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## Bibliography of the Popper–Miller Theorem\*

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\*Version of May 25, 2022. Compiled by Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda & David Miller. © Copyright reserved. Addenda and corrigenda will be appreciated, and should be sent to David Miller at the e-mail address given at <http://go.warwick.ac.uk/dwmiller>. For light relief, see also ‘The Miller popper’ at [http://www.solarbotics.net/library/circuits/bot\\_popper\\_miller.html](http://www.solarbotics.net/library/circuits/bot_popper_miller.html).

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