

# Signcryption Schemes Based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography

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# Signcryption Schemes Based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography

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## Certificate

This is to certify that the work in the thesis entitled *Signcryption Schemes Based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography* by *Biswojit Nayak*, bearing roll number 212CS2111, is a record of an original research work carried out by him under my supervision and guidance in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of *Master of Technology* in *Computer Science and Engineering Department*. Neither this thesis nor any part of it has been submitted for any degree or academic award elsewhere.

*Banshidhar Majhi*

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## Abstract

Signcryption is cryptographic primitive which simultaneously provide both the function of digital signature and public key encryption in a single logical step. Identity based cryptography is an alternative to the traditional certificate based cryptosystem. Its main idea is that each user uses his identity information as his public key. Many identity based signcryption scheme have been proposed so, far. However, all the schemes were proven using bilinear pairing.

Elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) have recently received significant attention by research due to their low computational and communicational overhead. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is the hardest computational problems, the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem and elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman problem are the most reliable cryptographic technique in ECC. The advantages of ECC that it requires shorter key length compared to other public-key algorithms. So, that its use in low-end systems such as smart cards because of its efficiency and limited computational and communicational overhead.

We introduce new signcryption schemes based on elliptic curve cryptography. The security of proposed schemes is based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) and elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman problem (ECDHP). The proposed schemes provide various desirable security requirements like confidentiality, authenticity, non-repudiation and forward security as well as chosen ciphertext attack and unforgeability.

# Contents

<b>Certificate</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>Acknowledgment</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>Abstract</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>List of Figures</b>	<b>vii</b>
<b>List of Tables</b>	<b>viii</b>
<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Security Goals . . . . .	1
1.2 Message Encryption . . . . .	2
1.3 Digital Signature . . . . .	2
1.4 Signature-Then-Encryption . . . . .	3
1.5 Disadvantages of Signature-Then-Encryption Approach . . . . .	4
1.6 Signcryption . . . . .	5
1.7 Motivation . . . . .	6
1.8 Objective of Research . . . . .	6
1.9 Organization of the Thesis . . . . .	7
<b>2 Related Work</b>	<b>8</b>
2.1 Related Work on Signcryption . . . . .	8
2.2 Related Work on Signcryption Based on ECC [33] . . . . .	9
2.3 Related Work on ID-Based Signcryption Scheme in Random Oracle Model [34] . . . . .	10
2.4 Related Work on ID-Based Signcryption Scheme in Standard Model . . . . .	11
2.5 Related Work on Strong Designation Verifiable Signcryption scheme . . . . .	12

2.6	Summary . . . . .	12
<b>3</b>	<b>Mathematical Background</b>	<b>13</b>
3.1	Mathematics of Cryptography . . . . .	13
3.1.1	Modular Arithmetic . . . . .	13
3.1.2	Algebraic Structures . . . . .	14
3.2	Hash Function . . . . .	16
3.3	Elliptic Curve Cryptography . . . . .	17
3.3.1	Elliptic Curve . . . . .	17
3.3.2	Why ECC? . . . . .	17
3.3.3	Elliptic Curves over $GF(p)$ . . . . .	18
3.4	Elliptic Curve Hardest Problem . . . . .	21
3.4.1	Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem . . . . .	21
3.4.2	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Problem . . . . .	21
3.5	Summary . . . . .	21
<b>4</b>	<b>ID-based Signcryption Scheme Based on ECC</b>	<b>22</b>
4.1	Formal model of identity-based signcryption . . . . .	22
4.2	Proposed Scheme . . . . .	23
4.3	Security analysis of the proposed scheme . . . . .	24
4.3.1	Correctness . . . . .	25
4.3.2	Security Proof . . . . .	25
4.4	Comparison . . . . .	27
4.5	Implementation . . . . .	28
4.5.1	Block Diagram of Classes . . . . .	28
4.5.2	Snapshot of Output . . . . .	29
4.6	Summary . . . . .	29
<b>5</b>	<b>A Strong Designated Verifiable Signcryption Scheme Based on ECDLP</b>	<b>31</b>
5.1	Existing Scheme . . . . .	31
5.2	Proposed Scheme . . . . .	32
5.3	Security analysis of the proposed scheme . . . . .	34
5.3.1	Correctness . . . . .	34
5.3.2	Security Proof . . . . .	34
5.4	Implementation . . . . .	37

5.5 Summary . . . . .	38
<b>6 Conclusion</b>	<b>39</b>



# List of Figures

1.1	Symmetric Key Encryption Process . . . . .	2
1.2	Asymmetric Key Encryption Process . . . . .	2
1.3	Digital Signature . . . . .	3
1.4	Signature-Then-Encryption . . . . .	4
1.5	Signcryption . . . . .	5
3.1	Elliptic Curve . . . . .	19
3.2	Point Addition Image . . . . .	19
3.3	Point Doubling Image . . . . .	20
4.1	Block Diagram of Classes . . . . .	29
4.2	Snapshot of Output . . . . .	30
5.1	Snapshot of Output . . . . .	38

# List of Tables

3.1	Key sizes for equivalent security levels (in bits) . . . . .	18
4.1	Comparison based on the Computational Cost . . . . .	28

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Security Goals

Network Security is most important to provide security in a public network, because we place most critical information in this network. To provide security in public network we must consciously of the three primary goals of network security. These goals are:

- **Confidentiality:** Confidentiality ensures that data or information can't access by unauthorized users.
- **Integrity:** This primary goal of network security prevents unauthorized modification of data at the time of transmission.
- **Availability:** This goal ensures that network resources are always accessible to authorized parties when needed.

Message encryption and digital signature schemes are cryptographic tools for providing confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation. Confidential can be achieved by encryption. Integrity, authentication and non-repudiation can be achieved by digital signature.

## 1.2 Message Encryption

Encryption is the process of encoding messages that only authorized users can access it. In an encryption scheme, the message or information, known as plaintext, is encoding using an encryption algorithm, converted it into an unreadable ciphertext. This is generally done with the use of an key along with encryption algorithm. So, any adversary can't be able to settle anything about the original message. An authorized user, however, is capable of decode the ciphertext by using a decryption algorithm, that normally requires a secret decryption key, that adversaries do not have access to it. Cryptography has two way of an encryption process called symmetric key encryption and asymmetric key encryption or public key encryption is given below.




Figure 1.1: Symmetric Key Encryption Process




Figure 1.2: Asymmetric Key Encryption Process

## 1.3 Digital Signature

Digital signatures rely on certain types of encryption to ensure authentication of sender. The signature process intended to receiver that the message was sent by

sender and nothing modified at the time of transmission. Digital signatures are generally made in a two-step. The first step is to use a secure hashing algorithm on the data. Thus, when a signature is verified by the public key, it decrypts to a hash matching the message. That hash can only be deciphered by using the public key if it were encrypted with the private signing key.




Figure 1.3: Digital Signature

## 1.4 Signature-Then-Encryption

This is a traditional method of providing confidentiality and authentication by using two serial algorithms [14].

- In first step sender sign message using his/her private key for authentication and then encrypt message using public of receiver.
- At the receiver end, recipient verifies the signature then decrypt the message.

This technique is known as signature-then-encryption. Steps of process are given in the figure [1.4].




Figure 1.4: Signature-Then-Encryption

## 1.5 Disadvantages of Signature-Then-Encryption Approach

The disadvantages of traditional signature-then-encryption are in terms of

- Number of bits
- Computational operations
- Size of an entire data packet

In traditional signature-then-encryption, above indicator are increase as compare to signcryption.

## 1.6 Signcryption

In cryptography, Signcryption is a public key primitive which full fill both the functionality of a digital signature and public key encryption in a single logical step. In the signcryption scheme, the sender generates a one times secret key by using the recipient's public key for symmetric key encryption. Then the sender sends the ciphertext to recipient. After the recipient receives the ciphertext, he derives same secret key by using his/her private key [14].




Figure 1.5: Signcryption

## 1.7 Motivation

Digital signature and message encryption is two cryptographic primitive that provide security goals like confidentiality, authenticity, non-repudiation, integrity. Traditional signature-then-encryption process contains two different steps to achieve all these security goals. Signcryption is a cryptography, which provides both the functionality of digital signature and message encryption in a single logical step. There are lots of research have been done in signcryption since 1997.

In identity-based signcryption, user identity likes name, email, telephone no. is used as a public key. A lot of research has been done in identity based signcryption. However, most of the ID-based signcryption has proven secure in random oracle model. It is a formal model used in cryptographic proofs, where the one way hash function is taken as a black box that maps every unique query with a random response from its output domain. Conversely, it has been proven that security proofs in the random oracle model doesn't imply the security in the real world.

Bilinear mapping is a hardest computational problem, which combining the elements of two vector space to yield an element of another vector space. ID-based signcryption uses bilinear mapping, which is easy to prove in random oracle model. However, bilinear mapping has been more computational as well as simulation overhead as compare to other hardest problems.

Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is hardest computational problem and is based on the algebraic structure of an elliptic curve over a finite field. ECC has received significant research due to their performance, and shorter key compare to another public-key algorithm.

## 1.8 Objective of Research

The main objectives we find from the motivation to work in signcryption are discussed as follows:



- To design a secure identity-based signcryption in the standard model. Standard model is a computational model in which the attacker have some limited of time and calculative power available.
- To develop a ID-based signcryption based on hardness of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).
- To proof its security goals are under hardness of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) as well as elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman problem (ECDHP).
- To design a strong designation verifiable signcryption scheme based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) and prevent this scheme from chosen ciphertext attack and unforgeability.

## 1.9 Organization of the Thesis

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:

1. Chapter 1: In this chapter we have discussed about the introduction to signcryption, motivation and objective of our research.
2. Chapter 2: In this chapter we present the literature review where we have described some existing works on signcryption.
3. Chapter 3: In this chapter we discussed the mathematical background of thesis work.
4. Chapter 4: In this chapter we present our proposed ID-based signcryption scheme based on ECC their implementation.
5. Chapter 5: In this chapter we present our proposed strong designated verifiable signcryption scheme based on ECDLP and their implementation.
6. Chapter 6: At last we concluded in this chapter.

# Chapter 2

## Related Work

### 2.1 Related Work on Signcryption

Encryption and digital signature schemes are cryptographic tools for providing confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation. Confidentiality can be achieved by encryption. Integrity, authentication and non-repudiation can be achieved by digital signature. To achieve simultaneously all these goals, the traditional signature-then-encryption approach is first to sign a message and then to encrypt it. In 1997, Zheng [1] proposed a cryptography primitive that fulfill the function of both digital signature and message encryption simultaneously called signcryption, and also proved that cost of signcryption is significantly lower than that needed by traditional signature and encryption approach. There are several signcryption [2–5] have been proposed since 1997.

In the traditional signcryption scheme, the public key of a user is a random element chosen from a group. So, that signcryption doesn't provide the authentication of user by itself because group element can't define the user identity. This problem can be solved through a certificate based signcryption, which provides arrangement that binds public keys with respective user identities by a certificate authority (CA). That form a hierarchical structure is called public key infrastructure

(PKI). A PKI has a difficulty for the creation, storage and distribution of digital certificates.

To reduce the key management procedure, Shamir [5] introduced the concept of identity-based cryptosystem. The main idea is that the identity information such as name, e-mail, telephone no. of each user uses as his public key. In other words, the identity is used to calculate a user's public key instead of than being extracted from a certificate issued by CA. In ID-Based cryptosystem; users communicate securely without distributing public key certificate, without storing public key directory, and without online participation of a PKG. Malone-lee first proposed the identity based signcryption scheme[6]. There are several ID-based signcryption have been proposed [5–10].

## 2.2 Related Work on Signcryption Based on ECC

In 1999, Y. Zheng and H. Imai [2] used the hardness of elliptic curve cryptography in signcryption and proposed a signcryption scheme based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). They also proved that signcryption have approximately, 58% computational cost and 40% of communication cost less than that of traditional Signature-then-Encryption scheme based on the elliptic curve, but the scheme was missed of forward secrecy and public verifiability.

Later F. Bao, R.H. Deng [11] point out that judge can't verify sender authentication without recipient's private key, so they extended Zheng's Signcryption scheme that the judge can verify signature of sender without the recipient's private key. C. Gamage et al. [12] was proposed a signcryption scheme based on Zheng's Signcryption that anyone can verify the sender authentication, but the application area was fixed to firewalls only. H.Y. Jung et al. [13] point out that when the sender's private key is lighted, Zheng's scheme can't provide forward secrecy. In 2005, Ren-Junn Hwang [14] proposed a Signcryption scheme based on Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) and Elliptic Curve

Diffie-Hellman Problem (ECDHP) with forward secrecy and public verifiability.

Jun-Bum Shin et al. [15] used a concept of standard DSA algorithm in the verification phase and proposed a DSA-verifiable Signcryption scheme, but the scheme doesn't provide forward secrecy. Raylin Tso [16] proposed a signcryption scheme which uses a standard algorithms for verification, based on hardness of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). The scheme was modified of Shin et al.'s scheme and also proved the property of forward secrecy.

In 2009, M. Toorani and A. A. Beheshti Shirazi [17] proposed a Signcryption scheme based on elliptic curved which provide both the properties of forward secrecy and public verifiability.

## 2.3 Related Work on ID-Based Signcryption Scheme in Random Oracle Model

In 2002, Malone-Lee [5] uses the concept of identity based cryptography and signcryption, and designed an identity based signcryption scheme based on bilinear pairing.

Libert and Quisquart [18] showed that Malone Lee's proposed scheme has a problem that the signature of the message is visible in cipher text so, it does not provide semantically secure. Libert and Quisquart also proposed three IBSC schemes, but these schemes satisfy either forward security or public verifiability.

In 2004 Chow et al. [19] proposed an ID-Based signcryption scheme that allows for both forward security and public verifiability.

Boyen [20] designed an ID-Based signcryption scheme that provides forward security and public verifiability as well as ciphertext anonymity and unlinkability. After that Malone Lee [21] modified Boyen's scheme and construct a more efficient scheme.

Barreto et al [18] constructed the most reliable and efficiency ID-Based signcryption scheme to date.

The above ID-Based signcryption schemes are proven secure in the random oracle model. It is a mathematical model, where hash function is taken as a random function and is used to analyze cryptography schemes. So, the security proof in the random oracle model does not imply security in the real world.

## 2.4 Related Work on ID-Based Signcryption Scheme in Standard Model

In cryptography, the standard model is a computational model in which the attacker is only limited of time and computation power available. The security scheme which are proven secure using the complexity assumption are said to be secure in the standard model.

In 2009, Yu et al. [8] proposed an ID-Based signcryption scheme is standard model based on Water's ID-Based message encryption scheme [14] and pateson's and Schuldt's ID-Based signature scheme.

In 2010, Jin et al [9] point out that Yu et al.'s scheme does not prevent against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack and proposed a modified ID-Based signcryption scheme. Jin et al proved that the modified scheme is semantically secure in the standard model.

In 2011, Li et al. [10] pointed that Jin et al. scheme do not have existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks and indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack . To construct a more flexible scheme which allow ID and message of arbitrary length, collision resistance hash function and used a secure one time symmetric key encryption scheme.

## 2.5 Related Work on Strong Designation Verifiable Signcryption scheme

In 1996 Jakobsson [22] introduced a strong designated verifier signature scheme in which the private key of designated verifier is used to verify the validity of signature and identity of signer. But that scheme has a problem that, the third party can't determine whether the signer or designated verifier issued the signature. To overcome this problem, Saeednia et al. [23] proposed a strong designated verifier scheme. However, in 2008 Lee-Chang [24] pointed out that Saeednia's scheme would reveal the identity of the signer if the secret key of the signer is compromised means the signature can be verified not only with the designated verifier's secret key but also the signer's secret key. To overcome this problem Lee and Chang [24] proposed a designated verified signature scheme in which a signature can be verified only with the designated verifier signature.

In 2012, S. Mohanty and B. Majhi [25] proposed a strong designated verifiable signcryption scheme based on the mechanism of Lee and Chang proposed signature scheme and incorporated in to signcryption scheme.

## 2.6 Summary

In this chapter, we have discussed some existing work related to signcryption. A lots of research have been done in signcryption, we briefly mention some of the work and it's flaws.

# Chapter 3

## Mathematical Background

### 3.1 Mathematics of Cryptography

#### 3.1.1 Modular Arithmetic

Modular arithmetic is defined as a system of arithmetic for integers, where we are interest in only remainder not quotient [32].

**Set of Residues:**  $Z_n$

A residues modulo  $n$ , or  $Z_n$  is always an integer between 0 and  $n - 1$  or we can say that a nonnegative integer less than  $n$ .

$$Z_n = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, (n - 1)\}$$

#### Additive Inverse

Additive inverse in set of residues or  $Z_n$  means, if two numbers  $x$  and  $y$  are additive inverse of each other then

$$x + y = 0(\text{mod}n)$$

Additive inverse of  $x$  in modulo  $n$  can be calculated as  $y = n - x$ . For example, the additive inverse of 8 in  $Z_{12}$  is  $12 - 8 = 4$ .

#### Multiplicative Inverse

In the set of residues or  $Z_n$ , if the multiplicative inverse  $x$  is  $y$  or vice versa, then  $xy = 1(\text{mod}n)$ . For example in  $Z_{11}$ , the multiplicative inverse of 2 is 6. In other word, a integer element  $x$  has a multiplicative inverse in  $Z_n$  if and only if  $\text{gcd}(n, x) = 1(\text{mod}n)$ .

In this case,  $x$  and  $n$  are said to be relatively prime. For example, there is no multiplicative inverse of 8 in  $Z_{10}$  because  $\text{gcd}(8, 10) = 2 \neq 1$ .

The Set  $Z_n$  and its 3 instances are shown below

1.  $Z_{n^*}$ : The set,  $Z_{n^*}$  is defined as a subset of  $Z_n$  and it contains elements of set  $Z_n$  that have multiplicative inverse. In the set  $Z_n$ , all the elements have additive inverse, but only some members have a multiplicative inverse.

Example:

$$Z_7 = \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9\} \quad Z_{7^*} = \{1, 3, 7, 9\}$$

2.  $Z_p$ : In the set  $Z_p$ ,  $p$  is a prime number and same as  $Z_n$  i.e, contains all elements from 0 to  $p - 1$ . In  $Z_p$ , all the elements.

Note: We need to use  $Z_n$  when additive inverses are needed; we need to use  $Z_{n^*}$  when multiplicative inverses.

Example:

$$Z_{13} = \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12\}$$

3.  $Z_{p^*}$ : In the Set  $Z_{p^*}$ ,  $p$  is a prime number and same as  $Z_{n^*}$  i.e, contains all the elements from 1 to  $p - 1$ . In  $Z_{p^*}$ , all the elements have additive and multiplicative inverse.

Example:

$$Z_{13^*} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12\}$$

### 3.1.2 Algebraic Structures

In this chapter, we briefly discuss the subject of algebraic structure. Algebraic structure is defined as the set of element with an operation that is applied to the



element of the set. There are three common algebraic structure known as groups, rings, and fields [32].

- **Groups:** A group( $G$ ) is defined as a set of elements, which satisfies following four properties with a binary operation, denoted as  $G = \langle \{...\}, \bullet \rangle$ .

1. **Closure:** If  $a, b \in G$ , then  $c = a \bullet b \in G$ .
2. **Associativity:** If  $a, b, c \in G$ , then  $(a \bullet b) \bullet c = a \bullet (b \bullet c)$ .
3. **Identity:**  $\forall a \in G$ , there exists an identity element  $e$ , such that  $e \bullet a = a \bullet e = a$ .
4. **Inverse:** For all  $a \in G$ ,  $\exists a'$ , called the inverse of  $a$ , such that  $a \bullet a' = a' \bullet a = e$ .

If a group which satisfies above four properties along with commutative property is called commutative group or Abelian group. Commutative property means  $\forall a, b \in G$ , we have  $a \bullet b = b \bullet a$ .

**Finite Group:** If a set contains a finite number of elements, then it is called finite group, otherwise it is an infinite group.

**Order of a Group:** Total number of elements that contains in a group is called order of a group, i.e,  $|G|$ .

**Subgroups:** A subgroup is a subset of group and subgroup itself is a group. If  $\mathbf{G}$  and  $\mathbf{H}$  are two groups of same operation and elements of  $\mathbf{H}$  is a subset of element of  $\mathbf{G}$ , then  $\mathbf{H}$  is subgroup of  $\mathbf{G}$ . The above definition implies that:

- If  $a, b \in \mathbf{G}$  and  $\mathbf{H}$ , then  $c = a \bullet b \in \mathbf{G}$  and  $\mathbf{H}$ .
- Both group and subgroup share the same identity element.
- If  $a \in \mathbf{G}$  and  $\mathbf{H}$ , then  $a' \in \mathbf{G}$  and  $\mathbf{H}$ .
- The group made of identity element of  $\mathbf{G}$ ,  $\mathbf{H} = \langle \{e\}, \bullet \rangle$  is a subgroup of  $\mathbf{G}$ .

- Each group is a subgroup of itself.

**Cyclic Subgroups:** A subgroup of a group is called cyclic subgroup, if all the elements of group generated using the power of an element. The term power means repeatedly applying the group operation to the element.

$$a^n \rightarrow a \bullet a \bullet \dots \bullet a(n \text{ times})$$

**Cyclic Groups:** The element that generates all the elements of cyclic subgroup can also generate all the elements group is called a generator. A cyclic group is a group that itself own cyclic subgroup. If  $g$  is a generator, the element in the finite group can be written as

$$\{e, g, g^2, \dots, g^{n-1}\}, \text{ where } g^n = e$$

- **Rings:** A Ring( $R$ ) is a set with two binary operations. It is denoted as  $R = \langle \{\dots\}, \bullet, \square \rangle$ . The first and second operation must satisfy all five and two properties respectively. In addition, the second operation must be distributed over first, means that for all  $a, b$ , and  $c$  elements of  $R$  we have  $a \square (b \bullet c) = (a \square b) \bullet (a \square c)$  and  $(a \bullet b) \square c = (a \square c) \bullet (b \square c)$ . If the second operation satisfies commutative operation, then ring is called commutative ring.
- **Fields:** A Field( $F$ ) is a set of elements with binary operation, denoted as  $F = \langle \{\dots\}, \bullet, \square \rangle$ . Both two operation satisfies all five properties except the identity of the first operation has no inverse.

## 3.2 Hash Function

A hash function takes a group of characters and maps it to a value of a certain length called a hash value or message digest. The hash value is representative of the original string of characters, but is normally smaller than the original. Hash function is mainly used to generate a fixed length of string. It is also used to check, where two objects are same or not. Hash function generates same result, if two

input string are same, so it is called deterministic. There are different type of design approach of hash function likes MD, MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA, SHA1, SHA2, SHA3. I have use SHA1 in our scheme.

In our proposed work, we used SHA1 hash function for experimental use. SHA1 takes maximum  $2^{64} - 1$  bit length of input string and generates 160bit length of output string. SHA1 is collision free hash function, so we used in our proposed work.

### 3.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was discovered in 1985 by Victor Miller (IBM) and Neil Koblitz as an alternative mechanism for implementing public-key cryptography based on elliptic curve over finite field. ECC is based on discrete logarithm that is much more difficult to challenge at equivalent key lengths as compare to other public key cryptography. It uses smaller key as compare to other public key cryptography with same security level. So, it is used widely in lower resource system like mobile communication.

#### 3.3.1 Elliptic Curve

An elliptic curve is define as a nonsingular cubic curve over finite field in two variables,  $f(x, y) = 0$ , with a rational point (which may be a point at infinity) which satisfy the equation:  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ . The field K is generally taken to be the complex numbers, reals, rationales, or a finite field.

#### 3.3.2 Why ECC?

The National Institute of Standards and Technology recommended the key sizes to protect keys used in conventional encryption algorithms like the (DES) and (AES) together with the key sizes for RSA, Diffie-Hellman and elliptic curves that are

needed to provide equivalent security are given in the Table [3.1].

Table 3.1: Key sizes for equivalent security levels (in bits)

Symmetric	ECC	DH/DSA/RSA
80	163	1024
128	283	3072
192	409	7680
256	571	15360

From given table, we conclude that if the symmetric key size is increase the required key sizes for RSA and Diffie-Hellman increase at a much faster rate than the required key sizes for elliptic curve cryptosystems. Hence, elliptic curve systems offer more security per bit increase in key size than either RSA or Diffie-Hellman public key systems [35].

### 3.3.3 Elliptic Curves over $\mathbf{GF}(p)$

An elliptic curve  $E$  over  $\mathbf{R}$  (real numbers) is defined by a Weierstrass equation

$$E : y^2 + a_1xy + a_3y = x^3 + a_2x^2 + a_4x + a_6$$

The Weierstrass equations can be simplified by performing the following change of variables:

$$(x, y) \rightarrow \left(x - \frac{a_2}{3}, y - \frac{a_1x + a_3}{2}\right)$$

and set  $a_1 = 0, a_3 = 0$

$$a = \frac{1}{9a_2^2} + a_4, b = \frac{2}{27a_2^3} - \frac{1}{3a_2a_4a_6}$$

we get one of the simplified Weierstrass equations:  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$  where  $a, b \in F_p$  and  $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$ , together with a special point  $0$  called the point at infinity.




Figure 3.1: Elliptic Curve

### Point addition

Addition of two point in elliptic curve is defined as a line between two point and the intersection of line in the elliptic curve. The negative of the intersection point is used as the result of the addition.

The operation is denoted by  $P + Q = R$ , or  $(x_p, y_p) + (x_q, y_q) = (x_r, y_r)$ . This can algebraically be calculated by:

$$\lambda = \frac{y_q - y_p}{x_q - x_p}$$

$$x_r = \lambda^2 - x_p - x_q$$

$$y_r = \lambda(x_p - x_r) - y_p$$




Figure 3.2: Point Addition Image

### Point doubling

Point doubling in elliptic curve is defined as a tangent of the point and the intersection of line in the elliptic curve. The negative of the intersection point is used as the result of the addition.

$$\lambda = \frac{3x_p^2 + a}{2y_p}$$

$$x_r = \lambda^2 - 2x_p$$

$$y_r = \lambda(x_p - x_r) - y_p$$




Figure 3.3: Point Doubling Image

### Point multiplication

Point multiplication is nothing but scalar multiplication is defined as repeated addition of point. There is a method for point multiplication called double and square method, which is similar to multiply and square method in modular exponentiation. The algorithm is given as follows:

For computing  $dP$ , take the binary representation for  $d : d = d_0 + 2d_1 + 2^2d_2 + \dots + 2^m d_m$ , where  $[d_0..d_m] \in 0, 1$

## 3.4 Elliptic Curve Hardest Problem

This section describes definition of the hard computational problems in which the security of the proposed scheme relies [27].

### 3.4.1 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem

With the given two point of an elliptic curve  $A$  and  $B$ , where  $A = k.B$ , it is difficult to find out the value of  $k$ .

### 3.4.2 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Problem

With the given two points of elliptic curve  $A$  and  $B$ , where  $A = c.G$  and  $B = d.G$  without  $c$  and  $d$ , it is difficult to find out another point  $K = c.d.G$ .

The ECDLP and ECDHP is a computational infeasible problems [30].

## 3.5 Summary

In this chapter, we briefly discussed mathematical background of our thesis work. All the mathematics we define are being use in our proposed work.

# Chapter 4

## ID-based Signcryption Scheme

### Based on ECC

In this chapter, we proposed an identity based signcryption scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography. The scheme, based on the concept of Li et al. [10], which allow ID and message of arbitrary length, collision resistance hash function and used a secure one time symmetric key encryption scheme.

#### 4.1 Formal model of identity-based signcryption

An identity-based signcryption scheme consists of the following four algorithms [8].

- **Setup:** Here, the private key generator (PKG) takes input as security parameter  $k$  and generates the system's public parameters  $params$  and a master secret  $s$ . PKG publishes  $params$  and keeps the master secret to itself.
- **Extract:** Given an identity  $ID_u$ , the PKG computes the corresponding private key  $x_u$  and transmits it to its owner in a secure way.
- **Signcrypt:** To send a message  $m$  from Alice to the receiver Bob whose identity is  $ID_b$ , Alice computes cipher text  $c$  using algorithm  $\text{Signcrypt}(m, x_a, y_b)$ .



- **Unsigncrypt:** After receiving ciphertext  $c$ , Bob computes  $\text{Unsigncrypt}(c, y_a, x_b)$  and generates the plain text  $m$  if the ciphertext is valid between two identities otherwise the symbol  $\perp$ .

## 4.2 Proposed Scheme

This scheme consists of three parts, namely PKG, Signcryptor and Receiver. The PKG provides private and public key of all parties, when they join first time in the network. There are four phases in the proposed scheme: Setup, Extract, Signcrypt, Unsigncrypt. In the initial phase, the system chooses and publishes all the parameter of elliptic curves and PKG generates private key and the related public key of each user in the network.

- **Setup:** Here, PKG selects and publish system security parameters are given below.

$q$  is a large prime number.

$(a, b)$  two elliptic curve element which is smaller than  $q$  satisfying the equation  $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$  and  $q \neq 0$ .

$F$  the elliptic curve over finite field which satisfying the equation  $q : y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \pmod q$ .

$G$  a generator of elliptic curve.

$0$  a point at infinity of elliptic curve and  $n$  the order of  $F$ , which satisfy  $n.G = 0$ .

Hash functions  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow Z_q$  and PKG choose a number  $s$  as master secret and compute master public key  $R = s.G$ .

Publish parameter  $(q, G, a, b, H, R)$ .

- **Extract:** If  $U$  has the identity  $ID_u$ , the PKG computes the private key of signcryptor as follows.

$$X_u = (H(ID_u)).s \pmod q$$

and compute its public key as  $Y_u = X_u.G$

The PKG generates private and public key of the sender and receiver as follows.

$$X_s = (H(ID_s)).s \text{ mod } q \quad (4.1)$$

$$Y_s = X_s.G \quad (4.2)$$

$$X_r = (H(ID_r)).s \text{ mod } q \quad (4.3)$$

$$Y_r = X_r.G \quad (4.4)$$

- **Signcrypt:** Sender chooses a random number  $r \in [1 \dots (q-1)]$  and computes,

$$Z = r.G \quad (4.5)$$

$$K = ID_r.r.Y_r = (K_1, K_2) \quad (4.6)$$

$$c = E_{K_1}(m) \quad (4.7)$$

$$h = Hash(m, ID_s, ID_r, K_2) \quad (4.8)$$

$$S = ID_r.r - ID_s.h.X_s.Z \quad (4.9)$$

The cipher text is  $(c, h, S, Z)$

- **Unsigncrypt:** The receiver receives ciphertext  $(c, h, S, Z)$ , and computes,

$$K = S.Y_r + ID_s.h.Z.Y_s.X_r = (K_1, K_2) \quad (4.10)$$

$$m' = D_{K_1}(c) \quad (4.11)$$

$$h' = Hash(m', ID_s, ID_r, K_2) \quad (4.12)$$

Verify, if  $(h = h')$  then receiver accepts the signature.

### 4.3 Security analysis of the proposed scheme

In this section, the correctness of the proposed signcryption scheme is evaluated. Then, there is a brief discussion of the security aspects of the proposed scheme. We also proof that the proposed scheme provides all the security goals.

### 4.3.1 Correctness

The signcrypted text  $(c, h, S, Z)$  is a valid one; its correctness is given below.

$$\begin{aligned}
K &= S.Y_r + ID_s.h.Z.Y_s.X_r \\
&= (ID_r.r - ID_s.h.X_s.Z).Y_r + ID_s.h.Z.Y_s.X_r \\
&= ID_r.r.Y_r - ID_s.h.X_s.Z.Y_r + ID_s.h.Z.Y_s.X_r \\
&= ID_r.r.Y_r - ID_s.h.Z.X_s.Y_r + ID_s.h.Z.X_s.G.X_r \\
&= ID_r.r.Y_r - ID_s.h.Z.X_s.Y_r + ID_s.h.Z.X_s.Y_r \\
&= ID_r.r.Y_r
\end{aligned}$$

### 4.3.2 Security Proof

The proposed work provides message confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, unforgeability, and forward secrecy.

#### Confidentiality

The proposed scheme provides message confidentiality. If an attacker tries to obtain the original message from the ciphertext, he must know the secret parameter  $K$ . Now we discuss some ways that attacker can try to obtain the secret key  $K$ .

$$K = ID_r.r.Y_r \quad (4.13)$$

$$Z = r.G \quad (4.14)$$

Suppose the attacker tries to derive secret key  $K$  from Eq. (4.13), he must find out secret parameter  $r$  from Eq. (4.14). But the Eq. (4.14) has properties ECDLP. So, it is infeasible to solve to derive  $K$  from Eq. (4.13) and (4.14).

$$R = s.G \quad (4.15)$$

$$K = H(ID_r).ID_r.r.s.G \quad (4.16)$$

If the attacker tries to derive secret  $K$ , by using Eq. (4.16) from Eq. (4.14) and Eq. (4.15), then attacker has to solve the hardest ECDHP.

$$S = ID_r.r - ID_s.h.X_s.R \quad (4.17)$$

$$K = S.Y_r + ID_r.h.Z.Y_s.X_r \quad (4.18)$$

It is also possible to derive  $K$  from Eq. (4.18) by using Eq. (4.17), but the attacker has to gotten  $X_r$ , which is infeasible to derive. Therefore, proposed scheme provides message confidentiality.

### Authentication

The recipient uses public key  $Y_s$  and certificate  $S$  in Eq. (4.18) for verifying sender authentication. The sender signed with its private key  $X_s$  in Eq. (4.17). So, in the proposed scheme recipient can authenticate identity of sender.

### Integrity

In the proposed scheme, the receiver can verify that whether the ciphertext is tampered or not at the time of transmission.

$$h = Hash(m, ID_s, ID_r, K_2) \quad (4.19)$$

If the attacker change the cipher text  $c$  to  $c'$ . Then the original message in Eq. (4.19) also change from  $m$  to  $m'$ . At the time of verification it is infeasible in one way hash function that  $h = h'$ . Therefore, our scheme provides integrity.

### Unforgeability

Unforgeability ensure that, the attacker can't create a valid ciphertext. In the proposed scheme, the attacker cannot create a valid  $(c, h, S, Z)$  without the private key of the sender. If an attacker forge a valid  $(c', h', S', Z')$  from previous  $(c, h, S, Z)$ , then  $(c', h', S', Z')$  has to satisfy Eq. (4.18).

To generate a correct  $h'$  and  $S'$ , the attacker must get random secret  $r$ . But the attacker can't get the correct random secret  $r$  and  $S$ . To obtain  $r$  from  $Z = r.G$ , then attacker should have to solve ECDLP firstly but it computationally infeasible. Therefore, proposed scheme prevents the properties of unforgeability.

### Non-Repudiation

In proposing schemes the recipient can know from Eq. (4.18), whether the original message send by sender or not. As the sender sign with his private key in Eq. (4.17), the recipient can verify. So proposed scheme provides non-repudiation.

### Forward Secrecy

The proposed scheme ensures that, if the sender private key is lighted, but attacker can't recover original message  $m$  from ciphertext  $(c, h, S, Z)$ . In our scheme if an attacker tries to derive plain text  $m$ , he has to decrypt its cipher text by secret key  $K$ . Therefore our proposed scheme provides forward secrecy.

## 4.4 Comparison

We compare cost of our proposed work with some elliptic curve cryptography schemes and try to reduce the cost of computation. We have used some notation to define number of operation, in the Table [4.1] are given below.

**MUL**= modular multiplication operation.

**DIV**= modular division operation.

**ADD**= modular addition operation.

**ECPM**= elliptic curve point multiplication operation.

**ECPA**= elliptic curve point addition operation.

**HASH**= one way hash function.

Table 4.1: Comparison based on the Computational Cost

Schemes	MUL	DIV	ADD	ECPM	ECPA	HASH
Hwang	1	0	1	5	1	2
Zheng	3	1	1	3	1	4
Proposed Scheme	3	0	1	5	0	2

## 4.5 Implementation

All the security schemes are operated by large number to protect different type of attacks. Java has a special class for implementing security schemes, called BigInteger class. The proposed scheme is implemented using java BigInteger class.

### 4.5.1 Block Diagram of Classes

The proposed scheme is using three classes that are given in the Fig.[4.1]. Signcryption.java, class is the base class, where the algorithm of the scheme is implemented. ECC.java class contains the elliptic curve parameters and different point operation. There is another class, that defines the x and y coordinates of elliptic curve points as well as some methods.




Figure 4.1: Block Diagram of Classes

### 4.5.2 Snapshot of Output

In our scheme we have used the SHA1, a one way hash function that take variable length of input and generates a 160bits of output. The elliptic parameters are chosen randomly and generate points in the curve. It takes an arbitrary length of message and calculates the cipher text and sends it to recipient. At the recipient end verify the signature and decrypt the message. The snapshot of the output is given below in Fig.[4.2].

## 4.6 Summary

In this chapter, we have described our proposed ID-based Signcryption Scheme Based on ECC. The proposed scheme consist of three algorithm and two different parties. We proof, the correctness of the scheme and also different type security goals that satisfy the scheme.

```
Output - ECC (run)
run:
----Elliptic curve parameter----
p=701 a=12 b=23
No. of points in elliptic curve=743
Generator G=(1,6)
Master secret=23
----Sender Key----
Private key hash string: [B@7e5284e9
Private=18
Public=(136,532)
----Receiver Key----
Private key hash string: [B@5b941dc9
Private=5
Public=(125,31)
----Signcryption----
x=: 6
Z=(163,355)
K=(491,448)
SHA1 hash of string: [B@592fa617
h= -146822082193909875782170567272604302005129392507
S=213
----Unsigncryption----
K'=(491,448)
----Verification----
Key Verified
BUILD SUCCESSFUL (total time: 1 second)
```

Figure 4.2: Snapshot of Output



# Chapter 5

## A Strong Designated Verifiable Signcryption Scheme Based on ECDLP

In this chapter, we proposed a Strong Designated Verifiable Signcryption Scheme Based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. The scheme, based on the S. Mohanty and B. Majhi [25] proposed a strong designated verifiable signcryption scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP).

### 5.1 Existing Scheme

In this section, there is a brief discussion of S. Mohanty and B. Majhi [25] proposed scheme. The scheme consists of three algorithms, namely, setup, signcryption and unsigncryption with verification.

- **Setup:** The signcryptor(S) chooses  $n = p.q$ , where  $p = 2fq'$  and  $q = 2fq' + 1$ .  $p, q, p', q'$  are distinct primes.

The signcryptor chooses his private key  $X_S \in Z_{q^*}$  and computes his public key

as follows.

$$Y_S = g^{X_S} \text{ mod } p$$

The designated verifier also chooses his private key  $X_R \in Z_{q^*}$  and computes his public key as follows.

$$Y_R = g^{X_R} \text{ mod } p$$

- **Signcryption:** The signcryptor chooses  $t \in Z_{q^*}$  and computes

$$K = Y_R^t \text{ mod } p$$

$$C = E_K(m)$$

$$r = H(K)$$

$$s = t - r.X_S \text{ mod } p$$

The signcryptor send the cipher text  $\delta = (r, s, C)$  to designated verifier.

- **Unsigncryption:** After receiving  $\delta = (r, s, C)$ , the designated receiver computes  $K'$  as given below.

$$K' = (g^S Y_S^r)^{X_R} \text{ mod } p$$

Then he verifies the authenticity of sender by checking the following condition.

$$r = H(K')$$

Then message  $m$  is recovered from the ciphertext as follows.

$$m = D_k(C)$$

## 5.2 Proposed Scheme

This scheme consists of two parties namely Signcryptor and Receiver. There are three phases in the scheme : Setup or key generation, Signcrypt and Unsigncrypt.

## Chapter 5A Strong Designated Verifiable Signcryption Scheme Based on ECDLP

In the initial phase, signcryptor generates and publishes all the public parameter of elliptic curve as well as each user chooses his own private key and calculates his related public key.

- **Setup:** In this phase, signcryptor setup some elliptic curve parameter are given below.

$q$  is a prime number.

$(a, b)$  two integer element and  $(a, b) < q$  satisfy  $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0 \pmod{q}$ .

$F$  is the elliptic curve over finite field with order  $n$ , which satisfy equation  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \pmod{q}$ .

$G$  a base point of  $F$ .

hash function  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow Z_q$ .

Publish parameter  $(q, G, a, b, H, n)$ .

Signcryptor chooses his private key  $X_s \in [1, 2 \dots (n-1)]$  and computes his public key as

$$Y_s = X_s \cdot G = (Y_{s1}, Y_{s2}) \quad (5.1)$$

Receiver also chooses his private key  $X_r \in [1, 2 \dots (n-1)]$  and computes his public key as

$$Y_r = X_r \cdot G = (Y_{r1}, Y_{r2}) \quad (5.2)$$

- **Signcrypt:** Signcryptor chooses a random number  $t \in [1 \dots (n-1)]$  and computes

$$K = t \cdot Y_r = (K_1, K_2) \quad (5.3)$$

$$c = E_{K_1}(m) \quad (5.4)$$

$$r = H(m, K_2) \quad (5.5)$$

$$s = (t - r \cdot X_s) \pmod{n} \quad (5.6)$$

The cipher text is  $\delta = (c, r, s)$

- **Unsigncrypt:**The receiver receives ciphertext  $\delta = (c, r, s)$  and computes

$$K' = s.Y_r + r.X_r.Y_s = (K'_1, K'_2) \quad (5.7)$$

The message is recovered from the cipher text  $\delta = (c, r, s)$  as follows.

$$m' = D_{K'_1}(c) \quad (5.8)$$

Then he verifies the authenticity by checking the following condition.

$$r' = H(m', K'_2) \quad (5.9)$$

### 5.3 Security analysis of the proposed scheme

In this section, the correctness of the proposed signcryption scheme is evaluated. Then, there is a brief discussion of the security proof of the different type attack that the proposed scheme provides.

#### 5.3.1 Correctness

The signcrypted text  $\delta = (c, r, s)$  is a valid one; its correctness is given below.

$$\begin{aligned} K &= s.Y_r + r.X_r.Y_s \\ &= (t - r.X_s).Y_r + r.X_r.Y_s \\ &= t.Y_r - r.X_s.Y_r + r.X_r.X_s.G \\ &= t.Y_r - r.X_s.Y_r + r.X_s.Y_r \\ &= t.Y_r = (K_1, K_2) \end{aligned}$$

#### 5.3.2 Security Proof

Definition 1: A signcryption scheme is said to have the indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack property, if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantages in the following game [8].

## Chapter 5A Strong Designated Verifiable Signcryption Scheme Based on ECDLP

1. The challenger  $C$  runs the setup algorithm with security parameters and obtains common parameters  $\text{params}$ . He sent the parameter to adversary  $A$ .
2. The adversary  $A$  asks adaptively a polynomially bounded number of queries to signcryption and unsigncryption.
  - signcryption queries: In this phase, adversary chooses a message  $m$  along with an arbitrary recipient public key  $Y_r$  and sends them to the challenger. Then the challenger, runs the signcryption algorithm  $\text{signcrypt}(m, X_s, Y_r)$  with private key of signcryptor  $X_s$  and send ciphertext back to adversary.
  - unsigncryption queries: In this phase, adversary  $A$  submits a ciphertext  $C$  for decryption to the challenger. Then the challenger runs the signcrypt algorithm  $\text{unsigncrypt}(C, X_r, Y_s)$ . If the plaintext is valid for the recovered signcryptor's public key, then the challenger returns the plaintext to  $A$ , otherwise the challenger returns the symbol  $\perp$ .
3.  $A$  chooses two plaintexts,  $m_0$  and  $m_1$ , and an arbitrary private key  $X_s$ , on which he wishes to be challenged. Challenger chooses randomly a bit  $b$ , computes  $\delta = \text{Signcrypt}(m_b, X_s, Y_r)$  and sends it to  $A$ .
4.  $A$  asks a polynomial number of queries adaptively again as in the first stage. It is not allowed to make query the unsigncryption corresponding to  $\delta$ .
5. Finally,  $A$  produces a bit  $b'$  and wins the game if  $b' = b$ . The advantage of  $A$  is given as

$$\text{Adv}(A) = \Pr[b' = b] - 1/2$$

Proof: We proof the scheme based on above game that, the proposed scheme is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.

## Chapter 5A Strong Designated Verifiable Signcryption Scheme Based on ECDLP

We assume that, the adversary chooses a signcryptor's private key and two message  $m_0$  and  $m_1$  of equal length and send them to challenge. The challenger then chooses a random  $b$  and compute the ciphertext  $\delta$  with given receiver public key  $Y_r$ .

$$\delta = (c, r, s)$$

Adversary after receiving the challenge ciphertext  $\delta$ , he first guess of  $b$  and generates a new ciphertext by choosing a random message  $m'$ . Then he chooses a random  $X'_s \leftarrow z_q^*$ . Then A computes,

$$Y'_s = X'_s \cdot G \tag{5.10}$$

$$K' = t' \cdot Y_r = (K'_1, K'_2) \tag{5.11}$$

$$c' = E_{K'_1}(m') \tag{5.12}$$

$$r' = H(m', K'_2) \tag{5.13}$$

$$s' = (t' - r' \cdot X'_s) \text{ mod } n \tag{5.14}$$

The adversary then send the challenge ciphertext  $\delta'$  to challenger for unsigncryption. After receiving ciphertext  $\delta' = (c', r', s')$ , the challenger computes  $K = s' \cdot Y_r + r' \cdot X_r \cdot Y_s = (K_1, K_2)$  and  $m' = D_{K_1}(c)$

If  $r = H(m', K'_2)$ , then challenger returns the message  $m$ , otherwise rejects the message. The response is automatically rejected because  $K' \neq K$  as  $X'_r$  can not be computed from  $Y_r$ , whose complexity elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. So, we conclude that proposed scheme is prevent against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.

**Definition 2:** The proposed signcryption scheme is unforgeable against chosen message attack.

**proof:** In proposed work, the attacker cannot create a valid ciphertext  $(c, r, s)$  without private key of sender. The computational complexity of sender private key is under hardness of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.

In case, the value  $K$  is leaked or compromised, the attacker can not generate  $s$  as it required two parameters,  $t$  and  $X_s$ . If an attacker wants to derive  $t$  from  $K = t.Y_r$ , he should have to solve ECDLP first, which is computationally infeasible. Therefore, the proposed scheme satisfies the properties of unforgeability.

**Definition 3:** In the proposed signcryption scheme, the signcrypted message can not be verified by anyone other than the designated receiver.

**Proof:** In the proposed scheme, a one-time symmetric key is generated using the public key of the designated receiver. To verify a signcrypted message, a one-time symmetric key is generated from the private key of the designated receiver, which is computationally hard under ECDLP.

If the private key of the signcryptor ( $X_s$ ) is compromised, the adversary  $A$  generates the signcrypted text  $\delta$  before the designated receiver  $R$  receives it. The adversary cannot verify the signature, because the signature is only verified by the designated receiver, which is protected under the hardness of ECDLP.

## **5.4 Implementation**

We implement this scheme in Java using the Java BigInteger class. In this work, we used SHA1 as a one-way hash function, an elliptic curve class, and a point class. The algorithm generates all elliptic curve points by choosing elliptic curve parameters. From all points, one point is chosen as the generator, which can generate all the points of the elliptic curve by scalar multiplication. Then the algorithm calculates the private and public keys of the sender and receiver using the generator. In the signcryption phase, the sender calculates the ciphertext and sends it to the receiver. In the unsigncryption phase, the receiver verifies the sender's identity and decrypts the message. The snapshot of the output is given below in Fig.[5.1].

```
Output - ECC (run)
run:
----Elliptic curve parameter----
p=733
a=27
b=11
No. of points in elliptic curve=733
Generator G=(2,325)

----Sender Key----
Private=18
Public=(634,512)

----Receiver Key----
Private=b
Public=(705,284)

----Signcryption----
t= 6
K=(584,481)
SHA1 hash of string: [B@592fa617
r= -246962783389593491319764396759982028504138761816
s=399

----Unsigncryption----
K'=(584,481)
----Verification----
Key Verified
BUILD SUCCESSFUL (total time: 1 second)
```

Figure 5.1: Snapshot of Output

## 5.5 Summary

In this chapter, we have introduced a strong designated verifiable signcryption scheme based on ECDLP. We also proved that, the proposed scheme is secure against chosen ciphertext attack and unforgeability. We have implemented this scheme in java and result is also given.



# Chapter 6

## Conclusion

Our proposed schemes based on ECDLP and ECDHP simultaneously provides message confidentiality, unforgeability, non-repudiation, integrity, authentication and forward security. The proposed schemes achieve the security properties with a saving in computational cost compared to the traditional signature the encryption scheme which makes the new scheme more appropriate for environment with limited power. Finally, the proposed schemes have low computational and communication cost so, can be applied to a smart phone environment more efficiently.

## Scope for Further Research

In ID-based signcryption, a third is used to generate the private key of users called a private key generator (PKG). There is a problem of key escrow in ID-based signcryption that key is held in escrow, or stored, by a third party. So, to avoid this problem the proposed works can be design in certificateless signcryption.

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