

WORKERS OF THE EREĞLİ-ZONGULDAK
COAL BASIN, 1848-1922

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

ERDEN ATTİLA AYTEKİN

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS IN HISTORY

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

July 2001

Approved by the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences.

Prof. Dr. Kürşat Aydoğan

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of History.

Assist. Prof. Dr. S. Akşin Somel

(Thesis Supervisor)

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of History.

Dr. Oktay Özel

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of History.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aykut Kansu

ABSTRACT

WORKERS OF THE EREĞLİ-ZONGULDAK COAL BASIN, 1848-1922

Aytekin, Erden Attila

M.A., Department of History

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. S. Akşin Somel

July 2001

This thesis focuses on the workers in Ereğli-Zonguldak coal basin, the most important mining region in the Ottoman Empire. The operation in the basin started in 1848, and in the course of the three quarter-centuries that passed until 1922, considerable transformations in terms of technology, administrative structure, capital composition etc. have taken place in the basin. These transformations had important consequences for the working and living conditions of the workers, and towards the end of the period in question, the workers themselves emerged as innegligible actors and began to influence the developments in the basin.

The thesis is basically organised around two lines of investigation. The first line is the wages of workers. The development of the wages of different categories of workers is investigated for the period of 1875-1922, for which data exists, and the period of 1905-11 and the year 1922 are paid special attention. Leaving aside the apparent erosion during the war years, it could be observed that the real wages in the basin presented a stable pattern. On the other hand, this erosion was not distributed evenly; different categories of workers were affected to different extents. The thesis

also discusses the impact of the Strikes of 1908, which broke out in the basin as did throughout the empire. The cuts and deductions imposed on wages under different names are also discussed under a separate heading.

The second line of investigation is the industrial accidents that have taken place in the mines. The accidents that occurred in the years 1909-10 are discussed in detail and the reactions of different people, groups and institutions including the state and the workers, to these accidents are analysed. The state's response has been ambivalent and at times contradictory, in accordance with the nature of Ottoman state of the time and the structural and conjunctural conditions in which it found itself. The response of the workers has manifested itself in strikes.

Keywords: Mine Workers, Ereğli-Zonguldak Coal Basin, Ottoman Working Class, Wages, Industrial Accidents

ÖZET

EREĞLİ-ZONGULDAK KÖMÜR HAVZASI İŞÇİLERİ, 1848-1922

Aytekin, Erden Attila

Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd.Doç.Dr. S. Akşin Somel

Temmuz 2001

Bu tez, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun en önemli madencilik bölgesi olan Ereğli-Zonguldak kömür havzasındaki işçileri konu almaktadır. Havza 1848 yılında işletilmeye başlanmış ve 1922 yılına kadar geçen üç çeyrek yüzyıllık süreçte teknoloji, idari yapı, sermaye kompozisyonu vs. bakımlardan hatırı sayılır dönüşümler yaşamıştır. Bu dönüşümlerin havzada çalışan işçilerin çalışma ve hayat şartları bakımından önemli sonuçları olmuş, incelenen dönemin sonuna doğru işçiler de kayda değer aktörler olarak olayların gidişini etkilemeye başlamışlardır.

Çalışma esasen iki temel hat üzerine kurulmuştur. İlk hat, havzadaki işçi ücretleridir. Farklı kategorilerdeki işçi ücretlerinin gelişimi verilerin mevcut olduğu 1875-1922 yılları arası dönemde incelenmekte, 1905-11 dönemine ve 1922 yılına özel bir vurgu yapılmaktadır. Buna göre, savaş yıllarında yaşanan belirgin aşınmayı dışarıda bırakırsak, gerçek ücretler istikrarlı bir nitelik arz etmiştir. Savaş yıllarında görülen erozyon da işçiler arasında eşit dağılmamış, farklı işçi kategorileri bundan farklı oranlarda etkilenmişlerdir. Tezde ayrıca, tüm imparatorlukta olduğu gibi havzada da meydana gelen 1908 Grevleri'nin ücretler üzerindeki etkisi de

tartışılmaktadır. Ücretler üzerinde çeşitli adlar altında yapılan kesintiler de ayrı bir başlık altında ele alınmaktadır.

Üzerinde durulan ikinci konu havzadaki ocaklarda yaşanan iş kazalarıdır. 1909-10 yılında vuku bulan kazalar ayrıntılı biçimde ele alınmakta, başta devlet ve işçiler olmak üzere, çeşitli kişi, grup ve kurumların kazalara verdikleri tepkiler tartışılmaktadır. Kazalar devletin tepkisi, o dönem Osmanlı devletinin niteliğine ve içinde bulunduğu yapısal ve konjonktürel koşullara uygun olarak, çokbiçimli ve yer yer çelişkili olmuştur. İşçilerin kazalara tepkisiyse greve gitmek biçiminde tezahür etmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Maden İşçileri, Ereğli-Zonguldak Kömür Havzası, Osmanlı İşçi Sınıfı, Ücretler, İş Kazaları

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First I would like to thank S. Akşin Somel, the supervisor of the thesis, for his guidance and the timely interventions he made during the whole process of preparing the thesis. I should thank Oktay Özel and Aykut Kansu for their helpful criticisms and suggestions. I also appreciate Dr. Kansu's role in my shift to history. I should also mention Galip Yalman and H. Tarık Şengül from Middle East Technical University, who greatly contributed to my decision to be a scholar. Throughout my undergraduate and graduate study, Ebru Deniz Ozan provided continuous moral and practical support, which will always mean much to me. My parents also did whatever they could do for me.

I am indebted to Donald Quataert and Nadir Özbek for informing the academic community about the extensive sources pertaining to the Ottoman era that exists in Zonguldak. I am personally grateful to Prof. Quataert for his special interest and help. I should also thank Erol Çatma from Zonguldak for his help and for the motivation he provided with his diligence and resoluteness. Lastly, I should express my gratitude to Mustafa Yüce from Zonguldak Karaelmas University, who has contributed to the uncovering of the sources used in this thesis. In addition, without his kindness and the means he provided to me in Karaelmas University, this thesis could not have been written.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	viii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Problems to be Investigated	5
1.2 The Sources.....	7
1.3 Structure of the Thesis.....	7
CHAPTER 2: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COAL BASIN	9
2.1 Introduction	9
2.2 The Historical Development of the Basin	10
2.2.1 The Coal Basin as <i>Vakıf</i> : the <i>Hazine-i Hassa</i> Period, 1848-1865	10
2.2.2 The Coal Basin under <i>Bahriye Nezareti</i> , 1865-1908	12
2.2.3 French Capital Enters the Region: the Ereğli Company.....	14
2.2.4 The Ottoman Policy in the Basin in the Post-Revolutionary Era	19
2.2.5 The Basin through the War Years, 1918-1922	23
2.3 The Miners of the Basin: Misery and Struggle	25
2.3.1 The Miners until ' <i>Dilaver Paşa Nizamnamesi</i> '	26

2.3.2 'Dilaver Paşa Nizamnamesi'	27
2.3.3 Workers after the ' <i>Dilaver Paşa Nizamnamesi</i> '	29
2.3.4 Workers in Struggle: The Strikes of 1908	30
2.3.5 Legislation of the Ankara Government	32
CHAPTER 3: WAGES	36
3.1 Introduction	36
3.2 Ottoman Wages	37
3.3 Wages in the Coal Basin	39
3.4 Wages in the Coal Basin according to Karaelmas University Archives	40
3.4.1 Wages during 1905-1911	40
3.4.2 Wages circa 1922	44
3.4.3 Changes in Wages through the Years of War, 1911-1922	46
3.5 Wages in the Basin, 1875-1922: An Analysis	48
3.5.1 The Impact of the Strikes of 1908	52
3.6 Deductions	54
3.6.1 <i>Amele Birliđi</i>	54
3.6.2 Official Deductions	57
3.6.3 Other Deductions: Bread, Goods, Transport and Fines	57
3.6.4 After the Deductions: What's Left?	58
CHAPTER 4: ACCIDENTS	61
4.1 Introduction	61
4.2 Accidents and Their Outcomes, 1909-1910	63

4.3 Responses and Reactions to Accidents	69
4.3.1 Mine Administration	69
4.3.2 Engineer's Office	70
4.3.3 The Ottoman State on Accidents: An Evaluation	72
4.3.4 The French Company and the Accidents	73
4.3.5 The Workers and the Accidents	74
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION	77
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	80
APPENDICES	84

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Ottoman labour history is one of the most underdeveloped and neglected areas of the Ottoman social history. One can observe that in this area even the most basic and essential studies still remain uncarried. The practitioners of Ottoman labour history attribute this poor condition of the field to a number of factors and the problem of the lack of sources is often held responsible. It is no doubt that the scarcity of primary material to be used in historical studies is not the only serious problem with which the Ottoman labour historians confront; yet, it constitutes a great obstacle for the advancement of our state of knowledge concerning the Ottoman workers.

The study of the workers of Ereğli-Zonguldak coal basin also shared this backward state of the Ottoman labour historiography; presently, what we know about these workers is much less extensive than what we do not. Indeed, due to a number of factors, the workers of the coal basin may constitute a highly interesting and promising subject matter for Ottoman labour studies. First, there was a high degree of labour concentration in the basin. At the turn of the century, there were approximately ten thousand workers in this relatively small region. Moreover, the heavy dependence of mining industry on transportation via railways required a significant population of railway workers and thereby further increased the density of labourers. Secondly, the mine workers, rather justifiably, have been given a special place in labour historiography in general. Among other things, the

extraordinary hardship of the working conditions of these workers and their apparent militancy in terms of struggle and resistance have made them one of the foci of working-class histories. Thirdly, all of the workers of the Ereğli-Zonguldak coal basin were not permanent workers. A significant proportion of the labour force consisted of rotational workers who continued to spend half of their working times in agriculture and thus did not solely depend on income from mine labour. Fourthly, there was *mükellefiyet*, the practice of forced labour imposed by the government as a solution to the acute problem of labour scarcity. The wide application of this practice indicates that the forms of labour other than free labour existed in the basin, which adds another dimension to the complexity of studying the workers of this mining region.

These points, among others, depict the significance of the history of these labourers for the Ottoman labour history. On the other hand, the history of the coal basin is of high importance for Ottoman history in general. For one, the basin became one of the most important concentration areas of foreign capital in the Empire. The French company, which was granted the right to exploit mines in the region, represented the biggest foreign investment in mining sector¹ and became the second largest employer throughout the Empire².

The history of the basin started in 1848, when the revenues of the mines were allocated to a religious foundation³. From 1848 to 1865, the basin was administered by *Hazine-i Hassa* (Privy Purse). The land on which rich coal

¹ Vedat Eldem, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İktisadi Şartları Hakkında Bir Tetkik* (Ankara: TTK, 1994), p.46.

² *Ibid.*, p.141.

³ Sina Çıladır points out the oddity in dedicating the revenues of such a strategic mine to charity: *Zonguldak Havzasında İşçi Hareketlerinin Tarihi 1848/1940* (Ankara: Yeraltı Maden-İş, 1977), p. 34.

reserves lied was state-owned land⁴ and the ownership structure and status of land had, as in other parts of the world, an influence on the development of production relations. In late-nineteenth century Bolivia, for example, landed estates were combined with mines, basically as a solution to labour scarcity and the problems of labour discipline⁵. In European states such as Spain, Portugal, Italy and Luxemburg, landownership was so fragmented that capital could not flow freely through lands, and this led to nationalisation in these countries. By contrast, in Britain, the highly concentrated nature of mining lands did not hinder the development of mining and nationalisation was delayed until 1938⁶. It is possible that the absence of landed property in the Ereğli-Zonguldak coal basin had a similar impact on the development of mining. It may have enabled the concentration of production in a few hands before the French company and the actual monopolisation of the basin by the company afterwards. The fact that the nationalisation of the coal basin did not occur before 1940 may also have had a relation to this. Secondly, due to the absence of private property of mining land and due to the fact that the pits were operated with concessions of the government, the mine operators emerged as both capitalist entrepreneurs and *mültezims* simultaneously. Similar to the situation in Latin American mining, where “employers tried to tie their workers through debt or coercive measures”⁷, the relation between operators and workers in the coal basin was rather complex and

⁴ The provisions of the Arazi Kanunnamesi (Land Law) of 1858, which formally established private ownership of land, did not apply to the basin. See Ali Özeken, *Türkiye Kömür Ekonomisi Tarihi, Birinci Kısım* (İstanbul: İ.Ü. İktisat Fakültesi, 1955), p.9-10.

⁵ Erick D. Langer, “The Barriers to Proletarianization: Bolivian Mine Labour, 1826-1918”, *International Review of Social History*, vol.41 (1996), 27-51, pp.39-41.

⁶ Ben Fine, *The Coal Question: Political Economy and Industrial Change from the Nineteenth Century to the Present Day* (London: Routledge, 1990), pp.38-41.

⁷ Langer, “Bolivian Mine Labour”, pp.33-4.

involved many dimensions, some of them being in ‘contradiction’ with modern capitalist relations of production⁸.

The mining activity in the basin during the *Hazine-i Hassa* period was characterised by insufficient capitalisation, poor technology and low and unstable level of production. This tended to change after the basin was left to the Naval Ministry in 1865. But the real change started in 1882, when the ministry’s monopoly on the purchase of coal was lifted. From 1880s onwards, big capital invested in the region, big companies were formed, and the annual production substantially increased. Another major transformation began with the entrance of the French *Ereğli Şirket-i Osmaniyesi* to the basin. The company initiated a process that was characterised by the more rational organisation of production, substantial investments in infrastructure, the liquidation of small capital and monopolisation.

The rule of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) after 1908 also had its influence on the development of the basin. Within a short span of time, the CUP government replaced the military and ‘Hamidian’ high and middle bureaucrats of the basin with civilian personnel linked to Union and Progress. Moreover, it attempted to establish a closer and firmer control on the basin. However, under pressure from foreign capital, it had to consent to policies that furthered the position of foreign companies in the basin.

All of these changes in the structure, organisation and administration of the coal basin more or less affected the lives of thousands of workers working and living in the region. The conditions under which the labourers worked during the *Hazine-i Hassa* administration were extremely unhealthy and unsafe. The workers

⁸ See Çıladır, *Zonguldak Havzası*, pp.31-2.

worked ‘from dawn to sunset’ and without any regulations governing the work, or without any medical service. More often than not, wages were paid in kind.

It is no doubt that the Naval Ministry administration and particularly the so-called ‘Dilaver Paşa Regulation’ represented an improvement for the workers. The protection provided by the regulation in the form of regular pay schedules, regulated work hours, medical care etc. is in itself a major event for the history of the workers of the coal basin. On the other hand, it is not fully known to what extent the provisions of this one-hundred-article regulation were implemented. At least, the problem of the payment of wages on time continued.

Although the entrance of the French company to the basin brought about a progress in terms of technology and infrastructure, it is hardly possible to say that this found reflection in the working and living conditions of workers. Except a brief period of relatively improvement (between 1880s, when the flow of big capital brought about a high demand for labour, and 1906, when the ban on hiring workers from outside the region was lifted), the plight of workers perpetuated. A strong indicator of the persistence of unsafe working conditions is the industrial accidents, which seemed not to be affected from the increase in the big investments and improvement in infrastructural facilities in the basin.

1.1 Problems to be Investigated

As -hopefully- clear from the above presentation of the history of the basin and its workers during the Ottoman period, there are a number of problems that could and should be investigated in this history. For example, in the basin, there were rotational workers, mostly local people, and permanent workers, mostly outsiders.

There were also skilled and unskilled ones. What was the relationship between them? What was the role of these differences in promoting or hindering a sense of solidarity among them?⁹ What was the effect of the money pumped by the rotational workers' wages into the peasant economy of the region? What were the consequences, in terms of class formation, of the 'semi-proletarian' nature of these workers? How did the wages develop in the course of the years in question? What was the level of the standard of living of the workers? Was it possible to observe a difference in workers' attitudes towards foreign and Ottoman mine operators? What were the strategies and tactics of foreign capital in the basin? What were the state policies towards the basin in general, towards the workers, foreign firms and local firms in particular? Were the policies of CUP substantially different from those of the *ancien régime*? What was the frequency of the accidents and which measures were taken by the operators and the state to avoid them? What was the labour's reaction to those accidents?

The number of these questions could be easily increased. On the other hand, due to certain limitations, in this thesis, only a few of them is thoroughly and systematically discussed. Some of them are touched upon briefly and some are simply ignored. Yet, the focus is on the points that seem to be representative and that promise to extent our knowledge about the workers of the basin more than the others.

⁹ Quataert, Donald, "Zonguldak Maden İşçilerinin Hayatı, 1870-1920", *Toplum ve Bilim*, no.83

1.2 The Sources

There are not too many works on the history of the coal basin in the Ottoman period and I tried to make intensive use of those that exist and were of reach to me. As primary sources, I used the archival sources located in Zonguldak. These sources, which were uncovered by coincidence, constitute, in Quataert and Özbek's words, the finest assemblage of materials on Ottoman labour history yet uncovered¹⁰. Thus, it seems that the importance of these archival materials for the Ottoman labour history is comparable to that of the region for the late Ottoman economy. Among the thousands of documents, there are those that relate to the Republican period but the majority pertains to the Ottoman era. The documents that concern the Ottoman era are now found in three locations: Zonguldak Karaelmas University, *TTK Eğitim Dairesi* and in private hands¹¹. Among the 31 types and over 200 hundred pieces of registers in Karaelmas University, I worked on a portion of them. Indeed, these registers deserve years of meticulous study by numerous scholars.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

The thesis consists of five chapters, including the introductory and the concluding ones. Chapter 2, "A Brief History of the Coal Basin", is divided into two parts. In the first part, major developments and policy changes in the coal basin is presented briefly. In the second part, these developments and changes are discussed and

(1999/2000), 80-91, p.87.

¹⁰ Donald Quataert and Nadir Özbek "The Ereğli-Zonguldak Coal Mines: A Catalog of Archival Documents", *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, vol.23, no. 1 (1999), 55-67

¹¹ For a detailed description and classification of these documents see Ibid.

interpreted from the point of view of labour. Developments that specifically concern the workers are also mentioned and discussed. Chapter 3 is devoted to the wages in the basin. After a brief section on Ottoman wages in general, wages in the basin are discussed in the context of certain overlapping time periods, namely 1905-11, circa 1922, 1911-22 and 1875-22. The impact of the Strikes of 1908 on Ottoman wages in general and on wages in the basin in particular is also interpreted. The second part of Chapter 3 relates to different forms of deductions and cuts imposed on worker's wages. Chapter 4 is devoted to the industrial accidents that took place in the basin. Here, the focus is a period of six months that extend from the last months of 1909 to the first months of 1910. In the light of the accident records of this period, various state organs', the company's, and the workers' reaction to the accidents are interpreted. The thesis, needless to say, ends with a concluding chapter in which the most significant conclusions that come out of individual chapters are summarised and combined.

CHAPTER 2

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COAL BASIN

2.1 Introduction

The Ereğli-Zonguldak coal basin and its inhabitants experienced major transformations in the course of the 19th century. The situation in the early 20th century was substantially different from that in the 1830s, when the existence of coal is allegedly noticed for the first time. During this period, the basin witnessed different managements, fluctuations in the production, the entry and exit of national and foreign capitals, a number of mining and labour regulations put into force, several incidents and massive strikes. Therefore, before going into detail about the workers' working and living conditions, it is necessary to review these changes as a background to the period that constitutes my major focus of interest. Here, it should be noted that different periodisation schemes could be used for examining the history of the coal basin. The most frequent scheme used by researchers up to now has been one that periodises it according to the state organ in charge of the control of the mines. I will use this periodisation for the sake of convenience and bear in mind that such a periodisation scheme may obscure more than it reveals.

After that, the developments in the conditions of the mineworkers are presented briefly and in doing this, a different periodisation used. The so-called Dilaver Paşa regulations and the strikes of 1908 are considered as historical

landmarks concerning the workers of the basin and their situation is discussed in three sections: until the regulation, between the regulation and the strikes, and during and after the strikes.

2.2 The Historical Development of the Basin

In this section, the historical development of the coal basin is examined under four major headings: *Hazine-i Hassa* period, Naval Ministry period, the period after the entrance of the Ereğli company into the basin (this includes the post-revolutionary Ottoman policy towards the basin) and the years of war and interregnum.

2.2.1 The Coal Basin as Vakıf: the Hazine-i Hassa Period, 1848-1865

According to the popular wisdom, a man named Uzun Mehmet who took a sack of coal to the capital and was rewarded first found the coal in the region. Indeed, there is no evidence to support this argument¹² and it seems that it is hardly anything more than a legend.

The land on which the rich coal deposits lied was in the status of *miri* (state-owned) land and in 1848, Sultan Abdülmecid endowed the revenues of the mines to a *vakıf* (foundation) and the revenues started to be used for religious purposes¹³. The task of the *Hazine-i Hassa* (Privy Purse) management was to collect the revenue deriving from the sources called *mukataas* (tax-farming units) and to supervise the mining operations of the *mültezims* (tax-farmers) in the basin¹⁴. In the same year, *Hazine-i Hassa* transferred the right to exploit the mines to *Kömür*

¹² Erol Çatma, *Asker İşçileri* (İstanbul: Ceylan, 1998), p.69.

¹³ For some examples of these religious purposes see Kadir Tuncer, *Tarihten Günümüze Zonguldak'ta İşçi Sınıfının Durumu. "Kumpanyalar Dönemine Geri Dönüş"* (İstanbul: Göçebe, 1998), p.30.

Kumpanyası, established by the bankers of Galata, for an annual payment of 30,000 piasters¹⁵. Although the *Hazine-i Hassa* management took the right of operation of the mines back from this company in 1851 and assigned a director to the basin¹⁶, many of the operators remained the creditors of the Ottoman government.

During the *Hazine-i Hassa* period, the mining in the region was characterised by production through extremely primitive methods. Mainly due to the lack of investment on the part of the operators of the mines, contemporary coal mining technology could not be introduced into the basin. The amount of production, therefore, remained considerably low and showed no sign of recovery through the period. One exception to this could be the English company that was granted the right of operation of the mines during the Crimean War (1854-56). Despite the briefness of the period, the company made some steps towards improving the infrastructure of the coal mining¹⁷.

During the *Hazine-i Hassa* period, the relations of production were in an underdeveloped state. The operators of the pits were both capitalist entrepreneurs and *mültezims* (tax-farmers). Moreover, it is known that the state occasionally granted the right of collecting the taxes of nearby villages to mine operators in exchange for the coal it took from them¹⁸. Thus, the relation between the workers and the operators was something more than a relation between free labour and capitalists. More of then not, the mine operator was simultaneously a capitalist who exploited the workers' surplus labour, a tax collector who was in charge of

¹⁴ Vedat Eldem, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İktisadi Şartları Hakkında Bir Tetkik* (Ankara: TTK, 1994), p.47.

¹⁵ Tuncer, *Tarihten Günümüze*, p.28.

¹⁶ Çatma, *Asker İşçiler*, p.70.

¹⁷ Tuncer, *Tarihten Günümüze*, p.29.

collecting the agrarian taxes and a usurer who lent money to the workers with high interest rates. The outcome of this complex set of relationships in the basin was frequent payments in kind and different forms of forced labour¹⁹.

2.2.2 The Coal Basin under Bahriye Nezareti, 1865-1908

Having seen the low production level and the disorganisation in the basin, the Ottoman government placed the Ereğli-Zonguldak coalmines under the authority of the *Bahriye Nezareti* (Naval Ministry) in 1865. This decision was taken because the coal produced in the basin was mainly used by the ships of the Ottoman navy and the navy was in a process of reconstruction and enlargement²⁰. The commerce of coal was regulated according to a *yed-i vahid* (monopoly) system; “[u]ntil 1882, the Ministry of the Navy had the sole right to purchase, at government-determined prices, coal produced at Ereğli.”²¹

Although mining was carried out with relatively better infrastructure and organisation in this period, the management of Naval Ministry was not successful enough either. The amount of total production remained highly unstable. For example, while the production was 142,000 tons in 1877, it decreased to only 56,000 tons in 1880²². This unstable nature and low level of production was combined with pressures both from foreign capital to ensure concessions and from

¹⁸ Sina Çıladı, *Zonguldak Havzasında İşçi Hareketlerinin Tarihi 1848/1940* (Ankara: Yeraltı Maden-İş, 1977), p.31.

¹⁹ A similar situation could be observed in nineteenth-century Latin America. There, the employers responded to labour scarcity by trying “to tie workers to their enterprises through debt or coercive measures.” Moreover, particularly in early and mid-nineteenth century, payment in kind was very frequent. Erick. D. Langer, “The Barriers to Proletarianization: Bolivian Mine Labour, 1826-1918”, *International Review of Social History*, vol.41 (1996), 27-51, pp.33-4 and 42.

²⁰ Towards the end of the reign of Abdülaziz, Ottoman navy became known as the third largest navy of its time; Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. VII (Ankara: TTK, 1983), p.191.

²¹ Donald Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908. Reactions to European Economic Penetration* (New York, NYU Press, 1983), p.45.

Ottoman capital aiming to abolish Naval Ministry's monopoly in purchasing the coal. These pressures led the government to make an important decision in 1882. Rather than giving a concession to a French company, which was trying, for some time, to get one, the Ottoman government chose to abolish the Naval Ministry's purchasing monopoly as an inducement to existing mine operators²³. The 1882 decision was followed by policies designed to support private Ottoman capital in the basin; these policies were in the form of tax reductions, reductions in export duties and customs duties exemptions²⁴. Both the decision and the subsequent policies brought about a considerable change in the capital structure of the basin. From 1880s onwards, relatively big capital invested in the mines; big-scale Ottoman companies such as İnsaniye, İnamiye, Eseyan-Karamanyan and Gürcü companies were formed²⁵. The production substantially increased. The figure of 98,000 tons in 1881 rose to 158,000 in 1886 and averaged around 150,000 tons for several years²⁶.

Another point that should be of concern is the condition of the ownership of mines in the basin before the Ereğli Company. After the entrance of big capital in the 1880s, small-scale enterprises were liquidated. This brought about a high concentration in the ownership; the biggest four firms, namely the Karamanyan, Gürcü, Halaçyan and Gregoviç companies had a share of $\frac{3}{4}$ over total production

²² Ibid., pp.45-6.

²³ Ibid., p.46.

²⁴ Ibid., p.47.

²⁵ Ahmet Naim quoted in Çıladı, Zonguldak Havzası, p.59.

²⁶ Ibid., p.47. Although the figures given by Eldem is different (e.g. 1886=100,000 tons), they also indicate a substantial rise: Eldem, Tetkik, p.50.

around 1893²⁷. It is no surprise that this highly concentrated structure of ownership continued during the domination of the Ereğli Company as well.

The Naval Ministry administration could be considered as the beginnings of modern capitalist production in the basin. The authority of this ministry continued formally until 1908; yet, the concession given to the Ereğli Company was so important that it deserves to be examined under a separate heading.

2.2.3 French Capital Enters the Region: the Ereğli Company

The concession to exploit the Ereğli coal mines given to the *Société d'Heraclée* (*Ereğli Şirket-i Osmaniyesi* / Ereğli Company) in 1896 is a major event for *fin de siècle* Ottoman history. For, “[t]his became the most important single venture of foreign capital in the Ottoman Empire to exploit mineral sources until the Mesopotamian oil fields were opened up.”²⁸ Ereğli Company was really a major foreign investment in the Empire. For the mining sector, its investment capital of 186,000,000 piasters was incomparable to that of other companies, the biggest of which, the French Balya-Karaaydın company, had an investment capital of 49,200,000 piasters²⁹. It was also very large in terms of the number of people it employed. Among all national or foreign firms in the empire, with its over 5,000 personnel, it was surpassed only by the *Tütün Rejisi* (Tobacco Régie), which employed approximately 14,000 people³⁰. The French government also attached

²⁷ Quataert, *Disintegration*, pp.47-8.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.41.

²⁹ Eldem, *Tetkik*, p.46.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.141.

great importance to the company; at the time, “The French Ambassador wrote glowingly of the French colony being established at Zonguldak”³¹.

The company undertook major infrastructural activity in the region, including the construction of a coal washing factory, a repairs workshop, a coke and briquette factory and most importantly, the development of the Zonguldak port³². These improvements, and the railway construction undertaken by the Ottoman government quickly increased production. The company production rose rapidly and averaged over 500,000 tons. In the first years after the turn of the century, the Ereğli company found itself in fierce competition with the other big firms in the basin, especially the Sarıcazadeler company, which was established by Ragıp Paşa from Abdülhamid’s court³³. In general, the French company emerged triumphant from this competition. It also acquired or took under its control abandoned pits, pits run by individual operators and those operated by the state. The company also gained an almost monopoly position. In 1902 and 1907, it accounted for 79 and 77 percent of the total coal output of the basin, respectively³⁴. By 1909, in Çatalağzı region, for example, all the mines were operated by the company³⁵. Because of this ‘dominant position’ of the company, the increase in the

³¹ Quataert, *Disintegration*, p.49.

³² Çıladı, *Zonguldak Havzası*, p.80.

³³ *Ibid.*, p.83. Ragıp Paşa had other investments in the mining sector. From 1899 through 1903, at the expense of a British company, he got the concession to exploit the chromium mines of Dağardı and Harmancık, the latter being the most important reserves throughout the Empire; see Orhan Kurmuş, *Emperyalizmin Türkiye’ye Girişi* (İstanbul: Bilim, 1977), p.203-8.

³⁴ Quataert, *Disintegration*, p.49. On the other hand, according to official mine statistics, the share of Ottoman Turkish, Ottoman non-Turkish and foreign operators in the coal production of the years 1908-11 was as follows: Turkish 21,35 %, non-Turkish 26,34 %, foreign 52,01 %: Gündüz Ökçün, *XX. Yüzyıl Başlarında Osmanlı Maden Üretiminde Türk, Azınlık ve Yabancı Payları* (Ankara, 1969), p.876. It should be noted, however, that these data tend to obscure the fact that some mines that were formally operated by an Ottoman subject were, in reality, controlled by the Ereğli company. Thus, the real figures of the amount of coal extracted by foreign operators should be higher.

³⁵ Karaelmas University Archives (KÜA), no.40 (Evrak Defteri), p. 96.

production of the company found direct reflection in the overall production of the basin. In 1907/8, with a revenue of 42,962,000 piasters, the region became the most important mining region of the empire. Another figure shows that coal had a share of 44.4 percent over the total revenues obtained from mining³⁶.

According to Donald Quataert, despite the major concession it had granted in 1896, the Ottoman government was hardly friendly towards the company. It tried to limit further involvement of foreign capital in the mines via legislations, regulations and other means, and pursued policies designed to support Ottoman capital in the region vis-à-vis foreign capital. It is possible to argue that this ambivalent attitude reflects the contradictory situation in which the Ottoman government found itself. On the one hand, within the context of the integration into world capitalist system of the Empire, it could hardly resist the aspirations of foreign capital. On the other hand, it did not want to abandon its control over the country's resources completely and used the means that were in its disposal to prevent such a development, particularly through the mine administration, which, under different names, was responsible for the whole basin. For example, when the Çatalağzı office, one of the branch offices of the mine administration, asked the central office to take a document of permission from the company in order to enter the mines of the company located in Çatalağzı, the central office responded that the mine administration has the unconditional right to enter and control the mines of the company whenever it considers necessary³⁷. This correspondence is particularly important, since it indicates the confusion between local and central offices of the mine administration concerning their rights vis-à-vis the company. It should be also

³⁶ Eldem, Tetkik, p.43.

recalled within this context that all the mines in Çatalağzı belonged to the Ereğli Company³⁸. The mine administration also demanded that the maps and plans of particular mines operated by the company should be presented to the administration; it seems, however, that the company was reluctant in doing so. The administration again responded in a harsh tone, stating that the administration could ask for the maps and plans of the mines whenever it wants³⁹. But it is understood that this problem between the company and the mine administration continued even after this statement of the latter⁴⁰. The administration also shut down some of the mines of the company and again, the company tried to resist; we learn from a correspondence between the Zonguldak *Kaymakamlığı* that the seals put on one of the seams of the company was removed⁴¹, which means that the production in the seam was resumed without the permission of the administration. On the other hand, the relations between the company and the administration was not always, or as a whole, tense. For example, the Çatalağzı branch rented the buildings of the company and the two thus entered into a relationship of landlord-tenant⁴². The same branch also proposed to employ a night-watchman in order to prevent the stealing of company's coal stocks by the local population⁴³. It may also be argued that the changing personal attitudes of high-level bureaucrats to the company contributed to the complexity of the company-administration relations. Hüseyin Fehmi (İmer), one of the directors of the mine administration, writes in his

³⁷ KÜA, no.40, p.100 (18 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 / 31 October 1909).

³⁸ KÜA, no.40, p.96 (28 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 / 10 November 1909).

³⁹ KÜA, no.40, p.131 (28 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 / 10 November 1909).

⁴⁰ KÜA, no.40, p.104 (21 Kanun-ı Evvel 1325 / 4 December 1909).

⁴¹ KÜA, no.40, p.132 (4 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 17 November 1909).

⁴² KÝA, no.40, p.105 (10 Kanun-ı Sani 1325 / 23 January 1910).

⁴³ KÜA, no.40, p.102 (10 Teşrin-Sani 1325 / 23 November 1909).

memoirs that while his predecessor, Eşref Bey, had not been in good relations with the company, he got on well with the high-level officers of the company⁴⁴.

In addition to having unstable relations with the mine administration, the company was met with hostility from rival concessionaires and local capitalists as well. During the spring of 1909, the newly elected parliamentarians from the region heavily protested “against the ruination of Ottoman mine operators by the company.”⁴⁵ The hostility of the deputies from the region may well be reflecting the ongoing struggle in the region between the French company and the Ottoman capitalists for control of the mines.

Apart from the hostility of local mine operators to the company, it may be argued that there was a kind of popular hostility as well. The local population was hardly friendly towards the company. The company constantly faced robberies⁴⁶, attacks on its mines⁴⁷, illegal construction near its seams etc. For example, in five months’ time in the year of 1325 (1909-10), five incidents against its property were recorded. In a letter sent from one of the local branches to the centre of the administration, it is even argued that the daily loss of coal powder of the company due to theft is three to five tons⁴⁸. I think that these incidents could be interpreted as more than ordinary crimes. Their high frequency and that no such incidents were

⁴⁴ Kerim Yund (ed.), Seçkin Türk Ormancısı Hüseyin Fehmi İmer Hayatı Hatıraları (1871-1960) (İstanbul: Baha, 1973), pp.46-8.

⁴⁵ Quataert, Disintegration, p.54. At the time, the basin was a part of Bolu sancak and the deputies of Bolu were Hacı Abdülvehab Efendi, Habib Bey, Ahmed Şerafettin Bey and Taşhancızade Mustafa Zeki Bey. All of them were Turkish, and with the exception of Habib Bey, independent. See Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi (İstanbul: İletişim, 1995), p. 395.

⁴⁶ See KÜA, no.40, p.71 (19 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 2 December 1909) and p.103 (19 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 2 December 1909).

⁴⁷ For example, see KÜA, no.40, p.134 (11 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 25 November 1909).

⁴⁸ KÜA, no.40, p.102 (10 Teşrin-Sani 1325 / 23 November 1909).

seen against local capitalists urges one to consider these incidents as signs of hostility or dissent against the French capital in the region.

2.2.4 The Ottoman Policy in the Basin in the Post-Revolutionary Era

Although the policies of the Ottoman government during the Young Turk era are occasionally mentioned in other sections of this chapter, at this point, a few words about the general policy of the post-Revolutionary Ottoman government towards the coal basin would be appropriate. In this context, the attitude towards mine operators other than the French company should also be considered. For, although the company produced a significant part of the total output, the existence of other foreign and local capitals in the region is an innegligible fact.

The Union and Progress government initiated a number of substantial administrative changes in the basin. The mines were taken out from the authority of Naval Ministry and put under first the Ministry of Public Works, then the Ministry of Commerce, Agriculture and Mines⁴⁹. The mine administration's name was converted from *Maden-i Hümayun Nazırlığı* (Department of Imperial Mines) to *Maden Umum Müdürlüğü* (General Directorate of Mines). Civil bureaucrats were assigned to the administrative and technical posts in the basin to replace the military officers attached to the Naval Ministry⁵⁰. In 1910, Hüseyin Fehmi (İmer) from the Committee of Union of Progress was assigned as the general director and was granted a wide range of powers. Indeed, the archival sources also suggest that a comprehensive change in the personnel structure of the mine administration occurred after the Young Turk revolution. The *Maaş Defteri* (salary register) of

⁴⁹ Ahmet Ali Özeken, *Türkiye Kömür Ekonomisi Tarihi, Birinci Kısım* (İstanbul: İ.Ü. İktisat Fakültesi, 1955), p.15.

1325⁵¹ (1909-10) includes information about the assignment dates of the personnel as well and it is striking to see that nearly all high and middle officials were assigned to their posts after July 1908. Moreover, it is also seen in this register that a number of employees who were removed from their offices were also expelled from civil service. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the Young Turk government almost completely removed the cadre of the *ancien régime* from the mine administration and replaced it with that of Union and Progress during the years 1908-10.

During the post-revolutionary era, the internal organisation of the mine administration was highly centralised. The local branches always had to ask for the approval of the centre even for the smallest construction work, smallest spending, employment of a single worker or granting their employees leaves of short periods. Every branch sent regular monthly detailed reports on spending and coal production of the sub-region under their responsibility⁵². One of the major goals of the government policy towards the coalmines was, needless to say, to increase production. According to mining regulations, the mines that were left idle for three months were considered abandoned⁵³. Thus, the mine administration behaved accordingly. It was very keen on not allowing any stoppage on the operation of the

⁵⁰ Çıldır, Zonguldak Havzası, p.98.

⁵¹ KÜA, no.158.

⁵² See various entries in KÜA, no.40, “Evrak Defteri” (1325 / 1909-10); no.154, “Evrak-ı Varide Defteri” (1326 / 1910-11); no.42, “Evrak İrsalat Defteri” (1326 / 1910-11) and no.26, “Evrak İrsalat Defteri” (1326 / 1910-11). Indeed, this was not a peculiar feature of the Union and Progress era: see KÜA, no. 73, “Evrak-ı Umumiye Defteri” (Mart 1321-Mayıs 1323 / March 1905-June 1907).

⁵³ KÜA, no. 154, entry no.32.

mines or the transportation of coal, and if a problem occurred, it pressed the local offices to complete the necessary repairs swiftly⁵⁴.

The government's desire to establish control over the operation of the mines also found its reflection in the attitude of the mine administration towards mine operators other than the French company. All mine operators were required to assign a director to each mine, who would be directly responsible for the whole affairs of the mine vis-à-vis the administration⁵⁵. The mine administration was also concerned with the issues related to labour; it closely followed the actions of the mine operators concerning the payment of wages⁵⁶, accommodation⁵⁷ and workplace organisation⁵⁸. On the other hand, as in the case of the Ereğli Company, the relations between the administration and other mine operators was complex and involved many dimensions. For instance, when assigned as the director of the mine administration on May 23rd, 1910, Hüseyin Fehmi (İmer) saw no problem in accepting the 'kind invitation' of the Gürcü company and making his journey from İstanbul to Kozlu in one of the company's ships⁵⁹.

The changes in the formal hierarchical structure of the mine administration may have also had an influence on its policies towards the basin in general and the mine operators in particular. According to memoirs of Hüseyin Fehmi (İmer), when the Ministry of Forest and Mines attempted to assign a military officer to the head of basin's mine administration around 1909-10, the mine operators of the region

⁵⁴ For example, see KÜA, no.40, p.78 (22 Kanun-ı Sani 1325 / 4 February 1910) and no.41, entry no.2721/54 (8 Nisan 1326 / 21 Nisan 1910).

⁵⁵ KÜA, no.41, entry no.3558/148 (11 Ağustos 1326 / 24 August 1910).

⁵⁶ KÜA, no.154, entry no.146/35 (1 Ağustos 1326/ 14 August 1910).

⁵⁷ KÜA, no.154, no.- (12 Teşrin-i Evvel 1326 / 25 October 1910).

⁵⁸ KÜA, no.41, p.47 (25 Teşrin-i Evvel 1326 / 7 November 1910).

heavily protested and demanded a non-military director, reminding the difficulties they had suffered under the military administration of the Naval Ministry⁶⁰.

In general, the policies of the CUP government concerning the basin was oriented towards a firmer control of the coal mines. It is possible to argue that these policies had an impact on the development of the basin after 1908. On the other hand, the foreign capital continued to dominate the region. The government cancelled the concessions granted to the Sarıcazade company, the biggest Ottoman company in the basin, and this resulted in its acquirement by a German coal mining giant⁶¹. The owner of the company, Ragıp Paşa, had acquired these concessions by virtue of his close relationship to Abdülhamit and thus this should be considered as a political decision on the part of the new régime. On March 5th, 1912, the Ereğli company was granted major concessions. Initially, the government had rejected the demands of the company *in toto*. Under pressure from the Ottoman Bank, however, it had to agree to the conditions imposed by the company and the parties signed an agreement. By this agreement, the company was freed from almost all of its liabilities to the Ottoman government (to link railways via tunnels, to pay the government's share of 8 percent from the port's income, to sell the coal of abandoned pits transferred to itself to the Ottoman state with a low price, to give for free the government's share of 10 percent from the coal powder it produced etc.)⁶². Thus, despite its efforts, the CUP government's desire to establish a firmer control over the mines failed and the situation even got worse, with the entrance of

⁵⁹ Yund (ed.), Hüseyin Fehmi İmer, p. 45. Such relations existed in the Hamidian era as well. For example, in 1905, nineteen mine operators contributed the financing of the construction of the Bartın Hükümet Konağı: KÜA, no.73, p.24 (18 Mart 1321 / 31 March 1905).

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.44.

⁶¹ Çıladır, Zonguldak Havzası, p.101.

⁶² Ahmet Naim quoted in Çıladır, Zonguldak Havzası, pp.105-7.

a giant German enterprise into the basin and the advancement in the position of the French company vis-à-vis the Ottoman state. To conclude this section, it should be said that this interpretation of the policies of the CUP is in contradiction with that of Zafer Toprak. Toprak argues that, while the period between the Revolution and 1912 was characterised by a belief in and a practice of economic liberalism (free trade, support for foreign capital etc.), for this time to the end of the World War I, CUP adopted a policy of '*milli iktisat*' (national economy) and attempted to put the economy under strict control and favoured small Muslim entrepreneurs vis-à-vis foreign and non-Muslim ones⁶³. On the contrary, the above investigation of the policies of the CUP on the coal basin suggests that such a significant turn did not exist in the economic policies of the post-Revolutionary Ottoman state, at least concerning the coal basin. Rather, throughout the period in question, there were attempts on the part of the CUP government to exert a firmer and closer control on Ottoman economy; but these attempts, for different reasons, failed. As is discussed in relation to the labour issue in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3 below, the Ottoman state of the time was influenced by a number of factors, some of which stemmed from its very nature, and was under various internal and external pressures, and thereby could find only little room to take initiative in such economic policy issues.

2.2.5 The Basin through the War Years, 1918-1922

The onset of the World War I marked the end of the operation of French capital in the basin. During the war, a war coal centre was established under the command of a German officer⁶⁴. It should be noted that this was strikingly similar to the

⁶³ Zafer Toprak, *Milli İktisat-Milli Burjuvazi* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt, 1995).

⁶⁴ Özeken, *Kömür Ekonomisi*, p.15.

situation during the Crimean War, when the administration of the basin was actually left to Britain. During the German control, the German capital in the basin initiated some new investments and replaced the impact of French capital with its impact⁶⁵. In 1920, however, the region was occupied by the French. French troops took control of the strategic Zonguldak port and deployed extensive forces in Kozlu, Kilimli and Kapuz coasts and Ereğli's Bababurnu coast. Having confronted a significant resistance from the people, the French troops left Zonguldak and its surrounding in June 1921, and thus ended the fifteen-month occupation⁶⁶.

After the end of occupation, the Ankara government took control of the region and initiated legislation concerning the basin. The first law, the law no.11, was enacted on 15 August 1920, when French troops were still in the region. It imposed an additional tax of three liras from washed coal and two liras from unwashed coal per ton⁶⁷. The discussions held in the Assembly concerning this law suggests that, at the time, there was a kind of dual authority (of French troops and the Ankara government) over the coal basin⁶⁸. The National Assembly also passed the law no.114, "*Zonguldak ve Ereğli Havza-i Fahmiyesinde Mevcut Kömür Tozlarının Amele Menafi-i Umumiyesine Olarak Furuhtuna Dair Kanun*" (Law on Selling the Coal Powders of Zonguldak and Ereğli Coal Basin for the General Interests of the Workers) on April 28, 1921 and the law no.151, "*Ereğli Havzai Fahmiyesi Maden Amelesinin Hukukuna Müteallik Kanun*" (Law Concerning the

⁶⁵ Çıladı, Zonguldak Havzası, pp.110-11.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p.114-19.

⁶⁷ Yund (ed.), Hüseyin Fehmi İmer, pp.58-9.

⁶⁸ T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi, cilt.3, Devre 1, İçtima Senesi 1 (Ankara, 1941), pp.172, 213-23.

Rights of Mine Workers of the Ereğli Coal Basin) on 10 September 1921⁶⁹. These three pieces of legislation is discussed in more detail in Section 2.3.5 below.

Up until this point, I have tried to present significant developments that occurred in the basin from 1848 to 1922. In the course of these 75 years, the basin witnessed many changes in terms of legal status, administration, concessions, capital composition, infrastructure, technology and so on. Some of these changes had an impact on workers, but some did not. Furthermore, workers were not always the passive objects of this interplay of forces involving the Ottoman state, and the local and foreign capitalists. Particularly towards the end of the period in question, the workers emerged as a subject and influenced the developments in the basin. Thus, the following section is devoted to the historical process in which the workers of the basin transformed themselves from passive objects to historical subjects.

2.3 The miners of the basin: Misery and Struggle

Apart from the historical development of the mines in the basin, the workers who have worked in the mines constitute the main focus of this study. The beginning and intensification of mining in the region has meant much to the people of the region, which has been predominantly agricultural for centuries. The mines and all kinds of commercial activity surrounding the mines gradually but irrecoverably transformed their lives. Men, women or children gradually became a part of the mining activity of the region. The immigrant workers, who have been parts of other cultural environments and who, at least in the beginning, had been in a different

⁶⁹ Fevzi Engin, “151 Sayılı Kanun” in Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı ve Tarih Vakfı, 1996), vol.3, p.545.

kind of relationship to their jobs than the native workers, were necessarily involved in this profound historical transformation. There are infinitely many questions to be asked about the lives of the workers in the region; and unfortunately, as I have noted before, we are in a position to answer only a number of them accurately.

2.3.1 *The miners until ‘Dilaver Paşa Nizamnamesi’*

From the mid-century onwards, mining intensified in the Ereğli-Zonguldak region, an area where agriculture has been the main occupation for ages. Therefore, during the *Hazine-i Hassa* management, naturally, there was a shortage of experienced skilled workers. Because of this, Montenegrin and Croatian miners were employed; on the other hand, a native labour force, which is familiar with coal mining practices and techniques, emerged gradually. Yet, the labour problem remained unsolved and its one or another aspect constituted a chief obstacle for both the Ottoman government and its concessionaires throughout the period that I examine here.

I have noted above that the mining in the region was carried out with strikingly primitive techniques under *Hazine-i Hassa*. The price of this for the workers was an unhealthy and highly risky working environment. The disorganised and arbitrary nature of the management of the coal basin negatively affected the miners’ lives and they worked without any regulations concerning the most basic working conditions, not to mention those pertaining to ‘social security’. The working hours were calculated according to the formula “from dawn to sunset”. No

hospital was constructed for the treatment of workers injured in accidents. There were no doctors even in places where the worker population was the most dense⁷⁰.

2.3.2 '*Dilaver Paşa Nizamnamesi*'

A detailed regulation that concerned different aspects of mining in the basin was promulgated in 1867 and from that time onwards is known as '*Dilaver Paşa Nizamnamesi*', with reference to the local administrator of the region at the time. The regulation constitutes one of the most controversial phenomena not only for the history of the workers of the region but also for the historiography of the Ottoman-Turkish working class in general. After giving an account of the most important articles of the regulation, I will turn to these debates.

- i. The regulation recognised three categories of workers: *Kazmacı* (sapper), *küfeci* (basketman) and *kiracı* (those who furnished the animals to work the pumps), and the first of them enjoyed preferential treatment⁷¹.
- ii. The regulation created an obligatory labour system. Villagers in the 14 *kazas* (districts) of Ereğli *sancak* (province) were obliged to perform certain tasks in the mines. The *muhtar* (headman) of each village was to oversee the whole process of providing the roster, dispatching the workers punctually and distributing the wages to workers⁷².
- iii. The hiring of workers from outside the 14 districts was forbidden.
- iv. The regulation provided protection to all categories of workers in the form of regular pay schedules, limited work hours, clearly defined labour conditions, medical and pharmaceutical care, dormitories for workers,

⁷⁰ Ahmet Naim quoted in Çıladır, Zonguldak Havzası, p.30.

⁷¹ Quataert, Disintegration, p.55-6.

regulated work hours, regulated holidays and measures against workers' dismissal without cause etc⁷³.

The Ottoman government's intention in putting into effect this detailed regulation has been a point of debate among researchers. Yıldırım Koç, for example, argues that the goal of the regulation was not to protect the workers but to increase production in the mines⁷⁴. On the other hand, for Quataert, "[t]he government imposed the regulations on the mines in order to balance its desire for coal with that for domestic stability and continuation of the prevailing agricultural system."⁷⁵ Perhaps a more important point of controversy pertains to the implementation of '*Dilaver Paşa Nizamnamesi*'. It is not certain which articles of this one-hundred-article regulation was implemented fully or to a considerable extent. A report in 1875 from an engineer attached to the Department of Mines and a proposal of French investors in 1880⁷⁶ suggests that at least some of the articles of the regulation were implemented properly. In any case, it is inaccurate to think that the regulation changed the working and living conditions of the thousands of workers of the basin immediately and *in toto*. The enactment of such a detailed regulation in 1867 is a major event in itself and much research is needed before we can judge about the fate of the requirements it imposed.

⁷² Ibid.,p.55.

⁷³ Ibid., p.56.

⁷⁴ Yıldırım Koç, 100 Soruda Türkiye'de İşçi Sınıfı ve Sendikacılık Hareketi (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1998), p.19.

⁷⁵ Quataert, Disintegration, p.56.

⁷⁶ quoted in ibid., pp.56-7.

2.3.3 Workers after the ‘Dilaver Paşa Nizamnamesi’

Despite the article of the regulation that had forbidden the hiring of non-native labourers, hiring of foreign and non-native Ottoman workers continued⁷⁷. Leaving aside the ongoing poor workplace conditions, the main problem of workers during this era seems to be that of payment of wages on time. This problem prevailed in 1875 and continued for at least two decades⁷⁸.

The concession given to Ereğli Company should have meant a great deal of change for the workers as well. A great majority of the workers now worked for a foreign company that controlled an important part of the basin. It seems that the plight of the workers perpetuated under the Ereğli company. In general, the company declined to provide adequate nutrition, accommodation and training for the workers⁷⁹. We learn from the memoirs of Yusuf Tatar, a miner, that when he started to work in the mines at the age of 9 in 1905, he and other workers used to work with undetermined working hours and they sometimes stayed in the pit for 16-17 hours⁸⁰. As we shall discuss in Chapter 4, the pit accidents also persisted.

Thus, the previous situation of the labour continued and due to the persistence of an insecure and unhealthy working and living environment, problems in payments, the workers’ dependence to the agricultural cycle, and lastly the mobilisation for war after 1903 Macedonian crisis, the company suffered a constant shortage of labour. It is known that the company repeatedly demanded the Ottoman government that the restriction of hiring non-natives workers be abolished. For this demand to be fulfilled, the company had to wait until 1906,

⁷⁷ Ibid., pp.57-8.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 58.

⁷⁹ Eldem, Tetkik, p.49.

when the governor of Kastamonu, under the influence of a local mine operator, abolished the restraint and opened the basin to the employment of all Ottoman subjects. This decision solved, to a certain extent, the problem of labour shortage, which intensified from the 1880s onwards, when large-scale investments to the basin began. It also meant the end of the relative period of improvement for the workers that took place in this period of labour shortage. At the beginning of the 20th century, the total number of people employed in the basin by Ereğli company and other firms was around 10,000. An estimated of $\frac{3}{4}$ of the workers were rotational, remaining in the mines for two or three weeks at a time. The remaining $\frac{1}{4}$ of work force was permanent and consisted of Kurdish and Laz workers who worked mainly at the surface⁸¹.

2.3.4 Workers in Struggle: The Strikes of 1908

During the second half of 1908, a wave of strikes shook the Empire. From 24th July to the end of that year, 111 strikes were organised across the Empire, from Salonica to İstanbul, Aydın to Beirut, Adana to Monastır (Bitola). This density in worker activism has not been seen again in Turkish history down to the present⁸². The workers of the coal basin also played their part in the strikes. There were four strikes in the basin until the end of 1908, and the one in 14th September was the most effective, virtually involving all workers in the region. Like some other cases across the Empire, the government sent troops to the region to suppress the strike⁸³. The company reacted to the strikes by accusing a number of ‘foreign agitators’ who

⁸⁰ quoted in Tuncer, *Tarihten Günümüze*, pp. 46-7.

⁸¹ Quataert, *Disintegration*, p.60.

⁸² M.Şehmus Güzel, *Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketi 1908-1984* (İstanbul: Kaynak, 1996), pp.31-2.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp.54-55; Quataert, *Disintegration*, p.64.

prevented the rest of the work force from going to their jobs. The ‘foreign agitators’ mentioned by the company were the newly hired metal miners from Sivas and Zonguldak, who were full-time skilled and mostly Christian workers. It is interesting to note that despite company’s effort, the local Ottoman officials effectively prevented the punishment of the ‘agitators’ of the strikes: “Some of the strikers were arrested, but Ottoman officials at Zonguldak intervened and sought their release, even from İstanbul jails”.⁸⁴ One may perhaps conclude that this difference in the attitudes of central and local Ottoman officials towards the strikers indicates that the strikers and their demands and activities enjoyed a kind of legitimacy in the local community; or perhaps there was a more direct link between the workers and the officials. Another explanation may be that the local officials’ attitude should be considered within the context of local (capital’s) hostility towards foreign capital. In any case, however, one should be cautious about the nature of this relation until adequate research is conducted.

After the strike, the Ereğli Company raised salaries on an average of 30 percent and accepted the demands of the workers. During the years following the strikes, it engaged in large-scale housing projects for the workers⁸⁵. These developments may be conceived to depict that the strikes in the basin resulted in a remarkable success for the workers. The high rate of participation and the apparent sympathetic attitude of local officials, in addition to the ongoing problem of shortage of work force, may have forced the company to accept the workers’ demands. On the other hand, one should not be so quick to evaluate the success or

⁸⁴ Ibid., p.66.

⁸⁵ Ibid., pp.64, 66.

failure of the strikes⁸⁶. Besides, the outcome of the strikes of 1908 in the basin may not be as important as it seems at first sight. It is clear that this first organised workers' action with a dramatically high rate of participation is a crucial development in the history of the basin and it definitely changed the line of the workers' struggles, both materially and ideologically / symbolically.

The strikes of 1908 by no means put an end to workers' struggle in the basin. To our knowledge, six more strikes broke out in the basin until 1914⁸⁷. Given the lack of research on primary sources and thus the derivative nature of most secondary sources, it should be expected that more incidents than known had occurred. Besides, the presently known number of ten strikes from 1908 to 1914 well depicts that strikes have become a part of workers' resistance and struggle tradition.

2.3.5 Legislation of the Ankara Government

As mentioned above, the Turkish Grand National Assembly enacted three laws related to the basin in the years 1920 and 1922. The first one (no.11)⁸⁸, which was passed on August 15, 1920, was not directly related to labour. It was imposing an additional tax on coal extracted in the basin. Despite this limited nature of this law, a number of diverse issues arose during the discussions held in the general council of the Assembly. The name of the basin, the possibility of a British attack on the mines and the conscription of the men living in the region were among the issues that were discussed. The most important point of debate, however, was whether an

⁸⁶ This point is further discussed in Chapter 3.

⁸⁷ One of them is presented and discussed in Chapter 4 in detail.

⁸⁸ See Appendix 25 for the text of the law.

article on the health and safety of workers should be added. In the end, the bills to include such an article were rejected and the law pertained only to taxation⁸⁹.

Another bill about the basin became law on April 28, 1921 (no.114)⁹⁰. Its official name was "*Zonguldak ve Ereğli Havza-i Fahmiyesinde Mevcut Kömür Tozlarının Amele Menafi-i Umumiyesine Olarak Furuhtuna Dair Kanun*" (Law on Selling the Coal Powders of Zonguldak and Ereğli Coal Basin for the General Interests of the Workers) and as the title suggests, the goal of this five-article law was to provide benefits to the workers of the coal basin from the revenue of the coal powder produced in the basin. The discussions in the Assembly about this law were also very interesting. Some deputies who were against the bill accused the defenders for 'bolshevism'. A great deal of debate focused on the rights of workers and how they could be defended. The owner of the property of the coal powder produced in the basin (whether the state, the mine operators, or the workers) was also questioned. In the vote, 118 deputies voted for the bill and 47 deputies against⁹¹.

The third, and the most important, law (no.151)⁹² concerning the basin and its workers was enacted on 10 September 1921 and its name was "*Ereğli Havza-i Fahmiyesi Maden Amelesinin Hukukuna Müteallik Kanun*" (Law Concerning the Rights of Mine Workers of the Ereğli Coal Basin). The article consisted of 15 articles and regulated very important aspects of labour in the basin. The law banned forced labour and the employment of minors underground and established minimum wage. It also determined working hours as eight hours a day. It also

⁸⁹ Zabıt Ceridesi 3, pp.172, 213-23.

⁹⁰ See Appendix 26 for the text of the law.

imposed several requirements on mine operators: among other things, they had to build dormitories and baths for the workers, keep regular records of their employees, compensate the loss of personal property of workers during work. The employers were also required to provide medical care to workers and ensure the medical treatment of the injured ones free of charge. They also were required to pay compensation to the relatives of the workers killed in accidents. Another important provision of the law was the establishment of *Amele Birliđi* (Workers' Association) reserve and aid fund, which would be financed by mine operators with one percent of total wages every month⁹³. *Amele Birliđi* also had the authority to inspect the records of the operators and sue them in the court on behalf of the sufferers of accidents.

The law no.151 brought about vivid and heated debate in the Assembly. From formal matters such as whether the word “*amiľ*” (operator) or “*sahip*” (owner) was better and whether “*amele*” (worker/workers) or “*ırgat*” (worker) should be preferred, to more substantial matters such as socialism and communism were included in the debate. Some deputies considered the requirements imposed on mine operators to be too much to be handled. Whether the state should establish a worker organisation was also questioned. Article 7, which set forth the legal process after the accidents, created great controversy and long legal disputes, and could be passed only after a return to the related commission⁹⁴.

⁹¹ TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Cilt 10, Devre 1, İřtima Senesi 2 (Ankara, 1958), p.25-32, 122-24, 149-50.

⁹² See Appendix 27 for the text of the law.

⁹³ A discussion of *Amele Birliđi* could be found in Chapter 3, section 3.6.1.

⁹⁴ T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi, Cilt 10, Devre 1, İřtima 2 (Ankara, 1958), pp.197-224 and T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi, Cilt 12, Devre 1, İřtima 2 (Ankara, 1958), pp.172-79.

The law no.114 and particularly no.151 included provisions that would substantially improve the conditions of labour in the basin. In addition, the minutes show that, during the discussions, some deputies of the dominant group in the Assembly overtly leaned towards workers. On the other hand, the significance of these three pro-labour bills should not be exaggerated. As some deputies admitted, the fact that most mine operators were foreign or non-Muslim and almost all workers were Muslim/Turkish should have played an important role in providing the ground for this pro-labour and anti-capital intervention of the government and the Assembly. Although these two bills, particularly the second one, could be considered progressive labour legislation, we do not have much information about to what extent their provisions were observed after the extraordinary conditions of the interregnum period ended.⁹⁵

CHAPTER 3

WAGES

3.1 Introduction

A more or less complete historical investigation of the workers of the coal basin necessitates the study of very diverse aspects of their lives, including wages, conditions in the workplace, family life, community life, solidarity and conflict among them, their political attitudes etc. Given obvious limitations, however, this study first of all focuses on wages. I single out wages because wages are important for a number of reasons. Firstly, they are a good indicator of the quality of life of the workers; analysing the level of the wages, we can make some hopefully accurate points about the quality of the life that working in the mines provide to the workers. Secondly, wages are related to some other important issues such as hierarchy between workers (in terms of skill, ethnicity, or some other factor), government's or mine operators' attitude towards workers, the availability of labour, the overall economic conditions within the region etc. Thirdly, wages constitute one of, if not the most important single issue over which conflict between workers and employers take place, and thus the wage level may be a reliable indicator of the success or failure of workers' struggles. Lastly, the wage data are more 'concrete' and thereby more easily analysable.

In this chapter, I first summarise and evaluate the existing state of knowledge about the wages in the coal basin. Then I move on to discuss the points that I derive from the study of archival sources.

3.2 Ottoman Wages

Given the underdeveloped state of research in the field of Ottoman labour history, it is not surprising that the studies about the Ottoman wages are far from being sufficient in both quantity and quality. There's still much to do in this area of labour history. This does not mean, however, that informative works about Ottoman wages do not exist. Charles Issawi, for one, has shown that for the nineteenth century Ottoman economy, wages as a type of income and wage earners as an economic group could be empirically studied⁹⁶. This is in itself an important step forward; for in the literature there are plenty of works that argue that the class of wage earners does not constitute a meaningful category for this period of Ottoman history.

The basic work that gives us substantial information about Ottoman workers is that of Vedat Eldem⁹⁷. Eldem also admits that our knowledge about the working life of wage earners hardly goes beyond theoretical considerations and clichés⁹⁸. Yet he compiles very useful information about the wages in the Empire. There are figures about wages in different industries, such as food, leather, textile and mining industries⁹⁹, different regions of the Empire, such as İstanbul, the coal basin,

⁹⁶ Gündüz Ökçün et al., "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Ücretler (1839-1913)", *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), p.753.

⁹⁷ Vedat Eldem, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İktisadi Şartları Hakkında Bir Tetkik* (Ankara: TTK, 1994).

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.138.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.142.

Damascus and Bursa¹⁰⁰, and different countries, such as Bulgaria, Greece and Romania¹⁰¹. It is also possible to find information about the development of the salaries of Ottoman officials as well.

Eldem argues that, in comparison to neighbouring countries, the wages in the Ottoman Turkey were higher. While the average wage in what is now Turkey in the eve of WWI was 12,5 piasters, it was 8,5 in what is now Syria, 10,34 in Bulgaria, 13,5 in Greece (Athens/Piraeus) and 14,0 in Romania. Although the figures suggest that the level of the wages in Ottoman Turkey was not above some neighbouring countries, given the relatively low level of prices, the purchasing power of the wages were higher than these countries¹⁰².

Another study that is significant for the study of wages in the Ottoman Empire has been conducted by Gündüz Ökçün, Korkut Boratav and Şevket Pamuk¹⁰³. Their main argument is that during the period between Tanzimat and World War I, both the nominal and real wages show a significant increase. According to their calculations, between 1839 and 1913, nominal wages rose by 118% (or with a different method 123%) and real wages by 170% (with a different method 120%). They point out that the main mechanism behind this long-term tendency was the sharp rises that have occurred during times of war and chaos¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p.145.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ökçün et al., “Ücretler”.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p.756.

3.3 Wages in the Coal Basin

Up until now, we do not have sufficient information about the level of wages in the Ereğli-Zonguldak coal basin. Besides, it is not certain to what extent the existing figures are reliable.

Since the coal basin is the first area where a concentration of an important number of workers occurred, Eldem's main reference in discussing the workers and wages in the Empire is the workers of the Ereğli-Zonguldak coal mine workers. According to the figures he provides, there is an apparent nominal increase in the wages from 1900 to 1913. However, if we take into account the consumer prices index of İstanbul of that period and assume that the trend in consumer prices in the coal basin did not diverge considerably from that in İstanbul, the picture changes. While there is a real increase in the wages in the 1900-1905 period, there is a significant drop from 1905 to 1911 and a slight decrease during the years 1911-1913. Overall, the real wages decreased by slightly, namely by 5 percent from 1900 to 1913.

Table 1: Average daily wages in the coal basin¹⁰⁵

Year	Piasters	1900=100	İstanbul C.P.I.¹⁰⁶
1900	7,6	100	100
1905	8,6	113	104
1911	9,7	127	135
1913	10,2	131	126

Donald Quataert reaches also a similar conclusion about the daily wages in the basin. If we compare his figures of the 1900-1911 period with those of Eldem, we

¹⁰⁵ Compiled from Eldem, Tetkik, p.141 and Şevket Pamuk, İstanbul ve Diğer Kentlerde 500 Yıllık Fiyatlar ve Ücretler 1469-1998 (Ankara: DİE, 2000), pp. 17-8.

¹⁰⁶ C.P.I.: consumer prices index.

see that the former presents a real decrease of 18 percent, while the latter gives us a real decrease of 8 percent. On the other hand, Quataert's figures extend to a time period of over thirty years; thus, given the real increase in the wages from 1875 to 1900, he concludes that at least for the three groups that was covered in the Dilaver Paşa regulations, wages seem to have remained unchanged for these thirty years¹⁰⁷. The figures that he gives and the İstanbul consumer price index are as follows:

Table2: Daily Wages at Ereğli (in piasters)¹⁰⁸

Category of worker	1875	1882	1890	1900	1907	1908-1911
Kazmacı (sapper)	15-18			8-20	12	10-20
Küfeci (transporter)	6				6	6
Kiracı (pumper)		5	6	6		
İstanbul C.P.I.	100	-	100,4	80	89	100,7

3.4 Wages in the Coal Basin according to Karaelmeas University Archives

3.4.1 Wages during 1905-1911

The fundamental sources in the archives about the mine workers' wages is the six *yevmiye defteris* (daily wage registers) that belong to the financial years 1321, 1322, 1323, 1324 (1905-09) and 1338 (1922). As we have seen above, both Eldem and Quatert provide figures concerning the years 1905-1909; these registers, however, do not constitute a sound basis for comparison with the figures presented by Eldem and Quataert. First of all, the registers include data not about daily payments but about aggregate payments; we do not know for how many days' work the payment was made. For example, from one of these registers, we learn

¹⁰⁷ Donald Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908 Reactions to European Economic Penetration* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1983), p.61.

that “Asker Bilal oğlu Raşid bin Mustafa” got 15 piasters and 20 *paras* on 17 Mart 1321 (30 March 1905)¹⁰⁹. However, there is no information about the duration of the work for which this payment was made. Another method may be summing up the amounts of all payments made in a day. If one does so, it is seen that on March 30, 1905 the total money given to workers is 1760,35; the number of workers is 134 and the amount per capita is 13,5¹¹⁰. On 10 Mayıs 1321 (23 May 1905), the total amount is 1517 piasters, the number of workers is 109 and the average payment is 13,35 piasters¹¹¹. Since the two figures are very proximate to each other, in the light of the findings of Eldem and Quataert, it seems plausible to deduce that the average daily wage in this mine was around 13 piasters in the year 1905. Two significant objections, however, could be raised against this deduction. Firstly, we cannot learn from the register anything about the workers’ skill levels. Given the fact that in the mines, along with the skilled workers (sappers, for example), there must have been a significant number of semi-skilled and unskilled ones, the average of over 13 piasters seems incomprehensibly high. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the workers noted in this¹¹² and some other¹¹³ registers are qualified as “*asker*”, i.e. they are working obligatorily in the mines as a part of military service. It is known that such workers in the coal basin normally got only a portion of the daily wage paid to other workers¹¹⁴. Therefore, again, the figures that come out of the registers that belong to 1905-1909 period are implausibly high. To

¹⁰⁸ Compiled from *ibid.*, p.60 and Pamuk, *Fiyatlar ve Ücretler*, pp. 17-8.

¹⁰⁹ “Ereğli Kömür Maden-i Hümayunu Tahsilat Sarfiyat Sandık Yevmiye Defteri”, *Karaelmas Üniversitesi Arşivi (KÜA)*, no.68, p.4.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.4-7.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp.13-5.

¹¹² *KÜA*, no.68.

¹¹³ *KÜA*, no.92 (1321 / 1905-6), no.80 (1322 / 1906-7) and no.79 (1323 / 1907-8).

sum up, although these registers provide useful information in different aspects, they do not constitute a reliable source for the calculation of average daily wages in the basin.

On the other hand, the *evrak defteris* (registers in which incoming and outgoing correspondence has been recorded) of the years 1325-1326 (1909-1911) provides sporadic yet reliable information about the wages of some categories of workers in these years. For example, it is noted that the daily wage of both a *gece ateşçisi* (night fireman) and a *ateşçi* (fireman) was 8 piasters¹¹⁵. The *makasçıs* (railway switchmen) got either 7¹¹⁶ or 8¹¹⁷ piasters per diem. Around 1910, a *demirci* (blacksmith) was employed with a daily wage of 10 piasters¹¹⁸. The daily wage of a *marangoz* (carpenter) was significantly higher: he got 14 piasters a day¹¹⁹. On the other hand, there were workers who got monthly payments. A *makinist* (engine-driver) were paid 360 piasters a month¹²⁰, a *zincirci* (chainman) 250¹²¹ and a carpenter 450 piasters¹²². Thus, around the years 1910-1911, the daily wages of these employees of the mine administration was as follows:

¹¹⁴ For detailed information about ‘asker’ (soldier) workers, see Erol Çatma, *Asker İşçiler* (İstanbul: Ceylan, 1998).

¹¹⁵ KÜA, no.40, p.71 (Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / November-December 1909) and no.41, p.81 (20 Şubat 1326 / 5 March 1911).

¹¹⁶ KÜA, no.40, p.82 (28 Şubat 1325 / 13 March 1910) and no.41, entry no.3165/111 (7 Haziran 1326 / 20 June 1910).

¹¹⁷ KÜA, no.40, p.80 (14 Şubat 1325 / 27 February 1910).

¹¹⁸ KÜA, no.41, entry no.3127/106 (3 Haziran 1326 / 16 June 1910).

¹¹⁹ KÜA, no. 40, p.108 (18 Şubat 1325 / 3 March 1910).

¹²⁰ KÜA, no.41, entry no.3029/94 (18 Mayıs 1326 / 31 Mayıs 1910).

¹²¹ Ibid. and KÜA, no.41, entry no. 3165/111 (7 Haziran 1326 / 20 June 1910).

¹²² KÜA, no. 41, p.64 (11 Kanun-ı Sani 1326 / 24 January 1911).

Table 3: Daily Wages During 1910-1911

Worker	Daily Wage
Ateşçi (fireman)	8
Makasçı (switchman)	7-8
Zincirci (chainman)	8,3
Makinist (engine-driver)	12
Marangoz (carpenter)	14-15

These are significant figures that provide, at least, a rough idea about the level of wages before the advent of the war years. On the other hand, it should also be noted that the workers in question were not directly involved in the extraction process of coal. They were performing auxiliary tasks and mainly employed in the transportation. Indeed, the transportation of coal has been a major part of the coal production not only in Ottoman Empire, but in coal-producing countries as well. Coal transportation through land and without railways was irrationally costly.¹²³ Likewise, in the Zonguldak-Ereğli coal basin, the railways were of paramount importance in transporting coal from the pits to the port. Thus, the railway workers were a significant part of this process. On the other hand, since the railway lines were operated by the mine administration itself, these workers were employed directly by the mine administration, but not by companies or individual mine operators¹²⁴. Moreover, it can be assumed that the number of workers who worked in the actual extraction far outweighed that of those working in the transportation-related jobs. Therefore, although the figures concerning the daily wages of these

¹²³ Ben Fine, *The Coal Question: Political Economy and Industrial Change from the Nineteenth Century to the Present Day* (London: Routledge, 1990), pp.6-8.

¹²⁴ It should be noted, however, that the Gelik-Çatalağzı and Üzülmöz-Zonguldak railway lines were operated by the French company; see Kerim Yund (ed.), *Seçkin Türk Ormancısı Hüseyin Fehmi İmer Hayatı-Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Baha, 1973), p.50.

workers are valuable and meaningful, one should be careful not to extend them to workers working in the pits.

3.4.2 Wages circa 1922

In contrast to the *yevmiye defterleri* that date from 1321-1324 (1905-09), those that belong to the years 1338-1339 (1922-23) constitute a valuable source for calculating (or, at least, estimating) daily wages. In two of these registers¹²⁵, the category of workers and the daily wages they get are explicitly stated. If we combine the information in these two registers, we reach such figures:

Table 4: Categories of Workers and their Wages around 1922

Type of worker	Daily wage (piasters)	Type of worker	Daily wage (piasters)
<i>Tamirci</i>	90-135	<i>Tamirci çavuşu</i>	145
<i>Tamirci yedeği</i>	70-95	<i>Maden mektebi talebesi</i>	100
<i>Kazmacı</i>	85-105	<i>Yol marangozu</i>	180
<i>Kazmacı yedeği</i>	70-100	<i>Amele çavuşu</i>	170
<i>Amele</i>	60-75	<i>Lağımçı</i>	100-125
<i>Çubukçu</i>	90	<i>Sopacı</i>	80
<i>Çavuş</i>	130-160	<i>Sucu</i>	70
<i>Arabacı</i>	70-75	<i>Manavracı</i>	65
<i>Küfeci</i>	60-80	<i>Başçavuş Muavini</i>	200-250
<i>Kuyucu</i>	60-80	<i>Dahili Katip</i>	160
<i>Kuyucu Yedeği</i>	77-80	<i>Varageleci</i>	90
<i>Marangoz</i>	100-180	<i>Başçavuş</i>	200
<i>Marangoz yedeği</i>	80	<i>Direk katibi</i>	80
<i>Bekçi</i>	130	<i>Dengeci yamağı</i>	65
<i>Ateşçi</i>	100-120	<i>Hizmetli</i>	85
<i>Vinççi</i>	80	<i>Pişirici</i>	120
<i>Madenci</i>	60	<i>Demirci kalfası</i>	100
<i>Taşçı</i>	80	<i>Saççı</i>	80
<i>Dahili başçavuş</i>	130		

¹²⁵ KÜA, no.217 “Sarrafiye Ocakları 287 Numerolu Ocağın Amele Kayıt Defteri, 1338-9” ve KÜA, no.66 “64 Numerolu İktisad Ocağının Amele-i Daim ve Muvakkata Esas Kayıt Defteri”.

These categories and wages could be grouped into three:

- A. Unskilled workers or mates of skilled workers: *tamirci yedeği* (repairman's mate), *kazmacı yedeği* (sapper's mate: the worker who assists the sapper in transporting his tools and who put the coal cut by the sapper to the chute), *amele* (literally worker, here unskilled worker), *çubukçu* (?), *arabacı* (carter), *küfeci* (basketman), *kuyucu* (well-sinker), *kuyucu yedeği* (well-sinker's mate), *marangoz yedeği* (carpenter's mate), *madenci* (?), *taşçı* (mason), *sopacı* (?), *vinççi* (winch operator), *sucu* (waterman), *varageleci* (the worker responsible for the machine with which heavy material is transported within pits), *dengeci yamağı* (?), *hizmetli* (employee?), *saççı* (the worker who controls and directs the full and empty trams in the crossroads of the pit), *direk katibi* (the worker who counts the wooden props used in the pit), *manavracı* (same as *vinççi*). The most important workers that falls into this category are *küfeci* and *kazmacı yedeği*.
- B. Skilled workers: *tamirci* (repairman), *kazmacı* (sapper), *ateşçi* (fireman), *maden mektebi talebesi* (student from mining school), *lağımci* (the worker who opens holes in the shafts, puts dynamites or gunpowder into these holes and bursts them), *pişirici* (?), *demirci kalfası* (blacksmith's journeyman). The main type of worker in this group is *kazmacı*, who is one of the most important elements of actual production.
- C. High-level skilled or supervising workers: *çavuş* (foreman / boss), *marangoz* (carpenter), *bekçi* (watchman), *dahili başçavuş* (internal head-foreman), *tamirci çavuşu* (repairman's boss), *yol marangozu* (the worker who paves rails into the pit and repairs them), *amele çavuşu* (worker's boss), *başçavuş muavini*

(assistant head-foreman), *dahili katip* (the worker who records the underground use of different materials and tools), *başçavuş* (head-foreman). The main type in this category are various kinds of *çavuşs*, who supervise the work process¹²⁶.

3.4.3 Changes in Wages through the Years of War, 1911-1922

If we combine the wage figures from 1922 with those of 1911, and the consumer price figures, the below table emerges:

Table 5: Wages from 1911 to 1922

	1911	1922	Change (%)
Sapper	10-20 (15) ¹²⁷	95 ¹²⁸	850-375 (533)
Basketman	6 ¹²⁹	70 ¹³⁰	1066
Carpenter	14-15 (14.5) ¹³¹	140 ¹³²	900-833 (866.5)
Fireman	8 ¹³³	110 ¹³⁴	1275
İstanbul C.P.I. ¹³⁵	100	1198	1098

As clear in the figures of İstanbul consumer prices' index, the inflation rate during the war years was very high; the prices increased eleven times from 1911 to 1922. If we look at the wages and compare their increase with that of the prices, we see that while some of the wages could match or even surpass the increase in the prices, some of them could not. If the wage of fireman is taken, for example, a real increase could be noticed. The wage of a basketman more or less matches the

¹²⁶ The English equivalent of the Turkish terms in Table 4 has been compiled from Ülgen Oskay, *Geçiş Dönemi Tipi Olarak Zonguldak Kömür Havzası Maden İşçisi* (İzmir: Ege Ü. Edebiyat F., 1983); Ahmet Naim, *Bir Yudum Soluk. Maden İşçilerinin Ocak İçi Yaşantıları*, 2nd ed., (Ereğli: Şirin Ereğli, 1983); Dilip Simeon, "Coal and Colonialism: Production Relations in an Indian Coalfield, c.1895-1947", *International Review of Social History*, 41 (1996), pp.83-108; and personal communication with Erol Çatma.

¹²⁷ 1908-11. Quataert, *Disintegration*, p.60.

¹²⁸ KÜA, no.217.

¹²⁹ 1908-11. Quataert, *Disintegration*, p.60.

¹³⁰ KÜA, no.217.

¹³¹ KÜA, no.40, p.108; no.41, p.64.

¹³² KÜA, no.217; no.66.

¹³³ KÜA no.40, p.71; no.41, p.81.

¹³⁴ KÜA, no.217; no.66.

¹³⁵ Pamuk, *Fiyatlar ve Ücretler*, p.18-22.

increase in the prices. On the other hand, the increase in the wages of sapper and carpenter is below the increase in the consumer prices' index; this is more significant in the case of sapper. Although this situation seems to be chaotic, where the changes in the wages of different types of workers seem arbitrary, I think that it suggests a pattern. The worker types that match or surpass the price increase (basketman and fireman) is less skilled ones, whereas the wages of skilled jobs (sapper and carpenter) suffered a real decrease. The outcome is an apparent convergence of wages of skilled and semi-skilled or unskilled workers as of 1922. The daily wage of a fireman even surpassed that of a sapper around this year. The case of sapper is particularly important in that he is the one who does the actual cutting of coal, and one could say, without exaggeration, that he is the basic element of coal extraction process. There may be a number of accounts of this fall in sapper wages. Firstly, leaving aside the changes in other daily wages, the significant real decrease in the money paid to sappers should have generated a considerable fall in the production costs in the basin. It follows from this reasoning that the factor behind the real decrease in sapper wages is that the great number of sappers employed in the pits made the suppression of their wages particularly beneficial for the mine operators¹³⁶. Secondly, if the diminishing real wage of carpenter is conceived along with the situation of the sappers, one may conclude that from 1911 to 1922, there is a decrease in the monetary reward of skill, or, one could say, a re-definition of 'skill' in wage terms. Thirdly, since the sappers were

¹³⁶ It is not possible to find any information about the proportion of sappers to all workers working in the pits during the Ottoman era. We only know that it was around 11 percent in 1942; see Theo Nichols and Erol Kahveci, "The Condition of Mine Labour in Turkey: Injuries to Miners in Zonguldak", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 31(2), 1995, pp.199. Since the level of mechanisation was lower in the Ottoman period, it is acceptable to assume that the proportion of sappers, who do the actual cutting of coal, to the whole labour force, was higher.

mostly rotational workers, who were on and off on a usually fifteen-day basis and could also rely on some agricultural income, these workers may have showed less resistance to diminishing real wages than the permanent workers whose sole source of income was the occupation in the mines. Probably, the real situation was a result of the combination of these three factors. In any case, it is clear that while the difficult war years eroded the wages of some of the workers of the basin, some wages remained intact or even went better off.

3.5 Wages in the Basin, 1875-1922: An Analysis

The whole discussion conducted in this chapter up until this point about the wages in the basin and the Ottoman wages in general could be summarised in Table 6. It is important, however, to note that the table is far from being complete. It was compiled from many different primary and secondary sources so that there are inevitable gaps between the categories. Secondly, some of the data used are only tentative. Thirdly, all interpretations regarding the real increase or decrease in the coal workers' wages are based on the assumption that the consumer prices' index of İstanbul is not dramatically different from that of the coal basin¹³⁷. Yet, meaningful deductions could be done on the basis of this table. Firstly, it has an internal logic as a whole; secondly, it provides the ground for conducting a number

¹³⁷ Eldem remarks that the increase in prices during the WWI in İstanbul is significantly below the increase in other provinces, with the exception of Syria, Palestine and Cebel-i Lübnan; see Vedat Eldem, *Harp ve Mütareke Yıllarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Ekonomisi* (Ankara, TTK, 1994), p. 50. Therefore, if this remark is valid, in every comparison between the increase in the wages in the basin and İstanbul consumer prices index during WWI, a margin should be left in favour of the wages.

Table 6: Wages in the basin, in Istanbul and Ottoman wages in general¹

	1875	1882	1890	1900	1905	1907	1911	1913	1917	1919	1922
Average wages in the basin											
1900=100				7.6	8.6		9.7	10.2	35	67.0	
Sapper	16.5		14	100	113	12	15 ⁱⁱ	131	460	881	95
1875=100	100		85			73	91				576
Basketman	6					6	6 ⁱⁱⁱ				70
1875=100	100				100		100				1162
Carpenter							14.5 ^{iv}				140
1910=100							100				966
Fireman							8				110
1911=100							100				1375
Skilled construction worker^v	17.96 ^{vi}	17.38	16.71 ^{vi}	17.72	18	18.49 ^{vii}	29.17	27.03	26.29 ^{ix}		231.36 ^x
1874=100	100	97	93	99	100	103	162	151	146		1289
Unskilled construction workerⁱⁱ	8 ⁱⁱⁱ	7.62	8.019 ⁱⁱⁱ	8.19	8.41	8.36 ^{iv}	14.17	12.20	17.91 ^v		83.89 ^{viii}
1874=100	100	95	100	102	105	105	177	153	223		1049
Ottoman Wages	6.87	11.21	11.08 ^{viii}	10.91	9.85		13.71	13.40			
1875=100	100	163	161	159	143		199	195			
<i>Istanbul C.P.I.</i>	100		101	80	83	89	108	117	746	1555	1360

Notes to Table 6

i “Skilled construction worker” and “unskilled construction worker” data taken from Pamuk, *Fiyatlar ve Ücretler*, pp.73-4; “İstanbul Consumer Prices Index” data taken from Ibid., pp.17-22; “Ottoman Wages” data taken from Ökçün et al., “Ücretler”, p.754. The rest of the data has been compiled from the following secondary and primary sources: Eldem, *Harp ve Mütareke Ekonomisi*, p.55 ve Tetkik, p.141; Quataert, *Disintegration*, p.60; KÜA no.40, p.71; KÜA no.41 p.64 and 81; KÜA no.217; KÜA no.66. The deflated figures have been rounded. Where meaningful, the figures that were given as a range (e.g. 10-20) in the original source have been replaced with their averages (e.g. 15). Unless otherwise stated, all monetary figures are in piasters.

ii 1908-11

iii 1908-11

iv 1910

v In İstanbul; the units are in silver grams

vi 1874

vii Average of 1889 and 1901 figures

viii Average of 1906 and 1908 figures

ix Estimate based on the assumption that the rate of silver in akçe remained constant from 1915 to 1917

x Estimate based on the assumption that the rate of silver in akçe remained constant from 1915 to 1922

xi In İstanbul; the units are in silver grams

xii 1874

xiii Average of 1889 and 1901 figures

xiv Average of 1906 and 198 figures

xv Estimate based on the assumption that the rate of silver in akçe remained constant from 1915 to 1917

xvi Estimate based on the assumption that the rate of silver in akçe remained constant from 1915 to 1922

xvii 1891

of limited analyses: e.g. comparing the changes in the wages of sappers and skilled construction workers through the 1900-1907 period.

If we analyse the development of the coal workers' wages from 1875 to 1922, we see that different categories of workers underwent different processes. During this half-a-century period, the increase in sappers' wages is dramatically below that in consumer prices. Although being in a better position than the sappers, carpenters also suffered a real decline in wages. Basketman wage's development is better than both of these two categories, but it is also, albeit slightly, below the consumer prices. The position of fireman wages is different from the other three. There is a real increase from 1911 to 1922-3. Thus, we see a convergence in wage levels: while the previously higher ones suffered significant declines, the previously lesser ones remained intact or even improved. I have already discussed the possible causes of this convergence in Section 3.4.3, where I analysed the changes in the wages through the war years. It is not necessary to repeat the discussion here; for, this convergence is mainly an outcome of the period of 1911-1922. For example, the responsibility of the decline of the 1875-1911 period in the overall real decline in sappers' wages is highly insignificant relative to the real decline that occurred from 1911 to 1922.

Another point that should be noted is that the general monetary loss of labour during the war years of 1911-22 was mainly due to the loss that occurred during WWI. Although we do not have average wage information for the year 1922, the trend of wages in the basin and in İstanbul for the WWI years on the one hand and the 'armistice' and interregnum periods on the other well depicts that wages recovered during the latter period.

3.5.1 The Impact of the Strikes of 1908

It has been already mentioned that after the Revolution of 1908, various parts of the empire, including the coal basin, were shaken by massive strikes. From the 24th July to the end of the year, 111 strikes were organised throughout the Ottoman territories. Such a density in worker activity may have resulted in, among other things, an increase in the wages. Table 6 provides some information to test such an assumption. To proceed from general to particular, it is appropriate to start from the Ottoman wages, the most comprehensive category in Table 6. Ottoman wages, after a period of sharp increase (1875-1882) followed by a relative stability (1882-1900), fell 7 percent in real terms from 1900 to 1905. During the period that includes the 1908 Strikes, namely 1905-1911, the wages rose by 28 percent whereas the consumer price index rose by 30 percent. Therefore, during this period the increase in wages could only match the increase in prices. As to the average wage in the basin, its rate of increase of 12 percent is considerably below the increase in consumer prices. Likewise, the basketman wage remained nominally constant and thus, in real terms, suffered a decline. On the other hand, after a significant real decrease of 25 percent from 1900 to 1907, the sappers' wage had a slight gain; it rose by 3 percent from 1907 to 1911. At first sight, the fact that neither the average wage nor single wage categories in the basin depicts a significant real increase seems to be in contradiction with Quataert's point that, following the strikes, the company raised salaries on an average of 30 percent¹³⁸. This may really be a contradiction; on the other, it can be interpreted in a different way. Although real increases are absent or slight, it is evident that there is a *nominal* rise in wages in

¹³⁸ Quataert, *Disintegration*, p.64.

the basin. Thus, it is *possible* to argue that along with other concessions (such as large scale housing projects that the company engaged in) that the workers obtained as a result of the strikes, a nominal rise helped the wages to at least match the rise in prices. This is not to say, to be sure, that the strikes in the basin were definitely a success in terms of the wages. What is stressed here is that we are far from judging the success in terms of wages of the strikes of 1908 in the basin. Furthermore, if the workers did not reach their goal concerning the money they get, this does not mean that the strikes as a whole were a failure. Rather, a more empirically based and a more wider-angle analysis is needed in order to bring out a more reliable judgement on this issue.

The wages of the construction workers of İstanbul, however, followed a different path than that of the coal basin. From 1907 to 1911, the skilled construction workers enjoyed a real rise of 46 percent, while their unskilled mates' gain exceeds 50 percent. This is particularly striking in the light of the fact that, despite 41 strikes took place in İstanbul in 1908 and 13 in 1909-1915 period, no construction workers' strike was noted. Therefore, the apparent rise in construction workers' wages should be accounted for with factors other than the strike of this group of workers; the atmosphere brought about by the wave of strikes throughout the empire, the more positive stance of the new régime towards labour, or more 'conventional' factors such as labour force scarcity could have been among these.

Thus, we are faced with a situation in which, of the six categories of wages in question, the rise is significantly below the rise in consumer prices, for two, slightly below for one, slightly above for one and dramatically above for two. It is possible to argue, then, the information gathered in Table 6 does not present an

overall picture about the impact of the Strikes of 1908 on the wages in the coal basin or on Ottoman wages as a whole.

3.6 Deductions

A necessary part of the discussion about the wages in the basin should concern the deductions made from the miners' wages under different names. The payments made to workers were by no means complete and various cuts and deductions affected the wage levels, in some cases, as we shall see, significantly. The problem of deductions also leads to the discussion on the first 'social security' fund in the basin, the *Amele Birliđi*, which will be touched upon briefly.

3.6.1 *Amele Birliđi*

Amele Birliđi was established as a reserve and aid fund by the fourth article of "Eređli Havza-i Fahmiyyesi Maden Amelesinin Hukukuna Muteallik Kanun" (no.151, 10 Eylül 1337/10 September 1921). Its goal was to provide the mineworkers and their families social and economic aid. It was directly linked to the mine administration; its head was the director of Eređli mines¹³⁹. The income of the fund came from the one percent of wages to be paid by workers and their employers and the fines imposed on workers. It is important to note that *Amele Birliđi* did not comprise all the workers in the basin. In order to be eligible for the aid, it was mandatory to work at least 180 days a year and live in the mine area. Thus, the rotational workers and those living in villages could not benefit from the fund.

¹³⁹ Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: Kùltür Bakanlıđı ve Tarih Vakfı, 1996), vol.3, p.547.

As to the establishment of *Amele Birliđi*, up until now, it has been said that although the law constituting it enacted in 1921, the actual establishment of the fund could be possible only with the “İhtiyat ve Teavün Sandıkları Talimatnamesi” (Regulation on Reserve and Aid Funds: no.2608, 22 July 1923)¹⁴⁰. The primary sources located in Karaelmas University suggest a different interpretation, however. In the *Yevmiye Defteri* of 1338, it is noted that there was a deduction of one percent from the wages for the *Amele Birliđi Teavün Sandıđı* as early as September 1922¹⁴¹:

<i>Amele Birliđi Teavün Sandıđı Eylül 338 zarfında zikr-i ati</i>		
<i>hesaplara ber vech-i zir amele istihkakı olarak tahakkuk eden</i>		
	<i>Ash</i>	<i>Yüzde biri</i>
<i>Amele Tahakkukatı</i>	<i>11856,82</i>	<i>118,56</i>
<i>Memurin Maaşatı</i>	<i>1410</i>	<i>14,10</i>
<i>Yekun</i>	<i>13666,82</i>	<i>132,66</i> ¹⁴²

In another register, “64 Numerolu İktisad Ocađının Amele-i Daim ve Muvakkata Esas Kayıt Defteri” (Register of Permanent and Rotational Workers of the *İktisad* mine no.64) we find information that supports the above quotation. Here is an exemplary entry¹⁴³:

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ “The amounts that was transferred to Workers’ Association Aid Fund as due wages during September 338 is as follows:

	Total	One Percent
Workers’ due wages	11856,82	118,56
Salaries of officials	1410	14,10
Total	13666,82	132,66”

¹⁴² KÜA, no. 194 (Yevmiye Defteri, 1338/1922), p.12.

¹⁴³ KÜA, no.66, p.3.

<i>Sıra numrosu</i> (Number)	41	<i>Sanatı</i> (Occupation)	Bekçi
<i>İsmi</i> (Name)	Ömer	<i>Yevmiyesi miktarı</i> (Amount of daily wage)	130 kuruş
<i>Pederinin ismi</i> (Father's name)	Hüseyin	<i>İstihkakı</i> (Due wage)	39 lira
<i>Şöhreti</i> (Reputation)	Süleyman oğullarından	<i>Ekmeğ bedeli</i> (Cost of bread)	3,40 lira
<i>Tevellüdü</i> (Year of birth)	288	<i>Ambardan alınan eşya bedeli</i> (Cost of goods taken from storehouse)	45 kuruş
<i>Tabiyeti</i> (Nationality)	Türk	<i>Felaketzedegana muavenet olunmak üzere ber-muceb-i emr kat olunan</i> (Amount cut for aid to victims of disasters)	2,60 lira
<i>Kazası</i> (District)	Trabzon	<i>Mütebaki alacağı</i> (Balance payment)	32,55 lira
<i>Karyesi</i> (Village)	-	<i>Bononun numrosu</i> (Bill no)	41
<i>Şubesi</i> (Branch)	Trabzon	<i>Bononun tarihi</i> (Bill date)	31 Eylül 38
<i>Cüzdanın numrosu</i> (File no)	81-87 204	<i>Vezenin numrosu</i> (Payment no)	71
<i>Cüzdanın tarihi</i> (File date)	22 Eylül 38	<i>Vezenin tarihi</i> (Payment no)	31 Eylül 38

It is known that the workers who are not members of the fund are called *cüzdansız amele* (worker without file/papers). Therefore, the *cüzdan numrosu* (file number) and *cüzdanın tarihi* (file date) in this entry refers to the *Amele Birliği* account of this worker. Thus, the argument that *Amele Birliği* fund were realised only after July 1923 is hardly valid. The above quotations concerning September 1922 and some other entries in the *Yevmiye Defteri* of 1922¹⁴⁴ are clear enough to suggest that, at least, the mandatory contributions of the workers to this fund were in force as of 1922.

¹⁴⁴ e.g. October 1922, KÜA, no.194, p.20.

3.6.2 'Official Deductions'

Around the year 1922, some other deductions were also imposed on the workers' wages. These deductions went either to charity organisations or the military. For example, an amount equal to two days' payment was cut and sent to the *Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti* (Red Crescent Society)¹⁴⁵. The Ankara government also took money from workers for the military. Under the title of "*vesait-i nakliye-i askeriye vergisi*" (tax for military transport vehicles) a certain amount of deduction was imposed on the permanent workers¹⁴⁶.

There were other forms of deductions as well. The workers of the "64 Numerolu İktisad Ocağı" –probably this was not peculiar to them- were subject to a deduction under the name of "*felaketzedegana muavenet olunmak üzere ber muceb-i emr kat olunan*" (the amount deducted in accordance with the directions to be used in assisting the victims of disasters). It is important to note that in time, this deduction was replaced by that of "*vesait-i nakliye-i askeriye*", which suggests that the disaster aid was a temporary deduction.

3.6.3 Other Deductions: Bread, Goods, Transport, and Fines

It is clear from the *Yevmiye Defteri* of 1338 and the register of permanent and rotational workers of the mine 64 that the money equivalent of bread and other good given to workers were cut from their due wages. It seems that while the money cut for the goods was insignificant, the money equivalent of bread was considerable. For instance, while the total due wages of workers included in register no.194 for October 1922 was 14925.48 liras, the money equivalent of

¹⁴⁵ KÜA, no.194, pp. 28, 37.

¹⁴⁶ KÜA, no.194, p.282.

bread and goods was 2074.86 and 87.51 liras, respectively¹⁴⁷. Thus, while only 0.6 percent of the wages went to goods given by the administration to the workers, 14 percent of the total gross wages were deducted for bread.

Lastly, there were the fines. Fines were imposed on the workers for several reasons; stealing coal and damaging the working materials were among the most frequent. The imposition of fines continued around 1922¹⁴⁸, but after the establishment of *Amele Birliđi*, these amounts were going to the fund. This was also a solution to constant tensions and protests on the part of the workers seen in the previous years as a reaction to the imposition of arbitrary fines by the mine operators¹⁴⁹.

3.6.4 After the Deductions: What's Left?

It is evident that these various forms of deductions on wages negatively affected workers' livelihoods. The problem is to determine the extent of this effect. If we consider the total gross wages and total deductions of October 1922 in register no.194, this table emerges:

¹⁴⁷ KÜA, no.194, p.18-9.

¹⁴⁸ For example, see KÜA no.217, p.83, 98.

¹⁴⁹ Sina Çıladı, "Zonguldak Kömür Havzasında İşçi Hareketi ve Sendikacılık" in Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı ve Tarih Vakfı, 1996), vol.3, p.558.

**Table 7: Deductions and Total Net Wages
in *İktisad* Mine No. 63 in October 1922**

Total gross wage	14925.64
Bread	2074.86
Goods	87.51
<i>Amele Birliđi</i> fund	149.25
Military tax	20.50 ¹⁵⁰
<i>Hilal-i Ahmer</i> aid	686,50 ¹⁵¹
Total deductions	3018.62
Total net wage	11907.02
Percentage of deductions	20

Here we see that 20 percent of the due wages of workers were cut in various forms. On the other hand, in *İktisad* mine number 64 in September 1922, the deduction rate is even greater: considering that the total gross wage was 111856,82 liras and the total net wage 9012.90 liras, the percentage of cuts emerges as high as 24. So much for the total figures. The individual figures confirm the above calculation. If we take, for instance, the money paid to “Süleymanođullarından Hüseyin ođlu Ömer”, whose full record is presented in Section 3.6.1 above, it is seen that the amount of cuts imposed on him is 6.45 liras over a gross wage of 39 liras, which is equivalent to a 17 percent cut. This is below the general 20 percent and 24 percent calculated above. However, the deductions follow a ‘regressive’ pattern, that is, as the wage increased the percentage of the cuts decreased. In this context, it is meaningful to contrast the wage of Hüseyin Ođlu Ömer, which was cut with a rate of 17 percent with that of another worker, whose net wage was 37 percent below

¹⁵⁰ Estimate based on the military tax collected in *İktisad* mine number 63 during October 1922: KÜA, no.194, p.28.

¹⁵¹ Estimate based on the *Hilal-i Ahmer* aid collected in *İktisad* mine number 63 during October 1922: KÜA, no.194, p.28.

the gross one: Gross: 9.20; bread cut: 2.60; goods cut: 0.15; aid to disaster victims:
1.50; net wage 5.85¹⁵².

¹⁵² KÜA, no.66.

CHAPTER 4

ACCIDENTS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is devoted to workplace accidents that have taken place in the mines of the Zonguldak-Ereğli coal basin. Accidents occur in almost every industry, in this sense, no manual worker is exempt from risk. Yet, the working environment in coal mines was so unsafe -and was definitely so in the coal basin of the *fin-de-siècle* Ottoman Empire- that the accidents in collieries seemed to be an ‘integral part’ of the production process. Beside this general feature of the coal mining accidents, studying accidents is important and necessary for the purposes of this thesis for a number of reasons. First of all, accidents mean great human suffering and an attention on the causes and consequences of this suffering requires no justification. Secondly, the frequency of accidents is a reliable indicator of the technical/physical conditions in the mines; any change in them would probably find its reflection in accidents. Thirdly, the measures taken or not taken by the mine operators against the occurring of accidents is an important indicator of their attitude towards their employees. Fourthly, the actions of state organs following the accidents may tell us a great deal about the official attitude and policies towards the workers in particular and the mines in general. Fifthly, the last two points are tied closely to the level of labour organisation, struggle and militancy. Last but not the

least, an accident is a tragic event not only for the miners who were directly involved but also for the working community as a whole. Thus, the reactions of the workers who have not been direct victims of grave accidents are worth considering, particularly in terms of the sense of solidarity among all workers.

The above points constitute also a list of possible emphasises that could be done when studying the accidents. In this chapter, the emphasis will be on the general attitude of the state organs towards the accidents and the official reactions to particular accidents on the one hand and the workers' reactions on the other. Both the frequency and the technical reasons of the accidents would be a required part of any inquiry into this subject, yet the primary sources that I have consulted are far from providing data comparable to, for instance, the registers used by Kahveci and Nichols for the accidents in the Republican era¹⁵³. I will also refrain from discussing the health-related aspects of the accidents; indeed, a more or less comprehensive investigation of the health problems of workers should include many occupational diseases they suffer, such as lung diseases and nystagmus.

I also limited the subject in terms of the time period. Although there are mentions of other periods as well, I have chosen to focus on a roughly six-period, extending from the last months of 1909 to the first months of 1910. This 'choice' can be justified in a number of ways. First, the nature of the sources. The registers that pertain to this period is more complete than those that pertain to other periods. Secondly, the years 1909 and 1910 are 'meaningful' ones, in that they belong to a period when the *ancien régime* had ended, but its features were still alive and even dominant in many respects. Thus, being the years of Revolution, they provide clues

for understanding the *ancien régime* as well. Thirdly, I am interested less in drawing a statistical picture based on long-term data and then to proceed to interpret it than to tell a more or less detailed ‘story’ of a certain limited period and make deductions that would hopefully be valid for longer periods of time.

4.2 Accidents and Their Outcomes: 1909-1910

The chain of fatal accidents, which would be followed here, began with the death of Receb of Cide, who was working in the mine of Herafim Efendi and Co. The incident was reported from the office of the mine administration in Kilimli region to the central office with a letter of 2 October 1909. The summary of the letter recorded in *Evrak Defteri* is as follows:

*Herafim Efendi ve şürekasının ocağı amelesinden Cideli Receb bundan bir kaç gün mukaddem hasta olub bugün müteessiren vefat ettiği ve kazazedenin Zonguldak'a nakledildiğine dair*¹⁵⁴

What is significant here is that the contradictory terms *hasta* (literally sick, suggesting a 'natural' disease) and *kazazede* (victim of an accident) were used in the same sentence.

Two days later, in the Çatalağzı region, around the Gelik mine of the Ereğli company, sapper Hasan and his mate, İlyas were lightly injured after fire came out from their lamps when passing a railway switch¹⁵⁵. One day later, on 5 October 1909, the Çatalağzı branch office demands that both the engine-drivers and the

¹⁵³ Theo Nichols and Erol Kahveci, “The Condition of Mine Labour in Turkey: Injuries to Miners in Zonguldak”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 31(2), 1995, pp.197-228.

¹⁵⁴ KÜA, no.40, p.66 (19 Eylül 1325 / 2 October 1909).

“ Among the workers of the mine of Herafim Efendi and Co., Receb of Cide had been sick for some days and today sadly died. The victim of the disaster was transported to Zonguldak.”

¹⁵⁵ KÜA, no.40, p.96 (21 Eylül 1325 / 4 October 1909).

Ereğli company should be warned in order to prevent the accidents in the railway¹⁵⁶.

On November 19th, 1909 the Çatalağzı office reported the death of the worker Sarrac Mehmed due to a falling stone from the ceiling in the Gelik mine of the French company¹⁵⁷. This prompted the centre of the mine administration to order the Zonguldak office to go the place of incident, conduct an investigation and send the investigation report swiftly¹⁵⁸. In the very same day, the Çatalağzı office asks the centre the following question: A doctor has not yet come to examine Sarac Mehmed, who had died in Gelik. Should we authorise or not authorise the burial?¹⁵⁹ In response, the centre decided to ask the question to Zonguldak Kaymakamlığı and forwarded the letter. On the second day of December, fire broke out in the Karadon mine of the company¹⁶⁰. Although no death or injury reported, it is understood that an investigation was carried out by the Çatalağzı officials; a letter sent from Çatalağzı to the central office says that the pits in the Karadon was controlled and no dangerous situation was detected¹⁶¹. On the very same day, an official letter from the central office to Zonguldak *Kaymakamlığı* reports that a circular concerning the precautions against the accidents had been sent to the branch offices and the engineer's office as of 1 November 1909 and mentions a *tezkire-i aliyye* on the same subject issued on 30 Kasım 1909¹⁶². This is particularly important because not only the mine administration issues a circular on preventing the accidents but the Ministry of Mines is also involved and issues an order. This

¹⁵⁶ KÜA, no.40, p.97 (22 Eylül 1325 / 5 October 1909).

¹⁵⁷ KÜA, no.40, p.102 (6 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 19 November 1909).

¹⁵⁸ KÜA, no.40, p.132 (7 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 20 November 1909).

¹⁵⁹ KÜA, no.40, p.102 (7 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 20 November 1909).

¹⁶⁰ KÜA, no.40, p.103 (19 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 2 December 1909).

¹⁶¹ KÜA, no.40, p.103 (21 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 4 December 1909).

shows that the accidents were taken seriously by both the administration and the ministry.

An order sent from the centre to the Kozlu office is also worth mentioning here. In this letter, it is said that the mine operators shall build a hospital for the treatment of workers who would be injured in the mine accidents and if they would not do so, the mine administration would build one and all the costs would be paid by the mine operators themselves¹⁶³. This is particularly significant; for the mine administration considers the construction of a hospital for the workers as a responsibility of the mine operators. On January 3rd, 1910, the centre also forwarded an order of the ministry about the precautionary measures to be taken in mines with firedamp¹⁶⁴. This further depicts that, rather than leaving the sole responsibility to the miner administration, the ministry was involved in the problem of accidents.

The third day of January marks the beginning of a set of tragic events for the workers and a set of highly interesting correspondence between the centre of the mine administration and the engineer's office. On January 3rd, 1910, it was reported that two workers had been injured in the Kaplu (?) mine and the worker Mehmed had been badly injured in Gelik, both of the mines belonging to the company¹⁶⁵. On the very same day, another worker lost his life; sapper Veli Hüseyin died in Gelik¹⁶⁶. A week later, the centre warned the engineer's office to conduct the investigation of the death of Veli Hüseyin rapidly¹⁶⁷. Another letter

¹⁶² KÜA, no.40, p.136 (21 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 4 December 1909).

¹⁶³ KÜA, no.40, p.138 (6 Kanun-ı Evvel 1325 / 27 December 1909).

¹⁶⁴ KÜA, no.40, p.139 (21 Kanun-ı Evvel 1325 / 3 January 1910).

¹⁶⁵ KÜA, no.40, p.139 (21 Kanun-ı Evvel 1325 / 3 January 1910).

¹⁶⁶ KÜA, no.40, p.105 (21 Kanun-ı Evvel 1325 / 3 January 1910).

¹⁶⁷ KÜA, no.40, p.139 (28 Kanun-ı Evvel 1325 / 10 January 1910).

from the centre to the engineer's office was sent on 11 January. It informs the latter about the loss of life and injury in Çay seam without specification and demands a investigation and examination, emphasising the need to be swift¹⁶⁸. On January 14th, the centre attached a telegraph of the Zonguldak Office to the engineer's office and demanded that the accident in company's mine be investigated and the "health and life of the workers be ensured"¹⁶⁹.

Another worker died in Gelik, on 23 January 1910, due to a cave-in¹⁷⁰. A worker lost his life in Çay seam the day after¹⁷¹. The telegraph of the central office to engineer's office sent on 25 January provides information about yet another accident. This time, the language sounded firmer and included a flavour of threat:

*Şirketin Gelik ocağında vefat eden amele hakkında Zonguldak memurluğunun telgrafi balaya yazıldı. Ocak vukuatı hakkındaki tebligattan bir şübhe hasıl olmadığından mucib-i mesuliyet olacak ahvale meydan verilmemesi ve netice-i tahkikatın rapor işarı hakkında*¹⁷²

On 29th January, another letter was sent to engineer's office and this time demands an explicit answer:

*Ocaklardaki kazalar hakkındaki raporların 8 Kanun-ı Sani 325 [21 January 1910] tarihli olduğu halde 16 Kanun-ı Sani 325'de [29 January 1910] gelmesine sebep ne olduğunun ve emsali muamelenin bila-tehir işar ve irsaline dair cevaben*¹⁷³

¹⁶⁸ KÜA, no.40, p.139 (29 Kanun-ı Evvel 1325 / 11 January 1910).

¹⁶⁹ KÜA, no.40, p.139 (1 Kanun-ı Sani 1325 / 14 January 1910).

¹⁷⁰ KÜA, no.40, p.105 (10 Kanun-ı Sani 1325 / 23 January 1910).

¹⁷¹ KÜA, no.40, p.140 (11 Kanun-ı Sani 1325 / 24 January 1910).

¹⁷² KÜA, no.40, p.140 (16 Kanun-ı Sani 1325 / 29 January 1910).

“The telegraph of the Zonguldak office concerning the death of the worker in the Gelik mine of the company is written below. Since there is no doubt about the incident, no room for (legal) responsibility should be left and the outcome of investigation should be sent as a report.”

¹⁷³ KÜA, no.40, p.140 (16 Kanun-ı Sani 1325 / 29 January 1910).

“Why were the reports about the accidents in the mines dated 21 January 1910 but received on 29 January 1910? Similar correspondence should be sent without delay.”

Another accident occurred in Kozlu, in the mine of Şakir Bey and Cemal Bey and claimed the live of a worker. The central office called the engineer to the centre on February 1st¹⁷⁴.

On 21st February the chain of fatal accidents in Gelik mine of the Ereğli company continued: sapper Osman of Hamidiye lost his life, and worker Ahmed and sapper Nikola were injured¹⁷⁵. This was the last event in a chain of accidents in Gelik. In this mine, which was operated by the French company, seven significant accidents had taken place within five months, claiming the lives of five workers and injuring another five of them. Things did not settle in Gelik: The workers went on strike on 25th February, four days after the last accident¹⁷⁶. In a telegraph sent by the Çatalağzı office, it is reported that a sufficient number of workers and sappers started working¹⁷⁷. This emphasis on 'sufficient number' suggests that some workers continued the strike.

Unfortunately, there is no information about the fate and outcome of the strike in the pages of the *Evrak Defteri* of 1325 (1909-10). On the other hand, it is clear that it, along with the high frequency of accidents, alarmed the mine administration. In a telegraph to engineer's office, the central office wrote that:

*Zonguldak memurluğunun 594 numrolu telgrafi balaya yazıldı. Münderecatına göre mahallinde tedkikat icrasıyla raporunun yarın akşama kadar irsali ve terk-i eşgal meselesinde olduğu gibi bu hususda da istirahat-i zatiyenizi hayat-ı insaniyeye tercihle tekasül edilirse nezarete şikayet edileceğinize dair*¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁴ KÜA, no.40, p.141 (19 Kanun-ı Sani 1325 / 1 February 1910).

¹⁷⁵ KÜA, no.40, p.107 (8 Şubat 1325 / 21 February 1910).

¹⁷⁶ KÜA, no.40, p.107 (12 Şubat 1325 / 25 February 1910).

¹⁷⁷ KÜA, no.40, p.107 (13 Şubat 1325 / 26 February 1910).

¹⁷⁸ KÜA, no.40, p.142 (15 Şubat 1325 / 28 February 1910).

“The telegraph no.594 of the Zonguldak office is written below. An examination in the place of incident should be carried out and the report should be sent until tomorrow evening; if you, as in the case of strike, prefer your personal comfort to human life, you will be reported to the ministry.”

This very harshly worded telegraph includes an order with a deadline: "until tomorrow evening"; an accusation: "preferring personal comfort to human life"; and a threat: "if not, a complaint about you will be issued to the ministry".

The centre of the mine administration continued the correspondence on the Gelik strike on the first day of March. The summary of the memorandum sent to the Ereğli company reads:

Gelik'de amelenin terk-i eşgaline tarafınızdan tenzil-i ücret hakkında yazılmış bir tahrirat sebep olduğu ve ay nihayetlerinde amelenin cezaen akçe tevkif ve ceza tertib ve çavuşlar tarafından anneye ve namusa küfür suretiyle tahkir ve ————— edilmekte olduğu kaymakamlığın tezkeresinden anlaşılıp nezarete yazıldığından meni hakkında¹⁷⁹

In the following days, the centre continued to send letters blaming the company and the engineer. On March 2nd, a letter was sent to the engineer's office, stating that the engineer's reports number 45 and 47 could not be accepted¹⁸⁰. Three days later, this time the company received a letter in which the company, after a train went off the railway on the Üzülmöz line and three people were injured, was held responsible for not employing a switchman in every switch¹⁸¹. Lastly, a letter was sent to the engineer's office, the summary of which reads as:

Vazifenize mübaşeret tarihinden itibaren bu güne kadar ocak kazalarıyla bunlar hakkındaki tahkikatınız üzerine neticeyi mübin ne gibi tedabir ittihaz edilmiş ve bilumum madencilerin amelîyatı fenne muvafık mıdır değil midir ve bu babda ne gibi raporlar verilmistir beyan edilmesi ve izahat-ı lazımevi havi olmak üzere mufassal bir defterinin nezarete li-ecli 'l-takdim irsaline dair¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ KÜA, no.40, p. 142 (16 Şubat 1325 / 1 March 1910).

“It is understood from the memorandum of the lieutenant-governor (of Zonguldak) that the reason of the strike in Gelik was a letter written by the company about a reduction in the wages and that in the ends of months, money is cut from workers as fines and the foremen insult them by swearing against their mothers and chastity. These points were reported to the ministry and should be prevented.”

¹⁸⁰ KÜA, no.40, p.142 (17 Şubat 1325 / 2 March 1910).

¹⁸¹ KÜA, no.40, p.142 (20 Şubat 1325 / 5 March 1910).

¹⁸² KÜA, no.40, p.142 (21 Şubat 1325 / 6 March 1910).

This completes the chain of events and the set of correspondence that took place between the central office, various local branches, the engineer's office of the mine administration, Zonguldak Kaymakamlığı, the ministry, and the French company. In the following section, the accidents and the subsequent events and developments are discussed and interpreted.

4.3 Responses and Reactions to Accidents

At the time that has been considered here, the coal basin was under the responsibility of the Ministry of Forest and Mines. The ministry, indeed, took the accidents seriously and issues orders about the measures to be taken in order to prevent the accidents in the mines. On the other hand, it was not the ministry but the mine administration that was responsible for carrying out these measures. In a sense, the ministry's responses were general and the mine administration dealt with particular cases. Thus, in this context, it is appropriate to start with mine administration and assume that it was representing the official side of the problem of accidents.

4.3.1. Mine Administration

If the actions of the mine administration are considered through the period constituted the focus here, what will most probably emerge is that it was really working and pressing hard to ensure the safety of the workers in the basin. In doing this, the centre of the mine administration warned the local offices about the

“Since you started your duty, which result-delivering measures has been taken following your investigations into mine accidents? Are all mine owners' operations scientifically sound, and which reports has been sent on this issue? A detailed register containing the necessary explanations should be sent in order to be presented to the ministry.”

precautionary measures against accidents. When an accident happened, it did not hesitate to accuse the company for failing to fulfil its obligations. It reacted swiftly to every accident and pressed the engineer's office to complete the investigation process without delay. When the workers went on strike, rather than any agitators and provocateurs, it accused the company itself for inappropriate behaviour towards the workers. It urged the mine operators to build a hospital for the treatment of victims of the accidents. In short, in the context of the events described above, the centre of the mine administration consistently took the side of the workers against the French company and against the other mine owners. I will turn to this issue below.

4.3.2 Engineer's Office

The correspondence described and discussed in this chapter clearly suggests that there was a growing tension between the centre of the mine administration and the engineer's office. The former constantly urged the latter to be quick, set deadlines for the preparation of technical reports, asked for explanations in case of delay, and issued a complaint to the ministry. The centre asked which measures were taken after the technical reports had been prepared in the pits in which accidents have taken place. The centre even accused the engineer's office for neglecting human life.

At first glance, this tension between the engineer's office and the centre and the toughness of the latter suggests a personal dispute. Indeed, the wording of the letters of the centre of the administration implies that they were addressing not an official body, but one person. The memoirs of Hüseyin Fehmi (İmer), a former

director of the mine administration, also support such an idea; he says that there was only one engineer in the administration at the time of his assignment¹⁸³. Therefore, it is plausible to see this dispute to be a personal one between the director and the engineer. Moreover, the pressure of the director on the engineer might be a consequence of the latter being too busy with the affairs of the whole basin.

On the other hand, a closer look to the events may present a different picture. The centre's insistence that the "health and life of the workers be ensured" and the fact that it asked the engineer whether all the operations of mine owners are scientific and proper suggests that the engineer was not fulfilling his job properly. Besides, how can the fact that a report on the accidents that had been completed on 21 January 1910 was sent to the centre after an eight-day delay. It seems that the engineer was intentionally delaying the investigation processes after accidents. The only explanation to this could be that the engineer (or the engineer's office as a whole) had 'improper' or illegal relationships with the French company and the other mine owners. Although there is no evidence to prove the validity of such reasoning, the correspondence shows, at least, that the centre (director) of the mine administration thought it to be so.

¹⁸³ Kerim Yund (ed.), Şeçkin Türk Ormancısı Hüseyin Fehmi İmer Hayatı-Hatıraları 1871-1960 (İstanbul: Baha, 1973), p.50.

4.3.3 The Ottoman State on Accidents: An Evaluation

As discussed above, in the period that has been covered in this chapter, namely the last months of 1909 and first months of 1910, the Ottoman state seems to act always in favour of the workers. Yet, if we go a little further in time, the story of a worker, fireman İsmail can complicate the issue to an extent. In a 9 October 1910 letter sent from the Amasra branch to the centre, it was written, “276 piasters should be cut from the due wage of injured İsmail in return for the examination and treatment costs”¹⁸⁴. The subsequent correspondence¹⁸⁵ shows that the administration was very keen on taking the money from İsmail that they even sought to employ him for just this purpose. Beneath these five letters lay a tragic story: The administration demanded İsmail, whose leg had been injured in a railway accident, to pay 276 piasters in return for medical costs by additional working, while the wage of a fireman was 8 piasters.

Another complicating factor may be the attitude of the engineer. Above all, he was also a representative of the Ottoman state in the basin and his actions thereby could not be isolated from the official attitude regarding the workplace accidents. Moreover, it can also be argued that the favouring attitude of the mine administration towards the workers reflected less a concern in human life and health than a concern in increasing production and maintaining ‘law and order’ in the basin.

I think that, rather than from the different personal tendencies of officials, these seemingly contradictory actions stemmed from the contradictory nature of the

¹⁸⁴ KÜA, no.154, p.43 (26 Eylül 1326 / 9 October 1910).

Ottoman state. On the one hand, the Ottoman state around 1909-1910 was a revolutionary one. The revolution was accomplished in the name of the principles of “*hürriyet, müsavat, uhuvvet*” (liberty, equality, fraternity), which might have led the revolutionary regime to adopt a more favourable stance towards workers. On the other hand, the class character of the 1908 revolution should have played an opposite role. Its bourgeois nature should have imposed limits on the new regime’s favourable attitude towards the labour problem. Still, there was the need to establish ‘law and order’ and increase production in the basin. This need, depending on the context, might have given rise to both lines of action on the part of the state: either intervention in favour of labour, or the policy of ‘iron fist’. Lastly, as we have seen in the case of the engineer of the mine administration, corruption also played its part.

4.3.4 The French Company and the Accidents

In fact, the concession to exploit the Zonguldak-Ereğli coalmines given to French company represented a significant improvement in the region in terms of investment and technology. The French company undertook major infrastructural activity in the region including the Zonguldak port. Moreover, the French government was considering the company’s entrance into the basin as the establishment of a French colony at Zonguldak¹⁸⁶.

The investment of the company and the construction of railways by the Ottoman government rapidly increased production. It seems, however, that this

¹⁸⁵ KÜA, no.154, letters and telegraphs of dates 26 Eylül 1326 / 9 October 1910; 23 Teşrin-i Sani 1326 / 6 December 1910; 5 Kanun-ı Evvel 1326 / 18 December 1910; 22 Kanun-ı Evvel 1326 / 4 January 1911.

¹⁸⁶ Quataert, *Disintegration*, p.49.

‘modernisation’ in the basin did not mean any improvement in the working conditions. 15 years after the concession was granted, the frequency of accidents in the pits operated by the company is really astonishing. From November 1909 to February 1910, six serious accidents occurred in Gelik alone, killing five workers and injuring another five. Further, if we consider the memorandum of Zonguldak lieutenant-governor¹⁸⁷ to be true, the company attempted to cut down wages, arbitrarily imposed fines on workers, and the foremen constantly insulted them. Thus, the condition of mineworkers working in the pits of the company seems not to be very different from that of the workers in other pits: highly unsafe working conditions, low wages and inhumanly treatment.

4.3.5 The workers and the Accidents

As evident from the correspondence discussed in Section 4.2 above, the workers of the Gelik mine, which belongs to the Ereğli company, went on strike on 25th February 1910, and at least some of them continued to strike the other day. The lieutenant-governor of Zonguldak and the mine administration thought that the strike was a result of the company’s attempt to cut down wages, arbitrary fines imposed on workers and the insulting treatment of the workers by the foremen and there was no mention about the accidents¹⁸⁸. On the other hand, the strike followed a series of tragic accidents in which five workers had been killed and another five had been injured and the last of which had taken place four days before the strike. Thus, although the workers had other problems, it is very likely that the accidents also played their part in urging the workers of Gelik to strike. It seems that the

¹⁸⁷ KÜA, no.40, p.142 (16 Şubat 1325 / 1 March 1910).

¹⁸⁸ See note 27 above.

workers found the frequency of accidents and the death toll unacceptable and reacted to them via striking. Apart from indicating the workers' reaction to the accidents, this is also an indicator of the fact that striking has become a plausible method for struggle.

What is more significant is that the workers of Gelik did not give up their struggles. In mid-1910 and late 1911, two more strikes were organised in this mine. This time, the factor behind the strikes was the low level of wages¹⁸⁹.

The militancy of the Gelik workers continued even during the World War I. According to Hüseyin Fehmi (İmer), in the evening of the day when Zonguldak was bombarded by the Russian army, a few hundred armed workers from Gelik mine moved to Zonguldak in order to attack the French company's headquarters and this could only be prevented with force, with the declaration of martial law in the region¹⁹⁰. This incident is particularly significant in that it shows the level of hatred among the Gelik workers towards the company.

The workers of Gelik went on strike again in May 1922. According to the gendarme, the major reasons of this resistance were arbitrary deductions from wages, implausibly high fines, and the company's insistence on not giving more than a piece of bread per worker¹⁹¹.

Thus, the workers of Gelik mine emerged as highly militant ones in these years. The reasons behind this peculiar nature of workers of this mine are not definitely known. Perhaps a significant number of workers were concentrated in this mine, which facilitated the organisation of various forms of resistance. It is

¹⁸⁹ Sina Çıladı, "Zonguldak Kömür Havzasında İşçi Hareketi ve Sendikacılık", Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı ve Tarih Vakfı, 1996), p.558.

¹⁹⁰ Yund, Hüseyin Fehmi İmer, p.54-5.

also plausible that the working conditions were especially hard in this mine; this possibility is supported by the high frequency of accidents. It may well be that certain forms of political activity carried out by some workers or by those the company named as ‘outside agitators’ induced the other workers to organise resistance. We are far from deciding which of these factors took part. In any case, however, it is evident that the workers of Gelik maintained a tradition of struggle and resistance over years.

¹⁹¹ Çıladı, “İşçi Hareketi ve Sendikacılık”, p.558.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The beginning and intensification of mining activity in the Ereğli-Zonguldak region brought about a great transformation in people's lives. The agrarian population of the region constituted the backbone of the labour force employed in the mines and the basin attracted poor and wealthy emigrants from surrounding regions. People who were not directly linked to mining, most significantly the women, were also affected by this sea change. The dimensions of this transformation that occurred in the basin were well depicted in the development of Zonguldak itself. Zonguldak, which was only a small neighbourhood of a village at the time of the beginnings of mining activity, became a province in 1924. During this time, the basin remained a place in which many interesting events and trends could be observed: transformation of the agrarian community, rivalry between local and foreign capitalists, relations among workers, their struggles, state policies and so on. Here, it would be worthwhile to notice the reaction of Hüseyin Fehmi (İmer) when he was assigned as the director of the mines in 1910: "Why did you sacrifice me? Am I the only faulty one in this ministry? You sacrificed me to that chaotic place."¹⁹²

¹⁹² Kerim Yund (ed.), Seçkin Türk Ormancısı Hüseyin Fehmi İmer Hayatı Hatıraları (1871-1960) (İstanbul: Baha, 1973).

One of the focal points of this study is the wages in the basin. I chose the wages because they seem to be closely related to a number of factors, labour scarcity or abundance, the quality of life of workers, the level of labour organisation and militancy, to state a few. If a very broad statement about the wages in the basin should be made, it would be that, leaving aside the erosion that took place during the war years, the real wages presented a more or less stable pattern. On the other hand, the erosion of the war years was not evenly distributed. While the increase in the wages of some categories of workers, particularly the skilled ones, remained significantly below the increase in prices, some wages, particularly those of unskilled workers, could match or even surpass the rise in prices. The result was a convergence of wages of skilled and unskilled workers. I also attempted to understand the impact of the strikes of 1908 on the wages in the basin but my conclusion turned out to be that presently, we are far from putting forward a reliable judgement on this issue.

As to deductions imposed on wages, there were various forms of deductions *circa* 1922 and the average percentage of them was 20 percent. Yet, to the detriment of workers who were less paid, the deductions followed a 'regressive' pattern. Another point that deserves mention here pertains to the *Amele Birliđi*, the first social security institution in the basin. Although it has been argued that the realisation of this fund had to wait until 1923, I found out that that cuts were made for this fund as early as 1922.

The second emphasis of this thesis is on the accidents in the mines. This part of the study concentrates on 1909-10 and it is possible to say that the high frequency of accidents persisted in this period and in the mines of the Eređli

company as well. There were seven serious accidents within five months in only the Gelik mine of the company, killing five and injuring another five workers. In response to this, the centre of the mine administration accused the company for failing to take the necessary preventive measures and the engineer's office for putting off its job. Indeed, it is highly likely that the engineer established some illegal or extra-legal relationships with the French company and with other mine operators. The government's reaction probably reflected the ambivalent situation in which it found itself. Amidst various concerns, interests and pressures it could not take a consistent attitude towards the problem of accidents. As to the workers, who heavily suffered in these accidents, their response was in a form with which they seemed to be familiar at the time and which they would also employ in the future: striking.

In this thesis, I tried to shed light on some aspects of the lives of the labourers of the Ereğli-Zonguldak coal basin during the Ottoman period and followed this up to the first years of the Kemalist government. Miserable conditions, poverty and fatal accidents were transferred to the Republican period. On the other hand, it seems that these workers also transferred their tradition of resistance and struggle to this new era.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. *Primary Sources*

Karaelmas University Archives (KÜA): Karaelmas Üniversitesi Zonguldak Meslek Yüksekokulu, Zonguldak.

no.26: Evrak İrsalat Defteri (1326)

no.40: Evrak Defteri (1325)

no.41: Evrak İrsalat Defteri (1326)

no.42: Evrak İrsalat Defteri (1326)

no.66: 64 Numarolu İktisad Ocağının Amele-i Daime ve Muvakkata Esas Kayıt Defteri

no.68: Ereğli Kömür Madeni Hümayunu Tahsilat Sarfiyat Sandık Yevmiye Defteri (1321)

no.73: Evrak-ı Umumiye Defteri (1321-23)

no.79: Ereğli Kömür Maden-i Hümayunu Tahsilat Sarfiyat Sandık Yevmiye Defteri (1323)

no.80: Yevmiye Defteri (1322)

no.92: Tahsilat Sarfiyat Sandık Yevmiye Defteri (1321)

no.154: Evrak-ı Varide Defteri (1326)

no.158: Maaş Defteri (1325)

no.194: Yevmiye Defteri (1338)

no.217: Sarrafiye Ocakları 287 Numarolu Ocağın Amele Kayıt Defteri (1338-9)

T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi, cilt.3, Devre 1, İçtima Senesi 1 (Ankara, 1941)

T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi, Cilt 10, Devre 1, İçtima 2 (Ankara, 1958)

T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi, Cilt 12, Devre 1, İçtima 2 (Ankara, 1958)

2. Secondary Sources

Çatma, Erol, *Asker İşçiler* (İstanbul: Ceylan, 1998)

Çıladır, Sina, “Zonguldak Kömür Havzasında İşçi Hareketi ve Sendikacılık” in *Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı ve Tarih Vakfı, 1996), vol.3, 557-563

Çıladır, Sina, *Zonguldak Havzasında Emperyalizm, 1848-1940* (Ankara: Aydınlık, 1970)

Çıladır, Sina, *Zonguldak Havzasında İşçi Hareketlerinin Tarihi, 1848-1940* (Ankara: Yeraltı Maden-İş, 1977)

DeWind, Josh, “From Peasants to Miners: The Background to Strikes in the Mines of Peru” in Cohen, Robin; Gutkind, Peter C.W. and Brazier, Phyllis (eds.), *Peasant and Proletarians* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1979)

Eldem, Vedat, *Harp ve Mütareke Yıllarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Ekonomisi* (Ankara: TTK, 1994)

Eldem, Vedat, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İktisadi Şartları Hakkında Bir Tetkik* (Ankara: TTK, 1994)

Engin, Fevzi, “151 Sayılı Kanun” in *Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı ve Tarih Vakfı, 1996), vol.3, 545

Fine, Ben, *The Coal Question: Political Economy and Industrial Change from the Nineteenth Century to the Present Day* (London: Routledge, 1990)

Güzel, M. Sehmus, *Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketi 1908-1984* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1996)

Kahveci, Erol, “The Miners of Zonguldak”, in Erol Kahveci, Nadir Sungur and Theo Nichols (eds.), *Work and Occupation in Modern Turkey*, (London: Mansell, 1996), 172-207

Kansu, Aykut, *1908 Devrimi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1995)

Karal, Enver Ziya, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol.VII (Ankara: TTK, 1983)

Koç, Yıldırım, *100 Soruda Türkiye’de İşçi Sınıfı ve Sendikacılık Hareketi* (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1998)

Konrapa, M.Zekai, *Bolu Tarihi* (Bolu: Bolu Vilayet Matbaası, 1960)

- Kurmuş, Orhan, *Emperyalizmin Türkiye'ye Girişi* (İstanbul: Bilim, 1977)
- Langer, Erick D., "The Barriers to Proletarianization: Bolivian Mine Labour, 1826-1918", *International Review of Social History*, vol.41 (1996), 27-51
- Lockman, Z., *Workers and Working Classes in the Middle East* (New York: SUNY Press, 1994)
- Naim, Ahmet, *Bir Yudum Soluk. Maden İşçilerinin Ocak İçi Yaşantıları*, 2nd ed., (Ereğli: Şirin Ereğli, 1983)
- Naim, Ahmet, *Zonguldak Havzası. Uzun Mehmet'ten Bugüne Kadar* (İstanbul, Hüsnü Tabiat Matbaası, 1934)
- Nichols, Theo and Erol Kahveci, "The Condition of Mine Labour in Turkey: Injuries to Miners in Zonguldak", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.31, no.2 (1995), 197-228
- Oskay, Ülgen, *Geçiş Dönemi Tipi Olarak Zonguldak Kömür Havzası Maden İşçisi* (İzmir: Ege Ü. Edebiyat Fak., 1983)
- Ökçün, Gündüz, "XX.Yüzyıl Başlarında Osmanlı Maden Üretiminde Türk, Azınlık ve Yabancı Payları", in *Abadan'a Armağan* (Ankara, 1969), 803-895
- Ökçün, Gündüz, Korkut Boratav ve Şevket Pamuk, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Ücretler (1839-1913)", *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), vol.3, 753-759
- Özeken, A. Ali, *Türkiye Kömür Ekonomisi Tarihi*, Birinci Kısım (İstanbul: İ.Ü. İktisat Fakültesi, 1955)
- Pamuk, Şevket, *İstanbul ve Diğer Kentlerde 500 Yıllık Fiyatlar ve Ücretler 1469-1998* (Ankara: DİE, 2000)
- Quataert, Donald and Nadir Özbek, "The Ereğli-Zonguldak Coal Mines: A Catalog of Archival Documents", *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, vol.23, no.1 (1999), 55-67
- Quataert, Donald and Eric Zürcher, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet Türkiyesine İşçiler 1839-1950* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1995)
- Quataert, Donald, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908. Reactions to European Economic Penetration* (New York: NYU Press, 1983)

Quataert, Donald, “Zonguldak Maden İşçilerinin Hayatı, 1870-1920”, *Toplum ve Bilim*, no.83 (1999/2000), 80-91

Simeon, Dilip, “Coal and Colonialism: Production Relations in an Indian Coalfield, c. 1895-1947”, *International Review of Social History*, vol.41 (1996), 83-108

Tuncer, Kadir, *Tarihten Günümüze Zonguldak'ta İşçi Sınıfının Durumu. Kumpanyalar Dönemine Geri Dönüş* (İstanbul: Göçebe, 1998)

Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı ve Tarih Vakfı, 1996)

Yolalıcı, M. Emin, *XIX.Yüzyılda Canik (Samsun) Sancağı'nın Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı* (Ankara: TTK, 1998)

Yund, Kerim (ed.), *Seçkin Türk Ormancısı Hüseyin Fehmi İmer Hayatı Hatıraları (1871-1960)* (İstanbul: Baha, 1973)

ردیف	تاریخ	موضوع	خلاصه	ملاحظات
۱	۱۳۰۵
۲	۱۳۰۶
۳	۱۳۰۷
۴	۱۳۰۸
۵	۱۳۰۹
۶	۱۳۱۰
۷	۱۳۱۱
۸	۱۳۱۲
۹	۱۳۱۳
۱۰	۱۳۱۴
۱۱	۱۳۱۵
۱۲	۱۳۱۶
۱۳	۱۳۱۷
۱۴	۱۳۱۸
۱۵	۱۳۱۹
۱۶	۱۳۲۰
۱۷	۱۳۲۱
۱۸	۱۳۲۲
۱۹	۱۳۲۳
۲۰	۱۳۲۴

ردیف	تاریخ	موضوع	خلاصه	ملاحظات
۱	۱۳۰۵
۲	۱۳۰۶
۳	۱۳۰۷
۴	۱۳۰۸
۵	۱۳۰۹
۶	۱۳۱۰
۷	۱۳۱۱
۸	۱۳۱۲
۹	۱۳۱۳
۱۰	۱۳۱۴
۱۱	۱۳۱۵
۱۲	۱۳۱۶
۱۳	۱۳۱۷
۱۴	۱۳۱۸
۱۵	۱۳۱۹
۱۶	۱۳۲۰
۱۷	۱۳۲۱
۱۸	۱۳۲۲
۱۹	۱۳۲۳
۲۰	۱۳۲۴

Appendix 6: Register no. 40, p. 140 (right)

رقم	التاريخ	الوصف	رقم	التاريخ	الوصف
١	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
٢	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
٣	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
٥	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
٦	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
٧	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
٨	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
٩	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
١٠	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤

Appendix 5: Register no. 40, p. 138 (left)

رقم	التاريخ	الوصف	رقم	التاريخ	الوصف
١	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
٢	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
٣	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
٥	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
٦	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
٧	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
٨	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
٩	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤
١٠	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤	١٨٤٤

Appendix 7: Register no.40, p.140 (left)

سنة	رقم	تاريخ	ملاحظات	اسم	ملاحظات
1887	221	12/12
1888	225	12/12
1889	226	12/12
1890	227	12/12
1891	228	12/12
1892	229	12/12
1893	230	12/12
1894	231	12/12
1895	232	12/12
1896	233	12/12
1897	234	12/12
1898	235	12/12
1899	236	12/12
1900	237	12/12
1901	238	12/12
1902	239	12/12
1903	240	12/12
1904	241	12/12
1905	242	12/12
1906	243	12/12
1907	244	12/12
1908	245	12/12
1909	246	12/12
1910	247	12/12
1911	248	12/12
1912	249	12/12
1913	250	12/12
1914	251	12/12
1915	252	12/12
1916	253	12/12
1917	254	12/12
1918	255	12/12
1919	256	12/12
1920	257	12/12
1921	258	12/12
1922	259	12/12
1923	260	12/12
1924	261	12/12
1925	262	12/12
1926	263	12/12
1927	264	12/12
1928	265	12/12
1929	266	12/12
1930	267	12/12
1931	268	12/12
1932	269	12/12
1933	270	12/12
1934	271	12/12
1935	272	12/12
1936	273	12/12
1937	274	12/12
1938	275	12/12
1939	276	12/12
1940	277	12/12
1941	278	12/12
1942	279	12/12
1943	280	12/12
1944	281	12/12
1945	282	12/12
1946	283	12/12
1947	284	12/12
1948	285	12/12
1949	286	12/12
1950	287	12/12
1951	288	12/12
1952	289	12/12
1953	290	12/12
1954	291	12/12
1955	292	12/12
1956	293	12/12
1957	294	12/12
1958	295	12/12
1959	296	12/12
1960	297	12/12
1961	298	12/12
1962	299	12/12
1963	300	12/12

Appendix 8: Register no.40, p.142 (right)

1964	301	12/12
1965	302	12/12
1966	303	12/12
1967	304	12/12
1968	305	12/12
1969	306	12/12
1970	307	12/12
1971	308	12/12
1972	309	12/12
1973	310	12/12
1974	311	12/12
1975	312	12/12
1976	313	12/12
1977	314	12/12
1978	315	12/12
1979	316	12/12
1980	317	12/12
1981	318	12/12
1982	319	12/12
1983	320	12/12
1984	321	12/12
1985	322	12/12
1986	323	12/12
1987	324	12/12
1988	325	12/12
1989	326	12/12
1990	327	12/12
1991	328	12/12
1992	329	12/12
1993	330	12/12
1994	331	12/12
1995	332	12/12
1996	333	12/12
1997	334	12/12
1998	335	12/12
1999	336	12/12
2000	337	12/12
2001	338	12/12
2002	339	12/12
2003	340	12/12
2004	341	12/12
2005	342	12/12
2006	343	12/12
2007	344	12/12
2008	345	12/12
2009	346	12/12
2010	347	12/12
2011	348	12/12
2012	349	12/12
2013	350	12/12
2014	351	12/12
2015	352	12/12
2016	353	12/12
2017	354	12/12
2018	355	12/12
2019	356	12/12
2020	357	12/12
2021	358	12/12
2022	359	12/12
2023	360	12/12
2024	361	12/12
2025	362	12/12
2026	363	12/12
2027	364	12/12
2028	365	12/12
2029	366	12/12
2030	367	12/12
2031	368	12/12
2032	369	12/12
2033	370	12/12
2034	371	12/12
2035	372	12/12
2036	373	12/12
2037	374	12/12
2038	375	12/12
2039	376	12/12
2040	377	12/12
2041	378	12/12
2042	379	12/12
2043	380	12/12
2044	381	12/12
2045	382	12/12
2046	383	12/12
2047	384	12/12
2048	385	12/12
2049	386	12/12
2050	387	12/12
2051	388	12/12
2052	389	12/12
2053	390	12/12
2054	391	12/12
2055	392	12/12
2056	393	12/12
2057	394	12/12
2058	395	12/12
2059	396	12/12
2060	397	12/12
2061	398	12/12
2062	399	12/12
2063	400	12/12

Appendix 23: Eređli ve Zonguldak Havzalarından İhraç Olunanacak Maden K m rlerinden Alınacak İhracat Resmi Hakkında Kanun (15.08.1920; no.11)

Madde 1: Eređli ve Zonguldak havza-i fahmiyesinden ıkarılan k m rlerin f ruht ve sevki hakkında mevzu kuyut refedilmiřtir.

Madde 2: Maden k m rlerinin yıkanmıř cinsinin beher tonasından iskeleden hin-i ihracında muayyen olan r sum-ı nisbiyeden maada maktuan   lira ve yıkanmamıř cinsinden iki lira ihracat resmi alınacaktır. K m r fiatlarının tereff  veya tedennisinde iřbu r sum Heyet-i Vekile karariyle y zde elliye kadar tezyit veya tenkis olunabilir.

Madde 3: Komisyon namına beher ton k m rden istifa edilmekte olan on beř kuruř badema ahzedilmeyecek ve simdiye kadar alınmıř olan mebaliđin hesabı Zonguldak muhasebesince r yet edilerek bakiye-i mevcude mal sandıđına devrolunacaktır.

Madde 4: İřbu kanun tarih-i neřrinden itibaren meri licradır.

Madde 5: İřbu kanunun icra-yı ahkamına M dafaa-i Milliye, İktisat ve Maliye Vekilleri memurdur.

Appendix 24: *Zonguldak ve Eređli Havza-i Fahmiyesinde Mevcut Kmr Tozlarının Amele Menafi-i Umumiyesine Olarak Frhtuna Dair Kanun* (28.04.1921; no.114)

Madde 1: Zonguldak ve Eređli havza-i fahmiyesinde elyevm mevcut bulunan ve badema kmr istihsalatından vcuda gelecek olan maden kmr tozları maden amelesinin menafi-i umumiyesine hasr  tahsis olunur.

Madde 2: Maden kmr tozları amele heyet-i idaresi tarafından İktisat Vekaletinin nezareti altında bilmzayede satılır ve amele hayeti namına Ziraat Bankasına tevdi olunur.

Madde 3: İşbu kanun tarih-i neşrinden muteberdir.

Madde 4: İşbu kanunun icra-yı ahkamına İktisat Vekili memurdur.

Appendix 25: *Ereğli Havza-i Fahmiyesi Maden Amelesinin Hukukuna Müteallik Kanun* (10.09.1921; no.151)

Madde 1: Maden ocaklarında müstahdem amelenin beytutetleri ve temin-i istirahatleri için her ocak civarında İktisat Vekaletince tanzim edilen numunelerine tevfikan amele koşulları ile hamam inşasına ocak amilleri mecburdur.

Madde 2: Maden işlerinde amelenin cebren istihdamı ve angarye suretiyle herhangi bir işe sevki ve on sekiz yaşından dun olanların maden ocakları dahilinde istihdamı memnudur.

Madde 3: Her madenci istihdam ettiği amelenin miktar-ı ücretiyle künyesini mübeyyin numunesine tevfikan muntazam defter tutmağa ve bu defteri Amele Birliği müfettişine ve İktisat Vekaleti memurlarına beray-ı tetkik ibraza mecburdur.

Madde 4: Alelumum madenciler tarafından nizamname-i mahsusuna tevfikan amele tarafından teşkil olunanacak ihtiyat ve teavün sandıklarına beher mah zarfında istihdam edecekleri amele ücret-ı umumiyesinin yüzde birinden dun olmamak üzere muavenet-i nakdiyede bulunmağa mecburdurlar.

Madde 5: Amelenin zatına ait olup esna-yı ameliyatta kırılan alet ve edevat ile nakliyat esnasında telef olan hayvanatı madenci tarafında tamir ve tazmin olunur.

Madde 6: Bilumum madenciler hasta ve kazazede olan ameleyi meccanen tedavi ettirmeğe ve bunu teminen maden civarında hastahane, eczahane ve şahadetnameli etibba bulundurmağa mecburdurlar. Bunların tayin-i mahal ve adediyle muhtelif madencilerin arasında mesarifin vech-i tevzi ve itasına dair ayrıca bir nizamname tanzim olunacaktır.

Madde 7: Havza-i fahmiyede say ü amelden dolayı kazazede olanlarla vefat edenlerin varisleri veya amele müfettişliği veyahut İktisat Vekaleti taraflarından tazminat davası

ikame olunur. İşbu tazminat davası miktarı kaç kuruştan ibaret olursa olsun sulh hakimleri hakkındaki kanuna tevfikan sulh mahkemelerince kabil-i temyiz olmak üzere rüyet olunur. Tazminat miktarı tarafeynden alelusul müntehap erbab-ı vukuftan teşekkül edecek heyetin vereceği rapora istinad eder. Kaza vukuu amel veya mültezimlerin sui idaresinden veya fennen ifası lazım gelen hususatın adem-i ifasından neşet etmişse tazminattan maada işbu amel veya mültezimlerden beş yüz liradan beş bin liraya kadar ceza-i nakdi alınır.

Madde 8: Mesai-i yevmiye alelittlak sekiz saattir, bu müddetten fazla çalışmağa hiçbir işçi icbar edilemez. Tahtezemin mesafede nüzul ve suut için geçen müddet sekiz saate dahildir.

Madde 9: Amelenin ahval-i sıhhiye ve şerait-i hayatiyeleriyle hukuk-ı umumiyelerine müteallik işbu mevaddı ifa etmeyen madenci ve mültezimlerin ruhsatname ve şartname ve itilafname ve imtiyazları fesh olunur.

Madde 10: İşbu kanun ahkamı elyevm meri olan bilumum ruhsatname ve şartname ve itilafname ve imtiyazlara şamildir.

Madde 11: Maden ocaklarında çalışan amelenin hadd-i asgari ücreti ocak amel veya mültezimleriyle Amele Birliği ve İktisat Vekaleti tarafında müntehap üç zat marifetiyle tayin olunur.

Madde 12: Maden Nizamnamesinin 77'nci ve 78'nci maddeleriyle işbu kanun ahkamına tearuz eden alelumum mevadd-ı nizamiye mülğadır.

Madde 13: Maden ocağı amilleri bir mescid ve genç ameleye gece dersleri vermek üzere bir mektep yapmağa ve muallim tutmağa mecburdurlar.

Madde 14: İşbu kanun tarih-i neşrinden muteberdir.

Madde 15: İşbu kanunun icrasına Adliye ve İktisat Vekilleri memurdur.