

# DIALOGISM AND DEMOCRACY

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by

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April 2003

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## ABSTRACT

### DIALOGISM AND DEMOCRACY

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This thesis examines the notion of democracy not as a straightforward political process for decision-making, but as a type of dialogue. One of the main reasons for choosing this particular approach is to reveal the conditions of genuine democratic politics. A politics built on the image of people who can express themselves without fear and are free of obligation of sameness. Therefore, this thesis excavates the assumptions and complex relations of values by virtue of which democracy can be produced, reproduced and validated. It approaches Bakhtin's idea of dialogue as an important but neglected concept in democratic studies and explores what dialogue is for Bakhtin, showing how his general theory of language and meaning not only implicates particular concepts of democracy such as addresser/ruler and addressee/ruled, but also reveals the conditions of freedom that is necessary to produce the momentum towards the enabling practices of political life. With respect to these, it discusses how Bakhtin's idea of dialogue anticipates normative concerns that are central to contemporary democratic theory: Is it possible to establish a balance between unity and diversity or between the universal and the particular in a way that promotes recognition of differences as an instrument of democratic rule? Or, is it possible to prevent the inevitable tension between constituting a regulatory framework for political participation (which inevitably posits some fixity and exclusion) and celebrating heteroglossia? In order to address these issues, this thesis considers politics not only as a united body, but also a heteroglossic and multivoiced body.

Key words: Democracy, Dialogue, Self-government, Constitution

## ÖZET

### DİYALOGİZM AND DEMOKRASİ

Koçan, Gürcan

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Bu tez demokrasi olgusunu karar verme sürecinin ötesinde diyalogun bir türü olarak açıklamaktadır. Bu yaklaşımı seçmedeki ana amaç, demokratik siyasetin şartlarını sadece “kendi kendini yönetme” ya da “halkın kendi üzerindeki iktidarı” gibi tanımlara bağlı kalmadan ve insanın ruhunu tutaksaklık altına alan çoğunluğun ya da kendisini çoğunluk olarak kabul ettirmeyi başarmış olan aynılık ve bütünlük iradesinin ötesinde yaşamın farklılıkları arasındaki ilişkiyi çok daha derin bir biçimde diyalog çerçevesinde betimleyerek yeniden ortaya koymaktır. Yaşamın ve dilin özünde diyalog olduğunu ileri süren ünlü düşünür Mihhail Bakhtin’in felsefesinden faydalanarak diyalog olgusunu çeşitli yönlerden açıklamak, siyaseti homojen bir vücut bütünüün ötesinde çok sesli, karmaşık ve heteroglot bir etkileşim bütünü olarak algılamamızı sağlar. Bu karmaşık bütün içinde farklı dillerin ya da anlamların birbirinden bağımsız olmaması nedeniyle, siyasal etkileşim süreci farklı konular arasında belli bir merkezde uzlaşma üretebileceği gibi, bunların merkezden uzaklaşarak muğlaklık düzlemi içerisinde yeni anlamlar kazanarak hem kendilerine hem de diğer konulara göre yeniden farklılaşmasına yol açabilir. Bu nedenle demokrasinin yalnızca kendisinden anlamlı bir biçimde söz etmek güçtür çünkü demokrasinin en önemli kaynağı dildir ve bu dilde diyalogsaldır. Dilin sözkonusu diyalogsal özelliği dikkate alındığında, demokratik siyasi kurum ve pratikleri gerçekte ifade ettiği anlam, halkın en çok sayıda veya en katılımcı kısmınının ya da kendilerini halkın iradesi olarak kabul ettrimeyi başarmış olanların iradesinin ötesinde heterojen doğası içerisinde çoksesli bütünlüğün olduğunu ifade eder. Bu bütünlüğün temelinde her sesin, görüşün ya da konunun yanıtlanabilir olduğu ilkesi bulunur. Yanıtlanabilirlik ilkesi temel alındığında, demokratik sürece katılan bütün aktörler aynı anda hem yöneten (özne) hem de yönetilen (nesne) niteliğini kazanacağından siyasal sistem öziktidar özelliğini kazanır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokrasi, Diyalog, Öziktidar, Anayasa

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*There is neither a first nor last word and there are no limits to the dialogic context (it extends into the boundless past and the boundless future). Even past meanings, that is, those born in the dialogue of past centuries, can never be stable (finalized, ended once and for all) - they will always change (be renewed) in the process of subsequent, future development of the dialogue. At any moment in the development of the dialogue there are immense, boundless masses of forgotten contextual meanings, but at certain moments of the dialogue's subsequent development along the way they are recalled and reinvigorated in renewed form (in a new context). Nothing is absolutely dead: every meaning will have its homecoming festival. (Bakhtin 1986: 170)*

## INTRODUCTION

In *The Brothers Karamazov*, Dostoevsky wrote that if there were no God everything would be permitted. Simply put, it seems to me that in engaging in practices of democracy, people have lost the awareness that they have a “spirit” which allows for anything being possible or permitted. The only spirit people have to recognize is their own. In *The Brothers Karamazov*, Dostoevsky communicates with this spirit and with differing voices via the contradictory voices of the human condition. He places these voices in dialogue with one another and underlines the dilemma between happiness and freedom at the point of the dialogic meeting between two or more consciousnesses. This scenario is aptly represented by Alyosha Karamazov whose voice is associated with a deep sense of spirituality, and Ivan Fyodorovich Karamazov who speaks with the voice of an intellectual agnostic. Ivan’s speech is primarily informed by a skeptical mind. In the dialogue between Alyosha and Ivan, the latter is akin to a Grand Inquisitor in prose as he tells of a “fantasy,” or a “poem”. The prose starts with the portrayal of a Christ who comes back to earth again during the Spanish Inquisition in 16<sup>th</sup> century Seville. Walking through the town like an ordinary person, he performs miracles such as healing the sick, restoring vision to the blind and resurrecting a girl from the dead. In the meantime, the Cardinal Grand Inquisitor, after witnessing the performance of these miracles, not only arrests Christ but immediately incarcerates him as well. The Grand Inquisitor visits Christ in the prison that evening and discusses the numerous problems he has ascertained

regarding Christ's return to earth. For example, the Grand Inquisitor suggests that Christ's return is interfering with the earthly rule of the Church. He tells Christ that all power now lies in the hands of the Church, and not with him. The Grand Inquisitor argues that the people cannot handle the burden of free will and so the Church has abrogated the freedom of the masses in order to make them happy. Thus, they become slaves in order to receive bread from the Church. But, the Church has merely deceived them when claiming that they provided bread in the name of Christ. As the Grand Inquisitor says (Dostoyevsky, 1993: 297):

Receiving loaves from us, of course, they will clearly see that what we have done is to take the loaves they won with their own hands in order to distribute it to them without any miracles, they will see that we have not turned stones into loaves, but truly, more than of the bread, they will be glad of the fact that they are receiving it from our hands!

He tells Christ that this is what Christ should have done in the first place. The Church substitutes the "banner of earthly bread" for the "banner of freedom and the bread from heaven" as praised by Christ. As result, people stop suffering because they do not need to ask for freedom. He says that Christ should have been more miraculous in order to give people something to hold onto and believe in. People need security—and to the Grand Inquisitor, that is what the earthly Church offers (Dostoyevsky, 1993: 293):

There are three powers, only three powers on the earth that are capable of eternally vanquishing and ensnaring the consciences of those feeble mutineers for their happiness—those powers: miracle, mystery and authority. You rejected the first, the second and the third and yourself gave the lead in doing so. When the wise and terrible Spirit set you on the pinnacle of the temple and said to you: 'If you would know whether you are the Son of God then cast yourself down from hence, for it is written: the angels will take charge of him and bear him up, and he will not fall and dash himself pieces—and then you will know if you are the Son of God, and will prove how much faith you have in your Father.' But having heard him through, you rejected his offer and did not give way and cast yourself down. Oh, of course, in that you acted proudly and

magnificently, like God, but people, that weak, mutinying tribe—are they god?

These three forces—miracles, mystery, and authority—are necessary for establishing government on the earth. The Cardinal Grand Inquisitor argues that people are too weak to believe in a God if that deity does not perform miracles. The Grand Inquisitor explains that the execution of the decrees of the church is aligned with miracles. The means of a miracle is based on the same process as that of the Christ miracles which not only provide persuasion for the people but also impart the knowledge that he is the prophet of the God and will bring eventual salvation. He says (Dostoyevsky, 1993: 294):

Oh, you knew that your great deed would be preserved in the Scriptures, would attain to the depth of the ages and to the outermost limits of the earth, and you hoped that in following you, man too would make do with God, not requiring a miracle. But you did not know that no sooner did man reject the miracle than he would at once reject God also, for man does not seek God so much as miracles. And since man is not strong enough to get by without the miracle, he creates new miracles for himself, his own now, bows down before the miracle of the quack and witchcraft of the peasant woman, even though he is a mutineer, heretic, atheist a hundred times over you.

Miracles bear the power of conviction. In practicing this power, the church establishes its earthly authority. The Cardinal Grand Inquisitor also tells Christ that mystery is also necessary for manufacturing the obedience of the masses to the earthly authority of the church. He thinks that the mystery of God grants promises of immortality while the mystery of the church promises happiness. He says (Dostoyevsky, 1993: 295):

And if there is a mystery, then we were within our rights to propagate that mystery and teach them that it was not the free decision of their hearts and not love that mattered, but the mystery, which they must obey blindly, even in opposition to their consciences. And that was what we

did. We corrected your great deed and founded it upon *miracle, mystery and authority*.

The Grand Inquisitor explains that he employs the forces of miracle, mystery, and authority to conquer and hold captive forever the consciences of people for their happiness. He believes that freedom for the masses is a sentence to suffering. He explains that he takes “the sword of Caesar” in order to establish his kingdom which in turn offers the miserable masses the security that they most need. The Grand Inquisitor proclaimed that his kingdom must “vanquish freedom” in order to make people happy and provide the total security that they avidly seek. He uses specific examples of children suffering, screaming for Christ to help them. He noted that though the children scream for Christ to help, there was a choice not to intervene in earthly relations and this choice makes them suffer. He says if Christ does not help them, then he is not omnipotent; he only chooses the strong to be saved. However, the earthly kingdom of the Grand Inquisitor took the responsibility for the masses that do not have desire to take responsibility for themselves and in turn, gave them freedom and life that the temporal reality chose. He explained that people could never be free because they are weak, vicious, worthless and rebellious, and he says that even the most rebellious could easily become obedient in exchange for happiness and security. He suggested that all human beings may be born free and equal but now they are in absolute submission because they have brought “their freedom to us and place it at our feet...” (Dostoyevsky, 1993: 291). In exchange for their freedom, the rule of his kingdom offers happiness to the people in security. He says Christ’s way, allowing the strong to be chosen, offers people only an element of freedom. Therefore, it is not effective nor desirable, as it does not give the people happiness and freedom simultaneously.

At the end of the Grand Inquisitor's speech, the Cardinal waits for a response but Christ says nothing. He merely kisses the ninety-year-old man on his withered lips. That is the only response that is given to the old man. At this moment, the Grand Inquisitor changes his mind regarding the decision to burn Christ at the stake, and sets him free, telling him never to come back again.

The Grand Inquisitor section of *The Brothers Karamazov* dealing with freedom and happiness delves deeply into questions of democracy. It underlines the argument that political systems abrogate people's freedom because the rulers choose and constitute a social order for them, therefore taking away their freedom to choose. It compares the relationship between freedom and happiness. Considering freedom and happiness as two different states of being provides an interesting twist as to how we look at the concept of democracy. The issue here is about the possibility of a concept of democracy that generates a balance between freedom and bread, between freedom and power and influence, between freedom and security. Dostoyevsky creates a trace of this concept of democracy in the dialogues of *The Brothers Karamazov*. There are three important traces of democracy that we can find in the writings of Dostoyevsky. Firstly, there is the understanding that democracy is a dialogue. This form of dialogue refers to the juxtaposition of the plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses of different people. The second trace of democracy is that of free choice or rebellion exercised by heroes and it is fundamental to a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices. The genuine polyphony of fully valid voices is not only the chief characteristic of Dostoyevsky's novels but also democracy. According Bakhtin (1997: 6):

What unfolds in his novels is not a multitude of characters and fates in a single objective world, illuminated by a single authorial consciousness; rather a plurality of consciousnesses, with equal rights and each with his own world, combine but are not merged in the unity of the event.

In stressing the autonomy of voices, Dostoevsky imagines democracy not with voiceless people, but with free citizens capable of standing alongside the author (i.e. government), capable of disagreeing with or even rebelling against the author/government. In effect, the characters in Dostoevsky's novels affirm their freedom precisely in their rebellion against the author and against any finalized definition of themselves. And finally, the third trace of democracy is the *menippean satire* that Bakhtin ascertains in the section of the Grand Inquisitor. (Bakhtin, 1997: 156) Understanding these traces, dialogue, polyphony and *menippean satire*, their consequences and effects, are critical to the generation of what can be called dialogue.

Bakhtin's understanding of dialogue goes beyond mere conversation or a narrative system that is employed in the process of communication. It is an interaction of voices and it is geared towards new understandings, connections, or possibilities in the novel. It initiates the development of complex structures and ideas. In the *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, Bakhtin noted, "all else is the means, dialogue is the end. A single voice ends nothing and resolves nothing. Two voices is the minimum for life, the minimum for existence." (Bakhtin 1997: 252)

A central concern underlying Bakhtin's approach to dialogue is to characterize the new authorial position in and around the idea of polyphony. Bakhtin describes the term "polyphony" in three ways. First, it means "plurality of plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses." (Bakhtin 1997: 6) Secondly, it refers to the equality and freedom of those voices to interact with each other and with the voice of the author in an arena in which no single voice—particularly not an authorial voice—has importance. (Bakhtin, 1997: 7) Thirdly, it is linked to "the unity of the event." Here the event can be seen as the meeting and dialogue of different, independent voices. It is co-existence, shared existence or being *with* another. (Bakhtin, 1997: 7)

Concerning the notion of dialogue in and around Dostoevsky's polyphony, Bakhtin devotes a great deal of attention to *menippean satire*. Bakhtin's characterizations of satire rest on contrasts—of unresolved exchange of ideas between the past and present and between characters who represent opposing values and ideologies. Bakhtin conceives of satire as an open form of dialogue that is free from situations of history, realism, and legend. Satire contains fantastic elements created in extraordinary situations for the purpose of testing philosophical truth, especially through the manipulation of perspective. A satiric exchange mixes the fantastic, symbolic, and even quasi-religious with “crude slum naturalism” and “a genre of ‘ultimate questions,’” combining bold invention with broad philosophical reflection. Satire as form of use includes the utilization of the spheres of heaven, earth, and hell to look at these ultimate questions. It refers to “experimental fantasticality,” that is, “observation from some unusual point of view.” It contains unusual states of insanity, split personality, dreams, and excessive passion, creating a “dialogic relationship to one's own self.” Satiric forms of dialogue are full of scandal, eccentricities, inappropriate speech, violations of politeness and social expectations. Communicative agents of satire are produced with contradictory behaviour with combinations of various elements of social utopia. These agents insert a variety of other genres that are parodies and the questions presuppose (or impose) an integrated and stable universe of values and beliefs. In doing so, they express a concern with “current and topical issues.” Satiric forms of dialogue do not create discrimination between good and bad; it only creates interrogation of any claims that consist of a systematic understanding of the good. The goals of a satiric form of dialogue are to dismiss conventional and hierarchical relationships between claims of good and bad. Therefore, they contain “multi-styled” and “multi-toned” voices who express themselves in their own ways, as opposed to monologue, the single consciousness that tries to impose itself as the authority, for generation of the truth. (Bakhtin 1997:114-118)



Both polyphony and satire are literary devices utilized in Dostoevsky's novels. Essentially, they enable the formation of narratives and provide the engines through which different forms of dialogue come into being. These different forms of dialogue will constitute key criteria for this research project as it is concerned with evaluating the application of different dialogical models to concepts of democracy. It will advance Bakhtin's emphasis on considering dialogue within democratic contexts, but will also expand on that methodology to privilege both (a) particular context where the multi polyvocal polity occurs and (b) heteroglossia as the meeting in language of democracy where political actors express themselves in their own ways, in contrast to monoglossia, the single language. In this context, this research project will primarily be concerned with issues such as how dialogue itself as a starting point would be actualized as a conception of democracy.

The conceptual integration of dialogue with democracy is inspired by the writings of Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975). Mikhail Bakhtin who is Russian literary critic, linguist and philosopher, lived and wrote who spent most of his life as a Soviet citizen, did his major work in the nineteen-twenties, -thirties, and -forties. He was part of a study group, now famous as the "Bakhtin circle," which included such figures as P. N. Medvedev (1891-1938), and V. N. Voloshinov (1884/5-1936). Most of his works went unpublished in the Soviet Union during the Stalin era and were almost unknown to generations of readers until the mid-1980s but have become influential since.

Bakhtin's works focused both literary theory examining the relation between literature and linguistics; and political theory, a critique of the monological hegemony precluding any social diversity imposed by the totalitarian Stalinist regime. Bakhtin valued heteroglossia (opposite monologia that is a system of norms, of one standard language, or an "official" language, a standard language that to push all the elements of societal

communication, all of its various rhetorical modes into one single form, coming from one central point). Heteroglossia, a multiplicity of languages, the collection of all the forms of social speech, or rhetorical modes, that reveals the realities of multi-voiced dialogue or polyvocal polity that explicitly recognizes different voices and perspectives in unity.

His approach to the notion of multi-voiced dialogue can be viewed as consistent with the concept of democracy. Bakhtin's view of multi-voiced dialogue, and by extension democracy, is intrinsically plural and polyvocal. Just as each citizen develops his/her own voice through relationships with other citizens in a dynamic and vital interaction, Bakhtin's emphasis on plurality and polyvocality provides a framework for conception of democracy as it imagines a political system that is free of a single authorial consciousness. The idea of a single authorial consciousness is based on the assumption that languages and their meanings are fixed, not modifiable as they are exposed to new voices. It may manifest itself in almost all social organizations, from totalizing systems or philosophies, to governments—a spectrum that ranges from a system of norms, of one standard language that everyone would have to conceive (and which would then be enforced by various mechanisms of politics. It demands that people accept it without questioning—that they make it their own view or preference. It builds an external or authoritative source of meaning in order to bind people with power.

In contrast to a single authorial consciousness as manifested in centralized power of every sort—charismatic, bureaucratic, class, military, political, party, and technocratic—Mikhail Bakhtin celebrates *dialogism*, *heteroglossia* and *polyphony* as reciprocal plays of voices. From this initial conception, this research project will advance Bakhtin's emphasis on developing a concept of democracy within a framework of multiple contesting voices.

These contestations represent a variety of ideological positions and engage equally in dialogue; they are free from authorial judgment or constraint.

This dissertation uses the notion of dialogue in a broad sense of politics. It views dialogue not only as a reciprocal relationship between political actors but also as a communication with the immediate social, historical and cultural contexts. This point is subtle but important. Language and hence meanings of democracy change both (a) when considered from within each different historical, social and cultural context, but also (b) when considered from the dialogue that occurs at the frontiers between different preferences and views. Therefore, this dissertation will not be geared toward the expression of an authoritative voice—a voice based on clear-cut normative principles or the assumptions that language and its meanings are fixed, not modifiable. Instead, it takes dialogism as a methodical structure for examining the very concept of democracy in a polyphonic and multivoiced context. Such polyphonic and multivoiced contexts awaken new and independent meanings of democracy while it dialogizes masses of meanings from within without relegating them to an isolated and static condition.

In this context, this dissertation will begin by exploring the main elements associated with the concept of dialogue quite generally, and then consider the special advantages of Bakhtinian viewpoints in comparison to other viewpoints (e.g. Habermas) in the course of developing an alternative dialogical concept of democracy. From this comparison, this dissertation attempts to develop and to defend a Bakhtinian form of dialogical democracy as one that is more suitable for serving the purposes of democracy as dialogue. It argues that Bakhtin's viewpoints on dialogue offer appealing conceptual tools with inclusive and freeing capacities that can be useful for the further conceptualization of democracy. The starting points for this line of reasoning are the circumstances for dialogue.

Circumstances of dialogue can be specified at two levels: the first level refers to language; and the second level refers to institutional and procedural conditions. Therefore, this dissertation is built on a two-part structure. The first aspect of this arrangement (chapters 1, 2 and 3) describes combined meanings of dialogue and the list of conditions that play a decisive role in the constitution of dialogue in language. The second part of the structure (chapters 4, 5 and 6) considers the procedural aspects of dialogue in the political field by working through different normative conceptions of democracy.

The first chapter aims to make the point that democracy is a form of dialogue. Therefore, it will specifically focus on the question of dialogue and provide an overview of generally conceived meanings of dialogue. Focusing mostly on the relations that dialogue reveals, it will underline not only that there are different forms of dialogue in reference to patterns of communicative performances and the ends to which they are directed, but also acknowledges that there are different kinds of relations (i.e., equal respect, difference in unity, and autonomy) that are revealed, i.e. the certain conditions that are required when dialogue occurs. In connection to these, at the end, this chapter will try to re-conceptualize the complex idea of dialogue as both a democratic ideal and a political method.

The first step in this reformulation of dialogue is to describe the ways in which people with different characteristics, styles, values, and assumptions engage in communication and what the results of their communicative acts entail. Certain dialogical acts, notably that of Socrates, serve as starting point from which we can discern the different ways in which dialogue elicits modes interactive engagement. Socratic dialogues represent a highly informative and directed interactive engagement that questions various postulations and values that are presumed by everyday actions and judgments. They involve the use of active communication in the shared pursuit of knowledge and

understanding. They represent the external expression of an internal, dialectical thought process of back-and-forth ratiocination, question and answer or challenge and response in pursuit of epistemological and ontological discovery. These relational movements of question and answer as an avenue toward discovery have two communicative patterns: *anacrisis*, the “means for eliciting and provoking the words of one’s interlocutor”; and *syncrisis*, “the juxtaposition of various points of view on a specific object.” (Bakhtin, 1997: 110-11) They move gradually and systematically, so that all participants gain insight into the substance of understanding through an experience of *aporia*. In Socratic dialogues, the experience of *aporia* refers to a situation of inconclusivity in which participants no longer know what to utter about the issue being queried. It creates perplexity, as it requires participants to advance their understanding, while it reminds them of the limits of their understanding and language. From here, the chapter describes dialogue as an interactive process of understanding. (Gadamer, 1979)

In the course of dialogue, each participant reveals his or her understanding to the other person, sincerely accepts his or her point of view as a reflection and gets inside the other’s understanding to such an extent that an interlocutor understands what the other utters. In this process, the utterances that are expressed are not a fixed phenomenon containing objective meanings for understanding. Rather, they contain meanings that arise out of interaction. With the expression of utterances in the communicative field, each participant brings his or her understandings to encounters. They try to understand an utterance that can have various meanings if visualized from different vantage points. Such different vantage points refer to horizons of understanding that may fuse to each other’s space without necessarily having sameness. (Gadamer, 1979: 143) Sameness cannot be imposed, but rests on a fusion of understanding. In this sense, the understanding that participants bring to plays of dialogue is fused in encounters with the

difference of meanings. Therefore, in the field of dialogue, participants experience not only a fusion of horizons but also a unity in difference.

From here, the chapter moves on to different conceptions of dialogue that are oriented towards different ends. There are three primary conceptions of dialogue. These categories describing conceptions are not absolute because all of them contain general characteristics of dialogue, such as tolerance, patience and respect for differences, a willingness to listen in consideration of everyone involved, the ability to be both addresser and addressee, and the disposition to express one's views sincerely. These categories may have overlapping characteristics, but they can take on different forms if they are directed towards different ends with a discrete purpose.

*“Regulative”* is the first conception of dialogue. This is a form of dialogue that marks regulation and consensus in interactive relations between the addresser and addressee. In other words, it guides interactive relations oriented toward the formation of understanding and consensus with respect to the rationality of arguments. This model of dialogue presupposes agreement about implicitly raised conventions as background conditions or the normative context of a communicative situation. Operating within the domain of a shared normative context, dialogue binds and guides interactions between addresser and addressee toward the formation of rational agreement. In regulative dialogue, participants take up an attitude towards each other as referents of an ethical world, that is, of an ethic constituted by shared normative rules. Participants keep an eye on whether their claims in communicative interaction accord with established norms and values. Therefore, they question, redeem and filter all claims that rest upon implicit norms through the medium of rationality. Rationality, which is a medium possessing evaluative and regulative standard, helps to ground all claims in the uncoerced consensus that such dialogue can achieve — including critical reflection on the conditions under

which that agreement is obtained. These conditions regulate communicative interactions and accord the outcomes of such dialogue generalizability not based upon absolute claims of truth, but secured on the nonrelative criterion of valid agreement among the parties concerned.

“*Truth orientation*” is the second conception of dialogue. This form of dialogue evolves with forms of question and answer, challenge and response and the delivery of one understanding leading to another. It has the *telos* of truth in the form of innate principles of knowledge that exist in understanding. The *telos* of truth through the employment of strategic reason is the driving force of communication and it is not attainable at the end of dialogue. The initial situation of dialogue starts with conflicting points of view. The expression of views comes out through a clash and contest of ideas, or an opposing series of arguments, which seek to negate each other. In this way, expressions of views instruct various forms of persuasion. The basic form of persuasion refers to the use of particular evidence or methods of reasoning (inductive or deductive) to negate certain viewpoints that do not have validity and also to prove that another set of viewpoints has validity. This process of negation can clear the way for new understandings and the production of novel ideas. Thus, with the involvement of a high degree of reasoning, this process refers to the communicative representation of a dialectical process of assessment based on conjecture, a criticism of values and beliefs, and a reconstruction of ideas along with an exploration of new meanings. Truth-oriented dialogue serves to suspend judgments and overcome paradoxes, dilemmas and contradictions.

“*Celebration*” is the third conception of dialogue. This is a form of dialogue that has an end in itself rather than being merely procedural (i.e. a way to reveal truth or reach agreement encounter, agreement, convergence, compromise, and synthesis among different positions or perspectives implied in and underlying any act of communication).

It is derived from diversity and moves in the direction of difference. Thus, it embodies and values the multiplicity of voices within languages. It exposes fixity of languages in order to make voices extend beyond categories concepts and stereotypes, as they often represent specific histories, memories and experiences. Thus, it provides an escape from the absolutism and dualism that demands deepened and sharpened positionalities. In essence, it makes positionalities relational rather than substantive. This means that all socially, culturally and politically positioned participants display their preferences and points of view in relation to the other. Thus, the most concrete configuration of celebratory dialogue can be seen not only as communication via exchanges in language, but also as freedom from social roles, statutes and conventions of the social world. It features polyphony, dialogism, heteroglossia, and centrifugal force, all of which are expressed in a movement outward from a center. Therefore, this form often takes place in the non-institutionalized context, for example in the public sphere. It is closely connected to the deontological attempts of participants, who do not try to maximize their situationality in an effort to achieve a greater share of a particular given set of scarce goods and services.

After a general overview of dialogue in the first chapter, the second chapter will introduce a number of Bakhtin's perspectives, terms, and assumptions (i.e. polyphony, heteroglossia, and carnival) on dialogue in order for examining the very concept democracy. The purpose of this excursus is to emphasize the notion that democracy has a multi-voiced character in the same fashion as dialogue conceptualized by Bakhtin. On the one hand, Bakhtin did not write specifically about politics, and hence does not directly address the combined issue of dialogue and democracy. On the other hand, Bakhtin was interested in the dialogical activity between different people or between selves and within language. According to the Bakhtinian view, each form of dialogue is



somehow the product of mutual efforts of the participants who remain open to different modifications and interpretations of meaning regarding their actions and outlook. Keeping an open mind as to different modifications and interpretations of actions, dialogue provides freedom, creativity and independence with the establishment of reciprocal relationships. Retaining its own communicative characteristics, the dialogue may allow the development of agreement and understanding among the people

The dialogical method is the instrument of communication and inherent in that method are processes, which fundamentally enable the formation of citizens, of the public sphere, and provide the engine by which democracy comes into being. Therefore, despite the fact that the notion of democracy that rarely explicitly appears in his work, Bakhtin seems to want to use dialogue as the basis for a democratic community.

This principle points not only to the constant interaction among multiple languages, intentions, and contexts but also the reciprocal relationship in which addresser/ruler and addressee/ruled change their positions constantly. Reflecting on these terms, this chapter will identify democracy as a dialogical activity that establishes a mode of reciprocal relationships between addresser and addressee. This activity is produced via the material of a particular linguistic complex. Hence, politically meaningful democratic acts can only be considered in terms of linguistic dialogical processes. These processes play a decisive role for the political meanings of democratic acts, all of which is the product of a two-sided act and which is realized only when brought into play. The political meanings of democratic acts are dynamic, which is to say, they evolve over the course of interaction; they are not exactly the same between one person and another; and it manifests the cultural and ideational assumptions that people bring to the dialogical realm. This is not to say that actors do not have full power over determining the political meaning of their democratic actions; instead, whatever political meaning is achieved for individual and

collective actions is a result of the interaction of what both addresser/ruler and addressee/ruled bring to the dialogical realm of language.

After describing the democratic realm as a linguistically determined reciprocal relationship, the third chapter seeks to embark on democracy as it exists within and through language and hence in the interaction among different forms of life as represented by different uses of language. With this in the background the chapter builds upon the comparison of the language and dialogue theories of two prominent theorists: Bakhtin and Habermas. Here attention will be paid to the issues of dialogical freedom and the inclusivity of difference within these two theories, as this dissertation considers their framework in the process of searching more appropriate theories of dialogue for the construction of a new understanding of democracy. The chapter will examine their overall scheme and explain why this dissertation finds Bakhtin's theory of dialogue to be a more suitable basis for democracy.

The chapter will begin by contrasting Habermas' theory of language and Bakhtin's philosophy of language in terms of their conception of what language entails. At a broader level, Habermas' theory of communicative action possesses three traits in connection with the interactive use of language: domains of reality, functions of speech, and the attitude of agents. In the domains of reality, Habermas sees language as the medium of the three interrelating worlds of the objective, the social, and the subjective. It shapes three relations into reality: representing facts, establishing legitimate (or valid) interpersonal relations, and expressing one's subjectivity. At the functional level, Habermas describes language as an instrument for accomplishing both communication, through the dimension of validity, and truth disclosure, via the dimension of meaning. In connection to both domains of reality and functionality, Habermas examines the underlying assumptions, intentions, or values of competent interlocutors who employ

sentences in various types of language use. He depicts constative speech acts as references to things standing in the objective world, regulative speech acts as references to the norms and expressive speech acts references to individual experience. On the basis of three axis which are built into the very fabric of interactive language use, Habermas postulates an ideal speech situation; a situation of dialogue in which each person who is not internally or externally constrained by status differences or one-sidedly binding norms discovers an equal opportunity to participate and openly express and defend his/her ideas and criticize the ideas of others. For Habermas, the ideal speech situation is the basis of dialogue for producing uncoerced agreement and consensus, which is binding on all parties; a reasoned discussion for the deliberation and negotiation of differences and a therapeutic engagement for ontological and epistemological exploration. His view of an ideal speech situation also appears as a means of cognitive development and understanding, a method of critically comparing and assessing alternative claims, and a form of ethical order that is epistemically justified.

In contrast to Habermas' ideal speech scenario, Bakhtin's idea describes dialogue in terms of the multivocality, openness, and ambiguities that are active in the use of language. For Bakhtin, dialogue is a term that is meant to capture the relational character of language. As opposed to Jürgen Habermas, for whom communicative action is consent-oriented aimed at reaching a rational agreement and a reconciliation of differences, Bakhtin sees dialogue as the mix and collision of perspectives and languages; in his terms dynamic interplay of centripetal forces that tend toward unity and centrifugal forces that tend toward difference. (Bakhtin, 1981:272-273) With this emphasis on dynamic interplay, polyphony and heteroglossia, Bakhtin considers dialogue as a phenomenon of consciousness. It can only be generated in consciousness and through communication among consciousnesses. However, it essentially comes into being only through individual

oral or written utterances in the various communicative activities of people. Dialogue, which is a part of the whole, structure of utterances, and interfere at all semantic and expressive layers of communication; hence, he suggests that words or sentences cannot have any meaning until they enter into an interactive field among people. Dialogue is always a part of an utterance. (Bakhtin, 1986: 117) The dialogical quality of utterances always makes the expression of words or sentences as a response to both past and future links in a communication chain.

Bakhtin also associates dialogue with voice or an addressing consciousness because an utterance may only subsist when generated by a voice. Utterance always stems from a perspective, a voice. Thus, utterances become actions bringing into being a meaning and understanding. Voices always subsist in reference to the social, historical and cultural context; they cannot be separated from the realm in which they are expressed. Each utterance that is produced by a voice reflects in its own way a context that has produced it. Therefore, utterances are not independent of each other or dialogical when standing alone, rather they are produced in a context in which they mutually reflect each other in a communicative chain. In connection to the perspective and context in which they are uttered, each and every utterance is a response to prior utterances. When they become a response to preceding utterances, they not only correspond to the addresser's voice, but also to the voice of the person to whom they are intended. When the voice fabricates an utterance, it not only responds to preceding utterances, but also anticipates the voice of the responses in potential utterances. In this way, dialogue may be attained. Therefore, Bakhtin's view of dialogue consists of a complexity that cannot be reduced either to the rational communicative acts of actors or to purely linguistic relations. Such a view of dialogue has a dynamism all of its own containing the multi-dimensional elements of a narrative and also marked by an open-endedness of the issues and the plot. (Bakhtin

1986: 117) In this context, this comparison will show that the Habermasian and Bakhtinian theories of dialogue are in some ways similar as well as different. Both of them focus on the relationships that are established with language, and both take language and interaction as the underlying concepts on which the theory of dialogue is to be developed. However, what is different in their theories of dialogue are not only the particular practices, or the system of beliefs and values that support them, but also a larger and specific frame of reference in which their theories can be seen as bearing distinct understandings.

From the conceptual discussion of dialogue and language, the fourth chapter will proceed with a discussion of democracy, as self-government in order to make a case that democracy is inherently reciprocal between rulers and ruled. Thus, this chapter will begin to describe systems of self-government because they emerge at the interstices of being both the object and the subject of political deliberations.

The central claim of this chapter is that self-government is essential property of both dialogue and democracy. Dialogue can only flourish and democracy will only survive if everyone is guaranteed their right to take turns in addressing/ruling and being addressed/ruled as equals. The term self-government primarily connotes a certain kind of unity between restraint and freedom, ruler and ruled and addresser and addressee through which the people are able to connect with *one another* and separate from one another in the dialogical process of democracy: where they can fulfill their potential for being responsible to themselves and others. In the field of dialogue, the functionality of self-government is to act as a framework of regulations, which empowers and facilitates the participants, encouraging relations of mutual respect and cooperation among them. Under this self-government they can organize, learn, and act with one another to

construct the more complex dialogical relationships of responsibility, which are necessary for democracy to occur.

This chapter sees the idea of self-government as linkage of dialogue to democracy because of its double connotation: first, the self portrays attention to people who are active participants of a dialogical realm and are actively involved in determining their own communicative ends. In this sense, their sources of action lie between one and another though are not totally as an internal agent or the result of external forces, compulsion, etc. A governmental process emphasizing dialogue is both open and an open-ended process dealing with the development of regulatory space wherein every participant takes a turn as the addresser and addressee or to engage in the communicative activities that led to democracy. So, just as self-government includes the reciprocal principle of turn taking, it also includes the responsibility to give shape to the selfhood of oneself and other persons by communicative action.

After a discussion of the concept of self-government, the fifth chapter will focus on the role of values and perceptions that normatively construct certain conceptions of democracy. As there are multitudes of normative frameworks of democracy, we always need to address the plurality of conceptions of democracy as part of democratic theory and practice. The chapter's aim is not to advocate one model over another, but to offer an analysis that serves as a springboard for new understandings of democracy or political self-government, in relation to dialogue. There are two important classical accounts that have significant implications for our understanding of democracy. These accounts are the republican and the liberal conceptions of democracy. Both of them take as their starting point a different end (*telos*) towards which democracy is or ought to be striving. Their different premises are based on the common and public goals that they assign to the model of democracy, which they conceptualize. In theory, liberalism, which emphasizes

the plurality of values and methodological individualism, describes the *telos* of democracy as it is produced via the aggregation of individual preferences and interests. In contrast to liberalism, the republican approach, which underlines unity and methodological communitarianism, identifies the *telos* of democracy as the common good. For the republican democrat the common good refers to a shared good that cannot be obtained individually because it is generated through common deliberation and common action in reference to broad understandings of the common interests and values that democracy is supposed to strive to achieve.

The difference between liberal and republican strands of democracy hinges on who the tension between unity and difference is resolved. Liberalism embraces individual freedom over collectivity. Hence, it links individual freedom to a system of rights in which individuals are free to choose and pursue their own ends.

According to classical liberal thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham, the pursuit of chosen ends is equal to the pursuit of happiness. Regardless of the shading one gives to an individual's pursuit of ends and their fulfillment, they define individual freedom. For a liberal then, in this context, what is good for the society (unity), is not necessarily good for each individual (difference) because each individual has a distinct and unique outlook, hence they have different desires and goals. The fulfillment of an individual's wants and goals may be independent of that which his/her societies deems desirable. In contrast to liberalism, republicanism depicts freedom in connection to collectivity. Therefore, it views freedom as an integral part of a political and social community. Because republican philosophy is predicated on the view that freedom is societal, it requires citizens to be active participants in the public affairs of the community. It expects that citizens can only realize their freedom through this active participation. Republican philosophy stresses and requires that citizens acquire freedom through civic virtue in the guise of experience

and character formation, thus gaining the qualities and traits necessary for the pursuit of a shared conception of common good. In this regard, it believes that what is good for each individual is not necessarily good for the society because each individual is a part of the community or a greater whole from which they, in a sense, receive their sense of being, and hence the good of the whole is inseparable from the good of each part. For this reason, the republican approach requires a formative politics, a politics that cultivates in citizens the qualities of civic virtue.

Both the liberal and republican approaches tend to raise the tension between the individual and the community, or difference and unity, and they are therefore unable to come to generate an adequate conceptualization of democracy. Even though in different ways they criticize each other, their approach to the concept of democracy appears to be either a collectivist one that leaves aside the crucial role-played by the individual or an individualist one that pays no attention to shared values. In contrast to the dichotomic approaches entailed by liberalism and republicanism, the dialogical approach tries to bring a balance between the individual and community while emphasizing each, in part, for the sake of the other. For the dialogical approach, the individual and the community or difference and unity are co-original – democracy cannot have one without the other, and it cannot eliminate one without eliminating the other. In a way, the referentiality and reflexivity elements are simultaneously in operation in the dialogical approach of democracy; it is a phenomenon wherein both the individual and the community concurrently refer to themselves and to aspects of each other as their own condition of possibility and as their own limit. Therefore, this chapter will argue that neither the republican nor liberal conceptions of democracy would be sufficient to settle this dilemma of unity/difference. The resolution of the dilemma can be seen as dialogical only to the extent that democracy can constitute free interaction among all differently



situated, but politically equal, participants whose unique qualities are protected and affirmed within unity. In other words, the dialogical realm of democracy structures the relationship between the individual/difference/plurality and the community/unity/whole in such a way that can protect individual/difference/plurality and the community/unity/whole. Nonetheless, because practical dialogical arrangements of democracy require choices of emphasis on behalf of the individual/difference/plurality or the community/unity/whole, functioning dialogical theories of democracy will distinguish themselves based on the emphasis they place on one or the other. Even when they do directly reflect one emphasis, the awareness and recognition of the alternative emphasis continues to provide the necessary balance. For where either emphasis is taken to an extreme, the dialogical character loses the moderation necessary for its durability and stability. To deny the importance of the individual/difference/plurality or the community is to attack the basis of a dialogical order. In this context, this chapter will review the dialogical theories that derive some of their premises from classical theories of democracy. In comparing different dialogical theories of democracy, this chapter will also attempt to elaborate the rudiments of a Bakhtinian dialogical concept of democracy.

The sixth chapter, which sees democracy as a set of rules and procedures embedded ideally in the constitution, embarks on the background conditions of democracy. As taken up in this chapter, the constitution is the embodiment of procedures and institutionalized frameworks of self-government. The constitution as an expression of the development and deployment of an array of methods and institutions connotes a dialogical/regulative way to conduct political decision-making. Further, procedures and institutions can be viewed as one source of self-government. In democracies, all political and legal acts ultimately correspond to procedures and institutions as referential sources. It is a mark of the referential character of such procedures that they are enacted and

utilized in all political actions in a dialogical means in order to perform a variety of proceedings for the formation, organization, governance, regulation, inspiration and justification of politics. It is an appraisal of the detrimental character of this referential source that very often is taken to be the final word, the ultimate frame of reference, the last recourse, and the very limit of possible political conflict. However, the deployment of an array of institutional and regulative mechanisms for democracy must remain incomplete, in the sense of happening, in order for it to remain as ideal in the sense of openness. One can assert that a once and for all organizational structure and set of rule for democracy is impossible because democracy is an ongoing open-ended process that cannot be closed. Thus, procedures and institutional mechanisms are important in two ways. First, they have the intrinsic quality of dialogue among those who are subject to binding collective decisions as they inherently incorporate the ideas of respect, freedom and equality. In essence, the communicative acts of citizens who are expected to govern their acts in dialogue with procedures and institutionalized frameworks of politics are treated by those constituent processes as equal participants. Second, the establishment of procedures and institutionalized frameworks of politics are instrumentally important: they help protect the basic rights of citizens as free participants. Further, they advance the concept of a free and equal citizen, as defined by the ends and projects with which they identify. In this context, the constitutional framework of democratic politics protects equality and freedom of people while preventing them from the tyranny of majority. More fundamentally, a constitutional system of democracy for the exercise of self-government in which citizens are acted as equal restrains the exercise of power by protecting majorities from minority rule, avoiding at least some arbitrary violations of rights, and conceiving of the governor and governed in the same context and manner. In this situation, the constitution fulfills the role of a procedural and institutional

mechanism, which will generate conditions of self-governing citizens – i.e. being a ruler and the ruled at the same time – and hence help engender the birth of dialogical systems.

## **CHAPTER I. WHAT IS DIALOGUE?**

### **I.1. Introduction**

In this chapter, I discuss first the very meaning of dialogue as separate from conversation. I argue that the very function of dialogue is different from conversation because it is a fluid, and deeply connected interaction that transcends the merely personal communication between two (or more) people alternately taking the role of speaker and listener.

It is interaction mediated by utterance, language, meaning, understanding, time and space. In this regard, I examine the Socratic idea of dialogue. The Socratic method emphasizes the to-and-fro relation between question and answer as a process of new understanding and knowledge. It is a creative force, open, critical, and aimed at action. Furthermore, it is a dialectical process, from which one can learn about the world, others and oneself across various domains of knowledge: ontology, epistemology and political praxis. The application of dialogical reasoning breaks down accepted ways of seeing and doing to construct new approaches. The natural outcome of this is not truth but *aporia*. *Aporia* is a dialogical situation in which participants are no longer able to generate answers for the issues that are currently under discussion. In essence, it constitutes a state of perplexity. Once a state of *aporia* has been inspired, both the destructive and constructive components of the Socratic dialogue are achieved. Without pretending that they have achieved truth, participants engage in a collective search through further dialogue. (Kidd,

1992: 88-89)<sup>1</sup> In this regard, Socratic dialogue serves to advance a dialogical collective search process wherein each participant's views not only contribute to the dialogue but also in fact have merit.

Secondly, I will examine dialogue as a *process* of understanding. I conceive dialogue as a way of reaching an understanding - a continual process that not only goes back and forth between participants and also occurs within each individual. Thus, it is a reciprocal practice of eliciting and juxtaposing ideas for and through understanding. Such dialogue is not only directed toward an understanding of one's own and others' ideas, but also toward the very persons who hold them. Dialogue is simultaneously an instrument and result of the understanding process. It occurs in, across, between, or through relationships of understanding.

Thirdly, I shall argue that dialogue is not only a medium of understanding between communicating individuals, as well as selves, but also an emergent quality that represents necessity and contingency. Through this quality, participants in dialogue can simultaneously appear as reactive and responsive agents who are the objects of their actions. (i.e., self-governed)

Finally, I shall take up the issue of the functionality of dialogue for its participants. In this part of the chapter, I will suggest three different models of dialogue – regulatory, truth-oriented and celebratory – for clarifying the different meanings that might be attached to dialogue in the politics of democracy – a question that I will subsequently address in the chapter five.

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<sup>1</sup> In the same way, Bakhtin describes the image of ambivalence as *fire* in the dialogues of Carnival. Bakhtin calls ambivalence “a fire that simultaneously destroys and renews the world.” (Bakhtin 1997: 126)

## **I.2. Conditions of Dialogue**

My conception of dialogue is not one, which incorporates everyday conversations. Instead, I conceive of this term as a particular kind of communicative situation, which explicitly recognizes different voices, languages and perspectives. It is linguistic production formed in the process of social interaction. As linguistic activity, it relies upon sustained and mutual trust and respect, and belief in the sensibility and care of the demos (Benhabib, 1989: 152-153). It also refers to the fact that only presenting the interaction of at least two voices can reveal genuine knowledge: knowledge resides in interaction rather than in a set of sentences. Therefore, it represents a collective capacity of understanding that comes through reflective, reciprocal and self-reflexive interaction between two free and equal bodies occupying simultaneous but different spaces. (Freire, 1972: 61)

*Dialogue:*

- 1.a. A conversation carried on between two or more persons; a colloquy, to talk together.
- 1.b. Verbal interchange of thought between two or more persons.
- 2.a. A literary work in the form of a conversation between two or more persons.
- 2.b. Literary composition of this nature; the conversation written and spoken by actors on the stage; hence in recent use, the style of dramatic conversation or writings.
3. Such composition set to music for two or more voices.

*Dialogism:*

1. The discussion of a subject under the form of dialogue, to the personages of which the author imputes ideas and sentiments.
2. A conversational phrase or speech; dialogue, spoken and written.
3. A term introduced for a form of argument having a single premise and disjunctive conclusion.

In the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the terms dialogue and dialogism appear to be very closely related. However, these two particular terms are not easily defined. Both concepts are used in such a myriad of contexts and in such diverse manner in interchangeable ways, that it often seems there is no clear understanding of either concept. This speaks to a further need for clarifying these concepts conceived by different thinkers, and how we might employ them for conception of democracy.

In a general sense, the term dialogism implies complex mix and clash of languages and voices with a wide variety of links and interrelationships that reflects complex sense of world. (Bakhtin, 1981: 263) Dialogism is the state of affairs created by heteroglossia. (Hirschkop, 1999: 67-108; Holquist, 1990: 14-17) It highlights the dynamism of multivoicedness inherent in all language. Dialogism contains a linguistic activity that describes ability to spark different and spontaneous communicative acts with no authoritative power. Dialogism is the stimulating flow that not only brings heteroglossia to life but also creates a language of democracy. It reflects the language of democracy not as single and unitary but complex and multiple. Dialogism is the base condition for dialogue, the mix and clash of languages and perspectives upon which such process of dialogue depends.

The etymological root of the word, dialogue, comes from unity of two Greek words, *dia*, which means, “through” or “across;” and *logos*, which is usually translated, “word” or “speech account.” Thus, the etymological meaning of dialogue refers to speech across, between or through meanings. David Bohm, in his book, *Dialogue*, calls dialogue a “flow of meaning.”(Bohm 1996) Dialogue is not debate or discussion. The term debate comes from Latin term *debat* that means fight, fighting and contention by means of words. Debate can be imagined as a language game the goal of which is to win an argument by besting an opponent. Dialogue is also different from discussion, which comes from Latin “*discutere*” (*dis*-apart + *cutere* to shake, strike). Discussions tend to be representing persuasive means of communication in which participants tries to convince each other of a point of view to gain agreement. In contrast to debate and discussion, the dialogue refers to both communicative process and language action. The process of dialogue, which relies upon sustained and mutual trust and respect, contains a critical and nonjudgmental reflectiveness, penetrating one’s own world and the others’ worlds as well as listening to the impact of language on each other, especially those to whom the language applies. This process leads to learning about views and values other than one’s own. It can be revealed new only by presenting the action of at least two voices. Actions take effect by virtue of language. Therefore, primary of the acts in communicative process are linguistic—they represent utterances by parties to the dialogue (or silences that are listened to as standing for an act). Utterances are not unrelated actions, but participate in larger language structures: syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Syntax here refers to the structure of visible forms language. It embodies grammatical rules for determining the basic constituents such as letters, words and sentences or the ways in which utterances can be formed. Semantics stands for systematic relation between utterances and space of their potential meanings. It includes the portrayal of individual constituents (e.g., words and sentences). Pragmatics deals with the use of language in

context. The conditions of dialogue depend on three aspects of language. This means that the concept of dialogue cannot be simply described as an immediate, face-to-face conversational engagement between two or more persons because it depends on conditions of the context and linguistic background of the people who enter, interpret, and use the language

In a similar vein, Socrates sees dialogue as a particular systematic activity directed toward searching for reality about life. (Vlastos, 1996: 34) This search is geared toward new self-discovery and self-examination through understanding, which explicitly tests out prejudices (or prejudgments) about oneself and one's pursuit of the truth. (Kidd, 1992: 91) In seeking new understanding through dialogue, people become more critical about their ideas and proposed courses of action. For this reason, dialogue lies at the heart of the Socratic search for new meaning. Socratic dialogue advances a discourse of critique that breaks down certain ways of seeing and builds up novel ways of sight and action. It is a common inquiry for knowledge. The outcome of Socratic dialogues is not the development of common ground for the absolute truth, but to engage in a collective search for new ways of seeing and doing through further dialogue.

For Socrates, the truth is always in and out of sight. The truth has an elusive quality that can only be captured moment by moment through constant refutation and confirmation of reasoned views. Otherwise, it could not be the object of common search or dialogue. On the one hand, this approach implies the rejection of the concept of absolute truth. On the other hand, partial truth is possible, and dialogue is the necessary action to achieving it. To this end, Socrates used dialogue as an active and responsive source for the production of original knowledge. In this approach, Socrates could be regarded as somewhat of a spiritual midwife who helped interlocutors recognize or experience



something that was not in fact true. (Plato 149, 210b; 1987b: 25-25, 130 and Burny, 1992: 54-55)

This feature of dialogue is correlated with either an epistemic or a linguistic situation that reveals new paths for knowledge through which interlocutors go beyond the limits of their own consciousness in terms of what they can individually see or experience. In other words, the basic force behind the Socratic dialogue is truth. This truth is neither born nor found in individual consciousness, but rather it is something that could only arise between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction. Truths are temporally situated, contingent knowledge and they depend on reflective questioning process. In this process, dialogue aims to expose the problems of generally accepted concepts and beliefs that participants have asserted as truth. On the one hand, this process is characterized by mutual inquiry ensuing from the provocative words participants speak and engage the utterances they author and answer. Conversely, it may be referred to as a form of interrogation accompanied by multidirectional communication.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> In *The Republic*, through the voice of Socrates, Plato assessed the state of affairs of a group of people who had collectively been prisoners inside a cave since childhood. They were chained in such a way that they were unable to look towards the cave exit. There was a wall behind them, and on the other side of this wall people passed on images and shapes of different things, which appeared over the wall. Behind the prisoners, was refracted sunlight. In essence, the prisoners were able to catch sight only of the shadows that these objects cast on the cave wall. Because these people had never known anything other than these shadowy images, they mistakenly believed that the shadows themselves were the “real” objects. The analogy, at least in this simplified form, is quite uncomplicated. The cave may correspond to the world of language used for descriptions of the world, and the people in chains may be equated with those whom have not yet learned about or experienced the tangible objects. The shadows are appearances that are accepted as real. In addition, the objects passed on the shadows are the real forms of these appearances, whose scenery can continuously be revealed to perceptive reflection. In other words, the movement from illusion and appearances towards the point where things are seen for what they really are represents the perceptive process in which knowledge of things from appearances on the cave wall is neither a singular conceptual structure of knowledge nor a sole universal principle for any true form. Rather the knowledge of things is a plurality of differently fixed illusions and perspectives; and simultaneously it is the knowledge that people develop of it by engaging in the processes of seeing, interpreting and understanding. Insight becomes the knowledge of what people see or observe, suffer and/or enjoy. For Plato, these insights are an innate source of reality as they can all be made explicit by the dialogical process. Clarification occurs through appropriate compulsion of dialogue where the knowledge of ideas with highest idea of good can be revealed by the means of critical questioning (e.g. dialectics). See Plato, *Euthdemus* 273a-290; (1987: 323-332) .

Multi-directional communication is a deeply complex endeavor, much more so than our ordinary ways of thinking of it. We can generally describe multidirectional communication in three ways: one and the other everyday individualities, between one and oneself, and between one and the truth. In these three-way communications, the Socratic mode of dialogue does not simply develop by one person merely arguing for one position and another person arguing for the diametrically opposed stance. It also develops when each interlocutor is allowed to display him/herself in the position of *syncrisis* - “the juxtaposition of various points of view” on an object”- and *anacrisis* - the “provocation of the word by the word” - to draw out knowledge for truth. (Bakhtin, 1986: 110-11) Both *syncrisis* and *anacrisis* are rhetorical devices that are employed with inductive arguments to refute, clarify, or support a particular explanation for the point of demonstrating to the one who put forward the explanation that he or she does not know what a truth about the good life is and therefore cannot know how to live in accordance with it. As rhetorical devices, *syncrisis and anacrisis* can provide means of eliciting and juxtaposing ideas and engaging and testing them on issues not only of knowing about truth but also of living good life. In connection to this point, Vlastos classifies the elenchus into a philosophical one and a therapeutic one according to its double objective: discovering truth about the good life and testing one’s life (Vlastos, 1991: 114).

Having argued that the elenchus is both therapeutic and philosophical method for the search of the good and the truth, it cannot establish propositions for the good or truth, it can demonstrate only what objects are not and not what they are. Thus, it creates a state of perplexity, that is, the state in which the interlocutor realizes that they do not know the valid answer to the issues at hand or are unable to describe the truth of the concept or issue that is under scrutiny. (Vlastos, 1991: 114) *Aporia* is important component of the elenchus. On one the hand, it is affirmative because it can lead to the sort of knowing

that is possible for human beings. On other hand, it is negative because it helps people to realize their dreadful lack of knowledge in which it allows them to realize what they do not know. Such states are vividly demonstrated by the *Charmides*. (Plato, 1987: 192-209)

In the *Charmides* (153a-176d), Critias sees elenchus (166d-e) in both affirmative and negative ways, and he suggests that such ways of elenchus brings in a kind of self-knowledge. He says that such self-knowledge is knowledge of what isn't known. This idea introduces the final and perhaps most important part of the dialogue, which, of course, ends in state of perplexity. During this part of dialogue, Socrates state the position that knowledge of  $X$  must also be knowledge of the opposite of  $X$ , and so knowledge is always knowledge of opposites. By the end of the dialogue, however, such positions are knotted to state of perplexity; and in such state of perplexity, there is the relation of ambiguity with experiences of knowing with not-knowing.

Elenchus, as the instrument in the process both knowing and not knowing places one argument against the other in dialectical way also contains linguistic relationships that connect meanings, events and possibilities, ideas and images by linking or weaving them together. These relationships are both cooperative and confrontational. In essence, this duality generates persuasive power for the continuity of dialogue. Persuasive power is constructed through *logos*. The term *logos* can sometimes refer to the myth itself, or to some unknown, hidden meaning. It presents each thing, and the world as a whole, in its reveals plurality while at the same time produce about an oneness based on which the thing can be understood in a shared way. Logos may hold both truth of things and myth that mislead one to the conclusion that they know something they do not. Therefore, elenchus may place logos against itself in the elenchus for bringing just new meanings out into the light. It carries a meaning when used in combination with other *logos*. Elenchus discloses myths in terms of refutation and challenge—i.e.: the dialectic. It can create new

revenues for new meanings and knowledge of ideas simply by arranging communicative relations so they complement or stimulate each other.

Elenchus is enhanced by communicative relations of logos that consist of elucidating contradictions in the views of participant interlocutors via recognition and by enhancement of reason. (Brickhouse and Smith, 1996: 121) Here, reason is about exercising a cooperative quality or the capacity to apply thinking, interpretation for co-creating shared awareness, understanding, success, transformation or wholeness in a spirit of communicative relationship, rather than for domination. Therefore, elenchus appears not as communicative practice that seeks to orient dialogue towards doctrinal monism or universal systems for replacing one proposition with another one but instead, creates a situation for particular kind of understanding (i.e. *aporia*) in which interlocutors no longer firmly hold a position for beliefs and truth (Nehamas, 1999: 16) *Aporia* as particular understanding can not be individually produced nor is it to be found in the reasoning in an individual person. It is born between people collectively searching for truth in the process of their dialogic interaction. In this context, elenchus is not characterized by or with precise and ultimate meanings that are unalterable across contexts and contents. It opens up new world and it drives the comprehension of interlocutors in order that they may grasp new awareness or reflection in a mirror where a misconception has been exposed, stripped away, and where a clean terrain now exists for the reconstruction of new knowledge. (Vlastos, 1991: 266)

The elenchus in Socratic dialogues contains six stages in which dialectical moments of succession occur:

1. The Socratic practitioner asserts a claim about a certain issue or concept and elicits the view of another interlocutor.

2. An interlocutor's answers are refuted by Socrates through questioning.
3. Questioning allows Socrates to discover inconsistent points in an interlocutors view.
4. Since the interlocutor cannot hold inconsistent views, the interlocutor agrees on counter points.
5. Through further questioning, interlocutors suggest logically higher points from which to approach the issue (knowledge).
6. The dialogue ends with ambiguity (*aporia*)

These six moments of *elenchus* involve an ongoing critical attitude toward the world as one in which people “participants” always remain receptive to the possibility of being persuaded against their beliefs or dogmas by the different viewpoints they encounter. Thus, *elenchus* is inseparable from a kind of critical stance toward oneself, willingness to take the other's view seriously. The term “critical stance” has different connotations but all would affirm that dialogue is critical when it contains expression of a meaning different from its apparent sense. However, there are numerous types of difference. In speaking of the Socratic conception of difference as a type of self-consciousness, it does not imply a critical stance either as a strategic way for persuading participants, or as an infinite unconstructiveness or self-reflexive negativity. A self-critical stance is the virtue of reason. It contains both positions: skeptic and prognostic. In one sense, dialogue develops with speech acts of reflective interlocutors who refuse to accept anything that is presented as truth; something held as an established opinion or belief. In another sense, dialogue consists of interlocutors who reach agreement and offer a modified version of their claims. In this sense, Socratic dialogues contain both skeptical and prognostic positions. These dual stances of the participants allow them to evaluate any view via

critical scrutinization. Participants do not suppose that knowledge is in principle unobtainable, nor that they should not commit themselves to beliefs they do not absolutely know to be true. What they do retain is the sense that their assertions beliefs and concepts are provisional and subject to revision.

The skeptical and prognostic features of the Socratic dialogues are associated with critical stance. This situation establishes a ground for *aporia* and an end to the certainty of viewpoints. (Brickhouse and Smith, 2000: 87-88) The concept of *aporia* is most familiar from Plato's dialogue that portrays the uniquely crafted encounter between Meno, a character representing a particular frame of mind, and the particular *techné* and *logos* used by Socrates to assist in transforming Meno's particular view. In that dialogue, Meno poses a question: what is virtue and how is virtue acquired? Responding to the question at issue, Socrates does not directly address Meno's role as the addressee. Instead, he takes a critical stance about Meno's views concerning virtue. Socrates provocatively asserts that he never met anyone who knew precisely what virtue was or what it entailed. Subsequently, he persuades Meno to defend an account of virtue. In the course of dialogue, through a step-by-step line of argument (*elenchus*), Socrates cross-examines Meno's responses. He ascertains that while Meno appears to be elucidating a response, he is actually imparting very little. With help of dialectical cross-examinations, he amalgamates Meno's various statements and places each one side by side. In so doing, Socrates illustrates how statements can contradict one another even when referring to the same things, in relation to the same things, and in the same respect. At the end, Socrates converts the response of Meno into to paradoxes (that is, previously impossible or unimaginable statements that Meno must now accept or that he is at least incapable of rationally rejecting). The effect

of all this is the moment of *aporia* where Meno is flustered confused and perhaps puzzled.<sup>3</sup>

At the moment of *aporia*, a misconception has been exposed, stripped away, and a clean terrain now exists for the reconstruction of new knowledge. The new knowledge is what holds dialogue together. New knowledge is not static—it is flowing meaning. (Bohm 1996:40) It requires mutually empowering cross-examinations with the help of critical stance for the generation of *aporia*. *Aporia* is generated by mutually empowering cross-examinations that constitute deconstructive places in the dialogical field through destruction of old views and construction new perspectives. (Brickhouse and Smith, 1996: 125)

*Aporia* is a specific dialogical experience that affects participants on many levels simultaneously: they experience doubt and discomfort with their belief systems. An *aporia* is a predicament of choice and of action. It is a form of exploration for new meanings and ideas. When participants have known nothing and do not have many choices, dialogue becomes an end in itself.<sup>4</sup> In other words, in Socratic dialogues, participants

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<sup>3</sup> Meno's *aporia* is exemplified in the following speech:

Socrates even before I met you they told me that in plain truth you are a perplexed man yourself and reduce others to perplexity. At this moment, I feel you are exercising magic and witchcraft upon me and positively laying me under your spell until I am just a mass of helplessness. If I may be flippant, I think that not only in outward appearance but in other respects as well you are exactly like the flat stingray that one meets in the sea. Whenever anyone comes into contact with it, it numbs him, and that is the sort of thing that you seem to be doing to me now. My mind and my lips are literally numb, and I have nothing to reply to you. Yet I have spoken about virtue hundreds of times, held forth often on the subject in front of large audiences, and very well too, or so I thought. Now I cannot even say what it is. In my opinion, you are well advised not to leave Athens and live abroad. If you behaved like this as a foreigner in another country, you would most likely be arrested as a wizard. (Plato 1961; Meno, 80a-b)

<sup>4</sup> The depiction of the idea of “end in itself” is perhaps to be found in Kant's note to 65 Of the *Critique of Judgement*, which relates to the relationship of parts with a whole. Kant writes:

The *first* requisite of a thing considered as physical end, is that its parts, both as to their existence and form, are only possible by their relation to whole. For the thing is itself an end, and is therefore, comprehended under the conception or an idea that must determine *a priori* all that is contained in it... This *second* requisite is involved,

announce that they are not advancing anything forward as unequivocal truth. However, if others do so, they are resolved to find arguments counting against the truth claim, whatever it may be. Therefore, the Socratic modes of dialogue persuades or inspires people to question and reason, or critically disclose those very things—ideas that are concealed or lost in routines of everyday life. Though these ideas and meanings form the background of everyday life, this revelation itself cannot be the purpose of a dialogue; otherwise, all actions in the field of dialogue can be perceived as strategic. Socrates considers dialogical action as an end in itself. Dialogue inevitably engages people's intentions, opinions, and knowledge but it may reveal *aporia* in which the new ideas and meanings can be formed without reference to the intentions of the participants.

Communicating through ambiguities of the *aporia*, the dialogical process opens a larger consciousness, and reveals another kind of understanding based on the development of a new meaning that is constantly transforming in the process of the dialogue. Here, a Socratic dialogue can be seen as an unconditioned method of knowledge, but this unconditionality appears to be at variance with the contractual character of the intentions of participants. Socrates' opening part in a dialogue can hardly be described as a part of an intentional act. It might become so, but cannot really be considered as such at the outset. The only implicit intention is to be present, to listen and elicit the statements of others, and to speak if so moved. Thus, there is a disagreement between the implicit intention and a certain worldview that describes a person or event with purpose as found, purposeful, to be avoided. It follows, then, that Socratic dialogue consists of participants who do not have any direct interest in the subject, or an interest in the other participant present in a field of dialogue. Everybody speaks in his or her own voice. They do not address each other or participate in the dialogue in order to realize certain projects.

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namely, that parts of the thing combine of themselves into the unity of a whole by being reciprocally cause and effect of their form. (Kant, 1952: 556)



Moreover, among a broad range of political, social and philosophical points of reference, it is generally agreed that dialogue is seen as purposeful communicative activity. This implies that people do not participate in dialogue merely for the sake of participating; participants have certain ends in mind, which can range from communicative power, social status, to the improvement of living conditions. If participants have purposes as to why they participate in dialogue, dialogue itself becomes a means to achieve a specific end. Those ends can be variously conceived; i.e.: from resolving social conflict, to building bases of equality and fairness for public deliberation in order to promote civic communication across difference. In contrast to dialogue that has an end in itself, shows itself in the interaction of signs, and signifying practices, end oriented dialogue demonstrates itself when different interests and objectives come together. In both cases, dialogue refers to a communicative process in which various elements such as the addresser, utterance, addressee, and language matrix influences communication in giving direction. What this suggests is that there is a distinct difference in the state of affairs in the process of dialogue

At the beginning, the initial states of affairs of the dialogical process are connected—circumstances of participation exist through which dialogue requires active listening, understanding and uttering. Subsequently, the state affairs of the dialogical process refers to respect as waiting attentively for each of the others to finish the expression of their respective idea(s), pausing to breathe, and pausing to reflect. At the end, the state affairs of dialogical process refer to an outcome as new knowledge, meaning or merely understanding.

The state affairs of dialogical process, therefore, are not only fleeting, they are transformative and transforming. They cannot be determined by the single individual nor by the collectivity of interplay among those who communicate together through the

constant switch of positions for expressing views, paying complete attention, active listening, waiting attentively for others to finish their idea, pausing to breathe, and pausing to reflect and so on. Well-organized unity of the state affairs of the dialogical process constitutes the form and the rhythm of dialogue. The form and the rhythm of dialogue develop around actions of expression, response and understanding. These actions are directly linked and are mutually dependent on each other. The knowledge as new meaning arises in the intersection between these different actions. (Bakhtin, 1986: 141-146)

The actions of expressing and responding in the field of dialogue critically depend on the circumstances of meanings. In the system of meaning, each meaning is not objective and self-contained entities but it is dialogical, is constantly transformed, and flows in the relation between writers and readers or between speakers and listeners. Thus, all meanings are relational—the result of a dialogue between and among utterances. Each utterance consists of chains of meanings that are not isolated from each other— they may be considered components in an abstract system of language.<sup>5</sup> Each is a complex web of dialogic interrelations with other utterances, which shape both individual meaning and whole meaning. For Bakhtin, dialogue is possible because every utterance creates meaning only by tacitly interacting with other utterances and meanings, which can and cannot be articulated. As Bakhtin (1997:276) points out:

The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular historical moment in a socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological consciousness around the given object of an utterance; it cannot fail to become an active participant in social dialogue.

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<sup>5</sup> Bakhtin considers the utterance as the basic unit of language. An utterance may consist of anything varying from a word or a short expression in a communication to a long passage. (Bakhtin 1986:60-61) It is situated within the framing context of an exchange of interlocutors. It shows direct relationship the extraverbal context of situation, setting, prehistory and with the utterances of other interlocutors. (Bakhtin 1986.73-74)

Considered as a dialogic interrelationship, the utterance has a number of distinctive qualities. First, every utterance referentially contains a semantic component (theme). Secondly, every utterance involves an expressive component (the interlocutors approach toward the theme). Thirdly, every utterance is primarily about a *response* to previous utterances of the given sphere of language communication. Therefore, each utterance is active in a chain of configuration while it refutes affirms, supplements, and relies upon the other utterances. For this reason, each kind of utterance is packed with various kinds of responsive reactions to other utterances. (Bakhtin, 1986: 84, 90-91 and 95) Fourthly, any utterance is filled with responses and necessarily brings out those reactions in one or another form of understanding. In essence, the listener becomes the speaker. (Bakhtin, 1986: 68-69)

Utterances reside not only in the dialogical interaction of the speaker and listener. Therefore, dialogic relationships of utterances are reducible neither to relationships of reason nor to relationships of intention that are oriented semantically toward objective meaning. On the one hand, they are active in discourse, and through discourses, they become representative of positions of various subjects expressed in discourse. On the other hand, they involve an extra-verbal situation in which each and every utterance may express the new meaning in relation to the context. Consequently, an utterance as a meaningful chain is comprised of two components: (1) the part realized or actualized in verbal reality and (2) the extra-verbal part. (Bakhtin, 1997: 183) On this basis, the utterance can be associated with the double meaning of what is said and unsaid. (Voloshinov, 1976: 100 and Bakhtin, 1997: 185-187) These characteristics of utterances make dialogical communication profoundly open-ended and unpredictable. All accounts of understanding of meanings therefore remain incomplete and constitutively temporal

much of the time because the two-sided acts of utterances present more than one discursive verbal moment.

Therefore, orientation of the utterance toward the listener has not only high significance on one's understanding but also impacts upon and in the context in which they are uttered. Therefore, the meanings of an utterance entail a two-sided performance because they are shaped equally by the addressee and addresser. As responsive understanding, they are the product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, addresser and addressee in the communicative field of dialogue. While each and every utterance expresses the one in relation to the other, each participant's view is shaped from another's point of view. Utterances are connections between one and another in the field of dialogue. (Voloshinov, 1973: 86) This means that dialogue is both connected to temporality and worldliness through a communicative matrix of utterances in different contexts. (Bakhtin, 1986: 90-91) What one labels dialogue is the effect or function of those particular, historically, linguistically and contextually created worlds of utterances. Utterances always create something new – a dialogical world between people as they address that world in which they live. And, because they are contextual, the meaning of utterances, and thus, dialogical communication cannot be easily centered or located in a steady way for the pursuit of certain objectives and ends because it does not contain elements of mechanical and systemic communicative action. Therefore, dialogue always remains open-ended and never completed; it is a continuously built situation, an interactive space, a world between one and another. (Bakhtin, 1984: 217)

Dialogue is also a discursive relation of difference situated against the background of relations or conditions involving distinct empathies, respects, characteristics, styles, values, assumptions, and purposes. These background conditions may or may not be matters of choice, and they can be produced or imposed upon the dialogical relation in

ways that make communication multivocal interactions. Often these backgrounds are expressed as both forms of empowerment or limitation because the relative positions of people place asymmetrical constraints on what one can utter, what can be communicated. On the one hand, this signifies that dialogue has a substantiality that is conditioned by both the facilitating and inhibiting circumstances of meanings. On the other hand, it is not simply a matter of the present context at hand, but also other imaginary contexts, including anticipated future contexts of need or use. While the situationality and substantiality of contexts makes dialogue finite and bound, the imaginability of contexts makes dialogue infinite and unbound. (Burbules, 2000: 263-264) From this standpoint, dialogue cannot be viewed simply as an exchange of views between people, or mere conversation. Rather, dialogue can be viewed as a multiplicity of relations among multiple forms of meanings, practices and mediating objects.

### **I.3. Dialogue as Understanding**

Conversation is not only a matter of two (or more) people who alternately take the role of speaker and listener but rather that both actions of speaking and listening engage responsive activity of understanding. In this vision, understanding is an active not a passive action which requires cooperation and interpretation. In the communicative field, no utterance, no word, can be spoken without generating responsive understanding of what was said. In this sense, understanding is also both collective: two or more sides work together toward a common understanding between individuals: one listens to the other side(s) in order to understand meaning utterances. At both levels, understanding is mediated by selfhood, phonetic, grammatical, or lexical rules of language and context. These parts of communication determine the ways that understanding manifests itself in the field of dialogue. Selfhood refers to what characterizes people. It is the generative

center overflow with the representation of things (i.e. knowledge, sense experience). This means that selfhood is responsively intertwined in with things that are around each person. In being responsively intertwined with their surroundings, it has knowledge and sense experience prior to a reflection or an expression of something. Such knowledge and sense experience can initially be the element of understanding. Phonetic, grammatical, or lexical rules of language form the infrastructure of understanding. In order to generate shared understanding with words, utterances must fulfill the presumption of a shared language; the conformation to the, phonetic, grammatical, or lexical rules of language. Context is what is around addressers and addressee—the social, historical, cultural and political conditions, forces and structures that shape meaning of utterances. Ultimately, context contains everything that is representative of the surroundings related to communication. A different context can influence generations of understanding differently.

The relationship among selfhood, phonetic, grammatical, or lexical rules of language and context governs emergence of understanding at the individual and collective levels. When people are aware of elements of their selfhood—phonetic, grammatical, or lexical rules of language and context—they are able to respond to each other adequately. As Bakhtin understands the concept of responsibility, it entails both a literal ability to respond that embodies responsiveness and answerability but it also contains a more ethically burdened meaning.<sup>6</sup> In this context, dialogue appears to be the route to establish a coherent meaning of responsibility and answerability. As Bakhtin suggested, the point about dialogue is not only that people engage a depth of understanding by delving deeper into the insides of things (including themselves) but also that they stimulate responsiveness

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<sup>6</sup> Emerson suggests that the Russian word for responsibility {otvetstvennost} implies both a literal ability to respond, that is responsiveness, answerability, as well as a more ethically burdened meaning (Emerson 1997: 283)

for whatever is going on in the world, not only nearby but also far away. (Bakhtin, 1986: 68-69) In this sense, we can say that dialogue is the kind of communicative pattern that enhances the responsive understanding of the individual dialoguers.

Responsive understanding requires interconnectedness and interpretation of things or assemblages of meanings that continually flow and change, transferring participants at various levels of dialogue. Therefore, dialogue is closely associated with the capacity to communicate as a whole, via interconnectedness, -- individually and collectively—and to engage with and in surroundings that are whole or as unity within diversity. While dialogue connects people and things, events and possibilities, ideas and images, linking or weaving them together, any true understanding becomes dialogic in its disposition. (Voloshinov, 1973: 102) The dialogicality of understanding appears to be the ways for establishing coherent meaning among parts that also appears as unique wholes in their own special qualities. In other words, dialogicality of understanding refers to responsibility to the parts (i.e. utterances and the other) that are in unity. For this reason, we can say that understanding is responsive dialogical reflection through and between interconnectedness and relationality of utterances. (Bakhtin, 1981: 280)

Dialogicality of understanding closely associates all interpretation of connotative and denotative meanings of utterances. Firstly, when utterances refer to an object, that object is not separated from understandings that are located in dialogical specificity. In this dialogical specificity, utterances are perceived by their entrance into the participants' conceptual systems, filled with specific objects and emotional expressions. As an extension, the understanding of an utterance is thus inseparable from the participant's response to it and its surroundings.

Every understanding participates in dialogical communication as *a response* to the utterances of the given sphere. Depending on what has been said, understandings are forced to reflect on the meanings of the words participants have used, on the concepts they have applied, on whether the reasons they have given actually lead to any type of conclusion, whether they rely on underlying assumptions or on alternative ways of approaching the problem, and so forth. Through responsive actions of understanding, the dialogue becomes a systemic exchange of answer or response that goes back and forth between one and other. (Bakhtin, 1981: 282) Such a systemic exchange creates a complex unity of oneself with the other. This means that understanding resides neither in one's intention nor in what one utters but at a point between one's intention and that of another. On the one hand, the meanings that one express is dialogical. Understanding becomes one's own only when one generates it with one's own interpretation. Conversely, the meanings that one expresses become reflected in turn with the understanding of another—for in the dialogical character of utterance, one's understanding is always directed toward the active understanding of the other, which is itself reflected with its own understanding.

This dialogization of understanding occurs constantly through a process of transformation. This process of transformation is both private and public. Understanding is transformative as it is passed from private language and private thought to public language and thought. It is not static—it is flowing and connected with circumstances of public and private thought within the levels of dialogue. (Issacs, 1999) At each levels of dialogue, understanding is transformed and tends to connect some of the meanings with something else. Therefore, there are different phases and planes and understanding that it passes through before it is reflected in words. In these areas, understanding initially becomes property of the private realm. Private understanding has more representational



and passive qualities. Secondly, understanding is also public and as such is the primary means of change in the understandings of interlocutors—interacting and mixing of various understandings co-existing within the boundaries of a dialogue. Understanding as a public thing refers to both the active and responsive aspects of positionality that rises between people.<sup>7</sup> At each level, dialogues form a unity of public and private understanding. But this unity is not homogeneous; rather, it is complex and preserves difference.

At the first level, dialogue means dialogue for oneself, or self-understanding. (Arendt, 1958: 237-48) It refers to the passive kind of representational understanding, embodied in ontological moments of oneself or interpersonal relationships of oneself. It is an understanding informed by questions of who one is and what one does, what one thinks—the self-image one establishes from the social and material relationships. (Bakhtin, 1986: 111) When one is fully absorbed in what s/he is performing in the position of addresser and addressee, self-understanding normally recedes into the background; but it can be suddenly brought back into the fore if one grasps the view of oneself reflected in the dialogical field. The dialogical equivalent of being confronted by one's own image is to be scrutinized about what one knows and expresses; instead of taking place smoothly, it advances forward under its own drive. Thus, the flow of thought is turned back on itself with the assistance of dialogue. Depending on what meaning has been expressed or to what words are referred, one is compelled to reflect upon oneself through the meanings that have been raised. In short, to understand the dialogical position is to understand interactively which is to understand reflectively. This level of understanding most completely manifests what must be transformed. The

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<sup>7</sup> Martin Buber makes a similar case. For him, there are three levels for I-thou relationship (i.e. dialogue) and two relational postures. The levels of dialogue are between man and nature, between man and man, and between man and God. Dialogue in the character of I-Thou relation, it also has disposition of going from the outside to the inside of a relation, from reflecting *on* objects to reflecting *within* relation to a subject. (Buber, 1958: 4-14)

transformation may be characterized as self-transformation or as change in “knowledge of what one knows and one does not know.” (Plato, 1961: 165e-167c or 1987: 192-196)

The second level of dialogue refers to active and responsive understanding that rises in interactions between people, between different viewpoints. It is both active and responsive in the sense that understanding resides neither in one’s intended meaning nor in what one uttered, but in the dialogical output that does not directly go from addresser to addressee. It is an active stage of incompleteness that is always in the process of being worked out. An important characteristic of this process is how each participant exposes oneself to others in order to understand the intended meanings, to grasp different viewpoints and to convey one’s own meanings.

In the realm of dialogue, difference is a most powerful factor for the rise of creative and active understanding. An understanding of a meaning only reveals its depths once it has been exposed and encountered to another, different meaning. Participants engage in a kind of dialogue, which rises above the mutuality of these particular meanings, these understandings. The addresser’s words may raise new spaces for inquiry into the addressee’s understanding, ones that it did not raise itself. The addressee, in turn, may seek a response to the addresser’s inquiry as well as his own inquiry in it; and the addresser’s understanding responds to the addressee by revealing new aspects and semantic depths. Such a responsive encounter of two understandings does not result in a merging or mixing. Each retains its own open unity, but they are mutually enriched. In the continuity of dialogue, understandings may appear as contextual, contingent, non-total and shared. (Gadamer, 1975: 302-3)

From this perspective, reaching a shared understanding in dialogue requires that the participants are ready to engage in that activity and that they attempt to allow for the

relevance of what is different and contrary to themselves. (Gadamer, 1975: 388) This happens on a reciprocal basis, and each participant put his or her own views and thoughts into play on an interactive field where they hold their own ground while simultaneously assessing and addressing the counterpoints. The mutual recognition with the interplay of understandings is manifested in the fusion of horizons wherein views and thoughts emanating from one conceptual world are translated into clauses relevant for the other.<sup>8</sup> As a result, the understandings of each participant are not merged into singleness, but transformed without necessarily losing their identity in the process.

Openness, as self-disclosure of personal feelings, knowledge or evaluative views about particular issues is also important for eliciting and provoking understandings. It occurs in the dynamic process of the possibility of revealing information about oneself while trying to see the world through the eyes of others. (Bakhtin, 1986: 6-7) This requires the distancing of oneself from oneself and from one's private rationale, which allows for a knot of connection that inextricably intertwines the worlds of interlocutors with many social, cultural and political contexts for understanding. The rise of a knot of connection contributes to a sense of fluid boundaries among participants with recognition of the separate and non-merged voices within the chorus of them. (Ostram, 1997: 151-65) At this moment, the process of understanding connects self and other in an ever-changing joint world of dialogue.

This notion of the joint world of dialogue refers to a reciprocal exchange relation. Interlocutors are dependent on each other's wordings or actions for formation of their utterances, but rather interact spontaneously in response to one another and in reference

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<sup>8</sup> Gadamer uses the term "fusion of horizons" to describe understanding. For him "all understanding is a fusion of horizons" (Gadamer, 1975: 302) Gadamer's views impart the impression that understanding involves incorporating addressers conceptual world into addressees one. At the same time, Gadamer describes the event of understanding in relation "consensus" and "agreement." He asserts that "to understand means to come to an understanding with each other. Understanding is primarily agreement." (Gadamer, 1975: 180)

to the surroundings and momentous occasions, jointly giving rise to an understanding of views, ideas or issues that neither interlocutor had earlier considered. Such openness serves as a starting point for self-transformation or differentiation of the participant from previous positions. The emergent understandings are available as new potentials and new possibilities that fuse different perspectives found in one and the same participant.<sup>9</sup>

This is a case of a rise of a mutual understanding or new understanding that involves a unity of what is said at the beginning and what is not uttered. This means that every understanding in dialogue is not only a response to preceding messages of the given context but also a prompter of understanding. Participants of dialogue are determinant to the extent that they can alter one another's responses from their baseline levels. Each response refutes affirms, supplements, and relies upon other responses, presupposes them to be known, and somehow considers them. Therefore, each kind of response is filled with various kinds of reactions to other messages as responsive understanding of the given context of the dialogical situation. In dialogue, responsive understanding of the meaning of a particular message not only belongs to a particular meaning of utterance as such but also to the context.

To acquire understanding of context, however, is a task of peculiar difficulty. The very idea of context means that dialogical communication operates in relation to the intentional world of the addresser, to the conceptual world of the addressee and to the

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<sup>9</sup> A similar viewpoint is also expressed by Bakhtin's analysis of dialogue. For Bakhtin, the key quality of dialogue is that it simultaneously represents unity of the participants' perspectives as fusion of one with another, on the one hand, and completes divergence of views, on the other. In this context, the whole dialogical process can be viewed with Bakhtinian terms which underlines social process of dialogues as polyphonic, involving multiple voices, representing dynamic interplay between *centripetal* (i.e., drive of unity) and *centrifugal* (drive of difference) forces as many-sided, variegated and kaleidoscopic immediate conditions of particular moment. The social and political reality of these forces is produced and reproduced by dialogical actions of participants. Furthermore, the ongoing dialogue of voices as interplay of contradictory forces opens up dialogical fields to multi-vocal complexity. For this reason, the most important thing about the dialogue is not only what kind of different view and idea is exchanged through dialogue but also what kind of new views transpire through the exchange. The difference produces difference through dialogue. (Bakhtin, 1981: 272-273) I shall elaborate on this further in the chapters two and five.

interpretation of the immediate social situation and the broader socio-linguistic and historical milieu that can determine the meaning of utterances. The idea here is not to get on upper hand in the dialogical process, or to reach an agreement. Rather, it is to move actively and responsively in understanding what has passed, is present and will be. This is the fusion of horizons, which involves incorporation of one's conceptual repertoire with the other within the process of creation. (Gadamer, 1975: 273)

The fusion of horizons is the link between active and responsive understanding and dialogue.<sup>10</sup> This connection can be seen in each and every utterance. When an utterance is formulated and addressed to somebody, it responds not only to previous utterances, but is also intended for mutual understanding. This is created in the meeting of different and similar voices in oneself or between self and other. The addresser and addressee are perceived by a reciprocal relationship in which each simultaneously takes on an active and passive role. Therefore, understanding is not separately created by each and every participant, but rather it is mutually produced and shared in a dialogue. (Bakhtin, 1997: 292-93)

Shared and mutual understanding is a dialogical act that is mediated through language and context. Bakhtin (1986: 125-126) says:

The person who understands (including the researcher himself) becomes a participant in the dialogue, although on a special level (depending on the area of understanding or research)... The observer has no position

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<sup>10</sup> Bakhtin's ideas of responsive and creative understanding are crucial at this point in the discussion. For Bakhtin, responsive understanding is important for the continuation of dialogue because response aligned to interaction between what has been voiced before and to what can be voiced. Responsive understanding necessarily elicits dialogue in reciprocal form: the listener becomes the speaker. In dialogical situation, the fact is that when the listener perceives particular the meaning, one simultaneously takes an active, responsive position toward it. One who has either the same opinion with it or different from particular understanding (totally or to some extent) adopts these responsive positions for the entire duration of the process of listening and understanding, from the very beginning. (Bakhtin, 1986: 68) Even when overt responses are delayed, Bakhtin insists that understanding is actively responsive: sooner or later, what is heard and actively understood will find its response in the subsequent speech or behavior of the listener. Thus, all dialogical understanding is actively responsive, and constitutes nothing other than the initial preparatory stage of a reply.

*outside* the observed world, and his observation enters as a constituent part into the observed object. This pertains fully to entire utterances and relations among them. They cannot be understood from outside. Understanding itself enters as a dialogic element in the dialogic system and somehow changes its entire sense.

In this sense we can say that shared and mutual understanding depends not only on one's use of language, or on one's intentionality in formulating an utterance, but also on the conceptual world of the addressee by which the meaning of the utterance is understood.<sup>11</sup>

The conceptual world of the addressee operates as a framework for interpretation. Thus, the meaning of an utterance arises out of the relation between the intended act and the attempt to understand it. This relation is both multitudinous and two-sided: multitudinous because meanings depend on the conceptual world of the addressee; and two-sided because meanings emerge out of interaction between the addresser and addressee.

In dialogue, when a reply is made, it places value on the views expressed. If the reply were to be merely mechanical with no intention involved, it would be one that belongs properly to the original addresser. That is, the mechanical reply confirms or closes off exchange in favor of the original utterance. (Bakhtin, 1997: 110) What takes place, then, is monologue. Bakhtin (1997: 292-293) suggests:

Monologism, at its extreme, denies the existence outside itself of another consciousness with equal rights and equal responsibilities, another *I* with equal rights (*thou*). With a monologic approach (in its extreme pure form) *another person* remains wholly and merely an *object* of consciousness, and not another consciousness. No response is expected from it that could change anything in the world of my consciousness. Monologue is finalized and deaf to other's response, does not expect it and does not acknowledge in it any force. Monologue manages without the other, and

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<sup>11</sup> Some philosophers have claimed that the meaning of dialogical act is not something that is relative to the interpreter; rather the meaning of a dialogical act always is in the act itself. This implies that the meaning of dialogical or its products derive from the intentions of its producer. For further discussion of the theory intentionalism through a consideration of "verstehen," see W. Outhwaite, 1975.

therefore to some degree materializes all reality. Monologue pretends to be the *ultimate word*. It closes down the represented world and represented persons.

As Bakhtin mentions, in a monologue, the addressee remains wholly and merely an *object* of the other's understanding, and does not embody another autonomous understanding. Monologue is hearing-impaired to the other's autonomous reply, s/he does not expect it and does not acknowledge in it any *decisive* force.

In contrast, in dialogue, the utterances become only understandable when one places them in a specific interpretative context. (Gadamer, 1975: 350) At the same time, one's interpretation cannot privilege a particular content as a given or self-verifying part separate from the whole, from other contents or from the activities of the addressee. The meanings of utterances do not represent a property of reality but an interactive field of interpretation and understanding as it relates to its participants. This implies that the meanings of utterances and their understanding will vary as the interpretative horizons of addressees change over time or from one participant to another. The meanings of utterances can never be definitively fixed.

What that suggests is that dialogical understanding moves in what Gadamer calls a "hermeneutic circle."<sup>12</sup> To produce meaning in a dialogue, one must always move around from the meaning of a particular (single utterance) to the meaning of the whole or general (chain of utterance), and vice versa from whole to part. (Gadamer, 1975: 190-92) The "whole" may represent the entire meaning of utterances that are expressed in dialogue, the particular message that passed to the other, and a shared linguistic space to which

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<sup>12</sup> For more detailed discussion of Hermeneutic Circle, See Gadamer, 1975; and Charles Taylor, 1987: 15-57.

utterance belongs— a historical period, personal experiences of participants, and so on.<sup>13</sup> This “whole,” then, provides the horizon against which one gives significance to the “particular.” The meaning of the utterance itself cannot be immediately apparent, if one attempts to see and understand in the larger context. The contextually retained meaning of the utterance then changes the meaning of the whole—i.e., dialogue.

When the hermeneutic circle is applied to the parts-whole relations in understanding the processes of dialogue, the understanding of each message depends on not only the interpretation of the whole but also on previous messages and the context in which they occurred. In other words, the interaction between a message and recipient is not a one-off event of communication. New interpretations help to reconstitute the universe of understanding of the recipients, and the newly shaped universe of understanding allow recipients to reinterpret the meaning of the previous message once more. The result of this circularity is a constantly evolving process of dialogue in which the meaning of both previous message and the universe of understanding of recipients is altered.

This implies that understanding is always already underway and never completely finished. For this reason, the understandings of the participants are partial and never complete, because their horizons are always limited and incomplete, and they exist inside and not outside dialogue. (Gadamer, 1975: 490-92) Incompleteness of understanding, however, does not drain the possibility for dialogue, because there is always a difference, which slips away from the comprehension of participants. Thus, incompleteness becomes a driving force for dialogue along with the possibilities of further interpretative efforts at understanding. The incompleteness and weakness of understanding also make dialogue

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<sup>13</sup> For example, utterances attain their meaning through the contexts of pronouncement they generate, (as similar words gain their meaning through the context of sentences), pronouncements through correlative relations of the dialogue they help to produce and vice versa.



exist in flux. It is this state of flux that makes the interaction of participants multi-sided and contingent.

#### **I.4. Dialogue as Relation of Contingency and Necessitation**

Dialogue is a method of knowledge and a way of understanding and is particularly significant in situations when there are multiple, perhaps contradictory or clashing, points of view and discourses. It is an open-ended, dynamic process that takes place between and among people in the ongoing here-and-now, as part of their use of language. Through dialogue, people produce their social, cultural and political reality. In dialogue, two or more people join one another in mutuality, reciprocity, and co-examination. Self-transformation takes place in moments of praxis, as people attempt to identify their unique experience of the world and to understand one another. The dialogue is not a linear or sequential process. Therefore, its course toward certain ends cannot be controlled. People cannot predict neither the outcome nor the beginning of process or even guess what the second move will be until they presume the first move through language. Such dynamic relations in the process of dialogue might appear to be unsystematic and even chaotic to those who are accustomed to highly systematic interactions. Therefore, liveliness, creativity, unpredictability, spontaneity, and freedom appear as the main characteristics of the process of dialogue. These characteristics are not only hallmarks of process that take place among and between people but also outputs of that process. They nurture the communicative process of dialogue, while their very conditions are cultivated by the process.<sup>14</sup> Dialogue derives its growth from them while it reflects their underlying principles.

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<sup>14</sup> Contingency plays a central role in Rorty's discussion of dialogue, language, self, and community. For Rorty, contingency signifies the demolition of limitation on thinking. It provides the nourishment and impulse for rich dialogue with well-differentiated positions. (Rorty 1989: 369)

Through conditions of freedom, spontaneity and liveliness, people produce processes of dialogue. In dialogue, two or more person's actions interact with one another in the context of necessitated and contingent responses. In communicative process of dialogue, responses and outcomes of these responses (i.e. utterances) are not free from others or sufficient when standing alone, rather it reflects and reacts on one another. These movements of connectivity between utterances and responsive understanding that reflect and react upon one another represent contingent and necessitated moves upon moves. Contingent and necessitated moves of participants make dialogue non-linear and non-sequential complex of communicative relation. The non-linear and non-sequential complex relationality of dialogue can be identified as united patterns of regularity and unpredictability. (Ostram, 1997: 151-65) These pairs of dialogue embody ways that difference and unity manifest themselves in a fluid, evolving and ever-changing joint world to reflect and generate wholeness of communication. This is the case as these pairs provide options, resources and stimulation for generating conditions of open-ended fluid, evolving and ever-changing process because each participant meets one another in mutuality, reciprocity, and co-inquiry while they reflect one another in contingent and necessitated manners. For this reason, dialogue is best described as a multi-directional movement toward a state of becoming. This multi-directionality derives from pre-existing identities, relationships and series of structures. Yet, it invokes contingent alteration that does not involve some necessary, presumed state or ideal end. It encompasses non-repeating, unexpected moves that transform sets of relationships to new configurations previously unimagined.

The multi-directional or free nature of dialogue provides an arena for change, in either the public or the private sphere. In dialogue, one can review not only oneself and others but also conventions and traditions, institutions and policies. The dialogical spirit does

develop and affect a wider range of social and cultural behaviors. However, more importantly, it allows for new interpretations and understandings, for new visions of life, of political paradigms, of values and ideas, or the discovery of knowledge. (Tully, 1999b: 162) The free nature of dialogue can be conceptualized as a source of an ongoing platform of becoming. At this point, contingency is useful concept for elucidating the indeterminate nature of dialogue.

In the field of dialogue, contingency refers to indeterminateness, randomness, and absence of cause and predictability. It is a source of dynamic and autonomous status of meaning that flows among participants.<sup>15</sup> Contingency is the very essence of dialogue that generates unconditioned will that makes one's existence free not only from authoritarian determination, but also from all inherited or environmental influences. Free choices of will sometimes are merely nothing more than random meaning like unpredictable movements of individual electrons. If all participants' communicative actions and meanings are determined by communicative order, then those actions and meanings are not "free" at all. If one of the participants is to be seen as responsible from one's own communicative acts, then at least some of his/her expression must be ultimately free from the determination of the other. This conception of freedom asserts that at minimum in some particular important decisions it is partially undetermined and unconditioned. Phrased alternatively, the event of contingency is partially responsible for one's immediate communicative actions, for his/her or dialogical meaning and more fundamentally his/her understanding. Here contingency can be conceptualized, as

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<sup>15</sup> Aristotle tended to include contingency as an autonomous explanatory element in the theory of universe. Aristotle was a thoroughgoing advocate of indeterminism and in his theory of atoms, an example of chance was conceptualized in the ever-swerving movement of atoms. In his view, uncaused movements were explained with the concept of chance. (Kirk, Raven and Schofield: 1957: 418-419) Aristotle also presented a concept of chance in illustrating the scenario of an accidental meeting of two friends in the marketplace after years of separation. In this instance, the order of movement or intention that persuaded each friend to go market place represents a cause, but coincidence or intention of two friends was uncaused or determined by indirect causation. (Aristotle, 1950: 70-76)

consequences of dialogical interaction but also it is a source that can contribute to an explanation of the development of meaning and understanding in terms of becoming. On these lines, the potential significance of contingency as a provoking mechanism becomes essential for on occasions of temporality rather than those of stability and permanence.<sup>16</sup> Participants of dialogue have the opportunity to adopt different but transmissible views on various issues. Their choices reflect the precarious compromises they make between self-reflexivity and self-referentiality, between freedom and necessity. The dialogical field does not represent absolute freedom, but it does permit participants to engage others in bringing their different potentials of freedom to bear upon actions.

Freedom, in the Arendtian sense, rises from a communicative move upon move in a public space neither where each participant's moves appear "autonomous" nor as a necessitated part of action or means in a great mechanism which produces an enormous force for creative change for differentiation. (Fox, 1999: 35-53) One cannot predict the outcome of a communicative act in an arena where everybody has equal capacity to act. (Arendt, 1958: 201-42) To regulate communicative acts between participants in the dialogical field is to regulate the outcome, and in so doing, the free position of the participants would be denied. Each participant is free insofar as his or her view is taken into account, not because he or she can freely pursue his or her own ends. Thus, the dialogical field serves as a means for bringing different worlds or viewpoints together in communicative contact for self-transformation and creativity. It is a field, for which continuous regulation of communicative acts can never be worked out.

Attempts to regulate dialogue measure communicative acts in quantitative terms and set up a hierarchy of values according to norms or procedures. Put simply, it is a process of

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<sup>16</sup> Every dialogue is positioned at the boundary between just now -pronounced words and views of the distant past and their verbal and non-verbal expression in the present with consideration of the listeners or readers possible response. (Bakhtin, 1981: 84-86 and 257-258)

standardization, limiting the scope for thought and action. Participants of regulative dialogue *appear qua* individuals only within the situations created for them by this dialogical framework, which is, in function, more akin to monologue. The standardization of dialogue works against the spontaneous rise of differences. The dialogical field, in the Arendtian sense, fixes no common norm for individual thought and action. (Arendt, 1961: 50-57)

Arendt views totalitarianism as a regulatory organization that tries to eliminate multivocality from a given space with the formation of isolation and loneliness. (Arendt, 1979: 474) Totalitarianism, through systematic regulation, suppresses individual initiative in a way that renders the spontaneous nature associated with human freedom void. In so doing, totalitarianism leaves us as mere cogs in a great wheel, i.e.: those who do nothing but function according to the mechanics of the system. For Arendt, freedom is only possible when the dialogical field allows participants to take on different and unpredictable positions, when the dialogical field is dynamic.

For self-reflexive and self-referential, moves to occur there must be what Arendt calls an “in-between.” (Arendt, 1958: 57) In this area, each participant has room to reach his or her own understanding, but not so singular that the mutuality of dialogue is lost. It is here that stimulation takes place, the source of creativity as well as new communicative acts. The idea of “in-between” does not simply refer to the capacity to choose among a set of possible alternatives or to the faculty of synthesis. Rather, it refers to the potentiality of a new beginning, the initiation of something different and the achievement of the unexpected. Moreover, dialogue, as a by-product of stimulation and freedom, involves an

element of disclosure. The free and contingent nature of dialogue reveals the deepest layers of each participant in his or her search for new understanding and articulation.<sup>17</sup>

Contingency and freedom, in the dialogical process, form a mutually generative relationship, with freedom resulting in contingency that by extension enhances the dialogical reward value of freedom.<sup>18</sup> To some extent, the contingent quality of dialogue allows participants to take into account unexpected requirements of the moment or indeterminate local circumstances, and to move from one activity or topic to another. The contingent qualities of time and space introduce into dialogue self-expanding opportunities.

In addition, the contingent qualities of dialogue endorse the exercise of an unconditioned self, which is free from both monological determination and all inherited, or environmental influences. Dialogue is sometimes no more than random interaction. If all one's communicative acts are determined by necessity or closely ordered, then one is not free. If one is held responsible for oneself, then some of one's communicative acts are ultimately not determined by those of others. Phrased alternatively, the event of freedom is partially responsible for one's immediate, contingent actions, but also for one's moral conduct and more fundamentally one's personal identity. (Arendt, 1961: 150-161)

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<sup>17</sup> Bakhtin expresses this view in the terms of *anacrisis*. *Anacrisis* is a way for invoking and stimulating the words and views of participants, compelling them to reveal their views as deepest part of their identity and manifest them straightway. (Bakhtin, 1997: 110-111)

<sup>18</sup> Agnes Heller formulates the two different types of contingency, which have an effect on the development of dialogue. The first type of contingency is "*cosmological contingency*." This variant prevents one to effectuate foundations for the universal *telos* or truth because there is no knowledge of the contingency. In other words, the question of freedom can no longer be responded to in a universal form, but only with reference to a subject. The second type of contingency is *sociohistorical* contingency. She describes this type of contingency as "the infinitude of our initial possibilities, freedom and nothingness, that makes modern men and women "tremble in their boots". With regard to social contingency, there is no "thing-in-itself. One knows that one has been thrown into freedom, that one's life has no pre-set destination that one is, or is supposed to be, the master of one's destiny. What one does not know is precisely one's destiny." (Heller, 1993: 223)

This brings us to the question of whether participants are bound by one another in producing ideas and views. From the participants' point of view, dialogue is a means for action, by virtue of which the self is expressed in difference. In dialogue, one experiences oneself in contradistinction to others, which in turn discloses the uniqueness of one's self-identity. Thus, in the contingent nature of dialogue, indeterminacy can appear as part of the inner feature of the dialogue between one and oneself and between one and others. (Richardson, Rogers and McCarroll, 1998: 496-515)

In the dialogical process, freedom is not equated with the capacity to pursue one's own ends, but with an agglomeration of possibilities, that has no necessary order: neither thought nor actions are destined to take one inevitable form. The actualization of freedom can be seen as one's contingent capacity "to call something into being which did not exist before, which was not given, not even as cognition or imagination, and which therefore strictly speaking, could not be known. (Arendt, 1977: 151 and cited in Tully, 1999: 164) Here, contingency means the absence of cause and predictability. It is significant not only as a functional element for freedom but also as an emergent new space where freedom is part of the reality of dialogue. To act freely means to be able to take new initiatives and to do the unforeseen, which all participants in dialogue are capable of by virtue of their participation.<sup>19</sup>

Freedom can find its full voice in a web of dialogical relations that is both an indeterminate and determinate play-space, which in turn constitutes oneself in a contingent and necessitated manner. This means that freedom is contingent upon the existence of dialogical spaces wherein both indeterminacy and self-determination can be

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<sup>19</sup> Rorty holds that truth only exists as a metaphoric quality of language in reference to time, place and sentences, which are the real regulator of the truth. These descriptions and sentences are strictly our products and therefore truth cannot be external to us. Thus, it would seem that truth exists in dependence to the human mind because if there are no sentences, there will be no truth. In essence, sentences are viewed as inseparable elements of historically contingent languages which in essence, are human inventions. (Rorty, 1979: 157-160)

exercised. Freedom as indeterminacy refers to communicative processes that are not yet shaped or conditioned by the blueprints of rhetoric or pre-assigned objectives. Dialogue is rhetorically indeterminate when its form and content offer no clear characterization of the particular situation to which it is addressed — i.e., *aporia*. The meaning of the freedom also is reflected in the idea of communicative power. Communicative power entails one's ability to frame, revise, pursue and protect their own conceptions of well-being without being obliged or impeded by others. It is the ability to act as an understanding and understandable being (i.e. self-determination). This means that freedom is not only contingent upon interactive space but also is developmental in the sense that “doing” or “deliberation” becomes a necessary condition for the realization of its meaning in public space. (Habermas 1996:147-149)

In both cases, freedom does not occur in isolation from others but rather in the context of interaction. However, in the course of interaction, one's determinations may obstruct the freedom of others, to the point that such interaction may in principle undermine indeterminate mode freedom. Thus, in order for freedom to be realized at both levels, a “dialogical space” must be formed wherein a unity is created for the exercise of both the contingent and self-determinative character of freedom. The constituting of a dialogue, which is a public space, is the act of a special kind of contract—not in a Hobbesian or Lockean sense wherein the people contract with a governmental authority for protecting their freedom, but in a positive sense of mutual initiation for recognition of free and equal status. In essence, I am referring to a mutual respect through which people are able to develop recognition of their free and equal status of one with another in the dialogical process for framing and pursuing one's own meanings, as one understands it. In other words, the primary function of the dialogical field is to act as a framework of mutual respect, which empowers and facilitates the relations between people, encourages



cooperation among them and abates opportunities for domination. (Habermas 1996: 418-419) Through dialogue people can organize, learn, and act with one another to construct the more complex democratic relationships, which are necessary for development of freedom to occur. The function of dialogue is not only to situate the communicative interaction for expression views and support them with reasons but also to initiate a sense of responsibility to listen a wide spectrum of views on subjects of concern. In other words, in the field of dialogue, each participant has a right, as well as a responsibility to be addresser and addressee. This means that they have taken turns reciprocally for talking and listening in order to take into account each other's views. In relation to this, a fair system of cooperation is developed as an awareness of interdependence and connection between free and equal individuals, living in a web of dialogical relationships people; when this web is extended to include all people, then the ideal community of communication is achieved. (Habermas 1990:201-202) In this sense, dialogue does not only represent a relationship of free and equal people who are free. It also implies that each individual possesses the capability to determine h/her own conceptions of h/herself or equal because each pursues h/her own conceptions equally. This idea is also consist with a sense of respect that is connected to the awareness of interconnection that every participant is contained within the dialogical community and thus deserving of equal treatment. It is this sense of the participants' understanding of respect that entails cooperation, and reciprocity (which is a fundamental prerequisite for dialogue), which is a basis for such a sense of respect and it, provides the foundation for the listening and addressing each other.

## 1.5. Conceptions of Dialogue

Dialogue, as a necessitated and contingent form of understanding, has multiple functional and instrumental notions with respect to both its structures and modes. (Bakhtin, 1997: 125) Functional and instrumental notions of dialogue serve democracy through the reconciliation of differences, the promotion of mutual respect, the cooperative pursuit of ends, or as Burbules aptly suggests: “the possibility of open, emphatic, critical engagement from which one can learn about others, about the world, and about oneself.” (Burbules, 2000: 252) All these functional and instrumental notions of dialogue depend on the way that dialogue is structured, or the way that dialogue moves, grows, develops and functions.

I will now turn my focus briefly on reviewing three conceptions of dialogue based on the way that dialogue is structured, or the way that dialogue moves, grows, develops and functions. These are regulative, truth-oriented and celebratory categories, each of which is informed by different structures and functions of dialogue.<sup>20</sup>

### *1.5.1. Regulative Dialogue*

The regulative dialogue embodies communicative action systems that are designed to achieve certain ends such as agreement. Therefore, it is constitutive of identities, norms and relations between those participated in communicative process. It has also coordinating character in that it builds shared regulatory norms as to communicative

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<sup>20</sup> There can be more than three type of dialogue if they are categorized according to the interplay rationalities of the participants and the goal that they are directed. For example, Walton describes eight type of dialogue: Critical discussion, debate, inquiry, negotiation, planning committee, pedagogical, quarrel and expert consultation. See Walton, 1990: 413. In fact, dialogues can be divided into more than eight types, if we consider different criteria for judging various aspects (participation, the use of language, power relations, creativity) of dialogue. In this context, we can categorize dialogues as fictional, open, closed, persuasive, dramatic, elitist, vernacular, verisimilitude, teaching, commentative, carnivalistic, expository, spontaneous, reasoned, historical, future oriented and momentous and so on.

relations and social practices, which then shapes the basis of communicative action. Therefore, it establishes operational categories that shift propositions to the context of regulation. It forms regulation in that produces shared understanding, common meanings for description of issues and acceptable appropriate responses. It has functional, coordinative and constitutive categories that are studied by Jurgen Habermas (Habermas (1984). According to Habermas, communicative action—which consists of the comprehensibility of the utterance, the truth of its propositional component, the correctness and appropriateness of its performatory component, authenticity of the speaking subject—involves a regulative model to guide communication, which is oriented toward the formation of a rational consensus and mutual understanding. (Habermas, 1973: 18) That model governs the interaction of participants who are capable of speech and action and who can follow validity conditionality (i.e. comprehensibility, truthfulness, rightness and truthfulness) claims in order to connect speech acts to mutual understanding and agreements. (Habermas 1991: 58-59 and Bernstein, 1983: 163) This model of communication can be called as regulative dialogue or what Habermas calls an “ideal speech situation.” Ideal speech situation, in turn, point to the notion of mutually recognized a validity claims that are constitutive for three basic types of speech acts: a claim to truth raised in constative speech acts, a claim to normative rightness raised in regulative speech acts, and a claim to truthfulness raised in expressive speech acts. The three aspects of validity claims, rightness of normative context, truth claim of evidential basis, truth claim of expression characterize different categories of a regulation embodied in speech acts. (Habermas 1991: 56-57) This means that regulative dialogue presupposes agreement about implicitly raised validity claims as background consensus because of common meaning of a situation. In order for any consensus to be regulative, each of the implicit validity claims must be acceptable by rational argumentation, open to questioning of assumptions, addressed by interlocutress free from inequality, coercion, and

domination. (Habermas, 1996c: 161). Rational argumentation is not only central to the legitimization but also regulative notion of dialogue. Regulation is coming to a common meaning of a subject or rule.

Focusing on mutually recognized validity claims as basis of regulation in the sphere of dialogue creates a situation for strong idealization of agreement in the dialogical situation. More specifically, these validity claims reflect the regulative functions of speech acts: (a) external nature: the interlocutors must make a true statement, or make correct truth claims (b) internal nature: interlocutors must be truthful in expressing their beliefs, intentions, feelings etc. and (c) society: interlocutors must perform a speech act that is “right” with respect to a given normative context. The dialogical processes by which different validity claims of speech acts are brought to a satisfactory resolution appeals to these three levels to set regulative basis (as common values, customs, roles and guidelines) for what constitutes the right or appropriate kind of action. (Held, 1980: 338) Valid are only those norms or procedures that meet (or can meet) the goal of common understanding, with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants of dialogue. (Habermas, 1996b: 296-99)

Regulative dialogue communication, which is oriented to achieving and sustaining, reviewing consensus, rests on the recognition of two conditions: equality and freedom. The first is equality. In this context, equality refers the equal rights of participants and equal respect for personal dignity. (Habermas, 1991: 200) This means that all participants have an equal voice in the decision-making process for equal consideration of their interests. All concerned agree upon whatever consensus emerges. The second condition concerns the freedom of all participants to accept or reject any proposal. Any proposal to be considered valid must meet the condition that all affected parties can freely accept the consequences and side effects of the consensus that is implemented. In essence, this

situation means that participants of dialogue should have continuous mutual reference to an agreed set of rules or meanings in order to strengthen the regulative quality of that exchange. (Habermas 1991:84-86)

Regulative dialogue requires coherent, consistent and persuasive arguments on the part of its participants, who each make his/her own case. The aim here is not to assess particular propositions simply in terms of whether they are true or false, but to discuss critically various propositions in order to establish consensus. Regulative dialogue represents a reflective communicative rationality or a process of inference. Every reasoned case can be inferred (i.e., justified or refused) by another reasoned case. (Habermas, 1996c: 188-189)

As a result, the proposal supported by the best arguments should not only prevail but can give rise to new ones.

Regulative dialogue has a pragmatist notion of discursive justification. This idea refers to the moral and political validation of the plurality of claims and differences among participants. In essence, regulative dialogue does not acknowledge differences without approving all differences as morally and politically valid. Regulative dialogue does not deny our embodied and embedded differences, but aims at developing moral capabilities and dispositions and encouraging transformations that can yield a point of view suitable to all. In regulative dialogue, difference serves as a starting point for reflection and action, but it must be settled rationally. (Habermas, 1996c: 121) Persuasion and agreement are necessary conditions for this settlement. (Habermas, 1996c: 194-195)

### *1.5.2. Truth-oriented Dialogue*

It is confrontational communication in that it exposes discrepancies, contradictions, rifts in meanings and understandings. It contains communicative means (i.e. rhetoric) to test

people and ideas, including one's own ideas. It begins with an interlocutor's claims. Once one interlocutor makes a claim, the other interlocutor tries to elicit further perspectives and proceeds to show that series of claim are inconsistent and contradictory. The result of truth-oriented dialogue, however, is not truth or definitive conclusions, but a kind of perplexity that allows the rise of new understanding. Therefore, truth-oriented dialogue can be described as the joint undertaking for proposing claims, opposing claims, formulating arguments and putting forth counter-arguments for discovery of the truth. It is the union of questioning and answering, which frees one from one's own particular limitations and situations through the invention, and reinvention of one's self-understanding. Hence, truth-oriented dialogue is a way of drawing forth latent, unformed understandings and facilitating the discovery of truths.

The concept of truth-oriented dialogues is represented by Socratic dialogues. (Bakhtin, 1997: 110) Socratic dialogues contains distinctive mode of inquiry for the truth. At the heart of this inquiry is questioning and this questioning is initialized with question of "What is it?" A Socratic question is answered by a definition or *logos*, an account that says what for example Justice, or for any property X, what X is. In relation to questioning, truth-oriented dialogue embodies means of dialectical for serving to justify or refute viewpoints. It also contains ongoing argumentation in which each participant uses reason or logic in order to persuade one another. Each participant puts forward his or her case, offering accurate or appropriate support for conclusions. This happens in the pattern of claim, reasoning and counter-claim, which lead toward a kind of new understanding or knowing. This new understanding plays a positive role in the dialogue; it forms the heart of and guide for the communicative process in the form of the central paradoxes of the dialogue.

Truth-oriented dialogue is preoccupied with the force of the inductive arguments. The better argument is the entral effect to refute, clarify, or support moral definition of truth. Moral truth, in the practical concerns of political life, is a question of confronting public failings and limitations or of reconciling and combining opposites. Truth-oriented dialogue is a critical scrutiny of the moral truth for demonstrating one trying to offer the general definition that one does not know about what justice is and therefore cannot justify particular actions for everybody. The inductive arguments are not deductions from particulars to a generalization, but deduction from one proposition or a set of coordinate propositions to an acceptable proposition, to another coordinate proposition, or through a more acceptable proposition to another coordinate proposition. In such an inductive argumentation, action of proposed meanings and counter-proposals would go on until a satisfactory response was found.

The chief part of truth oriented dialogues are “rational accounts” which examine or justify beliefs or theories. Here justification is characterized as giving a rational account of the belief. Nevertheless, the justification of a certain belief can never be final, as it is always conditioned. Paradoxically, the dialogue must remain unsatisfactory (i.e., non-final) in order to remain dialogical (i.e., open). A final and universal justification of something is empirically and logically impossible in truth-oriented dialogue, because when such a justification is made the basis for having a dialogue no longer exists. Justification, then, is thought of as something that is always out of the reach of the participants. Nevertheless, at the same time, the participants must presuppose its possibility in order for dialogue to succeed. This suggests the truth should be seen as an ever-receding horizon of dialogue.

### 1.5.3. *Celebratory Dialogue*

Celebratory dialogue is a concept associated with Bakhtin's observations on the groundbreaking communicative vitality of the carnival. According to this scholar, to celebrate in the space of carnival means to participate in dialogue—to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue, people participate wholly and throughout their whole way of life. (Bakhtin, 1997: 279) *Carnival* is the open-ended dialogue and by its very nature is an interactive “live event” played out at a point of dialogical meeting among multiple actions. In this sense, it is promotes a type of freedom. In promoting a sense of freedom, liberation, and creativity, carnival's celebratory dialogue satirically and paradoxically undermined the formal, the abstract, the ideological, and the spiritual and released people temporarily from official restraints. In giving expression to the world turned upside down theme of celebratory dialogue, participants engaged in many forms of criticism in erasing old hierarchies, producing new equalities. It has been noted. (Bakhtin, 1984: 10) that the erase of hierarchy had especially profound effects, as it allowed “free and familiar contact” between people otherwise completely separated by social designation.

[S]uch free, familiar contacts were deeply felt and formed an essential element of the life of the carnival spirit. People were, so to speak, reborn for new, purely human relations. These truly human relations were not only a fruit of imagination or abstract thought; they were experienced. The utopian ideal and the realistic merged in this carnival experience, unique of its kind.

Bakhtin elucidates the significance of carnival to illuminate the celebratory dialogue not as dyadic, much less a binary phenomenon but as a manifold phenomenon that allows for unusual combinations: “the sacred with the profane, the lofty with the low, the great with the insignificant, the wise with the stupid.” Bakhtin (1997:132) suggest:



Folk-carnival “debates” between life and death, darkness and light, winter and summer, etc., permeated with the pathos of change and the joyful relativity of all things, debates which did not permit thought to stop and congeal in a one-sided seriousness or in a stupid fetish for definition or singleness of meaning.

In this context, celebratory dialogue represents a way of challenging hierarchies existing in religious, political, and moral values, norms, and prohibitions. It brings a critical spirit, instead of strictly maintained hierarchy of official culture. It tries to reflect absolute equality and means for promoting empathy and understanding among the diversity of voices. It is a mode of mutual examination, a therapeutic engagement of self- and other-exploration; and a basis for shaping uncoerced social and political conditions for freeing human consciousness, thought, and imagination for new potentialities. (Bakhtin, 1984: 10) It prepares the way for social political and cultural change without creating divisions between performers and spectators because its participants do not watch but *live* in it. (Bakhtin, 1997: 122 and 1984: 7) It creates change not with mechanical or rhetorical use of language but through parody and satire. Therefore, it is language free from a presupposed truthfulness of values. It does not distinguish between virtues and vice. Its discourses are comprised of contrasts—of virtues and non-virtues that are both free and enslaved. It does not have end but it is end in itself. It defies the sources of power by ridiculing truths and teasing authorities, and in such a way makes the political life closer and more familiar while it shakes conventions of social life.

It has indirect, ironic language use and discourse that combines the new with the old, death with birth; end with beginning. (Bakhtin, 1981: 75) Its indirect discourse is double-voiced, at least insofar as one discourse represents another’s discourse with two or more different response. Embracing double voiced-ness, celebratory dialogue resides in a system of multiplicity in which a meaning simultaneously stands two different, and opposite, things within a particular narration. Celebratory dialogue is a dialogized

heteroglossia in and of itself, but it also can qualify, or be qualified by, other forms of diversity of voices such as polyphony. Hence, celebratory dialogue is stripped of its universal elements, thereby exactly gains its deepest significances and becomes particular the situation of a communication in which the myriad responses one might make at any particular point, but any one of responses can not easily be framed in one a specific discourse. Celebratory dialogue is a way of communication made up of a roiling mass of languages, each of which has its own distinct signs. Thus, it does not participate in a unitary ideological voice in a multitude of discourses. Celebratory dialogue could only be understood as an active responsibility that calls for an active listening to each voice from the perspective of the others. Its rationale evolves around the test and provocation of ideas while it interrogates *ready-made truths* as the official voice of established beliefs. In doing so, it allows free and familiar contact between people otherwise completely separated by social designation. (Bakhtin 1984:10) It does not lead to definite conclusions; it only liberates participants from existing viewpoints, conventions and established truths, from all that is traditional and universally accepted. It represents the rise of a new spirit of ambivalence. (Bakhtin, 1997: 126) Its revitalizing spirit sanctifies freedom as creativity and frees people to have a new outlook on existing social and political relations and to experience a completely new order of things.

Celebratory dialogue is guided by freedom from rhetoric and the reasoned and mechanized process of action. It refers to a means to an end but also a medium through which participants discover their own meanings, either by contrast or by appropriating the meaning of others. It represents a kind of self-governing practice, a free move in the game whose rules are contingent rather than necessary. It gives voice to the other as it exposes differences and overcomes fears. It is an open-ended, personal and public practice that celebrates other ways of knowing, doing and being, thereby upsetting the

status quo and promoting a robust and multi-vocalic communication of the independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses. (Bakhtin, 1997: 124)

## **1.6. Conclusion**

In the chapter I have argued that dialogue is not only a communicative engagement of two (or more) persons, but of people with understandings, languages and rules that shape the particular ways in which dialogue functions. This means that dialogue is active in the multiplicity of communicative forms that are situated in relational, material and imaginary circumstances. These multiplicities of communicative forms of dialogue not only refer to the matters of choice but also to an externality that impinges upon the dialogical relation in ways that may extent or empower or limit communication in the terms of freedom, diversity, co-existence and understanding.

Dialogue has multiple moments within communicative process, some inevitably convergent toward agreement and understanding, others transgressive and dispersive. Indeed, once one starts thinking of dialogue in such terms, the more difficult it is to maintain the dyadic character of dialogue as an either/or scenario. For in any ongoing dialogue, all of these moments may recur, with no particular one defining dialogue as such. In this sense, dialogue is a thing in itself as well as an end for itself. It is not only a constitutive force for unity through mutual understanding but also an occasion for discovering differences as instances of diverse values, points of view and contingently emerged understandings. It is a tool or means for the achievement of the purposes that are valued by the participants. Dialogue helps constructs mutual points of interest that can be both contingently and determinedly evolved.

The assumptions of the participants with different values/ends about the nature of dialogue may have determinative or contingent effects upon the form and tone of the dialogue itself. These assumptions may indeed lead to the institutionalization of different models of dialogue in a society. Once institutionalized, the determined or contingently emerged form and tone of the dialogue creates a context in which different judgments and understandings often play central roles. Concerning this, there are three major models of dialogue with different characteristics, reflected by their orientation to the communicative process. These are regulatory model, truth-oriented model and the celebratory model.

The regulatory model of dialogue emphasizes the communicative mode of resolution or dissolution of differences, and privileges an inclusive capacity for the co-construction of a mutual understanding or consensus. The truth-oriented dialogue emphasizes the search for the truth that can be discovered between participants with different perspectives. Therefore, these two are purpose-oriented. Celebratory dialogue differs from these two by emphasizing or celebrating differences. Therefore, celebratory dialogue is not guided by any pre-given purpose to realize other than the dialogue itself. In this sense, it brings forward the critical and constitutive potentiality of differences by leaving the boundaries of dialogue open and creating a capacity for continuing and expanding the communication process through the inclusion of multiple voices and perspectives that allows questioning of the very terms and assumptions of the dialogue and its direction at any time.

At this point it must be stressed that differences not only exist as an internal feature of the dialogue or as the consequence of the relationship between the self and the other, but also they emerge as unexplored and unrecognized possibilities, (for example, the possibility of tolerance may dialogically be connected to the possibility of intolerance

because intolerance dialogically provides normative criteria for identifying what should not be tolerated. In other words, by specifying what should not be tolerated, intolerance invokes its “opposite” as a difference that is part of its own notion or identity. (Laclau, 1996: 50-51) Nevertheless differences may exceed dialogical categories of language and hence understanding, challenging the fixity of them in ways that mystify conventional meanings and assumptions. Furthermore, differences can also be characterized by their resistance to governing views and their persistent refusal to allow themselves to be identified with the dominant conventional points of view. (Burbules, 2000: 261))

In each of these three means, differences pose a fundamental challenge to the purposes of the regulatory dialogue and the truth-oriented dialogue that are directed to achieving mutual understanding, agreement or consensus around the idea of reconciliation and truth. In its own way, each mode is a repudiation of convergent models of discourse generally, and each, in its own way, resists the categorical characterization of diversity.

In this context, I have argued that instead of bringing differences under control, dialogue has to be open towards explorations and thereby the celebration of differences because not only is the self socially and historically formed but also comes into existence in and through dialogue. Dialogue, as a communicative relation requires engagement with the other voice or coming to know the self through its relation to the other voice. Therefore, the concept of celebration of differences is not a euphemism but a central aspect of the self-understanding and self-recognition. In encountering different voices and divergent ideas as compared to his/her own, each participant can develop new understandings and conceptions of the self. It is in recognition of the other that one becomes able to see greater possibilities within his/her self. Understanding comes through dialogical relationship and recognition of the other that in turn facilitate the dialogue itself.

## **CHAPTER II. LANGUAGE, DIALOGUE AND DEMOCRACY**

### **II.1. Introduction**

Conception of democracy do not refer abstract system of normative forms, its meaning is never fixed. The meaning of democracy is always various and open-ended. There are constant relations between language, thought and action. Language shapes the thought and bring into being through action. This means that the meaning of democracy is not 'out there' to be discovered but always produced and reproduced through language and bring to practice through language. Language is medium to instantiate democratic perspectives and judgments that intimately tied various social structures, histories, cultures and ideologies. Therefore, meaning of democracy with use of language will vary in context in which it is used with different type of speech acts and put into practice in different speech communities. Moreover, the meanings of democracy dialogically constructed through communicative interactions even if dialogue with text or with in thought. Furthermore, language is public resource: in one's own use of term of democracy, one cannot run away the usages and meanings that have been produced by it others. All use of language is intimately related to power because all words bear the taste of context in which they are used. This means that linguistic context firstly govern the way that concept of democracy can be grasped and interpreted because it constitutes symbolic systems of order and representation.

In this context, this chapter will give basic outline theory of language, including some of the principal divisions around philosophy of language. It will suggest how the conception of democracy could be explored in linguistic context and where Bakhtin's philosophy of language could provide frame for elucidating recognizable phenomenon of language. So first part this chapter will give brief outline of language theory. Third both consider Bakhtin's and Habermas theories of language to show that how they might be

constructive for forming language of democracy. This discussion is two-fold. First, I compare Bakhtin's theory of language with that of the structuralists. Second, I discuss how Bakhtin's theory of dialogue can be considered in relation to Habermas's theory of communicative action. It will be argued that Bakhtin's theory represents a more radical and critical paradigm of dialogue in relation to the very notion of freedom. In relation to this view, the final part of this chapter together major threads and suggests that direction for construction of language of democracy.

## **II.2. Language, Dialogue and Democracy**

The theory of dialogical democracy is guided by a simple idea that human interaction is fundamentally dialogical. (Clarke and Holoquist, 1984: 6) This statement encompasses the inclusion of an addresser and addressee as well as the relation between the two and all is rooted in language. It is language that produces realities, the medium by which one understands phenomena and structures experience and knowledge of the world. In other words, existence can never be divorced from language, as linguistic representations locate one's understanding or oneself in language. Language itself is produced by a particular set of social relations that obtains at a certain time and place. It is never neutral or ideologically free, but designed to convey particular kinds of knowledge to achieve certain effects. As linguistic and therefore dialogical beings, people cannot step outside language and look at the world from an objective standpoint.

If one argues that language shapes people's understanding of their surroundings, one can also argue that democracy derives and develops from the dense and interactive network of social representations and language systems, which are themselves impelled to linguistic and dialogical activity expressive of various forms of life with the reflection of

oneself.<sup>21</sup> It is through the process of acquiring language that democracy is realized or immersed into the political culture. However, the view of language as dialogical practice should not conclude that democracy is nothing but language, even though our understanding of democracy is certainly mediated through a linguistic conceptual framework. Language operates as discourse and content within social contexts. In short, language does not represent democracy, but makes sense of it as representations.

Democracy, then, is a linguistic and dialogical activity, a system of representation that has developed socially and politically to communicate individually and collectively on specific issues, and it functions as a context of collective decisions that form an integral part of the linguistic patterns people use to represent their experiences. Therefore, this conception regards people as communicative agents who are caught up in a combination of social identities, or of subject and object positions constructed in advance in language, functioning as reflective dimensions of being as event. (Bakhtin, 1986: 169)

Nevertheless, linguistic action is not fixed to a single system of understandings that aims at a minimum level of comprehension. Instead, it is part of an ever-evolving, ever-changing nexus of subjective truths and value judgments that represent the plural and dialogical quality of the self. Bakhtin sees the plurality of the self as a struggle between a unitary language and heteroglossia, between stasis and uniformity and between change and diversity. This shows that linguistic processes are intimately related to political relations because politics remains the site of struggle between unitary language and

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<sup>21</sup> Hegel holds a similar view. According to him, the world is the object of knowledge of understanding as well as the product of understanding. Hegel's world is articulated in terms of three inseparable and organically united moments. First, he emphasizes the abstract distinction between experience-knowledge and object. This distinction depends upon a moment of observation that consciousness discerns as a thing that relates to itself. The second moment refers to a constructive aspect of the interrelationship between itself and the object, which is indeed the unification - also called the consciousness of the object or 'being for another' or knowledge. Third, while consciousness engages objects in term, it is in fact only engaged in itself, the consciousness of itself. This is the consciousness of 'being in itself.' Therefore, consciousness encompasses both the object and itself, i.e. the *spirit*. Since consciousness incorporates, what the world is and the knowledge of this world the unification of being-for-another and being-in-itself as oneness is the fundamental feature amongst the moments of consciousness itself. (Hegel, 1977: 79-80)



heteroglossia. The dominant discourse, class or ideology function as unitary forces of language to make society and people homogeneous; secondary views as forces of heteroglossia, on the other hand, strive for difference, for liberation from the dominant forces.

For Bakhtin, two forces, centripetal and centrifugal, come into play whenever language is utilized. The centripetal force of language tends to push toward a unifying direction, toward a single frame of reference that every member of society employs. In contrast, the centrifugal force of language tends to push toward difference, decentralization and multiplicity. The tension between the two allows language to be both a determined and determining element, as historical, political and social conditions of people change, as social groups modify, or oppose certain meanings and ways of experience.

The view that language is fundamentally a construction of meaning with which people make sense of their world is built on power relations between centripetal and centrifugal forces. The close connection between language and power suggests that democracy is connected to the heteroglossia of language, which resists a unity of meanings as truth for everybody. For Bakhtin, the promotion of a unitary language leads to a homogenous society or authoritarianism, constituted by fixed identities.

### **II.3. The Language of Democracy**

Bakhtin does not consider language an objective structure that is independent of its users. Rather, he considers it a dialogical and social practice active in time and space primarily because it is used in concrete and particular circumstances. In relation to this conception, Bakhtin proposes to study language as dialogical chain of utterances that are situated not only within the framing context of their interrelations with other utterances but also

within extraverbal contexts of situation, setting and history. As expressed as unit of speech communication and located in dialogical chain, utterances are determined by change of communicative agents who can be both the author (addresser) and the addressee from whom the author anticipate a reply. (Bakhtin 1986: 71) The addresser is in active position in which one directly refers semantic content of utterance. (Bakhtin 1986: 90) In addition, both the addresser and addressee also express an understanding toward the semantic content of the utterance. (Bakhtin 1986: 84) The understanding of the utterance catches the general and specific meaning of the utterance. According to Bakhtin, a general sense of utterances can be caught by traditional studies of language as a system (such as linguistics) but a specific sense of language can only be caught in the context of a particular situation, setting and history, which is extralinguistic or metalinguistic. (Bakhtin 1986: 85-86) Therefore, for Bakhtin, utterances, distinct from sentences, are associated directly or extra-verbally to the contexts. In other words, they cannot exist in isolation from the world that they are part. (Bakhtin, 1986: 73-74)

Central to Bakhtin's emphasis of the utterance is the dialogical connection between language and personal and impersonal context. On the one hand, language does not directly reflect the world, but is a system of representation by which the world is perceived. On the other hand, language is produced by a particular set of social relations that obtains at a certain time and place. Dialogues with different contexts produce different meanings. A language comes to represent the social world by virtue of the context in which people use to refer to it. Put simply, language is the production of knowledge through context.

Dialogue as interaction between language and context links language with the social and thus, it foregrounds the understanding of language as a system of meanings conditioned by the signifying practices of culture. All values, beliefs, assumptions and background

knowledge people use to understand relations in time and space dialogically shape the social world. As language is a determining practice of the social world, dialogues form an integral part of the linguistic patterns people use to represent their experience. Communication implies one and the other, with the potential for effect.

Not surprisingly then, Bakhtin considers the structural theory of language problematic, because it describes language as a unity independent of actual use in terms of social relations and polyglossia as another's speech in another's language.

Structuralists assert an ordered relation between the signifying practices of language and the production and reproduction of meaning, seeking to discover the underlying system or deep structures, by which meaning is manifested (or determined) in the surface structures of communication. As such, structuralists tend to place language outside context. They over-emphasize individual linguistic elements (i.e., words or sentences) at the expense of the multiplicity of meanings. Conversely, Bakhtin argues that language is dialogical and composed of social-verbal interactions. He also asserts that the interactive nature of language consists of social and political structures. Language is not conceived of as a closed and abstract system but as a dialogical system. This dialogical system, takes place in two ways: initially, it would take place within the people themselves as they contextualize through understanding their own interpretation of concrete and particular circumstances. Secondly, it occurs between people who use utterances for communication purposes. Therefore, it is internal (between an earlier and a later self), external (between two different people), or internal (in self or between an earlier and a later self).

The basic units of this dialogical system of language are utterances. (Bakhtin, 1986: 71)  
Utterances represent a number of aspects: a referential aspect toward meaning or the

subject matter, an expressive aspect toward meaning or the subject matter and a responsive aspect in relation to other utterances. (Bakhtin, 1986: 73) The surrounding context of an utterance includes both the speaker and listener. The speaker makes an utterance, bearing in mind his or her listener. The listener responds accordingly. The specific sense of the utterances is made only in connection with the particular context of the exchange.

The listener to whom the speaker addresses is also the author of other utterances preceding and succeeding the particular exchange. The listener is an active participant in a dialogical chain of utterances, for whom the utterance is assembled in expectation of a response, which in turn elicits a further response. (Bakhtin, 1986: 74) Therefore, each speaker constructs each utterance not only in response to a particular meaning or subject matter, expressing a position toward that meaning or subject matter, but also to worldviews and conceptualizations. In the process, each utterance shapes another. In the cases of utterances, language exists for people not as a closed, abstract system, but as “use”; that is a play of double voices with many meanings. This is the notion that Bakhtin calls heteroglossia. This term refers to a multiplicity of languages and discourses that are all in operation in everyday life. It contains the multiplicity of social speech, or rhetorical modes, dialects, idiolects, and jargons that people use in the course of their daily lives. (Bakhtin 1981: 324) For this reason, in Bakhtin’s conceptualization, there is no one abstract system of language that has representation over all the others. In essence, he regards language as a living complex of systems of social worlds that is constantly in dialogue with other social worlds, determined by and simultaneously determining them.

Bakhtin often uses the term discourse to describe this living system of social worlds that is active in and through language. Discourse refers to the regular, systematic, coherent and historically specific ways of using language. It inscribes meanings and identities to

utterances from many social worlds. Utterances convey meaning by virtue of discourse. Contingently, discourses impose a regulative relation over the interactive use of utterances. Through this relation, each use of language becomes not reflexive but referential. (Bakhtin, 1986: 73-74) With this referential usage, language contains speech genres, which are normative, political, and ideological givens. Genres are common ways of utilizing language. They are not created by an individual speaker but instead are repeated subsystems of communication. They are a form of an internalized web of discourses, a complex system of means and memories that facilitate communication between one's own and the other. It is especially important here to draw attention to Bakhtin differentiation of speech genres between primary (simple) and secondary (complex). (Bakhtin 1986: 61-65) In Bakhtin's view, primary speech genres refer to daily expression or social languages that are used by an academician, a farmer or any other person practicing a specific profession. Secondary speech signifies highly developed and organized communication and it becomes visible in literary works.

The difference between primary and secondary genres is important because interrelations between language and discourse is revealed and defined through functionality of both types. This inter-relation with the functionality of both types of speech genres is characterized by an organizational closure but it remains open to structural variation and differentiation. From this vantage point, the languages and identities of communicative agents are always on the interactive edge between unity and differentiation on one hand or the flux between connectedness and separateness on the other hand.

#### **II.4. Dialogue and Ideal Speech Situation**

Bakhtin's language theories focus primarily on the notion of dialogism, and on the view that language—any form of speech or writing—is always a dialogue. This dialogical

notion of language is not identical to Habermas's idea of language, although it is similar in that it focuses on the idea of the social and historical nature of language, and the idea of context as inherent within it. Bakhtin's dialogical view of language consists of three elements: a speaker, a listener/respondent, and a dialogical relation that occurs within oneself and between the two. Language (and what language says—ideas, characters, forms of truth, for example) is always both external (between two different people) and internal (between an earlier and a later self) and is thus the product of the interactions between selves and between two or more people. Bakhtin contrasts that notion of the dialogical character of language to the idea of monologic, which is a use of language that comes from a single, unified source.

Habermas was aware of Bakhtin's study and of dialogical theories in general but he does not adopt nor endorse a dialogical view of language. His approach differs from the celebratory tradition ascribed to Bakhtin which values heteroglossia and which inherently reveals the complex and inevitable interaction of languages. Habermas is more concerned with the system and structures of languages as they are expressed in different language usages. He tries to define qualities and situations that are supposed to be immanent in speech. Habermas is particularly focused on the ideal speech situation as representative of ideal conditions of dialogue. The ideal speech situation is the method, or the group of methods and communicative processes that fundamentally enable people to engage in undistorted communication. This method of communication entails a rational and critical examination of claims and which looks forward to bring consensus about the good life and creation of universal.<sup>22</sup> An ideal speech situation is a form of communicative action through which people can rationally assess the quality of language for rightness and

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<sup>22</sup> Habermas defines the situation of the ideal speech as something that is "neither an empirical phenomenon nor simply a construct, but a reciprocal supposition unavoidable in discourse... It is a fiction, which is operatively effective in communication. I would therefore prefer to speak of an anticipation of an ideal speech situation... It is a critical standard against which every actually realized consensus can be called into question and tested." (Habermas 1975: 258 and 1996b: 56-57)

truthfulness (i.e. sincerity). (Habermas, 1996c: 127-131) From this perspective, any form of language is part of validity claims or the effort to make language acceptable by all. According to Habermas, only those views that meet with the consent of all, as participants in a reasoned exchange can be declared valid. (Habermas, 1996: 235) In this context, there are three general characteristics that must exist for ideal speech situation: the logic, the dialectic and the rhetoric. (Habermas, 1990: 86-94) The logic of ideal speech situation represents the outcome of critical exchange. The dialectic represents procedures through which free, equal participation is guaranteed, and strategic elements that might guide communicative action are discouraged. The rhetoric represents the level of exchange at which different participants overcome their self-interests in recognition of their shared world.

Similarly, Bakhtin views dialogue as the key to existence that permits a multiplicity of social voices and wide variety of their links and interrelationships through use of language. Bakhtin draws a sharp line between dialogue (which is active and expressive communication between a speaker, a listener/respondent, and a relation between the two) and monologue (which is passive and one-sided communication, expressed by single entity organization). He sees dialogue as operation of multiplicity of languages between people. Bakhtin conceives of dialogue with the collection of all the forms of languages, social speech, or rhetorical modes that people use in the course of communication between one another. He sees dialogue as value not virtue of consequences it engenders or to rules that it applies but to a state of affairs that it conveys. These states of affairs do not contain a system of norms, of one standard language, or an “official” language that everyone would have to speak (and which would then be enforced by various mechanisms but viewed as heteroglossia or a move toward a multiplicity of meanings

with the inclusion of a wide variety of different ways of speaking, different rhetorical strategies and vocabularies.

Bakhtin emphasizes two forces in operation whenever dialogue is manifested between one another: centripetal force of language and centrifugal force of language. A centripetal force of language (tends to push toward a central point; a centrifugal force of language tends to push meanings away from a central point and out into all directions. In other words, dialogue is a communicative realm where centripetal and centrifugal forces of language collide. (Bakhtin 1981: 426, 428) This notion of dialogue is not the same as the Habermasian notion of a consensus/truth oriented view of an ideal speech situation, though it is similar in focusing on the idea of the social nature of communication, and the idea of struggle inherent within. In Bakhtin's view, dialogue contains a more emergent or spontaneous image of dialogical existence, a sort of "carnivalistic" existence. In this situation, there is an "antitbody" residing within multiplicity of voices, a diversity of meanings. Its purpose is not to test one's own position against those of others and persuade them to adopt it, but to express, juxtapose and negotiate the differences toward a better understanding of self and the other. (Gardiner, 1992: 139-140) In contrast to Bakhtin's views, Habermas supposes that people are rational beings, and that their communications are governed above all by the principle of non-contradiction. It is easy today to regard the term rational as a concept that refers to a close relation between judgment and existence—hence as a communicative technique, where the power of judgment is employed. In an ideal speech situation, the affirmation of reason, and the evaluation of other people's language succeed. A Bakhtinian conception of dialogue, for its existence and the grace of its self-reflexivity, requires authentic pluralism not judgment. It requires a willingness to go beyond categories of logic and concepts of rhetoric.



Moreover, in contrast to Habermas's appeal of the functioning role logic plays for conformity of and for an ideal speech situation, Bakhtin appeals to dialogue itself because he believes that rules of conformity of any kind cancel the very value of dialogue since dialogue is rooted in provoking relationships of language and selves. Any type of rule and procedure depersonalizes dialogical interaction with its artificial and static concepts. Bakhtin states: "Take a dialogue and remove the voices (the partitioning of voices), remove the intonations (emotional and individualizing ones), carve out abstract concepts of judgments from living words and responses, cram everything into one abstract consciousness—and that's how you get dialectics." (Bakhtin, 1986: 147)

For Bakhtin, the plurality of different perspectives must be brought into dialogue. Each view expressed reflects freely and openly distinct feelings experiences and feelings. Therefore, Bakhtin (1986: 84-86) suggests:

Any utterance is a link in the chain of communication. It is the active position of the speaker in one referentially semantic sphere or another. Therefore, each utterance is characterized primarily by a particular referentially semantic content... This is the first aspect of the utterance that determines its compositional stylistic and features. The second aspect... is the *expressive aspect*, that is, the speaker's subjective emotional evaluation of the relation semantic content of his utterance... There can be no such things as an absolutely neutral utterance. The speaker's evaluative attitude toward the subject of his speech (regardless of what it may be) also determines the choice of lexical, grammatical, and compositional means of the utterance... One of the means of expressing the speaker's emotionally evaluative attitude toward the subject of his speech is expressive intonation, which resounds clearly in oral speech...

Therefore, the dialogical expression of each view has specific characteristics. In this context, each view cannot be reduced to the purely logical (even if dialectical) or to the purely linguistic (compositional-syntactic). Dialogic relations of views are expressive relations among utterances. If expressions of sentences or utterances are placed side by

side on a semantic plane (not as objects and not as linguistic examples), they initiate expressive aspects of dialogic relations. (Bakhtin, 1986: 117)

Another difference between Bakhtin's theory of dialogism and Habermas's notion of communicative action is the idea of argument. Bakhtin treats arguments as representative of speech genres, styles and modes of delivery. They are not only utterances specific to arguers, but also generic forms learned from others. (Bakhtin, 1986: 60) He therefore considers the structure of arguments, both at the level of discourse analysis and at the level of the individual participant's point of view. At the both level, his analysis focuses a theory of language in use. Through this focus, Bakhtin sees language not abstract system of normative forms that needs to be discovered but constructed dialogical relations, utterances and selves. Thus, reference of arguments are always multiple and unlimited. Meaning of arguments will be various with context in which they are expressed with different utterances and with different participants. Further, language is open resource: in one's arguments, one cannot escape language usages or speech genres that have been formed made by others. All arguments bear the flavor of commonness and uniqueness, unity and distinction and sameness and difference.

In contrast to Bakhtin's view, Habermas views on arguments and his comments on speech acts and the concept of truth are very systematic and well organized. he introduces the concept of validity claims as an alternative to Bakhtin's notion of dialogicality conditions for arguments. Habermas argues that each argument raises the three validity claims of understandability, claims to truth, normative rightness and expressive truthfulness. Then, he proposes classification and systematization of arguments depending on which is the major validity claim. (Habermas, 1991: 137; Held, 1980: 338) He suggests that in making argument, interlocutors at least implicitly raise these three types of argumentation: claims to truth, normative rightness, and sincerity or

truthfulness. These three types of arguments, in turn, point to the notion of an ideal speech situation freed from all external constraints and in which nothing but the force of the better argument prevails. In an ideal speech situation, any argument considered valid must meet the conditions of reasoned exchange (i.e. discourse ethics). Discourse ethics represents an attempt to formulate this counterfactual ideal as a constitutive rule of argument for dialogical communication: norms of communicative action are only legitimate if, when challenged, they could be justified in a dialogical communication and this dialogical provide a formal procedural model of communication in the sense that it lays out the conditions that disallow particularistic interests from skewing the ideal speech situation. In addition, instead of laying out any substantive norms, dialogical communication also incorporates norms and maxims, which must be met if it is to be valid instead. (Habermas, 1991: 196-198) The main debates about his assumptions structure of arguments have focused on systematization and organization of validity claims and discourse ethics at times forces argumentative phenomena into pre-established categories, which do not create big room for seeing dialogical nuances and details of arguments. As far as argumentation process is concerned the need to bring dialogical open-endedness of utterances into the picture (and, hence, the need for an adequate explanation of what arguments is) can hardly be challenged. In addition, his systematization of theories of argumentation in relation to the types of validity claims offers a systemic theory of communicative action and discourse ethics.

Ideal Speech Situation is a situation of symmetrical free speech in which all participants have an equal chance to employ speech acts. This means communication free from distortion and coercion. The conditions for an ideal speech situation refer to both linguistic and material circumstances expressed by discourse ethics. Discourse ethics is expressed in a theory of universalizability, parallel to the categorical imperative of Kant,

which is aimed to function as a principle of rational argumentation for testing the rightness of contested norms. (Habermas, 1990: 65) Rational argumentation, which is only produced through free and open exchange, involves two lines of communication, communicative action and strategic action (Habermas, 1979: 209). Strategic Communication—is purposive-rational and end oriented. It acknowledges no equal respect and communication can only be indirectly conditional from indicators to determination. It is a sub-species of purposive-rational action or instrumental rationality by which participants regard each other as means for reaching particular ends

In contrast to strategic action, communicative action constitutes an independent and distinct type of *telos* that is not directly expressed or realized by interlocutors. It involves reaching equal respect and mutual understanding about something in the world. Thus, while strategic action is teleological or goal-oriented in a broad sense, in the communicative action is deontological. In the character of deontology, In acting communicatively, individuals more or less naively accept as valid the various claims raised with their utterance and mutually suppose that each is prepared to provide reasons for them should their validity be questioned. In other words, interlocutors tied more specifically to moral principles theory in two senses. They assume the priority of the right over the good. Their basic moral principle is specified in a way that they do not presuppose a specific conception of the good life since that would violate the very teleological character of communicative action. In a further sense, the distinction between strategic and communication is distinction between deontological and teleological presumptions. This is closely related to Kant's distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. In this regard, Habermas argues for morality (discourse ethics) that consists of categorical imperatives (imperatives that do not require non-reason-based interests or desires). In ideal speech theory in connection to the discourse ethics,

Habermas accounts for the obligatory character of moral norms in terms of their relation to communicative action: valid norms are morally binding because of their intimate connection with processes of reasoning (Habermas, 1983: 109; 1990: 83-85).

Unlike Habermas, Bakhtin does not offer strong sense of deontological theory, nor does he delineate communicative action along reasoning. It breaks with Habermas two-action model (strategic/communicative) and differentiates exclusively monological interpretation of the moralistic version of the principle of universalizability in favour of a carnival. Carnival Situation—is neither a deontological phenomenon nor simply a construct, but a freedom unavoidable in dialogue. It is a ‘fiction’ which is operatively effective in communication. It is a situation of free action in which all participants have an equal chance to employ their independent acts. This means interaction free from discourse ethics in which all the participants have a rational and agreement on effective rule of morality. The conditions for a carnivalistic situation are not linguistic in character, but rather social and material conditions. Bakhtin’s carnival situation can be seen autonomous communication among self-directed, responsible individuals

In contrast to Bakhtin’s understanding of language and dialogue, Habermas theory of communicative action implies a very sense sense of rationality. For this scholar, dialogue cannot develop appropriately without reference to validity claims, without consideration of social facts, norms, beliefs and openness, without commitment to free and equal participation. (Habermas, 1991:58-59) Habermas’s account of dialogue has an objective force since it is derived from the fundamental presuppositions of rationalism. In this sense, his understanding constitutes a goal for discursive communication rather than a description of what dialogue entails, or what Bakhtin might call the exception. Even if Habermas’s characterizations of reasoning are too limited to preserve social and historical

specificity, the objective force of his claim stands: to communicate genuinely, one must achieve some sense of critical distance from one's own position.

In defining rationalism so broadly and failing to provide a specific description of validity, Bakhtin is certainly open to a greater degree of freedom. If rationality refers to different meanings in different contexts, there is no common basis for the resolution of differences. In that case, two different ideas about an issue may be incommensurable with no decisive factor to give one proposal priority over the other. Be that as it may, Bakhtin's direction of dialogue is optimistic because it emphasizes openness and freedom through which development may occur. Bakhtin recognizes more space for free movement toward creativity, whatever that conception may incorporate. He demonstrates that commitment to spontaneity, which Habermas argues is necessary for all of discursive dialogue, can continue to be meaningful if conceived of in an open way.

## **II.5. Conclusion**

Through a comparison between Habermas' idea of communicative action and Bakhtin's view of dialogue, I have revealed that the search for consensus or final and universal validation of views can be unattainable within the situation of dialogue. Dialogue is initiated and continued because of difference among the views of participants. It is initiated and continued because participants may view and experience situations differently from others. If there is a final consensus in dialogue, there cannot be difference—hence there can be a dialogue. Final validation of views in this sense must then be thought of as something that is never reached, as something that will perennially escape us.

The outcome of a successful dialogue is supposed to be a rational consensus. In other words, the participants have to suppose that rational consensus as belief can be achieved, whereby the notion of belief expresses the idealizing conditions: if only the argumentation could be conducted openly enough and continued long enough. Final validation of views through attendance of consensus is impossible, but simultaneously, one must presuppose its dialogical relationality to the agreement in order for dialogue and interaction to succeed. The problem with Habermas' theory of language and communicative action is that he over-emphasizes that the condition of reasoned dialogue (that is, the idea of agreement or a final validation of views) is also the limit of interaction. He does not strongly comprehend that there is a persistent need for difference in dialogue, and that dialogue is shaped by the circumstances of difference and relies for its condition of possibility these circumstances. While we may find some highlights which underpin such problems, Habermas does not regard the consequences of such a scenario, especially when it comes to his theory of democracy. He often transfers the idea of universality and finality from language theory to communicative action as a bridging principle of deliberative democracy.

Habermas seeks to ground his theory of communicative action and language in something more universal than a given context (as varying in space and time): he does so by grounding communicative in rationally based understandings of immanent conditions of ideal speech situation. (Tully 1999b: 101) As a result of this approach, Habermas's theory, while mapping out the necessary conditions of the ideal - and thereby, democratic - speech community, is at the same time overtly universalistic in terms of the forms of communication that can be counted upon to foster the requisite capacities and motivations for engaging in utopian and abstract dialogue

Unlike Habermas, for Bakhtin the point of such dialogue is not to arrive at agreement on final validation of the views, but instead to promote exploration of being as event in terms of development of views and the exercise of judgment after having taken account of different viewpoints. This view of dialogue enables the self to emerge as other viewpoints are acknowledged. The importance of dialogue in which each participant becomes better able to consider each other own situation without relinquishing the uniqueness of its own situation or suppressing each other's context dependent situation is underlined.



## CHAPTER III. CONCEPTIONS OF LANGUAGE AND DEMOCRACY

### III.1. Introduction

Language is the medium through which the idea and practice of democracy operates. Language and the idea of democracy are coextensive. The idea of democracy first finds itself always within language, immersed in it, unable to extricate itself from the medium. All ideas about democracy are involved in language and various social and historical forces. Language is always already connected to democracy because the heteroglossia of language seeks to protect and sustain itself against unitary language or—ideology and/or a monolithic worldview that tries to in still homogeneity between people. For this reason, language and politics cannot be separated from each other; they are always connected. In this regard, any study of politics has to have a linguistic analysis of its own. Such an investigation should consider the idea of democracy not only as a politically constituted system of acts but also a multiplicity of linguistic activities or communication which consists of various expression in the terms of social dialects, characteristic group behavior, professional jargons, generic languages, languages of groups and classes, languages of the authorities, exhibited in a heteroglossia of language. In other words, people think and through language. Their different social reality are represented by heteroglossia, a multiplicity of languages, which contains the collection of all the forms of social reality, or rhetorical modes that people use in the course of their daily lives. The source of democracy is heteroglossia of language. It tries to protect the differences among languages (or rhetorical modes) in order to present one heteroglossia of language. Democracy is not single system of norms, one standard language, or an “official” language, a standard language that everyone would have to use (and which would be enforced by various mechanism). It is dialogical process, formed through interaction of languages.

This chapter aims to explore this dialogical and formative relation between the heteroglossia of language and democracy. It argues that the conditions of democracy are not only social, political and material conditions in character, but also dialogical and linguistic conditions. Linguistic conditions of democracy do not allow people to become independent from language that they utilize. It posits a connection between expression and action or between utterances and doing, in time and space. At this point, my argument rests on the supposition that the action of language and the action of selves, and hence democracy go hand in hand.

Lately, there has been a burgeoning of scholarship examining the concept of democracy in relation to the philosophy of language. A number of philosophers such as Jurgen Habermas often aspire to systematic accounts of language in order to explain democracy. This scholar attempts to describe the ideal speech situation of language. In essence, language theory is important for Habermas because his theory of democracy is predicated on an ideal speech situation. He grounds his conception of democracy on linguistically based understandings of the praxis of democracy. As a result of this foundation, Habermas's theory of democracy, while charting out the necessary conditions of the ideal speech situation and thereby, democratic community is at the same time overtly dependent on a theory of language. A theory that explains what is required to foster the capacities and motivations for engaging in dialogical democracy.

The focus on a theory of language is characteristic of both Habermas's theory of a democratic speech community and Bakhtin's theory of dialogism. Each scholar tries to describe conditions of language as the central praxis oriented towards democracy. However, there are differences between these two theories of language. In contrast to Habermas' conception, Bakhtin proposes a more material and historical explanation of language. A number of his views can be contrasted with those of Habermas whose theory

incorporates rationalized views of language that not only examines the shape (or structure) of language, but also regards the manners in which people use language. Bakhtin's theories of language focus primarily on the concept of dialogue. His dialogical notion of language is not identical to the Habermasian notion of ideal speech situation, although it is similar because it focuses on the idea of the social and material settings of dialogue, and the idea of interaction (consists of three elements: a speaker, a listener/respondent, and a relation between the two) inherent in it. The similarity extends to the fact that the Habermasian theory of language uses two poles: language as a system, and the rationality of the individual who employs it. For Bakhtin, both poles are reflective of monologic language—language that seems to be derived from a single, unified source. Bakhtin opposes monologic theories of language and instead stresses the importance of heteroglossia and polyglossia.

In this regard, Bakhtin sees language as a viewpoint for the explanation and understanding of the dialogue. In his explanation, he places more emphasis on the practical meaning of language when it is utilized. His theory underpinned the poetic and rhetorical, the social and historical, the pluralistic, as well as the responsive and sensuous aspects of language that are apparent when it is utilized. He suggests that language is not something simply felt or experienced in isolation. Its meaning is responsively understood, in terms of the dialogical relations, it creates and in the responses, its communication calls out in others.

Habermas has developed a philosophy of language along the lines of grammaticism as a body of generative or transformational rules for the construction of sentences and pragmatics as situating sentences used in interaction. The structures, which govern the generation of sentences, can be related, in Bakhtin's terms, to the process of signification prior to utilization in the specificity of the dialogical act. Similarly, the structures for

situating sentences in any language use significations similar to Bakhtin's concept of utterance. Despite their similarity, there are also differences between the Habermasian theory of language and Bakhtin's philosophy of language. First, Habermas's theory of language is closely connected to ordinary language as communicating a message or information by references to the external, social and subjective worlds in addition to universal pragmatics (this concept refers to the study of the universal aspects of reason embedded in language). In contrast to Habermas's conception, Bakhtin's philosophy of language is connected with literary language in general or the various categories of the prose such as novels and poems. However, he also contends that literary language is not represented in the novel as unitary, completely finished-off and indisputable—it is represented as a living mix of varied and opposing forces, developing and renewing itself. (Bakhtin, 1981: 48-49) Literary language is used in a fundamentally different way than is ordinary language.

Literary language foregrounds certain features, which in themselves call attention to language not as an abstract system—sentences as decontextualized, lexical and grammatical forms but language use as situated within the framing context of dialogic interrelations. Thus, the special quality of language use differentiates it from abstract and systemic forms of language. It is not the structure which distinguishes language, but the way those structures foreground their distinctive use of language. If lexical and grammatical forms of language is designed to reduce a language to some sort of systemic order, literary language seeks to undermine the basis upon which that order rests. Literary languages often challenges the notion that all forms of linguistic activity are generated from within a rational center, advancing the more disturbing proposition that such centers are themselves to be grasped only dialogically as rhetorical constructions.

This chapter is organized into three sections. First, I provide a detailed summary of Habermas's theory of language. Then I will analyze Bakhtin's philosophy of language in order to ascertain to what extent Habermas' position corresponds or departs from that of Bakhtin. In my summation, I hope not only to elucidate the fact that Bakhtin and Habermas' views of language have a significant number of similarities as well differences but also to indicate how Bakhtin's philosophy of language is more radical and critical for gaining insight into the conceptualization of the language of democracy democracy. Following on Bakhtin's theory of language it can be suggested that the language of democracy is dialogic and polyvocal in two senses: On the one hand, the language of democracy is not an neutral, impersonal and abstract system of normative forms divorced for social context but rather it exists in people's voices, in people's contexts, serving people's intentions; it is from there that one take the language of democracy, and make it their own. Therefore, it is collection of the multiple language constituting heteroglot conceptions of world. On the other hand, the language of democracy is a responsive activity that is uttered in multiple voices in response to multiple voices and in anticipation of polyvocal responses. It simultaneously contains centripetal, centralizing, unitary and centrifugal, carnivalistic, differentiating discourses.

### **III.2. Habermas's Conception of Language**

In a series of influential essays, Habermas produced a very systematic analysis of language theory along with metatheoretic reflections on the basic concepts of language and explanations on the methodology of the linguistics. His analysis of language embraced two directions: an orientation to analysis of communication and an orientation to truth disclosure and emancipation. On these directions, on the one hand, he attempted to produce a reconstructive understanding of the way in which competent language users

employ sentences in various types of speech acts in order to relate to three domains of reality (e.g., external, internal and societal). On the other hand, he pursued a systematic critique of scientization of politics and increase in instrumental rationality of bureaucracy. Through these critiques, he wanted to open new prospects for new levels of democracy in complex, pluralist societies (Habermas, 1991: 201-202, 1992: 25 and 1995: 42-43).

Habermas theory of language presupposes language as a medium for a kind of reaching understanding, in the course of which, through relating to external, internal and societal state of affairs (Habermas, 1993: 23 and 1995: 9-10). Therefore, he distinguishes three function of language in the world: pragmatic, expressive and interpersonal. Pragmatic function of language enables the people to link to an external state of affairs. The expressive function allows the people to focus on their internal nature. Interpersonal function allows people to establish societal relations. This language analysis of Habermas is reconstructive because it tries to reconstruct the rules (that constitute the communicative competence/intuitions to use language. It looks at the necessary belief that facilitates production of successful language usage, as contrast to an empirical study of actual situations of language use, as in, e.g., sociolinguistics. Habermas' interest with social and political theory and the analysis of communicative action offer a kind of framework for not only his awareness in pragmatics but also his concern in practice of ideals speech situation and pluralist democracy. Therefore, in his view of communication, he takes the type of communicative action intended at reaching mutual understanding to be essential to pluralistic forms of democracy and treats insincere strategic or manipulative communication as impediment to human freedom. (Habermas, 1993: 24)

In his theory of language, Habermas has depended a great deal upon the linguistic work of Austin, Dummet, Searle, Wittgenstein and Grice. (Habermas, 1992: 64-73) There are two approaches within the philosophy of language—pragmatics, and generative-

transformational grammar—that are particularly influential in the Habermasian theory of language. Theorists such as Wittgenstein and Austin develop the first approach. They considered that the way language is used in interaction is the most important base of meaning. (Habermas, 1991: 10-11 and 1996c: 143-145) When people interact with each other, when they perform action in the various realms of the world together, they utilize language. From that action, people generate meanings and understanding of things and events with the facilitation of language and thus, they represent the world through these the meaning of things and events. Nevertheless, this formation of meaning and understanding has its origin in language use and the relationships that are established with language. For Habermas, the way to understand the relationships between language, people and the world is to study the way in which language is used, in terms of the, external, internal and social contexts from which it derives its signification. (Habermas, 1991: 69) Habermas elaborates these context most fully in his theory of communicative competence, which holds that in a successful act of communication, the interlocutors have tacit agreement on five validity claims: that the language usage is true, that the interlocutor is sincere or truthful, that the use of language reply to the appropriate values, that it is fitting to the relation between interlocutors, and that it is understandable. From these claims, Habermas develops a notion of communication competency similar to Chomsky's syntactic competency. Habermas's concept of communicative competence refers to both generative or transformational grammar and set of rules that interlocutors mutually ascribe to one another in specific forms of communicative interaction. Habermas integrates Austin's speech act and Chomsky's notion of communication competence for reconstructing the rules that constitute the people competence to employ sentences in various types of speech acts in order to relate to three domains of reality. (Habermas, 1996c: 170-174 and 1995: 16-20) This reconstruction of rules for communicative competence implies a political project that, if achieved, would extend and

deepen democracy in a striking way, since they imply an ideal speech situation undistorted by domination, asymmetry and coercion.

This reconstructive project recognizes that more is involved in theory of language than the grammatical comprehensibility of a sentence. Therefore, on the one level, it explores language in connection to syntactic structure and categories of *langue* and *parole*. On the other level, it tries to grasp the social structure of speech acts. It focus on ordinary language as the context within which general principles for understanding occurs. It examines structures of ordinary language in terms of the phrases and sentences, the ways expressions exhibit and contribute to meaning and the practices of communication in which the expressions find use. The study of the organization of phrases and sentences has been guided by Noam Chomsky's cognitivist approach. (Habermas, 1995: 53)

Habermas employed Chomskyan generative and transformative grammar as the first base for his theory of communicative competence. Communicative competence, he embraces, rise from a cognitive faculty whose structure is the proper subject matter of a theory of language because it allows people to understand meanings in different sentences and generate new sentences that are comprehensible to others. (Habermas, 1995: 26-33)

Indeed, for Habermas, every ordinary language is organized in abstract linguistic structures in terms of phrases and sentences. All competent speakers have an innate understanding of phrases and sentences in the set of grammar rules. Habermas holds that communicative competence issues from a dedicated understanding of abstract structures in a cognitive faculty whose structure is the proper topic of linguistics. For this reason, Habermas construes the study of sentences and grammatical rules as attempts to uncover cognitive structures in terms of "communicative competence." (Habermas, 1996c: 11)

This communicative competence refers to a basic mastery of a particular language's fundamental system of rules or grammar in order to employ sentences in communication.



This competence is a necessary initial step for the establishment of communication through the employment of language.

Habermas has combined Chomsky's systematic explanations of *syntax* as construction of sentences with universal rules known by all communicators, with *semantics* as the ways expressions exhibit and contribute to meaning; and *pragmatics* as the practices of communication in which the language finds use in his theory of communicative competence. Thus, Habermas's theory of semantics can be seen as an incorporation of a variety of accounts in the meaning of the sentences. Among them, the formal semantic (truth-conditional) (Frege and Dummett), the intentionalist approach (Grice and Searle), and the use theories of meaning (Wittgenstein, Austin) are the important approaches of what constitutes the ability to understand meaning. (Habermas 1998: 57-64)

In the light of these various approaches, Habermas suggests that when the person uses language three things occur. First, the linguistic structures of language -the syntactic rules or grammar, second the systematic relation between structures in a language and a space of potential meanings and third, the universal pragmatics of language action as language is used in a particular context (Habermas, 1995: 29-34). In this context, Habermas's philosophy of language rests on theories of language, but not linguistics in the rather specialized sense that is often understood. His views not primarily concerned with the details of particular language utterances, but with the universal issues of form, structures of meaning and use that are common to all languages. As a universal framework for outlining a philosophy of language, he adopts and extends the conventional syntax theory of language. What distinguishes Habermas's syntax theory from other levels of analysis is that it does not directly take into account interpretation or meaning. Firstly, it talks about the syntactic rules (or grammar) then it moves other subdivisions of language theory: semantics and pragmatics. Syntax is the rules of systematic and structural relation of

language. It not only determines the basic elements (letters, words sentence, etc.) but also truth conditions of language. At this point, Habermas move syntax theory to reformulation of Dummet's truth-conditional dictum Dumett (1976) noted that understanding the meaning of a sentence is knowing under what conditions the sentence is true. Therefore, understanding an assertion contains notions of knowing what reasons a speaker can give for the truth of the utterance (e.g., interlocutors being able to know what would make the utterance true "Snow is white" and it being the case that snow is white). (Habermas, 1998: 68) Secondly, Habermas' philosophy incorporates an intentionalist approach, which is developed by P. Grice. Through intentionalist approaches, Habermas finds the key to understanding in one's ability to discern the communicative goals of speakers and writers or more directly in one's ability to 'pass' linguistically, without censure. (Habermas 1998: 58-59) In relation to this view, Habermas see language as a rational, cooperative enterprise, and a vehicle for the transformation of information with strong connections to the intentional acts and aims of speakers. In terms of the intentionalist approach, his account draws attention to a number of conceptions of meaning formed as central strategies and tools for achieving communicative purposes. Thus, he focuses on the speaker's position by analyzing linguistic meaning in terms of the goals and practices of speakers, and in terms of relations among communities of speakers. Thirdly, Habermas's theory of language focuses on the use of a theory of meaning such as the one developed by Wittgenstein. (Habermas 1998: 46) The focus on the theory of language pertains to the meaning as embedded in social practices and relationships that are established by language. Understanding the meaning of sentences and words that are used in the communicative process requires a shared form of life. In other words, people need to have a set of common background assumptions and shared normative orientations - what Habermas calls the "lifeworld" - in order to keep language working as a communicative instrument.

(Habermas, 1991: 135-136) Thus, the communicative process emphasizes that the manner in which language is used in interaction is a more important source of meaning than the way the words signify the objects they represent because language use consists of the speaker's intentions. (Habermas 1998: 62-64)

By looking into the pragmatic structure of communication, Habermas conceives of language as the medium of three interrelating worlds: First, there is the external or objective world—the state of affairs in reality; secondly, there is the internal or social world of what the speaker expresses. Thirdly, there is the subjective world of what the speaker feels. (Habermas, 1995: 66-68) In the objective world, language is the medium of communication with things in the external world of reality. (Habermas 1998: 75-76) It consists of references to facts. It allows people to focus on the state of affairs of the reality. In this world, the interlocutor treats the object of discussion as having an independent existence and s/he attempts to issue a true statement in relation to these facts. In the social world, a language consists of reference to interactions of the people in the forms of norms, rules, and values of society. It initiates interpersonal relationships between people. In the subjective world, language consists of the “totality of experiences to which only one individual has privileged access.” (Habermas, 1984: 100 and 1998: 95-96)) In this world, language mediates one's experiences, desires and feelings; it makes one's subjective world known to the others. Speech acts within the three worlds of language embody three contents. Initially, there is the propositional content. It is the factual sense of the speech act. It draws a parallelism between an objective world of things and the truth claim. Therefore, it is categorized as a constative speech act. Constative speech acts are expressed in an assertoric mode. They express truths of what is occurring or how things exist in the objective world. (Habermas 1995: 50-55) Secondly, there is the illocutionary content. It builds connections between the social world and the

rightness of a claim. (Habermas, 1996c: 180) It is categorized as a regulative speech act. Regulative speech acts involve the establishment of a regulated interpersonal relationship between interlocutors. They reveal normative rightness through appeals to interpersonal relations. (Habermas, 1995: 57-58) Thirdly, there is an expressive content. It builds connections between the subjective world of inner states and truthfulness/sincerity. It is categorized as an affirmative speech act. Affirmative speech acts involve disclosure of one's own wishes, feelings, and intentions in reference to one's own subjectivity. They expose sincerity. (Habermas 1995:58-59)

Moving from speech acts to issues of communication, Habermas drew a series of distinctions between methods in which language functions in communication. It finds that communication in everyday life is directed to reach an understanding. Reaching understanding also implies rationally motivated agreement among participants that is measured against criticisable claims. Rational agreement is to Habermas a formal, abstract, but not idealized reconstruction of assumptions implicit in ordinary communications. According to Habermas, when speech acts are made in the context of ordinary communication within the three aforementioned worlds, there are three spaces of meaning which come into play simultaneously. Speech acts are at once objective, social and intersubjective. All domains, speech actions can be either consent-oriented' (or communicative) and success-oriented (or strategic) actions; within the latter

Communicative action is a self-governing type of action. It presumes speech acts as a medium for reaching an agreement or mutual understanding about something in the objective, social and subjective worlds. The aim of communicative action is reaching understanding, in the course of which participants equally raise validity claims that can be accepted. Communicative action exemplifies the different notion rationality as giving reasons for or against validity claims raised, challenging, accepting or rejecting claims of

others based on the better argument. It denotes a communicative practice for agreement and a mutual understanding. It also makes the communicative actor representative of two things in one body: an *author*, who shapes situations through actions for which one is responsible, and a *subject* of the transitions surrounding oneself, of society whose unity is based on solidarity to which one belongs, and of processes of socialization in which one is reared.

There are four types of communicative actions based on different practices of rationality: teleological, constative, normatively regulated and dramaturgical. Rationality of teleological action attempts to subordinate participants' individual aims and interest for the goal of achieving a mutually shared understanding about the world (Habermas, 1996c: 136-137) Rationality of constative action attempts to ground truthfulness of the claim on experience or state of affairs that has existed prior to the action itself (Habermas, 1996c: 180-181). Rationality of normatively regulated action is oriented legitimation of the claims in accordance to established common values and traditional roles of society. (Habermas, 1996c: 137-139) Rationality of dramaturgical action is oriented to self-expression of one's authentic subjectivity for establishment of legitimate (or valid) interpersonal relations. (Habermas, 1991: 58-59 and 1996c: 139-143)

Strategic action, by contrast, is purposive-rational action. It aims at influencing others for achieving some end. Therefore, it is oriented to success with instrumental use of language. It contains systemically distorted patterns of communication. Systemically distorted communication is ideological deception. It involves openly and hidden elements of expressions for reproducing belief systems that could not be validated if subjected to rational discourse. This is a situation of asymmetrically manipulated actions in which all participants have an effective inequality to take part in the dialogue. Strategic action is a

way of achieving rational domination through the coercive force of the argument. (Habermas 1995: 117-119 and 73-84)

Habermas' analysis on the rational processes of action leads to a rather strong idealization of the communicative action. Communicative action is oriented to achieving, sustaining and reviewing consensus that rests on the mutual recognition of validity claims. He describes four different types of validity claims that explicitly or implicitly correspond to the different types of speech acts and communicative action in connection with the different worlds (e.g., the external, the internal and the social) of language. In producing speech acts and participating communicative action, interlocutors at least implicitly raise four basic types of validity-claims: a claim to *understandability* raised in linguistic content of speech acts, a claim to *truth* raised in constative speech acts, a claim to normative *rightness* raised in regulative speech acts, and a claim to *sincerity* raised in expressive speech acts.

A claim for *understandability* refers to speech acts that contain the linguistically intelligible truth. (Habermas 1991: 57-61) *Truth* raised in constative speech acts signifies propositional content of true statements with objectifying facts of external world. (Habermas, 1991: 60-61) A claim to normative *rightness* encloses situation of conformation in light of existing societal norms and values with the establishment of justifiable interpersonal relations (as guidance, suggestion, requests) in a regulative way (Habermas 1991: 58) A claim to *sincerity* refers to truthful expression of feeling and full disclosure of intentions as opposed to creating false apprehension, confuse issues and concealing information, attempting to give the wrong impression about others, or manipulating. (Habermas, 1991: 137)

Habermas uses validity claims identify the notion of an ideal speech situation freed from all situations of inequality, coercion, and domination. More specifically, validity claims

mirror the rationality of communicative actions. Beginning with this rationality of communicative actions, which are built into the very fabric of language use, Habermas suggested that every language use has at least three orientations— objectivating, conforming and expressing. Operating within the domain of the external, the social and the intersubjective world, language use involves the expressive attitudes of participants who engage in a rational discourse to give and receive meaning. (Habermas, 1984: 42) This means that communicative agents are never directly related to individual validity claims; instead, they are almost indirectly related to validity claims through certain discourse. Here, discourse is understood as systemic patterns of particular rational action or argumentation that communicate with validity claims. By engaging communication in discourse, communicative agents seek to convince one another with arguments. (Habermas, 1991:197) This means that different validity claims require different means of rationality by which interlocutors deliberate whether a certain claim is valid. While there are four types of communicative action, each of which corresponds to different validity claims in reference to different types of speech act, they also corresponds to four different types of discourse: explicative, theoretical, practical, aesthetic and therapeutic. Explicative discourse, which includes issues of comprehensibility, is concerned with issues of comprehensibility of how arguments are to be understood. Theoretical discourse, which is related to the truth of propositions, involves both analytic-empirical discourse, and cognitive-rational discourse that are oriented to describing states of affairs in society. Practical discourse involves with the rightness of norms of action. (Habermas 1991: 104-109) Therapeutic discourse addresses truthfulness or sincerity as the obligation to demonstrate that the stated intention behind the action is the actual motive in use.

Habermas' conceptions of discourse models can be seen as an attempt to reconstruct the terms political society which addresses norms and rules and external world that addresses

questions of truth and to clarify and define the difference how people perceive between analyzing a politics and knowing how a rationality of politics operates. Habermas adds other categories to include what people must understand about communicative processes and the language that produce both models of politics and rationalities. One of these categories is ideal speech situation. Habermas describes ideal speech situation as a pattern of a reciprocal communication freed from external constraints. It is a situation of symmetrical free dialogue in which all participants have an equal chance to utilize constative, regulative, and representative speech acts. (Habermas 1995: 56-59) This also means discourse free from distorted communication in which all the participants have an effective equality of chances to take part in the dialogue. The conditions for an ideal speech situation do not only refer to linguistic circumstances but also social and material conditions. Habermas ideal sees speech situation as practical alternative to conventional models of democracy, a way of achieving ideal community of communication or rational consensus on public issues through the non-violent force of the better argument (Habermas, 1991: 201-202)

This emphasis on the ideal speech situation leads to a rather strong idealization of the dialogue situation whereby people have an equal opportunity freely expressing their viewpoints. For Habermas, dialogue refers ideal community of communication or sharing experience that allows mutual examination each participant's views about phenomena. It is situation of ideal speech that creates more refined and clarified understanding of the issue in question. It is systematic and reasoned examination of viewpoints that may contain the inconsistencies and contradictions between subject and object. In this examination, on the one hand, all participants presupposes agreement about implicitly raised validity claims as background consensus because of common definitions of a situation, on the other hand all of them have the equal opportunity to use constative



(e.g., asserting, reporting, explaining and contesting), regulative (e.g., requests, warnings, recommendations, advice), and representative speech acts (e.g., reveal, expose, admit, express) for advancing their view points.

The success of ideal speech situation depends not on a collectively acting citizenry but on the fulfillment of linguistic conditions (e.g., communicative competence) and social and material conditions (that refers to a situation of general symmetry in which all interlocutors have and equal and unrestrained opportunity to engage in communication). Here linguistic conditions of ideal speech situation are associated with rules of transformative grammar for generating sentences. The task of transformative grammar is to identify communicative competence and reconstruct linguistic conditions of possible understanding. They are based on universal rules known by all communicative agents, regardless of culture, and other specific situations. Social material conditions of ideal speech are associated with notions of freedom, equality and regulative principles that govern the communication between communicative agents. The idea of freedom and equality refer to a situation in which all participants have symmetrical and unrestrained opportunities to engage in communicative action. In this situation, the power of reasoning is the only power. Reasoning is the tool that initiates participants to replace their beliefs (epistemic), and strategic actions (teleological) with meaning. It signifies a mode of transacting with (raising and accepting) validity claims. Like reasoning, regulative principles which are associated with rightness of action, creates inherent obligation to return to the normative context from which the interlocutors justifies the action. If this justification does not expels all doubts on the validity of the regulative principles, validity of regulative principles is called into question for change. If regulative principles are justified, they create better opportunity for the thoughtful and deliberate examination of

underlying assumptions, views, values, or intentions of individuals with the formation of a rational consensus with respect to universality.

Central to the view of ideal speech situation is not only the communicative competence and social and material conditions, taken together, generate for a rational agreement and mutual understanding, but discourse ethics as a rule of argumentation for testing the rightness of contested views and claims. Habermas build up the idea of discourse (or communicative) ethics as an important part of his theory of communicative action. It is projected to function as a rule of communication and expressed in a principle of universalizability of contested norms. This idea is similar Kant's idea of categorical imperative. The first mean of the principle of universalizability is:

Every valid norm must satisfy the condition that all affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities). (Habermas 1983: 65)

The second meaning of the principle of universalizability is derived from the general pragmatic presuppositions of communication. (Habermas, 1991: 197) It is argued that that a norm, to be universal, must an outcome of ideal speech situation freed from inequality, coercion, and domination. This means that all communicatively competent people must have the ability to participate in a moral-practical discourse for introducing assertion and questioning assertion for constructing the norms. In making assertions, speakers at least implicitly raise different types of validity-claims - for example, claims to truth, normative rightness, and sincerity or truthfulness. These validity-claims, in turn, point to the rule argument in moral/practical discourse. Habermas understanding of moral/practical discourse include notion of formalistic ethics that derives its main features from Kant's theory of ethics. Similar to Kant's idea of ethics, it does not take for

granted particular substantive content beyond the idea of practical reason. In connection to the rule of practical reason, Habermas defines a formal procedure which any norm must satisfy if it is to be morally acceptable if, when it contested. It also assumes an independent order of moral facts with the priority of the right over the good. Therefore, Habermas does not presuppose a specific conception of the good life since that would violate the deontological commitment to Universalist position. Habermas suggest that rational interpretation of any phenomena can only be universally validated by testing against counter examples in historical (and geographical) contexts - not by using transcendental ontological assumptions. Norms are morally binding because of their intimate connection to people who are potentially affected by its implementation, directly participate in the communicative process for the validation of norms. (Habermas, 1983: 109) If this is the case, people can or would freely come to an understanding and grant consent for approving certain rules as law in the process of communicative action. Naturally, those processes consist of the situation of the ideal speech. This means that the universal acceptability of law as a categorical imperative can only be established by participants through the communicative rationality of an ideal speech situation, whereby general acceptance of any norm occurs with a general agreement of participants or rational consensus, which makes a judgment as valid and legitimate. (Habermas, 1991: 202) At the end, Habermas (1991:65) develops two principles for argumentation from two types of universal presuppositions of these communicative actions. First is the U principle:

*All* affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its *general* observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of *everyone's* interests (an these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation).

Second is the D principle:

Only norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a *practical discourse*.

U and D principles, which are identified as bases of discourse ethics, are also a part of the reconstruction of the Kantian type deontological system which appeals to universal norms for determining rightness or wrongness of action rather than the consequences of action. The system of deontology, with which Habermas is concerned deals with the view that rightness of actions do not request the consequences of actions that are good but instead, appeals to a conformity with certain rules of duty. Deontological systems coincide with rules as criterion for judging rightness or wrongness of actions. This means that actions are made right or wrong because of discourse ethics that forbids or enjoys actions.

In political communities, the system of the discourse ethics is backed by sanctions of institutional rules and procedures. The existence of procedures and institutional rules makes generally known right type of actions, which are conducive to public interests. Habermas believes that norms of discourse ethics are not only necessary for the production of continued stability about the communication process, but also imperative for the production of possible results for public interest. In the book *Between Facts and Norms*, Habermas incorporates the deontological scheme of discourse ethics into the legal and constitutional system with support of the deliberative concept of democracy. In this incorporation, Habermas emphasize strong connection between will of the people (democracy) and basic rights (constitution). Both democracy and constitution, which is consent oriented (communicative), include conception of right as public agreement achieved in the communication community. Moreover, by stressing the procedural dimensions of communicative reason Habermas develops a model of deliberative democracy that discards the liberal vision of the political process as primarily a process of

competition and aggregation of private preferences and republican vision of united citizenry that actively pursue the common good as the goal of achieving general will situation through a cooperative process of rational communication (Habermas, 1996b: 310-315). At the same time, Habermas offers a model of weak and strong public with institutionalization of different forms and levels of communicative action with discourse ethics that produces for a rational will-formation and agreement (Habermas, 1996b: 274-275). In Habermas deliberative model, while the weak public represents civil society as corresponding with informally organized public sphere ranging from private associations to the mass media, the strong public signifies political society as containing parliamentary bodies and other formally organized institutions (Habermas, 1996b: 360-373). In this division of labour, civil society identifies, interprets and address political issues for institutional politics while political society as formally organized political system produces decisions based on consensually grounded norms and laws and derived from the general communications and argumentations of civil society (Habermas 1996b: 369-373).

### **III.3. Bakhtin's Conception of Language**

In Bakhtin's philosophy, the issue of language is a much broader notion than that usually associated with the linguistic terms in contemporary social science. In general, it is concerned more about the ways in which language is utilized and, when expressed, comes into contact with another participant. Therefore, emphasizes the use of language rather than abstract rules that systemically define structure of language. Bakhtin's (1981: 293) portrayal of language has at least two key connotations. First, it indicates that language, as an utterance is essentially a matter of an active use of language rather than of abstract system of words and sentences. As Bakhtin (1981: 293) noted:

...language is not an abstract system of normative forms but rather a concrete heteroglot conception of the world. All words have the 'taste' of a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a particular work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, the day and hour.

Second, it designates language use as the operation of two contradictory forces—centripetal and centrifugal—that tries to pull meaning in opposite directions. The centripetal (centralizing) tendency drives meaning towards some unified, concrete, final worldview. Therefore, Bakhtin (1981: 291) sees language as the heteroglot operation of multi-voiced discursive acts.

Language is heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth.

In this context, his theory does not focus upon the structural analysis of language (of which word and sentence are a part) without considering the actual use of language, the social settings and historical context of which language is a part. (Bakhtin, 1986: 80,82 and Hirschkop, 1999: 6-12 and Holquist, 1990: 14-17, 40-42) Bakhtin sees virtually all language use as enclosing three basic functions: to represent things in the world, to convey meanings, and to generate new meanings for the representation of world and understanding. These functions may be termed the 'polyvocal' and the 'dialogic' functions of language, respectively. In this respect, Bakhtin points the way to understanding the generation of dialogicality, a relation that can occur on the elements of language as well as the inter-mental plane of communicating. Bakhtin argues that when language is dialogically active and heavily orientated toward serving a dialogic function, it cannot be adequately understood in terms of a structural and systemic uniformity. This is so because such structural uniformity presupposes that a fixed uniform use of language conveys

some constant information between input (sender) and output (receiver), whereas Bakhtin sees the use of language as dialogical and polyvocal activity

Bakhtin's view of functional dialogicality and polyvocality of language focuses the relationship of utterances that come into contact each other in the kind of reply to another voice's language, an anticipation of another's language. (Bakhtin, 1986:82-83) This dialogical relationship is initially perceived in the process of self-understanding. In Bakhtin's view, self-understanding is a kind of dialogical process wherein the language of the later self is exposed to the concrete reality (i.e. context), language of the addresser or confronts the language of an earlier self. Each self speaks through a voice that is active only through language. (Bakhtin, 1993: 4-6) With these voices, language always invokes a responsive understanding, and this responsive understanding shapes what the voice of the individual addresser can utter. (Voloshinov, 1973: 102) This process of producing unique responsive understanding by uttering words involves a specific kind dialogicality of language.

A second way deals with the idea that language is a kind of dialogic relationship that is manifested when voices come into contact in a kind of interaction and it is also associated with a particular set of cultural, historical and institutional settings. (Bakhtin 1986: 86-91) It is such settings that provide the 'dialogical overtones' mentioned by Bakhtin. (1986: 92) Since language also embodies the mediational means that shape responsive understanding in this view, the particular uses of language are also inherently shaped by the sociocultural setting in which they occur. Therefore, Bakhtin labels language as a social event. This event expresses a specific stratum of society (professional, age group, etc.) within a given political system at a given time. (Holquist and Emerson 1981: 430) It contains various discourses that are full of behavior and value systems that invoke united forms of language use. These discourses produce a complex unity of languages (social, cultural,

democratic and national languages, languages of the authorities of various circles, languages that serve the specific intentions within specific chronotope) and which equally embody a unity of attitudes or points of view about the world. This complex unity of languages is not merely a unity, however, but a dialogised unity of oneself with the other. This is important; it signifies that language is a social event due to the fact that the language which one utters is partly a reflection of someone else's utterances and it only becomes the individual's own when one fills the language, adapting it to one own semantic and expressive intention and fills it with intention and accent. (Bakhtin, 1981:293) This means that every use of language is reflected in the practice of one voice (language) taking over another voice (language). For example, single concrete voices (language) employ social language, but they incorporate the expressions of another voice (language) in such a way that the second voice (language) can be heard as well, resulting in a 'multi—voiced' language. Thus, if a particular use of language reiterates the language of a particular social group by producing a particular use of language with a different intonation or in contexts that differ from those in which the original language occurred, the polyvocal effect derives from the simultaneous presence of two voices. Indeed, it is only if one hears both voices that a polyvocal effect is produced. Therefore, language is a form of multivoicedness that illustrates the kind or phenomena at issue when one is concerned with a basic issue arising out of Bakhtin's work of language. (Bakhtin, 1981: 282)

For Bakhtin, every language use is full of dialogic qualities. This dialogic quality of languages represents reflexive responses. (Bakhtin, 1986: 92) This means that every use of language provokes a reply, anticipates new language use as well as semantic structures in the responsive way. For this reason, in Bakhtin's view, language does not belong to a stable, self-identical system that resides in the mind or soul of the author-speaker or the



reader-listener. It does not obtain its full characteristics unless it is delivered as part of a semantic set of connections, which includes responsive chains of utterances, embedded in a differentiating dynamic web of past, present, and future, acts. This means that the value and the meaning of language are relative to its context of manifestation and its relation to another language in time and space. Language is always advanced as the outcome of a distinct function of interweaving chains of utterances and as such, expresses an answer to one or many languages, which in turn, pave the way for a particular usage of language. This concurrence of language with interweaving chains of utterances (which represent a conception of the world with traces of past and future) implies that language has a dialogical quality in relation to time and space or in a relation between an addresser and an addressee. A dialogical quality of language is established between a present utterance and a past utterance since the latter is variable by time and space (i.e. chronotope). (Bakhtin, 1981: 282-283) Language's dialogical quality links its expressive dimension to an incomplete, mutual and distinct event. Bakhtin (1981: 270 – 27) says:

We are taking languages not as system of abstract grammatical categories, but rather languages as ideologically saturated, language as a world view, even as a concrete opinion, insuring a maximum of mutual understanding in all spheres of ideological life.

This means that every use of language is a historically located event and evolves through joining with difference of meaning in its relation to another utterance or context. An utterance is always advanced as a function of other utterances and thus expresses an answer to one or many utterances, which preceded it. For this reason, a meaning in a new use of language can only be understood in reference to previously used language. Understanding of the meaning in language emerges in the dialogical relationship between one individual consciousness and another. Therefore, the meaning in language is

connected not to syntax, but to dialogue in time/space with understanding of addresser and addressee. (Bakhtin 1986: 82) The response of language use assimilates abstract elements such as the sentences and words into the conceptual system of the understanding, which reproduce it with new elements. Because every language use is produced with a living response within it, response is shaped by the changes of references of which language embodies. (Bakhtin 1986: 91) Thus, the language continuously resides in a dialogical relationship between the conceptual horizons of understandings of both addresser/addressee and addressee. Every instance of language use places the meaning in a hermeneutical relationship with the conceptual horizons of the addressee, whose expected response, in turn, anticipates a new response in the addresser. (Bakhtin, 1981: 278-279)

In Bakhtin's view, the language is dialogical because the meaning that is embodied is in dialogue with the meaning of the other language that corresponds to it and which includes different discourses that operate in different times and spaces and in different social settings. Therefore, the same words and sentences of utterances can have divergent meanings when expressed in different situations of time and space to different addressees. (Bakhtin 1986: 170) No usage of language, which consists of utterances, can ever be repeated because it expresses a point of view in a certain context to a certain addressee. It is always only one of a kind of use in certain time and space. (Bakhtin, 1986: 108) The use of language, which may contain the same words and sentences inevitably, becomes part of a different language use when moved from one context of use to another. (Bakhtin, 1986: 60) In other words, language is inherently material, historically located, and constructive. View points, expressed in language through utterances, are situated and positioned as outcomes of social and historical development. As an

interactive part of ongoing historical and social development, every use of language is exposed to different milieu of transformation and alteration dialogue.

Bakhtin's dialogical treatment of language suggests that they have particularly obvious or regularly overt markers attached to them. Often, there is a form, such as an utterance repeated a distinct dialect or vocabulary or the use of unique tense and aspect forms, that connects one form of language use to the other form. In considering elements of the same type of language use, Bakhtin posits relatively stabilized forms of language use. This position is elucidated in detail when he discusses his ideas about "speech genres." (Bakhtin 1986: 79-81)

Speech genres are portrayed primarily in terms of their representation to typical situations of speech communications. They are generic forms of language that typically correspond to expressions or rhetoric. (Bakhtin 1986: 87) They are also self-regulating social systems of language. Therefore, they represent potentiality of language to be unitary—that is, to contain expression from the same registers, dialects, or discourses. It represents centripetal forces, which pull towards centralization and unification—the kind of pull that is exerted by any strongly consolidated ideological system. This way it promotes common criteria for promoting particular modes of understanding and interpretation for individual judgment and evaluation. In other words, interpretation and understanding, which are a part of the language usage, are strongly shaped by speech genres that emerged as part of a specific historical moment in a unique social setting. One will understand and reply with various utterances according to the individuality of speech genres and individuality also with changes in time and space.

Bakhtin's theory of language makes the two phenomena (i.e. individual and society) and the two sets of criteria (i.e. difference and unity) analytically separate. These analytical

separations also emphasize how two distinct phenomena are thoroughly intertwined in the use of language. On the one hand, every use of language is marked by uniqueness of the event. This means that language is not to be regarded as a universal system of signs that relates to objects in a common or universal way, but languages should be envisioned as living systems that represent a world in distinct ways in every use because utterances which are involved in interaction or play between themselves or between themselves and subject, represent same object in a different way. On the other hand, language as a living system is marked by a unity of event. This is a unity of language that contains ideology, generic languages of social strata, and groups or the entire society as a whole. Therefore, all language use is involved in the centripetal, centralizing, and unitary with centrifugal, anarchic and differentiating. Unitary characteristics of language endorse a maximum of understanding between people who share ideologies and class background. It promotes a unity of society with cultural, social, and political centralization. The differentiating elements language supports pluralism and recognition of identities with intrusions of distinctive tastes, styles, and individuality into interplay of utterances. Therefore, it supports the individual with cultural, social and political decentralization. Language cannot, therefore, be seen as a single abstract system of forms, as if it were exhibiting meanings in a self-identical way, but rather part of a dialogical and polyvocal activities none of which can be abstracted into a single system. These polyvocal and dialogical activities of language consist not only of the “taste of a profession, tendency, a party, a particular work, a particular person, a generation,” but also of “the contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life.” (Bakhtin, 1981: 293) This way Bakhtin grounds language in particular historical, social and cultural context of utterance. Unlike the structuralist notion of parole, Utterance refers to the idea of language used by people, in a specific circumstance, embedded in a context. That is to say, language is assemblage of

utterances that are uttered in multiple voices in response to multiple voices and in anticipation of polyvocal responses rather than abstract systems of forms.

Bakhtin thought of language as composed of tastes expressive of various forms of life, exhibited in a multiplicity of forces. This conceptualization includes forces through which the language regimes are imposed at the same time that the interaction of utterances proceeds. Therefore, Bakhtin seek to distinguish a generic use of language. Regimes of language refer to rule-regulated activities of language as expressive of generic uses of languages. Bakhtin describes generic languages through patterns of speech genres. He makes a distinction between speech genres at two levels. Firstly, he describes primary genres that the social languages or jargons used by professionals or members of a social group in everyday conversation. Next, he describes secondary genres in terms of literary, legal, scientific, journalistic language and rhetoric. Through secondary genres, he primarily elaborates literary genres in terms of novel, parody, prose, drama and poetry. Bakhtin finds these genres in the fictional worlds of a narration. Among various genres, he discloses the polyphonic novel.

A polyphonic novel is characterized by a new dialogical author's position. That author is dialogically positioned alongside the characters in order to emphasize that no single point of view is privileged, restricted and/or finalized. It contains a particular form of dialogue among "a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses" representing a variety of viewpoints. (Bakhtin 1981: 6) The author of the polyphonic novel, the characters, and the reader participate in the dialogue as equals, and each holds h/her ideological position in open contestation with no single position regarded as either privileged or viewed as representative of the truth. (Bakhtin, 1981: 315-316) Polyphony can also be seen as the free play of multiple languages wherein centripetal and centrifugal forces collide. (Bakhtin 1981: 486)

In contrast to dialogical characteristics of polyphonic novels, Bakhtin describes poetry as a secondary genre that accomplishes the task of cultural, national and political centralization with its employment of centripetal forces of language. It is meant to persuade, not to produce a dialogical effect because of its endowment of singular (i.e. monologic) language that only objectifies itself. According to Bakhtin, poetry operates in a closed system that is centered on the word that is fully infused with author's intentions. Centripetal forces inherent in this language wipe away individuality of utterances. Rhythm itself interrupts the dialogical structure of language. It serves to strengthen and concentrate even further the unity and closed quality of the language and it does not enter into dialogue with different languages. Bakhtin also suggests that the language of the prose is the opposite of poetry. It is representative of centrifugal forces of language.

As language makes the world dialogical, Bakhtin observes different forms of social speech, or rhetorical modes, that people use in the course of their daily lives. Language, in this sense, can be seen as an indistinctive socially shared activity; something is formed beyond any individual and forming particular social relationship within a historically determined situation. It is also material, filled with specific content, which is shaped by the addresser. The materiality of language contains a distinctive system of signs, tones, accents and jargons that carry out communication with generation of certain normative, political and ideological discourses or unique understandings of people. Existence between indistinctiveness and distinctiveness makes language not as a unique product of a producer but rather as mixture, which is given to a speaker. Therefore, Bakhtin argues that the object of the philosophy of language is not syntax with sentences and words but pragmatics, which provides detailed explanations of practical attitudes towards concrete situations. For this reason, Bakhtin's theory of language emphasizes the intimate

connection between practical situations (i.e. social and historical context) and the use of language, which are defined as utterances.

This pragmatic aspect of language theory has been developed into sophisticated theories about language and practice. Therefore, Bakhtin regards literary language as the explanatory tool for the use of language in connection to practical situations. Literary language, for him is the perfect place to represent the dialogical character of language in an interrelation of voices. The dialogical quality of literary language enables him to perceive language not as an abstract system of normative forms but rather as a concrete and complex mixture and as a worldview. This complex mixture of languages and worldviews is labeled a dialogized heteroglossia. (Bakhtin 1981: 295-96)

Dialogized heteroglossia is “another’s speech in another’s language.” (Bakhtin, 1981: 324) It represents a view of each language from the perspective of another. It is expressed by not the authoritative voices but by the persuasive voices, which is half ours and half someone else’s. (Bakhtin 1981: 293) It suggests that individuals absorb languages through their own conceptual systems, which are themselves filled with specific objects and emotional expressions. Absorption of languages creates complex unities between one individual and another. Bakhtin (1981 293-294) says:

Language ... lies on the borderline between oneself and the other. The word in language is half someone else’s ... the word does not exist in a neutral or impersonal language ... but rather it exists in other people’s mouths, in other people’s contexts, serving other people’s intentions.

This means that the language people use is already “half someone else’s.” At the beginning, it is in possession of particular person because it is filled with that person’s own intentions, meanings and understanding. (Bakhtin 1981: 294) However, when that person uses language for communication purposes, language immediately becomes filled

with the intention, meanings and understandings of an addressee. This means that a language resides neither in a particular person's intention nor in what he/she expresses but at a point between that person's intention and that of another.

This dialogization of languages, dialogized heteroglossia, also occurs in a process of hybridization. Hybridization is "a mixture of two social languages within the limits of a single utterance, an encounter, within the arena of an utterance, between two different linguistic consciousnesses, separated from one another by an epoch, by social differentiation or by some other factor." (Bakhtin, 1981: 358) In Bakhtin's specific heteroglot conception of the language, hybridization appears as dialogical devices to foster an expanded shared space between one another in the sense of negotiation, expression and juxtaposition.

Bakhtin's emphasis on heteroglossia and hybridization also represents the notion that language is not a closed form in abstraction, severed from any social or historical specificity, but instead it is a contextual, ideological and relational form that carries meaning only in relation to another language. It is always dialogical. It always includes the real or potential position of the addresser and addressee, the horizon (the meaning and values) and social and historical materiality. (Bakhtin, 1986: 117) Language, which is always in dialogue, sets a dual mode relationship between the addresser and the addressee. It contains the operation of both centripetal forces and centrifugal forces. To recap, centripetal force tends to push things toward a central point; centrifugal force tends to push things away from a central point and out in all directions. Centripetal forces, which are forces of regulation and discipline, operate with monologic. It makes language as something that comes from itself and refers to itself. It supports the hegemony and the dominant ideology as it forces languages in all of their various rhetorical modes (the cultural, the political, the economic) into one single system,



procedure of form, coming from one central position centralize to unify the language. (Bakhtin 1986: 270) It is represented by poetic language. And naturally, the centrifugal forces operate in the opposite direction. It is in dialogic form. It stimulates multiplicity with the inclusion of different styles, rhetorical strategies and vocabularies. It paves the way for non-hierarchical heteroglossia. It undermines all those discourses and genres whose power supports ideological uniformity and a forced respect for the established orders. It is represented by the novel, satire and prose. At the end, Bakhtin argues, every language use is marked by centrifugal (dialogic and heteroglotic, politically differentiating) as well as centripetal (monologic, politically unifying) forces.

Moreover, by stressing the dialogical dimensions of language Bakhtin offers a model of dialogical politics that revolve among the alternatives of deliberative, liberal and republican. In particular, with the republican model, it rejects the vision of the political process as primarily a process of competition and aggregation of private preferences. The success dialogical politics depends not on a collectively acting citizenry or on the institutionalization of the corresponding procedures or institutionalized deliberative processes with informally constituted public opinions but to the language which is dialogical and polyvocal explicitly recognize and support express multiple voices and perspectives. People can take part in the development of this language of democracy if they feel that their language and views are being represented, typically through a dialogical process. People are more likely to be able to question and correct the unified language of political community through a dialogical process that solicits and values the diverse voices of all of its interested parties. In this view, the processes of creation and negotiation of language of democracy become a means to an end, as well as an end in itself. Dialogism in language of democracy is thus paired with a complex mixture of language forces that moves language toward both unity and multiplicity.

### **III.4. A Contrast Between Conceptions of Language**

The most obvious difference between Habermas's theory of language and Bakhtin's philosophy of language is that the former wants to identify a regulative and universal conception of language while the latter takes language as a dialogical being that simultaneously assures unity and difference. Habermas captures an ideal speech situation in the context of what is rational, universal, norm-governed, consent-oriented and continual in instances of communicative action. Unlike Habermas, Bakhtin sees the dialogical quality of language as an active thing that may not necessarily be norm-governed or consent-oriented. Bakhtin's view of dialogical language deviates from Habermas' view of communicative action in that the former theorists approach encapsulates the idea that participants take steps argumentatively in order to reach an understanding about something in the world. If Habermas's validity claims are taken as a basis of communication, the dialogical quality of language cannot be effectively described.

Habermas tries to develop an abstract, systemic, rational and consistent language theory that tries to oversee, predict, control, and govern every territory of language. While his theories of language and communicative action integrate various propositions into a single coherent system, he produces universalistic propositions such as discourse ethics from self-evident explanations, beliefs and suppositions. His propositions are predicated on the belief that the rationality and consistency of propositions corresponds to the validity of universalistic moral principles. While systematicity, rationality and consistency become primary values of Habermas's theory of language and communicative actions, they also become important features of the monologism that the logic of his theories implies. In other words, there is a strong emphasis on the rationality, consistency and systematicity on structures of language and communicative action, which generates

*monological* constructions of language that is both the product of a single voice of rationalism and of being cast in terms of one coherent and self-validating reason. This is the case because firstly, rationality suspends multi voicedness to a single voice of reason, a reason that is assumed common to all people (universality). Secondly, rationality in Habermas's theory of language is also about the coordination of propositions into a single coherent logic or structure that is free from practical concerns and contradictions. It does not provide options among which the components of a system (characters in novel) may become independent and choose their conceptions. In other words, it leaves no spaces for the polyphonic constituents of language systems. This also restricts dialogical accounts of a language's narrow range. At both levels, Bakhtin's theory of language deviates from Habermas theories of language because the former's explanations challenge rational, abstract and structural theorizing. The Bakhtinian conception of language centers on the fact that words are actions and that languaging accomplishes things beyond describing them because all the conceptions are dialogical and multivoiced.

Habermas's theory of language is a more narrow philosophy of language since it attempts to integrate various propositions into a single, rational, consistent universalistic logic that supports abstract practices of power (such as eurocentrism); the urge to control, and govern ever-growing territories social, political and cultural life. (Tully 1999a: 107) In other words, in Habermas's conceptualization, the logic of propositions corresponds to the logic of a certain world that may easily become independent from all concrete life situations. All concrete life situations are always larger than the logic of world that is described and theorized. At this point, Habermas's theory is not open-ended and incomplete; therefore, it makes no room for the inclusion of difference. It does not provide options for differences, which certain members of a society may independently decide on their different conceptions of life. Because his theory is incorporates a formed

and strong idea of consent, he does not encourage difference and as such, leaves feasible spaces for the different members of cultural and political societies to live with the awareness of each other's differences without surrendering their cultural worlds with different conceptions.

In a dialogical field of social and cultural life, consensus cannot be expected nor demanded. Conceptual diversity and conflicts, even struggles over different interpretation life are constitutive of the multiple and ever emerging new realities of life, precisely because these conceptions subsist in dialogical processes. In order have consensus, different members of society have genuinely paying attention to each other's views, values, and strong will to modify or alter their preconceived notions. If there is no strong will for change, then it can be difficult to convince people to follow procedures of communicative rationality and to agree with the consensus of the group. This means that consensus can never be achieved because the participants can never fully transcend the presuppositions and preconditioning that they bring to the ideal speech situation of communicative action. For example, besides a will to overcome cultures with personal opinions and desires, there has to be a shared narrative or social reality. Ideal speech situations cannot be produced, transmitted, or understood without reference to that underlying shared reality. This includes both the mutual recognition as it enters the communicative action as well as the compatibility of languages and truth claims based on different social contexts of languages or epistemological paradigms. If there is an absence of mutual recognition and compatibility of languages, agreement as universality of an ideal speech situation can be difficult to achieve. In order to reach such universality in terms of agreement, ideal speech situations have to abstract communicative process away from the embedded, contingent, and predetermined aspects of human beings. If this is

case, then, Habermas's ideal speech is in the position of losing contact with life altogether. This can lead to the denouncement of variety and richness of human diversity.

In this context, the other the most obvious difference between Habermas's Ideal Speech Situation and Bakhtin's dialogue is that Habermas wants to describe a regulative model of the communicative situation. Thus, Habermas thinks it possible to detain what is universal, rule-governed, and repeat-able in instances of ideal communication. Unlike Habermas, Bakhtin has no such plea. As differently from Habermas identification of language with three general types of validity claims: a claim to truth raised in constative speech acts, a claim to normative rightness raised in regulative speech acts, and a claim to truthfulness raised in expressive speech acts, Bakhtin takes language as a dialogical being, even as a becoming, simultaneously insuring a unity and difference. Bakhtin sees language as a living totality and not as an isolated abstraction; and he offers a dialogical understanding of language that has a practical and historical orientation. (Bakhtin, 1981: 181-182) According to him, each speech act is situated within its unique, concrete context. Hence, it is phenomenological event.<sup>23</sup> For Bakhtin, each speech act cannot be represented by abstract or idealized concepts, because as a performed act it holds a unique dialogical place within the architectonic whole, as a once-occurring event. (Bakhtin, 1993: 32) According to Bakhtin, a dialogic relationship of language is interpenetrated inside every utterance, even inside the individual word. In this particular conceptualization, as he often does, Bakhtin localizes his observations about the dialogical character of language to the literary language, which he sees is the perfect place to represent this dialogical interrelation of utterances and voices. In the realm of literary language, languages interact with each other in a variety of ways (involving dialogical lines with age, class, and family groups and socio-ideological parts of the past). Bakhtin (1981:

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<sup>23</sup> Michael Bernard-Donals has pointed out that the language theory of Bakhtin is decidedly shaped not only by the neo-Kantian milieu but also by phenomenology and Marxism (Bernard-Donals 1995)

291-292) stresses that languages intersect with each other in many different ways.” Each one of these languages represents “specific points of view on the world, forms for conceptualizing the life in language, specific world views, each differentiate by its meanings and values” – each encounters each other in a world of multiplicity. Therefore, while Habermas’ theory of language is oriented centripetal, centralizing, and universalistic understanding, Bakhtin’s philosophy of language is oriented toward centrifugal, carnivalistic, differentiating and polyvocal understanding. This difference between Habermas theory language and Bakhtin’s philosophy of language should be viewed as the clashing centers of meaning, contradictions, and complexities working within a decentred understanding of the world. This also involves a fine-tuning of distinction between language that is oriented toward systematic unity (consisting of instrumental and strategic action) and language, which is oriented toward dialogical action.

From this point of view, Bakhtin not only posits as dialogical and polyvocal a dialogic understanding of language but also describes the condition of language in which such dialogical activity takes place. For Bakhtin, dialogism is the stimulating flow that brings heteroglossia to life. This view of language is itself centrifugal and decentralizing in its aspect. This decentralization is accomplished by heteroglossia, which is never perfectly in line with the intentionality of the communicative process. In order to make further provision for the dialogic nature of language alongside the centrifugal forces, Bakhtin’s philosophy of language also emphasize the centripetal forces (i.e., discourse and genre) that carry on their uninterrupted work for verbal-ideological centralization and unification. Bakhtin’s theory of language acknowledges the ineradicability of the play of centripetal and centrifugal forces. Bakhtin supposes that neither truth nor understanding can ever be expressed in isolation. Bakhtin understands that every expression of viewpoints requires an alternative position to be articulated against, indeed contains

within itself this opposition. Therefore, he sees not only both centripetal and centrifugal forces of language are necessary for dialogue to function but also an understanding that requires liberating power of centrifugal forces to reach outside social constraints and negotiate entirely new bases. This way, Bakhtin endorse more strongly differentiating role centrifugal forces while Habermas support the role of centripetal forces (e.g. reason) for orienting communicative process toward reaching an agreement or mutual understanding. Generally, Bakhtin theory of language is dialogic, whereas Habermas theory of language is not because Habermas system of language tends move communicative elements towards the universal, the non-specific, decontextualization while Bakhtin's view of language actually encourage dialogical activity in the terms heteroglossia

In Bakhtin's view, heteroglossia is the condition of dialogical activity, which encourages the mingling of languages. Heteroglossia, as organized in clashes of centripetal and centrifugal forces, is not merely heteroglossia vis-à-vis the centralizing tendencies in the life of language, but is a heteroglossia deliberately opposed to truth claims as victory of centripetal forces of language. Bakhtin (1981: 272) suggests that

Every utterance participates in the 'unitary language' (in its centripetal forces and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces . . . . The authentic environment of an utterance, the environment in which it lives and takes shape, is dialogized heteroglossia, anonymous and social as language, but simultaneously concrete, filled with specific content and accented as an individual utterance.

It is multivoiceness, and aimed sharply against the centralized verbal and ideological life. It is heteroglossia that has also been dialogized. Dialogized heteroglossia is incorporated into the multiplicity of language, verbal-ideological belief systems, history and accidental and intentional use of multiple voices. Dialogized heteroglossia is active in incorporating

a double voicedness, diversity and multiplicity between one person or group and another in communicative process. In contrast to Habermas's ideal speech situation, Bakhtin's dialogical approach cannot be seen as an attempt to fix and unite meaning for universality but it can be more accurately viewed as a both locus or meeting point of differing meanings and differing points of view as well as the rise of multiplicity and difference.

In contrast to Habermas's analysis of cognitive and ordinary language and its emphasis on communicative competence, the primary source of Bakhtin's analysis of language is literary language. Analysis of language through this source is important for Bakhtin because he wants to express the dialogical in the rhetorical triangle, which consists of addresser/author, addressee/reader, and hero. The influences between the three elements result in a complex dialogical interaction that is firstly, not characterized by charges of absolutism. Secondly, the interaction does not attempt to cement an unchanging meaning and hierarchy of values. In other words, Bakhtin does not want to insert particular language as the sole verbal and semantic center of the understanding of the world. By literary language, he means language in use or as a concrete act. Literary language takes on meaning at some specific historical moment in a social setting where it engages in an ongoing socially dialogic manner with a host of other languages. So literary language, which is a specific use of language, is dialogical and a continuation of the dialogues which preceded it, and of which it can also constitute a part.

According to Bakhtin, the kaleidoscopic nature of literary language enables us to perceive in language that which escapes the systematicity of linguistics of communication and that, which concentrates, on the sphere of the unity and stability in terms of a grammar, or logic. Literary language operates in a sense in an open system, turning on meaning on multiple ways, the decentralizing image, which inserts specificity and dialogue; utterance itself forms the normal dialogical structure and serves to strengthen and concentrate even



further on the dialogical communication. Therefore, literary language does not stand for a unitary, complete and incontestable structure; rather it is the play of forces; much as past and present or hero, reader and author. (Bakhtin, 1981: 49) Through the play of forces, literary language becomes the language of dialogical. It is the language of dialogical because, there is no authority to embrace objectivity.

Literary language represents the multiple notion of dialogical in various ways. It represents dialogical not only as an exchange of voices of a hero, reader and author or a reciprocal relationship (having addresser and addressee, real or imagined) but also a relationship of utterances that are alive in context. This point brings us to the main theme flowing through Bakhtin's philosophy of language. While Habermas, as we saw earlier, concentrated more on the rational form of language as an abstract system of expression in relation to norms, feelings and purposes, Bakhtin more so focuses on the social dynamics of utterances as they are uttered in a social and historical setting. He takes the specific concrete historical utterance as locus for understanding the dynamic and creative forces of the life of language. Seeing language as the interaction of the utterances from a social interaction perspective enables him to conceptualize language as akin to a living social act.

When language is described as living acts, then meaning does not directly belong to language as either a stable or systemic element of communication. Nor does it reside in the comprehension of the addresser and addressee. Moreover, it goes beyond obtaining meaning—for in semiotics it is only in virtue of its position in a web of differential signs. Rather it belongs to an utterance in its position between speakers and is realized only in the process of active and responsive understanding. Every utterance in a way has its own multiple meanings, which has build up a certain amount of semantic and connotative information. Meaning is the effect of the interaction of utterances that are voiced

between addresser and addressee. So meaning that is expressed and represented by language is not something that is already given but rather is produced in the context of a specific, space-time communicative event of language. When uttering, an addresser uses words in a concrete narrow meaning but bears in mind everything this word possesses (at least everything the speaker knows about this word). Likewise, the addressee perceiving the word with its entire 'belongings', tries to ascertain the meaning the speaker implied, to decipher it with the help of the communicative context. Therefore, the interlocutors must install the dialogical connections with all the elements of the context in order to be understood and to understand each other. Still, of course, the most important thing is the dialogue between the interlocutors. Each utterance is somehow the product of mutual efforts of the participants of the conversation to establish understanding, to reach the productive communality of their verbal actions.

### **III.5. Conclusion**

The theories of language of Habermas and Bakhtin offer different accounts of the content and characteristics of meaningful social action in and through language use. Different routes that these authors take lead them and their audiences to different viewpoints. In the case of the ideal speech situation, Habermas tries to develop a common unitary language within the system of linguistic and moralistic norms. On one hand, these norms constitute an abstract imperative. On the other hand, they appear to be the generative force of social and moralistic life, forces that struggle to overcome heteroglossia of language, forces that unite and centralize viewpoints in terms of a search for consensus. What Habermas has in mind is an abstract linguistic and moralistic minimum of a common language, in the sense of a system of elementary forms guaranteeing a minimum level of comprehension in practical communication. Thus, on

one hand, he regards languages as systems of abstract grammatical categories; on the other hand, he considers them as ideologically saturated worldviews. In contrast to Habermas's logical, rule based, centered theory of language, Bakhtin's theory of language emphasizes the decentring notion of the dialogue in order to grasp the complexity and multivoicedness of the language in the state of heteroglossia that is more or less alive. It gives more attention not to structural investigation of language (of which word and sentence are constituent parts) but to the use of languages that are dialogical as to-and-fro movement. This motion reflects a continual shifting between unity and difference in order to release various aspects of the language.

Bakhtin also sees language as a transparent medium, which carries the addresser's meaning to the addressee. Habermas views language as the medium of rationality of communication used by the participants to create mutual understanding. It mediates between the surface of the communicative action and its deep below-the-surface structures of communicative action. Therefore, the language theory of Jurgen Habermas has more of the centralizing tendencies of abstraction, systematicity and analytical rule making. In contrast to Habermas, Bakhtin's theory of language is couched in dialogical relationship. This relationship determines and is determined by social and historical formations; in essence, it is a material production of a particular time and place and it has the world-view and understanding of addressee and addresser embedded within. In relation to this, he sees language as two-sided social and historical acts with the addresser on one side and addressee on the other. From this outlook meaning does not belong to any systematic of language, rather it belongs to use of language in relation to the positions between speakers

## CHAPTER IV. SELF-GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY

### IV.1. Introduction

An agreement on the conceptualization of democracy is a remote possibility, “first because of its very nature and, second, because for a long time it has been the stake in political debates and struggles.” (Castoriadis, 1997: 340) A direct translation from its original Greek connotation (i.e., *demos* and *kratos*, meaning, the power of the people) is not sufficiently helpful as this also calls into play a set of issues regarding the parameters and essence of power and how individuals living in a certain time and space can be conceptualized as people. Nevertheless, one who aims to discover the very notion democracy within the context of a concrete dialogical formation cannot avoid engaging conceptualizations of “power” and “people.” Common to almost all conceptions of power is the view of some kind of capacity to make choices towards determining one’s conditions in given situations. From this affirmative viewpoint, power is connected to the idea of freedom that one is supposed to have in attaining his/her desired ends. From a negative point of view, power is associated with conditions of limitations and types of imperative control. (Weber, 1947: 324-325) Weber defined the imperative control as “the probability that certain specific commands . . . from a given source will be obeyed by a given group of persons.” (Weber, 1948: 214) In introducing the concept of imperative control, Weber underlined the importance of the role of legitimate authority in the formation and pursuit of ends. Encountering these commonly held views on the notions of “power” one can basically define self-government as limitation or power practice which makes citizens free to choose and to pursue their own ends and which are also subject to legitimate authority. (Castoriadis, 1997: 251)

The practice of power can be classified within two analytical categories of politics: micro and macro. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari describe these as the micro (i.e.

molecular) and macro (i.e. molar) categories of politics. As these authors conceptualize the terms, one side of the coin is inextricably linked to the other. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) Macropolitics results in a specific micropolitical structure, while the micropolitical power in turn influences the structure of macropolitics. Macropolitics refers to the cohesive realm of ideology, parties, institutions, constitutions, and other formal arrangements that impose rules on everyday life. In contrast to macropolitics, micropolitics is the cohesive realm of the discourse that operates and evolves through linguistic and semiotic practices of communication. It is concentrated and widely operated. Similarly, up to this point in my discussion in the previous chapters, I have tried to conjecture the concept of dialogical democracy at two levels. The first is the micro level at which self-government is affected by particular modes of human social interaction, communication and language (i.e. a reciprocal relationship among voices). The second is the macro level where self-government exists in relation to the particular framework of structures and organizations, which empower and facilitate people, encourage relations of mutual respect and cooperation among them, and abate opportunities for domination.

I maintain that at both the macro and micro levels of abstraction, the concept of self-government not only fulfills the conditions of dialogical democracy but also provides a viewpoint regarding an overall understanding of the dialogical notion of democracy. Moreover, the concept of self-government helps one to ascertain how micropolitics is linked to macropolitics. Whether in micro or in macropolitics, democracy can be said to exist in so far as people are the authors of their own actions and the source of their own power and law. For democracy to characterize the essential moments of politics, people must be the object of their actions and the subject of their laws at each level. This means that they must possess a capacity for self-government. Two conditions warrant the

materialization of self-government at both the individual and collective levels. First, persons must be free from any influence that may drive them to give up their inherent authority. Second, officials and institutions that are authorized to use political power in order to reach collective decisions in the name of the people must be continually held responsible for their actions. The second condition follows through the proviso that in a state of self-government, people are not only the authors of political power but also the subjects of their own power because they, in one way or another, authorize the use of power over themselves. In doing so, they give their consent to the conduct of self-governance as parts of an individual and collective source and structure of political power.

In this chapter, first, I will elaborate on the accounts of self-government put forward by Jean Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant. These conceptions will help us to understand the requirements of democracy at the macropolitics level. Rousseau and Kant made significant contributions to political theory as they clarified some of the central tenets of self-government and their relation to democracy. Rousseau showed how people have gained a new form of freedom by participating in the social contract viewed as the negative image of the state of nature. The form of freedom that is by the social contract is characterized by rationality and the ability to be the author of laws that one is subject to. According to Rousseau, this freedom can only be gained by being a member of a body politic, becoming a part of the sovereign, and obeying the government that executes the general will as expressed in abstract laws. If people break the law or refuse to comply with the authority of the state, they destroy the very institution of self-government that has made their freedom possible in the first place. By forcing people to comply with the authority of the state and the law, the state would only be forcing people to hold on to their own true will: hence, there exists civil freedom. In contrast to Rousseau, Kant

defines freedom as the will and rational ability to form one's own laws. He states that people are not free if they follow the demands of their inclinations, if external forces determine their will or if they make deliberate calculations about the probable consequences of their action. He suggests that freedom is possible only in the following instances; if people follow categorical imperatives, if they choose maxims that can be accepted as universal laws, if they are living in a "state of autonomy"—that is, a will that constitute laws for themselves by the use of reason. Thus, according to Kant, people are in a state of self-government only if they are the subjects and authors of categorical imperatives. Sure enough, this account of self-government makes sense only within Kant's system of concepts. Therefore, a basic overview of Kant's philosophical system is inevitable.

In the second part of this chapter, I shall scrutinize the very notion of self-government with respect to the realm of micro flows of meaning residing in a continuous stream of heteroglotic dialogue. I shall reflect on dialogue as a process of negotiations within an ever-widening circle of human self-identifications and self-determinations. In this context, first, I shall explore the meaning of the self as conceived by Bakhtin. Penetrating the meaning inherent in Bakhtin's concept of the self, I aim to develop a broad picture of the individual who participates in the dialogical process; and, based on this exploration, I will offer a particular formulation of self-government. In essence, it will be advanced as a reciprocal relationship between "I" and "me," addresser and addressee, and between ruler and ruled. It will be apparent that this clarification of self-government at the micro interaction level can provide valuable insights into the notions of self-government suggested by Rousseau and Kant for a political system to have democracy as its central axis.

## IV.2. Rousseau's Conception of Self-Government

Rousseau's view of self-government flows with an interchangeable use of terms: *people*, *citizens*, *subjects*, *power*, *state* and *sovereign*. His emphasis on the different connotations of otherwise interchangeably usable terms (*as noted previously* all refer to the *republic* or to the *body politic*) are extremely important for understanding the self-governing characteristic of dialogical democracy. As noted previously, even for a minimum definition of both self-government and democracy, one must elaborate on the meanings of people and power. This follows from the assertion that democracy is a regime of self-government by virtue of which people are empowered to make decisions to the effect of materializing their very interests. Thus, it can be argued that in order for a political regime to contain the main character of self-government, the problems of *collective choice* and *social choice* must be resolved. The problem of collective choice is about "by whom the decision is taken"; and to tackle this problem, the concepts of *people*, *citizens* and *subjects* must be "precisely" distinguished from each other. The problem of social choice is about "whose interest the decision serves"; and to cope with this problem; the concepts of *power*, *state* and *sovereign* must be differentiated from each other. At this point, I will briefly expand upon Rousseau's suggestions regarding the precise meanings of these terms and also the relationship among them in order to construct a general framework for determining the democratic potentials and limitations of a political regime.

To begin, we must note that the social contract refers to the renouncement of some "natural liberties" individuals have in order to constitute a political authority to which they subject themselves. (Rousseau, 1988: 94-96) This may also refer to a departure of people from a *State of Nature* to form an association and the *body politic* for securing peaceful coexistence. (Rousseau, 1988: 92-93) Rousseau describes the *State of Nature* as a



situation of free will (absolute freedom) and as an absence of any civil authority. (Rousseau, 1988: 15-16) This means that people are born free and hence are unbounded to do whatever they want without any kind of restraints; their actions are only guided by instant instincts, impulses and desires. They are little different from animals because their actions are not determined by an ability to be rational and moral. For this reason, Rousseau suggests that in the *State of Nature*, people may appear to be free but they remain a greater slave to their own instincts and impulses. This means that in the *State of Nature*, people enjoy absolute freedom, as there is no will to govern them. However, because they are moved by instincts and impulses, they may be the subject of oppression and the practice of violence. In essence, there exists no authority that can protect them and ensure their freedom. Given the conditions of absolute freedom, where one person's action is not restrained and he or she is free to do whatever he or she wants, the security and well-being of the people cannot be ensured. The security and well-being of individuals depends upon the conduct of their actions. In other words, personal security, arguably, requires authoritatively imposed constraints on absolute freedom. If there are no constraints on absolute freedom, then one's security and well-being cannot be ensured, hence, one is not free and one lies in chains everywhere. (Rousseau, 1988: 85)

If one is to be secure and free, absolute freedom must be restrained; and, again arguably, the constraints will not be effective unless they are imposed by an agency that is recognized as authoritative. Nevertheless, if such constraints are necessary, how could one associate in a way that accommodates concerns rooted in self-government? How could individuals combine for security, while obeying only himself/herself and so remaining as free as before? How is it possible to combine authority, which provides protection, with freedom, which consists in giving the law to one's self. The state of

nature is exemplified by certain characteristics that necessitate the political authority of individuals.

Rousseau believes that the *State of Nature* is characterized by problems of absolute freedom. This condition motivates people to pull themselves out of insecurity by agreeing among themselves to form a social contract. By putting forward a social contract, people hope to secure the freedom that should accompany a cooperative life in society. This freedom is tempered by an agreement not to harm one's associates, but this restraint leads people to self-government and to be good and rational. With the contract comes a new type of freedom called civic freedom. By agreeing to live together and look out for one another, a person is not only born free but also learns to be free, and tempers his/her brute instincts. Thus, Rousseau's idea of "man is born free" has special significance, because it reflects freedom as the faculty (i.e. rationality) that constitutes the specific difference between man and other animals. (Rousseau, 1988: 85) Rationality is the quality of being a free agent. In the natural world, every animal is governed by instincts. For animals, the need to survive and to live well is realized and built through the order of nature. In contrast to animals, people encounter the same impression, but they realize themselves as free to resist the order of nature in terms of instincts. The specific difference between people and other animals are their rational capacity to live free. For Rousseau, individuals can truly be free and live well if they do not act on instincts, desires and passions. Freedom, like the faculty of rationality, is part of their nature, even when they alienate their liberty and make themselves subject to authority. (Rousseau, 1988: 88) Freedom that belongs to the people has a special moral significance for Rousseau. In enjoying freedom, all persons recognize corresponding responsibilities through rights and obligations. For him, "to renounce liberty is to renounce one's humanity, the rights of humanity and even its duties." (Rousseau, 1988: 89)

For this reason, Rousseau clearly sees the necessity for protecting freedom. This means that if a person begins in a natural state in which one is entirely free, yet because one's freedom has no protector, one's freedom can be subjected to brute force. Thus, if one's freedom is not protected, then there is no availability of freedom to anyone. The only way to protect freedom and secure one's well-being is to create a force that cannot be overpowered. This force can arise only where several persons come together. This force is created by a social contract, which is an act of association to form an artificial body, the political society with *body politic*. (Rousseau, 1988: 44-46) Parties to the social contract come to an agreement to relinquish their freedom to constitute a sovereign with the right to exercise power with the intention of establishing a system of imperative control. (Rousseau, 1988: 103)

Nevertheless, the exercise of power cannot derive its legitimacy from any private person - however magnificent this person might be- or from any tradition -however cherished it might be by a person or group- it can only rest on a formal rational basis. In this very sense, the *body politic* is an entity beyond the sphere of society because the latter is the realm of "private" institutions such as family, professional associations, political parties, classes, ethnic and religious communities and associations. The recognition of this very principle appears to be the precondition of the social contract and, hence, it can be called the tacit element in the contract. In other words, it exists as a tacit solidarity among the parties, *imagined or real*, as to the supremacy of the general will that gains formal public authority with the contract. (Rousseau, 1988: 93) This amounts to saying that the general will, in order for being the unifying building block of the body politic, must be recognized at all times. Only given this condition, the body politic can act as the *sovereign* when it is creating laws, and, hence, exercising the general will. The sovereignty of body politic is important because the legislative power is granted to the sovereign, which is consisted of

all contracting parties. In other words, sovereign is the ultimate authority to legislate, whose execution of the general will gives direction to the executive organ, i.e. the government. In this sense, the sovereignty of body politic has utmost significance in providing a base of self-government to the state because in the absence of a sovereign body politic the state cannot gain legitimacy characterized by the rule of law. (Rousseau, 1988: 98)

In this manner Rousseau conceived self-government as *body politic* not only as result of the agreement of all “private” bodies that recognize “the supreme control of the general will” over them but also as a means of uniting separate powers of people in a sum of forces strong enough to overcome resistance and uniting people enough so that their powers are directed by a single motive and act. It is *body politic* to which people totally and voluntarily alienate themselves for the purpose of using this sum of forces for the protection of each member, including oneself. (Rousseau 1988: 92) Rousseau (1988: 93) says:

Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme control of the general will, and, as a body, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.

For Rousseau, the very idea of self-government refers not only to a departure from the state of absolute freedom but also to the power of a people to give unto itself law. Without *body politics*, any concept of self-government is useless because it would exist solely at the will of those in power. (Arendt, 1977:165) Rousseau suggest that the goal of the *body politic* is to set up a form of established order (i.e. state) that protects the freedom of each citizen without significantly depriving the freedom one has enjoyed in the natural state. In other words, the *body politic* essentially attempts to reconcile an individual’s freedom with the existence of the state, and in particular with the state’s authority to create and enforce laws. Rousseau (1988: 92) sets out this issue as to “find a form of

association that defends and protects the person and passions of each associate with all common strength, and by means of each person, joining forces with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before.” This is Rousseau’s description of self-government, which is initiated by the social contract, formed by the *body politic* and implemented by the rule of general will. (e.g., sovereign)

The *body politic*, which is composed of every individual who agrees to the contract, is the unifying force behind self-government. *Body politic* unites the separate wills of people in such way that a public person emerges as a single motive and acts together (i.e. *general will*). Hence it seeks the general will and enables it to rise. Thus, when one person enters into a *body politic*, one participates in the creation of the general will and supports its longevity. In return, the *body politic* provides protection without subordination to any particular will because it is representative of the sovereign. Gaining its being wholly from the social contract, the *body politic* can never alienate any part of itself, or submit itself to another sovereign other than the people. It only binds itself to the original consent of the people. The *body politic* cannot represent any will that is contrary to the will of the people (i.e. general will) because it is united with the one body of people who created it. Accordingly, *body politic* as sovereign power cannot hurt any of its subjects, because it is impossible for the body to have the aspiration to hurt all of its creators. Thus, Rousseau believes that the *body politic* expressed through the exercise of the general will have two forms: the sovereign and the state. The *body politic* is acting as a sovereign when it authors laws. It is acting as a state when it is under the rule of law. More specifically, Rousseau (1988: 93) describes:

In place of the private person of each contracting party, this act of association at once produces a collective and artificial body, composed of as many members as the assembly has votes, which receives from this same act its unity, its collective self, its life and its will. This public person, which is thus formed by the union of all the other persons,

formerly took the name of *city* and now takes that of *republic* or *body politic*, and its members called it a *state* when it is passive, as *sovereign* when it is active, and a *power* when comparing it to others of its kind. As for the associates, they collectively take the name of *people*, and individually, they are called *citizens* when they participate in the sovereign authority, and *subjects* when they are subject to the laws of the State. But these terms are often confused and taken one for another; it is enough to know how to distinguish them when they are used with absolute precision.

This description demonstrates that the act of political association consist of actions between the public and individuals in the sphere of the *body politic*, and that each individual, in agreeing with oneself, is constrained in a threefold authority; as agreeing with oneself, one is bound to oneself, as an associate of *the people* (i.e. sovereign), one is bound to other associates, and as a constituent of the general will to the sovereign (i.e. the state). In this description, the sovereign is the *body politic* where people act collectively. It cannot be represented, divided, or broken up in any way: only when all the people act collectively can there be a sovereign. The sovereign authors laws as an abstract reflection of the general will and then orders the state to enforce these laws. To clarify, the body is composed of the state and sovereign — it is just acting in different functions. Furthermore, the exercise of the *body politic* and consequently any act of sovereign and state is an exercise of the general will. Rousseau sees that the general will not be an aggregate of particular wills or the sum total of individual desires, but a will of all or the unity of the numerous wills of all persons who live in a society. (Rousseau, 1988: 100-101) It is a universal category and, hence, it appeals not to personal interests but to the common interests of the people as a whole.

In Rousseau's view, the sovereign is not a legislature of elected representatives as we see today, but rather an assembly composed of each citizen of the *body politic*. Rousseau does not believe that freedom could exist in a representative legislature, as the result would be the alienation of sovereignty. For Rousseau, sovereignty is inalienable because, by its very

identity, it is derived from the will of all, hence, general will. (Rousseau, 1988: 94-95) Additionally, sovereignty, in order to be applied to all, must be derived from all. Thus, any exercise of the sovereign will cannot emerge from a detachment of association (namely, elected representatives or government). If it detaches itself from the collective action of the people, it not only makes the *body politic* become unlawful, it denies freedom for the people because freedom is the capability of the citizenry to give itself law. Without the ability to give itself law, any notion of freedom is worthless because it would exist exclusively at the will of those in power.

Another of Rousseau's understandings of self-government deals with a reconciliation of individual freedom with the unity of people as it appears in the relationship between the subject and the republic. Rousseau defines the republic as a state ruled by the law. (Rousseau 1998: 107) The subject is an individual who complies with the orders of the state. The orders of the state are laws that are authored by the sovereign. (Rousseau, 1988: 93) A subject is also a *citizen* who is a participant in the *body politic* that is taking part in the activities of the sovereign. Rousseau calls the collective grouping of all citizens the "sovereign," and claims that it should be considered in many ways to be like an sovereign power of individual person (Rousseau, 1988: 103).

A self-governing republic is an ideal state in which the general will is equal to the will of all. Not only does this mean that everyone in association recognizes the common interest of the body politic, it also means that everyone pursues the general will in exactly the same way. This means that a subject, who acts upon laws, is obeying himself. Thus, by acting upon laws and, hence, obeying the government, the subject is obeying the sovereign, which means that the subject is upholding the general will. In an ideal state, each subject's will is definitively the general will, and the subject becomes sovereign. In particular, under Rousseau's republic, what each person accepts as sovereign is not the

will of any individual or collections of individuals, but the general will that represent the will of all. The sovereign is a collective being constituted by a collection of persons who share an understanding of the common good and accept the authority of that general will in matters of collective decision-making. So, the general will is such not simply in that it comes from all, but in that it is by its character heading for the interests of all: its substance is universal. Thus, if an ideal republic is governed by a general will, each person governs him/herself.

In the ideal republic, all persons equally play a part in the creation of laws to which all will equally be subject. In other words, individual freedom is reconciled with the unity of society by a form of direct, participatory democracy. For him, individuals are citizens insofar as they participate in the making of laws and their own state, based on their ascertaining of the general will, and they are subjects insofar as they must give obedience to that same law and authority of the identical state. For Rousseau, freedom and subjection to authority go together thus, but in a way, that makes it a concept of self-government.

In a republic, the general will find its clearest expression in the general and abstract laws of the state. (Rousseau, 1988: 105-107) All laws ensure liberty and equality: beyond that, they may vary depending on local circumstances. While the sovereign exercises legislative power by means of the laws, states also need a government to exercise executive power. The act of government is the execution of the law, which also is the execution of the General Will by the government. The government is not distinct from the sovereign, and the two are almost always in unity. (Rousseau, 1988: 121) This unity is instructed by the unity of all the people (eg. general will). The people exercise their sovereignty by meeting in regular, periodic assemblies. It is important to attend these assemblies, because attendance is essential to give rise to the general will. When citizens elect representatives,



the general will cannot appear. When voting in assemblies, people should not vote for their personal interests, but for what they believe is the common good. In a republic, the results of these votes should move toward elements of unanimous consent. (Rousseau, 1988: 151) In such a situation, Rousseau presupposes that all people have agreed to the rule of the majority, as there would be no disagreement if all laws were approved by unanimous consent. In order to be legitimate, the use of the rule of the majority itself must be agreed to unanimously. He believes that majority rule is a way to treat people as equals and free because it represents a fair system of collective choice. Furthermore, majority rule is the best way of settling disagreements about what the laws, as abstract expressions of the general will, should be. (Rousseau, 1988: 153)

Rousseau suggests that if there are long discussions and disagreements, this may engender the superiority of particular interests and the decline of the public. However, if more dialogue happens, that is, the nearer opinion approaches unanimity, the greater is the dominance of the general will. (Rousseau, 1988: 152) Nevertheless, at this point, Rousseau reveals the problem of those who vote differently from the majority. In other words, if one is sovereign only when one authors laws, what happens when laws are passed by a majority which one voted against, or how can persons can be both free and forced to conform to a set of wills that are not of their own making? How are the opponents at once free and subject to laws to which they have not agreed?

Rousseau's answer to the problem is complex. Rousseau believes that the citizens of the republic give their consent to all the laws, including those, which are passed in spite of their agreement, and even those, which restrain one when one has refused to comply with them. The continuous will of all the subjects of the state is the general will; by virtue of it, they are self-governing and they are free. When in the assembly of a republic, a law or policy proposal is anticipated. What is requested from the people is not exactly whether

they confirm or reject the proposed law or policy, but that they ponder its merits to ascertain whether it is in agreement with the general will, which is their will. Each participant in the *body politic*, or assembly, taking part in a ballot, expresses his or her view on that proposed law or issue; and the general will comes into force by the mere counting of votes. He suggests that if people vote differently from the majority, if their private will wins through, they are mistaken. (Rousseau, 1988: 101 and 118-122) They are not the winning side, either they pursued their self-interests rather than the common good or they have done something other than what they wanted. They are simply in error with respect to their notion of the general will, which is universal. It is then that they would not have been free. To restate the point, they would have done what they were not willing to do and would thus not be in a state of self-government. In fact, he meant that what one really wants, by participating in a political body, is the common good. If one votes against the majority, then one was simply mistaken about what the general will actually entailed or embodied.

In the rule of the majority, Rousseau tries to reconcile the value of freedom, hence self-government with political community, rather than submit one to the other. For this reason, no one can be removed from the political community and subjected to the political power of another without their individual consent. The only way whereby anyone separates freedom from oneself, hence self-government is by agreeing with other people to join and unite into a community for their collective comfort, safety, and peaceful living in a secure environment that will then assist them in the enjoyment of their property. Any number of people may pursue this avenue, as it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the freedom of the state of nature. When any number of people has so agreed to make one political community, they are thereby

presently “built-in,” and make one *body politic*, which combines the wills of individuals into a “general will” all acts of sovereignty through majority vote. (Rousseau, 1988: 92)

Through majority rule, Rousseau establishes a complex conception of democracy. He proposes to institutionalize and sustain the majority’s supremacy through a system of egalitarian-democratic institutions, a direct democracy in which equal citizens regularly gather together to reaffirm their social bonds and decide on the fundamental laws that will best advance their common good, and in which limits on social-economic inequality help to sustain such institutions. Rousseau’s idea of democracy aims both to reconcile full self-government with the authority required for security, and full self-government with freedom. In democracy, freedom and self-government are inextricably linked; each sustains and gives life to the other. Self-government arises from the freedom of the people both as individuals and as members of a whole. One is free because he or she is governed by one’s own will, obeying no other will but their own, although in concert with others who are doing the same. This means that freedom is the source of self-government, which is internal to the individual: it is not the product of external forces, compulsions, etc. The requirements of freedom, in short, do not stand as limits on democracy, but instead are both ingredients of and preconditions for such a democracy wherein one is simultaneously sovereign and subject.

### **IV.3. Kant’s Conception of Self-Government**

Kant’s understanding of self-government is similar to the Rousseauian position as both are based on the idea of freedom. Kant has discussed the concept of freedom in multiple forms. (Rosen, 1993: 6-39) Firstly, he sees freedom as a purely transcendental idea because it cannot be revealed by experience. This means that the concept is based on the *a priori* principles of reason. (Kant, 1952: 42) *A priori* principles are concepts that occur to

people before they have any experience of the world rather than being extrapolated from their experiences. If the concept of freedom is drawn from experience, then it could not be guaranteed universal validity, for it would be based only on the limited set of events that individuals have experienced. The concept of freedom can be universally valid, Kant argues, only if it is based on the intrinsic validity of *a priori* principles. It is prior to and independent of any particular experience or circumstance. It occurs in the action of thinking. Thus, freedom is an *a priori* principle, just like causality that involves the concept of laws.

Freedom cannot be based on an analysis of actions one experiences or observes. Whenever one looks at people's actions, one can see circumstantial motivations. Just as no confirmation can be initiated for freedom, so it is difficult to confirm the pure concept of freedom. Nevertheless, this does not mean that pure freedom does not exist. It is the property of all rational beings and hence it exists only as an *a priori* principle. (Kant, 1952: 280)

As an *a priori* concept, Kant has described freedom as the will to do or causality as well as a rule of reason that is inherent to all individuals. (Kant, 1952: 279) Will is the faculty that enables people to pursue a course of actions and influence events in the world. Reason is the capacity for logical analysis, deliberation and argument. Thus, freedom simultaneously consists of the will as the *physical necessity* or capacity for making and pursuing choices independently of foreign cause and, it is based on logical analysis. This is called positive freedom.<sup>24</sup> (Kant, 1952: 279) Positive freedom consists of determination in a rational process that precedes action. Determining differences, weighing up options and having the power to exert decisions without coercion or restraint are the basis of positive freedom. The concept of freedom is one that is lawful in both the positive and negative

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<sup>24</sup> Rosen calls positive freedom as inner freedom (Rosen 1993:41-43)

senses in that through the understanding of free will one comprehends and can appreciate a certain independence of choice for making decisions. (Rosen, 1993: 42) For Kant, both aspect of freedom (i.e. positive and negative) are contained in the single concept of autonomy. An autonomous will is a will that is not determined by “foreign causes,” which includes not only external influences, such as physical coercion, but also internal influences, such as untoward desires. As Kant (1952: 279-280) notes:

The *Will* is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational, and *freedom* would be this property of such causality that it can be efficient, independently of foreign causes *determining* it, just as *natural necessity* is the property of causality of all irrational beings to be determined to activity by the influence of alien causes.... What, else then, can freedom of the will be but autonomy, that is, property of the will's property to be a law to itself? But the proposition: “The will is in every act on a law to itself,” only express the principle: “to act on no other maxim that which can also have as an object itself universal law.”

Thus, Kant's view that grasps self-government as unity of self-determination and independence, finds its expression in the single concept of autonomy, “the will's property of being a law to its self.” Positive freedom, for Kant, is simply the exercise of capacity (both natural and political) for self-government. This means that along with this positive freedom, one becomes responsible for one's decisions as well as actions. Self-government is, therefore, double-sided; on the one hand is positive freedom or freedom of choice, the unconstrained deliberation one makes without any interference from any other agent and is made when a possibility of a choice exists. On the other hand, it is responsibility as a capability to recognize and respond to the laws that are generated by one's self. From here, Kant theorizes the idea of freedom with respect to the terms “duty” and “inclination.” For him, these two forces within the individual guide one's actions. Inclinations emerge from desires. According to Kant, in order to make ourselves we have to detach ourselves from our inclinations and empirical interests because inclinations are

representative of natural states of being. (Kant, 1952: 281) Kant believes that “every rational being which has a will that it has also the idea of the freedom and acts under entirely this idea.” (Kant, 1952: 280) For such rational beings, it is a duty to act freely. Freedom derives its obligations from the rationality of people. In other words, the rationality of citizens is based on laws that obligate citizens to act according only to *a priori* reason. It is the specific responsibility of a free will. This responsibility is to act out of respect for the universal law. (Kant, 1952: 270) After describing inner forces of the individual, Kant suggests that freedom consists of doing actions not from inclination but from *duty*. In other words, Kant implies that whenever people pursue the demands of their inclinations, they receive their motivation from something other than themselves, and they are not free. Freedom is possible only in a condition of duty—that is, by depending only on reason for their motives and principles.

In this sense, according to Kant, we can suggest that actions consist of free will when they are undertaken for the sake of duty alone. This means that if people have a duty to love others, duty dictates their actions. However, many people may love others not out of a sense of duty, but rather because it gives them pleasure to spread happiness to other people. A clearer example of duty would be a person who feels no humanitarian inclination towards others, but who nonetheless respect others because one rationally recognizes that it is a duty to do so. Secondly, actions consist of free will not according to the goal they are meant to achieve, but rather by the law that serves as their motivation. When someone is free to act with no other motivation other than a sense of duty, they are doing so because they have rationally recognized a principle that is valid *a priori*. Thirdly, freedom consists of a respect of the law that one has authored. Animals can act out of instinct. Accidental events could convey positive results. Only a people who have the capacity for reasoning can author a general law and act out of respect for it. This

means that people are free if they are simultaneously the authors and the subjects of the laws they respectfully execute through their free will.

In relation to these three points, if we paraphrase Kant's concept of freedom, one is free if and only if one's action is good (i.e. free) in itself. (Kant, 1952: 265) This view has two main implications. First, free will cannot have motivations based on inclinations; otherwise, the action would be based on inclinations, and not on the intrinsic goodness of the action. Secondly, free will cannot be based on considerations of possible outcomes. Otherwise, the action would not be free (i.e. good) in itself, but would instead be free in that it achieved a particular outcome (contingency). Kant develops the concept of freedom neither in relation to motivating circumstances nor in relation to intended outcomes, but with regards principles possessing universal validity—a principle that is valid no matter what issue one is considering. The only principles that fit this criterion are the practical reason that one has to follow if actions are to make sense in terms of a freedom that is controlled by universal laws.

One of the primary *a priori* principles of reason is the principle of non-contradiction: actions do not make sense in terms of freedom if they are controlled by universal laws that contradict themselves. Kant's universal laws are based on this principle of non-contradiction. (Kant, 1952: 284) In order for one action to be good (i.e. free), it must be good in itself. In order for it be good in itself, it must make sense under the pure conditions of reason. In order for it to make sense, it must not contradict itself. If one lies but expects other people to believe one's self, one contradicts one's self. A will lacking pure conditions of reason and universal validity is therefore deficient in transcendental freedom. It is controlled by causation. From here, I can state that, for Kant, pure conditions of reason are conditions that are necessary for the realization of freedom. This

means that freedom, as an ability to choose and pursue is the condition of the law as well as the notion that the law is the only condition under which freedom can be realized.

For Kant, the concept of freedom and universal practical laws are reciprocally conditional for each other. At the beginning, freedom as a state of being totally unconstrained by any external forces is the condition of the possibility of the laws. At the same time, laws are the only condition under which freedom is known and recognized because they are the principles that lie distinctly before and in reason as the guiding rule of one's action. Kant defines the demands of the law for recognition of freedom as categorical imperatives.<sup>25</sup> Categorical imperatives are maxims that are intrinsically valid; they are good in and of themselves; they must be obeyed in all situations and circumstances if our behavior is to conform to the moral law. Again, Kant points out that we cannot base our understanding of these imperatives on observations of specific decisions and actions. Categorical imperatives must be grasped *a priori*. (Kant, 1952: 268)

Categorical imperatives are universal laws that one gives to oneself. However, they must also be applicable and internalized by everyone else, i.e., each person acknowledging these laws as universal and applicable. They are principles that are inherently authenticated; they are good in and of themselves; they are unconditional and hence they must be obeyed in all situations and circumstances if one's actions are to conform to the situation wherein freedom is considered an intrinsic good. This leads to a vision of a kingdom of ends that is a community in which all rational beings are free if they are at once the authors and subjects of all laws. This reasoning is apparent in Kant's categorical imperative, "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law." (Kant, 1952: 268) Laws as categorical imperatives in

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<sup>25</sup> In contrast to categorical imperatives, Kant defines Hypothetical imperatives as rules that a particular action is necessary as a means to some purpose, such as the attainment of personal happiness. (Kant 1952: 265-266)



inquiry are not those of the phenomenal world — i.e. ones that hold in respect of things as they appear to people, and which one uses in causal explanation. Rather, they are imperatives that ought to inform the conduct of all rational beings, and which they should follow absolutely (even against their inclinations). Their character is formal (i.e. general and abstract) — if it were substantive, it would re-introduce dependence. In practical terms, it involves three distinct interrelated elements: First, they consist of universality (act such that your maxim could become universal law). Second, they are ends in themselves (act such that all rational beings are respected as ends in themselves). Third, they contain a complete social system (act such that your maxim could be law in the kingdom of ends).

If laws are ends in themselves, and not means to some other end, then the will of a rational being is thought of as the maker of universal law. Otherwise, their actions would be governed by some interest and they would function as mere means to some purpose. When rational beings will something for the sake of duty alone, they must renounce all interests and motivations other than duty. Thus, their obedience to the law cannot be based on any specific interest. Rather, they must understand themselves to be subjects as well as authors of the law, and recognize that the law requires unconditional obedience.

This notion of rational beings as simultaneous authors and subjects of universal law leads Kant to the idea of a perfect community in which all people make the laws to which they are in turn subject. Such a community must be poised as an ideal to provide an adequate incentive to follow the objective laws of reason and treat their fellows not merely as means to ends but also as ends in themselves. This ideal community is called the “kingdom of ends,” meaning a kingdom composed of ends in themselves, which respects all its members as ends in themselves. In this kingdom of ends, people are acting as members of the sovereign when they create universal laws in the realm of reason. They

are acting as the subject when they are under the rule of universal law. Kant suggests that when people are obeying the rules of universal laws, they are obeying their own will and not the will of any other. Thus, they are free. (Kant, 1952: 274)

In this sense, a person's freedom consists in adopting only those maxims and motives that are consistent with the establishment of a kingdom of ends where they are both subject and sovereign. This means that no individual is free unless he or she has the reasoning power to make decisions on future generations of laws. Similarly, no society is free unless it consists of free individuals who make decisions for themselves, because without them there is no kingdom of ends. When one's free reasoning is suppressed to the margins, society's autonomous situation is also suppressed. Further, such freedom is inseparable from that of others. Freedom is hardly meaningful unless it is embedded in a shared, obliging and cooperative environment. A free individual acknowledges the ends of others as something inviolable and absolute. This leads to the recognition of equality among people. Once freedom is equally respected and endorsed as the condition for making independent decisions, one's decisions do become one's own.

In Kant's view, the governmental authority is nothing but the *united will of all rational beings* and because this will of all rational beings is universal — each decides the same thing for all and all for each — no one may claim to be wronged by the ruler. Moreover, since all justifications proceed from the universal, governmental authority cannot do anyone wrong because of its law. However, when someone makes provisions about another without reference to the general principles of reason, it is always possible for one to do upon the other an immoral thing; but one can never be morally wrong when one acts upon universal principles of reason. Therefore, only the united will of all, insofar as *each decides the same thing for all and all for each*, and so only the universal united will of the people

can be the only justifiable act which is embodied in the governmental sense over the will of all. (Kant, 1952: 280)

This *universalizing* character of the will of all *each decides the same thing for all and all for each* finds its genuine illustration in Kant's conception of morality where every rational being, insofar as one's maxims can have universal law-making force, is the will of the individual and an end in oneself.<sup>26</sup> What one should respect is the humanity present in oneself and others. Respecting one's self and others is called dignity of the person. It has an intrinsic and absolute value because when people see their free wills not as means but as ends, they will naturally accept that others have the same capacity to govern their lives. (Kant, 1952: 274) It constitutes people as ends in themselves. It rests upon their capacity to formulate objective maxims that are valid as universal laws for all people. For Kant, if people are to be free, people must try to act in such a way that they always treat humanity, whether in their own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always as an end.<sup>27</sup> If they treat other humanity as mere means, they contradict the fact that people are ends in themselves. In this case, their principles could not be universal laws, and they would violate the categorical imperative. In this sense, dignity requires that people themselves must be the authors of the law. Dignity is the criterion for people to serve as lawmakers in the kingdom of ends. (Kant, 1952: 274) When people follow the categorical imperative and chose maxims that could be universal laws, they are subject to universal laws. Hence, they are in a state of autonomy because they use reason to

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<sup>26</sup> Kant (1952: 272) says the following about the people:

Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature's, have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, that is as something which not be used merely as means, and so far therefore freedom of action (and is object of respect).

<sup>27</sup> This is second categorical Imperative of Kant. "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means." (Kant, 1952: 272)

determine their own law for themselves. (Kant, 1952: 282) In other words, people who author laws and individuals who are subject to laws are one and the same. Through this categorical imperative, we ascertain that one is bound to the law by one's duty; thus one is subject only to those laws given by the one's self. This means that the people are bound only to act in conformity with their own will. People become free when they act based on the will as informed by reason, and not that of desires and the incitements of the senses. People are free because the laws they choose to impose on themselves are based on their own reason and they do not depend on some previous cause (i.e. natural necessity). They are ends in themselves and the end is a will giving universal law.

This view of Kant is very similar to Rousseau's views on self-government. As noted above, for Rousseau, self-government is nothing but the general will, because this will equals to the will of all — each one's will the same thing for all and all for each — no one may claim to be mistreated by the sovereign because sovereignty is nothing less than the exercise of the general will. Hence, if acts of the sovereign are the executions of the general will, by obeying the sovereign, each citizen is not only upholding the general will but also obeying one's own will, thus they are self-governing. Similarly, Kant (1952: 274) says that:

A rational being belongs as *member* to the kingdom of ends when, although giving universal laws in it, he is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as sovereign when while giving laws; he is not subject to the will of any other.

For both Kant and Rousseau, self-government as democracy is explained by the united will of the people (i.e. general will). For, freedom or choice or to act to proceed from it, it cannot do anyone harm by its dictates. Now, when someone makes provisions about another, it is always possible for one to abuse the freedom of the other; but one can never abuse what one decides with regard to one's self. Therefore, though the *general*

united will of the people as *each decides the same thing for all and all for each*, people become self-governing.

#### **IV.4. Self-Government as Dialogical Text Creation and Policy Formation**

Up until this point, I have been arguing that we should consider self-government as freedom—that means the ability to govern oneself, and to be the author of the laws of one’s own action or capacity for having self-imposed or self-legislated laws, or “being a law to oneself.” To be free means that one cannot be forced to obey the authority or laws made by others. People are free only if they obey their own will. The space between freedom and obedience to one’s own will depends on the system of social interaction wherein everyone is an end in him/herself, but at the same time is fully dependent on others because of the deep reciprocity involved in attaining the state of self-government. Here, the system of social interaction means the use of language and this is the means through which people become both the subject and object of their own action, as in the case of the subject and author of their own laws. Language is the universal medium through which self-government is realized. All notions of self-government are conveyed through interpretation and understanding, and all interpretation and understanding takes place in the medium of language.

At this point, it may be useful to re-configure self-government within the communicative process as a dialogical process of text and policy formation. The body politic exists and is reproduced within a communicative process. The individual and the collectivity are integrated by use of language, and each is necessary for the other. In the body politic, people deliberate and act on textual structures called laws. Other texts, such as executive authority, guide the implementation, or non-implementation, of laws. Government attempts to have all actions conform to the law or the text. Courts interpret texts.

Citizens are informed of this activity via texts and are asked to vote on their representatives using text. If democracies are based on self-government as in the creation (i.e. authoring) and interpretation (reading) of those textual structures that guide governance, we may approach self-government as a dialogical activity of text creation and interpretation. Therefore, in this part of the chapter, I will reconsider the notion of self-government in terms of the subject/object or author/reader relationship as these dyads meet in texts. In other words, I will attempt to ground the notion of self-government in the dialogical triangle that may be variously represented as author-text-reader, subject-language-object, addresser-dialogue-addressee, and sovereign-laws-citizens.

The categories of text, author and reader are dialogical functions of language. Traditionally, the categories of author, text, and reader are held as self-evident and disconnected things. In these categories, the term author is the unique individual person who is expressing one's own will for producing text by using language. Will is the source and origin of some imaginative power, which may be unique to one's self, but stemming from that source, there is a creation of something new. In the use of language, an author organizes words, signs, and symbols for purposes of transferring one's own meaning to the other (i.e. reader) for communication. The words, signs, and symbols through which meaning is transferred remain essentially separate from the author and reader. From this perspective, text becomes a unity of words, signs, and symbols via which meaning is transferred, and through which one's meaning is made public. At this point, the act of reading appears as a discovery of meanings presented to the reader. In other words, the reader tries to generate a story from the meaning that is supposed to be the manifestation of the intention of an author. In accordance with the previous two assumptions, *meaning* from the view of narrative individualism is believed ultimately residing in the mind of the individual author.

Poststructuralist thinkers, such as Michel Foucault and Roland Barthes, argued against the author's position as the sole creator of a textual meaning that is to be uncovered by the reader. This view is called as "The Death of the Author." According to this view, authors do not possess any privilege over the text that is produced by their writing. For this reason, they have tried to replace the understanding of relations between author, text, and reader by an understanding of the relations between language and subject positions that inhabit the structure of discourse. They suggest that after a text is created, the author has no function in the formation of meaning; the text stands on its own. Once the author is detached from the text, the assertion for interpretation of the text according to author's intention becomes quite pointless. To present a text, an author is to impose a border on that text, to provide it with a final signification to close the writing. (Barthes, 1977: 147-150)

At this point, Barthes distinguishes between two types of texts: the "readerly" and the "writerly." On the one hand, the readerly text is identified as a closed text that guides the reader to an intended meaning. It creates fixed interpretation. On the other hand, the writerly text is acknowledged as an open text that encourages to act as an author, to fill in gaps within the narrative, and to create meanings.<sup>28</sup> By rejecting the notion of the dominance of authorial intent, Barthes privileges the text and reader over the author. He recognizes the freedom of a reader to create textual meaning, regardless of the intentions of the author or any pretensions to objective content. Therefore, we can argue that Barthes' intention is not to transcribe the monologue that the author (subject) carries

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<sup>28</sup> Similarly Umberto Eco distinguishes between two types of texts: the closed and the open. Open text requires the reader to make truthful interpretations that consist of a single, definite, and intended meaning. In other words, for a closed text, the reader's task is to decipher or uncover the intended meaning of the author. There is no place for the reader to firstly, discover a plurality of meaning involved in a text, secondly, to perceive experiences that reflect such plurality, and finally, to interact with it in order to play with the meaning. Open text encourages infinite readings without allowing any possible reading as final. This makes it impossible to say definitively what the best reading of a text might embody. Open texts frequently say more than their authors intended to say but less than what many incontinent readers would like them to say. (Eco, 1990: 148)

through the text, but to establish a dialogue with the text (object) itself insofar as the text (object) is nothing more than what addresses the reader in reply to one's enquiry. The position of the subject who is responsible for the reply can, therefore, be conceived of as an empty space, a place constructed by an exchange between the text (object) and the reader.

Bakhtin believes the word is never just a reflection or an expression of representation or meaning that is given, final, and already existing and outside it. Again, to reiterate, it is a two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is intended. For Bakhtin, the word is the outcome of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, addresser and addressee. Bakhtin (1986: 121-122) says:

A word (or in general any sign) is interindividual. Everything that is said, expressed, is located outside the 'soul' of the speaker and does not belong only to him [or her]. The word cannot be assigned to a single speaker. The author (speaker) has his own inalienable right to the word, but the listener has his rights, and those whose voices are heard in the word before the author comes upon it also have their rights (after all, there are no words that belong to no one). The word is a drama in which three characters participate (it is not a duet, but a trio). It is performed outside the author, and it cannot be interjected into the author.

As Bakhtin suggests, a word is a dialogical relationship that is established between an addresser and an addressee. Therefore, he believes that the word does not carry a neutral representation, but rather it does embody one's own semantic and expressive intention. After this moment of installation of one's own semantic and expressive intention, the word becomes a part of a personal language. At the event of the utterance of the word, the word becomes a part of another language. It is determined equally by a speaker's expressive and semantic intentions and the perceptions of addressee. As word, it is precisely the product of the dialogical relationship between speaker and listener, addresser



and addressee. Each and every word expresses the one's meanings in relation to the other meanings. (Bakhtin 1981: 293-294)

For this reason, Bakhtin sees text as a dialogical field that is activated by the intention of the author, readers' perception, and context. He says: "The event of the life of the text, that is, its true essence, always develops *on the boundary between two consciousnesses, two subjects.*" (Bakhtin 1996:16) In his essay, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Bakhtin lays out the main aspects of the dialogical content of the text as a relationship between author, hero, reader and text. He approaches the relationship of the author, hero, and reader as the participants of dialogue. For Bakhtin, texts have dynamism for meaning, which is realized only in the dialogue between author, hero, and reader. In other words, he does not see authors or readers as positions completely determining the meaning of the text; instead, whatever meaning is achieved is a unique dialogical interaction of what author, hero and reader bring to the text. Dialogic interactions of the author, hero and reader are open-ended and indeterminate; they prevent a fixing of the meaning in the text itself. The meaning of the text lies neither in the text itself per se, nor in the intention of the author, nor in the text recalled by the reader. The meaning of the text lies in the dialogical relationality between all three.

In this relationship, the meanings of the author are active and they act with/among the other meanings. These meanings are embodied in different characters. In a fully dialogic text, the author does not take sides with one or another character/meaning. Meanings consist of ideas portrayed from a distance. They are neither confirmed nor renounced directly by the author. Other ideas/characters may, and do, confront them, but they are still all placed in the text without being absolutely accepted or rejected. This confrontation, however, is important as it makes possible different views to come out. In other words, the text is a dialogical place of communication between views and characters

and voices. In contrast to dialogical text, in monological text, the ideas and characters of the author are actively apparent and they are in the sense of rejecting or accepting certain ideas. (Bakhtin, 1997: 82) In a monologic work, standards consist of absolute values and truths. Only the authorial consciousness knows what the truth is, and this version of the truth is dictated to another's consciousnesses (i.e. reader and hero). Therefore, genuine interaction through the text becomes impossible, and thus genuine dialogue is impossible as well. In this model of the text, the flow of ideas tends to move unilaterally, from top to bottom, from author to hero, from hero to other characters, from the writer to the reader. There is no interactive dialogical relationship between the consciousnesses of the author or the reader. Only powerful and dominant ideas in the system of binary opposition working as either/or (i.e. either good or bad) are dictated. There is no third party that can see the events from another point of view. In this one-way relationship, the hero only takes a passive role as the ideas come from a source above him/her: the author. Hence, the hero cannot question the author or his/her ideas, thus one cannot choose but to act according to the rules of the author.

In a dialogical text, all views or characters are in a constant process of communication, so that no view or character can find a possibility for domination over the others. Dialogical text has the relativity of truth as its starting point. There are no absolute truths working in dialogical text. In contrast to monological text, neither good nor bad is clearly described. All truth exists in relation to each other and, hence, is relative. At this point, Bakhtin suggests that there is no objective reading method above, beyond, and removed from working texts. All reading methods are within the texts or, more clearly, within the dialogical relationship between all three, that is, author, hero and reader.

The ongoing dialogues that are carried out in the course of writing and reading characterize the self in the reality of author and reader. Bakhtin has made clear that the

self develops through dialogue with the social world and with other human beings, which are mediated by language. Dialogical activity mediated by social and linguistic relations is fundamental to the configuration of the self.

For Bakhtin, to be a “self” is not to be a certain kind of being, but to be in a dialogical event between one and other. The self is an on-going dialogical event between multiple and contingent voices, between “both/and”, between “I,” “you,” and “he/she/it.” (Taylor, 1989: 35; 1991: 304-14) For this reason, for Bakhtin, the self can never achieve a full and complete identity, since it is always being shaped by experience, responding to social, cultural and natural surroundings. The procession of these responses is what makes up a person’s identity. Moreover, the uniqueness of each response is an affirmation of “I,” which forms the basis of one’s life being at once something actual *as well as* something yet to be achieved. (Bakhtin, 1999: 41-42) This is to say, “I” has no alibi in life. If one is shaped by experience, then “I” exists in a relation of “answerability” to the world at large, in the sense that the world enfolds one in a unique relation to one’s ends. In other words, *I* experience the world differently than others and, therefore, *I* can accept full responsibility for my actions and thoughts. But this I is a part of the dialogue the agent, as self, organizes the actions of others, selects objects on which the individual will act, and chooses or commits itself to a response.

Bakhtin’s concept of answerability can be loosely translated to mean responsibility, because one’s life is unique and non-recurrent. No other shares one’s life, and no other can accept responsibility on behalf of another. This notion of answerability prevents one from validating or legitimizing one’s actions in universal terms, since that would provide an alibi for evading one’s responsibility. When an action is justified on universal grounds, it is no longer an answerable deed but rather a technical or instrumental one. When one acts purely out of obligation to universal rules or abstractions, one becomes an invented

creature and relinquishes responsibility. In the Bakhtinian view, an ethical life is one that cannot be prescribed or formulated, but is wholly bound to the life of individual actors.

The self is also always involved in social relationships from the moment one is born free and as such; it remains a part of a network of other selves. In such a view, society and the individual, or self, and the other are not two separate entities – rather, they are two sides of the same coin. The most important element about the dialogical self is not what is contained within itself, but what becomes known between one and other. The dialogical self develops through seeing its form in the attitudes others take towards it. It consists of those attitudes of others that have been incorporated into the self.

Constantly the dialogical self has to adapt to the activities of others. There is a continual process of construction and reconstruction. One constantly tries to take meaning from other's communicative actions, and in the process, become conscious of oneself. In communicating, one learns to assume the position of others and monitor one's actions accordingly. Self-consciousness and individuality are, thus, understood as developing in dialogue with the other (i.e. society). The self is dialogical, for the other is continuously defining it. Put simply, the self is contingent on the other if one is to understand or pursue who one is. Bakhtin (1997: 287) states:

To be means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself. A person has no internal sovereign territory; he is wholly and always on the boundary, looking inside himself, he looks *into the eyes of another* or *with the eyes of another*.

For Bakhtin, the self as a source of what one expresses or how one acts exists as multiple characteristics, and is developed through dialogical relations between the “I” and “other” and between the individual and the community. (Bakhtin, 1990: 52-60) Neither of these can exist without the other. He argues that one develops in response to the utterance of

others—one takes in or incorporates certain aspects of others’ utterances towards oneself.

On the one hand, the self consists of a unique personality that exists outside of intersubjectivity; on the other hand, it represents a situated communal being where the “I lives in and for the other.” According to Bakhtin (1990: 121):

I experience, strive, and speak herein the chorus of the others. But in chorus I do not sing for myself; I am active only in relation to the other and I am passive in other’s relation to me; I exchange gifts, but I do so disinterestedly; I feel in myself the body and the soul of another... Not my own nature but the human nature in me can be beautiful, and not my own soul but the human soul can be harmonious.

The self lives on the boundary between one and other. As such, the self has no internal, independent terrain or any authoritative control over a sense or action conceived in advance and/or in isolation from the other. When one communicates with others, one can hear several different streams of expression, often developing in divergent directions and employing a number of separate, distinct languages. (Bakhtin, 1997: 202-3) Each of these different voices also has its own way of structuring and perceiving the world. These different voices, as users of language, are in the subject position. The self can only be truly individual by virtue of the inter-subjectively created and maintained by language (i.e. object). Thus, we cannot conceive of the self as equivalent to any one of the voices in terms of subject or object but only as an ongoing dialogue between them.

Bakhtin seeks to ground his understanding of the self in something universal than contextuality. He proposes a kind of reference to the generalized other (i.e. truth or common sense) that is presumed either metaphysically, scientifically or historically in the field of dialogue. This is called the “superaddressee.” Bakhtin (1986: 126) says:

Any utterance always has an addressee (of various sorts, with varying degrees of proximity, concreteness, awareness, and so forth). This is the second party (again not in an arithmetical sense). But in addition to this addressee (the second party), the author of the utterance, with greater or lesser awareness, presupposes a higher *superaddressee* (third), whose absolutely just responsive understanding is presumed, either in some metaphysical distance or in distant historical time (the loophole addressee).

For Bakhtin, the superaddressee is the higher authority that a self addresses beyond an immediate context. It is presumed, either in some metaphysical distance or in distant historical time” (the loophole addressee). Superaddressee is the “third party” that is invisibly present beyond the immediate communicative situation of oneself or two parties within dialogue. It is a true active understanding that grasps the self better than anyone at hand can, even better than one can oneself. This third party is a kind of responsive understanding that is beyond the immediacy of situation. It is hypothetical addressee that understands the addresser perfectly. It is constitutive aspect of a “common sense” in reference to “the God, absolute truth, the court of dispassionate human conscience, the people, the court of history, [or] science. (Bakhtin, 1986: 126) Superaddressee stems from the dialogic nature of self that seeks responsive understanding. Bakhtin (1986: 126-127) claim that

Each dialogue takes place as if against a background of the responsive understanding of an invisibly present third party who stands above all the participants in the dialogue (partners)... The aforementioned third party is not any mystical or metaphysical being (although, given a certain understanding of the world, he can be expressed as such) - he is a constitutive aspect of the whole utterance, who, under deeper analysis, can be revealed in it.

Here, the term “dialogical partners” refers to a dialogue between the party of the first part as “I,” the party of the second part as “the other,” and the party of the third part as the rhetorical, social and transcendental being. This third party in oneself simply refers to our individual responsive selves that draws that self out and dialogize it in relation to a distant

context and time. It is an element of generality for overcoming one's specificity. It is also a component of common language or *logos*, which one already shares with others. Nevertheless, it is neither one nor the others. It therefore supersedes the subjective opinions of the participants of dialogues that even the one always remains uninformed. The superaddressee enabled by dialogue between one and the other thus "always involves rising to a higher generality that overcomes not only one's own particularity but also that of the other." (Bakhtin, 1986: 127) This ceaseless overcoming is a unifying process of dialogue, which is not something isolated individuals "do", but is rather more like something done *with* individuals; one "falls into" dialogue and is "swept away" by something with an existence of its own.

The superaddressee appears through the agency of an "author-reader" who stands outside the characters' purview. Bakhtin refers to this aspect of the self as outsideness in aesthetic activity. Aesthetic activity is a specific form of social interaction between author and hero characterized by reciprocal relationships. (Bakhtin, 1990: 4-256) In aesthetic activity, the hero does not simply refer to finished or static things or the intention of the authors; rather, the hero presents itself to the author as an autonomous entity that stands on its own as distinctively objective qualities and viewpoints. In the novel, the author constantly tries to establish a stable character for his or her hero. Nevertheless, the efforts of authors become a source of struggle with their own self. (Bakhtin, 1990: 7) At the same time, these efforts reveal an open-ended self-awareness of oneself, the other, and the other's opinions of oneself. As Bakhtin (1997: 51-52) writes:

The hero becomes relatively free and independent, because everything in the author's design that had defined him and, as it were, sentenced him, everything that had qualified him to be once and for all a completed image of reality, now no longer functions as a form for finalizing him, but the material of his self-consciousness.

When the hero behaves as his author does, they coincide, when they find themselves standing either next to one another in the face of a value they share as same or against one another in opposition, the aesthetic activity dissolves and an ethical activity is embarked upon. For Bakhtin, aesthetic activity is the dialogical interaction of distinct voices and actions (behavior). It is not only a set of common ideologies forming an endorsement of the common good shared between the author and hero that damage the dialogical quality of aesthetic activity, but traces of the author's self within his hero to the extent that the hero responds dialogically in his world as does the author in his individual sphere. Theoretically speaking, the author and hero are one here, but Bakhtin describes the ways in which the reader fulfills the aesthetisizing role that is filled by the author in writings such as a novel. Here we should remark that the roles could be seen as probes that help order the "turn taking" within the dialogical process.

It should be emphasized that the "turn taking" system is a crucial condition and outcome of a dialogical situation. In the dialogical situation of "turn taking," the expression of one party conditioned by the expression of others constitutes a turn, with "turn taking" being the process through which the party as addresser or addressee of the moment is changed. The turn system's main function is to manage the sequential nature of communication. It organizes the information exchange between two (or more) communicating parties and ensures an efficient transmission between them. This "turn taking" system is also described as a set of reciprocal relationships that mean a mutuality of experience, whether being addressed or addressing participants are simultaneously engaged in the same activity at the same moment at different places.

This scenario exactly maps out the reciprocal relationship between author, hero and reader. In the first model, authors and heroes change their roles constantly, then readers become authors, and authors need to view their own production as readers. The unique



perspective of each subject allows the objectification of others except oneself, which is objectified by others. In this reciprocal relationship, one gains an awareness of one's own place within the whole through dialogue, which helps to bestow awareness on others at the same time. Through this reciprocal relationship, the author's capacity to independently impose a structure or meaning on a text is continuously undermined. The process of reading becomes the active making of a connection between intersections of text in the same way that authoring does. Hence, the reader does not try to uncover a meaning embedded in the text since the text itself consists of dialogical elements. What happens is that readers generate dialogues with the text and then the text becomes meaningful. Thus, readers do not try to understand the text; what they understand—what serves as the basis for meaning—are their dialogical relations with the text, rather than the text itself. Through their dialogical relationship with the text, what they understand is not only what the text addresses to them, but also their own preparation of responses to the text, which may take the form of a new textual understanding. Bakhtin calls this interaction responsive understanding.

Bakhtin sees text or artwork as a special kind of dialogical interrelationship that is realized in the object text or body of an artwork. The meaning of the work lies neither in the body per se, nor in the mind of the creator, nor in the text evoked by the body in the consciousness of the reader. This means that understanding a text is not generating new text, including everything recalled by the reader, although one may do this to come to grips with the text's meaning, as part of a dialogue of what the text is regarding, and its connotation etc. The role of the reader is not primarily in this process of generating a new text.<sup>29</sup> Rather, the text has already been produced for a reader (with a reader in

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<sup>29</sup> In "Author Hero Aesthetic in Activity," Bakhtin talk about the "confession as self-accounting," which is a form of text in which the author writes about himself, to himself, for himself. In this case, the author and hero remains as one or difference in unity. However, Bakhtin explains the ways in which the reader

thought). In other words, the role of the reader is already put together in the text itself. Through the understanding as interpreting, the meaning of the text is an attempt to regenerate that dialogical relationship between author, hero and reader. From this point of view, to understand a text, or to appreciate an artwork, does not mean one must interpret the artistic work or text suggested by the original work, but to grasp or to feel in (through), the very body of the text or artwork, viewer or reader being addressed about something, and to grasp that voice or sense which it addresses. The text is rather like an artistic work in the dialogical realm. A text is objectivity, a product of an objective dialogical interrelation that takes the form of an irreducible depth. To understand it involves absorbing it with one's senses and imaginatively reproducing its form, which is the very form of this interrelation itself. Where is meaning, then? The same place as its dialogical content: It is in the text itself, where a specific reciprocal relationship between writer, reader and hero has been formed.

Bakhtin's insights into the dialogical relationship between author and readers are illuminating in the context of the theory of self-government. Through Bakhtin's theory, we can see people as authors and readers for their realities. Texts are the dialogues they create with each other as authors and readers. People communicate with each other as authors and readers in an ongoing process of reality and meaning creation. Communication is the process of creating participation, of making shared what had been isolated and singular.

Here we are moving into the ground of generative interplay. One must understand oneself as not being outside the relations that constitute the other; one's own existence is dependent on being in relations with the other. The author alone cannot be the generator

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carries out the aestheticizing role that is filled by the author in generating such as a text. (Bakhtin, 1990: 143-149)

of text, just as most machines cannot switch themselves on or off. A text and its authorship and readership are in a relationship of mutual activation and formation—each switching and forming the other as each seeks to interpret the other into its own language. Through text, the author tries to force (on its readers) its own system of codes, and readers respond in the same way. In other words, one must understand oneself as not being outside the relations that constitute the other; one's own existence is dependent on being in relation to the other. Positions between author versus reader and sovereign versus citizens constantly change in the space of the text or self-government

#### **IV.5. Conclusion**

The understanding of self-government has two points: the active object status through the expression of free will and the passive subject status of individuals in relation to the production of policies and text as a reply to the expression of their free will. In the first case, self-government implies authorship through the direct expression of intentions and interests, desires and feelings by the people themselves. The active object status of people can be realized only through dialogue, which serves as an end as well as a means for the self-governing process of individuals. Dialogue allows people to engage in the body politic, to reflect and act on their reflections, and thus to become aware of themselves.

Moreover, self-government implies a readership as passive dimensions through which one gives oneself to one's authority. In other words, individuals are not only the subject of policies and laws but they are also readers of texts concerning laws and policies.<sup>30</sup> As long as individuals live in a society, they are both citizens subject to governance and readers that judge and conceptualize the terrain of associational life.

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<sup>30</sup> Kant says the following about the author of the law, as it is identical to the subjects to the law. "The will is not simply subject to the law, but so subject that it must be regarded *as itself giving the law* and, on this ground only, subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author)." (Kant, 1952: 273)

The emphasis here is not only placed on the conditions for authorship, but also on the participation that incorporates a type of readership, that reflectively establishes dialogue for the authorship of its being. Self-government, in other words, is intended to be dialogical through which participants become both authors and readers.

This author/reader model in relation to the dialogical self as described by Bakhtin can be seen as a reciprocal principle within a democratic society and as a model of relations in self-government. In Bakhtin's dialogical model, participants in dialogue are sincere and truthful and respect the right of each other to speak. They change their roles constantly as addresser or addressee. This is the "turn taking" system of self-government where the participant addresses as ruler and is addressed as ruled.

## CHAPTER V. NORMATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY

### V.1. Introduction

Up to this point, I have compared Bakhtin's understanding of dialogism with Habermas's concept of ideal speech to address the very notion of dialogue. In this chapter, I will argue that democracy is not an absolute state that ontologically preexists. It is founded on normative conceptions of the concept of democracy. Thus, democracy cannot rest on the sameness of objects, but on belonging to different understanding and explanations. First, I will survey several conceptions of democracy: republican, liberal, deliberative, agonistic, and Bakhtinian. I discuss the different theoretical underpinnings of these models and how they might apply in various political contexts to clarify the relationship between self-governance, democracy and dialogue. This conception-based approach to the notion of democracy requires the establishment of ideal types, which can serve as interpretive tools in determining convergences and divergences in the ways scholars conceptualize democracy.<sup>31</sup> My aim here is not to advocate one conception over another, but to offer new understandings of democracy in relation to dialogue.

The first part focuses on schools of philosophy that provide the source of contemporary normative conceptions of democracy. Classic debates on the meaning and significance of democracy reflect the divide found between two broad schools of thought namely, republican and liberal. The republican school proposes a unitary conception of

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<sup>31</sup>The ideal type methodology is closely associated with the conceptual tools of Max Weber. Weber has developed the methodology of the ideal type by exaggerating one side of phenomena, or selecting multiple aspects of phenomena and synthesizing them into a unified analytical construct. (Weber, 1949: 90-91) Weber frequently used ideal types for correlations and causal imputations as to the connections between the emergence of Protestantism and that of capitalism or between social organizations founded on patrimonial, bureaucratic, and charismatic authority. Weber's methodological tool of ideal type can offer us a modeling picture of different understandings of democracy. This conceptual pattern brings together certain relationships of democracy into a complex model, which is conceived as an internally consistent system. Substantively, this construct in itself is like an abstraction, which has been arrived at by the investigative emphasis of certain elements of understanding. Its relationship to the phenomena consists solely in the fact that where relationships of the type of democracy are referred to by the abstract construct formed or suspected to exist in phenomena to some extent, one can make the characteristic features of this relationship pragmatically clear and understandable by reference to an ideal-type.

democracy, as defined by the common good. The common good is seen as a corollary of the wider notion of active citizenry. Both are realized through civic virtue. Civic virtue constitutes public deliberation, the coming together of citizens who collectively decide on the content and parameters of the common good. The very ability of citizens to decide what the common good entails depends on their ability to take part in a public dialogue. That is the republican model of democracy.

In contrast, the liberal school of philosophy offers a particularistic conception of democracy centered on individual liberty. Individual liberty is defined as freedom of choice, and the maintenance of that condition is construed as the cornerstone of democracy. Hence, democracy, in liberal thought, is seen merely as an instrument for the exercise of individual autonomy. Democracy functions as a sort of catalyst for generating a political equilibrium for the multitude individual preferences. This political equilibrium is a procedural one, with a constant translation of different individual preferences into an aggregate one.

The second part of this chapter concentrates on contemporary conceptions of democracy; that is to say, the deliberative and the agonistic models of democracy, which represent not only major trends in political philosophy but also a well-composed mixture of republican and liberal conceptions. The difference between the deliberative and the agonistic models pertains mainly to the notion of dialogue. The deliberative model emphasizes the resolution of conflicts that could hamper the realization of the public good. The agonistic model points to difference and disagreement as the very condition of dialogue.

The third part deals with how Bakhtin's understanding of dialogism can be viewed as a normative conception of democracy. Here I consider Bakhtinian dialogism as a basis for

overcoming problems of representation found in the republican emphasis on the common good, the liberal stress on self-interest, the deliberative focus on agreement, and lastly, the agonistic orientation towards disagreement.<sup>32</sup> For Bakhtin, the dialogical process is a unity of conflicting dispositions. What we understand from Bakhtin is that widely held views of dialogue rest on the false assumption that agreement excludes conflict and vice versa. In other words, there is no dialogue without agreement and disagreement, since one conditions the other. Thus, we can say that the “good” of democracy entails not only individuality and collectivity but also agreement and conflict.

## V.2. Normative Conceptions of Democracy

To have a clearer understanding of the dialogical concept of democracy, it is necessary to focus on different conceptions of democracy from a normative point of view.<sup>33</sup>

Normative views are theoretical ideals. A normative view sets out a theory of how democracy would be if it were an ideal type. Therefore, it describes conditions under which the democratic quality of political system are produced. Normative views of the democracy are important because they set out different criteria against which to assess the

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<sup>32</sup> Bakhtin’s discussion of dialogue does not directly address any political concern with respect to a well-defined design for the materialization of democratic politics because his views are not systematic in the sense of efficiently organizing and directing any means to attain a particular goal such as democracy. His conceptions provide a kind of a framework, which potentially maximizes the likelihood that participants can attain their own chosen ends – insofar as those ends are harmonious with the self-organized regulations of dialogue, which generate the democratic system itself. Having said this, I must acknowledge that Bakhtin himself has not concluded that dialogue represents an example of a political model of democracy. However, Bakhtin’s conception of dialogism is crucial in understanding the meaning and significance of dialogical democracy.

<sup>33</sup> Sartori (1962:4) suggests:

What democracy is cannot be separated from what democracy should be. A democracy exists only insofar as its ideals and values bring it into being. No doubt, any political system is sustained by imperatives and value goals. But perhaps a democracy needs them more than any other. For in a democracy the tension between fact and value reaches the highest point, since no other ideal is farther from the reality in which it has to operate. And this is why we need the name democracy.

Bakhtinian viewpoint. These different criteria function as yardsticks to tell us just how appropriate the Bakhtinian views is in relation to those interpretations.

Normative conceptions of democracy are not supposed to be practical, nor a method to describe politics in such way that it might actually achieve a particular outcome. They are part of political imagination that can be presently beyond reach. However, they are useful because they establish different theoretical and practical understandings of what democracy is and how it dialogically functions. This different theoretical understanding allows us to generate new political imaginations for dialogical democracy or to establish new ideals, values and ends to work towards.

Conceptions of Democracy	Republican	Liberal	Deliberative	Agonistic	Dialogical
<b>Basic Characteristics</b>	Civic virtue Popular Sovereignty, Active Participation Common Good Contestation Unification	Pre-eminence of the individual, Neutral and Limited State, Private Interest Negative Freedom, Proceduralism, Contestation	Rational agents, Presupposed Plurality, Proceduralism, Universalism, Consensus, Public Interest Contestation	Critical Freedom Contingency Resistance to Order and Closure, Decentralization, Relativism, Non-Proceduralism, Conflict	Democracy is a quality of language, action, and understanding Heteroglossia, Polyphony Active Understanding Self-regulation Interaction
<b>How is dialogue expressed by the model?</b>	Dialogue is necessary for promotion of active citizenship, formation of a civic virtue and realization of the common good. Dialogue is mean to an end	Dialogue is necessary for contestation of personal preference for being translated into aggregation of individual interests. Dialogue is a mean to an end.	Dialogue is necessary for public deliberation, involving the weighing of various options and the consideration of different preferences for reaching agreement on public interest. Dialogue is both a mean for ends and end in itself	Dialogue is necessary for the rise of creativity as difference or realization of freedom in action. Dialogue is end in itself	Dialogue is necessary for empowering difference in unity. Dialogue is end in itself
<b>Representative theorists</b>	Aristotle, Machiavelli Rousseau, Madison, Arendt,	Mill, Bentham	Habermas, Benhabib, Bohman	Schmitt, Tully, Mouffe	Bakhtin



### *V.2.1. The Classical Republican Conception of Democracy*

Citizenship is central to the republican perception of democracy. Citizenship emanates from the membership status of individuals belonging to a political community. (Aristotle, *Politics*: 1275a22 or 1998: 169) The republican idea of citizenship embodies the establishment of self-government through a bilateral relationship between the individual and the political community. (Held, 1996: 48-50) Citizenship gives free and equal power to individuals to participate in the community's political life. It is empowerment to the extent that the act acknowledges in every citizen the same free capacity to act in politics for the common good. Thus, the sole purpose of democracy is the empowerment of citizens as an active citizenry. The empowerment of citizens to take part in politics assumes citizens to be virtuous beings who can make virtuous decisions not only for what is best for oneself but for also what is best for political society (i.e. the common good).

To clarify the previous statements made, let us now turn some of the theorists whose works inform the republican perception of democracy: most notably Aristotle, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Nicola Machiavelli and, in more recent times, Hannah Arendt. Machiavelli offers a delicate vision of active citizenship. He connects the exercise of self-government with individual liberty. For Machiavelli, if citizens want to maximize their personal liberty, they themselves must take charge of public affairs (Buttle, 2001: 2). Simply put, participation in politics is the best route to individual liberty. Be that as it may, Machiavelli also saw individual liberty as part of a collective liberty in the sense that the individual good is part of the common good. Therefore, the good can only be had, be it individual or collective, when liberty for all is protected.

In a similar vein, Aristotle, Rousseau and Arendt also emphasize the intrinsic value of active citizenship. (Arendt, 1961: 143-151) Active citizenship, for them, is necessary because not only does it serve as a means for protecting and accommodating the common good, but because it also fosters civic virtue and communal ties—the qualities of a successful body politics. (Rousseau, 1988: 61, 93)<sup>34</sup> The objective of democracy, then, lies not in the protection of individual liberty, but in its capacity to develop individual potentialities for active participation in politics that lead to the unleashing of the common good.

Republicans, more specifically, do not equate individual freedom to the pursuit of self-interest. In fact, they are critical of the pursuit of self-interest. For classical republicans, the absolute freedom to pursue self-interest, with its accompanying atomization, inequality in wealth, vanity and distortions, produces suffering. They believe that freedom is not a personal but a public affair, and that it can only be realized through interaction between people. (Arendt, 1968: 148) It is only through such interaction that the common good can come into being.

Connected to the republican notion of the common good is civic virtue. As Rousseau argues, civic virtue refers to the collection of qualities and attitudes held by the citizenry that are often thought to promote a moral, valuable unity of the people. (Rousseau, 1988: 67-72) A sense of belonging, tolerance, self-respect, public-spiritedness, a willingness to subordinate one's self-interest to the common good are traits that constitute civic virtue. These traits develop attachments, form identities, confer dignity, and create the “good citizen” who is oriented toward the common good of the political community.

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<sup>34</sup> In this view, the intrinsic value of people corresponds with the qualities of mind and character that are exercised not only in the pursuit of the good or human excellence, but also realized in the achievement of the good. See Aristotle *Politics* 1260a1-25, 1276b15-1278b5 or, 1992: 94,176-188 and *Nicomachean Ethics* 1102a5-26 1996:22-23).

Contemporary proponents of the republican model of democracy describe the good citizen as someone who not only participates eagerly and competently in political affairs that are central to realization of the common good but also possesses qualities and attitudes that are often thought to promote the common good. Conceptualizing the “good citizen” means, that he/she embodies civic virtue. On the one hand, civic virtue, which has its roots in the political philosophy of Aristotle, refers to the qualities of mind, characters and responsibilities of citizens for political life. (Aristotle, 1992: 176-182 or 1276b16-1277b32 and) On the other hand, virtue is about the empowerment of citizens because it demands that they be both active and responsible participants in the political process. Virtue seems just as necessary to the successful functioning of self-government in democratic process.

Civic virtue is exercised both in the individual pursuit of excellence and in the achievement of the common good. It determines one’s ability to live the good life and to make decisions for the mutual advantage of people who live in the political community. According to republicans, the purpose of every democracy is to help its citizens live the good life, which requires the citizens to be virtuous because in a democracy citizens are both ruler and ruled and are not divided into rulers and ruled. Therefore, each citizens required same sorts of common character in order to execute their responsibility of self-government. (Aristotle, 1992: 176-177). Democracy thus persuaded individuals to broaden their common understanding, to attain civic virtue from both point of view both ruler and ruled. (Aristotle, *Politics* 1277a25-1277b16 and 1332b12-1133a or 1992: 18-182 and 431-433) Thus democracy, with its support of active participation, is in the Aristotelian way of cultivating the character of the citizens and leading them toward the good life. This also corresponds with virtuosity and the good life of citizens who are both rulers and ruled not separated as rulers and ruled.

Republicans argue that civic virtue does not arise from a pre-existing consensus that only needs to be discovered, nor can one take hold of civic virtue through some form of abstract calculation. Citizens must learn values and moral character as a virtue in order to strengthen their attachment to the political community. They also suggest that democratic government has a duty to teach its people how to be virtuous because virtue does not have inherent value in itself. They hold that the participatory process for democracy is valuable for not only the substantive quality of the decisions produced by that process but also for virtue because it produces morally valuable effects on the character of participants. This means that republican believes the very fact of participation that operates to educate and improve the character of citizens, to inculcate the right values and a sense of the common good. Citizens learn civic virtue through the act of public participation and in common action. For this reason, the republican approach is not neutral toward the moral character of its citizens or the ends they pursue. It involves moral discourse concerned with goods, values, and identities of citizens. For republicans, moral discourse of democracy requires that one choose one's specific purposes in life in accordance with common good. Besides the participatory process the republican thinks that the governing authority has a duty to teach its citizens how to be virtuous.

These republican commitments to civic virtue and the common good can be classified into two, mutually reinforcing types: formative and participatory. By formative, Aristotle meant that civic virtue is something acquired, as part of character development or qualities of the mind that are exercised for the pursuit of the common good. Aristotle believed that people were born with virtue but they learned how to use virtue for the achievement of the good. For this reason, he wished to educate people in the virtues that are required for achievement of the common good and the virtuous life. In other words, he would inform and reform the character of citizens thus enabling them to

make wise choices.<sup>35</sup> (Aristotle, *Politics*: 1260a36, 1277a12-1277b7, 1332b12-1334a10 or 1992: 97, 180-182 and 430-436) Participatory refers to the specific commitment for full involvement or engagement in political life for the common good as defined by conditions of taking turns in ruling and being ruled. Thus, for republicans, it is the duty of the body politic to create institutional organizations that not only to empower citizens to enter the community's political life but also to cultivate qualities in citizens that good politics requires (i.e. democracy). (Rousseau, 1988: 61-162)

The republican theorists have constructed different frameworks that would be most conducive to the development and maintenance of civic virtue. Some have proposed the dialogical sphere, in which citizens constitute both the addresser and addressee and as such, theorists have afforded the ideal arena for civic virtue. Some have advanced the political realm, in which all citizens are actively involved in their own governance, as the most favorable setting for civic virtue. Still others have viewed the realm of community, in which citizens freely engage in social relations, as the setting best suited for the production and protection of civic virtue.

Republican understanding of democracy is established with a view toward the common good. Nevertheless, the republican understanding of the common good also varies. In general, the republican approach considers the common good as an appeal to the good of every citizen who engages in self-government, taking turns in ruling and being ruled by their equals. It is a good that transcends and surpasses individuals' interests. (Rousseau, 1988: 101-102; Held, 1996: 17) It consists of a commonality with respect to its initiator, which is the entire body politic, or rule of the people, rather than to a mere party or faction. The common good can also refer to commonality with respect to its form—i.e.,

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<sup>35</sup> Likewise, in Plato's dialogue, Socrates maintained that virtue is knowledge or understanding of good and evil and in reference to the degree of goodness and evil, it can only be learned with dialogue of the other. (Weingartner, 1973: 55-67)

its egalitarian character, which applies to all citizens' impartially. Further, the common good can stand for commonality with respect to its aim, which is the common interest that may involve economic, social and moral appeals.

At the same time, however, republican theorists concur that the common good should not be seen as a mere aggregation of individual preferences. For them, the common good is always subject to the will of the citizens who actively define it by their participation in politics. It is through this participatory process that citizens create public values and transcend their narrower self-interests.

Yet, a number of citizens can come together to argue and make the case for promoting their personal interests, thereby orientating the political situation toward the good of the few. For this reason, republican theorists see factions, which Rousseau calls "factions, partial associations," as major threats to general will hence the self-governing character of republican democracy. (Rousseau, 1988: 101)

To prevent factionalism, some republican theorists emphasize the institution of dialogue in the public realm, which would allow each citizen to exchange views with one another on what they think is best for the community. Others emphasize a strong constitution that would be authored by and is responsive to all citizens.<sup>36</sup> What is noteworthy here is the imposition of an institution or constitution that would, in effect, supersede the authority of citizens. In that case, as republican theorists argue, it is paramount that such an institution or constitution represents the will of the citizens as the foundation of the political community.

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<sup>36</sup> In contrast to contemporary republicans, Rousseau believes that when factions arise, and partial groupings arise at the expense of the common good, dialogue becomes more problematic because it may accelerate splits. Thus, the will of each group may become general in relation to its members, while it remains particular in relation to the political community. It is therefore essential; if the common good is to be able to express itself, that there should be no dialogue that allows rise of factionalism within the political community. (Rousseau 1988: 62 and 101)

According to the republican approach, the purpose of every democracy is to help its citizens achieve the good life. But this means that the good life and hence, democracy is limited to those who feel and share effective public spirit which motivates political action toward the common good.

#### *V.2.2. The Classical Liberal Conception of Democracy*

Liberalism as a model of democracy involves a kind of discourse that is generally characterized by emphasis on the intrinsic quality of individual. For liberals, the intrinsic quality of an individual refers to those, which one has in and of oneself such as human reason. The individual's extrinsic features refer to the persona, which one has only in its relation to something else. Thus, for example, an individual is intrinsically a free human being, but only extrinsically made a free and equal citizen. In this perspective, democracy is viewed primarily as a means toward the end of realizing individual as a free human being that has end in and for itself. (Held, 1996: 101-102)

The main proponents of classical liberal democracy were Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. A key concern of these theorists was the protection of the individual in order to make the individual live as one chooses without conditions of interference that might block an individual for realizing his/her happiness. (Sayre-McCord, 2001: 333-335) These scholars emphasizes that individuals have (or should have) inalienable rights or freedom which should not be transgressed by any other individuals, groups, or, most importantly, the state even in pursuit of the greatest good for the greatest number. They argued for the instrumental value of democracy in protecting individual freedom and rights. For them, the freedoms and rights of individuals are seen as precious entities that are essential for making one's own life happy. (Held, 1996: 98)

The liberal sense of individual liberty involves more than merely an absence of coercion or negative liberty. For liberals, to be free is to be able to act without interference. Isaiah Berlin describes negative liberty as the absence of a deliberate intention of an individual, state, or society to interfere in the personal affairs, of another individual. (Berlin, 1991: 34) Bentham thought that each individual's liberty consists of a living without being subjugated. (Bentham, 1988: 98) Thus, liberal liberty in this sense entails a space where one is immune from the coercive interference of others. (Rosen 1982: 515) However, this space to one's self is contingent upon keeping political authority under the control. This means that liberty requires a protection or security against oppression by others. This protection is based on the control of power and is secured by regulation of actions. This protection entails security against both tyranny and subjugation by others. To be a free individual does not mean the ability to engage in any action one wishes to undertake. If everyone had such freedom to do whatever he or she wanted, a condition of pure anarchy would ensue. To have a freedom in any meaningful sense entails that others cannot legitimately interfere with one's personal space, and this implies that freedom must be amenable to enforcement measures. Such restriction is the regulative province of the self-government. In other words, given conditions of living together, where one person's freedom depends on the regulation of the free action of others, personal freedom possibly requires authority to impose constraints on the free actions of others. This means that liberty of the individual consists in obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself. Individuals may have an innate capacity to pursue a free life, but they must equally recognize their capacity, before they can hope to be free. In essence, the free individual is someone who acts with others, and this scenario requires the person to rise above given features of his or her identity to impose a ruling to one's own actions, but this ruling has to be internal to oneself. Recognizing this, a free person becomes familiar with certain conditions such as laws that grant one the condition to be



free and which confer the ability and environment to allow one to lead a free life. Democracy, in this sense, refers to a system of procedures that not only guarantees resources and opportunities for each individual's pursuit of the well-being but also to protect the individual's immune zones from intervention.

The liberal emphasis on individuality has been linked to the intrinsic quality of individual preferences. By virtue of this intrinsic quality, preferences are aggregated in a collective choice where procedures do not have independent effects on outcomes, but only function as a sort of means producing a balance. Like Bentham, most liberal theorists advocate that the main aim of democracy should be to ensure both the individual's happiness and the public interests of society as a whole. This aim is manifested not in an appeal to the unity of the political community in the terms of common good but to the greatest good (i.e. happiness) for the greatest number of individual. (James, 1993: 594-598) In other words, liberals reject the validity of all established principles or values that are external to the individual. For them, the republican idea of a common good such as on Rousseau's ideas of the general will, is an artificial construct. (Held, 1996: 58) Personal rationality is the supreme authority to judge goodness. Only that to which an individual gave his/her free consent is binding on their will. This means that the will of each individual, unrestricted and unguided by anything except their own deeply felt conception of freedom, is the foundation of political community. Thus for the republican, the constant will of all the individuals of the political community is the will of all; by virtue of it, they are citizens and free. Liberals have the same view with this Rousseau's idea of the will of all. Will of all simply refers common interests as the aggregate of the particular wills of each individual. (James, 1993: 595 and Rousseau, 1988: 100-101)

In contrast to republican idea of common good, Jeremy Bentham suggested that society had no part in describing the good of a human person. Bentham believed that in the idea

that “the community is a fictitious body” which is defined as the “sum of the interests of the several members who compose it” (James, 1993: 594-595) In this vision, the public interest of the democratic process or the greatest happiness of the greatest number is identical to the mechanical summation of individual preferences. (James, 1993: 595) In other words, what is the good of the liberal approach is an aggregate good— what gives the greatest satisfaction to the greatest number of individuals.

Embodied in liberal democracy is a vision of the political process as primarily an aggregation of private preferences and a process of competition. (Held, 1996: 206-207) For liberals, competition among the individual preferences is necessary in order to arrive at the best policy. According to classical liberal theory, individual preferences should compete with each other until the better ones become apparent. If one individual truly believes in the validity of his/her preference, then subjecting it to the test of the competition of preferences in the political process should not be feared. Any desire for being represented at the government level should respect that competition is the most productive way for utilizing individual freedom as presenting and defending propositions. The competitive process of democracy, furthermore, is not conceived of as closed or having an end. It is always considered as open process where particular wills of individuals engage in a competition with preferences over the determination of public policies.

Liberal democracy based on the competition between the particular wills of individuals emerges in the place of state neutrality. According to the liberal approach, state neutrality is the sole driving condition of the democracy. It is identified with relationships of non-interference and the protection of competition between individuals. For liberals, any kind of incursion on individual choices is regarded as problematic because it reduces the intrinsic quality of individual freedom. The liberal idea of neutrality is also closely

connected with idea of impartial criteria derived through procedures that reflect “fair play” or basic ideas of fairness for each individual for having equal footing in the democratic process. (Habermas, 1996b: 26)

For liberalism, the good of the democratic system is measured by the extent to which the individual is free to pursue self-interest. Because liberalism perceives individual freedom as good in itself, there is no substantive societal conception of the good. There is, however, a substantive conception of the good of democracy, which is individual in character. The good of democracy is whatever individuals seek in their self-interest. To achieve that, liberalism aims for the establishment of principles and enactment of procedures that protect and foster substantial space for individual freedom, based on the exclusion of arbitrary power and the limitation of state power.

In this perspective, procedures are based upon the consent of individuals who have agreed with one another to protect their individual rights. Thus, these procedures should be limited to the protections of these fundamental rights. Bentham maintained that by guaranteeing those rights, a regulative function of the procedures have to be conducted according to “the greatest good for the greatest number” on the supposition that each person is to be protected from the possible violation by other individuals, or the state as equally important. (James, 1993: 594-595) On this perception, the aim of liberalism is understood as the aggregation of individual private interests in order ensures the maximum degree of satisfaction, or alternatively to minimize the degree of suffering experienced by people. Therefore within these utilitarian foundations, liberalism does not endorse any specific role for morality for the liberal discourse of proceduralism since it is impossible to choose standards of universal criteria or to identify the best set of beliefs and values. (Schoeman, 1993: 738-739)

While withdrawing moralistic terms from democratic theory, classical liberal philosophy attempts to judge political actions strictly in terms of their consequences, in particular their effects on individual good. Therefore, a classical liberal philosophy of democracy typically contains criteria by which right from wrong are to be distinguished. According to utilitarian liberalism, the right thing to do, in any situation, is to maximize the utility for the individuals. For example, for Bentham, the utility of a political act can be characterized as the total sum of happiness created by the political action with subtraction of the total sum of unhappiness created by the political action. (Peardon, 1993: 623)

This view of Bentham has implications for the nature of procedures and institutions and what their roles in democracy should entail and prescribe. In general, utilitarian liberals believe that the most important function of procedures and institutions is to create a secure setting in which individuals could pursue their own interests. (James, 1993: 594-498) At this point, the precedence liberalism gives to individual rights posits democracy as a utilitarian process within which the utility of different preferences is maximized for the interests of all in regulated competitive processes that promote the freedom of the individual.

The utilitarian tradition of liberal philosophy places strong emphases on the freedoms and rights of individuals. The central idea is that all individuals are equal, autonomous of any circumstance, and are the holders of inalienable rights that cannot be cancelled by any organization. While the liberal approach emphasizes the rights of individuals and their protection from the arbitrary use of power, they distinguish between two types of rights in a democracy, hinging on whether they are viewed from the perspective of the individual or from the perspective of the institutions and procedures with which the individual interacts. From the perspective of the individual, rights are an entitlement to be free, to act in one's best interest. From the perspective of the institutions and procedures

with which the individual interacts, rights necessitate obligations upon individuals. These obligations, which may be called duty, cannot be used to breach the rights of others.<sup>37</sup>

### *V.2.3. The Deliberative Conception of Democracy*

The deliberative model of democracy is most often associated with the thought of Jürgen Habermas, James Bohman and Seyla Benhabib. These scholars have employed an eclectic approach to the concept of democracy and therefore, they have borrowed from some of their main arguments different philosophical traditions including Marxism, critical theory, hermeneutics, Freudian psychoanalysis, and language philosophy.

The deliberative model firstly considers democracy as a form of communicative action that is defined as melted in the independent forms of an intersubjectively fixed discourse ethics that govern the flow of deliberations in such way that rational notions and will formations can take the place. This means that democracy is a free, open and ongoing process aimed at reaching rational consensus concerning the public interest. (Benhabib, 1996: 70-71)) Secondly, the deliberative model draw attention to the institutional bodies and procedures that generates conduct for a communicative discourse of democracy. Thirdly, they give emphasis to practical rationality as it is embodied at the core of political rule.

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<sup>37</sup> There have been two distinctively liberal approaches to the issue of rights in close connection with Immanuel Kant's concept self-respect and duty. In the first case, the liberal idea of rights is closely tied to Kant's categorical imperative: *Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.* Kant's imperative prescribes respect toward individuals, as equals and holders of the same rights. In that case, the most fundamental right of individuals is precisely to exercise their individual nature as autonomous rational beings—that is, as beings able to give freely the law of reason to themselves. This exercise is the goal of the democracy. In the second case, the liberal idea of rights is linked with the Kantian idea of duty. Duty is what is one "ought" to do. Kant makes three general statements about duty. First, actions are genuinely good when they are undertaken for the sake of duty alone. Second, actions are judged not according to the purpose they were meant to bring about, but rather by the "maxim" that served as their motivation. Third, duties should be undertaken out of "reverence" for the [universal] law. For Kant, actions are rightful when they are in accordance with duty. The one formal condition, common to all rightful actions, is the motive of conformity to universal law. (Kant, 1952: 383-94)

Deliberative theorists criticize both the republican view, which considers civic virtue and common good as an end of democracy, and the liberal view that reflects upon competing interest of the individuals with an emphasis on the negative freedom. (Habermas 1996: 22-26) As an alternative to the liberal and republican views, in their descriptive or evaluative use, the deliberative version of the good reflects two aspects of democracy as a multi-voiced communicative body: persuasive argumentation and consensus or agreement. (Benhabib, 1996: 82-83) They claim therefore, that if democracy as a communicative action of politics is to conform to democracy as a communicative form of politics, it must promote communicative exchange with one another and encourage not only the production of new ideas or discourses but also an agreement between the dual aspects. In affirming the persuasive communication without surrendering the audibility of any voices (as opposed to the mere plurality thereof), democracy becomes the reflection and intensification of society's transforming multi-voiced body in which each voice consists of qualities that can be simultaneously classified as the unique and same.

The objective of deliberative theorists is to generate procedural conditions for free and equal discursive participation to the communicative action which takes place not only in formal institutions and but also in public affairs as an informal opinion-formation. On the one hand, discursive participation is directly associated with decision and action. (Benhabib, 1996: 73-74) On the other, it is connected as a free and equal participative, yet inclusive network of people in public space. In both spheres, discursive participation consists of a "communicative power" or an argumentative process that can lead to mutual understanding and consensus. (Habermas, 1991: 298)

According to the deliberative model of democracy, communicative power exists in reasoned communication or persuasive communicative exchange. For deliberative

theorists, reasoned communication or persuasive communicative exchange is important in three ways. First, reasoned public deliberation establishes a process for reaching decisions or compromises in the absence of unanimity. (Christiano, 1996: 51-53) Second, it is central to the operation of the decision-making process itself, as it allows every member of the community to be involved. (Bohman, 1996: 23-71) Third, reasoned deliberation is a vehicle for individuals to claim one's own interests. Moreover, the communicative character of public deliberation is potentially transformative, with the establishment of a set of connections between participants for reasoned considerations, compromises and discourses of self-understanding.

Deliberative theorists believe that societies consist of clearly defined and historically differentiated individuals and cultural groups. If there are no effective consensus and agreement among differences, then society can hardly survive, without, on the one hand, major transformative processes like secession, civil-war, genocide, or, on the other hand, imposition of some kind of authoritarian rule. For this reason, they point to the fact that democracy has to assure popular consent among members of society with conditions of free expression and public association. That is to say, the deliberative approach aims to construct a discourse of democracy toward a rationally motivated agreement by finding a rationale that is persuasive to all parties for creating the prospect of coordinating and reconstructing preferences. (Bohman, 1996: 34-37) To this end, the deliberative approach attempts to develop an institutionalization of communicative procedures, for not only enabling consensus among different views and preferences to reach understanding and agreement but also for translating fixed individual preferences into an aggregate that produces particular political outcomes. (Habermas, 1996a: 21-31)

This procedural communicative deliberation refers to a free and equal process in which participants are constrained only by the result of their reasoned decisions and by the

regulative preconditions for those reasoned decisions (Bohman, 1996: 37) For communicative deliberation to be meaningful and to ensure consensus and agreement on the public quality of the deliberative good, participants must be equally positioned to perceive and express their interests and views. (Christiano, 1996: 91-93) Simply put, all participants are formally and substantially equal. Everybody who wishes should be given the opportunity to participate. Here, formal equality represents formal procedures that ensure the necessary conditions for all affected parties to participate in the process of communicative deliberation to determine the public good. (Benhabib, 1996: 72-73)

In particular, formal conditions of equality are necessary to ensure fairness through which participants can have similar powers and resources to affect the argumentative process of deliberation. Besides formal conditions of equality, deliberative theorists see the process as free in the sense that the participants are not bound by values or conditions other than those found in their own deliberation. (Bohman, 1996: 36) They stress that the deliberative democratic process should be rational and fact-oriented. Their understanding of reason resides not in the individual right for self-determination (i.e., private use of reason), but in the regulative norms of communication (i.e., public use of reason) and in forms of argumentation that contribute to a public conception of general interest through consensus.<sup>38</sup> In this respect, communicative deliberation is a rationalizing process in which participants are required to voice their arguments for advancing and supporting their cases, or criticizing the proposals of others. For deliberative theorists, it is important that public deliberation function as a critical medium against formal political decision-making.

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<sup>38</sup> The procedural character of democracy or about what dialogue requires in a given particular situation is proposal if it can be defended by appeal to common values which all members of society can reasonably be expected to accept for their own reasons. (Chambers, 1996: 101-105 and 186-187)



The deliberative approach assumes that democracy is a means used by essentially free and equal agents to secure agreements and mutual understandings necessary for obtaining the benefits of societal life and avoiding the costs of conflicts. It is also a communicative action since different voices and public assessment of those voices can take place in the generation of agreement and mutual understanding.

The deliberative approach also assumes a capacity for impersonal reflection and mutual recognition of the value of each individual. The deliberative approach ascribes to each individual the competence to deliberate freely and rationally. (Cohen, 1996: 102-103) Thus, no individual can be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from participating in the communicative process. As a result, individuals see one another as ends rather than means in the pursuit of their own self-interest.

Here, democratic communicative action refers to something more than the instrumental rationality provided by self-interest calculated models to the extent that participants engage responsively to one another toward mutual understanding and consensus. (Christiano, 1996: 83-87) Mutual understanding and consensus are reached through the force of better rational argument. But the arguments must be regulated by norms and procedures that are accepted by all participants as embodying the common interest. Otherwise, norms and procedures cannot be valid. Valid norms and procedures guard against distortions and differences in the deliberative process.

For deliberative theorists, the basic structure of democracy is governed by principles and rules that are publicly agreed upon. (Rawls: 1993:175) Furthermore, these principles and rules are consistent with and supported by a sense of free individual deliberation that naturally arises within the relationships and rational attachments made possible by such a democracy. In deliberative democracy, there is a reciprocally assured confidence that

everyone will abide by the principles and rules that were previously agreed upon. Publicly agreed upon rules and procedures affirm an ideal of politics. Within this procedural and deliberative form of politics, rational agents benefit from living and working together in reaching mutual understanding about their differences. Mutual understanding can be achieved only if agents are able to recognize plurality in life—that they live together in different ways. This represents the recognition of the value of pluralism in terms of equal respect for all the different choices possible in life and the rejection of coerced agreement.

At the same time, the deliberative approach does not see the pursuit of different self-interests as incompatible with a democratic process that is oriented toward reaching agreement. Rather, in the deliberative democratic process, individuals go beyond their own conceptions of self-interest. The deliberative democratic process ensures that self-interests are reflexive and not simply accepted as grounds for individual action without rational assessment by others. The deliberative democratic process guides participants to achieve consensus with a measure of critical assessment regarding prevailing interests. The deliberative democratic process is not only reflective of individual preferences, but affirmatively molds and shapes them towards an agreement.

#### *V.2.3.1. Habermas's Dialogical Approach to Deliberative Democracy*

One of the many defining characteristics of deliberative democracy may be said to be that of Habermas's concept of an ideal speech situations. Habermas inscribes to ideal speech situations an essential part of the dialogical project to construct a framework for democracy. As he focuses on communicative relations between individuals as the paradigm of ideal speech communities, he explores the dialogical properties of deliberative democracy. In this context, Habermas inserts the conditions of ideal speech

situations into the structure of public deliberation that work towards an agreement for setting the public policies. In the structure of public deliberation, general conditions of the ideal speech situation function as the practical force of reason or forceless force of the better argument for convergence of different preferences for the setting of public policies. Habermas believes that this function of the ideal speech situation can be attained only under maximally fair deliberative procedures that secure impartiality, equality, openness and lack of coercion and will guide the individual deliberation towards public interests. He thinks that deliberative procedures have to be materialized as a complex ensemble of practices of discourse ethics. (Habermas, 1996: 53) Those practices of discourse ethics constitute specific forms of normative consent or agreement, which make possible the allegiance to the deliberative procedures. It is because they are inscribed in agreements in ruling that deliberative procedures can be accepted and followed for the emergence and sustenance of ideal speech communities. They can be seen as rules that are agreed upon by all participants based on reasoning.

Deliberative procedures ensure an active participation mechanism for the sustenance of autonomous expressions of individual preferences and the realization of public good. In this context, the Habermas model can be seen as the incorporation of both the republican focus as the common good and the liberal focus as individual liberty into a single framework. In this context, Habermas believes that morality is important for establishing fair conditions that are conducive to the reasoned communicative interaction of citizens. (Habermas, 1996: 23) To provide such fair conditions, Habermas suggests that communicative and deliberative democracy requires a kind of governance inserted by binding consensual rules, procedures, and institutions. On the one hand, these consensual rules, procedures, and institutions have often been thought of negatively as a matter of freedom from power, action or as protecting equality and freedom among participants in

the dialogical field. On the other hand, they are considered in terms of freedom to engage in the individual pursuit of the good.

Besides embodying the regulative characteristics, consensual rules, procedures, and institutions, Habermas's model of deliberative democracy also emphasizes the importance of the public sphere for supporting a rational public opinion or collective will-formation and uncoerced participant debate wherein different values and views might achieve their fullest expression. Habermas thinks that the public sphere provides a forum for dialogue within which citizens can find more opportunity to voice their concerns and to understand each other without coercion in order to pursue a personal agenda or act on behalf of outside interests. He believes that when people raise issues about their concern, they support their proposals which, when scrutinized, bring into being a deductive understanding in terms of true, truthful and appropriate.

Since understanding is a necessary part of language itself, truthfulness and appropriateness of the propositions can be confirmed by reference to the way in which facts and knowledge are brought into play. In order to do that, all participants have to utilize the same level of language that refers to familiar facts or knowledge. Shared language develops communicative action in an open and sincere way. Habermas's theory of deliberative democracy assumes the existence of a wide range of informal associations and shared language in the public sphere as important conditions of democracy. They are important because these organizations create channels for communication wherein ideal speech situations takes place and in which various issues can be openly debated and agreement can be reached on norms that are acceptable to everyone.

In relation to this, Habermas distinguishes two types of public: weak and strong. The weak public refers to the informally organized sphere of democracy, ranging from private

associations to mass media located in civil society. Another hallmark of the weak public consists of a communication for informal public opinion-formation without reference to the greater decision-making process. The strong public refers to the formally organized institutions of the democratic system. It comprises legislative bodies, political parties and other institutions. The strong public consists of a communication that bears directly upon decision-making and action. (Habermas, 1996b: 298-309) Habermas argues that the role of deliberative communication in the public sphere not only identifies problems and makes them a subject of democratic discourse but also generates new opportunities for forming, refining and revising the different preferences toward consensus.

Habermas takes individual preferences as endogenous to the democratic process, and conceives of the public good as separate from the expression of private interests and thus, is not considered an aggregation of those interests. This is not to say that citizens cannot express their own private preferences in the democratic process; indeed, they may but only to the extent that they are willing to discover a public good. In the processes of regulated and reasoned dialogue, critical examination of individual preferences molds and shapes them to become reflexive and responsive to the public good. (Habermas, 1996a: 28)

Habermas develops dialogical criteria for individual deliberations that are grounded in contextually defined or regulated communication through the public use of reason. (Habermas, 1996a: 29) The dialogical criteria offered by Habermas represents something more than the rationality of individual deliberation; it is a regulated and reasoned ideal speech situation among equal and free citizens. Participants in ideal speech situation are not merely to “respect” the viewpoints of others but to engage in a reasoned dialogue to move toward consensus. He argues that this is a special kind of reasoned dialogue that

aims not at compromise but toward a convergence of judgments for mutual understanding—the agreement of free citizens.

There are three general levels of conjecture in Habermas's notion of reasoned dialogue: rationality alongside outcomes, regulation alongside procedures and norms and rhetoric for the processes of communication. (Habermas, 1996a: 28) First, rationality of communication underlines the production of cogent, consistent arguments. It requires that citizens avoid contradicting themselves and express meanings consistently. Second, regulation of communication requires that citizens engaged in reasoned dialogue or argumentation adopt a high level of inter-subjectivity, through which they can consider the validity of differences regardless of their immediate needs in the situation. This higher-level of inter-subjectivity of communication forces participants in reasoned dialogue to step back from their personal perspective and consider the relevant issues critically for the interests of the public. Finally, rhetoric of communication requires that the structures of dialogue be immune to repression and inequality.

For Habermas, agreement or mutual understanding can only be rationally motivated, and influences apart from reason cannot interfere with the participants' decision-making. When participants are forced to agree with the argumentative reasoning of others, then dialogue cannot be considered rational. Therefore, the democratic context of dialogue requires that participants enter freely, with a genuine sense of equality. By identifying freedom and equality as necessary bases of reasoned dialogue, Habermas carries out his argument for democracy in terms of regulation. If and whenever participants exchange views or argue for the validity of their views, they must follow not only the norms of logical sense but also the norms of what is collectively accepted.

In this regard, Habermas's view of deliberative democracy does not assume that citizens can come to a mutual understanding only through the exchange of views or that agreement would be a naïve discovery of one's own comprehension. Rather, under conditions of rational argumentation in the processes of dialogue, citizens coordinate their actions in terms of consensus. The rational activity of argument presupposes an ideal of free agreement in judgment founded on good reason, in "forceless force of the better argument." The actors involved characterize "forceless force of better argument" as persuasion that is free from domination or strategizing. This means that force of truth in the argumentative realm of dialogue will yield some consensus among participants, and the emerging consensus must be responsible for the best argument.

As Habermas insists, the argumentative process of dialogue must be egalitarian and free in the most fundamental sense: this means that no one is accorded any privileged position, all are equal and all are bound to produce and question arguments. There should be no restrictions on the participation of these competent actors in the public realm. Under such conditions, the only remaining authority is that of a force of argument, which can be advanced on behalf of the reality of the rational account, the understanding and, equally important, the validity of normative decisions for the public. Thus, the most important function of the dialogical and deliberative realm of democracy is to produce reasons, to provide arguments—to strive for the public good.

#### *V.2.4. The Agonistic Approach to the Concept of Democracy*

One of the shortcomings of the deliberative approach is its incapability to respond to the dimension of conflict that the pluralism of values may entail. At this point, we need to turn to the agonistic model of democracy. The agonistic model of democracy is commonly identified with the thought of Carl Schmitt, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe,

and James Tully. The agonistic model of democracy is mainly associated with principles of conflict or adversarial dialogue. This model refers to an interplay of contesting forces or voices. The agonistic conception of democracy derives from the analysis of *agon* in the Ancient Greek drama where protagonists and antagonists verbally engage in struggle. The concept of agonism is also identified with Athenian democracy, where popular face-to-face confrontation and debate on public matters and the arena(s) in which such contestation took place shaped politics. (Foucault, 1982: 222-233)

The agonistic model of democracy emphasizes the need for citizens to engage and communicate with one another actively. In other words, it does not look simply for values of democracy for co-existence in a plural society, but also looks for genuine adversarial dialogue between citizens. Embedded in this model is an affirmative role of conflict and contestation in democratic deliberation. (Tully, 1999a: 163) It argues against the dangers of the consensus-oriented model of deliberative democracy. While the agonistic model displays strong links with the republican idea of democracy in terms of active participation and unconditioned space, it also represents an extreme departure from republican collective presuppositions (i.e., civic virtue and the common good). The republican concern with the common good and civic virtue suggests a shared normative order that provides mediation not only between people but also between people and the government. For agonistic theorists, regulation is problematic because it arrests the tension upon which dialogical contestation is based. Therefore, agonistic theorists emphasize unconditioned communication rather than conditioned communication.

For agonistic theorists, the first moment of regulative order is conditioning that creates departure for self-government or the separation and transformation of the ruler/ruled or author/reader into two roles. The next moment begins with the increasing ubiquity and hegemony of one-way utterances, unchecked by the possibility of immediate retort. As a



result, the republican model can easily devolve into monologue. In order to prevent this scenario from occurring, the agonistic model does not stress the conditioning roles of formal political structures or institutions for the inculcation of civic virtue or the materialization of normative order, but instead, the unconditioned political engagement and self-revelation in active participation. Agonistic active participation can be perceived as constitutive of freedom, rather than instrumentally facilitative of it. (Tully 1999a: 164)

The agonistic model requires active participation in unconditioned space.

The importance of unconditioned political engagement and self-revelation in active participation is fundamentally opposed to models that try to understand and salvage democracy by applying systems of abstract ideas to the practical circumstances of everyday life. For agonistic theorists, democracy cannot be deduced from abstract principles such as equality and individual freedom since it resists order, closure, centrality, extreme rationalism and social engineering. If the existence of a center is tacit, other ways of seeing and understanding the very nature of democracy can be ignored, repressed or marginalized. That is to say, democracy and its values are not universal but are conditional upon specific cultural, social and political perspectives. For the agonistic theorists, the components of democracy can only be found in agonistic action: the activities of conflicting, appearing, contesting, persuading, and deciding.

The conception of agonistic democracy is not only significant for emphasizing the role of active or radical participation that generates the potential for extending the frontiers of democracy, but also it is in itself a critical action that disturbs the traditional patterns of democratic theory. Such is the case because the agonistic democratic model reflects not only on democratic practice but also on political theory, where it challenges attempts to develop a single, rational, systematic, and foundational ideal upon which democracy could be based and justified. In doing so, the agonistic approach has become a critical action at

its core, in a new and ineluctably dynamic form. The agonistic approach can be found in the political contestation of conceptions of democracy.

The effects of the agonistic conception have been important, for it has called into question the very notions of epistemology that constitute contemporary democratic theory and practice. This questioning reorients democracy to a new perspective by destabilizing the foundations of everyday politics and the centers of truth. Emphasis on diversity and challenge to universality has led to the acknowledgement of a plurality of competing views, of ways of life that are inharmonious or even in conflict with one other. The agonistic approach underscores the variety of irresolvable tensions and contradictions that are often incapable of formal, rational or intellectual resolution in terms of democracy.

The agonistic approach does not offer a well-defined and systematic alternative model of democracy. Instead, the aim of agonistic approach is to push contemporary political theory and political practice toward new understandings, by revealing how the centers of truth and the foundations of everyday life have been hierarchically constructed and how certain views have been left out, pushed and relegated to the margins.<sup>39</sup> Its legacy on current understandings of democracy has been to draw attention to radical participatory action that requires the recognition of the value of pluralism, of contingency, of anti-foundationalism, and of particularity.

In the agonistic model of democracy, radical participatory action allows for a more open space, foregrounding multiplicity over constructed unity, particularity over generality and marginality over centrality. Opening the space of democracy to the multitude means degrading particular discourses of democracy that may be too narrowly rationalistic and

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<sup>39</sup> Tully characterizes critical thinking as critical freedom. For him, critical freedom is a primary good of dialogical democracy. (Tully, 1995: 202-205)

argumentative and then to marginalize those groups whose preferences, interests, identities, or forms of discourse might differ. People's preferences, interests, and identities are not given, but only emerge through discourse. One can only know oneself after experiencing the difference of others whose views one has not only to take into account. This extends to the idea that if one wants exists in the society then one must also know one's self. For this reason, multitudinous presumes an initial basis for democracy, not a particularly privileged discourse for the regulation of actions of the people but a dialogical contestation within a democratic *agora*. This means that the agonistic approach sees self-governance through recognition of differences in the unifying activities of dialogue.<sup>40</sup>

The agonistic approach commits itself to dialogical contestation by celebrating differences through the exclusion of any efforts to reshape social values, be it praising civic virtue or creating political communities based on shared moral visions, a common culture or a simplified, continuity of political principles. (Mouffe, 1996: 252-53) It celebrates difference as a "source" for democratic politics. (Young, 1996: 126) In the agonistic model, differences generate democratic energies for coping with tensions or a position of care for pluralism in the present.

To meet the changing circumstances of everyday life, the agonistic approach rules out reliance on rational methods, norms or communicative procedures for achieving democracy in terms of societal consensus. (Mouffe, 2000: 102-03; Young, 1990: 102-11) The agonistic approach emphasizes the practical process of dialogical contestation as containing moments of agonism. Such a dialogical contestation requires a substantive exchange of ideas that is simultaneously antagonistic and collaborative. The condition for

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<sup>40</sup> James Tully argues that there is a certain priority with respect to the recognition of cultural diversity as part of self-government. (Tully, 1995: 4-5)

having dialogical contestation of different viewpoints and positionalities is an agreement to be adversarial in a play of difference. This allows for the possibility that new thinking will develop. In turn, this will create further thinking. Therefore, dialogical contestation with its creative process can make any single set of beliefs or ideas temporary by forcing people to engage with whatever voices, or positionalities, any set of beliefs or ideas which are previously excluded. In short, dialogical contestation is necessary to break up the closedness of the democratic process.

Dialogical contestation embodies an aspiration to engender agreement through the play of differences, but it does not presuppose that a historical truth will be revealed if participants follow the right rational procedures for achieving agreement. The strength of dialogical contestation involves a continual attaining and jeopardizing of agreement (i.e., temporary agreement). This means that in order to continue, dialogical contestation has to seek difference. Dialogical contestation finishes once final agreement is reached in terms of truth, and it stays alive only as long as there is enough difference or disagreement on truth propositions between participants to make dialogue necessary. In other words, without a firm and continuing sense of the difference, there can be no dialogical contestation. Dialogical contestation based on pragmatism inspires democratic practices that encourage individuals and groups to find sensible ways of living together in spite of their differences.

This emphasis on difference or disagreement means that the agonistic approach places a premium on dialogue itself. Democracy, then, is a dialogical activity that has the rationality of disagreement and agreement as its very own rationality. The agonistic approach describes a form of democracy in which people can engage in mutual conflict, but one that can handle that disagreement by revealing points of controversy as well

places of common ground toward a temporary agreement that resolves the specific conflict.

If there is too much self-interested orientation, then finding common ground can be almost impossible. In democracies, the pursuit of self-interest weakens the system of dialogical contestation by breaking the association between disagreement and agreement. The agonistic theorists understand that democracy cannot rest merely on the simple recognition of difference, which in itself homogenizes groups through particularistic identities, which denies individuality by emphasizing the uniqueness of a community or tradition and which attempts to freeze inter-relations through the specificity of norms and customs. These theorists argue that democracy itself can be shown to be one interactive concept, within which “difference” engenders dissimilarities through an articulation with self-governance, which is in an intersection with dialogue. Actions among groups and between individuals can then be seen as relevant through those actions which uphold self-governance; which are understood as continuous expressions of difference, and which have significant consequences on oneself through mutual coexistence.

#### *V.2.4.1. Tully’s Dialogical Approach to Agonistic Democracy*

James Tully sees agonistic democracy as an intercultural dialogue that demands that constitutions recognize and accommodate distinctiveness and indeed, to embody the inherent right to self-government. For democracy to represent a wide-ranging notion of justice, Tully stressed that just constitutions must include diverse intercultural and multicultural voices in order to create a cultural recognition within different co-existing intercultural identities. An open and fair democracy with a just constitution can only be

built on a fair system of recognition of cultural differences. Tully emphasizes three important conventions that are necessary to avoid conflicts that arise under modern constitutionalism: mutual recognition, consent and cultural continuity. (Tully, 1995: 16-17 and 209) With these three conventions, Tully argues for a critical democracy that necessitates intercultural dialogue without the presupposition of a comprehensive language even though it is grounded in a “common” one that accommodates cultural diversity and which includes the distinctive ways and languages in which people speak. (Tully, 1995: 131-36)

Reviewing the European constitutional tradition and applying it to descriptive stories from Aboriginal history, Tully reveals ignored aspects of the historical formation of constitutions and the current limitations of modern constitutionalism. In this regard, Tully points out that contemporary constitutions are a composite of two different languages. On the one hand, there is a monolithic or modern language that rises with the institutionalized and generalized use of constitutional terms (e.g., conceptions of people, popular sovereignty, citizenship, equality). For Tully, these terms all tend to presuppose the uniformity of a state with a centralized and unitary system of legal and political institutions. (Tully, 1995: 9) The establishment of a unitary political authority in constitutional texts often leads to the development of a mono-ethnic state on a multi-ethnic polity with the destruction of the languages of indigenous minorities and their right to self-government. (Tully, 1995: 82-83) This uniform constitutional definition of the state reflects a denial of the ethnic diversity of the polity and the equality of a particular group in relation to others.

On the other hand, Tully indicates that there are hidden languages in the historical formation of constitutions. These languages are hidden in the sense of being inaccessible to the limited modern languages of constitutionalism. Hidden languages of the

constitutional tradition have two sources. The first source refers to the western texts and organizations that have communicated with aboriginal cultures. The second source is closely related to the classical understanding of “ancient or common law.” (Tully, 1995: 57) Both these hidden sources of the constitutional tradition represent an intercultural dialogue in which, despite the unequal situationalities of participants, negotiation, accommodation and cultural recognition have occurred.

Tully states that contemporary constitutionalism consists of an assemblage of languages that represents complex sites of intercultural dialogue and struggles for power. He claims that these constitutional languages can be reconstructed to accommodate cultural diversity by means of an intercultural dialogue. Thus, for Tully, the democratic response to recognize and accommodate such communities and their culturally distinct ways of speaking and acting is intercultural dialogue.

While emphasizing the politics of cultural recognition and intercultural dialogue within discourses of contemporary constitutionalism, Tully raises several issues that are central not only to the restructuring of contemporary constitutional politics but also to the practices of democracy. First, Tully criticizes the notion of culture or nation as “separate, bounded and internally uniform.” (Tully, 1995: 10) Instead, he believes that cultures are “overlapping, interactive and internally negotiated” and heavily interdependent in their structure and identity.” (Tully, 1995: 10) Tully makes a convincing argument that the main function of constitutionalism or democracy is the accommodation of the intercultural nature of our identities. (Tully, 1995: 11)

What Tully envisions here is inter-cultural dialogue between assemblages of the languages of constitutions and between all inter-cultural elements of society. For Tully, constitutions must be rewritten in a common intercultural language, which is collective

rather than imperial, within which all elements of the community can be understood and one that addresses to their reality. (Tully, 1995: 57) The common intercultural language must be inclusive and come from the diverse cultural dialogues of peoples themselves, rather than imposed by a central, assimilating force. Using three critical components: mutual recognition, consent and cultural continuity, Tully believes that diverse elements of society must engage in constant intercultural constitutional dialogues and in mutual accommodation of their cultural differences. (Tully, 1995: 32-56) Constant intercultural constitutional dialogues help both the varied voices to be heard and the diverse circumstances of particular contexts to be taken into account. Intercultural constitutional dialogues allow for specific and collective decisions that meet special circumstances, relevant change and different points of view.

Tully uses the symbology of Bill Reid's sculpture the *Spirit of Haida Gwaii* to represent intercultural dialogue between the many "languages" and diverse elements of society, all simultaneously proceeding through life but with different priorities and goals. This sculpture is made of a long black bronze canoe carrying thirteen passengers paddling synchronously, all of whom are spirit creatures from the Haida mythology. (Tully, 1995: 18) In the spirit of Haida Gwaii, each passenger has key status for the beauty of the canoe. If one of the figures comes to dominate the expression of the *Spirit of Haida Gwaii*, the beauty of sculpture is easily destroyed. Tully describes intercultural dialogue in connection to the passengers' exchange of stories, of their claims and of their relations to each other. He uses the sculpture to highlight intercultural dialogue: the intercultural richness of the Haida mythology is a response to homogenizing discourses of modern constitutions.

According to Tully, the equal representations of the figures of Haida in Reid's Sculpture admirably communicate the desires of people who struggle for recognition in culturally



unique ways. (Tully, 1995: 25) For Tully, people's claim for recognition is connected with their sense of belonging through which one can identify oneself with a particular culture and space. In Reid's Sculpture, the passenger's sense of belonging is based not on the exclusion of one another, but rather on a mutual reinforcement and an interconnected dialogical existence that is necessary for living together. This means that the recognition of cultural diversity in the sense of belonging and commitment to identification with particular space and time are strongly connected not only with public acknowledgment of one's identity, but also with the respect that provides the affirmative base for an ethos of becoming.

At the same time, the public acknowledgement and self-respecting affirmation of cultural diversity also comes with critical freedom that advances a critical positionality to one's own identification and a tolerant and critical positionality towards identification of others. (Tully, 1995: 205-07) The critical freedom to question one's identity and inherited practices, and the aspiration to belong to a culture and place, are two key elements often believed to be fundamentally opposed to each other. For Tully, rather, they are mutually reinforcing and interdependent on each other's existence. For this reason, it is necessary to recognize that one's position is simply one amongst a multiplicity of others—others who are near and not separate (they are all in the same canoe in an interconnected way; they are expressions of intercultural dialogue that interrupt self-centered particularity of self-understanding). Thus, critical freedom and the sense of belonging through intercultural dialogue stimulate and act on each other's existence.

### **V.3. The Dialogical Conception of Democracy**

Neither the deliberative nor the agonistic model of democracy seems sufficient to resolve the issue of conflict and agreement between individual and community on a dialogical

basis of democracy. The rationale behind those models requires that emphasis is placed firstly, on either the individual or the community, or secondly, on either conflict or agreement. But when one emphasis is extended to the extreme, the proposed model of democracy loses its dialogical quality. To reject, on the one hand, the importance of conflict or agreement for dialogue, or to deny, on the other hand, the integrity of the individual or the well being of the community for democracy is to attack the dialogical foundation of democracy.

Given that argument, any functioning model of dialogue is oriented more toward conflict or agreement. Further, a particular dialogical approach may reflect different choices of emphasis at different times. Dialogical approaches reflecting different orientations may be categorized as conflict-centered or agreement-centered.

The deliberative model can be seen as an agreement-centered dialogical approach. Its proponents argue that a democratic polity ought to be realized through dialogue between free and equal citizens. The argument each citizen puts forward in the process of deliberation only needs to be justifiable to others. That, however, leaves open the possibility of many different forms of argumentation. Problems occur when such an approach over-specifies the procedures of argumentation, thereby over-regulating it. In other words, the deliberative model, in effect, dictates what is required in order to self-govern. Moreover, the deliberative approach over-emphasizes consent and uniformity. In essence, it downplays the tensions and adversary action that any dialogical democracy actually needs.

In contrast, the agonistic model can be considered as a conflict-centered dialogical approach because it is ineluctably tied to adversarial action. It holds that there can be no dialogue without a firm and continuing sense of opposition. This model views

disagreement as indicative of not only pluralism but also the continuity of the entire process. As its advocates point out, dialogical democracy ends once perfect agreement is reached, and it only exists as long as there is enough disagreement to make dialogue possible. However, it may not be possible to implement the agonistic model practically because adversarial positions within dialogue can easily be destructive to the whole process of democracy. Further, in the agonistic approach, there is an emphasis on the absence of formal political structures. As this is the necessary condition fostering autonomous political judgments, chaos could ensue.

As an alternative, Bakhtin's theory of dialogue connects the tensions endemic to the idea of democracy without undermining the freedom of the individual or the unity of the people as a whole. It is principally committed to both the self-government of individuals and to the self-government of people as a whole.

Bakhtin's dialogical connection of individual-centered conflict and community-centered agreement is found in his understanding of the dialogization of languages. This insight creates a complex unity of oneself with the other in a dynamism combining the centripetal forces that tend to pull people toward a unity and the centrifugal forces that tend toward pulling people back out into variety and difference. Bakhtin (1981: 272) says:

Alongside the centripetal forces, the centrifugal forces of language carry on their uninterrupted work; alongside verbal-ideological centralization and unification, the uninterrupted processes of decentralization and disunification go forward.

Bakhtin's democratized language—dialogical, heteroglossic—becomes, at its best, unity in difference because of the mix and clash of individual and communal languages and perspectives. The unity in difference is the play of the centripetal and centrifugal forces. It represents a field of heteroglossia created by mutual conditionings between centripetal

forces that strive to keep things together and unified, and centrifugal forces that strive to keep things separate, apart and different. This play of the centripetal and centrifugal forces of language builds a complex unity of oneself with the other because deliberation in politics resides neither in one's intention nor in what one deliberates but rather at a point between one's intention and that of another. On the one hand, the deliberation (like the word one speaks) is heretofore "half someone else's." (Bakhtin 1981: 293-294) In other words, preferences are one's own only when one populates it with one's own meanings. On the other hand, the preference that one deliberates is also populated in turn with the intention of another, for in the active life of the society one's intention is always directed toward the active understanding of the other, which is itself populated with its own intentions. This is the dialogization of languages. In this dialogization of languages, Bakhtin's dialogical paradigm privileges the centrifugal forces that not only resist the totalization of the meaning of democracy but also decentralizes the meaning of democracy towards heteroglossia. (Bakhtin, 1981: 273, 295-96) His dialogical paradigm produces a complex mixture of languages of democracy. This complex mixture is a generative dialogized heteroglossia that struggles to overcome differences to ensure a minimum level of mutual understanding in politics, or of varying approaches to democracy. (Bakhtin, 1981: 271-73)

Dialogized heteroglossia refers not only to the complex unity of centers but also to the functionality of multi-voiced discursive acts that are at work in the language of democracy. Dialogized heteroglossia occurs constantly through a process of hybridization, both deliberate and spontaneous. Hybridization "is a mixture of two social languages within the limits of a single utterance, an encounter, within the arena of an utterance, between two different linguistic consciousnesses, separated from one another by an epoch, by social differentiation or by some other factor." (Bakhtin, 1981: 304, 347,

358) Hybridization is deliberative as a democratic device in the politics. It is also spontaneous and as such is the primary means of change in a politics.

Hybridization is the primary means of combining individualistic and communitarian meanings of democracy. Neither the individual nor the community can exist in extreme conditions of unalloyed individualism or collectivism. Unless a political system is a hybrid of difference-centered and unity-centered features, it cannot be a democracy that is committed to both difference and unity through self-government on a dialogical basis. This is to say that a genuine democracy must be representative of dialogues of different approaches, emphases and meanings, and it must be able to combine all elements of particularistic and collectivistic meanings reflecting those of the individual and the community by moving toward dialogized heteroglossia. Otherwise, it cannot resolve the tension that ensues from a lop-sided particularism or a lop-sided wholism.

Dialogized heteroglossia prevents the establishment of a democratic model to achieve some particular end because it is an act of understanding each voice from the perspective of the others. It resists the continual attempt of domination where certain voices subordinate other voices under its own parameters. Bakhtin implied that dialogized heteroglossia is an imperative of democracy in that different voices and languages required dialogical interaction before they could make themselves apparent. This interaction was necessary; otherwise, their identities remained unfinished and incomplete without dialogue. Bakhtin (1997: 252) writes

When dialogue ends, everything ends. Thus dialogue by its very essence cannot and must not come to an end... All else is means; dialogue is the end. A single voice ends nothing and resolves nothing. Two voices is the minimum for life, the minimum for existence.... Dialogue here is not the threshold of action, it is the action itself. It is not a means for revealing, for bringing to the surface the already ready-made character of a person: no, in dialogue a person not only shows himself outwardly, but he

becomes for the first time what he is, and we repeat, not only for others but for himself as well. To be means to communicate dialogically.

In this respect, if democracy refers to openness and readiness to engage in dialogue, it cannot be constructed as means for a common good, a foundational epistemology or a new political method, but rather as a self-regulating interaction. Self-regulation is a form of regulatory communication. Unlike other regulatory communications, this form of regulation is not imposed upon the interlocutors. This communication mode allows the individuals and groups to regulate themselves, i.e. to make decisions that will control or limit the behavior of their members. Thus, this form of regulation comes from the inside of the dialogue, which means self-government where there is no separation between ruler and ruled ones. Self-regulation is also a kind of self-organizing process enabling agents to rule themselves.

The self-regulating and self-organizing characteristics of dialogue is not manipulated by dominance of belief that obligates attempts for reaching some determinate state or end (e.g. agreement or mutual understanding). At the heart of self-regulating practice is mutual respect and empathy. Mutual respect and empathy are positions that are not static and fixed, but are dynamic and grounded in the social world. Their authority comes from not grounding, expressed as a consensus of the participants but as recognition of differences without negations or understandings, that necessitates equality and freedom of participation in the realm of dialogue. The self-regulative process of dialogue, by its critical nature, is autonomous process that is not limited or confined by the constraints of essentiality such as truth and agreement. The function of dialogue is to bring about a democratic action that is free in itself, and not for the benefit for any individual or group.

In Bakhtinian terms, free action may be described as responsibility or responsive understanding and answerability. (Bakhtin, 1986: 68-69; 126-27) We can make some general points about responsibility as obligations to answer. Obligation to answer refers to self-regulation as a social, ethical activity of responsible agents. It makes utterances genuinely free when they are taken out of obligation to answerability alone. That is to say, people must not act out of compulsion or mere self-interest. When someone acts with no other motivation than a sense of responsibility (i.e. civic virtue), he or she does so because he or she recognizes the value of dialogicality that is valid *a priori*. By contrast, if someone acts in order to engender a particular result, then he or she is motivated beyond mere responsibility.

Moreover, responsibility (i.e., answerability) should entail respect for meanings of dialogicality. Anyone can act spontaneously. Chance events could produce positive results. But only through dialogue can people recognize new meanings and act out of respect for it. Thus, this position considers that meanings are of value and that they are an imperative of dialogue. By extension then, democracy that embodies this dialogue transcends all other concerns and interests.

A particular point to note is that self-regulated and self-organized dialogue transcends the unity or homogeneity of identity that can be expressed by any person or group. It is not something that can be passed on to future generations. Rather, self-regulated and self-organized dialogue is a discontinuity across time and place in terms of non-identity. As such, it is free of holistic meanings or totalistic views as well as clearly demarcated boundaries between conceptual categories. Self-regulated and self-organized dialogue is systematic in the sense it is a communicative framework that maximizes the likelihood that the participants can attain their own chosen ends

Self-regulated and self-organized dialogue consists of carnivalistic initiatives of spontaneity. Spontaneous dialogue is characterized by multi-voicedness, wherein participants pursue their own desires and ends and interact through a self-governing system of exchange rather than by being coordinated in terms of a specifiable goal. Indeed, one can say that spontaneous dialogue exists to serve democracy. Self-organizing dialogical democratic systems generally coordinate information, enabling the harmonization (as much as possible) of people's independent pursuit of varied and unpredictable goals. This coordination process may be impeded or assisted by changes in the practical regulations generating the democratic order, but those participating within it cannot be regarded as means to be calculated efficiently if the order is to be truly spontaneous.

It follows that the character of regulations and procedures found in an instrumentalist dialogical democracy differs from that found in a non-instrumentalist dialogical democracy. Because an instrumentalist dialogical democracy directly pursues a goal such as the common good, its regulations and procedures for participants reflect and subsist to that end. These regulations and procedures need not be direct instructions, but all can be oriented toward assisting that democracy in attaining its goals and in allocating different positionalities to different people. In the process, regulations and procedures can easily create new positions as centers within the dialogical endeavor of democracy. This means that hierarchies among people can be a direct result of regulations and procedures that are oriented toward achieving a democracy.

In contrast, regulations and procedures generating a non-instrumentalist dialogical democracy are fundamentally egalitarian in that all people are in a give-and-take position in relationship to those regulations and procedures. That is, regulations and procedures are continuously adopted or changed. The character of a non-instrumentalist dialogical



democracy is closely connected with the notion of freedom that challenges the fixity of discourses in creative practice. Various views expressed in the field of dialogue can be seen in a dynamic with particularistic interpretations based on different experiences, across history, economic and social systems. Dialogue can then be seen as the expression of self-government, which can be used in different forms, in different arenas, and with different effects for different groups of people.

Bakhtin's approach to dialogue and hence democracy is about freedom and creating indeterminate spaces for change. The point and value of dialogue for people lie in spontaneous freedom. Spontaneity occurs when the unexpectedness and randomness of actions are attributed to the fact that those actions were responsively, reflexively and autonomously provoked rather than produced as the outcome of calculated deliberations. Each participant is autonomous; each intervenes in the other, not causally through dialogue in which one determines the other but by virtue of dialogical interaction. Dialogical interaction is a dynamic or temporized process. Each successive reply by one participant prompts reconfiguration within his or her partner, which in turn prompts a new configuration of the partner and so on. This ongoing process is emergent or creative in the sense that each reply is an act upon a previous or ongoing act.

Bakhtin's theory of dialogism as a model of democracy entails a notion of citizenship that is egalitarian in character, and that refers to individuals' power relations. Because its normative attitude is self-government, its aspiration is not that of reproducing collective identities in terms of sameness, but that of giving voice to political relations of capability that situates individuals belonging to a body of collectivity in a position of subordination. Thus, Bakhtin's view of democracy rests on a conception of citizenship that unifies the two basic forms of equalities that have belonged to republican and liberal models of democracy. The first form is the equality of right. This concept implies a basic and

straightforward form of equality that grants all citizens the right to equal participation. The second form is equality of capability. This form of equality gives all citizens an equal opportunity to express their preferences publicly. The combination of both forms of equality accords substance to the self-regulated and self-organized character of dialogue that not only promotes consent but also interplay of contesting voices.

#### **V.4. Conclusion**

The major difference between the classical republican theory of democracy and the classical liberal theory of democracy lies in their different approaches to the principles of individual and society. Liberals emphasize the importance of individuals over the unity of the people as a whole or the community, while republicans stress that the priority must be to the well-being and unity of the people as a whole. To rephrase, a liberal theory of democracy considers the protection of individual freedoms fundamental to the very nature of democracy and rejects an emphasis on a strong role for morality in the conceptualization of democracy. In contrast, the classical republican approach favors the participation of the people in the political process for the realization of the good of the people as a whole. It also focuses on societal values for keeping morality well connected to democratic theory. For republicans, morality is important because they want simultaneously to protect the individual and society. These theorists aim to prompt the notion of justice by postulating equal respect for each citizen. At the same time, societal values are associated with the notion of solidarity as the realization of community as whole

Democratic theories reflecting these different orientations of republican and liberal approaches may be categorized as individual-difference-centered or community-unity-centered. These two categories reflect a distinction between what has been called self-

determination of the person and self-determination of the whole. Self-determination of the person refers to the capacity of the individual to act autonomously. Self-determination of the whole refers to the capacity of the people to self-govern. These theories attempt to organize the relationships of self-determination of the person in such a way that the integrity of the individual and the well-being of the community are protected or realized. Nevertheless, because practical political arrangements of democracy require choices of primary value on behalf of the individual or community, liberal and republican theories of democracy place different emphasis on behalf of the individual or community. Even when one side is privileged over the other, such recognition provides an alternative point of view for the establishment of dialogue for further conceptualization of the theory of democracy.

Any particular model of democracy that can exist in practice will be an outcome of the dialogue between these two different theoretical emphases. These emphases also consist of fundamental differences, which cannot be easily settled without undermining the freedom of the individual or the rule of the people as a whole, both of which are key to an understanding of democracy in contemporary life. However, if each emphasis is extended to the extreme, democracy loses the dialogical characteristics necessary for its development. To deny the importance of the freedom of the individual or the rule of the people as a whole is to attack the dialogical base of democracy. Therefore, democracy has to commit to a dialogue not only between individual and community but also between liberal and republican approaches.

In its dialogical attempt to reconcile the liberal tradition with the republican, the deliberative model assigns more of an emphasis on the possibility of achieving a fully inclusive rational consensus or agreement while agonistic model calls attention to the ineradicability of antagonism in the field of democracy. Certainly, by stating that

democracy cannot be reduced to the aggregation of preferences (taking place through political parties for which people would have the power to vote at regular intervals), both deliberative and agonistic models present comprehensive views of democracy. However, deliberative democrats tend to raise the tension or dichotic division between difference and unity and are therefore unable to come to terms with an adequate understanding of the main task of democracy. Both approaches to democracy appear to be either a rationalist one that leaves aside the crucial role played by contingency in the field of politics or one of conflict that pays no attention to the shared values that are necessary to constitute not only democracy but also dialogue.

In contrast to polarized understandings of democracy, Bakhtin's model of dialogue reflects a pluralism of language that supports the combination of different theoretical emphases as well as the attainment of difference in unity. The specificity of Bakhtin's approach resides in promoting a form of consensus as well as difference. Another distinctiveness of the Bakhtinian approach is its attempt to provide a solid basis of allegiance to the notion of contingency as well as rationality by reconciling the idea of Socratic dialogue with the defense of carnivalistic dialogue. In this sense, the Bakhtinian approach to democratic theory acknowledges both the antagonistic character of politics and the importance of achieving an inclusive rational consensus. Therefore, it has more capacity to imagine the main challenge facing democratic politics today: how to establish a dialogical realm that will help mobilize a rationale and enthusiasm for democracy.

## CHAPTER VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY

### VI.1. Introduction

In the previous chapters, I have maintained that democracy develops in time and space not as a fixed universal concept, somehow contrived from a chorus of pluralistic voices into a single utterance, but as a contested political concept (i.e. self-government). For in presenting that self-government is the root concept of democracy, it has also been presented that it is a normative view, one that is dependent on comprehensive conceptions. Comprehensive normative conceptions represent different theories that not only attempt to construct the concept of democracy in different ways but also seek to describe background conditions of that ideal—the basic structure of democratic society.<sup>41</sup>

In other words, normative conceptions of democracy have two main features. The first is to have its basis in certain fundamental values latent in comprehensive theories and to be guided by deeper concepts of language and self-government. Secondly, normative conceptions of democracy are committed to set and to pursue particular ends, to construct and implement an idea of democracy. This idea is adopted and guided by metaphysical conceptions of the communitarianism and individualism. That means that these metaphysical conceptions formalize moral norms of democracy and act upon them.

For these normative conceptions of democracy, the primary subject of democracy is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major political institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties. By major institutions it is understood the political constitution and the main procedural arrangements. Political

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<sup>41</sup> In his theory of justice, Rawls formulate basic structure of society as the primary subject of justice. He assumes that the basic structure of the society, which indicates constitutions and sub-set of social political and economic institutions enable people to meet the principles of justice. For this reason, the principles of justice that Rawls derives from the original position employ for organization of the basic structure of society. For Rawls, basic structures of society are involved with the distribution of primary goods that make people's lives rich, fruitful, and enjoyable and social primary goods that include rights, liberties, power, opportunities, income, wealth, and self-respect. When persons enter the original position to derive principles of justice, they will be concerned with finding principles that will order the basic structure of society in not only a just manner but also in democratic way. (Rawls 1971: 3-17, 54-90, 100-108, 258-265 and 1993: 175)

constitution is the primary subject of each conception of democracy because its effects are so profound and present from the start. It is a sub-set of political procedures and institutions, which, in turn, becomes a sub-set of political practices. The norms of constitution apply to all citizens, in a sense: they are constrained by the norms of constitution that constrain political institutions. Here a political institution refers to a group of citizen who follows rules. This means that the political constitution, which shapes the basic structure of institution, also regulates citizen's behavior. Therefore, it is not only necessary to make the basic structure of democracy subject to supreme authority but also essential to make political constitution a subject of democracy. In other words, the dialogical democracy that we are considering is principally concerned with turn taking systems as basic structure of dialogue. The main feature of this turn taking system is to manage the reciprocal disposition between rulers and ruled one. This means that one can only be a ruler if he or she is ruled (i.e., self-government). Therefore, in this chapter, I will argue that in order to meet principles of self-government, it is necessary to establish a system of reciprocity that constantly shifts borders between rulers and ruled.

In the initial section of this chapter, I argue that the different conceptions of democracy employ the idea of constitution as a normative, descriptive and regulative principle for eliciting setting each particular conception of democracy. The idea is that once these normative, descriptive and regulative principles are preferred, a constitution is shaped to embody those principles. In other words, different conceptions of democracy support various models of constitution involving a sustained and focused attempt to conduct behavior of citizens and actions of institutions according to identified norms and principles with intention of producing particular normative conception of democracy. A constitution that is formed to support particular different conceptions of democracy cannot be seen as a judicial activity performed only by officially authorized actors but its

very meaning is as wide as Tully and Habermas adopted. A constitution is thus understood here to be not only the communicative, intentional and goal directed but also dialogical involving unintended and unforeseen consequences produced by relations between addresser and addressee or author and reader. The constitution is emphasized here, as an “open text” that is always incomplete and subject to the ongoing exercise of self-government, as changing contexts and historical situations require. Because the dialogue is characterized by openness and reflexivity, the principles of the constitution must remain open as reflexive so as well.

In the second part of this chapter, I discuss classical accounts of the constitution – republican and liberal—and explain why the different conceptions of democracy seek to ground the constitution in generally agreed procedures. It will be argued that constitution is required by democracy because as a general procedure it corresponds to a conception of democracy (that is, it is a procedure that provides and secures equal rights and liberties), and because of its tendency to produce righteous outcomes (i.e. common good). It will also be maintained that constitution has authority above the will of the people only if it is dialogical, or (more strongly) if it is collectively dialogued by the people.

In the third part of this chapter, I will discuss the circular and reciprocal relationship between democracy and the constitution. This relationship may entail that the constitution can be formulated prior to and above democracy or within the democracy and itself thereby framing the democracy. Each relationship corresponds to a distinctive moment of dialogism. The first refers to the extraordinary, instituting moment of intervention (i.e. mediator). To get collective decisions to be based on dialogue, it seems indispensable to employ a generally agreed procedure that conforms the principles of equality and freedom (that is, it is a procedure that not only recognize everyone’s equal

rights and liberties but also safe guards very notions of them against the tyranny of the majority). Second, democracy is contained by the constitution because constitution has authority only if it is based on actual consent, or (more strongly) if it is democratically authorized by the people as a whole. The second relationship represents the moment of formal, economic, political, and social institutions of society. This relationship protects, consolidates and reproduces the basic structure of democratic society. Basic structure of democratic society is about dialogue. Finally, the third relationship denotes the starting position from which people will decide on principles of democratic society. The idea is that once these principles of democratic society are concluded, then a constitution can be shaped to embody those principles. The constitution will then set up a governing democratic body, which will enact laws and regulation that accord with the constitution and therefore the basic principles of democratic community. At the end, administrators and individual citizens who must decide how to respond to the laws and regulation in the light of their own beliefs about the situation, and (at least in the case of individual citizens) their views of democracy. Here the starting position become a self-referential and self-reflexive dialogical position. Repeatedly, these citizen deliberations follow the conduct that is accord with the principles constitution. However, this cannot always the case. Sometimes the change in the superior position constitution is introduced. This change in the superior of positions of constitution means that there is also a change in the process of legitimatizing constitution as democratic. It is now will of the people mark out the conditions of constitution as the procedure or form of discourse as the central praxis of democracy

## **VI.2. Conception of Democratic Constitution**

The conception of democracy cannot hinge on particular metaphysical principles for the regulation of the relations of political actors since each people have different his or her



own arrangement of life. What it is needed to establish referential set of principles, which enables political actors to live peacefully together despite their differences. These principles are the principles of constitution: they provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of democratic society and they define the appropriate distribution of the task and responsibilities of political institutions. Among actors with disparate aims and purposes, a shared conception of referential constitution establishes the bonds of citizenship and constitutes the fundamental charter of a well-ordered democratic association. In order to be completely legitimate and referential, such a constitution derives their validity from the sovereign will of the people (Rousseau, 1988: 98-110). The close association of the constitution with the sovereign will of the people affirms conditions of self-government.

The conditions of self-government refer to two level processes. In the first level, citizens who are sovereign communicative agent with right to rule, determine forms, ratifies constitution. This basic structure includes rules for holding office, exercising power, and making political decisions. It establishes basic rights, as well as the form and limits of the power. It also ensures people's participation in decision-making, as well as government accountability, through freedom. In the second level, citizens become subject to the structures, rules and processes of constitutional system so laid down. Compliance with the constitutional provisions by the political actors would be secured through a system of checks and balances, notably including an independent judiciary, incorporated in the constitution itself. With constitutional rule, the citizen has become both sovereign communicative agent with right to rule and subject with right to be ruled. Right in this context refers to capability for it being capable of self-government that sovereign will of the people can realized. Unless citizens have rights to achieve this level of self-government, the other moments of democracy cannot be accomplished. Therefore, these

two levels correspond to two fundamentally different forms of democratic activity. The first level of dialogue involves more about approval, while the second level involves endorsement. At the first level, basic principles for instituting basic rights and freedom are mark out. At the second level, basic principles for regulating the relationship between the rulers and ruled ones are defined

Accordingly, to the principle of self-government constitutions carry out at least three broad functions in order to establish a democratic system: First, it establishes basic structures that specify the basic rights and freedoms of citizens. Here structures refer on the one hand to the empowerment of capacities or developments of citizens, on the other hand to the limits and restrictions on the arbitrary use of power. In other words, affirmation and protection of basic rights and freedoms is the main purpose of the rule of constitution. To this end, the constitution establishes fundamental principles that determine the general structure of democratic system (Rawls, 1993:227). This constitutional democratic system is based on the separation of powers. Separation of powers means dividing power between executive, legislative and judicial branches. Separation of power by constitution creates systems check and balances that each executive, legislative and judicial branches capable to control the actions of one another.

Second, constitutions ensure respect for people's autonomy. This is the principle that all powers in a democracy ought to expand, not restrict, people's potential to determine their own life. In order to do that constitution binds all the use of power to the rule of law. First, the rule of law of contributes on the one hand to the freedom of individuals who are able to believe, act, and express themselves freely so long as doing so does not violate the rights of other individuals, on other hand to equality of rights that provide means for equal treatment individual under the law. Second, the rule of law limits all power action for the good of freedom. Power holders are only able to take action provided they have

the authority. Moreover, they are not allowed to bestow themselves authority. Authority can only be given by the constitution or through will of the people. By binding authority to the rule of law, the freedom of the citizen is guaranteed.

Third, constitution reflects the will of the political sovereign. In democratic system, people are the only source of governing power. (Rousseau 1998: 103) Hence they are the sovereign and their sovereign status gives them constitutional right to govern themselves.

Sovereignty of people is democratic principle that reflects the will of the people and it forms bases for a majority rule. In democratic systems, the consistency of constitution with sovereignty of people also requires account for limitation of power of a majority rule in protecting everybody's basic equal rights and freedom to govern themselves.

Therefore, constitution can be considered as existing within a strained relationship to majority's rule, since it serves in limiting power, even if this power is derived from the democratic principle of sovereignty of people. Constitutional constraints on rule of majority are consistent with popular sovereignty because these constraints are themselves chosen by the people for protection against the ruler (sovereign). In other words, constitutions are framed with the joint convictions and deep agreement of all its citizens to respect and safeguard the basic rights of freedom and equality with rights of participation. (Rawls 1993.229) Only with constitutional limitation of majority power, basic rights can be secured over the long term. Therefore, constitution can be seen as the principle of self-government and the dialogical rule that not only reflect the will of the people forming the majority's rule but also prevents the majority's rule from imposing restrictions on the freedoms and rights of the citizens is provided

At three levels, constitution can also be conceived of as regulative of two kinds: principles structuring the composition and organization of the fundamental political institutions and principles specifying fundamental rights and liberties of citizenship. These principles

contain different sets of values. These values are central to shaping the characteristics of democracy according to the different conceptions. They contain a prescriptive quality of 'oughtness.' Thus, they present what can be done, what ought to be done, as well as what should not be done. In this context, normative underpinnings of constitutions provide means and ends for the process of democracy. These means and ends can be called values of democracy and they reflect ideas such as freedom and equality. These ends are conceptual ideals and supply criteria on which to evaluate political action.

The notion of regulation adopted here is that of process concerning the persistent attempt to adjust the actions of political actors according identified principles of democracy. Regulative function is thus not seen as an doings performed only by legal institutions, but the idea includes every constituent power of democratic people. In other words, the notion of regulation includes communications that occurs as a dialogue between rulers and ruled ones. Regulatory notions of constitution are significant feature of democracy in a number situation. First, the regulatory function of constitution is characterized by constraints on the governance. It involves compliance to the rules, standards and principles. Constraints on governance are consistent sovereignty of people. Therefore, they represent the constraints that are chosen by the people. This way regulative function of constitution creates strong emphasis on the addresser citizens as well as the addressed citizen that self-government that citizens are ruled by but also shape the structures in which they act.

The second, the regulative function of constitution involves communicative activity with produce of shared meanings and understandings that form certainties at political and social bases of dialogical actions. The development of shared meanings and understandings is characterized by both collective reliance authority of the laws and rules of the democracy and where unleashed actions filtered. Here filtering unleashed actions

refers to dialogical space within and between rules in which democratic society exercise preference. The regulative aspects of constitutions also contain coordinative activity for the political process because only they conduct the actions of political agents according identified purposes of democracy such as sovereignty of people. As such, these conceptions prescribe how those agents should act within the political course in order to reach the goal of democracy. Therefore, they are closely connected with institutionalizing the rules and procedures for the processes of democracy or the regulation of actions that are likely to succeed in improving the dialogical quality of democracy.

Thirdly, the constitution can be perceived as descriptive power in that it builds objects of democracy not just reflects them. The descriptive function of constitution portrays a system of political organization in which all is governed by the supreme rule, and in which only the people's will can supersede and change the supreme rule. In portraying the form and character of a political system, the descriptive concept of constitution provides no basis on which to evaluate or justify different forms of democratic life. Thus, there is no basis upon which then advocating one form of democracy rather than another. It only establishes bases for an understanding of how the system of democracy works and what its constituent nature entails without imposing certain values on political agents, i.e. it does not attempt to suppress the political agent's autonomous voice.

The constitution combines some or all these normative, regulative and descriptive functions in varying degrees to comprise a series of specific and complex institutional operations which contribute to the construction of the dialogue with the authorial function within the context of democracy. The authorial function can be described in political terms as a superaddressee or anchor of meaning that provides some kind of fixed value to language and practices of democracy. Foucault specifically describes four main characteristics of the authorial function, which operate within a specific dialogical

context. (Foucault 1979b: 101-120) The first of these traits delves into the presence of power that performs within a certain political dynamic. This trait serves as a means of circulation, and it outlines the operation of certain discourses that determine both the development and the construction of the key institutions that shape governance in political society. The second meaning of the authorial function is that of the series of specific practices or group of practices, and complex procedures, which contribute to the construction of the referential locus within a certain political community. The third point of the authorial function stresses complex political and cultural operations whose functionality is to construct the higher authority or a superaddressee for not only expanding and enriching the dialogical practices without denying the free expression of preference political agents, but also insuring a “protection” through which minorities can flee the oppressions of the majority. Finally, the authorial function refers to a thoroughly consistent dialogic position that operates as a unifying agent for the generation of the unity of language as illustrative of heteroglossia.

The authorial function of the constitution is more complex than it seems to be. It is part of a larger system of discourses, practices and procedures that serve to limit and restrict asymmetric relationships of power that constrain dialogue and shape the manner and direction of the political process toward the tyranny of the majority. This means that all democracies are at risk. Therefore, the authorial function of the constitution or superaddressee is required for democracy precisely because inequalities of power occur between political agents, and because democracy is always constrained by the power interests that impinge upon it. When the political process is constrained and directed towards the fixity of the good life in one direction that is determined by strong interests of power groups, it is necessary to establish a higher authority or superaddressee to create not only a referential point of impartiality through which the citizens take equal and

active role in determining their life process or protection through which people can flee the oppressions of majority, Subsequently, this higher authority or superaddressee can also cancel the imminent hierarchy between one and another or ruler and ruled altogether, but also a tripartite dialogue in which people are objects (of authorial consciousness) subjects (of their own directly governing will).

The emphasis on this authorial function of the constitution is especially important for the constitutional theory of democracy, because it is useful in enabling the use of more interconnected details on the theory of democracy. These linked devices may serve to complement the understanding, distinguishing and situating classical conceptions of a constitution such as those embodied in the republican and liberal models of democracy. For example, republican constitutional theory has often described the authorial function of the constitution as guiding and enabling activity in the public's pursuit of the common good. In contrast to the republican theory of the constitution, classical liberal thought identifies the authorial function of the constitution as practice of protection of freedoms. Unlike both the aforementioned theories, the dialogical approach perceives the authorial function of the constitution as the superaddressee or higher authority that an agent addresses from a direct context. The people participate in this political process not as objects of the authority's consciousness but as free people, capable of standing alongside a higher authority. In this system, people are not only objects of authorial communication but also subjects of their own directly governing communicative action, and together they become a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices (Waldron, 1999: 83-87).

In the theory of democracy, numerous approaches have been advanced for the discussion of the normative, regulative and descriptive conceptions of the constitution, and it would be impossible to cover all of them here. As a result, brief overviews of some of the classical approaches in favor of dialogical democracy will have to suffice. Therefore, I will

first emphasize classical republican and liberal theories as the most obvious point of view for explaining the rationale of the constitution with activity analogous to the authorial function in democratic activity. After describing the main characteristics of both these classical approaches, I will consider the dialogical concept of the constitution which will depict not only the ruler and ruled or one and another, a presence or observer but also that of a third participant, the superaddressee that takes part in the political process and becomes a participant in the dialogue, although on a special level. I refer to the third one as the higher authority and the activity as analogous to the authorial function of the constitution in democracy.

<b>Classical Republican Constitution</b> (e.g., Aristotle and Rousseau)	<b>Classical Liberal Constitution</b> (e.g., Bentham and J. S. Mill)	<b>Dialogical Constitution</b> (e.g. James Tully)
Collective Rights (rights are necessary for realization of collective ability to pursue common good)	Individual rights (rights are necessary individual ability to choose what one values in life)	Performative Rights (rights are necessary for establishing active citizenship in the pursuit of autonomous, though interdependent lives)
Positive Liberty (freedom is civic achievement)	Negative Liberty (freedom is natural attribution of individual)	Critical Freedom (freedom is action)
Common interests in goods (political participation is a crucial for the promotion of the common good)	Aggregation of individual interests (political participation is a important for recognition of aggregation of individual self-interests)	Dialogue (political participation is important for empowerment of dialogue that elicits new and respectful relationships with shared understandings.
Linear: Teleological/substantive (good before right)	Perpendicular: Deontological/proceduralist (right before good) and Consequentialist/utilitarian (happiness as a good before right)	Dialogical: Polyphonic/Intertextual
Centralizing: Homogeneity, Unity of citizens	Decentralizing: Plurality, Autonomy of citizens	Simultaneously Centrifugal and Centripetal: Heteroglossia, Unity of citizens with difference
Normative/Conductive	Descriptive/Protective	Regulative/ Facilitative
Sovereign self-government	Checks and balances of power	Authorial function with general tone of superaddressee
Positive/Constructive	Negative/unconstructive, neutral	Symmetrical/Deconstructive
Value based	Reason based	Tripartite dialogue based (e.g. the relations of author, hero and reader)



### *VI.2.1. Classical Republican Conception of the Constitution*

Republicanism provides an influential view of the possibility of an appropriately designed constitution to achieve a democracy. A constitution is most often considered a vehicle for empowering certain conceptions of democracy, especially a constitution that citizens not only control but who also have a responsibility to uphold. Such conceptions are abstract, procedural, and rooted in the republican political philosophy that emphasizes the obligation of citizens to act virtuously in pursuit of the common good. Central to the republican approach is the principle of a common good that is publicly produced and limited in the democratic aims it embodies. However, simultaneously, it is also focused on the collectivity it must fulfill. Thus, the common good is only possible if constituted collectively and institutionalized by a constitution that is principally designed to “express” all the common interests held by the citizenry.

Republicans have been consistently encouraged by the fact that constitutions are not a certain kind of institution that has to be desired in and for itself – i.e. as an intrinsic aspect of a certain kind of democracy. Rather they are a part of the instrumental regulation of a political system. They do pursue specific norms and incentives in the sense of tending towards a certain conception of democracy. Therefore, it is a conception whose details is and can be subject to discussion. Republican deliberation of the constitution as the background condition for democracy can be traced to ancient Athenian city-state. In Athenian city-state, constitution technically meant a political system based on liberty, a liberty that is core republican approach. Liberty means an exercise of self-government by a people. It signifies to rule and to be ruled in turn. (Aristotle, 1992: 362-364 or 1317a40-b17)

The heart of the republican argument, to say again, is that the liberty of each individual reliant on social sense of being expressed in political community. Social sense of being of

each individual also depends on living together independently under just and equal laws – being ruled by constitution, as Aristotle states it - in an independent or self-governing republic. In ancient thought, living together independently under just and equal laws could mean many different things and require many different actions. Firstly, republican conception of liberty refers to a form of identity and social belonging. Aristotle notably express: “man is by nature political animal.” (Aristotle 1992: 59 or 12153a1-7). Then he suggests that their happiness (*eudemonia*), interlinked one another as it is with that of their wives, children and friends (Aristotle, 1996: 11-12 or 1097b8-14) It is for this reason that people come together to live in common social life. Since their happiness (*eudemonia*) requires communal achievement, people also come together to form political associations to provide necessary conditions for maintenance of social life. These conditions are expressed in household management and in constitutional rule of city-state, which binds all. (i.e. republic) (Aristotle, 1992:57-59 or 1256a1-b39; 1252a34-1252b27 and 1996: 153 or 1141b34). Therefore, in Aristotle’s view, constitution as being authorized by independent political exercise of the will of the people is connected with three issues: it satisfies people’s compulsion towards a social life; it gives people a share in the *eudemonia*, which refers to their good life; and it helps people to live independently. Aristotle here suggests three ends for which the constitution has to work: social life, which expresses happiness with fulfillment of natural impulse; political life, which is to communicate the good that is shared by citizens; and independent life, which states individual life that has a value in itself.

Secondly republican idea of liberty refers to a political status, set of rights for active participation and self-determination, as a political identity (the virtuous citizen). In connection to these points, Aristotle distinguished three different types constitution or political system: rule by “the one” (monarchy), by “the few” (oligarchy), and by “the

many” (polity). (Aristotle, 1992: 189-190; 1289a22-1279b10) The most important way in which these systems differ, in Aristotle’s view, is in their aims or goals (Aristotle, 1992 1289a17-28), that is to say, in their ability to activate participation and common good. (Aristotle 1992: 428 or 1332a9-10) In other words, Aristotle’s categorization of constitution reliant on (1) the ends pursued by constitution and (2) the kind of authority exercised by their rule. For Aristotle the common good life has to be the chief end both for the constitution as a rule of the whole and for each of people individually. Those constitutions that contribute most to the common good (i.e. which contribute most to good action of people) are right type of constitution and those constitutions that contribute most to self-interest are deviant type of constituents. From here, Aristotle shaped another systematic distinction in types of constitutions, based on who ruled in constitution and how they support the selfish good of the ruling authority. He suggests that if the constitutional rule of monarchy only aims to increase the monarch's wealth and power, then constitutional rule becomes to represent a tyranny; if constitutional rule of aristocracy supports benefit of the few rich, Aristotle referred to such a constitutional rule as an oligarchy, and if the constitutional rule of polity supports benefit of the poor, Aristotle called such constitutional rule as democracy. (Aristotle 1992: 193-198, 333, 342 and 362-363 or 1280a25-32, 1310a29, 1311a9-10 and 1317a40-41)

The definitions and meanings of constitutions in Aristotle’s philosophy are uncomplicated especially within the context common good. For Aristotle, constitutions that are central to political life have to be reflection of the higher form of common good. Therefore, Aristotle’s account views right type of constitution as manifestation of common good while it considers deviant type of constitutions as image of particular interest. Right type of constitutions are distinguished by characteristics that those who rule act with regard to the interest of the whole, while deviant type of constitutions

contains characteristics those rulers who rule act in their own interest only. It is for this reason (i.e. to provide these necessary conditions to political system to act to the good of the whole) that the republican constitution is framed on the principle that its subjects are equal and free citizens and should hold government by turns. This principle implies that the responsibility of ruler is to exercise ruling not in the interest of the ruler but common good to both ruler and ruled because both ruler and ruled are same. The idea of responsibility indicates the sense of virtue. Virtue is a substance of doing the right things. (Aristotle 1976: 99-100 or 1105b26-1105b20) Therefore, citizens who hold government offices or who participates political process, should possess the virtue for correctly understanding a situation and doing right thing for right end (i.e., common good). Aristotle believes that if a special individual may possess a superior virtue, and therefore should be king. Thus, he maintains the idea that the rule of constitution, as interpreted by many rulers, should be virtuous. (Aristotle 1992: 395: or 1324a23-5) and (Pangle, 1987: 111-113) Put another way, it is only in the right type of constitution that the virtues of a ruler coincide with that of a common good. (Aristotle: 1992: 190 or 1279a32 and 1996. 231,232 or 1288a32-9, 1288b4)

Because individual characters are differ from citizen to the citizen, the constitution should describe and endorse right conceptions of virtue. Rights conception of virtue are those based on human nature (active social life), so too the right type of constitution must also be based on the goods of social life, respecting needs, abilities, and freedom of individuals. The connection between the new issue of social life now raised and the issues of social life previously discussed is thus that both are determined by the fact of the constitution. It is that fact which determines the freedom of individual. It is also that point which shapes the relation of the good of political life to that of the good of the social life. This also means that self-government that is actuated this kind of positive

freedom because it allowed each citizen to participate in shaping the rules of conduct of social life (i.e. house management) that best promoted her own notion of happiness. (Aristotle, 1981: 361; 1317a40)

The other freedom dimension of Aristotle's view of constitution is ability to shape the conditions under which citizen lives their own social and political life. It is obvious how a constitutional rule can be thought to endorse this aspect of freedom. Part of a citizen's life in a political association always will be regulated by constitution. To the extent the citizens can participate in determining how this constitutional rule is framed and the circumstances in which it will take effect, that citizens participates in shaping part of their own social and political life. Constitution is a form of democratic rule that allows this kind of participation; as such, it promotes the freedom derived from citizens ability to shape the conditions of their social and political life.

Therefore, Aristotle believes that the purpose of every constitution is to help its subjects live the free life, and to achieve that goal, the active participation of the citizenry is required. (Aristotle, 1981: 362; 1317a40) Each citizen, through his or her situation, possesses different opinions about the good. The rule of constitution needs to be informed of a wide range of propositions to ensure that its policies equally apply to every citizen. Since the resources utilized to assess and improve ruling for helping citizens live the social and political good life cannot be circumscribed in advance, there is no single mode of experience of the good life on which all citizen's preferences can be based. All citizens should have equal capacity to pursue their own social and political good life freely; this goal is the most fundamental value the constitution can safeguard. This is not just a virtue of the constitution, but the most significant self-governing capacity that citizens have in a democracy

The lines of Aristotle's thinking appear most clearly as a republican constitution, which specially identifies positive framework, based positive dimensions of freedom. Republican notion of positive framework relies upon the availability of participation in ruling. Participation is the only way to establish the citizens's positive freedom to shape their own social life. The republican constitution does not seek to institute negative freedom by imposing severe limitations on the powers of rulers because citizens represent both rulers and ruled with engagement in self-government or taking turns in ruling and being ruled by their equals. This process of self-government is valuable as not only it allows the ruled ones to participate in the authorship of the laws that govern them but also it is also solution to the problem of domination in which one citizens or group of citizens have disproportionate power over the other citizens. The affirmation of this view is demonstrated in the master/slave relationship in which the imaginary goodwill of the master, who does not interfere with his slave's preferences, does not free the latter from the situation of domination that is to be a slave. For the republicans, even the case of the slave is one of negative freedom; they assume one would not necessarily be free even if there were no interference. (Pettit, 1999: 165-172)

Therefore, the republican approach emphasizes the constitution as a context that promotes positive freedom as the citizenry's ability to be masters of their own lives. At its heart, republicanism asserts that democracy is only possible via a constitution, particularly a constitution that individuals have control over and responsibility for. The elucidation of incentives and norms of a constitution for the achievement of republican conceptions of democracy tended to develop around two positions. The first one rests on a conception of communitarian republicanism that stems from the work of Aristotle and Rousseau. The second one reflects the ideas reflected in individualistic republicanism, which is evident within the texts of Machiavelli and Pettit.

Individualistic republicans emphasize the constitutive relationship between the idea of non-domination and the constitution in democracy. According to republican thought, the pursuit of the common good is not a natural attribute but rather a public achievement that requires a context where rules, structures, or regularities structure a citizenry's interaction with the common good.

These rules, structures, or regularities that are combined by a constitution enable liberty. Here liberty is understood as a background condition of democracy and it is often described as non-domination. (Pettit, 1999: 163-165) Non-domination is understood as the avoidance of subordination or the elimination of one's capacity arbitrarily interfering in another person's life. The republican idea of non-domination arises only by a constitution that is independent. An independent constitution is both defined and constrained by the principle of the sovereign self-government of the people and is publicly controlled and focused on a common or public good. Thus, those who are responsible for the practice of the constitution must be free from domination by the state and by factional interests. In this way, a constitution that is defined and constrained by the principle of the sovereign self-government of the people and communicates non-arbitrary interference does not cause liberty but constitutes it as non-domination. Therefore, republican constitutions, understood as constitutions of liberty, enable a democratic condition that is defined by the functionality of the diminution or elimination of arbitrariness. In its enabling characteristics, the constitution denotes a particular political order for minimizing the potential for any arbitrary or partial exercises of power that can lead to oppression and/or the disproportionate influence of the government on the people. (Reynolds, 1987: 91) They refer to the construction of an institutional framework that, if it functions impartially, guides decision-making more effectively and

sensitively and prevents power-holders from invoking concealment and shutting themselves off from criticisms, counter-arguments and different viewpoints.

In contrast to an individualist republican's emphasis on non-domination, communitarian republicans emphasize a constitution that can seek only ends and employ only means that are derived from the common good. In other words, at the center of communitarian republican thought is a strong constitution with a clear notion of the common good that is the general will of the people. The enabling function of the constitution to those who live within and control political society is central to the underlying values of communitarian republicanism. Thus, fundamental to the communitarian republican tradition is the existence of a constitution that is publicly controlled and limited in the aims it is able to endorse, but is also focused on the common good. Therefore, for communitarian republicans, the constitution has a value or teleological meaning: what the constitution is cannot be separated from what is of value to a person, group or society. The constitution exists only insofar as its ideals and values bring that into being. In other words, the constitution has an end, and every democratic structure that is supported by it has a purpose. The purpose, or justification, of the constitution in any given community is the formation of the common good. The common good is the key to democracy: it frees the people from limitation to the restricted field of one's own self-interested activity; it gives absolute grounding to one's existence; and it certifies one's value of the good.

General republican themes of the constitution are both defined and controlled by the conceptions of unity, positive liberty, active participation, civic virtue, common good and popular sovereignty. For republicans, the strength of democracy, and hence unity of a community, resides in the cohesion of its citizens. Cohesion is attained through their participation in collective self-rule, and the constitution provides the necessary resources for the effective unity of the people. It represents an agreement for the construction of a



political society that would have priority over the individual, in which active participation is seen as the epitome of freedom. That is, liberty is only possible through the experience of participation. Thus, participation in a political community is the constitution of positive liberty. Such a constitution provides essential institutional support that enables people to maintain their ability to participate and compels winners to treat losers with respect. More concretely stated, the institutional task of a constitution is to enable citizens to participate as free and equal in delineating common aims, to ensure that the state has the capacity to pursue that objective, and to provide citizens with the powers they need to make certain that the state properly exercises that capacity. At this point, the constitution inculcates civic virtue that encourages individuals to subordinate their private interests for the sake of the common good or for a deeper appreciation of the intrinsic importance of public affairs concerning the political community.

When mentioning the virtuous quality of a constitution, republicans meant the greater accountability and responsiveness of decision makers to citizens, i.e., those who directly rule; and it enhances self-government by effacing the distinction between rulers and those ruled. The people are legitimately assembled as a sovereign body and all separation between rulers versus those ruled are removed. Emphasizing widespread unity between rulers and the ruled provides the means for the citizenry to pursue the good life as they see fit. It does not prescribe the greatest good for its citizens in advance, but always leaves the good open to modification.

At this point, the republican idea of the constitution appears as both a means and an end in itself, and as both instrumental and functional.<sup>42</sup> The constitution supports the free and

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<sup>42</sup> Here the idea of the good can be seen as a dynamic event directed at the enhancement of self and society. The idea of the good is always developing toward a higher, unachieved yet achievable good. To recognize the unachieved good is a step toward its actualizing, but the process of striving is never completed: not because one never gets to the next or higher good, but the idea of the good always remains in the process of moving from one point of view to another.

equal participation of all citizens in achieving their own good—as a shared experience respectful of differences. Moreover, through that experience, each citizen’s idea of the good (greater and personal) is enhanced and enriched, along with his or her sense of identity. Only by actively participating in the governing process and sharing in the common idea of achieving the good can citizens realize their own versions of the good life.

#### *VI.2.2. Classical Liberal Conception of the Constitution*

In the previous chapter, I mentioned that liberalism provides a powerful statement of the potential of a constitutionally designed democracy to achieve and protect negative conceptions of liberty. In this regard, the liberal model produces normative and regulative, negative conceptions of the constitution that express strong concern for structuring democracy. This is the case in order to engender certain outcomes that these theoretical approaches hold are important for liberal conceptions of democracy.

Firstly, constitutional outcomes are emphasized in terms of neutrality. Neutrality functions of the constitution occur here as an outcome reflecting tolerance, the primacy of individual rights over the good, freedom of speech, plurality, as well as the independence of institutions, courts and government. The neutrality functions of a constitution refer to the establishment of a general scheme or framework of procedures according to which political relations that appear among individuals and between an individual and the state or between organizations are evaluated as proper, legitimate and justified. The matter of neutrality is of course the matter of a specific image of democracy, but it is also a matter of liberal suggestions concerning political and social relations that appear among human beings. In fact, it is tied to a given conception of the individual. The individual, according to the liberal conception, is an agent who has a

natural orientation towards free choices as a matter of his/her existence. However, this orientation does not refer the individual to particular, preferred conceptions—for instance, to a republican conception—one is free to choose her/his good within the structure of a given common good. In this context, the liberal approach develops a theory of constitution that defines the conditions of neutrality where individuals are viewed as agents who have natural orientations toward the free choices of their existence.

Another outcome is that of the protection of individual liberty from any abuse of power. The idea of individual liberty is secured in a structural context within which power is distributed. A constitution helps specify who holds political power, what that power entails, and how it might be employed for the achievement and protection of individual liberty. It creates a discourse for the liberal idea of negative liberty. The liberal idea of negative liberty is also closely connected with conditions of non-interference. The conditions surrounding non-interference require a constitution that intervenes in those political activities that enact or potentially enact conditions of domination. It defines conditions where institutions are viewed as being involved in the structures of limited power. These conditions are arranged to secure a liberal pattern of individual liberty and they are combined with the idea of non-interference. It puts effective restraints on governmental power so as to minimize the abuse of governmental power in order to free the power of the individual for self-government. (Castiglione, 1996: 18-21)

The idea of limited power is built into the liberal constitution through the description and regulation of the use of political power. The description of the use of political power applies to issues where actions of a government are restricted to its legitimate use of power, all of which is controlled by the public and the constitution. (Mill, 1956: 4) The descriptive and regulative use of power or limited government promotes individual freedom while giving the people a formidable voice in their self-government. Limited

government is built into the constitution through restrictions on the arbitrary use of power. (Mill, 1958: 128, 175) Limited government is also reinforced by the checking of power-by-power.<sup>43</sup> The checking of power is based on a separation of different powers. The familiar constitutional separation of powers is only part of that institutional story. In the system of separation of powers, the constitution functionally divides the political power distinguishing the legislative, executive and judicial institution of powers so that no single institution has the ability to exercise great power without the agreement of other institutions.

The separation of powers operates not only in different areas of democratic systems (i.e. the executive, judicial and legislative) but also in acts horizontally within each branch of a democratic system. Here, the separation of powers does not mean a complete separation and absolute demarcation between the judicial, executive and legislative powers of a democratic system. A complete separation could make a democratic system chaotic, impracticable, and potentially dangerous. For this reason, liberals have combined the idea of the separation of power with a checks and balances mechanism. By giving each area of

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<sup>43</sup> Montesquieu whose work is widely influential in liberal thought makes a very similar argument. Montesquieu has adapted the ancient principle of democracy by making the separation of powers into a constitutional system of checking power by power. (Montesquieu, 1952: 69) He argued for a strict separation of the three main state powers namely legislative, executive and judiciary because he was aware of the difference between the freedoms offered by democracy and that offered by monarchy. According to this scholar, the difference between two political systems is separation of the power. (Montesquieu, 1952: 75) In a monarchy, the power of decision theoretically rests with just one individual. Because such monarchical systems do not have a system for controlling power, citizens are left at the mercy of those in power. Montesquieu (1952: 70) says that:

When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from legislative and executive.

In democracy, liberty is secured because the power is divided among different and independent bodies of a constitution. He thought that such division of the legislative, executive, and judicial functions among separate and independent constitutional bodies limits the possibility of arbitrary excesses by government, since the sanction of all three bodies is required for the making, executing, and administering of constitution. (Montesquieu, 1952: 69)

the democratic system some control over the other two branches, the liberal constitutional system of checks and balances creates an elaborate web of control to prevent any one branch, person or party from accumulating all political power. That is, checks and balances work to prevent a tyrannical concentration of power. This means that the liberal negative emphasis on the constitution does not strongly endorse the sovereignty of executive power or the legislature. Instead, it not only recognizes the sovereignty of the people but also puts more emphasis on an independent judiciary that regularly conducts a review of legislative and executive acts. Independent judicial assessment is essential to the protection of individual freedom. (Craig, 1990: 265-269) Through an independent judiciary, liberal constitutionalism puts limits on the discretionary and emergency powers of the state.

A further issue is that of individual rights. A liberal sees individual rights as the political means to prevent intervention. (Ingram, 1994: 99) Such rights are stated in the constitution in order to protect individual citizens and groups from certain decisions that a majority of citizens might want to make. The liberal constitutional notion of individual rights is divided between a characteristic, private dimension on the one hand, and a strongly legalized public dimension on the other. In this regard, the idea of citizenship rights is embodied in the notions of equal respect and self-government. For liberals, to be free means to be subject to one's will rather than to the will of others. To be fully free thus means to rule oneself not only in private matters such as family and business but also in affairs that concern society as a whole, that is, self-government. The liberal idea of self-government cannot flow from values that are shared by everybody. Instead, self-government is derived from the idea of equal respect. Equal respect also implies the social interaction between free and equal citizens who are autonomous and engage in

dialogue for developing and exercising their capacities to form and implement their own plans and projects. (Mill, 1956: 97)

The idea of equal respect is institutionalized through a constitution, especially through recognition of the equal procedural and political rights of individuals. The constitution defines equality as rights, liberties, protections, duties, and responsibilities. (Arneson, 1993: 192-193) Therefore, the liberal constitution can be seen as the source of individual rights (individuals as rights-holders). For example, the constitution pledges freedom of speech. That gives the individual permission (within limits) to say whatever he or she wants, and it forces the individual (within limits) to refrain from interfering with another's right to express his or her opinion. Non-interference occurring as the avoidance of subordination or vulnerability depends on the constitutional constraint of the actions in the name of protecting individual rights. These constraints are rights based not on the grounds of some social convention, aggregate common good or dispensation from God, but by virtue of individuals having the moral autonomy and dignity that make them the bearers of rights. (Gray, 1986: 45-46) As such, procedures and rights form the heart of a deontological conception of the constitution that legitimately rules. The constitution and political decisions are binding to the degree to which they respect deontological norms (i.e., individual rights), which in turn justify constitutional order. Thus the liberal who affirms the priority of rights by calling attention to the contingent and arbitrary character of all historically conditioned conceptions of the good, value the constitution because it creates space for individual participation while it is protecting the individual autonomy. In this perspective, liberal theories of constitution differ from one another according to the ways in which each endorses processes of constitution. Some see constitution is as valuable in itself, as an expression or necessary outcome of fundamental moral principles. These theories are called deontological theories. Others see constitutional process as

important because it promotes certain consequences. These are called consequentialist theories. Both deontological and consequentialist theories come out in various ways.

The deontological theories give importance to the constitution in democratic process because of an idea that its constitution has an inherent moral value. The dominant strain of deontological theories is individual based constitutionalism, which sees that people are benign and reasonable by nature, and their actions are right or wrong by virtue of their intrinsic nature, regardless of the consequences of those actions. Under this system, an action is judged by its own intrinsic nature and not by the extent to which it serves as an instrumentality in furthering one's goals or aspirations. Therefore, this view urges the constitution not to interfere with individual choices and allows individuals to set collective and personal courses of action on their own.

The deontological theory of the constitution values individual autonomy for its own sake and sees constitution as a necessary manifestation of that individual autonomy. Therefore, it endorses promote negative freedom in two ways. First, it secures that individual is essentially a choice maker and rational agent and therefore no individual should have unequal power over one another for preventing one's rational capability of choice. Locke referred to this as the goal of civil society or constitutional government. Locke (1993: 159 or II.90) says that:

For the end of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniences of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own Case, by setting up a known authority

Locke suggests that this civil society can have any form of constitutional rule, so long as that the rule is not an absolute monarchy. He believes in an absolute monarchy the individual does not have a liberty to judge the absolute authority of monarch and therefore the monarchy reproduces the harms of a state of nature. (Locke, 1993: 159) or

II.90 What is necessary is a system of rule in which all individual consented to be bound equally with each other this system is constitution through which every citizen has an equal voice in shaping the world around them

This meant that deontological theories provide freedom that is more positive or entitlement that gives a right to participate in decisions that affect them. This right is more about individual autonomy that not only recognize individuals's ability to act free of constraint by others but also acknowledge individual freedom to judge of their own end or seek their own good in whatever way one sees. This is positive aspect of deontological theories. It establishes procedural conditions for recognizing freedom to shape the conditions under which one lives one's life

Therefore, for the deontological view, what matters is not the ends people choose but their rational capacity to choose them. This rational capacity to choose, which resides in individuals, is prior to any particular ends that are external to the individual. Such a view gives expression to an absolute form of non-interference. The individual is considered to be a self-reflective and separate moral agent, is assumed to have an intrinsic value and, hence, is worthy of respect. The deontological approach identifies a constitution as having the duty to act in ways that do not impinge on the freedom of the individual. Therefore, for the deontological approach, the liberal constitution has to reflect respect for, and the intrinsic value of, the individual as essentially a choice maker and rational agent. It has to reflect a positive entitlement of individuals to be involved in principles that affect them; an entitlement that follows from the importance of what it is to be an individual. In light of these points, the deontological approach does not try to embrace any conceptions of the good. It rules them off limits to constitutional theory. Therefore, the deontological approach embraces a model of the constitution that is ruled by principles that are not geared for any particular end or presupposes a particular



conception of the good. As such, deontological principles center on conceptions of neutrality. In other words, the constitution of a democracy is desirable in itself, independent of the consequences. This is the most important deontological feature of the constitution that appropriately endorses the neutrality of institutions and democratic processes. A deontological position stresses that the neutral status of a constitution cannot be judged by its consequences, but only by its objectives and meanings.

Unlike deontological theories, the consequentialist theories do not consider the value of the constitution has intrinsic quality that is necessitated by some fundamental moral principle. As an alternative, consequentialist theories maintain positions that the constitution is important because it produces important effects on the democratic process. This means that constitution always exists for the sake of some end or purpose. First aim and purpose of constitution is democracy. Constitution protects democracy because it ultimately benefits not just individuals, but society. Therefore, Second aim of constitution is individual freedom or the ability to act free of constraint by others and to make decisions to shape the conditions under which one lives one's life. Under these principles, constitutions are only valuable democracy if they maximize democratic quality of political system. This practical usefulness of constitutions is evaluated solely by virtue of their effects on the society. In assessing the consequences and principles of a constitution, the only consideration that is important rests on the amount of happiness or unhappiness that a proposed constitution is to cause. (Sayre-McCord, 2001: 331-334) All other factors and considerations are irrelevant. Thus, the right kinds of constitutions are those that cause the greatest balance of happiness over unhappiness. In calculating the happiness or unhappiness that a constitutional action or principle may cause, no one's happiness is to be counted as more important than any other individual's happiness. Each person's well-being is equally important. Therefore, constitution ought to strive in all its

procedural actions to maximize the sum of happiness in that society--act so as to maximize pleasure in the aggregate.

The sum of happiness requires equal treatment of every individual member of society and an equal voice in determining what the laws will be in that society because happiness of each individual member bears equal weight in the sum of happiness. At this point, what matters when consequentialist approach evaluates the value of a constitution are not the intentions from which it is established but its consequences. This maxim engenders consequentialist approach to advocate utility as the principle that either approves or disapproves of principles of a constitution according to its tendency to increase or decrease everybody's happiness. (Sayre-McCord, 2000: 330-335 and Ryan, 1990: 193) Consequentialist approaches develop principles for what could be termed 'the utility principle' of a constitution. Among consequentialists, Bentham strongly argues that a constitution should be dictated by the utility principle. (Bentham 1988: 58-59 and 104-105) The utility principle implies that the constitution that produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number, namely of individuals, promotes happiness by means of a democracy structured by the rule of law.

Bentham's principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number recognizes the possibility of the infliction of harm or oppression by the governors upon the governed or one individual over another individual for the advancement of one's own private and personal happiness at the expense of the public happiness – all of which is merely an aggregate of the happiness of individuals. (Rosen, 1982: 515) Consequentialists seek to avoid such situations as the abuse of power in a constitutional democracy, and therefore come up with a principle that is called 'the harm principle' for checking the abuse of power. The harm principle discloses that a constitutional system may only justifiably limit a person's freedom if that person is somehow threatening to harm another person. (Mill,

1956: 13-16) The harm principle is intended to apply to any member of a democratic community in the sense of the self-protection of anyone who is able to become fully involved in the political activities of that democracy. This means that the harm principle of a constitution may only justify intervention to prevent harm in order to secure certain kinds of freedom that may lead to greater happiness.

Consequentialist approach considered that granting people the right to exercise certain kinds of freedom would achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. The right to certain kinds of freedom is essential for having the capacity to develop as individuals. By individual development, consequentialist approach refers to the growth of the self that has a rational capability for possessing reflections on one's own choices of action. Self-government can develop fully if individuals are given the freedom to make their own choices. This means that developing, as self-governing individuals would make individuals happier because each individual is more likely to know what will make him or her happy as an individual than others would. (Mill, 1956: 71) Individuals who have freedom of choice as an essential element of self-government will tend to act in a way that will make them happier than they could be if society dictated how they must perform. Therefore, it is essential that the liberal constitution enables and secures freedom of choice for each individual in order to achieve individual development that will lead to the greatest happiness for the greatest number of the people.

Both the consequentialist and deontological approaches within liberal constitutional theory oppose each other, but both of them reveal a strong concern with individualism in their orientation towards constitutional democracy. Both emphasize a restriction of political power. The restriction of political power is built into the constitution through limited government. Limited government is reinforced by a system of separate institutions sharing power, creating elaborate checks and balances between the three

branches of government. Both of them regard majority tyranny as the animating problematic of democracy. (Mill, 1945: 7-8) In order to prevent majority tyranny they see the use of a constitution as a means to place substantive constraints on political majorities. Constitutions are fixed to protect individual citizens from certain decisions that a majority of citizens might want to make, even when that majority acts in what it deems to be the general or common interest. The most important powers of the constitution have often been rendered in terms of individual rights. Attempts to deal with the problem of the tyranny of majority have historically embraced individual rights. Both approaches endorse certain models of constitutionality that respect private preferences over that of collective deliberation because liberal politics is largely a matter of aggregating private interests. Liberals regard the aggregation of private interests as a functional requisite of a democratic constitution that guarantees tolerance of one sort or another. The constitutional guarantee of tolerance is typically expressed in terms of pluralism or the respect of difference.

### *VI.2.3. Dialogical Conception of the Constitution*

In previous section, I have articulated and discussed the two different types of constitutional theory offered in support of the democratic process. First are republican theories that see constitution not valuable in itself, as an expression or necessary corollary of fundamental moral principles, but valuable because it is constitutive of democracy in the way of common good. It posits that constitutional support of active citizenry not only gives citizens the opportunity to reflect themselves while it allows them to shield themselves from domination but also serves to edify the citizens, to inculcate the right moral values and a sense of the common good.

Second are liberal theories that consider constitution both valuable in itself and produces beneficial results (e.g. happiness) for society and individual. The deontological

characteristic of the liberal approach based on its fundamental principle that there is independent fact of the constitution as to what the best or right outcome is. Therefore, the deontological approach states that rule of constitution have to trail that truth of freedom. In contrast to deontological approach, consequential characteristic of liberal approaches refers to the fundamental premise that there is no process independence of constitution as to what the best consequence is. Therefore, consequential approach states that the rules constitution has to be framed in way of the best or right outcome. Best or right outcome coincided necessarily with the aggregate happiness/interest; that the aggregate interest is identical with the happiness/interest of the majority.

Both republican and liberal theories appear to offer a different theoretical basis for endorsing constitution in democratic process. Both, after all, suppose significant in the process of constitutional rule. Firstly, they are not comprehensive and specific enough to cover all situations. In other words, they are not context sensitive. Secondly, both republican and liberal theories regarded as the sovereign body as a homogeneous and undivided collective unity. They fail to recognize plurality of life experiences and preferences that makes constitution as dialogical arena

Both republican and liberal conceptions of the constitution have tendency to sees as constitution as monological form or as the whole of a single consciousness. In this understanding, the constitution is seen as a procedural means appropriately directed to fulfill a given task sought by monological conception of democracy. The constitution will relieve the top of the hierarchy of complete determination, but will confer the certainty that all decision-making will be made based on laws following an instrumental rationality to the liking of the hierarchy.

The hierarchical structure of monological form of constitution is one of the most important essentials in which the set of laws were observed, and it requires power that grants the hierarchy the possibility of imposing sanctions in case of a violation of the rules. The chain of orders from top to the bottom should secure the identity of the system and ensure the capability of the constitution to determine a set of policies, though at the top. Therefore, politics is not only constrained by the rigid and deterministic rules of the constitution, but also the constitution itself is determined by the rigidity of principles and rules that supposedly guide the constitution through instrumental reasoning. These principles and rules are also characterized by abstract procedural regulations possessing a hierarchy of fixed values and goals, such that some are more respected than others are. These hierarchies exist in the specific image of democracy, and in the internal structure of constitutions deliberately created to achieve specific outcomes. The essence of this hierarchy of values is that a structure of the constitution appears with explicit pressure or constraints from outside of the constitution. In other words, the constraints on the model are external to the particular structure of a constitution. They may not result from the interactions between political agents, whilst such constraints may be independent of the social characteristics of those agents. In this way, a regulation of constitution, hence political system, and its relations cannot evolve in either time or space, cannot maintain a well-established form. Since it refers to politics as a solid field of instrumental regulation, therefore it does not seek to discover new conceptions and relations of a constitution based on dialogism, the new political procedure. Both republican and liberal models of constitutions appear as systemic structures of law, but this systemic structure of law does not consist of a unity formed by the plurality of consciousnesses but a unity constituted by single consciousness. The unified functioning of laws and rules depends upon the fixed arrangement of the parts. In other words, the

systemic structure of a constitution has conceptions that are fixed; they are contained within none of the parts and exist at a lower level of description for fulfilling certain aims.

In contrast, dialogical approach presumes that constitution is a dialogical form. Dialogical form of constitutions contains plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses. This characteristic makes constitutions more context sensitive and inextricably links to the life experiences of people. Therefore, norms of constitution and life experiences of people are in a dialogical interaction. People's understanding of life frames the constitution, which in turn is reflected back to the people in the form of ruling. Consequently, people's views are entwined with constitution (they are both author and reader), carrying the implication that although people have the potential to shape their own world.

Dialogical approach assumes that the unifying character of constitution does not lie in the pursuit of common good or aggregate interest but ahead of a dialogue, that is, ahead of self-government in the attempt of giving rise to policies that are more consistent with means of democracy: to rule and to be ruled in turn. The aggregate interest and common good are vague abstractions; they do not have homogenous and fixed identity for the very reason that it cannot be defined once and for all. Therefore, the aim of constitution has to the dialogue of the people defined by conditions mutual respect based on political equality and individual independence.

Contrary to republican and liberal normative hierarchies of values and frozen images that the constitution embodies, the starting point of the dialogical approach, inspired by Bakhtin's view of dialogism, focuses upon how constitution arises from the dialogical relations occurred between ruler and ruled ones and between author and reader. It is developed within the process of dialogue and becomes actualized as democracy, as it is

the objectified and scrutinized by political theory. The dialogical approach regards a constitution not only as a political/legal phenomenon but also as a linguistic phenomenon. This means that the constitution cannot fail to retain some relation to the linguistic world of which it is a part. Therefore, the constitution is fundamentally linked to the objectives and conceptions of democracy and internally linked to the language and its products. In this context, the primary function of a constitution is not only the regulations of the acts of autonomous agents in the political field but also the transmission of 'order-acts'. Order-acts are understood as inherent parts of a pragmatic or performative language function; their role is to accomplish certain types of political actions in and through discourse. Hence, a constitution does not have as its main concern the representation of what constitutes democracy, but directly intervenes at the level of representations, transforming them according to the dictates of collective assemblages of imaginations. Collective assemblages of imaginations as components of languages are constellation of voices, produced in the field of dialogue.

In the dialogical approach, a constitution is a communicative process that shaped and supported by dialogism of language. It is in this communicative and dialogical process that a constitution has been identified as the supreme building block in the struggle against monological authoritarianism. The dialogical process accorded to a constitution is also related to the understanding that a constitution necessitates much more than an abstract construction of the laws. A dialogical process of constitution necessitates a direction of political life on which durable institutions could be grounded. In this dialogical way of political life, constitutional conceptions are fluid, with old meanings giving way to new, critical interpretations and with new critical conceptions assuming the center stage. This means that constitution is not possessed by a fixed idea or meaning



rather it gives a life to ideas within a democratic community. It contains dialogical character of texts.

The dialogical text of constitution contains two language centers within one context—the will of the authority or the author’s intention and will of the people/the reader’s intention (Waldron 199: 83-85). The most practical interrelation here presents a dialogue between the subject (ruler) and the object ruled. Any such exchange affects both sides of the dialogue: Two equally weighted discourses on the same theme, once having come together, must inevitably orient themselves to one another. Two embodied positions cannot lie side by side like two distinct and separate objects – they must come into unity; that is self-government. When the discourse of the constitutional text is subordinated to ruler’s intention, the self-governing voice becomes “objectified” and a fixed discourse results. Therefore, the dialogical approach attempts to incorporate into a constitution the surrounding objects into an image that exhibits no finished contours, an image completely injected with multi-dimensional elements and open-endedness. Therefore, it does not try to condition a constitution to pursue specific goals either in the sense of tending towards an instrumental regulation or towards a specific policy of the good. The reason is not that the constitution is an original authority that fosters a meta-logic or privileged meaning that can dictate rightness for the discourse of democracy, for one’s conscience, or for political decisions through instrumental rationality. Rather, it is that the constitution does in fact tend towards a particular fixed pattern of the text, but it is dialogical whose particulars are open, not finished, not finalized, as in those texts with monologic structures.

Such a dialogical pattern of constitution takes roles of superaddressee as higher presence, activity or authority that a participants addresses beyond an immediate situation. Witnesses and judges democratic process while it remains democratically positioned the

third party 'alongside' the political actors so that no single point of view is privileged. It takes on a referential character within multiple and various forces rather than a single force. Therefore, it does not reflect a direct expression of the ruler's truth but an active creation of the truth in the dialogical process with an equal and active participation of whole parties. This truth is a unified truth that nonetheless requires a plurality of voices and languages. Therefore, a dialogical constitution aims to expose the dialogical process to heteroglossia for the realization of a unified truth.

Such dialogical pattern of constitution created as it is in many languages, presents two opposing tendencies. There is a centrifugal force dispersing it outward into an ever-greater variety of voices, outward into a seeming disorder. In addition, there are various centripetal forces reserving constitution from overwhelming fluidity and variety. The dialogical drive to frame constitution that have some kind of coherence -- that is, formal unity -- is obviously a unity between centrifugal and centripetal force; it provides us with the best practice of democracy that does justice to variety of independent voices

This quality of the constitution refers to functional dualism. On the one hand, a constitution conveys traditional meanings that stabilize threats of chaos, enforcing conformity for the very notion of the democracy. On other hand, it generates new meanings that can be full of the general tone of laughter, which represents a critical attitude or spirit outside the coercive limits imposed by a single discourse or ready-made thoughts of the truth. Laughter can be a mode of constitution that gives insights and subverts ossified hierarchies and stale judgments to allow for the rise of new potentialities and great changes. (Bakhtin, 1984: 73) This mode of constitution offers a clear conceptual vantage point from which existing conceptions and practices of democracy may be reflected upon, critically assessed and modified from a position outside their own confines.

A dialogical approach grants a strong emphasis to the notion of mutual respect as equality conditions of a constitution. Casting constitutional matters in the terms of quality of conditions makes dialogical democracy more plausible. An equality condition of a constitution refers not to the abstract universal right to deliberate but a capability or actual exercise of the right of all to participate in the political decision-making process. (Christiano, 1996: 3) With respect to these actual equal rights of participation, a constitution guarantees individual freedom to exercise a self-determinative power to undertake what every citizen wants without being constrained by other agents and political authorities to the extent that such actions do not interfere with the same freedom to execute those others possess. In this regard, equality conditions of a constitution refer to a dialogical description and not a metaphysical conception. They apply to the part and not to the whole of political life. This means that equality conditions are not an all-at-once fixed and inborn set of limits. Given human diversity, equal capability arises from many stimuli and which can be directed or redirected, given conditions that cooperate with it. In other words, equal capabilities of people change depending upon changing conditions. A man may be able to determine his life, when he has sufficient skills, wealth, materials, and tools on hand. His capability to act is not something purely “inside of him.” The term equal capability is dialogical because it refers to temporality of what a person can do here and now, given available resources, and what he could do, if certain absent conditions were made present. In other words, equality capability represents changing and interactive characteristics of positive freedom through which one is able pursue ends and desires that depend on the ends and desires one possesses and what freedom one has in order to convert external and internal resources into the achievements of his/her ends.

Equality of capabilities as part of dialogical freedom is a condition and component of democracy. It interactively connects freedom to the power of participation. This means that the endurance of equal capabilities and opportunities through a constitution can create effective different potentialities for each participant in order that he/she has an occasion and opportunity to deliberate in the political process. For example, Sen describes capability with freedoms that play detrimental roles in regard to one's reflection on the alternative arrangements of functioning that one can achieve (i.e. beings and doings), and from which one can select one combination" (Sen, 1992: 31 and 56-73) This understanding of capabilities can be ascertained as a good that is structured as functioning. Functioning can be characterized by parts and of the states of a person (i.e., beings and doings—including self-governance and self-respect the person actually achieves). (Sen, 1992: 31) In that sense, for Sen, capability is not only a means but also an end in itself, supplemented and supported by other basic rights. Capabilities have intrinsic importance for the person's achievement of well-being. To stress this intrinsic value, Sen's idea of capabilities appears as freedom, such as freedom from lack of food and under nourishment, freedom to take education for reading and writing. (Sen, 1992: 39) In this view, equality conditions of dialogical conception of constitution can be seen a matter of achieved situation and proceedings. By extension, the capacity to achieve self-determination is a matter of the combinations of beings and doings within a person's reach.

A dialogical process requires a capacity for freedom of action for its completion; reflection is incomplete without equality of capabilities. No individual is sovereign unto oneself unless it consists of equal capabilities because without the equality of the capabilities there is no positive freedom. In addition, outside, such a freedom one cannot be effectively self-governing.

Capabilities and resources change depending upon shifting conditions. Capabilities of people can develop as consequences of interactions; they cannot be realized before the interactions have occurred. The accomplishment of self-governance through positive freedom, which consists of the development of capacities with the help of resources, requires the adaptation of social conditions. It also requires cooperation and accommodation to the capacities of people. What a person is able or unable to do depends upon what others can or cannot do, their capacities, the presence and movement of their reactions. The freedom of some may mean the restraint of others. Thus, there is no such thing as freedom as well as self-governance isolated from the activities of others. Though freedom is the fulfillment of distinctive individual capacities for self-governance, freedom is always linked to the other. The freeing and activation of individual freedom in relation to the active participation is inseparable from constitutional conditions.

Besides equality conditions, a dialogical conception of constitutions emphasizes the position that active participation remains pivotal to the democratic process. From the constitution, it is expected that a positive framework for citizens will be produced as well as a route to develop the capacity effectively participating within the dialogical process of the democracy. This capacity is not innate. It requires that citizens acquire through experience and character formation the qualities and traits necessary for dialogical communication. Nevertheless, this does not imply that a dialogical model is imposing the notion of the good into the democratic process. Dialogical conceptions of a constitution reject any role for the notion of the good in democratic discourse. The reason is that although each participant may possess elements of the good, it is impossible to identify the criteria constituting the common good. Further, any identification of the democratic discourse with common good can lead to closure and finality of its dialogical quality. Given an importance to ensuring the openness of the democratic process to the

difference, a dialogical constitution excludes any fixed criteria or discourse that defines public good. It posits a dialogical realm in which active participants autonomously choose the good for themselves with no commitments prior to these choices, creating themselves. In such a realm with no pre-existing, unchosen good, the only political obligation can be to respect the dialogical process of expression itself. Hence, the dialogical commitment to cultivation of the characters merely reflects the conditions necessary to ensure that these participants have the freedom to express their own preferences and values. Nevertheless, it does not order its components, political or otherwise, according to any predetermined concrete plan or goal. Nevertheless, it is characterized by structures of speech genre not in the sense of efficiently utilizing resources to attain a particular goal, but rather in providing a regulation, which potentially maximizes the capability that participants will participate effectively into political process.

The effectiveness of a dialogical conception of democracy depends on questioning and critically examining its own discourses. This is necessary because if the essentialist conditions of the discourses gain precedence over democracy, the democracy itself can become a monologue of illegitimacy. At this point, dialogical conceptions endorse the constitution that “overpopulated” with the critical and regulative intentions because both centripetal and centrifugal forces operate in environment of dialogue.

### **VI.3. Dialogical Constitutional Democracy**

In earlier chapters, I argued that democracy should be seen in three ways: first, as a dialogue; second, as a way of language use; and third, as a political process. As such, democracy is also a discourse. Discourse analysis of democracy requires specific focus on the formal (institutional) and informal (language use) aspects of self-regulatory process that is partially explored. Self-regulation is in large part of both ongoing communicative

processes. Communications between all those involved in discourse system of democracy are formative, coordinative and functional. Formative aspects of discourse system of democracy contain authorial posture, to construct identities and relations of between those involved in political process. A functional aspect of discourse of democracy reflects certain institutional frameworks that are designed to achieve certain ends such individual freedom and political equality. Coordinative aspects refer to ideological/educative activity for producing meanings and shared sense of understanding as to political practices and rules.

These three aspects of dialogical constitutions represents significant feature of self-regulation. The word self refer to political actors. It could mean both individual and the people as a collective body. The terms regulation refers to structuring the rules and procedures of conduct between the actors, represented in the dialogical process of the democracy. The concept of self-regulation means that the individuals who define norms and structures procedures to provide not only contents to the political actions but also to produce the means to enforce a self-imposed restriction on one own actions. Therefore, self-regulation has three components: (1) legislation that is, defining appropriate norms and procedural structures; (2) enforcement, such as initiating a self-imposed restriction of the sovereign freedom of action; and (3) openness, that is, equal and free participation or active involvement of political agents for making system to continuously reorganizes itself in response to environment in a dynamic, nonlinear way.

Effective self-regulation requires active a circuitous relation between the two: the rule of people and the rule of constitution. The will of people gives the authority for the rule of constitution. The rule of the constitution protects and enables the will of people. This circular relation is not a cause-and-effect relation where the good and value are determined by those holding the most power. This relationship is based on equilibrium

not on an opposition between subject and object, author and reader and between rulers and ruled. The idea here is not an emphasis on only the restrictive and regulative or freeing and deregulating character of democracy through constitution but both/and. restriction/freedom have meaning and significance in relation to each other. (Laclau, 1996: 52-53) The dialogical sense of constitution depends on this vantage point, maintaining both conditions and points of perspective at the same time. This means that dialogism is the epistemology of constitutions. In a constitution where meaning of democracy is only comprehensible in terms of other meaning of democracy, where a actions always bespeaks other actions, and where political process is constantly being forced centripetally toward unity, and forced centrifugally into relations of difference, dialogism is the way meaning of democracy is produced.

The angle point of democracy is between empowerment of the freedom and restriction of the freedom. Indeed, once one starts thinking of democracy in terms of dialogue, it is more difficult to maintain the dyadic character of this empowerment and restriction as a either/or situation. For in any ongoing democratic process, all restrictive and empowering moments may recur with none defining democracy as such. Such a view of diverse forms, purposes, and relations is partly a corrective to what I have called the dialogization of constitution. A dialogical understanding of constitution requires not only a recognition of multiple moments within it, some inevitably “restrictive” while others “empowering”; some convergent toward unity and mutual understanding, others transgressive and dispersive but also constitution of these moments for freeing further conditions of dialogical democracy. This means that dialogical democracy can be shaped as it is in many languages, presents two opposing tendencies. There are a centrifugal force dispersing people outward into an ever-greater variety of voices, outward into a seeming chaos. And there are various centripetal forces reserving them from overwhelming



fluidity and variety. The drive to constitutional democracy that have some kind of coherence -- that is, formal unity -- is obviously a centripetal force; it provide unity that does justice to variety of voices

In this context, the diaogical function of constitution is related to democracy in three ways: it is prior to and above democracy, within democracy and itself framing democracy. The first relationship refers to the moment when the constitution is given supreme authority to set out the rules for engagement. Without that provision, protection of individual freedom, especially freedom of expression, is not possible. The constitution safeguards differences on the basis that all citizens are of equal status and forms a bulwark against the tyranny of the majority, which limits effective participation in the democratic process and weakens the capacity of every citizen to pursue his or her own well-being. (Hamburger, 1990: 251-57) As John Stuart Mill (1991: 8) noted:

The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or most active *part* of the people—the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority. The people, consequently, *may* desire to oppress a part of their number, and precautions are as much needed against this as against any abuses of power.

The second relationship refers to the moment of formal and procedural application of the constitution in a democracy. This relationship consolidates and reproduces the practice of democracy, for democracy requires an institutional and regulative basis if it is to be one of self-government. Thus, we can see this relationship as the following: on the one hand, democracy is the expression of the will of the people, who themselves are authors of its constitution; on the other hand, democracy is an act of self-limitation, since the constitution is a self-imposed system of norms.

The third relationship puts democracy next to the constitution. This relationship safeguards and reproduces politics in an unconditioned space, allowing for moments of spontaneous mobilization and informal intervention that can exist side-by-side with the established constitutional order. It refers to the people's sovereignty over constitution making. (Morris, 2000: 9-11) Democracy as the expression of self-government or will of the people is not possible without the capacity of people to shape its constitution.

The constitution is instrumental to democracy at a number of levels. The constitution provides the normative and procedural framework for democracy. (Post, 1993: 169-70) It is the institutional arrangement for defining, realizing and establishing the legitimacy of the power of the people. It also serves as a mechanism for limiting the exercise of that power. (Castiglione, 1996: 9-10) Such a mechanism is necessary because democracy is not possible without open, public deliberation in which each individual can fully participate. Further, the constitution provides a stable framework for decision-making, especially when there are shifts in political power. Beyond that, the constitution supports democracy as a dialogical way of life, as an interplay (as opposed to a mere plurality) of voices in society, including the sense in which each voice is both identical to and different from the rest.

To conceive democracy, then, is to ask what the constitution does for democracy. First, the constitution has its own intrinsic value: it embodies the reflective image of democracy. The constitution is the binding output of all citizens, either directly or through representatives. Second, it is the ultimate frame of reference for certain rules, discourses and exercises of power, which is invoked in all manner of ways to perform, to organize, to control, to achieve democracy as a desired political system. (Barber, 1996: 58) Third, the constitution serves as a mechanism for effecting change without political upheaval or oppression. In this respect, the constitution provides a system of general

rules by which citizens can participate in the decision-making process equally and freely, being able to express their own views and preferences.

In addition, the constitution fortifies the dialogical realm of the political process. Individual views are informed by the views of others, in either accepting or refusing them. The language of the constitution recognizes the presence and formative role of different voices upon political discourse. If the constitution is meant to be the realization of free and equal participation in the political process, it has to ensure dialogue. Without dialogue, no political system can accommodate the views and preferences of all its citizens. Hence, democracy and self-government are both weakened.

As an ideal reflection of an inclusive dialogue, the constitution not only affirms the sovereignty of the people, but it also guarantees difference in unity. The purpose of the constitution faces basic conflicts, perhaps rationally insoluble, between opposing obligations, between freedom and constraint, between tolerance and intolerance. Therefore, the freedom found in a constitutional democracy must be regulated. Constitutional freedom means control over individual actions to secure individual freedoms. Otherwise, dialogue will not be possible, as some individuals will be able to express their wills and others will not do so. There are two aspects to constitutional democracy. On the one hand, it is a closed process that prevents monolithic authority. On the other hand, it is an open process that allows for the free and equal expression and consideration of all and sundry opinions.

The regulative aspect of the constitution is built on ideas of political equality and of a legitimate use of power. An ideal constitutional democratic process enables public dialogue, the aim of which is to maximize participation. This requires rules and institutions that establish dialogue between convergence and divergence. A convergence

of views is necessary for policy-making. However, that should not restrict personal freedom, as institutionalized in civil and individual rights, which are themselves protected by the constitution. The constitution exists independently, and the power-holders (i.e., government) are limited in their authority. It requires of the limited governing body to distinguish the private, personal from the public and political, to separate the individual good from the greater good; it gives fundamental recognition to individual needs. (Sunstein, 1988b: 338-42)

Political equality implies an equality of input. For constitutional democracy to work, the decision-making agency must be in dialogue with its citizens. If the decision-making agency affects policies unilaterally, it may cross the line from being a representative governing body to an autocratic one. For this reason, it is necessary to have the constitution place limits on the discretionary and emergency power of the government. (Elster, 1998: 2-4) The equality objective of the constitution provides people with a means for self-governance. Moreover, the constitutional application of political equality collectively binds the policies of the government as outcomes that address and serve the common interest. Through the equality objective, the constitution prevents the decision-making agency from advancing one interest over another. Instead, it encourages consideration of all relevant views.

By its dialogical nature, the constitution is both positive and negative; it both enables and restricts. The characteristics here are not the positive or the negative but both/and. As such, the constitution is a balancing act between competing powers found in any governing body. (Loveland, 1996: 11-22) To achieve balance, the constitution can mandate a separation of power between agents, be it vertical or horizontal, thereby creating checks and balances so that no agent can become too powerful and hence dangerous. (Holmes, 1988: 238)

On the positive side, the constitution enables people to be both active and responsible. The term of empowerment can refer to what a person can do here and now, given the available resources and a certain system of general rules. The positive side of the constitution encourages individual capacities with the equal distribution of rights and opportunities and the arrangement of an environment that allows everyone to participate in the political process of ruling and being ruled (i.e., in the exercise of power). (Berry, 1993: 82) Constitutional empowerment also means active dialogue between citizens and power-holders in the exercise of power, in the decisions that will shape their lives. The expressions of every individual will lie at the heart of constitutional democracy. In expressing their wills, citizens can define and control not only the course of politics but also their own direction of life.

As the constitution guarantees difference in unity, it fosters a climate where there is tolerance for dissent and room for individuals and groups to retain and develop their own identities while sharing the larger goals of the body politic. In short, constitutional empowerment refers to self-determination in both the public and private spheres. Self-determination is based on freedom, the capacity of a self-determined body to do what he or she wants without being constrained by other individuals and political authorities. (Laclau, 1996: 52)

On the negative side, the constitution puts restraints on the exercise of power since one's freedom to act must not infringe upon the freedom of others to act. (Castiglione, 1996: 10-11) Individual action does exist in isolation. By restricting the free exercise of power, the constitution secures negative freedom: namely, freedom from coercion by particular individuals or groups, or from the arbitrary use of power by the government. To this end, the negative function of the constitution imposes limits on majority rule, either in the public or private domain, by protecting individual rights. (Castiglione, 1996: 18-21)

The constraining power of the constitution represents the will of the people as well as its stature outside of and above the rule of the people. The authors of the legal norms of the constitution are the people themselves. (Henkin, 1994: 41-42) This means that the rule of the people is constrained by those very norms that the constitution puts into effect. Thus, in practice, self-government refers not to an absolute, omnipotent and limitless constitutive will, but to a constrained will that is imposed upon oneself by oneself. (Holmes, 1988: 231) This indicates the dialogical quality of self-government, the dialogue between freedom and self-regulation.

The constitution functions as a watchdog on the exercise of power, governs political life from the outside and operates within an institutional framework that safeguards individual rights. (Slagstad, 1988: 138-49) Further, the types of constraint imposed by the constitution, the mechanisms it provides and the elements to which it applies are specific because they form an ordered way life, creating modes of behavior, meaning and self-understanding. In this respect, the negative side of the constitution demands an independent judiciary that regularly conducts reviews of legislative and executive acts to ascertain any abuses of power. Here, we can speak of Foucault's idea of governmentality, the idea of creating a total system of rules and general conduct whereby everything would be controlled to the point of self-sustenance, without the need for external intervention.<sup>44</sup>

In both its positive and negative aspects, the constitution is ascribed supreme authority to achieve a desired outcome—i.e., dialogical democracy. A democratic society cannot exist without regulation of the exercise of power. For the people to consent to be governed, they must be able to voice their constituent power as consent (or dissent). For the government to make laws, the people must be informed about the nature of the choices.

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<sup>44</sup> Foucault (1979: 101) states, “the way in which the conduct of a whole of individuals is found implicated, in an ever more marked fashion, in the exercise of sovereign power.”

For the people to retain the constitution within their control and dependence, they must be able to transform the rules. The supreme authority of the constitution also limits the sovereignty of individuals in order that it does not transgress the freedom of the whole. The power of the constitution and the power of the people are interrelated in two ways: as a hypothetical or real contract, underlying the consent as self-generated will of the people based on dialogue. (Chambers, 1998: 143-73)

As a hypothetical contract, the power of the constitution and the power of the people are unambiguously settled into an agreement of rational individuals and made binding into the future.<sup>45</sup> The hypothetical contract is based on the idea that rational individuals, who see themselves as equals with inalienable rights, come together to set up structures of common living to protect their rights to life, liberty and property. Locke (1993.126 or II.23) referred to this as the issue of freedom:

This Freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined with a man's preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his preservation and life together. For a man, not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he pleases.

The main characteristics of contract based constitution is transformation every act of ruling authority into an act of constraint by the individual's own consent because it assumed that each individual agreed to be ruled by the will of himself or willpower of the political community/government. If an individual has consented to rule by the willpower of the political community, which is constitutional government, one necessarily has also agreed to whatever particular choices the ruling authority of constitution might make.

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<sup>45</sup> This view of constitutionalism is often associated with contractualism. Contractualism refers to the idea that constitutions are made legitimate by the consent of the governed, which represents the hypothetical or real notion of agreement. See, for example, Castiglione, (1996: 15-18).

Here, individual freedom is not really being restricted by government at all: one has acted autonomously in granting her general tacit consent to all specific limitations on one's absolute freedom that political community may enforce. In similar vein, Locke says:

Every man being, as has been showed, naturally free, and nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power, but his own consent; it is to be considered what shall be understood to be a sufficient declaration of a man's consent, to make him subject to the laws of any government. There is a common distinction of an express and a tacit consent, which will concern our present case.

The other characteristic of contract-based constitutions is equality and mutual respect.

Locke (1993: 166 or II.4) explains:

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty

Constitutional acknowledgement of an equal voice to each citizen in the formation of the public will supposes that every individual has an opportunity to participate in ruling and that no one individual or group of individuals is allowed to ruling. Constitutions promotion of ruling through consent supposes that every individual, through participation, has the opportunity to be among the consenting people with respect to issue. This meant that respect for one's own freedom to participate necessarily entails respect for everyone else's freedom because they all agreed to be bound equally with each other for realizing their freedom. There is an identity of interests in consenting; that is, we all benefit from being in political society ruled by constitution (as opposed to being in a state of nature). Thus, being consenting to be ruled by constitution generates advantages



(i.e. equalities and freedom). This leads rise of mutual respect. Mutual respect means that each partner has an equal right to rule the conditions of the contract (i.e., the constitution) and to be ruled by the conditions of the contract. If the bond between the power of constitution and the power of the people is to be sustainable, individuals must listen to each other, respond to each other and justify their claims to each other. (Benhabib, 1989: 153) Simply put, the parties, for their own self-interest, have to respect the rights of others under the terms of the contract. The instituting source of the connection between the power of the constitution and the power of the people is the consent of free and equal individuals to be governed. (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985: 19-31)

The consent based constitution to be governed works at two levels: at the level of the textual formation and of ongoing interpretation. By consenting to the supreme authority of the constitution, free and equal individuals reduce the arbitrary state of nature while protecting the broadest set of mutual freedoms. The exercise of power can only justified within the parameters set out by the constitution. Constitutional intervention can also be justified when it removes social or political forces that infringe on individual freedoms. Therefore, the constitution ensures self-determination to every citizen and prevents the discriminatory use of power that checks or diminishes, either explicitly or implicitly, the free expression of views and preferences. (Loveland, 1996: 11)

Further, the connection between the power of the constitution and the power of the people can be realized through dialogism. The power of the constitution is based on an open-ended public dialogue, which serves as the procedural and constitutive means for invoking the power of the people. The commitment to the constitution and its interpretation as an open-ended public dialogue involves the exchange of ideas, the reevaluation of previous courses and the consideration of new ones between citizens and

between citizens and institutional agencies. It is when public dialogue breaks down, not when some group loses the ability to take part in the decision-making process that the connection between the power of the constitution and the power of the people is broken. Hence, the power of the constitution may degenerate into oppression or authoritarianism. (Chambers, 1998: 163-77)

Dialogue also legitimates the power of the constitution by protecting and enabling the expression of differences amidst plurality. However, what is the other basis of dialogism in terms of the constitution? Two answers are suggested. The democratic process can produce a dialogue-based constitution by stimulating either a new interpretation of previously united views or a different realization of already convergent values. The key to a dialogue-based constitution is the application of the idea of “the sovereignty of the people,” which gives ultimate authority to the subjects of the constitution. When citizens freely and equally interact with each other, they actually take part in formulating the rules of their self-government. The constitution can be seen as important part of the self-governing process, which simultaneously ensures and limits the citizen’s right to exercise power. (Weber, 1978: 214-17)

Beyond that, it is important to say that the connection between the power of the constitution and the power of the people rests on the idea of fairness. It is through the constitution that exercises of power become representative of justice and equality in social and political bodies. As Rousseau has written: “Agreement and laws are therefore necessary for uniting rights to duties and bringing justice back to its objective.” (Rousseau, 1988: 106) In relation to the idea of justice, the constitution has three references. First, it refers to fair ruling scheme *to* some rational act that interprets it. (Rousseau, 1988: 107) Second, it refers to a referential scheme *for* the agent in the corresponding rational act. (Rousseau, 1988: 117) Finally, it refers to a referential scheme

*in* some power capacity, which connects it with the ruled. (Rousseau, 1988: 93) Through the referential triad, the constitution performs the task of organizing the function of dialogue and connecting distinctive traits of subject, object and interpreter on the positions of citizenship. The very act of a constitution establishes a certain orientation toward the citizens with representation of the practices of power. (Arneson, 1993: 192-202) Citizens are both the source and the agent of this power. (Rousseau, 1988: 88 and 106) They are also interpreters who dwell on the frontiers of language and make impromptu meanings in order to determine in what capacity the agent stands in for the rule of the constitution. (Rousseau, 1988: 107-109)

#### **VI.4. Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have argued that the key to the successful establishment of the background conditions of democracy is the constitution. A constitution that exists alongside the establishment of appropriate institutions clearly makes a significant difference with regard to the achievement of the goals embodied in conceptions of democracy such as a discourse formation or as a dialogue, including active participation, separation of powers, checks and balances, as well as individual protections.

In these conceptions, constitutions can be viewed in two distinct senses. In one, a constitution is necessarily seen as dialogic. The second sense of a constitution contains three kinds of components: normative, descriptive, and regulative. The normative component of a constitution refers to a desirable state of affairs for the model and direction of democracy. It elucidates a constitutional theory of institutional arrangement in order to arrive at political decisions in which citizens as political equals acquire the self-governed power to participate in the political process as well as the ability to reach decisions via various means of dialogue. The descriptive component of a constitution explains or describes what democracy actually entails. These descriptions narrate two

important themes. One is how to represent varying types of democracies and, second deals with means and methods to set up democracy as dialogical systems of governance in which citizens can be both subject and authors of actions. The regulative component of a constitution prepares and prescribes actions or institutional structures which are likely to succeed in setting or improving the dialogical and democratic quality of the political system

## VII. CONCLUSION

Dialogism was the umbrella concept for this entire project. I attempted to expand it as the epistemology of a heteroglossic world of democracy. In a heteroglossic world where a worldview, preference and decision is only understandable in terms of other worldviews preferences or decisions, where a meaning always communicates other meanings, and where public language is constantly being forced centripetally toward unity, and forced centrifugally into relations of difference and ambiguity, democracy is the way that the meanings of worldviews, preferences and decisions are made. It is the ongoing process of making decisions interconnected, in the sense of being ultimately fixed to other decisions. Democracy is factual primarily in terms of the relations people have to one another, or the relations the producers of those decisions have to one another. Democracy both justifies and is justified by dialogism, the connected plurality of voices and the associated interrelation of meanings, views and decisions across people.

Dialogism is central to Dostoevsky's understanding of democratic society. He perceived and conceived his world primarily in terms of a dialogical community: different voices and consciousnesses all present and competing in the same place at the same time. The dialogism is to be respected: it is a goal, not merely a means to an end. His dialogism is more than simply communication of voices. Rather, it is as open-ended event occurs as the interaction of structures: whether they be voices, words or ideas. His book *Brothers Karamazov* materializes the dialogism not only between voices and the consciousness of the various characters that are opposed to one another but also through a dialogue of view points produced out of the inter-character dialogue of voices and consciousness. The characters and situations always stand for more than themselves. There is always plurality of independent and unmerged voices. In the Grand Inquisitor section in Book V, Chapter 5, the dialogue of a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and

consciousnesses are represented by the tormented, doubting Ivan who seeks a rational explanation for things that comes to being in the world and the gentle, loving, and wise Alyosha who hold a natural, strong faith in God that turn into a genuine love for people. The Grand Inquisitor section also provides a dialogue between the Inquisitor and Jesus -- who remains silent, but whose presence makes the addresser shape his expressions to his presence, to his views and unvoiced objections. In this dialogue, Grand Inquisitor says:

“Decide who was right: You or the One who questioned You that day? Remember the first question, though not in literal terms, its sense was this: ‘You want to go into the world, and are going there with empty hands, with a kind of promise of freedom which they in their simplicity and inborn turpitude are unable even to comprehend, which they go in fear and aware of —for nothing has ever been more unendurable to man and human society than freedom! Look, you see those stones in that naked, burning hot wilderness. Turn them into loaves and mankind will go trotting after you like a flock, grateful and obedient, though ever fearful that you may take away your hand and that your loaves may cease to come their way.’”

The Grand Inquisitor thinks that freedom is too great a burden for the weak therefore it is the root of the people’s unhappiness. The earthly institution of the authority has liberated the people of their freedom in order to make them happy. However, they become slaves in order to be fed. He suggests that earthly institutional authority offers to feed them and deceives them because people need stability and security. He thinks that security and stability requires rejection the banner of freedom and the bread from heaven and acceptance of the banner of earthly bread.

In *Karamazov Brothers*, Dostoevsky establishes a fundamental link between people and their freedom. Dostoevsky suggests that freedom is constitutive of the fundamental nature of people. It is a source of being human. Hence, people must achieve their freedom in order to realize their very being. It is a goal of individual and political community, not merely a means to an end. The condition of freedom may seem to be

guaranteeing independence of each individual and ensuring that no outside force can control and determine their choices with regard to life. But throughout *The Brothers Karamazov*, Dostoevsky portrays freedom as a paradox, one that particularly afflicts those characters who have freedom of choice. Freedom can be seen as a paradox because it places a burden on people to voluntarily reject the securities, comforts, and protections of the ideologies and doctrines in favor of the uncertainties. Dostoevsky suggests that most people are too weak to follow inner consciences to make this choice hence they are destined to have unhappy lives.

The condition of freedom may seem to be democracy, guaranteeing the independence of each individual and ensuring that no outside force can impose their choices. Here democracy can be conceived in two ways: as a form of life and political process. When we consider it as a form of life, then democracy represents certain characteristics of individual and social existence – that is, it is not simply a forced choice concerning the way people should live together. Democracy as a form of life reflects two aspects of social existence as a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses and formation of a genuine polyphony of fully valid views. Therefore, that if democracy as a political process is to conform to democracy as a way of life, it must promote dialogic exchange one another and encourage the rise of new voices, new forms of freedom.

In considering democracy as both a way of life and political process, the first chapter focused on the conception of dialogue with a specific elaboration of some circumstances and conditions that inspire promise and constitute freedom of the people. It has attempted to weave together threads of different meanings of dialogue, which have been gleaned, from a variety of sources in order to reconstruct a new language of democracy. In doing this, it has modified certain notions, or used them in a different manner than

usual, in order to give a clearer picture of the impact and conceptions of dialogue for different types of democracy.

The first chapter has described dialogue as consisting of three elements: an addresser, an addressee/respondent, and a communicative and reciprocal relation between the two. Discussing the general meaning of dialogue that consists of these three elements points to three important facts: First, it is an external mode of communication that occurs between individuals who reciprocally exchange utterances and understandings. Second, it occurs in and through the use of language. Third, it is an internal mode of communication that occurs in the stages of self-understanding.

Discussion of conditions and circumstances of dialogue in these three contexts allow us to identify dialogue as multidirectional, open ended, and polyphonic, multivocal communicative practice that has regulative quality or external authority other than potentially both agreeing and disagreeing parties.

It is a complex and non-linear communicative process determined by the interrelations of voices because meaning which is not an inherent property of things or persons, emerges through interaction, interrelationship, and responsive understanding. There is no external regulative quality or authoritative source of dialogue other than participants who hold regimes of truth. A regulative basis of dialogue is responsive understanding and self-governance. Responsive understanding does not depend on the good feelings one might have for others. Instead, it is encountered in dialogical qualities as a sense of capacity for one's actions; a sense of responsibility to those who are dialogued; and an attachment to those who have opened their understanding for others. It is found in a respect for the values of one's own and others' views and preferences; recognition of one's mutual



compassion for a communication; and understanding of the meaning others impart to their expressions of beliefs, values and preferences.

Self-governance is also a fundamental component in the process of dialogue. Self-government means creating a common ground for relationships that are harmonious, synergistic, cooperative, respectful and mutually beneficial. When people are divided by their independence, the patterns of disconnection tend to reinforce separation, fragmentation and divisiveness. Self-governance is a connection of the sense of responsibility and is predicated on respect to and between one and the other. In the field of dialogue, it is expressed by a turn taking system. The main function of this turn taking system is to manage the sequential disposition of communication for perceiving, inquiring into, and shifting various underlying patterns of influence, as well as creating entirely new kinds of outputs. It conditions the information exchange between two (or more) interlocutors and ensures an efficient transmission between them.

The concept of dialogue is as diverse as the number of different elements and the circumstances that are involved. However, some guidelines do exist that color the classification of varying dialogical conceptions. One way to classify different conceptions of dialogue is with interlocutors who reposition themselves from one mode of communication to another or one end to another. This repositioning of interlocutors can be described from three perspectives: the regulative, truth-oriented and celebratory. These are types of interaction that entails different models of dialogues

The regulative model is dialogue that is the juxtaposition of various points of view and claims with regard to a specific object (syncrisis). Such a dialogue involves the resolution of disagreement and the formulation of compromise. Hence, it is directed toward consensus and agreement. It has a persuasive character. The basic forms of dialogical

persuasion refer to the use of particular evidence or methods of reasoning (inductive or deductive) to prove that a certain viewpoint has greater validity than other viewpoints. In this regard, there must be at first a regulative model of dialogue based on contestation of ideas, or a contrasting a series of arguments, that seek to challenge each other. Secondly, the contestation of ideas and claims are objectified through an agreement that participants aim to satisfy.

The truth-oriented model is dialogue that contains a deliberate reference to truth as an end-point of the communicative process. It involves an intentional process in which an examination of views and claims through questioning and the formulation of specific answers establish new ways to reveal truths that are partly or wholly warranted by the participants. This examination includes critical discussions whereby participants try to establish critical propositions or, alternatively, critically outline that certain proposals cannot be accepted given a contemporary situation.

The initial situation of the celebratory form of interaction refers to a dialogue that is considered an end in itself. This means that there can be no prior ends of dialogue. The positive value of pluralism defines a fundamental striving or end in the dialogue without, however, specifying the end. All this means that while interlocutors may have some overarching aims, when it comes to participating in dialogue it is not possible to have clear objectives beforehand with respect to the sorts of issue examined and decisions deliberated. Participating with this sort of objective can undermine the very basis on which dialogue flourishes.

Therefore, in the celebratory form of dialogue, interlocutors do not try to impose one view on others. This is not to say that they participate in dialogue with a blank sheet. They may have some sort of general agenda – a list of some of the views or acts that they

might like to see to be endorsed. They can ask each other to endorse their views – but both agreeing and conflicting on a subject matter is a mutual activity. There is a continual interplay between agreement and conflict on subject matters. In the same way, there is a continual interplay between means and ends. Therefore, it does not imply a communicative exchange for reaching agreement, or finding common answers. Therefore, it seeks to establish unity in difference.

However, once we begin to discuss different models of dialogue oriented towards developing a substantive vision of democracy in which the various dialogical practices such as active participation and equal respect are recognized as shaping outcomes of political systems, various themes arise about the priorities of these processes. To deal with various themes of democracy, the fourth and fifth chapters addressed different ideas and narratives of democracy and were sustained by a vision of frame-reflexive dialogue between competing visions of the good life. Discussions on different conceptions of democracy are thus clearly aimed towards producing basic principles on which democracy should be based.

These discussions once again deal with more or less the same issues of dialogue because different conceptions of democracy generate themselves through dialogue. The conceptions and practices of democracy are the political function of the dialogue. The basic political function of dialogue for democracy is self-government, where the political world is not divided into those who rule and those who are ruled. Self-government is capability of citizens for taking an active role in policy decision-making. It depends on both the active participation and responsibility of citizens who take the initiative to engage in dialogue about the policy choices. It is the act of unity established through continuous generative or formative process of dialogue.

Self-government is a fundamental component in the process of democracy building. Democracy building means creating a dialogical infrastructure for relationships that are creative, open, and inclusive cooperative, respectful and mutually beneficial. When people are divided by their language differences, the patterns of relating tend to reinforce separation, fragmentation and divisiveness. In situations of severe clashes of languages, the lack of dialogue breeds uncertainty and cycles of chaos. Dialogue is a way of constructing bridges across the chasms of languages that are historically dialogically specific, contain signs from different registers, dialects, sociolects, or genres and evolved out of the power relations within particular social structures and function largely (although not unassailably) to reproduce these power relations. And because language is always evolving, its living, dialogical form is constantly resisting what Bakhtin has labeled the centripetal pull towards centralization and unification. Some theorists such as Habermas propose a conception of democracy that envisions a deliberative conception of dialogue that recalls a reconciliation of the social tensions of pluralistic language in the moments of democracy. Here deliberative dialogue is seen from the point of view of the outcome or horizon for reconciling consensus, and therefore it is expected to establish substantive procedures of dialogue to reduce differences by amalgamating different interests into unity. I have labeled this model an end-oriented (deliberative) model of dialogical democracy. In this model, dialogue is about procedures and goals rather than the process in itself.

Alternatively, other models of democracy emphasize the celebration of heteroglossia as they called it a norm of democracy. They celebrate heteroglossia as the meeting in language of democracy in which each language expresses itself in its own unique ways, as opposed to monoglossia, the single language that tries to impose itself as the authority and the truth. The celebratory model of democracy is concerned with means of

communication among different languages. Therefore, it is specifically dedicated to one's own reflection on heteroglossia within dialogical contexts and the responsive understanding that takes place across language differences. According to celebratory model of dialogue, only a concept of democracy that is based on an end in itself or a model of democracy that is based on dialogized heteroglossia within a single polity could recognize and protect the ability to reflect on the celebration of differences within social and cultural contexts. Dialogized heteroglossia of concept is important because what matters for a democracy is not the mere plurality of specific languages, social and political forces. Instead, what is significant in regards to democracy is the dialogue itself in which different languages and forces are continuously juxtaposed with or counter posed against one another in political action.

The dialogized heteroglossia or dialogism of democracy requires the concrete political context of languages to be exposed and revealed as the force that determines its "form" and its "content," determining it not from without, but from within. Dialogue reverberates actual intersections of languages within a particular context of democracy generally, in those relating to "content," as well as the "formal" aspects themselves. Therefore, oppressive power persuasion is circumvented through a rejection of the dichotomy between means and ends, while the emphasis is placed on the critical moment more than on a consensus over an impartial definition of the public good. I have labeled this a celebratory model of dialogical democracy.

The difference between the end-oriented model of dialogical democracy and the celebratory model of dialogical democracy primarily pertains to the way we can consider dialogue. On the one hand, the end-oriented model demands a persuasive mode of communication to overcome sources of conflicts in the field of dialogue. For this model, the sources of conflicts range from different opinions on a certain public issue to

different political views or from disagreements over certain ways of life to competing interests. Conflicts arise when people use different languages that have incommensurable purposes and are characterized by different understandings. Because there are no absolute criteria that apply across the incommensurability of languages, conflicts become the main problems of democracy. To enforce absolute criteria for the incommensurability of different language usages is to enforce the criteria of dialogue with facts of reason and persuasion. In other words, all language claims are passed through dialogue, but it is a dialogue with evaluative standards built-in: language claims rest upon reasoned rules that can be, and should be, critically questioned and redeemed. The grounding value of different language claims in the end-oriented model of democracy lays in the uncoerced consensus that such dialogue must achieve — including, significantly, critical reflection on the conditions under which that agreement is obtained. These conditions — uncoerced consensus and the reasoned rules (discursively redeemed) that regulate the interaction of languages — provide to the outcomes of dialogue a commonality not based upon absolute claims of truth or rightness, but outcomes secured on the criterion of valid agreement among those concerned parties of democracy.

On the other hand, the celebratory model of dialogical democracy stresses the moments of dialogue that have not been formed with an eye towards producing a particular result. Instead, the idea is that dialogue as presented here is what is demanded by respect for each different claim, proposition and view regardless of what the outcome of it may be. As in the problems of Dostoevsky's poetics, Bakhtin mentioned that dialogue is good in itself, and the celebratory model of dialogical democracy carries a commitment to a model of dialogue that puts emphasis on a continuity of difference. (Bakhtin, 1997: 252) The emphasis on the continuity of difference in the field of dialogue is meant to be counter-corrective, a centrifugal pulling against a centripetal force, in that it insists upon

the legitimacy of departure from certain dominant regulative norms that are supposed to orient communicative actions for producing a kind of convergence or particular agreement on any controversial issue. The celebratory model attempts to promote a dialogical representation of self-reflexivity and self-respect within diverse language groups. It is then released in order to represent the meaning and significance of their own way of life. At a more subtle level, the celebratory model tries to establish the dialogical basis of a unity forged between otherwise disparate language groups which are joined in this respect at minimum because that they share a concern with justifying difference itself. Furthermore, the celebratory model seeks to espouse what might be called a kind of relativism, of denying the universality of regulative norms, not by reasoning against them, but by arguing exceptions to their scope of applicability on the grounds of democracy. In other words, the celebratory model seeks to promote the conditions of dialogue within categories of difference overlapped with positions of equal relative power and the identification of grounds for active responsive understanding. In this context, the celebratory model of dialogical democracy is concerned more with the capacity to enter into the types of practical and contextual dialogical relations in which people inquire, disagree, adjudicate, explain, or argue without making reference to the outcome (consensus).

The dispositions of the celebratory concept of dialogue are described in the second and third chapter. The dispositions are manifested in the ways that participants address with and are addressed by one another within a language system that is active in the immediate cultural and social context (or, in internal reflection, the ways that people represent-communicating voices internally as they reflect upon a issue). In this category, language functions in a political context. The words that people utter not only describe or capture an experience, situation or idea or make available a meaning for the possibility of

understanding but also create relations of power between one another. As is consistently examined here, language involves the political relationship between interlocutors. This relationship, however, is manifested precisely in the contradictory paths of centralization and decentralization.

Bakhtin describes the centripetal (central) forces of language as those that work a “verbal–ideological unification of relationship” into a kind of political monologia. This situation operates according to the centripetal force of politics: the addresser of monologic language is trying to push all the elements of politics in all of its various rhetorical modes into one single form, coming from one central point. The centripetal force of monologia seeks to erase the differences among the languages of society in order to present one unified mode of politics. Monologia is a system wherein one language is privileged; a situation wherein that language must be utilized by everyone in that society and where various institutions enforce this privileged language situation. Therefore, it denies that there exist any other voices beyond, with the same freedom, capable of responding on an equal footing. For monologue, the other remains entirely and only an object of one voice, and cannot reveal another voice. It does not look forward to including more than one voice. Monologue makes do without a plurality of voices; that is why to some extent it objectivizes all political life. Monologue pretends to be the last expression.

In contrast to the monologia of the centripetal force of language, the centrifugal force of language tends to push things away from a central point and out in all directions so as to stratify relationships into a kind of heteroglossia. Heteroglossia (hetero (mixed) glossial (tongue)) is a meeting of voices that express themselves in their own ways, as opposed to “monoglossia,” the single language that tries to impose itself as the authority, the truth. Heteroglossia is a linguistic realm of multiple voices consisting value of equality.



Heteroglossia is a fluctuating, living complex of communicative systems that is constantly in dialogue with other languages, shaped by and at the same time shaping them. It contains multiple strands of discourses and voices that infiltrate and intersect each other in a variety of ways. These different strands, discourse and voices gain their identities in dialogue with one another. This suggests that this dialogue could lead to different ways of shaping people's lives and could also illustrate why democracy cannot be a fixed form, why there is no one language in democracy that has authority over all others, and why democracy is instead a play of many languages, discourses and voices that are not determined by the authority of the single author, but by the heteroglossia from which the author arrives. In this context, the language of democracy is a heteroglossia that contains communication among many and varied languages that do not exclude each other, but rather intersect with each other in many different ways. It is based on alterable meanings that are modifiable as different languages are exposed to new voices. Therefore, it is specifically dedicated to the responsive understanding that is developed through a dialogical process, which explicitly recognizes different languages, voices and perspectives, with different claims and views held by diverse constituencies.

In the sixth chapter, I have proposed the employment of a constitution as a background condition of democracy in order to enable and protect heteroglossia in the dialogical realm of democracy. First, I have tried to examine and illustrate how such a constitution can provide the means to a dialogical democracy, and what sorts of outcomes might arise from it. Second, I have tried to show why such a constitution as a background condition of democracy is distinctive. But what makes it so important? I have based this notion on four grounds: its importance in improving and protecting the dialogical field of democracy; its significance in fostering the equal opportunities of participation in dialogue dealing with the rights of citizens; its value in placing ruling authority under

control and thus strengthening the freedom of people; and its meaning in possibly moving towards systemic unity of differences.

I have argued that constitutions have two aspects in and for democracy. Those are both protective and enabling functions. It acts as a binding set of rules that—dialogically read and are externally enforced by judicial institutions against political actors—improves and protects the dialogical quality of democracy. For example, when a particular agent has substantially more power for controlling the direction of the communicative process than other agents, the relationship is not dialogical. A dialogical relationship requires that power be reciprocal or balanced. Similarly to dialogue, democracy is a political relationship characterized by equality of functioning capabilities. This does not mean there should - or could - be equality between all individuals in earnings or social position or any other particular form of power. In annotating the rights of citizens, the constitution creates conditions for equal opportunities of participation or equality for the realization of different patterns of being. (Sen, 1993: 33) This means that it creates the conditions for freedom to pursue different patterns of action that lead to different lifestyles in political society. For this reason, it puts strictures on the ruling authority that strengthen people's freedoms and respects their different choices and lifestyle preferences. The constitution is one of the ways through which respect for different ways of living may be forced. Constitutional enforcement of respect for different lifestyle preferences depends substantially on the control of all forms of power practices in political society. Therefore, the constitution seeks to establish a self-regulative context for control of power in and for democracy. This context is comprised of the conditions, forces, structures that not only involve self-regulation for the structuring of politics for democracy, but also contains referential meaning for the formation of democracy.

The self-regulative function of a constitution is formed by political institutions such as laws, customs, and forms of political organization. This fact is imperative in democracy, and it is only possible where political agents are self-governed. There are three constitutional means to regulate the powers of political agents: diffusion of power, legitimate use of power, checks and balances. A distribution of power arrangement refers to the diffusion of the power in political society in order to prevent an individual or small group from exercising significant power over the rest of society. A legitimate use of power configuration indicates constitutional responsibility to those (the people) over whom it is exercised. (Note here that “responsible” translates into “answerable”). These constitutional checks and balances refer to the division of power between the legislative, executive and judicial branches, and between the central and local levels of government. Each political agent’s power in the democratic system is thus balanced by the powers of other political agents who have a different focus of interests.

Self-regulative aspects of constitutions form active citizenries that enable the conditions for engaged participation and also protect polyglot dialogue within the political process, which is closely associated with the generation of rights of citizenship. Among these rights are freedoms of thought, religion, expression, movement the right to assembly, the right to organize, vote, and equality before the law. Constitutions provide the means for the generation and cultivation of institutional capabilities of dialogical democracy. What are the capabilities of dialogical democracy? These institutional capabilities include the abilities of different political bodies to engage in meaningful dialogue on even the most divisive issues, to identify and frame political issues from multiple viewpoints, to build unity in difference and cultivate relationships. This unity refers to anything that holds a political society intact. In connection to this idea of unity, the purpose of the constitution

is not only to strengthen the symbiotic relationship between rulers and ruled, center and local, but also to support common meanings for self-regulative quality of democracy.

To sum up, in this dissertation I have attempted to underline the reasons why democracy needs to be viewed as a dialogue, a interactive relationship in which people creatively participate in the political process to shape their lives. The concept of dialogue that I have emphasized is in part driven by an idea that requires an active suspension of certain “givens” of political theory in order to view arrangements from novel perspectives. It is a conscious commitment for the exploration of new possibilities. It requires attention to create an interactive realm in which differences are used as occasions for examining underlying assumptions and sources of democracy.

The dialogical imagination of democracy does not exist in any absolute form. It exists only in relation to political theory, taking into account people’s different preferences and the political system’s ability to satisfy those predilections. People generally become conscious of the dialogical concept of democracy as a political problem or objective only when a gap develops between their preferences and the system’s ability to satisfy those choices. Although most people think of the dialogical notion of democracy as active participation, that is but one inherent facet only.

Dialogical democracy is about the systemic ability to respond to the people’s views and preferences. It has three aspects. First is responsive understanding, which is the realization and recognition of different views and preferences and of possibilities for expressing and fulfilling them. Second is freedom that involves an availability of means and opportunities for responding to people’s preferences and views. Third is freedom from restrictions, coercion, and other factors blocking active participation. These three

aspects of dialogical democracy are inseparable; there can be no political form of dialogical democracy unless all three are present.

All three aspects of dialogical democracy are closely connected to the communicative capability of people to act on their values and views. The communicative capability of people is closely connected to the notion of communicative authorship. After all, the term author comes from a Latin word meaning, simply to make, to create, to originate and to prompt. Authorship is seen as a dynamic, creative and interactive relationship, not the uni-directional power relationship derived from a single source. When communicative authorship is understood as derived from relationships among and between people, not from power over people, suddenly the categories of performer and performed-upon are no longer mutually limited.

The authorship of the people is intimately related to the notion of freedom. On the one hand, freedom is an element for generating greater authorship for people who practice it. On the other, dialogical patterns of authorship greatly determine the extent to which enabling forms of freedom can be put into effect. In other words, empowering the authorship of people often involves assisting them to discover the genuine patterns of self-determination in their lives.

In addition to these conceptualizations, I have tried in this dissertation to imagine as a Bakhtinian dialogical conception the unleashing of democracy from dogmas and fixity of truths. This imagination is a part of interactive and open-ended exploration to ascertain what elements of a democracy function well in political society. It revolves the very concept of democracy around critical, constructive, open and confrontational relationships based on a mutual recognition or equal respect. It tries to sense beyond what is expressed to what is not elucidated. It mirrors the idea of democracy with what is

enabling relationships, active participation and responsive understanding. It considers active citizenry not only as an opportunity for people to develop their own authorship with others, to determine their own lives, but also as a requirement of democracy as a political regime, that is both responsible enough and creative enough to address the values and the interests of people. Therefore, it approaches the concept of dialogue as a vehicle to expand the power of active citizenry, to transform people's understanding of themselves, to strengthen the relationship between them.

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