ Further, Lee stated that 'the way in which the mother was and is affected by being the mother of a CBOW determines how the child experiences being a CBOW'.⁴⁶⁹ In the case of CBOW who are rejected by their mothers, the strained mother-child relationships leave them with a sense of guilt for being born.⁴⁷⁰ However, some CBOW and their mothers establish a loving and caring relationship even in the case when the mother is traumatised by how the child was conceived.⁴⁷¹

⁴⁶⁶ See, for example, Hamel, Ethnic belonging of the children born out of rape in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, p. 298.

⁴⁶⁷ Carpenter, C. R. 2005. Children born of wartime rape in Bosnia Herzegovina: A preliminary study. In UNICEF report 2005.; Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, pp. 163-164.

⁴⁶⁸ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 245.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁰ See, for example, Ezawa, 'The guilt feeling that you exist': War, racism and Indisch-Japanese identity formation, pp. 489-496.; Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 66.

⁴⁷¹ See, for example, Hamel, Ethnic belonging of the children born out of rape in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, p. 298.

Moreover, in various historical and geopolitical contexts, patriarchy, which Walby defined as ‘a system of social structure and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women’, has been an underlying condition for the lives of many CBOW and their mothers.⁴⁷² Some state and military policies concerning different groups of CBOW have reflected patriarchal norms at the state level. Such policies often work in favour of the repatriated foreign fathers by exempting them of the responsibility to cater for the needs and well-being of the mothers and their left-behind children.⁴⁷³ Patriarchal values and beliefs also influence the perception of women’s role in her family and community as well as children’s identity and belonging. For instance, Hamel argued that in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, a patriarchal understanding of women as ‘passive recipients of men’s seeds’ subordinated the mother’s ethnic identity to the father’s ethnic background.⁴⁷⁴ Because some mothers impose the violent father’s identity on their children born of rape, these children are often denied of membership from the maternal community.

As we have seen in Chapter 3, by examining the legal procedure that Sino-Japanese CBOW took to acquire Japanese nationality, it became evident that the mothers played a pivotal role in the life course of Sino-Japanese CBOW. Migrating to Japan would have been considerably more difficult for Sino-Japanese CBOW without their mothers’ testimony or support for their decision to become a Japanese citizen. This chapter aims to clarify why the mothers who had consensual relationships with a Japanese man during and after the war came to support their children’s wish to migrate to their paternal country and what role they played in the formation of their children’s identity and belonging.

As both China and Japan have a long history of patriarchy, this study explores how patriarchal values and beliefs influenced wartime and post-war Sino-Japanese consensual relationships and circumstances under which Sino-Japanese CBOW were conceived.⁴⁷⁵ In China, Confucianism placed more value on men than on women, and the dominant patriarchal beliefs that formed the basis of women’s subordination are represented by the ‘three obediences’ (a woman needs to obey her father, husband, and adult sons) and the ‘four womanly virtues’ (morality, speech, appearance and work) which serve the patrilineal clans.⁴⁷⁶ The Japanese patriarchal family system called *ie* system was

⁴⁷² Walby, S. 1990. *Theorizing patriarchy*. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 20.

⁴⁷³ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, pp. 245-246.

⁴⁷⁴ Hamel, *Ethnic belonging of the children born out of rape in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda*, pp. 287-304.

⁴⁷⁵ See, for example, Lee, Y. T. 2015. A comparative analysis of China and India: Ancient patriarchy, women’s liberation, and contemporary gender equity education. *African and Asian Studies*, 14, pp. 134-153, pp. 139-140.; Garon, S. 2010. State and family in modern Japan: A historical perspective. *Economy and Society*, 39(3), pp. 317-336.

⁴⁷⁶ Lee, A comparative analysis of China and India: Ancient patriarchy, women’s liberation, and contemporary gender equity education, pp. 139-140.

institutionalised in the Meiji era and emphasised the vertical relationships between parents and children as well as the absolute power of the male household head in the family.⁴⁷⁷ Thus, the dominant patriarchal system prevalent in both China and Japan during and after the war legitimised the supremacy of the father as the head of the household. As we will see in this chapter, the interconnectedness of Chinese and Japanese patriarchal norms contributed to the father occupying the central position and the mother's subordinate position within the family.

This chapter starts by exploring the wartime debates on 'intermarriage' and 'mixed-blood children' in Japanese colonies and in China. Such elite-dominated wartime debates highlight the imperial Japan's ideology of race and family that had a certain influence on the wartime Sino-Japanese consensual relationships in China. It then discusses four novels that explore the themes of 'intermarriage' and 'mixed-blood children' in Japan's colonies as well as cinematic representations of 'intermarriage' in China. Despite being works of fiction, these cultural productions illuminate unequal power relations within intimate relationships of a particular gender-race combination and illustrate the identity crises experienced by some children born of mixed heritage in the Japanese Empire.

Based on the collected sources, this chapter then explores various patterns of wartime and post-war Sino-Japanese consensual relationships. It reveals the inequalities inherent in both wartime and post-war Sino-Japanese consensual relationships in which the Japanese father's authority was paramount in the household. The analysis highlights the significance of the mother's role in passing on paternal lineage to the child and in developing the child's positive identification with the father.

4.2 Wartime policy towards Sino-Japanese consensual relationships and consequent childbirth

4.2.1 Assimilation policies and 'intermarriage' in the Japanese Empire

Prior to an investigation of wartime Sino-Japanese consensual relationships, this section explores wartime policies and debates on marriage between Japanese nationals and their partners from colonial Korea and Taiwan. These policies and debates provide a basis for the discussion of wartime Sino-Japanese marriage and consequent childbirth. Within the Japanese Empire, tensions and unequal relationships between Japan and the colonised countries became pronounced through ideologies and policies based on the concepts of race, ethnicity and nation. When Japan imported the notion of 'race' in the late nineteenth century, the country was emulating more industrialised western countries in an endeavour

⁴⁷⁷ Morris-Suzuki, T. 1998. *Re-inventing Japan: Time, space, nation*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 114-115.

to modernise. This was closely linked to the idea of placing the white races at the top of the racial hierarchy based on racial theories represented by Social Darwinism.⁴⁷⁸ It also became inextricably intertwined with other imported notions such as ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’.⁴⁷⁹ However, when Japan aimed to become one of the imperial states, Japanese intellectuals constructed a distinct ‘Japanese race’ that put an emphasis on the superiority of the Japanese over its indigenous groups and other Asians despite the similarities in the physical features. The tensions and unequal relationships created based on ‘race’ at the state level also had a profound impact on the intimate relationships of any Japanese with a partner from Japan’s colony.

The Japanese Empire was a multi-racial empire. About thirty percent of its population consisted of Japanese colonial subjects from Taiwan, Korea and the South Sea Mandate.⁴⁸⁰ As the empire expanded, Japan implemented an assimilation or Japanisation policy called *kōminka*, which literally meant to ‘make people become subjects of the emperor’. The policy forced Japanese language and culture upon colonial subjects to instil loyalty towards Japan and its emperor. It gained momentum after the Manchurian Incident in 1931, which led to the occupation of northeast China where Japan established its puppet state of Manchukuo. This series of events led the Japanese government to have a vision of assimilating the entire Chinese population.

In implementing assimilation policies to turn colonial subjects into loyal subjects of the emperor, the Japanese government utilised the imagery of the family (*kazoku, ie*) with the emperor as the head of the patriarchal family-state (*kazoku kokka*).⁴⁸¹ The notion of family-state was based on the imagery of the family in which members holding different rights play complementary roles and create ‘harmony’. This ideology was used by the Japanese ruling elites to legitimise and obscure social inequalities based on gender, race and class.⁴⁸² Supposedly, the Japanese and those from the colonised countries were all ‘Japanese subjects’, and imperial Japan’s slogans such as *isshi dōjin* denoted ‘all who came under the sway of the sovereign shared equally in his benevolence’.⁴⁸³ However, Japan’s assimilation policy never intended to confer equal rights to the colonial subjects that increased in the process of imperial expansion – the annexation and incorporation of Taiwan in 1895, Korea in 1910 as well as the South Sea Mandate (former German colonies in the Marianas, Carolines, Marshall Islands and Palau) in 1919 and the creation of Manchukuo in 1932. The sharp dividing line between the coloniser and the colonised

⁴⁷⁸ Morris-Suzuki, *Re-inventing Japan: Time, space, nation*, pp. 85-86.; Yamashiro, J. H. 2013. The social construction of race and minorities in Japan. *Sociology Compass*, 7(2), pp. 147-161, p. 148.

⁴⁷⁹ Morris-Suzuki, *Re-inventing Japan: Time, space, nation*, pp. 84-88.

⁴⁸⁰ Oguma, *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*, p. 4.

⁴⁸¹ Morris-Suzuki, *Re-inventing Japan: Time, space, nation*, p. 84.

⁴⁸² Dower, J. W. 1993. *War without mercy: Race and power in the pacific war*. New York: Pantheon Books, p. 279.

⁴⁸³ The translation was taken from: Duus, P., Myers, R. H. and Peattie, M. R. eds. 1996. *The Japanese wartime empire, 1931-1945*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 97.

derived from the racial ideologies that placed the Japanese race as the leading race (*shidō minzoku*) at the top of the racial hierarchy and tasked to ‘guide the members of all the other races in Asia to its prosperous future’.⁴⁸⁴

Two major racial theories emerged to construct the Japanese Empire. The first theory represents the Japanese as a racially pure and homogenous group descended from the common lineage of the imperial family (*tan'itsu minzokuron*).⁴⁸⁵ According to this theory, Japanese people were the descendants of the emperor, and they had the divine mission to exercise their power over other Asian countries. The second theory emphasises the fact that the Japanese were formed through mixing with various Asian peoples as well as people of the Japanese isles. Japanese people are entitled to lead other Asian people precisely because of their racial hybridity, emphasised as the source of national strength. The proponents of the assimilation policy adopted the latter racial theory called ‘mixed-race theory’ (*kongō minzokuron*) as a justification for imposing Japanese culture and placing other Asian peoples lower than Japanese.⁴⁸⁶ The ultimate aim of the assimilation policies was to eradicate distinctiveness of colonised races through racial mixing.⁴⁸⁷ In other words, through ‘intermarriage’ (*zakkon* in Japanese) or inter-racial marriage between Japanese and other Asians, their children supposedly become ‘Japanese’, and the features of the ‘inferior races’ would eventually disappear in the Japanese Empire. While acknowledging the problematic nature of the term ‘intermarriage’, it will be used below to highlight the fact that Japanese policymakers regarded marriage between Japanese and non-Japanese in the Japanese Empire essentially as ‘racial mixing’.

What formed the basis of the wartime debate on Sino-Japanese intermarriage were the intermarriage policies in colonial Korea (1910-1945), Taiwan (1895-1945) and other Japanese colonies that developed in association with the development of the assimilation policies. The development of Japan’s assimilation policy was closely linked to its ambition to occupy the whole of China after the Manchurian Incident in 1931. Manchukuo (1932-1945), Japan’s puppet state that upheld the cosmopolitan ideal of harmonious cooperation amongst the five ethnic groups (Japanese, Manchu, Han Chinese, Korean and Mongol) was another important place within the Japanese Empire where many cases of intermarriage occurred. Although there is no comprehensive knowledge on intermarriage of different combinations amongst these ethnic groups in Manchukuo, existing research shows that there were no non-fraternisation policies in place that would have posed limitations on intermarriage. According to Koshiro, marriage between Japanese men and Russian women ‘posed no problem’ and was regarded as a

⁴⁸⁴ Asano Tamanoi, Introduction, p. 13.

⁴⁸⁵ Oguma, *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*, pp. 6-9.

⁴⁸⁶ Oguma, *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*, pp. 325-329.

⁴⁸⁷ Oguma, *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*, p. 243.

means of social and economic security by Russian families.⁴⁸⁸ Similarly, the colonial South Sea Mandate authorised intermarriage between Japanese and Chamorro as well as Carolinians.⁴⁸⁹

In colonial Korea, Korean-Japanese intermarriage started as a symbol of a reconciliatory colonial governance. Since Japan annexed Korea in 1910, the Governor-General's Office of Korea had used violence to suppress the Korean people. After the March 1st Movement in 1919, the third Governor-General of Korea, Saito Makoto, decided to move to a more reconciliatory governing policy, under the slogan *naisen yūwa* or 'harmony between Japan and Korea'. As a symbol of *naisen yūwa*, Korean-Japanese intermarriage (*naisen kekkon*) of Crown Prince of Yi Eun from Korean royal family and Princess Masako of Nashimoto from Japanese imperial family was carried out in 1920. Masako later recollected in her autobiography that it was purely a political marriage to 'strengthen the ties between Japan and Korea and set an example for the common people'.⁴⁹⁰ The marriage intended to end the Korean royal family line by means of 'fusion of blood'. Consequently, Yi Eun became the last Crown Prince of Korea. This royal intermarriage was followed by that of Princess Deokhye and So Takeyuki, a Japanese nobleman, in 1931 as well as of Yi Geon, a grandson of King Gojong, and Matsudaira Yoshiko, Masako's cousin, in 1931.⁴⁹¹ In June 1921, the Governor-General's Office of Korea enacted a law legalising intermarriage between Korean and Japanese (*naisenjin tsūkon hō*) as a measure to promote assimilation. As a result, the number of married Korean-Japanese couples steadily increased from 116 in 1912 to 1,206 in 1937.⁴⁹² By the end of 1942, 2,600 Korean-Japanese couples were married in Korea.⁴⁹³

The increase in the number of intermarriages alarmed Japanese eugenicists who were against the racial mixing of the coloniser and the colonised.⁴⁹⁴ However, the assimilationists were dominant in the Governor-General's Office in Korea, and they took various measures to encourage Korean-Japanese intermarriage as a significant means to promote the assimilation policies. In 1930, Minami Jiro, who was an army general at the time, stated that 'Japanese and Koreans have to become one people, in terms of

⁴⁸⁸ Koshiro, Y. 2013. East Asia's 'melting-pot': Reevaluating race relations in Japan's colonial empire. In *Race and racism in modern East Asia: Western and eastern constructions*, eds. R. Kowner and W. Demel, pp. 475-498. Leiden, Boston: Brill, pp. 488-494.

⁴⁸⁹ Koshiro, East Asia's 'melting-pot': Reevaluating race relations in Japan's colonial empire, p. 482.

⁴⁹⁰ Yi, B (Ri, M.) 1973. *Sugita saigetsu* [Years that went by]. A self-published book, p. 35.

⁴⁹¹ Koshiro, East Asia's 'melting-pot': Reevaluating race relations in Japan's colonial empire, p. 478.

⁴⁹² The number includes both marriage between Japanese men and Korean women as well as between Korean men and Japanese women. In 1937, the former account for fifty-seven per cent. See, Suzuki, Y. 2003. *Naisen kekkon* [Japanese-Korean intermarriage]. In *Minzoku, sensō to kazoku* [Ethnicity, war and family], ed. S. Obinata, pp. 166-195. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, pp. 168, 173.

⁴⁹³ Koshiro, East Asia's 'melting-pot': Reevaluating race relations in Japan's colonial empire, p. 479.

⁴⁹⁴ The Korean Eugenics Association was established in 1934 and was active until 1937. It published a journal 'Eugenics'. See, Yokoyama, T. 2015. *The history of eugenic society in Japan*. Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, p. 12.

appearance, heart, blood and flesh'.⁴⁹⁵ When he became the eighth Governor-General of Korea in 1936, Minami ardently promoted intermarriage under the slogan *naisen ittai* which meant 'Japan and Korea as one body'.⁴⁹⁶ In August 1938, promotion of Korean-Japanese intermarriage was listed as one of twelve criteria in the basic assimilation policy proposed by the advisory body of the Governor-General's Office of Korea.⁴⁹⁷ In March 1941, 137 Japanese-Korean couples⁴⁹⁸ that married in the previous year were given an award by the Korean League for National Mobilisation for their 'exemplary work in promoting *naisen ittai*'.⁴⁹⁹ In the same year, Furukawa Kanehide, the then security division chief of the Governor-General's Office of Korea, criticised Japanese eugenicists who were against intermarriage and labelled them 'germanomaniac [*doitsu kabure*] nationalists' as many Japanese eugenicists were supporters of Nazi racial policy against a backdrop of the Japanese-German alignment since the mid-1930s.⁵⁰⁰

In Taiwan, which was colonised by Japan in 1895, until approximately 1906, Japanese colonial officials excluded intermarriage from their basic colonial policy based on the belief that racial mixing should not occur between the coloniser and the colonised. For instance, in 1900, the head of legislative bureau in the Governor-General's Office in Taiwan, Ishizuka Eizo, praised the 'best practice' of British colonisers for avoiding intermarriage with 'barbaric race' in their colonies and asserted that intermarriage is fatal for colonial governance.⁵⁰¹ However, by the 1910s, the assimilationist discourse gained force in both Japan proper and Taiwan. In 1919, intermarriage officially became part of the assimilation policy in Taiwan. By that time, the pro-intermarriage discourse became the dominant discourse in the colonial administration in Taiwan. For instance, the Governor-General Den Kenjiro stressed that intermarriage is the most effective measure to achieve *naitai yūwa* or 'harmony between Japan and Taiwan'. Those who disagreed with the intermarriage were ousted. For example, in 1925, Togo Minoru, one of the high-ranking officials in the Governor-General's Office of Taiwan, resigned because he strongly disapproved of intermarriage and consequent childbirth and advocated segregation of Japanese and colonial subjects in schools and other institutions.⁵⁰²

⁴⁹⁵ Suzuki, *Naisen kekkon* [Japanese-Korean intermarriage], p. 174.; Koshiro, East Asia's 'melting-pot': Reevaluating race relations in Japan's colonial empire, p. 479.; Oguma, *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*, p. 241.

⁴⁹⁶ Suzuki, *Naisen kekkon* [Japanese-Korean intermarriage], pp. 170, 174.

⁴⁹⁷ Suzuki, *Naisen kekkon* [Japanese-Korean intermarriage], pp. 171-172.

⁴⁹⁸ The couples who were awarded a prize in 1941 were predominantly a combination of Korean men and Japanese women. The couples that consist of Japanese men and Korean women accounted for only twenty-three per cent.

⁴⁹⁹ Suzuki, *Naisen kekkon* [Japanese-Korean intermarriage], p. 174.; Koshiro, East Asia's 'melting-pot': Reevaluating race relations in Japan's colonial empire, p. 479.

⁵⁰⁰ Oguma, *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*, pp. 240-241, 243.

⁵⁰¹ Huang, J. 2013. *Nihon tōchi jidai niokeru 'naitai kyōkon' no kōzō to tenkai* [Structure and development of Japanese-Taiwanese intermarriage during the Japanese colonial period]. *Hikaku kazokuhi kenkyū*, 27, pp. 128-155, p. 132.

⁵⁰² Oguma, *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*, p. 239.

In 1919, the Governor-General's Office in Taiwan conducted an investigation on 136 Taiwanese-Japanese married couples and their 176 children of mixed heritage in order to find out how the 'fruit of assimilation policy manifested itself'.⁵⁰³ The majority of Taiwanese who took part in the survey were Han Taiwanese.⁵⁰⁴ It was discovered that out of 176 Taiwanese-Japanese children, 151 lived in Japanese-style (*naichi fū*) family environments and 138 were using the Japanese language. Based on this outcome, the colonial administration understood that the Japanese culture and language became more dominant in most mixed families. According to Huang, this survey served as the rationale for the Governor-General's Office in Taiwan to pass the law in 1920 to promote Taiwanese-Japanese intermarriage (*naitai kyōkon bengi hō*).⁵⁰⁵ In 1933, the Governor-General's Office in Taiwan also passed a law (*naitai kyōkon hō*) which enabled official registration of Taiwanese-Japanese intermarriage.⁵⁰⁶ What triggered the Japanese government to order the colonial administration in Taiwan to enable official registration of Taiwanese-Japanese intermarriage was Japan's ambition to expand its territory to the whole of China after the Manchurian Incident in 1931. The Japanese Cabinet Office considered that it would be advantageous for Japan if many Japanese could legally be united with Han Taiwanese before starting the full-fledged war of aggression in China where the population is mostly Han Chinese.⁵⁰⁷ Thus, the policy on Taiwanese-Japanese intermarriage was closely interlinked with the Japanese government's vision to assimilate Han Chinese in China.

After the law that enabled the official registration of Taiwanese-Japanese intermarriage took effect, the number of intermarriages steadily increased in Taiwan.⁵⁰⁸ The majority of intermarriages occurred between Han Taiwanese men and Japanese women.⁵⁰⁹ This pattern of intermarriage conformed to the pattern by the colonial administration in Taiwan which recommended the marriage between elite Taiwanese men

⁵⁰³ Huang, *Nihon tōchi jidai niokeru 'naitai kyōkon' no kōzō to tenkai* [Structure and development of Japanese-Taiwanese intermarriage during the Japanese colonial period], pp. 141.

⁵⁰⁴ Huang, *Nihon tōchi jidai niokeru 'naitai kyōkon' no kōzō to tenkai* [Structure and development of Japanese-Taiwanese intermarriage during the Japanese colonial period], p. 142.

⁵⁰⁵ Huang, *Nihon tōchi jidai niokeru 'naitai kyōkon' no kōzō to tenkai* [Structure and development of Japanese-Taiwanese intermarriage during the Japanese colonial period], pp. 141.

⁵⁰⁶ Although this 1920 law served to promote Taiwanese-Japanese intermarriage in colonial Taiwan, such marriage could not be officially registered because there was no equivalent of the Japanese *koseki* register in Taiwan at the time. In 1933, the Japanese Cabinet Office commanded the colonial administration in Taiwan to establish a *koseki* system in Taiwan to enable legal registration of Taiwanese-Japanese intermarriage. See, Huang, *Nihon tōchi jidai niokeru 'naitai kyōkon' no kōzō to tenkai* [Structure and development of Japanese-Taiwanese intermarriage during the Japanese colonial period], p. 137.

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁸ Koshiro, East Asia's 'melting-pot': Reevaluating race relations in Japan's colonial empire, p. 479.

⁵⁰⁹ Tai, E. 2014. Intermarriage and imperial subject formation in colonial Taiwan: Shoji Soichi's Chin-fujin. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 15(4), pp. 513-531, p. 515.

and educated Japanese women, who could educate the children to mould them into ‘Japanese’.⁵¹⁰

4.2.2 Wartime debate on Sino-Japanese ‘intermarriage’

As stated above, in both colonial Korea and Taiwan, intermarriage was legalised and actively promoted as a significant part of the assimilation policies until the fall of the Japanese Empire. Although there were some opponents to intermarriage in these colonies, the assimilationists remained dominant and reinforced the policy in accord with Japan’s wartime ambition to assimilate the entire Chinese population. However, towards the end of the wars in the Asia-Pacific region, a small group of Japanese eugenicists gained political influence and opposed intermarriage and consequent childbirth, particularly in regard to China. This section explores the recondite wartime debate on Sino-Japanese marriage and consequent childbirth.

Since Japan started to expand its Empire, Japanese researchers from various disciplines, such as biology, medicine and anthropology, developed a keen interest in eugenics. Since the 1920s, the Japanese eugenics movement gained strength with the formation of groups of active eugenicists. Academic articles on intermarriage and ‘mixed-blood children’ were published in two academic journals of eugenics: (1) ‘Eugenics’ (*yūseigaku*) published by the Japan Eugenics Association (*Nihon yūsei gakkai*) established in 1924 (and discontinued in 1943)⁵¹¹ and (2) ‘Racial Hygiene’ (*minzoku eisei*) published by the Japan Racial Hygiene Association (*Nihon minzoku eisei gakkai*; JRHA) established in 1931. They were *de facto* lobbying groups to influence national population policies. Some eugenicists increasingly felt a sense of urgency to speak out and stop the growing number of intermarriages and consequent childbirths. They believed that Japanese blood would be contaminated by mixing with an ‘inferior race’.

It needs to be noted that not all eugenicists were vehemently opposed to marriage between the coloniser and the colonised. For instance, Unno Yukinori, a eugenicist, applied the logic of ‘hybrid vigour’ – improvements in form or function of plants and animals as a result of crossbreeding – to justify miscegenation. He held that traits of the racially superior race would subdue that of inferior races and therefore marriage between Japanese and colonial subjects would result in children with ‘Japanese traits’.⁵¹² Anthropologists like Torii Ryuzo and Ueno Tsunekichi asserted that Koreans and Japanese shared a common genetic heritage and therefore assimilation should be smooth and simple.⁵¹³

⁵¹⁰ Koshiro, East Asia’s ‘melting-pot’: Reevaluating race relations in Japan’s colonial empire, p. 480.

⁵¹¹ Yokoyama, *The history of eugenic society in Japan*, p. 123.

⁵¹² Oguma, *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*, p. 237.

⁵¹³ Oguma, *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*, p. 245.

Although other eugenicists opposing intermarriage were advocating the importance of maintaining the purity and superiority of the Japanese race, they could not simply ignore the then commonly accepted and afore-mentioned theory, that the Japanese originated from mixing with other Asian peoples in the past (see p. 108).⁵¹⁴ However, some eugenicists such as Kawakami Hajime and Togo Minoru came up with a peculiar theory to explain why intermarriage should still be banned. They admitted that mixing with other Asian peoples did occur in ancient times. However, they argued that after centuries of relative seclusion and isolation on the Japanese archipelago, these people gradually transformed into a unique 'superior race'.⁵¹⁵ They asserted that mixing with other Asian peoples should be avoided at all cost because it would take a long time to foster a 'pure and superior race' again.⁵¹⁶

Until the early 1930s, these eugenicists who opposed intermarriage and consequent childbirth cautiously chose their words in public so as not to be regarded as criticising the colonial assimilation policy.⁵¹⁷ However, from the late 1930s until the end of the war, they became increasingly vocal in collaboration with the bureaucrats in MHW.⁵¹⁸ When MHW was established in 1938 as an administrative body to formulate population policies, a eugenics division was established. Some eugenicists of the aforementioned JRHA worked for the division and took part in national population policy-making processes in the late 1930s.⁵¹⁹

Some of the eugenicists who gained a prominent voice in the late 1930s vehemently opposed Sino-Japanese marriage and consequent childbirth. Koya Yoshio, one of the prominent eugenicists and opponents of 'intermarriage', played a central role in shaping population policies in MHW.⁵²⁰ Koya was a medical doctor and specialised in racial hygiene studies at Kanazawa Medical University. He was also JRHA's vice-chairman and a proponent of Nazi racial policies. When Koya became the head of a research department in MHW in 1939, he played a key role in shaping their eugenic and population policies to reflect the eugenics movement of JRHA.⁵²¹ Like other eugenicists who opposed 'intermarriage', Koya acknowledged the widely-accepted theory at the time which claimed that mixing with Asian peoples did occur on the Japanese archipelago in

⁵¹⁴ Hasebe Kotondo and Kiyono Kenji, who were medical doctors and members of JRHA, were reluctant in admitting past miscegenation. Oguma portrays how their opinions came to be widely accepted in post-war Japan. See, Oguma, *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*, p. 267.

⁵¹⁵ This theory was partly inspired by a British-born German philosopher Houston Stewart Chamberlain who asserted that English maintained its 'pure-blood' on the British Isles after miscegenation with other ethnic groups such as Celts and Teutons. See, Oguma, *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*, p. 238.

⁵¹⁶ Oguma, *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*, p. 250.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid.

⁵¹⁸ Yokoyama, *The history of eugenic society in Japan*, pp. 70, 208-209.

⁵¹⁹ Oguma, *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*, pp. 237, 250, 252.

⁵²⁰ Yokoyama, *The history of eugenic society in Japan*, p. 85.

⁵²¹ Oguma, *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*, p. 250.

the past. However, Koya asserted that the ‘negative biological features of Japanese people’ such as the prevalence of myopia and misaligned teeth were the ‘after-effect’ of the past ‘miscegenation’.⁵²² He emphasised that it took a long time for Japanese people to acquire their ‘racial excellence’ after mixing with other Asian peoples.⁵²³ He also argued that the possible difficulties for the ‘mixed-blood children’ to integrate into the Japanese population would have negative social consequences.⁵²⁴ For these reasons, he asserted that it is irresponsible and dangerous to promote the birth of Sino-Japanese children.

Another reason why Koya opposed Sino-Japanese marriage in China was because he believed Chinese people to have a strong ability to assimilate other races (*dōkaryoku*). He likened Sino-Japanese ‘miscegenation’ to ‘throwing away precious Japanese blood into Chinese blood that is as massive as [the] Yangtze River’ and asserted that small-scale ‘miscegenation’ between Japanese and Chinese people would result in producing ‘Chinese’ children.⁵²⁵ Koya tried to justify anti-intermarriage in China by pointing to the impossibility of assimilating with ‘Japanese blood’ the entire Chinese population that was almost four times larger than the population in Japan proper.

Other eugenicists also exhibited a keen interest in Sino-Japanese children amongst different groups of mixed-blood children in the Asia-Pacific region and opposed Sino-Japanese intermarriage.⁵²⁶ Ishihara and Sato researched 204 Sino-Japanese children from sixty-four families residing in Tokyo.⁵²⁷ All children in the study were born of a particular gender-race pattern of intermarriage: Chinese fathers and Japanese mothers. The Chinese fathers were from all walks of life such as barber, chef, bookbinder and furrier. The study investigated the Sino-Japanese children’s intellectual and physical ability, physical size, and health condition. Their findings demonstrated that these children performed well and indeed better in certain activities than average children born of Japanese parentage. Nevertheless, they concluded that ‘Japan must avoid the birth of Sino-Japanese children at all cost’ not based on their pseudo-scientific ‘medical investigation’ but based on the children’s possible lack of loyalty towards the Japanese state. They asserted that because seventy percent of their parents did not register their marriage and children in *koseki*

⁵²² Koya, Y. 1944. *Kyōeiken to konketsu no mondai* [The problem of mixed-blood in the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere]. In *Senjika no shinkekkon* [New marriage during the war], ed. H. Maki, pp. 66-73, pp. 69-70. Osaka: Asahi Shobo.

⁵²³ Koya, Y. 1939. *Minzoku kokusaku no shomondai* (1) [Issues regarding state policies on race (1)]. *Yūseigaku* [Eugenics], 189, pp. 3-13, p. 13.; Koya, Y. 1939. *Minzoku kokusaku no shomondai* (2) [Issues regarding state policies on race (2)]. *Yūseigaku* [Eugenics], 190, pp. 1-10, p. 12.

⁵²⁴ Koya, *Kyōeiken to konketsu no mondai* [The problem of mixed-blood in the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere], p. 66.

⁵²⁵ Koya, *Kyōeiken to konketsu no mondai* [The problem of mixed-blood in the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere], pp. 67-68.

⁵²⁶ Ishihara and Sato call these children ‘*nikka konketsuji*’ (literally, Sino-Japanese mixed-blood children) in their article.

⁵²⁷ Ishihara, F. and Sato, H. 1941. *Nikka konketsujidō no igaku chōsa* [Medical investigation of Sino-Japanese mixed-blood children]. *Minzoku Eisei*, 9(3), pp. 162-165.

register, such unregistered ‘children born out of wedlock’ may lack loyalty towards the emperor. Their assertion was reflective of the anxieties that some eugenicists and bureaucrats had about the possibility of the growing number of ‘mixed-blood children’ posing a threat to the privilege of the ‘Japanese’ – a privilege sustained by racial and legal lines between the coloniser and the colonial subjects.

In 1943, MHW created a classified policy document with over three thousand pages called ‘An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus’ (*Yamato minzoku o chūkaku to suru sekai seisaku no kentō*) (hereinafter, Global Policy document).⁵²⁸ It was produced by the order of the Health and Welfare Minister, and only one hundred copies were distributed within the government. This policy document which reflects a strong influence of the anti-intermarriage eugenicists, stated the government’s concerns on intermarriage and consequent childbirth within Japan’s occupied territories as follows.⁵²⁹ If Japan continued to implement its assimilation policy, ‘miscegenation’ would disrupt the unity of Yamato race⁵³⁰ and consequently the Japanese race would lose its position as a ‘leading race’.

The Global Policy document also denigrated intermarried couples and their children. According to the document, intermarriage was usually driven by sexual impulse and such couples had poor social skills and intelligence. Since these couples usually got married despite their parents’ disapproval, such marriages eventually caused the demise of the family system. Further, the document claimed that the ‘mixed-blood children’ had a range of personality issues: irresponsible, weak-willed, shameless, ingratiating and nihilistic.⁵³¹ The policy document claimed that these children had physical problems as well: lack of resistance to illness and poor ability to adapt to changing conditions. The contributors of this document stressed in particular that these children tended to lack patriotic spirit and a sense of belonging to a particular country.⁵³² These claims were fabricated clearly based on the biased information provided by anti-intermarriage eugenicists.⁵³³

The Global Policy document proposed several measures to be taken to prevent the birth of children born of mixed heritage and to minimise the potential ‘problems’ these children could pose for the empire. Firstly, it suggested that Japanese men from Japan

⁵²⁸ For a detailed analysis of this classified policy document, see, Dower, *War without mercy: Race and power in the pacific war*, pp. 262-290.

⁵²⁹ Oguma, *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*, p. 253.

⁵³⁰ Yamato is a term that indicates group of people native to the Japanese archipelago, excluding people living in peripheral areas such as the Ainu and Ryukyuan. The term has been in use since around the late nineteenth century during the Meiji Era. The 1943 Global Policy document most often identified the Japanese themselves as the Yamato *minzoku* (Yamato people or race) rather than simply the Japanese [*Nihonjin*]. See, Dower, *War without mercy: Race and power in the pacific war*, p. 267.

⁵³¹ Dower, *War without mercy: Race and power in the Pacific War*, p. 275.; Tai, Intermarriage and imperial subject formation in colonial Taiwan: Shoji Soichi’s Chin-fujin, p. 522.

⁵³² Oguma, *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*, pp. 253-254, 268.

⁵³³ *Ibid.*

proper who were assigned to reside and work in Japan's occupied territories should be accompanied by their Japanese spouse. Thus, such measures were mainly targeting Japanese male civilian workers. The 'comfort women' system must have been regarded as the measure to prevent 'miscegenation' between local women and Japanese soldiers abroad. Secondly, if children of mixed heritage were born abroad, they ought to be sent to Japan proper to receive education to become an imperial subject.⁵³⁴ In the Advisory Committee for the Construction of Greater East Asia (*daitōa shingikai*) on population issues which took place in 1943, then Prime Minister Tojo Hideki agreed on the policies to make Japanese male residents abroad bring their wives along as well as to prepare educational institutions for their children.⁵³⁵ This policy closely resembles the measures some French organisations took in the end of the nineteenth century to educate children born of local women and French men in colonial Indochina into 'French'.⁵³⁶ As mentioned in Chapter 3 (see p. 65), the French government was keen on educating and assimilating their children fathered by French soldiers in the Indochina Wars and insisted on full immersion into the French culture by transporting these children to France.⁵³⁷ Thirdly, the Global Policy document also proposed the segregation of Japanese people residing abroad and the local populations by creating 'Japanese towns'.⁵³⁸ The Second Sino-Japanese War ended before Japan fully implemented these measures to prevent Sino-Japanese marriage.

Regarding children born of mixed heritage in the Japanese colonies and China, both assimilationists and their opponents were primarily concerned about them from the aspect of race as well as in terms of benefits and harms for the imperial cause. While they paid attention to their levels of assimilation, intellectual and physical abilities and their sense of loyalty towards imperial Japan, they were not interested in the welfare or well-being of those who were actually born of Sino-Japanese unions in China at the time. The following section discusses literary works that paid close attention to the issue of identity of children born of relationships between a Japanese and a partner from colonial Taiwan or Korea that were largely ignored by the policymakers.

⁵³⁴ Kōseishō. 1943. *Yamato minzoku o chūkaku to suru sekai seisaku no kentō* [An investigation of global policy with the Yamato race as nucleus], p. 2364.

⁵³⁵ Kōseishō. 1943. *Yamato minzoku o chūkaku to suru sekai seisaku no kentō* [An investigation of global policy with the Yamato race as nucleus], pp. 2363-2364.

⁵³⁶ Käuper, Children born of the Indochina War: National 'reclassification', diversity, and multiple feelings of belonging.

⁵³⁷ Ibid.

⁵³⁸ The Advisory Committee for the Construction of Greater East Asia presented this segregation plan in 1942, and the plan was also proposed in the Global Policy document in 1943. See, Kōseishō. 1943. *Yamato minzoku o chūkaku to suru sekai seisaku no kentō* [An investigation of global policy with the Yamato race as nucleus], p. 2363.

4.2.3 Literary exploration on identity crisis of children of mixed heritage in colonial Taiwan and Korea

This section explores the following four novels written in Japanese that deal with the question of identity of children of mixed heritage in colonial Korea and Taiwan: (1) *Kanjō* [Emotion] (1936) by Huang Baotao, (2) *Tokeisō* [Passionflower] (1943) by Sakaguchi Reiko, (3) *Chin-fujin* [The wife of Mr Chen] (1940, 1942)⁵³⁹ by Shoji Soichi and (4) Natsume [Jujube] (1937) by Yuasa Katsue. All four novels were inspired by the writers' first-hand experience of living in colonial Taiwan or Korea. Both Japanese and non-Japanese colonial novelists explored how political discourse on assimilation and intermarriage played out within mixed families as it was regarded by the colonial officials as a 'crucial site in which future subjects and loyal citizens were to be made'.⁵⁴⁰ These novels shed light on the mother's situation after giving birth, and the mother-child relationship, which can be related to the experiences of Sino-Japanese CBOW. The authors explored different variations of power relations in various gender-race patterns of cross-border intimate relationships in Japanese colonies that affected the identity and belonging of their children. However, it needs to be noted that these stories were written within the confines of censorship of imperial Japan and were constructed in a way that directly or indirectly endorsed the assimilationist stance.⁵⁴¹

In these four novels, fictional children of mixed heritage encounter various forms of discrimination and stigmatisation in their communities and face an identity crisis.⁵⁴² While colonial administrations promoted harmony between Japan and the colonies through intermarriage, both Japanese and colonised populations could not fully accept such a policy. Imperial Japan regarded colonised subjects as part of an 'inferior race', the colonised people were experiencing on a daily basis the opposite of the aforementioned slogan *isshi dōjin* that claimed all imperial subjects were to be treated equally.

In these literary works, whether the father was from Japan or from a colonised country had a great impact on the identity and belonging of the fictitious children of mixed heritage. In the novel *Kanjō*, Taro, born of a Japanese father and a Taiwanese woman, had an unwavering belief that he was 'Japanese' even though his father deserted him and

⁵³⁹ It consists of two parts: the first part is titled *Fūfu* [Husband and wife], and the second part is titled *Oyako* [Parent and child]. See, Tai, Intermarriage and imperial subject formation in colonial Taiwan: Shoji Soichi's *Chin-fujin*, pp. 513-514.

⁵⁴⁰ Cooper, F. and Stoler, A. L. 1997. *Tensions of empire: Colonial cultures in a bourgeois world*. Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 203.

⁵⁴¹ For various literary and cinematic works on colonial intermarriage and mixed-blood children in the Japanese Empire, a book chapter of Hoshina is helpful. See, Hoshina, H. 2002. *Shokuminchi no 'konketsuji': Naitaikekkon no seijigaku* [Colonial 'mixed-blood children': Politics of Japanese-Taiwanese intermarriage]. In *Taiwan no 'Daitōasensō': Bungaku, media, bunka* [Taiwan's 'Great East Asia War': Literature, media and culture], eds. S. Fujii, C. Tarumi and Y. Huang, pp. 267-294. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, pp. 278-279.

⁵⁴² Tai, Intermarriage and imperial subject formation in colonial Taiwan: Shoji Soichi's *Chin-fujin*, p. 523.

his mother. His parents' relationship was patriarchal and hierarchical. His mother was submissive to his father and repeatedly told Taro stories about 'beautiful Japan' that she had learned from her husband. Taro was subjected to discrimination: Japanese people regarded him as Taiwanese, inferior in race, and Taiwanese people ostracised him for being a 'mixed-blood'. Taro chose to live as 'Japanese' to be part of a superior race and identified more strongly with his father whom he perceived to be superior to his mother in terms of gender and class as well.

The 1943 novel *Tokeisō*, also depicted intermarriage and consequent childbirth in Taiwan, but the union occurred between a Japanese policeman and an aboriginal woman. Between 1910 and 1914, the fifth governor-general of Taiwan, Sakuma Samata, commanded the suppression of Taiwanese aborigines while simultaneously promoting intermarriage between Japanese policemen and aboriginal women. Intermarriage was promoted to infiltrate the aboriginal community in order to obtain information. Japanese husbands often deserted their wives after accomplishing their tasks.⁵⁴³ In the novel, the Japanese father states that it was not enough to simply provide education to uncivilised populations, and it is instead necessary to transmit advanced civilisation through the introduction of 'civilised blood' into an 'uncivilised lineage'.⁵⁴⁴ This particular policy ran contrary to the 'correct' intermarriage between elite Han Taiwanese men and Japanese women held by the Taiwanese colonial administration (see p.111).⁵⁴⁵ However, it conformed to the MHW's Global Policy document published in 1943 that if intermarriage could not be prevented, it should occur between Japanese men and colonised women. Such a policy was based on the view that placed Japanese men at the top of the racial, cultural and gender hierarchy in the empire as well as the view that equated colonial rule to male dominance over women.⁵⁴⁶ Jun, born of a Japanese father and Taiwanese aboriginal mother, is subjected to discrimination, and his mother blames her own minority status for her son's hardships. Jun's father deserted him and his mother, but he reconciles with his absent father as he learns that his father did love his mother. Contrary to Taro in the aforementioned novel *Kanjō*, who developed a strong sense of belonging to Japan, Jun acknowledges his mother's aboriginal blood running through his body, but at the same time, becomes filled with a sense of mission to bring about advancement to the aboriginal community on behalf of the Japanese state and his absent father. Thus, the

⁵⁴³ See, Barclay, P. D. 2005. Cultural brokerage and interethnic marriage in colonial Taiwan: Japanese subalterns and their aborigine wives, 1895-1930. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 64(2), pp. 323-360.; Hoshina, *Shokuminchi no 'konketsuji': Naitaiekkon no seijigaku* [Colonial 'mixed-blood children': Politics of Japanese-Taiwanese intermarriage], p. 280.

⁵⁴⁴ Tai, Intermarriage and imperial subject formation in colonial Taiwan: Shoji Soichi's Chin-fujin, p. 522.

⁵⁴⁵ Tai, Intermarriage and imperial subject formation in colonial Taiwan: Shoji Soichi's Chin-fujin, p. 516.

⁵⁴⁶ Hoshina, *Shokuminchi no 'konketsuji': Naitaiekkon no seijigaku* [Colonial 'mixed-blood children': Politics of Japanese-Taiwanese intermarriage], p. 273.

writer effectively depicted a child of mixed heritage as a facilitator of an imperial cause to assimilate Taiwanese aborigines.

In another colonial novel *Chin-fujin*, the author also deals with the identity of a child of mixed heritage, Seiko, born of a father from a wealthy Taiwanese family and a Japanese woman, who successfully inculcates ‘Japanese spirit’ in the family space.⁵⁴⁷ This pattern of intermarriage depicted in *Chin-fujin* perfectly matched the ‘correct’ pattern of intermarriage between elite Taiwanese men and educated Japanese women promoted by the colonial officials in Taiwan (see p. 111). Her Taiwanese father was depicted as an ‘incomplete imperial subject’,⁵⁴⁸ but under his Japanese wife’s guidance, he eventually becomes a self-motivated Taiwanese who would dedicate himself to the Japanese Empire.⁵⁴⁹ The concept of ‘incomplete imperial subject’ is similar to the concept ‘incomplete Japanese’ used by Japanese historian Kita Sadakichi (1871-1939), an influential proponent of Japan’s racial hybridity theory and assimilation policies. He described Japan’s colonial subjects as people who are ‘in the process of merging their languages and forgetting where they came from’ and asserted that they will be ‘gradually and irresistibly absorbed into Yamato race’ (see p. 115).⁵⁵⁰ Seiko’s father accepts his place as a member of ‘Taiwanese’ which he defines as a subgroup of the broader category of ‘Japanese’. Yet, Seiko is stigmatised for being a Taiwanese-Japanese child. In the novel, being a ‘mixed-blood’ is likened to a ‘bruise that will never disappear’. Although her Japanese mother has been teaching Seiko that she is undoubtedly ‘Japanese’, Seiko eventually awakens to her strong sense of belonging to Taiwan as well as to her blood ties with her Taiwanese father and his ancestors. Acknowledging her father’s blood meant that Seiko accepted her minority status in the empire – a ‘mixed-blood Taiwanese’, who respects the boundary between herself and ‘pure-blooded’ Japanese. By depicting Seiko and her father as exemplary colonial subjects who would strive to be ‘Japanese’ but would not erode the privileged territory of the Japanese, the author provided Japanese readers who had anxieties about the issues of loyalty and rights of children of mixed heritage with a sense of reassurance.⁵⁵¹

As the novel was written during the ongoing war between China and Japan, the representation of Seiko, born of Han Taiwanese and Japanese, was implying imperial Japan’s ambition to assimilate Han Chinese in China (see p. 111). Her cousin likens Seiko to Zheng Chenggong (1624-1662) who was born of a Chinese father and a Japanese mother in Japan and became a pirate leader of Ming forces against the Manchu conquerors of China. During the colonisation and the Asia-Pacific War, this ‘mixed-blood’ historical

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁸ Tai, Intermarriage and imperial subject formation in colonial Taiwan: Shoji Soichi’s *Chin-fujin*, p. 518.

⁵⁴⁹ Tai, Intermarriage and imperial subject formation in colonial Taiwan: Shoji Soichi’s *Chin-fujin*, p. 521.

⁵⁵⁰ Morris-Suzuki, *Re-inventing Japan: Time, space, nation*, pp. 91-92.

⁵⁵¹ Tai, Intermarriage and imperial subject formation in colonial Taiwan: Shoji Soichi’s *Chin-fujin*, p. 522.

figure was used as a symbol of the ambitious expedition abroad from Japan to justify the construction of the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.⁵⁵² The novel *Chin-fujin* was well received by Japanese readers and won a 1943 Greater East Asia Literary Prize in the Greater East Asia Writers Conference held by the patriotic association that absorbed existing literary associations and worked to instil imperialist nationalism in the public mind.⁵⁵³

The novel *Natsume* depicts the identity crisis of Kim Taro, a child born of a Korean man and a Japanese woman. Taro's father was a university student in Japan when he met his mother. His mother went to Korea with him only to find out that he had a wife and children. As she was pregnant, she had no choice but to raise Taro in Korea as a concubine. As a result, she harboured resentment not only towards Taro's father, who became a merchant but also towards anything related to Korea. The power relations within the relationship of Taro's parents were complex. On one hand, his Japanese mother, who had to endure her demeaning status as a concubine, maintained her self-esteem by emphasising her racial superiority as a Japanese within the family. On the other hand, while his father was superior to Taro's mother in terms of gender within both Korean and Japanese patriarchal systems, the Japanese racial ideology placed him lower than her in terms of race and culture. Due to the mother's strong wish for Taro to be 'Japanese', he received Japanese education. Whenever he was bullied as a 'Korean' child by his Japanese schoolmates, he told himself that he has Japanese spirit. However, he had an ambivalent identity and sense of belonging as he could not deny his emotional attachment to his gentle father and the paternal country, Korea. What separates the Japanese-Korean child portrayed in this novel from the aforementioned *Tokeisō* and *Chin-fujin* is that it was Taro's personal and emotional attachment to his father – not the assimilationist policy or imperial doctrine – that led to his acknowledgment of the hybridity.

Because of the ongoing project to expand the Japanese Empire, the above stories of children of mixed heritage in Japanese colonies needed to be written in alignment with imperial ideologies and carry political effects desirable for the authorities. For instance, Jun in *Tokeisō*, born of a Taiwanese aboriginal mother and a Japanese father, inherited an assimilationist view and an imperialist mission from his absent father. In another instance, the 'hybridity' of Seiko in *Chin-fujin*, born of a Japanese mother and a Han Taiwanese father, was depicted as a metaphor of Japan's impending domination over China by likening her to Zheng Chenggong. Thus, the identity crisis of the fictitious intermarriage

⁵⁵² Hoshina, *Shokuminchi no 'konketsuji': Naitaiekkon no seijigaku* [Colonial 'mixed-blood children': Politics of Japanese-Taiwanese intermarriage], pp. 274-275.; Tai, *The discourse of intermarriage in colonial Taiwan*, p. 92.

⁵⁵³ Hoshina, *Shokuminchi no 'konketsuji': Naitaiekkon no seijigaku* [Colonial 'mixed-blood children': Politics of Japanese-Taiwanese intermarriage], p. 271.

and mixed-heritage personages in these novels had to be depicted within the confinement of patriarchal and racial ideologies that were mobilised for the construction of the Japanese Empire.

However, the depictions of how the patriarchal beliefs and racial ideology shaped the colonial intermarriage and mixed children's identity are relevant to the analysis of the actual wartime and post-war Sino-Japanese consensual relationships and the identity of Sino-Japanese CBOW. First, due to the Japanese racial ideology and the interconnectedness of patriarchal traditions in Japan and its colonies, a correlation can be found between having a 'racially superior' male parent and having an identity as 'Japanese' in the novels depicting children born of mixed heritage in Japanese colonies. Both Taro in *Kanjō* and Jun in *Tokeisō* born of Japanese fathers were depicted to have a clearer self-perception as 'Japanese' although their Japanese fathers were absent. This correlation between the gender-race combination in a mixed couple and children's strong identification to the paternal country is important in understanding Sino-Japanese CBOW's strong sense of belonging to Japan. Secondly, the mothers' role in fostering their children's identity as 'Japanese' was prominent in all four novels. The women who were married to Japanese men in *Kanjō* and *Tokeisō* were depicted as submissive and self-effacing characters who supported their children in fostering their identification with the absent father and the paternal country. Japanese women depicted in *Chin-fujin* and *Natsume*, who were 'racially superior' to their husbands, assumed their role as an educator of their offspring in the patriarchal system to guide their children to become 'Japanese'. The mother's role in shaping Sino-Japanese CBOW's emotional attachment to the absent Japanese father will be examined later. Thirdly, these novels pointed to the importance of the naming practice embedded in the patriarchal systems. All the children in the four novels inherited their paternal surnames. Some had a Japanese surname and a Japanese first name which reinforced their identity as 'Japanese', whereas others had a hybridised name – a Korean or Taiwanese surname and a Japanese first name which highlighted their hybridity. The actual naming of Sino-Japanese CBOW will also be explored later as it was one of the common practices that shaped these children's identity through their paternal lineage.

4.2.4 Fictional Sino-Japanese intimate relationship in the film *China Night*

While no wartime novels on Sino-Japanese relationships and children could be found, three films depicting romantic relationships between a Japanese man and a Chinese woman became box-office successes amidst the escalating war between China and Japan.⁵⁵⁴ Through examination of the cinematic dealing of the hierarchical power relations between the fictional Sino-Japanese couple in one of the three films, *China*

⁵⁵⁴ Sekiguchi, T. 2014. 'Shina no yoru' kenkyū [Studies on 'China Night']. *Phases*, 5, pp. 96-111, p. 96.

Night, this section highlights the wartime patriarchal beliefs and Japanese racial ideology that profoundly affected the actual Sino-Japanese marriages in wartime China.

Between 1939 and 1940, Toho Studio, a major Japanese film production company, screened *On Song of the White Orchid* (*Byakuran no uta*) (1939), *China Night* (*Shina no yoru*) (1940) and *Vow in the Desert* (*Nessa no chikai*) (1940).⁵⁵⁵ In all three films, the Chinese female character played by an extremely popular actress, Ri Koran (Li Xianglan in Chinese),⁵⁵⁶ saves the Japanese male character from anti-Japanese elements in China, and they ultimately fall in love despite ideological and cultural differences. *China Night* was by far the most popular amongst the three.⁵⁵⁷ After the Manchurian Incident in 1931 and the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Japanese public developed a keen interest in China. A large Japanese audience was fascinated by the film's romantic story as well as by landscapes of China and its massively popular theme song. The Japanese audience adored the modern Sino-Japanese couple depicted in *China Night*. It even became fashionable for young Japanese women to imitate the exotic make-up of the main actress and give themselves Chinese-sounding names.⁵⁵⁸ It was also one of the most prominent wartime propaganda films from Japan. *China Night* promoted the image of Japan as the civilised and benign leader of Asia.⁵⁵⁹ It was actively screened outside Japan proper, including China, Manchuria, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Burma, the Philippines and the United States.⁵⁶⁰ In 1944, the Office of Strategic Services, a wartime intelligence agency of the United States analysed *China Night* as one of the significant wartime Japanese propaganda films.

The intended political effect of the fictional Sino-Japanese romance of the Japanese hero, Hase, and the Chinese heroine, Keiran, in *China Night* needs to be understood in light of the cinematic depiction of the unequal power relations within the consensual relationship. At the outset of the film, Keiran appears as a young woman in a tattered dress roaming the streets of Shanghai, a contrasting image to Hase, a modern and well-

⁵⁵⁵ Hauser, W. B. 1998. Japanese war films. In *World War II in Asia and the Pacific and the war's aftermath, with general themes: A handbook of literature and research*, eds. L. E., Lee and R. Higham, pp. 255-262. Westport: Greenwood Press, p. 257.; Baskett, M. 2008. *The attractive empire: Transnational film culture in imperial Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, p. 80.

⁵⁵⁶ Ri Koran was born of Japanese parentage in Fushun, Manchuria, in 1920. She was so fluent in Chinese that she could pass as Chinese. Producers of her films hid her Japanese identity and introduced her to the public as a Chinese actress fluent in Japanese. After the end of the Second Sino-Japanese war, Ri Koran was charged for treason against China due to her wartime collaboration with Japanese. She was released and deported to Japan after proving her Japanese nationality.

⁵⁵⁷ Sekiguchi, 'Shina no yoru' kenkyū [Studies on 'China Night'], p. 96.

⁵⁵⁸ Eigajin tōroku (1940) *Nihon eiga*, August, p. 117.

⁵⁵⁹ See for example, Sekiguchi, 'Shina no yoru' kenkyū [Studies on 'China Night'], pp. 97-98.; Baskett, *The attractive empire: Transnational film culture in imperial Japan*, pp. 79-84; Kawasaki, T. 2017. *Eiga 'shina no yoru' ni taisuru ken'etsu no tagensei* [Multi-faceted censorship of the film 'China Night']. *Intelligence*, 17, pp. 124-134, p. 128.

⁵⁶⁰ Some studies analyse several versions of the film that are edited differently for different destinations. Sekiguchi, 'Shina no yoru' kenkyū [Studies on 'China Night'], pp. 96-109, 107.; Kawasaki, *Eiga 'shina no yoru' ni taisuru ken'etsu no tagensei* [Multi-faceted censorship of the film 'China Night'], pp. 124-125.

dressed young man from Japan. Keiran originally had strong anti-Japanese sentiment and displayed a rebellious attitude towards the Japanese because her parents had been killed in a bombing raid by the Japanese army. However, after she encounters Hase, she assimilates into Japanese culture – quickly learning to speak Japanese and to behave similarly to other Japanese women.⁵⁶¹ Throughout the film, Hase is presented as superior to Keiran not only in terms of gender and race but also because he was depicted as instilling civilised behaviours, such as keeping good hygiene, in Keiran.

There is a symbolic scene that reveals the profound power imbalance between Hase and Keiran. Hase gives Keiran's face a hard slap to make her understand the kind intentions of Hase's Japanese female friends who tried to help her. He also alludes to the breakup of their relationship. Instead of taking offense, Keiran looks at Hase with a stunned eye and begs:

‘Hase-san. Don't make me leave. Forgive me! It didn't hurt. It didn't hurt at all when you hit me. I felt a sense of happiness [when you hit me]. I'll be docile. Please let me stay. Hase-san, forgive me!’⁵⁶²

Keiran interprets Hase's use of violence as a physical ‘correction’ for her betterment, and thus Keiran confirms Hase's love through his ‘correction’. Keiran's interpretation could be compared to a study on contemporary Ugandan women who interpret the lack of physical ‘correction’ by their husbands as a lack of love.⁵⁶³ Such an interpretation of male violence by the heroine in *China Night* and acceptance by the audience point to the significant gender inequality based on patriarchal norms that were prevalent at the time. Furthermore, Keiran's interpretation of Hase's violence as an appropriate and justifiable means to help her appreciate the good intentions of Japanese people points to the unequal relationship between the Japanese and Chinese constructed by Japan's wartime racial ideology. As Liu stated, the above scene implies that the act of aggression by Japan was necessary to make Chinese people realise Japanese people's ‘kind’ intention to lead China into the harmony of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.⁵⁶⁴ According to Frantz Fanon, who analysed the dehumanising effects of colonisation upon the colonised, ‘the major weapon of the colonisers was the imposition of their image of the colonised on the subjugated people’.⁵⁶⁵ It could be argued that *China Night* was one of Japan's ‘major weapons’ that effectively presented the image of Japan as a ‘first-class nation’ and that

⁵⁶¹ Sekiguchi, ‘*Shina no yoru*’ *kenkyū* [Studies on ‘China Night’], p. 103.

⁵⁶² The translation is taken from: Baskett, *The attractive empire: Transnational film culture in imperial Japan*, p. 81.

⁵⁶³ Seymour, “‘You are beaten if you are bad, it is said you woman you have made your husband tired’”: Conceptualising gender violence in Northern Uganda’.

⁵⁶⁴ For the analysis of this scene, see, Liu, W. 2004. *Eiga no naka no shanghai: Hyōshō toshiteno toshi, josei, puropaganda* [Shanghai in films: City, women and propaganda in the representation]. Tokyo: Keio University Press, p. 202.

⁵⁶⁵ Fanon, F. 1991. *Les Damnés de la Terre* [The Wretched of the Earth]. Paris: Gallimard.

of China as a subjugated nation through the relationship of Hase and Keiran.⁵⁶⁶ The gender and race combination in the consensual relationship in *China Night* – consistent with MHW’s policy that ‘intermarriage needs to occur between men from a conquering race and women from a conquered race, and not vice versa.’⁵⁶⁷ – was a vital element that produced both the drama and the political effect that served the ambitions of the Japanese Empire.

The Sino-Japanese love affair depicted in *China Night* is fictional just like the colonial literary works examined in the previous section. However, *China Night* also has implications for the actual wartime Sino-Japanese consensual relationships and for the context in which such relationships formed. First, the absence of representation of a Sino-Japanese child in *China Night* and two other Japanese wartime films on Sino-Japanese romance corresponded with the fact that Japan was at its early stage of examining Sino-Japanese marriage and consequent childbirth.⁵⁶⁸ In contrast, the literary exploration on identity of children of mixed heritage in colonial Korea and Taiwan in the 1930s and 1940s showed that these colonies had entered a phase in which the governing bodies needed to assess the outcome of their policies that promoted intermarriage since the 1920s in Korea and the 1930s in Taiwan. Secondly, while there was an ongoing anti-intermarriage debate during the war (see p. 112), the depiction of the wedding ceremony in the film offers eloquent evidence of the absence of concrete restrictions on Sino-Japanese marriage at the time. In *China Night*, the wedding ceremony of Hase and Keiran was held openly with the attendance of Hase’s Japanese friends and colleagues who celebrated their marriage. The Chinese Nationalist government had passed anti-*hanjian* (traitor to the Han Chinese state) laws including the ‘Regulations on Handling *Hanjian* Cases (*chuli hanjian tiaoli*)’ promulgated in 1937. While these laws pointed to the possibility that a Chinese woman could be punished for having an intimate relationship with a Japanese man in wartime China, they were not specifically intended to ban wartime Sino-Japanese marriages.⁵⁶⁹ Lastly, patriarchal beliefs and racial ideologies that shaped the fictitious Sino-Japanese romantic relationship are relevant to the following analysis of the power relations within the actual Sino-Japanese consensual relationships that formed during the war.

⁵⁶⁶ Understandably, the illustration of Japan as a benevolent nation and China as a subservient nation as well as the implicit justification of Japan’s aggression inspired a strong feeling of resentment amongst Chinese audience. See, Baskett, *The attractive empire: Transnational film culture in imperial Japan*, p. 82.

⁵⁶⁷ Oguma, *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*, p. 254.

⁵⁶⁸ Ko, M. 2014. *Sengo Nihon ni okeru ‘konketsuji’ ‘hāfu’ hyōshō no keifu* [Genealogy of representations of ‘mixed-blood children’ and ‘hāfu’ in post-war Japan]. In *Hāfu towa dareka: Jinshu konkō, media hyōshō, kōshō jissen* [Who are hāfu?: Mixed race, media representation and practice of negotiation] , ed. K. Iwabuchi, pp. 80-113. Tokyo: Seikyusha, p. 83.

⁵⁶⁹ Xia, *Engendering contempt for collaborators: Anti-hanjian discourse following the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945*, p. 112.

4.3 Wartime Sino-Japanese consensual relationships

While Japanese eugenicists were attempting to restrict Sino-Japanese intermarriage and consequent birth during the war (see p. 112), Sino-Japanese intimate liaisons and marriage occurred due to the presence of a large Japanese male population mainly in large cities that were occupied by Japan. Although these large cities had turned into battlefields at times, these Japanese men had opportunities to meet local women in non-violent settings. Previous studies on CBOW in different historical and geopolitical contexts confirmed that there is a highly possible correlation between the character of a conflict and the nature of the sexual liaisons between the parents of CBOW.⁵⁷⁰ Although exceptional cases always exist in wartime and post-war contexts, sexual liaisons between enemy troops and local women in a hostile environment tend to involve a higher level of coercion, whereas a greater range of non-violent intimate relationships tend to be formed between friendly troops and local women.⁵⁷¹ Parents of Sino-Japanese CBOW who migrated to Japan in this study had a married life of four years on average (see Appendix 5).⁵⁷² Therefore these parental relationships of Sino-Japanese CBOW differed significantly from some circumstances in other historical and geopolitical contexts where relations in many cases were forced, transactional or casual and where women frequently did not know ‘more than the forename of their child’s father’ even when the relationship was based on mutual consent.⁵⁷³

The aforementioned literary works and film have pointed to the cross-border relationships that are born of inequalities at various levels and power struggles occurring at the intersections of concepts such as gender and race, ethnicity and nationality which largely conforms with the assessment of previous studies on intimate relationships formed as a result of global cross-border movements.⁵⁷⁴ The following section explores various patterns of wartime consensual relationships based on the collected sources. It specifically examines how wartime patriarchy and racial ideology affected the parents’ relationships and roles within the household and contributed to the centrality of the (often absent) father within the family.

⁵⁷⁰ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, pp. 27-28.

⁵⁷¹ Ibid.

⁵⁷² In calculating the average number of years these couples lived together, I excluded the parents of Toshio, Keiko and Yongyun as they lived together for a long time in the post-war period – 53, 29 and 19 years respectively.

⁵⁷³ Stelzl-Marx, *Soviet children of occupation in Austria: The historical, political and social background and its consequences*, p. 285.

⁵⁷⁴ Constable, N. ed. 2005. *Cross-border marriages: Gender and mobility in transnational Asia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.; Johnson, E. 2007. *Dreaming of mail-order husband*. Durham: Duke University Press.; Yeoh, B.S.A. and Heikkilä, E. K.eds. 2010. *International marriages in the time of globalization*. New York: Nova Science Publishers; Suzuki, N. 2010. Outlawed children: Japanese Filipino children, legal defiance and ambivalent citizenships, *Pacific Affairs*, 83(1), pp. 31-50.

4.3.1 Loving relationships and the mothers passing on paternal lineage to the child

The following analysis focuses on various wartime Sino-Japanese loving relationships. While the evidence points to the little-known mutual love and family bond between the men and women from the opposite sides of the war in China, it also reveals the inequalities inherent in wartime Sino-Japanese intimate relationships in which the father figure often played a dominant role. This section highlights the role of the Chinese mothers in passing on paternal lineage to the child not only because of the prevalent patriarchal norms at the time but also because they were motivated by the positive memories of the loving relationship with the Japanese partner.

4.3.1.1 Case of Michiko's parents

An analysis of the relationship of Michiko's parents shows not only their strong mutual love and bond but also the hierarchical gendered power relations. Michiko's father, Takashi, was assigned to become an intelligence agent in 1937. Michiko's mother, Shulan, who was born in 1914 into an affluent family, used to work as a primary school teacher. However, she applied for a job as a clerk at an office in Beijing where Takashi worked, when her father went bankrupt and her primary school closed down due to the warfare. Takashi fell in love at first sight with Shulan, and they got married in 1939. Michiko was born in 1942 in Japan-occupied Beijing. Shulan's siblings at first opposed their sister's marriage with a man from the enemy country, but Takashi eventually won their recognition as a family member. According to Michiko, one of the reasons why Takashi could build and maintain a friendly relationship with his Chinese relatives was because Takashi had a high income and used to offer gifts to his relatives.⁵⁷⁵

The case of Michiko's parents is one of the few cases in which both the father and the mother never remarried after their post-war separation.⁵⁷⁶ Michiko discovered in the process of acquiring Japanese nationality in the 1980s that Takashi had registered both Michiko and her mother in *koseki* register before his death.⁵⁷⁷ Out of twenty-four fathers in Appendix 5, Takashi's case is the only known case in which the father registered his wife and child in *koseki* register. Takashi's action made it considerably easier for the family left behind in China to migrate to Japan later on because those who are registered in *koseki* register are automatically conferred Japanese nationality (see Chapter 3, p. 92). It is unknown why Takashi, who had neither a previous marital relationship nor a new relationship after repatriation, decided to register his Chinese wife and Michiko. What can be assumed is that the registration was his personal commitment to his family in

⁵⁷⁵ Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 20 January 2017.

⁵⁷⁶ For another case, see, Nagatomi, *Hakurō no tsumeato* [Traces of a white wolf], pp. 204-206.

⁵⁷⁷ Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 20 January 2017.

China that he longed to reunite one day. It is also possible that he had wished to give his assets to them upon his death.

The patriarchal naming practice, which was highlighted in the aforementioned colonial literary works (see p. 121) was exercised in the actual Sino-Japanese consensual relationships. While it is common in both China and Japan to pass on the paternal lineage by providing the father's surname to a child, some Japanese fathers also gave a Japanese first name to the child. Choosing to call a Sino-Japanese child by a Japanese first name amidst the ongoing war in China must have been based on the father's conscious decision. His decision might have been made in anticipation of Japan's victory in the war or of moving to Japan together after the war. The first name Takashi chose for his child comprised of three Chinese characters: *mi* (美), *chi* (支) and *ko* (子). It means 'a beautiful child born in China'. One of the characters in her name, *chi*,⁵⁷⁸ is a component of the old term for 'China', 支那 which is pronounced *shina* in Japanese and *zhina* in Chinese. It was a neutral term in the pre-war period during which the use and interpretation of the term developed differently in China and Japan. After the establishment of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1912, the Chinese government repeatedly requested the Japanese government to adopt the term ROC. However, the Japanese side rejected the request and continued the official use of the term *shina* until 1946. Because of this past, *shina* is now linked with the unequal Sino-Japanese relationship in the first half of the twentieth century and is regarded as an extremely discriminatory and offensive term in today's China. However, for Michiko's father, who named his daughter with endearment, the character *chi* simply was a common geographical term. Yet, his choice of the character for his daughter's name inadvertently reflected the unequal power relations between Japan and China at the time. There are also some cases in which Japanese men gave Japanese first names to their Chinese wives.⁵⁷⁹ Some mothers even changed her surname to that of her Japanese husband.⁵⁸⁰ While most women take their husband's surname in Japan, it is not commonly practiced in China.⁵⁸¹

In addition to the patriarchal naming practice, some Japanese fathers used their authority to dictate the lifestyle within a household. Sadao, the father of Kayoko and Yoshio, recreated a quasi-Japanese family life by living in a Japanese-style housing in Shanghai with *tatami* mat, a type of flooring material in traditional Japanese houses. The family members had to take off their shoes at home like in Japan.⁵⁸² Sadao used to wear

⁵⁷⁸ 'Chi' is an unusual way of pronouncing the character 支, which is usually read *shi* in Japanese.

⁵⁷⁹ Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 2, Ryotaro.; 'Ikiwakaretamono no kiroku' [The record of those who parted and lost contact], *Asahi Shimbun*, 8 December 1980.

⁵⁸⁰ Unpublished personal documents, Case 1, Tsuneyoshi.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 2, Ryotaro.

⁵⁸¹ Unpublished personal documents, Case 2, Ryotaro. See, Qi, X. 2018. Surnaming in contemporary China: Women's rights as veiled patriarchy. *Sociology*, 52(5), pp. 1001-1016, p. 1002.

⁵⁸² Unpublished personal documents, Case 3, Yoshio.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 6, Kayoko.

a Japanese traditional garment, *kimono*, at home, and his favourite dish was raw shrimp *sashimi* with soy sauce.⁵⁸³ While these Japanese men might have behaved exactly the way they would have behaved had they married a Japanese woman, their practices carried different meanings in the wartime context and outside Japan. In the study of nuanced relationships between Korean ‘comfort women’ and Japanese soldiers (see Chapter 1, p. 19), Park referred to a novel that mentioned that some Japanese soldiers gave Japanese names to ‘comfort women’.⁵⁸⁴ Park argued that Japanese soldiers did not regard Korean ‘comfort women’ as an enemy that needed to be dominated but rather as a ‘wife’ in less hostile military posts or as a ‘substitute Japanese’,⁵⁸⁵ which resonates with the notion ‘incomplete imperial subject’ in the aforementioned novel, *Chin-fujin*, that depicted the relationship between a Taiwanese man and a Japanese woman in colonial Taiwan (see p. 119). In the cases of Sino-Japanese married couples, Japanese husbands’ dominance over their Chinese wives occurred not through coercion but through the husband’s authority. Even if Japanese husbands did so unconsciously, by exercising patriarchal practices, they were inadvertently putting into action at micro-level what Japanese colonial administrations were imposing on ‘substitute Japanese’ or ‘incomplete imperial subject’ at a macro-level.

Shulan, Michiko’s mother, continued to give her husband, Takashi, a central place in the family even after his repatriation by telling stories about him to Michiko. When Michiko started to ask questions about her father around the time she entered primary school, Shulan did not hesitate to talk about various stories about Takashi and their loving relationship.⁵⁸⁶ Shulan told Michiko about how Takashi fell in love with her at first sight, how he endeavoured to remain in China after the war, and his promise to come back to China to bring them to Japan.⁵⁸⁷ In the case of Michiko’s mother, while she might have internalised certain patriarchal norms, I argue that she talked openly about Takashi to her child early on based on her love and devotion for her husband. She assumed Takashi would return one day, and she tried to keep alive his memory in the family.

Michiko stated in her interview that because she had repeatedly imagined her absent father by listening to her mother’s stories, she was not certain whether some of the images of her father were what she had actually seen or imagined. For instance, when Michiko’s father, Takashi, was interned in a repatriation camp after the end of the war, Michiko and her mother frequently visited the camp until he was deported. Michiko stated that it felt

⁵⁸³ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁴ The novelist was a soldier in the Imperial Japanese Army during the war and had sexual liaisons with Korean comfort women. See, Furuyama, K. 1971. *Shiroi tanbo* [White rice field]. In *Bungaku Senshū 36* [Selected literary works 36], ed. Nihon bungeika kyōkai. Tokyo: Kodansha.

⁵⁸⁵ Park, *Teikoku no ianfu: shokuminchi shihai to kioku no tatakai* [Comfort women of the Empire: Colonial rule and memory wars], pp. 69-73, 75-79.

⁵⁸⁶ Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 20 January 2017.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid.

like she remembered visiting her father at the camp, but the images that appeared in her mind might have been what she imagined from her mother's stories. Thus, the boundary between her mother's stories about the father and Michiko's own memories about the father may have been blurred over time.

The experience of Michiko, who learned about the absent father from her mother in her childhood is not widely shared amongst other groups of CBOW. Many CBOW in other historical contexts and locales encountered the 'wall of silence' that limited their access to information about the father.⁵⁸⁸ Many CBOW grow up without knowing who their biological father is, let alone his name, what he looked like, or his relationship with the mother. In contrast, Michiko could talk openly about her absent father with her mother and could start constructing her father's images positively early on in her life.

Some Chinese mothers of Sino-Japanese CBOW were not only in a financially precarious position after the repatriation of their Japanese husbands but also were subjected to political persecution in the post-war period for having an intimate relationship with a Japanese man.⁵⁸⁹ The post-conflict 'punishment' of women who had intimate relationships with enemy men is often represented by Robert Capa's photo of a shaven-headed young French woman with a baby in her arms parading through a jeering crowd in August 1944, being 'punished' for her relationship with a German man during World War Two.⁵⁹⁰ There is no record of a large number of ordinary Chinese women who were punished for the 'guilt by association' with Japanese men in the immediate aftermath of the Second Sino-Japanese War when both the Nationalists and the Communists emphasised the importance of taking a generous attitude towards Japanese civilians remaining in China to make use of their skills to win the Civil War.⁵⁹¹ However, both the Nationalists and the Communists carried out campaigns during the Second Sino-Japanese War that purged *hanjian* (traitor to the Han Chinese state) or collaborators. Xia's study

⁵⁸⁸ See, for example, Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, pp. 89, 245; Stelzl-Marx, *Soviet children of occupation in Austria: The historical, political, and social background and its consequences*, pp. 282-283.; Ezawa, 'The guilt feeling that you exist': War, racism, and Indisch-Japanese identity formation, p. 489.; Glaesmer et al., *Childhood maltreatment in children born of occupation after WWII in Germany and its association with mental disorders*, p. 1; Mitreuter et al, *Questions of identity in children born of war: Embarking on a search for the unknown soldier father*, pp. 3220-3221.; Uhlenius, P. 2010. *The hidden children of German soldiers and Soviet prisoners of war*. In *The Children of Foreign Soldiers in Finland, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Poland, and Occupied Soviet Karelia: Children of Foreign Soldiers in Finland 1940–1948 Volume II*, ed. L. Westerlund, pp. 153-158, p. 157. Helsinki: Nord Print.

⁵⁸⁹ Unpublished personal documents, Case 2, Ryotaro.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 5, Masao.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 7, Maki.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 8, Mariko.; Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 10 May 2016.; Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 20 January 2017.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 11, Taro.

⁵⁹⁰ See, Robert Capa: The definitive collection, *Magnum Photos*. <https://www.magnumphotos.com/arts-culture/robert-capa-the-definitive-collection/> (accessed on 23 September 2020); Beevor, A. 'An ugly carnival', *The Guardian*, 5 June 2009. <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/jun/05/women-victims-d-day-landings-second-world-war> (accessed on 23 September 2020)

⁵⁹¹ Ward, *Delaying repatriation: Japanese technicians in early postwar China*, p. 475.; King, *Reconstructing China: Japanese technicians and industrialization in the early years of the People's Republic of China*, p. 6.

on the laws and discourse regarding *hanjian* during and after the Second Sino-Japanese War showed that female celebrities who were associated with Japanese officers by romance or marriage were denounced along with wives and (suspected) mistresses of Chinese collaborators in a distinct type of post-war literature which she refers to as ‘hideous histories’ genre.⁵⁹² Such literature was produced for mass-consumption and featured scandals about ‘female collaborators’ under catchy titles such as ‘Hideous histories of female collaborators’ and ‘Revealing the faces of female collaborators’. Such literature targeted female celebrities, and only a small number of women were tried and punished under anti-*hanjian* laws. However, the hostility towards famous ‘female collaborators’ must have effectively provoked fear amongst the mothers of Sino-Japanese CBOW.

Some mothers of Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study were subjected to political persecution as a series of political campaigns were launched and intensified after the establishment of the PRC in 1949. Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers lived through Three-anti and Five-anti Campaigns (1951-1953), the Anti-Rightist Movement (1957-1959) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). These events included the killing and imprisonment of tens of thousands of people who were labelled ‘counterrevolutionary’ either by official investigations or by rumours and private accusations amongst individuals at workplaces, at schools, in communities, in neighbourhoods and in families.⁵⁹³ In rural area alone, it is estimated that 750,000 to 1.5 million people were killed during the Cultural Revolution.⁵⁹⁴ People of any political, occupational or familial background could be arbitrarily persecuted as ‘counterrevolutionary’, and any such links to Japan could be construed as a potential ‘counterrevolutionary’.

Under such socio-political circumstances, the mothers of three participants encountered significant adversities for having a relationship with a Japanese man during the war, while the mothers of five other participants were not subjected to any form of punishment. It is not known whether the severity of punishment towards the mothers was related to their Japanese husband’s wartime profession, as two of the mothers who suffered ill-treatment were married to intelligence agents and one mother to a businessman.

Michiko’s mother was targeted for interrogation during the Cultural Revolution because she worked at an office of Japanese intelligence agents during the war. She had

⁵⁹² Xia, Engendering contempt for collaborators: Anti-*hanjian* discourse following the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, pp. 111-134.

⁵⁹³ Masuda, H. 2015. *Cold War crucible: The Korean conflict and the postwar world*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 252.; Masuda, H. 2017. What was the Cold War? Imagined reality, ordinary people’s war, and social mechanism. *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 15(4).

⁵⁹⁴ MacFarquhar, R. and Schoenhals, M. 2006. *Mao’s Last Revolution*. Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, p. 262.

no access to classified information as a clerk. However, for two years, the authority frequently summoned her for interrogation without prior notice. She was also assigned to clean the neighbourhood as a penal labourer as part of the re-education through labour system (*laodong jiaoyang*), which is a form of correction for persons who have committed minor offenses.⁵⁹⁵ Maki's mother, who was married to a Japanese businessman, was put into a detention centre in Hankou in the 1950s for re-education through labour. In the detention centre, she received the Communists' ideological education and was interrogated on suspicion of espionage. Although she wished to maintain her marital status with her Japanese husband, the city court forced her to file for a divorce.⁵⁹⁶ Yuko's mother was subjected to stigmatisation, ostracism and harsh punishment. After the war, she moved from Beijing to Hankou to hide her association with her Japanese husband, who was a doctor, a businessman and an intelligence agent during the war. When her name appeared in a newspaper along with the allegation that her husband had been placed on a wanted list, she changed her name to conceal her identity. However, around 1955, a former domestic helper informed the authority about her wartime marital relationship with her Japanese partner. After this incident, she was stigmatised and ostracised in the community. Yuko recalls that her mother sometimes came home with a paper attached to her back which read *lishi fangeming* (historical counter-revolutionary), *maiguozei* (traitor to China) and *zougou* (running dog, traitor). Yuko's mother also had to carry out forced labour in a farm as a prisoner of a criminal justice system called reform through labour (*laodong gaizao*) for fourteen years.⁵⁹⁷

These three mothers who were subjected to political persecution, continued to regard their children as a reminder of the loving relationship with their Japanese partner. It is possible that their memories of the wartime loving relationship helped to sustain them through the difficult times. Michiko, Maki and Yuko were alarmed by their mothers' plight, and the fear of political persecution facilitated their view of their paternal country as a safe haven.⁵⁹⁸

Furthermore, amongst the Chinese spouses of twenty-four Japanese men listed in Appendix 5, there are five known cases, including Michiko's mother, in which the mother migrated to Japan with their child after 1972. Although her husband passed away in 1966, Michiko's mother migrated to Japan together with Michiko in 1987 and passed away at the age of eighty-four after living in Japan for eleven years. Yuko's mother also migrated in her old age to Japan with Yuko and chose her husband's country as her final home.⁵⁹⁹ Yuko's mother used to mention a Chinese idiom concerning the patriarchal understanding

⁵⁹⁵ Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 20 January 2017.

⁵⁹⁶ Unpublished personal documents, Case 7, Maki.

⁵⁹⁷ Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 10 May 2016.

⁵⁹⁸ Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 20 January 2017.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 7, Maki.; Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 10 May 2016.

⁵⁹⁹ Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 10 May 2016.

of a woman's role in a relationship – 'Follow the man you marry, be he a cock or dog' (*jiaji suiiji, jiagou suigou*). It means that no matter what kind of husband a woman marries, she should live with him obediently for the rest of her life. The mothers of Sino-Japanese CBOW who had a loving relationship with their Japanese partner might have been motivated to migrate to Japan in their old age not only by patriarchal norms that they had internalised but also by their wartime romance, their wish to spend their last days in their husband's home country, and their will to facilitate their children to get to know their paternal country.

4.3.1.2 Case of Maki's parents

Yumei, Maki's mother, wrote in her testimony that she had a romantic relationship with Masanori during the turbulent times in Hankou, a part of today's Wuhan. Masanori was a graduate of Tokyo University and an elite businessman working for the Wuhan branch of Mitsubishi Corporation. Yumei was adopted in her childhood by a German businessman who owned a fur business in Hankou and grew up to be an educated woman, capable of speaking English. Masanori and Yumei started to see each other after meeting at a party in Japan-occupied Hankou in 1941.⁶⁰⁰ Masanori's letter addressed to Maki in 1980 provides a vivid account of his romantic relationship with Yumei.⁶⁰¹

I will never meet anybody like your mother again. We were like two shells of a clam that [fit each other perfectly]. . . . Your mother and I used to dance and dance with Fukuta-san (a Japanese friend who lived in Wuhan) who sang and played his guitar. It was really the happiest time of my life.⁶⁰²

Masanori and Yumei had a relatively progressive relationship. While sources suggest that some Sino-Japanese couples encountered language barriers,⁶⁰³ both Masanori and Yumei could communicate well in English, and they had candid discussions about the ongoing war and their future. Towards the end of the war, Masanori increasingly lost control over the direction of his life. When the United States Army Air Forces air-raided Hankou in December 1944, Masanori lost his residence and all of his possessions. Consequently, Masanori moved into the house of Yumei's family, and it was Yumei and her family that came to provide his livelihood. They held a wedding ceremony on 7 August 1945, only seven days before Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration.

⁶⁰⁰ Hankou was first occupied by the Imperial Japanese Army in October 1938 and then by the Wang Jingwei regime, a short-lived Chinese puppet-state, in March 1943.

⁶⁰¹ Maki is one of the few Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study who could learn about her parents' loving relationship not only from her mother but also from her father with whom she could communicate by letter after the re-establishment of the Sino-Japanese relations in 1972.

⁶⁰² These texts are not translated texts as the letter, dated 10 June 1980, was written in English by Maki's father. He sent his letter from Uruguay to Maki who lived in Yinchuan, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.

⁶⁰³ Unpublished personal documents, Case 8, Mariko.

About thirty guests were invited to their wedding ceremony, and they asked Masanori's friends to become their wedding witnesses in accord with the Chinese marriage law and custom at the time. After the end of the war, their daughter, Maki, was born on 2 January 1946, and Masanori was forced to reside in a repatriation camp. Despite his desperate attempts to stay with his family in China, twenty-seven-year-old Masanori was repatriated in June 1946.

Despite their mutual love and strong bond, Maki's parents remarried after separation. Most Chinese mothers of Sino-Japanese CBOW remarried after the repatriation of their Japanese husband because of the financial constraints.⁶⁰⁴ As discussed in Chapter 3, the prospect of reuniting in the immediate aftermath of the war was remote. In his letter written in 1980, he emphasised that his marriage with Yumei was the only good marriage that he ever had in his life.

I waited and waited, but I finally gave up [the idea of reuniting with you] when I became forty years old and [got] married, but this marriage was not a happy one and ended [up] in a divorce. After . . . several years, I [got] married again, but the wounds of the past still have not healed. . . . I must confess that I am still not happy.⁶⁰⁵

At the time he wrote this letter to Maki in 1980, he was in Montevideo, Uruguay, as a distributor of a Japanese automobile company. He told Maki how her mother was still so important to him as follows:

Your mother had sent me a [parcel] containing [a pair of] socks and a cigarette lighter around 1947. I still have the lighter with me. . . but I never use [it] because I am afraid of losing it. I kept it always with me as the only remembrance of your mother, and [I] have it with me in Montevideo. It is preciously stored where nobody else [can] touch, and I occasionally take it in my hands to feel the presence of your mother.⁶⁰⁶

Although Yumei also eventually remarried, after trying to contact Masanori by mail in vain (see Chapter 3, p. 74) Yumei remarried a Chinese man who worked in a city remote from Hankou to protect Maki from persecution based on her origin. Although Yumei had five children with her second husband, she also maintained a strong wish to reunite with Masanori. Before her death, she asked all her children to let her ashes flow freely in the sea so that she could drift towards Japan.⁶⁰⁷

⁶⁰⁴ Unpublished personal documents, Case 1, Tsuneyoshi.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 3, Yoshio.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 6, Kayoko.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 8, Mariko; Unpublished personal documents, Case 10, Teruo.

⁶⁰⁵ Unpublished personal documents, Case 7, Maki.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁷ 'Futari no tabiji: Nicchū gekidō o ikita kyōgeki fūfu [A journey of a couple: Beijing opera actress and actor who led a tumultuous life in China and Japan]', NHK, Tokyo, 1 March 2011.

In Masanori's letter addressed to Maki, he stated that his true love was commonly taken for a temporary affair by other Japanese people.⁶⁰⁸

I am still [hesitating whether or not to tell] my [current Japanese] wife about you. She probably would not understand and think that [you were] the result of an affair in my younger years. . . . I might offend her if I were to insist that it was a serious relationship . . . After much consideration, I still think I should keep it to myself . . . because no one would understand. Even a secretary at the [Japanese] embassy, who notified me that you [are currently living in China], assumed that it was one of those scandalous matters, and I could not bear [listening] to him.⁶⁰⁹

Such misinterpretation of his love for Yumei as a casual affair may be based on observations that reflect a reality, but only a partial reality because the Sino-Japanese intimate relationship described here has never been given any room in the public's perception. These perceptions led some Japanese fathers to conceal their past consensual relationships with Chinese women during the war.

Yumei, Maki's mother, played a pivotal role in passing on the paternal lineage to Maki even after Masanori was repatriated. When Yumei gave birth, it was Masanori who gave a Japanese surname and first name to their child. After Masanori's repatriation, Yumei chose a Chinese name for Maki so that she would not be subjected to political persecution. As most Chinese surnames are comprised of only one Chinese character, Yumei chose one character from her Japanese husband's surname that was comprised of two Chinese characters. She also gave a Chinese first name that was pronounced similar to the Japanese name that her husband chose. Yumei's choice might have been influenced by the patronymic surnaming practice, but it could have also been that she was motivated by her love for and good memories of Masanori to pass on the paternal lineage to Maki.

The above cases of Sino-Japanese CBOW born of loving relationships suggest that the mothers passed on paternal lineage to the child through stories about the absent father and patriarchal practices not only as her duty in a patriarchal society but also because they were motivated by their love for the Japanese partner and positive memories of the time they spent together. A sociological study suggested that the quality of the parents' relationship has a positive correlation with children's self-esteem, and accounts of loving relationship of the parents are likely to have positively affected the self-esteem of Sino-Japanese CBOW.⁶¹⁰

⁶⁰⁸ Unpublished personal documents, Case 7, Maki.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁶¹⁰ Bulanda, R. E. and Majumdar, D. 2008. Perceived parent-child relations and adolescent self-esteem. *Journal of Child and Family Studies*, 18(2), pp. 203-212, p. 210.

4.3.2 Nuanced Sino-Japanese consensual relationships and patriarchal relations

This section explores cases of wartime Sino-Japanese consensual relationships that were more nuanced than the above cases that demonstrate unambiguously loving relationships. Firstly, it explores several cases of Sino-Japanese relationships in which the Japanese father maintained a marital relationship with a Japanese woman in Japan. Secondly, it examines a case in which the mother gave her consent to marriage with a Japanese man under considerable social and financial constraints.

4.3.2.1 Cases of Chinese mothers becoming a ‘second wife’

Collected data for this study includes several cases in which the father of Sino-Japanese CBOW maintained a marital relationship with a Japanese woman while they married a Chinese woman during the war (see Appendix 5). Some of them went back to live with their Japanese wife immediately after they returned to Japan.⁶¹¹ The reasons for married Japanese men marrying a Chinese woman in wartime China may vary depending on the individual, but there are some key social factors in both their home country and China that might have encouraged their behaviours.

In Japan, bigamy was banned by the Civil Code in 1898, however, the practice of extramarital affairs was prevalent amongst men. An appalling gender inequality from today’s perspective could be found in how adultery was legally dealt with until the mid-twentieth century. According to the criminal law (article 183, deleted in 1947), only a married woman who had an extramarital affair would be punished if she was sued by the husband, but not vice versa. Even if a married man had an extramarital relationship with an unmarried woman, he was exempt from any form of punishment, and his wife could not claim divorce based on his extramarital affair. A man could be penalised only when he was sued by the husband of the married woman with whom he had an affair.⁶¹² The adulterous affair of the wife was considered as violation of the patriarchal authority that could undermine the foundation of the family system.⁶¹³ For instance, if a married woman gives birth to a child as a result of an extramarital relationship, the issue of inheritance for that child would affect the order within the family system. In other words, the then criminal law allowed men to have an extramarital relationship with unmarried women as

⁶¹¹ Unpublished personal documents, Case 8, Mariko.; Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 12 May 2016.

⁶¹² See, ‘*Kantsūzai*’ [Adultery], *Buritanika kokusai daihyakka jiten* [International Encyclopaedia Britannica]. <https://kotobank.jp/word/%E5%A7%A6%E9%80%9A%E7%BD%AA-49267> (accessed on 22 September 2020)

⁶¹³ See, ‘*Kafuchōsei to kantsūzai*’ [Patriarchy and a law to punish adultery], *Furin no hōritsu mondai* [Legal issues regarding extramarital affairs]. http://niseco.jp/immorality/immo_law/index.html (accessed on 10 April 2020)

such behaviours did not affect the patriarchal system and male authority within the household.

Another factor that might have led Japanese married men in wartime China to have relationships with local women was the difference in marriage laws and customs between the two countries. Japanese marriage law requires a marriage to be registered in *koseki* register, whereas Chinese marriage law did not have such a requirement (see Chapter 3, p. 94).⁶¹⁴ Therefore, a Japanese man could safely maintain one marital relationship in Japan and the other in China without violating the marriage laws in the respective countries. Furthermore, the geographical distance between China and Japan and the lack of a fast means of communication at the time made it easier for Japanese men to conceal their relationship abroad and return to their Japanese wife after the war.

In China, too, extramarital affairs were more tolerated for men than for women both before and during the war. It was only in 1950 that polygamy was banned by the new marriage law.⁶¹⁵ Being a second wife was of course not ideal for women as their status was inferior to that of the first wife. However, prevalence of the practice in China might have been an important factor when a Chinese woman consented to marry an already-married Japanese man. Thus, the interconnectedness of Japanese and Chinese patriarchal structures and practices played an important role in the formation of wartime Sino-Japanese consensual relationships and marriages.⁶¹⁶

Within this study there are some cases in which Chinese women initially refused to become the second wife of their Japanese partner before eventually acquiescing. When Tao, who was pregnant at the time, found out that her Japanese partner, Tsuneyoshi, was already married to a Japanese woman, she tried to commit suicide by lying down on a railway. Tsuneyoshi's mother who heard about the incident came all the way from Japan to Shanghai to offer money to Tao in exchange for the baby. Tao refused this offer and eventually accepted to be Tsuneyoshi's second wife.⁶¹⁷ In another instance, Lin learned that her Japanese husband, Seikichi, was maintaining his marital relationship with a Japanese woman after their first child was born in 1941. Lin stated in her testimony that she would have declined Seikichi's proposal if she had known his marital status in advance. Lin's mother and relatives arbitrated the quarrel between Lin and Seikichi, and

⁶¹⁴ See, *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hunyinfa* (1950 nian) [Marriage law of the People's Republic of China, 1950], Falü Tushuguan [Library of Law]. http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view1.asp?id=43205 (accessed on 12 September 2020); Okuda, *Kazoku to kokuseki: koku saika no susumu naka de* [Family and nationality: Upon advancement of internationalisation], pp. 175, 178.

⁶¹⁵ See, *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hunyinfa* (1950 nian) [Marriage law of the People's Republic of China, 1950], Falü Tushuguan [Library of Law]. http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view1.asp?id=43205 (accessed on 12 September 2020)

⁶¹⁶ Walby, *Theorizing patriarchy*; Piper, International Marriage in Japan: 'race' and 'gender' perspectives, pp. 321-338.

⁶¹⁷ Unpublished personal documents, Case 2, Ryotaro.

Lin eventually forgave Seikichi. Seikichi had a *de facto* bigamous marriage as Seikichi's Japanese wife, Fumi, and their children came to China in 1943. Fumi gave birth to the third child in Shanghai in April 1943, and Lin gave birth to her second child in April 1944. Thus, when these women gave consent to their marriage, their choices were significantly constrained by the fact that they were already pregnant or had given birth to a child of the Japanese partner. Presumably it would have been much worse financially and socially to be an unwed mother, thus they had little choice but to become a second wife.

It is worth reflecting on the motivations of and choices made by mothers in the construction of narratives for their children about their relationship with the Japanese husband. Some mothers of Sino-Japanese CBOW, who consented to become a second wife – positively recollected their patriarchal and hierarchical relationship with their Japanese husband. In the case of aforementioned Tao, despite the fact that she reluctantly accepted her status as a second wife, her Japanese husband, Tsuneyoshi, was still the love of her life. At her deathbed, Tao asked her son, Ryotaro, to scatter her ashes from the source of Yangtze River towards the east so that her soul could reunite with Tsuneyoshi.⁶¹⁸ Lin, another mother of Sino-Japanese CBOW mentioned above, recollected that she had a good relationship with her Japanese husband, Seikichi. According to Lin's testimony, before his repatriation in December 1945, Seikichi shed tears and left most of his valuables and a note with his address in Japan for Lin and their children.⁶¹⁹ Despite her position as a second wife, Lin cherished her relationship with Seikichi and mentioned in her testimony written in 1987 that she was still wearing a marriage ring offered by Seikichi. At times these mothers might have needed to use self-deception to cope with the demeaning status of 'second wife', but they also loved their Japanese partner. Because they had at least a few years of a proper family life with the Japanese partner, they could extract positive aspects from their relationship and pass them on to the child.

The patriarchal and hierarchical relation was pronounced in the relationship between the parents of a participant, Koretada due to age difference, gender and Toru's social status. Toru went to China in 1938 as a general (*shōshō*) in the Imperial Japanese Army.⁶²⁰ Even after his retirement from the military, Toru remained in China as the head of a food factory commissioned by the military. He also was deeply involved in the ongoing warfare and maintained his political power as a consultant for the collaborationist government in Nanjing.⁶²¹ When the two met in 1942, Huizhen, who was thirty-four years

⁶¹⁸ Ibid.

⁶¹⁹ Unpublished personal documents, Case 4, Katsue.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 9, Kayo.

⁶²⁰ Toyama, M. 1993. *Rikukaigun shōkan jinji sōran: Rikugun hen* [Comprehensive list of generals in the Japanese army and navy: Army]. Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo, p. 253.

⁶²¹ Permission for *shūseki*, Kumamoto Family Court to Koretada, 16 September 1987.

younger than Toru, was an actress but also a cashier and accountant at a Japanese restaurant. According to Huizhen, Toru seemed modest and gentle in her eyes, and she recalled that one of the strong feelings towards him was a sense of respect.⁶²² Before their marriage, Toru confessed to Huizhen that he was still married to a Japanese woman in Japan. He told Huizhen that he did not love his wife anymore and wanted to spend the rest of his life with Huizhen in China.⁶²³ Huizhen accepted his words, and they held a wedding ceremony in accord with the then Chinese marriage law in 1943. Their son, Koretada, was born in 1944. After Japan's surrender, Toru was repatriated in 1946. Koretada found out in the 1980s that Toru returned to his Japanese wife immediately after his repatriation.

Huizhen kept Koretada's origin secret until his teenage-hood not because she was ashamed of her wartime relationship with Toru but because she wanted to avoid inflicting on Koretada the burden of knowing his biological father. As mentioned earlier, Koretada wrote a novel in 2020 based on his life and the following passage links his mother's internal conflict and her positive recollection of the relationship with her Japanese partner.

My mother was wavering. 'What and how should I tell my little son? Should I wait until he becomes a little bigger before I break the news?' . . . She was always thinking about my father and was replaying in her mind the days that she spent with him.⁶²⁴

When Koretada played the role of a 'bad Japanese' while playing soldiers with his friends, his mother called Koretada and revealed to him that his father used to be a high-ranking officer in the Japanese army. Since this incident, his mother started to tell him stories about the father. Koretada mentioned in his autobiographical novel how his mother relayed her good memories of her husband to him.

I unconsciously absorbed the kindness and warmth of my family. . . . My mother used to shed tears of happiness while remembering and talking about her love for my father. She would suddenly pull me tight against her, stroke my clean-shaven head, and say 'Your face resembles me, but your kind heart resembles your father'.⁶²⁵

While the above episode might appear a beautified version for the novel, Koretada's recollections of his mother telling him nothing except the goodness of his father were confirmed in the interviews.⁶²⁶ Previous studies have also tested the link between satisfaction of psychological needs and resulting self-esteem and demonstrated that supportive environments with unconditional positive regard by one's close others in

⁶²² Interview transcript, Koretada, Tokyo, Japan, 19 May 2017.

⁶²³ Permission for *shūseki*, Kumamoto Family Court to Koretada, 16 September 1987.

⁶²⁴ Serikawa, *Yahan no shōsei* [Sound of a bell in the middle of the night], p. 18.

⁶²⁵ Serikawa, *Yahan no shōsei* [Sound of a bell in the middle of the night], p. 49.

⁶²⁶ Interview transcript, Koretada, Saitama, Japan, 22 May 2017.

childhood and adolescence promotes secure self-esteem.⁶²⁷ Growing up being regarded as a ‘reminder of love’ with various stories about the father is likely to have laid the basis for Sino-Japanese CBOW to build high self-esteem and to have a strong emotional link with the absent father.

Huizhen constructed her narrative for Koretada about her relationship with Toru by disregarding his marital relationship with his Japanese wife. One of the stories that Huizhen cherished was the story of what Toru did for her and Koretada before his repatriation. According to Huizhen, because Toru was a wealthy man, he did his best to leave all his property and money to Huizhen to enable her to make a livelihood after his departure.⁶²⁸ Before repatriation, he changed money into gold bars as a safe way to carry his wealth from his repatriation camp to a flat in Shanghai where Huizhen lived with Koretada. Although Toru was occasionally attacked and injured by thugs on the way to his family’s flat, he would hide the gold bars in his socks and carried them several times from his repatriation camp. Toru told Huizhen to keep living in the same flat so that he can find her when he returns to China to bring them to Japan.

The mothers extracted positive stories about the father to narrate to the child, and such positive stories carried more weight for Sino-Japanese CBOW who wished to imagine their missing father in a positive light. In a series of interviews with Koretada, he never mentioned the existence of his father’s wife in Japan, and I learned about Toru’s Japanese wife in a document that Koretada provided. He showed no sign of ambivalent feelings towards his father and expressed his love and respect for him. Sino-Japanese CBOW constructed the images of the absent father through what the mother chose to narrate and what the child chose to remember. In this process, Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study could develop positive identification with the absent father.

4.3.2.2 Case of Toshio’s parents

Existing research on CBOW indicates that loving or friendly relationships existed even in extremely brutal conflicts.⁶²⁹ While a ‘consensual relationship’ can be defined as an ‘intimate liaison formed voluntarily by both parties without any form of coercion involved’, voluntary relationships during and in the aftermath of a conflict often involve various constraints especially for women. War exacerbates the inequalities of gendered power relations and places constraints on women that may encourage them to engage in

⁶²⁷ W. L. and Kernis, M.H. High self-esteem: Multiple forms and their outcomes. In *Handbook of identity theory and research*, eds. S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx and V. L. Vignoles, pp. 329-355, p. 343. London: Springer.

⁶²⁸ Interview transcript, Koretada, Saitama, Japan, 22 May 2017.

⁶²⁹ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 23.

relationships with transactional elements such as food, money and safety.⁶³⁰ In the case of Toshio's parents, their union had initially been a marriage of convenience, but their relationship eventually developed into an affectionate one.

Toshio's father, Yoshiharu, was a Japanese intelligence agent during the war. He was disguised as a Chinese businessman in carrying out his missions and was given an order from the Imperial Japanese Army to marry a local woman to blend into Chinese society.⁶³¹ Toshio's mother, Qixia was only fifteen years old when her relatives introduced Yoshiharu to her in 1942. Her choices were significantly constrained by patriarchal norms and financial difficulties. It was common for young Chinese women at the time to give their consent to marriage under the pressure that derived from a patrilineal kinship system.⁶³² Chinese parents often used their authority to choose an appropriate partner for their child.⁶³³ When parents were faced with financial difficulties, they were under considerable pressure to marry off their daughter.⁶³⁴ Qixia's family was in serious debt, and her marriage with Yoshiharu was regarded as a means to pull her entire family out of poverty. According to the marriage law of the Republic of China that came into force in 1931, girls were allowed to marry on reaching sixteen years of age. However, in a society where patriarchal norms and financial pressures overrode a daughter's meaningful consent to marriage, 'under-age marriage' was of little concern for parents and the community in China at the time.⁶³⁵ Under such social and financial circumstances, Qixia made a constrained choice for the marriage with a man she hardly knew.⁶³⁶ When Qixia married Yoshiharu, she did not even know the fact that her husband was Japanese and that his actual job was intelligence work.

The nature of the relationship between Qixia and Yoshiharu eventually changed, and it developed into a caring relationship. After their marriage, Qixia learned about Yoshiharu's real job and supported his work partly to repay his favour for helping her family.⁶³⁷ After Yoshiharu was imprisoned in 1958 for conducting intelligence work

⁶³⁰ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, pp. 26-27, 31.

⁶³¹ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku* [The last soldier that returned to Japan: Fukatani, Yoshiharu and his family], pp. 18-21.

⁶³² Gupta, M. D. and Li, S. 1999. Gender bias in China, South Korea and India 1920-1990: Effects of war, famine and fertility decline. *Development and Change*, 30(3), pp. 619-652.

⁶³³ Okuda, *Kazoku to kokuseki: kokusaika no susumu naka de* [Family and nationality: Upon advancement of internationalisation], p.179.

⁶³⁴ Gupta and Li, Gender bias in China, South Korea and India 1920-1990: Effects of war, famine and fertility decline, pp. 620-622.

⁶³⁵ For instance, a Chinese journalist Zou Taofen wrote about his mother in an essay and stated that she was fourteen years old when she married his father in the 1880s. Zou, T. 1936. *Wo de muqin* [My mother]. In *Banianji yuwen shangce di shi'er ke* [8th grade Chinese Textbook Volume 1 Lesson 12]. Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe.

⁶³⁶ Seymour, "You are beaten if you are bad, it is said you woman you have made your husband tired": Conceptualising gender violence in Northern Uganda', p. 28.

⁶³⁷ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku* [The last soldier that returned to Japan: Fukatani Yoshiharu and his family], pp. 33-36.

during and after the war, Qixia visited the prison every month to give a prison officer things that Yoshiharu might need, although she was not allowed to meet him directly.⁶³⁸

Like other mothers of Sino-Japanese CBOW in previous sections, Qixia tried to retain the presence of Yoshiharu as the central figure of the household even after he was imprisoned. Until Yoshiharu was finally released in 1978, Qixia raised her children in dire poverty. To make ends meet, Qixia had to sell most of the household items, even selling her blood when there was nothing else to sell. However, she never sold the clothes that Yoshiharu left behind. Instead of selling them, she remade them into her children's clothes.⁶³⁹ After experiencing persecution and ostracism in post-war China, Qixia strongly believed that Japan was the only place where her family could live safely.⁶⁴⁰ Her devotion to Yoshiharu and her view of Japan as a safe haven had a considerable impact on Toshio's sense of belonging contributing to his perception of Japan as his 'homeland'.

Thus, we can observe a variety of patterns of wartime consensual relationships of Chinese women with their Japanese partners. The mothers of Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study passed on the paternal lineage to the child through patriarchal practices and the narration based on their affirmative recollection about the absent father, regardless of the power imbalance within the relationship and the differences in more or less constrained choices in their consent to marriage. In the cases in which the mothers had more nuanced consensual relationships, they narrated positive stories about the absent father to their children after going through the process of selectively recollecting the positive aspects of the relationship and retrospectively justifying their consent to marriage given under various constraints. The mother's narratives about the absent father resulted in the knowledge of all participants (except for Momoko whose mother had passed away when she was one-year old) about their father's good qualities and deeds such as his kindness, politeness, intelligence, work ethics, skills and good looks. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the construction of positive images of the absent father had a significant influence on the life-long development of identity, belonging and life choices of Sino-Japanese CBOW.

4.4 Post-war Sino-Japanese consensual relationships in China

While it is highly likely that Sino-Japanese intimate encounters and marriages occurred between remaining Japanese nationals and Chinese women, very little is known about how they met and what happened after the marriage owing to scarce data. This section

⁶³⁸ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku* [The last soldier that returned to Japan: Fukatani Yoshiharu and his family], pp. 52-53.

⁶³⁹ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku* [The last soldier that returned to Japan: Fukatani Yoshiharu and his family], p. 81.

⁶⁴⁰ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku* [The last soldier that returned to Japan: Fukatani Yoshiharu and his family], p. 74.

examines four different circumstances under which Japanese men had consensual relationships with local women in post-war China. It is reasonable to assume that the following evidence of post-war Sino-Japanese intimate relationships represents only the tip of the iceberg of a myriad of post-war Sino-Japanese consensual relationships. This section first examines various post-war circumstances under which Sino-Japanese intimate relationships and consequent childbirths have occurred. It then explores the actual cases of post-war Sino-Japanese consensual relationships based on interviews with two participants whose fathers remained in post-war China.

The Japanese male population did not increase in the aftermath of the war in China as the flow of migration from Japan to China stopped when Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration in mid-August 1945. SCAP, in cooperation with the Nationalists and the Communists, repatriated the majority of Japanese nationals remaining in the immediate aftermath of the war (see Chapter 3, p. 70). However, these organisations were not in complete alignment. As mentioned earlier, when the Chinese Civil War resumed immediately after the Second Sino-Japanese War, both the Nationalists and the Communists persuaded certain groups of Japanese nationals to remain for their own political interests. As for civilian workers, both the Nationalists and the Communists recruited Japanese medical staff for their army and Japanese technicians for companies and factories that were confiscated from the Japanese as part of the ‘legitimate right of the victorious nation’.⁶⁴¹ In addition, both the Nationalists and the Communists managed to make use of thousands of Japanese soldiers until the Civil War ended in 1949, which this section discusses below. Consequently, the phenomenon of cross-national encounters and marriages of Japanese men and Chinese women continued in the immediate post-war period.

It needs to be noted that this study does not include male Japanese stranded war orphans who married Chinese women after the 1950s and had children born of mixed heritage. They were babies and children at the war’s end, and most of them grew up without the knowledge of their biological origin, Japanese language or culture. The power relations within relationships between male stranded war orphans and Chinese women were different in comparison with power relations in relationship formed between Japanese men who migrated to wartime China in their adulthood and Chinese women. Previous studies on the former group have advanced understanding on their legal, social and cultural issues as well as problems related to their children’s integration after

⁶⁴¹ These civilian workers who remained in post-war China are called *ryūyōsha*. Sato, *Sengo Nichū kankei to dōsōkai* [Post-war Sino-Japanese relations and alumni reunion], p. 65.

migrating to Japan.⁶⁴² This section focuses on the latter group that has remained understudied to date.

4.4.1 Various Sino-Japanese consensual relationships in post-war China

The following testimony of Takami Hiroshi, a Japanese railway technician in post-war China, is valuable evidence of unions and consequent birth that occurred between Japanese civilian workers and local women in post-war China. Hiroshi was involved in the construction project of a railway that connected Lanzhou and Tianshui in Gansu Province, and he stated that while most Japanese technicians lived with their Japanese spouses and children, some Japanese had children with local women in Lanzhou.⁶⁴³ As it was estimated that more than 35,000 Japanese civilian workers were in China in 1949, such Sino-Japanese intimate relationships might have continued to form in various parts of China in the 1950s. I have argued in Chapter 3 (see p. 80) that these Japanese civilian workers were the ones who were likely to have been permitted to take their Chinese wives and children to Japan during the collective repatriation organised by nongovernmental organisations in the PRC and Japan between 1953 and 1958.

The following circumstances under which Taro met and married his Chinese partner in the 1950s might have been rare, but his case provides a rare window into diverse situations that made encounters of Japanese men and Chinese women possible in post-war China. Taro went to wartime China as a soldier and was detained as a POW after Japan's surrender.⁶⁴⁴ When Taro was released in March 1953, he was ordered to reside at a repatriation camp in Shenyang. This is when he met his future Chinese wife,⁶⁴⁵ and they got married in August 1953, five months after his release. After their first son was born in July 1954, the family moved to Ningxia where they had their second son in 1955. Taro worked on a farm until he died due to an accident in 1957. Taro's children acquired Japanese nationality in 1987. Although the personal documents found in the Tokyo law firm provide only a summary of the life trajectories of Taro's family, it shows that Taro's children followed exactly the same path as the study group born of wartime consensual relationships who acquired Japanese nationality after 1972.

⁶⁴² See, for example, Araragi, S. ed. 2000. '*Chūgoku kikokusha*' no seikatsu sekai [Life world of 'returnees from China']. Kyoto: Korosha.; Araragi, S. ed. 2009. *Rethinking Manchukuo and Japan: A living history of Japanese left-behind in China after WWII*. Tokyo: Bensei.

⁶⁴³ After the war, many Japanese men were ordered to remain and continue to work as railway technicians in northeast China. In 1950, about three hundred of them were ordered to move to Lanzhou. See, Takami, H. 2005. *Tensui-Ranshū tetsudō no kensetsusha: Tensuikai kaichō, Minamitani Masatada shi* [Builders of the Tianshui-Lanzhou Railway: Mr Minamitani Masatada, the chairperson of Tensui Association]. In *Zoku shin Chūgoku ni kōkenshita Nihonjintachi* [Japanese who contributed to New China Volume 2], ed. *Chūgoku chūnichi kankeishi gakkai*, pp. 49-66. Tokyo: Nihon Kyōhōsha, pp. 53, 62.

⁶⁴⁴ Unpublished personal documents, Case 12, Yu.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 13, Tadashi.

⁶⁴⁵ The personal document obtained through the Tokyo law firm does not specify how Taro got to know his Chinese wife.

An autobiography of Kaji Makoto, one of the Japanese soldiers who fought in the Chinese Civil War on the side of the Communists, provides a glimpse into how the Communists dealt with marriage between Japanese soldiers and local women.⁶⁴⁶ The majority of the ten thousand Japanese who served the Communist army during the Chinese Civil War were medical staff. Japanese soldiers, like Kaji, constituted a minority.⁶⁴⁷ Kaji's Communist army commanders discouraged both Chinese and Japanese soldiers in combat from marrying local women, in particular, women who did not serve in the army because soldiers often had to fight away from their spouses for a prolonged period. Soldiers in combat in other historical and regional contexts generally need permission from their commanders to marry, but previous studies have shown that intimate relationships formed regardless of such military instructions.⁶⁴⁸ While some Sino-Japanese CBOW were likely to have been born in consequence of sexual liaisons between local women and Japanese soldiers that served the Communist army, no evidence that points to the birth of such Sino-Japanese CBOW could be found.

In contrast, two memoirs of Japanese soldiers who served the Nationalist army in post-war Shanxi Province exist and include vibrant depictions of intimate relationships with local women and evidence of the birth of Sino-Japanese CBOW. While some literature on 2,600 Japanese soldiers who remained in Shanxi after the war exist, the issue of Sino-Japanese sexual liaisons and the consequent birth of Sino-Japanese CBOW has been overlooked to date.⁶⁴⁹

When Japan surrendered, Yan Xishan, a powerful local warlord of Shanxi Province, believed that making use of the remaining Japanese soldiers and civilians would be vital in winning the war against the Communists.⁶⁵⁰ By making Japanese soldiers remain in post-war China, Yan was aware that he was violating the Potsdam Declaration that stipulated that all Japanese soldiers needed to be swiftly repatriated.⁶⁵¹ However, he

⁶⁴⁶ Kaji, M. 1957. *Chūgoku ryūyō jūnen* [Serving China for ten years]. Tokyo: Iwanamishinsho, pp. 163-164.

⁶⁴⁷ Yonehama, *Nihongun 'sansei zanryū': kokkyō naisen ni honrō sareta yamashita shōi no sengo* [Remaining Japanese soldiers in Shanxi: Lieutenant Yamashita at the mercy of fate during the Chinese Civil War], p. xii.

⁶⁴⁸ See, for example, Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, pp. 55, 72, 75.

⁶⁴⁹ See, for instance, Gillin, D. G. 1983. Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945-1949. *Journal of Asian Studies*, 42(3), pp. 497-518.; Yonehama, *Nihongun 'sansei zanryū': kokkyō naisen ni honrō sareta yamashita shōi no sengo* [Remaining Japanese soldiers in Shanxi: Lieutenant Yamashita at the mercy of fate during the Chinese Civil War]; Ikeya, K. 2010. *Ari no heitai: Nihonhei 2600 nin sanseishō zanryū no shinsō* [Ant soldiers: Truth about 2,600 Japanese soldiers who remained in Shanxi Province]. Tokyo: Shinchosha.; Okumura, W. and Sakai, M. 2006. *Watashi wa 'ari no heitai' datta* [I was one of the 'ant soldiers']. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

⁶⁵⁰ Yonehama, *Nihongun 'sansei zanryū': kokkyō naisen ni honrō sareta yamashita shōi no sengo* [Remaining Japanese soldiers in Shanxi: Lieutenant Yamashita at the mercy of fate during the Chinese Civil War], pp. xii-xiii.

⁶⁵¹ Yonehama, *Nihongun 'sansei zanryū': kokkyō naisen ni honrō sareta yamashita shōi no sengo* [Remaining Japanese soldiers in Shanxi: Lieutenant Yamashita at the mercy of fate during the Chinese Civil War], pp. 103-104.

bypassed international criticism by hiding Japanese soldiers from the international team of inspectors.⁶⁵² Yan told Japanese high-ranking military officials that he would not allow any Japanese in Shanxi to be repatriated if they failed to persuade ten thousand Japanese soldiers and skilled civilians to remain in Shanxi.⁶⁵³ When the Second Sino-Japanese War ended, most Japanese soldiers and civilians were hoping to safely return to Japan. However, the Japanese officials who were threatened by Yan persuaded their subordinates to remain in Shanxi. They asserted that Japanese soldiers could establish a foothold for Japan's future economic reconstruction and prosperity if they remained in resource-rich Shanxi.⁶⁵⁴ As incentives for those who remained in Shanxi, Yan proposed preferential treatment including: (1) promotion and treatment of all Japanese soldiers as officers (*shōkō*), (2) provision of accommodation, (3) arrangement of repatriation after two years of military service, and lastly, (4) arrangement concerning their family life.⁶⁵⁵ For Japanese soldiers who had a family in Japan, Yan promised to do his best to either help them bring their family members to Shanxi or send a remittance to their family in Japan. But for those who were single, Yan stated that they were welcome to marry the local women.⁶⁵⁶ It is highly probable that local sentiments towards Yan's policy were sharply divided due to the atrocities committed by the Japanese in wartime Shanxi including numerous tragedies of the victims of the 'comfort women' system. However, although these soldiers were anticipated to return to Japan in two years, Chinese women were offered to Japanese soldiers as 'gifts' from Yan in return for their cooperation with the Nationalists. Consequently, about 2,600 Japanese soldiers were persuaded by their superiors to remain in post-war Shanxi to serve the Nationalists during the Chinese Civil War.⁶⁵⁷

As a result of the policy that promoted Sino-Japanese marriage, Mainichi Shimbun reported in 1996 that at least twenty-three to fifty children – although presumably a much larger number of them exist – were born between Sino-Japanese couples in Shanxi during

⁶⁵² Yonehama, *Nihongun 'sansei zanryū': kokkyō naisen ni honrō sareta yamashita shōi no sengo* [Remaining Japanese soldiers in Shanxi: Lieutenant Yamashita at the mercy of fate during the Chinese Civil War], pp. 134, 172-175.

⁶⁵³ Yonehama, *Nihongun 'sansei zanryū': kokkyō naisen ni honrō sareta yamashita shōi no sengo* [Remaining Japanese soldiers in Shanxi: Lieutenant Yamashita at the mercy of fate during the Chinese Civil War], p. 79.

⁶⁵⁴ Yonehama, *Nihongun 'sansei zanryū': kokkyō naisen ni honrō sareta yamashita shōi no sengo* [Remaining Japanese soldiers in Shanxi: Lieutenant Yamashita at the mercy of fate during the Chinese Civil War], pp. 106-107.

⁶⁵⁵ Yonehama, *Nihongun 'sansei zanryū': kokkyō naisen ni honrō sareta yamashita shōi no sengo* [Remaining Japanese soldiers in Shanxi: Lieutenant Yamashita at the mercy of fate during the Chinese Civil War], p. 108.

⁶⁵⁶ Nagatomi, *Hakurō no tsumeato* [Traces of a white wolf], p. 39.; Yonehama, *Nihongun 'sansei zanryū': kokkyō naisen ni honrō sareta yamashita shōi no sengo* [Remaining Japanese soldiers in Shanxi: Lieutenant Yamashita at the mercy of fate during the Chinese Civil War], p. 108.

⁶⁵⁷ Yonehama, *Nihongun 'sansei zanryū': kokkyō naisen ni honrō sareta yamashita shōi no sengo* [Remaining Japanese soldiers in Shanxi: Lieutenant Yamashita at the mercy of fate during the Chinese Civil War], p. viii.

the Chinese Civil War.⁶⁵⁸ After the remaining Japanese soldiers lost in a battle against the Communists in Taiyuan in April 1949, Japanese fathers of Sino-Japanese CBOW were captured and they could not reunite with their family in most cases.⁶⁵⁹ In 1989, several Sino-Japanese CBOW in Shanxi started to search for their fathers in Japan and as a result, three Japanese fathers visited Taiyuan to see their children.⁶⁶⁰

Evidence of Sino-Japanese consensual relationships in Shanxi could be found in two memoirs of remaining Japanese soldiers. In his memoir, Nagatomi Hakudo,⁶⁶¹ who was one of the high-ranking officials, depicted a range of intimate relationships between local women and Japanese soldiers in post-war Shanxi.⁶⁶² According to Nagatomi, most Japanese soldiers who married local women regarded their wives as a ‘second wife’ (*daini fujin*) or ‘mistress’ (*aijin*).⁶⁶³ Nagatomi’s observation was probably a reasonable one not only because some Japanese men maintained their marital relationship with their wife in Japan but also because remaining Japanese soldiers were promised that the maximum period of their military service would be two years. Although these men were soldiers of the defeated country, with Yan’s permission, they could have sexual liaisons with local women, without much consideration for their Chinese wives and their children that they were to leave behind. In war-stricken Shanxi, some women might have also regarded their relationships with Japanese soldiers as a temporary ‘business arrangement’ for economic security.

The remaining Japanese soldiers in post-war Shanxi were treated by the local Nationalist soldiers as ‘comrades’ fighting on the same side. The memoir of Omata Sachio, one of the Japanese remaining soldiers in post-war Shanxi, provides a rare account of how such a ‘comradeship’ was reinforced by ‘sharing a wife’.⁶⁶⁴ Sachio married a Chinese woman, Yumei, who was the third wife of his Chinese superior.⁶⁶⁵ Their wedding ceremony took place in the house of a village elder in a village near Taiyuan, and the wedding guests consisted of four Chinese soldiers, Sachio’s Japanese

⁶⁵⁸ The newspaper reported that there were at least twenty-three because it is the total number of Sino-Japanese CBOW that two witnesses in the article had known. If they include Sino-Japanese CBOW that they heard about from veterans who already passed away, there were more than fifty of them. See, ‘*Sanseishō zanryūgun ni ‘daichi no ko’: Chūgoku josei tonō aida ni 23 nin*’ [‘Children remaining in post-war China’ born of Japanese soldiers that remained in Shanxi Province: 23 children born of Chinese women], *Mainichi Shimbun*, 27 July 1996.

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁶¹ After Nagatomi Hakudo fought in the Civil War with the Chinese Nationalists, he was detained as a POW and then sentenced to thirteen years in prison due to his active involvement in atrocities committed during the war. After his release and repatriation in 1963, Nagatomi actively promoted friendship between China and Japan.

⁶⁶² Nagatomi, *Hakurō no tsumeato* [Traces of a white wolf].

⁶⁶³ Nagatomi, *Hakurō no tsumeato* [Traces of a white wolf], pp. 27, 205

⁶⁶⁴ Omata, *Zanryū: Nicchū yūkō e no chikai* [Remaining in post-war China: My pledge for Sino-Japanese friendship], pp. 49-50.

⁶⁶⁵ Sachio did not have a child with Yumei.

superior and five villagers. To make a vow of brotherhood, both Sachio and his Chinese superior with whom Yumei was married cut the pulp of their middle finger. They then mixed their blood and pressed the blood with a finger on a paper. According to Omata, it was a traditional ceremony of the Nationalist army in Shanxi. While it is unknown how common such a practice of ‘sharing a wife’ was amongst Japanese and Chinese Nationalist soldiers, this case suggests that women were objectified for reinforcement of Sino-Japanese ‘comradship’ and sexual gratification of Japanese soldiers during the Chinese Civil War.

While Sino-Japanese sexual liaisons in post-war Shanxi might have been essentially exploitative and temporary, a few anecdotes reveal that some Japanese soldiers wished to maintain their relationship with a local woman and their children. When remaining Japanese soldiers lost the war against the Communists in Taiyuan on 24 April 1949, Japanese soldiers, including aforementioned Sachio, surrendered to the People’s Liberation Army.⁶⁶⁶ Sachio was detained in Changning, a village that was about forty kilometres away from the capital city of Taiyuan. He depicted his relationship with his Chinese wife, Yumei, as well as relationships that his Japanese colleagues had with local women as follows:

On the fifth day [at the detention centre in Changning village], eight Chinese women came by carriage from Taiyuan to see their Japanese husbands. . . . When I returned to my detention centre, I found Yumei and the Chinese girlfriend of [my colleague,] Iwasa Kenji awaiting to see us. We were both happy to find each other safely. I noticed that Yumei’s belly was larger than before. I caressed her belly and asked her, ‘Did you get pregnant?’ She replied, ‘No, it’s the stomach medicine for you.’, and took out the medicine from her belly band. She then pointed at Iwasa’s girlfriend and said, ‘She is the one who is pregnant.’ Iwasa’s girlfriend was three-month pregnant.⁶⁶⁷

This anecdote shows that Sachio – who shared his wife with his Chinese superior – and his Japanese colleagues had more or less loving and caring relationships with local women.⁶⁶⁸ Sachio also recollected that one Japanese man fled his detention centre to remain in China with his wife.⁶⁶⁹ However, no evidence could be found on former Japanese soldiers in post-war Shanxi who were repatriated with their Chinese wives and children during the collective repatriation in the 1950s (see Chapter 3, p. 81).

⁶⁶⁶ Okumura and Sakai, *Watashi wa ‘ari no heitai’ datta* [I was one of the ‘ant soldiers’], p. 69.

⁶⁶⁷ Omata, *Zanryū: Nicchū yūkō e no chikai* [Remaining in post-war China: My pledge for Sino-Japanese friendship], p. 81.

⁶⁶⁸ Omata, *Zanryū: Nicchū yūkō e no chikai* [Remaining in post-war China: My pledge for Sino-Japanese friendship], pp. 79, 81.

⁶⁶⁹ Omata, *Zanryū: Nicchū yūkō e no chikai* [Remaining in post-war China: My pledge for Sino-Japanese friendship], p. 81.

In his memoir, Nagatomi also introduced an anecdote of his friend, Ota Shigeo, who had a loving relationship with his Chinese wife whom he regarded as his one and only wife.⁶⁷⁰ Before he died in a battle against the Communists in 1947, Shigeo registered his Chinese wife, Yanhui, in *koseki* register (see Chapter 3, p. 92).⁶⁷¹ According to Nagatomi, Yanhui was determined to live as ‘Japanese’ after her marriage, regardless of their short-lived family life due to her husband’s death. Yanhui migrated to Japan with her children after 1972. While this is the only documented case of Sino-Japanese CBOW born of a Japanese soldier who remained in post-war Shanxi who migrated to Japan, it is highly likely that the mother’s identity as ‘Japanese’ strongly influenced her children’s identity and belonging.

4.4.2 Post-war consensual relationships: Parents of Keiko and Yongyun

This section explores the parents’ consensual relationships in the post-war period based on the interviews with two participants – Yongyun and Keiko – who were born in 1947 and 1953 respectively. While Keiko acquired Japanese nationality and migrated to Japan in 1999, Yongyun did not migrate to Japan. What Keiko and Yongyun have in common is that they lived together with their fathers who remained and passed away in post-war China.

During the war, Yongyun’s father, Hiroshi, was a veterinarian for the Imperial Japanese Army, but he fled the army as he could not stand witnessing the atrocities committed by the Japanese soldiers. After the war, he was helped by local people and decided to remain to contribute to the reconstruction of China as an atonement for Japan’s wartime deeds. He studied medicine and worked as a doctor in a small surgery in Jinan, Shandong Province, until he passed away at the age of 102 in 2010. He was introduced to his Chinese partner who was in dire poverty at the time and married her in 1947.

Although most local people treated Hiroshi with respect as a doctor, he has been in a politically and socially vulnerable position because of his nationality during the political campaigns under Mao. Some local people used to call him by his nickname ‘*guizi daifu*’ (Doctor Japanese devil) behind his back, and Chinese media also labelled him ‘*guizi yisheng*’ (Doctor Japanese devil) and ‘*guizibing*’ (Japanese devil soldier) until his death.⁶⁷² Hiroshi was harassed at times during the Cultural Revolution. For instance,

⁶⁷⁰ Nagatomi, *Hakurō no tsumeato* [Traces of a white wolf], pp. 204-206.

⁶⁷¹ It is unknown how Shigeo could register his wife in the family register as there was no Japanese diplomatic mission in post-war Shanxi.

⁶⁷² See, for example, “‘*Guizi yisheng*’ *shezui daifu Shanqi Hong de zuihou yicheng*” [‘Dr Japanese devil’: The last days of the apologetic doctor, Yamazaki Hiroshi]. *iqilu.com*, 2 December 2010. <http://news.iqilu.com/shandong/yaowen/2010/1202/372356.shtml> (accessed on 15 September 2020); ‘*Shanqi Hong: Zhongguo zuihou yige “guizi”, cong wei sharen, que yong yisheng zai wei riben shuzui*’ [Yamazaki Hiroshi: The last ‘Japanese devil’ in China who never killed anyone and yet dedicated his life

Hiroshi once found in front of his surgery a poster of a slogan ‘*Dadao Shaoqi!* (Down with Liu Shaoqi!)’⁶⁷³ that was deliberately written in cursive script to make the word ‘Shaoqi’ look like ‘Shanqi’, Hiroshi’s surname.⁶⁷⁴

Despite his social vulnerability as a Japanese national, the patriarchal norms in China strengthened Hiroshi’s central position in the household. According to Yongyun, although her mother was strict with Yongyun, she used to behave docilely in front of Hiroshi. The naming of Yongyun was also influenced by the patriarchal norms. Her parents originally gave Yongyun a surname ‘Liu’ (刘), taken from her mother’s surname. By doing so, Yongyun’s parents tried to prevent Yongyun from standing out as a ‘foreigner’s child’. Takezawa pointed out that it is one of the strategies amongst children born of mixed heritage whose physical features are not different from the majority of the population.⁶⁷⁵ The same naming practice was used by the mothers and main caregivers of other participants (Michiko, Momoko, Yuko and Koretada) as a strategy to conceal the ‘mark’ of their association with the Japanese father in post-war China. However, when Yongyun entered her primary school, she insisted on using her father’s surname because her classmates told her that children should have their fathers’ surname. Her current surname, ‘Shan (山)’, was taken from Hiroshi’s Japanese surname that comprises of two Chinese characters (山崎).⁶⁷⁶

The father occupied the central position in Yongyun’s interview narrative, whereas her mother was overshadowed by the father’s stories due to the following factors.⁶⁷⁷ First, Yongyun had a better relationship with her father than with her mother who was extremely strict to her. Secondly, although Hiroshi hardly talked about himself to his daughter, Yongyun learned about his life trajectory in great detail from media reports because he attracted considerable attention as a Japanese doctor who dedicated his life to atone for the wartime Japanese aggression.⁶⁷⁸ While narrating about her mother seemed laborious, Yongyun was very fluent in the way she narrated about her father as she had

for atonement on behalf of Japan]. *Sohu*, 14 May 2020. https://www.sohu.com/a/395179186_100174998 (accessed 15 September 2020); Interview transcript, Yongyun, Shandong, China, 11 January 2017.

⁶⁷³ When the Cultural Revolution started, Liu Shaoqi (1898-1969), a powerful politician once regarded as Mao’s successor, was criticised and ousted from his positions.

⁶⁷⁴ Interview transcript, Yongyun, Shandong, China, 11 January 2017.

⁶⁷⁵ Takezawa, Y. 2016. *Konketsu shinwa no kaitai to jibun rashiku ikiru kenri* [Deconstructing myth of mixed-blood and the right to be oneself]. In *Jinshu shinwa o kaitaisuru 3: ‘Chi’ no seijigaku o koete* [Deconstructing racial myths: Beyond politics of ‘blood’], eds. K. Kawashima and Y. Takezawa, pp. 3-34, p. 23. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

⁶⁷⁶ *Dangnian weiyi liuzai zhongguo de ‘guizibing’ Shanqi Hong* [Yamazaki Hiroshi: The only ‘Japanese devil soldier’ who remained in post-war China]. <https://v.qq.com/x/page/m0618sxaugf.html> (accessed on 15 September 2020)

⁶⁷⁷ Interview transcript, Yongyun, Shandong, China, 11 January 2017.; Interview transcript, Yongyun, Shandong, China, 12 January 2017.

⁶⁷⁸ See, for example, ‘*Shanqi Hong: Zhongguo zuihou yige “guizi”, cong wei sharen, que yong yisheng zai wei riben shuzui*’ [Yamazaki Hiroshi: The last ‘Japanese devil’ in China who never killed and dedicated his life for atonement on behalf of Japan]. *Sohu*, 14 May 2020. https://www.sohu.com/a/395179186_100174998 (accessed 15 September 2020)

taken several media interviews in which she was asked to talk about him. Yongyun had a strong interest in visiting her father's home country, but to this day she has never visited Japan. Her decision was strongly influenced by her father's determination to remain in China. According to Yongyun, her father used to donate any extra money he earned to organisations that promoted Sino-Japanese friendship, and he never took Yongyun to Japan.⁶⁷⁹

Tadashi, Keiko's father, was also vulnerable to ostracism and political persecution in post-war China. Nevertheless, similar to the above case of Yongyun's father, he also occupied a central position in the family. Tadashi, who originally migrated to Heilongjiang Province with his family as agricultural immigrants, remained in post-war northeast China on his own because he became separated from his family members in the chaos after the Soviet invasion in August 1945. After studying at a post and telecommunication school, Tadashi worked as an engineer at a post and telecommunications office in Sunwu, Helongjiang, and married Shuzhen, who was his colleague at his workplace, in 1952. According to Keiko, most women did not want to marry a Japanese man at the time because other people would talk behind their back and say that 'That woman couldn't find a Chinese man to marry!' However, Shuzhen first felt sympathy for Tadashi who was all alone without a family and decided to marry him. When the Cultural Revolution started, the local officials categorised him as – in Keiko's words – *bufangxin de ren* (untrustworthy person) based on his nationality. Because Tadashi had access to highly confidential information at his workplace, he was transferred to a remote tractor repair factory in Jinshui. He not only was separated from his family but was also assigned a task in which his professional skills could not be used.

Although Tadashi was socially marginalised, Keiko's narrative revealed his central position in the family. Keiko and her four siblings were given a surname, 'Ju', taken from the father's Japanese surname that is comprised of two Chinese characters (菊地). Though Tadashi was taciturn and not fluent in Chinese, the entire family knew that he yearned to return to Japan one day. As mentioned earlier (Chapter 3, p. 82), Tadashi was not informed of the policy that permitted Japanese men remaining in China to be repatriated with their wife and children in the 1950s, and he decided to remain in China to stay with his family. After visiting Japan for six months in 1977 and witnessing Japan's economic development, Tadashi started to drink heavily and passed away due to excessive drinking in 1981. Keiko, her four siblings and her mother migrated to Japan in the 1990s. Her narrative clearly showed her positive identification with her father and his country (see Chapter 5, p. 180), spending considerably more time discussing her father than her mother.

⁶⁷⁹ Interview transcript, Yongyun, Shandong, China, 12 January 2017.

Unlike the previously mentioned cases of Japanese soldiers who were permitted to marry local women in post-war Shanxi, these two fathers were subjected to discrimination and persecution not only because their social status was no longer backed up by the military might and racial ideology of imperial Japan but also because they voluntarily remained in China – not at the request of the Nationalists or the Communists. Yet, these fathers were still placed as a central figure in the family not only because they were the breadwinner of the family but also because their authority as the household head was emphasised through patriarchal naming practices and the subordination of the mother.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter first explored the wartime discussions on Sino-Japanese ‘intermarriage’ which was of significant concern for both proponents and opponents of ‘intermarriage’ between the Japanese race and other races in imperial Japan. The literary exploration on ‘intermarriage’ in colonial Taiwan and Korea paid close attention to identities of the ‘mixed-blood children’. Such exploration, which might at first seem remotely relevant to actual identity and belonging of Sino-Japanese CBOW, could be regarded as a complementary debate on the evaluation of Japan’s colonial assimilation policy as Japanese politicians, bureaucrats and eugenicists were primarily concerned about the political usefulness of the ‘mixed-blood children’. Analysing the fictional Sino-Japanese intimate relationship depicted in the propaganda film *China Night* is also helpful in understanding the socio-political context around which the actual Sino-Japanese consensual relationships occurred in wartime China: While Japanese eugenicists and the Chinese Nationalists’ anti-collaborator regulations opposed wartime Sino-Japanese ‘intermarriage’, Japanese audiences of *China Night* were fascinated by the Sino-Japanese romance, although the story embodied abominable racism and sexism. This chapter then analysed various case studies of the actual wartime and post-war Sino-Japanese consensual relationships and demonstrated that the mothers of Sino-Japanese CBOW played a significant role in their children’s positive identification with the father in their childhood and adolescence. The key factor that shaped various patterns of wartime and post-war consensual relationships was the male-female power imbalance ascribable to interconnected patriarchal structures in both China and Japan. Although the social status of the Japanese fathers fluctuated with the racial ideology and military might that intensified during the war and receded after the war, they were always placed as the central figure of the household through patriarchal practices such as patronymic naming and having a Japanese lifestyle at home. Regardless of whether the relationship was an unambiguous loving one or a more complex one, the mothers of Sino-Japanese CBOW created room for the father in the children’s lives by keeping alive the memory, and ensuring that the physically absent father remained present in the family through acts of

memorialisation and naming. Consequently, the fathers – physically absent or not – were placed at the centre of the household.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the sources collected for this study are biased towards Sino-Japanese CBOW born of parents who had a relatively long married life because the parents' marriage was the prerequisite in acquiring Japanese nationality. Because of this prerequisite in the legal procedure discussed in Chapter 3, Sino-Japanese CBOW, whose parents' relationships did not result in marriage, could not migrate to Japan by acquiring Japanese nationality even if they wanted to, and their cases are much less likely to be documented. Furthermore, the cases analysed in this chapter are characterised by the mothers' affirmative recollection of their relationship with the Japanese partner even when they were the 'second wife' or were under considerable constraints when they gave consent to marriage. They actively supported their children's decision to migrate to Japan, and some of them migrated to Japan with their children.

Being told stories of the parents' loving relationship and positive aspects of the father by the mother has developed participants' positive identification with the father. However, the mother's influence on Sino-Japanese CBOW does not sufficiently explain the motivations for Sino-Japanese CBOW – who were scattered across China and did not know each other – to migrate to their paternal country around the same time. The following chapter examines how the centrality of the father was reinforced in the identity and sense of belonging of Sino-Japanese CBOW through the analysis of their narratives.

CHAPTER 5: LIFE-LONG SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FATHER IN CONSTRUCTING IDENTITY AND BELONGING

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter argued that the fathers of Sino-Japanese CBOW became the central figure in the family. Chinese mothers, who had positive relationships with the Japanese husband, shared affirmative memories of the father with Sino-Japanese CBOW. The knowledge gained in their childhood and adolescence about their parents' relationship and the positive attributes of their father, however, do not fully explain their strong urge to leave their country of birth and upbringing and migrate to a country that they had never set their foot in.

The aim of this chapter is twofold. The first half of this chapter aims to elucidate how and why Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study developed their strong motivations to migrate to Japan. When the Second Sino-Japanese War ended, Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers became extremely vulnerable to political persecution due to their association with the Japanese father. The end of the war with Japan did not bring about peacetime in China as the Civil War resumed shortly thereafter. When the Civil War ended and the Communists established the PRC, the entire population – from powerful politicians to ordinary people – were in danger of suffering persecution that was not just ordered by the Communist authorities but also carried out by ordinary people.⁶⁸⁰ Sino-Japanese CBOW and their mothers were amongst those particularly vulnerable groups of individuals not only because many Chinese people retained personal memories of the Japanese wartime atrocities but also because the Communist party actively worked on the construction of a grand nation-building narrative based on the people's struggle against humiliation and suffering caused by imperialist powers, including Japan.⁶⁸¹ Consequently, although most Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study encountered significant adversities due to their origin, their narratives were not given any space in post-war China. While they have never formed a group of their own in China or Japan, all study participants who migrated to Japan used the term '*huiguo*' (in Chinese) or '*kaeru*' (in Japanese) – meaning 'to return to one's country' – to refer to their migration to Japan. Although I consciously employed neutral verbs 'go' and 'migrate' when asking questions in the interview, all participants who migrated to Japan replied with the term 'return'. Thus, it is not a concept imposed on the participants' action but is a concept adopted by the participants themselves. They also referred to their father's country as their *zuguo* (in

⁶⁸⁰ Masuda, What was the Cold War? Imagined reality, ordinary people's war, and social mechanism.

⁶⁸¹ See, for example, Vickers, E. 2013. Transcending victimhood: Japan in the public historical museums of Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. *China Perspectives*, 4, pp. 17-28, p. 18.

Chinese) or *sokoku* (in Japanese) – a ‘homeland’. While participants used these terms as ‘natural part of their migration story and their life in general’,⁶⁸² how they came to define their migration to the father’s country as ‘return migration’ to their ‘homeland’ needs close scrutiny. I explore the significance of constructing idealised notions of the father and his country for Sino-Japanese CBOW in their multi-faceted motivations to migrate.

The second half of the chapter aims to understand how and why participants tended to construct positive narratives about their past experiences. Before I started to interview, I anticipated the potential psychological risks of asking participants to talk about their past experiences based on previous studies on other groups of CBOW who had suffered from trauma of stigmatisation and discrimination.⁶⁸³ However, most participants of this study displayed clear signs of positivity – expressed verbally and non-verbally – when they narrated their life events including negative ones. They stated that they have been ‘fortunate’, and they refused to be perceived as a ‘war victim’. How did participants come to have such positive identities? I first explore various ways in which they construct their identity and belonging and highlight the impact of their constructed notions of the father on their evolving identity and belonging. Through the analysis of their narratives about their experiences in pre-migratory and post-migratory phases, this chapter illustrates the life-long significance of the constructed notions of the long-lost father in Sino-Japanese CBOW’s identity, belonging and life choices.

5.2 Experiences, identity and belonging in the pre-migratory phase: Constructing the absent father and imagined homeland

This section first sheds light on the phenomenon of the idealisation of the absent father that is commonly observed amongst other groups of CBOW in various historical contexts and locales. Through a case study on a child born of a Chinese ‘comfort women’ system survivor, this section highlights the *need* for CBOW across time and space to construct acceptable or desirable notions of the father in their identity formation process. This section moves on to examine their strong motivations to migrate to Japan by exploring how Sino-Japanese CBOW came to feel ‘foreign’ in China and how they constructed the positive notions of the father and the father’s country as their ‘homeland’. Finally, it explores Sino-Japanese CBOW’s experiences in their father search and nationality acquisition and the significant impact these experiences had on their identity and belonging.

⁶⁸² Kunuroglu et al. Motives for Turkish return migration from Western Europe: Home, sense of belonging, discrimination and transnationalism, p. 441.

⁶⁸³ See, for example, Glaesmer et al, Childhood maltreatment in children born of occupation after WWII in Germany and its association with mental disorders, pp. 1-10.

5.2.1 CBOW's need for constructing desirable notions of the father

Previous studies have pointed out that CBOW often idealise their fathers regardless of the amount of information they have about the father or circumstances under which they were conceived (see Chapter 1, p. 27). While it is somewhat understandable for CBOW born of loving relationships to have positive notions of the absent father, is it possible or even common for CBOW to idealise the father even, for instance, after learning about the mother's traumatic conception by rape or sexual slavery? Some CBOW born of rape in various historical contexts and regions have constructed acceptable notions of the father, if not idealised notions. Some children born of rape and forced marriage in the civil war engendered by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda (1987-2006) emphasised the father's care and protective role in their narratives despite the notorious deeds of the LRA members.⁶⁸⁴ In a study on CBOW born of German mothers who were raped by the Red Army soldiers towards the end of World War Two, the children constructed over time desirable, humanised notions of the rapist father by contextualising the rape that occurred in the chaos of the war and by positively interpreting the unknown father's presumed race/ethnicity, class, and educational background.⁶⁸⁵ These examples inform our understanding of CBOW and indicate that they have a common need for constructing desirable notions of the father.

The specific mechanism of what leads to CBOW's idealisation or construction of the 'desirable father' has not been fully elucidated in the CBOW literature thus far. While a full investigation on this matter falls outside the limits of this thesis, it is worth exploring the correlation between such 'need for constructing desirable notions of the father' and CBOW's identity and belonging. The following analysis of the case study of aforementioned Luo Shanxue (see Chapter 1, p. 16), the only man who came forward as a child born of a Chinese 'comfort women' system survivor, highlights his need for constructing desirable notions of the father and how this relates to his own identity.

Unlike Sino-Japanese CBOW born of consensual relationships in this study, Luo Shanxue encountered the proverbial 'wall of silence' reported by CBOW outside the Sino-Japanese context. During his childhood, Shanxue sensed something was odd about him from the way children and adults in his family and community treated him. Shanxue demanded an answer from his mother, but she refused to talk about how he was conceived. She only told Shanxue, 'When you grow up, you need to take revenge.'⁶⁸⁶ When Shanxue was around ten years old, his uncle finally told him that he was born as a

⁶⁸⁴ Denov and Lakor, When war is better than peace: The post-conflict realities of children born of wartime rape in northern Uganda, p. 261.

⁶⁸⁵ Schwartz, Trauma, resilience, and narrative constructions of identity in Germans born of wartime rape, pp. 320-323.

⁶⁸⁶ Kasuya, K. 2007. 'Rupo: Keirin sansuiga no kanata de' [Reportage: Behind picturesque Guilin]. *Shūkan kinyōbi*, 665, 3 August, pp. 20-23, p. 22.

result of sexual slavery perpetrated by the soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army.⁶⁸⁷ Although he learned about his origin relatively early, he had no means to learn about his biological father in detail apart from the fact that his mother was raped by several Japanese soldiers at a ‘comfort station’.

Shanxue could not gain high self-esteem or a sense of acceptance at home as he was subjected to prolonged physical and emotional abuse from his stepfather. His stepfather would give him coarse cereal while his younger siblings (the stepfather’s biological children) could eat white rice. In addition, although Shanxue’s siblings were allowed to go to secondary school, his father forced Shanxue to drop out from his primary school. Furthermore, his stepfather caused permanent physical damage by beating Shanxue which resulted in him becoming visually impaired in one eye. The stepfather also prevented him from seeking medical attention when he became injured which resulted in one of his legs becoming permanently disabled.⁶⁸⁸ Although his mother did not want her husband to maltreat Shanxue, she remained silent as her husband was abusive towards her as well.⁶⁸⁹

Understandably, it was difficult for Shanxue to create an emotional connection with his Japanese father. In response to a journalist who asked ‘How would you feel if your biological father was to be identified through a scientific test?’, Shanxue replied, ‘I would kill him with a knife.’⁶⁹⁰ He also stated, ‘I will loathe him to the last breath’⁶⁹¹ and that his Japanese father does not exist for him.

His absent father was nonetheless far from ‘non-existent’ in his life but was a central element in the formation of his identity. First, his identity has been conditioned by the social context – patriarchal norms and the lingering trauma of the Japanese invasion – that always linked his identity to his rapist soldier father. Secondly, he had a conflicting

⁶⁸⁷ *Josei kokusai senpan hōtei 10 shūnen jikkōinkai*, ed. 2011. *Hōtei wa nani o sabaki, naniga kawattaka: seibōryoku, minzoku sabetsu, shokuminchishugi* [What did the court judge? What changed?: Sexual violence, ethnic/racial discrimination, colonialism]. Josei kokusai senpan hōtei 10 shūnen jikkōinkai: Tokyo, p. 51.

⁶⁸⁸ ‘*Tsuzuku kunan, modoranu jinsei. Hikage no “Nihon no ko”.* Haha wa Chūgokujin ianfu.’ [Ongoing struggles, irretrievable past. A ‘Japanese child’ living in the shadow. His mother is a Chinese comfort woman.], Kyoto Shimbun evening edition, 16 December 2015.; Kasuya, K. 2007. ‘*Rupo: Keirin sansuiga no kanata de*’ [Reportage: Behind picturesque Guilin]. *Shūkan kinyōbi*, 665, 3 August, pp. 20-23, pp. 20-22.; ‘A former “comfort woman” and her son, a product of wartime rape, struggle with stigma’, *Global Times*, 20 July 2015. <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/932919.shtml> (accessed on 3 June 2020)

⁶⁸⁹ *Wei shaoran san shōgen shūkai* [Public gathering to listen to the testimony of Ms Wei Shaolan], *Nihongun ‘ianfu’ mondai kansai nettowāku* [Japanese Military ‘Comfort Women’ Issue Kansai Network], December 2010. <http://www.ianfu-kansai-net.org/old/20101211.html> (accessed on 2 June 2020); Kasuya, K. 2007. ‘*Rupo: Keirin sansuiga no kanata de*’ [Reportage: Behind picturesque Guilin]. *Shūkan kinyōbi*, 663, 20 July, pp. 24-27, p. 26.

⁶⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹¹ ‘*Hen dao si weizhi! Weianfu yu tade ribenhaizi.* [I will loathe him until the last breath! A comfort woman and her Japanese child.]’, *Chinatimes.com*, 23 November 2015. <http://hottopic.chinatimes.com/cn/20151123001904-260812> (accessed on 17 June 2020)

desire to search for the father and construct acceptable notions of the father. During his visit to Japan, Shanxue perplexed his Japanese supporters when he voluntarily visited Yasukuni Shrine – a shrine known for commemorating the war dead including Japanese war criminals of World War Two. As mentioned earlier, since the 1980s, everytime Japanese politicians pay their respect to it, it evokes anti-Japanese sentiments in China and other neighbouring countries.⁶⁹² Shanxue explained that it was a way for him to show politeness and there was no deep meaning to his visit. One way to interpret his interest in Yasukuni Shrine is that he might have thought that his father is one of those war dead commemorated at the shrine. He also might have associated his imagined father with media-inspired images of Japanese male politicians and veterans visiting the shrine. According to the relatives who accompanied Shanxue to Japan, he was also intensely looking at documents related to Japanese soldiers who invaded his hometown.⁶⁹³ It appeared to the relatives that Shanxue was searching for clues about what his father might have been like and ways to find his father. Furthermore, his search for images of the Japanese father in the media seemed to have affected his behaviour. When a Japanese journalist visited Shanxue for an interview, the journalist's Chinese assistant was surprised to see Shanxue bowing to greet the journalist. Shanxue might have internalised media depictions of a typical Japanese gesture which does not exist in his region.⁶⁹⁴

Shanxue's case highlights his need for constructing desirable notions of the father which is related to the issue of his own identity. Previous studies on identity suggest that people are generally motivated to see themselves in a positive light.⁶⁹⁵ Whitney and Kernis pointed out that the 'need for self-esteem' or the 'desire to construct an identity where one feels good about oneself' is crucial for various aspects of identity construction, including what one considers central to one's personal identity.⁶⁹⁶ If we acknowledge that the need for self-esteem is universal and that the father factor is central to CBOW's identity across time and space, it could be hypothesised that constructing favourable notions of the father is crucial in constructing their own identity where they can see themselves in a positive light.⁶⁹⁷ Schwartz's qualitative analysis of children born of rape by the Red Army soldiers in Germany supports this point. Schwartz stated that constructing acceptable notions of the father helped the children to perceive themselves positively.⁶⁹⁸

⁶⁹² See, for example, Mitter, *Remembering the forgotten war*, p. 18.

⁶⁹³ 'Tszuzuku kunan, modoranu jinsei. Hikage no "Nihon no ko". Haha wa Chūgokujin ianfu.' [Ongoing struggles, irretrievable past. A 'Japanese child' living in the shadow. His mother is a Chinese comfort woman.], *Kyoto Shimbun evening edition*, 16 December 2015.

⁶⁹⁴ Kasuya, K. 2007. 'Rupo: Keirin sansuiga no kanata de' [Reportage: Behind picturesque Guilin]. *Shūkan kinyōbi*, 664, 27 July, pp. 26-29, p. 28.

⁶⁹⁵ Vignoles, Identity motives. In *Handbook of identity theory and research*, pp. 403-432.

⁶⁹⁶ Whitney and Kernis, High self-esteem: Multiple forms and their outcomes, p. 340.

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁸ Schwartz, Trauma, resilience, and narrative constructions of identity in Germans born of wartime rape, pp. 320-323.

As for the issue of sense of belonging, Shanxue emphasised that he belongs to his hometown in China as follows:

[I have] only one nationality, one mother, one [Chinese] stepfather, and one hometown. [My] identity is as simple as what is written in the family register. Luo Shanxue – a farmer who resides in Lipu county, Guanxi Province, China.⁶⁹⁹

While he could not feel ‘secure, accepted, included, valued or respected’ in his family and the community, he had to accept the fact that he had no other option but to live in his hometown. First, he had no means to acquire Japanese nationality as he was not born of marriage. Secondly, while he attempted to construct acceptable images of his Japanese father, the sources of his imagination mostly derived from the media, unlike Sino-Japanese CBOW born of consensual relationships who grew up with stories that fostered emotional attachment to the Japanese father.

5.2.2 Adversities in China: Feeling ‘foreign’ in the country of birth and upbringing

In contrast to the above case of Luo Shanxue, Sino-Japanese CBOW born of consensual relationships in this study fostered their emotional links with the father – absent or not – from the mothers who passed on the paternal lineage through patriarchal practices and affirmative narratives about the father (see Chapter 4). Some participants’ intimate sphere where they could talk about the father sometimes included their maternal relatives and the neighbours who had a good relationship with the Japanese father.

The accounts below offer a glimpse into wartime Sino-Japanese interpersonal relationships that are neglected in the dominant narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Seiji recalls that his mother, uncle and cousin used to talk about his repatriated father at his home.⁷⁰⁰ Yuko’s grandmother served two years in prison for helping her Japanese son-in-law flee after the war, but she raised Yuko with affection.⁷⁰¹ In the case of Momoko, she could find her father’s goodness through the accounts of her grandmother and neighbours. Her grandmother used to recount that her Japanese son-in-law, who was repatriated after the war, was polite and used to call her *okāsan* (‘mother’ in Japanese).⁷⁰² Momoko’s neighbours, who had a friendly relationship with Momoko’s father, used to call her *Maomaojiao*. Her father used to call Momoko ‘*Momo-chan*’ in Japanese (‘*chan*’ is an affectionate honorific in Japanese), and the neighbours were imitating the Japanese

⁶⁹⁹ *Wengnuang rensheng: Wo de die shi guizhibing* [A TV series ‘Warmth of Life’: My father is an evil Japanese soldier], v.ifeng.com, 2012. <http://v.ifeng.com/404.shtml> (accessed and downloaded on 1 March 2017)

⁷⁰⁰ Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

⁷⁰¹ Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 10 May 2016.

⁷⁰² Interview transcript, Momoko, Tokyo, Japan, 23 May 2017.

pronunciation using Chinese words. Because her Chinese name is Lingli, Momoko believed for a long time that *Maomaojiao* was merely her Chinese nickname. Yuko shared her view on what made such friendly relationships possible during the war and stated that Chinese people differentiated ‘good Japanese’ and ‘bad Japanese’ during the war.⁷⁰³ These accounts of wartime Sino-Japanese interpersonal relationships not only indicate that Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study had an intimate sphere in which they could have a sense of acceptance but also complicate existing knowledge and preconceptions about wartime relationships between Chinese and Japanese people.

Outside their intimate sphere in which Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study could construct affirmative notions of the father, they had to employ several coping strategies to avoid stigmatisation, discrimination and political persecution. One of the common coping strategies adopted by people of mixed heritage who do not have visible marks of difference with the mainstream population is to conceal their origin, and Sino-Japanese CBOW tried to keep their origin secret by erasing the ‘marks’ of the father.⁷⁰⁴ They changed their names to Chinese names, although most of them were given Japanese names by their fathers at birth (see Chapter 4, p. 127). This naming strategy is comparable to the findings about the coping strategies taken by the Philippine Nikkeijin in the post-war Philippines.⁷⁰⁵ In order to prevent becoming a target of persecution, they also discarded or destroyed mementos and photos that were left behind by the father or were kept in his memory.⁷⁰⁶ Another common coping strategy amongst Sino-Japanese CBOW was to be discreet in their communities. Makoto’s uncle used to tell him and his younger brother not to play outside and spanked them when they escaped.⁷⁰⁷ Momoko and Yuko were repeatedly told by their respective grandmothers to always avoid conflict with others. Yuko’s grandmother thought that Yuko could get into trouble because of her origin, and she used to advise Yuko to ‘live like river water that winds whenever encountering a rock’ instead of ‘being like seawater that crashes and gets shattered by a rock.’⁷⁰⁸ Momoko and Michiko managed to live as ‘Chinese’ throughout their life in China and did not encounter discrimination and persecution as a result. Some of their acquaintances knew about their origin, but the information did not reach her schoolmates

⁷⁰³ Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 12 May 2016.

⁷⁰⁴ Takezawa, Y. 2016. *Konketsu shinwa no kaitai to jibun rashiku ikiru kenri* [Deconstructing myth of mixed-blood and the right to be oneself]. In *Jinshu shinwa o kaitaisuru 3: ‘Chi’ no seijigaku o koete* [Deconstructing racial myths: Beyond politics of ‘blood’], eds. K. Kawashima and Y. Takezawa, pp. 3-34, p. 23. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

⁷⁰⁵ Ohno, Regaining ‘Japaneseness’: The politics of recognition by the Philippine Nikkeijin, p. 248.

⁷⁰⁶ See, for example, Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 20 January 2017.; ‘Michiko: a child born of war’, Zhou, V., 15 May 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvD-z5NaLU8> (accessed on 31 July 2020)

⁷⁰⁷ Hosaka, M. 1988. ‘*Bunkaku de sabakareta zanryū konketsu koji: Omae no chichi wa Sakata tokumukikanchō da*’ [Mixed-blood orphan left behind in China who was punished during the Cultural Revolution: Your father was Sakata, the head of the secret military agency!], *Shokun!*, 20 (4), pp. 196-225, pp. 205-206.

⁷⁰⁸ Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 21 December 2015.

and colleagues. However, it did not mean that they were free from the fear of being persecuted. They consciously kept their origin secret even to their closest friends out of fear of political persecution.

Despite using these coping strategies, the origin of most Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study was known or revealed to the public, and they suffered from stigmatisation and discrimination.⁷⁰⁹ Sino-Japanese CBOW commonly received discriminatory remarks such as *ribenren* (Japanese), *xiaoriben* (Japanese runt), *riben guizi* (Japanese devil), *hanjian* (traitor to the Han Chinese state) and so forth. They were also labelled as *waiyuoren ziniu* (a foreigner's child), *youwenti de ziniu* (a problematic child) and *zhengzhi chengfen buhao de ren* (a person with bad political affiliation).⁷¹⁰ Yuko remembers being called *zazhong*, a pejorative label that has two meanings: 'half-breed' and 'bastard'. This term indicates the 'double burden' that Sino-Japanese CBOW had to bear for being perceived in the community as an inferior child based on their mixed heritage and as a child born out of wedlock (although the parents of Sino-Japanese CBOW born of consensual relationships in this study were married).⁷¹¹ These acts of name-calling were effectively acts of 'othering', which Jensen defines as 'discursive processes by which powerful groups, who may or may not make up a numerical majority, define subordinate groups into existence in a reductionist way which ascribe problematic and/or inferior characteristics to these subordinate groups'.⁷¹² Such discursive processes condition the sense of belonging of the 'subordinate group'. As a result of being subjected to 'othering', Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study could not feel 'secure, accepted, included, valued or respected', which made it difficult to engender a sense of belonging to their maternal country.

In addition to these acts of 'othering', Sino-Japanese CBOW encountered other adversities. It was common for Sino-Japanese CBOW to encounter barriers to various life opportunities and to participation in political activities. Koretada had to give up the possibility of going to university because a family register officer who carried out his background check revealed his origin to the public just before he graduated from high school.⁷¹³ Although Yuko was a competent actress in a theatre, she was usually not

⁷⁰⁹ The origin of other Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study was revealed under various circumstances. In some cases, the neighbourhood knew about the Japanese father during the war. In other cases, their origin was revealed by someone who tried to score political points during the Cultural Revolution such as a former domestic helper, a relative, and a civil servant who had access to the family register. (Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 12 May 2016.; Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku*, p. 39; Interview transcript, Koretada, Tokyo, Japan, 19 May 2017.)

⁷¹⁰ Interview transcript, Keiko, Kanagawa, Japan, 20 May 2016.; Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

⁷¹¹ Glaesmer et al., Childhood maltreatment in children born of occupation after WWII in Germany and its association with mental disorders, p. 2.

⁷¹² Jensen, S. Q. 2011. Othering, identity formation and agency. *Qualitative Studies*, 2(2), pp. 63-78, p. 65.

⁷¹³ Interview transcript, Koretada, Tokyo, Japan, 19 May 2017.

allowed to go on the stage unless the main actress needed a substitute.⁷¹⁴ Keiko and Maki were expelled from the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution when the members found out about their origin.⁷¹⁵

During the Cultural Revolution, having a Japanese father could become a tangible threat to the security of Sino-Japanese CBOW. Three Sino-Japanese CBOW were subjected to extremely harsh persecution and experienced several years of detention, imprisonment and forced labour as ‘counter-revolutionaries’. Shigeo and Makoto, who were fathered by Japanese intelligence agents, were detained and imprisoned for nine years and eleven years respectively.⁷¹⁶ Both were released after the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan was signed on 12 August 1978. In a magazine interview with Makoto who migrated to Japan in the 1980s, he stated that the authorities ordered Makoto to ‘keep a clear line’ between him and his father. He could not help arguing back at the risk of getting additional punishment:

The father-child relationship is not a matter of thought (*sixiang/ shisō*), but it is a matter of flesh and blood. I don’t understand what it means to keep a clear line. . . . I cannot completely do away with the relationship with my father.⁷¹⁷

As will be discussed in the following section, Makoto, who was separated from his father at the age of five, did not demonise his father but instead emphasised the father’s positive aspects. Even in the face of extreme adversity as imprisonment, Makoto cherished the relationship with his absent father. Three participants (Michiko, Yuko and Toshio) were fathered by Japanese intelligence agent but were not detained or imprisoned for the ‘crime’ of being fathered by Japanese intelligence agents. Thus, punishment of Sino-Japanese CBOW was arbitrary and depended on various local and personal circumstances. These difficulties that Sino-Japanese CBOW encountered during the series of political campaigns in Mao’s China led to stress, trauma and a state of constant fear, which led Sino-Japanese CBOW to imagine Japan as a ‘safe haven’ where they would be able to feel secure and accepted.

Some Sino-Japanese CBOW were made to feel ‘foreign’ not only due to the adversities stated above but also through ‘preferential treatment’ given to the households of Japanese men who remained in China after the war. A study on the Westerners who resided in

⁷¹⁴ Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 12 May 2016.

⁷¹⁵ Interview transcript, Keiko, Kanagawa, Japan, 20 May 2016.; ‘*Futari no tabiji: Nicchū gekidō o ikita kyōgeki fūfu* [A journey of a couple: Beijing opera actress and actor who led a tumultuous life in China and Japan]’, NHK, Tokyo, 1 March 2011.

⁷¹⁶ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku*, pp. 296-301.; Hosaka, *Bunkaku de sabakareta zanryū konketsu koji: Omae no chichi wa Sakata tokumukikanchō da* [Mixed-blood orphan left behind in China who was punished during the Cultural Revolution: Your father was Sakata, the head of the secret military agency!], pp. 196-225

⁷¹⁷ Hosaka, ‘*Bunkaku de sabakareta zanryū konketsu koji: Omae no chichi wa Sakata tokumukikanchō da*’, pp. 205-206.

China between 1949 and 1976 shows that the Chinese government gave them ‘preferential treatment’ (*youdai*) including access to special stores for high-quality products or products that were difficult to purchase in regular shops.⁷¹⁸ The rationale for such treatment was that the foreign residents were not accustomed to low living standards. While such a ‘preferential treatment’ slightly helped the household finances for the families of Yongyun and Keiko who lived with their Japanese fathers, this policy defined the entire family with a Japanese household head as a ‘foreign’ family. Yongyun recalled how her classmates perceived her family as a richer foreign family.

[By having a Japanese father,] you could have meat, oil, and so forth three hundred grams more than the local people. You could receive more ration tokens for clothes, oil, and cotton. . . . I was told by my classmates that I must be eating bread and drinking milk. They believed that I was eating better and dressed better.⁷¹⁹

Both Yongyun and Keiko experienced stigmatisation and discrimination for having a Japanese father, and so having the ‘preferential treatment’ did not mean that they were exempt from vulnerability as children fathered by Japanese.

The above evidence of adversities that Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study encountered is consistent with Lee’s claim that children born of consensual relationships did not necessarily have an easier childhood and adolescence than those conceived under exploitative or violent circumstances.⁷²⁰ Furthermore, children born of Japanese fathers who were civilian workers at the time of marriage were as vulnerable to persecution as those born of Japanese intelligence agents or former soldiers. Their adversities point to the far-reaching consequences of the war which deserve attention from the children’s rights and human rights perspective as these children were stigmatised, discriminated and persecuted on the basis of their origin and presumed association with the former enemy country. Sino-Japanese CBOW born of consensual relationships could not develop a sense of belonging to China, which became a powerful influencing factor for their ‘return migration’ as will be discussed below.

5.2.3 Constructing idealised notions of the father and the ‘homeland’

The plight of Sino-Japanese CBOW, attributable to having ‘enemy’ fathers, is comparable to adversities of CBOW across time and space. However, what sets Sino-Japanese CBOW apart from many other groups of CBOW is that they came to have a clear sense of belonging to and a strong desire to ‘return’ to the father’s country. This

⁷¹⁸ Hooper’s study on the foreigners who resided in post-war China focuses on the Westerners, and it is unknown whether the same ‘preferential treatment’ was systematically applied to non-Westerners and foreign women. Hooper, B. 2016. *Foreigners under Mao: Western lives in China, 1949-1976*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, p. 5.

⁷¹⁹ Interview transcript, Yongyun, Shandong, China, 11 January 2017.

⁷²⁰ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 6.

section examines their narratives about the father and his country to understand how they constructed their absent father and their imagined ‘homeland’. In the narratives of participants who migrated to Japan, the following equation was presented as something self-evident and natural: ‘my father’s homeland = Japan = my homeland’. Given that they are born of mixed heritage and grew up in China, their strong sense of belonging to the father’s country is not ‘self-evident’ for others and therefore deserves to be examined.

In addition to the stories Sino-Japanese CBOW heard about the father from their mothers (and their caregivers in the absence of the mother), some of them conducted their own research on their fathers’ wartime roles in their adolescence and adulthood. They assessed their fathers positively although the fathers were deeply involved in the Japanese military operations in their maternal country during the war. Michiko asked her acquaintance who had access to confidential personal documents to find out about her father’s wartime role as an intelligence agent. Consequently, Michiko stated that she was relieved to find out that there was no record that proved her father’s direct involvement in the killing of Chinese people.⁷²¹ Michiko did not get to know everything about her father’s wartime role in China, and she constructed her positive notion of the father mainly based on various positive stories she heard from her mother. Makoto searched for information about his father who was a prominent intelligence agent at a library and was consequently tormented by his father’s wartime role that harmed numerous Chinese people.⁷²² However, based on his first-hand positive memories of his father as a family-minded man, Makoto eventually constructed humanised notions of his father as someone who had good work ethic and diligently carried out the role that he was ordered to do.⁷²³ Molinari and Reichlin argued that, ‘in order to create a version of *our past* that we can be proud of, we omit difficulties, humiliations and contradictions.’⁷²⁴ The act of omitting some of the father’s past deeds that were difficult for Makoto to accept from his constructed notions of the father was essential in constructing his own identity positively.

In post-war China, Sino-Japanese CBOW were also exposed to negative portrayals of Japanese men as ‘*riben guizi*’ (Japanese devils) in the media and textbooks.⁷²⁵ They ignored these portrayals and constructed positive notions of the father by focusing on the affirmative information about him. In the case of Toshio, he had first-hand memories

⁷²¹ Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 20 January 2017.

⁷²² Makoto’s father, Sakata Shigemori, was a well-known wartime intelligence agent and was the head of Sakata Intelligence Agency (*Sakata kikan*) in China. See, Hosaka, M. 1988. ‘*Bunkaku de sabakareta zanryū konketsu koji: Omae no chichi wa Sakata tokumukikanchō da*’ [Mixed-blood orphan left behind in China who was punished during the Cultural Revolution: Your father was Sakata, the head of the secret military agency!], *Shokun!*, 20 (4), pp. 196-225, p. 200.

⁷²³ Hosaka, ‘*Bunkaku de sabakareta zanryū konketsu koji: Omae no chichi wa Sakata tokumukikanchō da*’, p. 209.

⁷²⁴ Stanley, J. 2010. ‘We were skivvies/we had a ball.’: Shame and interwar ships. *Oral History*, 38(2), pp. 64-74, pp. 72-73.

⁷²⁵ Ching, L. 2012. ‘Japanese devils’: The conditions and limits of anti-Japanism in China. *Cultural Studies*, 26(5), pp. 710-722, p. 716.

about the father as he lived with his father. His father was an intelligence agent disguised as a Chinese citizen during and after the war, and Toshio lived with him until 1958 when his father was arrested for his activities. In his autobiography, Toshio recollected as follows.

Wartime Japanese soldiers were depicted as hideous-looking ‘Japanese devils’. . . . However, there was such a contrast between my father and what I was taught [at school]. He used to frequently take us to a park in Hongkou [in Shanghai]. On the Chinese National Day, he would take us to lively Nanjing Road, and we enjoyed looking at the fireworks together. . . He was very kind and worked hard for the family.⁷²⁶

He also stated that he used to leave the cinema when the film was depicting Japanese cruelties as he could not tolerate images that were incompatible with the memories of his loving father.⁷²⁷

The favourable construction of the father occurred amidst adversities and supports the hypothesis that such construction is crucial in shaping a positive personal identity for CBOW (see p. 157). As Sino-Japanese CBOW were stigmatised and ostracised because of their association with the Japanese father, it was essential to construct and maintain positive notions of the father to construct their own identity positively. In contrast with Luo Shanxue, born of sexual slavery, who struggled to construct desirable notions of his unknown father based on the Chinese media depiction of Japanese men, Sino-Japanese CBOW born of consensual relationships in this study had far more sources from which they could selectively recollect the positive aspects of the father and construct desirable images of the father: They learned various mediated pieces of information about the father and sometimes had their first-hand memories of the father.

Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study started to imagine and construct Japan as their ‘homeland’ when they found out about their origin. Toshio recounted, ‘I learned that my ancestral homeland is Japan when my father was arrested’.⁷²⁸ He believed that his father was Chinese until his imprisonment in 1958, but when he found out that his father was Japanese, his ‘homeland’ switched from China to Japan. This shift in Toshio’s sense of national belonging was based on patrilineality, a kinship system and a belief that one’s family membership derives from the paternal lineage. In a society that adopts patrilineality, when one traces a family backwards in time, one only focuses on the father in each generation.⁷²⁹ Thus, Sino-Japanese CBOW believed in the logic that they belonged to Japan where his paternal ancestors lived for generations.

⁷²⁶ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku*, p. 75.

⁷²⁷ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku*, p. 77.

⁷²⁸ Interview transcript, Toshio, Hiroshima, Japan, 15 January 2017.

⁷²⁹ Jacka, Kipnis and Sargeson, *Contemporary China: Society and social change*, p. 28.

Yuko is another participant whose ‘homeland’ shifted from China to Japan based on the logic of the patrilineality. She emphasised in the interview that she is ‘Japanese’. I then asked whether she has ever perceived herself as ‘Chinese’ because she only found out about her father’s nationality at the age of thirteen. She replied ‘I’ve never thought about that. Now I feel bad for my mother!’ According to previous identity studies, people construct narratives to reconcile apparent inconsistencies in their sense of identity to preserve a subjective sense of self-continuity.⁷³⁰ Yuko seemed to have unconsciously omitted the shift of her sense of national belonging that took place in her teenage-hood which allowed her to have a sense of self-continuity.

Koretada’s strong sense of belonging to Japan has been influenced not only by the logic of patrilineality but also by a particular view of femininity, masculinity and their social roles.

Primitive societies are mother-centered, right? More advanced societies are father-centered. . . . so the father’s country is my country (*sokoku*). I inherited my native language from my mother’s country, but socially, historically, and logically speaking, my father’s country is my country.⁷³¹

Koretada attempted to explain his father taking a superior position to his mother based on his understanding that more developed countries adopt patrilineal kinship system. How Koretada associated his mother to his native language reflected a patriarchal understanding of women’s roles that are often associated with tasks at home including children’s education.⁷³² In his view, patriarchy occurs hand in hand with social development, presumably based on the concept of men being associated with work outside of the home and modernisation.⁷³³ It is also possible that in Koretada’s mind, Japan’s economic superiority over China somehow overlapped with the Japanese father’s superiority over the Chinese mother.

Since Sino-Japanese CBOW were made to feel ‘foreign’ in their communities and had to cope with a prolonged state of fear, they came to imagine the father’s country as a ‘safe haven’ where they will be ‘secure, accepted, included, valued and respected’. As a study on return migration pointed out, as the need for a sense of belonging grows, the imagined and idealised homeland becomes the place that can provide them with a sense of belonging.⁷³⁴ Toshio’s autobiography offers a glimpse of the construction process of the

⁷³⁰ McAdams, D.P. 2011. Narrative identity. In *Handbook of identity theory and research*, eds. S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx and V. L. Vignoles, pp. 99-115, pp. 104-109. London: Springer.; Vignoles, Identity motives, pp. 403-432.

⁷³¹ Interview transcript, Koretada, Saitama, Japan, 22 May 2017.

⁷³² Jacka, Kipnis and Sargeson, *Contemporary China: Society and social change*, p. 249.

⁷³³ Ibid.

⁷³⁴ Wessendorf, ‘Roots migrants’: Transnationalism and ‘return’ among second-generation Italians in Switzerland, pp. 1083-1102.

imagined homeland. The following narrative show how Toshio's brother, Shigeo, developed a strong sense of belonging to Japan to which he wished to 'return' during the time he suffered from his classmates' bullying.

In middle school, a bully in my class called me '*dongyangren*' (derogatory term that denoted 'Japanese') and '*riben guizi*' (Japanese devil). I could not stand it anymore, so I stood on a chair and fiercely jumped on him. . . . When I arrived home, I cried in front of my mother. I felt so sad, and once again I felt my fervent wish to return to my ancestral homeland as soon as possible.⁷³⁵

For Toshio, Japan was an imagined place where he could protect himself from everyday stigmatisation and discrimination.

I used to go to sleep and dream about my whole family returned to and reunited in my ancestral homeland. While dreaming, I could escape from my sufferings and felt a momentary sense of happiness.⁷³⁶

While it was difficult for ordinary citizens to find information about Japan during Mao's era, Sino-Japanese CBOW actively searched for clues. Toshio imagined Japan as a 'beautiful and mythical place', and his imagination was influenced by Chinese culture in which he grew up.⁷³⁷

What is my ancestral homeland like? How is it different from a mirage emerging from the horizon? Or is it like the Peach Blossom Land (*taohuayuan*), an ethereal utopia that ancient Chinese sought? I had no choice but to keep imagining.⁷³⁸

When the Japanese Embassy offered a Japanese magazine to Toshio, he devoured the visual images from Japan such as Mt. Fuji.⁷³⁹ Toshio also actively searched for places where he could feel and develop a sense of connection with Japan.

I learned from a book that cherry blossom is Japanese national flower. So I went to Hongkou district in Shanghai which used to be a Japanese settlement to find them. I searched around where some Japanese buildings were still left untouched, but cherry blossom trees and Shanhai Jinja (a Shinto shrine in Shanghai) were gone.⁷⁴⁰

Yuko wrote a poem just before she migrated to Japan, and it shows how intensely she longed to reunite with her father and to see her imagined homeland.

⁷³⁵ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku*, p. 76-77.

⁷³⁶ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku*, pp. 99-100.

⁷³⁷ Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, p. 146.

⁷³⁸ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku*, p. 225.

⁷³⁹ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku*, pp. 224-225, 234.

⁷⁴⁰ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku*, p. 77.

My dream is to see Mt Fuji's reflection on the Japanese ocean
I convey my thoughts through turbulent waves
My homeland (*furusato*) where leaves float in waves of the distant sea
Facing a wall, I agonise on my own
What should I do?

Cannot stop my tears thinking about my father
It's heart-breaking to recall my agony over the past
Thirty-five years since our separation
Cannot fall asleep wondering 'When can I see my father?'
If I'm blessed with kind people...[we may reunite one day]

On an island beyond the eastern sea rises Mt Fuji
Blessed with spring when cherry blossoms bloom
Hand in hand, I wish Sino-Japanese friendship to last forever
I want to become a seagull and sit on my father's lap
When will we reunite?⁷⁴¹

Similar to Toshio who had limited access to visual images of Japan, Yuko's imagined Japan consisted of images from typical picturesque landscapes with Mt Fuji and cherry blossoms. Yuko expressed her longing for Japan by using the term *furusato* (homeland), which indicates one's sense of nostalgia for the place where you spent your childhood and adolescence – comparable to a German term, *heimat*.⁷⁴² For Yuko, her 'homeland' was a notion filled with emotions and imagined as a beautiful, mythical and nostalgic place where she might be able to reunite with the long-lost father. Toshio also used the term *kokyō*, a synonym of *furusato*, to refer to his father's hometown in Shimane Prefecture. *Kokyō* is also usually defined as a place where one was born and spent one's childhood and adolescence. In contrast to the term *zuguō* (in Chinese) or *sokoku* (in Japanese) which implies one's ancestral tie and loyalty to one's country, *kokyō* connotes one's nostalgia for the special, unrecoverable and good memories that are part of one's identity.⁷⁴³ The use of the terms *furusato* and *kokyō* indicates that Toshio and Yuko, to some extent, *lived* in their homeland in their imagination during their childhood and adolescence to escape from the hard reality. Toshio stated that he experienced *déjà vu* and a sense of nostalgia when he finally saw Mt Fuji in real life and felt that he finally 'returned' to his 'homeland'.⁷⁴⁴

The above analysis clarifies one of the research questions: why do Sino-Japanese CBOW refer to their migration as 'return'? I argue that they use the term 'return' because they subjectively perceive Japan as their 'homeland' to which they added various meanings. While their notions of 'homeland' vary depending on the circumstances and

⁷⁴¹ A photocopy of a newsletter issued by a support group for stranded war orphans, Yuko.

⁷⁴² Wierzbicka, *Understanding cultures through their key words: English, Russian, Polish, German, and Japanese*, pp. 156-161.

⁷⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴⁴ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku*, pp. 329, 432.

imagination of each individual, it was commonly a conflation of: (1) a place where they belonged based on patrilineality, (2) a place where they could feel secure and respected, (3) a place where they would finally reunite with the father as well as (4) a place that was imagined as affluent and beautiful.

5.2.4 Various motivations to ‘return’

While their idealised notions of the father and homeland constituted a significant part of their motivation to migrate to their paternal country, economic disparity between China and Japan in the 1980s as well as Sino-Japanese CBOW’s political vulnerability also motivated them to migrate. This section examines to what extent Sino-Japanese CBOW’s longing for the father and the imagined homeland enhanced their motivation to migrate to Japan in relation to economic and political causal factors.

The opportunity to move from a less industrialised country to an economically stronger country was undoubtedly a significant factor that motivated Sino-CBOW to acquire Japanese nationality. The importance of the economic differentials between the maternal and paternal countries becomes pronounced when we make comparisons with a limited number of groups of CBOW who had an option to acquire the nationality of their paternal countries. Children born of local women fathered by American soldiers during the Vietnam War were one of the very few groups of CBOW who were given an option to migrate to the father’s country (see Chapter 3, p. 65). Since many were suffering from poverty, economic differentials considerably enhanced their motivation to migrate to the United States to capitalise the opportunity for economic betterment.⁷⁴⁵ In contrast, a small minority of children born of local women fathered by Americans in the United Kingdom, Germany and Austria during and after World War Two acquired US citizenship by proving their father-child relationship but never had a desire or need to migrate to the United States. They simply wanted to ‘hold the US passport in their hands to confirm that they are American citizens’ to feel the sense of connectedness with the father.⁷⁴⁶ It is highly likely that their lack of desire to move to the United States derives from the small economic disparity between their parents’ countries.

The economic disparity between China and Japan in the 1970s and the 1980s was significant: Japan’s GDP was seventy to eighty percent higher than that of China.⁷⁴⁷ Driven by the aspiration for economic betterment, many Chinese chose Japan as their destination to study and work from the mid-1980s. The large-scale migration from China to Japan was also facilitated by recommencement of passport issuance, expanding

⁷⁴⁵ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, pp. 135-138.

⁷⁴⁶ E-mail correspondence, Ute Baur-Timmerbrink to Kanako Kuramitsu, 7 April 2018.

⁷⁴⁷ Araragi, *Diversifying ‘Japanese returning from China’: the crossroad of post-colonialism and globalism*, p. 8.

disparity in wealth within China since its economic reform as well as labour shortages in Japan.⁷⁴⁸ Some participants and their families stated that they regarded their migration to Japan as a highly desirable means out of their unfavourable economic circumstances.⁷⁴⁹ Michiko and Momoko were persuaded by their family members to acquire Japanese nationality for the purpose of economic advancement.⁷⁵⁰ Momoko's husband who was at the interview venue referred to a colloquial idiom, 'water flows downwards, but people struggle upwards' to suggest that for him, migration to Japan was an obvious choice for him and his family to make in the 1980s.⁷⁵¹ Another participant, Seiji, explicitly stated that the prime factor that drove him to acquire Japanese nationality was to provide a better life for his children. Seiji said regretfully that he and his wife could feed only one child out of their three children with an egg – which could add vital nutrition to their poor meals – a day, indicating how poverty was felt particularly acutely in his inability to provide for his children. Seiji learned while residing in China that his father had already passed away, but he was still determined to move to Japan for economic reasons.⁷⁵² While participants had little information about Japan in their pre-migratory phase, they imagined Japan as a place of affluence. Seiji stated that since childhood he had a vague idea that Japan was economically stronger than China.⁷⁵³ In the 1970s, Yuko once saw a pair of nylon trousers which her acquaintance brought back as a souvenir from Japan.⁷⁵⁴ She stated that she could imagine better living conditions in Japan from the quality of the trousers.⁷⁵⁵

Another key motivation for Sino-Japanese CBOW was to escape from continuing political vulnerability and the consequent state of fear, similar to political refugees and return migrants who experience marginalisation and discrimination in the host country.⁷⁵⁶ Michiko stated that one of her reasons to migrate was to be free from political oppression and find her inner peace.⁷⁵⁷ Although she is one of the participants whose origin was not disclosed to the public, she suffered from a state of constant fear during the Cultural Revolution. Once Michiko went out shopping with her mother, and they saw a pile of dead bodies on the back of a truck. Michiko still has a vivid memory of the scene, as she remembers thinking that she could easily end up like one of those corpses if her origin was to be revealed.

⁷⁴⁸ Liu-Farrer, G. 2013. Chinese newcomers in Japan: Migration trends, profiles, and the impact of the 2011 earthquake. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, 22 (2), pp. 231-257, pp. 232-233.

⁷⁴⁹ Project for the study of the 21st century. A 'culture of migration'. <https://projects21.org/2015/11/04/a-culture-of-migration/> (accessed 24 May 2020)

⁷⁵⁰ Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 20 January 2017.; Interview transcript, Momoko, Tokyo, Japan, 23 May 2017.

⁷⁵¹ Interview transcript, Momoko, Tokyo, Japan, 23 May 2017.

⁷⁵² Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

⁷⁵³ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁴ Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 12 May 2016.

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁶ Mohamed and Abdul-Talib, Push-pull factors influencing international return migration intentions: A systematic literature review, p. 236.

⁷⁵⁷ Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 14 January 2017.

Nevertheless, some participants originally carried hesitation towards the idea of moving to Japan. Migrating to Japan in their mid-life where they would encounter cultural and linguistic hurdles signified downward occupational mobility for those who had specific work skills and qualifications as doctors, pharmacists, teachers and so forth.⁷⁵⁸ However, in some cases, their emotional attachment to the absent father became the decisive factor that motivated their migration. Although Michiko wanted to provide her children with better educational opportunities, she initially hesitated to go to Japan because she and her husband had decent incomes as a doctor and a physicist respectively. However, she decided to move to Japan when she heard from one of her Japanese relatives that her father remarked at his death bed that he wished Michiko and her mother could live in Japan one day. She wanted to respect the will of her deceased father and to be in a place where he wished her and her mother to be.⁷⁵⁹ In another instance, one of Keiko's important motives to live in Japan was to fulfil her filial responsibility to build her father's grave in Japan and bury the ashes of her father who died in China.⁷⁶⁰ Another participant, Koretada, stated that it was his father's goodness that pulled him towards Japan. Koretada's determination to migrate was consolidated when his Chinese uncle came from Hong Kong to Suzhou to meet Koretada and his mother in the 1970s. His uncle was indebted to Koretada's father who previously offered financial support to open a restaurant, and he visited them to show appreciation for the father's kindness.⁷⁶¹ While talking about his migration process, Koretada constructed an image of his father as a piece of rope (*tsuna*) that pulled together the support from all the cooperative individuals as follows.

As I was telling you my story, I could picture a vivid image of a piece of rope. My father was the driving force of all the support that helped me to have the courage to move forward. Also, I think that rope [that pulled together all the support] consists of his wisdom and love.⁷⁶²

While economic and political factors were significant factors that motivated Koretada to migrate to Japan, Koretada emphasised that the father was the main pull factor.

All economic, political and emotional factors were inextricably intertwined in their motivation to migrate to Japan, and the degree of importance of each factor weighed differently for each Sino-Japanese CBOW at the time when they decided to migrate. However, the significance of the emotional factor that is deeply personal is pronounced in the 'return migration' of Sino-Japanese CBOW. This point is elucidated when

⁷⁵⁸ After graduating from secondary school or university in China, participants became a doctor (Michiko), a pharmacist (Keiko), a school teacher (Momoko), an engineer (Seiji), factory workers (Toshio), an actress (Yuko) and a playwright (Koretada).

⁷⁵⁹ Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 20 January 2017.

⁷⁶⁰ Interview notes, Keiko, Kanagawa, Japan, 24 December 2017.

⁷⁶¹ Interview transcript, Koretada, Saitama, Japan, 22 May 2017.

⁷⁶² Interview transcript, Momoko, Tokyo, Japan, 23 May 2017.

compared with the return migration of other migrant groups in different historical and geographical contexts. Previous studies on return migrations that occurred *en masse* presuppose migrants are members of groups bounded by ancestral/ethnic ties and ethno-communal consciousness (see Chapter 1, p. 29). Sino-Japanese CBOW's return migration, however, was realised individually. Their migration was primarily driven not by a perception that they were a member of a larger ethnic community but by deeply personal emotions deriving from constructed beliefs about the father that were based on memories of familial love and separation. Furthermore, while economic and political factors prompted Sino-Japanese CBOW to leave China, Sino-Japanese CBOW never considered an option to migrate to a different country using their Japanese passport. Seiger's research on children born of Filipino mothers fathered by Japanese after the 1980s demonstrates that some of them regard their legal right to acquire Japanese nationality as their 'consanguineal capital' as their Japanese passport enables them to travel and work abroad more easily and provides them with a higher social status within the Philippines.⁷⁶³ Consequently, these Japanese-Filipino children do not necessarily settle in Japan after acquiring Japanese nationality. For Sino-Japanese CBOW, acquiring Japanese nationality was their essential means to 'return' to Japan which they perceived to be their 'homeland'.

5.2.5 Search for the father and its impact on identity

The search for the father is a life mission for CBOW across time and space, and the process and outcome of the search have a considerable impact on their identity. Ezawa claimed that the significance of father searches is that 'they provide a unique outlook on a new source of meaning of their identity'.⁷⁶⁴ This is especially true for those who have suffered from alienation from their families and communities that take a hostile view of the father's country. The possibility of finding positive attributes of the biological father creates the potential for them to see themselves more positively. However, CBOW who could visit the paternal country and successfully reunite with the long-lost father constitute a minority for several reasons.⁷⁶⁵ First, the wall of silence could hinder their access to information about the father even well into old-age.⁷⁶⁶ Second, they rarely receive official support and as a result, their search for the father becomes dependent on

⁷⁶³ Seiger, Consanguinity as capital in rights assertions: Japanese-Filipino children in the Philippines, pp. 10, 14, 16.

⁷⁶⁴ Ezawa, 'The guilt feeling that you exist': War, racism, and Indisch-Japanese identity formation, p. 497.

⁷⁶⁵ Ezawa, 'The guilt feeling that you exist': War, racism, and Indisch-Japanese identity formation, pp. 499-500.; Buchheim, Enabling remembrance: Japanese-Indisch descendants visit Japan, pp. 104-125.; Huijs-Watanuki, *Watashi wa dare no ko?: Chichi o sagashimotomeru Nikkei nisei orandajin tachi* [Whose child am I?: The second generation Japanese-Dutch descendants searching for their fathers], pp. 32-43.

⁷⁶⁶ Stelzl-Marx, B. 2011. The children of Soviet occupation soldiers and Austrian women, 1945-55. In *The children of foreign soldiers in Finland, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Poland and occupied Soviet Karelia: Children of foreign soldiers in Finland 1940-1948 Volume II*, ed. L. Westerlund, pp. 242-260, p. 243. Helsinki: Nord Print.

individuals who each have limited means to find information about the father, such as researchers, journalists and support groups.⁷⁶⁷ Third, some CBOW who managed to find the contact information of the father or his relatives encounter rejection.⁷⁶⁸

In this regard, the cases of Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study are rare as the search for the father was not hindered by their mothers or other relatives. These cases are exceptional also because the possibility for the father search and nationality acquisition opened up after the re-establishment of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972. Nevertheless, they encountered considerable difficulties in the process. This section first discusses Sino-Japanese CBOW's experiences of searching for the absent father, which sometimes was part of the procedure to acquire Japanese nationality, to demonstrate that the search required extraordinary determination and perseverance. As will be argued later in this chapter, successful achievement of this important life goal led to a relatively high sense of satisfaction in their old age. This section then explores how the outcomes of the father search affected their identity and their plan to migrate to Japan.

When some Sino-Japanese CBOW started to search for their fathers in the 1970s, their action carried considerable political risks due to the ongoing Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Seiji's narrative below illustrates a stressful process of establishing contact with a possible supporter in Japan at the risk of political persecution. Seiji and his family were in dire poverty during the Cultural Revolution, and he had been waiting for an opportunity to acquire Japanese nationality not just to search for the father but also to escape poverty (see p. 169). Before 1972, the Chinese state media had started to emphasise the importance of promoting friendship and exchange between China and Japan. Seiji carefully read between the lines of state newspapers and concluded that it should be safe to start searching for his father. Seiji stated in the interview:

The Sino-Japanese relations were about to be normalised, and the Chinese government seemed to put importance on this matter. I thought I wouldn't be politically oppressed even if I send a letter to Japan.⁷⁶⁹

Since Seiji did not have his father's address, he decided to contact his mother-in-law who happened to be a Japanese stranded war wife who married a Chinese man in post-war China. His mother-in-law was living in Japan at the time as she had returned to Japan during the collective repatriation between 1953 and 1958 (see Chapter 3, p. 76). Seiji's wife was opposed to his decision to contact her mother. Her father and uncle were labelled 'historical counter-revolutionary' (*lishi fangeming*) by the Chinese Communist Party because they used to work for a company controlled by the Nationalist government. For

⁷⁶⁷ See, for example, Stelzl-Marx, *The children of Soviet occupation soldiers and Austrian women, 1945-55*, p. 243.; Ezawa, 'The guilt feeling that you exist': War, racism, and Indisch-Japanese identity formation, pp. 496-497.

⁷⁶⁸ 'Children's tears: Searching for Japanese fathers', Sunada, Y., 1 October 2014.

⁷⁶⁹ Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

this reason, Seiji's family had been under surveillance by the Communist authority during the Cultural Revolution. His wife feared that Seiji's plan might backfire if the Sino-Japanese relations became hostile again. Despite the risk, Seiji wrote a letter to his mother-in-law with the hope that she would agree to become his guarantor to resettle in Japan. Seiji commented, 'I took extra caution when I wrote the letter. I did not mention anything political.'⁷⁷⁰ He was thrilled when he received a reply two weeks later, however, to his disappointment, his mother-in-law wrote that Seiji and his family should not migrate to Japan because of the cultural and linguistic barriers that they were bound to encounter.

Other Sino-Japanese CBOW also narrated the risk of making contact with someone in Japan at the time. Maki, referred to contacting her father and other people in Japan in the 1980s and stated 'I cut all the possible paths [in China] to move forward' because making such connections meant that she might be placed under surveillance and could be subjected to persecution.⁷⁷¹ Similarly, Taro, wrote to a Japanese lawyer,

Every time I send a letter to you, I am taking a huge political risk. Although what I write in the letter is based on facts, my family and I are placed under surveillance because I still do not have Japanese nationality.⁷⁷²

After learning about the news reports of stranded war orphans who were visiting Japan to search for their Japanese kin in the 1970s and 1980s, Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study put extra effort into the search for their father and acquisition of Japanese nationality to migrate to Japan. Some Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study contacted the Chinese Red Cross or the Japanese Embassy as they did not have contact information of the father in Japan.⁷⁷³ As discussed earlier, only a small minority of Sino-Japanese CBOW could receive support and identify the father through the Japanese Embassy (see Chapter 3, p. 86).⁷⁷⁴ Although Seiji's wife remained pessimistic about him finding his father and the possibility of migrating to Japan, Seiji did not give up. Seiji's wife who was present at the interview recalled:

He was so adamant. He wanted to go to Japan no matter what. He went everywhere to find information. If there was a bit of hope, he would go there and explore every avenue. He even went to the Japanese Embassy in Beijing [from Nanjing]. Oh, it was so cumbersome!⁷⁷⁵

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁷¹ Unpublished personal documents, Case 7, Maki.

⁷⁷² Unpublished personal documents, Case 11, Taro.

⁷⁷³ Unpublished personal documents, Case 1, Tsuneyoshi.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 11, Taro.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 2, Ryotaro.; Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.; Interview transcript, Momoko, Tokyo, Japan, 23 May 2017.

⁷⁷⁴ Unpublished personal documents, Case 2, Ryotaro.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 11, Taro.

⁷⁷⁵ Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

Due to the lack of support from the government, coming across ‘key persons’ was the decisive factor in making a breakthrough in the extremely uncertain and time-consuming process of searching for the father, as was the case for other groups of CBOW in their search for the father.⁷⁷⁶ In all the collected cases, aspirations of Sino-Japanese CBOW to find the father were passed on from one person to another like a baton in a relay race until the father was identified – this is similar to the stories collected by Pamela Winfield about the father searches by children born of British women and American soldiers during and after World War Two in the United Kingdom.⁷⁷⁷

Seiji’s case demonstrates how his search for the father depended on cooperative individuals in both China and Japan. In 1984, Seiji’s friend introduced Seiji to a man called Zhang Ming, another Sino-Japanese CBOW who was born in the same year (1942) in the same city (Nanjing) as Seiji. It also turned out that both their fathers used to work at the Central China Railway during the war. There was a story behind Seiji’s encounter with Ming. Ming’s father remarried a Japanese woman after he was repatriated to Japan. When his Japanese wife died, he decided to contact Ming’s mother whom he left behind in China and sent a letter to an address in Nanjing where their house was located during the war. Although Ming’s mother no longer lived there, a neighbour of the addressee happened to know her new address. The letter was forwarded to Ming’s mother, and as a result, Ming could contact his father forty years after their separation. Ming’s friend, who heard about this story, happened to know Seiji, and he introduced Ming to Seiji. After Seiji and Ming discovered each other, Ming sent a letter to his father to ask about Seiji’s father, Seiichiro. It turned out that Ming’s father knew Seiichiro during the war. Every time Ming sent a letter to his father, it took a long time to receive his father’s reply because his father who lived in Hiroshima needed the translation by his former colleague, Nakatani Osamu, who resided in Osaka and turned out to be a former colleague of Seiji’s father. Osamu was a member of Katesukai, an association that was established after the war to connect former Japanese workers of the Central China Railway, and he sent Seiji one of the newsletters issued by Katesukai. Subsequently, Seiji could write a letter to Katesukai, asking for information about his father. When Seiji received a reply from Katesukai, to his disappointment, he learned that his father had already passed away. However, thanks to the detailed information Katesukai provided about his father (e.g. his father’s date of birth, the year he was sent to China and returned to Japan, his life after repatriation, the cause of his death, the situation of his family in Japan), Seiji could later prove his parents’ marriage and the father-child relationship to the Japanese family court in acquiring Japanese nationality.

⁷⁷⁶ See, for example, Stelzl-Marx, *The children of Soviet occupation soldiers and Austrian women, 1945-55*, p. 243.; Buchheim, *Enabling remembrance: Japanese-Indisch descendants visit Japan*, p. 117.

⁷⁷⁷ Winfield, P. 1993. *Bye bye baby: The story of the children the GIs left behind*. Bath: Chivers Large Print.

Other Sino-Japanese CBOW also had received the support of cooperative individuals. Some of these individuals worked for the media, and others were motivated by their personal war memories. For instance, Nomura Shigeo happened to learn about the story of Kayo who was looking for her Japanese father when he was watching television in 1984.⁷⁷⁸ He had fought as a soldier in three different provinces in China during the war and took part in the atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese Army for which he had felt deep remorse.⁷⁷⁹ He deemed Sino-Japanese CBOW as remnants from the war and felt a strong sense of responsibility to bring them justice.⁷⁸⁰ Consequently, he spent a substantial amount of time and effort in finding Kayo's father and even paid for her flight to come to Japan to reunite with her father which was realised in 1986.

The search for the father could result in either successful family reunification or negative outcomes. As for the former case, Sino-Japanese CBOW could confirm the mutual affection between them and their fathers. Some fathers played an active role in realising the family reunification. Yuko's father immediately contacted a newspaper publisher in Japan, when he found his daughter's short biography amongst biographies of stranded war orphans who were searching for their Japanese kin.⁷⁸¹ Since that day, he not only exchanged letters with Yuko, but he also sent a long request letter (*chinjōsho*) to Japan's Civil Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice to grant his daughter Japanese nationality.⁷⁸² His friends donated money so that Yuko could purchase a flight ticket to Japan, and Yuko could finally visit Japan with a short-term visa to visit her relatives and reunite with her father in Japan in 1980.⁷⁸³ In another instance, after many individuals helped Taro to find his father's contact information, Taro's father made his utmost effort in helping his son acquire Japanese nationality.⁷⁸⁴ Despite his old age and disability due to cataracts, the eighty-two-year-old father visited Shanghai in 1989 to reunite with his forty-two-year-old son and to take a blood test to prove the father-child relationship.⁷⁸⁵ Amongst twenty-seven cases of Sino-Japanese CBOW closely studied in this chapter, there were only two cases in which the paternity test result was used as evidence of the father-child relationship. Taking a blood test was not compulsory to prove the father-child relationship, but it was a method used in the 1980s for some stranded war orphans to determine a genetic relationship with their Japanese kin. After helping Taro to acquire Japanese nationality, his father passed away in 1990.

⁷⁷⁸ Unpublished personal documents, Case 9, Kayo.

⁷⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁸¹ In order to ensure the participant's anonymity, I have excluded the reference of these newspaper articles.

⁷⁸² Letter, Yuko's father to Yuko, 16 July 1979.; Letter, the Ministry of Justice to Yuko's father, 15 August 1979.

⁷⁸³ Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 10 May 2016.

⁷⁸⁴ Unpublished personal documents, Case 11, Taro.

⁷⁸⁵ Itoh, *Japanese war orphans in Manchuria: Forgotten victims of World War II*, pp. 90, 92; Chan, *Abandoned Japanese in postwar Manchuria: The lives of war orphans and wives in two countries*, pp. 59-60.

Other Sino-Japanese CBOW faced outcomes that were sad and disappointing, such as the father's death or his rejection of the father-child tie. The process of the search for the father and the acquisition of Japanese nationality took many years, and some elderly fathers passed away during that period. In his letter addressed to his Japanese friend in 1990, Ryotaro expressed his frustration with the Japanese government and stated that he wished the Japanese government could be more humane.⁷⁸⁶ Ryotaro started to search for his father through the Red Cross Societies as early as in 1965 and could contact his father in 1979. However, because neither the Red Cross nor the Japanese Embassy offered practical guidance for acquiring Japanese nationality, he found out about the *shūseki* procedure (Chapter 3, p. 92) only in 1992 and migrated to Japan in 1994 at the age of fifty-four. During the time Ryotaro was looking for ways to acquire Japanese nationality, his father passed away in 1987. However, what is noteworthy is that Ryotaro continued to make efforts to achieve his long-term goal to 'return' to his 'homeland' even after his father's death.

Teruo had a bitter experience in the process of searching for the father. Through his acquaintance in China, Teruo managed to request help from a Buddhist monk, Todo Shinnen, in 1982. Shinnen, exhibited extraordinary devotion in finding Teruo's father. He had lived in Manchuria during the war, and he deeply empathised with Teruo who was born around the same time as his daughter who was in a critical health condition at the time of repatriation to post-war Japan. Shinnen wrote numerous letters to those who had the same surname as Teruo's father by looking up a thick telephone directory. He also requested that major newspaper publishers as well as a business paper for florists (Teruo's father and grandfather used to manage a well-known flower shop in Tokyo) publish articles about Teruo's search for his father.⁷⁸⁷ Subsequently, Shinnen received a phone call from Teruo's seventy-four-year-old father in 1984. To Shinnen's great disappointment, Teruo's father told Shinnen that the appearance of Teruo after thirty years was nothing but a nuisance and that he had no intention of meeting or acknowledging Teruo. Teruo's mother remembered that the father promised to return to China to bring Teruo and his mother to Japan. Nonetheless, Teruo's father not only refused to meet Teruo but also told Shinnen that he made it clear to Teruo's mother that their relationship was over before his repatriation.

However, upon learning of his father's rejection, which must have come as a great shock to Teruo, he demonstrated an understanding of his father. In the letter he sent to the aforementioned prominent activist who supported both stranded war orphans and Sino-Japanese CBOW, Chino Seiji (see Chapter 3, p. 87), Teruo wrote,

⁷⁸⁶ Unpublished documents, Case 2, Ryotaro.

⁷⁸⁷ Unpublished personal documents, Case 10, Teruo.

Deep inside, my father must have memories of me and my mother. But acknowledging me as his child must cause damage to his reputation. It must be difficult to do so because of his current family circumstances.⁷⁸⁸

The above cases of Ryotaro and Teruo, who encountered the father's death and the father's rejection respectively, highlight the issue of identity and belonging as well as their motivation to migrate to Japan. One way to interpret Teruo's response to the father's rejection is that he would have had to redefine his own identity had he radically and negatively redefined his father who had been central to his identity. Thus, it was important for Teruo to keep imagining his father as a 'good man' who wanted to protect his family in Japan by keeping his memories of Teruo and his mother secret. Moreover, the fact that both Teruo and Ryotaro did not abort their project to migrate to Japan upon learning of the father's rejection or death illuminates the significance of their strong sense of belonging to Japan and various economic and political motivational factors to migrate other than their longing to reunite with the father. Since they have been subjected to long-term 'othering' in China, their sense of belonging to Japan remained strong even though reuniting with the father was no longer an option. In addition, they have put an enormous amount of effort and time into the procedure to acquire Japanese nationality at the risk of political persecution, and even the father's rejection or death did not prevent them from proceeding with their plan to move to Japan.

5.2.6 *Shūseki* procedure and its impact on identity and belonging

Acquiring Japanese nationality by taking *shūseki* procedure (see Chapter 3, p. 92) was not just a required legal procedure to acquire Japanese nationality, but it also had a significant impact on Sino-Japanese CBOW's identity.

First, *shūseki* procedure allowed Sino-Japanese CBOW to further develop their concept of the father by discovering a wealth of information about him, in addition to the information they have already learned from the mother or other caregivers since their childhood and adolescence. Sino-Japanese CBOW literally walked in the footsteps of the father by visiting the places where the father used to live and work as well as the venue of the parents' wedding party.⁷⁸⁹ They not only collected detailed information about the parents' encounter and wedding but also discovered the father's wartime interpersonal relationships with his Chinese neighbours, colleagues, friends and relatives which they might not have had a chance to do otherwise. A former neighbour of Teruo's father, testified at the age of seventy-three in 1987 as follows.⁷⁹⁰

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁹ Unpublished personal documents, Case 2, Ryotaro.; Unpublished personal documents, Case 9, Kayo.

⁷⁹⁰ Teruo's father used to manage a flower farm and a flower shop in Nanjing during the war.

Before his repatriation, Isao (Teruo's father) and I often went to Xijia Dakuang to fish using fishing nets. Isao and I had a very good relationship.⁷⁹¹

A seventy-year-old former colleague of Kayoko's father also referred to their relationship as follows in 1988.

I know my former Japanese colleague . . . very well. . . . Our relationship was very good. We were friends.⁷⁹²

In Kayoko's case, her understanding of the father's interpersonal relationships was complicated by learning about name-calling towards her father and wartime strained relationships between Chinese and Japanese workers at a steel factory where her father used to work.⁷⁹³ By learning detailed information about the father, Sino-Japanese CBOW further developed their concept of the father, which had been more abstract before this process.

Secondly, because *shūseki* procedure officially recognised the parents' marriage, it is highly likely that it had a positive impact on the self-esteem of Sino-Japanese CBOW who were at times stigmatised as children born out of wedlock. Yuko was the only participant who took the naturalisation procedure, and a comparison of her case and those who used the *shūseki* procedure highlights the impact of the legal procedure on their identity.

Yuko visited Japan in 1980 before a group of lawyers supporting stranded war orphans started to use the *shūseki* procedure to grant them Japanese nationality. When she was looking for ways to remain in Japan, an immigration officer advised her to naturalise. While both naturalisation and *shūseki* procedures result in the acquisition of Japanese nationality, the implications of these two procedures are different. While the former is a procedure for 'foreigners' to *become Japanese*, the latter is a procedure for individuals to *regain their Japanese nationality* to which they were entitled to at birth by establishing *koseki* register. Although Yuko possessed evidence of her parents' wedding party, the naturalisation procedure did not require her to submit it. Because she has been stigmatised for being fatherless and her mother was the father's 'third wife' (his father was married to two other women with whom he had children), she had always felt and still feels a deep sense of shame for being a child born out of wedlock.⁷⁹⁴ Although she acknowledged that polygamy (*sanqiliuqie*) was a common practice especially for rich men in China at the time, she repeatedly stated, 'I'm a child born out of wedlock (*shiseiji*). Don't you think

⁷⁹¹ Testimony by Hu Yusheng, 4 April 1987

⁷⁹² Unpublished documents, Case 6, Kayoko.

⁷⁹³ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁴ Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 12 May 2016.; Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 19 December 2017.

it's shameful?' She also used a term '*kakushigo*' to describe herself, which literally means a 'child born out of wedlock whose existence had to be concealed'.

In contrast, none of Sino-Japanese CBOW who took *shūseki* procedure called themselves as children born out of wedlock in the interview although they (except for Keiko who lived with her father in post-war China) also grew up in a fatherless household. The comparison of naturalisation and *shūseki* procedures provides reasons to assume that the Japanese family court's recognition of the parents' marriage had a positive impact on Sino-Japanese CBOW's identity that allowed them to perceive themselves as 'legitimate children', especially for those whose fathers had a bigamous marriage.

Thirdly, the efforts Sino-Japanese CBOW put into nationality acquisition and successfully achieving that goal led to their sense of satisfaction in their old age. Looking back at difficulties in the process of acquiring Japanese nationality, Seiji's wife, who was present at the interview, stated,

[The process consisted of] a series of amazing coincidences. If these things didn't happen, we had no hope to return to Japan.⁷⁹⁵

But Seiji then told her,

You say that there was no hope [without these series of coincidences], but these things could not have happened without making efforts. It was the hard work that bore fruits in the end.⁷⁹⁶

The processes of searching for the father and acquiring Japanese nationality in the pre-migration phase at times required a series of coincidences as Seiji's wife suggested, but Seiji emphasised that his perseverance and determination were essential in successfully achieving his goal to migrate to Japan. We will return to the sense of satisfaction that Sino-Japanese CBOW gained from accomplishing their quest to search for the father and migrate to Japan.

5.3 Experiences, identity and belonging in the post-migratory phase

Sino-Japanese CBOW's experiences in the post-migratory phase were not necessarily negative but were certainly different from what they imagined as their 'homeland' while in China. Upon arrival in Japan, Sino-Japanese CBOW encountered various challenges in their daily life. Some Sino-Japanese CBOW had access to government-sponsored assistance in learning Japanese and finding a job, which was primarily arranged for stranded war orphans (see Chapter 3, p. 97). However, others were not given any support as they did not know such assistance existed or they were not 'accidentally included' in

⁷⁹⁵ Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

⁷⁹⁶ Ibid.

the bureaucratic records as JRCW (see Chapter 3, p. 97).⁷⁹⁷ Because there was no financial assistance from the government, they had to find a job and familiarise themselves as fast as possible with Japanese culture and language that was ‘foreign’ for Sino-Japanese CBOW in their thirties and forties. Due to the linguistic barrier, most of them experienced downward occupational mobility, at least until they could start communicating in Japanese. Learning Japanese while working was challenging, and they were often perceived as a ‘foreigner’ due to their accent.⁷⁹⁸ Some of them found themselves to be in an ironic predicament of discriminated against as ‘Chinese’ in their ‘homeland’.⁷⁹⁹

The following section analyses the participants’ narratives to understand how and why most of them positively constructed their identity and belonging in their post-migratory phase. I first explore how they construct their identity and belonging vis-à-vis the majority group ‘Japanese’ as well as a minority group ‘stranded war orphans’ in the absence of an established category. It sheds light on how the constructed notions of the father impact on their evolving identity and belonging in their old age. I then investigate the factors that led to their positivity by analysing how participants narrate their past adversities and life choices.

5.3.1 Keiko’s case: Feeling ‘in-between’ in the homeland

Keiko was born and raised in Heilongjiang Province in northeast China. Her father died in 1981 in China, and she migrated to Japan with her mother and siblings in 1999. After migration, Keiko opened a Chinese restaurant that serves home-style dishes from northeast China. Keiko stressed that her homeland is Japan, not China where she was treated as a ‘foreigner’. When I asked, ‘which country is your homeland?’, she openly showed her frustration and replied with a loud voice, ‘Japan!’ She then stated,

Although I grew up in China, I lived as a Japanese child since my childhood. I have always wanted to return. I was committed to returning.⁸⁰⁰

What influenced Keiko’s sense of belonging to Japan was the fact that she could not feel ‘secure, accepted, included, valued or respected’ in China due to stigmatisation and discrimination. Her father has been the central figure in the household (see Chapter 4, p. 150), and she strongly empathised with her father who could not return to Japan before his death (see Chapter 4, p. 150). She also had a sense of responsibility to bury her father’s ashes in his homeland (see p. 170). Her ‘sense of responsibility’ might derive from filial

⁷⁹⁷ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku*, pp. 349-352.

⁷⁹⁸ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku*, p. 405.

⁷⁹⁹ Ibid.; Refsing, K. 2003. In Japan, but not of Japan. In *Ethnicity in Asia*, ed. C. Mackerras, pp.48-63, p. 58. London and New York: Routledge.

⁸⁰⁰ Interview with Keiko on 24 December 2017

piety (*xiao*), a virtue of respect towards one’s parents that has been given a distinctive amount of attention and importance in Chinese culture.⁸⁰¹ Keiko stated that she was extremely relieved when she and her siblings could build a tomb for their father in Japan and finally place his ashes to rest in his homeland. Her empathy and a sense of filial responsibility towards her father have sustained and reinforced her sense of belonging to Japan. In addition, it is important to consider the impact of acquiring Japanese nationality on Sino-Japanese CBOW’s identity and belonging. Because neither China nor Japan recognise dual nationality, Sino-Japanese CBOW who received a Japanese passport needed to renounce their Chinese nationality.⁸⁰² While there are various reasons, the main purpose for a state to prevent its citizens from having double or multiple nationalities is to emphasise its citizens’ obligations to only one state. It is likely that the nationality acquisition reinforced Keiko’s identity as ‘Japanese’.

Although Keiko has a strong sense of national belonging to Japan, she also exhibited signs of dissociation between herself and ‘Japanese people’. In the interview, Keiko called herself ‘*Heilongjiang de ren*’ (Heilongjiang person). She was emphasising the fact that her dispositions are closer to people from Heilongjiang Province, who are typically considered as generous (*dafang*).⁸⁰³ She then contrasted herself to her father, whom she seemed to regard as someone with qualities that are quintessentially ‘Japanese’. Her father was an important reference point in negotiating the distance between her and the majority group ‘Japanese’.

Japanese people are so serious-minded. . . . [My father] is a good person. He didn’t have any shortcomings. [He was] so serious-minded. [In comparison,] I’m silly and so-so.⁸⁰⁴

She also used the third person plural ‘they’ (*tamen*) when referring to ‘Japanese’. When she talked about the characteristics of ‘Japanese’, she stated, ‘Japanese people, *they* are very united (*tuanjie*).’⁸⁰⁵

Keiko’s narrative showed that there is a disparity between her strong sense of national belonging and how she feels in her ‘homeland’. Keiko wishes to be perceived as ‘Japanese’ in her ‘homeland’ but she feels that she is subjected to ‘othering’ once again.

Keiko: When I lived in China, Chinese people didn’t trust me because I’m Japanese. After coming to Japan, Japanese people don’t trust me

⁸⁰¹ Ivanhoe, P. J. 2004. Filial piety as a virtue. In *Filial piety in Chinese thought and history*, eds. A. Chan and S. Tan, Chapter 11. London: Routledge.

⁸⁰² Ching, F. 2018. Nationality vs ethnic identity: Attitudes toward passports by China, other national governments and a multiplicity of people in Hong Kong. *Asian Education and Development Studies*, 7(2), pp. 223-233, p. 227.

⁸⁰³ Interview transcript, Keiko, Kanagawa, Japan, 20 May 2016.

⁸⁰⁴ Interview transcript, Keiko, Kanagawa, Japan, 20 May 2016.

⁸⁰⁵ *Ibid*.

because I'm Chinese. Now I feel that I'm sandwiched in between. Both countries don't trust me. They don't believe me. [In China, they say,] 'You are Japanese, so we can't give you an important post', and vice versa in Japan.⁸⁰⁶

Researcher: You are in between.

Keiko: Yes, yes. I'm an in-between person (*zhongjianren*)!
[laughter]⁸⁰⁷

The above narratives showed her ongoing process of interpreting a range of experiences before and after migrating to Japan. The hard reality that Keiko had to face after migration was that Keiko could not feel 'accepted, included, valued or respected' in Japan either.⁸⁰⁸ This sense of 'in-betweenness' is a feeling commonly shared by other cross-border migrants.⁸⁰⁹ However, Keiko sustained a subjective sense of temporal-spatial continuity by her life-long love and empathy for her father that organically linked her imagined homeland in the pre-migratory phase and the lived homeland in the post-migratory phase.⁸¹⁰

5.3.2 Cases of Koretada and Toshio: 'Bridge builder' identity

Two participants (Koretada and Toshio) perceive their current social role as a 'bridge builder' between their parental countries. Previous CBOW studies showed that some CBOW claim themselves as 'bridge builders', carrying a message of peace and friendship.⁸¹¹ A study on adolescents born of war rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina also demonstrated that one participant viewed her duty as reconciling the Bosniak and Serbian for the better future of Sarajevo.⁸¹² She grew up in a middle-class family with a caring mother and stepfather, and she has been empowered by her mother who testified in the Hague about the traumatic circumstances under which she conceived her daughter. After learning about her father, she constructed her unknown father as someone who has given her the 'meaning of life' to promote peace and reconciliation. Moreover, some elderly individuals who were born of German mothers raped by Red Army soldiers at the end of World War Two claim themselves as 'bridge builders' and see their role as presenting

⁸⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁸ Mahar, Cobigo and Stuart. Conceptualizing belonging, p. 1030.

⁸⁰⁹ See, for example, Zhang, L. 2009. The 'Japanese war orphans left in China' and their identity: A sociological analysis through life-story. *Studies on Humanities and Social Sciences of Chiba University*, 18, pp. 53-68.

⁸¹⁰ Côté, J. E. and Levine, C. 1988. A critical analysis of the ego identity status paradigm. *Developmental Review*, 8, pp. 147-184.; Vignoles, Identity motives, p. 413.

⁸¹¹ Hutnik, N. 1991. *Ethnic minority identity: A social psychological perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 163.

⁸¹² Erjavec and Volčič, Living with the sins of their fathers: An analysis of self-representation of adolescents born of war rape, pp. 377-380.

their resilience and spreading a message of peace.⁸¹³ Some children born of Indisch mother and Japanese father – born in Indonesia and moved to the Netherlands – could visit their father's home country at the Japanese government expense.⁸¹⁴ One of them remarked that she sees her sympathy for both victims and perpetrators of the war as a 'bridge' between oppositions.⁸¹⁵ Although these cases might constitute a minority amongst previously studied groups of CBOW, their identity as 'bridge builders' deserves attention as the relationship between maternal and paternal countries of CBOW often remain strained or hostile after the war and such relationships have impact on the way CBOW perceive themselves.

Koretada came to regard his role as a 'bridge builder' linking China and Japan during the time he was a playwright in China.⁸¹⁶ After migrating to Japan, Koretada eventually became a successful businessman after experiencing a few different jobs. After handing over most of his business to his sons, he has published two novels in 2019 and 2020 on the themes of war, peace, cultural exchanges and interpersonal relationships between China and Japan. The first book consists of three short stories of Sino-Japanese friendly exchanges in different historical periods, and the other novel is based on his parents' loving relationship and his autobiography.⁸¹⁷ He considers that, as a child born of a loving relationship during the war, he is in a unique position to talk about the war from an original perspective that promotes peace and Sino-Japanese friendship.

Another participant, Toshio, has also published a book about the experiences of his father, himself and other family members. The content of the book is uniquely structured. Some sections are Toshio's autobiographical narratives, but the main sections are his father's experiences written in the first person. In order to write autobiography-like narratives on behalf of his father, Toshio conducted extensive research on his father's professional and private life. In this process, he not only discovered new facts about his father who was an intelligence agent but also intensely relived the experiences and emotions of his father who had survived a twenty-year imprisonment in dire conditions, leading to reinforced love and empathy for his father.

His objectives of publishing his book were linked to his father. First, Toshio strongly wished to 'pay off old scores' on behalf of his father who did not receive a sufficient military pension although he served a twenty-year prison sentence for the charges of

⁸¹³ Ibid.

⁸¹⁴ Buchheim, Enabling remembrance: Japanese-Indisch descendants visit Japan, p. 116.

⁸¹⁵ Buchheim, Enabling remembrance: Japanese-Indisch descendants visit Japan, p. 120.

⁸¹⁶ '*Chichino kuni e: Eijū no michi saguru*' [Returning to the father's country: Searching for ways for his permanent return]. *Mainichi Shinbun*, 4 May 1983.

⁸¹⁷ Serikawa, K. and Yu, X. 2019. *Ai wa dokokara: Hatō o koeta mittsu no monogatari* [Where did love come from?: Three stories that transcended the waves]. Tokyo: Ark Communications.; Serikawa, *Yahan no shōsei* [Sound of a bell in the middle of the night].

espionage in China after carrying out the orders from the Japanese military. Toshio strongly wished his father to be legitimately rewarded for his military service and hardships while his father was alive. The way Toshio was driven by a sense of filial responsibility towards his father is comparable to the afore-mentioned case of Keiko, who built her father's tomb with her siblings to realise her father's unfulfilled wish to be repatriated (see p. 181). Toshio was deeply pleased that he could publish his book in 2014 just before his father passed away at the age of ninety-nine in Japan. Secondly, Toshio wanted to spread the message of peace and demonstrate the far-reaching consequences of the war because the war brought about serious hardships to Toshio and his family, including discrimination, dire poverty and the long-term imprisonment of his father and elder brother.⁸¹⁸

Although the Japanese government did not apologise or compensate his father's military pension before his death, publishing a book has provided Toshio with a new identity as a writer and a sense of being valued and respected. After he migrated to Japan, he could not feel 'secure, accepted, included, valued or respected' in his 'homeland'. He was treated as 'Chinese' because of the linguistic barrier. While it took six years to write the entire manuscript in Japanese, writing in Japanese instead of his native language was a way for him to prove to himself and others that he is 'Japanese'.⁸¹⁹ His strong identity as 'Japanese' was also evident in the interview in which he chose to speak in Japanese with the researcher (see Appendix 2). After publishing his book, he could finally feel valued and respected in Japan. Toshio received many letters from his readers who were moved by his story and wished the Japanese government to give Toshio's father legitimate recognition and compensation.⁸²⁰ As an author, he has been invited to a large event commemorating the seventieth end-of-war memorial day in Japan.⁸²¹

The cases of Koretada and Toshio point to the life-long significance of the construction of positive images of the father in their identity formation. In this process, they gained a new identity as a 'bridge builder' in their old age which provide them with a sense of purpose in the context of ongoing historical and political disputes between China and Japan. Koretada stated that his father is his 'driving force' that helps him to move forward. Toshio was also motivated to publish another book to address the injustice his father suffered.

⁸¹⁸ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku* [The last soldier that returned to Japan: Fukatani Yoshiharu and his family].

⁸¹⁹ Shiotsuka, Y. 2015. 'Chichi no kokorozashi tsugi ikka no kuan tsuzuru: Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei, Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazou, Fukatani Toshio san' [Writing about the family's predicament to carry out the intention of his deceased father: Fukatani Toshio and his book 'The last soldier that returned to Japan, Fukatani Yoshiharu and his family']. *Sankei Express*, January, p. 10.

⁸²⁰ Interview transcript, Toshio, Hiroshima, Japan, 15 January 2017.

⁸²¹ *Shōroku* 'Sensō o kataritsugu sekinin' [Excerpt from a lecture meeting 'The responsibility of telling stories of the war']. *Seishun to Dokusho*, September 2015, pp. 6-11.

5.3.3 Yuko's case: Changing concept of the father, identity and belonging

Yuko's case shows her struggle in constructing positive identity and belonging in her old age, wavering in between the majority group 'Japanese' and the minority group 'stranded war orphans' – social categories that are applicable to Sino-Japanese CBOW in the absence of their own special category. As discussed in Chapter 3 (p. 101), Yuko's applications for JRCW have been rejected, and she was questioning her choice to migrate to Japan as well as her identity and belonging during a series of interviews conducted between 2015 and 2017. MHLW's rejections in the post-migratory phase negatively affected her perception of the father that had previously been positive as well as her identity and belonging.

I met Yuko five times during the fieldwork (see Appendix 2) for the following reasons. First, she refused to have her interviews recorded, and the amount of information that I could obtain by taking notes was limited compared to interviews in which I could use a voice recorder. Secondly, in the process of building a trustful participant-researcher relationship, her positive narratives about her past experiences and father turned dramatically into negative narratives. To understand the gap in her positive and negative narratives, I asked for additional interview sessions. In the first interview, while carefully choosing her words, Yuko claimed that she was 'happy' (*shiwase*) and emphasised that she felt indebted towards numerous Japanese people who helped her in the process of repatriation and resettlement. She also shared numerous positive qualities and deeds of her father who was affectionate and endeavoured to realise Yuko's migration to Japan. However, from the end of the second interview, she started to reveal that MHLW's rejections of her applications for the special benefits for JRCW overshadowed the positive recollections of her experiences and her father. As mentioned earlier, Yuko also revealed that she has been suffering from occasional suicidal thoughts (see Chapter 2, p. 61).

In her narrative, Yuko distanced herself from Chinese people in general as well as the community of stranded war orphans. She emphasised that she belonged to the majority group – in her words, 'normal Japanese' (*futsū no Nihonjin*). Although Yuko fully used her linguistic and cultural skills that she acquired in China as a teacher of Chinese language, Chinese cuisine and Tai Chi in Japan, she rejected being perceived as 'Chinese'. She dissociated herself from Chinese people by making random criticisms of Chinese people in general with a disdainful tone regarding their hygiene standards, food safety and public behaviours. Yuko also developed a clear sense of superiority over stranded war orphans. Yuko stated that her father, with whom she could reunite in Japan, initially advised Yuko to return to China. It was not because he wanted her to leave Japan but because he thought that she would have to struggle with cultural and linguistic barriers if she decided to live in Japan. Yuko objected to him by saying, 'I am Japanese. I will

work hard in Japan and show that I can do things as well as Japanese people.’⁸²² Yuko took on several jobs as soon as she migrated to Japan in 1980. After employment in various part-time jobs, by 1987, she became a CEO of a trading company, a representative of a technology and development liaison organization of Heilongjiang Province and a Chinese language teacher. She has also endeavoured to be fluent in Japanese, which she believes is what sets her apart from the majority of stranded war orphans. It seemed that her sense of superiority over stranded war orphans developed when she started to work as a translator and a counsellor in a support group for stranded war orphans after acquiring advanced Japanese language skills. Yuko also made regular donations to a support group for stranded war orphans from her salary as a counsellor. Yuko criticised stranded war orphans who claimed that they were war victims (*sensō giseisha*); arguing that all Japanese people were more or less affected by the war. This narrative matched the Japanese government’s discourse which aimed to circumvent its responsibility towards stranded war orphans.⁸²³ Before the Japanese government passed a law to provide special benefits to stranded war orphans in 2008 (see Chapter 3, p. 99), MHLW has asserted that stranded war orphans are not entitled to special provisions because their tragic circumstances are mere variations of the suffering that all Japanese had to endure due to the war (see Chapter 3, p. 98).⁸²⁴

A newspaper article published in 1987 shows how Yuko contrasted herself with stranded war orphans.⁸²⁵ According to Yuko, an MHLW official, who regarded Yuko as an ‘exemplary returnee from China’, recommended a journalist to interview her to inspire stranded war orphans who remain dependent on welfare benefits. Yuko accepted this official’s request as she felt obliged to cooperate with the government as ‘Japanese’. While the article labelled Yuko as a ‘stranded war orphan that bear[s] the burden of the tragedy of war’ (*sensō no higeki o seotta koji*), she was also depicted as a white-collar, successful and independent-minded ‘stranded war orphan’. According to the article, Yuko mentioned that she disliked being labelled as a ‘pitiable stranded war orphan’ (*mijimena koji*). She also harshly criticised both the Japanese public and stranded war orphans by stating:

[The general public in Japan] think stranded war orphans can only do physical labour such as washing dishes. And stranded war orphans are complacent about such stereotypes. They are both wrong. . . . What I dislike the most is to be told that I have a strange face and I am dressed in funny-looking clothes like stranded war orphans. So I always tell

⁸²² In order to ensure the participant’s anonymity, I have excluded the reference of this newspaper article.

⁸²³ Efir, Japan’s ‘war orphans’: Identification and state responsibility, p. 365.

⁸²⁴ Ibid.

⁸²⁵ In order to ensure the participant’s anonymity, I have excluded the reference of this newspaper article.

myself, ‘I am not a stranded war orphan’. . . . I want to succeed and live on an equal footing as everyone else [in Japan].

After some stranded war orphans criticised Yuko for not presenting herself as a ‘war victim’ in the above article, Yuko gradually took distance from the community of stranded war orphans as she thought the differences of opinion between them and her were irreconcilable. Yuko constructed her identity differently to other stranded war orphans, and it is noteworthy that she felt she was more ‘Japanese’ than stranded war orphans who were born of Japanese parentage due to her work ethic, language ability, and her opinions that were in agreeance with those of the Japanese government.

However, when her applications for special benefits for JRCW were rejected and she lost the legal fight against MHLW (see Chapter 3, p. 101), Yuko started to question her identity and belonging. She felt betrayed by the Japanese government because she had endeavoured to be an ‘exemplary returnee from China’ without relying on welfare benefits. Yuko wrote the following in her letter to the researcher:

I feel so sad that it is suffocating. The [Japanese] society has not discriminated against me. Many kind people support me. But the state not only ignored my personality but also used me and disposed of me. . . . I never imagined that my application would be rejected. . . . I am saddened by the cold and unjust response. . . . Even if they don’t recognise me as a JRCW, I want them to understand my qualities.⁸²⁶

The irony of Yuko’s situation was that she craved for the Japanese government’s recognition of her past efforts, but she believes that the only way for the government to give her the recognition is to approve her as a JRCW – the same official category as stranded war orphans.

Other participants also contrasted themselves with stranded war orphans but in different ways. Michiko and Seiji exhibited their sense of affinity towards stranded war orphans. Both Michiko and Seiji are active members of local support groups for stranded war orphans and participate in regular activities such as language learning and exercise, which constitute an important part of their social life. Michiko, who was a doctor in Beijing, stated that she feels sorry for stranded war orphans because they are mostly from rural areas and were unable to receive a good education.⁸²⁷ She thinks that some stranded war orphans could not find a job in Japan because they were deprived of educational opportunities in China. While Seiji maintains genuinely good relationships with the community of stranded war orphans, he also pointed to the differences in their past living and working conditions in China.⁸²⁸ Seiji stressed the stranded war orphans’ difficult

⁸²⁶ Letter, Yuko to Kanako Kuramitsu, November 2017.

⁸²⁷ Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 20 December 2017.

⁸²⁸ Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

living conditions in China by talking about one of the stranded war orphans whose fingers are permanently curled towards his palm because of the hard agricultural work he participated during his time in northeast China. While Michiko and Seiji had experienced significant hardships in China, they concluded that they were relatively ‘fortunate’ after learning about the suffering of some stranded war orphans with whom they had become friends. Both Michiko and Seiji currently receive special benefits for JRCW because they migrated to Japan at the government’s expense. It could be assumed that in addition to cultural and linguistic similarities, being recipients of the same benefits in their old age contributes to their affinity towards stranded war orphans. Other participants who had little interaction with stranded war orphans in Japan expressed neither antipathy nor affinity towards stranded war orphans.

Yuko’s prolonged financial difficulty and MHLW’s rejection of her applications for the special benefits for JRCW ‘contaminated’ her previously positive concept of the father that constituted the central element in her identity and belonging. The studies on narrative identity – which refers to an individual’s internalised and evolving story of the self that a person constructs to make sense and meaning out of his or her life – propose several coding constructs to analyse how individuals create their identity through construction of their stories.⁸²⁹ McAdams and McLean defined the feature of one of the coding constructs, ‘contamination’, as ‘good or positive events turn dramatically bad or negative, such that the negative effect overwhelms, destroys, or erases the effects of the preceding positivity’.⁸³⁰ Such feature of ‘contamination’ narrative is apparent in Yuko’s narratives when analysed in a combined set of narratives over five interview sessions. Although she shared many positive aspects of her father in the first two interview sessions, she was unable to construct a positive concept of her father in the last three interview sessions. She bitterly criticised her father’s marital relationships with two other women as ‘morally unacceptable’. Yuko also stated that she had written an unpublished manuscript titled ‘Please give her life back to my mother’, in which she wrote about her mother’s plight and blamed her father for the sufferings she and her mother had to endure.⁸³¹ The negative construction of her deceased father also affected how she constructed her own identity and belonging. Although Yuko had previously stated that she is a ‘normal Japanese’, after reflecting further on her current difficulties, she stated that she is merely a ‘Chinese with Japanese nationality’ (*Nihon kokuseki o motteiru Chūgokujin*) after all. She also mentioned that she sometimes even considers ‘returning’ to China, indicating that her strong sense of belonging to Japan started to waver.

⁸²⁹ McAdams, Narrative Identity, p. 99.

⁸³⁰ McAdams, D.P. and McLean, K.C. 2013. Narrative Identity. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 22(3), pp. 233-238, p. 234.

⁸³¹ Unlike two participants (Koretada and Toshio) who published their manuscript, Yuko decided not to publish hers as she was afraid that she would not be allowed to travel to China after disclosing her mother’s plight in China.

5.3.4 Positivity in the narratives about past difficulties

Apart from Yuko, who was facing considerable financial and psychological difficulties at the time of the interview, other six participants who migrated to Japan positively narrated their past adversities. The use of positive emotions in narrating adverse experiences may appear baffling or be dismissed as a form of unhealthy denial.⁸³² However, by analysing how participants construct their past adversities and life choices to make meaning out of their lives, this section clarifies the factors that led to their positivity, in other words, their capacity to construct positive narratives.

Keiko is one of the participants who narrated the past adversities positively. Her narratives of past adversities are not just descriptions of what happened and how she felt at the time but are expressions of how she interpreted and experienced the negative incidents from today's perspective. In the narrative below, Keiko first talks about her experience of being bullied, but Keiko resolves the negative event to produce a positive ending.

Some boys at my school used to tease me by calling me ‘*xiaoriben*, *xiaoriben*’ (Japanese runt). Girls didn't do that to me, but boys... they made me furious.⁸³³ Once I could not tolerate it anymore and hit the bully with a stick of firewood.⁸³⁴ [Many years later,] I became a pharmacist, and that ‘bully’ joined the security bureau, which put people like me and my family under surveillance. . . . [During the Cultural Revolution,] medicine was in short supply, and people had to be on good terms with a pharmacist to buy medicine. . . . One day, the bully needed some medicine and came into a pharmacy without knowing that I worked there. As soon as he spotted me, he dashed out of the pharmacy. He was scared of me. [laughter] Later, his wife came in to fetch the medicine on behalf of him and told me that her husband is still scared of me. It's really funny to recall my childhood. [laughter]⁸³⁵

Keiko emphasised her resilience in the negative event in her childhood which had led to what she thinks as a ‘funny’ incident in her adulthood. Her narrative indicated that she was able to influence the bully by demonstrating that she was not a ‘victim’ who silently tolerated bullying.⁸³⁶ When participants narrated their adversities, most of them avoided and resisted being perceived as a ‘victim’. Seiji who was born in Nanjing in 1942, first

⁸³² Bonnano, G.A. 2004. Loss, trauma, and human resilience: Have we underestimated the human capacity to thrive after extremely aversive events? *American Psychologist*, 59(1), pp. 20-28, p. 26.

⁸³³ Interview transcript, Keiko, Kanagawa, Japan, 20 May 2016.

⁸³⁴ Ibid.

⁸³⁵ Ibid.

⁸³⁶ McAdams and McLean, Narrative Identity, p. 234.

stated that he was never bullied during his childhood.⁸³⁷ However, in the second interview, he narrated that he was occasionally called 'Japanese' by his neighbours.⁸³⁸

Neighbours used to call me *ribenren* (Japanese) and *xiaoriben* (Japanese runt). But they didn't have any ill intention. I was so small. . . . What can a small child like me do to them? So they called me like this.⁸³⁹

Seiji carefully constructed the narrative so that the incident would not be perceived as 'bullying'. Because his neighbours were generally kind to him, he interpreted that the 'name-calling' was not done out of malice and therefore was not remembered as a negative experience.⁸⁴⁰ The only participant who referred to himself as a 'war victim' was Toshio. He is currently seeking justice for his father who did not receive a sufficient military pension. While it is entirely justifiable to call himself a 'war victim' given the significant adversities he experienced, he constructs his narrative partially to achieve his objective.

Keiko also narrated her experience of being expelled from the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution with a positive tone.

During the Cultural Revolution, everyone used to try to become the Red Guards, right? ...I wore an armband of the Red Guards for only three days. Just three days, you know? It was one of my classmates who reported that I'm not fit for it. She said I'm a child of a foreigner. [The classmate said] her father is Japanese, so she can't be a member of the Red Guards. I was young at that time. I wasn't happy when they took it away from me. In retrospect, it was much better not to be one! [laughter]⁸⁴¹

Although it was a disappointing experience for Keiko in the past, upon learning the Red Guards had committed numerous cruelties and killed innocent people, she feels 'fortunate' that she did not become an accomplice. By showing an emotionally negative event that was triggered by her origin that led to a positive outcome, Keiko gave positive meaning to being a 'child of a foreigner'.⁸⁴²

Other participants also emphasised how 'fortunate' they have been when narrating their adversities. Koretada once managed to run away from imminent persecution by jumping out from a window on the first floor of a building in which he was under house

⁸³⁷ Interview notes, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 22 December 2015.

⁸³⁸ Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

⁸³⁹ Interview transcript, Yongyun, Shandong, China, 12 January 2017.

⁸⁴⁰ Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

⁸⁴¹ Ibid.

⁸⁴² McAdams and McLean, *Narrative Identity*, p. 234.

arrest. He showed me a scar on his knee that was gained during the escape and remarked as follows:

After I got older, I started to feel the pain in this joint again. Well, it can't be helped. I was really fortunate compared to other people. Really fortunate.⁸⁴³

Similar to the above narrative of Keiko who was expelled from the Red Guards, Koretada first talked about a negative event that put his life at risk but concluded the narrative positively. While the pain of the old wound reminds him of the incident, it is also a reminder of his survival and of how 'fortunate' he was. After the interview, Koretada came up with a word that he thought described himself well. He wrote it down on a piece of paper which read '*sensō no kōunji*' (a fortunate child born of war).

The above narratives highlight the importance of analysing the participants' stories of adversities against the backdrop of the tumultuous times they lived through. Based on what Sino-Japanese CBOW witnessed and heard about the fate of those who suffered the widespread violence during the Cultural Revolution including those who lost their lives, they feel 'fortunate' that they survived and could eventually migrate to Japan. Some participants (Michiko and Seiji) also stated that they feel 'fortunate' by comparing their significant hardships in China with that of stranded war orphans (see p. 188).

Positivity can also be identified in the participants' narratives about their challenges after migrating to Japan. Although they have encountered various difficulties in their post-migratory phase, most participants expressed their sense of satisfaction with regard to the aspects in life related to their economic, political and emotional motivations to migrate (see p. 168).

Most participants' efforts to learn the language and work in Japan had led to their current economic security in Japan. While most participants live in modest social housing, they currently do not have any financial concerns thanks to the business they own or the special benefits for JRCW which provide a basic pension and healthcare plan (see Chapter 3, p. 99), except for Yuko whose applications for the special benefits were rejected. By making a livelihood in Japan, they could provide educational and vocational opportunities for their children. Seiji and Michiko were particularly eager to talk about their children who currently have respectable jobs after graduating from Japanese universities.⁸⁴⁴ Keiko feels secure in Japan as she thinks economy and healthcare services in northeast China lag a long way behind Japan. She said '[Life in Japan] is not just a little better – a lot

⁸⁴³ Interview transcript, Koretada, Saitama, Japan, 22 May 2017.

⁸⁴⁴ Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.; Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 20 January 2017.; Interview transcript, Toshio, Hiroshima, Japan, 15 January 2017.; Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 12 May 2016.; Interview transcript, Keiko, Kanagawa, Japan, 20 May 2016.

better'.⁸⁴⁵ She concluded her narrative about the negative experiences due to language barriers and discrimination in Japan positively by stating that there were always people who extended support after migrating to Japan.

But I feel safe in Japan. It is reliable. . . . There are more good people
[than bad people]. [laughter]⁸⁴⁶

As we have seen, the emotional attachment to the father and the positive conceptualisation of the father has been central to constructing their own identity positively and in their motivation to migrate to Japan. I argue that the father factor continues to impact on their lives even in their old age. Both Keiko, who built a tomb in Japan for her father, and Toshio, who published a book about his father, feel relieved to have fulfilled their filial responsibility. Koretada also felt relieved when he could finally change his surname to his father's in 2017. While other participants started to use their father's surname upon registering themselves to *koseki* register, Koretada had used his uncle's surname for almost two decades for the following reason. After taking *shūseki* procedure (see Chapter 3, p. 92) in 1987, Koretada could receive an approval from the Japanese family court to add his name to his father's *koseki* register. However, because his father's Japanese wife was also registered in the same *koseki* register, Koretada decided not to add his name in order not to disturb his widowed stepmother's life. Instead, his uncle who was indebted to his father offered to adopt Koretada. After his uncle passed away, Koretada finally changed his surname from his uncle's to his father's. This example points to the unaltered significance of patronymic surnaming from their birth to old age.

As the case study of the child born of a Chinese 'comfort women' system survivor highlighted the need for a CBOW to construct acceptable or desirable notions of the father in their identity formation process, Sino-Japanese children born of consensual relationships in this study constructed idealised images of the absent father in the process of constructing their own identity, although the obtained knowledge about the father was not always positive. Such positive conceptualisation of the absent father was also pivotal in constructing their imagined 'homeland' which was not only associated with the father factor but also with safety, economic betterment and beautiful landscapes. Moreover, this chapter has also shown that the absent father was often the decisive factor that motivated Sino-Japanese CBOW to 'return' to their 'homeland' which helped them to sustain their effort in taking time-consuming procedures to acquire Japanese nationality. Although most Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study encountered significant adversities in post-war China for having a Japanese father, they constructed their narratives about their past positively while one participant constructed her narratives negatively. However, all cases

⁸⁴⁵ Keiko heard from someone that she is not eligible for any benefit and was not aware that some Sino-Japanese CBOW currently receive the benefits. Therefore, she has never applied for the benefits for JRCW. Interview transcript, Keiko, Kanagawa, Japan, 20 May 2016.

⁸⁴⁶ Interview transcript, Keiko, Kanagawa, Japan, 20 May 2016.

showed the life-long significance of the constructed notions of the long-lost father in their identity, belonging and life choices. They also point to the fact that their current familial and financial situation profoundly affect the way they reconstruct the past and their conceptualisation of the father. Although the analysis has limited generalisability due to the small number of participants, the particularities of their life trajectory provide explanations for the positivity expressed by most participants. Their life stories unfolded in a distinctively different way than the vast majority of CBOW who never had any means to search for their absent father, not to mention the means to migrate to their father's country. Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study were successful in their quest owing to the particular geopolitical and cultural context in which they were born and raised as well as to the legal route to migrate which opened up for them at a particular juncture of history. Having been raised with an affirmative recollection of the father and having accomplished their major life goals, they can reflect on the past and make a positive meaning out of it.

5.4 Discussion: Dilemmas of being socially invisible

Various groups of CBOW in different historical and geopolitical settings have formed their own support groups and networks in recent decades.⁸⁴⁷ This trend has been reinforced through the development of social media for CBOW of all ages.⁸⁴⁸ Some groups of CBOW form groups to support each other in achieving their important life goal – to search for their absent fathers. Forming a group and exchanging experiences and thoughts have proven to be extremely important especially for CBOW who have encountered the 'wall of silence', stigmatisation and discrimination.⁸⁴⁹

However, although all participants were aware that I was interviewing other individuals who share the same origin, none of them showed any interest in meeting them or learning about them. Only one participant, Yuko, clearly rejected the idea of forming a group with other Sino-Japanese CBOW. She stated, 'It is nothing but a nuisance (*meiwaku*) to be associated with a minority group'. Yuko referred to a child born of a Chinese 'comfort women' system survivor who approached Yuko to form a group to apply for the special benefits for JRCW together. Yuko does not find any advantage in

⁸⁴⁷ See, for example, Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 87.; Huijs-Watanuki, *Watashi wa dare no ko?: Chichi o sagashimotomeru Nikkei nisei orandajin tachi* [Whose child am I?: The second generation Japanese-Dutch descendants searching for their fathers].; Forgotten Children of War Association. <http://zdr.org.ba> (accessed 6 October 2020)

⁸⁴⁸ See, for example, Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 87.; *Erizabesu-sandāsu-hōmu: Beikoku de dōsōkai yobikake*' [Elisabeth Saunders Home: Calling for reunion in the U.S.], *JBpress*, 3 May 2014. <https://jbpress.ismedia.jp/articles/-/40641> (accessed on 5 June 2020); Kagawa, M. 'Postwar adoptees from Kanagawa shelter connect in U.S.', *The Japan Times*, 11 November 2014. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/11/11/national/history/postwar-adoptees-kanagawa-shelter-make-connections-share-stories-u-s/#.XtrE8W5FzIU> (accessed on 5 June 2020)

⁸⁴⁹ Lee, *Children born of war in the twentieth century*, p. 87; Huijs-Watanuki, *Watashi wa dare no ko?: Chichi o sagashimotomeru Nikkei nisei orandajin tachi* [Whose child am I?: The second generation Japanese-Dutch descendants searching for their fathers].

forming a group as she thinks that being a part of a minority group could bring about unwelcome attention, such as being constructed as a group of 'war victims' which Yuko wanted to avoid.

Although other participants did not explicitly express their opinions about forming a group, some assumptions can be made about their lack of interest. First, Sino-Japanese CBOW have already completed their search for the father (between the 1970s and 1990s). Secondly, participants did not have a common need for financial, legal and psychosocial support. Thirdly, while participants were eager to share their life stories with the researcher or publish their own autobiography/autobiographical novel, they did not yearn to be recognised and remembered as a collective. Participants regarded their experiences as something inherently unique and deeply personal. Toshio, for instance, believed that his father was the only intelligence agent who was allowed to marry a local woman during the war.⁸⁵⁰ Seiji, who happened to know a few other Sino-Japanese CBOW, stated that his life story is quite different from that of his acquaintances.⁸⁵¹

The question of group formation helps to highlight what constitutes Sino-Japanese CBOW's invisibility in Japan today. In Chapter 3, I discussed the lack of specific policies towards Sino-Japanese CBOW due to oversights as well as accidental and intentional exclusions (and inclusions of a limited number of Sino-Japanese CBOW) in the post-war historical and geopolitical context. Sino-Japanese CBOW were overshadowed by stranded war orphans in the process of their father search and nationality acquisition due to the media and support groups that treated them as a 'subgroup' of stranded war orphans. Once they acquired Japanese nationality, they were demographically absorbed into the majority group 'Japanese'. Unlike other groups of Japanese descendants such as Nikkeijin (see Chapter 1, p. 36) from South American countries who enter Japan with a special residence permit, Sino-Japanese CBOW have never been counted in the immigration statistics. These external factors may have significantly contributed to the current social invisibility of Sino-Japanese CBOW.

However, I argue that it is also the way Sino-Japanese CBOW have constructed their identity and belonging that led to their social invisibility. As we have seen, some participants positioned themselves vis-à-vis the majority group 'Japanese' as well as a minority group 'stranded war orphans' in the absence of an established category. Some participants had a clear preference to be perceived as members of the majority group over becoming members of minority categories such as 'Chinese in Japan' and 'stranded war orphans'.⁸⁵² One significant reason is because they believe that nationality is something that one inherits from the father and as a result fostered a strong sense of national

⁸⁵⁰ Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku*, p. 22.

⁸⁵¹ Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

⁸⁵² Refsing, *In Japan, but not of Japan*, p. 59.

belonging to Japan. However, in the case of Yuko, she refused to be categorised as a member of a minority group as ‘majority-minority relationship is by definition hierarchically ordered with power inequality’.⁸⁵³ Yuko perceived herself as morally superior to stranded war orphans and attempted to avoid the disadvantages (e.g. stigmatisation, discrimination) of being categorised as one of them.

The tension between the collective and individuals becomes inevitable once a group is formed. Sino-Japanese CBOW who have been interacting with stranded war orphans have witnessed first-hand that a ‘war victim’ narrative became the dominant narrative of stranded war orphans in their long legal fight against the state to receive compensation and sufficient welfare benefits (see Chapter 3, p. 98). In the process of creating the dominant narrative, narratives of stranded war orphans as well as Sino-Japanese CBOW that did not help strengthen the legal case have been excluded.⁸⁵⁴ As discussed above, most participants did not want to be reduced to the label of a ‘war victims’. They encountered significant adversities due to the association with their ‘enemy’ fathers, but they wished to emphasise their stories of familial love, resilience and accomplishment through a selective reconstruction of their autobiographical past. Thus, by remaining socially invisible, Sino-Japanese CBOW in this study constructed their deeply personal narratives via their interaction with the researcher, which was free from the constraints of a particular collective narrative.

The dilemma is, however, that by remaining invisible, the valuable voices of most Sino-Japanese CBOW will inevitably be lost. Those who need specific financial, legal, and psychosocial support may become isolated as well. The challenges in categorising this group of individuals will be discussed in the following chapter.

⁸⁵³ Ohnuki-Tierney, E. 1998. A conceptual model for the historical relationship between the self and the internal and external others. In *Making majorities: Constituting the nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States*, ed. D.C. Gladney, pp. 31-51, p. 51. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

⁸⁵⁴ Minami, *Chūgoku kikokusha o meguru hōsetsu to haijo no rekishishakaigaku: Kyōkai bunka no seisei to sono poritikkusu* [Historical sociology of inclusion and exclusion of returnees from China: Engendering border culture and its politics], pp. 235-237.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

6.1 Key findings and the question of terminology

This research project formed part of an international interdisciplinary doctoral training network on CBOW. The starting point of this particular research theme was the ambition to start closing our knowledge gap related to children born between Japanese soldiers and Chinese women during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Therefore, the development of the conceptual and analytical framework was based on the CBOW research framework. However, in the course of the research process, as the focus moved towards children conceived in consensual transnational relationships, and the father not always being a member of the armed forces, the question of the suitability of this framework and the appropriateness of considering the group I referred to as ‘Sino-Japanese CBOW’ as CBOW in the original sense of the definition needed to be re-examined.

My study participants were children of Japanese men who came to China because of the war, but, although some of them were part of the war effort (e.g. as intelligence officers), generally, at the time of befriending the participants’ mothers, they were not men in uniform. This contrasts sharply with the single case of the child of a Japanese soldier born within the context of the forced prostitution system, whose mother was a so-called ‘comfort woman’. The latter, a child born of sexual slavery, falls within the definition of a CBOW as he was fathered by an enemy soldier. The comparative analysis of his experiences with other groups of CBOW in different historical and geopolitical settings demonstrated that typical features of CBOW’s experiences manifested in his life. For example, he was subjected to the ‘wall of silence’ and to intense childhood adversities. He was also faced with ‘absolute fatherlessness’⁸⁵⁵ due to the taboo around the subject of the father and the absence of the father’s memorabilia.

The Sino-Japanese children born of consensual relationships, who were the main focus of this study, also had similar experiences as many groups of CBOW including their adverse experiences of being stigmatised and discriminated against as a direct consequence of being known to have an ‘enemy’ father. However, children born of Chinese mothers fathered by Japanese civilians and non-uniformed military personnel in other ways differ significantly with regard to their life course experiences, and many of those differences are attributable to the fact that they were not offspring of uniformed personnel. Although some fathers were soldiers before and/or after their marriage with a Chinese woman, this study discovered that they could have a perceptibly ‘normal’ family life that lasted from a few months to many years (see Appendix 5) precisely because they were not soldiers during that time. For instance, some Chinese wives of Japanese

⁸⁵⁵ Glaesmer, H. and Lee, S. Children born of war: A critical appraisal of the terminology.

intelligence agents were not informed of their husbands' actual occupation and believed that their Japanese husbands were civilians throughout their married life.⁸⁵⁶ This difference in the fathers' occupation led to the study group's experiences that were distinctively different from the majority of CBOW. What sets the study group apart from other groups of CBOW is that their physically absent fathers were very much 'present' in their lives and could construct positive images of the father from early on. Because the mothers could have a married life with their Japanese partner, even if their consensual relationships were rather nuanced, they could selectively recollect the positive aspects of their relationships and provide positive information about the father to the child.

In the absence of a satisfactory term for this group of individuals, I suggest that we refer to the participants of this study as 'children born to Chinese women fathered by Japanese military and non-military personnel during and after the Second Sino-Japanese War'. By referring to those participants in Chinese and Japanese languages, we immediately run into the questions of war memories. China calls the Second Sino-Japanese War the 'War of Resistance against the Japanese Aggression' (*zhongguo kangri zhanzheng*), whereas Japan calls the same war the 'Sino-Japanese War' (*Nicchū sensō*). Because these two countries remember the same war very differently from each other,⁸⁵⁷ it is therefore likely that the wartime consensual relationships and consequent childbirth might be interpreted differently as well.

While there is no grassroots initiative to create a collective term for the study group as participants do not have an urgent need or a common interest in forming a group, it would still be worthwhile for researchers of Asian war-affected children born of transnational heritage in the Asia-Pacific region to reflect on a common conceptual framework to study their experiences in the future. In 2017, there was an attempt to start an interdisciplinary research project to explore the conceptual framework of 'children born of the Asia-Pacific War' (*ajia taiheiyō sensō de umareta kodomotachi*), which was directly inspired by the concept of CBOW.⁸⁵⁸ Although the project has been discontinued due to circumstances beyond the control of the researchers, it was a welcome step towards understanding the current field of study and elucidating the circumstances under which these children were conceived as well as their experiences. Considering studies of children born before, during, and after Japan's wars in the Asia-Pacific region and studies of CBOW, many children were not only born of soldiers but also of non-uniformed military personnel and

⁸⁵⁶ Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 10 May 2016.; Fukatani, *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku* [The last soldier that returned to Japan: Fukatani Yoshiharu and his family], p. 22.

⁸⁵⁷ Rose, *Interpreting history in Sino-Japanese relations: A case study in political decision-making*, pp. 18-19.

⁸⁵⁸ "'Children Born of Asia-Pacific War' Study of Japanese fathered children under Japanese military occupation of Southeast and East Asia during the Second World War', Toyota Foundation Research Grant Program 2017 (grant number D17-R-0770).
<http://toyotafound.force.com/psearch/JoseiDetail?name=D17-R-0770> (accessed on 13 July 2020)

civilians, as in the case of China. Another distinct feature is that many children were born of Japanese soldiers and civilians who remained abroad after the war for various reasons.⁸⁵⁹ Developing a conceptual framework would not only facilitate cross-regional and cross-chronological analysis of these children's experiences, but also research on various groups of children who are missing from the public memory. Sino-Japanese children studied in this thesis would not have been discovered without the CBOW demanding their voices to be heard and the initiative of researchers in the field of CBOW who conceptualised CBOW and conducted cross-regional comparative analysis.

Despite this terminological issue, this qualitative analysis of the children born of Chinese mothers and non-soldier fathers can contribute to CBOW studies, and to the discussion about the idealisation of the absent father. The analysis of the case studies of Sino-Japanese children highlighted the need of these children to construct positive images of the father that are pivotal in constructing their positive personal identity. The analysis also pointed to the importance of gaining information about the father himself and his wartime roles that served as the basis for the children to selectively recollect the positive aspects of the father and construct acceptable or desirable notions of the father. While mediated knowledge about the father that Sino-Japanese children could obtain was not always positive (e.g. the father's active involvement in the warfare against the maternal country, the father's denial of the father-child relationship), the children's narratives about the father was overwhelmingly positive. Such construction of positive notions of the father based on the obtained knowledge becomes important particularly when these children come under attack from those who stigmatise and discriminate against them by demonising their 'enemy' father. Furthermore, this study elucidated the life-long significance of their constructed notions of the father in the development of their identity and belonging. In particular, it revealed that constructed notions of the father continue to be central to these children's identity and belonging even after completing the search for the long-lost father and migrating to the paternal country.

This study of children of transnational heritage fathered by 'enemy' men also contributes to the existing literature on second-generation return migrants born of a local parent and an immigrant parent who feel 'foreign' in their country of birth and deem the immigrant parent's country as their 'homeland' as well as their country of destination. Sino-Japanese children in this study were subjected to various acts of othering which led them to feel 'foreign' in their communities in post-war China. Both the participant interviews and personal documents from the law firm have shown that Sino-Japanese CBOW perceived their 'return' to the 'homeland' in the 1980s and 1990s as 'inevitable part of their migration story and their life'. Their difficulties in developing a sense of

⁸⁵⁹ See, for example, Hayashi, E. 2012. *Zanryū Nihon hei: Ajia ni ikita ichiman nin no sengo* [Lives of ten thousand Japanese soldiers who remained in Asian countries after the war]. Tokyo: Chūkōshinsho.

belonging to China and their emotional attachment to the constructed positive images of the absent father led to the idealisation of the paternal country as their ‘homeland’. While their economic, political and emotional motivations to migrate were inextricably intertwined, this study specifically contributes to the field of second-generation return migration by highlighting their emotional connection to the absent father and their longing to be in the father’s country as the key motivator, an emotional motivation that has not been discussed in the previous return migration studies. Moreover, this study also points out that the absent father was the prominent factor in constructing Sino-Japanese children’s notion of ‘homeland’ under the influence of patriarchy and unfavourable political climate for them.

6.2 Impact of research on participants and the researcher

The principal aim of oral history is to give voices to people who have been ‘hidden from history’. Because an oral history interview provides a rare chance to talk about one’s unique life experiences in the context of an evolving participant-researcher relationship, participation in oral history interview is closely linked to the empowerment of participants.⁸⁶⁰ Sino-Japanese children in this study had not had a chance to have their voices heard for more than six decades. The process of constructing narratives through interaction with a researcher, who was strongly interested in their life stories, seems to have led them to appreciate how extraordinary and valuable their own experiences are.

The cases of Michiko and Koretada illustrate how they regarded the research participation as a positive affirmation of their life experiences and became motivated to find their own voices. In the first interview with Michiko, she took a cautious stance towards the researcher. Her condition for participation in research was to ensure her anonymity, and she refused to allow the interview to be recorded (see Chapter 2, p. 59). Approximately eight months later, I proposed to her to make a short animation film based on her life story. To my surprise, she not only agreed to the proposal but also actively took part in the film-making by recording her voice for the film’s narration.⁸⁶¹ She appeared to have become confident in telling her story over time and even agreed to have her photo taken by a photographer in 2017.⁸⁶² In another instance, as mentioned earlier, Koretada published a novel based on his autobiography in Japan in June 2020.⁸⁶³ Koretada was a playwright in China, and he had a plan to write an autobiographical novel

⁸⁶⁰ Mishler, E. 1986. *Research interviewing: Context and narrative*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 118.

⁸⁶¹ ‘Michiko: a child born of war’, Zhou, V., 15 May 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvD-z5NaLUu> (accessed on 31 July 2020)

⁸⁶² Okuyama Miyuki, the Netherlands-based photographer, has taken some participants’ photos with the funding from the Toyota Foundation.

⁸⁶³ Serikawa, *Yahan no shōsei* [Sound of a bell in the middle of the night].

for almost forty years. However, he stated that he became motivated to finally publish the novel after narrating his experiences in two interviews with the researcher in May 2017.⁸⁶⁴

Conducting the interviews also had a considerable emotional impact on both the participants and the researcher. Yuko, who needed financial, legal and psychological support, described herself in a letter sent to me as ‘a wayside grass (*lubiancao*) at the brink of drying up and dying’ and wrote, ‘You are a very important person for me. Do you know how much it means to have someone who can listen to my sufferings in order for me to keep on living?’⁸⁶⁵ Conducting a ‘good interview’ and the emotional burden of listening to her life story were like two sides of the same coin. By establishing a relationship based on trust with a participant, as any oral historian would endeavour to do, the researcher was able to gain access to that participant’s previously untold personal life story. It is likely that Yuko herself did not originally regard the researcher as her ‘last resort’. As Yuko sensed, however, that I was eager to listen to her stories, her expectations towards me grew as did my emotional burden.

I could mitigate the emotional burden by receiving support from my supervisors and university counsellors, and by being part of the CHIBOW network. The ethics officers of the network provided advice on how to deal with sensitive and emotionally difficult issues arising from CBOW research. Moreover, two other historians in the CHIBOW network and I could collaborate to reflect on ethical responses to unanticipated expectations of CBOW towards the researcher in the research process.⁸⁶⁶ We have argued that balance and compromises need to be found between conflicting interests of meeting the research goals and taking into consideration the personal circumstances of the participants from various historical and geopolitical settings. Above experiences pointed to the importance of continuing discussions on how to better support future researchers on various groups of CBOW and other war-affected children who may be in need of psychosocial and legal support.

6.3 Implications for memories of the Second Sino-Japanese War

When I embarked on this research project in November 2015, I had little idea where this research would lead. Inspired by the eventual success in locating the study participants and cognizant of their age profile, I came to develop a sense of mission to find as many children born of the Second Sino-Japanese War as possible as it seemed unlikely that these individuals will be given other chances to have their voices heard. The fieldwork

⁸⁶⁴ Email correspondence, Koretada to Kanako Kuramitsu, 30 July 2020.

⁸⁶⁵ Letter, Yuko to Kanako Kuramitsu, November 2017.

⁸⁶⁶ Schretter, Kuramitsu and Sersté, Ethical challenges in conducting interviews with children born of war: Reflections on navigating participants’ expectations.

was an eye-opening journey during which I collected extraordinary life stories that pointed to a missing part of Sino-Japanese history.

The year 2020 marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War, but the future of Sino-Japanese relations remains uncertain. The legacy of the war has become the source of diplomatic friction between China and Japan since the 1980s. What was regarded as the recent thaw in the relations after decades of hostility has become precarious due to the United States' shift in its policy towards China and the heightening tension over the Japan-administered islets in the East China Sea.⁸⁶⁷

One of the contributions of this study is that it provides powerful evidence of transnational familial love and Sino-Japanese human interactions that defy the boundary between national war memories that have been constructed in China and Japan respectively over the years. The narratives of Sino-Japanese children whose entire lives have been affected by the war and the political and legal boundaries between China and Japan tell us that clear-cut and dichotomous narratives of the war and human interactions are neither natural nor self-evident. However small the number of these Sino-Japanese children may seem to the majority groups in each country, they undoubtedly participated in the making of Sino-Japanese history: They coped with various political, economic and social difficulties as 'Japanese children' in post-war China, became the pioneer group that acquired Japanese nationality amongst children born of local women and Japanese fathers due to wars in the Asia-Pacific region and realised their return migration by negotiating with the Japanese government and building their transnational personal networks. That their existence has remained unremembered to date also helps us realise that our discussions throughout the post-war period have often been focused on groups of individuals that have certain political value for the political elites. Such politicised memories make a broad range of wartime and post-war Sino-Japanese interpersonal relationships appear so bleak and narrow and prevent the public from learning about the histories of individuals that negotiated political, legal and imaginary Sino-Japanese boundaries and provide valuable perspectives from their unique standpoint.

While this research project could document the experiences of Sino-Japanese CBOW born of consensual relationships in the academic domain, it is most likely that their stories will remain relatively discreet not just because participants did not show their desire to

⁸⁶⁷ See, for example, Nakamura, K. 'Is the Japanese public on board with the "new era" of China-Japan relations?', *The Diplomat*, 10 June 2020. <https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/is-the-japanese-public-on-board-with-the-new-era-of-china-japan-relations/> (accessed on 3 August 2020); Burcu, O. and Wang, W. 2020. 'Land apart, shared sky': Sino-Japanese relations amid the Covid-19 Pandemic. *The Jamestown Foundation China Brief*, 20 (9). <https://jamestown.org/program/land-apart-shared-sky-sino-japanese-relations-amid-the-covid-19-pandemic/> (accessed on 3 August 2020); Johnson, J. 'China's 100-day push near Senkaku Islands comes at unsettling time for Sino-Japanese ties', *The Japan Times*, 27 June 2020. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/27/national/china-japan-senkaku-islands/#.Xyc6m25uLIU> (accessed on 3 August 2020)

be remembered as a collective but also because it seems that the media have little interest in covering their stories. During this research project, I came across a few cases in which people in the media industry played the role of ‘gatekeepers’ of memory, preventing the stories of Sino-Japanese children from being told to the public. First, a Chinese publishing company, that had published one of Koretada’s books in 2019, refused to publish his autobiographical novel in China. Presumably, the publisher had judged that the manuscript should be ignored because the story nuances the dominant Chinese narrative of the war. Second, I had an opportunity to hold a meeting in 2019 with directors of a Japanese documentary production company specialised in topics related to China who were initially interested in the stories of Sino-Japanese CBOW. They were particularly interested in the stories of children fathered by Japanese soldiers who remained in post-war Shanxi Province as they could have presented them as ‘children of forgotten soldiers in post-war China’.⁸⁶⁸ However, they stated that the stories of other Sino-Japanese children born of consensual relationships were not newsworthy enough based on the assumption that they lack the urgency and political activism that are necessary to catch the audience’s attention.

If Sino-Japanese children born during and after the Second Sino-Japanese War are to ever become a subject of public debate in the future, I wish to emphasise following important points. As discussed in this thesis, Sino-Japanese children born of consensual relationships encountered significant adversities, often lived in a state of constant fear of political persecution and were accused of a ‘crime’ of having an ‘enemy’ father. Thus, their experiences are comparable (though different) to those who were born of wartime sexual violence, and thus deserve our attention, too. Furthermore, I wish to stress again that the subject of their parents’ consensual relationships is not a statement to undermine the wartime atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese. Such an interpretation would go entirely against some participants’ intention in sharing their deeply personal stories with us as the lessons of history. Koretada stated ‘I am a “child of war” (*sensō no ko*)’, indicating that without the war, his parents would never have met and he would not have been born.⁸⁶⁹ He also said ‘I am a “child of peace” (*heiwa no ko*)’ because he wants to promote peace and friendship based on his life experiences as a child of an ‘enemy’ father. I hope Sino-Japanese children who have been missing from the war memories will serve as an opportunity to question our preconceptions and understanding of the wartime and post-war Sino-Japanese interpersonal relationships as well as to re-imagine a better future for Sino-Japanese relationships.

⁸⁶⁸ While ego-documents of two former Japanese soldiers in Shanxi Province could be found, I have not been able to identify these individuals.

⁸⁶⁹ Fujita, Y. ‘*Gekidō no hansei shōsetsu ni*’ [Publishing a novel about his tumultuous life], *Mainichi Shimbun*, 15 August 2020.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adachi, N. 2006. Introduction: Theorising Japanese diaspora. In *Japanese Diasporas: Unsung pasts, conflicting presents, and uncertain futures*, ed. N. Adachi, pp. 1-22. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Al-Ali, N. and Koser, K. 2002. Transnationalism, international migration and home. In *New Approaches to Migration? Transnational communities and the transformation of home*, eds. N. Al-Ali and K. Koser, pp. 1-14. London and New York: Routledge.
- Anderson, B. 2006. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso Books.
- Anderson, K. and Jack, D.C. 2015. Learning to listen: Interview techniques and analyses. In *The oral history reader*, eds. R. Perks and A. Thomson, pp. 179-192. London: Routledge.
- Ang, I. 2001. *On not speaking Chinese: Living between Asia and the West*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Aoki, F. 2016. *Sawada Miki: GHQ to tatakatta onna* [Sawada Miki: The woman who fought GHQ]. Tokyo: Shinchosha.
- Apio, E. 2016. 'Children Born of War in Northern Uganda: Kinship, Marriage, and the Politics of Post-conflict Reintegration in Lango society'. PhD thesis, University of Birmingham.
- Araragi, S. ed. 2000. '*Chūgoku kikokusha*' no seikatsu sekai [Life world of 'returnees from China']. Kyoto: Korosha.
- Araragi, S. 2000. *Chūgoku kikokusha kenkyū no kanōsei to kadai* [Studies on returnees from China and challenges]. In '*Chūgoku kikokusha*' no seikatsu sekai [Life world of 'returnees from China'], ed. S. Araragi, pp. 389-421. Kyoto: Korosha.
- Araragi, S. 2007. *Chūgoku 'zanryū' Nihonjin no kioku no katari: Katari no henka to 'katari no jiba' o megutte* [Narratives from the memory of Japanese remaining in post-war China: Changes in their narratives and 'social context of their narratives']. In '*Manshū*': *Kioku to rekishi* ['Manchuria': Memory and history], ed. Y. Yamamoto, pp. 212-251. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press.
- Araragi, S. ed. 2009. *Rethinking Manchukuo and Japan: A living history of Japanese left-behind in China after WWII*. Tokyo: Bensei.
- Araragi, S. 2016. Diversifying 'Japanese returning from China': the crossroad of post-colonialism and globalism. *Cosmopolis*, 20, pp. 1-26.
- Arnold-de Simone, S. 2013. *Mediating memory in the museum: Trauma, empathy, nostalgia*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Asano Tamanoi, M. 2000. A road to 'a redeemed mankind': The politics of memory among the former Japanese peasant settlers in Manchuria. *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 99(1), pp. 163-191.

- Asano Tamanoi, M. 2005. Introduction. In *Crossed Histories: Manchuria in the age of empire*, ed. M, Asano Tamanoi, pp. 1-24. Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawai'i Press.
- Asano Tamanoi, M. 2006. Japanese war orphans and the challenges of repatriation in post-colonial East Asia. *The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus*, 4 (8), pp. 1-17.
- Baldassar, L. Missing kin and longing to be together: Emotions and the construction of co-presence in transnational relationships. *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 29(3), pp. 247-266.
- Barclay, P. D. 2005. Cultural brokerage and interethnic marriage in colonial Taiwan: Japanese subalterns and their aborigine wives, 1895-1930. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 64(2), pp. 323-360.
- Baskett, M. 2008. *The attractive empire: Transnational film culture in imperial Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Behlau, W. ed. 2015. *Distelblüten: Russenkinder in Deutschland* [Thistle flowers: Russian children in Germany]. Ganderkesee: Countour.
- Berthomière, W. 2003. Integration and the social dynamic of ethnic migration: The Jews from the former Soviet Union in Israel. In *Diasporas and ethnic migrants: Germany, Israel and Russia in comparative perspective*, eds. R. Münz and R. Ohliger, pp. 315-331. London and Portland: Frank Cass.
- Bix, H. P. 1992. The Showa Emperor's 'monologue' and the problem of war responsibility. *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 18(2), pp. 285-363.
- Bonnano, G.A. 2004. Loss, trauma, and human resilience: Have we underestimated the human capacity to thrive after extremely aversive events? *American Psychologist*, 59(1), pp. 20-28.
- Bovenkerk, F. 1974. *The sociology of return migration: A bibliographic essay*. Publications of the Research Group for European Migration Problems: The Hague.
- Brubaker, R. and Cooper, F. 2000. Beyond 'identity'. *Theory and Society*, 29, pp. 1-47.
- Brubaker, R. 2005. The 'Diaspora' Diaspora. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28(1), pp. 1-19.
- Bucheim, E. 2008. 'Hide and seek': Children of Japanese-Indisch parents. In *Forgotten Captives in Japanese occupied Asia*, eds. K. Blackburn and K. Hack, pp. 260-277. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.
- Buchheim, E. 2015. Enabling remembrance: Japanese-Indisch descendants visit Japan. *History and Memory*, 27(2), pp. 104-125.
- Bulanda, R. E. and Majumdar, D. 2008. Perceived parent-child relations and adolescent self-esteem. *Journal of Child and Family Studies*, 18(2), pp. 203-212.
- Burawoy, M. 1998. The extended case method. *Sociological Theory*, 16(1), pp. 4-33.
- Burcu, O. and Wang, W. 2020. 'Land apart, shared sky': Sino-Japanese relations amid the Covid-19 Pandemic. *The Jamestown Foundation China Brief*, 20(9). <https://jamestown.org/program/land-apart-shared-sky-sino-japanese-relations-amid-the-covid-19-pandemic/> (accessed on 3 August 2020)

- Burgos-Debray, E. ed. 1984. *I, Rigoberta Menchú: an Indian woman in Guatemala*. London: Verso.
- Carpenter, C. R. 2005. Children born of wartime rape in Bosnia Herzegovina: A preliminary study. In UNICEF report 2005.
- Carpenter, R.C. ed. 2007. *Born of war: Protecting children of sexual violence survivors in conflict zones*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Carpenter, R.C. 2010. *Forgetting children born of war: Setting the human rights agenda in Bosnia and beyond*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Cassarino, J. 2010. Theorising return migration: The conceptual approach to return migrants revisited. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, 6(2), pp. 253-279.
- Castles, S. and Miller, M. J. eds. 2014. *The age of migration: international population movements in the modern world*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Chan, Y. 2011. *Abandoned Japanese in postwar Manchuria: The lives of war orphans and wives in two countries*. Abingdon, New York: Routledge.
- Chen, T. 2007. Minorities 'in between' China and Japan: Complexity of legal status and identity. *Bulletin of National Museum of Ethnology*, 31(3), pp. 419-437.
- Chen, Z. 2010. *Shanghai ni ikita Nihonjin: Bakumatsu kara haisen made* [Japanese who resided in Shanghai: From the end of Edo Period to Japan's defeat]. Tokyo: Taishukan Shoten.
- Ching, F. 2018. Nationality vs ethnic identity: Attitudes toward passports by China, other national governments and a multiplicity of people in Hong Kong. *Asian Education and Development Studies*, 7(2), pp. 223-233.
- Ching, L. 2012. 'Japanese devils': The conditions and limits of anti-Japanism in China. *Cultural Studies*, 26(5), pp. 710-722.
- Christou, A. 2006. American dreams and European nightmares: Experiences and polemics of second-generation Greek-American returning migrants. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 32(5), pp. 831-845.
- Christou, A. and King, R. 2010. Imagining 'home': Diasporic landscapes of the Greek-German second generation. *Geoforum*, 41, pp. 638-646.
- Clifford, J. 1994. Diasporas. *Cultural Anthropology*, 9(3), pp. 302-338.
- Coble, P. M. 2007. China's 'new remembering' of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 1937-1945. *The China Quarterly*, 190, pp. 394-410.
- Cohen, R. 1997. *Global diasporas: An introduction*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Committee to compile 'The 50-year history of relief measures' of Social Welfare and War Victim's Relief Bureau, the Ministry of Health and Welfare. ed. 1997. *Engo 50 nenshi* [The 50-year history of relief measures (for remaining Japanese overseas)]. Tokyo: Gyosei.

- Constable, N. ed. 2005. *Cross-border marriages: Gender and mobility in transnational Asia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Cooper, F. and Stoler, A. L. 1997. *Tensions of empire: Colonial cultures in a bourgeois world*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Côté, J. E. and Levine, C. 1988. A critical analysis of the ego identity status paradigm. *Developmental Review*, 8, pp. 147-184.
- Côté, J. E. 2006. Identity studies: How close are we to establishing a social science of identity? An appraisal of the field. *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research*, 6, pp. 3–25.
- Daitōshō Sōmukyoku Keizaika. 2004. *Chūkaminokoku zairyū honpōjin oyobi daisankokujin jinkō gaikēihyō, shōwa 19 nen dai san pō* [Figures of Japanese and foreign population residing in the Republic of China, third edition]. In *Senzenki Chūgoku zairyū Nihonjin tōkei dai 8 kan* [Figures of Japanese residing in China in the pre-war period, Volume 8], pp. 1-33. Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan.
- de Tinguy, A. 2003. Ethnic migrations of the 1990s from and to the successor states of the former Soviet Union: ‘Repatriation’ or privileged migration? In *Diasporas and ethnic migrants: Germany, Israel and Russia in comparative perspective*, eds. R. Münz and R. Ohliger, pp. 100-113. London and Portland: Frank Cass.
- Delic, A., Kuwert, P., and Glaesmer, H. 2017. Should the definition of the term ‘children born of war’ and vulnerabilities of children from recent conflict and post-conflict settings be broadened? *Acta Medica Academia*, 46(1), pp. 67-69.
- Denov, M. and Lakor, A. A. 2017. When war is better than peace: The post-conflict realities of children born of wartime rape in northern Uganda. *Child Abuse and Neglect*, 65, pp. 255-265.
- Dower, J. W. 1993. *War without mercy: Race and power in the pacific war*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Dower, J. W. 1999. *Embracing defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II*. New York: The New Press.
- Dragojlovic, A. 2011. Did you know my father?: The zone of unspeakability as postcolonial legacy. *Australian Feminist Studies*, 26(69), pp. 319-334.
- Duus, P., Myers, R. H. and Peattie, M. R. eds. 1996. *The Japanese wartime empire, 1931-1945*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Efird, R. 2008. Japan’s ‘war orphans’: Identification and state responsibility. *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 34(2), pp. 363-388.
- Efird, R. 2010. Distant kin: Japan’s ‘war orphans’ and the limits of ethnicity. *Anthropological Quarterly*, 83(4), pp. 805-838.
- Enari, T. 1984. *Shaohai no manshū* [Children and Manchuria]. Tokyo: Shueisha,
- Erjavec, K. and Volčič, Z. 2010. Living with the sins of their fathers: An analysis of self-representation of adolescents born of war rape. *Journal of Adolescent Research*, 25(3), pp. 359-386.

- Ericsson, K. and Simonsen, E. eds. 2005. *Children of World War II: The Hidden Enemy Legacy*. Oxford: Berg Publishers.
- Evans, G. E. et al. 1972. The Leicester conference on problems of oral history (Thursday 23rd March-Saturday 25th March 1972): Four impressions. *Oral History*, 1(3), pp. 3-14.
- Ezawa, A. 2012. *Kodomo to sensō: Nikkei orandajin no kōjutsushi* [Children and war: Oral history of Japanese-Indisch Dutch people]. *The journal of Ohara Institute for Social Research*, 648, pp. 32-52.
- Ezawa, A. 2015. 'The guilt feeling that you exist': War, racism and Indisch-Japanese identity formation. In *Race and racism in modern East Asia Vol.II: Interactions, nationalism, gender and lineage*, eds. R. Kowner and W. Demel, pp. 481-502. Leiden: Brill.
- Fanon, F. 1991. *Les Damnés de la Terre* [The Wretched of the Earth]. Paris: Gallimard.
- Field, N. 1993. *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor: Japan at Century's End*. New York: First Vintage Books.
- Fielding, N. 1994. Varieties of research interviews. *Nurse Researcher*, 1(3), pp. 4-13.
- Fuchs, D., Tse, P. F. and Feng, X. 2019. Labour research under coercive authoritarianism: Comparative reflections on fieldwork challenges in China. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 40(1), pp. 132-155.
- Fukatani, T. 2014. *Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei: Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazoku* [The last soldier that returned to Japan: Fukatani Yoshiharu and his family]. Tokyo: Shueisha.
- Funao, O. 2015. *War-displaced Japanese descendants of the Philippines*. Tokyo: Tosei Publishing.
- Furuyama, K. 1971. *Shiroi tanbo* [White rice field]. In *Bungaku Senshū 36* [Selected literary works 36], ed. Nihon bungeika kyōkai. Tokyo: Kodansha.
- Garon, S. 2010. State and family in modern Japan: A historical perspective. *Economy and Society*, 39(3), pp. 317-336.
- Gillin, D. G. 1983. Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945-1949. *Journal of Asian Studies*, 42(3), pp. 497-518.
- Ginsburgs, G. 1982. The 1980 Nationality law of the People's Republic of China. *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, 30(3), pp. 459-498.
- Glaesmer, H. et al. 2012. Die Kinder des Zweiten Weltkrieges in Deutschland: Ein Rahmenmodell für die psychosoziale Forschung [Children of World War Two in Germany: Framework for psychological research]. *Trauma und Gewalt*, 6, pp. 319-328.
- Glaesmer et al. 2017. Childhood maltreatment in children born of occupation after WWII in Germany and its association with mental disorders. *International Psychogeriatrics*, 29(7), pp. 1147-1156.
- Glaesmer, H. and Lee, S. Children born of war: A critical appraisal of the terminology. Forthcoming.

- Gluck, C. 2007. Operations of memory. In *Ruptured histories: War, memory, and the post-Cold War in Asia*, eds. S. Miyoshi Jager. and R. Mitter, pp. 47-77. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
- Grieg, K. 2001. *The war children of the world*. Bergen: War and Children Identity Project.
- Gries, R. 2015. Les enfants d'État: Französische Besatzungskinder in Deutschland [Les enfants d'État: French occupation children in Germany]. In *Besatzungskinder, Die Nachkommen alliierter Soldaten in Österreich und Deutschland* [Occupation children: The offspring of Allied soldiers in Austria and Germany], eds. B. Stelzl-Marx and S. Satjukow, pp. 380-407. Wien: Böhlau-Verlag.
- Gupta, M. D. and Li, S. 1999. Gender bias in China, South Korea and India 1920-1990: Effects of war, famine and fertility decline. *Development and Change*, 30(3), pp. 619-652.
- Hamel, M. 2016. Ethnic belonging of the children born out of rape in postconflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda. *Nations and Nationalism*, 22(2), pp. 287-304.
- Hamilton, C. 2008. On being a 'good' interviewer: Empathy, ethics and the politics of oral history. *Oral History*, 6(2), pp. 35-43.
- Hamilton, C. 2010. Moving feelings: Nationalism, feminism and the emotions of politics. *Oral History*, 38(2), pp. 85-94.
- Hamilton, W. 2013. *Children of the occupation: Japan's untold story*. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press.
- Harding, J. 2010. Talk about care: Emotions, culture and oral history. *Oral History*, 38(2), pp. 33-42.
- Hatano, M. and Iimori, A. 2000. Visits of the Red Cross Society of China mission and Japan. *Tokiwa Kokusai Kiyo*, 4, pp. 1-18.
- Hauser, W. B. 1998. Japanese war films. In *World War II in Asia and the Pacific and the war's aftermath, with general themes: A handbook of literature and research*, eds. L. E., Lee and R. Higham, pp. 255-262. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Hayashi, E. 2012. *Zanryū Nihon hei: Ajia ni ikita ichiman nin no sengo* [Lives of ten thousand Japanese soldiers who remained in Asian countries after the war]. Tokyo: Chūkōshinsho.
- Hershatter, G. 2011. *The Gender of memory: Rural women and China's collective past*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ho, B., Bartels, S. and Lee, S. 2019. Life courses of Amerasians in Vietnam: A qualitative analysis of emotional well-being. *VNU Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 5(5).
- Honjo, Y. et al. eds. 2014. *Shirīzu sensō koji: Konketsu koji, erizabesu sandāsu hōmu e no michi* [Series, war orphans: Mixed-blood orphans, how they arrived at Elizabeth Saunders Home]. Tokyo: Choubunsha.
- Honma, T. 1995. *Sensō no otoshigo rarabai* [Lullaby of a child born of war]. Tokyo: Sanichishobo.

- Hooper, B. 2016. *Foreigners under Mao: Western lives in China, 1949-1976*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Horii, K. 2012. The Japanese who were kept working in Tianshui by conscription after the foundation of the People's Republic of China. *Gendai Chūgoku*, 86, pp. 95-106.
- Hoshina, H. 2002. *Shokuminchi no 'konketsuji': Naitaikekkon no seijigaku* [Colonial 'mixed-blood children': Politics of Japanese-Taiwanese intermarriage]. In *Taiwan no 'Daitōasensō': Bungaku, media, bunka* [Taiwan's 'Great East Asia War': Literature, media and culture], eds. S. Fujii, C. Tarumi and Y. Huang, pp. 267-294. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- Huang, J. 2013. *Nihon tōchi jidai niokeru 'naitai kyōkon' no kōzō to tenkai* [Structure and development of Japanese-Taiwanese intermarriage during the Japanese colonial period]. *Hikaku kazokuhi kenkyū*, 27, pp. 128-155.
- Huijs-Watanuki, Y. 2006. *Watashi wa dare no ko?: Chichi o sagashimotomeru Nikkei nisei orandajin tachi* [Whose child am I?: The second generation Japanese-Dutch descendants searching for their fathers]. Tokyo: Nashinokisha.
- Hutnik, N. 1991. *Ethnic minority identity: A social psychological perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ikeya, K. 2010. *Ari no heitai: Nihonhei 2600 nin sanseishō zanryū no shinsō* [Ant soldiers: Truth about 2,600 Japanese soldiers who remained in Shanxi Province]. Tokyo: Shinchosha.
- Ioriya, K. 2009. *Chūgoku zanryū Nihonjin shien shisaku no tenkai to mondaiten: Borantia no shiten kara* [Development and problem of policy to support Japanese remaining in post-war China: From a volunteer's point of view]. In *Rethinking Manchukuo and Japan: A living history of Japanese left-behind in China after WWII*, ed. S. Araragi, pp. 213-254. Tokyo: Bensei.
- Itoh, M. 2010. *Japanese war orphans in Manchuria: forgotten victims of World War II*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ivanhoe, P. J. 2004. Filial piety as a virtue. In *Filial piety in Chinese thought and history*, eds. A. Chan and S. Tan, Chapter 11. London: Routledge.
- Jacka, T., Kipnis, A. B. and Sargeson, S. 2013. *Contemporary China: Society and social change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Japan Red Cross. 1972. *Nihon Sekijūjisha Shashikō Dai 6 Kan* [Japan Red Cross, draft of the company history, volume 6].
- Jensen, S. Q. 2011. Othering, identity formation and agency. *Qualitative Studies*, 2(2), pp. 63-78.
- Johnson, E. 2007. *Dreaming of mail-order husband*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Johnson, M. 2007. The theoretical and social context of research ethics. In *Research ethics in the real world: Issues and solutions for health and social care*, eds. T. Long and M. Johnson, pp. 29-46. Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone.

- Jones, K. A. 2007. Assessing the impact of father-absence from a psychoanalytic perspective. *Psychoanalytic Social Work*, 14(1), pp. 43-58.
- Jones, P. and Krzyżanowski, M. 2008. Identity, belonging and migration: Beyond constructing ‘others’. In *Identity, belonging and migration*, ed. D. Gerard, pp. 38-53. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- Josei kokusai senpan hōtei 10 shūnen jikkōinkai. ed. 2011. *Hōtei wa nani o sabaki, naniga kawattaka: seibōryoku, minzoku sabetsu, shokuminchishugi* [What did the court judge? What changed?: Sexual violence, ethnic/racial discrimination, colonialism]. Josei kokusai senpan hōtei 10 shūnen jikkōinkai: Tokyo.
- Kaiser, M., et al. 2015. Depression, somatization, and posttraumatic stress disorder in children born of occupation after World War II in comparison with a general population. *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, 203(10), pp. 1-7.
- Kaiser, M. et al. 2018. Long-term effects on adult attachment in German occupation children born after World War II in comparison with a birth-cohort-matched representative sample of the German general population. *Ageing and Mental Health*, 22(2), pp. 197-207.
- Kaji, M. 1957. *Chūgoku ryūyō jūnen* [Serving China for ten years]. Tokyo: Iwanamishinsho.
- Kaji, I. 2001. *Chūgoku zanryū hōjin*” no keisei to ukeire ni tsuite [Formation and acceptance of remaining Japanese in post-war China]. In T. Kajita, ed. *Kokusai imin no shindōkō to gaikokujin seisaku no kadai: Kakkoku ni okeru genjō to torikumi* [New trends of international immigrants and challenges in policy towards foreigners in Japan], pp. 271-294. <https://www.kikokusha-center.or.jp/resource/ronbun/kakuron/24/kaji.pdf> (accessed on 28 July 2020)
- Kamita, S. 2018. *‘Konketsuji’ no sengoshi* [Post-war history of ‘mixed-blood’ children]. Tokyo: Seikyusha.
- Kano, M. 2007. *‘Konketsuji’ mondai to tan’itsu minzoku shinwa no seisei* [How ‘mixed-blood’ problem and myth of homogeneity came into being]. In *Senryō to sei: seisaku, jittai, hyōshō* [Occupation and sex: Policy, reality and representation]. Tokyo: Impact Shuppankai.
- Karpf, A. 2014. The human voice and the texture of experience. *Oral History*, 42(2), pp. 50-55.
- Kataoka, T. 1995. *Ha wa ochite ne ni kaeru: luoye guigen-Chūgoku no yōfubo to Nihonjin zanryūkoji no monogatari* [All leaves return to the roots: Stories of stranded war orphans and their adoptive parents]. Tokyo: Toyoigakusha.
- Kato, Y. 1995. Demobilization and repatriation of Japanese armed forces in China. *Kokusai Seiji*, 109, pp. 110-125.
- Kato, K. ed. 2002. *Kaigai hikiage kankei shiryō shūsei 32 Chūgoku hondo hen* [Compilation of documents regarding repatriation from abroad, 32, China mainland]. Tokyo: Yumani Shobo.
- Käuper, E. Children born of the Indochina War: National ‘reclassification’, diversity, and multiple feelings of belonging. Forthcoming.

- Kawai, Y. 2014. *Nihon ni okeru jinshu-minzoku gainen to ‘Nihonjin’ ‘konketsu’ ‘hāfu’* [Concept of race/ethnicity, ‘Japanese’, ‘mixed-blood’ and ‘hāfu’ in Japan]. In *Hāfu towa dareka: Jinshu konkō, media hyōshō, kōshō jissen* [Who are hāfu?: Mixed race, media representation and practice of negotiation] , ed. K. Iwabuchi, pp. 28-54. Tokyo: Seikyusha.
- Kawasaki, T. 2017. *Eiga ‘shina no yoru’ ni taisuru ken’etsu no tagensei* [Multi-faceted censorship of the film ‘China Night’]. *Intelligence*, 17, pp. 124-134.
- Kelly, K. R. 2016. Mother-child conversations and child memory narratives: the roles of child gender and attachment. *Psychology of Language and Communication*, 20(1), pp. 48-72.
- Kiconco, A. 2015. ‘Understanding former “girl soldiers”’: Central themes in the lives of formerly abducted girls in post-conflict Northern Uganda’. PhD thesis, University of Birmingham.
- Kılınc, N. and King, R. 2017. The quest for a ‘better life’: Second-generation Turkish-Germans ‘return’ to ‘paradise’. *Demographic Research*, 36, pp. 1491-1514.
- King, A. 2015. Reconstructing China: Japanese technicians and industrialization in the early years of the People’s Republic of China. *Modern Asian Studies*, pp. 1-34.
- King, R. and Christou, A. 2010. Diaspora, migration and transnationalism: Insights from the study of second-generation ‘returnees’. In *Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods*, ed. R. Bauböck and T. Faist, pp. 167-183. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- King, R., Christou, A. and Ahrens, J. 2011. ‘Diverse mobilities’: Second-generation Greek-Germans engage with the homeland as children and as adults. *Mobilities*, 6(4), pp. 483-501.
- King, R. and Christou, A. 2014. Second-generation ‘return’ to Greece: New dynamics of transnationalism and integration. *International Migration*, 52(6), pp. 85-99.
- King, R. and Kılınc, N. 2014. Second-generation Turks from Germany ‘return’ to Turkey. *Nordic Journal of Migration Research*, 4(3), pp. 126-133.
- Ko, M. 2014. *Sengo Nihon ni okeru ‘konketsuji’ ‘hāfu’ hyōshō no keifu* [Genealogy of representations of ‘mixed-blood children’ and ‘hafu’ in post-war Japan]. In *Hāfu towa dareka: Jinshu konkō, media hyōshō, kōshō jissen* [Who are hāfu?: Mixed race, media representation and practice of negotiation] , ed. K. Iwabuchi, pp. 80-113. Tokyo: Seikyusha.
- Kobayashi, M. 2016. Japanese residents in North China during the Sino-Japanese War. *NUIS Journal of International Studies*, 1, pp. 103-116.
- Kōseishō. 1943. *Yamato minzoku o chūkaku to suru sekai seisaku no kentō* [An investigation of global policy with the Yamato race as nucleus].
- Kōseishō hikiage engokyoku. 1961. *Maizuru chihō hikiage engokyoku shi* [History of Maizuru Regional Bureau of Repatriation and War Victim’s Relief].
- Kōseishō. ed. 1997. *Engo gojū nen shi* [The fifty-year history of assistance extended to repatriates]. Tokyo: Gyōsei.

- Koshiro, Y. 2013. East Asia's 'melting-pot': Reevaluating race relations in Japan's colonial empire. In *Race and racism in modern East Asia: Western and eastern constructions*, eds. R. Kowner and W. Demel, pp. 475-498. Leiden, Boston: Brill.
- Koya, Y. 1939. *Minzoku kokusaku no shomondai* (1) [Issues regarding state policies on race (1)]. *Yūseigaku* [Eugenics], 189, pp. 3-13.
- Koya, Y. 1939. *Minzoku kokusaku no shomondai* (2) [Issues regarding state policies on race (2)]. *Yūseigaku* [Eugenics], 190, pp. 1-10.
- Koya, Y. 1944. *Kyōeiken to konketsu no mondai* [The problem of mixed-blood in the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere]. In *Senjika no shinkekkon* [New marriage during the war], ed. H. Maki, pp. 66-73. Osaka: Asahi Shobo.
- Kunuroglu, F. et al. Motives for Turkish return migration from Western Europe: Home, sense of belonging, discrimination and transnationalism. *Turkish Studies*, 19(3), pp. 422-450.
- Kushner, B. 'Chinese war crimes trials and Japan – A brief assessment'. Speech, Beijing Forum 2015, Diaoyutai State Guest House, Beijing, 6 November 2015.
- Kushner, B. and Muminov, S. eds. 2017. *The dismantling of Japan's empire in East Asia: Deimperialisation, postwar legitimisation and Imperial afterlife*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.
- Lados, G. and Hegedűs, G. 2019. Return migration and identity change: A Hungarian case study. *Regional Statistics*, 9(1), pp. 150-167.
- Landsberg, A. 2009. Memory, empathy, and the politics of identification. *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 22, pp. 221-229.
- Lee, S. 2011. A forgotten legacy of the Second World War: GI children in post-war Britain and Germany. *Contemporary European History*, 20(2), pp. 157-181.
- Lee, S. 2017. *Children born of war in the twentieth century*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Lee, Y. T. 2015. A comparative analysis of China and India: Ancient patriarchy, women's liberation, and contemporary gender equity education. *African and Asian Studies*, 14, pp. 134-153.
- Levett-Jones et al. 2009. The duration of clinical placements: A key influence on nursing students' experience of belongingness. *Australian Journal of Advanced Nursing*, 26(2), pp. 8-16.
- Li, E. 1997. *Zhongri minjian jingji waijiao, 1945-1972* [Sino-Japanese people's diplomacy on economics, 1945-1972]. Beijing: People's Publishing House.
- Li, X. 2014. 'State-led people to people diplomacy in China: Where should it go?' Master's thesis, Aalborg University.
- Liu, W. 2004. *Eiga no naka no shanghai: Hyōshō toshiteno toshi, josei, puropaganda* [Shanghai in films: City, women and propaganda in the representation]. Tokyo: Keio University Press.

- Liu-Farrer, G. 2013. Chinese newcomers in Japan: Migration trends, profiles and the impact of the 2011 earthquake. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, 22(2), pp. 231-257.
- MacFarquhar, R. and Schoenhals, M. 2006. *Mao's Last Revolution*. Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press.
- Madsen, K. D. and van Naerssen, T. 2003. Migration, identity and belonging. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, 18(1), pp. 61-75.
- Maeda, A. ed. 2016. *'Ianfu' mondai no genzai: 'Paku yuha genshō' to chishikijin* [Current issues of 'comfort women': 'Park Yuha phenomenon' and intellectuals]. Tokyo: Sanichishobo, pp. 65-108.
- Maekawa, K. 2006. *Ōraru hisutorī no jissen: Indonesia heiho o meguru katari to rekishi taiken* [Practicing oral history: Narratives and historical experiences of Indonesians who were forced to fight for the Imperial Japanese Army]. *Rekishigaku Kenkyū*, 813, pp. 8-16.
- Mahar, A. L., Cobigo, V. and Stuart, H. 2013. Conceptualizing belonging. *Disability and Rehabilitation*. 35(12), pp. 1026-1032.
- Mainichi Shimbun. 1970. *Zaigai hōjin hikiage no kiroku: Kono sokoku e no setsunaru bojō* [Record of repatriation of Japanese abroad: Yearning for this homeland]. Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun.
- Masuda, H. 2015. *Cold War crucible: The Korean conflict and the postwar world*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Masuda, H. 2017. What was the Cold War? Imagined reality, ordinary people's war, and social mechanism. *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 15(4).
- McAdams, D. P. 2011. Narrative Identity. In *Handbook of identity theory and research*, eds. S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx and V. L. Vignoles, pp. 99-115. London: Springer.
- McAdams, D.P. and McLean, K.C. 2013. Narrative Identity. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 22(3), pp. 233-238.
- McAreevey, R. and Das, C. 2013. A delicate balancing act: Negotiating with gatekeepers for ethical research when researching minority communities. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 12(1), pp. 113-131.
- McKay, S. 2005. Girls as 'weapons of terror' in Northern Uganda and Sierra Leonean rebel fighting forces. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 28, pp. 385-397.
- McKee, H. A. and Porter, J. E. 2012. The ethics of archival research. *College composition and communication*, 64(1), pp. 59-81.
- Minami, M. 2016. *Chūgoku kikokusha o meguru hōsetsu to haijo no rekishishakaigaku: Kyōkai bunka no seisei to sono poritikkusu* [Historical sociology of inclusion and exclusion of returnees from China: Engendering border culture and its politics]. Tokyo: Akashishoten.
- Minami Manshū Tetsudō Chōsabū. 1939. *Hoku-chūshi, mōkyō ni okeru shinsetsu shuyō kaisha ichiran: Gokuhi* [List of major enterprises in North and Central China and Inner Mongolia: Confidential].

- Mishler, E. 1986. *Research interviewing: Context and narrative*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Mitreuter, S. et al. 2019. Questions of identity in children born of war: Embarking on a search for the unknown soldier father. *Journal of Child and Family Studies*, 28(11), pp. 3220-3229.
- Mitter, R. 2005. Remembering the forgotten war. *History Today*, 55(8), pp. 17-19.
- Mochmann, I. C. 2008. Children Born of War. *OBETS: Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, 2, pp. 53-61.
- Mochmann, I. C. and Larsen, S. U. 2008. Children born of war: The life course of children fathered by German soldiers in Norway and Denmark during WWII - Some empirical results. *Historical Social Research*, 33(1), pp. 347-363.
- Mochmann, I. C. 2009. Developing a methodology for the research field of ‘children born of war’. European Survey Research Association Conference, Warsaw, 30 June.
- Mochmann, I. C., Lee, S., and Stelzl-Marx, B. 2009. The children of the occupations born during the Second World War and beyond - An overview. *Historical Social Research*, 34(3), pp. 263-282.
- Mochmann, I. C. and Lee, S. 2010. The human rights of children born of war: Case analysis of past and present conflicts. *Historical Social Research*, 35, pp. 268-298.
- Mochmann, I. C. 2017. Children born of war: A decade of international and interdisciplinary research. *Historical Social Research*, 42(1), pp. 320-346.
- Mohamed, M. and Abdul-Talib, A. 2020. Push-pull factors influencing international return migration intentions: A systematic literature review. *Journal of Enterprising Communities*. 14(2), pp. 231-246.
- Morris-Suzuki, T. 1998. *Re-inventing Japan: Time, space, nation*. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Morris-Suzuki, T. 2011. *Borderline Japan: Foreigners and frontier controls in the postwar era*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Morris-Suzuki, T. 2015. You don’t want to know about the girls? The ‘comfort women’, the Japanese military and Allied Forces in the Asia-Pacific War. *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 13(31).
- Münz, R. 2003. Ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe and their return to Germany. In *Diasporas and ethnic migrants: Germany, Israel and Russia in comparative perspective*, eds. R. Münz and R. Ohliger, pp. 242-252. London and Portland: Frank Cass.
- Murray, C. D. and Wynne, J. 2010. Researching community, work and family with an interpreter. *Community, Work and Family*, 4(2), pp. 157-171.
- Muth, K. 2008. *Die Wehrmacht in Griechenland – und ihre Kinder* [The Wehrmacht in Greece – and their children]. Leipzig: Eudora Verlag.
- Nagatomi, H. 1996. *Hakurō no tsumeato* [Traces of a white wolf]. Osaka: Shinpu Shobo.

- NHK ‘ryūyō saretā Nihonjin’ shuzaihan. *‘Ryūyō’ saretā Nihonjin: Watashitachi wa Chūgoku kenkoku o sasaeta* [Japanese who had to remain to ‘serve China’: We supported the establishment of the PRC]. Tokyo: NHK Book.
- Obradović-Wochnik, J. 2013. The ‘silent dilemma’ of transitional justice: Silencing and coming to terms with the past in Serbia. *The International Journal of Transitional Justice*, 7, pp. 328-347.
- Oguma, E. 1997. *The Myth of the Homogenous Nation*. Tokyo: Shinyosha.
- Oguma, E. 2002. *A genealogy of Japanese self-images*. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.
- Oguma, E. 2014. *The boundaries of ‘the Japanese’: Volume1: Okinawa 1818-1972—Inclusion and exclusion*. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.
- Ohno, S. 2007. Regaining ‘Japaneseness’: The politics of recognition by the Philippine Nikkeijin. *Asian Studies Review*, 31, pp. 243-260.
- Ohno, S. and Iijima, M. 2010. *Nihon zaijū Firipin Nikkeijin no shiminken, seikatsu, aidentitī: Shitsumonhyō haifu niyoru zenkoku jittai chōsa hōkokusho* [Citizenships, lives and identities of the Philippine Nikkeijin residing Japan: Report on the results of a nationwide questionnaire survey]. Fukuoka: Kyushu University.
- Ohno, S. 2015. *Transforming Nikkeijin identity and citizenship: Untold life histories of Japanese migrants and their descendants in the Philippines, 1903-2013*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Ohno, S. 2016. *Nikkeijin kara zanryū Nihonjin e no tenkan: Firipin Nikkei nisei no sengo mondai to shūseki undo o chūshin ni* [Shift from ‘Nikkeijin’ to ‘Remaining Japanese in the Philippines’: Concerning issues of second generation Philippine Nikkeijin and their movement to acquire Japanese nationality through *shūseki* procedure]. *Imin Kenkyū Nenpō*, 22, pp. 23-42.
- Ohnuki-Tierney, E. 1998. A conceptual model for the historical relationship between the self and the internal and external others. In *Making majorities: Constituting the nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States*, ed. D.C. Gladney, pp. 31-51. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Oka Norimatsu, S. 2012. Nanjing Massacre 75th anniversary and the China-Japan island dispute. *The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus*, 10(54), pp. 1-4. <https://apjjf.org/-Satoko-Norimatsu/4748/article.html> (accessed on 5 March 2020)
- Okubo, M. 2009. *Chūgoku kikokusha to kokka baishō seikyū shūdan soshō* [Returnees from China and class-action lawsuit against the state]. In *Rethinking Manchukuo and Japan: A living history of Japanese left-behind in China after WWII*, ed. S. Araragi, pp. 285-315. Tokyo: Bensei.
- Okuda, Y. 1996. *Kazoku to kokuseki: kokusaika no susumu naka de* [Family and nationality: Upon advancement of internationalisation]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku Publishing.
- Okumura, W. and Sakai, M. 2006. *Watashi wa ‘ari no heitai’ datta* [I was one of the ‘ant soldiers’]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
- Okuyama, M. 2015. *Dear Japanese*. Breda: The Eriskay Connection.

- Omata, S. 2003. *Zanryū: Nicchū yūkō e no chikai* [Remaining in post-war China: My pledge for Sino-Japanese friendship]. Tokyo: Koyo Insatsu.
- Osawa, T. 2002. *Zaika Nihonjin 'senpan' no kikoku: Tenshin kyōtei seiritsu no keii to sono igi* [Repatriation of Japanese 'war criminals' in China: How the Tianjin Agreement was finalised and its meaning]. *Chūō Daigaku Shakaikagaku Kenkyūjo Nenpō*, 7, pp. 165-180.
- Osawa, T. 2007. The reorganization of the postwar regional order in northeast Asia and the emergence of the war: Displaced Japanese left behind in China. *Sēsaku bunka sōgō kenkyūsho nenpō*, 10, pp. 35-51.
- Osawa, T. 2016. *Mō Takutō no tainichi senpan saiban: Chūgoku kyōsantō no omowaku to 1526 mei no Nihonjin* [Mao Zedong's trial on Japanese war criminals: Intentions of the Chinese Communist Party and 1,526 Japanese]. Tokyo: Chuokoron-shinsha.
- Park, Y. 2014. *Teikoku no ianfu: shokuminchi shihai to kioku no tataikai* [Comfort women of the Empire: Colonial rule and memory wars]. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Publications.
- Pector, E. A. 1999. I found my history - and so much more. *Medical Economics*, 76(7), pp. 113-114.
- Piper, N. 1997. International Marriage in Japan: 'race' and 'gender' perspectives. *Gender, Place and Culture*, 4(3), pp. 321-338.
- Plummer, K. 2001. The moral and human face of life stories: Reflexivity, power and ethics. In *Documents of life 2: An invitation to a critical humanism*. London: Sage.
- Ponte, I. C., Wang, L. K. and Fan, S. P. 2010. Returning to China: The experience of adopted Chinese children and their parents. *Adoption Quarterly*, 13(2), pp. 100-124.
- Portelli, A. 2013. Afterword. In *Oral history off the record: Toward an ethnography of practice*, eds. A. Sheftel, and S. Zembrzycki, pp. 273-286. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Portelli, A. 2015. What makes oral history different. In *The Oral History Reader*, ed. R. Perks and A. Thomson, pp. 48-58. London: Routledge.
- Qi, X. 2018. Surnaming in contemporary China: Women's rights as veiled patriarchy. *Sociology*, 52(5), pp. 1001-1016.
- Qiu, P., Chen, L. and Su, Z. eds. 2014. *Chinese Comfort Women: Testimonies from Imperial Japan's Sex Slaves*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rattansi, A. and Phoenix, A. 2005. Rethinking youth identities: Modernist and postmodernist frameworks. *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research*, 5, pp. 97-123.
- Refsing, K. 2003. In Japan, but not of Japan. In *Ethnicity in Asia*, ed. C. Mackerras, pp.48-63. London and New York: Routledge.
- Renzetti, C. M. and Lee, R. M. 1993. *Researching Sensitive Topics*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

- Rickard, W. 1998. Oral history - 'More dangerous than therapy'?: Interviewees' reflections on recording traumatic or taboo issues. *Oral History*, 26(2), pp. 34-48.
- Robertson, J. 2007. *Yūseiteki shokuminchishugi: Nihon ni okeru chi no ideorigi* [Eugenic colonialism: Japanese blood ideology]. Shisō, 995, pp. 91-106. Tokyo: Iwanami.
- Röger, M. 2005. Children of German soldiers in Poland, 1939-45. In *The children of foreign soldiers in Finland, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Poland and Occupied Soviet Karelia: Children of foreign soldiers in Finland 1940-1948 Volume II*, ed. L. Westerlund, pp. 261-271. Helsinki: Nord Print.
- Rose, C. 1998. *Interpreting history in Sino-Japanese relations: A case study in political decision-making*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Rose, C. and Sýkora, J. 2017. The trust deficit in Sino-Japanese relations. *Japan Forum*, 29(1), pp. 100-124.
- Saada, E. 2012. *Empire's children: Race, filiation, and citizenship in the French colonies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Safran, W. 1991. Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and return. *Diaspora*, 1(1), pp. 83-99.
- Sakurai, A. 2007. Ethical dilemmas in life story research. *Advanced Social Research*, 6, pp. 87-113.
- Sato, R. 2016. *Sengo Nicchū kankei to dōsōkai* [Post-war Sino-Japanese relations and alumni reunion]. Tokyo: Sairyusha.
- Schretter, L. 2020. 'Britische Besatzungskinder: Die Nachkommen britischer Soldaten und österreichischer Frauen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg' [British occupying children: The descendants of British soldiers and Austrian women after the Second World War]. PhD thesis, Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz.
- Sedgwick, M.G. and Yonge, O. 2008. 'We're it', 'we're a team', 'we're family' means a sense of belonging. *Rural and Remote Health*, 8(3), pp. 1-12.
- Schretter, L., Kuramitsu, K. and Sersté, N. Ethical challenges in conducting interviews with children born of war: Reflections on navigating participants' expectations. Forthcoming.
- Schütze, F. Pressure and guilt: War experiences of a young German soldier and their biographical implications (Part 1). *International Sociology*, 7(2), pp. 187-208.
- Schwartz, A. 2020. Trauma, resilience, and narrative constructions of identity in Germans born of wartime rape. *German Studies Review*, 43(2), pp. 311-329.
- Seiger, F. 2017. Consanguinity as capital in rights assertions: Japanese-Filipino children in the Philippines. *Critical Asian Studies*, pp. 1-19.
- Sekiguchi, T. 2014. 'Shina no yoru' kenkyū [Studies on 'China Night']. *Phases*, 5, pp. 96-111.
- Serikawa, K. and Yu, X. 2019. *Ai wa dokokara: Hatō o koeta mittsu no monogatari* [Where did love come from?: Three stories that transcended the waves]. Tokyo: Ark Communications.

- Serikawa, K. 2020. *Yahan no shōsei* [Sound of a bell in the middle of the night]. Tokyo: Ark Communications.
- Seymour, E. 2020. ““You are beaten if you are bad, it is said you woman you have made your husband tired””: Conceptualising gender violence in Northern Uganda’. PhD thesis, University of Birmingham.
- Shao, D. 2009. Chinese by definition: Nationality law, *jus sanguinis*, and state succession, 1909-1980. *Twentieth-Century China*, 35(1), pp. 4-28.
- Sheftel, A. and Zembrzycki, S. eds. 2013. *Oral history off the record: Toward an ethnography of practice*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sitzia, L. 2003. A shared authority: An impossible goal? *The Oral History Review*, 30(1), pp. 87-101.
- Sixsmith, J. 1999. Working in the hidden economy: The experience of unemployed men in the UK. *Community, Work & Family*, 2(3), pp. 257–278.
- Social Welfare and War Victim’s Relief Bureau of the Ministry of Health and Welfare. 1977. *Hikiage to engo 30 nen no ayumi* [Thirty-year trajectory of repatriation and relief]. Tokyo: The Ministry of Health and Welfare.
- Soejima, E. 1984. *Senzenki Chūgoku zairyū Nihonjin jinkō tōkei* [Figures of Japanese residing in pre-war China]. *Wakayama Daigaku Kyōiku Gakubu Kiyō*, 33, pp. 1-33.
- Soeya, Y. 2013. A view from the inside on Japan’s perpetual trust gap. *Global Asia*, 8(3), pp. 38-41.
- Stanley, J. 2010. ‘We were skivvies/we had a ball.’: Shame and interwar ships. *Oral History*, 38(2), pp. 64-74.
- Stelzl-Marx, B. 2011. The children of Soviet occupation soldiers and Austrian women, 1945-55. In *The children of foreign soldiers in Finland, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Poland and occupied Soviet Karelia: Children of foreign soldiers in Finland 1940-1948 Volume II*, ed. L. Westerlund, pp. 242-260. Helsinki: Nord Print.
- Stelzl-Marx, B. 2015. Soviet children of occupation in Austria: The historical, political and social background and its consequences. *European Review of History*, 22(2), pp. 277-291.
- Su, Z. 1999. *Weianfu yanjiu* [A study of the comfort women]. Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian Chubanshe.
- Sugawara, K. 1989. *Nihonjin ni narenai’ Chūgokujin koji: Kanryō to kikokusha tachi* [Stranded war orphans who are unable to become Japanese: Bureaucrats and returnees]. Tokyo: Yosensha.
- Suzuki, Y. 2003. *Naisen kekkon* [Japanese-Korean intermarriage]. In *Minzoku, sensō to kazoku* [Ethnicity, war and family], ed. S. Obinata, pp. 166-195. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan.
- Suzuki, N. 2010. Outlawed children: Japanese Filipino children, legal defiance and ambivalent citizenships, *Pacific Affairs*, 83(1), pp. 31-50.

- Tai, E. 2014. Intermarriage and imperial subject formation in colonial Taiwan: Shoji Soichi's Chin-fujin. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 15(4), pp. 513-531.
- Tai, E. 2014. The discourse of intermarriage in colonial Taiwan. *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 40(1), pp. 87-116.
- Taguchi, L. Y. 2017. The formation of discourses regarding ‘konketsu’/‘hafu’ and the social consequences: Critical use of ‘racial formation’ and ‘articulation’ theories. *Shakaigaku Hyōron*, 68(2), pp. 213-229.
- Takami, H. 2005. *Tensui-Ranshū tetsudō no kensetsusha: Tensuikai kaichō, Minamitani Masatada shi* [Builders of the Tianshui-Lanzhou Railway: Mr Minamitani Masatada, the chairperson of Tensui Association]. In *Zoku shin Chūgoku ni kōkenshita Nihonjintachi* [Japanese who contributed to New China Volume 2], ed. Chūgoku chūnichi kankeishi gakkai, pp. 49-66. Tokyo: Nihon Kyōhōsha.
- Takezawa, Y. 2016. *Konketsu shinwa no kaitai to jibun rashiku ikiru kenri* [Deconstructing myth of mixed-blood and the right to be oneself]. In *Jinshu shinwa o kaitaisuru 3: ‘Chi’ no seijigaku o koete* [Deconstructing racial myths: Beyond politics of ‘blood’], eds. K. Kawashima and Y. Takezawa, pp. 3-34. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- Tanaka, Y. 2002. *Japan’s comfort women: Sexual slavery and prostitution during World War II and the US occupation*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Tanno, K. 2014. *Kokuseki no kyōkai o kangaeru* [Reflection on the boundary of nationality]. Tokyo: Yoshida Shoten.
- Taylor, C. 1994. The politics of recognition. In *Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition*, ed. A. Gutmann, pp. 25-73. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tezcan, T. 2019. Return home? Determinants of return migration intention amongst Turkish immigrants in Germany. *Geoforum*, 98, pp. 189-201.
- Thompson, P. 2000. *The voice of the past: Oral history, third edition*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Toyama, M. 1993. *Rikukaigun shōkan jinji sōran: Rikugun hen* [Comprehensive list of generals in the Japanese army and navy: Army]. Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo.
- Tsuda, T. 1999. The motivation to migrate: The ethnic and sociocultural constitution of the Japanese-Brazilian return-migration system. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 48(1), pp. 1-31.
- Tsuda, T. 1999. Transnational migration and the nationalization of ethnic identity among Japanese Brazilian return migrants. *Ethos*, 27(2), pp. 145-179.
- Tsuda, T. 2013. ‘When the diaspora returns home’. In *A companion to diaspora and transnationalism*, eds. A. Quayson and G. Daswani, pp. 172-189. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Uhlenius, P. 2010. The hidden children of German soldiers and Soviet prisoners of war. In *The Children of Foreign Soldiers in Finland, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Poland and Occupied Soviet Karelia: Children of Foreign Soldiers in Finland 1940–1948 Volume II*, ed. L. Westerlund, pp. 153-158. Helsinki: Nord Print.

- van Ee, E. 2011. Traumatized parents and their relationship with their children in a historical and cultural perspective. *Psychologie & Gezondheid*, 39, pp. 163-168.
- van Ee, E. and Kleber, R.J. 2012. Child in the shadowlands. *The Lancet*, 380 (9842), pp. 642-643.
- Venken, M. and Röger, M. 2015. Growing up in the shadow of the Second World War: European perspectives. *European Review of History*, 22(2), pp. 199-220.
- Vertovec, S. and Cohen, R., ed. 1999. *Migration, diasporas, and transnationalism*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Vickers, E. 2013. Transcending victimhood: Japan in the public historical museums of Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. *China Perspectives*, 4, pp. 17-28.
- Vignoles, V. L. 2011. Identity motives. In *Handbook of identity theory and research*, eds. S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx and V. L. Vignoles, pp. 403-432. London: Springer.
- Wakatsuki, Y. 1991. *Sengo hikiage no kiroku* [Record of post-war repatriation]. Tokyo: Jijitsu-shinsha.
- Walby, S. 1990. *Theorizing patriarchy*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wang, L. K., Ponte, I. C. and Ollen, E. W. 2015. Letting her go: Western adoptive families' search and reunion with Chinese birth parents. *Adoption Quarterly*, 18(1), pp. 45-66.
- Ward, R. 2011. Delaying repatriation: Japanese technicians in early postwar China. *Japan Forum*, 23(4), pp. 471-483.
- Watt, L. 2009. *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and reintegration in postwar Japan*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press.
- Weitsman, P. A. 2008. The politics of identity and sexual violence: A review of Bosnia and Rwanda. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 30(3), pp. 561-578.
- Wessendorf, S. 2007. 'Roots migrants': Transnationalism and 'return' among second-generation Italians in Switzerland. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33(7), pp. 1083-1102.
- Wierzbicka, A. 1997. *Understanding cultures through their key words: English, Russian, Polish, German, and Japanese*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Winfield, P. 1993. *Bye bye baby: The story of the children the GIs left behind*. Bath: Chivers Large Print.
- Women's Active Museum. ed. 2008. *Aruhi Nihongun ga yattekita: Chūgoku, senjō deno gōkan to ianjo* [Japanese army came one day: Rape in the combat zone and 'comfort stations' in China]. Tokyo: Women's Active Museum.
- Women's Active Museum. ed. 2014. *Taiwan 'ianfu' no shōgen: Nihonjin ni sareta amā tachi* [Testimonies of Taiwanese 'comfort women': 'Ama' ('Grannies' in Taiwanese) who were forced to become Japanese]. Tokyo: Women's Active Museum.
- Wu, W. 1999. The return of the remaining Japanese in China: The history and types, 1946-1998. *Kobe Law Journal*, 49(1), pp. 189-245.

- Wu, W. 2004. *Chūgoku zanryū Nihonjin no kenkyū: Ijū, hyōryū, teichaku no kokusaikankeiron* [Research on Japanese people who remained in post-war China: International relations regarding migration, drifting and settling down]. Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Center.
- Xia, Y. 2013. Engendering contempt for collaborators: Anti-hanjian discourse following the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945. *Journal of Women's History*, 25(1), pp. 111-134.
- Yamamoto, Y. 2007. 'Manshū' no shūen: Yokuryū, hikiage, zanryū [The end of 'Manchuria': Internment, repatriation, remaining in China]. In 'Manshū': *Kioku to rekishi* ['Manchuria': Memory and history]. ed. Y. Yamamoto, pp. 4-33. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press.
- Yamamura, M. 2015. Japanese small business in Shanghai and their chauvinism 1916-1942: An analysis on 'Directory of Japanese Residents in China' (Part I). *Wakō Keizai*, 47(2), pp. 1-34.
- Yamashiro, J. H. 2013. The social construction of race and minorities in Japan. *Sociology Compass*, 7(2), pp. 147-161.
- Yamashiro, J. H. 2017. *Redefining Japaneseness: Japanese Americans in the ancestral homeland*. New Brunswick; Camden: Rutgers University Press.
- Yasutomi, S. and Ueki, T. 2005. Adaptation of war brides to American society: Between two value systems. *Kaetsu University Academic Repository*, 48(1), pp. 75-97.
- Yeoh, B.S.A. and Heikkilä, E. K. eds. 2010. *International marriages in the time of globalization*. New York: Nova Science Publishers.
- Yi, B (Ri, M.) 1973. *Sugita saigetsu* [Years that went by]. A self-published book.
- Yonehama, Y. 2008. *Nihongun 'sansei zanryū': kokkyō naisen ni honrō sareta yamashita shōi no sengo* [Remaining Japanese soldiers in Shanxi: Lieutenant Yamashita at the mercy of fate during the Chinese Civil War]. Tokyo: Seiunsha.
- Yokoyama, T. 2015. *The history of eugenic society in Japan*. Tokyo: Keiso Shobo.
- Yoshimi, Y. 2002. *Comfort women: Sexual slavery in the Japanese military during World War II*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Yoshino, K. 1992. *Cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan: A sociological enquiry*. London: Routledge.
- Yow, V. R. 1995. Ethics and Interpersonal Relationships in Oral History Research. *The Oral History Review*, 22(1), pp. 51-66.
- Zagar, M. 2009. Kjersti Ericsson and Eva Simonsen. Children of World War II: The Hidden Enemy Legacy. *Scandinavian-Canadian Studies*, 18, pp. 114-117. https://www.scancan.net/zagar_1_18.htm (accessed on 9 August 2020)
- Zhang, L. 2009. The 'Japanese war orphans left in China' and their identity: A sociological analysis through life-story. *Studies on Humanities and Social Sciences of Chiba University*, 18, pp. 53-68.

Zou, T. 1936. *Wo de muqin* [My mother]. In *Banianji yuwen shangce di shi'er ke* [8th grade Chinese Textbook Volume 1 Lesson 12]. Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe.

Newspaper articles (in chronological order)

‘*Konketsuji wa kaerenu: Chūkyōgawa de kazai kaiage, yokuryūsha no tayori*’ [Mixed-blood children cannot repatriate: The letter from a remaining Japanese national says that the Chinese side will purchase the household goods of Japanese who are going to repatriate], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 13 February 1953.

‘*Konketsuji wa gaijin atsukai: Chūkyō kikansha no nyūkoku* [Mixed-blood children will be treated as foreigners: Entrance of returnees from Communist China]’, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 17 February 1953.

‘*Zanryūsha wa yaku 6,000 nin: Chūkyō sekijūji no kanbu kataru* [A cadre of the PRC Red Cross states about 6,000 remaining Japanese exist]’, *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 July 1956.

‘*Kon’nan daga chōsa ni kyōryoku: Zairyū Nihonjin no shōsoku, Chūgoku sekijūjisha ga hōkoku* [The PRC Red Cross stated it will cooperate in searching for remaining Japanese despite the difficulty]’, *Asahi Shimbun*, 3 September 1957.

‘*Satogaeri enjo senu: Chūgoku sekijūjisha daden* [The PRC Red Cross’ telegram: We won’t support stranded war wives to make a home visit]’, *Asahi Shimbun*, 5 June 1958.

‘*Ikite aete yokatta: Mihokosan, 40 nen buri inochi no onjin to*’ [So glad to see him while alive: Mihoko meets the person who saved her life after 40 years], *Asahi Shimbun*, 14 July 1980.

‘*Nihon no chichi sagashite: Setsusetsu shanghai kara Kō-san—Betsuri sanjūgo nen, chichi no na wa Suwa Motokichi*’ [Please find my father: Ms Ko pleads from Shanghai—35 years since the separation. My father’s name is Suwa Motokichi.], *Mainichi Shimbun*, 18 November 1980.

‘*Ikiwakaretamono no kiroku*’ [The record of those who parted and lost contact], *Asahi Shimbun*, 8 December 1980.

‘*Nikushin sagashi watashitachi mo: Sen’nin kosu kataoya to ikiwakare, Nicchū konketsu koji uttae*’ [Please search for our kin, too.: More than one thousand Sino-Japanese mixed-blood orphans who were separated from a Japanese father or mother appealed], *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 February 1983.

‘*Chichino kuni e: Eijū no michi saguru*’ [Returning to the father’s country: Searching for ways for his permanent return], *Mainichi Shimbun*, 4 May 1983.

‘*Chichi o sagashitekudasai: Nicchū konketsuji, honsha e tegami*’ [Please find my father: A letter was sent from a Sino-Japanese mixed-blood child to Asahi Shimbun headquarter], *Asahi Shimbun*, 18 March 1985.

‘*Chichi wa Nihonjin, haha wa Chūgokujin: watashitachi nimo Nihon kokuseki o. Koko nimo zanryūkoji 2,000 nin*’ [My father is Japanese, my mother is Chinese: Please give us Japanese nationality, too. There are two thousand more stranded war orphans.], *Mainichi Shimbun*, 16 January 1986.

‘*Konketsu koji mo nikushin sagashi: Chūgoku kara shien yōsei, shūseki mōshitata zokuzoku*’ [Mixed-blood children are searching for their kins, too: Many applications to establish *koseki* register coming from China], *Asahi Shimbun*, 16 January 1986.

‘*Chūgoku koji: konketsuji nimo Nihon kokuseki*’ [Stranded war orphans in China: Japanese nationality should also be granted to mixed-blood children], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 31 January 1986.

‘*Chichi no kuni daikangeki: Nicchū konketsu koji shimaira rainichi, eijūkikoku no dai ichi gō*’ [Sisters ‘Deeply moved to be in our father’s country’: The first cases of Sino-Japanese mixed-blood orphans realising their permanent return to Japan], *Mainichi Shimbun*, 23 December 1986.

‘*Sanseishō zanryūgun ni ‘daichi no ko’: Chūgoku jōsei tonō aida ni 23 nin*’ [‘Children remaining in post-war China’ born of Japanese soldiers that remained in Shanxi Province: 23 children born of Chinese women], *Mainichi Shimbun*, 27 July 1996.

‘*Ioriya Iwao san: Chūgoku zanryūkoji mondai ni torikumu borantia*’ [Mr Ioriya Iwao: A volunteer tackling the issues of stranded war orphans], *Asahi Shimbun*, 20 November 1998.

Beevor, A. ‘An ugly carnival’, *The Guardian*, 5 June 2009.
<https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/jun/05/women-victims-d-day-landings-second-world-war> (accessed on 23 September 2020)

‘‘*Guizi yisheng*’’ shezui daifu Shanqi Hong de zuihou yicheng’ [‘Dr Japanese devil’: The last days of the apologetic doctor, Yamazaki Hiroshi]. *iqilu.com*, 2 December 2010.
<http://news.iqilu.com/shandong/yaowen/2010/1202/372356.shtml> (accessed on 15 September 2020)

‘*103 sui Shanqi Hong cishi*’ [103-year-old Shanqi Hong passes away], *Jinan Shibao*, 2 December 2010. <http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2010-12-02/042918425185s.shtml> (accessed on 15 August 2020)

Okubo, M. ‘*Moto Chūgoku zanryū koji mondai zenkoku kyōgikai kaichō ioriya iwao san: motometsuzuketa “chi no kayou gyōsei”*’ [Mr Ioriya Iwao, the former chairperson of national committee of associations for stranded war orphans: A man who continued to demand ‘humane administration’], *Asahi Shimbun*, 18 February 2012.

Brasor, P. ‘The public shame of crying poor’, *The Japan Times*, 10 June 2012.
<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/06/10/national/media-national/the-public-shame-of-crying-poor/> (accessed on 11 September 2020)

Erizabesu-sandāsu-hōmu: Beikoku de dōsōkai yobikake’ [Elisabeth Saunders Home: Calling for reunion in the U.S.], *JBpress*, 3 May 2014. <https://jbpres.ismedia.jp/articles/-/40641> (accessed on 5 June 2020)

Kagawa, M. ‘Postwar adoptees from Kanagawa shelter connect in U.S.’, *The Japan Times*, 11 November 2014.
<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/11/11/national/history/postwar-adoptees-kanagawa-shelter-make-connections-share-stories-u-s/#.XtrE8W5FzIU> (accessed on 5 June 2020)

Hornby, L. 'China's "comfort women"', *Financial Times*, 20 March 2015. <https://www.ft.com/content/b44ae604-cdc1-11e4-8760-00144feab7de> (accessed on 13 March 2020)

Kawabata, T. 'Former Asahi Shimbun reporter says threats against him are getting worse', *The Japan Times*, 29 April 2015.

<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/04/29/national/crime-legal/former-asahi-reporters-comfort-women-libel-suit-begins/> (accessed on 7 October 2020)

'A former "comfort woman" and her son, a product of wartime rape, struggle with stigma', *Global Times*, 20 July 2015. <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/932919.shtml> (accessed on 3 June 2020)

Kingston, J. 'Rightists distort author Park Yu-ha's views on 'comfort women'', *The Japan Times*, 25 July 2015.

<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/07/25/commentary/rightists-distort-author-park-yu-views-comfort-women/#.XAqitTuLTIU> (accessed on 7 October 2020)

'*Senryōka no koji "dōsōkai": Beiheishi to Nihonjin haha no ko ra*' [Occupation children's 'reunion': children born of American soldiers and Japanese women], *Shikoku News*, 26 July 2015. <https://www.shikoku-np.co.jp/national/international/20150726000320> (accessed on 5 June 2020)

'"*Ianfu*" no ko no kunan' [Plight of a child born of a 'comfort woman'], *Tokyo Shimbun evening edition*, 3 September 2015.

'*Hen dao si weizhi! Weianfu yu tade ribenhai zi*. [I will loathe him until the last breath! A comfort woman and her Japanese child.], *Chinatimes.com*, 23 November 2015. <http://hottopic.chinatimes.com/cn/20151123001904-260812> (accessed on 17 June 2020)

'*Tsuzuku kunan, modoranu jinsei. Hikage no "Nihon no ko". Haha wa Chūgokujin ianfu.*' [Ongoing struggles, irretrievable past. A 'Japanese child' living in the shadow. His mother is a Chinese comfort woman.], *Kyoto Shimbun evening edition*, 16 December 2015.

'Japan and South Korea agree WW2 "comfort women" deal', *BBC News*, 28 December 2015. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35188135> (accessed on 7 October 2020)

Choe, S. 'Professor ordered to pay 9 who said 'comfort women' book defamed them', *New York Times*, 13 January 2016. <https://nytimes.com/2016/01/14/world/asia/south-korea-park-yu-ha-verdict.html>. (accessed on 7 October 2020)

'Japanese court's disappointing ruling in defamation case related to comfort women', *Hankyoreh*, 21 January 2016.

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/727243.html (accessed on 7 October 2020)

'Emperor meets Vietnamese wives, kin abandoned by Japan's veterans after war', *The Japan Times*, 2 March 2017.

<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/03/02/national/emperor-meets-vietnamese-wives-kin-left-behind-japans-wwii-vets/> (accessed on 12 August 2020)

'*Shūseki, saigo no hitori made: Kokuseki kaifukusha 200 nin o tassei*' [Let us realise the *shūseki* procedure for everyone: 200 Philippine Nikkei regained Japanese nationality], *The Daily Manila Shimbun*, 6 November 2017.

Liu, J. 'Xiexie yongyou boda xiongpei de zhongguoren' [We are grateful to big-hearted Chinese people], *People.cn*, 2 February, 2018.

<http://ydyl.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0202/c411837-29802524.html> (accessed on 11 October 2020)

Cheyney, M. 'Mindful care: Changing the perception of mental health in Japan', *Japan Today*, 9 June 2018. <https://japantoday.com/category/features/lifestyle/mindful-care-changing-the-perception-of-mental-health-in-japan> (accessed on 3 August 2020)

'Symposium on 'comfort women' in China postponed, not cancelled', *Global Times*, 8 August 2018.

<https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1114478.shtml#:~:text=Gallery-,Symposium%20on%20%27comfort%20women%27%20in,China%20postponed%2C%20not%20cancelled%3A%20source&text=The%20symposium%20was%20originally%20scheduled,to%20attend%2C%20Kyodo%20News%20reported.> (accessed on 8 October 2020)

'Chichi nemuru haka te awase namida: Firipin zanryūhōjin Fusato-san' [Praying and shedding tears in front of the father's grave: Ms Fusato, Japanese left behind in the Philippines], *Okinawa Times*, 27 May 2019. <http://pnlsc.com/190527Fusato.pdf> (accessed on 25 May 2020)

'Mi o teishita chichi, kodomo wa minogashite: Wasurerareta dōhō, firipin zanryū nisei' [The father sacrificed himself and said 'Let go of my child': Forgotten Japanese descents, Japanese left behind in the Philippines], *Sankei Shimbun*, 10 August 2019. <http://pnlsc.com/0810sankei.pdf> (accessed on 25 May 2020)

Sito-Sucic, D. "'Invisible" Bosnians born of wartime rape', *Reuters*, 15 October 2019. <https://fr.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1WU1SC> (accessed on 5 June 2020)

'Nikkan ianfu gōi, iken teiso o kyakka, kankoku kenpōsai' [South Korean constitutional court dismissed the lawsuit that claimed the unconstitutionality of Japan-Korea comfort women deal], *The Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 27 December 2019. <https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO53900110X21C19A2EA3000/> (accessed on 7 October 2020)

'Shanqi Hong: Zhongguo zuihou yige "guizi", cong wei sharen, que yong yisheng zai wei riben shuzui' [Yamazaki Hiroshi: The last 'Japanese devil' in China who never killed anyone and yet dedicated his life for atonement on behalf of Japan], *Sohu*, 14 May 2020. https://www.sohu.com/a/395179186_100174998 (accessed on 15 September 2020)

Nakamura, K. 'Is the Japanese public on board with the "new era" of China-Japan relations?', *The Diplomat*, 10 June 2020. <https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/is-the-japanese-public-on-board-with-the-new-era-of-china-japan-relations/> (accessed on 3 August 2020)

Johnson, J. 'China's 100-day push near Senkaku Islands comes at unsettling time for Sino-Japanese ties', *The Japan Times*, 27 June 2020. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/27/national/china-japan-senkaku-islands/#.Xyc6m25uLIU> (accessed on 3 August 2020)

'Inomata Norihiro san: Firipin zanryū Nihonjin nisei no nihon kokuseki kaihuku o shien suru' [Inomata Norihiro: Supporting second generation of Japanese remaining in the Philippines to regain their Japanese nationality], *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 July 2020.

https://asahi.com/article/DA3S14562086.html?iref=pc_ss_date (accessed on 15 October 2020)

Ono, T. and Sakamoto, J. '4 members of Abe's Cabinet visit Yasukuni on war anniversary', *Asahi Shimbun*, 15 August 2020. <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13638479> (accessed on 24 October 2020)

“Deep remorse”: Japanese emperor marks 75th anniversary of surrender’, *The Guardian*, 15 August 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/15/deep-remorse-japanese-emperor-marks-75th-anniversary-of-surrender> (accessed on 25 October 2020)

Fujita, Y. 'Gekidō no hansei shōsetsu ni' [Publishing a novel about his tumultuous life], *Mainichi Shimbun*, 15 August 2020.

Wang, X. 'War end anniversary sees no Abe apology', *China Daily*, 17 August 2020. <https://www.chinadailyasia.com/article/140312> (accessed on 26 October 2020)

Magazine articles, blog posts

Berrigan, D. 1948. 'Japan's occupation babies'. *Saturday Evening Post*, 19 June, pp. 117-118.

Chandler, D. and Parker, R. 1946. 'Jap underground to China'. *Collier's*, 19 January, 75, pp 18-19.

Hashimoto, Y. 2011. 'Mou hitotsu no biruma no tategoto' [Another story of a Japanese man who remained in post-war Myanmar]. *About Myanmar*, 2 November. http://www.yangonow.com/info/history/burma_harp.php (accessed on 10 October 2020)

Hosaka, M. 1988. 'Bunkaku de sabakareta zanryū konketsu koji: Omae no chichi wa Sakata tokumukikanchō da' [Mixed-blood orphan left behind in China who was punished during the Cultural Revolution: Your father was Sakata, the head of the secret military agency!], *Shokun!*, 20 (4), pp. 196-225.

Kasuya, K. 2007. 'Rupo: Keirin sansuiga no kanata de' [Reportage: Behind picturesque Guilin]. *Shūkan kinyōbi*, 661, 6 July, pp. 10-15.

Kasuya, K. 2007. 'Rupo: Keirin sansuiga no kanata de' [Reportage: Behind picturesque Guilin]. *Shūkan kinyōbi*, 662, 13 July, pp. 16-19.

Kasuya, K. 2007. 'Rupo: Keirin sansuiga no kanata de' [Reportage: Behind picturesque Guilin]. *Shūkan kinyōbi*, 663, 20 July, pp. 24-27.

Kasuya, K. 2007. 'Rupo: Keirin sansuiga no kanata de' [Reportage: Behind picturesque Guilin]. *Shūkan kinyōbi*, 664, 27 July, pp. 26-29.

Kasuya, K. 2007. 'Rupo: Keirin sansuiga no kanata de' [Reportage: Behind picturesque Guilin]. *Shūkan kinyōbi*, 665, 3 August, pp. 20-23.

Kojima, S. 'Nikkeijin teigi no henyō to aidentitī' [Shift in the definition of Nikkeijin and identity]. *The 57th Convention of Nikkei and Japanese Abroad*, pp. 17-20. Tokyo: The Association of Nikkei and Japanese Abroad.

- Ohno, S. 1988. ‘*Hapon tachi no nagai sengo: Firipin zanryū Nikkei nisei, Nihonjin koji o tazunete*’ [Long post-war struggles of ‘Hapon’: Visiting Japanese left behind in the Philippines and Japanese orphans]. *Sekai*, August, pp. 55-66.
- Park, Y. 2014. ‘*Soredemo ianfu mondai o kaiketsu shinakerebaikenai riyū*’ [The reasons why we still need to resolve the ‘comfort women’ issue]. *Huffpost*, 9 September. https://huffingtonpost.jp/park-yuha/korea-comfort-women-issue_b_5782226.html. (accessed on 7 October 2020)
- Shiotsuka, Y. 2015. ‘*Chichi no kokorozashi tsugi ikka no kunan tsuzuru: Nihonkoku saigo no kikanhei, Fukatani Yoshiharu to sono kazou, Fukatani Toshio san*’ [Writing about the family’s predicament to carry out the intention of his deceased father: Fukatani Toshio and his book ‘The last soldier that returned to Japan, Fukatani Yoshiharu and his family’]. *Sankei Express*, January, p. 10.
- Shōroku* ‘*Sensō o kataritsugu sekinin*’ [Excerpt from a lecture meeting ‘The responsibility of telling stories of the war’]. *Seishun to Dokusho*, September 2015, pp. 6-11.
- Yoshino, T. “‘*Teikoku no ianfu*’ Paku Yu-ha kyōju no zaitakukiso ni gakushara 54 nin kōgi seimei’ [54 scholars issued a public statement against the indictment of Park Yu-ha, the author of ‘Comfort Women of the Empire’]. *Huffpost*, 26 November 2015. https://www.huffingtonpost.jp/2015/11/26/park-yuha-charge-remonstrance_n_8659272.html (accessed on 24 March 2020)

Online sources

- Children Born of War research network. <https://www.chibow.org/> (accessed on 24 October 2020)
- Chūgoku zanryū hōjin no jōkyō* [Situation of Japanese Remaining in post-war China], Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 30 June 2020. <https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/bunya/engo/seido02/kojitoukei.html> (accessed on 12 July 2020)
- Commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the Asian African Conference 1955 (Bandung Conference) and other events: April 22, 2015, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/actions/201504/22article1.html (accessed on 24 October 2020)
- Commemoration of the International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict. <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/2018/06/commemoration-of-the-international-day-for-the-elimination-of-sexual-violence-in-conflict-children-born-of-war/> (accessed on 10 July 2020)
- Convention of Nikkei and Japanese abroad, The Association of Nikkei and Japanese Abroad. <http://www.jadesas.or.jp/en/taikai/index.html> (accessed on 19 February 2018)
- Courts in Japan. Administrative suit, Legal precedent, Incident *gyō-u* no. 140, 2017. https://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_jp/detail5?id=88850 (accessed on 5 September 2020)
- Courts in Japan. Shinpan tetsuzuki ippan [Trial procedures in general]. https://www.courts.go.jp/saiban/syurui/syurui_kazi/kazi_02/index.html (accessed on 18 September 2020)

Distelblüten: Russenkinder in Deutschland [Thistle blossoms: Russian children in Germany]. <https://www.russenkinder-distelblueten.de/> (accessed on 5 June 2020)

Documents of Nanjing Massacre, Memory of the World, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/memory-of-the-world/register/full-list-of-registered-heritage/registered-heritage-page-2/documents-of-nanjing-massacre/> (accessed on 8 October 2020)

Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hunyinfa (1950 nian) [Marriage law of the People’s Republic of China, 1950], *Falü Tushuguan* [Library of Law]. http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view1.asp?id=43205 (accessed on 12 September 2020)

Forgotten Children of War Association. <http://zdr.org.ba> (accessed on 6 October 2020)

Futatsu no sokoku no hazamade: Chūgoku zanryūkoji sancedai ni wataru raifusutōrī, Chūgoku zanryūkoji kenkyū chō ran shi intabyū [In between two ancestral homelands: Life stories of three generations of stranded war orphans—interview with Zhang Lang, a researcher of stranded war orphans]. Synodos, 4 September 2017. <https://synodos.jp/society/20400> (accessed on 27 May 2020)

GI Trace. <http://www.gitrace.org/> (accessed on 5 June 2020)

Introduction to oral history, Baylor University Institute for Oral History. <https://www.baylor.edu/content/services/document.php/43912.pdf> (accessed on 17 August 2020)

Ioriya nōto [Notes taken by Mr Ioriya]. <https://www.kikokusha-center.or.jp/resource/sankoshiryo/ioriya-notes/ioriya-title.htm> (accessed on 2 September 2020)

‘*Kafuchōsei to kantsūzai*’ [Patriarchy and a law to punish adultery], *Furin no hōritsu mondai* [Legal issues regarding extramarital affairs]. http://niseco.jp/immorality/immo_law/index.html (accessed on 10 April 2020)

‘*Kantsūzai*’ [Adultery], *Buritanika kokusai daihyakka jiten* [International Encyclopaedia Britannica]. <https://kotobank.jp/word/%E5%A7%A6%E9%80%9A%E7%BD%AA-49267> (accessed on 22 September 2020)

Kumustaka – Association for living together with migrants. http://www.geocities.jp/kumustaka85/20071008_asahi.html (accessed on 24 January 2019)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2018. *Kaigai zairyū hōjinsū chōsa tōkei* [Statistics of the number of overseas Japanese]. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/toko/page22_000043.html (accessed on 8 September 2020)

Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, ‘*Chūgoku zanryū hōjin no jōkyō*’ [The situation of Japanese remaining in post-war China]. <https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/bunya/engo/seido02/kojitoukei.html> (accessed on 3 September 2020)

Netherlands Foundation for War Victims in the East: Japanese archives and contacts (SOO). s-o-o.nl/warchildren/ (accessed on 18 October 2020)

Oral History Society, 'Is your oral history legal and ethical?'. <https://www.ohs.org.uk/advice/ethical-and-legal/4/#interview-relationship> (accessed on 17 August 2020)

Philippine Nikkei-jin Legal Support Center. http://pnlsc.com/index_e.html (accessed on 11 September 2020)

PNLSC-Philippine Nikkei-jin Legal Support Center. http://pnlsc.com/index_e.html (accessed on 10 October 2020)

Prime Minister visits Indonesia, India and Malaysia: Sunday, August 19 to Tuesday, August 21, 2007, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/abephoto/2007/08/20indonesia_e.html (accessed on 24 October 2020)

Professor Bruce Cumings' Endorsement, 17 January 2017. <https://parkyuha.org/archives/5757> (accessed on 7 October 2020)

Robert Capa: The definitive collection, *Magnum Photos*. <https://www.magnumphotos.com/arts-culture/robert-capa-the-definitive-collection/> (accessed on 23 September 2020)

'*Chūgoku zanryūkoji kokusekishutoku 1,000 nin tassei no kiroku*' [Achievement of helping 1,000 stranded war orphans to acquire Japanese nationality], Sakura Kyodo Law Offices. <https://www.sakuralaw.gr.jp/contribution/01.htm> (accessed on 3 September 2020)

'Kawai Hiroyuki', Sakura Kyodo Law Offices. <http://lawyer-kawai.com/humanitarian> (accessed on 3 September 2020)

Smith, G. Making history: The changing face of the profession in Britain, 'The making of oral history: Section 1-2'. https://archives.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/articles/oral_history.html#historyfrombelow (accessed on 18 August 2020)

The Nippon Foundation. '*Shūseki tetsuzuki de Nihon kokuseki shutoku 200 nin ni*' [The number of those who acquired Japanese nationality through *shūseki* procedure reached two hundred], 27 July 2017. <https://blog.canpan.info/nfkouhou/archive/1000> (accessed on 14 September 2020)

"'Children Born of Asia-Pacific War' Study of Japanese fathered children under Japanese military occupation of Southeast and East Asia during the Second World War', Toyota Foundation Research Grant Program 2017 (grant number D17-R-0770). <http://toyotafound.force.com/psearch/JoseiDetail?name=D17-R-0770> (accessed on 13 July 2020)

Wei shaoran san shōgen shūkai [Public gathering to listen to the testimony of Ms Wei Shaolan], *Nihongun 'ianfu' mondai kansai nettowāku* [Japanese Military 'Comfort Women' Issue Kansai Network], December 2010. <http://www.ianfu-kansai-net.org/old/20101211.html> (accessed on 2 June 2020)

60 nen ijō hete higan no rainichi [Their ardent wish finally came true after 60 years], The Nippon Foundation, 20 October 2017. <https://blog.canpan.info/nfkouhou/archive/1063> (accessed on 10 October 2020)

Film, TV programme (in chronological order)

'*Reiko, kokoro no tabiji: Nihon no chichi ni aitai*' [Reiko's journey: I want to see my Japanese father], Yamagata Broadcasting Company, 1994.

Dangnian weiyi liuzai zhongguo de 'guizhibing' Shanqi Hong [Yamazaki Hiroshi: The only 'Japanese devil soldier' who remained in post-war China]. <https://v.qq.com/x/page/m0618sxaugf.html> (accessed on 15 September 2020)

'*Futari no tabiji: Nicchū gekidō o ikita kyōgeki fūfu* [A journey of a couple: Beijing opera actress and actor who led a tumultuous life in China and Japan]', NHK, Tokyo, 1 March 2011.

'Thirty-two', Guo, K., December 2013.

'Children's tears: Searching for Japanese fathers', Sunada, Y., 1 October 2014.

'*Jiaodianrenwu: Weianfu muzi*' [Focus on people: A comfort woman and her son], Tengxun Xinwen, 2014. <http://news.qq.com/original.drw.j12.html> (accessed 15 August 2016)

'*Sengo 70 nen kataru, tou: Kaigai Nikkeijin no sengo*' [Narrate and question 70 years after the war: Overseas Nikkeijin in the post-war period], Japan National Press Club, 2015. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aSxe7JX6wfE> (accessed on 10 October 2020)

'Twenty-two', Guo, K., 2015.

'Michiko: a child born of war', Zhou, V., 15 May 2018.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvD-z5NaLU8> (accessed on 31 July 2020)

'*Watashi wa Nihonjin desu: Sensō no "wasuregatami" firipin zanryūkoji*' [I am Japanese: War orphans in the Philippines, 'remnants of the war'], TV Tokyo, Tokyo, 14 August 2019. <https://www.tv-tokyo.co.jp/zipangu/backnumber/20190814/> (accessed on 12 July 2020)

'*Wengnuang rensheng: Wo de die shi guizhibing*' [A TV series 'Warmth of Life': My father is an evil Japanese soldier], v.ifeng.com, 2012. <http://v.ifeng.com/404.shtml> (accessed on 1 March 2017)

'*Nihonjin no wasuremono: Firipin to Chūgoku no zanryū hōjin* [What Japanese left behind: Remaining Japanese in the Philippines and China]', Kawai, H., July 2020.

Other sources

Court decision (Yuko's case), 5 December 2014.

General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 1945. *Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government, Policies governing repatriation of Japanese nationals in conquered territory*, 16 October.

General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 1946. Annex III to Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government, file AG 370.05 (7 May 46) GC (SCAPIN 927), dated 7 May 1946, subject: 'Repatriation', Repatriation to and from Japan, Section I General plan, 5 November.

Permission for *shūseki*, Tokyo Family Court to Seiji, 3 March 1987.

Permission for *shūseki*, Kumamoto Family Court to Koretada, 16 September 1987.

Secretariat of the House of Representatives. 1953. *Dai 15 kai kokkai shūgiin, kaigai dōhō hikiage oyobi ikazoku engo ni kansuru chōsa tokubetsuiin kaigiroku dai 11 gō* [The 15th Diet session of the House of Representatives. The 11th minutes of the special investigatory committee on repatriation of fellow citizens abroad and relief assistance for their family members], pp. 1-18.

The House of Councilors. 1957. *Dai 26 kai kokkai sangiin yosan iinkai dai 2 bunkakai kaigiroku dai 1 gō* [The 26th Diet session of the House of Councilors Budget Committee. The 1st minutes of the 2nd sectional committee.].

Written confession of Nagatomi Hiroyuki. *Chukiren Peace Memorial Museum*, 25 February 1955.

Interviews with participants

Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 21 December 2015.

Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 10 May 2016.

Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 12 May 2016.

Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 16 December 2017.

Interview notes, Yuko, Kanagawa, Japan, 19 December 2017.

Interview notes, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 22 December 2015.

Interview transcript, Seiji, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 2016.

Interview transcript, Keiko, Kanagawa, Japan, 20 May 2016.

Interview notes, Keiko, Kanagawa, Japan, 24 December 2017.

Interview transcript, Yongyun, Shandong, China, 11 January 2017.

Interview transcript, Yongyun, Shandong, China, 12 January 2017.

Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 14 January 2017.

Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 20 January 2017.

Interview notes, Michiko, Chiba, Japan, 20 December 2017.

Interview transcript, Toshio, Hiroshima, Japan, 15 January 2017.

Interview transcript, Koretada, Tokyo, Japan, 19 May 2017.

Interview transcript, Koretada, Saitama, Japan, 22 May 2017.

Interview transcript, Momoko, Tokyo, Japan, 23 May 2017.

Other interviews

Interview notes, Ikeda Sumie, Tokyo, Japan, 18 May 2016.

Interview notes, Kawai Hiroyuki, Tokyo, Japan, 17 January 2017.

Interview notes, Ishii Sayoko, Tokyo, Japan, 26 May 2017.

Unpublished personal documents obtained from a law firm in Tokyo

Unpublished personal documents, Case 1, Tsuneyoshi.
Unpublished personal documents, Case 2, Ryotaro.
Unpublished personal documents, Case 3, Yoshio.
Unpublished personal documents, Case 4, Katsue.
Unpublished personal documents, Case 5, Masao.
Unpublished personal documents, Case 6, Kayoko.
Unpublished personal documents, Case 7, Maki.
Unpublished personal documents, Case 8, Mariko.
Unpublished personal documents, Case 9, Kayo.
Unpublished personal documents, Case 10, Teruo.
Unpublished personal documents, Case 11, Taro.
Unpublished personal documents, Case 12, Yu.
Unpublished personal documents, Case 13, Tadashi.

Letters and e-mail correspondence (in chronological order)

Letter, Yuko's father to Yuko, 16 July 1979.
Letter, the Ministry of Justice to Yuko's father, 15 August 1979.
Letter, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare to Yuko, October 2009.
Letter, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare to Yuko, December 2012.
E-mail correspondence, a contact person of Taipei Women's Rescue Foundation, 15 December 2015.
E-mail correspondence, a representative of a support group for stranded war orphans in Nagano Prefecture, 5 March 2016.
E-mail correspondence, a representative for a support group for stranded war orphans in Hyogo Prefecture, 5 September 2016.
Letter, Kanako Kuramitsu to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, April 2017.
Letter, Yuko to Kanako Kuramitsu, June 2017.
Letter, Yuko to Kanako Kuramitsu, November 2017.
Letter, Yuko to Kanako Kuramitsu, December 2017.
E-mail correspondence, research ethics officer of the University of Birmingham, 8 February 2018.
E-mail correspondence, Ute Baur-Timmerbrink to Kanako Kuramitsu, 7 April 2018.
E-mail correspondence, Yonekura Yoko (lawyer) to Kanako Kuramitsu, 29 August 2019.
E-mail correspondence, Yasuhara Yukihiro (lawyer) to Kanako Kuramitsu, 29 August 2019.
Email correspondence, Koretada to Kanako Kuramitsu, 30 July 2020.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: List of participants

Asterisks indicate pseudonyms. I ensured anonymity for all participants except for those who have published books and/or appeared in the media under their real names.

	Name	Gender	Year of birth	Place of birth	Wartime occupation of the father	Year of migration to Japan
1	Yuko*	F	1942	Beijing	Doctor, company manager, intelligence agent	1980
2	Michiko	F	1942	Beijing	Intelligence agent	1987
3	Seiji*	M	1942	Nanjing	Employee of the Central China Railway	1987
4	Koretada	M	1944	Suzhou	General of the Imperial Japanese Army, head of a food factory for Japanese military	1988
5	Momoko	F	1944	Shanghai	Soldier, security guard, company manager	1984
6	Toshio	M	1948	Beijing	Intelligence agent	1978
7	Keiko*	F	1953	Heihe	None	1999
8	Yongyun	F	1950	Jinan	Civilian worker for the military (military veterinary), employee of a railway company, soldier	Residence in China

Appendix 2: Interview with participants

Asterisks indicate pseudonyms. I ensured anonymity for all participants except for those who have published books and/or appeared in the media under their real names.

	Name	Number of interview session	Total length of interview (hour)	Main language used in the interview	Place of interview
1	Yuko*	5	12	Japanese	Kanagawa, Japan
2	Michiko	3	4	Japanese	Chiba, Japan
3	Koretada	2	12	Japanese	Tokyo and Saitama, Japan
4	Seiji*	2	4	Chinese	Tokyo, Japan
5	Momoko	1	2	Chinese	Tokyo, Japan
6	Toshio	1	4	Japanese	Hiroshima, Japan
7	Keiko*	2	3	Chinese	Kanagawa, Japan
8	Yongyun	2	5	Chinese	Jinan, China

Appendix 3: List of Sino-Japanese CBOW born of marriage whose information was obtained from a Japanese law firm

Unpublished personal documents of the following twenty individuals were obtained from a law firm in Tokyo. Asterisks indicate pseudonyms. I ensured anonymity for all individuals except for Makoto who had appeared in a magazine article under his real name.

	Name	Gender	Year of birth	Place of birth	Wartime occupation of the father	Year of migration to Japan
1	Maki*	F	1946	Wuhan	Company employee	1991
2	Makoto	M	1940	Macau	Intelligence agent	1987
3	Tsuneyoshi*	M	1939	Shanghai	Employee of a textile factory, translator for the military, soldier	N/A
4	Ryotaro*	M	1940	Shanghai	Manager of a trading company	1994
5	Yoshio*	M	1944	Shanghai	Soldier	N/A
6	Kayoko*	F	1943	Shanghai	Soldier	N/A
7	Katsue*	F	1944	Suzhou	Manager of a café, a restaurant and a tofu shop	N/A
8	Kayo*	F	1941	Suzhou	Manager of a café, a restaurant and a tofu shop	N/A
9	Masao*	M	1943	Nanjing	Employee of a shipping company, head of a shipping company	N/A
10	Mariko*	F	1946	Shanghai	Soldier	N/A
11	Teruo*	M	1945	Nanjing	Manager of a tobacco, liquor and flower shop. Also managed a flower farm. Soldier.	N/A
12	Taro*	M	1941	Shanghai	Manager of a ranch commissioned by Japanese military	N/A
13	Akiko*	F	1944	Nanjing	Employee of a shipbuilding company	N/A
14	Yu*	F	1945	Jiaozuo	Head of a subsidiary company of Jiaozuo mine	N/A

15	Tadashi*	M	1942	Jiaozuo	Head of a subsidiary company of Jiaozuo mine	N/A
16	Akio*	M	1942	Kaifeng	Manager of a construction company	N/A
17	Mieko*	F	1943	Nanjing	Civilian worker for the military, employee of the Central China Railway	N/A
18	Yo*	M	1954	Shenyang	Soldier	N/A
19	Takashi*	M	1955	Yinchuan	Soldier	N/A
20	Kuniyoshi*	M	1943	Shanghai	Employee of a glass factory, employee of a weaving factory	N/A

Appendix 4: List of fathers and their occupation

Asterisks indicate pseudonyms. Pseudonyms are used for all fathers except for those who had appeared in the media and public documents under their real names.

While there are twenty-eight Sino-Japanese children in total listed in Appendix 1 and 3, twenty-four fathers are listed in the table below because four of them had two children each.

	Father of Sino-Japanese CBOW	Wartime occupation in China	Post-war occupation in China
1	Masao*	Soldier	—
2	Masatoshi*	Soldier	POW, farmer
3	Sadao*	Soldier	—
4	Chukichi	Soldier, security guard, company manager	—
5	Toru	General of the Imperial Japanese Army, head of a food factory for Japanese military	—
6	Hidenori*	Employee of a textile factory, translator for the military, soldier	—
7	Hiroshi	Civilian worker for the military (military veterinary), employee of a railway company, soldier	Doctor
8	Kenji*	Manager of a tobacco shop, a liquor shop, a flower shop and a flower farm, soldier	—
9	Yoshiharu	Intelligence agent	—
10	Takashi*	Intelligence agent	—
11	Shigemori	Intelligence agent	—
12	Ryoichiro*	Doctor, company manager, intelligence agent	—
13	Katsuo*	Civilian worker for the military, employee of the Central China Railway	—
14	Kojiro*	Manager of a ranch commissioned by Japanese military	—
15	Seiichiro*	Employee of the Central China Railway	—

16	Masanori*	Employee of Mitsubishi Corporation	—
17	Muneo*	Employee of Mitsui Shipbuilding	—
18	Nagamatsu*	Manager of a construction company	—
19	Yoshio*	Employee of a shipping company, head of a shipping company	—
20	Taro*	Head of a subsidiary company of Jiaozuo mine	POW, farmer
21	Tsuneyoshi*	Manager of a trading company	—
22	Seikichi*	Manager of a café, a restaurant and a tofu shop	—
23	Yoshio*	Employee of a glass factory, employee of a weaving factory	—
24	Tadashi*	None	Engineer

Appendix 5: List of fathers, their marital relationship(s) and repatriation

Asterisks indicate pseudonyms. Pseudonyms are used for all fathers except for those who had appeared in the media and public documents under their real names.

	Father of Sino-Japanese CBOW	Married with a Japanese partner before arrival in China	Children with a Japanese partner	Year of arrival in China	Year of marriage with a Chinese partner	Number of children with a Chinese partner	Approximate length of time the couple lived together after marriage (year)	Repatriated after the war
1	Masao*	No	No	N/A	1944	1	1.5	Yes
2	Masatoshi*	No	No	N/A	1953	2	4	No
3	Sadao*	N/A	N/A	N/A	1942	1	3	Yes
4	Chukichi	No	No	1937	1942	2	4	Yes
5	Toru	Yes	Yes	1937	1943	1	2.5	Yes
6	Hidenori*	No	No	1935	1939	4	5	Yes
7	Hiroshi	No	No	1937	1947	1	19	No
8	Kenji*	No	No	Around 1940	1941	2	3.5	Yes
9	Yoshiharu	No	No	1937	1942	4	53	Yes
10	Takashi*	No	No	1937	1939	1	6	Yes
11	Shigemori	Yes	Yes	1924	1940	2	5	Yes
12	Ryoichiro*	Yes	N/A	1935	1941	2	4	Yes
13	Katsuo*	Yes	Yes	1923	1940	1	6	Yes
14	Kojiro*	Yes	Yes	1939	1940	1	1	Yes
15	Seiichiro*	Yes	Yes	1939	1941	1	5	Yes
16	Masanori*	No	No	N/A	1945	1	0.5	Yes
17	Muneo*	Yes	Yes	1938	1940	1	5	Yes

18	Nagamatsu*	Yes	Yes	1941	1941	2	5	Yes
19	Yoshio*	No	No	1940	1942	1	3.5	Yes
20	Taro*	Yes	No	N/A	1940	2	5.5	N/A
21	Tsuneyoshi*	Yes	Yes	N/A	1940	1	5	Yes
22	Seikichi*	Yes	Yes	1938	1940	2	5.5	Yes
23	Yoshio*	Yes	Yes	N/A	1942	1	3.5	Yes
24	Tadashi*	No	No	1945	1952	4	29	No

Appendix 6: A set of questions for the mothers

A Japanese law firm formulated the following set of questions for Sino-Japanese CBOW's mothers in the 1980s to collect necessary evidence of the parents' marital relationship. The evidence was necessary for Sino-Japanese CBOW to establish Japanese family register and acquire Japanese nationality.

1. When did you get married with _____?
2. Where did the wedding ceremony take place? Please state the exact address. Did it take place at home? If not, please state the name of the restaurant, ceremonial hall or wedding reception hall where the ceremony was held.
3. Were you also willing to marry _____? (Was it a consensual marriage?)
4. Who made the marriage proposal?
5. Was the wedding ceremony in accordance with Japanese custom or Chinese custom? What kind of style did it take? Please describe the details of the ceremony in sequence.
6. At the time of your marriage, Chinese marriage law required you to have two wedding witnesses. Were there witnesses? Who were they?
7. If you have held a wedding ceremony based on Japanese custom, was there someone who played a role of a go-between (*nakoudo*)? Who was it?
8. Were there other participants in the wedding ceremony? Please state their names, relationship with you and _____ as well as the number of participants. (Please send their testimonies regarding the wedding ceremony if you can obtain them.)
9. Please state the address, where he is registered, his parents' names, date of birth and family situation in Japan.
10. Did Japanese relatives of _____ participate in the wedding ceremony? If so, who were they? If not, did you ask the reason to _____?
11. Did _____ ever tell you about his family members in Japan?
12. Have you introduced and explained about your family members to _____? If not, why?
13. Did your family participate in the wedding ceremony? If so, who were they? If not, why?
14. Please state any other matters that you remember regarding your wedding ceremony.
15. Please state your address after marriage and names of people you lived with. If you have moved elsewhere, please state all other addresses and dates of removal.
16. Until when have you lived with _____ after marriage? Why did you separate?
17. Has any family member, colleague, friend or acquaintance of _____ ever visited your home after marriage? Please state if you know their name, relationship to _____, date of birth, address and whether they are alive or not.
18. Has any of your family member, colleague, friend or acquaintance ever visited your home after marriage? Please state their name, relationship to you, date of birth, address and whether they are alive or not.

19. Have you registered your child's birth at a Chinese or Japanese institution? If so, please state when, by whom, and to which institution the birth was registered. If not, why? Please send us a photocopy if the institution still has the original copy.

20. Have you ever been to Japan? If so, where and how long did you stay? Who did you meet in Japan? What was the purpose of your stay? With whom have you been moving around within Japan?

21. Do you know whether _____ is alive or not? If he has already passed away, were you there at the time of his death? Where were you at the time?

22. Please state any other relevant matters that you wish to add.