



THE STATE AND INTELLECTUAL IN TURKEY: BETWEEN LIBERAL  
ETHOS AND THE MYTH OF DEMOCRACY

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences  
of  
Bilkent University

by

Simten Coşar

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree  
of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC  
ADMINISTRATION

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF  
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION  
BILKENT UNIVERSITY  
ANKARA

June 1997

Simten Coşar

*Simten*

JG  
1809  
.A15  
C67  
1997


B138402

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.




Prof. Dr. Metin Heper  
(Supervisor)

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.



Prof. Dr. Elizabeth Özdalga  
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.




Prof Dr. Ahmet Evin  
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.




Yrd. Doç Dr. Nur Bilge Criss  
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.



Yrd. Doç Dr. Ayşe Kadioğlu  
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences



Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu  
Director

## ABSTRACT

This study analyzes the liberal discourse in the Republican Turkey with a view to shedding light on the state-intellectual relationship. The aim is to elaborate the reasons for the lack of an intellectual tradition of liberalism in Turkey. The answer is searched in the historical unfolding of the state-intellectual relationship within a state dominant, ever-modernizing context.

The bulk of the study has been shaped by the periodization beginning from the foundation of the Turkish Republic and extending throughout the 1990s. The Ottoman period, especially, the *Tanzimat* era (1839-1876) has been examined with the aim of providing an historical background. The emergence of a liberal identity in different periods, has been analyzed in relation to the problematique that shaped the intellectual discourse in different periods, namely modernization, democratization, and liberalization.

In the study the state-opposition pendulum has been taken as the clue to gain an understanding of the impasse that the Turkish liberal intellectual has experienced. In this respect, it is concluded that the liberal intellectual in Turkey has always had to walk on a tightrope between the premises that fed his intellectual matrix and his self-identification with the state. His quest for liberty and salvation of the individual from

the constraints of the state was inspired by the West. Yet, due to his concern for the state he has had to construct the ideal individual which turned his liberal agenda into a project.

## ÖZET

Bu araştırma Cumhuriyet dönemine özgü liberal kimliği devlet-entellektüel ilişkisi çerçevesinde incelemiştir. Çalışma Türkiye'de, liberalizmin bir düşünce geleneği olarak neden oluşamadığı sorusu etrafında şekillenmiştir. Cevap devletin ön planda olduğu, sürekli modernleşen bir bağlamda devlet-entellektüel ilişkisinin tarihsel evrilişinde aranmıştır.

Çalışmanın çatısını Cumhuriyet'in kuruluşundan 1990lara kadar uzanan dönem oluşturmaktadır. Tanzimat (1839-1876) döneminden itibaren meydana gelen gelişmeler tarihsel bir arka plan sağlamak amacıyla çalışmaya dahil edilmiştir. Liberal entellektüel kimlik birbirini takip eden dönemlerde entellektüel söyleme şekil veren problematikler etrafında incelenmiştir. Buna bağlı olarak, liberal kimliğin değişik dönemlerdeki farklı görünümleri entellektüelin içselleştirdiği misyona referansla anlaşılma çalışılmıştır. Sözkonusu misyon(lar) birbirini dışlamayacak şekilde modernleştirme, demokratikleştirme ve liberalleştirme olarak belirlenmiştir.

Çalışmada devlet-muhalefet sarkacı Türk liberal entellektüelinin karşı karşıya kaldığı açmazları anlamak açısından faydalı olmuştur. Türkiye'de liberal entellektüel, entellektüel kimliğini devletin tanımladığı çerçevede içinde bulmuştur. Batı'nın liberal öncüllerinden hareketle oluşturduğu kavramsal şeması ise onu ister istemez muhalif konumuna oturtmuştur. Dönemin



önceliklerine göre devlet ve muhalefet arasında gidip gelen sözkonusu entellektüelin son tahlilde vardığı nokta ise liberalizmi projelendirmek olmuştur.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the Association for Liberal Thinking for their documentary support for Chapter 6; Mehmet Arif Demirer who was generous in opening his personal library which eased the researching process for Chapters 5 and 6; and Sevgi Korkut at TGNA library who welcomed my arbitrary visits for lacking materials.

It is a pleasure to record my thanks to Tanıl Bora for his willingness to help me to get access to some of the most crucial materials for, and sharing his views especially about Chapters 4 and 5.

I also wish to thank Murat Şentürk and Ahmet Yıldız who acted as my METU and TGNA branches and tolerated my repetitive delays. Another form of support was proffered by T.L.E. who motivated the completion of each and every chapter.

A different kind of thanks is due to Nalan Soyarık for sharing the home and being around in times of emergency.

Nazım İrem and Aylin Özman were of utmost help by providing me with both their invaluable friendship and scholarly contribution all throughout this thesis.

My special thanks are due to Fuat Keyman and Ayşe Kadioğlu who have read the first draft and offered me theoretical extensions.

Finally, and most importantly I would like to thank my supervisor, Metin Heper, whose deep understanding and constructive criticisms made this thesis possible.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ÖZET.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	viii
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL BACKDROP.....	14
2.1 State as the Focus of Analysis.....	14
2.2 The State and the Intellectual: The Interface between Institutions and Concepts.....	27
2.2.1 Some Conceptual Clarifications on the Category of the Intellectual.....	28
2.3 State Tradition and Liberal Thought: Towards a Tentative Matrix.....	38
2.3.1 Renaissance and Reformation: 'Man' as the Focus.....	40
2.3.2 Liberal Thought in the English Context: The Cradle of a Tradition.....	42
2.3.2.1 Man, Society and the State: Hobbesian Scheme as the Precedent?.....	42
2.3.2.2 Liberal Thought in a "Stateless" Society.....	46
2.3.3 Liberal Thought Outdoors: The Continental European Experience.....	52
2.3.3.1 Germany: "State Liberalism".....	52
2.3.3.2 France: Liberalism between the Individual and Citizen.....	59
2.4 Concluding Remarks.....	68
CHAPTER III: STATE TRADITION AND THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLECTUAL MIND AND IDENTITY IN THE OTTOMAN CONTEXT.....	71

3.1 The State and Society in the Classical Age of the Ottoman Empire.....	71
3.2 "Institutional Intellectual": From Advisor to Ruler.....	82
3.2.1 The Ottoman Intellectual of "Advise Literature".....	83
3.2.2 A New Identity For the Ottoman Intellectual: Between Tradition and Modernity.....	90
3.3 The New Role of the Intellectual in the Policy Making Process: The Case of <i>Tanzimat</i> .....	92
3.3.1 Intellectuals of Opposition: Press as the New Circle.....	102
3.3.2 The Young Ottomans and Freedom in Tradition.....	105
3.4 The Ottoman Intellectual at the Crossroads: The Emergence of the Platform of Liberal Intellectual.....	109
3.4.1 Liberalism in its Economic Facet.....	109
3.4.2 <i>Prens Sabahaddin</i> : Portrait of a Liberal Intellectual.....	113
3.5 Concluding Remarks.....	118
CHAPTER IV: THE STATE AND INTELLECTUAL OF THE REPUBLIC: CONTINUITY WITHIN CHANGE.....	125
4.1 Early Republican Era: Institutionalization and Nation Building as the Twin Processes of Break with the Past.....	125
4.1.1 Continuity within Change: A New Identity for the State with the Old Mission of Modernization.....	126
4.1.2 The Double Identity of the early Republican Intellectual: Legislator and Transmitter.....	131
4.2 Liberal Identity within the Context of the Attempts at the Construction of Opposition.....	138

4.2.1 State and Opposition in the early Republican Era.....	141
4.2.2 Emergence of the Liberal Opposition...	147
4.2.2.1 Liberal Identity in the Form of Tutelary Opposition.....	150
4.3 Intellectual between the State and Opposition: The Case of Ahmet Ağaoğlu.....	157
4.3.1 Ağaoğlu as the Intellectual in Opposition.....	161
4.3.2 The Intellectual in Search of Liberal Identity.....	162
4.3.3 The Individual in Ağaoğlu's Conceptual Matrix.....	166
4.4 Concluding Remarks.....	168
 CHAPTER V: THE STATE AND INTELLECTUAL IN AN ERA OF 'LIBERALIZATION' (1946-1960).....	173
5.1 The State and Democracy.....	173
5.1.1 The Rise of Opposition: A Replay of the Claims for "Rational Debate"?.....	177
5.1.2 An Organized Liberal Movement as the New Claimant to Democracy.....	182
5.2 The DP on the edge of a New Intellectual Cross-Fertilization.....	188
5.2.1 Evolution from Hesitant Opposition to a Political Identity.....	192
5.2.2 Shortcomings of a Liberal Circle: Immaturity or Past Legacy?.....	202
5.3 The DP Rule (1950-1960): Dissolution of the Liberal Rhetoric.....	208
5.3.1 Intellectual, University and Press: <i>Forum</i> as the 'Missionary' Triangle for Democracy.....	212
5.3.2 Democracy on the Cutting Edge: <i>Forum</i> <i>versus</i> the DP.....	216
5.3.3 From Intellectual Neutrality to	

of the Republic: Rupture or Synthesis?.....	290
6.5 Concluding Remarks.....	295
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION.....	302
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	327

Organized Political Identity.....	225
5.3.4 The Identity of Forum: A "Liberal-Socialist State of Being".....	229
5.4 Concluding Remarks.....	237
CHAPTER VI: THE STATE AND INTELLECTUAL IN POST-1960 ERA: THE ULTIMATE RUPTURE: REPUBLIC OR DEMOCRACY?.....	
242	
6.1 The State and Intellectual in a Joint Task: The 1961 Constitution.....	242
6.1.1 The 1960 Military Intervention.....	243
6.1.2 The 1961 Constitution: The Realization of the 'Utopia'?.....	245
6.2 Liberal Identity in Shades.....	251
6.2.1 The State and Intellectual as the Apostles of Democracy.....	251
6.2.2 <i>Forum</i> : The Victory of Social Democracy over Liberal Ethos.....	252
6.2.3 1961-1979: Demise of Liberal Identity.....	256
6.3 The 1980 Military Intervention and Beyond: The Legacy Continues.....	266
6.3.1 <i>Yeni Forum</i> : Disorder versus Freedom.....	268
6.3.2 Third Constitution of the Turkish Republic: Establishment of a Tradition?.....	271
6.3.3 The Emergence of a Negative Discourse.....	277
6.4 From <i>Yeni Forum</i> to <i>Liberal Düşünce</i> : A "Spontaneous" Formation?.....	280
6.4.1 The Universal Shaping the National: Intellectual of the Liberal International...	282
6.4.2 Identity of the Turkish Liberal Intellectual in the 1990s: A Scheme of Priorities.....	287
6.4.3 The Liberal Ethos versus the Democracy	

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Turkish Republican history has epitomized a pattern of modernization one encounters in a late-comer society.<sup>1</sup> Not unlike the other late-modernizing countries,<sup>2</sup> in the Turkish context, too, modernization has been perceived as a task to be fulfilled. It basically meant Westernization first in the institutional structure of authority and subsequently in the value system of the society. While the state has been the vanguard in this process of all-out change the intellectual turned out to be its main medium as regards the transmission of the changes from the institutional level to the society. In the pursuit of this task the intellectual has been preoccupied with legitimatizing changes at the institutional level with recourse to the society.

However, the Turkish case did not evince a smooth process of modernization. Aside from the tension inherent in the task of modernization,<sup>3</sup> the tension between the authority and intellectual which for Edward Shils is by

---

<sup>1</sup>. The term late-comer is borrowed from Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 9 (3) (April 1967), 291-346.

<sup>2</sup>. S. N. Eisenstadt, Wilbert E. Moore and Neil J. Smelser eds., *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966); Eisenstadt, "Post-Traditional Societies and the Continuity and Reconstruction of Tradition." *Daedalus*, 102 (1) (Winter 1973), 1-27; Edward Shils, *The Intellectuals and Powers and Other Essays* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), 335-467.

<sup>3</sup>. Eisenstadt, "Post-Traditional Societies and the Continuity and Reconstruction of Tradition."



definition prevalent,<sup>4</sup> forms one of the intriguing factors which have led the conduct of the present study. This congenital tension became all the more interesting in the Turkish context where the state has long constituted the locus of authority, whilst it also framed the object of intellectual vocation. Thus, the general framework of the study is drawn along the boundaries of the state-intellectual relationship in a modernizing context—Turkey.

The intellectual, as a category, has generally been studied as co-emergent with the transition to modernity.<sup>5</sup> In the Western world, the category of intellectual connoted a breakthrough from the religious monopoly over knowledge. The intellectual of modernity has been taken as the possessor of an alternative medium of knowledge and formulator of universal values to provide the basis for the best form of order in society. Zygmunt Bauman has summarized this transformation while attributing the intellectuals of modernity the identity of legislators.<sup>6</sup> This new identity has accompanied the rise of the modern state, and the two were joined within the process of modernization. The process of modernization which characterized the Western historical development roughly from the sixteenth century onwards took on a new display

---

<sup>4</sup>. Shils, *The Intellectuals and Powers and Other Essays*, 17-8.

<sup>5</sup>. Eisenstadt, "Intellectuals and Tradition," *Daedalus*, 101 (Spring 1972), 1-19; Shils, *The Intellectuals and Powers and Other Essays*; Ron Eyerman, *Between Culture and Politics* (UK: Polity Press, 1994).

<sup>6</sup>. Zygmunt Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987).

on the non-Western lands, ultimately turning into a project to be accomplished.

It is in this instance that the relevance of the intellectuals comes to the agenda since they have been perceived as the constructors of the new universe of modernity. The tension that is inherent in the course of modernization has gained a second dimension in the non-Western context since the intellectuals experienced a dichotomous disposition of denying the past (read as tradition) on the one hand, and formulating a ground of reconciliation between the tradition with the requisites for the achievement of modernity, on the other. Thus, if the state-intellectual relationship in a modernizing context forms the broader framework upon which this study has been drawn, the tense milieu that has ensued furnishes the contours of its topic of interest.

Specifically, the study focuses on the Turkish liberal intellectual with a view to defining his relation with the state. Throughout the text, a tripodal analysis is carried out. One aspect has arisen out of the emphasis on the overwhelming prevalence of state in the analyses of Turkish politics. A second aspect concerns the intellectuals of the Republic who have been assigned a missionary role in the Turkish modernization within the limits of their identity, predetermined by the state. The third aspect is related to the rather pendulous disposition of the liberal intellectual between his identification with the state and the universalistic claims that shape his liberal discourse, and thus to the

limits of liberal thinking in Turkey. The aim is to analyze the emergence of and (dis)continuity in Turkish liberal thinking with a view to Turkish modernization which in Eisenstadt's terminology corresponds to "split-up modernization," characterized by the existence of more than one way to modernity,<sup>7</sup> as well as to unravel the liberal discourse in the specific social constellation of Turkey.<sup>8</sup> Throughout the work the discourse of the liberal intellectual is studied as symbolizing "the historical unfolding of Turkish liberal intellectual through the interplay of tradition, role, and context."<sup>9</sup>

A study which takes Turkish intellectual as its central category faces a number of problems. Apart from the general unease in reaching a precise definition of the intellectual, this is partly because of my personal experience that almost every individual with higher education in Turkey proclaims himself to be an intellectual. A second and more intractable problem is the difficulty to reach a consensus on a unique definition of the intellectual. In this work the problem is partly avoided by resort to the Shilsian term "institutional intellectual," which refers to those intellectuals in state service, higher institutions of

---

<sup>7</sup>. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change*, 67-9.

<sup>8</sup>. According to Karl Mannheim no individual can totally be free from the particular societal constellations and thus one has to search for social bases of opinion. Mannheim, "The Problem of the Intelligentsia: An Inquiry into its Past and Present Role," in *Essays on the Sociology of Culture*, ed. Bryan S. Turner (London: Routledge, 1992), 91-166.

<sup>9</sup>. Eyerman, *Between Culture and Politics*, ix.

learning, and professionalized fields of study.<sup>10</sup> The analysis of Turkish liberal intellectuals gives rise to a number of problems, due to the rather contentious meaning of the term "liberal." In the Turkish context the term is often used with reference to the sphere of economy, and hence the self-assured consistency of those political parties that assumed a "liberal-conservative" identity. This conceptual confusion is very well summarized in the phrase "liberal fallacy," coined by a social scientist in Turkey, in a critical evaluation of the conventional tendency in the approach to Turkish liberalism.<sup>11</sup>

In the studies on Turkish political thought which are in fact extremely scarce, the recourse has always been to modernization as the central theme of analysis. This has turned the liberal thought into a sub-topic. More briefly, rather than directly focusing on the discourse of liberal intellectuals, there has been a tendency for selective analysis.<sup>12</sup> The present study is

---

<sup>10</sup>. Shils, "Intellectuals and responsibility," in *The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals*, eds. Ian Maclean, Alan Montefiore and Peter Winch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 257-307.

<sup>11</sup>. Nilüfer Göle, "Liberal Yanılgı," (Liberal Fallacy) *Türkiye Günlüğü* (24) (Fall 1993), 12-7.

<sup>12</sup>. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri (Westernization Movements in Turkish Political Life)* (İstanbul: Yedigün Matbaası, 1960); Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University, 1964); Berkes, "Batı Düşünü ve Türkiye." in *Felsefe ve Toplum Bilim Yazıları (Articles on Philosophy and Social Science)* (İstanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1985), 166-8; Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi: Makaleler IV (Turkish Modernization: Articles IV)*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992); Ali Erkul, "Prens Sabahattin," in *Türk Toplum Bilimcileri (Turkish Social Scientists)*, ed. Emre Kongar, vol. 1 (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1982), 83-150; Süleyman Seyfi Öğün, "Bir Türkçü-İslamcı Eklemleme Figürü Olarak Ağaoğlu Ahmet" (Ağaoğlu Ahmet as a Turkist-Islamist Articulation Figure), in *Modernleşme, Milliyetçilik ve Türkiye (Modernization, Nationalism and Turkey)* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1995), 195-203.

original since it attempts to arrive at a liberal tradition and pinpoint its (dis)continuities throughout the Republican era, with a view to the intellectuals as the formulators of a specific liberal discourse in Turkey. In a way, the burden of the study is to invert the general tendency noted above by employing modernization as an analytical tool in understanding Turkish liberal thought.

Apart from that, in relation to the above-mentioned fallacy, the studies which have incorporated an analysis of Turkish liberalism tended to refute the existence of and/or a potential for the survival of liberal discourse in the Turkish context. This has led to either focusing merely on evolution of economic liberalism,<sup>13</sup> or ending up with a negation concerning the flourishing of a genuinely liberal identity in Turkey.<sup>14</sup> In contrast, drawing upon Andrew Vincent's classification of approaches to liberalism, the present study analyzes Turkish liberal discourse as a theme specific to a particular national tradition while also reserving its reference to the distinction between Continental and British liberalisms.<sup>15</sup> Thus, it approaches the discourse of those intellectuals who proclaim to be liberals with a view to both their Western reference points as well as their contextual considerations and tries to avoid any surrender to the

---

<sup>13</sup>. Tefrik Çavdar, *Türkiye'de Liberalizm (1860-1990) (Liberalism in Turkey (1860-1990))* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1992).

<sup>14</sup>. Ahmet Insel, *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı (Crisis of Turkish Society)* (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1990), 78-90;

<sup>15</sup>. Andrew Vincent, "Liberalism," in *Modern Political Ideologies* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1992), 24-5. Vincent adds two more sets of approaches as class-based and constitutionalist approach.

impasse of preoccupation with an ought-to-be liberal identity. An additional concern is with discerning the unconscious inheritance of the past generations' dispositions by the self-proclaimed liberal intellectuals in the subsequent periods of Turkish Republic (1923-1990) under study.

Chapter II takes up the three theoretical dimensions employed in this study. The focus derives from the selective aspects of Western liberalism as displayed in the related intellectual discourse, from the perspective of state-centric theory. A comparative analysis of liberal thought as regards the British example on the one hand and Continental European one on the other, is provided. In this respect, while the main terminological tools such as state tradition, stateness, and statelessness, which are employed in this work are clarified, the legacy of (non)existence of state tradition and/or the influence of a society high/low in stateness in the specificity of an intellectual layout in a particular context is unraveled. More briefly, the state-intellectual relationship is taken as the determining factor in the flourishing and evolution of liberal thought on a contextual and periodical basis. In the meantime, it should also be noted that due to the rather contentious nature of liberal identity, attention is placed more on concepts grounded in contexts rather than individual liberal thinkers.

Chapter III aims at establishing the historical framework for the analysis in the following chapters

within the context of state-intellectual relationship in the Ottoman Empire, especially after the inception of the *Tanzimat* era. The period was selected deliberately since the effect of modernity on the intellectual sphere was first concretized in the *Tanzimat* Charter (1839). The period is also important because it hosted the emergence of the first proclaimers of liberal identity among Western-minded Ottoman intellectuals. Throughout the chapter, the main thesis of this study is substantiated with observations concerning the legacy of a state tradition on the conceptual matrix of the intellectuals. The clue is found in the overwhelming concern of the Ottoman intellectuals with "how to save the state." A by-interest is spared for the internal tensions that the Western-minded Ottoman intellectuals experienced due to their internalization of the critical disposition of their Western counterparts on the one hand and their self-identification with the state, on the other. Particular attention is given to *Prens Sabahaddin* as displaying the portrait of a liberal intellectual as well as of a more or less unorthodox Ottoman intellectual, due to his aloofness from active engagement in state service. All in all, the aim is to draw the historically determining factors which destined the Ottoman-Turkish liberal discourse to be perceived as a sub-title under the grand topic of modernization as a project, as well as limited its conceptual matrix to statist concerns.

Chapter IV searches the (dis)continuities in state-intellectual relationship in a period of a proclaimed

break with the past that was epitomized in the task of nation-building (1923-1946). The period is important since it witnessed the employment of liberal discourse not only in the first attempts to form relatively independent political opposition, but also in the formation of loyal opposition by the state. Special attention is given to the writings and political activities of Ahmet Ağaoğlu, a self-proclaimed liberal intellectual as an illuminative example of liberal identity in a period when the state tradition was crystallized into a strong state. An additional aim that can be discerned between the lines is to substantiate the observation about the liberal intellectuals throughout the Republican era concerning their pendulous proclivity to sustain their identification with the state on the one hand, and to situate themselves in opposition, on the other, which furnished them with an on the edge identity.

Chapter V analyzes the simultaneity in the evolution in Turkish political life which experienced a definitive transition to multi-party politics (1946-1960), and in the intellectual sphere toward Anglo-American model. The period is marked with the consolidation of the Anglo-American cross-fertilization both at the institutional level and in the Turkish intellectual layout. The period is also important, since it signified the solidification of a new topic of debate between the state and the intellectuals, that is democracy, which however did not mutate the general relationship between them. Thus, during the era in question, state-intellectual



relationship displayed indecisive controversy and conjunction this time around the theme of democracy. By a periodic categorization between 1946-1950 and 1950-1960, the Chapter is designed to establish the impasse, particularly of the liberal intellectual of the Republic who was squeezed between the state and his theoretical framework. Apart from searching for the consequences of such a disposition, the chapter also problematizes the yet-to-be constituted consistency in the liberal identity for almost forty years of Turkish Republic, as best exemplified in the inconclusiveness of such liberal initiatives as the Association for the Dissemination of Free Ideas, and the limits of the liberal identity of the *Forum* group.

Chapter VI covers the period between 1960-1990 followed by some tentative remarks on the 1990s. The period between 1960 and 1990 is studied with a view to the rather debilitating evolution of the liberal identity as first represented in the *Forum* group, despite their initial applause for the 1961 Constitution as embracing the long-aspired liberal premises, and then in the writings of Aydın Yalçın and lastly in *Yeni Forum* group organized under his leadership. The main topic of interest is shaped around the evolution of a liberal identity in a society high-in-stateness alongside with a preoccupation to search for the contours of a tradition of a liberal appearance. The Chapter takes the post-1960 *Forum* discourse which was ironically expressed in the phrase *via media*-due to the dynamics of the period-, as

exemplifying the victory of the 'socialist' identity to the detriment of its 'liberal' companion. The growing aggressiveness in the statist discourse of Aydın Yalçın after a hesitant political display between active politics and missionary intellectual disposition to the detriment of the former, especially in his writings in *Yeni Forum*, which in the final analysis left no room for a liberal identity, are viewed in terms of state-centric approach. The problem of the tacit negation of a liberal precedent by each generation of intellectuals who have assumed a liberal identity, is surpassed by a recourse to their past links as well as their disposition *vis-à-vis* the state. The Western cross-fertilization is additionally employed as a tool in substantiating the logic of analysis. Thus, as far as the post-1990 period is concerned, *Liberal Düşünce* group is analyzed as an attempt by the liberal intellectual to eradicate the tension that has been prevalent in the liberal identity throughout the Republican era. The assumed *nouveaux* identity of the group with its self-proclamation of a genuinely liberal standing for the first time in Turkish Republican history, is examined with a view to the eventual boredom on the part of the liberal intellectual with his indecisive disposition between the state and political opposition. Care is taken not to reach definitive absolute conclusions about this last generation of Turkish liberal intellectuals. Instead, the breaks introduced by the conceptual matrix of these *nouveaux* liberal intellectuals from the preceding decades

are observed within the broader framework of an institutional restructuring in the post-1980 period that brought with it a narrower locus for a stronger state. An equivalently meticulous attention is employed to elaborate the potential of their all out universalism to fall into abstractionism. It also aimed at initiating a critical view to the probable consequences of their almost monopolistic claim over comprehension of the one and only liberal theory.

All in all, throughout the study, the focus is on the emergence(s) of the liberal identity in the Ottoman-Turkish context with special reference to (dis)continuities between the state-intellectual relationship. The rather indecisive evolution that has been displayed by the topic of interest throughout the Republican era engendered a particular hardship in the conduct of the study. However, the consistency in the internal tension experienced by the Turkish liberal intellectual as well as in his rather ambivalent disposition *vis-à-vis* the state in the context of a society high-in-stateness provided the main escaping gates for the author. Lastly, a supportive ease is offered by a wider perspective which legitimized the problem-loaded nature of studying liberalism in general, since there are more than one liberalisms. Thus, at the risk of repetition, it is tempting to state that the present study pursues a comparative historical account of the liberal identity as framed in intellectual discourse. Throughout the text, the intellectual and the state

and/or the intellectual *vis-à-vis* the state in the Turkish political scheme forms the sketch against which a liberal identity is established. In the chapters that follow the liberal identity seems somehow to be treated as behind the scenes. This arises out of the fact that in the Turkish context, the identity and the conceptual matrix of the intellectual has to a great extent been influenced by the nature of the state.

## CHAPTER II

### THEORETICAL BACKDROP

#### THE STATE AS FOCUS OF ANALYSIS

In his chapter, "Do We Need a Theory of the State?" where he provides a brief account of different approaches to the state, Andrew Vincent has concluded that every theory has a different conceptualization of the state.<sup>1</sup> This remark connotes the difficulty of developing a universal theory of the state. In this respect, consideration of history as an analytical tool has been proposed as a remedy for theory in explaining different types of the state across countries.<sup>2</sup> This is the same as questioning the sufficiency of existing theories of the state.<sup>3</sup> The underlying schema of the studies from the late-1960s onwards which take the state as the focus of analysis, have been formulated on this account of insufficiency.

Most studies on the theory of the state which originate from this problematique of universalization,

---

<sup>1</sup>. Andrew Vincent, *Theories of the State* (Oxford, New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 219-25.

<sup>2</sup>. Vincent, *Theories of the State*.

<sup>3</sup>. David Held et al., *States and Societies* (UK: Basil Blackwell, 1983); Roger King, *The State in Modern Society: New Directions in Political Sociology* (Chatham New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers Inc., 1986); Martin Carnoy, "Whither Theories of the State?," in *The State and Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 246-61.

attempt to provide a classification. In this respect, Andrew Vincent has offered a broad categorization between juristic/normative and sociological/historical approaches.<sup>4</sup> Starting from the same premise David Held has employed specific political approaches, determining the particular way in which the state is both conceptualized and evaluated as an observed empirical institution. More briefly, Held has distinguished between liberalism, liberal democracy, Marxism and political sociology.<sup>5</sup> In his overview of political sociology Roger King has taken the state as the center of his analysis and outlined the development of the relevant literature with respect to changes in approaching the state. King has taken the lack of emphasis on state as a weakness of orthodox political sociology.<sup>6</sup>

Likewise, in the 1970s many studies on the state which arose from different theoretical frameworks have begun to present shifts in their conceptualization of the state. The most exemplary one can be observed in the structuralist variant of neo-Marxist literature.<sup>7</sup> Roughly, the structural approach responded to the problem of

---

4. Vincent, *Theories of the State*.

5. Held et al., *States and Societies*, 2-3.

6. King, *The State in Modern Society*.

7. For an analysis of the neo-Marxist writings see Bob Jessop, "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, (1977), 1 (4), 353-73. See also Philip Resnick, "The functions of the modern state: in search of a theory," in *The State in Global Perspective*, ed. Ali Kazancigil (UK and USA: Gower Publishing Company Ltd., 1986), 155-83; David Held and Joel Krieger, "Accumulation, Legitimation and the State: the Ideas of Clauss Offe and Jürgen Habermas," in *States and Societies*, eds. Held et al. (UK: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1983), 487-97; Carnoy, "Whither Theories of the State?."

explaining the growing interventionist capacity<sup>8</sup> of the state with the concept of "relative autonomy."<sup>9</sup> The state is accorded with the "objective function" of sustaining the capitalist structure.<sup>10</sup> It is also acknowledged that in the pursuit of such a task, the policies of the state may run counter not only to the interests of the dominated classes but also to those of the capitalist class itself, since it is presumed to act in the "common interest of all members of a *capitalist class* society,"<sup>11</sup> and that is interpreted as the relative autonomy of the state. However, here one should not overlook the fact that the state in itself is not employed as an explanatory category, but still as dependent on the peculiar social factors.<sup>12</sup> It is again located within the framework of a theory, rather than forming a theory in itself. Thus, the tendency to employ the social and/or economic factors as the main variable and continue from thereon remains unchanged. The changes were conducted not in the approach to the state as such. Instead, the state was continued to be perceived as merely an arena for or an instrument of the groups or classes in society which are taken to be the main actors on the historical stage.

---

<sup>8</sup>. Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," in *States in History*, ed. John A. Hall (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986), 113-36. Anthony Giddens, "The Modern State," in *Sociology: A Brief But Critical Introduction* (London: Macmillan, 1982), 77-96.

<sup>9</sup>. Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State."

<sup>10</sup>. Jessop, "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," 358.

<sup>11</sup>. Claus Offe and Volker Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State," *New German Critique* (1975), 6, 139.

<sup>12</sup>. Jessop, *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 79-104; Giddens, "The Modern State," 82-3.

Despite the divergence in the theories of the state, as regards its definition, Vincent has proposed a common denominator. Whatever it is, the state is identified in terms of the category of public power.<sup>13</sup> This category is significant for the purposes of this study since it forms the central theme of its referential theoretical framework -i.e., the state-centric approach. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, studies conducted within this framework have initiated a methodological shift in the field of political science. Contrary to the orthodox trend in state theory, this strand of analysis has taken the state as the parameter in the analysis of societies. The presumption was that state is an independent and determining figure in the social, economic and political spheres. In this respect, autonomy and sovereignty are taken as the identifying features of the state.

Nourishing on the Weberian approach to the state as "a distinct institution within society,"<sup>14</sup> the state-centric approach goes one step further with respect to the autonomy and the independence of the state from economic and social factors. While its predecessor acknowledges the prerequisite of a certain type of economy - i.e., capitalist economy -<sup>15</sup> for the sustenance of the state as such, the new approach holds that the state should be taken into account as an "organizational

---

<sup>13</sup>. Vincent, *Theories of the State*, 218.

<sup>14</sup>. Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 17.

<sup>15</sup>. Ibid.



configuration," in the analysis of political, social and economic developments.<sup>16</sup>

Interpreted as "Tocquevillian" by Theda Skocpol, state along this line of analysis is viewed as an organization with a composition of its own and hence possessing an eventual capacity to affect the social, political and economic dynamics with a potential disregard of all the forces out of its own structure.<sup>17</sup> Skocpol has elaborated such a standing as "organizational" and "realist."<sup>18</sup> In other words, there is neither a question about the grounds on which the state can found its legitimacy,<sup>19</sup> nor a preoccupation to analyze the structure of the state on the basis of social and economic determinants. The concern is neither with how the state acquires and utilizes power within a specific economic structure -which is the case in Marxist writings- nor with the "strength" and/or "weakness" of the state to be analyzed on the grounds of state capacities -which is the case in neo-Weberian writings.<sup>20</sup> Instead, the perception of the state as autonomous by definition leads to a concern with the existence of the state-as-such, and the way this affects the polity,

---

<sup>16</sup>. Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in *Bringing the State Back In*, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 27.

<sup>17</sup>. Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 20-1, 28. This standing is also elaborated in Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 3-43.

<sup>18</sup>. Ibid., 31.

<sup>19</sup>. Ibid., 31-3.

<sup>20</sup>. Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, "On the Road toward a More Adequate Understanding of the State," in *Bringing the State Back In*, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 351-2.

society and economy.<sup>21</sup> In this instance, the term autonomy connotes an idea and practice of the state which is an organization in its own right, independent from any other social and/or economic body, in the formulation of the principles and objectives of its activities.<sup>22</sup> Thus, taking the state as the starting point of analysis leads one to study the state as it is, rather than formulating conceptions of a 'better' state.

The pioneering work in this strand was provided by J.P. Nettl, who has provided a framework for state-centric analysis.<sup>23</sup> In his analysis, he has employed the term "statelessness" for societies which lack the experience with the state-as-such.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, according to Nettl where the state has been autonomous and determinative *vis-à-vis* the society, one can talk about societies high in stateness.<sup>25</sup> In such societies the state is autonomous in delineating the principles, objectives and the functioning of politics. Politics is run by the predefined principles by the state which are not necessarily determined in accordance with the flow of demands from the society.<sup>26</sup>

Nettl has explicated the concept of stateness on the grounds of a set of criterion as the

---

21. Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 3-44.

22. Pierre Birnbaum, "State, Center and Bureaucracy," *Government and Opposition*, 16 (1981), 58-77.

23. J.P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics*, 20, (4), (July 1968), 303-33.

24. *Ibid.*, 304-5.

25. *Ibid.*, 308-12.

26. This corresponds to the sovereignty of the state *vis-à-vis* the society. Birnbaum, "State, Center and Bureaucracy."

institutionalization of sovereignty, centralization of administration, and state dominion in the legal sphere.<sup>27</sup>

To begin with, institutionalization of sovereignty means that sovereignty of the state is impersonal and pertinent to all individuals. This impersonality ascribes the state a distinct institutional identity. In other words, it is not the sum total of state officials or different state branches. On the contrary, the state officials are identified in terms of their particular roles within the state structure.<sup>28</sup> Additionally, Nettl has pointed at the distinctive body of rules and regulations which determine the running of administrative processes in societies high in stateness. The administrative law delineates the sphere of function of the state, while the latter is the ultimate determiner in its formulation and execution.<sup>29</sup> When the last criterion, that is the legal sphere is taken into account, one again faces the state, as possessing the authority to establish legal norms and influencing the running of the judicial system. The fact that law is provided with no sphere of its own outside that of the state is also reflected in the self-perception of the legal professionals as the "state servants."<sup>30</sup>

In the reading of state-centric approach, one eventually sees the inherent link between the concept of modern state and the concept of state tradition and/or

---

<sup>27</sup>. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," 319-25.

<sup>28</sup>. Ibid., pp. 319-22.

<sup>29</sup>. Ibid., pp. 320-2.

<sup>30</sup>. Ibid., pp. 322-3.

stateness. As noted above, the term stateness connotes a categorization of the societies with respect to the autonomy of the state as an institution both conceptually and empirically. The criteria that are used for assessing the different degrees of stateness among various countries overlap with those in the formulation of the conceptual matrix of the modern state, as far as its presumed distinctiveness, both structurally (corresponds to autonomy) and functionally (corresponds to sovereignty), is concerned.<sup>31</sup> The connection is further clarified in *Theories of the State*, whereby Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary have summarized the basic characteristics of the (modern) state.<sup>32</sup> In this respect, the (modern) state is presumed to have a specific institutional structure which imposes a standard identity on all the state officials—whose recruitment is based on the prerequisite of specialization. The institutional distinctiveness of the state also ensures the separation between public and private realms and endows the state with final authority in the public realm. This distinct institutional identity also applies to the officials within the state structure.<sup>33</sup> In a similar vein, Held has also referred to state as a modern concept constructed on the development of European political system from the sixteenth century onwards.<sup>34</sup> In his work, *The State: Its Nature, Development and*

---

<sup>31</sup>. Birnbaum, "State, Center and Bureaucracy."

<sup>32</sup>. Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary eds., *Theories of the State* (Hampshire and London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1987).

<sup>33</sup>. Ibid., 2.

<sup>34</sup>. Held et.al., *States and Societies*, 1.

*Prospects*, Gianfranco Poggi has provided an historical analysis of the development of the state, tracing its origins back to the decline of feudalism. Poggi has not used the concept of the state in the case of those political structures predating the experience with what is termed as the modern state, and thus put reserve on the use of the term "modern."<sup>35</sup> More briefly, the state as one form of the institutionalization of political power is itself taken as a modern phenomenon that came into being along with such other modern concepts as the individual, citizenship, nation, and bureaucracy.<sup>36</sup>

Above all, the concept of the modern state includes an idea and practice of political rule by a territorially defined, centralized and autonomous institution with control over the population.<sup>37</sup> Such a definition is adopted in state-centric studies of state. However, this link (with the modern state) can mislead one to view the state-centric approach as ahistorical. Here, the inclusion of the historical dimension into the methodology comes into help with its emphasis on state tradition -i.e., whether there is an historical experience with public power which assumes itself a distinct identity over and above the society.<sup>38</sup> All these studies are also important methodologically in the sense that they put the state under an historical-sociological focus in the explanation of the distinguishing features

---

<sup>35</sup>. Gianfranco Poggi, *The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects* (UK: Polity Press, 1990).

<sup>36</sup>. *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>37</sup>. Badie and Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*, 152, fn. 2.

<sup>38</sup>. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," 308-12.

of societies. The common point is the acknowledgement of the difficulty of a unique theorization, applying to all cases of modern states arising out of different historical, cultural and international contexts. The concern is more with the searching of differences to explain peculiarities of societies, than with reaching a universal categorization.

In Nettl's terminology, alongside with historical experience, cultural and intellectual dimensions are employed in the analysis of the degree of stateness.<sup>39</sup> As far as the historical dimension is concerned, the question is whether the society historically has a state tradition. At the cultural level the question is more complex in the sense that it has to do with the way people perceive the state and define its identity and functions. Nettl searches the criterion in the everyday language of the individuals, which he views as one way of access to political culture. Similarly referring to state as "...an everyday reality"<sup>40</sup> among other things, Vincent has also emphasized the distinction between those societies where the state has become "...a customary disposition" and those where it has been perceived functionally, as merely a set of institutions.<sup>41</sup> Last but not the least, the intellectual dimension dwells upon the question whether there has been a theoretical preoccupation with the phenomenon of state, and the way

---

<sup>39</sup>. Ibid., 313-8.

<sup>40</sup>. Vincent, *Theories of the State*, 2-3.

<sup>41</sup>. Ibid., 219.

it has been employed in the studies on society and polity.

Inspired from this framework, Badie and Birnbaum have applied the historical perspective in the study of state and took its analysis to the realm of sociology with the premise that state is itself an actor in the social system, but not necessarily a derivative of social factors.<sup>42</sup> On the contrary, Birnbaum has argued that the emergence of the state itself should be taken as the determining factor in re-shaping the peculiar socio-cultural and religious context from which it has arisen.<sup>43</sup> Again, the state as a universal concept is avoided, and its emergence is linked to particular historical contexts.<sup>44</sup> In other words, the assumption is that there is no unique pattern for the development of state which applies to all the societies. Rather, it is due to such historical contingencies in each society, as the need to provide social cohesiveness and/or detrimental external threat, and that the experience with the state differs from one society to another.<sup>45</sup>

In this respect, Badie and Birnbaum have distinguished between the state and the center. The distinction is based on the (lack of) experience of state tradition in different societies. Briefly, the assumption is that one can talk about center in those societies

---

<sup>42</sup>. Badie and Birnbaum, "Sociology of the state revisited," *International Social Science Journal* (June 1994) (140), 153-67.

<sup>43</sup>. Birnbaum, "States, ideologies and collective action in Western Europe," *International Social Science Journal*, 32 (4) (1980), 671.

<sup>44</sup>. Badie and Birnbaum, "Sociology of the State Revisited."

<sup>45</sup>. Badie and Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*.

which have been historically capable of sustaining social order themselves, and hence the sphere of function of the institutions of power has been limited to one of coordination.<sup>46</sup> The argument is elaborated by the examples of England and France. Badie and Birnbaum have taken England as the example for those societies whereby a center, but no "true state"<sup>47</sup> exists. On the other hand, the French state provides the most suitable case for those societies with high level of stateness. Such a modeling is linked to a wide range of historical peculiarities, as the need to organize a standing army, of the ever-continuing state hand in the organization and running of the economy, and of a distinct body of administrators -the precedents of modern bureaucracy- with exclusive power over the society.<sup>48</sup>

As far as the criteria adopted by Nettl in his analysis of the level of stateness are concerned, the British case again stands as an example of societies low in stateness, while France stands on the other side of the spectrum. Specifically, in Britain there has been a strict separation between the administrative apparatus and the sphere of politics. This was enhanced by the prerequisite of resignation for the civil servants from political posts in order to run for office. The sphere of politics has been exclusively reserved to the

---

<sup>46</sup>. Badie and Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*, 103.

<sup>47</sup>. Ibid., 121-34. It should be noted that Birnbaum and Badie have employed the concepts of "true state," and "strong state" interchangeably; Badie and Birnbaum, "Sociology of the state revisited," 158.

<sup>48</sup>. Badie and Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*, 105-15.



representative government, which fits well in the dominant concept of the minimal state. On the contrary, in France, the administration has had dominance over the politics through administrative law, whereby the mobility between the administrative and political posts was a common phenomenon. Apart from that, the English legal system has to a great extent been based on common law, a body of rules piled up of traditions. It was thus more a product of society rather than of a distinct branch of the state. This again contrasts with the case in France whereby there has been a distinction between public and private law. The public law -the administrative law of the state- has been constituted and regulated by the state itself, and thus ensured state power over society.<sup>49</sup>

In his study on ideological movements, Birnbaum links variations in different countries -particularly France, Germany and England- to the nature of the state experienced historically.<sup>50</sup> The state is again taken "as an independent variable around which the entire social system is molded."<sup>51</sup> Such an analysis also corresponds to the thesis put forth by Nettl that the historical experience with high level of stateness eventually prompts dissensus.<sup>52</sup> This argument is based on the assumption that in societies with low level of stateness, the occupants of ruling posts act more as mediators, than

---

<sup>49</sup>. Ibid., 110-25.

<sup>50</sup>. Birnbaum, "States, ideologies and collective action in Western Europe," 671-86.

<sup>51</sup>. Ibid., 672.

<sup>52</sup>. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," 312.

as law-givers and regulators, which result in the resolution of conflicts through consensual procedure. On the contrary, in societies with high levels of stateness, the discontent of the masses or part of the masses are presumed to result in a dissensual positioning against the ensured sovereignty of the state.<sup>53</sup>

Another study on the state is provided by Kenneth H. F. Dyson. Dyson has indulged in an historical analysis of the emergence of the state -both conceptually and in practice-, on a comparative basis, mainly with respect to the differing Continental European and Anglo-American cases.<sup>54</sup> In addition to the similar line of analysis with the above-sketches studies, Dyson has specifically dwelled on the intellectual tradition of the state, which is of ultimate importance for this study, since it highlights the mutual influence of the state on the one hand, and the intellectual layout on the other, with a view to the interaction in between.

#### **THE STATE AND THE INTELLECTUAL: THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS AND CONCEPTS**

When noting the necessity of integration of history with philosophy in studying the state, Vincent has relied on the state as more than an "institutional structure," but as a "mental category."<sup>55</sup> In criticizing the Marxist

---

<sup>53</sup>. Birnbaum, "States, ideologies and collective action in Western Europe," 671-86; Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," 322.

<sup>54</sup>. Kenneth H.F. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and Institution* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980).

<sup>55</sup>. Vincent, *Theories of the State*, 219ff.

approach to intellectual work for ignoring the influence of "particular institutionalized types of states," on Theory, Birnbaum has formed the link between these two perceptions of state.<sup>56</sup> In other words, these remarks point that intellectual work in a specific country cannot be isolated from the socio-political milieu in which it arises, and in particular from the nature of the state - which in turn influences the intellectual's conceptualization of the state. In this perspective, the assumption underlying this study is that the peculiar experience with the state both as a concept and as an institution affects the sphere of problematique of a particular strain of thought.

### **Some Conceptual Clarifications on the Category of the Intellectual**

There has been extensive divergence among the arguments around the category of the intellectual. This is very much related to the rather controversial conceptions of the intellectual as regards to his historically commencing actual identity on the one hand, and "ought-to-be" social and political identity, on the other. This controversy has been expressed in two broad and eventually opposing approaches to the intellectual. On one edge stands the terminologically retrospective argument by Julien Benda, which endows the intellectual

---

<sup>56</sup>. Birnbaum, "States, ideologies and collective action in Western Europe," 673ff.

with the engrossment in the interpretation and transmission of the "transcendental truth" and considers the politicization of the intellectual as a "betrayal" to his genuine task.<sup>57</sup> As is the term intellectual, the involvement of the intellectual in political life is a modern phenomenon. In his work "Intellectuals between politics and culture," which has the same spirit with Benda's work, Jerry Scazki has distinguished between the political and cultural intellectual and referred to the latter category as detached from the particularistic conceptions of truth and hence possessing the ideal qualifications for the intellectual as set by Benda.<sup>58</sup>

On the other end is the counter argument by Ernest Gellner that politicization of the intellectual is a natural outcome of his responsibility to the society.<sup>59</sup> This strain of argument holds that the intellectual might be furnished by a political and social identity which does not necessarily avoid his search for the truth, while adding the task of searching for the best order in a particular culture and society. This 'extra' concern denotes a not necessarily distinterested posture towards the political and social concerns of his time. In this respect, the responsibility of the intellectual is

---

<sup>57</sup>. Julien Benda, *The Treason of the Intellectuals*, trans. Richard Aldington (N.Y. And London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1969).

<sup>58</sup>. Jerry Scazki, "Intellectuals between politics and culture," in *The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals*, eds. Ian Maclean, Alan Montefiore and Peter Winch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 247-57.

<sup>59</sup>. Ernest Gellner, "La Trahison de la Trahison des Clercs," in *The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals*, eds. Ian Maclean, Alan Montefiore and Peter Winch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 17-29. See also, Edward Shils, "Intellectuals and responsibility," in *ibid.*, 257-307.

reinterpreted with respect to such particularistic phenomena as the culture, politics and economy that surround him.<sup>60</sup> Nevertheless, the meeting point between the two edges can be found in the attribute of the intellectual as being in a critical quest for and the transmission of the universal truth.

The controversy in different approaches has naturally had connotations for the variety of methods in studying the intellectual as a category. On the one hand, the intellectual may be taken as over and above the historical and structural concerns. In this case, it is standardized with respect to a particular manner of thinking and acting. On the other hand, the study may be structurally oriented. In this case, one should distinguish between the class-based theories which mainly take the class identity of the intellectual as the starting point,<sup>61</sup> and those which adopt a more comprehensive approach in relating the disposition(s) of

---

<sup>60</sup>. For an analysis of works of Marx, C. Wright Mills and Naom Chomsky along this line, see Kurt H. Wolff, "The Intellectual Between Culture and Politics," in *The World of Intellectuals*, eds. Dharam Vir and B.P. Sharma (New Delhi: Classical Publishing Co., 1990), 119-32. For an historical analysis of the different functions -read as responsibilities- attributed to the intellectual see Andrew Ross, "Defenders of the Faith and the New Class," in *Intellectuals: Aesthetics, Politics and Academics*, ed. Bruce Robbins (USA: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 101-32. For a series of comparative questions and proposed answers for the role of the intellectual with a view to the peculiarities of the pre-modern and modern epochs see, R. Radhakrishnan, "Toward an Effective Intellectual," in *The World of Intellectuals*, eds. Vir and Sharma (New Delhi: Classical Publishing Co., 1990), 57-99.

<sup>61</sup>. For a recent contribution on the collection of the class-based analysis of the intellectuals of the modern epoch see Bruce Robbins ed., *Intellectuals: Aesthetics, Politics and Academics* (USA: University of Minnesota Press, 1990); Eyerman, Lennart G. Svensson, Thomas Söderqvist eds., *Intellectuals, Universities and the State in Modern Societies* (California: University of California Press, 1987).

the intellectual to historically arisen social situations.

As far as the second perspective is concerned the leading works have been provided by Karl Mannheim. Beginning with a particularistic conception of the intellectual, preoccupied with the "...interpretation of the world for a specific society,"<sup>62</sup> Mannheim has asserted that no individual can totally be free from the particular societal constellations, and thus, one has to search for the social bases of opinion. More briefly, what is more pertinent is searching for the historical and social conditions under which the intellectual formulates his disposition, rather than analyzing strains of thought at an abstract level.<sup>63</sup> Relatedly, the role and function of the intellectual varies along with the historical and social peculiarities. On the other hand, apart from the wider social configurations which surround the intellectual and are free of him, Mannheim has also introduced such side factors as the social background, reference group, prevalent occupational standing, decisive in the analysis of the intellectual as category.<sup>64</sup> In this respect, even the "detached" or "unattached" intellectual is analyzed from this

---

<sup>62</sup>. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (San Diego, New York and London: HBJ Publishers, 1985), 6.

<sup>63</sup>. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*; Mannheim, "The Problem of the Intelligentsia: An Inquiry into Its Past and Present Role," in *Essays on the Sociology of Culture*, ed. Bryan S. Turner (London: Routledge, 1992), 91-166.

<sup>64</sup>. Mannheim, "The Problem of the Intelligentsia," 158.

perspective without relegating his indifference to his opinions in an isolated cognitive process.<sup>65</sup>

Along the same line Ron Eyerman has provided an historical analysis of the intellectual with a view to three interlinked spheres, namely cognitive, institutional and self-referential.<sup>66</sup> In this respect, Eyerman has tried to escape from a static definition of and role ascription to the intellectual. In its stead, he has analyzed the "intellectual as an emergent role constructed by actors out of cultural traditions in historical contexts."<sup>67</sup>

By and large, the term intellectual has been taken as the by-product of modernity, when knowledge was transformed from being a value in itself, to a means for alternative mediums of power.<sup>68</sup> In line with developments throughout the age of Enlightenment and thenceforth, the term was assigned to those societal groups which held the monopoly of access to knowledge outside the religious sphere. However, when viewed from a wider perspective - i.e., according to the common denominator of intellectual activity - as the one who "...is inclusively preoccupied with reaching to and disseminating the facts about the

---

<sup>65</sup>. Ibid.; Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 153-64.

<sup>66</sup>. Ron Eyerman, *Between Culture and Politics: Intellectuals in Modern Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 20.

<sup>67</sup>. Ibid., ix.

<sup>68</sup>. According to the commonly held view the term intellectual was first used with political connotations during the Dreyfuss Affair with a rather negative sense to refer to those petitioners who supported Dreyfuss. See Seymour M. Lipset and Asoke Baseu, "Intellectual Types and Political Roles," in *The Idea of Social Structure, Papers in Honor of Robert M. Kerton*, ed. Lewis A. Coser 1975; Eyerman, Svensson, Söderqvist eds., *Intellectuals, Universities and the State in Modern Societies* (California: University of California Press, 1987), 1.

man, society and universe,"<sup>69</sup> the term also becomes pertinent for the pre-Enlightenment ecclesiastics who had claimed to be the sole authority of the worldly and divine knowledge. However, by putting an end to the monopoly of the church over knowledge the intellectual of the Enlightenment took over the claim of the former to decide about the universal values to provide the basis for the best form of order in the society.<sup>70</sup> It is in this respect that Zygmunt Bauman has referred to the intellectual of the Enlightenment as the "legislator."<sup>71</sup>

Although he has comfortably been assigned the identity of legislator, the intellectual has always had a rather uneasy relation with Power. Edward Shils has summarized this uneasy relation in "the tension between the intellectuals and the powers -their urge to submit to authority as the bearer of the highest good, whether it be order or progress or some other values, and to resist or condemn authority as the betrayer of the highest values-..."<sup>72</sup> This tension gains a new appearance in those societies high-in-stateness. In such societies existence of the state not only as an institution, but also as an active concept<sup>73</sup> transforms the tension between the intellectual and the Power to an internal one that the

---

<sup>69</sup>. International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (USA: The Macmillan Company and the Fress Press), 399.

<sup>70</sup>. For the argument about the continuity between the clerics of the medieval era and secular intellectual of the Enlightenment with respect to the access to universal, see Gellner, "La Trahison de la Trahison des Clercs."

<sup>71</sup>. Zygmunt Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987).

<sup>72</sup>. Shils, *The Intellectuals and Powers and Other Essays* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), 17-8.

<sup>73</sup>. Vincent, *Theories of the State*, 224.



intellectual experiences in his disposition *vis-à-vis* the state. This is especially true for the Shilsian institutional intellectual. By the term institutional intellectual Shils has referred to that particular intellectual employed in state service, as well as in professionalized fields of study and in the academies. The institutional intellectual is endowed with a sense of political responsibility and thus a tendency to actively participate within the authority structure.<sup>74</sup> This tension can also be observed in Dick Flacks' study on the relation between social theory and the power structures. Flacks has referred to the delimitation of the "organizationally mobilized intellectual's" interest to "maintenance and order."<sup>75</sup>

Dyson has provided a comprehensive account of the relation between the state and intellectual and the effects of this relation on intellectual work.<sup>76</sup> Employing a comparative analysis of the intellectual preoccupation with the concept of the state with respect to Anglo-American and Continental European cases, Dyson has attributed the differences among countries to particular philosophical and legal traditions as well as to the diverse historical experiences with the state as an

---

<sup>74</sup>. On the other side of the spectrum Shils points at the free-lance intellectuals which are characterized by an aloofness from society and a critical stand towards the existing authority structure coupled with an aversion to participate in it. Shils, "Intellectuals and responsibility."

<sup>75</sup>. Dick Flacks, "Making History and Making Theory: Notes on How Intellectuals Seek Relevance," in *Intellectuals and Politics: Social Theory in a Changing World*, ed. Charles C. Lemert (Newbury Park, London and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991), 9-10.

<sup>76</sup>. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*.

institution. Throughout the book the core argument is that the degree of stateness and/or state tradition is determining for the variations among different intellectual traditions.<sup>77</sup>

Dyson has searched the rationale behind different conceptualizations of the state and variations among prior issues that occupied the intellectual work in the nature of the state and in its relation with academia. As regards the nature of the state, he has exemplified the function of the state as providing order in Germany and in nineteenth-century France. Comparatively he has taken the Anglo-American case whereby the state as an all-comprehensive concept -viewed either as an institution or as an organism- did not have such weight as did preoccupation with specific issues and diverse institutions, autonomous within their distinctive spheres of action.<sup>78</sup>

As far as the relation between the state and academia is concerned, Dyson has traced the extent of state interference in academic issues in continental Europe in the nineteenth century. He has also added the role of the state institutions as potential recruitment agencies for the intelligentsia. In this respect, the state's hand in university education was most manifest in the growth of historiography in France and statistics in Germany. More briefly, in France history performed a unifying function in a time of social turmoil and

---

<sup>77</sup>. Ibid., 81-93.

<sup>78</sup>. Ibid., 83-95.

external threat by the injection of the idea of state as the provider of order in society. And in the German context, the growth of statistics on the initiative of the state is linked to the tendency of the state for efficient means of information-gathering and control, which was perceived as a way to enhance the centralization process.<sup>79</sup>

Relatedly, Dyson has referred to the difference of the Anglo-American intellectual tradition, pointing at the lack of experience with the state as a separately defined institution, both legally and sociologically.<sup>80</sup> Specifically in Britain, the fact that it is the society, rather than the state, that has been on the forefront in history prevented the emergence of the continental model of state with its predominance over all spheres, including politics and economy.<sup>81</sup> Not differently, the American society inherited the British tradition of self-government, without the need for a separate centralizing institution. The American society did not share the continental unease with providing for an integrated social identity.<sup>82</sup> Additionally, as in its British antecedent, political power in the American context has been concentrated in the hands of social groups, mainly

---

<sup>79</sup>. Ibid., 83-93. For the same line of argument see, Hans Kastendiek, "Political development and political science in Western Europe," in *The Development of Political Science: A Comparative Survey*, eds. David Easton, John G. Gunnell and Luigi Graziano (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 108-12; Jean Leca, "French political science and its 'subfields': some reflections on the intellectual organization of the discipline in relation to its historical and social situation," in *ibid.*, 147-65.

<sup>80</sup>. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*.

<sup>81</sup>. Badie and Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*, 121-5.

<sup>82</sup>. Ibid., 126.

the businessmen.<sup>83</sup> Such a configuration laid the grounds for the replacement of continental preoccupation with the state as possessing public power, by the prominence of elite studies.<sup>84</sup> Thus, it is no surprise that the major focus of concern has been the individual -which symbolized the identity of British bourgeoisie and American businessmen-, the liberty -which primarily connoted free-initiative-, and equality -essentially meaning that of opportunity. Interest in the state has been limited to the delimitation of its sphere of function with respect to the individual-as-such.

Last but not least, Dyson has read the differences between Anglo-American and continental intellectual traditions as regards the concept of state with a view to the peculiar experience of liberalism in the British political culture -and its cross-fertilization into America. Thus the preoccupation has turned out to be with the delimitation of authority, rather than with the understanding of an all-embracing state -which had already been absent in history.<sup>85</sup>

Given the above picture - though general in vista - it can be concluded along with Dyson that there are "national traditions of political theories."<sup>86</sup> In other words, the issue area with which an intellectual tradition engrosses itself, and the means of interpretation employed thereof reflect particular

---

<sup>83</sup>. Ibid., 126-30.

<sup>84</sup>. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, 196.

<sup>85</sup>. Ibid., 201.

<sup>86</sup>. Ibid., *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, 155.

cultural experiences. On the other hand, intellectual traditions are prone to transformation - i.e., that no particular case is unchangeable in itself, since throughout history the intellectual tradition within the same country retains the potential of changeability due to the arising socio-political problems.

#### **STATE TRADITION AND LIBERAL THOUGHT: TOWARDS A TENTATIVE MATRIX**

In his chapter on liberalism Vincent has distinguished among four approaches in studying liberal thought. Roughly, he has cited the nation-state approach, the approach to particular liberal traditions, the approach as co-emergent with a particular type of economic structure namely capitalism, and finally constitutionalist approach.<sup>87</sup> The first and second approaches inhere the assumption that flows between the lines of this thesis, -i.e., there is no one liberal tradition but national traditions of liberal thought.

Liberal literature in the Western context is marked basically by its opposition to the unlimited power of the state, which was used to be legitimated on the grounds of a paternalistic view of acting in the name of the subjects for the fulfilment of their happiness.<sup>88</sup> The tradition that would later be named as "liberal," and

---

<sup>87</sup>. Vincent, "Liberalism," in *Modern Political Ideologies* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1992), 24-5.

<sup>88</sup>. J.G. Merquior, *Liberalism: Old and New* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991), 85-6.

which found its most salient examples in England from seventeenth century onwards, did not emerge out of the blue. Rather, it was the outcome of a process extending through almost two hundred years of Western history characterized by an overall change in the socio-political domain. The process also contained intellectual shifts in the way of providing appropriate theories as regards the evolution of the relationship between the ruler and ruled -i.e., from the sovereign - subject to the state-citizen formulation within the framework of nation-state.

It is not possible to account for a monolithic picture of the liberal tradition, since due to the specificities of the countries as well as of the epoch it was introduced, the major focus of concern has displayed variations. A general background can be framed for the rise of liberal literature in different western countries, though not necessarily falling into the same period. Roughly, the historical process through which a reformulation of the political and social theory has come about was built on the dissolution of the socio-political structures of the Middle Ages. The dissolution also contained a radical shift in the understanding of the universe whereby science and reason -free from religion- began to overwhelm the predominating metaphysical and cosmological theology.<sup>89</sup> In other words, the perception of knowledge as a way to salvation -which had been the

---

<sup>89</sup>. Contained within the Enlightenment thought, a new scientific outlook -discarding all modes of understanding which preclude the intelligibility of man- was initiated with reflection on the analysis of social and political structures.

commonly held idea in the preceding period-was replaced by a new understanding whereby knowledge was taken as a means of power over nature. The epoch also witnessed restructurations in the relations of authority parallel to the changes in the social, economic and political spheres.<sup>90</sup>

### **Renaissance and Reformation: 'Man' as the Focus**

A brief look at the background out of which liberal theory emerged, provides a schema of drastic transformations. Beginning with the materialization of a new formation, the predominantly agricultural economic structure of the Middle Ages was gradually replaced by a new spirit, introducing the perception of wealth as an end for its possessor, which had been denounced for the sake of society. Parallel to this shift were geographical discoveries, technological innovations and the extension of literacy. This overall transformation accompanied and carried the signs of the subsequent historical developments of Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment.<sup>91</sup> Firstly, Renaissance and Reformation brought in the primacy of the man and the idea of toleration to the religious sphere, to find firm grounds in the Protestant movement which upheld individual examination of Scriptures as the only means of fulfilment of faith and worship. Subsequently, Enlightenment

---

<sup>90</sup>. Harold J. Laski, *The Rise of European Liberalism: An Essay in Interpretation* (London: George Allen and Unwin LTD, 1936), 11-86.

<sup>91</sup>. *Ibid.*, 11-86.

thought, providing a scientific outlook, attributed the central role to the principle of progress and credibility to reason and scepticism in its accomplishment.<sup>92</sup>

It is against this background that what is named as liberal tradition arose with a social and political theory, based on toleration as an inheritance of the Protestant movement, though in an extended nature.<sup>93</sup> The emerging tradition employed the scientific outlook of the Enlightenment in fulfilling its ambition to understand the world and society.<sup>94</sup> In its understanding of the world and society it proposed a new interpretation of the relationship between society and man, and man and state. The roots of such an interpretation can be traced back to the shift in the outlook as regards the nature of man which is most significant in the writings of Thomas Hobbes.

---

<sup>92</sup>. Ibid.; Vincent, "Liberalism," 25.

<sup>93</sup>. However, here it should be noted that the Protestant opposition to the centralized and hierarchical structure of Rome and its attack on the medieval institutions was not merely a reflection of faith in the individual. It is linked more to a conviction of the incapacity and irrelevancy of the then-existing human institutions in matters of faith. For the argument about the discrepancies between the Protestant premises and liberal thought see Andrzej Rapaczynski, *Nature and Politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987), 62-3; and Laski, *The Rise of European Liberalism*, 29-34.

<sup>94</sup>. Jeremy Waldron, "Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism," *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 37 (147) (April 1987), 135.



## Liberal Thought in the English Context: The Cradle of a Tradition

### *Man, society and the state: Hobbesian scheme as the precedent?*

Hobbes has been commonly referred to as a breaking point in the study of philosophy, politics and society.<sup>95</sup> His writings introduced the presumption of an analogy between the studies of nature and society.<sup>96</sup> In the study of society and polity he adopted nominalism -i.e., the studying of institutions with reference to the individuals as their constitutive units.<sup>97</sup>

Hobbes also introduced separation between the ideal and the real to social sciences. This was manifested in the reformulation of the concept of the state of nature as a category for providing an explanation of the formation of the society and the state.<sup>98</sup> In contrast to the preceding tradition, Hobbes freed the concept from its theological bonds. Instead of the preceding

---

<sup>95</sup>. Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), 166ff. Ian Shapiro, *The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 23-80.

<sup>96</sup>. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 181-202; C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), especially 30-1. See also Rapaczynski, *Nature and Politics*, especially Part I.

<sup>97</sup>. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 183; Rapaczynski, *Nature and Politics*, 63.

<sup>98</sup>. In Hobbesian terms the function of the state was one of provision of the existence of the natural rights of each individual, rather than determining the basis of a virtuous life for the citizenry. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 181. See also Rapaczynski, *Nature and Politics*; Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*.

theological state of grace which foresaw virtue as the basis of the ideal order, in Hobbesian society man and his desires turned to be determining in the escape from the state of nature and in the maintenance of the order established thereof.<sup>99</sup>

The reinterpretation of the nature of man by Hobbes as basically containing selfish and independent attributes, also laid the basis of his social and political theory. The society and the state were both perceived to be post-individual, and formed by the self-determined actions of the individual. Such an analysis turned the preceding theories about man and society upside down, through a rejection of an organic perception of the society and the state, as well as by the reservation of a sphere for the individual independent of social and/or political institutions.<sup>100</sup> On the other hand, aside from the private sphere of the individual, Hobbes accorded the state with extensive dominion in the public domain as a prerequisite for the fulfilment of its ultimate task of preserving peace and security.<sup>101</sup> Again different from the preceding tradition, whereby the concern had prevailed to be with "the best regime," for

---

<sup>99</sup>. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 166-202.

<sup>100</sup>. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, p. 17; Rapaczynski, *Nature and Politics*, 7-8; Shapiro, *The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory*, 275.

<sup>101</sup>. The Hobbesian state, dressed with absolute sovereignty in the public sphere, has led to controversial interpretations of Hobbes's legacy to the liberal thought. While Rapaczynski rejects an attribute of a precedence to liberal thought in Hobbes's writings. Rapaczynski, *Nature and Politics*, 62; Shapiro states that what Hobbes had delineated within the context of absolute sovereignty were almost the same with the liberal interpretation of the regulative state. Shapiro, *The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory*, 65-6.

Hobbes the *raison d'être* of the state was the main question.<sup>102</sup>

It would not be wrong to argue that the writings of Hobbes had handed over a thematic and methodological legacy for liberal theory. In this sense, the most significant point is the perception of individual as the basic category, both ontologically and methodologically.<sup>103</sup> The concept of the individual, occupying a central place in social and political analysis also brought with it the category of contract as the basis of social and political formation.<sup>104</sup>

The interpretation of the social and political structures on the grounds of a contract, presumed to be formulated through individual consent,<sup>105</sup> provided a

---

<sup>102</sup>. Here, it is also possible to observe the breakthrough initiated by Hobbes from the preceding tradition of political philosophy that the major concern turned to be with legitimacy to be assessed on the basis of consent, rather than on virtue. Strauss, *Natural Rights and History*, 191. Thus, the link with the liberal tradition is also observable which put forth the prerequisite that the workings of the socio-political order should be apprehensible for the people, rather than being clouded into a web of "mythological" and/or "mystical" justifications. James Waldron, "The Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism," 146.

<sup>103</sup>. Shapiro, *The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory*, 59-80; Rapaczynski, *Nature and Politics*, 63.

<sup>104</sup>. The confidence in the capacity of man to understand and control the nature also formed one basic feature of liberal thought as the a priori that reason is the natural possession of man. It is this a priori which leads man to enter into a contract and to form the society. However, here it should be noted that the basic feature of Hobbes's individual is passion rather than reason. Shapiro, *The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory*, 58, 75; Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 201. Also for the liberal reservation put on the a priori of man's rationality especially within the context of society see Waldron, "Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism," 133.

<sup>105</sup>. The stress in Hobbesian political philosophy was on consent as the basis of sovereignty. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 186-7. Not differently, within the context of liberal thought what is accounted is the prerequisite that the sovereignty should be based on the consent of the individual. Waldron, "Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism," 128.

precedence for liberal theory to be reflected in the perception of rights as being prior to society. Thus, the rights of the individual were accepted to be independent of the obligations to which the individual is expected to be exposed in social interactions. Rather, the latter were held to be a derivation from the voluntary consent of the individuals.<sup>106</sup>

On the one hand, the most fundamental legacy of the Hobbesian stand for liberal theory was the priority given to the individual as one actor other than the state.<sup>107</sup> On the other hand, the fact that Hobbes took the individual and state as the only categories worth analyzing and discarded all other social institutions as possessing no value is one point of divergence between his studies and the following liberal thought.<sup>108</sup> The case of religion is exemplary in this instance. Hobbes regards religious affairs as falling either in the individual sphere - concerning inner conviction-, or in the public sphere - concerning practice and hence the society-, and denies any legitimacy to any other institution other than the state in the latter.<sup>109</sup>

Additionally, Hobbes's contention with the concept of absolute sovereignty, insofar as it is based on the

---

<sup>106</sup>. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 181-3; Shapiro, *The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory*, 23-69, 82-122.

<sup>107</sup>. Shapiro, *The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory*, 48, 60-1.

<sup>108</sup>. Here, the distinction between the other regarding activities of man and his inward autonomy should be noted. For Hobbes only with respect to the other regarding activities the state, and only the state, has the authority to take measures. D.J. Manning, *Liberalism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 38; Rapaczynski, *Nature and Politics*, 61-2.

<sup>109</sup>. Shapiro, *The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory*, 48, 60-1; Rapaczynski, *Nature and Politics*, 62.

consent of the individuals, places his political theory at a different platform when compared to the liberal appraisal of the representative government as the most adequate form of political organization for the preservation of social order.<sup>110</sup> In this respect, it would be more proper to conclude that the categories and the concepts introduced by Hobbes in the analysis of actual social and political structures of his time -i.e., explanation of what is and why-, had provided the tools for the liberal formulation of what ought to be.

### ***Liberal thought in a "stateless" society***

Richard Bellamy has referred to "the gradual nature of Britain's social development" which "allowed British liberals to take the existence of a liberal society for granted..."<sup>111</sup> English liberal tradition flourished in a political setting which is characterized by Badie and Birnbaum as the "weak state model."<sup>112</sup> Such a setting influenced both the formulation of the basic categories as well as the methodology of the liberal writings. In England the prevalence of the Parliament which functioned effectively to balance the potentially conflicting areas

---

<sup>110</sup>. In this instance it should be noted that Hobbes wrote in a period of civil disorder due to an overall decomposition at both the social and economic levels, as a result of the dissolution of the feudal structures. What Hobbes proposed for the consolidation of the new structuration was absolute sovereignty of the state to have full control at all levels. Shapiro, *The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory*, 48-9, 66-9; Laski, *The Rise of European Liberalism*, 86-161; Rapaczynski, *Nature and Politics*, 25-7.

<sup>111</sup>. Richard Bellamy, *Liberalism and Modern Society: An Historical Argument* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 5.

<sup>112</sup>. Badie and Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*, 123-34.

of social sphere, and the gradual dominance of parliamentary power over potential centres of power - i.e., the king, the church, the aristocracy-,<sup>113</sup> coupled with relative external security, nullified the need for a strong state, both in idea and practice, which had been experienced by its continental counterparts.<sup>114</sup>

Such a configuration also delineated the sphere of problematique for the English liberal texture. Liberal thought which gained its political preeminence from the eighteenth century onwards had found its groundwork in the writings of John Locke.<sup>115</sup> Basically, the concern was not with the concept of the state, but with that of the individual, characterized by its natural possession of reason. The state was studied around the problem of legitimacy and in reference to the ideal limits of its sphere of functioning.<sup>116</sup>

The legacy of the lack of state tradition on English liberal texture was also nurtured with the Protestant movement. Within the context of Protestant reformism the individual was at the centre *vis-à-vis* the established Church -i.e., Rome. The affairs of religion and state were thought to belong to separate realms. The individual was perceived to be competent enough to interpret the Scriptures on his own.<sup>117</sup> The freedom of the individual in

---

<sup>113</sup>. Ibid., 121.

<sup>114</sup>. Ibid., 121-2.

<sup>115</sup>. For the Lockean precedence to the English liberal tradition see Rapaczynski, *Nature and Politics*, and Ruth W. Grant, *John Locke's Liberalism*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

<sup>116</sup> Grant, *John Locke's Liberalism*, 6.

<sup>117</sup> Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, trans. R.G. Collingwood (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 14-23, 395-9.

Protestant reformism which was idealized within the religious context, was carried to the sphere of the relation between the state and individual by the liberal texture.<sup>118</sup> In the early English liberal thought, freedom was perceived to contain a negative attribute -i.e., freedom from outside intervention in matters concerning the private realm of the individual.<sup>119</sup> Freedom, understood in this sense was based on the premise that liberty was a natural right of the individual prior to and independent of any social and political formation.<sup>120</sup> Such a conception was also linked to the centrality of the individual not only in the state of nature, but also within the social and political setting which laid the basis for the confirmation of the right of resistance for the ruled.<sup>121</sup>

The individual of the English liberal thought found its replica in the eighteenth-century *nouveaux*

---

<sup>118</sup>. Shapiro, *The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory*, 128-9.

<sup>119</sup>. The term "guarantism" well suits to the conception of individual freedom in the English liberal thought -i.e., liberty of the individual meaning its freedom from the state. Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, 60.

<sup>120</sup>. The society and state were perceived to be the rational construction of the individuals in order to ensure their security. Thus, the passage from the state of nature to civil society, and the law to regulate the latter is grounded on reason. Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, 160; Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 228.

<sup>121</sup>. In this respect what Locke credited as resistance was a spontaneously arrived "majority decision" to end the corrupt government only to replace it with an alternate legitimate one. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 232. On the other hand the reservation put on the right of resistance can also be found in the writings of Locke: "Unless a ruler actively places himself 'into a State of War with his People, dissolve the Government and leave them to that defense, which belongs to everyone in the State of Nature' he may not legitimately be resisted." Shapiro, *The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory*, 115. See also John Kilcullen, "Locke on Political Obligation," *Review of Politics*, 45, (1983), 323-44.

*bourgeoisie*.<sup>122</sup> Having been organized within a political party, and in constant struggle against the conservatives, the liberal intellectual had the dual preoccupation of access to power on the one hand, and of providing solutions to the problems of the day on grounds of his individualistic heritage, on the other hand.<sup>123</sup> From the eighteenth century onwards, English liberal thought evolved in the midst of party struggle, and its basic figure of opposition was the conservative party, rather than the state.<sup>124</sup> Its demands were against the traditional privileges of the nobility as represented in the Tory programme, and in favor of the merchant, the banker and the trader.<sup>125</sup>

However, the fact that England served as the homeland for liberal thought did not make it immune to continental European cross-fertilization. The continental European influence was manifest in the late-nineteenth century with the diversion of the liberals' interest in democracy. On the surface, arising out of party struggle, liberals slowly gave up their scepticism about state interference. Rather than viewing state activity as of mere negativity, the arguments now began to revolve around its necessity.<sup>126</sup>

As regards democracy, John Stuart Mill, while acknowledging its advantages for the individual, also

---

<sup>122</sup>. Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, 124-5.

<sup>123</sup>. *Ibid.*

<sup>124</sup>. *Ibid.*, 135.

<sup>125</sup>. Exemplary is the advocacy of the abolition of Corn laws and of free trade. *Ibid.*, 124ff.

<sup>126</sup>. *Ibid.*, 142.



drew out its possible dangers, as contained in the "tyranny of the majority" and the "tyranny of the society."<sup>127</sup> In the face of such danger, Mill took on liberal principles of government as a check against democracy.<sup>128</sup> However, the most important continental European influence on Mill's work was the due regard he extended to the moral and intellectual development of the individuals. Mixed with his individualistic standing, this turned into a rejection of government interference in matters not necessarily restricting individual liberty. As different from the liberty of the individual from government interference which was of ultimate importance for Mill, especially as regards the other regarding acts,<sup>129</sup> he also opposed government interference for "not restraining the actions of the individuals, but helping them."<sup>130</sup> Thus, an additional aspect was added to the denunciation of government interference on the basis of the principle of liberty. Regardless of its *raison d'être* Mill denounced any interference on the basis of moral and intellectual development of the individual, while at the same time reserving liberal wariness concerning the ever-present potential for increase in state power.<sup>131</sup>

---

<sup>127</sup>. Ibid., 144-6.

<sup>128</sup>. Ruggiero has posited Mill as representing the transitory stage in the "democratization" of English liberalism. Ibid., 143.

<sup>129</sup>. John W. Gray and G. W. Smith eds., *J.S. Mill ON LIBERTY in focus* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 90-107.

<sup>130</sup>. Ibid., 122.

<sup>131</sup>. Ibid., 122ff; See also Bellamy, *Liberalism and Modern Society*, 22-4.

The democratization of English liberalism was consolidated in the second half of the nineteenth century, in the works of T.H. Green, a prominent figure among the Oxford Idealists.<sup>132</sup> While introducing a reinterpretation of freedom, Green also opposed classical liberal premises. In Green's writings it is possible to observe a shift from the emphasis on the individual to the state and society. Such a shift can be linked to the rejection of faith in the principle of spontaneity in human relations.<sup>133</sup> Doing away with the negative conception of liberty, Green asserted that it can only be realized insofar as it is recognized by the state.<sup>134</sup> Freedom, thus understood, brought forth the necessity of state interference for the development of the characters of the individuals, and thus for the practice of morality.<sup>135</sup> Underlying such a perception was the approach to the rights of the individual which can be linked to the Benthamite descent. Thus similar to the Benthamite disposition, for Green there can be no rights anterior to the society, rather they evolve out of the relationship between the members of a society.<sup>136</sup> However, the

---

<sup>132</sup>. On the influence of Immanuel Kant on Green see, Bellamy, *Liberalism and Modern Society*; Bellamy "T.H. Green and the morality of Victorian liberalism," in *Victorian Liberalism: Nineteenth century political thought and practice*, ed. Bellamy (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 131-51; Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, 147-9.

<sup>133</sup>. Green asserted that the society needs external help -the help of the state- for the exercise of progress. Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, 148.

<sup>134</sup>. *Ibid.*, 148-9.

<sup>135</sup>. *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought*, ed. David Miller (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1987), 183-5.

<sup>136</sup>. Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, 148.

traditional approach to the state with a view to legitimacy remained untouched.

## **Liberal Thought Outdoors: The Continental European Experience**

### ***Germany: "state liberalism"***<sup>137</sup>

The individual and individual freedom in the context of German liberalism, -despite the shared experience with Protestant Reformation-, was interpreted from a totally diverging perspective when compared to the English case. Such a difference can be analyzed on the grounds of the argument made by Badie and Birnbaum that Germany stands as an example for the model of "government via the State."<sup>138</sup>

In Germany, the development of the state can be traced back to the mid-seventeenth century Prussia.<sup>139</sup> The process extended well into the nineteenth century. In the meantime the German state had to grapple with the military which had dominated the bureaucratic apparatus on the one hand, and with the *Stände* which had ensured economic power on the other.<sup>140</sup> The consolidation of an independent bureaucracy was achieved in the nineteenth

---

<sup>137</sup>. The term is borrowed from Hans Vorlander, "Is there a liberal political tradition in Germany?," in *The Liberal Political Tradition: Contemporary Reappraisals*, ed. James Meadowcroft (UK and USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1996), 101-14.

<sup>138</sup>. Badie and Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*, 115-20.

<sup>139</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>140</sup>. Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 1992).

century after the adoption of a series of reform legislations which gradually decreased the autonomy of the *Stände*.<sup>141</sup> Such a development in the institutional sphere was accompanied by a shift in the legal sphere. The replacement of the military state -*Polizeistaat*- with the *Rechtstaat* brought with it the codification of a systematic body of law, in accordance with which the state was presumed to act.<sup>142</sup> In fact, the codification was well underway from seventeenth century onwards. The precedence of a distinct sphere of administrative law can be found in the monarchical decrees of the seventeenth century through which the "commisserial bureaucracy" had ensured its extensive dominion over the society.<sup>143</sup>

In this respect, German liberal thought flourished in the midst of an ongoing centralization process. As Leonard Krieger has argued, it is not possible to talk about one German liberal thought.<sup>144</sup> Instead, liberal thought in Germany was dispersed within itself and across regions.<sup>145</sup> The variants of German liberal thought had to choose between either transcending the existing institutional configuration while paying due regard to history (the Moderates and the Dualists), or with the total replacement of the old with the new through a

---

<sup>141</sup>. Ibid., 57-64.

<sup>142</sup>. Badie and Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*, 117.

<sup>143</sup>. Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 55-7.

<sup>144</sup>. Leonard Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1972).

<sup>145</sup>. Krieger has provided a classification of the strands within German liberal thought with respect to thematic differences which also correspond to regional peculiarities. In this respect he has differentiated roughly between the Moderates (North-West), the Dualists (South) and the Radicals. Ibid., 278-398.

revolution (the Radicals).<sup>146</sup> Thus, the reality of a fragmented German society, perceived to be in need of unification by all the liberal theoreticians, cut across the preoccupation with the individual as the basic category of the classical liberal stand.<sup>147</sup>

On the other hand, arising out of an historical legacy of state tradition, in German liberal thought the concern was not with the individual as a social category, but with the "mission"<sup>148</sup> of molding that individual-as-citizen. This was considered as the *sine-qua-non* for the realization of the ideal liberal society.<sup>149</sup> Additionally, instead of putting emphasis on the concept of individual as the bearer of rationality, the German liberal thinker turned towards society which was perceived to contain a "latent" reason. This also led to a distinguished place for the programme of education in German liberal thought, which was perceived to be the basic intermediary through which reason as a social attribute would be realized.<sup>150</sup>

The significance of education in the German liberal context had its roots in the tradition of Romanticism and the organic theory of the state. Firstly, the Romantic tradition provided an asocial understanding of the

---

<sup>146</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>147</sup>. Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom*.

<sup>148</sup>. Woodruff D. Smith, *Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany: 1840-1920* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 84.

<sup>149</sup>. Ibid., 14.

<sup>150</sup>. Ibid., 23-5; Vorlander cites Immanuel Kant's emphasis on "'the release of people from their self-incurred immaturity'" in presenting the recourse of early nineteenth century German liberalism to the state to step in for the education of the individual in the way of moulding the German citizen. Vorlander, "Is there a liberal political tradition in Germany," 104.

individual which gave priority to the soul over reason, inner uniqueness over oneness, and inwardness over socio-political engagements.<sup>151</sup> The conviction that the perfection of the soul -the self-fulfilment of the individual- as the highest achievement of the individual could only be accomplished by education, confirmed the pivotal role of state as the provider and director of such a task.<sup>152</sup> Secondly, in the context of the organic conception of state, the state was perceived as one part of the society and as the highest form of individuality.<sup>153</sup> In this respect, the perfection of the individual soul was again held to be achieved only within the society, the state being the beholder of this perfection.<sup>154</sup>

Upon such an intellectual background, the primacy of the state was prevalent in all variants of liberal thought in Germany. Thus, ranging from the Moderates to the Radicals, the state was viewed as an a priori for the guarantee and exercise of freedom, either as the earthly reflection of divine order,<sup>155</sup> or as the "common will of associated persons."<sup>156</sup> The common denominator in all these conceptualizations was the priority given to order as the *sine-qua-non* of freedom, and not the *vice versa*.<sup>157</sup>

---

<sup>151</sup>. Steven Lukes, *Individualism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), 17-22.

<sup>152</sup>. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, 88.

<sup>153</sup>. *Ibid.*, 165.

<sup>154</sup>. *Ibid.*, 103; Vorlander has pointed that this legacy was displayed in the liberal perception of the state as an "educational institute." Vorlander, "Is there a liberal political tradition in Germany," 104.

<sup>155</sup>. Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom*, 306.

<sup>156</sup>. *Ibid.*, 327.

<sup>157</sup>. Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom*.

The professional identity of the proponents of liberal thought in Germany are important to understand such conceptual differences from the English liberal thought. In this respect, the career patterns of the theoreticians of German liberalism in the nineteenth century holds evidence for the modeling of the German state as an example of strong state. Except for the free-lance journalists and exiles which formed the Radical wing,<sup>158</sup> the bulk of German liberal intellectuals were academicians who were also involved in government service, with the responsibility of educating the bureaucratic elite on law and administration.<sup>159</sup> Thus they were a part of the state administration.<sup>160</sup> This traditional link between the state and intellectuals continued in the late nineteenth-century with neoliberal anthropologists. Apart from their responsibility of training state officials, they were also subsidized by the state for their research facilities.<sup>161</sup> Such a double sphere of function laid the grounds for the emergence of German liberal thought as an outgrowth of the development of social science in Germany. In that period social

---

<sup>158</sup>. Ibid., 295.

<sup>159</sup>. The most prominent organ of the nineteenth-century liberal thought was *Staatslexikon*, an encyclopedic publication (1834-1843, 1845-1848, 1856-1866). Its editors, Karl Rotteck and Karl Theodor Welcker, were also civil servants. Smith, *Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany*, 13-4; Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom*, 314-22.

<sup>160</sup>. As Vorlander has argued nineteenth century German liberalism was a "civil service liberalism." Vorlander, "Is there a liberal political tradition in Germany?," 103.

<sup>161</sup>. Ibid., 102-11.

science was perceived to be an instrument for the proper functioning of politics.<sup>162</sup>

In this respect, German liberalism grew out of the concern to provide a framework for the construction of the modern society and the ideal way of its government.<sup>163</sup> It nourished in a milieu whereby the state needed expert knowledge from the universities in order to cope with the problems of modernization, in a basically agrarian society.<sup>164</sup> It was formulated not after industrialization, but with the task of preventing the potential maladies of the pattern and consequences of English industrialization.<sup>165</sup> Coupled with the reaction to the French Revolution and Napoleon's invasion, such a disposition led the German liberal thinkers to grapple with the problematique of modernity, and thus with the problem "of how a modern society ought to be governed."<sup>166</sup>

Thus, instead of coming up with a homogeneous radical social and political theory,<sup>167</sup> German liberal intellectuals were more preoccupied with the task of finding compromising grounds for the German bureaucratic and university traditions on the one hand, and the

---

<sup>162</sup>. Ibid., 13-7.

<sup>163</sup>. Richard J. Bazillion, "Liberalism, Modernization, and the Social Question in the Kingdom of Saxony, 1830-1890," in *In Search of a Liberal Germany: Studies in the History of German Liberalism from 1789 to the Present*, eds. Konrad H. Jarauch and Larry Eugene Jones (USA: Berg Publishers, Inc., 1990), 108-9.

<sup>164</sup>. Smith, *Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany*, 14.

<sup>165</sup>. Dieter Langewische, "The Nature of German Liberalism," in *Modern Germany Reconsidered (1870-1945)* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 103.

<sup>166</sup>. Bazillion, "Liberalism, Modernization, and the Social Question in the Kingdom of Saxony, 1830-1890," 87, 108-9.

<sup>167</sup>. Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom*.



principles of the Enlightenment thought on the other.<sup>168</sup> Such a preoccupation also provided German liberal thought with another thematic divergence which can be named as particularism. While sharing the same mechanistic premise in the study of society with classical liberalism, the theme of tradition preserved its pivotal place in liberal texture for figuring out social laws, to the detriment of a priori, universal principles.<sup>169</sup> Such particularism was also manifest in the approach to progress. While giving priority to the sustenance of social equilibrium during the process of social change over the desirability of progress,<sup>170</sup> German liberal intellectuals were more interested in the analysis of the diverse ways of progress with respect to culture.<sup>171</sup>

Last but not least, accompanying the task of centralization, nationalism was another common denominator within the context of German liberal thought. What Krieger has referred to as the "German idea of freedom"<sup>172</sup> gains more clarification in this respect. For the German liberal, the freedom of the nation, meaning the freedom of the one German state, laid at the basis of individual freedom.<sup>173</sup> The nationalistic aspiration was

---

<sup>168</sup>. Smith, *Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany*, 14.

<sup>169</sup>. Ibid., 27-9, 35-8. German Enlightenment was shaped around a reaction to the universalistic premises of the Enlightenment and French Revolution, and thus it bore a particularistic interpretation of the concepts imported. Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 1.

<sup>170</sup>. Smith, *Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany*, 29.

<sup>171</sup>. Ibid., 109-10.

<sup>172</sup>. As Krieger notes the German idea of freedom is well summarized in Treitschke's article (*Freedom*), as the "freedom in the state," rather than "freedom from the state." Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom*, 367-8.

<sup>173</sup>. Ibid., 278-398.

not reserved to any one of liberal strands of thought. Though ironically, even the Radical branch had to linger between its abstractionist and universalist ideals on the one hand, and the ideal of "a common German fatherland"<sup>174</sup> on the other.

***France: liberalism between the individual and citizen***

Apart from Germany, French liberal thought also contains differing tenets from that of the fatherland of the theory. Unlike its German counterpart, French liberal texture flourished in a setting whereby centralization of the authority had already been underway. It was consolidated with the French Revolution, which ensured the dissolution of feudalism, clericalism and divine monarchy.<sup>175</sup> The basic premises of the French liberal thought were documented within the Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789), which also provided its peculiarity.<sup>176</sup> Liberal theory in France evolved out of a process of transfer of power from the divinely ordained absolute monarchy to the secular state. In this respect, the theoreticians of liberal outlook saddled themselves with the task of providing the framework according to which a socio-political restructuration should be consolidated, whereby science turned out to be their main

---

<sup>174</sup>. Ibid., 328.

<sup>175</sup>. Kingsley Martin, *French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. J.P. Mayer (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962), 1.

<sup>176</sup>. Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, 66-73.

guide.<sup>177</sup> In pre-Revolutionary France, the liberal intellectual was more opposed to Church in favor of the secular state, than he was to the state in favor of the individual, while acknowledging the prerequisite of a strong state for the sake of the individual.<sup>178</sup> Thus, as different from the English case, French liberal texture was originally shaped more around the challenge between the "secular" and the "divine", rather than between the individual and the institution of political authority. In fact, in France the freedom of the individual was a matter of struggle for power among the two contending institutions of the time.<sup>179</sup> In this respect, mid-nineteenth century Liberal Catholicism exemplifies the standpoint in favor of the Church -though originally received Papal condemnation- as the protector of the individual against the State.<sup>180</sup> Basically, it advocated the independence of the Church from the State and the "catholicization of liberalism."<sup>181</sup> This meant the interpretation of freedom in consistence with religion.<sup>182</sup>

Apart from that, the Physiocratic standpoint -most akin to the premises of classical liberalism as far as its economic dimension was concerned-<sup>183</sup> of pre-Revolutionary France also served as another historical instance for the diverging feature of French liberal

---

<sup>177</sup>. Martin, *French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century*.

<sup>178</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>179</sup>. Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, 399-403.

<sup>180</sup>. Ibid., 175.

<sup>181</sup>. Ibid., 175-6.

<sup>182</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>183</sup>. Martin, *French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, 228-35.

thought. The liberal economic principles which corresponded to the interests of the English *nouveaux bourgeoisie* found their replica in France within the agricultural sphere.<sup>184</sup> On the one hand, the Physiocratic principles can be summed up as the full freedom of trade, encouragement of the labor of every member of the community so as to increase competition, and the opening of all possible markets to the sale of production.<sup>185</sup> Thus opposing the traditional network of agricultural production, Physiocrats proposed the removal of arbitrary taxation, and of legal and commercial barriers to trade.<sup>186</sup> On the other hand, they were distinguished from their English counterparts on the basis of their acknowledgment of the necessity of an enlightened despot.<sup>187</sup> The Physiocratic adherence to an enlightened despot was based on the perception of the ideal social order to be spontaneously constituted out of the already existing laws of nature, whereby the despot was ultimately authorized with its sustenance.<sup>188</sup>

Arising from such background, the evolution of French liberal thought throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries displayed a continuous search for reconciliation between the individualistic disposition on the one hand, and an ever-present theme of strong state on the other. In this sense, the preeminence of the

---

<sup>184</sup>. Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, 34ff.

<sup>185</sup>. *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>186</sup>. Martin, *French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, 234.

<sup>187</sup>. Laski, *The Rise of European Liberalism*, 185.

<sup>188</sup>. Martin, *French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, 233.

concept of the state in French liberal texture was another major difference from its English counterpart.<sup>189</sup>

Firstly, the Revolutionary liberal texture -as exemplified in the writings of the *Philosophes*- put faith on the secular state as the ideal form for its abstract individual.<sup>190</sup> And the individual of the Revolution was not different from that of the classical liberal theory.<sup>191</sup> In this respect, the Declaration of 1789 -in complete conformity with the principles of the *Philosophes*-<sup>192</sup> contained not only faith in the priority of the individual, but also the task of delineating the ideal political structure for the individual as such.<sup>193</sup>

Secondly, the decades following the Revolution witnessed the emergence of a new rival to the individual, other than the state -the society.<sup>194</sup> The experience with the rule of Napoleon which had based the legitimacy of its despotism upon the principle of popular sovereignty of the Declaration, led "liberals" to speak in the name of the individual and find a framework for a new reconciliation -that between democracy and liberalism.<sup>195</sup>

This endeavour was most manifest in the writings of two prominent nineteenth century liberal thinkers,

---

<sup>189</sup>. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, 155-74.

<sup>190</sup>. Martin, *French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century*.

<sup>191</sup>. Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, 68ff.

<sup>192</sup>. Martin, *French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century*.

<sup>193</sup>. According to Bauman the intellectual of the Enlightenment -the *Philosophes*- very well fits into the model of legislator. By giving an end to the monopoly of the Church over knowledge the intellectual had taken over the claim of the former to possess the wisdom about universal values which would provide the basis for the best form of order in the society. Zygmunt Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters*.

<sup>194</sup>. Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, 208.

<sup>195</sup>. For the evolution of French liberal thought throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see *ibid.*, 158-210.

Benjamin Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville. While attacking democracy, Constant reformulated the concept of liberty by a differentiation between its "ancient" and "modern" forms.<sup>196</sup> By ancient liberty, he referred to that 'pseudo-liberty' --exercised through the post-Revolutionary right of political participation-- which had ensured the all-encompassing presence of society to the detriment of the individual.<sup>197</sup> On the other hand, modern liberty was precisely modeled on the English version, which corresponded to "civil liberty" -i.e., the complete independence of the individual within its private sphere.<sup>198</sup> However, unlike its model it excluded any interpretation on the presocial existence of liberty.<sup>199</sup>

Deeply fascinated by American democracy, Tocqueville re-read Constant's conception of liberty as detrimental to the "healthy" individual, which ultimately meant the citizen.<sup>200</sup> Thus, what he emphasized most was not the freedom of the individual from, but participation in the public affairs which he viewed as the only means to preempt the domination of the state over individuals. Such an approach led him to end up positing the citizen, committed to the nation, over and above the individual, for the sake of liberty:<sup>201</sup>

---

<sup>196</sup>. Kelly, *The Humane Comedy*, 56.

<sup>197</sup>. Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, 167-8.

<sup>198</sup>. Kelly, *The Humane Comedy*, 57.

<sup>199</sup>. *Ibid.*, 55.

<sup>200</sup>. Roger Boesche, *The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987), 51.

<sup>201</sup>. *Ibid.*, 198.

It is said, it is repeated; all organs of the press, from whatever side, say: local interests are becoming, in the mind of the citizens, in the mind even of deputies, stronger than the general interest.

What is that, Gentlemen, if not the greatest political demoralization which can exist in a country?

How do you expect that, in this fight between the general interest and the particular that will take place without cease in their hearts, the particular interest will not often be stronger? Is that possible? And will they not soon lose the country from view in order to see only themselves?<sup>202</sup>

Such an approach to the concept of liberty also corresponded to the shift from the ontological and methodological perspective of classical liberal theory. French liberal texture of the nineteenth century relinquished the classical assertion of the ontological priority of the individual to the state. Instead, while asserting the "ideal" of priority in terms of individual's rights, it introduced an historical insight whereby the appearance of the individual and the state were perceived to be colateral.<sup>203</sup> This inherently contained the prerequisite of a close scrutiny of the history of the relation between the individual and the state.

The framework for the historical perspective, prevalent in the nineteenth century, had already been provided in the writings of Montesquieu, a loyal observer of English institutional structure.<sup>204</sup> The basic themes, style of approach and formulation of the concept of

---

<sup>202</sup>. Quoted in *ibid.*

<sup>203</sup>. Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, p. 208.

<sup>204</sup>. Thomas L. Pangle, *Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on The Spirit of the Laws* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1973).

French way to modern society in the liberal texture of the period, bear the legacy of Montesquieu's writings, which ironically furnished it with conservative colors. It is in this respect that one comes across a similarity with the particularism of German liberal thought. In the last analysis, the Montesquieuan heritage handed over the theme of the reconciliation of the universal -reason- with the national to the coming generations of liberal intellectuals.<sup>205</sup> The projection of the national on the universal was analyzed with respect to the legislative structures of different countries. And the peculiar way for the French nation towards the "modern" was searched in the adoption of the appropriate legal framework, which would not run counter to the peculiar attributes of the French nation.<sup>206</sup> In other words, "laws are always unsteady so long as they are not based for support on morals. Mores are the only tough and durable power among a people."<sup>207</sup>

Apart from the Montesquieuan heritage, the Revolution had also worked in the way of providing the historical framework in which the nineteenth-century liberal intellectual would frame its sphere of problematique. In this respect, the Revolution had not only ensured the dominance of the secular state *vis-à-vis* the Church, but also redefined the individual with respect to the nation and state. The state-stripped of

---

<sup>205</sup>. Pangle, *Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism*, 194-7.

<sup>206</sup>. "...the laws 'should be so appropriate to the people for which they are made,...'." Quoted in *ibid.*, 43.

<sup>207</sup>. Quoted in Boesche, *The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville*, 183.



divine legitimation—was conceptualized on the basis of national sovereignty, and thus as a derivative of the nation. Relatedly, the *French* individual was (re)defined with respect to his membership in the state, which ascribed it with the identity of the citizen.<sup>208</sup> Rogers Brubaker has argued that the legal recognition and codification of the French individual as such was perceived to be a prerequisite for the strengthening of the state for the sake of providing internal order and external security.<sup>209</sup> Such a development well corresponded to the concern of the nineteenth-century liberal intellectual with the necessity of strengthening the state for the sustenance of unity and homogeneity in society.<sup>210</sup>

The variations in liberal theory across countries can be re-read with respect to different legal traditions.<sup>211</sup> The difference in the legal sphere also accompany differences with respect to state models. As stated above, in England one criterion for the experience of "government-via-civil society" was the infusion of the private and public realms as was manifest in the prominence of traditions in the codification of laws.<sup>212</sup> England did not have a separate body of administrative laws which would ensure the existence of a predominant

---

208. Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 35-49.

209. *Ibid.*, 48-9.

210. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, 164.

211. For the elaboration of the differences inbetween as an outcome of the particular experience with the Roman law and the Common law see Laski, *The Rise of European Liberalism*, 56-7.

212. Badie and Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*, 121-5; Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, 41-3.

public law. The supervision and application of laws have been run by independent bodies.<sup>213</sup> On the other hand, in the case of France and Germany the existence of a separate body of administrative laws further ensured state power over society.<sup>214</sup> Unlike England, the task of the supervision and application of law was carried out by officials tied to the state structure.<sup>215</sup>

From the legal perspective, reflections of different state traditions can be analyzed in relation to the concept of natural rights. At the origins of English liberal thinking, rights were originally separated from law and attributed prior existence as an inherent feature of the human being.<sup>216</sup> On the other hand, in France and Germany the distinction between the "ancient" and "modern" liberty, the latter corresponding to the perception of liberty basically as a civil right, connoted that its realization was to be found within the society, and under the guidance of the state.<sup>217</sup> Such a perception also carried hints of concern with the strength of the state, both against the external threats and for the sustenance of the internal order in a new social structure, rising on the instabilities of the

---

<sup>213</sup>. Badie and Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*, 123.

<sup>214</sup>. Ibid., 117, Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, 42.

<sup>215</sup>. Badie and Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*, 117.

<sup>216</sup>. Shapiro, *The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory*, 51-2. In this instance it is possible to observe the Hobbesian legacy within the context of liberal thought on the grounds that it was first with Hobbes that the basis of law was ensured to be the natural rights of man. The legacy is manifest in the writings of Locke whereby it is proposed that only the natural rights are innate in men, and not the duties. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 225-7.

<sup>217</sup>. Pangle, *Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism*, Kelly, *The Humane Comedy*, Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*.

feudal past. Eventually, the right of resistance, so prevalent in English liberal thinking, did not occupy a significant place in the continental case.<sup>218</sup> In the French case, Declaration of 1791 serves as an example. The Declaration acknowledged the prerequisite of the right of resistance to oppression, but only to be activated by an organized body independent of State; the National Guard. The National Guard was held responsible "to defend the rights of the individual and avoid unnecessary violence in the name of resistance."<sup>219</sup>

#### CONCLUDING REMARKS

Above all, the distinguishing point in English liberal thought was its synthetic character.<sup>220</sup> In England, the practical reflections of liberal premises were consolidated through a smooth transition, while the bases of traditional life have assumed their place. English liberal thought was not formulated against an all-embracing state, in any of its phases. Rather, it initially grew out of an attempt by the intellectuals who were engaged in a political struggle *vis-à-vis* the

---

<sup>218</sup>. The reservation put on the right of resistance in the continental European case is best observable in the writings of Kant, whereby alongside with the acknowledgment of the constitutional limits on the ruling mechanism to ensure the accountability of those elected to public offices, all kinds of resistance are also rejected. Manning, *Liberalism*, 77. Bellamy exemplifies "many of the supposed contradictions of German liberal thought..." on "Kant's a priori definition and defense of liberal principles, and his practical willingness to compromise with tyranny..." Bellamy, *Liberalism and Modern Society*, 161.

<sup>219</sup>. Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, 167.

<sup>220</sup>. *Ibid.*, 135.

conservatives, and thus in search of alternative policies for the problems of the day. The English liberal did not have the task of dissolving the existing system. He aspired to transcend it, while preserving the tradition. This was in total contrast to the French experience, whereby the realization of the liberal ideals required the Revolution and the radical dissolution of the past.<sup>221</sup> On the other hand, French liberal intellectuals had to walk on a conceptual tightrope between the individual of classical liberal theory and the concept and practice of a strong state. The same was also true for Germany. Such an unease which arose from the rather problematic adaptability of liberal premises on foreign land has led to a particular concern with history. History, especially in the German liberal literature, was more than a phenomenon which connoted a universally achievable unilinear development.<sup>222</sup> Instead, it provided an escape from hovering between the individual of liberal theory on the one hand, and the legacy of the state tradition on the other.

The comparison above which was carried out on the basis of thematic differences between the English and continental European contexts suggests that one cannot come up with a monolithic structure of liberal thought either on a country, or on a periodic basis. Instead, what is observed is an all-out and ongoing process of the formation of an intellectual layout, which has

---

<sup>221</sup>. Ibid., 81-2.

<sup>222</sup>. Smith, *Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany*, 109.

experienced shifts due to particular social and political problems of the period, and the country in question.<sup>223</sup> However, within this framework one variable stays constant. It is the absence and/or existence of state tradition acting behind the scenes, but still with considerable influence on intellectual vocation.

---

<sup>223</sup>. This is best discernible in the variety of the claimants for liberal premises which originated in the clash between the aristocracy, bourgeoisie, and the state, to be extended to the tension between the working and the middle classes in the eighteenth century. Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, 48.

## CHAPTER III

### STATE TRADITION AND THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLECTUAL MIND AND IDENTITY IN THE OTTOMAN CONTEXT

#### THE STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE CLASSICAL AGE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

As it has been shown in the preceding chapter, when the West was experiencing an intellectual revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire was entering into a phase of decline. This phase was initially marked with military reverses, and with deepening economic backwardness. Thenceforth, the main issue in the Ottoman agenda would be the question of "how to save the Empire."

The initial remedies proposed for coping with the decline were modelled on the institutional framework, consolidated during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566). By the end of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman state had become a strong state.<sup>1</sup> This meant both the overwhelming military power of the

---

<sup>1</sup>. See Halil İnalçık, "Turkey Between Europe and the Middle East," *Foreign Policy*, 7 (1980); Şerif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 12 (June 1969), 258-81; Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Walkington, England: The Eothen Press, 1985); "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire with Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century," *International Political Science Review*, 1 (January 1980), 81-105.

state and the development of state autonomy *vis-à-vis* the society.

The state in the Ottoman Empire as consolidated in the sixteenth century was symbolized in the person of the ruler.<sup>2</sup> The ruler carried the double identity of the Sultan and the Caliph. As Sultan, he held absolute authority over all his subjects, regardless of religious and/or ethnic differences, within the territories of the Empire; and as the Caliph he was accepted as the "protector of Islam."<sup>3</sup>

During the sixteenth century, the Sultan dominated the system. The main constituents of the ruling institution were referred to as the *Askeri* ("the Military") due to the warrior nature of the empire, that is to the commonly acknowledged mission of extending the boundaries of Islam.<sup>4</sup> The *Askeri* was composed of the members of the bureaucracy, military and *Ulema* (religious dignitaries). The members of the first two groups had

---

<sup>2</sup>. Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 164-5; İnalçık, "Turkey," in *Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, eds. R.E. Ward and D.A. Rustow (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 42-61; Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?," *Daedalus*, 102 (1973), 169-89; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd ed. (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 371.

<sup>3</sup>. İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600* (USA: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973), 57. See also Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, 164-5. Here it is necessary to point at the argument by Niyazi Berkes that not the Sultan personally in his Muslim identity, but the Caliphate as an institution made up one of the two bases of the authority in the Ottoman polity. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 9, 13-4.

<sup>4</sup>. İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 5-9, 57; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, 12-22.

direct attachment and loyalty to the Sultan. They were subjected to special education and training from the very beginning of their recruitment that stressed service to the state. They were stripped of their preceding social bonds, educated and made slaves of the Sultan, in the real sense of the term.<sup>5</sup> Their possessions and survival depended on his sheer will.<sup>6</sup>

The third group, the *Ulema* comprised of the educated segment of the Muslim population.<sup>7</sup> The relation between the *Ulema* and Sultan was slightly different when compared to that between the military and bureaucracy. The *Ulema* having the claim of monopoly over the interpretation of Islam, oversaw whether the practices of the Sultan were in line with the *Şeriat*, the religious law. This placed them in a position of potential shareholders of power -if not equality with the ruler.<sup>8</sup>

Here, it is in order to note the predominance of Islam in the Ottoman state structure and its functioning. In order to serve within the ruling body, conversion into

---

<sup>5</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 12.

<sup>6</sup>. The fact that the servants of the state other than the *Ulema* could be condemned to death for reasons of state ("*siyaseten katl*") and their property confiscated further illustrates the totally dependent status of the latter on the will of the ruler. See, Emre Kongar, *İmparatorluk'tan Günümüze Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı (The Societal Structure of Turkey from the Empire until Present)* (İstanbul: Evrim Matbaacılık Ltd., 1985), 121-22. For a thorough analysis of the structure of Ottoman ruling institution, see Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, 113-50.

<sup>7</sup>. By the term education what is meant is purely religious education. The *Ulema* were chosen from the most prominent graduates of *medreses*, the religious high schools. For further information on the *Ulema* see, Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 13-7.

<sup>8</sup>. *Ibid.*, 13-7. However while making such an evaluation one should bear in mind the fact that the *Ulema*, as not different from the bureaucracy and the military, owed their posts in the state to the Sultan and were subject to dismissal at his will.



Islam constituted one of the basic conditions.<sup>9</sup> The activities of the Sultan were also checked according to their compatibility with the principles of *Şeriat*. It is true that the Sultan had the right to issue laws in those spheres falling outside of religion. However, until the reign of Mehmed II (1444-1481) this right had not been systematically used.<sup>10</sup> In this sense, Mehmed II was the first to codify the already existing legal practices and traditions.<sup>11</sup> However, this did not mean the end of the predominance of Islam. From this point onwards, the duality in the identity of the ruler was carried to the legal sphere.<sup>12</sup> Such a duality had already been present in the distinction between *Şeri* and *Örfi* laws, the latter referring to those body of laws "enacted by the Sultan on his will and independent of the *Şeriat*, and in the name of the public good."<sup>13</sup> The enactment of the *Fatih Kanunnameleri* (Codes), gave permanent status to the *Örfi* laws in those spheres that the religious law fell short of regulation. This basically meant state organization.<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup>. It was not only the Ulema who were Muslims. In the classical age, as a prerequisite of the *devşirme* system, it was obligatory to convert into Islam in order to enter into state service. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, 114.

<sup>10</sup>. İnalçık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu; Toplum ve Ekonomi Üzerine Arşiv Çalışmaları, İncelemeler (Ottoman Empire; Archive Studies, Analysis on Society and Economy)*, ed. Muhittin Salih Eren (İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık Ltd. Şti., 1993), 319-41.

<sup>11</sup>. Ibid.; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, 62.

<sup>12</sup>. İnalçık, *Ottoman Empire*, 70-5. For the Ottoman legal structure and duality therein, also see Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, 134-38.

<sup>13</sup>. İnalçık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, 320.

<sup>14</sup>. Ibid., 322-36.

Above all, the Sultan came to possess "theoretical" superiority *vis-à-vis* the *Ulema*, who were state servants appointed and subject to dismissal by the Sultan.<sup>15</sup> However, the duality in both the legal sphere and power structure continued, and it was in the following ages of decline that Islam would gain the upper hand and hence the *Ulema*, from then on representing the conservative bloc against reformist rulers, would overwhelm the dominant standing of the Sultan, and from time to time to the extent of dethroning him. Exemplary are the abandonment of the throne by Ahmed III to Mahmud II (1730), and the destitution of Selim III (1807) at the will of the *Ulema*.<sup>16</sup>

As already noted, the centrality of Islam was also manifest in the mission long-attributed to the Ottoman state. In this respect, the precedence of ghazi (warrior) tradition made the basis of the authority of the ruler to depend on military might and the expansion of Islam to far territories westward.<sup>17</sup> The warrior identity of the Empire was not limited to the ghazi-state tradition but also had an economic dimension. In its classical set-up, the Ottoman Empire was basically living off victories at the battlefield. Each newly occupied territory was always a new source of revenue to be taxed. The link between the military and the land was further strengthened by the

---

<sup>15</sup>. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, 164-5.

<sup>16</sup>. *Ibid.*, 169-277. For the conservative opposition as most effectively carried out by the *Ulema*, see Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (especially) 51-85.

<sup>17</sup>. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 55-9.

*timar* (fief) system, by which the *-sipahis-* (fief-holder in return for military service), appointed by the state, had the right of tax collection in return for providing military force to the state during times of war. The ownership of land belonged to the state while peasants only had the right of usufruct.<sup>18</sup> The state had double control over production. While it assured regular flow of taxes through the the fief-holders, the tripartite network of checks and balances comprised of *beylerbeyis* (officials of the highest administrative unit in the Empire), *kadis* (judges applying both religious and *Örfi* law; highest administrators of *kaza*) and *defterdars* (officials of provincial treasury) in the provinces formed the second dimension of control, this time over the fief-holders.<sup>19</sup> Production was limited to the supply of the means for survival. By restricting the size of the production mainly to the local level, the system automatically prevented the flow of surplus production to the peasant, and of incentive for profit-making on the part of the peasantry.<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup>. Here it must be noted that there were also categories of land that fell outside the ownership of the state, namely the *Uşr* land and the *Haraç* land, the owners of which were subject to taxation. But, in the classical age, most of these were converted into *Miri* status, meaning the land of the country (*Araziyi Memleket*). Taner Timur, *Osmanlı Toplumsal Düzeni (Ottoman Social Order)* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1979), 2nd ed., 160-201. For a thorough analysis of *timar* system see İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600*, 107-18.

<sup>19</sup>. *Ibid.*, 117-8.

<sup>20</sup>. İnalçık, *Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic History* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), 105-26; Kemal Karpat, "Land Regime, Social Structure and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire," in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, eds. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), especially 69-90.

Apart from its control over rural production, the state also played a determinative role in the urban economy. This was particularly manifest in the activities and organizations of the craftsmen. Under the guild system the craftsmen were subject to dual control of the state. The *kahya*, the executive authority within the guild structure, acted as the intermediary between the central authority and guild members. On the one hand, they fulfilled the role of the representative of the guild *vis-à-vis* the government, and on the other hand assumed the basic responsibility of seeing to it that the laws were regularly obeyed. The *kadis* and the *muhtesips* represented state control in executive and economic matters.<sup>21</sup> Through these officials, the state ensured its authority over the dynamics of the market; the price and quality qualifications of the items traded were all determined, regulated and maintained by the state itself. The *kadis* also represented the state authority in matters concerning the organizational structure of the guilds.<sup>22</sup>

On the basis of the account given above, one may conclude that the Ottoman state held a monopoly in the economic sphere. Moreover, the values and norms governing the action in society were formulated on the basis of either the Islamic principles or *Örfî* laws issued by the Sultan, and their proper practice were ensured by the

---

<sup>21</sup>. İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 150-62; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, 156-8. See also Huricihan İslamoğlu-İnan, 1991, 35-6. Robert Mantran ed., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi (History of the Ottoman Empire)*, trans. Server Tanilli, vol. 1 (İstanbul: Say Dağıtım Ltd. Şti., 1992), 256-73.

<sup>22</sup>. İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 150-62; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, 156-7, 159-61.

officials responsible to the center.<sup>23</sup> Such an effective presence of the state in both the economic and social spheres, coupled with the fact that it had a distinct identity and structure from the rest of the society, led to the formulation of the legitimacy of state power not on its responsiveness to society, but on military might and divine will.<sup>24</sup>

The rest of the society was commonly named the *reaya*.<sup>25</sup> The relationship between the *askeri* and *reaya* was also manifest in the principle of "the circle of justice," which was a legacy of the Asia-Front tradition.<sup>26</sup> The circle of justice meant that the state was held to be the provider and protector of justice.<sup>27</sup> For the state to survive and also perform its basic

---

<sup>23</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, p. 13, Mardin, "Freedom in an Ottoman Perspective," in *State, Democracy and Military in Turkey in the 1980s*, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 29-30.

<sup>24</sup>. Timur, *Osmanlı Kimliği (Ottoman Identity)* (İstanbul: Hil Yayın, 1986), 59-61.

<sup>25</sup>. In this instance we should note the counter argument posed by Timur against the tendency to classify all those falling outside state ranks as *reaya*. Making a class analysis of the Ottoman society, Timur uses the term only for the peasants, and refers to the moneylenders and merchants as forming one side of the economic basis of the state beside the rulers. Timur, *Osmanlı Toplumsal Düzeni*, 201, 232.

<sup>26</sup>. The idea of the circle of justice as the basic formula for the duties of the state and the society had its origin in the *Kutadgu Bilig* (1069) of Yusuf Khass Hajib. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 61-2. On the other hand, the emphasis on justice is commonly linked to the "Islamic Middle Eastern Civilization" as presented by Nizam ul-Mülk, whereby the ruler is believed to have been created by God to provide justice to the ruled. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, 112; Timur, *Osmanlı Toplumsal Düzeni*, 177.

<sup>27</sup>. Justice in the Ottoman system meant simply the "protection of the *reaya* against administrative abuses." İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 66. In a more comprehensive context when coupled with the preponderance of the concern with keeping the order as such it connoted the preservation of the status of each and every subject, i.e., the maintenance of the hierarchical structure. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 11-2.

function, the military assumed a central role. For the military to function effectively, the state needed revenues which the reaya was responsible to provide by paying regular taxes.<sup>28</sup> Thus, the one basic link between the ruled and state was through taxation. The ruled had no say in the ruling process.<sup>29</sup>

The reaya was divided among itself along economic and religious lines. There was almost no horizontal mobility in the society.<sup>30</sup> However, the economic and religious divisions within the society did not necessarily overlap. Outside the workplace the individual was identified according to the religious community to which he belonged.<sup>31</sup> The division along religious lines was structured by the *millet* system, the grand community to which the particular individual belonged through religious and ethical lines. Outside the boundaries of his religious community, the individual had no identity of his own. The link between the individual and state could only be established through the leaders of his *millet*. In this respect, the concept of *had* corresponded to the realm of individual action which was delineated by its family, status, religion and wealth. Only within that particular realm the individual had the right of action on his behalf, and insofar as it was also compatible with

---

<sup>28</sup>. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, 112.

<sup>29</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 16.

<sup>30</sup>. As argued by Berkes the Ottoman system was based on the continuity of the separateness of the basic economic functionaries: the farmers, merchants and artisans. *Ibid.*, 10-1.

<sup>31</sup>. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 150-1.

the existing rules and regulations as well as with the traditions.<sup>32</sup>

All in all, the main characteristic of the Ottoman system was the clear-cut distance between the ruler and ruled. Yet, this does not mean that the service in state ranks was hereditary and thus closed to other segments of society. On the contrary, there was a selective upward mobility. However, the servants of the ruler comprised a distinct body with an identity totally separate from society. The only link between the ruler and the ruled was the performance of the responsibilities. The state was held responsible to provide justice for the preservation of statusquo, and hence social structure.<sup>33</sup> And the people were held responsible for regular payment of taxes and allegiance to the ruler.

The Ottoman empire serves as a model for the experience of living with a state tradition. The criterion used in assessing the state tradition in a country, elaborated in the preceding chapter, fit well into the Ottoman example. To begin with, the determination and supervision by the state of the fundamentals of political and social life corresponds to the concept of sovereignty as interpreted by Pierre Birnbaum.<sup>34</sup> The foundation of the basis of authority

---

<sup>32</sup>. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, 166.

<sup>33</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 10-2.

<sup>34</sup>. Pierre Birnbaum, "State, Center and Bureaucracy," *Government and Opposition*, 16 (1981), 58-77. However, here it should be noted that the norms of action as fixed by the state were confined to the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, roughly to fiscal and economic concerns. More briefly, the state was determinative in the

outside the society further confirms that the society was a passive recipient of the order imposed by central authority.

Additionally, in the Ottoman system, administration was located within the structure of the central authority. The members of the bureaucracy owed direct responsibility and loyalty to the Sultan only, who was perceived to be the locus of the state. The activities of each and every official were to be appraised directly by the Sultan. In this sense the already noted concept of *had* is illustrative. Besides connoting boundaries of action of the common individual, *had* also determined the sphere of interest and function of the government official. The official serving the state had the responsibility and authority only within his office, and was not to concern himself with matters falling out of his own sphere,<sup>35</sup> which can be viewed as a pre-modern replica of what Nettl terms as sectoral autonomy of the state.<sup>36</sup>

Last but not least, when the relation between law and the state in the Ottoman Empire is analyzed, one comes across the predominant status of the latter over the former. In the Ottoman system, law had no distinct

---

one basic sphere of its interaction with the society, i.e., in the flow of revenues. In this respect Shaw has pointed at the variety of *millet*s practising their own ethical codes and norms of action both within their own communities and in their relationship with each other. Shaw, "Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Reformers," in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, 32.

<sup>35</sup>. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, 166.

<sup>36</sup>. J.P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics*, 20 (4) (July 1968), 320-2.



realm from the state itself, but was perceived basically as a means of control of the ruled by the ruler. Apart from the principles of religious law, it was the state, deified in the person of the Sultan which had sole authority, to issue laws and regulations. Also, the fact that the interpreters of the religious law, *Ulema*, were appointed and dismissed at the will of the Sultan further confirms such an argument.<sup>37</sup>

The analysis presented thus far backs the argument that the Ottoman system serves as a model for the experience of state tradition. As far as the basic theme of this study is concerned, and drawing upon the argument by Nettl that intellectual tradition is one dimension of the experience with stateness,<sup>38</sup> the role of the intellectual in the Ottoman system becomes pertinent.

#### **"INSTITUTIONAL INTELLECTUAL":<sup>39</sup> FROM ADVISOR TO RULER**

In the Ottoman empire, knowledge traditionally meant that of Islam, and hence was reserved for the monopoly of the *Ulema*. In this respect, one must differentiate between *lore* and *science*, which referred to the different

---

<sup>37</sup>. The criteria of the dominantly active presence of the state in the legal sphere is also utilized by Kenneth H.F. Dyson in the differentiation of "state societies" from "stateless societies." Accordingly, Dyson presents the former as those societies with a tradition of state acting as a law-giver. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and Institution* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), 19, fn. 2.

<sup>38</sup>. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," 566.

<sup>39</sup>. Edward Shils, "Intellectuals and responsibility," in *The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals*, eds. Ian Maclean, Alan Montefiore and Peter Winch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 257-307. In the present study the institutional intellectual is taken as the intellectual educated and recruited by the state.

spheres of the act of "knowing." As far as the former is concerned, the subject of knowing was limited to tradition and belief. In this sense, the classical Ottoman men of knowledge were identified with respect to their authority over Islamic knowledge.<sup>40</sup> On the other hand, science, in order to find its place in the sphere of knowledge, had to wait for the detrimental experience of military defeat at the hands of the West that brought about the beginning of the irreversible decline.<sup>41</sup>

#### **The Ottoman Intellectual of "Advise Literature"<sup>42</sup>**

The Ottoman state acted as a recruitment mechanism for the men of knowledge. Their function had primarily been the interpretation of Islamic principles, the evaluation of the acts of the Sultan as regards their compatibility with religious law, and the depiction of the norms of conduct among the Muslim *millet*. It was from the late-classical age onwards that the Ottoman intellectual appeared to bear the role of advisor within the state mechanism in the search for the ways of "how to save the state."

---

<sup>40</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 98-100.

<sup>41</sup>. Shaw cites the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) as the marking point in the Ottoman history when the loss of territory was absolutely ensured. It is from then on that the classical Ottoman disregard of the West was replaced by a concern with the reasons of decline in the face of Western superiority. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, 225.

<sup>42</sup>. The term is borrowed from Virginia H. Aksan, "Ottoman Political Writing, 1768-1808," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 25 (1993), 53-69.

The existence of state as a constant phenomenon is observable in the Ottoman intellectual layout, whereby the main preoccupation had been with the question of what the structure and functions of the state "ought to be." A look at the analysis of the writings of the classical age suffices to conclude that what was at stake was a "paternal state,"<sup>43</sup> with its all-embracing institutions and structures that served to preserve the order of society. In this instance, the argument by Dyson is relevant. Dyson states that the conception of society as an hierarchical organization is substantiated by a paternal concept of state, the basic function of which is to ensure the durability of the existing societal configuration.<sup>44</sup> As already noted, the Ottoman system was based on a dual stratification of society along religious and economic dimensions. Since the sustenance of the Ottoman state depended at one point on the continuous flow of taxes from the ruled, the ruler was assigned with the duty of providing for the conditions to keep each and every individual in its status.<sup>45</sup> In this respect, the argument by Karl Mannheim, that every individual is born into a settled societal pattern which to a great extent shapes the predominant configuration of thought and

---

<sup>43</sup>. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, 140.

<sup>44</sup>. Ibid., p.140. Apart from the traditional Ottoman conception of justice, the fact that from the late sixteenth century onwards the Empire was in a state of flux, led the Ottoman intellectual to emphasize the function of the state as providing order in the society. A comparative example can be found in the post-Franco-Prussian War France whereby external vulnerability and internal distress were taken to have led to the centrality of order in the formulation of state theories. Ibid., 83ff.

<sup>45</sup>. Karpat, "Land Regime, Social Structure and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire," 73.

conduct,<sup>46</sup> is illuminative. In the Ottoman context, this corresponds to an intellectual totally preoccupied with the ideal of the sustenance of order, and who, till as late as the twentieth century, would be in almost total disregard of society, except insofar as its existing structure is in question. As far as the conceptual schema common to the Ottoman intellectuals is concerned, the state had been the center of intellectual preoccupation. The common themes had been justice, on the part of the state, and obligation, on the part of society, as the bases of order. The means to achieve order were perceived to be determined and actualized by the state. The Sultan, as the locus of the state, was perceived to possess absolute authority and to be the *sine-qua-non* for the prevention of potential conflict and unrest in society which would arise in case individual members were left to their own devices.<sup>47</sup>

The textual reference for the Ottoman intellectual was the *Kutadgu Bilig* of Yusuf Khass Hajib. The concept of circle of justice as formulated in this work provided both the framework of the social stratification and the role of the state. Exemplary is the *Ahlak-ı Ala'i* of Ali Kinalızade, a prominent sixteenth-century Ottoman intellectual. In his book Ali Kinalızade, drawing upon the concept of circle of justice, justifies the Ottoman social stratification, while according each social category its set of duties and rights which correspond to

---

<sup>46</sup>. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (San Diego, New York and London: 1985), 3.

<sup>47</sup>. İnalcık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu: Toplum ve Ekonomi*, 340.

its status in the society.<sup>48</sup> Apart from internal dynamics, *Kutadgu Bilig* also had its reflection on the Ottoman conception of state by the definition of the external function of the state as that of extending the boundaries of Islam.<sup>49</sup> Such an approach to the function of the state can be linked to the Ottoman perception of the West, i.e., Christendom, as the inferior-infidel 'other.'<sup>50</sup> In this respect, the absolute authority of the state, identified in the person of the Sultan was legitimated on two grounds; that of divine will, and derived from it, military power.

As stated above, from the late-sixteenth century onwards the Ottoman intellectual was to engage in a struggle against the ever-deepening problems, in all spheres including the economy and society, that the Empire faced. The failures at the battlefield which had the long-run effect of revenue-loss for the Empire, constituted the most conspicuous cause of economic deterioration. Such a development was also accompanied by the decline of the *tımar* system, which in turn led to the weakening of the control of land by the state.<sup>51</sup>

---

<sup>48</sup>. Aksan, "Ottoman Political Writing," 53.

<sup>49</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>. For the classical Ottoman perception of the West, see Hüseyin G. Yurdaydın, "Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi" (History of Thought and Science) in *Türkiye Tarihi (History of Turkey)*, ed. Sina Akşin, vol.3 (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1988), 251.

<sup>51</sup>. The dissolution of the *tımar* system was also due to the recruitment of the *reaya* to military service, from late-sixteenth century onwards, which further enhanced the curtailment of state revenues. İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 47; Karpat, "Land Regime, Social Structure and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire," 69-90.

Military degradation was just the surface cause of internal decline. The all-encompassing reason for the decline was the inability of the Empire to catch up with the already industrializing West. The West had been going through an ages-long process of development. While geographical discoveries were providing military upperhand and trading advantages,<sup>52</sup> social developments were bringing about the replacement of the traditional agricultural structures with industrial economies which had formed the second dimension of Western superiority. Another factor further deepening the crisis was the flow of American silver into the Empire in large quantities which had the final effect of the devaluation of Ottoman currency.<sup>53</sup>

At first hand, the remedies were sought in restrengthening the state as an all-out solution. What is called the advise literature was localized first and foremost among the ranks of the *Ulema*, and mainly comprised the works of the official historiographers. In this respect, as argued by Fleischer, Mustafa Ali (1541-1600) -a student of Ali Kinalizade- introduced a new outlook into the advise literature.<sup>54</sup> To begin with,

---

<sup>52</sup>. Among the many, the primary incident was the loss of the prominence of the Silk Road that had been for centuries a major source of revenue for the Empire, due to the new routes of trade that the West acquired through the Americas and Africa. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, 172.

<sup>53</sup>. For a multi-dimensional analysis of the reasons of Ottoman decline, see *Ibid.*, especially 169-215.

<sup>54</sup>. Cornell Fleischer, "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism and 'Ibn Khaldunism' in Sixteenth Century Ottoman Letters," in *Ibn Khaldun and Islamic Ideology*, Bruce B. Lawrence ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984), 49-61; *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: Mustafa Ali*

although Mustafa Ali was no exception among the Ottoman intellectuals with religious education, in his writings it is possible to observe a reservation on the monopoly of the divine will as the root of legitimate power, and thus a shift to more functional concerns as to increase the efficiency of the ruling mechanism.<sup>55</sup> Based on his analogy between the physician and the state, the latter being responsible for curing societal sickness,<sup>56</sup> and relating the problems of his time to institutional decadence, Mustafa Ali saw the escape from further decline in the restoration of the Sultan's authority.<sup>57</sup> He was critical of the bureaucratic corruption which he linked to the arbitrary staffing of bureaucratic ranks, as a natural extension of the increasing need of the Empire for state officials. In this respect, he staunchly argued for appropriate education and professional training as the basic principles for recruitment.

Apart from Mustafa Ali's precedence, Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddimah* provided another reference point especially for the seventeenth-century Ottoman historiographer.<sup>58</sup> His explanation of the decay of the state, as a natural outcome of being, invoked inquisitiveness among Ottoman

---

(1541-1600) (Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986).

<sup>55</sup>. Ibid., 201-13. See also Fleischer "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism and 'Ibn Khaldunism' in Sixteenth Century Ottoman Letters," 56.

<sup>56</sup>. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire*, 244.

<sup>57</sup>. Ibid., 201-13

<sup>58</sup>. For the analytical parallelism between Mustafa Ali and Ibn Khaldun, see Fleischer, "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism and 'Ibn Khaldunism' in Sixteenth Century Ottoman Letters," 46-69.

intellectuals.<sup>59</sup> The divergence appears to be where Ibn Khaldun approached the decline of the states as an inevitable phase of history. The Ottoman intellectuals were optimistic enough to argue for the possibility of stopping the decline of the Empire. They had faith in returning to the victorious old days, once the causes of the decline were apprehended.<sup>60</sup> Here, it is again possible to point at the emphasis on the function of the state to ease the pains that the Empire was going through.

In this respect, the writings of the two prominent seventeenth-century historiographers, Katip Çelebi and Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi, are illustrative. It is possible to observe in both the influence of Ibn Khaldun, as far as the organic view is concerned, and that of Mustafa Ali, as far as the remedies, suggested for dealing with the problems of the day, were in question. The paternalistic connotation common to the Ottoman intellectual is also evident here,<sup>61</sup> that both proposed reforms regarding state officials in line with what was ideal, the criteria of which were honor, justice, and the capability of taking timely precautions.<sup>62</sup>

The Ottoman historiographers of the late-sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are mostly important for the piecemeal meeting of the Empire with the West in the sphere of knowing. With such a precedence, the following

---

<sup>59</sup>. Ibid., 47.

<sup>60</sup>. Ibid., 48.

<sup>61</sup>. Illustrative is the analogy provided by Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi between parent-child on the one hand, and state-society on the other hand. Yurdaydın, "Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi," 263.

<sup>62</sup>. Ibid., 255-67.



decades witnessed the emergence of a new type of intellectual stratum primarily within the bureaucratic ranks. It was this strata that we now turn as the protagonists and initiators of a new epoch in Ottoman history, the epoch of Westernization, out of which the main subject of this study, the liberal intellectual, would emerge.

### **A New Identity For the Ottoman Intellectual: Between Tradition and Modernity**

As stated above, the attempts of the late-sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for reforming the state mechanism were to turn into a project of modernization, taken as Westernization in the following centuries. Justifying the chain effect, the first failure in the face of the superiority of the West in the battlefield would lead to a change in the Ottoman perception of the West from the inferior infidel to one that must be taken as a model for improvement, first and foremost in the technical sphere, and subsequently to an aspiration to understand it in all its aspects.

The emulation of the West by the Ottomans basically in technical terms began in the eighteenth century. In this respect, the most conspicuous development was the introduction of printing (1729), which bore the seeds of the examination of the Western way of government. The leading figure in this era was İbrahim Müteferrika (1670?-1754) who, besides his prominence in the opening of the first press house, provided seminal works which

paved the way for more comprehensive reform attempts of the coming decades. Berkes has cited the '*Usul ul-Hikam fi Nizam ul-'Umam* (1731) as the most significant work of İbrahim Müteferrika, which he submitted to Mahmud I (1730-1754). The book mainly concentrated on the military aspects of Western superiority and proposed parallel military reforms for the Ottomans to escape from decline. Additionally, he provided works in a wide range of fields including geography and physics which introduced European science.<sup>63</sup>

Following the subsequent conservative reaction, the task of Westernization was to be revitalized in the late-eighteenth century. During the reign of Selim III, (1788-1807) radical military reforms, under the supervision of foreign experts, were adopted as the basic project. On the other hand, and most importantly, the practise of sending Ottoman officials abroad with the duty of observing the structure and functioning of the Western institutions,<sup>64</sup> was systematized in 1793, by the establishment of permanent embassies.<sup>65</sup> In spite of the failure of the reform attempts in the short term, due to the recurrence of stultifying reaction coming from the conservative wing,<sup>66</sup> they formed precedence for the more far-reaching measures of the following periods.

---

<sup>63</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 36-47.

<sup>64</sup>. Ibid., 33-41.

<sup>65</sup>. Ibid., 77.

<sup>66</sup>. For the conservative reaction against the eighteenth century reform attempts, see Ibid., 51-89.

The opening of the medical and engineering schools basically with military concerns are important in this sense.<sup>67</sup> The introduction of scientific studies in these newly established institutions threw the seeds for the cultivation of a new type of men of knowledge donned with a new outlook. Acquainted with the Western type institutions and ideas throughout his education, and hence sharply differing from his predecessors, the new intellectual was to give precedence to the superiority of science to the detriment of lore. It was he who gained the upper hand in the bureaucratic ranks, and initiated a break away from the antedating traditional reformism.<sup>68</sup>

#### **THE NEW ROLE OF THE INTELLECTUAL IN THE POLICY MAKING PROCESS: THE CASE OF TANZİMAT**

The new intellectual was to reflect his presence on the politics of the Empire through a series of reforms which made up the essence of his ruling time, known as

---

<sup>67</sup>. Prior to *Tanzimat* all the high schools were established within the structure of military education. In this respect, the first meeting with the Western ideas was experienced in the Schools of Engineering and Medicine which were mere branches of military education. *Ibid.*, 75, 99-132; Cahid Baltacı, "Osmanlı Eğitim Sistemi" (Ottoman Education System) in *Osmanlı Ansiklopedisi (Ottoman Encyclopedia)*, vol.2. (İstanbul: Ağaç Yayıncılık, 1993), 105.

<sup>68</sup>. For the perception of reform attempts, till as late as the second half of nineteenth century, within the context of traditional reformism, see Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, 225-77; İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı (The Longest Century of the Empire)* (İstanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1987); Mardin, *Türkiye'de İktisadi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi (The Development of the Economic Thought in Turkey)* (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Maliye Enstitüsü, 1962) (12), 10-1; Shaw, "Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Reformers," 29-9.

the *Tanzimat* era (1839-1876).<sup>69</sup> In this period, the new intellectual consolidated his standing not only against the traditionalist wing, but also *vis-à-vis* the Sultan through a set of measures. By initiating the codification of a criminal code, the *Tanzimat* Charter (*Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu*) (1839), the basic texture initiating the *Tanzimat* era, aimed to provide security for the state official from the arbitrary punishment and dismissal by the Sultan.<sup>70</sup> Additionally, the Charter also contained the concept of law to be based not merely on the *Şeri* principles and arbitrary enactments of the Sultan, but on the prerequisite of the proper governance of the people.<sup>71</sup> The most prominent indicator of such a development was the acceptance by the Sultan to abide by the laws which were to be enacted by an independent assembly.

Apart from the strengthening of the disposition of the bureaucracy *vis-à-vis* the Sultan, the relation between the latter and the people was also redefined. In this respect, the fact that both were bound by the same rule had significant connotations for the perception of the ruled. Such a measure is interpreted by some as a sign of a conceptual shift from ruled-as-subject to the

---

<sup>69</sup>. Literally, *Tanzimat* corresponds to ordering. In the Ottoman context it meant reorganization. *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Tarih Sözlüğü* (Dictionary of History from Tanzimat to the Republic), ed. Necdet Sakaoğlu (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 125; Ortaylı, "Tanzimat," in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.6 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 1545.

<sup>70</sup>. İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri" (Implementation of Tanzimat and Its Social Reactions), *Bellekten* 28 (112) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1964), 620.

<sup>71</sup>. *Ibid.*, 619.

ruled-as-citizen.<sup>72</sup> The arguments in this strain draw upon the enactment of the Code on Citizenship (*Tabiiyet Kanunu*-1869), which ensured the legally equal status of Muslims and non-Muslims alike which had already been acknowledged in the *Tanzimat* Charter (1839) and subsequently in the Reform Edict (1856).<sup>73</sup> However, such a development should be comprehended more as a reflection of the deepening influence of the West on the Empire, and relatedly as a way to cope with the increasing uprisings by the non-Muslim population with nationalist aspirations.<sup>74</sup> Additionally, the tendency to appeal to the ruled-as-citizens rather than as subjects is interpreted as one measure by the center to reassure its control over the periphery *vis-à-vis* the increasing strength of the local notables as intermediaries between the ruler and the ruled.<sup>75</sup>

Apart from that, the granting of legal guarantee for life and property was also interpreted as connoting a new conception of justice, by incorporating a worldly dimension, and thus expanding its context from both the tutelage of the will of the Sultan, and the strict

---

<sup>72</sup>. Zafer Toprak, "İktisat Tarihi" (History of Economics) in *Türkiye Tarihi*, ed. Sina Akşin, vol.3 (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1988), 198; and Yurdaydın, "Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi," 292.

<sup>73</sup>. The principle of equality of Muslims and non-Muslims before the law was to be one grounds of agitation of the traditionalist wing against the *Tanzimat* reforms. İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri," 623-49; Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 75.

<sup>74</sup>. Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire: 1856-1876* (New York: Gordion Press, 1973), 234-70.

<sup>75</sup>. Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations," 169-90. For the relation between local notables and center, see Karpat, "Land Regime, Social Structure and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire," 69-90.

application of respective religious laws.<sup>76</sup> Hence, justice came to mean more than preserving societal hierarchy. Such a shift in the perception of justice can be seen in the establishment of independent courts with the authority of supervision over issuance of penalties,<sup>77</sup> and in matters which were assessed to be outside the sphere of the religious law.<sup>78</sup>

In this respect, the measures taken by the *Tanzimat* intellectual-as-bureaucrat, who aimed to preserve for himself a breathing space from the arbitrary will of the Sultan, and to assume authority in the state structure, may be considered to contain the glimmerings of the concept of the rule-of-law just for themselves, however unintentionally.<sup>79</sup> Indeed, it is possible to interpret the

---

<sup>76</sup>. İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri," 619. Berkes has dated the change in the conception of justice back to the rule of Mahmud II, whom he names as the "enlightened monarch." In this respect, he has cited the introduction of the concept of "adalet" (justice) by Mahmud II, as distinct from *Şeriat* and *Kanun*, and thus its implication of a legal sphere outside the both. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 92, 94-5. On the other hand, Karpas has linked the significance given to the security of life and property to such practical concerns of the center as to gain the support of the masses against the local notables. Karpas, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 3 (1972), 243-81.

<sup>77</sup>. Such a measure had significant implications not only for the ordinary men, but also for the members of the bureaucracy whose life, property and status in the state had long been dependent on the will of the Sultan.

<sup>78</sup>. For a detailed analysis of the institutional reflections of the change in the conception of justice, see Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 156-9. The contradictions between the enactment of codes, based mainly on Western models, and the religious law, can be observed especially in the sphere of penal code and trade. Exemplary are 1838 Commercial Treaty with England, 1850 Commercial Code, 1858 Penal Code, 1858 Land Code. For a thorough analysis in this respect, see *Ibid.*, 161-4; Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 141-4.

<sup>79</sup>. For a similar assessment see Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 146; İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve

reforms in the legal sphere as the manifestation of the attempt to forge a distinct identity for the legislative and judicial organs, outside the sphere of both the Sultan and the *Ulema*, that would hold the authority in setting out the principles of the relationship between the ruled and the ruler.<sup>80</sup> Exemplary here was the establishment of *Meclis-i Ahkam-ı Adliye*,<sup>81</sup> to devise required rules and regulations for the enactment of the reform package, as well as to supervise over the disputes between the ruled and the ruler. However, here one should bear in mind the fact that the officials were still appointed by the Sultan and the realization of the laws were dependent on their being ratified by the Sultan.<sup>82</sup> The final attempt came with the establishment of *Divan-ı Ahkam-ı Adliye* (1868) which assumed authority over the secular courts.<sup>83</sup>

Thus, unlike their predecessors, though sharing the same unease in the face of external threat coupled with internal unrest, the former being due to both military degradation and economic backwardness, the latter mainly

---

Sosyal Tepkileri," especially 620; Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, especially 21, 180.

<sup>80</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 146. Dyson has pointed at the concern with the public law as a characteristic of "state" societies. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, 115. The attempt to delineate a sphere of public law distinct from the religious law in the *Tanzimat* era is also significant in this respect.

<sup>81</sup>. *Meclis-i Vala-yı Ahkam-ı Adliye* (1837) and *Meclis-i Ali-i Tanzimat* (1853) subsequently acted as the legislative organs of the *Tanzimat* era. *Meclis-i Ahkam-ı Adliye* (1853-1861) was formed as a branch of *Meclis-i Vala-yı Ahkam-ı Adliye* (1837). In 1861 it rejoined the latter. *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Tarih Sözlüğü*, 82, 84.

<sup>82</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 146.

<sup>83</sup>. *Ibid.*, 157.

to the emerging nationalist aspirations again as a result of Western impact, the *Tanzimat* men diverged from the conception of state-as-might.<sup>84</sup> Rather, they concentrated on the reformation basically in the judicial sphere, which led to subsequent codifications<sup>85</sup> beginning with commerce and then extending to the public sphere.<sup>86</sup>

In this respect, it is possible to observe a shift in the role of the bureaucracy from preserving the existing order, to a tendency towards creating a new one.<sup>87</sup> In a sense, the *Tanzimat* intellectual-as-bureaucrat displayed a portrait of "intellectual-as-legislator,"<sup>88</sup>

---

<sup>84</sup>. As different from the conception of state-as-law, the idea of state-as-might takes economic and military power as the basis of the legitimacy of sovereignty. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, 102. Thus it can be argued that state-as-might well corresponds to the Ottoman idea of the state in the periods antedating *Tanzimat* when reform attempts were carried out extensively with the concern of recapturing the military supremacy of the Empire in the face of the West. For a supportive assessment, see Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*; Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 34.

<sup>85</sup>. "The whole assumption of the *Tanzimat* was that reform meant codification, systematization, and control..." Shaw, "Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Reformers," 33.

<sup>86</sup>. İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri." Ortaylı has pointed at the break in the *Tanzimat* period with the traditional reformism Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 80. However, such a shift did not happen out-of-the blue. Instead, it can be interpreted as a natural outcome of the preceding reform attempts. See Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 89-132, for the significance of the rule of Mahmud II in the emergence of the *Tanzimat* intellectual-as-bureaucrat, as well as of the first seeds of a new conception of justice outside the sphere of both the *Kanuns* of the Sultan and the religious law.

<sup>87</sup>. Traditionally, bureaucracy was one group of the slaves of the Sultan whose authority were confined to administrative sphere and the application of the rules and regulations in accordance with the will of the latter.

<sup>88</sup>. The term is borrowed from Zygmunt Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987). In his comparative analysis of the role of the intellectuals in the modern and post-modern era, Bauman argues that the intellectual of the modern epoch bore the role of the legislator with an alternative set of principles for the ideal societal order as a reaction to the



however, still carrying the traditional concern of saving the state.

On the other hand, one should bear in mind the fact that the *Tanzimat* period was a period of duality. Such duality was most manifest in the judicial sphere, and particularly in devising up of a penal code. The old bases of law making, the *Şeriat* and *Örf*, continued to exist side by side with reform attempts which were modeled on the West. This led to a schizophrenic practice at times leading to a deadlock due to the incompatible nature of the religious principles and the modern secular ones. Exemplary is the 1858 Penal Code which was modeled on the French Penal Code, whereby, despite its overwhelmingly secular structure, conformity with the religious law was assured.<sup>89</sup>

On the other hand, the *Tanzimat* intellectual has, in some instances, been attributed a liberal identity.<sup>90</sup> For such an assessment, the key has been found within the economic sphere. In this respect, as far as the agricultural policies were concerned, the 1858 Land Code which promulgated the right to private property and the freedom in production, has been taken as the most

---

dominance of the Church. However, in this chapter the term is used symbolically for the *Tanzimat* intellectual. When compared to the intellectual-as-legislator of the West, *Tanzimat* intellectual lacked the cognizance with respect to the society. His ideal world was shaped by the criteria of what the state mechanism "ought to be." On the other hand, he inherently carried the seeds of his Western counterpart, i.e., the concern with what the society "ought to be," which would be furnished in the coming decades, and ultimately consolidated in the Republican era.

<sup>89</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 164.

<sup>90</sup>. Toprak, "İktisat Tarihi," 215.

prominent example.<sup>91</sup> Apart from that, the 1838 trade agreement with England formed another basis for this argument. The negation of state monopoly over trade, and the immunity from internal tariffs for exporting have been cited as liberal policies. The students of Ottoman-Turkish politics in this strain have also pointed at the 1860 Trade Convention with England and France, which gave an end to the obstacles arising from tariff regulations, as another further step towards liberalization.<sup>92</sup>

These arguments have also been countered. In this respect, the main intention underlying the reforms, specifically in the agricultural sphere, has been interpreted as the aspiration to strengthen the center vis-à-vis local notables, rather than as a reflection of the liberal mood of the era.<sup>93</sup> In this strand of arguments the subsequent privatization of the land has been perceived to be a rather unintended outcome.<sup>94</sup> Not differently, reforms in the commercial sphere have been taken as the outcome of Western influence which concentrated on the Empire as the new market for manufactured goods and as a supplier of cheap raw materials and agricultural products.<sup>95</sup> The 1838 trade agreement has been analyzed from this perspective as providing the starting point of the Western infiltration

---

<sup>91</sup>. For the liberal tendency in the adoption of agricultural policies see, Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 169-71; Mardin, *Türkiye'de İktisadi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi*, 9-10, 24.

<sup>92</sup>. Toprak, "İktisat Tarihi," 200-3.

<sup>93</sup>. Karpat, "The Land Regime, Social Structure, and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire," 69-90.

<sup>94</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>95</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 139-41.

reform package of the *Tanzimat*. These measures were not advocated on the basis of a compact liberal theory.<sup>99</sup> Besides, it is difficult to categorize the reformers in terms of a certain theoretical viewpoint; rather they can merely be viewed as policy-makers with the common goal of restrengthening the Ottoman state in the face of the West. The disjunction among the *Tanzimat* reformers is best exemplified in the conflicting dispositions of the two prominent bureaucrats of the period, Ali and Cevdet Pashas, with respect to the codification process of the civil law. In this respect Ali Pasha, who can be taken among the Westernists, proposed the modelling of the civil law on the French model. On the other hand, Cevdet Pasha, representing the conservative wing, objected to such an adoption and proposed that the codification be drawn in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence.<sup>100</sup>

Above all, one may easily name the *Tanzimat* reforms as attempts towards Westernization. It is here that the dilemma of the *Tanzimat* intellectual-as-bureaucrat comes forth; he fluctuated between tradition and the modern.<sup>101</sup>

---

<sup>99</sup>. Exemplary is the testaments of the two prominent *Tanzimat* figures, Fuad Pasha and Ali Pasha, whereby the acknowledgement of the indispensability of the protective measures exists side by side with the pseudo liberal atmosphere which was limited to the sphere of foreign trade. *Belgelerle Tanzimat: Osmanlı Sadrazamlarından Ali ve Fuad Paşaların Siyasi Vasiyetnameleri (Tanzimat in the Documents: Political Testaments of Ottoman Grand Viziers Ali and Fuad Pashas)*, ed. Engin D. Akarlı (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1978).

<sup>100</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, pp. 165-169. Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 180-90.

<sup>101</sup>. Such a dilemma was also present in the *Tanzimat* Charter, which originally declared loyalty to the religious law. İnalcık, however, has interpreted the acknowledgment of the prerequisite of conformity with religious law in the enactment of reforms as one of formal

The policy implications of such a disposition can be observed in every sphere and especially in the codification process, whereby conformity with the religious law was repeatedly asserted.<sup>102</sup>

However, the continuous effort to bring the reforms in line with tradition should not be viewed as a pathology. Rather, the explanation should be sought in the fact that the *Tanzimat* intellectual-as-bureaucrat was the product of a Western type education which existed side by side with the traditional institutions of learning, still providing a channel for state service.<sup>103</sup> Thus, the argument that the *Tanzimat* era was an experience with dual identity of the state structure gains grounds, since the *Ulema* still existed within the state ranks with their own policy alternatives, the religious law constituting one of their bases of power.

In this respect, the inherent duel between tradition and the project of Westernization of the *Tanzimat* era was to merge in the synthesizing reaction of the Young Ottoman movement in the second part of the nineteenth century.

---

traditionalism. İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri," 518.

<sup>102</sup>. For the tensions arising out of the duality in the legal structure in the *Tanzimat* era, see Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 160-69.

<sup>103</sup>. Dyson has noted that the cross-fertilization of foreign ideas into the native intellectual framework does not occur in an isolated style. Rather the ideas imported are exposed to interpretations based on "...wider cultural attributes." Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, 156.

## Intellectuals of Opposition: Press as the New Circle

The *Tanzimat* period contained the seeds of a new type of intellectual, infiltrated by Western, and especially by the French Enlightenment thought. In contrast to the preceding era, it initiated the intellectual framework of the search for escape from decline not in the past, but in the present. The *Tanzimat* intellectual, unlike his predecessors, was in quest for transcending the present, rather than rebuilding the past.<sup>104</sup> Such a preoccupation also corresponded to a new conception of history as progress, which formed the second dimension of break with the classical Ottoman intellectual.<sup>105</sup> Last but not least, the period, however slowly, introduced a new attribute to the intellectual, - the "critical discourse."<sup>106</sup> It is especially in this respect, that the *Tanzimat* period provided a framework for the introduction of the press as an intermediary, though rather a weak one, in the articulation and dissemination of ideas.<sup>107</sup>

---

<sup>104</sup>. Shaw, "Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Reformers," 31-2; İltis Turan, *Westernization and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey*, Occasional Paper, (Ebenhausen, Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) (May 1989), 8-12.

<sup>105</sup>. Mardin, "Tanzimat ve Aydınlar" (*Tanzimat and Intellectuals*), in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.1, 53-4.

<sup>106</sup>. *Ibid.*, 47-9.

<sup>107</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 192. Except for the first official Turkish newspaper of the Empire, *Takvim-i Vekayi* (1831), *Tercuman-ı Ahval* (1860), *Tasvir-i Efkar* (1861), *Muhbir* (1863), and *Mirat* (1867) can be cited as the first instances of the experience with the relatively independent dissemination of ideas to the public. See Orhan Koloğlu, "Osmanlı Basını: İçeriği ve Rejimi" (*Ottoman Press: Its Content and Regime*), in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.1, 68-94.

Thus emerged a new wing of intellectuals, in opposition, and with an alternative sphere of function, around the press.<sup>108</sup> Such a disposition also contained connotations of a switch in the perception of the role of intellectual from a mere legislator to one preoccupied with educating the people.<sup>109</sup> However, this should not be mislead one to conclude with a portrait of independent intellectuals. On the contrary, the Ottoman intellectual kept his organic links with the state. This was mostly due to the fact that he was still educated by and for the state. His identity yet lacked any social projection.<sup>110</sup>

Yet, the press as a new circle for the intellectuals was not yet firmly established, because the strong hold of the state on the press continued. The 1865 Press Code made it possible to commit any publication found offensive to the state to pay heavy penalties and/or imprisonment for owners/editors. State control over the press was extended by a provision in the 1867 Sublime Decree. The provision gave the state the right of supervision over and stop the publications in case they were thought to be detrimental for the Empire.<sup>111</sup> Another

---

<sup>108</sup>. The assessment by Mardin that "Young Ottomans were the first ideologues of the Ottoman Empire. Their medium of action was not the sword, but the word" very well illustrates this point. Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), 397.

<sup>109</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 197-8; Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 146.

<sup>110</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 207.

<sup>111</sup>. The first example would be the closure of *Muhbir* in May 1867. For further information about the Press Code and its application, see Koloğlu, "Osmanlı Basını: İçeriği ve Rejimi," 68-94; Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 149-50.

practical reflection of the dependent status of the intellectual to the state can be observed in his swinging between exiles and returns to state service on state pardon. One such figure of the period was Namık Kemal (1840-1888). Namık Kemal experienced his first exile in 1867 by his appointment to provincial service. He continued his exile abroad between 1867-1871. Upon the pardon of the state, he returned to the country in 1871, and in 1873 was imprisoned in Cyprus. In 1876 he was again pardoned and returned to İstanbul.

### **The Young Ottomans and Freedom in Tradition**

The second half of the nineteenth century was marked by the Young Ottoman movement, which was formed into a society in 1865. The intellectuals that participated in this movement were mainly the graduates of the secular schools of the *Tanzimat* era. The origins of the movement lied in the opposition towards the policies of the *Tanzimat* bureaucrats. The main target was the higher bureaucrats such as Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha and their Westernization project, rather than the Sultan.<sup>112</sup> Their ideas were expressed in the newspapers *Tasvir-i Efkar*(1861), *Mirat*(1863), and *Muhbir*(1867). The official organ of the movement began publication in 1868 under the name *Hürriyet*.<sup>113</sup>

---

<sup>112</sup>. Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, 108-15.

<sup>113</sup>. Mardin, "Yeni Osmanlılar ve Siyasi Fikirleri" (Young Ottomans and Their Political Ideas), in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.6, 1698-1701.

These intellectuals were gathered around the ideal of a parliamentary system of government and the need for a constitution. In this respect, the open letter of Mustafa Fazıl Pasha (1867) to Abdülaziz (1861-1876) was important, since it represented the gist of the Young Ottoman thought.<sup>114</sup> The key term in the letter was "freedom." Freedom was perceived to be the basic need of the Empire to avoid further decadence and to achieve progress. The conception of freedom as formulated in the letter also contained the idea of a ruling mechanism with checks which, in the final analysis, would merge the Young Ottomans around the ideal of a parliamentary regime. Another important point was that Mustafa Fazıl Pasha stressed the necessity of a distinct sphere of laws for the state from that of religion.<sup>115</sup> Ironically, this point constituted the dilemma for the Young Ottomans. They were at a loss concerning the question of how to reconcile their Western-inspired ideals with tradition, that is with Islam.<sup>116</sup>

Among the Young Ottomans, Namık Kemal's writings were significant, in that he tried to come up with a synthesis. Mainly influenced by the writings of Rousseau

---

<sup>114</sup>. For the important role that Mustafa Fazıl Pasha played in the Young Ottoman movement, see Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 153-60. For a brief outline of the letter, see Tefrik Çavdar, *Türkiye'de Liberalizm (1860-1990) (Liberalism in Turkey)* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1992), 14-5. For more information about the ideas of Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, see Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, 276-83.

<sup>115</sup>. Mustafa Fazıl Pasha held the idea that religion was purely a matter of eternal life, and thus should be kept outside the ruling sphere. *Ibid.*, 282.

<sup>116</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 206.



and Montesquieu,<sup>117</sup> Namık Kemal attempted to find grounds to his liberal disposition in Islam. His 'liberal' side was discernible in his advocacy of the consent of the people, that is a parliamentary regime.<sup>118</sup> He also approached the theme of freedom from a 'liberal' stance, with the presumption that all individuals are born with natural rights the boundaries of which are delineated in respect to the absolute good. However, in his writings the absolute good turned out to mean the good as defined by religious law.<sup>119</sup> Namık Kemal applied the determinative hand of divine will to the society through the religious law which he perceived to be an ideal reflection of the former in the formation and survival of societies.<sup>120</sup>

Namık Kemal viewed the state as a moral personality, with no existence transcending the people.<sup>121</sup> The state in this respect was equally bound with religious law. Here one faces an admixture of traditionalism with

---

<sup>117</sup>. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 142; Kamıran Birand, *Aydınlanma Devri Devlet Felsefesinin Tanzimat'a Tesirleri (Effects of State Philosophy of Enlightenment Period on Tanzimat)* (Ankara: Son Havadis, 1955), 29.

<sup>118</sup>. For the conciliation of Islamic principles with the idea of freedom and prerequisites of a parliamentary regime see Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 208-18; Mardin, "Yeni Osmanlılar ve Siyasi Fikirleri," 1700-1.

<sup>119</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 211. The determinative existence of the absolute will as the conditioner of the individual rights is not foreign to the liberal theory. On the contrary, in Locke one can observe the prerequisite that laws of society be in conformity with the divine law. See David Gauthier, "Why Ought One Obey God? Reflections on Hobbes and Locke", in *Essays on Early Modern Philosophers: From Descartes and Hobbes to Newton and Leibniz*, ed. Vere Chappel (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992), 103-25.

<sup>120</sup>. Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, 291; Birand, *Aydınlanma Devri Devlet Felsefesinin Tanzimat'a Tesirleri*, 41.

<sup>121</sup>. *Ibid.*, 29-35; for more information about Namık Kemal's views on the state, see Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, 300ff.

Montesquieuan influence. Basically equating the state with the government, Namık Kemal delineated the boundaries of legislation outside and above the sphere of function of the state.<sup>122</sup>

Namık Kemal's idea of the state was also manifest in his writings on the economy, whereby he viewed the state as nothing more than an institution in the service of the people, of which revenues should correspond to the capacity and the needs of the public. More importantly, he reversed the traditionally held opinion about the economic backwardness of the Ottoman Empire. He explained lack of accumulation of national wealth and of private initiative on the grounds of non-development in industrial, trade and banking facilities. In this sense, while opposing protectionist policies as pseudo solutions, he proposed the creation of capital accumulation as the basic remedy for the economic maladies of the Empire.<sup>123</sup>

Namık Kemal is important for Ottoman-Turkish intellectual history; his stance serves as a model for the unease of the intellectual to comply both with the existing traditions and with the nature of the ruling mechanism. Thus, there emerges an intellectual having partially modern values and in a quest to reconcile them with tradition.

---

<sup>122</sup>. Ibid.; Birand, *Aydınlanma Devri Devlet Felsefesinin Tanzimat'a Tesirleri*, 33-5.

<sup>123</sup>. For the ideas of Namık Kemal on the economy, see Çavdar, *Türkiye'de Liberalizm*, 43-54.

The Young Ottoman movement failed to present a homogeneous schema of thought, as was the case with the *Tanzimat* bureaucrat.<sup>124</sup> There was a falling out among the members concerning political orientations. The means proposed by the members to reach the ideal of a parliamentary regime, ranged from compliance with the Sultan, to finding social support, and to seizing authority through a Sultan who would conform with their reform projects.<sup>125</sup> Again, not different from their predecessors, the conceptual schema of the Young Ottomans was roughly formulated around the question of the decline of the Empire and the ways to reverse this process. The uniqueness of the group arose from the fact that it was with the Young Ottomans that one sees the tendency to reach and educate the public through the press.

#### **THE OTTOMAN INTELLECTUAL AT THE CROSSROADS: THE EMERGENCE OF THE PLATFORM OF LIBERAL INTELLECTUAL**

##### **Liberalism in its Economic Facet**

The liberal tunes in the world of the Ottoman intellectual was not absent in the decades following the Young Ottoman movement. In this respect, the period of Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) is worthy of attention. It was during this period that courses on the economy was included in the context of secondary school and

---

<sup>124</sup>. Mardin, "Yeni Osmanlılar ve Siyasi Fikirleri," 1700-1.

<sup>125</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 207.

subsequently in the high school curricula.<sup>126</sup> The leading examples are books by Ahmed Midhat, *Ekonomi Politik*, compiled of the articles published in *Tercuman-ı Hakikat* in 1880, and by Sakızlı Ohannes, *Mebadi-i İlm-i Servet-i Milel* (1881).<sup>127</sup> In *Ekonomi Politik*, one can observe an explanatory introduction into the basics of classical economy; also the view that each country has a peculiar way of conducting its economic affairs.<sup>128</sup>

It was particularly in Sakızlı Ohannes's work that the precepts of liberal economy were stressed as guidelines for the proper functioning of the economy. The significance of the book arises from the fact that it was subsequently used as a textbook in the economy classes of Sakızlı Ohannes in the Schools of *Maliye* and *Mülkiye*.<sup>129</sup>

---

<sup>126</sup>. The practice had its precedent in the *Kız Sanayi Mektepleri* and The Faculty of Law where such a practice had begun in 1870 and 1874 respectively. During the 1877-1878 period economy was also included in the curriculum of *Mekteb-i Funun-u Maliye*. Mardin, *Türkiye'de İktisadi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi*, 46-9.

<sup>127</sup>. Çavdar translates the name of Sakızlı Ohannes's book into Turkish as *Economy*. Çavdar, *Türkiye'de Liberalizm*, 54.

<sup>128</sup>. The reader should not be misled to include Ahmed Midhat into the liberal stream. Ahmed Midhat is important with his pioneering work on economy. On the other hand, his emphasis on protectionist policies puts him at a distance from the liberal thought. *Ibid.*, 117-27. Mardin cites the emphasis on the idea of labor, and the criticisms against the state officials on the basis of the criterion of efficiency as the most important point in the writings of Ahmed Midhat. Mardin, *Türkiye'de İktisadi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi*, 45.

<sup>129</sup>. Çavdar cites the *Mebadi-i İlm-i Servet-i Milel* of Sakızlı Ohannes as the cornerstone of the Ottoman liberal economic thought. Çavdar, *Türkiye'de Liberalizm*, 55-83. However, one should not be misled by the above-stated observations to conclude with a liberal era. On the contrary, the reign of Abdülhamid II was merely one of formal constitutionalism and parliamentarianism, and one that distanced itself from Western institutions and ideas. In a way, it was an experience with wiping out the duality that was prevalent in the structure of thought of the Ottoman (institutional) intellectuals, and in this case especially the Young Ottomans who can be cited as the cultivators of the era. The duality between the

The same liberal disposition was also apparent in the *İlm-i İktisat* (1900) of M. Cavid Bey (1875-1926). M. Cavid Bey built his arguments on the premise of the constant laws of economy, and on the theory of natural selection.<sup>130</sup> In this respect, he perceived inequality as a natural attribute, which should not be eliminated, and as a prerequisite for the progress of the society. Eventually, he put emphasis on (economic) individualism, and thus denied any right of activity to the state in the economic sphere.<sup>131</sup> M. Cavid Bey is also important as an intellectual active in the state ranks. The Second Constitutional Period (1908-1920), whereby he served as the Finance Minister,<sup>132</sup> was marked with liberal policies in the economic sphere.<sup>133</sup>

On the other hand, in the same period the journal *Ulum-u İktisadiye ve İçtimaiye*,<sup>134</sup> founded by M. Cavid Bey together with Ahmed Şuayb (1876-1910) and Rıza Tevfik (1868-1951) in 1908, the two Ottoman advocates of

---

adoption of the Western ideas and institutions on the one hand, and the search to find them grounds on the traditional platform was challenged by the Pan-Islamic rhetoric and despotic policies of Abdülhamid. Such a challenge was also reflected in the intellectual layout which paralleled the anti-Western measures of the Sultan, by replacing the Western studies by Islamic ones as the main reference texts. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 256-71.

<sup>130</sup>. Çavdar, *Türkiye'de Liberalizm*, 86-7.

<sup>131</sup>. Ibid., 94.

<sup>132</sup>. M. Cavid Bey was appointed as Finance Minister between 1909-1911, in 1914 for short term, and in 1917 and 1918.

<sup>133</sup>. The Second Constitutional period (1908-1920) should not be perceived as a breathing space for the actualization of the liberal policies in the real sense of the term. On the contrary, liberal rhetoric was restricted to the economic sphere, which would also be curtailed under the dampening conditions of World War I whereby the subsequent rule of the Young Turks turned out to be one of "military dictatorship." Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 213-30.

<sup>134</sup>. For a brief analysis of the journal, see Çavdar, *Türkiye'de Liberalizm*, 141-52.

positivism, provided the sociological and philosophical aspects of the liberal stance which was most discernible in the economic field. In this respect, the journal provided the first examples in social analysis. Especially in the writings of Ahmed Şuayb (1876-1910) it is possible to observe a strong adherence to scientific methods in the study of society.<sup>135</sup> His approach was grounded on positivistic stance which was most clear in his conception of history as an ongoing process of progress.<sup>136</sup> Societies and the institutions were viewed in this respect not as static bodies, but ones that evolve in line with historical contingencies.<sup>137</sup>

Apart from the prevalence of liberalism in the economic policies with philosophical and sociological grounding,<sup>138</sup> the period between 1908-1918 is worthy of attention since it proved to be a determinative phase in the clearing of the lines between different and well-articulated policy proposals, which were based not only on the age-old question of how to save the state, but also on specific "schools of thought," namely the Islamists, the Turkists and the Westernizers.<sup>139</sup> Thus oriented, the new intellectuals of the epoch were equipped with well-defined conceptual schemes when compared to their predecessors.

---

<sup>135</sup>. Ekrem Işın, "Osmanlı Modernleşmesi ve Pozitivizm" (Ottoman Modernization and Positivism), in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.2, 359-62.

<sup>136</sup>. Işın, "Osmanlı Modernleşmesi ve Pozitivizm."

<sup>137</sup>. Çavdar, *Türkiye'de Liberalizm*, 147-8.

<sup>138</sup>. Işın, "Osmanlı Modernleşmesi ve Pozitivizm," 361-2.

<sup>139</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 337-411.

The Islamists formulated their conceptual schema in reaction to the Westernists, and in a way continued with the traditional reformism of the eighteenth century. While accepting the superiority of Western science and techniques, they sternly opposed the imitation of Western morals and mentality. They proposed a return to the 'glorious old days' when 'Islam had been properly practiced.'<sup>140</sup>

On the other hand, the Westernists of the period differed from their predecessors in their perception of the West and the ideal of Westernization. In fact, stripping off the unease of both grappling with the duality of adherence to Westernization, and conforming to tradition, the new Westernists were not satisfied with institutional reforms, rather they stressed the necessity of transforming the people through education to match the Western standard. This meant creating the Western man on Ottoman land.<sup>141</sup>

The Turkist wing was distinguished from the other two in its acknowledgement of the necessity of being a part of the Western civilization, without giving up national identity.<sup>142</sup> The Turkists perceived the critical attribute of the West as neither merely a matter of science and technique nor of morality and intellect, but first and foremost as a matter of national consciousness.<sup>143</sup>

---

<sup>140</sup>. Ibid., 340-3.

<sup>141</sup>. Ibid., 338-40.

<sup>142</sup>. Ibid., 343-6.

<sup>143</sup>. Ibid., 355.

As far as the scope of this study is concerned, the important wing is the Westernist one, within which the liberal disposition can be located. By the split that arose in the First Congress of the Young Turks in 1902, the liberal disposition found itself in the Society of Private Initiative and Decentralization (*Teşebbüsü Şahsi ve Ademi Merkeziyet Cemiyeti*), under the leadership of Prens Sabahaddin (1878<sup>?</sup>-1948). Both the name of the society and the intellectual identity of its leader carried hints of matching the twentieth-century Ottoman Westernist with the Ottoman liberal.

#### **Prens Sabahaddin: Portrait of a Liberal Intellectual**

The cleavage within the Westernist wing had already been solidified in the First Congress of the Young Turks (1902), on the surface, around the question of foreign interference in the reform process in the Ottoman Empire. The liberals approved such an interference.<sup>144</sup>

In this respect, Prens Sabahaddin appears as an important figure both due to his leading role in the organization and the running of the congress, as well as in the delineation of the layout of the liberal disposition.<sup>145</sup> Prens Sabahaddin is also significant as an intellectual figure in his total opposition to the existing power structure in the Ottoman Empire. His

---

<sup>144</sup>. Sina Akşin, "Jön Türkler" (Young Turks), in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.3, 835-6. See also Ali Erkul, "Prens Sabahattin," in *Türk Toplum Bilimcileri*, ed. Emre Kongar ed., vol.1, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1982), 92-6.

<sup>145</sup>. Erkul, "Prens Sabahattin," 92-149.



intellectual identity was shaped by an educational pattern which can plausibly be called private, and thus outside the state-controlled educational process, and eventually by the fact that he did not serve in the civil service. During the years of his intellectual maturation, he happened to be in self-imposed exile abroad.<sup>146</sup>

The conflict which came to surface in 1902 and caused the final split within the Young Turk movement in 1906, resulted in the foundation of the Society of Private Initiative and Decentralization under the leadership of *Prens Sabahaddin*.<sup>147</sup> The society was in opposition to the Committee of the Union and Progress of the Young Turks, which epitomized the faith solely in the reconstruction of the parliamentary regime. It is possible to find the grounds of difference at this point as far as the thought-formation of the two trends were concerned. While the Young Turks staunchly argued for the reorganization of the state structure, the group of *Prens*

---

<sup>146</sup>. This was linked to the dispute between *Prens Sabahaddin's* father, Damat Mahmut Paşa, who once served as the Minister of Justice, and Abdülhamid II, that had led to his expulsion from state service. Nezahat Nurettin Ege, *Prens Sabahattin* (İstanbul: Güneş Neşriyat, 1977), 19-20. The aloofness of *Prens Sabahaddin* from active engagement in state service was also attributed to his self-exclusion. In his writings *Prens Sabahaddin* repeatedly noted his disinterest in the power struggle. *Ibid.*, 138.

<sup>147</sup>. The journal which supported the views of the society, *Terakki*, began its publication in 1906. See M. Şükrü Hanioglu, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Meslek-i İctimai Akımı" (Social Science Trend in Ottoman State), in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.2, 382-3. The ideas of *Prens Sabahaddin* provided the groundwork in the formation of a number of societies and parties in the coming decades. Exemplary are the Society of Revolution (1904), Ottoman Liberal Party (1908), *Nesli Cedit Kulübü* (1908), as the successor of the Society of Private Initiative and Decentralization, the Party of Liberty and Conciliation (1911), and National Liberal Party (1919). See Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler (Political Parties in Turkey)* (İstanbul, 1952); Erkul, "Prens Sabahattin," 102-3.

Sabahaddin brought forth the social structure as the starting point for transformation.<sup>148</sup>

The grounds of such a disposition should be sought in the writings of Frederic Le Play and Edmond Demolins which had overwhelming influence in the intellectual formation of *Prens Sabahaddin*.<sup>149</sup> As already noted, setting himself apart from the prevailing concerns of the period with the state as the main object of reformation, *Prens Sabahaddin* took the society as an object of critical analysis,<sup>150</sup> and emphasized the need to adopt policies to bring it to maturity for the realization of the ideal form of polity which he modeled after the Anglo-American parliamentarism.<sup>151</sup> In this respect, *Prens Sabahaddin* introduced sociological analysis into the realm of politics.<sup>152</sup>

Apart from his pioneering studies in the field of sociology, *Prens Sabahaddin* is particularly important in his representation of the liberal thought in the Ottoman Empire in all its aspects. In his comparative analysis of the Western and Ottoman social structures, he adopted the Demolins' differentiation between individualistic and

---

<sup>148</sup>. Hanioğlu, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Meslek-i İçtimai Akımı," 382-6.

<sup>149</sup>. Ege, *Prens Sabahattin*, 36.

<sup>150</sup>. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 347. Hanioğlu, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Meslek-i İçtimai Akımı," 382-6.

<sup>151</sup>. Ege, *Prens Sabahattin*, 40.

<sup>152</sup>. As has also been mentioned above the emphasis on sociological analysis can also be found in the writings of the two nineteenth-century Ottoman positivists; Ahmed Rıza (1857-1930) and Ahmed Şuayb. However, Ahmed Rıza distinguished between the individual of the West from the "Ottoman man," on the basis of his contention that the individual of the West does not exist in the Ottoman culture. Adopting the Comtean perspective he focused on the family and bureaucracy as the main constituents of society. On the other hand, the contributions of Ahmed Şuayb were mainly in the field of literature. Işın, "Osmanlı Modernleşmesi ve Pozitivizm," 356-62.

communitarian societies, granting the former a higher status.<sup>153</sup> Thus, his proposals for an end to the decadence that the Empire was going through centered around the theme of transforming the Ottoman society from a communitarian into an individualistic structure. In this respect, education, to be modeled on Western, and particularly on Anglo-American style, emerged as the key process for the destruction of the Ottoman "individual" whose image was, for Prens Sabahaddin, represented in the bureaucratic identity as total dependence on the state; and the creation of the ideal Western individual about whose superiority he was firmly convinced.<sup>154</sup> Here, one can observe a critical approach to the Ottoman intellectual-as-bureaucrat, which coincides with the proposed educational reform. Prens Sabahaddin argued for an educational process which would bring up productive individuals, and not subservient state officials.<sup>155</sup>

In the realm of politics, Prens Sabahaddin proposed the delineation of respective spheres of responsibility and authority within the power structure.<sup>156</sup> He most straightforwardly criticized the overlapping function of the military with the executive.<sup>157</sup> More importantly, he argued for the desirability of decentralization in local

---

<sup>153</sup>. Prens Sabahattin, *Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir? (How Can Turkey Be Saved?)* (İstanbul: Türkiye Basımevi, 1950), 30-4, 60; Ege, *Prens Sabahattin*, 241.

<sup>154</sup>. Prens Sabahattin, *Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir?*, 37-43; Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 406.

<sup>155</sup>. Prens Sabahattin, *Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir?*, 48; Ege, *Prens Sabahattin*, 134-5; Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 406.

<sup>156</sup>. Prens Sabahattin, *Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir?*, 50.

<sup>157</sup>. *Ibid.*

administration as the prerequisite for the efficient running of local affairs.<sup>158</sup> Not surprisingly, his economic standpoint was grounded on the idealization of the Western capitalist economies, an important dimension of which was individual initiative.<sup>159</sup>

It can be concluded that the individual as the basic category of the Western liberal thought emerged as the ideal to be adopted in the context of Ottoman liberal thinking. In the Western context, liberal thought had found grounds in the nominalist epistemology the object of analysis of which is the individual constituents of a whole, and for the society the individual-as-such. On the contrary, for the Ottoman liberal the theme of the study was the society, and particularly the family as its basic element; the process of molding out the ideal individual was to be activated by the state. In this context, as far as *Prens Sabahaddin* was concerned, bearing in mind his ideal of transforming society, one eventually ends up with a portrait of a hopeful social engineer, which was the common characteristic of the nineteenth-century Ottoman intellectual.

---

<sup>158</sup>. Ibid., 51-8. Upon the criticisms directed against the idea of decentralization on the grounds of enhancing the separatism of the non-Muslim *millet*s, *Prens Sabahaddin* was forced to assure that the idea had mere administrative connotations, and that it had no political aspects. Ege, *Prens Sabahattin*, 163.

<sup>159</sup>. *Prens Sabahattin, Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir?*, 166-9; Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 393-4.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the West, the state was not the sole identification reference point for the intellectual. On the contrary, following the Renaissance, the intellectual was to find his identity in princely courts, in the salons of the aristocracy, and the seventeenth-century coffee-houses.<sup>160</sup> It was with the rise of the modern state that the latter was to systematically act as a recruitment channel for the intellectual.<sup>161</sup>

In the Ottoman case, the intellectual was devoid of any social circle to present independently formulated thought patterns. Instead, he was strikingly a part of the state mechanism. Such a situation was to a certain extent curbed in the late-nineteenth century, by the emergence of a new stratum of intellectuals who gathered around the press. However, one should bear in mind the strong hold of the state over the press.

In this respect, in the Ottoman classical period (1300-1566), the identity of the intellectual was delineated within the ranks of the *ilmiyye*. With the modernization attempts, the ideal intellectual was to be created by the state itself and placed within bureaucratic ranks. In the West, the emergence of the secular intellectual accompanied an ages-long historical process, beginning with the Renaissance, and stretching

---

<sup>160</sup>. Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Culture*, ed. Bryan S. Turner (London: Routledge, 1992), 132ff.

<sup>161</sup>. Here, the intellectual in question is the secular intellectual as against the clerics of the medieval era.

throughout the Reformation and the Enlightenment. In the Ottoman context, the secular intellectual was a product of the practical concerns of the state. Consequently, such a development had its reflections in the functions of the intellectual. While the intellectual-as-legislator of modernity in the West was in a struggle to transform his society in conformity with the ideal picture in mind which was based on reason, the Ottoman intellectual had the aim of reorganizing the state on the ideal model of the Western state structure.

In this respect, the most exemplary case was displayed in the *Tanzimat* era. The *Tanzimat* intellectual-as-bureaucrat was the first product of the Western type education again conducted by state initiative. The intellectual was educated by and for service to the state. During the period in question his task was that of modernizing the governmental machinery. Such a development had its reflections in the self-perception of the intellectual.

As far as the identity of the intellectual is concerned, the situation is far from clear. The predicament of the Ottoman intellectual from the eighteenth century onwards had been the necessity of reconciling Westernization with tradition. The intellectual of the *Tanzimat* period carried the double burden of a relatively positivist educational background on the one hand, and the difficulty of deciding whether to comply with Islamic principles or to justify innovation in terms of the same principles, on the other. This dilemmatic mode further distanced the intellectual

from any possibility of societal identification of which he had already been devoid. This was most apparent in his daily life; the *Tanzimat* man was one getting accustomed to the Western style in his everyday conduct and language, and thus was in a somewhat unconscious endeavour of transgressing the traditional modes of thought and conduct. While actively involved in the reorganization of the state structure, he was also experiencing a cultural mutation in his private life.<sup>162</sup>

Only as late as the twentieth century, the covert tension between the intellectual and society was to be taken into consideration with the shift in his concern of the social environment as an object of critical analysis. Such a shift paved the way for the replacement of the ideal of maintaining the traditional social structure by a search for models and means for its transformation. For the same period Şerif Mardin has pointed to a corresponding shift in the double identity of the Ottoman intellectual from the "bureaucrat-intellectual" to that of "intellectual-bureaucrat."<sup>163</sup>

The Ottoman liberal thinking as most typically represented in the writings of *Prens Sabahaddin* is important in this respect. *Prens Sabahaddin*, both due to his educational background and to his aloofness from state service, presented more or less an unorthodox portrait of the Ottoman intellectual. However, when his approach especially to the society was concerned, one encounters with a social engineer, not unlike his

---

<sup>162</sup>. In this respect see Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 192-8.

<sup>163</sup>. Mardin, "Tanzimat ve Aydınlar," 48.

contemporaries, since he, too, ended up with a project of transformation to be accomplished by education.

The above-stated schema of the Ottoman intellectual, however general in vista, shows the impact of the experience of living with a strong state tradition on the formation of the intellectual mind and identity. Both due to its function as a recruitment mechanism for the intellectuals, and to the consolidated faith in the natural limits of criticism,<sup>164</sup> the state determined the context of the intellectual concern to be confined to the question of how to save the state. Such a concern led to a preoccupation with the state as the central object of analysis. On the other hand, the partial internalization of the critical mission of the Western intellectual in the Ottoman mind, as late as in the second half of the nineteenth century, and insofar as a natural ingredient of the Western style education, should also be viewed in this respect.<sup>165</sup>

As far as the concept of state is concerned, it is possible to conclude with a shift in the Ottoman conception of the state from state-as-might, to state-as-law from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. Dyson explains the concept of state-as-might on the grounds of internal distress and external threat.<sup>166</sup> Such an

---

<sup>164</sup>. Ibid., 52.

<sup>165</sup>. The Ottoman intellectual, still tied to the state both financially and identically, would find grounds for his critical discourse mainly in literature. Ibid., 46-54; Işın, "Osmanlı Modernleşmesi ve Pozitivizm," 359-62.

<sup>166</sup>. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, 101-7. Dyson cites the prevalence of the theories of state-as-might, from sixteenth to nineteenth century, in various Continental European states on the basis of these factors.



explanation also fits well into the Ottoman context in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in that it is especially during the reigns of Selim III and Mahmud II that the Ottomans were to turn towards the West as a model for military reforms.

The *Tanzimat* period contained a framework of institutional reforms which corresponded to the conception of the state-as-law in the Western context. However, before concluding with the cross-fertilization of the conception of the state-as-law in the Ottoman context, one should bear in mind the *raison d'etre* of the reforms, that of saving the state.<sup>167</sup> In the Ottoman Empire, the institutions, whose formation had been grounded on a new conception of the state in the West, were established with the task of revitalizing and sustaining the existence of the Ottoman state. On the other hand, the adoption of reforms were a result of both the aspiration of the bureaucracy for power *vis-à-vis* the Sultan as well as of an intellectual interest in the West because of the belief in Western superiority. The problematic posture of the *Tanzimat* intellectual-as-bureaucrat appears at this point. The intellectual lacked the precedence of legal positivism which was congenital for the theory of the state-as-law especially in Continental Europe.<sup>168</sup> Instead, he was in a constant

---

<sup>167</sup>. The interpretation provided by Dyson, that cross-fertilization is partly an outcome of the incompetency of the tradition to meet the current problems, well fits the Ottoman case of Westernization. *Ibid.*, 160.

<sup>168</sup>. *Ibid.*, 108. However, the policies adopted by *Tanzimat* intellectuals unconsciously contained the motives of such a mentality. Exemplary is the constitution of assemblies which would be the sole determiner of the laws to which the ruler and the ruled were equally bound.

effort to reconcile reforms with Islamic principles. Exemplary here is the inept functioning of the secular courts which had been formed to be active in the public realm independently of religious courts, and thus further displayed the inherent contradiction between the *raison d'etre* of the reform measures in the Western context and their proclaimed bases in Islam.

Ottoman liberal thought nourished in such a political and intellectual milieu. Not surprisingly, its problematique was formulated around the question of how to save the state. It tried to provide remedies to the problems arising out of an ongoing decline due to the dissolution of the classical social and political structures of the Empire, and not to those concerning the independent running of the market. The Ottoman liberal thinker proposed liberal economic policies not in the name of the individual, but for the enhancement of the Ottoman economy.<sup>169</sup> Apart from that, the individual, as the basic category of liberal thought in the West, did not occupy a significant place in the Ottoman context. Instead, the texts which provided the philosophical and sociological groundwork for the Ottoman liberal thought focused mainly on the society and family. And the individual was attributed an identity that was to develop only with the transformation of the society and the polity.

---

<sup>169</sup>. Here the reforms in question are not those adopted during the *Tanzimat* period, but those adopted during the second Constitutional Period (1909-1918) by M. Cavid Bey, the Minister of Finance of the period. The reforms of the *Tanzimat* period can more plausibly be viewed as a result of Western pressure and of the growing unrest of the *millet*s. Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi (History of Contemporary Thought in Turkey)* (İstanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 1992), 36-7.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE STATE AND INTELLECTUAL OF THE REPUBLIC: CONTINUITY WITHIN CHANGE

#### EARLY REPUBLICAN ERA: INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND NATION BUILDING AS THE TWIN PROCESSES OF BREAK WITH THE PAST

Following the National Independence War (1919-1922), the commanding cadre of the Turkish Revolution provided a reform framework which theoretically proposed a total break with the Ottoman past. From the proclamation of the Republic onwards (1923) the Ottoman heritage was officially perceived to be the totality of all the negative features which had led to the breakdown of the Empire, and thus it had to be destructed.

Such a mentality of sweeping all that was accepted to belong to the Ottoman past was compiled within the project of modernization. However paradoxically, as in the Ottoman case in the early Republican era, too, the leitmotive of the project was again taken to be the state, this time with a different institutional structure.<sup>1</sup> What differentiated the Republican state from its Ottoman antecedent was not the role attributed to it,

---

<sup>1</sup>. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 362-400. Ali Kazancıgil, "The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism," in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, eds. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1981), 37-56.

but the mentality that shaped the process of its institutionalization.<sup>2</sup>

### **Continuity within Change: A New Identity for the State with the Old Mission of Modernization**

Long before the proclamation of the Republic the counter-government of the National Independence War had already reflected the ruling cadre of the coming decade, which was to a great extent comprised of governmental officials (43%).<sup>3</sup> By the 1923 popular elections the same group was gathered in the Republican People's Party (RPP), the only organized political force,<sup>4</sup> which naturally achieved majority, leading to an increase in the ratio of bureaucrats and army officers in the assembly.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the leading cadre of the National Independence War also took responsibility in the consolidation of the new regime, under the continuing leadership of Mustafa Kemal.

---

2. İlder Turan, "Continuity and Change in Turkish Bureaucracy: The Kemalist Period and After," in *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, ed. Jacob M. Landau ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Wetview Press, 1984), 99-121.

3. Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Revolution From Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978), 15.

4. *Ibid.*, 23.

5. In the first Turkish Grand National Assembly, out of 43% of governmental officers 23% were civil bureaucrats and 15% were military officers, *Ibid.*, 15-8. On this issue see also Richard L. Chambers, "The Civil Bureaucracy: Turkey," in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, eds. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow eds. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), 301-27; Ergun Özbudun, "The nature of the Kemalist political regime," in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, eds. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1981), 79-102.

Following the proclamation of the Republic, the relatively conciliatory stand of the leading cadre towards different tendencies within the first Assembly (1921) during the National Independence War, left its place to the enactment of radical laws in the way of restructuring the Turkish state and subsequently society in line with the prerequisites of modernization.<sup>6</sup>

Such a task necessitated extensive control over the government and society which was ensured by the dominance of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), whereby the RPP, civil and military bureaucrats had the ultimate power of decision-making and enforcing,<sup>7</sup> not only in political life, but also in the administration of the state.<sup>8</sup> Thus, the new Turkish state was built by a merge of politics and administration.

One can thus talk about a kind of continuity with the Ottoman past. Social engineering that was so prevalent especially in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire was also carried to the Republican era, again holding the bureaucracy as an instrument in the achievement of the task of modernization.<sup>9</sup> The institutionalization of the bureaucracy was pursued in such a manner. First, during the National Independence War the aim was to erase the Ottoman identity from the ranks of the bureaucracy by putting it under the

---

6. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Atatürk as an institution-builder," in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, eds. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1981), 57-77.

7. Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 109.

8. *Ibid.*, 20-1.

9. *Ibid.*, 112; Chambers, "The Civil Bureaucracy: Turkey," 301.

dominance of the military.<sup>10</sup> Second, during the Republican era the aim was to ensure its adherence to the modernization task.<sup>11</sup> The Turkish Revolution was thus realized from the top down.<sup>12</sup> Although prominent in this process was literally the TGNA, in practice it was Mustafa Kemal who, as the head of state, held the ropes. During the National Independence War, the status of the TGNA as the representative of the sovereignty of the nation and its doubling as the executive had already been accepted (1921).<sup>13</sup> The status of the TGNA was further enhanced by the Constitution of 1924 which accorded it executive, legislative and judicial powers.<sup>14</sup> However, by the proclamation of the Republic, it had also been ensured that the office of the head of the state would be over and above the TGNA.<sup>15</sup>

Underlying such a shift was the loss of faith in the competency of the TGNA to keep itself aloof from the interests of different social segments, which was perceived to be deviating from the *raison d'être* of the

---

<sup>10</sup>. Metin Heper, "Atatürk'te Devlet Düşüncesi" in *Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk (Atatürk in the Light of Modern Thought)* (İstanbul: Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 1986), 234; Turan, "Continuity and Change in Turkish Bureaucracy: The Kemalist Period and After."

<sup>11</sup>. Heper, *Türk Kamu Bürokrasisinde Gelenekçilik ve Modernleşme: Siyaset Sosyolojisi Açısından Bir İnceleme (Traditionalism and Modernization in Turkish Public Bureaucracy: An Analysis from the Perspective of Political Sociology)* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1977), 99; Chambers, "Civil Bureaucracy: Turkey," 325.

<sup>12</sup>. Frederick Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1965), 303-4; Trimberger, *Revolution From Above*.

<sup>13</sup>. Trimberger, *Revolution From Above*, 20-1.

<sup>14</sup>. Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 137.

<sup>15</sup>. Heper, "Atatürk'te Devlet Düşüncesi," 238.

state.<sup>16</sup> Mustafa Kemal perceived the state as exceeding the will of the individual.<sup>17</sup> State, in his words, found its being not in individual consent. Instead, the power of the state over its nation was something internal to the very concept of the state.<sup>18</sup> The concept of the state inherently transcended the political and social system.<sup>19</sup> Thus, the state should stand over and above any conflict that may arise in the society and be reflected in the TGNA.<sup>20</sup> Underlying such a stand was the delegatory conception of national sovereignty, which was taken as the *sine qua non* of the Republican regime, and of the "general interest" of the people, which would be determined not by the people itself, but by those who have the competence of acting beyond their individual interests.<sup>21</sup> The state, conceived as such, was eventually held responsible for upgrading the Turkish society so as not to let the preceding decadence recur.<sup>22</sup>

---

16. Bülent Daver, "Atatürk ve Sosyo-Politik Sistem Görüşü" (Atatürk and his View of Socio-Political System), in *Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk*, 265. As stated in the "Declaration of Populism" (*Halkçılık Beyannamesi*), published by the TGNA on October 21, 1920: "... TGNA presumes as its main task to eliminate all the underlying causes of people's misery via new means and institutions and replace it with welfare. In this respect, it will aspire to install social brotherhood and cooperation in all spheres, including land, education, justice, finance, economy and pious foundations, and to enact reforms and install institutions in accordance with the needs of the people." Quoted in *ibid.*

17. A. Afet İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal'in El Yazıları* (Civil Instructions and Mustafa Kemal's Handwritings), 2nd ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), 27.

18. *Ibid.*

19. Heper, "State, Democracy and Bureaucracy in Turkey," in *The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Perspective*, (New York, Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1987), 132-4; Heper, "Atatürk'te Devlet Düşüncesi," 223.

20. Heper, "Atatürk'te Devlet Düşüncesi," 238.

21. *Ibid.*, 239.

22. Kazancıgil, "The Ottoman Turkish State and Kemalism," 52.

Such a mentality inhered in the policy of imposing social change for the good of the society itself, rather than waiting for its occurrence.<sup>23</sup> The society was conceived as possessing a latent tendency towards the good. However, it needed the vanguardism of the state for the realization of *this* good (emphasis added). The project of modernization, built upon faith in science, complied with this perception by enabling state control in all spheres extending from education to economy.

The goal of modernization laid a positivist stand on the cadre of the revolution. The good of the society was not awaited to arise spontaneously from within society. Instead, related means and measures were determined and implemented from outside. In this respect, the early Republican era was a period of intense search and realization of the ways to transcend the social, political and cultural orders of the Ottoman past and their symbolic and structural basis.<sup>24</sup> It was a period of search which contained a twin process. First, uprooting all that "tradition" both from the institutions and from the society. Second, constructing the 'genuine tradition' for society.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>23</sup>. Heper, "State, Democracy and Bureaucracy in Turkey," 132.

<sup>24</sup>. S.N. Eisenstadt, "Post-Traditional Societies and the Continuity and Reconstruction of Tradition," *Daedalus* (Winter 1973), 102 (1), 6.

<sup>25</sup>. *Ibid.*, 1-27.



## The Double Identity of the early Republican Intellectual: Legislator and Transmitter<sup>26</sup>

The positivistic stand that was so prevalent in the early Republican era connotes some continuity in the role of the intellectual when compared to his Ottoman antecedents. In this period, the mentality of social engineering, that is faith in science in reshaping society was very well established to the detriment of religion.<sup>27</sup> The merger of the bureaucratic and intellectual identity was also a matter of continuation.<sup>28</sup> The difference lay in the competence of the state to provide for homogeneity with respect to the good of the society.

The intellectual of the Republican era took on a double identity. First he would act as legislator, in the way of ensuring institutional and social modernization. He would comply with and carry out the measures, predetermined by the state, "...to shape and administer

---

<sup>26</sup>. The term "legislator" is borrowed from Zygmunt Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity and Intellectuals*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987). The term is also used in the previous chapter. However, while it is employed symbolically for the institutional intellectual of the Ottoman era, legislator was the ideal model for the Republican intellectual which was determined by the state. In this respect, the ideal Republican intellectual well fits into the categorization of the intellectual of modernity by Bauman. Bauman typifies the intellectual of the modern epoch with the role of introducing and implementing an alternative set of principles for the ideal societal order as a reaction to the dominance of the Church.

<sup>27</sup>. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 401-42; Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University, 1964), 479-500.

<sup>28</sup>. Murat Belge, "Tarihi Gelişme Süreci İçinde Aydınlar" (Intellectuals in Historical Development Process), in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983) 124-6.

the social system according to a preconceived model of order..."<sup>29</sup> Second he would act as the transmitter of the logic of the subsequent reconstruction of the 'genuine tradition' to the society.

The conceptual schema for the intellectual had already been drawn by the state. As far as the task of building the 'genuine tradition' of the Turkish society was concerned, the basic themes were the nation and the individual-as-citizen, which ultimately meant the citizen of the Turkish Republic.

For the Republican leaders nation was of utmost importance for the task of constructing the modern state, which was based on a tripod of secularism, nationalism and citizenship.<sup>30</sup> In fact, as Kemal H. Karpat has argued, nationalism had long been the dominant motivating factor, both during the National Independence War and following the proclamation of the Republic.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, Niyazi Berkes has stated that the intellectual background to the Turkish Republic had been provided by one of the forerunners of Turkish nationalism, Ziya Gökalp.<sup>32</sup>

For the ruling cadre Turkish nation was identified in terms of language, history, ethics, and political territory.<sup>33</sup> The intellectual was left with the task of reconstructing and revitalizing the authenticity of

---

<sup>29</sup>. Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters*, 2.

<sup>30</sup>. Kazancıgil, "The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism," 38.

<sup>31</sup>. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 49; Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 13.

<sup>32</sup>. Niyazi Berkes, "Ziya Gökalp: His Contribution to Turkish Nationalism," *The Middle Eastern Journal*, (Autumn 1954).

<sup>33</sup>. İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler*, 18-25.

Turkish language and the consciousness of history.<sup>34</sup> This mentality was reflected at the institutional level by the establishment of the Turkish Language Institution (1932) and Turkish History Institution (1935),<sup>35</sup> as well as by the reorganization of the curriculum of Faculty of Humanities in Istanbul *Darülfünun*<sup>36</sup> (literally House of Sciences, the predecessor of Istanbul University) with overwhelming emphasis on all that was related to Turkish and Turkey, extending from history and language to geography.<sup>37</sup> A large number of the intellectuals worked in these institutions, and they were saddled with the task of exploring the fundamentals of the history and language of the Turkish Republic, and conveying them to the public.<sup>38</sup>

---

<sup>34</sup>. Such a mission of the Turkish intellectual fits well into the argument by that in those societies which took the path to Westernization, the nationalistic stand among the intellectuals presumably represents the yet-to-be rejuvenated national consciousness of the people. Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," in *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism*, ed. Jonh H. Kautsky (New York, London and Sydney: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), 209.

<sup>35</sup>. First established under the name of Turkish History Research Commission in 1930, which was transformed into Turkish History Research Society in 1931, and ultimately institutionalized under the name of Turkish History Institution in 1935.

<sup>36</sup>. For more detailed information about *Darülfünun* see *İstanbul Üniversitesi: Kuruluş, Tarihçe, Teşkilat ve Öğretim Üyeleri 1453-1981 (The Establishment, History, Organization and Staff of İstanbul University)* (İstanbul, 1983).

<sup>37</sup>. Ayşe Öncü, "Academics: The West in the Discourse of University Reform," in *Turkey and The West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*, eds. Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer eds. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd., 1993), 51.

<sup>38</sup>. The official view about the role of the university and the intellectual is well illustrated by Falih Rıfkı (Atay) : "...Even if *Darülfünun* is solely a scientific institution, it should sacrifice such a standing during the times of revolution, and hold itself responsible for the prime task of serving the revolution, and ingraining it in the minds and souls of the people." Atay, "Darülfunun," *Cumhuriyet*, July 23, 1932.

Emphasis upon the nation was a manifestation of the intense efforts to cut ties with the Ottoman past. The proclamation of the Republic, based on the sovereignty of the nation, signified the dislocation of religion as the basis of legitimacy. Relatedly the relationship between the ruler and the ruled was redefined. As a corollary of the "modern" state (read as nation-state), the Ottoman subject was replaced by the Turkish citizen. Both the citizen of the Republic and the state were defined in terms of the nation.<sup>39</sup>

The historical significance of the emergence of the nation-state for the conceptualization of the citizen is not peculiar to the Turkish context. As Moris Janowitz has argued, nationalist revolutions in the West have to a great extent provided the framework for the definition of the status of citizenship by the nation-state as a tool of carrying out the required transformation.<sup>40</sup> In other words, the "modern" has been associated with the process of the "citizenization"<sup>41</sup> of the subject. This process of citizenization has been analyzed by Rogers Brubaker.<sup>42</sup> In his study, Brubaker has delineated the transformation of the subject into a "member of the state"<sup>43</sup> as a product of

---

<sup>39</sup>. İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler*, 17.

<sup>40</sup>. Moris Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), 8.

<sup>41</sup>. Robert Nisbet, *The Making of Modern Society* (Great Britain: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, 1986), 132.

<sup>42</sup>. Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (London: Harvard University Press, 1992).

<sup>43</sup>. Brubaker defines the modern state as a membership organization. *Ibid.*, 21.

the development of the modern state.<sup>44</sup> In his words, the practice of citizenship, conceptually identified in terms of nationhood, provided the bureaucratic, centralized (modern) state with the new basis of legitimation for its rule, i.e., rule "...of' and 'for' a particular, distinctive, bounded nation."<sup>45</sup> The Republican individual was perceived in terms of his/her relation to the state.<sup>46</sup> The link of the individual-as-such to the state was symbolized in the term "social man," which referred to the duties of each to the other.<sup>47</sup> Besides its responsibility of carrying out foreign policy and providing for external and internal security, as well as justice, one of the most significant duties of the state was the definition and sustenance of the freedom of individuals.<sup>48</sup> The state was to fulfill this responsibility with a view to the rule of law.<sup>49</sup> In this instance it is possible to observe a sense of lack of faith in the individual. It is true that individual rights and liberties occupied an extensive place in the 1924 Constitution. However, as Karpat has argued, this had only a symbolic significance since the individual *vis-à-vis* the state had no autonomous means of their enforcement.<sup>50</sup>

---

44. Ibid., 49.

45. Ibid., 28.

46. İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler*, 53.

47. Ibid., 48.

48. Ibid., 44.

49. Ibid.

50. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 137.

The Republican cadres put special emphasis on education as a way of shaping the individual into the ideal Republican citizen. The making of the individual-as-citizen, which was perceived to be a task of utmost importance, was going to be the climax of the break with the past.<sup>51</sup> In this respect, the ideal individual of the Republic was defined as "...rationalist, anti-traditionalist, anti-clerical person approaching all problems intellectually and objectively."<sup>52</sup>

The emphasis on the process of education in the early Republican Turkey was not a deviation when compared to the emergence of citizenship in the Western context. Reinhard Bendix presents citizenship as "...a core element of nation-building...", whereby the state organs of education are perceived to be indispensable elements of the nation-state.<sup>53</sup> The status of citizenship in the Western context has been the denominator of a two-sided process, which contained the ruled demanding equality in the political and social arena on the one hand, and the state trying to provide for social cohesion and integration by constructing the grounds for the consensus around shared norms, values and consciousness, on the other.<sup>54</sup> In the Turkish case the balance was more to the side of the state. The introduction of the concept and

---

<sup>51</sup>. Macit Gökberk, "Aydınlanma Felsefesi, Devrimler ve Atatürk" (Philosophy of Enlightenment, Reforms and Atatürk), in *Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk*, 303.

<sup>52</sup>. Kapat, *Turkey's Politics*, 53-4.

<sup>53</sup>. Reinhard Bendix, *Nation Building and Citizenship* (New York, London, Sydney: John Wiley and Sons., Inc., 1964), 94.

<sup>54</sup>. *Ibid.*, 74-101.

status of citizenship was a deliberate step within the grand project of modernization. Not only the duties, but also the rights of the citizen were determined, and in the latter case, were not demanded by the ruled but granted, by the state.<sup>55</sup> The three subsequent phases of the process, namely legal, political and social, through which the status of citizenship in the West has developed, were simultaneously introduced by the state.<sup>56</sup>

In such a configuration the intellectual of the Republic was expected to occupy himself with the transmission of the already defined prerequisites for the sustenance of the regime. His identity differed from the Ottoman precedent; he was to be not just a bureaucrat but an educator. On the other hand, in the Ottoman-Turkish context, it was not the free preoccupations of the intellectuals with the universe, man, society and the legitimation of authority and social order, which have played an important part in the public life as was the case in the West.<sup>57</sup> Instead, the Turkish intellectual was held responsible for the transmission of the already set patterns of authority, its symbols and basis of legitimation to the society.

The acquiescence of the intellectual to the legitimacy of the Republican state and its policies to transform the society was related to his/her

---

<sup>55</sup>. İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler*, 42-9.

<sup>56</sup>. This classification belongs to T.H. Marshall, cited in Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship*, 76.

<sup>57</sup>. Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," 196.

"ideological" perception of modernization.<sup>58</sup> As Edward Shils has argued, in a political structure "...where authorities have tended on the whole to be more unitary and where alternative authorities ... have not yet emerged ... the modern intellectual can find an authoritative collectivity in 'nation' and that organized body which represents the 'nation' -namely, the party of national independence."<sup>59</sup> In his political orientation the early Republican intellectual was nationalist; largely identified with the state, and the party of the state, RPP, and was held responsible to transform the society in order to substantiate its inherent "collective personality."<sup>60</sup> The collective personality of the society was conceptualized in the term "nation."

#### LIBERAL IDENTITY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE ATTEMPTS AT THE CONSTRUCTION OF OPPOSITION

It is possible to argue that the intellectual-as-bureaucrat of the early Republican era had more competence to reorganize the society as compared to his precedents in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, it is not possible to refer to the Republican regime as a total break with the past, as far as the state-intellectual relationship was concerned. The

---

<sup>58</sup>. Karpas, "The Mass Media: Turkey," in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, eds. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 277.

<sup>59</sup>. Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," 206-207.

<sup>60</sup>. Ibid., 210.



intellectual of the early Republican era was also employed at the institutions of the state either as an educator, or as a member of the ruling party.

As far as the "liberal" stance is concerned, in the early Republican era those who called themselves liberals began to emerge within the context of active political struggle. The inheritors of the writings of *Prens Sabahaddin*, a forerunner of the liberal intellectual in the Ottoman period, happened to stand aloof from the liberal orientation. The legacy of the writings of *Prens Sabahaddin* had left its imprints mainly in the sphere of sociology. In this respect, M.Ali Şevki, the founder of the *Meslek-i İctimai Cemiyeti* (Association of Sociologists) (1918)<sup>61</sup> evinced a continuity of the conceptual and methodological framework developed by *Prens Sabahaddin*.<sup>62</sup> Again, the emphasis was on society, rather than on the individual and the tendency was to create an individualistic society via education, starting with training in the family.<sup>63</sup>

Thus, M.Ali Şevki, too, had shared the faith in education, as the leitmotive of social transformation which would be achieved by the replacement of the congregationist family by the individualist family.<sup>64</sup> His

---

<sup>61</sup>. *Meslek-i İctimai Cemiyeti* was founded on the influence of the *Science Sociale*. Şükrü Hanoğlu, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Meslek-i İctimai Akımı," *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.2 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 382-3.

<sup>62</sup>. Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi (History of Contemporary Thought in Turkey)*, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 1992), 443-7. First published in 1966.

<sup>63</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>64</sup>. Ibid.; Muzaffer Sencer, "Mehmet Ali Şevki," in *Türk Toplum Bilimcileri*, ed. Emre Kongar (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi A.Ş., 1988), 55.

studies mainly dwelled on education and social science. Following the establishment of the Republic, perceiving science as the means of finding out general laws through induction, M. Ali Şevki was interested in experimental sociology and initiated monographic surveys.<sup>65</sup> He held the view that a prerequisite for the realization of the task of modernization was first and foremost the understanding of the Turkish society and its requirements, which would facilitate the drawing up of appropriate policies. In his analyses of the evolution of the educational policies in different western countries, M. Ali Şevki concluded that the policies in this area should be in congruence with the level of economic and technological development in society.<sup>66</sup> He opposed the implementation of radical reforms, especially in the sphere of education, by the state from top down, and proposed a more evolutionary stance, whereby the reference point of the state policies would be the existing society, rather than the ideal model conceptualized by the state itself.<sup>67</sup> M. Ali Şevki's

---

<sup>65</sup>. M. Ali Şevki, "Tacrübi Sosyoloji" (Experimental Sociology), *Mülkiye*, (August 1933) (29), 4-8; "M. Paul Descamps'ın Yeni Eseri: La Sociologie Experimentale (1)" (New Work of M. Paul Descamps: La Sociologie Experimentale (1)), *Mülkiye* (30) (September 1933), 4-10; "Tacrübi Sosyoloji," *Mülkiye* (32) (November 1933), 5-8.

<sup>66</sup>. M. Ali Şevki, "Ümmilik ve İlk Tahsil Meselesi İlmi Usul ile Nasıl Tetkik Olunuyor?" (How Is the Issue of Collectivity and Primary Education Analyzed by Scientific Method?), *Mülkiye* (36) (March 1934), 10-5; "Mesele Nasıl Vaz'edilmeli: Tahsil Mükellefiyeti mi? Tahsil İhtiyacı mı?" (How Should the Issue be Spelled: Obligation of Education or Need for Education?), *Mülkiye* (37) (April 1934), 7-14; "Niçin Her Memleket Mektep İşini Aynı Yoldan Yürütemez?" (Why Education cannot be Handled in the Same Manner in Every Country?), *Mülkiye* (38) (May 1934), 4-9; "Bizde Bir Asırlık Maarif İşini" (Our Centennial Issue of Education), *Mülkiye* (39) (June 1934), 20-9.

<sup>67</sup>. M. Ali Şevki, "Mesele Nasıl Vaz'edilmeli: Tahsil Mükellefiyeti mi? Tahsil İhtiyacı mı?"; "Niçin Her Memleket Mektep İşini Aynı Yoldan Yürütemez?"; "Bizde Bir Asırlık Maarif İşini."

conception of state is not unambiguous, and can be gleaned only by reading between the lines of his work, whereby he acknowledged state interference in the social sphere in times when other social institutions lack the competence to provide the people with required services.<sup>68</sup> However, the writings of M.Ali Şevki remained within the newly consolidating sociological circle, and proved to have no significant political ramifications. Above all, it would also be a rather forced conclusion to label him as liberal.

### **State and Opposition in the Early Republican Era**

The Republican state, as the expression of political power in society, had all the means to prevent the emergence of any serious opposition as well as to avoid any congruence of interests among the opposition.<sup>69</sup> First, the civil-military bureaucracy was relatively autonomous, since it was composed of the cadres which had led the National Independence War, and which were independent of social groups, especially those with economic power.<sup>70</sup> Second, the same bureaucracy ensured its dominance in the Assembly, since it also comprised the majority in the

---

<sup>68</sup>. M. Ali Şevki, "Mesele Nasıl Vaz'edilmeli: Tahsil Mükellefiyeti mi? Tahsil İhtiyacı mı?," 7.

<sup>69</sup>. Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations," in *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Ergun Özbudun (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), 12-3.

<sup>70</sup>. Trimberger attributes the success of the Republican state, in initiating radical reforms while taming the opposition without much difficulty, to such an autonomy of the bureaucracy. Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*.

RPP, the only organized political force, which consequentially acquired the majority in the TGNA after the 1923 national elections, thereby depriving the possible opposition centers within its own structure, namely the religious representatives and local notables, of having political efficacy.<sup>71</sup> Third, the "tactical timing"<sup>72</sup> of the reforms, starting first at the institutional level without direct influence on the socio-economic basis of the different opposing groups, prevented the formation of immediate and unitary reaction to the changes in the political sphere.<sup>73</sup> Additionally, the Republican state had the opportunity to incorporate its policy against the potential economic power centers into the grand task of modernization. The positivist mentality of the revolutionaries which evicted religion from the political sphere,<sup>74</sup> has also served in the way of curbing the potential threat to the regime from the economically powerful groups, since it was especially the religious people who owned most of the vineyards and farms, as a legacy of the Ottoman past.<sup>75</sup>

As far as the intellectuals were concerned, the state either incorporated them into its structure, or tried to curb their opposition by proclaiming them as

---

<sup>71</sup>. Local notables were incorporated into the new political system by the recognition of their local economic and social supremacy. *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>72</sup>. Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 22.

<sup>73</sup>. *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup>. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 401-42.

<sup>75</sup>. Trimberger points at the confiscation of economic assets of the religious foundations. Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 29.

traitors.<sup>76</sup> The comprehensive process of sweeping away all that seemed to embody the seeds of potential opposition to the state was carried out and legitimated in the name of the spirit of the Republican regime. Following the disabling of the Second Group in the First Assembly (1920-1923)<sup>77</sup> and the successive ensurance of its ineffectiveness in the political system, by total control in the 1923 national elections, the state continuously stepped up its hostility to any voice which it perceived to be threatening to its ascendancy in the enactment of reforms.<sup>78</sup> The state's control over the intellectual activity can easily be observed in the state policies with respect to the press, one of the most available channels to reach the people. The first legal restriction on the press was introduced on March 4, 1925, within the framework of the Law for the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*). The main aim behind the restriction was to curb the increasing opposition coming mainly from the İstanbul press against Kemalist reforms.<sup>79</sup> The overall state control over the press was firmly established by the enactment of the Press Code in 1931,

---

<sup>76</sup>. According to the Law on Treason (April 15, 1923) "...Those who engage in oral, written or active opposition or provocation and publication against the legitimacy of the Turkish Grand National Assembly are treated as treasoners." Quoted in Ahmet Demirel, *Birinci Mecliste Muhalefet: İkinci Grup (Opposition in the First Assembly: The Second Group)* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), 529.

<sup>77</sup>. Ibid., 483-569.

<sup>78</sup>. Nurşen Mazıcı, *Belgelerle Atatürk Döneminde Muhalefet (1919-1926)* (İstanbul: Dilmen Yayınevi, 1984).

<sup>79</sup>. Among the main oppositionary newspapers of the İstanbul press were, *Tanin*, *Tevhid-i Efkar*, *Vatan* (closed down by the state due to the enactment of the Law for the Maintenance of Order), *İkdam* (closed due to the insufficient number of readers). Ali Gevgilili, "Türkiye Basını" (Turkish Press), in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 1, 224.

enabling the executive to ban those publications which were accused of propogandizing in favor of the Caliphate, Sultanate, and fostering anarchism.<sup>80</sup> The restrictions became more extensive paralleling the radicalization of the reforms and consolidation of the state-centered polity.<sup>81</sup> Such hostility towards the opposition reached its climax in the aftermath of the unsuccessful İzmir Plot to assassinate Mustafa Kemal (1926), which resulted in the execution of a number of the members of the former Union and Progress Party.<sup>82</sup>

As for the opposition of the intellectuals who worked for the state, especially in the universities, the case of firing of many members of *Darülfünun* (1933), because of their "unwillingness and/or incompetency to support the new regime"<sup>83</sup> is a manifestation of the unyielding stand of the state towards any deviation from the role ascribed to intellectuals. Following a change in its structure and curricula, *Darülfünun* was accorded

---

<sup>80</sup>. Ibid., 225.

<sup>81</sup>. In 1933, General Directorate of the Press was put under the authority of the Interior Ministry; and in 1938, by the amendment in the Press Code, stricter prerequisites for the publication of newspapers and journals were enacted. Ibid., 214-6.

<sup>82</sup>. Due to their rather oppositionary stance against the state and the RPP, the members of the ex-Union and Progress Party was under suspicion throughout the early Republican era. Exemplary is M. Cavid Bey, the liberal Minister of Finance of the Second Constitutional Period, who openly accused the state, including Mustafa Kemal, and the RPP of deviating from the *raison d'être* of the Republican regime in their actions, and exercising a military dictatorship under the mask of "pseudo democracy." M. Cavid Bey was executed in 1926, on the charges of planning the İzmir Plot. Cavid Bey, *Şiar'ın Defteri* (*Şiar's Diary*), ed. Şiar Yalçın (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995), 28-30, 33, 73-4, 86, 89-90, 96, 126, 268. On the trial of M. Cavid Bey, see, *Cavit Bey: İdama Beş Kala* (5 Minutes before the Execution) (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1993), 195-224.

<sup>83</sup>. Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Darülfünun."

financial and administrative autonomy (1924-1925).<sup>84</sup> The institution had come to have an historical significance, due to its representation of an intellectual tradition, inspired by the liberal and humanistic orientations of Europe.<sup>85</sup> For the Republican state, *Darülfünun's* significance was also due to its having a Faculty of Humanities, which made it instrumental for the state.<sup>86</sup> In this respect, *Darülfünun* was perceived to be the institution to provide intellectual support for the Republican mentality, as prescribed by the state itself.

However, as early as the 1930s, there appeared to be a decline in what used to be a harmonious relationship between the state and the institution.<sup>87</sup> The period was marked by accusations towards *Darülfünun*, coming both from the state and from the Ankara press, of lagging behind the process of modernization and deviating from the regime's ideals.<sup>88</sup> One field to search for such a shift in the disposition of the state with respect to the institution is the issue of the Turkish History Thesis (*Türk Tarih Tezi*). *Darülfünun* criticized the Thesis, to

---

<sup>84</sup>. Öncü, "Academics: The West in the Discourse of University Reform," 150-1.

<sup>85</sup>. Ibid., 147.

<sup>86</sup>. Ibid., 151.

<sup>87</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>88</sup>. Ibid., 142-3; Falih Rıfkı (Atay) criticized the institution as follows: "We know that TL 5000 worth award is still awaiting for its winner who would provide the best text for the Turkish Revolution. The fact that this award has not been given to anybody yet, can reveal the judgement of a rather static intellectual engagement. ...How can one conceive such a disposition towards Turkish Revolution which created a totally new material and moral order... We can tolerate neither indifference nor incompetence." Atay, "Darülfünun." For the same line of criticism see also Burhan Asaf (Belge), "Arkada kalan Darülfünun" (Darülfünun which Lagged behind) *Kadro* (August 1932) (9), 47-8; "Fırka Mektebi" (Party School) in *ibid.*, 30-33.

which it referred as unscientific and attracted the wrath of the Republican leaders.<sup>89</sup> Upon the inclusion of the issue of institutional reform into the agenda of the 1931 Party Program, and subsequent to the report prepared by Albert Malche,<sup>90</sup> a professor of pedagogy in Geneva University, (May 29, 1932) *Darülfünun* was restructured under the name of İstanbul University, by the University Act of July 31, 1933. The report mentioned the lack of scientific contribution, involvement of the academicians in extra-academic activities due to financial exigencies, the institution not having adapted the universal standards in teaching methods, insufficient comprehension of foreign languages among the students, and the necessity of training the academicians of the next generation abroad.<sup>91</sup> Ayşe Öncü pointedly argues that *Darülfünun* did not present an active opposition to political power. Its closure was more because it fell short of providing that unified body of intellectual support which was desired by the Republican state, a point already made.<sup>92</sup>

---

<sup>89</sup>. Turkish History Thesis was originally based on the assumption that various Turkish tribes immigrated throughout the world, due to an enormous drought in Central Asia, and created surpassing civilizations. Mete Tunçay and Haldun Özen, "1933 Darülfünun Tasfiyesi veya Bir Tek-Parti Politikacısının Önlenemez Yükselişi ve Düşüşü" (The Darülfünun Purge of 1933 or Unavoidable Rise and Fall of a Single Party Politician), *Tarih ve Toplum* (October 1984), 6-20.

<sup>90</sup>. For the details about the report, see *Ibid.*, 12-3.

<sup>91</sup>. *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>92</sup>. Öncü, "Academics: The West in the Discourse of the University Reform," 151-2. Here, the remark by Burhan Asaf (Belge) is also explanatory: "*Darülfünun* was established on the basis of the nineteenth-century concept of science. And this must have been the main reason of its remaining as a replica of *darülfünun*, rather than ensuring itself a standing of a *darülfünun* in its real sense. The rather indifferent scientific standings of the *darülfünuns* are both a result and a cause of the liberal thought. ...However, if liberal



The early Republican state was able to control, incorporate and suppress the opposition. Having the monopoly of political power and thus privileged access to the people, it was also successful to avoid the emergence and/or sustenance of any organized opposition, "till the time was ripe."<sup>93</sup>

### **Emergence of the Liberal Opposition**

The first organized opposition which proclaimed itself as liberal, came from within the state, and from the very ranks of the RPP. Subsequent to resignations from the RPP, mainly due to opposition to the centralized rule of the party and the monopolization of political power in the office of the head of the state,<sup>94</sup> a new party was formed on November 17, 1924, under the name of Progressive Republican Party (PRP) (*Terakkiperver*

---

thought had lost its credit in the real life and challenged by new perspectives; basing scientific approaches of the *darülfünuns* on liberal thought is nothing, but mere reactionism." Burhan Asaf (Belge) "Üniversite'nin Manası" (The Meaning of University) *Kadro* (August 1933) (20), 25-6.

<sup>93</sup>. " ..., the republic is still in its preparatory stages ... And we should not be asked for the same kind of political experience in one leap forward that ...England had been exposed throughout centuries. Mustafa Kemal, "Interview with Times," Cited in Erik Jan Zürcher, *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party 1924 - 1925* (Leiden, New York, Kobenhavn and Köln: E.J. Brill, 1991), 137.

<sup>94</sup>. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952* (*Political Parties in Turkey 1859-1952*) (İstanbul, 1952), 606-8. For the details of the daily developments in the formation of the party and thenceforth see Nevin Yurdsever Ateş, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Kuruluşu ve Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (*Foundation of Turkish Republic and Progressive Republican Party*) (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1994), 105-73.

*Cumhuriyet Fırkası*).<sup>95</sup> In the declaration of the party the motive behind its formation was stated as the inefficient functioning of the TGNA due to the lack of control mechanisms within the Assembly.<sup>96</sup> Moreover, the centralization of political power in the RPP and the delegation of executive function to a commission was heavily criticized as constituting a potential threat to the full realization of national sovereignty.<sup>97</sup> The party from its very foundation onwards displayed a portrait of an independently organized opposition. Such a stance led to intense conflict in the assembly between the PRP and the RPP. The conflict between the two parties also had its reflections on the press. Especially the İstanbul press gave support to the PRP, at times even acting as its spokesman, while the Ankara press continued in its stance as a branch of the state and directed sharp criticisms to the opposition.<sup>98</sup>

In its program, the PRP proclaimed itself to be liberal (Article 2).<sup>99</sup> Its liberal stance was mainly displayed with respect to the principles it adopted in the administrative, political and economic spheres. In

---

<sup>95</sup>. One columnist referred to the PRP as "...the child of misery and lack of freedom." Fevzi Lütüfî Karaosmanoğlu, *Son Telgraf*, October 12-13, 1924; quoted in Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*, 607.

<sup>96</sup>. For the details of the PRP Declaration, see Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*, 615-6; and Ateş, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Kuruluşu ve Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, 113, 188-90.

<sup>97</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>98</sup>. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*, 611-3; Ateş, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Kuruluşu ve Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, appendix 10, 205-6; appendix 11, 207-8; appendix 13, 211-2; appendix 14, 213-4; appendix 20, pp. 232-5; appendix 21, 236-7; appendix 22, 238-40; appendix 38, 280-2; appendix 43, 302-5.

<sup>99</sup>. According to Zürcher, the declaration and the program of the party (1924) contained nineteenth-century classical liberal premises. Zürcher, *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic*, 97 ff.

this respect, the main policy goals were stated as decentralization in local administration (Articles 14,15,16); encouragement of private enterprise, the limitation of the state hand in public works only to those spheres where private initiative was insufficient, and nullifying all restrictions on domestic and foreign trade (Articles 29-39).<sup>100</sup>

The significance of the PRP for the early Republican political life lies in its being the first organized, relatively independent and liberal opposition. It was basically such a disposition that caused the party to have a rather short-term existence in Turkish political life. In this respect, while the continuous attacks coming from the RPP and its press wing, as well as the disapproval of the party by Mustafa Kemal, worked against the firm establishment of the party since its foundation, and the political milieu of the era functioned as a catalyst in the process of its downfall.

The intensification of hostility towards the party coincided with the Şeyh Said rebellion, a Kurdish uprising, in the eastern provinces (February 13 - May 31 1925). Relatedly, Article 6 of the party program, which stated that the party shows respect to public opinion, faith and religious belief, was interpreted by the state to the disadvantage of the party, as it could be a shield for reactionary propaganda.<sup>101</sup> It was under such

---

<sup>100</sup>. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*, 616-20.

<sup>101</sup>. See "Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası'nın seddine dair vekiller heyeti kararı (Decision of the Council of Ministers on the closure of the Progressive Republican Party)," in *ibid.*, 621-2.

circumstances that arrests and executions of the party members, accused of collaboration with the uprising and reactionary propaganda took place. The PRP was closed on June 5, 1925.

Among other things, the PRP experience has been one of the most conspicuous manifestations of the omnipotence of the state. With such a precedence, the state in the following decade coped with potential opposition by actually launching its formation and organization itself. In this respect, while exemplifying the practice of tutelary opposition, the nature of the formation of the Free Republican Party (FRP) (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) (August 12, 1930) and its experience in the political sphere further indicated the power of the state.

#### ***Liberal identity in the form of tutelary opposition***

The formation of the FRP signifies the second trial of transition to multi-party politics, this time initiated by the state itself, but not against it, as was the case with the PRP experience. The state's tutelage over the party was manifest in the colloquies and correspondence between Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fethi (Okyar), the founder and chairman of the FRP, on the formation of the party; in the state financing of the party's formation, as well as in the selection of the

founder of the party and party members by Mustafa Kemal himself.<sup>102</sup>

Such a framework fits well into the mentality underlying the formation of political party in the early Republican era. In general terms the party was conceived as "... an organization for securing the necessary government and societal integration...",<sup>103</sup> and in particular as the executor of the reforms from top down.<sup>104</sup> Such a conception denoted a function for the party that deviated from the logic of opposition, namely to have a political sphere with multiplicity of views. On the contrary, the Republican state drew up an ideal picture for the political party, the basic function of which was to provide for social cohesion, which it would secure by acting as "...a mechanism for social control..."<sup>105</sup>

Thus, in its very foundation the place and role of the FRP in the political sphere was delineated by the state, as a test case for the transition to democracy. Underlying such an experience in the Turkish political life was the rational conception of democracy, whereby democracy was perceived as an end, rather than a means of reconciling opposing views and interests.<sup>106</sup> Democracy,

---

102. Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları (Memoirs of Free Party)* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), 21-35, First Published in 1950.

103. Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 23; Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, 304.

104. Trimberger, *Ibid.*, 23.

105. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, 304.

106. Heper, "Introduction," in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, eds. Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), 2-3; "Bureaucrats: Persistent Elitists," in *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*, eds. Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer eds. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd., 1993), 39.

understood as such, required "enlightened debate" to attain what was best for Turkey.<sup>107</sup> In this respect, the FRP would act as the second party in this "enlightened debate."

Emerging in the midst of such a political framework, the FRP represented the second liberal party of the early Republican era. Apart from the acknowledgment of the liberties and right of immunity, as guaranteed in the constitution (Article 1), the liberal stance of the party was most conspicuous with respect to the opposition it raised against the statist policies of the RPP in the economic sphere. The party program advocated the abolition of all state restrictions on private initiative, and restricted state involvement in the economy only to those spheres where private initiative lacked competence (Article 5). In principle, such an orientation on the part of the FRP did not contrast with the declarations by the state in the way of legitimizing the economic measures of the era. In fact, Bilsay Kuruç has pointed at 1927 as the year when state incentive to private initiative reached its climax.<sup>108</sup> On the other hand, as asserted both by Mustafa Kemal and by the members of the RPP such an incentive did not carry the signs of *laissez faire laissez passer* mentality.<sup>109</sup>

---

<sup>107</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>108</sup>. Bilsay Kuruç, *Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi (Economy in Mustafa Kemal's Period)* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987), 128.

<sup>109</sup>. The extent of the tolerance towards private initiative can be observed in 1927 RPP Program: "Our main goal is to see to it that the laws and the measures, that will be introduced by the state for economic development, will be based on the common good. We give utmost importance to avoid the state from taking any measure to provide and maintain a private benefit, as well as to ensure that it

However, as far as the economy was concerned, the nuance between the state and the FRP, would become more overt throughout the decade, as the state-initiated capitalist development proceeded.<sup>110</sup>

In fact, the economic policies adopted during the early Republican era conform with the economic contingencies of the time. As Karpas has argued, the Republican era inherited the "...paradoxical, piecemeal combination of statism, liberalism and nationalism..." that dated back to the Young Turk period.<sup>111</sup> The statement by Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt) (Minister of Economy of the period) in the 1923 Turkish Economic Congress fits well into this combination :

The new Turkish economy cannot be the same as any of the existing economic systems and policies. We have to pursue a genuine political economic policy which is in conformity with the economic requirements of our country and with the spirit of our economic history. ...We do not belong to any known economic school. We are neither *laissez faire laissez passer*, nor socialist, communist, etatist nor protectionist. We have a new school of economy...which I call the (New Turkey Economic School). The new Turkey should follow the system of

---

is impossible and inappropriate to expect any direct and/or indirect advantage from the treasury for private benefits of the individuals." Quoted in Ibid. As Mustafa Kemal stated: "...the Republic is yet too young. ...As is the case in political and intellectual life, it is not expedient to wait for the fruits of private initiative. The principle of "etatism," that we find proper to adopt, is not the same as the systems of collectivism, communism which depend on the principle of socialism, that take over the means of production and distribution from the individuals, ..., and preclude any possibility of private and individual economic initiative and action. ...Thus, the principle of "etatism" that we employ in order to provide national welfare and development, while perceiving individual action as essential, locates the state in a pivotal position in such issues which are of ultimate concern for the general interest of the nation," Quoted in Inan, *Medeni Bilgiler*, 48-9.

<sup>110</sup>. Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 115.

<sup>111</sup>. Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, 84.

mixed economy. ...Thus, in certain instances etatism will be adopted, and in some others the state will transfer its economic ventures to private initiative. ... As we are entering the economic war of our age, we have to ensure solidarity to the detriment of individuality. ...Individual initiatives are destined to step back and be rendered inconsequential in the face of the unified foreign economic world.<sup>112</sup>

As Erdoğan Alkin has stated, one of the aspirations in the economic sphere was to create the "national merchant."<sup>113</sup> However, in a milieu where private capital was almost non-existent and where the state entitled itself to its creation, such an aspiration brought with it the implementation of high tariffs on imports, reluctance in foreign borrowing and high taxation.<sup>114</sup> As also delineated by Karpat, despite the acknowledgment of private capital and enterprise, throughout the early Republican era, the state's economic activities led to ever-widening limitations on private initiative, and even to its elimination.<sup>115</sup>

Above all by the late 1920s, and throughout the 1930s, the primary task for the Republican cadre in the economic agenda turned out to be industrialization, which was perceived as a natural part of the grand project of modernization, and as the only way to maintain the aspired goals of self-sufficiency and self-reliance vis-

---

<sup>112</sup>. Quoted in *Türkiye İktisat Kongresi 1923-İzmir: Haberler-Belgeler-Yorumlar (Turkish Economic Congress 1923-İzmir: News-Documents-Comments)*, ed. A. Gündüz Ökçün (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1981), 257-66.

<sup>113</sup>. Erdoğan Alkin, "Atatürk Döneminde Devletçilik" (Etatism in Atatürk's Period), in *Atatürk Döneminde Türkiye Ekonomisi Semineri (Seminar on Turkish Economy in Atatürk's Period)* (İstanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Bankası, 1981), 116.

<sup>114</sup>. Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 117-8.

<sup>115</sup>. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 86-7.



à-vis the West.<sup>116</sup> With such a task at hand and especially in the midst of the 1929 World Depression, the state further enhanced its control and preeminence in the economy, which led to the intensification of protectionist measures.<sup>117</sup> The shift from the emphasis on the creation of the national merchant, to national industry also led to a parallel shift from the combinatory stance of the state, in the economic policy in 1923 İzmir Economic Congress towards etatism.<sup>118</sup> On August 30, 1930, İsmet İnönü (Chairman of the RPP; Prime Minister) identified the RPP as "Moderate Etatist" against the liberal stance of the FRP.<sup>119</sup> And in May 1931, etatism was included into the Party Program as the fundamental policy in economic sphere.<sup>120</sup>

The fact that the FRP emerged, with liberal proclamations, in a period of intensified protectionism, eventually put the party into a position of potential opposition to the state. This potential was perceived by the state to come to surface by the participation of the FRP in the municipal elections (1930), despite the reluctance of Mustafa Kemal to approve such a decision.<sup>121</sup> The state, in turn, toughened its stand *vis-à-vis* the party, especially in the face of the popularity the latter acquired from the public during its propoganda

---

<sup>116</sup>. Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, 85.

<sup>117</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>118</sup>. Kuruç, *Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi*, 105-24; Alkin, "Atatürk Döneminde Devletçilik," 116-21.

<sup>119</sup>. Alkin, "Atatürk Döneminde Devletçilik," 120.

<sup>120</sup>. Kuruç, *Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi*, 105.

<sup>121</sup>. Ağaoğlu, *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları*, 48.

tours.<sup>122</sup> The municipal elections can be taken as a turning point in the relationship between the FRP and the state. Following the elections, the party was no longer perceived as the "loyal opposition" in its idealized model, namely drawing the institutional schema of control within the assembly while staying under the general supervision of the state. This conviction on the part of the state was further enhanced by the submission of an interpellation by the FRP on the validity of the election results, mainly questioning the compatibility of the elections with democratic principles.<sup>123</sup>

Such a political configuration was met with the traditional action of the state in the face of any threat towards the maintenance of political power. Thus, the fate of the FRP was no different from that of the PRP. In fact, from its very foundation, the party was constantly subject to accusations of provoking "reaction" and anarchy, and of discrediting Mustafa Kemal both within the assembly and through the press. The party brought its own dissolution (November 17, 1930).<sup>124</sup>

The tutelary nature of the FRP, as has been presented above, was evident not only in its equivocal

---

<sup>122</sup>. Ibid., 53-69.

<sup>123</sup>. Ibid., 105-22.

<sup>124</sup>. Ibid., 69-123, 171-6, 216-7. Subsequently, the dissolution of the FRP was justified on the grounds of its exploitation by reactionary and anti-revolutionary forces as well as of the incompatibility of liberalism with the conditions in Turkey. Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *Atatürk'le Üç Ay ve 1930'dan Sonra Türkiye (Three Months with Atatürk and Turkey after 1930)* (Ankara: A.İ.T.İ.A Basımevi, 1981), 27-36. At the time Mustafa Kemal had argued that "...liberalism is a system which has been practised in the colonies!. ...However, we are not a colony, and we will never be. Thinking of liberalism is denying the revolution," Quoted in *ibid.*, 30.

standing in the political spectrum at the time it was founded,<sup>125</sup> but also in its rather facile self-dissolution at the time of its engagement in active opposition. Yet, the party ensured itself a specific place in Turkish political life, basically as a result of its intellectual orientation which was provided by Ahmet Ağaoğlu, the renowned liberal of the Republican era.

#### THE INTELLECTUAL BETWEEN STATE AND OPPOSITION: THE CASE OF AHMET AĞAOĞLU

Apart from his active participation in the foundation of the FRP and thenceforth, which ensured him an important place for the students of Turkish political life, Ağaoğlu is also significant for understanding the identity of the Republican intellectual, hovering between the state and opposition. Ağaoğlu served within the state structure both before and after the proclamation of the Republic.<sup>126</sup> In this respect, he represents the

---

<sup>125</sup>. Responding a question of Ahmet Ağaoğlu, the leading liberal of the time, about the program of the party, Fethi Okyar replied as follows: "... (The party) will not be different from the RPP in essence... (Mustafa Kemal) will have control over both parties. While holding (his) links with the RPP (he) will not be indifferent to my party, and will in fact determine the candidates of both parties in the elections. It seems that (he) is fed up with lack of control... (He) wants, on the one hand, the presence of two parties in the parliament which would control each other, on the other hand, an atmosphere of freedom throughout the country. However, in order to avoid anarchy and unrest, (he) wants to ensure that there be no radical difference between the two parties and that both parties be directed by one higher authority. Thus, my party will be on one side of the RPP. The circumstances will determine whether it will be on the right or on the left. Ağaoğlu, *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları*, 28.

<sup>126</sup>. From 1921 onwards Ağaoğlu took position in various state posts including the General Directorate of the Press and Information (General Director), the pro-state *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (editorial writer), and parliament after 1922, Turkish History Institution and

intellectual of the Republic preoccupied with the consolidation of the Kemalist principles and reforms into an intellectual framework and transmitting them to society. A thematic analysis of his writings may help to depict such a preoccupation. Ağaoğlu mainly dwelled upon delineating the mentality of the Turkish Revolution, the necessity of further change in line with Kemalist principles, and the role of the Turkish intellectual in this process. The common denominator throughout his writings appeared to be the spontaneous interlinkage between the West on the one hand, the concepts of nation and nationalism, on the other. His conformity with the Kemalist reforms was manifested first in his acceptance of the West as the reference point in the grand task of modernization.<sup>127</sup> He justified such a standing on the basis of national sovereignty, which constituted one of the basic themes throughout his writings. Ağaoğlu stated that the concept and practice of national sovereignty was peculiar to Western thought and history, and constituted an antithesis of Eastern mentality.<sup>128</sup> Second, in line with the preoccupation of defining the "Turkish nation," that was so characteristic of the early Republican era, the nation was another basic theme in his writings. Ağaoğlu defined the nation in terms of shared language, religion, literature and common history, which for him comprised

---

the Ankara and İstanbul Law Faculties. Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, 409.

<sup>127</sup>. Ağaoğlu, "Şark ve Garp" (The East and West), *Vatan*, September 5, 1923, no. 158, Cited in *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı I (Intellectual Life in Atatürk's Period I)* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1992), 83-7.

<sup>128</sup>. Ibid.

the basis of national consciousness.<sup>129</sup> He held that the role the intellectual would play was of utmost importance for the development of national consciousness, inherent within the society, and accorded the state the responsibility in the realization of such a task.<sup>130</sup> Such a conception of the nation provided another legitimation ground for Kemalist reforms, as harmonizing and unifying the different thoughts and feelings of the individuals for the sustenance of the Republican order, which basically meant the realization of national sovereignty.<sup>131</sup>

As far as the role of the intellectual in this nation-building process is concerned, Aġaoġlu again took the West as the reference point. In his comparisons between the East and West, he criticized Eastern literary works on the basis of their isolation from the society in terms of both terminology and content.<sup>132</sup> On the other hand, he praised the nineteenth-century positivist intellectual, who had entrusted himself the task of reconstructing the good and the bad for society, and of reorganizing society on the precepts of reason vis-à-vis the church.<sup>133</sup> For him this new society ultimately evolved into nation.<sup>134</sup> Mirroring on such a model he held the

---

<sup>129</sup>. Aġaoġlu, "Milli Őuur" (National Conscious), *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, August 8, 1924, no. 1189, Cited in *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı I*, 97.

<sup>130</sup>. Aġaoġlu, *Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde (In the Land of Free Men)* (İstanbul: Sanayii Nefise Matbaası, 1930), 69.

<sup>131</sup>. Aġaoġlu, "Milli Őuur," 97-101; "Milliyetçilik Cereyanının Esasları" (Principles of Nationalist Trend), *Türk Yurdu*, August 1925, vol.II, no.11, 389-95, Cited in *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı I*, 115-22.

<sup>132</sup>. Aġaoġlu, *Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde*, 70.

<sup>133</sup>. Aġaoġlu, "Türk Entellektüellerinin Zaafları" (The Weaknesses of Turkish Intellectuals) *Akın*, June 7, 1933.

<sup>134</sup>. *Ibid.*

Republican intellectual responsible for reading, interpreting and, in the final analysis, framing the latent consciousness among the Turkish people.<sup>135</sup> Aġaoġlu thought that the institutional aspect of the Turkish Revolution well exceeded the social ethos, and emphasized that it is the responsibility of the intellectual to find the matching point between them.<sup>136</sup> In fact, in the latter part of his works, he employed the term National Movement (*Harekatı Milliye*) instead of Revolution, which according to Aġaoġlu, was a display of unconsciousness among the people.<sup>137</sup> He underlined the function of literature to act as a transmission belt between society and state. Literature should present the ideal model, as set by the Movement, for the construction of Republican society.<sup>138</sup> Underlying such a faith in the intellectual was his peculiar perception of the intellectual as representing the nation and reflecting the national consciousness.<sup>139</sup> It is in this respect that Aġaoġlu displayed the portrait of an intellectual who has internalized the state-given role of the "bearer of culture"<sup>140</sup> with the mission of educating and training people in conformity with the mentality of

---

135. Ibid.

136. Aġaoġlu, *Devlet ve Fert (The State and Individual)* (İstanbul: Sanayiinefise Matbaası, 1933) 122.

137. Aġaoġlu, *İhtilal mi İnkilab mı? (Revolution or Reform)* (Ankara: 1941-1942) 18-22.

138. Aġaoġlu, *Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde*, 69ff.

139. Ibid., 68.

140. The term is borrowed from Dyson. Dyson employs the term "bearers of culture" for the late nineteenth century theoreticians of *Kulturstaat*, who took on the "interpretative role of the philosopher as the discoverer of norms and values." Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and Institution* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), 151.

the regime. Ironically, his professional history exemplified the intellectual of the Republican era, walking on a tightrope, by his appointment to the membership of Turkish History Institution (1932), and subsequent dismissal from the *Darülfünun* (1933).<sup>141</sup>

### **Ağaoğlu as the Intellectual in Opposition**

Ağaoğlu can also be taken as a model for the intellectual in opposition, coming from within the state, in the name of those very principles that the state determined and proclaimed. He was appointed member of the FRP; however he turned out to be a genuine opponent of the RPP.<sup>142</sup> Although the party had quite a short life which prevented it from extending beyond the status of opposition under tutelage, the peculiar standing of Ağaoğlu within the party, as its theoretician, continued after its dissolution. In contrast to the other ex-party members who later rejoined the RPP, Ağaoğlu chose to stay in opposition.<sup>143</sup>

Ağaoğlu perceived the formation of the FRP as the corollary of a natural necessity inherent in the *raison d'être* of the Republican regime.<sup>144</sup> For him, the FRP constituted the mechanism of constructive opposition within the parliament that would refresh political life and deter the potential of indifference and passivity

---

<sup>141</sup>. *İstanbul Üniversitesi*, 18.

<sup>142</sup>. For the colloquies between Ağaoğlu and Mustafa Kemal in this respect, see Ağaoğlu, *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları*, 35-40.

<sup>143</sup>. *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>144</sup>. *Ibid.*, 147.

among the people, which he thought, was an inevitable outcome of one-party rule.<sup>145</sup> Underlying his scepticism towards the one-party rule of the RPP, with whose principles he totally agreed, was his conviction on the corruptive effect of power on human beings, leading to oppression.<sup>146</sup> In this respect, he found much more in the second party of the regime than mere formal practice of opposition, namely the activation of public consciousness with respect to the political system. And, upon the dissolution of the FRP, it was again this perception that led Aġaoġlu to conclude that Turkey was still not mature enough to provide a suitable atmosphere for the nourishment of opposition parties.<sup>147</sup>

### **The Intellectual in Search of Liberal Identity**

The conceptual framework that Ahmet Aġaoġlu used in his writings is of utmost importance. It shows the contextual impasse that the liberal intellectual experienced throughout the early Republican era.

The liberal stance of Aġaoġlu was colored with his identification with the Republican state. In fact, the identity crisis of the early Republican era, which arose out of the uneasiness of matching changes at the institutional level with those at the cultural level, was

---

<sup>145</sup>. Ibid., 147, 198-9.

<sup>146</sup>. Aġaoġlu, *Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde*, 35.

<sup>147</sup>. "It is confirmed by experience that opposition parties cannot be founded and/or sustained (in Turkey)." Aġaoġlu, "Müstakil Memb'usluklar" (Independent Memberships of Parliament), *Akın*, June 15, 1933.



well symbolized in his writings: "I entered the FRP as a revolutionary democrat, liberal, statist and Kemalist. ...Till the foundation of the FRP, I sincerely believed that the RPP was a liberal, democratic party, and even as statist as I am."<sup>148</sup>

In this respect, it is necessary to read between the lines in order to understand the underlying factors of his peculiar standing as an intellectual of the state, which in the meantime led to his dismissal from the state circle. Throughout the writings of Aġaoġlu, it is possible to observe a co-existence of the acknowledgement of the faith in the principles of the Republican state and a distinctive interpretation of the *raison d'être* of those very principles based on a structured conceptual framework.

The matrix of the conceptual framework of Aġaoġlu can be found in his conception of history. Aġaoġlu perceived history as a process of a continuous search for harmony among the organic contradictions within each and every society.<sup>149</sup> For him history was composed of subsequent stages of "becoming,"<sup>150</sup> signifying a further level of progress, which arose out of the ongoing contradictions.<sup>151</sup> More briefly, he viewed history as a scene of "creative evolution,"<sup>152</sup> each stage of which contains a phase of order producing its own tensions.

---

<sup>148</sup>. Aġaoġlu, *Devlet ve Fert*, 101-2.

<sup>149</sup>. *Ibid.*, 35-7.

<sup>150</sup>. *Ibid.*

<sup>151</sup>. *Ibid.*, 40.

<sup>152</sup>. Aġaoġlu, "Yaratıcı Tekamül" (Creative Evolution), *Kültür Haftası*, January 29, 1936, no. 3.

According to Aġaoġlu each stage of progress delivers a more structured order, which in turn, bares more complex contradictions.<sup>153</sup>

Aġaoġlu placed the state and individual as the main actors on this scene of struggle between order and tension.<sup>154</sup> For him, individual action, which he viewed as the womb of the contradictions, is the main leitmotive behind further progress.<sup>155</sup> The state, on the other hand, is the manifestation of the antidote, namely order. Throughout the historical stages, this tense interaction between the individual and state is shaped by the specific exigencies of different historical stages.<sup>156</sup>

It is such a framework that provided Aġaoġlu with a breathing space to pursue his proclaimed liberal stance on the one hand, and to justify such a stance on the grounds of the Kemalist principles, on the other. In his writings, the nation constituted the common denominator between the individual and state. According to Aġaoġlu, the early Republican era was a period of nation-building as an eventual outcome of the "attraction"<sup>157</sup> among those, with shared anthropological origins, language, and culture to unite.<sup>158</sup> He held the state responsible for the pursuit of the consolidation of the ethical bases of national consciousness whose material foundations had

---

153. Aġaoġlu, *Devlet ve Fert*, 40.

154. *Ibid.*, 98-9.

155. *Ibid.*, 34-5, 40-2.

156. Aġaoġlu, *Devlet ve Fert*.

157. *Ibid.*, 93.

158. Aġaoġlu, "Milliyetçilik Cereyanının Esasları," 115-22; *Devlet ve Fert*, 92.

already been laid down by history.<sup>159</sup> On the other hand, Aġaoġlu perceived the individual not as an absolute category, but as the individual of the nation, namely the individual-as-citizen of the Republic.<sup>160</sup> For him, the individual could not be considered in solitude, but as a constitute part of society and the nation.<sup>161</sup> It is in this respect that he accorded the state with the task of consciousness-raising of the mutual responsibility between the individual and society, and thus of providing the groundwork for the solidification of the already-existing sense of belonging.<sup>162</sup>

Perceiving freedom as the essence of life for both the society and individual,<sup>163</sup> Aġaoġlu argued that freedom was crucial for the inculcation of such a consciousness in the individual.<sup>164</sup> He contended the views which held that freedom contained the risk of leading to anarchy.<sup>165</sup> Instead, he based the sustenance of social order, harmony and unity on the appropriate practice of freedom.<sup>166</sup> For Aġaoġlu, the appropriate exercise of freedom would ensure sweeping away the remnants of the Ottoman past which had circumscribed the individual will.<sup>167</sup> He invested the state

---

<sup>159</sup>. Aġaoġlu, *Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde*, 69; "Milliyetçilik" (Nationalism), *Akın*, July 10, 1933.

<sup>160</sup>. Aġaoġlu, *Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde; Ben Neyim (Who am I?)* (İstanbul, 1939), 10.

<sup>161</sup>. Aġaoġlu, *Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde*, 105.

<sup>162</sup>. Ibid.; "Maarifimizin Islahı" (Reform of our Educational System), *Akın*, June 21, 1933.

<sup>163</sup>. Aġaoġlu, *Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde*, 121.

<sup>164</sup>. Ibid.; *Devlet ve Fert*, 22, 106.

<sup>165</sup>. Ibid., 22, 87; "Nizamlı Hürriyet" (Ordered Freedom), *Akın*, June 5, 1933.

<sup>166</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>167</sup>. Aġaoġlu, *Devlet ve Fert*, 29ff.

with the task of training people in freedom, and thus carrying the achievement of national freedom at the institutional level, which was legally structured in the TGNA, to the cultural level.<sup>168</sup> In other words, in his writings a universal conception of freedom, based on his homocentric stance, was remolded into freedom-in-society. Freedom was praised not only from a homocentric perspective, (read as freedom as right), but also from a societal perspective (read as freedom as duty).<sup>169</sup> The freedom-in-society required delineation by and compliance with the principles of the state.<sup>170</sup>

### ***The individual in Aġaoġlu's conceptual matrix***

Aġaoġlu's individual corresponds to the personalist conception of man of the twentieth century continental European intellectual reaction against the "...subjectivism of liberal individualism."<sup>171</sup> In Aġaoġlu's work, the individual was described in terms of two opposing dimensions, namely "the outer self" and "the inner self."<sup>172</sup> The outer self is analogous to the identity of the ego-centered, interest-seeking individual with no commitment to any entity other than himself, which for the classical liberal is the individual-as-such. On the

---

<sup>168</sup>. Ibid., 80; Aġaoġlu, *Devlet ve Fert*, 74-5, 122.

<sup>169</sup>. Ibid., p. 35. Freedom, conceived as such, was taken to have formulated the ethical aspect of discipline in the society. Aġaoġlu, "Nizamlı Hürriyet."

<sup>170</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>171</sup>. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, 72.

<sup>172</sup>. Aġaoġlu, *Ben Neyim*.

other hand, the inner self inherently embodies "solidarity,"<sup>173</sup> "virtue,"<sup>174</sup> and "cognizance,"<sup>175</sup> and thus the essence of the ideal altruistic individual for Ağaoğlu.<sup>176</sup> He puts the inner self, that is the will of the individual, over and above the outer self, that is reason.<sup>177</sup> In his reading, freed from the bonds of the rationalism of classical liberal standing, the actions of the individual arise out of his will which is always in a state of "becoming," as a projection of the past over the present.<sup>178</sup> In congruence with his interpretation of the Turkish Revolution as the surfacing of the unconsciousness among the people, for Ağaoğlu the inner self is the bedrock of that unconsciousness which lies under the individual action, leading to "creative evolution."<sup>179</sup>

The reflection of such a portrayal of individual, in the image of a bifurcated self, on the conception of the state, can be located within the framework of the nineteenth-century continental European theories of state, associated with a communitarian model of society.<sup>180</sup> The organic metaphor, the common denominator of these theories, which perceives "...the individual as an integral part of the society..."<sup>181</sup> who can realize his

---

173. Ağaoğlu, *Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde*, 30-4.

174. *Ibid.*, 61.

175. *Ibid.*, 112-3; Ağaoğlu, "Maarifimizin Islahı;" *Ben Neyim*, 40.

176. Ağaoğlu, *Ben Neyim*.

177. Ağaoğlu, "Yaratıcı Tekamül."

178. *Ibid.*

179. *Ibid.*

180. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, 143-50.

181. *Ibid.*, 165.

"...value and dignity..."<sup>182</sup> only through integration with the society, can also be observed in the writings of Aġaoġlu. Derivatively, this perception not only accorded the state sovereignty, but also invested it with molding the ideal individual of the Republic, which would eventually lead to the surfacing of the inner self to the detriment of the outer self. Above all, in the writings of Aġaoġlu, the state has never been an outcast in the name of the individual. This is well manifested in his credence to the task of disciplining the individual for freedom,<sup>183</sup> which, for him, was already established in the state structure by the state itself.<sup>184</sup>

#### CONCLUDING REMARKS

The early Republican era was a period of crystallization of the legacy of the state tradition into a strong state within the process of nation-state building. In this process, the intellectual was saddled with double responsibility. He was endowed with the task of formulating the intellectual grounds for the Turkish Revolution, and of inculcating the logic of the new regime in society. Such a disposition can be taken as a corollary of social structure high-in-stateness in the intellectual

---

<sup>182</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>183</sup> "...that all those communities which have been successful in establishing Republics, have also determined and organized the means and manners of the practise of (these) freedom(s). Individuals can possess freedom if and only if they comply with these prerequisites." Aġaoġlu, "Nizamlı Hürriyet."

<sup>184</sup>. Aġaoġlu, "Ana kanunlar ve Nazım Kanunlar" (Main Laws and By-laws), *Akın*, June 27, 1933.

sphere.<sup>185</sup> To employ Kenneth H.F. Dyson's conceptualization, the Republican state was "...a generalizing, integrating and legitimating..." one.<sup>186</sup> Throughout the early Republican era it was the state that

determined the leading values of the political community with reference to which authority (was) to be exercised; ...found its embodiment in one or more institutions and one or more public purposes which thereby acquired a special social ethos and prestige and an association with the public interest or general welfare; and produced a socio-cultural awareness of the unique and superior nature of the state itself,<sup>187</sup>

and thus installed itself over and above the society. The Republican state, constructed as such, readily undertook unto itself the mission of setting up the conditions for upsurging the norms and values of Turkish society which awaited vitalization.

Such a configuration provided the early Republican intellectual with a conceptual framework which had already been determined by the state itself. As was the case in the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire, the intellectual continued to preoccupy himself with analyzing the West, in order to highlight why the East has failed in the face of the West. Again not differently from his precedents he found his safety belt within the

---

<sup>185</sup>. Such a conclusion is based on the work of two students of Turkish politics. "Experience in statecraft, respect for the state, the importance of the state in the history of the Turkish republic, endowing it with a political gravitas, absent from most new countries..." Andrew Mango, "The State of Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 13 (1977), 265; Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Walkington, England: The Eothen Press, 1985).

<sup>186</sup>. Kenneth H.F. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, 206.

<sup>187</sup>. *Ibid.*

state structure. This time he based his arguments on the logic of the Turkish Revolution, which at times resulted in mutually opposing interpretations among the intellectuals.<sup>188</sup>

It may be argued that Ahmet Ağaoğlu represents an isolated figure in the early Republican intellectual circles.<sup>189</sup> His isolation may be linked to the absence of a liberal circle. He was typical in that he constructed his liberal stance on the *raison d'être* of the Turkish Revolution, which ensured his loyalty to the state and its principles. In his *In the Land of the Free Men* (*Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesi'nde*) Ağaoğlu painted the utopia of that novel system, which for him underlied the cardinal aspiration of the Turkish Revolution.<sup>190</sup> In the land of the free men of Ağaoğlu, the system is founded on the principle of individual freedom. He argued that the Turkish Revolution was in fact a struggle of the will against memory,<sup>191</sup> for liberating the individual, "...and thus the community constituted by the individuals...", from the shackles of Eastern dogmatism.<sup>192</sup> Ağaoğlu substantiated his argument by referring to the structure of the Republican state and the Constitution. He specifically emphasized that the "...foundations of the new Turkish state were built upon..." the principle of the right of participation in the political system, basic channel for the disclosure of the free will of the

---

<sup>188</sup>. In this respect see the Kadro circle which provided a leftist interpretation of the Turkish Revolution and Kemalist reforms in the early 1930s, as opposed to Ağaoğlu's reading. *Kadro*, ed. Cem Alpar, vols. I, II (Ankara: A.İ.T.İ.A. Yayınları, 1978/1979).

<sup>189</sup>. Ironically, Ağaoğlu has been studied as among the "tradionalist-conservative" circle, however standing on the edge. In this respect see C. Nazım İrem, "Kemalist Modernism and the Genesis of Modern Turkish Conservatism" (Ph.D. Dissertation. Bilkent University. 1996).

<sup>190</sup>. Ağaoğlu, *Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde*.

<sup>191</sup>. *Ibid.*, 98.

<sup>192</sup>. Ağaoğlu, *Devlet ve Fert*, 30.



individuals.<sup>193</sup> However, such an emphasis on the individual should not mislead one to analogize his conceptual framework with the classical liberal stance, which accords the individual a pivotal place in the public sphere, over and above any other social entity. Instead, Aġaoġlu's arguments were derived from the concept of individual freedom in the name of sustaining a stable and dynamic society, which was modelled on the Western nation-state.<sup>194</sup> Here, it should be noted that faith in the individual was not in the individual-as-such, but in the ideal individual-as-citizen of the Republic, which he perceived to be the prerequisite for the sustenance of the order.

What pushed Aġaoġlu to opposition was not his views about the basis of the Republican regime, but those about the particular policies which the state pursued in the name of the regime. His conception of freedom, delineated above, led to his active participation in the FRP and his identification with the party even after its dissolution. For him the FRP experience represented the practise of control and criticism, prerequisites of the realization of freedom.<sup>195</sup> His conception of history was reflected in his challenge to the statist policies of the state, which had gained momentum in the 1930s.<sup>196</sup> However, one should not misinterpret such a standing as a manifestation of a refusal of statism. In fact, while acknowledging "the statism of the (Turkish) state"<sup>197</sup> as *sui generis*, Aġaoġlu rejected state intervention in the economy, because it

---

193. Ibid., 29.

194. Ibid., 74.

195. Aġaoġlu, *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları*.

196. Aġaoġlu, *Devlet ve Fert*, 62-76.

197. Ibid., 61, 98.

was too early.<sup>198</sup> He believed that the imperative contradictions in the economy, which occasionally lead the state to step in to reinstate social harmony and order, had not emerged yet. Instead, he stated that the requirements of the period asked for a role of the state as an organizer in the economic sphere, rather than as an active partner.<sup>199</sup>

The peculiarity of Ağaoğlu's liberal stance was mainly shaped by his perception of historical contingencies. Exemplary is his interpretation of the Turkish Revolution, not as an exceptional parenthesis in history, but as a contextual eventuality in the universal process of progress, as the climax of that "creative evolution." However, this perception of history was not steered by a portrait of a liberal intellectual acting with the universal and abstract principles of classical liberalism. He employed the universally authentic concept of individual freedom in order to provide an indigenous conceptualization, which would conform with the particular political configuration of his period in Turkey. It is in this respect that Ağaoğlu represented the intellectual of the early Republican era who was in search of a liberal identity for *his society*.<sup>200</sup> (emphasis added)

---

<sup>198</sup>. Ibid., 62-76.

<sup>199</sup>. For Ağaoğlu, the economic exigencies pushed the state to maintain technological improvement in agriculture, providing markets for agricultural products, upholding industrial development, and seeing to it that the national products are circulated within the country. Ağaoğlu, "Ziraat mi Sanayi mi?" (Agriculture or Industry?), *Akın*, June 3, 1933.

<sup>200</sup>. "Reflecting upon our past we can conclude that we -as a community- have not yet fulfilled the process of becoming. We do not have a definite form. We do not have divergent and opposing interests and intellectual formations. Now the ultimate task for us is to acquaint this country with freedom." Ağaoğlu, *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları*, 122.

## CHAPTER V

### THE STATE AND INTELLECTUAL IN AN ERA OF 'LIBERALIZATION' (1946-1960)

#### THE STATE AND DEMOCRACY

Ahmet Ağaoğlu died in 1939. The year was also marked by the beginning of a significant period in world history: the Second World War (1939-1945). The war affected not only the foreign but also domestic politics of the Turkish Republic. This effect was most conspicuous with respect to the economic sphere. The war brought with it the closing down of the borders, and the reinforcement of protectionist policies in the economic sphere. The period was distinguished by the ascendancy of Keynesian policies in the West. Beginning with the 1929 Depression, the West was going through a denial of the classical liberal idealization of the market economy. The focus of attention shifted from faith in the interest-seeking individual in the economy to the aspiration of providing full-employment. In this respect, John Maynard Keynes became a key figure by his rather moderating propositions between the efficiency of the autonomously working market and planning. The autonomy of the market was perceived to be essential for the quality of production, while planning was re-considered for the determination of the quantity of production beforehand.

Living in the midst of such an international milieu, the Turkish state adopted stricter measures in the running of the economy. In fact, this was no exception with respect to the preceding period of absolute etatism. The 1930s had witnessed the evolutionary consolidation of etatism. The state ensured itself the role of principal investor and producer in the sphere of railways, navigation, municipal services, energy, industry and mining. By the introduction of the First Five Year Plan in 1934, this role had been consolidated.<sup>1</sup> However, the rationale behind etatism was stated not as hostility towards private initiative, but as the conviction of its inadequacy at the time. Nevertheless, the Law on the Encouragement of Industry (*Teşvik-i Sanayi Kanunu*) was still in force. As argued by Korkut Boratav, in this period private capital was not perceived as a competitor against the state. Rather, it was provided with the opportunity of free initiative in small industrial spheres.<sup>2</sup> A statement of Celal Bayar in 1937, the incumbent Minister of Economy, confirms this argument:

We will support individual initiative for those spheres where it is competent. ... However, the state will assume the pivotal role for sustaining national security and common interest and for the

---

<sup>1</sup>. Bilsay Kuruç, *Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi 1987). On the etatist period, see Çağlar Keyder, *Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London: Verso Publications, 1987), 98ff.; Faruk Birtek, "The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey, 1932-1950: The Uncertain Road in the Restructuring of a Semi-Peripheral Economy," *Review*, VII (3) (Winter 1985), 407-38.

<sup>2</sup>. Korkut Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi (1908-1990)" (History of Economics), in *Türkiye Tarihi: Çağdaş Türkiye (1908-1980)* (*History of Turkey: Modern Turkey (1908-1980)*), ed. Sina Akşin, vol. 4 (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1995), 304-11.

development of individual initiative in those spheres where the latter lacks competence or under conditions of national protectionism.<sup>3</sup>

Such a standing would have led to a gradual shift to liberal policies when the time was ripe. However, the proviso of the period between 1939-1945 engendered a reverse development. Apart from the yet-to-be achieved goal of industrialization, and the lack of an effective national bourgeoisie, the requisite of getting prepared for the risk of entering into the war led to the tightening of state control over the economy. Thus, contacts with England and France in the late 1930s, which had also speeded up the actualization of proclaimed intention of the government to adopt liberal policies, lost their significance by the overwhelming emphasis on military expenditures.<sup>4</sup> The imposition of Capital Levy (*Varlık Vergisi*) (1942) was a further move in this direction.<sup>5</sup>

The most significant display of state intervention in the economic sphere was exercised by the enactment of the Law on National Protection (*Milli Korunma Kanunu*) (1940). The law provided the RPP government with the authority to determine the quality and quantity of production, plan production, fix price limits in imports and exports, temporarily confiscate private enterprises, and to the seize of land where it was deemed necessary for national security. In this respect, the government

---

<sup>3</sup>. Quoted in Kuruç, *Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi*, 84-5.

<sup>4</sup>. Z.Y. Hershlag, *Turkey: The Challenge of Growth* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968), 131-2.

<sup>5</sup>. *Ibid.*, 133; Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi (1908-1990)," 306-7.

was unaccountable, since it was the ultimate decision maker about the conditions requiring the implementation of the law, and it was obliged only to inform the Grand National Assembly about its deeds.<sup>6</sup> Not differently, in the implementation of the Capital Levy, owners of property had no right of appeal and were subject to severe punishment in case of disobedience.<sup>7</sup>

The social and political significance of the war time economic policies lay in the post-war panorama of political scene. The above-mentioned measures led to discontent among property-owners both in the agricultural sector and in the urban sites, which also corresponded to the rise of opposition within the RPP.<sup>8</sup> The opposition was first voiced against the Draft Law on Land in 1945, which proposed the nationalization and redistribution of landed property to the landless peasantry.<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup>. Hershlag, *Turkey: The Challenge of Growth*, 133; Boratav "İktisat Tarihi (1908-1990)," 306-7.

<sup>7</sup>. Hershlag, *Turkey: The Challenge of Growth*, 133.

<sup>8</sup>. Keyder, *Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, 40.

<sup>9</sup>. The name of the law was changed into Law on Providing Peasantry with Land (*Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu*) and passed on June 11, 1945. Tefik Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi: 1839-1950 (Turkey's History of Democracy: 1839-1950)* (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1995), 384-8.

**The Rise of Opposition: A Replay of the Claims for  
"Rational Debate"?<sup>10</sup>**

The indignation against the Draft Law later proved to be more than a voice against one particular issue. The opposing figures, namely Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan and Fuat Köprülü clarified their stance by a proposal, known as the Proposal of the Four (*Dörtlü Takrir*) submitted to the TGNA in June 1945. According to its propagandists the proposal was in the form of a reform report.<sup>11</sup> It basically contained "...setting up of a substantive control mechanism in the TGNA, certain constitutional amendments which blockade the emergence and survival of democratic institutions..." as the prerequisites for the "...fulfillment of democratic conscious and realization of democracy."<sup>12</sup>

Subsequent to the expulsion of Menderes, Koraltan and Köprülü from the RPP and the resignation of Celal Bayar from both his office at the Parliament and the RPP, a new opposition party was formed on January 7, 1946. The party was named the Democratic Party (DP).<sup>13</sup> Similar to the preceding attempts to initiate a multi-party regime, the party was formed by the former members of the RPP and

---

<sup>10</sup>. Metin Heper, "Bureaucrats: Persistent Elitists," in *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*, eds. Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer (London and New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, 1993), 39.

<sup>11</sup>. Refik Koraltan, *Vatan*, October 2, 1945.

<sup>12</sup>. *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup>. Tarık Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler: 1859-1952 (Political Parties in Turkey: 1859-1952)* (İstanbul, 1952), 648-9.

proclaimed itself to be liberal.<sup>14</sup> Again, not different from previous experiences, emergence of the DP was simultaneous with the shift in the RPP towards more liberal policies. The subsequent statements of İsmet İnönü, beginning by his speech in May 1945, pointed at the need for accelerating the move towards democracy.<sup>15</sup> In his opening speech of the TGNA (November 1, 1945) İnönü explained the means for the realization of such a task:

The democratic character of the Republic has been taken to be principal. ...In principle, dictatorship has never been accepted... Our only deficiency is the absence of a party opposing the party in power. ...by the motivation of the exigencies of the country and the eventual functioning of free and democratic life, the foundation of another political party will also be possible. ...There is no doubt that freedom of expression is the shared basis of each and every people's rule... We believe that instead of functioning as a faction, the ensurance of an overt disposition by a programme, by those who do not share the same views on principle and execution with their partners within a political institution, is both more appropriate for the development of our political life and more constructive for the interest and political maturity of the nation.<sup>16</sup>

On the other hand, as far as the economy was concerned, by the end of the Second World War the RPP

---

<sup>14</sup>. Ibid., 647-9.

<sup>15</sup>. In his speech İnönü mentioned the "...training of the nation for free thoughts and life of freedom by the people's rule..." He further stated that "...each nation is in a search of precautions against oppression on thought and morality. ...By the removal of the war-time conditions which necessitated precautionary measures, the principles of democracy will ensure their dominance in the political and intellectual life of the country. ...the national will which is placed in the National Assembly, will continue to develop in the path towards democracy." İsmet İnönü, May 19, 1945, quoted in *Forum*, 9 (102) (June 15, 1958), 10.

<sup>16</sup>. İsmet İnönü, Opening Speech of the Parliament, November 1, 1945, quoted in *Forum*, 10 (103) (July 1, 1958), 9-10.



government had already begun to search for ways to reconcile its statist standing with the need to boil down the increasing opposition urging liberalization. Although in the 1946 Five Year Development Plan the party continued in its traditional requisite of state initiative for development and industrialization and of economic independence in the international sphere, in the 1947 Turkey Development Plan the role of the private sector was emphasized.<sup>17</sup> More significant was the 1947 RPP Congress, whereby the party acknowledged most of the demands coming from the private sector. In the same Congress, etatism was reinterpreted as a substitute principle for the enhancement of private initiative.<sup>18</sup> In this respect, while Article 8<sup>19</sup> of the new party program delineated the spheres of state initiative, Articles 9<sup>20</sup> and 10<sup>21</sup> accepted a wider scope for the private initiative, at least in principle.

---

17. Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi," 314. See also Hershlag, *Turkey: The Challenge of Growth*, 133-7.

18. Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi," 314.

19. "State is responsible to pursue economic activities in those spheres concerning public interest and public services in national economy and national security via its own institutions. These are the construction of large mining enterprises, energy plants and heavy industry, large-scale investments such as defence industry and public works, and initiatives which are related to public services such as transportation and communication." Quoted in Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*, 585.

20. "The RPP acknowledges the necessity of private initiative in all economic spheres except those mentioned in Article 8. The state should support, encourage and protect private initiative. ...On the other hand, the state might come into the picture where the private initiative lacks competence and/or is unwilling to act due to absence of future profiteering." Quoted in *ibid.*, 585-6.

21. "The RPP acknowledges the requisite of the legal enactments on the operation of private initiative and state initiative under equal conditions." Quoted in *ibid.*, 586.

However, this tendency to soften the practice of absolute etatism did not help much in curtailing the opposition. On the contrary, the indifference of the RPP towards independent attempts at the reinterpretation of etatism and/or its incapacity to follow up with the related proposals led to an increase in the popularity of the DP. In this respect, the 1948 National Economic Congress, which was organized by the Istanbul Trade Chamber, is exemplary. The main theme of the Congress was the clarification of the role of the state and limits to its role in the economy.<sup>22</sup> The criticisms were mainly related to the issue of inconsistency in state policies as well as ambiguity in the relative dispositions of state and private initiatives. Another target of criticism was centralization and the inefficiency of bureaucratic mentality.<sup>23</sup> Such a standing provided the DP with a potential support base, at least in the initial stages of its opposition, following the failure of the subsequent RPP governments to pursue a consistent path towards liberalization.<sup>24</sup>

As noted above, the third attempt at the transition to multi-party regime had resemblance to its precedents. On the eve of the formation of the DP, İnönü promised to play a neutral role as a mediator between the two parties, which resembled the role that Mustafa Kemal had

---

<sup>22</sup>. For an outline of the principles determined in the Congress see Hershlag, *Turkey: The Challenge of Growth*, 137.

<sup>23</sup>. Birtek, "The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey, 1932-1950: The Uncertain Road in the Restructuring of a Semiperipheral Economy," 423-9.

<sup>24</sup>. *Ibid.*, 432.

assumed himself during the formation of the Free Republican Party (FRP).<sup>25</sup> Again, not different from the FRP experience, the standing of the DP on the political spectrum with respect to the RPP was rather ambiguous:

Since our party program refers both to the political and economic, as well as social spheres, it is difficult to prefigure whether we stand on the right or left with respect to the RPP in each of these spheres. These issues are stated in our program more clearly. We believe that Turkey is on a stage of democracy that it has to transcend. We reject the theory which perceives class struggle as imperative. We are determined to protect national interest as a whole.<sup>26</sup>

However, the authenticity of the DP opposition was that it disclosed a split within the RPP. While the incumbent prime minister, Recep Peker, attacked the opposition as "...provoking rebellion..."<sup>27</sup>, İnönü displayed a totally contrasting approach in his July 12 Declaration (1948) which ended up with the curtailment of the tough-liners within the RPP.<sup>28</sup> In fact, the Declaration may be interpreted as the genuine illustration of the reconciling role that İnönü took on himself, between the government and opposition:

The opposition party which operates not as an institution provoking rebellion, but on the basis

---

<sup>25</sup>. Exemplary is a series of Celal Bayar-İsmet İnönü meetings that began on June 7, 1947, which were initiated on the occasion of the deadlock reached between the DP opposition and the government. Throughout the meetings İnönü ensured his proclaimed arbiter role. Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi (Democratic Party: Its History and Ideology)* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası: 1970), 33-4.

<sup>26</sup>. Celal Bayar, Press Declaration as the President of the DP, January 7, 1946, quoted in *Celal Bayar Diyor ki: 1920-1950 (Celal Bayar Says: 1920-1950)*, ed. Nazmi Sevgen (İstanbul, 1951), 102.

<sup>27</sup>. Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, 34.

<sup>28</sup>. *Ibid.*, 31-8.

of the methods of legitimate political party should be provided with the same means the party in power has. Thus, I regard myself neutral with respect to both parties. ...It is beyond doubt that a responsible government is obliged to provide security and order. On the other hand, the basic prerequisite of the security of political life is the imperative of neutrality towards and equal treatment of legitimate and legal political parties. ...I would like to see to it that security among the two parties be consolidated. This security also corresponds to the security of the country. Opposition should exist in complete security and be sure of the fact that the government has no intention to destroy it. The government should be content that the opposition is merely concerned with its legal rights.<sup>29</sup>

### **An Organized Liberal Movement as the New Claimant to Democracy**

By the time of its foundation and in the following years, the opposition of the DP was mainly based on the principle of democracy. In his first declaration, Celal Bayar, the head of the party, explained the DP's conception of democracy as "...a move from bottom up..."<sup>30</sup> In line with this view the party was proclaimed to be "...the first party founded and created by the Turkish nation itself..."<sup>31</sup> to control state apparatus, the lack

---

<sup>29</sup>. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*, 688-9.

<sup>30</sup>. *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, 101.

<sup>31</sup>. In the first congress of the DP, Bayar stated that "It is a fact that a mono-party regime which by definition is not accountable leads to the emergence some deficiencies in the national structure. ...Our people ... were aware that a new development could only be achieved by the realization of control over the whole state administration by the nation. It is in this respect that "Democratic Party" movement triggered sympathy throughout the country and readily accepted by the nation. Thus, it can be said that "Democratic Party" came to be the first party founded and created by the Turkish nation itself..." *Celal Bayar Diyor ki*, 141; see also Bayar's Speech in Edirne Mass Meeting, December 5, 1948, quoted in *ibid.*, 314.

of which was perceived as the foremost drawback of the existing regime. Starting from this baseline, the DP demanded the revision of the electoral system and those laws which were perceived to be against the Constitution and the separation of the office of presidency from partisan politics. As noted, these points were initially made in the Proposal of the Four which can be taken as the cradle for the formation of the party. In the Oath of Freedom (*Hürriyet Misakı*), and the Oath of National Enmity (*Milli Husumet Andı*), the official documents compiling the decisions taken in the first and second congresses of the party, the same demands were articulated.<sup>32</sup>

On the other hand, the liberal identity of the DP was mainly manifested in its program. Apart from the re-acknowledgement of the adherence to the principle of democracy (Article 1)<sup>33</sup> in Article 43 of the DP program private initiative and capital were viewed as the principal actors in the economic sphere. The state was held responsible for providing grounds for free and secure functioning of private sector as well as opening up new opportunities for this sector.<sup>34</sup> In this respect, Article 44 pointed at the requisite of planning in the economic activities of the state for drawing the boundaries within which the state would act. The state was not to intervene in the functioning of the markets

---

<sup>32</sup>. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*, 673-6, 683-4.

<sup>33</sup>. Ibid., 662.

<sup>34</sup>. Ibid., 667.

except for sustaining competitive conditions (Article 53).<sup>35</sup> The program also proposed principles according to which the state would take on economic initiative. These were not different from what the new program of the RPP had introduced. The state action in the economy was perceived to be acceptable only in those spheres where private initiative lacked competency as in the case of big infrastructural investments, and when national interest was the issue (Article 45).<sup>36</sup> On the other hand, the DP went one step further in the liberal spirit by proposing the transfer of state enterprises into the private sector under appropriate conditions (Article 48).<sup>37</sup> Apart from that, in line with the common tendency of the era, the party program also contained a new interpretation of etatism (Article 17).<sup>38</sup> The DP perceived etatism as arising out of exigency. In the party program, etatism was viewed as a transitory policy which would provide harmonization between the activities of the state and private initiative, and protection of the latter *vis-à-vis* the former.<sup>39</sup>

The liberal disposition of the DP was also apparent with respect to the political sphere and bureaucracy. Article 19 of the party program construed the government as an administrative mechanism, formed by the people and one saddled with the task of performing public service.

---

<sup>35</sup>. Ibid., 667, 9.

<sup>36</sup>. Ibid., 668.

<sup>37</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>38</sup>. Ibid., 664.

<sup>39</sup>. Ibid.

Here it is possible to observe a nuance from the dominating early-Republican disposition of determining what is best for the people, in the name of, but despite the people. However, whether this nuance would turn into a distinct identity or have no significance rested on the actual practise of power by the DP. In the same Article, the DP also made clear its rejection of centralization of authority and proposed delimitation on the authority, and responsibility of the bureaucracy. Lastly, the granting of authority and responsibility to local administrations, as stated in Articles 20 and 21, derived from the party's consistency in the proclaimed adherence to the principle of decentralization.<sup>40</sup>

The factors that gave the DP its liberal feature also matched with the criticisms directed against etatist policies and the proposals for its re-interpretation in the National Economic Congress of Istanbul Trade Chamber (1948). Faruk Birtek has attributed a neo-liberal character to the reports prepared for and the proposals brought up in the Congress. According to Birtek, what made the participants in the Congress neo-liberal was that they did not adhere to a strictly classical liberal standing which would require the elimination of state from the economy.<sup>41</sup> Instead, like the other attempts at the re-formulation of etatism coming from the RPP and the DP,<sup>42</sup> they were asking for a re-definition of the role of

---

<sup>40</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>. Birtek, "The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey," 423ff.

<sup>42</sup>. In fact, if the statements by the party members are examined one may observe a shift from the allegedly liberal identity. Exemplary is

state in the economy. The main points of criticism which were articulated during the Congress, matched with those of the DP. In this respect, the criticisms were focused on the expansionist and monopolistic nature of the state enterprises, leaving no room for private initiative even in those spheres which it could prove to be competent.<sup>43</sup> As far as the proposals are concerned, the final report of the Congress specifically focused on the delimitation of the role of the state to the extent of acting as a support base for the emergence and consolidation of urban private sector.<sup>44</sup> The Congress specifically represented the dispositions of urban industry and commerce with respect to the role of state in the economic sphere.<sup>45</sup> At this point, divergence between the representational identity of the DP and the Congress emerged. They had represented the two blocs of criticism towards the party in power, in post-war Turkey. As Birtek has pointed out, the Congress expressed the interests of urban private

---

an excerpt from Celal Bayar's speech in İzmir, on April 6, 1947: "Drawing the boundaries of etatism is not within the sphere of power of anybody. If this boundary is wide it extends towards liberalism. If it is pushed further it even reaches to communism. It is imperative to practise moderate etatism; that is what this country needs. Since we accept proprietorship we should determine our policies accordingly. It is true that liberalism contains advantageous aspects. ...However, for us to pursue a totally open economic policy means falling short of providing for national welfare. ...We believe that a middle of the road protectionism is the best alternative for our country." Quoted in Celal Bayar Diyor ki, 162.

<sup>43</sup>. Robert W. Kerwin, "Türkiye'de Devletçilik: 1933-1950," trans. Nevin Coşar, in *Türkiye'de Devletçilik (Etatism in Turkey)*, ed. Nevin Coşar (İstanbul: Başlam Yayıncılık, 1995), 107-8.

<sup>44</sup>. Birtek, "The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey," 429; Hershlag, *Turkey: The Challenge of Growth*, 137.

<sup>45</sup>. Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton and New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1959), 295ff; Birtek, "The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey," 429-34.



sector, outside the agricultural sphere.<sup>46</sup> On the other hand, apart from the liberal features of this program with respect to the urban capital, a significant social basis which led the DP to power were found in the big landowners.<sup>47</sup> This disposition was also supported by the initial opposition of the founders of the party specifically to the Draft Law on Land which proposed the redistribution of state-owned land and land cultivated through share-cropping to the poor peasants.<sup>48</sup> By this opposition, which may be considered as the first step towards the formation of the party, the tendency to act in line with the interests of landowners had already been displayed.<sup>49</sup> On the other hand, the DP was more inclined to actively oppose the party in power for the sake of opposing, which for Karpas was the common tenet of the Turkish political system.<sup>50</sup> Publications of the party clearly showed this tendency on its part, and fell short of providing clear viewpoints on different issues sufficient to associate the party with a distinctive political identity, neither liberal nor some other

---

<sup>46</sup>. Birtek, "The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey," 429-34; Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy," in *Turkey in Transition*, eds. Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 40-1.

<sup>47</sup>. Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy," 40; Birtek, "The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey," 435; Karpas, "Structural Change, Historical Stages of Modernization, and the Role of Social Groups in Turkish Politics," in *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis*, ed. Kemal Karpas (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973), 58; Leslie L. Roos, Jr. and Noralou P. Roos, *Managers of Modernization: Organizations and Elites in Turkey (1950-1969)* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), 45.

<sup>48</sup>. Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy," 38.

<sup>49</sup>. Ibid., Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi*, 385-8.

<sup>50</sup>. Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, 391-2, 410-1.

ideological stance.<sup>51</sup> This ambiguity was further reinforced by the rejection of class differences by the DP and its "resolve" to act in the name of the Turkish nation as a whole.<sup>52</sup>

#### THE DP ON THE EDGE OF A NEW INTELLECTUAL CROSS- FERTILIZATION

Karpat has argued that "...the Republican regime was *theoretically* (emphasis added) inspired by the liberal and individualistic ideas of the French Revolution."<sup>53</sup> However, such an inspiration was more salient with respect to intellectuals rather than politicians.<sup>54</sup> In fact, the state tradition in Turkey matched more the dominant Continental European conception of the state - i.e., the idea of the omnipotence of the state in political life. This was most observable in reform measures.

The DP experience is also significant in this respect. Apart from the success of the party at the opposition with respect to the transition to a two-party regime, the era which is marked by its active opposition witnessed the beginning of a shift in political and intellectual cross-fertilization from Continental Europe to the Anglo-American world. First, this was manifest in the conception of democracy. The founders of the party solemnly announced their view about communism as the

---

<sup>51</sup>. Ibid., 410.

<sup>52</sup>. Ibid., 414.

<sup>53</sup>. Ibid., 137.

<sup>54</sup>. Ibid.

antithesis of democracy. They acknowledged the imperative of alliance with Western, particularly with the Anglo-American world, which for them formed the best model for the practise of real (emphasis added) democracy and as the only escape gate from the communist threat : "Policy which is presented as 'national' or 'independent,' ...means distancing (the country) from the democratic world. However, this would only ensure our country's placement in the midst of the Communist bloc."<sup>55</sup> The party explained such a disposition on the basis of international conditions following the Second World War: "Fascist governments had disappeared... Germany lost its status as a military power, ... and the boundaries of the Iron Curtain expanded through Europe. In this respect, it is no longer possible to talk about a European balance around which diplomatic activities with their positive and negative aspects are established."<sup>56</sup> On the other hand, adherence to the Anglo-American model at times reached to the unrealistic extent of trying to bring about a similarity between the Turkish case and the Anglo-American model and ignoring the actual political characteristics of the countries concerned : "It is not

---

<sup>55</sup>. Adnan Menderes, Speech in İzmir, on August 27, 1948, quoted in *Adnan Menderes'in Konuşmaları, Makaleleri, Demeçleri (Aralık 1933-Mart 1950) (Speeches, Articles, Statements of Adnan Menderes [December 1933-March 1950])*, ed. Haluk Kılçık (Ankara: Demokratlar Kulübü Yayınları, 1991), vol.1, 316. The same line of thought was also expressed by Celal Bayar in the Second Congress of the party: "After the last world war the world was divided into two blocs. One is the democratic bloc, the other is Soviet bloc. The DP, taking the Constitution of the United Nations as essential, has considered the Anglo-Saxon bloc and hence the democratic world and found it to be advantageous to ally with it." Quoted in Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*, 682.

<sup>56</sup>. Ibid., 315.

possible for the class issue to occur in our country. We resemble Anglo-Americans,... I sincerely believe that democracy in this country will also resemble democracy in the Anglo-American world... There are no such things as capital or capitalist in Turkey. ...The only problem is that we are at the lowest level with respect to living standards."<sup>57</sup>

The new conception of democracy also contained a different approach towards the relationship between the state and people. The DP acknowledged its faith in the consciousness of the people, thus reversing the early-Republican tradition of perceiving the people as not mature enough to make sound decisions about what was best for the nation.<sup>58</sup> As a matter of fact, what the members of the party termed as the distrust of the state to its people formed one of the major points of criticisms directed against the RPP:

We face serious problems. What is the source of these problems? The mono-party mentality which has not been eliminated till now. Either overtly or covertly, this mentality argues that (our) nation is not mature enough. There has been emphasis on order and security as if the citizens, having their basic rights and freedoms would lead to disorder and chaos. They think that in this country there is nobody other than themselves who is mature enough, who can comprehend the reality, and who is

---

<sup>57</sup>. Fuad Köprülü, *Cumhuriyet*, October 9, 1946, quoted in Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, 60.

<sup>58</sup>. "...They (the Republicans) say that citizens and Turkish nation will be educated by the intellectuals and only by this way they will practise freedom. ...It is of no doubt that this mentality is based on the aim to institutionalize tutelage over the country and nation." Adnan Menderes, Speech in Kütahya Democratic Party Provincial Congress, December 25, 1949, quoted in *Adnan Menderes'in Konuşmaları, Demeçleri, Makaleleri*, vol. 1, 396.

competent to use his/her rights... and (they) perceive themselves as authorized by faith to rule the nation.<sup>59</sup>

The pro-Anglo-American disposition of the DP was also displayed by the daily, *Vatan*, which was closely associated with the party from its foundation onwards.<sup>60</sup> The daily had already been infamous with its opposition to the mono-party rule of the RPP. It began its publication on March 26, 1923, and experienced subsequent bans throughout the mono-party period.<sup>61</sup> The significance of the daily was due to its owner and editorial writer, Ahmet Emin Yalman, (1888-1973) who had been a well-known adherent of the Anglo-American world. He also actively took part in the formation of the DP.<sup>62</sup> Yalman identified himself as a liberal.<sup>63</sup> He participated in the Union of World Liberals and was active in the formation of the Association for the Dissemination of Free Ideas (*Hür*

---

<sup>59</sup>. Celal Bayar, Speech in İzmir (July 15, 1946), quoted in *Celal Bayar Diyor Ki*, 122.

<sup>60</sup>. During the years of opposition prominent members of the DP published articles in *Vatan*. In this respect see, Statement by Adnan Menderes on the occasion of his and Fuad Köprülü's being dispelled from the RPP due to the Proposal of the Four: *Vatan*, September 22, 1945; Statement by Menderes, *Vatan*, April 1, 1946; "Teessür Verici Bir Manzara" (A Regretful Panorama), *Vatan*, May 19, 1946; "Demokrat Partinin En Bariz Vasfı" (The Most Obvious Quality of Democratic Party) *Vatan*, May 23, 1946; "Ulus Gazetesi'ndeki Bir Cevap Münasebetiyle" (On the Occasion of a Response in *Ulus Daily*) *Vatan*, June 22, 1946; "İdareciler Kongresi Dolayısıyla" (On Account of Administrators' Congress) *Vatan*, January 25, 1947; Menderes, "Açık Konuşma Zarureti" (Obligation to Speak Clearly) *Vatan*, January 28, 1947; *Vatan*, November 2, 1949.

<sup>61</sup>. The longest ban was experienced beginning by August 28, 1925, due to the support the daily gave to the Progressive Republican Party. This ban was applied for an indefinite period of time, and the daily started its publication only as late as 1935. It was banned on September 30, 1940 again for an indefinite period of time.

<sup>62</sup>. Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim: (1944-1971)* *My Recent Observations and Experiences: (1944-1971)*, IV, 32ff.

<sup>63</sup>. *Ibid.*, 109-11.

*Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti*), which was planned to be the branch of the Union in Turkey.<sup>64</sup>

### **Evolution from Hesitant Opposition to a Political Identity**

A chronological categorization of Yalman's articles can help one to observe the evolution of the main themes of the political agenda between 1923 and 1950. In this respect, one can clarify three periods of significance: 1923-1939, 1939-1945, and 1945-1950. This periodization also connotes the path of evolution in the life-span of *Vatan*.

The period between 1923-1939 proved to be the years when the basic themes around which the daily formulated its opposing stance were solidified. The arguments in the articles by Yalman in this period matched the political spirit of the era. Not different from the initial motive in the formation of the opposition parties to realize democracy --the articles published in *Vatan* had faith in the Turkish revolution and Republican regime and, at the same time, noted the obstacles in the pursuit of this ideal.<sup>65</sup> For Yalman the most serious threat to the realization of democracy laid in the mono-party regime. Yalman continuously pointed at the potential for absolutism, which for him was inherent in the nature of

---

<sup>64</sup>. Ibid., 109-12. On the Association for the Dissemination of Free Ideas see Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 294-5.

<sup>65</sup>. Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim*, vol. III, 81-4.

the mono-party rule.<sup>66</sup> He emphasized the high propensity of such a potential in the RPP due to the political identity of the head of the state as also the party leader.<sup>67</sup> He perceived the centralized and "tutelary" rule in the party as the main barrier in the path towards the ideal of democracy.<sup>68</sup> He further accused the party of being no more than a collection of numbers, thus incapacitated to lead the path of progress initiated by the Turkish Revolution.<sup>69</sup>

A little after the death of Atatürk (1938) İsmet İnönü was given the titles of National Leader (*Milli Şef*) and Permanent Chairman of the Party (*Partinin Değişmez Başkanı*), simultaneously, by the RPP. Thus, between 1939-1945, the domestic political scene continued to provide appropriate ground for the same points of criticisms. However, in this period an additional theme began to dominate the writings of Yalman. Especially, throughout the early-1940s, articles were published subsequently in *Vatan*, which mainly dwelled upon the concepts of the nation and history and the practise of tradition. This does not stand out as an exception when the war time conjuncture is taken into account. The period was marked by the rise of extreme nationalistic trends in Continental Europe. In the domestic site the fluctuating

---

<sup>66</sup>. Yalman, "Gazi Paşa Hazretlerine Maruzat" (Appeal to Gazhi Pasha), *Vatan*, October 5, 1923.

<sup>67</sup>. Yalman, "Bazı Esaslı Noktalar" (Some Essential Points), *Vatan*, September 27, 1923.

<sup>68</sup>. Yalman, "En Esaslı Mesele" (The Most Essential Issue), *Vatan*, January 8, 1925.

<sup>69</sup>. Yalman, "Gazi Paşa Hazretlerine Maruzat"; *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerimiz ve Geçirdiklerimiz*, vol. III, 90.

policy of the RPP government towards Germany was also an issue. Coupled with the demands of the extreme nationalists for forming an alliance with Nazi Germany,<sup>70</sup> such a rather ambiguous milieu led to intensification on the part of the intellectuals to address the themes of nation, nationalism, history, and tradition.<sup>71</sup> Thus, the concern with these themes was not reserved to the articles of Yalman. The period was also remarkable because of intensifying search to provide an ideological basis of the Turkish Revolution. It witnessed the formation of intellectual circles which provided the exegesis of the Revolution and the basis of Turkish nation.<sup>72</sup> In this respect, the emphasis on nation and nationalism can also be interpreted as a means to point out the distinctiveness of the Turkish nation and nationalism from the extreme nationalistic trends in Continental Europe.

Yalman emphasized the significance of history for the nation:

---

<sup>70</sup>. Karpaz, *Turkey's Politics*, 262ff; Mete Tunçay, "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Siyasal Düşünce Akımları" (Trends of Political Thought in Turkish Republic), *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 7 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1982-1985), 1927; Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, "The Ultrationalist Right," in *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, Irvin Cemil Schick and E. Ahmet Tonak eds., 2nd ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 177-217.

<sup>71</sup>. For an analysis of the intellectual climate of the Turkish republic in the concerned period see Celal Nazım İrem, "Kemalist Modernism and the Genesis of Modern Turkish Conservatism" (Ph.D. Dissertation. Bilkent University. 1996).

<sup>72</sup>. İrem notes the formation of an intellectual circle by Mustafa Şekip Tunç, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, Peyami Safa, Hilmi Ziya Ülken, gathered around a number of journals, focusing mainly on revealing the Turkish man and traits of the Turkish nation. Ahmet Ağaoğlu also happened to stand on the edge of this circle.



Nation, which is a social entity cannot be something that has come into existence in five or ten years. What mold a nation are the memories, shared sentiments and thoughts accumulated in political and geographical unity throughout the ages. Nation arises out of traditions ...which have been rooted in history. By tradition we mean the whole cultural life including custom and usage.<sup>73</sup>

Thus pointing at the impossibility for a nation to cut its ties with the past, Yalman noted the total rejection of the Ottoman past as a shortcoming resulting in social gaps, especially between the ruled and the ruler.<sup>74</sup> He basically criticized the perception of the past as "...the embodiment of the Eastern culture and a barrier against Western culture."<sup>75</sup> Instead, he proposed the utilization of Western methods of analysis in comprehending and internalizing the authentic elements of the past.<sup>76</sup> For Yalman everything belonging to the past should be scrutinized by Western spectacles in order to reach a proper understanding of Turkish nation. He stood against attempts which aimed at a radical Turkification of language in use, which for him was one of the fundamental constituents of a nation. He opposed the exclusion of words of Arabic or Persian origin which have daily usage.<sup>77</sup> He stressed the capacity of a society "...to represent and absorb foreign substance in its

---

<sup>73</sup>. Yalman, "Bizi Maziye Bağlayan Köprüler" (Links that Tie Us to the Past), *Vatan*, October 9, 1940.

<sup>74</sup>. Ibid.; "Kendi Kendimize Kavuşmak İhtiyacı" (The Need to Turn to Ourselves), *Vatan*, November 19, 1941.

<sup>75</sup>. Yalman, "Bizi Maziye Bağlayan Köprüler."

<sup>76</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>77</sup>. "Dilde İstikrar ve Birlik" (Stability and Unity in Language), *Vatan*, August 10, 1942.

structure.." as "...an indicator of awareness..."<sup>78</sup> The basis of such a disposition can be found in Gökalp's conceptualization of language, which he perceived as the main obstacle against the extremist potential of nationalistic trends:

Each and every word to which we are accustomed and which we use belongs to us. We do not consider the claim of the right of any foreign language on these words. However we cannot tolerate the capitulation of rules of foreign languages in our language. We act in accordance with the rules of our own language.<sup>79</sup>

Such a standing can be interpreted as a manifestation of the importance given to tradition. Yalman valued upholding of tradition as a display of the culture of nation. For him religion was part of one's tradition. Islam should not be perceived as a remnant of the past, but rather as a requisite for the preservation of order.<sup>80</sup> He opposed "...the replacement of social gaps..." that have developed out of arbitrary westernization "...by dogmatized modernization."<sup>81</sup> More briefly, Yalman's criticism was basically directed against the total rejection of religion, not only as a means of avoiding its usurpation for political aims, but also to the extent of excluding it from the social life.<sup>82</sup> In fact, Yalman's approach to the role of religion in the life of individual and in society contained the hints of

---

<sup>78</sup>. "Yarım ve Tam Vatandaşlık" (Half and Full Citizenship), *Vatan*, November 20, 1941.

<sup>79</sup>. "Dilde İstikrar ve Birlik."

<sup>80</sup>. "Din ve İnkılap" (Religion and Revolution), *Vatan*, November 22, 1941.

<sup>81</sup>. "Kendi Kendimize Kavuşmak İhtiyacı."

<sup>82</sup>. "Bir Tecrübenin Neticeleri" (The Consequences of an Experience), *Vatan*, November 25, 1941.

the political identity with which he accorded himself, especially after 1945. Yalman referred to reason as the *sine qua non* for the preservation of moral bonds in society.<sup>83</sup> On the other hand, he also stressed faith as an exigency for the preservation of moral values and "...the order which depends on these moral values."<sup>84</sup> In this respect, he perceived Islam as the ideal religion which "does not accept any medium between the individual and God. It denounces any kind of priesthood and presents full trust on the conscience of individual."<sup>85</sup> In the period of transition to multi-party regime he would find the DP supportive of his ideas, since the the party had the same perception towards religion.<sup>86</sup>

The significance of the post-1945 period lay in the evolution of the hesitant opposition of Yalman, which had been shaped in his articles in *Vatan*, into a political stance which he named liberal.<sup>87</sup> At the time DP was founded, the consistency in the themes of criticisms against the RPP which he based on the aspiration for democracy were integrated with an institutionalized political standing. As mentioned above Yalman took an active role during the formation of the DP. He noted:

---

<sup>83</sup>. "Din Bahsinde Vardığımız Neticeleler" (Results Concerning the Issue of Religion), *Vatan*, December 4, 1941.

<sup>84</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>85</sup>. Yalman, "İdeal Din Sistemi: Diğerlerine Üstünlüğün Esaslı Sebepleri" (Ideal System of Religion: The Fundamental Reasons of Superiority), *Vatan* (November 27, 1941); See also *Vatan*, August 7, 8, 1948.

<sup>86</sup>. "Din, milliyetçilik bahsinde Bayar'ın konuşması" (Bayar's Speech on Nationalism), *Vatan*, January 9, 1945; "Celal Bayar Ankara'da konuştu" (Bayar Speaks in Ankara), *Vatan*, April 25, 1949.

<sup>87</sup>. Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte, Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim (1945-1971)*, vol.IV, 112-3.

"Vatan has eventually become a unified bloc of struggle with those who submitted the Proposal of the Four. Thus I have become the fifth to the four and remained as such for years."<sup>88</sup>

Yalman's faith in the DP can be found in his perception of opposition as an exigency in the path towards the realization of democracy. This can be observed in his articles published during the initial stages of the rise of an opposing group from within the RPP: "When the Second World War ended with the victory of democracy, such an initiative stemming out from within the party in power acts as a saviour for the party itself."<sup>89</sup>

As far as the *raison d'être* of opposition was concerned, Yalman's approach did not present a radical deviation from the traditional conception of opposition in the early Republican era. The continuity can be found in Yalman's rejection of the existence of classes in Turkey.<sup>90</sup> He criticized the tendency to model the formation of a party in opposition on a class basis.<sup>91</sup> Distinguishing between Western and Eastern type of democracy, Yalman classified the Turkish political system

---

<sup>88</sup>. In his memoirs, Yalman talks of himself as the godfather of the DP; Ibid., 38,43.

<sup>89</sup>. Yalman, "Politikada Tesanüt İmtihanı" (Trial of Solidarity in Politics), *Vatan*, October 4, 1945.

<sup>90</sup>. Yalman, "Tam ve Hakiki Demokrasiye Giden Yol" (The Road to Full and True Democracy), *Vatan*, December 24, 1940.

<sup>91</sup>. Yalman, "Parti Sistemi Demokrasinin Temeli Değil Hatalı Tarafıdır" (Party System is not the Base of Democracy, but its Misdemeanour), *Vatan*, December 31, 1941.

in the most developed category of the former.<sup>92</sup> For him Turkey originally ensured itself an advantageous position in the path towards the ideal type of democracy due to "...the rootlessness of class and group interests in our country."<sup>93</sup> Thus, he emphasized that the party in opposition should represent the interest of the nation as a whole and act in a constructive manner by providing a control mechanism against the party in power on behalf of the nation.<sup>94</sup> In this respect, it is possible to observe the same perception of democracy as in the early Republican era, as a debating ground for the good of nation. However, the nuance that provided Yalman with an opposing standing to the RPP and confirmed his identification with the DP, lies in his perception of the people as mature enough to decide about what is best for the country.<sup>95</sup> In fact, for Yalman the basis of the mentality of the rule of the RPP was founded on a total distrust in the people.<sup>96</sup> In this respect, he referred to

---

<sup>92</sup>. Yalman, "Sağlam Bünyenin Manası ve Kıymeti" (The Meaning and Value of Healthy Structure), *Vatan*, November 1, 1945.

<sup>93</sup>. Yalman, "Tam ve Hakiki Demokrasiye Giden Yol."

<sup>94</sup>. Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerimiz ve Geçirdiklerimiz*, vol.IV, pp. 32-33; "Yeni Parti Kurulurken" (While the New Party is Founded) *Vatan*, December 3, 1945; "Demokrat Partinin Mesuliyetleri" (The Responsibilities of Democratic Party), *Vatan*, December 10, 1945.

<sup>95</sup>. Yalman, "İkinci Parti Herşeye Deva mı?" (Is the Second Party the Remedy to all Troubles?), *Vatan*, July 24, 1945; "İdare Edenler ve Edilenler" (The Governors and Governed), *Vatan*, August 2, 1945.

<sup>96</sup>. Yalman, "Tek Partili Sistemin Neticeleri" (The Consequences of Single Party System), *Vatan*, July 20, 1945. Yalman interpreted the mentality of the RPP as follows : "There are basically two groups in the world: Rulers and the ruled. If the ruled ...do not comprehend what they want, cannot find the truth and if they are left free, they might fall into an error of ... not electing us. In order to avoid this they need to be kept under strict discipline by intelligent men. Those are us. The rest is nonsense ...we need a disciplined order. ...a second right of election should only be initiated by the party and not on the demand of the people..." "Geniş Ufuklara Doğru" (Towards Wide Horizons), *Vatan*, September 19, 1945.

the political parties as mere mechanisms for the practise of democracy: "It is imperative that (we) should get rid of mono-party mentality and practise freedom of thought and discussion. However, a second or third party is only an instrument in this respect, and not an aim."<sup>97</sup>

For Yalman the DP represented the nation's aspirations. He viewed the new party as the appropriate actor which "...will represent the criticisms and opposition in the country which were ignored, and direct them to the legal sphere."<sup>98</sup> Apart from the shared perception of democracy and criticism against the mono-party rule, articles by Yalman on particular policies concerning especially the administrative and economic spheres also echoed the declarations made by the party members. To begin with, both opposed the extreme centralization at the governmental and local level. Yalman admitted the requisite of centralization for determining basic principles.<sup>99</sup> However, he pointed at the deficiency of extreme centralization in government which resulted in "tutelage which prevents checks and balances to go beyond formality," and "the mechanism to free itself from the position of inefficient bureaucratic mechanism."<sup>100</sup> He expressed the same view concerning the local government, too:

---

<sup>97</sup>. Yalman, "İkinci Parti Herşeye Deva mı?"

<sup>98</sup>. Yalman, "Huzur ve Ferahlık Yolu" (The Road of Peace and Relief), *Vatan*, November 22, 1945.

<sup>99</sup>. Yalman, "On Ana Prensip" (Ten Fundamental Principles), *Vatan*, August 1, 1942.

<sup>100</sup>. Yalman, "Fiili Halk Murakabesi" (Active Check by the People), *Vatan*, October 28, 1941. Yalman pointed at the potential of abuse of power in tutelary rule. According to him "...the mono-party rule,

The greatest hindrance to local development in the country is neither insufficient finance nor lack of means; it is solely the tutelary claim of the center....One cannot criticize this tutelage if it serves to prevent wrong doings and to provide technical specialization which the local administrations cannot fulfil....Local administrations should be set free, and provided with the opportunity of consulting with technical committees in certain ministries.<sup>101</sup>

Apart from the political and administrative spheres, Yalman also noted his opposition to centralized rule with respect to economic policies. Like the declarations of the DP members both before the formation of the party and during the time the party was in opposition, Yalman pointed at the inadequacy of etatism to meet the requirements of the country: "An experiment was made with etatism during the war....The results of the experience in common confirms that (etatism) works against common interest and the principle of economic efficiency."<sup>102</sup> Yalman based his criticisms against etatism also on the incompatibility of this principle with the principle of populism.<sup>103</sup> In line with the attempts from different circles, including the RPP itself, in an endeavor to reinterpret etatism, he argued that etatism could only be

---

despite all the goodwill, could not fulfil its responsibility of acting as the safeguard of common interest. Due to inefficient functioning of the mechanism of checks and balances, private interests found the grounds of surpassing common and shared interest." "Tek Partili Sistemin Neticeleri." On this issue see also "Devlet Otoritesi" (State Authority), *Vatan*, December 8, 1945; "Nazari Mantığın Fendleri" (*Vatan*, July 23, 1945.

<sup>101</sup>. "Demokrasi Müphem Bir Mefhum mu?" (Is Democracy an Ambiguous Concept?), *Vatan*, August 29, 1945.

<sup>102</sup>. Yalman, "Devletçilik ve Halk" (Etatism and People), *Vatan*, September 4, 1945.

<sup>103</sup>. Ibid.

accepted "...as a means if and only if it is required by general interest, and not as an aim."<sup>104</sup> In this respect,

The state is the guardian of the common interest. If this interest requires, the state engages in certain tasks. But, its principal responsibility is to avoid falling into *idee fixe*...the opportunity to private initiative is entrusted to the citizens on the condition of acting within the limits determined by the common interest. The state takes action against the usurpers of this trust....Apart from this, the state acts as an institution of control at times when citizens who engage in initiative in a certain sphere fall short of forming an institution which would provide regulation, ...(The state) functions as a guide, gives support in order to achieve efficiency, and fulfil common interest.<sup>105</sup>

Yalman construed statist policies under the rule of the RPP as "...an arbitrary practise putting the people in the condition of a means, and taking the state and bureaucracy as the principal beneficiaries..." which resulted in "a state which does not serve, but dominates."<sup>106</sup> Not differently from what the DP had proposed, he argued that the state and private initiative should cooperate in a milieu whereby the ideal sphere of function for the former is determined by the competency of the latter.<sup>107</sup>

---

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

107. Yalman, "On Ana Prensip."



## Shortcomings of a Liberal Circle: Immaturity or Past Legacy?

As mentioned above, the political identity of Yalman was not reserved to his articles and to the support he gave to the DP both in its formation and when the party was in opposition. Yalman also participated in international initiatives, such as the reappraisal of liberalism in the aftermath of the Second World War. In fact his self-proclaimed liberal identity was manifested more clearly in such cases. He took part in the first meeting of the Union of World Liberals (April 9-14, 1945). The meeting was basically an attempt to reinforce liberal standing *vis-à-vis* communism.<sup>108</sup> The first step here was the preparation of a liberal manifesto.<sup>109</sup> Besides its anti-leftist standing which matched the dominant spirit in Turkey, the significance of the meeting with respect to Turkey was the foundation of Association for the Dissemination of Free Ideas, which was planned to function as the National Committee of the union in Turkey.<sup>110</sup> Thus, the Association based its liberal standing on the grounds of an adherence to Western liberal democracies and a condemnation of "rightist and leftist totalitarianism."<sup>111</sup> Its liberal disposition was expressed

---

<sup>108</sup>. Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte, Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim*, vol. IV, 111.

<sup>109</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>110</sup>. Ibid., 112.

<sup>111</sup>. "Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti Beyannamesi" (The Declaration of the Association for the Dissemination of Free Ideas), in *Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti'nin Beyanname ve Esas Nizamnamesi*

in its emphasis on the individual in relation to the state. In Article 1 of the bylaws of the Association, the individual was conceptualized as "...possessing reason and the power of will, capable to distinguish between the good and evil and thus to take on the responsibility for his own acts..."<sup>112</sup> Furthermore the Association grounded the legitimacy of the state on the consent of the individual, the basic function of which was defined as service to the individual. (Article 8)<sup>113</sup> The boundaries of the state were set with respect to the basic rights and liberties of the individual.<sup>114</sup> Accordingly, the Association put special emphasis on economic freedom as a prerequisite for political freedom.<sup>115</sup>

Karpat has argued that this rhetoric fit well into the classical theory of natural rights.<sup>116</sup> However, this inspiration from the classical theory of natural rights<sup>117</sup> was built into the wider framework of nation whereby the priority of the individual was substituted by the citizen, and of freedom by duty:

---

*(Declaration and Regulation of the Association for the Dissemination of Free Ideas)* (İstanbul: İsmail Akgün Matbaası, 1949), 2.

<sup>112</sup>. Ibid. 5.

<sup>113</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>114</sup>. In Article 8 the rights and liberties were defined as: "individual liberty guaranteed by the legal independence of administrative and judicial organs; freedom of conscience; freedom of expression; freedom of association; freedom of occupation; right to get education; right of individual initiative; ... " Ibid., 5-6.

<sup>115</sup>. "Absence of economic freedom or arbitrary deterrence of freedom of initiative not only obscures political freedom but is also among the main reasons behind economic poverty." (Article 10). Ibid., 6.

<sup>116</sup>. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 294.

<sup>117</sup>. The prevalence of classical theory of natural rights is also observable in the publications of the Association. In this respect, see Ali Fuad Başgil, *Cihan Sulhu ve İnsan Hakları (World Peace and Human Rights)* (İstanbul: Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti Neşriyatı No.6, Tan Matbaası, 1948).

The inevitable cost of freedom is service. To each right corresponds a duty. For obtaining the expected results from individual freedom and free institutions each citizen should bear a sense of moral responsibility for the other human beings, respect the honor and dignity of humanity in the person of the citizen and be closely involved in social affairs and actively engage in social activities.<sup>118</sup>

Above all, the attempt to initiate a liberal circle in Turkey proved to be insignificant. This can be attributed to ambiguity as far as the conceptual framework is concerned. The best example can be found in the writings of Yalman. Pointing at the difficulty of defining liberalism, Yalman stated the main aim in liberalism as "...avoiding serfdom under anyone and anything, standing up against fear, fanaticism and extremism,... expressing the truth freely."<sup>119</sup> Such a literal characterization gained more clarification in his recourse to the liberal ideology as "...aiming to defend the rights and liberties of the individual *vis-à-vis* the totalitarian regimes which conceive the state as fundamental and the citizens as its subjects..."<sup>120</sup> However, Yalman's conceptual matrix fell short of providing sufficient ground for a solid liberal theoretical framework.

To begin with, in his writings the fundamental category was the citizen rather than the individual. His excessive emphasis on common interest, rather than on the

---

<sup>118</sup>. "Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti Beyannamesi," 6.

<sup>119</sup>. Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim*, vol.IV, 110.

<sup>120</sup>. *Ibid.*, 113.

interest of the individual further deepened the mentioned ambiguity. In fact, as noted above Yalman's faith was not specifically on the individual, but on the nation which for him had reached the sufficient level of maturity to freely participate in the ruling process.<sup>121</sup> Furthermore, his approach to freedom was not formulated around the general conception of liberty as a natural possession of the individual, but as a means for the attainment of order: "at a time when external threat and the struggle to make a living exist simultaneously, both the governments and citizens should be careful in practising freedom of expression....The natural imperative of freedom is to practise it virtually and for the right purpose."<sup>122</sup> Additionally, the main concern in his writings revolved around the mechanism of control. First, he directed his criticisms against the mono-party rule of the RPP on the basis of lack of checks and balances in the political system.<sup>123</sup> Second, he proposed alternative control mechanisms in the society in the form of associations which would take over the function of the state.

The emphasis on the associations was more prevalent with respect to the economic sphere.<sup>124</sup> According to Yalman, the extent of state control in the society and

---

<sup>121</sup>.Yalman, "İkinci Parti Herşeye Deva mı?"

<sup>122</sup>. Yalman, "Söz Hürriyetine Dair" (On the Issue of Freedom of Expression), *Vatan*, April 14, 1942.

<sup>123</sup>. Yalman, "Fiili Halk Murakabesi."

<sup>124</sup>. Yalman, "Yılanlar Kımıldarken" (While the Snakes are Moving), *Vatan*, August 12, 1942.

economy was a reflection of distrust in the people.<sup>125</sup> Yalman's standing in this respect may be summarized as the restriction of state's dominance in the political and economic spheres to the extent possible. He opposed the "unrestricted" perception of "freedom which depends on the 'laissez faire' mentality."<sup>126</sup> Instead he proposed;

that flow of freedom which provides specialization, control and cooperation in the name of common interest, and aims at achieving minimum level of employment, health, and knowledge for each and every citizen, delivers various kinds of social insurance, and tries to find solutions to social problems via scrutiny and discussion.<sup>127</sup>

In the economic sphere this meant that the boundaries of state action would be determined not by the autonomous working of the market, but by the competency of the associations formed on the basis of occupation. In the political sphere, it turned out to be adherence both to the participation of people in the ruling process through elections under a multi-party regime, and afterwards as the main holders of control to-be-represented in the national assembly by the opposition parties.

In fact, in the approach to the role of state which accorded the state responsibility rather than authority in sustaining the welfare of the citizens, a somewhat

---

<sup>125</sup>. In one of his articles Yalman interpreted the mentality of the RPP as follows : "...association in this respect is detrimental... In the country there should be no political, economic, social associations other than that of the RPP. The citizen should stand individually *vis-à-vis* the associations and powers which belong to the rulers. "İdare Edenler ve Edilenler" (The Governors and Governed) *Vatan*, August 3, 1945.

<sup>126</sup>. Yalman, "İktisadi Siyasetin Temelleri" (The Foundations of Political Economy), *Vatan*, December 21, 1945.

<sup>127</sup>. Ibid.

rough resemblance to the nineteenth century neo-liberalism can be observed.<sup>128</sup> As far as emphasis on common interest rather than on individual interest and the admission of the intervention of the state in the economy are concerned, this resemblance gains credit. However, the point may be challenged when the by-laws of the Association for the Dissemination of Free Ideas on classical theory of natural rights are taken into account.<sup>129</sup> All in all, this panorama supports the argument about the ambiguity of what liberal disposition basically stood for and its inadequacy to provide a solid liberal theoretical pattern. Despite the risk of falling into cynicism; since the period was one when the classical liberal conceptualizations had already been re-evaluated in the homeland of the theory, such a shortcoming may be

---

<sup>128</sup>. Here, the term neo-liberalism refers to a combination of the conceptualizations provided by nineteenth century British Idealists and subsequently by the British Pluralists which were synthesized within the welfare state package of Keynesian policies. Levent Köker has summarized the basic features of this disposition as the transposition from the atomistic conception of society, the Lockean theory of natural rights, the negative conception of freedom into an appraisal of common interest, rejection of attributing an a priori existence to the individual vis-à-vis the society and the positive conception of freedom which gave priority to the concept of "freedom to..." over that of "freedom from..." Levent Köker, *Demokrasi Üzerine Yazılar (Essays on Democracy)* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1992), 44-9. In his analysis of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century British thought Kenneth H.F. Dyson has also pointed at this transposition. Interpreting the diversities and connections between the British Idealists and Pluralists, Dyson has provided a schema of Continental European cross-fertilization into the Anglo-American world which swept away the excessive emphasis on the "individual" of the classical liberal theory. Kenneth H.F. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and Institution* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), 191-6.

<sup>129</sup>. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 294-5.

linked to the traditional unease that the Ottoman-Turkish intellectual has been grappling with.<sup>130</sup>

#### THE DP RULE (1950-1960): DISSOLUTION OF THE LIBERAL RHETORIC

It was such a conceptual framework that constituted the base of Yalman's faith in the DP. While the DP was in opposition this was strengthened by the overlap of the points which were emphasized in party declarations and the main themes in Yalman's articles. In the aftermath of the 1950 elections, when the party came to power, such an empathy seemed to promise a long-lasting character. Participation of the DP delegates in the Congress of Union of World Liberals in Stuttgart (1950) led Yalman to interpret such an initiative as the self-identification of the party as liberal.<sup>131</sup> The enactment of a liberal press law in July 1950 further supported Yalman's assumption.<sup>132</sup> Apart from that, the relative success of the DP government in the betterment of the economy in the early 1950s<sup>133</sup> seemed to represent the transmission of the liberal rhetoric of the opposition years to actual political, social and economic policies.

---

<sup>130</sup>. Yalman's enthusiastic applause of 1960 military intervention, which does not comply with a liberal standing is a manifestation of such an unease. Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte, Gördüklerimiz ve Geçirdiklerimiz*, vol.IV, 361.

<sup>131</sup>. Ibid., 112.

<sup>132</sup>. Eroğul, "The Establishment of Multi-Party Rule," 108.

<sup>133</sup>. Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy," 42. Boratav has argued that the basis of this positive panorama had in fact been laid by the attempts towards liberalization which were initiated in 1946. Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi," 311-9.

However, what actually took place moved in the opposite direction. Through time the DP rule resorted to policies which were in total contrast to its liberal acclamations of the prerequisites of democracy. Beginning with 1954, the liberal identity of the DP in the economic sphere was replaced by restrictive policies in foreign trade and an arbitrary decision making in domestic economy, which in the end resulted in regression towards dependence on the state.<sup>134</sup> In the political sphere, this reversion from the original disposition of the party was manifested by intolerance towards the opposition, which gradually evolved into hostility. This reversion was at times reflected in the perception of opposition as "enemy."<sup>135</sup> Not differently, the relations between the party and Yalman, which displayed a fluctuating path during the 1950-1954 period, deteriorated after 1954.<sup>136</sup>

---

<sup>134</sup>. Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy," 44-5; Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi," 319-25.

<sup>135</sup>. Such a hostile and suspicious perception of the opposition was manifest in various speeches of the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. "We see that ... all those whose enmity to us is beyond suspicion are attacking us." Menderes, Speech in DP Parliamentary Group, July 16, 1953, quoted in Kılçık, *Adnan Menderes'in Konuşmaları, Demeçleri, Makaleleri (Temmuz 1953-Nisan 1954) (Speeches, Statements, Articles of Adnan Menderes (July 1953-April 1954))*, vol. IV, 34. On the other hand, as far as the RPP was concerned the government was content that it showed tolerance to the extent possible: "As a party which held the 1946 elections under such a restraint ... which utilized the bureaucracy as a whole in order to prevent the foundation of our party, they should expect nothing but survival and parliamentary function .... Even their existence is a result of tolerance." *Ibid.*, 40.

<sup>136</sup>. Yalman has remarked that during the first four years of the DP rule Menderes maintained cooperation with a group of selected journalists. He has linked the fluctuations to the hostility of some DP members against the opposition. Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte, Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim*, vol. IV, 225-301. The deterioration was first manifested in the words of Menderes: "Elections displayed the support of the citizens to (the DP government). Till now, I have considered to consult to the journalists. Now, the enthusiastic trust of the



The roots of such a shift lies in the proclamation of the DP to be representing the national will. This formulation contained an authoritarian conception of power, which was gradually resorted to after the party came to power. The mentality of deciding and acting on behalf of the nation as a right thought to be accrued by the victory in the general elections, led to a severing in both the discourse of the party with the opposition and the policies it adopted in social, economic and political spheres. This was in total contrast to its preceding 'liberal' opposition. In this respect, 1954 can be taken as the year when the DP government totally broke its ties with liberalism and began to enact laws to curb the opposition.<sup>137</sup> These laws first aimed at putting the bureaucracy under the control of the party, and thus curtailing any potential for opposition from within the government. The second target was opposition from the society. In this respect, the most affected circles were the press,<sup>138</sup> and the universities. In fact, university

---

people implies that I do not need such a consultation (any more). I will make the final decision on my own." Quoted in *ibid.*, 317.

<sup>137</sup>. Exemplary are the amendments to the Press Law (1954), Kırşehir Law (June 30, 1954), "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Emekli Sandığı Kanununun Bazı Maddelerinin Değiştirilmesine Dair Kanun" (Law Concerning the Amendment of Some Articles of the Retirement Fund Law) (June 21, 1954) and "Bağlı Buldukları Teşkilat Emrine Alınmak Suretiyle Vazifeden Uzaklaştırılacaklar Hakkında Kanun (Law Concerning Removal from Active Duty) (July 5, 1954). Quoted in Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, 114-6.

<sup>138</sup>. In 1953 Menderes, was accusing an opposing newspaper of provocation as follows : "Yeni Sabah ... would publish articles to our detriment to which we would reply by passivity...Although not each one of us is a journalist we will find the opportunity to ensure that we are the real defenders and safeguards of the rights of this nation..." Menderes, July 16, 1953, Speech in DP Paliamentary Group, quoted in *Adnan Menderes'in Konuşmaları, Demeçleri, Makaleleri*, vol. IV, 34-5; in a press declaration Menderes accused the newspapers which criticized the economic policies of the government of

members were subjected to double restriction because of their dual identity -- working in the university which had traditionally been perceived as an organ of the state on the one hand,<sup>139</sup> and their self-identification to be the enlighteners of society, on the other.

**Intellectual, University and Press: *Forum* as the 'Missionary' Triangle for Democracy**

At the time when DP rule shifted towards authoritarian measures in the name of the national will, a fortnightly journal was founded (April 4, 1954). By its core group it was named *Forum* to symbolize their intention of scientific neutrality.<sup>140</sup> The core group consisted mainly of university professors.<sup>141</sup> In the article introducing the fortnightly, the *raison d'être* of the journal was stated as follows:

Today in most of the Western countries FORUM has become a symbolic term referring to any place whereby thoughts are expressed and discussed freely. In fact, today in those countries where

---

subverting the economic facts for political passions. Menderes, October 23, 1953, quoted in *ibid.*, 143-5.

<sup>139</sup>. It is in this respect that Prime Minister Menderes pointed at the possibility of the state control over the universities as well as the requisite of their depoliticization: "An institution which receives its finance from the state should be accorded only scientific autonomy. As far as the administrative aspect is concerned the state which provides finance should have and practise the right to control. It is required that regulations, which will ban the engagement of the university in politics, be enacted. Menderes, July 16, 1953, quoted in *ibid.*, 59.

<sup>140</sup>. "Forum'un Davası" (*Forum's Cause*), *Forum* (editorial), 1 (1) (April 1, 1954), 1.

<sup>141</sup>. Among the founders who were university professors, Aydın Yalçın (professor of economy), Bahri Savcı (professor of law), Turhan Feyzioğlu (professor of law), Osman Okyar (professor of economy), Turan Güneş (professor of law), and Muammer Aksoy (professor of law) can be cited. Such intellectuals as Metin And and Bülent Ecevit also wrote regularly in the journal.

democracy is successfully realized there are some organs of thought that mold, direct, and inspire public opinion, functions reminiscent of the FORUM of the Classical Ages.

Gathering around the journal, we believe that Turkish democracy is in urgent need of centers of thought similar to the FORUM of the Classical Ages. Gathering of such an extensive intellectual group which is aware of its ideals in the history of thought of our country should be the evidence of an intense need. This need arises from the longing of the Republican generation and Turkish intellectual for free and sophisticated discussion of the problems the country faces.<sup>142</sup>

This statement contained hints for the identity and responsibility of the intellectual. Throughout its publication years, excessive emphasis was put on the social and political responsibility of the intellectual as a natural derivative of his scientific identity. This emphasis was based on a particular approach to science and the scientist. The *Forum* group severely opposed the tendency to isolate science from "everyday events and social facts."<sup>143</sup> Instead, they perceived "scientific activity.." by definition as "containing an overt or covert acceptance of an ethical system." Thus the scientist was to be inescapably "engaged in the controversial issues of his time."<sup>144</sup>

Based on such an approach the interpretation of the role of the intellectual in social and political spheres contained faith in enlightened debate for "reaching an

---

<sup>142</sup>. "Forum'un Davası," 1.

<sup>143</sup>. Cemal Yıldırım, "Bilimin Sosyal İlgileri" (Social Concerns of Science), *Forum*, 4 (37), (October 1, 1955), 19.

<sup>144</sup>. Roger Apery, "Tarafsızlık Meselesi" (The Issue of Neutrality), trans. Cemal Yıldırım, *Forum*, 5 (52) (May 15, 1956), 17.

organic unity within a pluralist milieu."<sup>145</sup> As far as the society was concerned, the intellectual was held responsible to eliminate the traditional gap between himself and the people.<sup>146</sup> In the pursuit of this task the scientist would "...upgrade the society intellectually and aesthetically."<sup>147</sup> The intellectual was perceived as the carrier of the Turkish Revolution to its logical ends which "was initiated by the claim to create a great social and cultural transformation" in the way of consolidating the "secular worldview ... as in the case of the intellectuals of Renaissance and Enlightenment."<sup>148</sup> Thus, "in the midst of the process of cultural transformation" the intellectual should be aware of his mission in society "as a representative of high culture, and step to the forefront of society" in defense of "his thoughts, values and ideals."<sup>149</sup> The emphasis of the group on the mission of the intellectual was due to their following perception of Turkey: "a country which is going through cultural transformation ... (where) everything is in a state of flux.... Those thoughts, personalities, institutions to be trusted ... are still not known. In

---

<sup>145</sup>. Metin And, "Türkiye'de Aydınlar" (Intellectuals in Turkey), *Forum*, 4 (44) (January 1, 1956), 25.

<sup>146</sup>. The circle pointed at the fact that "In our country impact of Western culture increased the gap between the people and the intellectual and weakened the give and take between the people and the intellectual which is the most crucial factor of stability." "Türkiye'de Yıkıcı Cereyanlar Meselesi" (Issue of Destructive Trends in Turkey), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (30), (June 15, 1955), 3.

<sup>147</sup>. And, "Türkiye'de Aydınlar III" 25.

<sup>148</sup>. "İlme Verdiğimiz Kıymet" (The Value We Attach to Science), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (48) (March 15, 1956), 1-2.

<sup>149</sup>. "Demokratik Bir Düzendeki İlim Adamlarının Yeri" (The Place of Scientists in a Democratic Order), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (35) (September 1, 1955), 3.

such a milieu, the leadership of the scientist is of utmost importance."<sup>150</sup> It is in this respect that the intellectual was attributed political responsibility. The intellectual was to act as an enlightener with respect to not only the society but also the political actors. Besides the function of "gathering of knowledge and its preservation; dissemination and... amplification,"<sup>151</sup> for *Forum* the intellectuals were to be "guides for the statespersons by explaining to them various policy alternatives, with a view to existing conditions and available resources."<sup>152</sup> The existing conditions meant a state of instability and confusion, and available resources meant the scientific works of intellectuals.

If the intellectual was the laborer of scientific work and thus the protagonist of democracy, the university was the cradle of science which accumulates and disseminates "functional" knowledge.<sup>153</sup> The group stressed the need for an intellectual framework in proper conduct of politics, the center of which was viewed to be the university. As mentioned above, the faith in the intellectuals was grounded on the belief in enlightened debate for the consolidation of democracy. In this respect, providing an analogy between democracy and scientific method in the discussion of social, political

---

150. Ibid.

151. Aydın Yalçın, "Üniversitelerimizde Bilimsel Çalışmalar" (Scientific Works in Our Universities), *Forum*, 3 (34) (August 15, 1955), 19-20.

152. "İlme Verdiğimiz Kıymet," 2.

153. Yalçın, "Üniversitelerimizde Bilimsel Çalışmalar," 19.

and economic issues,<sup>154</sup> the group pointed at the university as the most significant institution which would help to tailor the nation to the task of "organizing its life freely."<sup>155</sup>

The third edge of the triangle which, for *Forum*, was the apostle of democracy, was the press. In a way the group which founded *Forum* perceived the press as an instrument that would disseminate the truth to the public, reached by scientific work at the university. For them, the press formed both a transmission belt between the intellectuals and public, and an alternative center for independent criticism and control.<sup>156</sup> In fact, the first function was stated repeatedly in the anniversary issues of *Forum*. The second function of the press was linked to the circle's perception of opposition "in a democratic state" as an "institution of public activity."<sup>157</sup> As stated in an editorial article of the journal:

Democracy is a regime whereby government is conducted under the continuous surveillance of the citizens, by those who acquired power via elections and where issues are pursued by free discussions....The difference of direct democracy from democracy adopted in today's states is that today the number of citizens makes it impossible

---

<sup>154</sup>. "In a way democracy is ... dissemination of scientific method ... in discussing the issues, to the whole country and nation." "Rektör Seçimi" (The Election of Rector), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (31) (July 1, 1955), 5.

<sup>155</sup>. Muammer Aksoy, "Üniversite Hadisesi ve Başbakan" (The Case of University and Prime Ministry), *Forum*, 6 (70) (January 15, 1957), 12.

<sup>156</sup>. Turan Güneş, "İç Tüzükteki Değişikliğin Manası," *Forum*, 8 (90) (December 15, 1957), 11.

<sup>157</sup>. "Son Parti Çalışmaları ve Gelişme İstikametleri" (The Last Party Activities and Development Routes), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (27) (May 1, 1955), 3.

for them to gather in a 'forum' to discuss public affairs. In today's democracies, the press has replaced this 'forum'.<sup>158</sup>

### **Democracy on the Cutting Edge: *Forum* versus the DP**

It was the above-stated framework which led to an intense conflict between the DP rule and the *Forum* group. Basing its disposition on adherence to democracy modelled on western liberal democracies, the journal directed its criticisms against the government throughout the late 1950s. The conflict between DP rule and *Forum* was materialized on two grounds: ethical and institutional aspects of democracy. The university-intellectual-press triangle provided a consistency in the articles containing the interlinkage between the two aspects. The ethical content was structured by the ideal of open society, which basically meant freedom of the individual from oppression and to decide on his own and to criticize the society in which he is living. The group viewed democracy as consisting of stages and pointed that in the 1950s, Turkish society was going through the first stage, that is the struggle to free the individual from oppression.<sup>159</sup> Not surprisingly, the individual was referred to as citizen: "if one pole of democracy is the use of political power by the people, the other is protecting the citizen's liberties vis-à-vis state

---

<sup>158</sup>. "Kırılan Basın Hürriyeti" (Restricted Freedom of Press), *Forum* (editorial), 5 (54) (June 15, 1956), 1.

<sup>159</sup>. "Kıymetlerimizi Savunma Kararı" (Decision to Defend Our Values), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (36) (September 15, 1955), 3 ; "Çarşaf" (Veil), *Forum* (editorial), 5 (51), 5.

authority."<sup>160</sup> In this respect, the journal mainly dwelled upon the increasingly restrictive measures the government took with respect to opposition, and defended freedom of thought and expression.

However, the main opposition stance of the journal was reflected more in relation to the institutional requisites of democracy. This basically meant "...delimitation of the practice of political power."<sup>161</sup> by providing authority to the parliament to hold political power accountable,<sup>162</sup> and to control government in the name of national sovereignty, autonomy to the members of parliament so that they participate more effectively in the decision-making process, and to certain institutions such as the judiciary, press and university. These measures were viewed essential for the realization of "immunity of legality and legitimacy."<sup>163</sup> Due to the professional identity of its writers, criticisms were directed to specific issues and through several aspects, including legal, social, economic and political. The serial of the enactments of government which gained intensity especially after 1954 were the focus of concern for the journal. To begin with, adhering to the rule of law as the ground for the realization of

---

<sup>160</sup>. "Vekaletin Sınırları" (The Limits of Representation), *Forum* (editorial), 5, 54 (June 15, 1956), 4.

<sup>161</sup>. "Hizip Günah mı?" (Is Faction a Sin?), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (37) (October 1, 1955), 6.

<sup>162</sup>. Bahri Savcı, "Demokratik Bir Düzendeki Meclisin Gerçek Yeri" (The Real Place of Assembly in a Democratic Order), *Forum*, 4 (45) (February 1, 1956), 9-10.

<sup>163</sup>. "Dört Mesele Bir Arada" (Four Issues at Once), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (45) (February 1, 1956), 5.



political democracy,<sup>164</sup> the group gave priority to the autonomy of the judiciary.<sup>165</sup> Basically opposing the enactment of subsequent laws, in 1954, on the duration of office and retirement of government officials, which provided the government with extensive authority *vis-à-vis* the judiciary,<sup>166</sup> *Forum* emphasized the impossibility of disseminating justice "by a judge deciding under the strain of any authority,"<sup>167</sup> and pointed at the contrariety between the law and "democratic regimes which conceive an autonomous judicial organ within the state structure as a safeguard of individual rights and

---

<sup>164</sup>. Aksoy, "Hukukçuların Manevi Mes'uliyeti ve İki Hukuk Derneğine Dair" (About the Spiritual Responsibility of Legal Professionals and Two Law Associations), *Forum*, 5 (56) (July 15, 1956), 12; "Uyanmalıyız Artık!" (We Should Wake Up!), *Forum* (editorial), 7 (80) (July 15, 1957), 1-2; Aksoy, "Demokrat Parti Milletvekillerine Açık Mektup: Rejim Buhranı Halledilmelidir" (Open Letter to Democratic Party Deputies: Regime Crisis Should be Handled), *Forum*, 8 (88) (November 15, 1957), 10; Aksoy, "Muhalafetin Birleşmesi Zaruridir" (Opposition Should Unify), *Forum*, 10 (110) (October 15, 1958), 7-10. Aksoy has restated the requisites of rule of law as providing free, equal, and honest elections, autonomy of the judiciary, neutral administration, neutrality of state media, freedom of press, freedom of meeting and freedom of science and university. Aksoy, "Muhalafetin Birleşmesi Zaruridir," 9.

<sup>165</sup>. Aksoy, "Fikir, İlim ve Öğretim Hürriyeti: Üniversite Muhtariyeti" (Freedom of Thought, Science and Education: The Autonomy of University), *Forum*, 4 (37) (October 1, 1955), 9; Aksoy, "Hukukçuların Manevi Mes'uliyeti ve İki Hukuk Derneğine Dair," 11; Savcı, "Seçim İklimi Yoktur" (There is No Room for Elections), *Forum*, 3 (33) (August 1, 1955), 10-11; "Bir 'Müjde' ve Bir Unutkanlık" (A Good News and a Forgetfulness), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (30) (June 15, 1955), 4-5.

<sup>166</sup>. By a law enacted on June 21, 1954 all government officials, without exception, were subjected to the regulation which proposed retirement after the completion of 25 years in office; and on July 5, 1954, a new law was enacted which contained the dismissal of government officials directly by the government. (*Bağlı Buldukları Teşkilat Emrine Alınmak Suretiyle Vazifeden Uzaklaştırılacaklar Hakkında Kanun*) Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, 116.

<sup>167</sup>. Münici Kapani, "İcra Organı Karşısında Hakimlerin İstiklali" (The Autonomy of Judges *vis-à-vis* The Executive), *Forum*, 6 (70) (February 15, 1957), 9.

liberties" and "(which) provides for the autonomy of the judiciary and judges."<sup>168</sup>

As far as the political aspect was concerned, the main focus was on the structure and functioning of the parliament. The group viewed the parliament as the platform for discussion to reach a gentlemen's agreement on national interest. Additionally, it accorded it utmost importance for the prevention of abuse of political power by exercising effective control.<sup>169</sup> In this respect, it proposed such institutional reforms as a bicameral legislature, the autonomy for the members of parliament, and the neutrality of the President and Speaker of the Parliament.<sup>170</sup> For the group, these institutional

---

<sup>168</sup>. Ibid., 10; For an analysis of the DP government's disposition with respect to the judiciary see Aylin Özman, "The State and Bar Associations in Turkey: A Study in Interest Group Politics," (Ph.D. Dissertation. Bilkent University. 1995), 125.

<sup>169</sup>. Savcı, "Murakabe Müessesesinin Korunması" (Protection of the Institution of Checks), *Forum*, 3 (29) (June 1, 1955), 9-10; İlhan Arsel, "Hükümet Sistemimiz Hakkında" (About our Government System), *Forum*, 3 (34) (August 15, 1955), 9-10; "Dört Mesele Bir Arada"; Savcı, "Demokratik Bir Düzendeki Meclisin Gerçek Yeri"; "Karanlıkta Vuruşanlar" (Those Who Fight in the Dark), *Forum* (editorial), 10 (114) (December 15, 1958), 2.

<sup>170</sup>. On bicameralism see Arsel, "Hükümet Sistemimiz Hakkında"; Feridun Canitez, "Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanununun Tadili" (Reform of the Constitution), *Forum*, 5 (54) (May 15, 1956), 11; Arsel, "Çift Meclis Sistemi" (Bicameralism), *Forum*, 8 (96) (March 15, 1958), 6-8; Kapani, "Yarınki Anayasamız Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler" (Some Reflections on Our Future Constitution), *Forum*, 11 (127) (July 1, 1959), 8-10. On the parliamentarians see Savcı, "Murakabe Müessesesinin Korunması"; Savcı, "Buhran İstidatları ve Önleme Yolları" (Buhran İstidatları and the Ways to Prevent Them), *Forum*, 3 (35) (September 1, 1955), 11-2; "Yol Ayrımındayız" (We Are on the Crossroads), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (39) (November 1, 1955), 1-3; Aksoy, "Partiden Ayrılma Mebusluk Sıfatını Kaybettirir mi?" (Does Quitting from Party Cause Liquidation of The Title of Member of Parliament?), *Forum*, 4 (41) (December 1, 1955), 7-9. On the neutrality of the President and the Speaker of the Parliament see "Tarafsız Organlar Üzerine" (On Neutral Organs), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (40) (November 15, 1955), 4ff; Savcı, "Buhran İstidatları ve Önleme Yolları"; Savcı, "Murakabe Müessesesinin Korunması"; Turhan Feyzioğlu, "Demokrasi Davamıza Genel Bir Bakış" (A General Look at Our Democracy Issue), *Forum*, 4 (46) (February 15, 1956), 12-4.

requisites led to the internalization of democratic rule by the masses; and the consolidation of democratic rule could only be achieved by active participation of the public in the political process. On this issue the opposition was held to be significantly responsible for providing alternative mediums of participation.<sup>171</sup> Thus, while attacking the restrictive measures of the government both in and out of the parliament, the group also accused the opposition of passivity and inertia.<sup>172</sup> For the group, both the opposition and government in Turkey, dwelled heavily on politics as "a dynamic activity of an organization and cadre for the pursuit and preservation of power,"<sup>173</sup> and thus lacked the wider comprehension of politics as "an activity of research, interpretation, comparison in searching for alternative solutions to the problems...."<sup>174</sup>

Apart from its institutional references such an interpretation also contained a social aspect. For the group the roots of the social problems of the period were to be found in the drawbacks of development. In this respect, the state was held responsible for both respecting the absolute sovereignty of person "in determining his own faith" and "providing those who are

---

171. "Türkiye'de Siyasi Buhran ve Muhalefet" (Political Crisis and Opposition in Turkey), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (30) (June 15, 1955), 4; "Yapmak Hürriyeti, İstemek Yasağı!" (Freedom to Do, Prohibition to Demand!), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (30) (June 15, 1955), 5.

172. "Meclis Tatil Girerken" (While the Assembly Closes down for Vacation), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (29) (June 1, 1955), 2; Savcı, "Seçim İklimi Yoktur," 10; "Rejimimizde Kararlı Muvazene" (Resolute Balance in Our Regime), *Forum* (editorial), 5 (56) (July 15, 1956), 1-3.

173. Savcı, "İktidar Savaşı Yapmadan Siyaset" (Politics without Power Struggle), *Forum*, 3 (32) (July 15, 1955), 8-9.

174. *Ibid.*, 9.

relatively disadvantaged in the system...with support which does not disrupt their absolute freedom, but which does help its development."<sup>175</sup> The assignment of such duties on the state was based on a conception of freedom with a "social content."<sup>176</sup> "Today, the requisites of social progress ... have filled the concept of freedom with a social content. ... freedom requires that a person, in all social categories should not be left economically and socially deprived."<sup>177</sup> Accordingly, the group repeatedly accused the government of falling short of devising a social program which would promote social equality.<sup>178</sup>

If one point of criticism was the failure of the DP to provide social equality, the other one was obstruction of the unions.<sup>179</sup> The significance given to the unions laid in that they were perceived to be alternative means of attachment to the system, in a time of social transformation where traditional mediums had been dislocated, by preparing the grounds for the individual

---

<sup>175</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>176</sup>. Savcı, "Batılı Demokrasinin Bazı Temel Kavramları Üzerine" (On Some of the Fundamental Concepts of Western Democracy), *Forum*, 4 (47) (March 1, 1956), 10.

<sup>177</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>178</sup>. "Gene Grev Hakkına Dair" (On the Freedom to Strike), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (33) (August 1, 1955), 6; Cahit Talas, "Müessir Bir Sosyal Politika Zarureti" (The Imperative of an Effective Social Policy), *Forum*, 4 (39) (November 1, 1955), 14-5; "İktisadi İstikbalimizin Görünüşü" (The Panorama of Our Economic Future), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (40) (November 15, 1955), 1-3; "Meselelerimiz ve Manevi Hazırlık Zarureti" (Our Problems and the Imperative of Spiritual Readiness), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (42) (December 15, 1955) 1-3; "İktisadi Tedbirler ve İçtimai Sonuçlar" (Economic Measures and Social Consequences), *Forum* (editorial), 5 (58) (August 15, 1956), 3.

<sup>179</sup>. Feyzioğlu, "Demokrasi Davamıza Genel Bir Bakış," 14; "Birlikler Kapanırken" (While the Unions Are Closed Down), *Forum* (editorial), 7 (75) (May 1, 1957), 1-2; "Biz Ne İstiyoruz?" (What Do We Want?), *Forum* (editorial), 5 (60) (September 15, 1956), 1-2.

for active participation.<sup>180</sup> It is in this respect that the government was criticized for both pushing the individual to passivity and inertia in political life and preempting any potential of opposition for political power; both were viewed to be irreconcilable with the *raison d'être* of democracy.<sup>181</sup>

The group's criticisms on social issues were reflections of its standpoint regarding the economy. As far as the economy was concerned, the group declared its adherence to a well-functioning free market system.<sup>182</sup> This adherence was based on the faith in the spontaneity of economic development and capital accumulation under competitive conditions.<sup>183</sup> However, the group also put reservation on this spontaneity by a remark on the distinction between developed and undeveloped countries. Thus, it admitted the need for a passive state in a well functioning economy which is based on the principle of free competition. On the other hand, taking Turkey as a developing country, it pointed at the indispensability of planning in the economic sphere to preempt disorder and inequality in the social structure and thus to achieve

---

<sup>180</sup>. Şerif Mardin, "Yeni Bir Ütopya" (A New Utopia), *Forum*, 5 (51) (May 1, 1956), 10-1.

<sup>181</sup>. "Evet, Hür ve Bağımsız Sendika" (Yes, Free and Independent Union), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (41) (December 1, 1955), 4; "Başlayan Bir Hareketin Düşündürdükleri" (Reflections on a Movement in Start), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (47) (March 1, 1946), 5; "İktisadi Tedbirler ve İçtimai Sonuçlar," 3-4.

<sup>182</sup>. Yalçın, "Sosyalizmin Bugünkü Meseleleri" (Contemporary Issues of Socialism), *Forum*, 4 (40) (November 15, 1955), 11-3; "Biz Ne İstiyoruz?," 2; "Plan Kelimesinden Maksat" (What Is Meant by the Term Planning), *Forum* (editorial), 7 (73) (April 1, 1957), 7.

<sup>183</sup>. Osman Okyar, "Planlama Tarihesine Müteallik Notlar VI: İktisaden Geri Kalmış Memleketlerde Planlama Meseleleri" (Notes on the History of Planning VI: Issues of Planning in Economically Backward Countries), *Forum*, 8 (89) (December 1, 1957), 15.

economic and social development spontaneously.<sup>184</sup> However, such a standing should not be misinterpreted as support of etatism. The group overtly put forth its perception of planning as a complementary pursuit in developing countries for the consolidation of competitive market economy.<sup>185</sup> Listing the problems of Turkish economy as the scarcity of resources and insufficiency of private capital, it idealized a regulative state which would devise rational plans to provide harmony among production, investment, and savings, without disrupting market mechanisms.<sup>186</sup> It is in this respect that the DP government was accused of arbitrariness in its pursuit of economic policies, which according to the group, was a result of dominating political aspirations in the economy.<sup>187</sup> To further differentiate itself from the

---

184. Okyar, "İktisadi Plancılığımızın Şekil ve Muhteva Meselesi" (The Issue of the Form and Content of Our Economic Planning), *Forum*, 3 (31), July 1, 1955, 9-10; "İktisadi Plan İhtiyacı" (The Need for Economic Planning), *Forum*, 3 (34) (August 15, 1955), 6-7; Yalçın, "Gelişme Gayretlerimizde Aksayan Nedir?" (What is the Trouble with Our Attempts at Development), *Forum*, 4 (45) (February 1, 1956), 11-2; Yalçın, "Az Gelişmiş Memleketlerde Para ve Maliye Politikası" (Fiscal and Financial Policy in the Less Developed Countries), *Forum*, 7 (82) (August 15, 1957), 16-8, (Review of Karl Iversen, *İktisadi Kalkınma Konferansları* [Conferences on Economic Development]); Okyar, "Planlama Tarihine Müteallik Notlar VI: İktisaden Geri Kalmış Memleketlerde Planlama Meseleleri," 15-7; Z.Y. Hershlag, "Türkiye: İntikal Halinde Bir Ekonomi" (Turkey: An Economy in Transition), *Forum*, 12, (134) (October 15, 1959), 8-10.

185. Okyar, "İktisadi Plan İhtiyacı"; "Biz Ne İstiyoruz?"; Iversen, "Az Gelişmiş Memleketlerde Para ve Maliye Politikası"; Hershlag, "Türkiye: İntikal Halinde Bir Ekonomi."

186. Okyar, "İktisadi Plan İhtiyacı"; Yalçın, "Gelişme Gayretlerimizde Aksayan Nedir?"; "İktisadi Gerçekleri Kavrama Derecemiz" (Our Limits of Comprehending Economic Facts), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (47) (March 1, 1946), 1-3; "Plan Kelimesinden Maksat"; Yalçın, "Plan ve Program Meselesi" (Issue of Planning and Program), *Forum*, 7 (75) (May 1, 1957), 8-9; Okyar, "Planlama Tarihçesine Müteallik Notlar VI."

187. "...The contradictions with which the party, that had come to power by the motto of private initiative, faces due to the incompetency to foresee the reflections of its policies in the long and middle-terms..." "D.P.'nin Liberalizmi" (DP's Liberalism), *Forum*

etatist trend, the group named its standpoint "democratic planning,"<sup>188</sup> which was modelled on the practice of state activity in the economy in the Anglo-American world.<sup>189</sup> Democratic planning called for a depoliticized and debureaucratized economic program by a developed public administration which would provide rationality in the economy.<sup>190</sup> This "was possible only in a free, competitive market dominant economic milieu whereby price stability was achieved."<sup>191</sup>

### From Intellectual Neutrality to Organized Political Identity

While making all the criticisms stated above, *Forum* was not immune to restrictions. The law which subjected

---

(editorial), 5 (60) (September 15, 1956), 6; Okyar, "İktisadi Plancılığımızın Şekil ve Muhteva Meselesi"; "Kendimize Güvenme Zamanı" (The Time to Trust Ourselves), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (31) (July 1, 1955), 1-2; "İktisadi İstikbalimizin Görünüşü," 1-3; Mümtaz Soysal, "Bütünlük" (Totality), *Forum*, 6 (63) (November 1, 1956), 11-2; Ömer Sakıp, "Demokratik Devrim Üzerine Düşünceler" (Reflections on Democratic Revolution), *Forum*, 7 (83) (September 1, 1957), 7-9; "Program ve Plan Tartışmaları" (Discussions on Program and Planning), *Forum*, 10 (114) (December 15, 1958), 7-9.

188. Yalçın, "Plan ve Program Meselesi," 8-9.

189. Yalçın, "Sosyalizmin Bugünkü Meseleleri," 11-3; Okyar "Planlama Tarihiçesine Mütteallik Notlar (1939'dan bu yana)" (Notes on the History of Planning [from 1930 until today]), *Forum*, 7 (82) (August 15, 1957), 14-6.

190. For the circle the ideal model was the running of the state economic enterprises with economic rationality and with the aim of founding the grounds for the efficient functioning of private initiative. Soysal, "İktisadi Devlet Teşekküllerinin Bünyesi" (The Structure of State Economic Enterprises), *Forum*, 3 (27) (May 1, 1955), 12-3; "İktisadi Devlet Teşekküllerinin Murakabesi" (The Control over State Economic Enterprises), *Forum*, 3 (28) (May 15, 1955), 11-3; Yalçın, "Gelişme Gayretlerimizde Aksayan Nedir?," 11-2; H.C. Richard, "İktisadi Gelişmede Devletin Rolü" (State's Role in Economic Development), trans. M.E., *Forum*, 6 (72) (March 15, 1957), 16-7.

191. Okyar, "İktisadi Plan İhtiyacı," 7.

the judiciary to political power was also a matter of criticism as far as the university was concerned, since it also exposed the deeds of university members under arbitrary evaluation of the government. Due to its attribution of a dual identity to the university both as the cradle of scientific research and derivatively the center for intellectual contribution to democracy, *Forum* criticized the government for misinterpreting intellectuals' political responsibility as politicization.<sup>192</sup> In fact, it is in this respect that the most conspicuous clash between the journal and DP came to the surface. The government's response was the application of the law to Osman Okyar in 1955 and Turhan Feyzioğlu in 1956.<sup>193</sup> On the other hand, the group was subject to restrictions not only with respect to the university law, but also the press law. The new press law which was enacted in 1956, further severed relations

---

<sup>192</sup>. Upon the removal by the Ministry of Education of Turhan Feyzioğlu from active duty in the university, the government declared that: "Apart from his articles in *Forum* which are clearly in opposition to the government (Feyzioğlu) had displayed an aggressive persistence and renitence in taking part in daily politics and its controversies in Thought Club (*Fikir Klübü*)..." *Zafer*, November 26, 1956.

<sup>193</sup>. "Osman Okyar Hadisesi" (The Case of Osman Okyar), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (35) (September 1, 1955), 3-4; On the reaction of the group against the law in question see Aksoy, "6435 Sayılı Kanun Karşısında Üniversite Muhtariyeti" (University Autonomy in the Face of Law 6435), *Forum*, 4 (46) (February 15, 1956), 14-6; "Vekalet Emrine Alınmanın Hakiki Sebebi," *Forum*, 6 (69) (February 1, 1957), 12-3. The objection towards the decision of the government were not reserved to articles; Munci Kapani, one of the members of the group, resigned from his post in the university as a display of protest: "The interpretation of writings and statements of some of my colleagues, which comply with scientific and objective standards as a display of opposition... is of utmost importance since it presents the predominant mentality (of the government)." Kapani, *Cunhuriyet*, December 8, 1956.



between the circle and DP.<sup>194</sup> One significant example was the rejection of an appeal from *Forum* to the Ankara Radio Directorate for a declaration on the occasion of its sixth anniversary due to its "degrading" publications about the policies of the state.<sup>195</sup>

In fact, one factor which intensified the hostility of the government towards *Forum* was the active support the journal gave to the Freedom Party (FP) (November 19, 1955), which was a splinter party from the DP. The significance of the party laid in the fact that it was formed by nineteen DP parliamentarians, nine of whom had been expelled from the party due to their submission of a proposal demanding the right to substantiate claims made by the press (*ispat hakkı*).<sup>196</sup> Initially, *Forum* assumed an advisory standing. Pointing at the lack of an intellectual basis behind the existing political parties as the major deficiency of the Turkish political system, the journal subsequently published articles concerning

---

<sup>194</sup>. Laws 6732 and 6733 (June 7, 1956) placed the media under arbitrary judgement of political power. Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, 136. On the reaction of *Forum* against this law in particular and the DP's policies vis-à-vis the media in general see "Kırılan Basın Hürriyeti," 1-2; "Siyasi Rejimimizin Temelleri" (Foundations of Our Political Regime), *Forum*, 5 (55) (July 1, 1956), 1-2; Feyzioğlu, "Radyo Meselesi-II" (The Radio Issue-II), *Forum*, 6 (70) (February 15, 1957), 15-7; Feyzioğlu, "Basın Hürriyeti Tartışmasına Dair" (About the Discussion on the Freedom of Press), *Forum*, 7 (73) (April 1, 1957), 11-3; Yalçın Tuna, "Basın Mevzuatımızın Antidemokratik Hükümleri" (Anti-democratic Sentences of Our Press Law), *Forum*, 7 (78) (June 15, 1957), 9-12; Feyzioğlu, "Basın Hürriyetine Darbeler" (New Blows to the Freedom of Press), *Forum*, 7 (80) (July 15, 1957), 7-8; Aksoy, "Bizde Basının Kontrol Vazifesini İmkansızlaştıran Sebepler" *Forum*, 7 (84) (September 15, 1957), 9-11; "Yeni Tedbirlere Doğru" (Towards New Measures), *Forum* (editorial), 12 (142) (February 15, 1960), 1-2.

<sup>195</sup>. "Arena ve Forum" (Arena and *Forum*), *Forum* (editorial), 10 (121) (April 1, 1959), 2.

<sup>196</sup>. Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, 126-9.

the ought-to-be disposition of the new party with respect to the social, political and economic issues of the period.<sup>197</sup> In the meantime, it also provided support by its appraisal of the party as presenting a fresh identity due to its immunity from "the attributes, mental tendencies and patriarchal traditions"<sup>198</sup> of the RPP and by its criticisms against government policies.<sup>199</sup> Through time, relations between the journal and FP proved to be more than a shared critical standing with respect to the policies of DP. This was first manifested in the remark about the propensity of *Forum* readers and subscribers among the party delegates.<sup>200</sup> The identification was further ensured when Aydın Yalçın who was among the core group of the journal, and Muammer Aksoy and Münci Kapani, two prominent columnists, joined the party.<sup>201</sup> The group justified its support for FP, which was perceived by the DP as the politicization of intellectuals and thus the

---

<sup>197</sup>. "Yeni Bir Parti Kurulması" (Foundation of a New Party), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (40) (November 15, 1955), 3-4; "Değişen Türkiye'de Yeni Adımlar" (New Steps in Changing Turkey), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (41) (December 1, 1955), 1-3; "Uzağı Düşünme Zamanı" (Time to Think Future), *Forum* (editorial), 5 (51) (May 1, 1956), 1-3; "Hürriyet Partisinin Yıldönümü" (The Anniversary of Freedom Party), *Forum* (editorial), 8 (91) (December 31, 1957), 6.

<sup>198</sup>. "Uzağı Düşünme Zamanı," 2.

<sup>199</sup>. "Yol Ayrımındayız," 1-3. The journal had criticized the decision of the DP to removal of those who had quitted from the party on the grounds of its incompatibility with democracy, from active duty in the parliament. "Sıra Milletvekillerinde mi?"; "Ezme Politikası: Mebusluktan Iskat" (Policy of Oppression: Removal From Membership of Parliament), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (39) (November 1, 1955), 3-6; Aksoy, "Partiden Ayrılma Mebusluk Sifatını Kaybettirir mi?," 7-9; Savcı, "Seçmenin Yaptığı Iskat," *Forum*, 4 (40) (November 15, 1955), 15-6.

<sup>200</sup>. "Hürriyet Partisi Kongresinden Notlar" (Notes from the Congress of Freedom Party), *Forum* (editorial), 8 (85) (October 1, 1957), 5.

<sup>201</sup>. "Siyasi Mücadeleye Katılan Forumcular" (*Forum* Members in Political Struggle), *Forum* (editorial), 8 (85) (October 1, 1957), 6; M. Arif Demirer, "Siyaset Adamı Aydın Yalçın" (Aydın Yalçın as a Politician), *Yeni Forum*, 15 (306) (November 1994), 13.

university, because of the party's devotion to the political responsibility of the intellectual and to the shared task of "protesting the divergence of the party in power from democratic imperatives."<sup>202</sup>

However, the relation of *Forum* to the FP may be re-interpreted. Rather than viewing the support of the group on the grounds of shared criticisms and the emergence of a new party with an intellectual formation, one can well argue that the group provided the party with an intellectual framework. In other words, the group found an opportunity for the realization of their long-aspired intellectually-framed game of politics.

### **The Identity of Forum: A "Liberal-Socialist State of Being"?<sup>203</sup>**

An analysis of the regular columnists of *Forum* notes the difficulty with stamping an absolute label to the journal.<sup>204</sup> In fact, this fits the claim that laid at its

---

<sup>202</sup>. "...As a journal of thought *Forum* has always defended neutral analysis and observation. ... the decision of our columnists to take part in the political struggle has also shown that this (neutrality) does not mean having no opinion and indecisiveness, a fact which we have stated on various occasions." "Siyasi Mücadeleye Katılan Forumcular"; see also Cemal Aygen, "Önümüzdeki Seçimlerin Muhtemel Neticeleri" (Possible Results of Next Elections), *Forum*, 8 (85) (October 1, 1957), 11-3.

<sup>203</sup>. In one of the issues, the group announced its compliance with "the approaches which find not a conflictual, but a complementary relationship among market mechanism, social control and etatism," and admitted its faith in "this current of thought, which is labeled as 'liberal-socialist state of being,' ... for the future world order." "Biz Ne İstiyoruz?," 2.

<sup>204</sup>. In the following decade a number of columnists happened to join in rival parties. Two examples are Aydın Yalçın who joined the Justice Party which was perceived to be the eventual inheritor of the Democratic Party; and Bülent Ecevit who joined and eventually headed the Republican People's Party.

origin -being an intellectual debating ground for issues concerning politics, society and economy. However, there were still some common factors other than the faith in intellectual debate and neutrality which constituted a common ground especially in the criticisms directed towards the DP rule, and which eventually led to the identification of the journal with the FP.

From its foundation onwards, the outstanding feature of *Forum* had been its opposition mentality based on the values and institutions of western liberal democracies, particularly the Anglo-American one.<sup>205</sup> Their understanding of Anglo-American democracy was reflected in the theoretical standpoint of the group and eventually on their perceptions of politics, society and economy.

To begin with, the group viewed the Lockean and Humean empiricism and nominalism, against Cartesian rationality.<sup>206</sup> Taking England as the ideal model for the realization of democracy, they emphasized the requisite for experimentalism in social science against speculation.<sup>207</sup> In fact, the analogy they made between the practice of democracy and the methodology of social

---

<sup>205</sup>. However, the Anglo-American influence should not be perceived as a surprising feature. Its roots can be found in the core group of the journal, who had been familiar to Anglo-American experience. In fact, Metin And, one of the regular columnists of the journal on culture and art, has stated that the idea of forming an intellectually-framed journal had been a matter of concern among the core group who occasionally met during their stay in England. (Author's) Informal interview with Metin And, December 10, 1995.

<sup>206</sup>. Yalçın, "Aydınların Ferdiyetçiliği" (Individualism of Intellectuals), *Forum*, 3 (29) (June 1, 1955), 16-7; "İktisadi Gerçekleri Kavrama Derecemiz," 1.

<sup>207</sup>. "İktisadi Gerçekleri Kavrama Derecemiz," 1; Kapani, "İngiliz Demokrasisine Bakışlar" (A Look at British Democracy), *Forum*, 12, (143) (March 1, 1960), 12-3.

science was a reflection of this viewpoint. The group held the view that democracy could be achieved only when politics is conducted through scientific debates on the issues of the day, rather than by mere speculation.<sup>208</sup>

This methodological approach was also reflected in the conceptual matrix of the group. The group emphasized the decisive role of the individual in the "regulation of society through his social, ethical and political functions" and the indispensability of individualism for democracy.<sup>209</sup> It is in this respect that the group repeatedly stated the requisite of the limitation of state power and the delineation of its sphere of activity by the rights and liberties of the individuals.<sup>210</sup> However, this did not mean a classical liberal outlook. Instead, the group criticized the abstract/ahistorical individual of classical liberalism as the basic unit both methodologically and ontologically; they worked with the concept of person in mass society ("*kütle adamı*").<sup>211</sup> The concept referred to the modern person grappling with the problem of identity in a society which was in a state of

---

208. Yalçın, "Aydınların Ferdiyetçiliği," 16; "İşte Forum Budur!" (Here is *Forum!*), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (46) (February 15, 1956), 1-2; Moris Ginsberg, "Bilim ve Günümüzün Meseleleri" (Science and Today's Issues), trans. Cemal Yıldırım, *Forum*, 6 (62) (October 15, 1956), 7-9; "İlmi Metod ve Hadiselerin Mantığı" (Scientific Method and the Logic of Events), *Forum* (editorial), 7 (76) (May 15, 1957), 5.

209. "İleri Toplum ve Şahsi Sorumluluk" (Advanced Society and Personal Responsibility), *Forum* (editorial), 6 (68) (January 15, 1957), 1-3.

210. "İşte Forum Budur!," 1-3; John Bowle, "Totaliterlik" (Totalitarianism), trans. Cemal Yıldırım, *Forum*, 6 (61) (October 1, 1956), 11-2; Kapanı, "Devlet Kudretinin Tahdidi" (Limitation of State's Power), *Forum*, 7 (76) (May 15, 1957), 8-9; Norman Marsh, "Fert Hürriyeti ve Teşrii Kuvvet" (Liberty of Individual and Legal Power), trans. Cemal Yıldırım, 11 (130) (August 15, 1959), 15-6.

211. Mardin, "Devrimizde Amme Felsefesi" (Public Philosophy in Our Age), *Forum*, 3 (36) (September 15, 1956), 12-3.

transformation from traditional to modern culture.<sup>212</sup> Person was perceived to be in urgent need of mediums which would provide him with new attachments to society and thus a new personality congruent with modern conditions.<sup>213</sup> These mediums were sought in the educational system which would ensure the education of the individual in the faculty of thinking as regards to his place in society.<sup>214</sup> And, by independent associations which would make it possible for the individual to engage in political, social, and economic life actively.<sup>215</sup> The state was held responsible for both framing the appropriate educational system and guaranteeing the independent functioning of the associations.

One step beyond this stance was the perception of pluralism.<sup>216</sup> The group emphasized the significance "in particular of professional associations, which in developed countries perform conspicuous functions to protect individual rights and liberties *vis-à-vis* the state..."<sup>217</sup> Underlying this disposition was the interpretation of the *raison d'être* of the state as the well-being of the ruled, rather than being a goal in

---

<sup>212</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>213</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>214</sup>. Yalçın, "Aydınların Ferdiyetçiliği," 16-7; Zinde Kip, "Türk Maarifinde Reform Nasıl Olmalıdır?" (How Should Turkish Educational System be Reformed?), *Forum*, 8 (87) (October 1, 1957), 11-3; "Maarifimizdeki Buhranın Sebepleri Nelerdir?" (What are the Reasons of Crisis in Our Educational System?), *Forum*, 9 (107) (September 1, 1958), 6-7.

<sup>215</sup>. Kapani, "Devlet Kudretinin Tahdidi," 8-9; "Devlet Kudretinin Tahdidi II" (Limitation of State's Power II), *Forum*, 7 (77) (June 1, 1957), 10-2; Karl Mannheim "Çağımızın Teşhisi" (Diagnosis of Our Age), trans. Cemal Yıldırım, *Forum*, 8 (86) (October 15, 1957), 10-2.

<sup>216</sup>. Mardin, "Devrimizde Amme Felsefesi," 12-3.

<sup>217</sup>. Kapani, "Devlet Kudretinin Tahdidi II," 11.

itself.<sup>218</sup> The Anglo-American cross-fertilization was most manifest in this respect. There was a discernible shift from the traditional preoccupation of the Ottoman-Turkish intellectual with the state being important in itself, to one where its existence was viewed to be derivative -not ontologically but functionally- and secondary to the individual. Thus, the focus of attention was directed towards the ought-to-be nature of the state for the sake of the individual.

The Anglo-American cross fertilization was also reflected in the manner the group considered issues concerning the society, politics and economy. Thus, "leaving away speculation and theorization for itself,"<sup>219</sup> it mainly focused on micro issues, found to be indispensable for the realization of democracy.<sup>220</sup> Not surprisingly, the arguments were derived from the Anglo-American models based on experimentalism.<sup>221</sup>

---

<sup>218</sup>. Bowle, "Totaliterlik," 11.

<sup>219</sup>. "İktisadi Gerçekleri Kavrama Derecemiz," 1-3.

<sup>220</sup>. In fact, the issues were organized with such a mentality. The editorial section echoed the common standing of the writers. The writers dwelled upon specific subjects as the parliament, judiciary, parliamentarians, party structure and inter-party relations, detailed analysis of the economic structure and the proposals on the appropriate measures. The division of the themes can roughly be stated as follows: Aydın Yalçın and Osman Okyar wrote articles concerning economy, Muammer Aksoy, Turhan Feyzioğlu, Turan Güneş, Bahri Savcı and Mümtaz Soysal, on law, government and parliament, and Metin And and Ömer Sakıp on the intellectuals.

<sup>221</sup>. England was taken as the model first for the functioning of the parliament as a debating society on the issues, which was interpreted to be the reflection of the compliance with the principle of "honest pursuit of the line of argument." "Tarafsızlık Meselesi" (The Issue of Neutrality), *Forum* (editorial), 7 (79) (July 1, 1957), 4. The group also drew upon the English experience in distinguishing themselves from etatist identity, due to their proposal for social and economic planning. Kapanı, "İngiliz Demokrasisine Bakışlar: Milli Karakterin Işığında Siyasi Müesseseler" (A Look at British Democracy: Political Institutions in the Light of National Character), *Forum*, 12 (143) (March 1, 1960), 12-3: "Dertlerimiz

In general, it is possible to observe parallels between the said intellectual preoccupation with post-war conditions in the West and developments in the western intellectual layout, which displayed a continuity in the liberal tradition thereon. That, in turn, confirmed the ultimate demise of classical liberalism and the rise of social democracy. When read within the frames of this schema, the seemingly inconsistent emphasis on individualism on the one hand, and planning on the other ensures a comprehensive understanding. The group referred to its approach as "a liberal-socialist state of being,"<sup>222</sup> which basically corresponded to a liberal standing with respect to the society and a democratic one with respect to the state.<sup>223</sup>

All in all, the Anglo-American predisposition was a projection of the task of taking Westernization intact that the group held fast to. If one major sphere of manifestation of this task was the emphasis on the transformation from the rural structure to urban way of living, the second one was the issue of religion. The responsibility which the group put on the intellectual as the enlightener of the public in a stage of cultural transformation,<sup>224</sup> had a structural counterpart. This was

---

Asıl Kaynağı" (The True Reason of Our Problems), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (32) (July 15, 1955), 1-2. Yalçın, "Sosyalizmin Bugünkü Meseleleri," 11-3; Okyar "Planlama Tarihesine Müteallik Notlar (1939'dan bu yana)," 14-6.

222. "Biz Ne İstiyoruz?" 2.

223. Yalçın, "Kültür Değiştirmemizin Temel Şartı" (The Main Imperative of Changing Our Culture), *Forum*, 3 (27) (May 1, 1955), 20-1.

224. Yalçın, "Aydınların Ferdiyetçiliği," 16; "Demokratik Bir Düzendeki İlim Adamlarının Yeri," 1-3; "Aydınların Sorumluluğu" (The Responsibility of Intellectuals), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (37) (October 1, 1955), 1-3; Aksoy, "Profesörlerin Siyasi Yayınları Memnu mudur?"



substantiated in the call for rapid urbanization due to the nourishment of "...liberal society and democratic state..." in urbanized societies which preempt the threat of closed rural structure to the development of individual consciousness.<sup>225</sup>

Second, the uncompromising westernist standing was reflected in the approach to the issue of religion. Again modelling on the Anglo-American experience with secularism, the group rigorously put forth the imperative of a total separation between state and religion. This meant not only the elimination of religion from matters concerning the state, but also the withdrawal of state from matters concerning religion.<sup>226</sup> Holding the view that religion is a concern of individual conscience, and thus no medium should be accepted inbetween, the group severely attacked the trends calling for a selective synthesizing process among western values and

---

(Are the Political Publications of Professors Illegal?), *Forum*, 4 (39) (November 1, 1955), 11-3. And "Türkiye'de Aydınlar I" (Intellectuals in Turkey I), *Forum*, 4 (42) (December 15, 1955), 18-9; "Türkiye'de Aydınlar III," 24-5; "C.H.P.nin Meseleleri" (RPP's Problems), *Forum* (editorial), 5 (53) (June 1, 1956), 3; "Siyaset Çamuru" (The Dirt of Politics), *Forum* (editorial), 6 (67) (January 1, 1957), 4; "Siyaset Eğitimi" (Political Education), *Forum* (editorial), 7 (74) (April 15, 1957), 1-2; "Fikir Partisi İmkanları" (Opportunities for an Intellectual Party), *Forum* (editorial), 7 (83) (September 1, 1957), 1-3; "Kubalı Hadisesi mi, Üniversite Meselesi mi, Yoksa Hukuk Devleti Davası mı?" (Kubalı Event, or University Issues, or the Issue of Rule of Law?), *Forum* (editorial), 8 (94) (February 15, 1958), 1-3; Sakıp, "Asıl Eksişimiz Aydınlarımızdaki Gerçek Duygusu" (Our Main Deficiency is the Lack of Sense of Reality in Our Intellectuals), *Forum*, 10, (122) (April 15, 1959), 8-10.

225. Yalçın, "Kültür Değiştirmemizin Temel Şartı," 20-1.

226. "Laikliği Noksan Anlama" (Deficient Comprehension of Laicism), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (44) (January 15, 1956), 3; İlhan Arsel, "Amerikan Demokrasisinde Din ve Devlet Ayrılığı" (The Separation of Religion and State in American Democracy), *Forum*, 5 (50) (April 15, 1956), 15-6; Necat Erder, "Din Meselesi" (The Issue of Religion), *Forum*, 5 (52) (May 15, 1956), 10; "Nursuzlar" (Sinisters), *Forum* (editorial), 9 (100) (May 15, 1958), 5-6.

institutions on the one hand, and the traditional features which were supposed to represent the authenticity of a nation, on the other.<sup>227</sup>

It may well be argued that *Forum* represented a crucial stage in Turkish intellectual life. First, it symbolized the logical end of the Anglo-American cross-fertilization, which Turkey had been experiencing from the transition to multi-party period onwards. It also provided a groundwork for the solution to the uneasy co-existence of the faith in the individual on the one hand, and a society which had been marked by the prevalence of a state tradition, on the other. Second, the group also represented the beginning of a shift in the relation between the state and intellectual. In this respect, they provided a re-definition of the identity of the intellectual, which subordinated his link with the state to his function as an enlightener of the public, due to employment in state institutions. Last but not least, it also exemplified a beginning point in the preoccupation of the intellectual with "specific issues, discrete institutions and the detailed analysis of functions and powers," reminiscent of the Anglo-American intellectual tradition of state.<sup>228</sup> However, it should be noted that the

---

<sup>227</sup>. " ...There is nothing more absurd than expecting an Hegelian synthesis between the East and the West. ...If we aim at Westernization, we should pursue a hundred percent westernization and as quick as possible." Soysal, "Bütünlük," p. 12. On the faith in absolute westernization see also, Soysal, "Türkiye'nin Son Ortadoğu Siyaseti ve Batılılaştırma Temposunda Yavaşlama" (The Last Middle Eastern Policy of Turkey and Retardation in Westernization), *Forum*, 9 (107) (September 1, 1958), 10-2; "Atatürk'ü Anlamak" (Understanding Atatürk), *Forum* (editorial), 10 (112) (November 15, 1958), 1-2.

<sup>228</sup>. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, 199.

group was not immune to engaging in framing the relation of the concerned themes to "an overarching rule like state" which, according to Dyson, is absent in the Anglo-American tradition.<sup>229</sup> Instead, this particular intellectual group was trying to substantiate their theoretical disposition within a system where the state had long been the focal point in their political and intellectual preoccupation.

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

The 1946-1960 period was significant for the Turkish political system for several reasons. First, it proved to be an era of definitive transition to multi-party politics, rather than a mere rehearsal which had been the case in the preceding period (1923-1946). Second, the acquisition of power by the DP also started a transition from state-centered polity to party-centered polity, which basically meant the handover of political power from state elites to political elites.<sup>230</sup> Last but not least, the period was also marked by a shift in the intellectual sphere from Continental European cross-fertilization to the Anglo-Saxon one.

It is in order to categorize the shifts in the intellectual sphere on a periodical basis. The first stage may be stated as 1946-1950, which began when an opposition in the RPP first surfaced and ended with DP

---

<sup>229</sup>. Ibid., 201.

<sup>230</sup>. Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Walkington, England: Eathon Press, 1985), 100.

coming to power. This opposition overlapped with the writings of Ahmet Emin Yalman --the self-proclaimed liberal journalist. The main themes of the opposition gathered around the discussion on the actual meaning of the term democracy. The main reference point was the Anglo-American democracies which had proved their supremacy by victory in the Second World War.<sup>231</sup> The period in question differed from the early Republican era, in that the influence of international developments on the domestic political scene began to increase. Thus, as far as the *nouveaux* opposition was concerned, the aura of nationalism which had been shaped by national independence, and nation-state building were gradually merged with the tendency towards an overall alliance with the Anglo-American world.

The intellectual framework, in a period where tentative initiatives for democracy were replaced by an alternative interpretation of democracy - claimed to be genuine by the opposition - integrated the concern with the requisites of democracy into preoccupation with providing the intellectual groundwork of the Turkish nation-state. However, one should not misread this shift as a total abandonment of the theme of "nation." Instead, excessive preoccupation with the construction of nation and its constituents continued during this period. However, in the rhetoric of the opposition, this concern was also related to the international milieu. Yalman's

---

<sup>231</sup>. In fact, for the *nouveaux* opposition the Anglo-American victory in the Second World War symbolized the victory of democracy against the totalitarian regimes.

articles had the tendency to differentiate the basis of Turkish nation and nationalism from the extreme nationalism of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. This tendency was nurtured by his engagement in international liberal platforms and the foundation of the Association for the Dissemination of Free Ideas, which connoted adherence to the Anglo-American model. The influence of the Anglo-American model on Turkey was also reflected in the DP's rhetoric during its opposition period. It may be argued that the liberal identity of the opposition was shaped more by this rhetoric than a consistent liberal theoretical scheme.

The second stage of the period (1950-1960) was marked by the consolidation of Anglo-American cross-fertilization in the *Forum* group. The significance of the group was that they formed an opposing bloc in defense of democracy against the rule of the DP --the party which came to power in the name of democracy. Despite the shift from a state-centered polity to a party-centered one, the experience with DP rule proved the continuity of the absolutist conception of power, which had traditionally been based on the will of the nation. Coupled with the politicization of bureaucracy by the DP, such disposition ensured a party-dominant state. In a country with a strong state tradition, this meant only representational change in the functioning of the system. Thus, the uneasy disposition of the 'liberal' intellectual with a dual identity, which had in fact become a tradition, persisted throughout the multi-party era. The liberal intellectual

once again found himself within a split identity between the state and opposition. As exemplified in the case of the *Forum* group, the intellectual was entrusted with a double responsibility as being part of the state, on the one hand, and being a neutral enlightener on the other.

The group constituted a consistent matrix as regards the Anglo-American influence, especially when compared with Yalman. Not differently, they grounded their opposition to the party in power on democracy, as practised in the Anglo-American world. However, the group provided an organized flow of thoughts which had theoretical and methodological bases. Theoretically, they represented social democratic claims, the culminating point in the relation between the individual and the state, and that between liberty and equality, following the neo-liberal and Keynesian chain in the West. The Anglo-American cross-fertilization was more manifest in the methodology applied. Thus, the articles published in *Forum* focused analytically on specific issues, institutions and ought-to-be(s), however, not arising out of abstract theorizing but with reference to the existing models.

The group was also significant since it totally dispensed with the ages-long ambivalence of the 'liberal' intellectual between tradition and modernity, which in the early-Republican era was transferred into a tendency to construct the national within the project of modernization. Thus, a second point which gave the group the identity of a breaking point in the intellectual

sphere, was their rejection of the synthesis between the East and West due to its implausibility. This was most manifest in the arguments proposing absolute westernism at the expense of tradition. In this respect, it is possible to argue that the group represented the climax of the tendency towards identification with the West.

However ironically, in the late fifties the oppositional stance of the group against the DP rule on the basis of political responsibility, terminated when it came close to the RPP, the party which had long been accused of a tutelary mentality. This disposition was first presented in the articles legitimizing the mono-party rule of the RPP;<sup>232</sup> and second in the call for the unification of the opposition to overthrow the DP.<sup>233</sup>

Apart from the argument that such a shift was merely based on practical concerns, it can also be interpreted as containing the signs of past legacy. Despite his faith in the individual, citizen, and/or people, the Ottoman-Turkish 'liberal' intellectual had always lived with a concern for the state. In the *Forum* group this was reflected in its scienticism and consequently in the

---

<sup>232</sup>. Aksoy, "Son Demokrasi Hamlemiz Kimin Eseridir?" (Whose Work is Our Last Democratic Leap?), *Forum*, 9 (102) (June 15, 1958), 9-11; Aksoy, "Son Demokrasi Hamlemiz Kimin Eseridir! -II- Tarihi Nutuk (İnönü'nün 1 Kasım 1945 Meclisi Açış Nutku)" (Whose Work is Our Last Democratic Leap! -II- Historical Speech [Opening Speech of İnönü on November 1, 1945]), *Forum*, 9 (103) (July 1, 1958), 9-11.

<sup>233</sup>. This shift, while blurring the identification of the group with the FP, as well as the distinct identity of the party itself, substantiates the argument by Karpas that there was no significant ideological disposition among the political parties of the said period. Instead, while all aspired for the construction of democracy when in opposition they could well be claimed to fall short of any "...viewpoint on the socio-economic aspects of democracy and freedom with which to supplement their political goal." Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, 390.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE STATE AND INTELLECTUAL IN POST-1960 TURKEY: THE ULTIMATE RUPTURE - REPUBLIC OR DEMOCRACY?

#### THE STATE AND INTELLECTUAL IN A JOINT TASK: THE 1961 CONSTITUTION

As is known, the view that the DP government is trying to expand is as follows: Freedom of press is practised in full in our country, everyone is free to express his thoughts. The only issue that is legally banned is to insult the individuals, and to offend their honor and dignity. However, free and fearless expression of thought especially in a country is possible only within an appropriate milieu. Is it possible to expect free expression of thought from intellectuals who are in one way or other linked to the Government, from the University staff members who are subject to the threat of removal from active duty in university by the Ministry of Education when they recognize that the practise of the freedom of thought results in prosecution or removal from active duty? This permanent and obscure repression by the government has been the basic reason for the stale and uneasy nature of intellectual work.<sup>1</sup>

In almost two months time after these statements were published in *Forum*, Turkish politics experienced a military intervention (May 27, 1960). The intervention was crucial since it opened the way for a new era as regards the evolution of liberal identity.

---

<sup>1</sup>. "İktidarın Basın Hürriyeti Anlayışı" (Government's Conception of Freedom of Press), *Forum* (editorial), 12 (144) (March 15, 1960), 2.



## The 1960 Military Intervention

As far as Turkish politics is concerned, the 1960 military intervention may be interpreted as a move to reinforce the position of the state elite *vis-à-vis* the political elite which had been impaired to the advantage of the latter under DP rule. However, the basis of legitimacy for intervention was provided more directly by the increasing political turmoil coupled with the failure of DP's economic policies. Beginning from the late 1950s onwards the Turkish political scene had turned into a show of hostile struggle between the government and opposition. The opposition included not only political parties, but also the press, judiciary, civil bureaucracy and university.<sup>2</sup> In contrast to the liberal rhetoric in the stages of its formation, the DP increasingly resorted to repressive policies which reached its climax with the establishment of the Assembly Committee of Investigation (*Tahkikat Komisyonu*) with both legislative and judicial powers to inquire about and take measures against the activities of the opposition (April 18, 1960).<sup>3</sup> The first target of the Assembly Committee was the university professors who criticized its establishment on the grounds that it was in violation of the Constitution.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>. Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1977), 44-56.

<sup>3</sup>. Cem Eroğul, "The Establishment of Multi-Party Rule: 1945-71," in *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, eds. Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 118.

<sup>4</sup>. Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993).

This was followed by the May 1960 incidents in the universities in Ankara and İstanbul<sup>5</sup> which symbolized the threshold of the decade (1950-1960). Apart from DP's falling short of implementing the policies in regard to upgrading the Turkish military, which proved to be to its disadvantage, such a situation served as a call to duty for the military.<sup>6</sup> The "duty" was taken over by the National Unity Committee (NUC) which was formed as an interim government to protect and re-institute democracy.<sup>7</sup> This self-entitlement may be explained in the identification of the military with the state and thus as the "guardian" of Turkish democracy.<sup>8</sup> In fact, the Military's declaration which was broadcasted on May 27, 1960 confirmed such a role:

Owing to the crisis into which our democracy has fallen and to recent, sad incidents and in order to prevent fratricide, the Turkish armed forces have taken over the administration of the country. Our armed forces have taken this initiative for the purpose of extricating the (political) parties from the irreconcilable situation into which they have fallen and for the purpose of having just and free elections, to be held as soon as possible under the supervision and arbitration of an above-party and impartial administration, and for the purpose of

---

5. Ali Fuad Başgil, *27 Mayıs İhtilali ve Sebepleri (The May 27 Revolution and Its Causes)*, trans. M. Ali Sebük and İ. Hakkı Akın (İstanbul: Çeltüt Matbaacılık, 1966), 141-4.

6. Ahmad remarks that DP's policies in the sphere of military proved as inconclusive as in the economic sphere, which resulted in the military's decreasing self-esteem and purchasing power. On the relationship between the DP and the Armed Forces see Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, 147-159.

7. Eroğul, "The Establishment of Multi-Party Rule: 1945-71," 118-24.

8. Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, "The State, Politics and the Military in Turkey," *Comparative Politics*, 16 (1) (1983), 21.

handing over the administration to whichever party wins the elections.<sup>9</sup>

In line with this announced eagerness to restore democracy the NUC called for designing a new constitution by university professors.<sup>10</sup>

### **The 1961 Constitution: The Realization of the 'Utopia'?**

Drafting the constitution took one year.<sup>11</sup> The significance of the process for this study lays in the fact that such figures as Muammer Aksoy, Turhan Feyzioğlu and Bahri Savcı who were among the founders of *Forum*, as well as İlhan Arsel whose articles also appeared in the journal, happened to be among the members of the three different commissions formed subsequently.<sup>12</sup> This was not a casual involvement. It was rather because these figures were university professors who had been in opposition to the DP rule both intellectually and in active politics with their already formulated reform proposals.<sup>13</sup> The

---

<sup>9</sup>. Quoted in Kemal Karpat, "Political and Social Thought in Turkey," in *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East*, ed. Kemal Karpat, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1982), 378.

<sup>10</sup>. Immediately after the intervention some professors from İstanbul University's Law Faculty arrived in Ankara for preliminary studies for laying out the new constitution. Walter F. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961: Aspects of Military Politics* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1980 reprint), 66.

<sup>11</sup>. For a detailed analysis of the constitution making process, see *ibid.*, 64-72.

<sup>12</sup>. Turhan Feyzioğlu participated in the commission referred to as the *Ankara Group*, while Bahri Savcı and Muammer Aksoy took part in all the three commissions, *ibid.*, 70-1. For the full list of the members of commissions see A. Aylin Özman, "The State and Bar Associations in Turkey: A Study in Interest Group Politics" (Ph.D. Dissertation. Bilkent University, Ankara, 1995), 144.

<sup>13</sup>. Muammer Aksoy had participated in the FP which had been formed by a split from the DP in 1955, while Turhan Feyzioğlu had joined the RPP.

proposals in question were made since *Forum* had started its publication in 1954. An analysis of the articles published in the journal substantiates the argument that the 1961 Constitution provided the institutional framework which the intellectuals built around the journal, and had idealized as most appropriate for the practice of democracy.

To begin with, the independence of the judiciary which occupied a substantial place in the columns of *Forum*<sup>14</sup> was ensured by Articles 132, 133 and 134 of the 1961 Constitution.<sup>15</sup> As against the experience of the previous decade, these articles stipulated the principle of the total autonomy of courts from the executive in the practice of both judicial authority and profession.

Secondly, by the establishment of the Senate of Republic<sup>16</sup> the 1961 Constitution also fulfilled one of the most repeatedly discussed institutional requisites by the *Forum* group against the abuse of political power: a bicameral Grand National Assembly.<sup>17</sup>

---

14. Muammer Aksoy, "Fikir, İlim ve Öğretim Hürriyeti: Üniversite Muhtariyeti" (Freedom of Thought, Science and Primary Education: Autonomy University) *Forum*, 4 (37) (October 1, 1955), 9; Muammer Aksoy, "Hukukçuların Manevi Mes'uliyeti ve İki Hukuk Derneğine Dair" (About the Ethical Responsibility of Legal Professionals and Two Law Associations), *Forum*, 5 (56) (July 15, 1956), 11; Bahri Savcı, "Seçim İklimi Yoktur" (There is No Room for Elections), *Forum*, 3 (33) (August 1, 1955), 10-1; "Bir 'Müjde' ve Bir Unutkanlık" (A Good News and a Forgetfulness), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (30) (June 15, 1955), 4-5; Münici Kapani, "İcra Organı Karşısında Hakimlerin İstiklali" (The Autonomy of Judges vis-à-vis The Executive), *Forum*, 6, (70) (February 15, 1957), 9-10.

15. For the full text of the 1961 Constitution, see Suna Kili, *Türk Anayasaları (Turkish Constitutions)*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Tekin Yayınevi, 1982), 67-159.

16. Article 70 of the 1961 Constitution.

17. Among numerous articles appeared in the columns of *Forum* on the issue of parliamentary control and bicameral legislature the following are exemplary: Bahri Savcı, "Murakabe Müessesesinin

Thirdly, the 1961 Constitution embodied a separate section on "Social and Economic Rights and Duties" which fit into the standing of the *Forum* group with respect to the social aspect of democracy.<sup>18</sup> Article 41 of the Constitution which stated that "Economic and social life are organized according to justice, principle of full employment and the aim of providing everyone with the level of living appropriate for the honor of humanity," fulfilled the group's demand that the state should be responsible for helping the disadvantaged in the pursuit of a respectable life.<sup>19</sup> In line with this view, the Constitution also introduced planning by the state for "realizing economic, social and cultural development by democratic means;... devising development plans with this aim..."<sup>20</sup>

---

Korunması," (Protection of the Institution of Checks), *Forum*, 3 (29) (June 1, 1955), 9-10; İlhan Arsel, "Hükümet Sistemimiz Hakkında," (About our Government System), *Forum*, 3 (34) (August 15, 1955), 9-11; "Dört Mesele Bir Arada" (Four Issues at Once), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (45) (February 1, 1956), 5; Bahri Savcı, "Demokratik Bir Düzenle Meclisin Gerçek Yeri" (The Real Place of Assembly in a Democratic Order), *Forum*, 4 (45) (February 1, 1956), 9-10; Feridun Canitez, "Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanununun Tadili" (Reform of the Constitution), *Forum*, 5 (54) (May 15, 1956), 11; Arsel, "Çift Meclis Sistemi" (Bicameralism), *Forum*, 8 (96) (March 15, 1958), 6-8; "Karanlıkta Vuruşanlar" (Those that Fight in the Dark), *Forum* (editorial), 10 (114) (December 15, 1958), 2; Munci Kapanı, "Yarınki Anayasamız Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler" (Some Reflections on Our Future Constitution), *Forum*, 11, (127) (July 1, 1959), 8-10.

18. Savcı, "Batılı Demokrasinin Bazı Temel Kavramları Üzerine" (On Some of the Fundamental Concepts of Western Democracy), *Forum*, 4 (47) (March 1, 1956), 10-1.

19. Ibid.; Savcı "İktidar Savaşı Yapmadan Siyaset" (Politics without Power Struggle), *Forum*, 3 (32) (July 15, 1955), 8-10.

20. Article 41 of the 1961 Constitution. *Forum* group had repeatedly pointed at the need for planning in social and economic spheres. See for example, Cahit Talas, "Müessir Bir Sosyal Politika Zarureti" (The Imperative of an Effective Social Policy), *Forum*, 4 (39) (November 1, 1955), 14-5; "İktisadi İstikbalimizin Görünüşü" (The Panorama of Our Economic Future), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (40) (November 15, 1955), 1-3; "İktisadi Tedbirler ve İçtimai Sonuçlar" (Economic Measures and Social Outcomes), *Forum* (editorial), 5 (58) (August 15, 1956), 3;

The institutional extension of such a responsibility with which the state was saddled in the economic sphere was the establishment of the State Planning Organization (SPO) (September 30, 1960).<sup>21</sup> In its initiation as a constitutional organ (Article 129), the SPO seemed to echo the demand of the *Forum* group for "democratic planning" which connoted depoliticization in the making of economic decisions.<sup>22</sup> Parallel to the group's criticisms against the DP's economic policies that they were arbitrarily made,<sup>23</sup> the SPO was held responsible for conducting economic and social research and devising

---

"Biz Ne İstiyoruz?" (What Do We Want?), *Forum* (editorial), 5 (60) (September 15, 1956), 1-2; "Plan Kelimesinden Maksat" (What We Mean by Planning), *Forum* (editorial), 7 (73) (April 1, 1957), 7; Osman Okyar, "Planlama Tarihçesine Müteallik Notlar VI: İktisaden Geri Kalmış Memleketlerde Planlama Meseleleri" (Notes on the History of Planning VI: Issues of Planning in Economically Backward Countries), *Forum*, 8 (89) (December 1, 1957), 15; Osman Okyar, "İktisadi Plancılığımızın Şekil ve Muhteva Meselesi" (The Issue of the Form and Content of Our Economic Planning), *Forum*, 3 (31) (July 1, 1955), 9-10; "İktisadi Plan İhtiyacı" (The Need for Economic Planning), *Forum*, 3 (34) (August 15, 1955), 6-7; Aydın Yalçın, "Gelişme Gayretlerimizde Aksayan Nedir?" (What is the Trouble with Our Attempts at Development), *Forum*, 4 (45) (February 1, 1956), 11-2.

21. O.N. Torun, "The Establishment and the Structure of the State Planning Organization," in *Planning in Turkey*, eds. S. İlkin and E. İlkin (Ankara: METU, 1967), 44-70.

22. Soysal, "İktisadi Devlet Teşekküllerinin Bünyesi" (The Structure of State Economic Enterprises), *Forum*, 3 (27) (May 1, 1955), 12-3; Soysal, "İktisadi Devlet Teşekküllerinin Murakabesi" (The Control of State Economic Enterprises), *Forum*, 3 (28) (May 15, 1955), 11-3; Yalçın, "Gelişme Gayretlerimizde Aksayan Nedir?," 11-2; Yalçın, "Plan ve Program Meselesi" (Issue of Planning and Program), *Forum*, 7 (75) (May 1, 1957), 8-9; H.C. Richard, "İktisadi Gelişmede Devletin Rolü" (State's Role in Economic Development), trans. M.E., *Forum*, 6 (72) (March 15, 1957), 16-7.

23. "D.P.'nin Liberalizmi, (The Liberalism of DP), *Forum* (editorial), 5 (60) (September 15, 1956), 6; Okyar, "İktisadi Plancılığımızın Şekil ve Muhteva Meselesi"; "Kendimize Güvenme Zamanı" (The Time to Trust Ourselves), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (31) (July 1, 1955), 1-2; "İktisadi İstikbalimizin Görünüşü" 1-3; Soysal, "Bütünlük" *Forum*, 6 (63) (November 1, 1956), 11-2; Ömer Sakıp, "Demokratik Devrim Üzerine Düşünceler" (Reflections on Democratic Revolution), *Forum*, 7 (83) (September 1, 1957), 7-9; Ömer Sakıp, "Program ve Plan Tartışmaları" (Discussions on Program and Planning), *Forum*, 10 (114) (December 15, 1958), 7-9.

development programs which would form the framework for the governments' economic policies.<sup>24</sup>

One other related issue that had occupied an extensive place in *Forum* columns in relation to the social aspect of democracy, was also met by Articles 46 and 47 of the Constitution. Article 46 recognized the right to unionize for all employees and employers, and Article 47 established the right to strike for the workers; both of which had been perceived as basic elements of democracy by the *Forum* group.<sup>25</sup>

Last and for the purposes of this study, the most important parallelism between the 1961 Constitution and standing of *Forum* group had to do with the universities. Article 120 of the Constitution secured scientific and administrative autonomy for the universities. This was crucial since the group had repeatedly emphasized the two dimensional significance of the universities for the realization of democracy: for them the universities, while providing the intellectual with the opportunity to conduct scientific work, also functioned as the bedrock of enlightened debate for the accomplishment of

---

<sup>24</sup>. William Hale, *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp.

<sup>25</sup>. "Gene Grev Hakkına Dair" (On the Freedom to Strike), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (33) (August 1, 1955), 6; "Evet, Hür ve Bağımsız Sendika" (Yes, Free and Independent Union), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (41) (December 1, 1955), 4; Turhan Feyzioğlu, "Demokrasi Davamıza Genel Bir Bakış" (A General Look at Our Democracy Issue), *Forum*, 4 (46) (February 15, 1956), 12-4; "Birlikler Kapanırken" (While the Unions are Closed down), *Forum* (editorial), 7 (75) (May 1, 1957), 1-2; "Biz Ne İstiyoruz?" (What Do We Want?), *Forum* (editorial), 5 (60) (September 15, 1956), 1-2; Şerif Mardin, "Yeni Bir Ütopya" (A New Utopia), *Forum*, 5 (51) (May 1, 1956), 10-1.

democratic order.<sup>26</sup> The same article also recognized the right of university members to engage in active politics, and thus opened the way for the intellectual to fulfill his political responsibility.<sup>27</sup>

Since most of the topics of reform that had been embodied in the columns of *Forum* were given official recognition by the 1961 Constitution, one may conclude with the victory of liberal standing against the authoritarian conception of power which had found its lattermost example in DP's rule. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that such a conclusion would be one-dimensional and short-sighted. The 1961 Constitution symbolized the beginning of an open-ended era, and its significance lied more in its illustration of the continuity in the relationship between the state and 'liberal' intellectual, and thus the limits of 'liberal' intellectual in the Turkish context.

---

26. "İlme Verdiğimiz Kıymet" (The Value Attributed to Science), *Forum* (editorial), 4 (48) (March 15, 1956), 1-2; "Rektör Seçimi" (The Election of Rector), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (31) (July 1, 1955), 5; Aydın Yalçın, "Üniversitelerimizde Bilimsel Çalışmalar" (Scientific Works in Our Universities), *Forum*, 3 (34) (August 15, 1955), 19-20; "Demokratik Bir Düzenle İlim Adamlarının Yeri" (The Place of Scientists in a Democratic Order), *Forum* (editorial), 3 (35) (September 1, 1955), 3.

27. Cemal Yıldırım, "Bilimin Sosyal İlgileri" (Social Reflections of Science), *Forum*, 4 (37) (October 1, 1955), 19-20; Roger Apery, "Tarafsızlık Meselesi" (The Issue of Neutrality), trans. Cemal Yıldırım, *Forum*, 5, (52) (May 15, 1956), 17; "Demokratik Bir Düzenle İlim Adamlarının Yeri"; "İlme Verdiğimiz Kıymet."



## LIBERAL IDENTITY IN SHADES

### The State and Intellectual as the Apostles of Democracy

The 1961 Constitution bore the seeds of a new era for Turkish political life. However, one should be cautious in claiming the same for the Turkish intellectual, and particularly for the 'liberal' intellectual. The identity of Turkish intellectual as legislator was once more enhanced by the 1960 military intervention. This was substantiated in the resort of military to university members for drawing up the new constitution.<sup>28</sup> The most conspicuous manifestation of such a responsibility imposed on the intellectual may be observed in General Cemal Gürsel's statement, who chaired the NUC:

We believe in the university. ... The reason why we appeal to you is as follows: Prepare a new constitution immediately. I urge you to accomplish this in the shortest time possible. Because we are determined to hold elections in three months time and to hand over the power to civilian government.<sup>29</sup>

However, this 'respect' for the university was not one-sided. The intellectual's self-identification contributed to a bilateral positioning. From the very start of the period, the intellectual happened to cooperate with the state. The inceptive example of this cooperation was displayed in the declaration prepared by

---

<sup>28</sup>. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961*, 66.

<sup>29</sup>. Quoted in Tefik Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi (1950-1995)* (*Turkey's History of Democracy [1950-1995]*) (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1996), 89.

university members to legitimize the intervention "scientifically":

It would be wrong to view the situation (i.e., in which we find ourselves today) as an ordinary political coup. It is regrettable that, for many months and even years now, the political power that should have been the guardian of civil rights and that symbolized the principles of state, law, justice, ethics, public interest, and public service has lost this quality; it has become, instead, a materialistic force representative of personal influence, and ambition and class privilege.

We look upon the actions of the Committee of National Unity (i.e., the military government) in arranging for the administration to be taken over by state forces and institutions as a measure dictated by the imperative need to re-establish a legitimate rule so as to redress a situation in which social institutions had been rendered virtually inoperative, in which the people were led to anarchy by being set at each other's throats, and in which there was being exerted a conscious effort to destroy all the ethical and moral foundations that support such institutions.<sup>30</sup>

As far as the liberal intellectual is concerned, one comes up with a rather debilitating picture. As constituting an irony with the 1961 Constitution, which contained their long-aspired reform proposals, it is not possible to trace a continuity in the identity of the liberal-minded intellectuals in the post-1960 period.

#### ***Forum: The Victory of Social Democracy over Liberal Ethos***

The case of *Forum* exemplifies the limits of liberal identity in the Turkish context. These limits may be

---

<sup>30</sup>. Quoted in Karpat, "Political and Social Thought in Turkey," 379-80. Zürcher interprets this declaration as a "modern fetva." Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 254.

observed in the uneasiness in upholding a cohesive and durable liberal identity in the face of identification with the state. The Turkish intellectual's liberal identity was squeezed first and foremost with his commitment to the sustenance of the state. In fact, for the *Forum* group, such an unequivocal stance had already been manifest at its very inception in its self-identification as "liberal-socialist."<sup>31</sup> In the late 1950s, this dual-identity evolved to the disadvantage of the former and ended with the solidification of "via media" (*orta yol*) standing in the early 1960s.<sup>32</sup>

This transformation as reflected in the political scene by the merging of FP with RPP continued in the constitution-making process, which reconstructed the state-intellectual fusion, that had been impaired in the past decade. This reconstruction was reflected in *Forum's* applause for the 1960 military intervention:

It would not be apt to accept and interpret the May 27 Revolution as merely a military movement, an incident initiated in the name of the Turkish Armed Forces to overthrow a deviated political system. ...especially after 1954, departure from natural principles of the democratic system, trying to cover difficulties and resentment by methods and means that do not conform with the nature of a democratic system motivated those forces of society which happen to perform the role of guidance.<sup>33</sup>

---

<sup>31</sup>. For *Forum* group the phrase "socialist" corresponded to a democratic standing with respect to the state. "Biz Ne İstiyoruz," 2.

<sup>32</sup>. "Orta Yolun Kaderi" (The Fate of Mid-Way), *Forum* (editorial) (194) (May 1, 1962), 3-5.

<sup>33</sup>. "27 Mayıs" (May 27), *Forum* (editorial) (196) (June 1, 1962), 3. See also "Ordu ve Politika" (Army and Politics), *Forum* (editorial) (209) (December 15, 1962), 3; "27 Mayıs ve İktisadi Hayatımız" (May 27 and Our Economic Life), *Forum* (editorial) (220) (June 1, 1963), 3-4.

Such a statist approach continued throughout the early 1960s.<sup>34</sup> The positioning of the journal as "*via media*", which ultimately meant social democracy,<sup>35</sup> did not represent a radical abandoning of the themes around which the *Forum* group had gathered in the past decade.<sup>36</sup> Instead, the difference from the past decade should be searched in the points of opposition in terms of which the post-1960 *Forum* tried to form its distinctive identity. To begin with the journal defined the phrase, "*via media*" vis-à-vis "extremist trends," which meant extreme nationalists and conservatives on the one hand, and "...extreme statist and socialist group..." on the other.<sup>37</sup>

---

34. "Sıkı Yönetim" (Martial Law), *Forum* (editorial) (221) (June 15, 1963), 3-4; Bülent Daver, "Demokraside Sıkı Yönetim" (Martial Law in Democracy), *Forum* (editorial) (230) (November 1, 1963), 8-9.

35. "Plan ve Sonrası" (Plan and Its Aftermath), *Forum* (editorial) (207) (November 15, 1962), 5.

36. In parallel to the past decade the journal continued in its appraisal of parliamentary regime, the role of intellectuals as well as the responsibility of political parties in full accomplishment of democracy, and of democratic planning. See for example, "Şekli Demokrasiden Öz Demokrasiye" (From Formal Democracy to Genuine Democracy), *Forum* (editorial) (199) (July 15, 1962), 3-5; "Plan ve Sonrası," 4-6; Cahit Talas, "Kalkınma ve İktisadi Sistemler" (Development and Economic Systems), *Forum* (209) (December 15, 1962), 15-7; A. Kerimoğlu, "Türk ve Fransız Plancılığı: Demokratik Plancılığın Doğuşu" (Planning in Turkey and France: The Birth of Democratic Planning), *Forum* (216) (April 1, 1963), 20-1; "Parlamentonun Sorumluluğu" (The Responsibility of Parliament), *Forum* (editorial) (218) (May 1, 1963), 3-4; Adnan Güriz, "Modern Demokrasinin Temel İlkeleri: I-Hürriyet" (Basic Principles of Modern Democracy: I-Freedom), *Forum* (219) (May 15, 1963), 11-4; Güriz, "Modern Demokrasinin Temel İlkeleri: II-Eşitlik" (Basic Principles of Modern Democracy: II-Equality), *Forum* (224) (August 1, 1963), 9-11; "Buhranın Asıl Kaynağı" (The Real Reason of Crisis), *Forum* (editorial) (229) (October 15, 1963), 3-4; "Siyasi Buhranların Gerçekleri" (Facts about Political Crises), *Forum* (editorial) (234) (January 1, 1964), 4; "Onbir Yıl" (Eleven Years), *Forum* (editorial) (240) (April 1, 1964), 3-4.

37. "Orta Yolun Kaderi," 3; "Onbir Yıl," 4.

The political extension of this self-identification was affiliation to the RPP. This affiliation was also reflected in the group's perception of the Justice Party (JP), which was among the claimants to the DP's legacy and the major rival of the RPP, as representing an extreme nationalistic and conservative trend.<sup>38</sup> Secondly, the group opposed liberalism on the grounds that it did not fit the Turkish context. Viewing liberals as "extreme optimists," the journal rejected the possibility of direct adoption of Western democracies. Instead, it proposed "levelled freedom, democracy in conformity with the conditions."<sup>39</sup> Thirdly, the symbolic split of the post-1960 *Forum* from its past identity appeared in its severe attack against Aydın Yalçın, one of the prominent founders of the journal and self-proclaimed liberal. The criticism was directed against Yalçın's reference to the past decade as the "Golden Age," and once more represented the journal's faith in the close relationship between the state and intellectual as apostles for the sustenance of democracy.<sup>40</sup>

---

38. "Onbir Yıl," 3-4. For the strict opposition of *Forum* against the J.P., see also "A.P. Kongreleri ve Milli İdare" (Congresses of JP and National Will), *Forum* (editorial) (200) (August 1, 1962), 6-7; "Türk Demokrasisinin Kaderi" (The Fate of Turkish Democracy), *Forum* (editorial) (204) (October 1, 1962), 3-4; "A.P. Genel Kongresi" (General Congress of JP), *Forum* (editorial) (209) (December 15, 1962), 7; "Huzur Çıkmazı" (The Impasse of Peace), *Forum* (editorial) (214) (March 1, 1963); "Bundan Sonrası" (From Now on), *Forum* (editorial) (217) (April 15, 1963), 3-4; "Başkanlık Seçimleri" (Presidential Elections), *Forum* (editorial) (231) (November 15, 1963), 5; "Mahalli Seçimlerden Hükümet Buhranına" (From Municipal Elections to Governmental Crisis), *Forum* (editorial) (233) (December 15, 1963), 3-4.

39. "İki Alanda da Orta Yol" (Mid-Way in Both Spheres), *Forum* (editorial) (211) (January 15, 1963), 3-5.

40. "Aydın Yalçın Meselesi ve Aydınlar" (The Issue of Aydın Yalçın and Intellectuals), *Forum* (editorial) (179) (September 15, 1961). For

In the final analysis, this evolution of *Forum* in almost a decade, which may be interpreted as the victory of democracy over liberal identity, once more represented the limits of liberal intellectual disposition in the Turkish context.<sup>41</sup> The period that was initiated by the 1961 Constitution bore the seeds of new political dynamics. As interpreted by some students of Turkish politics, in the latter half of the 1960s the liberal aura initiated by the Constitution resulted in the ideologization of politics and adoption of extremist identities in both the left and right of the political spectrum.<sup>42</sup> In such a milieu, the liberal intellectual searched either for identification with the state, which eased his claim to stand above-parties or for a definite political standing, which led him to hover between center-right parties.

#### **1961-1979: The Demise of Liberal Identity**

In the period between January 1961-January 1980, Turkey had nineteen different governments.<sup>43</sup> As mentioned above, the period was marked first with ideologization of

---

the response of Yalçın see "Aydın Yalçın'ın Cevabı" (Aydın Yalçın's Response), *Forum* (181) (October 15, 1961).

<sup>41</sup>. In the latter half of 1960s *Forum* assumed a leftist standing.

<sup>42</sup>. Ergun Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations," in *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Ergun Özbudun (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), 19-25; Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975*, 185-91; Jacob M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), 1-44; Eroğul, "The Establishment of Multi-Party Rule: 1945-71," 129-39.

<sup>43</sup>. Karpaz, "Political and Social Thought in Turkey," 375.

politics, followed by polarization and hence fragmentation of the political system.

Although the Turkish political system seemed to have achieved a stable standing following the rather conflict-ridden coalitions between 1961-1965, the late 1960s witnessed political turbulence initiated mainly by the extreme left. The incapacity of the government to overcome the ideological strife was coupled with the irritating emergence of such extremist parties on the right as the National Order Party (NOP), and the Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP).<sup>44</sup> This led to stepping in of the military by memorandum for the second time on March 12, 1971.<sup>45</sup> However, two years of indirect rule by the military could not eliminate the instability which became the major feature of Turkish political life. Thus, between 1973-1979, except for the short interval of the RPP government in 1977, Turkish politics was characterized by subsequent coalition governments.<sup>46</sup> The ideological strife which started in the late 1960s, further increased due to the intensification of political violence between the extreme left and right. Such a scene was nothing but a 'call to duty for the military' for the third time (September 12, 1980).

---

<sup>44</sup>. Renamed as Nationalist Action Party in 1966.

<sup>45</sup>. Özbudun has referred the March 12 coup by memorandum as a "half-coup," since the military exercised its rule through a civilian government. Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations," 21.

<sup>46</sup>. For a detailed analysis of the party system in the period concerned see Sabri Sayari, "The Turkish Party System in Transition," *Government and Opposition*, 13 (1978), 39-57.

This rather disruptive evolution of politics had its effects on the liberal-minded intellectual. As is clear by now, the liberal-minded intellectual has traditionally found himself in a dilemma arising from two contrasting claims on his commitment: universalistic commitments on the one hand, and the peculiarities of the Turkish context which required responsibility first to the state and secondly to the people, on the other. An escape from this predicament was found in Atatürkism; that is a re-interpretation of Kemalist principles. For the liberal intellectual Atatürkism symbolized "...a philosophy of enlightenment, a liberal trend of thought and a pure attempt of Westernization."<sup>47</sup> However, such an interpretation was common to the rhetoric of almost all political parties and intellectuals, except for the extreme left and pro-Islamists. Thus, during the period in question the liberal intellectual who was already facing problems in forming a consistent identity, also experienced dilemmas in expressing his disposition in the political spectrum. This uneasiness was due more to his faith in modernization-as-project, than radicalization of politics.

The case of Aydın Yalçın is exemplary in this respect. Upon his split from the *Forum* group, Yalçın began to publish a daily under the name *Öncü* (1960-1962) and subsequently a fortnightly, *Yarın* (1963-1968), and acted as editorial columnist. Both initiatives may be

---

<sup>47</sup>. Yalçın, "Gerçek Atatürkçülük" (True Atatürkism), *Öncü* (November 10, 1961).



interpreted as attempts to fill the gap that had emerged by the elimination of the liberal dimension from *Forum*. Such an interpretation is substantiated when one analyzes the basic topics of interest in Yalçın's articles.

Similar to the first issue of *Forum*, in the first issue of *Öncü*, Yalçın stated the main aim of the daily as "to assist the public by publication with eloquent intellectual concern on urgent and basic issues of" Turkey.<sup>48</sup> This disposition entrusted the intellectual with a leadership mission for the realization of democracy.<sup>49</sup> According to Yalçın, the mission contained not only the imperative to "think and express but also to act... in such countries as Turkey which experience rapid social change."<sup>50</sup>

Secondly, Yalçın insisted on the requisite of an intellectual basis in the formation of political parties. Such a concern was attributed to the lack of an intellectual tradition in Turkey for the realization of democracy.<sup>51</sup> In fact, this interpretation reconciled Yalçın's pro-interventionist standing with his commitment to democracy.<sup>52</sup> Putting the blame on the political leaders

---

48. Yalçın, "Yol Kavşağında Bir Öncü" (A Protagonist at the Crossroads), *Öncü* (August 26, 1960).

49. Yalçın, "İhtiyaç Sistem ve İdeolojiye midir?" (Do We Need System and Ideology?), *Öncü* (August 31, 1960).

50. Yalçın, "Siyasette Aydınlar" (Intellectuals in Politics), *Öncü* (December 17, 1960).

51. Yalçın, "Esasta Anlaşalım" (We Shall Agree on the Principles), *Öncü* (September 16, 1960); "Yeni Partinin Keşfi" (The Discovery of the New Party) *Öncü* (November 28, 1960).

52. Although *Öncü* was subjected to subsequent suspensions between December 1960 and September 1961, the daily was not in opposition to the military in the actual sense of term. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961*, 101-2. This was apparent in Yalçın's articles praising the 1960 intervention and military as the saviours of Turkish democracy. For example, see Yalçın, "Yol Kavşağında Bir

of the previous decade for constituting "monopoly of political professionals"<sup>53</sup> and thus impeding democracy, he referred to the intervention as an act "not against the multi-party regime, but against the disposition and cadres of some parties which degenerated democracy."<sup>54</sup>

Thirdly, Yalçın emphasized the necessity for debate for the realization of democracy. He posited the need for free expression of every thought in order to reach the best judgement for the whole.<sup>55</sup> In a way, this emphasis on debate formed the basis of his understanding of democracy: "Democracy is nothing but the method of organized debate in order to find the most appropriate system as regards the society."<sup>56</sup> Not unlike the *Forum* group of the past decade, he employed the term "open society" to denote the social aspect of such a definition.<sup>57</sup>

---

Öncü;" "Milli Birlik Komitesi" (National Unity Committee), *Öncü* (September 10, 1960); "Hürriyet İnancı" (Faith in Freedom), *Öncü* (September 29, 1960); "Devleti Korumak Hakkı" (The Right to Save the State), *Öncü* (May 5, 1962).

53. Yalçın, "Profesyonel Politikacı ve Demokrasi" (Professional Politician and Democracy), *Öncü* (September 26, 1960). Distinguishing between the DP as an organization with historical significance and its leaders, Yalçın directed severe criticisms to the DP leaders. "Demokrat Partinin Akıbeti" (The End of Democratic Party) *Öncü* (September 3, 1960); Yalçın, "Teşhisi İyi Koymalıyız" *Öncü* (September 4, 1960); Yalçın, "Milli Birlik Komitesi"; Yalçın, "Demokrasi ve Lider" (Democracy and Leader), *Öncü* (September 14, 1960); Yalçın, "Hürriyet İnancı".

54. Yalçın, "Esasta Anlaşalım."

55. Yalçın, "İlim ve Demokrasi" (Science and Democracy), *Öncü* (October 1, 1960); Yalçın, "Farklı Düşünceye Saygı" (Respect for Different Thoughts), *Öncü* (November 25, 1961); Yalçın, "Sosyalizm, Komünizm" (Socialism, Communism), *Öncü* (December 1, 1961).

56. Yalçın, "Zihniyet ve Tutum Meselesi" (The Issue of Mentality and Attitude), *Öncü* (February 22, 1961).

57. Yalçın, "Partiler ve Demokrasi" (Parties and Democracy), *Öncü* (November 17, 1960); Yalçın, "Siyasi İşbirliği" (Political Cooperation), *Öncü* (January 31, 1961).

In his arguments, Yalçın drew upon the English model, which in the final analysis led him to conclude with the need for an opposition party which would be competent to act as an alternative to government.<sup>58</sup> Criticizing the JP as a blind follower of the DP,<sup>59</sup> he personally engaged in the formation of a new party, under the name of New Turkey Party (NTP) (February 13, 1961), which was reminiscent of the FP experience.<sup>60</sup> According to Yalçın, the NTP fulfilled all the prerequisites of sound opposition: It had an intellectual framework which was grounded on faith in Western democracy. Relatedly, the party assumed a rational standing and thus in politics it was willing to cooperate rather than to struggle for personal ambitions. Lastly, it was determined not only to satisfy the demands of its social basis but also to guide them.<sup>61</sup>

Yalçın's experience with the NTP was important since it was through this process that one observes his distancing from the *Forum* group of the past decade with

---

58. Yalçın, "Partiler ve Demokrasi"; Yalçın, "Ders Aldık mı?" (Did We Learn a Lesson?), *Öncü* (February 2, 1961); Yalçın, "Yeni Parti".

59. Yalçın, "Demokratik Parti Hasreti" (Longing for Democratic Party), *Öncü* (January 9, 1961); Yalçın, "Yeni Türkiye Partisi" (New Turkey Party), *Öncü* (February 14, 1962).

60. The leader of the party had participated in the FP. Before the official foundation of the NTP Yalçın pointed that the party would be established on the legacy of the FP. Yalçın, "Bir Yıldönümü" (An Anniversary), *Öncü* (December 23, 1960). Above all chief members of the party were cautious to distinguish themselves from the JP which declared itself to be the heir of the DP. In this respect see Yalçın, "Siyasi Ortam" (Political Milieu), *Öncü* (October 25, 1960); Yalçın, "Yeni Partiden Maksat" (The Aim of the New Party), *Öncü* (November 24, 1960). For the self-identification of JP as the outgrowth of the DP see Avner Levi, "The Justice Party, 1961-1980," in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, eds. Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), 136.

61. Yalçın, "Dikkatli Olalım" (We Shall Be Careful), *Öncü* (August 6, 1961); Yalçın, "Yeni Türkiye Partisi"; Yalçın, "Siyasi Ortam."

respect to both topics of interest in his intellectual preoccupation and his engagement in active politics. The break can be observed in his approach to "freedom" and "issue of regime." Arguing that the NUC and the Constitutional Assembly settled such constitutional issues, Yalçın emphasized the need for constructing sound particular policies for economic development and social reforms.<sup>62</sup> This reflected his satisfaction with the liberal nature of the 1961 Constitution in providing and guaranteeing the institutional framework for a free order, which had formed the major basis of *Forum's* opposition to DP rule in the past decade. Now that the institutions of the regime fulfilled the 'prerequisites of democracy,' interest should shift to the means to sustain it.<sup>63</sup>

In this respect, Yalçın pointed at two aspects of the open-ended process of democracy: the society and political parties. As far as the society was concerned, he pointed to the need for "a revolution in mentality."<sup>64</sup> Stating that Turkish society has not yet fully internalized social elements necessary for the realization of democracy, he stressed the need for education for the development of the citizen who would himself be capable of deciding how to act, rather than being directed by tradition, or by others. Here, his main

---

<sup>62</sup>. Yalçın, "Yeni Türkiye Partisi."

<sup>63</sup>. Yalçın pointed at the need of taking care of the future of democracy. Yalçın, "Partizan İdare" (Partisan Administration), *Öncü* (July 28, 1961).

<sup>64</sup>. Yalçın, "Usul Hakkında" (On Procedure), *Öncü* (February 5, 1961).

reference points were personal responsibility and freedom of thought.<sup>65</sup> However, the creation of free order was not to be only through education. Viewing politics as a training ground in itself, Yalçın thought that first and foremost political leaders themselves had responsibility for shaping and directing the society.<sup>66</sup> In Yalçın's articles, the view of democracy as an open-ended process was not limited to a one-way flow of demands from the people to the parties. Instead, he emphasized the pursuit of active political leadership to form a mutual interaction between the two.<sup>67</sup> Political leaders were required not only for the immediate realization of demands arising from their social basis, but also to articulate this social basis in accordance with scientific mentality, i.e., "real Western mentality which found its expression through freedom of thought."<sup>68</sup> Thus, for Yalçın political leaders should arise among intellectuals, be revolutionary and act as statesperson.<sup>69</sup>

Yalçın also criticized the major political parties of the period. First, he accused the JP of ignoring the imperative of intellectual basis in political activity

---

<sup>65</sup>. Yalçın, "Eğitim ve Demokrasi" (Education and Democracy), *Öncü* (September 16, 1960); Yalçın, "Politikada İnsan Faktörü" (Human Element in Politics), *Öncü* (January 8, 1961).

<sup>66</sup>. Yalçın, "Teşhisi İyi Koymalıyız".

<sup>67</sup>. Yalçın, "Demokrasi ve Lider"; Yalçın, "Siyasi Liderlik" (Political Leadership), *Öncü* (July 3, 1961); Yalçın, "Karşılıklı Etki" (Mutual Influence), *Öncü* (July 14, 1961).

<sup>68</sup>. Yalçın, "Gerçek Atatürkçülük"; Yalçın, "Liderleri Yakından Tanımalıyız" (We Should Know Leaders Well), *Öncü* (July 25, 1961); Yalçın, "Yeni Partinin Keşfi"; "Demokrasi ve Lider"; Yalçın, "Demokrasimizde Aksamalar" (Breakdowns in Our Democracy), *Öncü* (September 15, 1960).

<sup>69</sup>. Yalçın, "Din ve Dil" (Religion and Language), *Öncü* (October 1, 1960).

and acting merely on populism.<sup>70</sup> Secondly, he attacked the RPP for displaying an incoherent, ambiguous and inconsistent approach in both political and economic matters.<sup>71</sup> For him, by making concessions to the extremist groups, specifically to the leftists, the RPP endangered the future of democracy.<sup>72</sup> He also accused the RPP for adopting a totalitarian mentality, which for him was evident by its statist approach to the economy.<sup>73</sup>

The most conspicuous manifestation of Yalçın's liberal disposition as well as that of the NTP, may be observed in the approach to economy, specifically to the SPO in the period concerned. It was in this respect that perhaps for the first time faith in the individual, and not in citizen, was expressed.<sup>74</sup> In parallel to the concept of "democratic planning" of the past decade, Yalçın approved the establishment of the SPO only as a practice of "Planning in Free Society."<sup>75</sup> For him, the ideal model would be an organization with only harmonizing functions in the running of the economy. Thus, Yalçın strictly opposed the extension of the state's sphere in the economy through the SPO for the sake of development. He ardently supported private enterprise as a stimulative force in economic

---

70. Yalçın, "Yeni Türkiye Partisi".

71. Yalçın, "Bu Tutum Güven Verir mi?" (Is this Attitude Trustworthy?), *Öncü* (December 13, 1961).

72. Yalçın, *Yarın* (October 27, 1965).

73. Yalçın, "İktisadi Gelişme ve Planlama" (Economic Development and Planning), *Öncü* (February 24, 1961); Yalçın, "Yanlış Teşhis-Yanlış Çözüm" (Wrong Diagnosis-Wrong Solution), *Yarın* (April 16, 1964).

74. Yalçın, "Hür Cemiyet Planlaması" (Planning in Free Society), *Öncü* (September 3, 1960).

75. *Ibid.*

development, and proposed state initiative to step in at times only when the former proved to be insufficient.<sup>76</sup>

However, both Yalçın's publications and the NTP had rather short life-spans. In fact, it was Yalçın who first left the NTP and joined the JP ranks (1964). Reminiscent of the FP, the NTP subsequently dissolved itself and merged with the JP.<sup>77</sup> The following decade of fierce political turbulence was to lead the liberal-minded intellectual into an intensive combat against communism.

Drawing upon the framework stated above it might not be wrong to conclude that similar to the Republican intellectuals of the previous decades who had assumed a liberal disposition, Yalçın's liberal identity was based first and foremost on modernization, which ultimately meant Westernization. In the period under scrutiny, he believed that the institutional structure that was required for this project was set up by the 1961 Constitution. Thus, for him the time had come to lay the basis for the flow of Western thinking, which would have enabled the institutions to operate efficiently. According to Yalçın, the most appropriate tradition of thought for Turkey was liberalism. It was in this respect that he opposed conservative disposition and deemed it subject to failure. For him the time was not yet ripe for

---

<sup>76</sup>. Yalçın, "İktisadi Gelişme ve Planlama"; Yalçın, "Sosyalistleri Yanıltan" (Fallacy of Socialists), *Öncü* (February 4, 1962).

<sup>77</sup>. It is possible to interpret that merge as somehow ironic since the NTP and particularly Yalçın repeatedly criticized the JP as displaying both "opportunistic" and "conservative" tendencies.

such conservatism either as a disposition or a tradition of thought.<sup>78</sup>

**THE 1980 MILITARY INTERVENTION AND BEYOND: THE LEGACY  
CONTINUES**

As mentioned above, the late 1970s were marked by ideological polarization which was reflected as fragmentation at the party level and as street fights at the social level. The fragmentation at the political level resulted in the incapacity of any party to achieve majority in the parliament. The solution was sought in the Nationalist Front governments (March 1975 - December 1977). Still, the inability of the Nationalist Front governments to reach consensus on basic policies, coupled with the politicization of bureaucracy deepened the political turmoil.<sup>79</sup> Further, with the intensification of economic problems the crisis reached a turning point by the inability of the parliament to elect a president in 1980. The last ditch effort on the part of the government was initiated with respect to the economic structure. The JP government of the period tried to escape at least from the economic crisis Turkey faced at the time by January 24 (1980) Decisions, which introduced a free-market

---

<sup>78</sup>. Yalçın, "İlericilik, Gericilik" (Progressivism, Reactionism), *Öncü* (July 9, 1961).

<sup>79</sup>. In his critical evaluation of the period especially after 1975, Metin Heper notes that the basic feature that characterized the concerned coalitions was "immobilism," which he attributes to political participation without normative content. See Metin Heper, "Recent Instability in Turkish Politics: End of a Monocentrist Policy?" *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 1 (1979-1980), 102-13.



economy. This was a reaction to the failure of the SPO's policies. The reform package was also against the State Economic Enterprises (SEE) that were perceived to be burdens on the economy.<sup>80</sup>

However, this last minute effort to at least stabilize the economy did not prevent the military from stepping in.<sup>81</sup> Above all, the military intervention has been interpreted as the culminating point of the failure of the 1961 Constitution. The Constitution was criticized by one group of the intellectuals to fall short of achieving its original task: strengthening the state, that is the bureaucracy, the military and the president, *vis-à-vis* the short-sightedness of the politicians. Another criticism came from the political sphere. Süleyman Demirel (Chairman of the JP) was repeatedly stating his disapproval for the Constitution by claiming that it gave way to "too much freedom" as to endanger the regime.<sup>82</sup> In parallel, one prominent student of Turkish politics has attributed the problems of the period not to "...repression, but [to] excess of expression."<sup>83</sup>

From one theoretical perspective, the 1961 Constitution which had been prepared with the aim of preventing the re-occurrence of the misdeeds of the DP

---

<sup>80</sup>. Çağlar Keyder, "Economic Development and Crisis: 1950-1980," in *Turkey In Transition: New Perspectives*, eds. Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 298-305.

<sup>81</sup>. In fact, the discomfort of the military had already been expressed by a memorandum on January 2, 1980 which fell short of producing the effect expected to be similar to the 1971 memorandum. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*.

<sup>82</sup>. Quoted in Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, p.

<sup>83</sup>. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Turkey's Travails," *Foreign Affairs*, 58 (1979), 1-29.

government, by reinforcing the state elite against the political elite did not stop the politicization of the bureaucracy in the 1970s.<sup>84</sup> When considered from this perspective, one may argue that the 1980 military coup had another significant dimension besides its being another example of the military's function as the saviour of democracy.<sup>85</sup> On the one hand, the intervention displayed the continuity of the tension between the state and political elites as claimants to be the sole authority for democracy. On the other hand, through the 1982 Constitution it opened a new era for the relation between the two through the restructuration of the sphere of state.<sup>86</sup> This restructuration was to have its effects also on the state-intellectual relationship.

---

<sup>84</sup>. Metin Heper, "The State, Democracy and Bureaucracy in Turkey," in *The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Perspective*, ed. Metin Heper (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 131-45.

<sup>85</sup>. Heper and Tachau, "The State, Politics and Military in Turkey," 26; George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s: Guardians or Decision-Makers?," in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 193.

<sup>86</sup>. For an analysis of the restructuration brought about by 1982 Constitution see Özbudun, "The Status of the President of the Republic under the Turkish Constitution of 1982: Presidentialism or Parliamentarism?" in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 37-45; Ahmet Evin, "Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After 1980," in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 201-13; Metin Heper, "The state and debureaucratization: the case of Turkey," *International Social Science Journal* (126) (1990), 605-15; Ersin Kalaycıoğlu "The 1983 Parliament in Turkey: Changes and Continuities," in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 47-62.

## **Yeni Forum: Disorder versus Freedom**

On the eve of the 1980 military intervention a fortnightly journal began publication, under the name of *Yeni Forum* (September 15, 1979). The name of the journal was deliberately chosen by its founders with the aim of differentiating it from the *Forum* of the past decade. The core group was headed by a familiar figure, Aydın Yalçın. Yalçın who had quit active politics upon his clash with Demirel and the latter's initiative for his removal from the JP, had returned to the university. Alongside with Yalçın some columnists, mainly from the liberal flank of the *Forum* of 1950s also participated in the journal.<sup>87</sup> Almost all of the contributors occupied posts in the university, and especially as students of Yalçın. However, the distinction from the *Forum* of the past decade was not reserved to the name of the journal.

*Yeni Forum* began its publication by declaring its affinity to the *Forum* of the 1950s, and underlining its difference from the *Forum* of the 1960s. This was due to the latter's shift towards the left in the second half of the past decade. At its inception, the journal declared a liberal democratic stance with an all out faith in freedom:

Forum, by definition, is a symbol, a concept, closely connected with democracy. The name of our journal is linked with such concepts as regime of freedom, pluralist order, freedom of discussion and human rights.

---

<sup>87</sup>. Exemplary are Osman Okyar and Kazım Berzeg.

We will repeat the phrase from a liberal philosopher: "In order to eliminate the difficulties caused by freedom, we need more freedom." It means that freedom as a regime has a mechanism of self-correction and in this sense it is unprecedented.<sup>88</sup>

However, at a time of intense political strife, this rhetoric of freedom soon left its place to efforts to counter the perceived threats from Marxist ideology and preventing it from damaging the foundations of the Republic, not only by informing the public, but also by trying to convince the Turkish intellectuals about the "pseudo-scientific" mentality of Marxism.<sup>89</sup> In fact, this was the most often made argument in the columns of the journal in the next decade.<sup>90</sup>

---

<sup>88</sup>. Yalçın, "Niçin Çıkıyoruz?" (Why Do We Publish?) *Yeni Forum*, 1 (1) (September 15, 1979), 2.

<sup>89</sup>. Yalçın, "Giriş: Savaşmadan Teslim Alma Çabaları" (Introduction; Efforts to Surrender without Struggle), in *Vatan Hıyanetinin Anatomisi (The Anatomy of Treason)* ed. Aydın Yalçın (Ankara: Daily News Web. Ofset Tesisleri, 1986), 5-12. This book comprises Yalçın's articles that appeared in *Yeni Forum* between 1979-1984 and which were basically against Marxist theory and the extreme leftists.

<sup>90</sup>. See for example, "Gençliği Hedef Alan İdeolojik Saldırıları" (Ideological Attacks that Target the Youth), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 6 (129) (January 15, 1985), 8-9; "Psikolojik Savaşta Karşı Önlemler Nelerdir?" (What Are the Counter-Measures in Psychological War), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 6 (131) (February 15, 1985), 3-5; "Üniversiteler ve Çağdaş Softalar" (Universities and Modern Softalar), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 6 (136) (May 1, 1985), 11-2; "Komünistler, Yalan ve Aydınlar" (Communists, Lies and Intellectuals), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 6 (137) (May 15, 1985), 11-2; "Orduya Komünist Sızması" (Intrusion of Communists into the Army), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 6, (138) (June 1, 1985), 9; "Solun Fikri Perişanlığı" (The Intellectual Disarray of Left), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 6 (141) (July 15, 1985), 10-1; "Aydınların Görevi" (The Duty of Intellectuals), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 6 (144) (September 1, 1985), 3-5; "Hayal Kırıklığı ve Pişmanlık" (Disappointment and Regret), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 6 (147) (October 15, 1985), 3-4; "Öğrenci Derneklerine Dikkat" (Attention to Students' Associations), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 6 (148) (November 1, 1985), 6-7; "DİSK'in Kapatılması Üzerine" (On the Closure of DİSK), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 8 (176) (January 1, 1987), 13-5; Zafer Dağhan, "Bir Konferansın Düşündürdükleri" (Reflections on a Conference), *Yeni Forum*, 8 (176) (January 1, 1987), 46-9; "DİSK, Marksizm ve Sosyal Demokratlık" (DİSK, Marxism and Social Democrats), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 8 (177) (January 15, 1987), 12-5; "Radikal Sol Dergi Fırtınası" (Overflow of Leftist Journals), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 8 (177) (January 15, 1987), 15-8; "Radikal Sol

### Third Constitution of the Turkish Republic: Establishment of a Tradition?

What makes *Yeni Forum* peculiar for the purposes of this study is the reform package it proposed for the Turkish political system and constitution. The publication of the proposal in the form of a comprehensive program, which also differentiated it from the reform proposals of the *Forum* of the 1950s, may be interpreted as another manifestation of the internalization of political responsibility by the intellectuals. On the other hand, the timing of its publication (May 15, 1980) inherited the continuity in the identification of the intellectuals with the state in preventing the extension of the crisis of the past decade into the 1980s. This was true at least of this specific group of intellectuals in the era under consideration, which witnessed polarization and fragmentation not only at the party level but also as far as the intellectuals themselves were concerned.

The closing part of the proposal summarized the perspective of the *Yeni Forum* group:

The Turkish State, its indivisible unity with its nation and free democratic regime, the

---

Dergilerin Fonksiyonları" (The Functions of Radical Leftist Journals), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 8 (180) (March 1, 1987), 7-8; "Birleşik Sosyalistler Birleşiniz" (United Socialists, Unite), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 8 (187) (June 15, 1987), 8-10; "Y. Forum 12. Yaşına Girdi" (*Yeni Forum* Celebrates Its 12th Year), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 11 (257) (October 1990), 13; "Entellektüel Kirilenmenin İzleri" (The Traces of Intellectual Corruption), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 12 (264) (May 1991), 13.

foundations of which were laid by Atatürk, are presently facing a detrimental threat. This threat can only be eliminated by the strengthening of our State.

Strong state does not mean irresponsibility on the part of those who are in public office. On the contrary, in a strong state the organs of the state balance each other. This reciprocal balancing does not mean intrusion of the state organs into each other's sphere of authority and thus hampering the performance of the functions of the other state organs.

...Reform in our Constitution, statutes of the National Assembly and some other regulations should set up a democratic political system. It is possible to accomplish such reform of the political system which will strengthen the national, secular and democratic state by democratic means. ... YENİ FORUM has the confidence that saving the state, indivisible integrity of the country and national unity on the one hand, and the free democratic regime on the other simultaneously is possible. We do not propose the separation of legal principles which determine the practise of basic rights and liberties from those principles employed in Western democracies. It is certainly necessary to protect rights and liberties of those political and social trends and individuals that comply with the principle of loyalty to the state and regime; and for this the first and foremost requisite is dealing with the threats that arise against the state and the territorial integrity of the country and national unity.<sup>91</sup>

Thus, not unlike the intellectuals of the pre-1960 period the group specified its disposition in relation to the state. Pure faith in freedom with a self-corrective capacity against its maladies was overwhelmed by political responsibility to provide intellectual support for the sustenance of the State, which ultimately meant

---

<sup>91</sup>. "Rejim ve Anayasamızda Reform Önerisi" (Reform Proposal in Our Regime and Constitution), *Yeni Forum* (May 15, 1980), 32.

the endurance of democracy.<sup>92</sup> This involved responsibility in the name of the "Turkish citizen" who longed for "not the shaping of his own structure according to the existing dysfunctional institutions, but correcting the latter in conformity with its values and structure."<sup>93</sup> In fact, if the prevailing object of criticism of the *Yeni Forum* group was Marxism, the 1961 Constitution was perceived to be the bedrock of "the most depressive period that Turkey has been experiencing since the foundation of the Republic," since for them it fell short of providing the mechanisms to eliminate trends detrimental to the regime.<sup>94</sup>

The group's assessment of the 1961 Constitution as being inappropriate to the Turkish polity derived from three basic observations they made. First, according to *Yeni Forum*, the Constitution did not create a strong presidency which would function with benevolence for the sake of democracy in times of crisis. Second, while providing excessive autonomy for the judiciary, the Constitution did not install security mechanisms which would stand in the way of this autonomy, and thus turned the regime into a "government by judges."<sup>95</sup> Third, the election system was criticized on the grounds that it eventually resulted in the fragmentation of political parties and hence in the impossibility of proper

---

<sup>92</sup>. Ibid., 1.

<sup>93</sup>. Ibid., 2.

<sup>94</sup>. Ibid., 1.

<sup>95</sup>. Ibid., 4.

functioning of the parliament.<sup>96</sup> And finally, the group drew attention to the incapacity of the Senate of the Republic to function effectively with an above-politics view to "the supreme interests of the country."<sup>97</sup>

It was this body of criticisms which led the group to devise an institutional reform package. As noted above, this initiation coincided with the 1980 military intervention. However, the significance of *Yeni Forum* was more due to the parallelisms between the package and the 1982 Constitution than its timing. To begin with, the 1982 Constitution furnished the office of Presidency with extensive powers both *vis-à-vis* the political elites and the judiciary.<sup>98</sup> Secondly, the new electoral law was designed to prevent fragmentation in representation.<sup>99</sup> Lastly, rather than revising the Senate of the Republic in line with the reform proposal of *Yeni Forum*, that is as the Council of the Republic, with legislative and executive powers, the 1982 Constitution created a stronger state with a narrower locus.<sup>100</sup>

---

<sup>96</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>97</sup>. Ibid., 7.

<sup>98</sup>. Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations," 27. For a thorough analysis of the re-institutionalization of the office of presidency, see Heper, "The state and debureaucratization: the case of Turkey."

<sup>99</sup>. Üstün Ergüder, "Post-1980 Parties and Politics in Turkey," in *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Ergun Özbudun (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), 124. However, it should be noted that the electoral system enacted immediately after the intervention was more limited than the one proposed by *Yeni Forum*.

<sup>100</sup>. Metin Heper, "The Executive in the Third Turkish Republic, 1982-1989," *Governance*, 3 (3) (1990), 299-319; Metin Heper, "Transitions to Democracy in Turkey: Toward a New Pattern," in *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Boulder, San Fransisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), 20.



Similar to the mentality behind the 1960 military intervention and the 1961 Constitution, the post-1980 restructuration, too, was conducted also for re-balancing the disposition of the state elite against political elite. However, the 1982 Constitution was different from its predecessor in the sense that it displaced the bureaucracy from its traditional place in the state structure. Instead, the state was reshaped to comprise of the office of presidency and the National Security Council. Besides, while providing the president extensive powers in the political sphere, the new structuration also provided a framework for a synthesis between the state and political elites.<sup>101</sup> Noting that locus of the state was the military immediately after the intervention,<sup>102</sup> students of Turkish politics have attributed this novelty to the growing tiredness on the part of the military to interfere with politics which began to develop into a regularity.<sup>103</sup>

*Yeni Forum* group welcomed the new political structuration. First, the group readily approved the 1980

---

<sup>101</sup>. Heper, "Executive in the Third Turkish Republic."

<sup>102</sup>. Chief of General Staff, General Kenan Evren who also headed the National Security Council assumed the post of presidency by the approval of the 1982 Constitution in referendum.

<sup>103</sup>. William Hale pinpoints this unwillingness by a quotation from Kenan Evren's statement in War Academy immediately after the 1980 military intervention: "Whenever the army entered into politics it began to lose its discipline and, gradually, it was led into corruption. ... Therefore I demand from you not to take our present operation as an example and never to get involved in politics. We had to implement this operation within a chain of commands and orders to save the army from politics and to cleanse it from political dirt." Quoted in Hale, "Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective," *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 163.

military intervention, and did not withdraw its support from the military throughout the decade.<sup>104</sup> Second, if read between the lines, the reform proposal of the group had argued for a synthesis between the presidential regime and parliamentary regime. While repeatedly stating faith in a well-functioning parliamentary regime, the group reserved modelling on the presidential regime to emergency conditions.<sup>105</sup> Last but not least, *Yeni Forum's* rejection of taking Atatürkism as an ideology and in its stead, interpreting it as a moderate, democratic mentality and thus as the bedrock for liberal disposition,<sup>106</sup> corresponded to the loosening of the strict Kemalist positivism of the state which had been prevalent in preceding periods.<sup>107</sup>

---

<sup>104</sup>. Two of the writers of the journal, Aydın Yalçın and Osman Okyar were appointed by the National Security Council (NSC) to give information to the American Senate about terrorism in Turkey. "Amerikan Senatosu'nda Terörizm Araştırması" (Investigation of Terrorism in US Senate), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 3, (45) (July 15, 1981), 3-4. See also "Vatanseverlik ve Sağduyunun Gür Sesi" (The Deep Voice of Patriotism and Common Sense) *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 2 (9) (January 15, 1980), 3-4 ; "Senaryonun İç ve Dış Tezahhürleri" (Internal and External Appearances of the Scenario) *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 3 (35) (February 15, 1981), 3-4; "Aysbergin Ucu ve Gövdesi" (The Apex and Body of Iceberg) *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 3 (36) (March 1, 1981), 3-4; "Teşhis Hatasının Sakıncaları" (The Drawbacks of Wrong Diagnosis) *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 5 (121) (September 15, 1984); Osman Okyar, "Türkiye'de Aydınlar Bunalımı" (Intellectuals' Crisis in Turkey), *Yeni Forum*, 6 (134), 20; "Yeni Yılda Milli Gündem" (National Agenda in New Year), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 6 (139) (January 1, 1985), 3-4; "12 Eylül'ün Beşinci Yıldönümü" (The Fifth Anniversary of September 12), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 6 (145) (September 15, 1985), 3-5; "Kış Başında Bulutlanan Ufuklar" (Cloudy Horizons in the Beginning of Winter), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 6 (148) (November 1, 1985), 3-4.

<sup>105</sup>. "Rejim ve Anayasamızda Reform Önerisi," 25-32.

<sup>106</sup>. "Niçin Çıkıyoruz?" 2; "Atatürkçülüğün Çetin Yolları" (Hard Routes of Atatürkism), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 6 (146) (October 1, 1985), 3.

<sup>107</sup>. Here I draw on Metin Heper's argument that the inclusion of the emphasis on "Turkish historical and moral values" in the Preamble of the 1982 Constitution was a withdrawal of the state from the positivistic project of constructing the history and normative ethics of the nation. Metin Heper, "A Weltanschauung-turned-Partial Ideology

## The Emergence of a Negative Discourse

By and large *Yeni Forum* presented a continuity in the identity of 'liberal' intellectual in the Turkish context. In other words, the intellectual persisted in his self-entitlement to "the expansion of democratic culture"<sup>108</sup> and thus "interpreting and explaining (to the public) the political philosophy of modern society and Western life style" for proper accomplishment of democracy.<sup>109</sup> This shared ideal also provided the mission for the group to function as the guide of society in periods of hardship.<sup>110</sup> This self-entitlement again put them into a position of eventual identification with the state. On the other hand, throughout the 1980s liberal discourse represented by the group included a new, however related dimension alongside its state-oriented feature. As has already been noted, issues of the journal were overwhelmingly filled with anti-Marxist articles both from a theoretical aspect and as far as active politics was concerned. This placed the liberal identity on the verge of turning into a negative ideology. This

---

and Normative Ethics: 'Atatürkism' in Turkey," *Orient*, 1 (1984), 83-94. See also Metin Heper, "The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in Comparative Perspective," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 18 (1) (1991), 38-51; Ahmet Evin, "Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After 1980," 211-2.

<sup>108</sup>. Atilla Yayla, "Teröristlerin İslahının Kültürel ve İdeolojik Boyutları" (The Cultural and Ideological Dimensions of the Disciplining of Terrorists), *Yeni Forum*, 6 (131) (February 15, 1985), 15-7.

<sup>109</sup> "Başarılı Bir Demokrasi İçin" (For a Successful Democracy), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 6 (141) (July 15, 1985), 3-4; "Aydınların Görevi" (The Duty of Intellectuals), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 6 (144) (September 1, 1985), 3-5.

<sup>110</sup>. "Aydınların Görevi."

negative positioning was also a manifestation of the group's self-perception as an intellectual extension of the state: "If Turkish statespersons, the military, and political parties represent the official and organized force of resistance of the Turkish people and the nation against the real external enemy, such publications as (Yeni) FORUM ... represent the force of resistance of unorganized, voluntarist and silent Turkish people."<sup>111</sup>

Not unlike its predecessor, Anglo-American influence was also present in the case of *Yeni Forum*. However, what distinguished the latter was that this influence did not amount to absolute Westernism. Instead, the journal searched for a synthesis between "the national essence" with "universal patterns in the light of critical reasoning."<sup>112</sup> Thus the intellectual was held responsible for a double task: On the one hand, he was to bring about the social framework that would enable the functioning of democratic life style which connoted a dynamic process.<sup>113</sup> On the other hand, he was to revitalize "Turkish history and national culture, religious and moral values and strengthen national unity, to get into close contact with the countries and societies which share the same

---

<sup>111</sup>. "Yeni Forum'un Cevabı" (Yeni Forum's Response), *Yeni Forum*, 5 (111) (April 15, 1984), 3.

<sup>112</sup>. Sevim Kantarcıoğlu, "Atatürk'ün Kültür Anlayışı" (Atatürk's Conception of Culture), *Yeni Forum*, 6 (149) (November 15, 1985), 15-20. See also, Aydın Doğaner, "'Aydın' Kavramı Üzerine" (On the Concept of 'Intellectual'), *Yeni Forum*, 6 (147) (October 15, 1985), 33-5.

<sup>113</sup>. "Başarılı Bir Demokrasi İçin," 3-4; Yayla, "Hür Basın ve Demokratik Sistem" (Free Press and Democratic Order), *Yeni Forum*, 6 (143) (August 15, 1985), 32-4;

historical heritage..."<sup>114</sup> This double responsibility may be read within the parameters of the group's appraisal of a new political standing as "right of center, a compound of liberal-conservative, nationalist, against the left and communism..." that was perceived to be the only security belt for the existence and stability of Turkish democracy.<sup>115</sup>

Consequently, there was a double track preoccupation in the journal, especially in the wake of the 1990s. The first was the increased interest in the Turkic Republics of the former Soviet Union.<sup>116</sup> This may be attributed to the light of the mission that *Yeni Forum* had undertaken, that is "the creation and internalization of Turkish-Islamic-Western civilization" by the Turkish

---

114. Yalçın, "Yeni Bir Dönemin Başında" (In the Beginning of a New Era), *Yeni Forum*, 11 (248) (January 1990), 4-5.

115. "Demokrasimizin Sıkıntılı Dönemleri" (Difficult Periods of Our Democracy), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 6 (133) (March 15, 1985), 3-4.

116. The group explained its interest in the Turkic Republics with respect to its wish to assist them in their escape from Marxism and in the adoption of liberal democracy. "Dergimiz 15. Yılında" (Our Journal Celebrates Its 15th Anniversary), *Yeni Forum* (editorial), 14 (292) (September 1993), 6. With this aim in mind *Yeni Forum* organized a number of seminars. Exemplary are "Türkiye ve Sovyetler Birliği'ndeki Değişmeler" (Changes in Turkey and Soviet Union), colloquium, organized between September 16-19, 1991 in Azerbaijan. The September and October 1991 issues of the journal contained the articles presented in the colloquium. Another one was "Türkiye-Azerbaycan ve Orta Asya Cumhuriyetlerinde Demokrasi ve Piyasa Ekonomisine Geçiş Sürecinde Bazı Pratik Sorunlar" (Some Practical Problems in the Transition to Market Economy in Turkey-Azerbaijan and Central Asian Republics), organized on November 16-23, 1992 in Azerbaijan. Again the articles presented in the seminar occupied a significant place in November and December 1992 issues of the journal. In relation to the Turkic Republics, see also Yalçın, "Atayurt'ta Arayışlar" (Searches in Atayurt), *Yeni Forum*, 13 (278) (July 1992), 20-7; Nesip Nesipzade, "Bağımsızlık Sorunu-I" (The Problem of Independence-I), *Yeni Forum*, 13 (278) (July 1992), 34-8; Nesipzade, "Bağımsızlık Sorunu-II" (The Problem of Independence-II), *Yeni Forum*, 13 (279) (August 1992), 21-7; Yalçın, "Washington'da Dağlık Karabağ Toplantısı" (Dağlık Karabağ Meeting in Washington), *Yeni Forum*, 13 (280) (September 1992), 34-9.

intellectuals.<sup>117</sup> As far as its liberal identity was concerned the group limited it to translations concerning liberal theory.<sup>118</sup> For the purposes of this study the theoretical framework which was provided by these translations is more important since it led to the emergence of a new group from within the core of *Yeni Forum*, with a claim to lay the foundations of liberal tradition in the Turkish context.

### FROM *YENİ FORUM* TO LIBERAL *DÜŞÜNCE*: A "SPONTANEOUS" FORMATION?

Nilüfer Göle has mentioned "liberal appearance" as one important development in Turkish politics in the 1990s.<sup>119</sup> Göle, drew her argument mainly from the changes that has occurred in the state-society relationship, from

---

<sup>117</sup>. Yalçın, "Yeni Bir Dönemin Başında," 6.

<sup>118</sup>. Exemplary are Isaiah Berlin "Bir İdeal Olarak Eşitlik" (Equality as an Ideal), trans. Mustafa Erdoğan, *Yeni Forum*, 11 (248) (January 1990), 29-37; Peter L. Berger, "Ahlak Yargısı ve Siyasal Faaliyet" (Moral Judgement and Political Activity), trans. Mustafa Erdoğan, *Yeni Forum*, 11 (250) (March 1990), 36-41; Ayn Rand, "İnsanın Hakları" (Human Rights), *Yeni Forum*, trans. Atilla Yayla, 11 (250) (March 1990), 68-71; Ayn Rand, "Kapitalizm Nedir?" (What is Capitalism?), trans. Atilla Yayla, *Yeni Forum*, 11 (252) (May 1990), 38-48; Maurice Cranston, "İnsan Hakları Nelerdir?" (What are the Human Rights?) trans. Atilla Yayla, *Yeni Forum*, 11 (253) (June 1990), 41-3; Elizabeth Teague, "Açık Toplum mu?" (Open Society?), trans. Mustafa Erdoğan, *Yeni Forum*, 12 (261) (February 1991), 45-6; Friedrich A. Hayek, "Liberal Bir Sosyal Düzenin İlkeleri" (Principles of a Liberal Social Order), trans. Atilla Yayla, *Yeni Forum*, 12 (263) (April 1991), 25-34; Otfried Höffe, "Adalet Bir Değiş tokuş mudur?" (Is Justice a Barter?), trans. Ahmet Arslan, *Yeni Forum*, 12 (264) (May 1991), 27-34; Ayn Rand, "Kollektif Haklar" (Collective Rights), trans. Mustafa Erdoğan, *Yeni Forum*, 12 (265) (June 1991), 29-31; George Urban, "Şimdiye Kadar Elde Edebildiğimiz Dünyaların En İyisi" (The Best World We Could Ever Achieved), interview with Sir Karl Popper, trans. Murat Aygen, 12 (267) (August 1991), 47-9.

<sup>119</sup>. Nilüfer Göle, "Liberal Yanılgı" (Liberal Fallacy), *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 24 (Fall 1993), 12.

1983 onwards; that is the development of civil society. However, she warned that this liberal appearance did not at all total to a liberalism with a theoretical framework, since it was basically limited to economic policies pursued in line with the market economy.<sup>120</sup> Metin Heper has read this development within the broader framework of institutional restructuring in the post-1980 period, which brought a new relationship between the state and political elite. Heper has pointed out that liberalism in question was employed by the political elite to enhance their standing in the political sphere *vis-à-vis* the state elite.<sup>121</sup>

The Association for Liberal Thinking (*Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu*) was born into this period where numerous liberal identities were prevalent.<sup>122</sup> The rise of this new group from within the *Yeni Forum* took almost a decade. The foundation of the Association for Liberal Thinking in 1992, which gained formal status in 1994, may be interpreted as the consolidation of one side of the synthesis *Yeni Forum* was after, that is the liberal flank:

The aim [of the Association] is to introduce liberalism in Turkey, deepen liberalism in Turkey, educate those who form public policy about the basic principles of liberalism, provide solutions to the problems of Turkey in line with the basic tenets of liberalism.

---

<sup>120</sup>. Göle, "Toward an Autonomization of Civil Society," in *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), 218.

<sup>121</sup>. Heper, "Trials and Tribulations of Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic," in *ibid.*, 238.

<sup>122</sup>. As similar to *Forum* and *Yeni Forum*, the bulk of the group is composed of academicians.

The Association pursues its activities with the long-term aim of constituting an intellectual formation. Thus, it takes onto itself the responsibility of a protagonist and educator for other liberal formations.<sup>123</sup>

This should not be read as a controversy between the Association and the *Yeni Forum* group. In its stead, the attempt was complementary to the task of forming a liberal tradition in the Turkish context.<sup>124</sup> Two of the founders, Atilla Yayla and Mustafa Erdoğan, were among the students and disciples of Aydın Yalçın.<sup>125</sup> Yayla and Erdoğan wrote in *Yeni Forum*; their contribution to the journal, however, was more through translations. Such figures as Kazım Berzeg, Osman Okyar who were affiliated to *Forum* and *Yeni Forum* and Ahmet Arslan who also wrote in *Yeni Forum* are also among the members of the Association.

### **The Universal Shaping the National: Intellectual of the Liberal International**

At its inception, the Association limited its sphere of activity to theoretical issues, with the aim of providing an intellectual infrastructure that would prepare the ground for the realization of liberal

---

<sup>123</sup>. Murat Yılmaz, "Mustafa Erdoğan ve Atilla Yayla ile Mülakat" (Interview with Mustafa Erdoğan and Atilla Yayla), *Polemik*, 12 (March-April 1994), 35.

<sup>124</sup> Melih Yürüşen, "Liberal Düşünce Kendine Bakıyor" (*Liberal Düşünce Looks at Itself*), Interview by Muhammed Nur Anbarlı, *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (4) (Fall 1996), 112-5.

<sup>125</sup> Atilla Yayla, "Hocam, Arkadaşım, Meslektaşım Aydın Yalçın" (Aydın Yalçın: My Teacher, Friend, Colleague), *Yeni Forum*, 15 (306) (November 1994), 20-3; Mustafa Erdoğan, "'Arkadaşım' Aydın Yalçın" (Aydın Yalçın: My Friend), *Yeni Forum*, 15 (306) (November 1994), 24-5.



solutions for Turkey's problems.<sup>126</sup> With this aim in mind, it organized a series of symposiums and seminars, in addition to its publications, including translated works.<sup>127</sup> The seminars were organized as educational programs for different groups, including the political parties.<sup>128</sup> It was by the publication of a quarterly under

---

<sup>126</sup>. Yılmaz, "Mustafa Erdoğan ve Atilla Yayla ile Mülakat," 37.

<sup>127</sup>. International Hayek Symposium, March 31, 1993, İstanbul; April 3, 1993, Ankara; *First International Liberal Thought Symposium of Turkey*, May 7, 1994, Ankara; *Second International Liberal Thought Symposium of Turkey*, May 18-19, 1996, Ankara; *Seminar on Introduction to Liberalism* (together with Friedrich Naumann Foundation), March-May 1995, Ankara; *Seminar on Great Traditions of Thought* (for Turkish Democracy Foundation), March-May 1995, Ankara; *Seminar on New World Order: 50th Anniversary of the End of Second World War*, May 26, 1995, Ankara; *Seminar on The Historical and Philosophical Grounds of Liberalism* (together with Friedrich Naumann Foundation), November-December 1995, Ankara and İstanbul; *Seminar on Liberalism, Conservatism and Socialism* (for Turkish Democracy Foundation), November-December 1995, Ankara; *Seminar on The Relation between Liberalism and Democracy* (for New Democracy Movement), March-May 1996, Ankara; *Seminar on Historical and Philosophical Background of Liberalism* (for Liberal Democratic Party), April-June 1996, Ankara and İstanbul. The Association also hosted Atlas Economic Research Foundation for its 28th International "Workshop" Program between September 15-17, 1996, İstanbul; *Seminar on Liberalism: Concepts and Turkey*, December 6-8, 1996, Kayseri. Among the books published by the Association we can cite the following: John Locke, *Hoşgörü Üzerine Bir Mektup* (A Letter Concerning Toleration), trans. Melih Yürüşen (Ankara, 1995); Friedrich A. Hayek, *Kölelik Yolu* (The Road to Serfdom), trans. Turhan Feyzioğlu-Yıldırım Arsan (Ankara, 1995) Mustafa Erdoğan, *Demokrasi, Laiklik, Resmi İdeoloji* (Democracy, Laicism, Official Ideology) (Ankara, 1995); Ahmet Arslan, *İslam, Demokrasi, Türkiye* (Islam, Democracy, Turkey), (Ankara, 1995); James Gwartney-Richard L. Stroup, *Temel Ekonomi* (Basic Economics), trans. Yıldırım Arsan (Ankara, 1996); Kazım Berzeg, *Liberalizm ve Türkiye* (Liberalism and Turkey), (Ankara, 1996); Cüneyt Ülsever, *Pratik Teoriyi Daima Aşıyor* (Practise Always Transcends Theory), (Ankara, 1996); Terry L. Anderson - Donald R. Leal, *Serbest Piyasa ve Çevrecilik* (Free Market and , trans. Vural F. Savaş (Ankara, 1996); Eamonn Butler, *Hayek*, trans. Yusuf Ziya Çelikkaya (Ankara, 1996).

<sup>128</sup>. Exemplary are the *Seminar on The Relation between Liberalism and Democracy*, March-May 1996, Ankara, which was organized for New Democracy Movement; April-June 1996, Ankara and İstanbul, the *Seminar on Historical and Philosophical Background of Liberalism* which was organized for Liberal Democratic Party, and the training seminar for Ata group from Bilkent University. The Association denies any direct links or the willingness to form such links. It has confined its relations with the political parties to training programs. Apart from that, some members of the Association provided assistance to the publication of books by political parties. In this respect see, Walter Wittmann, *Piyasa Ekonomisi Neden Sosyaldır? (Why is Market*

the name of *Liberal Düşünce* that the Association seemed to open the way for its delayed task: that of providing substantial solutions for Turkey's problems. However, this did not mean that the theoretical content would experience a demise. On the contrary, overwhelming importance has been given to explicating the theoretical framework that shaped the Association's identity.

The said theoretical framework was to a large extent shaped with recourse to such twentieth century liberal thinkers as Karl Popper, Isaiah Berlin and finally by Friedrich A. Hayek, and thus inherited the re-introduction of classical liberal ideals.<sup>129</sup> This is not something new. Especially the "open society" of Popper and "spontaneous order" of Hayek had already been underlined by the *Forum* and *Yeni Forum* groups.<sup>130</sup> The contribution of the Association is the full employment of the theoretical matrice of these thinkers, without concern for the problematique of harmonizing the universal with the national. Instead, the underlying argument throughout the

---

*Economy Social*), trans. Doğan Nadi Leblebici, eds. Atilla Yayla and Mustafa Erdoğan (Ankara: Anavatan Partisi Bilimsel Yayınlar Serisi: 1; 1993); John Gray, *Sınırlı Devlet, Pozitif Gündem (Limited State, Positive Agenda)*, trans. Doğan Nadi Leblebici, eds. Atilla Yayla and Mustafa Erdoğan (Ankara: Anavatan Partisi Bilimsel Yayınlar Serisi: 2; 1993), *Hayek'te Serbest Piyasa Ekonomisi ve Özgür Toplum (Hayek's Free Market Economy and Free Society)*, ed. Atilla Yayla (Ankara: Anavatan Partisi Bilimsel Yayınlar Serisi: 3; 1993).

<sup>129</sup>. This should not be misunderstood as to mean that the intellectuals in question have limited their preoccupation with liberal theory to these thinkers. However, throughout their works categories, conceptualizations and methodology of these thinkers happen to occupy a dominant place.

<sup>130</sup>. An analysis of the former *Yeni Forum* writers' articles in *Liberal Düşünce* presents a continuity in their approaches. As far as the then younger writers of *Yeni Forum* were concerned one may also conclude with the consolidation of the said theoretical framework, which has proceeded through their translations in the 1980s.

articles has been for the universal applicability of liberal premises regardless of national contexts. This universalism is also declared in their self-identification with the Liberal International.<sup>131</sup>

Popper's assessment of Marxist theory of knowledge as "pseudo-science" is one legacy that the journal inherited from *Yeni Forum*.<sup>132</sup> Furthermore, his reference to scientific activity as an "evolutionary passage" by the development of new theories for "deeper problems" and his related denial of the possibility of "achieving Utopian aspiration to control and reconstruct society..."<sup>133</sup> forms one theoretical basis for the journal's criticisms against the constructivist approach. *Liberal Düşünce* borrows from Popper the idea of proving the supremacy of liberalism against socialism by empirical evidence.<sup>134</sup> Thus, one declared aim of the journal is to provide substantial information to the Turkish public about the demise of socialism, and the strength that liberal theory displayed throughout the centuries.<sup>135</sup> Similarly, *Liberal*

---

<sup>131</sup>. Atilla Yayla, "Pratikteki Açmazlarıyla Liberalizm ve Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu" (Practical Impasses of Liberalism and Association for Liberal Thinking), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 13.

<sup>132</sup>. John Gray, "The liberalism of Karl Popper," in *Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 14.

<sup>133</sup>. Ibid., 16.

<sup>134</sup>. This disposition is summarized as "The truth, whatever it is, can only be reached in practice." Cüneyt Ülsever, "Marksızmden Liberalizme: Pratik Teoriyi Daima Aşıyor" (From Marxism to Liberalism: Practise Always Transcends Theory), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 37.

<sup>135</sup>. Yayla, "Pratikteki Açmazlarıyla Liberalizm ve Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu," 4-14; Mustafa Erdoğan, "Niçin Liberalizm?" (Why Liberalism?), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 28-33; Ülsever, "Marksızmden Liberalizme: Pratik Teoriyi Daima Aşıyor," 34-8; Kazım Berzeg, "Siyaset Pratiğindeki Somut Liberalizm" (Concrete Liberalism in Active Politics), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (2) (Spring 1996), 152-6.

*Düşünce* adopted Hayek's rejection of constructivist mentality and thus social engineering on the grounds that men can only have limited knowledge. This idea occupied a central place in the works of the *Liberal Düşünce* group. Thus, the concept of spontaneous order denoting an evolutionary mentality in human actions and achievements, and the related social and institutional outcomes have been utilized in justifying not only criticisms against Marxism-socialism (the universal dimension), but also in pinpointing the ills of Turkish political development and in proposing reformist policies (the national dimension). Isaiah Berlin's emphasis on man's imperfection and thus his incapacity to devise full-fledged plans for the best order provides another theoretical support for the group's denial of revolutionary projects.<sup>136</sup>

The framework delineated –though roughly– above, forms the epistemological starting point for the group. And the categories and conceptualizations derived from the said epistemological approach furnish the group with tools for their ultimate task which is announced as "changing the intellectual milieu of Turkey and forming a balance *vis-à-vis* anti-liberal thoughts and trends,"<sup>137</sup> – i.e., "contributing to the liberalization of the country without becoming politicized."<sup>138</sup> In the pursuit of this task the group needed to specify *their* liberal identity.<sup>139</sup>

---

<sup>136</sup>. For a through analysis of these thinkers from a liberal perspective, see John Gray, *Liberalisms: Essays on Political Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989).

<sup>137</sup>. Yayla, "Pratikteki Açmazlarıyla Liberalizm ve Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu," 14.

<sup>138</sup>. *Ibid.*, 8. In this respect see also Mustafa Erdoğan, "Türkiye 2. Uluslararası Liberal Düşünce Sempozyumu Üzerine" (On the 2nd

## Identity of the Turkish Liberal Intellectual in the 1990s: A Scheme of Priorities

In defining liberalism as "basically a thought of individual liberty"<sup>140</sup> *Liberal Düşünce* group find their starting point in the individual. Unlike their predecessors, they locate the individual neither in the nation nor in the citizen *vis-à-vis* the state. Instead, they take the individual as inherently possessing an existence autonomous from both the nation and the state. This classical liberal standing leads them to define the latter categories by resorting to the individual.<sup>141</sup> In this pursuit, such concepts as diversity, autonomy and liberty are employed in sorting out the nature of social and political institutions. More briefly these concepts are perceived to be the formative elements of individual's existence, -i.e., as the *sine-qua-non* in the continuous process of the individual's self-

---

International Liberal Thought Symposium in Turkey), *Liberal Bülten* (6) (Summer 1996), 9-10.

<sup>139</sup>. Yayla mentions about a number of liberal groups and/or persons, that for him fall short of a fully developed liberal agenda due to a lack of comprehensive knowledge of the theory. In this respect, he delineates the specificity of the Association for Liberal Thinking as possessing the historical and theoretical knowledge of liberalism. Yayla, "Pratikteki Açmazlarıyla Liberalizm ve Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu," 13. See also Murat Yılmaz, "Mustafa Erdoğan ve Atilla Yayla ile Mülakat," 36.

<sup>140</sup>. Erdoğan, "Niçin Liberalizm," 31.

<sup>141</sup>. Erdoğan, "Niçin Liberalizm?" 30; Coşkun Can Aktan, "21. Yüzyıl, Türkiye ve Sivil Toplum" (21st Century, Turkey and Civil Society), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (2) (Spring 1996), 57-75; İhsan Dağı, "Uluslararası Politikada Devletçilik Hareketi ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Maliyeti" (The Trend of Etatism in International Politics and Its Socio-Economic Costs), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 93-100; Ömer Çaha, "Birey-Devlet İlişkisi Çerçevesinde Türkiye'de İnsan Hakları" (Human Rights in Turkey within the Framework of the Relation between the Individual and State), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 100-7.

determination. This self-determination refers to a stre to reach self-chosen individual goals in conformity with (again) self-chosen principles. For the group, society and polity can be nothing but functionaries in this continuous and open-ended process.<sup>142</sup> Although going back as early as to John Locke, this perception more directly draws upon Hayek --his bringing classical liberalism back in and thus related conceptualization of the ought-to-be sphere of the state and the ideal composition of the society.<sup>143</sup>

As far as the composition of the society is concerned, the group refrains from reaching an absolute definition of the 'best' order. Instead, they employ the term 'best' for a model of society which provides individuals with the means to accomplish their diverse goals. For them the 'best' is a spontaneous society that is susceptible to open-ended evolution.<sup>144</sup> In fact, the group derives its adherence to spontaneity from their

---

<sup>142</sup>. Melih Yürüşen, "Otorite ve Özerklik: İmkansız Bir Beraberlik mi?" (Authority and Autonomy: An Impossible Coexistence?), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 39-48; Yürüşen, "Refah Partisinin Yükselişine Çeşitlilik Perspektifinden Bakmak" (Viewing the Rise of Welfare Party from the Perspective of Diversity), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (3) (Summer 1996), 16-8; Berzeg, "Neden Liberalim?" (Why Am I a Liberal?), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 23f; Erdoğan, "Niçin Liberalizm" 31-2; Dağı, "Uluslararası Politikada Devletin Yeri: Liberteryen Bir Eleştiri" (State's Place in International Politics: A Libertarian Criticism), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 93-4; Ahmet Arslan, "Türk Laikliği ve Geleceği Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler" (Some Reflections on Turkish Laicism and Its Future), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 58f; Ludwig von Mises "Antikapitalist Zihniyet" (Anticapitalist Mentality), trans. Mustafa Metin, *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (3) (Summer 1996), 107-8; Berzeg, "Siyaset Pratiğindeki Somut Liberalizm," 152-6.

<sup>143</sup>. Berzeg, "Neden Liberalim?"; Bekir Berat Özipek, "Özgürlüğü 'Kölelik Yolu'yla Anlamak" (Understanding Freedom through 'The Road To Serfdom'), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (2) (Spring 1996), 122-37.

<sup>144</sup>. Erdoğan, "Niçin Liberalizm?" 33; Ülsever, "Marksizmden Liberalizme: Pratik Teoriyi Daima Aşıyor," 38.

relativistic standing -i.e., respect for diversity which also means acceptance of the legitimacy of diverse truths. This disposition ends with a denial of full knowledge of the future, thus with the incompetency of the man to develop perfectionist plans for achieving the best for all times.<sup>145</sup>

On the other hand, the Turkish liberal intellectual of the 1990s adheres to the night watchman concept of the state -a state that possesses instrumental existence and thus is a body of institutions established for the sustenance of peace, justice and liberty. The state is perceived merely as an eventual exigency of a general moral and legal scheme of rules that arise out of "legitimate moral demands of individuals against authority."<sup>146</sup> In this respect, the sphere of state is limited to the sustenance of the conditions that enable the liberty of the individuals.

Here, holding fast to the negative conception of liberty, *Liberal Düşünce* group staunchly rejects any positive action on the part of the state with the aim of

---

<sup>145</sup>. R. Max Hartwell, "Bir Liberalin Eğitimi" (Education of a Liberal), trans. Sema Coşaroğlu, *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 49-53; Özipek, "Özgürlüğü 'Kölelik Yolu'yla Anlamak," 122-37; A. Nuri Yurdusev, "Laiklik ve Demokrasi: Biri Diğèerinin Vazgeçilmez Şartı mı?" (Laicism and Democracy: Is One the *sine-qua-non* of the Other?), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (2) (Spring 1996), 140.

<sup>146</sup>. Norman P. Barry, "Marksizmin Gerilemesi ve Komüniteryenizmin Yükselişi" (The Regression of Marxism and the Rise of Communitarianism), trans. Mustafa Erdoğan *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 111; Berzeg, "Neden Liberalim?" 25; Erdoğan, "Niçin Liberalizm," 32; Dağı, "Uluslararası Politikada Devletin Yeri: Liberteryen Bir Eleştiri," 93; Arslan, "Türk Laikliği ve Geleceği Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler," 58-9; Berzeg, "Siyaset Pratiğindeki Somut Liberalizm," 154.

regulating the society.<sup>147</sup> The main point of objection on the part of the group is the re-distributive policies which disrupt the spontaneous order. The group bases the model of the best society on the functioning of price mechanism. The group is in guard against the elimination of the dynamism so peculiar to the price mechanism.<sup>148</sup>

The *Liberal Düşünce* group summarizes its liberalism as "the pursuit of a negative project."<sup>149</sup> This concept of negativity is present in all the articles written by the members of the Association for Liberal Thinking. They all emphasize the negative task of "instrumentalization of the state" and thus "humanizing political power,"<sup>150</sup> -i.e., to decrease the state's sphere in society and economy to a bare minimum.

### **The Liberal Ethos versus the Democracy of the Republic: Rupture or Synthesis?**

This negative position towards the state has also determined what the group opposed in the Turkish context. Taking the individual as their basic category and price mechanism as a model, the group thinks of the dynamic society as the best order. The group criticizes the overwhelming power of the state in the economy and thus

---

<sup>147</sup>. Erdoğan, "Niçin Liberalizm?" 32-3; Dağı, "Uluslararası Politikada Devletin Yeri: Liberteryen Bir Eleştiri," 94; Aktan, "21. Yüzyıl, Türkiye ve Sivil Toplum," 66.

<sup>148</sup>. Aktan, "21. Yüzyıl, Türkiye ve Sivil Toplum," 63-5; Özipek, "Özgürlüğü 'Kölelik Yolu'yla Anlamak," 126; Berzeg, "Siyaset Pratiğindeki Somut Liberalizm," 155.

<sup>149</sup>. Erdoğan, "Niçin Liberalizm?" 33.

<sup>150</sup>. Ibid., 32.



over society. They perceive etatism not only as an economic policy, but also as a policy with social and political consequences. They consider etatism as a means to enhance the independence of the state/political elite from the society.<sup>151</sup>

The group criticizes the static nature of central planning and holds it responsible for rendering the economy and society into passive actors. As far as the society is concerned, the *Liberal Düşünce* group thinks that by injecting its democracy on the society, the state/government prevented the transformation from communitarian society to an individualistic one.<sup>152</sup> Interpreting the history of democratization in Turkey as a display of guided democracy, they arrive at the conclusion that the social actors in Turkey have come to bear a passive understanding of democracy, that is equating democracy with elections. The group rejects the social engineering that, has prevailed throughout the Republican history. In this respect, they are critical of the approach to democratization as a project to be carried out by the state.<sup>153</sup>

---

<sup>151</sup>. Güneri Akalın, "Türkiye'de Devletçilik Hareketi ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Maliyetleri" (The Trend of Etatism in Turkey and Its Socio-Economic Costs), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 85-92; Aktan, "21. Yüzyıl, Türkiye ve Sivil Toplum," 63-5; Osman Okyar, "Kumanda Ekonomisi, GÜdümlü Demokrasi" (Command Economy, Guided Democracy), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (4) (Fall 1996), 36-45; İhsan Çolak, "Paradigmanın İnşası: Türk İnkılabının İdeolojisinin Oluşumu ve Recep Peker" (The Construction of Paradigma: Formation of the Ideology of Turkish Revolution and Recep Peker), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (4) (Fall 1996), 69-81; Berzeg, "Siyaset Pratiğindeki Somut Liberalizm," 155.

<sup>152</sup>. Akalın, "Türkiye'de Devletçilik Hareketi ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Maliyetleri," 89; Okyar, "Kumanda Ekonomisi, GÜdümlü Demokrasi."

<sup>153</sup>. Okyar, "Kumanda Ekonomisi, GÜdümlü Demokrasi"; Berzeg, "Neden Liberalim"; Esat Öz, "Türkiye'de Demokrasiye Geçiş" (Transition to Democracy in Turkey), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (3) (Summer 1996), 79; Rasim

It is in this instance that *Liberal Düşünce* group may be distinguished from the preceding liberal-minded intellectuals. Referring to the Republican history as an example of the failures of constructivism, the group comes up with an alternative conceptualization of democracy. For them, democracy should not be understood as an end since this has the potential to lead to totalitarian and authoritarian policies. On the contrary the group adopts a 'liberal' conception of democracy. They take democracy as a means that would enable the functioning of spontaneous order.<sup>154</sup>

With respect to democracy in Turkey, laicism and Islam have turned out to be the most frequently studied topics by the *Liberal Düşünce* group.<sup>155</sup> As far as laicism is concerned, the group considers religion as an issue of civil society and thus proposes that the state should be neutral in this respect.<sup>156</sup> While criticizing Turkish

---

Toprak, "Demokrasi, Laiklik, Resmi İdeoloji Üstüne" (On Democracy, Laicism, Official Ideology), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (3) (Summer 1996), 125-31.

<sup>154</sup>. Yayla, "Demokrasi ve Türkiye" (Democracy and Turkey), *Liberal Bülten* (7) (Fall 1996), 9-10; Akalın, "Türkiye'de Devletçilik Hareketi ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Maliyeti."

<sup>155</sup>. Arslan, "Türk Laikliği ve Geleceği Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler," 54-76; Yurdusev, "Laiklik ve Modern Uluslararası Sistem" (Laicism and Modern International System), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 77-84; Yurdusev, "Laiklik ve Demokrasi: Biri Diğ erinin Vazgeçilmez Şartı mı?," 138-44; Arslan, "İslam, Adalet ve Refah Partisi Üzerine" (On Islam, Justice and Welfare Party), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (3) (Summer 1996), 3-12; Yürüş en, "Refah Partisinin Yükseliş ine Ç eş itlilik Perspektifinden Bakmak," 13-21; Toprak, "Demokrasi, Laiklik, Resmi İdeoloji Üstüne"; Arslan, "İnsan Hakları ve İslam" (Human Rights and Islam), *Liberal Düşünce*, 2 (5) (Winter 1997), 37-55; M. Hayri Kı rbaş oğ lu, "Kur'an ve İnsan Hakları Tartış maları" (Discussions on Quran and Human Rights), *Liberal Düşünce*, 2 (5) (Winter 1997), 56-70; Anthony Sullivan, "Muhafazakarlık, Ç oğ ulculuk ve İslam" (Conservatism, Pluralism and Islam), trans. Melih Yürüş en, *Liberal Düşünce*, 2 (5) (Winter 1997), 71-8.

<sup>156</sup>. Erdoğ an, "İslam ve Liberalizm: Kı sa Bir Bakış " (A Glimpse at Islam and Liberalism), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (4) (Fall 1996), 7-21; Barry,

laicism on the grounds that in Turkey the state has tried to install an official religion, they are also cautious to pose themselves against a religious state.<sup>157</sup> On the one hand, they consider the coming to power of the pro-Islamic Welfare Party (WP) as in line with democracy, - that is for them it is evidence of the coexistence of differences.<sup>158</sup> In the meantime, they do not rule out the probability that the WP's claim to represent the nation may result in authoritarianism. This point stands in sharp contrast to the group's approach to religion with a view to toleration for diversity.<sup>159</sup> While their rejection of laicism as practised in Turkey is based on faith in individuality, autonomy and diversity, their vigilance *vis-à-vis* the WP derives from the cognizance that democracy does not necessarily guarantee its own continuity.

Such a disposition with respect to democracy brings with it the second distinctive feature of the group from its predecessors. According to *Liberal Düşünce*, the intellectual with liberal identity may pass judgements on social and political developments only from a liberal

---

"Piyasa, Ahlak ve Devlet" (Market, Morality and State), trans. Mustafa Erdoğan, *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (4) (Fall 1996), 22-35.

<sup>157</sup>. Erdoğan, "Laiklik, Cumhuriyet'in Dini midir?" (Is Laicism the Religion of Republic), *Liberal Bülten*, (2) (Summer 1995), 6; Erdoğan, "Din, Demokrasi, Çok Kültürlülük, Sivil Toplum" (Religion, Democracy, Multi-culturalism, Civil Society), *Liberal Bülten* (6) (Summer 1996), 8; Erdoğan, "İslam ve Liberalizm: Kısa Bir Bakış"; Yürüşen, "Refah Partisinin Yükselişine Çeşitlilik Perspektifinden Bakmak," 18-9.

<sup>158</sup>. Yurdusev, "Laiklik ve Demokrasi: Biri Diğèerinin Vazgeçilmez Şartı mı?," 143-4; Yürüşen, "Refah Partisinin Yükselişine Çeşitlilik Perspektifinden Bakmak," 16-8.

<sup>159</sup>. Yürüşen, "Refah Partisinin Yükselişine Çeşitlilik Perspektifinden Bakmak," 18-9.

perspective.<sup>160</sup> This is a break from the Republican intellectual who had identified himself with the task of enlightening the public and thus contributing to the progress of the Turkish state. In contrast, placing relativism against positivism the group rejects "one absolute truth."<sup>161</sup>

This anti-constructivist standing has been reflected in articles on education. Apart from supporting the privatization of education in line with their opposition to centralization, and with a view to the sustenance of diversity in society,<sup>162</sup> they put special emphasis on the "education of a liberal."<sup>163</sup> This emphasis is due to a conviction that liberal virtues and liberal institutions are mutually dependent. The group proposes an education which will "endow the individual with the knowledge and comprehension that are imperative for his autonomy." They think that the educational framework is to be grounded on liberal premises, regardless of the outcomes.<sup>164</sup>

---

<sup>160</sup>. "Bu Dergi" (This Journal), *Liberal Düşünce* (editorial), 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 1.

<sup>161</sup>. Toprak, "Demokrasi, Laiklik, Resmi İdeoloji Üstüne," 129; Yurdusev, "Laiklik ve Demokrasi Biri Diğzerinin Vazgeçilmez Şartı mı?" 140.

<sup>162</sup>. Ülsever, "Türkiye'ye Paralı Eğitim" (*Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (2) (Spring 1996), 44-8; Akalın, "Yüksek Öğretimin Finansmanı ve Harçlar Sorunu" (Financing of Higher Education and the Problem of ) *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (2) (Spring 1996), 49-58; İrfan Erdoğan, "Bu Eğitim Düzeni Değişmelidir, Ama Nasıl?" (This Educational System Must Be Changed, But How?), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (4) (Fall 1996), 86, 89; Neşet Toku, "Türkiye ve Sivil Eğitim" (Turkey and Civil Education), *Liberal Düşünce*, 2 (5) (Winter 1997), 79-84; Ataç Ünlü, "Bu İşe Devlet El Atmalı mı? Bir Yüksek Öğrenim Polemiği" (Should the State Be Involved in This Issue? A Polemic of Higher Education), *Liberal Düşünce*, 2 (5) (Winter 1997), 85-91.

<sup>163</sup>. R. Max Hartwell, "Bir Liberalin Eğitimi," 49-54.

<sup>164</sup>. *Ibid.*, 51.

The liberal intellectuals of the 1990s, represented in the Association for Liberal Thinking and who gathered around *Liberal Düşünce*, distance themselves from the state and politics. But this does not amount to indifference. Instead, positioning themselves over and above politics, they claim to pursue a double task: "...on the one hand, responding to the need for learning and debate in our country, on the other hand devising liberal proposals for political issues."<sup>165</sup> Above all, the group claims novelty due to its aspiration to introduce the 'real face' of liberalism in a country where "statism has been an indispensable feature of both the collective and official mentality," and "collectivist structures of thought have established their hegemony in the intellectual sphere."<sup>166</sup>

#### CONCLUDING REMARKS

It might not be wrong to state that Turkish politics has displayed a milieu of trial-error between 1960-1990. Trial was with the proper conduct of democracy; and whenever error occurred the military stepped in. Just as the 'fallacy' caused by the DP government led to the 1960 military intervention that suspended the trial with multi-party politics, street violence in the late 1960s resulted in the 1971 coup by memorandum. Finally, political turbulence in the late 1970s ended with the

---

<sup>165</sup>. "Bu Dergi," 2.

<sup>166</sup>. "Liberal Düşünce Kendine Bakıyor," 112.

third military intervention on September 12, 1980. In each case, efforts were made to eliminate the errors of the past decade by devising a new constitution or amending the old one.

The 1960-1990 period was important for the liberal intellectuals both with respect to their proclaimed liberalism and their relationship with the state. To begin with, the 1961 Constitution offered a victory at least at its inception to those intellectuals who had earlier assumed a "liberal-socialist" identity, that is the *Forum* group. Some figures in this group participated in the making of the Constitution. The new constitution contained the reforms that had been proposed by the group in the latter half of the 1950s. However, this did not amount to a victory for liberal values because of the bifurcated identity of the group —liberal and socialist. The liberal facet of their identity was dissolved to the advantage of the socialist, resulting in a *via media* disposition as an aversion against extremist trends. This can be linked both to the continuity in the self-identification of the intellectuals in question with the state, and the contention with the fulfilment of their liberal aspirations by the Constitution.

The attempt to fill the gap that was created by the liquidation of liberal identity was initiated by Aydın Yalçın, one of the founders of *Forum*. Yalçın's intellectual and political experience provided the scheme of the evolution of a liberal identity in a society high-in-stateness. It also helped to account for the

influences of an unstable political and social milieu on intellectual priorities. The liberal intellectual of the era as represented by Aydın Yalçın, hovered between state and politics. His engagement in active politics did not mean a rupture from his allegiance to the general interest represented by the state. Instead, his involvement in politics arose out of the traditional missionary standing with respect to democracy. Yalçın's conviction that the 1961 Constitution provided the institutional framework for the functioning of democracy led him to pose for its sustenance. However, in the fierce political turbulence of the 1970s, liberal identity in the political arena was doomed to failure. Upon his withdrawal from active politics, Yalçın tried to pursue his 'mission' of sustaining democracy by the proclaimed aim of laying the foundations of liberal thought.

*Yeni Forum* emerged with this aim. The identity of the journal was shaped more by the political dynamics of the period, than by liberal discourse.<sup>167</sup> Arising on a precedent of intense hostility between the liberal democratic regimes of the West and the communist bloc, and of an ever-increasing street violence between the extreme right and left in Turkey, the journal eventually assumed a stand against extremism and most conspicuously against Marxism. This disposition had the potential for

---

<sup>167</sup>. The placement of liberal identity within the parameters of democracy at times led to the sacrifice of liberal values. This sacrifice was more prevalent in the periods of political and social disorder.

the 'liberal' discourse to echo a negative ideology. In fact, not unlike what had happened in the past decades, the liberal identity was integrated into a 'broader' scheme. While this scheme was modernization in the mono-party period and democracy in the following decades, for the liberal intellectual of the early 1980s, it was Atatürkism. Yet, all the three frameworks did not propose divergent identities, but were different reflections of the commitment to the republican values. It may be concluded that it was this commitment, which led the liberal-minded intellectual to return to a preoccupation with saving the state.

In the last instance the state was again "saved" by the military. The 1980 military intervention opened a new era in Turkish political life. The 1982 Constitution brought in a new structuration for strengthening the state. The period was marked by the narrowing down of state into the office of Presidency and the National Security Council with an increase in the powers of both.<sup>168</sup> This restructuration in the state was accompanied by a restructuration in the universities through the Board of Higher Education (*Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu-YÖK*). As a reaction to the politicization in the past decade, the state assumed overwhelming control in the appointment of the university staff.<sup>169</sup> In the meantime, there was the emergence of a new intellectual group in the 1990s, from

---

<sup>168</sup>. Heper, "The Executive in the Third Turkish Republic, 1982-1989," 299-319; "The state and debureaucratization," 605-15.

<sup>169</sup>. Ayşe Öncü, "Academics: The West in the Discourse of University Reform," in *Turkey and the West*, eds. Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 166-72.



within the academia, with claims to novelty as far as liberal identity was concerned.

This group was formed by a number of figures from *Yeni Forum* group, which has had a bifurcated identity, especially in the 1980s. This time the label of "liberal" was accompanied by conservatism which denoted faith in "the creation and internalization of Turkish-Islamic-Western civilization."<sup>170</sup> Thus, reminiscent of the *Forum* experience, the liberal identity formed for itself an alternative medium of organization in the Association for Liberal Thinking and of expression in the quarterly, *Liberal Düşünce*.

Turkish liberal intellectuals in the 1990s represent the continuity of Anglo-American intellectual cross-fertilization in Turkey. Terminating the traditional pendulum of republic and democracy, they have chosen liberal theory as the basis of their comprehension of democracy. Unlike its predecessors, the *Liberal Düşünce* group does not grapple with the problematique of having to express its liberal views within the parameters of the Republic. The pendulum seems to have swung towards the edge of the democracy of liberalism. This may be interpreted as an initial step taken by the liberal intellectual to free himself from the myth of democracy to the advantage of a liberal ethos. Inspired by the recourse to classical liberalism, the *Liberal Düşünce* group declare their faith in an individualist-liberal

---

<sup>170</sup>. Yalçın, "Yeni Bir Dönemin Başında."

mentality which they perceive to be the basis of Western civilization.<sup>171</sup>

The second breaking point of the *Liberal Düşünce* group can be found in their acclamation of a universalist identity.<sup>172</sup> This identification may be interpreted as an escape gate for the 'liberal' from the Republican fate. More briefly, his commitment to liberal theory in isolation eases the exhaustion of the Republican intellectual in search for a circle of reference for himself. While this circle was provided by the state to a large extent, which in turn put the intellectual in a schizophrenic position, the liberal intellectual of the 1990s seems to deny identification with any value but his liberalism.

The third break may be observed in a shift in the 'mission' of the 'liberal' intellectual. In the early-Republican era, this mission was the construction of the tradition of the nation. In the multi-party period, it turned out to be the construction and then the consolidation of democracy. In the 1990s, the mission which the intellectual takes on himself is constructing the liberal tradition in Turkey.

For the time being this shift connotes the consolidation of the role of transmitter for the intellectual to the disadvantage of that of legislator.

---

<sup>171</sup>. Berzeg, "Liberalizmin İki Determinist Tezahürü: Küreselleşme ve Yerelleşme" (Two Deterministic Appearances of Liberalism: Globalization and Localization), *Liberal Düşünce*, 1 (4) (Fall 1996), 91.

<sup>172</sup>. The group identifies itself first and foremost as a member of the Liberal International. Yayla, "Pratikteki Açmazlarıyla Liberalizm ve Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu," 13.

Not unlike its predecessors, the *Liberal Düşünce* group also assumes the role of a transmitter. Their distinctiveness lies in the fact that the object of transmission is sought not in the State but in the universal. On the other hand, though the group has not yet made any implicit and explicit recourse to the trend from which it has emerged, the culmination was the long-aspired goal repeatedly stated by Yalçın, that is forming the liberal intellectual framework for the sustenance of democracy in Turkey.

However, it might be too early to reach definitive conclusions about the liberal intellectuals of the 1990s. Rather, it may be argued that they walk in an open-ended path of universal values in a national context. Yet, it is possible to point at a rather hidden problem that seems to linger throughout their discourse: How is one to achieve a spontaneous order (which in their referential terminology corresponded to the centuries-long evolution of liberal thought and practices in the British context),<sup>173</sup> in a country where liberal tradition could not develop at all? Such a problem has the risk of falling into constructivism in their pursuit to form the liberal tradition in Turkey.<sup>174</sup>

---

<sup>173</sup>. Friedrich A. Hayek, "Liberalism," in *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas*, ed. Friedrich A. Hayek (London: Routledge, 1982), 119-51.

<sup>174</sup>. Apart from the problem that is intrinsic to the disposition of the group in taking just one strand of contemporary liberal thought which has the potential of monopolistic claims, their reference point(s) are not exempt from controversies. Thus, in the Western world debates have been carried out about and among the circle named either as neo-liberals or new right. More specifically, there have been disputes on the 'true' identity of Hayekian standing which turns out to be the main reference point of the group, as either conservative or liberal.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSION

The present study has focused on the liberal identity in the Turkish context with a view to the state-intellectual relationship. The discourse of those intellectuals who have undertaken the pursuit of liberal premises has been the object of analysis. In the conduct of such a task, first the historical evolution of state-intellectual relationship in the Ottoman-Turkish context has been taken up in order to provide a background to the nature of the liberal discourse, as well as to problematize the existence of and a potential for the formation of a liberal tradition in the Republican era. The periodization that has been employed in the work was framed with reference first to the changes in the Ottoman-Turkish state structure that eventually introduced modifications in the state-intellectual relationship and ultimately in the liberal disposition. The second reference point was the shifts and ruptures observed in the conceptual matrix of liberal intellectuals of subsequent periods. Such a periodization was useful to reach conclusions about transformations in the identity of the Turkish liberal intellectuals which can be referred to as modernizing, democratizing and liberalizing. Though each and every identity is not mutually exclusive, and in the final analysis all merge

into the grand project of modernization, the terms were instrumental in understanding the conjunctural center of the preoccupation of liberal intellectuals in different periods.

The Ottoman period, especially, the *Tanzimat* era (1839-1876) may be perceived as the decisive turn in attempts at modernization with respect to their effect on the identity of the intellectual. The outcomes of this influence also provided the historical predicament for the liberal intellectual in the Republican era. The Ottoman period was significant due to a number of interrelated reasons. First, it witnessed the deepening of the state-initiated modernization attempts, which led to the creation and positioning of the intellectual by the state and within the state cadres. In the study, this intellectual has been categorized as the institutional intellectual, drawing upon Edward Shils.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, the effect of Western modernity on the intellectual sphere was first concretized in the *Tanzimat* charter (1839), which was the starting point of the era. Thirdly, it prepared the grounds for the emergence of the first self-proclaimed liberals among Western-minded Ottoman intellectuals.

The Ottoman institutional intellectual was placed in bureaucratic ranks and entrusted with a secular identity within the limits offered by tradition. Thus, whereas in

---

<sup>1</sup>. Edward Shils, "Intellectuals and responsibility," in *The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals*, eds. Ian Maclean, Alan Montefiore and Peter Winch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 257-307.

the West the emergence of the secular intellectual was accompanied by an ages-long historical process beginning with the Renaissance period and extending throughout the Reformation and Enlightenment, in the Ottoman context he was a product of the practical concerns of the state. In this respect, he was held responsible for the task of modernizing the governmental machinery, that led him to be identified as intellectual-as-bureaucrat. Such a development solidified the predicament of the Ottoman intellectual; from the eighteenth century onwards, he was saddled with the task of reconciling modernization, which ultimately meant Westernization, with tradition, that is compliance with Islamic principles. Furthermore, the intellectual of the *Tanzimat* era had to grapple with the cultural mutation that he himself was experiencing in his private life due to his close encounter with the West, which in the final analysis destined him to adopt total identification with the state.

The *Tanzimat* intellectual was subjected to the impact of the experience of living with a strong state tradition on the formation of the intellectual mind and identity. The state recruited the intellectual and obliged him to fix his intellectual agenda within the limits of the question of how to save the state.

The first attempts to open an escape route from the strains of the state arose in the 1860s. The Young Ottomans gathered around the press to form an alternative and opposing circle for the articulation of their opinions. However, this did not bring about a shift in

the internalized *raison d'être* of the intellectual preoccupation with the well-known question of and the ways how to reverse the decline of the Empire. In any case, the continuity in the dominance of the state on the press did not permit the movement to present any prospects for the future. However, the movement was significant for it revealed the aforementioned tension experienced by the modernizing Ottoman intellectual. This was best exemplified in the writings of Namık Kemal (1840-1888). His works epitomized the effort to reconcile the Western-inspired ideals with tradition. He searched a basis for his 'liberal' stance -formulated around the presumption that all individuals are born with natural rights- in Islam which for him provided the framework for the apprehending the absolute good that delineated the boundaries of those rights.

The Young Ottoman movement did not present a liberal image, in any case it fell short of developing a consistent pattern of thought within itself. It was in this respect that Prens Sabahaddin (1878-1948) emerged as a significant figure since his works represented the final effort of the Ottoman intellectual to escape from the handicaps of concern with tradition and develop a consistent liberal identity. Prens Sabahaddin, both due to his educational background and to his aloofness from state service, presented a more or less unorthodox portrait of the Ottoman intellectual. His unorthodoxy was also concretized in his total opposition to the existing power structure of the Ottoman Empire. Nourishing on a

state-initiated modernizing context, which solely addressed the institutional framework, he framed his opposing stance with a touch of societal consideration. While, proposing Anglo-American parliamentarianism as an institutional remedy for the ills of the day, he regarded social transformation from communitarian to individualistic structure as the first and foremost prerequisite. Thus, with Prens Sabahaddin the intellectual who had earlier been entrusted with the task of devising an institutional re-structuration, now came to assume a second responsibility, that of social engineering. However, the locus of social engineering was again found in the state. On the whole, the Ottoman liberal intellectual who found his most recent example in Prens Sabahaddin, was not privileged to present an exception to the traditional concern of saving the state.

It may be concluded that the Ottoman era ended up with a transformation in the object of education for the pursuit of the modernization project. While the era had started by the education of the modernizing intellectuals for the purpose of saving the state, it terminated with the leftover task of educating the people with the same aspiration. It was in such a context that the Ottoman liberal intellectual tried to provide his own scheme for transformation. However, he fell short of -or probably found it inappropriate- taking the individual as the basic category of his discourse. In its stead, through the course of his entanglement with society, he reserved the individual as an identity that was to be developed by



the required transformation in the society and polity. This may be interpreted as carrying with it the first signs of the approach to liberalism as a project.

By the start of World War I (1914-1918), the task of saving the state was pursued in the battlefield and proved to expire its lifespan by the ultimate failure against the West. The War of National Independence (1919-1922) that followed the ultimate demise of the empire, served as the cradle for a new epoch in Ottoman-Turkish history. The early-Republican era (1923-1946) was significant, since it embodied behind-the-scenes continuities in the state-intellectual relationship despite hectic rejection of the Ottoman legacy and efforts to construct a radically different state structure, while hosting the glimmerings of a new liberal discourse.

The early-Republican era was characterized by the process of nation-state building. In this process the legacy of the state tradition was also crystallized. During the era, the intellectual was saddled with a double responsibility. He was responsible for formulating the intellectual grounds for the Turkish Revolution, and of inculcating the logic of the new regime in society. Such a disposition might have been a reflection of a social structure high-in-stateness. Throughout the early-Republican era it was the state which, if we may use Kenneth H.F. Dysons's terminology for the Turkish case,

...determined the leading values of the political community with reference to which the authority (was) to be exercised; ...found its embodiment in one or more institutions and one or more public purposes which thereby acquired a special social ethos and prestige and an association with the public interest or general welfare; and produced a socio-cultural awareness of the unique and superior nature of the state itself,<sup>2</sup>

and thus installed itself over and above the society. The Republican state, constructed as such, readily undertook unto itself the mission of setting up the conditions for the upsurge of the norms and values of the Turkish society which were perceived to be awaiting vitalization.

Such a configuration provided the early Republican intellectual with a conceptual framework which was imposed upon him by the state itself. As was the case in the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire, the intellectual continued to preoccupy himself with analyzing the West, in order to highlight why the East failed. Not unlike his precedents, the intellectual found his safety belt within the state structure. This time he based his arguments on the logic of the Turkish Revolution which at times resulted in mutually opposing interpretations among the intellectuals.

Liberal discourse which tried to forge for itself an identity in Republican Turkey had its first appearances in the political sphere in brief experiments with the transition to multi-party politics. However, in the case of both the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) (November

---

<sup>2</sup>. Kenneth H. F. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and Institution* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), 206.

17, 1924-June 5, 1925) and the Free Republican Party (August 12, 1930-November 17, 1930) the result was failure due to the structural dynamics of Turkish politics. First, the PRP experience which was the first organized, relatively independent and liberal opposition, has been one of the most conspicuous manifestations of state's omnipotence *vis-à-vis* any kind of opposition. Second, the FRP presented a problematic liberal identity at its very inception. The fact that the state launched the formation and organization of the party for the practice of loyal opposition destined the party to act within the contours of the state, which worked to the detriment of liberal premises on which its program was based. The tutelary nature of the FRP was evident not only in its equivocal standing in the political spectrum at the time it was founded, but also in its rather facile self-dissolution at the time of its engagement in active politics.

As for liberal identity, the development delineated above led to an indecisive course of choosing between actual opposition which meant death at birth, and loyal opposition which meant sacrifice of liberal premises. In fact, the experience with the loyal opposition of the FRP may be interpreted also as a test on the part of the state to incorporate liberal discourse into its fold. Immediately after the dissolution of the party, the state adopted a totally hostile stance *vis-à-vis* the liberal discourse. Yet, the party has ensured itself a specific place in the annals of Turkish political history,

basically as result of its intellectual orientation which was provided by Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869-1939), the renowned intellectual of the Republican era whose liberal identity was nevertheless rather contentious.

Apart from his active participation in the foundation of the FRP and after, Ağaoğlu was also significant for correctly perceiving dilemmas concerning the identity of the Republican intellectual, -hovering between the state and opposition- : "I entered the FRP as a revolutionary, democrat, liberal statist and Kemalist. ...Till the foundation of the FRP, I sincerely believed that the RPP was a liberal, democratic party, and even as statist as I am."<sup>3</sup> Ağaoğlu served within the state structure both before and after the proclamation of the Republic. In this respect, he represented the intellectual of the Republic preoccupied with the consolidation of Kemalist principles and reforms into an intellectual framework and transmitting them to the society. On the other hand, Ağaoğlu may be taken as a model of the intellectual in opposition, coming from within the state, in the name of those very principles that the state determined and proclaimed. Mustafa Kemal appointed him as a member of the FRP; however, he turned out to be a genuine opponent of the RPP. His peculiar standing in the party, as its theoretician, continued after its dissolution. In contrast to the other former

---

<sup>3</sup>. Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *Devlet ve Fert (State and Individual)* (İstanbul: Sanayiinefise Matbaası, 1933), 101-2.

party members who later rejoined the RPP, Ağaoğlu chose to stay in opposition.

Ağaoğlu represented an isolated figure in the early Republican intellectual circles. His isolation may be linked to the absence of a liberal circle. Yet, he was typical in that he constructed his liberal stance on the *raison d'être* of the Turkish Revolution, which ensured his loyalty to the state and its principles. In his *In the Land of the Free Men (Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde, 1930)* Ağaoğlu outlined his utopia. In the land of the free men of Ağaoğlu, the socio-political system was founded on the principle of individual freedom. He argued that the Turkish Revolution was in fact a struggle of the will against the memory for liberating the individual, "...and thus the community constituted by the individuals..." from the shackles of Eastern dogmatism.

However, such an emphasis on the individual was not inspired by the classical liberal stance, which accords the individual a pivotal place in the public sphere, over and above any other social entity. Throughout the writings of Ağaoğlu, the concept of individual freedom was taken to be the *sine qua non* for sustaining a stable and dynamic society. This ideal society of Ağaoğlu was modelled on the Western nation-state. Thus, faith in the individual was not in the individual-as-such, but in the ideal individual-as-citizen of the Republic. The creation of the individual-as-citizen was perceived to be the prerequisite for the sustenance of order.

Ağaoğlu had total commitment to the basis of the Republican regime. What pushed him to opposition were his views about the particular policies which the state pursued in the name of the regime. He participated in the FRP, since he thought that it would act as a medium for control and criticism -the imperatives of realization of freedom. This conception of freedom led him to continue with identification with the party even after its dissolution. However, in his writings the most apparent object of criticism were the statist policies of the state, which gained momentum in the 1930s. While acknowledging that the (Turkish) state was by definition statist, Ağaoğlu rejected state intervention in the economy because it was too early. Ağaoğlu thought that state interference was legitimate only when the imperative contradictions in the economy endanger social harmony and order. For him, the conditions of the time were not ripe for the state to take an active hold of the economy. Instead, he argued that, due to the structural dynamics of the period, the state should proceed as an organizer, rather than an active partner in the economic sphere.

Ağaoğlu's liberal stance, briefly delineated above, may be located in his conception of history. For him history could be analogized to a scene of "creative evolution," colored by the search for harmony among contradictions in different social contexts. This conception is most clearly observed in his interpretation of the Turkish Revolution -he viewed the Turkish

Revolution not as an exceptional parenthesis in history, but as one contextual eventuality in the universal process of progress. Yet, this did not lead him to adopt the universal and abstract principles of classical liberalism. He adhered to the universally authentic concept of individual freedom in order to provide native conceptualization that would be appropriate for the particular political configuration of his period. It is in this respect that Ağaoğlu represented the intellectual of the early-Republican era who was in search of a liberal identity for *his society*.

In the early Republican era modernization was imposed by the state as a comprehensive project. This project represented the official Republican mentality of obliterating all that was accepted to belong to the Ottoman past. However, despite this proclaimed endeavour to a break with the Ottoman past, the period witnessed an admixture of continuities within change. To begin with, not unlike the past, in the early Republican era, too, the state was the leitmotif of the modernization attempts, though with a different institutional structure. Second, the Republic inherited the social engineering ethos that had prevailed especially in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, again taking the bureaucracy as an instrument in the achievement of the task of modernization. As far as breaks with the Ottoman past were concerned, the split was not in the role attributed to the state, but in the mentality that guided its institutionalization. This mentality brought about

the preoccupation with how to surpass the social, political and cultural orders of the Ottoman past, and their symbolic and structural basis. Thus, the Republican project of modernization proposed a double-track process. The first task was to remove all "tradition" that belonged to the Ottoman past, both from the institutions and for the society. The second task was to revitalize the 'genuine tradition' for the society. This double-track process required that the intellectual -who continued in the modernizing mission of his precedents- assume a double identity. While acting as legislator in the way of ensuring institutional and social modernization, he was to act also as the transmitter of logic of the subsequent reconstruction of the 'genuine tradition' to the society. The liberal discourse was born from within this modernizing mission. Its significance was due to its endeavour to provide alternative interpretations in the path towards modernity which in the final analysis may be linked to the emergence of the mission of the coming decades, that of democratization.

The two subsequent attempts to the transition to multi-party regime signified the rather contentious nature of the concept of democracy in Turkish political life. Perceiving democracy as a display of "enlightened debate,"<sup>4</sup> between political parties for the good of the society, the state resorted to repressive measures

---

<sup>4</sup>. Metin Heper, "Bureaucrats: Persistent Elitists," in *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*, eds. Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer (London and New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, 1993), 39.



against 'legitimate' opposition on the grounds of the latter's immaturity. Yet, the PRP and FRP experiences may still be observed as (un)conscious attempts to oppose this monopolistic claim over the comprehension of and practice of democracy by the state.

In the 1946-1960 period, the concept of democracy became essential for the liberal discourse. The period in question was significant for the Turkish political system for a number of reasons. First, unlike the preceding period, it was marked by the decisive transition to multi-party politics. Second, Democratic Party's (DP) ascent to power (1950) led to the transition from state-centered polity to party-centered polity, that is the transfer of the political power from the state elites to the political elites. Last but not the least, the period witnessed the consolidation of Anglo-American cross-fertilization in the intellectual sphere, which constituted perhaps the only acceptable legacy for the liberal intellectuals of the coming decades.

The intellectual flux that took place during these fourteen years necessitates a sub-categorization. In this respect, the first stage was chosen as the 1946-1950 period. The period started by the rise of opposition from within the RPP and reached its logical conclusion with DP's acquisition of power. This opposition was accompanied by the writings of Ahmet Emin Yalman -the self-proclaimed liberal journalist (1888-1973). Both the critical discourse of the DP, and the writings of Yalman took the 'actual meaning' of the term "democracy" as their

starting point. They rendered the Anglo-American democracies, which for them had proved their supremacy by the Allied victory in the Second World War (1939-1945), as the ideal model that should be adopted. The post 1946 period also differed from the early Republican era by an increase in the influence of international developments on the domestic politics. Thus, in addition to the nationalist legacy of the past decade, the *nouveaux* opposition adopted the task of overall alliance with the Anglo-American world.

As far as the intellectual framework was concerned, this shift was reflected in the merging of the preoccupation with the requisites of democracy into the Republican responsibility to form the intellectual premises for the Turkish nation-state. In other words, the excessive preoccupation with the emergence of nation and its constituents of the previous era, continued in the rhetoric of the opposition which paid attention to the international atmosphere. Thus, in his writings Yalman emphasized the different nature of Turkish nation and nationalism from the extreme nationalism of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Apart from that, the engagement of Yalman in such international liberal platforms as in the first meeting of the Union of World Liberals (April 9-14, 1945) and the subsequent foundation of the Association for the Dissemination of Free Ideas - that was planned to function as the National Committee of the union in Turkey- further strengthened adherence to the Anglo-American model. The most distinguishing

characteristic of such initiatives was their proclaimed *raison d'être* to ensure the liberal standing *vis-à-vis* the communist one. With such a negative disposition, Yalman provided the first example of the Turkish liberal intellectuals to resort to liberalism in order to counter communism. However, the negative discourse which framed Yalman's liberal identity was built more on his opposition to the RPP, than anything else. This led him to side with the DP.

The DP took power with an "alternative" and "genuine" comprehension of democracy. In its discourse the party based this "genuineness" on the advocacy of freedom. However, when the party was in power, the discourse of freedom was delimited to economic and cultural policies. In fact, despite a shift in the locus of politics from the state to the party, the DP was in consensus with the RPP as regards the political principles of the Republican regime. This meant the continuity of the absolutist conception of power which had traditionally been legitimized on the "will of the nation." The DP politicized the bureaucracy with the proclaimed aspiration to echo the will of the nation at the state, which led to a party-dominant state. Thus, the coming to power of a party other than the party of state, in a country with a strong state tradition, was in the final analysis no more than a representational change in the functioning of the system.

With such a power structure at hand, the second stage of the period (1950-1960) witnessed the emergence

of a new group of intellectuals who were critical of the democratic nature of the DP rule --the claimant to "the real" comprehension of democracy. This opposition bloc comprised a number of Western-minded intellectuals gathered around the fortnightly *Forum*. Not unlike the case in the preceding period The *Forum* group, too, experienced the unease in fixing its disposition as regards the state and opposition. The liberal intellectual again found himself entrusted with a twofold responsibility --being a part of the state on the one hand, and being a 'neutral enlightener' which inescapably presumed an opposing stance, on the other.

As in line with the general trend of the period, the *Forum* group articulated their opposition in light of Anglo-American democracy. The Anglo-American influence was not limited to the conception of democracy, but shaped the systematization of a flow of thought which had theoretical and methodological bases. In viewing the relation between the individual and the state, and liberty and equality with respect to each other, the group took the social democratic claims of the period as their theoretical reference point. The *Forum* writers displayed the Anglo-American influence also in the methodology they adopted. Thus, the articles analyzed specific issues and institutions and the proposals as regards the ought-to-be(s) were based not on 'abstract theorizing,' but on the idealization of the existing models, namely Western liberal democratic institutions.

The group also ended the unease of the Ottoman-Turkish 'liberal' intellectual who had long experienced hardship in preserving the essence of tradition in the passage to modernity. Also, they did not take into consideration the early Republican task of revitalizing all that was national within the grand project of modernization. By an all-out rejection of the plausibility of a synthesis between the East and West the group argued for absolute westernism to the detriment of tradition. Thus, they represented the Turkish intellectual's adherence to the West.

However, the group displayed a rather volatile stand in their relation with political power. Following the short experience with the Freedom Party (FP), their opposition against the DP rule led them to come close to the RPP --the party which had previously been criticized for its authoritarian tendency-- in the late fifties. This was manifest in the articles explaining the *raison d'être* of the mono-party rule and calling for opposition to unite in order to bring down the DP government. One may argue that such a shift was the outcome of merely practical concerns --i.e., that the FP did not have the potential to acquire majority--. However, for the purposes of the present study, this shift was an indication of the continuity of the Ottoman-Turkish liberal intellectual's concern for the state. In the *Forum* case, this concern was revealed in the conceptualization of democracy as requiring meticulous construction. The democratizing

stance of the intellectual was also epitomized in such an approach.

The liberal identity of the *Forum* group remained in the shade of their intellectual disposition. They displayed consistency in their aspiration to fulfil the intellectual responsibility-providing a neutral ground for intellectual debate on issues concerning politics, society and economy. As far as the political preferences of the regular columnists of the fortnightly are concerned, the group failed to achieve a definitive identity. Above all, from the very beginning they had already displayed a bifurcated character under the label "liberal-socialist." The oscillation between the "liberal" and the "socialist" constituted the first example of the new ambivalence that the liberal intellectuals of the coming decades faced regarding their political preferences.

The prevailing concern of the 'liberal' intellectual for the state was exemplified in the applause that *Forum* extended to the 1960 military intervention. Beginning with Turkish democracy's first experience with military intervention, the period between 1960-1990 displayed a scene of trial-error for Turkish politics. Trial was with the "proper conduct of democracy" and whenever error occurred the military stepped in. Thus, the military interfered with politics for the second time by the 1971 coup by memorandum, and the subsequent military intervention took place on September 12, 1980. In the 1960 military intervention, the blame was put on the

political parties for falling into an "irreconcilable situation," thus disrupting Turkish democracy. In the 1971 coup by memorandum, it was the 1961 Constitution that was held responsible for providing civil liberties to such an extent that resulted in chaos. The 1980 military intervention was legitimized by the political and social deadlock that was caused by the deepening of this chaos.

In the 1960-1990 period, liberal identity as expressed in the intellectual discourse experienced a rather debilitating development. The 1961 Constitution was significant since it disclosed the nature of the proclaimed liberalism of the liberal-minded intellectuals. The Constitution embodied the premises advocated by the liberal intellectuals of the past decade, that is the *Forum* group. On the other hand, the participation of some figures in this group in the constitution making process, upon the call from the military, once again ensured the potential of close alliance between the intellectuals in question and the state.<sup>5</sup> Though the 1961 Constitution promised a victory for the liberal premises of the group, it did not constitute the upsurge of liberal identity. On the contrary, being content with the sufficiency of the liberal aura as fixed by the Constitution, the *Forum* group expressed their standing within the contours of the

---

<sup>5</sup>. Turhan Feyzioğlu participated in the commission referred to as the *Ankara Group*, while Bahri Savcı and Muammer Aksoy took part in all the three commissions that were formed for the preparation of the 1961 Constitution.

term *via media*, which connoted an abhorrence of extremist trends.

The attempt to fill the gap that was left by the liquidation of liberal identity was initiated by Aydın Yalçın, one of the founders of *Forum*. Sharing the faith of the *Forum* group in the 1961 Constitution, Yalçın continued with his proclaimed liberal standing both in his writings and participation in party politics. For the purposes of this study, Yalçın's discourse and engagement in active politics represented the path that a liberal identity took in a society high-in-stateness. He was also typical for the priorities of a liberal intellectual in an unstable political and social milieu.

Unlike the preceding periods when the intellectual was destined to choose among only two alternatives, that is the party of the state on the one hand, and that of opposition on the other, the liberal intellectual of the era as represented by Yalçın, hovered between the state and party politics. Yalçın shared the conviction with the *Forum* group that the 1961 Constitution provided the institutional framework for the functioning of democracy. Thus, he engaged in active politics since he felt himself responsible for sustaining it, which in the final analysis connoted continuity in the missionary approach to democracy. Ironically, in the fierce political turbulence of the 1970s, the liberal identity was doomed to failure in the political arena. Thus, in the late 1970s Yalçın continued in his commitment to sustain



democracy through the proclaimed task of nurturing liberal thought in the Turkish context.

With this aim in mind Yalçın took on the publication of a fortnightly journal under the name of *Yeni Forum* (1979). In their allegiance to Anglo-American institutional framework, the *Yeni Forum* group was not different from 'liberal' intellectual groupings of the preceding eras. At a time of ever-increasing street violence between extreme right and left this allegiance led the group to express their liberal identity by a negative discourse, -especially *vis-à-vis* the left.

As was the case for the Republican 'liberals' of the previous periods, the *Yeni Forum* group also formulated their liberal disposition with a view to the Republican values. However, rather than basing their stand on the grand project of modernization and/or the commitment to democratization, they found their reference point in the term "Atatürkism," which for them encompassed both. It may be concluded that it was this adherence which led the liberal-minded intellectual, to become preoccupied with saving the state. With this concern, the group published a proposal for reforming "the Constitution and the regime," on the eve of Turkey's third experience with military intervention (September 12, 1980).

Thus, despite the efforts of the liberal-minded intellectual, the state was again saved by the military. The post-1980 era which started by the devising of a new constitution in 1982, marked a new structuration. Though the structuration was new, the mentality behind it -

strengthening the state- was not novel. The period was marked by the narrowing down of the state into the office of presidency and military with an increase in the powers of both.<sup>6</sup> This restructuration in the state was accompanied by a restructuration in the universities by the establishment of the Board of Higher Education (YÖK). As a reaction to the politicization in the past decade, the state ensured overwhelming control in the appointment of university staff. The liberal identity of the 1990s was born into this political and academic structure. It grew out of the universities with claims to the true comprehension of liberalism.

This group was formed by a number of figures from the *Yeni Forum* group. As reminiscent of its precedent, the *Yeni Forum* group also presented a bifurcated identity, especially in the 1980s. Alongside their proclaimed liberalism, they adopted a conservative discourse colored by faith in "the creation and internalization of Turkish-Islamic-Western civilization." Thus, again resembling the *Forum* experience, the liberal aspect tried to forge itself alternative mediums of organization in the Association for Liberal Thinking (*Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu*) and of expression in the quarterly *Liberal Düşünce*.

Turkish liberal intellectuals of the 1990s share with those of the preceding periods adherence to Anglo-American liberal tradition. They are *nouveaux* since they

---

<sup>6</sup>. Heper, "The Executive in the Third Turkish Republic, 1982-1989," *Governance*, 3 (3) (1990), pp. 299-319.

seem to have put an end to the pendulum between republic and democracy which had shaped the liberal-minded intellectual identity, especially after the transition to multi-party politics. They have chosen liberal theory as the basis of their comprehension of democracy. Thus, unlike their predecessors *Liberal Düşünce* group do not grapple with the problematique of expressing *their* liberalism within the parameters of the Republic. The pendulum seems to have swung from Republic towards the edge of the democracy of liberalism. With a broader consideration, this may be interpreted as an initial step taken by the liberal intellectual away from the myth of democracy to liberal ethos.

The *Liberal Düşünce* group resort to the classical liberal standing in the formulation of their theoretical framework. Thus, they take not the citizen of the Republic, but the individual as their basic category. For them individualist-liberal mentality forms the basis of Western civilization. It is in this respect that the liberal intellectual of the 1990s has come to have a new mission -that of liberalizing. The object to liberalize is democracy and the task is liberalizing it from the state.

The evolution of liberal identity as framed in the intellectual discourse throughout the Republican era took place in a social context that is high-in-stateness. This had detrimental effects on the consistency in the conceptual matrice of liberal intellectuals not only in different periods, but also in the same period. However,

for the sake of consistency in the present study, one may conclude with a brief categorization on the basis of the missionary task that the Republican intellectual has took upon himself. In the early Republican era, the intellectual preoccupation was drawn with the modernizing mission; the following eras that began by the transition to multi-party period and extended till the 1990s, were ones when the democratizing spirit characterized intellectual vocation. All in all, the liberal intellectual hovered first, between the state (read as order) and opposition (read as freedom) (mono-party period); and then between the state (read as the Republic) and opposition (read as democracy) (multi-party period). The liberal intellectuals of the 1990s have adopted a liberalizing mission. Abstaining from definitive conclusions, it may be argued that they walk on an open-ended path of universal values in a national context. There is, however, a dilemma at the core of their agenda: How is one to achieve a spontaneous order which in their referential terminology corresponds to the evolution of liberal thought and practices in the British context,<sup>7</sup> in a country which for them could not develop a liberal tradition at all? This problem carries the risk falling into constructivism in their aspiration to construct the liberal tradition in Turkey. Perhaps it is safe to conclude that the tradition of Turkish liberal thought is most conspicuously symbolized in denial of the precedents, but not in a specific evolution of a strain of thought throughout subsequent generations.

---

<sup>7</sup>. Freidrich A. Hayek, "Liberalism," in *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics and the History of Ideas*, ed. Freidrich A. Hayek (London: Routledge, 1978), 119-51.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Sources on the State, Intellectual and Liberal Thought

- Badie, Bertrand and Birnbaum, Pierre. *The Sociology of the State*. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1983.
- Badie, Bertrand and Birnbaum, Pierre. "Sociology of the state revisited." *International Social Science Journal*. 140 (June 1994), 153-67.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. *Legislators and Interpreters*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987.
- Bazillion, Richard J. "Liberalism, Modernization, and the Social Question in the Kingdom of Saxony, 1830-1890." In *In Search of a Liberal Germany: Studies in the History of German Liberalism from 1789 to the Present*. eds. Konrad H. Jarauch and Larry Eugene Jones, 87-110. USA: Berg Publishers, Inc. 1990.
- Bellamy, Richard. "T.H. Green and the morality of Victorian liberalism." In *Victorian Liberalism: Nineteenth century political thought and practice*. ed. Richard Bellamy, 131-51. London and New York: Routledge, 1990.
- Bellamy, Richard. *Liberalism and Modern Society: An Historical Argument*. UK: Polity Press, 1992.
- Benda, Julien. *The Treason of the Intellectuals*. Translated by Richard Aldington. N.Y. and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1969.
- Bendix, Reinhard. "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered." *Comparative Studies In Society and History*. 9 : 3 (April 1967), 291-346.
- Birnbaum, Pierre. "States, ideologies and collective action In Western Europe." *International Social Science Journal*, 32 : 4 (1980), 671-86.
- Birnbaum, Pierre. "State, Center and Bureaucracy." *Government and Opposition*. 16 (1981), 58-77.

- The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought*. ed. David Miller. UK : Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1987, 183-5.
- Boesche, Roger. *The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987.
- Brubaker, Rogers. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 1992.
- Carnoy, Martin. "Whither Theories of the State?" In *The State and Political Theory*. ed. Martin Carnoy, 246-61. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Dunleavy, Patrick and O'Leary, Brendan eds. *Theories of the State*. Hampshire and London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1987.
- Dyson, Kenneth H.F. *The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and Institution*. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980.
- Eisenstadt, S. N., Moore, Wilbert E. and Smelser, Neil J. eds. *Modernization: Protest and Change*. N.J. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, 1966.
- Eisenstadt, "Intellectuals and tradition." *Daedalus*. 101 (Spring 1972), 1-19.
- Eisenstadt, S.N. "Post-Traditional Societies and the Continuity and Reconstruction of Tradition." *Daedalus*. 102 : 1 (Winter 1973), 1-27.
- Evans, Peter B., Rueschemeyer, Dietrich and Skocpol, Theda. "On the Road toward a More Adequate Understanding of the State." In *Bringing the State Back In*. eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol, 351-66. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Eyerman Ron, Svensson, Lennart G. and Söderqvist, Thomas eds. *Intellectuals, Universities and the State in Modern Societies*. California: University of California Press, 1987.
- Eyerman, Ron. *Between Culture and Politics: Intellectuals in Modern Society*. UK: Polity Press, 1994.

- Flacks, Dick. "Making History and Making Theory: Notes on How Intellectuals Seek Relevance." In *Intellectuals and Politics: Social Theory in a Changing World*. ed. Charles C. Lemert, 3-18. Newbury Park, London and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991.
- Gellner, Ernest. "La Trahison de la Trahison des Clercs." In *The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals*. eds. Ian Maclean, Alan Montefiore and Peter Winch, 17-29. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Grant, Ruth W. *John Locke's Liberalism*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
- Gray, John ed. *Liberalisms: Essays on Political Philosophy*. London and New York: Routledge, 1989.
- Gray, John. "The liberalism of Karl Popper." In *Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy*. ed. John Gray, 10-27. London and New York: Routledge, 1989.
- Gray, John W. and Smith, G. W. eds. *J.S. Mill ON LIBERTY in focus*. London and New York: Routledge, 1991.
- Giddens, Anthony. "The Modern State." In *Sociology: A Brief But Critical Introduction*. ed. Anthony Giddens, 77-96. London: Macmillan, 1982.
- Hayek, Friedrich A. "Liberalism." In *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas*. ed. Friedrich A. Hayek, 119-51. London: Routledge, 1978. Reprint. London: Routledge, 1982.
- Held, David and Krieger, Joel. "Accumulation, Legitimation and the State: the Ideas of Clauss Offe and Jürgen Habermas." In *States and Societies*. eds. Held et al., 487-97. UK: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1983.
- Held, David, and et al., eds. *States and Societies*. UK: Basil Blackwell, 1983.
- International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* (USA: The Macmillan Company and the Fress Press).
- Janowitz, Moris. *The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983.

- Jessop, Bob. "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State." *Cambridge Journal of Economics*. 1 : 4 (1977), 353-73.
- Jessop, Bob. *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place*. UK: Polity Press, 1990.
- Kastendiek, Hans. "Political development and political science in Western Europe." In *The Development of Political Science: A Comparative Survey*. eds. David Easton, John G. Gunnell and Luigi Graziano, 108-26. London and New York: Routledge, 1991.
- Kelly, George Armstrong. *The Humane Comedy: Constant, Tocqueville and French Liberalism*. Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, Melbourne, Sidney: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Kilcullen, John. "Locke on Political Obligation." *Review of Politics*. 45 (1983), 323-44.
- King, Roger. *The State in Modern Society: New Directions in Political Sociology*. Chatham New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers Inc., 1986.
- Krieger, Leonard. *The German Idea of Freedom*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1972.
- Nisbet, Robert. *The Making of Modern Society*. Great Britain: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, 1986.
- Smith, Woodruff D. *Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany: 1840-1920*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Langewische, Dieter. "The Nature of German Liberalism." In *Modern Germany Reconsidered (1870-1945)*. ed. Gordon Martel, 96 -116. London and New York: Routledge, 1992.
- Laski, Harold J. *The Rise of European Liberalism: An Essay in Interpretation*. London: George Allen and Unwin LTD, 1936.
- Leca, Jean. "French political science and its 'subfields': some reflections on the intellectual organization of the discipline in relation to its historical and social situation." In *The Development of Political Science: A Comparative Survey*. eds.



- David Easton, John G. Gunnell and Luigi Graziano, 147-65.  
London and New York: Routledge, 1991.
- Lipset, Seymour M. and Asoke Baseu, "Intellectual Types and Political Roles." In *The Idea of Social Structure, Papers in Honor of Robert M. Kerton*. ed. Lewis A. Coser 1975.
- Lukes, Steven. *Individualism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973.
- Macpherson, C.B. *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1962.
- Mann, Michael. "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results." In *States in History*. ed. John A. Hall, 113-36. UK: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986.
- Mannheim, Karl. *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, Translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils. San Diego, New York and London: HBJ Publishers, 1985.
- Mannheim, Karl. "The Problem of the Intelligentsia: An Inquiry into its Past and Present Role." In *Essays on the Sociology of Culture*. ed. Bryan S. Turner, 91-166. London: Routledge, 1992.
- Manning, D.J. *Liberalism*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976.
- Martin, Kingsley. *French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century*. ed. J.P. Mayer. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962.
- Merquior, J.G. *Liberalism: Old and New*. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991.
- Nettl, J.P. "The State as a Conceptual Variable." *World Politics*. 20 : 4 (July 1968), 303-33.
- Offe Claus and Volker Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State." *New German Critique*. 6 (1975), 137-47.
- Pangle, Thomas L. *Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on The Spirit of the Laws*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1973.

- Poggi, Gianfranco. *The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects*. UK: Polity Press, 1990.
- Radhakrishnan, R. "Toward an Effective Intellectual." In *The World of Intellectuals*. eds. Dharam Vir and B.P. Sharma, 57-99. New Delhi: Classical Publishing Co., 1990.
- Rapaczynski, Andrzej. *Nature and Politics*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987.
- Resnick, Philip. "The functions of the modern state: In search of a theory." In *The State in Global Perspective*. ed. Ali Kazancigil, 155-83. UK and USA: Gower Publishing Company Ltd., 1986.
- Robbins, Bruce ed. *Intellectuals: Aesthetics, Politics and Academics*. USA: University of Minnesota Press, 1990.
- Ross, Andrew. "Defenders of the Faith and the New Class." In *Intellectuals: Aesthetics, Politics and Academics*. ed. Bruce Robbins, 101-32. USA: University of Minnesota Press, 1990.
- Ruggiero, Guido de. *The History of European Liberalism*. Translated by R.G. Collingwood. Boston: Beacon Press, 1967.
- Scazki, Jerry. "Intellectuals between politics and culture." In *The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals*. eds. Ian Maclean, Alan Montefiore and Peter Winch, 247-56. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Shapiro, Ian. *The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory*. USA: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Shils, Edward. *The Intellectuals and Powers and Other Essays*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972.
- Shils, Edward. "Intellectuals and responsibility." In *The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals*. eds. Ian Maclean, Alan Montefiore and Peter Winch, 257-306. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Skocpol, Theda. "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research." In *Bringing the State Back In*. eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich

- Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol, 3-37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Strauss, Leo. *Natural Right and History*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1953.
- Skocpol, Theda. *States and Social Revolutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- Vincent, Andrew. *Theories of the State*. UK: Basil Blackwell, 1987.
- Vincent, Andrew, "Liberalism." In *Modern Political Ideologies*. ed. Andrew Vincent, 22-54. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1992.
- Vorlander, Hans. "Is there a liberal political tradition in Germany?" In *The Liberal Political Tradition: Contemporary Reappraisals*. ed. James Meadowcroft, 101-14. UK and USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1996.
- Waldron, Jeremy. "Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism." *The Philosophical Quarterly*. 37 : 147 (April 1987), 127-50.
- Wolff, Kurt H. "The Intellectual Between Culture and Politics." In *The World of Intellectuals*. eds. Dharam Vir and B.P. Sharma, 119-32. New Delhi: Classical Publishing Co., 1990.

## Sources on Ottoman - Turkish Politics, State and Intellectual

- Ağaoğulları, Mehmet Ali. "The Ultrationalist Right." In *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*. eds. Irvin Cemil Schick and E. Ahmet Tonak, 177 - 217, 2nd ed. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Ahmad, Feroz. *The Turkish Experiment In Democracy, 1950-1975*. London: C. Hurst and Company, 1977.
- Akarlı, Engin D. ed. *Belgelerle Tanzimat: Osmanlı Sadrazamlarından Ali ve Fuad Paşaların Siyasi Vasiyetnameleri (Tanzimat in the Documents: Political Testaments of Ottoman Grand Viziers Ali and Fuad Pashas)*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1978.
- Aksan, Virginia H. "Ottoman Political Writing, 1768-1808." *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 25 (1993), 53-69.
- Akşin, Sina. "Jön Türkler" (Young Turks). In *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 3, 832-43. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985.
- Alkin, Erdoğan. "Atatürk Döneminde Devletçilik" (Etatism in Atatürk's Period). In *Atatürk Döneminde Türkiye Ekonomisi Seminer (Seminar on Turkish Economy in Atatürk's Period)*. İstanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Bankası, 1981.
- Alpar, Cem ed. *Kadro*. Vols. I,II. Ankara: A. İ. T. İ. A. Yayınları, 1978/1979.
- (Atay), Falih Rifki. "Darülfunun." *Cumhuriyet*. (July 23, 1932).
- Ateş, Nevin Yurdsever. *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Kuruluşu ve Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Foundation of Turkish Republic and Progressive Republican Party)*. İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1994.
- Baltacı, Cahid. "Osmanlı Eğitim Sistemi" (Ottoman Educational System). In *Osmanlı Ansiklopedisi (Ottoman Encyclopedia)*. Vol.2. 7-145. İstanbul: Ağaç Yayıncılık, 1993.

- Başar, Ahmet Hamdi. *Atatürk'le Üç Ay ve 1930'dan Sonra Türkiye (Three Months with Atatürk and Turkey after 1930)*. Ankara: A.İ.T.İ.A Basımevi, 1981.
- Başgil, Ali Fuad. *Cihan Sulhu ve İnsan Hakları (World Peace and Human Rights)*. Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti Neşriyatı, no. 6. İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1948.
- Başgil, Ali Fuad. *27 Mayıs İhtilali ve Sebepleri (The May 27 Revolution and Its Causes)*. Translated by M. Ali Sebük and İ. Hakkı Akın. İstanbul: Çeltüt Matbaacılık, 1966.
- (Belge), Burhan Asaf. "Arkada kalan Darülfünun" (Darülfünun Which Lagged Behind). *Kadro*. 9 (August 1932), 47-8.
- (Belge), Burhan Asaf. "Fırka Mektebi" (Party School). *Kadro*. 9 (August 1932), 30-3.
- (Belge), Burhan Asaf. "Üniversite'nin Manası" (The Meaning of University). *Kadro*. 20 (August 1933), 25-6.
- Belge, Murat. "Tarihi Gelişme Süreci İçinde Aydınlar" (Intellectuals in the Process of Historical Development). In *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. Vol.1, 122-9. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983.
- Bendix, Reinhard. *Nation Building and Citizenship*. New York, London, Sydney: John Wiley and Sons., Inc., 1964.
- Berkes, Niyazi. "Ziya Gökalp: His Contribution to Turkish Nationalism." *The Middle Eastern Journal*. (Autumn 1954).
- Berkes, Niyazi. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University, 1964.
- Berkes, Niyazi. "Batı Düşünü ve Türkiye" (Western Thought and Turkey). In *Felsefe ve Toplum Bilim Yazıları (Essays on Philosophy and Social Science)*. 166-8. İstanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1985.
- Birand, Kamıran. *Aydınlanma Devri Devlet Felsefesinin Tanzimat'a Tesirleri (Effects of the Philosophy of State in Enlightenment Period on Tanzimat)*. Ankara: Son Havadis, 1955.

- Birtek, Faruk. "The Rise and Fall of Etatism In Turkey, 1932-1950: The Uncertain Road In the Restructuring of a Semi-Peripheral Economy." *Review*. 7 : 3 (Winter 1985), 407-39.
- Boratav, Korkut. "İktisat Tarihi (1908-1990)" (Economic History). In *Türkiye Tarihi: Çağdaş Türkiye (1908-1980) (History of Turkey: Modern Turkey [1908-1980])* ed. Sina Akşin. Vol. 4, 265-353. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1995.
- Cavid Bey. *Şiar'ın Defteri (Şiar's Diary)*. ed. Şiar Yalçın. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995.
- Cavit Bey: *İdama Beş Kala (Cavid Bey: Five Minutes to Execution)*. İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1993.
- "Celal Bayar Ankara'da konuştu" (Celal Bayar Speaks in Ankara). *Vatan* (April 25, 1949).
- Chambers, Richard L. "The Civil Bureaucracy: Turkey." In *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*. eds. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, 310-27. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964.
- Çavdar, Tefvik. *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi: 1839-1950 (Turkey's History of Democracy: 1839-1950)*. Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1995.
- Daver, Bülent. "Atatürk ve Sosyo-Politik Sistem Görüşü" (Atatürk and His View of Socio-Political System). In *Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk (Atatürk in the Light of Modern Thought)*. 245-79, 2nd ed. İstanbul: Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 1986.
- Davison, Roderic H. *Reform in the Ottoman Empire: 1856-1876*. New York: Gordian Press, 1973.
- Demirel, Ahmet. *Birinci Mecliste Muhalefet: İkinci Grup (Opposition in the First Assembly: The Second Group)*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994.
- "Din, milliyetçilik bahsinde Bayar'ın konuşması" (Bayar's speech on religion, nationalism). *Vatan* (January 9, 1945).
- Ergüder, Üstün. "Post-1980 Parties and Politics in Turkey." In *Perspectives on Democracy In Turkey*. ed.

Ergun Özbudun, 113-45. Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1988.

- Eroğul, Cem. *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi* (Democratic Party: Its History and Ideology). Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası: 1970.
- Eroğul, Cem. "The Establishment of Multi-Party Rule: 1945-71." in *Turkey In Transition: New Perspectives*. eds. İrvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak, 101-43. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Evin, Ahmet. "Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After 1980." In *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey In the 1980s*. eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin 201-13. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988.
- Fleischer, Cornell. "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism and 'Ibn Khaldunism' in Sixteenth Century Ottoman Letters." In *Ibn Khaldun and Islamic Ideology*. ed. Bruce B. Lawrence, 49-61. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984.
- Fleischer. *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: Mustafa Ali (1541-1600)*. Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Frey, Frederick. *The Turkish Political Elite*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1965.
- Gauthier, David. "Why Ought One Obey God? Reflections on Hobbes and Locke." In *Essays on Early Modern Philosophers: From Descartes and Hobbes to Newton and Leibniz*. ed. Vere Chappel, 103-25. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992.
- Gevgilili, Ali. "Türkiye Basını" (Turkish Press). In *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. Vol.1, 202-28. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983.
- Gökberk, Macit. "Aydınlanma Felsefesi, Devrimler ve Atatürk" (Enlightenment Philosophy, Revolutions and Atatürk). In *Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk*. 2nd ed., 283-333. İstanbul: Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 1986.
- Göle, Nilüfer. "Liberal Yanılgı" (Liberal Fallacy). *Türkiye Günlüğü*. 24 (Fall 1993), 12-7.

- Göle, Nilüfer. "Toward and Autonomization of Civil Society." In *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*. eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 213-22. Boulder, San Fransisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994.
- Hale, William. *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey*. London: Croom Helm, 1981.
- Hale, William. "Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective." In *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*. eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 159-175. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988.
- Harris, George S. "The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s: Guardians or Decision-Makers?" In *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*. eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 177-200. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988.
- Heper. *Türk Kamu Bürokrasisinde Gelenekçilik ve Modernleşme: Siyaset Sosyolojisi Açısından Bir İnceleme (Traditionalism and Modernization in Turkish Public Bureaucracy: An Analysis from the Perspective of Political Sociology)*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1977.
- Heper. "Recent Instability in Turkish Politics: End of a Monocentrist Policy?" *International Journal of Turkish Studies*. 1 (1979 - 1980), 102-13.
- Heper, Metin. "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire with Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century." *International Political Science Review*. 1 (January 1980), 81-105.
- Heper. "A Weltanschauung-turned-Partial Ideology and Normative Ethics: 'Atatürkism' in Turkey." *Orient*. 1 (1984), 83-94.
- Heper, Metin. *The State Tradition in Turkey*. Walkington, England: The Eothen Press, 1985.
- Heper, Metin. "Atatürk'te Devlet Düşüncesi" In *Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk*. 2nd ed., 207-43. İstanbul: Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 1986.
- Heper. "State, Democracy and Bureaucracy In Turkey." In *The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Perspective*. ed. Metin Heper, 131-45. New York,



- Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1987.
- Heper. "The state and debureaucratization: the case of Turkey." *International Social Science Journal*. 126 (1990), 605-15.
- Heper, Metin. "The Executive in the Third Turkish Republic, 1982 - 1989." *Governance*. 3 : 3 (1990), 299-319.
- Heper. "The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in Comparative Perspective." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 18 : 1 (1991), 38-51.
- Heper, Metin. "Introduction." In *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*. eds. Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, 1-9. London: I.B. Tauris, 1991.
- Heper, Metin. "Bureaucrats: Persistent Elitists." In *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*. eds. Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer, 35-68. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993.
- Heper. "Transitions to Democracy in Turkey: Toward a New Pattern." In *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*. eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 13-20. Boulder, San Fransisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994.
- Heper. "Trials and Tribulations of Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic." In *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*. eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 231-41. Boulder, San Fransisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994.
- Hershlag, Z.Y. *Turkey: The Challenge of Growth*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968.
- Işın, Ekrem. "Osmanlı Modernleşmesi ve Pozitivizm" (Ottoman Modernization and Positivism). In *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. Vol.2, 352-62. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985.
- İnalçık, Halil. "Turkey: The Nature of Traditional Society." In *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*. eds. R.E. Ward and D.A. Rustow, 42-61. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964.
- İnalçık. "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri" (Implementation of Tanzimat and Its Social

Reactions). Türk Tarih Kurumu. *Bulleten*. 28 : 112, October 1964, 623-49.

İnalcık, Halil. *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600*. USA: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973.

İnalcık, Halil. "Turkey Between Europe and the Middle East." *Foreign Policy*. 7 (1980).

İnalcık, Halil. *Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic History*. London: Variorum Reprints, 1985.

İnalcık, Halil. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu; Toplum ve Ekonomi Üzerine Arşiv Çalışmaları, İncelemeler (Ottoman Empire; Archive Studies, Analysis on Society and Economy)*. ed. Muhittin Salih Eren. İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık Ltd. Şti., 1993.

İnan, A. Afet. *Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal'in El Yazıları (Civil Instructions and Mustafa Kemal's Handwritings)*. 2nd ed. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988.

İnsel, Ahmet. *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı (Crisis of Turkish Society)*. İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1990.

İrem, Celal Nazım. *Kemalist Modernism and the Genesis of Modern Turkish Conservatism*. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. Bilkent University. 1996.

İslamoğlu-İnan, Huricihan. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Köylü (State and Peasantry in Ottoman Empire)*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 1991.

*İstanbul Üniversitesi: Kuruluş, Tarihçe, Teşkilat ve Öğretim Üyeleri 1453-1981 (The Establishment, History, Organization and Staff of İstanbul University 1453-1981)*. İstanbul, n.p., 1983.

Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. "The 1983 Parliament in Turkey: Changes and Continuities." In *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*. eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 37-62. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988.

Karpat, Kemal H. *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.

Karpat, Kemal H. "The Mass Media: Turkey," In *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*. eds. Robert E.

Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964.

Karpat, Kemal H. "Land Regime, Social Structure and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire." In *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*. eds. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, 69-90. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968.

Karpat, Kemal H. "The Transformation of the Ottoman State." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. 3 (1972), 243-81.

Karpat. "Structural Change, Historical Stages of Modernization, and the Role of Social Groups in Turkish Politics." In *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis*. 1-92. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973.

Karpat, Kemal. "Political and Social Thought in Turkey." In *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East*. ed. Kemal Karpat, 365-459. 2nd ed. New York: Praeger, 1982.

Kazancıgil, Ali. "The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism." In *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*. eds. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, 37-56. London: C. Hurst and Company, 1981.

Kerwin, Robert W. "Türkiye'de Devletçilik: 1933-1950" (Etatism in Turkey: 1933-1950). Translated by Nevin Coşar. In *Türkiye'de Devletçilik (Etatism in Turkey)*. ed. Nevin Coşar, 97-114. İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1995.

Keyder, Çağlar. *Turkey: A Study In Capitalist Development*. London: Verso Publications, 1987.

Keyder, Çağlar. "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy." In *Turkey In Transition*. eds. Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak, 27-65. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Keyder, Çağlar. "Economic Development and Crisis: 1950-1980." In *Turkey In Transition*. eds. Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak, 293-308. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Kılçık, Haluk. ed. *Adnan Menderes'in Konuşmaları, Demeçleri, Makaleleri (Speeches, Statements,*

- Articles of Adnan Menderes*). 4 vols. Ankara: Demokratlar Kulübü Yayınları, 1991.
- Kili, Suna. *Türk Anayasaları (Turkish Constitutions)*. 2nd ed. Ankara: Tekin Yayınevi, 1982.
- Koloğlu, Orhan. "Osmanlı Basını: İçeriği ve Rejimi" (Ottoman Press: Its Content and Regime). In *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. Vol.1, 68-93. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985.
- Kongar, Emre. *İmparatorluk'tan Günümüze Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı (Social Structure of Turkey from the Empire until Present)*. İstanbul: Evrim Matbaacılık Ltd., 1985.
- Köker, Levent. *Demokrasi Üzerine Yazılar (Essays on Democracy)*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1992.
- Kuruç, Bilsay. *Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi (Economy in Mustafa Kemal's Period)*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987.
- Landau, Jacob M. *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974.
- Levi, Avner. "The Justice Party, 1961-1980," in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*. eds. Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau, 134-51. London: I.B. Tauris, 1991.
- Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. 2nd ed. London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Mango, Andrew. "The State of Turkey." *Middle Eastern Studies*. 13 (1977), 261-73.
- Mardin, Şerif. *Türkiye'de İktisadi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi (Development of Economic Thought in Turkey)*. 12. Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Maliye Enstitüsü, 1962.
- Mardin, Şerif. *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962.
- Mardin, Şerif. "Power, Civil Society and Culture In the Ottoman Empire." *Comparative Studies In Society and History*. 12 (June 1969), 258-81.

- Mardin, Şerif. "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus*. 102 (1973), 169-89.
- Mardin, Şerif. "Yeni Osmanlılar ve Siyasi Fikirleri" (Young Ottomans and Their Political Ideas). In *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. Vol.6, 1698-701. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985.
- Mardin, Şerif. "Tanzimat ve Aydınlar" (Tanzimat and Intellectuals). In *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. Vol.1, 46-54. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985.
- Mardin, Şerif. "Freedom in an Ottoman Perspective." In *State, Democracy and Military in Turkey in the 1980s* eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 23-35. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988.
- Mardin, Şerif. *Türk Modernleşmesi: Makaleler IV (Turkish Modernization: Articles IV)*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992.
- Mazıcı, Nurşen. *Belgelerle Atatürk Döneminde Muhalefet (1919-1926)*. İstanbul: Dilmen Yayınevi, 1984.
- Menderes, Adnan. "Teessür Verici Bir Manzara" (A Regretful Panorama). *Vatan* (May 19, 1946).
- Menderes, Adnan. "Demokrat Partinin En Bariz Vasfı" (The Most Obvious Quality of Democratic Party). *Vatan* (May 23, 1946).
- Menderes, Adnan. "Ulus Gazetesi'ndeki Bir Cevap Münasebetiyle" (On the Occasion of a Response in *Ulus Daily*). *Vatan* (June 22, 1946).
- Menderes, Adnan. "İdareciler Kongresi Dolayısıyla" (On Account of Administrators' Congress) *Vatan* (January 25, 1947).
- Menderes, Adnan. "Açık Konuşma Zarureti" (Obligation to Speak Clearly). *Vatan* (January 28, 1947).
- Ortaylı. "Tanzimat" (Tanzimat). In *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. Vol.6, 1545-47. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985.

- Ortaylı, İlber. *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı (The Longest Century of the Empire)*. İstanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1987.
- Öğün, Süleyman Seyfi. "Bir Türkçü-İslamcı Eklemlenme Figürü Olarak Ağaoğlu Ahmet" (Ahmet Ağaoğlu as a Turkist-Islamist Articulation Figure). In *Modernleşme, Milliyetçilik ve Türkiye (Modernization, Nationalism and Turkey)*. 195-203. İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1995.
- Ökçün, A Gündüz ed. *Türkiye İktisat Kongresi 1923-İzmir: Haberler-Belgeler-Yorumlar (Turkish Economic Congress 1923-İzmir: New-Documents-Comments)*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1981.
- Öncü, Ayşe. "Academics: The West in the Discourse of University Reform." in *Turkey and the West*. eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 142-176. I.B. Tauris, 1993.
- Özbudun, Ergun. "The nature of the Kemalist political regime." In *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*. eds. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, 79-102. London: C. Hurst and Company, 1981.
- Özbudun, Ergun. "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations." In *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*. ed. Ergun Özbudun, 1-58. Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1988.
- Özbudun, Ergun. "The Status of the President of the Republic under the Turkish Constitution of 1982: Presidentialism or Parliamentarism?" In *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*. eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin 37-45. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988.
- Özman, A. Aylin. *The State and Bar Associations in Turkey: A Study in Interest Group Politics*. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. Bilkent University. 1995.
- Robert Mantran ed., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi (History of Ottoman Empire)*. Vol.1 : *Osmanlı Devletinin doğuşundan XVIII. yüzyılın sonuna (From the Birth of Ottoman State to the End of 16th century)*. Translated by Server Tanilli. İstanbul: Say Dağıtım Ltd. Şti., 1992.

- Roos, Leslie L. Jr. and Roos, Noralou P. *Managers of Modernization: Organizations and Elites in Turkey (1950-1969)*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971.
- Rustow, Dankwart A. "Turkey's Travails." *Foreign Affairs*. 58 (1979), 1-29.
- Rustow, Dankwart A. "Atatürk as an institution-builder." In *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*. eds. Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun, 57-77. London: C. Hurst and Company, 1981.
- Sakaoğlu, Necdet ed. *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Tarih Sözlüğü*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985.
- Sayari, Sabri. "The Turkish Party System in Transition." *Government and Opposition*. 13 (1978), pp. 39-57.
- Sevgen, Nazmi ed. *Celal Bayar Diyor ki: 1920-1950 (Celal Bayar Says: 1920-1950)*. İstanbul: n.p., 1951.
- Shaw, Stanford J. "Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Reformers." In *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*. eds. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, 29-39. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968.
- Shaw, Stanford J. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Vol.1 : *Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- Shils, Edward. "The Intellectuals In the Political Development of the New States." In *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism* ed. John H. Kautsky, 195-234. New York, London, Sydney: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967.
- Statement by Refik Koraltan. *Vatan* (October 2, 1945).
- Statement by Adnan Menderes. *Vatan* (September 22, 1945).
- Statement by Adnan Menderes. *Vatan* (April 1, 1946).
- Statement by Adnan Menderes. *Vatan* (November 2, 1949).

- Tachau, Frank and Metin Heper. "The State, Politics and the Military in Turkey." *Comparative Politics*. 16 : 1 (1983), 17-33.
- Timur, Taner. *Osmanlı Toplumsal Düzeni (Ottoman Social Order)*. 2nd ed. Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1979.
- Timur, Taner. *Osmanlı Kimliği (Ottoman Identity)*. İstanbul: Hil Yayın, 1986.
- Toprak. "Tanzimat'ta Osmanlı Sanayii" (Ottoman Industry in *Tanzimat*). In *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. Vol.5, 1345-7. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985.
- Toprak. "Osmanlı Devleti ve Sanayileşme Sorunu" (Ottoman State and the Problem of Industrialization). In *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. Vol.5, 1340-4. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985.
- Toprak, "Osmanlı Devleti'nda Para ve Bankacılık" (Money and Banking in Ottoman State). In *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. vol.3, 760-70. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985.
- Toprak, Zafer. "İktisat Tarihi" (History of Economics). In *Türkiye Tarihi*. ed. Sina Akşin Vol.3, 219-74. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1988.
- Torun, O.N. "The Establishment and the Structure of the State Planning Organization." In *Planning in Turkey*. eds. S. İlkin and E. İlkin, 44-70. Ankara: METU, 1967.
- Trimberger, Ellen Kay. *Revolution From Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978.
- Tunaya, Tarık Zafer. *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952 (Political Parties in Turkey 1859-1952)*. İstanbul, 1952.
- Tunaya, Tarık Zafer. *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri (Westernization Movements in Turkish Political Life)*. Siyaset İlmi Serisi 3. İstanbul: Yedigün Matbaası, 1960.
- Tunçay, Mete and Özen, Haldun. "1933 Darülfünun Tasfiyesi veya Bir Tek-Parti Politikacısının Önlenemez Yükselişi ve Düşüşü" (The Darülfünun Purge of 1933



or Unavoidable Rise and Fall of a Single Party  
Politician). *Tarih ve Toplum*. (October 1984), 6-20.

Tunçay, Mete. "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Siyasal Düşünce Akımları" (Trends of Political Thought in Turkish Republic). *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 7, 1924-8. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1982-1985.

Turan, İlter. "Continuity and Change In Turkish Bureaucracy: The Kemalist Period and After." In *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*. ed. Jacob M. Landau, 99-121. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.

Turan, İlter. *Westernization and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey*. Occasional Paper. Ebenhausen, Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 1989.

Ülken, Hilmi Ziya. *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi* (*History of Contemporary Thought in Turkey*). İstanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 1992.

Weiker, Walter F. *The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961: Aspects of Military Politics*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1980.

Yurdaydın, Hüseyin G. "Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi" (History of Thought and Science) In *Türkiye Tarihi (History of Turkey)*. ed. Sina Akşin, Vol.3, 275-344. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1988.

Zürcher, Eric Jan. *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party 1924 - 1925*. Leiden, New York, Kobenhavn and Köln: E.J. Brill, 1991.

Zürcher, Erik Jan. *Turkey: A Modern History*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993.

## Sources on Ottoman - Turkish Liberal Thought

- Çavdar, Tefvik. *Türkiye'de Liberalizm (1860-1990)* (*Liberalism in Turkey [1860-1990]*). Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1992.
- Ege, Nezahat Nurettin. *Prens Sabahattin*. İstanbul: Güneş Neşriyat, 1977.
- Erdoğan, Mustafa and Atilla Yayla. "Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu'nun kurucularından Mustafa Erdoğan ve Atilla Yayla ile Mülakat" (Interview with Mustafa Erdoğan and Atilla Yayla, Founders of Association for Liberal Thinking). Interview by Murat Yılmaz. *Polemik*. 12 (March-April 1994), 34-37.
- Erkul, Ali. "Prens Sabahattin." In *Türk Toplum Bilimcileri I (Turkish Social Scientists)*. ed. Emre Kongar, 83-150. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1982.
- Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Meslek-i İçtimai Akımı" (Social Science Trend in Ottoman State) In *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 2, 382-6. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985.
- "Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti Beyannamesi" (Declaration of Association for the Dissemination of Free Ideas). In *Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti'nin Beyanname ve Esas Nizamnamesi (Declaration and Founding Regulation of Association for the Dissemination of Free Ideas)*, 1-6. İstanbul: İsmail Akgün Matbaası, 1949.
- Prens Sabahattin. Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir? (How Can Turkey Be Saved?)* İstanbul: Türkiye Basımevi, 1950.
- Sencer, Muzaffer. "Mehmet Ali Şevki." In *Türk Toplum Bilimcileri II (Turkish Social Scientists II)*. ed. Emre Kongar, 31-67. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi A.Ş., 1988.
- (Sevündük), M. Ali Şevki. "Tecrübi Sosyoloji" (Experimental Sociology). *Mülkiye*. 29 (August 1933), 4-8.
- (Sevündük), M. Ali Şevki. "M. Paul Descamps'ın Yeni Eseri: La Sociologie Experimentale (1)" (New Work of M. Paul Descamps: La Sociologie Experimentale [1]) *Mülkiye*. 30 (September 1933), 4-10.

- (Sevündük), M. Ali Şevki. "Tecrübi Sosyoloji"  
(Experimental Sociology). *Mülkiye*. 32 (November  
1933), 5-8.
- (Sevündük), M. Ali Şevki. "Ümmilik ve İlk Tahsil Meselesi  
İlmi Usul ile Nasıl Tetkik Olunuyor?" (How Is the  
Issue of Collectivity and Primary Education Analyzed  
by Scientific Method?). *Mülkiye*. 36 (March 1934),  
10-5.
- (Sevündük), M. Ali Şevki. "Mesele Nasıl Vaz'edilmeli:  
Tahsil Mükellefiyeti mi? Tahsil İhtiyacı mı?" (How  
Should the Issue be Spelled: Obligation of Education  
or Need for Education?). *Mülkiye*. 37 (April 1934),  
7-14.
- (Sevündük), M. Ali Şevki. "Niçin Her Memleket Mektep  
İşini Aynı Yoldan Yürütemez?" (Why Education Cannot  
be Handled in the Same Manner in Every Country?)  
*Mülkiye*. 38 (May 1934), 4-9.
- (Sevündük), M. Ali Şevki. "Bizde Bir Asırlık Maarif İşi"  
(Our Centennial Issue of Education). *Mülkiye*. 39  
(June 1934), 20-29.

#### **Books and Articles by Ahmet Ağaoğlu**

- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. "Şark ve Garp" (The East and West).  
*Vatan*. 158. (September 5, 1923). In *Atatürk Devri  
Fikir Hayatı I (Intellectual Life in Atatürk's  
Period I)*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları,  
1992, 83-7.
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. "Milli Şuur" (National Conscious)  
*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*. 1189. (August 8, 1924). In  
*Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı I*. Ankara: Kültür  
Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1992, 97-101.
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. "Milliyetçilik Cereyanının Esasları"  
(Principles of Nationalist Trend). *Türk Yurdu*. 2 :  
11 (August 1925), 389-95. In *Atatürk Devri Fikir  
Hayatı I*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1992,  
115-122.
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. *Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde (In the  
Land of Free Men)*. İstanbul: Sanayii Nefise  
Matbaası, 1930.
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. "Ziraat mi Sanayi mi?" (Agriculture or  
Industry?). *Akın* (June 3, 1933).

- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. "Nizamlı Hürriyet" (Ordered Freedom). *Akın* (June 5, 1933).
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. "Türk Entellektüellerinin Zaafları" (The Weaknesses of Turkish Intellectuals). *Akın* (June 7, 1933).
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. "Müstakil Meb'usluklar" (Independent Memberships of Parliament). *Akın* (June 15, 1933).
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. "Maarifimizin Islahı" (Reform of Our Educational System). *Akın* (June 21, 1933).
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. "Ana kanunlar ve Nazım Kanunlar" (Main Laws and By-Laws). *Akın* (June 27, 1933).
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. "Milliyetçilik" (Nationalism). *Akın* (July 10, 1933).
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. *Devlet ve Fert (The State and Individual)*. İstanbul: Sanayiinefise Matbaası, 1933.
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları (Memoirs of Free Party)*. 3rd ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994.
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. "Yaratıcı Tekamül" (Creative Evolution). *Kültür Haftası*. 3 (January 22, 1936), 59-60.
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. *Ben Neyim (Who Am I?)*. İstanbul: n.p., 939.
- Ağaoğlu. *İhtilal mi İnkilab mı? (Revolution or Reform?)*. Ankara: n.p., 1941-1942.

#### **Books and Articles by Ahmet Emin Yalman**

- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim: (1944- 1971) (My Recent Observations and Experiences: [1944 - 1971])*, 4 Vols, n.p.
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Bazı Esaslı Noktalar" (Some Essential Points). *Vatan* (September 27, 1923).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Gazi Paşa Hazretlerine Maruzat" (Appeal to Gazhi Pasha). *Vatan* (October 5, 1923).

- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "En Esaslı Mesele" (The Most Essential Issue). *Vatan* (January 8, 1925).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Bizi Maziye Bağlayan Köprüler" (Links That Tie Us to the Past). *Vatan* (October 9, 1940).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Tam ve Hakiki Demokrasiye Giden Yol" (The Road to Full and True Democracy). *Vatan* (December 24, 1940).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Fiili Halk Murakabesi" (Active Check by the People). *Vatan* (October 28, 1941).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "İdeal Din Sistemi: Diğerlerine Üstünlüğün Esaslı Sebepleri" (Ideal System of Religion: The Fundamental Reasons of Superiority over the Others). *Vatan* (November 27, 1941).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Kendi Kendimize Kavuşmak İhtiyacı" (The Need to Turn to Ourselves). *Vatan* (November 19, 1941).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Yarım ve Tam Vatandaşlık" (Half and Full Citizenship). *Vatan* (November 20, 1941).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Din ve İnkılap" (Religion and Revolution). *Vatan* (November 22, 1941).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Bir Tecrübenin Neticeleri" (The Consequences of an Experience). *Vatan* (November 25, 1941).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Din Bahsinde Vardığımız Neticeler" (Results Concerning the Issue of Religion). *Vatan* (December 4, 1941).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Parti Sistemi Demokrasinin Temeli Değil Hatalı Tarafıdır" (Party System is not the Base of Democracy, but its Misdemeanour). *Vatan* (December 31, 1941).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Söz Hürriyetine Dair" (On the Issue of Freedom of Expression). *Vatan* (April 14, 1942).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "On Ana Prensipten" (Ten Fundamental Principles). *Vatan* (August 1, 1942).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Dilde İstikrar ve Birlik" (Stability and Unity in Language). *Vatan* (August 10, 1942).

- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Yılanlar Kımıldarken" (While the Snakes are Moving). *Vatan* (August 12, 1942).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Tek Partili Sistemin Neticeleri" (The Consequences of Single Party System). *Vatan* (July 20, 1945).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Nazari Mantiğın Fendleri." Vatan (July 23, 1945).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "İkinci Parti Herşeye Deva mı?" (Is the Second Party the Remedy to all Troubles?). *Vatan* (July 24, 1945).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "İdare Edenler ve Edilenler" (The Governors and Governed). *Vatan* (August 2, 1945).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "İdare Edenler ve Edilenler" (The Governors and Governed). *Vatan* (August 3, 1945).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Demokrasi Müphem Bir Mefhum mu?" (Is Democracy an Ambiguous Concept?). *Vatan* (August 29, 1945).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Devletçilik ve Halk" (Etatism and People). *Vatan* (September 4, 1945).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Geniş Ufuklara Doğru" (Towards Wide Horizons). *Vatan* (September 19, 1945).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Politikada Tesanüt İmtihanı" (Trial of Solidarity in Politics). *Vatan* (October 4, 1945).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Sağlam Bünyenin Manası ve Kıymeti" (The Meaning and Value of Healthy Structure). *Vatan* (November 1, 1945).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Yeni Parti Kurulurken" (While the New Party is Founded). *Vatan* (December 3, 1945).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Demokrat Partinin Mesuliyetleri" (The Responsibilities of Democratic Party). *Vatan* (December 10, 1945).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Huzur ve Ferahlık Yolu" (The Road of Peace and Relief). *Vatan* (November 22, 1945).

- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Devlet Otoritesi" (State Authority). *Vatan* (December 8, 1945).
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "İktisadi Siyasetin Temelleri" (The Foundations of Political Economy). *Vatan* (December 21, 1945).
- Articles Published in *Forum***
- "Forum'un Davası" (*Forum's Cause*). *Forum*. 1 : 1 (April 1, 1954), 1-2.
- "Son Parti Çalışmaları ve Gelişme İstikametleri" (The Last Party Activities and Development Routes). *Forum*. 3 : 27 (May 1, 1955), 3-8.
- Soysal, Mümtaz. "İktisadi Devlet Teşekküllerinin Bünyesi" (The Structure of State Economic Enterprises). *Forum*. 3 : 27 (May 1, 1955), 12-13;
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Kültür Değiştirmemizin Temel Şartı" (The Main Imperative of Changing Our Culture). *Forum*. 3 : 27 (May 1, 1955), 20-21.
- Soysal, Mümtaz. "İktisadi Devlet Teşekküllerinin Murakabesi" (The Control over State Economic Enterprises). *Forum*. 3 : 28 (May 15, 1955), 11-13.
- "Meclis Tatile Girerken" (While the Assembly Closes down for Vacation) *Forum*. 3 : 29 (June 1, 1955), 1-2.
- Savcı, Bahri. "Murakabe Müessesesinin Korunması" (Protection of the Institution of Checks). *Forum*. 3 : 29 (June 1, 1955), 9-10.
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Aydınların Ferdietçiliği" (Individualism of Intellectuals). *Forum*. 3 : 29 (June 1, 1955), 16-7.
- "Türkiye'de Siyasi Buhran ve Muhalefet" (Political Crisis and Opposition in Turkey). *Forum*. 3 : 30 (June 15, 1955), 4.
- "Bir 'Müjde' ve Bir Unutkanlık" (A Good News and a Forgetfulness). *Forum*. 3 : 30 (June 15, 1955), 4-5.
- "Türkiye'de Yıkıcı Cereyanlar Meselesi" (Issue of Destructive Trends in Turkey). *Forum*. 3 : 30 (June 15, 1955) 1-3.

- "Yapmak Hürriyeti, İstemek Yasağı!" (Freedom to Do, Prohibition to Demand!). *Forum. 3* : 30 (June 15, 1955), 5.
- "Kendimize Güvenme Zamanı" (The Time to Trust Ourselves). *Forum. 3* : 31 (July 1, 1955), 1-3.
- "Rektör Seçimi" (The Election of Rector). *Forum. 3* : 31 (July 1, 1955), 5-6.
- Okyar, Osman. "İktisadi Plancılığımızın Şekil ve Muhteva Meselesi" (The Issue of the Form and Content of Our Economic Planning). *Forum. 3* : 31 (July 1, 1955), 9-10.
- "Dertlerimizin Asıl Kaynağı" (The True Reason of Our Problems). *Forum. 3* : 32 (July 15, 1955), 1-2.
- Savcı, Bahri. "İktidar Savaşı Yapmadan Siyaset" (Politics without Power Struggle). *Forum. 3* : 32 (July 15, 1955), 8-10.
- "Gene Grev Hakkına Dair" (On the Freedom to Strike). *Forum. 3* : 33 (August 1, 1955), 6.
- Savcı, Bahri. "Seçim İklimi Yoktur" (There is No Room for Elections). *Forum. 3* : 33 (August 1, 1955), 10-1.
- "İktisadi Plan İhtiyacı" (The Need for Economic Planning). *Forum. 3* : 34 (August 15, 1955), 6-7.
- Arsel, İlhan. "Hükümet Sistemimiz Hakkında" (About Our Government System). *Forum. 3* : 34 (August 15, 1955), 9-10.
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Üniversitelerimizde Bilimsel Çalışmalar" (Scientific Works in Our Universities). *Forum. 3* : 34 (August 15, 1955), 19-20.
- "Demokratik Bir Düzendeki İlim Adamlarının Yeri" (The Place of Scientists in a Democratic Order). *Forum. 3* : 35 (September 1, 1955). 1-3
- "Osman Okyar Hadisesi" (The Case of Osman Okyar). *Forum. 3* : 35 (September 1, 1955), 3-4.
- Savcı, Bahri. "Buhran İstidatları ve Önleme Yolları" *Forum. 3* : 35 (September 1, 1955), 11-12.
- "Kıymetlerimizi Savunma Kararı" (Decision to Defend Our Values). *Forum. 3* : 36 (September 15, 1955), 1-3.



- Mardin, Şerif. "Devrimizde Amme Felsefesi" (Public Philosophy in Our Age). *Forum*. 3 : 36 (September 15, 1955), 12-3.
- "Aydınların Sorumluluğu" (The Responsibility of Our Intellectuals). *Forum*. 4 : 37 (October 1, 1955), 1-3.
- "Hizip Günah mı?" (Is Faction a Sin?). *Forum*. 4 : 37 (October 1, 1955), 5-6.
- Aksoy, Muammer. "Fikir, İlim ve Öğretim Hürriyeti: Üniversite Muhtariyeti" (Freedom of Thought, Science and Education: The Autonomy of University). *Forum*. 4 : 37 (October 1, 1955), 7-10.
- Yıldırım, Cemal. "Bilimin Sosyal İlgileri" (Social Concerns of Science). *Forum*. 4 : 37 (October 1, 1955), 19-20.
- "Yol Ayrımındayız" (We Are at the Crossroads). *Forum*. 4 : 39 (November 1, 1955), 1-3.
- "Ezme Politikası: Mebusluktan Iskat" (Policy of Oppression: Removal from Membership of Parliament). *Forum*. 4 : 39 (November 1, 1955), 5-6.
- Aksoy, Muammer. "Profesörlerin Siyasi Yayınları Memnu mudur?" (Are the Political Publications of Professors Illegal?). *Forum*. 4 : 39 (November 1, 1955), 11-13.
- Talas, Cahit. "Müessir Bir Sosyal Politika Zarureti" (The Imperative of an Effective Social Policy). *Forum*. 4 : 39 (November 1, 1955), 14-15.
- "İktisadi İstikbalimizin Görünüşü" (The Panorama of Our Economic Future). *Forum*. 4 : 40 (November 15, 1955), 1-3.
- "Yeni Bir Parti Kurulması" (Foundation of a New Party). *Forum*. 4 : 40 (November 15, 1955), 3-4.
- "Tarafsız Organlar Üzerine" (On Neutral Organs). *Forum*. 4 : 40 (November 15, 1955), 4-5.
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Sosyalizmin Bugünkü Meseleleri" (The Problems of Socialism Today). *Forum*. 4 : 40 (November 15, 1955), 11-3.

- Savcı, Bahri. "Seçmenin Yaptığı Iskat" (Removal from Office by the Voters). *Forum*. 4 : 40 (November 15, 1955), 15-16.
- "Değişen Türkiye'de Yeni Adımlar" (New Steps in Changing Turkey). *Forum*. 4 : 41 (December 1, 1955), 1-3.
- "Evet, Hür ve Bağımsız Sendika" (Free and Independent Union). *Forum*. 4 : 41 (December 1, 1955), 4.
- Aksoy, Muammer. "Partiden Ayrılma Mebusluk Sifatını Kaybettirir mi?" (Does Quitting from Party Cause Liquidation of The Title of Member of Parliament?). *Forum*. 4 : 41 (December 1, 1955), 7-9.
- "Meselelerimiz ve Manevi Hazırlık Zarureti" (Our Problems and the Imperative of Spiritual Readiness). *Forum*. 4 : 42 (December 15, 1955), 1-2.
- And, Metin. "Türkiye'de Aydınlar I" (Intellectuals in Turkey I). *Forum*. 4 : 42 (December 15, 1955), 18-9.
- And, Metin. "Türkiye'de Aydınlar II" (Intellectuals in Turkey II). *Forum*. 4 : 43 (January 1, 1956), 25-6.
- "Laikliği Noksan Anlama" (Deficient Comprehension of Laicism). *Forum*. 4 : 44 (January 15, 1956), 3.
- And, Metin. "Türkiye'de Aydınlar III." (Intellectuals in Turkey III). *Forum*. 4 : 44 (January 15, 1956), 24-5.
- "Dört Mesele Bir Arada" (Four Issues at Once). *Forum*. 4 : 45 (February 1, 1956), 4-5.
- Savcı, Bahri. "Demokratik Bir Düzendeki Meclisin Gerçek Yeri" (The Real Place of Assembly in a Democratic Order). *Forum*. 4 : 45 (February 1, 1956), 9-10.
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Gelişme Gayretlerimizde Aksayan Nedir?" (What is the Trouble with Our Attempts at Development), *Forum*. 4 : 45 (February 1, 1956), 11-2.
- "İşte Forum Budur!," (Here Is *Forum*!). *Forum*. 4 : 46 (February 15, 1956), 1-3.
- Feyzioğlu, Turhan. "Demokrasi Davamıza Genel Bir Bakış" (A General Look at Our Democracy Issue). *Forum*. 4 : 46 (February 15, 1956), 12-4.

- Aksoy, Muammer. "6435 Sayılı Kanun Karşısında Üniversite Muhtariyeti" (University Autonomy in the Face of Law 6435). *Forum*. 4 : 46 (February 15, 1956), 14-6.
- "İktisadi Gerçekleri Kavrama Derecemiz" (Our Limits of Comprehending Economic Facts). *Forum*. 4 : 47 (March 1, 1956), 1-3.
- "Başlayan Bir Hareketin Düşündürdükleri" (Reflections on a Movement in Start). *Forum*. 4 : 47 (March 1, 1956), 5-6.
- Savcı, Bahri. "Batılı Demokrasinin Bazı Temel Kavramları Üzerine" (On Some of the Fundamental Concepts of Western Democracy). *Forum*. 4 : 47 (March 1, 1956), 10-1.
- "İlme Verdiğimiz Kıymet" (The Value We Attach to Science). *Forum*. 4 : 48 (March 15, 1956), 1-2.
- Arsel, İlhan. "Amerikan Demokrasisinde Din ve Devlet Ayrılığı" (The Separation of Religion and State in American Democracy). *Forum*. 5 : 50 (April 15, 1956), 15-6.
- "Uzağı Düşünme Zamanı" (The Time to Think Future). *Forum*. 5 : 51 (May 1, 1956), 1-3.
- "Çarşaf" *Forum*. 5 : 51 (May 1, 1956), 5.
- Mardin, Şerif. "Yeni Bir Ütopya" (A New Utopia). *Forum*. 5 : 51 (May 1, 1956), 10-1.
- Arsel, İlhan. "Amerikan Demokrasisinde Din ve Devlet Ayrılığı" (The Separation of Religion and State in American Democracy). *Forum*. 5 : 51 (May 1, 1956), 11-2.
- Erder, Necat. "Din Meselesi" (The Issue of Religion). *Forum*. 5 : 52 (May 15, 1956), 10.
- Apery, Roger. "Tarafsızlık Meselesi" (The Issue of Neutrality). Translated by Cemal Yıldırım. *Forum*. 5 : 52 (May 15, 1956), 17.
- "C.H.P.nin Meseleleri" (RPP's Problems). *Forum*. 5 : 53 (June 1, 1956), 3-4.
- "Kısılan Basın Hürriyeti" (Restricted Freedom of Press). *Forum*. 5 : 54 (June 15, 1956), 1-2.

- "Vekaletin Sınırları" (The Limits of Representation).  
*Forum. 5 : 54 (June 15, 1956), 4.*
- Canitez, Feridun. "Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanununun Tadili"  
(Reform of the Constitution). *Forum. 5 : 54 (June 15, 1956), 11-2.*
- "Rejimimizde Kararlı Muvazene" (Resolute Balance in Our Regime). *Forum. 5 : 56 (July 15, 1956), 1-2.*
- Aksoy, Muammer. "Hukukçuların Manevi Mes'uliyeti ve İki Hukuk Derneğine Dair" (About the Spiritual Responsibility of Legal Professionals and Two Law Associations). *Forum. 5 : 56 (July 15, 1956), 11-3.*
- "Siyasi Rejimimizin Temelleri" (Foundations of Our Political Regime). *Forum. 5 : 55 (July 1, 1956), 1-3.*
- "İktisadi Tedbirler ve İçtimai Sonuçlar" (Economic Measures and Social Consequences). *Forum. 5 : 58 (August 15, 1956), 2-4.*
- "Biz Ne İstiyoruz?" (What Do We Want?). *Forum. 5 : 60 (September 15, 1956), 1-2.*
- "D.P.'nin Liberalizmi" (DP's Liberalism). *Forum. 5 : 60 (September 15, 1956), 6.*
- Bowle, John. "Totaliterlik" (Totalitarianism). Translated by Cemal Yıldırım. *Forum. 6 : 61 (October 1, 1956), 11-2.*
- Ginsberg, Moris. "Bilim ve Günümüzün Meseleleri" (Science and Today's Issues). Translated by Cemal Yıldırım. *Forum. 6 : 62 (October 15, 1956), 7-9.*
- Soysal, Mümtaz. "Bütünlük" (Totality). *Forum. 6 : 63 (November 1, 1956), 11-2.*
- "Siyaset Çamuru" (The Dirt of Politics). *Forum. 6 : 67 (January 1, 1957), 4.*
- "İleri Toplum ve Şahsi Sorumluluk" (Advanced Society and Personal Responsibility). *Forum. 6 : 68 (January 15, 1957), 1-3.*
- Aksoy, Muammer. "Vekalet Emrine Alınmanın Hakiki Sebebi" (The True Reason of Removal from Active Duty). *Forum. 6 : 69 (February 1, 1957), 12-3.*

- Kapani, Münci. "İcra Organı Karşısında Hakimlerin İstiklali" (Independence of Judges vis-à-vis The Executive). *Forum*. 6 : 70 (February 15, 1957), 9-10.
- Aksoy, Muammer. "Üniversite Hadisesi ve Başbakan" (The Case of University and Prime Minister). *Forum*. 6 : 70 (February 15, 1957), 11-3.
- Feyzioğlu, Turhan. "Radyo Meselesi-II" (The Radio Issue-II). *Forum*. 6 : 70 (February 15, 1957), 15-6.
- Richard, H.C. "İktisadi Gelişmede Devletin Rolü" (State's Role in Economic Development). Translated by M.E. *Forum*. 6 : 72 (March 15, 1957), 16-7.
- "Plan Kelimesinden Maksat" (What Is Meant by the Term Planning). *Forum*. 7 : 73 (April 1, 1957), 6-7.
- Feyzioğlu, Turhan. "Basın Hürriyeti Tartışmasına Dair" (About the Discussion on Freedom of Press). *Forum*. 7 : 73 (April 1, 1957), 11-3.
- "Siyaset ve Eğitim" (Politics and Education). *Forum*. 7 : 74 (April 15, 1957), 1-2.
- "Birlikler Kapanırken" (While the Unions Are Closed Down). *Forum*. 7 : 75 (May 1, 1957), 1-2.
- Yalçın, "Plan ve Program Meselesi" (The Issue of Planning and Program). *Forum*. 7 : 75 (May 1, 1957), 8-9.
- "İlmi Metod ve Hadiselerin Mantığı" (Scientific Method and the Logic of Events). *Forum*. 7 : 76 (May 15, 1957), 5.
- Kapani, Münci. "Devlet Kudretinin Tahdidi" (Limitation of State's Power). *Forum*. 7 : 76 (May 15, 1957), 8-9.
- Kapani, Münci. "Devlet Kudretinin Tahdidi II" (Limitation of State's Power II). *Forum*. 7 : 77 (June 1, 1957), 10-2.
- "Tarafsızlık Meselesi" (The Issue of Neutrality). *Forum*. 7 : 79 (July 1, 1957), 4-5.
- Tuna, Yalçın. "Basın Mevzuatımızın Antidemokratik Hükümleri" (Anti-democratic Sentences of Our Press Law). *Forum*. 7 : 78 (June 15, 1957), 9-12.
- "Uyanmalıyız Artık!" (We Should Wake Up!). *Forum*. 7 : 80 (July 15, 1957), 1-3.

- Feyziođlu, Turhan. "Basın Hürriyetine Yeni Darbeler" (New Blows to the Freedom of Press). *Forum*. 7 : 80 (July 15, 1957), 7-8.
- Okyar, Osman. "Planlama Tarihçesine Müteallik Notlar (1939'dan bu yana)" (Notes on the History of Planning [since 1939]). *Forum*. 7 : 82 (August 15, 1957), 14-6.
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Az Gelişmiş Memleketlerde Para ve Maliye Politikası" (Fiscal and Financial Policy in the Less Developed Countries). *Forum*. 7 : 82 (August 15, 1957), 16-8. (Review of Karl Iversen, İktisadi Kalkınma Konferansları).
- "Fikir Partisi İmkanları" (Opportunities for an Intellectual Party). *Forum*. 7 : 83 (September 1, 1957), 1-3.
- Ömer Sakıp, "Demokratik Devrim Üzerine Düşünceler" (Reflections on Democratic Revolution). *Forum*. 7 : 83 (September 1, 1957), 7-9.
- Aksoy, Muammer. "Bizde Basının Kontrol Vazifesini İmkansızlaştıran Sebepler" (Reasons for the Impotence of Our Press to Perform Its Duty of Control). *Forum*. 7 : 84 (September 15, 1957), 9-11.
- "Hürriyet Partisi Kongresinden Notlar" (Notes from the Congress of Freedom Party). *Forum*. 8 : 85 (October 1, 1957), 5.
- "Siyasi Mücadeleye Katılan Forumcular" (*Forum* Members in Political Struggle). *Forum*. 8 : 85 (October 1, 1957), 6.
- Aygen, Cemal. "Önümüzdeki Seçimlerin Muhtemel Neticeleri" (Possible Results of Next Elections). *Forum*. 8 : 85 (October 1, 1957), 11-3.
- Mannheim, Karl. "Çağımızın Teşhisi" (Diagnosis of Our Age). Translated by Cemal Yıldırım. *Forum*. 8 : 86 (October 15, 1957), 10-2.
- Kip, Zinde. "Türk Maarifinde Reform Nasıl Olmalıdır?" (How Should Turkish Educational System be Reformed?). *Forum*. 8 : 87 (November 1, 1957), 11-3.
- Aksoy, Muammer. "Demokrat Parti Milletvekillerine Açık Mektup: Rejim Buhranı Halledilmelidir" (Open Letter

to Democratic Members: Regime Crisis Should be Handled). *Forum*. 8 : 88 (November 15, 1957), 9-12.

Okyar, Osman. "Planlama Tarihçesine Mütelaik Notlar VI: İktisaden Geri Kalmış Memleketlerde Planlama Meseleleri" (Notes on the History of Planning VI: Issues of Planning in Economically Backward Countries). *Forum*. 8 : 89 (December 1, 1957), 15-7.

Güneş, Turan. "İç Tüzükteki Değişikliğin Manası" *Forum*. 8 : 90 (December 15, 1957), 11-2.

"Hürriyet Partisinin Yıldönümü" (Anniversary of Freedom Party). *Forum* (editorial), 8 : 91 (December 31, 1957), 6.

"Kubalı Hadisesi mi, Üniversite Meselesi mi, Yoksa Hukuk Devleti Davası mı?" (Kubalı Event, or University Issues, or the Issue of Rule of Law?). *Forum*. 8 : 94 (February 15, 1958), 1-3.

Arsel, İlhan. "Çift Meclis Sistemi" (Bicameralism). *Forum*. 8 : 96 (March 15, 1958), 6-8.

"Nursuzlar" (Sinisters). *Forum*. 9 : 100 (May 15, 1958), 4-5.

Aksoy, Muammer. "Son Demokrasi Hamlemiz Kimin Eseridir?" (Whose Work is Our Last Democratic Leap?). *Forum*. 9 : 102 (June 15, 1958), 9-11.

Aksoy, Muammer. "Son Demokrasi Hamlemiz Kimin Eseridir! - II-, Tarihi Nutuk (İnönü'nün 1 Kasım 1945 Meclisi Açış Nutku)" (Whose Work is Our Last Democratic Leap! -II- Historical Speech [Opening Speech of İnönü on November 1, 1945]). *Forum*. 9 : 103 (July 1, 1958), 9-11.

Soysal, Mümtaz. "Türkiye'nin Son Ortadoğu Siyaseti ve Batılılaşma Temposunda Yavaşlama" (Turkey's Last Middle Eastern Policy and Retardation in Westernization). *Forum*. 9 : 107 (September 1, 1958), 10-2.

Kip, Zinde. "Maarifimizdeki Buhranın Sebepleri Nelerdir?" (What are the Reasons of Crisis in Our Educational System?). *Forum*. 9 : 107 (September 1, 1958), 6-7.

Aksoy, Muammer. "Muhafetin Birleşmesi Zaruridir" (Opposition Should Unify). *Forum*. 10 : 110 (October 15, 1958), 7-10.

- "Atatürk'ü Anlamak" (Understanding Atatürk). *Forum*. 10 : 112 (November 15, 1958), 1-2.
- "Karanlıkta Vuruşanlar" (Those Who Fight in the Dark). *Forum*. 10 : 114 (December 15, 1958), 1-2.
- Ömer Sakıp. "Program ve Plan Tartışmaları" (Discussions on Program and Planning). *Forum*. 10 : 114 (December 15, 1958), 7-9.
- "Arena ve Forum" (Arena and *Forum*). *Forum*. 10 : 121 (April 1, 1959), 1-2.
- Sakıp, Ömer. "Asıl Eksişimiz Aydınlarımızdaki Gerçek Duygusu" (Our Main Deficiency is the Lack of Sense of Reality in Our Intellectuals). *Forum*. 10 : 122 (April 15, 1959), 8-10.
- Kapani, Munci. "Yarınki Anayasa Düzenimiz Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler" (Some Reflections on Our Future Constitution). *Forum*. 11 : 127 (July 1, 1959), 8-10.
- Marsh, Norman. "Fert Hürriyeti ve Teşrii Kuvvet" (Liberty of Individual and Legal Power). Translated by Cemal Yıldırım. 11 : 130 (August 15, 1959), 15-16.
- Hershlag, Z.Y. "Türkiye: İntikal Halinde Bir Ekonomi" (Turkey: An Economy in Transition). *Forum*. 12 : 134 (October 15, 1959), 8-10.
- "Yeni Tedbirlere Doğru" (Towards New Measures). *Forum*. 12 : 142 (February 15, 1960), 1-2.
- Kapani, Munci. "İngiliz Demokrasisine Bakışlar I : Milli Karakterin Işığında Siyasi Müesseseler" (A Look at British Democracy: Political Institutions in the Light of National Character). *Forum*. 12 : 143 (March 1, 1960), 12-3.
- "İktidarın Basın Hürriyeti Anlayışı" (Government's Conception of Freedom of Press). *Forum*. 12 : 144 (March 15, 1960), 1-2.
- "Aydın Yalçın Meselesi ve Aydınlar" (The Issue of Aydın Yalçın and Intellectuals). *Forum*. 179 (September 15, 1961), 1-2.
- "Aydın Yalçın'ın Cevabı" (Aydın Yalçın's Response). *Forum*. 181 (October 15, 1961). 3-4.



- "Orta Yolun Kaderi" (The Fate of Mid-Way). *Forum*. 194 (May 1, 1962), 3-5.
- "27 Mayıs." (May 27). *Forum*. 196 (June 1, 1962), 3-5.
- "Şekli Demokrasiden Öz Demokrasiye" (From Formal Democracy to Genuine Democracy). *Forum*. 199 (July 15, 1962), 3-5.
- "A.P. Kongreleri ve Milli İdare" (Congresses of JP and National Will). *Forum*. 200 (August 1, 1962), 6-7.
- "Türk Demokrasisinin Kaderi" (The Fate of Turkish Democracy). *Forum*. 204 (October 1, 1962), 3-4.
- "Plan ve Sonrası" (Plan and Its Aftermath). *Forum*. 207 (November 15, 1962), 4-6.
- "Ordu ve Politika" (Army and Politics). *Forum*. 209 (December 15, 1962), 3-4.
- "A.P. Genel Kongresi" (General Congress of JP). *Forum*. 209 (December 15, 1962), 7.
- Talas, Cahit. "Kalkınma ve İktisadi Sistemler" (Development and Economic Systems). *Forum*. 209 (December 15, 1962), 15-7.
- "İki Alanda da Orta Yol" (Mid-Way in Both Spheres). *Forum*. 211 (January 15, 1963), 3-5.
- Kerimoğlu, A. "Türk ve Fransız Plancılığı: Demokratik Plancılığın Doğuşu" (Planning in Turkey and France: The Birth of Democratic Planning). *Forum*. 216 (April 1, 1963), 20-1.
- "Huzur Çıkmazı" (The Impasse of Peace). *Forum*. 214 (March 1, 1963), 3-4.
- "Bundan Sonrası" (From Now On). *Forum*. 217 (April 15, 1963), 3-4.
- "Parlamentonun Sorumluluğu" (The Responsibility of Parliament). *Forum*. 218 (May 1, 1963), 3-4.
- Güriz, Adnan. "Modern Demokrasinin Temel İlkeleri: I-Hürriyet" (Basic Principles of Modern Democracy: I-Freedom). *Forum*. 219 (May 15, 1963), 11-4.
- "27 Mayıs ve İktisadi Hayatımız" (May 27 and Our Economic Life). *Forum*. 220 (June 1, 1963), 3-4.

"Sıkı Yönetim" (Martial Law). *Forum*. 221 (June 15, 1963), 3-4.

Güriz, Adnan. "Modern Demokrasinin Temel İlkeleri: II-Eşitlik" (Basic Principles of Modern Democracy: II-Equality). *Forum*. 224 (August 1, 1963), 9-11.

"Buhranın Asıl Kaynağı" (The Real Reason of Crisis). *Forum*. 229 (October 15, 1963), 3-4.

Daver, Bülent. "Demokraside Sıkı Yönetim" (Martial Law in Democracy). *Forum*. 230 (November 1, 1963), 8-9.

"Başkanlık Seçimleri" (Presidential Elections). *Forum*. 231 (November 15, 1963), 5.

"Mahalli Seçimlerden Hükümet Buhranına" (From Municipal Elections to Governmental Crisis). *Forum*. 233 (December 15, 1963), 3-4.

"Siyasi Buhranların Gerçekleri" (Facts about Political Crises). *Forum*. 234 (January 1, 1964), 3-4.

"Onbir Yıl" (Eleven Years). *Forum*. 240 (April 1, 1964), 3-4.

#### **Articles by Aydın Yalçın published in Öncü**

Yalçın, Aydın. "Yol Kavşağında Bir Öncü" (A Protagonist at the Crossroads). *Öncü* (August 26, 1960).

Yalçın, Aydın. "İhtiyaç Sistem ve İdeolojiye midir?" 8Do We Need System and Ideology). *Öncü* (August 31, 1960).

Yalçın, Aydın. "Demokrat Partinin Akıbeti" (The End of Democratic Party). *Öncü* (September 3, 1960).

Yalçın, Aydın. "Teşhisi İyi Koymalıyız" *Öncü* (September 4, 1960).

Yalçın, Aydın. "Milli Birlik Komitesi" (National Unity Committee). *Öncü* (September 10, 1960).

Yalçın, Aydın. "Demokrasi ve Lider" (Democracy and Leader). *Öncü* (September 14, 1960).

Yalçın, Aydın. "Esasta Anlaşalım" (We Shall Agree on the Principles). *Öncü* (September 16, 1960).

- Yalçın, Aydın. "Profesyonel Politikacı ve Demokrasi"  
(Professional Politician and Democracy). *Öncü*  
(September 26, 1960).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Hürriyet İnancı" (Faith in Freedom). *Öncü*  
(September 29, 1960).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Hür Cemiyet Planlaması" (Planning in Free  
Society). *Öncü* (September 3, 1960).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Demokrasi ve Lider" (Democracy and  
Leader). *Öncü* (September 14, 1960).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Demokrasimizde Aksamalar" (Breakdowns in  
Our Democracy). *Öncü* (September 15, 1960).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Eğitim ve Demokrasi" (Education and  
Democracy). *Öncü* (September 16, 1960).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "İlim ve Demokrasi" (Science and  
Democracy). *Öncü* (October 1, 1960).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Din ve Dil" (Religion and Language). *Öncü*  
(October 7, 1960).
- Yalçın, "Partiler ve Demokrasi" (Parties and Democracy).  
*Öncü* (November 17, 1960).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Yeni Partiden Maksat" (The Aim of the New  
Party). *Öncü* (November 24, 1960).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Yeni Partinin Keşfi" (The Discovery of  
the New Party). *Öncü* (November 28, 1960).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Siyasette Aydınlar" (Intellectuals in  
Politics). *Öncü* (December 17, 1960).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Bir Yıldönümü" (An Anniversary). *Öncü*  
(December 23, 1960).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Politikada İnsan Faktörü" (Human Element  
in Politics). *Öncü* (January 8, 1961).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Demokratik Parti Hasreti" (Longing for  
Democratic Party). *Öncü* (January 9, 1961).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Siyasi İşbirliği" (Political  
Cooperation). *Öncü* (January 31, 1961).

- Yalçın, "Ders Aldık mı?" (Did We Learn a Lesson?). *Öncü* (February 2, 1961).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Usul Hakkında" (On Procedure). *Öncü* (February 5, 1961).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Zihniyet ve Tutum Meselesi" (The Issue of Mentality and Attitude). *Öncü* (February 22, 1961).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "İktisadi Gelişme ve Planlama" (Economic Development and Planning). *Öncü* (February 24, 1961).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Siyasi Liderlik" (Political Leadership). *Öncü* (July 3, 1961).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "İlericilik, Gericilik" (Progressivism, Reactionism). *Öncü* (July 9, 1961).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Karşılıklı Etki" (Mutual Influence). *Öncü* (July 14, 1961).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Liderleri Yakından Tanımalıyız" (We Should Know Leaders Well). *Öncü* (July 25, 1961).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Partizan İdare" (Partisan Administration). *Öncü* (July 28, 1961).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Dikkatli Olalım" (We Shall Be Careful). *Öncü* (August 6, 1961)
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Gerçek Atatürkçülük" (True Atatürkism). *Öncü* (November 10, 1961).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Farklı Düşünceye Saygı" (Respect for Different Thoughts). *Öncü* (November 25, 1961).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Sosyalizm, Komünizm" (Socialism, Communism). *Öncü* (December 1, 1961).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Bu Tutum Güven Verir mi?" (Is this Attitude Trustworthy?). *Öncü* (December 13, 1961).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Sosyalitleri Yanıltan" (The Fallacy of Socialists). *Öncü* (February 4, 1962).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Yeni Türkiye Partisi" (New Turkey Party). *Öncü* (February 14, 1962).
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Devleti Korumak Hakkı" (The Right to Save the State). *Öncü* (May 5, 1962).

## Articles published in *Yeni Forum*

- Yalçın, Aydın. "Niçin Çıkıyoruz?" (Why Do We Publish?). *Yeni Forum*. 1 : 1 (September 15, 1979), 1-2.
- "Vatanseverlik ve Sağduyunun Gür Sesi" (The Deep Voice of Patriotism and Common Sense). *Yeni Forum*. 2 : 9 (January 15, 1980), 3-4.
- "Rejim ve Anayasamızda Reform Önerisi" (Reform Proposal in Our Regime and Constitution). *Yeni Forum*. Supplement. (May 15, 1980), 1-33.
- "Senaryonun İç ve Dış Tezahhürleri" (Internal and External Appearances of the Scenario). *Yeni Forum*. 3 : 35 (February 15, 1981), 3-4.
- "Aysbergin Ucu ve Gövdesi" (The Apex and Body of Iceberg). *Yeni Forum*. 3 : 36 (March 1, 1981), 3-4.
- "Amerikan Senatosu'nda Terörizm Araştırması" (Investigation of Terrorism in US Senate). *Yeni Forum*. 3 : 45 (July 15, 1981), 3-4.
- "Yeni Forum'un Cevabı" (*Yeni Forum's* Response). *Yeni Forum*. 5 : 111 (April 15, 1984), 3-4.
- "Teşhis Hatasının Sakıncaları" (The Drawbacks of Wrong Diagnosis). *Yeni Forum*. 5 : 121 (September 15, 1984), 3-4.
- "Yeni Yılda Milli Gündem" (National Agenda in New Year). *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 128 (January 1, 1985), 3-4.
- "Gençliği Hedef Alan İdeolojik Saldırıları" (Ideological Attacks That Target the Youth). *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 129 (January 15, 1985), 8-9.
- "Psikolojik Savaşta Karşı Önlemler Nelerdir?" (What Are the Counter-Measures in Psychological War?). *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 131 (February 15, 1985), 3-5.
- Yayla, Atilla. "Teröristlerin Islahının Kültürel ve İdeolojik Boyutları" (The Cultural and Ideological Dimensions of the Disciplining of Terrorists). *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 131 (February 15, 1985), 15-7.
- "Demokrasimizin Sıkıntılı Dönemleri" (Difficult Periods of Our Democracy). *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 133 (March 15, 1985), 3-4.

- Okyar, Osman. "Türkiye'de Aydınlar Bunalımı"  
(Intellectuals' Crisis in Turkey). *Yeni Forum*. 6 :  
134 (April 1, 1985), 18-20.
- "Üniversiteler ve Çağdaş Softalar" (Universities and  
Modern *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 136 (May 1, 1985), 11-2.
- "Komünistler, Yalan ve Aydınlar" (Communists, Lies and  
Intellectuals). *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 137 (May 15, 1985),  
11-2.
- "Orduya Komünist Sızması" (Intrusion of Communists into  
the Army). *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 138 (June 1, 1985), 9.
- "Başarılı Bir Demokrasi İçin" (For a Successful  
Democracy). *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 141 (July 15, 1985),  
3-4.
- "Solun Fikri Perişanlığı" (The Intellectual Disarray of  
Left). *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 141 (July 15, 1985), 10-1.
- Yayla, Atilla. "Hür Basın ve Demokratik Sistem" (Free  
Press and Democratic System). *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 143  
(August 15, 1985), 32-4.
- "Aydınların Görevi" (The Duty of Intellectuals). *Yeni  
Forum*. 6 : 144 (September 1, 1985), 3-5.
- "12 Eylül'ün Beşinci Yıldönümü" (The Fifth Anniversary of  
September 12). *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 145 (September 15,  
1985), 3- 5.
- "Atatürkçülüğün Çetin Yolları" (Hard Routes of  
Atatürkism). *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 146 (October 1,  
1985), 3-4.
- "Hayal Kırıklığı ve Pişmanlık" (Disappointment and  
Regret). *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 147 (October 15, 1985), 3-  
4.
- Doğaner, Aydın. "'Aydın' Kavramı Üzerine" (On the Concept  
of 'Intellectual'). *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 147 (October  
15, 1985), 33-5.
- "Kış Başında Bulutlanan Ufuklar" (Cloudy Horizons in the  
Beginning of Winter). *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 148 (November  
1, 1985), 3-4.

- "Öğrenci Derneklerine Dikkat" (Attention to Students' Associations). *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 148 (November 1, 1985), 6-7.
- Kantarcioglu, Sevim. "Atatürk'ün Kültür Anlayışı" (Atatürk's Conception of Culture). *Yeni Forum*. 6 : 149 (November 15, 1985), 15-20.
- Yalçın, Aydın ed. *Vatan Hıyanetinin Anatomisi*. (The Anatomy of Treason). Ankara: Daily News Web. Ofset Tesisleri, 1986.
- "DİSK'in Kapatılması Üzerine" (On the Closure of DİSK). *Yeni Forum*. 8 : 176 (January 1, 1987), 13-5.
- Dağhan, Zafer. "Bir Konferansın Düşündürdükleri" (Reflections on a Conference). *Yeni Forum*. 8 : 176 (January 1, 1987), 46-9.
- "Disk, Marksizm ve Sosyal Demokratlık" (DİSK, Marxism and Social Democrats). *Yeni Forum*. 8 : 177 (January 15, 1987), 12-5.
- "Radikal Sol Dergi Fırtınası" (Overflow of Leftist Journals). *Yeni Forum*. 8 : 177 (January 15, 1987), 15-8.
- "Radikal Sol Dergilerin Fonksiyonları" (The Functions of Radical Leftist Journals). *Yeni Forum*. 8 : 180 (March 1, 1987), 7-8.
- "Birleşik Sosyalistler Birleşiniz" (United Socialists, Unite). *Yeni Forum*. 8 : 187 (June 15, 1987), 8-10.
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Yeni Bir Dönemin Başında" (In the Beginning of a New Era). *Yeni Forum*. 11 : 248 (January 1990), 4-5.
- Berlin, Isaiah. "Bir İdeal Olarak Eşitlik" (Equality as an Ideal). Translated by Mustafa Erdoğan. *Yeni Forum*. 11 : 248 (January 1990), 29-37.
- Berger, Peter L. "Ahlak Yargısı ve Siyasal Faaliyet" (Moral Judgement and Political Activity). Translated by Mustafa Erdoğan. *Yeni Forum*. 11 : 250 (March 1990), 36-41.
- Rand, Ayn. "İnsanın Hakları" (Human Rights). Translated by Atilla Yayla. 11 : 250 (March 1990), 68-71.

- Rand, Ayn. "Kapitalizm Nedir?" (What Is Capitalism?).  
Translated by Atilla Yayla. *Yeni Forum*. 11 : 252  
(May 1990), 38-48.
- Cranston, Maurice. "İnsan Hakları Nelerdir?" (What Are  
Human Rights?). Translated by Atilla Yayla. *Yeni  
Forum*. 11 : 253 (June 1990), 41-3.
- "Y. Forum 12. Yaşına Girdi" (*Yeni Forum* Celebrates Its  
12th Year). *Yeni Forum*. 11 : 257 (October 1990), 13.
- Teague, Elizabeth. "Açık Toplum mu?" (Open Society?).  
Translated by Mustafa Erdoğan. *Yeni Forum*. 12 : 261  
(February 1991), 45-6.
- Hayek, Friedrich A. "Liberal Bir Sosyal Düzenin İlkeleri"  
(Principles of a Liberal Social Order). Translated  
by Atilla Yayla. *Yeni Forum*. 12 : 263 (April 1991),  
25-34.
- Höffe, Otfried. "Adalet Bir Değiş tokuş mudur?" (Is  
Justice a Barter?). Translated by Ahmet Arslan. *Yeni  
Forum*. 12 : 264 (May 1991), 27-34.
- Rand, Ayn. "Kollektif Haklar" (Collective Rights).  
Translated by Mustafa Erdoğan. *Yeni Forum*. 12 : 265  
(June 1991), 29-31.
- Popper, Karl. "Şimdiye Kadar Elde Edebildiğimiz  
Dünyaların En İyisi" (The Best World We Could Ever  
Achieved). Interview by George Urban. Translated  
by Murat Aygen. *Yeni Forum*. 12 : 267 (August 1991),  
47-9.
- "Entellektüel Kirlenmenin İzleri" (The Traces of  
Intellectual Corruption). *Yeni Forum*. 12 : 264  
(May 1991), 13.
- Yalçın, Aydın. "Atayurt'ta Arayışlar" (Searches in  
Atayurt). *Yeni Forum*. 13 : 278 (July 1992), 20-7.
- Nesipzade, Nesip. "Bağımsızlık Sorunu-I" (The Problem of  
Independence-I). *Yeni Forum*. 13 : 278 (July 1992),  
34-8.
- Nesipzade, Nesip. "Bağımsızlık Sorunu-II" (The Problem of  
Independence-II). *Yeni Forum*. 13 : 279 (August  
1992), 21-7.



Yalçın, Aydın. "Washington'da Dağlık Karabağ Toplantısı"  
(Dağlık Karabağ Meeting in Washington). *Yeni Forum*.  
13 : 280 (September 1992), 34-9.

"Dergimiz 15. Yılında" (Our Journal Celebrates Its 15th  
Anniversary). *Yeni Forum*. 14 : 292 (September 1993),  
6.

Yayla, Atilla. "Hocam, Arkadaşım, Meslektaşım Aydın  
Yalçın" (Aydın Yalçın: My Teacher, Friend,  
Colleague). *Yeni Forum*. 15 : 306 (November 1994),  
20-3.

Erdoğan, Mustafa. "'Arkadaşım' Aydın Yalçın" (Aydın  
Yalçın: My 'Friend'). *Yeni Forum*. 15 : 306  
(November 1994), 24-5.

Demirer, M. Arif. "Siyaset Adamı Aydın Yalçın" (Aydın  
Yalçın as Politician). *Yeni Forum*. 15 : 306  
(November 1994), 10-9.

#### **Articles Published in *Liberal Düşünce Dergisi* and *Liberal Bülten***

Erdoğan, Mustafa. "Laiklik, Cumhuriyet'in Dini midir?"  
(Is Laicism the Religion of Republic?). *Liberal  
Bülten*. 2 (Summer 1995), 6.

"Bu Dergi" (This Journal). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 1 (Winter  
1996), 1-3.

Yayla, Atilla. "Pratikteki Açmazlarıyla Liberalizm ve  
Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu" (Practical Impasses of  
Liberalism and Association for Liberal Thinking).  
*Liberal Düşünce*. 1 (Winter 1996), 4-14.

Berzeg, Kazım. "Neden Liberalim?" (Why Am I a Liberal?).  
*Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 1 (Winter 1996), 15-27.

Erdoğan, Mustafa. "Niçin Liberalizm?" (Why Liberalism?).  
*Liberal Düşünce*. 1 (Winter 1996), 28-33.

Ülsever, Cüneyt. "Marksizmden Liberalizme: Pratik Teoriyi  
Daima Aşılıyor" (From Marxism to Liberalism: Practice  
Always Transcends Theory). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1  
(Winter 1996), 34-8.

Yürüşen, Melih. "Otorite ve Özerklik: İmkansız Bir  
Beraberlik mi?" (Authority and Autonomy: An

- Impossible Coexistence?). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 1 (Winter 1996), 39-48.
- Hartwell, R. Max. "Bir Liberalin Eğitimi" (Education of a Liberal). Translated by Sema Coşaroğlu. *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 1 (Winter 1996), 49-53.
- Arslan, Ahmet. "Türk Laikliği ve Geleceği Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler" (Some Reflections on Turkish Laicism and Its Future). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 1 (Winter 1996), 54-76.
- Yurdusev, A. Nuri. "Laiklik ve Modern Uluslararası Sistem" (Laicism and Modern International System). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 1 (Winter 1996), 77-84.
- Akalın, Güneri. "Türkiye'de Devletçilik Hareketi ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Maliyetleri" (The Trend of Etatism in Turkey and Its Socio-Economic Costs). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 1 (Winter 1996), 85-92.
- Barry, Norman P. "Marksizmin Gerilemesi ve Komüniteryenizmin Yükselişi" (The Regression of Marxism and the Rise of Communitarianism). Translated by Mustafa Erdoğan. *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 1 (Winter 1996), 108-11.
- Dağı, İhsan. "Uluslararası Politikada Devletin Yeri: Liberteryen Bir Eleştiri" (The Place of State in International Politics: A Libertarian Criticism). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 1 (Winter 1996), 93-100.
- Çaha, Ömer. "Birey-Devlet İlişkisi Çerçevesinde Türkiye'de İnsan Hakları" (Human Rights in Turkey within the Framework of the Relation between the Individual and State). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 1 (Winter 1996), 101-7.
- Ülsever, Cüneyt. "Türkiye'ye Paralı Eğitim" *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 2 (Spring 1996), 44-8.
- Akalın, Güneri. "Yüksek Öğretimin Finansmanı ve Harçlar Sorunu" (Financing of Higher Education and the Problem of *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 2 (Spring 1996), 49-56.
- Aktan, Coşkun Can. "21. Yüzyıl, Türkiye ve Sivil Toplum" (21st Century, Turkey and Civil Society). *Liberal Düşünce*. 2 (Spring 1996), 57-75.

- Özipek, Bekir Berat. "Özgürlüğü 'Kölelik Yolu'yla Anlamak" (Understanding Freedom through 'The Road To Serfdom'). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 2 (Spring 1996), 122-37.
- Yurdusev, A. Nuri. "Laiklik ve Demokrasi: Biri Diğzerinin Vazgeçilmez Şartı mı?" (Laicism and Democracy: Is One the sine-qua-non of the Other?). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 2 (Spring 1996), 138-44.
- Berzeg, Kazım. "Siyaset Pratiğindeki Somut Liberalizm" (Concrete Liberalism in Active Politics). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 2 (Spring 1996), 152-6.
- Erdoğan, Mustafa. "Din, Demokrasi, Çok Kültürlülük, Sivil Toplum" (Religion, Democracy, Multiculturalism, Civil Society). Paper delivered to 2nd Islamic Thought Symposium. (Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi, İlahiyat Fakültesi, 3rd Session, October 20, 1995). *Liberal Bülten*. 6 (Summer 1996), 8.
- Erdoğan, Mustafa. "Türkiye 2. Uluslararası Liberal Düşünce Sempozyumu Üzerine" (On the 2nd International Liberal Thought Symposium in Turkey). *Liberal Bülten*. 6 (Summer 1996), 9-10.
- Arslan, Ahmet. "İslam, Adalet ve Refah Partisi Üzerine" (On Islam, Justice and Welfare Party). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 3 (Summer 1996), 4-12.
- Yürüşen, Melih. "Refah Partisinin Yükselişine Çeşitlilik Perspektifinden Bakmak" (Viewing the Rise of Welfare Party from the Perspective of Diversity). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 3 (Summer 1996), 13-21.
- Öz, Esat. "Türkiye'de Demokrasiye Geçiş" (Transition to Democracy in Turkey). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 3 (Summer 1996), 61-85.
- Mises, Ludwig von. "Antikapitalist Zihniyet" (Anticapitalist Mentality). Translated by Mustafa Metin. *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 3 (Summer 1996), 107-14.
- Toprak, Rasim. "Demokrasi, Laiklik, Resmi İdeoloji Üstüne" (On Democracy, Laicism, Official Ideology). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 3 (Summer 1996), 125-31.
- Yayla, Atilla. "Demokrasi ve Türkiye" (Democracy and Turkey). *Meeting by Contributions of Aydınlar Ocağı*,

Mustafa Küçükaydın and Mehmet Özgen. (Kayseri, May 1996). In *Liberal Bülten*. 7 (Fall 1996), 9-10.

Erdoğan, Mustafa. "İslam ve Liberalizm: Kısa Bir Bakış" (A Glance at Islam and Liberalism). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 4 (Fall 1996), 7-21.

Barry, Norman P. "Piyasa, Ahlak ve Devlet" (Market, Morality and State). Translated by Mustafa Erdoğan. *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 4 (Fall 1996), 22-35.

Okyar, Osman. "Kumanda Ekonomisi, GÜdümlü Demokrasi" (Command Economy, Guided Democracy). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 4 (Fall 1996), 36-45.

Çolak, İhsan. "Paradigmanın İnşası: Türk İnkılabının İdeolojisinin Oluşumu ve Recep Peker" (The Construction of Paradigma: Formation of the Ideology of Turkish Revolution and Recep Peker). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 4 (Fall 1996), 69-81.

Erdoğan, İrfan. "Bu Eğitim Düzeni Değişmelidir, Ama Nasıl?" (This Educational System Must Be Changed, But How?). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 4 (Fall 1996), 86-9.

Berzeg, Kazım. "Liberalizmin İki Determinist Tezahürü: Küreselleşme ve Yerelleşme" (Two Deterministic Appearance of Liberalism: Globalization and Localization). *Liberal Düşünce*. 1 : 4 (Fall 1996), 90-9.

Yürüşen, Melih. "Liberal Düşünce Kendine Bakıyor" (*Liberal Düşünce Looks at Itself*). Interview by Muhammed Nur Anbarlı. *Liberal Düşünce*. 4 (Fall 1996), 112-5.

Arslan, Ahmet. "İnsan Hakları ve İslam" (Human Rights and Islam). *Liberal Düşünce*. 2 : 5 (Winter 1997), 37-55.

Kırbaşoğlu, M. Hayri. "Kur'an ve İnsan Hakları Tartışmaları" (Discussions on Quran and Human Rights). *Liberal Düşünce*. 2 : 5 (Winter 1997), 56-70.

Sullivan, Anthony. "Muhafazakarlık, Çoğulculuk ve İslam" (Conservatism, Pluralism and Islam). Translated by Melih Yürüşen. *Liberal Düşünce*. 2 : 5 (Winter 1997), 71-8.

Toku, Neşet. "Türkiye ve Sivil Eđitim" (Turkey and Civil Education). *Liberal Düşünce*. 2 : 5 (Winter 1997), 79-84.

Ünlü, Ataç. "Bu İşe Devlet El Atmalı mı? Bir Yüksek Öğrenim Polemiđi" (Should the State Be Involved in This Issue? A Polemic of Higher Education). *Liberal Düşünce*. 2 : 5 (Winter 1997), 85-91.