

IDENTIFYING PERSISTENT FAULTS IN NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM



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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the project entitled, “**Identifying Persistent Faults In Network Access Control System**” submitted by **Govind Upman (108CS054)** and **Sunil Oram (108CS039)** is an authentic work carried out by them under my supervision and guidance in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Bachelor of Technology in Computer Science and Engineering** at **National Institute of Technology, Rourkela**.

To the best of my knowledge, the matter embodied in the project has not been submitted to any University / Institute for the award of any Degree or Diploma.

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ABSTRACT

The task of configuring and managing security policies in enterprise networks is becoming harder due to complex policy constraints of the organizations and rapid changes in the network topologies. Typically, the organizational security policies are defined as a collection of rules for allowing/denying service accesses among various network zones. Implementation of the policy can be realized in a distributed fashion via implementation of appropriate sets of access control rules (ACL) within the interface switches (Layer-3 routers) of the network. Due to organizational complex security needs the verification of the ACL implementations with respect to the security policy is a major technical challenge to the network administrators. The problem's complexity increases with changes in network topologies. In any point of time, the failure within the network infrastructure may occur, causing invalidation and performance degradation of the network parameters. Hence, the existing security implementation (distribution of ACL rules) may not conform to the policy.

Here we address the problem by analysing Network Access Control model with ACL implementation in a static fault environment considering static and persistent faults in network access control. We have considered various network topologies for our study and the simulation has been run for networks comprising of number of nodes from 8 to 256. Then we have induced faults to these networks and tried to determine the average and maximum fault latency in these networks in a simulation based approach.

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Chapter1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Over recent years the increase in the number of mobile workers, the number and types of mobile devices, and in the number of non-employees requiring access to corporate networks has dissolved the network perimeter. Access requests can come from anyone and anywhere, which is why organizations are turning to network access control (NAC) technologies.

Generic network access control at its core is a simple concept: Your identity should govern what you are allowed to do over the network. NAC, thus, is simply the hardware and software that as a whole lets you enforce access control policies based on your identity. NAC uses the set of protocols in order to implement policies that describe the security of network by defining sets of policies when end system attempts to access the network. NAC might also combine the automatic remediation process with the network system. It allows the routers, the switches and the firewalls to work together with back-office servers.

When all of the parts are in place, NAC acts like a way to apply a policy for accessing network across LAN, wireless and VPN infrastructures. The access control policy in NAC might range from simple, such as a go or no-go decision on network-access or a choice of virtual LANs, or it can be as complex as a set of per-user firewall rules defining which parts of network are accessible.

Since NAC is a huge step for people to consider adding to their network, all kinds of slants are seen on the idea of NAC. For example, some products tightly focus on endpoint security considering it to be the key reason for implementing NAC, while others concentrate on authentication and policy as the prime virtues. In reality, a good NAC product is not just a way to swing users between quarantine and production Virtual-LANs, but a generic access-control system that authenticates and authorizes all traffic the traffic it encounters. NAC is a bit different from control systems such as a firewall, because NAC provides us the tools available to provide user-focused access control.

When an end system connects to a computer network, it is not allowed to access anything unless it complies with different defined policy, including system update level, antivirus protection level and configuration. End system is checked by preinstalled software agent. When the policy is met, the computer is able to access the network resources and the internet, within the policy defined inside the NAC system. NAC is mainly used for the end point health check. Access to the network is given to the end user according to the profile and health check of the person.

We know that fault detection is the first phase of fault management, where unexpected error may occur and should be properly identified by the network system. This chapter is organized as follows. In section 1.1, we introduced the network access control system. The basic concepts are discussed in section 1.2. In section 1.3, the motivation and objective of the thesis is mentioned. Thesis organization is presented in section 1.4. This chapter is ended with summary in section 1.5.

1.2 BASIC CONCEPTS

1.2.1 Preadmission and Post admission

Basically in NAC there are two prevailing design philosophies, based on policies enforced before or after the end-system gain access to the network. **Pre-admission** NAC, end-system are inspected before being allowed in to the network. Alternatively **Post-admission** NAC makes enforcement decisions based on user actions, after those users have been connected to the network ^[9].

1.2.2 Agent versus agent less

The fundamental concept behind NAC is to allow the network to make access control decisions based on the end system's intelligence. It uses the agent or agent less software to report end system characteristics depending upon whether it use scanning and networking inventory techniques to discern those characteristics remotely.

1.2.3 Out of band versus inline

In out of band systems, agents are placed on the end systems and report information to central console, which in turn control the switches to enforce policy. Alternatively the inline solutions can be single box solutions which act as single firewalls for access layer networks and enforce the policy. Out of band solutions have the advantage of reusing the existing infrastructure but inline products can be easier to deploy on new network, and may provide more network enforcement capabilities, because they directly control the network packets on the wire.

1.2.4 Remediation, Quarantine

Network operators deploy NAC products and expect that some unsuccessful end user will be denied access to the network. For this, NAC solutions need a mechanism to remediate the end system problems that deny them access.

A quarantine network is a restricted IP network. It provides users with routed access only to certain hosts and applications. Quarantine is implemented using concept of VLAN. When NAC product finds that the end user is out of date. Their switch port is assigned to a VLAN that is routed only to patch and update servers, not to the rest of the network. Other solution use ARP, NDP for quarantine.

1.2.5 Captive Portals

A captive portal intercepts HTTP, redirecting users to a web application that provides instructions and tools for updating their computer. This is similar to the way wireless access works at the public access points.

External Captive Portals allow organizations offload wireless controllers and switches from hosting web portals. Single Portals can be used for both wired and wireless authentication.

1.2.6 IEEE 802.1X

IEEE 802.1X is an IEEE standard for port based authentication. It is a part of the IEEE 802.1 group of protocols. It provides authentication to the user wishing to connect to a LAN or WLAN. It consists of group of protocols. IEEE 802.1X encapsulates Extensible Authentication Protocol over IEEE 802 which is also known as EAP over LAN (EAPOL) [9].

IEEE 802.1X provides port authorization on a per-user or per-host basis (the authenticator will not forward frames until the RADIUS server signals that the supplicant is authorized)

IEEE 802.1X provides the following core capabilities:

- Port authorisation on a per-user or per-host basis (the authenticator will not forward frames until the RADIUS server signals that the supplicant is authorised)
- Support for multiple authentication methods (thanks to the use of EAP)
- Separation of the authenticator from the back-end authentication server, allowing user management and policy decision making to be centralised.

802.1X WIRED PROTOCOLS




Fig1:802.1X wired protocols

[Source= http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:802.1X_wired_protocols.png]

1.3 Motivation & Objective

Network Access Control has been extensively employed in large scale organizations to define and implement policies that describe how to regulate access to network nodes by the end users when they are initially attempting to access the network. Motivated by the need of fault detection in the network access control and its analysis, the following objective was undertaken in this project.

At the time of operation, network infrastructure may encounter a failure, thereby invalidating the control policies and resulting in performance degradation of the network parameters. Here we address the problem by analysing Network Access Control model with ACL implementation in a static fault environment. In order to validate the proposed schemes, we followed CISCO packet tracer.

1.4 Thesis Organization

In this thesis, we present the introduction, motivation and objective in chapter 1.

Chapter 2 discusses the necessary background of Network Access Control and possible types of faults in a NAC system.

Chapter 3 puts light on Access-Control-Lists, their types and implementation steps which are used in this project to incorporate Access-Control within a network.

Chapter 4 describes the details related to simulation carried out to identify the persistent fault inside the NAC under static fault environment.

Chapter 5 shows the conclusion drawn from the various simulation and experimental results and future scope for the research in the field of Network Access Control.

1.5 Summary

Here in this chapter we introduced the basic fundamentals of Network-Access-Control and the terminology associated with it. We discussed IEEE 802.1X which is the standard for port-based NAC. Then we came across the motivation and objective behind this work, which was followed by a short description of how this thesis progresses chapter-wise in thesis organization.

Chapter 2

BACKGROUND

2.1 Classification of Faults

Basically here we classified faults into two categories that are basic faults and generic faults typical to NAC. In section 2.1.1 we focus on classic fault structure inside a network and in section 2.1.2 we shall describe the common reasons for the occurrence of these faults inside a network.

2.1.1 Basic faults

Basic faults are mainly divided into four types

- Intermittent faults
- Persistent faults
- Transient faults
- Byzantine faults

- Intermittent faults-

Malfunctioning of a device or system that occurs at irregular interval of times but functions normally at other times. Intermittent faults are common in Computer software. It can be caused by several factors, from that some of may be random, which occur simultaneously. A simple example error in borderline electrical connection in the wiring or component of a circuit, where two conductors may touch subject to a minor change in temperature, vibration, orientation, voltage etc.

- Persistent faults-

These are just like permanent faults which do not disappear when power is disconnected. A simple example is faults in underground power cables. These faults have to be corrected as soon as they occur. There can be various reasons for these faults. Once they occur, persistent faults continue to keep the network segment down unless corrected.

- Transient faults-

Transient faults are faults that appear for a very small time. These are temporary in nature. These can be caused by lightening, or voltage fluctuations. These faults are non-persistent in nature and remain in the network for a very small time. These types of faults are temporary in nature. That is faults are no longer present if power is disconnected for a short time. Faults in overhead power lines are transient in nature.

- Byzantine faults-

Byzantine faults are faults that occur due to a combination of transient, intermittent and persistent faults. Byzantine faults are hard to correct and have the capacity to bring down a network segment as it includes persistent as well as intermittent faults.

In this project, we considered only the persistent faults in network access control of a large class network having a large number of components. This is due to the fact that the network access control components are more likely to suffer from persistent faults. For example, if we change the IP address of an end user machine of NAC to another IP address of a different network, the end user machine cannot be accessed showing a persistent fault. Until unless this fault is detected the appropriate IP address cannot be assigned. Therefore, it is essential for every NAC system to detect and diagnose the persistent faults in order to prevent the entire NAC system from interrupted service to the end users.

2.1.2 Generic faults related to NAC

These are the generic faults that can occur inside any network and are generally the reason behind most of networking related faults.

- Node failure:
If a node goes down due to reasons such as power failure or a hardware failure inside the device-
- Link failure:
Link failure occurs when the connecting media becomes faulty and the connection of the end-device is lost to the network.
- Configuration Error:
Fault generated due to erroneous network configuration inside the channelling device or end-device's network adaptors.
- Authentication generated errors:
Authentication related faults can arise out of an unintentional access control policy in place within the network traffic controlling devices.

2.2 Summary

In this chapter we discussed the basic fault structure inside a network and generic faults possible inside a NAC system that are capable of bringing the whole network down. To ensure optimal operation of all the activities inside the network, these faults must be diagnosed and eliminated from the network as early and as effectively as possible.

CHAPTER 3

ACCESS CONTROL LISTS

3. ACCESS CONTROL LIST

Building and managing network system involves more than just packet transfer. We also should consider that right people should be able to access to the network. In short we need to implement security, robustness and business policy with the network. This is about network policies and how to implement those policies using CISCO access lists. The access lists in this paper deal with only the IP protocol. Here all the example CISCO access lists and many of the concepts are generic and applied to the routers. ACLs cannot prevent all possible kinds of attacks on the network, but they are good at filtering out a lot of the garbage and then letting another component within the firewall system deal with the application layer attacks.

In this chapter Access-Control-Lists have been explained in detail. In section 3.1 we discuss categories of ACLs. In section 3.2 we discuss the syntax-structure of the access control lists and the various terminologies associated with it.

3.1 Types of Access Lists

There are two basic types of access lists.

1. Standard Access lists: These lists are used to implement three types of policy controls.

- Accesses to router resources.
- Route distribution
- Packets passing through a router

The standard list of access list is used to build policy sets of either IP address or Network number. Once policy sets are defined with the standard access lists, the access list can restrict access to the network resources or internet, determine which routes are accepted and distributed, and change routing metrics to influence traffic behavior [2].

2. Extended Access list

Extended IP ACLS are much more flexible than standard ACLs because their conditions can match on many more criteria in a packet or segment header. These kinds of access lists extend the standard access lists to increase the ability to specify protocol type, protocol port and destination in certain direction. These are often used for firewall purposes, specifying the packets that can pass through a router between networks of various degree of trust. That is allowing or denying packets through the router depending upon the matching of extend lists.

3.2 Syntax for Access-Control Lists

NOTE- Any field inside { } is mandatory while [] is optional. Underlined entries are keywords.

3.2.1 Syntax for standard access list

The generic format of standard access list is as follows:

*access-list List number [Permit/deny] source IP-address
[Wild card mask (optional)] [log]*

List number: The list number is from 1-99 and from 1300 to 1999.

Permit or deny: Permit includes a matching address in the set of IP address; deny excludes it. Basically permit or deny.

IP address: IP address used to match and determine the IP addresses that are include in policy set.

Wildcard mask: It is complement of Subnet-Mask. It is optional and determines what bits of IP addresses are significant.

3.2.2 Syntax for extended access list

The generic format of extended access list is followed-

*access-list List-number {Permit/deny} Protocol source source-wildcard
[operator source-port] destination dest-wildcard [operator dest-port] [precedence
precedence-number] [tos tos] [established] [Log/log-input]*

List number: Access list number from 100-199 and 2000-2699

Protocol: Defines the internet protocol for filtering. Available options are keywords such as TCP or UDP, or the number of the protocol as seen in the IP-header.

Source specification: A specification of the form [IP address] [Wildcard mask] [Port number specification (only for UDP or TCP)].

Destination specification: A specification of the form [IP address] [Wildcard mask] [Port number specification (only for UDP or TCP)].

Operator source-port: Defines the name or number of a source TCP or UDP port. Operators are gt, lt, neq, eq, range etc.
Similarly for operator dest-port.

Tos tos-number: Used for filtering by the type of service level specified by a name or number (0 through 7)

Logging: If the logging keyword is present, it turns on a log of all packets information every time the access list is matched.

3.3 Summary

In this chapter Access-Control-Lists, which are implemented to incorporate Access-Control policies into the network were described. We described the common types of Access-Control lists i.e. standard and extended Access Lists. We also had a look at their syntax-structure and the syntax structure to implement these access control policies inside the network routers

Chapter 4

PROPOSED WORK AND SIMULATIONS

4.1 ASSUMPTION

Because creating large scale networks is expensive and time-consuming, network routing algorithms are evaluated using the simulation based approach.

Every node in network runs on separate thread. In real environment each node is machine situated at different places. As we are simulating it in single system each node uses different port address.

In this chapter's section 4.1 we have described the assumptions that are conventionally made while simulating the real life networks on a single machine using a proper simulator. In section 4.2 we describe the CISCO proprietary Cisco Packet Tracer. This tool has been used in our project work with the purpose of studying static fault environment inside a NAC system. Section 4.3 lists down the required parameters for simulation. In section 4.4 we have included some screenshots showing the types of networks topologies upon which simulation work has been carried out.

4.2 Cisco Packet Tracer

Cisco Packet Tracer is a powerful network simulation program that allows the implementers to experiment with network behaviour. As an integral part of the Networking Academy comprehensive learning experience, Packet Tracer provides simulation, visualization, authoring, assessment, and collaboration capabilities of complex technology concepts.

The simulation-based environment helps users develop modern networking models. Packet Tracer allows users to easily learn and demonstrate complex technical concepts and networking systems design.

4.2.1 Supported Protocols

Packet Tracer supports various protocols belonging to various networking layers. Most notable of them being FTP, SMTP, HTTP, DHCP, DNS, TCP, UDP, ICMP, IPv4, IPv6, ARP, NAT, 802.3,802.11

4.3 SIMULATION PARAMETERS

Simulation is done using Packet Tracer, employing ICMP protocol (ping). The simulation has been carried out for 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256 nodes.

TTL (Time to Live): Lifetime of a packet before being discarded – 16.

Waiting time for each node is defined as maximum latency for previous transmission.

The packet tracer carries out the ICMP PING request to determine whether the network is faulty or fault-free. To achieve this it carries out PING request through the shortest path possible between the end nodes of the network.

4.4 Examples showing implementation




Fig. 4.1 Network topology used for a network with N=8




Fig 4.2 Network topology employed for $N=16$




Fig 4.3 Network topology employed for $N \geq 32$

4.5 Summary

In this chapter we discussed the general assumptions that are made while carrying out simulations in a virtual environment. Other than that we came to know about “CISCO packet tracer” simulator software and the various protocols it supports. Specifying simulation parameters helps us achieve the kind of output data we want to receive through the simulation process. Several diagrams were shown to demonstrate the network topologies that were studied and simulated in the project.

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Simulation Results

In order to validate the proposed fault model such as persistent faults in NAC system, we represented the entire NAC system by considering a general topology network. Usually the NAC systems follow general network topology having a number of nodes as well as number of links. To study the behavior of small to large NAC systems, starting from an 8 nodes NAC to 256 nodes NAC has been considered for all simulations.

After carrying out the simulations over each network topology, the ICMP Ping timings were obtained if the network contained any faults. These simulations were repeated over another network with different topology but same aggregate number of nodes. The results obtained were noted down to calculate the maximum and average latency for a general network with given number of nodes. The maximum and average latency refers to the maximum and average time taken between fault detection and fault occurrence in the network access control of a network respectively.

These values were later plotted versus number of nodes (N) in the network topology and results are shown in the graph (Fig.5.1). As the number of nodes in NAC increases, the maximum and average fault latency in the system increases proportionately.

Here in the section 5.1 we have discussed the results obtained and the trends observed after the study followed by the simulation process with the help of a graph.

In section 5.2 we describe the conclusions derived from the project work along-with the future scope of research in the area of Network Access Control.




Fig. 5.1 Maximum & Average Latency versus N

5.2 Conclusion and Future Work

The Packet Tracer propagates status information as quickly and through the best path possible to allow it to be effectively handled and monitored under static faulty network scenarios. The results obtained for an Access-Control implemented network were in accordance with the standard network fault analysis model.

The work presented here can be further expanded in several areas particularly as a dynamic fault based network access control analysis. It can also incorporate intermittent fault analysis with a focus towards fault tolerance in the network provided.

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