



# Managers vs. students: new approach in analyzing current practices in capital structure management education

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#### 1. Abstract

According to Graham and Harvey (2001), an immense gap exists between capital structure theories and practice. This paper argues that this can be partially explained by current educational practices by analyzing undergraduate students' perceptions of capital structure theories and the differences between their opinion and that of the current CEO's and managers. Educators mostly focus on one or maybe two most popular theories and students have much smaller knowledge other about Secondly educational theories. practices favor trade-off theory to information asymmetric based theories. The paper provides some suggestions regarding capital structure education and future research.

### 4. Capital Structure Facts

Phenomenon	Relationship with theory			
Negative correlation between debt and profitability	Contradicts trade-off theory			
Negative correlation between expected bankruptcy costs and debt	Consistent with trade-off theory			
Negative share price reaction on equity issues	Consistent with pecking- order theory			
Firms do not always follow pecking order	Contradicts pecking-order theory			
Share price does not react to debt issues	Contradicts signalling theory			
No relationship between managerial ownership and performance	Contradict agency theory			
Better operating performance after equity issue, long-term decline	Not consistent with theory			
Small and risky firms issue equity	Consistent with flexibility theory			

#### 5. Educational practices

- A typical textbook covers Trade-off Theory
- Pecking-order theory is briefly covered.
- Mere mention of other theories such as Agency costs, Signaling, Debt and Discipline,

Financing Flexibility, Firm Life Cycle and Capital Structure, Corporate Culture and Capital Structure

 Instructors usually talk about Trade-off theory and can mention without details Pecking-order theory

### 2. Capital Structure Basics



**A Firm Balance Sheet Liabilities & Equity Assets Short-term debt Short-term assets Fixed assets** Long-term debt **Preferred Stock Common Equity** 

## 3. Capital Structure Theories

- Trade-off theory
- Pecking-order theory
- Signalling
- Agency cost
- Debt and discipline
- Financing flexibility
- Life cycle theory
- Corporate culture and capital structure

### 6. Managerial View

Factors that determine a firm's capital structure:

Financial flexibility

Credit rating

Earnings and cash flow volatility

Insufficient internal funds

Level of interest rates

Interest tax savings

Transaction cost and fees

Equity misvaluation

Comparable firm debt levels

Bankruptcy/distress costs

Managers do not support theory!

## 9. Managers versus Students

- In contrast to managers students mostly talk about trade-off theory and pecking-order theory. Educators should focus more on other theories
- Students talk about trade-off theory more often than about pecking order however they often do not support the trade-off theory. Educators should have a better balance between trade-off theory and pecking order
- Best students seem to understand better asymmetric information, so educators should find the way to teach asymmetric information better and in a more practical way.

## 7. Students' perception of capital structure

Theory	No Opini on
Applicable to firm   by managers   sed   ot used   ng	_
Trade-Off Theory         10         6         80         3         31           Cost of Distress         50         -         26         2         14           Asymmetric Information         98         16         68         20         9           Pecking Order Theory         13         2         33         2         2         3           Signalling         60         6         21         1         3         2           Agency Cost         97         25         5         46	on
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Agency Cost         97         25         5         46	
Agency Cost         97         25         5         46	
	9
	25
Risk shifting         7         12         4         37         5	63
(asset	
substitution)	
<b>Debt and</b> 55 15 7 3 96	63
Discipline 7 5 70	
Discipinie	
<b>Life Cycle</b> 57 8 83	50
Theory	
Firm Flexibility 76 - 50 9	44
Tim Ficality 70 - 30	77
Comparable 2 1	120
firms	

#### 8. Best Students

Theory	Suppo rts/us	Supports/Th eory not	Supports/ not used	Does not support/us	Does not support/n	Misund erstandi	No Opini
	ed	Applicable	by	ed	ot used	ng	on
		to firm	manager			8	011
			S				
Trade-Off	3	1	13	4	14		
Theory							
Cost of Distress	2	1	15		13		3
Asymmetric	18	2	10		5		
Information							
Pecking Order	13	1	6		4		1
Theory							
Signalling	10	1	5		1		1
		1					
Agency Cost	2		5		19		6
Risk shifting	1			2	11		18
(asset							
substitution)							
				_			
Debt and	1	1		2	14		15
Discipline							
Life Cycle	2		1		20		2
Theory							
Firm Flexibility	27		3		1	1	1
Comparable	4				5		26
firms							

#### 10. CONCLUSION

An immense gap exists between theories and practice: educators mostly focus on one or maybe two most popular theories (Trade-off theory and Pecking order theory).

Educators focus on theory not practice Big differences exists in the researchers' opinion: educators exaggerate theoretical role of trade-off theory Different opinions regarding future work: existing asymmetric information theories are not sufficient.