An Investigation into the Role of Local Government in Enhancing the Public Participation in Sindh, Pakistan: Policy and Practice in Service Delivery

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Abstract

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Key words: Local Government, public participation, local community, and rural Sindh.

It is generally recognised that the primary role of the decentralise local governance is to establish closer relationship between rural communities and the governing authorities in local development. In Pakistan, the system of local governments has always been introduced by the non-democratic forces. The decentralised governments have often been discontinued by the civilian governments of Pakistan.

This study has sought to examine the role of the decentralised local governance in initiating the local community participation in local development in the province of Sindh, Pakistan. This thesis responds the questions about the initiatives taken by the local government authorities and the genuine local community participation in local community development programs. It further explores the main barriers to local public participation in the local policy making and implementation in Sindh.

The findings suggest that the challenges to participation have been ever increasing. The military establishment's hold on the central state policies has weakened the public empowering national laws. Furthermore, the local government's role to initiate meaningful local community involvement in development projects of the decentralised local governance has been engrossed by the hold of feudal lords, corruption, favouritism, and the attitude of indifference on the part of provincial and national governments. Thus, it is argued that, in such dominant military state and feudal lords' system, there is no positive link between

the local government reforms and the democratic participation in the local decision-making. Based on these findings, a realistic model for participation is introduced and relevant implications are considered.

Acknowledgement

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ABBREVIATIONS

BD	Basic Democracies
BDO	Basic Democracies Ordinance
CBO	Community Based Organization
CCB	Citizen Community Board
DC	Deputy Commissioner
DCO	District Coordination Officer
DPO	District Police Officer
ECP	Election Commission of Pakistan
EU	European Union
ICG	International Crisis Group
LGO	Local Government Ordinance
MAO	Municipal Administration Ordinance
MC	Municipal Corporation
MNA	Member of National Assembly
MPA	Member of Provincial Assembly
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NRB	National Reconstruction Bureau
PBS	Pakistan Bureau of Statistics
PFC	Provincial Finance Commission
PMA	Punjab Municipal Act
PMC	Public Monitoring Committee
PPP	Pakistan Peoples' Party
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SLGA	Sindh Local Government Act
SUCCESS	Sindh Union Council and Community Economic Strengthening Support Programme
TMO	Tehsil Municipal Officer
UC	Union Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
AIDP	Agriculture and Industrial Development Programme
WB	World Bank

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Background of the research

The motivation for this study arises from both a personal interest and the World Bank's (WB) appreciation that local governments tend to bring local people closer to the local authorities (World Bank 1994; World Bank 1996). As far the case of Sindh, Pakistan, is concerned (with regards to the conceptual purposes of the international organisations), decentralisation is essential regarding a policy decision citizen participation, and it needs to be explored. The problem of the role of the local governments in promoting community empowerment became more interesting because of these decentralisation reforms in Pakistan, including Sindh, which were introduced by the Pakistani military dictators. Thus, the aim of this research is to explore the relationship between the local governments and local community participation in the development projects of the local government in Sindh, Pakistan.

At least four local government acts have come into being during the different periods of governments of Sindh. Since Pakistan's independence, communities have been involved in very few development initiatives. The Local Government Ordinance (LGO) Act of 2001 offers an enabling environment for citizen participation through the creation of various provisions, such as Citizen Community Boards (CCBs), Public Monitoring Committees (PMCs), and School Management Committees (SMCs). This decentralisation (LGO 2001) of Pakistan replaced the 200 year-old colonial system of bureaucratic control over districts by the first two tiers of government very swiftly with the elected local representatives at the districts, talukas, and the union levels. The major promise

of LGO 2001 was to re-orientate the administrative system to allow public participation in decision-making (Mohmand and Cheema 2007).

However, the democratically elected government replaced LGO 2001 and introduced its own version of local government by claiming that the LGO 2001, introduced by General Pervez Musharraf, was an attempt to clothe authoritarianism with the fig leaf of a popular mandate, because he was a military dictator and he had nothing to do with democracy and citizen empowerment (Talbot 2002).

1.2 Statement of the problem

The decentralisation decision has brought a wave of reforms with the intention of democratising the governance process in developing countries (McEwan 2003). Decentralisation is laden with promises that will result in decisions that reflect local needs and priorities (Devas and Grant 2003). Decentralisation has been defined as the meaningful devolution of central powers to the local units of governance that are accessible and accountable to the local population (Blair 2000; Devas and Grant 2003).

The major promise of decentralisation reform is that it brings governments closer to the citizens through the mechanism of citizen participation in the decision-making process. The mechanism of public participation is defined and interpreted with different connotations. For example, McEwan (2003) defines participation as a process in which stakeholders (citizens) influence and share control over the development programmes, decisions, and resources which affect them. The more radical definitions of participation emphasise that community involvement in the process of local development leads to social development and the empowerment of community members. As far the case study of Sindh, Pakistan, is concerned, it (the Devolution Power Plan of 2001)

emphasised community involvement in development through the creation of CCBs (International Crisis Group 2004). The focus of this study is local government reforms in the period 2001-2009.

However, unfortunately, the paradoxes of decentralisation in Pakistan are that these devolution reforms have been mainly introduced by the military generals and underestimated by the civilian governments of Pakistan. Therefore, it was important to know whether the local governments of Pakistan intend to enhance community involvement during local policy formulation and local development activities. Do the local governments of Pakistan invite civic engagement during local development programmes? And to what extent were the local governments of Pakistan participatory in nature? Hence, the aim of this project is to investigate whether local governments have been contributing any community involvement as a main step towards the accountability of the government structures.

1.3 Aim, objectives, and research questions

1.4 Principal aim

The primary aim of this study is to explore the dynamics of public participation in local government during the period 2001-2009 in Sindh.

1.5 The overarching research question is:

How has local government initiated or reinvented public involvement in policy formulation and local development projects in rural Sindh?

1.6 Objectives of the study

1. To review the relevant literature on public participation in the local government's policy-making and local development projects in Sindh.

2. To explore the contributing factors influencing public participation in the local government's policy formulation and local development projects in rural Sindh in the period 2001-2009.

3. To assess the strengths and weaknesses of rural participation in the local government's policy formulation and local development projects in rural Sindh in the period 2001-2009.

4. To find out ways of facilitating effective involvement in the local government's policy formulation and local development projects in rural Sindh.
5. To assess the implications of the findings for improving policy and practice in other districts in Pakistan and in other developing countries.

1.7 Rationale

In many studies (Regmi et al. 2010b; Regmi et al. 2010a), it has been documented that local government could be a very essential feature which could deliver good, basic public services to the citizens in developing countries. It is believed that progress in community development must be measured in terms of improvement to the quality of life of the citizens. Local governments are judged on their ability and performance to ensure that the needs of the local community are met in terms of basic services such as improvement in public health, childcare, schooling, public health emergency services, water and sanitation. It is quite necessary to know the role of local councils in community participation for these basic delivery services. The researcher's observation is that local government can hardly deliver basic public services effectively without the involvement of the community. Kamberelis and Dimitriadis (2011) have shed light on the importance of the collective action of the public in various events and incidents. For example, they (2011) state that collective activism transforms the conditions of the stakeholders in the state. Noam Chomsky is cited as saying that collective action "has literally changed the world": the Lowell Factory girls' protest in the 1850s that catalysed the Labour movement in the United States; the anti-war, civil rights, and feminist movements of the 1960s; and the efforts of journalists, artists and public intellectuals in Turkey fighting censorship today through acts of civil disobedience in their everyday work. Participation can

work as a catalyst for collective action, as one, single person cannot do it alone, and it can make a much more civilized country.

Furthermore, there is no up-to-date study on citizen participation in the province of Sindh. Therefore, it is very important to measure the status of citizen participation during the period of local governments in Sindh.

1.8 Significance of study

There have been a few studies on the performance and delivery of services by local government reforms in Pakistan. These studies have not addressed the themes of community participation and citizen involvement in decision-making in Sindh, the second largest province of Pakistan. A few PhD studies have seen a focus on decentralisation and institutional performance in different provinces of Pakistan, but not in the province of Sindh, and particularly rural Sindh. For example, (Muhammad 2004) published a study titled Local Government Finance: Some Political Aspects: A Case Study of Punjab. He conducted a study on the financial and administrative autonomy of local government in the province of Punjab. In his findings, he concluded that in the present setup of Pakistani institutions - overambitious bureaucracy, weak politicians, and underdeveloped political institutions - the local government's autonomy is impaired on a large scale. Furthermore, (Kurosaki 2006) studied the constitutional clauses which impair the autonomy of local governments in Pakistan. Kurosaki (2006).

In this study, Kurosaki indicated that leadership is the key to the success of the CCB initiative, along with pro-poor components such as the active participation of the poor and landless. Khan and Anjum (2013). Khan (2006a). This study has importance because of the following new insights, which will be considered after the completion of this research:

1. Sindh is the second largest province of Pakistan, and its capital city is Karachi. This is the first study in which the focus is completely on the dynamics of public participation in local government.

2. Sindh is the country's chief port and has the largest city, dominating its coastline (Ansari 2015). This is the first study into the province of Sindh in which rural and urban participation dynamics are investigated.

3. Sindh constitutes 23% of the total population of Pakistan, and its capital city (Karachi) is the biggest city in Sindh with a population of 9.269 million, followed by Hyderabad and Sukkur(Bajwa 1999) This is the first study in which the ladder of participation has been used to locate the actual position of public participation and the problems of public participation.

4. The local governments in Pakistan have become the loved and loathed political features for the non-democratic rulers and the publicly elected politicians respectively; therefore, this study matters in such a regard that it will also feature a comparison of two local governments: one introduced by the military ruler (General Pervez Musharraf), and one formed by the publicly elected government of Asif Ali Zardari.

5. How are local governments linked with public participation in Sindh and Pakistan? What is the association between local governments and civic engagement?

It can be said that any study on the province of Sindh should not be underestimated. Another significance of this study is that this study will be the first study on the second largest province of Pakistan, through which the contributions of two local governments (General Musharraf's local government of 2001, and the publicly elected local government introduced in 2013) to public

participation and the factors which play a role in public participation are investigated.

Therefore, this study can provide great insight into whether local councils, which have very essential political features for basic public services, are participatory or non-participatory in nature.

One implication of this study is that it can provide a comprehensive, empirical assessment of the local government's willingness and commitment to encourage community involvement in social development projects in Sindh, Pakistan. Furthermore, through this research the nature of the constraints in community involvement in the decision-making of the local governments can be identified.

1.9 Towards a theoretical framework

A study of the literature, pertaining to the research questions, gives rise to three theorists' works on participation. For example, White (1996) put forward a typology of participation into four forms: nominal participation, representative participation, instrumental participation, and transformative participation.

1.10 Methodology

As the researcher was interested in understanding a complex and detailed social phenomenon, therefore, the case study approach was considered most appropriate to adopt. To understand the detailed stories of the people, it was crucial to adopt a qualitative methodology. Therefore, qualitative data was generated and analysed through the thematic technique. For more details please see Chapter Four.

1.9 Limitations of study

The main limitations of this study are time, the field areas, and the financial resources required to administer the open-ended questionnaires.

1.10 Theoretical limits

Another limitation of this study was theoretical limitation. For example, there are various theoretical models for community participation. However, it was not necessary for all of the components and concepts of a theory to fit into one political system of a country. For example, Arnstein's theory of the ladder of citizen participation has eight rungs, but in the context of Pakistan only one rung was fitting after analysing the data. The same was the case for other theoretical models. For details, please see Chapter Two.

1.11 Structure of thesis

Chapter One presents a background to the thesis, aims and objectives. It also covers the statement of the problem.

Chapter Two covers the broad debates of the previous literature on local government and its contribution to public participation in developed and developing countries. Various theories are discussed, and three theoretical models of community participation in the development process of the government are introduced.

Chapter Three throws light on the available literature in the context of Sindh, Pakistan, and the introduction of local governments. The contextual literature on the two districts of Sindh is further explained.

Chapter Four covers a detailed discussion of the research methodology, research design, and research questions. The different philosophical approaches to the research are covered, along with the research paradigms. Details about how the data are generated, managed and analysed are presented.

Chapter Five begins with the empirical findings of the study. The chapter features an analysis of the stories of the participants.

Chapter Six is a discussion of the results of **Chapter Five.** In this chapter, the theoretical accordance and non-accordance with the results of this study are discussed.

Chapter Seven - Conclusion In this chapter the general background of the whole thesis is presented. The existent disconnection between the aims and objectives of decentralised local governance in Sindh, Pakistan, is also identified.

Chapter tow

Literature review

2.0 Introduction

This chapter starts by considering the views of optimists and of pessimists about decentralisation reforms, their benefits for developed and underdeveloped countries, and finally the association between local governance and public participation in the decision-making process. This study also addresses the question of whether the local government system can enhance citizen involvement in the local development process in the context of Pakistan and specifically of Sindh. Specific sections are allocated to the literature which supports decentralisation reforms and their various positive impacts on the poor population and the association between decentralisation and citizen participation in local development projects. In addition, critical perspectives on decentralisation and public participation are also discussed.

The argument which is explored throughout this chapter is that some scholars are of the opinion that it is not necessary that decentralisation reforms should empower citizens at the universal level. This is because there are various factors which can contribute differently according to culture, the form of the government, the nature of the sovereign state and the institutional structures of the central state. In order to understand these relationships and factors, this chapter will consider the literature in favour of decentralization, critical perspectives on decentralization and the scope of citizen participation and critical perspectives.

This chapter also offers a discussion of relevant theories of citizen participation. The relationship between local development administration and public participation has been explored by a number of authors ((White 1996) (Laird

2016) and the adopted model of the citizen participation is critically evaluated in the relevant section of this chapter.

2.1 Trend of Decentralisation

Historically, local governments throughout the world are expected to be the providers of education in citizenship. It is assumed that the basic function of a local government should be to educate individual citizens to take an interest in and participate in the process of government (Rondinelli et al. 1989; Tambulasi 2011: 334). For three decades, decentralisation reforms have developed into a wave of decisions in various developing countries with the intention of democratising the governance process (Gaventa and Valderrama 1999; McEwan 2003). One of the main objectives of the advocates of local democratization is that there should be an active process in which local communities, as beneficiaries, influence the direction and implementation of development projects, rather than merely receive a share of project benefits (Paul 1987; World Bank 1996).

The specific assumption is that the local government system produces an opportunity for community involvement in local development activities, and that has been the principal motive behind pursuing decentralisation reforms across the world in recent decades, in both developed and developing countries (Agrawal 1999; Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Ribot et al. 2006). In addition to citizen engagement, a further expectation is that democratic devolution reforms can contribute to citizens' empowerment to an extent that the beneficiaries will demand accountability from their government services and a fair distribution of the public budget (Faguet 2004; Faguet 2005; Faguet 2014; Vergara 2015). As examples of the many countries which have launched local government reforms, (Irvin and Stansbury 2004) listed countries

in Latin America, Africa and Asia and named the two largest countries in the world, China and India, where decentralisation has been regarded as the major institutional framework supporting phenomenal industrial growth in the last two decades. India went further by introducing constitutional reforms in favour of decentralisation around the same time that it established main economic reforms in the early 1990s (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006b). Theoretically, as a conceptual framework, decentralisation is laden with promise to bring local communities closer to government, which looks fascinating for those who favour decentralization reforms (World Bank 1994).

The conceptual assumption that decentralisation leads to community participation and ultimately to empowerment does, however, have a big challenge in countries with high levels of corruption, an uncompromising attitude of a centralized government and institutional backwardness. For example, Véron et al. (2006) pointed out that a local government system is no panacea for curbing excessive corruption even though local citizens participate in local government development projects. Unfortunately, some factions exist which will build networks with a corrupt bureaucracy and corrupt local elites. In such circumstances, the impact of participatory local governance on the reduction of corruption is minimal.

In contrast, the literature of optimists states that in developing countries such as Bolivia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, South Africa and Uganda, where the political institutions are handicapped by having to compete with political forces or regional interests, decentralisation is used to compensate for either a concession of the central government to regional interests or as an instrument for legitimising the existing government or/and deterring separatist tendencies (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006b). Bardhan and Mookherjee

(2006a) were nevertheless very conscious that local democratization might not contribute positively because of the traditional modes of delivery in centralised bureaucracies. Many developing countries are traditionally centralised and corrupt for a variety of reasons and in these countries local democracy might worsen service delivery and public participation (Prud'homme 1995; Crook et al. 1998). Blair (2000), who expressed admiration for some aspects of decentralisation in six countries, assessed the contributions of participation and accountability during decentralisation reforms and found that both showed significant potential for promoting democratic local governance in those countries. He concluded that it is quite crucial that efficiency is needed to involve as many citizens as possible, and then the local government can contribute positively to the process of democratization. (Manor 1995; Crook et al. 1998) were optimists whose studies of states in South Asia and West Africa found that decentralisation had increased participation in all cases and had improved the performance of government services in some cases.

However, the impacts of decentralisation vary from one country to another. Asutay (2006) argued that the political values of one country or region cannot be applied to another nation. As an example, when General Musharraf became the military dictator of Pakistan after the military coup in 1999, he announced a democratically elected local government with the direct involvement of citizens in planning services and the provision of mechanisms for citizens' oversight of the execution of development projects (world Bank 2004a; Hasnain 2010). In the majority of developing countries, national governments have lost a great deal of legitimacy, so decentralisation has been widely expected to provide benefits to a marginalized public (Bardhan and Mookherjee 1998). Local democratic governance is therefore expected to bring governments closer to

citizens through the mechanisms of citizen participation and accountability in local governance (Danquah et al. 2018). The core definition of decentralisation is that there is a meaningful devolution of central powers to local units of governance which are accessible and accountable to the local population (Blair 2000). Here, it is assumed that with the introduction of local government reforms, the common public will have an opportunity to interact closely with the administration (Blair 2000; Yilmaz et al. 2010).

In developing countries such as Pakistan, however, unequal forces are strong enough to maintain the gap between the governed and the governing (Lall 2012a), and Crook and Sverrisson (1999) expressed their concern that this equates to a big gap between the rich and the poor. When the poor are excluded from political participation and political life, any attempt to provide greater political participation to ordinary citizens at the local level is denied by the corrupt political elites. These rich politicians therefore divert such schemes away from any political participation of the poor.

2.1.1 Democracy

The literature suggests that local government and improvements in democratic governance have a positive relationship and as long as local communities are invited meaningfully, the process of governance will be more democratic (Irvin and Stansbury 2004). (Ngo et al. 2019) stated that public involvement will lead to efficiency in local government and that community participation and the capacity of local government have positive relationships in terms of urban housing provision and infrastructure upgrading projects. The necessary capacity is the outcome of effective leadership, appropriate financial resources and an effective community information exchange process. That might be the reason why Smith (1998) suggested that even a weak form of public participation could

be beneficial to the local communities involved in development works because even poor consultation in developing countries can bring new values and perceptions to bear on the design and evaluation of projects.

This is very difficult for those countries which have non-democratic tendencies, a strong central hold and no robust or determined central authority for supporting and executing change and providing opportunities for citizen participation at the local level (Herzer and Pirez 1991; Mukandala 1998; Gaventa and Valderrama 1999; Kessy 2013). Ribot and Agrwal (1999) carried out three case studies of decentralization in Nepal in South Asia and in Senegal and Mali in West Africa; they confirmed the tendency of the central governments in these countries to maintain their hold even though there were decentralization departments.

In the case of Pakistan, after its creation in 1947, the country went into the hands of the military establishment which has been ruling the state directly through military coups and indirectly through so-called civilian governments. Consequently, the state institutions developed a big gap between the ruled and the rulers (Mohmand and Cheema 2007; Wilder 2009; Lall 2012a; Lall 2012b; Lall 2014).

Now, despite the hope that decentralisation can create an environment of accountability, responsiveness and good governance (Faguet 2014), it will not be easy to achieve these goals in a country such as Pakistan. (Faguet 2014) stated that all these potential benefits are bound together in one single issue: that with decentralisation, the common people might get the opportunity to participate in processes of governance such as policy making and policy implementation.

In addition, decentralisation can aggregate local-level politics which can consequently create local leadership and civic engagement. Moreover, it has been found that in Latin America, local governments have started spending between 10% and 50% of the national government revenues(Faguet 2014). Decentralisation can therefore be considered as a quiet revolution in terms of local government reform. Even civic, republican and communitarian theorists believe that local governments can play a pivotal role in promoting and supporting active civil and political society in the contemporary world. The role of local authorities is considered to be crucial for enabling communities to thrive and survive today's social, cultural and economic crises (Andrews et al. 2011: 595).

Scholars (Andrews et al. 2008; Andrews et al. 2011) studied various local councils' policies for promoting effective citizenship and found that an operational definition of citizenship had been adopted as educational or awareness-raising activities which help people to develop the knowledge, skills and confidence to engage in local decision-making. This definition is adopted in this current study. Andrews et al. (2008; 2011) adopted a methodology of surveys, telephone interviews and six case studies involving semi-structured interviews to determine the extent to which local councils were engaging with, educating and empowering local citizens. They found that young people were the main targets of the local councils because young people were more willing to engage and participate in empowering activities. They suggested that local councils could contribute a great deal to promoting effective citizenship if local people demonstrate that citizenship participation contributes a lot to local democracy; they recommended that various opportunities should be offered which could develop the confidence of local citizens.

Historically, local governments are expected to be the providers of citizenship education across the world because the basic function of a local government should be to educate individual citizens to take an interest in and participate in the process of government, and decentralisation has been recommended as a basic measure to achieve good governance and democracy (Rondinelli et al. 1989; Tambulasi 2011: 334).

This cannot be achieved without effective and meaningful citizen participation in the decision-making process. Decentralization reforms are therefore encouraged with the expectation that they can contribute to empowering citizens to demand accountability from their government services and the fair distribution of public budgets. The conceptual framework for achieving that was the introduction of local governance reforms.

2.1.2 Efficiency and local needs and priorities
The literature suggests that decentralisation is laden with promises that decisions will result in the reflection of local needs and priorities (Devas and Grant 2003). (Neshkova and Kalesnikaite 2019) reported the success story of Water Users Associations in Turkey's Aydin Province in which the local governance met the expectations of successful decentralization in irrigation management. On the other hand, Lima (2019: 669) explored the barriers to the integration of housing movements in participatory governance in Brazil. This is why it has been suggested that neither decentralization nor democratization can be achieved once and for all. These processes are both advanced and halted through acts of contestation: repetition, by definition, is multiple performances (Fan et al. 2009); Poteete and Ribot (2011) stated that to sustain these process of decentralization, centralization, democratization and de-democratization, there is a need to develop and renew resistance to counter pervasive

centrifugal pressures because the repertoires of domination will not be countered if they are not recognized, and awareness of these repertoires of domination on its own will not be sufficient.

2.2 Local governance and the critical perspective

Much of the literature discussed so far often claims that decentralisation is laden with promise to improve the lives of the poor in many ways (Faguet 2014; Smith 2018). (Rondinelli et al. 1989; Rondinelli 1991), however, suggested that there should be careful analysis of the context of a particular country before pursuing decentralization policies. Danquah et al. (2018) concluded that participatory development is exposed to various obstacles during the local development process. For example, some barriers are inherent within institutional structures and there are others outside the institutions, such as a culture of corruption and favouritism. For example, actors such as bureaucracy, civil society, NGOs, chieftaincies and central states have a pivotal role in deciding the capacity of local government to introduce citizen participation (Agrawal 1999; Agrawal and Ribot 1999). (Agrawal and Ribot 1999) case studies of decentralization in Nepal, Senegal and Mali referred to earlier confirmed that the central governments had a tendency to maintain their control even when they had established decentralization departments and had declared that decentralization was the goal of their reforms.

For instance, if a central state is not fully committed to supporting local government's capacity for participatory democracy, the citizens become cynical about participating, and once local communities become cynical, they withdraw from political life (Werlin 1992; Neshkova and Kalesnikaite 2019). Werlin (1992) showed that in Nepal's case, decentralization would open the door wider to local elites who could capture local administrative and political structures in the

absence of strong central authority and use these structures in an anti-democratic way. Dickovick (2014) therefore suggested that a central government's best incentive is to promote national stability which could be under threat of being destabilised. The central government must introduce laws which can improve positive participation and local government; they should legislate for authentic and effective participation which works equally for the local participants and for the administration (Berner and Smith 2004).

Even though measures taken by local councils do not apply to all ages and cultural groups (Asutay 2006; Andrews et al. 2008), different groups should be empowered through different approaches (Andrews et al. 2008). It is likely that empowering citizens for civic engagement will not be free from challenges, but local governments can still be expected to promote effective citizenship for the democratisation of non-democratic countries (Andrews et al. 2008; Andrews et al. 2011).

The mechanism of citizen participation through local governance is not easily to implement. Scholars do not agree on a definition of the concept of citizenship and it has become the subject of various interpretations with different implications for the role of the state (Danquah et al. 2018). Even at the small village level, local governments are prone to be captured by the local elites and traders (Rees and Hossain 2010: 584). The big limitation of decentralisation is that it is vulnerable to capture by corrupt local elites through their client mechanism. Pakistan's election system is particularly notorious for client politics. The feudal lords cannot reach every voter, so they simply rely on intermediaries, yes-men, who already have a customary trust relationship with voters (their clients) (Keefer and Vlaicu 2007). These intermediaries are uninterested in public goods since these benefits all citizens and not just their

clients. Patron disinterest thus constrains politicians' ability to use some policy instruments to appeal to voters and produces a disincentive for politicians to rely on patrons (Keefer et al. 2003; Keefer et al. 2005; Keefer and Vlaicu 2007). Decentralization reforms are therefore prone to being hijacked by opportunist and non-credible politicians who make credible promises at the time of elections (Asutay 2004; Keefer et al. 2005). This is therefore a big challenge for decentralization reforms to contribute positively to public participation and public empowerment. This is the reason why Prud'homme (1995) warned that if a system is not developed well, the decentralization governance will harm local interests rather than healing them. For example, regional disparities exist in most developing countries and they do not disappear with economic development despite the fact that it was assumed that these inequalities were temporary. Another concern is that corruption is rampant in the majority of developing countries. Critics of universal decentralisation therefore point out that during decentralization reforms, geographical location, population size and other cultural perspectives can have an adverse impact on the efficiency of decentralization (Prud'homme 1995; Véron et al. 2006). It is therefore important that the relevance of the programme should be addressed when attempting to introduce decentralisation reforms. It is evident in the literature that during the introduction of any development reforms, the first attention should be paid to establishing appropriate structures such as relevant skills and competencies, legislative support, appropriate behaviour and attitudes and, most important, visionary leadership of the institutions (Analoui 2009). In addition, Analoui (2009) argued that the initial preparation for structures, systems and leadership with a future orientation is imperative for the success of the introduction of new developments. For example, how to manage subsidies, mandates, constraints

and guidelines must be dealt with during the implementation of a decentralization programme (Prud'homme 1995).

In addition, the literature suggests that local governance is always vulnerable to capture by wrong interest groups because of higher levels of voter ignorance and corrupt electoral systems in developing countries (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000); it was stated that decentralization does not prevent corruption, but it can sometimes open the door to the exploitation of whatever public funds are available. In some countries, governments at local and national levels have systems which penalise the marginalized population because of unequal political opportunities and an anti-poor bias owing to lack of participation by the poor in special interest politics (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005). (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005) concluded that the primary weakness in decentralised governance is the proneness of local governments to pressure from the local elites to divert available funds to their own interests.

Furthermore, the literature on capacity development suggests that it should not be forgotten that corruption in underdeveloped countries exists in a wide variety of complex forms. Due to rampant corruption cultures in underdeveloped countries, their institutional capacities could be negatively affected (Analoui 2008; Analoui 2009). For example, in case of Pakistan where there is rampant corruption in the majority of government institutions (Keefer et al. 2003), the political environment leads to political opportunism which raises various challenges to public participation. It is therefore evident (Véron et al. 2006) that some factions exist in such a fashion that they build networks with the corrupt bureaucracy and corrupt local elites. In such circumstances, the impact of participatory local governance on the level of corruption reduction is minimal. (Asutay 2006) stated that once a state and its leadership benefit from the

myopic nature of individual voters, the incumbent government will try to create a short-term economic structure which can benefit only targeted voters. As a result, the culture of political economy becomes opportunistic and this can create long-term benefits for those who control it (Asutay 2006).

Decentralisation reforms could therefore be exploited by the short-sightedness of political elites, feudal lords and the political culture of corruption.

2.3 Decentralization and citizen participation

The conceptual framework suggests that local government can bring citizens closer to the government. Since the 1970s, the mechanism of public participation has been considered an essential component for the development process (Danquah et al. 2018). At the beginning of the 1950s, at various government levels, citizen participation programmes were launched with an underlying assumption that if citizens became actively involved as participants in their democracy, the governance which emerged from this process would be "more democratic and effective" (Irvin and Stansbury 2004). Wengert (1985: 23) believed that if there is a political revolution going on throughout the world, it might be called the participation explosion. (Ahmed 2011: 19) stated that community participation is absolutely essential for the successful implementation of public development projects. There is no doubt that community participation is the soul of all developments in good governance. In addition, it is a fact that many challenges faced by the rural community cannot be addressed by the local government without interaction with the citizens (Wood and Fowlie 2013). Citizen participation at the local or grassroots level has been widely used for community development projects. It has been suggested that there are at least four strands of citizen involvement in the government process – voting, political parties, lobbying, and community

involvement as a deliberative force into decision-making and budgeting for local development programmes (Gaventa & Valderrama 1999). The World Bank Learning Group on Participation defined participation as a "process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them". From this definition, it can be said that "participation is the level of consultation or decision making on the part of citizens or community in all phases of the project cycle, from needs assessment, to appraisal, to implementation to monitoring and evaluation" (Gaventa and Valderrama 1999).

It is also assumed that citizen participation is a solution to the growing crisis of legitimacy and complexity which is characterized by the sense of change in the state/citizen relationship (Hoa and Garcia-Zamor 2017: 39). Furthermore, it has been added that public participation has positive links with sustainable development. sustainable development goals (SDGs) introduced as "Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", were therefore set out by the United Nations (UN) in 2015. There are seventeen SDGs, one of which, Goal 16, is particularly ambitious, suggesting "peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels"(Hoa and Garcia-Zamor 2017: 39). It is also highlighted in the literature that citizen participation contributes positively to enhancing the quality of democracy, providing input and support for government challenges in addressing the appropriate solutions for health issues, budget cuts and trust-building (Siebers et al. 2019).

Plessing (2017), however, argued that in spite of various legal mechanisms enshrined for citizen participation such as the Municipal Structures Act of 1998

or the Municipal System Act of 2000 in South Africa, these do not safeguard the voice of ordinary citizens because they are not actually designed to empower the public. As the result of such dishonesty on the part of the central state, the citizens remain detached from the governance process (Kadirbeyoglu 2017; JÄSke 2019; Neshkova and Kalesnikaite 2019).

Government institutions do not intend to see that the traditional power repositories should be exercised by new actors and citizen participation (Schonwalder 1997; Crook et al. 1998; Mukandala 1998). There is a clash between governmental holders of power and the new candidates of local power over the exercise of power. Crook et al. (1998) studied Indian local councils and their role in citizen participation and found that most of the time the local councils avoided including local villages. The main factor was that these local councils tended to be possessive of their power. The same clash was identified when Schonwalder (1997) examined how decentralization reinvented an opportunity for citizen participation in Latin America.

JÄSke (2019) pointed out that citizens' attitudes towards democratic authorities are shaped by an expectation of the kind of democracy in which participatory innovations are encouraged. The author analysed data from 9,022 citizens in 30 Finnish municipalities and emphasized that attention should be paid to citizens' awareness of participation possibilities. Jäske(JÄSke 2019) also stated that the central power's role is crucial for establishing local democratic institutions with real empowered freedom. In other words, the issue is the institutional underpinning of decentralization – what is the nature of the central state? For example, the cases of the central governments of Uganda, Ghana, Indonesia and Nicaragua, where exploitation hijacked decentralization, provided a backlash to attempts at decentralization in environmental areas (Ribot 2003).

With strong constraints on the executive and high levels of citizen awareness, education leads to more open governments (Schnell and Jo 2019).

2.4 Citizen participation and the critical perspective

The inclusion of citizens in government channels has generated a variety of debates about the nature and effectiveness of citizen participation when unequal power structures at local and the national levels work as limits to participation (Lima 2019). However, an important assumption is that this will make local government responsible and accountable to the local communities (Gaventa and Valderrama 1999; Rafique and Khoo 2018). For example, Fagotto and Fung (2006) investigated the role of citizenship in urban Minneapolis and found that the participation in such a mechanism could not be equally beneficial to all neighbourhoods because white neighbourhoods were more influential in decision-making in comparison with their other counterparts. Michels (2012) studied participation in local policy making in four US states comprising twenty cases of participation and nineteen deliberative forums and found that in four cases of participatory governance, the recommendations of the citizen participants were not given proper attention in policy decisions. There were recommendations for future planning in the municipality and safety issues in the concerned city centres. Michels concluded that the effects of citizen participation in local policy-making depends on the design of the policy structure – different designs have different effects on the democratisation of the local administration, but the suitability of any particular policy was quite important for effective citizen participation (Michels 2012).

2.5 Problem with interpretation of public participation

The concept of public participation in development projects has become a lengthy subject in terms of its origin, theoretical stands and practical

implications (Danquah et al. 2018). The World Bank (1966) stated that citizen

participation "is a process through which stakeholders influence and share

control over development initiatives, decisions and resources that affect them",

whereas Arnstein (1969) insisted that public participation is giving real

empowerment to local communities. Because of these different interpretations,

(Danquah et al. 2018) summarised the different mechanisms of citizen

participation as shown in Table 2.1.

Table 2. 1 Participatory mechanism*s* used by the World Bank

Information-sharing mechanisms	- Information seminars, presentations and public meetings - Translation into local languages
Consultative mechanisms	- Consultative meetings - Field visits
Joint assessment mechanisms	- Beneficiary assessment - Participatory assessments and evaluations
Shared decision-making mechanisms	- Participatory planning techniques workshops - Meetings to resolve conflicts
Collaborative mechanisms	- Formation of joint committees with stakeholder representatives - Stakeholder groups with principal responsibility for implementation
Empowering mechanisms	- Capacity building of stakeholder organizations - Support for new initiatives by stakeholders

Source: adapted from (Danquah et al. 2018)

2.6 An explanation of critical perspectives

Citizens become cynical if they feel that their formal democratic institutions are

weak and that dictatorship and clientelism are strong and consequently they do

not feel any enthusiasm to participate in them. van den Brandeler et al. (2014:

502) conducted a case study in Brazil and found that the major decisions of local bodies were made outside the new deliberative bodies – the technocratic government departments maintained their claim on authority through their economic superiority and their use of expert knowledge, ultimately inhibiting the influence of the underprivileged actors (Neshkova and Kalesnikaite 2019).

Public participation has many challenges and elite control has become one of many recurring barriers to community empowerment and engagement in several developing countries. For example, Dauti (2017: 1531) conducted semi-structured interviews asking 'Do community members take advantage of the new forms of local governance introduced with decentralization?' and 'What barriers to participation do they face?' and found that social status had a close relationship with local participation. The findings showed that the more underprivileged a community was, the more likely it was to be restricted from participating in formal local council meetings. The findings of that study also showed that the lack of trust between the privileged and underprivileged was another barrier to participation in the formal local council's discussions. The more underprivileged people were, the less their suggestions in participative meetings were valued. Yang and Callahan (2007) argued that meaningful and authentic citizen participation is rarely found because it is quite often the norm among public officials that they are reluctant to include citizens in decision-making.

In many developing countries, citizen participation is not implemented due to elite control over the local power. As already described, Lima (2019) found in Brazil that unequal power structures at the local level and the lack of transparency of government decisions posed major obstacles to citizens' participation in decision-making. Kadirbeyoglu (2017) studied two provinces in

Turkey, Sanliurfa and Aydin, and found that the local government departments were plagued by corruption, embezzlement and failure in service delivery. Elites from the rich political classes, which wanted to continue their dominance and influence in politics, tended have considerable influence on the local politics. Neshkova and Kalesnikaite (2019) studied the same two provinces and found exactly the same problems, and that in places where power and income inequalities were greater, as in the case of Sanliurfa, the decentralization system was likely to be captured by the existing powerholders, making the system undemocratic.

Corruption can therefore prevent access to services by those most in need, disproportionately affecting poorer populations (Neshkova and Kalesnikaite 2019). Following Lima (2019: 667) findings in Brazil set out above, it was rejected that the decentralisation of decision-making could be achieved according to recommendations made by the poor citizens. In order to ensure citizen participation, there must be consistency and effectiveness in policies which address structural factors and remove obstacles to citizen participation (Devas and Grant 2003; Coleman 2014).

2.7 Citizen participation in Pakistan

Pakistan, as the part of the global south, was ruled by foreign non-democratic powers for centuries. After emerging as a new country in the South Asia, Pakistan was captured by the military establishment and that rule continues directly and indirectly sometimes. Consequently, the state institutions developed a big gap between the ruled and the ruling (Mohmand and Cheema 2007; Wilder 2009; Lall 2012a; Lall 2012b; Lall 2014).

Across the literature, political participation in the contemporary world is keenly encouraged, particularly among the young. There is a big gap between the

theoretical literature about the close relationship between community participation and community development. For example, various studies and reviews have shown that community participation improves the quality of the outcome of development projects in the local community and promotes effective, efficient and sustainable development. Furthermore, it has been highlighted that participation is expected to ensure that projects are properly designed. However, a case study of Muzaffargarh District in Punjab, Pakistan, showed that the participatory development which was expected through CCB-based projects could not take place and participation did not materialise (Khan and Anjum 2013).

Khan and Anjum (2013) found that Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) remained a low priority for local government officials and for the national leadership of Pakistan. Even, some success stories of CCBs' intervention were found. The performance of CCBs was impeded when various forms of CCBs were set up, such as politically affiliated contractors. For example, in Muzaffargarh, a sum of Rs681 million remained unused due to the large number of non-functional CCBs. Even though the funds, in comparison with the bureaucratic budget, were very nominal, the CCBs presented a real model of participatory development.

The common factors which contribute to citizen participation in local government seem to be the dishonesty of local elites and their misuse of power. The fact is that CCBs were the main tool for encouraging community participation in local development, but they could not play a positive role because they were hijacked by the elite. For example, the CCBs in Muzaffargarh were mostly controlled by the local political leadership of the area. The hidden motive for local politicians to establish these CCBs was to

strengthen their own influence and to gain profits. The elected influential politicians formed the CCBs with the names of their relatives on paper but ran all the affairs of the CCBs by themselves (Khan and Anjum 2013).

Khan et al. (2007) conducted 94 interviews to gather qualitative data from six school councils in Punjab and found that school management councils reproduced traditional social organization by predominantly appointing male members of the local elite; they nevertheless also enlarged the circles of participation to include women and marginalised groups. There were two principal challenges to improving participation: leadership qualities and civil society members. Furthermore, the most educated were more likely to volunteer to participate. However, the Local Government Ordinance provided for the representation of women, minorities and poor peasants on the district government bodies through quotas with no upper limits. It is interesting to note that participation was mainly challenged by social status. Those who are rich and influential are likely to be privileged to participate and dominate the decision-making process in Pakistan.

Kurosaki (2006) surveyed 42 union councils in the District of Hafizabad and showed that the quality of leadership and proper rules of CCBs were key determinants to the success of the CCB initiative. Further, Kurosaki emphasised that the capacity-building of CCBs and the local community was important and suggested that CCB-based collective action is not impossible in Pakistani society where the main network is not based on local residential areas. The Japanese government funded projects in Hafizabad's CCBs, which showed that there was moderate success in the CCBs' activities. The encouraging factors in the context of Hafizabad's CCBs were the increased budget released by the government and village visits and meetings by the CCB coordinators which

were found to be very effective. Furthermore, local leadership and the role of NGO guidance were also important. In addition, in order to make CCBs or participatory development in general more sustainable in terms of planning, implementing and monitoring, there should be pro-poor components with active participation of the poor and landless. In other words, to make CCB-based development possible in rural Pakistan, the Pakistani government or people need to pay sufficient attention to the heterogeneity of the local people (the depth of the socio-economic gaps between classes) and the potential of civil society institutions such as NGOs and the local elite for mobilising the people. CCBs were introduced in the 2001 devolution reforms and the local community was supposed to propose local development projects through the CCBs with 80% funding provided by the local government. However, the numbers of CCBs and of approved projects were below the expected level. This raised concerns that Pakistani people with limited historical experience of CBO-based development were too disadvantaged to benefit from the CCB scheme (Kurosaki 2006).

The big challenge to community participation in Pakistan is the core network based on familial, clan and tribal relationships and the limited historical experience; for example, the first Devolution of Power implemented through the Local Government Ordinance (LGO), the first local government elections in August 2001, the second elections in 2005 and so on. The second policy measure was the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) based on the World Bank-funded Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).

Ahmad et al. (2016) reviewed the previous studies and summarised that decentralisation improves community empowerment through the participation of marginalised groups hitherto excluded from the local government decision-

making process. Community participation encourages different human development features but there is still a lot remaining to be achieved in terms of empowerment and collective benefits for all. It has also been pointed out that the main barrier to community empowerment and participation seems to be the presence of an elite and local politicians. The central government, despite delegating powers to local governments, has continued to affect the decisions of the local governments, which consequently lost their grip on deepening participation.

Ahmad et al. (2016) found that CCB-based projects are more sustainable than projects implemented directly by local governments because local people themselves are owners of these development projects. Ahmed (2011) suggested that there could be improvements in sustainable development if four factors could be considered properly: community needs assessment, access to information by marginalised groups, capacity building, and people's participation. However, the most important of these factors which can promote local development is people's participation – community participation. During participation, there will be interaction between local people and local government officials. The authors concluded that decentralisation initiatives in Pakistan have increased community participation at the local government level. Additionally, decentralisation has encouraged the mobilisation of resources and improvements in service delivery, particularly in projects established through the CCBs, and has enabled poor communities to empower themselves through self-development. Even so, the majority of previous studies have suggested that CCBs could not implement community projects to the extent that was anticipated (Ahmad et al. 2016).

2.8 Theories and models of citizen participation

In this section, the researcher chose to discuss the most recent theoretical models first- for example, Laird's (2016) the pluralistic theory of community participation. Secondly, the theory (Choguill 1996) of the underdeveloped countries, and lastly Arnstein's theory of ladder of citizen participation. The reason of this is that, as Arnstein's theory is adopted as the guiding model, therefore, it is discussed with the more details in the later sections.

So far, in this chapter the researcher discussed a number of influential views which affect the level of public participation in decision-making and the meaningful implementation of democratic decentralisation systems across the world. To further this argument, four theories and three models will be discussed in this section in order to represent the type of power and the level of participation that can be achieved through local governance in the decision-making process. The models might have limitations in the sense that they were developed using the epistemologies of developed industrialised nations' governments. However, (Asutay 2006) commented that a vast literature has focused on industrialized governments so there are inevitably going to be issues of the unavailability of appropriate models for developing countries such as Pakistan. For this current study, the ladder of participation was therefore used as a guiding model, even though (Asutay 2005; Asutay 2006) warned that it could be Eurocentric. However, as there is no other explicit framework of various natures (rungs) of participation addressed directly at non-democratic countries such as Pakistan, it is appropriate to match the lowest level of manipulation in the case of Sindh.

White (1996) put forward a typology of four forms of participation: nominal, representative, instrumental and transformative. Nominal participation is just like

seeking legitimation from government departments, but they have nothing to do with people's input in decision-making. Instrumental participation is practised by government organisations with the purpose of utilising labour services and thus reducing outside labour costs for citizens. Representative participation is practised on the basis of the opinion of local people so that sustainability can be maintained. Transformative participation is in fact the empowerment of local people: it is real participation which gives confidence to the poor (White 1996).

(Pretty 1995) also devised a typology of citizen participation in development projects at a local level and explained that manipulative participation is simply a pretence of putting people's representatives on official boards but there is no empowerment. Passive participation is a form of participation in which participants are told about what has already been decided: it involves one-sided decisions taken by officials. Participation by consultation is when participants are consulted but the influence of external agents remains unaffected, without any acknowledgement of the people's recommendations or opinions. Participation by material incentive is when people's participation is exercised with the purpose of investing their labour in return for food, cash and other material incentives. Functional participation is when opinions are sought to reduce the costs of projects whereas interactive participation is a joint analysis of projects in which participation is required jointly. In this form of participation, linked groups take control over local decisions and determine how the available resources are used. The final form of participation in this typology is self-mobilisation, which is the real empowerment of local people in development projects. In self-mobilisation, people take initiatives independently of external agents (Pretty 1995).

2.8.1 Pluralistic approach to community participation
<u>Figure 2. 1 Effective Pluralistic Participation</u>

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                    ┌─────────────────────────┐
                    │ Pluralistic participation │
                    └─────────────────────────┘
         ┌──────────────┬──────────┴─────┬─────────────────┐
         ▼              ▼                ▼                 ▼
┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐
│ Members'     │ │ Opportunity  │ │ Access to    │ │ Means of coercion/│
│ voluntary    │ │ for learning │ │ officials    │ │ influence         │
│ roles        │ │              │ │              │ │                  │
└──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────────┘
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
Source: Adopted from (Laird 2016)

Pluralism is a theory of democracy based on the actions of organised civil society committees and groups (Concha and Villar 2013; Laird 2016). (Laird 2016) pluralistic approach encourages the involvement of citizens for the identification of common community needs and for the service delivery of common community interests, and voluntary groups gather together to address their own issues (Concha and Villar 2013).

The pluralistic theory of community participation is based on the actions of voluntary community groups and it shares essential elements with deliberative democracy (Denis et al. 2001; Smith 2009; Mäkinen and Kourula 2012; Concha and Villar 2013; Denis et al. 2016; Laird 2016; Nwapi 2016; Vallier 2019; Aghapouri 2020). Deliberative democratic theory suggests the participation of interest groups of community members in open dialogue to reach a consensus for solving the problems which affect the ordinary people (Concha and Villar 2013; Laird 2016). From this perspective, the pluralist theory of community participation encourages participation for the identification of local community needs and for delivery services for the common good (Concha and Villar 2013; Laird 2016). According to (Laird 2016: 344), "Pluralism requires that participation is meaningful in two senses: to enable citizens to understand their

interests and to have some sort of substantive influence over actual policies outcomes".

This model has the limitation that it does not have support from the centre. It represents the self-help mobilization of the marginalized poor population of underdeveloped countries. It can be applied in practicable activities in which citizens must mobilize themselves. Pro-poor movements cannot rely on government support to implement public participation in local decision-making. This can be used by practitioners who cannot expect or rely on a country such as Pakistan, so they have to initiate public participation.

From the perspective of Pakistan's federal law tendency, given the centralized nature of the government, the theory of pluralism emphasises the provision of opportunities for learning for interested citizens of Sindh and of Pakistan as a whole. The theory emphasises that a community must have access to relevant policy officials to represent their members' interests and to bring about policy changes (Laird 2016). Furthermore, the theory of pluralism emphasises that community participatory groups must have a means of coercion or influence on the relevant policy makers to whom they can have access (Concha and Villar 2013; Laird 2016). However, in the context of the Pakistani state, putting this kind of theory into practice could face big challenges within the local government policies.

2.8.2 Choguill's theoretical model of the ladder of community participation for underdeveloped countries

Choguill (1996) developed a model to address the low-income communities of underdeveloped countries with many examples of Pakistani community participation projects. (Choguill 1996) argued that because Arnstein's model of citizen participation is focused only on citizen power through which citizens

could influence the end product (public policy), in underdeveloped countries low-income communities want dual objectives from participation: marginalized communities need empowerment to influence decisions which affect them and in addition they want services such as housing, road construction and pavements too (Choguill 1996: 433). In terms of infrastructure, therefore, (Choguill 1996) proposed a model based on the progressive improvement of infrastructure, saying that "A key element of this model concerns a strategic input of outside assistance, whether it comes from government or non-governmental sources" (Choguill 1996: 433).

Figure 2. 2 The ladder of community participation for underdeveloped countries

Source: (Choguill 1996)

This suggested scale of participation for developing countries was based on the degree of governmental willingness for carrying out community mutual-help projects was as follows. The highest rung on Choguill's ladder of community participation for underdeveloped countries was empowerment. On this rung, participation might take the form of community members having power to influence the formal decision-making bodies over a particular project. The second highest rung on the ladder was partnership, in which local citizens and outside decision-makers agree to share planning and decision-making responsibilities for any development activities. The third highest rung on the ladder was when the government makes decisions but has the consent of community members. The fourth highest rung of Choguill's ladder of

participation is dissimulation, which refers to rubber-stamping advisory committees. This is a mere semblance of genuine participation because the communities do not have the power to influence a decision. The fifth rung is diplomacy, in which most of time community participation is manipulated by governments or outside decision-makers. The sixth rung consists of a one-way flow of information from officials to citizens about their rights, duties, responsibilities and options, but at this level the communities have no opportunity to give feedback on development projects. The seventh rung of the ladder of community participation for underdeveloped countries is conspiracy, in which there is no formal participation in decision-making activities and participation is not even considered at all. The bottom rung of ladder is self-management, in which the government does nothing to address the issues of local communities, but the community members, by themselves, plan to address their neighbourhood problems without any support from or involvement of the government (Choguill 1996).

There are limitations to adopting this theoretical framework. For example, the highest level of the hierarchy is empowerment, in which community members are given powers to influence the decision-making process. It is hardly practicable in underdeveloped countries to empower the ordinary population because the military bureaucracy and elite nexus tend to maintain their clutch on all levels of power. Also, there is no difference between empowerment and partnership. Conciliation and dissimulation overlap with Arnstein's level of tokenism in which have-nots are allowed to hear and have a voice and then just rubber-stamp the decisions of advisory boards. Rungs 7 (conspiracy) and 8 (self-management) are in line with the Pakistani context. First, politicians do not

want to empower the general masses, and second, local communities will have to take responsibility by themselves instead of relying on the government.

2.8.3 Arnstein's theoretical model of the ladder of citizen participation

Arnstein (1969) ladder of citizen participation is appreciated as a detailed analysis of citizen participation and furthermore it is relevant to public participation in development projects (Kessy 2013). It explains the degrees of public participation in the decision-making process as eight rungs on a ladder: each rung represents the nature and the extent of citizen participation in progressive stages. Although Danquah et al. (2018) pointed out that the term 'participation' takes different forms and meanings, (Arnstein 1969) definition fits better in the development context rather than in the political process of citizen participation and, excluding voting in elections, partaking in legislative assemblies (Kessy 2013). For example, as seen from the development perspective (Kessy 2013), participation can be defined as:

> … the distribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic process, to be deliberately included in the future. It is the strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources are allocated, programs are operated, and benefits like contracts and patronage are parcelled out. (Arnstein 1969: 1).

The theory of the ladder of citizen participation retains considerable relevance even in recent times (Cornwall 2008: 269). Another rationale for seeking guidance from (Arnstein 1969) ladder of citizen participation theory is that although Arnstein devised this theory in 1969 from the European perspective, scholars of developing countries can use it now to see how developing governments have moved towards democratic participation in development projects. (Arnstein 1969) ladder has been used as a guiding model first because of its detailed analysis of public participation (Kessy 2013), second, because the

theory is focused on public participation in the development perspective (Kessy 2013), and third, researchers believe that although it could be Eurocentric in direction and was developed in 1969, developing countries such as Pakistan should be moving towards the democratic principles and fitting at least the lowest rungs of the ladder.

This current study was designed to investigate the nature and the scale of citizen participation in local government development processes in Sindh and the best-known attempt to determine the scale of public participation is still that of Arnstein (Choguill 1996).

Arnstein (1969) identified three positions of citizen participation: non-participation, tokenism and citizen power.

Figure 2. 3 ladder of citizen participation by Arnstein

Arnstein's Ladder (1969)
Degrees of Citizen Participation

Arnstein contended that citizen participation is citizen power, which is rarely put into practice at almost all levels of community development. Citizen participation is misused for the rhetorically controversial nature of participation. Arnstein (1969) explained that the bottom rungs of the ladder are manipulation and therapy. The controversial form of participation is the manipulation of participation by which rubber-stamping advisory committees exist in various forums of the departments. Therapy is also a form of non-participation which deserves to be on the lowest rungs because it is both dishonest and arrogant. Actually, these stages of participation are non-participation in reality. They have been contrived as a substitute for genuine participation. Rung 3 is Information and Rung 4 is Consultation. These are once again an untrue showcase of participation; they are activities which make the powerless feel that they have a voice. However, information is always a one-way flow from the officials. Rung 5 is Placation, which is a similar form of tokenism which makes citizens realise that they are being heard, but the fact remains that real influence is still with the powerholders. Real citizen participation is citizen control over the decision-making; this comes at rung 6, Partnership, which enables citizens to negotiate and engage with powerholders on an equal footing. At the top level are rungs 7, Delegated Power, and 8, Citizen Control; here marginalised citizens have an influence on the decision-making process of their governance (Arnstein 1969).

2.8.4 Limitations of Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation

The authors (Cornwall 2008; Danquah et al. 2018) raised the question of what exactly the much-used term 'citizen participation' has come to mean. Similarly, some critics have questioned what exactly (Arnstein 1969) meant by a ladder with complex rungs of various levels which do not represent an analysis of the various forms of participation which can exist on any level of the ladder

(Arnstein 1969; Choguill 1996; Collins and Ison 2006; Tritter and McCallum 2006; Cardullo and Kitchin 2018). Furthermore, the central thesis of the theory refers to citizen control, which seems too idealistic to be achieved in a real situation. For example, countries such as Pakistan can be far from such an ideal situation as to attain Arnstein's levels 7 and 8, which represent genuine participation. Furthermore, Arnstein had ignored participation in elections as one of the main forms of citizens' control (Kessy 2013). In addition, the ladder of citizen participation did not discuss participation by self-mobilization, which seems crucial in the case of federal states which are inclined towards more centralized powers (Pretty 1995). Another limitation of the ladder of participation is that the whole framework depends on a single unit of analysis.

2.8.5 Critics of Arnstein's theory of citizen participation in local governance

Some critics have raised concerns that the validity of citizen participation as the only barometer for measuring the level of democracy in a particular country might not be sufficient (Andrews et al. 2008; Kessy 2013). In states where there is a culture of military dictatorship, clientelism and rent-seeking politics, public participation will not be a panacea to treat all governmental issues. Commentators have therefore warned that citizen participation and decentralization should be analysed according to the nature of a particular country (Agrawal 1999; Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Ribot et al. 2006). For example, political scientists have placed Pakistan in many categories of an abnormal state: from failed state to hybrid state, the world's top terrorism-breeding country and a military mafia-state (Hague and Harrop 2004: 89; Siddiqa-Agha 2007; Riedel 2008; Clark et al. 2017). Clark et al. (2017: 89) defined a failed state as a state-like entity which cannot coerce and is unable to successfully control the inhabitants of a given territory. If this

definition of a failed state is plausible, Pakistani does not have control over the armed forces. The current researcher is not bound to explore the characteristics of an abnormal state, but it is nevertheless important to have a brief look at the nature of the Pakistani state and identify the relationships between civic engagement and the local government systems. The point of my argument is whether a state such as Pakistan, which is sometimes is called a failed state, a domestic anarchy and an authoritarian hybrid state, can create obstacles to civic engagement in the local government systems, and whether there is any room for complacency that the local governments can always promote public participation no matter what the nature of the state.

According to the theory of domestic anarchy, when civil sovereignty has broken down, individual citizens are not protected by the civilian system, and the state authority crumbles, individuals not only lose the protection normally supplied by public offices but are also freed from institutional restraints. Then any group or powerful cadre can take advantage of the failure of the state to enrich themselves by raiding and robbing their weaker neighbours. As a result, each group is searching either for the safety of children, or for material gains (Rotberg 2010).

The generals have now injected their fear into civilian governments, for example. Now, the civilian leadership knows that it cannot tamper with military policy at any time. However, if the military's dominant influences become thinned at times, a military general takes over the civilian government and reflates the psychological and practical impression that Pakistan is a military empire. Thus the Pakistani state has a close resemblance to Harold Laswell's Garrison State, which posits that external crises can mean that the most important question is whether we can expect the civic engagement and

empowerment of the marginalized population given the nature of states such as Pakistan. Let us consider the nature of the Pakistani state from the perspectives of the political scientists and theorists before expecting the commitment of the central authority to the implementation of public participation at the local level. Pakistan, according to political scientists, has been put in many categories of an abnormal state. That study tended to emphasise the theoretical approach of historical institutionalism which suggests the importance of political institutions in structuring the political behaviour of the citizens (Thelen 1999; Steinmo 2008). For example, (Analoui 2009; Analoui and Danquah 2017) argued that an institutional role in designing and executing development initiatives is crucial for the success of reforms.

It is therefore necessary to link the exercise of power by the Pakistani institutions, at the local or provincial level, with the military control over the central sovereignty of the country. This is because it would be similarly logical for an environmental biologist who believes that in order to understand the specific fate of a particular organism it must be explicitly examined in the ecology or context in which it lives; thus a governmental system cannot be properly examined without any contextual study (Steinmo 2008). As it is stated in previous sections that leadership with myopic interests tries to purchase the votes on the short-term policies that can only make happy the public for only short periods. In that case the leadership and the public starts believing in the opportunistic approach towards the politics (Asutay 2006).

As already discussed, (Asutay 2005; Asutay 2006) pointed out that the previous literature is mainly focused on developed democracies and that the existing models were developed according to the nature of the political economies of these industrialized countries. In addition, Arora (2009) stated that each

country's specific challenges depend importantly on its economic and other developmental instruments. For example, a poor country with limited levels of development cannot compete on the basis of a borrowed and rudimentary technology (Arora 2009). So, because of the less-than-appropriate modelling issues and the unavailability of political and economic data from the developing countries, researchers have had to use the literature focused on developed countries. Furthermore, critics have contended that Arnstein's top rung, citizen control, gives an impression that any participation below this level is not legitimate and fails to acknowledge that for different people and different purposes, different levels may nevertheless reflect successful participation (Kenny et al. 2015: 1910).

Pakistan's foreign policy is managed by the higher echelons of the military and particularly military intelligence agencies. Pakistan has a military economic structure through the *Fauji* (army), *Bahria* (navy) and *Shahee* (air force, literally 'eagle') and foundations (Islam 2016: 318; Siddiqa 2017). That establishment now has severe challenges to the democratic process of public participation at the local level. (Keefer et al. 2003; Keefer and Vlaicu 2007) concluded that due to low-credibility in some states, the culture of patron-client networks might enhance welfare for a few, but in the long run, political development and the awareness of mass-based politics can be hampered. Elite politicians' reliance on patrons undermines the emergence of long-term, credible, mass-based political parties (Asutay 2006; Keefer and Vlaicu 2007).

In the case of Pakistan, citizen participation has many challenges. First, Pakistan's central government is controlled by non-democratic forces (Ali 2018). Second, there is a realization that the main reason for the failure of development projects was and still is attributed to the lack of an active, effective

and lasting participation of the intended beneficiaries of development activities (Danquah et al. 2018).

2.9 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the literature on decentralisation and its results for community participation. One of the main debates discussed in this chapter was on how to find a suitable system in which decentralisation can contribute to public participation and the empowerment of the poor. It was found that the factors which could influence democratic local participation are central state commitment towards public participation and empowerment, the role of the elite class and whether the system is corrupt or free from corruption.

This review has found that the role of the federal power is crucial for the success of democratic participation in the decision-making process. However, local governments in the majority of developing countries do not have support or strong commitment from the central state power. It was also found from the models of community participation presented by Arnstein (1969), (Choguill 1996) and (Laird 2016) that access to participation is limited and denied to the poor. The majority of efforts to achieve public participation end at the process of manipulation (and maybe therapy). The main factor of this kind of non-participation is the attitude of a top-down mechanism of devolution and decentralisation. This makes it clear that projects designed to achieve citizen participation cannot be easily implemented at an identical level across the world. Post-modernists have therefore criticised Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation on the grounds that it is mostly related to capitalist trends. According to postmodernists, it is not possible to adopt universal political and cultural principles and expect them to form a fixed standard by which to judge all cultures' perspectives (Ward 1997: 162). This is because (Arnstein 1969)

might not have observed the Pakistani political phenomena of corruption, military control over power politics, state-sponsored terrorism and rent-seeking voters. (Asutay 2006) suggested that although the majority of political and economic theoretical models were developed focusing on industrialist states, scholars of developing states have nevertheless sometimes had to use them as guiding frameworks. Here, theories which emphasise that local government brings marginalized communities closer to the government (Smith 1985) can be criticised by postmodernists on the grounds that one standard model for morality, justice and fairness cannot be used on a globally agreed basis for every single point of view (Ward 1997; Gibbins et al. 1999). The same implications of the decentralization theory apply to the state of Pakistan, where the military have been ruling the country ever since it was created (Cohen 2004; Wilder 2009). That is the reason why postmodernist theory is sceptical of any totalizing attempt to achieve global harmony through a single standard application of universal ideals (Ward 1997; Gibbins et al. 1999).

A further issue which was found through this review was that local elites often capture local government power and exploit it according to their own interests. These elites and powerful cadres have no intention of transferring local power to marginalised, ordinary, common citizens. As has been discussed in detail throughout this chapter, this is a big challenge in developing countries such as Pakistan. The behaviour of the Pakistani institutions in regard to power at the local or provincial level, with military control over the country's central sovereignty, the persistence of a military-dominant central state is a crucial factor affecting democratic local participation in the decision-making process.

So the concept of participation which appears to empower ordinary citizens is in reality dependent on how the dominant political structures treat the issue of democratic centralisation.

Chapter three

The context of the study

3.0 Introduction

This chapter gives an account of a contextual study of how institutions of local government were introduced in Pakistan before and after independence. It also throws light on Pakistan's political culture and some demographic information about the country of Pakistan, the province of Sindh and in particular the two districts selected as locations for the collection of data for this study.

The chapter is divided into three sections: one section is concerned with brief political, geographical and demographic information about the country, the second discusses the introduction of local government systems in Pakistan and the third describes the province of Sindh and the two selected districts, Larkana and Kambar Shahdadkot.

Pakistan is situated in southern Asia bordering Iran and Afghanistan on the west, China to the north and India on the east. Pakistan is the second largest economy in South Asia and the 27th in the world. It is a federation of four provinces, the Punjab, Sindh, Khyberpakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. Pakistan is a parliamentary state with the prime minister as the head of state. It is a rural homeland as only 36% of the population inhabit urban areas and the rest of the people live in rural areas. There are reports that 97% of the population is Muslim, 77% of whom belong to the Sunni sect and 20% are Shia; the remaining 3% of the population is divided into Hindus, Christians and other religions (Critelli 2010: 238).

3.1 Political Culture

It is important to look at the nature of the Pakistani state from the perspectives of political scientists and theorists before expecting the commitment of the

central authority to the implementation of public participation at the local level. The Pakistani government inherited many things from the British Raj – the centralized state is a notorious feature of Pakistani federal laws (Wilder 2009). Lange (2008) stated that various scholars had investigated the potential impact of colonialism on the development trajectories of the post-colonialist states. As far as the case of Pakistan as a post-colonialist state is concerned, it is notable in the literature that the Pakistani establishment kept colonial legacies intact in terms of sustaining a powerful centre (Talbot 2009b; Wilder 2009). Since the creation of Pakistan, the Pakistani military has controlled the central sovereign power through military coups (Burke and Quraishi 1995; Cheema et al. 2005; Wilder 2009; Lall 2012a). Even in times of seemingly democratic rule, the Pakistani military continued to rule the country from the back seat (Talbot 2009b; Lall 2012a; Lieven 2012).

The theory of domestic anarchy was set out in Chapter 2, and "Over the course of the past three decades, Pakistan's army has built a complex network of relationships with numerous jihadists like Osama bin Laden" (Riedel 2008: 31). The term 'mafia-state' is appropriate for such a hybrid state which is run by corrupt leaders who take advantage of their privileged positions to seize the nation's wealth for themselves (Magyar 2016) and create an elite class who sanction their crimes by using the state power (Magyar 2016). Now, let's have a look at the character of the state of Pakistan. After Pakistan's independence in 1947, civilian political forces have usually ignored or sidelined the system of local government in the country (International Crisis Group 2004; Khan and Rehman 2012). The civilian political leadership deliberately did not introduce local government in the belief that political leadership would be shifted towards the local political leaders. It is therefore interesting that successive military

generals of Pakistan have frequently introduced local government systems in the country. For example, Ayub Khan introduced the Ordinance of Basic Democracies in 1962, Zia-ul-Haque followed with further reforms in 1979 and then Musharraf in 2001 (Cheema et al. 2005; Taj and Baker 2018). The relevant literature shows that behind these local government reforms, there were ulterior motives of the non-representative governments, effectively the Pakistani military establishment, which introduced local governing bodies to legitimize their central military regimes. In such circumstances, the local governments could not reflect any genuine community-building participatory output (Cheema et al. 2005; Islam 2011). The current author will seek to create a connection between the Pakistani military's interests in power and the economy, and the local governments of Sindh and, if one is identified, to address the question of whether it is possible for local governments in Pakistan to empower the marginalized citizens without the support of central government policies. The central governments have been controlled by military rulers whose politics are both shaped and dominated by the military-bureaucratic elite supported by the landed elite. For the first fifty-seven years of the political history of the country, the army was the ultimate arbiter in all the affairs of the state because the nature of the governance was dominated by the military (Kukreja and Singh 2005: 11). Since the creation of Pakistan, it has been ruled more by military regimes than by public elected governments: military dictators have ruled the country from 1958 to 1971, 1977 to 1988, and 1999 to August 2008 (Critelli 2010). This is the reason for the ineffectiveness of state institutions due to their diminishing capacity, the over-politicization of bureaucracy and the patron-client political relationships between the bureaucracy and local elites. That bureaucracy and military nexus has disabled the state institutions from

protecting the welfare of the citizens and sustaining the rule of law (Wilder (2009: 6). Since the creation of Pakistan, the military has grown stronger and stronger because of its permanent position, not only as the country's strongest bureaucratic institution but also as its strongest political institution and interest group. The military establishment needs power, and with power comes money. The estimated worth of the legally acquired assets of Pakistani generals varies from Rs.150 to 400 million (US$2.59-690 million) (Siddiqa-Agha 2007; Fair 2009; Talbot 2009a; Siddiqa 2017). The reason why the Pakistani military is determined to control the country either directly or indirectly is that it has established its own economic empire in an entire country of more than 200 million people. For example, the Pakistani military owns the Fauji Foundation (FF), the Army Welfare Trust (AWT), the Shaheen Foundation (SF) and the Bahria Foundation (BF) and its economic empire extends far beyond these four organizations: the larger part of the military's internal economy remains invisible (Siddiqa 2017: 113).

The key question is therefore why the military generals have introduced local government reforms and handed local power over to the local feudal lords of Sindh and the other provinces of Pakistan. The reason is because the military needs to create a new client class to support its regime. A state such as this which is theoretically democratic politically could nevertheless be a mafia-state or a military corporation, and the empowerment of the local communities through the citizen participation mechanism cannot be expected. The military runs its own separate schools, hospitals, large cement factories and Shaheen Airlines and retired military officers occupy the key civilian administrative jobs in the country, such as vice-chancellorships of the country's universities. The

Pakistani military still owns large tracts of land, possibly up to 11.58 million

acres (Siddiqa 2017: 174).

On the map of Pakistan shown as Figure 3.1, the province of Sindh can be seen

at the bottom centre.

Figure 3. 1The Political Map of Pakistan.

Source: (Government of Pakistan 2020)accessed online at
http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/.

3.2 The historical development of local government in the sub-continent of India

This section considers the introduction of local governance in pre-independent

Pakistan. These decentralised governance reforms were often introduced by

rulers who had come into power through invasion, annexation and military

coups (Abbasi 2006). Ziring (2003: 68) set the background succinctly:

> Pakistan evolved from a history long involved with authoritarian modes
> of governance. Medieval rule, patriarchy, and monarchy permeated

the region. The years immediately before partition had offered little hint of democratic norms and process.

3.2.1 The Pre-Mughal Period

The literature gives an account of the first institution of local government in the sub-continent of India including what later became Pakistan.

When the Aryans from the north invaded the Indian subcontinent in second millennium BC, they introduced a village system (the Panchayat) of local governance during their rule over the united Indo-Pakistan. The Panchayat (literally 'council of five') was mainly a functional unit of local government with executive and judicial functions. However, these village councils were under the control of the feudal and central rulers of India and their purpose was to serve only the interests of the conquerors (Tinker 1967). It can therefore be said that these early local government systems were neither locally elected nor participatory. Muhammad (2004: 13) summed them up by saying that the "functions of the Panchayat were to settle land disputes, collect taxes and pay these taxes to the central ruler" (Tinker 1967; Cheema et al. 2005; Abbasi 2006).

3.2.2 The Mughal period

Centuries after the Aryan invasion, Mohammad bin Qasim, a Muslim general from Baghdad, set foot on the Indian subcontinent in 712 AD and paved the way for other Muslim conquerors from the north who consisted of Central Asians, Afghans and Persians. Many Muslim invaders before the eleventh century came simply to plunder and pillage in order to glorify their central Asian military might and did not establish Islamic ideals in the Indian subcontinent, but Mohmood of Ghazni conquered the Indian subcontinent in the eleventh century and established a kingdom (Tinker 1967; Muhammad 2004; Abbasi 2006).

Mughals came to India in the sixteenth century in the same way as the previous foreign invaders. Mughals gave unprecedented importance to the landowning (Zamindari) class. These Zamindar families had the principal say in village administration. Tinker (1967: 68) commented that "The Mughals were essentially an urban people in India. And their most distinctive achievements in the sphere of Local Government were in urban administration". On the other hand, there was no involvement of the lower classes or the landless population (Alam and Subrahmanyam 1998; Ashcroft et al. 2013).

So although there was no well-developed or organised system of local government during the Mughal period, village administration did exist; it was known as the 'Mansabdari system'. Streusand (1989) explained that the Mughal Empire was divided into 'Sarkars,' 'Parganas,' 'Towns' and 'Dehs'. Village administration was headed by a 'Mir deh' and in towns and cities by a 'Mir Mohallah'. In the big cities, the office of 'Kotwal' was established, as well as separate departments such as Qazi for justice and Mohtasib for public morals (Streusand 1989; Chattopadhyaya 1994; Gordon 1994). The lower class and the landless population had no say in the Panchayat administration and the motives for establishing village administration were only for revenue collection and policing. The former judicial powers of the Panchayat were considerably curtailed under the Mughals (Tinker 1967; Streusand 1989).

3.2.3 Local government in the British period

The credit of introducing modern local governments in India goes to the British colonialists who established the first formal form of local government in the subcontinent in 1688. The founders of this local government structure intended that these councils would serve as nurseries of democracy rather than simply a means of revenue collection (Cohen 2004).

3.2.4 The First Municipal Corporation 1688 (Madras) under the British Raj in India

Sir Josiah Child, the Governor of the East India Company, and other colonial administrators established a rule that the chief officers of the municipal corporations must be British and must perform their responsibilities as the town clerks of the new bodies. Tinker (1967: 25) described the composition of the municipal corporation of Madras: "The court of Aldermen should consist of three Englishmen, three Portuguese, and seven Moors and Gentoos". Those aldermen were to elect one of their number to serve as mayor. This composition was deliberately made to create a sense of self-government representing the native locals. The municipal corporations were authorised to provide public services such as maintaining the condition of the town halls and schools and keeping civil and criminal case records (Tinker 1967; Cheema et al. 2005; Islam 2011).

In 1726, the Imperial government took charge of both the rights to collect revenues and running the civil administration. Tinker (1967: 26) stated that the new corporations came into being in Madras in September 1688 but that the local residents had protested strongly against the imposition of new taxes which were introduced with the new municipal structure. The municipal corporation were unable to contribute towards local development because the local governments could not meet the expectations of the founders that "the local people would be more willing and liberally disburse five shillings towards the public good being taxed by them" (Tinker 1967: 27); Islam (2011: 8) stated that "the main objectives of these types of institutions remained to collect revenues and maintain law and order at the local level".

Later in 1726, the British colonial government introduced a second municipal charter setting up local government bodies in Bombay and Calcutta and reconstituted the Madras municipality. The new municipal corporations were to consist each of a mayor and nine aldermen, seven of whom must be British born. The British then introduced various modified charters for local government institutions in different parts of India with the same composition and membership structure. In other words, government-salaried commissioners were to be appointed by the central government and local control was given to the local chiefs (Muhammad 2004; Lange 2008; Islam 2011).

Cheema et al. (2005: 2) stated that the British took complete control of Sindh in 1843 and Punjab in 1849, areas which are presently part of Pakistan. After the annexation of Sindh and Punjab, the East India Company passed the Punjab Municipal Act in 1873 under which each town was divided into committees comprising a minimum of five and a maximum of seven members. These town committees were given the functions of maintaining city roads and streets and providing municipal services to the local residents. After the Punjab Municipal Act of 1873, the British continued to introduce various local government acts up to the first decade of the twentieth century, but local bodies saw a definite downward trend in their powers for a variety of reasons. For example, during the 1920s, the local boards were held back by the reluctance of the provincial government to provide financial support for large-scale capital works at a time of high and unstable prices. Moreover, the peasants were hugely indebted because of price increases in cultivation and cropping activities. The local services were forcibly contracted on account of the insufficient release of budgets for the local boards (Tinker 1967; Muhammad 2004; Cheema et al. 2005; Abbasi 2006).

The literature showed that members of these local bodies were not locally elected but mostly nominated by the colonial government. In effect, the colonial government did not make any drastic changes to the Mughals' Panchayat system but tried to keep intact the old system of the villages with some modifications. The former Zamindars were given rights to possess land in large chunks. The colonial local government system could not contribute to the development and empowerment of the local population, but the Indian local chiefs and landlords, who were compliant with the British administrators, were empowered to an extent that the local bodies simply became a synonym for despotism as far as the local citizens were concerned. The British colonial government of India, until the 1930s and 1940s, promoted local chiefs who were given legislative, judicial and executive powers to maintain control of their chiefdoms (Cheema et al. 2005; Lange 2008: 3; Islam 2011).

This was because the local chiefs were easier for the foreigners to handle. These local elites ruled according to the local customary traditions and laws so Indian Zamindars were able to mould and wield the system for their own benefit following the orders of the colonial officials.

In 1930, the political climate of India was replete with feelings of outrage and agitation against the British government in India and the colonial government was engaged in mitigating the feelings of anger of the Indian people. The colonial government decided to hold round-table talks with all shades of Indian political parties in order to find a solution to the constitutional deadlock in the country. There were three round-table conferences in 1930, 1931 and 1932, but they all failed to contribute any useful outputs to the Indian problem. The colonial government then passed the Government of India Act 1935, which

provided for a bi-cameral federal legislature with the provincial autonomy. This Act opened a new chapter of Indian politics (Mahmood 2000; Islam 2011).

The British had ruled India-Pakistan for more than a century, so for many centuries, the region which became India and Pakistan had been ruled by foreign invaders who had contributed nothing in terms of democratic principles and public participation in the governing process (Burke and Quraishi 1995; Mahmood 2000; Ziring 2003; Cohen 2004).

3.3 Local governments after the independence of Pakistan in 1947

Since the independence of Pakistan in 1947, civilian political forces consistently ignored or side-lined the system of local government in the country (International Crisis Group 2004; Khan and Rehman 2012). Civilian political leadership deliberately did not introduce local government in the belief that it would enable political leadership to shift towards local political leaders. It is therefore interesting to note that it was military leaders who consistently introduced local government institutions in Pakistan.

The relevant literature shows, however, that behind these local government reforms there were ulterior motives of creating non-representative governments. Consequently, in these circumstances, the country's local governments could not achieve any community-building participatory output (Cheema et al. 2005; Islam 2011). For these reasons the Pakistani political culture continued to be highly influenced by the colonial rule (Mahmood 2000; Muhammad 2004). During the early years of the new country, the local government structure received a death blow because between 1947 and 1952, the Pakistani government abolished the local government committees; the provincial governments were authorised to suspend or dissolve local bodies. The Village Agriculture and Industrial Development Programme (Village-AID) was

introduced in 1953 in order to bring the government closer to the common people (Kizilbash 1973; Muhammad 2004; ur and Shah 2018).

The newly created Pakistan was to be run by the landed elite (the majority of them were members of the Muslim League) and the military bureaucrats who came out of the colonial government (Ahmed 2011).

Adeney (2007) stated that, unlike India, Pakistan's political institutions were dominated by a non-democratic military institution – notably the military regimes of Ayub Khan (1958-1969), Zia-ul-Haque (1977-1988) and Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008), all of whom played a significant part in derailing the democratic process of Pakistan. After independence in 1947, therefore, the Pakistani political process went into the wrong hands – the civilian political parties were weak in comparison with the stronger civil-military bureaucracy (Ziring 2003; Wilder 2009).

Ahmed (2011) pointed out that real decentralisation at a local level could have given an opportunity to the people of Pakistan to participate in governing practices, but that after independence, Pakistan came under the control of centralised state institutions.

So both historically and politically, Pakistan evolved from the institutions which were left by invaders, traders and colonialists, and they were predominantly authoritarian in nature: as has been explained, Arab Muslims invaded Sindh in 711AD and in 1526 the whole sub-continent was ruled by the Mughal Empire from the sixteenth to the mid-eighteenth centuries, to be replaced by British rule(Bilal and Malik; Wilder 2009).

The failure of Pakistan's state institutions undermined the social and political capacity of the nation: Mahmood (2000) explained that the failure of democratic

institutions was due to the big gap between public participation and the political process. For example, after the creation of Pakistan, the general populace was kept away from the political process since only the political elites and the military bureaucracy could impose their will on the state's development programmes. Consequently, with the citizens kept apart from political practices, the military emerged as the most powerful, non-democratic institution which exploited the country's politics (Mahmood 2000: 350; Wilder 2009).

Lieten and Breman (2002) stated that after the creation of Pakistan, political power was captured by powerful feudal overlords and a specific class of landlords. The members of the Zimindari (landowner) class has kept politics in their own hands, so their class was more than capable of using political power. For example, Lieten and Breman (2002: 337) pointed out that the Waderas (village chieftains) and Zamindars (landlords) had enough resources to win in an expensive election process and maintain themselves in a position of power.

It can therefore be clearly seen that after independence, the Pakistani government could not address the big problem of a large social gap.

3.3.1 Ayub's Local Government Reforms in 1959

After the imposition of the first Martial Law in 1958, Mohammad Ayub Khan introduced local government reforms in 1959. Ayub's local governments (known as basic democracies, or the BD system) had a five-year tenure. There were two types: rural councils and urban councils and there were separate laws for each. Ayub promulgated the Basic Democracies Ordinance, 1959 and the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960. He introduced a hierarchical system of a four interlinked tier structure of local bodies. Although BDs were established in both the urban and the rural areas of Pakistan, the emphasis was on the latter (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000; International Crisis Group 2004; Malik

2009; Muhammad Khan and Mirza 2013; Lohana et al. 2015; Wahid et al. 2017).

Each union council consisted of a number of villages with populations ranging from 8,000 to 15,000 people. There were approximately 37,959 villages in West Pakistan and these were divided into 3415 union councils. In towns there were town committees and union committees. These bottom-tier union councils comprised fifteen elected BDs and the chairman was elected by the members (Bilal and Malik; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000; International Crisis Group 2004; Muhammad 2004; Malik 2009; Lohana et al. 2015; Nadeem 2016; Wahid et al. 2017).

The tier immediately above the union councils were the Tehsil councils. This was a coordinating class between the union council and the district council. In West Pakistan (the present Pakistan) there was the Tehsil council and in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) there was the Thana council. There were approximately 617 Tehsil councils in West Pakistan (Muhammad 2004; Cheema et al. 2005).

The Tehsil and Thana councils comprised some members elected indirectly by the directly elected members of the lowest tier and some officials were nominated by the government. An Assistant Commissioner or Tehsildar headed each Tehsil council. Above the Tehsil councils there were the district councils, of which there were 59 in West Pakistan and 17 in East Pakistan. The total membership of each district council was between 30 and 50. Each district council was a divisional council headed by a Divisional Commissioner. Although there was a lot of propaganda in favour of BDs, the controlling authority was vested in a Deputy Commissioner (DC). DCs had powers to suspend or quash any proceedings or orders passed by the local governments (Ziring 2003;

International Crisis Group 2004; Cheema et al. 2005; Mohmand and Cheema 2007).

Pakistan had existed for only eleven years when a new military dictatorship took control of the government. On 8 October 1958, the Commander-in-Chief of the army, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, imposed martial law on Pakistan. In his first speech on the radio, Ayub made it clear that his ultimate objective was to restore democracy in Pakistan, but that it would be a democracy which would be understandable by the people of Pakistan. However, "It was Ayub's deep mistrust in blindly following on the western type of government system that was totally unsuitable to the uneducated and the naïve masses of the country" (Mahmood 2000; Abbasi 2006: 26; Islam 2011). That was the system of local government which was referred to by Ayub as a democracy suitable for the culture and needs of the Pakistani nation. On 2 September 1959, the BD system was promulgated by Ayub.

3.3.2 Salient features of the BD system

The BD system was not, in any real sense, a representative government because it could not truly represent the culture and needs of the local people because Ayub's real purpose was to establish a sympathetic feudal/elite class loyal to the military regime. The irony was that it was a military dictator who introduced local government reforms in order to legitimise his unitary presidential government. According to his critics, Ayub established a system which was used solely as the main support for his illegitimate dictatorship and the local representatives of his BD initiative did indeed prove to be supportive of his military regime. The local government system introduced by a military ruler therefore had no credibility, so as soon as Ayub's regime came to an end in 1969, that local government system was discontinued. Just as the

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representative and elected politics were reduced to a passive institution during the British Raj, so the same passivity continued with the elected local bodies after independence (Cheema et al. 2005; Abbasi 2006; Mohmand and Cheema 2007).

In sum, Ayub's BD system theoretically assigned vast development and regulatory functions but in practice few powers were transferred in order to curtail their fiscal capacity. Ayub introduced a controlled local government scheme to secure his military government's mandate and consequently his BD system paved the way for corruption for a small patronage (Kizilbash 1973; Abbasi 2006).

The relevant literature shows that local government had always been introduced in a top-down manner by top centralised political forces in Pakistan (Burke and Quraishi 1995; Muhammad 2004). Such a basic democratic scheme was recognised as controlled democracy, and Cheema *et al*. (2005: 7) pointed out that "Ayub's concept of controlled democracy was a carryover from the paternalistic colonial view of guardianship where colonial bureaucracy was supposed to guide the politicians while resisting their corrosive influences". In effect, therefore, Ayub banned all political parties and political activities in Pakistan (Mahmood 2000; Cheema et al. 2005).

3.3.3 People's Local Government (1972)

Such a short-sighted, rural-biased and military-controlled local government structure started to wane with the end of Ayub's military rule in 1969. When the Pakistan People's Party founded by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came into power in 1972, the concept of people's local government was introduced by the country's first elected prime minister. Bhutto's new government passed the Municipal Committees Law which applied to all provinces of Pakistan, and during his

period in office, each province passed its own local government law in the early 1970s. The government of Punjab passed a local government law in 1972 but it was not implemented. Under another law passed in the Punjab in 1975, the People's Government provided laws for establishing Dehi (local) councils, Tehsil (subdistrict) councils, union councils and Halq (a sub-unit of subdistrict) councils. Dehi councils were established for villages and Halqa councils were for large groups of villages. The Halqa councils were lower than the Tehsil councils and the top tier of the people's government was Zila council responsible for district administration. In Ayub's previous BD system, the Zila council comprised elected representatives and non-elected officials from the central bureaucracy under the chairmanship of a DC. In the new People's Local Government, the Zila councils had only elected chairmen as the head (Abbasi 2006; Malik and Anjum 2006; Islam 2011). Some of the Ordinances afterwards became acts of the provisional legislatures. However, no local government elections were held under the Pakistan People's Party government(Abbasi 2006: 31).

In the previous BD experiment, there had been municipal committees for the larger towns and town committees for the small towns, but the new People's Local Government abolished them and replaced them with municipal corporations for the big cities of Pakistan such as Lahore, Multan, Faisalabad and Rawalpindi. New committees were them introduced under the municipal corporations. This new local government structure also established Mohalla (small locality) committees. The People's Local Government Law also integrated market committees with the municipal committees, rural and urban councils being given judicial powers and the municipal corporations were authorised to establish municipal police within their jurisdictions.

The new law provided special representation for farmers, peasants, women and the minority communities and in every respect the new system introduced by the first civilian government was a very useful step towards democracy. This was because, unlike Ayub's BD sham structure headed by non-elected officials, the new Peoples Local Government councils were to be headed by an elected chairman (Cyan et al. 2004; Cheema et al. 2005; Hasnain 2008; Hasnain 2010; Islam 2011).

In the event, however, no elections were ever held under the new law. The proposed local councils were never established under Bhutto's local government scheme because there was a default constitutional trend in Pakistan which was intentionally intended to revert power to the highly centralised central government. Bhutto could not devolve the powers of central government and as a consequence he himself was reluctant to share his powers with locally elected people (Cheema et al. 2005; Islam 2011).International Crisis Group (2004) reported that local government was consistently used as a political tool by various governments, both military and civil, for the aggrandisement of their political powers, rather than as a tier of government for promoting citizenship participation and democracy (Cheema et al. 2005; Islam 2011).

3.2.3 Zia's local government programme (1979)

General Zia-ul-Haq revived local government through the promulgation of Local Government Ordinances (LGOs) in 1979 in four provinces of Pakistan. These LGOs were also drafted for Federal Areas such as FATA, FANA and for Azad Kashmir. Zia sought to organise a strategy of divide and rule by creating a new collaborative class of the rural population. This local government consisted of urban areas with town committees and rural areas with union councils at a local

level comprising a group of villages with a population of 1000 to 8000 people. Above these lowest tiers of union councils there were Tehsil councils for rural areas and at the upper level there were again district or Zila councils. Again for the urban areas there were municipal cities and larger metropolitan corporations (International Crisis Group 2004; Cheema et al. 2005; Abbasi 2006).

In comparison with Ayub's earlier BD system, Zia's decentralisation reforms introduced more representation and greater devolution of powers. Despite the end results of both sets of local government reforms, they were not so different from those introduced by Ayub because the purpose of the introduction of the local bodies in either case was not to promote democracy and to improve service delivery for the rural population, but to create a loyal class which supported the governments of both Ayub and Zia. So the reforms also lacked constitutional protection and were created to support military regimes (Abbasi 2006; Haider and Badami 2010; Aslam and Yilmaz 2011).

There was always a pressing demand for local government in the political history of Pakistan. The military dictators sought to show a keen interest in introducing local government reforms and established elected local bodies system with a big claim that the regimes of both Ayub and Zia had promoted democracy, but neither system could deliver any positive services to the rural population (Bilal and Malik; Guess 2005; Malik and Anjum 2006; Malik 2009; Nadeem 2016).

3.4 Musharraf's Devolution of Power Plan 2000

President General Pervez Musharraf's landmark announcement of establishing a local government system on 14 August 2000 was not a new experiment for the people of Pakistan. Musharraf's devolution reforms were based on five

fundamental theoretical principles: devolution of political powers, decentralisation of administrative authority, decentralisation of management functions, diffusion of power authority and the distribution of resources at the district level (Abbasi 2006; Malik 2009; Nadeem 2016).

The Local Government Ordinance 2001 established a three-tier structure with union councils again at the lowest level, Tehsil administration at the middle level and district government at the top level of the third tier. The consequences of Musharraf's reforms were the creation of 6000 union councils, 334 Tehsil councils, 62 town councils and 110 district governments of which eight were recognised as city district governments. For the first time in Pakistan, 33% of central government seats were reserved for women, 5% for the marginalised class of workers and peasants and 5% for minority communities (Bilal and Malik; Malik and Anjum 2006; Malik 2009; Nadeem 2016). Each Tehsil council was comprised of one Tehsil Nazim (a mayor) and a Tehsil Naib Nazim (a deputy mayor). The members of the union councils acted as an electoral college, electing Nazims and Naib Nazims the Tehsil council in rural areas as well as the town councils in urban regions (Bilal and Malik; Malik and Anjum 2006; Malik 2009; Haider and Badami 2010; Nadeem 2016).

At the middle level, the Tehsil councils consisted of approximately 20 union councils. The Naib Nazims of the union councils became *ex-officio* members of the Tehsil councils. The directly elected members of all the union councils in Tehsil councils elected the mayor and deputy mayor and also voted for the reserved one-third of seats on Tehsil councils (Abbasi 2006; Haider and Badami 2010).

The highest tier of local government, the district government, was made up of approximately 60 union councils and the mayors of the union councils become

ex-officio members of the district councils and the mayors and deputy mayors of the district government were elected by the union councillors. Again one-third of seats on the district councils were reserved for the marginalized groups (Malik and Anjum 2006; Haider and Badami 2010). Table 3.1 summarises the local government structure.

Table 3. 1The decentralized local government structure

Administration	Council	Status of administration	Elected political head	Administrative head
District	District Council	District Administration	District Nazim	District Coordination Officer (DCO)
Tehsil	Tehsil Council	Tehsil Municipal Administration	Tehsil Nazim	Tehsil Municipal Officer (TMO)
Union	Union Council	Union Administration	Union Nazim	Union Nazim
Village	Village Council	Union administration	Union Nazim and Naib Nazim	Union Nazim

Source: (Ahmad and Noraini Bt Abu 2013: 38)

3.4.1 District Administration

The military regime's major thrust was the creation of the district government level. The district governments were assigned the functions of district coordination, community development, law and order, magistracy, information technology, works and services, land revenue, agriculture, environment, finance and the planning of rural development; before the 2000 devolution plan, these functions were under provincial government. Each district group was under the supervision of an Executive District Officer reporting directly to the DCO and they were responsible for coordination, human resource management, civil

defence, agriculture and crops, irrigation, water management, community development, education (except for university education), budgeting and finance, primary health including population welfare, information technology, law and order, revenue and excise. The district administration consisted of district and sub-district offices which were answerable to the district Nazim assisted by the DCO. In 2005, the number of union council members was reduced from 21 to 13 whereas there were no changes in the number of seats on town councils or the district administration (Mahesar and Mohyuddin; Sindh Government 2001; Afridi and Siddiqui 2013; Khan et al. 2013; Siddiqi 2013; Khan et al. 2014; Ansari 2015; Lohana et al. 2015; Rid and Murtaza 2018).

<u>Figure 3. 2 Tiers of the local government system in 2001</u>

Source: (Ahmad and Noraini Bt Abu 2013: 37)

3.4.2 The Tehsil Administration

In the Devolution Plan 2000, the second tier was the Tehsil. The Tehsil councils consisted of a Tehsil Nazim, a Naib Tehsil Nazim, the Tehsil council and the Tehsil administration. The Tehsil council was a directly elected body and it consisted of the Naib Nazims of all the unions. The number of general seats on the Tehsil council was the number of unions in that Tehsil council. An electoral college comprising the union councillors elected the Nazim and the Naib Nazim, and the Nazim was the head of the Tehsil administration (Mahesar and

Mohyuddin; Sindh Government 2001; Afridi and Siddiqui 2013; Khan et al. 2013; Siddiqi 2013; Khan et al. 2014; Ansari 2015; Lohana et al. 2015; Rid and Murtaza 2018).

The Tehsil municipal administration consisted of the Tehsil Nazim, a Tehsil municipal officer (TMO), the chief officer, and other officials of the local council services. The Tehsil municipal administration was responsible for the management of the local government offices, finance, rural development and the district inhabitants (Abbasi 2006; Malik and Anjum 2006).

In addition to its main responsibility, the Tehsil government also provided and coordinated municipal services to both rural and urban areas and undertook the basic municipal functions of development activities in land use and had responsibility for planning in every village and town in that Tehsil. The Tehsil was also assigned to monitor the performance of the Tehsil administration (Bilal and Malik; Malik and Anjum 2006).

3.4.3 Union Council Administration

The union councillors acted as an electoral college for the reserved seats on the Tehsil. The union council was the third and lowest tier of local government and consisted of the Nazim and Naib Nazim of the union administration. Every union council had three secretaries: a secretary of union committees, a secretary for municipal functions and a secretary for community development and other staff. The council was organised into monitoring committees and consisted of 26 councillors including the chairman. The union administration covered both rural and urban areas across the whole district. The union administration was assigned to coordinate community development and deliver municipal services under the supervision of the union Nazim. Under Musharraf's devolution reforms, the union councils performed various functions through monitoring

committees, for example, for municipal services, health, education, public safety and works and services (Bilal and Malik; Cheema et al. 2005; Malik and Anjum 2006; Malik 2009; Nadeem 2016).

3.4.4 Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) and monitoring committees

Another feature of Musharraf's devolution reform was the establishment of monitoring committees in each union council comprising the elected councillors with portfolios for monitoring progress, working development and governance in general. These monitoring committees also had to safeguard citizens' rights and security, monitor the performance of the district government and create the Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) discussed earlier. These CCBs were meant to play a role in the involvement of the local population in government activities and policies. The members of the union councils were to be elected directly on a single or multi-member ward basis (Kabeer et al. 2006; Muhammad Khan and Mirza 2013).

3.4.5 Deputy Commissioner

In the Devolution Plan 2000, the office of DC was abolished, and this became a big hindrance to the success of Musharraf's local government system. The mainstream of bureaucracy became anti-devolution reforms. Furthermore, the DCO was put under the charge of the district Nazim. With the abolition of the DCs and subordinating DCOs to the Nazims, the whole bureaucracy was reluctant to support a local government system to deliver services (Taj 2010; Islam 2011).

Although the DCO was now subordinate to the Nazims, the actual authority remained with the former because the DCOs not only possessed extensive administrative experience but also had a long-term interest in maintaining their authority. Moreover, the DCO, as a main group of bureaucracy, was a

permanent post. Moreover, the appointments and salaries of DCOs were determined by the provincial governments (Cyan et al. 2004; Hasnain 2008; Hasnain 2010; Islam 2011).

In addition, Nazims were mostly inexperienced and untrained in administrative affairs and they had no corresponding cadre network to challenge the well-established institution of bureaucracy. Therefore, it was not in the authority of the district Nazim to impose any penalty on a DCO. Because of this clear imbalance between district Nazims and the DCOs, the district government often complained that the DCOs did not consider themselves responsible to the elected district Nazims (Taj 2010; Islam 2011).

Devolution reforms under the military regime were criticised for having failed in the delivery of justice to the masses. For example, the Police Order 2002 was designed to deliver justice to the common people at grassroots level. According to critics, the local government reforms brought limited improvement in the implementation of the Police Order because of the reluctance of provincial governments to lose control of the district police. Further, due to the ambiguity in budgeting, training and the responsibilities of the Nazim and the DCO, the police could not deliver services efficiently. It should be noted that under the new local government system, the DCOs often complained about the use of district police by the Nazim and the Zila (district) Nazims consistently complained about having no control over the police (Malik and Anjum 2006; Taj 2010; Islam 2011).

Moreover, Musharraf's devolution plan envisaged the constitution of oversight bodies, these were the CCBs discussed earlier and the village councils. The CCBs were responsible for planning community development projects and mobilising resources for governance and citizens' awareness. As previous

literature repots (Kurosaki 2006; Khan and Kurosaki 2015) that 1,600 CCBs were registered throughout the country and approximately 25% of the development funds were to be allocated to projects identified by the CCBs. In reality, however, CCBs were not constituted in most places and their development and empowerment were largely neglected. Consequently, the funds which were allocated to oversight boards accumulated and were never used at all. Criticism was raised that even in the matters of the CCBs, the devolution plan was not properly implemented (Abbasi 2006; Wahid et al. 2017).

3.4.6 Financial dependence on Provincial Governments

The success of any local government system largely depends on fiscal decentralisation because proper and needs-based devolution can enable local decision-making and support service delivery at the grassroots level. In addition, local government should be independent of revenue generation from taxes and fees on imports, exports and the movement of goods. However, the system introduced by the military regime was dependent on fiscal transfers from the provincial governments. The district governments under Musharraf's devolution reforms had limited authority in financial matters (Abbasi 2006; Malik and Anjum 2006; Taj 2010).

In addition, 80% of the budget of local governments was only for salaries and could not be used for any other purposes. Because the district government relied on fiscal transfers from the provincial governments, the provincial governments established Provincial Finance Commissions (PFC) for the allocation of funds to the district governments, which had to seek approval from the provincial governments for the release of funds (Bilal and Malik; Abbasi 2006; Malik and Anjum 2006; Malik 2009; Nadeem 2016).

District Nazims faced severe opposition where the political affiliations of the provincial government and of the district Nazim were concerned. Thus, incompatibility between district governments and provincial governments slowed down the service delivery provided by local government. Another issue which hampered Musharraf's devolution system was ambiguity over the jurisdictional lines between different districts and the provinces. This happened in the departments of health, education and water and sanitation and created confusion between different districts. This confusion arose in Sindh at the district level over the jurisdiction of the former district councils because it was neither devolved to the Tehsil council nor delegated to the water and sanitation department (Cyan et al. 2004; International Crisis Group 2004; Abbasi 2006; Ahmad 2006; Kabeer et al. 2006; Kurosaki 2006; Talbot 2009a; Ahmad 2010; Hasnain 2010; Islam 2011).

3.4.7 Service Delivery

It was stated above that the quality and availability of basic public services such as education, health and water and sanitation were as bad as in the pre-devolution period; after this attempt at devolution, the rural areas were mostly without any municipal services and facilities and there was a complete failure of law and order system. Corruption in the local government departments was rampant. Consequently, the service delivery system of municipal administration became stagnant at the rural as well as the urban level. Due to the failure of municipal services, many towns and cities were flooded with waste and traffic congestion and illegal encroachments occurred on a large scale (Mohmand and Cheema 2007). However, there is another view that local government provided some facilities in the urban areas but that rural areas were neglected (Abbasi, 2006; Haider & Badami, 2010). For example, teachers and doctors had

a free hand not to fulfil their duties due to the leniency they were given (Abbasi 2006; Haider and Badami 2010; Islam 2011).

3.4.8 Challenges to the system

Because Musharraf introduced the local government system in a very short period and without taking politicians and provincial governments into his confidence, it became a bone of contention in the various layers of government in Pakistan which were not ready to accept power transferring to the newly elected Nazims. The members of the National Assembly (MNAs) and the Provincial Assembly (MPAs) often complained that Musharraf's local government system had snatched their control of the supervision of development schemes, which had previously been under the authority of the MNAs and MPAs. The result of this contention, the tug of war between Nazims and the MNAs and MPAs, was inevitable and a hot issue in governance on both sides (Cyan et al. 2004; Abbasi 2006; Hasnain 2008; Arif 2010; Hasnain 2010; Islam 2011).

According to the Federal Constitution of Pakistan, local government was a provincial issue so devolution reforms should have been under the supervision of the provincial governments, but Musharraf introduced the Devolution Plan 2001 and ordered the provinces to accept it as it was. Another violation of the federalism principle was that as local government was a provincial issue, the elections of local bodies should have been under the supervision of provincial governments. However, elections of the district Nazims and Naibs were conducted by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), which was purely working under the federal government (Cyan et al. 2004; Hasnain 2008; Haider and Badami 2010; Hasnain 2010; Islam 2011).

3.5 The Sindh Local Government Act 2013

The Sindh Assembly, elected by the public vote, passed a new local government system under the Sindh Local Government Act No. XLII of 2013. The law was passed by the Sindh Assembly on 19 August 2013 after the Sindh Governor had given his assent to it. The Act established one metropolitan corporation, ten municipal corporations, 23 districts, 40 municipal committees, 139 town committees, 434 union committees for urban areas and 1064 union councils for rural areas (Azfar-ul-Ashfaque 2013; Ghori 2018).

Under the Act, the districts of Sindh province were divided into town committees, municipal corporations and union committees for urban areas. For rural areas, there was a union council for each union and a district council for each district (Farooqi 2013).

The principal characteristic of this system is that it was the first time that local governments had been introduced under a civilian government (Rid & Murtaza 2018). The Act of 2013 was implemented in 2016 with the purpose of enhancing local service delivery in Sindh. In this new system, the key functions of the 2001 system which had been devolved to the district governments were reassigned to the provincial governments. In the new system, the Taluka councils were missing so it might be difficult for district councils to deal with so many rural councils spread all over the district territories (Azfar-ul-Ashfaque 2013; Rid & Murtaza 2018).

The single-tier system of town and municipal committees replaced the Taluka councils in rural Sindh (Azfar-ul-Ashfaque 2013; Murtaza 2017; Rid & Murtaza 2018).

Under the Sindh Local Government Act of 2013, a new tier of union committees was added: the metropolitan and municipal corporations had union committees

as their lowest units of administration (Rid & Murtaza 2018). The system of local administration was divided into urban and rural regions. Urban local administration was allocated to union committees, town committees and municipal committees and there were union councils and district councils are in rural regions (Kalia; Rid and Murtaza 2018).

3.5 1 The Province of Sindh

This section gives an account of the province of Sindh and the two districts from where data were collected for this study.

Sindh is the second most important province of Pakistan. It has a population of 47 million people and is administratively divided into seven divisions and twenty-nine districts. The seven administrative divisions are Karachi, Hyderabad, Mirpur Khans, Sukkur and Larkana and two newly created divisions of Shaheed Benazir Abad (formerly Nawab Shah) and Bhambhore. The twenty-nine districts are divided into Tehsils and union councils, the basic unit of local government (Rid and Murtaza 2018: 34).

British colonialists occupied Sindh in 1843. It is the southern province of Pakistan and its capital city Karachi is Pakistan's chief port and the largest city dominating the country's coastline (Ansari 2015). Sindh constitutes 23% of the total population of Pakistan and Karachi has a population of 9.269 million, followed by Hyderabad and Sukkur. Sindh is also one of the most industrialized regions of Pakistan. The province contributes in the production of raw cotton and has many other national mills (Bajwa 1999; Strazny 2013). A map of Sindh is presented as Figure 3.3, in which the two districts of Kambar-Shahdadkot and Larkana are shown.

Figure 3. 3 Map of Sindh Province

Source: (Research Gate). Accessed online at: https://www.sindh.gov.pk/

Sindh has many specific characteristics such as an historical civilisation, a

resilience to religious extremism and geographical importance, which is why it is

important to study this province in relation to the role of the local government

and its role in public participation. Sindh was the first province to pass a

resolution for Pakistan: after the partition of India, the newly created country

was fragile and vulnerable to riots. The partition of India was based on religion,

so communal and religious bloodshed was inevitable, but despite being such an

ideal ground for religious riots, Sindh was championed as a paradigm of inter-

faith harmony. Also, Sindh's Indus Valley civilisation is known to be one of the

oldest civilisations on earth and was a cradle of subsequent civilisations (Albinia 2010; Daswani 2019: 35). The picture of the ruins of Mohen-jo-Daro in Larkana district shown as Figure 3.4 shows the planning of streets in the town around 2500 BCE (Robinson 2015).

Figure 3. 4 Mohen-Jo-Daro

An ancient Buddhist stupa stands on top of the ruins of Mohenjo-daro.

Source: (Robinson 2015: 48)

3.5.2 The selection of two districts of Sindh

Two districts of the province of Sindh were selected for the examination of the role of the local governments in reinventing public participation in service delivery for this current study: there are Larkana and Kambar-Shahdadkot and they will be described separately in the paragraphs which follow.

3.5.3 The District of Larkana

This section gives information about the urban and rural parts of the district of Larkana including the geography, the administration and the local government set-up. Several tables are presented giving details about the administrative

division of the national and provincial government and the division of the
decentralised local governance in Sindh.

Larkana District was selected because of its rich political culture: two famous
Pakistani politicians, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his daughter Benazir Bhutto came
from Larkana and their family has been active in local, national and international
politics. Larkana is the seventeenth largest city in Pakistan and the fifth largest
urban division in the province of Sindh and was incorporated as a municipality
in 1855 (United States Agency of International Development 2014; Sindh Union
Council and Community Economic Strenthening Support Programme 2016a).

3.5.4 The History of Larkana

Larkana lies on the west bank of the Indus river in Upper Sindh in the north-
west of the province; it was founded on the banks of Ghar Wah (the rice canal).
About 300 years ago the Larak tribe lived there and before them it was ruled by
various dynasties, including the Soomras (1024-1351AD), the Summas (1335-
1520), the Arguns (15201650), the Kalhoras (1657-1783) and the Talpurs
(1783-1843). When the British came to the subcontinent, General Charles
Napier, a commander in the British army, became the First Governor General of
Sindh (United States Agency of International Development 2014; Sindh Union
Council and Community Economic Strenthening Support Programme 2016b).

The historical name of Larkana was Chandka. It was given the status of a
district (a Taluka) under the British. It is called *Larkano* in Sindhi and has long
been famous for its many characteristics. The Kalhoras were active in aspects
of politics, culture and the economy of the region from 1657 to 1783. Larkana
district was formed in 1901 and is famous for its fertile plain which is known as
the Garden of Sindh.

3.5.5 The Geography of Larkana

Larkana is situated at 67º 56″ 20′ to 68º 29″ 34′ longitude and 27º 7″ 31′ to 27º

56″ 2′ north latitude and is bounded by the districts of Shikarpur and Khairpur

Mirs on the east, Jacobabad in the north, Kambar-Shahdadkot and Dadu on the

west and Naushero Feroz to the south. The Larkana district has a well-

established network of irrigation channels and canals (United States Agency of

International Development 2014; Sindh Union Council and Community

Economic Strenthening Support Programme 2016b).

Figure 3. 5 Map of Larkana

Source**:** (United States Agency of International Development 2014)

The Bhutto family has served Pakistan in the political realm with their struggle to nourish the true nature of democracy in Pakistan: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto founded the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) which is the dominant political party of this district. Larkana is represented by two national assembly and four provincial assembly seats (Britannica 1957; Britannica 2013; Encyclopaedia 2013; Sindh 2013).

3.5.6 Administrative Division

Larkana has its district headquarters in Larkana City and four Talukas (sub-district administrative units): Larkana itself, Dokri, Rato Dero and Bakrani. The following table (3.2) illustrates the information about the district of Larkana and its sub-districts.

Table 3. 2 Population growth in Larkana

Name	Status	Population (1998 census)	Population (2017 census)
Larkana	**District**	**1,001,608**	**1,524,391**
Bakarani	Taluka	174,721	229,444
Dokri	Taluka	169,033	225,294
Larkana	Taluka	431,645	738,069
Ratodero	Taluka	226,209	331,584

Source: (Statics Pakistan Bureau).Accessed online at: http://www.pbs.gov.pk/
According to the Sindh Local Government Act 2013, Larkana district is divided into three town committees, three municipal corporations and union committees. he three town committees are Arija , Badah and Dokri and the three municipal corporations are Larkana, Naudero and Rato Dero (United States Agency of International Development 2014; Sindh Union Council and Community Economic Strenthening Support Programme 2016b). The table (3.3) shows the local government structure of district Larkana.

Table 3. 3The local government structure of Larkana district

Name	Status	Population
Larkana (city)	Municipal corporation	738,069
Naudero	Municipal corporation	48,962
Ratodero	Municipal corporation	331,584
Dokri	Town committee	225,294
Badah	Town committee	40,236
Arija	Town committee	20,661

Source: (United States Agency of International Development 2014; Sindh Union Council and Community Economic Strenthening Support Programme 2016b). Accessed online at: https://success.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Larkana-District-profile.pdf.

The following table (3.4) shows the gender information of district Larkana.

Table 3. 4 Gender information

of Larkana (2017 census)

Males	77,249
Females	746,093
Transgender	49

Source: (Statics Pakistan Bureau). Accessed online at: http://www.pbs.gov.pk/

Table 3. 5 Urban and rural Larkana (2017 census)

Urban	701,637	
Rural	822,754	

Source: (Statics Pakistan Bureau)

Table 3. 6 Union councils of Larkana district

District population	**1,524,391**
Union councils	47
Rural union councils	47
Total estimated households	157,546
Area	7,423 km2

Source: (Sindh Union Council and Community Economic Strenthening Support Programme 2016b).Accessed online at: https://success.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Larkana-District-profile.pdf.

This section provides information about the geography, administration and set-up of the local government structure of the second selected district, Kambar-Shahdadkot. Again, a series of tables gives detailed information about the district.

3.5.8 The history of Kambar Shahdadkot

The district of Kambar-Shahdadkot has three rural districts: Shikarpur, Jacobabad and Dadu. This district was formerly ruled by the Klhoras from 1700 to 1783 and then the Talpurs ruled from 1783 to 1843, after which it came under British colonial rule. After the creation of Pakistan, Kambar and Shahdadkot both remained as Talukas of Larkana district but in 2005, Kambar-Shahdadkot was created as a new district in the province of Sindh (United States Agency of International Development 2014; Sindh Union Council and Community Economic Strenthening Support Programme 2016a).

3.5.9 Administrative Structure

The following table (3.7) illustrates the government structure of KambarShahdadkot.

Table 3. 7 The division of Kambar Shahdadkot district

Name	Status	Population (2017 census)
Kambar-Shahdadkot	**District**	**1,341,042**
Kambar (city)	Taluka	395,206
Warah	Taluka/Tehsil	229,971
Shahdadkot	Taluka/Tehsil	202,745
Miro Khan	Taluka/Tehsil	158,191
Qubo-Saeed khan	Taluka/Tehsil	85,970
Sijawal Junejo	Taluka/Tehsil	117,459
Nasirabad	Taluka/Tehsil	151500

source: (Statics Pakistan Bureau).Accessed online at: http://www.pbs.gov.pk/. Separate data for each union committee and union council in the Larkana and Kambar-Shahdadkot districts were not available except for a list of town committees and municipal corporations. Kambar-Shahdadkot is divided as shown in the following table(3.8).

Table 3. 8 Local government divisions of Kambar-Shahdadkot

Name	Status	Population
Behram	Town committee	21,008
Kambar	Town committee	395,206
Miro Khan	Town committee	158,191
Nasirabad	Town committee	151,500
Qubo Saeed khan	Town committee	85,970
Shahdadkot	Municipal Corporation	202,745

| Warah | Town committee | 229,971 |

Source:(Statics Pakistan Bureau) Accessed online at: http://www.pbs.gov.pk/

3.5.10 Geography

Kambar-Shahdadkot lies in the north-west of Sindh at 67º 10′ to 68º 12′ longitude and 27º 26′ 31″ to 27º 58′ 55″ latitude. It has boundaries with Larkana district in the east, Jhal Magsi, Jafferababad and the Khuzdar districts of Balochistan in the north-west, Shikarpur and Jacobabad in the north-east and Dadu in the south (United States Agency of International Development 2014; Sindh Union Council and Community Economic Strenthening Support Programme 2016a).

Figure 3. 6 The map of Kambar Shahdadkot

Source United States Agency of International Development (2014)

The following table(3.9) gives demographic information about the population of the district, its sub-districts, its educational facilities and health units.

Table 3. 9 Demographic characteristics of Kambar-Shahdadkot

Name	Data	Name	Data
Population (1998 census)	900,507	Health facilities	64
Population (2017 census)	1,341,042	Educational facilities	1631
Talukas	7	Literacy rate (2012-13) age: 10+	42%
Union councils	40	Female literacy rate	23%
Revenue villages	248	Male literacy rate	59%
Area	5,676.66 sq.kms	Registered voters	496,422
National Assembly seats	2	Provincial Assembly seats	3

Source: United States Agency of International Development (2014).

Following table (3.10) shows the educational facilities of the district KambarShahdadkot

Table 3. 10 Education facilities

Number of Schools: ??	
Boys	48.92%
Girls	17.96%
Mixed	33.1%

3.6 Conclusion

After independence, Pakistan's attempts to establish representative and democratic institutions were handicapped by the centralised structure previously established by the Indian Government Act of 1935 which was consistently adopted by the post-independence Pakistani politicians, both military and civil (Ahmed 2011: 19). It can therefore be stated that post-independence Pakistani non-democratic institutions (military-bureaucracy establishments) became stronger than its democratic institutions. The trend to concentrate and centralise power in Pakistan grew consistently towards non-democratic institutions. The failure of Pakistan's state institutions undermined the social and political capacity of the nation as a whole (Wilder 2009).

Mahmood (2000) explained that the failure of democratic institutions resulted in a big gap between public participation and the political process. For example, after the creation of Pakistan, the people of Pakistan were kept away from the political process since only the political elites and the bureaucracy dominated state development programmes by deliberately excluding citizens from the political scene because they did not want to be subjected to the restraints of the democratic process. Consequently, the military emerged as the most powerful non-democratic institution which exploited the politics of Pakistan (Mahmood 2000).It has also been explained that the foundations of democracy consist of the principles of public involvement, popular sovereignty and rule with the consent of the people. In addition, Talbot (2010) stated that in Pakistan the successive military coups and the unholy alliance of the bureaucracy and the feudal Lords never let a democratic society evolve. Talbot (2009b: 324) stated that "Military rule should not be seen alone, however, as inhibiting democratic development … The poor have been disenfranchised throughout Pakistan's

history, not only by military fiat, but because of their marginality in an inegalitarian, rural society. The dominance of parliamentary politics has been inimical to the movement away from a patronage to an issue-based political system". It is also important to note that today's Zamindars, after acquiring huge areas of land after independence and establishing themselves as local politicians, have become major power players in Pakistan (Lieten and Breman 2002).

Talbot (2009b) also stated that democratic consolidation depends on an active and healthy role of civil society through participation with the state. The development of democratic ideals requires the inclusion and participation of all groups in a country. In Pakistan, civil society was not only undermined and intimidated but also, due to government failures to protect them, these social, ethnic and civil society groups have been attacked again and again.

Burki (2010) stated that Pakistan did try to devolve powers and bring the citizens closer to the decision-making process, but there was a basic default in the type of constitutions which consistently reverted to highly centralised institutions. For instance, throughout the history of Pakistan, a military-bureaucracy alliance has run the country. The military is always accustomed to a centralised command and control system, so it has never compromised over sharing power with the common citizens. Another issue with representation and democracy is that some strong politicians and landed elites have consistently been equally reluctant to share political power at the grassroots level (Talbot 2002; Cohen 2004; Cheema et al. 2005; Talbot 2009a; Talbot 2009b).

This chapter has given a full account of how systems of local governance have been introduced in Pakistan before and after independence. In short, various local government systems in Pakistan were introduced by invaders or occupiers

from other countries. A brief introduction to the demography of Pakistan has also been given in this chapter and a summary of the various local governments introduced after the birth of the country has also been provided. Demographic information of the province of Sindh and the two districts where the field work was carried out for data collection has also been set out.

Chapter four

Methodology

4.0 Introduction

In this chapter, the nature of this study and the methodological approaches

adopted are provided. An overview of the rationale of this project has been

highlighted in Chapter **One.** In Chapter **Two**, an overview of the theoretical and

empirical literature gap in the context of the province of Sindh, Pakistan, was

highlighted. Chapter **Three** featured a description of the contextual realities of

how local government reforms have been introduced in the historical context of

Pakistan. Therefore, the main motivation of this research was to understand the

role of decentralised local governance in initiating local community participation

in local policy making and implementation.

In this chapter, the details of what this research is are provided; detailed

knowledge of the philosophical paradigms and perspectives are presented as

well. Furthermore, in this chapter the research designs, the adopted research

strategy and the employed philosophical approach for this study are explained.

The rationale for selecting the methods of data generation and the decisions

made about the sampling are discussed in this chapter. The chapter provides

an overview of the research's validity, reliability, and the practice of ethics. In

this chapter, initially, the philosophical paradigms are explained, and then the

appropriate choices are made according to the relevance of the research

question. Research is often about how to reach reality and how to solve the real

problems which are faced by individuals. This may have a practical focus in

order to achieve measurable outputs that are specific to any community,

society, organisation or institution. On the other hand, there is another type of

research which is concerned with validating and building a theory (Creswell

2014). In this chapter, different alternatives of methodologies and methods are

discussed. The terms 'methodology' and 'methods' may be synonymous, but

methodology is broader and envelops methods (Neuman 2015).

4.1 Research philosophies and approaches

This section features a discussion of different research philosophies and

approaches. However, setting clear boundaries with regards to these

approaches is not an easy task:

> Learning about the approaches is not simple. When you read reports
> on research studies, the authors rarely tells you which approach was
> used. (Neuman 2015: 93)

For example, as it is explained, a paradigm consists of various components

such as ontology, epistemology and methodology and methods. Each paradigm

is based upon its own ontological and epistemological assumptions. Since all

assumptions are conjecture, the philosophical underpinnings of each paradigm

can never be empirically proven or disproven. Stating a knowledge claim means

that the researcher starts a research project with certain assumptions about

how they will learn and what they will learn during their inquiry. These claims

might be called paradigms: philosophical assumptions, epistemologies and

ontologies, or broadly conceived research methodologies (Creswell 2014).

Firstly, assumptions are of an ontological nature which concerns the very

essence of the phenomenon under investigation (Burrell and Morgan 1979).

Ontology is the study of being (Crotty 1998). It is an area of philosophy that

deals with the nature of being or what exists; the area of philosophy that asks

what really is and what the fundamental categories of reality are (Gray 2014;

Neuman 2015). Ontology concerns the issues of what exists, or the

fundamental nature of reality. There are two basic positions within ontology:

realism and nominalism. The realist sees the world as being "out there"

(Neuman 2015: 94). The world is organised into pre-existing categories, just

waiting for us to discover them. A realist assumes that the "real world" exists independently of humans and their interpretations. Realist ontology says that we see what exists, and we can easily realise, feel and capture it to produce objective knowledge. On the other side, there is the nominalist ontology, which assumes that humans never directly experience a reality "out there". The experience of mankind interacting with what we call "the real world" is always occurring through a lens or scheme of interpretations and inner subjectivity (Neuman 2015: 94). Subjective-cultural beliefs influence what we see and how we experience reality. Realities as entities exist only in the minds of the people contemplating them. These realities and entities do not exist in reality; they have ontological status only in so far as some groups of people grant them that status (Guba and Lincoln 1989). As this study is aimed at studying the contributions - historical, cultural, social, religious, institutional, and legal - made by constitutional factors influencing public participation in local government policies and development activities in Sindh from 2001-2009 and the local government system from 2013-present, this research falls into the camp of nominalist ontologies. This is because the nominalist ontology view is that our personal biography and cultural worldview organise our experiences into categories and patterns (Neuman 2015). For example, the aim of this study is to answer questions relating to what factors are responsible for hindering or promoting civic involvement in local government policies. How is public participation influenced due to multiple factors? How can these factors be addressed properly and effectively? When these questions are asked, the individuals are not free to answer according to their subjective values, beliefs, and experiences. Once again, when a researcher reads the transcripts, he or she may interpret those transcripts according to his or her subjective

personality. For example, there is also a variation between the researcher's personal observation of the working style and patterns during the 2001-2009 and 2013-present local government of Sindh, the tenure of local government, and the experience and observation of the interviewees. Therefore, there are possibilities that the experiences and observations of each individual cannot be the same as those of others. For example, Guba and Lincoln (1989) explain that social reality is relative to the individuals involved and to the particular context in which they find themselves. Change the individuals, and you change the reality. Or, change the context, and you change the reality. Therefore, the entities only exist in the minds of the individuals thinking and observing them. They do not really exist. They have ontological status when a group of people grants them that status (Guba and Lincoln 1989).

4.2 How we know the world around us or what makes a claim about it true
Epistemology is concerned with how to produce true knowledge of reality. There could be answers from two sides: a realist epistemologist says that we should not be worried about our cultural influences, because there is an empirical world "out there" that exists apart from our inner thoughts and perceptions; on the other hand, a social constructionist epistemologist says we should consider the influences of interpretations and subjective views because they greatly influence all observations (Neuman 2015). Guba and Lincoln (1989) explain that epistemology asks questions, such as what is the nature of the relationship between the would-be-knower and what can be known? Epistemology deals with the nature of knowledge, its possibility, scope and general basis. Epistemology is concerned with providing a philosophical grounding for deciding what kind of knowledge is possible and how we can ensure that they are both

adequate and legitimate (Crotty 1998: 8). There is, of course, a range of
epistemologies.

4.2.1 Objectivism and the path to quantitative studies

Objectivist epistemology holds that meaning and, therefore, meaningful reality
exist as such, apart from the operation of any consciousness. For example, a
tree in a forest is a tree, regardless of whether anyone is aware of its existence
or not. When human beings recognise it as a tree, they are simply discovering a
meaning that has been lying there in wait for them all along (Crotty 1998). The
objectivists (Neuman) say there is an empirical world out there that exists apart
from our inner thoughts and perceptions of it. As we gather evidence, some of
our ideas about reality are verified or found consistent with that evidence, while
other ideas are false because they lack supporting empirical evidence. If we
adopt a nominalist/ constructionist approach, making mere observations will not
lead to knowledge about reality, because interpretations and subjective views
greatly influence all observations. The same holds true for people we might
observe; their interpretations and subjective views shape all that they say and
do (Neuman 2015).

The research conducted was qualitative in format, using interpretive
approaches, attempting to make sense of the words or text. The respondents
were selected purposively. A questionnaire featuring open-ended questions was
answered in written form instead of using a voice recording. This is because all
these data have to be documented by recording and transcribing them, turning
them into texts that can be analysed (Flick 2018: 61). The research
methodology is embedded in the interviews (text, words and pictures), and, of
course, the researcher will need to understand these words or text. As Crotty
(1998: 66) suggests, social sciences are concerned with *Verstehen* (Shah and

Baporikar). After collecting the data, they were translated from Sindhi (the local language of Sindh Province) to English and analysed thematically. The emergent issues of the case studies will be discussed in **Chapter Five**. The research questions were discussed in **Chapter One**, and the context of case studies was discussed in **Chapter Three**.

4.2.2 Constructionism

Constructionism as a philosophical perspective is interest in the methods by which human beings interpret and construct the social or psychological world in a specific context (Schwandt 1997).The social constructionism approach suggests that meaningful reality is being constructed after its interactions with the mind. All knowledge of reality is not being discovered but constructed. Therefore, meaning does not exist in the object; it is not simply waiting to be discovered by someone, but is constructed. As Crotty (1998: 43) points out, the objects in the world are indeterminate. They may contain any meaning, but in fact meaning takes place when the human mind engages with them. What constructionism suggests is that the meanings of objects are constructed by human beings as they interact/engage with the world they are interpreting (Crotty 1998). The researcher of this study has adopted the constructionist approach, because in this project there is the process of semi-structured interviews which ultimately lead to interaction among the interviewees. They have shared their lived experiences of their participation in local government policy making. The researcher needs to constitute meaning from their varied experiences. No doubt the constructionist approach is expansive and amorphous (Gubrium and Holstein 2012); however, it suits qualitative methods, in which the construction of meanings of everyday life is inevitable.

4.2.3 Interpretivism

The opposite of the positivist stance is interpretivism, which is concerned with cultural and historical interpretations of problems and situations (Gray 2014). In terms of epistemology, interpretivism is closely related to constructionism. Interpretivism explains how natural reality and social reality are not similar in nature; therefore, each requires a different set of beliefs and methods (Gray 2014). The researcher intends to investigate the major contributing factors influencing community participation in local government's decision-making process. There is no doubt that the participants will share their views according to their experiences, values, and their held observations regarding local government's response to community participation. As the aim of this research is to investigate the unknown insights with regards to the major contributing factors in relation to public participation, so constructionism has been adopted as the philosophical approach for this research.

4.2.4 How does a researcher decide on any particular methodology?
4.2.5 Realism as the path towards the object (quantitative study)

Realists claim that fundamental reality is organised into pre-existing categories, just waiting for human beings to discover it (Neuman 2015; Saunders et al. 2019). Realists say that what you see is what you get.

Therefore, they claim that they are positive that whatever is there it is already existing, independent of our interaction and naming. Therefore, they are not interpreting but simply counting these objects using numbers, and not interpreting these objects with their words. Therefore, they tend to be realist and positivist that whatever they are counting is true and does not need any interpretation using many words, because the reality is pre-existing, waiting for us to discover it (Neuman 2015; Saunders et al. 2019).

4.2.6 Nominalism as the path towards interpretation (qualitative research)

However, nominalism assumes that we never directly experience any reality out there. Our experiences with what humans call the nature of reality (the real world) are always happening through the scheme of our interpretations, and are subject to be influenced by our beliefs (Neuman 2015).

Now, as far this case study is concerned, the researcher does not believe that whatever is there - i.e., local government is working, and there is a law in ordinance that there would be direct involvement of ordinary men in decision making - is true and is simply existing and it does not need our interpretation. Therefore, the researcher says that he must interact with the data and experience the data to prove what the data say. Realities as entities exist only in the minds of the people contemplating them. These realities and entities do not exist in reality; they have ontological status only in so far as some groups of people grant them that status (Guba and Lincoln 1989). As this study is aimed at studying the contributions - historical, cultural, social, religious, institutional, legal – of the constitutional factors influencing public participation in local government policies and development activities in Sindh from 2001-2009 and the local government system from 2013-present, this research falls into the camp of nominalist ontologies. This is because the nominalist ontology view is that our personal biography and cultural worldview are organising our experiences into categories and patterns (Neuman 2015).

4.2.7 How we know the world around us or what makes a claim about it true

When the scientific philosophy of epistemology raises the question of what we need to do to produce a reliable knowledge, realists say that there is an empirical world out there that exists apart from our inner thoughts and interpretations. Therefore, a realist claims that he or she is positive, and does

not worry about interpreting it according to our cultural beliefs. Therefore, realists claim to be positivists in such a sense that reality and the world exist in the form of objects. Therefore, positivist social science researchers prefer precise quantitative data and often use experiments, surveys, and statics (Neuman 2015: 97).

However, apposite to the objectivism strand is constructionism, which suggests that the meaningful reality of the social world is constructed through human minds. The objects themselves do not carry any meaning; they are meaningless if human beings do not construct their meaning according to any specific context. If the mind of a human being does not work, it means that any object will remain meaningless. Furthermore, if any researcher does not apply any specific context, the meaning of any social world would be irrelevant. For example, in this study project an open-ended questionnaire is going to be administered through survey methods to local farmers, local social activists (who work in non-profit NGOs), members of Citizen Community Boards (CCBs), teachers at high schools, and local government officials. As a consequence, the researcher has adopted a constructionist epistemology to understand the deep meaning of what the participants, community members, members of CCBs (citizen community boards) and local government officials have experienced, watched and observed. These individuals construct subjective meanings from their experiences. These meanings are varied from individual to individual.

Therefore, the researcher has to rely as much as possible on the participants' views of the situation being investigated. People construct reality out of their interactions and beliefs (Neuman 2015). Thus, the research questions of this study gave an opportunity to the local community, members of the CCBs and local government officials to share their experiences of local government

systems from 2001-2009 and 2013- present. As constructionist researchers are looking for the process of interaction between participants (Creswell 2014), therefore this research project was aimed towards looking at the interactions between the individuals from Sindh and Pakistan.

On the other hand, interpretive social science seeks to find out the meanings of the everyday life experiences of people in specific settings. Interpretive social sciences are related to **hermeneutics,** a theory that means making the obscure plain. It emphasises conducting very close, detailed reading of *text* to acquire a profound, deep understanding. *Text* can mean a conversation, written words, or pictures. The researcher can reach it only through a detailed examination and study of the text, by contemplating its many messages and seeking the connections among its parts (Neuman 2015).

4.3 Research methodology explained

A research methodology deals with methods, systems, and rules of conduct of inquiry (Guba and Lincoln 1989). A methodology is the plan or strategy of a research action, which is about choice and use of particular methods (Crotty 1998).

In quantitative methodology, researchers employ a logic that is systematic and adopts a linear research path, while in qualitative research, logic takes place in the ongoing practice, and a nonlinear research path is followed (Neuman 2015: 169). (See Table 4.3).The relevant methodology is explained in the next section.

Table 4. 1 Quantitative and qualitative research approaches

	Quantitative	Qualitative
Principal orientation to the role of theory in relation to the research	Deductive: testing of theory	Inductive: generation of theory
	Natural science model in particular	
Epistemological orientations	Positivism	Interpretivism
	Objectivism	
Ontological Orientation		Constructionism

Source: Adopted from Bryman (2016: 32)

4.3.1 Qualitative research

The first characteristic of qualitative research is that it uses soft data, such as words, sentences, or photos (Neuman 2015). Another characteristic of qualitative research is that it uses inductivist, constructionist, and interpretivist approaches (Bryman 2016). Qualitative research is a set of various representations, for example, field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings and memos. Furthermore, it involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to social settings. Qualitative research consists of studies of a variety of empirical phenomena, for example, case studies, personal experience, life stories, artefacts, or cultural texts, along with observational and historical texts. Qualitative researchers use various interpretive practices for the purpose of creating a better understanding of the subject matter of the world (Denzin and Lincoln 2011).

Being a qualitative researcher, one should not distance oneself from the interviewees and individuals who are the source of our primary data. Qualitative researchers are bound not to treat data arbitrarily. However, we should also

respect personal insight, feelings, and life perspective, to understand social life. The central principle of qualitative research is that the research must be open and integrated to deal with the data (Neuman 2015). The majority of researchers build and test a theory from two directions. The first direction is that the researcher begins with abstract thinking and then logically connects the ideas in relation to empirical evidence. The second direction is that the researcher begins with specific observations of empirical evidence and then generalises from the evidence building towards increasingly abstract ideas (Neuman 2015: 69).

4.3.3 Research methodology adopted

Bryman (2016) has suggested that the majority of qualitative research starts with research questions which begin with: *What, To What Extent, and How.* Therefore, this study is suited to qualitative research, because the research questions are worded thus:

1. What are the major factors contributing to and influencing public participation in local government's policy formulation/local development projects in rural Sindh?

2. What are the perceived strengths and weaknesses of public participation in local government's policy formulation/local development projects in rural Sindh?

3. How do you facilitate an effective involvement in local government's policy formulation/local development projects in rural Sindh?

4.4 Research design

A research design is the logical arrangement that links the empirical data to a research study's opening questions, and finally to its conclusion. In other words, a research design is a logical plan for getting from here to there, where here is considered as an initial stage of set research questions to be answered, and

there is a set of answers (conclusions) to these initial questions (Yin 2014).

Furthermore, the choice of research design is based on philosophical

assumptions, research aims and objectives, availability of time, and other

resources. For example, Yin (2014) states that research design is guided by the

type of research question, the extent of control that the researcher has over the

phenomenon, and the degree of focus on contemporary rather than historical

events. The most common research strategies are briefly discussed in this

section, and the selected research strategy is discussed in more detail.

4.4.1 The adopted choice is discussed below

As the researcher has proposed that the topic of this research is about a

specific phenomenon (local government and community participation in Sindh),

therefore, a case study strategy will provide in depth analysis of the context

within which it could be assessed what factors have contributed, during the local

government period of 2001-2009, to community participation in Sindh. This is

because the case study is about the particular rather than the general (Thomas

2014). Creswell (2014) opines that case studies are designed in many fields in

which the researcher develops in-depth analysis of a single event, often a

programme, case, activity, process, or one or more individuals. One reason why

the case study approach has been adopted is because this study is bound by

time and activity; researchers collect detailed information about the case.

Neuman (2015: 179) points out that most qualitative studies use a case-

orientated approach, but it does not have to be thus.

4.4.2 Case study

Gray (2014) defines that a case study is not a method in itself, it is a focus, and

it concentrates on one case in detail (Thomas 2014). Case study research helps

to understand complex social phenomena. The case study allows the

researcher to focus on a case and retain a holistic and real-world approach to understanding the situation (Yin 2014). However, Yin (2014: 3) contends that case study research remains the most challenging strategy of all social sciences studies. Despite this, a case study is conducted in many situations to contribute to the knowledge of groups, institutions, and socially and politically related phenomena. Bryman (2016) defines how a case study is a detailed and rigorous analysis of a single case under investigation. As Bryman (2016: 60) observes, case study research is concerned with complexity and a particular case in question.

The benefit of this approach is that it can be used to examine many aspects of a single case, or a few cases in-depth and intensively. The data on the case are detailed, varied and extensive. The usefulness of a case study is that it enables researchers to link the micro level, or the actions of individuals, to the macro level, or large-scale structures and processes (Neuman 2015: 42).

So, why choose case studies? The answer can be found in the philosophical position – the researcher has a specific case in mind, or he or she wants to base the research on general concepts. There is an opinion that when a researcher is inclined to conduct a case study, he or she, of course, has started from specific observation of the phenomenon or the world. Therefore, here the philosophical position should be clear, and the researcher should want to see the phenomenon through an inductive approach. This is because the selection of a case study design is the result of any specific observation of the researcher. However, after this researcher's observation of the institution of local government in Sindh, Pakistan, it remains unclear whether local government stands for public participation or public alienation. Therefore, in any case, what are the major contributing factors? From the above statement, it has

now become justifiable for me to investigate the case of local government and public participation in Sindh and Pakistan. Furthermore, the researcher became interested in the contributing factors to public participation in the policy making of local government in Sindh, Pakistan. If this study were to be started based on a specific case, it would mean that the inductive approach could be utilised by the researcher. If the inductive approach is justifiable, a case study design could be an appropriate strategy to answer the above research question: What are the contributing factors of public participation in policy making and implementation in local government of Sindh and Pakistan?

The aim of this study is to look for the factors which contribute to public participation in the policy of local government in Sindh and Pakistan. Therefore, this research is focused on looking for and assessing the factors contributing to public participation in policy making in the context of the Pakistan Devolution Plan 2001.

4.5 Qualitative research under consideration

Qualitative research is a process of the language of cases and contexts. Qualitative researchers interpret or make meanings of specific socio-cultural settings. In qualitative research, interpretations are made of social life from various dimensions and identities. Usually, the qualitative approach is inductive and is based on grounded theory. This inductive approach means that, in a qualitative study, theory is built from data or grounded theory in that data. The method of grounded theory adds flexibility and allows the data and theory to interact. This nonlinear process helps qualitative research to remain open to the unexpected. In qualitative research, social context is emphasised. This is because interpretations or the making of the meaning of social action, event or statement mostly depend on the context in which it happens (Creswell 2014;

Neuman 2015; Bryman 2016). Social context means considerations for time context (when the event takes place), spatial context (where the situation occurs), emotional context (feelings about what occurs), and socio-cultural context (the social situation and cultural aspect in which something occurs) (Gray 2014; Neuman 2015).

For further consideration in relation to qualitative research is the process of bricolage, the case and process method, and interpretation. In the bricolage technique, a variety of skills, materials and approaches are needed. For example, it is the process of mixing diverse source materials, using disparate approaches, and combining bits and pieces into the whole shape of a story. In the case and process method, the researcher divides the empirical world into two groups: case study (with one or a few cases), or cross-case (the study of many cases). Interpretation means assigning significance or coherent meaning. This process is in contrast to quantitative research, in which meaning comes from numbers (e.g., percentages, or statistical coefficients). Interpretation in qualitative data means weaving the data (words, photographs, maps, or images) into discussions of the ideas' significance. The researcher gives meaning to the data, translates them, or makes them understandable. The qualitative data is interpreted in multiple phases: first order interpretation, second order interpretation, and third order interpretation. For the first order-interpretation, the researcher begins with the point of view of the people that he or she is studying, and then finds out how they see the world (Neuman 2015; Bryman 2016).

4.5.1 Measurement process of qualitative research

All studies (quantitative or qualitative) are measured according to a suitable measurement process. Measurement is a process of connecting data to ideas

or concepts. Quantitative research has a distinct step in the research process that occurs before data collection. In qualitative studies, the researcher measures data with alternatives to numbers, and measurement is a lesser, separate research step. As this study is qualitative in nature, measurement of qualitative studies is discussed in more detail. In almost all studies, measurement involves two processes: conceptualisation and operationalisation. The process of conceptualisation involves taking an abstract construct and refining it by giving it a conceptual definition. A conceptual definition is a statement of the idea in the researcher's head using specific words. In qualitative data, researchers refine rudimentary working ideas during the data collection and analysis process (Neuman 2015: 209). Conceptualisation involves making coherent, theoretical definitions so that researchers are able to make sense of the data and their preliminary ideas about it. Operationalisation links a conceptual definition to a set of measurement techniques. Operationalisation is the process of developing a description of how researchers apply working ideas while making their observations (Neuman 2015; Bryman 2016).

4.5.2 Reliability and validity

Qualitative researchers should be aware that, in their qualitative research, replication mostly does not occur. This is because data collection is an interactive process between the researcher and respondents, whose context dictates applying different measures and interactions that cannot be repeated (Neuman 2015). However, Yin (2014) asserts that whilst establishing the reliability of a study, replication may be possible in a single case study research. Therefore, there are various steps that the researcher needs to take to assure quality criterion when evaluating qualitative research. The main objective of the

researcher is to maintain validity and reliability in qualitative research. Neuman (2015) points out that it is not possible to maintain perfect validity and reliability. For example, one challenge to qualitative researchers is that a qualitative study is unstable over time. To maintain the quality of an evaluation, the researcher has to apply four main tests in the research process: validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability (Bryman 2016). Case studies are criticised due to the reason that researchers fail to use an operational set of measures; therefore, the research has to establish *construct validity* by using operational measures of the subjective concepts which are being studied consciously. *Internal validity* is to establish correspondence between the researcher's observations and theoretical concepts. *External validity* is to establish a domain in which findings are generalised according to social settings, and *reliability* is related; if later the same methods of data collection are repeated again in a case study, consequently the results should come out the same as in the previous case study (Yin 2014). However, Bryman (2016) states that this is a difficult measure to meet when establishing qualitative research. However it could be possible only in ethnographic studies, wherein the researcher adopts a similar social role as that used by the original researcher (Bryman 2016).

4.5.3 Validity

Validity is considered as truthfulness on the part of various aspects of the research process. It means presenting a fair, honest, nonbiased and balanced account of the life stories and viewpoints of the people who live it every day (Bryman 2016). The main objective of the researcher is to capture a very deep, inside view and provide a detailed account of how the people being studied understand events. As qualitative researchers, we have to adhere to the core principle of validity, to be truthful, and to try to establish a balanced fit between

understanding, ideas, and statements about the social world and what is

actually occurring (Neuman 2015: 218).

Table 4. 2 Research design and tactics to ensure validity and reliability

Tests	Case study tactics	Phases of research in which tactic occurs
Construct validity	- Use multiple sources of evidence - Establish chain of evidence - Have key informants review draft case study	Data collection Data collection Composition
Internal validity	- Do pattern matching - Do explanation building - Address rival explanations - Use logic moles	Data analysis Data analysis Data analysis Data analysis
External validity	- Use theory in single-case studies - Use replication logic in multiple-case studies	Research design Research design
Reliability	- Use case study protocol - Develop a case study database	Data collection Data collection

Source: Adopted from (Yin 2014: 45)

4.5. Employed methodology, methods, data collection and analysis

In this section, the adopted and selected research philosophies, research

methodology, and methods will be clarified. Here, it is worth mentioning the

various types of research paradigms, philosophical assumptions, theoretical

approaches, research methodology and methods which have been discussed in

the previous sections.

4.6 Methodological underpinnings of this study

In earlier sections, it was discussed how this study is purely qualitative in

nature. Therefore, the ontological position of this study is the social

constructionist approach. For example, if ontology asks the question, "*What is

there (about participation in Sindh) that can be known?"*, the truth and reality

can be varied according to each participant's life experience. Therefore, social constructionism is the most suitable ontological approach for this study. The opposite of social constructionism is objectivism, which is largely used in natural sciences and quantitative studies. However, this study is qualitative in nature; therefore, the ontological position of this study is constructionism. As a researcher conducting a qualitative study, one has to constitute meaning from the participants' varied experiences. No doubt the constructionist approach is expansive and amorphous (Gubrium and Holstein 2012); however, it suits qualitative methods in which the construction of meanings of everyday life is inevitable.

As the question of epistemology is, "*What is the relationship of the knower to the known?*" (Guba and Lincoln 1989), the best answers could be provided by interpretive epistemology. This is because the raised question of epistemology is answered in that the knower and the known are and should be interlocked in such a way that the findings of an investigation are a literal creation of the inquiry process (Guba and Lincoln 1989). An interpretive epistemology has been adopted for this study. This philosophical stance guides the research to understand empathetically the everyday life experiences of people in specific historical settings (Neuman 2015).

Most importantly, the basic guidance of this approach is that it helps researchers make the obscure plain (Neuman 2015: 105). As the interpretive approach is closely related to **hermeneutics** (a theory of meaning that makes the obscure plain) and **verstehen** (the theory of understanding the life experiences of people empathetically), it encourages and guides the researcher so that he or she can focus on two sides of the data, to gain a deep understanding with shared meanings. This is the primary goal of the research,

by which a very close, deep understanding of the text is conducted (Neuman 2015).

Table 4. 3 Employed philosophical position

	Ontology		**Epistemology**	**Position of researcher**
Objectivism	Reality is out there. The world is waiting to be discovered. There is no need for interpretations of humans. We must be positive.	Positivism	There is an empirical world out there. It exists apart from our thoughts and perceptions. We need only empirical evidence, not our ideas.	Constructionism approach.
Constructionism	Humans never experience reality directly. Our experience with the real world is occurring through our lenses. We should not be positive, because we are constructors	Interpretivism.	Simply observing empirical evidence will not lead to knowledge about reality. Our subjective views are very present when we name them as knowledge	Interpretive approach.

Source: Adopted from (Neuman 2015: 94)

4.6.1 Methods and assumptions

The methodological question is answered by a variety of choices, such as the type of research topic, research questions, and the choice of ontological and epistemological positions. For example, if a methodological question is answered by the supporter of the constructionist paradigm by claiming that research must be conducted in such a way that will expose the constructions of

the variety of concerned parties, then, of course, such a paradigm is in alignment with qualitative data. This is because the constructions are not made based on a survey and experimental research (which is particularly quantitative in nature). For a study in which semi-structured interviews are used, the researchers need methodological choices and a paradigm, of which one needs a deep understanding and which is able to make sense of the voices of the interviewees. All of these claims are relevant to the social constructionism and interpretivist paradigms, which are suitable for qualitative methods.

4.6.2 Data generation and collection

Data collection is the key point of the indication of the nature of the research project (Bryman 2016). In broad terms, at first, data collection can be divided into quantitative research and qualitative research. After the division into quantitative and qualitative research, there are further methods of data collection. For example, in a survey, the structured questionnaires are distributed for quantitative research and mixed methods study. Another method of data collection is through experiments, in which the investigator seeks to test the impact of treatment (or an intervention in an outcome), controlling all other factors that might influence that outcome (Creswell 2014). Experimental data collection is also used in quantitative research (Yin 2014: 110).

This research project was valuable in that it was not withdrawn due to data collection methods. Therefore, given the importance of the research project, the interview methods were replaced with open-ended questions. Even through the questionnaire methods, the researcher is conscious of exactly what is needed to be found out through the questionnaire. If a researcher has safety issues, and the research topic is very important for the region, then a questionnaire is an appropriate method of collecting information rather than cancelling the

research project due to it not involving interviews or observations. The crucial issues are not which form of question is better, the important thing is the purpose, scope and practical limits of a study. It is more important to see the scope, purpose and time limits of a research project, rather than focusing on the forms of data gathering (Neuman 2015). An open-ended questionnaire permits an unlimited number of possible answers by the respondents; the respondents can answer in detail and can qualify and clarify their responses. However, there are careful steps that a researcher has to take before administering an open-ended questionnaire. For example, jargon, slang and abbreviations should be avoided in a survey questionnaire. Vagueness, emotional language, double-barrelled questions, false premises, and issues beyond the respondent's capabilities should not be used in a survey questionnaire (Neuman 2015).

4.6.3 Sampling explained

Who can participate? Bryman (2016) suggests that anyone for whom the topic is relevant can logically be an appropriate participant. This is because at certain times topics do not require participants of a particular kind, so there is little if any restriction on who might be a participant.

The purpose of sampling is to make a generalisation about a population based on a scientifically selected subset of that population. A sample is therefore thought to become a microcosm of a larger universe (Rea and Parker 2014). The most important factors that play a role in deciding the number of subjects is the cost of the survey and the time available. As Bell (2014) informs, for a research inquiry the number of subjects will necessarily depend on the amount of time the researchers have. However, the researcher should do his best to select an appropriate number of subjects so that the generalisation can be as representative as possible. Oppenheim (1992) states that researchers realise

that it could be possible that accurate parameters of the population may be lacking; however, investigators have to do their best to obtain as accurate a sampling as possible.

The mechanism of snowball sampling is where a few appropriate individuals are known or located by the researcher and he or she looks for the same appropriate individuals who could be relevant to the study background (Oppenheim 1992). Purposive sampling can be used when the researcher intends to identify particular or unique cases that are especially informative and relevant to the study (Neuman 2015). This researcher intends to benefit from purposive sampling and snowball sampling. Therefore, the researcher intends to start with purposive sampling, and the process will be continued through snowballing sampling. This is because, as (Oppenheim 1992) points out, when a few cases are identified, and then the names and addresses of other informants have been requested, and if this approach is repeated a number of times, it might increase the substantial number of relevant questionnaires.

Table 4. 4 Estimated number of respondents before data collection

Open-ended questionnaire to be administered	District - Larkana	District - Kambar Shahdadkot	Province: Sindh, Pakistan
Number of open-ended questions	150	150	Total = 300
Stratifying criteria (if any)	None, but all participants needed to have experience as members of CCBs, local government councillors, local government officials, bureaucrats related to local government, school teachers, members of school management committees, or civil activists.	School teachers = members of school management committees	Civil society activists, NGO members. And Local government councillors

Source: Self

4.6.4 Employed methods of data collection and analysis

The first choice of gathering information for this study was based on group and individual interviews. However, due to safety issues, an open-ended questionnaire was adopted for collecting empirical qualitative data.

4.6.5 Piloting

Blaxter et al. (2006) define how piloting is a process of trying out the research methods to see how well they work in practice, and, if necessary, modifying plans of study accordingly. Furthermore, piloting research is pivotal for many purposes. For example, a pilot study helps researchers to refine their questionnaires with respect to both the content of the data and the procedures to be followed (Yin 2014). Therefore, the researcher firstly conducted pilot case protocols with the field assistants, and the study was refined and developed clearly. The field assistants indicated that the open-ended questions could take

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a minimum of half an hour (30 minutes) to complete, and the maximum it could

take to complete was more than one hour.

This is because, as (Yin 2014) points out, piloting is not just a pre-test in a case

study; it assists a researcher to modify the relevant lines of the questions.

Therefore, the utilisation of piloting helped the researcher know how long it

could take the respondents to complete the open-ended questions. It was also

checked whether the instructions were clear or not, and whether the questions

were clearly understood by the individuals.

4.6.6 Research methods

In social sciences, qualitative research has undergone various methodological

approaches that are used to collect data (Flick 2014). As explained in the

previous sections, the method used for this study was using open-ended

questions to collect qualitative data. Yin (2011) defines data as follows:

> Data refers to a collection of organised information, usually the results
> of experiences, observation, experiment…This may consist of
> numbers, words, or images, particularly as measurements or
> observations of a set of variables. (Yin 2011: 130)

The qualitative data were gathered for this study by using open-ended

questions. If qualitative data is collected through open-ended questions and

respondents write detailed answers to these open-ended questions, this type of

data is called verbal data (Flick 2018). The researcher devised the question

protocols in an open-ended format to encourage the participants to write as

much as possible. As far as the comparison between recorded interviews and

written interviews is concerned, the researcher is now of the opinion that open-

ended questions, to be answered in writing by the respondents, could be more

informative and full of deep hidden stories than simply recording the voices of

the respondents, wherein freedom of speech is not fully developed.

Furthermore, writing the answers to the open-ended questions could be the

outcome of a brainstorm, which has proven to be a very effective way of gathering experiences or collective life stories. Additionally, giving an interview using a voice recorder could be a form of barrier for the interviewee, because the respondent could be in fear of a military, dominant society. Though ethical arrangements could be put in place, the respondent could still be in fear when they are being recorded. However, giving the answers to these open-ended questions in black and white could be safer and more secure for the respondent, because there would be no fear of voice recognition.

After the approval of the open-ended questions approach, the researcher hired eight field assistants. Those field assistants were hired because they had experience of local government election campaigns and an interest in the local government system. All of these field assistants were university graduates with varied experience in the research subjects. The field assistants were involved in several discussions about the principles of the research ethics. All of the ethical requirements were explained and briefed by the researcher.

This is because all of these data have to be documented by recording and transcribing - turning them into texts that can be analysed (Flick 2018: 61).

4.6.7 Sampling

It has been mentioned that the issue of non-probability sampling techniques remains ambiguous, and there are no rules. The logic of non-probability sampling depends on what the researchers need to find out. Purposive sampling was adopted for data collection in this study. This is because the focus of this research project was on finding good informants. There is no decision or strategy which is right per se (Flick 2018). However, the most important thing is to find the relevant informants who could give true accounts of the under-investigated phenomenon being researched (Neuman 2015).

The researcher selected the respondents from the members of local councils, who had experience during general Musharraf's local government system (2001-2009) and the current system (2013-present). The researcher tried to select to up to 50% female respondents, however in the end only 10% of the respondents were female.

Table 4. 5 Characteristics of respondents

Type of respondent	District – Kambar Shahdadkot	District – Larkana
Councillors (male)	28%	22%
Non-councillors (male)	62%	78%
All respondents (female)	12%	2%

Source: data collection

4.6.8 Data collection

Data was collected through the open-ended questions which were answered by the respondents. As previously explained, the researcher became a refugee during the middle of the research project, thus he changed the methods of interview from recording the answers to the respondents writing their answers to the open-ended questions. This process was completed by eight field assistants in two districts: Kambar Shahdadkot and Larkana. After completing the research protocols and obtaining approval for the research questions from the Ethics Committee and from the principal supervisor, these questions were translated from the English language into Sindhi, which is the mother tongue of the province of Sindh. After completing the translation from English to Sindhi, the researcher dispatched these open-ended questions, the respondents' information, and the respondents' consent for completing the seven open-ended questions. All of these instruments - the research questions, a brief introduction to the research study, and the consent forms signed by the respondents - were

sent through the WhatsApp application. The researcher appointed one focal person, who was once again the main connection, and the team was completed by the rest of the field assistants. The focal person was Khan Mohmmad Chandio. His first job was to make photocopies of each set of open-ended questions and deliver them to each field assistant in Kambar Shahdadkot and Larkana. The three main Tehsils (Subdistricts) of Kambar Shahdadkot were selected for distribution of the open-ended questions: these subdistricts were Kambar Ali Khan, Nasirabab, and Warah. As far as Larkana was concerned, the City District was selected for submitting the open-ended questions to the respondents. This process of data collection started in October 2019 and continued until the saturation point of the data was reached. The saturation point is a point in a set of data where the same themes and issues start emerging again and again (Saunders et al. 2019).

The introductory letter was distributed by the field assistants. In the request letter, the researcher provided his email address and mobile contact number (advice was given that if any respondent wanted to make contact, the researcher would call him or her). Through this letter, these respondents were reminded politely that they were fully independent whether they wanted to cooperate with the researcher or not. There was no pressure, coercion, or compulsion to participate in this study. 150 open-ended questions were given to the selected respondents during the data collection period which ran from October 2019 until the data had reached saturation point. In addressing the issue of what would be suitable as a sample size, many research textbooks have recommended that data should be continued until data saturation is reached.

Table 4. 6 Minimum non-probability sample size

Nature of study	Minimum sample size
Semi-structured/in-depth interviews	5-25
Ethnographic	35-36
Grounded theory	20-35
Considering a homogeneous population	4-12
Considering a heterogenous population	12-30

Source: adopted from (Saunders et al. 2019)

Open-ended questions were handed over by the field assistants who had been

hired by the researcher. The total number of completed open-ended

questionnaires received back was 70.

Table 4. 7 Profile of respondents

Characteristics	Year	District - Kambar Shahdadkot	District – Larkana
Local government (councillor)	2001-2009 2013-present	11	07
High school teacher		08	11
Member of a trade union		07	02
Social worker		08	05
NGO worker		02	03
Female teacher		01	01

Source: data collection

In many studies, at times field assistants are implicated as being the gatekeepers, or the source of communication between the researcher and the local community. Moreover, the assistants, as locals, can try to capitalise on the research process to encourage the debate and transformation within their own communities (Turner 2010; Caretta 2015). At times, the researcher's presence can cause unease amongst locals or officials. Therefore, if field assistants are used in research projects, they might not be objects of fear or unease but the mode of moderation between the researcher and the community.

The difference between this data (verbal data recorded by writing the answers to the open-ended questions) and data based on talking is that in the latter type of data there are two stages: data is recorded by a voice recorder, and then it is transcribed for further analysis. However, as far as verbal data beyond talking is concerned, the voices (audio) of the respondents are ready to be analysed. However, if it is in the local language, then it would need to be translated into English and then analysed. The data in this study were written in the local language (Sindhi), and then translated by the researcher for thematic analysis.

4.6.9 Participants

For this study, local government Union Councillors and members of civil society were purposively selected. Those civil society activists included high school teachers, advocates, and trade union members. These categories include those who are civil activists in these districts. The purpose of selecting such a non-probabilistic participant was because he or she encapsulates a critical knowledge base of the public participation dynamics in local government policy initiatives.

The purpose of the selection of local councillors was because the Union Council, as a unit of the Sindh local government administration, was a tier

whose main responsibility was to promote public participation through the CCBs. As the Sindh Local Government Act 2001 States, the functions of local councils are as follows:

> Mobilise the community involvement in the maintenance of public ways, public streets, culverts, bridges and public buildings, de-silting of canals and other development pursuits,…facilitate the formation and functioning of Citizen Community Boards. (Sindh Government 2001: 87)

Thus, the Union Councillors of both periods - local government 2001 and local government 2013 - were selected to answer the open-ended questions. The Union Councils were considered an important tier of the local government system, because the Union Councillors have been directly elected by the local community, and the Union Councils are required to implement local development programmes.

Members of civil society were selected purposively in such a manner that they could encapsulate as much critical information as possible about the studied phenomenon. The purpose of such sampling was to select such unique cases that would be especially informative (Neuman 2015). To identify this type of informative respondent, the researcher used local knowledge by contacting various known friends about people who have keen interests in local issues and the behaviours of the local government administration. This is because it was impossible to list all the councillors, chairmen of local government, officers of Sindh bureaucracy, and every single union council member of these two districts.

The researcher first used his personal contacts, and then sought referrals from informed people about the relevant respondents. To identify the relevant respondents, the researcher benefited from his previous experience of being on the teaching staff (as a lecturer in a Sindh university) and having many friends

in the research field, and secondly from having taught for the local government in Pakistan. As the researcher became a refugee in July 2019, he was unable to travel to Pakistan due to threats from religious hardliners. To cope with this issue of not travelling into the field, the researcher, on consultation with his principal supervisor, devised a very effective data collection strategy that would be just as effective and sufficient as if the researcher had travelled himself.

The researcher devised the question protocols in an open-ended format to encourage the participants to write as much as possible. As far as the comparison of recorded interviews and written interviews is concerned, the researcher is now of the opinion that open-ended questions, to be answered in writing by the respondents, could be more informative and fuller of deep, hidden stories, rather than recording the voices of respondents, where freedom of speech is not fully developed. Furthermore, writing the answers to the open-ended questions could be the outcome of a brainstorm, which has proven to be a very effective way of gathering experiences or collected life stories. As far as giving interviews before a voice recorder, this could be barrier for the interviewee, because the respondent could be in fear of a military dominant society. Although ethical arrangements could be in place, the respondent could still be in fear when they are being recorded. However, giving the answers to these open-ended questions in black and white could be safer and more secure for the respondent, because there will be no fear of voice recognition.

After gaining approval for this open-ended question approach, the researcher hired eight field assistants. The field assistants who were hired had experience of local government election campaigns and an interest in the local government system. All of these field assistants were university graduates with various experience in the research subjects.

The researcher established one main focal person for all of the field assistants. His name is Khan Mohmmad. He was with the master's qualification in Economics. He agreed to distribute questions to the other field assistants. In addition, the researcher was in contact with all of the hired field assistants, but the main contact for the open-ended questions was Khan Mohmmad.

4.6.10 Instruments used

As previously explained, the researcher became a refugee during the middle of the research project, and so he changed the method of data collection from interview recording to asking the respondents to answer open-ended questions. This process was completed by the eight field assistants in the two districts: Kambar Shahdadkot and Larkana. To obtain the data, the field assistants were firstly contacted by mobile phone through the Lyca Network, which had offered discounted rates for Pakistani telephone networks. The second contact was made through the WhatsApp application, which was used to capture pictures of the required information. In total, the following instruments were used by the field assistants for contact, to make photocopies, and to keep the recorded data safe:

1. Mobile phone Lyca package
2. WhatsApp mobile application
3. Facebook Messenger
4. Photocopies of the questions (150)
5. Four different files
5. A metallic box
6. Stationery

4.6.11 Data analysis

Bernard and Ryan (2010) state that analysis is the search for patterns and for ideas that explain why those patterns occur and why they are there in the first place. Analysis starts before the researcher collects data, and it continues

throughout the research journey. Flick (2014) says that the starting steps in data analysis are: (1) data reduction; (2) data reorganisation; and (3) data representation. The analytic technique for this study was thematic analysis. In thematic analysis, data is examined to extract core themes and issues that can be distinguished both between and within transcripts (Bryman 2016).

4.6.12 Conceptualisation

As qualitative research is part and parcel of the general ideas, themes or concepts of a piece of research (Neuman 2015), before the practice of thematic coding starts, concept formation is an integral part of data analysis; it begins during data collection. Thus, conceptualisation is a way to organise and make sense of data. This is because concept and evidence are mutually interdependent, particularly if there is a case study (Neuman 2015).

One of the main techniques of the identification of themes is coding (Bryman 2016). As Miles and Huberman (1994) explain:

> Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study. Codes usually are attached to 'chunks' of varying size – words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs, connected or unconnected to a specific setting. (Miles and Huberman 1994: 56).

Therefore, thematic coding was used to analyse the data. Dealing with the data started soon after the respondents had completed the open-ended questions. Arrangements were made with the main focal person (the Central Point Field Assistant) that after receiving the completed questions from a participant, they should be classified and coded before their return. For example, if the respondent was a councillor from Urban City in Larkana, that completed data was coded as UCM (Urban Councillor Male). If the respondent was a female non-councillor and was from a rural region, that data was coded RNCF (Rural Non-Councillor Female). As advised soon after the data collection, the data

should be summarised and classified, and clusters should be identified. This process could lead to the emergence of themes (Miles et al. 2014). The focal person of the other field assistants was briefed to code the data in the following style.

For a guide to the framework of classifying the data, see Table 4.8.

Table 4. 8 Methods of data classification

Rural (R) Urban (U)	R	No. of interviews	
	U		
Rural Male (RM)	RM		
Rural Female (Baig et al.)	RF		
Urban Male (UM)	UM		
Urban Female (UF)	UF		
Local councillors			
Non-local Councillors (NLC)			

Source: Self

This above classification is used in **Chapters Five** and **Six**, while providing direct quotes from the respondents. The verbatim quotes are cited by codes of classification plus the sequence number of the participant. For example, RCM 11 is used for the rural council male with the sequence number 11; UNCF 25 is used for the urban non-councillor female participant with the sequence number 25, and so on.

Along with classifying the data according to region, status and gender, the completed set of all of the open-ended questions was numbered. For example, the completed set of questions which arrived first was numbered as 1, and the next was labelled as 2, and so on. This classification enabled the researcher to locate any respondent according to their classification.

The main contact field assistant was advised that whenever he received any completed set of the seven open-ended questions, that data was numbered according to the number of the question, and was also classified according to region, status (profession), and gender. This information was scanned with strict confidentiality and was emailed to the researcher. There were three methods by which the researcher received the completed questions: the first was scanning it and sending through the researcher's email; the second was taking pictures through the WhatsApp camera and sending it to the researcher's account; and, finally, hard copies were sent by post.

Thus, when the researcher received any completed questions, he translated them into English one by one. The researcher created many classified folders on his personal laptop and other hard drives. For example, if the questions were not translated, they were filed as Non-Translated Rural Non-Councillor Females, and so on. Once all of the data had been translated, all of the answers to Question 1 were transferred to one document. When all the questions had been translated and transferred together, the researcher started to read the answers carefully again and again. The researcher was observing during the translation from Sindhi (the local language of the respondents) to English. The labelling started once all of the questions had been transferred to one document. Themes and issues were coded and labelled according to the research aims and objectives (Saunders 2019). As Saunders states:

Your identification of themes/issues or categories could be guided by the purpose of your research as expressed through your research questions and objectives. (Saunders et al. 2019: 557)

Thus, themes and issues were identified and coded according to the research questions and objectives. These themes were related to knowledge of both local government systems and the services of local government, local government and the occurrence of public participation, factors influencing participation, and efforts for participation. Furthermore, there was general discussion of how to make participation happen during the systems of local government.

The thematic analysis was done by hand, rather than using computer software for qualitative data. The reason for using manual coding was that the researcher was at ease using manual coding in the margins of the statements. The researcher adopted three steps and stages for the coding (Neuman 2015). The first step is called open coding (Neuman 2015), in which the researcher conceptualised the statements, assigned initial labels, and created various emergent issues from each research question. To identify or address the issues that occurred a few times, for example, consistent sequences of events or something significant happening again and again, notice must be taken so that a judgement of quality is made possible (Miles 1994). During the first stage, there were on average 15 to 16 emergent issues. For examples, see Table 4.2.

This table was generated according to related themes in the association between local government and public participation.

Table 4. 9 Method of frequency recoding of recurring issues

S.N.	Emerging issues related to Q2	Frequency	No of Interviews
1	Participation was in theory	I	1
2	Dominant class favoured each other	̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ I	1,4,9,11,13,16,17,66,54,56,59
3	Public kept away from participation	̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ III	1,2,3,4,5,7,8,11,12,13,14, 15,19,29,30,31,20,21,22,17, 32,33,40,41,43,44,46,27,65,66, 48,49,50,51,54,55,56,57,59,67,68,69,70
4	Z-have invited public (because they will go to public for votes)	II	1,2,
5	Dominant class always in power and in benefits	̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ I	9,19,11,13,15,28,30,17,32,33, 35,39,45,63,64,52
6	M-delivered services	̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ II	3,5,6,7,12,24,29,22,34,36,37, 40,42,43,60,64,54,
7	M-invited participation	̶H̶H̶	4,16,34,60,61
8	Corruption and darkest period (Z)	̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ III	7,8,5,10,11,12,13,24,28,30, 18,32,34,36,37,39,41,42,43, 27,62,66,48,67,68,69,70
9	Citizens are kept in darkness (no education, no awareness of their rights, no political education)	̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ ̶H̶H̶ I	7,8,9,11,15,28,35,41,45,47,27,50, 53,55,58,59
11	Feudal class frightened by public awareness	̶H̶H̶ IIII	9,10,20,18,44,47,57
12	Rural at a disadvantage	II	23,38
13	Musharraf gave more powers	III	38,46,61

| 14 | 18th amendment a good thing | II | 42,43 |

Source: Data Analysis

4.6.13 Frequency or counting the number of emergent issues

Some researchers have interpreted that qualitative data should always be forced in a quantitative mould (Miles 1994). However, it should be noted that in qualitative studies, numbers tend to be ignored eventually. It is the nature of qualitative data that a lot of counting goes on in the background, when the researcher makes a judgement about the qualities of the data. For example, Miles (1994) stated:

> So, it is important in qualitative research to know (a) that we are sometimes counting and (b) when it is a good idea to work self-consciously with frequencies. (Miles and Huberman 1994: 253)

There is a good reason for using numbers (frequency), in that researchers can keep themselves analytically honest and protect themselves against bias (Miles 1994). For example, the following table helps the researcher to protect himself against bias (this occurred when the respondents mentioned that General Musharraf's local governments contributed to the development of a physical infrastructure) (see Table 4.2).

Table 4. 10 Emergent issues after frequency recording of the recurrence of mentioned items

S.No.	Issues which emerged related to Question 1	Frequency	No. of interviews
1	Musharraf's Devolution Plan in 2001 transferred more powers and did more development	⊞⊞ ⊞⊞ ⊞⊞ ⊞⊞ ⊞⊞ ⊞⊞ IIII	13,7,4,6,12,16,2,3,5,17,19, 9,17,29,30,21,22,18,33,34,35, 37,39,40,42,48,49,53,54,55,56,58, 59,26
2	Both periods captured by feudal or particular class (Pirs, Mirs, Wadera and Bhotars)	⊞⊞ ⊞⊞ ⊞⊞ ⊞⊞ ⊞⊞	13,15,7,2,3,5,8,2, 24,29,31,10,28,36,40,41,52,46,27, 63,64,66,67
3	Feudal class fears public awareness (so the devil needs darkness); the rich class does not want the public to have awareness and activism)	⊞⊞ ⊞⊞ IIII	13,15,7,2,3,5,8,2,49.51,52,68
4	Public kept away from policy	⊞⊞ III	15,1,2,10,67,68,69,70
5	Corruption	⊞⊞ ⊞⊞ I	15,8,5,10,28,34,49,53,44,47,27
6	Z-worst and most corrupt	⊞⊞ ⊞⊞ ⊞⊞ I	6,3,30,10,11,32,33,34.35,37,38, 41,50,44,45,62
7	Yes-men for feudal lords	I	8
8	Institutions controlled by top leadership (party dictatorship)	⊞⊞ IIII	4,6,5,1,52,55,56,58,64
9	Favouritism (enriching their liked ones)	⊞⊞ ⊞⊞ ⊞⊞ IIII	13,15,7,2,3,5,8,9,34,54,56,46,27, 66,67,68,69
10	No funds from federal government	I	16
11	M-Poor's participation happened		29
12	M-lengthen military coup	⊞⊞	30,10,11,28,44
13	Currently have success	I	48
14	No worth of law; law is sick	I	47

Source: data analysis

Thus, the frequency of the responses was recorded so that the researcher

could identify what of significance was happening several times (Miles 1994). In

the second stage, these emergent issues were categorised into grand themes.

As a result, four to six major themes arose from each question. When open-ended Question 1 was answered by the respondents, the following major issues emerged:

- The military dictator General Musharraf's local government contributed more to physical infrastructure development.

  - Local government institutions are full of corrupt practices.

  - Local governments have been captured by the political elite.

- Reign of favouritism - enriching your liked and loved ones and your nearest and dearest.

  The second question yielded the following major issues:

  - The public is the least priority during policy implementation.

  - There is no concept of participation.

  - Citizens are deliberately kept away from political information.

- Local governments are sources of corruption, so participation will not be acceptable to the ruling elite.

  - The dominant class is protecting its own class and interests.

  The third open-ended question generated the following themes:

- Class control: feudal lords, landlords, religious politicians (Pirs)

- Those who have been in power are afraid of public supremacy.

- Corruption and favouritism.

  Another open-ended question yielded the following major issues:

- The common public wake up and create forums, committees, or corner meetings to mobilise every single member of the general public.

- Supremacy of law.

- Crackdown on corruption.

- Freedom of expression and freedom of media

The researcher labelled the second clustered themes in the reduced table of themes. During this second stage, frequency of response was realised and recognised. This is called axial coding during the second pass (Neuman 2015). At the third stage, the researcher created a table to present the order of themes. In this third table, themes were put in order according to the number of responses. Finally, there was the main composite table in which all of the emergent themes and the issues of all of the questions were created.

Table 4. 11 Composite thematic table

No.	Theme(s)	No.	Emergent issues	No.	Frequency (Order of priority)
1	Knowledge of services	1	Musharraf government provided the budget for delivery of services but no opportunity for participation	1	36 (1st)
		2	Both governments were corrupt	2	34 (2nd)
		3	Feudal class (or dominant class) is always in power	3	28 (3rd)
		4	Feudal class does not educate people to ensure their ignorance of their rights	4	17 (4th)
		5	Culture of favouritism and nepotism		17 (4th)
		6	Many institutions and political parties as personal property of an individual		16 (5th)
					Frequency (Order of priority)
2	Practically association between local councils and the public participation		Public regarded as a burden, and therefore kept away from participation		44 (1st)
			Public kept in the dark about their rights		27 (2nd)
			There is corruption in local governments		26 (3rd)
			Feudal lords, Pirs and Syeds are always in power		20 (4th)

		The dominant class always protects its interests		19 (5th)
				Frequency (Order of priority)
3	Major affecting factors in participation	Feudal lords exist in both government eras		42 (1st)
		Politicians do not wish the public to be alert and active about their rights		32 (2nd)
		No participation due to favouritism and main class in power		29 (3rd)
		Local governments are not pro poor of Sindh		17 (4th)
		Once the votes are cast there is no interest in the public anymore		03 (5th)
4	Name of services in which participation was allowed or not	Public kept away from participation to avoid learning about their rights		44 (1st)
		Local government is a source of corruption		38 (2nd)
		Any form of public awareness rising is curbed		34 (3rd)
		State laws are styled in such a way that only the rich and influential can partake in politics.		18 (4th)

		The public is regarded as a commodity		15 (5th)
		Culture of favouritism		8 (6th)
				Frequency (Order of priority)
5	How participation be made successful and sustainable	The common people must wake up and mobilise themselves		42 (1st)
		Supremacy of law and constitutional status of participation		30 (2nd)
		There should be a crackdown on corruption		11 (3rd)
		There should be freedom of expression via the media		04 (4th)

Source: data collection

4.7 Significance of the study

There have been a few studies carried out on the performance and delivery of services by local government reforms in Pakistan. These studies have not addressed the themes of community participation and citizens' involvement in decision-making in Sindh, the second largest province of Pakistan. Muhammad (2004) published a study called "Local Government Finance: Some Political Aspects: A Case Study of Punjab". He conducted a study on the financial and administrative autonomy of local government in the province of Punjab. Kurosaki (2006) published "Community and Economic Development in Pakistan: The Case of Citizen Community Boards in Hafizabad". Khan and Anjum (2013) wrote "Role of Citizen Community Boards in Promoting Participatory Development in Muzaffargarh District (Punjab), Pakistan". Khan (2006a) published "Local Government and Participatory Rural Development: The Case Study of District Government in North-Western Pakistan". Finally, Faroroqi (2013) carried out a study on the performance and delivery service in two districts of the province of the Punjab.

As for secondary data, the researcher is aware that documentary analysis is a cause for concern. (Walliman 2016) points out that it is not as simple and easy as it looks. Therefore, there are a few main methods through which documents can be analysed; for example, interrogative insertion, problem-solution discourse, membership categorisation, rhetorical analysis semiotics, and discourse analysis. The researcher has used two secondary sources in this study: a Pakistani English newspaper, and government documents related to local government ordinances.

Rid and Murtaza (2018) have analysed the Local Government Act of 2013 in Sindh.

This study has importance because:

- This is the first time the dynamics of public participation in local government in Sindh have been studied.

- The local governments in Pakistan have become a loved and loathed political feature for the non-democratic rulers and the publicly elected politicians respectively; therefore, this study matters in such a regard that it will also compare two local two approaches to public participation: one introduced by the military ruler (General Pervez Musharraf), and the other by the publicly elected government of Asif Ali Zardar.

- The study will reveal how local governments are linked to public participation in Sindh and Pakistan. What is the association of local governments and civic engagement?

- The study will contribute to the extant literature on public participation in rural areas.

4.8 Limitations of the study

The researcher was not present to observe the participants. However, the end result of the research project is the text to be dealt with. So, written text was present in this study. Many qualitative studies deal with text. Text means written words (Neuman 2015). In this study, interpretive science is used to discover the hidden and deep meanings of the words or the text (i.e., the written answers to the open-ended questions). The researcher has tried his best to benefit, along with other interpretive social sciences, from the theory of *hermeneutics*, which encourages the researcher to make the obscure plain, with an emphasis on conducting a very close, detailed reading of the text to capture a deep and profound understanding (Neuman 2015).

The adopted theoretical perspective of the Ladder of Participation (Arnstein 1969) has been selected as a guide for this study. It is believed that this approach to understanding the dynamics of public participation provides a comprehensive approach for the researcher to start off the study.

4.9 Study bias

Before data collection, this study had targeted that there would be 50% female respondents. However, due to the low female literacy rate of less than 24% in the current administration, only 10% of the participants are female.

4.10 Reliability and verification of the data

Validity is considered as truthfulness on the part of various aspects of the research process. It means presenting a fair, honest, nonbiased and balanced account of the life stories and viewpoints of the people who live it every day (Bryman 2016). It is important to keep in mind, or even question, whether what one discovers through the research is an outcome of genuine research and has not been due to the researcher being misled.

To give an answer to the above question, the researcher acknowledges that, apart from the subjective interpretation of the researcher, the in-depth interviews which were answered in written text are accurate and were translated with transparency. As the intended audience of this study is Sindh government policy makers and even those funding bodies who believe in the theory of decentralisation, all ethical and validity considerations were observed by the researcher.

4.11 Conclusion

In this chapter, the philosophical lenses of ontology and epistemology have been discussed. It has also been reported which social ontology and epistemology have been adopted for interpreting the empirical data.

Furthermore, research paradigms have also been discussed in this chapter. In this chapter, the researcher has established the range of methodologies suitable for various research projects. Additionally, the researcher has also explained the rationale for adopting this research approach. Firstly, the various aspects of different research paradigms, study strategies and research methods were detailed. Secondly, the researcher established what approaches have been adopted for this study. Furthermore, how the data were collected and classified was presented; the data were analysed thematically. To record the order of importance of recurring major issues, a system of frequency was adopted to keep a record of important emerging issues. See Tables 4.13 and 4.14 in this chapter. In the next chapter, **Chapter Five**, the results of this study are presented.

Chapter five

Results

5.0 Introduction

As stated in **Chapter One**, the aim of this study is to explore the association between local government and local public participation in the delivery of services. In this chapter, the results of the fieldwork are presented. As explained in the previous chapter, the data were analysed thematically. The themes are presented in descending order of importance. In other words, to identify the order of importance, the frequency of responses is used. As illustrated, each major theme was addressed in one or two open-ended questions to cover or identify as many relevant issues as possible. This chapter is. Five main themes were generated to address the objectives of the study. In each section, the results of the data for each identified main theme are presented. Themes such as local community participation, public participation, public involvement, and civic engagement have been documented interchangeably when mentioning the same concept of community participation. The researcher will present relevant verbatim quotes from the respondents. The recurring issues that emerged from the data have been reported in this chapter. These recurring issues are to be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

The main themes pertaining to the data will be described in detail. These main themes are:

- Characteristics of the respondents
- General knowledge of local government and its services
- The association between local government and the public participation in the local policy making and implementation at a local level in Sindh Pakistan
- Identification of any local government service where local community involvement could have happened
- The dynamics of public participation
- How to make public participation possible in local government policy implementation at a local level

Three to five issues emerged from each theme. These issues will be discussed in order of priority with regards to the participants' responses.

5.1 Characteristics of respondents

5.1 Introduction

In this section, the characteristics of the respondents are explained. There will be two tables in this section, in which the characteristics of the participants are presented. In the first table (5.1), the main categories, sub-categories and the major findings of the total population are presented. At the end of the section, there is a summary of the main findings.

Table 5. 1Theme One: Characteristics of the respondents

Main Categories	Sub-Categories	Major Findings
Demographic characteristics	1.1 Gender	• 63 of the participants (90%) are male • 7 of the respondents (10%) are female
	1.2 Age	• 20-40 years and 41-56 years are the dominant age groups • The majority of the respondents are under 50 years of age
	1.3 Job role/profession	• Male Union Councillors account for 8% of the number of participants • Union Councillors were elected directly by the local community during both periods (2001-2009, and 2013-present) of local government, but they were not given powers to implement local government policies • Social workers (21%) • Teachers, ranging from primary education to higher secondary schools (22%) • Trade union members (6%) • Current students of universities (9%) • Revenue and court staff (6%) • Former members of Citizen Community Boards, apart from councillors (5%)
	1.4 Education	• The education level of the majority of the participants is graduate or Master's education from university (51%) • 21% have a college level of education • 16% have a secondary level of education • Primary education accounts for 13%
	1.5 Regions	• Rural regions (Kambar Shahdadkot) account for 54% of the participants • Larkana Urban City accounts for 46%

Source: data analysis

Most of the participants are male, at 63 (90%), and 10% of the population of this study was comprised of female respondents. Further, 95% of the participants were between 20 and 60 years old. Most of the participants were 50 years old. 11% of participants were local councillors (who either worked for the local government in the periods 2001-2009 or 2013-present). 35 (31%) of the participants were related to the teaching profession. Out of the total population of the study, 9% of the respondents were former members of Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) - CCBs were a feature of local government during the period 2001-2009 in which, theoretically, direct participation was introduced during the Devolution Power Plan of 2001. Out of the total population of this study, 21% was comprised of social workers and members of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Participants from trade unions accounted for 8%. 9% of the population of this study was comprised of university students. 3% of respondents were lawyers, and 3% were revenue staff. The level of education of the participants was 51% university, 21% college qualifications, 16% secondary, and 13% primary.

In terms of the jobs or professions of the respondents, 26% were Union Councillors and former members of CCBs. 74% percent of respondents were non-councillors; 19% were social workers, and 17% of participants were from the teaching profession, whilst trade union members accounted for 14%. Out of the total population of the study, 56% were from rural regions, and 44% were from Larkana Urban City. See the expanded Table 5.2 for each category of region and each district.

Table 5. 2 Detailed identification of categories

District Kambar Shahdadkot		District - Larkana City	Both Districts
Age	**No. of participants**	**No. of participants**	**Total number in both districts**
18-28	12	13	25 (36%)
29-38	11	10	21 (30%)
39-50	12	8	20 (29%)
51-59	3	1	4 (6%)
60+	1	60+0	1 (2%)
Education			
Primary	6	3	9 (13%)
Secondary	8	3	11 (16%)
Higher (college)	11	4	15 (21%)
University	14	22	36 (51%)
Profession			
Teaching	7	15	22 (31%)
Councillor of local government	5	3	8 (11%)
CCB member	5	1	6 (9%)
Social worker/NGO	11	4	15 (21%)
Trade union member	3	0	3 (4%)
Shopkeeper	2	1	3 (4%)
Student	3	3	6 (9%)
Health	2	0	2 (3%)
Advocate	1	1	2 (3%)
Labourer	1	2	3 (4%)
Revenue	0	2	2 (3%)
Total:	**Total: 38 (54%)**	**Total: 32 (46%)**	**Total: 70 (100%)**

Source: data analysis.

5.1.1 District - Kambar Shahdadkot (rural region)

38 (54%) of the respondents were from the rural district of Kambar Shahdadkot.

Amongst that total, five of the participants were local councillors during General

Musharraf's local government system and the current system. There were

seven teachers from different schools from both primary and secondary

classes. Five of the respondents were former members of CCBs (the direct

platform for community involvement in the service delivery of local government).

11 of the respondents were social workers and members of NGOs, and there

were three students, three shopkeepers (who were also members of the shopkeeper's union), two health workers, and one advocate. 14 of the participants had a university education, 11 had a college education, eight reported that their level of education was from secondary school, and finally six reported that their level of education was primary.

5.1.2 District - Larkana (Urban City).

32 (46%) of the respondents were from Larkana Urban City. Out of these 32 participants, 15 were teachers from various schools in Larkana. Three were local councillors, one was a CCB member, four were social workers and NGO members, three were university students, one was an advocate, three were shopkeepers or related businesspeople, and two were members of the revenue departments. Out of the 32 participants from Larkana, 22 reported that they were university educated, four reported that their level of education was from college, three had qualifications from secondary school, and three reported that their education was of primary level.

5.1.3 Main findings

- Most of the participants in the study were male, a total of 63 (90%).
- Most of the participants were aged between 20 and 60 years old.
- The major education level reported by the respondents was university (51%).
- Union Councillors made up 8% of the population of the study.
- Former members of CCBs constituted 5% of the total participants.
- People from the rural region accounted for 54% of the respondents.
- Urban participants made up 46% of the total population of the study.

The first table, 5.1, features the main categories. In the second table, 5.2, each category is explained in detail. Table 5.2 also shows the categories in the two regions separately as well. The researcher has reported the findings thematically.

5.2 Theme Two: General knowledge of local government and its services

Introduction

The second theme yielded five issues. During the fieldwork, this theme was converted into an open-ended question. All of these issues are reported according to the level of importance given by the responses from the participants. Themes are presented in descending order of importance. Thematic analysis is used to record cases of recurring frequency. Theme Two yielded the following major issues:

- The military dictator General Musharraf's local government contributed more to physical infrastructure development; local government institutions are full of corrupt practices.
- The military dictator introduced devolution to legitimise his authoritarian regime.
- Local governments have often been captured by local political elites.
- There is a reign of favouritism in these local government institutions.
- Sindhi political institutions and political parties are treated as individual property - there is no democracy in these political parties.

These issues will be described and discussed briefly in Table 5.3.

Table 5. 3 Theme Two: General knowledge of local government services

Theme Two	Issues	Order of Importance
General knowledge of local government and its services	• The military dictator General Musharraf's local government contributed to some extent to physical infrastructure development.	First
	• Local government institutions are full of corrupt practices.	Second
	• Local governments are captured by the political elite.	Third
	• Reign of favouritism - enriching friends and family.	Fourth
	• State institutions are run through family-based dynasties	Fifth

Source: data analysis

Theme Two, which is related to general knowledge of the local government and its services, has shown the following findings: 54% of respondents reported that

the Devolution Plan of 2001 was given a sufficient budget. Therefore, some budget money was left for local development. On account of this, a share of the budget was spent on the development of roads, street pavements and water and sanitation services. The following quotes illustrate how the participants felt about the nature of the local governments of Sindh, Pakistan:

> The public money (local government budget) is spent on a few *Wadera*s (local feudal lords in Sindh); there is an absence of a system of checks and balances. Who will have accountability, because they have their own people everywhere? The NAB is a drama, and the national government pretends and feigns. (Yousuf, social worker, rural district, Kambar Shahdadkot)

> During Musharraf's time, whatever funds were available for Union Councils were spent on development, and they did other development activities as well. (Bilawal, member of a trade union, Warah, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

> The fact is that, to some extent, they (local governments) provided the basic services. But the public participation always remained low. This is because the common citizen is deliberately kept away from the process of policy implementation. (Naban Khoso, businessman and member of a trade union, Kambar Shahdadkot, union council, Miandad Chingini, Sindh)

> When General Musharraf came to power, he introduced a local government system. The purpose of these local councils was to serve the public with basic services such as supplying clean drinking water, keeping towns clean from garbage, and construction of local streets. And they succeeded in delivering the services. (Haq Nawaz, teacher in the Education Department, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

Participants commented that the local government, introduced by General Musharraf, had sufficient funds. As for budgets, more funds were allocated for the improvement of physical infrastructure. Development was seen in the construction of local roads, town streets being cemented, and drainage improvements.

The second major issue which was emphasised was that local government provides a safe platform for corruption and the misuse of public funds. For example, 43% of respondents reported that local government funds are

consumed in the illegal activities of corruption. The following quotes illustrate the nature of the local governments of Sindh:

> But these local governments have failed badly in their responsibilities. Their failure has many reasons, but the main reason is corruption. Now, imagine that 80% is corruption, and now guess how development is possible from a 20% budget. (Aneeta Gul, female member of a student society, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)
>
> In their legislation (the law of local government), there was the provision that local councils would serve the common citizen, but they did not do so. For that failure, there are many factors, but the main one was corruption. (Manzoor Ali, businessman and member of a labour union, Union Council Jonanee Shareef, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)
>
> Here, whoever swallows all public funds has huge respect. But, there is no value of public participation or public views. There is no difference in both periods. (Manzoor Ali, former member of CCBs, Warah, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

As shown, the majority of the local government budget is not used for public welfare,but is used unscrupulously. Thus, public funds, given to local government for local development, are misused for illegal purposes. One respondent calculates that if 80% of local government budget is not trickled down honestly, then there will be no development from the remaining 20% for the local public.

The third issue reported was that local government elections are captured by local elites. As Table 5.2 shows, 40% of respondents stated that these local political institutions are always captured and contested by feudal lords, landlords and *Pirs* (Islamic clerics-cum-politicians). The local public does not have the opportunity or freedom to be a candidate in these local government elections. The following quotes from the interviewees throw light on how local governments are captured by local feudal lords:

> Local government is a local tier of the government. This system is for villages and small towns to solve the problems of the local population. These days, these institutions have been occupied by the powerful class, thus the institution has lost its recognition. (Ahmed, unemployed, Taluka Qambar Ali, Khan, resident of Larkana)

But in this period (civilian powers in the local government of 2013-present), there is a culture of favouritism (making rich only your own people), corruption, and feudal lords, and their agents have gripped this period. In this comparison, Musharraf's period (2001-2009) was better. During Musharraf's time, there were many development projects at Union Council and rural population level. (Sarkash Sindhi, former member of CCBs, Jonanee Shareef, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

…the reasons for saying this is that the people who are in local councils, they are enemies (who do not want citizens to have an influence on the government) of the common citizen, and their interests are more dear than serving the common citizen. And the helpless poor public let themselves be destroyed, but these feudal people have no sympathy for them. (Manzoor Ali, businessman and member of a labour union, Union Council Jonanee Shareef, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

As the above respondent explained, theoretically, the purpose of these local governments is to serve and solve the problems of the local community. However, local institutions have been captured by the local elites - this institution has lost its effectiveness and importance for the lower-class public.

The fourth most important issue was reported by 27% of respondents, in which they stated that local government policies are usually implemented on a basis of favouritism and nepotism. Local government policies are implemented in such areas where local authorities have their own favoured nearest and dearest. The following quotes explain how some participants felt about favouritism in the local governments of Sindh:

Now that they have given powers to the chairman, development of areas such as health, education and employment is ignored, because they have always enriched their own people. Such orders are given from the top party leadership. (Awais Mashoree, NGO member, Larkana, Sindh).

In this period, powers are theoretically given to local councils. But the key to running things was somewhere else - they were being run remotely. They have four subjects, but have failed completely. (Muhammad Murad, former councillor, Union Council, Jonanee Shareef, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

The worst government of Sindh was the Pakistan People's Party. Crime has increased. Lawlessness has increased. The development budget goes directly to the ruling class. The people in power are fully

corrupt. (Shahid Ali, teacher, Union Council, Kallar, Kamabar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

This indicates that the heads of the municipalities, Union Councils and city governments approve funds for their own people. Furthermore, current local governments are party based. Therefore, funds for development are allocated on the orders of the top leadership of the ruling political party in Sindh.

Additionally, the fourth reported issue was that during election times, the powerful class, which the respondents referred to as the feudal class, try to select their own 'yes men', people who could be their servants or permanent supporters, and involve them in elections. So, once again, whoever is elected as a chairman or Union Councillor will be a 'yes man' of the local elites. The following quote illustrates how one respondent felt about the misuse of the local government system in Sindh:

> This period was an authoritarian period. These local councils could not give good results. This is because the feudal class was brought in by local government. And the feudal class is not from the common public, therefore local councils could not deliver basic services…Mr Asif Ali Zardari's local councils are the worst. This is because, in this period, corruption was at its peak. If they brought any people into local councils, they would be their own yes men. (Manzoor Ali, businessman and member of a labour union, Union Council Jonanee Shareef, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

The above participant reported that the local councils in the period 2001-2009 were introduced during an authoritarian regime. These local governments failed to give good results. Secondly, these local governments were captured by the feudal class people, who are not from the poor population. Finally, the current system of local government, which introduced a publicly elected government, is worse than the previous government which was introduced by General Musharraf. It has been shown that the feudal lords try to fill local government

seats themselves to take part in elections. If they are unable to fill more seats, they ask their 'yes men' to take part in local government elections.

Furthermore, the results show that 26% of respondents reported that the political parties and political institutions are designed in such a style that only rich people have the access to participate in political activities, such as the creation and maintenance of such parties, which is overseen by descent-based politics. In other words, it is reported that in Sindh, the political institutions and political parties are maintained as if they are something which belongs to a specific family or an individual, instead of their manifestos to serve the public. One social worker from Larkana commented:

> There was military dictatorship. The regions were divided among feudal lords. For example, Kambar was awarded to the Chandio tribe, Larkana was given to Altaf Unar to rule, Shahdadkot was given to Magsi, Ghotki to the Mahar caste. The feudal lord is always a flatterer and an opportunist. Although he lives in public, he is not of the public - he has his own interests. (Mihran, social worker, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

This participant pointed out that when General Musharraf imposed military martial law, he (General Musharraf) created a new local, loyal class of politicians. Thus, firstly, General Musharraf divided various regions into new districts, and these districts were awarded to the influential local feudal lords. For example, the subdistrict of Kambar was given to the feudal lord family of the Chandio tribe, Shahdadkot was awarded to the feudal family of the Magsis tribe, and Ghotki was given to the Mahar feudal family. The feudal lord family is always a flatterer and opportunist. Although, he (the feudal lord) lives in public, he is not of the public. He usually serves his own interests instead of those of the public. As one teacher from the city of Larkana explained:

> There is *Jeyalla* (member of a political party) culture within the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), and all benefits go to the *Jeyalla* class

and other common public people with the same pains and hardships These parties are occupied by the feudal lords and Mirs (financially rich families with a noble title from the past). How is it possible that they would let the common public be involved? These feudal lords are not ready to consider the common man as human beings. (Mujahid Ali, teacher, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

The above respondent commented that the government in Sindh is run by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). As these current local governments are party based, the budget of local government is approved for those who are party workers of the ruling party. These parties are controlled by the feudal lords and Mirs (the influential rich families). How is it possible for these upper-class families to invite a lower-class member of the common public? Even these feudal lords are not ready to respect the common man as a human being. The summary of these major issues is presented in the next section.

5.2.1 Summary of findings

- The results show that the majority of participants reported that, although General Musharraf's Devolution Power Plan of 2001 was designed to seek local elites' loyalty to extend his military regime, local government contributed to sharing local government funds for local development of physical infrastructure.
- The second most reported issue is that available funds for local development are eaten up by local elites.
- The third reported issue is that, most of the time, local government institutions are captured by local feudal lords and local political elites.
- Furthermore, it is indicated that if some available funds are released for public development, these funds are released based on favouritism.
- The fifth reported issue is that the political institutions run through the culture of family-based dynasties - these political parties are not established with pro-poor welfare manifestos.
These above results transpired when the main theme was addressed in an open-ended question. These important results are presented in detail in the table below (5.4). The major issues and major findings will be described.

Table 5. 4 Major issues and findings

Issues	Major Findings
2.1 Local government 2001-2009 and 2013-present	• Power was transferred from bureaucracy to the publicly elected local government, which resulted in some share of infrastructure development. • Musharraf introduced local government to extend his military regime. • Musharraf forwarded political elites to win the local loyalty of the feudal class.
2.2 Corruption in local governments	• There is a lax system of checks and balances in local government. Thus, corruption is rampant. • Zardari's local governments (2013-present) were more corrupt than the previous ones. • Local elites go into local politics to get rich by using public funds for themselves.
2.3. Feudal/local elite class always in power in local government	• Whoever introduces local government, it is not for the poor population to participate in local governments. • There is a political class which is the main player in the participation of control over local government seats.
2.4. Reign of favouritism - enriching your own loved ones and nearest and dearest.	• Even local elites get elected by their own 'yes men' (who could be from a poor class) to contest local elections, but they will serve the interests of the Wadiras and Zamindars. • Thus, these 'yes men' are tools used by the feudal lords to instigate corruption and policy implementation
2.5 Sindhi institutions or political parties as personal property of an individual but not for the public	• Public services are delivered on a party basis and a political loyalty basis, and party members are always preferred when providing local government services • State laws are effective only for downtrodden people. These state laws are ineffective for the powerful class.

Source: data analysis

5.2.2 Main findings

The findings of the above section show that the local governments in the period 2001-2009 in Sindh, Pakistan, did not have a pro-public agenda. These local governments were used by the military general Pervez Musharraf to win local political loyalties. General Musharraf awarded local government seats to the regional feudal lords and other influential local politicians.

The Sindh Local Government Act 20013 is reported as being one of the most corrupt local government institutions in the history of Sindh and in Pakistan. This local government was introduced by the publicly elected government of Mr Asif Ali Zardari. This local government system is ruled by the top leadership of the PPP. The delivery services of local government are implemented based on favouritism of kinship, voters, and party workers. Furthermore, results show that state laws do not address the sufferings of the poor masses.

In the next section of this chapter, the results of Theme Three(3) are presented, which is related to the association between local governments and public participation.

5.3 Theme Three: The association between local government and local community participation in Sindh

Introduction

In this section, the findings from the data pertaining to the theme of association between local government and public participation in local government's policy implementation are described. The findings are shown in Table 5.5, and the recurring issues are set out according to the order of importance of the issues. The issues shown in Table 5.5 will be supplemented by verbatim quotes from the participants. Each viewpoint reported by the participant will be described by the researcher. In addition, Table 5.5 will show the composite findings relevant to this theme.

Table 5. 5 Theme Three: Association between local government and public participation in Sindh

Theme Three	Issues	Order of Importance
Association between local government and public participation	• Public participation is the lowest priority during policy implementation. • There is no concept of participation.	First
	• Citizens are deliberately kept away from political information.	Second
	• Local governments are sources of corruption, so participation will not be acceptable to the ruling elite.	Third
	• The dominant class protects its own class and interests.	Fourth

Source: data analysis

The results show that 57% of respondents reported that during both periods of local government, public participation had been given the least priority by the authorities. Thus, the participants further delineated that once local elites came into power in local governments, they intended to keep the public ignorant about the public budget and public policy programmes for the local community. It was shown that the local community did not have any expectations from the current set up of the local government system. The following quotes from the participants demonstrate this:

> No doubt there was legislation in local councils, introduced by General Musharraf, that they must serve the common citizen and must invite the common people to participate. However, these people who came to power favoured only their own class, and the people of local councils kept common citizens away from participation and development. Furthermore, the remote and small settlements were absolutely neglected and side-lined in the process of participation. (Deedar Ali, former Union Councillor, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh).

> They (local government powerholders) never thought about public participation. This is because once the *big man* (metaphor for the powerful class) sits on the chair (metaphor for power), they think of themselves as superior to the public. There is no worth and value of law in our lovely Pakistan. Thus, there is no one to raise a question to the elected representatives about why they do not allow public participation. If they thought that they would be asked questions, they would encourage public participation. There is no concept of accountability. (Abdullah, teacher in the Education Department, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

> They (referring to the rulers of Sindh) have ignored the common public completely. There are many reasons for this. However, one of the main ones is that these people from the upper class do not want the public to be active and come out from poverty and hunger. Secondly, they do not want that the general public have access to these elected representatives. Thirdly, once they are elected, they think that the general public is untouchable to these elected people. So, how would they invite the public to engage in dialogue and deliberation (Murtaza, local government employee, Sindh)

> Public participation was not allowed, because the people who came into power in the local councils were *Wadera, bhotar, Rais* (different tiles of local chieftains and feudal lords in Sindh language), who remember the poor public only at the time of election. But once a *Wadero, Bhotar, Rais* is in power, the common man is forgotten. And the other thing is that our common population is not aware of their basic rights, and it (the society of Sindh) is in a deep slumber. Therefore, they do not know what their basic fundamental rights are. To address this malaise, we need urgent education. (Yousuf, social worker, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

As one of the above participants reported, there was the provision, in the ordinance of the Devolution Power Plan of 2001, for direct local community participation in community development. However, once the feudal class came into local government offices, they favoured their own people. The general public was kept away from public budget information and the development schemes of local government. Furthermore, the rural areas were neglected in relation to any physical infrastructure development.

Further, as the results show, 36% of the participants commented that the common public is deliberately deprived of an education on citizens' rights and political rights. Even information about the public budget and funding spent by

local governments is kept secret from the general public. As a teacher from

Larkana reported:

> They never encouraged public participation. The first reason is that they were not publicly invited, but they were selected to participate in elections. Second, there was their manifesto not to add the public to these development activities. The reason behind them not being invited was that once the public became awake, that would be bad news for the publicly elected representatives. (Liyakyat, male teacher, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

> In both periods (local governments of 2001-2009 and 2013-present), the public is kept away from the decision-making process, and this was deliberate. Once they (the local ruling class) are in power, they do not want to share the lush taste of power with the common citizen. They are trying their best to keep the common man in poverty - it has become a permanent mindset of this particular class. [Yousuf, social worker, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh]

> They (local government authorities) never allowed the public to get involved in policy implementation. However, they provided some development services, but they were given on a selection and favour basis. The common public is in pain (poverty, hunger and illiteracy), as it has always been. Here, the common citizen has always been used as a commodity. (Adnan, local government, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

Firstly, as explained, these ruling elite classes never encouraged public

participation. The first factor of this was that only the selected class was given

the opportunity to participate in local elections. Such a selection came from the

top of the leadership system during both periods of decentralised reforms.

Secondly, the local feudal class did not want the public to be active and aware

of their own basic rights.

As 33% of participants reported, local participation is disliked by local

government rulers, because if public participation is practised, the corruption of

public funds will be unmasked. Thus, public participation is discouraged by

those who control local government budgets as much as possible. The following

quotes throw light on how the participants felt about the causes of non-

participation:

But if one looks at it, the common citizen was kept away from these local councils, and the common public was not consulted for participation. This is because those local representatives in local councils were the sons and nephews of feudal lords. Thus, this family came into the system. This family has a huge fear that if the common man gets educated and comes into politics, he will drag the feudal lords by the neck. Therefore, the common population was deliberately side-lined. (Anmol, female member of student society, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

Whatever works were done under the premises of Union Councils, they were under the influence of *Pirs* (religious figures) and *Mirs* (historically wealthy ruling families of Sindh). In comparison to Sindh, in Punjab (another province of Pakistan) and in Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa (a Northern Province of Pakistan), there is much better development by Union Councils at a subdistrict level. (Sarkash Sindhi, former member of CCBs, Jonanee Shareef, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

As one of the above participants articulated, the common citizen was kept away from local government programmes. The reason for this was that these local governments are usually captured by feudal class people, for their sons and daughters to benefit from it. To control such a monopoly, they aimed to maintain the status quo of such a rule with only one dominant class.

As the results indicate, 16% of the respondents disclosed that the local dominant elite class always protects and promotes its own class. In other words, political participation in local government is only for feudal lords, landlords, Pirs (influential religious-cum-political figures) and Mirs (noble by wealth and birth). In other words, the dominant class would prefer those influential people to participate in politics, instead of a common citizen. The following quotes illustrate how the participants expressed ideas related to the particular class interests in maintaining the status quo:

As the influential brought forward their own favourite groups to local government, the poor were kept away from all services. It is the culture that this particular class always brings their own people into power, and the common public is pushed backward so that they are not able to be aware of their power. (Ali Haider Memon, labour member, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

In the current system, their duty is to provide basic services to the public. They have brought some amendments to the old laws of the local bodies. I am very sorry to say that these local councils have failed completely to address the public problems. If there is corruption in any society, such a society cannot prosper and develop. Such a society becomes sick, and does not grow. The law should be equal to all, then local councils could work properly. The law is lame here. (Murtaza, local government employee, Sindh)

This current period is the darkest period of local councils in our history. This is because there is a reign of corruption in local councils. The institutions where corruption is common cannot give good results. The people who controlled local councils were not from the common population. They were from a class. To expect anything from that particular class is like daydream. This is because the main purpose of these local councils is to sideline the common poor class. That is the reason, therefore, why local councils did not promote public participation in any activities. (Mohammad Ashim, social worker, Union Council Mirpur, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

As one of the above respondents has pointed out, the upper class do not want the population of the lower-class to come out of poverty and the slavery of the ruling class. Even the ruling class has various layers, but that class is comfortable enough with each layer to share state power. They even promote their own favoured people to come into power instead of giving an opportunity for this to the lower class. Finally, the results of the above theme are summarised in the next section.

5.3.1 Summary of findings

- The above findings show that there is no positive influence of decentralisation on public participation in Sindh. Most of the results show that the poor public is given the lowest priority during the policy implementation of local governments.

- Citizens are deliberately kept away from political awareness activities and programmes.
- Local governments are merely a source of eating up available public funds unscrupulously.
- The dominant class is not ready to lose its clutch or control of local government platforms.

These are the results of the main theme, which is the influence of

decentralisation on local community involvement in local government policy

implementation. The detailed findings of this theme are presented in Table 5.6

along with the sub-titles of the main findings.

Table 5. 6 Findings of Theme Three

Issues	Major Findings
3.1 The public is given the lowest priority during policy implementation. There is no concept of participation.	• Once Wadiras and landed elites came to power, and local elites came to power, they forgot that there should be public participation. • Public participation is unwelcome because it can unmask the corrupt activities within local government offices, such as corruption, or allocation of funds based on favouritism.
3.2 Citizens are deliberately kept away from political information.	• The common local community is not transferred any information which could empower the disadvantaged population. • Education about political rights, the modern world and citizens' rights is discouraged. The reason for this is that if the public are empowered, the feudal lords and ruling class can lose their power hold. • The ruling class tends to keep the public ignorant about citizens' rights.
3.3 Local governments are sources of corruption, so participation will not be acceptable to the ruling elite	• Local governments in Sindh are only a source of corruption, and the source of benefits for the political dominant class. • Corruption and public participation in local policy implementation cannot exist or go hand in hand if there is corruption. Public participation is not possible, and vice versa.
3.4 The dominant class is protecting its own class and interests	• The dominant class divides local government seats in order to capture power instead of allowing the poor class to take part in administration. • The dominant class compromises with each other instead of sharing power with the common population. • Even local councillor seats are filled by the feudal lords and their 'yes men', instead of giving seats to any local poor representative.

Source: data analysis

5.3.2 Main findings

The results show that the respondents knew that there was provision for public

participation in service delivery by the local governments in the period 2001-

2009. However, once local elites capture power, they focus on how to hoard any available funds unscrupulously. Public participation is considered a risk for the ruling elites. This is because it (public participation) could transform the political education to the general public. Furthermore, public participation could expose the corruption perpetuated by the feudal lords. Therefore, the concept of public participation is suppressed.

Furthermore, the marginalised groups of the community are deliberately deprived of awakening in terms of the programmes of the state. In other words, such open space dialogue and deliberation meetings are not arranged because of the fear that the general population could be empowered. Thus, it will cause trouble by making the corrupt rulers accountable for their dishonesty with the available public funds. Furthermore, education on citizens' rights and political rights is discouraged by the feudal lords to keep their monopoly in practice. As there is rampant corruption in local government institutions, so public involvement will not be welcomed by local authorities. The dominant class always shares the seats of local governments amongst themselves. This class compromises the sharing of power amongst themselves. Even local councillors' seats are filled according to the will of the feudal lords.

The next section shows the results of the data related to Theme Four, in which it is investigated whether there was any service in which participation could be easily possible or difficult to implement.

5.4 Theme Four: Identification of any service where participation could have happened.
Introduction

In this section, the results of two open-ended questions aimed at investigating any area (or service) of local governments which could be appropriate for local

involvement or otherwise are presented. However, the results were identical, and have been placed in one section with one theme.

The results of Theme Four are presented in two tables. Table 5.7 illustrates the emergent important issues from the data pertaining to Theme Four. These results are described in the summary of the results.

Table 5. 7 Theme Four: Where participation has least possibility

Theme Four	Issues	Level of Importance
Any specific services where participation could be practised easily or is not to be practised during local government development programmes	Local community is kept away from participation with the purpose of keeping funds a secret.	First
	Activities giving awareness about local community rights are kept away from the local public.	Second
	State (Sindh and Pakistan) laws are designed in such way that only the rich and dominant classes can come to power	Third
	The public is treated as a commodity	Fourth

Source: Data analysis

The results show that 57% of the respondents reported in both open-ended questions that participation is not possible. The main reason for this is that if local government chairmen or mayors were to invite the local community to spend public budgets through local government, these unscrupulous rulers would not be able to corrupt public funds. Therefore, to maintain the status quo of profiteering illegally from public funds, it was necessary for local government authorities to keep the local community away from local government policy

implementation. The following quote illustrates why public participation was not practiced:

> In this period the mayors thought it was necessary to keep the public away, because otherwise corruption would have been difficult for them to do. Further, if they had invited the public, the public could have got awareness about their rights, and as result the public could make demands about their rights. They are making fake bills and doing corruption. Therefore, they would never invite public participation. (Muhammad Usman, former government councillor, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

The above respondent explained that it is the practice of crooked earning through the local government budget that is anti-public participation. This is because, if the public is regularly involved in their local budgets, the head of the local government would not be able to corrupt the public funds. These corrupt rulers are afraid that once the public becomes alert that their budgets are being used illegally, the disadvantaged population could demand their rights. Public participation is hushed by the local government authorities through fear; once the public become active and well-informed, they will be able to protect their rights. As a result of that public activism, the ruling elite would not be able to benefit illegally from the public funds which come through the local government department.

Furthermore, 44% of the respondents described how such educational and informative public mobilisation programmes (policies, education and public training), which could enable citizens to be able to safeguard their rights, are always kept away from the common public. The reason for this practice is that if the general common public were to become active and alert, those feudal elites would not be at will to exploit the public funds and power. As one student from the University of Larkana pointed out:

> According my knowledge, the reason for not involving the public in policy implementation is that if they invited the public, the public would

expose the corrupt local authorities, and unmask their corrupt deeds. If they become exposed, they would not be able to do corruption. The public gives them votes for their development, and once they become exposed, the downtrodden communities would demand their money. (Aslam, senior student at university, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

The above respondent commented that local elites always come into power through the public vote. Once feudal lords come into state power, they become rich by using public funds illegally. Furthermore, if the public becomes aware that their elected representatives are corrupting public funds, these corrupt local authorities could be exposed as exploiting public votes for their own crooked activities.

As the results show, 20% of the respondents reported that most of the laws (in Sindh and Pakistan) are orchestrated in favour of the dominant class. Since 1947, when Pakistan was created, these feudal lords have been in the legislative assemblies of the country. Therefore, they have not made any laws which could provide equal opportunities to all to take part in elections easily. Furthermore, the respondents claimed that state laws exist only to benefit the ruling class. The following quote illustrates how local governments are manipulated by the local influential class:

> There is little democratic public government. But these governments give awards to the landlords, the feudal lords. Public funds are given to the elite rich people. They have no sympathy or sincerity with the common public. The current period is for enriching your own dear, favourite people. There is no movement of progress within local government institutions. There is no system of audit in this institution. Everything is a shambles. The public are always suffering from the cruelties of hardships. (Abdullah, teacher in the Education Department, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

This respondent pointed out that, first, these local governments are simply a showpiece or window dressing of democracy, because they have come through the public vote. Secondly, these seats of local government have been gifted to the feudal families and local political elite families. Thirdly, the public budgets

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are simply a reflection of the theory that these funds are for the common public. Finally, these funds are awarded to the ruling class families. There is no system of checks and balances; thus, the underprivileged local communities are in a shambles.

As 16% of the respondents delineated, most of the time the oppressed local population of Sindh is treated as a commodity. There is no sympathy with the suffering of the poor population. The ruling class and the state have become accursed to public suffering and hardship. The example of such cussedness is that there is no drinking water, no electricity, and no education facilities for the poor people. Another quote throws light on how one of the participants expressed the idea that the ruling class does not want change and public empowerment:

> The rulers are not ready to consider the public as humans. So, why would they be bothered to invite deliberation? They (feudal lords) are sure that the public is ignorant. The public has not had the education, therefore they (the public) will never be able to make the rulers accountable. (Mihran Khan, teacher, Larkana, Sindh)

The participant reflected that the general public, which is under the poverty line and unable to come into power, is considered as sub-human in Sindh. So, if the ruling class is not ready to consider the public as human beings, why and how would the feudal class be ready to sit with the common public to discuss local issues affecting the local community? The ruling class is confident that as the public is ignorant and uneducated; they (the poor class) are not in a position to make the rulers accountable.

5.4.1 Summary of findings

- Local populations are kept at bay to keep the available funds of local government in secrecy.
- Local heads of local government, once they have come into power, avoid meetings with the local public to share any information about public issues.

- The public is treated as a commodity.
- The state laws in Sindh are orchestrated in such a way that the poor class benefits from them the least.

  The above theme yielded major issues. In the following table, the main findings are presented.

Table 5. 8 Findings: Results of Theme Four: Areas of possibility of participation

Issues	Major Findings
4.1 Local community is kept away from participation with the purpose of keeping funds secret.	The general or local community (whose majority is lower class) is kept away from local policy activities as well as at provincial and national levels The elite class do not want to lose control of state power and politics. Local elites try not to share and transfer information to the lower poor class of Sindh. After coming into power, these influential people think that they are a superior class, thus they do not need to remain close to the common poor public.
4.2 Activities giving awareness about local community rights are kept away from the local public.	The feudal lords keep the poor public in the dark (not educating them) about their fundamental rights. Such factors which can empower and transform the knowledge of public supremacy are not given to the poor population. The feudal class does not give modern education, roads, democratic rights or political education to the poor population.
4.3 State (Sindh and Pakistan) laws are designed in such a way that only the rich and the dominant class can come into power.	State laws are designed in such a way that the lower class is unable to take part in state affairs - equal opportunities in all aspects of state life. State laws, provincial and national, benefit only the elite class. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) is a window dressing, not protecting the poor population's assets.
4.4 The public is treated as a commodity.	The poor population is considered as a commodity. The poor class is used only for purpose of getting votes. The poor class is used to fighting with each other and hate each other. Funds are allocated to the rich and not the poor population.

Source: Data analysis

During the field work, this section was divided into two themes: where participation was easily achievable, and where local participation was not easily achievable. However, after the data collection, the results of both themes were similar. Therefore, the researcher has produced these results in one section and in one table.

5.4.2 Main findings

The results of the above section show that the local community is treated as a commodity. There is no sympathy for the poor public from the local authorities. This attitude is nurtured from the central state to the bottom tier of the authorities. The public empowerment factors are as follows: education, jobs, roads, communication, social mobilisation, and political awareness. All of these are deliberately blocked from the poor masses. The reason for this is that if the public becomes active and alert, it would not be controlled by short-sighted rulers.

Even from the central state to the provincial state, laws are made to rule the poor public but not to empower the general population. For example, the law of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), a law made by the central state, is a showpiece and a drama. This law was not made to be implemented, otherwise everyone would be charged with corruption. The funds are allocated to the rich to be eaten up.

The poor class is used for votes, to hate each other, and to fight over trivial matters.

In the next section, the results from the data pertaining to Theme Five are presented.

5.5 Theme Five: Barriers to participation

Introduction

Theme Five is related to the dynamics (barriers to participation or encouraging factors) of public participation in local government in Sindh. In this section, the researcher will discuss emergent issues from the data related to Theme Five. Each issue is shown according to its level of importance. Verbatim quotes related to the results will be reported. The table below shows the emergent issues which have been produced.

Table 5. 9 Theme Five: Barriers to public participation

Theme Five	Issues	Order of Importance
Barriers to local community participation in local government's policy implementation	• Class control: feudal lords, landlords, religious politicians (Pirs).	First
	• Those who have been in power are afraid of public supremacy.	Second
	• Corruption and favouritism.	Third

Source: Data analysis

The results show that 54% of the population of this study reported that the class structure (system of inequalities) is the main obstacle to local community participation in local delivery of services. This is because, since the creation of the state of Pakistan, the feudal lords, the rich, and the elite classes have been in power. The ruling elite class is not ready to compromise and lose such a privileged position. The results show that if the ruling class were to invite the local common public to become involved in the public's rights, the public could become active and bold enough to demand their rights. Consequently, the ruling class would not be able to exploit the funds and powers of the lower class public. The following quotes shed light on this:

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The main reason is that they are the same people who always come to power - they are not from the public. They were all feudal lords and landlords. And this class loves only its interests rather than the common public's. This is because this class has always been greedy and filthy in its interests. If you peep into history, you will see that these feudal lords and landlords have always been traitors to their own common public. This class has always stabbed the common nation in the back. (Javaid Ali, advocate, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

The feudal lords and landlords keep the common public away. Their basic manifesto is to keep the public away. They are kings of corruption; therefore, why would they work for the common people. They always involve a group concerned with how to make more money, not how to deliver services to the public. (Irshad Ali, Massaood, student organisation, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

They do not involve the public, because in Musharraf's government there was such a cruel and pathetic class in power. That class has played havoc with democracy. Even the current government have brought constitutional change, but not practical change. (Khan, social worker, Ghaibi Dero, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

The rulers' dream is to enlighten the thinking level of the nation, whereas the politicians are always busy filling their pockets with the public budget. Such politicians do not have any sympathy for the pains of the common man, because they are busy in their lustful lives. (Javaid Ali, advocate, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

This indicates that there is a big divide between those who rule the country (ruling and feudal elites) and those who are unable to demand their basic rights (most of the population) in the province of Sindh. There is a real case of inequality. The ruling class families are not ready to believe that the public is equal to them. The ruling class is clever enough to know how to grab the power of the state. Even the ruling feudal lords are clever enough to keep the public backward.

Furthermore, 40% of the respondents reported that the politicians of Sindh do not want the public to be active, alert, or able enough to know how to safeguard their own rights. There are many main issues in this hidden, psychological motive. As one teacher from the city of Larkana reported:

They never let the common man get involved. Their purpose was not to let the common man come close to the elected representatives,

because if the common man came close to the elected representatives, they would be able to know about their rights. And thus, the public may become aware and alert. As a result, their luxuriant and lush lifestyle could get disturbed. The commoners are remembered at the time of election. Once the election is over, the common man is put on the back burner. (Ahmer, teacher, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

The main reason not to invite participation was that if they invited neighbourhood residents, the chances of committing corruption would be reduced. To be successful in doing corruption, it was necessary for the rulers to keep the public away from participation. (Naveed Khan, student organisation, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

According to my knowledge, the reason for not involving the public in policy implementation is that if they invited the public, the public would make them naked, and unmask their corrupt deeds. If they became exposed, they would not be able to do corruption. The public gives them votes for their development, and once they become naked the public would demand their money. (Aslam, senior student at the university, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

The main reason for not involving the public is that the administration does not want to work. The PPP (the government of the civilian party) period is the same link it same chain (- once elections are done, then none of them will seek acquaintance with the voter. (Sain Dad, teacher in the education department, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

The ruling class is living a luxuriant life from money acquired through corruption, so the ruling elite do not want to end their luxurious lifestyles by empowering the general population or the majority of the population. These ruling classes do not want to transfer their privileged status and power to the downtrodden public.

Further results indicate that, according to 36% of the respondents, the culture of corruption and favouritism is a barrier to local community participation. This is because whenever any funds are given to local government offices, these public funds are spent in two ways: one way is corruption and the second is that funds are allocated to favouritism. As one participant stated:

These local governments have become more political; therefore, everybody was supporting the party decisions. Therefore, services were given only on the party basis. The public elected the People's Party, which only promoted corruption, and funds were given to the favoured party workers and members instead of the general public.

Therefore, they did not invite participation. (Qamar-u-Din, lecturer, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

The above respondent reported that whenever the time comes to allocate funds for any local development, they deliver funds only to their own party workers and their favoured people. If the local authorities were to invite everyone, then it would be difficult for them to give favour to their own people. As two of the participants pointed out:

> The main reason for not inviting participation was that if they invited neighbourhood residents, the chances of committing corruption would be reduced. To be successfully corrupt, it is necessary to keep the public away from participation. (Naveed Khan, student organisation, City District, Larkana, Sindh)

> They did not invite the public due to fear that once the public is involved in local policies they will happen to know about their rights, and they will be enlightened with new thinking that will jeopardise the luxuriant lifestyle of the ruling class. Even in the Zardari period, they did not invite the public. However, if they invited the common man, still they would act according to their own will. There is not any thinking about public participation. There is only favouritism. (Liyakyat, male teacher, urban city, Larkana, Sindh)

The above participant explained that corruption is a barrier to public participation. This is because with public participation there is a chance that corruption could be unmasked. Therefore, the ruling corrupt class, to keep corruption continuous, has side-lined the poor population from any involvement in local policy implementation. The above results are summarised in the next section.

5.5.1 Summary of findings

- There has been one class in power since the creation of Pakistan. These are feudal lords, landlords, Pirs (the influential religious-cum-political figures) and Mirs (noble and rich families of Sindh).

- Those who have been in power and in privileged positions since the birth of Pakistan are not ready to lose their status. Therefore, the ruling elite is desperate to maintain its monopoly.

- Corruption and favouritism are very common practices in the Sindhi institutions. Therefore, if one wants to maintain corruption and favouritism, the participation of the poor public is not possible

The final part of this section consists of Table 5.10, in which the main findings

are illustrated.

Table 5. 10 Main findings of the dynamics of participation

Issues	Major Findings
5.1 Class control: feudal lords, landlords, religious politicians (Pirs).	• Feudal lord ego - that the right to rule belongs to those who are in the upper classes (feudal lords, landlords, Pirs) in Sindh. • Feudal lord status. This class does not believe that the poor population should be equally treated and have equal political opportunities. • This class is in fear of losing control of power, resulting in a shift of state power to the underprivileged population. • Feudal lords are not ready to accept the conditions through which the common public has suffered. • Feudal lords want to maintain their higher status.
5.2 Those who have been in power are afraid of public supremacy.	• The rich and ruling politicians are afraid of public supremacy and the rule of law, because the rule of law will treat all equally. • The ruling politicians do not want to come out of their comfort zones. • In Sindh and in Pakistan, political and social status is the main source of survival. Therefore, to remain in power is a source of high social status.
5.3 Corruption and favouritism	• Local elites are always desperate to control power to get rich. Therefore, corruption and public participation cannot be paralleled. • Apart from corruption, the ruling elite allocates any remaining funds to favouritism. Thus, public participation and favouritism cannot be adjusted at the same time. • Favouritism gives votes, and wins commitment for future elections. • Funds are allocated based on commitments of votes at elections. Thus, the ruling elite class pays attention to those who could be their voters.

Source: Data analysis

5.5.2 Main findings

The findings of the above section show that the main barriers to public participation are feudal lords, the landed elite, and the ruling elite ego. In other words, whoever is in state power should rule the poor masses. The feudal lord class is not ready to implement such laws in which everyone would practically be treated equally. For example, if a feudal lord were to invite the public to discuss the common issues related to local areas, such an equally footed discussion would be an insult to the local elites. In Sindh political power, wealth and influence are the main sources of public unrest. Therefore, it is important for the ruling elite to maintain the status quo - keep the local community at a distance, and do not let them participate in the delivery services of local government.

Corruption is a fast and easy way to be rich in Sindh. It is rampant in local government institutions. If the ruling class were to invite the general public, the former could be exposed in terms of their unscrupulous earnings from the available funds of the public budget. Therefore, to hush up this budget information, the general public is kept away from any involvement in the delivery services of local government. The practice of favouritism is very common in local government institutions. Favour is given to those who are party mates, close friends, committed voters, sons and relatives. Therefore, favouritism and the involvement of the general public cannot go hand-in-hand in local government policy implementation.

Those who have been ruling the poor public are not ready to lose their comfort zones of power, influence and privilege.

In the next section, the results of the data relevant to Theme Six are presented, which relates to how local community participation could be possible and easily achievable.

5.6 Theme Six: How local community involvement could be achievable.
Introduction

In this section, the results from the data pertaining to Theme Six are reported. Theme Six is around how to make local community involvement in the local government's policy practice possible. This section is the last in this chapter of results. The table 5.11 contains the main theme and the major emergent issues related to the main theme data. Furthermore, the researcher will report verbatim quotes related to each major issue as recorded by the participants. Finally, there will be a summary of this section.

Table 5. 11 Theme Six, and emergent issues

Theme Six	Issues	Level of Importance
How to achieve local community participation in the local government's policy implementation	• The common public wake up and create forums, committees, or corner meetings to mobilise every single member of the exploited poor groups of the population	First
	• Supremacy of law	Second
	• Crackdown on corruption	Third
	• Freedom of expression and freedom of media	Fourth

Source: Data analysis

The results show that 54% of the respondents reported that underprivileged citizens themselves should wake up to establish volunteer forums, citizen's volunteer committees and corner meetings. These volunteer forums should be

initiated by social workers, advocates, lawyers, journalists, trade union members and honest, educated citizens.

The population itself should build the foundations of community-based volunteer organisations and committees at ward levels, and at neighbourhood and village levels. These committees should persuade and mobilise the public to put pressure on local government administration to implement a policy of public involvement.

As a member of the Shopkeepers' Union reported:

> Civil society, the literary class, and educated people should come forward and establish a forum. And that forum should convey the message that local councils have completely failed in providing basic services to the common citizen. They should all come together to put pressure on the representatives of local councils so that public participation can be implemented, and the common citizen should be asked for deliberation for future policy implementation. It should be made sure that the common citizen must be informed by civil society, literary citizens and educated citizens that the common citizen can put pressure on local councils' representatives.(Naban Khoso, businessman and member of a trade union, Kambar Shahdadkot, UC, Miandad Chingini, Sindh)

The above participant recommended that there should be a movement of civil society, the literary class and educated people. They should come forward to establish volunteer committees and social mobilisation forums. These forums should start conveying the message that local councils have failed to provide basic services to the common citizen. All of these forums should awaken the poor population to pressurise local authorities that a policy of community involvement should be implemented. In addition, the local community should be given the opportunity to discuss the future policies of their local councils.

Furthermore, the results show that 37% of respondents set forth that there should be supremacy of law. There should be a constitutional obligation for local councils to implement a policy of local community participation before

introducing any development project. As a councillor from the rural region stated:

> There should be an amendment in the Sindh Local Government Act 2013 in which the powers should be devolved to the grass roots level. There should be an amendment to Article 140-A of the Pakistan constitution in which the powers should be transferred from the provincial governments to local councils, and there should be the provision for public participation, where it must be treated seriously. And there should be meetings with local government representatives in which they must be advised that until and unless they invite the common public, the resolution of public issues is not possible. (Muhammad Murad, former councillor, Union Council, Jonanee Shareef, District Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

> The implementation of any suggestion is very difficult. Let's hope for good (emphasising hope). It should be compulsory for local councils to involve the common man, and there should be a checks and balances law that each service or department is for the public, so there must be public participation in each department. (Irshad Ali, Massaood, student organisation, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

The above respondent recommended that there should be constitutional protection for civic engagement. Article 140-A should be amended in such a way that powers would be transferred from the provincial governments to the local government departments. In that constitution, public involvement should be made mandatory. It should be mentioned in Civic Engagement Law that no policy can be implemented before the process of public deliberation and dialogue has occurred.

Other results show that 10% of respondents indicated that there should be a crackdown on corruption. This is because most feudal lords capture local government power with the purpose of corruption to earn easy money. As they misuse funds, they shun public involvement in local government dialogue and deliberation activities. It is on account of this corruption that the elite class takes part in local government elections, as their greed will contribute to lining their pockets with dishonest money. As one social worker from a rural region commented:

> What can we tell you? It is a fact that there is rampant corruption here. There is no service by local councils. Until and unless there is control over corruption, there will be no solution to any problem. The powerful should be made accountable for their corruption. (Mohammad Ashim, social worker, Union Council, Mirpur, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

> We need be free from the corrupt political system. The people who are *Syeds, feudal lords, landlords* and are influential must be removed or banned, and then the public will start to speak, and then everyone will be able to know about public rights. The same people who were in the Musharraf period, now they are in today's governments. So, if the government is run by the influential, the public will be ineffective. (Mihran Khan, male teacher, Larkana, Sindh)

It is explained that unless the powerful are made accountable for their corrupt activities, there will be no public engagement in local policy implementation. This is because, as the rulers know corruption will take place, it should be done behind the curtain of the general public.

Moreover, the results show that 6% of respondents reported that there should be a law of freedom of access to information, and freedom of the media to expose to those who commit corruption. As one member of a trade union pointed out:

> Local council institutions should be run in such a style that the common man is prioritised or preferable to elected representatives. There must be a law in which it should be compulsory that without public information or involvement, there should not be any beginning of any development. They should not hide from the public. (Abdul Jabbar, member of a labour union, Union Council, Khando, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

As the above respondent stated, there should be a law in which priority should be given to the people of the disadvantaged class, instead of the rich who have been ruling the local government administrations. There should be a strict law which makes it necessary that without sharing the information and details of the budgets for development, there should be no approval for the release of funds for local development. There should be laws of access to information.

As another participant and teacher from Larkana stated:

> There should be a strong and effective system of accountability; according to that system, the allocated budget must be shared with the public, and whatever is spent on development, the projects must be examined according to a strong accountability institution. (Aaqib, university teacher, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

The above participant pointed out that there should be strict laws for checks and balances. Public budgets should be shared with the common citizens. There should be strong vigilante departments which keep a diligent eye on how public budgets are spent. On the whole, the participants felt that there should be stringent and strict laws to ensure checks and balances.

5.6.1 Summary of findings

The factors which can contribute to making public participation achievable are reported as follows:

- The poor population should wake up and come out to establish community mobilisation volunteer forums and committees and arrange regular corner meetings to mobilise the local community to put pressure on the local authorities to ensure that local community involvement is implemented. These committees should visit each household to tell them about their public rights.

- First there should be supremacy of law, and public participation should be made mandatory in constitutions of the state.
- There should be a crackdown on corruption.
- There should be a law which guarantees freedom of expression and freedom of the media.

Table 5. 12 Findings of Theme Six

Issues	Major Findings
6.1 The common public wakes up and holds forums, committees, or corner meetings to mobilise every single member of the downtrodden groups of the population.	• Public activism is needed at a national or provincial level to pressurise the rulers to invite the local community during the policy implementation of local governments. • The members of civil society - social workers, journalists, advocates and well-educated citizens - should come out to mobilise the general public to put pressure on the government to introduce local community participation in the local government's policy implementation. • There should be the introduction of citizens' volunteer forums to introduce awareness programmes about getting involved in the local government's policy implementation.
6.2 Constitutional status of participation and supremacy of law	• The national and provincial assemblies should formulate a law in which local community involvement in project development is made compulsory. • There should be a rule of law if the constitution makes public participation compulsory. • There should be a free and fair election system. • People with an honest, decent and spotless history should be brought into politics.
6.3 Crackdown on corruption	• There should be a crackdown on corruption. • There should be a system of accountability and checks and balances.
6.4 Freedom of expression and freedom of access to information through the media	• There should be freedom of expression. • There should be such a law which provides freedom of access to information through the media. • The media should be independent to expose corruption within the institutions of local government. • There should be independent watch committees which keep vigilant eyes on the ruling class.

Source: Data analysis

5.6.2 Summary of main findings

The findings presented above indicate that the general public itself should wake

up to establish volunteer forums, citizen's volunteer committees and corner

meetings. These volunteer groups of civil society should visit door to door to tell

the poor masses that their rights are being exploited by the corrupt ruling elite, and these exploitations are happening in the absence of local beneficiary involvement. Therefore, the poor population should unite and pressurise the local authorities to ensure that local participation should be implemented transparently.

Further, the findings show that there should be supremacy of law. Local community involvement should be made constitutionally mandatory for local councils to implement a policy of local community participation before introducing any development project. Also, there should be a law of freedom of access to information, and freedom of the media to expose those who commit corruption, and there must be a crackdown on corruption. This is because most feudal lords capture local government power with the purpose of acquiring easy money.

Table 5. 13 Summary of the findings

Main Themes	Major Issues	Findings of Major Issues and Themes
General knowledge of local government and its services.	The military dictator General Musharraf's local government contributed more to physical infrastructure development. Local government institutions are full of corrupt practices.	Powers were transferred from bureaucracy to the publicly elected local government. As a result, the public received a share of physical infrastructure development. Musharraf introduced local government to extend his military regime. There is a minimal system of checks and balances in local government. Thus, corruption is rampant. Zardari's local governments (2013-present) have been more corrupt than the previous ones.
Association between local government and public participation.	The public is the lowest priority during policy implementation. Citizens are deliberately kept away from political information.	Public participation is not introduced to hide corruption, and fraud in local government departments is rife. Public participation was considered as a burden or an unwanted provision by the local elites The common local community is not given any information which might enable them to be more active and alert.

Any specific services where participation could be practised easily or not to be practised during local government development programmes	Activities giving awareness about local community rights are kept away from the local public. State (Sindh and Pakistan) laws are designed in such a way that only the rich and the dominant class can come to power.	The general or local community (the majority of which is lower class) is kept away from local policy activities as well as at provincial and national levels. State laws are designed in such a way that the lower class is unable to take part in state affairs – this lack of equal opportunities exists in all aspects of state life. State laws, both provincial and national, are benefiting only the elite class. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) is window dressing and does not protect the poor population's assets.
Barriers to local community participation in local government policy implementation.	Class control: feudal lords, landlords, religious politicians (Pirs). Those who have been in power are afraid of public supremacy. Corruption and favouritism.	Feudal lord ego - that the right to rule belongs to those who are upper class (feudal lords, landlords, Pirs) in Sindh. Feudal lord status. This class does not believe that the poor population should be equally treated and have equal political opportunities Local elites are always desperate to control power to get rich. Therefore, corruption and public participation cannot work in parallel.
How to achieve local community participation in local government policy implementation.	The common public need to wake up and create forums, committees, and corner meetings to mobilise every single member of general public. There is a need for supremacy of law.	The national and provincial assemblies should formulate a law in which local community involvement in project development should be made compulsory. There should be a rule of law if the constitution makes public participation compulsory.

		There should be a free and fair election system. People who are honest, decent and have a spotless history should be brought into politics. There should be a crackdown on corruption. There should be a system of accountability and checks and balances.

Source: Data analysis 5.7 Conclusion

In each section of this chapter, one main theme pertaining to the research question and research objective was presented. The data have been described in each section, and the main findings have been presented in the summary shown in each table.

The study had three main research objectives. These main three research objectives were expanded into sub-objectives and this yielded seven themes. For the field work, the researcher converted these seven objectives into an open-ended-question based questionnaire. When the researcher analysed the data, four of the questions were merged into two main questions. Thus, the study now had five main research objectives. These objectives were: What knowledge about local government and its services did the respondents possess? What was the association of local government and local community participation in Sindh? Was there any specific service where participation could be achieved differently - where is it, and is it easily achievable or not? Although this question could fall within the quantitative camp, it was designed in such a way that the respondents could be provided with a platform to open themselves up. What were the barriers to local civic engagement? Finally, how could local community involvement be achievable, and how could it be instigated?

The researcher believed that these objectives could be addressed and achieved by designing an open-ended-questions questionnaire. Once more, the researcher reiterates that, in this chapter, the researcher has not recorded any single opinion of his own. The researcher has submitted more than one verbatim quote from the respondents related to the research questions. The main reason for submitting more than one direct quote was it strengthened the validity of the study results. Finally, a more detailed discussion of the results is presented in Chapter 6.

Chapter 6

Discussion

6.0 Introduction

In this chapter, the findings are discussed with the support of the existing literature to achieve the aim and objectives of the research. The results of the study were presented in the previous chapter. The aim of the study is to investigate the role of local government in the participation of the local community in public service delivery in the province of Sindh, Pakistan. To achieve the aim of the study, data were collected through the use of an open-ended questionnaire. The open-ended questions were distributed amongst participants from two regions. One region was rural district Kambar Shahdadkot and the other, Larkana, is an urban city in the province of Sindh. Purposive sampling was adopted to identify the relevant participants to complete the open-ended questions. The data were analysed thematically. After the data analysis, several issues emerged. The emergent issues are the impact of federal laws on the participatory performance of local government, the role of the military establishment on the democratisation of the devolution systems, the control of local elites over local Governments, rampant corruption, political patronage, and favouritism.

In the first chapter, the central state laws influencing participatory development of local government were discussed. The second chapter covered the military regimes of Pakistan and their impact on public participation in local government activities. The main topic in the third chapter was the feudal lords and their control over local governments in Sindh. Furthermore, the barriers to local community participation in the delivery services of local councils were analysed, and in addition, the views of the respondents relating to the feasibility of local involvement in local government policy implementation will be discussed. The

statements of the participants, that is, the qualitative data, will be presented to
support the discussion.

6.1 Broader state policy that has shaped the current scenario with the community-based approach of local government.

The most important question is, could the civic engagement and empowerment
of the marginalised population be expected from the nature of states such as
Pakistan? It is important to focus on the political and socio-cultural factors in
context first. This is because in the critical literature it is suggested that citizens'
participation must be studied through the nature of the contextual factors of a
country (Agrawal 1999; Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Agrawal and Ribot 1999;
Ribot et al. 2006). For example, it is argued that before studying civic
engagement in decision making, the contextual factors, such as political,
economic, and socio-cultural, must be analysed first before expecting a
decentralisation system to be laden with the promise of public participation in
the local decision making process (Ribot et al. 2006; Poteete and Ribot 2011).
Furthermore, other scholars argue that it is very important that before launching
any development reforms, attention should be paid to the appropriate structure,
such as institutional competencies, legislative support for newly introduced
reforms, and behavioural support from sovereign powers. Otherwise, these
development reforms could be hampered by traditional forms of corruption
(Analoui 2008; Analoui 2009; Analoui and Danquah 2017; Danquah et al.
2018).Therefore, it is important to have a look at the nature of the Pakistani
state through the lenses of political scientists and theorists before expecting the
commitments of the central authority through the implementation of public
participation at a local level. The Pakistani government has inherited many
things from the British Raj; the centralised state is a notorious feature of
Pakistani federal laws (Wilder 2009). Lange (2008) states that over the past a

few years various scholars have investigated the potential impact of colonialism on the development trajectories of the post-colonialist states. As far as the case of Pakistan as a post-colonialist state is concerned, it is notorious in the scholarly literature that the Pakistani establishment kept colonial legacies intact in the form of a powerful centre (Talbot 2009b; Wilder 2009). Also, since the creation of Pakistan, the Pakistani military has been controlling the central sovereign power through military coups (Burke and Quraishi 1995; Cheema et al. 2005; Wilder 2009; Lall 2012a). Even in the times of democratic rule, the Pakistani military continued to rule the country from the back seat (Talbot 2009b; Lall 2012a; Lieven 2012).

Pakistan, according to political scientists, has been put in many categories of an abnormal state. For example, it has been described as a failed hybrid state, domestic anarchy, domestic tyranny, the number one terrorism breeding country, and a military mafia-state (Hague and Harrop 2004: 89; Siddiqa-Agha 2007; Riedel 2008; Clark et al. 2017). Clark et al. (2017: 89) have defined the failed state as a state-like entity that cannot coerce and is unable to control successfully the inhabitants of a given territory. If these political scientists' (Clark et al. 2017) definition of a failed state is plausible, Pakistani does not have control over its armed forces. Here, though, the researcher is not bound to explore the characteristics of an abnormal state. However, it is important to have a quick look at the nature of authority and find the relationships between civic engagement and local government systems. The point of the argument is that with a state like Pakistan, which is sometimes called a failed state, or domestic anarchy, or an authoritarian hybrid state, is there any room for complacency such that local governments can always promote public participation, no matter what is the nature of state?

The findings of this study are only in accord with Arnstein's (1969) lowest rung of non-participation (manipulation), in which the system's real objective is not to enable people to participate in the decision making process. The researcher intends to say that though the theory of the ladder of citizen participation elaborated by (Arnstein 1969) may be focused on industrialised democracies, however, the lowest rung of non-participation is in line with the findings of this study, in that powerful actors or local elites do not want to enable the ordinary population to participate in planning or conducting development programmes. However, there is no accord between the findings of this study and the statement by (Arnstein 1969) that some systems tend to observe the empty ritual of participation - this statement might be focussed on democratic countries, where the system cannot blatantly prevent people from participating in decision making, though it is an empty ritual. As far as the case of Pakistani system is concerned, here the common citizens are blatantly and directly prevented from participation.

For example, in much of the literature it is realised that the laws of a central state and feasibility must be carefully analysed in the context of any country before pursuing local government reform (Rondinelli et al. 1989; Rondinelli 1991; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000; Galiani et al. 2008). Moreover, of course, to accept the change from centralised junctures to democratic systems, it is necessary to change the behaviour and outlooks of developing countries (Analoui 2009). This is because federal laws might have an impact on the democratisation process of decentralisation in any country. Therefore, it may be relevant to review the following literature describing the type of governance in Pakistan. Governance of Pakistan has been shaped by the military establishment since the birth of the country. Even Pakistan's civilian

governments tend to be more dictatorial than the military administration of the state (Lieven 2012; Mukherjee 2016).

According to several authors (Wheeler 1995; Webler and Tuler 2000; Habermas 2002; Habermas 2015), the theory of public participation emphasises that for civic engagement, the system must have, at least, two principles: fairness and competence. Fairness represents that a system - either a local government or federal state system - must provide equal opportunities for all interested or affected beneficiaries to assume that their role is legitimate in the decision-making process. As far competence is concerned, it refers to the ability of the system to reach the best reasonable decision known under all present conditions. However, as the data were observed, it was realised that 57% percent of respondents reported that during both periods of local government, public participation has been the lowest priority of the local authorities of Sindh. After coming into power, the marginalised population has been kept away from local governance activities such as budgeting, deliberation, and development. The following quote illustrates how the participants expressed these ideas:

> There should be a proper true representation (the honest and loyal public representatives should be in power). True representation can be possible when elections are free and transparent. There should be a rule of law; elections should be conducted according to the supremacy of law. There must be the system of accountability. Here (in Sindh and Pakistan), we do not have accountability. There is no punishment for crimes. Therefore, the powerholders feel confident that they cannot be punished for their wrong doings. (Shahid Ali, teacher, Union Council Kallar, Kamabar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

This evidence makes a reference to the current characteristics of the central state, which shows that there is no system of accountability or checks and balances which can mend the behaviour of the ruling elites. The statement is consistent with those of (Neshkova and Kalesnikaite 2019), who state that when central states do not support the true implementation of decentralisation, there

are various forms of corruption: conflicts of interests, bribery, extortion, embezzlement, and nepotism. The expectations of (Smith 1998), that even the weaker form of public participation can be beneficial to marginalised communities, seem difficult to achieve in the context of the Pakistani state. This is because the federal state itself is inclined to create gaps between government authority and the ruled (Lall 2012a). The following quotes are inconsistent with (Lall 2014), who believes that the main purpose of the Pakistani state is to keep the public unaware of modern citizenship knowledge:

> General Musharraf's period was a military dictatorship. Various regions of Sindh were divided among the feudal lords. For example, Kambar was awarded to the Chandio tribe. District Larkano was given to Altaf Unar to rule. Shahdadkot was given to the Magsi tribe. Ghotki to the Mahar caste. He (the local elite class) loves his own interests. (Mihran, social worker, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

The data analysis shows that the decentralisation system is used merely for the powerholders' purposes instead of for empowering the downtrodden society of Pakistan and its other sub-units. The results are also pertinent to the literature, in which it is stated that decentralisation may impact a state negatively if central state laws are weak or poor communities lack the ability to voice their issues (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005).

6.1.1 Central state policies and inequality in local government

Historically, it has been indicated that the military has been using local government systems to purchase local politicians for the legitimisation of state control (Cheema et al. 2005). The critical perspective of the literature illustrates very similar concerns that in the absence of a strong and determined central authority in supporting and executing service delivery and providing opportunities for citizen participation at a local level (Herzer and Pirez 1991; Mukandala 1998; Gaventa and Valderrama 1999; Kessy 2013), local governments cannot be expected to invite civic engagement in the local

decision making process. This is because in some developing countries the government institutions do not intend to see that the traditional power repositories should be exercised by new actors and citizen participation (Schonwalder 1997; Crook et al. 1998; Mukandala 1998). There is a clash between the governmental holders of power and the new candidates for local power over the exercise of power. Crook et al. (1998) conducted a study of Indian local councils and their role in citizen participation, and this study illustrates that most of the time local councils avoid including local villages. Huq (2014), in conducting a qualitative case study in Bangladesh, concludes that even though various programmes were introduced for citizen participation, as a whole citizens' access to influence on the local governance process is still nominal. Thus citizens' participation in Bangladesh is hampered by the central government's (both military and democratic) intentions to maintain their political power base at a local level by appointing their nominated men (Huq 2014: 434). These limits are caused by the privileged sections of society. The main factor is that these local councils tend to be possessive of their power. The following quote explains why authoritarian governments launched the decentralisation systems in Pakistan:

> During local government reforms under General Musharraf, local government Nazims (Park 2003) were never accountable to the common public. They (Muhammad Khan and Mirza 2013) were focused on pleasing the military dictator. General Musharraf was a military dictator; therefore, he was also not responsible and accountable before the poor masses. (Mihran Khan, teacher, Larkana, Sindh)

It is evident that local government institutions are manipulated for political purposes by military generals as well as by politicians. The literature even indicates that the local governments of Pakistan have been used for centralisation instead of for a democratic purpose (Cheema et al. 2005; Abbasi

2006), and politics in the country is shaped, as well as dominated, by the military-bureaucratic elite, with the secondary tool, who are the landed elite. For 57 years of the political history of this country, the army has been the ultimate arbiter in the affairs of the state. Thus, the nature of the governance of this central state is dominated by the military of Pakistan (Kukreja and Singh 2005).Throughout the history of Pakistan, the military has remained a major player of power politics (Kukreja and Singh 2005). Since 1947 and the creation of Pakistan, it has been ruled more by military regimes than by publicly elected governments. Military dictators ruled the country from 1958 to 1971, 1977 to 1988, and 1999 to August 2008. This situation has determined the lack of progress for most of the population (Critelli 2010).

The following statement shows an acknowledgement that the military has been manipulating various state institutions with the purpose of legitimising the military regimes of the state:

> General Musharraf took steps after coming into power. (He) sidelined the educated class by offering them incentives. This educated class always used to praise Musharraf. Secondly, he introduced a local government system whereby feudal lords, their children, their relatives and even their agents got elected through strategy. These local councils were handed over to the feudal lord class as a political bribe. (Iqra Abro, female member of a student union, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

The above statement shows that the state of Pakistan has been directly or indirectly ruled by the military establishment of the country. Since the creation of Pakistan, the Pakistani military has been growing stronger and stronger in its permanent position (Wilder 2009). Now, the Pakistani military is not only the country's strongest bureaucratic institution, but also its strongest political institution. Thus, it has become a group of interest too. Alienation by the Pakistani state is the greatest source of its government education system,

where social studies were replaced by, under the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhuto, the Pakistani studies that created the gap between the state and its citizens. The Pakistani state has increasingly abrogated its responsibility to provide a political education to its citizens (Lall 2012a; Lall 2012b).Therefore, non-democratic forces may have negative impacts on local government results. The feasibility of local democratisation must be carefully analysed using the ontological lens of any country before analysing the impacts of decentralisation (Rondinelli et al. 1989).

It has been revealed that the poor communities are treated as commodities by the ruling elites of Sindh. The general public do not have any hope that these central or provincial forms of governance will provide welfare for them. It has been raised that citizens become cynical if the downtrodden groups feel that formal democratic institutions are weak and dictatorship and clientelism is strong (Neshkova and Kalesnikaite 2019).

6.1.2 The military and devolution

Most analysts view Pakistani politics and policies as being under the influence of authoritarian rulers. Decentralisation reforms have often been launched by such governments which came into power through backdoor principles: invasion, annexation, and military coups (Ziring 2003; Mukherjee 2016). Furthermore, Huq's (2014) study on limits to citizen participation in Bangladesh concluded that the military of Bangladesh maintains its intentions to consolidate its powerbase at a local level.

The following statement makes a reference to how (and with what purposes) devolution reforms were introduced in Sindh:

> General Musharraf's coup d'état on 12 October 1999 wrapped up the democratic government. He introduced a local government system to legitimise his military regime. Local government was given the

> following services: supply of clean drinking water, supply of streetlights, a cleaning system of streets and street pavements, and employment in local government. (Anmol, female member of student society, Union Council, Town Committee, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

The findings of the study provide evidence that General Musharraf introduced local government reforms (the Devolution Power Plan of 2001) with the purpose of legitimising the military regime.

> General Musharraf's period was an authoritarian period. These local councils could not give good results. This is because the feudal class was brought into local government. And the feudal class is not from the common public. As a result, local councils could not deliver the basic services…Mr Asif Ali Zardari's local councils are the worst. This is because in his period of local governance corruption was at its peak. The feudal lords brought into local government their own 'yes men'. (Manzoor Ali, businessman and member of a labour union, Union Council Jonanee Shareef, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

The above evidence shows that local governments are awarded to local feudal lords by the top military leadership. In other words, it is usually already decided who would come into power in local governments. Local governments have been manipulated as a tool by the Pakistani Military General for their survival of coups d'état. For instance, (International Crisis Group 2004) reports that during the military regime of General Musharraf, Nazims District (Park 2003) spent public funds and used the state machinery to promote pro-Musharraf rallies during the April 2002 presidential referendum, to support the Musharraf party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam) (PML-Q). Moreover, local governments have proved to be a significant utility of the military regimes to apply divide-and-rule strategies. As some authors (Ribot 2003; Ribot et al. 2006) concluded in their study, the choice of powers and institutional arrangements devised by the central state can have a crucial impact on decentralisation systems. Khan (Khan and Kurosaki 2015) points out that General Musharraf's regime, through a military coup, was in dire need of seeking legitimisation in the face of international criticism. Therefore, evading

such criticism, he introduced the Devolution Power Plan of 2000 to win over local elites.

The findings of this study reflect the historical analysis of previous local governments enacted by non-representative (most of them military generals) regimes to legitimise their authoritarian control over the state. Some authors (Cheema et al. 2005; Mohmand and Cheema 2007) have said that Musharraf's local government reforms represented a continuity of this central strategy of previous non-democratic regimes to legitimise his military regime. One of the recurring findings of the themes was that Musharraf introduced local government reforms to ingrain local clientelism to legitimise his military coup d'état. For example, as stated in Section 5.2 (**Chapter Five - Results**), General Musharraf divided regions amongst the various local feudal lords and landed lords of the province of Sindh.

> When a General toppled down an elected prime minister…he brought some changes to different departments to try to elongate his regime. To lengthen his military rule, he introduced a system called local councils. (Aneeta Gul, female member of student society, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

This shows that the sovereignty of the state of Pakistan is in control of its military establishment. The Pakistani military, as an authoritarian force, is unaccountable to the public laws of state. It appears that it depends on the military generals to whom they bestow rubberstamp powers over the federating units.

6.2 The influence of local government on public participation

After the military, which is the main broker of central state power, the rest of the political power is captured by the *Wadiras* (local tribal chieftains), *Pirs* (religious-cum-political families of Pakistan) and the *Zamindars* (landed elites) of Sindh. As they misuse funds, therefore, they bar the public from getting involved in

local government dialogue and deliberation activities. This is corruption, due to which the elite class takes part in local government elections. The data observation shows that there are two main reasons why the rural elites maintain their control over local government. Firstly, they know that there will be no checks and balances if they commit any corruption. Secondly, they eat up the available budgets through local administration.

6.2.1 Control of the feudal lords and alienation of common citizens from local governance

The findings revealed that the common public has deliberately been alienated from the activities of local governments in Sindh. This reflects the fact that local government authorities do not want to empower local communities. The reason for this is that the feudal lords, landed elite and religious leaders want to maintain their hegemony over the political power of Pakistan. In the following statement, a female respondent provides a reference:

> This is the darkest period of local governments. Local councils have completely failed in completing their responsibilities. And there are many reasons for that. For example, in this system, the white collars are recruited. And, by injecting the white-collar class, there is extra need placed on the deserving, and corruption becomes rampant. Therefore, this system went down and finally failed. (Anmol, female member of student society, Union Council, Town Committee, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

The above statements refer to local governments introduced by the publicly elected government of Mr Azif Ali Zardari, former president of Pakistan, and currently the Co-Chairman of the PPP. The feudal lords use the state institutions for their own interests instead of for the welfare of the common citizens. The findings of this study reveal that local governments are often captured by the landed elite class. This class accounts for a mere 5% of the population of the country, but it owns nearly 90% of the total agricultural land of the country. These Zamindars, Wadiras and feudal lords run the country by dint

of their wealth (Serwar 1989). The following statement demonstrates evidence of this:

> The local councils of this period remained at the centre of corruption. In these councils (the rural elites), uneducated people and incompetents were elected; that was the bad luck of the common population. The local councils' entire focus was on hoarding public funds unscrupulously, therefore they never thought to contribute to the local community. In institutions where there is a culture of corruption, to expect anything from such corrupt institutions would be equal to stupidity. The current local councils have been in power since 2008. They have failed completely in addressing the legal matters of the public. (Iqra Abro, female member of a student union, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

The findings highlight the fact that local government institutions have always been captured by local Wadiras, Zamindars and Pirs. The evidence is consistent with an analysis of the International Crisis Group of Asia (International Crisis Group 2004), which finds that the key issue is a lack of checks and balances across various levels of district governments in Pakistan. As a result, the heads of local authorities feel themselves unaccountable to any law. Whoever introduces local government - either a military general or someone from the civilian government - ultimately these local government institutions are captured by the local feudal lords of Sindh province. It (the national government) does not want any checks and balances over the governance of local feudal lords (International Crisis Group 2004; Lall 2012a; Lall 2012b; Lall 2014; Wahid et al. 2017).

The findings of this study contrast with(Rietbergen-McCracken 1996; Shah 2006), who use the World Bank's conceptual framework to overcome the gap of checks and balances in various developing countries. The introduction of local government reforms is crucial to empower the citizens to demand accountability for their government services and fair distribution of public budgets. The conceptual framework of beneficiary participation in local government policy will

be an important innovation: the process of local democratisation (Fiske 1996; Khan et al. 2007). The results of this study indicate that local governments do not encourage the participation of the local community in Sindh.

Moreover, it is evident from the results that the local governments of Sindh have an adverse impact on beneficiary participation. In addition, it is revealed that public participation is the lowest priority of the local elites of the province of Sindh. Moreover, local government governance is negatively impacting the poor communities of Sindh. As Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005) state, when central state's laws are weaker and poor communities lack the ability to voice their preferences, decentralisation may negatively impact the poor population. This situation occurs in such countries where the process of transition to democracy and a market economy is underway, and where political institutions are still fragile (Neshkova and Kalesnikaite 2019).

As the results in **Chapter Five** (Section 5.2) indicated, 43% of respondents reported that local government funds are usually used illegally by the feudal lords.

The findings demonstrate that local governments in Sindh are the medium for corruption by the feudal lords. Analoui (2009) shows concerns that corruption in underdeveloped countries exists in its most varied and complex forms. Therefore, it (corrupt political culture) can easily derail the fair process of development, as the following statement demonstrates:

> The feudal lords and landlords keep the common public away. Their basic manifesto is to keep the public away. They are kings of corruption, therefore, why would they work for the common people? They always involve a group with proposals about how to make more money, not how to deliver to the public. (Irshad Ali, Massaood, student organisation, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

According to the results, as there is no system of checks and balances in the institution of local government, the rural politicians have carte blanche to eat up public resources. The findings of the study are coherent with those of (Crook and Sverrisson 1999), who comment that local government institutions are dependent on the nature of local politics and the nature of the central state's relations with local units. With reference to the results of local government, one social worker stated:

> There is no system of checks and balances. No one can do accountability checks here, because (the feudal lords) have their own people everywhere. The national state law curbing corruption (NAB) is a drama and pretence and feigns the national government. The current system has completely mutilated the common citizens. (Yousuf, social worker Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

Observation of the data reveals that these political parties are controlled by feudal lords. Even the laws of central state, dealing with corruption, seem to be window dressing. As the evidence of this study indicates, the central state of Pakistan is primarily dominated by military generals, directly or indirectly. Whenever any military general occupies the central power of the state, he introduces local government reforms with the purpose of legitimising his military coup. Therefore, if there is such a situation as in Pakistan, the authors (Crook and Sverrisson 1999) suggest that the effective participation of the poor and responsiveness of local authorities will be dismal. Furthermore, these authors (1999) conducted a study in various developing countries, including Kenya. They found that local elites always capture power and even control the mechanism of the participatory provisions in the district assemblies. Local participation in Kenya remains limited to arrangements for reaching agreement with central state policies (Rondinelli et al. 1989; Crook and Sverrisson 1999).

The results of this study conflict with the argument that decentralisation has the potential to promote civic education. Civic education inculcates common citizens of these rights and obligations, mobilising their importance to implement meaningful reforms, representation, justice, and services (Ribot 2003).

6.3 Barriers to participation: the institutional and contextual socio-political factors hindering participation

When the respondents discussed the recurring theme of the barriers to local community participation, it was indicated that the main hurdle in the involvement of local citizens is the dominance of the Wadiras, Zamindars and Pirs. This class has been in power since the creation of Pakistan. Furthermore, this class has been supported by the military establishment. As the military of Pakistan has become the strongest political institution and interest group in the country (Wilder 2009), they feel that to control the 200 million people of Pakistan, it would be easier to do this through a few families of feudal lords and landed elites (Serwar 1989).

Analysing the findings, it can be said that the first barrier to local citizens' participation in local government policy implementation is an unequal class structure in which the dominant class belongs to the feudal lords, landlords, and religious leaders. From the data observation, it can be seen that as the landed elites have remained in power since the birth of Pakistan, they now intend to maintain their hegemony. The findings of the study support the work of (Lima 2019), who states that the most significant barrier to the participation of citizens is posed by the political elites, including industrialists and agribusiness. Furthermore, (Nylen 2011; Lima 2019) suggest that barriers to participation are posed by the unequal power structures at a local level and the absence of transparency of central government policies towards social movement and

citizens' empowerment. The elite class barrier to citizens' participation has been found in different structures; however, the political elite class is recognised to be more of an obstacle to local participation in the service delivery of local governance in Brazil (Lima 2019).

6.3.1 Local feudal lords' hegemony and the fate of local participation

The findings suggest that another barrier to local public participation is the attitude of indifference on the part of the local elites of the province of Sindh. In the results presented in **Chapter Five**, Table 5.2 shows that 40% of respondents stated that these local governments are always captured by feudal lords, landlords, and Pirs. The local public does not have the opportunity or freedom to be candidates in these local governments' elections. One of the respondents from Larkana commented:

> As the influential brought forward their own favourite groups in local government, the poor were kept away in all services. This is the culture that the class always brings their own people to power. The common public is pushed backwards, so that they cannot be aware of their power. (Ali Haider Memon, labour member, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

The above evidence indicates that local governments are captured by a specific class who supports and brings in their own people to power. As Barter (2016) found, where democracy and state laws are weak, there will be a reign of clientelism and control of elites that makes decentralisation worse for the poor public. Furthermore, Barter (2016) suggests that in non-democratic states, local government institutions are captured by local strongmen. A few other studies are also in convergence with the findings of this study. For example, the common factors that contribute negatively to citizen participation in local government seem to be the dishonesty of local elites and the misuse of power on the part of local elites. The CCBs could not play a positive role, because they were hijacked by the elite. For example, the CCBs in the Muzaffargarh district of

Punjab were mostly controlled by the local political leadership of the area. The hidden motives for these CCBs being established by local politicians were to strengthen their influence and gain profits. The elected influential politicians formed the CCBs with the names of their relatives on the paper, but ran all matters of the CCBs by themselves (Khan and Anjum 2013).

However, as Kurosaki (2006) indicates through a survey involving 42 union councils in Hafizabad District, the quality of leadership and proper rules of CCBs were key determinants to the success of the CCB initiative. Further, Kurosaki emphasises that the capacity building of CCBs and the local community was important.

However, the results could be different if the central state supported decentralisation; it would mean the whole mechanism of the state, community and stakeholders supported each other in decision making, and the government would be more exposed to show their commitment to the development of local communities (Crook and Sverrisson 1999; Ahmad and Talib 2010; Ahmad et al. 2016).

The results of this study, however, are consistent with the arguments that a publicly elected government at a provincial level would consider devolution reforms as a competing tier or patronage (Wilder 2009; Husain 2012).

Arnstein (1969) states that when governments introduce the manipulative form of participation, "Their real objective is not to enable people to participate in planning or conducting the programs, but to enable the powerholders…(to) cure the participants" (Arnstein 1969: 2). The following findings also suggest this:

> They did not invite the public due to the fear that if the public is involved in local policies, they (the public) will happen to know about their rights. The citizens will be enlightened with a new thinking that could jeopardize the luxuriant lifestyle of the ruling class. Even in the Zardari

(Co-Chairman of the PPP) period, they did not invite the public. However, if they invited the common man, they would still do it according to their own will. There is no thinking about public participation. Here there is only favouritism. (Liyakyat, teacher, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

The second hurdle to participation is the greed of that dominant class, which is given carte blanche due to the weak democratic mechanism of the central state. Both the dominant players (feudal lords) and the military have economic interests; therefore, they prefer weak democratic state laws (Siddiqa-Agha 2007; Talbot 2009a). As Talbot (Talbot 2009a) highlights in his review of the works of(Siddiqa-Agha 2007), Pakistan is an economic empire of the Pakistani military establishment. The military controls political power for the economy of the state. For example, there are literature reports that the military runs its own separate schools, hospitals, big cement factories, and Shaheen Air; furthermore, retired military officers occupy the main white-collar jobs in the country, such as Vice Chancellors of Pakistani universities. Even now, the Pakistani military owns large tracts of land, which in total could be 11.58 million acres (Siddiqa-Agha 2007).

6.3.2 Overview of the current scenario of the local government cycle in Sindh, Pakistan.

Figure 6. 1 Cycle of local governments in Sindh

As literature(Fair 2009) concluded that genuine civilian control over the military is not likely to happen in the near future. There are two reasons for this. One is that the military is reluctant to lose control, and the other is the historical structural complexities that would prevent politicians from governing effectively (Fair 2009). Thus, the researcher's analysis suggests if the military is not ready to step down from the reigns of the country permanently, it is not going to introduce such a supremacy of law which could be applied to all individuals of the state. As a result, the feudal lords will continue to earn money illegally from local government budgets.

6.3.3 Family-owned politics

Political power is dominated by a few families of tribal chiefs. These rural elites play a critical role in the economic and political policies of local government

programmes. The literature is also consistent with the situation in the Philippines in terms of the economic and political life of the country (Shatkin 2000). Furthermore, the results of the study show that 26% of respondents reported that the political parties and political institutions are designed in such a style that only rich people have access to participate in political activities, such as creating and maintaining a party which is maintained by descent-based politics. In other words, it is reported that in Sindh, the political institutions are based on political dynasties. The following statement from the data makes a reference to how the funds of local government are released:

> These local governments became political rather than a neutral institution to serve the needs-based citizens. Therefore, these local authorities support the party decisions. Local government services were given only on a party basis. The publicly elected People's Party promoted only corruption. The available funds were given to the favoured party workers and members instead of the oppressed groups of the population. Therefore, they did not invite participation. (Qamar-u-Din, lecturer, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

So, the findings reveal that these families have a critical impact on the participation decisions of the local public. Consistent with other work in India, (Chhibber 2013) considers the case of the Indian National Congress, where the top leadership has stayed within the Nehru family. It started with Nehru himself, and followed on to Indira Gandhi, Sanjay Gandhi, Rajvi Gandhi, Sonia Gandhi and now Rahul Gandhi. There is a similar case with the PPP (Mohammed 2016), where its headship has stayed within the Bhutto family. The PPP was founded by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. After his death, the leadership of the party was automatically given to his daughter, Benazir Bhutto. After the death of Benazir Bhutto, the Chairmanship was given to her son, Bilawal Bhutto. The same pattern is being practised by other parties in Pakistan. The findings indicate that another barrier to the participation of the local community in local government delivery services is the family-based politics of dynasties. The researcher has

observed that in Sindh the political parties are owned by the specific families of the feudal lords.

Thus, the findings of this study do not support the idea that local government can introduce community driven development, which is supported by the World Bank (Dasgupta and Beard 2007).

However, there is evidence from the results that Sindh is the sub-unit of a country where, most of the time, decentralisation reforms have been introduced from the top down, and an authoritarian approach has dominated central or local politics since the creation of Pakistan. The same concerns are reported by(Dasgupta and Beard 2007), who state that in some parts of Indonesia community driven development is hampered by powerful family-based groups.

The political leadership of Sindh does want to devolve the power to the locals. As the findings reveal, the main fear amongst these rural elites is that if the public becomes active in terms of safeguarding its rights, these few families will not be able to control the power of the state. The one shared characteristic is that these parties invite only their supporters to receive public funds for development. These funds, as revealed in the results, are given to those who are Jeyalla (party workers), or to their own friends or families.

The findings reflect the expressions of other work, such as (Malesky et al. 2016), who state that decentralisation did not contribute to its lofty goals when central leaders did not want to devolve power to local communities and launched programmes where the true spirit of decentralisation was undermined, and also when centralised policies were leveraged to negate the trickling down of power to the poor communities (Malesky et al. 2016).

The evidence indicates that these dominant families of Sindh have created an extreme situation of poverty for the rest of the disadvantaged population. The main hidden motive of these rural elites is that they want to maintain their control over state power. As a study by (Critelli 2010) shows, there is extreme poverty in Pakistani society; poverty is strongly linked with the feudal class structure, unequal land ownership, and tribal chiefs controlling the policies of the poor public (Critelli 2010). Thus, the majority of the responses suggested that as tribal chiefs and rural elites do not want to lose their hegemony of local Government, they disallow the local community from participating in the delivery of services. Similarly, a case study of the city of Navotas in Metropolitan Manila (Shatkin 2000) concluded that the success of decentralisation reforms and participation is limited by dominant political families. Thus, the effectiveness of Citizen Board Organisations (CBOs) on the participation of beneficiaries in various activities of municipal projects was constrained by a handful of dominant families, and these elite groups also control political life in these areas (Shatkin 2000). This study depicts the power elite theory (D'Antonio 1965; Khan 2008), which holds that there is a small group of the community who remain as power elites. Many power elites are not representative of the larger community in social terms. They may be from the upper middle class of any society. The power elites have special skills and qualities required for ruling. They look different from the rest of the population because of their social status, political power, and resources.

6.3.4 Political patronage and vote-buying local politics (favouritism)

The results reflect the fact that if the local authorities (consisting of feudal lords and the landed elite) support public participation in local government development projects, then they will not be able to spend the available funds

congruent with their voters, supporters and party workers. The dominant families prefer to spend their available funds with the purpose of buying votes for their future election. This tendency dates back to the British Raj in Pakistan, where these local institutions were created by the colonial administration to earn the loyalties of local elites through a selective but extensive system of patronage. This practice was very common in the Punjab (which now dominates the state of Pakistan through military establishment) (Talbot 2002; Talbot 2009a; Talbot 2009b).

The findings are consistent with the works of (Crook and Sverrisson 1999), in which they surveyed many developing countries regarding the relationships of local councils and representation of the poor and disadvantaged. These authors (2001) found in one case study of Bangladesh that 64% of the subjects thought that the local council had negatively impacted the representation of the disadvantaged poor, mainly because of corruption and the dictatorial attitude of the dominant political elites (Crook and Sverrisson 1999; Crook and Sverrisson 2001).

The results of the study are pertinent. As Prud'homme (Prud'homme 1995) indicates, theoretically, demand for decentralisation is strong all over the world, but the positive results of decentralisation are not as clear as the standard theory of fiscal federalism suggests; there are many serious drawbacks that should be addressed before launching any decentralisation reforms. The findings show that the role of local government to invite local citizens to take part in decision-making is limited by the culture of political patronage and vote-securing in the local politics of Sindh. This issue with local participation has highlighted that local authorities, which are primarily comprised of rural elites and one-party rule, invite their own supporters to benefit from the allocation of

funds. In other words, the available funds of local government are spent on their party members, workers, and voters, instead of allocating funds to the deserving needs-based communities. In such a situation, the deserving beneficiary participation in decision-making is not tolerated by the authoritarian rural elites. Thus, political and family patronage is also a constraint on local community participation in the policy implementation of local governments in Sindh.

The evidence of this study supports(Malesky et al. 2016), which refers to Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, and states that all of the links of weakness in implementation (decentralisation and civic engagement) pertain to the fear that the ruling elites may lose control of their status quo of power hegemony. The authors (2016) suggest that if local government is expected to be a local school of training for democracy, then party patronage and vote-buying should be reduced as much as possible.

6.3.5 Impact of corruption on local participation in the decision-making of local governments

One of the main recurring issues in many, if not most, of the themes was that corruption is a major barrier to the participation of local citizens in local government programmes. The following statement from one of the respondents referred to this issue related to corruption as a barrier to local participation:

> During the time of General Musharraf's local government, the Nazims (Park 2003) thought it necessary to keep the public away. Otherwise, it would have been difficult for the Nazims to corrupt. Furthermore, if they invited the public, the public could have discovered an awareness about their rights. As a result, the public would be able to demand their rights. Now, as there is no participation, local authorities are making fake bills of development and continuing their corruption. That is the reason they would never invite public participation. (Muhammad Usman, former government councillor, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

This is an example of how the attitude of corruption can have an adverse impact on democratic participation in local governments in a feudal lord-ridden

province. Within the observations, in each case, it is seen that the military and the feudal lords create state policies for their own benefits.

The findings are consistent with the work (Prud'homme 1995), which indicates that decentralisation might be accompanied by more corruption in many, if not most, developing countries. The results of this study are pertinent to the findings of (Prud'homme 1995), who states that corruption is more rampant in local government institution than in any other departments of the national government. The following statement shows that corruption is one of the main barriers to public participation:

> The main cause of not inviting local communities was that if they invited neighbourhood residents, the chances of committing corruption would be reduced. To be successful in carrying out corruption, it was necessary to keep the public away from the participation. Even Zardari's local governments are the same. (Naveed Khan, student organisation, city district, Larkana, Sindh)

This indicates that the powerholders do not want the majority of the population to be active regarding their rights. This is because the dishonest rural elites have been able to exploit public funds without any fear of corruption charges. These rural elites have been supported by the tradition of establishing patron-client relationships between the state bureaucracy and local elites, which has resulted in rural-urban division and has deterred politics away from the middle class (Cheema et al. 2005). Thus, it has paved a way for the trend of introducing local governments not on the demand of the local public or general public, but mainly as a result of the central government initiative. This initiative was under the control of the well-entrenched imperial attitude of the old informal feudal lords, being antagonistic to the international theory of local democratisation. Furthermore, the following statement makes reference to the

conventional powerholders who deliberately do not want to empower the poor

communities in Sindh:

> According to my knowledge, the reason for not involving the public in
> policy implementation is that if they invited the public, the public would
> make them naked - unmask their corrupt deeds. If they become naked,
> they will not be able to do corruption. The public gives them votes for
> their development, and once they become naked, the public would
> demand their money. (Aslam, senior student of the university, Urban
> City, Larkana, Sindh)

This reveals that *Wadiras*, landlords and local politicians do not like local

beneficiaries' involvement in the decision-making of local government service

delivery. The main cause of this seems to be that the dominant class is focused

on eating up the available funds of local government without public knowledge.

These feudal lords, who came into power as civilians, happen to be a

discouraging factor for the democratisation process of devolution reforms

(Lieven 2012; Mukherjee 2016). The following evidence shows why public

participation is stymied:

> Ada (brother), there are many factors, but the major one is corruption.
> The institutions which are corrupt in nature, could they serve the
> public? Never, and impossible. For example, if these local councils
> encourage public participation, they would not be acting upon public
> suggestions. This is because they must ignore the common citizens.
> These local institutions must keep the public away from policy
> implementation. (Manzoor Ali, businessman and member of a labour
> union, Union Council Jonanee Shareef, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

It is realised that the poor population has stopped trusting the rulers. The

evidence reveals that, due to corruption, public participation is stymied. Even if

the local authorities pretend to call on the public, they ignore the public's

suggestions. This is because if the corrupt local authorities were to invite the

citizens to take part in the decision-making of local government, then corrupt

activities might be exposed. Interestingly, this correlation is related to the realist

literature (Prud'homme 1995), which states that if corruption is already rampant

in any local society, then decentralisation automatically increases the level of

corruption. Their (the feudal lords) main purpose of remaining in power is to hoard illegal wealth and remain in power.

As (Asutay 2006) points out, the literature and political theory used in the epistemology of industrialised democracies may not be applicable to the other nations of developing and under democratic countries. Similarly, Arnstein's (1969) top rung of citizen participation, wherein they (the local government and the community) agree to share the power of planning and decision making through joint community boards, cannot easily be implemented in a military dominant country such as Pakistan. However, Arnstein's (1969) theory's lowest rungs of non-participation (manipulation and therapy) make much more sense in the context of Pakistan, when the (world Bank 2004a; World Bank 2004b) reports that General Musharraf introduced local government reforms with the direct involvement of local beneficiaries in the decision making process. However, Danquah et al. (2018) express their concerns that many cases of citizen participation in developing countries have generally been selective in such a manner that only those whose views might not necessarily represent the views of the government are invited. Thus, it cannot be true participation when the beneficiaries are not meaningfully facilitated in the decision making process (Wheeler 1995; Webler and Tuler 2000). In other words, a country like Pakistan can only introduce manipulatory forms of citizen participation, where the powerholders - local elites, feudal lords, or *Pirs* - are enabled to cure the marginalised population of Sindh.

6.4 How can public participation be successful despite various structural barriers and in the context of Pakistani political culture?

When asked to give suggestions as to how public participation can be made possible in the current scenario, the respondents suggested public activism on

a large scale, the statutory status of participation and supremacy of law, and a crackdown on corruption.

6.4.1 Public activism can make participation possible

The eighth level of Choguill's ladder of community participation is in line with this section, in that when a government does nothing to solve local problems, local communities, by themselves, launch programmes of improvements for their neighbourhood, though not always successfully (Choguill 1996: 440). The findings reveal that 54% of participants purported that the members of a disadvantaged civil society should establish volunteer forums, citizens' volunteer committees and corner meetings. The following statement from a former Union Councillor makes such a reference:

> We shall have to prepare to be active, whether they should be from civil society, educated people at village level and town level need to pressurise the management of local government that they have to invite common citizenry during the implementation of these activities. This is because the common people are aware of their basic needs. The local population can give the best guidance on how to implement the local government's policy. (Deedar Ali, former Union Councillor, Kambar Shahdadkot, UC, Ghatthar, Sindh)

It has become evident that the common citizens do not have expectations from their usual powerholders. In addition, these members of the disadvantaged population might have a gut intuition that the feudal lords would prefer not to empower the poor population. This is because these common citizens are taking inference from the history of these feudal lords. The observation of the data reflects that the only ray of hope is the volunteer activism of the disadvantaged population of Sindh. This shows the situation of despair amongst the local public. It appears that the local public has no hope that citizens' basic needs will be served through local governments in the current scenario of an unequal class structure. Local citizens have only one ray of hope, which is that every single member of the disadvantaged population should come out through

the auspices of volunteer forums and social committees to mobilise the rest of the public and shout about their activism.

This shows that the disadvantaged citizens know that local authorities do not want to devolve power to the underprivileged public of Sindh. It reveals that those who have been in power for most of the time (the powerholders) are not going to let the local population be involved in the decision-making of local governments in the near future. Effective public participation is in many ways dependent on the ability and effectiveness of local authorities; it is widely criticised that it is unclear how to incorporate citizen input onto critical resource allocation and so make effective public participation more appropriate (Marlowe and Portillo 2006). A study by Marlowe and Portillo (2006) found that community participation creates a balance in budgeting in local government business. Furthermore, it is very difficult for the rural population of developing countries to initiate public participation, as concluded in the literature (Ingham and Kalam 1992). Igham and Kalam (1992) attribute these difficulties in public participation in local government to the national political structure, local power set up, and the inter-relationships within the class structures. As one member of the Shopkeepers' Union adds:

> We all should keep in mind that we (civil society) should inform the common citizen that local councils will never ever give the service delivery away and invite public participation until the common citizen puts pressure on them. The local government must be pressurised, through the informed common citizen, that they must start the process of dialogue and deliberation. This is because, with the dialogue and the deliberation, the issues of the public will be resolved very easily, and there will be solutions to the issues. (Naban Khoso, businessman and member of a trade union, Kambar Shahdadkot, UC, Miandad Chingini, Sindh)

These forums should convey the message to the local communities that local governments have been eating up the public's funds without letting the public

know. To protect the citizens' own rights, they should come out and be active. As citizens know their own issues better than local governments do, the beneficiaries should therefore be invited to dialogue and deliberation in the policy of development programmes of the local governments. As highlighted in the literature, at all levels of government, citizen participation programmes were launched, beginning in the 1950s, with the underlying assumption that if citizens became actively involved as participants in their democracy, the governance that emerged from this process would be more democratic and more effective (Irvin and Stansbury 2004). Furthermore, it is realised that development requires the support and cooperation of local beneficiaries (Werlin 1992).

6.4.2 Constitutional status of participation and supremacy of law

When the results were recorded, 37% of the respondents had put forth that citizens' participation should be made compulsory through the constitution of the state. Furthermore, local councils cannot approve any release of development funds unless local community participation takes place. Along with that, when legislating the law on giving statutory status, there should be supremacy of law so that the law should be implemented properly. As one councillor who has worked in both periods of the Union Councils of the rural region commented:

> There should be an amendment to the Sindh Local Government Act of 2013 in which the powers should be devolved to the grass roots level. There should be an amendment to Article 140-A of the Pakistan constitution in which the powers should be transferred from the provincial governments to local councils. There should be a provision for the public participation, that public participation must be treated seriously. And there should be meetings with local government representatives in which they must be advised that until and unless they invite the common public, the resolution of public issues is not possible. (Muhammad Murad, former councillor, Union Council, Jonanee Shareef, District Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

The above statement displays that there must be constitutional changes that bring about a transformation in local bodies so that local citizens' involvement can be made possible. There is no accountability, which is why local elites discourage public participation in the policy process of local governance. The World Bank has introduced its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These SDGs include 17 goals, one of which, Goal 16, directly addresses public participation in local governance around the world. SDG Goal 16 emphasises that good governance practices such as citizen participation, transparency, and accountability are strongly recommended to be integrated into political practices (Hoa and Garcia-Zamor 2017). Furthermore, (Coleman 2014) suggests that in order to make public participation effective in local government, state laws are required to address the structural factors that make users feel more empowered.

6.4.3 Crackdown on corruption, and honest and decent representatives should be in local government

The results show, as 10% of respondents indicated, that there should be a crackdown on corruption. This is because the feudal lords capture local governments with the purpose of making wealth through unfair or crooked ways. As they misuse funds, they prevent the public from becoming involved in local government dialogue and deliberation activities. It is corruption, due to which the elite class takes part in local government elections. As one social worker from a rural district commented:

> Until and unless the doors of corruption are closed, there will be no involvement of common citizens in policy implementation. And the poor citizen will always be away from policy implementation. As soon as the doors of corruption are closed, everything will be on the right track. According to our understanding, that corruption should be stopped and marched forward along with the common population. (Ihsaan Ali, social worker, Warah, Kamabar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

The above statement displays that, without stopping corruption, there will be no public involvement and development of local communities in Sindh. Data observation highlights the fact that corruption is a serious malady in the democratic process of decentralisation in Sindh. The respondents seem to be the victims of injustice on the part of local authorities; these poor citizens appear to be confident that corruption is hampering the good governance of local governments in rural Sindh. It is evident from the literature (Neshkova and Kalesnikaite 2019) that corrupt politicians make citizens cynical in local governance. This is because if the citizens know that the local authorities are corrupt, they stop participating in the local government policy process.

6.5 How participants view public participation in the decision-making of local governments

6.5.1 Participation and empowerment

The pluralistic theory of community participation seems pertinent to this section of study. (Laird 2016) explains it as follows:

"Pluralism requires that participation is meaningful in two senses: enable citizens to understand their interests and to have some sort of substantive influence over actual policies' outcomes." (Laird 2016: 344).

The theory of the pluralistic approach is based on the actions of organised voluntary groups. Pluralistic theory refers to the participation of interested parties in open dialogue to reach consensus over solving problems that affect citizens (Concha and Villar 2013). The theory of deliberative democracy encourages communities towards the identification of community needs and the delivery of common goods for society (Laird 2016). Furthermore, Azid et al. (2007) state that if corporate social responsibility and stakeholders' interests are

partly related to each other, various social sectors could join together for the

self-management planning of such programmes .

This study extends that theoretical framework as a practical implication of this
study.

**Figure 6. 2 community groups/social workers participation towards
common interests in Sindh**

Source: Adopted from (Laird 2016).

This model should be used by practitioners and civil society voluntary groups.

This is because, in the context of Pakistan, the policy makers cannot be relied

on and cannot be expected to initiate public participation.

 In this section, the findings suggest that the majority of the marginalised

communities have one common interest: their rights of public participation and

empowerment cannot be implemented without their own activism. The following

quote is in congruent to the pluralistic statement of (Laird 2016) that community

must have common interests for the common good:

> And these forums should work as the pressure groups. They should
> put pressure on public elected councillors so that they invite the local
> community for policy deliberation and participation. Until and unless
> the common man is engaged in the implementation of local policy, the
> public issues will not be resolved. There should be meetings between
> the common public and local representatives. Locally elected
> councillors must realise that until and unless they are promoting public

participation, local government will not be efficient in delivering public services. (Haq Nawaz, teacher in the Education Department, Town Committee Warah, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

These views of the participants in this study are pertinent to the arguments of (Berner and Smith 2004), who presented their focus group findings to reveal that all of their participants agreed on the importance of public participation. For example, the literature suggests that "people participate by taking initiatives independently of external institutions to change systems…such self-initiated mobilisation may or may not challenge existing distribution of wealth and power" (Pretty 1995), quoted in (Cornwall 2008: 272). The following quote illustrates that the government authorities are not going to support the mechanism of civic engagement in decision making:

> In both periods (local governments of 2001-2009 and 2013-present), the public is kept away from the decision making process, and it was deliberate. Once they (the local ruling class) are in power, they do not want to share the lush taste of power with the common citizen. They are trying their best to keep the common man in poverty- it has become a permanent mindset of this particular class. (Yousuf, social worker, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

The optimist paints public participation in a positive, communitarian light by emphasising the current need for democratisation in various countries. According to them, it is more beneficial for the values of the community (Putnam 2000). It is believed that local government promises a wide range of benefits. A few of them do, and it makes governments more responsive and efficient. Furthermore, public participation in decision making promises a system of competition, checks and balances (Bardhan 2002).

Whilst observing the responses from the data, the researcher realised that the participants put a great deal of importance on public participation. The respondents linked many positive things to public participation. The normative literature is consistent with the participants' statements that local government is

believed when it promises a wide range of benefits. A few of them think it

makes governments more responsive and efficient. Furthermore, public

participation in decision making promises a system of competition, checks and

balances (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000; Bardhan 2002; Bardhan and

Mookherjee 2005; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006b).

6.5.2 Local knowledge

Local councils are believed to encourage civic engagement and consult the

public during policy implementation. The participants commented that as local

citizens know about local issues in a better way, therefore local participation can

help local governance to resolve issues in an effective way.

> This is because the common people are aware of their basic needs,
> and only they can give the best guidance on how to implement local
> government policy. (Deedar Ali, former Union Councillor, Kambar
> Shahdadkot, UC, Ghatthar, Sindh)

The above participant indicates that local communities know about their local

needs and issues in better ways than the local authorities do. Therefore, public

participation may enable local governments to identify local issues in an

effective way. As Pickering and Jusić (2018) conceptualise, when local

governments include local dimensions, they can deliver with efficiency,

effectiveness, accountability, and needs-based orientation development.

However, one factor inhibiting the substantial reforms of local governments is

the trend towards patronage at local levels.

6.5.3 Efficiency

The following statement highlights the reflection that if there is public

involvement in local government decisions, it can have a positive impact on the

efficiency of local governance. This is because local people know very well how

to address public issues. The following statement makes such a reference:

> The message to be conveyed is that local councils are not doing their duties. Let's unite and have meetings with these local councils to put pressure on them. During implementation of the development projects, they must invite the common public and have dialogue with them. This is because through dialogue and listening to each other, a lot of issues could be resolved. (Mujahid Ali, teacher, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

The above statement observes that without mass public movements, public participation in Sindh is not foreseen in the near future. Furthermore, it is emphasised that once public participation is implemented, local issues can be effectively addressed. As Hoa and Garcia-Zamor (Hoa and Garcia-Zamor 2017) have emphasised, community involvement can be an effective tool of good governance in local government institutions. Public participation has great potential; once a policy window provides an opportunity for the population, it assures a large scale, efficient governing system. As Bardhan (Bardhan 2002) reported, there were successful case studies of decentralisation and participatory budgeting in two Latin American countries. One case study is on participatory budgeting in municipal government in the City of Porto Alegre in Brazil; the other success story is about participatory budgeting in municipal government in the post-1994 decentralisation initiative in Bolivia. It is understood that the participatory development of decentralisation promises efficient governance.

6.5.4 Public participation as training

If one applies the pluralistic framework of participation in the context of Sindh, Pakistan (Concha and Villar 2013; Laird 2016), from a pluralistic participation perspective, participation mechanisms are useful if they bring more interested communities into the decision-making process with defined and active member roles. The following quote illustrates how the public felt about the value of citizen participation:

> The public voice must be heard, because the common public knows better about their problems. The benefit of such participatory interaction will be the transfer of knowledge, and the public will be well-knowledgeable about the policy process of local councils. (Liyakyat, teacher, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

The above evidence conceptualises the consistent literature, in which it is believed that promoting citizen participation has a wide range of benefits, including increasing service delivery and the quality of democratisation. As well as getting involved in decision-making, it provides various opportunities for learning skills through training and getting educated about citizens' rights (Andrews et al. 2008; Andrews et al. 2011).

6.6 Reflection on study

This study was not meant to test a theory. The researcher's goal was more modest - only to use the ladder of citizen participation as the guiding model for the analysing the scale or the nature of public participation through the local governments of Sindh, Pakistan. Therefore, the researcher is turning to see if there is any accordance with any level of the ladder of citizen participation as developed by (Arnstein 1969).

6.6.1 Complementing the theory of the ladder of citizen participation with the voices of participants

The following quote of (Arnstein 1969) states:

> "…people are placed on rubberstamp advisory committees or advisory boards for the express purpose of *'educating'* them or engineering their support…this is an illusory form of *'participation'."* (Arnstein 1969: 4)

The findings of this study are in line with the above statement of Arnstein, because of the establishment of monitoring committees in each union council, comprising the elected councillors being given portfolios for monitoring progress, working development, and governance in general. Further, these monitoring committees were introduced to safeguard the citizens' rights and

security. Another function of these monitoring committees was to monitor the

performance of the district government and to create CCBs. These CCBs were

meant to play a role in the involvement of the local population in government

activities and policies (Kabeer et al. 2006; Muhammad Khan and Mirza 2013).

The introduction of these CCBs was described by the (world Bank 2004a) as a

far-reaching agenda for ensuing direct citizen involvement in planning services,

and which provides mechanisms for citizen oversight of implementation.

However, the evidence of this study suggest that the citizens were kept "miles

and miles" (this was very common dialogue of the participants when describing

the distance between the rulers and the local community) away from the

administration. The following quote demonstrates some of the ideas about

theory and practice in public participation:

> No doubt there was legislation in local councils, introduced by
> General Musharraf, that they must serve the common citizen and
> must invite the common people to participate. However, these people
> who came to power, favoured only their own class and the people of
> the local council, and kept the common citizens away from
> participation and development. Furthermore, the remote and small
> settlements were absolutely neglected and sidelined in the process
> of participation. (Deedar Ali, former Union Councillor, Kambar
> Shahdadkot, Sindh)

> In their legislation (law of local government), it was the provision that
> local councils would have served the common citizen, but they did not
> do so. For that failure, there are many factors, but the main one was
> corruption. (Manzoor Ali, businessman and member of a labour union,
> Union Council Jonanee Shareef, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

Thus, as far as the case of the Pakistani state is concerned, which is managed

by the military generals (Wilder 2009; Shah 2014), only the lowest rung of

manipulation, which is intended not to enable people to participate in

development projects, could be fit into the findings of this study. Furthermore,

as far as the present status of Pakistani governments are concerned, the other

rungs of (Arnstein 1969) ladder of participation, such as therapy of non-

participation, are not in line with the findings of this study. For example, therapy is also a form of non-participation, used to contrive real participation. This form of citizen participation could be expected from such a state which must have value for public opinion. However, in Pakistan, there is no consideration for public desires and opinions. From the findings of this study, it appears that Pakistan has not even developed a little democratic perspective which could be fit into the empty rituals of participation (Arnstein 1969). If (Arnstein 1969) means that some systems are bound to introduce the empty rituals of pseudo participation because these governments could not dare to refuse to introduce any form of participation plainly and blatantly, then this theory does not accord with the findings of this study, which is in the Pakistani context. This is because the Pakistani state refuses citizen participation clearly and blatantly (Lall 2012a; Lall 2012b; Lall 2014).

Apart from the manipulatory and rubberstamp advisory boards level of participation (Arnstein 1969), the other levels, which are (2) therapy, (3) information, (4) consultation, (5) placation, (6) partnership, (7) delegated power and (8) citizen control, do not correspond with the findings of this study. This is because, for example, even though therapy is a form of non-participation, it still reflects some form of responsibility on the part of the government system, in which group therapies masked with citizen participation are observed (Arnstein 1969). The results of this study suggest that public participation and local communities were the lowest priorities, and thus were kept "miles and miles" away from the governance process of local government.

For example, placation is a similar form of tokenism which makes citizens realise that they are being heard (Arnstein 1969), but in this study the evidence suggests otherwise:

> In both periods (local governments of 2001-2009 and 2013-present), the public is kept away from involvement; it was deliberate. Once they are in power, they do not want to share the lush taste of power with the common citizen. They are trying their best to keep the common man in poverty - it has become a permanent mindset of this particular class. (Yousuf, social worker, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

The above evidence is in accord with the theory of (Choguill 1996), who proposed the ladder of community participation for underdeveloped countries, which states that during the level of conspiracy, the government seems to reject any idea of helping the poor to participate in the decision-making process. However, the following rungs of Arnstein's ladder (Arnstein 1969) do not fit with the findings of this study, because on rungs such as (6) partnership (which enables citizens to negotiate and engage with powerholders on an equal footing), (7) delegated power, and (8) citizen control, the marginalised citizens have a good influence on the decision-making process of governance, which is reflected in the more responsive and democratic countries of the world, but not in the context of Pakistan.

The various rungs of this theory (Arnstein 1969) were kept under consideration during the interpretation of the data. Which rung should be the most appropriate for the existence of public participation in local government in Sindh, Pakistan? The theory of public participation provided an analytical tool which could be used to interpret the concepts and their definitions of the nature of participation. It is seen, when analysing the results, that out of the eight levels of participation propounded by (Arnstein 1969) there is the lowest rung (manipulation) of non-participation in the local governments of rural Sindh. However, this lowest rung of the ladder of participation, manipulation (which is also non-participatory), was used during the Devolution Power Plan introduced by the military General Pervez Musharraf. For instance, General Pervez Musharraf introduced the CCBs with the provision that these community boards would facilitate direct

community involvement in the decision making of local government development projects in Sindh. These boards, however, did not genuinely encourage public participation. These boards proved to be simply rubberstamped community boards.

Furthermore, it is interesting that although the local government system was introduced by the publicly elected governments of Sindh, even the lowest rung (manipulation) is absent. In other words, there is non-participation, but even manipulation, which is a facade of non-participation, is absent in these publicly elected governments. In reference to the aforementioned public participation during local governments, elected by the public, the literature (Lieven 2012) suggests that the role played by the democratic forces in Pakistan is more authoritarian than that of the military generals. Therefore, it can be said that the research was conducted within an appropriate framework, which lays emphasis on various programmes or provisions introduced in the name of public participation within local governments. They do not act in a meaningful, participatory nature.

6.6.2 Emergence of a new model of non-participation
6.6.2 1Contribution to knowledge

Now, if one compares the ladder of citizen participation developed by (Arnstein 1969) and the developed model based on the findings of this study, both ladders go in the opposite direction. For example, in Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation, as the ladder goes upward, the chances of real citizen participation increase. On the contrary, in the case of Pakistan, as the ladder model goes upward, the chances of real public participation decrease (see Figure 6.1).

Firstly, this study highlights that in the context of Sindh, there is no positive relationship between local government and citizen participation at present.

Secondly, it recognises the importance of an open-ended questionnaire, where freedom of speech might be limited, through which the participants open themselves up more deeply in black and white instead of exposing their voices. It is observed that giving answers to open-ended qualitative methods works like a brainstorm for the participants to recall more life experiences and events. Thirdly, this study offers empirical knowledge regarding the crucial role of participation and decentralisation and their impacts on public participation.

6.6.3 Emergence of a proposed model of non-participation
Figure 6. 3 State of barriers to public participation:

Highest level of non-participation created by the Central State of Pakistan

Federal Military

Federal Bureaucracy

Provincial Assemblies

Moderate level of non-participation created by Provincial Assembly of Sindh

Class disparities by

Local governments captured by local elites

Corruption within local government

Low-level of non participation posed by Local Governments of Sindh

Family-based politics

Source: Data analysis and adopted from (Arnstein 1969)

Analysis of the results of the study has established that local participation in Sindh is absent from the top to the bottom, as Figure 6.1 illustrates. This model appeared after using the theoretical framework of (Arnstein 1969), which is the ladder of citizen participation. According to (Arnstein 1969) ladder of citizen

participation, there is more chance of quality citizen participation as the process of the formal ladder goes upward. According to the theory of the ladder of participation, its lowest rung of non-participation is manipulation, which is at level one.

However, analysis of the findings of this study shows that the lowest rung of this model is, of course, non-participation, or a less strong version of non-participation. In this model, as the level of rungs ascends, the level and chance of participation decrease, and vice versa, in the ladder of citizen participation proposed by (Arnstein 1969).This study has found eight factors that influence public participation negatively and non-participation positively. A typology of eight levels of non-participation may help in understanding the fact that as the ladder model of non-participation goes up, there are lower and lower chances of public participation in the Sindh and Pakistani context.

For illustrative purposes, the eight types of barrier are arranged on the ladder, showing the base of ladder as the less strong form of non-participation. The eight rungs of the ladder in this model are arranged in three main categories – 1) local level alienation, 2) middle level alienation and 3) top level alienation – of non-participation in local governance of Sindh, Pakistan.

The local level category consists of the four bottom rungs of the ladder: (1) capture of local government by local elites; (2) family based politics within local governments; (3) favouritism within local governments; and (4) corruption within local governments. These four rungs of non-participation describe the local level of alienation between the marginalised local public groups and local powerholders in Sindh, Pakistan. The second upper category of alienation is the middle one, which consists of the rungs (5) class disparities and (6) provincial

assemblies. As the ladder model goes upwards it becomes narrower (as shown in Figure 6.1), and as a result decreases the space for public participation.

Rungs (5) class disparity and (6) Sindh legislative body represent the Sindh Assembly itself, which is the house of those who do not want to see the marginalised public before and after the provincial elections. The middle level of feudal or political elites creates more barriers to public participation, with the purpose of keeping the public disempowered. The final category is the upper level of alienation, which consists of two rungs: (7) federal bureaucracy and (8) federal military. Both of these top levels of alienation act as super masters of the public. Therefore, public participation is blocked before these two top levels of alienation.

6.6.4 Limitations of the rungs

Categories make more sense than rungs. However, the rungs are the findings of the study. Therefore, the first limitation of this study is that each rung does not make sense as clearly as each category does. In other words, three levels of the ladder model of non-participation illustrate more clearly the level of alienation rather than what each rung does, even though the rungs are attributed to each category. These rungs were attributed after the analysis of the findings of the study.

Furthermore, there are four rungs in the category of local level alienation, which is the local government system. These same rungs could be present at the top two levels of alienation, but they are not described as such because they create the space for the four local levels of barriers to civic engagement.

There are missing links between the disparities and assembly. It is not clear what the relationship is between class disparity and the Sindh Assembly. However, it was put in this category because the Sindh Assembly made such

laws which created unequal class opportunities within local governance. This shows that non-participation is created from the top descending towards the local level of alienation.

Another limitation of the ladder model of non-participation is that the federal bureaucracy does not appear in the findings. There is another missing link - through the direct mentions of federal bureaucracy - between the federal bureaucracy and non-participation. However, the literature review supports the idea that bureaucracy is one of many barriers to citizen participation in the decision-making process of the local governments of Pakistan. For example, it is evident from the literature that after the military establishment, the Pakistani bureaucracy is the biggest barrier to interaction between the citizens and the state (Talbot 2002; Wilder 2009).

6.6.5 Illustration of each rung as a barrier to participation

The following rungs describe how alienation is caused. These levels are described from top to bottom. In contrast, Arnstein's ladder is presented from bottom to top. However, in this study, the attitude of alienation on the part of the central state is presented from top to bottom. Thus, this conceptual model illustrates how the institutions of the Pakistani federation are inheriting the sense of a gap between the ruling class and the common citizens.

6.6.5.1 Highest level 1: the military as a barrier to citizen participation

The most significant turning point towards the wrong footing of the state of Pakistan is that since the birth of the state, the military of Pakistan has entrenched its roots as the country's strongest bureaucratic institution, but also as its strongest political institution and interest group too (Wilder 2009: 6). Now, this military establishment two-pronged short-sighted motives: enriching its own institution, as well as contributing to the prosperity of its breeding ground, the

province of Punjab. For example, the dominant role of the civil and military

bureaucracy, the dominant role of Punjabis within these bureaucracies, and the

unwillingness of the Punjabi-dominant establishment to transfer power to the

other regions are the main obstacles to democratic development (Wilder 2009:

29). This is because the main chunk of the country's resources goes to the

Punjab: its military, civil bureaucracy (Siddiqa-Agha 2007; Fair 2009; Talbot

2009a; Siddiqa 2017). As such, a kind of *status quo* has proved to be blessing

in disguise for the Punjabi-dominant establishment, and the military

establishment has devised the following strategy:

> The biggest fault line in Pakistani society is not between Sunni and
> Shi'a, Punjabi and other ethnic groups…it is between ordinary
> citizens and the state (Lall 2012b: 270).

The following statement from the literature illustrates details about the
military dictator who put in place the foundations of local governments to
legitimise the military coups of Pakistan:

> Under President Ayoub Khan's Basic Democracies system, an indirect
> form of democracy was supposed to mobilize people and educate
> them to be participants in local affairs; in fact, the system was designed
> to keep the ordinary citizens out of politics. Ayoub justified his limited
> representative system claiming that because Muslims in the
> subcontinent had historically never known real sovereignty, they would
> take longer as Pakistanis to adjust psychologically to their new-born
> freedom (Weinbaum 1996: 642).

In other words, the above quote suggests that the military dictator denied

the right to political participation by declaring Pakistanis not ready for

democracy (Lall 2012a).

Here, it is relevant to mention that the central sovereign power of the Pakistani

state is administered by the military establishment. Also, it is the Pakistani

military which has often introduced local government reforms for their limited

purposes.

The following quote throws light on this level of non-participation:

This period was an authoritarian period. These local councils could not give good results. This is because the feudal class was brought in by local government. And the feudal class is not from the common public, therefore, local councils could not deliver the basic services…Mr Asif Ali Zardari's local councils are the worst. This is because, in this period, corruption was at its peak. If they have brought any people into local councils, they are their own yes men. (Manzoor Ali, businessman and member of a labour union, Union Council Jonanee Shareef, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

There was a military dictatorship. The regions were divided among the feudal lords. For example, Kambar was awarded to the Chandio tribe, Larkana was given to Altaf Unar to rule, Shahdadkot was given to Magsi, Ghotki to the Mahar caste. The feudal lord is always a flatterer and an opportunist. Although he lives in public, he is not of the public - he has his own interests. (Mihran, social worker, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

It became evident from Pakistan that in the federal state of the province of Sindh, local governments have been used for centralisation purposes (Rondinelli et al. 1989; Lieven 2012; Mukherjee 2016). As far as the central state is concerned, its publicly elected governments did not introduce democratic decentralisation, but they cancelled the devolution reforms of those introduced by the military generals of Pakistan (Cheema et al. 2005; Lall 2012a; Lall 2012b; Lall 2014). These military generals do not want the state to be democratic, and a place where every institution should be accountable to the public; these generals receive incentives from the absence of the rule of law. Therefore, they do not want democracy for the public. It is assumed that democratic decentralisation, where local government tends to invite local disadvantaged communities to attend local council meetings or to participate in the local government's established citizen community committees, created by local government authorities with the purpose of involving the local community in decision-making, does not seem plausible in Sindh. Therefore, the conceptual framework supported by those who argue that decentralisation can

make governments more responsive to the governed (World Bank 1996), could

introduce such a development with a preference for smaller and local groups.

6.6.5.2 Highest level 2: federal bureaucracy as a barrier to public participation

This is the empowerment which should be given to the public, revolving around

the federal bureaucracy of Pakistan. The military holds the final say in power,

and after the military, bureaucracy is the department where powers are kept

and exercised. Musharraf devolved power, but DC (Deputy Commissioner)

resumed this power.

6.6.5.3 Middle level 1: barriers to public participation in provincial assemblies

> However, one of the main barriers is that these people of upper class
> do not want the public to be active and come out from poverty and
> hunger. Secondly, they do not want that the general public have
> access to these elected representatives. Thirdly, once they are
> elected, they think that the general public is like untouchable to these
> elected people. So, how would they invite the public for dialogue and
> deliberation? (Murtaza, local government employee, Sindh)

It became evident that there is a negative role of local government with regards

to public participation in Sindh, where general elections are rubberstamped,

federal laws do not provide checks and balances, the powerholder is reluctant

to devolve power from the top down, and the relationship between local

government and public participation does not exist positively. This is the middle

level of alienation, where these so-called publicly elected members of legislative

bodies are more difficult to access for their voters in comparison to the local

Nazims (Park 2003) and the chairmen of local government authorities. These

middle level super elite feudal lords arrive after five years of their government

tenures. Once, they (the elites) have got the votes from the marginalised

communities in Sindh, they come, after five years, to the next votes for the

elections of the provincial or national assemblies.

6.6.10 Middle level 2: class disparities by state assemblies

> But once a *Wadero, Bhotar, Rais* is in the power, the common man is forgotten. And another thing is that our common population is not aware of their basic rights, and it (the society of Sindh) is in a deep slumber. Therefore, it does not know that what its basic fundamental rights are. To address this malaise, we need urgent education.
> (Yousuf, social worker, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

Class disparities were highlighted as a barrier to public participation. No one in the provincial assembly wants to introduce and condone such laws which support equality for all. Their laws are merely a veneer. These middle category MNAs (Members of National Assemblies) and PMAs (Members of Provincial Assemblies) meet their voters at the time of election. Once elections are over, these feudal class MPAs do not want to hear the voices of the disadvantaged population in Sindh. To maintain their status, they construct insurmountable hurdles to public participation and public empowerment.

Once the elite class comes into power, the poor public is not even allowed to stand outside the offices of these mayors and chairmen. This trend is tacitly encouraged by those who are sitting in provincial assemblies in Sindh, Pakistan. For example, nearly 90% of the total agricultural land is owned by 5% of the main landlords, who, by way of dint, share the wealth gained from ruling Pakistan (Serwar 1989). Now, these landed elites tend to keep their hold over resources and power. Therefore, public participation might be thought of as a threat to their hegemonic control over public resources.

6.6.6 Lower level 1: local power captured by feudal elites

> This period was an authoritarian period. These local councils could not give good results. This is because the feudal class was brought in by the local government. (Manzoor Ali, businessman and member of a labour union, Union Council Jonanee Shareef, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

In the name of the democratisation of Pakistan, local governments were introduced in different eras. However, local governments have been captured

by the old established feudal system, which poses as antagonistic to democracy. This is an illusory form of local democracy, where the local community is alienated by these local feudal elites. Thus, local elites are level one of alienation. Though at the bottom rungs of the ladder there is non-participation, these rungs are lesser levels of alienation. This is because there are some rubberstamp rituals of activities within local councils. For example, these rubberstamp rituals include the CCBs, and various other seats being reserved for women and minorities. Although these are not working any more, these manipulations of participation are at a lesser level of alienation.

Now, these rural elites do not tend to enforce equal laws within local governance. These feudal lords are incompetent, workshy, and without skills. Despite being unqualified for ruling the nation, they have been powerholders since the creation of Pakistan. However, they do not want that power control to trickle down to the poverty-ridden public of Sindh, Pakistan.

6.6.7 Lower level 2: family-based politics as a barrier to citizen participation

Political power is dominated by a few families of tribal chiefs. These rural elites play a critical role in the economic and political policies of local government programmes. The following quotes throw light on how the public expressed their views about who comes in power:

> In both periods (local governments of 2001-2009 and 2013-present), the public is kept away from the decision-making process, and it was deliberate. (Yousuf, social worker, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

> However, these people who came to power favoured only their own class, and the people of the local council kept common citizens away from participation and development. Furthermore, the remote and small settlements were absolutely neglected and sidelined in the process of participation. (Deedar Ali, former Union Councillor, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

The literature is also consistent with this situation, as shown in the Philippines' economic and political life (Shatkin 2000). It is also consistent with other work in India (Chhibber 2013), such as the case of the Indian National Congress, where top leadership has stayed within the Nehru family. Starting with Nehru himself, the leadership was passed down to Indira Gandhi, Sanjay Gandhi, Rajvi Gandhi, Sonia Gandhi and now Rahul Gandhi. There is a similar case in the PPP (Mohammed 2016), where its headship has stayed within the Bhutto family. The PPP was founded by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. After his death, the leadership of the party was automatically given to his daughter, Benazir Bhutto. After the death of Benazir Bhutto, the chairmanship was given to her son, Bilawal Bhutto. The same pattern is being practised in other parties in Pakistan. The findings indicate that another barrier to the participation of the local community in local government delivery services is the family-based politics of dynasties. The researcher has observed that political parties are owned by specific families of the feudal lords in Sindh.

6.6.8 Lower level 3: favouritism as a barrier to public participation

The findings shown in previous sections highlight that local authorities are maintained by a few specific political parties; they invite their own supporters to benefit from the allocation of funds. In other words, the available funds of local government are spent on their party members, workers, and voters instead of allocating funds to the deserving needs-based communities. In such a situation, the deserving beneficiaries' participation in decision-making is not tolerated by the authoritarian rural elites.

> There is *Jeyalla* (member of political party) culture within the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), and all benefits go to the *Jeyalla* class and other common public with the same pains and hardships. These parties are occupied by the feudal lords and Mirs (financially rich families with a noble title from the past). How is it possible that they would let the

common public be involved? These feudal lords are not ready to consider the common man as human beings. (Mujahid Ali, teacher, Urban City, Larkana, Sindh)

If public participation is implemented, there will be no chance for these powerholders to give favour to their nearest and dearest. Thus, the findings indicate that political patronage is also a constraint on local community participation in the policy implementation of local government in Sindh.

6.6.9 Lower level 4: corruption as a barrier to public participation

Corruption is the easiest business for the ruling class in Sindh. If they invite the public to engage in dialogue and deliberation on the available funds of local government, the masses will come to know how these funds are spent. The following quote illustrates how the public view the role of corruption in public involvement:

Their failure has many reasons, but the main reason is corruption. Now, imagine that 80% is corruption, and now guess how development is possible from a 20% budget. (Aneeta Gul, female member of student society, Kambar Shahdadkot, Sindh)

Corruption is a highly rated concept in the data, which demonstrates that local governments are factories of corrupt activities. Therefore, these rural politicians, who are *Wadiras*, *Zamindars* and *Pirs*, want the public to be in the dark where the information on citizens' right is concerned. Therefore, they do not want public involvement in the policy implementation of local governance in Sindh.

6.7 Conclusion

The aim of this research is to discuss what has been learned about the dynamics of public participation in local government policy decisions, and the factors influencing local involvement in the participatory development of local governments in Sindh. First, the findings have revealed that the national state laws of Pakistan do not support public participation in local government decision making. It was also indicated that the national laws do not address crimes such

as corruption, fraud and inequality, which exist in local government institutions. Secondly, the data observation showed that the military establishment has weakened the democratic characteristics of the Pakistani state. It was also displayed how the military used local government reforms with the intention of legitimising the authoritarian regimes. As decentralisation reforms are introduced with the short-sighted motives of dictatorial regimes, the institutions lose their real spirit of serving the poor. Furthermore, it was indicated that as military generals do not tend to be accountable to the public, therefore, to extend their military coups, they (military generals) introduced local governments as bribery for the feudal lords of Sindh.

Thirdly, feudal lords came to power during the military regime; they try to run the institutions in such a way as to make the military chiefs happy, as happened during the last devolution reforms introduced by the military General Pervez Musharraf. Furthermore, as the local elites of Sindh are aware that there is no system of checks and balances in the national state, they tend to serve their own interests instead of serving the marginalised citizens. These local landed elites have misused public funds without any fear of accountability. As a result of the absence of effective laws in national government, these local government authorities try to consume dishonestly available funds, rather than thinking about involving the downtrodden local communities of Sindh.

Fourthly, these local governments are often contested and captured by the *Wadiras*, *Zamindars* and religious leaders of Sindh. The marginalised groups are unable to participate in these local elections. After coming to power, these rural elites turn their hands toward making illegal money from public funds. As they know, by dint of wealth, they hijack the state and local power of the government. The rural elites carry out various fraudulent activities - fake bills of

development projects, allocation of development projects on a favour-basis, corruption, and more. Whilst practising these unscrupulous activities, public participation is not implemented. This is because in the presence of local community involvement, these fraudulent activities could be hampered.

Fifthly, the issues of public participation discussed were party politics and favouritism within local government institution. These political parties have a negative attitude towards the open space meetings of local communities in local government development processes. This is because these conventional powerholders prefer to allocate the available funds to those areas which belong to their party supporters, or to their usual voters at elections.

Furthermore, it was highlighted that to make public participation possible within the local administrations, the marginalised public groups, civil society members, trade union groups, and organisations of lawyers and advocates should be active. These disadvantaged groups should establish volunteer forums to mobilise the poor population and inform them of their rights. Once the public gets mobilised, there should be pressure on local government authorities to initiate public participation in local government business.

Finally, the data observation determined that if and once public participation in local government is implemented meaningfully, there could be various benefits to the local communities of Sindh. For instance, if there is effective public participation, the allocation of the available funds of local communities could be sanctioned on a merit-basis: equal distribution of local government funds for the deserving and needs-based users may take place. Another concept was highlighted: as the local population knows more about their local problems, once public participation is implemented, it would help the local authorities to know about the important matters.

Chapter seven

Conclusion

7.0 Background of the study

The motivation for this study can be aligned with the conceptual statements of the World Bank that developing countries and donor organisations have emphasised that local governments should promote the access of the poor to development services. It has also been stated that developing countries and donor groups need to pay special attention to community participation in the decision-making of local governments. For instance, the agenda of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) emphasised state-citizenship relationships. Among them is Goal 16, which is more ambitious than ever, and in which it is emphasised that peaceful and inclusive societies targeting sustainable development should give fair access to justice for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels (Paul 1987; Cyan et al. 2004; Hoa and Garcia-Zamor 2017).

Therefore, decentralisation reforms are called the silent revolution of democracy. The widest assumption is that local governance is laden with the potential to bring citizens and local authorities closer to their governments. Finally, it empowers citizens. The local government system ensures a level of combination of public service consistent with voters' preferences while providing opportunities for the efficient provision of such service delivery (Uphoff 1993; Rietbergen-McCracken 1996). Thus local governments are seen not just as the governance of local people, by local people, and for local people, but also as a straightforward means of empowering local communities with an opportunity to shape the future of their local population (World Bank 1994; Fiske 1996). Even so, there has been a considerable amount of research on the different aspects of local government reforms in Pakistan. However, there was a distinct lack of

any theoretically informed studies on the role of local government in community engagement in local policy making and participatory development in the province of Sindh, Pakistan. Therefore, the motivation for this study can be aligned with the World Bank's theories and assumptions that decentralisation has the potential to engage beneficiaries in the decision-making of local governance. Thus, the purpose of this study was to explore how local governments invite public participation in the delivery services of such governance. This chapter is a reflection on the aims, objectives, and research questions, the gap in the literature identified for this study, and the methodology, methods, and data generation and analysis. The main findings will be reported here, along with the contribution of this study with new academic knowledge, the limitations of the study, and recommendations for future research.

7.1 Aim, objectives, and research questions
7.1.1 Aim of study
The primary aim of this study was to explore the dynamics of public participation in local government during the period 2001-2009 in Sindh.

On the basis on this single study, it would be too ambitious to claim to be certain about the exploration of the dynamics of public participation in local government decision-making in rural Sindh. This is because this study alone cannot provide a sound basis for all of the dynamics of public participation. However, there are subtle signs and concepts which indicate that there are such factors that have an adverse impact on public participation in local government decision-making in rural Sindh. From the data observation it was realised that decentralisation and the introduction of local governments in both

periods (2001-2009 and 2013-present) did not initiate democratic participatory development in rural Sindh.

7.1.2 Objectives

In Chapter 1, the author identified five objectives to be targeted in this thesis. These were:

- To review the relevant literature on public participation in the local government's policy making and local development projects in Sindh.

- To explore the contributing factors influencing public participation in the local government's policy formulation and local development projects in rural Sindh from 2001-2009.

- To assess the strengths and weaknesses in rural participation in the local government's policy formulation and local development projects in rural Sindh from 2001-2009.

- To find out the ways to facilitate effective involvement in the local government's policy formulation and local development projects in rural Sindh.

- To assess the implications of the findings towards improving policy and practice in other districts in Pakistan and in other developing countries.

It is relevant to revisit each of the above objectives in turn, and to review and reflect on them in light of the findings of the research.

7.1.3 Objective 1

The following was the first objective of the study:

To review the relevant literature on public participation in the local government's policy making and local development projects in Sindh.

This first objective required an examination of the meanings attached to

participatory development and meaningful local community participation in

decision-making. The literature review during the early stages of this study

revealed the existence of various definitions of democratic participation in local

governments. Subsequently, the literature enabled the researcher to give a

definition to authentic and effective participation which works equally well for

local participants and for administrators. Another reflection from the literature

was that, even though citizen participation is difficult to achieve, it has the

potential to empower the disadvantaged communities of any state. Devolution may negatively impact public participation and the empowerment of poor communities in cases where the central states have weaker laws (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005). It was also suggested that local governments should not be a politically motivated feature of local governance. It should, however, be introduced with the purpose of empowering poor communities through participatory development. Therefore, this study is useful in terms of understanding how to empower the public through involvement.

7.2 Literature gap

In the literature on local governments it is emphasised that democratisation and community involvement in the development process can take place if power is devolved to the lower levels (Lange 2008). Local governments' activities could play a positive role in promoting public participation in local policy making (Andrews et al. 2011). The sole responsibility of local governments is to take measures to provide effective citizen engagement in local state affairs. This was the concept the Indian Government introduced in their 73rd and 74th Amendments to its constitution for direct democracy in India. They considered Gram Sabhas as the cornerstones for the implementation of state development projects (Gibson 2012). There have been other studies on the barriers to public participation in local governments' decisions.

While there has been a lot of research on different aspects of devolution reforms in Pakistan (Khan 2006b; Khan and Anjum 2013; Ahmad et al. 2016), the literature primarily has not theoretically focused on the role of local governments in community engagement in development projects. In addition, most of these studies have been carried out in two districts in Pakistan: Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

As far as the case of Sindh was concerned, there was a notable gap in terms of theoretically guided studies on the role of local governments in community engagement in local policy making in Sindh. The researcher identified a gap in the theoretically informed understanding of the role of local governments in public participation in local policy making in Sindh, Pakistan. Therefore, this study was carried out to address the lack of any theoretically focused research on the role of local governments in initiating public participation using the cases of the rural district and the urban city district of Sindh.

7.2.1 Objective 2

The second objective of the research was:

To explore the contributing factors influencing public participation in the local government's policy formulation and local development projects in rural Sindh from 2001-2009.

In response to the second objective, examination of the factors influencing public participation in the local government's local policy making and service delivery in rural Sindh established that there was a diverse array of negative, instead of positive, factors influencing the participatory development of the local governments of Sindh. Some of these are the state policies of Pakistan, military intervention in central state policies that have been contributing to the reshaping behaviour of local government institutions towards the local community, and the value of public opinion in the decision-making of local government development projects. There was a military government strategy to introduce the Devolution Power Plan of 2000 to legitimise the military coup. The military general at that time compromised on the non-democratic and corrupt policies of local governments in Sindh.

Furthermore, it was learned from the research that another negative contributing factor is the system of the feudal class, rural elites, and religious

leaders in Sindh. This class is a barrier to communities participating in the decision-making of the local government in terms of delivery services in Sindh. Furthermore, there is a culture of corruption and favouritism in the local government institutions of Sindh. Evidence has revealed that in the presence of corruption and favouritism within the departments of local governance, public involvement cannot be expected by the marginalised groups of rural Sindh. This is because to keep fraudulent activities secret, public access to policy dialogue and deliberation is discouraged.

7.2.2 Objective 3

The third objective of the project was:

To assess the strengths and weaknesses of rural participation in the local government's policy formulation and local development projects in rural Sindh from 2001-2009.

This objective required the exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of rural participation in the local government's policy process and development. The respondents widely held a view that local governments are usually contested by the feudal elites of Sindh. The disadvantaged population is not in a position to participate in the elections system in competition with these local elites. Even when the elite class do not have their own family members to compete for more seats, they select their own 'yes men' to fill these seats. There is no system of checks and balances for these mighty powerholders in local government in Sindh.

The research evidence did not show any strengths in terms of public participation. However, the findings revealed that during the local government period of 2001-2009, there was the provision of the Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) to facilitate direct participation in development programmes in Sindh. However, the role of the CCBs remains largely undocumented – once the rural

elites came into power in local government, the concept of public participation was not practised any more. This is because (as the findings show), the local community has been kept away from local government programmes.

7.2.3 Objective 4

The following was the fourth objective of study:

To find out the ways to facilitate effective involvement in the local government's policy formulation and local development projects in rural Sindh.

In response to the fourth objective, the research findings showed firstly that civil society itself should create volunteer forums to act as pressure groups for public involvement in local government programmes. Further, it is revealed that there should be legislation in which direct public participation in decision-making should be made mandatory. Without public involvement, there should be no approval of any local government development projects. The participants indicated that once the legislation is passed, there should be supremacy of that law so that local government authorities think it is obligatory to invite citizen participation in decision-making.

The participants indicated that there was a need for self-public mobilisation at a door-to-door level, a village-to-village level, a town to town level, and finally at a society level, to make authentic participation possible in local government service delivery. This seems a very ambitious approach in the context of rural Sindh, where the majority of the public is mainly concerned about their stomachs and twice daily meals.

Furthermore, the participants indicated that mass movements should be launched to pressurise the national and provincial assemblies that without public participation, there would be no release of available funds for the development. In addition to that, the highest recurring concept was that

corruption is the main activity of local governments in Sindh. The researcher has observed that, in the presence of these abovementioned concepts, neither in decentralisation nor in local government democracy is there a relationship between the local government and public participation.

7.2.4 Objective 5

The last objective of the research was:

To assess the implications of the findings for improving policy and practice in other districts in Pakistan and in other developing countries.

This study has made it clear that without eradicating poverty, corruption and inequality, decentralisation could not be expected to initiate participatory development in Sindh. The members of civil society and all of the other marginalised groups should establish volunteer forums to mobilise the common population to support these volunteer groups to put pressure on the local government authorities to initiate meaningful public involvement in all development projects. Furthermore, every individual from the poor population should be told that the local feudal lords are corrupt; therefore, until and unless the public is active, these local powerholders will continue to violate the basic rights of the poor communities in Sindh, Pakistan.

It was observed that the law of the Sindh Assembly does not provide any legal status for public participation. Therefore, the findings suggest that, firstly, the national and provincial assembly should legislate to make public participation compulsory for the local administration of Sindh. It was further emphasised that without informing the deserving beneficiaries of local units, local authorities, as they are corrupt, should not sanction the release of any available funds from local government. This is because it was observed that the funds were released according to party-based and family-based methods, and on favouritism and nepotism. It has been realised that the culture of corruption within local

government institutions is one of the main barriers to public participation. There should be a crackdown on corruption. Otherwise, until and unless the rural elite stop eating up the available funds of local government, they will avoid introducing the practice of the public participation.

Even though the above findings appear plausible in terms of authentic and effective citizen participation in the local government's development practices, it is less possible to put active public pressure on the ruling class. It seems unlikely that these mass movements will take place easily. Furthermore, the ruling class is reluctant to devolve democratic power to a local level. These suggestions appear to be logical and practical if the governments and the donor agencies provide space for the NGOs and other civil society groups and organisations.

7.3 Research question

How has local government initiated and reinvented public involvement in policy formulation and local development projects in rural Sindh?

In response to the research question, the researcher examined how the local governments of Sindh did not initiate public participation in local development projects. It is felt that this sits on the lowest rung (manipulation) of non-participation out of the eight levels of the ladder model of participation propounded by (Arnstein 1969). That lowest rung of non-participation was introduced in 2001 during the Devolution Power Plan by the military General Pervez Musharraf. The rung of rubber-stamping (non-participation) belonged to the CCBs. According to the local government law of the Devolution Power Plan of 2000 (2001), these CCBs would facilitate direct community involvement in the decision making of local government development projects in Sindh. However, these boards did not genuinely encourage public participation. These CCBs remained merely as rubber-stamp features of the local government. This is

because these boards were hijacked by the dominant feudal lords of Sindh. Thus, the aggregated results showed that there were no positive impacts of decentralisation on participatory development in rural Sindh.

Overall, the results show that the expectations of the donors to developing countries to create pro-poor, pro-democratic conditions by introducing decentralisation reforms are not being implemented through the local governments of Sindh, Pakistan.

7.4 Reflection on methodology
7.4.1 Methodology

The researcher was interested in the deep stories of participants' experiences and understandings about the contributions of local government in reinventing the local community's engagement in local policy-making in Sindh. Therefore, the decision to adopt a qualitative research approach was made in order to deal with the richness of the text elaborated by the respondents.

This methodology facilitated asking the respondents to elaborate on their own experiences of what the role of local government was in initiating public participation in delivery services. Now, the researcher realises that this was the most appropriate methodology, because the participants were able to give a full account of their experiences and understandings of the phenomenon of public participation in the local government of Sindh, Pakistan. As the informants elaborated on very deep hidden facts related to how the local government has dealt with local community involvement in the serviced delivery practices in Sindh, it is now felt that this qualitative methodology was the appropriate approach for this study.

7.4.2 Methods

There is no decision or strategy which is right per se for finding good and relevant informants (Saunders et al. 2019). Thus, for this study the researcher adopted purposive sampling to identify the appropriate informants for collecting data. Furthermore, an open-ended questions questionnaire was adopted to generate data. 70 open-ended questions were completed by a variety of participants across two districts. However, the research is useful in terms of enabling the understanding of the relationship between local government and public participation in rural Sindh, Pakistan. Therefore, the researcher feels that the open-ended questionnaire proved to be the most effective method of data collection in the context of Sindh, Pakistan. This is because, where the marginalised respondents could not have the confidence to express what and how they really feel, this method allowed for a silent account of well-articulated, deep stories of their experiences of what and how local governments dealt with the poor communities' engagement in the local development activities of Sindh.

7.4.3 Analysis

The researcher adopted thematic analysis for the data analysis. The technique of frequency - which is the technique of identifying and recording a recurring number of respondents mentioning an issue - was employed with the purpose of noting the order of importance of the issues. The researcher feels that this analytical strategy was the best method for recording the major issues of the data. This is because, if this technique had not been used to highlight the recurring major issues, the researcher could have been in a complex situation when trying to decide which issues should be first or which is more important than any other. Furthermore, this technique went effectively even further, when the researcher selected two districts: the rural region and the urban city region

of Sindh, and without the technique of order of importance, it would still be unclear which issues should be compared between the two districts and which should not. When the technique of frequency was used, the important issues came out ultimately through recording the number of respondents mentioning these issues. In addition, the process of recording and counting the frequency of recurring issues enabled the researcher to keep himself analytically honest, without involving a biased recording of the issues based on his own decisions. It proved an effective technique to weight the order of importance of the recurring issues in the data.

7.5 Main findings

In this study, the researcher has critically examined how local governments initiate public participation in local policy-making and service delivery in Sindh, Pakistan. The researcher will now briefly reflect on the role of local governments in local community participation in service delivery in Sindh. The findings indicate that the experiences of the participants from the two districts of Sindh displayed how local governments were still dominated by feudal lords and other dominant families. The main findings of the study are:

1) Based on the results, it was evident that the Pakistani military was the main operator of the local government reforms, where the sole purpose of devolution was to serve the interests of military centralisation instead of serving the downtrodden communities of Sindh, Pakistan. Local government reforms for legitimising the military coup were introduced by General Pervez Musharraf. It is evident the military of Pakistan has become a strong political force. The military was also the first architect of the devolution reforms in Pakistan and in its other sub-units such as Sindh. The results indicate that local governments have been used as a centralisation tool by the military establishment of Pakistan. This

behaviour is inculcated in the central policy of the Pakistani state. When General Musharraf introduced the Devolution Power Plan of 2000, he transferred the powers from the Pakistani bureaucracy to local governments in the period 2001-2009, and this contributed in some way to the physical infrastructure development for the downtrodden groups of the population of Sindh. As the funding of devolution reforms was increased in the period 2001-2009, thus it contributed to the development of physical infrastructure. It was realised that the transfer from bureaucracy to local governments may allow local development to trickle down.

2) Very often local government is captured by the feudal class without leaving access to the marginalised groups of Sindh. As a few dominant factions of society maintain their control over local government power, public participation is the lowest priority, because they are afraid of public supremacy or activism by the general population of Sindh. Citizens are not empowered through education, talks, or participation. Many activities, which are considered to empower or mobilise most of the population in Sindh, are discouraged, or have been discontinued with the hidden motives of the local feudal class factions of the province of Sindh. For example, these policies or activities include access to education for the marginalised groups of rural Sindh, or empowering community awareness programmes.

3) The marginalised groups are treated as a commodity. The reason for this attitude on the part of the dominant feudal lords is that the dignity of the underprivileged groups of Sindh is oppressed so that these exploited poor masses do not dare to raise their voices against the ruling class. Most of the time, public votes are used to get into power to maintain the dominancy of the feudal lords in Sindh. The poverty-ridden population is used merely as heads to

be counted for votes instead of as equal citizens of the country. As the feudal lords and landed elites have benefited from the oppressed conditions of the masses, they tend to maintain their hold on power. For that, public participation is deliberately discouraged.

4) The local needy and deserving are alienated in order to keep fraudulent practices clandestine. Most of the time, open debates and mobilisation programmes are discouraged to keep the public ignorant of their basic rights as citizens. The corruption of, and other fraudulent practices with, the available funds of local government is one of the many main barriers to community participation in the delivery of services. This is because, if public participation is initiated, the unscrupulous rulers' corrupt activities could be seen as overt by the close interaction between local community groups and the local administration. Therefore, due to such a fear of being exposed by the public, public participation is discouraged by the powerholders in Sindh. It has been highlighted that the current local government system introduced by the civilian governments is more corrupt than that introduced by the military generals. Therefore, the civilian governments run by the feudal elites negate public participation in policy practice.

5) The public should take responsibility for coming out to safeguard the meaningful process of public participation. These forums should work as pressure groups. They should put pressure on the publicly elected councillors so that they invite the local community to take part in policy deliberation. Until and unless the common man is engaged in the implementation of local policy, the public issues will not be resolved. There should be meetings between the common public and the local representatives. Local elected councillors need to be made to realise that until and unless they promote public participation, local government will not

be efficient enough to deliver public services. Such a responsibility is believed by the social workers, civil society members, lawyers' groups, educated members of the population, and those people with an honest and decent background. They, along with their beliefs, should be brought in as public representatives. Furthermore, supremacy of law and a crackdown on corruption could pave the way for public participation.

7.6 Research implications

The purpose of this study was to develop evidence to show whether or not the local government's promises to bring government closer to the citizens through the feature of local community participation in local governance were true (Paul 1987; Fiske 1996). There is evidence that local governments do not initiate public participation in service delivery in Sindh. As the results of Chapters Six and Seven revealed, there are various factors contributing to the alienation between the needs-based marginalised groups and the ruling authorities of local governments. Therefore, one of the major implications of this study is how to overcome these barriers so that the process of public involvement can take place in the context of Sindh, Pakistan.

There is little doubt that Sindh is experiencing unequal social class structures; power is controlled by a few dominant class factions. So, how to address the lack of trust between the dominant rulers and the suppressed? Furthermore, it is necessary to identify the people who are ready to participate in the decision-making process of local governments and those who are not. As the literature (World Bank 1996) suggests, the devolution reforms were supported by a few international donor agencies, and this study can be of use to those who want to fund the Pakistani local government reforms, It is claimed that decentralisation promotes the public empowerment of citizen involvement in the decision-making

processes of local governance. Therefore, there should not be any complacency on the part of the governments of Sindh and donor organisations regarding the introduction of local government systems without effective and serious public participation in local development policymaking and implementation in Sindh.

7.6.1 Reflection on theory

Arnstein's (1969) theory of the ladder of citizen participation was employed as the guiding model for analysing the scale and the nature of community participation. The various rungs of this theory (Arnstein 1969) of the ladder of citizen participation were considered when analysing the existing relationship between local government and public participation in Sindh, Pakistan. The findings of this study are only in accord with Arnstein's (1969) lowest rung of non-participation (manipulation), in which the system's real objective is not to enable people to participate in the decision-making process. The researcher intends to say that although the theory of the ladder of citizen participation elaborated by (Arnstein 1969) may be focused on industrialised democracies, however, the lowest rung of non-participation is in line with the findings of this study, as powerful actors or local elites do not want to enable the ordinary population to participate in planning or conducting development programmes. However, there is no accord between the findings of this study and the statement by (Arnstein 1969) that some systems tend to observe the empty ritual of participation - this statement might be focussed on democratic countries, where the system cannot blatantly prevent people from participating in decision-making. The lowest rung (manipulation), which is non-participatory too, is a rubber-stamp feature which was introduced during the local government periods by the military general Pervez Musharraf. For instance,

General Musharraf introduced the CCBs with the provision that these community boards would facilitate direct community involvement in the decision-making process of local government development projects in Sindh. However, these boards were not genuinely encouraging public participation. These boards proved to be simply endorsed community boards. However, interestingly, these acceded CCBs were excluded from the local government system introduced by the publicly elected governments of Sindh. In other words, there is no participation without using any rubber-stamp advisory boards in the publicly elected local governments of Sindh, Pakistan.

7.6.2 Limitations of theory

Perhaps the best known attempt (Choguill 1996: 433) to measure the scale of participation by the public is that of Arnstein's ladder of community. However, the biggest challenges for the scholars whose studies are focussed on underdeveloped countries is that the theory of the ladder of community participation is focussed on the developed world. This is because Arnstein views citizen participation as a term for citizen power. For example, the rungs of Arnstein's ladder are defined as the extent of citizens' power in determining the end product, which is the public policy (Choguill 1996). Now, this kind of power for citizens cannot be expected from underdeveloped countries such as Pakistan, which as a very federal state is diehard in its determination to consolidate its centralised power by all means. Moreover, the marginalised population of Sindh, Pakistan is not only expecting such a power to direct public policy, but also to some extent to deliver development projects during the participation process. The citizens of developing countries could have dual objectives in the process of involvement in the development activities of local governance. First, they need empowerment to influence the decisions which

affect them; secondly, marginalised citizens want services such as roads and street construction, electricity, water, and council houses. For that kind of participation, citizens need to be willing to contribute labour, time, and money to get them (Choguill 1996). For example, in Pakistan most communities are expected to provide labour for such projects - even for projects that are undertaken for them (Choguill 1996: 434). However, in Arnstein's theory of the ladder of community participation, concepts such as free labour, time, money, and self-mobilisation initiatives have not been addressed. In addition, the degree of community involvement can vary widely from project to project; therefore, there might be 150 rungs with fewer and less sharp distinctions among them (Choguill 1996; Kessy 2013). However, Arnstein has simply drawn a broad range of eight rungs that do not accord with the nature of multi-dimensional participation in developing countries.

Thus, it is believed that the lower chances of meaningful participation should be illustrated differently, with the lower rungs far wider apart than the upper ones (see Chapter 6, page 30).

7.6.3 Contribution to the development of this theory

This framework suggests that in terms of the practical implications of this study, the state is questionable and centralised due to its military structure

Figure 7. 1 Figure Model of practical implications of study

Pluralistic participation			
Members' roles	Opportunity for learning	Access to officials	Means of coercion/ influence
Common interests and becoming part of a common cause	Corner meetings and mobilisation can enable people to exchange common interests and learn from each other	Local community can be able to access local officials through the majority of community members	Local community can be able to influence their demands for public participation and development

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Source: Data Analysis. Adopted from (Laird 2016)

7.6.4 Contribution to methods

In the case of weak states not protecting their underprivileged populations, the research method of using an open-ended questions questionnaire happened to be more appropriate rather than the qualitative research method of face-to-face interviews, where the fear of non-confidentiality exists. As far as the context of Sindh provinces ruled under the Pakistani military establishment is concerned, the silent research method (completing open-ended questions in black and white) used to gain the participants' accounts of their life experiences has proved to be the most important research method of data collection in rural Sindh. This method of data collection can be very effective in a context where there is a lack of freedom of expression, and weak members of civil society feel insecure about exposing their true stories about the corrupt governments through voice recorders or video recorders.

This approach of using an open-ended questions questionnaire allowed a great deal of opportunity for the informants to elaborate, without any fear of recognition of their identity, when talking about their experiences with their corrupt rulers without it being injurious. Therefore, the researcher feels that this research method should be considered for similar studies in similar regions where there is frustration about what would happen if they spoke out.

7.6.5 Contribution to practice

The main contribution is, as the findings indicate, that local governments have negatively impacted public participation in local development projects and have not played a role in public participation and in the empowerment of the poor communities of Sindh. The governments and donor organisations can use this model as their guide to learn how to address these barriers to participation.

The results indicate that democratic public participation in the local governments of Sindh can be achieved through the presence of an effective civil society and by the governing bodies themselves. Furthermore, local government should put emphasis on public empowerment first and the physical infrastructure afterwards, through authentic and effective local community involvement. Therefore, in the context of Sindh, the main priority of local governance should be meaningful: civic engagement instead of physical infrastructure development without public involvement. This is because it was evident that without local community involvement in development, the funds are spent fraudulently by the corrupt local elites. Therefore, the establishment of steering groups may be a good steppingstone to keeping public participation alive and meaningful.

As the findings suggest, without public participation, decentralisation has failed to contribute to the process of local democratisation and participatory development in the province of Sindh, Pakistan. Therefore, to make local governments serve pro-poor rights, it is important that public participation should be made compulsory in the local government laws of Sindh. The findings of this study suggest that if civic involvement is not made mandatory in local policy making and implementation, the poor communities may not benefit from the devolution reforms system in Sindh.

The Sindh government should hire the various semi-voluntary, semi-hired civil society forums, committees of non-governmental organisations, and special groups of the trade unions to participate actively in the budgeting process and project development practices in Sindh. The donor organisations should take notice of these requirements for public participation in local government policy-making and the implementation process in Sindh.

The Sindh governments need to introduce local community participation constitutionally, so that without public confidence no available funds should be released. Furthermore, there should be a strong partnership between local beneficiaries and the local government administration. It is suggested that local governments should not be a politically motivated feature of local governance. However, it should be introduced with a purpose of empowering the poor communities through participatory development. Thus, the present study can be used to empower the marginalised communities through public participation in the local government's development processes.

7.7 Limitations

The main limitation of this study was time. The first-choice of methods of data generation was face-to-face open-ended interviews with relevant informants. However, out of the blue, a situation developed in which the researcher was under immense stress regarding his safety. The researcher received life threatening messages from a few religious extremist groups in Pakistan. As this project was important to the researcher, changing the method of data collection was not as dangerous as the researcher travelling for field work in Pakistan. To address these issues of methods of data generation, the researcher had the option of recruiting available field assistants to carry out the field work. As the researcher was unable to travel into the field, the time limitation became more daunting in terms of the study being completed within the time allotted.

Therefore, the methods of face-to-face interviews with open-ended questions was replaced by a questionnaire containing open-ended questions. This strategy was devised to proceed by employing the various field assistants in the case study areas of Sindh. It was decided by the researcher to hire very efficient and pro-research field assistants; there was a massive need for

financial resources. As the researcher was unable to travel for the field work, various resources were needed to off-set the researcher's absence from the field work. For example, employing very efficient and trustworthy field assistants and ensuring their safety, storing the completed questionnaires in safe metal boxes, and the process of classifying the data in a timely fashion. Various plastic folders were purchased to keep the classified data safe from rain or water. However, as this study had been awarded a scholarship for field work, this mitigated a lot of the stress of investing in field work so that the field assistants could work efficiently.

Another limitation was how the researcher was going to be able to receive the open-ended questionnaires which had been completed by the participants. To achieve this step, the researcher assigned a special electronic medium through which the completed questionnaire was transferred to the researcher. Finally, once the data reached saturation point, all of the questionnaires were sent to the researcher by post.

This research project could have been more encompassing in terms of using more units from various districts of Sindh. There should have been more districts involved in the case study; however, due to time limitations, only two districts were assigned. In this study, none of the respondents were Nazims (Mayors) or chairmen. Only the union councillors of both of the local government systems of Sindh (2001-2009, and 2013-present) took part.

7.8 Future research

Firstly, there should be a further study on how participation in fiscal decision-making should be structured by considering both parties. In the context of Sindh, there are two opposing social classes. One class is the rural dominant class, who do not want citizen participation in local administration decisions.

The others are those who are downtrodden and underprivileged in rural Sindh. However, there should be arrangements made so that these two opposing groups can work together.

Secondly, how can citizens be provided with budgetary and staff resources to solve and implement decisions? It seems that there is a crucial need for a study to determine how to provide the citizens with budgetary provisions and staff resources to take a keen interest in the daily open space meetings of local governments. There should be a study into the feasible frameworks that could be practical in the context of Sindh.

Thirdly, any further study should encompass more districts of the province of Sindh. There should be other districts of rural and urban Sindh involved. There should either be urban studies separately, or both regions should be included, to explore the relationship of decentralisation and local community participation.

Fourthly, the heads of local governments - Nazims (mayors) and chairmen - should be included in the sampling of the study. This is because this would supplement further research.

Any future study should be conducted with the purpose of creating such an empirical model which can be practicable in the context of Sindh (because this study has focused on whether there is the existence of participation or not). The following research areas may be considered for future research:

- How should funds be allocated for citizen participation in the local governments of Sindh?

- How can citizen participation contribute to the resource management of the local governments of Sindh?

- What are the impacts on citizen participation of manipulatory participation? What can the participation of manipulation contribute to empowerment in the context of Sindh, Pakistan?

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Appendix 1

Open-ended questions questionnaires

A. Section: Respondents' understanding about Local Councils and public participation

1. **Question:** Please explain briefly what you know about the Local Councils of the Local Government under General Musharraf's era (2001-2009) and President Zardari's government in (2013- until now). Please write your response in the box below:

A. Local Councils of Musharraf period (2001-2009)

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B. Please write your response for the Local Council of Zardari period

 (2013-until now) in the box below:

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2. **Question:** Please briefly explain community participation during Musharraf's Local Councils and the Former President Asif Zardari's period of 2013.

Please write your response for public participation in the box below:

a) Public participation in Musharraf's Local Councils

b) Public participation in Asif Zardari's period

3. **Question:** Please say to what extent these local Councils invited citizen's participation in policy making during Musharraf's era and the current Local Government introduced by Zardari.

A. Please write your response about General Musharraf's Local Councils' role in community involvement during Musharraf's time (2001-2009) in the box below:

B. Please write here again about Asif Zardari's current Local Council's role in community involvement in policy making and development works.

4. **Question:** Please write what you know about the role of Citizen Community Boards in community participation in the Local Government's policy making and service delivery during Musharraf's time and under the current Local Councils of civilian government introduced by General Musharraf.

5. Please write here what you know about Musharraf's Citizen Community Boards' role in community participation in your region and in the whole of Sindh.

6. Please write here the role of the current Councils for Community Participation in your area and in the whole of Sindh.

C. Section: Questionnaire Covering research objectives

I. **Causes and factors for public participation in Sindh**

5. **Question:** Please explain the main reasons why Local Government compromised on public participation in the process of policy making by Local Councils in Musharraf's government and the current one.

6. **Question:** What have been the major factors and forces that have encouraged public participation in Local Government's policy making in rural Sindh during Musharraf's period and now?

D. **Strengths and weaknesses of the Local Council's role in public participation.**

5. **Positive and Negative sides of the Local Councils for public participation**

7. **Question. Please tell us briefly which departments were very accessible regarding participation during Musharraf's period and Zardari's Local Government**

Please write here for both periods

8. **Question:** Please explain in which region involvement was neglected most of the time during both periods of Musharraf's and Zardari's Local Government.

   Please write here for both the Local Governments of Musharraf and

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   Zardari

E.   **Your suggestions for effective and practical public participation in Local Government development projects in Sindh?**

6. **Your suggestions for future improvement.**

9. **Questions:** Please suggest how public participation can be made effective and successful in future Local Governments.

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10. **Question.** Please explain how public participation can be made accessible to all the common ordinary citizens in Sindh.

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Appendix 2

Demographic information of respondents

11. Finally, please provide the following information (optional)

Your name should be an alias--

A. What is your gender, please (optional)?

1. Male 2. Female

1) How old are you (optional)?

1. 18-28

2. 29-38

3. 39-59.

4. 59 and over

2) What is your education

1. Primary 2. Secondary 3. Higher Education 4. University .5. Other

3) What was/ is your profession/ business during the Musharraf's period and now (optional)?

1. Teaching 2. Local Government 3. Worker of Citizen Community Board Social Worker 4. NGO worker

4) What is your District of Residence?

1) Qambar-Shahdadkot

2) Larkana

5) What is your Union Council?

Appendix 3 Participants' consent form

Title of study: **Public Participation dynamics in Local Government: policy and practice in service delivery.**

Please note that the researcher is looking for the views of public elected councillors, members of citizen community boards, teaching staff and civil society members of this District Larkana / Qambar-Shahdadkot about public participation dynamics between the two local government systems: General Musharrafs local government (2001-2009) and Asif Ali Zardari's local government system introduced in (2013-until now).

- Signing this form does not commit you to take part in this study. ☐

- You can tell the Field Assistant you wish to withdraw from the study without having to give any reason for doing so. ☐

- I have read/ the information sheet and/or it has been read and explained to me by the Field Assistant. ☐

- I understand that the completed questions will be used for the above-mentioned research project. I understand that the findings of the research may be published but I will not be able to be identified from the writings of the researcher. ☐

- I understand that direct quotes from my completed questionnaire may be used in reports but that I will not be able to be identified from these because all responses will be coded. ☐

- Signature of individual: ☐

- Print Name:

- Date:

- I have explained this form and I was able to answer any questions that arose.

- Signature of Researcher: ☐

   Print Name:

   Date:

   Confidentiality and data protection.

   All data will be kept in a locked cabinet in the researcher's / Principal Supervisor office. All information stored electronically will be kept on password-protected

computers owned by The Bradford University. The data will be coded so that it cannot be linked to an individual.

RESPONDENTS' INFORMATION SHEET

UNIVERSITY of BRADFORD

Respondents' information sheet

PhD Title: **Public Participation dynamics in Local Government: policy and**

practice in service delivery.

I would like to invite you to take part in a research study and please complete the questions. Before you decide you need to understand why the research is being done and what you would have to do. Please take time to read the following information carefully. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. You can talk to or contact the principle supervisor, Prof. Farhad Analoui. Please take time to decide whether to take part in this questionnaire or not.

1.   What is the purpose of the study?

The researcher is looking for the views of publicly elected Councillors, members of Citizen Community Boards, teaching staff and civil society members of this District Larkana / Qambar-Shahdadkot. This study is also concerned to find out the public participation dynamics between two Local Government systems: General Musharraf's Local Government (2001-2009) and Asif Ali Zardari's Local Government system introduced in (2013-until now).

2.   Why have I been invited?

You have been approached because you live in District of Larkana/ Qambar-Shahdadkot.

3.   Do I have to take part?

No, you do not have to, it is entirely up to you to decide. If you are interested in taking part, my research field assistant Mr--------will meet with you to describe the study and go through this information sheet. You can take a copy away. You are free to withdraw any time up to a month after data collection, without giving a reason.

4.   What will happen to me if I take part?

You will be given an open-ended questionnaire to answer. The answers will be written in boxes for each question.

5.   What will I have to do?

You will be asked to sign a consent form indicating your willingness to complete the questionnaire.

6. What other information will be collected about me?

No other information will be collected.

7. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?

The researcher firmly believes that there are no risks associated with completing this questionnaire.

8. What are the possible benefits of taking part?

There are no direct benefits from taking part. We hope that the results from the study will contribute to a better understanding of the role of local governance in educating citizens' awareness of the role and responsibilities of the Local Council.

9. Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?

All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept confidential. The data will be used only for this study and only the researcher and principal supervisor will have access to it.

10. What will happen to the results of the research study?

The researcher will produce an 80,000-word report on the findings of the study (thesis). This will be made publicly available from Bradford University. The findings of the study may be used to prepare academic articles. You will not be identifiable in any report or publication.

12. Who has reviewed the study?

The research has been approved by Bradford University's Research Degree Board and the Research Ethics Committee to protect your safety, rights, wellbeing and dignity.

13. Complaints

If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask the field assistant to contact the researcher who will give answers your questions. If you wish, you can contact the following supervisory team of this research project.

This copy of the information sheet is yours to keep. If you decide to take part in the study, you will be given a copy of the signed consent form to keep.

The researcher's Principal Supervisor: Prof: Farhad Analoui

Email: f.analoui@bradford.ac.uk

Telephone contact:

Contact details for the researcher:

Aijaz AliEmail: aali19bradford.ac.uk