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INDO-PAKISTANI “HYBRID WAR” FOR KARGIL

ABSTRACT The armed conflict in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine introduced a new notion of hybrid war into security studies, but such kind of armed conflict is not anything new. History of wars provides at least a few examples when a country was attacked not by conventional armed forces, but by a mixture of special forces, information campaigns and backdoor proxies. Such armed struggles have taken place many times before, for example, during the so called Kargil War in 1999. Lessons for India emerged from the Pakistani operation in Kargil region necessitating a holistic national security review as well as rethinking of the nature of conflict and conduct in the new strategic environment and are very similar to the lessons learnt today by NATO, Poland and Baltic states concerning current warfare in Ukraine.

Keywords: Indo-Pakistani issues, Kargil, hybrid war

A HYBRID WAR OR JUST IRREGULAR WARFARE?

The armed conflict in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine introduced a new notion of hybrid war into security studies. This type of conflict is most often described as a combination of conventional and irregular warfare (such as guerrilla or terrorist warfare) and cyber war. One could agree with the hypothesis that *the notion of hybridity of modern warfare is an attempt to formulate a new analytical interpretation of armed conflicts in the context of contemporary security issues, asymmetry of military operations, chronicity of regional conflicts, the cultural divide and negative effects of globalization.*¹ However, hybrid war should be perceived at most as one of the types of irregular military activity, or perhaps even an attempt to define or rename irregular warfare.

Such kind of armed conflict, like the recent occurrences in Eastern Ukraine, is not anything new or surprising. History of wars provides at least a few examples when a country was attacked not by conventional armed forces, but by a mixture of special forces, information campaigns and backdoor proxies.

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Irregular warfare, which next to regular activities² has been the basic form of armed struggle³ in the wars and conflicts of the second half of the twentieth and twenty-first century, is becoming more important in the military strategies of countries and non-state military organizations. Irregular warfare may assume many forms – from guerrilla warfare, asymmetric operations, terrorism, to secret service operations.

Irregular warfare, from the eighteenth century onwards, has been described in Western literature as a “small war” (small war, kleine krieg, petite guerre, piccola guerra). One definition of a small war, dating from the early twentieth century reads as follows: [...] *Include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. [...] where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field, and it thus obviously covers operations very varying in their scope and in their conditions.*⁴

¹ A. Gruszczak, ‘Hybrydowość współczesnych wojen – analiza krytyczna’ in W. Sokała, B. Zapała (eds.), *Asymetria i hybrydowość – stare armie wobec nowych konfliktów*, Warszawa 2011, p. 17.

² Regular warfare consists in combat operations conducted by regular armed forces in which a division into battle zone and rear may be observed. In other words, it is the classical division of a battlefield along the lines of the generally accepted principles of waging war. The definition was formulated based on B. Balcerowicz (ed.), *Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, Warszawa 2002, p. 31.

³ The form of warfare treated as a category of the art of war, specifying the spatial relationship of the unit, maneuvers and strikes of the warring parties.

⁴ Ch.E. Callwell, *Small Wars. Their Principles & Practice*, Lincoln 1996, p. 21. Reprint of the third edition of 1906.

Irregular warfare has many contemporary definitions, for example, it has been defined in the rules of conducting land operations: *Irregular warfare is a form of military action conducted by battle groups which had been prepared in time of peace or created on an ad-hoc basis during the war, using specific fighting methods to combat and disorganize enemy activity in the area controlled by the enemy.*⁵

Definitions of irregular warfare have also been developed by the National Defence Academy. One of them reads:

[...] *Irregular warfare is a conscious choice of a fighting strategy in conditions where a regular (frontal) struggle may not be effective and may result in defeat. In other words, the contemporary form of irregular warfare involves avoiding frontal confrontation with the enemy who has a decisive advantage, and it gives a chance, even to significantly weaker forces, to fight effectively by using the element of surprise to strike the enemy in his weak spots (the flanks, logistic elements, isolated and weaker units, command system elements, etc.).*⁶

Another definition reads:

*Irregular warfare – a form of warfare most often fought in defense of a state (or for liberation) that aims at avoiding direct, potentially destructive clashes with overwhelming enemy forces as well as attacking, usually by surprise the flanks of enemy army, his logistical or isolated units. Such warfare may have a tactical, operational or strategic scale.*⁷

English-language sources commonly use the term "irregular warfare" to describe a wide spectrum of irregular military activities mainly relating to liberation operations, insurgent and subversive movements. The essence of the term is explained in the following way: *Irregular warfare comprises all those types of warfare alien to the conventional warfare of the period involved. It is usually employed against an adversary as a means minimizing his relative advantages, either in numerical strength or in the technology of his weaponry.*⁸ However, in military terminology adopted in the United States after the end of World War II, the term "unconventional warfare" is used to describe irregular activities, but the term was also treated as a synonym for special operations: *Unconventional warfare includes the three interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion. Unconventional warfare operations are conducted within enemy or enemy controlled territory by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source.*⁹ The modern meaning of the term "unconventional warfare" (UW) is defined in a similar way as: *a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion,*

⁵ *Regulamin działań Wojsk Lądowych (tymczasowy)*, Warszawa 1998, p. 147.

⁶ J. Marczak, J. Pawłowski, *O obronie militarnej Polski przelotem XX-XXI wieku*, Warszawa 1995, p. 202 (*Biblioteka Wiedzy Wojskowej*).

⁷ Balcerowicz B. (ed.), *Słownik terminów...*, p. 30.

⁸ J.P. Kutger, 'Irregular Warfare in Transition' in F.M. Osanka (ed.), *Modern Guerrilla Warfare. Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961*, New York 1964, p. 39.

⁹ *FM 31-21. Guerilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations*, Washington 1961, p. 3.

*sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery (UAR). When conducted independently, the primary focus of UW is on political-military and psychological objectives. UW includes military and paramilitary aspects of resistance movements. UW military activity represents the culmination of a successful effort that organize and mobilize the civil populace against a hostile government or an occupying power. From the U.S. perspective, the intent is to develop and sustain these supported resistance organizations and to synchronize their activities to further U.S. national security objectives. SF units do not create resistance movements. They advise, train, and assist indigenous resistance movements already in existence to conduct UW and, when required, accompany them into combat. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives; however, the political and psychological implications remain.*¹⁰

However, modern American concept of unconventional warfare is no longer synonymous to the term “special operations,” and fighting unconventional war is one of the main defined missions of the United States Special Forces.¹¹

Concepts such as insurgency and guerrilla forces have also been defined several times, for instance guerrilla war has been described as *an irregular war fought by volunteer units on the area occupied by invading armies or in their own country against the ruling regime, with the aim of gaining independence or changing the regime.*¹²

According to American views, *guerrilla warfare refers to those military and paramilitary operations most often employed by small indigenous and often irregular units operating against superior forces in hostile territory. Guerrilla warfare techniques can undermine the legitimacy of the existing government or an occupying power. They may also destroy, degrade, or divert military capabilities. Indigenous insurgent and partisan forces trained, organized, equipped, advised, and led by SF are the element of choice to execute tactical guerrilla operations.*¹³

Guerrilla forces, according to the definition, are *a type of irregular forces, consisting of volunteer groups usually recruited from the local population, often supplemented with soldiers of regular armed forces, organized for the purpose of armed resistance against the occupying power or the country's authorities with the support of the population.*¹⁴

The same source defines the concept of guerrilla activities as *a form of irregular warfare fought by forces recruited from the local population or defeated military units, against occupying or native forces.*¹⁵

It is worth noting the similarities and overlapping of concepts related to irregular and guerrilla actions.¹⁶ However, contrary to what may be inferred, these concepts are

¹⁰ *Special Forces Operations. FM 3-05.20 (FM 31-20)*, Washington 2004, p. 2-1.

¹¹ More on this issue in: H. Królikowski, *Geneza i rozwój polskich operacji oraz sił specjalnych*, Warszawa 2013, pp. 223-231.

¹² E.J. Osmańczyk, *Encyklopedia spraw międzynarodowych i ONZ*, Warszawa 1974, p. 668.

¹³ *Special Operations Forces. FM 3-05.20...*, p. 2-7.

¹⁴ Balcerowicz B. (ed.), *Słownik terminów...*, p. 125.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

¹⁶ Stanisław Koziej in his paper ‘Teoria Sztuki Wojennej’ (The Theory of the Art of War) points out that the main component of irregular warfare is guerrilla action.

not identical – the notion of irregular actions is wider and, in fact, the term “irregular form of armed struggle” should be used instead, as it includes asymmetric and guerrilla actions, special operations, etc.

The terms “little war” or “guerrilla warfare,” which have been used for many years, as well as the fact that there are no serious historical studies on irregular warfare, resulted in treating the above as less important, and the term “guerrilla warfare” has become synonymous with improvised, unprofessional and rash activities.

The second false stereotype concerning irregular warfare suggests that it is limited to defensive war or war for national liberation. Such understanding of irregular warfare is also reflected in one of the above definitions, which includes the statement: [...] *most often in defense of a state (or in the war for liberation)* [...]. This also shows a general tendency to depreciate irregular warfare by perceiving it as the war of those who are weak and less-developed.

Definitions cited above clearly emphasize such features and elements of irregular forms of armed struggle as:

- relation with politics and a political aspect,
- conscious choice of tactics based on the avoidance of direct clash,
- command, preparation, planning and supplies,
- cooperation with regular forces.

These definitions do not contain elements such as spontaneity, impulsiveness, improvisation (in a negative sense of the word) and lack of coordination. Therefore, the definition of irregular warfare developed by Professor Ryszard Jakubczak seems most accurate:

*Irregular warfare is a form of armed struggle which is effective for the troops who employ it [...]. Irregular warfare is not an immediate and heroic undertaking, but rather a military action highly sophisticated in its ways and means, usually having the qualities of deliberation, craftiness and cunning in order to inflict heaviest possible losses to the enemy, while incurring as little loss as possible and preserving one's own combat capability as long as possible.*¹⁷

This kind of warfare has been characterised in the following manner by General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the Russian General Staff on January 2013:

*There is a wide application of asymmetric actions, allowing decreasing the advantage of the opponent during the armed struggle. These include the use of special operations forces and internal opposition to establish a continuous front operating throughout the whole of the hostile country, as well as the use of information, whose forms and methods are constantly changing.*¹⁸

¹⁷ R. Jakubczak, *Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej. Militarne bezpieczeństwo Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej u progu trzeciego tysiąclecia*, Warszawa 2002, p. 428, 430 (*Biblioteka Wiedzy Wojskowej*).

¹⁸ ‘Роль Генерального штаба в организации обороны страны в соответствии с новым Положением о Генеральном штабе, утвержденным президентом,’ Академия военных наук Российской Федерации, at <<http://www.avnrf.ru/index.php/vse-novosti-sajta/620-rol-generalnogo-shtaba-v-organizatsii-oborony-strany-v-sootvetstvii-s-novym-polozheniem-o-generalnom-shtabe-utverzhdenym-prezidentom-rossijskoj-federatsii>>, 13 December 2014.

In conclusion, one may distinguish strategic elements which condition the effectiveness of irregular warfare, such as:

1. Treating irregular warfare (guerrilla, special operations and other kinds of activities) as a part of military strategy or warfare politics. This first basic quality determines other ones, affecting such basic issues as the ability to use external sources of supply. Numerous examples show that, for example, guerrilla activities that were not included in broader strategic or political concepts turned out to be unsuccessful or degenerated quickly.¹⁹

2. The support of the whole or a part of the population on the area of the operation. This is an important socio-psychological aspect of the issue, which is conditioned not only by current politics, but also by the level of patriotism, awareness, education, and traditions of the community in question.

3. Mass character. It is difficult to determine the percentage of the population that needs to be involved in the activities. In any case, it is necessary to create a situation of a constant threat to the enemy on the operation area along with a reconnaissance (intelligence) and logistics system.

4. Implementing actions of various character (from assault, sabotage and diversionary to psychological and information activities) allows for a complex, and therefore more effective influence on enemy forces and makes it more difficult for the enemy to fight threats appearing in different spheres.

5. External support (of a state, its allies, the government-in-exile or emigration groups). The above allows access to external sources of supplies²⁰ and the support of specialists. Secondly, it allows giving the activities a political dimension and using them in information war (propaganda). This also provides guerrilla fighters, commandos and militants with more guarantees that their rights will be respected, and the population will not be repressed.

6. Cooperation with regular forces that provide supplies and support of different kinds – starting from fire support (e.g. precise bombing), reconnaissance support (e.g. satellite data) or logistic support (e.g. medical aid). One of the reasons for the development of special forces during World War II and after its end was the need for specialized units that could support the work of resistance movements or the development of guerrilla warfare.

When analyzing the issue of irregular warfare, one must not forget its wide and diverse forms, which include special operations, resistance movements, terrorism and asymmetric activities. Over the centuries, irregular warfare, just like regular military

¹⁹ Examples of irregular warfare (guerrilla warfare in particular), which ended in defeat because of the above reasons include the January Uprising and the Warsaw Uprising. The examples of movements that have degenerated or changed into terrorism or criminal activities could be found among numerous guerrilla movements in Latin America, as well as in the history of WMRO (Wnutrena Makedonska Rewolucionarna Organizacija – Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), which was established in the 1990s.

²⁰ Historical examples clearly show that in the vast majority of cases the plans “to acquire weapons” and supplies of the enemy or the area of activity failed, and the funds obtained in this way were inadequate.

activity, was subject to development under the influence of technological and social advancement. A case in point here is the creation and development of the so-called urban guerrilla warfare, or the adoption of the latest developments of information technology and information war by terrorist organizations, as well as the permanent presence of various guerrilla forces on the political map of the world. Factors connected with modern civilization – population density, complex and sensitive critical infrastructure, critical facilities which are easy to access, easiness of conducting an armed attack or inflicting damage (caused by easy access to knowledge as well as the popularity of light-weight portable precision weapons), combined with relative safety and impunity of attackers (which is partially due to the omnipresence of information media and protection of individual rights) in combination with inefficiency or inability to use drastic repressive measures (punitive expeditions, displacement, strict censorship) – have caused an increase in the power and appeal of different types of irregular warfare (including terrorism).²¹

It is this very type of armed conflict whose main component is irregular warfare that we are dealing with in the eastern territories of Ukraine. However, such conflicts have taken place many times before, for example, in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

THE THEATER OF KARGIL STRUGGLE

Until 1947, Kargil was a part of the Baltistan district in Ladakh (the "Land of High Passes") in Jammu and Kashmir state in Northern India. It is located between the main range of Himalayas and Karakoram mountains, in the upstream region of the Indus River. It is the westernmost part of the Tibetan Plateau.

The city of Kargil is located 205 km northeast of the capital of Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar, at the northern section of the Line of Control (which will be discussed later), like other Himalayan areas. Summers in the region are cool with cold nights, and winters are long and cold, with temperatures often as low as -48° C.

Because of such conditions, Kargil is a very demanding area for military operations. Additionally, the dominant position of mountain ridges gives advantage to the party which manages to take over the area, and puts its opponent in a very difficult position.

The economy of the Jammu and Kashmir state is mainly based on agriculture and livestock farming. Kashmir is also known for its silk production and export of wood for the production of cricket clubs. According to the statistics from 2001, the population of Jammu and Kashmir was estimated at over 10.1 million people (in 2011 – over 12.5 million people), comprising of 66.97% of Muslims, 29.63% Hindus, 2.03% Sikhs and

²¹ More on the history and origin of irregular activities: H. Królikowski, 'Geneza i zarys historii działań nieregularnych' in L. Wyszczelski, J. Ślipiec (eds.), *Działania przeciwpartyzanckie. Historia i współczesność. Materiały z konferencji naukowej zorganizowanej w Instytucie Nauk Humanistycznych Akademii Obrony Narodowej w dniu 29 listopada 2005 roku*, Warszawa 2006, pp. 13-36 and idem, 'L'origine et les caractéristiques de la guerre irrégulière,' *Strategie. Insurrection at contre-insurrection*, No. 100-101 (2012), pp. 13-28.

1.36% of Buddhists and people professing other religion. In Kargil 90% of the population are Shia Muslim, 5% Sunni and 5% Tibetan Buddhist.²² The area of the Jammu and Kashmir state is 222,236 km².

AN OUTLINE OF MODERN HISTORY

When India gained independence, the ruler of Kashmir, the Dogri Maharaja, Hari Singh faced a choice whether his land should be joined to India or Pakistan. The choice was not easy, as the ruling dynasty of Kashmir maharajas professed Hinduism, while most of the population was Muslim. Hari Singh was not sure which of the countries to join. Merging his lands with India meant depletion of power, and joining Pakistan – riots and emigration of Hindus and Sikhs to India. He also attempted to manoeuvre to maintain his independence by playing off India and Pakistan. Soon, the Maharaja was forced to sign the act of joining Kashmir with India. Pashtun tribesmen from Pakistan invaded Jammu and Kashmir with the help of Pakistan's government under the impression that Hari Singh would accede to India. Hari Singh appealed to India for help. Although the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was ready to send troops, the Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten, advised the Maharaja to accede to India before India would send its troops. Hence, considering the emergent situation, the Maharaja signed an Instrument of Accession to the Dominion of India.

Later, throughout the post-World War II period, the state of Jammu and Kashmir has remained the subject of territorial disputes between India, Pakistan and, to make the situation more complicated, also China. The Kargil district was the area of hostilities during the wars between India and Pakistan in 1947, 1965 and 1971. During the war of 1971, Indian army won the control over the village of Turtuk in the valley Shyok, which was previously controlled by Pakistan.

The armed conflict of 1947 ended with the establishment of the Line of Control (LOC), which divided Baltistan, leaving the city and district of Kargil on the Indian side. On the Indian side of the divided territory, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was established.

In 1962 India started to construct the Srinagar-Leh Highway, thereby shortening the travel time from Srinagar to Leh from sixteen to two days, reaching Kargil in two years. The Indian National Highway (NH 1D) from Srinagar to Leh passes through Kargil.²³ The area where armed clashes took place extends over 160km along the moun-

²² Census of India 2001, 'Population by Religious Communities,' at <http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_data_finder/C_Series/Population_by_religious_communities.htm> and 'Jammu and Kashmir,' Geohive, at <<http://www.geohive.com/cntry/in-01.aspx>>, 4 June 2015.

²³ During the 1950s, tensions between India and China rose in the Ladakh region. China had clandestinely been building a military road spanning some 1,200 km from Xinjiang to Western Tibet. The road was discovered by Indians in 1957 and this was confirmed by Chinese maps showing the road in 1958. The political situation eroded, culminating in 1962 in the Sino-Indian War. The road on

tain ridges above the highway. Checkpoints and military facilities are located on the ridges above the highway at the altitude of 5 to 5.5 thousand meters. The nearest Pakistani city, Skardu, is located approximately 170km to the north.

After the war in 1971, there was a long period of relative peace enforced by the Simla Agreement, which was signed by the governments of the two countries on July 2, 1972 and ratified by the respective parliaments in the same year. This document also sanctioned the independence of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan). However, the years following the war of 1971 were not free from military tensions associated with nuclear weapons tests and the desire of both countries to take control over the Siachen Glacier. Since 1984, India and Pakistan have been fighting on the surface of the glacier, which makes it the highest situated battlefield in the world. One of the reasons for the conflict was the vagueness of the wording of Simla Agreement, concerning territorial issues and policies of the two countries regarding the disputed area.

In 1989, the Pakistani side of the the Line of Control was hit by bloody riots between Buddhists and Muslims living in this area. It was the response to the aggressive speeches of Benazir Bhutto, who was calling for attacks on Hindus and Buddhists in order to make them leave Kashmir.²⁴

WAR FOR KARGIL

Soon another military conflict between India and Pakistan in Ladakh took place – it was the so-called War for Kargil (or Kargil War) in 1999.²⁵ The conflict began when the Indian Army located Pakistani soldiers on their strategic points along the Srinagar-Leh Highway in Western Ladakh (in Kargil, Dras, Mushkoh valley, Batalik and Chorbalta).

In the winter of 1998-99, units of Pakistani military and paramilitary forces, acting as a mujahideen operating on their own initiative, penetrated the Indian side of the Line of Control. The Pakistani infiltration operation, code-named "Badr," had the aim of breaking connections between Kashmir and Ladakh, which was to lead to the withdrawal of Indian troops from the Siachen Glacier. Pakistan was hoping that the

the Chinese side gave the People's Liberation Army an advantage as a reliable supply line, giving the Indian Army impetus to build its own strategic road for supply and mobilization of their own troops.

²⁴ A. Kuszewska, *Indyjsko-pakistański konflikt o Kaszmir*, Warszawa 2010 (*Kompedia Historyczne*); K. Iwanek, A. Burakowski, *Indie. Od kolonii do mocarstwa 1857-2013*, Warszawa 2013, pp. 169-187, 230, 239-249, 271-176, 317, 359-361; M.C. Bhandari, *Solving Kashmir*, New Delhi 2006; S.P. Sinha, *Lost Opportunities. 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and India's Response*, New Delhi 2007, pp. 252-301; J. Modrzejewska-Leśniewska, 'Konflikty indyjsko-pakistańskie' in P. Ostaszewski (ed.), *Konflikty kolonialne i postkolonialne w Afryce i Azji 1869-2006*, Warszawa 2006, pp. 391-409.

²⁵ Description of the conflict based on: M.C. Bhandari, *Solving Kashmir*; V.P. Malik, *Kargil. From Surprise to Victory*, New Delhi 2012; P.L. Lavoy (ed.), *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia. The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict*, Cambridge 2009; G. Kanwal, *Pakistan's Proxy War*, New Delhi 2002; A. Kuszewska, *Indyjsko-pakistański konflikt...*, pp. 147-153; K. Iwanek, A. Burakowski, *Indie...*, pp. 384-385.

increased tension in the region of Kashmir would increase international interest in the conflict. At the same time, the aim was to improve the morale of the supporters of Pakistan on the disputed territory by making the country play a pro-active role in India-governed Kashmir.

Pakistani general Shahid Aziz confirmed later that it were the Pakistan Armed Forces that participated in the Kargil War, and not the mujahideen, whose presence was simulated by transmitting false pre-recorded radio messages.²⁶ At the same time, many circumstances indicate that Pakistani preparation for the operation (such as planning and logistics) had started much earlier. This preparation was related not only to the practice of running military operations, but also to the fact that the armed forces had presented proposals to infiltrate the region several times to Pakistani leaders Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and Benazir Bhutto in the 1980s and 1990s. However, these plans had not been implemented in fear of aggravating the conflict.

It is believed that the plan to invade Kargil district was readopted soon after Pervez Musharraf assumed the position of Chief of General Staff in October 1998. After the war Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of Pakistan during the Kargil conflict, claimed that he had been unaware of any such plans and that he had learned about the situation only when he received an urgent phone call from Atal Bihari Vajpayee, his counterpart in India. However, Musharraf claims that he had informed Prime Minister Sharif about the operation on February 20, 1999.

In materials describing the battle of Kargil it is generally agreed that the conflict had three phases. The first one was the Pakistani forces infiltrating the territory of India and penetrating into Kashmir to gain positions, enabling them to put NH1 highway under artillery fire. The second phase started when Indian troops discovered the fact and started mobilizing their forces in order to take countermeasures. The last phase was the clash between the Indian and Pakistani forces, with the former regaining parts of the occupied territories and the Pakistani troops withdrawing beyond the Line of Control as a result of international pressure.

During the winter, due to extreme natural conditions in the mountainous regions of Kashmir, both Indian and Pakistani troops left their furthest posts and reduced the number of patrols on the Line of Control only to most vulnerable areas. When the weather improved, the posts were manned again and patrols were undertaken. This diminished military activity due to weather was used by Pakistan.

In February 1999, Pakistani troops began to take over abandoned outposts in the area of Kargil, not only on their own side of the Line of Control, but also on the side of the enemy. These were soldiers from the elite Special Services Group and seven battalions of the Northern Light Infantry Regiment.²⁷ Pakistani forces established covert

²⁶ S. Aziz, 'Putting Our Children in Line of Fire,' *The Nation*, 6 January 2013, at <<http://www.nation.com.pk/columns/06-Jan-2013/putting-our-children-in-line-of-fire>>, 26 February 2014.

²⁷ R. Rikhye, 'The Northern Light Infantry in the Kargil Operations, 1999,' *Orders of Battle*, 25 August 2002, at <http://www.orbat.info/history/historical/pakistan/nli_kargil1999.html>, 27 February 2014. Northern Light Infantry Regiment was a paramilitary unit and was not a part of the regular Pakistani army.

and overt bases in the key points on the Indian side. These forces were supported by Kashmiri guerrillas and Afghan mercenaries.²⁸

Pakistanis infiltrated the region of the Mushkoh Valley, the area along the mountain ridges of Marpo La in Dras, Kaksar near Kargil, Batalik sector east of the Indus, the plains above Chorbatla sector in the area where the Line of Control turns north and the Turtok sector, south of Siachen region. It is estimated that Pakistanis seized an area of 130 to 200 square kilometres.

Their activities remained unnoticed for several reasons. As mentioned above, in winter the number of patrols was usually decreased. Moreover, Indians did not send their troops into the infiltrated areas, and Pakistanis masked the movements of their troops with intense artillery fire. The fact that Pakistani forces established themselves on the Indian side of the Line of Control had not been discovered by Indian patrols until the second week of May 1999.²⁹ Initially, Indian troops did not have precise knowledge of the scale of the Pakistani activities and assumed that what they discovered is a jihadist operation which will be easy to neutralize. However, gradually they began to discover the degree of Pakistani presence along the Line of Control, and they realized that they are dealing with a well-prepared operation on a significant scale.

The government of India began to prepare for the operation "Vijay,"³⁰ whose aim was for the Indian army (supported by artillery and air force) to force Pakistani soldiers behind the Line of Control established by the Indian government, which however, was not to be crossed by Indian soldiers.

India mobilized more than 200,000 soldiers for the operation "Vijay," and in its area two armed divisions of about 20,000 soldiers were gathered together with several thousand paramilitary forces and a special Air Force component. Geographical conditions in the area caused the operation to be conducted not on the level of corps or divisions, but rather on the level of regiments and battalions. It is estimated that almost 30,000 Indian and about 5,000 Pakistani soldiers were directly involved in the conflict in the area of Kargil and Drass.

The actions of the Indian Air Force were code-named "Safed Sagar" and focused first on supporting the mobilization and later the operation of the Indian forces. However, the high altitude of the theater as well as difficult weather conditions limited the possibilities of air force activities.

At the same time, the Indian Navy began preparing for blocking Pakistani ports and interrupting communication trails. These actions bore the code name "Talwar." India's western and eastern fleet joined forces in the northern part of the Arabian Sea and be-

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ A. Mehta, 'The Kargil Victory,' Rediff, 15 July 1999, at <<http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/jul/15ashok.htm>>, 28 February 2014.

³⁰ The same code name had been given to the operation conducted in 1961 by the Indian Armed Forces, which resulted in Indian occupation of the remnants of Portuguese Colonial Empire – Goa, Daman and Diu. More in: K. Kubiak, *Działania sił morskich po drugiej wojnie światowej. Studia przypadków*, Warszawa 2007, pp. 289-296.

gan aggressive patrols, threatening to suspend Pakistan's maritime trade, including fuel supplies, which were particularly important for conducting military operations.

As mentioned above, the natural conditions of Kashmir – mountains, high altitude and limited road infrastructure (even NH 1D is not a two-lane road, and in many places it is simply a quite narrow mountain trail) naturally channeled and slowed down movements of troops and supplies. Pakistanis, crossing the Line of Control and taking over observation points gained significant insight into Indian lines of communication as well as the ability to direct indirect artillery fire onto the main Indian supply route – NH 1D. This was a serious problem for Indians, because it resulted in a significant reduction of the possibility of supplying Leh, despite the existence of an alternative transport route via Himachal Pradesh.

The Pakistani forces that had penetrated into the Indian territory were armed with small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, artillery and anti-aircraft equipment. Posts occupied by the Pakistanis had been mined – Indians claim that they had later removed more than 8,000 landmines.³¹ Additionally, Pakistan used unmanned aerial equipment and artillery reconnaissance radars AN/TPQ-36, coming from the United States military aid, to support their reconnaissance activities.

Initial actions of Indian troops were directed against Pakistani outposts on the hills over the NH 1D road, near the town of Kargil. The first aims were the Tiger Hill and Tololing in Dras, objects dominating the route from Srinagar to Leh. Just behind these objects the sub-sector of Batalik Turtok stretched, providing access to the Siachen Glacier. Some of the peaks were crucial for Pakistan's defense, like Point 4590 and Point 5353. 4590 was the point closest to the NH 1D road and gave a direct overview of the road. 5353 was the highest terrain point in the Dras sector and also allowed an overview of the NH 1D.

Regaining of point 4590 by Indian troops on June 14 was a significant success and resulted in the largest number of Indian casualties as a result of a single battle during the entire conflict. Most of the stations near the highway were cleared of Pakistanis until mid-June, but occasional gunfire in the area of Drass could be heard until the end of the conflict.

When Indians regained control of the hills above the NH 1D, they began to force out of the invaders outside the Line of Control. The turning point of the conflict was the Battle of Tololing (the area and peak towering over the NH 1D), which tipped the scales in favour of the Indian forces. Pakistani forces in Tololing have been strengthened by Pakistani fighters from Kashmir. Some of the posts established by Pakistanis put up fierce resistance. Heavy fighting took place for the Tiger Hill (Point 5140); where in the final phase 10 Pakistani soldiers and 5 Indians were killed. Anonymous field objects, known only by their map coordinates, were fiercely defended by entrenched and well-prepared Pakistanis, and often were the sites of trench or close combat. The so-called Battle of Tololing lasted three weeks and eventually led to 23 fatalities on the Indian side.

³¹ Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, 'India,' at <<http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2000/india.html>>, 8 March 2014. In Jammu and Kashmir 889 civilians died and 7,798 were wounded by land mines and improvised explosive devices in the years 1990-1999.

Major Rajesh Adhikari³² (posthumously) and Corporal Kumar Digendra³³ were awarded the Maha Vir Chakra medal, one of the highest honors the Indian military, for their bravery during the battle.

During the conflict, the Indian side made extensive use of artillery – they employed over 250 guns, including 155mm Bofors howitzer-cannon FH-77B. Indian artillery provided effective support to the attacking forces, but due to terrain limitations and low depth of the theater heavy artillery support was not fully utilized.

Similar conditions negatively affected the use of the Indian Air Force. Nevertheless, air force operations were conducted, and Mirage 2000H aircraft, which by means of laser-guided bombs destroyed Pakistani defenses, proved very effective. Indian Air Force also suffered losses – as a result of engine failure the fighter-bomber MiG-27 was lost. Pakistanis also shot down a MiG-21 fighter. Both aircraft were lost on May 27, 1999. The Indians also lost a Mi-8 helicopter shot down by a Stinger portable missile kit.

Terrain and climatic limitations (the fighting took place at the altitude of 5,500m, in temperature as low as -15 degrees), pushed the brunt of fighting onto the infantry, who led assault operations and isolated Pakistani outposts, preventing the delivery of supplies. Hindus often conducted offensive actions during the night fearing the attack of Pakistanis prepared to defend the area.

After two months of fighting, Indians regained 75% to 80% of the occupied territory. As for the losses incurred by Pakistan, the government of that country confirmed that 453 soldiers were killed, but USA estimate Pakistan's losses to be around 700 fatalities. Nawaz Sharif claimed that Pakistan had lost 4,000 men. Other figures cited are 3,000 mujahideen and soldiers killed or 357 killed and 665 wounded. India estimated the number of Pakistani deaths to be 1,042 soldiers, and confirmed their own losses as 527 killed and 1,363 wounded.

Indian Armed Forces began the final part of the operation in the last week of July, soon after Drass sub-sector was clear of Pakistani forces. Fighting stopped on July 26, 1999, and this day is celebrated in India as Kargil Victory Day (Kargil Vijay Diwas). India regained control of the territory to the south and east of the Line of Control, in accordance with the provisions of the Simla Agreement of 1972.

³² On May 30, 1999, major Rajesh Singh Adhikari of 18 Grenadier Regiment (motorized infantry) received the task of securing the strong point and seizing the fortified forward edge. During the attack, the subdivision of major Rajesh Singh Adhikari was fired on by machine guns from two mutually supporting bunkers. The officer ordered the grenade launcher operators to shell the bunker and he attacked it, killing two opponents. Then, under the cover of a machine gun, the major attacked the other bunker, killing another opponent. Major Rajesh Singh Adhikari led the attack despite gunshot wounds and refused to be evacuated. Based on: 'Captain Vikram Batra,' Jubar Hills, at <<http://kargil.myiris.com/Gallantry/galstory.html>>, 9 March 2014.

³³ During the Battle of Tololing, Corpora Digendra Kumar from the 2nd Regiment of Rajputana Rifles commanded the LMG operators. On June 13, 1999 an assault group was approaching the object under precise enemy fire. Corporal Kumar Digendra ignoring the gunshot wound of his left hand, shelled enemy positions with great precision, forcing the enemy to hide, and thus effectively supported the attacking forces that captured the target in close combat. Based on: *ibid*.

Pakistan was criticized by other countries for inspiring armed conflict by sending paramilitary and insurgent units beyond the Line of Control. The government in Islamabad applied the strategy of “plausible deniability,” arguing that the actions were carried out by “Kashmiri freedom fighters,” who had ultimately failed. However, analysts argued that the military operations were conducted in extremely harsh conditions where only well-prepared and equipped armed forces could be effective, rather than enthusiastic fighters. Pakistan’s explanation was later undermined by events such as posthumously awarding two soldiers with the medal of Nishan-E-Haider (Pakistan’s highest military award for bravery) by the Pakistani authorities. The soldiers were Captain Karnal Sher Khan Shaheed and Sergeant Lalak Jan Shaheed, both from the Northern Light Infantry Regiment, both of whom died on July 7, 1999.³⁴ Ninety other soldiers also were posthumously honored for bravery in the same conflict. The Indian side also published recordings of senior military Pakistani leaders, proving the involvement of the armed forces of Pakistan in the Kargil conflict, but Pakistan claimed that the evidence was fabricated.

Starting from the beginning of the Indian military operation, Pakistan was expecting US aid in de-escalation of the conflict. At the height of Indian counter-offensive, on July 4, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met with US President Bill Clinton in an attempt to obtain support, which, however, he was refused. Bruce Riedel, an adviser to President Bill Clinton, claimed that intelligence had provided photographs illustrating the movement of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Deploying these strategic weapons was to be dictated by Pakistani fears that the Kargil conflict would escalate to a war between the two countries. President Clinton refused to intervene until Pakistan withdrew all their forces onto Pakistani side of the Line of Control. In accordance with the demands of Washington, on July 4, Sharif agreed to withdraw most troops beyond the Line.

At the same time, the Indian government was campaigning for a peaceful solution and returning to the status quo from before the conflict. During the Cologne Summit in June, G8 countries condemned the violation of the Line of Control by Pakistan. China and the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations took the stance that the Line of Control must not be violated by either of the parties.

However, some Pakistani forces remained on the Indian side of the Line of Control and the United Jihad Council (an association of extremist groups) rejected the Pakistani plan of settling the conflict and decided to continue fighting. Finally, under international pressure and Indian military superiority, Pakistan withdrew the remaining troops from the disputed territory.

INFORMATION WAR

The War of Kargil had its media impact and influence on the public opinion in both countries. The end of the twentieth century was a period of the growing importance

³⁴ Pakistan Army, ‘Nishan-i-Haider,’ at <<https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pld=31&rnd=181>>, 12 October 2014.

of electronic information media. Especially in India, war materials were often broadcast live by television stations and information portals offered analyses of the conflict. This is why the Kargil conflict became the first "live war" in South Asia. Such frequent coverage of the conflict in the media contributed to a very quick increase of patriotic attitudes in both countries.

The war was also fought on the plain of information and propaganda. Representatives of both governments gave briefings, during which they presented their demands and accusations. The Indian government introduced a news embargo from Pakistan, blocking the broadcast of official Pakistani TV channel – PTV, and blocked access to the online edition of the newspaper *Dawn*. Pakistani media criticized India's violation of the freedom of press, while Indian media justified such action with national security requirements. Indian government also sponsored advertisements in foreign press (e.g. the *Times* and the *Washington Post*), in which the role of Pakistan in supporting extremists in Kashmir was emphasized in order to win international support.

As the conflict in India developed, the amount of media coverage of the events increased. Indian media were more independent than those in Pakistan. India also had more private media, which resulted in Indian message being more noticeable. The information generated on the Indian side reached both Indian and global public opinion more effectively, was more convincing to the international community and also helped to increase the number of Indian military forces.

IN THE SHADOW OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Since India and Pakistan had weapons of mass destruction, it was feared that the conflict in Kargil could turn nuclear. There were also fears the use of chemical or even biological weapons might take place. In 1998³⁵ both countries conducted nuclear tests. Since the Kargil conflict broke out shortly after, many governments supported the idea of ending it as quick as possible, fearing nuclear war in South Asia.

The situation was relieved by signing the Lahore Declaration on February 21, 1999. It was the first major bilateral document signed between India and Pakistan since the end of the armed conflict in 1971. The Declaration committed the parties to reach a peaceful solution regarding the matter of Kashmir and to implement confidence-building measures with regard to nuclear and conventional arms. However, as the near future was to prove, the life of the document was short, because at the time of its signing the Pakistani Armed Forces were already crossing the Line of Control.

International concerns increased when between May 26 and June 30, 1999, when Pakistani leaders (among others, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Shamshad Ahmad)

³⁵ In India, the first nuclear weapon test took place on 18 May, 1974. The next series of five test explosions took place on May 11, 1998 (three simultaneous explosions) and May 13 (two simultaneous explosions). In Pakistan, the first and the only series of nuclear tests to date was conducted in 1998 in response to a series of tests in India. It probably consisted of five simultaneous explosions on May 28 and one explosion on May 30, 1998.

threatened to use nuclear weapons directly or indirectly at least thirteen times. As described above, during a meeting in Washington between Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of Pakistan and US President Bill Clinton, the latter received intelligence information of Pakistan moving its nuclear weapons close to the Indian border and tried to dissuade the Pakistani leader from the political and actual use of nuclear weapons. The Pakistani Prime Minister reportedly was surprised by such information, and later in his biography *The Traitor Within. The Nawaz Sharif Story in His Own Words*, he declared that it was General Pervez Musharraf who moved nuclear warheads without informing him of this fact.³⁶ On the other hand, General Pervez Musharraf in his memoirs *In the Line of Fire. A Memoir* stated that during the Kargil conflict Pakistan's nuclear warheads were not yet ready for operational use.³⁷ At the same time, India increased its state of readiness of its own nuclear weapons. Fortunately, Kargil conflict was a "landmark event," and did not cause a nuclear war.

FIFTEEN YEARS LATER

The conflict in Kashmir continues. The situation on the border remains far from stable, and every year numerous clashes and attacks on Indian soldiers organized by the separatists occur. In 2013, India announced losing as many as 61 soldiers in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

At the beginning of October 2014, the largest escalation of violence on the Kashmir demarcation line in the current decade took place. As a result of shelling more than 20 civilians were killed, both on the Pakistani and Indian side. Military personnel has probably also been killed, but none of the parties issued any official statement in this respect. India only informed that their border guards killed at least 12 Pakistani soldiers. The most serious clashes were to be fought in the southern part of the disputed area – the Poonch district. It could not be reliably determined who initiated those clashes, because both sides blamed each other for the bloodshed.

Other clashes took place on October 19, when the Indian Army claimed that in retaliation for the shelling carried out by Pakistan it carried out an artillery and mortar attack on 19 terrorist camps in the Pakistani part of Kashmir, which hosted up to 2,000 fighters. Some of these camps were located near Pakistani border posts, which were also affected by the attack. Representatives of Pakistan informed Western journalists visiting the region of the increased activity of Indian forces.

General Khan Javed Khan, the commander of Pakistani border patrol told the BBC that the recent attacks of the Indian army attacks have been most intense in this decade.

³⁶ 'Musharraf Moved Nuclear Weapons in Kargil War,' *The Nation*, 6 July 2006, at <<http://web.archive.org/web/20071223045736/http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/july-2006/6/index16.php>>, 18 October 2014.

³⁷ M. Fitzpatrick, *Overcoming Pakistan's Nuclear Dangers*, London 2014, pp. 56-59 (*Adelphi Series*); M.C. Bhandari, *Solving Kashmir*, p. 129; T.D. Hoyt, 'Kargil: the Nuclear Dimension' in P.L. Lavoy (ed.), *Asymmetric Warfare...*; V.P. Malik, *Kargil...*, chapter 'Crying Nuclear Wolf'.

In his opinion, only that month India fired as many as 20,000 missiles against Pakistan, while in 2012 only 200 such missiles were fired. It is not possible to verify these figures objectively. After an improvised explosive device killed a soldier on the Indian side, the Indian Defense Minister Arun Jaitley officially warned Pakistan against further attempts to escalate the tension. The politician said: *Whenever Pakistan fires, we are always equipped with a shield. This time we also have a sword.* India traditionally accused Pakistan's intelligence services of helping separatists in Kashmir.

Fighting in the region of Kashmir broke out shortly after the conciliatory gesture of the new Prime Minister of India Narendry Modi, whose government was sworn in on 26 May 2014. For the first time in history, the Pakistani Prime Minister took part in the celebrations. Analysts interpreted this as a signal that relations between the two countries – which had deteriorated rapidly after the terrorist attack on the parliament in New Delhi in December 2001 – might be softening. Since the perpetrators were Pakistani and Kashmiri terrorists, the attack almost led to an open war on the Indian subcontinent. After the recent clashes in Kashmir, the softening of relations between India and Pakistan again seems to be less likely. Although in August Prime Minister Modi urged the Pakistani side to begin talks on Kashmir, the Indian Minister of Defence of recently said that it is the duty of Pakistan to create the appropriate atmosphere for such talks.³⁸

SUMMARY

The conflict in the Donbas region and the earlier annexation of the Crimea were described by experts as a "twenty-first century war" or – in more scientific terms – a "hybrid war." In fact, the above conflict is not a phenomenon that is new or unique in the history of warfare. Russians, while preparing their operation in Ukraine drew from the experience of modern warfare in Georgia and Chechnya, but also the experience of World War II. Poland was also engaged in such activities, for example, during the Silesian uprisings.³⁹ The Kargil conflict also displays such characteristic features as the use of special forces

³⁸ A. Hładij, 'Kaszmir – "gorący" konflikt między atomowymi mocarstwami,' *Defence24*, at <http://www.defence24.pl/analiza_kaszmir-goracy-konflikt-miedzy-atomowymi-mocarstwami>, 25 October 2014. The author of the article characterizes contemporary mood in the region: *What is striking in Srinagar – the largest city in the Kashmir Valley, the summer capital of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir – is the number of anti-Indian slogans on walls and streets. My observation indicates that although the majority of the inhabitants of the region would like to have the right to self-determination and independence from New Delhi. These wishes however, do not translate into supporting incorporating southern Kashmir to Pakistan. On the other hand, the Kashmir Valley is a heavily militarized region with strongly marked presence of Indian Army, with its many posts conspicuous both in Srinagar and outside the city. The tension manifests itself in strikes and protests regularly organized by separatists.*

³⁹ More in: H. Królikowski, *Historia działań specjalnych od wojny trojańskiej do II wojny światowej*, Warszawa 2004, pp. 167-174. See also interesting essay by M. Dura, 'Wojna hybrydowa. Powtórka z historii,' *Defence24*, at <<http://www.defence24.pl/231107,wojna-hybrydowa-powtorka-z-historii>>, 2 June 2015.

and internal opposition to create a front on the territory of a hostile state as well as other elements characteristic of the so-called hybrid war. Pakistan challenged the status quo in Jammu and Kashmir by support of jihadi groups acting as local civil “freedom fighters” supported by Inter-Services Intelligence and commandos from Special Service Group (similar to the “separatists” and “little green men” in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine).

On the other hand, lessons for India emerged from the Kargil war, necessitating a holistic national security review as well as rethinking of the nature of conflict and conduct in the new strategic environment. Those lessons include:

- *There may be remote chances of a full-scale conventional war between two nuclear weapon states but as long as there are territory-related disputes, the adversary can indulge in a proxy war or a limited border or conventional war.*
- *A major military challenge in India remains political reluctance to commit a proactive engagement. This invariably leads us to a reactive military situation. Also, no loss of territory is acceptable to the Indian public and political authority. To deal with such situations, it is essential to have credible strategic and tactical intelligence and assessments, effective surveillance and close defence of the lines of control.*
- *Successful outcome of a border war depends on our ability to react rapidly in order to localize/freeze/reverse the military situation. The new strategic environment calls for speedier mobilization, versatile and flexible combat organizations and synergy amongst three services and other civil departments.*
- *A conflict may remain limited because of credible deterrence and escalation dominance. The adversary will then be deterred from escalating it into an all-out conventional or nuclear war due to our ability to respond with greater chances of success. This also gives more room for manoeuvre in diplomacy and conflict.*
- *A limited conventional war will require close political oversight and politico-civil-military interaction. It is essential to keep the military leadership within the security and strategic decision-making loop.*
- *Information operations are important due to the growing transparency of the battlefield – a comprehensive media and information campaign is essential.⁴⁰*

Above mentioned lessons are very similar to the lessons learnt today by NATO, Poland and Baltic states. Thus, the story of the conflict between India and Pakistan is worth deeper study not only because of its importance for the region, but also because of its dynamics and the associated processes which may be observed in contemporary international relations and topicality for present security studies.

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⁴⁰ V.P. Malik, *Kargil...*, ‘Preface to the New Edition.’

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