Examining the Viability of Organization-Sponsored Sharing Platforms

Ulrike Schultze
Southern Methodist University, uschultz@smu.edu

Anita D. Bhappu
University of California Merced, abhappu@ucmerced.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/jais

Examining the Viability of Organization-Sponsored Sharing Platforms

Ulrike Schultze,[1] Anita D. Bhappu[2]

[1]Southern Methodist University, USA, uschultz@smu.edu
[2]University of California Merced, USA, abhappu@ucmerced.edu

Abstract

Organization-sponsored sharing platforms represent the sharing economy ideal because they facilitate the peer-to-peer exchange of goods and services among members of an established community. By embedding sharing within an organization, this platform configuration infuses collaborative consumption with the moral dimension of shared values and concerns. However, the conflicting institutional logics inherent in community-based sharing create paradoxical tensions that are likely to destabilize this new organizational form. Therefore, to understand when an organization-sponsored sharing platform is viable, we conducted an empirical investigation of the Zimride by Enterprise® ridesharing platform for universities and corporations. Using qualitative and quantitative data from 25 organizations that sponsored Zimride's ridesharing service, we found that this new organizational form is characterized by contradictions due to the market, hierarchy, and community logics of its multilevel B2B2P2P service delivery model. However, the mere presence of such paradoxical tensions did not render this sharing economy ideal infeasible. We therefore discuss when the Zimride platform was viable and how site coordinators at sponsoring organizations managed, in particular, the tension between their organizational members' need for a heterogeneous supply of transportation options and a strong collective identity to motivate their collaborative consumption.

Keywords: Ridesharing Platforms, Service Delivery, Institutional Logics, Social Dilemmas, Dialectic Management

Pursuing simultaneous promises of equitable access for everyone, environmental sustainability, post-bureaucracy, emancipation and high scalability is very challenging, and any attempt to achieve them all at once lays bare the paradoxical nature of the sharing economy. (Acquier et al., 2017, p. 1)

1 Introduction

There is considerable debate over whether digital sharing platforms (e.g., Airbnb® and Uber®) facilitate sharing at all (Murillo et al., 2017). According to Belk (2010), "true" sharing is an act of resource use without

expectations of reciprocity. In contrast, collaborative consumption, which is "traditional sharing, bartering, lending, trading, renting, gifting, and swapping redefined through technology and peer communities" (Botsman, 2010) that "emphasize[s] the utilization of idle capacity" (Corten, 2019, p. 79), is "pseudo-sharing" (Belk, 2014).

Arguing that the sharing economy "amplifies the worst excesses of the dominant economic model," Morozov (2013) points out that contemporary digital sharing platforms are "neoliberalism on steroids" and are fundamentally at odds with the espoused sharing

economy values of collaboration, solidarity, and social relationships (Benkler, 2017). Research also suggests that digital sharing platforms are failing at enhancing the triple bottom line (Bhardi & Eckhardt, 2012; Parguel et al., 2017; Wilhelms et al., 2017); they are not creating the promised trifecta of financial, social, and environmental value (Botsman, 2010).

The digital platforms most often regarded as successful instantiations of the sharing economy (e.g., Uber® and Airbnb®) integrate only two of the three economic cores of the sharing economy (Acquier et al., 2017), namely the *access economy* (temporarily using rather than permanently owning assets) and the *platform economy* (enabling decentralized, peer coordination and transactions with digital technology). They lack the *community-based economy* (facilitating social networking through noncontractual, nonhierarchical, and nonmonetized exchanges), which incorporates community members' common values and resources.

In contrast, the "sharing economy ideal" (Acquier et al., 2017) is a new organizational form that integrates all three economic cores, thereby combining the collective identity and moral concerns of social movements with the economic goals and efficiencies of platforms (Kornberger et al., 2018). Although such community-based collaborative consumption is capable of effecting social change because it equates sharing with acts of caring (Gümüsay, 2018), the practice of sharing "what is ours" (Belk, 2014) with self-interested, utility-maximizing actors on digital platforms seems irrational (Slee, 2016). The sharing economy ideal thus may not be viable as "attempts to address all three cores simultaneously leads to an escalation of tensions and unfulfilled promises" (Acquier et al., 2017, p. 8).

Organization-sponsored sharing platforms represent the sharing economy ideal (Acquier et al., 2017) because they facilitate the peer-to-peer (P2P) exchange of goods and services (*access economy*) among members of an organization (*community-based economy*) by socially connecting them in a private online sharing network (*platform economy*). Therefore, they differ from well-known digital sharing platforms (e.g., VRBO® and BlaBlaCar®) in two principal ways: (1) peer users are all members of an established organization, and (2) members do not incur transaction fees when sharing in their organization-sponsored private network because these costs are subsumed within their organization's paid business-to-business (B2B) service agreement with the platform provider.

This new organizational form effectively creates a business-to-business-to-peer-to-peer (B2B2P2P) service delivery model (cf. Maglio & Spohrer, 2013) in which

a two-sided P2P market is nested within a hierarchical B2B service relationship (see Figure 1). At the interface, a private business-to-peer (B2P) service network emerges. Examples of platforms with this B2B2P2P service delivery model include Scoop® (takescoop.com), which a number of technology companies (e.g., Tesla) have deployed for their employees to share rides to and from work. Rheaply® (rheaply.com), which facilitates employee sharing of organizational assets such as office and lab equipment, is another example of an organization-sponsored sharing platform. By encouraging employees to consume more sustainably as a collective, sponsoring such community-based sharing platforms can enable firms to demonstrate their corporate social responsibility (Bhappu & Schultze, 2019) and enhance employee engagement (Bhappu & Schultze, 2018). Indeed, social dilemmas theory (Kollock, 1999) suggests that the collective identity associated with established organizations fosters prosocial behavior (e.g., sharing) among members with common characteristics, goals, and interests. Sharing platforms that limit access to members of an established community should also be more attractive than those open to the public because economic activity arguably benefits from and contributes to members' shared identity, which might include social and environmental activism. Moreover, the safety concerns and lack of trust that threaten to scuttle sharing among complete strangers (Schor, 2016) are ameliorated on organization-sponsored sharing platforms where peer users are all identified community members with common characteristics, interests, and/or experiences.

By leveraging the extant relationships among members of a community, organization-sponsored sharing platforms may be able to resolve the chicken-and-egg challenge encountered when bootstrapping a two-sided market (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005); the established collective is likely to be sufficiently heterogeneous, allowing both the buy- and the sell-side of the P2P market to emerge organically. Additionally, social ties between organizational members should augment word-of-mouth promotion, thus reducing the need for centralized marketing efforts.

Importantly, the B2B2P2P service delivery model of organization-sponsored sharing platforms represents a combination of three institutional logics, i.e., "organizing principles that shape the behavior of field participants" and "belief systems and associated practices [that] define the content and meaning of institutions" (Raey & Hinings, 2009, p. 631). The *P2P level* of this model is associated with the *market logic* of independent buyers and sellers who maximize their own interests and enact arms-length transactions (e.g., Eisenmann, 2008; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005).

Figure 1. B2B2P2P Service Delivery Model of Organization-Sponsored Sharing Platforms

The *B2B level* reflects the *hierarchy logic* wherein customers and providers are motivated by mutually beneficial goals to enact embedded service relationships (e.g., Gutek et al., 1999; Schultze & Orlikowski, 2004). The *B2P level* emphasizes the *community*[1] *logic* by restricting network access to members of an organization who ideally embody its norms and values. Based on the tenets of kinship, community logic is associated with shared goals and trusting relationships among organizational members (e.g., Bhappu, 2000; Ouchi, 1980).

The three conflicting institutional logics inherent in organization-sponsored sharing platforms could provide clues into the destabilizing tensions that Acquier et al. (2017) attribute to this new organizational form, irrespective of the benefits associated with embedding a sharing platform in a community. Therefore, we investigate this research question: *Given the tensions inherent in organization-sponsored sharing platforms, under what conditions are they viable?* We base our answer on an empirical investigation of Zimride by Enterprise®, which was an organization-sponsored ridesharing platform for universities and corporations.

We build on Acquier et al.'s (2017) paradoxical tensions hypothesis by drawing on institutional logics (e.g., Friedland & Alford, 1991) and social dilemmas (e.g., Kollock, 1999) to theorize the viability of organization-sponsored sharing platforms. Next, we outline the context and method of our qualitative study of 25 organizations that sponsored Zimride's ridesharing service, followed by a presentation of our abductive analysis (Locke et al., 2008) of interviews and our statistical analysis of organizational data about each of these customer cases. We then answer our research question by summarizing our findings and

discussing how to manage the tensions inherent in organization-sponsored sharing platforms during service delivery. We conclude by highlighting our research contributions and limitations.

2 Theorizing Platform Viability

Although Acquier et al. (2017) describe the sharing economy ideal as a combination of access, platform, and community-based economic cores, they do not provide an empirical example of this organizational form. Furthermore, they suggest that the sharing economy ideal has paradoxical tensions that undermine its viability. However, they remain silent on the source and logic of these contradictions. Nevertheless, Acquier et al. (2017) do assert that the platform economy operates on a market logic, whereas the community-based economy is associated with nonmarket logics (also Vaskelainen & Münzel, 2018). Therefore, we draw on institutional logics (e.g., Friedland & Alford, 1991) to develop a conceptual scaffold for theorizing the tensions that manifest when embedding a sharing platform in a community.

2.1 Institutional Logics

Institutional logics are "rules of the game" (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) and provide actors with a frame of reference for giving social meaning to their activities (Smets et al., 2015). As archetypes (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008), institutional logics can help us theorize why the B2B2P2P service delivery of organization-sponsored sharing platforms will likely be plagued by tensions because institutional logics are not only distinctive but also potentially contradictory. For example, the market logic of capitalism is produced and reproduced through the accumulation and commodification of human

---

[1] We refer to Ouchi's (1980) "clan" logic as "community" logic to better align with the nomenclature of the extant literature that underpins our research.

activity at arm's length. In contrast, the logic of community prevails in the family wherein humans linked by kinship demonstrate loyalty and build trust through reciprocal exchange (e.g., Venkataraman et al., 2016). This suggests that community-based organizational forms are the "obverse" of market-based relations (Ouchi, 1980, p. 35).

Taking a lead from prior sharing economy research, which has examined the combination of the market and hierarchy logics (Vaskelainen & Münzel, 2018) as well as the market and community logics (Kornberger et al., 2018), we posit that organization-sponsored sharing platforms integrate three institutional logics: market, hierarchy, and community (see Table 1). This tripartite configuration seems specific to the sharing economy ideal and is indicative of its complexity.

Market logic, which draws on the institution of capitalism, is characterized by independent rational actors who rely on informational transparency and well-defined contractual exchange terms to engage in cost-benefit calculations that maximize the utility of a commodity (Anderson & Anderson, 2002; Hennart, 1993). Interactions among these rational actors are characterized by arm's-length transactions that enact service encounters (Gutek et al., 1999; Schultze & Orlikowski, 2004) with clearly demarcated roles (e.g., Uber® drivers vs. passengers). Since opportunism is likely to occur because these transactions are not subject to the shadow of the future (Axelrod, 1984), the market seeks to combat it with control mechanisms such as behavioral tracking, information transparency, and competition. These mechanisms are typically encoded into contemporary digital sharing platforms in the form of apps that track, for example, the location of a shared car.

Market control mechanisms, however, do not work well when incomplete or contingent contracts are necessary or when cost-benefit calculations are complicated by differentiated goods and services (Anderson & Anderson, 2002). In these situations, *hierarchy logic* offers some solutions. Drawing on the institution of state bureaucracy, actors in a hierarchy are interdependent (e.g., Airbnb® hosts and guests within a household), with goals that are moderately congruent in that they are aligned around a defined organizational purpose (Ouchi, 1980).

Hierarchically constrained actors nevertheless seek to maximize value within the authoritative command and control structure of an organization or sharing community, which demands their obedience and conformity to rules and standards (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993). They inhabit clearly demarcated roles that are hierarchically ranked (e.g., host vs. guest), enacting embedded relationships characterized by mutual information sharing and reciprocity (Granovetter, 1985; Malone et al., 1987). Given

incomplete or contingent contracts, performance ambiguity is likely to occur in these embedded relationships. Organizations therefore develop and apply formal rules and standards to evaluate the performance of actors, which are frequently reflected in the reputational ratings and performance scorecards implemented in contemporary sharing platforms.

Bureaucracies, however, fail when there is too much ambiguity in the evaluation of performers (Ouchi, 1980). This can occur when work becomes too interdependent and role boundaries are rendered too blurry (e.g., teamwork) to apply individual performance standards. Under these conditions, *community logic* (Venkataraman et al., 2016) offers a viable alternative. Based on the institution of family, coordination is achieved through shared collective identity and solidarity (Bhappu, 2000; Yang, 1989), which community members develop as a result of intimate shared experiences (Gittel & Douglass, 2012). As highly interdependent actors, they are able to evaluate each other's performance by reading subtle signals that defy translation into verifiable measures (Ouchi, 1980).

Given a "belief that individual interests are best served by a complete immersion of each individual in the interests of the whole" (Kanter, 1972, p. 41), the goals of entangled organizational members are congruent in community logic. In fact, members' identities are fused with the community's (Hunt & Benford, 2004). In organization-sponsored sharing platforms, this collective identity is enacted by restricting network access to members of an organization. Through their embeddedness in the collective, participants in these private sharing networks are expected to embody its norms and values.

Furthermore, given a system of generalized reciprocity wherein people help others because they have received help in the past (Baker & Bulkley, 2014), organizational members who use these platforms take on undifferentiated roles as gift givers and gift recipients (Haveman & Rao, 1997) engaged in "true" sharing (Belk, 2010). They form relationships of equals who care for each other by giving the other timely and affectively appropriate responses that build interpersonal relationships, as well as feelings of solidarity and trust (Gittel & Douglass, 2012).

2.2 Social Dilemmas

Extending our understanding of community logic, research on social dilemmas highlights that the strongest predictor of cooperation among participants in a private sharing network is collective identity (Kollock, 1998), which consists of "individuals' identifications of, identifications with, and attachments to some collectivity in cognitive, emotional, and moral terms" (Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 450).

Table 1. Institutional Logics of Organization-Sponsored Sharing Platforms

Institution	Market	Hierarchy	Community
	Capitalism	State bureaucracy	Family
Goals	Divergent: self-interest	Moderately congruent: hierarchically aligned	Congruent: mutual wellbeing and shared solidarity
Coordination and control mechanisms	Contract: price Information: transparency Competition: low barriers to entry	Legitimate authority: command and control Specialization: professional roles Performance: standards and rules	Socialization: shared experience and trust Generalized reciprocity: obligation Reputation: social capital
Identities for participants in exchange	Rational: profit seeker Differentiated roles: customer vs provider	Constrained: obedient employee Differentiated roles: superior vs subordinate	Interdependent: community member Undifferentiated dual roles: giver and taker
Object of exchange	Commodity	Differentiated good or service	Gift
Nature of exchange	Transactional: arm's length encounter	Hierarchical: embedded relationship	Relational: interdependent community
Coordination problem addressed	Opportunism: no shadow of the future	Incomplete/contingent contracts: high transaction costs	Performance evaluation: ambiguous professional boundaries

In other words, collaborative consumption on an organization-sponsored sharing platform is fueled by network members' identification with shared values, ideas, and feelings rather than their maximization of individual benefits (Kornberger et al., 2018). In a ridesharing context, it is a driver's organizational identification that motivates them to make empty seats in their car available to others in their sharing network rather than a desire to defray their travel costs. After all, a rider's financial contribution toward these expenses (e.g., gas money and/or parking fees) is unlikely to compensate a driver for the effort and/or inconvenience of coordinating their shared ride (e.g., agreeing on a pickup location and time), not to mention the potential uncertainty or discomfort associated with sharing their car with a community member.

In addition to predicting cooperation stemming from collective identity, social dilemmas hold particular promise for theorizing situations "in which a tension exists between individual rationality on the one hand and collective rationality on the other" (Corten, 2019, p. 278). This is precisely the situation faced by consumers and providers in the two-sided, P2P market of an organization-sponsored sharing platform. In order for ridesharing to reduce the societal and organizational impacts of single-occupancy vehicle transportation, riders and drivers have to trust that the other party will not behave opportunistically (e.g., arrive late for pickup) or take advantage of them (e.g., not pay at drop-off). Organization-sponsored sharing platforms therefore create a social dilemma related to dyadic trust for participants in private sharing networks who must

assume short-term, individual risks in order to cooperate and accrue long-term, collective benefits.

Another social dilemma relates to the accumulation of communal resources at the B2P level of an organization-sponsored sharing platform, which is likely to be homogenous when organizational members have a strong collective identity (Kollock, 1999). However, a sufficient variety of goods and services sourced from organizational members (e.g., shared rides offered from many different locations to many different destinations at different times of the day) is a necessary condition to satisfy the heterogeneity of demand in a private sharing network (Corten, 2019). Therefore, an organization-sponsored sharing platform is only viable if a critical mass of organizational members cooperate by providing and consuming a heterogeneous supply of resources in private sharing networks.

The viability of organization-sponsored sharing platforms is also facilitated by the following additional conditions that increase cooperation among organizational members (Kollock, 1999):

- **Social value orientation:** Individuals who care about the distribution of social benefits and obligations are more likely to forego self-interest in order to enhance the collective welfare. For example, an organizational member who is worried about the negative effects of global warming will be more willing to shoulder the inconvenience of ridesharing than someone who is unconcerned about their environmental footprint.

- **Group communication:** Individuals are more concerned about and influenced by group members with whom they identify and interact regularly, rather than unknown others. For example, organizational members are more likely to carpool with peers than strangers, especially if they have discussed ridesharing as being a group norm.

- **Reputation controls:** Individuals are not likely to behave opportunistically when (1) they expect to interact in the future, (2) a record of their past actions is accessible to others, and (3) they are personally identified (Axelrod, 1984). For example, a rider whose organizational position is known to a driver is less likely to be late or not show up for pickup, especially if the driver can post a public report of the rider's behavior.

- **Incentive structures:** Individuals are more likely to engage in prosocial behavior when the individual and collective payoffs associated with their actions are aligned. For example, a driver will be more likely to share rides with peers if their organization provides perks (e.g., valet parking) for carpools.

In summary, institutional logics (e.g., Friedland & Alford, 1991) and social dilemmas (e.g., Kollock, 1999) can help us understand when and why organization-sponsored sharing platforms may be viable.

3   Method

To empirically investigate the viability of organization-sponsored sharing platforms, we decided to study the Zimride by Enterprise® ridesharing solution, which was the web-based precursor of Lyft® (Lawler, 2014). For several reasons, the Zimride platform constituted an appropriate research target. First, Zimride had a B2B2P2P service delivery model that reflected the sharing economy ideal. Second, since Zimride was launched in 2007 when the sharing economy was first emerging (Lawler, 2014), it had an established track record of customers. Third, a list of Zimride's customers was available online, as were usage-related statistics (e.g., number of rides shared, carbon emissions saved). We were therefore able to compile and assess valuable information about Zimride's customers and their private networks on its organization-sponsored ridesharing platform.

Zimride restricted access to each private ridesharing network via the sponsoring organization's single sign-on email. All authenticated users could create a Zimride profile with a link to their Facebook page. They could post and search for ride offers and requests, which the Zimride platform's algorithm then attempted to match. Rides brokered by Zimride were either daily commutes or one-off, single trips. Additionally, the Zimride platform calculated a recommended cost-sharing fee for every posted ride, which riders could pay to drivers online or in person. However, the Zimride platform did not track or report on actual shared rides because users were not required to record their rides on the platform. Instead, to report on the amount of carbon emissions saved by a customer organization, Zimride provided an estimate based on a default assumption that 20% of matched rides were in fact completed.

3.1   Data Collection

In the fall of 2015, we first conducted phone interviews with site coordinators who were the staff members responsible for managing the Zimride service at 25 customer organizations. We treated each customer organization as a case study of the Zimride platform (see Table 2 for a summary of this sample). As supplemental data, we also conducted phone interviews in the fall of 2016 with 18 users who were members of a university that had implemented Zimride (see Table 3 for a summary of this sample). Interview protocols for each sample are presented in Appendices A and B.

3.2   Recruitment and Sampling

In the summer of 2015, we retrieved a list of Zimride's customers (114) from the platform's website. We cross-referenced this information with the websites of each of these customer organizations, which enabled us to identify a Zimride site coordinator at 108 customer organizations. All identified site coordinators were invited via email to participate in an hour-long phone interview about their organization's Zimride ridesharing service. Of the 108 emails sent, two were returned for delivery failure. Our email invitation directed interested Zimride site coordinators to review our online study disclosure and complete our screening questionnaire.

The 25 Zimride site coordinators who consented and provided contact information (24% response rate) were interviewed by phone in the fall of 2015. A doctoral student with extensive training and experience in qualitative methods conducted these semi-structured phone interviews, which were recorded and transcribed. Interviewees had the option of requesting a $10 gift card thank-you gift, which was then mailed to them.

The majority of the site coordinators that we interviewed were located in transportation or parking departments at universities. Others were housed in information technology departments, offices of student affairs, and offices of sustainability. In one instance, the site coordinator was a student employed by the student senate. Several of these customer organizations had subscribed to Zimride's ridesharing service prior to the platform being acquired by Enterprise Holdings in 2013.

Table 2. Sample of Participating Zimride Customer Organizations

Adoption year	State	2010 census bureau urban-rural classification	Estimated ridesharing miles as of June 2015	Estimated ridesharing miles as of Sept. 2016	Organization type
2007	MA	Urban	2,097,449	2,490,852	University
2007	CA	Urban	8,942,179	11,226,758	University
2007	WI	Urban	2,911,136	3,165,658	University
2007	NC	Urban	1,975,279	Discontinued	University
2008	CA	Urban	8,585,870	10,327,054	University
2009	CA	Urban	4,009,823	4,905,692	University
2009	GA	Urban	2,128,510	Discontinued	University
2010	WI	Urban	4,384,333	4,768,654	University
2010	CA	Urban	2,491,139	2,953,117	Government
2010	VA	Urban	17,685,812	19,713,230	University
2010	FL	Urban	809,874	948,849	University
2011	MN	Urban cluster	1,062,933	1,135,447	University
2011	VA	Urban	2,500,481	3,068,247	University
2011	NC	Urban cluster	3,075,417	3,400,987	University
2011	CA	Urban	4,689,733	Discontinued	Government
2011	TX	Urban	5,935,892	8,165,695	University
2011	MN	Urban	6,931,607	Discontinued	University
2012	WI	Urban cluster	890,935	1,076,522	University
2012	AL	Urban	973,229	Discontinued	University
2012	FL	Urban cluster	1,791,453	2,156,923	University
2012	AZ	Urban	2,096,303	2,416,238	University
2013	MN	Rural	580,550	635,477	University
2014	NE	Urban	21,082	423,107	University
2015	OR	Rural	5,808	58,163	Company
2015	NE	Urban	40,265	Discontinued	University

Table 3. Sample of Interviewed Zimride Users

Start year	Role	Gender	Age	Highest level of platform activity	# Rides posted	# Rides completed
2012	Student	F	29	Gave and received payment for ride	21	5
2012	Staff	M	48	Gave ride (no payment)	1	~15
2012	Student	M	36	Posted ride	7	0
2012	Staff	M	35	Gave and received payment for ride	2	~180
2013	Student	M	22	Received and paid for ride	15	5
2013	Student	M	21	Received and paid for ride	0	5
2013	Staff	F	57	Gave and received payment for ride	1	~144
2013	Student	F	22	Received and paid for ride	3	3
2013	Student	M	28	Gave, received, and paid for ride	6	2
2014	Student	F	30	Received and paid for ride	12	4
2015	Staff	M	36	Gave and received payment for ride	0	~60
2015	Student	F	20	Received and paid for ride	0	~40
2015	Student	M	20	Received and paid for ride	1	3
2016	Student	F	18	Received and paid for ride	1	~70
2016	Student	F	32	Posted ride	2	0
2016	Staff	M	40	Posted ride	1	0

To triangulate our emergent findings on the Zimride platform from site coordinators, we conducted supplemental interviews in the fall of 2016 with Zimride users at a university from our customer organization sample where one of the co-authors was employed. We obtained a list of email addresses for all registered Zimride users (4520). These dated back to the spring of 2012 when the university first subscribed to the platform. We sent emails to all registered Zimride users inviting them to participate in an hour-long interview about their experience with the sharing platform. Our emailed invitation again directed interested users to click through to our online study disclosure and complete our screening questionnaire.

We received 271 automatic notifications from email addresses that were no longer valid. We also received 57 personal messages from registered users who indicated that (1) they had never actually used the Zimride ridesharing service, or (2) they did not recall registering for it. Fifty-eight (58) Zimride users (1% response rate) consented to the study and provided contact information. Based on self-reported usage data provided via our screening questionnaire, we prioritized Zimride users with the highest frequency of ridesharing. Ideally, we had wanted each Zimride user to have completed three shared rides in the three months prior to our interview so that we could rely on a triadic sorting technique for them to compare and contrast their ridesharing experiences (Schultze & Avital, 2011). Unfortunately, the majority of the 58 consented Zimride users reported fewer than three Zimride-brokered shared rides, with most posting one ride that remained unmatched. Therefore, the co-author not employed at the university conducted semi-structured interviews with 16 of these users, which lasted 35 minutes on average. Similar to the site coordinator interviews, these interviewees had the option of requesting a $10 gift card as a thank you gift. Also, all the user interviews were transcribed from audio recordings.

3.3 Data Analysis

We adopted an abductive approach (Locke et al., 2008) to analyzing our site coordinator and user interviews. Abduction is a process of iteratively going back and forth between theory and data to arrive at new insights that are both empirically and theoretically grounded (Van Maanen et al., 2007). It is an appropriate approach for theorizing our empirical data, given the lack of research about organization-sponsored sharing platforms, especially at a time when increasing importance is ascribed to this sharing economy ideal (e.g., Acquier et al., 2017; Kornberger et al., 2018). Furthermore, abduction is particularly useful for producing first suggestions about emergent phenomena (Bamberger, 2018), such as organization-sponsored sharing platforms. It generates context-rich and empirically grounded inferences that are relevant to both

researchers and practitioners. Therefore, we inductively developed initial hunches by engaging intensively with our interview data (Alvesson & Karreman, 2007). Drawing on extant theory as a sensitizing device (Walsham, 2006), we then increasingly refined these tentative insights by thematically coding and categorizing each interview several times. This entailed continuous comparison and contrast among interviews. Appendix C offers a more detailed description of our abduction method.

To supplement our qualitative abductive analysis, we used insights from the coordinator interviews to categorize each customer case on the following organizational variables: existence of a ridesharing solution prior to Zimride (yes/no), level of effort in marketing Zimride to members (low/moderate/high), transportation alternatives available to members (low/moderate/high), primary type of ridesharing demand actualized (single trips/daily commutes/both), the organization's motivation for adopting Zimride (financial/sustainability), the organization's tenure as a Zimride customer (< 6 years / ≥ 6 years), and the organization's overall satisfaction with the Zimride service (low/moderate/high). Both co-authors independently read all the coordinator interview transcripts and assigned values to these variables; differences in their coding were discussed and subsequently resolved. Using organizations' estimated ridesharing miles reported online in June 2015 and September 2016, we also calculated a categorical measure of mileage growth in each customer's private Zimride network (discontinued / $< 20\%$ / 20% or more).

4   Findings

We first sought to identify tensions that were borne out of the three conflicting institutional logics associated with these Zimride organizational networks in order to gain insights into the viability of the sharing economy ideal (Acquier et al., 2017). Our findings are summarized in Table 4. We now present them by the level at which they manifested within Zimride's B2B2P2P service delivery model.

4.1   Tensions between the Customer Organization and the Platform Provider (B2B Level)

4.1.1   Ownership and Technology Development

Given that a private Zimride ridesharing network (1) was promoted on its customer's website and during their new member orientations, (2) could only be accessed through its single sign-on authentication infrastructure, and (3) was co-branded with the customer organization's logo, there was uncertainty about the platform's ownership:

Table 4. Salient Tensions of the Zimride Platform

	Market	Hierarchy	Community
B2B-level tensions			
Ownership and Technology Development	Zimride as independent third-party technology provider who innovates to remain competitive.	Zimride as co-branded service provider who relies on a high degree of IT integration to meet customers' requirements.	
B2P-level tensions			
Liability	Zimride as independent third-party service provider.	Zimride as co-branded and endorsed service provider with shared liability.	
Reporting		For accurate reporting of service utilization, completed shared rides must be documented rather than estimated.	Off-platform interpersonal coordination of shared rides contributes to communal sociality and trust.
Critical mass	Heterogeneity of resources in a network of rational actors increases the value generated by matching buyers and sellers in a two-sided sharing market.		Homogeneity of participants in a community promotes cooperation and prosocial behavior, increasing perceived safety and interpersonal trust.
P2P-level tensions			
Self-disclosure	Only information relevant to the shared ride is needed to optimize ride matching.		Sharing personal information supports relational exchange and builds trust.
Reciprocity	Direct reciprocity in financial payment.		Generalized reciprocity in ridesharing.

I would consider [Zimride] a [University] program. They kind of co-brand it, which is one of the things that was important to us— we didn't want students to feel like they go to [University]'s website and then they're checked over to some completely separate entity. ... I mean it's definitely a third party, but it's integrated as much as possible to feel like it's a [University] program. (Site Coordinator JOMO)

The ambiguity surrounding platform ownership manifested itself in a tension around the rights and responsibilities for Zimride's technology development. Having to meet the specific data privacy standards and IT integration requirements of customer organizations meant that each private Zimride ridesharing platform required considerable customization:

[University] is super concerned with students' privacy with protecting their personal information. ... So, the CISO [chief information security officer] got in touch with us about six months ago and said "Hey. What is this Zimride service you guys are running? Why are they asking people to log in with [single sign-on email]? Is that information secure? What else are they

asking? They're asking for credit cards; they can access people's Facebook and match people and all this stuff? This isn't going to work. We gotta do this assessment." ... [Following the assessment] Zimride implemented some new security measures that [University] recommended. ... they definitely changed some of their programming around for us. (Site Coordinator JEMC)

As would be expected in a hierarchical service relationship (Gutek et al., 1998) wherein a provider is subordinate to a customer, Zimride was compelled to accommodate customer organizations' information technology (IT) standards and requirements. Under some circumstances, the features developed for one organization were offered to and benefited all Zimride customers. However, the need to integrate the Zimride platform into each customer's IT infrastructure constrained the platform's development. Developing a mobile-ready version of Zimride proved particularly challenging:

Part of the reason why [mobile app development] hasn't happened yet is because of all the private networks. So, it's like much more difficult for [Zimride] to come up with a universal app. They

basically have to work with each university individually in order to get the security settings right. (Site Coordinator BRDR)

Constrained technology development hindered the utility of Zimride's service and its competitive advantage as a ridesharing platform.

4.2 Tensions between the Customer Organization and Sharing Network (B2P Level)

4.2.1 Liability

The uncertainty and ambiguity about platform ownership also manifested in questions about service liability: "If there was an accident, what would that look like?" (Site Coordinator ANDI). When discussing service failures, site coordinators tended to describe their organization's service agreement with Zimride as an arm's-length contract. This was in line with the way the customer organization viewed the issue of platform ownership and technology development (B2B level tension). With Zimride framed as a third-party software vendor, organizational members were seen as individual users of Zimride's ridesharing service, which obviated the customer organization's liability:

> *As our board of regents was concerned, they just wanted a sort of disclaimer put up on our Zimride page; a disclaimer essentially that ... said that "You're using this website to self-identify rides. That people are responsible for any risk that you take on personally by signing up for using this service. Any risk or loss, etcetera the board of regents is not liable for that sort of risk that you might take."* (Site Coordinator BRHE)

Zimride users, however, viewed their organization as governing its private ridesharing network and hypothesized that as the platform sponsor, their organization would impose sanctions on any organizational member who behaved inappropriately or disobeyed platform rules:

> *I don't know this for sure, but I assume that if you take a ride ... but you don't pay in the end, that can have repercussions since it's connected to all of your other university stuff ... Maybe [not paying for rides] could have something to do with you not being able to sign up for classes.* (Student FEMO)

Zimride users' assumption that their organization was monitoring activity on its private ridesharing network and would police members' behavior suggests they attributed service liability to their sponsoring organization.

4.2.2 Reporting

Zimride's platform technology did not track shared rides as they actually occurred, which severely hampered site coordinators' ability to report on service utilization. Once matched by the Zimride algorithm, organizational members had to coordinate details of shared rides (e.g., pickup time and fare) off-platform (e.g., via email or text) and were not required to document completed transactions. As a substitute, Zimride estimated platform usage as a percentage of shared rides matched by its algorithm and calculated offset carbon emissions based on these estimates.

Many site coordinators expressed frustration with the inability to accurately measure the service utilization of their Zimride platform. This complicated determining the organization's return on investment in Zimride, as well as progress towards its environmental sustainability goals. Getting organizational members to voluntarily document their completed shared rides would require incentives:

> *The reporting is important but I don't think I would want [Zimride] to make it so difficult that [it turns users off] ... I'm not sure how you could do it where you have to log in every time you did a ride or something, but maybe if they offered prizes for the number of rides.* (Staff DAHE)

This quote highlights the tension between customer organizations' need for accurate reporting and organizational members' desire for communicating informally and privately with others when coordinating a shared ride. It also reflects a conflict between site coordinators' role as stewards of the organization's resources and caretakers of its ridesharing network. However, the relatively low cost of Zimride's service enabled site coordinators to continue sponsoring it without repercussions despite the platform's lack of usage transparency. Some of the site coordinators gave up on accurately measuring service utilization, rendering Zimride's value increasingly symbolic:

> *It's really hard to know what we're getting. ... The effectiveness [of the service], who really knows; but it's kind of like in the right direction. It's the kind of stuff I want to promote in my office, so I'll keep on going unless something better came along that's cheaper. It's like this is a good thing we should keep doing.* (Site Coordinator JAWA)

However, by giving up on measuring member activity on the Zimride platform and ignoring its potentially limited functional value as a viable transportation option, site coordinators also exhibited a disingenuous interest in solving their members' transportation problems and/or achieving the organization's environmental sustainability goals:

It's like, we have [ridesharing on campus]. It helps, so [students] can't really complain that we don't provide service and that we're not gonna do our best to provide somebody with options. But it's underutilized. ... And so I think it's kind of navigating these things like "Well I want to be able to say we offer this service," but whether or not it actually makes sense [is not as relevant]. (Site Coordinator ANDI)

4.2.3 Critical Mass

One of the perceived benefits of the Zimride platform was that only members of a customer organization had access to its private ridesharing network. This was a major factor in creating the impression that Zimride-brokered ridesharing was safe:

We wanted to make sure that [students] stay safe and have a convenient easy way to [rideshare]. ... [Zimride] is only open to students, faculty, and staff that have a [University].edu address. So it's very comfortable for us to tell parents at freshman orientation sessions that this is available and that we are not going to have this [accessible] to everybody out there, you know, stalking your child so to speak. (Site Coordinator DOAN)

Customer organizations effectively prioritized safety over critical mass when subscribing to the Zimride platform. Matching heterogeneous demand (e.g., variety of pick-up points and schedule preferences) within a network whose size was constrained by member-only access, made it difficult for the platform algorithm to match shared rides in these private, two-sided markets:

I needed to go to [City] a couple of times in like a two-month period and I listed the ability to give rides on Zimride and on Craigslist. And I found riders on Craigslist but I didn't find any on Zimride. So, in terms of the pool of people ... [it] can be better if physical safety concerns are not important. ... [with Zimride] you choose safety over the number of potential matches. (Site Coordinator JAWA)

However, Zimride users appreciated the sense of safety that came from identifying with and trusting their ridesharing counterparts as organizational members:

I think the main reason [I posted on Zimride] was that it was people from the university ... if it was like just the whole [City] community or something like that, I don't think I would have tried to use it, because I wouldn't have felt safe. ... Well, I mean I don't know all the

people in the university either, but I thought [the driver] would be a student just like me. (Student ITMA)

Many users reported that their ride offers/requests went unmatched and therefore regarded the Zimride ridesharing service as a backup to more reliable transportation options. Nevertheless, the posting of shared rides generated symbolic value even if it did not yield a match because users derived satisfaction from Zimride's potential to grow the organization's sense of community and to contribute to environmental sustainability. In sum, they regarded the sharing platform as a "good idea" that was worth supporting. They thus wanted their organization to continue sponsoring the platform.

4.3 Tensions within the Sharing Network (P2P Level)

4.3.1 Self-Disclosure

Zimride users were not able to rate their ridesharing experience or the performance of their matched peer on the platform. Gleaning reputational information about Zimride users was limited to viewing their Zimride and Facebook profiles. Despite lacking specificity regarding organizational members' ridesharing behavior, profile information nevertheless helped matched peers decide whether to pursue a shared ride:

So, I would only accept riders that attached their social media platforms, so it was very transparent, or I should say as transparent as possible. ... As someone who's offering rides, I have my social media connected. I have my profile. ... so, if I'm seeing these other people that also have the same social media or whatever, then those are the people that I would choose to come in my car. (Student JIPA)

Some Zimride users inferred an organizational member's attitude and openness to sharing from their social media profile: "[Linking a Zimride profile to Facebook] says that they're open. They're in a sharing economy, so they're not hiding themselves. It's a very transparent situation" (Student JODU).

Some, however, framed such profiling behavior as inappropriate:

I need to get from A to B. I'm not really going to waste my time stalking the person and that stuff. ... I prefer to get to know them if we start up a conversation in the car rather than look at their profile and know everything about them first. (Student FEMO)

Nevertheless, most organizational members seemed to consider carefully what information to make available about themselves in order to manage impressions on the Zimride platform and to safeguard their reputations (e.g., being perceived as a "cheapskate") within their network of co-workers:

> *I don't want to have to say "I'm offering five dollars per ride," because to me that's kind of high, actually, for [a] 12-15 mile drive. ... By using the dollar amount, it pigeonholes some people, because someone might think it's too low and so they don't even want to talk to you because they think you're a cheapskate. ... It's too early in the process [to name a price]. If the idea is about connecting us together and allowing us to share rides, then to have that dollar amount can set a sour taste even at the beginning of the conversation.* (Staff ARDE)

The availability of profile and transaction information on the Zimride platform was therefore a double-edged sword. It helped convert ridesharing matches into shared rides but also enabled the profiling and stereotyping of organizational members. Furthermore, disclosing potentially intimate information about oneself (either online or by enacting sharing) created reputational risk, which some peers perceived as being high when ridesharing with co-workers. Personal information that is given off during a shared ride (e.g., driving habits, taste in music) can lead to gossip and negative reputational consequences. In acquaintance relationships, the disclosure of information that provides insights into an individual's tastes and non-work-related habits, which is generated when rides, things, and living spaces are shared, is particularly worrisome because this social context lacks both the trust and reciprocity of intimate relationships and the anonymity of one-off interactions with strangers.

4.3.2 Reciprocity

Zimride's platform integrated direct reciprocity for payment, which implies that "I help you and you help me" (Baker & Bulkley, 2014, p. 1493), with generalized reciprocity for ridesharing, which implies that "I help you and you help someone else" (Baker & Bulkley, 2014, p. 1493). Generalized reciprocity is typically associated with communal sharing in families (Belk, 2010), whereas direct reciprocity is more transactional. This hybridization of direct and generalized reciprocity on the Zimride platform meant that many organizational members struggled to reconcile their self-interest (e.g., preserving their privacy) with their social obligation (i.e., a behavioral expectation prescribed by social etiquette) to interact with others in the organization:

> *My primary motivation [for ridesharing] is to be able to sit back and relax and not have to be the driver ... just closing my eyes; I don't know, maybe it would seem rude ... At some point, I would feel like it would be important for me to communicate with [the driver] ... so therefore I might lose some of that relaxation I was looking for. ... I feel [like a customer] because it is more of a financial transaction; I have the ability to be more of an anti-social person for the ride.* (Staff ARDE)

Some Zimride users, however, found it difficult to fully dispense with their social obligation to "help each other" (Student CYDI), especially when other organizational members were depending on them:

> *Yeah, it was kind of hard sometimes, ...[to] tell [the lady I offer a ride to], "hey I won't be able to make it." That was the only hard part, when I have to change my schedule a little bit. Sometimes I was sick and I forgot to call her and she didn't answer so pretty much I went, I picked her up and I dropped her, you know, because I wasn't able to contact her.* (Staff JOFR)

4.4 Paradoxical Tensions: Competing Institutional Logics

To understand how the tensions identified at different levels of the B2B2P2P service delivery model affect the viability of organization-sponsored sharing platforms, we now illustrate how each tension is borne out of the contradictions between two institutional logics.

4.4.1 Market vs. Hierarchy Logic

The tension surrounding *platform ownership* and *technology development* reflects the contradiction between the market and hierarchy logics. In the service agreements between customer organizations and Zimride, market logic for managing cooperation was evident in site coordinators' opinions that Zimride should act as an independent, rational actor and pursue technology innovations to stay competitive. This market logic led to their perception of the Zimride platform as a discrete software product to license. The customer organizations favored this framing.

However, given that the Zimride platform required integration with the IT standards and requirements of the customer organization, a hierarchy logic was also evident. Zimride was highly dependent on—and constrained by—their customers' single sign-on authentication infrastructure. This extended the scope and meaning of the Zimride platform beyond that of a discrete software product; instead, it reflected a

form of co-production. Zimride favored this hierarchy logic as evidenced by their reliance on account managers who sought to build service relationships with site coordinators.

The *liability tension* also reflects the contradiction between market and hierarchy logics. Customer organizations favored a market framing of Zimride as an independent actor who was responsible for any liability associated with the use of its software product. In contrast, Zimride users assumed that their hierarchical relationship—as employees or students—with the organization sponsoring the technology, extended to their use of the ridesharing platform. By posting and completing rides matched by Zimride's algorithm, employees and students were enacting their organization's goals. Customer organizations' endorsements of Zimride (enacted through a co-branded website portal and integrated single sign-on) were also indicative of a service relationship and shared responsibility for their private ridesharing network. However, customer organizations again favored the market logic, with many posting disclaimers on their co-branded Zimride portals.

4.4.2 Market vs. Community

The *critical mass tension* reflects the contradiction between market and community logics (Smets et al., 2015; Venkataraman et al., 2016). Site coordinators and organizational members prioritized perceived safety and trust associated with limiting ridesharing to established communities of homogenous members. This community logic was fundamental to Zimride's platform design and competitive distinction. However, by restricting network size, the likelihood of producing sufficient supply to match the heterogeneous demand for rides (e.g., divergent commute schedules) was lowered.

Similarly, the *self-disclosure tension* also reflects the contradiction between market and community logics. The lack of ratings on the Zimride platform is appropriate for ambiguous performance evaluation associated with community logic, as is the need to keep a community member's reputation implicit. The profile, whose content was controlled by the user it represented, should suffice as an identity marker in a community, as there are supposedly no secrets in a family. By implication, information on an individual's behavior and performance should be available through one's personal networks. However, in the absence of ridesharing-related reputational information about Zimride users and a network size that made it improbable that such information would become available via personal networks, organizational members read into whatever information was accessible to evaluate peers as viable

matches. This involved profiling and stereotyping, which increased the likelihood of discriminating against different user groups.

This conflict between Zimride users' market rationality and collective identity is also reflected in the *reciprocity tension*. Riders who favored market logic felt justified in behaving like customers whose obligations were limited to tendering a fare in exchange for a ride. They did not perceive an obligation to interact with the driver. They also sought to protect their privacy by preserving anonymity and treating others as strangers rather than as acquaintances (Morgan, 2009). Such behavior was deemed inappropriate by organizational members who favored community logic. They regarded their peers like family members (Morgan, 2009) and felt socially obligated to help them, rendering sharing an act of caring.

4.4.3 Hierarchy vs. Community

The *reporting tension* reflects the contradiction between hierarchy and community logics. Site coordinators' inability to accurately measure service utilization on the Zimride platform compromised their hierarchically defined duty towards their organizations. They were unable to accurately determine either their organization's return on investment or environmental sustainability from sponsoring a Zimride ridesharing network. In order to be effective stewards of their organization's resources, site coordinators would have to compel organizational members to document their completed rides on the Zimride platform. However, the latter was at odds with expectations generated by community logic, namely interpersonal coordination and social networking among members.

4.5 Viability of Sharing Networks

Having demonstrated that the sharing economy ideal as instantiated by the Zimride platform was indeed characterized by paradoxical tensions, we nevertheless noted that Zimride customers' private ridesharing networks were viable to varying degrees. While some of the 25 customer organizations in our study discontinued their Zimride subscription after an initial three-year service contract, others experienced considerable growth (see Table 2). To analyze the conditions under which Zimride networks were viable, we operationalized viability in terms of a customer organization's overall service satisfaction (low/moderate/high) as reported by site coordinators and the mileage growth in their private ridesharing network (discontinued / < 20% / 20% or more). We then ran mean comparison and one-way ANOVA statistical tests to determine any significant differences in organization-level measures (e.g., marketing effort), which we derived from our site coordinator interviews. These results are summarized in Tables 5 and 6.

Table 5. Correlations among Categorical Differences of Zimride Ridesharing Networks (*n* = 25)

	Customer tenure	Prior ridesharing solution	Marketing effort	Transportation alternatives	Ridesharing demand	Mileage growth	Adoption motivation	Service satisfaction
Customer tenure (< 6 years = 1, ≥ 6 years = 2)	1							
Prior ridesharing solution (no = 0, yes = 1)	0.210	1						
Marketing effort (low = 1, moderate = 2, high = 3)	0.116	0.268	1					
Transportation alternatives (low = 1, moderate = 2, high = 3)	-0.091	-0.249	0.021	1				
Ridesharing demand (trips = 1, commutes = 2, both = 3)	-0.126	-0.042	-0.391	-0.089	1			
Mileage growth (2015-2016) (discontinued = 0, < 20% = 1, ≥ 20% = 2)	0.512**	0.108	-0.077	0.327	-0.042	1		
Adoption motivation (financial = 1, sustainability = 2)	-0.204	0.514**	0.166	0.112	-0.088	-0.183	1	
Service satisfaction (low = 1, moderate = 2, high = 3)	0.354	-0.198	0.164	-0.194	-0.051	0.347	-0.577**	1
Note: **$p < 0.01$ (2-tailed)								

Table 6. Categorical Mean Differences in Zimride Ridesharing Networks (n=25)

	Service satisfaction				Mileage growth			
	Low[a] (n = 4)	Moderate[b] (n = 12)	High[c] (n = 9)	*F*	Discontinued[d] (n = 9)	< 20%[e] (n = 10)	> 20% (n = 6)	*F*
Customer tenure (< 6 years = 1, ≥ 6 years = 2)	1.25	1.58	1.78	1.64	1.22**e **f	1.80**d	1.83**d	5.55**
Prior ridesharing solution (no = 0, yes = 1)	0.75*b	0.17*a	0.33	2.55*	0.11**e	0.60**d *f	0.17*e	3.52**
Marketing effort (low = 1, moderate = 2, high = 3)	2.25	1.50**c	2.33**b	3.27*	1.78	2.30*f	1.50*e	1.95
Transportation alternatives (low = 1, moderate = 2, high = 3)	3.00**b **c	1.92**a	2.22**a	7.21**	2.00**f	2.00**f	2.83**d ***	2.07
Ridesharing demand (trips = 1, commutes = 2, both = 3)	1.50	2.00	1.56	2.36	1.89	1.60	1.83	0.24
Mileage growth (2015-2016) (discontinued = 0, < 20% = 1, ≥ 20% = 2)	0.50*c	0.75	1.22*a	0.77				
Adoption motivation (financial = 1, sustainability = 2)	1.75*b *c	1.17*a	1.00*a	1.58	1.22	1.30*f	1.00*e	1.04
Service satisfaction (low = 1, moderate = 2, high = 3)					1.89*f	2.30	2.50*d	1.58
Note: **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.10$ (2-tailed)								

In terms of frequencies, 60% (15) of the sampled organizations were Zimride customers for 6 or more years, 68% (17) had a prior ridesharing solution to Zimride, 80% (20) had a financial motivation for adopting Zimride, 32% (8) engaged in a high level of marketing Zimride to their members, and 52% (12) offered their members a high number of transportation alternatives.

In reviewing the statistically significant mean differences for customer organizations categorized by their *overall service satisfaction* (see Table 6), they varied in terms of the existence of a ridesharing solution prior to Zimride, level of marketing effort, available transportation alternatives, and motivation for adopting Zimride. Customer organizations with low service satisfaction were more likely to have had a prior ridesharing solution, more likely to have offered a high number of transportation alternatives, and more likely to have adopted Zimride for anticipated sustainability benefits (e.g., reducing environmental impact). Customer organizations with moderate service satisfaction were less likely to have had a prior ridesharing solution, less likely to have engaged in a high level of marketing, and less likely to have offered a high number of transportation alternatives. Interestingly, these same customer organizations were more likely to have adopted Zimride to generate financial benefits (e.g., fewer parking spaces). Customer organizations with high service satisfaction were more likely to have engaged in a high level of marketing and more likely to have had a financial motivation for adopting Zimride but less likely to have offered their members a high number of transportation alternatives.

Looking at the statistically significant mean differences for customer organizations categorized by their *mileage growth* (see Table 6), they varied in terms of the organization's tenure as a Zimride customer, the organization's prior experience with a ridesharing solution, level of marketing effort, availability of transportation alternatives, and motivation for adopting Zimride. Customer organizations that discontinued their Zimride ridesharing service were more likely to have subscribed within the past five years, were less likely to have had a prior ridesharing solution, and were less likely to have offered a high number of transportation alternatives. Customer organizations with under 20% mileage growth were more likely to have subscribed to Zimride for six or more years, more likely to have had a prior ridesharing solution, and more likely to have engaged in a high level of marketing. Interestingly, these same customer organizations were less likely to have offered a high number of transportation alternatives. Customer organizations who had 20% or more mileage growth were less likely to have had a prior ridesharing solution or to have engaged in a high level of marketing, but they were more likely to have subscribed to Zimride for six or more years, more likely to have offered a high number of transportation alternatives, and more likely to have adopted Zimride to achieve financial goals.

5 Discussion

We undertook this research to investigate the conditions under which an organization-sponsored sharing platform is viable because this sharing economy ideal is predicted to be unstable despite the benefits generated by embedding collaborative consumption in a community (Acquier et al., 2017). Our study of the Zimride by Enterprise® ridesharing platform for universities and corporations confirms that this new organizational form is characterized by paradoxical tensions stemming from the market, hierarchy, and community logics of its B2B2P2P service delivery model. However, in contrast to Acquier et al.'s (2017) prediction, we find that the mere presence of contradictions does not render this new organizational form infeasible. Of the 25 customer organizations that we sampled, 16 (64%) continued to sponsor their Zimride ridesharing networks during our 18-month study, with 6 (24%) of these cases experiencing mileage growth of 20% or more and 9 (36%) reporting a high level of overall service satisfaction.

Organizational forms that integrate conflicting institutional logics are not only commonplace but potentially productive (Smets et al., 2015). Furthermore, there is considerable research on how organizations manage paradoxical tensions that are inherent in their business model (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Gibbs, 2009; Raey & Hinings, 2009). One approach is to enact dialectic management strategies (e.g., Farjoun, 2010; Smith et al., 2017), which ignore, suspend, or resolve contradictions and social dilemmas (Smith & Lewis, 2011) so that organizational goals can be achieved. Dialectics reflect the dynamic interplay between two opposite poles or forces that are nevertheless interdependent (Mumby, 2005). We draw on Putnam et al.'s (2016) typology of dialectic management strategies to categorize how the tensions in Zimride's B2B2P2P service delivery model were resolved. Our empirical analysis (see Tables 4 and 6) revealed two distinct dialectic management strategies, namely selection and transcendence, that made the platform viable. However, they resulted in different Zimride mileage growth, although site coordinators were equally satisfied with the ridesharing service in both organizational conditions. We therefore now discuss these dialectic management strategies.

5.1 Conditions of Viability

Increase transportation options: Organizations with high mileage growth (20% or more) managed the heterogeneity of their members' transportation needs by offering them a relatively large number of alternative solutions beyond Zimride (e.g., subsidized public bus and train passes). Consequently, organizational members knew that if they did not find a shared ride via the Zimride platform, they had other transportation options for both one-off trips and daily commutes, which resolved the social dilemma related

to the homogeneity of accumulated resources in private sharing networks. As such, this organizational strategy of increasing transportation options reflected the dialectic management approach of *selection* (Putnam, 2015), wherein one institutional logic (market) is favored over another (community). It increased organizational members' utilization of all sustainable transportation options including Zimride because offering more service alternatives increases the number of consumers in a local market (Guven et al., 2019), just as the metaphorical tide raises all boats.

Promote collective identity and sustainability: Organizations with low mileage growth (under 20%) engaged in a high level of marketing that invoked common concerns about transportation sustainability and safety in order to promote ridesharing. This organizational strategy nurtured individuals' social value orientation and strengthened their collective identity, which mitigated the social dilemma related to dyadic trust among participants in private sharing networks. It did not, however, resolve the social dilemma related to the homogeneity of communal resources because shared rides via Zimride were primarily one-off, long-distance trips (e.g., to another town for a long weekend) and not daily commutes. As such, promoting the Zimride platform as "the right thing to do" reflected a dialectic management approach of *transcendence* (Putnam, 2015) wherein the opposing institutional logics (market and community) were integrated. It increased the symbolic value of Zimride for organizational members because it highlighted the sustainability and social benefits of ridesharing, which site coordinators' leveraged as a justification to continue sponsoring the platform despite a lack of service utilization.

These conditions of viability suggest that prioritizing the market logic rather than integrating it with the community logic is more effective for increasing the critical mass of participants in private sharing networks. This is counterintuitive because community logic builds collective identity (Hunt & Benford, 2004) and increases cooperation among organizational members (Kollock, 1999), which would be expected to fuel their collaborative consumption on an organization-sponsored sharing platform. However, research on privacy in the sharing economy (Teubner & Flath, 2019) provides a plausible explanation for this puzzling finding. It suggests that the self-disclosure associated with sharing personal goods and services (e.g., accommodation and transportation) is problematic when they are shared with acquaintances such as co-workers or neighbors (Morgan, 2009), because individuals seek to protect their privacy in these relationships. Therefore, there may be a zone of optimal distinctiveness (Bhappu & Helm, 2018) for individuals when consuming collaboratively with peers, which would be fruitful to explore further.

6   Contributions

Digital sharing platforms represent the organizational forms of the future in that they rely on distributed networks of independent actors, dynamically emergent markets, and technology-based controls (Laamanen et al., 2018). Studying these emergent modes of organizing in their diverse manifestations thus promises to advance the extension and application of management and organization theories. Our research delivers on this promise by highlighting how organization-sponsored sharing platforms are configured with conflicting institutional logics and how dialectic management strategies that resolve social dilemmas render this sharing economy ideal viable.

Our conceptualization of an organization-sponsored sharing platform's B2B2P2P service delivery model relates it to prior IS research on online marketplaces (e.g., Kambil et al., 1999; Koch & Schultze, 2011) and affords analytical clarity for understanding its unique configuration. For example, applying prior research on P2P sharing and B2B service relationships (e.g., Schultze & Orlikowski, 2004; Bhappu & Schultze, 2006) to our analysis of Zimride sensitized us to the institutional logics of market and hierarchy, which have been associated with the different configurations of online marketplaces (e.g., Koch & Schultze, 2011). This also revealed the connective B2P layer as being the locus of differentiation in this new organizational form, namely the sharing economy ideal (Acquier et al., 2017). Given that "unpacking the pluralism of organizational forms and practices is critical to examine the dynamics of the sharing economy" (Mair & Reischauer, 2017, p. 11), the B2B2P2P service delivery model could be used to compare and contrast other digital sharing platforms. For example, Uber® is configured to facilitate P2P market transactions, whereas the "sharing economy organization" enacted by the Train of Hope volunteer network (Kornberger et al., 2018) has a B2P2P configuration.

As far as the viability of organization-sponsored sharing platforms, we identified two dialectical management strategies with related organizational conditions that resulted in different Zimride mileage growth but equally satisfying service. The selection strategy of organizations with high mileage growth required financial investments to offer their members multiple alternative transportation solutions, which reinforced consumer motives for engaging in collaborative consumption (Bhappu et al., 2020). The transcendence strategy of organizations with low mileage growth required relational investments to promote sustainability and ridesharing to their members, which reinforced citizen motives for engaging in collaborative consumption (Bhappu et al., 2020). However, the relative effectiveness of these dialectic management strategies for increasing Zimride utilization suggests that consumer motives are a stronger predictor of

engagement on an organization-sponsored sharing platform than citizenship motives. Future research should investigate this pattern, especially in light of the privacy and self-disclosure concerns discussed previously (e.g., Teubner & Flath, 2019).

7   Limitations

Our findings should be considered in light of our research limitations. By collecting and theorizing empirical material from customer organizations of a single organization-sponsored sharing platform (Zimride), the generalizability of our findings about the sharing economy ideal is limited despite the effectiveness of case studies for theory building (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). For example, since Zimride did not include a reputation management feature, our analysis was unable to evaluate this functionality's contribution to enhancing cooperation within a collective (Kollock, 1999). Our research insights should thus be evaluated in terms of their potential for opening up new lines of inquiry into the sharing economy, in general, and the sharing economy ideal, in particular.

An important question that future research should address is the relative impact of the different platform configurations on consumption. For example, popular "access platforms" (Acquier et al., 2017) such as Airbnb® and Uber® have created P2P markets, which have lowered costs but increased overall consumption of lodging and transportation services (Lee et al., 2019). In contrast, organization-sponsored sharing platforms may increase the overall consumption of more sustainable service options, which we found in Zimride customer organizations with high mileage growth. Although this sharing economy ideal has the capacity to create the promised trifecta of financial, social, and environmental value (Botsman, 2010), its ability to do so is dependent on the dialectic management strategies used to resolve the contradictions and social dilemmas resulting from the conflicting institutional logics of its B2B2P2P service delivery model.

However, we did not interview anyone from the Zimride by Enterprise® platform, which limits our insight into the tensions at the B2B level of an organization-sponsored sharing platform. We were also unable to assess the viability of Zimride's entire business model and reconcile our empirical analysis with—according to its website [2]—the "difficult decision to indefinitely suspend" its private ridesharing networks effective December 31, 2020, after "careful consideration." Our assessment of the platform's viability was strictly based on Zimride customer organizations' use of and satisfaction with its service.

Furthermore, we relied on a sample of only 16 active Zimride users to inform our understanding of tensions at the P2P level of the platform. Our sample size was constrained by the small percentage of registered Zimride users who had experienced one or more shared rides in the three months prior to their completion of the screening survey. In order to generate rich data on the user experience of Zimride, we had planned to rely on triadic sorting (i.e., comparing and contrasting three events) during the interview (Schultze & Avital, 2011). Data richness can compensate for a small sample in abductive theorizing because highly contextualized narratives form the basis for evaluating the plausibility of alternative explanations (Bruner, 1990).

8   Conclusion

The sharing economy is continuously evolving (Junglas et al., 2017) and new service delivery models are emerging. One particularly promising configuration of digital sharing platforms embeds collaborative consumption within extant collectives, like an organization (Mair & Reischauer, 2017), and leverages community members' collective identity to enhance their cooperation (Kollock, 1999). These organization-sponsored sharing platforms are reflective of the sharing economy ideal (Acquier et al., 2017), which approximates "true" sharing (Belk, 2010) by infusing the consumption of goods and services with the moral dimension of shared values and concerns. While some scholars (Acquier et al., 2017) have argued that this new organizational form is doomed to fail under the weight of paradoxical tensions that characterize its B2B2P2P service delivery model, our research findings indicate otherwise. We identify and discuss the dialectic management strategies that render organization-sponsored sharing platforms viable.

---

[2] https://zimride.com, last accessed May 24, 2021

References

Acquier, A., Daudigeos, T., & Pinkse, J. (2017). Promises and paradoxes of the sharing economy: An organizing framework. *Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 1*25, 1-10.

Alvesson, M., & Karreman, D. (2007). Constructing mystery, empirical matters in theory development. *Academy of Management Review, 32*(4), 1265-1281.

Anderson, P., & Anderson, E. (2002). The new e-commerce intermediaries. *MIT Sloan Management Review, 43*(4), 53-62.

Axelrod, R. (1984). *The evolution of cooperation*. Basic Books.

Baker, W. E., & Bulkley, N. (2014). Paying it forward vs. rewarding reputation, mechanisms of generalized reciprocity. *Organization Science, 25*(5), 1493-1510.

Bakos, J. Y., & Brynjolfsson, E. (1993). From vendors to partners: Information technology and incomplete contracts in buyer-supplier relationships. *Journal of Organizational Computing, 3*(3), 301-328.

Bamberger, P. A. (2018). AMD—Clarifying what we're about and where we are going *Academy of Management Discoveries, 4*(1), 1-10.

Belk, R. (2010). Sharing. *Journal of Consumer Research, 36*(5), 715-734.

Belk, R. (2014). Sharing versus pseudo-sharing in Web 2.0. *Anthropologist, 18*(1), 7-23.

Benkler, Y. (2017). Peer production, the commons, and the future of the firm. *Strategic Organization, 15*(2), 264-274.

Bhappu, A. D. (2000). The Japanese family: An institutional logic for Japanese corporate networks and Japanese management. *Academy of Management Review, 25*(2), 409-415.

Bhappu, A. D., Blomqvist, K., Andreeva, T., Zappa, P., Yeo, M. L., & Lempiälä, T. (2020). Provider's initial trust on an organization-sponsored sharing platform: The framing of coworker collaborative consumption. *Frontiers in Psychology, 11*(2174).

Bhappu, A. D., & Helm, S. (2018). Zone of optimal distinctiveness: provider asset personalization and the psychological ownership of shared accommodation. In H. Yang, & R. Qiu (Eds.), *Advances in service science* (pp. 73-82). Springer.

Bhappu, A. D., & Schultze, U. (2018). Implementing organization-sponsored sharing platforms, recommendations for building employee engagement. *MISQ Executive, 17*(2), 109-120.

Bhappu, A. D., & Schultze, U. (2019). The Sharing economy ideal, implementing an organization-sponsored sharing platform as a CSR program. *Internet Research*.

Bhardi, F., & Eckhardt, G. (2012). Access-based consumption: The case of car sharing. *Journal of Consumer Research, 3*9, 881-898.

Botsman, R. (2010). *The case for collaborative consumption*. TEDxSydney. http://www.ted.com/talks/rachel_botsman_the_case_for_collaborative_consumption?language=en.

Bruner, J. S. (1990). *Acts of meaning*. Harvard University Press.

Corten, R. (2019). Social dilemmas in the sharing economy. In R. Belk, G. Eckhardt, & F. Bhardi (Eds.), *Handbook on the Sharing Economy*, 278-289. Edward Elgar.

Dunn, M. B., & Jones, C. (2010). Institutional logics and insitutional pluralism, the contestation of care and science logics in medical education, 1967-2005. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 55*(1), 114-149.

Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. (2007). Theory building from cases, opportunities and challenges. *Academy of Management Journal, 50*(1), 25-32.

Eisenmann, T. R. (2008). Managing proprietary and shared platforms. *California Management Review, 5*0 (4), 31-53.

Farjoun, M. (2010). Beyond dualism, stability and change as a duality. *Academy of Management Review, 35*(3), 202-225.

Friedland, R., & Alford, R. R. (1991). Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices, and institutional contradictions. In W. W. Powell, & P. J. DiMaggio (Eds.), *The new institutionalism in organizational analysis*, 232-263. University of Chicago Press.

Gibbs, J. (2009). Dialectics in a global software team: negotiating tensions across time, space and culture. *Human Relations, 62*(6), 905-935.

Gittel, J. H., & Douglass, A. (2012). Relational bureaucracy: Structuring reciprocal relationships into roles. *Academy of Management Review, 37*(4), 709-733.

Glaser, B. G. (1978). *Theoretical sensitivity, advances in the methodology of grounded theory*. University of California Press.

Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. *American Journal of Sociology, 91*(3), 481-510.

Gümüsay, A. A. (2018). Commentary, sharing is caring: From material to socio-material sharing. *Academy of Management Discoveries, 4*(3), 376-377.

Gutek, B., Bhappu, A., Liao-Troth, M., & Cherry, B. (1999). Distinguishing between service relationships and encounters. *Work and Occupations, 27*(3), 319-552.

Guven, G., Inci, E., & Russo, A. (2019). *Competition, concentration and pecentage rent in retail leasing.* Real Estate Economics.

Haveman, H. A., & Rao, H. (1997). Structuring a theory of moral sentiments: Institutional and organizational coevolution in the early thrift industry. *American Journal of Sociology, 102*(6), 1606-1651.

Hennart, J. F. (1993). Explaining the swollen middle: Why most transactions are a mix of "market" and "hierarchy." *Organization Science, 4*(4), 529-547.

Hunt, S. A., & Benford, R. D. (2004). Collective identity, solidarity, and commitment. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, H. Kriesi (Eds.), *The Blackwell companion to social movements* (Ch. 19). Wiley.

Junglas, I., Koch, H., Sundarajan, A., & Wang, P. (2017). Special issue editorial—Shared responsibility and blurring boundaries: Strategic implications of the sharing economy. *MIS Quarterly Executive, 16*(4), iii-ix.

Kambil, A., Nunes, P. F., & Wilson, D. (1999). Transforming the marketspace with all-in-one markets. *International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 3*(4), 11-28.

Kanter, R. M. (1972). *Commitment and Community.* Harvard University Press.

Koch, H., & Schultze, U. (2011). Stuck in the conflicted middle. A role-theoretic perspective on B2B marketplaces. *MIS Quarterly, 35*(1), 123-146.

Kollock, P. (1998). Social dilemmas: The anatomy of cooperation. *Annual Review of Sociology, 24*(1), 183-214.

Kollock, P. (1999). The economies of online cooperation: Gifts and public goods in cyberspace. In M. Smith, & P. Kollock (Eds.), *Communities in cyberspace* (pp. 219-237). Routledge.

Kornberger, M., Leixnering, S., Meyer, R. E., & Höllerer, M. A. (2018). Rethinking the sharing economy: The nature and organization of sharing in the 2015 refugee crisis. *Academy of Management Discoveries, 4*(3), 314-335.

Laamanen, T., Pfeffer, J., Rong, K., & Van de Ven, A. (2018). Editors' introduction—Business models, ecosystems, and society in the sharing economy. *Academy of Management Discoveries, 4*(3), 213-219.

Lawler, R. (2014). *Lyft-off, Zimride's long road to overnight success.* Tech Crunch. https://techcrunch.com/2014/08/29/6000-words-about-a-pink-mustache/.

Lee, K., Jin, Q., Animesh, A., & Ramaprasad, J. (2019). *Are ride-hailing services sustainable? The impact of Uber on the transportation mode choices of drivers, riders, and walkers.* Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244207.

Locke, K., Golden-Biddle, K., & Feldman, M. (2008). Making doubt generative: Rethinking the role of doubt in the research process. *Organization Science, 19*(6), 907-918.

Maglio, P. P., & Spohrer, J. (2013). A service science perspective on business model innovation. *Industrial Marketing Management, 4*2, 665-670.

Mair, J., & Reischauer, G. (2017). Capturing the dynamics of the sharing economy: Institutional research on the plural forms and practices of sharing economy organizations. *Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 125*, 11-20.

Malone, T. W., Yates, J., & Benjamin, R. I. (1987). Electronic markets and electronic hierarchies. *Communications of the ACM, 30*(6), 484-497.

Morgan, D. (2009). *Acquaintances: The space between intimates and strangers.* McGraw-Hill Education.

Morozov, E. (2013). *The "sharing economy" undermines workers' rights.* Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/92c3021c-34c2-11e3-8148-00144feab7de

Murillo, D., Buckland, H., & Val, E. (2017). When the sharing economy becomes neoliberalism on steroids, Unravelling the controversies. *Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 125*, 66-76.

Ouchi, W. G. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies and clans. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 25*(1), 129-141.

Parguel, B., Lunardo, R., & Benoît-Moreau, F. (2017). Sustainability of the sharing economy in question: When second-hand peer-to-peer platforms stimulate indulgent consumption. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 125*(C), 48-57.

Parker, G., & Van Alstyne, M. W. (2005). Two-sided networks: A theory of information product design. *Management Science, 51*(10), 1494-1504.

Putnam, L. (2015). Unpacking the dialectic, alternative views on the discourse-materiality relationship. *Journal of Management Studies, 52*(5), 706-716.

Putnam, L., Fairhurst, G. T., & Banghart, S. (2016). Contradictions, dialectics, and paradoxes in organizations: A constitutive approach. *Academy of Management Annals, 10*(1), 65-171.

Raey, T., & Hinings, C. R. (2009). Managing the rivalry of competing institutional logics. *Organization Studies, 30*(6), 629-652.

Schor, J. (2016). Debating the sharing economy. *Journal of Self-Governance and Management Economics, 4*(3), 7-22.

Schultze, U., & Avital, M. (2011). Designing interviews to generate rich data for information systems research. *Information and Organization, 21*(1), 1-16.

Schultze, U., & Orlikowski, W. J. (2004). A practice perspective on technology-mediated network relations: The use of internet-based self-serve technologies. *Information Systems Research, 15*(1), 87-106.

Slee, T. (2016). *What's yours is mine, against the sharing economy.* OR Books.

Smets, M., Jarzabkowski, P., Burke, G. T., & Spee, P. (2015). Reinsurance Trading in Lloyd's of London: Balancing the conflicting-yet-complementary logics in practice. *Academy of Management Journal, 58*(3), 932-970.

Smith, W. K., Erez, M., Jarvenpaa, S., Lewis, M. W., & Tracey, P. (2017). Adding complexity to theories of paradox, tensions, and dualities of innovation and change: Introduction to Organization Studies Special Issue on Paradox, Tensions, and Dualities of Innovation and Change. *Organization Studies, 38*(3-4), 303-317.

Smith, W. K., & Lewis, M. W. (2011). Toward a theory of paradox: A dynamic equilibrium model of organizing. *Academy of Management Review, 36*(2), 381-403.

Teubner, T., & Flath, C. M. (2019). Privacy in the sharing economy. *Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 20*(3), 213-242.

Thompson, C. J. (1997). Interpreting consumers, a hermeneutical framework for deriving marketing insights from the texts of consumers' consumption stories *Journal of Marketing Research, 34*(4), 438-455.

Thornton, M. A., & Ocasio, W. (2008). Insitutional logic. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin-Andersson, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), *The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism* (pp. 99-129). SAGE.

Van Maanen, J., Sørensen, J. B., & R. Mitchell, T. (2007). Introduction to special topic forum: The interplay between theory and method. *Academy of Management Review, 32*(4), 1145-1154.

Vaskelainen, T., & Münzel, K. (2018). The effect of institutional logics on business model development in the sharing economy: The case of german carsharing services. *Academy of Management Discoveries, 4*(3), 273-293.

Venkataraman, H., Vermeulen, P., & Raaijmakers, A. (2016). Market meets community: Institutional logics as strategic resources for development work. *Organization Studies, 37*(5), 709-733.

Walsham, G. (2006). Doing interpretive research. *European Journal of Information Systems, 3*(15), 320-330.

Wilhelms, M.-P., Henkel, S., & Falk, T. (2017). To earn is not enough: A means-end analysis to uncover peer-providers' participation motives in peer-to-peer carsharing. *Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 125*(C), 38-47.

Yang, M. M.-H. (1989). The gift economy and state power in China. *Comparative Studies in Society and History, 31*(1), 25-54.

Appendix A: Protocol for Site Coordinator Interviews

Introduction

Ask participant to describe their organizational role and tenure, as well as their organization's transportation needs and programs.

Zimride Experience

1. How did your organization learn about Zimride?
2. What motivated your organization to sign up for Zimride? How did that process unfold? Did you champion it from within?
3. What benefits and risks did you anticipate? Did having a private social network matter?
4. What did you expect would happen after your organization signed up with Zimride?
5. What actually happened? Tell me about your members' ridesharing experience to date.
6. How do you measure and monitor your members' ridesharing experience? What performance goals do you have to justify the continued offering of the Zimride service?
7. Have any members acted in a way that made you uncomfortable or annoyed? Tell me more.
8. What would (did) you do if (when) you had an issue amongst members, e.g., accidental harm or uncomfortable interaction?
9. Have any members acted in a way that pleasantly surprised you? Tell me more.
10. Why do you think that your members use the Zimride service?
11. How has their participation affected their feelings about your organization?
12. How has their participation affected their use of vehicles and/or public transportation?
13. Overall, how would you describe the outcome of offering the Zimride service? How can your experience be improved?
14. Is there anything else that you would like to tell me before we end?

Assistance

Would you be willing to help us recruit users of your Zimride network for a similar interview? We have an invitation for users to be distributed via an email and/or online network message and would appreciate your help in sending it to your platform users.

Appendix B: Protocol for User Interviews

Introduction

Ask participant to describe their organizational role (e.g., student, employee) and tenure, as well as their transportation needs and access/ownership (e.g., bike, car, bus).

Zimride Experience

How did you learn about your organization's Zimride network?
What motivated you to sign up for Zimride? What happened after you registered?

For DRIVERS:

1. Why did you decide to post a ride? How did you decide what to list as the passenger fee?
2. What did you expect would happen? What benefits and risks did you anticipate?
3. What actually happened? Tell me about some of your ridesharing experiences.
4. How did you determine whether you could trust the interested passenger(s)?
5. Did being a part of your organization's private social network have an impact your determination? Have you given rides to complete strangers before?
6. Did anyone ever do or say anything that made you uncomfortable or annoyed? Tell me more.
7. What would (did) you do if (when) you had an issue with a passenger, e.g., accidental harm or uncomfortable interaction?
8. Did anyone ever do or say anything that pleasantly surprised you? Tell me more.
9. Describe any repeat interactions with passenger(s). Were they strictly about ride sharing?
10. Overall, how would you describe the outcome of participating in your organization's Zimride network? How can your experience be improved?
11. Have you ever been a rider?

For RIDERS:

1. Why did you decide to look for a ride? How did you feel about the listed passenger fees?
2. What did you expect would happen? What benefits and risks did you anticipate?
3. What actually happened? Tell me about some of your ridesharing experiences.
4. How did you determine whether you could trust the prospective driver(s)?
5. Did being a part of your organization's private social network have an impact your determination? Have you taken rides from complete strangers before?
6. Did anyone ever do or say anything that made you uncomfortable or annoyed? Tell me more.
7. What would (did) you do if (when) you had an issue with a driver, e.g., accidental harm or uncomfortable interaction?
8. Did anyone ever do or say anything that pleasantly surprised you? Tell me more.
9. Describe any repeat interactions with driver(s). Were they strictly about ride sharing?
10. Overall, how would you describe the outcome of participating in your organization's Zimride network? How can your experience be improved?
11. Have you ever been a driver?

For Everyone:

1. Why do you think that your organization offers this Zimride service? How does this affect the way you feel about your organization?
2. How has participation in this Zimride service impacted the way you feel about owning a vehicle and/or using public transportation?
3. Would (have) you recommended Zimride to a friend? Why? Tell me more.
4. Is there anything else that you would like to tell me before we end?

Appendix C: Detailed Description of Abduction Method

Once the interviews of Zimride site coordinators had been transcribed, both co-authors read the corpus independently. Rather than relying on a coding software like NVivo, which tends to fragment and decontextualize the empirical material, the first author did open coding (Glaser, 1978) by cutting and pasting passages from each interview into an MS Word document. These utterances were organized by interviewee, thus preserving the context in which these statements were made. Tentative thematic codes were appended to each passage. For the site coordinators, these open codes included reasons for adopting Zimride, relationship with the Zimride sales representative, methods for marketing the Zimride service, as well as successes and challenges with the Zimride platform. The same procedure was followed for the user interviews. Open codes in the user data set included reasons for using Zimride, practices for finding a shared ride, criteria for evaluating potential rideshare partners, as well as benefits and challenges of using Zimride.

The two "quote summary" documents were then read by both co-authors independently. Each expanded the codes as the meaning of utterances were refined through constant comparison both within and across interviewees. The interview passages that dealt with tensions and discontinuities as perceived by the Zimride stakeholders became the focus of the interpretive work. During repeated conversations about the data, the co-authors then developed the intuition that conflicting institutional logics could help explain these tensions and the service delivery model's viability in a systematic manner.

Pursuing this tentative theoretical framing, the co-authors drew on the institutional logics literature to develop an understanding of the three archetypes that appeared evident in the data, i.e., market, hierarchy, and community (see Table 1). The first co-author then went through the passages in the code summaries again, appending codes that characterized the institutional logics evident in them. These passages and their codes were then discussed by the authors and only finalized once agreement had been reached. Since all the tensions, ambiguities, and challenges that interviewees had expressed could be explained by incongruences among the three archetypal institutional logics, the co-authors were satisfied with the theory-data fit.

Using the Word search function, the passages that had been coded with at least one of the institutional logics were identified and moved into a new Word document that was again organized by interviewee so as to preserve any given utterance's context. By focusing on the tensions alone and by comparing and contrasting them, a number of themes emerged (Thompson, 1997). These included tensions of ownership vs. responsibility, safety vs. critical mass, and transacting vs. caring. By attending to the stakeholders implicated in each of these tensions, we were then able to map them onto the levels of the B2B2P2P service delivery model. Additionally, statements related to how stakeholders dealt with the challenges and tensions they confronted were associated with each tension type.

About the Authors

Ulrike Schultze is a professor of information technology and operations management in the Cox School of Business at Southern Methodist University. Her research explores the complex relationship between digitalization and work practices. She investigates what the material conditions associated with information technology produce, especially with respect to work-related and societal change. While she has studied the work practice implications of knowledge management technology and internet-based self-service technology, her more recent research explores the implications of social media on personal identity. Online protest movements represent a key empirical context in her identity research. Her remaining digitalization research includes the sharing economy and blockchain technology. Dr. Schultze frequently relies on multimethod research designs including ethnographic observations, interviews, and surveys. Her research is published in leading journals such as *Information Systems Research, Management Information Systems Quarterly, European Journal of Information Systems, Journal of Information Technology*, and *Information and Organization*. She has served on the editorial boards of these and other journals, and is currently a senior editor at *Journal of the Association of Information Systems, Journal of Information Technology, and Information and Organization.*

Anita D. Bhappu is an associate professor and department chair of Management of Complex Systems, as well as associate dean for Student Success in the School of Engineering at the University of California Merced. She was previously on the faculty at the University of Arizona, Southern Methodist University, and Georgetown University. Dr. Bhappu conducts interdisciplinary management research on organizational behavior and information systems. She studies how digital technology platforms influence coworker collaborative consumption, service interactions, and decision-making in diverse teams. Her research is published in top-ranked journals including the *Academy of Management Review, Internet Research, Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of Service Research, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, and *Management Information Systems Quarterly Executive*. She serves on the editorial board of *Organization Science,* and insights from her research have been featured by *Fast Company, Huffington Post, Marketwatch, Mother Jones, NPR Marketplace, Slate, Time, The Washington Post,* and *USA Today*.