

W

**WORKING
PAPERS**

352

**Democracy, intermediation, and voting in Spain:
some new findings from in-depth
and longitudinal data (vol. 2)**

RICHARD GUNTHER

JOSÉ RAMÓN MONTERO

HANS-JÜRGEN PUHLE



Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials
Adscrit a la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

**Democracy, intermediation, and voting in Spain:
some new findings from in-depth and longitudinal data
(vol. 2)**

Part 2: Voting, Partisanship, and Ideology

(Part 1, on “Democracy and Intermediation”, has been published as WP 351)

RICHARD GUNTHER

Ohio State University

JOSÉ RAMÓN MONTERO

Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

HANS-JÜRGEN PUHLE

Goethe Universität Frankfurt

WP núm. 352

Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials

Barcelona, 2018

El Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS) es un consorcio creado en 1988 por la Diputación de Barcelona y la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, institución esta última a la que está adscrito a efectos académicos.

“Working Papers” es una de las colecciones que edita el ICPS, previo informe del correspondiente Comité de Lectura, especializada en la publicación -en la lengua original del autor- de trabajos en elaboración de investigadores sociales, con el objetivo de facilitar su discusión científica.

Su inclusión en esta colección no limita su posterior publicación por el autor, que mantiene la integridad de sus derechos.

Este trabajo no puede ser reproducido sin el permiso del autor.



El autor no se hace responsable de las opiniones recogidas, comentarios y manifestaciones vertidas en la presente obra, dado que recoge exclusivamente la opinión del mismo como manifestación de su derecho de libertad de expresión. Cualquier forma de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública o transformación queda totalmente prohibida, salvo excepción prevista por la ley.

El presente documento ha sido únicamente preparado como una versión de trabajo y estudio, no constituyendo asesoramiento profesional alguno. No deben llevarse a cabo actuaciones en base a la información contenida en este documento sin obtener el específico asesoramiento profesional.

Edición: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS)
Mallorca, 244, pral. 08008 Barcelona (España)
<http://www.icps.cat>

© Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero and Hans-Jürgen Puhle

ISSN: 1133-8962

DL: B-10186-2012

TABLE OF CONTENTS**PART 1 (WP 351): DEMOCRACY AND INTERMEDIATION****Abstract****Introduction****The origins of support for democracy, disaffection, and political engagement**

- Support for democracy
- The view from the grass roots
- Disaffection and political inefficacy
- Political engagement
- Political discussion under an authoritarian regime
- The roots of political disaffection
- Mobilization during the Franco regime

Political intermediation

- The mass communications media
- Media bias
- Membership in and political contact by secondary associations
- Face-to-face flows of political information through interpersonal networks

References**PART 2 (WP 352): VOTING, PARTISANSHIP, AND IDEOLOGY**

Abstract	6
Voting, partisanship, and ideology	7
Sources of electoral stability	8
Learning party identification after a dictatorship	16
Left, right, and center: the origins of ideological identification	22
Explaining the vote	29
The 1993 election	29
Change over time?	32
Concluding observations	40
References	42

ABSTRACT

The findings reported in this monograph (in two parts, published as WP 351 and WP 352) are based upon a broad-based, multi-method analysis of Spanish politics and society, including five national surveys conducted over nearly three decades, and many in-depth qualitative interviews with a “panel” of respondents who had been interviewed six years earlier. With these rich data resources, we are able to address a number of important hypotheses. We find that lifelong patterns of active engagement with democratic politics are primarily the product of childhood and young-adult political socialization (including formal education and informal socialization within the family) in both the Franco regime and the new democratic political system. In contrast, support for democracy in Spain was acquired primarily through adult political learning, with prominent political elites and their respective parties playing the key roles. Using both cross-sectional survey data and qualitative interview data, we explore the various and complex ways that individuals receive information about politics through relevant political intermediaries. These same data resources enable us to explore between 1979 and 2004 both the processes through which voters acquire potentially stabilizing long-term attitudinal links to partisan politics (especially party identification and left-right loyalties), as well as those forces (especially socio-economic and cultural change, and strategic decisions made by political elites) that can lead to substantial transformations of parties and party systems.

For technical reasons, this monograph appears in two parts. The first part (WP 351) deals with the origins of support for democracy, disaffection and political engagement, and political intermediation. The second part (WP 352) focuses on voting, partisanship and ideology, and on the factors explaining the vote.

The first two sections of this monograph, on the origins of support for democracy, disaffection and political engagement, and on political intermediation, respectively, have been published as WP 351.

VOTING, PARTISANSHIP, AND IDEOLOGY

We now turn our attention to an analysis of the determinants of the vote in Spanish elections conducted between 1979 and 2004. The dependent variable is a new variable measuring the extent to which the respondent cast a ballot in favor of the same party in the current and the previous election.¹ As already announced, this single-country study makes it possible for us to test some of the hypotheses set forth in most studies following a longitudinal rather than a cross-national comparative framework. Usually, the latter studies (for instance, Beck and Gunther 2016) include in their analysis three basic types of independent variables: socio-demographic and other individual-level variables that tend to belong to the “sociological” model of voting choice; party identification and positions on the left-right scale as long-term “political identities,” and the respondents’ evaluations of the state of the economy and affect towards party leaders as measures of short-term political factors. In general, these studies have found that the sociological variables explained more of the variance of the vote in the -economically less-developed countries, but that in the economically more advanced countries the impact of these social-structural factors was much reduced. Based on cross-national comparative analysis at a single point in time, they inferred that social-structural determinants of the vote decline in explanatory power as societies become more affluent and modern. But such inferences can be risky insofar as they are not based on empirical analysis of data collected over an extended period of time during which social change occurs.

With our case-study of Spain, however, we can undertake a direct test of this “modernization hypothesis.” Economic development and other processes of social change (especially secularization) dramatically transformed Spain over the period analyzed in this paper, so our longitudinal research design makes it possible to accurately monitor the changing impact on the vote of social-structural factors over time, while our focus on a single country holds constant a number of potentially confounding variables. But an important reversal of this trend provides evidence that the electoral mobilization strategies pursued by political elites can play a remarkable role—in this case by polarizing a previously dormant cleavage (Evans and De Graaf 2013). We regard this as further evidence that any analysis of the determinants of the vote should take into consideration the electoral strategies of political elites and their parties, particularly insofar as they choose to emphasize or downplay latent socio-structural or cultural cleavages in a society. Similarly, the incorporation of an in-depth interview component into this Spanish case study enables us to explore in great detail some of the explanatory factors that regularly emerge as powerful

¹This is a dichotomous variable in which a ballot cast for the same party in these two consecutive elections was scored as one, while votes for different parties or abstention from one or the other of these two elections was scored as 0.

determinants of the vote, as for instance the party or the left-right ideological identification. While the closed-ended survey questionnaire items do not allow to determine exactly what *left* and *right* mean to voters, and how they employ these labels in making electoral choices, our analysis of in-depth interviews with a representative sample of the Spanish electorate in 1988 makes it possible for us to examine how those labels have been understood and used by the voters. It also enables us to explore the historical origins of left-right in Spain and how historical memories of past events (such as the Civil War) were transmitted to contemporary Spaniards. Similarly, these qualitative interview transcripts provide relevant information to explore the processes through which voters in new democracies (in this case, following an authoritarian interlude of four decades, from 1939 to 1975) develop attachments to, or identify with, political parties.

Sources of electoral stability

The period that we shall examine began with extraordinarily high electoral volatility, but by the mid-1990s had settled into a stable pattern of competition within a “two-plus” party system. The Spanish election of 1982 produced the highest level of volatility of any West European election since at least 1885. In the aggregate, 42.3 percent of Spanish voters shifted their votes from one party to another (Gunther and Montero 2001: 88).² But while the total volatility that characterized this electoral *earthquake* was extraordinarily high, it is noteworthy that inter-bloc volatility was relatively low; that is, most of the shifting of the electorate took place between parties *within* the blocs of left and right. Indeed, until the mid-1990s, very few voters crossed over the ideological barrier that separated the two principal nationwide parties. We have argued (Gunther and Montero 2001; Montero 2008) that this was reflective of a high level of anchoring of partisanship in Spain, various dimensions of which will be explored below. By the late 1980s through early 1990s, inter-party shifts in electoral support were more moderate but still of a relatively high level (see Montero 2008: 38-40), and our in-depth interviews indicate they were motivated by certain aspects of the trajectories of these parties.

By far the biggest change that took place during this period was the collapse of support for the UCD, which fell from 35 percent of the vote in 1979 to 6 percent just three years later. The disappearance of the center-to-center-right UCD was accompanied by the massive increase in electoral support for the very conservative Alianza Popular and the Socialist PSOE, as well as the appearance of the Centro Democrático y Social (CDS, which reached its peak of 9 percent of the vote cast in 1986 but disappeared after its defeat in 1993, when it received less than 2 percent of the vote). The Communist PCE also suffered a serious defeat in 1982 (declining from 10.8 percent of the vote in 1979 to just 4 percent), but by 1996 it had recovered most of its electoral support after transforming itself into a coalition that included a variety of minor post-materialist groups, only to suffer from a steady erosion of support over the following decade. As can be seen in [Table 4](#),

² Of the more than 300 elections that have taken place in Western Europe since 1885, only four come close to this level of “total volatility:” the French elections of 1906 (31.1 percent) and 1986 (37.4 percent), the Weimar Republic election of 1920 (32.1 percent), and the Italian election of 1994 (41.9 percent); see Bartolini and Mair (1990: 323 ff.).

partisan preferences stabilized in the following elections. During the 1980s and 1990s, total volatility declined to remarkably low levels, with the exceptions of the few elections in which an increasingly strong competition between PSOE and PP (as those of 2000 and 2004) brought about relevant changes in parties' shares of the vote. In all remaining elections, volatility levels were higher among parties *within* each of the leftist and conservative camps than *between* those camps. In the 2010s, both the 2011 and above all the 2015 elections were exceptional contests; the latter also produced an *earthquake* similar to that of the 1982 elections. These were indeed elections of change, which put an end to processes of dealignment and realignment, and crystallized into a new party system. In 2015 the two major parties lost millions of voters and dozens of seats. With 28.7 percent of vote, the governing PP remained the largest party in spite of losing almost three million votes and more than sixty seats. The PSOE continued its decline, losing almost two million votes and 20 seats. Its 22.0 percent of the vote was the worst result for the party since the founding election of the new Spanish democracy in 1977. On the winning side, the extraordinarily high volatility came in the left from Podemos ["We Can"], a radical populist party which received more than five million votes and 69 seats, and on the center-right from Ciudadanos (C's), a liberal party which obtained more than three million votes and 40 seats.

Table 4. Aggregate electoral volatility in Spain, 1979-2016 (in percentages)

Elections	Total	Inter-bloc	Intra-bloc
1979-77	11.1	2.7	8.4
1982-79	43.4	5.9	37.5
1986-82	12.8	2.2	10.6
1989-86	8.9	1.6	7.3
1993-89	11.2	2.4	8.8
1996-93	5.7	1.0	4.7
2000-96	8.8	6.8	2.1
2004-00	10.9	8.2	2.6
2008-04	4.9	1.1	3.9
2011-08	16.4	6.0	10.5
2015-11	35.4	9.9	25.4
2016-15	4.9	2.8	2.1
Mean	14.5	4.2	10.3
Standard deviation	12.2	3.0	10.7

Source: Montero and Rama (2018).

Our 1988 panel study makes it possible for us to analyze the electoral behavior of individual voters over a full decade, based upon self-reports of votes cast in the 1979, 1982, and 1986 elections, and voting intentions as described by respondents in 1988. And the in-depth portion of these interviews gives us insights into the reasons why voters would abandon the party for which they had voted in the previous election. In the case of the PSOE, the most common complaint involved dissatisfaction with the González government's allegedly "neo-liberal" economic policies, which angered many of its traditional working-class supporters and culminated in the breakdown of century-long ties to the socialist trade union, the UGT. One of our respondents—a 43-year-old upper-middle-class, self-described social democrat—complained bitterly that the PSOE "has moved far away from where it had been ... producing a great disillusionment. It has moved totally to the right, supporting the bosses, and has not done 90 percent of what it had promised to do."

In the case of the CDS, the most frequently-heard complaint was that its opportunistic appeals to leftist voters alienated from the PSOE generated mixed messages that confused its otherwise centrist electorate. As a 32-year-old middle-class, university-educated housewife claimed, "What has happened to the CDS is that it is still a party that has not defined itself. You don't know where it stands regarding the general strike, abortion, divorce... You have to take a stand on some important issues like these, whether or not it costs votes. But you've got to define yourself."

With regard to AP and PCE, leadership succession crises following the resignations of Manuel Fraga and Santiago Carrillo, respectively, disoriented and alienated their respective blocs of voters in the mid-1980s, but were largely resolved by the end of that decade. For example, the resignation of party founder Manuel Fraga—widely recognized as an energetic and capable leader—by Antonio Hernández Mancha—regarded as an incompetent lightweight—was extremely unpopular with many AP supporters. One conservative, middle-class, and religious housewife said in an interview that she would not vote for the party in the next election: "The current situation makes me angry. The AP today is an embarrassment [and] Hernández Mancha is unrepresentable." It is not surprising that these tumultuous changes contributed to the perplexity of many respondents towards their respective parties, to uncertainty about their voting intentions, to shifts from one party to another, and, more generally, to disinterest in parties and politics. As a habitual AP supporter (a 58-year-old, middle-class, university educated man) put it, "The only party I could trust was the AP. But given the party's current disaster, I don't see any party that I could support." The AP's succession crisis was only resolved in 1989, with the new leadership of José María Aznar, and the *refounding* of the party as the Partido Popular (PP).

The changes in the Spanish party system, its subsequent stabilization, and the difficulties experienced by many voters in making electoral choices during this period were described as a situation of "volatile parties" and "stable voters" (Barnes, MacDonough, and López Pina 1986). In this context, an exploration of the determinants of stability in electoral behavior assumes a special significance. We begin with a quantitative analysis of the zero-order correlates of consistency in partisan preference over successive elections. Included in the initial correlation matrix were three variables commonly regarded as *anchors* of partisanship: these are the strength of the respondent's

identification with a political party,³ and the salience of the left-right dimension for the respondent.⁴ A second set of attitudes tapped into coders' assessments of certain cognitive or affective attributes of the respondent: his/her emotional involvement with politics, level of interest in politics, extent of substantive knowledge of politics, extent of cognitive structuring of political attitudes,⁵ and logical consistency of the respondent's belief system, as reflected in statements made over the course of the in-depth portion of the interview.⁶ The results of an analysis of stable voting in 1982 and 1986 can be seen in [Table 5](#), which includes those variables that were statistically significant at .1 or better.

Table 5. Correlates of stable voting in 1982 and 1986 elections^a

Variables	Correlations
Strong party identification	.28 [.000]
Emotional involvement	.17 [.026]
Cognitive structuring	.17 [.028]
Salience of the left-right dimension	.17 [.028]
Logical consistency	.15 [.043]

^a Figures are Pearson's *r* correlations; in brackets, statistical significance.

Source: The 1988 in-depth interview study, *N* = 175.

Not surprisingly, a respondent's propensity to vote consistently for the same party is most closely related to that individual's strength of identification with that party. While the close relationship between party identification and the vote is regarded by some as verging on a tautology (e.g., Budge, Crewe, and Farlie 2010 [1976]: 5), there appears to be a broad consensus that it is "a basic foundation in electoral democracy in that it is one of the most important bases of individual vote choice" (Weisberg and Greene 2003: 110). In any event, it provides us with an ordinal measure of the strength of partisan preference. It is also noteworthy that stable voting is underpinned by a set of affective (emotional involvement) and cognitive attributes (the extent of logical consistency and cognitive structuring) that accord with the initial formulation and empirical testing of the concept

³ The strength of the respondent's identification with a political party (scored from 1 to 7) was based on his/her self-designation as "very close" or "close" to each party in the closed-ended portion of the interview, as well as the coders' more subjective assessments of the respondent's partisanship as reflected in the open-ended, in-depth portion of the interview.

⁴ This was based on the respondent's self-placement on the left-right continuum: those who could not place themselves on this continuum and those who placed themselves exactly at the center were scored as 0, while those who selected one of the four positions on the left (1-4) or right (7-10) were scored as 1.

⁵ "Cognitive structuring" refers to the extent to which elements in the respondent's belief system are "constrained" —that is, the extent to which attitudes are linked to one another in a coherent manner.

⁶ "Logical consistency" measures the extent to which attitudes and opinions do not contradict each other. This is distinct from "cognitive structuring" insofar as it assesses logical consistency of linkages among elements in a belief system, where structuring merely measures the presence or absence of linkages.

of party identification by Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes (1960: 128) “as supplier of cues by which the individual may evaluate the elements of politics.” Later in this paper, we will explore the role of “ideological identification” as an additional source of partisan cues that helped to stabilize partisan preferences in the aftermath of Franco dictatorship.

Table 6. Correlates of stable voting in the 1989 and 1993 elections

Variables	Correlations
Strong party identification	.28 [.000]
Age	.25 [.000]
Salience of left-right self-placement	.22 [.000]
Education	-.18 [.000]
Exposure to partisan-biased media	.15 [.000]
Religiosity	.10 [.000]
Agreement with discussion partners	.10 [.000]
Member of trade union	.08 [.003]
Member of one or more organizations	.07 [.013]
Interest in politics	.06 [.020]

^a Figures are Pearson’s *r* correlations; in brackets, statistical significance.

Source: The 1988 in-depth interview study, *N* = 175.

We now turn our attention to an analysis of the correlates of stable voting in both the 1989 and 1993 elections, based upon our 1993 CNEP survey. This not only increases the size of our sample in a manner that greatly strengthens the statistical reliability of our findings, but it also enables us to test the impact of our three types of political intermediation processes, in addition to a number of standard socio-demographic factors in an expanded multivariate analysis. The latter included the respondent’s age, education, religiosity, affluence (as measured by the quality of housing), gender, level of interest in politics, residence in a rural area, three measures of occupational status, and subjective identification as a member of a social class. In order to test the impact of partisan bias in media exposure, a scale was constructed by adding together scores measuring exposure to political news through television, radio and newspapers.⁷ The impact of face-to-face flows of political

⁷ In accord with the perceptions of political bias discussed in the preceding section of this paper, reading a newspaper (*El País*), listening to a radio network (SER or RNE), and watching television news broadcasts (on TVE-1 or Tele 5) perceived as favoring the governing PSOE were each scored as -1, while exposure to pro-PP news outlets (*ABC* or *El Mundo*, COPE or Onda Cero, and Antena 3) were each scored as +1. These scores were added together, producing an overall score ranging between -3 and +3. (This is the version of the *BiasedMedia* variable that will be used in the following discussion of determinants of the vote.) In order to measure the impact of exposure to biased media on the stability of the vote, *per se* (for any nationwide party), the previously calculated *BiasedMedia* score was then recoded, such that those with consistently biased media exposure across two or all three media types (i.e., with scores of -3, -2, +2, or +3) were given a single score of 2, those with a score of 0 who did not receive net media exposure with a partisan bias (either because the pro-PSOE bias of one

communications was measured by the response to the “discussant generator” item for the first two discussants, with those whose political opinions differ from those of the principal respondent scored as -1, while those whose partisan orientations reinforced those of the respondent were each scored as +1. Finally, organizational membership was separately included in this analysis for trade-union membership and for membership in any one or more secondary associations. The results for those correlations being statistically significant at the .10 level or better can be seen in [Table 6](#).

It is interesting to note that the strongest of these correlations links the stability of voting to the strength of one’s party identification, and at precisely the same strength (.28) as in [Table 5](#), which was based upon an entirely different data set. Left-right self-placement also emerges as a strong determinant of electoral stability. Among the socio-demographic variables, only age, religiosity, and education were significantly correlated with a vote for the same party in both elections. None of the variables dealing with affluence or social class (both objectively and subjectively defined), as well as rural residence and gender, were linked to voting stability at an acceptable level of statistical significance. In contrast, all measures of partisan bias in the flow of information through each of the three types of intermediation were significantly correlated with the stabilization of partisan preference. These findings are consistent with those of another study based upon this same data set which found that “Spanish voters seem to be embedded in relatively homogeneous intermediation settings” (Morales 2010: 210), and that this reinforcement of respondents’ attitudes contributes to both stability in voting preferences over time, as well an overall increase in the partisan polarization of the Spanish political system.

Although our ultimate objective is to create a model that will explain electoral support for a particular party, the strength of both party identification and the salience of left-right as anchors stabilizing support for a party over the long term suggest that we examine some data concerning the nature of these concepts and some of their possible determinants. [Table 7](#) presents the zero-order correlates of the strength of party identification and the salience of ideology in 1988 in Spain with two different types of variables. The first include several variables relating to possible socialization processes that may facilitate the development or strong identification with a party or with an ideological orientation: formal education, the frequency of discussion of politics with parents under the Franco regime, and cleavage encapsulation. Others are presented in order to inform us as to the nature of party identification.⁸ The second column in this table presents zero-order correlations with ideological salience.

These data suggest that three sets of factors are relevant to the development of strong identification with a political party. The first involves informal learning processes, especially childhood socialization within the family. Under normal circumstances, this initial partisan orientation is progressively strengthened over time through a process of habituation, beginning with the casting

medium was offset by exposure to an equal number of pro-PP media, or because they did not follow political news through any medium) were scored as 0, while those exposed to mild net partisan biases were given a score of 1.

⁸ Age and gender were also included in this analysis, but neither was statistically significant, and are not presented in the table.

of the first vote for a party and culminating with a strong attachment to that party. In Spain, this incremental learning process was affected for older respondents by the impact of extraordinary events —especially involving the Civil War— which may be either the result of direct personal experience or inherited through intergenerational transmission from parents who experienced these dramatic events first-hand. These factors are entirely compatible with the classical theoretical model set forth by Converse (1969). As Guillem Rico (2010: 159) has demonstrated, in new democracies both direct personal and inherited personal experiences are strongly associated with partisanship, while in older, established democracies only inherited experiences are correlated with the strength of party identification, and at weaker levels.

Table 7. Correlates of party identification strength and ideological salience in Spain, 1988

Variables	Party identification strength	Ideological salience
Emotional involvement	.52 [.000]	.24 [.001]
Engagement scale	.52 [.000]	.32 [.000]
Political interest	.48 [.000]	.25 [.001]
Substantive knowledge	.41 [.000]	.29 [.000]
Cognitive structuring	.39 [.000]	.30 [.000]
Political talk when young	.33 [.000]	.18 [.018]
Left-right salience	.32 [.000]	
Left-right richness	.27 [.001]	.35 [.000]
Education	.14 [.077]	.19 [.014]
Age	.06 [.469]	-.17 [.026]
Party identification strength		.28 [.000]

^a Figures are Pearson's r correlations; in brackets, statistical significance.

Source: The 1988 in-depth interview study, $N = 175$.

A second bloc of variables involves age and education. In [Table 7](#), the correlations with the strength of party identification are not statistically significant. This contrasts with the findings of research conducted in other European countries. Rico (2010: 159-162), for example, reports that age is significantly linked to the strength of partisanship, which he interprets as a life-cycle effect reflecting the extent of personal experience with parties, in which party identification strengthens with age. What accounts for the absence of such a relationship in post-Franco Spain? In our 1988 Spanish study, very few respondents (i.e., with the exception of the tiny minority who were politically active in clandestinity under Franco) had *direct* personal experiences with parties lasting longer than eleven years, since parties were only legalized in 1977. Thus, most older voters did not have more extensive experiences with parties than younger voters, so evidence of a “habituation” process would not be reflected in differences among age cohorts.

A third factor to emerge from this table enables us to address questions in the comparative literature about the level of political awareness of strong party identifiers. Are strong party identifiers marginally engaged with or informed about politics, and therefore rely upon this heuristic device in order to make basic electoral choices, as has sometimes been suggested (e.g., Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960: 128-136)? Or do they belong to the most politically attentive segments of the electorate (Zaller 1992: 8-9)? The data presented in [Table 7](#) are more supportive of the second interpretation than they are of the first. Those who identify strongly with a party are the most active, engaged, and knowledgeable citizens (as measured by the aforementioned “engagement” scale), are interested and informed about politics, and have stronger emotional involvement with the electoral process. In turn, as we saw at the beginning of this paper, the development of these participatory traits was facilitated by discussion of politics when the respondent was young. To a somewhat lesser extent, this is also true of those for whom the left-right scale is highly salient. Strong party identifiers also exhibit a higher level of cognitive structuring than those who do not identify with a party. Accordingly, those respondents more strongly linked to a party had belief systems in which there was a richer and more coherent structure of political cognitions. More particularly, the strength of one’s identification with a political party is positively linked to the salience of the left-right dimension for the respondent, as well as the richness of the respondent’s understanding of that concept.⁹

Our in-depth interviews with these same respondents enable us to examine in detail some of the processes that contributed to or impeded the development of a close identification with a political party. In contrast with long-established democracies (within which most voters learn to support parties through inter-generational transmission from their parents), the development of partisanship was impeded by a four-decade interlude without political parties, and by the substantial historical discontinuities separating the Second Republic from the post-Franco democracy—including the complete disappearance of the political elite and the overwhelming majority of the parties of that era. The crises of leadership and of institutionalization experienced by each of the post-Franco nationwide parties also disrupted the process of developing a stable attachment to a party. As a result, at the time of our 1988 survey (conducted just eleven years after Spain’s first post-Franco democratic election), the percentage of Spaniards who identified with a political party was quite low: only 26 percent of our respondents claimed to be “very close” to a political party, and a Eurobarometer survey of Spain in that same year found that 35 percent regarded themselves as “close” to a political party.¹⁰

In the late 1980s, the stability of the vote following the 1982 party-system realignment was something of an anomaly, given the low level of party identification at that time. Analyses of our

⁹ This variable is based on the coders’ assessments (scored from 1 to 7) of the richness and sophistication of respondents, and relies to a question asking them to define and describe the concepts of left vs. right.

¹⁰ By way of comparison, Barnes, McDonough, and López Pina (1985) report that in 1985 the percentages of survey respondents who regarded themselves as close to a political party were 85 percent in the Netherlands, 82 percent in Finland and the United States, 81 percent in the United Kingdom, 73 percent in Italy, 66 percent in Germany, 65 percent in Austria, and 59 percent in Switzerland.

survey data collected between 1979 and 2004, and of our 1988 in-depth interview transcripts, suggest that two factors helped to stabilize electoral support for the two major nationwide parties. First, anchoring of partisan preferences in social cleavages (at the national level, class and religion); and second, strong links between the left-right orientation of the respondent in conjunction with the respondent's assessment of the ideological orientation of the major parties. While in the 1980s voters did not have sufficient long-term attachments to political parties *per se* (most of which had only been established one decade earlier), many of them had long-standing ideological orientations from their own or their parents' experiences dating as far back as the Second Republic and the Civil War. This served as an important source of electoral stability in the absence of high levels of party identification. So, too, did the link between voters' attitudes towards the parties' perceived images and policies regarding class and religion, on the one hand, and the voters' own social position and level of religiosity, on the other.

We now turn to a systematic analysis of our qualitative data in an exploration of the nature and origins of two of the most powerful determinants of the vote which emerged from the preceding analysis: party identification and left-right self-placement.

Learning party identification after a dictatorship

In the classic conceptualization of party identification (Campbell et al. 1960), two distinct dimensions of party identification are emphasized —direction and intensity. For most individuals, exposure to partisan cues within the family during childhood is the principal source of a favorable attitude towards a particular political party. Converse (1969) refers to this as “inherited experiences.” Intergenerational transmission from parents of a positive orientation towards a party (direction) thus represents the first step in identifying with a party. The strengthening of that attachment (intensity) is thought to develop later in life as a product of the interaction between parties and voters through subsequent iterations of electoral competition (Converse 1969: 148). And the transformation of these positive attitudes or preferences towards a given party in the early adult years usually come through citizens' voting, particularly the first vote, which is considered “to leave a quite long footprint on people's partisan profiles ... [since] the act of voting typically creates or strengthens the partisan attachment of young people” (Dinas 2014: 462). To this must be added the *indirect* learning of partisan attitudes through the processing of information supplied by the communications media. When fully developed, strong identification with a party can serve as an important source of stability in electoral behavior within a party system. Converse (1969: 167) argues that this process requires up to two and a half generations (i.e., over 60 years) of cumulative electoral experiences. Accordingly, insufficient time has elapsed to allow us to determine the extent to which partisan identification will eventually stabilize voting preferences in Spain.¹¹ However, our

¹¹ It is interesting to note, however, that there is no evidence that party identification had strengthened significantly over the two decades following our in-depth survey: data collected by the CIS in 1997 and 2004 (surveys # 2240 and 2574) found the level of party identification (as measured by the classic Michigan item) was unchanged at about 36 percent.

in-depth interview data collected in 1988 provide numerous rich insights into the processes through which individuals initially acquired partisan attitudes.

In contrast with long-established democracies (within which most voters learn to support parties through inter-generational transmission from their parents), the development of partisanship in Spain was impeded by a four-decade interlude without political parties, and by the substantial historical discontinuities separating the Second Republic from the post-Franco democracy. Indeed, at the time when the post-Franco party system came into existence in 1977, Spain was characterized by much more extreme and protracted discontinuity in partisan politics than any other Western European democracy (Bennet 1998: 198). In reverse temporal order, the sources of discontinuity included four decades (1939-1975) of authoritarian rule under a one-party or no-party regime (Linz 2009 [1964]; Gunther 1980), three years of Civil War, and five years under a highly polarized and unstable democracy —the Second Republic. Only ten percent of the Spanish population had been eligible to vote in the last democratic elections (1936), and most of the political parties, movements, and elites of that regime had disappeared. With the exception of the communist PCE and the socialist PSOE at the national level and two regional parties —the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) and the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)—, none of the 33 parties that had won seats in the Cortes of 1936 were represented in the Congress of Deputies in 1977. And even these four carry-over parties had experienced drastic changes in leadership, programs, and images. The PSOE had evolved from a mass-based workers party into a typically European catch-all party, and the PCE had abandoned its Stalinist past and embraced Eurocommunism (see Puhle 2001; Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1986). In contrast with the high levels of continuity in the cases of the pre-totalitarian German, Italian, and Austrian elites, the leaders of Spain's parties were notable for their youth, and had no links with the Second Republic (cf. Linz 1980: 102). The long duration of the Franco dictatorship and the relative youth of the Spanish population in the 1970s further reduced the possibility that partisan loyalties would have survived since the Second Republic.

Given these discontinuities, how did Spaniards acquire partisan attitudes? During the early transition they were presented with a plethora of new political parties. And there was no time between their legalization in the spring of 1977 and the June, 1977 founding elections for clear partisan attitudes to develop. It has been suggested (Richardson 1990: 33) that direct personal experience of respondents in our in-depth interviews were particularly strong in their inheritance of partisan identities, but their number was pretty small. Among our respondents there were indeed children of communists, socialists, *cedistas*, monarchists, or *falangistas*, but they were the exception rather than the rule. And, due to the profound social changes that had transformed Spain over the intervening decades, party identities rooted in the traditional cleavages that had underpinned partisan division in the 1930s also turned out to be relatively rare.

But while intergenerational inheritance of partisanship was relevant for relatively few respondents, memories passed down from parents concerning the Second Republic and especially the tremendous suffering during the Civil War sometimes had an extraordinary impact on the learning of partisan attitudes. For older respondents, this was especially true of their own personal

experiences. Sometimes these family memories were so intense as to lead the respondent to identify with a party that disappeared under *franquismo* only to be “re-encountered” as a newly legalized organization during the transition. For those individuals, the clarity and intensity of those inherited political preferences greatly facilitated identification with a party and a more or less consistent pattern of electoral support for it.

On the other hand, intergenerational transmission of partisan attachments was qualitatively different with regard to parties of the left as compared with those of the right of center. The two principal nationwide parties of the left, the PSOE and the PCE, had existed under the Second Republic and in clandestinity during the Franco regime. Thus, they represented specific partisan organizations to which individuals could quickly develop psychological attachments following their legalization during the transition to democracy. This helps to explain why potential rival parties on the left (such as the Partido Socialista Popular [PSP]) disappeared in the course of, or shortly after, the first democratic election, and the political space to the left of center was quickly and durably dominated by the PSOE and PCE. At the same time, historical memories of involvement with leftist parties tended to be traumatic, and often involved suffering during the Civil War and under the authoritarian interlude that followed. In other words, many socialist or communist identifiers were “survivors,” whose historical loyalties to the PSOE or PCE held up in spite of decades of authoritarian repression.

One example was a 39-year-old university educated upper-middle class woman, born into a family on the left for which defeat in the Civil War was a highly salient memory. Family members talked a lot about politics, and her father undertook “contra-education” to counteract the formal socialization she received in religious schools. In addition, one of her brothers was detained in the notorious headquarters of the Dirección General de Seguridad in Madrid and had spent time in jail under Franco. This respondent became a strong party identifier who was deeply committed to the Communist Party as an institution. As she explained, “In the PCE, what is important is the Party. The leader can change; the membership base is most important. I like everything about the party; and I like its party militants, and its demands for sacrifice. Belonging to [the PCE] is no luxury. There’s a real difference between being a member of the PCE and being in a capitalist party. The PCE receives few votes and its possibilities [of governing] are minimal. You work for the party’s ideals, while in other parties people are motivated by interests. Those who work in the Communist Party sacrifice a great deal. You have to have a strong ideology to be a member.” In short, the socialization she received through her family, reinforced by her own adult experiences in clandestine opposition to Franco, led her to adopt an intense identification with the PCE. Similar experiences shaped the political views of a 27-year-old labor lawyer from Córdoba, whose brother became a PCE activist during the Franco dictatorship and whose grandfather fought with the Republican army during the Civil War. A 43-year-old skilled worker was also profoundly affected by memories of the Civil War, in which three of his uncles were killed. His initial antipathy towards the right was subsequently reinforced by his occasional involvement with the leftist trade union, the Comisiones Obreras, leading him to identify with and vote consistently for the PSOE.

Our 1988 interviews generated much evidence that these inherited partisan attachments are reinforced by receiving political information within homogeneous intermediation environments,

especially if the respondent was a union or opposition movement activist. Among the strongest party identifiers, for example, was a working-class member of the UGT, who said that he frequently discussed politics with his fellow workers and follows political news with interest. These individuals are examples of the transmission of partisan predispositions of the kind analyzed by José María Maravall (1978) in his classic study of political dissent under the Spanish dictatorship. Maravall's analysis of workers and students in the late years of the Franco regime found that political activism on the left was commonly rooted in family traditions of support for leftist parties during the Second Republic and the Civil War that were subsequently reinforced by activism in clandestine opposition movements under the Franco regime. A somewhat different case is a 65-year-old retiree, with only a primary level of education but upper-middle-class social status. Even though his family was conservative, at the beginning of the Civil War (when he was 14 years old) he underwent an extraordinary radicalization within opposition organizations. He affiliated with the Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas, and a few years later he married the daughter of the provincial secretary general of the PSOE in Cádiz. This further reinforced his hostility towards *franquismo*. With the reappearance of the PSOE as a legal party in the early stages of the democratic transition, he affiliated with the UGT and has voted for the PSOE ever since.

Political socialization for those on the right was quite different. Both sides suffered during the 1930s, and some partisan attitudes could be traced back to historical memories of the Civil War and the polarization and instability of the Second Republic—which those on the right regarded as anti-Catholic, anti-Spanish, communist, and even masonic. These recollections and right-wing or conservative predilections were reinforced by formal education in religious or otherwise conservative schools, by experiences within the Falange or its ancillary Sección Femenina, and more generally by a very favorable evaluation of the Franco regime. One example was a 62-year-old school teacher who was attracted to the AP because he regarded it as a “party of discipline, of authority.” It is noteworthy that this respondent was a right-wing activist with the Falange and the Carlist Requetés during the Second Republic, and had visited Mussolini's Italy when he was a young *falangista*. The long duration of the Franco regime provided consistent reinforcement of these kinds of values and attitudes through its institutions, formal education, and numerous positive stimuli. Nonetheless, until the creation of the AP in 1976 and the UCD in 1977, individuals on the right lacked a party towards which they could channel their support. This may help to account for the weakness of potentially stabilizing support for the UCD, which disappeared after the debacle of 1982 and was replaced as the largest party to the right of center by the AP: many conservatives were less attached to a party, *per se*, than they were inclined to support a partisan option consistent with their ideological and political preferences.

Overall, however, strong party identification rooted in family historical memories of the Second Republic and Civil War or political activism under the Franco regime was restricted to a small minority of our respondents. Among the majority, less intense commitments to political parties were evident. Indeed, our expert coders categorized only 26 percent of our in-depth interview respondents as having reasonably strong affective links to a political party—a level which is identical to the percentage of respondents who claimed to be “very close” to a party in the

closed-ended portion of those interviews.¹² And a Eurobarometer poll conducted in 1989 found that more Spaniards regarded themselves as “close to no party” than citizens of any other European Union member country (Schmitt and Mannheimer 1989).

For most voters, the roles played by parties and their leaders in government and parliament—particularly during the 1977-78 process through which a new Constitution was drafted and ratified—were the most common factors relevant to crystallizing partisan sentiments. The particular characteristics of the Spanish transition, however, were not conducive to the development of strong partisanship. Samuel Barnes, Peter McDonough, and Antonio López Pina (1985) hypothesized that the very smoothness of the transition and the tactical demobilization by the socialist and communist opposition that accompanied the “politics of consensus” weakened the intensity of conflicts that might otherwise have helped to mobilize a strong partisanship. A recent cross-national comparative analysis (Lupu 2015) provides evidence in support of this claim.

A careful reading of the statements made by the respondents lacking inherited party identities, moreover, suggests that their attachments to parties were far from unconditional, and often mixed with other forms of attraction, such as satisfaction with the performance of the government or affection for individual leaders. These types of attraction are much less dependable as anchors of partisanship than the classic party identification, particularly insofar as party leadership must inevitably turn over, parties will shift their appeals, and the performance of the government or the economy will fluctuate over time. Moreover, many of these assessments were at a very elementary level, given the aforementioned lack of interest in politics and lack of information of most Spanish voters.

One example was an illiterate 53-year-old domestic servant who regarded herself as of the working class. The party to which she felt closest was the PSOE, although, she added, “I am really not of any party. I’m simply in favor of the one that does things best.” A 59-year-old cleaning lady was another loyal PSOE voter; but, as she also said, “I am from neither one party nor the other; I’m for the one that puts food on the table and leaves me in peace. As for all the rest, nothing—I’m not interested in politics.” Another middle-age woman residing in a small village in an agricultural region also supported the PSOE for its efforts to solve the problems of the country, most importantly unemployment and terrorism. The decisive factor for these and many other respondents appears to be general satisfaction (whether rudimentary or informed) with the performance of the party and government. In contrast with a true party identification model, however, assessments of performance may turn sharply negative, with the predictable electoral consequences. In the case of the PSOE in the mid-1980s, for example, the most common complaint involved dissatisfaction with the González government’s allegedly “neo-liberal” economic policies, which angered many of its traditional working-class supporters and culminated in the breakdown of century-long ties to the socialist trade union, the UGT. In short, performance satisfaction leads to a highly conditional variety of support for a party, and when conditions change, it no longer serves as a stabilizing *anchor* of partisanship.

¹² This is also consistent with the findings of a Eurobarometer survey of Spain in that same year in which 35 percent regarded themselves as “close” to a political party.

The personal attractiveness of party leaders emerges as a second significant determinant of identification with a party. A very religious, conservative, and upper-middle-class 51-year-old woman, for example, said that she was attracted by Manuel Fraga, and not so much by his party. For her, the leader was the focus of her identification since she believed that “no party has a real program of government.” In contrast, she had full confidence in Fraga “because he is the person who was working hardest, who has never changed his basic convictions, and exemplifies the very best of the party’s values.” Similarly, a 70-year-old female architect—who described herself as a “lifelong monarchist,” religious, conservative, and *franquista*—said she strongly supported the AP because it was led by “gentlemen,” especially Fraga, whom she describes as the best politician in Spain. Another conservative voter, a 30-year-old university-educated government employee, said that the “charisma and personality [of Manuel Fraga] were the things that attracted me.” Adolfo Suárez played a similar role for a 55-year-old, high-school educated, lower-middle class housewife: “for a long time I have been a *suarista*... [because of] his abilities as a leader.” But attraction to a party because of its leader/s can also be a potential source of electoral instability. The most dramatic example was the demise of the UCD in 1982, largely as a product of widespread revulsion over unseemly and destabilizing squabbles among its leaders (see Linz and Montero 1986; and Gunther and Hopkin 2002). With regard to AP and PCE, leadership succession crises following the resignations of Fraga and Santiago Carrillo, respectively, disoriented and alienated their respective blocs of voters in the mid-1980s.

Bradley Richardson (1990) attributes much of the instability in Spanish voting patterns in the 1980s to the weakness of party identification. Taking advantage of the panel design of our study, he found that the percentage of our respondents who regarded themselves as close to a party actually declined, from 68 percent in 1982 to 57 percent in 1988. But, on closer inspection, the level of stable partisanship was even weaker: only 26 percent placed themselves close to the *same party* in these two waves of our panel study, while 17 percent changed parties. In total, 40 percent of our respondents either placed themselves close to the same party in both surveys or voted for the same party in the 1979, 1982, and 1986 elections: 20 percent were stable party identifiers and voted for the same party, while 20 percent were “habitual voters”—that is, they used to vote for the same party, but without regarding themselves as “close” or “very close” to that party.

Thus, despite the data in [Table 5](#) revealing that party identification is a strong determinant of the vote among the minority of voters who identify with a party, we must conclude that, in the aggregate, party identification was not well developed among Spanish voters in the late 1980s. The weak anchoring of attachments to specific political parties was clearly reflected in the massive restructuring of the party system in the aftermath of the electoral *earthquake* of 1982 (Linz and Montero 1986). However, despite the high level of total volatility reflected in the 1982 election (42.3 percent), it is noteworthy that inter-bloc volatility was remarkably low (6.7 percent); that is, most of the shifting of the electorate took place among parties *within* the blocs of left and right. Also noteworthy is the high level of electoral stability over the decade following the 1982 election. These characteristics suggest that there are other significant sources of electoral stability among Spanish voters.

In the absence of widespread party identification, two factors have served as anchors of partisanship in Spanish elections: ideological identification with the *left*, *right* or *center*, and social-cleavage anchoring of the vote. With the progress of socioeconomic modernization and a profound secularization of Spanish society, the latter declined substantially by the early 1990s, as we will see later in this paper. Ideological identification, however, was strong at the very beginning, and strengthened its impact on voting behavior over time. It is to that source of electoral stability that we now turn our attention.

Left, right, and center: the origins of ideological identification

Since the pioneer study of Anthony Downs (1957), a substantial body of research literature, too extensive to discuss here,¹³ has documented the importance of the *ideological identification* both as a heuristic device and a stabilizing element of voting in many West European democracies. It appears to function as a repository of the historical memory of past partisan conflicts, encapsulating a rudimentary but nonetheless effective identification with the main parties, and serving as an anchoring device in the absence of strong psychological identification with specific political parties (Gunther and Montero 2001: 146). It also has a cognitive dimension, summarizing a great deal of information relating to several dimensions of social and political life. This heuristic device helps individuals to place a wide variety of political figures, institutions, and events within a comprehensive and stable evaluative framework (which is, in turn, linked to various clusters of socio-political values [Gunther and Kuan 2007]), and thereby to orient themselves within a complex and otherwise confusing political environment. And it can as well serve as a core element of an individual's political self-identification (Sani and Montero 1986; Fuchs and Klingemann 1989).

In terms of its impact on electoral behavior, it functions by channeling voters' support toward parties that they perceive to be at the "least distance" from their own self-placements on the left-right continuum (Downs 1957; Sani 1974). This type of anchoring may not preclude electoral volatility *per se*, but it does constrain voters to choosing among parties *within* blocs of left or right —e. g., from socialist to communist parties, or from Christian democratic to more generically conservative parties)—, and these were the precisely the patterns of volatility that characterized the Spanish party-system realignment of 1982 (Linz and Montero 1986).

These ideological orientations manifested themselves in three different patterns of electoral behavior. For some of our in-depth interview respondents, there was no accompanying loyalty to a specific party, but left-right self-identification channeled his or her vote to an ideologically compatible party within the blocs of left or right. In other cases, voters felt close to more than one party within an ideological bloc. Finally, when an ideological orientation was accompanied by identification with a specific party, consistent electoral support for the party over time was virtually assured. In this respect, the ideologically or programmatically based attraction to a specific party

¹³ But see, among many others, Laponce (1981), Inglehart and Klingemann (2010 [1976]), Klingemann (1995), and Van der Eijk, Schmitt, and Binder (2005), as well as Medina (2015).

(as reflected in excerpts cited above) can contribute to the development of a durable party identification over time.

It is noteworthy that an overwhelming majority of Spaniards, eight out of ten, were able to identify themselves using the left-right continuum as early as July 1976—seven months after the death of Franco, but before the legalization of political parties (Linz 1980: 189). Similarly, ecological analysis of electoral data reveals a striking continuity in electoral behavior over the 40 years between the so-called Popular Front election of 1936 and the first post-Franco democratic election of 1977. The provincial level share of the vote cast for parties of the left in 1936 was strongly correlated with electoral support for the PCE (Pearson's $r = .68$) and PSOE (.54) four decades later (Linz 1980: 103). At the other side of the continuum, support for the right-wing CEDA in 1936 was closely linked to electoral support for the UCD (.46) and Alianza Popular (.35) in 1977 (Linz 1980: 152). Thus, despite the fact that neither the UCD nor the AP had existed under the Second Republic, these old lines of political cleavage were replicated in the modern era.

Our in-depth interviews and other public opinion data suggest that historical memories of the Second Republic, the Civil War, and the Franco regime were the principal sources of left-right identities in Spain. A majority of Spaniards (53 percent), for example, agreed in a 2008 public opinion poll undertaken by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS, survey #2760), that the Civil War remains alive in the memories of all Spaniards, and 28 percent declared that the Civil War was the most significant event of the last hundred years. The deep division between the *rojos* (defenders of the Republic) and *franquistas* (the insurgent Nationalist side in the Civil War) was translated into a cluster of attitudes and historical memories associated with the terms *left* and *right* which subsequently were transmitted inter-generationally within the family. This family transmission has usually taken place through social learning processes according to which children tend to reproduce the attitudes and preferences they see in their parents. Parental politicization increases the frequency and modeling of cues, thus rendering ideological terms more salient and also favoring the offspring's perceptual accuracy (Rico and Jennings 2016: 239). This was reinforced by the conservative ideological nature of the authoritarian past, converted into a sort of *legacy* of Francoism that strengthened the updating of citizen's perceptions of left and right to the new political situation (Dinas 2016). Indeed, as the data in [Table 8](#) reveal, as late as 2008—seven decades after the Civil War—left-right self-placements were strongly linked to the side in the war supported by the respondent's family. Using the terminology introduced by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967: 50), this represented a “freezing of historical memories” (Fraser 1977, I: 29-30) into present-day electoral alignments.

In addition to family socialization, political attitudes and values were sometimes strongly affected by a variety of salient, if not dramatic, experiences. As Laia Balcells (2012: 333) has written, “Older generations transmitted their victimization experiences (and their rejection of the political identities of the perpetrators) to younger generations.” Death in combat, executions, exile, jail, hunger, and numerous other forms of repression and suffering were so traumatic for many Spaniards that they served as the centerpiece of historical narratives within families that were embedded within conceptualizations of left vs. right—*us vs. them*. Balcells (2012: 334-335)

concludes that this impact on the formation of the left-right divide was the product of “an intimate mechanism of transition (i.e., through narratives within the family); in other words, this was not generated or motivated by the themes in the public sphere... These effects are also more resilient and therefore [have persisted] through time and generations.” Indeed, the durability of these left-right self-designations across generations is striking: 57 percent of those placing themselves on the left shared this leftist orientation with their parents; at the center of the continuum, 69 percent shared their parents’ ideological stance; and on the right, this intergenerational transmission of ideological identities was even stronger, ranging between 80 and 83 percent (Linz 1980: 106; Maravall 1984: 39-42).

Table 8. Left-right self-placement and side supported by respondent’s family in Civil War, 2008 (in percentages)

Ideological self-placement						
Family side in Civil War	Left	Center- left	Center	Center-right	Right	Total
Nationalist	0	2	10	43	68	10
Neither/Both	17	33	63	44	15	46
Republican	80	54	16	3	6	31
No answer	3	11	11	9	10	13
(N)	(222)	(954)	(944)	(274)	(44)	(2,935)

Source: Data Bank, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), survey # 2760.

Within the left bloc, the socialization process was based upon persisting ideological loyalties of working-class communities and family traditions (Maravall 1978: 193). On the right, the transmission of these values and memories was more diffuse, and involved the internalization of the distinguishing characteristics of the Franco regime’ political culture: apathy and depoliticization, law and order, unity and discipline, religion and tradition, conservatism and immobilism. Barnes, MacDonough, and López Pina. (1985: 718) argued that the development of these political attitudes did not have to wait until after the death of Franco: “They had merely been submerged under the dictatorship, and they reemerged quickly, as modified by and enriched by both external experiences and widespread knowledge of other countries. Parties develop much more slowly.” As stated before, a remarkable majority of Spaniards were able to identify themselves using a left-right scale as early as the summer of 1976, only months after the death of Franco and before the entry of the recently legalized political parties. It has we had also noted, during the transition to democracy, many Spaniards also underwent an intense process of adult re-socialization within peer groups and certain types of organizations (student, union, professional, and partisan). This further strengthened the tendency of those raised within families with a rightist tradition to support in 1977 the AP and the UCD, while those with Republican parents tended to cast their ballots for the Socialist and Communist parties.

Besides citizens holding more or less specific attitudes within the left-right spatial ideological continuum, political parties also contributed to the process of voting choice through giving salience to their leftist or conservative images. From our in-depth interviews it is clear that many respondents based their voting decisions on the extent to which their own ideological identities fit with the ideological or programmatic orientations of parties. This process is reflected in the comments of a 51-year-old middle-class housewife, who described herself as “always of the right,” anti-republican, *franquista*, and from a military family. She explained that this predisposed her to vote for a conservative party, which at the time of the interview she had difficulty identifying: “More than voting for [specific] political leaders, I prefer to read the program that they’re offering [to the voters], and then vote for those who share my [conservative] ideas.” Following the disappearance of the UCD, she should have strongly supported AP, but its internal struggles led her to reject it: “Right now, the AP is a disaster.” This same orientation was shared by a 58-year-old high-school teacher. He regarded himself as a *franquista*, religious, conservative, and an “habitual” AP voter. But while he regularly voted for the AP, he rejected the notion that it could be considered as “his” party: “Alianza Popular is the one that is closest to my ideas, and has my support and my vote, but that would stop if it no longer defended my values and ideas.” A 24-year-old unemployed university graduate with an upper-middle class background shared this predisposition. She was very conservative and religious, and her formal socialization included schooling by the Sección Femenina of the Falange. “My home has always been on the right,” but she added that she did not identify with a political party. Initially, she voted for the UCD, but then switched to the AP because “I found it was the party closest to me.” While she said that she liked everything about the party—specifically citing its education and antiterrorism policies, and its stance on abortion—it is clear that her principal attraction to the party was ideological and programmatic. A 50-year-old upper-middle-class housewife described herself as of the “center, that is the UCD and CDS, ever since the birth of democracy in Spain,” because, she added, “it’s a progressive party and not so conservative as the traditional right with its authoritarianism and remnants of *franquismo*.” Similarly, a lower-middle-class UGT member regarded himself as somewhere between the PSOE and the PCE—“whatever party is progressive.” Another young man, a 29-year-old upper-middle-class university graduate, said he has always regarded himself as liberal, “and since there is no Liberal party, in the economic sense, I place myself somewhere between the PSOE and the AP.” He further explained that the most relevant criteria for choosing a party are its program and its ideology.

Despite the historical origins of left-right identifications of most respondents—involving events that occurred prior to their birth—it is important to note that the specific cognitive components of left-right can evolve over time. It has been pointed out that their continuity is, at least partly, also a function of their ability to attach to their more or less traditional cores new meanings, based on changing historical, intellectual, and political contexts (Bobbio 1996). As we have demonstrated elsewhere (e.g., Gunther and Kuan 2007; Moreno 2016), these concepts have been used to capture conflict and polarization between traditionalists and 18th century liberals, between 19th century free-market capitalists and socialists, or between 20th century neo-liberal

opponents of the social-welfare state and social democrats. But the diverse and varying content of left-right over time is not, as one might suspect, a conceptual weakness, rooted in ambiguity or imprecision. Quite the contrary; its adaptability is a powerful reason why this scheme has been so useful in capturing key dimensions of political and intellectual conflicts in Western Europe and several other countries over the past 230 years, with the precise meanings of this conceptual ordering device evolving in accord with changing social and political realities. As Cees van der Eijk, Hermann Schmitt, and Tanja Binder (2005: 182) have argued, “the meaning of left and right is politically constructed, not by a single individual or group, but through the everyday process of political cooperation and conflict. Over brief intervals of time, these meanings are usually quite stable, and function as constraints on political thinking and imagination. Yet, over longer periods of time, the ongoing processes of day-to-day politics and, occasionally, the creativity of individuals effectuate changes in these meanings.”

Among our in-depth interview respondents, left-right conceptualizations varied considerably, both in terms of coherence and rigor (ranging from the simplistic to well-articulated political ideologies), as well as with regard to the substantive content of these attitudes, beliefs and values. For some, *social class* distinctions largely define this continuum. Accordingly, interview transcripts were replete with references to the “poor” against the “rich;” “workers” against “capitalism and rich people,” or “the upper class,” or “the poor” against “capitalism and businessmen.” For other respondents, left-right entailed distinctions rooted in *political ideologies*, pitting the “progressive” left against “conservatives;” “socialism and Marxism” as opposed to “conservatism and egoism;” “communism” versus “dictatorship;” “progress, equality and human rights” against “backwardness and money,” and greater equality vis-à-vis “money.” For a third group, these political distinctions were more directly linked to political *parties and their leaders*. Some referred specifically to present-day actors and institutions: “IU and the PSOE,” or “socialism and communism” as opposed to “UCD and AP,” or simply “the left is Felipe [González] and the right is [Manuel] Fraga.” Others falling within this category referred to more historical *partisan* distinctions: “communists” or “the Reds” against “fascists” or “*franquistas*;” “parties with Marxist ideas” vs. “the parties of power,” or simply “the right is those who have always governed,” while “the left are those [in power] today.” Finally, many of our respondents’ left-right conceptualizations involved *religion* as a key defining element. There were many references to “religiosity,” “Catholicism,” or “persons who believe in God” as opposed to those who don’t; “no religion or priests” against “Franco and the Catholics,” while some respondents pitted “religion, family, private property, and country” against “abortion, disorder and a lack of education.”

To be sure, there were some respondents who said that they “drew a blank” when asked about this continuum, but many of them hastened to give relevant examples of persons or groups and their left-right identifications. As one of them put it, “We all know what it is, but we don’t know how to define it.” Only a small handful of respondents rejected the concept, *per se*, but their rationales for doing so suggested that some of them actually did use the continuum to make evaluative decisions: one said that “the extremes [of both left and right] are not at all good,” while another decried the very notion of left-right as “ancient, obsolete” or useless.

While a thorough examination of the correlates of left vs. right conceptualizations is not possible within this lengthy paper, a preliminary analysis indicates that this political orientation more closely reflects *political-historical* and *religious* values of Spaniards than the *economic concerns* that are more commonly associated with this concept in other countries. This is reflected in the data presented in [Table 9](#); it contains (Pearson's *r*) correlations for the 1982 survey, but the coefficients for more recent periods are similar. With the exception of the "nationalization" vs. "private property" dichotomy (which, it could be argued, is more a reflection of political ideology than it is of economic values or beliefs), left-right self-designation is more strongly linked to the respondent's level of religiosity and attitudes toward *franquismo*, and the centralized state structure under that regime, than it is to subjective class identification and family income. When left-right self-placement was analyzed as the dependent variable in an OLS multivariate analysis, moreover, two sociopolitical values related to religion were found to explain 15 percent of the variance in left-right self-placement (Montero, Calvo, and Martínez 2008).¹⁴ When three "economic values" were introduced as independent variables in this regression equation,¹⁵ they collectively explained only an additional 1.7 percent of the variance in left-right self-placement. Thus, in Spain, and contrary to the patterns observed in most other European countries (Inglehart and Klingemann 2010 [1976]; Medina 2010), the left-right dimension appears to be more strongly linked to the religious vs. anticlerical conflicts of the past than they are to economic self-interest.

Table 9. Correlates of left-right self-placement in Spain, 1982^a

Franquismo — Antifranquismo	.50
Nationalization — Private property	.50
Respondent's religiosity	.49
Centralized State — Regional self-determination	.43
Subjective social class identification	.31
Respondent's income	.26

^a Figures are Pearson's *r* correlations.

Source: Sani and Montero (1986: 184), with data from the 1982 DATA post-electoral survey.

We conclude this brief exploration of ideological identification and the left-right continuum by underlining two intrinsic features that make it well suited for structuring political conflict. The first is that it entails incompatibility, if not antagonism, between symmetrical opposites at either end of the continuum; the second is that the antithetical position is typically cast in normatively inferior if not pejorative terms. These characteristics can clearly be seen in the definition of left and

¹⁴ These items dealt with attitudes towards abortion and the respondent's level of commitment to traditional moral and religious values vs. complete freedom of choice as the opposite option.

¹⁵ They were support for private vs. public enterprises; preference for equal distribution of the nation's income vs. greater incentives for individual initiative, and preference for maintaining government services over tax cuts.

right offered by a respondent from a rural area in Galicia: “For me, the left has a meaning involving social justice, [while] the right is the opposite: it’s an ideology that provokes great social injustice.” Similarly, another respondent defined the left as “liberalization,” while the right entailed “fascism and dictatorship.” Not to be outdone rhetorically, a 66-year-old from a working class industrial city described the left as “supporting the common man,” while those on the right “repress and enslave” the people. And another respondent from the same region said that the left is characterized by “progress, greater social justice, and the recognition of the rights of men and women,” but that “the right frightens me; it is totally irrational.” Conversely, a 59-year-old cook stated that “Those on the left were the Reds, evil murderers, and those on the right were good [people].” And a middle-aged housewife claimed that the left favored “free love, adultery, divorce, delinquency, and poverty,” while the right was characterized by “perfection.” To cite one final example, a 23-year-old *madrileño* associated the left with “abortion, divorce, and one side in the Civil War,” and the right with “tranquility, security, continuity, and, above all, religion.”

EXPLAINING THE VOTE

The 1993 election

We now turn our attention to an effort to explain the vote for individual political parties. We begin with an analysis of the 1993 election, for which we have available the full panoply of CNEP intermediation variables. This election was won by the incumbent PSOE government of Felipe González by a relatively narrow margin (38.8 to 34.8 percent) over the PP, led by José María Aznar in his first contest as party leader. [Table 10](#) presents the zero-order correlates of the vote for the Socialist party vs. votes for the principal opposition party, Alianza Popular in that election.¹⁶ As can be seen, the two strongest variables linked to vote for the PSOE as incumbent party and Felipe González as president of the government are items measuring the “closeness” or proximity to the PSOE, and affect towards the president himself (using an evaluative 11-point “feeling thermometer”). Also strongly associated with a vote for the PSOE in 1993 was the respondent’s self-placement on the left-right continuum, satisfaction with the performance of government,¹⁷ and one of our intermediation variables dealing with face-to-face discussion of politics within interpersonal networks. This latter variable involved the political party supported by the respondent’s most frequent discussion partner.¹⁸ Variables of moderate strength included an intermediation variable summarizing cumulative exposure to pro-PSOE communications media (*El País*, RNE, SER, TVE-1, or Tele 5), subjective identification with the working class, affluence (as measured by the quality of the respondent’s housing), and the respondent’s level of religiosity. Each of these correlations was significant at the .000 level. Membership in the UGT was weakly linked to a vote for the PSOE, as was urban residence. Neither gender nor age were associated with a Socialist vote at an acceptable level of statistical reliability (and will therefore be excluded from future rounds on analysis). It should be noted that analyses based upon our 1988 in-depth interview surveys found that support for the Republican side in the Civil War by the respondent’s family was also rather strongly linked to a vote for the PSOE (producing a Pearson’s r of .45).

¹⁶ This forced dichotomous choice (which excluded non-voters and supporters of minor parties as missing data) was adopted in order to facilitate comparison with electoral behavior in other elections, which will follow. Not to do so would distort our findings concerning the relative strength of different types of variables over time as the incumbent government changed or as parties (such as the UCD and CDS) disappeared from the party system. The impact of left-right self-placement, for example, would vary substantially as an artifact of a change from the PSOE government of 1993 (which faced bilateral opposition from the IU on its left and from CDS and PP to its right, which would therefore depress the impact of the left-right variable on the vote for or against the governing PSOE) to the incumbency of the PP government of 2006 (whose only nationwide partisan rivals were located to its left). All major nationwide parties will be later analyzed in a final round of analysis, pitting parties of the left vs. right in an effort to measure the changing strength of social-structural determinants of the vote over time.

¹⁷ As measured by a scale created by combining the responses to items measuring satisfaction with the condition of the economy, with the political situation of the country, and with the performance of democracy in general.

¹⁸ If the discussion partner voted for the PSOE, this variable was coded as 3; support for a different party was coded as 1; and no discussion of politics with anyone identified as a frequent discussion partner received a score of 2. It should be noted that these discussion partners were not spouses, which were dealt with in a different questionnaire item.

Table 10. Correlates of vote for PSOE vs. AP, 1993^a

Proximity to PSOE	.69 [.000]
Evaluation of Felipe González	.62 [.000]
Left-right self-placement	.61 [.000]
First discussant voted PSOE	.49 [.000]
Performance satisfaction	.44 [.000]
Exposure to pro-PSOE media	.31 [.000]
Social class identification	.28 [.000]
Affluence (housing quality)	-.24 [.000]
Religiosity	-.21 [.000]
UGT member	.14 [.000]
Rural residence	-.07 [.037]
Age	.07 [.065]
Gender	** [.125]

^a Figures are Pearson's r ; in brackets, statistical significance.

Source: The DATA 1993 electoral panel survey.

Table 11. Variance of the vote for the PSOE over the PP as explained by selected variables, 1993^a

Socioeconomic	.138
Religiosity	.046
Left-right self-placement	.313
Proximity to government party	.189
Exposure to pro-PSOE media	.012
UGT member	.005
Discussant voted for PSOE	.058
Performance satisfaction	.008
Evaluation of Felipe González	.008
Cumulative Nagelkerke R^2	.777

^a Figures are incremental contributions to Nagelkerke R^2 .

Source: The DATA 1993 electoral panel survey.

Both the concepts of party identification and affect toward the party's top candidate for national office have been criticized for being so close to the voting choice itself as to not have any independent causal impact. Moreover, in the latter case one could argue that an empirical link

between vote for a party (or candidate) and positive affect towards that party (or candidate) is epiphenomenal —that they are both caused by other factors that are more unequivocally antecedent temporally and causally. In order to address these concerns, we have undertaken in [Table 11](#) a forced-stepwise multivariate Logit analysis of the vote in which the incremental contribution to the percentage of explained variance in the vote for the incumbent party (vs. vote for the principal opposition party) by each successive bloc of variables is presented separately and ordered in accord with the “funnel of causality” as formulated by Campbell et al. (1960: 24-37).

The first cluster of variables to be entered into this analysis are socioeconomic: these are affluence (as measured by our quality-of-housing variable), rural residence, and subjective identification with a social class. These socioeconomic indicators unequivocally precede the act of voting, and function as “exogenous” variables at the base of the “funnel of causality.” They collectively “explain” 13.8 percent of the variance in the vote for the PSOE over the PP in 1993.

In the second step, the respondent’s level of religiosity (which also temporally precedes the act of voting) was added to the multivariate Logit equation, explaining an additional 4.6 percent of the variance in the vote. The next variable added to this equation was left-right self-placement, which emerges as the most powerful predictor of the vote in this model. The fourth step in the analysis is somewhat less obvious in terms of temporal ordering: is one’s party identification acquired prior to one’s ideological orientation, or does a stand on the left-right continuum lead one to select a party in accord with one’s ideology? In some countries in which the same parties have existed over several decades, it could be argued that cues given by parties and party leaders may help to “socialize” a voter into adopting an ideological orientation of the left or right. In the case of Spain in 1993, however, this temporal ordering is less persuasive, since parties had not legally existed prior to 1976, and several of them only came into existence in the mid 1970s. It is therefore reasonable to enter party identification into the equation *after* left-right self-designation. And as can be seen in [Table 11](#), this enhances the predictive power of the equation by nearly 19 percent.

In the following three steps, the impact of our three types of political intermediation were added to the equation, beginning with the net impact of exposure to pro-PSOE communications media —the newspaper *El País*, and news broadcasts on Tele 5, the government-run television network (TVE-1), and the SER or RNE radio networks—, as contrasted with pro-PP media (*ABC*, *El Mundo*, COPE, Onda Cero, and Antena 3). As we argued earlier in this paper, there is a strong tendency for individuals to select or structure intermediation networks in accord with their partisan preferences, and this certainly pertains to the selection of preferred communications media as sources of political news. Accordingly, it is appropriate to add these variables to the equation *after* party identification has been taken into consideration. As can be seen in the table, this improves the predictive power of the equation by 1.2 percent. This result confirms the partisan selection of media in Spain: in a parallel equation in which party identification was entered *after* the communications-media variables, exposure to pro-PSOE media outlets accounted for 4.1 percent of the variance. Thus, by previously controlling for one’s party identity, the impact of partisan media exposure is reduced by over two-thirds.

The next step in this analysis had very little impact on the propensity to vote for the PSOE. By 1993, the impact of UGT membership had declined precipitously from its high-point in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a result of the breakdown of the linkage between the Socialist party and its trade union ally in the late 1980s (Astudillo 2001). Between 1979 and 1993, the percentage of the variance in the vote for the PSOE explained by UGT membership declined from 11 to less than 2 percent in a multivariate equation in which trade union membership preceded the inclusion of religiosity and party identity into the equation (Gunther and Montero 2001: 117). The vote-mobilizing capacity of UGT membership is even weaker when those two variables precede its inclusion, as can be seen in [Table 11](#). And it should be noted that it is proper to have UGT membership follow party identity in this equation: since Spain does not have “closed shop” union-affiliation requirements (but, instead, treats trade union membership as a voluntary act), even this type of secondary-association linkage may be established in accord with one’s partisanship.

Frequent face-to-face discussion of politics with someone who is a PSOE supporter, however, remains relatively strong as a predictor of the vote even after all of the preceding factors had been taken into consideration. The 5.8 percent of the variance explained by this variable makes it the fourth-strongest predictor of the vote.

The next step in this multivariate analysis was the incorporation of measures of performance satisfaction into the equation predicting the vote for the governing party. We saw in [Table 10](#) that this emerged from our examination of zero-order correlations with the vote as one of the strongest predictors —with a Pearson’s r of .44, which would be equivalent of “explaining” 19.4 percent of the variance in the vote (R^2). The weaker relationship that we see in [Table 11](#) (an incremental contribution to R^2 of just .008), however, suggests that performance satisfaction is, itself, influenced by several of the factors that we had previously entered into the equations in the preceding steps. This fits with our finding elsewhere (Gunther, Montero, and Torcal 2006 and 2007) that satisfaction with the performance of the government is strongly “contaminated” by the respondent’s partisanship —i.e., that supporters of opposition parties are more critical of the government’s performance than are those who identify with the governing party. Hence, whatever helps to explain partisan choice (class, religion, left-right, party ID) also affects assessments of the success or failure of the government’s performance in office, thereby depressing its independent causal impact on the vote.

The same is even more true of the respondent’s feeling thermometer evaluation of the leader of the governing party. While, as we saw in [Table 10](#), the zero-order correlations between leader affect and the vote in 1993 (Pearson’s $r = .62$, suggesting that it could explain 38 percent of the variance in the vote for the PSOE government in that election), its actual incremental contribution to the percentage of explained variance was reduced to less than 1 percent after the effects of all of these other variables had been taken into account in previous steps in the multivariate analysis.

Change over time?

To what extent have the traditional *anchors* of partisan preferences withered away over recent years? Much of the literature on electoral behavior has focused on the extent to which the stabilizing long-term determinants of the vote (social class, religion, party identification) have

weakened, leading to higher levels of electoral volatility derived from the increasing importance of short-term characteristics of individual election campaigns —especially “issues” that are raised in election campaigns and popular attitudes towards the candidates (Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984; Franklin et al. 1992; Thomassen 2005). As socioeconomic development alters the structure of class stratification (with an expanding middle class replacing the working class as the modal bloc of voters) and increases the overall level of affluence, it is hypothesized that the importance of social class should decline (Lipset 1981). As secularization in many countries weakens the role of the Church and reduces the salience of religious issues, it is widely believed that religiosity declines as a determinant of the vote (Norris and Inglehart 2004). And as “cognitive mobilization” empowers ever larger numbers of voters to follow politics on their own and make up their own minds about how to vote, heuristics such as traditional party loyalties are seen as weakening (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000).

In the remainder of this paper, we will test these hypotheses using longitudinal data from a single country —Spain from 1979 through 2004. During this period, Spain’s economy developed impressively, transforming Spain from a relatively poor country on Western Europe’s “semi-periphery” to an affluent and developed society whose GDP per capita was above the EU average. Spanish society also underwent a profound process of secularization, and its democratic system was consolidated. These major changes make possible a “natural experiment” in which there is substantial variance over time that facilitates a direct test of each of these hypotheses.

We begin by undertaking parallel analyses of voting behavior over the course of three elections: 1986 (using data collected in 1988), 1993, and 2004. In the analysis presented in [Table 12](#), we compare the explanatory power of those variables that are unequivocally *long-term* in their impact on electoral choice with those that are clearly *short-term* features of each individual election campaign.¹⁹ We include two different types of long-term factors —*social-structural variables* (including religiosity and three socioeconomic variables) and *long-term political predispositions* (left-right self-placement, and party identification)— as well as two *short-term political variables*— the respondent’s satisfaction with the performance of the incumbent government²⁰ and the evaluation of the incumbent president of government.²¹ An additional equation is presented for 1986, with data from the 1988 survey, in order to demonstrate the importance of a political socialization variable that was derived from transcripts of our 1988 in-depth interviews—historical memories of the respondent’s family’s involvement in the Civil War.

These data suggest that, even though privileged by being entered into the equation first, the social-structural determinants of the vote (objective and subjective indicators of class position, rural vs. urban residence, and religiosity) have steadily weakened over this period, from explaining

¹⁹ Our three intermediation variables are not included in this analysis since it is unclear whether these are durable long-term or changeable short-term factors.

²⁰ This is measured by a scale composed of satisfaction with the state of the economy, with the political situation of the country, and with the overall performance of democracy.

²¹ Felipe González in 1986 and 1993, and José María Aznar in 2004; the evaluation scale goes from 0 to 10.

38.8 percent of the variance in the vote in the 1986 election to just 13.3 percent in 2004. Conversely, the impact of party identification and, especially, left vs. right ideological orientation, have increased. In the aggregate, there is no sign of any weakening in the longer-term determinants of the vote, which explain between 68.6 percent and 85.9 percent of the variance in the vote over these three elections. To the contrary, there is no clear trend suggesting an increase in the importance of the two sets of short-term factors —satisfaction with various aspects of the government’s performance and popular evaluations of the governing party’s leader. And the explanatory power of these short-term factors (ranging between 50.3 percent and 65.8 percent of the variance in the vote) is somewhat weaker than for the long-term variables (68.6 percent to 85.9 percent). Moreover, the independent impact of these short-term factors would be greatly reduced if they are entered in a forced-stepwise multivariate analysis in which the long-term determinants of the vote had previously been taken into consideration.

Table 12. Long-term and short-term factors explaining variance of the vote for the governing party in Spain, 1986-2004^a

Long-term factors				
Variables	1986	1986	1993	2004
Socioeconomic variables ^b	.171	.171	.138	.048
Religiosity	.217	.217	.046	.085
Family side in Civil War		.129		
Left-right self-placement	.220	.126	.313	.554
Proximity to government party	.123	.110	.189	.172
Cumulative R ²	.731	.753	.686	.859
Short-term factors				
Variables	1986	1993	2004	
Performance satisfaction ^c	.252	.248	.267	
Evaluation of government leader	.274	.255	.391	
Cumulative R ²	.526	.503	.658	

^a Figures are incremental contributions to Nagelkerke R².

^b These are affluence (as measured by our quality of housing variable), identification with a social class (with working class scored as high and upper class as low), and rural residence.

^c In 1993 and 2004, these variables measured satisfaction with the performance of the economy, satisfaction with the political situation of the country, and satisfaction with the performance of democracy; in 1986, this was based on the coder’s aggregate assessment of all of the above as reflected in the in-depth interview.

Sources: For the two 1986 columns, the 1988 in-depth interviews and the survey applied to 175 respondents; for 1993, DATA electoral panel survey, and for 2004, the TNS/Demoscopia post-electoral survey.

Considerable caution must be exercised, however, in inferring long-term trends on the basis of just three elections. Moreover, one might question the statistical reliability of the findings con-

cerning the 1986 elections, based upon a small sample of voters (175). Fortunately, our data archives include two surveys from 1979 and 1982 whose sample sizes are so massive (5,439 and 5,463, respectively) as to definitively lay to rest doubts about statistical reliability. And since there was very little change between the founding election of 1977 and that of 1979, by including the 1979 and 1982 elections in this analysis, we can assess change in the determinants of the vote throughout the first three decades of Spain's post-Franco democracy.

This temporally expanded comparative analysis will, however, be constrained by two factors. First, two nationwide parties (including the UCD, which governed Spain from 1977 through 1982, and its successor centrist party, the CDS) disappeared over the course of the almost 30-year period under examination here. Thus, the nature of the dependent variable must be redefined to minimize the impact of changes in the structure of the party system, *per se*.²² Accordingly, we shall use as a dependent variable support for all major nationwide parties of the left and center-left (the Socialist PSOE, the Communist PCE, and, beginning in 1986, the PCE-dominated Izquierda Unida [IU]) against support for parties of the right and center-right (UCD, AP/PP, and, between 1982 and 1993, CDS). Unfortunately, party-specific measures —such as proximity to the governing party, affect towards its leader, and satisfaction with its performance in government— cannot be entered into the analysis, since the dependent variable is no longer electoral support for a single governing party.

Table 13 presents the results of multivariate Logit analyses of the vote for parties of the left vs. those of the right. The top three rows reflect the *incremental* contribution to R^2 resulting from the inclusion in the equation of each respective cluster of independent variables, and the final row reveals the *cumulative* percentage of the variance explained by all of the variables included in the final equation. As before, in all of these equations, the bloc entered first included the respondent's subjective identification with a social class, residence in a rural area, the respondent's employment status, and at least one ordinal measure of affluence or occupational status.²³ The results of this analysis reveal that, with the exception of an increase from 1979 to 1982, there has been a steady decrease in the impact of affluence and several "class" variables on the vote.²⁴ A more careful examination of the characteristics of the largest party to the right of center in 1979 further suggests

²² An apparent change in the electoral impact of left-right, for example, would emerge as an artifact of bilateral competition in 1993 (when the governing PSOE was competing against both a party to its left, IU, and two parties on its right flank, CDS and AP) as compared with 2004, when the governing PP only faced competition at the national level from parties to its left (the PSOE and IU).

²³ It should be noted that not all of the same socioeconomic variables were included in every questionnaire, so that there have been slight differences of operationalization for each individual election survey. However, since here we are interested only in the percentage of variance explained by each *cluster* of variables (not the coefficients for each *individual* variable), it is possible to compensate for the absence of a particular variable by using others with similar characteristics. In 1979, for example, socioeconomic status was measured by the respondent's self-reported income; in 1982, it included occupational status and the interviewer's assessment of the quality of the respondent's housing; in 1986 and 1993, it was the quality-of-housing variable; and in 2004 it included both the housing variable and occupational status.

²⁴ The fact that the 1986 figure is entirely consistent with this pattern is reassuring insofar as it suggests that, the small size of our 1988 sample notwithstanding, this appears to be a highly representative sample whose various characteristics fit with longer-term patterns based on very large samples.

that the downward trend in the electoral impact of class may be unilinear after all. In that election, the governing center-right UCD presented itself as the quintessential catch-all party, and heavily stressed its appeals to Spaniards of all social classes (Gunther and Diamond 2003). Its success in implementing that part of its campaign strategy can be seen in the relatively small share of the variance in the vote explained by these socioeconomic variables. The devastation of the UCD in the 1982 election (in which its share of the vote fell from 35 to less than 7 percent) effectively replaced it as the principal party on the right by the much more conservative AP, whose electorate was more homogeneously middle and upper-middle class. A similar trend can be observed in the case of the left-of-center PSOE which established itself in the 1982 election as the perfect catch-all party, much beyond its traditional working-class base of support: The social composition of the party's voters came very close to that of the electorate at large, a result that was not to be repeated (see Puhle 1986 and 2001). The decline of the socioeconomic variables is consistent to patterns observed elsewhere in established democracies (Franklin 1985; Franklin et al 1992; Evans 1999; Evans and de Graaf 2013; Gunther et al. 2016).

Table 13. Vote for nationwide parties of left vs. right, explained by socioeconomic variables, religiosity, and left-right self-placement, 1979-2004^a

Variables	1979	1982	1986	1993	2004
Socioeconomic ^b	.142	.225	.187	.138	.089
Religiosity	.233	.205	.229	.046	.091
Left-Right	.254	.318	.184	.313	.521
Cumulative R ²	.629	.748	.600	.497	.701

^a Figures are incremental and cumulative R² for each successive blocs of variables. In the Logit equations, dependent variables for 1979 and 1982 were for PSOE or PCE vs. vote for UCD or AP, with all other respondents (non-voters and supporters of other parties) excluded from the analysis; in 1986, vote for PSOE or IU vs. vote for AP or CDS; in 1993 and 2004, vote for PSOE or IU against vote for PP. The number of cases included in the equations for 1979 ranged from 2,441 for the socioeconomic variables to 2,172 for the full model; for 1982, from 2,441 to 2,320; for 1986, from 108 to 96; for 1993, from 935 to 888; and for 2004, from 1,093 to 934.

^b These included affluence (self-reported income or, when available, quality of housing), self-employed vs. employee, rural residence, and subjective identification with the working class vs. middle to upper classes.

Sources: For 1979 and 1982, DATA post-electoral surveys; for 1986, the 1988 survey applied to 175 respondents; for 1993, DATA electoral panel survey, and for 2004, the TNS/Demoscopia post-electoral survey.

A much more complicated picture emerges with regard to religion, however. Spain has undergone what is perhaps the most profound process of secularization of any Western society.²⁵ Accordingly, the percentage of the variance in the vote explained by our measure of religiosity fell from 23.3 percent in 1979 to 4.6 percent in 1993. However, in the 2004 election, the impact of

²⁵ Between 1970 and 1999, the percentage of the Spanish population describing themselves as “very good Catholics” or “practicing Catholics” declined from 64 to 29 percent. Attendance at religious services at least once a week between 1973 and 2016 declined from over 68 to 16 percent, while those who said they “never” or “almost never” attend mass increased from 12 to 60 percent (Montero 1994; Montero, Calvo, and Martínez 2006; Calvo, Martínez, and Montero 2017).

religiosity on the vote nearly doubled, to 9.1 percent—and that figure significantly underestimates the actual impact on the vote of religiosity, as we shall see.

These findings suggest that processes of social-structural transformation (such as socioeconomic development and secularization) do, indeed, have an important impact on electoral behavior over the long term. In the case of Spain over the course of these three decades, they generally reduced the impact of class and religion on the voting choice. However, these changes were not uniform or inexorable, and a more detailed examination suggests that the behavior of political elites and the parties that support them can have a significant independent impact. In formulating and implementing their electoral mobilization strategies, they can choose to ignore potentially divisive issues or work actively to defuse them, on the one hand, or take stands that politicize and polarize them as issues of partisan conflict, on the other.

During the first phase of partisan competition in post-Franco Spain (1977-1979), the dynamics of electoral competition were decidedly centripetal, and contributed to the depolarization of Spanish politics and Spain's political culture (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1986). Well aware of the explosive potential of the deep cleavages in Spanish society that had culminated in Civil War in the 1930s, the leaders of Spain's major nationwide parties stressed ideological moderation and pragmatism over doctrinal conformity. The UCD self-consciously sought to attract working-class supporters, even though its modal base of support was middle-class, and its principal rival, the Socialist PSOE, downplayed its working-class tradition in the interest of reaching across class divisions to attract a substantial number of middle-class voters. Accordingly, the dynamics of electoral competition at the national level were centripetal and non-ideological, and intended to overcome the class cleavage. This is reflected in relatively low levels of polarization of the electorate along class and ideological lines in 1979. In the realigning election of 1982, however, the catch-all UCD was replaced as the largest party to the right of center by a more right-wing and homogeneously middle-class "programmatic party," Alianza Popular (Linz and Montero 1986). The division of the electorate reflects both of these characteristics, as seen in the significant increase in the percentages of the variance in the vote explained by the socioeconomic and left-right variables in the equations presented above. Its image as a right-wing, upper-middle-class party with roots in the Franco regime, however, limited its electoral appeal and effectively consigned the party to minority status over the following two elections. A concerted effort to broaden its electoral appeals met with much greater success following the AP's *refounding* in 1989 as a catch-all party of the center-right under the leadership of a new generation of political figures who had no personal link with the defunct regime of General Franco. In short, the largest party to the right of center in the 1980s eventually transformed itself from a right-wing programmatic party into a more moderate catch-all party, culminating in the PP's victory in 1996 that brought it to power for the first time. Its moderation continued during its first term in office (1996-2000), due in part to its minority status and its dependence on moderate regional parties for the passage of its legislation in the Congress of Deputies.

Similarly, throughout the first two decades of Spain's post-Franco electoral competition, political elites scrupulously avoided potentially divisive religious issues as campaign themes,

despite the fact that the electoral supporters of the parties of the left and right were sharply differentiated along religious lines (largely an inheritance from the religiously polarized Second Republic and the use of religious themes and the Church itself by the Franco regime). This contributed to a dramatic decline in the salience of the religious cleavage between 1979 and 1993 (Montero and Calvo 2000).

Table 14. Vote for nationwide parties of left vs. right, explained by socioeconomic variables, religiosity, religious values, and left-right self-placement, 1993 and 2004^a

Variables	1993	2004
Socioeconomic	.138	.089
Religiosity	.046	.091
Religious values	.054	.134
Left-right	.273	.413
Cumulative R ²	.511	.727

^a Figures are incremental and cumulative R² for each successive blocs of variables. In the Logit equations, dependent variables for 1979 and 1982 were for PSOE or PCE vs. vote for UCD or AP, with all other respondents (non-voters and supporters of other parties) excluded from the analysis; in 1986, vote for PSOE or IU vs. vote for AP or CDS; in 1993 and 2004, vote for PSOE or IU against vote for PP.

^b These included affluence (self-reported income or, when available, quality of housing), self-employed vs. employee, rural residence, and subjective identification with the working class vs. middle to upper classes.

Sources: For 1993, DATA electoral panel survey; for 2004, the TNS/Demoscopia post-electoral survey.

In 2000, however, the PP scored such a sweeping victory that it secured an absolute majority of seats in the Congress of Deputies and was no longer constrained by its dependence on parliamentary support from centrist regional parties. It abandoned its pragmatic centrism and embraced the values and policies of the traditional Spanish right (Santamaría 2007: 53). From the standpoint of polarization along traditional social cleavage lines, the most important change in partisan behavior involved religion. After 2000, the PP sought to reactivate and mobilize the *religious vote* by taking up religious themes both rhetorically and in the formulation of public policy: it substantially increased state financial support for religious schools; it reintroduced religious instruction into the public school curriculum; and it substantially increased subsidies for the Catholic Church. At the same time, the new leadership of the PSOE chose to move to the left, forging a short-lived electoral alliance with IU in 2000, and subsequently with the more extreme ERC in 2004. Moreover, the Spanish Catholic Church (which had maintained partisan neutrality in the first post-Franco elections) began to side more openly with the conservative PP. The result is the (at least partial) revival of the religious divide in Spanish politics. As can be seen in the data presented in [Table 14](#), the electoral impact of religiosity doubled between 1993 and 2004. More importantly, polarization along religious lines appears to have become a durable feature of partisan conflict in

the first decade of the 21st century.²⁶ And when sociopolitical values are added to this equation, the impact of the religious cleavage appears to be even greater. The combined impact of the respondent's religiosity and two religious "values"²⁷ accounted for just 10 percent of the variance in the vote in 1993; by 2004, their impact had more than doubled, now accounting for 22.5 percent of the variance in the vote.

In short, long-term processes of social transformation do, as much of the literature indicates, have an important impact on electoral behavior—generally in the direction of reducing the impact of class and religious cleavages on voting choice. However, a more detailed analysis of these trends over time demonstrates that the electoral mobilization strategies and behavior of partisan political elites somewhat independently determine whether these trends will continue, or be reversed.

²⁶ Polarization along the lines of the religious divide continued to increase between 2004 and 2008 (Montero, Lago, and Torcal 2007; Montero and Lago 2011). As argued by Gunther and Montero (2009 and 2012), this is reflective of a broader strategy of sharper confrontation vs. the PSOE adopted by the PP beginning in the late 1990s.

²⁷ A "religious values" scale was constructed using respondents' answers when asked to indicate their own opinions concerning polar-opposite options using a 10-point scale. One question asked respondents whether abortion should always be illegal, or abortion on demand should remain legal. The other asked them to choose between the following two statements: "Defend our traditional religious and moral values," vs. "Respect the freedom of individuals to be and believe whatever they want."

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

As we stated at the beginning of this paper, this in-depth study of Spain allows us to explore a whole set of features and dimensions of intermediation, mobilization, and citizen participation in greater detail, and with regard to their impact and “causality,” than would have been possible on the basis of cross-national comparative data alone. In particular, we have been able to address a number of salient theoretical issues from a new perspective and to add more precision and better evidence to some important aspects of our overall argument as a result of the broad multi-method approach that our rich Spanish data make possible. Our longitudinal analysis of one country over the *longue durée*, is based on a combination of large-*N* survey data with qualitative data from the small-*N* Spanish micro study based upon open-ended interviews focusing on research questions that have long been central concerns of the Comparative National Elections Project.

What have we found? While we shall not attempt to summarize all of the findings of this extensive paper, it may suffice to state four concluding observations. First, our findings have underlined the importance of *country-specific* factors and of the interactive and contextual processes in which politics and intermediation are embedded. These interactive processes, however, change over time and vary considerably from country to country.

This brings us to a second concluding observation, a caveat: one should be careful not to “over generalize” about the causes, consequences, and possible impacts of a single factor. Indeed, we have learned from our analysis of the Spanish transition that the significance of cohorts, occupational experiences, and periods of time may vary from one issue to another. The determinants of support for democracy, for example, have shown a stronger period effect among age cohorts (around the axis of the transition), whereas political inefficacy was more determined by generational effects linked to informal socialization and education. With regard to basic support for democracy, our Spanish data suggest that adult political learning experiences have had greater impact than the classic “childhood socialization” hypothesis would allow, but that the strongest predictor of “citizen engagement” in politics is the frequency of political discussion under the Franco regime when the respondents were young.

This suggests a third point—that historical trajectories matter. Here the specific nature and duration of the repressive, demobilizing, and depoliticizing authoritarian regime comes in, but also the family histories and professional experiences of the respondents during and after the Civil War (measured in terms of which side they were on and how they remembered and debated it, mostly within the family). The respondent’s particular experience of adult (re-)socialization within peer groups or some organizations (student, union, professional, partisan) just before and during the transition also exerted a substantial formative influence. Another country-specific factor stemming from the particular *longue durée* political trajectory of Spain is the fact that party identification has been comparatively weak, whereas more general ideological identification (measured by self-placement on a left-right continuum) has consistently turned out to be strong. Hence, voters have tended to embrace a certain *bloc loyalty*, rather than identify with a specific political party. It is also

interesting to note that, in Spain, cleavage anchoring based on left-right orientation is much more linked to religion and religiosity than to class or other economic criteria.

We have also learned that there is change in the *longue durée*, that the categories of political identification and contestation are adaptable. Besides historical trajectories, social-structural determinants, and left-right self-placement, the behavior of political elites and their parties can have a significant independent impact on voters' political thinking and behavior. In addition to those kinds of electoral appeals that are treated in election studies as short-term factors, or campaign issues, these include more durable factors including the type of political party (catch-all vs. mass-based or cleavage parties), and especially the strategies adopted by party elites in their efforts to mobilize voters—in particular, whether or not latent cleavages in society are activated by competing elites and used as the basis of *wedge issues* to galvanize specific sectors of the electorate. In Spain, for example, despite the impressive extent of modernization, democratization, and an unprecedented secularization, and twenty-five years of centripetal and depolarizing politics that appeared to have overcome the old class and religious cleavages, the conservative Partido Popular returned to its traditional rightist religious heritage and successfully revitalized the religious cleavage (at least for the time being), and thereby more than doubled the impact of religion on electoral behavior. So the fourth point of our conclusion might be that elites, agency, and politics matter.

REFERENCES

- AGUILAR, Paloma. 2008. *Políticas de la memoria y memorias de la política*. Madrid: Alianza.
- ASTUDILLO, Javier. 2001. "Without Unions, but Socialist: The Spanish Socialist Party and its Divorce from its Union Confederation." *Politics & Society* 29: 271-294.
- ASTUDILLO, Javier. 2004. "La trampa partidista de la UGT: de la relación solidaria con el PSOE a la unidad de acción sindical con CC.OO." *Revista Española de Ciencia Política* 11: 71-99.
- BALCELLS, Laia. 2012. "The Consequences of Victimization on Political Identities: Evidence from Spain." *Politics & Society* 40: 311-347.
- BARNES, Samuel, Peter MCDONOUGH, and Antonio López Pina. 1985. "The Development of Partisanship in New Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 29: 695-720.
- BARTOLINI, Stefano, and Peter MAIR. 1990. *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates, 1885-1985*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- BECK, Paul A., and Richard GUNTHER. 2016. "Global Patterns of Exposure to Political Intermediaries". In Richard Gunther, Paul A. Beck, Pedro Magalhães, and Alejandro Moreno, eds., *Voting in Old and New Democracies*. New York and London: Routledge.
- BENNET, Anne. 1998. "Party System Change in Redemocratizing Countries." In Paul Pennings and Jan-Erik Lane, eds., *Comparing Party System Change*. London: Routledge.
- BOBBIO, Norberto. 1996. *Left and Right. The Significance of a Political Distinction*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- BOSCO, Anna, and Leonardo MORLINO, eds. 2013. *Party Change in Southern Europe*. London: Routledge.
- BUDGE, Ian, Ivor CREWE, and Dennis J. FARLIE, eds. 2010 [1976]. "Introduction: Party Identification and Beyond". In *Party Identification and Beyond. Representations of Voting and Party Competition*. ECPR Press/Rowman & Littlefield, 2nd ed.
- CALVO, Kerman, Álvaro MARTÍNEZ, and José Ramón MONTERO. 2018. "Religiosity and Vote in Spain..." Forthcoming in José Ramón Montero, Paolo Segatti, and Kerman Calvo, eds., *Religious Voting in New Democracies. Past Legacies and New Conflicts*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- CAMPBELL, Angus, Philip CONVERSE, Warren MILLER, and Donald STOKES. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley.
- CLARKE, Harold D., and Alan C. ACOCK. 1989. "National Elections and Political Attitudes: The Case of Political Efficacy". *British Journal of Political Science* 19(4): 551-562.
- CONVERSE, Philip E. 1969. "Of Time and Partisan Stability." *Comparative Political Studies* 2: 139-171.
- DAHRENDORF, Ralf. 2002. *Über Grenzen. Lebenserinnerungen*. Munich: C.H. Beck
- DALTON, Russell J. 2007. "Partisan Mobilization, Cognitive Mobilization, and the Changing American Electorate." *Electoral Studies* 26: 274-286.
- DALTON, Russell J., and Martin P. WATTENBERG, eds. 2000. *Parties without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- DALTON, Russell J., Scott C. FLANAGAN, and Paul A. BECK, eds. 1984. *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Societies: Realignment or Dealignment?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- DEUTSCH, Karl. 1961. "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review* 55: 17-24.
- DINAS, Elias. 2014. "Does Choice Bring Loyalty? Electoral Participation and the Development of Party Identification." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(2): 449-465.
- DINAS, Elias, and Ksenia NORTHMORE-BALL. 2016. "The Ideological Shadow of Authoritarianism." Manuscript.
- DOWNS, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.
- EVANS, Geoffrey, ed. 1999. *The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- EVANS, Geoffrey, and Nan Dirk DE GRAAF. 2013. *Political Choice Matters: Explaining the Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Cross-National Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- FERNÁNDEZ-MIRANDA, Torcuato. 1965. *El hombre y la sociedad*. Madrid: Ediciones Doncel, 6th ed.
- FRANKLIN, Mark. 1985. *The Decline of Class Voting in Britain: Changes in the Basis of Electoral Choice, 1964-1993*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- FRANKLIN, Mark, Tom Mackie, HENRY VALEN, et al. 1992. *Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- FRASER, Roland. 1979. *Recuérdalo tú y recuérdaselo a otros. Historia oral de la Guerra Civil española*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2 vols.
- FUCHS, Dieter, and Hans-Dieter KLINGEMANN. 1989. "The Left-Right Schema." In M. Kent Jennings, Jan van Deth, et al., *Continuities in Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three Western Democracies*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- GARCÍA-GUERETA, Elena. 2001. *Factores externos e internos en la transformación de los partidos políticos: el caso de AP-PP*. Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, PhD dissertation.
- GINER, Salvador, ed. 1990. *España, sociedad y política*. Madrid: Espasa Calpe.
- GREEN, Donald P., and Alan S. GERBER. 2008. *Get Out the Vote: How to Increase Turnout*, 2nd edition. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- GREENSTEIN, Fred I. 1965. *Children and Politics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- GUNTHER, Richard. 1980. *Public Policy in a No-Party State*. Berkeley and London: University of California Press.
- GUNTHER, Richard. 1992. "Spain: The Very Model of the Modern Elite Settlement." In John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- GUNTHER, Richard. 1996. "The Impact of Regime Change on Public Policy: The Case of Spain." *Journal of Public Policy* 16: 157-201.
- GUNTHER, Richard, and Larry DIAMOND. 2001. "Types and Functions of Parties." In Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther, eds., *Political Parties and Democracy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- GUNTHER, Richard, and Larry DIAMOND. 2003. "Species of Political Parties: A New Typology." *Party Politics* 9: 167-199.
- GUNTHER, Richard, and Jonathan HOPKIN. 2002. "A Crisis of Institutionalization: The Collapse of the UCD in Spain." In Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Juan J. Linz, eds., *Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- GUNTHER, Richard, and Kuan HSIN-CHI. 2007. "Value Cleavages and Partisan Conflict." In Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Hans-Jürgen, eds., *Democracy, Intermediation, and Voting on Four Continents*. 2008. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- GUNTHER, Richard, and José Ramón MONTERO. 2001. "The Anchors of Partisanship." In P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Richard Gunther eds., *Parties, Politics and Democracy in the New Southern Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- GUNTHER, Richard, and José Ramón MONTERO. 2009. *The Politics of Spain*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- GUNTHER, Richard, and José RAMÓN MONTERO. 2012. "From Consensus Transition to Adversary Democracy." In *Democràcia, política i societat. Homenatge a Rosa Virós*. Barcelona: Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- GUNTHER, Richard, José Ramón MONTERO, and Joan Botella. 2004. *Democracy in Modern Spain*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- GUNTHER, Richard, José Ramón MONTERO, and Hans Jürgen PUHLE, eds. 2007a. *Democracy, Intermediation, and Voting on Four Continents*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- GUNTHER, Richard, José Ramón MONTERO, and Hans-Jürgen PUHLE. 2007b. "Introduction: Intermediation, Information, and Electoral Politics." In Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds., *Democracy, Intermediation, and Voting on Four Continents*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- GUNTHER, Richard, José Ramón MONTERO, and Mariano TORCAL. 2006. "The Multidimensionality of Attitudinal Support for New Democracies: Conceptual Redefinition and Empirical Refinement." In Mariano Torcal and José Ramón

- Montero, eds., *Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies: Social Capital, Institutions and Politics*. London: Routledge.
- GUNTHER, Richard, José Ramón MONTERO, and Mariano TORCAL. 2007. "Democracy and Intermediation: Some Attitudinal and Behavioral Dimensions." In Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds., *Democracy, Intermediation, and Voting on Four Continents*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- GUNTHER, Richard, José Ramón MONTERO, and José Ignacio WERT. 2000. "The Media and Politics in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy." In Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan, eds., *Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- GUNTHER, Richard, Giacomo SANI, and Goldie SHABAD. 1986. *Spain After Franco: The Making of a New Party System*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- GUNTHER, Richard, Paul A. BECK, Pedro MAGALHÃES, and Alejandro MORENO, eds. 2016. *Voting in Old and New Democracies*. New York and London: Routledge.
- GUNTHER, Richard, Marina COSTA LOBO, Paolo BELLUCCI, and Marco LISI. 2016. "The Changing Determinants of the Vote." In Richard Gunther, Paul A. Beck, Pedro Magalhães, and Alejandro Moreno, eds., *Voting in Old and New Democracies*. New York and London: Routledge.
- HYMAN, Herbert. 1959. *Political Socialization*. Glencoe: Free Press.
- INGLEHART, Ronald. 1990. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- INGLEHART, Ronald, and Hans D. KLINGEMANN. 2010 [1976]. *Party Identification and Beyond. Representations of Voting and Party Competition*. ECPR Press/Rowman & Littlefield, 2nd ed.
- KATZ Richard, and Peter MAIR. 1992. *Party Organizations: A Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western Democracies, 1960-1990*. London: Sage.
- KLINGEMANN, Hans-Dieter. 1995. "Party Positions and Voter Orientations." In Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds., *Citizens and the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- KOHL, Helmut. 2004. *Erinnerungen. 1930-1982*. Munich: Droemer.
- LAPONCE, Jean. 1981. *Left and Right: The Topography of Political Perceptions*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- LENER, Daniel. 1958. *The Passing of Traditional Society*. Glencoe, NY: The Free Press.
- LINZ, Juan J. 1978. "Il sistema partitico spagnolo." *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica* 3: 363-414.
- LINZ, Juan J. 1980. "The New Spanish Party System." In Richard Rose, ed., *Electoral Participation: A Comparative Analysis*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- LINZ, Juan J. 2009 [1964]. "Un régimen autoritario: el caso de España". In J. J. Linz, *Obras Escogidas, vol. 3, Sistemas totalitarios y regímenes autoritarios*, ed. by José Ramón Montero and Thomas Jeffrey Miley. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
- LINZ, Juan J. 2013 [1981]. "Política e intereses a lo largo de un siglo en España, 1880-1980". In J. J. Linz, *Obras Escogidas, vol. 7, Historia y sociedad en España*, ed. by José Ramón Montero and Thomas Jeffrey Miley. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
- LINZ, Juan J., and José Ramón MONTERO, eds. 1986. *Crisis y cambio. Electores y partidos en la España de los años ochenta*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.
- LINZ, Juan J., and Alfred STEPAN. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- LIPSET, Seymour Martin. 1981. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, expanded and updated edition*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- LIPSET, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan, eds. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: Free Press.
- LÓPEZ PINA, Antonio, and Eduardo LÓPEZ ARANGUREN. 1976. *La cultura política de la España de Franco*. Madrid: Taurus.
- LUPU, Noam. 2015. "Elite Polarization and Voter Partisanship: A Comparative Perspective." *Political Behavior* 37: 331-357.

- MAINWARING, Scott, and Mariano TORCAL. 2003. "El conflicto democracia/autoritarismo y sus bases sociales en Chile, 1973-1995: un ejemplo de redefinición política de un cleavage". *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas* 103: 51-82.
- MARAVALL, José María. 1978. *Dictatorship and Political Dissent: Workers and Students in Franco's Spain*. London: Tavistock.
- MARAVALL, José María. 1984. *La política de la transición*. Madrid: Taurus, 2nd ed.
- MEDINA, Lucía. 2010. "Oferta partidista y ubicaciones en el eje izquierda-derecha: un estudio comparado." In Mariano Torcal, ed., *La ciudadanía europea en el siglo XXI. Estudio comparado de sus actitudes, opinión pública y comportamiento políticos*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- MEDINA, Lucía. 2015. *Izquierda y derecha en España: un estudio longitudinal y comparado*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- MILLER, Richard B., and Jennifer GLASS. 1989. "Parent-child Attitude Similarity across the Life Course." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 51: 991-997.
- MONTERO, José Ramón. 1981. "Partidos y participación política: algunas notas sobre la afiliación política en la etapa inicial de la transición española". *Revista de Estudios Políticos* 23: 33-72.
- MONTERO, José Ramón. 1988. "More than Conservative, Less than Neoconservative: Alianza Popular in Spain." In Brian Girvin, ed., *The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatism*. London: Sage.
- MONTERO, José Ramón. 1994. "Religiosidad, ideología y voto en España." *Revista de Estudios Políticos* 83: 77-111.
- MONTERO, José Ramón. 2008. "Elecciones y sistemas de partidos". In Manuel Jiménez de Parga and Fernando Vallespín, eds., *España siglo XXI*, vol. 2, *La política*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva.
- MONTERO, José Ramón, and Kerman CALVO. 2000. "An Elusive Cleavage? Religiosity and Party Choice in Spain." In David Broughton and Hans-Martien ten Napel, eds., *Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe*. London: Routledge.
- MONTERO, José Ramón, Kerman CALVO, and Álvaro MARTÍNEZ. 2008. "El voto religioso en España y Portugal". *Revista Internacional de Sociología* 51: 19-54.
- MONTERO, José Ramón, Joan FONT, and Mariano TORCAL, eds. 2006. *Ciudadanos, asociaciones y participación en España*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- MONTERO, José Ramón, Richard GUNTHER, and Mariano TORCAL. 1997. "Democracy in Spain: Legitimacy, Discontent, and Disaffection." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 32: 124-160.
- MONTERO, José Ramón, Ignacio LAGO, and Mariano TORCAL. 2007. *Elecciones generales 2004*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- MONTERO, José Ramón, and Ignacio LAGO. 2011. *Elecciones generales 2008*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- MORALES, Laura. 2010. "Getting a Single Message? The Impact of Homogeneous Political Communication Contexts in Spain in a Comparative Perspective." In Michael R. Wolf, Laura Morales, and Ken'ichi Ikeda, eds. *Political Discussion in Modern Democracies: A Comparative Perspective*. Florence, KY: Routledge.
- MORALES, Laura, and Fabiola MOTA. "El asociacionismo en España". In José Ramón Montero, Joan Font, and Mariano Torcal, eds., *Ciudadanos, asociaciones y participación en España*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- MORENO, Alejandro. 2016. "Value Cleavages Revisited". In Richard Gunther, Paul A. Beck, Pedro Magalhães, and Alejandro Moreno, eds., *Voting in Old and New Democracies*. New York and London: Routledge.
- MORLINO, Leonardo. 1998. *Democracy between Consolidation and Crisis. Parties, Groups, and Citizens in Southern Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- MORLINO, Leonardo, and José Ramón MONTERO. 1995. "Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe." In Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- NORRIS, Pippa, and Ronald INGLEHART. 2004. *Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics Worldwide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- POLLOCK III, Philip H. 1983. "The Participatory Consequences of Internal and External Political Efficacy: A Research Note". *Western Political Quarterly*: 400-409.
- PUHLE, Hans-Jürgen, 1986. "El PSOE: Un partido predominante y heterogéneo." In Juan J. Linz and José Ramón Montero, eds. *Crisis y cambio: electores y partidos en la España de los años ochenta*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.
- PUHLE, Hans-Jürgen. 2001. "Mobilizers and Late Modernizers: Socialist Parties in the New Southern Europe." In P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Richard Gunther, eds. *Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the New Southern Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- RICHARDSON, Bradley M. 1990. "The Development of Partisan Commitments in Post-Franquist Spain." Research Papers, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University.
- RICO, Guillem. 2010. "La formación de identidades partidistas en Europa: más allá de la teoría de Converse". In Mariano Torcal, ed., *La ciudadanía europea en el siglo XXI: estudio comparado de sus actitudes, opinión pública y comportamiento políticos*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- RICO, Guillem, and M. Kent JENNINGS. 2016. "The Formation of Left-Right Identification: Pathways and Correlates of Parental Influence". *Political Psychology* 37(2): 237-252.
- SANI, Giacomo. 1974. "A Test of the Least-Distance Model of Voting in Italy." *Comparative Political Studies* 7: 193-208.
- SANI, Giacomo, and José Ramón MONTERO. 1986. "El espectro político: izquierda, derecha y centro." In Juan J. Linz and José Ramón Montero, eds., *Crisis y cambio: electores y partidos en la España de los años ochenta*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.
- SANTAMARÍA, Julián. 2007. "Las elecciones generales de 2004 en su contexto." In José Ramón Montero, Ignacio Lago, and Mariano Torcal, eds., *Elecciones generales 2004*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- SCARROW, Susan, and Burcu GEZGOR. 2010. "Declining Memberships, Changing Members." *Party Politics* 16: 823-43.
- SCHMITT, Hermann, and Renato MANNHEIMER. 1989. "About Voting and Non-Voting at European Elections of 1989." *Paper presented at European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Paris*.
- STERN, Carola. 2001. *Doppelleben. Autobiografie*. Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch.
- THOMASSEN, Jacques, ed. 2005. *The European Voter: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press/ECPR.
- TORCAL, Mariano. 2002. *Political Disaffection in New Democracies: Spain in Comparative perspective*. Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University.
- TORCAL, Mariano. 2008. "El origen y la evolución del apoyo a la democracia en España: la construcción del apoyo incondicional en las nuevas democracias." *Revista Española de Ciencia Política* 18: 29-65.
- TORCAL, Mariano, Richard GUNTHER, and José Ramón MONTERO. 2002. "Anti-Party Sentiments in Southern Europe." In Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Juan J. Linz, eds., *Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- TORCAL, Mariano, and José Ramón MONTERO, eds. 2006. *Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies: Social Capital, Institutions, and Politics*. London: Routledge.
- VAN BIEZEN, Ingrid, Peter MAIR, and Thomas POGUNTKE. 2012. "Going, Going, ... Gone? The Decline of Party Membership in Contemporary Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 51: 24-56.
- VAN DER EIJK, Cees, Hermann SCHMITT, and Tanja BINDER. 2005. "Left-Right Orientations and Party Choice." In Jacques Thomassen, ed., *The European Voter: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- VAN DETH, Jan, José Ramón MONTERO, and Anders WESTHOLM, eds. 2007. *Citizenship and Involvement in European Democracies: A Comparative Analysis*. London: Routledge, 2007.
- WEHLER, Hans-Ulrich. 2006. *Eine lebhaftige Kampfsituation*. Munich: C.H. Beck.
- ZALLER, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



www.icps.cat