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# Transformation of the Turkish Military and the Path to Democracy

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Democratization scholars argue that Turkey has successfully transitioned to democracy and is consolidating liberal democracy. The political elite and the parties are deemed important factors in crafting democracies. However, the Turkish political leadership has not changed much until recently; therefore, it remains a puzzle why consolidation is taking place. There are two explanations: (1) there is no consolidation of democracy (2) a factor other than the turnover in political elite/change in the political system has led to consolidation. I argue that consolidation is in progress because of the lengthy but persistent transformation of the military in Turkey. I examine previously overlooked changes in Turkish military with respect to its structure and its relations to the society. I find that the change in the military contributes to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey, and other transitional democracies. As with any other institutional change, this process is slow and risky.

**Keywords:** *Turkey; democratization; consolidation; postmodern; military*

Traditionally, democratization scholars take Western democracies as models for different phenomena and examine how democratizing countries should fit into those models to pursue a working prescription for the further democratization of infant democracies. This article shows that Western models can be soundly used for democratizing countries but only if the model is adapted to the unique characteristics of the country and accounts for the right actors.

The questions that started this research are: which actors should change to transform a formal democracy to a liberal one? How much change is sufficient, and what kind of a model can be used to capture such change? The case study of Turkey, a country accepted as Western depending on the context, certainly at some stage of democratization but far from a mature democratic regime, yields great insights to answer these questions, as the struggle for democracy has been ongoing in Turkey for more than sixty years.

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Among the actors that need to change for democratic consolidation, the usual suspect for Western conventional wisdom is political leadership and its turnover. However, in democratizing countries like Turkey, with a legacy of a historically modernizing military, the military leadership and its transformation affect the prospects of consolidation. The political elite are just not the right actors to examine in countries where the civilian control of the military is rather weak. Moreover, any suggestion of absolute military disengagement from politics is unrealistic for countries like Turkey. Instead, this article empirically traces the ways the military transforms itself and how that transformation contributes to consolidation of democracy. I hypothesize that the lengthy but persistent transformation of the military toward a “postmodern military” paradigm in ways that naked eye can not detect, makes the consolidation of democracy more likely in Turkey and other democratizing countries.

This article briefly defines democratization with two phases: “transition” and “consolidation,” and discusses how Turkey passed the transition period long ago and why it is still struggling in the consolidation phase. Later, the puzzle is introduced: how has Turkey recently progressed through the stages of democratization without meaningful change in the political elite, one of the causal variables most commonly credited for consolidation? A brief literature review reveals that most theories of democratization ignore unique actors in various countries. Apparently, Western models of democratization need to include civil–military relations in democratizing countries. Following a discussion of theories on the transformation of armed forces, the hypothesis is tested through the case of the Turkish military. The changes in military are captured by using Moskos et al.’s “postmodern military” framework.<sup>1</sup> Finally, after showing the slow but prominent pattern of transformation of the Turkish military throughout decades, an evaluation of the likelihood of consolidation and suggestions for future scholarship follows.

## **Democratic Transition, Consolidation of Democracy, and the Case of Turkey**

Linz and Stepan claim that democratic transition is complete when a government elected by free and popular vote has the authority to make policies and all parties accept the democratic nature of the regime.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, Linz and Stepan define democratic consolidation as the point when democracy becomes “the only game in town.” However, consolidation requires more. The authors discuss three dimensions of the concept: political actors must accept democracy behaviorally, attitudinally, and constitutionally. The behavioral dimension means that no political group tries to overthrow the regime and the attitudinal dimension requires that an overwhelming majority of people believe in democratic processes. The constitutional dimension is satisfied when conflicts are settled by laws that are backed up by the imposition of costs on transgressors.

The West has occasionally criticized Turkey for not being democratic and the European Union (EU) has long stalled Turkey's integration with the Union on the basis of democratic immaturity. Nevertheless, Turkey seems to have completed transition to democracy in the 1990s.<sup>3</sup> Following Linz and Stepan's definitions, Heper and Guney argue that Turkey has made the transition with the necessary institutionalization and now democracy is the "only game in town," which means that consolidation took place.<sup>4</sup> However, Heper and Guney do not focus on different dimensions of consolidation. Yet, the problem with Turkish democratization seems to be particularly related to those dimensions, especially the behavioral shortcomings.

Diamond argues that "democracy becomes truly stable only when people come to value it widely not solely for its economic and social performance but intrinsically for its political attributes."<sup>5</sup> Ozbudun contends that Turkey has already established such an attitudinal notion of democracy.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, Huntington agrees that the Turkish experience is a successful conversion from a praetorian to civilian regime.

Strong evidence supports the claims that democracy is more likely in economically developed countries and that regime changes of all kinds are more likely during economic downturns.<sup>7</sup> Zakaria argues that the best answer to what makes democracy endure is wealth. Then follows the importance of leadership, a capitalist history, and a political culture that supports egalitarianism and compromise, as well as simple luck.<sup>8</sup> Zakaria finds that Turkey is especially a "very promising complex case" for consolidation because of its above average gross domestic product (GDP) and prospects of EU membership.<sup>9</sup> First, it is argued that the military in Turkey has slowly liberalized and modernized the country, and a constitutional liberal past combined with institutional authoritarianism is better than just illiberal and formal democracy.<sup>10</sup> Second, Zakaria discusses how the efforts of EU membership forced Turkey to amend its less than democratic constitution. Aydinli and colleagues agree that the EU helps further democratization of Turkey by getting the blame for many rather radical institutional and constitutional changes that have been under way in the last few years.<sup>11</sup> The much criticized but hardly ever changed 1982 constitution owes its makeover to the European Union's presence as a scapegoat. In sum, the constitutional dimension of consolidation is now fulfilled as well as the attitudes toward democracy in Turkey.

Constitutional and attitudinal changes and economic liberalization are indeed necessary in the process of democratic consolidation. However, behavioral shortcomings remain unless the elite who has the power to overthrow the democratic regime transforms themselves gradually but permanently. These shortcomings are the reason many regimes collapse before they can consolidate democracy.<sup>12</sup> It is the goal of this article to analyze the elite who have this kind of power and whether there is a variance over the years in mainly the social structure of those elite, which leads to behavioral change, and thus to consolidation of democracy in Turkey.

## **The Military Elite Effect Parsed Out from the Political Elite: The Hypothesis**

Scholars argue that several factors, such as capitalist market economy, economic development, modernization, civic culture, and civil society, facilitate democratization. Also, the presence and effectiveness of political elite crafting and institutional/legal choices are highly regarded factors to consolidate democracy. However, the role of military elite crafting and institutional choices is under-studied in the democratization literature.

Linz holds to the view that successful consolidation in new democracies owes much to leadership and elites, and he asserts that the leaders of developing countries must convince people of the value of democracy while letting them know that the legacy of some non-democratic rulers and accumulated mistakes can be overcome in time.<sup>13</sup> The political elite—without mention of military elite—are portrayed as the most significant factor for transition and as quite decisive for consolidation. On the other hand, the electoral system, the constitution, and the party system are some of the institutional choices that are seen as significantly influencing democratization.<sup>14</sup> Dahl goes so far to claim, “If the underlying conditions are mixed in a country, and some are favorable but others are unfavorable, a well designed constitution might help democratic institutions to survive, whereas a badly designed constitution might contribute to the breakdown of democratic institutions.”<sup>15</sup>

If political elite and/or institutional choices are important factors that facilitate democratization, then there should be significant variation in these variables over time to claim that consolidation is occurring in a country. In other words, the political elite and their decisions, as well as the institutional choices they make, should vary, resulting in a discernible change in the level of democracy. Such a change is either minute, or better explained by an intervening factor in developing countries. In the case of Turkey, it is puzzling that the country is consolidating its democracy in the last decades.<sup>16</sup> The Turkish political elite have hardly changed until recently,<sup>17</sup> and its institutions have not significantly changed since the 1980 coup until latest constitutional amendments. Its less-than-democratic constitution of 1982 and aging and bickering political leaders have been very negative for democratization, if not entirely stifling. Overinstitutionalization of politics, high volatility, fragmentation, ideological polarization, and political corruption are a few other obstacles to consolidation in Turkey. If the political elite and most other institutions did not dramatically change in Turkey until recently, and a variety of problematic issues exist, why has consolidation been taking place?<sup>18</sup>

As Zakaria notes, economic development is crucial for consolidation and Turkey is promising in terms of economy, yet still unstable.<sup>19</sup> Unless consolidation takes place in spite of sporadic growth and economic crises, the thesis of economic development contributes to but does not explain consolidation of democracy in Turkey. The more

plausible alternative hypothesis for the Turkish case is rise of civil society and civic culture. Diamond finds that

a vibrant civil society serves the development, deepening, and consolidation of democracy in many ways. The first and most basic democratic function of civil society is to provide the basis for the limitation of state power, hence for the control of the state by society, and hence for democratic political institutions as the most effective means of exercising that control.<sup>20</sup>

Lipset agrees that democracy requires a supportive culture.<sup>21</sup> However, the rise of civil society and culture in Turkey is rather new.

The legacy of the Ottoman culture was that the state did not trust *halk* (public). The distrust was so intense that when a new army was to be gathered in the end of the nineteenth century, the commanders were picked from castrated slaves who were raised in the palace, and not from the public.<sup>22</sup> After the proclamation of the republic, civil groups were under the strict control of the regime and by the 1970s the ideological polarization within the country prevented the formation of a healthy civic culture. Before the 1980 coup, there was an increase in the number of civil society organizations but most were strictly connected to political parties or religious orders. The strong state tradition supported corporatism more than pluralism, and the dance around those two lasted decades.<sup>23</sup> After the coup, civil society was again regarded with suspicion. In fact, trade unions and voluntary organizations were banned from political activities until a constitutional amendment in 1995.<sup>24</sup> Since then, thousands of interest groups and civic organizations have been established. There is a steady rise in a differentiated society where the political and military elite and bureaucracy loosens the traditional tight control over the public.<sup>25</sup> Especially because of the major role civil society organizations played in the 1999 earthquake and the EU accession talks, legislation on these organizations is relaxed.<sup>26</sup> The future looks promising; however, there is still a long way to go for Turkish civic culture to fully flourish. Consolidation, on the other hand, is argued to be already under way.

To solve this puzzle, this article argues that the effect of the military elite should be sorted out from the political elite, as the armed forces are a stable and influential force in the social and political system in Turkey with its long military legacy.<sup>27</sup> The armed forces in developing countries are generally far from being under objective civilian control, and they act as entities strictly interested in the political system and have close ties to the society. For this reason, I posit that the more the military structure and its ties to the society and the political system shift, the more likely that there will be variations in consolidation of democracy. In the next section, following a brief literature review on civil–military relations theories, this argument is tested against the case of Turkey. If no such transformation in the military is found, it is hard to maintain that there is any change in democratic consolidation.

## A Distinct Path to Democracy

With reference largely to the American case, Huntington argues that military professionalism is central to civilian control of the armed forces.<sup>28</sup> If the officer corps were “professional,” then they would supply the civilian body with their corporate expertise for national defense issues when needed. Therefore, they would not get involved in politics since involvement would reduce their efficiency as the guardians of the nation. Huntington suggests that the military ideally would and should be under “objective civilian control” in liberal democracies. Since the use of objective civilian control of the military has worked well for the United States and some other Western democracies, Huntington’s theory of civil–military relations has been idealized for decades. Like all theories that are based only on Western experience, this model of civil–military relations did not work for most developing countries that were struggling for consolidation of democracy because it neglects internal dynamics unique to those nations.

Stepan argues that in Latin American countries like Brazil, the military has not become passive and depoliticized through objective civilian control.<sup>29</sup> On the contrary, the military became more politicized since developing countries face internal threats such as ethnic, ideological, or other domestic conflicts, as opposed to external threats such as conventional wars.<sup>30</sup> This “new professionalism” pattern of the armed forces in many developing countries has a reasonable explanation, which makes them different compared to their Western peers. The military in the advanced democracies of the West was concerned primarily with international threats and neither had time nor interest to deal with the everyday political issues of the country. However, the circumstances are different with developing countries where internal problems overwhelmingly pressure the civilian governments and armed forces are used to counter those issues. Having to deal with both external and internal threats, the military has little choice but to politicize.<sup>31</sup>

This is the framework to consider the civil–military relations of any democratizing country. Not only external but also internal concerns, if improperly handled by a political elite that is quite inexperienced at wielding power, lead the military to feel that they need to get their hands “dirty with politics,” or occasionally feel that they can use the power vacuum to pursue their own agenda. Turkey has survived three conventional *coups d’etat* and a “postmodern” one; thus, democratization in Turkey cannot be studied without reference to its civil–military relations.

The Turkish civil–military literature examined in detail the three coups that the military has carried out in Turkey over the last forty-five years.<sup>32</sup> Prospects for consolidation in Turkey have been based on the evolution of “civilian control” of the armed forces<sup>33</sup> and Nordlinger’s model of liberal-democracy where the military’s complete subordination to the civilian authority was set as a goal.<sup>34</sup> While various publications covered the change in civil society and political life, the transformation of the military over the years is still understudied.<sup>35</sup> Like the civil polity, the military is a dynamic

institution in continuous change, and both international and domestic issues affect its transformation. Therefore, sociological research of the transformation of the military as an institution is invaluable to examining how the changes impinge on politics of a democratizing country.

## A Postmodern Turkish Military?

There is a growing literature on transformation of the armed forces in the Western world. There is now a notion of a postmodern era in terms of civil–military relations after the end of the Cold War. Leading military sociologists like Moskos and Williams maintain that Western militaries have significantly changed in terms of culture (leadership, organization, professionalism, and so forth) after the end of the Cold War. The criticism from the opposing camp is that Moskos and others overstate the sociological trends on Western militaries and that the changes after the Cold War are not widespread enough to label it postmodern.<sup>36</sup> This study believes in the value of the postmodern framework. The application of the model to the Turkish military shows that the framework is useful not only for developed Western countries but also for developing countries, if properly adapted. Therefore, this study empirically supports the first camp.

In their book, *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, Moskos et al. define postmodern military as a smaller and mostly voluntary armed force, whose concerns are both national security and humanitarian missions abroad (external and internal), characterized by increasing convergence of civilian and military spheres, socially and structurally.<sup>37</sup> In other words, first the international environment where the nation-state is not considered the core actor in international affairs requires militaries to multifunction in terms of mission and technology. Second, the society changes and liberalizes after the end of the Cold War as ideology becomes less divisive; the military, in turn, becomes more permeable by the civilian society. Not surprisingly, the armed forces reflect the cultural changes in their mother state. In the postmodern military framework, three distinct periods, modern (1900–1945), late modern (1945–1990), and postmodern (1990–), are utilized to trace the transformation of the military in terms of various criteria: perceived threat, major mission definition, force structure, dominant military professional, public attitude toward military, media relations, civilian employees, women’s role, military spouses, homosexuals in military, and conscientious objection.<sup>38</sup>

The reason this framework is used in this article as a tool or a guideline to analyze the transformation of the Turkish military is threefold. First, I want to explore if an explicitly Western model can explain the evolution of the military of a non-Western—or partially Western—country. Second, the model is flexible enough to adapt unique characteristics of any country. Finally, the use of Cold War as a moving point is appealing because foreign tolerance for the interventions of the Turkish military



minimizes after the end of the Cold War.<sup>39</sup> Thus, this Western model is employed as a framework, offering many insights to the case study. In the postmodern military paradigm, the authors not only compare a collection of cases but also set certain criteria to view how military forces are organized and how they relate to civilian society. Varoglu notes that there have not been many studies of the transformation of Turkish military from a military sociology perspective.<sup>40</sup> The next section contributes to filling this gap in the literature.

In sum, the postmodern military paradigm of Moskos et al. shows that it is not only the civil society or the political elite that varies over decades but also the military. Thus, it is crucial to understand the transformation of the armed forces to reliably predict whether consolidation is taking place in Turkey.

### **Perceived Threat and Major Mission Definition**

In the postmodern military paradigm, the perceived threat for the Western countries changes from an external enemy invasion before the Cold War to a nuclear war during the Cold War. After the Cold War, the nature of the international environment brings new subnational threats such as terrorism, ethnic wars, natural disasters, and others to military agenda. Thus, the major mission definition evolves from a home country defense during the World Wars to support of alliances such as NATO during the Cold War, and humanitarian interventions and homeland security against terrorism thereafter. Since the change in perceived threat throughout decades has directly affected the definition of the major mission by the military in the Turkish case, those two criteria are analyzed together.

After proclamation of the Republic in 1923, modern Turkey's founder Kemal Atatürk's goal for the new Turkish Republic was to be a close ally to the Western world, while the ties with the Muslim world deteriorated. Kemalism dictated the "West" and not the "East" as modern and civilized.<sup>41</sup> So, the Turkish military, as the most prominent guardian of the Kemalist principles, followed a national defense policy based on protection of national unity and deterrence of enemy invasion. Foreign policy was based on convergence with the West. The newly assumed independence was to be defended at all costs, and national borders and population homogeneity were to be secured. With this concern, the Turkish military and the civilian governments emphasized "Turkishness" in the following years of the modern period. Any other ethnic or otherwise identity was thoroughly suppressed until recently.<sup>42</sup>

In the late modern era, since the communist threat was very serious, Turkey pursued the role of a strategic ally for the West. Later, with its admission to NATO in 1952, Turkey set its security agenda and defense tactics on the possibility of a Soviet attack and a nuclear war. This was in line with the general path followed by the West during the Cold War. However, in late modern times, in addition to the threat of Soviet invasion, there was continuation of the modern era threats, including defense against

neighbors such as Greece, Syria, and Iraq. While there was no clear threat from the Southeast neighbors, the military believed that those neighbors were trying to encourage the Kurdish separatists and hosting the separatist organization, the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK). Greece was also thought to be one of those countries; however, this was not the only tension between these two countries: issues of Cyprus, Aegean islands/rocks, and Aegean airspace disagreements kept the military alert to a possible war with Greece.<sup>43</sup>

What made Turkish military different with respect to its most European counterparts in the late modern era was the presence of a variety of internal perceived threats during the Cold War. These internal threats were viewed more severe than the external threats during the Cold War mainly because the established alliances in NATO gave the military some sense of security. The armed forces believed that they were not up against the communist threat on their own.

In the late modern era from 1945 to 1990, the civilian governments in Turkey were not efficient to deal with major internal threats: (1) dictatorial tendencies of the government in the 1950s, (2) ideological polarization of, and violence between, the left and the right factions of the society in the end of the 1960s, (3) Kurdish separatism and terrorism that started in the middle of the 1980s, and (4) the slow rise of Islamist fundamentalism starting from the 1950s. The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) perceived itself as the only "able" force to deal with these issues because the civilian political elite could not stop violence in the streets. In the late modern era, the military carried out two direct coups (1960, 1980) and one half-way intervention (1971).<sup>44</sup>

These coups were the result of the military perception of internal threats as threats against the very existence of the nation. Contrary to power-seeking militaries of Latin America, the ultimate goal of the Turkish military was not to stay in power but to bring order and Kemalist democracy to the country that "incompetent" civilian governments could not achieve. The military in Turkey has never occupied the government for more than a couple of years and has always been willing to return to the barracks.<sup>45</sup>

The postmodern era arrived with radical changes in the international and social environment. According to the official claim of the TAF, the threats and risks directed at Turkey's national security in the post-Cold War period were different from all those in the past.<sup>46</sup> With the emergence of a new world order at the end of the Cold War, the concept of threat has become multidirectional, multidimensional, and unstable.<sup>47</sup> The concept of nation-state that the Kemalist Turkish Republic was built on started crumbling. Civil conflicts and identity politics replaced international conflicts and ideology. The September 11 attacks showed that an abstract transnational religious fundamentalist threat was replacing the concrete communist threat of the Soviet Union.

Before his appointment as Chief of the General Staff in August 1998, then Land Forces Commander General Hüseyin Kivrikoglu listed new threats to Turkey as regional and ethnic conflicts, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, religious fanaticism, and international terrorism. He did not identify specific countries as the

origins of these threats—a departure from previous Turkish discursive strategy—and focused instead on the effects of these new challenges on the Turkish military. Kivrikoglu argued that the military must become “a force primarily used against external and internal threats that target Turkey’s territorial integrity and the republican regime.”<sup>48</sup> This, so far, is very much in line with other Western countries experiencing the postmodern military paradigm.

Along with their Western peers, the TAF has played a major role in NATO peace-keeping operations and sent its troops to intervene the civil conflicts in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Somalia. Turkey has provided forces for United Nations operations such as SFOR, IFOR, United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), and United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). Now retired, General Kivrikoglu wrote that the armed forces moved beyond a mission of deterrence and strategic defense: the ability of the TAF to be rapidly deployed in distant places was substantial. He further outlined a modernization program of strategic mobility for joint operations to strike beyond borders.<sup>49</sup>

Clearly, in the post–Cold War period there has been a change in the Turkish military’s perception of threat and its mission definition. The perceived threat pattern fits the Moskos et al.’s postmodern paradigm perfectly and goes from “enemy invasion” to “subnational threats.” However, the internal threats of the late modern era and occasional conflicts with neighbors continued in the post–Cold War era. Internal threat concerns such as the ongoing Kurdish insurgency in the southeast by PKK and tensions with the Islamist government on secularism in addition to frictions with Greece added to the postmodern responsibilities of the TAF.<sup>50</sup>

The Kurdish insurgency started in 1984 and cost more than 30,000 lives in Turkey. Until the recent EU constitutional amendments, the presence of a Kurdish minority in mostly the southeast of Turkey was not officially accepted by the Turkish state. Jenkins argues that the civilian governments and the public did not show much interest in the solution of the Kurdish problem, and that they left the issue to be dealt with by the military. This in turn led to further politicization of the TAF.<sup>51</sup> However, the lack of interest seems to be because of strict media and information manipulation by the armed forces at the time, as will be discussed later. Nevertheless, the threat of Kurdish separatism and the counterinsurgency hurt both the prospects of democratic consolidation and EU membership until the leader of PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured in 1999. Thereafter, PKK terrorism cooled, the state of emergency was lifted, and cultural rights such as broadcasting and publishing in the Kurdish language have been granted to the Kurdish minority through EU constitutional amendments of 2001.<sup>52</sup> Until recently, the PKK terrorism was thought to have come to an end, but it seems that Kurdish separatism will remain as a perceived internal threat for the TAF in the foreseeable future.

In the postmodern era, while the Western world has to deal with religious fundamentalist terrorism, Turkey has seen a rising trend of Islamist movements at home.

This affected not only the TAF's perception of threats and mission definition but also the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. Ironically, the problem is partly a result of the "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" strategy that was adopted by the military and the political elite after the 1980 coup. The goal was to use Islam to hold the country together in the post-Cold War environment where ethnic identities led to civil wars everywhere in the world. The policy backfired, and Islam became politicized, especially by the Welfare Party (RP), in the beginning of the 1990s. The coalition government led by the RP established close foreign relations with Iran and Libya, against the traditional foreign policy of Turkey. Moreover, attempts to desecularize the government, as well as the education system and finance religious entities, were all against what the Turkish military has stood for more than seventy years. Nonetheless, the military warned the government instead of a traditional coup as it did in the late modern era. Instead, it acted as a pressure group to lead the Islamist-led coalition to resign.<sup>53</sup>

This is indeed the "postmodern coup" of the postmodern era. The military observed what was coming and behaved in a way less destructive to the democratization process than a coup. Although the coup led to loss of credibility for the Turkish democracy in the eyes of the West, especially the EU, the Turkish military showed a change of behavior which was crucial for the continuation of consolidation. There are still tensions between the Islamist-oriented government of AKP and the military. Islamist fundamentalism is still a perceived threat for the armed forces. In fact, the latest shootings and killing of one judge for the issue of headscarves by an Islamist lawyer flared tension between the government and the military.<sup>54</sup> However, Prime Minister Erdogan and the former Chief of Staff Ozkok seemed to have one thing in common that kept their relationship at bay for years: a desire for the EU membership. While Erdogan is after the benefits of "being the one who finally did it," accession to EU is the end of an eighty-year modernization project for the military. As Aydinli et al. agrees, all these recurring problems of Kurdish separatism, Islamist fundamentalism, and economic crises are draining for the TAF.<sup>55</sup> Consequently, the threat of Islamism seems to be sensitive but delicately handled by the military in the post-modern period not to risk EU accession. It is clear that a change in policy because of the changing international environment and the pressures on Turkey for further democratization are clearly felt by the military. The military's compliance with the constitutional changes demanded by the EU, which significantly curbs its power, is further evidence for the silent transformation.

On a different note, the defense spending of NATO countries have significantly decreased to less than 2 percent of GDP after the end of the Cold War, while Turkey remained at approximately 4 percent.<sup>56</sup> Also, Turkey's defense industry and its armed forces have undergone massive changes since the end of the 1990s. Turkey has launched an enormous \$150 billion procurement strategy to be implemented over the next twenty-five to thirty years.<sup>57</sup> Considering all the internal issues discussed above, and the constant apprehension of an attack from Greece, these numbers become less anomalous in the postmodern paradigm. When one has the insight of the long-term

strategy of the TAF's efforts to become the major deterrent power in the region, the increase in defense budget is plausible. Moreover, although Turkish defense spending is higher than other NATO countries, there is a gradual decline from 5 percent in 2000 to 4.3 percent in 2003 and to 3.9 percent in 2004.<sup>58</sup> Also, spending on import of weapons from 1992 to 2002 dropped from \$1347 million to \$721 million.<sup>59</sup>

In sum, the major mission definition in the Turkish military has gone through changes parallel to the changes in perceived threat. The defense of the homeland against external and internal threats has been the priority, and this goal remained unchanged through modern, late modern, and postmodern times. However, new international missions and responsibilities, such as humanitarian interventions in times of civil wars and natural disasters, have been added.

## Force Structure

Force structure of the military in the postmodern military framework evolves from a mass to a large army, and finally to a smaller professional army without conscription after the end of the Cold War. The Turkish military has always had a large, conscribed army and it still recruits draftees; yet, there are significant changes in the structure that deserve further discussion especially because the TAF itself promotes and advertises a modernization attempt in its force structure.

The new force structure policy of the TAF can be summarized as, "formation of a modern and more professional force, fewer in number, but having greater operational capability and fire power to be able to adapt the rapid technological developments in the 2000s."<sup>60</sup> The TAF tries to hire fewer temporary personnel and by assigning specialist corporals and sergeants to duties requiring considerable technical knowledge and expertise, forms a permanent postmodern professional structure.

The size of conscripts has been gradually reduced since the early 1990s. Varoglu maintains that "delaying," or abolishing the levels of regiments and divisions, and downsizing numbers of conscripts in Land Forces while modernizing the Air and Naval Forces, are new restructuring policies of the TAF.<sup>61</sup> Although there is no intention to abolish the conscription system and transform the TAF into a solely professional armed force, Turkey implements programs to change the force structure into a more postmodern one that matches the criteria of the NATO force-structure. One program envisions cutting TAF forces from 639,000 personnel to 350,000 in ten years, and spending \$150 billion on arms over the next twenty-five years of which \$60 billion will be allocated to the Ground Forces, \$65 billion to the Air Force, and \$25 billion to the Navy.<sup>62</sup> In this context, the priorities of the new approach are small but flexible units.<sup>63</sup>

An unseen piece of the iceberg is the development of new military policies for draftees. The modern and late modern era rarely experienced an attempt to exclude citizens from conscription. Yet, in the postmodern times, there are policies to raise funds by limited-time conscription or exclusion from conscription by fines. For

example, in 1999, to compensate the financial load on the state that the earthquake caused, those who were born before 1973 but had not yet completed the military service were charged DM 15,000 for a month of basic military training. Those older than forty years old would pay DM 20,000.<sup>64</sup> Thus, one can think of Turkish military conscription as becoming more flexible depending on the circumstances and internal/external threat perception because the manpower structure and needs are determined by the General Staff.

The TAF is still strongly hierarchical to maintain cohesion. The Chief of Staff and the High Military Council (which advises the Chief of Staff and all top generals) directly communicate with the civilian government. Below them is a “three-layer pyramid-shaped” structure of first lower-ranking generals, second advanced corps of special staff officers, and then all other officers. This structure is still maintained to keep the officers loyal to the military’s “shared sense of purpose.” In this force structure, sources of new officers are the Academy graduates, civilian personnel who are university graduates in the fields for which the TAF has a need, and noncommissioned officers who gain the right to become officers. Moreover, activities related to obtaining officers with a contractual status are continuing.<sup>65</sup>

Gendarmerie, a branch of the armed forces in rural areas, requires special attention in the force structure. The branch is connected to the Chief of Staff in terms of training and education but reports directly to the Ministry of National Defense in issues of security and order.<sup>66</sup> The major responsibility of the Gendarmerie is defending the borders in the east with Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Thus, the Gendarmerie has jurisdiction in 90 percent of the country and half the population. Unfortunately, police forces in Turkey are not well organized in many villages and towns in the east and southeast of the country. The security in these regions hence depends on the Gendarmerie. Thus, the gendarme faces the PKK terrorism every day and, since they are also connected to the TAF, this leads to the command of the armed forces of internal problems. The implication is that Gendarmerie’s position in Turkey has a negative effect on consolidation of democracy in the country because it strengthens the military’s political power. Consolidation requires civilians to have control on internal security through police forces but the civilian governments in Turkey seem to have weaker control in the eastern and southeastern areas.

In conclusion, the TAF followed the postmodern trend in force structure a little bit later than the paradigm; however, as noted earlier, it is not the exact timing but the phenomena themselves that allow us to see the postmodern pattern in the transformation of the Turkish military.

## **Dominant Military Professional**

Expectedly, the military professional skills tend to be less sophisticated and more combat oriented in modern and late modern times, while the need for a more

managerial and diplomat-statesman kind of soldier became clear in the postmodern era. The Turkish military elite strictly follow the transformation.

The dominant military professional in the TAF has traditionally been the combat leader. However, in the late modern period, with the effect of the NATO regulations, a “manager or technician” type became more common. Still, operations against the militant PKK in the southeast were mostly carried out by commando forces that required combat leader skills. So, once again: a new role was added to the old one from the late modern to postmodern times, and the two roles shifted depending on the origin of the threat. For security inside the country, the combat leader was crucial. However, for peacekeeping or terrorism operations carried out, managerial, scholarly, and diplomatic skills gained significance. Nevertheless, combat personnel constitute the backbone of the manpower structure.<sup>67</sup>

Change is more apparent with a close look at the military professional. The TAF is organized into Army, Navy, and Air Forces, plus the Gendarmerie. The officer corps of the Turkish military derives its ranks from the military high schools as well as civilian schools. There is a very careful selection process for the military high schools and military academies, and indications of religious activities are cause for exclusion from professional military service. In education, the military emphasizes deterrence of military power, command, communication, computer education, intelligence, superior maneuver capability and firepower equipped with high-tech weapons and systems, ability to conduct operations day and night, air/missile defense, and ability to conduct joint and combined operations, interoperability with the armed forces of the allies, and the ability to conduct various type operations such as peace support, counter-terrorism, disaster relief, crisis management, blockade, embargo, humanitarian aid, control of refugee flow, etc., as well as conventional war.<sup>68</sup>

With such high technology aims in mind, the education system is quite strict to raise eligible candidates. There are several military schools in Turkey, which include military high schools, military and war academies, and force colleges. Students can apply for admission to a military school after completing their eighth year of compulsory education at age fifteen. However, entering students are not yet considered members of the armed forces, but only prospective candidates. Furthermore, Turkey has three military academies: the Turkish Army, Air Force, and Navy Academies. A petition from his legal guardian supports the application of a person to these academies under the age of eighteen. This allows the cadet to be admitted and to legally attain the title “honorable member of the Turkish Armed Forces.” However, military law does not apply to the cadets until they turn eighteen.<sup>69</sup>

Also, the staff that finishes the military academies with an excellent record can enter the examinations for war colleges. The two-year war college experience provides the staff officers scientific and specialized postgraduate training at an advanced level. As can be seen from the strict procedure, education and training are taken very seriously by the armed forces.

In the postmodern era, in addition to this rigorous education, high-tech training and occasional seminars for personnel are arranged occasionally. Pilots are generally sent to the U.S. Air Force bases, and naval officers are sent to Italy for further training, so that the officers are exposed to life-long training during their careers.<sup>70</sup> The Partnership for Peace (PfP) Training Center in Ankara accepted a total of 1,057 people from thirty-seven NATO/PfP countries between 1998 and 2000. Fifty-eight courses were given and a total of 448 teaching staff performed duties, with 292 from Turkey and 156 from other countries.

One can further trace the change in the military professional in the TAF by examining the profiles of a Chief of Staff from the late modern and postmodern eras. While the 1980 coup general, Kenan Evren, has hardly any diplomat-statesman skills, the latest Chiefs of Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu and Hilmi Ozkok establish utmost soldier-diplomat and statesman skills. These skills led Kivrikoglu and Ozkok to success both in Turkey and in NATO forces. Contrary to Evren, General Kivrikoglu, who served as the twenty-third Commander of the TAF from 1998 to 2002, was an Academy graduate who was known for his success in NATO's Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). He also completed NATO Defense College and had been in Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers (SHAPE) in Belgium as a high-rank officer. Kivrikoglu, in short, was known for his statesman-soldier skills and experience. Apparently, those were the qualities that led to his duty as the Commander of the TAF. The same is true for Hilmi Ozkok. Following his staff officer education at the Army War College, Ozkok served mostly abroad as a staff officer at the Special Weapons Branch of the AFSOUTH and at the Plans and Policy Department of the SHAPE. He also served as the President of the Turkish Military Representation Committee of NATO until 1995. Ozkok then assumed the command of NATO Allied Land Forces Southern Europe (CLSE).<sup>71</sup>

In sum, there is a shift from promotion of officers who hardly spoke their native language without public contempt<sup>72</sup> and have never served abroad, to officers with state and diplomacy experience. This is partly because of the postmodern paradigm itself; since the international environment has changed toward globalization, there are more opportunities for experience abroad.<sup>73</sup>

## Public Attitude toward the Military

In Western democracies, the public attitude toward the military has varied from negative to ambivalent to indifferent, as is expected from a model where the military becomes more and more subordinate to the civilians. Predictably, this is not exactly the trend for the Turkish military and the public. Nonetheless, there are some significant changes in the relationship between the armed forces and the civil society.

This is a well-covered topic in the Turkish civil-military relations literature: the Turkish public expects the military to guard the nation from external threats and



restore order when inept and corrupt civilian governments fail. The Turkish nation has always given the military widespread acceptance and support; thus, lack of confidence in the political elite has permitted the military elite to have a major role in politics. Scholars argue that the Turkish public does not take responsibility for change and the Turkish military has always had the traditional role of a modernizing force and a guardian of Kemalist principles.<sup>74</sup> In other words, "Turkey has no history of change as a result of public pressure."<sup>75</sup> Nevertheless, the Turkish public does not reveal any enthusiasm for permanent military rule.

Generally speaking, support of and trust for the military from modern to the post-modern times have changed only slightly. In 1999, public trust of armed forces was 81 percent while only 16 percent of the public showed trust in political institutions and politicians.<sup>76</sup> However, there is a rising trend among the intelligentsia in the last years toward opposing military interference in politics.<sup>77</sup> Although elite-generated opposition is not yet reflected among the general public, it is possible that the public will stop seeing the military as the only available modernizing institution. Ironically, even advocates of a reduced role of the military have tended to turn to it in times of crises, like a child looking for comfort on his mother's lap, and did not really object to bans of various political parties.<sup>78</sup>

Nevertheless, another survey shows that the civil society organizations in Turkey do not support military interventions. Although military interventions were not considered as the main obstacle to formation of civil society and democratization, idea of the military's control on civil authorities was rejected.<sup>79</sup> This shows that no matter how much the Turkish public trusts in the military as an institution, they have a positive attitude toward the legitimacy of democracy. Thus, the attitudinal dimension of Linz and Stepan's definition of democracy is fulfilled in the postmodern times. In fact, Tessler and Altinoglu's statistical analysis of the 1997 World Values Survey in Turkey indicates that greater support for democracy in Turkey is associated with greater confidence in institutions of order, such as the military and the police.<sup>80</sup>

## Media Relations

In the postmodern model, the media is first incorporated into the military before 1945. Then it is strictly manipulated and controlled by the military during the Cold War because of the paranoia of the communist threat. After the Cold War, manipulation is replaced by the military's courting of the media. Turkey fits the model in that a restricted and manipulated relationship definitely turned into a courting one after the end of the Cold War.

During the Independence War and in the first twenty years of the Turkish Republic, namely the modern times, the press supported the Republican People's Party's (RPP) effort to establish a credible system with Kemalist principles. The military at the time was not involved in politics actively and the media was "incorporated" into the state

that RPP headed. However, in the late modern times the press and the radio were heavily censored and manipulated, first during the Democrat Party rule in the 1950s by the Party, then after the 1960 coup, by the military. However, in the postmodern times it became harder, though not impossible, to manipulate media once private television and radio stations, newspapers, and magazines became widespread.

In the late modern and most of the postmodern era, when reporting on the vast majority of issues such as domestic party politics or the economy, the media has been lively and unrestricted. Freedom, however, was shaky for sensitive topics like the role of Islam in politics, Turkey's Kurdish minority rights, the nature of the state, and the proper role of the military in the political system. Insulting state officials and "incitement to racial or ethnic hatred" were serious crimes and the Anti-Terror Law, Article 8, prohibited separatist propaganda.<sup>81</sup> In July 1993, in response to an intensification of the conflict in the southeast, the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff called for media support in a total war against separatism.

Although Article 28 of the Turkish Constitution stated that the press is free and should not be censored, journalists and others who openly opposed government policy in Southeast Turkey ran the risk of prosecution and imprisonment. Tunc reveals that cartoons and writings that fall into the vague and flexible description of "endangering the indivisibility of the state" have been prosecuted, and Turkey has gained a reputation for holding the largest number of jailed journalists in the past.<sup>82</sup>

However, the following example demonstrates that the strict control of the media is relaxing. Nadire Mater, a freelance journalist, was charged under Article 159 with "insulting and belittling the military" for having interviewed forty-two conscripts who fought in Southeast Turkey against the PKK.<sup>83</sup> An Istanbul court banned distribution of Mehmed's book on June 23, 1999, also under Article 159 of the penal code. Police confiscated copies from the book's publisher, Metis Publishers.<sup>84</sup> In 2000, the charges were dropped and the book is now published in English and sold in major bookstores in Turkey and the United States.

Other recent examples are even more revealing. The Chief of Staff sent a written note to the press that he had read in the papers that some soldiers were under interrogation at the police headquarters on May 30, 2006.<sup>85</sup> A piece of information like this, published in the newspapers before the TAF learns about it and manipulates the situation, would have been impossible a few years ago. Another unprecedented recent event is the claim of a public prosecutor, Ferhat Sarikaya, that General Yasar Buyukanit has been carrying out covert operations against the Kurds in the southeast of Turkey.<sup>86</sup> Not long ago it would be rather impossible for a public officer to make such allegations and to find a press to publish the information. Even if it was published, charges would have been expected. Although this allegation caused tension between the military and the civilian government because Sarikaya is known to be close to the Islamist government, the incident shows that the media-military relations demonstrably changed in the postmodern times.

How does one explain such a change? The EU-forced amendments to the constitution and the military's willingness to comply with them are the answer. In 2003, the military did not object to the amendments, including the Anti-Terror Law, to strengthen freedom of expression, cultural rights for the Kurdish minority, and so forth. In fact, the military now directly informs the Turkish media. Governmental and military pressure of the type experienced in the early 1980s and the 1990s does not exist,<sup>87</sup> and tolerance replaced severe punishment in mutual relationships. The military tries to legitimate actions; actually, the TAF has established a press office where it maintains a good relationship with the media through frequent briefings and occasional dinners. It seems that the relationship between the media and the TAF changed toward mere courting as the postmodern model dictates, especially because of the fulfillment of constitutional changes necessary for democratic consolidation.

### Civilian Employees

The pattern expected for the civilian employees in the military is an evolution from a minor to medium and from a medium to major component within the armed forces in line with the postmodern military paradigm. The Turkish military clearly fits the model in this criterion, not as strong and fast, but a trend of change is certainly there.

The armed forces in Turkey employ civilians for various tasks. Civilian personnel are employed in social services and technical fields at the headquarters, such as the Ministry of National Defense, the Turkish General Staff, and the Force Commands, in the places of duty that do not require wearing uniforms. These civilians are hired with a centralized examination method when needed. They take written general ability exams (KPSS) and interviews after their past criminal records and personal resumes are investigated.<sup>88</sup> According to the "White Paper" published by the Ministry of Defense in 2000, the Land Forces employ 20,500 civilians as opposed to 402,000 soldiers (4.86 percent). The Naval Forces employ 12,000 civilians as opposed to 53,000 military personnel (18 percent) and the Air Forces have 9,500 civilian personnel and 63,000 military personnel (13 percent).<sup>89</sup> A comparison with a country that somehow fits the postmodern paradigm, France, would make these numbers more meaningful. In 1995, 12 percent of the Army, 10 percent of the Navy, and 5.2 percent of the Air Force in France constituted of civilian personnel, which are deemed acceptable numbers in the model.<sup>90</sup> Thus, the proportion of civilians to soldiers in the TAF looks promising.

Overall, civilian employees were only a minor component of the armed forces in the modern times. By the end of the late modern era and the beginning of the postmodern era, a rapid increase in civilians is observed. In fact, because of the rise in the civilian employees in the last decade, the Gülhane Military Higher Nursing School, which used to train military senior nursing officers, began training civilian senior nurses in 2001.<sup>91</sup>

Another development is that the Ministry of National Defense was open to contracting almost two hundred civilian firms from the defense industry for its ten-year defense plan in 2000. Also, various civilian firms are employed for technical support, food, transportation, etc. The guidelines for the contractors and a list of in appropriate companies are systematically listed in the ministry Web site.<sup>92</sup>

In sum, this trend of increasing civilian employees and contractors within the armed forces implies that the military trusts civilians more than it did in the past. Consequently, the boundaries between the civilian public and the military blur, possibly leading to further democratization.

### **Women's Role in the Military**

The model predicts a progression from separate corps to partial and then full incorporation of women into the military. Turkish women have historically been willing to take part in the military for national defense and international peacekeeping although they are not conscribed like men. The incorporation of women into the TAF generally fits the postmodern model as well as the NATO standards, but like women in the American military, they have experienced problems such as negative discrimination.

Prior to 1955, women had been assigned as civilian personnel (doctors, nurses, teachers, etc.) in the Turkish military. Beginning in 1955, women were accepted by military academies, and they started to serve as officers in 1957 and worked in combat zones until 1961. Some of them even became fighter pilots. This recruitment process was interrupted because of its "cultural inappropriateness," and until 1992 female officers from civilian universities were recruited as non-combat officers. From 1992 on, together with recruitment from other sources, female cadets were allowed to enter military academies to keep up with other NATO countries. Now NATO recognizes the TAF as fully integrated.<sup>93</sup>

Female personnel are employed as officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in the TAF. Contrary to men conscripts, women enter the Turkish military on a voluntary basis. No formal plan is present to recruit women as corporals-privates, because there has always been sufficient number of male volunteers and draftees. Special troops comprised of women do not exist; the women officers serve together with men under the same chain of command. Female civilian personnel are assigned to the headquarters staff, technical fields, and social services without sexual discrimination. Women serve in all branches, including combat roles such as artillery, aviation, and engineering, but not in armor, infantry, and submarines. Assignments, promotions, and training are officially claimed to be on an equal basis.<sup>94</sup>

The number of female officers employed in the TAF has risen from 918 in 2002 to 1,245 in 2005. In the Army, there are 622; in the Navy, 229; in the Air Force, 270; 120 in the Gendarmerie (more than tripled since 2002); and 4 in the Coast Guard.<sup>95</sup>

Training is provided in the academies and higher schools of military education; leadership training and basic training are provided to both genders. Female officers are also accepted to service after their civilian university education. All entrance tests, except the physical proficiency test, are conducted under equal conditions with male candidates. Amendments to laws concerning maternity were added in 1998 and 2005.<sup>96</sup> Furthermore, women officers are entitled to 1.5 hours of breast-feeding leave each day for six months. It seems that training and education of both genders are much disciplined in the TAF. In line with the postmodern model, Turkish servicewomen have been deployed in support of Operation Joint Endeavour (IFOR), Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), and Kosovo Force (KFOR) peacekeeping operations as nursing supervisors in a special medical unit.

However, it seems that women in the military have fewer chances at promotion to higher ranks, such as general, although it is not impossible. The highest rank occupied by eight female officers is colonel as of 2005. None of these female officers come from the Military Academy tradition whereas all the male generals so far did. It is speculated that this background of the eight female colonels will prevent them from ever becoming generals, and there is at least five more years before a female officer with Academy background can be promoted.<sup>97</sup> Nevertheless, the achievements of women in the military so far are remarkable for a society of strong patriarchic tradition. Kuloglu argues that, in Turkey, military service is equated to full citizenship, and by excluding women from conscription, they have been treated as second-class citizens. Thus the presence of fifty-seven female cadets in the Military Academy in 2005 is symbolically very important.<sup>98</sup>

In short, conditions are improving for female officers in the Turkish military. Oddly, this criterion seems to be the one perfectly postmodern criterion met by the TAF.

## Spouses and the Military

In the postmodern military framework, military spouses shift from being first an integral part of the armed forces, then a partially separated part, and finally an independent body of people. The situation of the military spouses has not been examined as much as the other criteria in Turkey. However, examining the results of an informal forum that was carried out over the Internet in 2003, it is still possible to draw some preliminary conclusions about military spouses in Turkey.<sup>99</sup>

Military spouses were an integral part of the military in modern times, and they became less involved in the military and much more independent in late and postmodern times. Data call for a distinction between commissioned officer (CO) and NCO spouses. While CO spouses live in the postmodern stage of their involvement, the NCO spouses are still in the modern stage of integration and involvement.

The difference stems mainly from disparate education levels between CO and NCO spouses. Commissioned officers have to finish academies/universities; therefore,

they tend to choose their spouses from university graduates, mostly doctors, nurses, or teachers who also work for the state. On the other hand, non-commissioned officers are graduates of military high schools, and they generally lack higher education. Thus, they choose their spouses from mostly medium–high school graduates and housewives. However, there seems to be a change in the postmodern era parallel to rising numbers of working women: the number of working spouse increases. This leads to the removal of spouses from the military environment and gives them the opportunity to be more independent.

In the Turkish military, married professional personnel, or bachelor personnel living together with relatives for whom they are legally obliged to care, can benefit from military housing. This fact makes the housewives, and even the working spouses, more attached to the military environment since they have obligations to go to women's meetings organized by a different spouse almost every week.

An even less researched topic is male spouses of female officers. Women officers seem to marry other officers with similar backgrounds because officers are sent on compulsory duty in Turkey every four to five years. A husband from a different profession following his officer wife is not as common. When both members of the couple are officers, they are appointed to the same or close places. Consequently, most of the time, male officers choose wives who can relocate and work in any city, while women officers tend to marry other officers so that they can move together to the location of the next duty. Kuloglu in her interviews at the Military Academy also finds that female officers prefer to marry male officers because only another officer can understand their pressing working conditions. Interestingly, male officers told Kuloglu that they would not want to marry female officers because of the same reason: the pressing working conditions. Apparently, the interviewed male officers believe that female officers cannot perform proper motherhood duties because of the difficult working conditions.

Female officers complain that they feel the need to look strong at all times, and that Turkish society is still not very used to seeing women as soldiers. The lower rank CO and NCO wives complain mostly about how they are discriminated against with respect to higher rank CO and NCO wives. It appears that the wives carry the ranks of their husbands wherever they go. When a lower-ranked wife goes to the hairdresser and a higher-ranked wife enters the store at the same time, the lower-ranked wife has to wait. These wives seem to carry all the burden of their husbands' lower rank and if they do not show respect to higher-ranked wives, they say that their husbands suffer the consequences. It seems that this vicious cycle will continue for military wives if they stay housewives who do not have any other activity outside the military environment.<sup>100</sup>

Generally, it seems that spouses in the Turkish military have been in quite similar conditions in modern and late modern times and started to change in the postmodern period as women in general have become more active in the society. As mentioned earlier, it is imperative for democratization that women take active roles in the

society. The fact that the feminist movement accelerated in the world in the 1990s affected the situation of women in Turkey, and more educated and independent military wives mean further democratization of the military environment, thus, they are crucial to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey.

### **Homosexuals in the Military**

Homosexuals are first punished, then discharged, and finally accepted (rather, ignored) according to the postmodern paradigm. In the Turkish military, homosexuality is not a criminal act; however, when ignoring the homosexual soldier does not work, he is discharged, very much as is the case in the American military.

The Justice Commission of the Turkish Parliament passed a bill on July 31, 1996, stating that those people who conduct “unnatural sexual intercourse” shall be expelled from the Army. However, the bill does not state how to determine if the action is actually conducted, and court decisions are made on case-by-case basis. NATO members like France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden have been allowing homosexuals to serve, but discipline them if their homosexuality enters the barracks. Israel also follows the same strategy. On the other hand, Greece and Turkey ban homosexuals in the military without prosecution, as do Russia, Japan, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela.<sup>101</sup> Britain lifted the ban on homosexual soldiers only in 2000 through a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights.<sup>102</sup> Overall, the situation of homosexuals in the Turkish military resembles the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy of the U.S. Armed Forces. As the acceptance of homosexuality within the society increases, the odds of full integration of homosexuals into the military get higher.

In conclusion, there is a liberalizing trend on homosexuality issues in the Turkish military that extends from punishment in modern times to discharge in the late modern and postmodern times. This trend clearly follows the values and behaviors of the civilian society. However, the military views homosexuality as a mental or genetic illness and is unlikely to welcome overt homosexuals to the armed services in the near future. Even so, a close look at this trend shows that although the military is not intrinsically democratic when it comes to civil rights of homosexuals, there is still growing respect for acts that are not morally or ethically approved by the armed forces. That alone is a sign of behavioral change in the military that should lead to consolidation of democracy in the future.

### **Conscientious Objection**

In the postmodern model, conscientious objection was prohibited in modern times and accepted during the Cold War. Later, military service for conscientious objectors

was substituted with civil service. Conscientious objection in Turkey against military obligation is not an option. On the contrary, Article 72 of the Constitution declares that military service is the right and duty of every male Turkish citizen. For this reason, this criterion is unchanged from modern to postmodern times.

A recent report states: "The objector is confronted with martial jurisdiction consisting of several elements. Legal action is taken against anybody who publicly declares his conscientious objection. The offense is to cool down the population's enthusiasm for the military service."<sup>103</sup> According to Article 155 of the Turkish penal code, the sentence varies from two months up to two years of imprisonment, a penalty that cannot be suspended on probation or converted into a fine. Before 1993, most legal procedures brought before a state security court were dropped or not even opened. Since December 1993, legal procedures are being transferred to the military court of the general staff. The divisions of these courts have only three judges—two lawyers and one non-lawyer military representation. The objectors are treated as members of the armed forces under disciplinary regulations. The procedures are generally not public. Since these courts are located on military territory, cameras can not be brought inside and the press is asked not to report. If the court sends the conscientious objector back to his unit, and if he resists to wearing a uniform, he is arrested again.<sup>104</sup>

The sole organization for conscientious objection in Turkey is the Istanbul War Resisters' Association (Savas Karsitlari Dernegi [SKD]).<sup>105</sup> On May 17, 1994, SKD organized a press conference and the association's chairperson Arif Hikmet Iyidogan expressed his views on "the war in the south-east." After the press conference, nine people were arrested, five of whom were released soon afterward. Three people received month-long convictions and fines; one objector did not receive any sentence, but was given two days to report to military service. Some of the cases are brought to the European Court of Human Rights; however, the Turkish military has not stepped down on the issue so far.<sup>106</sup>

The Turkish government and the military maintain that conscientious objection to military service is not recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Besides, Turkey has reservations on General Observation No. 22 (48) of the Human Rights Committee, as well as all resolutions adopted by the Commission on Human Rights concerning conscientious objection to military service. Also, military service is taken as an important aspect of the principle of equality before the law, or "citizenship." Thus, equal implementation of law requires conscription for all males at a certain age.<sup>107</sup>

In conclusion, the armed forces' approach to conscientious objectors is neither in line with the postmodern paradigm nor a path to democratic consolidation. As the postmodern paradigm increasingly reflects on the military, and as the demands of the EU gets more sanctioning, it will be possible to see changes in this area.



## General Overview of the Paradigm and the Turkish Military

In the postmodern military framework, Moskos and colleagues examine how Western militaries are reshaped by international environment and domestic social factors in the post–Cold War era. While past civil–military relations literature generally examines one aspect of the military at a point in time, the postmodern military framework evaluates militaries over a century, and in connection to the society. By including in the model the unique characteristics of the Turkish military, such as Kemalism and perception of internal threats, this article analyzed the Turkish military in the postmodern military paradigm. The analysis shows that the Turkish military is in transformation and is following the Western trend slowly but eminently. The armed forces seem to realize the changes from modern to postmodern realities and adapts in time.

The Turkish military goes on peacekeeping missions overseas and trains against global terrorism, while still dealing with internal threats such as Kurdish separatism and antisecularism. The military's force structure is slowly modernizing with more professionals and fewer conscripts. The professional officers are trained for managerial soldier-statesman skills as well as traditional combat leadership. More civilian personnel are hired and specially trained for technical areas and service needs. The military does not overtly manipulate the media anymore. Instead, it occasionally explains itself to the media through dinners and social events. The public attitude toward the military is still positive but civilians no longer see military intervention as a viable option. As the Turkish society becomes more tolerant of different lifestyles, the military stops imprisoning homosexuals and adopts the "don't ask, don't tell" policy that the American military has been using. Open homosexuality is still not morally accepted in Turkish society, so it is not surprising that the armed forces also has reservations on the matter. On the other hand, women train and serve in the military in the same conditions as their male peers. The feminist movement of the 1990s seems to have further facilitated women's rights in the armed forces. Finally, spouses of military officers are more educated and independent than they were a couple of decades ago. The only criterion on which the TAF utterly fails is conscientious objection. The Turkish military still prosecutes, imprisons, and forces enlistment on the people who resist the draft. The patterns of change in the Turkish military can be found in Table 1.

The major difference that the Turkish military has experienced compared to Western militaries in the postmodern model is the military's continuing concern with internal threats. The TAF have been the guardian of the secular republic, thus homeland security and domestic threats are their priority. The international missions and NATO commitments of the postmodern times are taken very seriously. Yet, these missions have not replaced the old perceived threats and internal missions of the

**Table 1**  
**Transformation of the Turkish Military in the Postmodern Military Paradigm**

Changes in Each Period			
Criteria of the postmodern military paradigm	Modern (Pre-Cold War) 1900–1945	Late modern (Cold War) 1945–1990	Postmodern (Post-Cold War) Since 1990
Perceived threat	Enemy invasion	External threats: Nuclear war Problems with neighbors Internal threats: Ideological polarization Kurdish separatism Support of alliances The internal defense of the secular, Unified Republic, and Kemalism	External threats: Subnational (e.g., ethnic violence, terrorism) Problems with neighbors Internal threats: Islamist movement Kurdish separatism
Major mission definition	Defense of homeland		New missions (humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping) The internal defense of the secular, Unified Republic, and Kemalism
Force structure	Mass army with conscription	Large professional army and conscription	Large professional army, reduced conscripts plus occasional programs for exclusion from draft
Dominant military professional	Combat leader	Mixed (combat leader and manager or technician)	Possible future soldier-diplomat-statesman
Public attitude to military	Supportive	Supportive	Supportive
Media relations	Incorporated (media under complete control of the military)	Manipulated (media relatively free but often manipulated by the military)	Mostly courted (covert manipulation on sensitive issues such as the Kurdish separatism)
Civilian employees	Minor component of the military	Minor component of the military	Medium component of the military
Women's role	Excluded from military service	Partial integration to military service	Full integration to military service
Spouses and military	Socially an integral part to the armed forces	Socially an integral part to the armed forces	Partial social involvement in the armed forces
Homosexuals	Punished by the military courts	Discharged from military service	Exempted from service or ignored ("don't ask, don't tell" policy in force)
Conscientious objection	Prohibited by the military	Prohibited and punished by military courts	Prohibited and punished by military courts

modern times. Interestingly, with further evaluation of the postmodern paradigm, Williams adds to the model a second phase of postmodernism: "Postmodern II: 2001–Indefinite Future."<sup>108</sup> Williams argues that after September 11 and the War on Terror, homeland security and domestic threats are prioritized by Western democracies. The Turkish case shows how having a war at home deviated and slowed the transformation of the military toward the postmodern model. War now exists at home in the West. Thus, the Turkish military's dealings with internal issues are no longer a deviation, but the norm.

## Conclusion

This study maintains that Turkey has completed two of the three identified phases of the consolidation process and the third phase has begun. Most Turkish people believe democracy to be the best form of government. Thus, the attitudinal dimension of consolidation is fulfilled. The constitutional dimension is under way because of the EU membership efforts. Still in progress are the behavioral changes for a deepening of democracy.<sup>109</sup> This article argues that the military elite need to change their behavior for consolidation to be completed in democratizing countries. The findings show that the Turkish military has been going through a gradual transformation of its behaviors to the society and the civilian governments.

Signs of these behavioral changes are everywhere, especially the relations between the military and the AKP government. When the Islam-oriented party, AKP, won majority in the Parliament in 2002, the then Chief of Staff Gen. Hilmi Ozkok only made a statement on the secular nature of the republic, and stated that the elections were the will of the nation and were to be respected. A decade ago, the Welfare Party entered the parliament through the will of the nation but that had not stopped the military from taking measures to have the Islamist-led coalition resign. Cinar argues that the Islamists try to create their own "modernity" to make the future better than the present just like the military had its own Kemalist modernization project in the last eighty years. Although this rival modernization project is not what the military has planned for the nation, AKP's liberal discourse advocating consolidation of democracy and autonomy of the civil society has balanced the relations between the two parties heretofore.<sup>110</sup>

The behavioral changes in the military toward democracy seem possible because of the changes in the mother society and the military's desire to keep up with their peers in NATO and the EU.<sup>111</sup> In other words, the changes in the international environment and the civil society within the country create momentum in the military. As a result of the slow change of the military elite, the last piece (behavioral dimension) of the three-piece puzzle is completed.

The continued role of the military in "guiding," but not directly controlling, the political system will change as the transformation is completed and as internal factors

permit. Especially, the root of the Kurdish problem is the military's perception of "Turkishness," which rejects the presence of any ethnicity in the country and tries to melt all ethnic groups into the same pot under the rubric of Islam and "Turkishness." This has been changing with the constitutional amendments since 2001 granting educational, broadcasting, and other cultural rights to the Kurdish minority.<sup>112</sup>

Because of the effects of international factors and the changes in internal circumstances and society, Turkish democracy shows positive signals. After all, if democracy is the will of the people and if the military is the most trusted institution in a country, its contribution to the decision-making process could maintain a healthy partnership in the country with the concordance of the military, political, and civil elements.<sup>113</sup> At that point, what is desirable is to find ways to make the political institutions and the political elite as trustworthy and efficient as the military, so that order is maintained in the realm of law and politics rather than depending solely or principally on arms.

This study reveals different venues for future scholarship. The eleven criteria of the postmodern paradigm can be further researched. Military spouses, homosexuals, and conscientious objectors are especially under-studied. Another question is whether the military, as a hierarchical organization, can genuinely subscribe to democratic ideals. More research on homosexuals in the military and conscientious objectors could be the answer. The focus of this article was to find if and how the military transformed, and determine whether consolidation of democracy was attributable to these changes. The international actors and social change are hinted as possible suspects. Yet, all of the causes that led to the transformation of the armed forces need more attention. The Turkish military will be a topic of fruitful research for years to come.

## Notes

1. Charles C. William Moskos, John Allen, and David R. Segal, eds., *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

2. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 6.

3. Ergun Ozbudun, "Turkey: How Far from Consolidation?" *Journal of Democracy* 7, 3 (1996): 123.

4. Metin Heper and Aylin Guney, "The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic," *Armed Forces & Society* 22, 4 (Summer, 1996): 630-31.

5. Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," *Foreign Policy* 87 (Summer, 1992): 35.

6. Ergun Ozbudun, "Turkey: How Far from Consolidation?," 129.

7. Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization after Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (June, 1999): 119-44.

8. Zakaria argues that a per capita GDP of between \$3,000 and \$6,000 will be successful in transition to democracy. See Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 70-71.

9. Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom*, 79-80.

10. *Ibid.*, 57. Zakaria contends that order and liberty lead to more stable democratization than only pluralism and elections.

11. Ersel Aydinli, Nihat Ali Ozcan, and Dogan Akyaz, "The Turkish Military's March toward Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 85, 1 (2006): 77-90. The authors argue that issues that have been deemed nonnegotiable,

such as the Turkishness of the state or the headscarf are more easily discussed because the political parties and the military use EU membership as the reason for their complying policies.

12. For a survey of the most prominent works on factors that facilitate democratization, see Ross E. Burkhart and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis," *American Political Science Review* 88, 4 (1994): 903-10. Giuseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); R. Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999); Adam Przeworski, *Sustainable Democracy* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

13. Juan J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," *Journal of Democracy* 1, 1 (1990): 55.

14. Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 130. Also see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Problems of Democratic Consolidation," 3; and Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5 (1994): 59.

15. Dahl, *On Democracy*, 128.

16. Metin Heper, "The Consolidation of Democracy versus Democratization in Turkey," *Journal of Turkish Studies* 26 (2002): 146. Also see Metin Heper and Aylin Guney, "The Military and Democracy," 630.

17. Until the 2002 general elections, the same parties and political leaders have been dominant in the National Parliament, and the coalitions have been built between those same parties.

18. Tanel Demirel, "Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective," *Armed Forces & Society* 31, 2 (Winter, 2005): 254. I agree with Demirel that consolidation is stalled when military intervention is considered a viable option, because the military rule is not perceived "that repressive." For a discussion of why democracy should not be consolidating in Turkey, see Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey: How Far from Consolidation?" 123-38.

19. The country experienced one of the worst economic crises of the last decade in 2001. Thousands of people were unemployed and protesting on the streets.

20. Larry Diamond, *Consolidating Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 234.

21. Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited," *American Sociological Review* 59, 1 (1994): 2

22. Dogan Akyaz, *Askeri Mudahalelerin Orduya Etkisi* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2002), 22.

23. Robert Bianchi, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

24. The amendment was because of changes made in the Constitution to access Customs Union. This is another interesting piece of evidence for the effect of the international environment on democratization. See Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).

25. Halil Inalcik, "Turkey between Europe and the Middle East" *Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs* 3, 1 (1998).

26. Bahattin Aksit, Bahar Tabakoglu, and Ayse Serdar. "Opinions of Civil Society Organizations on Democracy and Interventions of the Military in Turkey," in *Military Missions and Their Implications Reconsidered: The Aftermath of September 11th*, eds. Giuseppe Caforio and Gerhard Kummels (Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Elsevier Science, 2006), 566.

27. See Fusun Turkmen, "The Military Establishment in Turkey: A Historical Overview of Its Socio-Political Role," unpublished paper (2001): 5. Murat Belge also argues that the military has ruled the country behind the scenes through the National Security Council after the transition to democracy in 1983.

28. Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1957).

29. Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 15.

30. Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in *Authoritarian Brazil*, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), 135-36.

31. Michael C. Desch, "Soldiers, States, and Structures: The End of the Cold War and Weakening of U.S. Civilian Control," *Armed Forces & Society* 24 (1998): 389-91.

32. Feroz Ahmad, "Military Intervention and the Crisis in Turkey." *MERIP Reports* 93, (January, 1981): 5-25; Celâl Bayar, *Bir Darbenin Anatomisi [The Anatomy of a Coup D'Etat]* (Istanbul: Emre Yayınları. Prepared for publication by İsmet Bozdağ, 1991); Mevlüt Bozdemir, *Türk Ordusunun Tarihsel Kaynakları [Historical Origins of the Turkish Army]*, (Ankara, Turkey: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1982); Tanel Demirel, "Anatomy of Turkish Military's Decision: The Case of 12 September 1980," *Armed Forces & Society* 29, 2 (Winter, 2003); and Demirel, "Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy."

33. Metin Heper and Aylin Guney, "The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic," *Armed Forces & Society* 22 (1996): 631.

34. William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London: Routledge, 1994), 308-9.

35. Robert Bianchi, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey*; Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (North Humberstone, UK: Ethan Press, 1985); Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994); Sabri Sayari and Yılmaz Esmir, eds., *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); and Kadir Varoğlu and Adnan Bicaksız, "Volunteering for Risk: The Culture of the Turkish Armed Forces," *Armed Forces & Society* 31, 4 (Summer, 2005): 583-98 come closer to this kind of analysis.

36. Harry Bondy, "Postmodernism and the Source of Military Strength in the Anglo West," *Armed Forces & Society* 31 (Autumn 2004): 33.

37. Moskos, Allen, and Segal, eds., *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. Also, Charles Moskos, "Military Systems in Twenty-First Century and New Trends," presented at Turkish Military Academy, June 2, 2003.

38. I took the liberty of omitting Moskos' twelfth criterion, "organizational format," from this analysis, following Moskos' decision, in chapter 2, so I analyze only eleven criteria. For a brief discussion on the organizational format, see A. Kadir Varoğlu, "The Turkish Military in Transition: Introduction," in Caforio and Kummels, eds., *Military Missions and Their Implications Reconsidered*, 553-5.

39. Aylin Guney and Petek Karatekelioğlu, "Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects," *Armed Forces & Society* 31, 3 (Spring, 2005).

40. A. Kadir Varoğlu, "The Turkish Military in Transition: Introduction."

41. The six principles of Kemal Atatürk, also a war hero, have become an internal ideology called "Kemalism." Kemalist principles include: republicanism, statism, secularism, revolutionism, populism, and nationalism. Sunar argues that Kemalism was secular, scientific, procedural, nationalist, universalist, and egalitarian; thus leading to further democratization. However, Parla and Davison maintain that Kemalism is a corporatist ideology that does not tolerate opposition and dissent, and therefore leads to authoritarianism. For further discussion of Kemalism and democratization, see Ilkay Sunar, *State, Society and Democracy in Turkey* (Istanbul: Bahcesehir University, 2004), 98-102 and Taha Parla and Andrew Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004). There is strong constitutional basis of Kemalist principles and reforms. "Kemalist nationalism" and "Kemalist thought" are often referred to in the Turkish Constitution. For specific references to Kemalism in the Constitution, see the first and fifth paragraphs of the Preamble, Articles 2, 42, 58, 81 (oath by deputies to the parliament), 81 (President's oath), 134 (Transitional Article 2).

42. Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, "The State, Politics and the Military in Turkey," *Comparative Politics* 16 (1983): 27.

43. Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, and William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002).

44. Turkmen, "The Military Establishment in Turkey" and Demirel, "Anatomy of Turkish Military." There is a saturated literature on the coups the Turkish military carried out. See endnote 32 for a comprehensive list.

45. The literature unanimously agrees on this statement. See Heper, "The Consolidation of Democracy" and Demirel, "Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy."

46. Sabri Sayari, "Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, 45 (1997).

47. See the official Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>.

48. Huseyin Kivrikoglu, "Land Forces Organization," *Ankara Savunma ve Havacilik* (September-October, 1998): 10-11.

49. Ibid.

50. A brief discussion of these concerns follows in the section where the Turkish military is evaluated within the postmodern paradigm.

51. G. Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001), 67-9.

52. "2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession," Commission of the European Communities. Brussels, September 10, 2002.

53. Stephen Kinzer, "Defending Secularism, Turkey's Military Warns Islamic Leaders," *New York Times*, March 2, 1997. Also see Robert Kaplan at <http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=1982> and Turkmen, "The Military Establishment in Turkey," 26. Also Metin Heper and Aylin Guney, "The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience," *Armed Forces & Society* 26, 4 (2000): 647.

54. "A Violent Detour in Turkey," editorial, *New York Times*, May 30, 2006.

55. Aydinli, Ozcan, and Akyaz, "The Turkish Military's March."

56. Shai Feldman and Yiftah Shapir, *The Middle East Military Balance* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), 310.

57. Lale Sariibrahimoglu, "Arming for Peace," *Jane's Defense Weekly* (1998): 19-25.

58. These percentages are in proportion to the GDP. See World Development Indicators April 2006 report at the World Bank Web site at <http://www.worldbank.org>.

59. Bulent Tuncer, *Sayilarin Diliyle Turkiye* (TESAV, 2004), 50.

60. See the White Paper Part 7, Personnel Policy at the Ministry of National Defense official Web site at <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/pdf/p7c1.pdf>.

61. Kadir Varoglu, "The Turkish Military in Transition." Also see the White Paper Section 2, Restructuring at the Ministry of National Defense official web site at <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/pdf/p4c2.pdf>.

62. See the NATO report at <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/force-structure.htm>.

63. "To achieve sufficient capability, equipped with technological weapons and systems, comprising sufficient command-control assets and precise and developed ammunition, the establishment of multifunctional units capable of conducting various tasks is critical." See the Turkish Armed Forces' official web site at [http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkumay/digerkonular/sivilasker/turksivil\\_eng.htm](http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkumay/digerkonular/sivilasker/turksivil_eng.htm).

64. If the number of the conscribed males is more than the needed number for the armed forces, the General Chief Staff publishes the conditions of the exclusion policy and a number of conscripts receive only one month of a basic training. See [http://www.asal.msb.gov.tr/er\\_islemleri/weberislem7.htm](http://www.asal.msb.gov.tr/er_islemleri/weberislem7.htm) and <http://www.belgenet.com/belge/bedelli.html> as well as the 2000 White Paper at <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/pdf/p7c2.pdf>.

65. Aydinli, Ozcan, and Akyaz, "The Turkish Military's March." Although this structure remains, the policies regarding personnel have significantly changed in the TAF. The most significant change regarding consolidation of democracy has been in the structure of the National Security Council (NSC) because of the EU constitutional amendments. NSC had five civilian and five military members under the 1982 Constitution and the president usually voted with the military, which led this advisory body to be "instructing." After the last legislation, the number of civilians in the NSC rose to nine. See the EU Regular report 2002, 43 for detailed information.

66. Gendarmes are recruited from male citizens between the ages of eighteen to twenty-four who have at least a middle school diploma. See the official Web site at <http://www.jandarma.gov.tr/> or <http://www.jandarma.tsk.mil.tr/>.

67. See the White Paper at <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/pdf/p7c1.pdf>.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. For example, the Turkish Land Forces Command requested a seminar on personnel issues in 2000, when they could not attend the SEDM seminar in Bucharest in 1999. The seminar includes subjects and areas such as “constituting and shaping a defense establishment,” “role deconfliction between military officers and civilian officials,” “rights and duties of officers and civilian officials,” etc.

71. See [http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genel\\_konular/gnkurbask/kenanevren.htm](http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genel_konular/gnkurbask/kenanevren.htm) for Evren’s profile, and [http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genel\\_konular/gnkurbask/hilmiozkok.htm](http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genel_konular/gnkurbask/hilmiozkok.htm) for Ozkok’s profile.

72. Evren’s infamous quote about the people he had executed, “Asmayalım da besleyelim mi bunları?” can be translated as “Should we not hang but feed them?” There is no shortage of such Evren quotes.

73. Metin Heper, “The Military-Civilian Relations in Post-1997 Turkey,” prepared to be submitted at the IPSA Armed Forces and Society Research Committee Conference: Bucharest, Romania (2002), 5.

74. Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, “Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force” *World Politics* XIII, 1 (1960), 19-44.

75. G. Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance: Turkish Military and Politics*, 19.

76. PIAR-Gallup Opinion Polls, *Milliyet*, November 8, 1999.

77. See the briefing by Stephen Kinzer, the Middle East Forum at <http://www.meforum.org/article/95>.

78. The intelligentsia and even the businessmen that were generally against military involvement in politics supported the military in 1997 that led to the “postmodern coup.” See Stephen Kinzer, “Defending Secularism, Turkey’s Military Warns Islamic Leaders” *New York Times*, March 2, 1997.

79. Bahattin Aksit, Bahar Tabakoglu, and Ayse Serdar. “Opinions of Civil Society Organizations,” 571.

80. Mark Tessler and Ebru Altinoglu, “Political Culture in Turkey: Connections among Attitudes toward Democracy, the Military and Islam,” *Democratization* 11, 1 (2004): 36.

81. See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2001/countryratings/turkey2.htm>.

82. Asli Tunc, “Pushing the Limits of Tolerance,” *Gazette: The International Journal for Communication Studies* 64, 1 (2002): 47-62.

83. See Madeleine Albright’s criticism of Turkey over Mater’s ban at <http://www.milliyet.com/1999/10/16/english/>. Also, Charles Levendovsky, “Without Free Press, Reporter Faces Prison for Insulting the Military” *Casper Star-Tribune*, October 17, 1999.

84. See the CNN piece “Turkish Court Acquits Journalist in Banned Book Case” October 2, 2000, at <http://archives.cnn.com/2000/books/news/10/02/turkey.bannedbook.ap/>.

85. “Subaylara gozaltiyi basindan ogrendik,” *Hurriyet*, June 4, 2006.

86. “Accusations about General May Expand Rift in Turkey,” *New York Times*, March 10, 2006.

87. See the country profile at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country\\_profiles/1022222.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/1022222.stm).

88. See the White Paper <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/pdf/p7c1.pdf>. The interviews were cancelled in 2000 because of the rumors of bribe and influence in oral exams and interviews.

89. White Paper, Section Three, Turkish General Staff at <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/pdf/p5c3.pdf>.

90. Bernard Boene and Michel Louis Martin, “France in the Throes of Epoch-Making Change,” in Moskos, Allen, and Segal, eds., *The Postmodern Military*, 63.

91. See the Recruitment page of the official MND site at [http://www.asal.msb.gov.tr/personel/personel1\\_1.htm](http://www.asal.msb.gov.tr/personel/personel1_1.htm).

92. See the links for the contractors on the official Ministry of Defense Web site at <http://www.msb.gov.tr>. The White Paper of 2000 is at <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/GnPPDBeyazKBol10Kis2.htm>.

93. The 2001 NATO year-in-review special edition report on female officers in Turkey can be found at <http://www.nato.int/ims/2001/win/turkey.htm>, or can be requested from the author.

94. Ibid.

95. See the NATO report at [http://www.nato.int/ims/2005/win/national\\_reports/turkey.pdf](http://www.nato.int/ims/2005/win/national_reports/turkey.pdf).

96. Ibid.



97. "Kadınlara genellik kاپisi bes yıl daha kapalı," *Hurriyet*, May 26, 2006.

98. Ceyda Kuloglu, "The Turkish Military Academy from a Gender Perspective," in Caforio and Kummels, eds., *Military Missions and Their Implications Reconsidered*, 577.

99. I gathered the findings of 202 messages sent to a forum from the followers of a Turkish Web site. The data reveal a general pattern. However, I acknowledge that the findings are biased since the method used limits the sample to only Internet users, and accuracy cannot be checked. However, since there is no other available data on the topic so far, this article draws conclusions from the present sample.

100. The social environments of COs and NCOs are strictly separated. In addition, the armed forces started to utilize a ticketing system to prevent conflicts of status among the personnel and their families.

101. See the report to the U.S. Senate, "Homosexuals in the Military: Policies and Practices of Foreign Countries" at <http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/GAO.pdf>, or it can be requested from the author.

102. Aaron Belkin and R. L. Evans, "The Effects of Including Gay and Lesbian Soldiers in the British Armed Forces: Appraising the Evidence," Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, University of California, Santa Barbara, November 2000.

103. Hulya Ucpinar's report, "Conscientious Objection in Turkey" at <http://www.zentralstelle-kdv.de/euro04.htm>.

104. Ibid.

105. See the official Savas Karsitlari Dernegi Web site at <http://savaskarsitlaridernegi.org>.

106. See the War Resisters' International Web page on Turkey at <http://www.wri-irg.org/news/2005/turkey05-en.htm#Heading43>.

107. See the United Nations Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights, 56th session, Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1998/77, "Civil and political rights, including the question of: Conscientious objection to military service," January 19, 1999, at [http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/\(Symbol\)/E.CN.4.2000.55.En?Opendocument](http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.2000.55.En?Opendocument).

108. John Allen Williams, "Leadership in the Postmodern Military: Meeting the Challenge," The International Leadership Symposium Papers, Turkish Military Academy, April 15-16, 2004.

109. Further changes are necessary for a fully democratic Constitution, but especially the changes to the internal structure of the military are crucial for consolidation.

110. Alev Cinar, *Modernity, Islam and Secularism in Turkey* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 51, 175.

111. The goal of this article is to examine how the Turkish military is changing and whether the change can explain the claim of further consolidation of the democracy. The causes of the change for individual criteria are not in the scope of this article. Nonetheless, the analysis suggests two trends, international pressure, mainly EU, and the liberalizing values of the society. Thus, a brief discussion of these factors is included.

112. Dogu Ergil, "Aspects of the Kurdish Problem in Turkey," in *Turkey since 1970: Politics, Economics and Society* ed. Debbie Lovatt. (New York: Palgrave Publishers, 2001).

113. Rebecca L. Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces & Society* 22 (1995): 8; Nilufer Narli, "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey," *Turkish Studies* 1, 1 (Spring, 2000): 108.

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