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ABSTRACT   *Defining the relationship between the US and Turkey as one in which Turkey was a "willing receiver," this study illuminates the general question of how Turkey's foreign policy orientation is relevant to the analysis of the success of US soft power in Turkey during the Cold War. For this purpose, it focuses on the centrality of Turkey's foreign policy orientation in facilitating the popular reception of Hollywood movies in Turkey by looking at how Turkey interpreted its regulations on films in favor of original or remakes of Hollywood movies. The paper concludes that while setting the scene for both the popularity of American movies and the effective use of US soft power strategies, Turkey's foreign policy orientation had far-reaching consequences for the development of the Turkish movie sector.*

Introduction

The concept of soft power illuminates the inextricably intertwined relationship between politics and culture.[1] Soft power suggests that intangible capabilities such as cultural means can serve one's political objectives by inciting attraction and becoming a role model. Rather than coercion or imposition, attraction is the foundation of the relationship between the holder and the receiver of soft power. In this regard, the logic of soft power implies that the effectiveness of its strategies depends largely on the "willing receivers."[2] Factors that may contribute to willingness are ideological, political and cultural affinities with the source of the soft power. According to this, the Western bloc countries were more susceptible to American soft power than they were to Soviet soft power.

The Cold War was a time when the US engaged in severe cultural warfare through the design, production and dissemination of images and representations to promote its way of life as better than the Soviet way.[3] Standard accounts of US cultural warfare in the Cold War era tell us how successfully the US used virtually every cultural

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medium, from art exhibitions to books and education, as a "weapon of mass attraction."[4] These studies also note Hollywood movies' crucial role in promoting American culture, ideology, lifestyle and values throughout the world.[5] Different from these accounts of US cultural warfare, this study underlines the centrality of Turkish foreign policy orientation in facilitating the success of Hollywood movies in Turkey in the Cold War era. It defines the relationship between the US and Turkey as one in which Turkey is not a passive receiver but a willing one. Furthermore, the study explores the impact of Hollywood movies on Turkish movies and discusses the far-reaching consequences of Turkey's foreign policy orientation on the Turkish movie sector.

The study first briefly underlines the significance of Turkish−American relations in terms of Turkey's foreign policy orientation during the Cold War. Second, it explores how Turkey's foreign policy orientation influenced the interpretation of its regulations on film production, distribution and exhibition and increased US influence on the Turkish movie sector. Third, it provides examples of Turkish movies that were influenced by Hollywood movies. The article concludes that Turkey's foreign policy orientation, which made the country a willing receiver of American soft power, set the scene for the popularity of American movies and the development of the Turkish movie sector and facilitated the effective use of US soft power strategies.

Turkey's Foreign Policy Orientation and Turkish−US Relations in the Cold War Era

Turkey's Western foreign policy orientation can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire, which started to seek recognition from the European great power to be included in the great powers' club in the eighteenth century.[6] During its republican era, Turkey preserved that Western orientation and sought to locate itself in the West as a modern state that met the standards of the civilized world. As International Relations (IR) scholar Pınar Bilgin stated, Turkey's "Westernness" became a crucial security and foreign policy objective for the young Turkish Republic.[7] In pursuit of this objective, Turkey engaged in an unprecedented reform movement, highly revolutionary and secular in character, to "raise national culture to the level of contemporary civilization" and modernize Turkey's economical, political, societal and cultural life.[8] In IR, Turkey followed the principle formulated by Ataturk, "Peace at home, peace abroad" and focused on preserving the balances and equality established with the European states by the Treaty of Lausanne.[9] However, despite the great achievements of Lausanne, the European great powers did not recognize Turkey's Westernness; and it is still being questioned abroad, as well as at home, as may be observed by the recent European Union accession negotiations.[10]

Moreover, Turkish political leadership's pragmatic strategy, which was based on keeping Turkey at peace by assuring its impartiality, did not help the country's search for recognition by the West. In the wake of World War II, IRs were restructured in line with the changing balance of power. The European great powers not

only lost their influential positions in world politics but also became dependent on the US for recovery and reconstruction. Hence, the US became the leader of the West. When the competition between the Soviets and the US turned into the Cold War, the leaders of both blocs played major roles in choosing the states that were essential for the security of their respective territories and interests. The US initially did not consider Turkey as a crucial member of the West; however, it changed its position due to the Soviets' demands regarding Turkish territory, the Turkish Straits and Turkey's strategic importance in the context of the Cold War.[11] In 1947, US president Harry Truman declared that the US would provide economic aid to Turkey (and Greece) to support their resistance to "attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."[12] In 1948, Turkey started to receive US economic aid, known as the Marshall Plan.

However, growing economic and political relations with the US did not secure Turkey's Westernness. The most important institution in the West was NATO membership in this organization signified one's Westernness and granted military security. For instance, as IR scholars Hemmer and Katzenstein argued, the US alliance with European states in NATO was the institutionalization of a political creation based on perceptions of collective identity emanating from historical, political and cultural factors.[13] Turkey applied to be part of NATO's defense and identity collective in May 1950, but the British and the Americans declined its application on the grounds that "Turkey did not belong either to Western Europe or the Atlantic and consequently she could not join the North Atlantic regional group."[14] Despite this rejection, as a country that constructed its identity in terms of Western civilization and envisioned its future in the West, Turkey continued to make considerable efforts to secure its place in the Western overlay and its recognition as a Western country.[15] The Turkish government's decision to send soldiers to the Korean War under the auspices of the United Nations, even without the Turkish parliament's approval, became very influential in facilitating Turkey's acceptance to NATO in 1952.[16] From the Turkish perspective, membership in NATO institutionalized Turkey's place in the West; its Westernness was finally recognized.[17]

Turkey's membership in NATO also broadened the Turkish conception of the West. Compared to the war-stricken and devastated Europe, the US was an attractive model for Turkey's ongoing project of modernization and Westernization. Turkey thus changed its reference for democracy and economic development from Europe to the US. The US became so attractive to Turkish politicians that transforming Turkey into a "little America" became a non-partisan state promise, which was repeated on October 21, 1957 by President Celal Bayar's Taksim address to the people: "We are emulating the development stages of America. Thirty years from now, this country will be a little America with 50 million people."[18] Consequently, American culture and lifestyle became popular objects of desire in Turkey.

Despite the strong ties established by the Western alliance, Turkish−American relations had their low periods.[19] For instance, bilateral relations were strained when the US ignored Turkey's interests by using the İncirlik airbase to transport troops to Lebanon in 1958, and when it bargained over removing Jupiter missiles

in Turkey without Turkey's knowledge during the Cuban missile crisis.[20] In 1974, the US declared its impartiality on the Cyprus issue and sent the Johnson Letter urging Turkey not to intervene. After Turkey did, the US imposed an arms embargo on the country. Later, when the US demanded the ban of opium poppy cultivation, US – Turkish relations took another downturn. However, as IR scholar and historian Nur Bilge Criss stated, despite fluctuations Turkey and the US have always managed to restore their special ties, which has mitigated an anti-American tone that contextually became dominant in Turkish public opinion (with the minor exception of a few left-wing groups in Turkey).[21] In this regard, America remained an object of attraction at state and societal levels and American movies became the conveyors of American culture and lifestyle to Turkey's willing receivers.

Institutions for Regulating Movies in Turkey

In line with its pro-American foreign policy orientation, the Turkish state individually and in cooperation with the US prepared structural conditions that would facilitate the reception of American movies in Turkey. First, Turkish authorities (re)interpreted the articles of the *Regulation on the Control of Films and Film Screenplays*, also known as the Censorship Statute.[22] From 1939 to 1985, this statute was the only regulation pertaining to movies that Turkey had. When the Turkish government introduced it in 1939, its aim was to prevent Turkish audiences from taking sides in the ideological clashes presented in movies, as was happening in Europe.[23]

The regulation prohibited ideological propaganda in favor of a particular state, prohibited offending friendly states and their nations and prohibited propagating ideologies contrary to Turkey's national political, economic and ideological system. Additionally, it banned the shooting of movies that were considered harmful to morality and discipline, opposed to national feeling or a danger to public order and security. Furthermore, movies that made anti-war propaganda, denigrated the honor and dignity of the military and military service, included propaganda scenes against Turkey, were offensive to a race or nation or made religious propaganda were outlawed.[24]

As a member of the Western alliance, Turkish authorities (re)interpreted the articles mentioned above accordingly. They began to use the regulation to block movies they considered contrary to the above-mentioned clauses.[25] According to Film Historian Nijat Özön, the foreign film commission banned all Soviet productions, citing the clauses that prohibited political propaganda in favor of a particular state and propagation of political, economic and social ideologies hostile to Turkey.[26] Obviously, the aim was to prevent Soviet influence in Turkey.[27] Films imported from communist countries were censored heavily. The control was so strict that even Cyrillic titles and themes of solidarity or communality were not tolerated. For instance, the Turkish Board of Censorship allowed *The Journey* (Anatole Litvak-1959), a movie about a group of Westerners trying to flee Hungary after the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, only if the phrase "Russians are nice" were omitted during the dubbing.[28] The political,

structural and legal factors that outlawed movies of Soviet ideology at the same time promoted Western movies and favored American ones.[29] As a consequence, starting in the 1950s, Hollywood movies started to dominate the Turkish market.

The second mechanism that controlled and facilitated the dissemination of American movies in Turkey was the United States Information Service (USIS),[30] a branch of the United States Information Agency (USIA), established to construct the American image in foreign countries that were under the threat of communism. The USIS censored several American movies in Turkey that they determined were contrary to true representations of the American lifestyle. For example, *The Gentleman's Agreement* (on anti-Semitism in the United States), *The Attack* (a story of military incompetence in World War II), *All the King's Men* (on soldiers' personal and psychological difficulties in returning to civilian life) and *The Blackboard Jungle* (which criticized the American high school system) were all censored.[31] On the other hand, the USIA facilitated the distribution of other American movies by including Turkey in its Information Media Guaranty (IMG) Program.[32] Turkish film importers were experiencing serious problems paying American film distributors due to the scarcity of dollars in Turkey; the IMG arranged that Turkish importers could pay their debts in Turkish lira through monthly installments over 1 year.

The Turkish Censorship Statute and the USIS in Turkey definitely facilitated placement of American films in Turkish movie theatres, but there were no competitors. The European film industry was in crisis due to the economic destruction in Europe and Turkey's own film industry was in its infancy. Neither, then, was in a position to present an alternative to Turkish audiences and compete with the successful marketing strategies of American movies.[33] Hence, the interventions of the Turkish and US governments provided favorable institutional conditions for the distribution and exhibition of American movies and shaped the preferences of Turkish audiences.

The Impact of American Movies on the Turkish Film Industry

The ascendancy of American films in the Turkish market in the early 1950s coincided with the ruling Republican Party's (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) decision to support the Turkish national movie sector by offering a 50 percent tax reduction for movie theaters willing to screen Turkish movies.[34] As the subsequent ruling party, the Democrat Party (DP, *Demokrat Parti*) preserved the decision. Under the DP rule, newly rich Anatolian businessmen were encouraged to invest in the movie sector.[35] However, in the volatile economic and political context of Turkey, filmmaking was a very risky venture. For this reason, film producers developed risk-reducing production strategies, such as making movies in genres that were in demand, i.e. American-style films. During the mid-1950s and 1960s, the Turkish film industry's peak years, Turkish filmmakers produced over 300 movies per year.[36]

Encouraged by this success, film producers claimed that Yeşilçam (the name for the Turkish film industry) was "little Hollywood," much like Turkish politicians wanted to make Turkey "little America."[37] However, because the most popular movies genre in Turkey at that time was Hollywood melodramas, the Turkish film

industry never moved beyond producing spin-offs, remakes and adaptations of American films.[38] Turkish melodramatic cinema shared the major characteristics of the American melodrama genre. These movies focused on love affairs and family relations, supported morally conservative values and the political status quo and depicted stereotypes, extreme emotions and moral binaries.[39] Typical Yeşilçam melodramas based their narratives on rich/poor, rural/urban and east/west binaries. According to these themes, the urban rich represented the West and the Western life-style was characterized by elements of capitalist modes of consumption and production. Male protagonists drove American cars, owned factories, wore suits, were educated in the US or Europe, drank whiskey and smoked Marlboros. Likewise, female protagonists dressed in haute couture Western-style clothing, wore expensive jewelry and organized parties.[40]

One of the most-repeated narratives in Yeşilçam was the following: a boy from the urban upper class and a girl from the lower class had an affair, and the boy suddenly left the girl. The girl followed the boy but he rejected her because she did not belong to his class and did not know how to act, eat, speak, etc. After being rejected, the girl was distraught and decided to transform herself into a new and modern woman. In a very short time, with the help of European teachers living in Turkey, she learned proper etiquette, acted like a lady, lost her heavy accent, dressed like an upper-class Western woman and then, as planned, met the boy in her new form. The boy failed to recognize her but fell in love. This time, exacting revenge, the girl left the boy. In the end, the girl's identity was revealed, the boy was taught his lesson and they reunited. After they were married, they lived as members of the upper class,[41] acting out the "Turkish dream" happily ever after.

In line with the features of the melodrama genre, the stark binaries in the representations of the male and female characters were in accordance with the dominant ideology of the state. Turkey has been defined as a homogenous, harmonious society in absolute national solidarity exempt from class and class conflict.[42] Therefore, in Turkish melodramas, rich and poor were not seen through a class lens because there was no place for class-consciousness or class conflict.[43] Class mobility was a frequent theme, and could easily be achieved through changes in income and/or education. In addition, Turkish melodramas consciously did not portray an enmity against wealth. Rich characters were represented as both good and bad; good rich characters always helped the poor protagonist to transform herself/himself, while bad rich characters were usually taught a lesson. The common lesson for the rich was to understand that family/friends/lovers were more important than wealth; therefore, rich and poor were often portrayed sharing bread and enjoying the ordinary life of the poor.[44]

In this regard, Yeşilçam melodramas, which were seemingly devoid of ideological content, functioned in fact as a tool for disseminating state ideology, which itself was shaped by Turkey's foreign policy orientation.[45] Melodramas helped establish social peace, harmony and order in line with the Turkish state's objectives. The political coding hidden in the happy endings facilitated the establishment of Turkey's Westernness, just like American movies strived to promote a particular kind of

Americanness.[46] Moreover, in portraying Westernness and modernity in reference to the American lifestyle, Yeşilçam melodramas acted in alliance with the Hollywood movies that aimed to promote the American lifestyle as opposed to the communist lifestyle in the context of the Cold War. In the end, then, Turkish melodramas were repetitions of their American counterparts in kind and also in purpose.

Turkey's Remakes of American Movies

Starting from the late 1960s, Turkish film producers faced a decline in the industry[47] and decided to remake some of the popular Hollywood films. These remakes differed from typical Yeşilçam fare and were called "fantastic Turkish movies"[48] because their narratives relied on fairy tales, science fiction and Westerns. Because of the peculiarities of the American originals, these movies were translated into the Turkish context historically, culturally and politically.[49]

Important examples of "adapted" movies included: *Snow White and the Seven Dwarves* (Ben Shartsteen—1937) into *Pamuk Prenses ve 7 Cüceler* (Ertem Göreç—1970), *The Wizard of Oz* (Victor Fleming—1939) into *Ayşecik ve Sihirli Cüceler Rüyalar Ülkesinde* (Tunç Başaran—1971), *The Invisible Man Returns* (John May—1940) into *Görünmeyen Adam İstanbul'da* (Lütfi Ö. Akad—1955), *Dr. No* (Terence Young—1962) into *Altın Çocuk Beyrut'ta* (Ertem Göreç—1967), *Mysterious Dr. Satan* (John English, William Witney—1940) as *Yılmayan Şeytan* (Yılmaz Atadeniz—1972), *Star Wars* (George Lucas—1977) as *Dünyayı Kurtaran Adam* (Çetin İnanç—1982), *Dracula* (Bela Lugosi—1931) as *Drakula İstanbul'da* (Mehmet Muhtar—1953), *The Exorcist* (William Peter Blatty—1972) as *Şeytan* (Metin Erksan—1974), *The Lone Ranger* (William Withey—1933) as *Maskeli 5'ler* (Yılmaz Atadeniz—1968) and *Maskeli Beşlerin Dönüşü* (Yılmaz Atadeniz—1968), *Jaws* (Steven Spielberg—1975) as *Çöl* (Çetin İnanç—1983), *The Mask of Zorro* (Ferd Niblo—1921) and *The Mask of Zorro* (Rouben Mamaulian—1940) as *Zorro Kamçılı Süvari* (Yılmaz Atadeniz—1969), *Zorro'nun İntikamı* (Yılmaz Atadeniz—1969), *Zorro Dişi Fantoma'ya Karşı* (Feridun Kete—1969) and *Zorro'nun Kara Kamçısı* (Feridun Kete—1969).[50]

In the Turkish version of *The Exorcist*, in the exorcism ceremony an Imam (rather than a priest) uses Zamzam water (taken from the holy well of Zamzam in Mecca) instead of Christian holy water and reads from the Quran. In addition, the main character visits a mosque after defeating the devil in her soul.[51] In *The Man Who Saved the World,* which was the Turkish version of *Star Wars*, the protagonist was told that Islam was the source of civilization and he was expected to save the world from attacks of evil. In *Superman,* Superman was told that his intelligence came from the Prophet Solomon. Count Dracula was repelled not only by garlic but also by the Quran. Also, due to problems with equipment in Turkey at the time, Superman rarely flew. In order to justify this change from the original, extra dialogue was added in the last scene: a friend of Clark Kent asks him why he chooses to ride on an airplane to return home and Kent replies, "Because I only

fly when dealing with the bad guys."[52] There were also a large number of Turkish Westerns produced, which pictured absurdities such as Turkish villagers in Mexican hats and Turkish actors as cowboys and sheriffs. A more illustrative (and disheartening) indication of how much American movies had shaped the Turkish psyche was *Düşman Yolları Kesti* (The Enemy Cut off the Roads).[53] This film was supposed to be a Turkish National War movie but it was shot as a Western because Turkish audiences considered American-type adventure movies more exciting.[54]

Turkish authorities did not consider these remakes as ideological propaganda. The Turkish law that banned another state's propaganda was not interpreted in such a way as to forbid Turkish film stars from acting out Western roles, such as Ayhan Işık with a sheriff's badge, Erol Taş wearing a Mexican hat or Cüneyt Arkın and Salih Güney riding horses through orchards as cowboys. However, in the Cold War context, it would not be wrong to assume that if these actors carried a flag with a hammer and sickle on it, appeared as trade union members, read *Das Kapital* or talked about class-consciousness, the law would have been interpreted otherwise. Hence, although the leisure activity of watching movies did not seem to be an ideological act, the production and distribution of filmmaking were definitely shaped by Turkey's ideological stance in the Cold War.

Despite the efforts of Turkish film producers, toward the end of the Cold War, the Turkish film industry suffered a serious decline and the dominance of local productions came to an end by the late 1970s. After the economic crisis in the West due to the increase in the oil prices by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1973 and the 1974 military intervention in Cyprus, the Turkish economy declined. The general unrest in society due to political polarization (as well as the increasing prices of cinema tickets) further discouraged moviegoers. The Turkish audience now preferred to watch television at home. Film producers attempted to keep the sector alive by producing sex and comedy films,[55] but after the coup d'état of 1980, the military government started to ban such movies, claiming they contributed to a decline in morality. As a result, many movie companies and movie theaters started to close. In the 1980s, the dissemination of Video Cassette Recorders (VCRs) further harmed the sector. By 1991, the number of cinemas had declined from 2,242 in 1970 to 281, an 87 percent drop.[56] Hollywood movies did fill the gap left by Turkish movies, especially after changes in the foreign capital regulations in 1987 came into effect, because foreign distributors were able to enter the Turkish market without an intermediary. Thus, American firms such as Warner Bros. and United International Pictures started to directly distribute both local and foreign films in Turkey. As Turkish firms could not compete with American distributors, the collapse of Yeşilçam became inevitable.[57]

Conclusion

The Cold War period was an extraordinary era in which the entwined relationship between politics and culture could be observed through the US' understanding of

the central role that soft power media play in shaping people's minds and affecting their hearts and minds. As standard accounts of US soft power frequently state, Hollywood movies were among the most significant and efficient "weapons of mass attraction," which disseminated the idea that the American way of life was superior to the alternative presented by the Soviets. The American way was as well received in most parts of the world as it was in Turkey. Different from other studies, this study investigated the reception of Hollywood movies in Turkey in the Cold War era by exploring the concept that Turkey was a "willing receiver" of American culture and lifestyle due to its Western-oriented foreign policy. The effect of US soft power on Turkey may not have been as strong if Turkey had not wanted to situate itself in the West from the beginning, or if the US had not facilitated Turkey's membership in the Western family of states by (eventually) supporting its application to NATO or if Europe had preserved its attraction for Turkey. In other words, Turkey's political will facilitated the success of US soft power in Turkey.

The study illustrated how Turkey's foreign policy orientation facilitated the reception of American movies by noting that Turkish authorities interpreted the articles of the *Regulation on the Control of Films and Film Screenplays*, also known as the Censorship Statute, to favor American movies. Turkey did not allow movies contradicting its national ideology of Westernness or propagandizing "wrong" images or misrepresentations of that ideology. Therefore, Hollywood movies beat out socialist-inclined movies. Choosing between the options allowed by the censorship authorities, the Turkish audience preferred high-quality Hollywood movies to the products of the newborn Turkish cinema sector. However, when Turkish movie producers started to imitate Hollywood movies that received popular receptions to make more profit, Turkish audiences favored the movies. Therefore, Hollywood movies directly and indirectly exerted US soft power in Turkey because both the original movies and their remakes were products of Western ideology.

However, it should be noted that although Hollywood movies contributed to the growth of the Turkish film sector in its initial phase by guaranteeing public demand, it did not take Yeşilçam film producers long to fall into a vicious circle of producing movies that were imitations of imitated movies. This profit-oriented production strategy was the catalyst for the decline of Yeşilçam. Unstable political and economic conditions, three coup d'états and the proliferation of television and VCRs were other contributing factors. In addition, technological, professional and financial issues prevented the production of movies of artistic value. By the end of the Cold War, the Turkish film sector could not compete with American, let alone European films. Thus, taken as a whole, Turkey's foreign policy orientation during the Cold War facilitated conditions for the effective use of US soft power strategies and the success of American movies in Turkey but also set the scene for the development—and near demise—of the Turkish movie sector.

Acknowledgements

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32. Ibid. The IMG was known as the informational side of the Marshall Plan and provided a federal guaranty for Hollywood distributors and producers to get their money if they faced difficulties in receiving payment because buyers could not find US dollars.

33. Gürata (2007), pp. 333–47.

34. Giovanni Scognamillo, *Türk Sinema Tarihi (1896–1997)* (İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayıncılık, 1998).

35. Nilgün Abisel, *Türk Sineması Üzerine Yazılar* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1994), pp. 100–1; Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, *Dünya Sinema Tarihi* (İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2003), p. 741.

36. Michael Cullingworth, "On a First Viewing of Turkish Cinema," in Christine Woodhead (ed.), *Turkish Cinema: An Introduction* (London: SOAS.11, 1989), pp. 11–8.

37. Hilmi Maktav, "Melodram Kadınları," *Toplum ve Bilim*, Vol. 96, No. 2 (2003), p. 273.

38. Ahmet Gürata, "Translating Modernity: Remakes in Turkish Cinema" in D. Eleftheriotis and G. Needham (eds.), *Asian Cinemas: A Reader & Guide* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), p. 242.

39. Daniel Gerould "Melodrama and Revolution," in J. Bratton, J. Cook and C. Gledhill (eds.), *Melodrama: Stage, Picture and Scene* (London: BFI, 1994), p. 185.

40. Nezih Erdoğan, "Narratives of Resistance: National Identity and Ambivalence in the Turkish Melo-drama between 1965 and 1975," *Screen*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1998), p. 264.

41. Barış Kılıçbay and Emine Onaran İncirlioğlu, "Interrupted Happiness: Class Boundaries and the 'Impossible Love' in Turkish Melodrama," *Ephemera*: *Critical Dialogues in Organization*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2003), pp. 236–49; Erdoğan (1998), pp. 259–69.

42. Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 79; Erik Jan Zürcher, "Ottoman Sources of Kemalist Thought," in Elisabeth Özdalga (ed.), *Late Ottoman Society: Intellectual Legacy* (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 23.

43. Kılıçbay and İncirlioğlu (2003), p. 241.

44. Başak Yeşil, "'The Rich Girl and the Poor Boy': Binary Oppositions in Yeşilçam Melodramas" (unpublished Master's thesis, METU, 2004); Behice Pehlivan, "Yesilcam Melodramatic Imagination and Its Influence on the New Turkish Cinema" (unpublished Master's thesis, Sabancı University, 2007).

45. Nezih Erdoğan, "Ulusal Kimlik, Kolonyal Söylem ve Yeşilçam Melodramı," *Toplum ve Bilim*, Vol. 67, No. 3 (1995), p. 183.

46. Erdoğan (1995), pp. 178–96; Jackie Byars, *All that Hollywood Allows: Rereading Gender in 1950s Melodrama* (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 107–10; Rogin (1984), pp. 1–36; Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, *Hollywood Goes to War: Patriotism, Movies and the Second World War, from Ninotchka to Mrs. Miniver* (New York: Tauris Parke, 2000).

47. Especially during the 1960s and 1970s, when the search for the fundamentals of Turkish cinema peaked, there were independent attempts to make movies with "national" characteristics, alternative plots and political messages. Such films were called *Milli Sinema*, and included *Yılanların Öcü (1962)* and *Susuz Yaz (1963)*, which won the Golden Bear in 1963. Yılmaz Güney's movies have a special place in Turkish filmmaking historiography because of their different stories and storytelling techniques. Güney's *Yol (1982)*, which was banned in Turkey until 2003, shared the Golden Palm Prize with Costa Gavras at the 1983 Cannes Film Festival. It is possible to argue, however, that *Milli Sinema* never reached the audience as freely as their American-inspired counterparts. Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, *Dünya Sinema Tarihi* [The Oxford History of World Cinema] (İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2003), pp. 740–50.

48. Giovanni Scognamillo and Metin Demirhan, *Fantastik Türk Sineması* (İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayıncılık, 1999), p. 91.

49. Savaş Arslan, "Hollywood Alla Turca: A History of Cinema in Turkey" (unpublished PhD dissertation, Ohio State University, 2006).

50. Scognamillo and Demirhan (1999), the Internet Movie Data Base.

51. Iain Robert Smith, "The Exorcist in Istanbul: Processes of Transcultural Appropriation within Turkish Popular Cinema," Portal *Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies,* Vol. 5, No. 1 (2008), pp. 1–12.

52. Scognamillo and Demirhan (1999), p. 387.

53. Directed by Osman F. Seden in 1959. Available at http://www.sinematurk.com/film_genel/3104/Dusman-Yollari-Kesti (accessed February 2, 2011).

54. Özön (1995), p. 170.

55. Burçak Evren, *Türk Sinemasında Cinsellik ve Erotizm* (İstanbul: Ad Yayıncılık, 1995), pp. 26–37.

56. Melis Behlil, "Close Encounters?: Contemporary Turkish Television and Cinema," *Wide Screen*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2010), p. 2.

57. Although the Turkish cinema sector will likely not return to its heyday levels due to the proliferation of private television channels signs of the sector's revival began to be seen in the early 1990s and Turkish movies started to gain considerable popularity in the 2000s.

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