THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN IDENTITY
TRANSFORMATION: THE CASE OF TURKISH-GREEK CONFLICT
WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO FRAMEWORKS

A Ph.D. Dissertation

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September 2003

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The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR
OF PHILOSOPHY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

September 2003

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ABSTRACT

The Role of International Institutions in Identity Transformation: The Case

of Turkish-Greek Conflict within the European Union and NATO

Frameworks

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August 2003

This dissertation analyses the impact of the *dynamics of Turkey and Greece's institutional links with the European Union and NATO* on the *nature of Turkish-Greek relations* from an International Relations theoretical perspective. In undertaking this task the main research interest is to uncover the impact of links with international institutions on the security identities of states. Relevant theoretical approaches, namely rationalist institutionalist theories of neo-liberalism and neo-realism and sociological institutionalist theory of social constructivism, are assessed in terms of their capabilities to explain the relationship between links with international institutions and security identities of states. In this regard, this dissertation mainly draws on the social constructivist approach for the main reason that the rationalist institutionalist theories fall short of offering convincing explanations as to the identity transforming effects of interactions within institutional environments.

The main argument is that the contextual environment of Turkey and Greece's interaction through the EU and NATO has contributed to the perpetuation of *realpolitik* security identities and practices in and around the Aegean Sea and Cyprus, rather than setting the stage for long-term cooperative bilateral relations based on non-*realpolitik* security identities. In this sense, the *realpolitik* kind bilateral security relations are ideational in nature and have been to a significant degree informed by the context of Turkey and Greece's joint membership in NATO and close relations on the margins of the European Union. This dissertation simply tries to unravel the mechanisms through which this outcome has taken place. Assuming that Turkey and Greece would have stable and long-term cooperative security relations if and only if their security identities and interests came closer to each other on the basis of the non-*realpolitik* security norms of the western international/security community, this dissertation argues that the way the dynamics of Turkey and Greece's institutional relations within the EU and NATO frameworks have unfolded has significantly curtailed this possibility.

By way of conclusion, this dissertation has reached the following points: First, the social constructivist approaches are better equipped with the tools to highlight the identity-transforming effects of links with international institutions. Second, the alleged security community identities of the European Union and NATO have not contributed to the emergence of a security community between Greece and Turkey. This was so because NATO has been a collective defence organization of *realpolitik* kind since its inception. Besides, the European Union members have acted towards Turkey and Greece from an instrumental perspective, highlighting the costs and benefits of their true inclusion in the Union, rather than from the logic of appropriateness believing that their incorporation into the Union would be in accordance with the security identity of the Union.

Third, for Turkey and Greece to develop a *non-realpolitik* security relationship within the framework of the European Union they should approach the EU from an ideational perspective, rather than an instrumental one. They should believe that the resolution of their territorial disputes in peaceful ways would be legitimate in order for them to be considered as real Europeans.

ÖZET

Uluslararası Kurumların Kimlik Dönüşümündeki Rolü: Avrupa Birligi ve NATO Çerçevesinde Türk-Yunan Anlaşmazlığının İncelenmesi

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Ağustos 2003

Bu tez Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ının Avrupa Birliği ve NATO ile olan ilişkilerinin yapısının, iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin doğasını nasıl etkilediğini Uluslararası İlişkiler teorileri açısından incelemektedir. Bunu yaparken temel araştırma konusu bu kurumsal ilişkilerin iki ülkenin güvenlik kimliklerini ne yönde etkilediğidir. Tezde referans yapılan ilgili Uluslararası İlişkiler teorileri, isim vermek gerekirse "neo-realist", "neo-liberal" ve "sociological institutionalist" teoriler, uluslararası kurumlarla kurulan ilişkilerin devletlerin güvenlik kimliklerininin oluşmasını açıklamaları açısından değerlendirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda düşünüldüğünde, bu tez ağırlıklı olarak sociological institutionalist teorilerin metodlarını benimsemiştir çünkü neo-realist ve neo-liberal teorilerin uluslararası örgütlerin kimlik dönüşümlerindeki etkilerini inceleme ya da bu etkilerin nasıl olduklarını gösterme boyutları sınırlıdır.

Tezin ana fikri şudur: Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın Avrupa Birliği ve NATO bağlamında kurduğu ilişkiler ve bu örgütlerin temsil ettikleri durumsal şartlar, iki ülke arasında realpolitik güvenlik kimklilerine dayalı ilişkilerin oluşmasına ve zamanla pekişmesine katkıda bulunmuştur. Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın NATO ve Avrupa Birliği çerçevesinde geliştirdikleri ilişkilerin doğası bu iki ülkenin "non-realpolitik" tarzda güvenlik kimlikleri üretmelerini engellemiş ve onların uzun vadeli işbirliğine dayalı ilişkiler kurma becerilerini olumsuz yönde etkilemiştir. Bu bağlamda düşünüldüğünde Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasındaki realpolitik bazdaki güvenlik ilişkileri daha çok kimliksel ve fikirsel düzeydedir. Bunun böyle olmasında ise bu iki ülkenin Avrupa Birliği ve NATO ile kurdukları ilişkilerin doğası belirleyici olmuştur. Bu tez basitçe bu kurumsal ilişkilerin Türkiye ve Yunanistan'da hangi mekanizmalar sonucu realpolitik güvenlik kimliklerinin oluşmasına katkıda bulunduğunu incelemektedir. Bu tez Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasında uzun vadeli işbirliğine dayalı ilişkilerin oluşmasında iki ülkenin güvenlik kimliklerinin Batı devletler topluluğunun non-real politik güvenlik kimliği ve normaları yönünde yakınlaşmasını ve evrilmesini şart gördüğğnden, yapmaya çalıştığı bu iki ülkenin bu kurumlarla kurdukları ilişkerin yapısının hangi süreçler sonucu tam ters istikamette neticeler doğurduğunu incelemektir.

Ulaştığı sonuçlar bağlamında bu tez asağıdaki hususları vurgulamaktadır. İlk olarak, "social constructivist" uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri, diğer teorilere

nazaran uluslararası kurumlarla kurulan ilişkilerin kimlik dönüştürme kapasitelerinin açıklamada daha başarılıdır. İkinci olarak, 'güvenlik topluluğu' oldukları farzedilen NATO ve Avrupa Birliği Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasında bir güvenlik topluluğunun oluşmasına pozitif anlamda katkıda bulunmamışlardır. Bunun nedenlerinden birisi NATO'nun daha çok realpolitik güvenlik kimliği üzerine kurulu bir ortak savunma örgütü olduğudur. Buna ilaveten, Avrupa Birligi Türkiye ve Yunanistan'a karşı daha çok araçsal bakış açısıyla ve kar-zarar hesabı zaviyesinden yaklaşmış, iki ülkenin Avrupa Birliği'ne gerçek anlamda katılmalarını kimliksel ve fikirsel bazda öngörüp meşrulaştıramamıştır. Üçüncü olarak, Türkiye ve Yunanistan şayet Avrupa Birliği çerçevesinde non-realpolitik güvenlik kimliğine dayalı bir güvenlik topluluğu kuracaklarsa bunu ancak Avrupa Birliği'ne taktiksel ve araçsal açılardan yaklasmayı bırakıp daha çok fikirsel ve kimliksel düzeyde hareket ederek yapabilirler. Bu bağlamda her ikisinin de şuna inanmaları elzemdir: Yaşıyor oldukları sınır problemlerinin barışçı yollardan çözümü onların gerçek Avrupalı kimliklerinin tescil edilmesi için bir önşarttır.

Acknowledgments

This dissertation would not be completed without the help and support of some distinguished personalities.

The first and foremost of whom is Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, my thesis supervisor and the head of the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University. His academic guidance and constructive contributions have led me to successfully deal with my research question. In times of difficulties in building my argumentation, my talks with him enabled me to focus my attention on the right direction without diverging from the main idea of the dissertation. In my quest how to combine theory with practice, I would most probably have failed absent his suggestions and recommendations.

Second, my sincere thanks go to my family. Even though they live far away from me, they have supported me through the long phone conversations.

Third, I would like to extend my thanks to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nuri Yurdusev, Assist. Prof. Dr. Gülgün Tuna, and Assist. Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı, all are included in the examining committee, for their useful insights into my argumentation. Without their suggestions, I would not be able to improve the academic quality of my dissertation as it is now.

Last but not least, my warmest thanks go to my fiancée, T. Meltem Berkmen. Since we decided to build a common destiny three years ago, she has always assisted me in coping with the distressful and exhaustive times I lived through. She has always tolerated when I had to spend a great amount of time in researching and writing my dissertation. Without her understanding and imaginative efforts to create the most comfortable environment for me, I would most probably have been lost among numerous books and articles.

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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation will mainly argue that the nature of the relationship between Greece and Turkey cannot be fully grasped without taking into consideration the institutional relationships which these countries have developed both with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This contextual environment has to a significant degree moulded the substance of bilateral relations since the onset of the Cold War era. Therefore, in accounting for the nature of Turkish-Greek relations, this dissertation does not analyse the impact of other possible indendent variables, such as the nature of domestic regimes in both countries, the personalities of the leaders involved in foreign and security policy making process, the systemic factors in the region measured in terms of the distribution of material capabilities, the historical legacy of bilateral relations. Neither is the goal to make a comparative analysis with respect to the weight of various independent variables on the nature of bilateral relations.

The goal is simply to unravel the mechanims through which this contextual environment, which has transpired through Turkish-Greek interaction within NATO and on the margins of the EU, has contributed to the more conflictual - less cooperative bilateral relations in and around the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. Stated somewhat differently, the goal is to account for the reasons why this contextual environment has not produced a transformation of Turkish-Greek *realpolitik* security relations into non-*realpolitik* security relations based on the security norms of the Western international community.

The argument is that instead of paving the way, and setting the stage, for similar and accommodating identity transformations between the two countries based on non-*realpolitik* security identities, their NATO membership and close

relationships with the EU have contributed to the perpetuation of their *realpolitik* security identities. Assuming that long-term cooperative relationships would most likely follow a collective identity formation between these two countries based on non-*realpolitik* security identities, this dissertation does not aim to explain the occurances of bilateral cooperation of *realpolitik* kind. Even if the above-mentioned contextual environment might have contributed to Turkish-Greek cooperation of *realpolitik* kind, this contextual environment will be analysed in terms of its cabapility/promise to engender Turkish-Greek cooperation of non-*realpolitik* nature. All the theoretical approaches to be referred to throughout the dissertation will be assessed in terms of their expectations of the role of 'links with international organizations' in the emergence of long-term cooperative relations between states based on non-*realpolitik* security relations.

Viewed in this way, this dissertation makes a distinction between three ostensibly interrelated concepts, or dependent variables, namely 'absence of war', 'cooperation', and 'identity transformation'. It is the third of these that this dissertation tries to account for. For example, the fact that Turkey and Greece has never fought since the inception of their institutional relationships with the EU and NATO, is not what is going to be explained here. Neither the emergence of a crisis-management culture nor bilateral cooperative schemes based on the convergence of conjectural national interests are the things that this dissertatin tries to explain.

The point this dissertation will try to make is that Turkey and Greece were given chances to get rid of their negative interaction and mutual misperceptions through their links with the EU and NATO. However, they have squandered this chance. In this process, the EU and NATO themselves played also quite negative roles. While the traces of the *realpolitik* security culture have gradually evaporated

among the western European members of NATO and the EU, this has not been the case on the southeastern edge of the continent. Instead of contributing to the elimination of the legacy of the conflictual past and *realpolitik* security behaviour, it appeared that 'the nature of these links with these international institutions' have further contributed to the normalcy of 'the conflict as inevitable' thinking in Turkish-Greek relations.

Seen as such, this dissertation seeks to problematize the social-constructivist expectation that both the 'EU's accession process' and 'membership in NATO' contribute to the emergence of a security community between the current members and membership candidates in the long-run by contributing to the transformation of their *realpolitik* security culture into a non-*realpolitik* one.

By 'their institutional relationship within NATO and the EU frameworks', I mean, first of all, the contextual environment in which Tukey and Greece interact with each other. The assumption is that absent the European Union and NATO, their relations would evolve differently. Second, by 'their institutional relationship within NATO and the EU frameworks' I mean the aggregate outcome of three simultaneous relationships. The first concerns the dynamics of EU/NATO-Turkey relations, especially defined in security terms, whereas the second pertains to the dynamics of EU/NATO-Greece relations. The third one relates to the dynamics of Turkey-Greece relations defined in terms of their interaction and status within NATO and the EU. How have the EU/NATO approached/viewed Turkey and Greece? How have Turkey and Greece approached/viewed the EU/NATO? How has Turkey approached/viewed Greece in terms of Greece's status within NATO/EU? How has Greece approached/viewed Turkey in terms of Turkey's status within NATO/EU?

This dissertation will not argue that the main responsibility for the emergence and continuation of conflictual relationship in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus Island falls on the shoulders of the EU and NATO or the links these two countries have established with them. However, it is contended here that their links with the EU and NATO have not helped them resolve their disputes by developing cooperative relationships, based on non-*realpolitik* security cultures. This dissertation will not discuss the Aegean Sea disputes and the Cyprus conflict in detail with a view to providing a descriptive account of the developments. Therefore, there is no specified chapter devoted to the description of these issues.

One who does not know the last half-a-century history of the Turkish-Greek relations in detail but is cognizant of the facts that they had no conflictual relationship in the aftermath of the Second World War, would most likely have argued that they must have ended up with a totally cooperative relationship by now. For example, Turkey and Greece could co-establish the Balkan Entente in 1934; settled many of the fundamental issues left over from the Lausanne Treaty of 1923; worked together in the revision of the Lausanne regulations concerning the straits in Montreux in 1936 (Bitzes, 1997: 307-323); promised to respect the territorial integrity of each other; promised to assist one another in case of an assault on their territories; could exchange high-level visits in the early 1950s during which many Greek and Turkish circles did even mention the possibility of any union between the two countries; co-establish the Balkan Pact of 1954 (Coufoudakis, 1985: 185-217). Turkey did not bow to the enticing tactics of the Great Powers during the course of the Second World War by laying claims to the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean Sea. The leaders of the neither country had invested important political capitals in Cyprus. While the Turkish leaders made it clear that Cyprus can never strain the

positive atmosphere of the bilateral relations (Bolukbasi, 2001; Uslu, 2000; Karpat, 1975), the Greek leaders tried not to problematize the political and legal status of the island in their relations with Turkey and the western powers, mainly the United Kingdom and the United States (Markides, 1977; Xydis, 1969).

So the question is how Turkey and Greece could not continue this less conflictual - more cooperative relationship since the early post-World War II years. Is the only reason for the emergence of the mutual conflict the Cyprus dispute? Or could one convincingly argue that Turkey and Greece would have been bound to live as enemies due to the legacy of their centuries-old hostile relations?

This dissertation is partly historical and partly theoretical. While the historical part will consist of the analysis of the developments within the specified time span, the theoretical part will analyse different theoretical approaches in terms of their expectations as to the role of international organizations, or institutional environments, in the transformation of *realpolitik* security cultures into non-*realpolitik* security cultures. Though it will be discussed later in detail, it is enough to point out here that there are mainly two kinds of IR theories, which interpret the roles of international institutions in different ways, namely the rational-institutionalist approaches of neo-realism and neo-liberalism and the sociological-institutionalist approach of social constructivism.

The main reason why this dissertation analyses the impact of EU-induced and NATO-induced contextual environments on the nature of Turkish-Greek relations by utilising the same IR theoretical approaches, despite the fact that these two institutional environments show different chracteristics, relates to two factors: One is that NATO and the European Union are the two main institutional pillars of the Western international community and that many consider them as security

communties. The second pertains to the fact that while the research interest of this dissertation is to uncover the impacts of 'Turkey and Greece's memberships in NATO' and 'Turkey's accession/Greece's intergation processes with the EU' on the security relations between these two ocuntries, it seems that analysts can make use of the above-mentioned theoretical approaches in a comparative manner.

The main reasons for focusing on Turkey and Greece's institutional relationships with the EU and NATO can be summarised as follows: First of all, since the onset of the Cold War both Turkey and Greece have attributed a significant place to their links with NATO and the EU in the formation of their foreign and security policies. This has been mainly due to the fact that both countries have attributed significant value to these institutions in their efforts to acquire Western-European identities.

Second, the dynamics of contemporary Turkish-Greek relations have been strongly informed by their links to NATO and the EU, particularly the latter. For instance, while it would be difficult to understand the EU's Helsinki decisions, particularly concerning the clauses on Turkey's candidacy and the Cyprus issue, without being aware of the parameters of Turkish-Greek relations, it would squarely be impossible to fully grasp Turkey's current position on the Cyprus and the Aegean disputes without comprehending the gist of the EU-Turkey integration process.

Third, an analysis of the institutional relationship between Turkey and Greece would be timely because the whole enlargement policies of the EU and NATO towards the Central and Eastern European Countries are based on the liberal hope that incorporation of these countries into the Western international community would contribute to regional peace and stability. However, it might not be automatic that the enlargement of these institutions to the peripheries of the European Continent would

lead to the emergence and consolidation of democratic regimes there. There might be lessons to be drawn from the Turkish-Greek example as such that these optimistic expectations would not come out right automatically but be contingent on many factors.

The fourth and the final reason why international institutions, NATO and the EU, might possess a significant explanatory weight in the outcome of Turkish-Greek relations concerns the point that no solution today is conceivable outside the institutional framework of the EU and NATO. In other words, the major partners of Greece and Turkey within these organizations have a direct interest in the way the disputes are resolved once and for all. The way they approach Turkey and Greece each would mould the way Turkey and Greece would view each other.

Before summarising the main contributions and chain of arguments of this dissertation, it is now the time to have a closer look at the contents of the following chapters. After presenting the chain of arguments within the introduction part, the first chapter will discuss the theoretical approaches that have a say on the transformation of *realpolitik* security cultures into non-relapolitik security cultures through the help of international institutions/organizations.

The second chapter will analyze the Cold War and Post-Cold War era experiences of the NATO-Turkey-Greece triangle with a view to demonstrating that NATO's involvement in the Turkish-Greek relations during the Cold War years was not helpful in the construction of cooperative bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey based on non-*realpolitik* security relations. What is meant by 'cooperative bilateral relations' here is not Greece and Turkey's abilties to develop a culture of crisis management, but their long-term cooperative interaction based on their non-*realpolitik* security identities. Even though NATO appears to have at times

contributed to the emergence of Turkish-Greek cooperation of *realpolitik* kind, a postive thing in itself, it has in the long run delayed the surface of security cooperation of non-*realpolitik* kind by perpetuating *realpolitik* practices, not a promising thing in itself. As for the post-Cold War era, the impact of NATO on the nature of Turkish-Greek relations has been marginal and insignificant.

The third chapter will focus on the role of the EU in the evolution of Turkish-Greek relations from the early 1960s until the EU's Helsinki Summit in 1999. This chapter will mainly concentrate on the post-Cold War era developments for the prime reason that the promise of the EU has been exposed to significant challenges in this new era due to two significant developments. While the re-construction process of the EU has on the one hand dictated new rationales in its approaches towards Turkey and Greece, Turkey's growing interest to join the EU on the other has sharpened the EU's role in determining the organising principles of Turkish-Greek relations. The marginalization of NATO on the one hand and the increasing importance of Turkey-EU relations on the other have led me to devote a greater portion of the dissertation to the dynamics of EU-Turkey relations.

The fourth chapter will analyse the EU's involvement in the Cyprus dispute with a view to demonstrating that the often-repeated 'catalytic' effects of the EU accession process have not taken place. Instead, the way the EU has involved in the dispute has produced nothing but further 'securitization' in and around the island, by contributing to the re-production of *realpolitik* security behaviours in the region.

The fifth chapter will analyse the post-Helsinki period in EU-Turkey-Greece triangular relationship. It will be asserted that this era has been giving mixed signals as to the credibility and promise of the European Union. While a bilateral cooperation process has already been under way between Turkey and Greece, mainly

due to the factors emanating from the dynamics of Turkey-EU relations, it has still been the case that a major identity/interest transformation on the parties concerned has not been in the offing. Unless this situation changes, it will not be possible that Turkey and Greece would end up developing a security community in their region based on non-*realpolitik* security understandings that would eventually enable them to resolve their territorial disputes once and for all.

The concluding chapter will summarize the main arguments of the dissertation, as well as discuss the reasons why the post-Helsinki Turkish-Greek relations within the EU framework might turn out to be fragile in the years to come.

This dissertation mainly relies on secondary sources, such as academic journal articles and books. Reference to newspaper articles and interviews conducted with some prominent figures can also be put under this category. The only primary sources used in the dissertation consist of official documents of the European Union and NATO, such as conclusions of summit meetings and EU's Accession Partnership Document and yearly progress reports on Turkey.

The main contributions of this dissertation to the existing body of knowledge on Turkish-Greek relations are as follows: First, this study aims at offering a partly theoretical and partly historical analysis on bilateral relations instead of relying on pure historical accounts, as has vastly been attempted by many others. Second, this study tries to analyse Turkish-Greek relations within the framework of their institutional relations with NATO and EU, a dimension of the bilateral relations that has not been covered from a theoretical perspective before. Third, this study seeks to explore the role of ideational factors, such as security identities/cultures, in the analysis of bilateral relations as opposed to pure material factors. In this way, it will be demonstrated that institutional relationships, depending on their nature, might

create the conditions under which states' *realpolitik* security cultures and behaviours can be re-constituted. Fourth, this dissertation is a timely study given that the enlargement of the European Union and NATO is generally assumed to contribute to regional security and stability. This dissertation demonstrates that this may not be so.

In explaining the conditions under which Turkey and Greece could not experience bilateral cooperation of non-*realpolitik* kind through their institutional links with the EU and NATO, this dissertation will stress the following points: The first main factor (variable) to probe into in this regard is the approach the EU and NATO have adopted towards the inclusion of Turkey and Greece into the western international community. The degree of their commitment towards Turkey and Greece's incorporation into the western international community would affect the promise of their efforts to socialize these countries into non-*realpolitik* security cultures. Depending on their logic of action towards Turkey and Greece, they would either adopt *teaching* and *persuasion* type socialization strategies (as foreseen by the logic of appropriateness) or *conditionality* and *rhetorical action* type socialization strategies (as foreseen by the logic of consequentiality). In the first case they would deem Turkey and Greece's memberships in their security communities appropriate (in conformity with their security cultures) and thus actively work for their socialization. In the second case, they would demand Turkey and Greece to internalize the non-*realpolitik* security culture of the western international community on their own. Here the main responsibility for the socialization would fall on the shoulders of Turkey and Greece. While the first case would prove more promising for the transformation of Turkey and Greece's security cultures from *realpolitik* into non-*realpolitik*, the second case would always carry the risk of contributing to the re-constitution of *realpolitik* security cultures in Greece and

Turkey. In uncovering the EU and NATO's approach towards Turkey and Greece's true inclusion in the western international community, the dissertation will stress the degree of compatibility between the security cultures of these institutions and those of Turkey and Greece. The claim is that in case there is compatibility, these institutions will adopt teaching and persuasion strategies.

The second main factor (variable) concerns the fact that the way the EU and NATO each conceptualizes Turkey and Greece's place within the Western international community would not only affect the nature of their relations with these countries but also the ways how Greece and Turkey would view each other. In one way or the other, Greece and Turkey's perception of each other would be to a great extent linked to the way these institutions would view them.

For example, what is significant in this regard is the impact of a particular relationship between any community of states (here the European Union) and an important outside state (here Turkey) on the relationship between the latter and any marginal state within the community (here Greece) that shares common borders and territorial disputes with the important outside state. The way the European Union defines its mission (whether or not to construct a particular community of states) and the way it interacts with Turkey would certainly affect the way Greece, a marginal insider, would define its identity and interest as well as its policies towards Turkey. The more the EU acts as an agent in the construction of the western international community on the basis of collectively shared identities and the more it adopts an exclusionary attitude towards Turkey, the more Greece would try to distance itself from Turkey in order to legitimize its own European identity within the EU. In such a case Greece and Turkey would continue to view each other through *realpolitik* lenses and the EU's identity-construction policies would not help Greece and Turkey

develop a collective identity in their region based on the EU's norms. This would militate against the formation of cooperative relations between these two countries, based on non-*realpolitik* security cultures.

As far as NATO is concerned the picture is somehow different because both Greece and Turkey are already members of this alliance. Here what would matter are the ways NATO defines its identity and the way Turkey and Greece each is attributed a role in the re-construction and representation of this identity. Their representational modes and weights within the Alliance would affect the tone and quality of their bilateral relationship, the particular security culture prevalent in the region. The more Turkey and Greece are attributed complementary roles and the more the resolution of their territorial disputes constitutes a must for the re-construction of NATO's institutional identity, the more likely they would come to an everlasting reconciliation within NATO framework.

The third main factor (variable) in this regard is the degree of credibility of Turkey and Greece's attempts at internalizing the institutional identity of the western international community and meeting the required conditions of membership. To what extent are they willing to become members of these institutions and therefore internalize their security cultures? To put it another way, what are the particular Turkish and Greek approaches towards the European Union and NATO? How do they view them and how do they situate them in the materialization of their security interests? What would matter in this regard is the fact that the degree of their willingness to internalize the security norms of these institutions would be dependent on the domestic salience of those norms. If those norms contradict their own security norms, the process of their socialization into the EU and NATO's security norms would last long and pass through tumultuous stages. The possibility of Turkey and

Greece coming closer in terms of their security identities and interests along their institutional relationships with NATO and the EU and to develop cooperative relations would also depend on their conceptualization of membership in NATO and the EU. The degree of their commitment towards meeting the constitutive norms of the western international community would not only affect their chance of being included in the West but also the promise of these institutions in paving the way for a cooperative relationship between Greece and Turkey. I will assume that the chances for an everlasting settlement in and around the Aegean Sea would vary with the degree of internalization of the institutional identity of the EU and NATO by Greece and Turkey, especially in terms of foreign and security policies. In other words, the more Turkey and Greece get socialized into the normative environment of the EU and NATO, the more prospects for everlasting cooperative relationships will take place. However, one thing needs to be made clear: for the cooperation-generating effects of internalization to take place, there should not be significant differences between the performances of the two countries in getting socialized into the institutional identity of the EU and NATO. If one of them edges out the other in this process, the net result might be just the opposite of what would be otherwise.

For example, it is a major argument of this dissertation that the EU accession process as a mechanism has fallen short of becoming conducive to the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes, particularly over Cyprus, mainly because of the fact that the involvement of the EU has contributed to the re-construction of conflictual and exclusionary identities on the side of the parties concerned. Let alone contributing to the emergence of non-*realpolitik* security cultures in Greece and Turkey, the way the EU has been involved in the bilateral relations has contributed to the perpetuation of *realpolitik* security cultures.

Two arguments can be put forward in this regard. The first is that the credibility of the European Union to play a positive role in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes has decreased in the 1990s as the diverging security cultures/identities between Turkey and the EU has made Turkey's accession to the EU a distant possibility. Owing to this, the EU approached Turkey from the logic of consequentiality that has eventually curtailed its efforts to socialize Turkey into non-*realpolitik* security cultures. When the European circles have gradually viewed Turkey's admission to the Union as threatening the post-Cold war era security identity of the EU, Turkey's traditional elites have increasingly interpreted the EU's demands as threatening and incompatible with Turkey's security understanding. The fact that Turkey's membership would not become a reality soon (due to both EU and Turkey-induced factors) has further decreased the willingness of Turkey's political-security elite to reach an everlasting settlement with Greece along the EU accession process. When the nature/quality of Turkey-EU interaction process in the 1990s has reinforced Turkey's gradual estrangement from the EU, despite the confirmation of Turkey's membership candidacy and Customs Union with the EU, the Greek-Turkish relations have been negatively affected by this outcome. In such an atmosphere, the incentives for Turkey and Greece to transform their conflictual relations into cooperative relations have remained highly limited.

Second, in the face of decreasing EU commitment towards Turkey's accession, the successive Greek governments of the last three decades could approach the EU from a strategic-instrumental perspective in their attempts at gaining influence over Turkey. Despite encouraging signs, Greece's post-1999 logic towards Turkey and the European Union has not been a significant exception to this

well-established strategic/instrumental tradition. This instrumentality on the part of Greece has further curtailed the promise of the EU.

Even though this dissertation will regard NATO and the EU as the two most important components of the western international community, one needs to make it clear that a process of gradual differentiation has been already under way between the two since the early decades of the Cold War era. It seems that this process has accelerated with the advent of the 1990s. The way NATO conceptualizes security problems and the means to deal with them does not always overlap with those of the EU. The stress on militarization of security and the existence of a wide range of external threats, both in conventional and nonconventional senses, is more visible within NATO than the European Union. This factor is particularly important because if NATO and EU's logics towards Turkey and Greece differ from each other to great extents, then their total promise in the resolution of Turkish-Greek disputes would decrease because diverging logics would hamper the synchronization required for success.

A security culture-oriented analysis is hoped to enable analysts to assess the impact of Turkey and Greece's links with the EU and NATO on their foreign and security policy identities and interests. It is significant to know whether Greece and Turkey have defined, and still define, their national preferences and select foreign and security policy options on the basis of their identities shaped by their links with the EU and NATO. In this regard the differences between EU-imposed/implied and NATO-imposed/implied identities are of fundamental value. It is also of utmost significance that whether the EU and NATO had, or still have, the same level of impact on the identity formulations in both Turkey and Greece.

CHAPTER 1: Theoretical Background

What is the relevance of the IR theories to the research interests of this dissertation? How are the identity-transforming functions of international organizations theorized in International Relations? Under which conditions is socialization of *realpolitik* security cultures into non-*realpolitik* security cultures more likely? These are the questions this section tries to analyse (Duffield, 2002; Martin and Simmons, 1998: 729-757; Keohane, 1998: 82-95; Cortell and Davis, 1996: 451-478; Cortell and Davis, 2000: 65-87; Alderson, 2001: 415-433; Checkel, 2000; Checkel, 2001). The analysis of the effects of Turkey and Greece's memberships in NATO and their institutional relationships with the European Union on the outcome of their bilateral relationships, especially their propensity to come to a mutual understanding over the Aegean and Cyprus disputes, based on non-*realpolitik* security behaviours, would be bound to vary with the particular theoretical approach an analyst adopts.

One of the things that would matter in this regard concerns the degree of institutionalization of an international environment. This would become particularly relevant as far as different conceptualizations of international organizations are concerned. The role of an international organization within a loosely institutionalized international environment would be regulative and functional (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 2000: 3-33). Membership in those organizations would be respected as long as states continue to feel that they benefit from cooperation.

A tightly institutionalized international environment would predict more constitutive roles for international organizations rather than causal and regulative. Being a member of an international organization in such an environment would imply that members of that international organization share in the fundamental norms and rules of that environment. They would feel constrained in their dealings with

each other by the normative requirements of that particular international organization. A high degree of convergence would be expected in their both domestic regimes and foreign policy identity and interests, for their membership in the same international organization would be based on the commonality of political, social and sometimes economic values and principles. In such international environments, institutions act to radiate the well-internalized norms and rules to states, which aspire to join. They perform socializing functions (Schimmelfennig, 2000: 109-139).

Another issue of importance is how international institutions are generally assumed to contribute to interstate cooperation. In an encompassing way, Russet and Oneal (1998: 441-468) summarize the main functions of international institutions as such. According to them inter-governmental organizations constitute the third leg of the Kantian project of world peace. Inter-governmental organizations, in association with democratic domestic regimes and highly interdependent economic interactions, prompt states to have more peaceful and cooperative relationships. There are basically five ways for international organizations to lead to cooperation and peace among states. First, they coerce the members, which break norms and rules. Alliances are better equipped with tools to enforce their norm-breaker members than other organizations, which lack effective enforcement mechanisms.

Second, international organizations mediate among their conflicting members. Third, they help reduce uncertainty by conveying information. Given that the lack of reliable information about the capabilities and intentions of states constitutes the major barrier before cooperation, international organizations rectify this handicap by circulating sensitive and credible information about the capabilities and intentions of their members.

Fourth, international organizations create norms and rules, which govern interstate relations in more efficient and cooperative ways. In one way or the other international organizations are the sites for socialization to collectively held and accepted rules and norms. They help socialize their members to their norms. Finally, and related with the previous point, international organizations generate narratives of collective identification. Put another way, they might contribute to the emergence of collective identities among their members. As time goes by, members of an international organization will develop collective understandings of what is the right thing to do.

Now a comparative analysis is in order in regard to the different conceptualizations of international organizations as they make up different international structures. Here the main goal is to imagine different pictures/models of the western international community, as represented and re-constructed by the EU and NATO. The potential role of the EU and NATO to contribute to the Turkish-Greek peace, through their socialization into non-*realpolitik* security cultures, would depend on the particular reading through which one would view these institutions (Jervis, 1999: 42-63).

1.1. Neo-realism

Built on Waltz's arguments that the anarchical structure of the international system would highlight the significance of the distribution of material capabilities in foreign policy behaviours of states and that anarchy would lead states to look after their survival as the ultimate goal, structural realist accounts are not optimistic about the role of international institutions in providing states with avenues to cooperate. States formulate their foreign policy behaviours in reference to the global distribution of

material power. The informational environments of international institutions do not act as independent or intervening variables in the determination of states' interest. Their roles are ephemeral (Waltz, 1979). The capacity of international institutions to change the security understandings of their members is highly limited, for all states behave similarly under the conditions of anarchy. The talk of different security cultures determining states' different security strategies would be meaningless, for all states get socialized into the same *realpolitik* security behaviours.

According to neo-realists, institutions are not capable of lengthening the shadow of the future just because states act on the basis of the distribution of power and material capabilities in the system (Waltz, 2000: 24). Within this logic, international institutions are nothing but mere tools of foreign policy implementation at the hands of statecraft. The more powerful actors in the system establish them in the hope that they would help them realize their national interests defined in terms of power. International institutions do not have independent variable status, let alone intervening variable, in the formulation of states' foreign policy choices (Mearsheimer, 1994/95: 5-49). They are the mere reflections of the distribution of power within the international system and serve the interests of the most powerful state. The gains from cooperation would depend on power disparities among members.

The role of any international institution to contribute to cooperative relations between any two of its members would only be possible if the most powerful country within the institution deemed that such cooperative relations would constitute a necessity for it to materialize its interests. To the neo-realist thinking, international institutions do not play significant roles in the re-constitution of national identities of their members.

When the fundamental goal of states were to survive in the anarchical environment of international system, cheating would not be the only impediment before cooperation but concerns about the relative power positions of other actors would also matter. Defined as 'defensive positionalists', states would pay utmost importance to the relative gains of others. If a cooperative scheme promises incremental changes in the absolute gains of any particular state as yet yields far greater benefits to the other side, that particular state would be discouraged to cooperate, since no one can guarantee that today's friend would not turn out to be tomorrow's enemy (Grieco, 1993: 116-140). Neo-realists contend that even if international institutions help allay states' fear of cheating, they would be incapable of assuaging concerns for relative gains. However, neo-realists admit that concerns for relative gains might be relaxed among a group of states, which share a relationship based on common domestic regimes and joint destiny for the future. The highly industrialised and democratic states of the European Union might not feel constrained by the concerns for relative gains in the presence of the highly institutionalized regional environment, which indisputably lengthens the shadow of the future in Western Europe. (Snidal, 1993: 208)

To the neo-realist logic, states join international institutions and perform pro-norm actions out of necessity. It is neither because of the common interests shared with any particular state nor the belief in the moral necessity in taking part in any particular international organization that a state aspires to join any particular international institution. It is all due to the selfishly formulated and externally imposed national interests that propel a state to take part in any international body. The necessity to survive in the anarchical international system might lead a particular state either to ally with an outside power against the sources of external threats or to

bandwagon with the sources of the threat. There is no choice. Either way, states would join international organizations due to existential concerns. The stakes are so high, either to survive or to perish. As soon as the external threat disappears, incentives for a state to maintain its institutional relationship with any particular international organization, or to cooperate with other states within the same international institution, decrease.

Cooperation within an alliance defined in terms of external threats would not lead to transformation of states' security cultures from *realpolitik* into non-*realpolitik*, for both the decision to join such an alliance is driven by *realpolitik* mentality and that allies' cooperation is directed towards outside states.

1.2. Neo-liberal (Rational) Institutionalism

Based on a materialistic and rationalistic view of anarchical structure, neo-liberal institutionalist insights endeavour to explain how to overcome the conflict-producing effects of anarchy through the creation of international organizations/institutions (Stein, 1993: 29-69). Even though neo-liberals share with the neo-realists individualism and rationalism as the basis of state interests and actions, they part with them in their claims that the international structure does not only consist of material factors but also some elements of social reality (Wendt, 1999).

Rather than the 'distribution of power', neo-liberals claim that the international structure is informed by the 'distribution of information'. Conceptualized as rationally egoistic 'utility maximisers' states care about only their absolute gains (Powel, 1991: 701-26; Stein, 1990). The only impediment before their cooperation, provided that they share in common interests, is the problem of cheating. Who would ensure that states will keep their promises and will not defect?

The lack of an internationally centralized authority to enforce rules elevates the verification problems and the uncertainties about others' intentions to the main hurdles before coordination and collaboration to take place. Neo-liberal institutionalism considers international institutions and regimes as somehow intervening variables between the constraining structures of anarchy and foreign policy behaviours of states.

> "The primary functions of institutions, in this framework, are to allow reciprocity to operate efficiently. Institutions perform this function by providing information about others' preferences, intentions, behaviours, and standards of behaviour. They also reduce transaction costs, which are the costs of reaching and maintaining agreements. The primary effect of institutions is an efficiency effect, in that they allow states to reach agreements that move them closer to the Pareto frontier (An equilibrium outcome from where none of the parties want to switch to other possible combinations of preferences). Institutions, in this rational model, do not modify underlying states' interests. Instead, by changing the informational environment and other constraints on states, they contribute to the change of states' strategies in such a way that self-interested states find it easier to cooperate reliably with one another." (Martin, 1997)

Rationalist approaches to international institutions assume that states turn to institutions in an attempt to solve cooperation problems. These cooperation problems are defined by patterns of state interest. Institutions change patterns of state behaviour not by changing fundamental state goals, in this perspective. Instead they

change the two key features of rationalist model: strategies and beliefs. By changing the rules of the game, and so increasing the costs of particular courses of action and decreasing others, institutions lead states to change their strategies in the pursuit of consistent goals, such as wealth and power. Institutions also change the informational environment. They provide information about others' preferences, behaviours, and intentions. They can also provide information about means-ends relationships, i.e., how particular policies will lead to different outcomes.

Thought of this way, the impact of international organizations on particular security cultures of their members will remain limited because neo-liberal approaches assume that states' security identities and interests are taken for granted. Therefore, the possibility of change from a *realpolitik* security identity into a non-*realpolitik* one is meagre.

States create international institutions in their efforts to overcome barriers before their cooperation. The main motivation to do is that states gradually realize that they can no longer attain their national interests individually and decide to act together with other states, which share the same interests. The subjectively defined common national interests dictate the formation of international institutions. If their interests coincide, they establish institutions, which would in turn have impact only on their strategies, excluding identities and interests. (Keohane and Martin, 1995: 39-51)

To the neo-liberal accounts, the reasons for states to join international organizations are not confined to the external constraints of the anarchical international system. Foreign policy choices do generally follow a process of cost/benefit calculation. The benefits that accrue to states are measured in tangible terms and the logic that guides states' actions is instrumental. If there were nothing to

gain in financial and material terms, there would not be any legitimate reason to remain as a member. Here behaviours would only change due to the material costs/benefits calculations.

What matter here are the side-effects of institutional memberships on behaviours of states. Socialization is weak in this situation because states decide to cooperate through international organizations out of domestically formed national interests. The prospect of collective identity formation is weak here because what unite different states are not their collectively held values and identities but their common interests defined in material terms. Nevertheless, the impacts of institutional affiliation on the interstate relations would be positive. It might be claimed that these institutional links would act as constraints on the conflict-producing effects of anarchical international system. Transparency, issue-linkages and information providing mechanisms of institutions would turn the international system into a more predictable place to live (Keohane, 1984: 246).

In neo-liberal institutionalist explanations of socialization the capability and credibility of international institutions to induce cooperative and pro-norm behaviours on the part of member-states would be insignificant, for the states in question would not feel convinced enough to comply with the behavioural requirements of that organization in the absence of identity transformation. Pure strategic thinking would prevent them from undergoing a process of identity transformation that might otherwise enable them to reap the benefits of institutional cooperation in further occasions. In rational-choice understanding of international institutions, institutions do not have any significant impact on the formation of national preferences, which are influenced either by the structural constraints of anarchy or the internal negotiation process between domestic actors. Institutions are

regarded as mere tools, which states can utilise in order to materialize their national interests.

According to Risse-Kappen (2000)

"institutional effects are mostly confined to influencing the behaviour of others, while the underlying interests and identities are exogenized. Institutions constrain behaviour by affecting cost-benefit calculations of actors and their preferences over strategies to reach one's goals. Once their fundamental interests change and/or rule compliance becomes too costly, however, they are expected to defect or to change the institutional rules, if they are powerful enough."

Actors would comply with norms as long as doing so would help them realize their self-interests. The combination of expected material benefits and sanctions would induce actors to take institutional constraints into account as factors in calculating national preferences. For example if their material and social interests in joining an international institution continues, they would adapt to the security norms of that institution. However, this adaptation would hardly evolve into full socialization since the institution itself would neither teach its norms nor persuade the state in question to the legitimacy of its norms. It would only put into place a conditionality strategy according to which it would either reward or punish the state in question depending on its performance to meet the accession criteria. Because the main responsibility would rest with the outside state, this process would not result in a successful socialization process. Absent the help of the institution, the upper limits of outside state's efforts to comply with the norms of the institution would only imply temporal and short-lived adaptations.

As articulated by Keaohane and Nye some 30 years ago, countries, which develop interdependent relationships among themselves through economics and other means, would thrive on peace and cooperation (Keohane and Nye, 1977). The more they get interdependent, especially through institutional mechanisms, the more they would stop seeing each others as rivals and enemies but friends who have a stake in the preservation of this interdependency. Transparency, issue linkages and increments in the level of trust and certainty regarding intentions would automatically lead to the emergence of cooperative relationships. It would be assumed that institutional links would lengthen the shadow of the future by increasing the level of trust between each other, thus making calculations for short-term economic and geo-political benefits redundant (Kydd, 2001: 801-828). The argument would go that each of them would cooperate in the short-term hoping that the other side would reciprocate in the same way. Therefore, a tit-for-tat strategy would prevail in the foreign policy implementation.

The institutional environment as conceived by neo-liberals would be of technical in nature. Its social attributes would be weak. NATO and the EU would be international platforms where states would exchange their interests and bargain over final outcomes. As explained by Moravcsik in his articles on the EU's integration process, the inter-governmental character of the EU would be far ahead of its social and supranational features. Maximization of national interests through international institutions/organizations would constitute the mode of state behaviour (Moravcsik, 2000: 473-524; Moravcsik, 2001: 611-628). The EU would be an inter-governmental organization that is constructed to serve the collective interests of the member states. Accession to the EU would be evaluated from a materially conceived cost/benefit perspective in the sense that the membership of any would-be member would

become likely if its benefits would exceed its costs. Economic logic would mould the way the EU would deal with outside states. Aspirant countries that may prove their usefulness to the EU in terms of economic consideration might be let in the club. In such a case the economic aspects of the so-called Copenhagen criteria would dominate the rationales of the parties concerned.

NATO would appear here as an inter-governmental alliance, which came into being as its members united around the common security interests against external threats and dangers. The conclusion that they would not be able to defend their externally defined security interests on their own seems to have led to the construction of NATO at the first instance. Here the boundaries of collective identification would be confined to the cooperation against external threats. Members would not be assumed to hold on to similar domestic identities and governing structures. Neither would they be presumed to solve their bilateral territorial problems as a prerequisite for their membership.

From a neo-liberal perspective, the promise of NATO in contributing to cooperative neighbourly relations, particularly between Turkey and Greece, would take place in the following way. As Turkey and Greece would continue to live as allies within NATO, the degree of interdependence, transparency and issue-linkages would gradually thin down the sources of conflictual relationship between the two countries. They would cooperate more easily within NATO so as to solve their territorial disputes because the mechanisms of the Alliance would inject them enough confidence not to feel suspicious of each other. Their collective security interests would also require them to settle their bilateral disputes because living with their disputes would negatively affect their capability to stand up to the common threat. The degree of their mistrust towards each other would gradually diminish as their

joint membership within NATO got solidified. Participating in joint military exercises and having access to each other's military capabilities would lead them to develop a confident climate in their region, free from doubts on their future intentions. Their attention would mainly focus on the common external threat and the strategic interests of the Alliance would play far greater roles in the conceptualization of their national security interests.

However, their cooperation within NATO would continue as long as their collective external threat lingers on. Once their common threats evaporate, they would stop cooperating, for their institutional cooperation within NATO would not be dependent on their re-construction of security cultures and identities in such a way that they would stop viewing each other as potential rivals and enemies.

1.3. Social Constructivism, Sociological Institutionalism

The theoretical perspective, which is of significant importance for the structuring of this dissertation, is social constructivism (Onuf, 1989; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 391-416; Checkel, 1998: 324-348; Wendt, 1995: 71-81. These are good summaries of constructivism). Common to all constructivist variants are that domestic and international structures consist of social (ideational) and material realities and that those structures do not only constrain and shape states' behaviours but also constitute their identities and interests. In one sense, constructivism holds on to ideational and structural (holistic) viewpoints. Without understanding the intersubjectively created social reality, one would not be able to grasp the essence of the material world. Meanings are social not material. The distribution of power and material capabilities in the system is not enough to explain everything, particularly interstate cooperation and conflict. What matters most of the time is the distribution of knowledge. States

act towards other states not only on the basis of the distribution of power among them. On the contrary, meanings, which are alluded to objects, govern states' action (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996: 33-75).

Constructivists claim that nothing is given by the distribution of power and material capabilities. In other words it is not automatic that structural variables or legacies of conflictual pasts would lead to self-help based *realpolitik* security cultures. Neither self-help system nor power politics is given by anarchy but (re) produced by the interaction process among states.

Constructivists do not gainsay that self-interested actors do not cooperate. Instead, they point out that self-interested actors may start cooperating just for egoistic interests. However, what they claim further is that this initial cooperation arisen out of self-interested motives might later turn into a kind of cooperation where cooperative behaviour would take place due to the internalization of the cooperation norm by states. To put it another way, cooperation takes place at the first instance just for instrumental reasons but later on it starts to take a life of its own. This holds true for both states' behaviour towards each other and towards international institutions. A state might think that cooperating with any other state either on a state-to-state level or through international institutions would serve its interest. So out of instrumental reasons, a cooperative interaction might start (March and Olsen, 1998: 953). Assuming that this process of instrumental cooperation will continue for a long time, states might find themselves in an ongoing cooperative interaction based not only on their short-term self-interests but also their evolving belief that cooperation is the right thing to do.

Constructivists attribute an important role to security cultures/identities of states in explaining their international behaviours, encompassing of course their

security strategies as well as conceptualization of international institutions (Katzenstein, 1997; Desch, 1999: 156-180; Berger; 1998). Constructivists point to the fact that particular security cultures do not stem from the distribution of material power within the international system. A state can display *realpolitik*/non-*realpolitik* security behaviours not because the anarchical international structure would dictate this but because its *realpolitik*/non-*realpolitik* security culture would not allow for something else (Johnston, 1995: 32-64; Duffield, 1999: 765-804; Banchoff, 1999). Depending on the nature of its interaction with other states or particular international institutions, representing a group of states, a state can develop a *realpolitik* security culture. For example, having excluded from an ideationally defined international institution, the excluded state would more likely view the outside world through *realpolitik* lenses, for what would matter for her would be its difference from others. If the interaction process of that state with other extra-state and intra-state actors culminated in a *realpolitik* security culture, the nature of the distribution of the material power would not matter a lot in choice of *realpolitik* security behaviours of that state (Lantis, 2002: 87-113).

The main variable that explains the emergence of an international institution at the first instance and then its engagement with outside world is 'identity'. Thought of this way, an international institution that plays boundary-making roles within a particular community of states would have different characteristics from international institutions that operate in line with the expectations of rationalist theories. International institutions of the second type do not have such functions, therefore their engagement with outside states proceeds in a more problem-free way compared to the international institutions of the first type. Representing and re-constituting the identity of a particular community of states, such institutions would treat outside

states more critically, particularly if those states aspire to join the community of states in question. Whether they share the same ideational features with the current members of the community of states and whether they are willing and capable to acquire those traits would constitute the prime variables affecting their prospects to join the particular community of states. This process would entail tumultuous stages, if the aspirant state claims to represent the identity of the community of states in question as yet behaves reluctant to meet the required conditions. In such cases, the 'otherness' of the outside states would become solidified and the aspirant country would likely be seen as a threat to the identity of the community of states, to which it aspires to join.

The fact that what defines an international institution would be the collectively held norms and identities among its members such an institution would adopt the logic of appropriateness in its dealing with outside states. If their inclusion were to be legitimized on identity terms (meaning helping the institution reconstruct its identity), then the institution itself would try to do its best to facilitate the socialization of the outside state into its norm. In such a case, the institution would either teach its norms (assuming that the outside state already shares their legitimacy) or try to persuade the outside state into the supremacy of its norms (assuming that the outside state also initially argues for the supremacy of its own norms) (Risse-Kappen, 1999: 529-560). An institution that acts on this logic would perform boundary-making roles. Both inclusion and exclusion would be determined by its own actions.

Another important point in this regard is the constructivist view of international institutions and organizations as norm creators and norm enforcers. Finnemore's book (1996) is a good example to the role of international organizations

in spreading norms. She shows that states interests' are to an important extent influenced and determined by normative preachings of international organizations. According to her, international organizations are not only simple tools of reducing transaction costs as portrayed by neo-liberals but also purposive entities that are able, in some cases, to trump states and their power. They teach states how to value certain goals. Systemic norms propagated by international organizations provide states with direction and goals for action. However, the success of this process is also dependent on whether the outside states are willing to internalize such norms.

These norms and rules draw the lines for appropriate behaviours. If a state were the member of any international community, she has to act according to the appropriate standards of behaviours collectively held within that particular community. As opposed to the neo-liberal expectation that common interests lead states to cooperate, and strategically adopt non-*realpolitik* security culture, constructivism holds that the presence (or lack) of common identities is the driving force behind either cooperative or conflictual relationships (Oneal ad Russet, 1998: 441-468; Oneal and Russet, 1999). The prospects of cooperation based on common identities would be far greater than prospects of cooperation based on common interests. Thought of this way, if membership in common international institutions induced common identities among members, then the quality of their bilateral relations would be high with the prospects of cooperation based on collectively held identities and cultures increasing.

International institutions are also sites of authority within the so-called anarchic international system. To the constructivist logic, collectively held meanings and understandings constitute the sources of authority and legitimacy in interstate relations. For authority to exist there does not need to be a centralized government as

one see within states. If state actors accord legitimacy to collectively held understandings, then authority would arise even in international structure where there is not any world government above states (Hurd, 1999: 379-409; Hall, 1997: 591-622).

Regarding states' decision to join international organizations, social constructivists offer more detailed answers than the rationalist approaches of neo-realism and neo-liberalism. To this interpretation, states join international organizations either because they have been well persuaded to the appropriateness of being there as a member or because the expected social benefits of being within that particular international organization would outweigh the social costs of exclusion.

However, there is a significant difference between the socialization through 'full persuasion' and socialization through 'social influence'. In the former case, the logic of appropriateness would be implemented to its extreme and states in question would never problematize the legitimacy of acting in the way the membership requirements would dictate. There would be no instrumental logic here (Checkel, 2001: 553-588). In the second case the instrumental logic would still prevail, even though in a different way. It would not be the material but social benefits that count (Johnston, 2001: 487-515).

In socialization through social influence states generally seem eager to join international institutions in order to reap the benefits of membership in some exclusive clubs. Hoping that membership would bring to them additional prestige and increase their worldwide reputation in the eyes of others, states pursue an instrumental logic in asking membership in those platforms. As is clear with social rewards coming from membership, states also take into consideration the negative

consequences of being excluded from those platforms. The expected shame and opprobrium in the eyes of the others would motivate them to act pro-socially.

Even though both of these rationalities better serve the socialization process than the logic of material costs/benefits, the end result would to a great extent hinge on the logic of action on the part of the institution itself directed towards outside states. Absent teaching and persuasion efforts on the part of international institutions, the efforts of outside states would not be enough for the completion of the socialization process in a successful way.

States acting on the ideational logic would overvalue their long-term interest over their short-term losses. Believing that being recognized as a particular type of state would generate both social and material interests later, those states would not care much about their short-term losses if the process of socialization in to that identity entails some short-term material losses.

3.3.1. Security Communities

Looking from a social-constructivist perspective, one would define the western international community as represented and re-constructed by the European Union and NATO as a security community, whose potential role/capacity to contribute to Turkish-Greek cooperation would become higher than other conceptualizations of the same entity (Lucarelli, 2002). However, this would be so, if and only if both Turkey and Greece were to be considered as legitimate parties of this community (Moustakis and Sheehan, 2002: 69-85).

As an extension of this benign liberal thinking into the literature of the discipline of International Relations, some scholars have convincingly argued that institutional relationships among states might even lead to the formation of pluralistic

security communities. Based on the path-breaking study of Karl Deutsch (1957), Adler (2001: 253) defines security communities as

> " 'cognitive regions' or 'community regions', which are regional system of meanings, and not limited to a specific geographic place. They are made up of people whose common identities and interests are constituted by shared understandings and normative principles other than territorial sovereignty and (a) who actually communicate and interact across state borders, (b) who are actively involved in the political life of an international or transnational region and engaged in the pursuit of regional purposes, and (c) who, as citizens of states impel the constituent states of the community-region to act as agents of regional good, on the basis of regional system of governance"

These scholars contemplate that through a process of learning and functional integration a group of countries might end up having a security community among each other where it would become inconceivable even to think of resorting to arms in settlement of disputes. In other words, it is hoped that dependable expectations of peaceful relations would take place with furthering of collective identification process. It is assumed that as time goes by, the more states interact with each other through institutional mechanisms, the more likely they would proceed to the achievement of collective identification. So as to speak, a so-called moral community based on collectively shared values, interests and understanding would consist of states that would identify with the well-being of each other (Adler and Barnett, 1997).

Those who adhere to such beliefs further argue that the anarchical structure of neo-realist forecasting advocated by Waltz would cease to exist with the elimination of uncertainty regarding the intentions of others and the collective identification with the well-being of the others in the system. Neither the relative gains concerns nor the uncertainty about the intentions of others would continue to impede the realization of cooperation. On the contrary cooperation would be easier with the surface of absolute gains and the lengthening of the shadow of the future. Peaceful settlement of disputes, coordination of policy choices, de-securitization of potential security issues, and de-militarization of security strategies will be the collectively held norms in security communities (Cronin, 1999: 13). Membership of two rival states in such a community would in the long run move them closer to each other in terms of their security identities, interests and behaviours.

However, one should not obscure the fact that the above-mentioned positive impacts of security communities only take place among the members of such communities. Such effects would not apply to a pair of countries, one of which is already a member of such a security community whereas the other is excluded on the basis of identity-related considerations.

In discussing the stages in the formation of security communities Barnett and Adler (1997: 29-65) place a great importance on the international organizations as factors facilitating the transition to a security community. The interest in examining how international organizations indirectly promote other factors that contribute to, and directly promote, mutual trust, shared identity elevates four reasons. First, security and non-security organizations can contribute to the development of trust among their members by establishing norms of behaviour, monitoring mechanisms, and sanctions to enforce those norms. Secondly, international organizations make

possible state action by virtue of their trust-building properties. Organizations, in this important respect, are sites of socialization and learning, places where political actors learn and perhaps 'teach' others what their interpretations of the situation and normative understandings are.

Thirdly, international organizations may be conducive to the formation of mutual trust and collective identities, because of their often underestimated capacity to 'engineer' the very conditions – for example cultural homogeneity, a belief in common fate, and norms of unilateral self-restraint – that assist in their development. International organizations, for instance, may be able to foster the creation of a 'regional culture' around commonly held attributes, such as, for example, democracy, developmentalism, and human rights.

What is important as far as such communities are concerned is the replacement of the 'logic of consequentiality' by the 'logic of appropriateness' (March and Olsen, 2001: 943-969). In the former case states tend to calculate the possible consequences of their actions and on the basis of those consequences they opt for the strategy, which they think will give to them the most optimum result. In other words, a calculation of costs and benefits of possible courses of action prevail in policy formulation.

In contrast to this, the logic of appropriateness

"…assumes that states will undertake rule-guided behaviours. These kinds of behaviours differ from instrumentally rational behaviours in that actors try to 'do the right thing' rather than maximising or optimising their pre-given preferences. The logic of appropriateness entails that actors try to figure out the appropriate rule in a given social situation. Normative rationality implies constitutive effects of

social norms and institutions, since these rules not only regulate behaviour, i.e., have causal effects, but they also define social identities." (Risse-Kappen, 2000)

From a social constructivist view, what seems to exist in Europe today is that there is a security community there, whose main pillars are NATO and the European Union. They would act to re-construct the particular identity of this community of states. This approach assumes that the states that make up this community have come around the norms, rules, values and principles, which all collectively share and find legitimate. (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 491-517; Schimmelfennig, 1999: 198-234). Therefore, the process of outside states to join this community would become thornier than the rationalist theories would expect to be.

A social constructivist might provide the following account in regard to NATO and its potential role to contribute to peaceful neighbourly relations between Greece and Turkey. There is consensus among constructivism-oriented academics that NATO has been one of the two pillars of the Western international community, which is based on the collective identity of liberalism and democracy. Risse-Kappen (1995), Schimmelfening (2000: 111), and Wallender (2000) argue that NATO was first established and then persisted with two purposes in mind: while the first has been to provide the territorial defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area against the communist threat whereas the second has been to preserve and promote the liberal democratic identity of the West. The so-called 'Article 2' and 'Article 5' missions of NATO were denoting these two complementary missions.[*] More than the aggregation of individual capabilities, the membership in NATO would imply that the member states are also 'allies', which would in turn lead to an understanding that

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[*] One can see these article at: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm

neither of the allies should be fearful or suspicious of any increase in the military capabilities of their partners.

As to the security community character of NATO, Duffield (1994: 369-388; 1994/1995: 763-787) discusses this issue within the context of NATO's persistence into the post-Cold War era. He refers to the smoothing function of the Alliance membership on members' behaviours and identities. Arguing that the presence of NATO in Europe helped stabilize the interstate relations Western Europe, Duffield implies that prospective members of the Alliance would enjoy peaceful inter-alliance relations.

> "By damping the security dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security policies, NATO has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the region virtually inconceivable".

He further claims that (1994/1995: 767) from very early in its history, NATO has played an important role in smoothing relations among its member. Through reassuring its members that they have nothing to fear of each other, NATO is claimed by Duffield to have eliminated the logic of security dilemma in Europe. Its presence is also claimed to have eliminated misperception and misunderstandings from the relations among its members.

Wiping out suspicions and mistrust from the scene, NATO is claimed to have contributed to the emergence of security community in Western Europe mainly because it existed as a 'democratic security community' (Willimans and Neumann, 2001: 357-387). By providing a high-degree of intra alliance transparency, NATO is assumed to facilitate cooperation among its members in the European theatre. NATO is also thought of contributing to peaceful relations among its members through its

mechanisms to de-nationalise security policies. Intra-alliance consultation mechanisms, participation into jointly planned military exercises, and socialization into a NATO culture are claimed to have led to the emergence of a zone of peace in Europe.

Risse-Kappen (1996: 357-399) refers to the liberal and democratic norms of the Alliance, which have been collectively held and shared by NATO members, in arguing for the success of the Alliance both in keeping peace in Europe during the Cold War era and in persisting into 1990s. He also argues that NATO has been a community of democratic states where the founding members externalised their democratic and liberal norms of domestic politics onto the level of NATO. That is why NATO was founded and persisted into the post Cold War Era surviving the end of the Cold War.

Looking from this perspective, one would argue that coexisting within the same institutional environment, being integrated into NATO's unified military structure, participating in various activities as partners around the same table, undertaking regular high-level meetings and periodical gatherings in Brussels, Turkey and Greece would be able to develop a new understanding of each other based on friendship, not enemies. In other words their joint NATO membership would lengthen the shadow of the future in their bilateral relations.

However, in contrast to these constructivist accounts of the Alliance, the Cold-War era suggested that the strategic culture of NATO was based on strategic-security concerns rather than the ideational functions of the Alliance as defined in the Article four of NATO's founding treaty. To this understanding the central focus of the Alliance would be on the central Europe, particularly on the borders' of the Federal Republic of Germany. The main functions of the Northern and Southern

flanks were to contribute to the defence of the central front (Kurth, 2001: 5-16). Second, the defence of Europe was based on the projection of the American power onto the continent. The US nuclear power was the linchpin of the NATO's efforts to defend and the preserve the western way of life (Aybet, 1997).

Third, the conventional military capabilities of the European members of NATO were of great use for the realization of the strategic goals of the Alliance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This became more visible following the adoption of the flexible response strategy in the early 1960s.

Fourth, the collective security guarantee of the Alliance, the so-called article 5 commitments, was not as certain as the text reads. The military capabilities of the European members of the Alliance had barely allowed those allies to look after their own security.

Finally, being a part of NATO did not necessitate member countries to satisfy some political and ideational conditions as well as to internalize democracy and liberalism. Contribution to the Western security interests through military capabilities and geographical assets most of the time counted enough for membership. Though the preamble of the Founding Treaty and the Articles 2 and 4 of the Washington Treaty of 1949 refer to the normative basis of the Alliance, the main priority of the alliance was to defend the territorial sovereignty of the members against the external threat, the Soviet Union. The characteristic feature of NATO was its being of a defence organization. When the Article 5 regulation was constituting the essential identity of NATO, neither intra-alliance disputes nor out-of-area contingencies were given significant emphasis. In case allies had territorial disputes among each other, the NATO scripture supported the view that they could take their differences anywhere except the North Atlantic Council.

Conceived in these terms, the identity transforming effects of NATO membership used to be meagre. Externally defined security communities, such as NATO, would be inadequate in transforming the identity of their members along collective internal characteristics. In such cases, member countries would be joining forces in order to resist an external threat without feeling the need to converge their domestic characteristics along common values and principles. When the security culture of the Alliance was defined in such a *realpolitik* manner so as to contain the communist danger through external balancing efforts and hard-core military capabilities, it would have been difficult for Greece and Turkey to transform their *realpolitik* security cultures into non-*realpolitik* security cultures.

Although Reiter (2001) argues that NATO as an organization has nothing to do with promoting democracy and contributing to the establishment of liberal-democratic regimes in members countries due to the lack of the policy of credible punishment and promising rewards, Wallneder (2000) attributes the reasons for NATO's persistence into the post-Cold War era to its general and specific assets designed for the purposes of strengthening intra-alliance trust and stability and thus consolidating the liberal-democratic regimes in member countries.

Similarly a social constructivist would likely regard the European Union as an international institution that has acted as a community-building agent in Europe and contributed to the emergence of a security community in the continent, at least in its western part, around collectively held liberal-democratic norms. This sort of accounts would also define the EU's integration process as a supranational activity, rather than strategic/rational interstate cooperation (Pollack: 2001: 221-44; Borzel and Risse-Kappen, 2000). In view of this particular account, the promise of the EU to contribute to cooperative and peaceful relations in Europe would be hight.

As the socialization and the EU-integration literatures in IR theory would assume, one should have witnessed a cooperation process between Greece and Turkey as they have proceeded with their integration process with the EU. Socialization into the collective European identity, particularly regarding foreign and security policy domains, would be presumed to lead both countries to converge both the processes and content of their foreign policy making on the EU level (Diez, 2000; Schimmelfennig, 2000: 109-139). Both of them would gradually internalize the 'coordination', 'de-securitization' and 'peaceful resolution of conflicts' norms of the European Union. The European Union, having a 'power of attraction' would radiate its norms both to member and candidate states and determine the confines of appropriate state behaviour in Europe (Manners, 2002: 235-58; Christou, 2002). Assuming that Greece and Turkey would converge on the norms of the post-modern European Union they would settle their disputes once and for all in ways short of threat and use of war.

Besides, their Europeanization processes would result in the emergence and consolidation of democratic reigns in both countries and this would in turn lead them to adopt more cooperative and friendly attitudes towards each other (Epaminondas, 2001: 161-175; Youngs, 2001). As democracies seldom, if ever, go to war against each other, Greece and Turkey would do their best to avoid the risks and dangers of aggravating their relations and sometimes escalating their tensions to the crisis points from where it would be difficult for them to escape (Pridham, 2002: 953-973).

In parallel to their internalization of the democratic culture/norms and the gradual establishment of democratic political-institutional structures, their tendency to utilize peaceful methods of conflict resolution would increase and the increasing

weight of the public opinion would dictate more cautionary, less costly and more cooperative outcomes (Oneal and Russet, 1999: 1-37).

As they become more 'European' in their national identities, they would more easily reach accommodating positions regarding their disputes. With the passage of time, they would internalize the idea that they need to solve their territorial disputes over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus in order to be counted as real members of the European political security community where the threat and use of force are treated as outdated and illegitimate state conducts.

Gradually, the traces of *realpolitik* security cultures between each other would be replaced by a new cooperative logic that would enable them to view each other as more friends and allies than enemies and rivals. Their tendency to view their respective gains on absolute, rather than relative terms, would increase in parallel to the development of a security community between each other (Johnston, 2001: 487-515).

In general, the EU would contribute to this above-mentioned positive outcome through the twin processes of enlargement and integration, the first with respect to Turkey and the second with respect to Greece (Biscop, 2003: 183-197). Holding the key to the benefits of membership, the EU would be in an ideal position to help Greece and Turkey fundamentally alter their preference orderings in such a way that both countries would gradually believe that their gains from mutual cooperation within the EU framework would far outweigh the returns of their current conflictual approach towards each other. By conditioning Turkey's eventual membership to its performance in adopting democracy and friendly neighbourly relations, and by indirectly pressuring Greece to come to a settlement with Turkey in order to qualify for first-class EU membership in the Euro-zone, the European

Union, would be in a privileged position to enhance cooperative relations between Greece and Turkey (Smith, 2000: 33-46). When this conditionality policy combined with the Greek and Turkish aspirations to become part of the Union, the overall impact of the European Union on the development of cooperative Turkish-Greek relations would be significantly positive.

The post-modern/post-national character of the EU's international/security identity would also increase the promise of the EU in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes in the 1990s in non-*realpolitik* ways (Stefanova, 2002: 156-181). Such a conceptualization of the European Union would certainly foresee Turkey's eventual membership. Turkey's exclusion from the EU on the basis of the logic of appropriateness would never be a reality given that the post-modern EU would not define its identity on spatial ways. Member states would be required not only to harmonise their security and military policies but also the whole range of economic, social, interior and legal systems. A supranational integration process, the EU's integration process would certainly imply that a far deeper common identity would percolate down the member states. In one sense the logic of Waltzian anarchy would cease to function within the EU given that externally and internally similar units would cooperate more than conflict with each other (Checkel, 2001: 553-88).

Construed as such, Weaver's conceptualization of the European Union's integration process as the most important catalyst for the security of the continent merits a special attention (Waever, 1995: 389-432). Within the EU, member states gradually converged on common liberal and democratic norms. The EU's integration process started to change the rules of the old interstate game in the European theatre. At least within the new Europe, the EU acted as a security community that rendered the logic of balance-of-power politics redundant. France and Germany, the two

archrivals, could reach a secure and stable relationship within the EU as the integration process contributed to the emergence of an embryonic collective identity between each other.

The role of the EU's integration process in the 'politicization' of the main security issues through the moving of them from the arena of 'security' to that of 'politics' has been immense in the materialization of security in Europe. If potential 'security' issues were framed as 'political' issues, then the need to solve them by the threat and use of force would drop out. The need to solve political problems would require a domestic discussion process with the procedures of engagement and consensus-building privileged over containment and use of force. The hope was that if Europeans achieved to 'politicize', rather than 'securiticize', the potential security issues in the domestic arena, then they would more easily repeat the same practice in the international arena (Waever, 1998: 45-63). With its norms of 'peace,' 'liberty,' 'human rights,' 'rule of law,' and 'pluralist democracy' the EU environment would allow for a more inclusive 'self-other' relationship to take root among the members (Waever, 1997: 69-118; Smith and Timmins, 2000: 80-90).

In contrast to highly centralized political structures, in polities where sovereignty is diffused, possible security problems would be more easily seen as political issues because people would tend to reach compromise solutions to such problems through the processes of discussion and consensus building. Thus, 'more integration' and 'EU centralisation' at the Brussels-level would result in greater collective identity, which would in turn result in the emergence of 'diffusion of sovereignty' and greater security. The passage from 'security government' to 'security governance' within the EU would erode the primacy of 'state' and 'military issues' in conceptualizing security and this would in turn contribute to the formation of

collective identities around similar norms and common functional interests as the best possible means to deal with the security challenges of today's globalized world. The promise of the EU's 'security governance' model would increase when the aspirant countries are required to internalize this model (Krahman, 2003: 5-26).

The promise of the EU would be facilitated by the allegedly post-modern character of the European Union, particularly within the context of EU's accession criteria and enlargement strategy. To this conceptualization, the EU has not clear-cut frontiers and it expands to include countries that meet the requirements of the accession process in a technical way (Grabbe, 2001: 1013-1031; Grabbe, 2002: 249-268). If countries, which aspire to join the EU, meet the EU's technical conditions, then accession will follow immediately. The fact that the EU's past is not defined in geographical-spatial manner but by temporal ways would be seen encouraging in this regard. The fact that the EU's other is its past, not any non-EU state, would make it likely for such countries as Turkey to accede to the EU once they meet the admission criteria (Waever, 1998: 250-88). The post-modern understanding of the EU's accession process also holds that the EU treats currently non-EU members as 'less-European' rather than 'non-European'. If so, there does not exist any taken for granted reason not to join the EU, except rationally unconceivable cases, once aspirant countries internalize EU's international/security identity.

The lack of a pure state-centric/*realpolitik* security culture within the EU would certainly shape the EU's engagement with the third states, as the accession criteria is understood as an EU attempt at dealing with the security challenges around the EU's periphery. Rather than erecting walls and excluding potential conflict-areas from its security community in a neo-realist inspired *realpolitik* security understanding, the EU engages such areas through a detailed accession process

(Cameron, 1998; Emerson, 2002). When the ultimate goal of this process were defined to contribute to the EU's self international/security identity by making the incorporation of such places into the EU's security community conditional on their transformation along the EU's terms, Turkey's accession to the EU would be only a question of 'when', not 'if'. If so, the incentives on the part of Turkey to bury the hatches with Greece along the EU accession process would increase.

In view of the above-mentioned theoretical accounts, the following sections of the dissertation will critically analyse these theoretical expectations, particularly those of the security community approach that defines the European Union as a post-modern entity. It is going to be demonstrated that the expected positive impacts of the post-modern EU on the outcome of Turkish-Greek relations have not taken place simply because the way the EU has approached Turkey prevented them from taking place.

CHAPTER 2: The NATO-Turkey-Greece Triangle

2.1. The Cold War Era

This chapter seeks to explore the reasons why their joint membership in NATO could not help Turkey and Greece resolve their long-standing territorial disputes in a problem solving win-win framework, based on the transformation of their *realpolitik* security cultures into non-*realpolitik* one. It is the main contention of this chapter that neither Turkey and Greece succeeded in adjusting their behaviours to the needs and expectations of each other, nor could they develop collective identities and interests that might in the final analysis have enabled them to form a security community in their region and solve their disputes once and for all.

From a theoretical perspective, in measuring the role of NATO to contribute to the resolution of Turkish-Greek territorial disputes and to the maintenance of bilateral cooperation, one could safely argue that the expectations of the sociological-institutionalism would hold more value than the rationalist-institutionalism. As the former theoretical approach assumes, Turkey and Greece would gradually converge their national identities and interests on the basis of the collectively held norms within the Alliance. They would gradually internalize the idea that it would be the most appropriate thing for them to hold on to the cooperative security approach and to settle their territorial disputes in a win-win framework by utilising the peaceful methods of conflict resolution. Long-term cooperation on the basis of friendship would be assured. They would also adapt their foreign and security policy doctrines to those of the Alliance and this would in turn prevent them from viewing each other as threats to their security. They would also share in the idea that living with territorial disputes within a NATO, defined as a pluralistic security community, would no longer be justified.

2.1.1. The Reasons for Failure

The role of the Alliance during the Cold War era in helping Greece and Turkey establish a long-term cooperative relationship did not prove promising for a number of reasons. First, the international/security identity of the Alliance did not necessitate a concerted and committed approach on the part of the United States, as the most powerful country in NATO, towards the resolution of their disputes. The NATO of the Cold War era was mainly a military alliance that came into existence around the US goal to contain Soviet communism (Rupp, 2000: 153-176). While the security culture of the Alliance was based on the *realpolitik* security strategy of containment, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to think of the possibility that membership in NATO would spread the norms of non-*realpolitik* security culture. The Alliance did neither have intra-alliance conflict-resolution mechanisms nor strongly emphasised the necessity of the resolution of territorial disputes among members as a precondition for the continuation of their membership. Turkey and Greece were simply admitted to membership because of their strategic and military contributions to the security interests of the Alliance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (Kuniholm, 1980). The rhetorical usage of normative arguments by the then US President, Truman, only aimed at convincing the reluctant US Congress and some European allies to the need of Turkey and Greece's incorporation into the Alliance (Frazier, 1999: 229-251).

The Alliance's major area of concern remained to be Western and Central Europe and the security concerns resulting from the Eastern Mediterranean region did not receive the high attentions of the Alliance. Neither the alliance could devote a concerted action to territorial disputes between Greece and Turkey nor a comprehensive approach has been developed independent of the Cold War era

strategic limitations. The technical and mechanical approach of the Alliance towards particular Turkish-Greek disputes did not contribute to their ever-lasting resolution (Stearns, 1992: 8-24). All Turkish-Greek disputes gained meaning in Washington only in terms of their possible implications on the struggle with the communist threat (Slengesol, 2000: 96-129). The costs of sorting out comprehensive solution packages seemed to be higher than adopting a low-key attitude in an effort to defuse the tensions. The consideration was that it would have cost the alliance the most if one of the parties felt aggrieved by a specific set of propositions of the Alliance and in turn left the Club.

As long as their military commitment towards the defence of the Euro-Atlantic security community against the Soviet threat was in place, the damaging repercussions of their disputes over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus were somehow tolerated. The most important concern of the US governments during the Cold War era was to prevent Turkey and Greece from fighting each other, as well as to forestall Soviet attempts at meddling in any intra-NATO dispute (Wilkinson, 1999).

It was assumed by many NATO officials that any undertaking to resolve Greek-Turkish differences is a no-win proposition for the Alliance. Besides, if NATO proved its impartiality by maintaining an attitude of detached concern, it was sometimes argued, Athens and Ankara would eventually realize that the alliance is not going to bail them out. Only then would they accept the responsibility for resolving their own differences (Stearns, 1992).

Second, the dynamics of Turkey and Greece's relationships within the Alliance have delayed, if not prevented, the process of democratization in both countries in the liberal-pluralist sense (Vamvakas, 2000). The American governments of the Cold War era did not hide their desire to work with anti-left and

royalist governments in Greece. They were also content with the miliary coups in Turkey, for they thought that the generals would keep Turkey on the orbit of the Alliance while eradicating the roots of communism and internal instability within the country. For example, while the European Union members froze Greece's association agreement during the 1967-1974 junta era, the high level US figures did not hesitate to visit Athens in order to lend legitimacy to the military regime (Danapoulos, 1983: 485-507). In the same manner, while the EU members suspended their relations with Turkey in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, the Americans expressed their satisfaction with the regime and could strike a defence and economic cooperation agreement with Turkey in 1983 (Dagi, 2001: 51-68). They thought that it would have become easier for them to work with such governments because their legitimacy would have been emanated from the close relations with the Allies in NATO. To Americans, such governments would have become more predisposed to take care of the interests of the Alliance, rather than pursing their own national priorities.

NATO memberships of Greece and Turkey resulted in the prevalence of military elites in both countries. When this was the case, the security elites considered the membership of their country within the western international community, as represented by NATO, on the basis of internationalism and strategic-security cooperation (Karaosmanoglu, 1993). They also got used to think militarily in the formulation of foreign and security policies. This enhanced the primacy of *realpolitik* thinking.

Third, the US' involvement in the bilateral Turkish-Greek disputes was predicated on the assumption that if the United States wanted to see a stable environment she would have to value the military balance between Greece and Turkey, taking utmost care not to discriminate one against the other. This was, and

still is, a *realpolitik* way of reaching peace or stability in interstate relations. When the US viewed the mainstay of Turkish-Greek stability based on military balance in the region, Greece and Turkey were strongly affected by this in the formulation of their security policies vis-à-vis each other. This approach decreased the credibility of the Alliance in both countries. The Turks tended to interpret the US' 7 to 10 policy in terms of military sales to Turkey and Greece as the confirmation of the Turkish threat by the Americans. The fact that it was the Greeks, who first pleaded the Americans with adopting such a stance on the basis of the so-called menacing Turkish threat in the East, the Turks did not see the US logic towards the region as impartial but lopsided in favour of Greece. Likewise, the Greeks would have also interpreted any whatsoever inaction on the side of Americans as the US' acquiesce in Turkey's greater geo-political value, as well as the legitimacy of Turkish arguments.

Fourth, the fact that geo-strategic position and military power of members defined their bargaining powers within the Alliance did shore up Turkey's relatively more important status over Greece. Internal mechanisms of the Alliance made the power disparity between Greece and Turkey very clear, particularly to the Greeks. This has contributed to the Greek thinking that any NATO-framed solution of the Cyprus and the Aegean disputes would likely favour Turkey at the expense of Greece (Papacosma, 1985: 189-213).

Another factor affecting the power disparity between the countries was that the way Turkey was accepted to the Alliance showed some differences from the way Greece was let in. It was the feeling of necessity that led the Americans to argue for Turkey's incorporation into the Alliance, particularly in order to convince some of the reluctant European states (Leffer, 1985: 807-825). The Greeks also thought that the Alliance valued Turkey's membership more than that of Greece (Conalis-Kontas,

2001: 385-405). To the majority of the Greeks while the choice to elevate Turkey's status to membership in the Alliance from a bilateral security guarantee was radical in the eyes of the Americans, Greece's NATO membership on the other hand was regarded by the same Americans as the continuation of the vassal-lord relationship dating back to the Truman Doctrine of 1947. The Greek politicians of the time did also regard Greece's NATO membership as the continuation of the American patronage in Greece (Legg and Roberts, 1997: 55-71).

Although it was argued that NATO in general and the United States in particular embraced a kind of low-key policy in order not to offend both Greece and Turkey, it is generally the case that Turkey appeared as the country that the western community did not want to antagonize the most. For instance, when the Turkish government was somehow implicated in the September 1955 events in Istanbul, that took place in response to the news that Ataturk's house in Greece was bombed by the Greeks, the US Secretary of State Dulles preferred to send identical telegrams to the leaders of both countries. When this was heard, the Greeks were infuriated. They thought that although the Turkish government was the real responsible for the events in Istanbul, why putting both countries under the same basket (Stearns, 1992).

In the face of such allegedly pro-Turkish leanings of the Alliance, the major dilemma for the Greek foreign policy makers within the Alliance was how to strike a balance between the two competing strategies, to favour better Turkish-Greek relations in accordance with the strategic priorities of NATO on the one hand and to work for the realization of the unification of Cyprus with the mainland Greece in accordance with the Hellenism ideology on the other (Coufoudakis, 1985: 185-217). While the rightist Greek governments leaned towards the first option, the leftist ones tilted to the second.

Fifth, right from the beginning of their membership in NATO, the more bilateral-less multilateral character of the security relations within NATO made Turkey and Greece feel doubtful about the collective security guarantee of the Alliance. The main reason behind their skepticism emanated from two factors. The first concerns the way how some northern European were so reluctant as to see Turkey and Greece within NATO. The second pertains to the fact that the military dominance of the US within the Alliance catapulted the Americans to the position of final arbiter to decide whether or not to offer security guarantee.

Besides, just as the United States established strong bilateral security relations with other members of the Alliance, Turkey and Greece also signed such treaties with the United States. Such a character of NATO membership made the resolution of Turkish-Greek disputes difficult for the main reason that the United States became a natural party to the conflict as both countries lobbied their cause in Washington. This trilateral character of the disputes made their resolution difficult (Kurth, 2001: 5-16). When it was the case that the continuation of the alliance's functions in the Eastern Mediterranean were made possible in the face of lingering Turkish-Greek problems, no need aroused in the Western circles to come up with serious and detailed solution proposals.

Sixth, the Turkish and Greek feeling that the United States and other major members of the Alliance did not care about their problems and were content with the maintenance of their conflictual relationship at the tolerable and manageable limits seems to have put Greece and Turkey into a position in which they tended to vie for the resources and benefits of the alliance in order to strengthen their bargaining positions via-a-vis each other. Because the importance of allies within NATO, particularly in the eyes of the Americans, varied according to their military

capabilities and geo-political significance, such kind of thinking fuelled rivalry in and around the Aegean Sea. This was a clear *realpolitik* outcome caused by the constitutive principles of the Alliance. The mentality that I could better represent the Western interests in the region had inevitably pitted Turkey and Greece against each other as contenders and rivals (Tayfur, 2002: 13-51).

Both Greeks and Turks, in other words, considered that NATO undervalued their membership, albeit for different reasons. Paradoxically, the alliance's hands-off policy, although intended to project NATO's impartiality and encourage Athens and Ankara to settle their own differences, seemed to have had the opposite effect. Both capitals were led to interpret NATO's attitude as proof that the organization did not take them seriously and, accordingly, to see less prospects for rewards from the alliance, should they adopt more flexible policies, or penalties, should they fail to do so. It is also logical to suppose that what Greeks and Turks alike viewed as the relatively low priority accorded to the southeastern flank gave them little reason to place NATO priorities above their own when it came to force planning and deployment, weapons procurement and other aspects of their national defence policy.

Seventh, the American guarantee that the alliance would defend them against the Soviets made them concentrate on regional foreign and security policy issues. When the first priority of their foreign policy, e.g. the security guarantee against the Soviet Union, was met by the Americans, Greece and Turkey became able to pay their attention to their regional security issues more easily. They did not feel the need to resolve their disputes as part of their effort to resist the communism. This shows that Turkey and Greece did even fail to cooperate with each other within NATO on the basis of their collective interests. The neo-liberal expectation of cooperation in times of collective interests did not materialize in and around the Aegean Sea. This to

a great extent led them to view the Alliance as a strategic instrument to serve their pre-conceived national interests, rather than as an institutional platform to materialize their collective security interests (Krebs, 1999: 171-201). They gradually believed that their support to the US's efforts to contain the Soviet Union in Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean region would in return beget a holistic US support to their every single security policy.

Examples to the instrumental usage of NATO's platforms for the pursuit of national interests abound. The first of such examples took place in 1954 when Greece argued for the establishment of a NATO patrol-boat base in the island of Leros, one of the Dodeconese islands. When NATO headquarter in Brussels tilted towards this idea, Turkey rejected this plan by arguing that such kind of an establishment would be in breach of the 1923 Lausanne and 1947 Paris treaties, which stipulated that the Dodeconese Islands would remain under the Greek sovereignty provided that they be demilitarized (Iatrides, 2000: 32-46).

In this vein, the most important reason why Greece wanted to re-join the Alliance in the late 1970s was to check Turkey's growing influence within NATO and to prevent the strategic balance in the Aegean Sea from favouring Turkey. Rather than helping Greece join her forces with Turkey against the Soviet threat in the North, the Greek governments evaluated Greece's NATO membership as the main external security guarantee against any possible Turkish threat (Loulis, 1985: 375-391). This was made evident in the late 1970s when the Karamanlis government came to the conclusion that Turkey's continuing NATO membership in the absence of Greece would only damage Greek security interests. Indeed, one of the significant benefits of NATO membership to the Greek government was that it 'Europeanized'

to some extent the small but controversial US military presence in Greece (Stearns, 1992).

Both countries tried to control the strategic area of the Aegean Sea through the strategic and military plans of the Alliance. Turkey did not agree to the inclusion of Lemnos and other Aegean islands in the strategic plans of NATO and argued that if Turkey were given the operational control over at least the half of the Aegean Sea, then she might better preserve the interests of the Alliance. Besides, Turkey made the case that fortification of the eastern Aegean islands would be in breach of the legal texts that regulate the status of those islands. By constantly vetoing the inclusion of the Lemnos Island in the planned military exercises of the Alliance in the region, Turkey hoped to prevent Greece from materializing her goals through NATO (Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 85-118).

Greece, on the other hand, was captive of the same mentality and tried to demonstrate to the Allies, other than Turkey of course, that the fortification of the eastern Aegean islands would provide a strategic depth to Greece in defending Greece's (therefore the Alliance's) territory against threats coming form the North. The Defence Doctrine of 1985 made the essential points of the Greek strategy very clear. If those islands were fortified, the defence of NATO's interests against threats coming from either the North through land operations or from the Soviet's Fifth Escadra in the Aegean Sea would be materialized in a much better way. However, one should not obscure the point that if NATO agreed to these strategic considerations, Greece would have also been able to deter any Turkish threat coming from the East. Irrespective of the existence of any serious Turkish threat coming from the other side of the Aegean, the main underlying motivation behind Greece's attempts at selling out its 'defence in depth' strategy to the Alliance was to deter

Turkey (Coufoudakis, 1988: 35-44; Varvitsioitis, 1992: 11-14; Veremis, 1988: 236-286).

Greece and Turkey lobbied against each other as bitterly in Brussels as they did in Washington and often used the same arguments in disputing NATO's allocation of infrastructure funds that they apply to the apportioning to US's military assistance. They objected to NATO's plans to provide infrastructure funds to each other. They vetoed each other's share (Brown, 1991).

The deadlock in NATO became so implacable that since 1984 Greece and Turkey vetoed each other's 'national chapters,' the yearly inventory of forces assigned to NATO, which serves as a basis for NATO planning and also, in the past, for the alliance's annual 'Comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces,' a document that for this reason was not issued after 1984.

Since spring 1982 until 2000 Greek and Turkish forced did not participate in NATO's military exercises in the Aegean Sea together due to the controversy over the political status of the Lemnos/Limni Island. Greek-Turkish antagonism disfigures the military structure of the Alliance (Schmitt, 1997: 1-25).

For example the Greek Defence Minister Papandreou, in a NATO defence ministers meeting in December 1981, asked NATO to issue a formal security guarantee that it would protect its borders against Turkey. When the US objected to this, Papandreou, as the defence minister of Greece did not sign the final communique, the first ever seen in the history of the Alliance (Dimitras, 1985: 134-150).

Successive Greek governments did also try to get a formal security guarantee from the United Stated against Turkey while the two sides were discussing the details of the Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement between the two countries.

For example in 1990, in response to US's access to military bases and other facilities in Greece, the Greek government asked the US to give the above-mentioned guarantee (Staphopoulos, 1992: 16-19).

When Turkey observed that the arms embargo put on herself was in part activated with the efforts of the Greek-American lobby in the United States' Congress; that the seven to ten ratio in American military aids to Turkey and Greece was in part forced by the attempts of the Greek government, then a future NATO involvement in Turko-Greek dispute was not seen favourable to Turkey. When the United States agreed to the continuation of the seven to ten ratio in the military aids delivered to both countries, it meant that the US concurred with Greece that Turkey posed a threat to Greece in the Aegean Sea. In fact, it was Greece, which argued that the road to peace in the Aegean Sea would have to go through the balance of power between the arsenals of the countries and the US military aid shipped to them.

The same logic also applies to Greece. When the Greek governments witnessed to NATO's passivity during the Cyprus crisis in 1974 and the subsequent de facto partition of the island; NATO's refusal to include the Lemnos Island in the military exercises in the Aegean Sea, an anti-NATO feeling might have developed in Greece in relation to its involvement in Turkish-Greek disputes.

Eighth, where NATO met the number one security consideration of Greece and Turkey, the flow of arms from the United States and other western European members of the Alliance to Turkey and Greece contributed to the emergence and perpetuation of a security dilemma situation (Collins, 1997; Glasser, 1997: 171-201) in the Aegean because they no longer shared in the collective interest to cooperate against the Soviet threat (Krebs, 1999: 171-201). This is a pure *realpolitik* outcome caused by a particular NATO policy. Furthermore, when the Alliance armed Turkey

with a view to helping her defend its (the Alliance's) borders against the Soviet Union, the main purpose behind the flow of arms to Greece was to buttress Greece's capability to check the communist threat within the country. When this was the case, the military disparity between Turkey and Greece manifolded as the Cold War years passed by. The logic of NATO inadvertently contributed to the widening of the gap between Turkey and Greece in terms of their military capabilities.

Ninth, Turkey and Greece were never asked to settle their disputes and internalize the security norms of the western international community before their accession to the Alliance. The detailed and comprehensive membership criteria were missing during the Cold War era enlargement of NATO. This might have indirectly curtailed the promise of the Alliance in contributing to the transformation of Turkey and Greece's *realpolitik* security cultures into non-*realpolitik* ones.

Finally, under such conditions, the transparency NATO's internal mechanisms provided did not prevent Turkey and Greece from perceiving the military instruments of each other as threats. Indeed, the more Greece became aware of Turkey's superior military capabilities within NATO, the more she adopted an exclusive attitude towards Turkey. The sheer military power of Turkey did not lessen the Greek fears of Turkey even though Greece could monitor Turkey's military capabilities through the NATO channels (Krebs, 1999). Their joint NATO membership revealed the power disparities between Greece and Turkey more acutely. Therefore, the intra-alliance mechanisms made it time again clear that significant power differences exist between Greece and Turkey both in terms of their military potential and their representational force within the Alliance. Thought of this way, their NATO membership contributed to the perpetuation of the *realpolitik* security culture in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

2.2. The Post-Cold War Era

The expectations that NATO would be a more reliable and credible institution in regard to the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes came to naught as the 1990s unfolded. Neither the changing institutional identity of the Alliance nor the changing structure of the international system made NATO a credible actor in terms of Turkish-Greek disputes. The hope was that as the constraining effects of the bi-polar international system came to an end with the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, NATO would be more able to propose detailed solution proposals to the particular Turkish-Greek disputes. The need not to antagonize either Turkey or Greece and the fear of losing any of them in the aftermath of a detailed NATO solution package lost its credibility as the Alliance's need to rely on Turkey and Greece's military cooperation decreased in the absence of the Soviet threat.

It was also hoped that the elevation of the Eastern Mediterranean region to the top place in regard to the strategic focus of the Alliance would push the leading powers of NATO to actively work for the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes. The new conventional and non-conventional security threats, challenges and risks to the Alliance emanating from the Greater Middle Eastern region would necessitate a concerted NATO effort to help resolve the Turkish-Greek disputes. In a word, the loosening of the structural constraints of the Cold War era and the degrading of the *realpolitik*-based containment strategy; the re-construction of the Alliance's security community identity on the basis of the promotion of the western norms to the ex-communist countries; the embrace of cooperative security strategy in dealings with outside states; and the designation of the Eastern Mediterranean region as the new Central Front of the Alliance would all constitute the very factors in explaining why

the new NATO would likely take a bolder approach towards the everlasting settlement of the Turkish-Greek disputes.

However, these expectations did not come true in the post-Cold War era, as NATO started to loose its magnet status for Turkey and Greece to define their collective western/European identities. Gradually, the Alliance ceased to become the platform, under which Greece and Turkey could reach a collective western/European identity that would have enabled them to accommodate their territorial disputes in a problem-solving win-win manner, based on non-*realpolitik* security understandings. This section of the dissertation is an attempt to analyse the reasons why NATO has increasingly lost its power of attraction in the eyes of these two countries that might have otherwise led them to end up with common identities and interests.

Thought of this way, what follows is an account of the factors that have led to the decreasing promise/credibility of NATO in bilateral relations. Before doing this, a few words are needed on the conditions that might have theoretically enabled NATO to play promising/credible roles in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes by accelerating the process of collective identity and security community formation in and around the Aegean Sea.

2.2.1. The Theoretical Expectations from A Sociological Institutionalist Perspective for A Promising NATO Role

Looking from an ideational perspective, there seem to exist some preconditions for NATO to have credibility/promise in the resolution of Turkish-Greek disputes. The first concerns the way NATO constructs its identity. The more the Alliance continued to exist on the basis of intersubjectively shared norms/rules and the more 'European' NATO remained in the post-Cold War era, the more leverage it would

have on Turkey and Greece (Moore, 2002: 1-34). The more the United States and the European Union members of the Alliance concurred on the 'European-ness' of the Alliance, the more encouraged Turkey and Greece would feel to solve their disputes within the NATO framework. This would be so because Turkey and Greece would be content with their membership in a NATO, which remains the prime security organization in Europe and whose main security priorities lay in Europe. In such a case, the degree of necessity for Turkey and Greece to resolve their problems would increase because the tone and quality of their bilateral relations would likely determine the quality of their relations with the Alliance, as well as the credibility of their claims to 'European-ness'.

Theoretically speaking, the degree of NATO's 'European-ness' would increase, or retain its Cold War era level, provided that the following conditions are met. First, the United States remains involved in the European security issues to the extent it was the case during the Cold War years. Second, the geographical boundaries of the Alliance are limited to Europe. Third, the Alliance defines its mission as to deal with the threats that emanate from either within Europe or Europe's very-near abroad. Fourth, the European Union members of the Alliance continue to regard NATO as the main institutional platform that offers security to themselves.

The second main factor that might increase the credibility of the Alliance pertains to the *reason d'etat* of NATO. If the main goal of NATO turns out to promote the western values of 'liberal democracy, free-market economy, peaceful relations among neighbours, the resolution of territorial disputes as urgently as possible through pacifist means' to the Central and East European countries *at the expense* of NATO's prime function, collective defence, then the Alliance might not

exert strong pressure on Turkey and Greece to settle their territorial disputes in the short-run. The danger would be that if the collective defence function of NATO erodes soon, without the members of the Alliance firmly internalizing and sharing the idea that the new NATO would be based on common norms, rather than common externally defined security interests, then the promise/credibility of the Alliance will diminish. If the collective defence character of the Alliance remains undisputed, with the continuation of the Europeans' commitment to Greece and Turkey's security interests and territorial defence, and if the collective security functions of the new more-political/less-military NATO foresees credible sanctions for those members that derail from the track of democracy and peaceful neighbourly relations, than the promise/credibility of the Alliance would radically improve (Waterman, Zagorcheva and Reiter, 2002: 221-235).

Third, if the alliance in general and the United States in particular sees the solution of the Turkish-Greek relations over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus 'necessary' to the realization of their security interest in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East regions, then the likelihood of NATO to act as a credible enhancer would definitely increase.

Fourth, if NATO turns out to become a loosely constructed global security organization under the leadership of the United States, its degree of leverage over Turkey and Greece would probably decrease. In such a case the main mechanism of security cooperation between the US and other countries would be organized on a 'more bilateral-less multilateral' basis. Such kind of an arrangement would increase the bargaining powers of smaller states vis-à-vis the United States, and erode the institutional cohesiveness of the Alliance (Risse-Kappen, 1995). If the Alliance remains as a collective-defence organization with its members credibly identifying

with the security interests of each other, then its credibility will increase in Turkish and Greek eyes.

Fifth, the success of NATO would vary with the level of internalization of its security community identity, based on cooperative security and non-*realpolitik* security understanding, by Greece and Turkey. If one of them regards NATO as the most important link to the western security system and seems to have adapted its foreign policy orientation to the priorities of the Alliance whereas the other does not accord to the institutional link with NATO the primary role in formulation of its foreign policy preferences, then it would be difficult for NATO to involve credibly in the solution process of the bilateral disputes. For NATO to appear as a credible forum, both Turkey and Greece must abandon their practice of viewing the alliance as a tool in the pursuit of their national interests vis-à-vis each other. Both of them should regard their membership in NATO as legitimate and necessary for the maintenance of their security interests as well as the conformation of their western/European identities. For NATO to retain its credibility, it should remain the main security link tying the western security community of the post-Cold War era to Turkey and Greece. The degree of transatlantic divisions should not damage the leading position of NATO as the prime security organization of the western democratic security community, particularly in the European theatre.

2.2.2. The General Factors of NATO's Low Promise/Credibility in the 1990s

Set against the theoretical conditions outlined above, this section will only succinctly mention the main factors that have diluted NATO's credibility to act as a promising third party in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes. First, the new priority of the Alliance has been to enlarge to the ex-communist countries of the post-Soviet era

in a political fashion, rather than to extend security guarantees of a collective defence organization to insecure places. This partially reduced the attention of the Alliance to the Turkish-Greek relations. Both countries have gradually become marginal to the new identity and missions of the Alliance.

Second, the erosion in the European identity of the Alliance, mainly stemming from the division of the West into two, gave boost to Turkey's efforts to join the EU in its goal to prove its 'European-ness'. This has gradually diminished the leverage of NATO on Turkey.

Third, the Alliance has gradually come under the domination of the United States as the process of 'Americanization' of NATO has speeded up over the last decade (Layne, 2000: 59-92). In parallel to the increase in the United States' relative power vis-à-vis the European members of the Alliance, the post-Cold War era NATO has mainly remained as a political instrument of the American government. The decisions to enlarge, to define the new missions of the Alliance and to determine the geo-political boundaries of the Alliance mainly reflected the concerns and priorities of the successive US governments in the 1990s (Kurth, 2001: 5-16).

It was somehow a tacit bargain between the Americans and the Europeans that the former asked the latter to recognize the global character of the Alliance in return for US's military involvement in European security affairs. The Europeans had to acquiescence in the US' involvement in European security, lest the fears of renationalization of security policies were awaken among themselves (Art, 1996: 1-39). Such conditions enabled the Americans to determine the identity of the Alliance as well as the main strategies of NATO's enlargement to the ex-communist countries. Rather than agreeing to the non-European, global and out-of-area character of the Alliance, the Europeans simply wanted the Alliance to remain as the main security

institution in Europe in order not to see that the old *realpolitik* security practices revisit them (Croft, 2000).

Fourth, the multilateral and transatlantic character of the Alliance dramatically eroded as the European members of the Alliance tried to establish autonomous 'European Foreign and Security Policy' and 'Common European Security and Defence Policy' structures within the European Union. In parallel to American efforts to globalize the Alliance and to turn NATO into an organization, on which they could rely in their efforts to compose US-led 'coalitions of the willing', the European Union members have gradually grown unsatisfied with these developments and resolved to set into motion their own security institutions that would eventually help them meet their 'European-way' security concerns (Walt, 1997: 156-179, Walt, 1998: 5-44). With the 'selective solidarity' and the 'coalition of the willing' characteristics of the Alliance becoming more pronounced, the Article 5 commitments of the Alliance was diluted.

Fifth, NATO has gradually evolved into a collective security organization with the political functions of the Alliance being emphasised at the expense of the military and defence functions (Yost, 1998: 135-160). This mainly took place as the Alliance members found it difficult to converge on collectively held security interests. The Cold War era degree of cohesion no longer existed during the post-Cold War years. There emerged significant differences between the United States and Turkey on the one hand and the EU members of the Alliance on the other in terms of security conceptualization and the meaning of the Article 5 collective defence commitments. The EU members found it difficult to abide by their Article 5 commitments towards Turkey because to them Turkey has increasingly appeared as a security liability rather than a security asset (Karaosmanoğlu, 2001: 271-299).

Sixth, the leverage of the Alliance over Turkey and Greece decreased following Greece's further Europeanization strategy and Turkey's preference for stronger-bilateral relations with the United States to weaker institutional relations with the European Union. As NATO has gradually lost its European character; as Greece sought its security within the European Union; and as Turkey felt that its European identity was strongly challenged by the non-Europeanization of the Alliance, the overall promise of NATO felt short of helping Greece and Turkey develop a collective identity between each other. NATO could not provide Greece and Turkey with common grounds to cooperate and transform their *realpolitik* security cultures into non-*realpolitik* security cultures.

Seventh, the promise of NATO further decreased as both Turkey and Greece approached to the Alliance from an instrumental perspective. Greece's main concern has been to balance Turkey's growing influence and bargaining power vis-a-vis the United States through using the mechanisms of the Alliance, whereas Turkey's main motivation has been to consolidate/strengthen its European identity in the eyes of the EU members through working hard within NATO. Having felt rebuked by the EU's discriminatory and exclusionary attitude towards her membership aspirations, Turkey tried to increase the quality of her NATO membership as a counter-reaction. However, neither of these strategies led Greece and Turkey to share a collective/European identity within NATO.

2.2.2.1. NATO's Emerging Identity/Interests/Missions and the Value of Turkey and Greece within the Alliance

Initially, it was expected that NATO's role in defining the basics of the security of the western international community would diminish as the main external other of

the Alliance disappeared with the collapse of the communist block. Being denied of her *reason d'etat*, it was speculated that NATO would certainly go out of business if the main rationale of the Alliance were not defined in a new fashion so as to adapt to the realities of the new world (Mearsheimer, 1990: 5-56, Rupp, 2000: 154-176).

During the 1990s there seemed to exist four main factors leading the Alliance to survive the end of the Cold War era. The first of these can be well explained by the sociological institutionalist accounts. To this logic, the alliance has turned out to construct its main identity and mission in the 1990s on the basis of the idea that security could not be reached without the promotion of the normative ideational elements of the western international community to the Central and Eastern European countries, as well as engaging Russia in a cooperative mood. In one way or other the Alliance started to act as a pan-European cooperative security organization. Together with the European Union and Organization for European Security and Cooperation, NATO acted as one of the main pillars of the emerging European interlocking security arrangements. The new mission of the Alliance has been based on NATO's political functions, instead of military ones. In this new era, the Article 2 and Article 4 commitments of the Alliance gained more importance than the traditional Article 5 commitments (Schimmelfennig, 1999: 198-234). In this vein, NATO undertook the North Atlantic Cooperation Council Program in 1991, the Partnership for Peace program in 1994, the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation program in 1997, signed the founding act with Russia in 1997, widened the scope cooperation with Russia through a new treaty in 2002, admitted three ex-communist countries to membership in 1997 and extended membership to other Central and Eastern European countries in 2002 in the historical Prague Summit (Smith and Timmins, 2000: 80-90).

Despite all the merits of the Alliance's cooperative engagement with its ex-foes, the fact that NATO constituted only one significant part of Europe's interlocking security architecture gradually made it clear that membership in NATO was not enough to define the contours of 'European-ness' on its own. NATO was transformed from being 'the only European' security organization into 'one of the European' security organizations during the post-Cold War era (Aybet, 2000). Thought of this way, the claim of the Alliance to embody the European identity was seriously disputed by the EU's simultaneous enlargement process. This became increasingly relevant as far as the promise of the Alliance to help Turkey and Greece develop a collective European identity is concerned.

Second, the continuation of the Alliance can be explained by the neo-realist accounts in the sense that this both constituted the most important mechanism to 'Europeanize' the unified Germany, hence assuage the fears of greater Germany, and enabled the United States to remain the prime security actor in Europe. The fear was that in the absence of NATO in general and the Germany's non-presence in the Alliance in particular, Germany would turn out to become the most powerful country in the continent after the unification. In such a case, other European countries, notably France, Britain and Germany's neighbours to the east, would find themselves developing *realpolitik* security strategies to balance against Germany. Under such conditions, all the positive achievements of the European integration process might have been lost in a very short time period. NATO's primacy as the main European security organization would have simply alleviated such widespread fears in the continent (Duffield, 1994/1995: 763-787).

Looking from this perspective one of the main functions of the Alliance during the post-Cold war era was to keep the United States in Europe, rather than to

keep the Soviets out and Germans down (Layne, 2003: 17-29). This particular mission of the Alliance was advocated to a great extent by the Atlanticist members of NATO, such as Britain and Netherlands, rather than France and Belgium, which on the contrary tried to balance the increasing German influence in Europe by locking Germany in the European Union.

Third, in accordance with the neo-realist logic, the continuation of the Alliance became possible when the United States, the sole superpower of the 1990s, wished so. Both the preservation of the Alliance intact and its enlargement to the Central and Eastern European countries were in the interests of the Americans in the sense that through this way the US would be able to preserve its prevailing power status in the continent and would be able to keep the growing influence of the European Union members under its control (Duffield, 1994/1995). Given that many of the Central and Eastern European countries concurred that their link to the United States within NATO would increase their security feeling vis-à-vis both Germany and the Russian Federation, such an enlarged NATO would enhance the dominant position of the United States within the Alliance.

Besides the rhetorical foundation of the enlargement policy, which rests on the American desire to contribute to the construction of a Europe whole and free, the US governments of the 1990s have mainly supported the enlargement of the Alliance on the ground that the enlarged NATO would also legitimize/justify the Americans' involvement in Europe as the main security actor in the post-Cold War era (Sloan, 1995: 217-231).

As the harmony between the American and European security interests started to erode, the application of Article 5 commitments became a distant possibility. In such a case, the Alliance turned out to become a state-centric platform

for the Americans to enlist possible allies to their global-scale security initiatives and undertakings.

The process of Americanization occurred through some significant developments. First, the new identity and missions of the Alliance mainly reflected US' interests. The Alliance as a 'coalition of the willings', as well as an American instrument in 'out of area' operations, were consistent with post-Cold War era US strategic interests (Stuart, Howorth, Terriff and Webber, 2000). The concepts of 'selective solidarity', 'selective engagement' began to define the main character of the Alliance better than the concept of 'Article 5 commitments.'

Second, all peacekeeping operations in the Balkans demonstrated the American dominance of the Alliance, as well as the need to rely on the United States for the protection of European security interests. Third, the stress on the Balkans, the Caucaus, the Central Asia, the Eastern Mediterranean and Gulf regions as the possible areas of deadly crises attests to the process of Americanization, for these are the places where the respective US governments of the 1990s put a great premium in terms of the security interests of the United States. Furthermore, the Americanization of the Alliance was made easier when the need on the part of the Americans to seek Europeans' help in Europe-wide and global-wide security arrangements decreased due to the widening capability gap between the two sides of the Atlantic (Chalmers, 2001: 569-585).

With the end of the Cold War, the relatively fair partnership between the US and the European countries of the Alliance began to evolve into a situation in which the US had the upper hand within the Alliance. Rather than being an institutional forum where the transatlantic members of the Alliance used to formulate common positions through intra-alliance bargaining and consultation processes, NATO of the

post-Cold War era started to serve as a pragmatic togetherness between the Americans on the one hand and the Europeans on the other and as a legitimizing institution for the unilateral US military actions. The degree of leverage the European members of the Alliance used to have within NATO has decreased to significant degrees. This seemingly led to a gradual lessening of the importance of the Alliance as an institutional platform where intra-member cooperation process would result in the mitigation of the anarchical effects of the international system (Duffield, 2001: 93-115).

While the European members of the Alliance turned inward to Europe in the 1990s, the scope of American global security interests expanded to various parts of the globe, of which Europe became a less important one. While the Europeans wanted the Alliance to remain mainly as a European security institution operating on a multilateral basis, the Americans wanted NATO to widen its scope and horizons beyond Europe. While the Europeans wanted the Alliance to deal with the security challenges emanating from Europe and its near abroad, the Americans wanted NATO to act as a global security actor with war-making capabilities in any part of the world. While the Europeans desired to influence the American security and foreign policies through their institutional leverages within NATO, the Americans tended to ignore European views so long as the Europeans remained a dwarf in terms of their military capabilities and geo-political horizons. While the EU members tried to modify the role of the Alliance in such a way as to dovetail the main principles of security cooperation within NATO with the particular 'power of attraction' model of the EU, the Americans tried to transform the Alliance in such a way as to make it more capable to deal with hard/soft global security challenges (Heisbourg, 1992: 665-678; Daalder, 2001: 553-567).

In line with American grand visions, starting with the Roma summit in 1991, and then through the historic 1997 Madrid, 1999 Washington and 2002 Prague Summits, the Alliance has gradually defined its security mission in such a way that the main responsibility of the alliance has now become to act as an effective crisis-management institution in out-of-area/out-of-Europe missions.[*]

In regard to the relevance of the Americanization of the Alliance to the nature of the Turkish-Greek interaction process, one could offer both optimistic and pessimistic accounts. As for the first, one could say the followings. Interestingly enough while the enlargement process of the Alliance to the CEECs diminished Turkey and Greece's relative positions within the Alliance, the emerging security concerns in the Balkans and the Greater Middle Eastern regions once again made it clear that the nature of Turkish-Greek relations could seriously affect the performance of NATO as a security institution (Larraabee, 1999: 131-147; Lewis, 2001: 22-42).

For example, catapulted into a position of 'front state', Turkey's significance within the Alliance began to increase from the second half of the 1990s onwards, as the Alliance members came to the conclusion that new threats to Alliance's security would likely come from the peripheries of the continent in the Balkans and the Greater Middle Eastern region. Such kind of geographical shifts in Alliance's strategic perspectives initially held out the promise that NATO would finally start to deal with the Turkish-Greek disputes in a committed manner, for the lingering of territorial disputes between Greece and Turkey might likely scutter Alliance's efforts to contribute to security in the region.

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[*] One can reach NATO's strategic concepts as understood by the Rome Summit, Madrid Summit, Washington Summit and Prague Summit at the following addresses in order: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm.

The post-September 11 era developments have once again reinforced the more American and less European character of the Alliance as the historic Prague Summit confirmed the incorporation of pro-American Central and Eastern European countries to the Alliance as well as defined the new mission of the Alliance as being the fights against global-transnationalised terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. These steps have been in total line with the American thinking (Say, 2003: 106-112; Talbott, 2002: 46-57).

As for the pessimistic accounts, one could offer the following explanation. The more Americanized the Alliance became, the more difficult it became for Turkey and Greece to reach a collective identity within NATO. This was the case mainly for the reason that neither Turkey nor Greece was happy with this development and both of them wanted the Alliance to preserve its European character and to act on 'a more multilateral and less bilateral' basis. Faced with increasing Americanization of the Alliance, Greece gave impetus to its Europeanization efforts and tried to identify its security interests with those of her partners within the EU (Tsakonas, 2001: 145-159; Stivachtis, 2002: 35-53), whereas Turkey, rebuked by the EU's gradual exclusionary/discriminatory policies, had to improve the quality of her strategic security relations with the United States within NATO, though on a more bilateral-less multilateral basis (Kirisci, 2000: 68; Larrabee, 1997: 143-173; Harris, 2000: 189-202).

Even though one might convincingly argue here that the change in the direction of NATO's threat perceptions from the centre of Europe to its peripheries in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean region made it more urgent for the Alliance to contribute to the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes, this should not obscure the fact that the Cold War era communist danger directed towards the

Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean region used to pose far greater 'threats' to the western security interests than the contemporary security 'risks' and 'challenges' emanating from the same areas.

Furthermore, that the new central front of the Alliance gradually turned out to become the Eastern Mediterranean should not obscure the fact that this mainly took place at the insistence of the Americans rather than out of a compromise between the European members of the Alliance and the United States (Blank, 2000: 24-48). Given the diverging security interests between the Americans and the Europeans in regard to the Mediterranean region, an increase in the qualitative emphasis on this region did not contribute to the credibility/promise of the Alliance in the Turkish and Greek eyes. It only enhanced Turkey's bargaining position vis-à-vis the Americans on a bilateral basis. This is an ideational factor affecting Greece's approach towards NATO as far as NATO's role in Turkish-Greek relations is concerned.

The apparent bifurcation of the West during the post-Cold War era, into an 'American West' and a 'European West', seems to have complicated the prospects for the resolution of the Turkish-Greek problems by affecting the promise of the EU and NATO to this effect. In contrast to the Cold War era, during which both Turkey and Greece interpreted their institutional relationships with the European Union as additional glues binding them to the Alliance, as represented mainly by their membership in NATO, in today's conjecture membership in the EU means something radically different from membership in NATO.

For example, while Turkey tried to reconstruct its European identity by actively participating in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and Partnership for Peace initiatives, Greece preferred to prove its 'European-ness' on the basis of active involvement in the European Union's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process.

While Turkey more easily identified its security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean region with those of the Alliance/Americans and saw the western Mediterranean as marginal to its security concerns (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Morali, 2002: 51-62; Bazoglu-Sezer, 1995: 149-172), Greece adopted a more pro-EU profile in determining its security interests in the whole Mediterranean region and tried to act as the agent of the EU in the region (Demestistichas, 1997: 215-227).

The importance of the Americanization of the Alliance in terms of the dynamics of Turkish-Greek relations also became more evident as the character of the interdependency relationship between the US and Turkey changed dramatically. The new period saw that Turkish-American and Greek-American relations mainly revolved around bilateral mechanisms, rather than the institutional platforms of NATO. The more Turkey gained importance within NATO, the more Greece felt estranged. The more Greece integrated with the European Union, the more Turkey felt alienated from the EU. These are all ideational considerations.

In regard to the survival of the Alliance into the 1990s, one could also offer an explanation based on the theoretical prisms of neo-liberal institutionalism and organizational theory. To this logic, the institutional bureaucracy of the Alliance in Brussels argued for the continuation of the Alliance on the ground that the costs of maintaining the Alliance would be far less than the costs of dissolving the Alliance and lay the ground for other alternatives to achieve security in Europe (Mc Calla, 1996: 445-475). In addition to this, as the neo-liberal institutionalists expected, NATO remained to operate as an Alliance in the 1990s because the collective good it offered could not have been reached by the individual attempts of its members. After all, the institutional cooperation within NATO reduced the transaction costs among members; increased the level of transparency; offered credible and reliable

information about members, particularly in regard to their military organizations and capabilities; and facilitated the formation of collective identity on the basis of shared liberal and democratic norms (Wallender, 2000: 705-735).

All in all, the new identity of the Alliance sent mixed signals as for the promise of NATO in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek problems. While the emerging collective security identity of the Alliance at the expense of its collective defence identity and its concentration on the enlargement to the CEECs seem to have led to a decrease in the attention, which the major powers of the Alliance should have shown to Turkish-Greek disputes, the new directions of the Alliance's strategic focus seem to have increased the risks of any inadvertent military clash between these two countries to the materialization of NATO's interests in the Greater Middle Eastern region (Lesser, 2001; Stilides, 2001; Wilkinson, 1999; Norton, 2001).

As NATO turned out to become less cohesive with the inclusion of new members; more political-less military oriented collective security entity; more non-European with the elevation of the Greater Middle Eastern region to the most important area of concern; and more Americanised with the growing influence of the United States in the decision-making mechanisms, its ability to contribute to a Turkish-Greek cooperation based on the transformation of their *realpolitik* security cultures into non-*realpolitik* one decreased.

2.2.2.2. The Turkey-NATO/US Dynamics

The post-Cold War approach of the US towards Turkey made it more difficult for the Americans to actively encourage, and sometimes put pressure on Turkey to accommodate Greek claims over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. The fact that the US' need to Turkey's cooperation tremendously increased in the 1990s eroded the

credibility of the US/NATO to act as a promising actor in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes.

The point is that the degree of possible American pressure on Turkey so as to encourage her to act more flexibly towards Greece in the resolution of the disputed issues dwindled as the bargaining position of Turkey significantly increased in the eyes of the Americans. This was mainly due to the fact that the Americans felt the need to cooperate with Turkey over as much areas as possible in order to materialize their national interests (Makovsky, 2000: 219-265). Just to give an example, it would be enough to have a look at the strategic-military plans of the United States prepared for the contingencies in the Greater Middle East Region during the first decade of the post-Cold War era. The discussions during 2000-2001 concerning the missile defence shield, which the United States wants to build against the possible threats that are likely to come from the rogue states located in the Middle East Region, attests to the importance of Turkey in territorially defined security conceptions in NATO circles (Kibaroglu, 2003).

The continuation of Turkey's strategic relations with the United States on a bilateral level, rather than through NATO, seems to have resulted in the gradual decrease in the credibility of NATO to act as an institutional platform where Turkey and Greece may come closer to each other. The more the 'European' character of NATO was diluted, the less Turkey felt the need to come to terms with Greece through NATO. The more Turkey's membership in NATO was conceived of within the context of the Greater Middle Eastern region, the less leverage the Alliance had on Turkey to negotiate with Greece.

Throughout the 1990s, Turkey increased her efforts to internalize the post-Cold War identity of the Alliance (Karaosmanoglu, 1995). It appears that there are

two main factors that explain Turkey's penchant for internalizing the post-Cold War era identity of the Alliance and adapt the basics of its security and defence policies to those of the Alliance. The first is the neo-realist connection. Even though both the elimination of the Russian threat and Turkey's increasing military capabilities enabled Turkey to deal with the post-Cold War era security challenges and risks in more confidant and efficient ways, Turkey continued to value its link to NATO, for this constituted the best possible way to secure the continuation of the American security guarantee to Turkey's external security (Karaosmoglu, 2000: 199-217). A bilateral US-Turkey security relations, outside the framework of NATO, might in the final analysis have weakened Turkey's bargaining power vis-à-vis the Americans. Despite the fact that the degree of European commitment to Turkey's security within NATO decreased in the 1990s, what mattered for the Turkish security elites was the preservation of American guarantee to Turkey (Karaosmanoglu, 2001: 65-69).

However, even though the membership in NATO remained the main security guarantee for Turkey during the 1990s, the degree of Turkey's dependence on the Alliance, in terms of both conventional and non-conventional threats, decreased. Turkey became more able to cope with these challenges on its own, mainly emanating from its neighbours to the south. When the non-European character of the Alliance combined with Turkey's decreasing need to rely on the Alliance for its own security, the leverage of the Alliance on Turkey dramatically decreased.

The second is the ideational link. Faced with the Europeans' refusal of her membership in the EU and the gradual erosion of the Europeans commitments to Turkey's security, the internalization of NATO's post-Cold war era identity seemed to be the only way for Turkey to register her European/western identity. However, this process only resulted in the increase of Turkey's bargaining power and

significance in the eyes of the Americans rather than the confirmation of Turkey's European identity. The main cause of this was that the post-Cold War era NATO turned out to become 'more-Americanized and less-Europeanized'. As the post-Cold War era developments demonstrated, the image that Turkey was a vital country for the European security was seriously contested. The more Turkey's partners within the Alliance, particularly the western European ones, perceived Turkey's security role in terms of the Greater Middle Eastern region, rather than Europe, the more doubtful Turkey's 'European-ness' turned out to become (Snyder, 1995: 58-63). In parallel to NATO's efforts to engage in Russia, Turkey's suspicions about the European character of the Alliance, and therefore its European security identity, increased. Turkey's suspicions on the Europeans' commitment to Turkey's security became evident during the two Iraqi crises, one in 1990 and the other in 2003. On both occasions, the European members of the Alliance did not adopt Turkey's security perceptions vis-à-vis Northern Iraq and hesitated to assure Turkey that NATO would come to Turkey's help in case Iraq-originated concerns damages Turkey's territorial security.

Looking from this perspective, some of the Turkish elites expressed worries about the enlargement of NATO towards the Central and Eastern European countries given that Russia, the successor of the Soviet Union, was no longer in a position to threaten these countries and that many of these countries have already been stable and secure (Karaosmanoglu, 1999: 213-224; Karaosmanoglu, 1998: 55-64). Furthermore, another Turkish concern was that the enlarged NATO would likely dilute the cohesiveness of the Alliance with the credibility of the Article 5 commitment eroded. In such a NATO Turkey would not feel so secure of American/European commitment to its security (Eralp, 1997). Moreover, the Turkish

public opinion was hesitant to see the Alliance enlarged because they worried that in such a case the democratization/westernization process in Russia might halt with the ascendancy of more nationalist and anti-Western fractions to power. Besides if Russia had felt aggrieved by NATO's enlargement to the central and eastern Europe, then it might have felt emboldened to act in a more *realpolitik* security manner and in a more aggressive mood in Caucasus and regions around Turkey. Such kind of an eventuality would likely damage Turkey's security because Turkey and Russia would likely find themselves in opposing blocks trying to contain each others' power through *realpolitik* security tools. Eventually Turkey adopted a pro-enlargement policy and strongly supported the memberships of the Central and Eastern European States, for the main reason Turkey could find a good opportunity to prove its western identity by contributing to the spreading of NATO's norms to these places.

Paradoxically, as Turkey actively participated in NATO's cooperative security activities in the Balkans and other parts of the world, this did not radically enhance Turkey's European identity but bolstered its image in the eyes of the Americans as a staunch ally. As long as Turkey seems to have remained as a security liability, rather than a security asset for the Europeans and as long as NATO reflected more American and less European concerns, the fact that Turkey strived to prove its western identity by internalizing NATO's post-Cold War era security identity did not help her prove its 'European-ness' in the eyes of the European Union members.

On the agency level Turkey showed willingness to internalize the new identity of the alliance in the post-Cold War era. In addition to providing the alliance with hard military power in risky locations of the world map, Turkey also tried to adapt to the new changing identity of alliance by taking part in many of the NATO-led peacekeeping and peace-making operations in and around Europe and by

redesigning its defence policy in line with the defence reforms in NATO. Turkey proved to be an ardent participant of the Partnership for Peace Program and to this end hosted a PfP education centre in Ankara (Karaosmanoglu and Kibaroglu, 2002: 131-164).

Turkey's bargaining power within NATO increased in the aftermath of the 11 September event. From a flank state Turkey evolved into a front state as NATO turned out to become more non-European with the placement of the war against global terror on top of the agenda of the Alliance. Prague summit is a case in point.

2.2.2.3. Greece's post-Cold War Era Instrumental View of NATO Membership

The incentives on the part of Greece to welcome any NATO or US initiative on the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes today would be less than the Cold War times, for Greece seems to have turned her face to the European Union as the latter offers to her a more credible ticket for the membership in the western international community. Unlike the case that the leverage of the Alliance decreased on Turkey due to the fact that Turkey's bargaining power increased in the eyes of the Americans within the Alliance, the leverage of the Alliance decreased on Greece due to the fact that Greece's bargaining power within the Alliance decreased in the 1990s.

In parallel to the deepening process within the EU, Greece seems to have shared in the belief that the EU should acquire an international actor status in as many areas as possible, most important of all being the areas of foreign and security policy (Tsoumis, 1988: 91-114 and Platias, 2000: 61-86). Today's Greece embraces a more European and less American foreign and security policy outlook in comparison to the Cold War times. The Greek governments of the 1990s saw their links with the EU as the most important security guarantee against external threats,

Turkey ranking the number one among them. The US leverage on Greece's foreign and security policy felt dramatically in the post-Cold War era (Maniatis, 2002: 48-52; Michas, 2002: 94-102).

Evidences to Greece's alignment with the European Union, rather than the United States, were abundant in the 1990s. During the wars in the territories of the former Yugoslavia, both Bosnia and Kosovo, Greece sided with the main European policies, if not embracing a parochial stance (Iatrides, 1999: 265-299; Papacosma, 1999: 47-67; Zahariadis, 1996: 303-327). When the United States brought the issue of 'national missile defence' to the agenda of the transatlantic relations, Greece again sided with her partners within the EU and argued against the rationale of the Americans arguments. Lastly, Greece decided to support Germany and France's points of view during the Iraqi crisis in post-September 11 era. Rather than backing the Americans' rationale on the need to use of war against Saddam's regime, the Greeks synchronised their views with those the Germans and French by arguing for the utilisation of the UN framework to the extent possible (Greek Foreign Ministry homepage).

In conformity with the Cold War era logic, Greece continued to see the Alliance from an instrumental perspective. To this end, the Greek governments of the 1990s generally succeeded in embracing the post-Cold war security identity of the Alliance. Although much Greek effort was invested in the Europeanization processes in the fields of foreign and defence policies, Greece soon came to the conclusion that NATO remained essential both to the security of the continent in general and the country in particular (Moustakis and Sheehan. 2000: 95-115). The reasons for Greece to nevertheless continue to value her membership in NATO can be summarised as follows. First of all, Greece could not succeed in securing a formal territorial

guarantee from the members of the EU and the WEU vis-à-vis her relations with Turkey (Valinkis, 1002: 52-68; Valinakis, 1993: 99-113). Neither the European Union nor the Western European Union became collective defence organizations of the NATO kind. However, this should not mean that NATO offers a security guarantee towards the territorial integrity of Greece in case of a war between Greece and Turkey. The attempts of the Greek government at securing such a guarantee from the United States seemed to have yielded positive results in 1990 when Greece was negotiating a new Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement with the United States. The inclusion of such words as to offer an implicit and covert US guarantee to Greece's territories was harshly criticised by Turkey and in the end the US government had to announce that the meaning of those words did not imply whatever Turkey seemed to have understood.

Nevertheless, membership in NATO is valued for the single reason that Turkey would have to think twice before formulating her policy stance towards Greece if the latter is firmly anchored in the western security structures, of which NATO is the most important one. In addition to membership in the EU and WEU, Greece's membership in NATO was thought of contributing to Greece's soft power vis-à-vis Turkey. A Greece, that is a staunch NATO ally and wields instruments to influence American policies towards the Eastern Mediterranean Region in general and Turkey in particular, would be able to check Turkey's power within the Alliance. The concern that the Americans respect the military balance in the region and do not contribute to Turkey's armament in such a way that might unbalance the military equality between Greece and Turkey seems to have shaped the Greek rationale towards NATO. It is the common thinking in Greece that only NATO has been able to keep the military balance in the Aegean Sea, at least by the time the European

Union evolves into a collective defence organization protecting the common boundaries of the Union against third parties (Dakos, 2001: 81-99).

It has been a significant component of Greece's post-Helsinki strategy towards Turkey that Greece relies on its NATO membership and the preservation of the balance of power in the Aegean Sea in her efforts to prevent Turkey from undertaking any fait accompli either in the Sea or in Cyprus. The fear is that if Greece did not counter-balance Turkey through such means, Turkey might abuse Greece's cooperative approach towards Turkey within the framework of the European Union's accession process. The way to prevent Turkey from interpreting Greece's cooperative gestures along the EU accession process as evidences of Greece's weakness, the Greek security and policy making elites continued to value Greece's links to Alliance (Couloumbis and Ifantis. 2002: 1-25).

Secondly, Greece could not see the EU and WEU developing successful military capabilities and acting as collective defence organizations with clear boundaries to defend. The possibility that the European Union might decide to remain neutral in case of a war between Greece and Turkey might turn out to be a reality as the negotiations continue between Turkey and the European Union in regard to the use of NATO's assets by the EU in only EU-led military operations (Please see the section on ESDP in the EU-Turkey-Greece triangle in chapter 3).

The Cold War came to an end for Greece in 1996 when Simitis came to power in Athens and set into motion a new foreign policy aimed at regaining lost power and prestige. The new government approached to the United States from a more rationalistic perspective in the hope that Greece, the only EU and NATO member in the Balkans, would be in a much better position vis-à-vis Turkey if she did not derail from the Alliance to greater extents. Free from the ideological constraints of the Cold

War era, the Greek decision-makers seem now to be able to construct more balanced relationships with the United States within NATO, and therefore to constrain Turkey's influence within the Alliance and the Eastern Mediterranean region. Based on this reasoning Greece took part in nearly all of the peacekeeping activities of the alliance in the periphery of Europe and elsewhere (Mathiopoulos, 2002: 297-304).

A significant development in this regard is that Greece vociferously argued for the transformation of the Alliance into a collective security organization in the post-Cold War era. It seems that there is a positive relationship between Greece's efforts in this regard and the degree of Turkey's characterisation of Greece's main external threat. The more Turkey remained Greece's main security threat, the more Greece advocated the transformation of the Alliance into a collective security organization. Given that the probability of Turkey being cast as a threat to Greece's security is all time low due to Turkey's membership in 'NATO the collective defence organization' and that such a NATO would have no internal mechanisms to resolve intra-alliance territorial disputes, Greece could not benefit from this NATO against Turkey. However, in a NATO, which is re-structured as a collective security organization, membership would not imply that a member state could never be labelled a future security threat. Not based on a clear-cut insiders/outsiders framework, a current member of 'NATO the collective security organization' can be categorically viewed as security threat in future if the majority of the members think as such (Papacosma, 1999: 47-67).

2.2.3. Examples to NATO's Positive Role in Turkish-Greek Cooperation

The highest level of cooperation between Turkey and Greece through NATO could include the realization of a limited-transparent security regime in the Aegean,

composed of arms-race stability and crisis stability (Tsakonas and Dokos, 1999). However, in terms of the achievement of a comprehensive and everlasting security regime between the two, the promise of the European Union would be higher than that of the Alliance, since their Europeanization policies would foresee a radical transformation process leading them to share the basics of the EU's collective identity. More than the Alliance, it is the EU framework that would possibly lead them to share a common identity.

Even though the Alliance could not help Greece and Turkey develop a collective identity and resolve their disputes in a problem-solving win-win framework, it nevertheless played some positive role in the evolutionary process of the bilateral relations in the 1990s. This NATO contribution most of the time occurred in times of crisis in and around the Aegean Sea. Besides, these two countries could agree to some confidence building and tension reduction measures through the intermediary roles of high level US or NATO figures (for a complete list of such occurrences one could visit the web pages of Turkish and Greek Ministries of Foreign Affairs).

When Secretary General Solona offered his good offices for mediation in 1996 in the aftermath of the Kardak crisis in January of the same year, Greece rejected his participation, as it would imply there was even something to negotiate. Turkey and Greece accepted the NATO-proposed confidence building measures in July 1997 on the margins of NATO's Madrid Summit. They agreed on a convergence of views regarding outstanding differences in the Aegean Sea. In effect, Greece acknowledged Turkey's interest in preserving international access through the Aegean, as well as the right of navigational freedom in the international airspace.

Turkey acknowledged the inviolability of Greece's borders, and the need to refrain from the threat and use of force.

NATO's role in the dissipation of crises took place during the Imia/Kardak crisis. Had they not cared about their requirements within the Alliance and had they not developed crisis-control regimes in the Aegean Sea over the last three decades, they might have easily fought each other. The latest Kardak/Imia crisis attests to the fact that an embryonic crisis-control regime is in the offing in the Aegean Sea. Neither of them mobilized their air forces but on the contrary made operational their navies, which are slow and easy to control (Karaosmanoglu and Kibaroglu, 2002: 141). If one combines this crisis-control capability of both actors with the American determination to do whatever necessary to prevent them from fighting, then one could explain the reasons for no-war in and around the Aegean Sea (Hickok, Michael Robert. 1998: 118-136).

In December 1997, Greece and Turkey agreed to the establishment of a NATO sub-regional command with headquarters in both countries. Greek and Turkish military officers now serve together, under each other's command. This was an important step towards enhancing NATO operational planning and eliminating jurisdictional air control disputes in the Aegean for NATO purposes (Faith, 1999: 273-292). In the summer of 1998 both countries agreed to revitalise the Confidence Building Measures, to which they had initially agreed in 1988. In this process, the role of the then NATO's Secretary General Solana was immense.

In September 1998, Greece and Turkey, along with Italy, established the Balkans rapid deployment task force known as the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG), to be used for peacekeeping operations in the region, as well as for potential deployment in nearby areas such as the Black Sea, in the vent of a crisis.

During the NATO war against Yugoslavia in spring 1999, the Greek and Turkish militaries cooperated regularly, especially to deliver supplies, reinforcements, and humanitarian assistance to the frontlines In Macedonia and Albania near the Kosovo border (Kay, 1998).

Following in the footsteps of these historic developments, both countries joined a NATO exercise in the Aegean together first in the last two decades. While Turkish fighters landed on a Greek island during the Dynamic Mix exercise of the Alliance in May 2000, a group of Greek fighters landed on Turkish soil in October 2000 during the Destined Glory exercise of the Alliance (Fiorenza, 2000: 66-69).

Although Greece withdrawn from the Destined Glory exercise in response to Turkish accusations that the use of the air corridors above the Islands of Lemnos and Ikaria by the Greek fighters were in breach of the NATO's plans, the fact that Turkish and Greek soldiers participated in a NATO exercise together after a long time period was something conducive to the regional peace and stability.

Even though a substantial number of Greek MPs vacillated to ratify the latest Greek-Turkish agreements in the aftermath of the latest recriminations over the Destined Glory Exercise, the Greek Parliament did eventually ratified those agreements. In this way, the Greek MPs denuded the sceptics of Turkish-Greek reconciliation in both countries of the chance to be proud of their predictions that the latest reconciliation process would not last long.

CHAPTER 3: The European Union-Turkey-Greece Triangle

3.1. The Cold War Era

The impact of the European Union on the outcome of Turkish-Greek relations was marginal during the Cold War era. The institutional and security identity of the EU was not so much independent of the identity of the western security community as represented by NATO. The facts that the EU's security culture vis-a-vis the outside world envisaged the *Realpolitik* strategies of containment as well practiced by NATO; that both Turkey and Greece were thought of being parts of this western security community defined in terms of common external threats; that the European Union members did not see Greece as a true European country and therefore they did not hesitate to instrumentally use Greece as a bargaining tool in their relations with Turkey; and that the EU's enlargement strategy did not foresee the transformation of outside states along liberal-democratic norms have all contributed to the perpetuation of Turkish-Greek bilateral relations in a conflictual manner based on *realpolitik* security understandings.

Since the onset of the Cold War era until the end of the 1980s, the European Union was not used to possess a significant role in the evolutionary process of the Turkish-Greek relations. On the one hand the international/security identity of the European Union did not necessitate a concerted EU attempt at the resolution of the Cyprus and the Aegean Sea disputes. The continuation of these maritime border disputes between Greece and Turkey did not level fundamental threats to the EU's Cold war era international/security identity. On the other, both Turkey and Greece tended to view their links to the EU from mainly an economic and inter-governmental perspective. Membership in the EU in itself did not constitute a fundamental goal for both states to demonstrate their western/European identities.

This was already been achieved through NATO. In addition to these, Turkey's security culture was to a great extent compatible with that of the European Union. Despite Greece's sporadic efforts in making use of its EU membership against Turkey, these years were mainly non-problematic as far as the quality of triangular EU-Turkey-Greece relationships is concerned. The role of the EU in contributing to the estrangement of Greece and Turkey from each other on the basis of their European identity was not significant in this era mainly because the community-building practices of the EU were not visible. On the contrary the compatibility of Turkey's security culture with that of the European Union prevented Greece and Turkey from diverging from each other and adopting conflictul relations in their regions.

The cementing factors that used to unite the EU members were their common interests in resisting the communist Soviet threat in the East and in creating a security community in the western part of the continent along the principles of capitalist market economy and liberal democracy (Deighton, 2002: 719-741). During this era, the level of integration among the EC members did not develop in such a way so as to encompass political and identity-related issues. Therefore issues of democratization, human rights and peaceful neighbourly relations did not constitute benchmarks in the EU's attitude towards outside states. Moreover, the community-building functions of the EU were not so significant so as to create clear-cut divisions between the EU members and outside states. The boundaries of the western international community were drawn by NATO, not the EU. The facts that the EU was somehow regarded as the economic component of the western European international community and that the lead of NATO as the main representative of the western international community in Europe was undisputed, the EU's attitude

towards Turkey remained cooperative and non-critical. The Turkish-Greek relations evolved in a less problematic way in this era due to the fact that Turkey was regarded as a European country.

Construed as such Turkey was regarded as a natural part of the western international community, of which the EU was one of its two constituent components, together with NATO. Turkey's equal standing with the EU members within NATO against the common enemy in the East led the Europeans to view Turkey as a 'security asset/provider'. As long as Turkey held a very significant geo-strategic position and prevented the Soviets from threatening Europe from the East and North by blocking the Soviet passage to the Mediterranean and tying down numerous Soviet divisions, Europeans did not argue against Turkey's inclusion in Europe of the Cold War era and tolerated her exceptionalism and differences (Aybet and Muftuler-Bac, 2000: 567-582). The Europeans did not question Turkey's 'European-ness' even though Turkey derailed from the democracy track many times during the Cold War years. The logic of security cooperation overwhelmed the logic of democratic peace (Dagi, 2001: 51-68). 'Democratization' did not constitute one of the indispensable elements of the whole 'Europeanization' process during much of the Cold war era. Neither the European powers asked Turkey to democratize more, nor Turkey displayed any further desire to move her Europeanization efforts beyond the realm of 'hard-security cooperation with the European powers'.

It seemed that the main logic behind the EU's attempts at constructing institutional mechanisms to anchor Turkey to the West was to make sure that strategic cooperation with Turkey would continue. This strategic mentality prevented the EU from embracing a holistic approach towards Turkey aimed at the transformation of Turkey's political, economic and social features into the model of

the EU countries. It was again the existence of such a mentality that prevented Europe from antagonising Turkey over Cyprus and other bilateral Turkish-Greek disputes. The aim was not to pave the way for Turkey's eventual accession to the EU/EC. The upper limit of Turkey's Europeanization was assumed to refer to the continuation of Turkey-EU strategic relations. When this was the case, the EU tolerated the lingering of the Turkish-Greek disputes, since this did not seriously hamper the EU's strategic relations with Turkey, as well as the EU's international identity. The costs of being committed to Turkey's accession to the EU through the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes would have been higher than the costs of maintaining strategic relationship with Turkey, even though the problematic Turkish-Greek disputes had at times appeared to have sabotaged EU-Turkey relations. The costs of maintaining Turkey's strategic relations with the EU appeared to be less than the costs of involvement in the resolution of Turkish-Greek problems.

Turkey's European character was made easier because of the 'ideological geopolitics' of the period under consideration (Agnew, 1998). The continuation of Turkish-Greek territorial disputes was not considered as obstacles to Turkey's strategic cooperation with the European Union. The European Union members, rather than constructing a distinctive and detailed approach towards the resolution of the Cyprus and the Aegean disputes, preferred to streamline their views with those of the United Nations and the US-led NATO (Ugur, 1999: 161-198). During the Cold War era, the solution process of the Cyprus dispute used to operate within the framework of the United Nations. The EU's accession process did not influence the main parameters of the settlement.

When the non-conformist, nationalist and purely inter-governmental Greek approach towards the EU's integration process combined with the

international/security identity of the EU, the latter did not fully adopt pro-Greek views on the Turkish-Greek disputes. For the sake of managing relations with Turkey, Greece was regarded as a state over which concession might be given to Turkey as part of general EU-Turkey relations. Exaggerated as it may seem to some extent, if the 1974 Cyprus crisis had not taken place, Greece might not have been granted accession to the EU. It is the dynamics of Turkey-EU relations that seemed to characterize the tone of EU-Greek relations, at least for the first ten-to-fifteen years following the Greek membership. Greece's strategic concerns vis-a-vis Turkey have been easily sidestepped for the sake of keeping Turkey on the EU track. For example, when the EU agreed to Greece's accession to the EU, it assured Turkey that bilateral Turkish-Greek disputes would not affect the tone of EU-Turkey relations. The EU did also ask Greece not to bring her disputes with Turkey on the EU-Turkey agenda. Furthermore, the EU Council of Ministers recommended the Greek government that it engages in a negotiation process with Turkey before she acceded to the EU. That is why Turkey and Greece undertook a negotiation process since 1976 till 1981 (Tsalicoglou, 1995: 29-61).

The facts that many high level EU authorities asked Turkey to lodge its own application with the EU alongside Greece and that some of them thought that a possible rejection of Greece's application would have been much easier had it been evaluated together with Turkey's application, demonstrate that there was not an ideational commitment on the part of the EU to admit Greece as a member. If the French government of the time had not acted as a patron and ardent supporter of Greece's membership, Greece might not have been let in the Club.

Rather than becoming a credible magnet for Greece, the EU did deny Greece of all her demands for security guarantees. The important point in this regard is that

as long as Greece's partners within the EU saw Greece as a country, located in the zone of conflict, they denied functioning as a credible security magnet for Greece. The EU politicians have been aware of the fact that because the Europeanization of the Turkish-Greek disputes would cost the EU a lot in its relations with Turkey, they did not want to extend a formal security guarantee towards Greece when the latter demanded this (Legg and Roberts, 1997: 55-71).

However, the EU's treatment of Greece as 'a spoiler and awkward' country seems to have contributed to a decrease in the incentives on the part of Turkey to try to understand Greece. Believing that the EU could not easily put its relations with Turkey into jeopardy, especially because of the dynamics of the Turkish-Greek disputes, the Turkish elite might have come to a conclusion that there was no need to accommodate Greece over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. If Turkey had believed that Greece was a true European Union member, with no difference from the others and whose veto power over its membership in the Union would play no less a role than those of the other EU members, than she might have felt the necessity to come to terms with Greece easily (Guvenc, 2000: 102-129; Onis, 2001: 31-47). The thinking that Greece's membership in the EU would not affect the main dynamics of Turkey-EU relations was so evident in the late 1970s when the Turkish Prime Minister of the time, Bulent Ecevit, did not heed to the warnings of the Turkish ambassador in Brussels, Tevfik Saracoglu that Greece's possible entry to the EU would likely create problems in Turkey's relations with the EU (Kabaalioglu, 2001: 1-16). Turkey was so confident of its geo-political and geo-strategic value in the eyes of the Europeans that she had never imagined that the Europeans would have dared to antagonize Turkey over the bilateral Turkish-Greek disputes.

Even though, the EU followed the lead of NATO/US in valuing Turkey over Greece, the general EU attitude towards these two countries was based on the idea of 'equal distance'. When this combined with the EU's failure to develop a truly distinctive international/security actor-ness independent of NATO and when the limits of the geo-political interests of the EU members of the Alliance were confined to the western Europe, the way the EU used to treat Turkey and Greece did not play a significant role in regard to the dynamics of Turkish-Greek relations. This situation radically changed in the 1990s due to the factors that will be explained in the next chapter. The institution that contributed to the perpetuation of 'rivalry' between Greece and Turkey during the Cold War era was NATO.

During much of the Cold War era, the European Union acted towards third countries on the basis of economic and security rationality. The ideational concerns or norm-governed EU actions were not observable in the EU's enlargement during the Cold War era. The EU had mainly acted as an inter-governmental organization by emphasising the economic interests of the existing members in regard to relations with third countries. Such kind of an approach curtailed the promise of the EU to contribute to cooperative and peaceful neighbourly relationship between countries lying on the peripheries of the continent. Because Turkey's membership would most likely serve as a huge drain on the EU's sources rather than as a net benefit to the EU's aggregate wealth and because Turkey's membership in NATO had already satisfied the EU's Cold War era security concerns, the EU had never felt so committed to Turkey's accession that it would have felt willing to undertake all the costs of Turkey's accession process. Thought of this way, the socializing capacity of the EU was marred from the beginning when the EU did not feel any reason to offer

credible incentives to Turkey to transform itself into EU's non-*realpolitik* security norms.

The main reason why Turkey did not interpret the EU's limited involvement in the Cyprus dispute as threatening during the Cold War era lies in the fact that Turkey's security culture/identity was mainly compatible with that of the EU. Or to put it other way, when the EU and Turkey viewed each other as 'security providers/assets', the EU's partial and ineffective involvement in the Turkish-Greek disputes did not seem threatening in Ankara. Below is a succinct account of the historical background of this compatibility.

The Republican elites largely held to the idea that the overall security of their new state would be guaranteed only if the Europeans recognized the Turks as Europeans (Aydın, 2003: 163-184; Karaosmanoğlu, 2000: 199-217). In other words, the more the Europeans recognized Turkey as 'European,' the more 'secure' Turkey would feel. And the more the Europeans saw Turkey as vital to European 'security,' the more the Turks thought of Turkey as 'European.' So, to the Turkish elite, as long as Europe and Turkey saw each other as 'security providers,' Turkey's 'European-ness' would be uncontested. As a contributor to European security and peace, the Turkish elite could legitimately claim that Turkey was a 'European' country and its security would be assured.

To be more concise, the ultimate goal of the founding fathers of the Republic was to ensure that the new state would live in security with the possibility of confronting the European states as enemies eliminated. The conviction that the geo-strategic and geo-political assets of the country were the main factors defining Turkey's 'European-ness' was so helpful for the state elite both in legitimising their

rule inside the country and in pursuing relations with the EU on the basis of 'strategic negotiations', an insincere Europeanization.

That logic suited the Turkey of the early 1920s when what mattered to the Turkish elite was successful nation-building along the 19th century positivist credentials of European nationalism. A strong state authority endowed with draconian instruments to keep it that way was deemed essential for this project, the main purpose of which was to root out the factors that had led to the demise of the Ottoman Empire, namely an Islamic social structure and a multi-ethnic society. The primary goals of the Republican elite - a homogeneous secular nation within a unitary state - were in close harmony with the prevailing European norms of the time. From this perspective, the 'Europeanization' attempts of the Turkish elites were mainly instrumental in nature; they were, after all, modelled on the European nation-states of the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Hale, 2000: 44-77; Karaosmanoğlu, 1993: 19-34).

The well-established state elites were also aware that if they really wanted their project to come to fruition they would have to maintain peaceful relations with the European powers of the time. For the founding fathers of the Republic, an ideal security relationship between Turkey and the European powers would be built on the following principles: non-interference in the domestic affairs of each other; respect for the territorial integrity and normative cultural backgrounds of each other; non-participation in rival camps; common alliances in the face of common threats; military preparedness for future contingencies; and, finally, Turkey, as the weaker entity, would oversee and help preserve European strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean (Oğuzlu, 2003: 285-299).

Turkey's membership in NATO and many other European international institutions in the early 1950s was a direct result of this thinking. Even though the goal of westernisation stood as an ideational factor in the background, the decision to join the Atlantic Alliance and to establish an associate membership with the then European Economic Community was mainly of strategic in nature. Though the Turkish elites knew that the process of Europeanization would have two main dimensions - a domestic reform process aimed at internalizing the constitutive norms of the European international society and following a Europe-friendly foreign policy by participating in the European state system - they preferred to give primacy to the second one because this was the cheapest and the most cost-efficient way of having the European identity of the country recognized by the Europeans (Karaosmanoglu, 2002).

The prevailing view in Turkey was that the European Economic Community was not radically different from the old European state system that embodied the Westphalian logic of balance-of-power politics. In this sense both the EU and Turkey held similar *Realpolitik* security understandings, particularly vis-à-vis the external world. Thought of this way, there was a similarity between the main security referents of the European members of the Alliance and those of Turkey. Both regarded their territorially defined nation-states as the main security referents. When this combined with the prevailing of military understanding of security of the time period under consideration, the Turks believed that the European powers would not antagonize such a Turkey that follows Europe-friendly foreign policies and is a strategic partner of the Europeans against common threats. It is due to this particular reading of Europe that the Turkish elite tended to put all the blame on Greece, rather

than the EU itself, when the latter had at times hinted that Turkey would need to solve her territorial disputes with Greece before joining the EU.

However, when the European Union members accelerated the process of integration in the second half of the 1980s, democratization and human rights concerns gradually replaced the sheer strategic-security concerns in the EU's attitudes towards third parties. The evolution of the EU's identity into more political forms has made its impact on the accession processes of the three Mediterranean countries to the EU, namely Greece, Spain and Portugal. Turkey was unable to detect these changes in the EU's identity and continued to see its 'Europeanization' process operating on economic and security levels. An accession strategy based on more trade relations with the EU countries, Turkey's adoption of the EU's trade regulations and Turkey's hard-core security cooperation with the EU members was assumed to eliminate the major obstacles before Turkey's journey to Brussels. Turkey has never shown the same level of commitment towards the EU as the many Central and Eastern European countries did in the 1990s. The idea that membership in the EU might necessitate an increased Turkish effort to come to a settlement with Greece over the Cyprus and Aegean Sea disputes has never become popular among the traditional Turkish elites.

Following Turkey's application for EU membership in 1987, the linkages between the 'Europeanisation' and 'democratization' processes became more apparent. As the former has begun to include the latter, Turkey's Europeanization process has entered into tumultuous phases in the 1990s, making Turkey's Europe-oriented foreign policy tradition a more difficult option to stick with.

3.1.1. Greece's Approach towards the European Union: A Bone in the Throat

Even though its impact on the quality of EU-Turkey relations started to take place in the 1990s, it is important to note that Greece's Cold War era logic towards the European Union contributed to Turkey's misgivings on the credibility of EU's role in the resolution of Turkish-Greek territorial disputes, in a non-*realpolitik* manner.

Since the foundation of the State in the early years of the 19th century, the Greek foreign policy aimed at enlargement of the Greek territories at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and the Greek security culture led the Greek politicians to view the European powers as possible allies, or external security guaranties, vis-à-vis their relations with Turkey (Goldstein, 1998: 154-169). This offensive *realpolitik* culture continued until the defeat of the Greek army in Asia Minor in the early 1920s. Since then, a kind of defensive *realpolitik* security behaviour could be noticed in foreign and security policy behaviour of Greece (Veremis, 1984: 1-40) This defensiveness has been overemphasised by the Greeks particularly in the aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus crisis. The general conviction in the Greece of pre-1974 period was that the alliance link with the United States through NATO would have been the main external balancer in Turkish-Greek relations. Whenever Turkey might have pursued anti-Greek policies and whenever she might have tried to alter the regional balance of power in her favour, the Alliance would intervene and prevent Turkey from realising her aims. This is in fact what happened during the 1964 and 1967 Cyprus crises (Veremis, 1988: 236-286).

As of 1974, Greece's attempts at forging institutional links with the organizations of the western international community, particularly the EU, could be interpreted as ramifications of the above-mentioned alliance behaviour as foreseen by neo-realism: balancing the Turkish threat in the East through the alliance

relationship with the EU. The successive Greek governments viewed the EU as a 'protector power' against Turkey, both in hard and soft terms (Ioakimidis, 1999: 169-191). The main reason for Greece to view the EU as such is that Greece's well-established security culture shaped Greece's conceptualization of the major European powers as sort of 'patrons' (Kourvetaris, 1999: 391-402). The way the Greek State was established in the 19th century and then the way how Greece could set into motion its well-known 'Megali Idea' policy against the Ottoman Empire determined Greece's post-1974 perception of the EU. An evidence of this kind of Greek view of the EU could be found in Greece's advocacy of the EU's integration process in the areas of defence and security. Greece wanted to see the European Union to evolve into a kind of collective defence organization like NATO that would guarantee the external borders of the member states against all external territorial threats (Stivachtis, 2002: 35-53).

Since Greece joined the EU in 1981 untill the second half of the 1990s, the majority of the Greek political parties converged on the foreign policy goal of Turkey's exclusion from the EU's orbit and the confirmation of Turkey's non-European character by Greece's partners within the EU (Tsakonas, 2001: 145-159). Such an exclusionary Greek approach towards Turkey was mainly made possible in such an atmosphere where the majority of the EU members were against Turkey's candidacy, not to mention its full membership. This negative EU attitude towards Turkey's membership and European character lent legitimacy to Greek efforts in manipulating the non-resolution of the Aegean and Cyprus disputes as obstacles on Turkey's way to Brussels.

Even though Greece's role had not been so strong as to mould the content of the EU's Cyprus policy, she was instrumental in leading the EU to have an interest in

Cyprus. Greece's membership certainly led to a more active EU policy towards Cyprus, as various EU organs began to discuss the issue. Stemming from the high-political character of the Cyprus dispute, Greece could have resorted to its veto power on other issues if her EU partners had not adopted pro-Greek stances on the Cyprus issue (Georgiadis, 2000: 421-430; Stephanou and Tsardines, 1991: 207-231).

As will be clarified later on, against such an anti-Turkish profile of Greek foreign policy, it gradually become more difficult for Turkish politicians to believe that Greece really changed its perception of Turkey and started to act on the basis of a new cooperative logic since 1996/1999. The legacy of the first two decades of the Greek membership in the EU has not been so easy to put aside.

Looking at the foreign policy behaviour of Greece towards Turkey and the European Union, one can notice a strong parallel between the two. As long as Greece was not so willingly committed to the integration process with the EU (Tsakolyannis, 1996:186-207), she appeared to have formulated anti-Turkish foreign policies aiming at Turkey's exclusion from Europe. Paradoxically, the longer it took for Greece to Europeanize and to adopt more federalist and supranational logic towards the EU's integration process, the less support she could secure from her partners within the EU against Turkey (Mitsos, 2000: 53-89).

All in all, Greece's efforts to make Turkey-EU relations more problematic by highlighting Turkey's non-'European-ness' in the eyes of the EU members did not strike a sympathetic chord among its partners, for the EU itself has not started to emphasise Turkey's non-European character yet. When Turkey was being considered a part of the western international community, where the EU used to follow the lead of NATO, Greece's attempts at damaging Turkey's relations with the EU were not seen legitimate and justified by her partners. When Turkey's Europe friendly foreign

and security policy orientation combined with Greece's US/Europe-sceptic external attitudes, the overall impact of Greece remained so marginal as to affect the main dynamics of Turkey-EU relations.

In sum the promise of the European Union to contribute to cooperative Turkish-Greek relations was low during the Cold War era despite Turkey's inclusion in the Cold War era western international community. The fact that Turkey and the EU had a positive image of each other as their 'security providers' did only limit the success of the Greek efforts to utilise the EU mechanisms against Turkey. In general, the facts that the EU was not an independent security actor of NATO; that the geo-political interests of the EU members were mainly confined to the western Europe; that Turkey and Greece did not view the EU from an ideational perspective; that Greece did mainly perceive its links with the EU from an instrumental perspective vis-à-vis its security relations with Turkey; that the EU's role in the drawing of the boundaries of the western international community was marginal and lagged behind that of NATO all contributed to the low promise of the EU's role in the Turkish-Greek relations.

3.2. The Post-Cold War Era

The characteristic feature of the post-Cold War era in the institutional relationship between Turkey and Greece through the EU and NATO has been that the EU has replaced NATO as the prime international institution of the western international community likely to affect the dynamics of bilateral Turkish-Greek relations. Due to a number of factors NATO lost its Cold War era importance in the bilateral relations and the EU replaced NATO in this regard. However the positive role of the EU in the

overall Turkish-Greek cooperative interaction process did not parallel the degree of EU's involvement in these relations.

The possible role of the European Union to act as a credible actor in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes decreased in the 1990s despite the growing need on the part of the EU to involve in the Cyprus and the Aegean Sea disputes. Neither Greece ceased to view its relationship with the EU as an alliance relationship against Turkey, nor Turkey internalized the idea that its EU accession process constituted a legitimate ground for the resolution of its disputes with Greece. They did not cooperate on the margins of the European Union. This dissertation argues that this can be explained by the following factors: First, the credibility of the EU decreased in the Turkish eyes due to the deterioration of EU-Turkey security relations, which has eventually made Turkey's admission to the EU a difficult exercise. The decades-long 'security provider' images gradually gave way to 'security burden' images. The need and the legitimacy of Turkey's accession to the EU decreased on the EU side. The EU's so-called power of attraction did not produce cooperative outcomes on the part of Turkey towards Greece when the EU's post-Cold War era approach towards Turkey remained ambiguous, to say the least (Grabbe, 2003). Thought of this way, the confirmation of Turkey's EU membership candidacy in December 1999 did not fundamentally change the dynamics of Turkish-Greek relations because the EU seems to have acted on an instrumental logic towards Turkey. The EU's approach towards Turkey did not lead Turkey to view Greece from a non-*realpolitik* perspective.

Second, Turkey's approach towards the EU turned out to become more critical. The security elites gradually interpreted the EU's demands of membership as threatening the mainstays of the Turkish elites' decades-long security understanding.

Turkish security elites found it difficult to adopt the EU's security norms, for they thought the EU's norms were incompatible with Turkey's norms. This did negatively affect their willingness to socialize EU's norms. Third, the European Union did increasingly adopt a pro-Greek/Greek Cypriot view on the evolutionary process of Turkish-Greek disputes. This was made easier by Greece's efforts in further Europeanization since the second half of the 1990s. Fourth, Greece's well-established instrumental/*realpolitik* approach towards the EU and Turkey continued to operate over the last decade and that Greece's new openings since 1999 have not proved promising enough for any radical change on this approach.

In the face of degrading Turkey-EU relations, Greece could more easily follow exclusionary anti-Turkey policies. Her efforts to legitimize her European identity became more sustainable when the EU seriously challenged Turkey's European identity. The facts that the EU generally viewed Greece from an instrumental perspective as bargaining tool in its relations with Turkey; that the EU's own view of Turkey did not go beyond the EU's attempts at constructively managing relations with Turkey; that the legacy of Greece's *realpolitik* security culture all contributed to Greece's *realpolitik* approach towards Turkey. Unless the European Union viewed Greece as a true European country, rather than as a bargaining tool in its relations with Turkey, Greece did not even cooperate with her partners within the EU in the pursuit of EU's constructively managed deliberate ambiguity policy vis-à-vis Turkey. Before critically analysing the factors that made the EU as a non-credible actor in this process, one should first of all mention the reasons why the European Union increasingly became involved in the Turkish-Greek disputes and why the EU's involvement did radically affect the quality and tone of bilateral relations.

3.2.1. The Reasons for the EU's Active Engagement with the Turkish-Greek Disputes

First, the European efforts to reconstruct the EU's post-Cold War identity on the basis of the promotion of the EU's own security model to the conflict-laden places around the peripheries of the continent are important in this regard (Richmond, 2000: 41-67). Cyprus has stood out the best case for the European Union to prove that its own security model could eventually lead to an everlasting peace in conflict-riven places. It would be a great success story for the EU's enlargement process if the Union could deliver a credible peace to the conflict-fatigued communities of the island. The EU's tarnished image as a conflict resolution actor might have been remedied after its failures in Yugoslavia.

A related factor is that the post-modern and security community character of the EU would necessitate the resolution of border problems among candidates or between candidates and member states. It would have been an irrational action on the part of the EU to import such border disputes as Turkey and Greece have been experiencing in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus before their settlement (Tank, 1998: 161-183).

Second, the evaporation of the Cold War constraints made it possible for the EU to take a more active international profile in regard to the Turkish-Greek disputes. When the applications of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus combined with the loosening of the Cold War constraints, the EU could more easily deal with the Cyprus dispute. The need not to antagonize Turkey lost its currency when Turkey's geo-political and geo-strategic value began to be defined in more non-European ways (Bilgin, 2002).

The third reason why the EU became more active in the 1990s relates to Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus's aspirations to further integrate with the EU. Had the EU continued to act as a bystander, both the EU's constructively managed deliberate ambiguity policy towards Turkey might have been negatively affected and the EU's enlargement and deepening process might have been sabotaged by the uncompromising Turkish and Greek policies (Brewin, 2000: 21-34).

Finally, Greece's attempts at Europeanising the dynamics of Turkish-Greek relations along the opportunities opened by Turkey's accession process should not be forgotten. If Greece had not wanted to get the EU to establish a link between Turkey's EU membership and Turkey's policies on Cyprus, then the EU might not have elevated the Turkish-Greek disputes to such a significant status as it is today (Featherstone, 2001: 141-162; Zambouras, 1999: 114-127).

In regard to the reason why the EU's involvement fundamentally altered the dynamics of Turkish-Greek relations, and contributed to the perpetuation of *realpolitik* security understandings in the region, one can argue that this has been so because of the changing character of the European Union in the 1990s. In contrast to the Cold War era, the EU of the post-Cold War era more increasingly acted as a community building institution. Over the last decade the policies of the European Union, particularly with respects to the enlargement process, defined the ideational boundaries of the 'European-ness'. Who would be regarded as European or not became to be linked to the way the EU engaged with outside states. Depending on the quality of the institutional relationship between the EU and an aspirant country, some countries were seen as more 'European' than others. The EU became the main European international institution determining the limits and terms of membership in the European international society (Diez and Whitman, 2001: 43-67). The

community building functions of the EU contributed to Turkey and Greece's estrangement from each other.

This is important because the behaviours of the members of the EU-based European international society towards each other would somehow be different from their behaviours towards outside states that are labelled as non-European. Just as many of the CEECs tried to justify their European identities by referring to the non-'European-ness' of the countries lying in their further east (Moiso, 2003: 89-116), some of the current EU members also tried to legitimize their European identities by differentiating themselves from the countries that the EU gradually excluded from the accession process. The density of this representational interaction process would become more between a current member of the EU, whose own European identity is already disputed by a great number of circles in Europe, and an outside non-European country. The only strategy to be left for the former to prove its own European identity would be to do everything possible to contribute to the non-'European-ness' of the latter.

This was exactly the logic behind Greece's exclusionary attitudes towards Turkey and her claim to EU membership. Under such conditions it would have been futile to expect that Turkey and Greece could have developed a collective identity between each other along Turkey's EU accession process, which would in turn have engendered the resolution of their territorial disputes in problem-solving win-win framework.

3.2.2. Turkey's Gradual Exclusion from the EU Membership due to Diverging Security Identities/Cultures of the Parties

In order to understand the fluctuations in the promise of the EU in contributing to the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes, through the transformation of *realpolitik* security cultures in the region into non-*realpolitik* ones, one should certainly have a closer look both at the EU's changing international/security identity and its impact on the EU's enlargement process in general and Turkey in particular. Without getting into the roots of the EU's post-Cold war security identity, one would not be able to grasp the logic of EU's enlargement process and the terms of the accession criteria that the EU required candidate countries to fulfil. It is the contention of this dissertation that the main reason why the European Union did not actively contribute to Turkey's socialization into EU's security norms is that the EU members did gradually find the idea of Turkey's inclusion in the Union as incompatible with their own security cultures. Therefore, they did neither try to teach their norms to Turkey nor persuade the latter to the legitimacy of the EU's norms; the only thing they did was to grade Turkey's performance whether the latter could adopt the EU's norms on its own. Thought of this way, this section simply argues the EU's power of attraction did not have a potitive impact on the overall Turkey-Greece relations when Turkey's chance to be incorporated into the EU gradually diminished as the EU increasingly found it difficult to justify Turkey's inclusion either on identity or economic rationality. This section holds that EU's security concerns vis-a-vis Turkey only allowed for Turkey's categorisation as a candidate country.

When the European Union members accelerated the process of integration in the second half of the 1980s, democratization and human rights concerns gradually replaced the sheer strategic-security concerns in the EU's attitudes towards third

countries (Kuniholm, 2001: 25-53). The 1990s saw that the EU evolved into a mixture of civilian-normative-international actor, rather than a military one having strategic-security interests only.

While the civilian dimension of the EU's identity concerns the huge economic resources of the EU members at their disposal, its normative dimension stems from the its ability to determine the confines of 'normalcy' and 'appropriate state behaviour' in global international society. Possessing a 'power of attraction', the European Union is able to set the normative standards of the global society. It does this mainly through the mechanisms of the accession processes (Christou, 2002). The aspirant countries are in one sense encouraged by the European Union to adapt their socio-economic and political structures to the existing EU norms. Through this way, it is hoped that the structural causes of potential instabilities and conflicts would fade away.

Despite all these, it would not be an exaggeration to claim that today's EU possesses the traits of an embryonic military actor as well. Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, the EU has taken some important steps on the way to becoming a global military actor. Following the failures in the territories of the Former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, the EU members increased their efforts to make the EU a military security actor able to speak and act with one voice. Since the Leaken Summit in December 2001, the European Security and Defence Policy dimension of the EU's integration process has been operationalized (Lizec, 2003: 32-51).

However, on balance today's EU is more of a normative-civilian actor than a global military one. It is still the case that there is not enough cohesion among the EU members as for geo-political and strategic issues (Van der Wusten and Dijkink,

2002: 19-38). In geo-political terms, it seems that each individual EU member, particularly those with an imperial legacy, has more actor-ness than the EU itself as an institution. For instance, France and the United Kingdom, two ex-imperial powers, led the way in the evolution of European Security and Defence Policy (Rasmussen, 2002: 39-60; Larsen, 2002: 283-302). The latest Iraqi war has once again revealed that there is not any cohesion among the EU members as to the scope and direction of the ESDP (Ortega, 2002).

Despite the reinvigorated European efforts to turn the EU into a military actor with strategic-security interests around the peripheries of the continent, the fact that the EU members have been further scaling down their military spending seems to have blocked this initiative as well. The EU's determination to activate a rapid reaction force of 60.000 by the end of 2003 might fail owing to the low military budgets and the lack of a common strategic outlook among the members (Muller, 2003; Kapstein, 2002: 141-155; Gordon, 1997: 74-101). The enlargement of the EU will likely complicate this process as the cohesiveness within the EU might diminish, which has become evident during the latest Iraqi crisis (Ortega, 2002).

During the post-Cold war years the geo-politic horizons of the European Union did not expand to include the Greater Middle Eastern region. The main area of interest of the European Union was confined to Western Europe, as well as the central and eastern parts of the continent (Lewis, 2001: 22-42). Even the Balkan region was marginally elevated to a significant status following the catastrophic wars in the territories of the Former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (Kagan, 2002).

Therefore, the need and legitimacy to incorporate Turkey into the Union on the basis of EU's security imperatives did not necessitate offering Turkey a credible membership prospect. The best possible means for the European Union to deal with

Turkey and the security concerns that might emanate from Turkey seemed to have been the placement of Turkey into an accession process, throughout which Turkey would remain in the EU's orbit and transform its security culture/identity along that of the European Union. While the accession of the EU into CEECs constituted a geopolitical necessity on the part of the EU, the continuation of the accession process with Turkey in an ambiguous way was legitimized by the EU's same international identity (Christiansen, Petito and Tora, 2000: 389-415).

In addition to these security-related explanations, one can also claim that the pull of civilisational and cultural factors were not so high on the side of the EU to offer more promising/credible membership prospects to Turkey. When the cultural and ethnical factors gained importance in the EU's attempts at re-constructing the boundaries of the European identity, the Central and Eastern European countries received warmer treatment from the EU (Sjursen, 2002; Schimmelfennig, 2001: 47-80; Whitman, 1997)). For example, it was under such conditions that the CEECs could leap ahead of Turkey on the road to Brussels. Their performance in meeting the Copenhagen criteria was not so brighter than that of Turkey, particularly in the field of economic and in terms of their ability to adopt the EU's Community Law (Onis, 1999: 107-136). That is why the EU had to announce in December 1997 that the aspirant states would have to meet at least the political criteria to start the accession talks with the EU. The condition to meet the political dimensions of the Copenhagen criteria has become a benchmark since 1997 to measure the 'European-ness' of aspirant countries.

Turkey's placement in the EU's accession process became a necessity for the EU's own security interests in the wake of the Kosovo war in 1999 (Nicolaidis, 2001: 245-277). That is why the EU offered Turkey candidacy status in December 1999 in

Helsinki. Before that date the EU did not feel the need to recognize Turkey as a candidate state in order to realize its security interests (Muftuler-Bac, 2000a: 489-502; Muftuler-Bac, 2000b: 21-35).

In analysing the post-Cold war era logic of the European Union towards Turkey from a security perspective, one needs to make it clear that the former acted towards the latter from two different time-perspectives. As for the short-term, it seems that there is a consensus among the EU members that while Turkey's accession to the EU would be to the disadvantage of the EU's international and security identity and delay the completion of the deepening and integration processes smoothly, the placement of Turkey on the EU's orbit within the framework of intensified EU-Turkey relations needs to be preserved.

The Western European countries saw Turkey neither as ethnically nor ideationally similar to themselves (Neuman, 1999; Kahraman, 2000: 1-21) nor calculated that Turkey's accession to the EU alongside with the Central and Eastern European countries would be tolerable in terms of the costs it would incur on the EU's ongoing integration/identity-construction process. Based on this calculation, the EU did not want Turkey as a member before it could successfully digest the memberships of the first and second wave of applicant countries. Besides, the EU did not want to bind itself with a strong commitment to Turkey's membership when most of the EU members quarrelled among themselves about the future institutional structure of the EU and the legitimacy of Turkey's accession (Ozdag, 2002).

It seems that the EU acted towards Turkey from a consequential logic with a view to eliminating possible Turkey-induced obstacles before it could successfully materialize its three important strategic goals. One was the continuation of EU-Turkey relations in such a way that Turkey would never turn its face from the EU.

The second was that the Republic of Cyprus would join the European Union as a member in such a way that neither the Greek government would veto the whole enlargement process nor Turkey would integrate with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Eichinger, 1997: 197-203). The third strategic goal of the European Union was that the EU would have access to the military capabilities of the Alliance in such a way that both the EU would fulfil its goal of establishing the European Rapid Reaction Force in the shortest possible time and Turkey would not be able to sabotage this European project.

When these combined, it becomes really difficult to interpret the EU's long-term objectives vis-à-vis Turkey. This dissertation argues that even if the EU's long-term objective vis-à-vis Turkey entails Turkey's future accession to the EU from positive ideational concerns, the longer the short-term period lasts, the less promising/credible the EU's involvement in the Turkish-Greek relations would become. The longer the short-term lasts, the more likely Turkey and Greece would move further away from each other and the more likely they would have a conflictual and *realpolitik* security environment in their region.

Looking from this perspective, one can safely argue that the EU allowed Turkey to be represented in the EU's institutional structure to the extent that Turkey formed a part of the EU's 'near abroad' in the Eastern Mediterranean region (Bilgin, 2002). The EU-Turkey relationship within the context of 'near abroad' conceptualization aims at keeping Turkey under EU's influence but denies to give her a fully respected seat in the EU (Webber, Terrif, Howorth and Croft, 2002: 75-100). Such a relationship would resemble to a one-sided love affair with Turkey incessantly running after its EU membership and the EU refusing to give up its 'constructively managed deliberate ambiguity' policy (interview with Seyfi Tashan,

25 April 2002). This conceptualization considers Turkey neither as a non-European nor European country, but located somewhere in the middle.

The discursive practices of the EU to build its security identity on the twin processes of 'integration-deepening' and 'promotion-enlargement' seems to have constructed the tone of the post-Cold war EU-Turkey relations in accordance with the expectations of the pessimists in regard to Turkey's place in the EU. While Turkey was not included among the Central and Eastern European countries, with which the European Union decided to initiate the accession negotiations mainly due to the strong pull of the civilisational logic, she was mentioned among the Mediterranean countries, with which the European Union decided to put into place the Euro-Mediterranean Process in order to contribute to the security and peace on the peripheries of Europe. Turkey was neither regarded as a part of the EU's 'Self', as were the CEECs, nor considered as the 'Other' of the EU's identity. In this era, civilisational geopolitics gained prominence over ideological geopolitics and political and cultural concerns began to mould the EU's logic of action towards Turkey.

It is only under this condition that Greece could successfully stir up Turkey-EU relations. Without getting into this mental background of Turkey-EU relations, one could easily fall into the trap of blaming Greece for the EU's approach towards Cyprus. If Turkey had expressed its satisfaction with the role that the EU seems to have offered her within the context of 'near abroad' conceptualization or if the EU had offered Turkey a promising membership prospect foreseeing the reality of Turkey's transformation into a real European country, then the increasing involvement of the EU in the Cyprus dispute would not have created such a great

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havoc in the overall EU-Turkey relations (Interview with Gunduz Aktan, 3 May 2002).

Thought of this way, it can be argued that the EU did not agree to the improvement of relations with Turkey, through the institutions of Customs Union and Turkey's candidacy, because it started to think that Turkey should be a part of Europe's Self. Even though the institution of candidacy improved Turkey's standing on the spectrum of 'European-ness', these were after all the steps, which needed to be taken by the European Union in order to continue its 'constructive ambiguity' policy towards Turkey in the age of enlargement (Interview with Seyfi Tashan, 25 April 2002). Otherwise, the EU would have contributed to its insecurity through the alienation of Turkey from Europe (Kalaycioglu, 2002: 119-135). The EU's security/insecurity based policy towards Turkey did not contribute to the settlement of the Greek-Turkish disputes, whereas an identity-construction/consolidation policy towards Turkey would facilitate the settlement.

However, if Turkey's candidacy were meant the EU's determination to actively contribute to Turkey's European identity with the real possibility of Turkey's eventual accession to the EU, then one might claim both that Turkey's ambiguous position vis-à-vis the EU started to lose ground and that Turkey's EU accession process did really become a promising framework for the resolution of the Turkish-Greek problems. This would be so mainly for the reasons that neither Greece would be able to legitimize her *realpolitik* driven hostile policy towards Turkey within the EU nor Turkey would be able to resist the European calls for the settlement of Turkish-Greek disputes as part of Turkey's accession criteria and blame Greece for the Europeanization of the disputes as tactical manoeuvres against Turkey (Nicoliadis, 2001).

This dissertation argues that Turkey's strangeness/otherness in the eyes of the EU members increased in parallel to a gradual differentiation between the security cultures of the two sides. This fundamentally curtailed the EU's influence to affect Turkey's behaviour through its so-called power of attraction. With the end of the Cold War era, Turkey turned out to become a rather 'strange' country for the EU as the former gradually lost her 'Cold War era meaning' in the eyes of the Europeans. Below is an account of the factors that engendered this differentiation, mainly on the part of the European Union.

The first difference in the diverging security understandings of the EU and Turkey can be found in their attitudes towards NATO, transatlantic relations and the formation of the European Army as part of the EU's evolving 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' and 'European Security and Defence Policy'. For Turkey, membership in NATO was (and still is) its most important security guarantee. But more than that, what would matter for Turkey was the continuation of the European character of the Alliance. To Turkey, erosion in the European character of NATO would seriously challenge Turkey's 'European-ness', as well as its equal standing with the European members of the Alliance. Thus, Turkey's major post-Cold War security concern had to do with NATO's collective defence characteristic and the possibility of the dilution of the Article 5 commitments. In Turkey's thinking membership in NATO stood for Turkey's inclusion within the European international society. Would Turkey continue to feel secure and European in a NATO that included Russia and various Central and Eastern European countries and that has gradually become a collective security organization rather than a collective defence organization? Turkey assumed that NATO would evolve into a loose collective

security organization once it opened the way for new members from the east (Karaosmanoglu, 1999: 213-224; Eralp, 1997).

Because the Turkish elite saw the emerging European army as part of an European attempt to construct an autonomous foreign and security policy identity that would transform the EU into a global geo-political security actor independent of NATO, it was imperative for Turkey to become a contractual party to it. In fact the Turkish security and political elite viewed the European' attempts in this regard as diluting the European character of NATO, and therefore Turkey's European identity. With this perception in mind, it was difficult for the Turkish elite to evaluate non-membership in this new arrangement from a 'self-other' dichotomy (Orhun, 2000; Gozen, 2002).

However, the Turkish elite misread the situation. This is mainly for three reasons. First, the reason why the EU members set into motion the Common Foreign and Security Policy was to prevent the re-emergence of balance of power politics among the EU members. In the face of the elimination of the Soviet threat in the East, the Europeans feared that their Cold War ally across the Atlantic might have decided to disengage from Europe. In such a case, they pondered that the balance of power politics might have revisited them. Thought of this way, construction of a common security and defence policy seemed to them the best possible way to prevent the continent from falling into the temptations of *realpolitik* security understanding.

Second, the European Security and Defence Policy, which was set into motion in the EU's Helsinki Summit in December 1999, aimed at the establishment of a European Rapid Reaction Force, dubbed as the European Army, for the tasks of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping and conflict management (non-Article 5

missions). The low end of the Petersberg tasks did not foresee the creation of a European Army with war-fighting capabilities to be deployable in any part of the globe at short notice. Thought of this way, the primacy of NATO in European security structure was not radically challenged, for the EU members of the Alliance were aware of the fact that they would not be able to materialize even their above-mentioned aspirations without the help/infrastructure of NATO. The major goal of the European Army was (and still is) to enable the EU members to respond to any future crisis of Yugoslavian-kind on the European continent (Rasmussen, 2002: 39-60).

Third, the EU members of the Alliance did not want to see NATO developing strategic and geo-political interests in different parts of the globe. To them, the Alliance was at the first instance created to find answers to Europe's own security problems. The end of the Cold War era should not have let the Americans to transform the strategic-outlook and horizons of the Alliance from being a European institution into a global security institution that would be in the service of the Americans. The Europeans did not want to get militarily involved in different parts of the planet just because they would have to follow the Americans in the pursuit of global American security interests. Thought of this way, Turkey's full-participation in the EU's evolving security mechanisms would have meant the possible/likely involvement of the EU-members in future American contingencies in the Greater Middle Eastern region. Put in another way, accepting Turkey's participation in the EU's own security structure would have meant the EU's approval of NATO's new global role in a new disguise. This would have certainly been in contradiction with the EU's Europe-limited security identity and interests. Somewhat in a contradictory way, Turkey contributed to the non-European character of the Alliance while

persistently asking for full membership in the EU's emerging security and defence policy mechanisms. Therefore, the EU members did not hesitate to reject Turkey's calls for full participation in these mechanisms, for such an eventuality might have implied that these emerging European structures would mean the continuation of the Alliance in a new guise.

When the rationale for establishing an autonomous European army was attributed to these modest goals, the European Union would saw no reason to extend an invitation to Turkey just because Turkey was a NATO member with significant geo-political and sophisticated military assets (Webber, Terriff, Howorth and Croft, 2002: 75-100). From this point of view, the EU members of NATO saw the Alliance's military capabilities as of great potential help for the embryonic European Rapid Reaction Force. They wanted NATO to function in the European theatre not to protect Europeans from a conventional source of threat but to intervene in possible crises that might erupt on the peripheries of the continent until such time as the European Union could mount its own army in the field.

It is appropriate to devote here a relatively long section to the Turkish-EU quarrel over the ESDP issue, for this highlights the main reasons and the evolutionary process of the gradual deterioration in Turkey-EU security relations, resulting in Turkey's otherness and the perpetuation of *realpolitik* security understandings. The way Turkey was included within the post-Cold War era European security architecture is important because by analysing these modalities one could get a better picture of the EU's perception of Turkey and the EU's credibility in the Turkish eyes in regard to the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes.

Turkey's equal standing with the EU members within NATO during the Cold War era gradually eroded as the European Union started to develop its distinctive foreign and security policy identity with the advent of the 1990s. This gradual change in Turkey's status did not come radically and abruptly. It was a step-by-step process, which started with the EU's decision to reactivate the Western European Union as the military pillar of the EU in the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 (Aybet, 2000). Since 1992 Petersberg Declaration, where Turkey was defined as an Associate member of the WEU, till the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, where the EU took the first step to include the WEU in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy structure, Turkey's status within the European security architecture was somewhat satisfactory for her. Due to the intermediary position of the WEU between the EU and NATO, as defined the European pillar of the Alliance rather than the EU's military arm, Turkey's status in the eyes of the EU was defined in parallel to the dominance of the Alliance in European security architecture. Because the military capabilities of the EU members of the Alliance within the WEU were not strong enough to enable them to undertake Petersberg type (non-Article 5) military operations in Europe on their own, it became somehow a necessity on their part to rely on the military assets and the capabilities of NATO (Yikilkan, 2001).

The point that matters for the research purposes of this dissertation is that the less willing the EU members were to establish their distinctive security and international identity independent of NATO and the less militarily capable they were to undertake Petersberg type military operations, the less discriminatory they were towards Turkey's inclusion within the European security structures as a European country (Cebeci, 1999).

A strong indication of the EU's less discriminatory attitude towards Turkey could be observed during the discussions between the EU and Greece on the impact of Turkish-Greek territorial disputes on the way how Greece would be accepted as a full member. In 1992, the WEU members agreed to Greece's WEU membership on the condition that the Article 5 commitments of the Modified Brussels Treaty would not be extended to Greece as far as its relations with NATO members, in particular Turkey, were concerned. Even though the WEU treated Turkey and Greece unequally, by admitting the former as an Associate member whereas the latter as a full member, it took utmost care not to extend a collective security guarantee to Greece in case the latter found itself in a war with Turkey (Platias, 1996: 33-54; Platias, 2000: 61-86).

Even though Turkey's status in regard to the WEU's military operations that would rely on NATO's assets was somehow satisfactory, this was not the case with respect to the WEU operations that would make use of only European sources. Turkey would not have a right to participate in the decision-making processes of such forces. Therefore, this could be interpreted as the first signs of the EU's discriminatory attitude towards Turkey. Turkey's 'European-ness' in terms of the EU-only military operations was seriously challenged.

The danger for Turkey started to surface when the EU members decided to merge the WEU with the EU in their Cologne Summit in June 1999.[*] With the evaporation of the WEU, only two European security institutions with military components would have been left in place, one was NATO and the other was the EU. Since then, the linkage between the EU's approach towards Turkey's inclusion in the EU's security structure and the EU's view of NATO turned out to become more

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[*] One can reach the EU's Cologne presidency conclusions at:
http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/june99_en.htm

visible. The more the role of NATO in European security architecture decreased, the more discriminatory the EU approached towards Turkey (Cebeci, 1999).

The degree of EU's discrimination against Turkey in the post-Cologne summit era increased. While the EU agreed to Turkey's official candidacy on the one hand, she did also take the decision to establish a European Army of 60000 troops, to be deployable in 30 days, by the end of 2003 on the other. (Article 28 of the EU's Helsinki summit conclusions). While Turkey's official standing in the EU improved with the confirmation of its candidacy, the EU at the same time downgraded its standing in the EU's security and defence structuring (Howorth, 2001).

The EU worsened its attitude towards Turkey after the merging of the WEU with the EU in late 2000. Following the Feira Summit in June 2000 and the Nice Summit in December 2000 the EU argued that Turkey had no legitimate right to fully participate in the decision-making process of the EU military operations even if that would rely on NATO sources because Turkey was not an EU member.[*] Rather than agreeing to the continuation of Turkey's associate membership rights within the WEU, whereby Turkey had a right to veto the use of NATO's assets by the EU on a case-by-case basis, the EU now argued that the EU should have an automatic access to NATO's assets. Turkey was allowed to participate only in decision-shaping and operational stages of EU-led military operations. Turkey's participation in such operations would be based on Turkey's wish to join. In regard to EU-only operations, Turkey could only participate if she were invited by the European Union and if she wanted to contribute forces. The logic on the part of the EU was that if Turkey wanted to join the EU, why questioning the legitimacy of the EU's regulations that

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[*] One can reach the EU's Feira and Nice presidency conclusions at:
http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=62050&from=&LANG=1 and
http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=64245&from=&LANG=1

would make Turkey's road to membership a more difficult exercise (Missiroli, 2002: 9-26).

In parallel to the EU members' efforts to endow their Union with a distinctive international and security identity independent of NATO, particularly in the aftermath of the EU's historic Helsinki summit, the non-European character of Turkey's security identity became more evident.

Looking from the Turkish side, the rationale was that if the EU were serious about Turkey's membership and therefore would like to make use of Turkey's high-quality military capabilities in both types of military operations, why creating so much fuss about the inclusion of Turkey in the decision-making mechanisms. To the Turks, the half-a-century togetherness within NATO; Turkey's internalization of the same strategic culture of the western security community; Turkey's sophisticated military capabilities and Turkey's participation in many of the peacekeeping operations (cooperative security) alongside the Europeans should all have been enough to convince the EU members to the legitimacy of the idea that Turkey's equal inclusion in the CFESP mechanisms would have been appropriate (Muftuler-Bac, 2000: 489-502).

In response to the EU's negative stance on its participation in the decision-making mechanisms of the emerging European Army as an equal party, Turkey long vetoed the EU's right of assured access to the assets of the Atlantic Alliance (Missiroli, 2002). Two assumptions lied behind Turkey's attitude towards this issue. The first was the possibility that the EU-NATO togetherness would further weaken in the years to come as the EU turned out to be an international actor of its kind with autonomous interests and military capabilities. The second was the possibility that Turkey's European identity would be seriously disputed, for Turkey's membership in

the EU would not be likely in the foreseeable future. The dilution of NATO's European character and her possible exclusion form the emerging European security architecture would level strong blows to Turkey's claim to being European (Demirdogen, 2003: 52-59). Turkey simply behaved as a country that did not believe in the possibility of its EU membership in the short-run. It wanted to get as much concessions as possible from the EU. Any security role for Turkey, within the Middle Eastern context and based upon the strategic partnership with the United States on a bilateral basis (Karaosmanoglu, 1983), rather than through the NATO platforms where she would be treated as a European country and have a say on the European security, would in no way satisfy the establishment elite in Turkey (Candar and Fuller, 2001: 22-38).

The strange point in this regard occurred in the aftermath of the September 11 era when the new international conjecture once again made it clear that NATO's (US') role as the main European security institution, at least concerning the hard security dimension of security understanding, was undisputed. When the failure of the EU members to increase their military spending combined with the increasing importance of the NATO's assets for the composition of the EU's military operations, it seemed that the bargaining power of the EU vis-à-vis Turkey diminished. Consequently, Turkey softened its position because the Turkish security elites thought that Turkey could strike a better deal with the EU while Turkey's geo-strategic and geo-political value increased in the eyes of the western international community. The Turks might also have calculated that if Turkey had accommodated the EU over the ESDP issue, the EU would in turn have adopted less anti-Turkish stances on the accession of Cyprus to the EU. On the side of the EU, the need to rely on NATO's assets increased given the low military spending of the EU members due

to the reluctance of the European Public opinion to prefer guns to butter (Kasim, 2002: 87-99). Besides, Turkey's exclusion from the EU's orbit in this new era might have been detrimental to the EU's security interests both in the continent and the EU's peripheries.

The Ankara agreement was reached within such a strategic environment in December 2001. One can read this understanding as a successful manoeuvre of the European Union in constructively managing its relations with Turkey. Due to the strong Turkish resistance, the European Union appeared to have bowed to some of the Turkish claims. While the EU-led operations (using NATO's strategic assets) would hinge on Turkey's first-hand approval within the Alliance, the EU was given an assured access to the non-strategic assets of the Alliance. Regarding the EU-only (no use of NATO's assets) operations, the EU promised to strongly take Turkey's views into account and assured Turkey that she would have the right of first-refusal in the military operations that might take place within the sphere of Turkey's influence. In other words, the EU promised not to take any military action around Turkey's borders without the approval of the former. Therefore, one could rightly claim that the area of responsibility of the emerging European Army would not cover the Aegean Sea and Cyprus, for Turkey made it clear that it would in no way acquiescence in the employment of European Army there given that Greece might want to use it against Turkey (Cayhan, 2003: 35-54).

Even though Greece did not let this agreement take a legal status for a year, the parties could finally come to a common understanding in late December 2002, on the margins of the EU's Copenhagen summit. The final arrangement reached in Copenhagen is similar to the Ankara agreement in the senses that both Turkey agreed to enhanced consultations rather than guaranteed participation in the decision-making

processes of EU-led and EU-only operations and that the EU promised to keep Cyprus away from the area of its responsibility (EU's Copenhagen Summit Conclusions).

The second difference between Turkey and the EU in terms of their security cultures/identities concerns their threat perceptions and the means how to deal with them. Their objects of security did not always concur over the last decade. Turkey continued to regard developments in Russia, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, particularly attempts by the latter to develop weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles to deliver them, as possible sources of conventional threats to its security (Sezer, 1992: 227-237; Sezer, 1995: 149-172). On the other hand, the EU members shared in the idea that today's world pose no conventional threats to Europe's security. To them, the greatest risks and challenges to the European security are posed by the undemocratic and unstable regions located on a rim stretching from the northwest Africa passing through the Balkans and reaching the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regions (Xenakis, 2000: 75-90). Cyprus and the Aegean Sea are such places where the vital security concerns of the European Union might be in danger if Turkey and Greece come to a collision course. Problems that might emanate from the unhealthy domestic structures of the countries located on these regions include immigration to the developed European countries, ethnic intra-state wars, environmental pollution, drug trafficking, organized crime and so on (Sjursen, 2001; Larsen, 2000: 337-356). Therefore, many European security analysts believed that Turkey's inclusion within the EU might increase 'conventional threats' to European security because Turkey lies at the epicentre of so many zones of instability, and its hard-security mentality might risk

bringing the EU into open conflicts with any one of Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbours (Muller, 2003; Buzan and Diez, 1999: 41-57).

Third, they differed on their subjects of security. While the security referents within post-Westphalian Europe turned out to become 'society' and 'individuals', replacing the 'nation-state' (Manners, 2002; Waever, 1998: 45-63), in Turkey, on the other hand, the security elite continued to view the Turkish state and its territorial integrity as the main objects of security. Turkey's struggle with the Kurdish separatism and political Islam as the two most important security threats sharpened her non-European character (Ergil, 2000: 122-135). While the majority of the EU members gradually evolved into more democratic and pluralist entities where the source of states' legitimacy started to come from the protection of fundamental human rights, Turkey remained a different entity where the protection of the State's territorial and existential unity against the societal and external dangers constituted the most sacred ideal to die for.

Fourth, the EU and Turkey also diverged in their approaches to terrorism. Turkey saw various kinds of terrorism as one of the greatest threats to its national security interests and prefers to rely on conventional military capabilities and military co-operation with the United States and Israel to 'contain' those threats (Guvenc, 2000: 131-163; Atesoglu, 2001: 26-32). The European Union adopted a rather more selective approach both towards the definition of terrorism and the means to deal with it. The EU refuses to treat all sort of anti-western (anti-US, anti-EU) and anti-regime political activities in the 'weak' and 'failed' states of the Greater Middle Eastern region as 'terrorism'. In case the EU defines any activity as such, it tends to deal with it through 'engagement', not 'containment'. Without initially rooting out the socio-political structure, which might (re) produce such

terrorist actions, the European circles ponder that terrorism could not be eradicated from earth (Hoffman, 1999; Lindley-French, 2002).

It is within this spirit that the EU members long refused to incorporate the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) and other leftist-oriented organizations into their list of terrorist groups, despite repeated calls from Turkey to do so. As long as such groups did not disturb the domestic order in EU member countries or abuse their right to express their claims peacefully within the plural democratic system of the EU area, the EU refused to see them either as terrorist organizations or as threats to its security (Eccarius-Kelly, 2002: 91-118).

Fifth, their approaches to use of military force in dealing with both conventional and non-conventional threats also differed. The EU members considered the use of military instruments on the condition that such actions would contribute to the strengthening of the socio-political structures in unstable countries. For them, the use of military instruments did not constitute an end in itself in eradicating structural conflicts around the peripheries of the continent, but rather as a means to pave the way for the efficient implementation of the strategy of 'structural development'. To this logic, efforts to endow the EU with a military body would not mean that the EU was inclined to evolve into a military security actor on a global scale, but rather a civilian power who might make use of military means in order to materialize its civilian goals (Solona, 2003). For the EU's development aids to unstable regions around Europe's peripheries to become successful in rooting out the structural causes of instability and terrorism, it became a necessity on the part of the EU to sometimes rely on miliary means (European Army). What the EU hoped was at least to provide for a minimum degree of internal stability in those areas, defined

as the absence of militarized warfare, before investing in structural development (Cornish and Edwards, 2001: 584-603).

On the opposite side, Turkey both 'broadened' the range of issues that it saw as threats to its national security and 'narrowed' its perspective to deal with them to largely military means (Jung, 2001). The use of force as an instrument in dispute settlement became more likely, at least in initial stages. Ond could see this in Turkey's new military doctrine, which moved on from 'territorial defence' to 'forward defence.' One of the most important components of the doctrine is the 'forward deployment of Turkish troops in a pre-emptive manner.' (Hickok, 2000: 105-120)

Sixth, the EU circles did also see Turkey as a problem just because of the fact that the majority of the Turkish political-security elite adopted a Euro-sceptic attitude towards Turkey's EU accession process. While believing in the necessity and legitimacy of undertaking the very reforms the EU demands, these Turkish circles also challenged this process in two main ways. While they on the one hand tried to bargain with the EU over the political terms of the accession process, they on the other hand insisted on their indigenous European identity and asked the EU members to admit Turkey as a member as it was. This kind of a Turkish attitude was totally different from that of the Central and Eastern European countries, which from the very beginning accepted the legitimacy and the supremacy of the EU's norms and thus endeavoured to internalize them as ardent door-knockers. Turkey's ambiguous approach towards the EU membership made the EU circles feel suspicious of Turkey's sincere intentions to join the EU. In the face of such Turkish ambiguity and counter-challenge, the EU circles did not feel committed to Turkey's inclusion and therefore did not lay down the mechanisms required for Turkey's smooth accession to the Union.

Seventh, not only have Turkey and the EU diverged on the definitions of threats to European security and stability from outside EU borders; they also felt out over the possible contributions of Turkey's membership to the distinctive security identity of the EU. While the majority of the Turkish elite argued for membership on the grounds that Turkey's inclusion would contribute to the multicultural and inclusive European identity, as well as its geo-political needs (Oguzlu, 2002/2003: 51-83), a great many in European circles spoke loudly against Turkey's inclusion on the ground that its membership would seriously challenge the cohesiveness and homogeneity of the European identity. Turkey's membership would become a possible threat because to them the main security referent of the contemporary Europe was the highly interdependent and functionally well-developed integration process within the EU. As long as the EU integration project was regarded as the main security generating mechanism and based on efforts to forestall the 'fragmentation' of the EU, Turkey's inclusion might seriously undermine those efforts (Winn, 2001: 19-48).

A related issue in this regard concerns the EU's treatment of Turkey as a source of threat in terms of the issues if immigration and political asylum. The EU regarded Turkey's position on these two issues as threats in two senses (Boswell, 2003: 619-638). First, the EU circles pondered that if Turkey did not liberalize (Europeanize) its immigration and political asylum rules, many people coming from Turkey's vicinity would like to come to the EU area, rather than Turkey. They would regard Turkey only as a gateway to Europe. The continuation of this situation would pose a threat to the EU because the EU area would become the number one destination for these people. Second, the EU circles calculated that if Turkey itself becomes an EU member, both the number of Turks, who would like to emigrate to

other EU countries, would increase and the number of other immigrants and political asylum seekers would more easily reach to the EU area. This situation would also pose a threat to the Europeans. The ideal situation from the EU's perspective would foresee that Turkey liberalised its regulations on these issues along the accession process; Turkey became a centre of attraction for many of these immigrant and asylum seekers originating from the Third World; and that Turkey remained on the EU's orbit rather than acceding to the EU (Kirisci, 2003: 79-106).

Based on the account above, one can safely argue that Turkey's accession to the EU over the last decade was not considered possible from a security perspective, for Turkey was thought of being a *too hard* security actor to be digested within the EU's soft-security environment.

3.2.3. Why Did the European Union Offer Candidacy to Turkey?

The relevance of this part to the general argumentation of the dissertation lies in the reason why the European Union decided to elevate Turkey's status from being an 'associate member-country' to a 'membership candidate' country, even though Turkey's performance in meeting the Copenhagen criteria was not promising during the last two years between December 1997 and December 1999. Did the EU circles come to the conclusion that Turkey would no longer be a security liability for the EU? Does the EU's change of decision imply the emergence of a serious EU commitment towards Turkey's full incorporation into the club in the years ahead? Have the doubts about Turkey's 'European-ness' and suitability to the EU membership been to a great extent evaporated with the confirmation of Turkey's candidacy in Helsinki in 1999? Or has the European Union acted on pure instrumental rationality in order to carry out with its well-established constructively

managed deliberate ambiguity policy towards Turkey? Could one claim that the confirmation of Turkey's EU membership candidacy had to happen otherwise the EU could not keep Turkey on the EU's orbit and therefore yield a significant influence on Turkey's policies?

3.2.3.1. Instrumental Logic: Politics of Linkages

The reason why the EU might have agreed on Turkey's candidacy in December 1999 seems to have resulted from the anxieties that Turkey's intransigent attitude towards the EU membership of Cyprus and the use of NATO's assets by the EU could sabotage the two fundamental EU projects, namely deepening and widening. Therefore, the European Union seems to have decided that the policy of offering candidacy to Turkey would be enough to break Turkey's steadfastness on these two issues. Given that Turkey's non-conformist policies since December 1997 did militate against the EU's capability to influence Turkish politics, the EU might have decided to elevate Turkey's status to membership with a view to regaining its influence on Turkey (Nicoliadis, 2001: 245-275).

The developments in Turkish foreign policy between the Luxembourg rebuke in December 1997 and the Helsinki summit in December 1999 witnessed to a gradual nationalisation of foreign policy behaviour. The policies Turkey undertook in her environment most of the time did not reflect the Europeans' concerns (Yesilada, 1999: 144-161). Either in response to the attempts of the Greek Cypriots at bringing in S-300 missiles to the island or in response to the increased Syrian support to the outlawed PKK terrorist organization, the way Turkey dealt with these developments were in direct conflict with the existing foreign and security policy norms of the European Union. In both occasions, Turkey did not hesitate to threaten with war if

her claims were not heeded (Makovsky, 1999: 92-113). To the surprise of some circles, Turkey's politico-military assertiveness bare positive results as the Greek Cypriots had to agree to the deployment of the missiles in Crete instead of the island and as the Syrian government had to extradite expel Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, from Syria.

Another avenue for Turkey's nationalised foreign policy behaviour took place in regard to Turkey's intensified relations with Israel. In a direct breach of the EU's norms, Turkey speeded up her efforts in seeking security through the formation of alliances (Altunisik, 2000: 172-191). While the 'coordination' norm of the European Union would expect Turkey to consult on the EU members before strengthening relations with Israel, the 'de-securitization' norm of the EU would envisage Turkey's efforts to gain security through the politicization of potential security issues, rather than formation of *realpolitik* security alliances. Neither of these happened as far as Turkey's relations with Israel were concerned.

The significance of the re-nationalisation of Turkish foreign policy for the European Union came to the fore as far as the tension-producing character of Turkish-Greek relations was concerned. Between 1997 and 1999 the bilateral talks over the future of the Cyprus conflict ended as the Turkish Cypriots were emboldened by Turkey to opt for a more nationalistic, and intransigent to some European circles, attitude by making the restart of the inter-communal talks conditional on the prior recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Eralp, 2000a; Eralp, 2000b: 173-188).

The cease of the political dialogue between the EU and Turkey also resulted in the break up of the 'Wise men process' initiated by the Netherlands as a possible

platform for the Turkish and Greek high standing figures to come together to exchange views over the bilateral problems.

In addition to her increased sensitivities over the EU membership of the Greek Cypriots, as representing the whole island, Turkey also adopted a less accommodating attitude towards the use of NATO's assets by the European Union. In an effort to defy the deal reached in NATO's Washington Summit in April 1999, the EU displayed its discontent with the continuation of the arrangements used to regulate the WEU-NATO relations. The NATO's summit in spring 1999 allowed for Turkey to maintain her privileges arisen out of the NATO-WEU understanding. However, the European Union, particularly after incorporating the WEU into its institutional structure, was in a mood to alter those regulations in a way that would enable her to act more independently of NATO. While the arrangement between the WEU and NATO allowed NATO to say the last word in terms of the use of NATO's assets by the WEU operations, the European Union preached for the autonomous EU operations even if the EU might rely on NATO's military capabilities (Park, 2000: 315-328).

3.2.3.2. Germany

Another significant factor that seems to account for the EU's volta-face in regard to Turkey's candidacy in 1999 concerns the governmental shuffle in Germany in 1998. If one took into consideration the opinions of the leading figures of the Socialist-green coalition government on the enlargement of the EU and the character of the integration process within the EU, a clearer picture would surface. Instead of adopting a rigid and uni-track enlargement and integration process, those people argued for a multi-track mechanism in response to the challenges put before the

European Union as to the ideal method of dealing with problems arising out of the integration and enlargement processes. To this understanding the European Union should develop a new strategy, which would allow for the willing EU members to proceed with further integration while less reluctant EU members would be free in maintaining their reservations but not obstruct other's intentions to further deepen the integration process. Applied to the enlargement process, this thinking would foresee that the European Union would proceed on different levels of expansion by admitting the most successful candidates into the first track of members while letting the others join the club on less intensive levels (Nicoliadis, 2001).

This kind of two tracks deepening and enlargement processes would satisfy the needs of both the federalists and inter-governmentalists members by allowing the first group of countries to see the EU transformed into a more developed political actor while letting the second group of countries fulfil their conception of the European Union, that is something more than a confederation and less than a federation. If the German conception of the European Union allowed for any place for Turkey in the second track members of the Union, then one could trace back the reasons for the policy change in the aftermath of the government change in Germany.

As far as the EU's 'deepening' and 'widening' processes were understood as constitutive of each other, the view of the Christian Democrats on Turkey's membership would not have been compatible with this understanding. To Christian Democrats, the European Union is a civilisational project and based on the values of Christianity and distinctive western European values. Therefore, Turkey has no place within this entity. The best way to deal with Turkey would foresee the continuation of relations on economic and strategic dimensions. This would be the best approach for both sides mainly because it is lest costly one. The leaders of the Christian

Democratic Parties of the EU members met in Netherlands on the 3rd of March 1997 and discussed the future shape of the EU. On the margins of these meetings, they also decided that Turkey could not join the EU as a member due to the significant cultural and ideational differences with the Europeans..

3.2.3.3. Britain

Another possible view accounting for the change in the attitude of the European Union towards Turkey is that the priorities of the British government led to a more inclusive European attitude in regard to Turkey's future membership. The proponents of this view hold that the United Kingdom government saw in Turkey a militarily strong ally, which could help the Union materialize its goal of constructing an independent Common Security and Defence Policy. Because the EU failed once again in Kosovo, after the failures in Bosnia and Crotia, as a military actor first to prevent the deadly conflicts to arise and later to help put an end to them, the United Kingdom might have thought that if Turkey became an EU member, despite her structural deficiencies for membership, the EU might more easily transform into an international actor able to act militarily. This view is also shared by some Turkish observers, to whom the EU offered candidacy to Turkey because of the latter's strategic capabilities emanating from her NATO membership in a volatile region, her strategic location, and her highly developed military capabilities (Muftuler-Bac, 2000: 21-35).

Another view that attributes Turkey's candidacy to the British support holds that the UK supported Turkey's membership because of her inter-governmentalist desires as for the future of the EU. To this view, the membership of Turkey in the EU would dilute the supranational character of the integration process. Turkey's

membership would also serve the continuation of the American influence within the Union. In addition to the United Kingdom, the other country that has strong dependency relationship with the United States is Turkey. Therefore in case Turkey achieved membership, the inter-governmental character of the Union would go hand in hand with the continuation of the American influence on the European politics. This American influence would most intensely be felt in the areas of security and defence policies. Turkey and the United Kingdom would act as Troyan horses of the US interests within the EU.

Another radical explanation for the British support to Turkey's candidacy is that the UK wanted to make Turkey's candidacy status as a bargaining chip in its relations with France. In order to demonstrate its pro-EU stance, the Blair government might have decided to support the embryonic Common European Security and Defence Policy. However, it was clear to Blair that the Americans would not easily give their consent to this project if its link to NATO were not overtly built. Therefore, the British might have thought that if the prospects of Turkey's, a staunch ally of the US in Europe, future membership in the EU was made clear through the announcement of Turkey's candidacy, then the Americans might not erect unbridgeable barriers to the formation of the European Army (Nicoliadis, 2001).

For the research interest of this dissertation, the most welcome account of the change in the EU policy towards Turkey would be that the EU accepted Turkey's formal candidacy based on her possible contributions to the emerging multi-cultural European identity. If Turkey were seen as a state-society complex which could live within the cultural complex of the EU with her distinctive identity, then the chances for the European Union to act as a honest broker in the settlement of the Turkish-

Greek disputes would increase. If the European Union's integration process unfolded on a clearly defined 'us against them' mentality, then the possibility for different cultural entities to live within the EU would be dim. Only a multi-cultural and multi-track European Union would allow for membership of countries, which are not inherently western European.

On the other hand, if Turkey was admitted to candidacy on the basis of her conjectural importance for the European Union's strategic and security interests, then her place within the EU would lie on shaky grounds letting the international political conjecture determine the European perception of Turkey. Depending on the character of the international political developments, Turkey's significance to the EU would tend to show fluctuations.

3.2.4. Turkey's Approach towards the European Union

The underlying question of this section of the dissertation is why Turkey could not internalize the EU's security norms in a problem-free manner and therefore see the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes within the EU framework as a legitimate component of her accession process with the EU. The potential role of the EU has also been affected by the particular logic Turkey has adopted towards the EU in the 1990s. In general, Turkey has embraced a very critical approach towards the EU accession process. The struggle with political/radical Islam and Kurdish separatism on the one hand and Greece's use of the EU against Turkey on the other both led to Turkey's further divergence from the EU's security norms and made the Turkish security elite view the accession process as threatening (Cizre, 2003: 213-231; Ulman, 2000: 99-130). Even though the following sections discusses in detail the impact of Turkey's well-established realist security culture on its approach towards

the EU accession process, it would be apt to point out here that there have been two general factors affecting Turkey's approach towards the EU.

First, Turkey acted towards the EU as if it was going to join an inter-governmental organization where it would not be required to share its sovereignty with the supranational organs of the Union in Brussels and the local authorities dispersed within the country. Having failed to capture the identity-transformative affects of the EU's integration process, Turkey incessantly made the case that the EU needs to respect Turkey's unique socio-political conditions and therefore should not interfere with its domestic as well as foreign affairs to the extent the accession process might entail (McLaren, 2000: 117-129).

Second, in contrast to the Cold War era, when the established elites set the major goal of Turkey's foreign policy as the full participation in the western international community, the new era saw a gradually increasing attention of the Turkish public towards the meaning of Turkey's membership in the EU. It is no longer automatic and for sure that the majority of the Turkish society want EU membership without questioning the ramifications of this action. Turkey's blind-eyed commitment towards the EU membership has no longer been the case and this seems to have constructed (constructed by) Turkey's doubts on the intentions of the European Union vis-à-vis Turkey. The domestic discussion process has gained an upward turn since the confirmation of Turkey's candidacy in 1999. The less ambiguous the EU's attitude towards Turkey's accession has become, the more principled and analytical arguments have been voiced either for or against EU membership in Turkey. Since 1999, the major fault-line in Turkish political life has been drawn along the EU membership of the country (Onis, 2003; Avci, 2003: 149-170; Carkoglu: 2003: 171-194).

However, the gradual development of such a critical approach towards the EU membership should not mean that a purely material instrumental logic started to dominate Turkey's thinking. Turkey has never adopted a pure cost-benefit rationality towards the European Union. This could be seen in Turkey's reactions towards the consequences of the Customs Union. If a pure economic reasoning, based on cost-benefit analysis, had shaped Turkey's decision-making, then the Customs Union deal with the EU should have never been cut because Turkey's expected economic benefits from the Customs Union would have fallen far behind those of the European Union (Calis, 2001: 123-137). This shows that main reason why the Turkish elites applauded the Customs Union is that they interpreted this as an important stage on the way to Turkey's eventual EU membership (Eder, 2003: 219-243). However, when the European Union did not take any responsibility for Turkey's socialization into EU's norms, by adopting teaching and persuasion strategies, this particular Turkish approach did not lead to Turkey's transformation of its security culture from *realpolitik* to non-*realpolitik*. These two factors did result in the dominance of Euro-sceptic circles in Turkey that has further curtailed Turkey's transformation.

3.2.4.1. Impact of Turkey's Security Culture on Its Reading of the EU Accession Process

In a country, which invests a lot in the integration with any particular kind of international organization, the political elite should share in the idea that integration would bring further security benefits to their country. If there existed serious doubts over the merits of the integration process as such that further integration would curtail the territorial sovereignty of the country leading to an overall decrease in the level of security felt, then the integration process would be levelled a serious blow.

In such a case, the domestic forces, which emphasise the sovereignty sensitivities of the country, would gain further ground at the expense of the forces, which argue for the security-generating effects of the integration process (Feldman, 2000).

Construed as such, it is important to discuss the ongoing discursive battle between the Euro-sceptic and pro-EU circles in Turkey in order to comprehend Turkey's growing critical approach towards the European Union. Of particular importance are their definition of Turkey's security identity and interests, their view of the EU's integration process and their diverging interpretation of the impact of the EU's accession process on the security of the nation-state, particularly concerning the dynamics of Turkish-Greek relations. Turkey's particular approach towards the EU and her performance to meet the EU's demands/norms would strongly depend on the people who rule the country. The more the Euro-sceptics reign in Ankara, the more Turkey becomes critical of the European Union and the less promising the EU's involvement in Turkish-Greek relations turns out to be.

Thought of this way, it would be appropriate to state here, just before moving to a full discussion of their views that the Euro-sceptic circles were in the dominant postitions over much of the 1990s. By this group of people, this paper means the higher echelons of the military and the majority of the political parties that came together within successive coalition governments over the last decade. These people are categorically in favour of Turkey's membership in the EU but problematize the terms of the accession process. One of the main factors that seems to explain their dominance in power is that the European Union circles could not show a clear commitment towards Turkey's incorporation into the Union and they could not sincerely and actively support the pro-EU circles in Turkey (Onis, 2003). When these factors combined with the opportunities that the ongoing democratization process

opened, the Euro-sceptic circles could succeed in dominating the domestic political life by mobilising the public opinion around nationalistic and at times anti-EU platforms (Adamson, 2002: 163-179).

3.2.4.1.1. The Pro-EU Discourse

Of the two current discourses, the pro-EU one constructs the ongoing accession process as the road-map that accelerates the pace of Turkey's inclusion in the EU as a full member. These people approach the EU from the logic of appropriateness in the sense that Turkey's claim to become an European/western country would foresee nothing but Turkey's attempts at internalizing the EU's norms without questioning them. The adherents of this view (mainly Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association-TUSIAD, Economic Development Foundation-IKV, the Centre of right parties-Motherland Party, the new version of political Islamists-the Justice and Development Party) feel committed to the idea of European integration and are content with the current structure of the European Union (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 297-326). This discourse overemphasises the things that Turkey needs to do. The underlying assumption here is that as the accession process unfolds, the quality of Turkey's relationship with the EU and the degree of Turkey's security will improve. This will be so because Turkey will gradually embrace the EU's distinctive security identity, not the other way around.

In regard to the general character of EU-Turkey relations, these people recommend that Turkey should behave in such an appropriate manner that would display its sincerity on the EU membership. Feeling so suspicious of the future intentions of the European Union on Turkey's security does not suit a country, which has continuously tried to make its way to Brussels. These people seem to be aware of

the fact that the relationship between the EU and Turkey is not symmetric and balanced and that Turkey, as the weaker party in this interaction process, is the side that should better do its homework to qualify for the membership. After all it is Turkey that knocks on the door of the EU.

Turkey's Customs Union deal in 1996, the publication of yearly progress reports since 1998, the confirmation of Turkey's EU candidacy in 1999, the devising of the Accession Partnership Document in 2000, the invitation by the EU of Turkey to participate in the European Convention meetings, the enunciation by the EU's December 2001 Leaken Summit of the possibility of the start of Turkey's accession talks, and the statement of a date for the start of Turkey's accession talks in December 2002 in the EU's Copenhagen summit, are all referred to by the pro-EU circles in Turkey as evidences to the commitment of the EU towards Turkey's membership (Kaleagasi, 2003; Aktar: 2001).

To this logic, if Turkey preserves its enthusiasm in complying with the Copenhagen criteria and fulfils the required steps that the Helsinki conclusions and the Accession Partnership document define, then it would be harder for the Europeans to delay the start of Turkey's accession talks for long. Once the accession talks start, it would be much easier and somehow automatic that the EU will admit Turkey as a member.

What seems to have led these circles to feel highly optimistic about the possibility of Turkey's EU membership is the logic that 'appears' to govern the current enlargement process of the EU towards the Central and Eastern European countries. To that logic, the EU is a post-modern security community and there is not a space-bounded conceptualization behind the EU's enlargement strategy but a temporal-mechanical understanding, which is mainly built on the principle that any

European country can become an EU member provided that its satisfies the Copenhagen criteria. In other words, this temporal logic implies a kind of ever-enlarging EU whose borders are not defined by clear-cut frontiers (Youngs, 2001; Ehrhart, 2002; Laffan, 2001: 709-727).

Looking at Turkey's relations with the EU from a geo-political perspective, the pro-EU view holds that Turkey, as an EU member, would be more able to pursue its geo-political interests in its neighbourhood. Because Turkey's current capabilities do not allow her to materialize her security interests in the most effective way, its EU membership would provide her with additional means in this regard. To them, Turkey's eventual membership in the EU would signify the realization of the permanent peace between Turkey and Europe (Ozdag, 2002: 28). Turkey would not be able to ward off the dangers to its security, if it does not pursue a closer relationship with the EU or just relies on its strategic relationship with the United States (Dagi, 2001; Aktar, 2003). In today's world, the EU membership seems to be the only avenue for Turkey to effectively respond to the risks and challenges of globalization. The sooner Turkey joins the EU, the more secure it would feel, in regard to both hard (conventional) and soft (non-conventional) security threats (Aktar, 2003).

To this discourse, the most important strategic issue that appears to have obstructed the effective functioning of Turkey's relations with the western international community in general and the EU in particular for long is Turkey's quarrel with Greece over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. As long as these problems linger, it would be the case that Turkey's place in the West will be questioned. It is only through Turkey's accession process with the EU that the Turkish political-military elite would feel the need to come to a compromise with Greece, that might

in the end relive Turkey of one of the stumbling blocks in its relations with the West. So the Europeanization of these problems is in fact an opportunity, not an obstacle as the Euro-sceptics argue, for Turkey to come closer to the EU and thus claim its rightful place in the western international community. Because Turkey's membership in the EU would give her the means to check the Greek influence in the region, Turkey should not be scared of the possibility of the EU's involvement in the solution of these problems. If Greeks, Greek Cypriots, Turks and Turkish Cypriots all alike live within the EU, why fear of the Europeanization of the Cyprus and Aegean disputes (Belge, 2003).

There seem to exist two major assumptions behind their optimism. One is related to the role that Turks generally assume Greece plays in the EU-Turkey relations. These people are of the view that one should not exaggerate Greece's potential to determine the main dynamics of Turkey's relations with the EU (Ugur, 2001: 161-198). They hold that if Turkey satisfies the Copenhagen criteria in its earnest and in turn if the major EU members feel optimistic about Turkey's accession to the EU, then it would not be a difficult task for them to overcome any possible Greek veto. They think that the further Turkey meets the membership criteria on the basis of the EU's security culture, the more pressure the EU would put on Greece to accommodate with Turkey. To them Turkey's bargaining power vis-à-vis Greece would only increase under such a condition. Their second assumption is that Turkey would find it easier to come to a compromise solution with Greece through the EU. It would become much easier for the Turkish politicians to sell any Turkish-Greek deal struck through the EU to the public. Once the thorny issues drop out of the agenda, then it would be easier for Turkey to take other required steps for membership. The existence of the Turkish-Greek disputes symbolises the most important psychological

barrier before Turkey's compliance with the EU accession process (Ozdag, 2002: 58).

These circles look at security from a different perspective. In an age of diminished threats from other states, they argue that the main security referents in Turkey should be the society in general and each Turkish citizen in particular. In today's world, the overall security of a nation-state cannot solely be measured by the degree of exemption from external threats but the degree of happiness and satisfaction its citizens feel. If there is no domestic peace, there is not going to be security (Dagi, 2001). The emphasis these people put on the societal dimensions of security seems to be in accordance with the current trends in international relations and the EU's integration process (Thelier, 2003: 248-263). These people see Turkey's EU accession process as the best strategy to deal with security threats, risks and challenges incurred by the ongoing globalization process (Bilgin, 2002, APSA). The flow of European money to Turkey, the continuation of democratization process and Turkey's successful integration with the global world would only occur if Turkey stayed on the EU accession process.

Thought of this way, the pro-EU circles in Turkey claim that Turkey's accession process with the EU is something good for the country because it reflects the letter and spirit of such a security mentality they claim to represent. Through pluralisation and liberalization of the domestic political life, they think Turkish people would be able to discuss every issue and in the end reach satisfactory outcomes. Turkey can only solve its problems of Kurdish separatism and political Islam through the process of politicization of these issues (Belge, 2003; Ozel, 2003). They fear that if Turkey turns its face away from the EU, no credible incentive would continue to exist for the establishment elite to try to embrace compromise solutions

to the issues of concern. A Turkey, which solved its major domestic problems through the EU accession process, would be more powerful and secure than as it is now. Above all, the main reason why the pro-EU circles in Turkey think the EU environment offers Turkey security is that they conceive of the EU as a post-modern, multi-cultural and supranational entity where people of different religious, historical, social and cultural origins can live in harmony and peace (Vural, 2002: 74-75).

Unlike the Euro-sceptics, these people think that Turkey's democratization should not be totally dependent on the quality of her relationship with the European Union and that the more Turkey gets democratised, the more it would be likely that the EU would admit Turkey as a member (Oguzlu, 2004-forthcoming). It is to the benefit of the Turkish people that the democratization process should proceed fast.

To them, the nature of the ongoing accession process, through its side effect of democratization, should not denote for the reluctance of the EU not to admit Turkey but on the contrary the EU's determination to prepare Turkey for future membership. In other words, these people think that the EU acts on a rational basis when it incessantly asks Turkey to further democratize. Why, these people ask, would the EU want to weaken Turkey through a process of democratization that would in the end lead to the decentralization and dismemberment of the country? (Kaleagasi, 2003) After all, it would be the EU itself that would have to deal with the risks and threats a decompartmentalized Turkey would likely pose to the EU's post-Cold War era institutional identity. To them the current EU accession criteria are designed in such a manner that would enable the EU to digest such a big country as Turkey at a future time.

3.2.4.1.2. The Euro-Sceptic Discourse

The Euro-sceptic discourse questions the current form of the European Union in general and the structure of the ongoing accession process in particular. Though the adherents of this view do not take issue with the general idea of European integration, they have a problem with the asymmetric power relationship between the EU members on the one hand and the candidate countries on the other (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 297-326). They want to bargain with the EU over the terms of the accession criteria, rather than strictly comply with the EU's demands. To these circles, Turkey does not need to prove its European identity in order to join the EU, but the EU should let Turkey in due to Turkey's European identity (Nas, 2001: 177-190).

They tend to characterise the accession process as a well-intended EU policy whose main goals are to de-emphasise Turkey's geo-politically defined strategic-identity and to create the best possible conditions for the EU to absorb Turkey. The underlying assumptions here are that the EU will (can) not admit Turkey as a member for security reasons and that as the accession process runs its course, Turkey will be confronted with grave risks and challenges for its security because the EU's attitude towards Turkey's membership is ambiguous to say the least. At the end of the day, Turkey will become a much weaker country than as it is now in terms of its ability to act as a pivotal geo-political security actor. Contrary to the previous discourse, the Euro-sceptics tend to put the onus on the European Union for all the bad and the good things in the EU-Turkey relations (Canefe and Bora, 2003: 127-148).

Even though these people have not seen a mutually constitutive relationship between democratization and the EU accession process right from the beginning,

they have gradually come to believe that the connections between these two processes are very strong and what happens in one can likely affect the other (Oguzlu, 2004-forthcoming). They have also developed the idea that since the EU is so reluctant on Turkey's membership, democratization might provide the EU with a lever to weaken Turkey and possibly pave the way for Turkey's disintegration in the face of increasing Kurdish and Islamist claims (Ozdag, 2002).

This discourse mainly holds that the EU accession process erodes Turkey's security because it contributes to the weakening of Turkey's geo-political power and identity, as well as the main principles, on which the modern Turkish Republic rest (Ilhan, 2000 and 2002). Conceptualizing Turkey's relations with Europe from a 'self-other' prism, Euro-scepticism in Turkey views the current accession process as a well-intended EU policy to construct a Turkey, whose resilience towards the EU's demands would gradually weaken.

The underlying assumption behind the Euro-sceptic logic is that the European Union, as it stands today, is not capable of digesting Turkey's membership for both economic and geo-political reasons. The main concern of today's EU is to successfully adapt to the membership of the twelve Central and Eastern European countries between the 2004-2008 time period. While this is the case, it seems to be impossible for the EU to accelerate Turkey's accession process. The EU is neither a global geo-political actor, with well-defined strategic interests in the regions around Turkey, nor possesses the required economic resources to cope with Turkey's membership. So read from this perspective, the Euro-sceptics tend to read Turkey's accession process with the EU by making a strong emphasise on the geo-political and economic calculations on the side of the EU (Ozdag, 2002). To them, the ongoing accession process aims two things. One is to develop a mechanism, which would

help the EU constructively manage its relations with Turkey by keeping her on the EU's orbit but not offering her a clear timetable for membership. The other is to slow Turkey's possible admittance to the EU while the latter will be busy with digesting the EU memberships of the CEECs and transforming into a geo-political actor of its kind.

The same circles go on to argue that while the geo-political logic dictated the EU's inclusive attitude towards the Central and Eastern European countries, neither an economic rationality nor geo-political imperatives seem to allow for such a possibility vis-à-vis Turkey. To this thinking, what motivated the EU members to extend membership to the CEECs was to stymie the possible hard and soft security threats that unstable and transitionary political environment there might pose to the EU. Due to the geographical closeness of these places to the Western Europe, it was somehow a geo-political necessity for the EU to offer those countries clear membership prospects (Reuber and Wolkersdorfer, 2002: 39-60). To the EU members, the threats that might stem from either the political structure of Turkey itself or the unstable places in Turkey's vicinity can be managed without granting membership to them, but by keeping them on the EU's orbit. In such a scenario Turkey would only be given the role of being a barrier between the EU's zone of peace and the zone of danger in the Greater Middle Eastern region.

These circles believe that the EU discriminates against Turkey on cultural, political and economic grounds (Onis, 1999). They point to the EU's treatment of the Central and Eastern European countries as evidences. Turkey was neither given significant sums of financial aids nor incorporated into many of the trans-European network programs (Rumford, 2000: 331-343).

To them, the ongoing accession process does mainly reflect the security interests of the European Union. Besides, there is not a positive relationship between the security of the EU and that of Turkey. It is inconceivable that the accession process serve both the EU's and Turkey's security interests at the same time, because the asymmetric power relationship between the two sides would not allow for this. A Turkey, which strives to meet the EU's membership criteria, would feel less secure than it does now (Manisali, 2001). To this conceptualization, the Europeans are still captive to their cultural and historical biases towards Turkey. The accession process would also serve as a constraint on Turkey's ability first to determine its geo-political priorities and then to pursue them.

To the Euro-sceptics the best possible arrangement of EU-Turkey relations would take place if the European Union evolved into a global strategic-security actor and then admitted Turkey as a member due to the geo-political and military capabilities of the latter. The continuation of EU-Turkey relations on an inter-governmental basis would serve Turkey's interests more because Turkey would not feel obliged to undergo a radical transformation process, hence preserve its security norms intact. Through this way, Turkey would be able to preserve its character of being a strong nation-state functioning on the Republican principles. These people are inclined to explain all positive developments in EU-Turkey relations in terms of hard-core geo-political considerations (Ilhan, 2000 and 2002).

The Euro-sceptics would like to see that the EU treats Turkey more positively than other candidates because Turkey is an important security actor not only in its environment but also the greater European context. If the EU wants to evolve into a global security actor in the regions surrounding Turkey, it is a must for the EU to agree to Turkey's accession. The facts that Turkey has been contributing to the

realization of the European security interests since the beginning of the Cold War as a legitimate partner and that Turkey has been equipped with the tools to provide for European security, namely its NATO membership and sophisticated military capabilities, seem to have emboldened those circles in their claims. These circles are inclined to explain the EU's decision to admit Turkey as a candidate in 1999, even though Turkey could not come closer to the EU since 1997 in terms of its performance in meeting the Copenhagen criteria, on the basis of the EU's growing security needs to attach Turkey firmly to Europe (Muftuler-Bac, 2000: 489-502).

It is further argued that rather than contributing to the emergence of a healthy liberal-pluralist domestic political environment in the country, the ongoing accession process damages to a significant degree internal peace in Turkey, whose foundations and security norms have been built by the Lasusanne Treaty of 1923 (Rumford, 2002: 258-277). In principle, full democratization, completion of a liberal economic order and adoption of the EU's Community Law are all regarded by these circles as legitimate EU demands. However, their anxiety arises out of Turkey's domestic and external context. Ideal as it might seem to have a plural democratic system in a country, especially in an EU-candidate one, the ongoing accession process in Turkey might result in just the opposite of what is intended. The sensitivity of the establishment elite over the founding principles of the Republic, namely secularism and Turkish nationalism, seems to have led to the cultivation of suspicions on their part in regard to the specific EU demands (Manisali, 2001; Kosebalaban, 2002: 130-146; Barkey, 2000: 87-105; Aydinli, 2002: 209-225; Yavuz, 2000: 33-38). To these circles, one should not compare Turkey to the major EU members where pluralism and liberalism in the political arena would not constitute grave risks for the make-up of their societies because their historical paths do not follow the same lines as those

of Turkey. Turkey is the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire, a multi-religious and multi-national polity, and therefore is justified to feel more sensitive over the demands on these issues.

The sources of their sensitivities seem to originate from two factors, both of which appear to reflect the legacy of the Ottoman Empire-Europe relations. One is that the Empire had to come to an end just because of the multi-religious and multi-national characters of the political structure of the Ottoman State. It was through the policies of the then European powers that these characteristics of the Empire led to its dismemberment at the hands of its subjects. The second is that the founding fathers of the Republic adopted the Europeanization ideal from an instrumental perspective with a view to rooting out the traces of multi-nationalism and 'politicization of religion' in the new State (Heper, 2000: 63-83). This is an ongoing process and has not reached a satisfactory conclusion yet. Their fear is that the Europeanization process might scuttle all the positive achievements reached so far (Jenkins, 2001).

They also fear that even though regionalization and the sharing of sovereignty in the European Union generally occur on the basis of economic rationality, that might take place in Turkey along ethnic-lines. The Europeanization process might also result in the erosion of the institution of citizensip in the sense that the well established state-above-society structure migth give into the society-above-state structre (Keyman and Icduygu, 2003: 217-232). Moreover, the Euro-sceptics contend that the EU may not necessarily turn out to become a more supra-national entity in the years to come, overemphasising common European interests instead of national ones. For the time being it seems that the allegiance of the peoples of the major EU members to their nation-states far outweighs the level of their

identification with the EU (Euro-barometer results). After all, the decision-making mechanisms within the EU, particularly concerning the key areas of foreign, security and defence policies, are mainly of inter-governmental in nature. Strong states have greater degree of representation in all of the EU organs. The logic lying behind the Euro-sceptic view is that if the EU will preserve its inter-governmental character in the years to come, why would Turkey feel obliged to embrace the often-heard understanding of sovereignty, according to which sovereignty is shared by supranational EU organs in Brussels, the central authorities in the capital and the local authorities dispersed throughout the country.

It is doubted that Turkey would have to evolve into a more decentralized and federalized political structure as the ongoing accession process runs its course. However, if it is highly likely that the common European interests are going to be defined by stronger EU members, then what would be the use of taking some steps that might contribute to erosion of the central authority in Turkey (Ozdag, 2002). What if the major EU members decide to turn the tide away from further integration towards more inter-governmentalism? What if they decide not to take Turkey in even though the latter would have been involved in the transformation process along the EU's demand to higher degrees?

To the Turkish Euro-scepticism, either the accession process itself or the future membership in the EU would certainly constrain Turkey's freedom of action around its environment. How would Turkey be able to devote a concerted attention to the external developments in its neighbourhood while being so busy with minimising the possible dangers of the would-be decentralisation process within the country? Because the quasi-imperial structure of the EU does not allow for the existence of strong nation-states along the peripheries of the EU, Turkey would not

be able to define and implement its geo-political interests in the way as it does now. The only option left for Turkey would be to follow the instructions of Brussels and to act as the agent of the EU in the region. Unless the core of the EU does not want, a federalised and highly decentralized Turkey would not be able to affect the geo-political priorities of the Union in such a way that the EU turns its attention to Turkey's neighbourhood and resolves to act as a strategic-security actor (Ozdag, 2002).

Thought of this way, the Turkish Euro-sceptics would feel more comfortable with Turkey's ongoing strategic cooperation with the United States and Israel. In the face of common threat perceptions and strategic mentality, they think Turkey would be in a much better position in pursuing its national interests in the Greater Middle Eastern region (Kibaroglu, 2003, forthcoming). The Europeans would most probably not understand Turkey's hard-core security concerns emanating from the possession by Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbours of Weapons of Mass Destruction and medium-to-long range ballistic missiles. Neither would the EU members be receptive to the idea that Turkey's policies of forming alliances with Israel and the United States and improving its conventional military capabilities are worth in containing such threats as mentioned above (Bir and Sherman, 2002: 23-52; Tayfur, 2000; Turan, 1998).

The Euro-sceptics in Turkey also argue that the current EU policies towards the Turkish-Greek relations are nothing more than the reflection of the EU's determination to contribute to the erosion of Turkey's geo-political power and identity. The thing that seems to have created the greatest pressure on the these elites is the EU's demand that Turkey needs to settle all its territorial disputes with Greece over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus by the end of 2004. To them, one of the significant

factors that constitutes Turkey's security culture as well as its geo-political identity in the Eastern Mediterranean region consists of the idea that the strategic balance between Greece and Turkey, which the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 and the 1960 treaties on Cyprus had established, needs to be preserved (Kramer, 1991: 57-71; Barlas and Turan, 1999: 469-489). The reason why they have been sensitive about the Europeanization of Turkish-Greek relations is that they perceive Greek actions within the EU as giving damage to the one of the well-established aspects of the EU-Turkey relations, that is the strategic connection. The strategic connection in EU-Turkey relations constitutes the most important and the oldest conduit binding Turkey and the EU to each other. Furthermore, it is pointed out that the real source of Turkey's geo-political identity and power in regard to the region stems from the fact that it is Turkey, not Greece or any other country, that can most effectively preserve and promote European interests in the area.

Thought of this way, the Euro-sceptics arrive at two major conclusions. The first is that the EU is not a neutral actor in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes simply because Greece has been an EU member since 1981 and successfully utilise the EU's platforms against Turkey. The second is that the EU membership of Cyprus, without *a priori* political settlement between the two communities, and a possible resolution of the Aegean disputes through the International Court of Justice in the Hague in line with Greece's position, would certainly militate against Turkey's geo-political identity, power and interests (Manisali, 2002; Suvarierol, 2003: 55-78). To the Euro-sceptics, any strategic retreat in Cyprus and the Aegean Sea constitutes the threshold, beyond which Turkey' ability to stand against the future demands of the EU will decrease. If a feeling of inferiority penetrates into the minds of Turkish political-military elite due to the erosion of Turkey's geo-political identity and

interests in the region, this will be the most dangerous thing one could imagine (Ozdag, 2002).

The signs of their discontent with what they perceived as a pro-Greek EU position could be seen in Turkey's response to the EU's invitation to participate in the European conference scheduled for March 1998 (Yesilada, 1999: 144-161). Prospective participants were asked to indicate a commitment to take unresolved border issues to the International Court of Justice. Turkey, already disgruntled at the EU decision at the Luxembourg summit in December 1997 to exclude Turkey from the first and second waves of enlargement, resolved to suspend its political dialogue with the EU and declined to join the planned conference on the grounds that its participation would have implied agreement with Greece's interpretation of how to resolve the Aegean disputes (Park, 2000: 31-53).

Their discontent with the accession process only increased when the EU seemed to offer Turkey the candidacy status in Helsinki on the condition that Turkey would need to accept that the political resolution of the Cyprus dispute would not be a precondition for Cyprus's membership in the EU (at least the Greek Cypriot part of it). In interpreting the EU position on the Cyprus conflict, the Euro-sceptic circles come to two main conclusions: the EU has been unwilling to put enough pressure on Greek Cypriots to compromise with their co-islanders in the north (Sonyel, 2003: 20-33) and Turkey's EU membership might depend on Turkish concessions over the island, which would in turn jeopardise Turkey's strategic (one can read national security) interests in the eastern Mediterranean. The best manifestation of the Euro-sceptics's view on the Cyprus dispute can be seen in Turkey's National Program prepared in March 2001.[*]

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[*] One can reach Turkey's National Program at:
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/npaa_full.pdf

To them, the major EU summit decisions, Luxembourg in 1997, Helsinki in 1999 and Copenhagen in 2002, are not encouraging enough to give Turkey incentive to continue the Europeanization process. In parallel to their scepticism on the EU's intentions on Turkey, they have gradually tried to hinge the scope and intensity of the democratization process within the country on the quality of Turkey's Europeanization process. To them further democratization should follow credible EU attitudes towards Turkey's accession. The more the EU becomes receptive to Turkey, the more democratization process in Turkey will proceed and the more Turkey will adopt pro-EU foreign policy choices and behaviours. The first step should come from the European Union (Ilhan, 2000 and 2002).

3.2.4.2. Turkey's Security Culture and Attractiveness of non-EU Options

An important factor that seems to inhibit Turkey's efforts to internalize the EU's security identity concerns her close strategic relationship with the United States in Eurasia, the Central Asia and the Greater Middle East. This also inhibits Turkey's cooperative relations with Greece on the basis of non-*realpolitik* security understanding. However, it needs to be stated that such kind of a foreign policy course has not been Turkey's first option but gradually came into being as the European Union turned down Turkey's membership application. Even though the majority of the political parties and the public have been advocating Turkey's EU membership, they have found themselves backing non-EU alternatives as they perceived the EU discriminating against Turkey (Kirisci, 2000: 37-63).

Nevertheless, there are some facilitating factors that made such a non-EU option as a strategy to implement. First, Turkey's Republican security culture made it possible to cooperate with the United States in the above-mentioned regions. Both

Turkey and the United States are used to operate in the international arena along the principles of *realpolitik* security culture. Second, the 1990s witnessed an increase in the quality of the whole gamut of Turkish-Israeli relations, which fostered bilateral cooperation in economic, social and military areas (Inbar, 2001: 115-128; Makovsky, 1996:147-170; Altunisik, 2000: 172-191). To mention one example, the two could sign a sophisticated military agreement in 1996. These strategic relationships with the US and Israel did not constitute an aberration from Turkey's security culture. Their threat perceptions vis-à-vis the Weapons of Mass Destruction, the ballistic missiles to deliver them and terrorism were (are still) similar. Third, the American governments did not force Turkey to go through a radical transformation process to become a model for the newly established states in this region (Kuniholm, 2001: 25-53; Larrabee, 1999: 231-247). To them, the secular and homogenous nature of the Turkish nation-state was enough for those countries to emulate. For the Americans Turkey's stability always came before Turkey's democratization (Kramer, 2000: 223-231). Fourth, the American interests in the above-mentioned regions did most of the time coincide with those of Turkey. Fifth, the US governments always declared their support to Turkey's march to the EU, (Pearson, 2001/2002: 53-61, Kirisci, 2001: 129-150) and played the role of consoling Turks when the Europeans rebuke them. The Turkish elites seem to be content with their relations with the Americans because the latter tend to treat Turkey as a more important country then Greece in terms of the geo-political and geo-strategic considerations (Wilkinson, 2000: 185-218). Sixth, there was (and is still) a similarity between Turkish and US ways of dealing with terrorism. The United States has assisted Turkey in its struggle against terrorism while some of the EU members supported the PKK and served as the PKK's financial bases.

When the Western international community acted as a coherent entity, Turkey could find it easier to align its policies with that of the European Union. In such cases Turkey followed a cooperative and multilateral foreign policy, in accordance with EU's security norms. Turkey's participation in cooperative security arrangements in the Balkans and other parts of the world together with the Europeans testifies to this (Criss, 1995: 198-214). In case the Turkish security elites concurred that the issues of concern touched upon Turkey's vital interests and that the Western international community seemed divided on such issues, they tended to follow unilateral and nationalistic foreign policies. In such cases it would not matter to them whether they aligned their choices with those of the European Union (Sayari, 2000, 169-183; Makovsky, 1999: 92-113).

Nonetheless, co-operation with the United States has many drawbacks. First, the alliance will last only so long as the bilateral security interests of the two countries continue to overlap. For Turkey, as the weaker and more dependent party, this could create strong pressure to forsake some national interests for the sake of the alliance. Second, it would be irrational for the Turkish elite to find solace in a strategic-security relationship with the United States in the absence of institutionalized economic relations with Washington. It seems that the Americans are content with keeping the relationship a military one, despite repeated Turkish calls for more free trade and social interaction (The latest of many attempts to establish institutional economic relations with the United States occurred in February 2002 when the Turkish prime minister visited Washington DC).

Third, if reliance on the strategic relationship with the United States is at the expense of the 'Europeanization' of Turkey, Turkey's march to a 'more pluralistic-less authoritarian' democracy and 'more liberal-less statist' economic order will certainly

be delayed (Dagi, 2002). Even though it is not my intention to portray the accession/integration process with the European Union as the best possible alternative to Turkey's strategic-security dominated relationship with the United States, one needs to be cognizant of the fact that Turkey's interests in gaining EU membership are far more important than a continued strategic-security relationship with the United States. More than half of Turkey's trade is with the EU countries, and traditionally Turkey's Western identity lies in Europe, not across the Atlantic.

Even though the majority of the Turkish elite does not fall into the trap of either the United States or the EU and seems to recognize the different dynamics of EU-Turkey and United States-Turkey relations, the danger is that further 'Americanization' of Turkish foreign and security policy orientation might risk derailing Turkey from the EU track. This danger will be more acute if the West becomes more divisive (Walt, 1999: 3-11).

The latest Iraqi war has demonstrated that Turkey and the United States do not always see eye to eye. If they cannot bridge their perspectives on Iraq, particularly Northern Iraq, they might further apart from each other on the basis of their security understandings. While Turkey might feel the need to internalize the EU' security culture as a balancing strategy vis-à-vis the Americans, the United States might continue to stick to the *realpolitik* security culture to the degrees never seen before. The fact that the gap between the United States and other security actors is continuing to widen in terms of material power capabilities, the US' adherence to *realpolitik* security culture would likely increase.

3.2.5. Turkey's Approach towards Greece

Another factor that decreased the promise of the EU in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes over the last decade is that the Turkish security elite did not view Greece as a truly European country and acted towards her from a strategic-instrumental perspective. In this process, the EU's treatment of Greece as a bargaining chip in its overall relations with Turkey also played an important role. What would be the use of coming to terms with Greece along Turkey's EU accession process when the EU did not foresee Turkey's accession in the short-run and when the Turks regarded Greece as a non-European country (Onis, 2002; interview with Onis, 2 July 2002).

The important thing in this regard is that the dynamics of EU-Turkey relations affect the dynamics of Turkey-Greece relations. As Turkey felt excluded from the European Union on the basis of identity-security related rationalities, its tendency to view Greece from a *realpolitik* perspective increased. Turkey at times projected its failures in meeting the EU's demands onto Greece. These concerns are pure ideational concerns and cannot solely be explained by the power disparities between the two countries.

The Turkish elites perceive Greece's attempts at Europeanising the dynamics of bilateral Turkish-Greek disputes as dangerous for the smooth functioning of EU-Turkey relations, especially in the field of security. The fear is that Greece's instrumental usage of the EU's platforms against Turkey might further erode the 'positive-European-security-provider' image of Turkey in the EU's eyes, as well as Turkey's privileged position over Greece in the greater Middle Eastern region.

The dynamics of Turkey's relations with Greece matter to a considerable extent in determining the congruence between the security conceptualizations of the

EU and Turkey. In contrast to the Cold War era, in which the heat of Turkey-Greece relations used to be taken off by the constraints of the bipolar structure of the international system, the last decade proved to be more conducive to any armed confrontation between them. The dynamics of the post-Cold War Turkey-Greece relations demonstrated two things. One is the fact that the possibility that Turkey might indulge in an interstate-armed conflict with Greece increased. It is not only with its Middle Eastern neighbours to the south, but also with Greece, an EU member developed country, that Turkey might find itself in a future military conflict. The way Turkey deals with her territorial problems with Greece will play an enormous role in demonstrating whether and if Turkey can be regarded as a country fit for EU membership. The fact that one of the most important requirements of the EU membership is about the lack of possibility of interstate war and the presence of peaceful neighbourly relations, Turkey's interaction with Greece over the Cyprus and the Aegean sea disputes serves as a litmus test as for the appropriateness of Turkey's EU membership.

Because Greece is fundamentally different from Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbours due to its EU and NATO memberships and inclusion among the developed members of the international community, Turkey's way of interaction with Greece will be much more important than the way it deals with its neighbours in the south. What one can drive from this observation is that Greece holds one of the most important keys, which might open the doors of the EU to Turkey. Turkey's interaction with Greece will shed light on Turkey's feasibility for the EU membership, that is a pure 'ideational' concern. A Greece, which builds her European identity on the otherness of Turkey and Turkey's exclusion from the EU, might easily sabotage Turkeys' future hope for the EU membership by carrying the

Cyprus and the Aegean Sea problems to the EU-Turkey agenda and by forcing Turkey to adopt an intransigent and hardline attitude towards its western neighbour.

As a result of their misgivinbgs about Greece's role within the EU, the Turkish elites have never internalized the idea that the earlier Turkey reached a consensus with Greece along its accession process, the more likely the prospects of its accession to the EU would become. The EU's gradual exclusion of Turkey on the security-identity basis has made it difficult for the Turkish elites to cooperate with Greece along the EU accession process. They did not see the resolution of bilateral disputes within the EU framework as legitimate. Instead, Turkey mainly considered its policy towards Greece as a derivative of its overall approach towards the EU. The Turkish rationale has evolved in such a way that the more the majority of the EU members treat Turkey as European and offers her a credible membership prospect backed by promising rewards and costly punishments, the more easily Turkey solves her territorial disputes with Greece along its accession process (Guvenc, 2000: 102-129).

This points to a pure instrumental logic in the sense that Turkey is not interested in the solution of the Turkish-Greek problems in themselves, but views and exploits the outcomes of any cooperative Turkish-Greek interaction in order to extract further benefits from the European Union. In one sense, Turkey has countered the Greek strategy of 'conditional rewards' with the strategy of 'conditional sanctions'. The message sent to Greece has been that 'if you cerate problems in my relations with the European Union, you had better forget any peaceful atmosphere in the Eastern Mediterranean region that would otherwise enable you to complete the 'Europeanization process' successfully'. These are ideational points and directly constituted by the dynamics of Turkey-EU relations.

The Turkish political-security elite has also regarded Greece as a possible scapegoat for all the negative developments in the EU-Turkey relations. When Turkey's 'European-ness' has been severely disputed by the EU circles, the Turkish elites have countered these moves by arguing that Turkey has been European for ages and if there were any country within the EU that is not European that would be Greece. Labelling Greece as a non-European country and blaming her for the worsening of EU-Turkey relations has at times served as an excuse for Turkey's own failures and deficiencies in meeting the EU's membership criteria. Greece has served as a useful target to divert the attention of the domestic and European circles when things went wrong in the overall EU-Turkey relations (Interview with Bolukbasi, 16 June 2002; Onis, 2001: 105-119; Ugur, 2001: 217-242).

At times of negative EU-Turkey interaction processes, Turkey adopted *realpolitik* behaviours and tried to prove its 'European-ness' by projecting all non-European attributes onto Greece. The promise of the European Union was at its lowest level at these times. For example, this was the case between 1995-1999. During the Imia crisis in 1996 and the S-300 missile crisis in 1997-1998, Turkey vociferously argued that Greece's course of action during these crises did not fit well with European identity. To Turkish political and security elites, Greece's behaviour during these crises provided the EU members with additional evidence to Greece's non-European identity. In fact, one could argue that it was a deliberate action on the part of the Turkish security elite to escalate the crisis atmosphere and push Greece to adopt aggressive stances. Through this way, the Turkish elite might have thought that it was Greece's non-European identity and behaviours that caused these crises at the first instance (Ayman, 2000).

The same logic of behaviour was also evident during the course of Öcalan crisis in 1999, when Turkey in one sense caught Greece off red-handed. The capture of Öcalan, the leader of the outlawed PKK terrorist organization, in the Greek embassy in Kenya with a Greek-Cypriot passport on himself revealed the close relations between Greece, a self-alleged European country, and PKK, a terrorist organization trying to undermine the territorial integrity and national security of an EU-associate country, Turkey. This provided Turkey with the greatest opportunity ever found to justify the decades-long claim that Greece did not deserve a European label and a seat around the tables in Brussels (Interview with Eralp, 10 May 2002).

Despite the fact that Turkey's perception of Greece started to change with the second half of the 1990s as the Turkish elite saw that the dynamics of Turkey-EU relations were to be strongly affected by the tone of Turkey-Greece relations, the main reasons behind Turkey's recently initiated cooperative approach towards Greece in 1999 prior to the Helsinki Summit displayed that Turkey still treated Greece instrumentally and from a *realpolitik* perspective. The main motive of Turkey's cooperative mood towards Greece was not to resolve the long-standing Turkish-Greek disputes but to enhance her prospects of EU membership by taking advantage of the changing dynamics of regional environment in 1999, not to mention to ameliorate Turkey's image in the eyes of the major EU members (Siegl, 2002: 40-52). In other words, relations with Greece were instrumentalized in order to accelerate Turkey's EU accession process.

When Greece was caught off guard in the Öcalan affair and when the EU's ability to forge a common foreign and security policy was given a serious setback by the EU's poor performance on the Kosovo conflict, the international strategic environment turned out to become very favourable for Turkey to act on a cooperative

logic towards the EU. The thinking was that both Greece's and the EU's bargaining leverages vis-à-vis Turkey seriously deteriorated and that Turkey's gains from a cooperative policy towards Greece and the EU would become more than its possible losses. Greece would have to show more flexibility towards Turkey's positions on the Cyprus and the Aegean Sea in order to recuperate her tarnished image in the eyes of Turkey and the international community.

Besides, political elites in Ankara might have concluded that a Turkey, which is on good track with Greece, a member of the EU, might have better chances for admission into this exclusive club. Given that Athens holds one of the 15 keys to Ankara's EU membership, Turkey might have approached Greece with such a strategic consideration in mind (Bahcheli, 2000: 131-152).

3.2.6. The Legacy of the Past, 1990-1997: Conflict Dominates?

The record of the Turkish-Greek relations during the first decade of the post-Cold War era did not prove optimistic for the future because the decades-long culture of mistrust has well penetrated into the national thinking in both countries. Based on the account below, this section of the dissertation argues that it will be extremely difficult for these countries to break the well-established conflictual cycle in bilateral relations.

Starting with the divergence of opinions as for the handling of the crises in the territories of the ex-Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey set off a chain of rivalry in the Balkans reflecting their desires to dominate the regional politics in the post-Cold War era (Cavusosmanoglu, 2002; Buyukcolok, 2000; Sonmezoglu, 2000; McDonald, 2001: 116-150). Despite the claims that both are members of the Western security community and have the entire wherewithal to work together for peace and stability

in the region, they preferred completely divergent and conflicting courses of actions in the Balkans. Instead of cooperating within the institutional links they have with the West, they constructed a kind of rivalry in the region. The crises in the territories of the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Macedonia, demonstrated that Turkey and Greece were actually involved in opposite camps. Neither during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina nor over the name issue concerning the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) they saw eye to eye.

However, one needs to mention here that the rivalry relationships mainly stemmed from the nature of Greece's relations with the European Union. As long as she was a marginal insider within the EU; as long as she approached the EU from a *realpolitik* perspective; and as long as the EU did not treat Greece as a true European country, Greece viewed Turkey from the *realpolitik* perspective setting the stage for regional rivalry. While Greece's Balkan politics in the first half of the 1990s were mainly nationalistic, unilateral and anti-Western, Turkey's course of actions reflected a multilateral, pro-western and cooperative dimension. Rather than constituting a fact, the image of Turkish-Greek rivalry in the Balkans was mainly a Greek fabrication based on Greece's fear of encirclement in the face of Turkey's cooperative relations with Greece's neighbours.

The Turkish-Greek rivalry in the Balkans took place as Turkey and Greece each advocated different routes for the transportation of Caspian Sea oil and gas reserves to the European markets. While Turkey campaigned for the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipelines project, Greece argued for the merits of Burgas-Alexandropolis pipeline (Kentrotis, 2000: 323-338). Besides, while Turkey worked for the realization of an East-West Motorway project, which would pass through Turkey, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania bypassing Greece, Greece proposed the

construction of North-South Motorway project, which would exclude Turkey (Buyukcolak, 2000: 131-139; Craig, 1999).

When Turkey's partial exclusion from the EU was on the agenda, Turkey and Greece developed *realpolitik*-based security relations. For example, a serious crisis broke out in February 1996 over the legal status of two small islets in the Aegean Sea situated within three miles off the Turkish coast, called Kardak by the Turks and Imia by the Greeks. Two countries almost came to the brink of war (Hickok, 1998: 118-136). The significance of this crisis lays in the fact that Turkey for the first time started to question the legal status of some islands scattered in the Aegean Sea. Coining the term 'gray areas' Turkey initiated a policy of bringing the sovereignty issues onto the agenda of Turkish-Greek relations. The Imia/Kardak crisis also revealed that if the ongoing democratization process in Turkey were not seriously supported by the European Union in such a way that the EU channels its credible backing to the pro-democracy and pro-EU circles in Turkey, then this democratization process would benefit only the circles which thrives on parochial and unilateral nationalism. The EU's incredible socializing strategy enhanced the position of the Euro-sceptic circles in Turkey. The performance of the then Prime Minister Tansu Çiller of the True Path Party exactly confirmed this observation. In the face of the EU's ambiguous policy towards Turkey, it was not difficult for the political parties to successfully employ mobilising ideologies of 'nationalism' and 'political Islam' over the last decade.

Another crisis took place over Cyprus when the Republic of Cyprus intended to bring in S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Russia. Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus jointly declared that such a move by the Greek Cypriots would be reciprocated harshly. It was made clear that Turkey would strike

at the missiles if they were installed on the island. Although the tension was reduced with the decision of the Greek Cypriot government to install them in the island of Crete, instead of Cyprus, the underlying logic that dictated the policy of ordering such surface-to-air missiles still prevails in the southern part of the island (Christodoulos, 2001: 325-355).

Another crisis was the involvement of the Greek agents in Öcalan case. For the first time, the Turkish accusation that Greece has been giving support to PKK terror organization for years was proven right when it was made public that Ocalan, the leader of the outlawed terror organization, was given shelter in the residence of the Greek ambassador in Kenya.

3.2.7. The EU's Changing Approach towards Greece

Another factor that has affected the overall promise of the EU relates to the EU's changing perception of Greece from being a bargaining chip with Turkey into a true European country that needs to be listened carefully. What makes the EU's changing perception of Greece important with respect to the EU's role to contribute to Turkish-Greek cooperation is the fact that while the EU has gradually accepted Greece's normalcy in the EU-based European international society, it has at the same time adopted a more critical attitude towards Turkey's aspirations to become a part of the same society. The EU has inadvertently contributed to the chasm between Turkey and Greece by treating Greece as European and Turkey not. While Turkey's otherness has been reinforced, Greece's 'selfness' has been gradually internalized by the EU. Under these conditions, it proved really difficult for Turkey and Greece to end up with a cooperative relationship in their region.

The fact that Greece has been regarded as more European from the second half of the 1990s onwards did not lead Greece to develop a non-*realpolitik* security behaviour towards Turkey, because the EU itself did not see Turkey as European and continued to hold on to its well-established constructively managed deliberate ambiguity policy towards Turkey. As will be explained later in detail, it would be apt to point out here that when this situation, namely the EU's treatment of Greece as more European, combined with, first, Greece's partially internalization of the EU's constructively managed deliberate ambiguity policy towards Turkey, and then, the EU's decision to engage Turkey through the candidacy mechanism, a regional stability set in the region. This dissertation argues that the regional stability and tranquillity in the region within the last four years is attributable to *realpolitik* factors, such as the increase in Greece's soft power vis-à-vis Turkey. However, this *realpolitik* outcome, stability on the basis of distribution of power capabilities, can only be understood within the context of Turkey-EU relations. Turkey and Greece have lived through a relative stability not because Greece's bargaining power has increased vis-a-vis Turkey but this has occurred within the context of identity-security based Turkey-EU relations. Therefore this kind of *realpolitik* stability is not material but ideational (Couloumbis and Ifantis, 2002). In the pre-1999 era, there was an unstable regional environment based on identity-driven *realpolitik* security understanding and now, since 1999, there is a partially stable regional environment based on identity-driven *realpolitik* security understanding.

Initially, the European Union did not help Greece avoid of thinking in *realpolitik* terms by treating her instrumental in terms of its relations with Turkey and in terms of its concerns over the EU's enlargement. Two examples from the recent past would be enough to demonstrate that the EU did not act as the 'protector

power' as Greece wanted to see (Ioakimidis, 1999: 169-191). The 1992 decision of the Ministrial Council of the Western European Union (the military wing of the EU until its merger with the EU in 1999) to exclude Greece from the collective defence area of the Brussels Treaty in case of an armed conflict with Turkey was the harbinger of the most recent EU decision that the area of responsibility of the emerging European Army would not cover the Aegean Sea and Cyprus (Tsakaloyannis, 1996: 186-207).

However, in parallel to Greece's further Europeanization efforts, Greece's partners in the EU gradually adopted more pro-Greek stances in regard to specific Turkish-Greek disputes in the second half of the 1990s (Ioakimidis, 2000: 359-372). What has been observed in the EU-Turkey-Greece triangle since 1996 has been the confirmation of this outcome. As Greece acquired a more European face and adopted a more federalist attitude toward the EU's integration process, her soft power against Turkey dramatically increased because her partners within the EU started to view Greece as a European country in the Balkans rather than as a Balkan country in Europe (Tsoukalis, 1999: 65-74). It became possible under these conditions that the EU had to agree to Customs Union with Turkey in return for a pledge to Greeks/Greek Cypriots that accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus would start six months after the end of inter-governmental conference. The EU's pro-Greek attitude has become solidified since 1999 as many of the official documents regulating EU-Turkey relations attest to this.

Greece gradually embraced the view that the previous inter-governmentalist approach towards the EU integration process did not yield positive outcomes in the strategic games with Turkey.

3.2.8. What does Europeanization Mean in Greece's post-1996/1999 Policy towards Turkey?

Before the second half of the 1990s, Greece's policy towards Turkey was not in accordance with that of the European Union. In one way or the other, one can argue that Greece's conception of Turkey was more primitive and conflict-conducive compared to that of the EU. Turkey was cast as Greece's other and all Greek attempts were made to keep Turkey away from the EU. When the EU's ambiguous attitude towards Turkey combined with Greece's ambiguous/non-European position within the EU, one could safely argue that Greece adopted anti-Turkey policies in order to legitimize her 'Europan-ness' in the eyes of her partners within the EU (Panagiotopoulou, 1997: 349-370; Dragonas and Bar-On, 2000: 335-353). However, such a course of action proved to be the worst of all outcomes for Greece, since both Greece's partners within the EU could hide behind Greece when they had to decline Turkey's membership aspirations and Turkey did not agree to the settlement of the disputes in mor pro-Greek ways. It would become a highly difficult course of action for Greece to actively support Turkey's EU membership when her partners have seen Turkey non-European. In one way or the other, non-Turkey policies could better serve Greece's interest in having its EU partners recognize her European identity.

However, one needs to make it clear that the level of EU's anti-Turkishness was lower than that of Greece. Even though both Greece and her partners within the EU shared in the idea that Turkey's membership in the EU would (should) not become a possibility in the years ahead, Greece differed from her partners in the sense that she was even against any effective and cooperative relationship between the EU and Turkey. Instead, Greece's partners within the EU were happy with Turkey's EU-orientation among many choices of Turkish foreign policy.

Built on the partial differentiation between the EU and Turkey in terms of their security and foreign policy cultures, another argument of this dissertation is that it would be simplistic to claim that the more Greece integrated with the core of the European Union, the less it would embrace an anti-Turkish foreign policy, with a view to sincerely supporting Turkey's EU membership. This would be so because the European Union itself did not seem to want to accord membership to Turkey. I contend that Greece *even* failed to adopt the EU's 'constructively managed deliberate ambiguity' policy toward Turkey, let alone channelling its full support to Turkey's full membership in the EU.

What matters in this regard is that the upper limits of the 'Europeanization' in the context of Greece's foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey do not presuppose a 'sincere' belief in Turkey's membership in the European Union. Instead, it foresees the internalization of the EU's consequential view of Turkey, i.e., the EU had better constructively manage its relations with Turkey, rather than offering her full membership (Tsoukalis, 1999: 65-74). Therefore, one should not feel so much optimistic as to expect that the Europeanization of Greece's foreign policy would certainly lead to cooperative Turkish-Greek relations. The change of the old policy of 'trying to do everything possible to exclude Turkey from Europe' with the new policy of 'helping its EU partners keep relations with Turkey on the level of constructively managed deliberate ambiguity' will not offer promising signals for future cooperation between these two countries (Interview with Taşhan and Öniş), for such a policy change would only imply Greece's adoption of a less dangerous *realpolitik* security behaviour instead of a more dangerous one.

Even though, there has been an apparently positive shift in Greece's attitude both towards the EU's integration process and Turkey since the instalment of Simitis

government, this reversal would be bound to remain insufficient for the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes. On the other hand, the dispute settlement would be greatly facilitated if Greece ceased to view Turkey's EU membership accession process as a means to secure its national interests and begin to regard it as an end in itself, meaning Turkey's further attachment to the EU, paving the ground for a mutual internalization of the shared norms and values of European security community. The main reasons for this scepticism arises from the underlying rationales behind Greece's later Europeanization efforts and its openings to Turkey.

It appears that Greece increased its efforts in further Europeanization from an instrumental perspective in the sense that Greece would remain as a highly marginalized EU member-state in the ever enlarging EU if she delayed its convergence with the EU (Prodromou, 1997: 123-134). Through the twin processes of enlargement and deepening, the EU has now found itself in the process of redefining its own institutional and representational identity. In case the number of the EU members climbed into more than twenty in the years ahead, it seems inevitable that a kind of differentiation would take place in terms of the quality and class of EU membership.

Given the dynamics of these twin processes, the Greek politicians of the last 6 to 7 years might have come to a common understanding that if Greece could not succeed her own structural transformation process and join the European Monetary area by the specified time limits, it would have been highly likely that Greece's current position within the EU would have been downgraded to those of the new comers (Tsoukalis, 1999: 65-74; Ioakimidis, 2001: 73-94; Moschonas, 2001: 11-24).

Besides, Greece's relative bargaining power vis-a-vis Turkey would further deteriorate if she remained as an awkward EU country and Turkey's geo-political and

geo-strategic significance increased in the western (European) eyes (Constas, 1997: 48-54; Skarvelis, 1997: 106-112). In contrast to the arguments that Turkey's relative importance in the first decade of the post-Cold War era was in decline, Turkey's moves in the international arena disproved them. The changing context of Turkey-US and Turkey-EU relations did not mean the loss of Turkey's value to the West but the reconstellation of Turkey's relations with the West. Increased cooperation with the West either in the Balkans during the wars in the territories of ex-Yugoslavia or in the Greater Middle Eastern region strengthened Turkey's international standing. Besides, Turkey's relations with the European Union improved in this new era with the signing of the Customs Union (Muftuler-Bac, 1997).

Turkey also increased its sphere of influence in the Balkans by establishing solid and bilateral relationships with the ex-communist countries in the region. While the government of Papandreou was involved in a bitter and embarrassing name dispute with the newly formed Macedonian State, Turkey was highly active in constructing a cooperative interaction process with Macedonia, Bulgaria and Albania (Calis, 2001: 135-146; Barlas and Turan, 1999: 469-489).

What one can deduce from all these developments is that the upgraded international standing of Turkey indirectly propelled the Greek politicians to set into motion a new chapter in their relations with the European Union and the United States. The most visible demonstration of this new understanding took place during the war in Kosovo. In contrast to the ethno-nationalistic lenses Greece put on during the wars in Bosnia and Serbia, this time the Greek government actively participated in the NATO campaign (Papacosma, 1999: 47-67; Iatrides, 1999: 265-294; Papandreou, 2001: 1-10; Papandreou; 2002: 17-23). Eventually, following the peace accord in Kosovo and the initiation of the Stability Pact of the European Union,

which was designed with the aim of bringing stability and prosperity to the war-torn countries of the Balkans, Greece has jumped into a new role in the region as the country that could help the Balkan countries successfully complete their Europoanisation, namely liberalization and democratization, process (Karamanlis, 2000: 7-11; Kaklamanis, 2003: 1-5).

This increased Europeanization in Greece's world outlook could not be based on an anti-Turkish character mainly for the reason that in an age of improved EU-Turkey relations if Greece had continued to sabotage the dynamics of Turkey's relations with the EU, then she would have been probably cast both by the EU and Turkey as the 'spoiler'. Though the EU was, and still is, not eager to offer Turkey membership, she would have been content with a constructively managed relationship with Turkey that would render Turkey neither as a constitutive part of the EU's 'Self' nor the 'Other'. Thought of this way, one could argue that the EU was and still is against Turkey's estrangement from the EU's orbit. As long as Turkey remained on the EU track, neither the lingering Aegean disputes nor the continuation of the political deadlock on Cyprus seemed to have constituted an unbearable headache for the EU. It was also the case that as long as Turkey remained within NATO and turned its face to the West, her diverging security conceptualization in regard to Russia and her Middle Eastern neighbours could have been tolerated.

The EU appeared to have been successful in its goals vis-à-vis Turkey until Greece's behaviours began to sabotage this invisible harmony. Turkey participated in the Gulf War alongside the Europeans; took part in many of the peacekeeping and peace-making operations in a regional and global scale shoulder to shoulder with the Europeans; signed the Customs Union deal with the EU (Muftuler-Bac, 1997).

Given that the EU valued Turkey's Europeansiation process (or the European orientation), it would have been risky for Greece had she continued to hamper the functioning of the EU-Turkey relations. In such a case the security feelings of the Greeks would have been bound to diminish because a Turkey, which would feel estranged from the EU due to the Greek machinations, would feel less restrained towards Greece. Besides, Greece would have likely lost the respects, as well as the future security guarantee, of its European partners that might otherwise have strengthened its relative position vis-à-vis Turkey. If Greece's conceptualization of her relations with Turkey, or the level of Turkey's Europeanization, had lagged behind those of her partners within the EU, then her actions against Turkey might have carried the risk of disrupting the EU-Turkey strategic-security relations, which the EU would certainly view as an anathema (Muftuler-Bac, 1997).

In fact, it would not have been too difficult for Greece to prove its 'European-ness', had she adopted the EU's 'constructively managed deliberate ambiguity' policy towards Turkey. Therefore, Greece's efforts to give support to Turkey's EU membership aspirations since 1999 have been mainly driven by *realpolitik* and instrumental considerations in the sense that Greece could never join the EU's security community if she continued to deal with territorial problems with Turkey and spent increasing amounts of its resources on armament rather than on economic convergence (Tsakonas, 2001: 1-40). A Turkey, which meets Greece's concerns on Cyprus and the Aegean Sea as required by the EU accession criteria, would be the best means for Greece both to further Europeanize its national identity and to enhance its soft-power against Turkey (Keridis, 2001: 2-18).

A strange development in this occurred in 1997 when the then Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos had to find himself supporting Turkey's European credentials to

join the EU. It was hard to believe in his sincerity given than he had used a very derogatory language towards Turkey previously. Rather than generating a positive backlash from the Turkish side and a more accommodating Turkish attitude towards the Turkish-Greek disputes, such statements of Pangalos felt on deaf ears in Turkey. The main reason behind such Turkish skepticism was that Pangalos made these statements in response to declarations of the Christian Democrat leaders of the EU countries, who convened in Belgium in March 1997. They simply stated that Turkey can (should) never join the EU because it is a non-European country mainly because of its alien religion and culture. If the then Greek government had signed onto this argumentation, Greece might have faced with two negative consequences in her foreign policy. The first would concern the degree and quality of her relations with her partners within the EU. Because Greece's own European identity was based on shaky grounds and she used to hold a precarious position on the identity spectrum of 'European-ness', if Turkey had been excluded from the EU on the grounds of cultural and religious differences, Greece might have experienced the same thing in future. Her orthodox religion and Eastern Mediterranean socio-political culture might have likey led to her alienation from the enlarged EU.

Second, Greece might have faced the terrible consequences of Turkey's estrangement from the EU in her relations with Turkey. To Greek politicians, such a Turkey would have appeared as less flexible on bilateral relations, for Turkey would not have felt enthusiastic to come to an accommodation with Greece as part of her Europeanization strategy.

3.2.9. Why Did Greece Cooperate with Turkey in 1999 and Agree to Turkey's Candidacy in Helsinki?

The two fundamental Greek foreign and security policy objectives in the second half of the 1990s were that both Greece could join the first tier EU members of the Euro-zone and that the Republic of Cyprus acceeds to the EU even if *a priori* political settlement could not be initially reached (Moustakis and Sheean, 2000: 95-115). These Greek concerns were also highlighted by the failure of Greece's internal balancing strategy to counter Turkey's growing power and influence in the 1990s. Greece could not simply reciprocate Turkey's growing military expenditures in the second half of the 1990s and her strategy of deterrence against Turkey was given a setback due to her humiliation during the Imia crisis of 1996 (Fakiolas and Mavrides, 2001: 205-233). When all these factors combined, the only strategy left for Greece to adopt against Turkey would be to increase her soft power through its external alliance relationship with the EU. It somehow appeared that for Greece to fulfil its two significant objectives, Turkey would have to be encouraged in its Europeanization process.

Greece's new policy towards Turkey might have also emanated from the thinking that the external balancing policy towards Turkey did also come to a naught in 1999 when Greece's potential allies against Turkey were one by one loosing their struggles with Turkey. When Turkey's both external and internal power increased, the Greek security elite pondered that Greece might find herself in such a situation in which Greece would have to face Turkey on its own. This would have certainly constituted a nightmare for Greece. To this matter, Turkey's victory over PKK and Syria, as the most important external supporter of the former, and her growing strategic relations with Israel led the Greek political-security elites to conclude that

countering Turkey through external alliance relationship would not prove useful in the years to come (Adabi, 2000: 40-70). The dominance of a neo-realist strategic mentality in Greece's approach towards Turkey most radically became evident in Greece's responses to the growing military, economic and political ties between Turkey and Israel (Geokas and Papathanasis, 2000: 1-6; Athanassopoulou, 2003: 108-125). The Greek political and security elites concurred that Turkish-Israeli cooperation, particularly on military issues, would prove destabilising for the Eastern Mediterranean region and level a strong blow to Greece's capacity to stand up to Turkey.

Under these conditions, the only option for Greece to adopt seemed to lure Turkey into the EU's orbit. Through this way, it was hoped that Greece would find a legitimate ground to increase her sof-power vis-à-vis Turkey (Nachmani, 2001: 71-92; Nachmani, 1998: 136-153). The hope was that the more Turkey wanted to join the EU and was encouraged in this way, the more it would adopt a flexible attitude towards the resolution of the Aegean and Cyprus disputes and in turn that the more the resolution of these territorial disputes became a reality, the faster Greece would be able to join the EU's zone of peace. Without Turkey becoming an EU candidate, it might have been difficult for Greece to accomplish its Europeanization project since a Turkey, which felt further alienated from the EU, would continue to keep Greece occupied with territorial issues (Tsakonas, 2001: 1-40). Therefore, since 1999, it has no longer been stated that Turkey is not a European country and can never become an EU member. On the contrary, this new Greek policy of 'facilitative conditionality' has been based on a new discursive practice emphasising the points that Turkey is a European country and can always become an EU member (Papandreou, 2002: 17-23).

Athens might also have hoped that by setting off a new policy initiative towards Turkey, some circles in Ankara and the EU would conclude that it was not Athens but the others in the EU that block Turkey's entry into the EU. A further advantage of such a policy would have been that Athens would be relieved of the additional burdens of her military armament program set into place with a view to achieving military parity with Turkey in the Aegean Sea. A side-benefit of reductions in military spending would be that Greece would be able to devote more resources to her economic program of catching up with the EU standards put before her to join the European Monetary Union. The fact that Greece will organise the Olympic Games in 2004 might have also propelled the Greek authorities to try to do everything possible to downsize military spending in order to allocate more resources to the realization of this organization (Papandreou, 2002: 17-23; Kaklamanis, 2003: 1-5).

Greece's attitudes towards Turkey and the Turkish-Greek disputes in the post-11 September era appear to be instrumental as well. It seems that the Greek foreign policy makers are aware of the facts that Turkey's strategic importance has increased in this new era and that Greece's above-mentioned strategic goals might be seriously endangered by a more intransigent and intimidating Turkish attitude towards Greece. Therefore, the Greek government of the last four years has been vociferously arguing for the start of Turkey's accession talks with Turkey lest the latter switch from her current cooperative stance to a much harder line. Interestingly enough, Greece has now become the most ardent supporter of Turkey's EU membership.

Despite Greece's appearing support to Turkey's EU membership, her rationale on the ESDP dispute once more alerted the Turkish politicians to the possibility that Greece did not radically give up its well-established exclusionary policy towards

Turkey. What proved difficult to understand for objective analysts was that while Greece one the one hand been argued for Turkey's EU membership within the context of Cyprus's accession to the EU, she on the other hand adopted a very intransigent attitude towards the resolution of the ESDP conflict between the EU, Turkey and NATO. Her reaction to the Ankara deal of November 2001 was a case in point. Until the latest EU summit in Copenhagen in December 2002, where the dispute over the ESDP issue came to a satisfactory end for all the parties concerned, the Greek governments appeared to act on the assumption that Turkey would never join the EU and therefore what would be the rationale of offering her full rights to participate in the decision-making process of EU-led and EU-only military operations (Missiroli, 2002: 9-26). The Greek government harshly rejected the rationale of the Ankara deal by arguing that the European Union (should) cannot let a non-EU member country take hostage the future of the European Army. They objected both to the exclusion of the Aegean Sea and Cyprus from the area of responsibility of the emerging European Rapid Reaction force and Turkey's qualitatively strengthened role on the initiation and implementation of autonomous EU military operations in Turkey's vicinity.

This Greek attitude seems to have fallen short of even meeting the gist of the EU's view of the relations with Turkey. Rather than contributing to the EU's attempts at constructively managing relations with Turkey, as the latest Ankara deal demonstrates, Greece's course of action has had the potential risk of putting the EU-Turkey relations into jeopardy by leading to the cultivation of anti-EU feelings in Turkey and vice versa. This risk has even been higher than as some circles might have expected, for at the end of the day the lack of any final agreement between Turkey and the EU over the ESDP issue might accelerate the process of drifting apart

between the EU and NATO (Missiroli, 2002: 9-26) If the EU ceased to value its link to NATO as inevitable and vital for the European security and stability, it would be highly likely that its perception of Turkey, as an Alliance member, would downgrade.

In order to better understand this Greek reaction, one should make an inquiry into the ways in which Greece has traditionally conceptualized the European Union in regard to its foreign and security policy interests vis-à-vis Turkey. In one way or the other, Greece has been beset by a strategic dilemma in her approach towards the EU. While taking up an inter-governmentalist approach towards the EU's integration process would enable her to use its veto power against Turkey in various EU organs in her efforts to damage Turkey's relations with the EU, the same approach would at the same time highlight the non-European character of Greece in the eyes of its partners within the EU (Mitsos, 2000: 53-89).

Greece has always been in favour of the development of the EU's independent security and defence identity (Aybet, 2000). Thinking in a regional strategic context, it would not be so much meaningless for Greece to see the EU to have evolved into a collective defence organisation. Given that NATO's platforms did not prove useful to put pressure on Turkey due to the geo-strategic and military significance of the latter in the eyes of the Americans, it would make sense for Greece to see that the EU turns out to function as a kind of collective defence organization where Turkey is not present. According to the Greek Memorandum presented at the 1996 inter-governmental conference, the EU should guarantee the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member countries as a collective defence organization.

Based on Greece's performance over the ESDP issues, one can conclude that Greece has not given up its old foreign policy understanding vis-à-vis Turkey yet. Rather than helping Turkey accelerate its Europeanization process by eliminating the seemingly most important hurdle before its membership in the EU, it seems that Greece felt prey to its old policy of keeping Turkey at an arm's length from the European Union. If the main rationale of Greece's latest Europeanization process since 1999 had been to attain security through the further Europeanization of Turkey, including Turkey's membership in EU as the ultimate goal, then it would have been difficult to explain why Greece took up such an uncompromising attitude in response to the above-mentioned deal on the margins of such EU's summits meeting as Leaken and Sevilla.

CHAPTER 4: A Case Study: The EU's Involvement in the Cyprus Dispute

The main goal of this chapter is to critically analyse the so-called catalytic effects of the EU's involvement in the Cyprus dispute and to demonstrate that the promise of the European Union has not been so high as some circles have expected to be. Thought of this way, in what follows, first an historical account will be provided in order to highlight the major turning points in the EU's Cyprus policy, then the attention will focus on the analysis of the major assumptions, on which the catalytic effects of the EU's involvement are based. In analysing the reasons for the EU's seemingly failure in Cyprus, this dissertation will pay a concerted attention to the identity aspects of the Cyprus dispute, as well as the main points why the allegedly 'post-modern' security community character of the EU could not lay the ground for the resolution of a highly 'modern' conflict on the island.

The reason why this dissertation emphasises the role of the EU, rather than NATO, in the evolutionary process of the Cyprus dispute concerns the fact that it has been the EU's involvement in the dispute that has fundamentally altered the main dynamics and parameters of the dispute in the 1990s, as well as contributed to the re-construction of *Realpolitik* security understandings in the region.

4.1. Historical Evolution

4.1.1. 1990-1994

The EU initially adopted a reluctant attitude towards the dispute, particularly toward the membership application of the Greek Cypriot Administration in July 1990. Cyprus was rarely mentioned within the EU's enlargement plans in the first years of the post-Cold War era when the EU was about to redefine its new identity in the

wake of the Cold War era, as well as articulate its strategies how to deal with the ex-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The mainstream European conviction was that Cyprus was a problem area and the possibility of its membership in the EU without any 'a priori' political settlement of the dispute would cause a great headache for the EU (Eichinger, 1997: 197-203). The EU members would not have had any clearly defined interest in the importation of a Turkish-Greek territorial dispute to the EU given that the first decade of Greece's membership did not prove promising for the EU-Turkey relations.

Since 1990 till 1994 the EU documents stressed that the membership of the island would be much easier once a political settlement reached. Even though the EU considered the non-settlement on the island as a significant stumbling bloc to Turkey's accession to the Union, the dynamics of EU's approach to the island and Turkey were not identical, if not constitutive of each other. The possible problems to be incurred from the accession of the island without the solution of the dispute were somehow distinct in themselves (Redmond and Pace, 1996: 430-450). When the European Commission announced its opinion in July 1993 on the membership application of the Greek Cypriots, it recommended that the accession process should follow the resolution of the dispute.[*]

In analysing the possible reasons why the EU might have decided to postpone the inclusion of Cyprus in the EU before the conclusion of any settlement, one could provide the following reasons. First of all, the EU was then during the initial stages of its post-Cold War era identity construction. It was simply not able and confident enough to take such a strategic decision to incorporate such a problematic island as Cyprus into its body. When the EU was in its initial stages of developing a highly

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[*] One can reach the EU Commision's opinion on Cyprus's membership application at :
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/cyprus/op_06_93/index.htm

institutionalized foreign and security policy identity and when the EU members were not in harmony as for the appropriate policies to be adopted towards Turkey and Cyprus, it seemed to be a logical conclusion at that time to postpone the time of decision on Cyprus.

Second, it was not appropriate for the EU to antagonize Turkey at that time when it had recently rejected Turkey's application for full membership and suggested to establish a functioning relationship with Turkey along the Matutes's package (Redmond, 1993; Kramer, 1994: 190-259). Turkey's possible reactions to such an EU decision that would see the accession of Cyprus to the EU before the solution of the dispute might have been severe. Besides, the second Gulf War that had ended a few years ago demonstrated once again Turkey's geo-strategic and geo-political value to the Europeans. Looking from a cost-benefit analysis perspective, the European Union valued Turkey's attachment to the EU more than the Europeanization of the Cyprus dispute. Given that the EU's main area of concentration did not cover the greater Middle Eastern region with the Eastern Mediterranean in focus, and that Turkey's cooperation with the EU over the security challenges stemming from the Balkans was considered vital, the EU did not simply want to confront Turkey over Cyprus.

Third, the international conjecture in the Balkans was not suitable for the EU to deal with such a thorny issue as the Cyprus dispute. The EU had been busy with the recently started war in the territories of the ex-Yugoslavia (Holland, 1995).

Fourth, the credibility of Greece in the eyes of the EU members was at its lowest point at that time due to the highly non-European foreign and security policy behaviours of the Athens government. Greece was at odds with its partners in the EU over the Bosnian war and the Macedonian issue. The signing of the joint-Defence

doctrine with the Greek Cypriots in late 1993 showed that Greece was still thinking in *realpolitik* and modern terms in regard to the essential of its foreign and security policy (Valinakis, 1992: 52-68; Rizopoulos, 1993: 17-26). Greece was also preoccupied with the Macedonian conflict and could not devote a concerted attention to the resolution of the dispute. It was somehow satisfactory for Greece that Turkey's chance to be included in the EU remained low due to the continuation of the conflict, among many other factors. The resolution of the dispute in pro-Greek way through Turkey's EU accession process was not on the agenda of the Greek politicians at that time.

4.1.2. 1994-1999

However, the EU had to change its view on the membership of Cyprus as Greece successfully utilised the dynamics of the EU-Turkey relations in order to accelerate the accession process of the island to the EU. The EU decided to include Cyprus within the next group of countries to be admitted to the EU. This about-turn in the EU's position came about for the first time in the EU's Corfu summit meeting in June 1994 and later was confirmed in the Essen summit in December of the same year.[*] On 6 March 1995 on the sidelines of the signing of the Customs Union treaty between the EU and Turkey, the EU's General Affairs Council added a new dimension to the declared Cyprus policy of the EU by establishing a strong link between Turkey's relations with the EU and the EU membership of Cyprus. The deal was that Greece would have lifted its veto over Turkey's Customs Union with the EU in return for the EU's agreement to the start of the accession talks with the Greek

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[*] One can reach the EU's Corfu Summit conclusions at:
http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=54738&from=&LANG=1. One can reach the EU's Essen Summit conclusions at:
http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=54760&from=&LANG=9

Cypriots on behalf of the whole island six months after the end of the intergovernmental conference to be held in Amsterdam (Nicolaidis,1998: 30-34).

Following the historic 1995 deal, the EU started the structured dialogue with the Greek Cypriots in order to prepare them for the real accession talks. In the footsteps of the recommendations of the European Commision's July 1997 Agenda 2000 report, the EU decided in December 1997 to include Cyprus within the first track countries, with which the accession talks would start in March 1998, while denying Turkey of the formal candidateship status. From 1994 till 1999, the tone of the EU language turned out to be more pro-Greek Cypriot in the sense that the EU documents allowed for the possibility of an early membership of the island prior to any political settlement on the island (Nugent, 2000: 131-150). The international conjecture at that time seemed suitable for the EU to take such a bold decision. First, the geo-strategic value of Turkey decreased in the European eyes as the memories of the Gulf War were gradually left behind. A clear manifestation of this situation took place with the change of US policy towards the Europeanization of Turkish-Greek disputes after Richard Hollbrooke was appointed as the US government representative on Cyprus (Evriviades, 2003: 241-156). The new American rationale was based on the assumption that Turkey could never be anchored to western international community, particularly Europe, without the resolution of the Cyprus dispute within the EU framework. In the past, the Americans tended to show their respect for Turkey's value to the Western world, and therefore to attach Turkey to the West, by trying to take utmost care not to antagonize Turkey over the Turkish-Greek disputes.

However, they soon came to the conclusion that this strategy would no longer facilitate Turkey's firm placement in the Western world, for the continuation of the

Turkish-Greek disputes would likely constitute an important obstacle on this way. The new American strategy was built on the premise that Turkey's anchoring to the West would sooner or later require Turkey's full membership in the European Union (Larrabee, 1999: 231-247). Conceived of this way, the Clinton Administration, in the personality of Hollbrooke saw the resolution of the Cyprus dispute within the EU framework from an instrumental perspective that would finally bring Turkey closer to the EU. With the American support in the background the European Union could more easily get involved in the Cyprus dispute.

Second, Turkey was at that time doing poorly in its Europeanization process. Both the pace of internal reformation process was slow and the state of Turkish domestic politics was in a mess. Kurdish separatism and political Islam were on the rise. Turkey was giving non-European signals both in its domestic and foreign policy behaviours (Calis, 2001: 3-34; Kramer, 1996: 202-233). Turkey's performance over the Imia/Kardak crisis, the S-300 crisis and the quarrel with Syria over the extradition of the PKK leader Ocalan sharpened Turkey's non-European outlook. Such images were further reinforced by the rise of nationalist and to some extent religious undertones in Turkey's foreign policy approach (Lombardi, 1997: 191-215; Wood, 1999: 95-115). The Erbakan period was a case in point. When Turkey's non-European character in foreign and domestic politics combined with the EU's emphasis on identity-related security considerations in its enlargement process towards the enlargement to the Central and Eastern European countries, Turkey's gradual otherness became more visible in this era. Consequently, the EU might not have felt the need to constrain itself in regard to the accession process of the Island. The quality of EU-Turkey relations was so seriously damaged during this time that

Turkey was increasingly seen as an 'other' of Europe. The EU members did not hesitate to adopt ostensibly anti-Turkish policies towards the Cyprus dispute.

Third, Greece entered into a new era with the advent of the Simitis rule in Athens. The new Greek government started to gain legitimacy in the eyes of its partners within the EU due to its more-European outlook. The more Europeanized Greece became, the more pro-Greek views the EU adopted on the dispute (Moschonas, 2001: 11-24). When the quality of EU-Turkey relations worsened during this period, Greece could easily legitimize the accession of the island to the EU irrespective of its possible dangers for the EU-Turkey relations. Because Greece held the EU's presidency in 1994, it found herself in a good position to utilize the EU's mechanisms to accelerate the accession process of the island.

Fourth, it seemed that the EU left the memories of the Bosnian war behind with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in late 1995. The end of this war gave a boost to European efforts to put into place a distinctive European strategic identity with its military means on the ground. Cyprus stood out as the best place for the EU to demonstrate the conflict resolution characteristics of its distinctive security identity and to make clear in which ways the EU's strategic identity would differ from that of the United States (Diez, 2002a, 2002b).

In response to the EU's growing exclusionary approach towards Turkey's membership and concomitantly with the radical *volte-face* seen in the EU attitude towards the Cyprus dispute with the start of the second phase, Turkey adopted more *realpolitik* security behaviours and started to lay the ground for a future integration of the TRNC with Turkey (Bagci, 1997: 159-169). The new policy was based on the idea that the closer the EU came towards the Greek Cypriots, the more Turkey would speed up the integration process with the TRNC, a kind of tit-for-tat mentality

(Dodd, 1999: 67-89). The main underlying motivation behind Turkey's oft-repeated intention arose from the EU's ambiguous attitude towards Turkey's membership. The fear that it might lose the prestigious and advantageous position it used to hold over the island should the divided island join the EU before its own accession seems to have led the Turkish foreign policy makers to set the thresholds high on the island.

What the Turkish elite tried to do was to convince the EU circles to the idea that any early EU membership of the island would be highly risky and costly for the EU's interests since the EU would gain nothing by antagonising Turkey over such a small island as Cyprus. In conformity with this thinking, Turkey and the TRNC initialled some agreements in 1997 envisioning closer integration between the two countries. Turkey also lent its support to the "confederation" proposal of the president of TRNC, Rauf Denktaş, put forward on 31 August 1998 (Olgun, 2001: 21-38). The thrust of his proposal revolved around the idea of two externally sovereign states on the island recognized by the international community as such. With this proposal, a prior recognition of the external sovereignty of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was elevated to the sine quo non condition for the Turkish Cypriots to come back to the negotiation table. The significance of this Turkish endorsement of Denktaş's confederation proposal lies in the fact that Turkey reverted back from the years-long federalism argument in favour of a more hardline attitude towards the resolution (Dodd, 1999: 128-147).

It was within this spirit that the President Denktas of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus left the inter-communal talks in Gilon in Switzerland in the summer of 1997 when the EU commission announced in its Agenda 2000 report that the resolution of the Cyprus dispute should not be a precondition for the accession of the island to the EU. The strange point during this time period was that the more anti-

Turkish the European Union turned out to become, the more *realpolitik* behaviours the Greek and Greek Cypriot governments adopted. The modernist and nationalistic undertones of the Greek Cypriots' policies towards the Cyprus dispute could become likely within the framework of the European Union's exclusionary approach towards Turkey. The Greek Cypriots might have thought that if they kept their distance from the Turkish Cypriots, they would more likely attain the EU membership. Hence the non-yielding Greek Cypriot attitude during the inter-communal talks under the auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations (Stavrinadis, 1999: 54-97).

For example, the S-300 crisis displayed that the Greek Cypriots still held on to *realpolitik* rationalities. They did not hesitate to create a crisis situation on the island in 1997-1998 time period, even though the European Union started to become more pro-Greek. The Greek Cypriot rationale that these weapons systems were mainly of defensive in character and the sole purpose of their possible deployment was to deter any aggressive Turkish military assault on the south of the island did not seem to be in accordance with the main spirit of the ongoing accession process with the EU. If the hope were to contribute to the security of the island through the transformation of the national-exclusionary-communal identities of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots into an inclusive-island-wide-identity along the EU accession process, then such a military strategy of armament would seem odd to understand.

This shows that the main reason why the Greek Cypriots applied for the EU membership was political and intended to help them achieve their highly nationalistic foreign policy goals vis-à-vis the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey (Zervakis, 1999: 137-150; Featherstone, 2001: 141-162). Despite this parochial Greek Cypriot behaviour, the Athens government displayed a more European attitude during the crisis as Greece tried to convince the Greek Cypriots to agree to the deployment of the

missiles in Crete instead of Cyprus. Many high level Greek politicians were warning the Greek Cypriots not to create a crisis atmosphere when the EU membership of the island was on the agenda (Zambouras, 1999: 114-127).

The developments between December 1997 and December 1999 showed that Turkey's approach to the Cyprus dispute was strongly linked to the evolutionary process of her relations with the European Union. Whenever there was a gradual worsening in the tone of EU-Turkey relations, Turkey hardened her policy stance over the Cyprus issue. During this time period, the degree of the EU's power of attraction was at its lowest point in the Turkish eyes. Turkey's escalatory and nationalistic behaviour during the S-300 missiles crisis were examples to this situation (Ayman, 2000; Ayman, 2002: 5-34).

On the other side of the Aegean Sea, Greece threatened to veto the whole enlargement process of the EU towards the CEECs if the EU delayed Cyprus's accession to the EU on the ground that no political settlement has been reached yet.

4.1.3. Helsinki and Its Aftermath: From December 1999 until December 2002

In the face of such Turkish and Greek threats and warnings prior to the Helsinki Summit, the EU circles seemed to have come to the conclusion that if they did not come up with a new policy initiative they would (might) face a real crisis situation when the time comes to decide over the accession of the island to the EU.

The ideal situation from the EU's perspective would be that Turkey would actively encourage the Turkish Cypriots to reach a compromise solution with the Greek Cypriots; the two communities would agree on the modalities of the new political arrangement and they decide to join the EU together; the EU would admit the undivided Cyprus as a member; Greece could not find any reason to veto the

enlargement of the EU to the CEECs; and finally the EU could continue its constructively managed deliberate ambiguity policy towards Turkey (Joseph, 1996,2000, 2003). This seemed to be the only way to secure the enlargement process of the Union towards the CEECs by the end of 2002.

The nightmare for the EU would concern the scenario in which the Greek Cypriot Government would successfully complete all the chapters of EU accession process; the two communities could not reach a political settlement by the end of 2002; the EU would decide not to admit the island to the membership bowing to the pull of Turkish warnings; and finally Greece would veto the enlargement of the EU towards the CEECs (Barkey and Gordon, 2002). In addition to this scenario, there happened to be another worst-case scenario, according to which the EU would have to agree to the accession of the divided island at the expense of worsening EU-Turkey relations.

Given that the second scenario seemed not so far-fetched, the European Union might have decided to prevent its happening by offering Turkey the 'candidacy carrot' hoping that Turkey would not create a great fuss over the accession of Cyprus, though divided, to the EU. The Helsinki decisions were the inscription of this rationale on the paper (Oguzlu, 2002). Given that the quality of EU-Turkey relations did not radically change between December 1997 and December 1999, it seems that the instrumental EU logic could explain the decision of the EU to offer Turkey the candidacy status (Park, 2000: 31-53).

Given that neither the rationalist institutionalist logic (cost-benefit calculations) nor the sociological institutionalist logic (identity-related concerns) seems to have explained the EU's about-turn towards Turkey, one would be left only with instrumental concerns on the part of the EU, resulting in inefficient socialization

strategies adopted towards Turkey. It seems that the EU's decision to offer candidacy to Turkey was more a cost-management strategy than a full commitment to Turkey's membership. Given that Turkey's policy stances might damage the EU's deepening (ESDP) and widening (enlargement and Cyprus) policies, the EU circles might have thought to reduce such risks to minimum by buying Turkey's cooperation through the placement of the latter among the candidate countries. The 1997-1999 period did greatly curtailed the EU's capability to influence Turkey's policies (Park, 2000: 315-328).

Even though the EU's decision to grant candidacy to Turkey can be explained from an instrumental perspective, the main idea behind the developments of the last four years has been to handle Turkish-Greek disputes and to sustain Turkey's security cooperation with the European Union by re-emphasising Turkey's 'European' identity. The institution of candidacy, an identity-related category, would in the final analysis both enable Turkey to more easily accommodate with Greece within the EU framework and lead Greece to view Turkey from a more inclusive-less exclusive angle. Thought of this way, the promise of the European Union in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes have improved a lot since December 1999, if not resulted in the resolution of the thorny Cyprus and Aegean disputes once and for all.

Turkey did not show a fascinating performance in meeting the EU's Copenhagen criteria since 1997. Nor did the EU circles begin to think that the material benefits of Turkey's placement on the accession process would be more than its benefits. Besides, the EU circles could not muster any identity-rationale vis-à-vis Turkey as was the case with respect to the Central and Eastern European countries. Turkey was neither seen as an identical part of the EU's self identity nor there existed any patron-country within the EU that would actively and persistently argue for the

merits of Turkey's accession to the EU. Under such conditions, it seems that the EU acted towards Turkey from a security-driven instrumental logic in 1999, according to which Turkey's proposed candidacy status within the EU would mitigate its negative and security-degenerating responses towards the Europeanization of the whole gamut of Greece-Turkey relations. It was assumed that Turkey would not dare to risk damaging her EU membership candidacy by seriously confronting the EU over the accession of the island to the EU divided.

In a manner to avoid such costs to its enlargement process, the EU adopted a 'constructive ambiguity' policy towards the question of Cyprus' EU membership both in Helsinki and in its aftermath. It seems that this policy is based on three different legs.[*] One is that the EU would not regard the resolution of the political deadlock on the island as a precondition before the mebership of the island. The second is that the EU will take all relavant factors into account when deciding whether or not to admit the island into membership. The third is that the EU would most likely approve of any political settlement between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities and would not create problems during the implementation process of the EU's internal regulations in each and every parcel of the island.

In total, these conflicting sentences were formulated to send different messages to all interested parties to the conflict. The first part seems to have sympathised with the Greek Cypriots's view. The message sent to Turkey was that the EU membership of the island cannot be taken hostage by any third country and that if the Greek Cypriots fulfilled the accession criteria they would become an EU member.

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[*] One can reach the EU's Helsinki decisions on Turkey's candidacy and and the Cyprus dispute at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm. Articles 4, 9-a, 9-b, and 12 are relevant.

The second is adressed mainly to the Greek Cypriots. Through this policy stance the EU hoped to put some pressure on the Greek Cypriots lest the latter felt assured that the island would be admitted to the EU whatever happens during the negotiation process. Here the EU somehow established a link between Turkey's EU membership and the way the Cyprus dispute is solved. In one way or the other the EU wanted Turkey to know that if the latter worked for the resolution of the Cyprus dispute in good faith, without overlooking the possiblity of the EU membership of the island, then Turkey would likely get a favourable EU treatment on its way to Brussels. The EU message was that if Turkey aspired to join the EU, its performace on this issue would likely affect the substance of what she would get from the EU.

The last one is aimed at encouraging the Turkish Cypriots to show more commitment to the EU membership of the island. By making it clear that the EU would likely agree to the possiblity of some exceptions (opt-outs) from the EU's Community Law, it is hoped that both commnuities, particularly the Turkish Cypriots, would adopt a more flexible approach towards the settlement of the dispute within the EU's environmet.

Judged against this instrumental rationality on the part of the European Union, this dissertation argues that the European Union agreed to Turkey's EU candidacy in 1999 in the hope that Turkey would put pressure on the Turkish Cypriot community to reach a political settlement with the Greek Cypriots before the accession of the island to the EU takes place. This was so mainly for two reasons. One is that the way the island joined the EU would fundamentally affect the gist of the future Turkey-EU relations, carrying the risk of damaging the 'constructively managed deliberate ambiguity' policy of the EU towards Turkey. The second is that any crisis over Cyprus's accession to the EU would seriously affect the destiny of the

EU's overall enlargement process to the Central and Eastern European countries. The main motivation of the EU in regard to the EU membership of the island appeared not to make a genuine contribution to the everlasting resolution of the Cyprus problem, by trying to embrace an impartial attitude towards the positions of the parties to the conflict, but to secure the enlargement of the EU to the Central and Eastern European Countries proceed smoothly (Tocci, 2002: 104-138; Larrabee, 1998: 25-29).

It is within this spirit that Turkey has been required, as part of the short-term requirements of its Accession Partnership prepared in late 2000 and yearly progress reports of the European Commission, to contribute to the attempts of the United Nations at reaching a settlement on the island.[*] The political conditionality between Turkey's accession to the EU and the settlement of the Cyprus dispute has for the first time been officially inserted into an EU document in relation to Turkey (Accession Partnership Document).

From Helsinki until the end of 2002, the European Union made it evidently clear that Turkey's accession to the EU would not be possible unless the Cyprus dispute was solved in such a way that the whole island acceded to the Union following a comprehensive deal between the two communities. In addition to this stick poised to Turkey, various EU officials also offered carrots to the Turkish Cypriots. For example, the head of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, stated in the Greek Cypriot Parliament in late 2001 that the EU would be content with whatever regulations the communities reach as part of a comprehensive solution package. Provided that the island would have a single international

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[*] One can see the Acession Partnership document at the address: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_085/l_08520010324en00130023.pdf. Turkey was required to "in accordance with the Helsinki conclusions,in the context of the political dialogue,strongly support the UN Secretary General's efforts to bring to a successful conclusion the process of finding a comprehensive

identity/sovereignty and acts with one voice in the EU organs, the EU would agree to some derogations in the EU's Community Law.

However, while the EU officials have been pushing for the Turks and Turkish Cypriots to work for resolution, they have on the other hand taken the pressure off the Greek Cypriots by reiterating that the island would join the EU without the resolution of the dispute being a precondition (Guven, 2003).

Thought of this way, the EU circles felt quite uneasy with the end of the inter-communal talks between November 2000 and December 2001. They, however, invested great hopes in the latest face-to-face negotiations set off in late 2001 with the initiatives of the President Denktas of TRNC.

Despite the appearance that both the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots have engaged each other in an inter-communal negotiation process since 16 January 2002 under the auspices of the United Nations from an instrumental perspective, both parties have to a greater extent internalized the idea that an everlasting solution on the island could more likely take place within the EU framework (Tocci, 2003: 199-212). This fact itself demonstrates the increasing promise of the European Union in the resolution of the Cyprus dispute.

Even though the communities themselves could not smooth over their decades-long points of frictions, the EU circles strongly asked them to reach a final settlement along the so-called Annan Plan, which the Secretary General of the United Nations put on the table in November 2002 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). To the EU, this plan proved successful in meeting the fundamental demands of the parties concerned. While the constitutional and political status of the Turkish Cypriots

settlement of the Cyprus problem,as referred to in point 9(a)of the Helsinki conclusions" in 2001. One can also reach the EU's yearly progress reports on Turkey at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/docs.htm

would be improved, a significant portion of the Greek Cypriots would be allowed to resettle in the north of the Island and to reclaim their previously held properties.

Despite the inter-communal talks, the parties could not come to a settlement before the EU's Copenhagen summit in December 2002 and the EU eventually had to agree to the EU membership of the divided island with the proviso that the EU's Community Law would not be applied to the northern part of the island (Copenhagen conclusions) temporarily. However, it appears that the EU will continue to support the parties in their efforts to finally arrive at a settlement until May 2004 when the island will officially accede to the Union.

4.2. The Catalytic Effect: Flawed Assumptions versus the Facts on the Ground

The hope in the EU's involvement in the Cyprus dispute was twofold: On the one hand it was claimed that the post-modern and post-sovereign international environment of the European Union would allow the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to escape the dangers of their decades-old state-centric modern conceptions of what an ideal solution would entail on the island. They would resolve their dispute by developing a collective identity within the EU framework.

On the other hand it was also hoped that the EU's mere power of attraction would be enough for both sides on the island and Turkey to come to a mutually satisfied settlement along the EU's norms as they proceed with their accession processes. When the lure of EU membership in the eyes of Turkish and Greek communities combined with EU's credible conditionality policy, it was simply assumed that an everlasting settlement would be achieved soon (Diez, 2000).

However, this dissertation argues that the performance of the European Union in the evolution of the Cyprus dispute has led to the intensification of the

'securitization' in and around the island, rather than generating the conditions that would allay the concerns of the two communities, especially the Turkish Cypriots, as to the EU membership of Cyprus. The main reasons for this outcome seem to lie in the EU's failure both to formulate a credible conditionality policy in regard to Turkey's EU membership prospects and to adopt a neutral position in the eyes of the Turkish Cypriot community. When the European Union's exclusionary attitude towards Turkey became clearer with the enunciation of Turkey's non-European identity more frequently in the 1990s, it turned out to become more difficult for the Turkish side to invest in any solution proposal crafted within the EU's frameworks. Under such a condition, the Greek Cypriots did not feel encouraged enough to come to terms with Turkish Cypriots on an equal basis, but viewed the EU as a strategic instrument in order to force them to accept more pro-Greek Cypriot settlements.

It is the contention of this dissertation that had the EU made it clear right from the beginning that the accession of the island to the EU would become more likely in the aftermath of a political settlement between the two communities provided that both communities successfully internalize the EU's institutional norms, then the catalytic effects of EU involvement would have become more visible. Now what follows is an account of the factors that have diluted the expected catalytic effects of the EU's involvement in the Cyprus dispute.

The first problematic assumption in this regard concerns the security producing character of the adoption of the EU's internal regulations. Though they were initially assumed to foster collective identification process on the island, the less numerous Turkish Cypriots have gradually grown fearful of being swallowed by the Greek Cypriots and denied their communal identity. It is mainly assumed that the membership of the whole island would be a sufficient reason for both communities,

especially the Turkish Cypriots, to feel secure. It was hoped that the supranational institutional environment of the EU; the EU's culture of tolerance and 'unity in diversity'; the upward and downward diffusion of sovereignty within the EU area; and social security guaranties of the EU's Community Law would all help the communities to rid themselves of their security-driven mentalities. With the realization of the three fundamental rights of movement, settlement and buying property within a post-sovereign EU, a secure and stable environment would flourish on the island. A federal arrangement on the island, internally similar to the Swiss model and externally to the Belgian model, would lead the parties to view each other through less nationalistic and sovereignty sensitive perspectives (Emerson and Tocci, 2002).

However, this assumption could not convince the Turkish Cypriots mainly because of the fact that in the eyes of many in Turkey and TRNC, there was no difference between the official stance of the Greek Cypriots and the character of the EU's internal regulations (Ertekun, 1999: 97-113). The current EU policy has been interpreted by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey as such that what the EU is doing would be tantamount to lending support to the Greek Cypriots. If the EU proceeded with its declared goal of admitting the Greek Cypriots in to the membership before the reach of any political settlement, this would indirectly imply that the EU cared for only the security considerations of the Greek Cypriots and did not hesitate to alienate Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots further from the EU. The end result of any imposition on Turkey to pull its forces back from the island on the ground that it occupies the territories of any EU member state would be the demarcation of new boundaries between the EU on the one hand and Turkey on the other. The EU seemed to have overlooked the fact that it is due to the presence of the Turkish troops

on the island that the Turkish Cypriots felt secure. This has been strongly inscribed into the collective conscious of the Turkish Cypriots (Olgun. 1998: 35-42; Duner, 1999: 485-496).

Moreover, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots could not agree on the implementation of the EU rules, the most significant of which concerned the three fundamental freedoms, namely the freedoms of free movement, settlement and buying property. While the Greek Cypriots insisted on the immediate implementation of these rights, the Turkish Cypriots considered the activation of these freedoms as attempts to dilute the Turkish character of the northern part of the island by providing the Greek Cypriots with incentives to extend their foothold in these places (Stavrinides, 1999: 54-96; Ertekun, 1999: 97-113).

The main reason why the two communities have so far interpreted the EU's regulations as differently concerns the way of how they conceptualize/define the Cyprus dispute. It is the contention of this dissertation that the Cyprus dispute is more of an identity dispute than a simple clash of political views (Diez, 2002c). The facts that there has not taken place a Cyprus-wide collective identity between the two communities; that the ideology of nationalism has been the dominant current in both parts of the island; that the number of circles that worked for the materialization of collective identity has been so limited and only confined to a handful of leftist circles in both sides; that the main direction of the nationalisms on the island have been towards the mainlands; that the current political leaderships in both sides have adhered to nationalist ideology and interpreted the EU's Community Law through the prisms of their ideologies; have all obstructed the expected catalytic effects of the EU's involvement to take place. When the mainland countries Greece and Turkey gradually estranged from each other on identity terms due to the EU's identity

building functions, the communities on the island were also affected by this development. The Turkish Cypriot political leadership, backed by the power holders in Ankara, have gradually invested in the idea that the EU membership of the island, particularly if that took place before Turkey's own accession, would certainly erode their communal identity and pave the ground for the Hellenisation of the whole island. Likewise, the Greek Cypriot political leadership seems to have calculated that the Hellenisation of the whole island under the contemporary international society could only take place should the island join the EU. Otherwise the ongoing inter-communal negotiations within the UN framework would lead nowhere since Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots would do their best to preserve their gains of the post-1974 era (Bahcheli, 2001). To the Greek Cypriot rationale, the Turkish side would not have been put under pressure if the ongoing UN-based negotiation process had continued uninterrupted.

The Greek Cypriots became aware of the fact that in today's international conjecture, the western international community would not consider the pursuit of enosis (the unification of the island with Greece) as a legitimate and legal action. Therefore, today's Greek Cypriot Nationalism does not pursue this goal. However, the new Greek Cypriot Nationalism asserts, on the other hand, that the island is Greek; that the Greek Cypriots are entitled to govern the island; that any common Cypriot identity is not possible to emerge given the degree of cleavages between the two communities; that the close cooperation between the Greek Cypriots and the mainland Greeks is a must for the realization and preservation of the rights of the Greek Cypriots; that Greece's extension of its security guarantee to the island through the joint defence doctrine is essential for the security of the Greek Cypriots; and that the EU membership of the island would provide the best mechanisms for the

close cooperation between the Greek Cypriots and the mainland Greeks (Mavratsa, 2001: 151-179; Yiallourides: 2002: 325-357).

In stark contrast to the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots argue that the origins of the Cyprus dispute lie in the Greek Cypriot attempts at overhauling the constitutional structure of the 1960 agreements in late 1963. To their conceptualization, the island has never come under a sole Greek Cypriot rule and that the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus became possible in 1960 when both communities of the island gave up their maximalist positions, enosis for the Greek Cypriots and partition fro the Turkish Cypriots. To them, the Turkish Cypriots are as much politically equal as the Greek Cypriots and that their legal status of being recognized as one of the constitutive components of the Republic of Cyprus must be observed in all proposals for the reunification of the island. Therefore, they are strongly against the solution proposals that would likely dilute their equal status vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriots. The membership of the Island in the EU as represented by the Greek Cypriot dominated Republic of Cyprus would level fundamental blows to their concerns for political equality. The dangers would be grave if the island were admitted to the EU either before any political settlement has been reached by the two communities or before Turkey's EU membership.

The second problematic assumption, on which the current EU policy towards the island is based, holds that Turkey would do whatever is necessary in order to become an EU member. This assumption is predicated on the hope that Turkey would value its interest in getting EU membership more than anything else because Turkey would value the social benefits of inclusion in the EU more than the social costs of exclusion. However, this proved insufficient for Turkey to internalize the EU's norms and see the EU accession process as legitimate for the settlement of the

dispute. Absent the EU's commitment to Turkey, Turkey's own efforts did not result in strong socialization on the part of Turkey. The logical consequence of this reasoning has resonated in the EU circles with the expectation that Turkey would give her consent to any EU-backed Cyprus solution in order not to risk her own prospective EU membership. Such kind of reasoning on the part of the European Union is flawed, for it allows for blackmailing tactics against Turkey likely to be implemented by the Greek and the Greek Cypriots. The recent past has clearly demonstrated that Turkey did not hesitate to drive wedges with the EU in case the latter did not upgrade the tone of the association relationship with more developed mechanisms. Rather than softening its position on the Cyprus dispute with a view to mending fences with the EU, Turkey decided to harden its Cyprus policy in the aftermath of the Luxembourg decisions of December 1997 (Suvarierol, 2003: 55-78).

It is the case that the factors underlying Turkey's policies towards the island are of strategic character (Tank, 2002: 146-164). Scared of any Greek encirclement from the south, Turkey has been alert to the possibility that the Greek Cypriot domination of the island might deprive it of a very important strategic outlet to the Mediterranean Sea. Besides, the presence of the Turkish troops on the island seems to have increased Turkey's leverage against Greece in the Aegean Sea. A much speculated Turkish argument was that given that the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline is planned to terminate in Ceyhan oil port, the possession of Cyprus under the control of any power but Turkey might inhibit the Turkish interest in controlling the flow of the oil to the western capitals.

Rather than softening its position on the island, the Turkish security elite defined Turkey's interests on the island in more strategic-security terms since the second half of the 1990s. Whereas it was previously stated that the well-being of the

Turkish Cypriot community constituted Turkey's prime concern in the island, since the mid-1990s the emphasis has been put on the strategic-security value of the whole island, at least the northern part of it, for Turkey's own security needs (Bahcheli, 2001: 208-222).

In the minds of Turkish security elites, the incorporation of the island into the EU, as suggested by the Greek Cypriots, would be tantamount to the Hellenization of the southern periphery of Turkey, invoking the fears the 'Crete example' raised in the aftermath of the unification of the Crete Island with Greece in 1913 (Yetkin, 2002; Gurel, 1993: 55-66). Besides, the fear of any possible degradation in her role of being the strategic outpost of the western security community, particularly by being replaced by the Greek Cypriots, is the prime reason leading Turkey to view the developments in and around the island from a strategic perspective (Stivachtis, 2000). If the changing parameters of the international system offer the EU a grater role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle Eastern regions; and if the EU decides to pursue its interests in these regions through Greeks/Greek Cypriots; and if the EU does not envision Turkey's membership soon, it is highly likely that Turkey would continue to view the developments over the island from a strategically oriented *realpolitik* perspective.

The third flawed assumption on which the EU has acted holds that the Turkish Cypriots would join the Greek Cypriots during the accession talks in order to reap the economic benefits of the accession process and future membership. To this logic of economic rationality, the Turkish Cypriots would be relieved of the unbearable effects of the economic embargo put on them by the Greek Cypriots and the international community. The EU was also assumed to channel enormous amounts of financial help to the areas, which are under Turkish control, within the

framework of EU structural aids to the less developed regions of the Union (Stivachtis, 2000). To this end, the EU commission announced an economic aid package in the early 2002 foreseeing the flow of more 200 million Euro to Turkish Cypriots until 2006 following the settlement of the dispute through the accession of the island to the Union undivided. However rational it may sound, economic rationality is not the only logic currently under consideration in the TRNC. More than economic rationality, what seems to matter for the Turkish Cypriots are the needs of societal and political security. For them the continuation of Turkey's security guarantee and the presence of the Turkish troops on the island, rather than the cohabitation with the Greek Cypriots within the EU, have proved to be more vital in terms of their security. It is not the economic well-being but physical and societal security that matter for the Turkish Cypriots (Diez, 2000).

The fourth assumption was that not only the Turkish Cypriots but also the Greek Cypriots would soften their negotiating positions. The EU membership of the island would be a supporting reason for the Greek Cypriots to feel themselves more secure. Conceived of as such there would be nothing wrong for them to give the Turkish Cypriots something more than what they actually desire.

However, the main impediment before the Greek Cypriots to show a more accommodating behaviour towards the Turkish Cypriots was related to their major political goal of scoring diplomatic gains against the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey via the EU (Stavrinides, 1999). If there did not exist a strong political will on the part of the Greek Cypriots to carry the Cyprus dispute to the EU circles, and if they did not lodge a membership application with the EU as representing the whole island, the EU might have not involved in the Cyprus dispute to the current degree.

With the evaporation of the Cold War dynamics, the Greek Cypriots had stopped to view their connections with the Non-Aligned Countries in a less vital manner since it would have been no longer possible for them to exploit these links at the expense of Turkey. Therefore, they had come to a conclusion that their gains against Turkey would be more if they courted the European Union, which started to view Turkey less from a strategic-security perspective but more from political and human rights perspectives in the 1990s (Yiallourides, 2001: 325-357).

Within this spirit since 1995 the Greek Cypriots have hardened their negotiation positions. Neither the inter-communal talks in the second half of 1997 nor the negotiations between December 1999 and September 2000 were indicative of any softening in the Greek Cypriot policies. When the EU made it clear that the resolution of the conflict would not be a precondition for the membership of the island to the EU as representing the whole island, the incentives on the part of them to negotiate a new deal with the Turkish Cypriots decreased. Why would the Greek Cypriots agree to share their internationally recognized sovereignty over the island with the Turkish Cypriots under a new political framework where both communities would be considered as politically equal? (Tocci, 2003)

The fifth assumption is that the EU could act as an impartial third party towards both communities. However, this is wrong given that Greece is a member of the EU and can affect the final EU decisions in regard to Turkey's and Cyprus's accession to the EU to a considerable extent (Brewin, 2000: 21-34; 2002a, 2002b).

The sixth assumption regarding the EU's active engagement with the Cyprus dispute revolves around the idea that the EU is in fact contributing to the realization of the UN-designed Cyprus settlement. The most important evidence of this is that numerous EU officials have been repeatedly stating that the EU supports the efforts

of the United Nations Secretary General to broker a deal between the two communities. To this logic, the EU is not an active third party, as the Secretary General of the United Nations has been, during the inter-communal negotiations. Though the European Union started to appoint EU representatives and rapporteurs on Cyprus since 1994 mandated to write reports on whether the parties negotiate in earnest within the UN framework, their mere existence and contacts with the parties have undeniably affected the negotiation position of the parties.

This assumption is flawed mainly for the reason that even though the EU members did not put some solution proposals on the table and preferred to refer to the EU accession process as the framework for an everlasting settlement (Richmond, 2002: 117-136), the prospective EU membership of the island certainly altered the main parameters of the conflict as well as the incentive matrixes of the parties concerned (Baier-Allen, 1999: 179). This has had no less an impact than the overall UN role. Even though the EU circles made it clear that they would welcome any solution of the dispute along the United Nations framework and would relax the Union's Community Law for the sake of accession of the island to the Union, this has not produced any settlement so far. One reason for this is that the EU involvement has seriously questioned the legitimate rights of Turkey on the island. While the Greek Cypriots have not felt any serious EU pressure, Turkey has been considered as the most important party to affect the solution prospects of the dispute.

While the UN framework used to respect Turkey's legitimate concerns on the island emanating from the 1960 agreements and considered the optimum way of solution process to revolve around inter-communal negotiations, the European Union seems to have invested in the idea that if Turkey was encouraged/asked/pressurised/demanded to push the Turkish Cypriots for some

reconciliation with the Greek Cypriots the solution would immediately follow (Brewin, 2002c). In contrast to the EU's attitude, the well-established UN framework used to assume that all parties concerned would have to feel satisfied with the ultimate settlement on the island (Baier-Allen, 1999).

The fact that UN authorities and the US governments have increasingly supported the EU membership of the island as the most important external dynamic that would encourage the communities on the island to come to a settlement has contributed to the Europeanization of the conflict. The Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities have gradually believed that this UN-US attitude has damaged their interest on the island and made the Greek Cypriots more reluctant to negotiate with them in good faith. How would the Greek Cypriots accommodate the Turkish Cypriots if the EU, UN, and US authorities all argued for the EU membership of the island without any a priori resolution of the dispute being a precondition and without the European Union not feeling committed to Turkey's own accession to the Union?

4.3. The Risks of the EU Membership of A Divided Cyprus

The performance of the EU's involvement in the Cyprus dispute has demonstrated three things. The first is that the cooler and the less intensive Turkey's relations with the EU are, the less conducive an environment exists to an inter-communal negotiation process and the less conciliatory the Turkish Cypriots become towards the Greek Cypriots. The second is that if the EU continues to proceed with the accession talks only with the Greek Cypriots as representing the whole island, then prospects for resolution will be dim with the political environment on the island turning out to be more 'securitised' and the Greek Cypriots feeling no need to accommodate the Turkish Cypriots. The third is that the Turkish political/military

elites have come to the conclusion that the EU acts towards Turkey from an instrumental perspective in the sense that if Turkey were encouraged on its way to EU membership, then Turkey would actively support the Turkish Cypriots to agree with the Greek Cypriots. I argue that if the EU does not radically phase out its ambiguous position as to Turkey's membership and offer Turkey a clear membership prospect in the wake of radical domestic reforms within the country, the most probable outcome in the years ahead would be the EU membership of Cyprus as a divided island.

As of the first half of 2003, the situation is as follows: The parties could not come to a settlement along the so-called Annan Plan of the Secretary General of the United Nations, despite of the fact that the original plan of November 2002 was revised twice in December 2002 and February 2003. The parties could neither reach the 28th of February dateline of the Secretary General nor agree to submit the plan to public referenda by the end of March 2003. Eventually, the Greek Cypriots have signed the Accession treaty with the European Union on 16 April 2003 on their own on behalf of the whole island. Both the Secretary General Annan has pointed to the Turkish Cypriot leader as the main party responsible for the failure of his plan and the international community, including the EU as well, interpreted the latest decision of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to open the border gates and allow the communities to visit each other with scepticism.

If the Greek Cypriots accede to the Union by May of 2004 without the resolution of the dispute as representing the whole island, this will further increase the 'securitization' dynamics in the region mainly for the reasons mentioned below. In such a case the Greek Cypriots would permanently loose their hopes of a unified Cyprus where it could be possible for them to enjoy one day all of the three

fundamental rights all over the island. Besides, their incentive for any further round of inter-communal talk would go down, for given their EU membership they would have felt less motivated to accommodate the claims of the Turkish Cypriots as part of a final deal. They would also have to increase their military spending in the face of escalated risks in the region. Their economic performance would be negatively affected by the escalation of the crisis environment on the island, since foreign investors would not want to come to the island to invest their capitals. Besides, sharp reductions in the profits of the lucrative tourism sector would be likely. It is for certain that a divided Cyprus would constitute a major source of friction in EU-Turkey relations (Barkey and Gordon, 2001/2002: 83-94).

The Turkish Cypriots would not be immune from the negative consequences of the EU membership of a divided Cyprus either. First of all, their dependency on Turkey would tremendously increase in many policy areas. The economic benefits of the EU membership would be foregone. This situation would level a serious blow to their communal identity and the years-long claim that they possess an independent and sovereign state (Barkey and Gordon, 2001/2002: 83-94). In parallel to the increased integration with Turkey, more settlers may come from Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots might find themselves as the minority community in their territories. The number of Turkish Cypriots who might both leave the northern Cyprus either for the southern part or other places of the European Union or apply for Greek Cypriot passport might increase. This would certainly shake up the ground on which social peace in the TRNC is built. It would be highly likely that growing numbers of Turkish Cypriots would view their political leaders, who object any deal with the Greek Cypriots within the EU framework, through suspicious and critical eyes (Guven 2002). Besides, the increased economic dependency on Turkey would

not relieve them of their current economic problems. Neither the economic embargo, put on them by the Greek Cypriots and endorsed by the European Union, would be lifted, nor the deteriorating economic performance of Turkey would be able to bail them out on a future occasion of financial crisis.

Turkey would also be affected by the membership of a divided Cyprus in the EU negatively. First of all, the addition of the Greek Cypriots to the anti-Turkish block within the EU would lessen Turkey's chance for future EU membership. Second, the EU might not start the accession talks with Turkey on the pretext that the latter has not worked enough to encourage the Turkish Cypriots to come to an agreement. If the accession talks with the EU do not take off the ground in the next two to three years, particularly due to the continuation of the stalemate on the island, Turkey's relations with the EU would be seriously severed. If Turkey proceeds with its declared intention to annex (or integrate with) the TRNC to the mainland, then Turkey's hope to join the EU will sink to the bottom (Wallace, 2002). In Turkey the pace of EU-induced transformation process would slow down. In parallel to heightened tensions in the island, Turkey might find itself spending more on armament, thus forsaking investments on more lucrative fields.

Moreover, the Euro-sceptic forces in Turkey might gain political victories against the circles, which see the future of the country in closer integration with the EU. Turkey would also channel huge amount of financial resources to the Turkish Cypriots to buttress their position on the island.

The most important consequence of this scenario would be seen on the ongoing negotiation process between Greece and Turkey. All the gains of the last three years in the bilateral relations might be squandered. If the atmosphere soured in the Aegean Sea, risks to regional and continental security might abound with Greece

and Turkey finding themselves on the opposite sites. One additional disadvantage of the non-membership of the island in the EU would be that Turkish would not be registered as an official language spoken within the EU zone. However, if registered, the use of Turkish language might lead to the evaporation of one of the psychological barriers before Turkey's membership in the EU (Barkey and Gordon, 2001/2002: 83-94).

Greece would also feel the negative consequences of the crisis situation on the island. The pro-EU-integrationist Smitis government in Athens might be exposed to harsh criticism at home as such that Europeanising the Turco-Greek relations did not yield to satisfactory outcomes for Greece. Critics might accuse the PASOK government of its pro-conciliatory attitudes toward Turkey on the ground that neither the bilateral negotiation process since the late 1999 nor the transformation of the dynamics of the Turkish-Greek relations into EU-Turkish relations did help Greece see the accession of Cyprus to the EU undivided and in favour of the Greek Cypriots. Greece's defence expenditures would also increase in order to keep pace with Turkey (Wallace, 2002). A Greece, which would have to live next to a Turkey that would have further estranged from the European Union, would in no way feel itself so secure as to channel its energy and resources to the completion of its Europeanization program.

The European Union as an institution or the EU member states would also be negatively affected from the membership of a divided Cyprus. In addition to the escalation of risks to the security and stability in the region, the EU would have found itself having a member state whose borders are patrolled by the UN forces. Imagine the negative impact of this on the EU's institutional identity. In case the divided island became an EU member, it would be a likely option for the Greek

Cypriots to sabotage EU-Turkey relations by sparking a crisis with Turkey and then inviting the EU's Rapid Reaction forces to come to their help (Wallace, 2002). However far-fetched it might sound, this scenario would not be unlikely given that one of the main arguments of the Greek Cypriots is that Turkey would find itself in a position to occupy a part of the EU's territory should it not withdraw its troops from the island following the EU membership of the island.

The EU would also face a Turkey, which would have felt alienated from the EU. Such a Turkey might easily adopt anti-EU policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, Balkans, and Middle Eastern regions if its interests contradict with those of the EU. Given that transatlantic bonds are getting as fragile and flimsy as possible, the impression that Turkey is siding with the United States, rather than the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regions would not serve the interests of the EU.

CHAPTER 5: Post-Helsinki Period: Change or Continuity

The post-Helsinki period in the EU-Turkey-Greece triangle has been giving mixed signals as to the credibility and promise of the European Union to constructively contribute to the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes, through the transformation of Turkey and Greece's *realpolitik* security culture into non-*realpolitik* security culture. While there exist some factors that seem promising for the future, some other factors continue to shed doubts on the ongoing positive climate and remind the observers of Turkish-Greek relations of the painful cycles of conflict-cooperation seen in the past. Viewed through this prism, what follows first is an analysis of the factors that might lead observers to feel optimistic about the future.

5.1.Encouraging Factors

The first promising thing is the fact that Turkey and Greece have been involved in a cooperation process since 1999 (Heraclides: 2002: 17-32). It seems that the dynamics of Turkey's EU accession process has in one way or the other led the two countries to develop a positive view of each other. Thus, it would not be an overestimation to claim that Europeanization processes on the both shores of the Aegean Sea constitutes the main underlying factor behind this cooperation process. Rather than the mere existence of this cooperation process, what seem promising are the factors that make this process different from the previous cycles of cooperation. Before proceeding with the reasons why this is so, what follows next is a brief account of the latest cooperative interactions between Greece and Turkey.

In the summer of 1999 Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece set off a new policy of reconciliation on the margins of a UN meeting in New York in late June. Note that this was happening before the earthquakes struck both countries in August

and September. Following the high level bilateral meetings and consultations in Ankara and Athens throughout the second half of 1999, Turkey and Greece signed a total of 10 agreements on various issues, ranging from organized crime, tourism, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, environment, culture, trade to terrorism. Half of these agreements were signed in Ankara when the Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou paid an historic visit to Turkey on 19-22 January 2000, first in the last three decades. The other half was signed in Athens during Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem's visit on 1-3 February 2002.[*]

Since the first Turkey-Greece EU Committee meeting in February 2000, Greek officials have been offering training to their Turkish counterparts on customs and financial issues, judicial reform, agricultural issues, and low enforcement concerning illegal immigration, narcotics trafficking, and organized crime in the region.

In early 2001, both countries agreed to eliminate the landmines on their common borders over the next ten years. They also simultaneously became signatories of the 1997 Ottawa Convention requiring the destruction of their existing landmines and prohibiting future landmine use and production.

In early 2001, Greece has lifted the state of mobilization of war against Turkey. Turkey is no longer officially considered as the prime threat to Greece.

In early 2001 they agreed to cooperate on a feasibility study under the EU's Inogate program for a series of pipelines to carry natural gas from Central Asia to Europe. The $10 billion project would bring interconnections between the Greek and Turkish networks. In spring 2002 they agreed to build a cross-border pipeline to carry natural gas from central Asia to Western Europe. The 177-mile pipeline would

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[*] One can visit the web sites of Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministries to have an idea about the treaties signed by thesecountries. http://www.mfa.gov.tr and http://www.mfa.gov.gr

be the first joint infrastructure project launched since the two neighbours set aside their traditional hostility in the wake of disastrous earthquakes in both countries in 1999. The pipeline, which would cost $300 million and take three years to build, is the first inter-governmental project to take practical shape (Hope, 2002)

In mid 2001, the soccer authorities of both countries agreed to make a joint bid to host the 2008 European soccer championship. In mid 2001 the militaries of both countries announced to downsize their military spending. Although the main reason behind the decision of the Turkish military authorities was the latest economic crisis precipitated by the developments of the February 2001, the Greek authorities foresaw this and announced that they would also go for savings.

In early 2002, the two foreign ministers, Papandreou and Cem achieved a political breakthrough when they agreed that both countries would set up expert committees to discuss the solution of the long-running bilateral disputes, such as airspace over the Aegean Sea and ownership of mineral rights in the seabed.

A very important sign of the success of the latest reconciliation process between Greece and Turkey took place in early August 2002 when Turkey's new National Security Policy Document did not mention Greece as the top external threat to Turkey's national security.

Their cooperation within the NATO framework is also worth mentioning. In July 1997 they signed a memorandum of good neighbourly relations on the margins of the NATO's Madrid Summit where the Alliance officially endorsed the primacy of the Eastern Mediterranean region for the Alliances' future interests. Greece and Turkey finally came to an agreement over the NATO's command structures in December 1997 with the promulgation of the Alliance's new command structure. In the summer of 1998 both countries agreed to revitalise the Confidence Building

Measures, to which they had initially agreed in 1988. In this process, the role of NATO's Secretary General Solana was immense. In September 1998 they agreed to the establishment of a Balkan regional peacekeeping force alongside with NATO allies Italy and the United States. Their cooperation in NATO's war in Kosovo in 1999 is also worth remembering. Last but not least, Greek and Turkish soldiers for the first time since 1982 participated together in a NATO military exercise in May 2000, called Dynamic Mix (Papacosma, 1999: 47-67).

The first reason why this latest cooperative mood is promising for the future is that the new thaw in bilateral relations has a strong domestic public support. If compared to the old times when the public opinion did most of the time constrain the political leaders to take bold initiatives, the new era witnesses that the majority of the Greek and Turkish people support the current reconciliation process (Heraclides, 2002: 17-32).

Second, in addition to the public support, the majority of the political leaders in both countries are also in favour of closer cooperation. It is getting more and more difficult for the political parties to get votes by strictly adopting a nationalistic discourse (Heraclides, 2002: 20). Further democratization in both countries, particularly along the Europeanization process, holds out the prospect of decreasing the appeal of more-nationalistic and more unilateral policies to the public.

Third, the business elites in both countries also encourage the political leaders to mend the fences. The fact that the bilateral trade volume increased at least three-fold over the last three years shows the degree of support the business circles give to the ongoing cooperation process (Larabee and Lesser, 2003: 87). The activation of the Greek-Turkish and Turkish-Greek business councils in 1998, the increase in the number of joint ventures and investments all display that the stakes of the business

elites in the continuation of the cooperation process is getting higher and higher. If the volume of these bilateral economic activities increase without interruption, it would be extremely difficult for the future political leaders to reverse this process. The creation of the Turkish-Greek academic forum in 1998 and the fact that Greece and Turkey have put into practice various confidence building measures since 1998 are also positive steps worth mentioning in this regard.

Fourth, the current Turkish-Greek cooperation seems to operate in accordance with the functional approach of David Mitrany. Instead of dealing with the resolution of the hard security issues in the short run, the leaders in both countries actively support the view that cooperation should first continue in areas of low politics. The hope is that the more the level of cooperation increases in areas of low politics, the more difficult would be for political leaders to put the gains of this process into danger by adopting intransigent and unyielding approaches towards the resolution of the issues of high politics (Heraclides, 2002). Since 1999, both countries have signed more than ten treaties regulating as many issues as possible. Cooperation on terrorism, immigration, energy transportation, environment, de-mining, illegal drug traffic, tourism, fisheries, education, sport are worth mentioning in this regard (Ministries of Foreign Affairs).

It is to be noted with great satisfaction that both countries have also initiated a process of consultation on the issues of high politics as well. Since the early months of 2002, diplomats from both Foreign Ministries come together to discuss these issues with a view to determining the areas of contention as well as the means how to handle them. The facts that the Steering Committees, which prepared the content of the treaties on the issues of low politics, have not been dissolved and that the Task Force, which was established with a view to channelling Greece's experiences and

know-how to Turkey in her efforts to adopt the EU's Community Law, are still functioning are good omens for the future.

Fifth, the Greek national strategy towards Turkey has evolved in such a way that the majority of the Greek political and military elites are today in favour of Turkey's closer relations with the European Union. For now, it seems that Greece's national interests vis-a-vis Turkey envisage Turkey's further anchoring to the European Union because this seems the only way for Greece to settle territorial disputes with Turkey in the name of further Europeanization. The old strategy of 'conditional sanctions' has given way to the new strategy of 'conditional rewards'. Instead of threatening Turkey to veto her EU membership aspirations unless the latter support more pro-Greek settlements over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus disputes, the new Greek strategy emphasizes the point that Greece would actively support Turkey's EU membership prospects should the latter shows more accommodating and cooperative stances over the bilateral disputes (Couloumbis, 1999: 407-422). This new Greek policy is promising because the materialization of Greece' national interests requires both the resolution of Turkish-Greek disputes and the continuation of Turkey's EU accession process. Besides, it is based on positive incentives rather than negative conditions.

The hope that a Turkey, which is more Europeanized and democratized, would be more peaceful and cooperative in her foreign policy appears to underpin the essence of the current Greek strategy (Tsakonas, 2001: 145-159). With Turkey's acceptance as an EU candidate, one of the most important excuses for Greece's non-European outlook in foreign and security policy areas would wither away, since Greece would no longer feel the need to counter Turkey on the basis of a *realpolitik* threat perspective, characterising the latter as non-European. In one way or the other,

Turkey's closer relations with the EU in the post-Helsinki era have indirectly contributed to Greece's 'European-ness' within the EU.

Sixth, Turkey's perception of Greece's relative position within the EU has also started to change in this new era in such a way that the Turkish elite now see that the dynamics of Turkey-EU relations have been strongly affected by the tone of Turkey-Greece relations (Guvenc, 2000: 102-129). Unsatisfactory though it may seem, the Turkish political elites have gradually embraced the view that Turkey has also to come to terms with Greece over the Aegean and Cyprus disputes, if she wants to join the EU. Greece is now considered more seriously by Turkey. The more Europeanized Greece has become, the more difficult has become for Turkey to carry out the old policy of relying on major EU members in the hope that they would exert pressure on Greece not to put obstacles on Turkey's way to Brussels. It is to be noted with satisfaction here that Greece is not mentioned as a main security threat for Turkey in the latest National Security Document issued in August 2002. Compared to the previous document issued in 1997 and despite traumatic effects of the Ocalan crisis on Turkey-Greece relations, this development should be considered of significant value.

Seventh, the European Union and the United States, as the major external actors that have significant interests in the region, have been actively supporting the current cooperation process for their own security reasons. In this regard, the most important thing is the changing EU policies towards Turkey. Since 1999 Turkey has been an official candidate for the EU membership destined to join the Club on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other would-be members. The promising thing in this regard concerns the likelihood that the EU might have started to look at Turkey from a new perspective that holds that Turkey's eventual admission to the EU

would serve the EU's own security interests (Kalaycioglu, 2002). Rather than sticking with the old idea that the EU would be able to influence Turkey to overhaul its socio-economic and socio-political dynamics if/when the former could keep the latter on the EU's orbit (Duner, 2002), this new thinking has started to emphasise the EU's own interests that might be damaged if Turkey remains outside of the Union for an indefinite period of time. Particularly since September 11, 2001, a growing number of people in the EU have been increasingly arguing for the merits and advantages of Turkey's admission to the EU on the basis of economic and security rationality. This is promising because if one could prove that the main reason for the EU's recent commitment to closer and more cooperative relations with Turkey has emanated from the EU's own security needs rather than the instrumental concerns over the settlement of the Cyprus and the ESDP issues, then one might feel optimistic about the future.

There are some important signs in this regard. The Kosovo war in 1999, the cease of political dialogue with Turkey between 1997 and 1999, and the electoral triumph of the more nationalistic and isolationist circles in April 1999 elections as a response to EU's exclusionary attitude towards Turkey might have all alerted the EU circles to the dangers that Turkey's gradual alienation from the EU would damage the EU's core values and post-Cold War era security interests. Thought of this way, one can aptly argue that Turkey's EU membership candidacy might denote for the EU's determination to contribute first to Turkey (directly) and the EU's (indirectly) security interests through Turkey's transformation on the basis of the EU's norms. If so, the promise of the EU in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes would increase in the years ahead simply because the EU's attitude towards Turkey has started to become less ambiguous and more receptive due to the high stakes in the

estrangement of Turkey from the EU. A committed EU would certainly skyrocket Turkey's penchant for EU membership as well as efforts to come to an everlasting settlement with Greece along the ongoing accession process. A more 'European' Turkey would easily compromise with Greece.

A related strategic reason for the EU's more receptive approach towards Turkey has become evident in the post 11 September era as the Europeans have found themselves opposing the American model of security conceptualization and international order. The war against global terrorizm on the one hand and the American plans to revise the organizing principles of the Middle Eastern security order on the other might alerted the EU circles to the danger that Turkey's placement within the American camp would likely erode the EU's global/regional power status as well as the 'power of attraction' of the EU's soft-security model. Assuming that the EU would feel the need to make its own security model appear strongly in the years ahead, then the degree and quality of Turkey's placement within this model would be of fundamental importance.

Based on this logic, the European Union for the first time announced in its Leaken summit in December 2001 that if the pace of Turkey's EU-induced reformation process goes unabated, the accession talks with Turkey would likely start soon. In such a way as to reiterate this position, the European Union recently made it clear in Copenhagen in December 2002 that the accession talks with Turkey will start immediately should the European Commission recommends this in its yearly progress report on Turkey in 2004 (Copenhagen conclusions). These developments are important because the EU members for the first time enunciated clear dates in regard to Turkey's accession talks with the EU.

The future would prove more promising if the EU members agreed to Turkey's candidacy in Helsinki and Turkey's participation in the EU convention meetings with a view to accelerating the re-institutionalization of the EU on the basis of the EU's multi-cultural and supranational traits. A multi-cultural and heterogenous EU area 'united in diversity' on the one hand and a two-tier integration process on the other will increase the promise of the EU in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes since Turkey's membership prospects in such an EU would become realistic.

What is important in this regard concerns the EU's gradually changing attitude towards the Kurdish question in Turkey. In contrast to the pre-Helsinki period, the EU circles have been referring to this issue for the last three years within the framework of Turkey's democratization. Rather than exerting pressure on Turkey to accept the Kurds in Turkey as a minority group entitled to community rights, the EU has changed its attitude towards this issue in the sense that Turkey has been demanded in the EU's Accession Partnership Document and yearly progress reports to recognize and improve individual political, social and cultural rights of all Turkish citizens regardless of their ethnic origins (Kirisci, 2002). Turkey's victory over the PKK, the changing strategies of the Kurds-dominated political parties in Turkey in favour of more political-less confrontational approaches, and Turkey's growing recognition of the Kurdish issue as a problem in its relations with the EU have all made it easier for the EU to modify its old approach.

The Americans are also encouraging the latest Greek-Turkish cooperation process in the hope that Turkey's EU membership prospects will be higher if one of the great obstacles in this regard is eliminated. The fundamental US concern in this regard is that Turkey's pro-Western and pro-American character will be bolstered if Turkey joines the EU. A more European and western Turkey will more easily and

likely cooperate with the US in the realization of the latter's strategic-security interests in the Greater Middle Eastern region (Kuniholm, 2001: 25-53). It seems that the Americans are aware of the inverse relationship between Turkey's European vocation on the one hand the power of nationalism/isolationism in Turkish foreign policy on the other. To them, if Turkey finds itself isolated from the EU, then nationalist/isolationist circles would become dominant in Turkish domestic and foreign policy and this would in turn increase the degree of Turkish scepticism of the Western world (EU and the USA alike). It would gradually become more difficult for the Americans to buy Turkey's participation in US-designed security policies in Turkey's near abroad. Doing business with Turkey *outside* the weakening transatlantic framework (EU-USA drifting apart on the on hand and the marginalisation of NATO on the other) and on the basis of bilateral relations would become highly costly for the Americans. The Americans are of the view that if they supported Turkey's EU membership prospects and lobbied for Turkey in the EU circles, then Turkey would more actively support the American policies in Turkey's strategic environment.

In addition to this instrumental reasoning, the US authorities also approached Turkey's EU membership from an ideational perspective. To them, if Turkey acceded to the EU, the doubts over Turkey's national and international identity would cease to exist. From then on, Turkey would become a true member of the western international community and cooperate with the US more easily and in a more efficient and time-consuming way. The hope is that Turkey's nationalistic and sometimes anti-western foreign policy openings in its region would strongly be curtailed by its membership in the EU.

The second promising factor, in addition to the new rationale of the latest Turkish-Greek cooperation process, is that Turkey's interest in the EU membership has increased in the post-Helsinki period, particularly following the ominous September 11 events. Given that the stakes of exclusion from the EU, particularly on cultural and civilisational grounds, will be much higher today than the past, Turkey has speeded up its efforts to meet the accession criteria. To this end, the Grand National Assembly enacted some radical reforms over the last years, the latest of which occurred in August 2002. Not only Turkey abolished the death penalty and civilized the composition of National Security Council but also allowed the use of Kurdish in education. All these changes aim at adapting Turkey's internal and external make-up to those of the European Union. Turkey's gradual success in this regard has been noted by the EU Commission's progress reports issued in 2001 and 2002.

Turkey's enhanced interest in the EU membership is also affected by concerns not to live with the Americans on a bilateral level. Given NATO's decreasing importance in general transatlantic relations, further estrangement of Turkey from the EU would mean that both Turkey's European character would erode in the years to come and Turkey would find itself dealing with the United States on more bilateral-less institutional levels (Oguzlu, 2002: 579-603). This would certainly weaken Turkey's bargaining power vis-à-vis the Americans, as the latest Iraqi war has demonstrated.

Estranging from the European Union and joining the Americans in their global campaigns as a secondary power, Turkey would not feel itself in security. She would likely face increasing, and at times disturbing, pressures coming from the United States to throw its lot with the Americans, sometimes to the detriment of her

national security interests (Aktar, 2003). Reflecting this new mood in Turkey, even the ex-Chief of the General Staff argued for Turkey's EU membership on strategic-security grounds claiming that Turkey's accession to the EU is a geo-political necessity on the part of Turkey.

Additionally, the political Islamists have recently made a u-turn and decided to give support to Turkey's accession process with the EU. Even though many claim that their prime reason for this change is their hope to find an external ally against the secular establishment within the country, the fact that these circles constitute nearly one third of the Turkish society is important in this regard (Oguzlu, 2004: forthcoming).

A significant concern in Turkey's growing desire for the EU membership relates to the fact that the Turkish foreign policy makers have realized that if Cyprus joins the EU as a divided island, this will have catastrophic impacts on Turkey's relations with the EU. It would become more difficult for Turkey to reach its EU membership goal when the Greek Cypriots would be able to block Turkey's attempts from within the EU (Oguzlu, 2002: 79-101).

As an indication of the EU's increasing promise, the Greek and Turkish governments, particularly the latter, encouraged the Cypriots in their efforts to come to a settlement before the island joins the EU in the middle of 2004. Despite a break with the inter-communal negotiation process between late 2000 and late 2001, the two sides set into motion a new negotiation process in early 2002. Even though the parties themselves could not sort out their points of friction until the EU's Copenhagen summit in December 2002, the fact that they seriously considered the peace plan of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan is of significant value. It seemed that all parties concerned have realized, to varying degrees though, the urgency of

reaching a solution. While the Greek Cypriot leadership has tried to garner the support of the sceptical Greek Cypriot public opinion to the need to solve the dispute along the Annan plan, the majority of the Turkish Cypriot public opinion has actively and vociferously encouraged their sceptical political leader to show more flexibility in helping pave the way for the accession of the island to the EU united (Guven, 2003).

The public discussions in Turkey are also very encouraging. As being different from the past experiences, this time the quality of the domestic discussions on the merits of the Annan plan and on the need to help facilitate a solution before the EU casts its final decision has been comparatively high. A significant portion of the Turkish political elite as well as the Turkish public, compromising of academicians, intellectuals, businessmen and the men on the street, have enthusiastically argued that Turkey should accept the Annan Plan as a framework for negotiations and not let this important opportunity wither away (Arim, Karaosmanoglu and Tashan, 2002). To these circles, Turkey's EU membership prospects would certainly be affected by the political situation in Cyprus.

It is now the time to analyse the factors that seem to still negatively affect the promise of the EU's involvement in the Turkish-Greek relations.

5.2. Discouraging Factors on the Part of Greece

The first signs in this regard took place during the negotiation of the terms of Turkey's candidacy in 1999 and Turkey's Accession Partnership document in 2000. On both occasions, Greece tried to link Turkey's eventual accession to the Union to the resolution of the Aegean and Cyprus disputes in favour of Greece. The tough bargaining between the Greek diplomats on the one hand and EU and Turkish

diplomats on the other proved that Greece tried to get as much concessions as possible from Turkey as the latter tries to march to Brussels.

Despite all Greek attempts at further Europeanization, it seems that the increasing Greek calls for the set of a clear date for the start of Turkey's accession talks with the EU has been driven by Greece's instrumental concerns vis-à-vis Turkey. According to them, if the Turks were given such an exact date for the start of accession talks, they would not make a great fuss over the incorporation of the Greek Cypriots Administration into the EU as representing the whole island even if a political solution could not be reached. It is quiet telling that Greece was the only EU country, which adopted such a stance by the time the EU Council convened in Copenhagen in December 2002.

Given that the successive Greek governments in the 1990s elevated the EU membership of the Greek Cypriots to Greece's most important foreign policy goal, the negative repercussions of any delay in this process might be unbearable for any Greek government.

Although one cannot be so sure about the real intentions of the current Greek government on Turkey's EU membership by analyzing Greece's policy towards Cyprus, one could get a clearer picture if the attention were turned to Greece's policy on the ESDP issue. Here Greece behaved towards Turkey on the assumptions that Turkey can never join the EU and that Turkey's exclusion from the ESDP (therefore the EU) would contribute to her security.

The interpretation of the latest Copenhagen summit by the majority of the Greek political elites does not also seem promising for the ongoing Turkish-Greek détente because that once again displayed that the Greeks still approach Turkey from an instrumental perspective. To these circles the new status quo has resulted in a win-

win situation for Greece. On the one hand, if Turkey accepted these conclusions and fulfilled the EU's requirements, than her behaviour towards Greece would be cooperating and accommodating (a positive outcome for Greece). On the other hand, if Turkey chose the path of escalation and refused to comply with the EU's decisions over the Aegean and Cyprus disputes, then Turkey would have to face the European Union, rather than Greece (another positive outcome for Greece) (Dragoumis, 2002).

Another non-promising sign concerns the position the Greek government took up during the European Convention meetings. While Greece on the one hand argued for the strengthening of the power of the European Commission and the European Parliament, as instruments to protect the interests of 'smaller' members against 'bigger' members, she on the other hand appeared quite satisfied with the inter-governmental character of the decision-making process within the European Councils in regard to European Security and Defence Policy issues (Gropas, 2003). When this inter-governmental approach toward the ESDP issues combined with demands that the EU turns into a unique international political and security actor equipped with instruments to defend borders of the Union and security interests of the members states, it appears that the Greek view of the EU as a 'security alliance' and 'protector power' is still valid. Otherwise if a qualified-majority system were adopted as regards ESDP issues, Greece's more powerful partners within the EU might easily sidestep Greece's security concerns for the sake of constructively managing relations with Turkey.

What one can derive from this particular Greek approach towards the EU integration process is that Greece has tried to give a more European outlook by adopting more federalist appearances in regard to less problematic issues in return for EU backing of Greece's national security interests vis-à-vis Turkey. When this

particular logic towards the EU integration process combines with the repeated statements of the Greek politicians that there is only one dispute between the two countries in the Aegean Sea, namely the delimitation of the Continental shelf areas, and that the last resort to solve this dispute is the International Court of Justice in the Hague, Turkey's incentives to come to a final agreement with Greece within the ongoing EU accession process will to a great extent diminish.

Despite the significance of the new approach towards Turkey, one should not ignore the still influential position of the traditional anti-Turkey circles in Greece as to how to deal with Turkey. It is getting more frequent that a quite number of Greek politicians and strategists are blaming the current government for its blind support to Turkey's European vocation. They hold that Turkey has not showed any compromising stance towards Greece and upped the ante in the Aegean and Cyprus in spite of the fact that Greece has gradually helped clean Turkey's ways to Brussels. A clear manifestation of this thinking become more evident during the course of the first half of 2003 as such circles pushed the government to take up a much harder line towards Turkey, particularly concerning Turkey's alleged disrespect for Greece's air zone. Even though the Turkish military fighters flew over the extra 4 miles of Greece's alleged air zone, they took place in accordance with NATO's military planning and in quite low numbers compared to the Greek flights over the Aegean Sea. Fearing that the ruling PASOK government might face a defeat in the upcoming elections in the spring of 2004, the Greek authorities could easily adopt a highly nationalist and anti-Turkish discourse and even lodged the European Commission with accusation-files in regard to Turkey's allegedly non-European misbehaviour over the Aegean Sea. As this episode demonstrates, domestic political concerns might even push the current Greek Foreign Minister, seemingly a figure in favour of

Turkey's closer attachment to the EU, to embrace nationalistic stances vis-à-vis Turkey.

5.3. Discouraging Factors on the Part of Turkey

The most important reason for pessimism on the part of Turkey emanates from the particular logic Turkey embraced in coming to a settlement with the EU over the ESDP issue. Rather than believing in the need and appropriateness to meet the required demands on the way to accession, particularly concerning convergence with the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, Turkey seems to have acted on the assumption that the international conjuncture heavily favoured Turkey against the European Union in general and Greece in particular in the post 11 September era. The reason for this was that the negotiation position of Turkey might have increased with the elevation of the country to a very significant place in the American strategies of containing and fighting terrorizm. Due to her increased international standing in regard to global war against terrorizm and Iraq, the Turkish security elite might have calculated that this would have been the right time to strike a deal with the Europeans, for Turkey's bargaining power would have certainly increased vis-à-vis them (Yetkin, 2002). Another instrumental concern driving Turkey's actions in this case seems to have been the rationale that if Turkey cooperated with the EU over this issue, the latter would likely take the pressure off Turkey concerning the non-settlement on Cyprus. The fact that the need to develop healthier security relations with Turkey in this new era has increased on the side of the EU has also constituted another reason helping produce a deal over the ESDP issue.

A significant factor why Turkey's particular behaviour towards the European Union may not be promising for the EU's role to contribute to Turkish-Greek

cooperation is that the Turkish political-security elite acts on the assumption that the more the EU approaches to Turkey the faster Turkey would accommodate with Greece. In addition to this, a survey conducted among the members of Turkish Parliament concluded that Turkish MPs have not considered Cyprus and the Aegean Sea disputes as fundamental obstacles towards Turkey's accession to the EU. They mainly signed on the idea that if Turkey successfully handled its problems in the areas of human rights and democratization, then the EU would hardly find any excuse to deny Turkey's membership. The fact that the Cyprus dispute has not been regarded as a condition for Turkey's membership would likely militate against the prospects of the resolution of this dispute along the EU accession process (McLaren and Muftuler-Bac, 2003: 195-218).

Such thinking on the part of state elites was highly conspicuous during the discussion process of the Annan plan in Turkey. The core of Turkey's security elite did not want to cast their decision on the applicability of the Annan plan before hearing what the European Union would offer Turkey in Copenhagen in December 2002 (Guven, 2003). It seems that the ruling Justice and Development Party has also signed on to this thinking despite the initial comments of the important figures of the party that this plan would constitute a promising ground for the continuing inter-communal negotiations on the island. Some have even argued that the main reason why the President Denktas of the TRNC has invited the Greek Cypriot President to face-to-face talks in late 2001 was to enhance Turkey's relative negotiation position vis-à-vis the European Union (Yetkin, 2002).

The important thing in this regard is that all the parties concerned, including the Greek and Greek Cypriots as well, have taken an utmost care not to appear as the intransigent side during the negotiations. Rather than engaging each other with a

sincere interest to come to an everlasting settlement, their prime concern has been to please the European Union and give the image that they are the party working for a true settlement (Guven, 2003).

One of the handicaps in regard to Turkey is that Turkey's EU accession process will likely pit the current Justice and Development Party government against the traditional state elites, if the European Union does not reward Turkey's reformation attempts with clearer prospects of membership soon. It seems that whatever the EU offers Turkey in the months/years to come, the current government would likely accept, for the Europeanization process appears to constitute the most important legitimation strategy of the government (Insel, 2003: 293-308). However, the danger is that the traditional elites might not feel satisfied with whatever the EU gives to Turkey and start to mobilise the pubic against the European Union by deciphering the cynical intentions of the EU. Under such conditions, the government might also adopt more nationalistic anti-EU openings if the majority of the public takes side with the traditional elites (Robins, 2003: 547-566). Such domestic conditions would highly likely diminish the promise of the European Union in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes.

5.4. Discouraging Factors on the Part of the EU

Despite the fact that the EU's approach towards Turkey has evolved into more concrete forms since Helsinki 1999, with the confirmation of Turkey's candidacy in 1999, one can still claim that the roots of ambiguity has not been cleared away yet. It is still the case that there does not exist any cohesion or consensus among the EU members whether to admit Turkey as a member in the next decade. Given that the majority of public opinions in each member country are against Turkey's inclusion in

the Union, that Turkey's accession to the EU cannot still be justified on economic and identity grounds, that the EU is going to become very busy in adopting its institutional structures according to the requirements of the enlarged EU, that there is not any common understanding among the members as to the scope and direction of the EU's geo-political and security horizons, that the future of transatlantic relations will likely remain blurred and uncertain, the EU will have likely clung to its old 'constructively managed ambiguity policy' towards Turkey. It is a reflection of this thinking that the EU did not mention Turkey in its Nice Summit conclusions when the future plans to re-organise and re-structure the Union were on the table (Muftuler-Bac, 2002: 79-95; Nice Conclusions). One can also read the EU's vague answer in Copenhagen to Turkey's calls for an early start of the accession talks in this as such (Aktar, 2003, ASAM).

In addition to its vagueness on Turkey, the European Union has also preserved the main principles of its Cyprus policy since 1999. The hope is still that Turkey would actively encourage the Turkish Cypriots to come to a final accord with their co-islanders within the UN-EU framework, if she wanted to see that her accession process to the EU goes less problematic. Thought of this way, the EU circles have not put significant pressures on the Greek Cypriots despite their sporadic warnings that the accession of the island to the EU as divided would not be certain. However, in many ways and on numerous occasions, they have not hesitated to make it clear that Cyprus has successfully completed the accession process and would join the Union as foreseen in Helsinki in 1999 (Guven, 2003). The Copenhagen decision to admit the divided Cyprus to membership constitutes the latest evidence of this EU thinking.

Despite Turkey's growing international geo-political significance in the post 11 September era and despite the increased domestic reformation process since Helsinki in 1999, the European Union does not view the issue of Cyprus's membership from a Turkey-friendly perspective. After all the stakes in the possibility of a Greek veto over the whole enlargement process in case the EU decides not to let the divided Cyprus in appeared to be greater than the risks that Turkey's reactionary estrangement from the EU would engender.

CONCLUSION

Before summarising the main conclusions of this study, we will first of all mention the reasons why the ongoing cooperative relations between Turkey and Greece for the last four years within the EU framework might turn out to be fragile in the years to come.

The first and the foremost point concerns the fact that Turkey's cooperation with Greece seems to be dependent on the nature/quality of her relations with the European Union. The risk is that whenever Turkey-EU relations deteriorate, the quality of Turkish-Greek cooperation might degenerate, hence accelerating the perpetuation of *realpolitik* security identities and practices (Larabee and Lesser, 2003). If the European Union does not increase her commitment towards Turkey's accession by adopting more credible policies, then Turkey's ongoing democratization process might result in a decrease in Turkey's penchant for EU membership and this might in turn lead Turkey to embrace more non-cooperative policies towards Greece.

An additional risk is that the longer it takes for Turkey to take some bold steps on the issues concerned, the more difficult it would be for the Greek politicians to legitimize their pro-engagement policy in the eyes of Greek public opinion. At one point, the Greek politicians might reverse back to their old habit to court nationalistic Greek public opinion for their domestic political interests (Larabee and Lesser, 2003). However for Turkey to reciprocate Greece's ostensibly cooperative approach towards Turkey, the EU needs to change its view of Turkey.

Second, if the current intra-Alliance rift cannot be healed soon, Turkey's behaviour towards the European Union and Greece might show some vicissitudes. This would make it difficult for Turkey to assess the possible consequences of her actions and to easily line up with European stances against the American ones. A

Turkey, which would always feel itself to be sandwiched between European and American choices, would end up thinking in more strategic and instrumental ways. A Turkey, which would perceive her foreign policy environment through strategic-security lenses, would likely tend to interpret the developments in the region from a zero-sum mentality, highlighting costs at the expense of benefits (Oğuzlu, 2004: forthcoming). If the West gets further divided into two, with the EU and the US being the two polars, Turkey's chance of being included in the EU would to a great extent be affected by the dynamics of transatlantic relations. If the Europeans feel that the Americans are supporting Turkey's EU membership with a view to weakening the Union and accelerating its disintegration, then the EU's attitude towards Turkey would not change from its current ambiguous one to a more receptive one.

Third, the current Greek strategy towards Turkey should value Turkey's membership in the EU more than the resolution of the Aegean and Cyprus disputes in favour of Greece. The former should be the end whereas the second the means, not the other way around. Given that Turkish public opinion and the military-security elites are highly suspicious of Greece's intentions to use EU mechanisms against Turkey, it would be difficult for the Turks to believe in Greece's sincerity on Turkey's accession to the EU. The highly shared Turkish view is that Greece advocates Turkey's accession to the EU in general and the start of the Turkey's accession talks with the EU in particular in the hope that Turkey would agree to more pro-Greek solutions in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. It is not still certain whether the latest Greek openings towards Turkey reflect a 'change of hearth' or can be labelled as a 'change of mind' with new tactics put into practice in order to pursue the old belligerent and exclusionary strategy towards Turkey (Siegl, 2002: 40-52).

Fourth, Turkey's domestic conditions are also important in this regard. Even though it seems that Turkey's penchant for EU membership has increased in the aftermath of the latest war in Iraq, due to the need to increase Turkey's bargaining power vis-à-vis the United States, Turkey's doubts about the West might not be limited to the Americans but include the Europeans as well should the EU does not start the accession talks soon.

As for the main conclusions of this dissertation the following points can be said: It has been demonstrated here that the theoretical expectations of neo-realism with respect to the role of international organizations in interstate relations have not come true. Turkey and Greece's links with the EU and NATO played quite significant roles in the evolution of their bilateral relations. Despite the fact that structural realists do not aim to explain states' identities and interests, particularly the impact of international institutional environments on states' identities, one would find it difficult to argue that the institutional links with the EU and NATO have played marginal roles in the evolutionary process of Turkish-Greek relations. Besides, it was not due to the regional anarchy and distribution of material capabilities in the region that these two countries have at times cooperated and at times conflicted with each other in line with *realpolitik* security understanding. They have done so because the dynamics of their institutional relations with the EU and NATO has provided the context conducive to these happennings.

As for the expectations of rationalist institutionalism of neo-liberalism one can say that these institutional links have not helped them cooperate easily by contributing to the elimination of cheating and relative gains concerns. Neither their joint membership in NATO nor close relations on the sidelines of the European Union led them to trust each other. This was so because their institutional relations

with NATO and the EU have not only continued on technical and functional grounds but also included ideational aspects. This disseration has made the point that even if they had had collective interests before starting to interact with each other through these institutions, they would have ended up with divergent interests due to the dynamics of their relationships with EU and NATO.

The expectations of the sociological institutionalists that Turkey and Greece's links with NATO and the EU would first and foremost affect their identities and interests, rather than their strategies, have come true. Even though these countries could not develop a cooperative relationship in their region based on non-*realpolitik* security culture and continued to view each other through *realpolitik* glances, this end result is an ideational outcome and to a significant extent informed by the dynamics of their institutional relations with NATO and the EU. However, sociological institutionalists' claim that Turkey and Greece would transform their *realpolitik* security cultures into non-*realpolitik* ones through their interaction within the framework of western security community, as represented by the EU and NATO, has not come true. The main reason for that was neither the Cold War era NATO was a security community nor the post-Cold War era European Union approached Turkey and Greece as a credible socializing institution in accordance with the security norms of the post-modern European Union. The following section summarizes the main arguments of the dissertation why such an outcome has taken place.

It has been argued here that for a long-term cooperative Turkish-Greek relationship to take place, their current *realpolitik* security cultures should evolve into non-*realpolitik* security cultures. To this end, Turkey and Greece's institutional links with the European Union and NATO initially seemed promising. Their long-term membership in NATO and joint aspirations to become members of the

European Union were initially thought of playing encouraging roles in this regard. The credibility of these institutional links to play such roles were assumed to be extremely high if one could consider these institutions as security communities based on non-*realpolitik* security norms. Presumably, the EU and NATO would value the resolution of Turkish-Greek border disputes in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus lest their socially constructed international/security identities were not negatively affected by their continuation.

NATO, conceived of a security community based on liberal-democracy norms and constituting the main security organization of the western international community, would become the main platform for Turkey and Greece to come closer in terms of their national identities and interests. Its potential role in this regard was assumed to be at its peak during the Cold War era simply because Turkey and Greece were members in the Alliance and considered as Western/European countries. The hope was that their joint interests to seek security against the Soviet Union and prove their Western/European identities would eventually lead them to develop collective identities within NATO. This would become possible when these countries first internalized the security culture of the Alliance and then gave the primacy to the concerns of the Alliance over their regional security interests. Besides, Turkey and Greece would gradually begin to trust each other when they interacted within the informational environment of the Alliance. The possibility of their cooperation would have increased when they participated in NATO's joint military command, military planning, and exercises and shared sensitive military information about their respective military capabilities and strategic plans.

However, I argued here that such expectations did not take place for a number of reasons. The most important of all were the following: First, the Cold War

era NATO was not a security community based on collective liberal-democratic norms. It was a military collective defense organization whose security culture was based on the practices of *realpolitik* security understanding. Containment of the Soviet Union, the extension of the United States' nuclear and conventional military assets to Europe, the improvement of other allies' military capabilities were the main instruments of NATO in its struggle against the communist block. Designed as such, the significance of allies within the Alliance and in the eyes of the United States, in principle, varied according to their military capabilities and geo-strategic positions. From this perspective, their joint membership in NATO did demonstrate the power disparities between Turkey and Greece in the clearest way, as well as contributed to their *realpolitik* security understanding. Besides, the NATO's policy to arm Turkey against the externally defined Soviet danger whereas the flow of arms to Greece on the basis of its internal struggle against the communist groups did further widen the military capabilities between these two countries. The potential role of the Alliance further decreased, from a neo-liberal perspective, when Turkey and Greece did not develop a collective security interest against the Soviet Union. They did not feel it necessary to cooperate closely in order to ward off the Soviet threat. The bilateral character of their security relations with the United States, in conformity with the security relations between other allies and the the United States, first reduced the multilateral character of NATO and then relieved Turkey and Greece of the need to solve their disputes in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus in order to deal with the Soviet threat more effectively.

When these combined with the deficiency of the Alliance to act as a democracy promoter, the contextual requirements for a promising NATO role in the transformation of Turkey and Greece's *realpolitik* security cultures into a non-

realpolitik one did not simply take place. The most significant role of NATO was to pave the ground for Turkey and Greece to learn how to build confidence-building mechanisms in their region and how to develop a crisis management culture. Even though these points can be mentioned as NATO's positive impact, one could also make the case that these developments were only partially positive simply because they did not encourage Greece and Turkey how to mutually contribute to the solution of substantial issues.

With the advent of the 1990s, the role of NATO in the nature of Turkish-Greek relations started to decrease mainly for the reasons that NATO's European identity started to erode with the gradual division of the West into two, EU and American, and that Turkey and Greece turned to the European Union as the main international fora in order to secure their places within the western international community. Gradually, Turkey and Greece found it difficult to develop a collective security identity under the 'more political-less military', 'more American-less European', 'more bilateral-less institutional', and 'more global-less regional' NATO.

Despite all its drawbacks, the dynamics of institutional relations between Turkey and Greece on the one hand and NATO on the other have positively contributed to the emergence of cooperative bilateral relations of *realpolitik* kind. These two countries could develop and sustain a functioning crisis-management culture. For example, it was due to the existence of such a culture that Turkey and Greece could eventually succeed in de-escalating the Imia crisis of January 1996. Absent this crisis-management culture developed within the NATO framework, Turkey and Greece might have resorted to use of force in the past. Though they could not transform their *realpolitik* security identities into non-*relapolitik* ones, their joint memberships in NATO helped them control their warlike/crisis situations. This

can be considered as a postive aspect of their institutional relationship within NATO, rather than a mere indication of the Alliance's fire-fighting capabilities.

In the post-Cold War era, the main international institution to have the greatest potential to affect the nature of Turkish-Greek relations has been the European Union. When Turkey's increasing aspiration to join the EU combined with Greece's instrumental strategy to use the EU platforms against Turkey, in accordance with its security culture, the European Union has found itself in a unique position in regard to the evolution of Turkish-Greek relations.

I argued here that if the European Union had formulated its enlargement strategy towards Turkey on the basis of the logic of appropriateness, rather than the logic of consequentiality, the contextual environment for Turkey and Greece to develop cooperative relations on the basis of non-*realpolitik* security culture would have been created. In such a case, the EU would have justified Turkey's possible entry into the EU on the basis of its international/security identity/culture and adopted a credible socializing strategy by teaching its norms to Turkey or persuading her to the legitimacy of the EU's norms and constitutive principles. Such kind of an EU action would have been in conformity with the oft-repeated view that the European Union evolved into a post-modern security community in the 1990s.

A post-modern European Union would foresee the widening and deepening processes as constitutive of each other; define its identity on the rejection of its *realpolitik* past, rather than in reference to particular territorial conceptualizations; try to secure its identity through the projection of its non-*realpolitik* security culture to the peripheries of the continent; and adopt a particular enlargement strategy that foresees the accession of aspirant countries if they met the technical requirements of membership.

However, as the 1990s unfolded, it became crystal clear that the European Union behaved as a post-modern security community only towards the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Its logic towards Turkey has been based on the logic of consequentiality in the sense that the EU did simply ask Turkey to meet the membership criteria on its own. It did not actively try to socialize Turkey into the security norms of the Union. Depending on Turkey's performance, it would either let her in or close the door forever. Such an approach towards Turkey emphasised the costs and benefits of Turkey's accession and the EU undertook this task in terms of the compatibility of Turkey's security culture with that of the European Union.

When the EU found it difficult to admit Turkey as a member due to the incompatibilities of her security culture, it adopted a constructively managed deliberate ambiguity policy towards Turkey whose main goal was to effectively reduce Turkey-induced costs to the EU's twin processes of deepening (ESDP) and widening (Cyprus). In response to such an ambiguous EU approach, the Turkish elites have gradually adopted critical attitudes towards the ongoing accession process and most of the time tended to interpret it as a threat generating exercise. In the face of the EU's reluctant attitude towards Turkey's accession and its inefficient socialization strategies, both Turkey's non-European character has become more visible and the pro-EU circles in Turkey found it difficult to convince the public opinion to the idea that the ongoing accession process would in fact be the best strategy for Turkey to cope with the security risks and challenges of the globalization process.

Within the context of such negative EU-Turkey relations, the *realpolitik* character of Turkey-Greece relations have been re-constituted, particularly by the

efforts of the successive Greek governments to prove their European identity on the basis of Turkey's non-European identity. The Greek efforts to hamper Turkey's relations with the EU and contribute to Turkey's exclusion from the EU became possible within the context of deteriorating Turkey-EU relations. If the European Union had given credible signals with respect to Turkey's European identity, for instance by approaching Turkey from the logic of appropriateness, Greece would have been denied any legitimate ground for her exclusionary attitude towards Turkey.

On the other hand, when Greece's partners within the EU seriously challenged Greece's European identity by using Greece as a pawn in their relations with Turkey, Greece's view of the EU as a security alliance has been further reinforced. In the face of Turkey's growing hard-core military capabilities and increasing regional power status and in the face of its marginal status within the EU, Greece continued to see Turkey as a threat and the EU as an external security alliance to balance Turkey. The important point is that Greece's view of the EU as a security alliance was made easier when Turkey's European status was being challenged by Greece's partners within the EU.

Thought of this way, Greece's efforts to Europeanize its national identity through her federalist and pro-integration approach since the advent of the Simitis government has not generated the context conducive to the transformation of *realpolitik* security relations in and around the Aegean Sea into non-*realpolitik* one. The main reason for this was that the Europeanization of Greece's foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey did not mean anything more than Greece's internalization of the EU's 'constructively managed deliberate ambiguity' policy towards Turkey. Besides, Greece's decision to Europeanize was to a great extent caused by the dynamics of the

EU's enlargement and deepening processes. If Greece continued to remain as a Balkan country within the EU with strong nationalistic and unilateral undertones in its foreign and security policies, both she would get further marginalized within the ever-enlarging and deepening EU and find it extremely difficult to secure EU's help against Turkey.

Seen against this background, I argued that Greece's pro-engagement policy towards Turkey since 1999 has contributed to the regional stability only in *realpolitik* terms. Even though one can claim that this regional stability and the ongoing Turkish-Greek cooperation process might have been casued by Greece's increasing bargaining power vis-à-vis Turkey (a neo-realist outcome), the fact is that such an outcome has been made possible by the way the EU has viewed Turkey and been involved in the Turkish-Greek relations (a social constructivist process). The more Europeanized Greece could find it easier to adopt a pro-engagement policy towards Turkey because Greece's further Europeanization has brought with itself the EU's involvement in the Turkish-Greek relations in favour of Greece. The EU's Helsinki summit conclusions and the EU's Accession Partnership Document tailored for Turkey are the best indications of this reality. However, unless the European Union views Turkey within the EU project and offers her credible membership prospects, Turkey and Greece would not be able to develop a stable and cooperative relations in their region on the basis of non-*realpolitik* security practices.

I also argued that the EU's involvement in the Cyprus dispute has so far not produced any cooperative outcome on the island based on the non-*realpolitik* security understanding. The way the EU approached the dispute has contributed to the further securitization of the conflict, as well as the perpetuation of the *realpolitik* identities of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. Unless the identity-related

security concerns of the Turkish Cypriots are taken into consideration and unless the EU offers Turkey a credible membership prospect, it seems that only the Greek Cypriot Administration will join the EU in 2004. Their admission to the EU as representing the whole island, regardless of the fact that EU's Community Law would not be applied in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, would bode dangerous for future.

Given that a long-term cooperative relationship based on non-*realpolitik* security identities and practices is difficult to take place, this dissertation suggests that Turkey and Greece should develop appropriate mechanims with the help of the European Union and NATO in order to sustain their ostensibly cooperative interaction in the years to come. In this regard, the European Union and NATO might play facilitative functions. For example, it is a promising sign that these two countries put into place some confidence building measures with the help of the Alliance. The new command structure of the Alliance, in which Turkish and Greek military officers would work together in Larissa and Izmir, and NATO's emerging response force might provide useful avenues for Greece and Turkey to cooperate miliatrily and develop a climate of mutual confidence.

The European Union might also contribute to the bilateral cooperation by financing joint projects, as well as including Turkey and Greece within its regional cooperation schemes.

Even though a bilateral cooperative interaction of *realpolitik* kind would be preferred to a bilateral conflictual interaction of *realpoitik* kind, a lasting Turkish-Greek stettlement would be significantly enhanced if the security identities of these two countries get transformed into non-*realpolitik* kind. Rather than rendering any bilateral military conflict costly and undesirable, as has been the case since 1999, the

institutional links with the EU and NATO will prove more beneficial if they help these two countries converge their security identities and interests on the basis of the non-*realpolitik* security norms. For this to happen, the following points should be materialized:

- the EU approaches Greece and Turkey mainly from an 'ideational' perspective believing that their joint memberships in the EU would be legitimate and necessary for the re-construction of the EU's post-Cold War era international/security identity;

- the European Union gives up its deliberate ambiguity policy and devises a credible conditionality and socialization policy backed by promising rewards and costly punishments;

- the European Union stops treating Greece as a pawn in the overall EU-Turkey relations by engaging in strategic bargains with Turkey over the dynamics of bilateral Turkish-Greek relations;

- Turkey and Greece approach the European Union from an 'ideational' perspective believing that their EU membership would certainly constitute their prime national interest as well as be in accordance with their security identities;

- Turkey thinks that the resolution of Turkish-Greek disputes along her accession process with the EU would be legitmate;

- Greece values Turkey's EU membership more than the resolution of Turkish-Greek problems within the EU framework in favour of Greece;

- Greece and Turkey cease approaching each other from an 'instrumental' perspective whereby they view their links with the European Union as strategic instruments to be utilised against each other;

- And finally both believe that their simultaneous Europeanization processes create significant 'windows of opportunities' for them, rather than 'windows of vulnerabilities', to be able to develop 'win-win' settlement frameworks.

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