

CIVILIZING PROCESS FROM ABOVE:
CULTURE AND STATE IN TURKEY, 1923-1945

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

YILMAZ ÇOLAK


In Partial Fulfillment Of The Requirements For Degree Of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA


July, 2000

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.



.....
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu
(Supervisor)

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.




.....
Assoc. Prof. Dr. E. Fuat Keyman
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.



.....
Assist. Prof. Dr. Orhan Tekelioğlu
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.




.....
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nür Bilge Criss
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.



Assoc. Prof. Dr. Kurtuluş Kayalı
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences



Prof. Dr. Ali Karaosmanoğlu
Director

ABSTRACT

THE CIVILIZING PROCESS FROM ABOVE: CULTURE AND STATE IN TURKEY, 1923-1945

Yılmaz Çolak

Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Supervisor: Assc. Prof. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu

July 2000

This dissertation deals with the formation of the official notion of culture during the early Republican era (1923-1945) from a historico-political perspective. This formation reflected the civilizing process from above, directed and determined by the state. The dissertation will analyze the legal and institutional bases of the discursive formation of culture by focusing on the cultural institutions of the Republic, especially the THS and the TLS. Here, the concept of culture will be examined as inherent to the state and its project, promoting the construction of an identity. The dissertation will discuss that culture in the state discourse, overlapping all expressed through civilization, denoted the modern state of mind and way of life as a high, developed category and so came to be the name of re-ordering and re-cultivating the society, taming the people and creating future-generations. Based on a hierarchical and assimilationist understanding, it was the sole means to determine the scope of the public sphere and membership to both political and cultural community. In this sense, it is inclusionary and, at the same time, exclusionary. The Kemalist notion of culture as construction has become more and more a politically contested issue, which has put its stamp on Turkish political life.

Keywords: Culture, State, Civilization, The Civilizing Process, Nation-Building, History and Language.

ÖZET

YUKARDAN AŞAĞIYA MEDENİLEŞTİRME SÜRECİ: TÜRKİYE'DE KÜLTÜR VE DEVLET, 1923-1945

Yılmaz Çolak

Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu

Temmuz 2000

Bu çalışma, erken Cumhuriyet döneminde (1923-1945) resmi kültür anlayışının oluşumunu tarihsel-siyasal bir çerçevede ele almaktadır. Devletin sevk ve idare ettiği yukardan aşağıya medenileştirme süreci, bu oluşumun gösterdiği kültür-inşasının gidişatını belirlemektedir. Bu tez, Cumhuriyetin kültür kurumlarına değinerek kültürün söylemsel kurgulanmasının resmi ve kurumsal temellerini incelemektedir. Bu nokta, kültür kavramı devlet ve onun yürüttüğü siyasal proje ile bir bütün olarak çözümlenmektedir. Bu çalışmada, devlet söylemi içerisinde medeniyet kavramı ile örtüşen kültür kavramı gelişmiş ve modern bir mentaliteyi ve hayat tarzını belirtmekte olduğu ve toplumu şekillendirme, halkı ehilileştirme ve gelecek nesiller yaratma iradesinin ve faaliyetinin adı olarak belirdiği tartışılmaktadır. Bu kültürlendirme ve kimliklendirme anlayışıdır ki, hiyerarşik ve asimilasyonist bir mantığa dayanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, kamusal alanın ve siyasal üyeliğin sınırları belirlenmektedir. Belirlenen sınırlar Kemalizmin kültür yaklaşımının hem kapsayıcı hem de dışlayıcı olduğunu göstermektedir. Sonuçta, siyasal bir süreçte inşa edilmişliğin getirdiği özellik, Türk siyasal yaşamını öteden beri etkilemekte olan resmi kültür tanımını tartışmalı bir konu haline getirmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kültür, Devlet, Medeniyet, Medineleşme Süreci, Millet-İnşası, Tarih ve Dil.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation is a product of the process of research and writing taking three years. I owe dept of appreciation to many people whose support and encouragement have made this difficult and painful process more comfortable. Ahmet İçduygu, my supervisor, has a special place. I am very grateful to him for his constructive and teaching comments and motivating friendship, which has been a source of inspiration for me to complete this study. I am also thankful of the Committee members, Fuat Keyman, Orhan Tekeliođlu, Nur Bilge Criss and Kurtuluş Kayalı. Many thanks go to my friends, Ertan Aydın, Nalan Soyarık, Murat Öztürk, and Howard Eisenstadt who gave their support throughout this study. I thank to American Research Institute in Turkey which granted me a doctoral fellow.

Lastly, I would like to thank my father and my mother, to whom this study is dedicated, and my brothers and my sisters. Without their support this work would not be possible. I hope this study will pave a way for other researchers, which may enrich the academic knowledge in making.

To My Father and My Mother

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ÖZET.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER II: CULTURE, STATE AND THE “CIVILIZING PROCESS”.....	24
2.1. Culture as a Modern Artifact.....	26
2.1.1. <i>Culture and Modernity</i>	27
2.1.2 <i>Culture and Nation-State: “The Legitimate Use of Culture”</i>	31
2.1.3. <i>Culture and Nationalism: A Critique of the Ethnic/Civic Dichotomy..</i>	37
2.2. Culture as a Part of “Civilizing Process”: The Roots of the Hierarchical-Assimilative Notion of Culture.....	41
2.2.1. <i>Culture, Civilization, and Enlightenment</i>	43
2.2.2. <i>The Political Roots of Culture in France: The Revolution, Jacobenism and the Cultural Crusade</i>	52
2.3. The Romantic Understanding of Culture.....	58
2.3.1. <i>Romanticism, Culture and the Hatred of Civilization</i>	58

2.3.2. <i>The Organic and “Authentic” Concept of Culture and German Nationalism</i>	66
CHAPTER III: OTTOMAN MODERNIZATION, THE IDEA OF	
SOCIETY–MAKING AND CULTURE.....	72
3.1. The Political Basis of the Pre-modern Ottoman Concept of Society and The Ottoman <i>Millet</i> System.....	74
3.2. First Modernizing Reforms as a Sign of the Emergence of a New Concept of Society.....	81
3.2.1. <i>Civilization as a New Socio-Political Outlook</i>	85
3.2.2. <i>Ottomanism as a Name of Modern Membership</i>	90
3.3. Boundaries of the New Ottoman Society and its Critics: The Young Ottomans’ Quest for Authenticity.....	96
3.3.1. <i>Abdülhamit II’s “Civilizing” Policies</i>	101
3.4. The Young Turks and the CUP’s Rule: Scientism and Nationalism as Basis of “Cultivated” Society and Culture.....	104
3.5. Three Intellectual and Political Movements in the Second Meşrutiyet... ..	112
3.5.1. <i>Islamism and the Idea of “Alternative” Civilization</i>	113
3.5.1. <i>Westernism: The “Universalized” Conceptions of Civilization and Culture</i>	116
3.5.3. <i>Turkism: The Name of “Authenticated” Culture</i>	121
CHAPTER IV: THE KEMALIST REVOLUTION AND THE PROCESS	
OF CULTURE PRODUCTION.....	131
4. 1. The Revolution and the Kemalist Politics of Culture.....	133

4.1.1. <i>The Principles of Kemalism</i>	143
4.2. The Idea of Civilization and the Early Phases of the Kemalist Nation- Building Process.....	152
4.2.1. <i>Civilization and Symbolic Transformations</i>	161
4.3. Culture as Part of the Civilizing Process From Above.....	171
4.3.1. <i>Mustafa Kemal and Culture</i>	176
4.3.2. <i>The Ideological Base of the Concept of Culture</i>	185
4.3.3. <i>The Law of Settlement and the Boundaries of Culture</i>	188
4.3.4. <i>The Institutional Base of the Kemalist Conception of Culture: The People Houses as “a Fount of Culture for the Turkish People”</i>	197
4.4. Culture in the Official Discourse During the İnönü Period (1938-1945).....	205
4.4.1. <i>“Humanicizing” Culture</i>	206
4.4.2. <i>Modernizing the Peasants: The Village Institutes and the People’s Rooms</i>	211
 CHAPTER V: THE TURKISH HISTORY SOCIETY AND CREATING	
A SUITABLE PAST FOR A NEW CULTURE.....	223
5.1. Problematizing the Turkish History Thesis and the Way to the Turkish History Society.....	225
5.1.1. <i>Mustafa Kemal’s Interest and Institutionalization in History</i>	231
5.1.2 <i>The New History Textbooks</i>	237
5.2. The History Congresses and Scienticization of the Thesis.....	242
5.2.1. <i>The First History Congress and Later Developments</i>	242

5.2.2. <i>The History of the Turkish Revolution</i>	249
5.2.3 <i>Archeology and Anthropology: Determining the Historical Boundaries of New Turkish Culture</i>	253
5.3. The Turkish History Thesis and Turkification of World History: An Overview.....	260
5.3.1. <i>Civilization and the Turkish Nation</i>	260
5.3.2. <i>Culture and History in the Kemalist Historiography</i>	267
CHAPTER VI: THE “LANGUAGE QUESTION” AS A CULTURAL DILEMMA AND THE TURKISH LANGUAGE SOCIETY.....	273
6.1. The Revolution in Language and Its Background.....	275
6.2. The Alphabet Change as Part of the Republican Civilizing Process from Above.....	280
6.3. The TLS and the Language Planning: the Process of the Creation of <i>Öz Türkçe</i>	295
6.3.1. <i>The First Turkish Language Congress</i>	299
6.3.2. <i>The Imagination of Osmanlıca (Ottoman Turkish) as an Other of Öz Türkçe</i>	304
6.3.3. <i>The Radicals and the Moderates in the Language Reform</i>	309
6.3.4. <i>The Radical Purists’ Language Policing</i>	312
6.3.5. <i>The Phase of the Moderate Purism and the Sun-Language Theory</i> ...	320
6.3.7. <i>The Second Wave of Purism</i>	327
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION.....	335
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	349

APPENDIX A.....	384
APPENDIX B.....	386
APPENDIX C.....	405

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this dissertation is to explore the process of the formation of the Kemalist discourse on culture during the early Republican period (1923-1945), and, in doing so, to show how a form of culture was effectively produced, re-produced and disseminated by the state. In order to achieve this aim, it focuses mainly on ideological, legal and institutional bases of the civilizing rulers' notion of culture from a historical and political perspective, and history and language policies maintained as its foundation by the Turkish History Society, THS (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*, TTK) and the Turkish Language Society, TLS (*Türk Dil Kurumu*, TDK). In other words, the dissertation analyzes in a detailed account the efforts to construct and inculcate new myths, linguistic forms, rituals and habits by attempting to examine the activities of the cultural institutions of the Republic, but not popular resistance to the state policies and various formulations of culture among the intellectual circles of the period. In this sense, it argues that what these institutions worked for was a culture production, which was very influential in determining the scope of the public sphere and the boundaries of membership.

The rationale for such a study may be found in two main developments. The first is connected with a global search for establishing a new conceptual and symbolic

universe to every sphere of life undergoing a rapid transformation. That means that we live in the age of the “postmodern version of modernity”¹ in which all concepts regulating social, political, economic and international relations have been questioned and re-defined. It is coupled with the rising tide of globalization and particularization² through which transnational forces from above and identity politics from below erode the rule and practicing of the traditional state system, and, at the same time, the idea of state based on a homogenized nation within a nation-state. Thus, the result is to question the certainties of the nation-state such as nation, citizenship and sovereignty. In this vein, nation-building, nationalism, culture and identity have come to the fore as the most stressed topics, especially in terms of their relations to the state and its homogenizing attempts.³ In the last two decades, more emphasis has been placed on difference rather

¹ This signifies the condition where a series of uncertainties deeply affect all aspects of human life. See Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodernity and Its Discontent* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 3, 21-25. In this age, the terms “civilization” and “culture” are among the most disputed aspects of modernity: here, it is “civilisation, generally used to refer to processes which have made human being more civilized, and less savage. This connotation has been criticised within the postmodern circles, regarding Western ideal of civilisation or its civilising mission that, through the meta narratives of reason, progress and freedom, have brought destruction and disappointment to human being.” John Rundell and Stephen Mennel, “Introduction: Civilization, Culture and the Human Self-Image”, in *Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization*, eds. J. Rundell and S. Mennel (London: Routledge, 1998), 2.

² Both are closely interrelated, while seeming contradictory. See Ronald Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992).

³ It is obvious in the new literature on nationalism and nation-building. For the reviews of these studies on these topics see Benedict Anderson, “Introduction”, in *Mapping the Nation*, ed. G. Balakrishnan (New York: Verso, 1996), 1-16; Anthony D. Smith, “Gastronomy or Geology? The Role of Nationalism in the Reconstruction of Nations.” *Nations and Nationalism*. 1/1 (1995); Michael Schudson, “Culture and the Integration of National Societies”, in *The Sociology of Culture*, ed. Diana Crane (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 21-43; Special issue on Nationalism, *Critical Review*, 10/2 (Spring 1996); David Brown, “Are There Good and Bad Nationalism?” *Nations and Nationalism*. 5/2 (1999), 281-302.

than sameness, heterogeneity rather than homogeneity, multiculturalism rather than monoculturalism, etc. Within this context, culture as an idea and discourse have become a more contested issue and means of the struggle, especially on the basis of determining state-society and state-individual relations.⁴ This is why the nation-states' monoculturalism has been in every respect under assault both practically/politically and theoretically. Because of its peculiar position among non-Western societies, the Turkish case has been the subject of various recent studies in the West; and the Kemalist path of modernization has been criticized especially as being authoritarian and politically and socio-culturally failing.⁵ Under the light of new literature there emerges the need to reconsider and recover the early Republican period, in which a group of rulers strove to create a new society and nation. This is one of the goals of this dissertation, which particularly focuses on the concept of culture to understand the nature of the early Kemalist project of nation-building.

The second development, closely associated with the first, is about the politico-social, politico-cultural and socio-economic context of Turkey in the 1990s. Indeed,

⁴ See Jack David Eller, "Anti-Anti-Multiculturalism." *American Anthropologist*. 99/2 (1997), 251-253. In fact this is the struggle of "which groups and interest will hold power and shape the production and reproduction of society in such domains as education, government, institutions, and art." *Ibid.*, 251.

⁵ See Bobby Said, *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentricism and the Emergence of Islamism* (London: Zet Books, 1997); Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic* (London: Hurst and Company, 1997); Kevin Robins, "Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe", in *Questions of Cultural Identities*, eds. S. Hall and P. du Gay (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 61-86; Andrew Davison, *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic Reconsideration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Ernest Gellner, "Kemalism", in his *Encounters with Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). Beside these, for an extensive study on critics of Kemalist modernization, see Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle: Washington University Press, 1997).

throughout the 1990s, Turkish politics was overwhelmed by an intense war of images and symbols. In fact this condition accompanies the above-mentioned process of globalization bringing the questioning of the modern nation-states' certainties. In Turkey, emphasizing particularistic affiliations, new social movements, namely Islamic, Kurdish, Women and Alawi movements, then gained more and more assertion to be represented in the public sphere and expanded claims to new rights. They have posed questions concerning the official definition of Turkish culture and the implications of this definition in determining membership at the political, social and cultural level. What was mainly contested was the scope of the public sphere coming with the idea of democratization and re-structuration of the state and administrative mechanisms. This occurred around problematizing those who are included in and who are excluded from the public sphere, which brought about the redefinition of state-subject relations. In this context, these movements were deemed by the holders of the old-age official ideology, the so-called Kemalists, as signs of reaction to modernity of which the official political authority has claimed to be the sole legitimate representative.⁶ Here modernity is reduced to a way of life. So, in fact, what occurred in the 1990s appear to be simple reflections of the struggle over the "essential" images, symbols and rituals belonging to the way of life Turks are attached to, which determines the boundaries of membership and the public sphere. The

⁶ The republicans strove to erode their visibility and reject their representation in the public realm. For example, Islamist opposition wanted to de-westernize culture (by defining an identity with rejection of the secular "other"), and Kurdish groups rejected a homogenized Turkish national culture. See Yılmaz Çolak and Ertan Aydın, "Encountering Identities: Kemalism versus Islamism in Turkey in the 1990s." Paper presented at GSSA Conference on "Society at the Turn of the Century." University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, April 14-15, 1999; Ahmet İçduygu, Yılmaz Çolak and Nalan

result was a war of culture waged by the Kemalists for *re-monopolizing* “the legitimate use of culture”. It was stimulated by nostalgia for the golden age of Kemalism⁷, the 1930s, in response to the felt discontinuity in the Kemalist tradition of culture. The war ended with the process initiated by the 28 February decisions,⁸ which sought to redefine the “enemies” of the Republic and re-canonize the tradition. This re-canonization reached its peak point during the celebrations of the 75th Anniversary of the Republic (1998).⁹

Soyarık, “What is the Matter With Citizenship? A Turkish Debate.” *Middle Eastern Studies*. 35 /4 (1999), 187-208.

⁷ In the literature on the Turkish politics, Kemalism is usually used to refer to the name of the official ideology. While employing it in its general sense as an ideology, this dissertation applies the term ideology in line with Raymond Williams. In its relation to cultural production he uses ideology to describe “the *formal and conscious beliefs*” of a specific group – “as in the common usage of ‘ideological’ to indicate general principles or theoretical positions or ... dogmas.” See Raymond Williams, *The Sociology of Culture* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 26-29. But here, like culture, ideology is also subject to a set of processes by which it is itself produced. This occurs in power relations including tensions and struggles as well as harmony. This usage makes it possible to relate the production of ideology to specific classes or groups who conduct the route of culture production. In the early Republican case, it was a ruling circle composed of Mustafa Kemal and his close colleagues. After 1930 the efforts to form an official ideology, called Kemalism, was speeded up and resulted in some ‘ordered’ works in which the boundaries of new ideology were to some extent determined. See Mediha Muzaffer, *İnkılabın Ruhu* [The Spirit of the Revolution] (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1933); Tekin Alp, *La Kamalizm* (Paris: Alcan, 1937); Peyami Safa, *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar* [Perspectives on the Turkish Revolution] (İstanbul: Ötüken Yay., 1993) (original publication 1938); Mehmet Saffet Engin, *Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri* [The Principles of Kemalism’s Revolution], two vol. (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1938); Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, *Atatürk İhtilali* [Atatürk Revolution], 3rd ed. (İstanbul: Kaynak Yay., 1995) (original publication 1940). Kemalism as a name of the official political doctrine took place in the RPP’s 1935 and 1939 programs as a form of *Kamalizm* in 1935 program and *Kemalizm* in 1939 program. After the Atatürk era, Kemalism was made more systematized and reproduced again and again, but remained as the ideology of the state and as the formal and deliberate creed of the ruling group.

⁸ This reflected a sort of quasi-military intervention in the politics, occurring in February 28, 1997.

⁹ Through the celebrations, like the ones held in the 1930s, some activities such as organizing “republican balls and dance parties” were revived and expanded countrywide.

Here, attempts were made to revitalize the “spirit” of the Republic manufactured during the early Republican period.

In this study it will be shown that many of the themes running through politics of culture in the 1990s were part and parcel of a discursive formation within which the Kemalist notion of culture made its first appearance during the formative years of the Kemalist regime. For that reason, any analysis of the formation seems to be necessary to understand the political causes behind the contemporary polarization in the socio-political life of Turkey due to a constant war over cultural symbols.

The stand may be justified with a reasoning that cultural revivalism in Turkey, or anywhere else, has inevitably taken shape within the frame of the nation-state’s nationalist projects, which have discursively produced their own imagined communities¹⁰ through defining a new belonging around essential modes of behavior, historical images, symbols, and so on. Like their counterparts, the new social movements in Turkey came within a modern context of power (shaped to a greater extent by Kemalist nationalism), providing “alternative” imagined communities by reconstructing the past and present for a sake of new identity.¹¹ That is, they have constituted a process of “othering”. Therefore in some sense they have to be thought of as the heirs of the Kemalist project of

Participation in such activities was deemed to be symbols of being Kemalist and modern. The state agents, media, private sector, labor unions and civil organizations participated to the celebration of the Republic in such an unusual way that their foremost agenda was to preserve and perpetuate the values and norms of the Republic.

¹⁰ For imagined communities, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991).

¹¹ Thus, all revival groups can not be seen as “the awakening or the return of the repressed [as the post-Orientalist/post-Kemalists did], but a modernist reinvention of the past.” Yael Navaro-Yashin, “Travesty and Truth: Politics of Culture and Fantasies of The

modernity. In this process the definition of culture has become more and more a contested issue between the pioneers of the official ideology and revival identities. The formative decades of the Republic has been at the center of this debate and therefore regularly *revisited* for both critiques and revitalization.

Thus this study, stressing on continuity in history, aims at being one of the scholarly visits to this period as a political analysis of the process of culture production by focusing on its ideological and institutional bases. It tries to portray the process of how new standards including new myths, symbols and rituals were produced through the new disciplinary agents of the Republic. In doing so, it will be shown that the state, as an ultimate producer and initiator of the Kemalist project of modernity, had been an effective agent in defining, advancing and diffusing a form of cultural identity. This is based on the assumption that culture is *discursively* produced, reproduced and spread by means of the school system, quasi-professional cultural institutions, the military and the media. However, it is not the intention of this dissertation to claim that the state in Turkey was an absolute, omnipotent, all-seeing and all-controlling mechanism, but just to consider it as an active agent and sole authorized power in determining the boundaries of “legitimate” culture.¹² In this regard the official discourse on culture is not simply evaluated as an intellectual production, but examined by situating into a politico-historical and politico-social context. So, this dissertation highlights the role of

State in Turkey.” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, January 1998, 41, and for a more details, see its introductory chapter.

¹² The Turkish polity during the formative years of the Republic was based principally on a state-centered legitimization reducing any potential and alternative power centers. Davison calls this polity as “state-dominant monoparty authoritarianism”, reflecting the new regime’s interest in exploiting the traditional relations of power.” Davison, *Secularism*, 141.

institutional and administrative transformations and the state agents to put into practice those manufactured cultural forms as part of everyday life in the process of culture production. At that point, it argues that the Republic's new cultural institutions came to have a decisive role in the production, and that it was this discursive formation of culture that lies at the heart of the Kemalist nation-building process.

In recent times the subjects of nation building, nationalism, nationalist history, national identity and ethnicity in Turkey have become the topic of several studies.¹³ All these studies, tackling with the formative years of the Republic and later developments from various angles of nation-building, base their arguments on a model evolved around ethnic versus civic nationalism. This dichotomous model¹⁴ has recently attracted many criticisms that reject the idealization of the civic model as only a political entity free from any cultural bias. In fact, cultural artifacts are inherent to both conceptions, and so all that is collected under the name of "civic" is also bound up with a specific conception of

¹³ For examples, see Büşra Ersanlı Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye'de "Resmi Tarih" Tezinin Oluşumu* [Power and History: The Formation of "Official History" Thesis in Turkey], 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Afa, 1996); Ayşe Kadioğlu, "Milletini Arayan Devlet: Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Açmazları" [State Seeking its Own Nation: Paradoxes of Turkish Nationalism]. *Türkiye Günlüğü*. 33 (March-April 1995), 91-100; Ahmet İçduygu, "Türkiye'de Vatandaşlık Kavramı Üzerine Tartışmaların Arkaplanı" [Background of the Discussions on Citizenship in Turkey]. *Diyalog*. 1/1 (1996), 134-147; Poulton, *Top Hat*; Ahmet Yıldız, "Search for an Ethno-Secular Delimitation of National Identity in the Kemalist Era." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Bilkent University, May 1998.

¹⁴ It works through dual categories, civic / western / liberal / individualistic versus ethnic / eastern / cultural / collectivistic. This formulation dates back to Meinecke's distinction between the *staatsnation* and the *kulturnation*. Later H. Kohn formulated it as Western and Eastern nationalism. A. Smith, with a minor modification, calls it as civic and ethnic nationalism. The first of the pairs are deemed as good, and the second, bad. See Brown, "Are There," 284-286.

culture.¹⁵ Beyond this dichotomy, as Nieguth argues, new “organising principles” such as “ancestry”, “race,” “culture” and “territory” may be employed to define the “boundaries of civic and ethnic nations.”¹⁶ In this sense, this dissertation uses the concept of culture to revisit the French and German models and highlights two dominant notions of culture. All discussions about the formation of the idea and discourse of culture throughout the thesis include to some extent a comparison with that of these two dominant conceptions.

This dissertation contemplates culture not simply as an entity reflecting given and distinctive set of values, as in its anthropological definition, but as “constructed” regarding its relation to the nation-state and nationalism.¹⁷ In other words, it is always subject to a process of constant production, as a significant tool of projecting a new social order. Due to being integral to power relations within the confinement of the modern nation-state, culture seems to be always “contested, contingent and historically grounded,” and so it is “a constituting element of political action and identity.”¹⁸ It is for

¹⁵ See Will Kymlicka, “Misunderstanding Nationalism.” *Dissent*. (Winter 1995), 130-137; idem, *States, Nations and Cultures* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1997), 22-27; Bernard Yack, “The Myth of the Civic Nation.” *Critical Review*. 10/2 (1996); Tim Nieguth, “Beyond Dichotomy: Concepts of the Nation and the Distribution of Membership.” *Nations and Nationalism*. 5/2 (1999).

¹⁶ Nieguth, “Beyond Dichotomy,” 155-56.

¹⁷ I draw here from the recent dominant trend in the analysis of culture. In this trend, the classical anthropological concept of culture reflecting a set of “shared” values by all members of a specific society has been challenged through embedding it into power relations and specific contexts. “If we speak of culture as shared, we must now always ask “By whom?” and “In what ways?” and “Under what conditions?”” See Nicholas B. Dirks, G. Eley and S. B. Ortner, “Introduction,” in *Culture/Power/History*, eds. Dirks, Eley and Ortner (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 3.

¹⁸ Kay B. Warren, “Introduction: Revealing Conflicts Across Cultures and Disciplines”, in *The Violence Within: Cultural and Political Opposition in Divided*

this reason that culture plays a decisive role in the construction of nations and national identities. The basic goal of the architects of national cultures and identities is to provide a link between membership to the political community (state) and belonging to the cultural community (nation), which both constitute the status of citizenship. All these make culture and state more matched. This sense of culture may be related to Bourdieu's concept of "habitus", a structure of common ideas, concepts or perception patterns; in constructing this habitus, the state has an active role through all its agents and mechanisms.¹⁹ It is in this respect that culture as a constituting part of the nation is regarded as a product of the political discourse of nationalism. It is a nationalist ideology of the nation-state which standardizes and subjugates all perceived qualities of living culture. Here, in the course of nation-building during the nineteenth century, culture became the primary interest of the state.²⁰ The state during this time began to see culture as both its object and instrument in its project of transforming and shaping society.²¹ Briefly, by means of its policies and institutions the nation-state formulated its own

Nations, ed. Kay B. Warren (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 17. This stand is also very akin to Hall's analysis of production: seeing "identity as a 'production' which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside representation... Not an identity grounded in archeology, but in the re-telling of the past." Stuart Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora", in *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*, eds. P. Williams and L. Chrisman (New York: Harvester, 1993), 392-93.

¹⁹ Pierre Bourdieu, "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field." *Sociological Theory*. 12/1 (1994), 7.

²⁰ See Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

²¹ This was based on a modernist program of culture or civilization constituting "an active politics and policy of culture... to transform ways of life". Tony Bennett, *Culture: A Reformer's Science* (London: Sage Publication, 1998), 104.

culture as part of its project for social engineering. This might be seen as the top-down formulation and production of culture.

Culture is in general used to designate “a developed state of mind” (as a cultured person), “the processes of this development” (“as in ‘cultural interests’, ‘cultural activities’”), “the means of these processes” (“as in culture as ‘the arts’ and ‘human intellectual works’”).²² In this sense there exist two dominant views of culture, formulated by Williams as idealist and materialist positions.²³ The first sees this way of life as unique, ahistoric, unchangeable, inherited from the long history. This organic and distinctive view is used in this study in connection with the Romantic conception of culture. The second, based on constructivist understanding, evaluates a “whole way of life” as something changed and controlled by the human will. Mainly as a product of Enlightenment philosophy and French revolution, it is based on human self-cultivation and cultivation of the ideal, covering and designating this life as a more developed and civilized category. This study employs this position as the French conception of culture.

This dissertation, stressing a relation between culture and the state - which lies at the center of the process of nation-building - through focusing on the above-mentioned two dominant notions of culture, examines the place of culture in the Kemalist project of modernization. Its basic assumption is that any analysis of culture production during the

²² Williams, *The Sociology*, 11. It is often associated with the anthropological and sociological use to denote “the ‘whole way of life’ of a distinct people or other social group.” Ibid.

²³ Williams sees the former as the *idealist* position based on the *informing spirit* which is expressed in “the whole range of social activities but most evident in ‘specifically cultural’ activities – a language, styles of art, kinds of intellectual work.” The second, as the materialist position, sees culture “the *signifying system* through which

early Republican era makes it possible to understand to a greater extent the dynamics behind all disputes over the scope of the public sphere that has largely been under the control of the state mechanism. Furthermore, it argues that all official efforts towards nation-building in this era were accompanied by the crystallization of a *hierarchical and assimilative notion of culture*.

The content and meaning of this culture was defined by a group of the ruling elite with a mission to civilize the “ignorant” and “unconscious” people. In fact, their stand reflected a sort of the “civilizing process” which is used by Norbert Elias to refer to the long process of the emergence of modern society later accompanying the state formation and nation building in Europe.²⁴ In the hands of the Kemalists it turned into a “civilizing” pressure on the people through the disciplinary practices by means of schooling and adult education in the army and the People’s Houses and Rooms, and so the Kemalist model may be formulated as a *civilizing process from above*.²⁵ Through this process, deliberate efforts were made to bring “civilization” and “culture” to the people believed to be

necessarily ... a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored.” Ibid., 11-13.

²⁴ The civilizing processes implies the development of social standards relating, for instance, to manners about eating, washing, spitting, blowing one’s nose, urinating and defecating, and undressing. In the process these standards were absorbed as habits in a mostly implicit ways. Later they gradually became the civilizing devices in the hands of modern state imposing on their citizens. See Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners*, vol. I, trans. Edmund Jebhcott (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).

²⁵ This modeling reflects the nature of the Kemalist project promoting, in the words of Göle, “state-centered modernization from above.” This understanding of modernization gave way “detraditionalizing the past” and the creation of “new” legal, cultural and social forms from above. See Nilüfer Göle, “The Freedom of Seduction for Muslim Women.” *New Perspectives Quarterly*. 3/15 (1998).

“backward” and “savage”.²⁶ Thus Kemalist nationalism came to be a reaction to “backwardness” (regarded resulting from the philosophy and system of the *ancien régime*, or the Ottoman/Islamic Empire), rather than “foreignness.”²⁷

It was for this reason that the Kemalist project of modernity, promoting a civilizing process from above, maintained an assault against “backwardness” and “ignorance”. Thus it constituted in the first instance a “Cultural Revolution” intended “to deal a mortal blow to an entire culture and to set up a new culture, with new men.”²⁸ The goal was to transform all symbolic, spatial and substantial reminders of the Ottoman/Islamic past²⁹ and to forge the “developed” and “civilized” way of life equipped with new standards. It was based on what one might call *Jacobean utopianism*, setting the political and cultural parameters for the future generations. By all regulations from dress

²⁶ Charles Tilly relates this sort of the attitude of the ruler, who see the position of ordinary people to be “backward,” to nationalism initiated as top-down format. Charles Tilly, “The State of Nationalism.” *Critical Review*. 10/2 (1996), 304.

²⁷ See Deniz Kandiyoti, “Identity and Its discontents: Women and the Nation,” in *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*, eds. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993). This characteristic makes the Turkish official nationalism different from other non-Western nationalism based on resentments against foreigners.

²⁸ Nur Yalman, “Some Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Turkey.” *Deedalus*. (1973), 154. Mardin calls it a “revolution of values.” Şerif Mardin, “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Transformation.” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 2 (1971), 209. This was indeed the most emphasized theme in the writings of the Kemalists during the 1930s and 1940s. For two popular examples, see Mehmet Saffet (Engin), “Kültür İnkılabımız” [Our Culture Revolution]. *Ülkü*. 5 (June 1993), 352-354; Neşet Ömer (İRdelep), “Kültür İnkılabımız” [Our Culture Revolution]. *Varlık*. 17 (15 March 1934), 257-258.

²⁹ Here the Ottoman/Islamic past was judged as the main “significant Other” of the new regime. See Tanıl Bora, “Cumhuriyetin İlk Döneminde Milli Kimlik” [National Identity in the Early Republican Period], in *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik* [Republic, Democracy and Identity], ed. Nuri Bilgin (İstanbul: Bağlam, 1997), 58.

to surname, and from the abolishment of the Caliphate to rewriting history it was aimed to pattern new symbolic representations held up only by those who internalized newly forged social and cultural values based on new categories of definition.³⁰ For the ruling elite, new values, centered on new standards and categories, became the privileged names of civilization and culture. It was mainly the base line of the new Turks' "identification"³¹. In this respect, identification refers to the state commitment to define, defend, and preserve those values. Here, it means that the will and efforts of political authorities shape citizenry to identify with "produced" life forms, or culture.³² Through the disciplinary and civilizing institutions of the Republic, these forms and values attempted to be turned into everyday practices of the people as new standards, which included prescriptions on how to dress, how to eat, how to look at others, how to dispose of spittle, how to walk, how to speak, and so forth. All gradually became the means of public representation.

³⁰ In fact, at the center of this revolutionary zeal, there was a strong desire to form a new society with a new mental and emotional basis. What all these remind of us are the happenings after the French revolution. Here it is very akin to the Jacobean revolutionary tradition, reflecting the formation of a public sphere with a new symbolic universe and its expansion into private sphere. See Bernhard Giesen, "Cosmopolitans, Patriots, Jacobins, and Romantics." *Deadalus*. 127/3 (1999).

³¹ Identification, as Balibar argues, refers the processes of the construction of identity which is "a *discourse* of tradition". This construction is "not an imaginary process but *a processing of the imaginary*: a behaviour, a history or a singular strategy of the subject in his relation to the imaginary." Etienne Balibar, "Culture and Identity (Working Notes)", in *The Identity in Question*, ed. John Rajchman (London: Routledge, 1995), 187.

³² In fact this was realized on the basis of the connections between culture and policy through which, as Miller argues, citizens were formed. Here, in terms of discursive tactics of cultural policy, culture is charged with "the task of aiding the subject in finding out the truth of itself." Toby Miller, *The Well-Tempered Self: Citizenship, Culture, and the Postmodern Subject* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 39-49.

In fact, the social structure the civilizing rulers aimed to transform was too far from being close to their “modernized” and “cultured” standards. Here, the clarification of the question of as to what kind of a social structure they applied sweeping reforms from above is important to understand the scope and parameters of their application. The society the Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire was first of all a more heterogeneous and traditional village society. Population structure underwent drastic changes from 1912 to 1923. During that time span, as a result of great military and political shifts,³³ the more heterogeneous structure of the Imperial society was transformed to some extent. This process was completed with the population exchange between Turkey and Greece through the mid-1920s.³⁴ Although these migrations and population exchanges brought about a religiously homogenous societal base -a firmly Muslim population (approximately %99)- within the boundaries of new Turkey, there existed a still more heterogeneous structure regarding language and culture. The Kemalist nation-building project targeted the turning of this ethnically, linguistically and culturally heterogeneous society into a nation. This society was also a rural-based society. According to the 1927 census only 16.4 percent of the population lived in six cities, namely İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Adana, Bursa, and in fifty-two towns, with a population

³³ These shifts resulted in the rise of the Muslim population in Anatolia through migrations from the Balkans and at the same time the decrease of the non-Muslim population through Armenian and Greek migrations.

³⁴ It was about the mutual exchange of a Greek population in Eastern Thrace and Western Anatolia (more than one million) and a Turkish population in Northern Greece and Greek Macedonia (approximately 500,000). For the extensive study on the population exchange see Kemal Sarı, *Büyük Mübadele* [Great Exchange] (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yay., 1995); Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve ‘Türkleştirme’ Politikaları* [‘Capital Tax’ and ‘Turkification’ Policies] (İstanbul: İletişim, 2000), Chapter I.

of 10,000.³⁵ The majority of the people lived in very difficult life conditions and suffered from infectious diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, syphilis, etc.³⁶ In addition, in 1927 only 10 per cent of the population were literate. At the beginning of the 1920s, there was also insufficient transportation and communication network, and not any serious industrial production; there were only 341 mechanized factories, most of them small and ill-equipped.³⁷

This was a sociological profile of the Turkish society the Republican regime strove to make “modernized” or “civilized”. Thus, the “civilizing process from above” included some measures to improve the living conditions of the people through lowering the mortality rates and assaulting social and infectious diseases as well as through some structural and educational transformations to create a vigorous nation.

In this civilizing project the watchword came to be largely *civilization* from 1923 to 1930 and *culture* from 1930 to 1945. In this way, the articulating role of the state in

³⁵ For the 1927 census see *Umumi Nüfus Tarihi, 1927* [General Population History, 1927] (Ankara: İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, 1929); Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic, A Case Study in National Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 59. The village population remained almost same in 1935 (%16.9); it was %18 in 1940; and % 18.3, in 1945. Frederic C. Shorter, “Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Nüfus Yapısı ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Değişmeye Etkisi” [The population Structure and its Impact on Socio-Economic Changes in the First Years of the Republic], in *Türkiye’de Sosyal Bilim Araştırmalarının Gelişimi*, ed. Sevil Atauz (Ankara: Türk Sosyal Bilimler Derneği, 1986), 353.

³⁶ Life expectancy thus was only 30 years, and also there were also great imbalances among different age and sex groups. Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, “Osmanlının En Önemli Mirası: Türk Toplumunu” [The Most Important Ottoman Inheritance: Turkish Society], in *Osmanlı* [Ottoman], ed. Güler Eren, vol. V (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 1999), 21.

³⁷ Robinson, *The First Turkish*, 103; Yediyıldız, “Osmanlının”, 21. The lack of infrastructure was another feature of the society; for instance, in 1923, there existed less

culture-production may be periodized in two broad stages, the early phases of the production based mainly on the concept of civilization (1923-1930), and the crystallization of the Republican notion of culture imagined as a “modern” state of mind and a “civilized” way of life (1930-1945). Within this second period, the İnönü era (1938-1945) came to the fore by the emphasis, in the definition of culture, on the Greek and Latin roots of “Western culture”, rather than historical mythicization centered on Central Asia mostly highlighted during the Atatürk era.

The main questions this study deal with are: what did the concept of culture mean for the Turkish “culture-builders”? What was the nature of the process of culture formation? To what extent was it formed around artificial or authentic values? What did the Republican civilizing elite understand from the concept of authenticity? How did they conceive and formulate the relationship between Turkish national culture and “universalized” Western civilization? To what extent did culture, which was formulated in the top-down process, determine the boundaries of political and cultural membership? To what extent did there emerge differentiation and deviation in the civilizing process from above?

The contributions of this dissertation may be twofold: firstly, conceptualizing the Kemalist notion of culture as *hierarchical* and *radical assimilationist*.³⁸ Through setting a

than 1,000 kilometers of good roads and 8,300 kilometers of broken-surface roads. Ibid, 103.

³⁸ “Radical assimilation” is used in line with Mason’s formulation. He makes a distinction between *moderate* and *radical* assimilationists. “*Radical* assimilationists”, writes Mason, “aim to create a polity in which members of the nondominant cultural communities abandon all their distinctive customs and practices; that is, they aim to undermine those communities. *Moderate* assimilationists, in contrast, aim to create a polity in which members of the nondominant cultural communities abandon only those customs and practices which are either unjust or in conflict with some of the central

strict hierarchy between “archaic,” “backward” life forms and that of a “modern,” “civilized” one³⁹ and applying coercive and noncoercive radical assimilation policies, the politics of culture in the early Republican regime manifest what might be called a *dual-partite exclusion-inclusion process*.⁴⁰ The Kemalist nation-building project promoted a process of assimilation for everybody defined as citizens, but at the same time determined a public good and identity only accessible for those who internalized the new value system, those who did not were excluded. This hierarchical and exclusionary inclusion concept of culture made the Kemalists isolate themselves from all traditional and particular positions assumed to belong to archaic times. These peculiarities imply the specificity of the Turkish case, which was denoted through non-colonial nationalism, a

public customs and practices of the dominant group.” Radicals can use both coercive measures (for example, including “laws against practicing particular religions, or against wearing certain kinds of dress, or using certain language in public places”) and noncoercive measures (for example, including “giving the customs and symbols of the dominant culture public status and respect). Andrew Mason, “Political Community, Liberal-Nationalism, and the Ethics of Assimilation.” *Ethics*. 109 (January 1999), 267 and 286.

³⁹ This is based on logic of transforming cultural differences into a homogenous whole, through *hierarchicizing* ways of life, favor of a “high” or “developed” form of life. See Bennett, *Culture*, 104. This is closely tied with the efforts of totalizing all forms in the society under the rubric of an imagined cultural community.

⁴⁰ This determination draws back from Balibar’s formulation according to which culture may include “exclusive inclusion, or interior exclusion” to express the internal exclusion in cultures. See. Balibar, “Culture and Identity.” 190-2. Exclusion has two main meanings; first, as Nieguth states, “it can mean to bar individuals and collectivities and thus the cultures they carry from physical entry into a given society – that is, its territory.” Secondly, exclusion on the contrary “can also mean *the marginalisation of individuals and their cultures and collectivities* which already and despite the sanctions regarding physical entry exist within this society – for example, by *restricting their access to public goods and institutions, by relegating them to lower ranks in the socioeconomic order, or by establishing segregated institutions*. In effect, this amounts to an exclusion from full and equal societal membership” (my emphasis). Nieguth, “Beyond Dichotomy,” 166.

specific nation-building process initiated by the strong, centralized state in a non-Western context, and the politically defined and determined concept of culture not as a unique category primarily distinguishing simply the Turks from Europeans.

Secondly, this particularity of the official discourse of culture differentiates Kemalism from its European and non-Western counterparts in the process and nature of culture production. Although the concepts the dissertation depends on have to be treated in its historical and social context, it may become more understandable only within the Western historical frame of references. Thus the clarification of this specific model as one of the explanatory categories in related literature might help us to better understand a complex relationship between culture and state, and between culture and nationalism. In other words, this study aims at contributing to a theoretical and practical repertoire of codes for the construction of culture. This is the main theoretical interest of this dissertation.

In this sense, one of the main contributions of this dissertation is to analyze the Turkish case with new literature of political/social science, that is, to examine the old case through new theoretical perspectives. Therefore, the process of culture production during the formative decades of the Republic is studied especially on the basis of history and language within the confines of new conceptual frameworks such as “imagined community”, “the modern project of culture”, “identity construction”, “constructed nature of culture”, “critiques of civic-ethnic model of nationalism”, and so on. In fact this is part of the general tendency in social sciences according to which the past is always re-written from the present perspective.

The present dissertation employs Elias's "process model" as an explanatory category in examining the structure of processes behind culture production in the early Republican period.⁴¹ Drawing from Elias' analysis, the development of culture as a base for a public identity is here referred to any *processes* rather than a static entity. This perspective makes it possible to historicize and analyze "culture" by situating it in power relations compassed within a nationalist project. What was produced in such a process was a discourse. Thus this analysis is based on "the discourse-historical approach" revealing the analysis of all-possible original documents and texts shedding light on the historical process.⁴² The analysis provides some clarifications about how the official discourse on culture was produced through the Republic's pseudo-scientific and disciplinary institutions and how it contributed to the process of culture production.

Within the frame of these perspectives, to examine processes of institutionalization of studies in the fields of culture, history, language and mass education, the following groups of sources were utilized in this study. The first group of resources used in this analysis was the published views and memoirs of the state and

⁴¹ Elias applies this model in analyzing "individual" and "society", which are "changing, evolving entities" and referring to "processes." This is based on the idea that everything from self to state structure is in a constant process of change. Various causal factors are interwoven for the production of a process in a period of time. For him this methodology is necessary for an "understanding of the civilizing process." Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 211-263. On conceptualizing that model as "process model" see Stephen Mennell, *Norbert Elias: Civilization and the Human Self-Image* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 177 ff.

⁴² Rudolf De Cillia, Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, "The Discursive Construction of National Identities." *Discourse and Society*. 10/2 (1999), 156. Here discourse is seen as a form of practice which "constitutes social practice and is at the same time constituted by it." Ibid., 157. For "'discourse' as a form of social practice", see N. Fairclough and R. Wodak, "Critical Discourse Analysis", in *Discourse as a Social Interaction, Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, ed. T. van Dijk, vol. 2 (London: Sage, 1997), 258-284.

intellectual elite who had a decisive role in determining the official policies.⁴³ The second group includes the texts of related legal regulations and minutes of the Assembly Sessions (published in *Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi or Zabıt Ceridesi*). This study gives special importance to discussions in the Parliament, which reveals different perspectives and all intentions and projections behind legal regulations. It also includes some publications on the implemented policies. Some collections of articles of the prominent leaders and intellectuals, which give us a general intellectual picture of the period, constitute third group of resources.⁴⁴ The fourth group employed is composed of books and texts documenting and reporting the activities of the THS, the TLS and the People's Houses, such as the minutes of the THS and TLS congresses, some of their publications as booklets or books (e. g. the history textbooks), and their prominent journals (*Ülkü* of the Houses, *Belleten* of the THS). Two newspapers, *Ulus* (semi-official daily) and *Cumhuriyet* (İstanbul daily) were used in a selective way during some cases or topics happening in a definite time span investigated. In addition, this study has employed books and articles related to literature about culture, state and nationalism, Ottoman history and its modernization, and the politics and history of the formative years of the Republic. This research was conducted in the *Milli Kütüphane* (National Library), and the libraries of *TTK*, *TDK* and *TBMM*, Bilkent University and METU Libraries in the period from 1997 to 1999. After this methodological clarification, the focuses of the chapters are as follows.

⁴³ For example, these include *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçler*, M. Esat Bozkurt's *Atatürk İhtilali*, S. Maksudi Arsal's *Türk Dili İçin*, F. Rıfkı Atay's *Çankaya*, etc.

⁴⁴ Such as *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı* (Two Volumes), *Atatürk Ve Türk Dili* (Two Volumes), *The Turkish Press* (Two Volumes), *Alfabe Tartışmaları*.

The second chapter deals with a theoretical explanation of the philosophical, historical and political roots of the idea of culture. This is done through focusing on culture's relations with modernity, the nation-state and nationalism. The analysis is deepened with the examination of the development of two historical models of culture, namely the Enlightenment-Jacobin and Romantic-German, which were about two processes of culture production. Providing a theoretical background, such an analysis becomes helpful to trace the line of the early Republican experience in Turkey.

The third chapter analyses Ottoman modernization, some main projects of modernity in the last decades of the Empire, and the transition from the empire to a nation-state system. The reason behind this exploration is to shed light on to what extent there was continuity or discontinuity between the Ottoman reform movements and the Kemalist Revolution. In this sense, it explores the emergence of the idea of society-making and its relation to civilization and culture in the Empire, which provided the ideological background and roots for the new regime's notion of culture.

In the fourth chapter, firstly the nature of the Kemalist Revolution and nation-building is portrayed. Then in the three main periods (1923-1930, 1930-1938 and 1938-1945) the development of the concept of culture in state discourse is analyzed, tracing the stock of the civilizing reforms. In the first period the concept of civilization, constituting the basis of the state discourse on culture, came to be the sole legitimizing element for the reforms. Culture during the second period was defined in its broadest meaning as comprising all that were expressed through the term civilization, and national. In the third period, while almost akin to the previous conceptualization, there was quite an emphasis on the Greek and Latin roots of the West in the definition of culture. This chapter argues

that culture as a high category was associated with “the modern way of life”, revolving around the idea of “society-making” and “order-making”.

The subject matter of chapter five is the invention of a new past through the works of the THS. It was the formation of the Turkish History Thesis, the aim of which was to provide continuity between the past and present, that is, the justification for the construction of a new way of life. Here the process of the formation of the thesis, including controversy over its validity, was one of the constitutive elements of the production of culture.

The sixth chapter investigates the language policy of the new regime, which included two main steps; firstly, the change of alphabet and secondly, the revolution in language. As the cornerstone of a new vision for a new future, the first one in fact reflected a radical break with the past. Following this, the creation of a new language was another revolutionary step in the new cultural formation. However, the debate on the revolution resulted in the radical and moderate phases (1930-1935 and 1940-1945 were radical in nature, and 1935-1940, relatively moderate). The last chapter forms conclusion.

CHAPTER II

CULTURE, STATE AND THE “CIVILIZING PROCESS”

Culture is the distinctive element that allows us to avoid conflating the nation with the state, even as, in practice, individuals “encounter” the nation through the state ... that “represents” it, through the state’s institutions. Culture is thus the name to be given to the “essential nation”; it designates the pure difference between the nation as national state and the other “nation” that is to be distinguished from any state, just as an “internal” or intrinsic “community” is to be represented from an artificial community... In this capacity it can either anticipate the state, resist it or figure the “ultimate” goal of its construction. But, being indebted to culture for the national identity that founds it, the first duty of the state is to “give” to the nation its cultural identity and above all to work to “develop” it.¹

During the last two centuries in Western and non-Western societies, culture as an idea and process has been at the center of all modernist projects for constructing an “ordered” society and “cultivated” individuals. In the West, the term culture became visible as a part of the comprised process of modernization through which politics, social structure and subjects took new shapes and visions. In this manner, from the beginning, culture has had a close link with the organized, centralized and integrative polity, namely the nation-state. That is, it is subject to the processes of constant production led by the state agencies and so it is a vision of the nation-state to “describe”, “manage” and “monitor” the society. Therefore, in this chapter, basic emphasis is especially placed on the role of the state and its agencies in describing the boundaries and contents of culture and

forging an identity, that is, in culture production. From the early nineteenth century, coupled with the idea of nationalism, culture became the effective instrument of nation-building and identification processes through which a (national) identity - necessary for membership to the polity - was constructed. This meant that the concepts of culture and nation usually overlapped. Thus it is also a key for the formation of modern public sphere and citizenship. Thus, above all, it seems necessary to examine the concept of culture by situating it in philosophical/theoretical and politico-historical processes.

The main purpose of the present chapter is to clarify and shed some light on culture's relations to modernity, state and nationalism by examining the philosophical and politico-historical background of the concept of culture. This is done through focusing on two dominant understandings of culture, namely Enlightenment-Jacobin and Romantic conceptions of culture. The first conception was closely tied with the idea of civilization, developed in France under the effect of the Enlightenment and through later Jacobin policies; and the second, stimulated and flourished by the Romantic tradition as a reaction to universalizing and atomizing tendency of the Enlightenment and French concept of civilization. This analysis is based on French and German cases. These two cases have been employed in all inquiries about both state- and nation-building and nationalism in the literature, and almost all studies on Turkish nationalism. In fact they are still indispensable and very significant for these studies, but they should be re-considered in terms of changing contexts. Thus, this dissertation tries to re-examine them critically with reference to culture.

¹ Etienne Balibar, "Culture and Identity (Working Notes)," in *The Identity in Question*, ed. John Rajchman (London: Routledge, 1995), 178.

2.1. Culture as a Modern Artifact

Before explaining the development of the idea of culture in the two cases, it seems necessary to clarify culture's relation with modernity and modernization. As Bauman argues, "culture" is a modern invention. It came onto the scene in the eighteenth century; before that time there had not been any understanding comprising the "complex world-view that the word 'culture' attempts to capture."² Its "discovery" occurred as a part of the process initiated by emerging modern conditions. However, it is usually mentioned together with the development of the Romantic philosophy which criticized the "universal" principles of the Enlightenment, like Reason, science, freedom, the autonomous individual and so on. In light of such a conception, it is seen as an authentic, unique and organic whole, and so it is, unlike the claims of the philosophers and intellectuals of the Enlightenment, not simply composed of autonomous and free individuals. Being the internal part of culture each individual subject gains its true identity. In fact, until now, this conception has been the basis of most nationalist, ethnic and culturalist movements under which it is seen as a useful and usable tool for a project of forming society and, often, building their own independent states. However, this is not only one notion of culture.

2.1.1. *Culture and Modernity*

The other conception that provided convenient ground for the organic notion of culture to flourish, resulted from the early modern conditions brought about by the process of epistemic, socio-economic, political and cultural transformations taking place in Western Europe. According to such a conception, culture is first of all perceived as part of the ideal of the creation of “civilized man” and “civilized society.” It seems that it has developed as one aspect of the “civilizing process.”³ To understand culture’s intimate relations to politics and the state,⁴ such a conception, for the purpose of this dissertation, appears to be important as well as the Romantic conception of culture.

The appearance of the concept of culture went parallel to the “civilizing process” that, including “changes in the way men conceived the cosmological reference-world”⁵, completely exterminated the existing understandings of social and political order, and self. Such cultural and political rupture, for the first time, began in England and later in Western Europe. It reflected the emergence of the *modern* conditions and process called *modernization*. From the Renaissance and Reformation movement to the French Revolution, in the context of loss of the ground on which certainties and symbols in the

² Zygmunt Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 81.

³ For the civilizing process, see Norbert Elias, *History of Manners, The Civilizing Process*, vol. I, trans. Edmund Jephcott, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).

⁴ For inescapable ties between culture and state, see Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Will Kymlicka, *States, Nations and Cultures* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1997), 22-25.

⁵ Michael Walzer, ‘On the Role of Symbolism in Political Thought’, in *The Self and the Political Order*, ed. Tracy B. Strong (New York: NY University Press, 1992), 68.

human life dwelled, the search for a new symbolic infrastructure and reference points by the philosophers and intellectuals gained impetus.⁶ For Descartes, whose scientific outlook was not simply epistemological but also *moral*, traditional moral standards could be modified or even abandoned in the light of philosophy and science. This determining scientific knowledge can be seen in almost all the works of scholars interested in finding out a new “political and moral system.”⁷ All these efforts strove to unify the previously dispersed universe to reproduce a new sense of wholeness through establishing “new” standards and certainties. This is the modern view of the world based on universality of human beings and ordered unity of thought and socio-political structure.

Modern thought around which new standards and certainties were produced, went hand in hand by challenging and rejecting the absolute “Truth” closely tied to the view of the God-given and -ordered world. This rejection and secularizing efforts may find their true expression especially in the Enlightenment’s attack on traditional, religious and particular attachments, and, instead, preaching “universal” standards.⁸ A uniform law of Nature and Reason directed these mores which were not tradition- and context-bound.

⁶ This became the earlier attempt for the cultural formation of modernity. Thus, for Giddens, the basic feature of modernity has been the organization of “time and space” in a cultural sense, reflecting time and space compression. Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 14.

⁷ All scientists in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries “tried in practice to *reinvent* the *moral* world around them on scientific grounds” (my emphasis). Samuel Fleischacker, *The Ethics of Culture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 24; On this see Charles Taylor, *Sources of The Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), especially Part II.

They universally implied the code of right and wrong. It was assumed that “secularized” moral ideals are common to all human beings. There emerged, therefore, the belief in the human capacity to plan and set models for new moral, social and political structures. The human being that is intrinsically valuable, self-satisfied and reasonable has the capability to *know* and therefore is able to carry on control over himself/herself, nature and society.⁹ This is the basis of the modern individualist understanding. But to decide what is best for individuals is in the hands of a specific group of persons who know the human nature and needs.¹⁰ That is, *knowing* is power which makes the modern subject and determines and imposes a law of truth and forms which are shaped through the preference of that group by asking the question “who we are.”¹¹ Having inner depth and autonomy, each person needs guidance to find and realize his/her individuality. In fact, as it is argued above, the elite’s attempts at looking for new “certainties” or unity of Truth aimed at designing and establishing an “ordered”, meaningful world for the subjects. These attempts might be seen

⁸ All first efforts to form a new vision of the world aimed at producing “an account of morality freed as much from the unexamined notions and rituals passed down in families and small communities.” Fleischacker, *Culture*, 20.

⁹ For an extensive study on modern self, see Taylor, *Sources of The Self*.

¹⁰ Agnes Heller talks about the success of early European modernity in producing a “cultural elite based on merit rather than on birth”, carrying on the power of authority. See Agnes Heller, “Omnivorous Modernity”, in *Culture, Modernity and Revolution: Essays in Honour of Zygmunt Bauman*, ed. Richard Kilminster and Ian Varcoe1 (London: Routledge, 1996), 108. It is this context in which modern elitism developed as one main result of the “demand to base political action on scientific standards.” Paul Feyerabend, “Democracy, Elitism, and Scientific Method”, *Inquiry* 23 (1980), 3.

¹¹ See Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, in *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinows (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982).

as *re-enchanting* the world through which culture, a modern vision of realizing a “cultivated”¹² society and in turn a “rationalized” individual, take place.

As a determining agent in that perspective, the properly shaped modern self is capable of forming and developing a well-ordered social structure. It was the “cultural programme of modernity” associated with the “belief in the possibility of the active formation, by conscious human activity and participation, of crucial aspects of social, cultural and natural orders... [S]ociety itself had become an object of human activities oriented to its reconstruction.”¹³ This program lies to a greater extent upon the modern progressive ideal for which each stage of human history showed an advance over previous ones.¹⁴ In that program, the approach that society can be cultivated and shaped by rational subjects dominated the intellectual and political arena, but, at the same time, every self was certainly tied to such a process of forming a new social and moral base, in which each individual’s identity is structured. That is, by deliberately designing a social order especially through the state mechanism, it is aimed at dressing up subjects with new moral and cultural vision, or identity. Here the new ordered society is not simply based on the understanding that society is a collection of individuals, but in general a collective whole.¹⁵

¹² For a vision of culture to cultivate society see Bauman, *Legislators*, 51.

¹³ S. N. Eisenstadt, “The Cultural Programme of Modernity and Democracy”, in *Culture, Modernity and Revolution: Essays in Honor of Zygmunt Bauman*, ed. R. Kilminster and I. Varcoe (London: Routledge, 1996), 27.

¹⁴ Modern notion of progress - as a force in history shaping the “individual will according to a -natural- pattern” - was unilinear and automatic. See John Andrew Bernstein, *Progress and the Quest for Meaning* (London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1993), 10.

These are new secular moral standards determined by context-free, universal Law and Reason. The modern state from the late eighteenth century came to the fore as the most powerful and confining mechanism which has constituted the modernist program of culture.

2.1.2 Culture and Nation-State: “The Legitimate Use of Culture”

The modern conditions with new standards and certainties based on new discourses provided not only self and society with a new meaning for the world, but also, for Walzer, “politics with a series of references.” It was the state (modern nation-state) which must be “*personified* before it can be seen, *symbolized* before it can be loved, *imagined* before it can be conceived” (my emphasis).¹⁶ It is in this sense that the nation-state is, as generally accepted, an entity that is a convergence of the idea of state and the idea of symbolically ordered community, that is, nation, or culture. Only through this community “personification”, “symbolization” and “imagination” is possible. That is why it is in itself national, and so cultural. This is based on the modern belief that every state has its own homogenous culture and every culture has its own state. It is only in this unique way that a political authority is made “legitimate”.

¹⁵ For modern understandings of “collectivity”, see Richard Handler, “Is ‘Identity’ A Useful Concept?”, in *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, ed. John R. Gillis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 33.

¹⁶ Walzer, “Symbolism,” 66-67. Modern political and cultural understanding becomes dependent upon the *imagined* characteristics. Walzer evaluates the role of the image as providing “an elementary sense of what the political community is like, of how

In order to clarify such assumed relationship between the state and culture (national culture), at the beginning, it seems necessary to start with an effort to describe the nature of the modern state. The nation-state is the modern form of state that came into existence at the end of the eighteenth century. A modern state is, first and foremost, a legal organization, which has some distinguishing peculiarities: impersonal constitution of rule, centralized authority, determined territory and legitimate use of violence within its boundaries.¹⁷ This legal association, mostly derived from Weber's ideal type, came with the emergence of a bureaucratic structure and became autonomous from any particularistic interests in society, which meant supremacy over every kind of social group.¹⁸ And also, it is capable of effectively collecting together the social forces under its jurisdiction and implementing official goals especially over the existing or potential oppositions of powerful social groups. This meant "central control" through which it is aimed at forming an administrative system "extending directly from the central power down to individual communities and households."¹⁹ These definitions shed light on two major functions of the

physically distinct and solitary individuals are joined together, so ... individuals... exist only as member of a body." Ibid., 67.

¹⁷ For the legitimate use of violence, see Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 54.

¹⁸ See Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1983). In fact the approach to see the state and society as two completely distinct entities was questioned in various way. Mitchell argues that state autonomy should be treated within historical contexts where various processes shaped the state's relations to the society. See Timothy Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their Critics", *American Political Science Review*, 85/1 (1991), 77-96.

¹⁹ Charles Tilly, "States and Nationalism in Europe, 1492-1992." *Theory and Society*. 23 (1994), 140.

modern state. The first is its “integrating” function with which the state seeks to unify the disparate elements of society around norms and symbols; and the second is its “legitimizing” function which involves an acceptance of the state’s rules of game, its social control, as true and right.²⁰ In the Weberian sense, this all-encompassing description implies a union that is not only *institutionally* but also *culturally* structured.²¹

All these empower the state to speak in the name of society as a whole and to describe the people living in its determined territory by the criterion of citizenship. This description occurs at two levels. It is a legal status through which the individual’s relations with the state apparatus are arranged, that is, citizens are seen equals before a “uniform” law, and, at the same time, it is a cultural status, a culturally-defined identity ascribed to every individual.²²

Citizenship is the identity that expresses the culturally and legally determined membership to a political community. It comes out as the important result of a coincidence of the idea of the state and the idea of the nation. This coincidence lies at the heart of Max Weber’s theory of state and society. For him, the nation-state exists as one crucial result of linking of the two mentioned ideas. It has a double-feature: “the belief in group affinity, regardless of whether it has any objective foundation, can have important

²⁰ See Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In”, in *Bringing the State Back In*, eds. P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

²¹ See Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. I, 385-398 and vol. II, 921-926.

²² On the relations of citizenship status with shared culture and state, see Will Kymlicka, “Misunderstanding Nationalism.” *Dissent*. (Winter 1995), 130-137; idem, *States*,; John Keane, “Nations, Nationalism and Citizens in Europe.” *ISSJ*. 140 (1994).

consequences especially for the formation of a political community” whereas it is essentially “the political community, no matter how artificially organized, that inspires the belief in common ethnicity.”²³ In this sense, his notion of a political community is an entity which is held together not merely through coercion, but also through shared values and experiences. Thus, it is an “community of shared memory” (*Erinnerungsgemeinschaft*).²⁴

Weber clarifies this in his following statements that:

Material and ideological interests of strata, privileged within a polity and by its very existence, comprise especially all those who think of themselves as being the special ‘partners’ of a specific ‘culture’ diffused among the members of the polity. Under the influence of these circles, the naked prestige of ‘power’ is unavoidably transformed into other forms of prestige and especially into the idea of nation.²⁵

In his view, in opposition to the nationalist claims, the nation is not determined by the well-known objective criteria (language, common descent, etc.), but it is mostly described in a political process by the constant interactions with interests groups in society. So the nation-state, as a polity of culturally and linguistically homogenous people, combines rationalized administration with communal ties based on emotions. That is why the intimate relation between the concept of nation²⁶ and political power dominates modern

²³ Weber, *Economy and Society*, 389.

²⁴ Guenther Roth, “Introduction”, in *Economy and Society*, LXXXIV.

²⁵ Weber, *Economy and Society*, 922.

²⁶ “The concept”, writes Weber, “ seems to refer...to a specific kind of pathos which is linked to the idea of a powerful political community of people who share a common language, or religion, or common customs, or political memoirs; such a state may already exist or it may be desired. The more power is emphasized, the closer appears to be the link between nation and state.” Ibid., 398.

politics. The result is a “imagined community” developed under the established control of the modern state through holding the task of socialization.²⁷

The honor of being a member of that nation is available for everybody who belongs to the “subjectively believed community of descent”. This rests on the idea of “chosen people” that “derives its popularity from the fact that it can be claimed to an equal degree by any and every member of the mutually despising groups, in contrast to status differentiation which always rests on subordination.”²⁸ In this regard, every sort of difference is seen as culturally disgusting. They are harmful to determined symbols of membership through which solidarity is produced as a political artifact.²⁹ Because the importance of nation is closely tied with the belief in its superiority, these symbols or cultural values are “preserved and developed only through cultivation of the peculiarity of the people.”³⁰ This is indeed the process of “nation-building” by which “cultural” affiliation is developed. This process, coupled with centralized control, embodied in large measure “cultural control” which was possible by the “creation of a single linguistic, historical, artistic, and practical tradition from all those present within the national territory.”³¹ The result was less heterogeneous populations. In the process, together with

²⁷ For imagined communities, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991); and for the role of the state, see Gellner, *Nations*.

²⁸ Weber, *Economy and Society*, 391.

²⁹ See *ibid.*, 391-392.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 925.

³¹ Tilly, “States,” 140. For gaining that control, “the state began as never before to create national educational system, to impose standard national languages, to organize

the state agencies, national bourgeoisie and intellectuals played a significant part dominantly.

In the process, the self-nominated intellectuals who seize leadership in a cultural community play a determining role of a culture because their task is to develop and spread it.³² They represent *cultural prestige*. Nevertheless, other groups of elite that are the political representatives of power appeal to the idea of the state. They represent *power prestige*. According to Weber, cultural prestige and power prestige are closely associated.³³ It is in this respect that besides the linking of the idea of the state and the idea of nation the association of these two groups is another base line of the nation-state.

The above argument brings us to the point that the state's strength and legitimacy does not only revolve around its legitimate use of violence, but also, perhaps most importantly, its "legitimate use of culture" or cultural products. The cultural products are the forces that direct the action of individuals in a unifying and normative way towards the common purpose. This is the nation-state's "imagined harmony", because in modern conditions the most fundamental form of binding people to the state is brought about on the whole in terms of an imagined "national culture" and "shared common identity".

2.1.3. Culture and Nationalism: A Critique of the Ethnic / Civic Dichotomy

expositions, museums, artistic subventions, and other means of displaying cultural production or heritage, to construct communications networks, to invent national flags, symbols, anthems, holidays, rituals, and traditions." Ibid.

³² Weber, *Economy and Society*, 926. For him, this group, by virtue of their peculiarity, have passage to particular goods that are seen "culture products", *ibid*.

³³ *Ibid*.

As argued above, culture, in connection with the modern nation-state, exists as something signifying a collective shared identity as a crucial element of legitimacy. In this sense, it is considered in terms of its relationship to nationalism. Nationalism, as a modern ideology, can not be separated from the idea of state, with the claim that those who assume to be a coherent nation have their own independent state or *vice-versa*.³⁴ So one of the central roles of the nation-state, which is the expression of cultural values and the means of socialization into common norms, is to reproduce a culture: standardized, homogenous and universal.³⁵ This has been the modern “nationalist” idea of a culture, an end product of the nationalist ideology of the state. In this respect, culture enriched with invented history and tradition makes possible everyone in a definite territory to think they belong to an “imagined community.”³⁶ To the extent that culture provides a sense of identity for this community, the state tries to provide a link between state and society, between individual and community, between past and future. Here, as an ideology of

³⁴ For the ties between the modern nation-state and nationalism, see Eric Hobsbawn, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 9-10; Gellner, *Nations*. Hobsbawn explains this relation with the equation state=nation=people. See Hobsbawn, *Nations*, 19, 22-23.

³⁵ Ernst Gellner, *Culture, Identity and Politics* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987), especially 5-28.

³⁶ Anderson, *Imagined*, 1990.

common culture³⁷, nationalism is prone to the process of identification evolved around symbolic attachments and a sense of collectivity.³⁸

As indicated in the Introduction, almost all analysis of nationalism employ dual categories, Western / civic / liberal / individualistic versus Eastern / ethnic / cultural / collectivistic.³⁹ This separation recently attracts many criticisms for it is not so easy to differentiate nationalism in the civic and ethnic type accentuated mostly by the liberals and republicans. In this distinction culture has a peculiar position generally tied with the ethnic / Eastern type of nationalism. Nevertheless, all aspects thought within culture are in fact deep-seated in both conceptions, and so all that is collected under the name of civic is also bound up with a specific conception of culture.⁴⁰ To understand much better culture's deep-rooted relationship with the modern state, nationalism in an ideal typical model in Weberian sense is classified as *top-down* and *bottom-up*, as Charles Tilly aptly elaborates.⁴¹

³⁷ Nationalism, like all other modern ideologies is, first and foremost, an ordered set of cultural symbols. See Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System", in *The Interpretation of Cultures* (London: Fontana Press, 1993), 196.

³⁸ For a detailed information, see Elias, "Civilization," 233-238.

³⁹ See David Brown, "Are There Good and Bad Nationalism?" *Nations and Nationalism*. 5/2 (1999), 284-286.

⁴⁰ See Kymlicka, *States*, 22-27; Bernard Yack, "The Myth of the Civic Nation", *Critical Review*, 10/2 (1996); Nieguth, "Beyond Dichotomy".

⁴¹ See "The State of Nationalism", *Critical Review*, 10:2 (1996), 303-304. Also both are what A. Smith calls as *state-led* nationalism and *state-seeking* one. In fact, these two denote the two different routes to the nation-state, which are ideal types rather than merely classifications of particular historical realities. See Anthony Smith, "State-Making and Nation-Building", in J. A. Hall (ed.), *States in History* (New York: Basil Blackwell,

In *top-down* nationalism, rulers of the sovereign state⁴² fight against any particularistic orientations and try to impose a collective and generalized culture and identity. They produce “doctrines and practices that implemented their visions of the Nation: standardized national languages, national histories, pageants, ceremonies, songs, banners, museums, schools, and much more.”⁴³ This stand makes their orientation legitimate in interpreting the collective interest of the defined nation/people. This has a direct relation with two functions of its pioneers: first, to reform the existing state, and second, to modernize people believed to be “backward”.⁴⁴

It is obvious in this kind of nationalism that the state that carries out a nationalist project describes and determines the nature and boundaries of culture. Thus, it is “subject to the logic of *nation-building* and needs to explore ways of turning its more or less heterogeneous people into a nation.”⁴⁵ According to that logic, membership to a political and cultural community is defined more or less in political terms rather than as a racial and ethnic one. It is therefore not exclusive in accepting outsiders as members, but they must give up their old ways of life and culturally integrate into the imagined cultural

1986); Charles Tilly, “States and Nationalism”, 23 (1994), 133; B. Parekh, “Ethnocentricity of the Nationalist Discourse”, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1/1 (1995), 36.

⁴² This state that seeks to have a nation with the help of its nationalist ideology is indeed a strong state. It is autonomous from every particularistic interest and provides a framework for the society with its tradition of a centralized state that state is the “principle expression of the nation and its unity.” Michael Keating, *Nations against the State* (London: MacMillan, 1996), 17.

⁴³ Tilly, “The State of Nationalism,” 304. Revolutionary France seemed to be much closer to this type with its efforts of crashing all particular privileges and affiliations. *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

community.⁴⁶ The view of culture such affinity is based on does not denote an ethnically and racially homogenous community, but denotes a civilized way of life surrounded with cultural memories, myths and symbols. However, it seems to be “assimilative” and “hierarchical” in nature with a “civilizing” mission.

Unlike the state-generated nationalist ideology, bottom-up nationalism is about a movement to form a state. In that, the pre-existing nation or people that does not have its own state precedes the state. By struggling and organizing on the basis of nationalism the leaders of national or ethnic group strives to form their own independent political entity. They claimed a separate state on “the ground that the population had a distinct, coherent cultural identity.”⁴⁷ That is expressed in the logic of ‘state building’ with which they look for proper ways to turn “fellow nationals into fellow citizens” and create “a secure public space.”⁴⁸ This logic comes to be a unifying force by collecting separate power centers under the canopy of a unified, centralized state, as was in Germany, and self-conscious nationalist groups setting up the state, as in the case of Israel.

In that nationalist understanding, ethnic and cultural features taken for granted as the identity of people are regarded as the identifying aspects for membership in both nation

⁴⁵ Parekh, “Ethnocentricity,” 36.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 37.

⁴⁷ Tilly, “States and Nationalism,” 133. Tilly argues that this bottom-up nationalism is usually generated by top-down nationalism as “its antithesis and mirror image”. Under the effect of the doctrines of top-down nationalism some leaders with particular and regional attachments begin to voice cultural and political autonomy through emphasizing their distinct ways. See idem, “The State of Nationalism,” 304.

⁴⁸ Parekh, “Ethnocentricity,” 36.

and state. In other words, the people who do not belong to the defined cultural community can not easily be accepted as members of its political community or citizens. This outlook finds its clear expression in an “organic” view of culture that is exclusive in defining the criteria of citizenship.

Both types, ideal typical in the Weberian sense and not reflecting a true form in reality, manifest two main ways in the process of establishing a strong tie between the state and nation.⁴⁹ In fact it is the “direction” of this process which has a determining place in the production and dissemination of culture. That is, in its broader terms, this distinction makes it possible to separate “two distinct understandings” of culture which are firmly established in terms of memories, myths, rituals and common ancestry, and also to grasp the nature of how the state treats particularisms.

2.2. Culture as a Part of “Civilizing Process”: The Roots of the Hierarchical-Assimilative Notion of Culture

There were two dominant conceptions of culture: Enligthenist-Jacobin and Romantic. The former developed within the Enlightenment movement, the Jacobin revolutionary tradition and top-down form of nationalism. It came to the fore as a vision of the creation of “ordered” and “civilized” society, especially in France. Here it was part and parcel of the process of transforming the socio-political order in the path of civilization, certainly tied to the ideals of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution: science, reason, freedom and equality.

Culture that was, for the first time, often used to represent the artistic and intellectual activities and so softened behavior, took place under the name of civilization in the French intellectual and political tradition.⁵⁰ Then, together with the concept of civilization it dominated political thought and practice, led by the emergence of a new form of polity (modern nation-state) and socio-economic changes as well as ideational transformations. The process of the emergence of modern conditions in which certainties and sense of wholeness were reconstructed gave way to the concept of culture as a vision of “ordered” and “civilized” society. Gellner argues, one can roughly divide cultures into two main groups: “savage” and “cultivated” ones. In the pre-modern times, where there had been an understanding of God-given and -created world, “savage” cultures were self-reproducing, that is, reproduced “themselves from generation to generation without conscious design, supervision, surveillance or special nutrition.”⁵¹ They provided the unity of Truth to their members and the notion of natural differences between people; their political rulers never evaluated them as things directed by deliberate intervention, and “the lack of experience of such intervention”, writes Bauman, “prevented the thought of a man-made nature of the human world.”⁵² The Reformation movement (questioning of one absolute truth represented by the Church), emergence of new forms of politics (centered power making visible the differences between countries and nations), and the gradual

⁴⁹ See Nieguth, “Beyond Dichotomy,” 157.

⁵⁰ Lucien Febvre, *Uygarlık, Kapitalizm ve Kapitalistler* [Civilization, Capitalism and Capitalists] (Ankara: İmge, 1995), 52.

⁵¹ Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism*, 50.

⁵² Bauman, *Legislators*, 83.

weakening of “wild cultures” and subsequently forming a new one, were all influential in the “discovery of culture.”⁵³ At the end, as a moral and social vision, “cultivated” cultures came into the scene; they can be “most usually sustained by literacy and by specialized personnel.”⁵⁴ This notion firstly appeared in France and England as one significant part of civilizing project and later in Germany as an “authentic” idea and the critique of civilization, signifying collective personality of the people belonging to an organic community.

2.2.1. Culture, Civilization, and Enlightenment

During the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the term “culture” had been mentioned in connection with the concept of “civilization”.⁵⁵ In French and English, culture was used as equivalent to civilization, although in German these terms were clearly

⁵³ Ibid., 84. Bauman discusses that in the definition of culture there was a strong reformist inclination associated with the meta-narratives of modernism. As the ideology of intellectuals culture constituted the transformation of all primitive, backward and local forms of life. See Zygmunt Bauman, “Legislators and Interpreters: Culture as the Ideology of Intellectuals,” in *Intimations of Postmodernity* (London: Routledge, 1992), 1-25.

⁵⁴ Gellner, *Nationalism*, 50.

⁵⁵ The etymology of the word ‘civilization’ goes back to a family of Latin words such as “*civilis* (civil, civilian), *civis* (citizen), *civitas* (self-governing municipality) and *civilitas* (citizenship)”. The Greeks and Romans used them to distinguish themselves from the barbarians who were “inhuman – outside of the society of accomplished citizens.” John Rundell and Stephen Mennell, “Introduction: Civilization, Culture and the Human Self-Image”, in *Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization* (London: Routledge, 1998), 6. Around the term *civilité* and *police*, it took a new form throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in France and England. For the genealogy of the word in the early

differentiated. In the former one, civilization was used to describe a progressive and ordered world of the Enlightenment, which mirrors a refined and developed mode of human conduct in contrast to the barbaric and savage form. In this sense, both concepts refer to “a general process of human development, of becoming ‘cultivated’ and ‘civilized’.”⁵⁶ In its most general modern usage, according to Norbert Elias, the concept of civilization reflects the “self-consciousness of the West”:

It sums up everything in which Western society of the last two or three centuries believes itself superior to earlier societies or “more primitive” contemporary ones. By this term Western society seeks to describe what constitutes its special character and what it is proud of: the level of its technology, the nature of *its* manners, the development of *its* scientific knowledge or view of the world, and much more.⁵⁷

This usage stemmed from a long political transformation and state formation in the West. Nevertheless, its use represents different characteristics in various Western societies; the French and English usage is greatly different from the German one. In French and English, the term “civilization” was firstly invented to “denote not only a code of manners, but also an intellectually cultivated style of life.”⁵⁸ In this usage, referring to “political or economic, religious or technical, moral or social facts”, it appeared to reflect the progress of the West and of whole mankind. Nevertheless, in the German usage, civilization is “something which is indeed useful, but nevertheless only a value of *second* rank, comprising only the

modern times, see Lucien Febvre, “History and Civilization: ‘*Civilization*: Evolution of a Word and a Group of Ideas,” in *Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization*, 164-168.

⁵⁶ John B. Thompson, *Ideology and Modern Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 124.

⁵⁷ Elias, *The Civilizing*, 3-4.

outer appearance of human beings, the *surface* of human existence. The word through which Germans interpret themselves... is *kultur* (my emphasis).”⁵⁹ Since civilization began gaining widespread usage especially in France, it became a moral ideal of the philosophers of the Enlightenment, the ideal of producing “civilized” and “enlightened” citizens making up a “nation”. And it was based on the progressive philosophy under which one nation could be “civilized” step by step in an endless manner in the lights of science and reason.⁶⁰ Progressive ideals first of all necessitates enlightened rulers or “philosopher” kings who, having acquired necessary knowledge with the help of science and reason, know the people’s interest and needs, and so reshape them. They then grant the upper and significant positions to other enlightened men. All these give way to advancement in the fields of administration, law and education. That is why, in its specific form, civilization expresses a “choice of strategy for the centralized management of social process” that was “to be a knowledge-led management” aiming first of all at governing “individual minds and bodies.”⁶¹ In this sense, Diderot says, “to educate a nation is to civilize it; to extinguish knowledge is to reduce it to the primitive condition of barbarism.”⁶²

On the road to reach an ordered and civilized society, local customs and values were regarded as obstacles, and so graceless, rude, irrational and undeveloped. In this

⁵⁸ Rundell and Mennell, “Introduction:,” 6.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 4. This notion will be elaborated in later part.

⁶⁰ Febvre, *Uygarlık*, 33-35 and 42, and Elias, *The Civilizing*, 5.

⁶¹ Bauman, *Legislators*, 93.

⁶² Quoted in Febvre, *Uygarlık*, 35.

notion there did not emerge any understanding of plurality of ways of life, and, instead, what was proposed was the coherent and unitary notion of civilization where all human beings come under its effect. Being “civilized”, as Elias aptly clarifies, describes a “social quality of people, their housing, their manners, their speech, their clothing... which refers exclusively to particular human accomplishments”; that is why the “national self-image” of the French see their own way as a universally applicable and desirable thing.⁶³ This nurtures the self-awareness of being superior in every fields of life such as science, technology, administration, arts and so on. The main question this understanding seeks to clarify therefore appears as “what ought to be.” Based upon the question, such perspective does not only strive to transmute their own society into a more civilized one, but also opens the gates to legitimize the expansionist and colonizing tendencies,⁶⁴ while insisting on their *civilizing mission*. This belief came to the fore with a desire to set hierarchy among ways of life, such as savage forms and civilized ones; the teleological understanding or the idea of progress of the Enlightenment, modernization brings every human society to the civilized one. It is obvious that it was a “universalized order-making” notion of civilization, in general used in the singular.

⁶³ Elias, *The Civilizing*, 5-6.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 5 and 49-50. This gave rise to an understanding of “a nation-with-a mission”, a civilizing mission flourished through universalistic idealism of the Enlightenment. In other words, the non-European societies believed to be backward were seen as being easily assimilated to a linear idea of European civilization. Walzer argues, in this respect, “The members of the nation... carry to foreign lands a culture to which other people ought to be assimilated or a doctrine by which they ought to be ruled. They teach the others a way of life that more closely expresses natural law or divine command or historical development.” Michael Walzer, “Nation and Universe,” in *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990), 541. For example,

The social base of the concept of civilization in France lay upon firstly the courtly - middle class intelligentsia, the basis of Physiocratism, using it in the internal social conflict; in their usage, it denoted a peculiar way of behavior belonging to their circles.⁶⁵ Later, the emergence of the bourgeoisie with considerable and influential power changed the direction and it became the thing comprising the whole nation and expressing the “national self-image”⁶⁶, that is, gradually bound up with the identity of the nation. Initiating a civilizing project largely based on the idea of civilization, the pioneers of the French Revolution and the Jacobins strove to establish a well-ordered, progressive, developed way of life.

Coupled with such perception of civilization, the concept of culture came to be its sub-derivative aspect. In other words, it appeared as an intimate aspect of the process of describing new standards and certainties which set new boundaries to human life, and of patterning and forming a new way of life and social structure. Culture, for a long time, was used as farming activity. “To culture (cultivate) land,” writes Bauman, “meant to select good seed, to sow, to till, to plough, to fight weeds and undertake all other actions deemed necessary to secure an ample and healthy crop. This was exactly the shape of the

Napoleon attempted to justify his efforts to conquest Egypt in the name of civilization. Ibid, 5 and 49-50.

⁶⁵ In the hands of the Physiocrats and other reformists, it became an “indication of the existence of systematic social regularities”, and stood “in opposition to ‘barbarism’”. Jonathan Fletcher, *Violence and Civilization: An Introduction to the Work of Norbert Elias* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 9.

⁶⁶ Elias, *The Civilizing*, 49.

task in relation to human society.”⁶⁷ The cultivation of land, with the modern turn, was transformed into cultivation of the human mind and society. In other words, Williams aptly notes that, in its social, intellectual and artistic sense, the “word ‘culture’... is a metaphorical term derived from the act of cultivating the soil (Latin, *cultura*).”⁶⁸ Here, it stood to serve as tool in the hands of “cultural gardeners” for designing and organizing human life needed to be shaped. It was this usage of culture that, as Philippe Bénéton argues, represented the “formation of *spirit*, and always used in singular, it reflected the unitary ideal of the eighteenth century and its universalist perspective; it applied to Man - with a capital “M”- beyond all national or social distinctions”.⁶⁹ This notion of culture thus implies “the processes of creativity, innovation and a *break* from the past, and thus the movement and ceaseless activity of the present.”⁷⁰ It is generally deemed as *high* culture. It is this modern perception through which social order is redefined as one end product of human activities. And, at the same time, the individual human being is dressed with new qualities determined through the *gardening* works of a group of people dominating the sphere of knowledge and power, namely the elite. This brought about activities that led to the attempts to pattern and shape suitable modes of behavior and ways of life. It

⁶⁷ Bauman, *Legislators*, 94.

⁶⁸ Raymond Williams, “Culture and Civilization”, in, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Collier and MacMillian, 1967), 273.

⁶⁹ Quoted in Bauman, *Legislators*, 94-95.

⁷⁰ Rundell and Mennell, “Introduction:,” 13; and also see G. Markus, “A Society of Culture: The Construction of Modernity,” in *Rethinking Imagination: Culture and Creativity*, eds. G. Robinson and J. Rundell (London: Routledge, 1994), 18. Although this understanding was used by some idealist German thinkers like Kant against the

manifested the processes of “cultivation and acculturation”. In this sense culture was, as Bauman puts it, the “orthodox notion of culture” or the “order-making” and “society-making” notion of culture.⁷¹ Here it reflected an entity or process.

In the hands of cultural gardeners, the above mentioned notions of civilization and culture were used to represent the whole people by ignoring all their particular attachments (class, ethnic, family, traditional, etc.). That is why both are inherently collective, evolving around two phrases: a “collection of individuals” and a “collective individual.”⁷² Collectivist notion as a collection of individuals was at the beginning based upon the idea of the common good, *general will* or will of subjects, of which individuals become part. For J. J. Rousseau, “general will” as the source of the law represents common freedom, under which all citizens are equally honored; for him, freedom, equality and common purpose can not be separated. This conception of society comes with the requirement for creating citizens and teaching them how to become virtuous citizens⁷³. In this sense, what is needed is a kind of “perfected art” which is inevitable to “forge a self

Enlightenment’s universal reason and understanding of nature, it came to be counted as the basis of the development of the French conception.

⁷¹ Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodernity and Its Discontents* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 130, 134.

⁷² The expressions belong to Louis Dumont. Quoted in Richard Handler, *Nationalism and The Politics of Culture in Quebec* (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 32.

⁷³ In the words of J. J. Rousseau, “It is not enough to say to the citizens, *be good*; they must be taught to be so.” See J. J. Rousseau, “Discourse on Political Economy,” in *Social Contract and Discourses*, trans. G. D. H. Cole (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1975), 130.

capable of living under the conditions of modernity”⁷⁴. Each self must beware of the realization of his/her individuality “only in its relationship to the body of the State” and therefore identify himself/herself “in some degree with this greater whole.”⁷⁵ This collectivity mirrors a community of equals reciprocally recognized. In the hands of the Jacobins who strove to turn all differences into a homogenous whole, this understanding became associated with the idea of a “collective individual.”

That acquired and possessed conception of culture is based on *hierarchical* and *value-laden* understanding.⁷⁶ “The original hierarchical concept of culture” was based on the idea that “satisfaction of human needs may be improved in one fashion only; human history is the story of that improvement; the term ‘culture’ must therefore be used in the singular only.”⁷⁷ It is closely tied with the idea of progress and perfection. People and communities are ranked in accord with the level of their culture in “a hierarchical ordering”⁷⁸; if there is a cultured group, there is automatically an uncultured, archaic one. Similarly there is the notion of *cultured* person versus *wild* one. What the savage/wild culture comprised of was that which came from the *ancient regime*: traditional and local tastes. It is evident that, during the early modern period, the upper stratum and

⁷⁴ See Tracy B. Strong, “Introduction: The Self and the Political Order,” in *The Self and the Political Order*, 11.

⁷⁵ Rousseau, “Discourse,” 135.

⁷⁶ For a hierarchical concept of culture, see Zygmunt Bauman, *Culture as Praxis* (London: Routledge, 1973), 7; Tony Bennett, *Culture: A Reformer’s Science* (London: Sage Publication, 1998), especially chp. 4.

⁷⁷ Bauman, *Postmodernity*, 130.

intellectuals saw the people from the lower echelons of society as carriers of backward and archaistic values.⁷⁹ Only could they be freed from their inferior position with the guidance and instructing efforts of the elite by using the state agencies. One aspect of these efforts was to free people from the tight local ties and to end the autonomous local power centers. Then they could be educated and be good citizens through the centralized state mechanism. In France all these were due to the rising tide of centralizing and unifying structure of the state. Before and after the Revolution all particularisms became the object of a “cultural crusade”. Only one form of culture, that of the intellectuals and state elite, came to be legitimate form. The cultural gardeners began to extend it to everybody as part of a civilizing project.⁸⁰ Up until the French Revolution and its aftermath, the project gained new and radical impetus to transmute people’s souls and minds into a cultured and civilized form. The ultimate aim then was to merge the diverse and traditionally patterned forms into oneness that existed later as a legitimizing force for the modern polity. That meant to collect different social, ethnic and sub-cultural groups under the centralizing and unifying state and to symbolically pattern them into a union, a *collective* union made up of civilized individuals. In this sense it is inclusionary and assimilative. But people from the lower echelons of the hierarchical structuration suffered a social exclusion. To be included

⁷⁸ This phrase belongs to Tony Bennett. See Bennet, *Culture*., 91.

⁷⁹ This made legitimate their hegemony over these people. See Jacques Revel, “Forms of Expertise: Intellectuals and the ‘Popular’ Culture in France (1650-1800),” in *Understanding Popular Culture, Europe from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Steven L. Kaplan (London: Mouton, 1984), 262; Bauman, *Intimations*, xiv.

⁸⁰ This quest for homogeneity was the name of the ‘civilizing conquest’ in France. Bauman, *Legislators*, 60.

they had to be assimilated, or “modernized”. That is, inclusion does not take place on equal terms for everybody.

For that reason, the original hierarchical notion of culture is *assimilative*. It was this sense in which, as the main target of socio-cultural engineering (The objective of the Enlightenment), this notion intended to produce uniformity around the Enlightenment’s conquering terms: freedom, equality and fraternity. The result would be the existence of a social arena where each citizen expresses himself freely and equally and participates in a uniform, determined and modern life. This is the process of “becoming,” coupled with the political process while being directed by the intellectual groups. Perceiving society and societal difference as man-made, constructed and calculable prepared the ground for the attempts to revise and form cultural structure to a greater extent in accordance with the taste of a group of people. It was these people who can hold the power resulting from knowledge and so know best for the people. They had organic ties to the state and its agencies. In the following section, that aspect of culture will be elaborated together with the state and nationalism, especially by focusing upon the case of France.

2.2.2. The Political Roots of Culture in France: The Revolution, Jacobenism and the Cultural Crusade

The hierarchical-assimilative notion of culture began to take root in politics with the French Revolution. The Revolution was at the first insight based on a new idea of the state taking its legitimacy from the consent of free citizens. In other words, the sovereignty of the French people was at the heart of the Revolution. The state came to be

as an active agent transforming the society by setting boundaries and imposing a new order. Then this idea of the state came to be associated with the idea of the nation that is a cultural community with a common language and a shared history. In the discourse of the Revolutionaries together with the idea of nation, republicanism took an important place. The Revolutionary Republicans promoted the radical break with the past in the name of a new beginning.⁸¹ The Revolutionaries brought together republicanism and nationalism, and so the formation of the republic was closely tied with the emergence of the nation.⁸² However, the new national past did not have to be something that could be used by the proponents of *ancien regime* against the new regime.⁸³

The Jacobins, a new wave of intellectuals who were mostly migrants without any local ties and looking for something new, made efforts to create such an imagined community, with the Revolutionary and Republican mission. They tried to define new categories for the people, which were thought to be *immature* form, and determined the boundaries of a new community with a new world of *sacred* based on a new symbolic order.⁸⁴ Under this community everybody would be “equalized” with their titles and their

⁸¹ “A political reason for this ideological move”, writes Meadwell, “was the control or appropriation of other regnant or emergent languages of legitimation by political rivals in the old regime.” Hudson Meadwell, “Republics, Nations and Transitions to Modernity.” *Nations and Nationalism*. 5/1 (1999), 26.

⁸² Biancamaria Fontana, “Introduction,” *The Invention of the Modern Republic*, ed. B. Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 4.

⁸³ Meadwell, “Republics,” 26.

⁸⁴ In order to reconstruct a new symbolic order, the Revolutionaries adopted a new calendar (to recreate time), changed the names of days and months, renamed themselves and even chess pieces, and changed crockery, furniture, law codes, the map of France and

dress as well as their legal and political status.⁸⁵ It seemed to be the “community of equals”⁸⁶, imagined as contrary to any heterogeneity, any sort of particularistic tendencies and regionalism. This quest for homogenizing the new society in their discourse came with the rejection of the separation between the public and the private that the Enlightenment thinkers put forward. For them the private represented the particularistic and traditional affiliations and values and so was in contrast to a collective identity the revolutionaries attempted to create. So it had to be erased in the name of the public (society) by means of revolutionary acts.⁸⁷ This effort to extend the boundaries of the public sphere toward the private one was also one of the goals of the Kemalist revolution in Turkey. The revolutionary rulers strove to form a public sphere by targeting and attacking all values, customs and habits belonging to the private sphere.

dress. See Robert Darnton, *The Kiss of Lamourette* (New York: Norton, 1990), 6-9. The new world of sacred may find its true meaning in the public festivals and ceremonies. The festivals, with its new sense of time and space, “functioned as the new ritual basis of the revolutionary community” through providing new social values and categories and emphasizing “oneness rather than distinctions.” See Lynn Hunt, “The Sacred and the French Revolution,” in *Durkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies*, ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 29-30; Mona Ozouf, *Festivals and the French Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).

⁸⁵ It would be a community where, as mentioned in a petition given to the National Convention (1794), “there will be less pride, less discrimination, less social reserve, more open familiarity, a stronger leaning toward fraternity, and the therefore more equality.” Quoted in Darnton, *The Kiss*, 8; Larry Roy, “‘Fundamentalism’, Modernity and the new Jacobins.” *Economy and Society*. 28/2 (1999), 210.

⁸⁶ For the community of equals see Jacques Rancière, *On the Shores of Politics*, trans. Liz Heron (London and NY: Verso, 1995).

⁸⁷ See *ibid.*, 8.

In the Jacobin formulation the idea of people had a fundamental place. The new identity was created through imagining the people as the true player of history.⁸⁸ The will of the people aimed at being instituted by the Revolution. It manifested the collective will based on order and progress. All outsiders and opponents were portrayed as the enemies to “the order of reason and universe.”⁸⁹ The imagined community of the Jacobin elite was largely inclusionary in the sense that everyone had a potential to be turned into a civilized, patriotic citizen. This mission of inclusion was irresistible. All opponents who were portrayed as “enemies” of the Republic suffered to be overwhelmed.⁹⁰ Around this mission the boundary of membership to the imagined community expressed in French (national) culture was constructed.

In the discourse of the Jacobins, membership to the French political community, or the public, was only possible through cultural assimilation. This stemmed from a strong link between citizenship and nationhood set by the Revolution. The outsiders would be accepted as members of the French nation if they gave up their old ways of life and

⁸⁸ “The People” became the new sacred center for the Revolutionary Republicans when the King who had been “the sacred center of French society” was removed. See Hunt, “The Sacred”, 32-39.

⁸⁹ See Bernhard Giesen, “Cosmopolitans, Patriots, Jacobins, and Romantics.” *Deadalus*. 127/3 (1999), 241. They had to be destroyed in the name of saving “the future from the past and the public from the private... The king had to be decapitated, as he represented the past, the personal, and the unnatural order. At the end, *la nation une et indivisible* [of the French Jacobins] was to emerge, the perfect realization of the new collective subject of history.” *Ibid.*, 241-242.

⁹⁰ On this mission, Giesen writes, “every act of resistance on the part of outsiders not only puts the inclusion of an individual at risk but also challenges the entire mission of inclusion. Outsiders cannot resist inclusion, neither by right nor by reason. Whoever questions the mission has to be overwhelmed and destroyed.” *Ibid.*, 247.

culturally integrate into the nation. Here the result was the “inclusionary” and “assimilationist” understanding of membership to French culture.⁹¹

At this juncture, access to citizenship passed through linguistic and cultural assimilation. During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, the French tried to actualize language unification by means of state agents. During the second half of the nineteenth century in the language and cultural integration, the army and schools had a decisive role.⁹² In such a way the French state had sought to give a common cultural content to the new French identity. In the time of the Third Republic (1871-1940) appearing with the claim that it would complete the Revolution, this act reached its zenith. The French Republicans made efforts to civilize and assimilate the masses, especially the peasants who had been untouched by the center. This cultural crusade aimed at building a nation and forging the sense of the homeland.⁹³ This civilizing mission, or “civilizing

⁹¹ For the connection between citizenship and nationhood, and their assimilationist and inclusionary characteristics, see William R. Brubaker, “Immigration, Citizenship and the Nation-State.” *International Sociology*. 5/4 (1990).

⁹² Josep R. Llobera, *The God of Modernity: The Development of Nationalism in Western Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 1994), 200.

⁹³ This “Third Republic’s civilizing efforts in rural France” was rationalized by “the example of original ancestors –brave, inspiring, but primitive and uncouth- civilized by Rome and much better off as a result despite the discomforts of conquest.” To educate children by using the textbooks, by the 1880s, was one of these efforts. See Eugen Weber, *My France: Politics, Culture, Myth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 31-32; idem, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (, 1976), 486. Also about the transformation of the French peasants, see James R. Lehning, *Peasant and French: Cultural Contact in Rural France during the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), especially chapter 2.

conquest”, was also applied to justify the French imperialism outside France.⁹⁴ This nationalism of the 1880s largely provided the roots for “an expansive, assimilationist reform of citizenship law whose central provisions have endured to this day.”⁹⁵ Since then, the law has also been applicable for the newly naturalized foreigners (mostly immigrants) and the colonized. The Republican institutions worked for them and turned them into Frenchmen as in rural France.

Nevertheless, this assimilationist understanding of membership includes some inconsistencies in terms of inclusion and exclusion. Inside France the way for full membership to the political community passed through being assimilated into the French culture or similar to those who formed a new life at the center. If anyone insisted on his particularistic affiliation, he would be deprived of attaining public identity. This is “particularistic exclusion” within a universalistic system.⁹⁶ This became very clear in the cases of the position of the colonized and recent immigrants. According to the French colonial regime, they were seen as potentially assimilated as “citizens of the Republic”, but “[T]his assimilation depended on a process of transformation that could only take place gradually through education and a transformation from tradition to modernity.”⁹⁷ The

⁹⁴ According to this belief, the colonized people were “also expected to benefit from French conquest, as France had gained from that of Rome. Conquest was painful but salutary and, in the spirit of the nineteenth century, progressive.” Weber, *My France*, 32.

⁹⁵ Brubaker, “Immigration,” 393.

⁹⁶ Laurent Dubois, “*La République Métissée: Citizenship, Colonialism, and the Borders of French History.*” *Cultural Studies*. 14/1 (2000), 26.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 27; Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997). It is “this complex of inclusion and exclusion, and of the deferral of the application of

exclusion here came to the fore only when considering them as immature to act as free citizens and to have “full citizenship.”⁹⁸ To be a full citizen means to be free from “savagery” and traditional forms of life.

With its strong state tradition, France is the most representative example of the state pursuing the policies of ‘nation-building’ project. The French model attempted to attain a culturally and linguistically homogenous society by top-down, or state-generated, nationalism. The French conception of culture is based on self-cultivation and cultivation of the ideal. But it is embedded in a newly formed symbolic order based on “hierarchical” structuring. Here culture is something which is largely “achieved”. So it is inclusive only if anyone willing to be assimilated into or merge his/her soul into this order. Otherwise it is exclusionary.

2.3. The Romantic Understanding of Culture

2.3.1. Romanticism, Culture and the Hatred of Civilization

The second dominant conception of culture in its relation to nation-state was of the organic one developed in the late eighteenth century in Germany. It was the time that the intellectuals, of the rising new middle class in Germany began asking the question

universal ideas, is the very ‘Republican racism’ which continues to haunt the contemporary discussions around immigration in France.” Dubois, “*La République Métissée*,” 27.

“who are we really?” This attitude came to the fore as “resentment” of the existing condition stemming from *real politik*, the cultural and intellectual hegemony of France through the eighteenth century, and its direct political domination at the turn of the eighteenth century.⁹⁹ And then a new *Weltanschauung* appeared under the name of Romanticism¹⁰⁰ in the fields of philosophy, literature, art and, lastly, that of politics. Indeed, this was the main response to the symbolic and intellectual domination of the French way especially over the aristocratic and newly emerging bourgeoisie stratum. The most significant outcome of this movement was the emergence of a new vision of culture (an organic one) as a reaction to the French universal and “assimilative” understanding of civilization, culture. In other words, for the German Romantics, the ideal of community that granted a new meaning world came as a result of their attempt to find out the German unique tradition. Such a search for particular and authentic way came into being in contrast to the universal ideals and principles of the Enlightenment: Reason, equality,

⁹⁸ This expression is used by Tim Nieguth to refer the position of non-white Americans facing with some racial hindrances which prevent their equal participation in the public life of the United States. See Nieguth, “Beyond Dichotomy,” 162.

⁹⁹ See Elias, *Civilizing Process*; idem, “Civilization, culture, identity: ‘Civilization’ and ‘Culture’: Nationalism and Nation-State Formation’: an extract from *The Germans*,” in *Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization*, 227. The “resentment” aspect is dominant in late-coming nationalisms; it was evident in the case of the emergence of German nationalism, its roots including resentment feeling among the middle classes against France and its hegemony. See Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983).

¹⁰⁰ As a philosophical, intellectual and political movement, it was the product of the process of what is happening from Reformation to Revolution. Then, first of all, it must be seen as the “antithesis of rationalism and the Enlightenment.” Carl Schmitt, *Political Romanticism*, trans. Guy Oakes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 6.

freedom and the individual, were regarded superficial and alienated from history and nature.

In this context, *Kultur*, which, as indicated above, was expressed in contrast to *Zivilisation*, came to be used by the new German intellectuals to depict their peculiar position as a self-identification, as an “expression of their self-image and their ideals.”¹⁰¹ Then it turned into the reflection of “the self-consciousness of a nation.”¹⁰² Generating from the Romantic philosophy, *Kultur*, which was the basis of the Romantic view of community, was simply defined as an organic whole, and all the integral parts of such whole (traditional values, manners, customs, and so on) were seen as “taken-for-granted”. This was the open challenge to the Enlightenment understanding of society that was “man-made” and “constructed” and with its constructed nature based on the distinction between the private and the public. The Romantic thinkers began to work by bringing forward the individual life worlds in contrast to the banalities of the politics and the public sphere.¹⁰³ The self is not free from its bonds with its community. And thus subjects whose personality comes from their communal ties can not provide new mores for their society and make rational calculations on it. Like the individual, each culture has a unique, self-satisfying entity. History in this regard came to the fore as a force to draw up the meaning

¹⁰¹ Elias, “Civilization,” 226. On the other hand, *Zivilization* reflecting real alienation to themselves was deemed as “a symbol of the world of princes, courts and the ruling upper classes.” Ibid., 228.

¹⁰² Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 4-5. In this sense there is a constant search for determining the boundaries of culture politically as well as spiritually. Ibid.

of culture represented in the “spirit of the people”.¹⁰⁴ It meant that each group of people sharing the same heritage and destination should be taken for granted.

That new idea of community has close ties with changes in the theory of knowledge, the perception of the self and understanding of history. Opposite to the previous God-given (divine revelation)¹⁰⁵ and naturally determined (natural law) views of morality of the Enlightenment, it is obtainable from “an inner voice of conscience and duty”.¹⁰⁶ The human being is not the product of Nature and experiment, and does not have a universal Reason independent from communal ties and traditional values. But the self is embedded in self-consciousness, personal experience and “the life of Spirit”.¹⁰⁷ That is why the personality of each human being is not only tied to individuals but also, perhaps most significantly, to groups in which they share manners, norms and values common to all. The Truth that is needed to decide on what is wrong and what is right “never lies in what the individual person comprehends or wants because everything is the function of a

¹⁰³ In the Romantic understanding, the public and the private are merged into an organic and authentic whole in favor of the latter. For that understanding see Giesen, “Cosmopolitans,” 242-245.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 24.

¹⁰⁵ Romanticism, as well as its Enlightenment counterpart did, brings about the process of secularization. Since it “replaces God –the ultimate principle of traditional philosophical occasionalism- with the individual aesthetic consciousness, this not only secularizes metaphysics but subjectifies and privatizes it as well”, Guy Oakes, “Translator’s Introduction”, in *Political Romanticism*, xxxi. In this way, it is possible to raise the isolated individual to the level of a cosmic unity.

¹⁰⁶ Antony Black, *Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought to the Present*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 198.

¹⁰⁷ Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (1975)

reality that acts beyond him.”¹⁰⁸ In short, the notions of self, knowledge and freedom in Romantic philosophy can gain their true meaning only by embedding them into a communal life. Thus, community, as a reflection of society, is seen as an organic whole in which traditional elements (ignored by the Enlightenment thinkers as “irrational”) played an active, constitutive role. Its inner *Geist* (spirit) only determines its essence. It has provided the basis for the German concept of *Kultur*.¹⁰⁹ In the Romantic formulation culture denoted a collective personality, but not particular affiliations.¹¹⁰ Culture as a collective structure is regarded as an individual who is “authentic”¹¹¹ and has the freedom to choose and ability to determine its destiny, that is, self-determining. The particularized

¹⁰⁸ Schmitt, *Political Romanticism*, 80. In this sense, Antony Black notes, “Since the basis of moral thinking is the “positing” and recognition of the “other”, morality –even knowledge itself- stands in a vital relationship to community: man is a social being, not only in the sense that his needs and aspirations require him to associate with others..., but in the further sense that without communion with others he would lack all truly human character. Such a view gave rise to the doctrine that freedom and community can only be realized together.” Black, *Guilds*, 198.

¹⁰⁹ In Romantic philosophy, as Bauman aptly argues, this “Spirit came to fill the empty center of the stateless nation” and in this context “the people” became the main subject of history. Zygmunt Bauman, *Hermeneutics and Social Science, Approaches to Understanding*, 2nd ed. (Hampshire: Gregg Revivals, 1992), 24.

¹¹⁰ Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 7.

¹¹¹ The modern notion of individual is authentic, for each individual has his/her own unique way of being and so she has a moral vision making possible deciding what is wrong or right. “Modern freedom and autonomy centers on ourselves, and the ideal of authenticity requires that we discover and articulate our own identity.” Charles Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991). It is this event that is “part of the massive subjective turn of modern culture, a new form of inwardness.” Charles Taylor, “Politics of Recognition,” in *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition: An Essay by Charles Taylor*, ed. Amy Gutman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 29.

authentic group is cohesive, homogenous and unique, and has a collective personality; thus it is not derivative, and it is one among others in the world.

In this respect, the explanation of J. G. Herder's concept of culture is worth mentioning. Herder, one of the founding fathers of the Romantic philosophy, was the first to put into use the concept of *Kultur* (culture) in its actual term as an explanatory category in both philosophy and politics. This concept finds its explanation in his concept of *Volk* (people, but its usage commonly overlaps with nation); each *Volk* developed its own *Kultur*, which was bound with Herder's idea of belonging. At the first hand he attributed it to a culture. According to Herder, the way to be a human runs through feeling at home together with the same kind.¹¹² That is to say, those humans belong to groups that are naturally determined, and find their individuality and freedom by being embedded in an organic community as *Kultur*. According to Herder, each group has its own *Volkgeist* or *Nationalgeist* (national soul) composed of a mode of perception and understanding only belonging to it. In this sense, culture is simply the expression of the national soul. It is "a product of the group mind... which, having a body and a soul, becomes a single being. This being expresses itself in all the phenomena of its history, in language, in literature, in religion, in custom, in art, in science, in law, and the sum of these expressions is the culture of a nationality."¹¹³ All aspects of cultural life take form in a flow of tradition that arises from a collective history shared by the group's members. It is rooted in nature because humans belong to and are part of particular natural environments that are the

¹¹² See Isaiah Berlin, "Volgeist'in Dönüşü." *NPQ Türkiye*. 3 (Kış 1992), 7.

¹¹³ Robert Reinhold Ergang, *Herder and The Foundations of German Nationalism* (New York: Octagon Books, 1976), 87.

sources of national folk traditions. Herder's notion of culture is just based on the view that each people have a right to determine its cultural destiny. It is the idea that all cultures are equal with their own inner qualities; that is, the uniqueness makes each culture valuable and irreplaceable. Thus he rejected imitating a foreign culture and building a new one in its place. Any sort of imitation and the idea of building culture on foreign appropriations, here he means the imitation of the French one, could bring about, in his words, "disease, flatulence, abnormal surfeit and approaching to death."¹¹⁴ Upon that, he believed that plurality of cultures could not be reduced into an absolute universal category. This stand is contrary to the belief of combining incommensurable things (which are cultures) under the rubric of one polity. This is based on the approach that, opposite to the Enlightenment, Truth was not one, but various. Here he rejected the idea of cosmopolitanism, and embraced plural diversity and intrinsic cultural distinction.¹¹⁵

At the heart of Herder's discourse on culture, there is language, territory, literature, a shared past and tradition, but not race and blood. Among them language has a vital importance; only it gives rise to the sense of belonging. Language as a natural basis of *Kultur's* intrinsic character and soul expresses a particular history, taste and

¹¹⁴ Quoted in *ibid.*, 119. This reflects his resentment to the hegemony of French culture and civilization over German culture. At his time he was at unease with the situation of the German culture facing a great division as in politics. The cultural leaders of Germany, mainly imitators, "sought perfection in foreign writings, foreign manners, foreign culture." *Ibid.*, 115. In this respect with his formulation of culture he aimed to save German culture from destructive influences.

¹¹⁵ On his view about plurality in culture, see Berlin, "Volgeist'm," 7, 9; also see *idem, Vico and Herder, Two Studies in the History of Ideas* (London: Hogarth, 1976), 150-157.

experiences.¹¹⁶ In this regard, it came to be a means that provided continuity in history. Imposition of a foreign language thus leads to cultural degeneration; for example, for him, the ongoing education in French among the upper and aristocratic stratum prevalent in his time distorted the mind of German youths. Like language, in his view, literature has a determining place in reflecting the national and cultural feeling and allegiance. Herder's view of culture is primarily organic, authentic, socially and historically embedded, plural. It was this conception from which the anthropological usage of culture coming into the scene in the late nineteenth century especially with E. B. Tylor's formulation emerged.¹¹⁷

In Herder's social and political thought, state and politics as temporary and superficial entities have a secondary place. Nevertheless, culture came to be a basic tool by which national unity might be attained. Here, Herder dealt with states and politics "only in so far as they contributed to cultural national unity."¹¹⁸ Intellectuals and men of literature and arts "expressing the inner-most feelings of the *Volk's* collective experience and stimulating its cultural awareness" should assist a possible nation-state, the expression of cultural autonomy.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ "Each nation", writes Herder, "speaks the way it thinks and thinks the way it speaks." Quoted in H. J. Hahn, *German Thought and Culture: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Present Day* (Manchester and NY: Manchester University Press, 1995), 63.

¹¹⁷ See Bennett, *Culture*:, 87. In contrast to Herder, however, Tylor's account includes a hierarchical evaluation of ways of life, due to his Eurocentric biases. *Ibid.*, 93-94.

¹¹⁸ Sam Pryke, "Nationalism as Culturalism: A Critique." *Politics*. 15/1 (1995), 66.

¹¹⁹ Hahn, *German Thought and Culture*, 64; also, see Ergang, *Herder*, 87.

The relationship between the state and culture in the Romantic tradition finds its clear expression in the thoughts of J. G. Fichte. He, while insisting on Herder's concept of culture, emphasized the necessity of a state with the rule of law. The state in his discourse is the vehicle of becoming and remaining "a human being... A man outside the state is a savage. All culture originates from man's relationship with the state."¹²⁰ It was this idea of the state that reflects the soul and spirit of the people. In this regard it is an artistic institution and "its purpose is culture. Culture is the process whereby man becomes really man..., it is this realization which is the perfect freedom."¹²¹ Thus, for Fichte, the new German state had to end the alienated attitudes of upper and aristocratic stratum, and revitalize the real character of the Germans through education. The product would be a patriotic citizen whose will would merge in the will of the state. In education, a purified language and literature which constitutes the society as an organic whole plays a leading role.¹²² The New German State as an expression of culture, or wholeness, would direct and conduct the process.

2.3.2. The Organic and "Authentic" Concept of Culture and German Nationalism

¹²⁰ Quoted in *ibid.*, 68.

¹²¹ Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 4th ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1985), 38. But, contrary to Herder's views, he brought to the fore the idea of superior, refined culture developed through more historical creativity.

¹²² For further details, see Hahn, *German Thought and Culture*, 68-69; Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 47-48.

The intellectuals from the rising new German middle class in the late eighteenth century provided a new cultural and political model for Germany. It came as a reaction to the French hegemony over German court society and aristocracy. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the search for a unified political structure among the intellectuals started to take place under the impact of Romanticism's unique, particularistic and organic view of culture. It was an ideology of nationalism that defined its nation and sought a secure political structure for it. Here nationalism was established on the concept of *Kultur* expressing Germanness, more against *Zivilisation* generally associated with France and the non-German components.¹²³ The search for a new political ground by means of German nationalism was coupled with the changes in the social and legal spheres of Germany, especially through expanding markets.¹²⁴ In the German case, nationalism emerged as a movement of a group of elite who wished to unify various power centers in a state. Thus, it was a state-seeking nationalism, with a strong emphasis on an organic and unique community, a nation that was the political equivalent of the concept of culture.¹²⁵ Flourishing in an atmosphere where there was no state-led symbolism, it was based on the principle of "spiritual nationhood of a nation-in-search-of-a-state."¹²⁶ This nationalism,

¹²³ Rundell and Mennell, "Introduction:," 7.

¹²⁴ For the transformation in the social structure, see Reinhard Bendix, *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 378-430.

¹²⁵ It was the name of politics anticipating that the culture as a product of the spirit forms the nation. See George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 214.

through the nineteenth century, largely coincided with Romanticism and so “made symbols the essence of its style of politics.”¹²⁷ In this regard, symbols as the objectified forms of myths that are created through nationalist endeavors came to the fore as part and parcel of the people’s identity.

During the middle of the nineteenth century, the middle-class groups with their nationalist ideals became the sole dominant social and economic group.¹²⁸ Their ardent efforts and their coalition with other groups played a decisive role in the unification of Germany toward the end of the 1860s. In conjunction with the new nationalist project generally inspired by the Romantic concept of culture, the new state, under the intellectual and cultural domination of the middle-class groups, attempted to “revitalize” and set in motion the German culture. It endeavored to penetrate more and more into the life of the people through institutionalizing and politicizing myths and symbols. In the periods of Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic and National Socialism, public festivals, national monuments, national dramas, had been inaugurated to restore a “world made whole again”, or a sense of wholeness. Efforts were made to shape the mass through

¹²⁶ Bauman, *Hermeneutics*, 28. The nationalism of the intellectual groups became popularized during the war waged against the French occupation. The pioneers of new politics used the Romantic notion of the culture -denoting Germanness- to mobilize the youths largely for the sake of an imagined community. For the effect of the French occupation causing the rise of nationalist feelings in Germany, see Birnbaum, “Nationalism:,” 378-379.

¹²⁷ Mosse, *The Nationalization*, 7.

¹²⁸ In fact this was the result of their rising close ties with the higher state officials and the business class. See Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Imperial Germany 1897-1918: Politics, Culture and Society in an Authoritarian State* (London: Arnold, 1995), 121.

nationalizing them.¹²⁹ Throughout these periods, German nationalism and its efforts to regenerate Germanness evolved into a tradition of political culture. That political culture found its clear expression in the politics of citizenship in Germany. According to these politics based mainly on the German citizenship law of 1870, citizenship was defined in terms of descent or ethnic ties, which were coupled with the principle of *jus sanguinis*. In this respect it denotes a status of membership distributed around a culture of common ancestry.¹³⁰ It was the result of German nationalism that defines the people as an organic and unique community. This attitude has been very evident in the German policies toward immigrants. Rigorously “controlling access to citizenship”, the German state in general excluded and deprived immigrants from citizenry. They, with distinct cultures, have been seen as non-assimilative into the German culture.¹³¹ This has been the main policy of Germany since the nineteenth century. It is in this respect that the German concept of culture, coupled with an exclusionary nationalism, is organic, differentialist and historicist. It differentiates itself from that of the French that denotes a process of cultivating the people in accordance with an idealized “image” of the human being, and is assimilative and sets up hierarchy among the life forms.

¹²⁹ For these periods where the artistic turned political, see Mosse, *The Nationalization*.

¹³⁰ See Nieguth, “Beyond Dichotomy,” 163; Brubaker, “Immigration,” 396-397. This understanding of membership is in coincidence with “[t]he German conception of nationhood” that “has been particularistic, organic, differentialist and *Volk*-centred.” This stems from the nature of “national feeling developed before the nation-state.” *Ibid.*, 386.

¹³¹ For the German concept of citizenship’s relation with immigration, see Brubaker, “Immigration,” 396-398. It takes for granted “a *virtually* impossible form of cultural assimilation” (my emphasis). Birnbaum, “Nationalism:,” 382.

All in all, the Republican understanding of culture in Turkey appears to become settled since it is considered and evaluated in comparison with the above-mentioned two dominant conceptions of culture. The two conceptions are elaborated as two different models, namely the French and German one, which, coupled with a nationalist ideology, indeed reflect the two separate ways of the processes of culture production. Embedding culture into the analysis of these models helps us to go beyond civic/ethnic dichotomy utilized in most of the studies on nationalism, nation-building and citizenship. It also helps us to understand the scope and parameters of the official discourse of culture produced through the processes of nation-building during the formative years of the Republic.

The French model constituted the idea of the creation of a new culture free from all traditional and particular elements, which developed in tandem with the progressive ideals of the Enlightenment and the Jacobin image of “revolutionized” society from above. The hierarchical-assimilative notion of culture, flourished from this model, from the beginning, was closely related to the idea of civilization denoting a developed state of mind and cultivated or refined way of life. It came to be a vision of “ordered” and “civilized” social structure. After the French revolution it became the ideological base for a political project led by a state-led, or top-down, nationalism. What was promoted was the formation of a new society by setting a hierarchical structuration among the life forms and applying assimilative policies that included both inclusion and exclusion. Such a model seems to be necessary to interpret and grasp the Kemalist civilizing rulers’ revolutionary ambitions to construct “secularized” culture.

The second model, stemming from the Romantic tradition, has been the historical framework of references for most of nationalist and culturalist movements; this was also true for the formation of the official culturalism in the early Kemalist regime. The model's conception of culture manifests a historically and contextually bounded-whole, an organic whole, which is the source of individual identity and collective happiness. In the hands of nationalist intellectual in the second half of the nineteenth century in Germany, it became something to be revitalized through the state mechanisms and intellectual/artistic works. The result was the "revitalized" community denoting a collective personality for all citizens. Beside the general comparison made between two models, this model is useful for this study to conceive the nature of "authenticity" and collectivism in the Kemalist discourse of culture.

CHAPTER III

OTTOMAN MODERNIZATION, THE IDEA OF SOCIETY– MAKING AND CULTURE

Civilization is the sum total of concepts and techniques created consciously and transmitted from one nation to another by imitation. Culture, however, consists of sentiments which cannot be created artificially and cannot be borrowed from other nations through imitation.¹

As argued in the previous chapter, the idea of reconstructing society or making a new social and cultural base lies at the center of all modernist programs of culture and civilization. As an idea and process, culture, which was used as a tool of social engineering in the hands of cultural gardeners, stemmed from a long process of conceptual and structural transformations, namely modernization, in Europe. These modernist programs were employed as ideal models in non-Western contexts where there did not exist any proper structural and material base as in the European societies. Similarly, in the Ottoman Empire, modernizing attempts had been initiated from above for the sake of the state. For the purpose of this dissertation they are analyzed as the preliminary phases of the Republican project of modernity.

¹ Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, trans. Robert Devereux (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), 24.

In the late Ottoman Empire, two basic concepts, namely civilization and culture, were at the center of all significant discussions of modernity and all attempts at Westernization. These discussions and attempts have invited a debate on the ways and means of achieving modernity and the limits of modernization: to what extent should the Ottoman institutional and administrative structure be transformed? To what extent might values and even manners be changed? From the end of the eighteenth century to the early twentieth century the Ottoman *elite* had been very busy with these questions in the name of saving the Empire from destruction. Indeed, as might be assumed, what we call Ottoman modernization was closely associated with the West and western civilization, and manifested a turn by which the Ottoman view on the world, society and culture began to change. That is why all analyses of the Ottoman socio-political system necessarily take the Ottoman period as pre-modern and modern. Mainly focusing on the modern era, the basic argument of this chapter is that during the nineteenth century and early decades of the twentieth century, a new Ottoman society, on the basis of civilization and culture, was discursively formed, reproduced and transformed as a mental product.

Therefore, this chapter attempts to explore the dimensions of a new Ottoman society and, in doing so, to show how adopted modern ideals such as civilization, culture, citizenship, rights and people had been very influential on the views of modernizing rulers and intellectuals to reorganize the social and political structure. For this purpose, it focuses on what classical Ottoman understanding of society was and to what extent it was transformed and reproduced in the process of modernization. And, the analysis of the concepts of civilization and Ottomanism, which gave way to the formation of a new “civilized” and “modernized” way, is the main topic discussed. Moreover, some changes

in the discursive formation shall be analyzed through focusing on three different projects of modernity, namely Islamism, Westernism and Turkism, which designed a vision of society by means of traditionalization, Westernization and Turkification. This chapter highlights that these positions included three different conceptions of culture.

3.1. The Political Basis of the Pre-modern Ottoman Concept of Society and The Ottoman *Millet* System

It is obvious that any attempt at clarifying the nature of the pre-modern Ottoman polity and its conception of society can provide some clues to understanding the Ottoman institutional and social reforms which brought cultural changes. Thus, at first glance, the main question we deal with here is what the main characteristics of the pre-modern Ottoman conceptualization of social order are as well as those of different religious and ethnic groups and subjects. The Ottoman political structure in the pre-modern period may be regarded as being in tandem with its conception of society.

The Ottoman State as one of the most enduring multi-religious and multi-ethnic states survived for nearly half a millennium. Under the rubric of a regulatory and strong state, the Ottomans tried to establish an “immortal” political and social order.² It is a vision of the world according to which the main task of the *Devlet-i Aliye* was to prepare the ground for a ‘just’ and ‘ordered’ structure. Two sources of legitimation came to the fore for the state: religious (Islamic) and *örfi* law. Fundamentally, Islam existed as a tool

² This order was based on two refined principles: *Devlet-i Aliye-i Ebed-müddet* (Eternal Sublime State) and *Nizam-ı Alem* (Order of Universe). On that, see Mehmet Genç, “Osmanlı’da Zanaat, Ahlak, İktisat İlişkisi”, in *Anatomi Dersleri: Osmanlı Kültürü* (İstanbul: YKY, 1995), 129.

to crystallize political power at the top.³ However, the nature of the Ottoman understanding of politics went beyond such an Islamic conceptualization of politics by separating the sphere of the state from that of religion and, in most cases, putting more emphasis on the state and its affairs than any previous Islamic state. This mostly stemmed from the semi-‘worldly’ nature of its law, which was *örfi* law, patterned on daily practices and experience.⁴ The result was a center with a well-established and institutionalized value system, having the power to organize, in a unique way, the political and social sphere. The two legitimating systems find their clear expressions in the words of Aron Rodrigue:

Ottoman version of the Islamic discursive framework ... that was in a dynamic relationship with the earlier Islamic textual religious tradition; and the interplay between that framework and the actual day-to-day reality in which this discursive paradigm was continuously molded and shaped.⁵

It was the setting in which the concept of *nizam* (order and, in some senses, balance), together with the concept of *adalet* (justice), was based. *Nizam* meant expressing a scale of political order that was taken into account to establish a balance between the locations

³ In the Islamic tradition justification of political power can only be based upon an ontological interpretation of power, relating power and authority to *Allah* (God). For further details, see Ahmet Davudoğlu, *Alternative Paradigm* (Lanham: The University Press of America, 1994), 152.

⁴ It primarily gave authority to the Sultan to make into law the living norms of society, termed as the *Örf-i Sultani*, the will of the Sultan. See Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi* [Turkish Modernization] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1997), 82.

⁵ Aron Rodrigue, “Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire.” *Stanford Humanities Review*. 5/1 (1995), 82.

and functions of the state's parts.⁶ Consequently, the state-society relations reflected a kind of ordered integrity based on the concept of *nizam*.

In such a polity composed of diverse orders and estates, society was seen as made up of various groups and peoples who lived in a certain number of layers and compartments. Materialized by the state through providing order and justice, the integrity was, as Berkes aptly notes, “‘pyramidally’ stratified and ‘hierarchically’ arranged.”⁷ At each compartments of this integrity some cultural codes and forms became prevalent. The first main rank in this hierarchically structured system was between the rulers -called *askeri*- and the ruled -called *reaya*.⁸ The group of rulers, military and civil officials, the learned and *ulema*, held huge political and military power for, as found in Ottoman state philosophy, the establishment of justice all over the world. In order to establish *adalet* they had to preserve the tradition of *nizam*. The *devşirme* system was the most significant method for their selection.⁹ Trained and socialized in the particular mechanism, the rulers internalized values and morals enriched with the Ottoman approach to state and society.

⁶ For which see Niyazi Berkes, “‘İhtilal’, ‘İnkılap’, ‘Devrim’”, in *Atatürk ve Devrimlerimiz* (İstanbul: Adam, 1982), 138.

⁷ Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 10.

⁸ Halil İnalcık, “The Nature of Traditional Society. Turkey”, in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, eds. R. Ward and D. Rustow (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 44.

⁹ This was the periodic gathering of unmarried male children from the Christian peasantry of the empire. See Braude and Lewis, “Introduction”, in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, eds. B. Braude and B. Lewis, vol. I (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982), 12; Yavuz Ercan, “Ottoman Rule over the Non-Turkish and Non-Muslim Communities.” *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest*. 2 (1985), 72-73.

In this way, they had no social bonds and became “Ottomanized”.¹⁰ They drew upon such a group in whose settled tradition at the center, indeed, there had existed the “Ottoman way” and the “Ottomans” who were equipped with mostly cosmopolitan values and shared a more or less similar way of life, world view and artistic and architectural taste.¹¹ The result was a different set of manners including a distinct language, taste, music, and so on.

The second group was the *reaya* composed of all types of religious and cultural communities, guild organizations, foundations, peasantry and so on. In this group, each subject belonged to a religio-ethnic community as well as to some secondary groups which were occupational organizations (e. g. guilds), dervish orders and so on. As an expression of the second main rank in the Ottoman hierarchy, the Ottoman system of treating all groups with respect to their way of seeing the world was mostly inspired from the Islamic view of politics. The view, at first sight, established a category between the Muslim and non-Muslim, which was called the *millet* system. The *millet* system, as a vision of society, denoted the framework within which the *Gayri Müslim* (non-Muslim), namely Christian and Jewish, communal authorities functioned under Ottoman rule.¹² It

¹⁰ They therefore existed only for the sake of the state and had to be indifferent to the various interests in society. These servants of the State who were not from the people became the parts of the machine of *siyasa* (polity). See Berkes, “‘İhtilal’,” 138. In fact, it was one significant way to establish the state structure in accordance with institutionalized mores.

¹¹ See İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* [The Longest Century of the Empire], 3rd ed. (İstanbul: Hil Yay., 1995), 50; Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 9.

¹² See Bilal Eryılmaz, *Osmanlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi* [Millet System in the Ottoman Empire] (İstanbul: Ağac Yay., 1992) and Cevdet Küçük, "Osmanlılarda Millet

was conceived as being regulated by a pact called *zimmi*. The people benefiting from it were known as *zimmiler* (people of the pact). By the terms of this contract, the Muslim ruler quarantined the subjects' lives, life-style and property, and allowed them to practice their religion.¹³ In this vision of society where the particularities with their “ontologically” defined status were accepted as such and not seen as a “moral” problem, as Rodrigue argues, the difference was the “given” and “normative”.¹⁴ In fact, seeing the social structure as given was the general characteristic of all pre-modern societies. As shown in the first chapter, Gellner and Bauman argued that in the pre-modern times, where there had been an understanding of a God-given and -created world, societies were self-reproducing; there was no direct intervention into its work, that is, they were not man-made.¹⁵ However, unlike its counterparts, what the Ottomans did was to create a social structuration under an well-organized political system in which every group was hierarchically counted down according to their positions in the pecking order of religion, naturally Islam.

Sistemi” [Millet System in Ottomans], in *Osmanlı* [Ottoman], ed. Güler Eren, vol. IV, 208-216, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 1999). In theory, because the privilege of becoming a protected group was only given to those whose religion is a monotheistic one (Judaism and Christianity), others were hardly entitled to the protection of the “Islamic” state. However, after the Islamic expansion, members of other religions such as Hindus, Zoroastrians, Buddhists, the Gnostics of Harran and pagan Berbers of North Africa were also accepted as protected minorities, see Braude and Lewis, "Introduction," 5.

¹³ On the position of *zimmi* in Islam, see C. E. Bosworth, "The Concept of Dhimma in Early Islam," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*.

¹⁴ Rodrigue, “Difference,” 84.

¹⁵ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New York, 1983), 50. Zygmunt Bauman, *Lagislators and Interpreters* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), 83.

The millet system in its true sense started when Mehmet II appointed the patriarch of Constantinople, Gennadros Scholarios, as the titular head of all the Orthodox faithful in the Empire. With that appointment the Orthodox Church had a number of privileges which included, most importantly, legal, administrative and fiscal autonomy of the community.¹⁶ Comparable arrangements were made with the Armenians and Jews. In the system, as an organizing force, the Ottoman State was limited to performing only the administrative, military and financial responsibilities of the communities.¹⁷ It usually dealt with *zimmi* as members of a community (*millet*), not as individual subjects.¹⁸ Thus the term *millet* was used to refer to a religious community, or “a religiously-defined people”.¹⁹ Religions and, as their sub-branches, sects facilitated the development of the emergence of the *millet* as a universal belief system, though ethnic and linguistic differences provided for divisions and subdivisions within each one of the Muslim, Christian and Jewish *millets*. Nevertheless, the Ottoman administration and all the autonomous communities, in determining the boundaries and nature of their own people, did not officially recognize ethnic and linguistic peculiarities.

¹⁶ As a head of his *millet* (*millet başı*), the Patriarch, whose authority was supported by the Sultan, was responsible for his own community's judicial affairs and taxes. See R. Clogg, "The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire." in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, 85.

¹⁷ Stanford Shaw, " Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Azınlıklar Sorunu," in *Tanzimat Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, 1002.

¹⁸ This meant that membership of the subject *zimmi* to a community determined his status at the social and political level. Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun*, 97.

¹⁹ Benjamin Braude, "Foundation Myths of the *Millet* System," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, eds. B. Braude and B. Lewis, 69.

However, the recognition in the Ottoman system did not mean that there was no discrimination between groups. It arose from the rigid differentiation between communities whose values were ontologically taken for granted and hierarchically classified. The non-Muslims under the Ottoman rule were, therefore, responsible for some obligations; for instance, they should pay *cizye* (special poll tax) instead of participating in the military service and *haraç* (land tax), both of which were based upon certain regulations arranged in accord with the tradition of Islamic jurisprudence. Beside these, they had to agree to certain restrictions, such as wearing separate clothes and colors, not riding horses (except in some special cases) and carrying arms.²⁰ Most of these restrictions were more or less valid until the *Tanzimat*.

In short, in the pre-modern era, the Ottoman State's view on society found its clear expression in the *millet* system in which various (religious) communities were incorporated into the Ottoman system by being "hierarchically" ordered. In this compartmentalized and hierarchized administration system, based on religious communities, Muslims and their cultural priorities had a privileged position, resulting from the Muslim character of the state and its so-called "high culture" at the center. The rulers that were detached from all social strata and belonged to a particular way of life at the center governed them. Thus, in the pre-modern outlook, society was not something that was calculated, formulated and restructured over someone's ideals, that is, it was not "man-made". It was only 'governable', applying the mores provided through the Ottoman state mechanisms.

²⁰ Eryılmaz, *Osmanlı Devletinde*, 40.

3.2. First Modernizing Reforms as a Sign of the Emergence of a New Concept of Society

The Ottoman classical system entered into the phase of transformation with the Ottoman modernization movement that was initiated at the end of the eighteenth century. The movement led to some fundamental changes in the Ottoman perception of society and people and brought about on a large scale a new discourse of society in parallel with the institutional and administrative reforms.

Why did the Ottomans need to make new regulations in their system? The answer might be found in some external and internal developments: an external one is the unexpected and enormous rising power of Europe that threatened the Empire and expanded their borders to the Ottoman lands. An internal one, and perhaps the most significant, is the dissolution of the centralized structure of the Empire.²¹ In the process of disintegration, the state always remained as “the sole legitimizing authority”²². It was the state that, coupled with the modern understanding of the centralized and institutionalized state, would be the sole initiator of all reform attempts to prevent the decline of the state; that is, the attempts were made on behalf of the state.

²¹ For the reasons of the decline, see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 27; Kemal Karpat, “The Stages of Ottoman History: A Structural and Comparative Approach,” in *The Ottoman State and its Place in the World History*, ed. Kemal Karpat (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 92.

The idea of reform revealed by the Sultan and the bureaucrats came with the attempt of cutting off all that threatened the state. In the beginning, principally, it was thought of in a traditional line, that is, recapturing the strength of the centralized authority and recollecting power in the hands of the rulers at the center. At first, the way to reach this goal was seen as a restoration of the military power. Therefore, the first efforts instituted by Selim III (1789-1808) were directed at making changes in the military system. Thus, supported by establishing military and naval cadet schools, the *Nizam-ı Cedid* (New Order) was established. However, the *Nizam-ı Cedid* did not mean only a military movement; encompassing the Ottoman administration to some extent, it included some array of new instructions and institutional regulations.²³ It signified the introduction of techniques of training and “uniforms of Europe”.²⁴ By this move the Ottomans for the first time faced “Western culture” which had been at the heart of all controversies over the ways of modernization.

The second main reform attempt came from Mahmud II (1808-1839), believing the necessity of the administrative and institutional transformation of the Empire along European lines.²⁵ Mahmud II’s reforms basically included the development of a new

²² Halil İnalçık, “On the Social Structure of the Empire,” in *From Empire and Republic: Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1995), 55.

²³ The Sultan was interested in the New Order that was initiated by the King of France as a result of upheavals. It was then applied to the whole program of reform in Turkey. See Lewis, *The Emergence*, 57.

²⁴ Here, “Western scientific thought challenged traditional Muslim thought, and the European uniforms challenged traditional symbols.” İnalçık, “Political Modernization,” 129.

²⁵ Among his reforms were the opening of a medical school, a military academy and various secondary schools, the abolition of the Janissaries and the establishment of

army and centralized bureaucratic organization with a progressive and secular perspective. That is, he initiated the process of state-building in the European way. In the process, the idea of 'people' came to be a "new basis for the Ottoman sovereignty... He [Mahmud II] threw away his cloak of sacred power with all its trappings and made himself not the defender of the faithful but the enlightener of the Ottoman citizenry."²⁶ The centralized organization of the state, on the path of becoming a modern centralized state, made it necessary also to determine "symbolically", as well as politically, a public sphere.

This might be illustrated with the fez reform, apparently only enforced among officials, soldiers and sailors, instituted to replace the traditional male headdress.²⁷ This was in direct relation with Mahmud II's wish that "his subjects of various faiths should

new regular standing army, establishing a postal service and founding a police system. Here his aim was to restore the state's authority and so, in its broadest sense, to centralize the state structure as in the modern state in the West. In this way he tried to re-establish the authority of the central government in the provinces by ending the autonomy of the provincial lords -particularly the *ayan*- and abolishing the Janissaries. See Lewis, *The Emergence*, 80.

²⁶ Berkes, *The Development*, 92. This was the first, but most crucial, sign of "Enlightened Despotism" which was then the dominant administrative vision for the Tanzimat rulers. The name of this administrative doctrine as Şerif Mardin discusses, is "camaralism" that constituted the political theory of political opinion called "enlightened despotism". By collecting the power at the center, it preached how to control the societal forces for the interests of the state. Mardin, *Türk*, 12-13, 83-84.

²⁷ This was the starting point for using clothes as a political symbol in the process of modernization. After that time, westernized groups preferred to show themselves "civilized" at least with their clothes, wearing a fez and *İstanbulin* (a kind of frock coat) especially in the second half of the nineteenth century. This attitude reached its peak in the Young Turk period (1908-1918) and the Republic's (after 1923) replacement of the fez with a European hat reflected a complete turn in the process of seeing clothes as a political symbol of Westernization. For the relations between clothes and modernization in the Ottoman Empire see Selçuk Esenbel, "Medeni Davranışın Aczi-I." *Toplumsal Tarih*. 47 (Kasım 1997), 12-14.

be no longer distinguishable by their attire.”²⁸ It was reported that Mahmud II said, “[H]enceforth I recognize Muslims only in the mosque, Christians only in church, Jews only in synagogue. Outside these places of worship I desire every individual to enjoy the same political rights and my fatherly protection.”²⁹ At the center of these words there is a view that all subjects and communities would be treated more or less on equal terms in its “modern” sense. Of course, coupled with the symbolism of reform, this equality would bring about a tendency toward homogenization, which might be related to the public visibility of subjects. In fact this later would be the basis of Ottomanist policies.

When M. Reşit Paşa, the Grand Vizier, proclaimed the *Hatt-ı Hümayun* (Imperial Script) in the *Gülhane* Court in 1839, the Empire entered into a new stage of reform. The charter brought, perhaps most importantly, equal treatment of Muslims and non-Muslims before the law. With this equality, Mahmud II’s ambition to see his subjects in equal terms, at least by their appearance, found its clear expression in legal rearrangement. Besides creating a centralist bureaucratic state, these attempts were indeed the sign of the Ottoman rulers’ need for a new social organization.

All in all, after the first contacts with modern institutions and opinions, especially among the bureaucratic and intellectual elite, there gradually came into being a modern reformist vision based on the view of society made up of individuals.³⁰ The shape of the world-view that came with the Tanzimat reform movement urged the reformist elite to think of the military, administrative and educational reorganizations in direct relation to

²⁸ Geoffrey Lewis, *Modern Turkey* (New York: Preager, 1974), 43.

²⁹ Quoted in *ibid*; Yusuf Akçura, “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset” [Three Ways of Politics]. *Türkiye Günlüğü*. 31(1994), 10.

the question of “social” organization. It was mingled with two basic ideas alien to the classical Ottoman way. The first was the idea of civilization that reflected a progressive, rational and self-determining modern way of life, and the second was a new membership in the political community associated with the idea of citizenship. Both seem of the same spirit, which reflected a new vision of society composed of citizens but not autonomous communities.

3.2.1. Civilization as a New Socio-Political Outlook

The usage of civilization denoted a form of modernist project for forming an ordered society. In this respect it came with the idea of culture especially at the later phases of Ottoman modernization insofar as it was often used to include all belonging to the definition of culture. In this section, the concept of civilization is discussed with that of *medeniyet* (civilization) and its relation to the term *tanzimat*, meaning “to put in order” or “to organize”. After 1834, the term civilization began to be used at the intellectual and social level when Mustafa Reşit Paşa encountered it in Europe and tried to define it in Turkish, that is, it was his gift to the Ottoman Turkish dictionary. *Nizam* and *tanzimat*, which before 1839 were two concepts reflecting the yearning for European civilization and order, expressed what the concept of civilization meant.³¹ *Tanzimat* has same Arabic root as the terms *nizam*, *nizam-ı cedid* and *nizamat*. As it is indicated, since the *Nizam-ı*

³⁰ On this vision see Şerif Mardin, “Just and Unjust.” *Daedalus*. 120 (1991), 121.

³¹ Tuncer Baykara, “‘Nizam’, ‘Tanzimat’, ve ‘Medeniyet’ Kavramları Üzerine” [On the Concepts of ‘Order’, ‘Tanzimat,’ and ‘Civilization’], in *Tanzimat’ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu* [International Symposium on the 150th Anniversary of the *Tanzimat*] (Ankara: Milli Kütüphane Yay., 1991), 64.

Cedid came onto the scene as new regulations especially in military affairs, it conveyed much more than simple military reforms and had a direct connotation with the French phrase *Reform Générale*, translated in Turkish as *Nizamat-ı Cedide*. Here, first of all, it meant “New Order” including military, administrative and social reorganization. In this sense, *nizam* referred to a worldview that, as a principle, relied upon reform, improvements and newness.

In the 1830s, parallel to the military and administrative reforms, social reforms began to increasingly take place. The result was a widespread usage of the terms *tanzimat* and *nizamat* originating from *nizam*, such as *Tanzimat-ı Mülkiye* (organization of the civil service) (1833), *Nizamat-ı Müstahsene*(1834), *Nizamat-ı Hasene*(1836), *Nizamat-ı Hasene* and *Tanzimat- Mergube* (1836), and so on. By introducing a French concept, *sivilizasyon*, Mustafa Reşit Paşa made it clear what all these expressed.³² In 1834, it was first mentioned in its original form in his official writings sent from Paris, and he tried to describe it as *terbiye-i nas ve icra-yı nizamat* (the training of mankind and the execution of orders).³³ In 1838 as an equivalent to *sivilizasyon*, previously explained with the terms *nizam*, *nizamat* or *tanzimat*, a new term *medeniyet* was created. It was used to refer to “life in cities” or “being a city-dweller” and, in a broad term, included the meaning of the life-style developed in cities, in its original sense denoting a European social order based on city-life. Nevertheless, the concept of *medeniyet* did not begin to gain widespread usage until the 1850s.³⁴

³² Ibid., 63.

³³ Cemil Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa* [From *Umran* to Civilization] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1996), 33.

The easy acceptance of the concept of “civilization” (*medeniyet*) and of “order” (best expressed through the term *nizam and tanzimat*) might be directly related to their traditional connotations in Ottoman vocabulary. Civilization, in its modern usage, was the name of the struggle against barbarism, archaic values and wildness, and signified more “cultivated” and “refined” forms of life. As in such use, from the beginning, in the classical Ottoman perspective, there had been a widespread belief among the Ottoman rulers that they had a mission of good to carry into the lands they conquered.³⁵ Similarly, the concept of order, as discussed in the previous section, was the fundamental principle of the Ottoman view of state and society, which preached an order in the world. The aim of modernizing reforms, supported with new modern concepts, was to restore the order. However, the modern conception of order with its totally different meaning was differentiated from the Ottomans’ one based on a “divinely” regulated universe. The modern one seemed to be more close to a “worldly” order designed, created and organized by rational, self-seeking human beings through institutions. With the modernizing movement, the content of the order the Ottoman elite tried to restore entered into the process of transformation in accordance with its “modern”, “secular” usage.

According to the Ottoman ruling elite, the way to achieve modern civilization was through establishing modern educational, as well as modern administrative, institutions. The idea of mass education that was for the first time put forward by Mahmud II³⁶

³⁴ In the late 1850s, as a sign of its common use, Şinasi in one of his poems commended Mustafa Reşid Paşa as *Medeniyet Resulü* (Prophet of Civilization). Ibid., 65.

³⁵ Bernard Lewis has stated that “the Ottoman gazis and dervishes believed themselves to be bringing civilization and the true faith to people sunk in barbarism and unbelief.” Lewis, *The Emergence*, 26.

through providing compulsory primary education and taking necessary measures for modernizing official education came to be seen as the basis of institutional, and later perhaps most significantly social, modernization. Here, one of these institutions is mentioned as an example: the *Encümen-i Daniş* (Society of the Learned) which was set up in 1851 at the suggestion of the *Meclis-i Muvakkat*, concerned with educational affairs for the government. Its aim was to prepare books for instruction in the planned *Darü'l Fünun* (university), composing or translating works needed for the education of the people. In the first two articles of the report of the *Meclis-i Maarif-i Umumiye* (Council of Public Education), significant works written in western or eastern languages would be translated into Turkish, and in order to educate the people language had to be Turkified and simplified. That is, works presented for the benefit of the people should be written in a way that ordinary subjects could easily understand.³⁷ The idea of “educating the people” and “promoting sciences” came with the idea of civilization. For this report, science and knowledge were the basis of the development of civilization, but the state played a major role in completing civilization, and so it had to improve sciences to provide welfare and civilization for its people.³⁸ The assumed attitude of the Tanzimat

³⁶ He opposed the traditional *medrese* education and the class of *ulema*, and he preferred to use the term *maarif* that was required to institute education with a new and more scientific outlook, Howard Reed, “Tanzimat Ne Zaman Başladı ve Bitti? Zamanlaması ile İlgili Görüşler” [When did Tanzimat Begin? The Views on its Timing], in *Tanzimat'ın 150. Yıldönümü*, 23.

³⁷ Kenan Akyüz, *Encümen-i Daniş* (Ankara, 1975), 16

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 16. The Tanzimat elite attempted to justify their orientation through mentioning the golden age when their ancestors attached importance to science and knowledge that were under the protection of the state, making them powerful and rich. See *ibid.*, 16-17. This emphasis on pristine traditions and localizing the modern understanding might be seen as the first preliminary efforts to look for an authentic way,

elite with the foundation of the *Encümen-i Daniş* reflected their great ideal of a modernizing movement that might be expressed in terms of the concept of civilization.

There were also echoes of this trend in other fields of education. Mustafa Reşit Paşa defended the foundation a *Darü'l Fünun* (university). According to him, it had to be founded in order to increase the educational level of the public through “making modern science diffuse throughout our country and it is necessary that the citizens benefit from it”,³⁹ so that science and education could make it possible for human beings to attain security and happiness in this world and the next. This is the meaning of civilization without which no one can achieve anything. For Reşit Paşa, it was the civilization that “can only come to us from Europe.”⁴⁰

In addition, the Tanzimat elite, based on the ideal of civilization denoting a developed category in human life by bringing order and progress, believed to carry on a “modernizing-civilizing mission.”⁴¹ This understanding after the mid-nineteenth century turned into an official policy. The policy targeted especially nomadic peoples with heterodoxical and heretic beliefs, including Turkmens, Alawis, Nusayris, Iraqi Shiites,

which is one of the major aspects of the modern state-building process and the creation of a suitable public.

³⁹ Cited in Ali İhsan Gencer, “Encümen-i Daniş ve Mustafa Reşid Paşa” [*Encümen-i Daniş* and Mustafa Reşid Pasha], in *Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Dönemi Semineri* [Seminar on Mustafa Reşid Pasha and his Period] (Ankara: TTK, 1994), 33.

⁴⁰ Cited in Şerif Mardin, “Patriotism and Nationalism in Turkey”, in *Nationality, Patriotism and Nationalism*, ed. Roger Michener (St. Paul: Paragon House, 1993), 196. Sadık Rıfat, another supporter of Westernizing reforms, revealed civilization based on the “fullest realization of human rights, the freedom and security of life, property, and honor;” that is why, first of all, it appeared as a matter of a “way of thinking”. Berkes, *The Development*, 131.

and so on. They had to be “tamed” and “civilized”, since they were regarded as ignorant, barbaric and uncivilized, by means of judging their positions according to “civilization.” Here “civilizing” meant, “if they were nomadic, their settlement, making them Sunni, and being part of centralized order.”⁴² In later times Abdülhamit II and the Committee of Union and Progress’ (CUP) governments maintained in a more effective way this policy based on the idea of “hierarchical” structuration of civilization.

Briefly, the Tanzimat elite began to consider the notion of civilization as a necessary vehicle to save the state. Civilization, as an outcome of scientific and cultural development and as a sign of most developed form of life, was something conceived of as a whole comprising the technical, scientific and cultural domains. That view had been a cornerstone of the Ottoman ruling and intellectual elite’s thoughts on political and social structure and, in turn, became more or less the basis of all projects of modernity until the end of the Empire. It was essential for them not only to make new configurations for the reorganization of the state but also to bring new perspectives on society. When one regards it in terms of the culture defined in the previous chapter, it signified a “developed” state of mind and “civilized” way of life.

3.2.2. Ottomanism as a Name of Modern Membership

⁴¹ See Akşin Somel, “Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Türk Kimliği” [Turkish Identity from the Ottoman to the Republic], in *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik* [Republic, Democracy and Identity], ed. Nuri Bilgin (İstanbul: Bağlam, 1997), 75.

⁴² Ibid.

The second idea is that the new notion of political membership seems to have been associated with the *Osmanlıcılık* (Ottomanism) movement and its effect on and transformations in the *millet* system. It was the first preliminary step of institutionally and politically forming modern citizenship. The Ottoman rulers initiated some institutional reforms to strengthen the authority of the central government, but these reforms were not adequate to meet the existing needs required for a modern centralized administration, and the challenges from the rising separatist nationalist movements. In order to redefine the relations between the government and the subjects and communities, the Ottoman rulers attempted to develop a common political membership. In fact, their attempt to look for new ways to provide Ottoman unity and to create a “moral” base for the centralized modern state was the search for a collective identity transcending all community-based identities in their pre-modern use. It was for this reason that the term *reaya*, which only expressed the devotion to the ruler, was replaced by the concept of *teb'a* comprising all Ottoman subjects.⁴³ Since the time of Mahmud II⁴⁴, Ottoman reformers had tried their best to eradicate the differences, at least in the visible ones in the public realm, between the various groups through creating an “Ottoman subject”. Through a secular concept of *Osmanlı* that was the term for political membership, or in some sense, modern citizenship, the aim was to show that ethnic and religious affiliations were of secondary importance.⁴⁵ It appeared for the first time as an official arrangement, in the *Gülhane*

⁴³ Mardin, *Türk*, 30.

⁴⁴ Yusuf Akçura argued that Mahmud II put into practice politics of Ottomanism in its full meaning. Later Ali and Fuat Pashas turned into a widespread search for the creation of the Ottoman nation. See Yusuf Akçura, “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset,” 9-10.

Hatt-ı Hümayunu (Reform Edict) in 1839 called the *Tanzimat Fermanı* which brought the security of life, property and honor, and equal treatment before the law. Its main novelty was that all subjects living in the Empire were called *Osmanlı*, or Ottoman citizens, regardless of their ethnic and religious origin. Karpas aptly clarified the later developments of this matter in the following way:

In order to achieve further integration, the government recognized the non-Muslims through the reform edict of 1856, the municipality and vilayet laws and the right to be represented in the newly established administrative councils... Thus, by 1850 the millet members began to be treated already as Ottoman "citizens," although the formal nationality law was not passed until 1869. This law, which is often cited as having created a new and modern legal status for Ottoman subjects, was a mere technicality that legalized and clarified further an already established concept.⁴⁶

As a result of the Tanzimat reform movement and 1876 Constitution, the subjects of the Empire were, for the first time, taken as individuals or citizens making society, not simply as being parts of the religious-ethnic communities.⁴⁷ In sum, all the efforts gave way to the reinterpretation of the Ottoman *millet* system and led to the moderate discharge of the age-old compartmentalized administrative system tied with religious

⁴⁵ See Şükrü Hanioglu, "Osmanlıcılık" [Ottomanism], in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, 1390.

⁴⁶ Kemal Karpas, "Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, 162

⁴⁷ See A. İçduygu, Y. Çolak and N. Soyarak, "What is the Matter with Citizenship? A Turkish Case." *Middle Eastern Studies*. 35/4 (1999), 193. In fact, the first regulation on the legal status of citizens in the Empire came with a law called *Tabiyet-i Osmaniye Dair Nizamname* dated 23 January 1869. For it, those born to Ottoman parents, and in a limited number of territories of the Empire, were regarded as Ottoman citizens. See Ergin Nomer, *Vatandaşlık Hukuku* [Citizenship Law], 9th ed. (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1993).

communities. The newly defined loyalty to the state with a new collective identity began to erode the boundaries of the *millet* structuration.

It was the concept of citizenship that redefined the subjects' relations to the state. They would, henceforth, establish contact with the state by going beyond their communal ties, for the government saw, at first hand, its subjects as members of the state. As one of the major institutional reforms that brought together the Enlightenment's universal values, "Ottoman citizenship, theoretically intended to cut across religious and ethnic boundaries," writes Karpas, "undermined the *millet's* autonomy and self-rule in cultural and religious matters."⁴⁸ This was arranged on the basis of certain rights and obligations, which made it possible for all non-Muslims, for example, to obtain the right to be employed in the civil service and, even, with some restrictions in the military and to benefit from the state's educational privileges.⁴⁹ In general, with new regulations the *millets* whose rights and freedoms, even though extended and certified, coming under the guardianship of the government, became more and more dependent on state control.⁵⁰

As in its modern usage, the concept of citizenship, which together with the idea of common (national) culture joins the state and newly emerging social and economic

⁴⁸ Karpas, "Millets and Nationality," 163.

⁴⁹ During the mid-nineteenth century, Karpas notes that the "Ottoman subjects going abroad were issued passports as early as 1844 which were, in fact, the counterparts of a document used for interior travel known as the *mürur tezkiresi*. The latter is the predecessor of the *nüfus tezkiresi* and of the *nüfus cüzdanı* which today are the basic documents proving Turkish citizenship. The Ottoman census conducted in the nineteenth century, in addition to counting the population, had the purpose of issuing to each subject a *tezkere*." Ibid., 196.

⁵⁰ This means the erosion of classical understanding for which "rights and freedoms were inherent in the millet itself and could not be restricted or changed at will". Ibid., 164.

particulars to each other, appears under the name of patriotic allegiance. In the Ottoman Empire it was the ideology of Ottomanism⁵¹ by which the rulers aimed at forming a common homeland and common traits on the basis of modern patriotic nationality. The ideas of common homeland and common traits can be considered within the frame of common culture around which the modern public sphere is constructed. It seems obvious that what they tried to create was an “imagined” Ottoman community as in the sense of Anderson’s formulation; it was imagined because everyone living in the Empire was required to think of himself or herself as an *Osmanlı* and belonging to the Ottoman nation.⁵²

The idea of homeland expressed by *vatan* was initiated as being the common homeland of that community and it also determined the boundaries of Ottoman citizenship.⁵³ *Vatan*, equivalent to the French *patrie*, appeared as an expression of a spirit of patriotism. Applied to the concept of *vatan*, the intention of the reformers was to

⁵¹ The *Tanzimat Fermanı* and *Kanun-i Esasi* (the first constitution of the Ottoman) provided the legal and political basis of the ideology of Ottomanism. Such an ideology had been the official ideology of the Ottoman state until the end of the Empire.

⁵² For “imagined political communities” and their relation to nationalism and modern state, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991).

⁵³ It began to be officially used especially after the Tanzimat reforms. At the beginning of its official usage, Bernard Lewis writes, “[A] report published by the Board of Public Works in 1838, speaking of the need for better and more extensive education, observes that ‘without science, the people cannot know the meaning of love for the state and *vatan*... In the following year, *vatan* even appears in an Ottoman official document...known as the Edict of the Rosebower, *Gülhane*. In this the Sultan, speaking of military matters, observes that ‘it is inescapable for all the people to provide soldiers for the defense of the homeland [*vatan*]...By the mid-century, the association of country (*vatan*), with the state (*devlet*) and the nation (*millet*), as something not only to be loved but also to be served and if necessary fought for, has become commonplace.” Bernard

provide a sense of solidarity between the state and people, and also common shared symbolic traits among the various people of the Empire by promoting *Osmanlılık*.⁵⁴ In order to achieve this new skeleton, especially after the mid-nineteenth century, they strove to set up a “secular education through which ‘Ottoman nationality’ would be formed and propagated.”⁵⁵ All these struggles to provide a common identity through “Ottoman nationality” were in direct relation to the existing needs of the public sphere in line with modern state structure and, parallel to that, establishing political and some social institutions. *Osmanlılık* and *vatan* were represented as the “rhetoric” of the public realm. The consequence was the re-formulation of the old Muslim / non-Muslim category in terms of majority / minority that is the end product of the modern public sphere. The nature of the *millet*s began to be redefined in a secular and egalitarian way and transformed into minorities and majorities. This led to the loss of the classical structure of non-Muslim groups as autonomous religious communities and they became “minority groups.”⁵⁶ Because the state and those who control it appropriate the public sphere, the features of the majority gradually took a significant part in the administration. Thus, the “Muslim character of the Ottoman government,” writes Karpata, “began to acquire a new

Lewis, “Watan,” in *The Impact of Western Nationalisms*, eds. Jehuda Reinharz and George L. Mosse (London: Sage, 1992), 172-173.

⁵⁴ It also promoted the desire to defend the shrinking boundaries of the empire. See Roderic H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact of the West* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 88.

⁵⁵ Berkes, *The Development*, 179. The interests of *vatan* and the people, together with the state, became determinant for the rule of the sultan, see Kemal Karpata, “The Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East,” in *Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East*, eds. M. J. Esman and I. Rabinovich (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 50.

⁵⁶ Karpata, “The Ottoman Ethnic,” 49.

political significance. The Muslims identified themselves with the government as Muslims and claimed special status and position in society.”⁵⁷ The position of the minority began to be conceived as a “moral” problem, the problem that arose from their differences and separatist nationalist movements⁵⁸ fighting for their own independent states in line with the European nation-state model. Using the method of taking administrative, juridical and economic measures to collect power at the center, the Ottoman rulers thought to create a consciousness of being Ottoman through melting various groups in one pot by establishing a modern citizenship. This paved the way for the ruling elite to begin to employ new techniques and ways to govern society. This project of the Tanzimat reformers was doomed to fail, for it was the age of nationalism through which every group, whether being minority or majority, strove to achieve its own political structure and its own culturally unique way. The critics of the Young Ottomans may be evaluated in terms of this frame.

⁵⁷ Karpat, “*Millets and Nationality*,” 163.

⁵⁸ In order to unite diverse ethnic and cultural elements, Ottomanism as a response to the centrifugal forces of religion and nation aroused little support. It was because of the secularization and nationalization of the *millets*, led by the *Tanzimat* and *Islahat Fermani*, the individual subject who became freed of the influence of the *millet*. This promoted a new feeling of secular identity and belonging in the new socio-political components in terms of ethnicity, culture and language.” Ibid., 144. The Western scientific and nationalist ideals, newly emerging market forces and the breakdown of age-old patron-client relationships prepared the end of the “arrangement of the private and personalized form of justice,” and gave rise to new political faithfulness legitimized by a new modern political language. See Rodrigue, “Difference,” 87.

3.3. Boundaries of the New Ottoman Society and its Critics: The Young Ottoman Quest for Authenticity

Since the Ottoman elite accepted western military and technological superiority, they began to observe that there was an *a priori* tie between technological advancement and social and cultural organization. As mentioned above, coupled with the absolute monarchic administration and “enlightened despotism” of the Tanzimat elite, from the time of Mahmud II there emerged a new belief that society may be redesigned according to the enlightened rulers’ principles by means of shaping people. It was, at first glance, the outlook that brought about a new view of society made up of individuals and operates in accordance with the “mechanical concept of machine”. “This new ideal of society,” writes Mardin, “functioned with such novel impulses as *change* -a new social value which replaced ‘stability’ as a central concern. New actors –the youth- became the operators of the machine for change and the relations between ‘things’ became the basis for an understanding of the workings of society.”⁵⁹ This perspective became widespread among the westernized rulers educated in the newly established military and civil schools and in Europe, whose perception of “nature” totally changed. Unlike the traditional elite stratum, the sources of their power did not come from God, but a moral capacity, “reason”, an inner sense of “freedom” and “conscience”, inherent to human beings.⁶⁰ As

⁵⁹ Mardin, “Just and Unjust,” 121.

⁶⁰ Mehmet Kaplan, “Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Yeni Aydın Tipi” [Mustafa Reşid Pasha and New Type of Intellectual], in *Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Dönemi Semineri*, [Seminar on Mustafa Reşid Pasha and his Period] (Ankara: TTK, 1994), 115. The

a new social element, the ruling class maintained a westernized life-style, the so-called *alafrangalık* (European way), especially among state officials and intellectuals.⁶¹ There, in time, existed a dual structure in every sphere of life in the empire: “new” (modern educational and judicial institutions and new manners) beside “traditional” (*medrese* and religious courts, and the way of life the masses continued).⁶² The consequence was the rising “discursive” gap between the ruler and the ruled.⁶³

In the end, the dual structure began to give rise to public discontent. By the mid-1860s, young intellectuals called the Young Ottomans began to severely criticize the modernizing reforms of the first and second generation of the Tanzimat elite.⁶⁴ At the

transformation in their world-view can be observed in the books, especially literary, written during the Tanzimat period. In these works, speaking French, playing piano, identifying identical with the characters in the books read and seeing the world through them became widespread among the new middle class. See İnci Enginün, “Tanzimat Sonrası Çeviriler” [Translations after the Tanzimat], in *Tanzimat’ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, 435.

⁶¹ *Alafranga* and *Alaturka* (Turkish way) were the two most stressed concepts employed in defining and determining the boundaries of authenticity during the last three decades of the Empire.

⁶² The result was a dual structure –traditional and modern- at the political and even social level, produced by the modernizing reforms, around which all discussions on reforms and political and intellectual life in the Empire were maintained until the end of the Empire.

⁶³ This was, as Mardin fittingly observes, “two universe of discourse”. Mardin, “Just and Unjust,” 114. Before this discursive rupture caused by the modernizing efforts, there had been a shared discourse among both the upper and lower echelons of the empire to the extent that Islam played a mediating role in the Ottoman system. On the rupture with modernity, see *ibid.*, 114-116, 118.

⁶⁴ The young intellectuals’ criticisms of their ‘alienated’ life style had some resemblance with the new German middle class’s harsh criticisms of the ‘Frenchised’ way of life of the upper class and aristocracy in the last decades of the eighteenth century. To the intellectuals who initiated the Romantic Movement, the Germans had a unique way, a peculiar culture, which had to be saved from foreign influences and from the harmful effects of civilization rooted in French fashion. For more details, see Norbert

center of their criticisms, there was the accusation that the Tanzimat rulers intended to facilitate European economic domination and that they misunderstood Western ideals, principally in that they lied about parliamentary and constitutional ideals and freedom. It was, perhaps, most significant for our purpose that they criticized the unrestricted imitations of western manners and symbols. For them, imitation resulted in the emergence of an upper stratum independent from traditional moral standards and who impeded their own culture signified with Islam. In their view, the Tanzimat was not founded on a moral base that provided a philosophy. To fill this void, they proposed to benefit from Islam.⁶⁵ That is why they put strong emphasis on Islam and traditions in determining the people's identity and proposed, for the first time, a synthesis between western ideals and local Islamic values in their political meaning. According to their views, there was no reason for a mismatch of western and Islamic ideals, for the equivalents of the basic modern notions such as democracy, freedom and progress could be found in Islamic thought. This makes them the first intellectuals who tried seriously to fabricate a synthesis between western political ideals and Islamic values.⁶⁶ It was through these principles that they thought to mobilize the masses to build a modern political and social structure as in Europe, for in their view the Tanzimat's project of "civilisation" and "Ottomanism" failed to band together the Empire's "new" citizens. In this respect, they strove to describe the nature of the people, especially the Muslims who would be most

Elias, *History of Manners: The Civilizing Process*, vol. I (New York: Urizen Books, 1978), 1-50.

⁶⁵ Mardin, *Türk*, 88.

⁶⁶ Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), 3.

faithful to the state. These efforts appeared to be the first major attempt to search for an “authentic” identity that seemed necessary for modern public life and for the self-expression of the intellectuals. Indeed, by means of this search for “authenticity”, a sign of a new stage of reform, they set out to look for a proper common ground, a “common good”, as a unifying force. The common good was based on a synthesis between European and Islamic values, denoting an “authenticated” cultural system.

Thus, on the one hand, the Young Ottomans modified the Tanzimat’s civilization thesis, though continuing to pair the concept of civilization to Westernization. In their perception of modernity, civilization was not something that had to be “universally” applied. It had “spiritual” and “material” aspects. They agreed with the bureaucratic rulers of the Tanzimat on the material aspects, the universal ideas: science, technology and progress. But they refused “identification in culture and life style.”⁶⁷ In that distinction lay the separation of the spirituality of the Ottoman Turkish religious and traditional ideas, of eastern civilization, from the material concerns of western civilization. To put it in a simple way, it gave expression to the new sentiment that westernizing reforms had to be limited to science and technology.

Namık Kemal’s view on civilization finds its apparent expression in that sentiment. For him, the civilization now flourishing in the West was the sources of a well-ordered society and a dignified and mature individual. It was a pillar of freedom and homeland. These were valid everywhere, that is, universal, and should be approved wherever they were found. However, progress on the path of *hürriyet* (freedom), *meşveret* (consultation) and *asayiş* or *nizam* (order), was not possible by abandoning the

⁶⁷ İnalcık, “Between Europe,” 149.

sacred manners of the Ottomans. That is why what was taken had to be selectively approved, as well as what was preserved. Islam was not responsible for the backwardness of the state, but “the domination of the West, which had deprived the east of the opportunity of self-advancement.”⁶⁸ It had to modernize itself, but not submissively imitate the West and give up its traditions and laws. This was the only way to become a ‘modernized’ state and a ‘civilized’ society. In the past, empowered with morality, Muslims had been the center of various civilizations. Today, the protective and guiding rules of the *Şeriat-ı Muhammediye* and the living manners of the people, which upheld the universal standards of western civilization, could be the essence of a new state and social structure.⁶⁹

Relying on the unique position of Islam, the Young Ottomans had a “relative” understanding of civilization based on a “historical” creed that there had been several civilizations in world history, that is, in its origin, civilization was not western-restricted. Their “relative” standpoint that proposed the preservation of native values through the filter of the post-Enlightenment ideals points out the view of “authenticating” and “localizing” civilization.⁷⁰ It seemed to be the first rough draft of Gökalp’s formulation separating culture (representing inner and unique world of the people) from civilization (displaying all material, scientific, administrative and legal achievements).

⁶⁸ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 142.

⁶⁹ On the Namık Kemal’s views on civilization see Meriç, *Umrandan*, 84.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 84. In this sense, it seems to be akin to the process of “authentication” efforts in the colonized countries, which placed much emphasis on local values to re-

3.3.1. Abdülhamit II's "Civilizing" Policies

The thoughts of the Young Ottomans were to some extent put into practice during the reign of Abdülhamit II (1876-1908). The policy of both Ottomanism and Islamism could be found in the *Kanun-u Esasi* (the 1876 Constitution) and in the policies of Abdülhamit II, who set up a highly centralized and autocratic state⁷¹. With the constitution, although Ottomanism by which all subjects had equal rights and duties before the law was acknowledged to be the official policy of the state, the *halifelik* (caliphate) was recognized, for the first time, as one of the constituting elements for the justification of the Sultan's political power.⁷² This emphasis was regarded as the result of a need for an authority to solidify the symbolic power. The expectation was that the caliphate functioning as a symbolic power center would perform this task, in the line of the policy of Islamism applied in and out of the Empire to gain the support of all Muslims against the European powers and also to shape the identity of Muslim groups. In other words, the ruling elite were in struggle to reinterpret the pre-existing world of meaning such as *halifelik* and *hanefi mezhebi* through applying the new modern values, and project them as "the social cement for their increasingly intense relations with their subjects /

define a new national and cultural identity. See Partha Chattarjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.

⁷¹ To complete the reforms begun by the men of the Tanzimat, he strove to expand the scope of bureaucratic, judicial and legal, and financial and economic reforms by putting into practice new applications.

⁷² Niyazi Berkes, "İhtilal," 138.

citizens.”⁷³ In such a way, they made an attempt to form a modern centralized and secular state, using traditional religious symbols and language.⁷⁴

Abdülhamid II’s policy on education had a central place in the search for establishing the symbolic universe for the state. In the context of an imperial structure faced with crisis of legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects and the problem of their loyalty to the state, modern mass and elite education became apparent as the main vehicle to regain the people’s affinity. Through elite and mass education, during the Hamidian era, the rulers tried to place the sense of belonging into the hearts of every Ottoman subject on the basis of citizenship.⁷⁵ In providing a common identity, the basic mission of the implemented policy was to “gradually ‘civilize’ subject populations into espousing the value system of the center.”⁷⁶ Civilizational aspects applied in the centralized educational policies were also observed in the policy of the compulsory settling of nomadic people; this trend was, as best expressed in Deringil’s phrase, “the ‘civilizing’ or ‘Ottomanizing’ of the nomad.”⁷⁷ To sum up, Abdülhamit II “functionally” used the policy of both

⁷³ Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), 66. Also, during that era, “the systematization of the Shariah” happened, in such a way that it “became a fluid notion and was used in conjunction with, indeed as the ultimate justification for, change”, 168. It was in this sense that, as Ahmet Yaşar Ocak argues, the Islamism of the Hamidian period was essentially a *modernist* movement, and so it was “entirely a reaction against classical Ottoman Islam.” Cited in *ibid.*, 67.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 166.

⁷⁵ On the Hamidian educational policy see *ibid.*, 90-110.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 110. Also for civilizing attempts by instituting a centralized educational system, especially in the backward areas of the empire, see Şerif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in modern Turkey: the Case of Bediuzzaman Saidi Nursi* (New York: State University, 1989), 32, 253.

Ottomanism and Islamism to form a secure symbolic ground, and also, for this purpose, firstly applied pan-Turkish ideals and supported the study of Turcology for the same reason.⁷⁸ It appears as a pragmatic aim that was to save the state by forging a feeling of common Ottoman identity. That was why all the official searches for a common ground had not been a sole legitimizing ideology for the state's action until the CUP government used a modern ideology, namely Turkism in which the idea of culture had a privileged place, especially after the Balkan wars (1912-1913).

3.4. The Young Turks and the CUP's Rule: Scientism and Nationalism as Basis of "Cultivated" Society and Culture

In addition to the efforts of the advocates for Ottomanism and Islamism to look for a common purpose and bond among the empire's subjects, the third attempt came from the Young Turks, the second opposition movement in the process of modernization. To overcome the problem of creating a bond, they tried their best to arouse the consciousness of Turkism as their major premise, on a large scale, coupled with a rough scientism. The rise of this opposition group had a direct connection with the extensive modernizing reforms of Abdülhamit II. As mentioned above, educational reforms had a central place among his reforms. By broadening and founding several professional schools he "re-modernized" and expanded secular education. These schools, as centers for elite education, constituted a typical context for the spread of western thought, mainly

⁷⁷ Deringil, *The Well-Protected*, 67

⁷⁸ Standford J. Shaw, "Sultan Abdülhamit II: Last Man of Tanzimat," in *Tanzimat'ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, 194-196.

positivism and biological materialism, among young students. The graduates came out equipped with new values by which they opposed the rule of the sultan and promoted a “utopian” perspective on society.⁷⁹ In the end, as the main end-product of the new schools, a new learned generation having a new-fashioned vision colored by the positivistic and nationalist imagery of nineteenth century Europe came to the fore.⁸⁰

The new world-view the reformist elite obtained in secular schools largely made it possible for men of the new genre to gain this very different view of reality. As Mehmet Kaplan argues, school and books appeared to be the two things that separated them from the life and practices of the ordinary people.⁸¹ For that reason, they both fulfilled the function of socialization in producing a profile of the elite who treated religion as an obstacle to social advancement and so were in conflict with the living values of society rooted in the religious tradition.⁸² This gave way to a deep rupture between these reformists and the traditional segments of the elite.⁸³ The reformists began to obtain a “speculative, utopian and projective mentality.”⁸⁴ These were the “knowing” elite who

⁷⁹ The graduates of the *Harbiye* were the first group who, gaining the best secular education, began to conceive of themselves as constituting a “class of knowledge”. See Şerif Mardin, *Türkiye 'de Toplum ve Siyaset* [Society and Politics in Turkey] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1997), 223.

⁸⁰ Mardin, *Türk*, 119.

⁸¹ Cited in Mardin, *Türkiye 'de*, 227.

⁸² Şükrü Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet* [Abdullah Cevdet as a Political Thinker] (İstanbul: Ücdal Neşriyat, 1981), 8-9.

⁸³ This was, as Mardin aptly puts it, the rift between *ilim* (traditional knowledge) putting the “stamp of morality on knowledge and its application to human relations” and *fünun* (modern scientific knowledge) systematizing “human relations as a scientifically observable process and a part of the realm of ‘things.’” Mardin, “The Just and Unjust,” 123-124.

were uneasy with the Ottoman socio-cultural life and searched for a model to attain a perfect socio-cultural system in which everyone was pleased and happy.

This search explained the young intellectuals' rising interest in positivism, social Darwinism and biological materialism providing a philosophical and methodological basis for their project of modernity. In their view, more than its significance in the study of nature, science had a moral implication, especially tied to the Comtian Positivism.⁸⁵ Science therefore served as a "method" and a "mechanism" to restructure society according to the Westernist ideals of the intellectuals claiming to know the nature of the people sinking in "darkness". This positivist interpretation of science then came to be a main guiding principle for the revolutionary zeal of the Republic.

Belief in science and progress appeared to be the essence of the Westernist tendency increasingly gaining popularity among the civil and military elite who supported the Young Turk Movement. At the same time, nationalist principles began to take root among them. Studies on the history and language of the Turks by Orientalists and Turcologists and the emigration of people of Turkish origin from Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Volga Region to the Empire led to the rising interests of the new intellectual groups on the character of the Turks. Newspapers, becoming widespread, reaching and affecting all educated persons, dealt with issues relating to the outside world, especially the world of Turks, and historical and cultural matters because of the

⁸⁴ Ibid., 124.

⁸⁵ Comte aimed at founding a naturalistic science of society capable of explaining the past, present and future of humankind by applying to it the scientific methods successfully used in the study of nature. L. J. D. Wacquant, "Positivism," in *Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought*, eds. W. Outhwaite and T. Bottomore (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 496.

ban over the discussion of internal politics.⁸⁶ All these began to lead to the rise of consciousness of being a national group among the larger segments of the intellectuals of the Hamidian period; and even some of the Westernists and Islamists managed to justify their position with “nationalist” ideals.⁸⁷

Turkism became popular with the well-known pamphlet of Yusuf Akçura’s *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Three Ways of Politics) published in 1904 in the newspaper *Türk*, appearing in Cairo. Yusuf Akçura⁸⁸, a leading figure in pan-Turkist movement, considered Turkism as one of three ways of politics –Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism-, which were proposed to solve the problem of dissolution the Empire faced:

The first is to create an *Ottoman nation* by representations and unification of various nations which are the subjects of the Ottoman government. The second, to *unify all Muslims under the authority of the Ottoman State* (called by the Europeans as *Panislamisme*)... The third, to form *a polity of the Turkish nation* based on *ırk* (race).⁸⁹

For him, Ottomanism failed to be a project of binding different ethnic and religious groups in the Empire, because of the changing international and internal social, political

⁸⁶ David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908* (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 14-15.

⁸⁷ During this period, as Kushner concisely indicates, “the concept of *Türk* had been transformed into a honorable and proud term; chapters of Turkish history had been brought to light; Turkish-speaking Muslims outside the Ottoman Empire had been recognized as racial brothers; and the significance of Anatolia as a Turkish homeland had been established. The role of the Turkish language and culture as the foundations of Turkish nationality, and the need to promote and develop them, had been similarly affirmed.” *Ibid.*, 97.

⁸⁸ Yusuf Akçura (1876-1933), a journalist, teacher and politician, played an active role in the Turkist movement and also in the formation of the Republican history thesis.

⁸⁹ Yusuf Akçura, “*Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*,” 9.

and economic conditions. The last two came to be only alternatives to establish a modern polity necessary for a strong state. Although he seemed to be uncertain as to which of them was more useful, he placed quite an emphasis on the politics of Turkism, because the Turks were not outside the trend of the rise of the nationalist ambitions of various groups in the Empire. At the end, he said he did not find a convincing answer to the question: “which, of politics of Islamism and politics of Turkism, are the most beneficial and applicable for the Ottoman state?”⁹⁰ Besides science, particularly positivism, by then, nationalism became the one of the core parameters of the Young Turks.

As an opposition movement the Young Turks firstly became organized secretly under the name of *İttihad-ı Osmani Cemiyeti* (Ottoman Union Society) in 1889. The group took a new name a little later, *Osmanlı İttihat ve Terraki Cemiyeti* (Ottoman Union and Progress Society) in which the positivistic influence was observed. Their fundamental aim in setting up such a secret society was to work for saving the state and “nation” from the tyranny of the existing government and the external enemies.⁹¹ In time, in the Young Turk Movement there existed two main groups with two distinct ideological stands. The first was Ahmet Rıza’s group stressing the belief of a strong centralized administration, the continuation of the Committee for Union and Progress; the second group led by Prince Sabahattin was organized as *Teşebbüs-i Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti* (Society of Private Initiative and Decentralization).⁹² Ahmet Rıza, as an zealous

⁹⁰ Ibid., 18.

⁹¹ This objective was the basis of the Society’s *Nizamname* (regulations of the organization) prepared in 1895. For the *Nizamname* see Tevfik Çavdar, *İttihat ve Terraki* [Union and Progress] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1991), 17-18.

follower of Comte, proposed a reform program for which progress was possible through taming and edifying the thoughts of people. It was only education that provided the necessary means to shape individuals, and so it was in his “positivistic” inclination that there was “no means of saving the country and the nation from the danger other than education and the positive sciences...the best way to enlighten people’s minds.”⁹³ This was the basis of his social and political project that put forward the necessity of the centralized administration affirmed by the restoration of the constitutional regime. Such a sort of entity would make it easy to reach a “civilized” and “cultivated” social system that was the core of modern life. In contrast, Prince Sebahattin, a student of Le Play sociology, had a liberal outlook and so, for the first time, proposed a social reform program according to which the real problem was not simply political but was to “transform society from a collectivistic formation to an individualistic order.”⁹⁴ The reason was because the collectivistic nature of society was the basic source of backwardness and an obstacle to progress. For him, it was the reformers’ mistake that all the modernizing efforts had strengthened the collectivistic structure in the Empire. He offered a new system of education in which individuals would be educated to rely upon themselves. In this way private property ownership would take the place of collectivistic ownership. He also offered a new system of administration that had to be decentralized. At the end, in his view, we would reach a social system where there are individuals

⁹² For all splits in the movement see Eric Jan Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), 14-18.

⁹³ Cited in Berkes, *The Development*, 306. In this sense his ideas were prone to more “centralism and Ottoman-muslim nationalism.” Zürcher, *The Unionist*, 17.

capable of standing alone and a democratic and decentralized political system.⁹⁵ His liberal ideas did not come out as principles of a strong political movement becoming dominant over the state structure. Nevertheless, the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), under the leadership of Ahmet Rıza, consolidated its position as the main opposing organization and in 1907 declared a new *Nizamname* (Regulations of the Organization). We find in this *Nizamname* his views on forming a “cultured” and “civilized” system. Its first article promised to strengthen local manners by taking into account national and regional needs; it further aimed to spread education and culture and to raise the Ottomans to the level of contemporary civilization.⁹⁶ In fact, the creation of a “cultured” and “civilized” order by this ideological outlook appeared to be, in its general sense, the CUP’s basic legacy to the Republic’s project for social and cultural engineering.

The CUP played a leading role in the 1908 Revolution as a result of which the Young Turks comprising young military officers, intellectuals and bureaucrats, became influential in the state affairs. It came to power in 1913 and was in government until the end of the First World War, 1918. During the early years of its administration, it appeared to be under the influence of *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, namely Islamism, Ottomanism and Turkism. The principles of *İttihad-ı Anasır* (Union of Elements) and *Vatan-ı Umumi* (Common Fatherland) were significant parts of the CUP’s program until the Balkan

⁹⁴ Ibid., 311.

⁹⁵ On the views of Prince Sabaheddin, see *ibid.*, 310-312.

⁹⁶ In the second article, the emphasis was on to provide the unity of the Ottomans; and the third was about the reinstatement of the constitution, the application of general reforms and setting up the constitutional monarchy based on equality. Çavdar, *İttihad Terraki*, 21-22.

Wars, the last great war in the Balkans resulting from the spread of nationalism among the subjects of the Sultan. The CUP government now had to meet the question of what would be the focal point of patriotism and the basis of identity of the Empire's subjects. Mainly there were three options -the Ottoman, Islamic community and the Turkish nation, which were commonly discussed in the circles of the intellectuals. From time to time, the CUP's leaders referred to the pan-Islamist policies to justify their position and reforms and to hold up support, especially during the wars, although on account of their reformist and secularist structure they put into practice common secularizing changes notably in education and law.⁹⁷

With its 1916 Congress the CUP completely gave up Ottomanist and liberal policies, and instead began to undertake a Turkist, secularist and statist attitude.⁹⁸ It was because of this the Unionists conceived nationalism and secularism as inevitable aspects to obtain a modernized social and political system. These views brought about the discussions for the complete replacement of Islam as the basis of identity. Thus, they introduced the "notion that the nation was the sources of all authority."⁹⁹ The institutional and structural reformulation also came to constitute the basis of the Unionist concept of culture. It became clear in two basic aims. The first one was to gain the benefits of "civilization" that was universalized Western civilization, and the second was to search for a national Turkish identity that, for them, had been for a long time submerged underneath the Ottoman cosmopolitan identity. Both inclinations may be observed in

⁹⁷ On that policy of the CUP, see *ibid.*, 95-96.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 91.

their imitation of the West and the rise of interest to Central Asia, due to the Turkist ideology and the activities of the *Türk Ocakları* (the Turkish Hearths).¹⁰⁰ What were found out as unique peculiarities of the people (the Turks) had to be proved in accordance with the modern nationalist ideals. At the same time, together with civilized manners of the West, they had to be taught to the people, conceived as sinking into the darkness of ignorance and unaware of their true identity. This, according to the prevalent views of the Unionists, who claimed to know what was best for the people, was the only way to become modernized.¹⁰¹ It was this elitist position which provided a political, as well as ideological and intellectual, ground for the development of Kemalism as an elitist revolutionary tradition.

3.5. Three Intellectual and Political Movements in the Second Meşrutiyet

⁹⁹ Metin Hepar, "Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective." *Middle East Journal*. 35 (1981), 345-363.

¹⁰⁰ Çavdar, *İttihad ve Terraki*, 134.

¹⁰¹ On the characteristics of the Unionists, see *ibid.*, 132-134.

There were the three dominant currents of thought during the period of the CUP, namely Turkism, Westernism and Islamism. As it is indicated above, the first two gradually gained significance over the CUP's policies. The pioneers of these three currents were in the search for a common political and cultural identity to which the Empire's subjects belonged. All their efforts and discussions came to invite a debate on "to which civilization we belonged and whether or not we had a unique way," and the result was three notions of culture and civilization.

3.5.1. Islamism and the Idea of "Alternative" Civilization

Islamism as a political and cultural project during the first decade of the twentieth century was put forward and reformulated by a group of intellectuals.¹⁰² But its roots dated back to the Young Ottomans and Abdülhamit II's Islamist policies. In this regard *İttihad-ı İslam* (Union of Islam), which had been the frequently repeated motto of Islamism, was the name of the Young Ottomans' search for authenticity. In this new modern outlook¹⁰³ Islam was a different and unique civilization compatible with the

¹⁰² Among these intellectuals Sait Halim Paşa, Babanzade Hakkı, Çerkeşehizade Halil Halid, Mehmed Akif Ersoy, and Bediüzzaman became the prominent figures. They came around *Şeb-i-ül Reşad*, *Sırat-ı Müstakim* and *Volkan* journals. See İsmail Kara, *İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri* [The Political Ideas of the Islamists] (İstanbul: İz Yay., 1994). For detailed information about these thinkers, see İsmail Kara, ed., *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi, Metinler/Kişiler* [Islamist Thought in Turkey, Texts/Persons] (İstanbul: Risale, 1986).

western one and others. Such relativism mostly inspired by the social thought of Romanticism, could be also observed in the thoughts and writings of Muslim intellectuals in other Islamic societies, such as Jamal'ed-Din Afgani and Muhammed Abduh. Like Namık Kemal and other Young Ottomans, they attacked the universalistic notions of civilization and instead, in their “differentialist” discourse, the Islamic value system was unique and had a pregiven nature. This was the “discourse of “authenticity”, in which societies chosen as the field of application of the totalizing category “Islam” – “Islamic societies” – are thought to constitute a *Lebenswelt* with an essential and closed homogeneity.”¹⁰⁴ Such discourse relied on the notion of “ontologically differentiated history,” resulting in a particularism and the rejection of universalistic aspects. Continuity in history strengthened with the idea of a return to the “Islamic golden age” was in tandem with procuring individual identity.¹⁰⁵ With a modern ideological outlook, Islam was regarded as a civilization or a secular power more than anything else was; it required loyalty much more than piety. The ideology of particularism in Young Ottoman thought came with the idea of body politics. In this sense, as in the modern nationalist ideology in the West, Islam was perceived and interpreted as a modern ideology to redefine the masses and to mobilize into gaining transcendental ideals. It began to function as a category with the “non-religious” or “secular” as its binary opposite and came to “represent itself as *the* language of the public sphere.”¹⁰⁶ It was in this connection that it

¹⁰³ For which see Mümtaz'er Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu* [The Emergence of Islamism as Political Ideology] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1994), 245-246.

¹⁰⁴ Aziz Al-Azmeh, *Islams and Modernities* (London: Verso, 1993), 22; and also on the relativism and Islam, see *ibid.*, 5-6.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 27, 42-47

indeed appeared to be a symbolic justification for the centralized modern state and the way to determine the symbolic boundaries of the newly shaping public sphere. Abdülhamit II tried to put into practice these ideals by means of active use of the institution of the Caliphate.¹⁰⁷

In the answer of the Islamists during the Second Meşrutiyet to the question of “to which civilization we belonged and whether or not we had a unique way,” it was obvious that Muslims had their own distinct civilization. They, developing a counter argument to the Westernists, saw Islam not as an obstacle to progress, but that it could even provide a technological and political awakening if the Islamic traditions that made the Ottomans a great state were retrieved and reinterpreted.¹⁰⁸ The Muslims had to belong to an Islamic civilization, but for the Islamists of the Second Meşrutiyet there existed the need for some steps of reform mostly related to the material aspects of Western civilization.¹⁰⁹ Thus, borrowing technology and science from the West was acceptable; nevertheless, Islam had to stay in command in spheres of government, law, social usage, education and basic loyalty.¹¹⁰ This was the base line of their understanding of civilization, according to

¹⁰⁶ Rodrigue, “Difference,” 85. In fact, this was the crucial outcome of process of modernization from the time of Tanzimat. Muslims as a majority gradually came to identify themselves with the state in the course of which Islam was offered to be a binding ideology. This was the territorial and centralized state, the *vatan*, to which all Muslims would pledge loyalty. And the “state-Islam relationship was politicized and popularized and became the basis of a new national-Islamic identity.” Karpap, “The Ottoman Ethnic,” 45, 50.

¹⁰⁷ For the Abdülhamit’s use of Islam as a political instrument, see Mardin, *Türkiye’de*, 53.

¹⁰⁸ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *İslamcılık Cereyanı I* [Islamist Movement I] (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet, 1998), 26-28.

¹⁰⁹ For their view of civilization see Kara, *İslamcıların*, 24-25.

which each had a particular history and roots in the past, which were the sources of its true identity. There was no one true civilization and no one road to progress. Relying on that, they proposed a program of Islamization in which, by refraining from the vigorous imitation of Western manners, “social reform would be achieved by putting even its details under the sacred sanction of religion.”¹¹¹ It is obvious from the views of the Islamists that the culture of each society was a historically unique entity incompatible with the Western one. This was mentioned together with plural civilizations. Here culture could not be reformed and transformed, and, if it was, people would lose their cultural identity and become slaves. Only this understanding of culture and civilization, based on Islam, which was the sole language of public sphere, provided a legitimacy for politics and all its mechanisms.

3.5.1. Westernism: The “Universalized” Conceptions of Civilization and Culture

Unlike the Islamist resistance to the total conversion from the traditional order to a modern one, the “Westernist” strand of the intellectuals argued for, to a greater extent, the complete transformation of administrative, political and socio-cultural system, that is, complete Westernization. Although Westernization had been a movement with the efforts of reformation of the Empire since the late eighteenth century, after the 1908 Revolution Westernist thoughts, a school of thought was called *Garpcılık* (Westernism), began to be

¹¹⁰ This was “Islamization”. Said Halim Paşa defined it as “the successful interpretations and adaptation of Islam’s belief, moral, social and political system according to the needs of age.” Quoted in Tunaya, *İslamcılık*, 25. For his political views, see Said Halim Paşa, “İslamda Siyasi Teşkilat” [Political Organization in Islam], in *Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi*, 79-157.

systematized and proposed as a primary problem of society.¹¹² According to the Westernists' views, complete Westernization was inevitable; this account was based on the political, social, cultural and economic superiority of the West, which could not be questioned because it was based on science. It was impossible to separate the material side of civilization from its manners and ideas that were the bases of technological domination of Western civilization. In other words, the West, as an "image", and Western Civilization did not simply reflect material and technological development, but also, most importantly, "a completely different mode of thinking."¹¹³ The obstacles to the progress of the Ottoman society were the traditional values and religion itself, Islam. That was why society had to be freed from these "archaic" values which were in contradiction with the contemporary ideals. The Westernists therefore aimed at forming a new moral structure and creating a new 'humane' equipped with the European *adab-ı muaşeret* (etiquette) as well as the scientific mind who would reject traditional mores.¹¹⁴ That would bring about the needed material superiority. One of the leaders of that strand, Kılıçzade Hakkı, prepared a reform proposal, published in the *İctihad* of Abdullah Cevdet in 1912, that appeared to be a rough draft of Atatürk's later reforms. Shortly, the proposal suggested a complete transformation of society and a new vision of social order.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ Berkes, *The Development*, 363.

¹¹² Şükrü Hanioglu, "Batıcılık" [Westernism], *Tanzimat Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1983), 1384. Among its prominent figures were Abdullah Cevdet, Kılıçzade Hakkı, Celal Nuri (İleri) and Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın).

¹¹³ Berkes, *The Development*, 352.

¹¹⁴ For the Westernists' thesis, see Hanioglu, "Batıcılık," 1384-1385.

Abdullah Cevdet had a leading position in the movement. Thus, the explanation of his views help us to settle the Westernist ideas of civilization and the West. For him, the West was not our enemy; it was our guidance. Our enemy was in fact “our own inertia, ignorance, fanaticism, and our blind following of tradition... The West is our teacher; to love it is to love science, progress, *material* and *moral* advancement.”¹¹⁶ “There is no second civilization. The one, unique civilization is European Civilization, and it must be imitated with its roses and its thorns”, he continues.¹¹⁷ It was in this sense that civilization was defined in *universal* terms and seen as “the outcome of positivistic universal science and rationality”¹¹⁸ and free from particular, traditional culture. Thus, in

¹¹⁵ It included the following ideas; “The Sultan would have one wife and concubines; the prince would be...given a thorough education, including service in the army; the fez would be abolished, and a new headgear adopted; existing cloth factories would be expanded, and new ones opened, and the Sultan, princes, senators, deputies, officials, and soldiers made to wear their products; women would dress as they pleased, though not extravagantly, and would be free from dictation or interference in this matter by the ulema, policemen, or street riff-raff; they would be at liberty to choose their husbands, and the practice of match-making would be abolished; convents and *tekkes* would be closed, and their revenues added to the education budget; all *medreses* would be closed, and new modern literary and technical institutes established; the turban, cloak, would be limited to certificated professional men of religion, and forbidden to others; vows and offerings to the saints would be prohibited...; exorcists, witch-doctors, and the like would be suppressed, and medical treatment for malaria made compulsory; popular misconceptions of Islam would be corrected; practical adult education would be opened; a consolidated and purified Ottoman Turkish dictionary and grammar would be established by a committee of philologists and men of letters; the Ottomans, without awaiting anything from their government or from foreigners would, by their own efforts and initiative, build roads, bridges, ports, railways, canals, steamships, and factories; starting with the land and *Evkaf* laws, the whole legal system would be reformed.” Lewis, *The Emergence*, 236-237.

¹¹⁶ Cited in Berkes, *The Development*, 357.

¹¹⁷ Cited in Hanioglu, *Doktor Abdullah Cevdet*, 359.

¹¹⁸ Nilüfer Göle, “Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey,” in *Civil Society in the Middle East*, ed. Richard Norton (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 22.

order to reach the level of that civilization, it was necessary to entirely demolish traditional values regarded responsible for the decline of the state, and instead to re-institute a “civilized” one. These were what were found in his view and other positivist-nationalist intellectuals who were in constant search for the “idealized” life style. In the process of “civilizing”, for him, traditional motifs peculiar to the Ottoman society which were unable to adopt to the course of being perfected could not be benefited from, and so they had to be changed with suitable European ones.¹¹⁹ He, therefore, waged war against illiteracy and ignorance of the people, as the “great danger to the health of the nation”, which would be eliminated by making them perfect.¹²⁰

The project Abdullah Cevdet proposed included the idea of setting up a new belief system, a new “ethic”, for which Islam might be instrumentally used in a temporary manner because of its existing role in social relations. In this regard, Islam was seen only as a tool in justifying changes in the path of establishing European ideals. The planned ethical system would be based on the idea of “biological materialism” that would substitute for religion in the near future.¹²¹ In providing substantive changes in the thoughts of every individual and cultural accumulation in society, he believed in the importance of the activities of translation because translated books from the west would

¹¹⁹ Hanioglu, *Doktor Abdullah Cevdet*, 361

¹²⁰ Frank W. Creel, “Abdullah Cevdet: A Father of Kemalism.” *Int. Journal of Turkish Studies*. 4(1980), 14-15. This could be provided through the mass schooling in the hands of enlightened rulers. On his views on education, see 11-12.

¹²¹ Hanioglu, *Doktor Abdullah Cevdet*, 333-337. To benefit from Islam’s social content he tried to separate its social aspects from its religious one and to attract attention of people to its second aspects. See *ibid.*, 131. It was his aim to solve the social problems arising from Islam itself through using its social contents, and, at the end, to get materialism hold up all functions that had been fulfilled by Islam. *Ibid.*, 139.

bring to us enlightened modern thoughts.¹²² In his “utopian” project, the elite played a leading role as the administrators of society. A group of elite educated in western standards would administer the mass that, in every sphere, indeed had to be controlled. They would have to raise the “educational” and “cultural” level of all people, especially peasants, to control and manage them easily.¹²³ It was the process of making people conscious of being *humane*. Only in this way would the Ottoman society become an integral part of the civilized world, the West. The proposed principles in his project would provide suitable ground for protecting the national existence by “submitting to the current of civilization”.¹²⁴ For him, the politico-cultural identity of the Ottomans as a civilized nation of contemporary civilization had to be defined in terms of the idea of citizenship and the idea of a common fatherland. In this respect, he espoused a “view of Turkishness which emphasized the need of Turks, Kurds and Armenians to unite their destinies as a matter of common survival and which placed the rights of all on the same level.”¹²⁵ All living in Turkey shared commonalties inferred from habitually accepted aspects of the civilized world. The emphasis was on the idea that brought into scene not a

¹²² Ibid., 367-368.

¹²³ Ibid., 368-9

¹²⁴ Cited in Creel, “Abdullah Cevdet,” 21.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 16. This is most clear in the following words of Abdullah Cevdet: “You are an Armenian, I am a Kurd, but both you and I have the right to be a minister of the nation in the “Council of Turkey”...Isn’t Turkey the common fatherland of all us?... Neither of these elements (the Kurds and the Armenians) has given to mankind a Shakspeare, a Molière, a Gutenberg, a Pasteur”, “We are not at a time to be playing with the words Kurdistan, Arabistan, Lazistan, Ermenistan; we are at a time to be giving material manifestations that we are capable worthy of living free and united.” Ibid., 17

racially and ethnically restrictive notion of nation, but a culturally “assimilative” and “hierarchic” (civilized or modern versus archaic or ignorant) one.¹²⁶

The Westernist program of civilization was very akin to the French conception of civilization and culture. In this program civilization was defined as a far-reaching concept comprising every aspect of life or the “whole way of life.” This life denoted a socially, economically, culturally and ethically developed category according to which other ways of life (generally regarded as barbaric, ignorant or less developed) were judged. It also had a great potential to transform “others” into a civilized form. One might argue that the hierarchic, progressive and assimilative understanding of civilization and ethic (reading culture) was a former description of the Republican discourse on civilization and culture.

3.5.3. Turkism: The Name of “Authenticated” Culture

Turkism as mentioned above, emerged as an intellectual movement in the last years of the nineteenth century and turned into a powerful and influential political movement, especially during the CUP governments.¹²⁷ The Turkists’ understanding of

¹²⁶ Abdullah Cevdet’s project, offering the idea of “Westernization” to fully transform the pre-existing social reality, provided a faction within the Westernist strand, which was called the moderate wing. This wing led by Celal Nuri opposed the complete transformation and instead promoted the acceptance of technical side of civilization. Celal Nuri divided civilization into two kinds: technical and real. Technical civilization could be applicable for the Ottoman society, for Europe had attained “the highest peak of technical civilization, but had not achieved and never would achieve any ‘real’ civilization.” Lewis, *The Emergence*, 235. For him, up to his time, the Ottomans mixed both, and had imitated its real aspects. In his view, it was necessary to benefit from traditional patterns by selecting among them, which would be more beneficial to the Ottomans. See Hanioglu, “Batıcılık,” 1386.

the West, modern civilization and authenticity, in the first instance, differentiated them from the other two movements. But, as Berkes aptly states, “[t]hey were as pro-Western as any Westernist and as anti-Western as any Islamist. They accepted both attitudes, but only partially.”¹²⁸ In their project of modernization, the basic argument, in contrast to Westernism, was that Turks had a peculiar “culture” truly expressed in *emotive* terms. It could not be easily changed and replaced with strange ways of understanding that belonged to other nations. Nevertheless, culture was not in contradiction with modernizing reforms through which it would be refreshed. Western civilization, made up of various (national) cultures, was not simply seen as reason or humanity as claimed by the Westernists. That was why being part of modern civilization, “as the Western nations had, was ... a matter of appropriating the international civilization, but not the national cultures of the Western nations.”¹²⁹ In this sense Turkism was also in direct conflict with Islamism that rejected Western civilization which brought moral decadence to the world of Islam. In short, according to Turkist principles, to become a true nation was the only way to become an integral part of the civilized world, the world of nations, only by preserving their authentic culture.

¹²⁷ Among the prominent representatives of the movement there were Ziya Gökalp, Ömer Seyfettin, Hamdullah Suphi, Yusuf Akçura, Halide Edip and Ahmet Ağaoğlu, who were the leading and enthusiastic young journalists, writers, politicians and scholars. In the 1910s Turkism developed around periodicals *Genç Kalemler* (Young Pens) and *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland), and a cultural organization called *Türk Ocağı* (Turkish Hearts). For a short history of Turkism, from inside, see Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles*, 1-11.

¹²⁸ Berkes, *The Development*, 355.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 355.

At this point, briefly elaborating the views of Ziya Gökalp who was the leading theoretician of the Turkist movement and the ideologue of the CUP, made it conceivable how the terms of civilization and culture were visualized in the period of the Young Turk era. To begin with, Gökalp's view on society¹³⁰ that is the source of all uppermost moral values, constitutes what belongs to nation (*millet*) and culture (*hars*). All its divine ideals are identified with the nation that is the perfect society and in fact "the highest stage in human development."¹³¹ His views on society and nation became more explicable with his dualistic notions on culture and civilization. He defined both concepts as comprising "all aspects of social life – religious, moral, legal, intellectual, aesthetic, economic, linguistic and technologic." But there are two main differences between culture and civilization;

First of all, culture is national, whereas civilization is international. Culture a harmonious whole of the eight above-mentioned aspects of the life of a single nation. Civilization, on the other hand, is a mutually shared whole of the social lives of many nations situated on the same continent... Secondly, civilization is the sum total of social phenomena that have occurred by conscious action and individual wills... The elements included in culture, however, have not been created by conscious action and individual will. They are not artificial.¹³²

¹³⁰ Mostly generating from Durkheim's theory, his theory of society based on the idea of "the collective consciousness of the group" from which "social phenomena" emerges. This is "conscious realizations" named as "collective representations" (myths, epic, rituals, moral, legal, economic rules, practices, etc.) As the source of collective consciousness the society was the highest moral authority. Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles*, 51-52.

¹³¹ Uriel Heyd, *Foundation of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp* (London: Luzac and Company, 1950), 59. He defined a nation as a society composed of "people who speak the same language, have had the same education and are united in their religious, moral and aesthetic ideals – in short, those who have a common culture and religion." *Ibid.*, 63.

Civilization is the product of modern sciences and techniques by which human beings can create “all knowledge and theories relating to ethics, law, fine arts, economics, philosophy, language and technologies.”¹³³ It is artificial. In his view, it was common to cultures of the West but was not reduced to its own specific cultures; and so it was *universally* applicable. Culture, however, is not man-made. It is something that has spontaneously and naturally developed and can not easily be imitated by other nations. Gökalp translated the French concept of culture into Turkish as *hars* partially in parallel with its original usage which refers to both cultivating the land and worshipping. It was derived from the word *ihras* that means plugging and cultivating land.¹³⁴ Although this usage seemed parallel to the French practice of the term as an understanding of cultivating and civilizing the people, it had some connotations with the Romantic view of culture.

Gökalp used culture and nation as interrelated concepts, and every culture has its own dynamic structure that separates a nation from others. “Turkishness” with its unique language, ethics, sentiments and arts, evolving through a long history, was the core of the national culture of the Turks. However, it was not racially determined, but was the name of a shared, common culture because “a nation can be defined as a group which possesses a culture peculiar to itself. Therefore, a Turk can have only one language, only a single culture.”¹³⁵ Islam, together with Turkishness, was part of the Turkish culture. Mostly inspired from Durkheim, it was seen functional for social cohesion and solidarity, but not

¹³² Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles*, 22.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ortaylı, “Osmanlı’da Kültür,” 150.

a source of law that was the inviolable basis of the modern, secularized state.¹³⁶ The guiding principles in the modern state and society were national morals; that is, the nation was the exclusive justifying force for political authority. A powerful state, therefore, existed only in the context of which there was a culturally and politically integrated group, the nation.

According to Gökalp's nationalist ideas, civilization and culture, at that time, could not be separated from each other easily, because that "civilization is the sum total of many institutions. However, the sum total of institutions peculiar to a specific nation is called culture".¹³⁷ Civilization had to penetrate into the daily life of the people, especially through education, which made it possible to keep up their cultural elements; but, at the same time, the improvement of culture contributes to the rise of civilization. It was this perception that would make it possible for the Turkish nation to keep alive its "cultural authenticity" and, at the same time, be a powerful member of the world of nations. Stressing plural civilizations Gökalp saw each having "its own logic, its own aesthetics, its own interpretation of life. For the same reason, a civilization must be accepted in its entirety."¹³⁸ In other words, the adoption to modern civilization would lead to achieve

¹³⁵ Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles*, 19.

¹³⁶ On secularization in the thoughts of Gökalp, see Andrew Davison, "Secularization and Modernization in Turkey: Ideas of Ziya Gökalp." *Economy and Society*. 24 (1995), 189-224.

¹³⁷ Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles*, 38-39. On this point Heyd argued that in the thoughts of Ziya Gökalp both are "compatible and jointly determine the life of modern nations." Heyd, *The Foundations*, 86.

¹³⁸ Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles*, 39. For this reason the Tanzimat elite failed to adopt European civilization through "outward imitation", since they could not understand this point. *Ibid.*, 39.

modernity besides revitalizing its authentic culture. At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that Gökalp's conception of culture and civilization differentiated from Romantic idea on culture and civilization especially in terms of culture's relations and interactions with civilization. Although his distinction between culture and civilization seemed to be just one reflection of the dualistic tendency of Romanticism (a distinction between spirit and material) and his understanding of "authenticity" was in line with its organic and historicist view to some extent, there could not be any conflict between culture and civilization. Unlike the Romantics, he used the word civilization in its broadest sense to refer all aspects of social life, not simply technological and material ones. Both were indeed jointly interdependent. Put in another way, civilization was not something that prevented flourishing of cultures and distorted their authenticity.

That was why he proposed a synthesis of Turkish and Islamic values and modern civilizational aspects, which would be the basic premise of Turkish national culture. The synthesis was the only way to obtain a harmonious unity that was only possible with symmetry between the components of both civilization and national culture.

Here, Ottomannes was excluded, because, in conformity with the necessity of the time, those Turkish culture and Western civilization had to / would take the place of the Ottoman civilization. This was one inescapable result of a process that Western civilization should substitute eventually Eastern civilization everywhere. Ottoman civilization, a part of Eastern civilization, was: "[A]n amalgam of institutions stemming from Turkish, Persian and Arab cultures, from Islam, and from Eastern and, more recently, Western civilizations. These institutions never merged and, therefore, never

produced a harmonious system.”¹³⁹ In fact, outside it, possessed by *havas* (a group of elite at the center), *avam* (the governed mass) composed of Sunni Turks, a national culture had developed with a unique judgement of tastes carried on from the times of the ancient Turks of Central Asia. Because Ottoman civilization was artificial, disharmonious and imitative, it had been an obstacle to spontaneously developed, original and unique Turkish culture. Being Ottoman, therefore, constituted a position of anti-Turk in every realm of life.¹⁴⁰ As a consequence, in the views of Gökalp, the rejection of all that belonged to Ottoman civilization appeared to be one of the corner stones of the true cultural identity of the Turks; to put it in real terms, it was transformed into the position of the “Other.” In a similar way, Westernists treated it as a basic ‘Other’ of projected ‘civilized’ Turkish identity, but they went one step further in the sense that it included all traditional elements.

His distinction between civilization and culture and his view on Ottomanness shed light on the problem of modernization in Turkey. It was in such a way that it conditioned what is and what is not to be borrowed from the West. All that belonged to modern civilization should be adopted without any hesitation, but not that belonged to the realm of culture. To catch up with that level of modern civilization, Turkish culture must be studied, and some of its aspects that were archaic and out-of-date must be eradicated. Therefore, his projected scheme for a future socio-political system was based on a pair, pathological versus normal, as in a similar dose with modern dichotomies such as traditional/modern, faith/reason, etc. For him, to decide what was pathological and what

¹³⁹ Ibid., 31.

was normal in society was the work of the political and cultural elite.¹⁴¹ Studying in detail the consciousness of the society and bringing to light the new inclination in the society, they could “turn the unconscious groupings into conscious, cultivated, systematized, coordinated ideals.”¹⁴² This was indeed the cultivation and, in some sense, civilization of a national culture that was simply neither the culture of the West nor Islamic or the pre-Islamic ethnic culture. In the process, “the cultural elements of the West would be appropriated only as models for the cultivation of a *modern* national culture.”¹⁴³ His project of modernity anticipated a total re-organization of ethics, language, religion and aesthetics in line with authentic Turkish culture evolving from the time of the ancient Turks.

This mission of the hunt for purification and genuine roots, first and foremost, was at the center of his Turkism that was to “seek out the Turkish culture that has remained only among the people and graft onto it Western civilization in its entirety and in a viable form.”¹⁴⁴ The fundamental aim was to free the national soul from alien elements, to make the people conscious of being Turkish with a rich historical and cultural heritage, and to transmute them into civilized individuals as in Western cultures.

¹⁴⁰ This was very clear in language, music, arts, etc.; their Ottoman versions were constructed. See *ibid.*, 22-30.

¹⁴¹ The elite, with their superior education and knowledge, possess civilization but the people possess culture. In his motto of *halka doğru* (towards the people), the elite had to go to the people. Two reasons behind this move are: “(1) to receive a cultural education from them, and (2) to carry civilization to them... Thus, to speak of “going to the people” means “going to culture,” because the people are a living museum of our national culture.” Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles*, 34.

¹⁴² Berkes, *The Development*, 365.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 365.

This was, first and foremost, the most salient precondition for modernizing reforms that should be implemented in an evolutionary way, not a radically revolutionary one.

In short, Ottoman modernization brought a new state of mind, new world-view, and new life forms and practices, which seemed to be, in one way or another, associated with the concepts of civilization and culture. The pre-modern Ottoman view on society began transforming into a new form with the escalating tight of modernizing reforms from the early nineteenth century. After the post-Enlightenment ideals (science, reason, progress and order) came to affect the world-view of the Ottoman elite, in parallel with a new ruling class with a modern-oriented mentality, there existed a new vision of polity and society. From now on, society was perceived as being composed of individuals, and as a continuously changing mechanism that was the idea of ordering society by the hands of the knowledgeable and enlightened rulers. This idea of society construction went hand in hand with a search for a common ground or purpose to collect various groups under a symbolically determined canopy.

Hence, from the Tanzimat to the end of the Empire, all projects of modernity and intellectual movements (mainly the Tanzimat reform, Young Ottoman and Young Turk Movements, Ottomanism, Islamism, Westernism and Turkism) looked for a feasible common purpose, or, in some sense, a collective identity for the Empire's subjects. In this search the concept of *medeniyet*, *Osmanlılık*, *Türklük* and *hars* came to the fore as regulatory forces in the creation of new identifications during the last decades of the Empire. All tried to answer the above-mentioned question of "which civilization the Ottomans / Muslims / Turks belong to and whether or not they had their own way." In

¹⁴⁴ Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles*, 33

fact the question was about ways of modernization. It was above all based on East versus West dichotomy. Culture as a concept and a whole way of life was targeted in all the modernist projects. Within the frame of policy all “civilizing” and “modernizing” efforts of the Tanzimat and the First and Second Meşrutiyet reformers aimed to transform traditional ways into a more developed (ordered and progressive) form. This perception was also at the center of three dominant modernist projects of the last decades of the Empire. The Islamists, rejecting the Western way of life, perceived the “living” culture corrupted and so tried to make it “authentic” through exploring its spirit from the golden-age of Islam, the source of Eastern civilization. The Westernists, on the other hand, emphasized the necessity of complete transformation of the society toward the West and the construction of new ethical, artistic, legal structure, reading culture. Unlike either of these, the Turkists proposed a kind of synthesis between West and East; culture had to be authentic but subject to an evolutionary process directed toward the dominant civilization, the Western one. Here culture was not a focal point of challenging and rejecting the basic premises of modernity. What is common in these discourses of culture is the will to create new identifications by transforming the past and present and creating a new world of meaning, and also to construct a new moral base for the political authority. At this juncture, as discussed in the first chapter, in modern times culture came to provide a legitimatization for the modern polity.

CHAPTER IV

THE KEMALIST REVOLUTION AND THE PROCESS OF CULTURE PRODUCTION

The aim of the present chapter is to expose the process in the formation of the official discourse on culture by discussing the westernizing reforms and nation-building project during the formative years of the Republic. It was this historically rooted process that made clear the dimensions of culture production, and its intimate ties with the state that was the sole legitimate power to determine the boundaries of the “new” culture. Here it is argued that with its civilizing and modernizing mission, the Kemalist discourse of culture came to imply a *hierarchically* structured entity coupled with the logic of *assimilation*; this assimilationist orientation includes a *dual-partite inclusion-exclusion process*. In this understanding the Republican elite’s perception of civilization, modernization, nationalism, laicism and populism had a central place.

The Kemalist notion of culture was first of all a product of a specific political project fabricated within the frame of a particular historical and political context. To understand its boundaries, therefore, seems possible only by portraying the dynamics of this political project. At first insight, as mentioned in the Introduction, the Kemalist project of modernity anticipated a revolution, the so called Turkish Revolution, which

was a “Cultural Revolution”. It essentially implied the will to reconstruct a new cultural identity and to become a member of the Western civilization. Basic obstacles in front of this goal were the prevailing traditional structures, including all that belonged to the Islamic/Ottoman heritage, and all particularistic affiliations of the people. Thus, it involved radical westernizing reforms that totally aimed at cutting off all ties with tradition/Islam and the Ottoman Empire (portrayed as the relevant “Other” of the Republic) and rearranging all pivotal social values to set up a new society and new men with a new state of mind.

It was this rearrangement that was based on an ideology, Kemalism, mostly formed in the 1930s.¹ So it may be seen in its broadest term as a “political discourse” fixed firmly on the standpoint that had been shaped throughout all discussions and implementations during the Mustafa Kemal era. As an official ideology, it was presented as a unique ethos of legitimacy for political authority, used for both describing the boundaries of politics and also as the standard of judging attitudes in every sphere of social life. This may be called a *civilizing process from above*. The term culture together with the concepts of civilization, Westernization and secularism, one might argue, lied at the center of that firm outlook. Primarily, it had a *culturalist* approach in terms of which it provided a set of “idealized” and “methodized” symbols, images and rituals for a new social personality. The main questions dealt with here are; what was the nature of Kemalist conception of culture in the early Republican period? What was its role in the nation-building process which was the main target of the civilizing process from above? How did the Kemalist elite perceive its relationship with their ideals of civilization,

¹ For a discussion on whether Kemalism is an ideology and, if it is so, what kind of ideology it is, see footnote 7 in the Introduction.

nationalism, secularism and populism? Did an idea of authenticity have a place in the Kemalist civilizing project?

4. 1. The Revolution and the Kemalist Politics of Culture

After the War of Independence (1919-1922) and the Treaty of Lausanne, the name of the state was proclaimed as a republic. It was no longer an empire ruled by the dynasty, but became a nation-state. In fact, this was the last point of long searches for arresting the reasons of “backwardness” in the Empire. In the history of Ottoman modernization, the elite who were one way or another fascinated by the European development began to criticize their own institutions and strove to reform them. This self-criticism brought about various projects on modernization. In the last decades of the Empire, as noted in Chapter III, there were three main competing ideologies (*Islamism*, *Turkism* and *Westernism*), each seeking to provide a determined project for transforming the state and social structure. The pioneers of these three currents primarily dealt with the question of what would be the focal point of patriotism and the basis of identity of the Empire’s subjects. As a strand slightly different from Westernism and Turkism, Islamists proposed the idea that Muslims had a unique civilization totally opposite to the Western one, especially at the cultural level; that was why they had to preserve it as the true essence of their identity. By contrast, the Westernists defended a project of modernity that called for complete transformation and secularization in every domain of social life in line with Western models. The Turkists were between the two movements: despite

putting emphasis on the Turkish culture exposed from tradition and history, being part of the civilized world was usually accentuated.

The founders of the Republic, led by Mustafa Kemal, seemed to be chiefly inspired more from the Westernists' ideals than the Turkist perspective.² As argued in Chapter III, we can find the ideological framework of Atatürk's reforms in the Westernists' project of modernization. This can be observed especially in terms of their inclination and formula to build up a new social structure and new culture. Beside this ideological continuation, it is clear that the reforms initiated during the last century of the Ottoman Empire provided a solid background to the Kemalist reforms.³ The institutional and conceptual transformation in the last century of the Empire provided a suitable ground on which the Turkish Revolution flourished. However, the sweeping reforms of the 1920s and 1930s were radical in nature; these reforms gave way to drastic changes

² As opposed to common opinion, Creel argues that Atatürk was mainly inspired by the "futurist-utopian" ideas of Abdullah Cevdet, the chief figure of Westernism in the period of the CUP regime, rather than those of the Turkist Ziya Gökalp. See Frank W. Creel, "Abdullah Cevdet: A Father of Kemalism." *Int. Journal of Turkish Studies*. 4(1980), 9-26. And also, see Dankwart A. Rustow, *The Founding of a Nation-State: Atatürk's Historic Achievement* (Ankara: THS, 1981), 15. In fact, the existing real politic during and after the First World War terminated the possibility of Islamist and Ottomanist politics; that meant to discard any dreams of recovering an Ottoman Empire, or an Islamic Empire. Such failure of the imperial conception was also instrumental in eliminating the Turanist side of Turkish nationalism.

³ New modern institutions and military and civil officers of the Ottoman Empire appeared to be the base the Republic was grounded on. In this sense there was a historic continuity between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic. See Dankwart A. Rustow, "Atatürk as an Institution Builder", in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, eds. A. Kazancıgil and E. Özbudun (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 73; Roderic H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 243-260. For some doctrinal legacy of the Ottomans see Bernard Lewis, "The Ottoman Roots of the Turkish Republic," in *The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilization*, eds. Kemal Çiçek, and et al, vol. III (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000), 221-228.

felt in every sphere of life.⁴ The Kemalists had a different interpretation of modernization from the Tanzimat and Second Meşrutiyet reformers who saw modernization as a technique to save the state. For them, it was “a project” seen as an end in itself rather than a technique as a means to an end.⁵ In this respect, in the discourse of the modernizing elite, modernization (regarded in close connection with the idea of Westernization) meant bringing the existing rules of the political and social life in conformity with something that existed in the civilized nations of the West.⁶ Here, modernization and nation-building (anticipating the creation of all the apparatus of a nation-state such as emblems, patriotic holidays, music, statues, and monuments) were equated with the belief of endless and irresistible progress of modern civilization. Thus, the concept of civilization constitutes the core of the Kemalist project of modernization. Civilization as an idea and discourse was employed as a main instrument of the official identification process. It becomes more clear as it is considered within the frame of Elias’s conceptualization according to which

⁴ Its radicality finds its clear expression in Mustafa Kemal’s words: the goal was to build “a new country, a new society, a new state ... respected at home and abroad.” Quoted in Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 480.

⁵ Bobby Said, *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentricism and the Emergence of Islamism* (London: Zet Books, 1997), 67.

⁶ Here the idea of westernization was related to the idea of one world and one mankind’s future represented in the West. It came with the understanding of state-centered modernization from above. Thus, modernity was conceived only through its “institutional, ritual, symbolic, and aesthetic manifestations.” Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, “Introduction”, in *Rethinking Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. S. Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 5. The Kemalists strove to forge modern manifestations and images on the people as the very essentials of their identity.

in Europe civilization came to be in use as an “self-image of Europe”; it was mainly used as expression of identity based on a “we-image” versus a “they-image”.⁷

The official thesis of civilization was, in Peyami Safa’s words, “civilizationism.”⁸ According to this doctrine, civilization was not something that was defined in technological and scientific terms. It was a whole comprising a dense network of all practices in life. In this regard, Mustafa Kemal said, in 1923, “there are various countries, but civilization is one. And a nation willing to progress must take part in this unique civilization.”⁹ Thus, in every respect, the civilization Mustafa Kemal promoted referred to “the whole modern way of life” as well as “the modern mentality.” The only way to survive as an independent and developed nation was to make transformations in every sphere of life in tandem with this universal civilization. It is obvious that the Kemalist conception meant the internalization of universal, ahistorical and progressive sense of the

⁷ See Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: History of Manners, and State Formation and Civilization*, trans. Edmund Jephcott, two volumes (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).

⁸ For Peyami Safa, civilizationism together with nationalism was a fixed principle of Atatürk’s Revolution. It was the movement that aimed at ending the *dual structure* created by the Tanzimat and Meşrutiyet reforms. Before the Republic, courts were half-modern and half-religious (modern courts beside sharia courts), education half-secular and half-religious (modern secular schools and religious ones –medrese), and so on. Atatürk’s reforms ended the half structure by instituting the modern one. Peyami Safa, *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar* [Perspectives on the Turkish Revolution], (İstanbul: Ötüken, 1993) (original publication, 1938), 92. All reforms on secularization, the dress code, the alphabet change, the ban on the *a-la turca* music in the conservatoire, the adoption of the Western calendar and of Sunday as the weekly day of rest, and the adoption of all social intercourse and clothes of the West, all were *revolutionary* acts which emanated from Kemalist civilizationism. *Ibid.*, 100.

⁹ *Atatürkçülük* (Birinci Kitap) [Atatürkism (First Book)] (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1983), 351. For him modern civilization was a sole representative of “all of humanity”, and so “[Our] country has to be modern, civilized and renovated; this is a war of life of death.” *Ibid.*, 353.

civilization of the West, especially of the French type. Like the French conception, it was used to delineate the aestheticized and softened behavior, shared common values and the idea of progress; and so, it refused the Romantic view of civilization according to which civilization as a technological and moral quality disturbed national culture.¹⁰ At the center of that “Europeanization” of world history and civilization there was the belief that the West was at the peak of the unilinear progress of the world. As indicated in Chapter II, that idea of civilization is based on the logic of totalizing dichotomies, such as civilized / barbarian, traditional / modern, progress / backwardness, and religious / rational.¹¹ In these ontologically and epistemologically defined categories, the first member of the pairs were regarded in general as belonging to the Western civilization, and the second, the Eastern civilization.¹² The West, and its civilization, denotes, perhaps more than anything else, a state of mind, and so for the civilizing rulers it became essentially the name of a cultural identity. It was in fact based on the belief that other

¹⁰ For a comparison of Mustafa Kemal’s notion of civilization with the French and German one see Enver Ziya Karal, “Atatürk’ün Siyaset Üzerine Düşünceleri” [Atatürk’s Views on Politics], in *Atatürk Hakkında Konferanslar* [Conferences on Atatürk] (Ankara: THS, 1946), 37-54.

¹¹ This was in line with Said’s analysis of orientalism. In that the West and the East are ontologically and epistemologically defined categories, working through totalizing dichotomies. The modernizing intellectuals and rulers, especially in non-Western contexts, judge, freeze and polarize all traditional elements according to these categories. This means the orientalizing and essentializing of “the other”. See Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).

¹² The West and the East are not simply geographical entities, but denote a state of mind. On the West and East in the Kemalist discourse, see Peyami Safa, *Türk İnkılabına*, 111-135. Thus, the basic goal of the civilizing reformers was to bring all Turks up to the level of the West and its science, philosophy, arts, mentality and worldview. See Tark Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri* [The Movements of Westernization in the Political Life of Turkey] (İstanbul: Yedigün Matbaası, 1960), 154.

civilizations and cultures have a legitimate position only in so far as they become assimilated into Western civilization or culture. Western civilization and culture, which were seen as “unique” and “universal”, were at the top of the *hierarchical* structuration of civilizations and cultures. In the modernist projects of nineteenth century Europe, as Bennett argues, “the progress of civilization” had eliminated all particular and traditional forms portrayed as “‘survivals’ of prehistoric forms of life... [T]hey represented a past in the present that needed to be removed - that is, to be effectively assigned to the past as past.”¹³ Being devoted to such a belief, the Republican project chose Western civilization as a model for the cultural transformation. It strove to “assign” all living traditions and forms to “the past as past”.¹⁴

In this respect, it meant a clear rejection of both the Islamist idea that promoted the separation of civilization into two parts: the spiritual domain (religious and traditional values) and the material one (technological and scientific aspects), and the Turkist idea that culture and civilization are two distinct things. Like the binary structure between the elite’s life and the masses or between “high” culture and “low” culture in the Ottoman Empire, the duality in thought was mainly attached to Kemalist ideology.¹⁵

¹³ Tony Bennett, *Culture: A Reformer’s Science*, (London: Sage Publication, 1998), 97-98.

¹⁴ The result was the complete disgust of the Kemalist elite on the living values and shapes. They did not easily welcome the display of “native” aspect even as touristic objects. For example, Yaşar Nabi expressed the discomfort he experienced at “the display of the “picturesque East” with its old wooden buildings, men with a strange headgear and dress, veiled women, and chaotic bazaars, as a commercial commodity.” Yaşar Nabi, “Turizm Meselesi ve Türkiye” [The Question of Tourism and Turkey]. *Ülkü*. 67 (September 1938), 57.

¹⁵ Laid on the monist understanding of modernization and nationalism, the Kemalist project rejected the “dualist cultural theory” of the Turkists and Unionists. Thus, it came with a quest for universalized ideals rather than a particularized and

In the Kemalist program of civilization, the aim was to create a secular, moral, and cultural base for the society to replace the existing religious/tradition-oriented social structure. Through dissolving the hegemony of traditional institutions and values over the state structure and society, the state elite, initiators of the Cultural Revolution, made efforts to build a totally secular state and a new culture. In other words, attempts were made to secularize the state institutions and society for redefining the basis of political legitimation (nation-state) and the boundaries of a civilized community.¹⁶ This was mainly the task of Kemalist politics of culture.

As the sole architect of such politics, the state was the main active agent in institutionalizing a (national) culture through which the boundaries of Turkishness and Turkish citizenship were clearly described. This formulation from above was to a greater extent the cause of belief in the Jacobean and positivist ideals of the nineteenth century Europe, especially France. Kemalism took nourishment from scientism, particularly Comtean positivism, together with laicism, nationalism, solidarism and the idea of progress.¹⁷ To put it in a somewhat in different way, scientific validation appeared to be a

authenticated one. For this rejection see Renata Holod and Ahmet Evin, "Introduction", in *Modern Turkish Architecture*, eds. R. Holod and A. Evin (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 6. The existing dichotomy between the elite and mass was targeted for elevating the people to the elite's level. See Hasan Ali (Yücel), "Dil İnkılabımızın Karakteri" [Characteristics of Our Language Revolution]. *Ülkü*. 22 (November 1934), 257; Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, *Atatürk İhtilali* [Atatürk Revolution] (İstanbul: Kaynak Yay., 1995) (original publication, 1940).

¹⁶ See Ergun Özbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime", in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, eds. A. Kazancıgil and E. Özbudun, 83-84.

¹⁷ In this sense, it "owes a lot to the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and nineteenth-century scienticism." See Ali Kazancıgil, "The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism", in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, eds. A. Kazancıgil and E. Özbudun, 37.

moral base for the ruling elite's activities, which was legitimized by "superior" and "rectified" knowledge. It was *Jacobean utopianism* directing the ruling group to build up a new society.¹⁸ In the process, such a belief in science made necessary the elimination of all traditional forms and customs that were seen as incompatible with progress and science.

In the context where there had not existed any opposing political and social groups as a force of modernization, a group of ruling elite and intellectuals emerged as a chief figures to play this role by initiating modernizing policies from above. Their ideology reflected their aesthetic preferences, which indeed manifested their will to constitute themselves as "Western." Because of their belief equipped with scientific knowledge, they claimed to know the nature of the people and so could decide what was best for them.¹⁹ Mustafa Kemal defined them as *bilen* (knowing) revolutionaries: "they are true revolutionaries who can affect deeply the true leaning of the people's

¹⁸ In the discourse of Kemalist revolutionaries throughout the period from 1923 to 1945 all efforts were made to construct an "idealized" social base for future generations; for this aim they abandoned their taste and habits. In the article on the twelfth anniversary of the People's Houses in 1944 Reşat Şemsettin Sirer (Director of Higher Education, Ministry of Education) portrayed the future Turkish society by the following example: "In one day Turkish mine and textile workers, a Turkish peasant (who will come to the city for one day to watch the opera "Tahir" and "Zühre"), a professor and a general with clean, black clothes will be lined in front of the box office." Reşat Şemsettin Sirer, "Halkevlerinin Bugünkü ve Yarınki Vazifeleri" [Today's and Tomorrow's Functions of the People's Houses], *Ulus*, February 20, 1944, 2.

¹⁹ They belonged to the elite tradition going back to the late Ottoman period. As mentioned in the previous chapter, having been educated in the secular schools of the Empire, they became intellectuals with secular, scientifically oriented mind and a closed group mostly cut off from traditional social ties. See Şerif Mardin, "Just and Unjust." *Daedalus*. 120 (1991), 117-129.

consciousness and soul to make them part of the revolution.”²⁰ Based on “objective” knowledge that sheds light on Truth in verifying their nationalist and culturalist ideas, the enlightened rulers would only speak in the name of the society, manage the people and raise the *educational* and *cultural* level of the people.²¹ The Kemalists had strong faith to carry out such mission of *civilizing* the ignorant and unconscious people.²² They strove to make them aware of being *humane* by eradicating all patterned standards and imposing a new life style. In other words, in general, the society became an object of their activities as something that had to be reconstructed.

For this generalized and universalized end, they undertook several reforms to sweep away all remains of the *ancien régime*.²³ In addition, some cultural institutions,

²⁰ Mustafa Selim İmece, ed., *Atatürk'ün Şapka Devriminde Kastamonu ve İnebolu Seyahatleri, 1925* [Atatürk's Trips to Kastamonu and İnebolu during the Hat Revolution] (Ankara: THS Basımevi, 1959), 59.

²¹ In the discourse of the Kemalists, the rationale for this end was set in a way that the masses had not reached a sufficient level of maturity so their problems had to be solved, and reforms needed to make them civilized had to be applied *from above*. This was very clear in the decisions to make regulation in cultural and artistic fields. For a typical example, see Burhan Asaf (Belge), “Kurultay” [Congress], *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, September 26, 1932, 2.

²² This mission may be illustrated with one of the Kemalists' statement on the villagers: “we have to improve these villages, to make these our brothers speaking, dressing and living like us.” Abdullah Ziya, “Köy Mimamrısı” [Village Architecture]. *Ülkü*. 7 (August 1933), 40.

²³ The basic institutional reforms were the abolition of the Sultanate (1922), the proclamation of Republic (1923), the abolition of the Caliphate which mainly symbolised ties with the past and Seyh-ul Islam (1924), the closing of the *Medrese* (religious schools) and the unification of education in secular schools (1924), the termination of the *tekkes* and *zaviyes* (religious orders and tombs of saints) (1925), and the adoption of the Swiss civil code, the Italian penal code and the German commercial code (1926). These institutional changes provided the basis to attack the culture of the *ancien régime*. To intensify the intended symbolic turn, the dress code abolishing the headgear and veil was instituted (1925), the Islamic calendar was abolished (1925), the Arabic script was

such as the Turkish History Society, THS (*Türk Tarih Kurumu, TTK*), the Turkish Language Society, TLS (*Türk Dil Kurumu, TDK*), the People's Houses, and even the Turkish Language, History and Geography Faculty (TDTCF) - charged with a mainly cultural rather than academic missions - were founded to cultivate and refine a culture.

By means of these official agencies, as well as schools, extraordinary amounts of energy was spent on the secular socialization of the people. Their masterful role was not to express, in the words of Metin Heper, "the unconsidered thoughts of the crowd, but rather to add to them more mature thoughts."²⁴ It was evident that the *mature* thoughts were inferred from the scientifically and rationally rooted and universalized terminology of the West. It was this terminology which provided a strong sentiment for the civilizing rulers to certify and judge the existing value structure of the society. That is to say, denoting a form of westernized *reference-world*, it emerged as the basis of determined "certainties" and "symbols" of Kemalism. Notably what its certainties judged was to set precisely how citizens should speak, dress themselves, behave in public and (even) private life, and so on.²⁵ The civilizing process from above was based on these certainties, which were observed in almost all-official and popular texts of the 1930s. The following extract from the editorial commentary of *Milliyet* (İstanbul daily) in 1932 may exemplify that:

replaced with the Latin alphabet (1928), the *ezan* (call to prayer) was changed from its Arabic form to a Turkish one (1933), and the code on surname was instituted (1934).

²⁴ Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Washington: Eotheon Press, 1985), 50.

²⁵ This was an attempt on the part of the civilizing elite to "penetrate into the life style, manners, behavior and daily customs of the people, and to change the self-conception of Turks". Nilüfer Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The

A person wearing a European *hat* can not eat his food with his five fingers. A nation borrowing the Latin characters must not use the medieval pieces of *wood* as musical instruments. A person that permits its women to enjoy social intercourse, does not put his fingers in his nose and clean it out in the street. A society understanding the dangers of *microbes* does not worship by rubbing his face on the floor of the mosque where others have trodden with their feet (my emphasis).²⁶

These exterior appearances of modernity provided a solid ground for the public representations of the new Turkish identity. In the above-mentioned process, the end product would be new “civilized” Turks who are equipped with new modes of behavior and are faithful to their own enlightened leaders and state.

4.1.1. The Principles of Kemalism

All above legal rearrangements, cultural reforms and newly established cultural institutions were embracing efforts to prepare a suitable ground for the solidification of Kemalist culturalism. It is possible to find out the essence of that culturalism in the Six Principles of Kemalism, namely *Cumhuriyetçilik* (republicanism), *Milliyetçilik* (Nationalism), *Halkçılık* (Populism), *Laiklik* (Laicism), *İnkılapçılık* (Revolutionism) and *Devletçilik* (Statism).²⁷ Here, to give more focused attention to these principles, statism is

Case of Turkey”, in *Civil Society in the Middle East*, ed. Richard Norton (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 21.

²⁶ Lootfy Levonian, ed. and trans., *The Turkish Press, 1932-1936* (Beirut: The American Press, 1937), 66.

²⁷ These six principles were for the first time adopted at the 1931 Congress of the RPP. For the full text of the 1931 program, see Mete Tunçay, *T. C.'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923-30)* [The Establishment of the Single Party Regime in T. R.] (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992), 447-454. On February 5, 1937, they were placed in

skimmed. It seems useful to explain these ideals in a brief way to provide a framework for later detailed examination of the Kemalist conceptualization of culture.

Republicanism and Revolutionism:

The Kemalist way of modernization was mainly inspired from “the centralist Jacobin model of republicanism.”²⁸ It was this perspective that made the notion of republic in the discourse of Kemalism not simply a name of the political system. In other words, in early Republican Turkey, it did not only denote the change of the regime from the Sultanate to the Republic, but also the elimination of superstitious mentalities and manners which had poisoned the consciousness of the Turks throughout history, that is, the name of a civilizational shift. And also, it was commonly believed that it made it possible for the Turks to live free and civilized among modern nations of the world.²⁹ With its universal and eternal characteristics, the republic was seen to habitually open the gates for being rational and modern in every sphere of life.

The Republic is not the name of a time which is quiet and stagnant. On the contrary it is *a symbol of life* which constructs and creates every day...The present age and the future require the Turkish society to be invested with various qualities such as activity, hard work, knowledge and scientific and artistic creativity. Or we may express these qualities in one single word, *civilization* (my emphasis).³⁰

the Constitution by adding an item that the Turkish State is republican, nationalist, populist, statist, laic and revolutionist to the Article 2. For the 1924 Constitution and later rearrangements see Şeref Gözübüyük and Suna Kili, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri : Senedi İttifaktan Günümüze* [Turkish Constitutional Texts from *Senedi İttifakt* to the Present] (Ankara: A. Ü. SBF Yay., 1957).

²⁸ Nilüfer Göle, “The Freedom of Seduction for Muslim Women.” *New Perspectives Quarterly*. 3/15 (1998), 49.

¹

²⁹ Mediha Muzaffer, *İnkılabın Ruhu* [The Spirit of the Revolution] (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1933), 41, 44, 48.

It meant the transformation in morality, alphabet, dress and language. The result would be a particular form of a vision of life, a *good* life to which all citizens should adopt.

Kemalist republicanism, preaching new values which were set for an embracing way of life, was not merely a political and cultural republicanism.³¹ It was, one might say, culturalist. Based on a Jacobeanist disciplining understanding of republic, it seemed to be one of the ways to establish cultural images, which determined who belonged to the politico-cultural community. It seemed to be a priory category for a new society.

In that sense it is tied with the Kemalist idea of revolution. In the discourse of the Kemalists, the basic goal of all revolutions was to “institute a new way of life in place of an old one;” here “new way of life” manifested the will to “disapprove of the existing one and its philosophy and substitute it with new one.”³² It became the name of the creation of a new society, which had to be realized as stated in the RPP 1935 Program in a revolutionary way rather than evolutionary steps of development.³³ It was expected that

³⁰ The PM İsmet İnönü made these statements at Malatya in 1928 on the Alphabet change. See *Tarih IV* [History IV] (İstanbul: Maarif Vekaleti Yay., 1931), 253-254; *Milli Eğitimle İlgili Söylev ve Demeçler* [Speeches and Statements on National Education], vol. I (Ankara: TDTE Yay., 1946), 97-98.

³¹ For Thomas Jefferson political republicanism requires cultural republicanism. Cultural republicanism means “tolerance, diversity of opinion and disagreement, and education into the arts of rulership”. Thomas Jefferson, “Civilization, enlightenment and the New World: extracts from *Notes on State of Virginia*”, in *Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization*, eds. John Rundell and Stephen Mennell (London: Routledge, 1998), 61 and 67.

³² Zeki Mesut, “İnkılabımız Cihanşümuldür” [Our Revolution is Universal], *Hakimiyeti Milliye* (March 23, 1934), reprint, *Ayin Tarihi* (March 1-31, 1934), 75-76.

³³ See *Program of the People's Party of the Republic* (official translation) (Ankara, 1935), 3. Cited as Apendix E in Donald Everett Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk*:

by creating a “new national entity” and opening a “new historical phase for the Turkish nation”³⁴ the Turkish Revolution would construct a new social and moral structure. As Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, one of the leading theoreticians of Kemalism, claimed, “from the aesthetic point of view, newness, in comparison with oldness, always demonstrated beauty, kindness and goodness. Only a revolution brought about newness by cutting of all ties with the past.”³⁵ For him, on the basis of Kemalism’s six principles, the “Turkish revolution erased the past completely. And instead it created economically, socially, and politically the most radical newness.”³⁶

Nationalism:

The model Kemalist nationalism depended on was simple: the principle of one state, one nation and one people.³⁷ At first glance, it was totally different from the Turkist/Turanist nationalism of the last two decades of the Empire in the sense that it was based on the principle of territoriality, pragmatically conditioned within the confines of Anatolia, but not on the basis of ethnicity.³⁸ Also, because of its rejection of a living,

Social Process in the Turkish Reformation (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political And Social Science, 1939).

³⁴ Ahmet Asım, “Türk İnkılabının Mana ve Mahiyeti” [Meaning and True Nature of the Turkish Revolution]. *Vakit* (March 22, 1934), reprint, *Ayın Tarihi* (March 1-31, 1934), 74-75.

³⁵ Bozkurt, *Atatürk İhtilali*, 72-73.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 53.

³⁷ E. J. Hobsbawn sees the equation state = nation = people as the locus of nationalism. It seems that in this equation the state has an active, decisive role. E. J. Hobsbawn, *Nations and Nationalism since 1870: Programme, Myth, Reality*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 19 and 23.

authentic value system, it was automatically distinguished from Gökalp's understanding of nationalism. Although both promoted the idea of nationalism to establish a culturally and linguistically homogenous state, the idea of cultural authenticity, as in the Gökalian sense, did not take part in the nationalist ideology of the Republic. Unlike the attempts of other non-Western and anti-colonial nationalists, putting strong emphasis on traditional and local values in determining their very identity, Kemalists did not wish to make a synthesis of the material civilization of the West and indigenous cultural traits.³⁹ In doing so, they refused the idea of culture as a protest against Modernity to preserve its own particular way. Their understanding of nationalism was not anti-imperialistic,⁴⁰ and excluded a *resentful* nationalism⁴¹ challenging the cultural traits of the West. In fact, that meant the rejection of being the Oriental and the antagonistic Other of the West.⁴² Simply

³⁸ On its territorial characteristics, see Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*, (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), 93-94.

³⁹ In anti-colonial nationalism, a backward society could modernize itself through gaining a synthesis between the materiality of the west and the spirituality of the East, and so to assert a cultural identity distinct from the foreigners or the colonizers was possible, while achieving material progress. For anti-colonial nationalism, see Partha Chattarjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota press, 1992).

⁴⁰ For Atatürk, the Turkish people were responsible for their own backwardness, and so the blame was not just put on imperialism or any European nation. The real enemy of the Turks was their state of ignorance, or uncivilized condition, which was only due to the despotism of the Sultans. See C. H. Dodd, *Democracy and Development in Turkey* (Washington: The Eothen Press, 1979), 86; Karal, "Atatürk'ün," 44.

⁴¹ For the resentment in the emergence of nationalism, see Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983).

⁴² Said, *A Fundamental*, 68.

put, Kemalist nationalism manifested resentment against the traditionalism of Islamism and Turkism.

First of all, by its nature, Kemalist nationalism was top-down, or state-led, nationalism. Its first goal was to modernize the state and social structure as a project of social engineering. It was in a vigorous search from above for the creation of a new nation⁴³ and the invention of a new Turk by eliminating the popular notions of Islam and Ottoman heritage. Its project of turning existing more or less ethnically and culturally heterogeneous people into a nation depended on the binary logic of “old” and “new”. “Old” designated all things in the darkest age of the Ottomans, but “new” denoted Turk and Turkishness rooted in the Western way.⁴⁴ The main intention was to end the Ottoman legacy by seeking to overcome the multinational character, and inscribe a new temporal order in order to eradicate the duality –high culture or elite culture versus mass culture. The discourse of unity with which creating a new order was associated, was at the center of Kemalist nationalism. This discourse led to a strong orientation to explore ways of preserving the cohesion of the state and nation in the face of ethnic separatist demands.

Populism:

Kemalist nationalism did not reflect simply an ethnic nationalism that preached an ethnically and racially closed community.⁴⁵ It was because the principle of populism

⁴³ At the time of the early years of the Republic, the Turkish nation was a “non-existent, hypothetical entity” and the Revolution “breathed life into it.” Şerif Mardin, “Religion and Secularism In Turkey,” in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, eds. A. Kazancıgil and E. Özbudun, 208.

⁴⁴ Webster, *The Turkey*, 164-165.

played a determinant role in such direction of nationalism.⁴⁶ This principle finds its clear expression in the most repeated motto declaring the Turkish nation as “a fused mass without any privileges or class.” That emphasis on a classless society came with the necessity of establishing a social order and solidarity among the different segments of the society.⁴⁷ The concept of people which signified “a new and perfected whole” (*mütecettid ve mütekamil bir kütle*)⁴⁸, was at the heart of such understanding of society. The people in the hands of the revolutionaries seemed to be first of all the name of a “community of equals”, which determined who belong to the category of citizens.⁴⁹ Kemalist populists claimed that in the Ottoman times the people having been chained in the hands of the “ignorant” clerical classes were not capable of deciding what was best for them. By the process of “educating” and “enlightening” through policing, they would become conscious of being people who could direct their destiny. In the process it was the task of the knowing populists “to develop the people’s mental power, make them enjoy the high

⁴⁵ This was associated with the nature of The Kemalist project of Turkification that did not include racism. See Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve ‘Türkleştirme’ Politikaları* [‘Capital Tax’ and ‘Turkification’ Policies] (İstanbul: İletişim, 2000), 90-92.

⁴⁶ For the articulation of nationalism and populism in the state discourse, see Mesut Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu* [Kurdish Question in the State Discourse] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1999), 96-97.

⁴⁷ In the speech delivered at the RPP’s Fourth National Convention, Recep Peker said, “even if there is linguistically and culturally united structure, a national aggregation with class and privilege conflicts or a nation without *populist* feelings cannot form a large united nation made up of individuals with equal rights and honors. The national aggregation has to have such populist feelings in order to form a united body by means of mutual love produced by the power of nationalism.” *CHP Dördüncü Büyük Kurultay Görüşmeleri Tutalgası* [Proceedings of the Fourth National Convention of the RPP] (Ankara, 1935), 5.

⁴⁸ İmece, ed., *Atatürk’ün*, 47.

arts and thought, and knowing what is right and what is wrong, as well as to elevate their economic and social level.”⁵⁰ That formulation of the people was used with the concept of nation interchangeably.⁵¹ The Turkish people were the Turkish nation aware of solidarity, and the Turkish nation was the Turkish people, conscious of its Turkish character.

Dependant on the Kemalist principle of populism, national unity overtly and frequently mentioned in the state discourse would be possible only through providing *tesanüd* (solidarity) between different social groups. In other words, it was the unity, due only to a harmony of interests and national solidarity instead of class struggle.⁵² Overall, populism and its emphasis on solidarism appeared as the name of conceptualizing the society through substituting the traditional social union with a new and perfected structure that was grounded on a generalized national culture. This is a point at which Kemalist view on society appeared as a new integrative system to unite all interests under the rubric of an imagined community. Also, this was a vision of cultural life that would represent the common good and national interest, and not a particularistic and individualistic one, for the latter was risky for national unity. In short, this ideal was based on the view of “rationally” constructed society which is free from all “destructive” and “suffocating” influences of tradition.

⁴⁹ For community of equals, see Jacques Rancière, *On the Shores of Politics*, trans. Liz Heron (London and NY: Verso, 1995).

⁵⁰ Yaşar Nabi, “Halkçılık ve Halk Dili” [Populism and People’s Language] *Ulus* (May 30, 1938), 2.

⁵¹ Hamza Eroğlu, “Atatürk’s Conception of Nation and Nationalism”, in *Atatürk’s Way* (İstanbul: Otomarsan, 1982), 168.

⁵² See *Program of the People’s Party of the Republic*, 2.

Laicism:

Laicism emerged as an official attitude towards Islam in the discourse of the Kemalists who saw it as one of the fundamental components of modernization. For them laicism meant the separation of the state from religious life where religion would remain as a matter of conscience; on the other hand, in practice, it resulted in the state control over religion. As a project, it also, perhaps most importantly, aimed to end the hegemony of Islamic concepts and practices over the mind of the individual. It was because that the modernizing rulers saw the mores of traditional power centers (Caliphate, Sheyh-ul-Islam, sheiks, religious orders, and so on) as fossilized traces of a social and cultural archaism. All belonged to, as Necmeddin Sadık asserted, “the Middle Ages” where there was no “freedom of mind, and no freedom of conscience. Everyone was required to think according to the judgements of religion.”⁵³

By means of efforts to describe new principles for the state and society, Kemalist laicism prearranged a process of secularization covering all spheres of life: science and reason instead of religious thought would provide the legitimate ground for power. For example, in modern times, for Necmettin Sadık, the source of morality was the society itself: “Morality is not defined by the unchangeable judgements of this or that religion, but the changing society... This is a laic morality of which the laws, sources and goals base on the human will.”⁵⁴ But in Turkey, the state, as the disseminator and protector of

⁵³ Necmettin Sadık, “Laik Ne Demektir?” [What is Laicism?]. *Ülkü*. 12 (December 1933), 371; for the partial English translation see Levonian, *The Turkish Press*, 31. In Necmeddin Sadık’s view, in the Middle Ages, religious feeling came to be the basis of social solidarity and individual identity. Ibid.

progress in every sphere of life, maintained the process of secularization from above. It placed emphasis on secular, national rather than religious affiliation as a legitimizing force. That is to say, the civilizing elite saw laicism as a constituent part of their cultural identity. It was in this respect that they tried to use Islam, in its traditional form, as the integral Other of Kemalism; because of its “reactionary”, “obscure” and “inferior” characteristics, Islam was considered responsible for the backwardness of the society. They tried to control and domesticate Islam by institutionalizing it under state control.⁵⁵ In short, laicism became not only the name of secularization of institutional, legal and educational structures of the state, but also, perhaps more importantly, the name of the quest for creating a secular culture.

4.2. The Idea of Civilization and the Early Phases of the Kemalist Nation-Building Process

Kemalist principles were greatly grounded on the above-mentioned thesis of “civilizationism”. In this regard, civilization, especially during the 1920s, came to be a stimulating force behind the sweeping reforms, and also the first name of the Kemalist

⁵⁴ Ibid., 372.

⁵⁵ In fact, the relation between the state and religion during the early years of the Republic was not settled. At the beginning the idea of reform in Islam was commonly accepted among the ruling circles; so the modernizing rulers strove to reform Islam and even create new rituals for it. Here the aim was to make a creation something like Protestantism; and the enlightened form of Islam would serve to justify the new reforms at some initial stages of reform. But due to some popular reactions against reforms in Islam in the early 1930s the policy was ended. After that time, since Islam, and even religion in general sense, which was regarded as an “archaic” element, would lose its all significance in the course of modernization, it was completely negated in the official discourse.

notion of culture. Thus the Republican project of modernity was indeed a project of civilization.⁵⁶ It was obvious that the aim was to adapt totally to a new civilization, Western civilization, to raise the Turkish people to the scientific and cultural level of the West.⁵⁷ Until the early years of the 1930s, the emphasis on civilization came to the fore as the only means to justify the radical sweeping reforms.

However, during the War of Independence (1919-1922) that was enforced over against the allied forces occupying some parts of Anatolia (heavily Muslim and Turkish populated territory), the main tendency of the rulers of the Ankara governments was in the opposite direction. It was a war waged against the “civilization that was a monster with one tooth.” During the war Islam was stressed as a sole force to legitimize the national struggle and to mobilize the masses against the “infidels.” The regulation of the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia (Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafâ-i Hukuk Cemiyeti), established in the Sivas Congress on September 1919, stressed that it was an Islamic organization that defended Ottoman patriotism.⁵⁸ Then, this also became the motto of the Grand National Assembly - the specification of “Turkey” added later - (The GNA), founded on 23 April 1920 in Ankara. Similarly, in the program of the executive committee on national education proclaimed on 3 May 1920,

⁵⁶ Mustafa Kemal, from the early days of the Republic to 1938, insistently dwelt upon the project by emphasizing *medenileşmek* [becoming civilized], *medeni milletler camiasına girmek* [being part of the world of the civilized nations], *muasır medeniyeti iktisap ile onun seviyesinin üzerine çıkmak* [by reaching the level of modern civilization going beyond it], *asrileşmek* [becoming modernized] and *garplılaştırmak* [becoming Westernized]. See Abdurrahman Çaycı, “Atatürk’ün Uygarlık Anlayışı” [Atatürk’s Understanding of Civilization]. *Bellekten*. 204 (1988), 1105.

⁵⁷ On the Republican will to accomplish a civilizational shift, see Tunaya, *Türkiye’nin*, 110; Göle, “Authoritarian,” 20-23.

the main goal of education was to make children religiously and nationally well-equipped.⁵⁹ The GNA emerged as a sole administrative body during the war, and consolidated its position with the abolition of the Sultanate.⁶⁰

After the victory, the GNA and Mustafa Kemal gained popular support, prestige and authority in the eyes of the people. This opened the gates for Mustafa Kemal and his cadre to gather power in their hands by abolishing the Sultanate and eliminating the opposition groups in the GNA, namely the Second Group.⁶¹ The first sign of later reforms can be seen in the program of the PP declared in April 1923. It included three main items: the first was mainly about “modernization” and “the law of the state”; the second, the principle of opposing any privileges, based on the concept of people fused without privileges and class; and the third described the membership to the party in the way that every person who is Turk or accepts Turkish culture and citizenship could become a

⁵⁸ Tunçay, *T. C. 'nde Tek Parti*, 29.

⁵⁹ The program put the strong emphasis on the authentic national values as a basis of determined national culture. See Selçuk Kantarcıoğlu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümet Programlarında Kültür* [Culture in Republic of Turkey's Government Programs] (Ankara, Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1987), 36. And on the committee, see *T. C. Hükümet Programlarında Kültür Politikası* [Politics of Culture in T. C. Government Programs] (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1990), 1-8.

⁶⁰ The basic implicit justification for the abolishment was to declare the shift of the sovereignty from personal rule to the nation. The Sultan represented the shameful, the personal and the unnatural order of the past. For Mustafa Kemal's views on the Ottoman Sultanate, see Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk* [Speech], ed. Zeynep Korkmaz (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1994), 470. This was really the most important step in the way of becoming a nation-state.

⁶¹ The domination of the Mustafa Kemal-led First Group's name was changed as *Halk Fırkası* (the People's Party, PP) with Mustafa Kemal's declaration of *Dokuz Umde* (Nine Principles) in April 1923 and officially on 9 September, was consolidated by the election in June 1923. As was expected, the controlled and rigged election resulted with the great success of the candidates of the First Group, but a conciliatory assembly could not be created. See Tunçay, *T. C. 'nde Tek Parti*, 51-52.

member of the Party.⁶² The first item was related to the open declaration of the Turkish State as a nation state on the path of modernization. The second, which would later become a principle of Kemalist populism, led to a different conception of the people from the Ottoman times. And the third, the main part of nation-building, was about the first step for the formation of citizenship as membership to the state and cultural community. And it also brought about the will to define a culture of which the citizens would be part, not as an ethnically closed entity but based on the idea of assimilation. If they were willing to assimilate into the newly determined culture, it would be available for everybody who lives within the boundaries of the Turkish State. The non-Turkish Muslim groups became subjects of the policy of assimilation into the Turkish culture, as well as the Muslim Turks who had lived in a traditional way to which the new regime was a mortal blow. On the part of the non-Muslim communities, coupled with the Treaty of Lausanne, this new understanding encouraged them to give up their old *millet* status to be part of new community on the basis of citizenship.

In the years after 1923, the nationalist movement evolved into a movement with a far-reaching goal of radically transforming the society and culture.⁶³ The proclamation of

⁶² Ibid., 58.

⁶³ This can be clearly observed in the program of the Fethi Okyar government established on August 14, 1923. The educational policy laid stress on the *terbiye* (education and training) of the public through three goals: (1) education and instruction of children, (2) the adult education, and (3) providing means for the rise of national intelligentsia. The basic principles of *terbiye* would be based on national culture and modern civilization, which would be supported through giving more importance to the organization of national culture. All these rearrangements, as declared in Article 6 of the program, would be applied to provide the progress of bodily, intellectual, moral and social capabilities of all individuals. See *T. C. Hükümet*, 14-15. This tendency became more rigid in the 1924 program of the II. Fethi Okyar government: the goal of national

the Republic (29 October 1923), with Mustafa Kemal as its first president and İsmet İnönü as its first Prime Minister, was the first and most significant political act to acquire a culture firmly rooted in modern civilization. It was the first step of the Republican program of civilization that included the abolition of the Caliphate, the suppression of the Ministry of *Şeriat*, the closing of the *medreses* and *tekkes*, the introduction of the hat.⁶⁴ In fact, the Turkish state as a newly shaping modern nation-state held up centralized power and authority by means of the previously modernized institutions. It then became the sole power center with its legitimate use of violence. It was now on the route to consolidate its power by gathering the legitimate use of culture in its hands. In that, institutional secularization was the first step.

In this respect, the Caliphate was seen as the first obstacle to provide full cultural control embedded in a new symbolic universe. In this way the civilizing rulers saw it as a center strongly linked with both tradition/Islam and the past, and as a source of reactionaries to civilization.⁶⁵ Thus, the abolition of the Caliphate (3 March 1924) was followed by another series of secularization attempts.⁶⁶

education which was settled with the law of unification of education was to produce a young generation equipped with monolithic education and instruction. *Ibid.*, 23.

⁶⁴ Mustafa Kemal mentioned these in *Nutuk*. See *Nutuk*, 605-606.

⁶⁵ Mustafa Kemal believed that the Caliphate was a myth of the past that had no place in modern times. *Quotations from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk*, tran. Yılmaz Öz (Ankara: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1982), 52.

⁶⁶ These were the closing of the *medreses* (religious schools) and the unification of education under the secular Ministry of Public Instruction (*Maarif Vekilliği*), the elimination of the office of *Şeyh-ül- İslam* and the Ministry of Sheriah established in 1920 and instead setting up a Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) under the Prime Minister, and the abolishment of the Sheriah courts. All these were ratified in the new constitution that was adopted on 20 April 1924. For these laws, see *Resmi Gazete*, 06. 03. 1340 (1924). And for their full text in English, see Henry Elisha

The movement was institutional secularization that meant to abolish the “traditional strongholds of the institutionalized Islam of the *ulema*.”⁶⁷ The process was completed with the abolition of religious law – before the Republic, just limited to the family law-, and the adoption of *Türk Kanun-i Medenisi* (Turkish Civil Law).⁶⁸ By instituting monogamy and new regulations in the affairs of marriage, divorce and inheritance on a secular basis, the legal reform led to the rearrangement of private and public life. Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt), the Minister of Justice, saw the change as a matter of civilization:

On the day that this document of the New Civil Law is promulgated, the Turkish nation will be rescued from the false beliefs and traditions which have encumbered our nation during the last thirteen centuries. It will close the door on the old civilization, and our country will enter upon the contemporary civilization of life and progress.⁶⁹

Allen, *The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and Religious Development* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968) (original publication, 1935), 176-177. The law also included a regulation of the *Evqaf* (foundation) affair by controlling the rich *Evqaf*'s money. The effort to control such an autonomous social organization, which had been set up for religious reasons, claimed to be made to be in conformity with the genuine interests of the nation.

⁶⁷ Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993), 194. This was the first step of secularization. “The secularization of social life and attack on popular Islam” and “the attack on religious symbols and their replacement by the symbols of European civilization” were the second and the third steps. See *ibid.*, 194-195. The result of these three steps was the creation of “a new secular legitimacy for the state.” Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Revolution From Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1978), 28.

⁶⁸ It included the Swiss Civil Code (17 February 1926), the Italian Penal Code (1 March 1926) and the German and Italian Commercial Code (29 May 1926).

⁶⁹ He made this statement in February 1926 while the new legal code was under discussion in the GNA. Quoted in Charles H. Sherril, *A Year's Embassy to Mustafa Kemal* (New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), 181.

In short, it brought the elimination of remaining affects of the Sheriah on the state affairs in general, and the law in particular, and the ban over forming any autonomous association on a religious basis.

Although the State became secularized, it strove to keep control on what kind of religious activities its people could practice through re-institutionalizing religion. From then on, by abolishing religious institutions, Islam began to lose officially its significance in the legal system and in education. As Mustafa Kemal claimed, these were the preliminary footsteps to “become a modern social body as a whole in the world ... on this route it is unacceptable to stop and anyone who hesitates to walk on will be suffocated under the gushing flow of civilization.”⁷⁰ All the above-mentioned official efforts to secularize went beyond the Ottoman reformers and the project of the Turkists for whom Islam was seen as part of a Turk’s identity, and that of Turkish culture.

The secularizing reforms attracted more grievances to the government. The newly emerging opposition group in the Assembly began to organize as a party, *Terrakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (The Progressive Republican Party, RPP) founded in November 1924 by a number of leaders of the War of Independence with conservative and liberal orientation. They opposed the authoritarian rule of Mustafa Kemal and his cadres, and perhaps most importantly the radical westernizing reforms of the government. The leaders of the PRP preferred a gradual transformation in contrast to the revolutionary tendency of the Kemalists; that is, it wanted *ıslahat* (reform) rather than *inkilap*

⁷⁰ *Atatürkçülük*, 351. In speaking to the Assembly in November 1924 on these new regulations, he said, “ the Turkish nation has perceived with great joy that the obstacles which constantly, for centuries, had kept Turkey joining the civilized nations marching forward on the path of progress, have been removed.” Quoted in Lewis, *The Emergence*, 267-268.

(revolution). The PRP was conservative in the sense that it wanted to make the new Turkey adhere to the living traditions and manners.⁷¹ Coupled with its opposition to the statist, centralist and revolutionary attitude of the People's Party, its emphasis on "authentic"/traditional values drew the masses' attention towards the PRP.

At the same time, as a reaction to the reforms, in 1925, there existed local uprisings in the eastern provinces particularly among the Kurdish tribes. A local religious leader (Sheih Sait) led the most widespread and violent one, with an aim at restoring the Caliphate. By passing *Takriri-Sükun Kanunu* (Law on the Maintenance of Order) on 4 March 1925 and reinstating the Independence Tribunals that was previously set up in 1923, the Kurdish uprising were put down forcefully after military operations. At the same time, the PRP was accused of responsibility for the uprisings, especially because of an item in its program that the party respected the religious beliefs of the people, and was closed down.⁷²

The next decisive step in the struggle with "ignorant fanaticism" came with a new law to erase its social roots. Law no. 677, which was passed on 30 November 1925, closed all *tekke* and *zaviye* (dervish convents), prohibited individuals from continuing with all initials (titles and clothes) associated therewith, and closed all *mescid* (small

⁷¹ For the PRP' manifesto and program, see Erik Jan Zürcher, *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), especially 97-102 and 111. And, on its evolutionary orientation, see Feroz Ahmad, "Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925", in, *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, eds. Metin Heper and J. M Landau (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), 61.

⁷² By the *Kararname* (written decree) of the government issued on 3 June 1925, the PRP were closed down. In *Kararname*, the Kemalists interpreted the High Treason Law in the case of the PRP for the use of religion for political purposes so the reactionaries were encouraged by the Party that, for the rulers, became the sources of *irtica* (reactionism). *T. C. Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi*, Aded 1987.

mosque) attached to the orders and all *türbe* (tombs).⁷³ On this change in 1925 Mustafa Kemal said:

I cannot accept that in our civilized society people continue to be so primitive in the sense that they seek material and spiritual happiness through the guidance of some sheikh or others, while they now face to the light of today's knowledge and science and the whole scope of modern civilization... The Turkish republic cannot be the country of sheikhs, dervishes, novices and members of orders. The truest, the most rightful Way (*tarikât*) is the way of civilization. To be a human being, it is enough only to do what civilization orders and demands.⁷⁴

For Mustafa Kemal, these institutions in the hands of “ignorant” religious persons became the source of fanaticism and hatred for civilization and progress, prevented the Turks from the true way of civilization, and maintained a threat to the regime politically with their secret meetings and rituals. That was why they could not have a place in a civilized country. These efforts to secularize the society went parallel with the eradication of all symbols belonging to the past.

⁷³ *Resmi Gazete*, 30. 11. 1925/ 243.

⁷⁴ İmece, ed., *Atatürk'ün*, 59-60. On this matter, in *Nutuk*, (two years later) Mustafa Kemal asked, “[Could] a *civilized nation* tolerate a mass of people who let themselves be led by the nose by a herd of Sheikhs, Dedes, Seids, Tschelebis, Babas and Emirs; who entrusted their destiny and their lives to chiromancers, magicians, dice-throwers and amulet-sellers? Ought one to conserve in the Turkish State, in the Turkish Republic, elements and institutions such as those which had for centuries given the nation the appearance of being other than it really was? Would one not therewith have committed the greatest, most irreparable error to the cause of progress and reawakening?” *Nutuk*, 606; for the English translation, *Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustafa Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic* (Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1929), 722. For him the

4.2.1. Civilization and Symbolic Transformations

As a basic part of this struggle with “superstitious customs and traditions,”⁷⁵ the most important symbolic act in the civilizing process from above was the hat reform. It was a fundamental part of the question of dress, which has been the main subject of political process in Turkey. That is to say, it became an issue of politics, rather than of fashion, intended to civilize the Turks. Before the hat was amended, with two *kanunames* the wearing of religious garbs and the clothes of public servants were regulated.⁷⁶ The hat was introduced in place of the fez and *sarık* (turban) with a legislative act that obliged all men to wear the hat.⁷⁷ This reform was indeed the most significant end product of the Kemalist view that appearance of the people gained utmost importance in the quest for

elimination of all these remnants of the Middle Ages was “necessary to show that we are not a primitive society.” Ibid.

⁷⁵ *Atatürk* (İstanbul: T. C. G. Harp Tarihi Encümeni Basımevi, 1939), 92.

⁷⁶ Two *kanunames* (decrees), together with a *kararname* on the closing of the *tekkes*, were passed on September 2, 1925. The first one defined those who belonged to the class of *ilmiye* and prohibited the wearing of religious garb by unauthorized persons. The second was on the clothes of officials. Accordingly, if they were not required to wear a special uniform, all officials were to dress in the ordinary clothes as in use among the civilized nations, and were to uncover the head indoors and also out-of-doors as a mark of *salutation* (because the uncovering of the head was a universal sign of respect); ordinary people could wear these clothes of officials. For these decrees, see *T. C. Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi*, Aded 2413; and also, see Allen, *The Turkish Transformation*. With a law passed in 3 December 1934, the wearing of religious garb by authorized persons was limited by granting only the head of any religious community to wear clerical dress, but others could not, in the public realm, except during religious services. And this law also determined under which conditions certain uniforms could be worn. *Resmi Gazete*, 13. 12. 1934/ 2879.

⁷⁷ For the Law on Wearing of the Hat, see *Resmi Gazete*, 28. 11. 1925/ 230. Ironically, a hundred years ago the fez had been adopted by Mahmut II as a reform, which symbolized the re-structuration of the state as in the modern state structure.

becoming a civilized society; in this respect the hat was principally valued as one of the images of modernity.

It was in accordance with the tendency that the dress of the Turks had to be rooted in a similar fashion with all civilized peoples. For Mustafa Kemal, this was an important step in the process of turning the course of Turkish identity definitely towards the West, and of building an appearance or a visible mark of western culture. To show his ideals by deeds, during a provincial tour to Kastamonu, where he carried on his propaganda on the dress reform, he dressed up in western style with a panama hat.⁷⁸ In the words of Mustafa Kemal delivered in Kastamonu on 26 August, 1925:

We must be civilized men from every point of view. We have suffered much. The reason for this is that we did not understand the condition of the world. Our ideas, our reasoning will be civilized from head to toe. The Turkish and Islamic world suffered from too much pains and diseases because of failing to adopt their mentality to the progress and transformation of civilization. We have only saved ourselves in the course of these past years, thanks to change in our outlook... we cannot stop now. We must go on and on. Our people must know that civilization is such a powerful fire that it destroys those who ignore it. It is the source of welfare, happiness and humanity.⁷⁹

In a similar account, Mustafa Kemal on the occasion of introducing the hat in İnebolu proclaimed that if the Turkish people wanted to be modern, they had to be modern in “family life or the way of life, and had to display being modern and perfect men by their appearance.”⁸⁰ This was the sign of the later sweeping reforms aimed to transform the

⁷⁸ This attitude, of “charismatic and narcissistic leader”, did not appear at once. When he was in Sofia as the military attaché, he began to wear a European style hat that he preferred instead of the Ottoman *kalpak* and *fes*. See Vamık D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, *The Immortal Atatürk* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 78.

⁷⁹ İmece, ed., *Atatürk'ün*, 17-18.

private sphere. In the civilizing project from above, new life constructed at the center was extended to the private realm through erasing its traditional moral base. This seemed to be parallel with what the Jacobins did in post-Revolutionary France.⁸¹

The issue of dress lied precisely at the center of the understanding that even private life with all its forms should be taken into similar line with civilized social life of the West. For Mustafa Kemal, like its intellectual and technological values, the clothes of the West were universal, and so they could be not particularly attached to one nation. It was therefore not acceptable on the part of the civilizing rulers that the national and the international were on different forms.⁸² In this sense the belief that the *authenticated*, distinctive dress is one of the aspects of having a genuine and distinct national culture was excluded in Kemalist discourse. Accordingly, he said:

In times we had a national dress, but we forgot it. Today the dress we are wearing is not national but universal ... Friends! there is no need to investigate what our ancestors wore in the past and to revive that. The modern civilized, international form of dress is well suited to Turkish nation and we shall achieve it. We will wear shoes or boots, trousers, waistcoats, shirts, jackets with collars, and the headgear with a rim called the hat.⁸³

⁸⁰ Ibid., 45.

⁸¹ The Revolution formed a new public life and extended the public into the private sphere, see Robert Darnton, *The Kiss of Lamourette* (New York: Norton, 1990), 8; Bernhard Giesen, "Cosmopolitans, Patriots, Jacobins, and Romantics." *Deadalus*. 127/3 (1999), 241-242.

⁸² This was one result of the Kemalist understanding of "modern life-style" based on the idea that the national and universal (read western) ways of life could not be separated and so it was unallowable to restrain "new way of life" within "the national boundaries." Zeki Mesut, "İnkılabımız," 76.

⁸³ Ibid., 46. His description how the new Turks dressed up reminds us how the Jacobins revolutionized dress after the Revolution. "[T]he revolutionaries adopted a term from clothing: *sans-culotte*, one who wears trousers rather than breeches." See Darnton, *The Kiss*, 9.

They had to be adopted in place of the Oriental ones (rawhide sandal, baggy trousers, fez and turban). For him, a civilized man's dress could not have "a fez on his head, a green turban around that, an old-fashioned shirt-jacket on his back with a jacket like mine over it." All these clothes, regarded as badges of being "Oriental," were symbolized under the fez. Later, in *Nutuk*, he declared,

It was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on our heads as a sign of *ignorance*, of *fanaticism*, of *hatred for progress and civilization*, and to adopt in its place the hat, the customary headdress of the whole civilized world, thus showing, among other things, that no difference existed in the manner of thought between the Turkish nation and the whole family of civilized mankind (my emphasis).⁸⁴

To free from those symbols of "fanaticism" and "ignorance" meant to escape from the humble thoughts of the past and the Orient. Here the enlightened officials would carry on the task of remedying these "outmoded" dress forms depicted as "uncivilized" and "unhygienic." For Mustafa Kemal, modern dress had to be worn because it was experienced from every point of view as "scientific" and "healthy" in a practical sense.⁸⁵ It is obvious that, stressed on the "hygienic" and "unauthenticated" national dress unlike most of the non-Western nationalists, the state elite strove to make the members of the "Turkish nation" – in modern clothes - imagining themselves to belong to two communities; a national community based on a new language and history (but not

⁸⁴ *Nutuk*, 605; for the English translation, see *Speech*, 722.

⁸⁵ See İmece, ed., *Atatürk'ün*, 61. In this sense Kandiyoti writes, "The Western hat and tie were not merely items of fashion but... a uniform of secularism that also signified loyalty to the state. The new cadres of the republic, civil servants and professionals, wore the insignia of their allegiance; conversely, insubordination could be indicated by misplaced facial hair or the wrong hat." Deniz Kandiyoti, "Gendering the

completely distinctive), and at the same time a community of “civilized” peoples of the world.⁸⁶

Mustafa Kemal’s efforts to provide a moral and aesthetic ground for the new reform resulted in the above-mentioned law on the hat, “the headgear of civilization”. During the discussion on a bill on the hat, the first reaction came from one of the deputies, Nurettin Paşa. He declared that this would violate the articles on the rights of personal liberty in the Constitution and that the proposed headgear did not fit to the national dress form. This objection awakened the revolutionary spirit of other deputies. The critics on the objection were centered on the claim that the Constitution that was itself a product of civilization, and could not be violated by “adopting hats which were the very symbol of civilized peoples.”⁸⁷ Şükrü Bey (deputy of Muğla) rejected Nureddin Paşa’s assertion on the non-authentic character of the proposed dress. For him, “*national*

Modern: On Missing Dimensions in the Study of Turkish Modernity”, in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, 122.

⁸⁶ This had been one of the most emphasized themes in the discourses of the Kemalists throughout the period this dissertation covers (1923-1945). Kazım Nami (Duru), one of the enthusiastic pro-Kemalist elite, in his article on humanism, wrote in 1934: “We are both Turkish nationalists and internationalist. It is our ideal to be an Europeanized nation rather than Asian one. By being Europeanized with our all institutions, we become part of internationalism.” Kazım Nami (Duru), “Humanisma” [Humanism]. *Ülkü*. 17 (May 1934), 336.

⁸⁷ H. E. Wortham, *Mustafa Kemal of Turkey* (New York: William Edwin Rudge, 1930), 173. This was the very tone of Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt)’s (Minister of Justice) words: “freedom is limited. Its limit is the benefit of Turkish nation. There is nothing or laws for which the progress of Turkish nation can be sacrificed.” For these and other speeches in the parliament on the issue, see Mahmut Goloğlu, *Devrimler ve Tepkiler, 1924-1930* [Revolutions and Reactions, 1924-1930] (Ankara: Goloğlu Yay., 1972), 153-156. In *Nutuk* (Speech), Mustafa Kemal severely condemned Nurettin Paşa for trying to prevent the implementation of the hat reform and as being a “conservative” and “reactionary” provocateur. *Nutuk*, 606. As a reaction to the reform, there occurred some demonstrations at Erzurum, Maraş, Sivas and Rize in favor of the fez. Goloğlu, *Devrimler*, 156-158.

dress can be seen only in *history* and in *museums*. Today, the dress of all nations are the same” (my emphasis).⁸⁸ This claim just manifested the will for freezing some “unwanted” living things by making them worthy of a museum and folkloric elements. It appeared that this act of “antiquation” would pave the way for the complete prevalence of a modern life, and so it was about the construction of an alternative culture instituted in place of the living one. Here the issue of dress became the significant part of the process of culture production that is elaborated in Chapter II.

Women, in the Kemalist discourse on civilization, appeared as another image for social engineering towards Westernization. In other words, the creation of a modern woman with her dress and status in society, or the transformation of the basic features of the private sphere, was part of the process of forming a civilized society. In the process, women had to be set on the path of progress by improving their position in social and family life.⁸⁹ Women’s dress was at the heart of the issue. In the first instance, to be liberated from the chains of “tradition”, they had to be freed from the uncivilized form of dress, especially from the veil.⁹⁰ This was the task of men to show women the true civilized path. After touching on the uncivilized and impractical aspects of the traditional women dress, in Kastamonu, 1925, Mustafa Kemal went on to say:

⁸⁸ Goloğlu, *Devrimler*, 155.

⁸⁹ In his speech in Kastamonu on 23 August 1925, Mustafa Kemal said, “a society is made up of two kinds of human being, called men and women. Is it possible for the whole group to progress by making one part progress while ignoring the other part? ... The two sexes must take the steps of progress together as friends... If this is done, our revolution will be successful.” İmece, ed., *Atatürk’ün*, 61.

⁹⁰ For the Kemalists, the veil was a sign of “ignorance” and “backwardness,” and a tradition stemming from the darkness of Middle Ages. For one evaluation, see Hikmet Bayur, “Atatürk.” *Bellekten*. III/10 (1939), 264.

My male friends, this is somewhat the product of our selfishness...But our women are sensitive and rational people like us. After inspiring the sacred morality, explaining our national ethics to them, and equipping their minds with enlightenment and virtue, there will no more need for selfishness. Let them show their faces to the world, and let them be able to view the world carefully.”⁹¹

They had to display modern attitudes with their dress and their conduct in the public realm:

In some places I see women who throw a dustcloth and waistcloth over their heads to hide their faces and their eyes. When men pass by, they turn their backs and sit down on the ground. What is the meaning of this behavior? Ladies and gentlemen, does a mother and daughter of a modern nation act in this strange way? This must be immediately corrected.⁹²

However, correction of the veiling and the practice of women’s dress were carried out in a legislative way as in the hat case. On the issue, the belief was that, in time, the forward march of culture would bring about the end of the usage of the veil in social and private realms.⁹³ Only upon the request to set the modern style, wives of public servants went unveiled and dressed up like Europeans. Nevertheless, it was obligatory for all women employed as officials and all girls in the schools⁹⁴ to dress in a modern way. All these

⁹¹ İmece, ed., *Atatürk’ün*, 47. According to Kandiyoti, this attitude may also be seen as the redefinition of “the paternal role” for modern women. “The remote, authoritarian father figure began giving way to a new intimacy and paternal involvement. The modern father had a special link to his daughters, who were valued, educated, and nurtured – men gave social birth to the new woman of the Republic.” Kandiyoti, “Gendering,” 123.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 61-62.

⁹³ See Bayur, “Atatürk,” 264.

⁹⁴ Schools, in the discourse of the Kemalists, appeared as the most trusted institution to inculcate the ideas of civilization in the new generation.

meant that women dressed in the “traditional” way were deprived of being represented and did not benefit from the public sphere.

This fact was heightened with a symbolic, cultural crusade and legal arrangements. The official attitude attempted to spread through a nation-wide dress campaign in which local newspapers and officials played an important role to “enlighten” the people on the new styles.⁹⁵ Legally, the social status of women was changed with the new Civil Code through an adaptation of the Swiss Code. It led to the regulation of the private life of Turks with a secular law as practiced in the West, instead of an Islamic one. It brought monogamy, the resolution of marriage and divorce by secular authorities and the change in the law of inheritance grounded more or less on the Kemalist principle of a community of equals. In April 1930, with a law on municipalities, women gained the right to participate in local elections, and in December 1934, the parliament granted women the right to vote and to be candidates in national elections. Women, legally empowered and dressed in the modes of Paris, in conformity with the civilizing program of the Kemalists, began to be more and more visible in the public realm. A woman dancing at balls and working and being educated side by side with “shaven” men became henceforth one of the chief images of the Republic, the images by which modernity was symbolized. As Göle aptly puts it: “Photographs of *women* unveiled, *women* pilots, *women* professionals and photographs of men and *women* in European fashion depicted the modernist representations of the “prestigious life.” Civilized Republican individuals

⁹⁵ While stressing both men’s and women’s dress style, the campaign was maintained mainly on women’s dress and how they could be saved from the veil and bedclothes. See Mesut Çapa, “Giyim Kuşamda Medeni Kıyafetlerin Benimsenmesi ve Trabzon Örneği” [The Adoption of Modern Clothes as Garments and the Case of Trabzon]. *Toplumsal Tarih*. 5/30 (1996), 22-28.

went to tea salons, mixed-gender dinners and balls.”⁹⁶ In this regard the organizations of “Miss Turkey” contest during the 1930s were seen as a necessary nationalist step in the path of civilization and to maintain a potent assault on the patterned value structure of “tradition.” By these contests it was shown to the civilized nations that in Turkey there existed a “modern way of life” and Turkish women lived no longer in harems as prisoners.⁹⁷ As a consequence, in the nation-building project, women were represented and symbolized as the carriers of the modern way of life and so denoted to be Western.

Beside these, the calendar and clock change (bringing the rearrangement of time),⁹⁸ the elimination of all signs reminding of the Ottoman past,⁹⁹ the question of the

⁹⁶ Göle, “The Freedom,” 50. For Kandiyoti women became “symbolic pawns” in the hands of the civilizing rulers. Deniz Kandiyoti, “Women and the Turkish State: Political Actors or Symbolic Pawns?” in *Woman-Nation-State*, eds. N. Y. Davis and F. Anthias, (London: The Macmillan Press, 1988).

⁹⁷ Duğan Duman and Pınar Duman, “Kültürel Bir Değişim Aracı Olarak Güzellik Yarışmaları” [Beauty Contests as an Element of Cultural Change], *Toplumsal Tarih*, 7/42 (1997), 21.

⁹⁸ On 26 December 1925, the Gregorian calendar in place of the Muslim calendar (*Hicri*) and the 24-hour day were adopted. For both laws, see *Resmi Gazete*, 2. 1. 1926/ 260. These changes displayed a critical break with the Muslim world, as well as with the past. Although further emphasis was put on its practicability, for the rulers the old calendar had been one of things that set up the wall between Turks and the civilized nations. Mustafa Baydar, *Atatürk ve Devrimlerimiz* (İstanbul: T. İş Bankası Yay., 1973), 229. That line of reasoning brought forth the abolition of the Friday holiday in favor of Sunday in 1935, to make rearrangement in working days in line with the Western countries.

⁹⁹ The modernizing rulers’ venture to eradicate all signs reminding the Ottoman past went on by a law, passed on 28 May 1927, on removing all Sultan’s monograms (imperial signature), riggings, inscriptions from all buildings. All these would have to be displaced (by transferring to *museums* or covering over) because they were symbols of the Ottoman Sultanate. *Resmi Gazete*, 15.6.1927/ 608.

emblem of the new Turkish State,¹⁰⁰ the alphabet change in 1928¹⁰¹ were the end products of the cultural crusade on the traditional symbols. Evidently, when the aim was to make it possible to unite new Turkey with modern civilization, symbolic transformations manifested a tendency to save the young Turkish generations from the past, that is, the Ottoman-Islamic cultural heritage.

Consequently, it seems to be obvious that all the above sweeping reforms, removing all age-old intermediary structures between the state and the individuals and establishing a new symbolic universe, were valued positively under the notion of civilization that was depicted with science and progress. Here it was perceived in regard with the process of nation-building based on the republican and nationalist understanding.

¹⁰⁰ Towards 1928, as Afetinan reports, Mustafa Kemal rejected some wolf headed figures prepared for the state emblem. For him, none of them was going to be the emblem of a modern state; it would be symbolized with a human head that was the source of everything. A. Afetinan, *M. Kemal Atatürk'ten Yazdıklarım* [My Writings from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk] (Ankara: Altınok Matbaası, 1969), 9. No doubt, this was the head of Atatürk, for all reforms were seen as the product of his brain which was of the genius Leader. Thus, the photograph and sculpture of his head as badges of his "personality cult" have been one of the component emblems of the Turkish Republic. One of the leading interpreters of Kemalism, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, saw the "Turkish revolution" as nothing but "a mere photograph of Atatürk's mind." Bozkurt, *Atatürk İhtilali*, 75. This canonization resulted from a role attributed to Mustafa Kemal who as a real "Man of Genius" changed the destiny of a nation with a touch of his finger.

¹⁰¹ It is certain that the most critical symbolic turn came with the replacement of the Arabic script with the Latin in the writing of Turkish. Here the blame of being "backward" was placed on the Arabic alphabet that was regarded as colonizing the mind and mentality of Turks, that is, had tied Turks to the Orient. In fact, the adoption of the Latin alphabet was the most significant point of a radical cultural break with the past that, for the civilizing elite, was now complete. It provided the "greatest effect on Turkish life from the cultural point of view", together with the adoption of the Swiss Family Law, from the social point of view. See Halide Edip Adıvar, *Conflict of East and West in Turkey* (Delhi: Jamia Millia, 1935), 135 and 163. The language reform had been on the agenda until the end of the Single-Party period, especially through efforts to purify Turkish from Arabic and Persian origins. The new "Turkish" script and purified language were regarded as one of the most usable and useful tool to spread the civilizational ideals

As mentioned above, the aim of the Kemalist civilizing project, with its emphasis on a distinction between civilization and archaism or between modern and traditional, was to create and forge the new mentality and the modern way of life by a total break in the cultural legacy of the past. It was the name of the public life only through which individuals in Turkey would become cultivated and perfected “patriotic” citizens. It, therefore, made it possible to judge who was human or savage, or who would be included and who would be excluded. New images, symbols and rituals were invented for signifying the modern one, which was done by establishing a hierarchy in ways of life. These were politically determined dress, styles, tastes, badges, status and mode of behavior, which were valued through the condemnation of the “traditional” ones. They provided the legitimacy for being represented in the public sphere of the Republic. So was the concept of civilization – used as part of culture production in the official discourse - essentially deemed as a “concept of identity” denoting to be both Western and Turk. This Kemalist conception of civilization, especially after 1930, began to be integrally identified with the term culture.

4.3. Culture as Part of the Civilizing Process From Above

Until the early 1930s, the reform movement found its justification to a greater extent in the concept of civilization that had been seen satisfactory to create a new moral and social structure to which all Turks would adhere. Changes in the socio-economic conditions and the rising need for a new ideological outlook to diffuse the Republican

of the new regime. These language policies will be elaborated in Chapter V in a detailed way.

ideals deeper, brought about an ideological turn in 1930. The concept of culture became on the part of the ruling groups the motto of a new ideological orientation. The new conceptualization of culture in the 1930s may be traced in the thoughts of Mustafa Kemal, some main official texts and the cultural institutions. Thus, this part is very selectively formulated around the analysis of Mustafa Kemal's statements and their echoes in intellectual life, of *İskan Kanunu* (The Law of Settlement) and the RPP's Programs, and of the ideology and activities of the People's Houses. In this sense, the following two chapters are set aside for other two prominent institutions of the Republic (The THS and the TLS) directing the process of culture production.

By 1929 the radical westernizing reforms of the 1920s, bad economic conditions substantially caused by the 1929 Great Depression, and continuing rebellions in eastern Anatolia, led to the rising tide of social discontent. This began to threaten an important degree the Republic and its reforms. To air the accumulated social opposition and to cover up the mortal menace of stagnation and opposition, a political party, the Free Party (*Serbest Fırka*, FP), was founded in August 1930 as a loyal opposition party.¹⁰² The FP's critics on the RPP's economic policies and its promise for more liberal political conditions immediately attracted a large group of enthusiastic followers. Coupled with the demands of a return of the fez, the Arabic script, and so on, its growing popularity

¹⁰² Fethi Okyar established this with the direct encouragement of Mustafa Kemal, who urged others to join it, including his sister. The reason behind the selection was that they were not challengers to Mustafa Kemal's authority and the regime. He did not only determine the founders, but also the FP's program. See Tevfik Çavdar, "Serbest Fırka" [the Free Party], in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1983), 2053 and 2055. And also, on the purpose of its establishment, see Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to A Multi-Party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 64-65.

began to turn immediately into a rising opposition to the westernizing reforms. The Republicans regarded it not only as a threat to their own rule, but also to that of the regime, and so, for them, this support mainly came from the reactionaries. Meanwhile it ended with the dissolution of the FP by its leaders in November 1930, by alleging that it had become the instrument of counter-revolutionaries. This was followed by the Menemen incident which was seen as one of the most dangerous reaction to the regime.¹⁰³

The social discontent and the experience of the FP gave on the part of the ruling elite a signal of the failure of the first phase of the civilizing project from above. Although the modernizing reforms had become strong in the center (constituted by a close circle of elite), they failed to create a sense of belonging and collectivity among the masses.¹⁰⁴ That is to say, as Ahmad argues, “[T]he mass of the people, even in the more advanced parts of the country, did not identify with the new state.”¹⁰⁵ This meant that a cultural duality between the ruling cadre and the masses seen as the main enemy of the Republic continued to exist, and even widened through forging a modern way of life that

¹⁰³ For the modernizing elite, this incident was important because it took place in one of the most developed provinces of Anatolia, not in a backward one. Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), 60. In the words of Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), the resentment and anxiety of the state elite found its clear expression: “it is as though nothing has happened all these years, as though ... the idea of any of our radical reforms has not altered anything in this country.” Quoted in *ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ In fact this was a common opinion among the ruling elite. This may be found in A. H. Başar’s study covering Mustafa Kemal’s visits to some provinces to grasp the reason for shortcomings of the regime. See Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *Atatürk’le Üç Ay ve 1930’dan Sonra Türkiye* [Three Months with Atatürk and Turkey after 1930] (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1945).

¹⁰⁵ Ahmad, *The Making*, 61.

was of the ruling elite and intellectuals in big cities.¹⁰⁶ The ideals of science and progress, the basis of the Kemalist understanding of civilization, failed to raise the cultural level of the people.

Thus, to refresh the revolutionary spirit of the Republic, a new ideological orientation was put to use. The name of the ideology was Kemalism, which came into existence firstly at the Third Republican People's Party Congress in 1931.¹⁰⁷ Accordingly, the measures taken at the Congress brought about the merging of the State and the Party; the result was a one party-dominant polity. All autonomous organizations besides the State-Party control were banned.¹⁰⁸ Among them there were the Masonic lodges, the Women's Association, and most importantly the Turkish Hearts; instead, new state-controlled institutions such as the THS, the TLS, and the People's Houses were established.¹⁰⁹ Here, what was aimed with new measures resulting in the reorganization

¹⁰⁶ This life did not, as Belge argues, reflect the existing social relations, but "wished human relationships. In this regard it was assumed that the people in times would evolve on the path of modern civilization." Murat Belge, "Kültür" [Culture], in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* [Republican Period Encyclopedia of Turkey] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1983), 1300. In fact, the duality between the elite life-world and that of the masses was one of the legacies of the Ottoman-Turkish reform movement, which was fostered by the Republic's sweeping reforms. See Cemal Kafadar, "The New Visibility of Sufism in Turkish Studies and Cultural Life", in *The Dervish Lodge: Architecture, Arts, and Sufism in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. R. Lifehez (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 316.

¹⁰⁷ Here, Kemalism was built on the above-mentioned six principles. See Tunçay, *T. C. 'de Tek-Parti*, 447-454. For the ideological turn, see *ibid.*, 308.

¹⁰⁸ Mustafa Kemal emphasized the necessity of unifying all power centers in one hand to reach revolutionary goals and so declared to approve the works of "all nationalist and republicanist forces" under the RPP. See *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri* [Atatürk's Speeches and Statements], vol. III (Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1989), 130.

¹⁰⁹ For the RPP's "totalitarian tendencies," see Zürcher, *Turkey*, 184-88.

in the sphere of culture was to gain complete cultural control.¹¹⁰ In fact, this reflected an ideological turn in the process of culture production. Now, the greater emphasis in the Republican civilizing process was placed on the concept of culture that was deemed essential for the self-identification of the people. This is indeed what Rancière argues that, in its relation to modern politics and nation-state, culture is tied to “a logic of identification” so it is one of the most significant forces to turn citizens – politically defined as equals - into a culturally identified whole.¹¹¹ It is in this respect that, after 1930, culture appeared as the name of the search to promote collective identity to provide a sense of belonging necessary for social and cultural affinity.¹¹² So, the rising interest of Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues throughout the 1930s in history and language was

¹¹⁰ Recep Peker clarified this reorientation in his opening speech of the People’s Houses (*Halk Evleri*). See Recep Peker, “Halkevleri Açılma Nutku” [The Opening Speech of the People’s Houses]. *Ülkü*. 1 (February 1933), 6-8.

¹¹¹ Jacques Rancière, “Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization”, in *The Identity in Question*, ed. John Rajchman (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), 66-67.

¹¹² After the civilizing elite realized that the emphasis only on civilization was regarded as insufficient to meet the people’s spiritual needs which were as necessary as political ones, for being a modern society, the role was now given greatly to culture. In fact before 1930 there existed some views stressing the ties between civilization and culture and cultural transformation among the ruling circles. Celal Nuri in 1928 used the concept of civilization and culture interchangeably. See Celal Nuri (İleri), “Latin Harfleri Meselesi” [The Issue of the Latin Letters], in *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe Tartışmaları* [Discussions on Alphabet from the Tanzimat to the Republic], ed. Hüseyin Yorulmaz (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 1995) (original publication, 1928), 293 and 298. Hasan Cemil (Çambel) in 1929 talked about a cultural shift in Turkey in a way that the Revolution “eliminated the old, dead culture and began a quest for a vigorous culture in the realms of life, art and thought.” Hasan Cemil (Çamlıbel), “Hars Tebdili” [Change of Culture], in *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı II*, eds. Mehmet Kaplan, and et al. (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1992) (original publication, 1929), 66 (66-68). For the role of the Alphabet change in the creation of a new culture, see Yunus Nadi, “Yazı İnkılabı” [Alphabet Reform], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* [Atatürk and the Turkish Language 2], ed. Zeynep Korkmaz (Ankara: TDK, 1997) (original publication 1929), 11-13.

regarded necessary for the construction of an identity on the basis of modern ideals.¹¹³ This was a cultural crusade, led and maintained by Atatürk himself. All efforts throughout the 1930s seemed to be the most significant steps in the attainment of monopolizing the legitimate use of culture, that is, establishing full cultural control over the society, which had not been fully realized during the first decade of the Republic.

4.3.1. Mustafa Kemal and Culture

At this juncture, there existed the need to re-conceptualize culture that until that time, as a discourse, remained in large measure under the influence of Gökalp's notion of "authentic", "distinctive" culture. The seeds of the new official attitude to culture with the above-mentioned ideological turn may be best found at first in the thoughts and expressions of Mustafa Kemal.¹¹⁴ In 1930, in the early days of the FP, Mustafa Kemal for the first time expressed his assertion on culture as being part of his thesis of civilization.¹¹⁵ On the issue, he said:

¹¹³ Here history and language were regarded as, in the words of one of the Kemalist interpreters and legislators, İ. Necmi Dilmen, two backbones of national culture in the sense that both were essential "to form a new and developed cultural ideal in our country." İ. Necmi Dilmen, "TDK Adına Genel Sekreter Burdur Mebusu İbrahim Necmi Dilmen'in Nutku" [Burdur Deputy İbrahim Necmi Dilmen's Speech in the Name of the TLS], in *III. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara 15-20 Kasım 1943, Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler* [III. Turkish History Congress, Ankara 15-20 November 1943, Papers Presented at the Congress] (Ankara: TTK, 1948), 13.

¹¹⁴ To write this section some of his views on culture are chosen which can not be easily linked with any specific contextual frames of the 1930s. It is obvious that the context was the social milieu of this period as the state and its "knowing" rulers entered into re-defining their conceptual framework in terms of culture and its relation to civilization.

There are some people who define civilization in different ways. In my opinion it is hard and unnecessary to separate civilization from culture. In order to clarify my point of view, let me explain what culture is: it is the product of all achievements of a human society in the domains of (a) state, (b) thought, that is to say, science, social science, and fine arts, and (c) economy, that is to say, agriculture, crafts, trade, transportation and communication. When one talks about a nation's civilization, I think it may not be other than a product of all these three kind of domains. Of course, the degree of culture, or civilization, could not be the same. The difference may be seen in each sphere of life, as well as the agglomeration of three spheres. A high culture does not only belong to its owner nation, and, at the same time, has strong effects on other nations. Maybe, it is in this respect that a high and extensive culture is called civilization, such as European civilization, *asr-i hazır* (modern) civilization.¹¹⁶

What is significant here is the equation of the concept of culture with that of civilization and the setting of a hierarchy between a high and cultivated culture and primitive and savage one.

This conceptualization excludes the idea that a culture is the solid structure of living values and manners. At that point, in the words of Mustafa Kemal who dictated to Afetinan in 1930, we find his implicit criticism of Gökalp's claims on the pre-eminence of spiritual peculiarities over civilization:

There are those who limit the concept of culture only to some arduously, slowly changing racial and hereditary characters of nations. This becomes fundamental for them ... This viewpoint and explanation is incorrect ... Summing up, civilization is noting *but* culture. The meaning of culture can not be reduced to the concept of character called *seciye* (moral quality).¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Parallel to his general orientation until 1923, his view on culture seemed to be under the effect of Gökalp's ideals; well built in moral character (*seciye*) and history of the Turks, it should be saved from all corruptive and immoral influences coming from the West and the East. After that time, in his statements we can not witness such an emphasis on "authentic," unique notion of culture. For his statements on the issue during the 1920s, see Kantarcıoğlu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*, 88-94.

¹¹⁶ Afetinan, *M. Kemal*, 48. Also Appendix A.

In his discourse, culture could not be something challenging or in contrast to civilization, but rather inherent to civilization. In this regard, Mustafa Kemal first of all conceived culture as a mentality:

Culture is to read, to understand, to see, to infer meaning from all seen, to take a lesson, to think, to train intelligence ... Culture is a fundamental component of being *humane* in the sense that, with his energy and his rising and expansive intelligence given by nature, the human being who calls himself as “human” becomes a peculiar quality. To put it into a brief explanation, culture means to be happy with the rich spiritual power that emanates from nature; it is this definition that includes *cleanliness, purity, refinement, humanity*, etc., all of which are *humane* qualities. In this regard, when the term culture is put into an infinitive form, it means to transfer all qualities given by nature, to young and future generations (my emphasis).¹¹⁸

Thus, on the basis of this definition, he went on to say, “all children of the Republic are *cultural men*; that is, they should internalize culture and, at the same time, be convinced of spreading this peculiarity to the whole Turkish nation.”¹¹⁹ It was the mentality that every “civilized” Turkish citizen should have in picturing and determining his own way.¹²⁰ For him, the way to reach that end passes only through benefiting from

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 48-9; Appendix A. On the matter of distinct qualities of civilization and culture, he explained his views by giving examples from Turkish history. As opposed to some claims (of Gökalp), he asserted that the Turks had been successful in conquering İstanbul because of being civilized and cultured in every sphere of life. See *ibid.*, 49.

¹¹⁸ Afetinan noted these words down in 1936. *Ibid.*, 50; Appendix A. And also, on Mustafa Kemal’s views on the relationships of nature, progress and human being, see *ibid.*, 28.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 50.

¹²⁰ Afetinan, A. *Atatürk Hakkında Hatıra ve Belgeler* [Memoirs and Documents on Atatürk] (Ankara: T. İş Bankası Yay., 1959), 272.

the culture and methods of Europe to which the elite have to be in constant cultural relation.¹²¹

Thus, in the civilizing project, science and scientific thinking seemed to be determinant in setting up new modes of behavior. Mustafa Kemal strongly believed that scientific thinking should be dominant as “a basic principle and as a world-view, which shape culture as a whole”.¹²² It would result in the progress of culture. In order to work on and crystallize national culture in a scientific way, some institutions of culture (the THS, the TLS, and the DTCF -Faculty of Language, History, Geography (1936) were founded. Their role was to work towards inventing new myths to bring the new Turks much closer to modern civilized nations, and, in this way, to create a sense of community around these myths. In such a way they became the instruments of cultural control over the people.

The basic impetus behind all investigations and scientific studies on the Turkish language, Turkish history and fine arts and music was to raise Turkish national culture to the highest level of civilized nations. The endless elevation of national culture as the basic desire of the Republic, attempted to be maintained by rediscovering its historical characters and capabilities. As Mustafa Kemal declared in the speech on the tenth anniversary of the Republic, 1933, the Turks’ “high civilized character and capabilities” had been to “love fine arts and elevate it, to be committed to science, and to cultivate the sense of national unity under every condition.”¹²³ This was also the very tone of his

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² For Mustafa Kemal’s assessment on the role of science and scientific thinking in the production of culture, see Çaycı, “Atatürk’ün,” 1115-1116.

opening speech of the Fourth Grand Assembly of the RPP in 1935. On cultural affairs, he made the following remarks:

By being loyal to the program of the Party we have gained a lot of achievements in social and cultural domains from the last assembly held in 1931 today. These have given way to the national countenance of the Turkish Republic. Now there exists a modern Turkish *sosyete* (society) with a new script, national history, purified language, (modern) art, scientific music, technical institutions and equality between men and women ... Only when the Turkish nation surrounds its existence with deep and strong borders of culture, its high capacity and morality will be recognized in the international arena (my emphasis).¹²⁴

This society included “elegant” and “refined” qualities on which the boundaries of culture were determined. They had to be spread and diffused in deeply by means of state agents.¹²⁵

¹²³ *Atatürk'ün Maarife Ait Direktifleri* [Atatürk's Orders about Education] (İstanbul: Maarif Vekilliği, 1939), 33-34.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 37. What is most significant here is his use of the term *sosyete* (today it is often used to refer to a life style of upper classes including highly modernized manners). It is so obvious that by this term he meant a “modernized” and “civilized” life that he and his co-workers strove to create. After his use, it became one of the most applied terms among the Kemalist elite to denote a modern life style. For example, Şemsettin Günaltay and H. Reşit Tankut tried to situate the Turkish Language Thesis into the Republican project by emphasizing “Kemalist Turkey’s creation of *sosyete* and appropriation of a (modern) mentality”. See Şemsettin Günaltay and H. Reşit Tankut, *Dil ve Tarih Tezlerimiz Üzerine Gerekli Bazı İzahatlar* [Some Explanations on Our Language and History Theses] (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1938), 27.

¹²⁵ This was attempted through instituting new conventions and gatherings. Balls were the most significant one. As Wortham reports, “[A]s the result of the impetus by the President, whose (official) balls at Angora and [at İstanbul] became a regular feature of social life, the inhibitions of the professional and official classes were overcome, and ‘dancing,’ thanks to the gramophone, which played an important part in this revolution in all the larger cities, enjoyed such a vogue that young men with social talents found lucrative openings as dancing-masters.” Wortham, *The Turkey*, 177. This was the result of Mustafa Kemal’s “unmerciful” incentive: “More and more Turkish Women began to attend the increasing number of gala events at which the Ghazi was the main attraction. He derived enormous pleasure and satisfaction from seeing Turks dance and display “civilized” manners.” Volkan and Itzkowitz, *The Immortal*, 292. For the use of

At the heart of his definition above there were the two theses, the Turkish history and language theses, which were sustained through the activities of the THS, the TLS and the People's Houses. Both were used to prove, by "scientific" discoveries and evidences, that all civilizations were of Turkish origin; that is, Turkish history and language were the mother of world culture.¹²⁶ In this regard, Mustafa Kemal claimed that "Turkish historical proofs" had a greater importance even to reinvestigate "the history of world culture".¹²⁷ The aim behind the linguistic and historical studies was to provide a spiritual background and structure for culture. Thus the official discourse of culture was based on a "Spirit" which was something "living" and "giving a life"; it was "the national and social sources of best feelings, knowledge and acts" by which each element of a nation is equipped.¹²⁸ Thus, as Necip Ali maintained, "spiritual factors" had a significant place in the progress and development of culture.¹²⁹ In fact, this was a highly "secularized" Spirit. What was needed, as Mehmet Saffet (Engin) claimed, was to make a "spiritual revolution to attain a

"Republican Balls" as an ideological tool in the 1920s and 1930s, see Doğan Duman, "Cumhuriyet Baloları" [Republican Balls]. *Toplumsal Tarih*. 7/37 (1997), 44-48.

¹²⁶ It was "positive" science which was empowered to direct and determine the activities of the THS and the TLS. For that see Afetinan's speech in the third Turkish Language Congress of which contents were determined by Mustafa Kemal, *Üçüncü Türk Dil Kurultayı* [The Third Turkish Language Congress] (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1937) 7. In the opening speech of the same Congress, in 1936, Saffet Arıkan, the Ministry of Culture and the President of the TLS, declared that, as core of the Kemalist cultural movement, "the Turkish History Thesis and the Turkish language Theory are aimed to arouse a cultural, social and ideal awakening establishing the nation's psychology in a new progressive outlook and understanding." *Ibid.*, 3.

¹²⁷ *Atatürk'ün Maarife*, 39. Also on his views on proofs, see Afetinan, *M. Kemal*, 52.

¹²⁸ Mehmet Saffet (Engin), "Kültür İnkılabımız" [Our Culture Revolution]. *Ülkü*. 5 (June 1933), 351.

great cultural structure by being aware of directing the training and education of whole human kind in history.”¹³⁰ All these made it possible to provide a sense of belonging and identity for new generations who were being trained and educated, through the school system, to be “civilized” citizens within the Revolutionary culture of the Republic thorough the school system, universities and the People’s Houses.¹³¹ These institutions were regarded as the agents of *terbiye*. Nusret Kemal defined *terbiye* as “culturating” which meant giving “ideals.”¹³² It was in this sense that on 28 December 1935, the name of the Ministry of Education was changed from *Maarif Vekaleti* to *Kültür Bakanlığı*, which was used until 1941.¹³³ In this change, the official discourse on culture used in a broader sense had a determinant role, while the language purification efforts had some effect. Mustafa Kemal and his collaborators wished to produce and spread cultural structure on wider ground as far as possible.

In fact, this was the quest for a shared cultural identity which was necessary in the process of forming a sense of belonging together. Every sort of particular and traditional attachment was seen dangerous for this identity. Thus, relying on the polity that the idea

¹²⁹ Necip Ali, “Kültür ve Medeniyet” [Culture and Civilization]. *Ülkü*. 3 (April 1933), 245.

¹³⁰ Saffet (Engin), “Kültür,” 351.

¹³¹ The success of the Revolution in every sphere was dependent on “the extensiveness and deepness of *kültür kuvveti*” (cultural capability) through these three agents. Necip Ali, “Kültür ve Medeniyet,” 245.

¹³² Nusret Kemal, “Terbiye Meselesi” [The Issue of Training/Education]. *Ülkü*. 6 (July 1933), 436.

¹³³ For this use, see *Atatürk’ün Maarife*, 40; *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. V, C. 4, 3 Kanunievvel 1935, 92-93; Bahir Sorguç, *1920’den 1981’e Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı* [The Ministry of National Education from 1920 to 1981] (İstanbul: MEB, 1982), 9.

of unity constitutes its basis, the policy was implemented as part of official nationalism to assimilate all customs and practices of particularities into a newly designed common good. What was aimed through policing was the construction of culture free from all traditional and particular elements. It was the culture to which only civilized individuals belonged. In this sense, as Kahraman aptly notes, it was “distanced from its sources ... and defined within the boundaries of a virtual mind-world.”¹³⁴ It denotes a deliberate choice for the place of living culture.

To sum up, what can be drawn from Mustafa Kemal’s views on culture is best summarized by Afetinan: “In his usage of *kültür* (culture) Atatürk, beside its dictionary meaning, dwelt especially on the comprehensive meanings of the term *medeniyet* (civilization) and *hars* (culture), and he meant the expression of the same thing via these three concepts.”¹³⁵ To put in a more simple way, culture in his usage includes all practices, habits and manners thought within the frame of civilization.¹³⁶ They for instance came to be modes of “softened” behavior, “high level” of tastes, a way of thinking, scientific knowledge, and so on.

¹³⁴ Hasan Bülent Kahraman, “A Journey of Rupture and Conflict: The Culture in Purgatory.” *Privatview*. 1-2/ 4-5 (1997), 108.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 273.

¹³⁶ For example, culture was closely associated with hygiene and a healthy future generation. Yusuf Kemal Tengirşek, in his Turkish Revolution Lectures (1933-1935), mentioning the importance of cultural policies in providing hygienic and healthy conditions, stressed that “the main ideal of culture in our age is to produce mentally and physically strong Turkish youths.” Yusuf Kemal Tengirşek, “Türk İnkılabı Dersleri Ekonomik Değişmeler” [Lectures on Turkish Revolution: Economic changes], in *İlk İnkılap Tarihi Ders Notları* [Lecture Notes of the First Revolution History Lectures] (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1997), 314. Yusuf Kemal Tengirşek was, together with Recep Peker and Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, one of the lecturers on the Revolution at İstanbul University from 1933-1935.

It is self-evident in his definition that a law of Nature seems to be fundamental to direct the manners around which human life forms are patterned. This is the result of empowering science as a force in the regulation of human life in an endless manner. Accordingly, the human being that is intrinsically valuable and rational has an active role in determining and constructing models for social structure. A group of “enlightened” and “cultured” elite had a mission of bringing out this capability inherent to everybody. In other words, they are Men of Genius who further the progress of human mind and taste. Therefore, the new manners, which are projected in the skilful hands of this group, are seen to be universally applicable and context-free. These are developed in a privileged way through assaulting and delegitimizing all traditional and particular affiliations. In short, in the discourse of Mustafa Kemal, culture as a mentality and as a “civilized” way of life was subject to men’s conscious actions licensed by the law of Nature, Reason and Science. It denotes high qualities and values defined as “elegant”, “pure” and “refined”, which were set in motion in contrast to the “traditional”, “savage” ones. That is, the concept of culture was used to differentiate the cultivated and the civilized from the traditional and the primitive. By these qualities it belonged to the people who had “knowledge”, and, at the same time, it accompanied an “advanced” consciousness and moral virtue. So did it come to be the basic criteria for determining who was going to participate in the public sphere.

4.3.2. The Ideological Base of the Concept of Culture

This discourse on culture - defined in “the virtual mind-world” – was obviously seen in the official legal and popular texts such as the RPP’s programs and the Law of Settlement. Firstly the political roots of the Kemalist view of culture of the 1930s may be found in the 1923 program of the RPP. In that, there was a more or less clear definition of common culture based on the idea of assimilation that set in motion membership to the political community, namely the state. It was also based on the notion of community of equals, made up of the people who were fused without any privilege and class. This orientation also took place as a general rule in the 1927 program of the RPP. Similarly, the program attributed a key role to the acceptance and internalization of Turkish culture as a basic criterion for admission to the party. Culture here was revolved more around nationalist and populist inclinations. Its fifth article was on this: “being convinced that unity of language, unity of ideal and unity of thought are necessary for the strongest ties between the citizens, the basic goal of the party is to improve and diffuse the Turkish language and Turkish culture and to make every individual appropriating them by means of the law.”¹³⁷ Of course, as rigidly broached in the program, the endeavor for the progress of culture would be firmly established on “scientific” grounds.

The distinguishing peculiarity of the RPP’s 1931 ¹³⁸ and 1935 program¹³⁹ which were written almost with a similar insight was the existence of a clear definition of the

¹³⁷ For the full text of the 1927 program, see Tunçay, *T. C. 'de Tek Parti*, 382-394.

¹³⁸ This program brought about first of all the ideological restructuring for the state policies on creating a new society. The basic emphasis was now placed on culture that would be created. In general, it denoted a state of mind and a life style of an imagined Turkish community. For the 1931 program, see *ibid.*, 447-458. The program as an official document for the first time mentioned the six principles of Kemalism.

nation; “the nation is the political and social unit composed of citizens tied together by the bonds of language, culture and ideal.”¹⁴⁰ In other words, culture together with language and ideal were constitutive parts of the nation in the way that they were fundamental to provide a sense of belonging together for the citizens. Culture was something achieved with the constant education and training of children through schooling and of adults especially through the People’s Houses. In this sense, as openly expressed in Part 4 on National Education and Instruction, the goal of the cultural policy was expressed as the “suppression of ignorance” by the process of education through which every citizen would be patriotic, civilized and nationalistic.¹⁴¹ At the heart of the policy was their intellectual and physical development necessary to enhance “the character to the high level inspired by our great national history.” For this purpose the education of Turkish history in which the Turks’ civilized ancestors had shown the true way to all civilizations, and the Turkish language had to be taught. Also the fine arts and especially western-style music, as determined in Article 44, gained the utmost importance for the Party to instill “the revolutionary culture” in the people.¹⁴² In sum, what was found in the programs was the notion of culture which was something achieved, including aspects ranging from sharing a common language to attaining physical strength.

¹³⁹ See “Program of the People’s Party of the Republic.”

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 307.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 314.

¹⁴² Ibid., 312. Article 52 set “the national opera and the national theatre” as one of important tasks of the Party. Ibid., 316. The opera and theatre as components of the new high culture seem to have owed much to Mustafa Kemal’s personal preferences or his desire to appear Western and modern at all times. See Lord Kinross, *Atatürk: The Birth of A Nation* (Nicosia: K. Rustem and Brother, 1984) (original publication, 1964), 469-470.

In this sense, as cement to bound individuals together, it came to be the name of the modern way of life woven around the civilizing ideals of the Revolution which every Turkish citizen had to adopt through appropriation.

The other text, elaborated here, is the 10 Anniversary brochure published by the Ministry of Education, entitled as “10.”¹⁴³ It was the standard and most circulated brochure in 1933 and later years.¹⁴⁴ This propaganda brochure was based on the comparison between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic, focusing on “how it was” and “how it is”, and full of condemnations of the past by revealing its “backwardness”, “ignorance” and “reactionism” and the “historic” achievements of the new regime. The contents of “10” contained almost all the modifications, novelties, and the concepts the new regime dwelt on. It is worth mentioning here to portray the pages on the appearances and styles of the new generation of the Republic. On the page “how it was” the princes of the Empire were portrayed as unhappy and sulky in the “oriental” dress, but in the page “how it is” children and youths dressed modernly were healthy, joyful, happy and certain.¹⁴⁵ The children and youths pictured in “what it is” seemed to be from a country

¹⁴³ It was prepared by Vedat Nedim (Tör) and Burhan Asaf (Belge). See *10* (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1933). For its selective pages, see Appendix B. The brochure “10” included two main copies: the first was a thick text with 208 pages, mainly prepared for the intellectuals. See Webster, *The Turkey*, 184-184. The other was the pictorial and colorful, popular text (the 50 pages), which was circulated to almost all official bureaus and institutions in the country.

¹⁴⁴ It became the model of all other publications on the Anniversary. On this Webster reported that he read all special editions of the more important daily newspapers, the special publications of chambers of commerce, Party locals and national organizations. And he realized that “they appeared to follow a single model. That model was the Anniversary brochure..., bearing the simple title ‘10’.” Webster, *The Turkey*, 184.

of Europe, nearly all with blond hair and blue/green eyes. Other images and writings, ranging from women in schools and working places side by side with men to the well-covered volumes on modern Turkish history, were embedded in a dichotomy, the traditional/modern. Thousands of copies of “10” as a main propaganda text were published and circulated in all parts of the country. Its slogans and illustrations were wallpapered on the walls of almost all school classrooms, the People’s Houses, the Party’s local organizations, the official bureaus, and even the coffeehouses.¹⁴⁶

4.3.3. The Law of Settlement and the Boundaries of Culture

The Kemalist task of turning the existing human dust into a “cultivated,” “cultured” whole finds its clear expression in the Law of Settlement (*İskan Kanunu*), issued on June 14, 1934, which has been one of the most contested laws.¹⁴⁷ For the purpose of this dissertation it is chosen to bind the factual events to the main arguments of the dissertation. It was the significant document which determined the official policy of the population initiated to re-populate Anatolia and re-organize its population

¹⁴⁵ 10, 8-9. In fact, as Linke reported, “in the recruitment poster of the 1930s shifty looking youths were transformed into fit strapping young men wearing modern Western clothes in contrast to the old days of bearded turbaned men.” See Lilo Linke, *Allah Dethroned: A Journey through Modern Turkey* (London: Constable, 1937), 330.

¹⁴⁶ Throughout his journey in Turkey, Webster reported to see these images and graphs whenever he went to. Webster, *The Turkey*, 184-185.

¹⁴⁷ *Resmi Gazete* [Official Gazette], “İskan Kanunu” [Law of Settlement], n. 2733, (Ankara: Prime Ministry, June 21, 1934).

structure.¹⁴⁸ The Law, as defined in Article 1, was on “the settlement and distribution of the population with respect to Turkish culture.”¹⁴⁹ Although the reason for the Law was to determine the fundamentals of the population policy, the basic impulse, as Yusuf Kemal Tengirşek evaluated, was “to provide *cultural* unity.”¹⁵⁰ It was for this reason that it was part of the creation of the citizens faithful to Turkish culture. In terms of settlement, Article 2 of the Law constituted a new regulation in the map of Turkey by which it was divided into three main regions according to whether or not Turkish culture prevailed.¹⁵¹ The first one included the places where those who belonged to the Turkish race and culture were dense. The second comprised the places reserved for those who would be transferred and settled to provide for their adoption to Turkish culture. And the third, the places which would be emptied and prohibited for settling and dwelling due to reasons of location, health, economy, culture, politics, military and security.¹⁵² Even if

¹⁴⁸ The RPP’s 1935 program adopted the policy for “the increase of the population and the bringing up of a strong and healthy future generation” determined in Part VI. See “The Program of the People’s Party of Republic,” 316. The goal of repopulation realized through migrations from abroad was one of the main policies to increase the population; others were to lower the mortality rate and increase the number of birth. See Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, “Osmanlının En Önemli Mirası: Türk Toplumunu” [The Most Important Ottoman Inheritance: Turkish Society], in *Osmanlı* (Ottoman), ed. Güler Eren, vol. V, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 1999), 22.

¹⁴⁹ *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. IV, C. 23, 7-6-1934, 73. This Article was amended with a Law no: 5089/1, 18/6/1949, as “the settlement of *muhacir* (a Turk or Muslim who has emigrated from Balkans and Caucasia), refugees, nomads and gypsies, and the regulation of settlement and distribution of the existing population in accordance with the level of their attachment to Turkish culture.” See *Resmî Gazete*, 21. 6. 1934/ 2733.

¹⁵⁰ Tengirşek, “Türk İnkılabı,” 314.

¹⁵¹ See *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. IV, C. 23, 7-6-1934, 142.

¹⁵² The boundaries of these regions were not clear even during the discussions on the Law at the Parliament. Mehmet Bey (deputy of Kütahya) pointed out one of these regions as “forbidden military zone” and one of them as “places beyond the Eastern

they were old dwellers, anybody who did not belong to the Turkish culture would not be permitted to re-settle in the first region. In this region the people of villages and *aşirets* who had forgotten their language, but were of Turkish origin were to be settled around villages, towns and cities, where Turkish culture prevailed.¹⁵³ What was clear from these regulations was that Turkish culture came to be a main criterion in determining the policy of settlement. This was accomplished on the basis of external (migration and refugees) and internal (position of nomads and different ethnic and religious groups) factors.

In the Law, the term *muhacir*, as established in Article 3, was used to refer to all settled and nomadic groups from the *Türk ırkı* (Turkish race), and to all settled peoples belonging to the Turkish culture, who lived in foreign countries, especially in the Balkans, and wanted to migrate to Turkey as permanent settlers.¹⁵⁴ Indeed, in practice as

region". And he said, "the government will describe their boundaries with a map." Ibid., 148. It seems obvious that the first region included places of the Eastern region mostly inhabited by the people with Kurdish origin; yet the second one included areas where people speaking Turkish were dominant groups. The forceful migration of the Kurds toward western regions, especially in the mid-1930s, may be evaluated in this re-mapping. For the migrations, see İsmail Beşikçi, *Kürtlerin Mecburi İskanı* [Compulsory Re-settlement of the Kurds] (İstanbul: Komel Yayınevi, 1978). The third one included for example militarily sensitive regions. Among these areas were the Dardanelles and Thrace where the displacement of the Jews occurred in 1934. See Aktar, *Varlık*, 71-99.

¹⁵³ This was determined in Article 12. See *ibid.*, 144. Similarly Article 13 established those who were not going to settle in the second region set aside for immigrants, refugees, nomads of the same region and those transferred from the first and third regions. See *ibid.*, 145. Both Articles were amended with the Law no. 5098/13, 18/6/1947.

¹⁵⁴ The basic reasons for such a policy of migration appeared to re-populate Anatolia and nationalize and modernize the Turks of the Balkans who had been free from the effects of the Turkish Revolution. Emphasizing the second point, Yaşar Nabi evaluated their migration as necessary, because they had been untouched by the Revolution which was creating 'civilized' life forms. So there began to emerge a huge gap between "the Turks of homeland and those Turks of the Balkans who are still using old letters in their schools, consulting with religious men in their daily affairs and wearing red fez." For him, before getting deeper, this gap had to be removed, which

well as its official account, the Turkish race was not depicted merely in racial and ethnic terms, but as a sign of affiliation, and so the wish to be part of Turkish culture came as a basic criterion in the definition.¹⁵⁵ It was clear in the Law that anyone who was accepted as a *muhacir* was easily and immediately naturalized, but, as made it clear in Article 4, “those who did not belong to the Turkish culture,” “anarchists,” “spies,” “nomadic gypsies” and “exiles” were excluded. A and B Paragraphs of Article 7 determined the *muhacir*’s freedom of choosing where they settled; “the migrants of Turkish origin” would be free to choose the suitable places to dwell, but “those of non-Turkish origin” would have to settle where the government would approve for them; otherwise their Turkish citizenship would be withdrawn.¹⁵⁶ Although the former groups would settle in the first and second regions, the latter would only settle in the second one.¹⁵⁷ This means that membership to the Turkish culture was accessible to those who were Muslims living in the Balkans and Caucasia with or without Turkish ethnic origin.¹⁵⁸ Because of their

would be realized only through their migration to Turkey. See Yaşar Nabi, “Balkanlardaki Türkler” [The Turks of the Balkans]. *Varlık*. 22 (1 June 1934), 1.

¹⁵⁵ During the sessions on the Law, one of the heated discussion was on the usage of the term *soy* (in its broader sense, race). B. Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of Interior Affairs, proposed the term *ırk* (which may be roughly translated as race) instead of *soy*, which was accepted. In his usage, and that of other defenders in the Parliament, *ırk* came to mean a comprising term expressing more than racial ties. On this account, Mustafa Reşit stated, “those who have migrated to Turkey but do not belong to Turkish culture were called Turks from a racial point of view. But due to being not part of Turkish culture, they do not speak Turkish. In fact, they are our true citizens and also true brothers.” See *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. IV, C. 23, 7-6-1934, 144-145.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 142. In 1947 these two items were dropped from the Law with a rearrangement, Law no. 5098/13, 18/6/1947.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 144-145.

¹⁵⁸ Although the migration of Muslim groups (Bosnians, Albanians, Macedonians) from both the Balkans and the Caucasus were accepted, the migrations of

Ottoman background they were thought of as Turks who had forgotten their language. Therefore in the official discourse those immigrants could not be called “Bosnian,” “Albanian,” “Circassian,” “Georgian,” or “Laz,” which had all been allowed as different languages in the Ottoman “cosmopolitan structure.” The basic difference was just linguistic, which would be overcome through Turkification policies bringing about linguistic integration.¹⁵⁹ The leading RPP elite, Recep Peker, previously set this official mode, in 1931, in the following way:

[W]e consider as ours those of our fellow citizens who live among us, who politically and socially belong to the Turkish Nation and who have been inculcated with ideas of sentiments like ‘Kurdism’, ‘Circassianism’ and even ‘Lazism’ and ‘Pomakism’. We consider it as our duty to end, by sincere efforts, these false conceptions inherited from the absolutist regime and which are the products of long historical oppression.¹⁶⁰

Here it was evident that Muslim people with a different language or of non-Turkish origin were to be deemed part of Turkish culture. The other main issue emphasized during the session on the Law was the position of the non-Muslim groups (Greeks, Armenians and Jews). They had been previously called Turks only in respect to citizenship, but not to nationality. But it was possible for these groups to accept the Turkish culture through being linguistically and culturally assimilated.¹⁶¹ The debate on

the Gagavuz Turks, a small Turkish group with a Christian origin, were rejected. See Selçuk Akşin Somel, “Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Türk Kimliği” [Turkish Identity from the Ottoman to the Republic], in *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik* [Republic, Democracy and Identity], ed. Nuri Bilgin (İstanbul: Bağlam Yay., 1997), 81.

¹⁵⁹ These were stressed in the Parliament by Ruşeni Bey (deputy of Samsun). See *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. IV, C. 23, 7-6-1934, 69-79.

¹⁶⁰ Quoted in Poulton, *The Top Hat*, 123.

the status of different ethnic and racial/religious groups continued during the discussion on *Soyadı Kanunu* (the Law of Surname) occurring in the same month, where the official line was on their assimilation into the Turkish nation.¹⁶² All these show that the Turkish culture was open to non-Muslim groups as well as non-Turkish Muslim groups, who were accepted as members of the Turkish nation and state so long as they were willing to integrate culturally and linguistically or assimilate into the Turkish culture. The way to be a Turkish citizen was the desire to be assimilated into the Turkish culture that manifested a civilized and westernized life-world.

With regard to some of the people in the boundaries of Turkey, the Law brought forth the rearrangement of the status of nomadic tribes and nomadic gypsies, and the abolishment of the *aşiret*, a sort of tribal social group in the Eastern region of Turkey especially among the Kurds. By the former regulation (Article 9 of the Law) the

¹⁶¹ In fact their Turkishness was proved through the works on history and language of the new Regime. On the issue Ruşeni Bey said, “one day they will understand the benefits of being a Turk and feeling Turkish.” Regarding the Jews, he went on saying, “it is not necessary to exile them. But according to our law, these people with high trading capabilities may mix with the Turks. This does not only honour them but is also beneficial for them. In fact, they do not have another alternative to be *represented*” (my emphasis). See *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. IV, C. 23, 7-6-1934, 70. Indeed this was seen as a part of debates on the status of the non-Muslim communities and their assimilation continuing during the formative decades of the Republic.

¹⁶² On the critics of Refet Bey who claimed to disapprove of the abolishment of names of foreign race and nation, B. Şükrü Kaya insisted about its necessity. “The main task of a country”, said he, “is to merge and represent in its own community everybody within its borders... If the Ottomans had had such a thing, today we would have a country extended to the Danube... So it is our urgent responsibility to make them part of the civilization of Turkish society and make them benefit from civilization. Why do we still call the names of Kürt Memet, Çerkes Hasan, Laz Ali. Such a thing reflects the weakness of the dominant group... It is not correct to allow these differences. If anyone feels anything different, we will erase it in schools and society. And then he will be a Turk as well as myself, and serve the nation.” *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. IV, vol. 23, 21-6-1934, 249. For the Law, see *Resmi Gazete* [Official Gazette], “Soyadı Kanunu” [the Law of Surname], n. 2741 (Ankara: Prime Ministry, July 2, 1934), 506.

Revolutionary elite strove to settle, educate and tame those nomadic groups, which coincided with Abdülhamit II's and the CUP's efforts of forceful settlements in the name of making them "civilized." Those groups not belonging to the Turkish culture would be settled in towns (but not as a group), and also through scattering they would be settled in villages of Turkish culture.¹⁶³ Such a regulation, as B. Şükrü Kaya (Interior Minister) stated, was inescapable because "[T]hey are deprived of humanist, moral, national and political education and training. The fruits of the Republic have not yet reached to them... This law included the rules to make those citizens *civilized* and *improved*" (my emphasis).¹⁶⁴ According to Paragraphs A and B of Article 10 of the Law, the *aşiret* was no longer acknowledged as a legal personality; all previous rights and titles *-reis* (chiefdom), *bey* (master), *ağa* (feudal lord), *şeyh* (sheik)- associated with tribes, stemming from either some legal or traditional structure, were brought to an end. Ç Paragraph stated that those members of an *aşiret* who were Turkish citizens but did not belong to the Turkish culture would be settled separately in the second region, and other nomadic *aşiret*, of Turkish citizens and culture, would be settled in other suitable places.¹⁶⁵ Thus, the tendency to destroy the local, traditional power centers through

¹⁶³ *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. IV, V. 23, 7-6-1934, 143.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 141.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 144. Together with Item C anticipating the forceful migration of *reis*, *ağa*, *şeyh*, and their families living in the borders, Item Ç was amended with the Law no. 5098/13, 18/6/1947. The status of the *aşiret* also became an issue in the Parliament during the session on the Law of Surnames immediately after the Law of Settlement. Then B. Şükrü Kaya described *aşiret* life as a social organization belonging to the Middle Ages, and, today, as a source of division among the people. There existed more than 200 *aşirets* in the Eastern region. For him, if they were not abolished, they would become autonomous entities within the Turkish nation. See *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. IV, C. 23, 21-6-1934, 246.

closing of *tekkes*, *zaviyes* and *medreses* in the mid-1920s culminated in the elimination of the remaining sections of particularistic, traditional affiliations in the society. These intermediary structures had to be destroyed, for these “last social organizations of the Middle Ages” were regarded as “unnatural”, “archaic” structures threatening the new “Turkish social entity” based on “the unity of language, culture and ideal”.¹⁶⁶ That was why they were regarded as chief obstacles on the part of the state agencies to reach those people and so to form a “cultured,” high society composed of equal citizens, which would be free from all traditional affiliations. In fact, both regulations might be conceived mainly in terms of the Kemalist civilizing tendency in creating the community of *cultured equals*.

The Law, as mentioned above, was mainly focused on linguistic and cultural integration. The main measure was to scatter individuals with different languages and different cultures. Its 11th Article brought the ban on “the establishment of a village and a quarter in towns, workers’ and artisans’ organizations, composed of individuals whose mother tongue was not Turkish”, or “such individuals monopolizing a village, a quarter, a job or a craft for their same kind.”¹⁶⁷ At the same time, it charged the Ministry of Interior Affairs with an authority to remove the people, of different culture or language, who had previously established a separate group, to other places, but not as a whole. The duration of settlement was described in Article 27: the government-led settlers (*Muhacir*, refugees, nomads and those who were transferred from the first region) had to live at least for ten years in the places they were settled by the government. Nevertheless, those who were

¹⁶⁶ See Neşet Hakkı’s statements, *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. IV, C. 23, 7-6-1934, 68.

transferred from the first and third regions to the second one, and from one place to another within the second region, could not leave their settlement places even after ten years.¹⁶⁸

The rationale for all the above measures was to provide “cultural unity” by destroying the social basis of various linguistic and cultural groups, and so preventing them from organizing as separate communities where they would maintain their distinct languages and manners. Here it was aimed at fusing them with the people speaking the “Turkish language” and belonging to the “Turkish culture” through providing for their linguistic and cultural integration into the nation. That is, the goal was to create, in the words of Şükrü Kaya, “a nation/country with one language, one thought and one feeling.”¹⁶⁹ This is the logic of cultural and linguistic assimilation, not simply based on ethnic or racist concerns. This quest to make “similar” is of course much more than simply making all people speak the same language. Also, homogenization meant sharing and internalizing a “civilized” way of life, manufactured at the center. In this regard, speaking the same language as a first step gained the utmost significance for the Republican rulers. Under a “modern” canopy, emerging as the form of an imagined community, all citizens were going to be “cultured” equals appropriating the “Turkish culture.” In short, as an official document, it implies in a general sense boundary making in such a way that the boundaries of the Turkish culture were differentiated from its “reactionary” and “particularistic” surroundings.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 144. This article was amended with the Law no. 5098/13, 18/6/1947.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 148. 27 Article was dropped from the Law in 1947.

4.3.4. The Institutional Base of the Kemalist Conception of Culture: The People Houses as “a Fount of Culture for the Turkish People”¹⁷⁰

Within these boundaries efforts were made to construct and disseminate the new Turkish culture seen indispensable for being a modern society. During the early 1930s, overlapping with the ideological turn in the process of culture production, new cultural institutions were established to realize this goal. In this sense, in 1931, as a “cultural institution of the Revolution”¹⁷¹, the People’s Houses were founded with a mission of transforming the masses into a more “elegant” and “cultured” form.¹⁷² Working as a cultural branch of the RPP the Houses came to be the centers of adult education, thought of in terms of *halk terbiyesi* (the people’s training and education).¹⁷³ In this regard, it was obvious that the Houses replaced the Turkish Hearths (*Türk Ocağı*) that had served as the

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 141.

¹⁷⁰ This was the motto of İzmir’s People’s Houses displayed at its entrance. See EHUD HOUMINER, “The People’s Houses in Turkey.” *Asian and African Studies*. 1 (1965), 86.

¹⁷¹ The expression belongs to B. ŞÜKRÜ KAYA, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the General Secretary of the RPP. B. ŞÜKRÜ KAYA, “Halkevleri’nin Açılış Konferansı” [Opening Speech of the People’s Houses]. *Ülkü*. 61 (March 1938), 9. The rationale for its establishment was to turn the immature masses into a collective, conscious and cultural entity. Ibid., 5.

¹⁷² RECEP PEKER, in the opening speech of the People’s Houses, frankly expressed the rationale for establishing the People’s Houses. For him, the Houses were founded to carry out the people’s education and training beside the regular school education. This sort of education would make the nation a collective whole sharing a similar ideal. For the text of his speech, see RECEP PEKER, “Halkevleri Açılma,” 6.

¹⁷³ For one representative example of how the terms *halk terbiyesi* was conceived among the elite circle, see HAMİT ZÜBEYİR (KOŞAY), “Halk Terbiyesi Vasıtaları” [Vehicles for Training/Educating People]. *Ülkü*. 2 (February 1933), 152-159.

centers of adult education.¹⁷⁴ In fact during the 1920s the Hearths were used as effective agents by the ruling elite to make the people adapt to new standards.

The establishment of the Turkish Hearth went back to the early years of the 1910s. Until the mid-1925, under the effect of young pioneers of Turkism, especially Ziya Gökalp, it had served as centers of refining and diffusing the ideals of Turkism. Attaching more importance to the need for such cultural organization, the rulers of the new regime supported its organization to be nation-wide and tried to give it semi-official status.¹⁷⁵ Here the aim was to propagate the necessity and benefits of the reforms.¹⁷⁶ At first sight, it targeted especially young people who were seen as more ready to accept new ideals.¹⁷⁷ By 1930, once the rulers realized that their cultural policies had failed in indoctrinating the new standards, a desire to make reforms in the Turkish Hearths came

¹⁷⁴ See Kemal H. Karpat, "The People's Houses in Turkey, Establishment and Growth." *The Middle East Journal*. 17 (1963), 59.

¹⁷⁵ The Turkish Hearths took semi-official status, by the 1927 Congress of the RPP making the Hearths the RPP's cultural branch. See Yusuf Sarınoy, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Tarihi Gelişimi ve Türk Ocakları, 1912-1931* [The Historical Development of Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Hearths, 1912-1931] (İstanbul: Ötüken, 1994), 308.

¹⁷⁶ In this regard, the Turkish Hearths, as Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver) -the president of the Hearths- said during its Second Congress, were committed to work for "the Turkish nation passing from one civilization to another"... as "representatives of Westernism." See Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, *Seçmeler* [Selections], ed. M. N. Sepetçioğlu (İstanbul: MEB Yay., 1971), 72-73.

¹⁷⁷ To this end, the Turkish Hearths used "every device of the missionary technique - the school, the dispensary, the spoken and printed word, the talkie and the movie to convert the youth of the country to the new ways." Wortham, *Mustafa Kemal*, 180. For more details on the Turkish Hearths, see Füsün Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları, 1912-1931* [Turkish Nationalism from the Empire to the Nation-State: The Turkish Hearths, 1912-1931] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1997); Yusuf Bayraktutan, *Türk Fikir Tarihinde Modernleşme, Milliyetçilik ve Türk Ocakları*

to the fore.¹⁷⁸ The Hearths began to be conceived as insufficient to meet the needs of the civilizing rulers who wished to create a new culture free from all particularisms. That is to say, the ruling elite believed that the Hearths failed to provide mass politico-cultural education and indoctrination on the basis of new ideas they put forward. Perhaps the most important rationale for this was that the influence of Ziya Gökalp's formulation of culture that gave special importance to the living values in the definition of "authentic" culture was still felt among the circle of this institution. Beside this ideological difference, with the semi- autonomous status, the Hearths continued to be the means of potential political opposition for the new regime. Then in 1931 they were compelled to close, and the Hearths' property was transferred to the RPP.

In this context, the establishment of the People's Houses was in direct relation to the revolutionary rulers' efforts of monopolizing the legitimate use of culture in the context of a firm one-party system. This monopolization of use of culture gave the Houses a unique position in the civilizing process from above, especially in bringing the values of the Republic to the ordinary people.¹⁷⁹ The expectation was that the Houses

[Modernization, Nationalism and the Turkish Hearths in the History of Turkish Thought] (Ankara: Kültür Bak. Yay., 1996); Sarıay, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin*.

¹⁷⁸ For the necessity of reform in the Hearths, see Reşit Saffet (Atabinen), "Milli Tarih" [National History], in *Atatürk Dönemi Fikir Hayatı II* (original publication 1930), 237. All discussions on the status and works of the Hearths occurred around the ideological disorder, and, as implicitly emphasized, the uncontrollable structure of the Hearths. See Karpas, "The People's," 57.

¹⁷⁹ The Houses, from the beginning, had organic ties with the ruling party, the RPP, by working as its cultural branch. Only the members of the RPP and civil servants could become administrators in the Houses. See *CHF Halkevleri Talimatnamesi* [The RPP's Regulations of the People's Houses] (Ankara, 1934), 72. Even all officials and party leaders were ordered to become active members of the Houses, by an official decree (19/7/1932, n. 13178). See Karpas, "The People's," 59. Only the RPP's Central Committee had an authority to open a People's House and determine its general policy.

would be the places where new cultural ideals and images, manufactured and advanced by the THS and TLS and other cultural institutions of the RPP, would be disseminated and those from all strata of society would be indoctrinated.¹⁸⁰ In other words, the Houses were the institutions of the dissemination of ideological principles and practices produced at the center. This made it a house of cultivation where the “Turk-human” would be processed and advanced.¹⁸¹ Here “cultivation,” or perhaps more correctly “culturation,” meant an intervention by means of constant training and education in order to, in the words of Cevat Nasuhi, “provide a harmony and unity among *differences* in soul and

See Ibid. In addition to this, the leading elite of the RPP such as Mustafa Kemal, İ. İnönü, R. Peker, A. Kansu, C. Bayar, and many others “often visited the People’s Houses and closely supervised their operation.” Houminer, “The People’s,” 110.

¹⁸⁰ Its goal was, in the words of B. Şükrü Kaya, to “raise the level of the people with respect to culture and knowledge, and to make the ideals and reforms of Kemalism reach the hearts of the People.” Şükrü Kaya, “Halkevleri’nin”. For this purpose, a series of conferences was held in the People’s Houses to teach and spread ‘positive’ knowledge necessary for everyday life. The RPP asked for some specialists (especially from the universities) to give lectures at the People Houses B. Şükrü Kaya, “Önsöz” [Preface] to *Spor-Sağlık-Kültür* [Sport-Health-Culture] (Ankara: CHP Yay., 1938); for the lectures given at some Houses by 1939 see “Halkevleri’nin Yedinci Yıldönümü ve 158 Halkevi’nin Daha Açılışı – Halkevleri’ne Toplu Bir Bakış” [The Seventh Anniversary of the People’s Houses and The Opening of 158 New Houses – A General Outlook on the People’s Houses]. *Ülkü*. 73 (March 1939), 83-84.

¹⁸¹ Stressing this act of cultivation, Cevdet Nasuhi made an analogy between natural sciences and a kind of social engineering and wrote: “What the farmers do in the fields is an act of cultivating, implanting. A bacteriologist’s effort to grow up a colony of bacterium in a test tube is an act of cultivating. A state of mind arouse through implanting into human mind is also an act of cultivating... Of course, in their essence, there are a great difference between the third one and the former two.” Cevdet Nasuhi, “Halkevinin Çatısı Altında” [Under the Canopy of the People’s Houses]. *Ülkü*. Nisan (1933), 1. This stand reflects a rigid belief in (natural) science and its social science version, positivism, which in the case of Kemalism ended in the search of the political elite for examining and ordering social structure as scientists did with objects. In fact it is also parallel to the credence in the will of human beings intervening into the works of society.

consciousness, prevailing in the society” (my emphasis).¹⁸² For him, it had to be thought in terms of national identification. It is for this reason that:

The People’s Houses are the places of those who strive to create a collective consciousness, that is, a cultivation of the “Turk-human”, and to cultivate the minds of citizens with our own personality, history, language, art and knowledge...Our characters belong only to us. In the next years it will be our main task to collect, manufacture and mature them... Under the umbrella of the Houses, we are cultivating a common language, belief, affection and ideal.¹⁸³

This act of cultivation was, as another pro-Kemalist stressed, occurring around “revolutionary education” (*inkılap terbiyesi*) that mainly included the information of the homeland and life, learning how to be civilized and patriotic citizens.¹⁸⁴ According to the RPP elite, the result would be melting of the people into a social body, coming more and more close to “new way of life.”¹⁸⁵ It was in this respect that everybody was encouraged to participate in all activities of the Houses, and the sense of belonging was aimed to generate through eliminating all their particular attachments.

In addition to the function of dissemination, the People’s Houses provided to some extent information and raw materials to the central institutions which were charged to produce official ideologies.¹⁸⁶ The collection of information occurred mainly around

¹⁸² Ibid., 2.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 4.

¹⁸⁴ See Hıfzırâhman Raşit Öymen, “Köy Eğitimi ve Bize Göre Yeni Köy Pedagojisi” [Village Education and a New Village Pedagogy for Us]. *Varlık*. 82 (1 İlkkanun 1936), 147.

¹⁸⁵ See Recep Peker, “Recep Peker’in Yeni Halkevlerini Açma Nutku” [Recep Peker’s Opening speech of New People’s Houses]. *Ülkü*. 37 (March 1936), 2, 4.

the collection of raw materials such as the active participation of the TLS campaign of collecting words from various dialects in Turkey, of the THS efforts for obtaining old texts and historical remnants, and of some folk tales and songs. In its broadest sense, these may be seen as attempts to discover and describe the nature of the people that in the hands of the civilizing elite came to be an object of social engineering. In fact this act of “knowing” would make them project a “well-refined” way of life from above.

As stated above, the basic goal of the People’s Houses was to transform the immature masses into a more ‘civilized’ people regarded akin to the true nation. In addition to that, as Karaömerlioğlu argues, the Houses were charged with providing the affinity of the intelligentsia to the principles of Kemalism.¹⁸⁷ In other words, the Houses were seen as places where the literate and the members of upper classes would be tamed. From the early 1930s, the Kemalist elite understood that there was still doubts among intellectuals about the revolutionary reforms. Urging them to participate in the House activities came with the will to make them loyal to the state and its ideology. In all writings on the Houses during the 1930s, the intelligentsia and literate who had been “tamed” were portrayed as civilizing missionaries going to meet and join the people in the Houses.¹⁸⁸ That is, beside the schoolteachers, officials and members of the Party,

¹⁸⁶ As Öztürkmen argues, the Houses fulfilled the function of transferring “information to such central organizations [the TLS and the THS] for the formulation of these ideologies and projects.” Arzu Öztürkmen, “The Role of People’s Houses in the Making of National Culture in Turkey.” *New Perspectives on Turkey*. 11 (Fall 1994), 160.

¹⁸⁷ M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, “The People’s Houses and the Cult of the Peasant in Turkey.” *Middle Eastern Studies*. 34/4 (1998), 69; also see Walter F. Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and its Aftermath* (Laiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), 179.

being the carriers and spreaders of a new way of life, they were driven to take part in the Houses in civilizing the people. Here the basic aim was to overcome a deep cultural chasm between the elite and ordinary people through raising the cultural level of the latter to the former. This shows that even among the elite groups the possibility of the emergence of different life forms, even “being modernized” in a different way, was not easily welcomed.

To achieve this end, the activities of the People’s Houses concentrated, more than anything else, on cultural issues. In a People’s House there could be nine main divisions: 1) Language, Literature and History, 2) Fine Arts 3) Dramatics, 4) Sports, 5) Social Assistance, 6) Public Classes and Courses, 7) Library and Publishing, 8) Peasantism, 9) Museums and Exhibitions.¹⁸⁹ In these divisions, there occurred activities ranging from politico-cultural education by means of lectures, propaganda films and ceremonies to giving some practical information on farming techniques. Among them lectures, music concerts, performances and exhibitions came to the fore to generate in the hearts of the people a love for Western-style music, taste, fine arts and the modernist principles of Kemalism.¹⁹⁰ In general the RPP elite strictly controlled the forms and

¹⁸⁸ For typical examples, see Zübeyir (Koşay), “Halk Terbiyesi”; Şükrü Kaya, “Halkevleri’nin”, 8; Behçet Kemal Çağlar, “Halkevleri Çalışmaları” [The Activities of the People’s Houses]. *Ülkü*. 73 (March 1939), 85-87.

¹⁸⁹ At the opening ceremony of the Houses, Reşit Galip explained these branches in detail and what kind of activities each branch would maintain. See *Hakimiyet-I Milliye*, 20 February 1932. Due to the main tendency of the official ideology, the first, second, seventh, eighth and ninth divisions were seen as more essential. See Karpat, “The People’s,” 60.

¹⁹⁰ For example, in 1938, there occurred 2827 lectures, 1420 concerts, 1703 performances, and 267 exhibitions in 209 Houses with 136,500 active members. For the statistics of all activities year by year from 1932 to 1938, see “Halkevleri’nin Yedinci,” 82. In 1943 the number of concerts, film shows and art exhibitions held in the Houses was

contents of all these activities in this sense that Ankara People's House, under the direct control of the Secretary General of the RPP, was used as a model for others, where plays and compositions chosen for the People's Houses were first performed.

As argued above, the Houses, as one of the constituting agents of the civilizing process from above, served to function as a social and cultural milieu where mode of behaving, dressing, speaking, attending a public meeting or concert, and mode of eating were shown in explicit or implicit ways. This was possible through many new social activities like dance parties, balls, dramatic representations, concerts, exhibitions, lectures, national celebration days,¹⁹¹ and so on. In addition, a House was the only public hall and "legitimate" organization in town, it was used for some local celebration and activities.¹⁹² The Houses tried to be constituted as a social space where not only politico-cultural education and adopting civilized manners could take place, but also people were encouraged to use the Houses for individual activities such as weddings and circumcisions. In such way some of the tradition of the age-old ceremonies and other practices were aimed to be civilized according to modern standards, and new artistic and aesthetic forms were introduced. Within this broad framework, the Houses were designed to serve as the places of both entertainment and leisure time.¹⁹³ In time, the People's

impressive. See *Halkevleri ve Halkodaları* [The People's Houses and the People's Rooms] (Ankara, 1943).

¹⁹¹ National celebration days, or "commemoration days," included "the foundation of the Great National Assembly as Children's Day on 23 April, the final defeat of the Greek Army as Victory Day on 30 August; the proclamation of the Republic on 29 September and many others marking symbols of national history, were enthusiastically celebrated by the People's Houses throughout the country." Öztürkmen, "The Role of," 167.

¹⁹² See Houminer, "The People's," 90.

Houses played a most important role in creating a significant social base for the Republic. They produced the new generations that had adopted new cultural styles and Westernized life forms promoted by the state.

4.4. Culture in the Official Discourse During the İnönü Period (1938-1945)

After the death of Atatürk on November 1938, the period of *Milli Şef* (National Leader) signifying the rule of İsmet İnönü began in Turkish politics. From this time on, Atatürk became *Ebedi Şef* (Eternal Leader). As second man in the Atatürk era, İnönü had come to the fore as one of the most persistent pioneers of the radical westernizing policies. Following the path of Atatürk, the politics of culture in his presidency were bound up with similar ideals in conformity with the efforts to create a westernized, high culture in the previous epoch. It went one step even further in the new epoch. Being devoted to the idea that the culture of “civilized” nations was high culture and, when adopted, the problem of backwardness would be solved, İnönü and his collaborators urged a widespread cultural crusade by means of educational mobilization. As in previous decades, the reason was, to be part of cultural milieu of the West was only possible through transforming the society and instilling secular ideals and tastes of the ruling elite. To this end, during his reign, the state put forward some cultural policies such as the translation of classical works into Turkish, setting up operas and conservatories, spreading village schools, establishing the Village Institutes and People’s Rooms, and even making classical Greek and Latin compulsory courses for high schools.

¹⁹³ See Sirer, “Halkevlerinin.”

In this respect, in the İnönü era, there were two main steps in maintaining the process of culture production. The first was to accelerate the “scientific” studies on Turkish history and language and to spread the activities of arts. The second, to make the masses (especially the peasants who constituted 80 per cent of the people according to the 1940 census¹⁹⁴) appropriate all constructed myths, symbols and rituals of their own. The latter was clearly expressed in the 1939 program of the RPP that put strong emphasis on the cultural and political education of the peasants through village schools (led by missionary school-teachers trained in *Köy Enstitüleri* – the Village Institutes) and People’s Rooms.¹⁹⁵ In other words, the transformation of the peasants became the new motto of the RPP’s program.

4.4.1. “Humanicizing” Culture

In fact, the first step was in harmony with the efforts made during the Atatürk era, manufacturing a life-world and normative order through the works of new cultural institutions (the THS, the TLS, music conservatories, schools of fine art, the People’s Houses) and, for this purpose, subsidizing the activities and performances of the theatre, operas, bale, orchestra. But now the difference was that the official ideology came under

¹⁹⁴ Frederic C. Shorter, “Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Nüfus Yapısı ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Değişmeye Etkisi” [The population Structure and its Impact on Socio-Economic Changes in the First Years of the Republic], in *Türkiye’de Sosyal Bilim Araştırmalarının Gelişimi* [The Development of Social Science Research in Turkey], ed. Sevil Atauz (Ankara: Türk Sosyal Bilimler Derneği, 1986), 353. Also for some statistics on the late 1930s, see *Köy Enstitüleri, 1* [The Village Institutes, 1] (İstanbul: Maarif Matbası, 1941), 1-4.

the influence of an intellectual movement, called Humanism.¹⁹⁶ Hasan Ali Yücel, as the minister of education in the governments from 1939 to 1945 came to the fore as the most significant figure in determining the cultural policies of the state, adopted it as part and parcel of the official cultural policy. It was based on the official efforts to prove the roots of modern civilization and culture belonged to the ancient Turks. On the issue, Hasan Ali Yücel declared, “nationalist understanding brought us to a new humanism. We are now on the path of forming humanism comprising all products of the human mind.”¹⁹⁷ The seeds of this movement can be found in the early 1930s in some translations from Greek classics by Yakup Kadri and Ruşen Eşref and some studies of Nüşet Haşim and Nurullah Ataç.¹⁹⁸ In 1935, this orientation turned into a movement with the efforts of a group of intellectuals around *Yücel*, a periodical, called as *Yücelciler* (belonging to *Yücel*). Their basic aim was to provide a milieu where Turkish humanism could flourish. Around this ideal, the movement anticipated a cultural transformation in Turkey, which would take place in accordance with Turkey’s realities. For that purpose, the first step was the translation of all classics into Turkish and then the internalization of their spirit.¹⁹⁹ As Kazım Nami (Duru), more close to the ruling circle of the 1930s as one of its

¹⁹⁵ See Kemal Ünal, “C. H. P. Beşinci Kurultayı” [The RPP’s Fifth Congress]. *Ülkü*. 77 (July 1939), 388-389.

¹⁹⁶ In writing this section the intention is not to give the ideological roots and contents of the movement, but just to elaborate its impact on the official ideology

¹⁹⁷ *Cumhurbaşkanları, Başbakanlar ve Milli Eğitim Bakanları’nın Milli Eğitim ile ilgili Söylev ve Demeçleri* [Speeches and Statements of Presidents, Prime Ministers and Ministers of Education on National Education], vol. III (Ankara, 1946), 13.

¹⁹⁸ See Suat Sinanoğlu, *Türk Hürmanizmi* [Turkish Humanism], 2nd ed. (Ankara: TTK, 1988), 92.

representatives, claimed, the translation of the classics would provide for the development of modern literature and the national language, and at the same time, most importantly, “*fikri terbiye*” (intellectual training/education).²⁰⁰ For him, his act was not contrary to Turkish nationalism, but even supported it. This previous intellectual movement in the 1938-1946 period began to gain root as part of the “official cultural ideology”, and so it had some effects on all cultural and educational mechanisms of the state and even on school textbooks.

In this official humanist understanding, greater emphasis was placed on the Greco-Latin roots of western civilization. In fact, it was this reorientation which gave way to a new reinterpretation of the Kemalist notion of civilization and history thesis. According to the new understanding, “the source of modern civilization was the classic Greek and Roman cultures”, not central Asia, and so it was necessary to learn its basic masterpieces to be part of it.²⁰¹ In order to raise consciousness of the continuity in the historical development of Western culture, classical Greek and Latin began to be taught

¹⁹⁹ For the program, subject and method of “Turkish humanism”, see Orhan Burian, “Hümanizma ve Biz” [Humanism and We]. *Yücel*. 62 (1935) and see his other two articles with same title, in n. 63 and 64. For the movement, see Tunaya, *Türkiye'nin*, 158-159.

²⁰⁰ Kazım Nami, “Humanizma,” 335.

²⁰¹ In his essay on the necessity of education of classical languages, Reşat Şemsettin Sirer (Director of Higher Education, Ministry of Education) implicitly negated the Turkish history thesis by associating ‘modern, European civilization’ with ancient Greek and Latin roots but not with the East and Central Asia. For him ancient civilizations such as Central Asia, Sumerian, Egypt, Hind, China, Anatolia and so on, were all different in large measures from modern civilization by their essence. On the other hand all modern qualities can be found in classical Greek and Rome cultures. See Reşat Şemsettin Sirer, *Klasik Kültürü Tanımanın ve Dilleri Öğrenmenin Faydaları* [Benefits of Knowing Classical Culture and Learning Its Languages] (Ankara: TTK, 1942), especially 35, 39-44.

in some high schools.²⁰² This was based on the belief that to know these languages would make it easier to understand the evolution and true nature of modern civilization and to feel as part of this genealogy.²⁰³

In addition to that, another important activity was the translation of classical and modern literary and philosophical works into Turkish. For this purpose, in 1940, as a part of the Ministry of Education, *Tercüme Bürosu* (Bureau of Translation) was set up. Its goal was to translate all classics into Turkish in a systematic and “scientific” way and to watch and criticize the activities of translation.²⁰⁴ To this end, the Bureau began to

²⁰² For H. A. Yücel, both languages would serve to fill the void created by the removal of Arabic and Persian, which was “one of the manifestations of nationalism” as a result of “cultural understanding of the Republic.” See *Cumhurbaşkanları, Başbakanlar*, 13. To put into practice the teaching of these languages, from the beginning of the 1940-1941 educational year, *Klasik Kol* (Classic Branch) in three high schools was established. Then in 1949 it was abolished. See Hasan Cicioğlu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde İlk ve Ortaöğretim* [Primary and Secondary Education in the Republic of Turkey] (Ankara: DTCF Yay., 1985), 141.

²⁰³ See Sırer, *Klasik Kültür*, 35. In Sırer’s view, being the language of a life with high scientific and artistic qualities made Greek indispensable to establish a ‘civilized’ society for Turkey as in all modern nations. At the same time, Latin came to be the carrier of these qualities until then. *Ibid.*, 43-4. In a similar vein, Nurullah Ataç, one of the leading figures who had a great influence on the cultural policies of the İnönü period, saw both languages as the source and essence of the Western tradition, for “the Europeans achieved today’s state of mind, thought and level of civilization by learning both languages and making them the basis of their education.” Quoted in Sinanoğlu, *Humanizm*, 48.

²⁰⁴ See Cevdet Perin, *Atatürk Kültür Devrimi* [Atatürk’s Cultural Revolution], 4th ed. (İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1987), 148; Mustafa Çıkar, *Hasan-Ali Yücel ve Türk Kültür Reformu* [Hasan-Ali Yücel and Turkish Cultural Reform] (Ankara: T. İş Bankası, 1997), 81-84. Beside the Western classics, among the translated works, there were a few Islamic and Hindu classics, collected under the serial of Eastern-Islamic Classics. See *Cumhuriyetin XXI. Yıldönümünde Yayınlanan 105 Klasik ve Modern Eserin Listesi* [The List of 105 Classics and Modern Writings in the Sixteenth Anniversary of the Republic] (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1944), and *Cumhuriyetin XXII. Yıldönümünde Yayınlanan 129 Klasik ve Modern Eserin Listesi* [The List of 129 Classics and Modern Writings in the Seventeenth Anniversary of the Republic] (İstanbul: MEB, 1945).

publish a periodical called *Tercüme* (Translation). In his preface to its first issue, H. A. Yücel explained why they had taken up such an activity:

Civilization is a whole! With their different characters, the East, the West, the New World or the Old World, each may be respected as one appearing of such a whole. The intellectual background of cultural communication has always come into existence with the exchanges of language and written works everywhere.²⁰⁵

For him, the first sensorial stage of the essence of humanism was the acceptance of artistic works which were concrete expressions of human existence; thus, the activity of translation would make it possible for the Turks, by opening new gates, to better understanding of classical works of art.²⁰⁶ In this respect, the expectation was that translated “masterpieces” would contribute to the development of the culture of the Turkish nation.²⁰⁷ Culture that was provided in accordance with the new humanist utopia of the state elite seemed to reflect both a state of mind and a way of life.

4.4.2. Modernizing the Peasants: The Village Institutes and the People’s Rooms

²⁰⁵ Hasan Ali Yücel, “Önsöz” [Preface]. *Tercüme Dergisi*. 1 (1940).

²⁰⁶ For his views see “Preface” to the serial of world classics.

²⁰⁷ In the preface of the serial of world classics, in 1 August 1941, President İnönü wrote, “the translation of masterpieces which had been created in the artistic and intellectual fields from the ancient Greece would help those who wish to serve Turkish culture. It is natural to benefit from highly developed things to achieve perfected literature, fine arts and thoughts. For that reason, I believe that complete works of

As a second step of the state cultural policy, the modernizing elite now turned their face toward the countryside, which until that time had not been touched by the civilizing fingers of the state agencies to transmute their life style into more civilized and cultured form. In other words, the masses, especially the peasants, whose life had been becoming more and more distant from that of the center with the sweeping Kemalist reforms, had to adapt to a culture manufactured at the center. Besides, the peasants, in fact, lived in very miserable conditions, suffering huge material and economic deprivations. Their life was woven into strong kinship and feudal ties and traditional patterns were regarded as a threat to the Kemalist model of civilized Turkishmen. This new effort came to mean expanding cultural control of the modernizing center to the countryside. As indicated above, this new attitude took a significant place in the 1939 program of the RPP that set new measures to provide cultural education to the peasants and improve their life forms.¹ To this end, there were two main attempts; firstly, creating *Köy Enstitüleri* (Village Institutes) and spreading village schools, and secondly, establishing new People's Houses and founding *Halk Odaları* (People's Rooms). They were new agents of integrating the peasants into the center by means of setting up strict cultural control.

On the one hand, the Village Institutes² should be considered in terms of the general tendency of the Kemalist project of culture production. According to the main

¹ Ünal, "C. H. P.," 389. In this regard, the Program also included the goal to put the leisure times of the people to good use with some activities which would enhance their knowledge and civilized manners. Ibid. It was expected that the works and activities of the People's Houses and the People's Rooms would fulfill this goal.

² For the general organization of the Village Institutes, see *Köy Enstitüleri: 1*, 9-35, and for their characteristics and goals, see İ. Hakkı Tonguç, "Köy Eğitimi ve

pillars of the Turkish Revolution, as one of the state cultural institutions, the Village Institutes would undertake the responsibility of transforming the Turkish society, particularly Turkish villages.³

This was because the position of the peasants, who were considered to be *culturally* backward, was depicted as a deficit in the path of Westernization.⁴ The problem could only be solved through the development of the peasants, which meant that their life conditions would come close relatively to that of the civilized nations in terms of social, cultural and economic sense.⁵ However, this civilizing process had to be maintained locally, that is, “the peasants would be modernized in their resident places, in their villages.”⁶ What was important here was that the position of the peasants portrayed as “untamed” was needed for the efforts to make them “cultured,” although in the earlier

Öğretiminin Amaçları” [The Goals of Village education and Instruction], in *Köy Enstitüleri: 2* [The Village Institutes, 2] (Ankara: Maarif Matbaası, 1944), 4868.

³ See Fay Kirby, *Türkiye’de Köy Enstitüleri* [The Village Institutes in Turkey] (Ankara: İmece, 1962), 7.

⁴ When this regulation came on the agenda, over the 80 percent of the people lived in the villages and village-like small towns. Among them, only 10 percent were literate. This “underdeveloped” position of the rural hinterland was regarded as the basic reason to put into practice the project of rural transformation for integrating the peasants into the homogenous national whole. For this and the other detailed statistics on village life, see *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. 6, Vol. 10, S. Sayısı: 98, and also, see the speech of Hasan Ali Yücel, *ibid.*, 77-78.

⁵ On the issue for the views of İnönü, H. A. Yücel and Ali Suha Delilbaş (the Deputy of Kütahya), see *ibid.*, 76-79.

⁶ This was stated by Kazım Nami Duru, (the Deputy of Manisa). See *ibid.*, 75. The education of “the peasants by the peasants” was aimed in a way that the Village Institutes would create an elite among the peasants. See M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, “The Village Institutes Experience in Turkey.” *British Journal of Middle East Studies*. 25/1 (1998), 58-59.

phases of the Republican regime they were sometimes seen as the reservoir of national pride.⁷

The creation of the Village Institutes, in which İsmail Hakkı Tonguç– the leading pedagogue and one of the founding fathers of the Institutes - had a special role, was the first main step in the above mobilization. According to the Law on the Village Institutes, their goal was to train the village youths as primary-school teachers for village schools, who would give normal education to children and also provide some cultural and practical information to peasants, such as on agriculture and modes of behavior.⁸ But, for our purpose, the most important side of the Law was Article 10 which determined the role of village teacher not only as a mere teacher, but also a pedagogue who was responsible for the education of all residents in villages. According to the B paragraph of the Article, the mission of a village teacher was “to raise the national culture of the peasants, to train and educate them in accordance with the requirements and conditions of the age from the point of social life; to take necessary measures to spread and strengthen the positive values of village culture; to organize and direct ceremonies at the times of national festivals, school openings and local festivals, taking into account local songs and dances; to make them benefit from radios.” Also, the other five subsections of the paragraph determined his role as organizer in the economic and social life of the village.

⁷ For this ambivalence, see Kandiyoti, “Gendering,” 122-123.

⁸ As a preliminary stage, a Law (no. 3704) issued on 7 July 1939, brought the regulation on *Köy Eğitmen Kursları* (Village Instructor Courses) and *Köy Öğretmen Okulları* (Village Teacher Schools). After a one year trial, with a Law (no. 3803) issued on 17 April, 1940, the Village Teacher Schools were called *Köy Enstitüleri* (Village Institutes). For the full text of the Law on Village Institutes, see *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. 6, Vol. 10, 82-92 and S. Sayısı: 98. In 1942, Hasanoğlan High Village Institute was opened.

Article 11 of the Law describes the functions and responsibilities of peasants: they were charged with the obligation to help and work together with teachers while performing their functions determined in the previous article. If they did not do so, they would be punished.⁹ The question of why this role was given to village teachers can find its clear expression in the Law on Organizing Village Schools and Institutes:

If the peasants were not involved in the activities of schools, it would be impossible to spread the positive values of village culture; if they were not raised to the level of performing several duties by arousing their national consciousness, the activities of schools would not have any effect on the peasants. In order to rescue the villages from their unchanging and stagnant position and make them alive and active, the task of educating the adults of villages like students and join their life with the schools was given to village instructors and teachers.¹⁰

Here, teachers as agents of the state in the country were assigned a “role of prophet/leader.”¹¹ This mission appeared to be the basis of the state discourse that from the beginning gave teachers a leading role in constructing a new nation. So, as the representatives of power, they became the privileged class of the Republic. Now, they, “missioners of the Republic,”¹² had a new task of bringing civilization to the villages which were believed to have been suffocated by the archaic and traditional customs. In this regard, H. A. Yücel, during the discussions on the Law in the Parliament, said: “A

⁹ In a similar way, according to Article 25, peasants were obliged to work in the construction of village and district schools. For the relevant articles of the Law on Organizing Village Schools and Institutes (*Köy Okullarını ve Enstitülerini Teşkilatlandırma Kanunu*) (issued in 8 May 1942), see *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. 6, Vol. 26, S. Sayısı: 150, 16-17 and 23.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

¹¹ This expression belongs to Emin Sazak (deputy of Eskişehir), see *ibid.*, 62.

¹² This expression belongs to İsmail Hakkı Kılıçoğlu. *Ibid.*, 77.

village teacher is one who is the spreader, guard and instructor of the Republic and the Revolution. By means of these components, it will be possible to bring our secret values to our people living into remote villages.”¹³ For Tongu such teachers were being trained in the Institutes, for “the student of the Institutes like and believe the truth and the true qualities. They try to convince others to believe in them and disseminate these qualities.”¹⁴ Here what was portrayed as “the civilizing mission of the village teacher” was, in the words of Kandiyoti, “the struggle of science and enlightenment against ignorance and obscurantism.”¹⁵ At the heart of this struggle, it was their duty to make the peasants imagine themselves as part of the organic whole through putting in order and teaching “the right way” to them. To this end, all particularistic ethnic and linguistic affiliations would have to be sacrificed.¹⁶

That was why the basis of the process of establishing political and cultural control over the rural hinterland through civilizing was the main part of the formation of a

¹³ *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. 6, Vol. 26, 56. In the views of the rulers who prepared the Law, because they were equipped with all modern knowledge on the life of the ordinary people, there would not be any resistance to village teachers and so would be easily welcomed. *Ibid.*, 70.

¹⁴ Tongu, “Ky Eđitim,” 55.

¹⁵ Kandiyoti, “Gendering,” 122.

¹⁶ During the discussions on the Law at the Assembly, this tendency was emphasized as the core of the project. For example, on the issue, Feridun Fikri, deputy of Bingl, said that “since teachers became busy with the peasants, from the social, cultural and especially linguistic point of view, they have to rectify the language of the peasants, and so they have to indoctrinate them with all ideals of our fatherland, our nationality and our solidarity wherever they go. This should be taken into consideration especially for the eastern provinces of Turkey more than other places.” *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. 6, Vol. 10, 74-75.

homogenous national culture.¹⁷ It is in this regard that, like other cultural institutions of the Republic, the Village Institutes were charged with aiding the process of melting the heterogeneous structure of the society into a homogenous culture and constructing a national identity.¹⁸ At this point, it is worth-mentioning that during the discussions on the Law at the Assembly the basic critique came from Kazım Karabekir (the president of the Assembly). His point was that if the training of teachers were accomplished within the borders of the rural areas, there would exist two totally different cultures in the cities and villages because of completely different existing social and cultural conditions in both areas and the lack of interaction among them. His critiques were rejected loudly by Hasan Ali Yücel, K. N. Duru, Emin Sazak and Feridun Fikri. According to their assertions, culture was something that was constructed through applying a fixed program; that was why, after using similar techniques, instructing similar courses in the village schools and showing a similar mode of behavior to the peasants, it would not be possible for two different cultures in the cities and villages to come into being.¹⁹ Accordingly, the cultural mission of the Village Institutes was to make the peasants imagine themselves as citizens belonging to the culture of the new Turks; the citizen, as H. A. Yücel described, would be “well-informed, healthy, devoted to his country, and productive.”²⁰ In short, the Village Institutes were planned as new agents of the process of culture production to bring the Republican ideals to the rural hinterland. In the process of rural transformation, they

¹⁷ See Yeğen, *Devlet*, 200.

¹⁸ For the Institutes’ task of national identification of the peasants, see Karaömerlioğlu, “The Village Institutes,” 64.

¹⁹ For the discussions, see *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. 6, Vol. 10, 83-86.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 79.

would play their attributed role by promoting new social values, creating a sense of belonging, and reviving economic life. To put it in other words, in the civilizing and modernizing process from above, they seemed to be the agents to monitor and control the countryside by the modernist center.²¹

As mentioned above, the civilizing mission, of transforming the masses into more civilized and cultured form, was also attributed to the People's Houses. Until 1938, they were established only in the cities and towns; at the end of 1938, the number of the People's Houses had reached 209.²² Parallel to the new policy of bringing the revolutionary ideals to the masses of people, especially the peasants, there emerged the need for new People's Houses, and, resultantly, in 1939, 158 new Houses were opened in the countryside - small towns and some villages near urban areas.²³ Now, the Houses were on duty to work to increase the cultural and social level of all strata of the nation and society. The activities of the Houses were expanded to focus mainly on cultural education through stressing music, fine arts and some local artistic manifestations, while the ultimate aim, which was to diffuse "civilized" manners among the peasants through

²¹ During his reign (1938-1946), İnönü's support kept the Village Institutes in existence. With the transition to the multi-party period, which provided a suitable place for politically discontent to raise their voices, he was not strong enough to maintain his political and favored support. This caused the weakening of its support base because of its nature of reform from above which prevented it from taking root among the people. See İlhan Başgöz, *Türkiye'nin Eğitim Çıkması ve Atatürk* [Turkey's Education Dilemma and Atatürk] (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1995), 223. In fact this paved the way for the emergence of an opposition to them and brought about their end. Finally, in 1949 they were converted into the Teacher Schools.

²² "Halkevleri'nin Yedinci," 82. In 1944, the numbers of the People's Houses were over 400. See Tahsin Banguoğlu, "Halkevleri: Milli Kültür Ocakları" [The People's Houses: The Hearths for National Culture], *Ulus*, 20 February 1944, 2.

²³ *Ibid.*, 82.

making them internalize the positive views and values of the Republic, remained similar.²⁴

The program also anticipated expanding the organization of the People's Houses toward the villages by establishing the People's Rooms where similar activities would be made according to their scope. Thus, in 1940, the People's Rooms were founded to support the People's Houses and to reach small towns and villages in order to disseminate and diffuse the Republican ideals.²⁵ The reason behind the establishment of the People's Rooms was to expand the assumed social and cultural control of the new regime toward the villages; they would be its "managing" and "monitoring" agents in the villages. Like the Houses, the Rooms had organic ties with the RPP that provided technical support and materials.²⁶ In the first year, 141 People's Rooms were opened. With the devotion of the RPP to the establishment of the Rooms rather than the Houses, in 1945 there were 2,688 compared with just 365 in 1944; by 1946 this number had reached 4068, and by 1949, 4,306.²⁷ As in the People's Houses, the peasants would come together in the People's

²⁴ For this reorientation see Karpat, "The People's," 62; İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, *Halkın Evi* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1950). For the activities of the Houses in this vein, see "Halkevlerimizin Son Yıl İçindeki Çalışmalarına Bir Bakış" [A General Outlook to the Activities of the People's Houses in the Final Year], *Ulus*, 20 February 1944, 3.

²⁵ For the decision approved in 1939 by the RPP's Council, *CHF Halkevleri Çalışma Talimatnamesi* [The Working Program of the RPP's the People's Houses] (Ankara, 1940); K. Ünal, "Halkodaları" [The People's Rooms]. *Ülkü*. 79 (September 1939), 13-15.

²⁶ The chairman of a People's Room and members of the managing committee had to be the members of the RPP. All Rooms would be under the control of the party's secretariat in the district. *Ibid.*

²⁷ *17inci Yıldönümünde Halkevleri ve Halkodaları* [the People's Houses and the People's Rooms in the Seventeenth Anniversary] (Ankara, 1949), 8.

Rooms for social meetings and functions to learn the civilized forms. The basic difference between the People's Houses and the People's Rooms was that the People's Rooms did not have distinct branches of work which carry on the social and cultural activities, but their activities were mostly concentrated on organizing meetings on several issues. In each People's Room there had to be a reading room containing books directly approved and sent by the RPP, which functioned as a classroom of the school. However, most of the People's Rooms did not work as effectively as the People's Houses did, because of the lack of peasant interest, local enterprise and educated professionals who maintained the activities in the Rooms.²⁸ Both institutions, as cultural modernizing agents of the RPP, were seen as a modern need for cities, towns and small towns, and even villages.

During the İnönü period, the main emphasis in the state discourse was placed on diffusing the new cultural tastes, codes and images among the masses. In that, the People's Houses and People's Rooms appeared to be the basic cultural institutions, which fulfilled this function. In the views of the National Chief, İnönü, they were indispensable for the cultural and social education of the society.²⁹ They were strongly tied to the ideal of creating a new and high national culture. For Tahsin Banguoğlu, one of the managers

²⁸ Karpat, "The People's," 63; Houminer, "The People's," 111. In the villages, in spite of the greater expectation, they could have been as successful as the People's Houses had been in the towns. For example, there did not exist any change in the status of women in the villages, whereas they took part in the social life of the towns. There, "veils are still common, and there is no such thing as a village function or dance in the 'People's Houses' at which women and girls attend." M. Philips Price, *A History of Turkey: From Empire to Republic* (London: G. Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1956), 188.

²⁹ On his views see Sabaheddin Sönmez, "Halkevleri Bayramımız" [The People's Houses Festives], *Ulus*, 20 February 1944. For his earlier claims, see "Milli Şeften Halkevleri'ne Direktifler" [National Chief's Orders on the People's Houses]. *Ülkü*. 75 (Mayıs 1939), 195-196.

of the People's Houses, this would be "real" national culture, and not display a cosmopolitan character and such a strange taste and life style. It would be "a high people's culture, its each stratum created from a similar essence ... this is the clear expression of our populism."³⁰ Thus, every layer of the society shared this unique culture which was being created. This was the process of "making the people know, understand, and recognize what they want, and speak; that is, making the mass a cultured element."³¹ Consequently, maintained by state institutions, the process was in direct relation to the elimination of the huge cultural gap between the symbolic universe of the Anatolian masses and that of the modernizing elite, in favor of the latter.

All in all, the Kemalist project of modernization from the beginning accompanied a process of culture production. The state as the sole initiator of the project was the main active agent in the process. This was done through employing the new techniques of power including the state instruments' efforts to revolutionize the society from above. Kemalist nationalism lied at the center of this new form of politics. It was very akin to Tilly's top-down format of nationalism. What is significant here is that it reflected the direction of the process of the official modernist program of civilization and culture during the formative decades of the Republic. Here, the aim was to transform the society by transmuting all traditional structures into a "developed" and "civilized" whole; that is, society came to be an object of targeting to construct a "better" future. It was this process through which the state discourse on culture was produced.

³⁰ Banguoğlu, "Halkevleri:."

³¹ Şükrü Kaya, "Halkevleri'nin," 5.

The cultural institutions of the Republic, such as the THS, the TLS, the People's Houses and Rooms and Village Institutes, came to the fore as both producers and carriers of the official discourse on "culture". These disciplinary institutions became the basic agents for promoting and imposing a new way of life, or new cultural format. The Kemalist conception of "way of life", including the prescriptions of how people think, perceive life and act, was rather close to the concept of "mentality." This mentality was seen in terms of collective notions that the civilizing rulers strove to make part of everyday practice.

Culture as an idea and discourse seemed to be the civilizing rulers' "science"; it manifested the construction of an orderly society and both of "civilized" and "nationalized" citizens. So the state discourse on culture did not accept the equal value of all forms of life and then assumed a strict hierarchy among them. As a basis of the Kemalist nation-building, it coincided with the de-legitimization of the past and tradition. The denial of the "other" came with targeting all forms of difference and transforming them into sameness. It was the basis of national identification.

The official concept of culture differentiates to a greater extent from that of Romanticism, because that culture was not defined within the circle of *Geist* historically and contextually formed throughout centuries. Culture was not taken as the basis of a critique of civilization. What was most emphasized around the concept of culture was the images of human self-cultivation and cultivation of society, which lie at the center of the Kemalist civilizing process from above. As in the Enlightenist-Jacobin model, the Kemalist one appeared to be largely matched with the idea of civilization.

Culture in the Kemalist regime was the name of two imagined communities: First, it came to determine the boundaries of national community and manifested its

membership status by playing a major role in the construction of a citizen identity. Secondly, it reflected the will to be part of a modern civilization representing the sole legitimate international community of “civilized” nations. To achieve this imagination the new Turkish culture strove to be created according to their standards. At that point, the main question comes into scene on the relation between two communities from the perspective of “Turkish” culture: to what extent would Turkish culture be differentiated from the cultures of Western civilization? Would it serve to express a unique way? These questions become somewhat settled when they are considered in terms of history and language, both of which in nationalist narratives serve to provide the suitable ground for the idea of authenticity. Both shed light on the life of two communities in history. The last two chapters are about this investigation.

CHAPTER V

THE TURKISH HISTORY SOCIETY AND CREATING A SUITABLE PAST FOR A NEW CULTURE

Turkish reformism was heavily influenced by the two dominant trends in the nineteenth century European thought: positivism and historicism. The notion of history as a progression toward more rational, more enlightened societies and of the inevitability of the triumph of progress was deeply entrenched in the minds of the reformers. They viewed their task in terms of ushering in the new, which was by its very succession better than the old. Even if this superiority was not immediately recognized, in time it would be through the state's steadfast insistence on upholding the new and suppressing revivalist tendencies. The ideological fervor of nationalism did effect a heightened interest in history but a highly selective interest that focused only on those aspects of Turkish history thought to prove to the Turkish people and the rest of the world that Turkey could be a civilized nation because it was civilized.¹

The state discourse on “culture” during the formative years of the Republic was greatly produced and re-produced through the works and activities of the official cultural institutions. In the process of the production, the Turkish History Society, THS (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*, TTK), together with the Turkish Language Society, was in the most important place among them. As discussed in the previous chapter, these institutions as the main instruments of the Kemalist civilizing process from above came to the fore to be the agents of *ordering* and *culturing* the society. What was promoted with the help of

these institutions was a new way of life which went hand in hand with the construction of a national culture and identity. Aiding the projection of new forms of life, the Republican cultural institutions became very influential in determining the status of ordinary people as citizens of the state.

Any analysis of the formation of Kemalist historicism² – the Kemalists’ efforts to find out historical variability for its system of thoughts and deeds - has a wider implication for understanding the boundaries of the new Turkish culture, projected as a “modern” mentality and “civilized” way of life during the early Republican period. It is because all-historical claims of Kemalism were necessarily significant parts of the process of culture production around the ideals of the new nation-state. As one of the leading cultural institutions, the THS had an important place in the process. The following pages will document and explain its place in the process of providing a historical background to a new Turkish culture. In order to achieve this aim, the formative years of the Turkish History Thesis - the early years of the 1930s – will be analyzed primarily through focusing on the role of Mustafa Kemal, the history textbooks and the First Turkish History Congress (1932). The later process will be clarified around the analysis of the role of archeology and anthropology, and the place of civilization and culture in the official history thesis. The main argument here is that the THS was the main figure in the formation of the official historical thesis and the Turkish historical identity, and in this way contributed to the efforts to create a new cultural content by

¹ Cemal Kafadar, “The Visibility of Sufism in Turkish Studies and Cultural Life”, in *The Dervish Lodge: Architecture, Art, and Sufism in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Raymond Lifchez (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 315-316.

bringing out the “forgotten” Turkish past through a national historiography. Also it is argued that it did all these by tracing the genealogy of the West, that is, forming an *ahistorical* genealogy of the Turks linked with the West.

5.1. Problematizing the Turkish History Thesis and the Way to the Turkish History Society

The writing of a nationalist history, the basis of the construction of a national identity, comes with the act of “commemoration” and “forgetting”.³ At this juncture, each nationalist project invents and edits its own past through remembering “glorified” events and heroic figures, and at the same time forgetting many “shameful” occasions in the past. For example, as Anderson puts it, in writing “the nation’s biography... these violent deaths [exemplary suicides, poignant martyrdoms, assassinations, executions, wars, and holocausts] must be remembered/forgotten as ‘our own’.”⁴ It is the invention of a suitable history for a people without a “national” history.⁵ This makes it possible for this people to imagine themselves as a community deep-rooted in history.

² For historicism, see William Outhwaite, “Historicism,” in *The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 261-262.

³ See Benedict Anderson, “Memory and Forgetting,” in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 187-206. For commemoration and its relation with identity, see John R. Gillis, “Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship,” in *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, ed. John R. Gillis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 3-24; and on the relationship of history with the act of remembrance and forgetting, see David Lowenthal, “Identity, Heritage, and History,” *ibid.*, especially 50-51.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 206.

The Kemalist project followed such course. It was even very radical in nature to construct a new history by a complete break with the inherited near past (the Islamic-Ottoman heritage). It came to be primarily a matter of communal national identity around a common culture which required both remembering and forgetting.⁶ Thus the Kemalist history thesis was formed to a greater extent through the political project.⁷ Parallel with the creation of new values for the younger generations of the Republic, the civilizing rulers strove to invent a new history to “compensate for the real ones that were being abandoned.”⁸ As “an expression of collective self-consciousness” Kemalist historiography, or history-writing, was affected by “changing concepts of group identity”

⁵ See Eugen Weber, “What Rough Beast?” *Critical Review*. 10/2 (1996), 289; Eric Hobsbawn, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁶ The relation between history-writing and the formation of an identity for citizens was well portrayed in the 1935 program of the RPP. Article 41 made it clear in the following way: “Our party lays an extraordinary importance upon citizens knowing our great history. This leaning is the sacred essence that nourishes the indestructible resistance of the Turks against all currents that may prejudice the national existence, his capacity an power, and his sentiments of self-confidence.” See “Program of the People’s Party of the Republic,” quoted as Appendix E in Donald Everett Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation* (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political And Social Science, 1939), 313.

⁷ I draw here on the perspectives of Mesut Yeğen who situates the formation of the Turkish History Thesis in the historical and political context of a definite political project leading to the construction of Turkish national identity. In that sense he criticizes Büşra Ersanlı-Behar who relates the emergence of the Thesis mainly to the works of historians, anthropologists and archeologists, of the period, with a political, rather than scientific, mission. See Mesut Yeğen, “Türk Tarih Tezi Bir “Kaza” An’ı mıdır?” [Was the Turkish History Thesis an Accident?]. *Mürekkap*. 6 (1996), 23. For the political mission of historians, see Büşra Ersanlı Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye’de “Resmî Tarih” Tezinin Oluşumu* [Power and History: The Formation of the “Official History” Thesis in Turkey] (İstanbul: Afa, 1996), 13.

⁸ Kevin Robins, “Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe,” in *Questions of Cultural Identity*, eds. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 70.

through the reforms and at the same time “in turn affects those concepts.”⁹ To use another expression, if it is thought in terms of the civilizing project of the Republic, it implies that history, regarded as being “distorted” at home and “misrepresented” abroad, was rewritten to supplant the new Turkish culture, emphasizing its historical peculiarity even by creating myths on the role of the Turks in history. Here, the expectation was that the rewriting would provide the basis of a common language, collective consciousness and self-respect among the Turks,¹⁰ considered in terms of the peculiarity of the historically constituted cultural production. It was in this regard that history was used, more than anything else, as, in the words of Toby Miller, “a technique of cultural policy, a technique that sees historians acting as referees in, for example, discussions over memorials in museums, heritage sites, and historical mini-series.”¹¹ In fact, it was one result of the need to legitimize the centralized mechanism of a nation-state.

The process of the emergence of Kemalist historiography, which was eventually constructed within the frame of the culture formation, took part in a limited time period: especially the early 1930s. This process reflected what Copeaux calls a “coup d’Etat in history.”¹² It is for this reason that this chapter focuses chiefly on the developments of the

⁹ Bernard Lewis, “History-writing and National Revival in Turkey.” *Middle Eastern Affairs*. (June-July 1953), 218.

¹⁰ One of the basic aims of the Kemalist history-writing was to create a self-confidence and self-respect among Turkish citizens. See F. Öymen, “Atatürk.” *Belleten*. III/10 (1939), 282-283.

¹¹ Toby Miller, *The Well-Tempered Self: Citizenship, Culture and Postmodern Subject* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 32.

period from 1930 to 1933, and the First Turkish History Congress (1932), where the Turkish History Thesis was declared and shaped, more than the second (1937) and the third (1942) one.¹³ The rising interest of the state in history writing during the early 1930s emerged just in a political context where, as discussed in Chapter III, the state took on a new ideological orientation. The state apparatuses tried to monopolize totally the cultural affairs in every sphere of life, that is, the “legitimate use of culture”. This resulted in the closing of civil societal elements, which maintained to some extent a cultural tradition from the time of the Young Turks. Instead, some new centralized institutions were created. In this way, the knowing statesmen of the Republic attempted to collect all instruments of power in their hands to interpret to the new generations the “glorified,” “mythicized” traditions of their ancestors, that is, to direct the process of remembering/forgetting. At the heart of this process lay the Turkish History Thesis. It seems necessary here to give its general outline. As Reşid Galip, one of the leading figures of the THS, summarized it, there were nine principles of the thesis:

1 – The cradle of the human race is Central Asia, the homeland of the Turks. 2 – the earliest civilization of the world was founded there by the Turkish race that was the original inhabitant of Central Asia. 3 – In the anthropological

¹² See Etienne Copeaux, *Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931-1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Tezine* [From the Turkish History Thesis to Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in History Textbooks (1931-1993)] (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yay., 1998).

¹³ The seeds of this process were found in 1928 when he encouraged Afet İnan to undertake the rewriting of Turkish history to show the Turks were not “secondary human beings.” In 1928, she reported: “Showing Mustafa Kemal a book in French which said that the Turks belonged to the yellow race and were considered by Europeans a “secondary human type”, I asked him: Is this true? Atatürk answers: No, that is impossible; we should investigate this. Start working.” See Afet İnan, “Atatürk and Tarih Tezi.” *Bellekten*. III/10 (1939), 244. In 1929, Mustafa Kemal together with Afet İnan initiated a feverish work by reading and translating history books into Turkish. It was in this process that the THS began slowly taking shape.

classification of races, the Turkish race was represented by brachycephalic - alphian one. 4 – The great migrations have always been from east to west, not west to east. 5 – The drought events in different times of Central Asia were the most significant factors compelling the Turks to migrate to various places of the world, where they founded all ancient civilizations. 6 – The Turkish language is the mother of all tongues. 7 - As in all ancient civilizations, the creators of the so-called Islamic civilization, were also the Turks. 8 – Anatolia has been a Turkish homeland since prehistoric times; the oldest history of Turks can be traced in Anatolia as well as in Central Asia. 9 – In the last few centuries, because of external causes, the Turks lost their leading position in directing the course of world civilization. But, today, these degrading causes are being removed with the reforms, and so the Turkish nation is looking forward to undertake again its role in bringing mankind to a higher grade of civilization.¹⁴

This thesis as stated above manifested the attempts to construct a collective identity substituting for the dominant Islamic and traditional collective consciousness.

It was in the process of the thesis production that the THS , as one of the new institutions, played a leading role. In 1931, in order to study Turkish history more “scientifically” and “professionally,” the THS was set up as a “semi-autonomous” institution, which was firstly organized in 1930 as a special committee. But, its foundations were laid deep in the development of modern Turkish historiography in the late Ottoman period. In the second half of the nineteenth century, it was formed under the effect of European Orientalism and Turcology which firstly imagined the figure of the Turk in history as a historical, ethnic and linguistic identity.¹⁵ Enthusiastically embracing the modern rational principles of European historiography, the new elite group became

¹⁴ Reşit Galip, “Türk Tarih Tezi ve Yabancı Tezler” [Turkish History Thesis and Foreign Theses]. *Ülkü*. 9 (1933), 142-143.

¹⁵ For further information on the effect of orientalism and Turcology, see Lewis, “History-writing,” 220-221; Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, trans. Robert Devereux (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), 1-3.

deeply interested in this new discipline of Turcology and began to produce new works.¹⁶ Hence, corresponding with the rise of Turkish nationalism during the reign of Abdülhamid II, there were discussions in the newspapers on Turkish history before the Turks' conversion.¹⁷ In the process, all the Ottoman cultural items began to be gradually substituted by ancient Turkish heroes and myths. This Turkification was very apparent especially in the field of history throughout the Second *Meşrutiyet*. Thus, although the Turkish conception of nation had no affinity to the state, overall references in Turkish nationalism of the period aroused interest in the pre-Islamic past and culture of the Turkish people.¹⁸

With the change of the regime, from the first years of the 1920s, the Republican governments began to institute successively Turkist historical ideals as their official view of history. This may be clearly seen in school textbooks of the period in which the historical greatness of the Turks in history was presented. For example, *Yurt Bilgisi*

¹⁶ One of the first major work on Turkish history from a nationalist point of view was of Süleyman Paşa's (served as Director of Military Schools and of the Military Academy from 1877-1877) *Tarih-i Alem* (History of the World) published in 1876. It was on the prehistoric Turks and for the first time used the Turkish instead of the Ottoman language and civilization. See Kerim K. Key, *An Outline of Modern Turkish Historiography* (İstanbul, 1954), 3.

¹⁷ In this period, much of the stress was on their service to humankind to whom they had transmitted civilization See David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908* (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 31-32 and 36.

¹⁸ This period accompanied the first history organization in its modern sense founded in 1909, called *Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni* (The Ottoman Historical Commission), with Abdurrahman Şeref as its first president. Its aim was to write a new Ottoman history with a broader perspective. The commission published a journal, *Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası*, which appeared until the end of the twenties, and in 1924, its name was changed to *Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmuası* when the society was renamed as *Türk Tarih Encümeni*.

(Knowledge of the Home) written by Mithat Sadullah for use in primary schools was full of new historical “facts” on Turkish presence in history:

Turks are the oldest independent nation in history... While the other nations were in a state of near barbarism, the Turks had a strong government and good laws. The Turks who lived in Central Asia some thousand years ago have left many traces of their civilization... Turks have formed great and independent states since very old times and from time to time have taken many nations under their domination.¹⁹

This was also the tone of *Türkiye Tarihi* (History of Turkey) by Hamid Muhsin used between 1924 and 1929 in the intermediary schools, in which much emphasis was laid on Turkish racial characteristics as a nation before coming under the domination of Islam.²⁰

5.1.1. Mustafa Kemal's Interest and Institutionalization in History

The need for a new institution, during the last years of the twenties, was on the agenda with the rising interest of Mustafa Kemal in rewriting Turkish history. For this purpose, in 1930, the Turkish History Research Committee (*Türk Tarih Tetkik Heyeti*) was instituted as a part of the Turkish Hearths, while holding the VIth congress of the Turkish Hearths in Ankara in April 1930. Its main task was to “study and investigate Turkish history and civilization in a scientific way.”²¹ It was composed of sixteen

¹⁹ Henry Elisha Allen, *The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and Religious Development* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968) (original publication, 1935), 113-114.

²⁰ See Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic* (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), 104.

members. The founding members of the Committee came to the fore much more with their political identity as politicians than historians.²² It was because many of the historians who undertook the task of history-writing were indeed politicians and political figures.²³ The most significant end-product of their works and efforts was the politicization and, in parallel, “ideologization”²⁴ of history which was stimulated for the sake of the search for a new cultural ground. Indeed, parallel to the general trend that all existing political and civil societal organizations came under the control of the RPP, the Committee and later the Society (founded in place of the Committee) worked as a cultural branch of the RPP and functioned to invent a “mythical past” in order to provide a legitimate, secure ground for political authority throughout the Single-Party Period.

²¹ Afet İnan, *Atatürk Hakkında Hatıralar ve Belgeler Belgeler* [Memoires and Documents on Atatürk] (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası, 1981), 198.

²² Mehmed Tevfik (Bıyıklıoğlu), the Head of the Committee, was the Secretary-General of the Presidency; there were two assistant presidents, Yusuf Akçura and Samih Rifat, who were members of parliament; Dr. Reşit Galip, the Secretary General of the Committee, was also a member of parliament. Other twelve founder-members –Afet (İnan), Vasıf (Çınar), Halil Ethem (Eldem), Yusuf Ziya (Özer), Sadri Maksudi (Arsal), Reşit Safvet (Atabinen), Meşaros, İsmail Hakkı (Uzunçarşılı), Ragıp Hulusi (Özden), Mükrimin Halil (Yinanç), Zakir Kadiri (Ugan) and Hamit Zübeyir (Koşay)- were either members of parliament or members of the RPP. For the founders of the Committee, see Uluğ İğdemir, *Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Türk Tarih Kurumu* [Turkish History Society in the 50th Anniversary of the Republic] (Ankara: TTK, 1973), 4-5. Afterwards, instead of Meşaros and Zeki Kadiri, Hasan Cemil (Çambel) and Şemsettin (Günaltay) were accepted as new members. See Mete Tunçay, *T. C. 'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923-30)* [The Establishment of the Single Party Regime in T. R.] (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992), 299.

²³ This was a continuation of the pattern of the CUP period, “when most historians were political figures working for nationalism in the form of Turkism –for example Yusuf Akçura, Ziya Gökalp, Fuad Köprülü, and Ahmet Ağaoğlu. Some, like Akçura, lived through to the new thesis.” Poulton, *Top Hat*, 103.

²⁴ For the ideologization of history in the early Republican period, see Copeaux, *Tarih*, 31.

In the formation of the Committee, of all the fundamental parts of the process of creating a new past, or a “coup d’Etat in history,” the most striking one was the role of Mustafa Kemal. In fact, from the beginning, he took a keen interest in history. His interest was affirmed with his own library which included a lot of history books. Among the books he attached the greatest value were ones evaluated the Turks in very positive terms, such as, H. G. Wells’ *Outline of World History*²⁵, Léon Cahun’s *Introduction a l’histoire de l’Asie*, Eugène Pittard’s *Les Races et l’histoire*, which were extensively made use of in forming the “Turkish History Thesis.”²⁶ Bounding the origin of the Turks to the West, these books made it possible for him to combine the history of the Turks to that of the civilized nations of Europe.

He was very active in all stages of the process of a coup d’Etat in history. Indeed, as a “sole initiator of the activity of recreating national history,”²⁷ he himself formulated the official historical course. It was the very tone of all writings of the period that, as in

²⁵ H. G. Wells and his book had a fundamental effect in the formation of his historical perspective. After reading its French translation, the book became a book of revelation to Mustafa Kemal. He had it in Turkish in 1929 and one year later in a similar line *Türk Tarihinin Anahatları* (an Outline of Turkish History) appeared. “Wells became his principal hero ... He was a great historian and prophet ... He opened Kemal to a new view of history.” Lord Kinross, *Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation* (Nicosia: K. Rustem and Brother, 1981), 468.

²⁶ In addition to these books, Mustafa Kemal’s views about prehistory was to a greater extent influenced by Georges Passion’s book entitled *Les Ayens* putting forward the representatives of “cimotric brachycephalic” race as Pamirians, Turks, Tajiks, Caucasians, Armenians and Anatolians. See Ahmet Cevat Emre, *Atatürk’in İnkılap Hedefi ve Tarih Tezi* [Atatürk’s Revolutionary Goal and History Thesis] (İstanbul: Ekin Basımevi, 1956), 59.

²⁷ The expression belongs to Köprülüzade Fuad Bey. See *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi: Konferanslar Münakaşalar Zabıtları* [The First Turkish History Congress: Minutes of Papers and Discussions] (Ankara: T. C. Maarif Vekaleti, 1933), 47.

“well-working” reforms, the Turkish History Society was an outcome of “Ghazi’s great ability”. For example, for Yusuf Akçura, the emergence of the Society was explicated only in this way: “In a way of serving our national goal, he strove to find out himself possible ways to teach history, which had a pivotal function in national education and socialization, to all children of the nation.”²⁸ In the same manner, Mustafa Kemal himself decided the Committee’s principal duty as doing research on and writing an Outline of Turkish History and the Turks’ services to civilization.²⁹ It was evident that he checked all writings of the Committee members on its first book entitled an Outline of Turkish History and made corrections on it.³⁰ All these illustrated his greatest interest in the activities of the Committee and later Society.³¹

In the Congress of the Turkish Hearths, once again Mustafa Kemal urged Afet İnan to undertake the revolution in history. Thus, a speech of Afet Hanım delivered at the VIth congress of the Turkish Hearths, whose content was determined by Mustafa Kemal, had a major place as a first step in founding the Committee. It was about the idea of the re-writing of Turkish history and, particularly, about the so-called “history thesis.” It

²⁸ Akçuraoğlu Yusuf, “Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi” [First Turkish History Congress]. *Ülkü*. 3 (1933), pp??26.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 243.

³⁰ For his readings and corrections, see *Bellekten*. III/10 (1939), Lev. LXXXII - Lev. XCI. He named Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti. See *ibid.*, Lev. LXXXI. And also, he named the journal of the THS as “Bellekten” beginning its publication in 1937. See Uluğ İğdemir, “Atatürk ve Bellekten” [Atatürk and Bellekten]. *Bellekten*. III/10 (1939), 355-356.

³¹ This interest remained until his death in 1938. For example, even when he was in his sickbed, he wanted to see the new ruins of excavation in Thrace. After assessing them, to urge archeological excavations Atatürk said to Afet İnan, “go on! You will bring

became the preliminary narration of the Turks' role as civilizing and culturing gardeners throughout history, who had been the highest and first civilized people of mankind.³² It emphasized the re-writing of Turkish history under the light of new "historical facts."

It was the task of the new Committee. The Committee would provide the information on Turkish history to overcome some "prejudices" on the Turks in the historiographies of the Western countries, which for the historians of the Republic had resulted from the deficiency of knowledge on the Turkish past. Immediately, after its establishment, the Committee began working. On 4 June 1930, it held its first meeting under the presidency of Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver). In the meeting, the remarks of Mehmed Tevfik (Bıyıklıoğlu) who was elected as the president of the Committee, are worth mentioning in terms of directing the activities of the Committee and determining the route of the official historical thesis at the beginning:

The problem which will concern us is *national Turkish history*. There are good reasons for writing such a history. Turkish national history is distinguished not only as a glorious, honorable history which can not be compared with the history of any other nation on the face of the earth, but also as the first to have discovered, used and spread the basic means of civilization which assured the prosperity and comfort of all mankind. Until recently the only known sources of contemporary civilization have been Greece and Rome. However, it has been absolutely proven that Greek civilization is merely a translation from older Turkish civilizations... I am certain that Turkish history will emerge in a completely different way than it has heretofore, and will receive all the glories of which it is deserving.³³

out more and more the richness of our country's cultural history." Afet İnan, "Atatürk," 243.

³² Ibid., 197.

³³ Quoted in Walter Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy, the Free Party and its Aftermath* (Liden: A. J. Brill, 1973), 228; Lutfy Levonian, trans. and ed., *The Turkish Press, 1925-1932* (Athens: School of Religion, 1932), 190. For the other delegates' statements, see Afet İnan, *Atatürk Hakkında*, 198-199.

Based on these ideals, the Committee began to work on the ancient and near past of the Turks. At the outset, it was aimed to determine the general and rough boundaries of Turkish history, which would become the base-line of a new historical understanding of the Republican Turkey. This aim would be maintained by the Society created instead of the Committee. After the closing of the Turkish Hearths on April 1931, the legal status of the Committee came to end in actual terms. In 15 April 1931, the same committee set up the Society for the Study of Turkish History (*Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti*).³⁴ In fact, there did not exist a break in the studies of the Committee, for the Society undertook all its studies and projects with similar members and program. Even, the first meeting of the Society held on 26 April 1931 was issued as the eighth meeting as a sign of the continuation of the previous one.³⁵ Still, its responsibility was the prosperity of studies and publications on history. In general, as a professional institution, it was first of all assigned with the task of “imagining a version of Turkish history” from the nationalist point of view.³⁶ This is evidently seen in the Society’s statute which prepared on 12 April 1931. Its fourth article established its goals: “the goal of the Society is to analyze all the matters related to Turkish History and the History of Turkey and to distribute the obtained results by using every means.” This goal included the activities of (a) studying

³⁴ Following the year of the language purification movement or language reform, in 1935 its name was changed to the Turkish History Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*). İğdemir, *Kurumu*, 5. Based on the general trend, in this study, it is preferred to use the Turkish History Society instead of the Society for the Study of Turkish History.

³⁵ Afet İnan, *Atatürk Hakkında*, 201.

the sources of Turkish history and making publications, (b) translating works on Turks and Turkish history into Turkish, (c) arranging meetings and congresses to discuss new discoveries and scientific themes, and (d) making and maintaining archeological excavations.³⁷ To put it briefly, the general purpose of the Society's members was to write an extensive and detailed Turkish history according to their thesis and to set down school textbooks that would be taught at every level of education.

5.1.2 The New History Textbooks

The first main effort of both the Committee and the Society was the search for new textbooks in conformity with the new historical perspective. That is to say, it was due to the need of the new state for new history textbooks. At the end of 1930, the Committee put forth its first product, a book entitled *The Outlines of Turkish History (Türk Tarihinin Anahatları)*. It consisted of eleven chapters, dealing with a wide-range period from the formation of the earth to the Turkish Republic.³⁸ It was published only as a hundred copies and distributed amongst the related historians and intellectuals to take their comments and approvals. In its Introduction entitled “why this book has been

³⁶ Mesut Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu* [Kurdish Question in the State Discourse] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1999), 189.

³⁷ *Türk Tarih Kurumu* [Turkish History Society] (Ankara: THS, 1970), 4.

³⁸ The first chapter is an Introduction to the History of Mankind; the second, an Introduction to Turkish History; the third, China; the fourth, India; the fifth, Chaldeans - Elamites – Akads”; the sixth, Egypt; the seventh, Anatolia; the eighth, Aegean basin; the ninth, Ancient Italy and Etruscans; the tenth, Iran; the eleventh, Central Asia (comprising one third of the book). See *Türk Tarihinin Anahatları* [Outlines of Turkish History], 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Kaynak, 1996) (original publication, 1930).

written”, the writers³⁹ explained the goals of writing a history book in the following ways:

The role of Turks in the world history had been consciously or unconsciously degraded in the books published in Turkey and in the French history books from which the Turkish ones aroused. This deficient knowledge negatively affected the development of the self-consciousness among Turks. The main goal of the book is to correct these mistakes which are a menace for our nationality that today is trying to regain its natural place in the world, and at the same time to write a national history for a Turkish nation in whose spirit the feeling of national self-respect and unity came to life with the last great events [the westernizing reforms from 1923 to 1930].⁴⁰

This aim would bring forward the historical achievements of the Turks whose ancestors had been one of the great civilized and conquering peoples of the world. And also, perhaps most importantly, as indicated in its Introduction, the book was aimed at demonstrating the Kemalist reforms as having deep historical and racial roots. All these required a scientific study; it was the second principal goal of the book to provide the knowledge and detailed information which had been saved and purified from “superstitious” beliefs through scientific research.⁴¹ For the writers the book did not cover a perfect national history, but just provided the general framework for those who would study Turkish history, that is, determined the boundaries of historical research. In this respect, with this book, for the first time, the official historical thesis was broadly declared. In the thesis, as mentioned before, emphasis was placed on Central Asia, which

³⁹ Almost all members of the Committee (Afet Hanım, Mehmet Tevfik, Samih Rifat, Akçura Yusuf, Dr. Reşit Galip, Hasan Cemil, Sadri Maksudi, Şemsettin, Vasıf and Yusuf Ziya) participated actively in writing. Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 25.

was the cradle of all human civilization. The first human beings lived there, and they were the first to invent gunpowder, the magnetic compass, paper, porcelain, silk, glass, the calendar and writing, which all were thought as parts of civilization. The Turks, wherever they went, brought with them this developed civilization.⁴² That is to say, the prehistoric migrations of the Turks, who were a white, Aryan people made it possible for other nations to reach a high level of progress. Although the book placed great emphasis on the ancient history of Turks of Central Asia and their relationships with other ancient civilizations, it left little space for Islamic-Ottoman times which were emphasized as the main causes of the decline of the Turks and suppression of Turkishness. Thus, especially, the Ottoman past was seen as an especially dishonorable period in Turkish history, and so it had to be forgotten. Nevertheless, this did not mean that the Ottoman times had to be completely wiped out from the memory of Turks but its negative effects on Turkishness and Turkish culture had to be on the agenda, used to rejuvenate again and again the Kemalist culturalist discourse.

The book was not widely accepted and attracted some harsh criticism from the historians, although it was ordered to be written for use as a textbook in schools. Only the chapter entitled “Türk Tarihine Medhal” (Introduction to Turkish History) and “Orta Asya” (Central Asia) of the book were circulated in a form of a thick booklet of 74 pages, entitled *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları Medhal Kısmı (Introductory Part of the Outline of Turkish History)*. 30.000 copies were published for use in schools.⁴³

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² See *ibid.*, 57-72, 325-366.

In the same way, in 1931, the Society as its first activity began to issue four volume textbooks for use in high schools, named *Tarih I-V*.⁴⁴ They were greatly inspired from the Outline of Turkish History published in 1930. In the volumes, the authors' names were not stated, and, as one contemporary observer justly recorded, they seemed to be written with "a steady eye to their purpose –making the record of the past support the nationalism of the present"- and it was not difficult for the authors to find "plenty of material suitable to this thesis."⁴⁵ The first volume was on ancient times and antiquity, covering the period of the beginning of history to the Roman Empire. In that the new historical thesis made up its essence to a greater extent that the Turks were presented as creator and carrier of the most brilliant civilizations of antiquity, like the Sumerians, the Hittites and the Etruscans. Moreover, as other steps of the thesis, the Hittites were presented as Turks in order to see Anatolia from the oldest times a Turkish Land since remote antiquity. At this point, it is important to note that all ancient civilizations whose

⁴³ See İğdemir, *Kurumu*, 5. One of the decisions taken in the First Turkish History Congress (held in 1932 in Ankara) was to maintain the project of writing a book on Turkish national history the Committee had undertaken. In 1933, under direct control of Mustafa Kemal, several meetings were held on the issue by the Society; it was decided that one scholar, a specialist, wrote each phase of Turkish history on the period. The result was extensive studies that could not be published in one volume. For that reason, it was generally agreed that several volumes on every phase of Turkish history would be provided in the course of time. *Ibid.*, 21-3.

⁴⁴ *Tarih I* (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931); *Tarih II: Ortazamanlar* [History II: Middle Ages] (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931); *Tarih III: Yeni ve Yakın Zamanlarda Osmanlı-Türk Tarihi* [History III: Ottoman-Turkish History in Modern Ages] (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931); *Tarih IV: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti* [History IV: Republic of Turkey] (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931). Beside the high schools they were taught in the secondary schools. But, because of their difficult content for students in secondary education, in 1933, its simplified form of three volumes of text-books entitled *Ortamektep İçin Tarih I, II, III* for use in secondary schools and two volumes for primary schools were written. See İğdemir, *Kurumu*, 10.

origin was not well known were chosen to prove their roots as Turkish.⁴⁶ It was also accentuated in the first volume that the Turks' ability to form states had a central place in the emergence of these civilizations, but, in this tradition, cultural and political authorities merged into a whole.⁴⁷ It is no doubt that this ahistoric and essentialist state as an outcome of the context-free, inborn feature of the Turks seems to stem from the idea of a modern nation state form.

The other three volumes came immediately after the first volume.⁴⁸ The very tone of the Turks' civilizationist and statist characteristics from ancient times up till the time

⁴⁵ Webster, *The Turkey*, 241.

⁴⁶ For this tendency of the thesis, see Copeaux, *Tarih*, 31.

⁴⁷ This was the result of the Turks' peculiar features which made them more superior than the Chinese, Indians, Egyptians, Iranians and Greeks in history. The last products of this state tradition were the Ottoman state and the Republic. In fact, the state described in these books "can not be explained with one of the concepts of the political theories of the ancient and antique times. The state is perceived as a cultural authority based on racial and linguistic solidarity whose political and administrative boundaries are uncertain." Behar, *İktidar*, 111. It seems that the volumes were written to prove the idea that the Turks in history had formed several states; thus, this resulted in several voids among the events which explained the formation of states, and the incoherence of the information on the emergence of these states. See *ibid.*

⁴⁸ The second volume was about the Turkish states in history from prehistoric times to middle ages, tackling cases from earlier "Turkish states", the Huns, to later ones in India and Arabic basin. The third volume, of 200 pages while other three volumes were approximately 400 pages, was on the Ottomans. In that the ties between the Ottomans and the Turks were unclear, and in some parts of the volume, the Ottoman Empire was mentioned as an alien empire, not having any ties with the Turks. The fourth volume, more than 370 pages, was about the Republic of Turkey. It was made up of two main parts; the first contained two chapters entitled "Once again the Establishment of a New State by the Turkish Nation" and "the War of Independence", the second was on the westernizing reforms of the Republic. In the first chapter, it was stressed that, before the Turkish Republic, there existed the Turkish nation that had formed several states in history but did not have any predetermined connections with the Ottoman Empire implicitly affirmed as a non-Turkish state. The second chapter had similarities with the 1931 program of the RPP. For further elaboration on *Tarih II, III, IV*, see *ibid.*, 112-115.

of writing can be found in the four volumes. Emphasizing the relationship of the Turks and the ancient civilizations of China, India, Egypt, Anatolia and the Mediterranean, Kemalist civilizationist historiography aimed at showing the Turks as the original representatives of civilization through emphasizing their “achievements” in social, political and cultural spheres. This demonstration of the Turks as bearers of civilization and culture bearers became the essence of the process of culture production. So did the history textbooks of the Republic full of nationalistic bias come with certain assumptions and interpretations which were directly in contrast with the previously accepted concepts of the Ottomans. Aiding the Kemalist top-down formulation of civilizing, they had been in use as unrivalled textbooks in the schools until the end of the Single-Party Period.

5.2. The History Congresses and Scienticization of the Thesis

5.2.1. The First History Congress and Later Developments

The Turkish History Thesis, the coup d’Etat in history, was generally formed from 1930 to 1932. In order to introduce and spread the thesis, a convention known as the “First Turkish History Congress” was held on 2-11 July 1932 in Ankara, by the direct inspiration of Mustafa Kemal.⁴⁹ There were 241 participants in the congress, and it was

⁴⁹ As Copeaux aptly argues, it was “a great ceremony organized in honor of Mustafa Kemal. Until that time, Ghazi had become legendary and gained his distinguished place in history; as if his statue in front of Ankara Halkevi was tightly monitoring the discussions to keep them in a determined way. The volume which was the edition of the minutes of the congress was dedicated to this “biggest son of Turkish history”, with his half-god appearance, who was the creator of Turkey, the *heir (varisi)*

more educationally oriented.⁵⁰ Accordingly, its aim, set in the Introduction of the published minutes of the congress was “to explain the results of the Society’ s scientific researches on Turkish history to schoolteachers who undertake the responsibility of teaching new history textbooks... and to provide a standard history teaching.”⁵¹ Thus, it is clear from this aim that the impetus behind the Congress was to strengthen and spread the thesis especially among schoolteachers and scholars. In this regard, it seemed that it was in harmony with the general purpose of the Society’s members, attempting to write a comprehensive Turkish history according to their thesis and to prepare school textbooks for every level of education. In this regard the congress became the occasion where new history textbooks were introduced in the act of indoctrinating participant schoolteachers by accentuating the new history thesis; the main discussion, though limited, was on the validity of their thesis and its applicability in schools.

The Congress appeared to be a major phase of instituting a new history which was in the process of being created. Of course, this was being done on the basis of science, naturally inspired from the scientism, or, if more properly expressed, positivism, of Kemalism. As stated before, it was firmly anchored in the will of political authority; that is, new Turkish history was constructed on the ideological ground as a political manifesto. Thus, it could not be expected from Kemalist scientism to tolerate any

and maker of Turkish history, and the founder of new history-writing.” Copeaux, *Tarih*, 46. Such canonization of Mustafa Kemal was very clear in the volume of the published minutes of the congress. See *Birinci*, V.

⁵⁰ Most of the participants (198) were teachers of high and secondary schools from all over Turkey and others, 18 professors at universities, and 25 members of THS. On the participants and their professions, see *Birinci*, VII-XIII.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, V.

criticism of the historical thesis being constructed. That was why in the construction the politician-historians became very selective in choosing the references to prove their historical theory, and, referring to the works of some European scholars and making an extensive interpretations on these works, they tried to present their claims as universally accepted events.⁵² At this juncture, what was important was to “use the views of an authority as evidence: the discourse of the greatness of Turkishness becomes meaningful when a European depicts it.”⁵³ This was indeed the very tone of all discussions on the new historical thesis throughout the Congress. Therefore, in the Congress, some Western Orientalists or Turcologists whose works were contrary to the new Turkish historical thesis were condemned as enemies of the Turks and their theories were certainly rejected. For example, on the second day of the Congress, Zeki Velidi (Togan) criticized some claims of Sadri Maksudi (Arsal) and Reşit Galip, who together with Afet (İnan) depicted the basic outlines of the new thesis there. Grounding his arguments on V. V. Barthold’s works, Zeki Velidi rejected the idea that since antiquity the migration from Central Asia had occurred simply because of continuing heavy droughts and starvation. And he argued that the migration of the Turks resulted from political reasons and, in some places, population density.⁵⁴ Replying on these arguments, Reşit Galip made a severe remark by saying: “this author [Berthold] is a man who has tried his best to prove that Turks do not have any role in history, especially in the field of civilization, and the presence of Turks

⁵² Almost all papers and speeches were full of such justifying effort. See *Ibid.*

⁵³ Copeaux, *Tarih*, 37.

⁵⁴ For his claims, see *Birinci*, 168-174.

in Central Asia does not go back to ancient times.”⁵⁵ Thereupon, one of the participants cut Reşit Galip off and cried, “True! Berthold is a vulgar enemy of Turkishness.”⁵⁶ This reaction did not stop with the declaration of Berthold as an enemy of the Turks. Moreover, Reşit Galip, Sadri Maksudi and Şemseddin Bey accused Zeki Velidi with harsh words by persistently questioning his sources.⁵⁷ In due course, Şemseddin Bey drew attention to another direction, personal hatred, from the continuing “scientific” discussion on migration, geographical conditions and population. He claimed that when he was in Russia, Zeki Velidi brought discord to the Turkist movement by dividing the Turks into several culturally and ethnically distinct groups like Tatars, Baskurts, Uzbeks, Azeris; he went on saying, “I wonder whether Zeki Velidi Bey wants to play the same role in this congress? But, he can be sure that all the participants coming together around this congress are burning with the fire of nationality. Every attempt against this fire are doomed to failure.”⁵⁸ The discussion came to end with complete success in favor of the politician-historians who represented the will of the new regime requiring a historiography based on the view of constant migration from east to west.

As a result, in the congress convened to introduce and consolidate the official historical thesis, the opposition was not easily welcomed; that is, the imposed thesis was very close to any non-official interpretations and arguments. Hence, throughout the congress the mode of opposition was entirely “apologetic”; the criticism made without

⁵⁵ Ibid., 178.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 179.

⁵⁷ For their arguments, see *ibid.*, 178-193, 376-400.

injuring official ideology was appreciated, for any criticism on any part of the new history was perceived as a hindrance to national ideals. On the mode of opposition in the congress, Ersanlı Behar argues:

In the Congress nobody wants to be in opposition to science and nationalism. Indeed, opposing both science and nationalism was regarded as identical ... In accordance with the direction of the method of dealing with political opposition, the appointed missionary historians of the Congress did not permit any attitude questioning and criticizing the ideology anticipated to indoctrinate. All who wanted to bring different interpretations to Turkish nationalism and the Turkish race, culture, language and history, were seen as distrustful persons. All who were faithful to the reform and mission with politically determined boundaries, were the only trustful persons.⁵⁹

In short, in the congress, all efforts and thoughts outside of main stream historical ideology were unquestionably condemned, and, of course, under such nationalistic circumstances, it was not so easy to promote any opposite and scientific claims. Playing a determinant role in the process, the Kemalist missionary historians represented the will of political authority which was the sole legitimate power monopolizing culture. In this sense, the congress appeared to be a course for the institutionalization of the official historical discourse that was conditioned to a greater extent by Kemalist nationalist ideology. And, in the congress, historians who were charged with a political mission to produce a continuity between the past and present, set a standard of historical perspective that cleared the air from the ignorant tendencies of the Ottoman times.

The follow-up on the proclamation of the Turkish History Thesis was the University reform that came with the abolishing of the İstanbul *Darülfünun* in 1933. This

⁵⁸ Ibid., 400.

⁵⁹ Behar, *İktidar*, 122.

was not simply the restructuring of *Darülfünun* under the name of İstanbul University, but making corrections in the worldviews, dominant there, belonging to the *ancien régime*. To this end, more than half of its staff was dismissed, including the professors and scholars who opposed the official view of history and language. The reason behind this rectification was its failure to adopt Kemalist cultural reforms, especially ones of history and language.⁶⁰

In the following years of the University Reform, there occurred the attempts to strengthen the Turkish History Thesis particularly in education. As one of these, in order to provide a framework for the thesis, a faculty called *Dil ve Tarih – Coğrafya Fakültesi* (the Faculty of Language, History, Geography, *DTCF*) was founded in 1935 in Ankara. The Faculty, its name indeed echoed the thesis' central themes, was conditioned to verify Turkish achievements and contributions to the development of civilization, to document Turkish roots in Anatolia, the cradle of civilization, and to make a comparison of the prehistoric and modern languages. From then on, the educational structure of the Kemalist cultural authority, from primary to higher education, was settled, which helped to implant its historical ideals in young minds.

After the first congress, in coincidence with the cultural attitude of the Kemalist ideology, throughout the 1930s there emerged a total mobilization in historical research, which found its clear expression in the new program of the Turkish History Society made in 1935 by the direct initiative of Atatürk.⁶¹ In the program, the most stressed theme was

⁶⁰ For further details, see Horst Widmann, *Atatürk Üniversite Reformu* [Atatürk's University Reform], trans. A. Kazancıgil and S. Bozkurt (İstanbul: İ. Ü. Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fak., 1981), 31-59.

the verification of the national history thesis in a “scientific” way. For that purpose, “with an inclination to present to scholars at home and abroad the results of the research maintained for clarifying Turkish history, and to give way to scientific discussions on the thesis,” the second History Congress was held in 1937.⁶² At the congress, Kemalist scientism reached its peak. Making the images of the idealized past visible, proofed through the innocent hands of Reason and experiment, archeology and anthropology (both of whose relation to history and the congress will be elaborated below), were the vanguards of this scientism of the congress.⁶³ The papers presented at the congress were mostly in concord with the political will to uphold the thesis, of high importance for Kemalist nationalist ideology. That meant a mass of scientists coming to an agreement on the “scientific truths” brought forward by the Society.⁶⁴ In that, the role of the scientists from abroad was emphasized to the extent that their approval was regarded as the declaration of a decisive victory for the thesis.⁶⁵ The atmosphere of the second congress

⁶¹ See İğdemir, *Kurumu*, 26-31.

⁶² Muzaffer Göker, “İkinci Tarih Kongresi” [The Second History Congress]. *Bellekten*. II/5-6 (1938), 1.

⁶³ On the scientism of the congress and its relation to archeology and anthropology, see M. Saffet Arıkan, “Kongre Başkanı, Maarif Vekili Saffet Arıkan’ın Nutku [The Congress President, Minister of Education Saffet Arıkan’s Speech], in *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi, İstanbul, 20-25 Eylül, 1937, Kongrenin Çalışmaları ve Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler* [The Second Turkish History Congress, İstanbul, 20-25 September, 1937, Works of the Congress and Papers Presented at the Congress] (İstanbul: Kenan Matbaası, 1943), 2; also, see Behar, *İktidar*, 174-175.

⁶⁴ Göker, “İkinci,” 4.

⁶⁵ See Şemsettin Günaltay, “Türk Tarih Tezi Hakkındaki İntikatlardan Mahiyeti ve Tezin Kat’i Zaferi” [The Aims of Critiques on Turkish History Thesis and Absolute Victory of The Thesis]. *Bellekten*. II/5-6 (1938), 338. In his article, he mentions five

was almost similar to that of the Third Turkish History Congress held in 1943, on a safe ground provided with the help of Kemalist scientism.⁶⁶ By means of this scientist perspective, in the Third Congress as in the previous ones, for example, it was approved that the great monuments of Turkish culture had been established in the various places of the world such as the Nile and Ganges deltas.⁶⁷

5.2.2. The History of the Turkish Revolution

In the Turkish History Thesis, the History of the Turkish Revolution gained utmost importance when it set to determine a fresh, glorified past for the conquering reforms of the Republic. It became the subject of the Revolution Institute founded as the evolution of İstanbul University, and the Revolution Chair founded in Ankara in 1934. It was there that a series of lectures on the history of the Turkish revolution, by which a new beginning for the Turkish nation was to be acknowledged.⁶⁸ The lectures were given

objections to the thesis, and, in harmony with his “scientific” method, he tries to refute the objections usually by referring and citing secondary sources of western scholars.

⁶⁶ In Şemseddin Günaltay’s remarks made at the opening ceremony of the congress, this tone is so obvious. See Şemsettin Günaltay, “Türk Tarih Kurumu Başkanı Prof. Şemseddin Günaltay’ın Açış Nutku” [The Opening Speech of Prof. Şemsettin Günaltay, the President of the Turkish History Society]. *Bellekten*. VIII/29 (1944), 5-10; *III. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara 15-20 Kasım 1943, Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler* [III. Turkish History Congress, Ankara 15-20 November 1943, Papers Presented at the Congress] (Ankara: TTK, 1948), 1-6. Unlike the first one, most of the papers presented at the Congress focused on Anatolia and its ancient and near past. Archeological and anthropological studies and research had had a peculiar place among them. See *III. Türk Tarih Kongresi*.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

by the leading political figures and *interpreters* of Kemalism, such as Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Recep Peker, Yusuf Tengirşek and Hikmet Bayur.⁶⁹ In 1935, the lectures became compulsory for all students of the senior classes of the Universities. With a Law, in 1942, these lectures were turned into established courses under the name of “İnkılap Tarihi ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Rejimi” (The History of the Revolution and the Regime of the Republic of Turkey); to make investigations on these matters and spread the findings, *Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü* (The Turkish Revolution History Institute) was founded as part of the Faculty of Language, History and Geography.⁷⁰

It was in these courses that the politician historians started their works to describe the Ottomans’ view of history as being based on the criteria of divine intervention and norms of the right procedure in judging the genealogy of the Sultanate. Indeed, this tendency seemed to be an attempt made to create a new historiography attributed to the Ottomans. Accordingly, as Akçuraoğlu Yusuf writes, “Ottoman history did not pay enough attention to the Turkish language and history, and also did radically separate itself

⁶⁸ Ahmet Asım, “Türk İnkılabının Mana ve Mahiyeti” [The Meaning and Nature of Turkish Revolution]. *Ayın Tarihi*, (March 1934), 75. These lectures were seen indispensable for indoctrinating Turkish youths with the enlightening ideals of the Revolution, for they were “the most important one of the courses on culture in the universities which were the cultural laboratories of the society”. Ahmet Şükrü, “Üniversitede İnkılap Tarihi Dersleri” [Lectures of Revolution History at the University]. *Ibid.*, 71. For İsmet Paşa’s lecture, “İnkılap Kürsüsünde İsmet Paşanın Dersi” [İsmet Pasha’s Lecture at the Institute of the Revolution]. *Ülkü*. 14 (April 1934), 81-88.

⁶⁹ Most of these lectures were published in *Ayın Tarihi* and *Ülkü*. For the lectures given by Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Recep Peker and Yusuf Kemal Tengirşek at İstanbul University, see Oktay Aslanapa, ed., *1933 Yılında İstanbul Üniversitesinde Başlayan İlk İnkılap Tarihi Ders Notları* [Notes of First Lectures on the Revolution History Given at İstanbul University from 1933] (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1997).

⁷⁰ For the Law on the Founding of Turkish Revolution History Institute, see *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. 6, vol. 24 (3. 4. 1942), 69.

from Turkish history. The great victories and achievements of the Turkish nation to which the Ottomans belonged was not taken into account when writing history.”⁷¹ That is, in the Ottoman historiography, there was not a Turkish nation, but a Muslim community whose members had to be unconditionally faithful to the Sultanate, which, after the Tanzimat, was replaced with the idea of the Ottoman nation. The Ottoman Empire’s negation of Turkish national history resulted in negative effects on the national revival and became the basic cause of the failure of the Turks in their leadership in civilization.⁷² It was the main argument in the Kemalist historiography that the reason why the Turks became decadent and corrupt was the rule of the Sultanate, and the subjection of the nation. The Ottoman rule was “the dark age” of the Turks. For that reason, in writing a new history for the Turks, it had to be ignored. These lectures and almost all public speeches made by the Republican leaders contained a review of history of the Republic from its beginning. This was based on the need to “remember” all the modernizing reforms which set in motion the Revolutionary History of the Republic.

⁷¹ Akçuraoğlu Yusuf, “Birinci,” 26. He goes on to argue, “As for the Ottoman historians, Ottoman history began with the life of Osman the First and his father, Ertuğrul Ghazi, founding a small principality near Bursa... In the classical period, in the textbooks, prepared for use in Ottoman schools, that generally traced the genealogy of the Sultanate, Turkish history took a little part and the characters of the Turkish race were never stressed. After the Meşrutiyet, for the sake of the admiration for Western civilization, Turkish history was sacrificed.” Ibid., 26-7. Also, for further information on the Ottoman view of history from the Kemalist point of view, see Reşit Galip, “Türk Tarihi,” 139-140.

⁷² Tengirşek explained the reasons of being backward with the Ottomans’ negation of Turkish culture. Ottomanness had made the Turks “lazy” and “indolent.” See Yusuf Kemal Tengirşek, “Türk İnkılabı Dersleri Ekonomik Değişmeler” [Lectures on Turkish Revolution: Economic changes], in *1933 Yılında İstanbul*, 315-314.

As one outcome of the condemnation of Ottoman despotism, the Turkish Revolution signified a complete rupture with the “Ottoman order”, which was seen to be antagonistic from the beginning to the new Turkish order with its entire worldview and institutions.⁷³ The legitimate history of Republican Turkey was thus started with the beginning of the War of Independence, 19 May 1919, the course that prepared the way for founding the Republic with a new worldview, cadre and program. “Time” was restarted with that date. At the heart of this re-arrangement of time, there was intrinsically the definition of the significant Other that was the Ottoman-Islamic past. This attitude is exactly what Fabian argues for *othering*: for him the Other is something “living in another time”, which determines its status as low-grade, temporary and illegitimate.⁷⁴ In the Kemalist discourse, the Ottoman-Islamic past belonged to “another time” and had disappeared in the face of the continuing march of progress. None of the cadres, mentalities and programs existing before 19 May 1919 belonged to the legitimate history

⁷³ This was the very tone of İsmet İnönü’s lecture on History of Turkish Revolution, in the opening ceremony of the Revolution Chair in Ankara. For him, the Turkish Revolution first of all meant to wage war on the Ottoman order: “We were successful in the War of Independence not only by resisting the attacks of the foreign invaders, but also by destroying the basis of the Ottoman order. So, because of its national character, our revolution was not merely a continuation and a result of the evolution of the Ottoman reform movement... Consequently, it was necessary to replace the Ottoman order with the Turkish national order, that is, instituting TBMM and the secular Republic instead of the *Meclisi Mebusan*, Sultanate and Caliphate.” “İnkılap Kürsüsünde İsmet Paşanın Dersi” [İsmet Pasha’s Lecture at the Institute of the Revolution]. *Ülkü*. 14 (April 1934), 81; reprint in *Ayın Tarihi*, 1-31 March, 1934, 30-36. For another Kemalist interpretation of the discontinuity, see Recep Peker, “Hürriyet İnkılabı” [Freedom Revolution], in *1933 Yılında İstanbul*, 224-225.

⁷⁴ See Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Antropology Makes its Object* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 144.

but to a different historical realm.⁷⁵ Throwing away all that belonged to the Ottoman past and tradition from the “legitimate” history might be one expression of setting hierarchy in the old and new way of life. *A suitable past* was constituted to be the basis of a modern way of life. The Turkish Revolution, as in all revolutionary movements, strove to establish this past in place of the old one.

5.2.3 Archeology and Anthropology: Determining the Historical Boundaries of the New Turkish Culture

At the initial stages of the production of the new history, the pace necessitated taking much material from Western secondary sources as well as Turkish ones. In constructing a ‘glorified’ account of past events on the basis of the remains of those events, the politician historians of the Republic employed archeology and anthropology. Especially toward the mid-1930s, the Turkish History Society began to be more engaged in archeological and documentary research of a primary nature.⁷⁶ In other words, the

⁷⁵ From now on, in the Kemalist historiography, Yeğen argues that “the palace, Sultans and İstanbul; the caliphate, Islam, tradition; Circassians, Laz, Kurd; the CUP, Freedom and Entente and Vahdettin; Cemal, Talat and Enver, all belonged to a some other historical realm, not to the past.” Yeğen, *Devlet*, 193. In this respect, as M. Nermi proclaimed in 1930, all Ottoman literary and language products, “manifesting foreign taste”, belonged to a different realm. See M. Nermi, “Nermi Bey Diyor ki: “Öz ve Ulu Yol Tutulmuştur!” [Nermi Bey Says: “The True and Great Way Has Begun!”], *Cumhuriyet*, 1 August 1930, 3.

⁷⁶ The program of the Society put into use in 1935 encouraged these researches in collaboration with the subsidiary sciences: archeology, physical anthropology, physical geography and linguistics. For the program see “Türk Tarih Araştırma Kurumunun Programı” [The Program of the Turkish History Research Society]. *Ülkü*. 31 (September 1935), 8-12.

rising interest of political authority on history seemed to be a driving force behind the acceleration of archeological research. As much as investigating the documents, the Society attached importance to make excavations and evaluate the findings in relation to the history of Anatolia.⁷⁷

To begin with, the nationalist historians saw archeology, a “positive” science, as one of the constituent elements of maintaining the efforts to create a sense of unity between the land and people. To put it differently, it was used for a political cause that a national history deeply rooted in a given territory (Anatolia) by means of archeology was necessary for constructing a collective consciousness. For the Turkish archeologists, all prehistoric findings concerning the material culture of Anatolia that was elevated in practice as the milestone of Turkish and world history⁷⁸ shed light on the fact that during prehistoric times there had been a native Turkish nation in Anatolia.⁷⁹ The narration of past events by means of archeological activities became the most stressed issue of the Second Turkish History Congress, held in 1937, where, in its absolute term, the victory of

⁷⁷ For this alignment of the Society, see Afet İnan, “Contribution to Turkish History through the research Activities of the Archeological Section of the Turkish Historical Society.” *Bellekten*. XIII (1949), 429. Here, the aim was to prove the antiquity of the Turkish roots in Anatolia where from the ancient times the Turks established states and created a high culture. See Miraç, “Anadolu” [Anatolia]. *Ülkü*. 37 (Mart 1936), 32-33.

⁷⁸ For an illustrative description on Anatolia, see Mehmet Saffet (Engin), “Anadolu’da en Eski Türk Medeniyeti ve Cihan Medeniyetlerine Hakimiyeti” [The Oldest Turkish Civilization in Anatolia and Its Hegemony of World Civilizations]. *Ülkü*. 16 (April 1934), 263-264.

⁷⁹ The incentive behind all archeological, anthropological and linguistic efforts was to confirm that “the first civilized man that lived in Anatolia was a Turk”. Enver Behnan Şapolyo, “Anadolu’da Kumuklar Tarihi” [History of Kumuks in Anatolia]. *Ülkü*. 31 (September 1935), 69.

the Turkish History Thesis was approved by “positive” sciences.⁸⁰ That is to say, the second congress was an archeology congress. While the emphasis on Central Asia was still influential in forging a cultural identity, Anatolia began to gain much more attention, supported by archeological excavations. The aim was to emphasize the pre-Islamic and pre-Ottoman past of Anatolia, resulting from the secularist ideology of the new regime. The end product of this trend was a movement called *Anadoluculuk* (Anatolianism). As mentioned in Chapter IV, the movement came with the humanistic ideology of the İnönü period, which gave rise to the increasing concern in archeology until the mid-1940s. For that reason, archeological excavations and findings became again a dominant theme in the Third Turkish History Congress held in 1943.⁸¹

At this point, it seems necessary to illustrate the role of the archeological excavations in the formation of a historical identity by discussing one of the results. The excavation, published as an article in *Bellekten* by Hamit Zübeyr Koşay, director of the excavation, was made at Alaca Höyük, a city of the Hittites, in the summer of 1936.⁸² The findings showed that there was in the Anatolia of the Hittites a high life and culture

⁸⁰ Most of the papers presented at the Second Congress were on archeological excavations. See *İkinci*.

⁸¹ See Uluğ İğdemir, “III. Türk Tarih Kongresi” [Third Turkish History Congress]. *Bellekten*. VIII/29 (1944), 1-4; Muzaffer Göker, “Türk Tarih Kurumu’nun Çalışmaları Hakkında” [On the Works of the Turkish History Society]. *Ibid.*, 19-21; “Türk Tarih Kurumu’nun Bir Yıllık Çalışmalarına Ait Rapor” [An One-Year Report about the Works of the Turkish History Society]. *Bellekten*. VI (1942), 132-133. And also, for the general explanations of the archeological activities of the period, see Afet İnan, “Türk Tarih Kurumu’nun Arkeoloji Faaliyeti” [Archeological Activities of the Turkish History Society]. *Bellekten*. II/5-6 (1938), 5-8, and “Contribution.”

firstly stimulated with metal-work; it originated from Central Asia and even its traces could be noticed in the Central Anatolian culture of the present day. In the article, these findings are supported with the claims of European scholars, or “authorities”, on “Eurasian questions”:

We find the vestiges of this culture [the metal culture in Anatolia] in the so-called horseback-riding immigrants. And... the mother of this primary culture is certainly Central Asia. Later on this culture spread from China to Scandinavia and was an important step in the development of human culture. According to Alfödi, Menghin, and particularly Cooper, the peoples from the Altai, perhaps to some extent from the Ural-Altai, are the chief representatives of this culture... These facts have a direct bearing on Turkish history.⁸³

The following statements of these remarks make deepened the official thesis:

We call the culture of Central Asia mentioned here the Turkish culture... On the shores of the Pacific, on the shores of the Mediterranean and even on the shores of the Atlantic, they have shown great ability in state organization. They undertook the defense of the ideas of great religions like Buddhism, Manichaeism, and finally Islam. They carried artistic conceptions from East to West and from West to East, and, above all, they created worthy civilizations. The Turkish race is active now as it has been in prehistoric periods... With the light shed from the documents found at Alaca and other excavations, our organizing ancestors are emerging out of the darkness of the past from where they went forth from Asia all over the world.⁸⁴

Now, this organizing capability made the Turkish race able to create a new culture which, as in its heydays in the past, would be the most developed form of mankind.

⁸² Hamit Zübeyr Koşay, “The Results of the Excavations Made on the Behalf of the Turkish Historical Society at Alaca Höyük in the Summer of 1936.” *Bellekten*. I (1937), 534-542.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 541.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 542.

Along with archeology, anthropology, seen as a subsidiary discipline of history, became object of interest for a political purpose to provide the scientific basis, with ‘approved’ evidence, to show the people living in Anatolia in prehistoric times as Turks and reaching the zeniths of civilization in wealth, learning and power.⁸⁵ On that account, establishing a racial affinity between the ancient dwellers of Anatolia and the Turks of the Republic, and between the Europeans and the Turks, anthropological evidence provided great support to the archeological activities which were maintained to bring to light connections between today’s culture and that of antiquity.⁸⁶ It indeed overlapped with the use of anthropology, one of the historical sciences, in the nationalist endeavors in Europe during the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nationalist historians used anthropology, especially physical anthropology, to historicize “presently existing peoples by interpreting their anatomies, customs and artifacts as the remnants of earlier stages of human evolution and civilization.”⁸⁷ Like their European counterparts, the Kemalist historians applied anthropological evidence from the beginning to support their thesis. In that way they examined skulls and skeletons of the dead, especially that of prehistoric peoples, and living people. The expectation was that these research would prove the racial continuity between the past and the present, and so

⁸⁵ Şevket Aziz Kansu, a leading Kemalist anthropologist, claimed that anthropology was a positive science and could be used to show how all positive sciences were utilized. Şevket Aziz Kansu, “Antropoloji’nin Tarifi ve Programı Hakkında (1)” [On the Definition and Program of Anthropology]. *Ülkü*. 37 (March 1936), 34-40.

⁸⁶ For this connection of two disciplines, see Afet İnan, “Arkeoloji Faaliyeti”, 6.

⁸⁷ See Tony Bennett, *Culture: A Reformer’s Science* (London: Sage, 1998), 137.

prove that the Turkish race, belonging to the European race group, had been white, Aryan and beautiful.⁸⁸

It was the discipline of “anthropology which”, writes Akçuraoğlu Yusuf, “divides human beings into two main kinds according to the shapes of their skulls; *geniş kafalılar* (brachycephalic) and *uzun kafalılar* (dolechycephalic). Until now, all measurements of skulls have unquestionably shown that the founders of the first civilization were “brachycephalic”, of Central Asia. That most of brachycephalic peoples are of Turkish race is also a fact proven with the research on men living today.”⁸⁹ As a result of this orientation, measurements of skulls and skeletons were on the agenda from the early 1930s to the mid-1940s.

The result of one of the earliest research made in 1930 by Professor Mahir and Hamza of the Faculty of Medicine, and Professor Mouchet, is very typical of illustrating the direction of these research. They examined 1000 skulls and skeletons of Turks and other races in Turkey, mostly from İstanbul.

The result has shown that the Turks are the most perfect and highest of all the races in Turkey regarding ability and other characteristics. It has been understood

⁸⁸ In his presentation at the first Congress Reşit Galip, by quoting one of the European anthropologists, Dr Legendre, portrayed a “Turk as a most beautiful example of the white race with a long, white face, smooth or belted thin nose, orderly lips, mostly blue eyes which were not slanted.” Yet, going one step further he said, “the Turks in time became Europeanized, but the Europeans whose origin were Protonegroit and Protostraloit became Turkicized and acquired their appearance of today only after the Turks’ constant attacks on and their intimate relations with the Europeans.” See Reşit Galip, “Türk Irkı ve Medeniyet Tarihine Umumi Bir Bakış” [General Outlook on History of Turkish Race and Civilization], in *Birinci*, 158-159.

⁸⁹ Yusuf Akçura, “Birinci Türk,” 28-29; Reşit Galip, “Türk Irkı,” 106-108.

that the Turks are like the Europeans in stature and the form of head. The facial angle of the Turks is 84-88 degrees, which shows high development.⁹⁰

This was the common characteristic of all anthropological measurements until the mid-1940s.⁹¹ To sum up, the basic impetus behind this racist tendency in the thesis was to designate the existence of racial homogeneity in Anatolia from the early times of history, and to prove the Turks belonged to the European race group. But, at the heart of that claim, there was not the belief that the Turkish race is the most superior with its intrinsic quality, but the will to show the Turks, with their physical appearances, resembled Europeans, that is, white, tall, “beautiful”, but not belonging to the yellow race.⁹² In other words, Europeans and Turks were of the same race.⁹³ These “approved facts” made it

⁹⁰ Cited in Levonian, trans. and ed., *The Turkish Press, 1925-1932*, 188.

⁹¹ The most extensive measurement was made in 1937 under direction of Afet İnan on forty thousand Turks, and she used the findings in her Ph. D. dissertation. See Afet İnan, *L'Anatolie, le pays de la “race” turque. Recherches sur les caractères anthropologiques des populations de la Turquie* (Geneve: Georg and Cie, 1941); Afet İnan, “Arkeoloji Faaliyeti,” 6.

⁹² This tendency was clearly observed in the reactions when Keriman Halis, Miss Turkey for 1932, was chosen as Miss Universe. She became the symbol of Turkish beauty and civilization, showing that the Turks were racially beautiful as were the Europeans. See Duğan Duman and Pınar Duman, “Kültürel Bir Değişim Aracı Olarak Güzellik Yarışmaları” [Beauty Contests as an Element of Cultural Change]. *Toplumsal Tarih*. 7/42 (1997), 25; Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), 87-88.

⁹³ This was stressed by Afet İnan in the Second Turkish History Congress. Thus for her Turkish expansion into the inwards of Europe could not be considered as an invasion, but as an act of re-mixing people of the same race. See Afet İnan, “Türk-Osmanlı Tarihinin Karakteristik Noktalarına Bir Bakış” [An Overview of Genral Characteristics of Turkish-Ottoman History], in *İkinci Türk Tarih*, 757.

legitimate on the part of the modernizing elite the discursive endeavors in constructing life forms as they existed in the West.

In sum, archeology and anthropology were seen as positive sciences, which made legitimate to use them in the process of creating a historical imagination necessary for “targeted” national identification. That is to say, the positivist historians of the Kemalist regime regarded both as essential tools to form a self-image, image of “we,” among the Turks who would consider themselves as members of an imagined community. This was based on the pride of being the first creators of a high, civilized way of life in history.

5.3. The Turkish History Thesis and Turkification of World History: An Overview

5.3.1. Civilization and the Turkish Nation

With the First Turkish History Congress, by means of a discursive strategy, the “Turkish History Thesis” began to be effectively circulated as a much more controlled narrative. As discussed above, the thesis was a result of the need for a new history for culture production/construction. And also, due to a reaction against the general European perception of the Turks as a secondary class of humankind, and therefore barbarian and uncivilized, and the historical claims on the Turkish land,⁹⁴ it was an attempt to prove the Turks were a civilized and cultured people from prehistoric times up till then. In the thesis, greater stress was placed on the pre-Ottoman period of the Turks whose national identity, according to its pioneers, had been very alive before coming under the

domination of Islam. In the thesis, the main emphasis was placed on prehistory. The first reason for this emphasis may be related to the fact that in the early twentieth century there was not enough information on prehistory. This lack of knowledge made it possible for the politician historians to produce presumptions and scenarios for prehistoric times. The other reason was the wish of the ruling cadre to make a complete break with the near past. That was why, one might argue, the new Turkish history was created in a vacuum, filled with context-free, mythicized narrative, which were supplied with modern images. The result was the substitution of the Turks' pre-Islamic history with the Islamic and Ottoman past and forming a new Turkish history with an intimate relationship with modern civilization.

As mentioned above, Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues spent all their energies in revolutionizing Turkish history and rewriting a “true narrative” of the Turkish race. In his history thesis, two claims appeared being of high significance for the cultural attitude of the new regime; the first, the Turks were deeply rooted in the past, that is, had been a civilized race from prehistoric times. Thus, they did not simply appear at the moment with the appearance of the Ottoman Empire.⁹⁵ The second is that Anatolia had been the Turkish homeland from the beginning, and so the view that the Turks migrated to Anatolia in recent times and that they could not possess this land, was not true from the

⁹⁴ Enver Ziya Karal, “Atatürk’ün Türk Tarih Tezi” [Atatürk’s Turkish History Thesis], in *Atatürk Hakkında Konferanslar* (Ankara: TTK, 1946), 57.

⁹⁵ In her paper presented at the First Turkish History Congress, in regard to the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, Afet İnan claimed that “Turkish race did not originate from a tribe with 400 tents, but was a nation derived from Aryan, civilized, high race with its tens of thousands of years of history.” See Afet İnan, “Tarihten Evvel ve Tarih Fecrinde” [Before History and Dawn of History], in *Birinci*, 41.

historical and scientific point of view.⁹⁶ In the first claim as the starting point of the Turkish History Thesis, the emphasis on Central Asia became more apparent. Afet İnan, the voice of Mustafa Kemal as his adopted daughter, notes:

The people who lived in Central Asia were the first group to discover polish stone, cultivate land and benefit from mines. They became compelled to migrate from Central Asia to the east, south, west. Wherever they went to, they settled and established their culture there. The brachycephalic race of Central Asia was the descendant of the first founders of the civilizations in Iraq, Anatolia, Egypt and the Aegean. Today, we, the Turks, are their children.⁹⁷

Therefore, to the pioneers of the thesis, there was undeniable proof that the Turks were not a minor segment of humanity, but the purest representative of the first civilized human lineage. All ancient civilizations were of Turkish stock. Thus all civilized and cultural formations in the Middle East, Egypt, Aegean, India, China and Europe were considered in a similar framework as part of Turkish construction. But the thesis mainly focused on the Anatolian and Middle East civilizations. As Mustafa Kemal stated:

Of all those early excursions of our venturesome ancestors we, the Turkish nation of today, are most interested one, not in the movements such that broke through China's great wall into the heart of her hitherto safeguarded civilization, nor in that which swung northwesterly up into the great Scandinavian area, nor in that which, under a great Turk that history calls Atilla the Hun, raided central Europe... We are naturally and chiefly concerned with that group which, coming

⁹⁶ See Afet İnan, "Atatürk ve Tarih Tezi," 244. The main questions Mustafa Kemal dealt with at the beginning of the process were what the Turks' relationship with the ancient civilization of Anatolia, the Hittites, was. Who the settlers in Turkey and the people creating civilization were. What the role of the Turks in the history of world and the emergence of civilization was. Ibid., 245.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 246. On a general evaluation of the thesis on Central Asia, see Afet İnan, "Tarihten".

due west toward the Near East, developed those various ancient civilizations now called Sumerians, Hittite, and other prehistoric ones of Asia Minor.⁹⁸

For this reason, before the Semitic Babylonians, Chaldeans, Ninevites and Assyrians in the Middle East, 2000 years B. C., the Sumerians and Elamites, lived there and founded a high standard of life, 5000 years B. C. They were not peoples depicted under the name of Aryan and Semitic, but of Turkic origin circulated under “the name Turanian.”⁹⁹

It is obvious in the thesis that the concept of civilization was the most stressed theme. As stated above, the Turks in history first of all came to the fore with their distinguished ability of creating great civilizations, and, in such a way, contributing to the progress and emergence of modern civilization as being a sole creator of civilization. Of the Turks as the origin of all human civilization, the myth proclaimed to prove that the Turks, whose culture appropriated universal aspects, had been a civilized race from prehistoric times. The driving force behind the assertion that the Turks were not barbarous humankind since remote antiquity was the open rejection of being the Other of the West. According to the thesis, this characteristic made them a leader nation by rendering very great “services” to all human beings, such as, teaching other nations how to cultivate and how to work metals, and building big cities and founding strong states. Throughout history this service enabled mankind to be civilized, cultured and

⁹⁸ Sherril quoted from his talk with Mustafa Kemal on the history thesis. See Charles H. Sherril, *A Year's Embassy to Mustafa Kemal* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), 211.

⁹⁹ Yusuf Akçura, “Birinci Türk,” 28. However, in the course of time, they gradually forgot their Turkishness and became Semitic. See *Tarih I*, 87-88.

progressed.¹⁰⁰ This was the result of the Turks' civilizing and ordering capabilities. Thus, from the beginning, Turkish history signified an *ahistoricized* way of life which was "materialized" with the modern codes and standards of Western civilization. No doubt, this tendency might be explicit if it is evaluated within the frame of the Kemalist concept of civilization for which modern/western civilization was the most developed human form; as discussed in Chapter III, at the center of this belief there was the idea of linear progress of world history. Thus, by applying *universalized* modern standards, the Kemalist historians did not hesitate to construct, exaggerate and judge past events without situating them in any historical context. The result was fabrication of the necessary myths, memories, values and symbols in place of that of the Ottoman-Islamic past and tradition. By such Turkification of world history, it was aimed to show that the Turkish nation had been part of a broader picture of the world civilization, that is, western civilization. To put it in other words, Turkification of the world history was one end product of its Westernization.

Secondly, in the Turkish History Thesis, in order to show Anatolia as a Turkish homeland since remote antiquity, greater efforts were spent. It was the result of two needs; the first, to refute Greek and Armenian nationalist claims according to which the

¹⁰⁰ For the Turks' services to mankind, see Afet İnan, *Atatürk Hakkında*, 202-203; Etienne Copeaux, "Hizmet: A Key Word in The Turkish Historical Narrative." *New Perspectives On Turkey*. 14 (1996), 100-101; Mehmet Saffet Engin, *Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri* [The Principles of The Revolution of Kemalism], vol. I (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1938), 235. *Türk Tarihinin Anahatlarına Medhal* (Introduction to The Outline of Turkish History) was full of the claims of verifying the Turks' services to mankind that had been deliberately ignored in European historiographies. See *Türk Tarihinin Anahatlarına Medhal* (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1932). Even, it was implied that the Turks played a leading role in the development of the Islamic religion and civilization and produced the greatest philosophers of the Islamic world. *Ibid.*, 69.

Turks were newcomers and so did not have any rights on Anatolia.¹⁰¹ According to the thesis the assumption that the Turks came to Anatolia with the Seljuks or at the earliest a thousand years before, was a mistake that needed correction. In fact, the Turks had been the true inhabitants of Anatolia thousands of years before the coming of the Seljuks.¹⁰² The second was the urgent need to fill the gap in history of Anatolia resulted from the rejection of the Islamic-Ottoman past. For these reasons, the Republican regime began to seek its past in ancient Anatolian civilizations.

Especially, for this purpose, the Hittites attracted particular attention of the Kemalist nationalist historians, the sole *legislators* of the thesis.¹⁰³ Their discovery of the Hittites was a blessed opportunity for them to create a second past in Anatolia. In the thesis, the Hittites who, together with the Sumerians, were a Turkish people were shown as the original inhabitants of Anatolia. Their language resembled that of the Elamites and the Sumerians, which were neither Indo-European nor Semitic.¹⁰⁴ “They”, Webster writes, “were brachycephalic, like the Sumerians and the Elamites –unlike the European

¹⁰¹ Karal “Atatürk’ün,” 58.

¹⁰² This claim was elaborated on to some extent to show that the Greeks and Armenians living in Anatolia came from Turkish origin. It was for this reason that the Turks who came later to Anatolia accepted Islam, but the majority of those already settled had accepted the various forms of Christianity. See Lootfy Levonian, trans. and ed., *The Turkish Press, 1932-1936* (Beirut: The American Press, 1937), 64; *Cumhuriyet*, 15 December 1932.

¹⁰³ The Turkishness of the Hittite was extensively emphasized at the first congress by Reşit Galip. See Reşit Galip “Türk Irkı,” 131 and 155-156.

¹⁰⁴ Until the early 1930s, it was unclear as to which linguistic family the language of the Hittites called “heiroglyph” belonged. Later, it became clear that it belonged to the Indo-European linguistic group. Yet, because the Sun Language Theory of 1936 proved

Semites. At the time the Sumerians moved into Mesopotamia, the Hittites possessed an advanced stone-age culture, engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry, and built houses and boats.”¹⁰⁵ For one of the Kemalist politician historians, the vestiges of the prehistory did therefore testify that the Hittites whose civilization was of the brachycephalic Turks founded a “high culture in Anatolia” hundreds of years before Judaic, ancient Aegean, and Christian civilizations.¹⁰⁶ This was also true for other inhabitants of Anatolia and the Aegean Islands.¹⁰⁷ In short, it is prevalent in the thesis that Anatolia began to be Turkicized from the end of the Paleolithic age and it reached its maximum point in the Chalcolithic age. The continuous invasions for thousands years until the end of the Selcuks (the mid-thirteenth century) made Anatolia one of the places, in its purest sense, belonging to Turkishness.

All in all, the pioneers of the Turkish History Thesis attempted to prove and establish Anatolia as a Turkish land and the center of their civilization since prehistoric times in a “scientific” way by ignoring its Islamic past. This was the act of *remembrance*, in which it is obvious that the result would be the rise of the Turks’ sense of belonging to their true homeland, Anatolia, and the justification for the Turkish presence in Anatolia. In general, the Kemalist return to “pristine” traditions, or a “forgotten” past, appeared as

that all tongues come from the Turkish language, this discovery was not so significant for the nationalist historians. See Copeaux, *Türk Tarih*, 32.

¹⁰⁵ Webster, *The Turkey*, 242.

¹⁰⁶ See Saffet (Engin), “Anadolu’da,” 263, 265.

¹⁰⁷ After the Hittites, other settlers of Anatolia, the Phrygians (becoming dominant after 1500 B. C.) and the Lydians (coming to Anatolia after 800 B. C.) were of Turkish origin. Moreover, the first settlers of the Aegean Islands came from Anatolia, who were

a zeal to help fill the gap created by the rejection of the Ottoman-Islamic past and to establish a solid basis for a new Turkish culture. In fact, the official historical doctrine targeted its ethnic and cultural differences and cosmopolitan values of the old and traditional life forms. This was a constituent part of the efforts of *ahistoricizing* Anatolia to transform its inhabitants into a oneness by forging a new identity.

5.3.2. Culture and History in the Kemalist Historiography

Parallel to a discursive strategy which required the use of the concept of culture interchangeably with that of civilization, towards the mid-1930s, much emphasis in all writings on Turkish history was placed on the Turks' role in history as culture creators and transmitters since prehistoric times. Here, the term culture was used as a sub-derivative of civilization, denoting a high standard of life forms. Putting forward the idea that the Turks had created and transmitted culture, the thesis came to reject the Eurocentric interpretation of the progress of civilization and culture according to which Europe was the native land of culture, and so Europeans undertook the task of bringing it to all of humanity. In this respect, Muzaffer (Göker) - General Secretary of the Society – claimed:

It is not true that *culture* was discovered in the West and brought to the East. Culture, from the Neolithic age to the last centuries, became apparent and widespread in the life of humanity for the first time when the Turks created and elevated its most deep-seated form in Central Asia. The Turks presented it to all human beings. For that reason, the first cultural nation of humanity is that of the

brachyphalic and therefore Turks. On Turkicizing Anatolia and the Aegean world, see *Tarih I*.

Turks creating a first human culture. This is about our history thesis (my emphasis).¹⁰⁸

The accentuation of the Turks as culture creators shed light on the relationship of culture with history in the thesis. This relation finds its best expression in the words of Afet İnan:

Turkish history had been in evident relationship to the cultural history of humankind; it was the cradle of all cultures. The Turks who were white, Aryan and brachycephalic were the descendants of those who were the oldest culture-creators. According to the testimony of the vestiges of culture, their homeland was Central Asia. Wherever they went with the torch of culture were the places where civilization prevailed... Culture of every age in Anatolia is familiar to that of the Turkish race. Since antiquity, Turkish race has existed in Anatolia with its culture, while there has been the hegemony of various political entities and the difference in its names throughout history.¹⁰⁹

For her, the Turkish History Society worked to confirm these facts in conformity with its founding principle, which was to write a general outline of Turkish history and place it in its worthy place in the world culture. Central Asia and Anatolia were, therefore, not only the homeland of the Turks, but also the oldest centers of culture.¹¹⁰ In Hasan Cemil Çambel's article written on the death of Atatürk we find the similar mode with greater stress on Atatürk's role:

¹⁰⁸ Muzaffer (Göker), "Türk Soy ve Türk Tarihi" [Turkish Race and Turkish History]. *Ülkü*. (Birincikanun 1934), 253.

¹⁰⁹ Afet İnan, "Türk Tarih," 5-6. As a preliminary argument, she made a similar statement in 1931 at the First History Congress as to the way that both in prehistoric and historic times "Turkish race had achieved a high level of culture in its homeland while the peoples of Europe were still ignorant barbarians." Afet İnan, "Tarihten," 40.

¹¹⁰ See Günaltay, "Tarih Tezi," 343.

Atatürk was the first man who saw for the first time the line of the culture of humankind from prehistory up to now, its first roots in Central Asia from ten thousand years, and the creative and spreading role of the Turks in this trend... In history for the first time he saw and believed that all nations of the world come together under *a unity of culture*, and so all human beings are *relatives* from the point of unity in culture. He called for all human communities to unite around this new ideal he found out from the reality of the old and new history... With his charisma, he stood before the world and cried: "Unite! because you are one and the children of same culture".¹¹¹

This was for example evident in the case of the conversion of Hagia Sophia into a museum in 1932 by the order of Atatürk. Here, in parallel with the cultural policies of the Republic, the aim was to create the affinity of the people with "the past" of homeland. "This," writes Kuban, "was also the recognition of the status of a great monument's significance for universal culture."¹¹²

A similar account was also the dominant theme of the writings of the İnönü period. For example, Uluğ İğdemir began his article on the Third Turkish History Congress by highlighting that Atatürk strove to raise the Turkish nation to the cultural level of modern nations through making them "remember the honorable and bright past."¹¹³ That is to say, it had been "the Turkish nation that had transmitted the lights of culture to nations all over the world."¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Hasan Cemil Çambel, "Atatürk and Tarih" [Atatürk and History]. *Bellekten*. III/10 (1939), 270-271. Şevket Aziz Kansu, in his article in the same volume, argues that the dynamics of Atatürk's reforms was based upon the cultural atmosphere Atatürk wanted to create. Atatürk tried to shed lights on the place of the Turks in the genealogy of humankind as cultural bearers. Şevket Aziz Kansu, "Atatürk." *Bellekten*. III/10 (1939), 275.

¹¹² See Doğan Kuban, "Coservation of Historical Heritage during the Republican Era." *Turkish Review*. 2/7 (1987), 65. For him this directly related to "the importance given to the study of Anatolian archaeology during his [Mustafa Kemal's] time."

Consequently, what was implied in the above argument was that as cultural gardeners the Turks carried on the mission of establishing cultured and ordered society. In the process, this mission was interrupted with the Ottoman rule which was portrayed as a period of despotism, misrule and anarchy. In the view of the Kemalists, today, the Europeans, whose civilization and culture was the highest and most developed one, have maintained this task. They created this culture mostly by inspiring knowledge produced by the Turks. “Nowadays, it is not just to see the *possession of culture*, which ought to be *common*, as belonging to one nation” (my emphasis).¹¹⁵ The historical role of the Turks in forming the first civilizations and cultures provided them with the right to regain *the culture* that was prevalent in the West. Cultivating land, applying metal-works, civilized life patterns (organized urban life, softened behavior, tolerance, pity, and so on) were in the Kemalist historiography among the most stressed aspects of culture the Turks created and flourished throughout history. Based on the idea of endless-progress in every sphere of life, this concept of culture signifies the “high” way of life compared with barbaric and primitive one. Therefore, finally, one might argue that the Kemalists’ interest in history-writing was considered as the quest for a historical justification to the process of culture production.

To sum up, the Kemalist nationalist project, like all nationalist projects, was based on an imagination for the past as well as the future. It had to prove that history provided a

¹¹³ İğdemir, “III. Türk,” 1.

¹¹⁴ Karal, “Atatürk’ün,” 63.

¹¹⁵ Muzaffer, “Türk Soyu,” 253.

legitimization for its causes. The Kemalist historiography seemed to validate a view of cultural history as simply the amoral pursuit of *raison d'état*. Here the role of history was to re-write the past such as to prove that the nation was historically deep-rooted, and in this way to create historical continuity between the past and the present. The definition of "the past" was the main question the politician historians of the new regime dealt with. They were very selective in the construction of the past. Here history-writing was maintained through the denial of the other. As the main part of their discursive strategies, the Orient, including the Ottoman Empire and Islamic/Arabic worlds, was portrayed as established Others on the basis of myth and fantasy. Then especially emphasizing the pre-historic times they attempted to construct a new "national history" by transforming all possible differences and pluralities in history into oneness. This quest for inherent oneness and continuity in history strove to be realized with an act of "forgetting" or the rejection of one thousand year past (Islam/Ottoman). It was in such a form of figuration¹¹⁶ that myths and fantasies replaced realities.

Kemalist positivistic historicism was preoccupied with the idea that there was an endless march of progress toward the "better", "rational", and "comfortable". Civilization, that of the West, had represented this line throughout history. Kemalist historicism implied the will of articulating into the genealogy of "civilization" and "culture." According to it, the Turks had a right to belong to that civilization because they were its first initiators and carriers to the rest of the world. It was in this respect that

¹¹⁶ For such form of figuration, see John Pratt, "Norbert Elias and the Civilized Prison." *British Journal of Sociology*. 50/2 (June 1999), 275; Norbert Elias, *The Germans* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

Kemalist historicism serves to legitimize the position of the Turks willing to uphold a high life constituted by the civilized nations, that is, Kemalist westernizing reforms.

In the Early Republican period, the state elite launched a widespread historical crusade through the school system and adult education centers (the People's Houses and Rooms) to arouse consciousness of being firmly established in a secular genealogy or time-period in the hearts of the new Turks. This campaign tried to "remind" them that they had been part of a "great family", the carrier of all "civilized" and "cultured" qualities throughout the centuries. So did they have the right to live as peoples of the "civilized" world did. At the same time, the Turkish History Thesis became extensively intrinsic to all aspects of the Kemalist Revolution. In addition to its usage in implanting new historical "facts" in Turkish minds by means of all educational and cultural institutions and organizations, as one of the Kemalist meta-narratives, it was stressed to provide a legitimate cause for political, social, economic, cultural and legal regulations. For example, coupled with the very control of the state on all economic affairs, two state-owned banks were named as *Sümer Bank* (The Bank of Sumer) and *Eti Bank* (The Hittite Bank). This indeed was the result of the strong link between culture, politics and economy.

CHAPTER VI

THE “LANGUAGE QUESTION” AS A CULTURAL DILEMMA AND THE TURKISH LANGUAGE SOCIETY

During *Nevruz*¹ celebrations in 2000 some local newspapers wrote it as *Newroz*, upon which the official authorities brought suit against those newspapers that spelled the term *Nevruz* as *Newroz*.² This act indeed resulted from the new official attitude to the term. When during the early 1990s it gradually came to be the symbol of revolting against the Turkish state, the official authorities tried to tame it and declared that *Nevruz*, not *Newroz*, was really a Turkish festival commemorated by the Turks through centuries. In this way they tried to turn it into part of official cultural ideology, written as *Nevruz* as opposed to local usage, *Newroz*. This case seems to be very illustrative to show the importance of the issue of language as a political and cultural dilemma in Turkish politics and society, and to what extent language has become politicized. In this way language has had a central place in determining the boundaries of the official notion of culture, and, at the same time, it has been used as a vehicle by forces from the center for different identification processes.

¹ *Neruz* is a popular festive celebrated in the South East region of Turkey and some Turkic societies as the starting day of spring.

The politicization of language in Turkey, closely tied with the state's discourse of culture, is one significant end product of the official cultural policies of the Kemalist regime. Its seeds were found in the early Republican period when a process of language revolution was initiated, especially through the works and activities of the Turkish Language Society that was founded in 1932 as an official body. This quest was based on a purifying approach to eliminate all foreign grammatical rules and words from the Turkish language. In fact, together with the alphabet change in 1928, the foundation of the TLS was one of the critical turning points of the language revolution. It signified the goal to create *öz Türkçe* (pure Turkish) by ending the dominance of foreign lexical elements, mostly Arabic and Persian, in the Turkish language. And, in their place, the TLS strove to institute *öz Türkçe* words which were generally taken from dialects in and outside Turkey and old literary texts, and also invented some in accord with existing Turkish roots.

In this chapter, in order to trace the process of the creation of *öz Türkçe*, the discussions on the alphabet change and the works and activities of the Turkish Language Society will be analyzed. And, in doing so, it will be shown that new Turkish language with its new letters and words became one of the constituent parts of a new Turkish culture the modernizing rulers attempted to create from scratch.

6.1. The Revolution in Language and Its Background

² Celal Başlangıç, "Bunu da mı W'apacaktınız!", *Radikal* (April 1, 2000), 19.

Together with history, language was seen as an indispensable component for the Kemalist project of culture and society, foreseeing that it had to be reproduced as a new entity. It was based on the belief that, like all aspects of culture, language could be reformed in accordance with the politically designed plan and thus used as an effective tool to rename and reshape a new social and political order.³ This was the trend of revolutionizing the language with stress on its political role in the formation of culture and identity. Here language appears as another “man-made” object. It was the link between language and power⁴ which made it easy for the Kemalist revolutionaries to *rename* the world according to their own aesthetic preferences. The revolution in language, as part of the Kemalist civilizing process from above, was initiated in general by the state elite, politicians and non-professionals rather than linguists. What was done from above was therefore at the first hand linguistic engineering, bound up with a political project of creating a new culture. *Öz Türkçe* as a new language would be an instrumental device “to spread *culture* among the people. It should be a language through which the flow of thought and idea from *above* is possible in order to publicize and inculcate culture.”⁵ It was “scientification of language”⁶ entirely inspired by Kemalist

³ This use of language was very common in the France of the Jacobins after the Revolution. See Robert Darnton, *The Kiss of Lamourtte* (New York: Norton, 1990), 6-7. This was one result of the belief in the power of the human being to re-form and re-construct reality. It was also evident in the American Revolution. See Cynthia S. Jordan, *Second Stories: The Politics of Language, Form, and Gender in Early American Fiction* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 7, 10-11. This was one result of the belief in the power of human being to re-form and re-construct reality.

⁴ For the relation between language and power or authority and the usage of language as a device for “the act of renaming”, see Cynthia S. Jordan, *Second Stories: The Politics of Language, Form, and Gender in Early American Fiction* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 10-11.

positivism. In fact, this was in parallel with the cultural tendency of the new regime that, as Heyd aptly puts it, engendered a “complete break with the Islamic past and the adoption of the secular values of modern civilization. The new outlook led, *inter alia*, to the introduction of the Latin script and the an urgent demand for the creation of a language capable of fully expressing the thoughts and feelings common to Occidental culture.”⁷ Based on this formula, the official discursive formation of language gradually took its shape through the process in which there were the two main steps; the first, the adoption of the Latin alphabet, the second, the creation of *öz Türkçe* by eliminating all foreign elements.

The discussions on alphabet change and purification attempts in Turkey did not, of course, suddenly spring up with the establishment of the Republic, but dated back to the Tanzimat reform movement. As mentioned in Chapter III, the transformation in the Ottoman vision of society resulted in the emergence of a new idea of people anymore composed of individuals who were seen as being educated and enlightened. This world-view went hand in hand with the idea of “educating the people” that, toward the mid-nineteenth century, was coupled with the need for a common language that ordinary people could easily understand. The new trend became very visible in the attempts of the Tanzimat elite to simplify the legal, administrative and educational language. In the

⁵ “Gazi Türkçesi” [*Gazi Turkish*], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1932), 114. Here the main expectation was that this new language would be “a genuine and vigorous language expressing a whole culture and civilization as well as other languages, [of the civilized world].” *Ibid.*, 116.

⁶ The expression is of F. Rıfıkı Atay. See Falih Rıfıkı Atay, “Dil Kurultayı” [Language Congress], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1936), 518.

⁷ Uriel Heyd, *Language Reform in Modern Turkey* (Jerusalem: The Israel Oriental Society, 1954), 20.

second half of the nineteenth century, the rise of a new modern intellectual group and the spreading effect of newspapers accelerated the tendency of purification and simplification. For the modern-educated intellectuals, along with modern standards, Ottoman Turkish had to be corrected in a way by putting a strong emphasis on Turkish words and coining new terms from Arabic and Persian origin through changing their meaning and spelling.⁸ The rapid spread of newspapers, using standard language, played a leading role in the process of forming a common language through simplification. This is indeed in a greater degree what Benedict Anderson refers to the “print capitalism” that brought about a common language, necessary for the persistence of nationalism and the possibility of a national imagined community.⁹ In the Ottoman Empire, as occurred in Europe, language began to emerge as being the main dimension for expressing new cultural affiliation which went beyond the particularistic one, and so served as a bond for the people seen as belonging to the same community.

The search for a standard, common language held the main place in the nationalist writings of the last three decades of the Empire. Seeing language as one of the constituting aspects of nation, the Turkish nationalists began to give importance to the Turkish part of the Ottoman language and regard the vernacular of the people as a reservoir of Turkish language needing help to become prevalent. This view began to gain support from the various sections of the intellectuals and rulers, especially during the rule

⁸ Consequently, almost all literary works of Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ziya Paşa, Ali Suavi, Ahmet Mithat and others became nearer to spoken language, as opposite to the Ottoman literary tradition. For further details on the developments of the period, see Agah Sırrı Levend, *Türk Dilinde Gelişme ve Sadeleşme Evreleri* [Phases of Development and Purification in Turkish Language], 3rd ed. (Ankara: TDK, 1972), 113-148.

of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (1908-18) striving to create a linguistic unity among various layers of society. Newspaper and literary languages began to be simplified, especially stimulated by the activities of the Turkist movement.¹⁰ Among them, the most important one was the “new language movement” led by the prominent Turkists such as Ömer Seyfeddin and Ziya Gökalp.¹¹ The basic aim of the movement was to create a *Yeni Lisan* (New Language) through standardizing the vernacular of the people, especially that of İstanbul.¹² The “new language”, during the reign of the CUP, received political support and gradually became the legal and administrative language as much as the newspaper and literary one.¹³

In all discussions on the language reform from the beginning of Ottoman modernization, the alphabet, particularly letters, had become the hottest issue. During the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, language simplification attempts

⁹ See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 1991), 37-82.

¹⁰ From the early 1910s, the activities of *Türk Derneği* (Turkish Association), journals -*Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Land), *Halka Doğru* (Toward the People), *Türk Sözü* (Turkish Speech)- and the literary movement known as *Genç Kalemler* (Young Pens) intensified the simplifying trend by placing a strong stress on a written version of the spoken language. See Levend, *Türk Dilinde*, 300, and, for further information, 300-347.

¹¹ It required the elimination of Arabic and Persian grammatical rules and some words for which there existed Turkish synonyms in the spoken language, and the coinage of technical terms from Arabic roots. In this sense, Ziya Gökalp's language reform program was the main product of the movement. He strove to give birth to a language (one of the main components in his definition of culture) free from all foreign elements and understandable for everybody. For his program, see Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, translated by Robert Devereux (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), 93-94.

¹² Yusuf Ziya Öksüz, *Türkçenin Sadeleşme Tarihi Genç Kalemler ve Yeni Lisan Hareketi* [History of Simplification of Turkish: Young Pens and New Language Movement] (Ankara: TDK, 1995), 170

¹³ Heyd, *Language*, 18.

came with some efforts for modifications in the alphabet.¹⁴ In the CUP period, although the need for reforming the alphabet to express Turkish phonemes and syllables in a proper way was widely recognized, the main discussion on the issue of alphabet took place between the pro-westernist strand and moderate group including the Turkists and Islamists. The former, believing in a revolutionary turn, insisted on the necessity of a change in the alphabet, for, in their views, the Arabic letters were not suitable for writing and wording of Turkish well.¹⁵ The moderates opposed any serious changes in the Arabic alphabet, while accepting some new arrangements to make the alphabet easily read and written.¹⁶ During the rule of the CUP, the views of the moderates became the official

¹⁴ As parallel with the attempts made to purify Turkish in the second half of the nineteenth century, some people began to state loudly that some modifications on the Arabic letters were essential for the writing of Turkish. For some proposals on modifications in the alphabet, see M. Şakir Ülkütaşır, *Atatürk ve Harf Devrimi* [Atatürk and Language Revolution] (Ankara: TDK, 1973), 17-20; Münif Paşa, “İmla Meselesi” [Problem of Orthography], in *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet Alfabe Tartışmaları* [Discussions on Alphabet from the Tanzimat to the Republic], ed. Hüseyin Yorulmaz (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 1995) (original publication 1863), 25-28; Namık Kemal, “Kıraat ve Islah-ı Huruf Meselesi” [Reading and Alphabet Rreform], in *ibid* (original publication 1869), 48-59; Ali Suavi, “Lisan ve Hatt-ı Türki” [Language and Writing in Turkish], in *ibid* (original publication 1870), 60-89. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the issue of alphabet was dealt with seriously as a public matter by Şemsettin Sami, who made some changes in the alphabet. He even prepared a new alphabet known as “the Istanbul Alphabet” in Latin characters which might be seen as antecedent to the Turkish Script Reform in 1928. See Frances Trix, “The Stamboul Alphabet of Shemseddin Sami Bey: Precursor to Turkish Script Reform.” *Int. J. of Middle Eastern Studies*. 31 (1999), 255-272.

¹⁵ Among the westernists, Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), Abdullah Cevdet, Celal Nuri (İleri) and Kılıçzade Hakkı came to the fore as leading figures in drawing the need for alphabet change, proposing to form a new alphabet based on the Latin one. See Ülkütaşır, *Atatürk*, 29-33, 38-41; Bilal Şimşir, *Türk Yazı Devrimi* [Turkish Alphabet Revolution] (Ankara: TDK, 1992), 47-52. As in most reforms of the Republic, the westernists’ call for change in the alphabet might be seen as forerunner of the 1928 alphabet revolution.

¹⁶ This was evident in all writings of the moderates of the period. See Şimşir, *Türk Yazı*, 44-45, 47-48.

line.¹⁷ In general, the CUP's efforts seemed to be part of the quest for forming a common vernacular, necessary for drawing the boundaries of the community composed of those who had similar feelings. In the 1920s, after the proclamation of the Republic, the alphabet as a most problematic side of language reform in Turkey kept appearing on the agenda as a contested issue.

6.2. The Alphabet Change as Part of the Republican Civilizing Process from Above

With the first attempts to build the institutions of a nation-state during the early years of the Republic, a common language was seen essential to make the masses conscious of being a cultural whole. The civilizing rulers of the new regime regarded language necessary for political and cultural identity and so the essential and unique way to become a nation.¹⁸ For their goals, as opposite to Second Meşrutiyet reformers and intellectuals' general tendency for simplification of the language without a direct

¹⁷ As an official body, in 1914, *Islahat-i İlmiye Encümeni* (The Committee for Scientific Terms), working on correcting and regulating the rules of letter and writing, was founded; among its members were Babanzade Naim, Ziya Gökalp, Rıza Tevfik (Bölükbaşı) and İsmail Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu). Based on the fact that Arabic letters had to be written separately to be easily read and written, Enver Paşa in 1917 attempted to put in use in some official affairs a new alphabet, known as *huruf-u munfasıla*, *hatt-ı cedid* or *Enverpaşa yazısı*. See G. L. Lewis, "Atatürk's Language Reform as an Aspect of Modernization in the Republic of Turkey", in *Atatürk and Modernization of Turkey*, ed. Jacob M. Landau (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 196.

¹⁸ In the 1924 Constitution, Turkish was declared as the official language of the State (Part One, Article 3). Article 42 forbade the use of any language other than Turkish "taught as mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institution of training and education." See "Constitution of the Republic of Turkey" quoted as Appendix D in Donald Everett Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation* (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political And Social Science, 1939), 297-236.

intervention in its structure, the rulers aimed to create a pure Turkish, formulated to be realized in a revolutionary zeal.

The alphabet change in 1928 was the first phase in the state's language revolution. In the period of 1923 to 1928, although there was wide consensus on the necessity of simplification in language, the main continuous discussion occurred on the letters and orthography.¹⁹ In this way the alphabet had become the subject of heated debate from the early days of the Republic. In the debate two leading groups came to the fore: the first was the supporters for change composed of those who were mostly followers of the westernist strand in the CUP period, and the second, the opponents who had been moderate in the matter of language, of the same period. The debate began with a motion made by İzmirli Nazmi with his two friends at the İzmir Economic Conference in February - March 1923, which was not taken into consideration by the chairman Kazım Karabekir because of the reason that "Latin letters being harmful for the unity of Islam".²⁰ Immediately, after Kazım Karabekir's views against the Latin letters published in the newspapers, a fervent discussion began to dominate the public. In the following days, in the *Tanin* and *Resimli Gazete* (İstanbul daily), Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) and Kılıçzade Hakkı (Kılıçoğlu) who argued for the change published articles refuting Kazım

¹⁹ For more information on the issue of language of the period, see Levend, *Türk Dilinde*, 389-391.

²⁰ See Ülkütaşır, *Atatürk*, 44. In the following days, in a newspaper interview, Kazım Karabekir explained his views on the issue that the call for adopting the Latin letters was the satanic idea propagated by the enemies of Turkey, by which it was aimed to separate Turkey from the rest of the Islamic world, and the Arabic letters were not so difficult to write and read and ugly as was declared. For the text of the interview, see Levend, *Türk Dilinde*, 392-393; For his other statements published in newspapers, see Kazım Karabekir, "Latin Harflerini Kabul Edemeyiz" [We Can't Accept Latin Letters], in *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete*, 90-93.

Karabekir's views on the alphabet and mentioned the necessity of an alphabet reform to be freed from the burdens of ignorance.²¹ Both writers in company with Abdullah Cevdet and Celal Nuri (İleri), who had been the main carriers of the westernist models from the early years of the Second Meşrutiyet, had been the loyal defenders of the idea of a revolution in the alphabet. And also, on the issue as in most of the reforms, from early 1910 on, they had implied the way commonly followed in later years by the rulers of the new regime. Even the debate was carried in the parliament; in 1924, Şükrü Saracoğlu, during the session on the budget of the Ministry of National Education, put the blame on Arabic letters as a main cause of the ignorance and backwardness of Turkish people.²² In 1926, once again the issue of the Latin letters became a widely and heatedly discussed topic among the intellectual and political circles. Most of the linguists, historians and writers were against the proposed change in the alphabet.²³ For them any change in letters

²¹ Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) in his article (entitled "Latin Hurufu ile Türkçe Yazmak Mümkün müdür?" published in the *Resimli Gazete* (on 22 September 1923) whose editorial policy was opposed to the proposed change) promoted the idea that the existing Arabic letters were responsible for illiteracy and ignorance, and if replaced with that of Latin ones, would open a new horizon for young generations who would easily learn to read and write. For him there was not any religious obligation behind the use of the Arabic letters, but it was just a matter of choice. "Of course, there are many difficulties in passing to a new alphabet. But, why will the people who sacrifice their life for the sake of fatherland suffer this "cultural sacrifice" on behalf of eternal cause of fatherland?" Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Latin Hurufu ile Türkçe Yazı Yazmak Mümkün müdür?" [Is It Possible to Write in Turkish with Latin Letters?], in *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete*, 94-97.

²² See Sami N. Özerdim, *Yazı Devrimin Öyküsü* [The Story of Alphabet Revolution] (Ankara: TDK, 1978), 20. And also, for the debate of the period, see Şimşir, *Türk Yazı*, 57-63.

²³ From on 28 March 1926, in *Akşam* (İstanbul daily), opponents of the proposed change, began an inquiry on whether to accept or reject the Latin letters among the leading writers and scholars. Among the respondents (15 writers and scholars) were just only three persons (Dr. Abdullah Cevdet, Refet Avni (Aras), Mustafa Hamit) who defeneded change. Among the opponents were Ali Ekrem (Bolayır), Muallim Cevdet

would damage the continuity in intellectual and daily life of the nation. The debate between the proponents and the opponents of the proposed idea continued at the end of 1926.

At that point, in order to provide a background overview to the 1928 revolution and later purifying attempts of the early 1930s, it seems necessary to summarize both groups' views. The main arguments of the supporters, who were among the leading figures of the westernists of the Second Meşrutiyet, were based on, first, the failure of the Arabic letters in expressing Turkish and the compatibility of the Latin one with Turkish, and second, the justification of new letters through the general westernizing and civilizing ideology of the new regime.²⁴ The first argument was mainly about the nature

(İnançalp), Necip Asım (Yazıksız), İbrahim Alaaddin (Gövsa), Avram Galanti, Halil Nimetullah (Öztürk), Veled Çelebi (İzbudak), Halit Ziya (Uşaklıgil), İbrahim Necmi (Dilmen) and Gombotes Zoltan (Hungarian professor). For their detailed evaluations and judgements, see "Latin Harflerini Kabul Etmeli mi, Etmemeli mi?" [Should Latin Letters Be Accepted or Not?] (original publication, 1926), in *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete*, 194-232. As prominent figures of the opponents, Avram Galanti and Fuat Köprülü came to the fore. For Galanti's views on the issue, see Avram Galanti, *Arabi Harfler Terakkimize Mani Değildir* [Arabic Letters Do Not Hinder Our Progress], 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Bedir Yay., 1996) (original publication 1925). Rejecting a revolutionary transformation in social and cultural life through a "rationally" modelled formula from above Fuat Köprülü evaluated all proposals for a change in the alphabet revolutionary in nature. See Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad, "Harf Meselesi" [Question of Alphabet] (original publication 1926), in *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete*, 233-35; idem, "Lisanımıza Dair" [On Our Language] (original publication 1927), in *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı II* [Ideational Life of Atatürk Period], eds. Mehmet Kaplan et al (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1992), 33-37. Nevertheless, this stands in sharp contrast to his statements made 12 years later when he wished to become part of the official trend and became one of the champions of the new letters. For which see Köprülüzade Fuad, "Alfabe İnkılabı" [Alphabet Revolution]. *Ülke*. 67 (1938), 1-2.

²⁴ For their claims, see Hüseyin Yorulmaz, "İslah-ı Huruf'tan Tebdil-i Hurufa" [From Reforming the Alphabet to Alphabet Change], in *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete*, 8-9; Avni (Başman), "Latin Harfleri Meselesi" [Question of Latin Letters] (original publication 1926), in *ibid.*, 244-245. For typical examples of the writings reflecting the proponents' inclinations, see Falih Rıfkı (Atay), "Latin Harfleri" [Latin Letters], in

of Arabic letters which did not suit Turkish and so did cause a serious difficulty in Turkish orthography and Turkish spelling. Thus these letters had been responsible for widespread illiteracy and ignorance. Due to the fact that the Latin letters very easy compared to Arabic one, the new alphabet would be easy to write and read for everybody. Secondly, if Western civilization was wholly accepted, then it was necessary to imitate its writing and reading style and so adapt its Latin letters to the Turkish language; if otherwise, the Turkish revolution would be incomplete. In this respect, accordingly, the adoption of the Latin alphabet would be the redemption of the Turkish nation “chained in darkness” with the Arabic one seen responsible for the miserable condition of all Muslims.

On the other hand, the opponents who were mostly the Turkists and Islamists of the Second Meşrutiyet developed a moderate attitude to the issue of language. They essentially emphasized some practical reasons why there was no need for the Latin alphabet and the fear of a cultural and mental break with the heritage of the past.²⁵ In their views, although it was necessary to make some corrections in the alphabet and add some letters, Turkish had adjusted to the existing Arabic letters in its structure. Contrary to the views of the proponents, they argued that the ignorance and illiteracy among the

Hayatı II, 23-25; İzzet Ulvi, “Yeni Türk Harfleri Münasebetiyle” [On the Occasion of New Turkish Letters], *ibid.*, 50-55; Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), “Latin Harfleri” [Latin Letters], in *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete* (original publication 1923), 94-98; Celal Nuri (İleri), “Latin Harfleri Meselesi” [Question of the Latin Letters], *ibid* (original publication 1928), 285-301.

²⁵ For the opponents’ views, see *ibid.*, 9-10; Avni (Başman), “Latin,” 245-46. Zeki Velidi criticized the proposed change in the alphabet, arguing that for the sake of participating in a new civilization and creating a new culture, adoption of Latin alphabet would cause “deep crisis and erase entirely national culture (milli hars) in the near

people stemmed from economic backwardness and insufficiency of a true national education, but not necessarily the letters. So, in order to be an integral part of Western civilization, it was not necessary to adjust to its form of writing. The focal point of their argument was that the adoption of the Latin letters would bring about a loss of the ties with a vast religious and cultural literary tradition. In short, what this meant was that the basic discussion in terms of the proposed reform in letters occurred around determining the preferences of how to be westernized, that is, whether or not it was indispensable to make transformation in the alphabet to participate in Western civilization. After 1926, in accordance with the revolutionary zeal of the civilizing rulers the trend began gradually turning on behalf of those who supported the change.

Therefore, toward the end of 1926, the ongoing debate on the alphabet came to an end parallel with the RPP's authoritarian orientation to silencing all opposition. After that time, there did not emerge any view that was in sharp conflict with the standards determined by the official authorities. On this secure ground, the move toward new letters became the official line. Moreover, according to the changing political climate, indeed, some writers who had been among the opponents began to change their approach to the problem, for it was not easy for them to be impartial when a sort of political authoritarianism dominated and set some strict orders on the issue of letters. In the following years, 1927 and 1928, the first preparations to realize the revolution in the alphabet were made in essence in a covert way; it was in this period that some writers of the official line such as Falih Rıfki (Atay), Yunus Nadi (Abalıođlu), Mithat Sadullah (Sander), Celal Nuri (İleri) and Ahmed Cevad (Emre), continued to write in favor of the

future." Zeki Velidi (Togan), "Türklerde Hars Buhranı" [Crises of Culture among the Turks] (original publication 1926), in *ibid.*, 243.

Latin letters in newspapers. It seemed that to carry out the revolution in the alphabet was decided in 1927 as state policy, and from the beginning of 1928 the decision was put into use.²⁶

The government's first step to change letters was to set up in May of 1928 the Language Committee engaged on the task of Latinizing the writing system and preparing a new grammar.²⁷ As the first preparatory phase of the dressed change in alphabet, in May 1928 the Arabic numerals were substituted for with the Western one with a law that made them compulsory for all official bureaux as from June 1st, 1929, and for private businesses from June 1931. In the next two months, the committee prepared a report, *Elifba Raporu*,²⁸ and presented it to Mustafa Kemal on August 1, 1928. Immediately, on the basis of this report, in İstanbul, on 9 August 1928 Mustafa Kemal introduced the "new Turkish letters."²⁹ In the following days, classes for higher officials and other staff,

²⁶ On the decision for the revolution, see Özerdim, *Yazi*, 21.

²⁷ Among the members of the Committee there were Falih Rıfki (Atay), Fazıl Ahmet (Aykaç), Ruşen Eşref (Ünaydın), Ragıp Hulusi (Özdem), Ahmet Cevat (Emre), İbrahim Grantı (Grantay), Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), Mehmet Emin (Erişirgil), Mehmet İhsan (Sungu), Ahmet Rasim, İbrahim Necmi (Dilmen), Celal Sahir (Erozan), Avni (Başman) and İsmail Hikmet (Ertaylan). See Ülkütaşır, *Atatürk*, 60-61. Most of them at the time of preparing alphabet believed the process of change in the alphabet would take at least ten years. Mustafa Kemal rejected this and wanted it to happen as soon as possible. To his close friend, Falih Rıfki Atay, he said, "it will either happen in three months or it won't happen at all". See Falih Rıfki Atay, *Çankaya* (İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş, 1969), 440.

²⁸ The report was prepared by İbrahim Grantay, writing at its introduction that "taking into account the speaking language of İstanbul on which today our common and literary language rely, we tried to create an alphabet theoretically and practically suitable to that language, ... which is originated from Latin letters used by European nations." See Levend, *Türk Dilinde*, 401; İbrahim Grantay, *Elifba Raporu* (İstanbul, 1928).

²⁹ The way to name the new letters might be convenient to the political will behind the revolution. The committee held the meetings in Dolmabahçe palace in 25, 27,

deputies, university professors, intellectuals, were held to teach them the new letters. In order to present the new letters to the masses, Mustafa Kemal went to some provinces where he gave public lectures on the new letters.³⁰ After the presentation of the Latin script, the parliament passed a law on the alphabet change on 1 November 1928.³¹ Passing to the new alphabet would have to be realized, at most, in one year.³² The rulers, at once, set to spread a nation-wide education campaign by passing education in the new letters for school children in the following semester and setting up *Millet Mektepleri* (nation schools) as a system of compulsory adult education.³³

29 August, and there İsmet Paşa (İnönü) named new letters as truly “Turkish alphabet” (*Türk alfabesi*). The new one, for him, is the “most scientific and practicable formula”. Three items were determined as ultimate decisions of the committee: “1) in order to save the nation from ignorance only one way is to change the existing Arabic letters unfit for the Turkish language and to accept Turkish letters based on Latin origin; 2) the alphabet the committee proposed was truly a Turkish alphabet and this is definite; 3) the rules of use and orthography will evolve in parallel with reformation and progress of language and national taste.” Levend, *Türk Dilinde*, 403.

³⁰ For further details on the tours, see Ülkütaşır, *Atatürk*, 90-128.

³¹ *Resmi Gazete* [Official Gazette], “..... 3 November 1928.

³² The law brought obligations for everybody to begin to use the new alphabet immediately, while government departments, periodicals and advertisements had to adapt to the new letters on 1 December 1928. See *ibid*; for the samples of the first writings in newspapers, see *Yazı Devriminin 50. Yılı Sergisi* [50th Anniversary of Alphabet Revolution] (Ankara: TTK, 1979).

³³ For *Millet Mektepleri Talimatnamesi* (Nation Schools Statute), see “Millet Mektepleri Talimatnamesi”, in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili: Belgeler*, ed. Zeynep Korkmaz (Ankara: TDK, 1992), 84-102. *Millet Mektepleri* as a wide system of adult education came to be the first well-organized adult education centres of the Republic. Every adult between the ages of sixteen and forty had to attend classes regularly held in primary schools. It was obligatory for them. The impressions of one foreign contemporary observer about the application of new law in Samsun might be illustrative: “My friends told me with considerable glee of enforcement measures taken by police who visited cafés and backgammon dens, removing to school any culprits who could not produce certificates of their reading and writing ability... The penalties were prescribed both for those who neglect to attend the schools and for those who attend but are lazy.” Henry

There exist two basic themes in the discussions during the adoption of the Latin alphabet. The first one was about the destructive influences of the Arabic characters on Turkish culture from the early time of their adoption; the second, the importance of the Latin alphabet presented, from the beginning, as “new Turkish alphabet” and its possible effects. The first theme seemed to be related very much with the Kemalist understanding of modernization based on the civilization/archaism dichotomy. The Arabic letters, together with the sultanate, caliphate, sharia courts, *mecelle* (first constitution in modern sense), medresses, tekkes, clothes, *serpuş* (traditional male headgear), were seen as images belonging to the East imagined within the frame of barbarism as a mentality and way of life. They had imprisoned the Turks to live in a backward Eastern position. So, for the sake of progress in the path of civilization the Arabic letters had to be removed.³⁴

As a result, the Arabic alphabet was seen in the official discourse as having colonized the mind and mentality of Turks, that is, having tied the Turks to the East for ten centuries. On the question, the words of Mustafa Kemal, uttered on the night of introducing the new alphabet on 9 August in 1928, seems illustrative:

Fellow countrymen! In order to express our beautiful language we are adopting *new Turkish letters*... We have to emancipate ourselves from the incomprehensible signs that had placed our minds in an *iron* frame for centuries. We want to understand our language by all means. We shall understand it surely with these new letters in a near future... Today, one of our tasks is to learn quickly the new Turkish letters and teach them to the whole nation... If at least eighty percent of our nation is still illiterate, the fault is not ours. The fault lies

Elisha Allen, *The Turkish Transformation* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968) (original publication 1935), 125.

³⁴ For a Kemalist perception of shortcomings of the Arabic alphabet, see Ahmed Cevad (Emre), “Muhtac Olduğumuz Lisan İnkılabı” [The Language Revolution That We Need] (original publication 1928), in *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete*, 272; Celal Nuri, “A New Phase of the Turkish Revolution,” in *The Turkish Press 1925-1932*, trans. and ed. Lutfy Levonian (Athens: School of Religion, 1932) (original publication 1928), 90-91.

with those who, not understanding the Turkish character, have *chained our heads with iron bands*.³⁵ (Italics added)

The time had come to correct the faults of the past. In the correction, the Arabic alphabet had to be removed, for it had been insufficient in expressing Turkish in general and modern scientific and technical terms in particular; yet, the new one was introduced as easily adapted to the writing of Turkish. This was regarded urgent, and so some objections, which focused on the discontinuity in history, were rejected. As Mustafa Şekip (one of the pro-reformists in language) stated, “[W]e have no time to listen to such objections which insistently point out to us the risk which our culture and traditions may run. The foremost thing in our minds is the present and the future. Let those who are *fond of the past*, remain in the past” (my emphasis).³⁶ Thus, to establish a new future and create new generations, it was at first necessary to free youths from the destructive influences of the books and all writings full of “superstitious and scholastic” knowledge.³⁷ To put it in a more clear way, free from the sensation of the old

³⁵ *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri* [Atatürk's Speeches and Statements], vol. II (Ankara: İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1989), 274; for English translation, see “Mustafa Kemal Pasha' Address on Launching the New Characters,” in *The Turkish Press 1925-1932* (original publication 1928), 86-87. Through all stages of the revolution, Mustafa Kemal came to the fore as a main leading figure in initiating the reform in language. His role is soundly stressed in *Tarih IV* on the section of “History of the Revolution”. *Tarih IV* (İstanbul: Maarif Vekaleti Yay., 1931), 252.

³⁶ See “Some Extracts from the Address of Mustafa Şekip Bey, Professor of Psychology in the University of Constantinople,” in *The Turkish Press 1925-1932* (original publication 1928), 87.

³⁷ For such a revolutionary evaluation in an official line, see İzet Ulvi (Akyurt), “Yeni Türk Harfleri Münasebetiyle” [On the Occasion of New Turkish Letters], in *Atatürk Devri*, 53. “These books belonging to the pre-modern, archaic ages were”, writes Celal Nuri, “insufficient to meet today's cultural needs, and even these outmoded volumes got us into a dilemma we face today.” Celal Nuri, “Latin,” 298.

generations, as one of the Kemalists expressed, “new generations will escape from the effect of what was written and then come under that of what is being written and will be written.”³⁸

Consequently, in the discourse of the civilizing rulers the Arabic letters with their form and writing style and with their Arabic-Islamic and Ottoman overtones were not capable of fitting modern ways. No longer concerned with the association with the past and other Islamic societies, they stressed the need for an alphabet in common with the West. It was for this reason that, in the views of Mustafa Kemal:

So long as Turkish was written from right to left, it could never properly diffuse the ideals of European civilization. The picturesque involutions and intricacies of Arabic script afforded a psychological background to *Oriental mentality* which stood as the real enemy of the Republic” (my emphasis).³⁹

That is to say that the Turkish nation with a new language in its new dress (new alphabet) would gain a new mentality and take a place in the family of “*alem-i medeniyet*” (the civilized world).⁴⁰ Here the emancipatory aspects of the Latin letters that were of the civilized nations of the world were emphasized as a panacea for correcting the shortcomings and deficiencies common to *Oriental mentality*. That was why the new

³⁸ Burhan Asaf (Belge), *Türk Yurdu*, 39/233 (March 1931), 46-60.

³⁹ Quoted in H. E. Wortham, *Mustafa Kemal of Turkey* (New York: William Edwin Rudge, 1930), 188-89.

⁴⁰ *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, vol. II, 272. The expectation, as one of the leading pro-reformist journalists (Yunus Nadi) claimed, was that, being the beginning and base-line of Western civilization, “the adoption of the Latin letters will make us more closer to that civilization from the point of gaining its educational and instructional tools.” Yunus Nadi, “Yeni Yazı” [New Alphabet], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2: Atatürk Devri Yazarlarının Türk Dili Hakkındaki Görüşleri* [Atatürk and Turkish Language 2:

letters, as Mustafa Şekip fittingly said, “not only solve our educational problem but also emancipate our minds and hearts from the influence of Ottoman traditions.”⁴¹ In short, what was needed was a revolution in language, the change in alphabet was its first step. As argued above, in the search for identifying the reasons for being backward, the blame was placed, as one of the causes, on the alphabet in use for ten centuries. The solution was a new creation, the Latin letters, that could give way for progress and development of the Turkish language and overcome illiteracy. Beside these positive effects, perhaps more importantly, the other expectation was that it would end the backward position of the Turks in life and science by eliminating the domination of Arabic and Persian rules and lexicons.

Why was the Latin alphabet adopted as the “new Turkish alphabet”? For Celal Nuri, there were two reasons for the acceptance. The first was its international character; secondly, it was suitable for use not only in European languages, but also in languages with Ural-Altai origins such as Finnish and Hungarian.⁴² For our purpose, the emphasis on its international character is significant, because the substitution for the Kemalists was something signifying to participate wholly in Western civilization which was seen as universal. To put it in other words, it would make it easy for the Turkish nation to possess the omnipresent and universalized standards of civilization.

In short, the replacement of the Arabic alphabet with that of the Latin in the writing of Turkish appeared as a most critical symbolic turn in socio-political and cultural

The Atatürk Period’s Writers’ Views on Turkish Language], ed. Zeynep Korkmaz (Ankara: TDK, 1997) (original publication 1928), 7.

⁴¹ “Some Extracts,” 88.

⁴² See Celal Nuri, “Latin,” 285-301.

life of Turkey. It is critical because it led to a radical cultural break with the tradition and heritage of the *shamed* past by creating a *state of illiteracy*. This was indeed a starting point for a “language without history which was ready to be filled with a new cultural content.”⁴³ In other words, what was aimed with the alphabet change was to end historical continuity and to create the new language for a new beginning and future generations. Thus, evidently, as an act of “forgetting”, it was political will to cut new generations off from the influences of the Ottoman-Islamic cultural heritage and to make them closer to modern civilization by means of a newly manufactured culture.⁴⁴ Thereupon, by the change the state gained a chance to control the whole process of publications including new ones and transcriptions.⁴⁵ Printing was, therefore, so important on the part of the ruling elite to spread the idea of the new “imagined community” as in what we find in Benedict Anderson’s analysis.⁴⁶

During the heated discussions on the possible alphabet change, as mentioned before, the opponents rejected it, as expected, on behalf of a strong desire to preserve the

⁴³ See Beşir Ayvazoğlu, “Devletin Kültüre Düşen Gölgesi” [Shadow of the State on Culture]. *Dergah*. 28 (1992), 12.

⁴⁴ Taking into account literary continuity, Victoria Holbrook sees the change as one of “nationalist” and “chauvinist” political endeavours to make Ottoman literature unattainable to the new Turks. It led to the emergence of the “new mode of literacy” to which, according to their position at the moment of change, some have advantage in access. See Victoria Rowe Holbrook, *The Unreadable Shores of Love: Turkish Modernity and Mystic Romance* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 2, 20.

⁴⁵ This was very clear in the position of some newspapers with opposing tendency. After the change, facing the loss of their readers, newspapers and other periodicals took financial support from the government. Some newspapers, which criticised the change and other reforms, were deprived of the critical subsidy. See Allen, *The Turkish*, 126. The last opposition groups were thus eliminated and what was contemplated was a new literature including no views contrary to the official line.

tradition and the living culture. On the other hand, portraying the living one as archaic, the proponents put forward a revolutionary zeal judging the change as a necessary stage to create a new generation and a new life ordered in an “endless” progressive manner. The change was therefore in general justified and inaugurated with the concept of civilization that was the name of a “world order” covering everything in socio-economic, political and cultural realms. Only in this sense did the concept of culture totally differentiate from that of the opponents taking place in the discourse of the reformists. For example, for one of the pioneers for the change, Ahmed Cevad (Emre), each nation had to adopt at least scientific and cultural terminology and letters of universal and dominant civilization to gain a civilized mentality in language. The alphabet change was the first step in the nationalization of “culture and technique of universal civilization”, which was necessary for being civilized and progressed.⁴⁷ Celal Nuri put it in more clear words, claiming that “the substitution of the Latin alphabet with that of Arabic will fulfill our need at the first instance, and then, enable the Turks to enter into the *international culture*” (my emphasis).⁴⁸ Despite these general remarks on universalized culture, there was an ambiguous attitude among the Kemalists towards culture and its relation with language and alphabet, which mostly stemmed from the harsh criticism of those placing strong emphasis on local and “authentic” culture. The main justification was their stress on the new and civilized way of life, to be created on the basis of universalized values of

⁴⁶ See Anderson, *Imagined*, 44-45.

⁴⁷ Cevad (Emre), “Muhtaç,” 273 and 279.

⁴⁸ Celal Nuri, “Latin,” 291. He continues, “after the adoption of the new alphabet, in the near future, the Turkish nation will catch up with the civilized nations which are the forerunners of civilization, and take part in their culture”, 298.

civilization. However, after mid-1929, there emerged a new trend when the issue of the alphabet was directly perceived within the context when the Revolution was mentioned in connection with the term culture. In this context, the basic theme was that, with the help of new alphabet being easily read and written, a new culture would be created as a requirement of the modern age. The abolishing of the old alphabet meant to be free from the “old culture” and also the emergence of new literature which would produce a “new one.”⁴⁹ Here culture, beside its nationalized form, was often used to refer to all aspects of life developed in the West; that is to say, the most stressed view in the discussion on the change was that following the change a great abundance of culture would begin to flow into Turkey.

After 1930, it is evident that this attitude began to take place in official texts and discourse. For example, in *Tarih IV* prepared in 1931 to be taught in high schools, the change was portrayed as a turning point in the struggle for the “cultural independence of Turkishness”.⁵⁰ On the tenth anniversary of the change, in 1938, this was obvious in the words of the leading elite of the Republic. Then Atatürk described it as a “base for the progress of the Turkish capability in the sphere of culture.”⁵¹ Indeed, after the adoption,

⁴⁹ This was the very tone of the claims of Yunus Nadi as he stated all that was done after the adoption of new alphabet in one year as an essence of creating new national culture. See Yunus Nadi, “Yazı İnkılabı” [Alphabet Revolution], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1929), 11-13. In his views, the substitution of the Arabic letters was indispensable because it caused the Turkish language and culture to be dominated by alien elements, that of Arabic and Persian. With the revolution in alphabet the Turkish language was freed from the bad influences of “alien and Eastern culture”. Yunus Nadi, “Dilimiz Hakkında” [On Our Language], in *ibid.*, (original publication 1929), 16.

⁵⁰ *Tarih IV*, 252.

⁵¹ Nimet Arsan, ed., *Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri* [Atatürk's Circulars, Telegraphs and Declarations] (Ankara: T. İ. T. Enstitüsü Yay., 1964), 594;

the search for a purified and simplified language went hand in hand with the creation of a unified national culture. That is to say, the main efforts of the state agents, especially the TLS, were directed to make “new” language of “new” culture, which was purified from all “archaic” and “eastern” elements.

6.3. The TLS and Language Planning: the Process of the Creation of *Öz Türkçe*

As argued above, the first step in revolutionizing the language was the change in the alphabet and the second was, as an inevitable result of the first, the movement of purifying the Turkish language. So, in connection with the revolutionary cultural program of the Republic, both had to be conceived on familiar terms.⁵² This was the movement of “fully freeing Turkish from the chaos of the old taste” Arabic and Persian phrases fostered.⁵³ It was in this sense that the ruling elite tried to purify the language from

Atatürk ve Türk Dili, Belgeler, 50. In the same line, M. Fuad Köprülü, though he had harshly criticized proposals for a change in the alphabet in the mid 1920s, saw the alphabet change as passing from the circle of old culture into that of new one, meaning that “the abolishing of the Arabic letters meant escaping from the *Eastern culture* of Middle Ages and being a part of *Western culture*” (my emphasis). See Köprülü, “Alfabe,” 1.

⁵² This was among the pro-reformist elite a common view which was deliberately and soundly expressed in the newspapers of the period. In an editorial comment in *Milliyet* (1 Mart 1929), the old writings were stressed as being full of Arabic and Persian origins because “they were most fitting to Arabic letters, and also Arabic and Persian way of thought and feeling were in fashion in the Ottoman time.” The change of alphabet from Arabic to Latin gave a chance to the rulers to replace Arabic and Persian words with that of “*öz Türkçe* that will take its shape in our mind with new alphabet.” See “Yeni Türkçe Sözcükler” [New Turkish Words], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 70. This was the movement of “fully freeing Turkish from the chaos of the old taste” Arabic and Persian Phrases fostered.

⁵³ M. Nermi, “Nermi Bey Diyor ki: “Öz ve Ulu Yol Tutulmuştur!”” [Nermi Bey Says: “True and Great Way was Held!”], *Cumhuriyet*, 1 August 1930, 3.

“foreign” words, mostly Arabic and Persian derivations, through the works of the TLS⁵⁴ which was one of the basic cultural institutions, founded on 12 July 1932, with the task of forming and reproducing national culture.

In fact, the search for gaining a “scientific” and “civilized” language⁵⁵ went back to the mid-1920s, but gained momentum with the alphabet change in 1928. It was a widespread purification movement with fervent official support. The movement finds its true mode in Mustafa Kemal’s words, in his Introduction to Sadri Maksudi’s *Türk Dili İçin* (For the Turkish Language).⁵⁶ After mentioning the strong link between national sentiment and language, he continued:

[A] rich national language has great influence on the development of national feeling. The Turkish tongue is one of the richest of all; it only needs to be intelligently cultivated. The Turkish nation, which knows how to establish its government and its sublime independence, must free its language too from the yoke of foreign words.⁵⁷

To this end, after the alphabet change, a commission called *Dil Encümeni* (The Language Commission) was set up in Ankara, assigned to provide “the new Turkish Standard Dictionary.”⁵⁸ The dictionary was aimed to put *öz Türkçe* words in place of Arabic and

⁵⁴ Its first name was the *Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti* (the Turkish Language Research Society). In 1936 it purified its own title as the *Türk Dil Kurumu*.

⁵⁵ The expression belongs to Balhasanoğlu Necip Asım (Yazıksız). See Balhasanoğlu Necip Asım, “Dil Heyeti” [The Language Committee], in *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı II* (original publication 1926), 32.

⁵⁶ *Türk Dili İçin* was one of the studies worth mentioning directing the purification movement in the first half of 1930. Sadri Maksudi (Arsal), *Türk Dili İçin* (Ankara: Türk Ocakları İlim ve Sanat Heyeti Yay., 1930).

⁵⁷ Ibid.

Persian origins (seen incomprehensible for the people). This trend also found its echoes in other spheres; for example, to free the schoolboy from the influence of Arabic and Persian words, both were deleted from the *lise* curriculum on 1 September 1929. In 1931 the activity of the committee was ended. Immediately after the first Turkish History Congress, on 12 July 1932, the TLS was officially founded with a direct encouragement and initiation of Mustafa Kemal.⁵⁹ He himself decided two main branches in its working areas: the first, philology and linguistics, and the second, the Turkish language (studying and determining Turkish language from the point of dictionary-technical term, grammar-syntax, etymology).⁶⁰ Mustafa Kemal appointed Samih Rıfat as the first president of the TLS, and Ruşen Eşref (Ünaydın) as its first general secretary. Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu) and Celal Sahir became its first members. These four founding-members, charged with a political program of forming the new Turkish, were politicians

⁵⁸ See “İsmet Pasha’s Address,” in *The Turkish Press, 1926-1932* (original publication 1929), 147. For İsmet Paşa, the Dictionary “will not only collect the words which a civilized nation uses. It must satisfy all the needs of culture.” Thus the task of the Committee was “to find the way to transfer into Turkish all the words and terms” of a developed language. Ibid, 148. In June 1930, the commission announced that it had just completed the letter *A*. See Allen, *The Turkish*, 127.

⁵⁹ After the first congress of the Turkish History Society, as noted by Ruşen Eşref Ünaydın, Mustafa Kemal said, “if so, let a language society be found, called the Turkish Language Research Society, working in a similar fashion to the Turkish History Society.” See Ruşen Eşref Ünaydın, *Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti’nin Kuruluşundan ilk Kurultaya kadar Hatıralar* [Memoirs from the Foundation of the Turkish Language research Society to the first Congress], 2nd ed. (original publication in 1933) (Ankara: TDK, 1943), 10.

⁶⁰ Mustafa Kemal drew a schema of working areas of the Society with his handwriting. For that, see *ibid*. The role and cult of Mustafa Kemal in its foundation finds its clear expression in the words of Ruşen Eşref Ünaydın: “As occurred in every reform, the Society was born out of the mind of Ghazi Mustafa Kemal.” *Ibid*, 11.

rather than linguists or social scientists.⁶¹ Setting the modes to all discussions and policies about language until the end of the Single Party Period, this political, or something like a bureaucratic, mission had a central place in inventing new *öz Türkçe* free from all “destructive” and “unenlightened” influences of the “old” one. It would be the new Turkish language conceived as more deserving to the new Turkish society. This quest finds its clear expression in the words of Hasan Ali (Yücel): “We have to create a language convenient to our new life and new ideal, and, within its setting, create a national culture.”⁶²

Coupled with the motivation of a desire to build up a high culture, its founding principle implied at first a deliberate cultivation of the language to *rename* and *redefine* what was incorrect in the past. Thus, the principal aim of the Society was to purify the Turkish language, elevate it to the level of the modern languages or a language of civilization and science, and close the gap between the written language and that of the people; for which it would seek words of vocabulary in Turkish of the people -whose language was thought to be less distorted-, its dialects, old texts and other Turkic languages. All were clear in Article 3 and Article 4 of the TLS’s statues. In Article 4 the procedure to realize its aims were given as follows: a) to organize scientific meetings, b) to determine and codify the Turkish language in accordance with its roots, evolution and needs, c) to obtain all materials useful to study the Turkish language and to collect new words from old books and dialects of people from various places of the country, d)

⁶¹ All were members of the parliament and the RPP. Ünaydın, *Hatıralar*, 13.

⁶² See *Birinci Türk Dil Kurultayı: Tezler Müzakere Zabıtları* [The First Turkish Language Congress: Theses, Discussion Minutes] (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1933), 213.

publish the products of the activities of the Turkish Language Research Society.⁶³ By reporting and publicizing all, founding the TLS was aimed to present and propagate *öz Türkçe* words to replace “foreign” ones in the (written and spoken) language.

6.3.1. *The First Turkish Language Congress*

In order to further and discuss ideas on the Turkish language and determine an elementary program for the TLS, as its first main activity, the first Turkish Language Congress (*Birinci Türk Dil Kurultayı*) convened in İstanbul on 26 September 1932.⁶⁴ The Congress aimed to solve the question of language with a directive and order from above; and in this way, as Burhan Asaf (Belge) declared, it:

[W]ill determine a set of rules and principles, and will order to write and speak Turkish according to these rules and principles. The journalists and intellectuals who up to now have defended an evolutionary approach to language and so not made any progress in the affairs of language, will obey this order... The last task of the Congress is to set language control comprising the world of the press.⁶⁵

⁶³ For the statute of the Society, see *ibid*, 420-55; Ünaydın, *Hatıralar*, 13-15.

⁶⁴ Five language congresses were convened during the period I examine: 1932, 1934, 1936, 1942 and 1945. 1932 and 1934 congresses were almost on similar account, and so in this study the main stress was placed on the first one. Similarly, there did not exist any thematic difference between 1942 and 1945 congresses where the second wave of the puristic effort was prevelant.

⁶⁵ Burhan Asaf (Belge), “Kurultay” [Congress], *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, September 26, 1932, 2. Indeed, language control, one of the first steps to reach a common language, may be seen in connection with cultural control which, as discussed in the first chapter, is necessary for creating a homogenous structure through creating one linguistic, historical and artistic tradition.

Mustafa Kemal wished to take a different way in the congress from that of the first Turkish History Congress that was convened after the history thesis previously determined was put at the disposal of writers, authors, and academicians.⁶⁶ This stemmed from his fear of facing once again a similar dilemma resulting from discussions on the accuracy of the official historical thesis at the Turkish History Congress. The participation of Mustafa Kemal and the far-reaching interest of the press and radio made the congress a grand national convention.⁶⁷

Mustafa Kemal and his co-workers expected that in the Congress their program would be wholeheartedly welcomed. Nevertheless, there was a heated debate on whether the reform would be in an evolutionary or revolutionary way. Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), the former editor of *Tanin* and who was one of the pro-reformists on the issue of the alphabet in the 1920s, severely criticized the official purist tendency to throw away some

⁶⁶ According to his program, the first step was to organize a congress, introduce the thesis there and take the interpretations of experts, poets, men of letters, journalists and teachers. The second step was to make people interested in the affairs of its own language, to conduct the statue of the Society at the congress. Ünaydın, *Hatıralar*, 21. Mustafa Kemal wanted the thesis to be prepared at least a week before the congress. For this purpose, he ordered the formation of a committee made up of individuals who introduced and defended the thesis. According to the program prepared by the committee, the proposed language thesis had to be framed in company with the history thesis, and so the roots of the Turkish language would be studied either in its oldness or its relation to Indo-European languages and other Asian and European languages. Mustafa Kemal himself read and made some corrections to the program. He ordered to announce that congress would be held in 26 September 1932. See *ibid*, 29 and 33. For the program, see *ibid*, 33-35.

⁶⁷ Especially Mustafa Kemal's presence was especially exposed in the words of Ruşen Eşref: "Mustafa Kemal in the hall of the Congress positioned something like a monitoring eye filtering everybody from head to foot and correcting their faults and defects... He was a leader who himself, for the first time, made the Turkish nation think in its own language". See *ibid*, 55 and 64. He mythicized Mustafa Kemal's entrance into the hall as a sun, seeing everything and every action. *Ibid.*, 63. It was the "shining sun symbolism" associated with Mustafa Kemal.

commonly used words of foreign origin and, instead, create new ones.⁶⁸ For him in the last fifteen years the language had been simplified to a sufficient level. So there was a slight exaggeration on stressing the hegemony of foreign words in the Turkish language. While believing in the necessity of some regulations, he argued that language was not something that could be deconstructed and reproduced with “a deliberate action”; it was just a natural organism taking its shape in an evolutionary way. Against the general official line, he proclaimed, “the written language has never in any place been identical with the spoken language, and it cannot be identical.”⁶⁹ Almost all speakers, main representatives of the official line, fervently condemned his views. They believed that language can and should be consciously cultivated and reproduced, which was necessary as in other reformist acts, for they were “revolutionists, not evolutionists.”⁷⁰ Their stand, signifying a radical purist stream, in turn became the official line, supported by Mustafa

⁶⁸ In his view, words from foreign languages were only adopted by a nation through assimilating them to its national language, which can not distort its grammatical and syntactic structure. See *Birinci*, 274.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 276; Frank Tachau, “Language and Politics: Turkish Language Reform”, *Review of Politics*, 26/2 (1964), 196. In this regard, he gave an example, “To make high art and literature -certainly products of culture- possessed by everybody is not to bring them down to the level of everybody, but to broaden the sphere of culture as comprising everybody.” *Ibid.*, 278.

⁷⁰ Hasan Ali, Ali Canip, Fazıl Ahmet, Dr. Mustafa Şükrü, Sadri Ethem and Namdar Rahmi denounced his claims, arguing for the will to create *a new moral base* in a revolutionary zeal. See *ibid.*, 280-310. Ali Canip declared, as in the revolutions like the hat and the alphabet, the revolutionary cadre of the Republic would transform the Turkish language in a new mode. *Ibid.*, 285-290. Sadri Ethem criticized Hüseyin Cahit’s wish for continuation with the past: “The past having its own economic, legal and artistic entity can not be fitting today’s understanding. This difference can only be overcome with a revolution, not evolution. Today we have a *new society* with *new tastes* and *morality*” (my emphasis). *Ibid.*, 300.

Kemal.⁷¹ They emphasized the significance of total elimination of all words of foreign origin, to create a culture unrestrained by the nostalgic preferences of the older generation, which had been nourished with Arabic and Persian (Oriental) mentality.

In the Congress in connection with the official history thesis, a comparison between the most ancient Turkish languages (including Hittite and Sumerian) on the one hand, and the Indo-European and Semitic languages on the other hand was authorized. This nationalist tone of voice was at the heart of most of the presentations in the Congress.⁷² In these presentations, the general framework of the language thesis was outlined by drawing parallelism with the official history thesis. The core of the thesis was that Turkish was the mother of all tongues in the world.⁷³ On the thesis, Ruşen Eşref, in

⁷¹ As in the case of the works on history, in the Congress and later, any view against the official line was condemned as a reactionary urged by the enemies of the Republic. See Jacob M. Landau, "The First Turkish Language Congress", in *The Earliest Stage of Language Planning: The 'First Congress' Phenomenon*, ed. Joshua A. Fishman (Berlin: Mouton: De Gruyter, 1993).

⁷² See *Birinci*, 71-185. In his presentation entitled "Türk Filolojisi-Türk Dili Bir Hint-Avrupa Dilidir" [Turkish Philology-Turkish Language is an Indo-European Language], Saim Ali tried to show that the Turkish language had been of the family of the Indo-European languages. *Ibid.*, 75. Ahmet Cevat (Emre) compared the Sumerian language with the Turkish one and found out many similarities. *Ibid.*, 81-94. Similarly, Agop Martayan strove to attract attention on commonalties between Turkish on the one hand and Sumerian, Indo-European and Armenian languages on the other. *Ibid.*, 94-104. Artin Cebeli went one step further and claimed that "the Turkish language was of a similar family with the "Turco-European languages" and the languages of all white races... Also the mother of all languages, as it is thought, is not Sanskrit, but Turkish." *Ibid.*, 129). What was common in their argument was that Turkish was the oldest of living languages all over the world.

⁷³ Samih Rıfat, by making an analogy in terms of words about history, society, nature, law, art, foods and clothes, reached a conclusion that there were a lot of commonalties between Turkish on the one hand, and the Indo-European (he called *Ari*) and the Semitic languages on the other. See *ibid.*, 455-456. On Turkish's relationship to Semitic and *Ari* languages he had mentioned his views in the First Turkish History Congress. See Samih Rıfat, "Türkçe ile Diğer Lisanlar Arasında İrtibatlar" [The

his closing speech of the Congress, depicted the Turkish as a language of *culture-creators*:

In the program of the Congress it was proven that the Turkish language had spread from Central Asia to the shores of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian oceans and of Finnish gulf... It was very likely to estimate that it was the language of the Sumerians and Hittites... Turkish was the language of the *first* and *oldest* culture. It was at the roots of Sanskrit, Greek and Latin, which make up the basis of modern linguistics. Turkish was, therefore, the language of those who have founded big cities and states and of those who have cultivated land and enlightened human kind (my emphasis).⁷⁴

Nevertheless, the thesis, implicitly anticipating that, like all Semitic and Indo-European languages, Arabic and Persian in their origin could be based on Turkish, became senseless with the hegemony of the radical purists in the mainstream official line. And thus it was not stressed so much until 1935 when a new, more moderate route was decided in language reform.⁷⁵ It was in 1935 that Mustafa Kemal, convinced of the unnecessary to change every word of foreign origin, came to cease this radical purist line, which found its evident exposition in the Sun Language Theory, that will be elaborated in latter parts. What were solidified in the First Congress, and later in the Second Congress,

Relationship of Turkish with Other Languages], *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi* (Ankara: T. C. Maarif Vekaleti, 1933), 60-61, 66-67.

⁷⁴ See *Birinci*, 470; Ünaydın, *Hatıralar*, 76-77.

⁷⁵ Although in the daily press of 1932 on the relations of the Turkish language with others there were a lot of commentaries and articles emphasizing the oldness of the Turkish language and it as the source of the languages all over the world, in the period between 1932 and 1935 there were very few. In 1935, in harmony with the new official line, a number of writings began to appear in the newspapers. See *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 623-680. A similar case, to some extent in comparing with the First and Third Congresses, may be observed in the lectures delivered at the Second Turkish Language Congress in 1934. See “İkinci Türk Dil Kurultayı” [The Second Turkish Language Congress], *Türk Dili*, no: 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14.

were the imagination of *Osmanlıca* as a significant “Other” of *öz Türkçe* and the hegemony of the radical purism.

6.3.2. *The Imagination of Osmanlıca (Ottoman Turkish) as an Other of Öz Türkçe*

As mentioned above, the official language reform movement was primarily based on the idea to save young generations from the old language. Here the old was *Osmanlıca*. In the discourse of all writings and speeches on the language revolution remarkably after 1928, the passing from *Osmanlıca* to *öz Türkçe* appeared to be a most emphasized issue. Especially in the period between 1928 and 1936, the civilizing rulers and intellectuals had regarded *Osmanlıca* as a significant Other of the newly constructed *öz Türkçe*. The First Turkish Language Congress was an official scene of once again displaying the “old” language, that is, *Osmanlıca*.⁷⁶ In the established plan of the language engineers, all efforts were made to downgrade *Osmanlıca* in status. Their main assumption was that culture could not be formed on the basis of a language made up of two foreign languages [Arabic and Persian], *Osmanlıca*.⁷⁷ *Osmanlıca*, far from being a language of the new Turks, was the “language of the Sultanate and religion.”⁷⁸ So they

⁷⁶ One of the Kemalist purists, Ahmet Şükrü, with a nationalist and mythicized tone, described the Congress as a main step in the “revolution of passing from *Osmanlıca* to Turkish”. It was the declaration of ending the hegemony of *Osmanlıca* and of the independence of Turkish language, leading to the “emergence of the Turkish nation that wanted anymore to speak and write Turkish.” See Ahmet Şükrü, “Osmanlıcadan Türkçeye Geçiş İnkılabı” [The Revolution of Passing from *Osmanlıca* to Turkish], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1932), 97-98.

⁷⁷ Falih Rıfkı Atay, “Büyük Dile Doğru” [Toward Great Language], *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1935), 259.

first of all devalued *Osmanlıca* and the Ottoman Empire through stressing its non-Turkish character. In its broad terms, the effort may be summarized as follows:

Before coming under the influence of Islam, Turkish, though it borrowed some words from various languages, had preserved its true essence. When the Turks met Islam, Arabic and Persian began to have a strong influence over Turkish; the former was in administrative and legal areas, and the latter, in literature. This trend reached its peak point in the Ottoman time when the sense of national belonging and consciousness did not prevail. It was the era that Turkishness was mentioned mostly with pejorative terms.⁷⁹ So Turkish became distorted, losing its functional power and its vocabulary and grammar structure. The result was a language that was a mix of three languages -Arabic, Persian and Turkish-, known as *Osmanlıca*. This language in time also became dominant as a spoken language among the circles of the upper stratum as well as a written one. Under the burdensome effect of Arabic especially, it took the shape of a language full of foreign affections and taste that were unsuitable to the Turkish state of mind. Unnatural and obscurantist in comparison to modern taste, it developed naturally out of Ottoman culture that was equally “hybrid” and “entirely aristocratic”.⁸⁰ As a language of

⁷⁸ İsmail Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu), “Dil” [Language], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1933), 149.

⁷⁹ Thus, in the Ottoman Empire, Turkishness was submerged under a constructed Ottoman identity. For a typical characterization, see Samih Rifat’s opening speech, *Birinci*, 4-5.

⁸⁰ The phrase belongs to Yunus Nadi. See Yunus Nadi, “Dil İnkılabına Dair Bir İki Deyiş” [One or Two Words on Language Revolution], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1933), 135. This characteristic, for him, made it not having “any links with the rest of the people. It was for this reason that the basic goal of the alphabet change and language reform was to create a culture lending itself to the whole Turkish nation.” Ibid. In his speech at the First Congress, Reşit Galip, Ministry of Education,

administration and high culture developed at the center, it completely alienated itself from the people's language. At the end, there emerged two different languages: the written (and spoken) language of the ruling class called *Osmanlıca* and the Turkish of ordinary people called *öz Türkçe*.⁸¹ It was seen as a significant sign of duality between the rulers and ruled, or a sign of social status between the two groups.⁸² Thus, alongside *Osmanlıca*, with its pureness and cleanliness Turkish had lived among the people without any of the corruption that was evident in the language of the Ottoman ruling stratum. On the other hand, *Osmanlıca* was full of Arabic and Persian terms having lived as "foreign and frozen *cliché*". To be a national and civilized community, the Turks had to remove

stressed that, as a cosmopolitan language of the rulers, *Osmanlıca* had been incomprehensible for the rest of the people. *Birinci*, 469.

⁸¹ Seeing *Osmanlıca* as a foreign language for the Turks might expose its best signs in the words of Mustafa Kemal: "When you translate something from *Osmanlıca* or another language, first look at the meaning and try to express it in Turkish." Quoted in Ahmet Cevat (Emre), "Dilimizi Öz Benliğine Kavuşturmaya Başlarken" [Beginning to Discover the True essence of Our Language], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1932), 122. For a similar tone in translation from *Osmanlıca* to *öz Türkçe*, see "Osmanlıcadan Türkçeye Geçerken Düşünülecek Bir İş: Osmanlı Sözlerini Olduğu Gibi Türkçeye Çevirmekten Çekinelim" [One Thing during Passing from *Osmanlıca* to Turkish: Avoiding to Translate Ottoman Words in Turkish as They Are], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1932), 117-119. Regarding *Osmanlıca* as an artificial language, Sadri Maksudi (Arsal) in his book (1930) tried to show its difference from Turkish with texts written in both languages. He argued that it could "not be suitable for spreading education and civilization and prevents the advance of national sentiment." See Sadri Maksudi, *Türk Dili İçin*, 248-261.

⁸² In the writings on this duality, two hugely separated life-style and world view each group held were usually stressed. In the First Congress, against Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın)'s arguments that it is not easy to remove the difference between the written and spoken languages, Hasan Ali (Yücel) deemed *Osmanlıca* responsible for the deep chasm between the intellectuals and the rest of the people. The language revolution was aimed at abolishing this chasm and "making a civilized language by understanding the people's language and making it academic". See *Birinci*, 284. Also, on this duality and the hybrid characteristics of *Osmanlıca* and Ottoman culture, see Ahmet Ağaoğlu, "Yeni Nesil Arasında Dil Meselesi" [Language Issue among the New Generation], *Atatürk ve Türk*

all which up to now had inculcated on the people “scholastic meanings”.⁸³ In other words, it had to be cut off because of the “fact” that “*Osmanlıca* came to be regarded, as a result of the need to express a state of mind or point of view belonging to *another realm*. On the other hand, today we have *our own realm* and thus we dislike old phrases signifying foreign taste” (my emphasis).⁸⁴ What was needed was to reshape the Turkish

Dili 2 (original publication 1933), 131-134; also see Yunus Nadi, “Türk Dili Türkçeye Doğru” [Toward Turkish, Language of the Turks] (original publication 1933), 145.

⁸³ See Samih Rifat’s speech, *Birinci*, 481-82. In his comment on the Congress, Avni Ali (Çandar), stressing “Ottoman cosmopolitan literature” with non-Turkish characteristics, depicted scientific and literary understanding of the old regime closely tied with a “scholastic” language and knowledge. *Osmanlıca*, not having been the People’s language, had to be abolished like the Sultanate and all of its institutions. See Avni Ali (Çandar), “Dil Kurultayından Sonra”, in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1932), 495-497. In the Ottoman time the duality between “*Lisani Osmani*” (Ottoman Language) and folk Turkish was not a mere linguistic one, but a sharp difference among “understandings” or “state of mind”. Ottoman understanding and all its institutions was the child of the knowledge of the Middle Ages or “medrese”, swam of scholasticism. Ottoman understanding created by *Osmanlıca* was in its true terms a mind of Middle Age... By the language revolution we do not only pass from one language to another, but also pass from one understanding –that of Middle Ages- to a “Turkish understanding” –that of the civilized world.” Halil Nimetullah, “Osmanlıca Anlayıştan Türkçe Anlayışa” [From the Ottoman Understanding to the Turkish One], *Cumhuriyet*, 27 March 1933, 3. M. Fuad Köprülü went one step further, saying that “[I]t was the logic of the Middle Ages which has hindered our development until now. Ottoman language and culture of the Middle Ages it belongs to has distorted our taste, our spirit and good judgement and so has made the Turks alienated from themselves. Thanks to the language revolution, in particular, and cultural revolution, in general, with which the language one is closely tied, future generations will create new art and new literature signifying the Turkish spirit, Turkish character and Turkish ability.” Köprülü, “Dil İnkılabı Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler II” [Some Thoughts on the Language Revolution II], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1933), 142.

⁸⁴ M. Nermi, “Nermi Bey Diyor”, 3. For him the new realm had to be free from the bondage of old writing and its literature: “Writing full of *old* expressions could not be a model for new generations growing up in a new civilized realm” (my emphasis). Ibid. Moreover, about the relationship between *Osmanlıca* and the old mentality, Falih Rıfkı (Atay) said, “a new language would bring forth a new Turkish mentality and Turkish culture easily taking a secure place in modern civilization... By imitating western-style music while abolishing the oriental one, the goal is to create a Turkish music in the world of western civilization.” Falih Rıfkı (Atay), “Yazı, Dil, Kafa” [Alphabet, Language,

language in terms of nationalist and populist principles. In nationalizing language, in the first place, one had to take into consideration scientific and technical ability and civilizational progress, which would bring about a close link between the national language and people's language.⁸⁵

This imagination brings us to the official understanding that *Osmanlıca* with its artificiality and foreign sense of feeling could not set a model for a more civilized domain of the Turkish nation portrayed as a community of equals, because it had been of a "foreign" world. It was for this reason that on behalf of the civilizing elite *Osmanlıca*, the language of "high culture", was unbecoming to the new regime's principle of populism aiming at abolishing class differences and privileges. What was needed was a new Turkish purified from all foreign affections nourished by alien elements in the language. This would bring about the end of the cultural gap between the Turkish of popular language and that of the upper classes. A purified and simple Turkish easily understandable by everybody, was preferred as a language shared by all strata in the society, regardless of class, religious and ethnic differences.⁸⁶ In this respect, one might

Mind], *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1932), 103-104). For one of the Kemalist politician purists, Şeref (Aykut) (deputy of Edirne), the Turks had to take into account the fact that Turkish way of thinking and *Osmanlıca* way of thinking are totally different. Insofar as the Turks get away from all suffocating domination of *Osmanlıca*, they can think, speak and write in Turkish. See Şeref, "Türk Dilidir Osmanlıca Değil" [It Is the Turkish Language, not *Osmanlıca*], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1934), 186-187.

⁸⁵ This was the very tone of Samih Rifat's opening speech. See *Birinci*, 4-6.

⁸⁶ This can be clearly observed in Yunus Nadi's statements in his article on the Statute of the TLS according to which every Turkish citizen, whether woman or man, was accepted as its member. For Yunus Nadi, this meant, "the idiom of "every citizen" in the Statute comprises citizens with non-Turkish origin in Turkey. It was necessary that the people of a homeland come together with a common language... For this reason, the

argue that *öz Türkçe* was invented as a common language that would be of the community of “civilized” equals.

6.3.3. *Radicals and Moderates in the Language Reform*

After the adoption of Latin letters, the creation of new Turkish, *öz Türkçe*, became the dominant idea among the ruling circles. On the formation of *öz Türkçe*, there began to appear two main groups representing two dominant views on the language issue. The first group argued for the total elimination of all foreign words and words of foreign origin in the written and spoken Turkish language. They also believed that all these words would be replaced by *öz Türkçe* words and terms coined and created from the people’s dialects in Anatolia and other Turkic dialects and languages. It included the “so-called” radical purists. The second group, while promoting the elimination of the Arabic and Persian rules and words in general, and the simplification of the written language as far as possible, rejected the view of getting rid of all words of foreign origin widely used even in popular language. Mainly they did not believe in the need for a harsh revolutionary break in linguistic affairs. This group was called the “moderate purists”.⁸⁷ Ahmet Cevat

Statute, regardless of their ethnic, racial and religious difference, assumed all non-Turkish and -Muslim citizens as collaborative in view of both rights and duties in the affairs of language that is the best expression for citizenship. The TLS thus saw all citizens as its natural members.” Yunus Nadi, “Türk Dili İçin İlk Kurultay” [The First Congress for Turkish Language], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1932), 467.

⁸⁷ For a detailed account of the two trends, see Ali Ekrem Bey “Turkish Language Changing Rapidly”, in *The Turkish Press, 1926-1932* (original publication 1931), 150. Sadri Maksudi (Arsal), İ. Necmi (Dilmen), Celal Sahir and Ruşen Eşref (Ünaydın) were the leading radicals. On the other hand, among the famous moderates were Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), Ahmet Cevat (Emre), Falih Rıfkı (Atay) and Yunus Nadi (Abalıoğlu).

(Emre) firstly elaborated moderate purism in his book entitled *Yeni Bir Gramer Metodu Hakkında Layiha* (1931).⁸⁸ The book emphasized in the first instance the impossibility of revolution in language, for it was a living thing in the mind first based on “understanding.” And so it strongly excluded newly created words that did not have any connotation in the people’s language.⁸⁹

The radical purism as a revolutionary project firstly appeared in Sadri Maksudi (Arsal)’s book entitled *Türk Dili İçin*, published in 1930 with an Introduction written by Mustafa Kemal. With a highly secularized nationalist passion, he emphasized that the Turkish race all over the world was losing their national character, which was due mainly to the gradual weakening of its language. For the survival of the Turkish race, in his view, the first and most important task was to create a written and spoken language that would be *öz Türkçe*, a language of civilization.⁹⁰ The main idea of the book is that, like the modern nations developing their language through a deliberate renewal, Turkish had a strong need to be redressed in such a way, called the language revolution. This included a “collection of words circulated among the people, setting them up in type and using them

⁸⁸ Ahmet Cevat (Emre), *Yeni Bir Gramer Metodu Hakkında Layiha* [Text on A New Grammar Method] (İstanbul, 1931).

⁸⁹ Ibid., 17, 44. For him, in reforming the language, *orta Türkçe* (common Turkish), used by most of the people in their daily languages, had to be taken into consideration to create a common language. It could include some words of foreign origin, which had been already Turkicized. See Ahmet Cevat, “Dilimizi,” 122-23.

⁹⁰ Why was this very important? The answer lay in his definition of culture. For him, culture as one of powers necessary for the survival of a nation was the “set of national ideas and feelings expressed in a definite language.” Its strength was based on a cultivated language and a literature (covering strong and sincere feelings and advanced ideas expressed in that language). Such a language would bring about the civilizational and cultural progress of the Turks. For further details, see Sadri Maksudi, *Türk Dili*, 12-

in scientific and literary works, coining new words in accordance with the language's grammatical and syntactic rules, substituting words of foreign origin with them.”⁹¹ In order to achieve such an end, he argued that all words of foreign origin including Arabic, Persian and Latin terms should be eliminated and a new terminology should be recreated from Turkish origin.⁹²

The struggle between the radical and moderate purists put its stamp on all discussions of the language reform until the end of the single party period. During the early years of 1930s radical purism became the official line especially when Mustafa Kemal sided with it. So it became a sole influential factor in policing language until 1935 when, in the First Turkish Language Congress, it came to be the official language policy.

The Congress was closed on 5 October 1932 with a full language planning. It was the starting point of the period 1932-1935. The Congress elected a Central Committee to direct the works and activities of the Society, and enacted a program to speed the language reform. The program included the following items: A comparison between the ancient and modern Turkish on the one hand, and the Indo-European and Semitic languages on the other, the preparation of a Turkish grammar, the collection of all Turkish words in five dictionaries, analysis of foreign works dealing with the Turkish language, the publication of the research in a periodical, and reservation of space for the

20; for some comments on the book, see Ragıp Hulusi (Özden), “Düşünceler”, *Öz Dilimize Doğru*, 4-15 Ağustos 1932, 56.

⁹¹ Ibid., 18.

⁹² For his views on terminology, see *ibid.*, 375. Ahmet Cevat Emre, criticizing Sadri Maksudi who with more fervent nationalist orientation tried to create a common Turkish language shared by all Turkic groups in the world, argued for a common terminology with the West, necessary to engage in its scientific and cultural atmosphere.

discussion of linguistic problems in the newspapers.⁹³ Upon that, first of all, the Committee began to initiate two main projects. The first was the collection of words from the vocabulary of the people, old texts of ancient Turkish vocabularies and other Turkic languages. The second was the search for Turkish equivalents of foreign origin words.

6.3.4. The Radical Purists' Language Policing

To accomplish this task the government supported the TLS with its full authority. It was in this language planning that, by a kind of national mobilization, several agencies were involved in the process of creating *öz Türkçe*: government agencies, schools, universities, newspapers, and even individuals. A decree issued in November 1932 provided the cooperation of all administrative organs throughout the country in the collection of Turkish words that existed in the everyday speech of the people, but not used in written language.⁹⁴ In every province and every district a language committee was established, comprising leading officials and the RPP's leaders of the region. Mostly teachers and other educated people maintained the collection. They filled in a separate form for each word by registering its meaning, synonyms and antonyms, how and where it was used. In such a way, it was aimed to process completely every single form. Within eight months, the Society collected 129,792 forms.⁹⁵ At the same time, together with the

See Ahmet Cevat Emre, *Atatürk'ün İnkılap Hedefi ve Tarih Tezi* [Atatürk's Goal of Revolution and History Thesis] (İstanbul: Ekin Basımevi, 1956), 29-31.

⁹³ *Birinci*, 456.

⁹⁴ See Heyd, *Language*, 26; *Söz Derleme Dergisi*, I (İstanbul, 1939), 13-16.

vocabulary of the living dialects, more than 159 old literary texts and dictionaries, mostly of Turkish dialects, were systematically investigated to discover Turkish words. Parallel to the project of collecting words from the spoken language, was the other project, a language survey among the literate to find *öz Türkçe* equivalents in place of 1400 words of Arabic and Persian origin.⁹⁶ Although the survey aroused a lively public interest by the active participation of the newspapers, the radio, the RPP and the People's Houses, the responses were very insufficient for providing relevant equivalents. Therefore, the language engineers turned to the approximately 130,000 items previously collected.

These items as well as other words collected from the old texts and dictionaries were examined. Then the popular, ancient and Turkic material in the summer of 1934 was put into a dictionary form entitled *Osmanlıcadan Türkçeye Söz Karşılıkları Tarama Dergisi* (a Collection of Turkish Equivalents for *Osmanlıca* Words). It suggested about 30,000 *öz Türkçe* words as possible substitutes to over 7,000 Arabic and Persian loans.⁹⁷ Meanwhile the grammatical elements, suffixes in particular, were gathered, analyzed and

⁹⁵ "İkinci Türk Dil Kurultayı." *Türk Dili*. 8 (September 1934), 24. By September 1933, or in nine months, this was over 130,000. See Ahmet Şükrü, "Dil Bayramı" [Language Festive], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1933), 162. The collection had been maintained until the mid-1940s, and the number reached more than 200,000 by 1942. *Dördüncü Türk Dil Kurultayı* [The Fourth Turkish Language Congress] (Ankara: TDK, 1943), 73.

⁹⁶ For further details, see Ahmet Şükrü, "Tarama Derneği," *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1934), 500; "İkinci," 24-28. For the survey, see "Dil Anketi Başlıyor: Osmanlıca Kelimelerin Tam Karşılığı Bulunacak" [The Language Survey Begins: Accurate Equivalents of Ottoman Words Will Be Found], *Cumhuriyet*, 10 March 1933, 1 and 6.

⁹⁷ See "İkinci," 28. In this thick book of 1300 pages, *Osmanlıca* words were put in an alphabetic order and on the opposite side, their *öz Türkçe* equivalents were placed.

classified, and all scientific terms, in French, English or German, were collected in a pair of lists, and distributed to specialists and asked them for their equivalents in Turkish.⁹⁸

The intention of collecting and coining new words, as mentioned above, was to create a new meaning world for future generations. This was the most emphasized idea by the radical language engineers. As one of them, Halil Nimetullah, wrote, “new words collected and coined by the TLS express a new meaning world totally different from the “old”, *Osmanlıca*. They are signs of making the Turkish nation closer to civilization and further from primitiveness.”⁹⁹ The new Turkish, constituting a new meaning world, had to have its own accent free from that of İstanbul.¹⁰⁰ In the process of the invention of *öz Türkçe*, as Heyd aptly puts it:

[E]very word of Arabic or Persian origin was considered outlawed and condemned to suppression as soon as a Turkish equivalent was found... This attitude was clearly reflected in the lists of the ‘inquiry’, which mainly contained Arabic and Persian words used in the everyday language, many of them even in the vernacular of the uneducated and rural population.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Halil Nimetullah, “Osmanlıca,” 3. For him it was because that “a nation’s level of civilization is judged in the first place in accordance with the meaning of words used in its language. Thus Osmanlıca full of foreign words could not express the taste of ... the Turks.” Ibid., 153.

¹⁰⁰ See İ. Necmi (Dilmen), chairman of the TLS, put the reason in the following way: “Because of collecting a lot of words from people’s accents, each has its own pronunciation. All have to be transformed into a common accent. In this sense, the dialect of İstanbul will not be sufficient, for it does not include the voicing of newly collected and coined words. We have to form a common one comprising and expressing every voicing.” İbrahim Necmi (Dilmen), “Şive İşi İçin İki Söz” [Two Words About the Issue of Accent], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1932), 30.

¹⁰¹ Heyd, *Language*, 31.

It was attempted to replace foreign orinim words with words provided in *Tarama Dergisi*, the inquiry and with some new creations from Turkish roots.¹⁰²

This attitude of replacing all words of Arabic and Persian origin reached its peak point during the years 1933-1935. In those years, various measures, such as massive publicity, encouragement, reshaping of habits in the use of language and coercion through legislation, began to be actively employed to achieve everyone's acceptance or compliance with the new policy. For example, after February 1933, the newspapers began to use the new substitutes, due to the last item of the program approved by the first Congress, requiring the newspapers to save some space for the language issue. Thereupon, at least two articles appeared, translated into new Turkish with a glossary explaining the new words published at the end.¹⁰³ By a decree issued in November 1934, *Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü* (General Directorate of the Press) ordered the press to publish its editorial in *öz Türkçe* in the front pages in full text.¹⁰⁴ In addition to the above

¹⁰² However, many borrowings from European languages (especially technical terms) were welcomed and some new ones were even used to replace those that were excluded. See Metin And, *Culture, Performance and Communication in Turkey* (Tokyo: ILCAA, 1987), 174.

¹⁰³ For one of the first examples, see Yunus Nadi, "Niçin Dilimizi Düzeltmeye Çalışıyoruz?" [Why Do We Try to Correct Our Language?], *Cumhuriyet*, 3 March 1933, 1. Sadri Maksudi (Arsal) published a guideline of how the writers use *öz Türkçe* in all their writings. For him, they had to write in *öz Türkçe*, because using new language was their national duty. Sadri Maksudi (Arsal), "Dil Düzeltme İşinde Yazıcıların Borçları." *Öz Dilimize Doğru*. 19 (19 June 1934), 12.

¹⁰⁴ Ahmet Şükrü, "Dil Değişiminde *Milliyet*" [*Milliyet* in Language Change], *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1934), 50. In the newspapers, especially in the semi-official daily *-Hakimiyeti Milliye-*, there were commentary parts publishing new words and showing how to use them in a sentence. For an example, see M. Nermi, "Dil Bayramı Yaklaşıyor" [Language Festive Coming], *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, 23 September 1934, 1-2. Even in the same newspaper, M. N. published the list of new words used by the President of the TLS in his speech delivered on account of *Dil Bayramı* (Language

legislative actions and incentives on the press, some measures were taken to force the people to change their speech-habits. This can be illustrated by a decision of the İzmir municipality approved in March 1933. According to the decision, the use of the language and words other than Turkish were prohibited in the public realm. It particularly restricted street-venders who usually used the words of the “old” and other languages while performing their profession.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, this act had been voiced throughout the single party period by the campaign of *Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!* (Citizen! Speak Turkish!). Here, what was required was that the true Turkish citizens who had to free from, as Ahmet Emin Yalman put it, the “cosmopolitan, mosaic” structure had to speak Turkish. Those who did not do so would be excluded:

Let those who did not want to be Turkish citizens by means of their languages and deeds, those who did not want to adopt the “umumi hayat” (the public life) of the country, be visible and exclude themselves from the whole something like an *ecnebi* (foreign) element.¹⁰⁶

At this juncture the role of the People’s Houses was emphasized in educating and diffusing *öz Türkçe* within their locality. It was in this regard that two main tasks were attributed to the Houses: the first was to “transform the Turkish of the native speakers into the dialect of the centre”; the second, perhaps more importantly, to “be engaged

Festivity) one day before. See M. Nermi, “Dil Bayramı Yarın” [Tomorrow Language Festive], *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, 25 September 1934, 1 and 4.

¹⁰⁵ See “Güzel Bir Emir” [A Good News], *Cumhuriyet*, 7 March 1933, 3. In addition, in the same news, it was stressed that İstanbul municipality where in its various districts the street-venders were still using languages other than Turkish had to take this implementation as model. “Though being free whatever languages minority groups use in their private life, in public places like streets and *gazin*os Turkish should be the dominant language.” Ibid.

continuously and more closely with those whose mother tongue is not Turkish or who do speak one another language among their families even if speaking Turkish.”¹⁰⁷ The campaign targeted mainly the non-Muslims and non-Turkish Muslims to make them speak the new Turkish. It was obvious that the aim was to form a homogenous national-cultural community with a common language. Moreover, the usage of the new Turkish was to be advanced through the propagation of the officials over the country to use the new language. In that Mustafa Kemal set himself with this task by making his speeches and writing letters in the new language.¹⁰⁸

The process of the constant, radical modification in the Turkish vocabulary also gave way to changes in many names and titles. The act of *renaming* appeared first in the names of some cities, places and geographical names, containing some reference to the *ancien regime* and particular ethnic and traditional structures. Also, this trend paved the way for a fashion of changing names from Arabic to Turkish. For instance, Hüseyin Kazım, one of the radical purists, argued for the necessity of calling children by such names as Alp and Bozkurt in preference to Arabic and Persian names like Ali and

¹⁰⁶ Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Umumi Yerlerde Türkçe” [Turkish in Public Places], *Tan*, 4 March 1937, in *Varlık Vergisi ve ‘Türkleştirme’ Politikaları*, 122-124.

¹⁰⁷ Yaşar Nabi, “Halkevleri’nin Dil, Tarih, Edebiyat Yolundaki Çalışmaları” [Language, History, Literature Works of the People’s Houses]. *Ülkü* (March 1939), 45-46.

¹⁰⁸ For a typical example of his speech in *öz Türkçe*, see *Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, vol. II, 320-321. This, delivered in honour of the crown prince of Sweden on 3 October 1934, was impossible to understand for those who were unfamiliar with the new language. As H. Reşit Tankut says, it was first written in Ottoman with Arabic words and then replaced with neologisms. See Lewis, “Atatürk’s,” 206; H. Reşit Tankut, “Atatürk’ün Dil Çalışmaları” [Atatürk’s Language Studies], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili* (Ankara, 1963), 125.

Mehmet.¹⁰⁹ This alteration of Islamic names was later turned into the Law of Surnames (*Soy Adı Kanunu*) issued in June 1934 which required that everyone had to take a surname within two years.¹¹⁰ Article 3 of the Law prohibited taking as surnames names denoting rank and officials, *aşiret* and other nations, and uncivil manners; and so, all new surnames had to be *öz Türkçe*.¹¹¹ At the same time, a law issued on 26 November 1934, prohibited the further use of titles such as *paşa*, *gazi*, *efendi* and *bey*, as well as names indicating noble lineage.¹¹² Following the western style, it anticipated that putting before names, a man would be addressed merely as *Bay* (“Mr.”) and a woman, as *Bayan* (“Ms.”).¹¹³ In conjunction with this decree, Mustafa Kemal dropped the title *Gazi*, of Arabic origin.

¹⁰⁹ Following Mustafa Kemal’s endeavor to Turkicize many people’s names, he listed new names in his article. He even declared that he dropped unofficially his name, Hüseyin Kazım, and wanted from his friends to call him Yılmaz. See Hüseyin Kazım (Duru), “Her Türk’ün Adı Türkçe Olmalıdır!” [Name of Every Turk Has to Be Turkish!]. *Öz Dilimize Doğru*. 17 (12 March 1934), 11.

¹¹⁰ *Resmi Gazete* [Official Gazette], “Soyadı Kanunu” [Law of Surname], no. 2741, (Ankara: Prime Ministry, July 2, 1934), 506.

¹¹¹ During the sessions on the Law, Şükrü Kaya, Minister of Interior Affairs, emphasized that establishing Turkish surnames instead of those reflecting any traditional, ethnic, religious attachments would be necessary for national unity. For him, words such *Çerkes*, *Laz*, *Kızılbaş*, *Haydaranlı* [an *aşiret* name], and so on, belonged to the Middle Ages, and gave way an “imagined” division among the people. Thus words preferred as surnames had to be free from all particularisms and also they had to be *öz Türkçe*. For his statements, see *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. IV, C. 23, 21-6-1934, 246-249. In particular within this vein, uncivilized names were seen unacceptable to be used in Turkish society, for “nobody”, said Şükrü Kaya, “has a right to be foolish and disgusting in the Turkish society.” *Ibid*, 247.

¹¹² *Resmi Gazete* [Official Gazette], “Efendi, Bey, Paşa Gibi Lakap ve Unvanların Kaldırılmasına Dair Kanun” [The Law about the Abolishment of Nicknames and Titles like *Efendi*, *Bey*, *Paşa*], n. 2867 (Ankara: Prime Ministry, November 29, 1934), 6.

¹¹³ In the Army the old ranks of *muşir* and *liva* were substituted with that of European ones: *mareşal* and *general*. For Ahmet Cevat Emre, “the adoption of “bay”, “bayan” and surnames Europeanized our language.” See Emre, *Atatürk’ün*, 46-47.

24 November 1934, the parliament bestowed on him a surname, that of Atatürk, “Father Turk” and another law issued on 7 December 1934 prohibited the use of Atatürk, or its any modification, by anyone else. Then he considered substituting Kemal with an old Turkish word that has a very similar sound to the name Kemal. It was “Kamal”, meaning the “strong”, the “armed.” He was now called Kamal and upon that his political system as *Kamalism*.¹¹⁴ In this regard the similar act of renaming was evident in post-revolutionary France. The Jacobins renamed themselves and urged others to name children in accordance with the new system, as well as changing the names of places and streets reminding of the past.¹¹⁵ The Kemalist efforts to abolish all titles belonging to the “old” and the setting up of new names seemed to be due mainly to the trend of equalizing and civilizing everyone thought in the boundaries of a modern way of life, which was at the heart of the Kemalist notion of culture.

Moreover, the period of radical purism coincided with another phase of the Kemalist secularizing efforts. Among those efforts were the ban of wearing religious clothes outside the places of worship, the conversion of the Aya Sofya (Hagi Sophia) mosque into a museum, and the change of the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday, the closing of Theological Faculty of the İstanbul University, the removing of religious

¹¹⁴ Rıza Nur, *Hayat ve Hatıratım* [My Life and My Memoires], vol. IV (İstanbul: Altındağ Yay., 1968), 1785-1786. Finally he decided on Kemal, but usually signed his name as K. Atatürk. However, after 1935, Kamalism gained a widespread usage among the Kemalists. See Mehmet Saffet Engin’s book entitled *Kamalism* and *La Turquie Kamaliste* (an official journal) which was published under this name until 1950.

¹¹⁵ See Darnton, *The Kiss*, 6-7. This was, as Hunt calls it, “revolutionary language” which “did not simply reflect the realities of revolutionary changes and conflicts, but rather was itself transformed into an instrument of political and social change... The language itself helped shape the perception of interests and hence the

instruction from the school curriculum.¹¹⁶ It was attempted for the purpose to eliminate all remainders and remnants of the past together with its language.

6.3.5. *The Phase of Moderate Purism and the Sun-Language Theory*

The *Tarama Dergisi*, providing a large alternative of possible substitutes, created great chaos in using new words in place of those that were dropped. By the loss of words accumulated throughout centuries, which formed the crucial component of the vocabulary of spoken Turkish, most of the people were faced with a severe handicap to find the proper designation and so to express themselves.¹¹⁷ This situation was a “linguistic anarchy”.¹¹⁸ Mustafa Kemal described it as follows: “We have brought the language to a deadlock...we will also save it from this deadlock.”¹¹⁹ In the end, it brought about a change in the Society’s attitude. The tendency was now toward a more moderate position. Due to the linguistic anarchy, during the mid-1935 the voice of the moderates began to find echo in the official line. The critique of the moderate purists may be

development of ideologies.” Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley, CA: California University Press, 1984), 24.

¹¹⁶ Heyd, *Language*, 30.

¹¹⁷ One contemporary observer reported that “[D]uring 1935 the metropolitan press passed through a period of trying to use nothing but the pure Turkish words. Even the best educated men and women could not learn the daily news without looking up several words per paragraph in their pocket glossaries.” The result was for the newspapers to suffer a “tremendous drop in circulation.” See Webster, *The Turkey*, 244.

¹¹⁸ Hundreds of borrowings from Arabic and Persian, integral part of the everyday speech, could not be removed before “Turkish substitutes had been accepted by the people.” Heyd, *Language*, 32. Also see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968), 428.

illustrated with the views of Yaşar Nabi. He saw the efforts of the radical purists as making “Turkish far too barren and insufficient by eliminating all words of foreign origin... many of them taking roots in the people’s tongue”; the result was a “few *öz Türkçe* words with which it is impossible to make any progress in science and technique and even create the most primitive form of literature.”¹²⁰ By the autumn of 1935, the TLS dropped its policy of extreme purism. With Atatürk’s encouragement, a new dictionary commission was founded with the task to make a comparative study on words in the *Tarama Dergisi* and discover the best Turkish equivalents that would be published in a dictionary form.¹²¹ In September 1935, its product came as *Osmanlıcadan Türkçeye Cep Klavuzu* (An Ottoman-Turkish Pocket Dictionary) and its associate publication, *Türkçeden Osmanlıcaya Cep Klavuzu* (A Turkish-Ottoman Pocket Dictionary).¹²² Now

¹¹⁹ Atay, *Çankaya*, 477.

¹²⁰ Yaşar Nabi, “Dil Devriminde Ülkü Söz Kıtılığı Değildir” [The Ideal in the Language Revolution Is Not The Scarcity of Words], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1935), 261. But a rich language as in the West included many words as much as possible. So, while he believed in the necessity of “replacing *some* Arabic and Persian origins with that of *öz Türkçe* words existing in popular usage”, Turkicized words of foreign origin had to remain. Also, like other moderates, he rejected the radical purist idea of making the language of the elite and the people very close to each other. See *ibid.*

¹²¹ As Falih Rıfkı Atay recounts, at the beginning the committee consisted of only the moderates. Then, upon the demand of Atatürk, some purists entered into the committee. He tells us that “We [the moderates] preferred for a lot of words to remain in the language, although others [the radical purists] wanted to create a pure language having no relevancy in the world. In Turkish we leave as many words through proving that they are Turkish.” Atay, *Çankaya*, 475-479. See İbrahim Necmi Dilmen, “Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti Nasıl Çalışıyor?” [How The Turkish Language Research Society Works?], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1935), 506, for the members of the Committee. The Commission examined a number of books by taking into account French and German equivalents of Arabic words, and then making a comparison with Arabic and Persian. For a list of the books the Committee studied, see Saffet Arıkan, “Türk Dili Araştırma Kurumunun Bildirisi” [The Turkish Language Research Society’s Declaration], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2 (Ulus)*, 26 March 1935), 508-509.

the main stress was no longer placed on finding Turkish equivalents for all words of foreign origin.¹²³ So it included many assimilated Arabic-Persian words previously put into the list of condemned words.¹²⁴ Although the *Klavuz* made it unnecessary to eliminate all words of foreign origin used in Turkish to some extent, for Atatürk it was far from his expectation to lessen the ongoing chaos in the language issue. He seemed convinced of the need for using foreign origins going deep down in both the written and spoken languages. The use of these words in any way would not be contrary to the language reform.¹²⁵

During late 1935 and early 1936, the Society's moderate attitude became a new official line in the language policy. The new policy was justified with a theory the "so-called" Sun Language Theory (*Güneş Dil Teorisi*).¹²⁶ After almost ten months of work,

¹²² For the *Klavuz*, see İbrahim Necmi Dilmen, "Dil Kurumunun Çalışmaları" [The Works of the Language Society], in *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* (original publication 1935), 514-515.

¹²³ In a statement issued on the incident of its publication, the goal was put forward "to provide genuine Turkish substitutes for words which are considered foreign because they are used (only) in our written language and are not found in the spoken language of the people", and also to "establish a written language which every literate person can understand." Quoted in Heyd, *Language*, 32.

¹²⁴ In the Society's journal, *Türk Dili*, it was rationalized in a way that etymological research had proved that "a number of words... formerly thought to be of foreign languages had originally passed from Turkish into those languages." *Türk Dili*, 16 (April 1936), 22; Heyd, *Language*, 33.

¹²⁵ In late 1935, on the eve of giving up the extreme purist tendency, while he was at a dinner in Çankaya with his close friends, he said: "Friends! "Kitap", "katip", "mektup" are ours; "yetübü", "lemyektüp" are of the Arabs." See M. Şakir Ülkütaşır, "Dil Üzerine Atatürk'ten Üç Hatıra" [Three Memoires on Language from Atatürk], in *Türk Dili İçin* [For the Turkish Language], vol.1 (Ankara: T. Kültürü Araş. Enst., 1966), 212.

¹²⁶ It was first mentioned to some degree in *Ulus* (2 November 1935), running a column devoted to the theory. Also it was stated in the foreword to the *Klavuz* that "In the

the Theory became publicized and crystallized in the Third Turkish Language Congress (*Üçüncü Türk Dil Kurultayı*). It convened on August 1936, as İ. Necmi Dilmen clarified, “to introduce the Turkish Language Thesis to the whole world” by showing that Turkish was the “basic source of all *cultural languages* including the Ural-Altai, the Indo-European and the Semitic ones” (my emphasis).¹²⁷ That is, the Theory revealed that Turkish was the mother of all languages. It was in the first instance in harmony with the Turkish History Thesis which showed that the Turks in history had been culture-creators, and their homelands (Central Asia and Anatolia) were the cradle of human civilization (or “high culture”).¹²⁸ It was proved by the “TLS’s serious philosophical, scientific and

dictionary we have accepted that all words that appear to have passed from a Turkish root to foreign languages and then later returned to our tongue in inferior form. It is our unshakable conviction... that the main source of the so-called Indo-European and Semitic languages... lies hidden in the depths of Turkish.” Quoted in Tachau, “Language,” 199; *Türk Dili*, 16 (1936), 9 and 15. Atatürk’s venture again came to the fore in the formation of the theory. In the formation he seemed to be mostly inspired from an unpublished paper by Hermann F. Kivergic sent to him in mid-1935. In its general term, it was on the connection between the emergence of first thought and language. Mustafa Kemal wanted his colleagues to work on and transmute it into a theory for the Turkish language. For a detailed account, see Atay, *Çankaya*, 475-479; Emre, *Atatürk’ün*, 46-50. For the role of Atatürk in the initiation of the Theory, see Lewis, “Atatürk’s,” 206-7. For more details on the Sun Language Theory from various perspectives, see *Üçüncü Türk Dil Kurultayı* [The Third Turkish Language Congress] (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1937), 37-284; Şemsettin Günaltay and H. Reşit Tankut, *Dil ve Tarih Tezlerimiz Üzerine Gerekli Bazı İzahatlar* [Some Explanations on Our Language and History Theses] (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1938), 27-69.

¹²⁷ See *Üçüncü*, 4. It is obvious that by cultural language he meant a language with highly developed, artistic, scientific capability (like the Western languages, specifically French, German and English). In this Congress, and then on, it was used interchangeably with the phrase “culture language” which seemed adopted as equivalent to that of “civilized language” put to use in previous official discourse of language.

¹²⁸ That is why, in this regard, “the language works had to examine closely the presence of a primitive Turkish culture language which had taken root everywhere through Turkish migrations... The New Turkish Language Thesis anticipates that at the foundation of all languages, there has been the language of our ancestors who carried culture to the four corners of the world.” *Üçüncü*, 9-11. This nation took “the names of

linguistic works for ten months” supported with several publications including articles, booklets and books. Coupled with the desire of presenting this “scientific” discovery to the whole world of science, a number of foreign scientists were invited. İ. Necmi Dilmen saw their participation as “making it possible to go hand in hand with the world of science.”¹²⁹ Their presence was clearly to serve the linguistic engineers’ search for a justification of their theory.

The Sun Language Theory had a far reaching effect; if all existing languages were of Turkish origin, it was no longer necessary to eliminate words previously thought to be of foreign origin.¹³⁰ The Theory opened a new epoch since everybody could “write and speak as you did without any hesitation because all are in Turkish.”¹³¹ At the same time, Atatürk himself set the tone by reestablishing some words of Arabic origin such as *millet*

their cultural creations and systems of thought related to these creations to Asia, Europe and America... and thought them to other nations.” Günaltay and Tankut, *Dil ve Tarih*, 28. It was attempted to discover the justification of the Thesis in the unknown parts in modern literature on the roots of some languages (like French, English, German) and that of Latin and Ancient Greek. “For it, the unknown words in these languages can be easily explained with Turkish.” *Üçüncü*, 10. With the Theory, the sun took its distinguished place among the symbols of the Kemalist regime: “Our ancestors who founded the first culture in Anatolia used the sun as a symbol... The sun takes its place in history as a symbol of Turkish thought and art.” As Afet İnan recorded, this expression was made by Mustafa Kemal himself. See *Üçüncü*, 7.

¹²⁹ *Üçüncü*, 4-5. Mustafa Kemal, in his opening speech delivered at the Grand National Assembly (1 November 1936), stressed chiefly the participation of the European scholars as legitimating the official thesis. See *Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçler*, vol. 1, 406.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 13-14. For example, almost 16 % of the substitutes suggested in the *Klavuz* were “words (or derivations of words) which until recently had been thought to be of Arabic, Persian and other foreign origin, but which have [now]... been proved to be derived from Turkish roots.” *Ibid.*, 14; Heyd, *Language*, 33. Especially at the first hand those who wrote for the people, like writers and journalists, had to take into consideration the new discovery when they wrote. *Ibid.*, 13.

¹³¹ Atay, “Dil Kurultayı,” 517-518; idem, *Çankaya*, 473.

“nation” in his speeches from late 1935 onwards in place of the purist replacement *ulus*. In a similar fashion, in the following years, several words of Arabic and Persian origin were re-welcomed as well as that of European languages which began to take place more than previous times.

It is generally accepted that the reason for the Sun Language Theory was to end the radical purist trend which caused a great chaos in finding satisfactory substitutes to the dismissed words. Thus in later times it was not so much emphasized in the official discourse.¹³² However, this did not mean the abandonment of reform in language. The goal remained the same that to some degree Turkish should be purified and simplified and free from foreign yoke. Now the TLS maintained its work primarily concentrated on technical and scientific terminology. In general, in determining the terms, it was settled that some foreign roots were tolerated when a proper Turkish equivalent could not be found. If it was necessary, new terms should be re-invented from Turkish roots by means of Turkish word formation.¹³³ It was the name of a new trend to exchange Arabic terms

¹³² After Atatürk's death, it was completely dropped out of the official discourse. Even then İ. Necmi Dilmen cancelled his lectures on the Theory, which were made obligatory in 1936 at the Faculty of Language, History, and Geography of the Ankara University. See Lewis, “Atatürk's,” 208; Nihat Sami Banarlı, *Türkçenin Sırları* [Secrets of Turkish] (İstanbul, 1972), 317.

¹³³ In the Third Congress, 1936, the following items concerning the formation of terms were proposed for the Language Theory. 1) In the curriculum of primary and secondary schools, a) “the terms, of Turkish origin and common in the world of culture (elektrik, dinamo, metre, gram, etc.) should be applied as they are”, and b) “others should be coined from Turkish roots”. 2) “The terms of professional and higher education should be directly adopted from the terms belonging to the world of culture, which have been of Turkish origin.” *Üçüncü*, 22. In this text, a working report of the TLS, the term culture seemed to be used to express what all the previous definition of civilization comprised. It is so obvious that the world of culture was the world of civilization.

for European ones, especially French, and directly apply some of them if they di not exist in Turkish.¹³⁴

With the death of Atatürk (November 1938), the direction of the language reform went to the opposite angle for a short period of time. A number of old names previously Turkicized was re-instituted.¹³⁵ And the TLS maintained its moderate position regarding purism. This attitude may be understandable when one takes into account the vulnerable political context resulting from the change in the ruling cadre. After the new cadre consolidated its power, a new tide of purism was put forward by the successor of Mustafa Kemal, İsmet İnönü.

6.3.7. *The Second Wave of Purism*

¹³⁴ Some of them were benzin, makina, fizik, psikoloji, kimya, telefon, elektrik, radyo, gazete, kongre, parti, demokrasi, and so on. See Webster, *The Turkey*, 242. Coupled with this trend, in 1936, the Republican People's Party changed its name from *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası* to *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*. Here chose the French *parti* to the Arabic *fırka*, while the other two words in the title were of Arabic origin.

¹³⁵ Heyd writes that "On 1st January, 1939 the İstanbul newspaper *Vakit* (Arabic loanword for "time") resumed its old name, which in Nowember, 1934 had been changed to (Turkish) *Kurun*. A short time later the Ministry of Education replaced its new name *Kültür Bakanlığı* with the previous... one, *Maarif Vekaleti*, and the Ministry of the Interior reintroduced *vilayet* 'province' and *kaza* 'district' in place of the Turkish terms *il* and *ilçe*. When, at its 1939 Congress, the RPP adopted its new programme and statutes, many Arabic terms previously eliminated were reinstated." Heyd, *Language*, 36.

The new step in the renewed purism under İnönü's patronage was taken in the early years of 1940. Coupled with an extremely puristic approach, language was again seen as the effective vehicle of the Republican ideals. In this trend, as Atatürk had, İnönü played a decisive role through directing the literate to apply more purified Turkish and setting an example by delivering the speech in the new language.¹³⁶ Now the emphasis was placed not chiefly on the formation of new words and terms, but to provide the wider usage of the words and loanwords previously advanced.¹³⁷ Under this circumstance, the TLS started a campaign to Turkify the written and spoken language. And so it began its work to recover words invented in the first half of the 1930s and impose them on the public, the press and the people.¹³⁸ Most importantly, in March of 1942, it published the list of philosophical, sociological, grammatical and pedagogical terms as new substitutes

¹³⁶ For this task, on 26 September 1942, he called for the intellectuals and whole public to make efforts for the betterment of the language reform. See *Dördüncü*, 4. It was the renewed attempt to close the assumed gap between the written language and spoken one in favour of "Turkish" and continued to Turkify the language of the state and science. See *ibid*; *Beşinci Türk Dil Kurultayı, 1945* [The Fifth Turkish Language Congress, 1945] (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Basımevi, 1946), 23.

¹³⁷ In the Fourth Congress, Hasan Ali Yücel, Minister of Education and President of the TLS, focused on this new trend as the government's sole task, claiming that "We are now at the stage of settling the new, completing the missing... and maturing our [language] revolution." *Ibid.*, 6. He also claimed, it was the task of "making the national language of Turkish a language of science and technique in eight or ten years." *Ibid.*, 150. For the works of the TLS on the second wave of the revolution, see *ibid.*, 17-19.

¹³⁸ The representatives of the mass media were especially urged to share this campaign. By the late 1941 and early 1942, the editorial of *Ulus*, semi-official daily, and *Anadolu Ajansı*, semi-official news agency, began to use new substitutes, while most of these substitutes were being promoted and proposed in the language section of *Ulus*. Thereupon, in January of 1942, the Turkish Press Association published a booklet, for their members, including the list of new substitutes applied by *Ulus* and *Anadolu Ajansı* and a small guideline for how to use new words. See *Dil Kolu Tarafından Birlik Üyeleri İçin Çıkarılan Aylık Broşür* [Monthly Brochure Published by the Language Section for the Members of the Unity] (Ankara: Türk Basın Birliği, 1942).

to existing ones in a book form.¹³⁹ In that, almost all terms of foreign origin were replaced with that of new creations incomprehensible for both the literate and the people. In the Fourth Congress, the issue of terminology took a considerable place among other topics. In the commission for terminology there emerged a heated debate on whether the terminology would be based on newly created terms or that of Europe.¹⁴⁰ The dominant political will in the Congress sided with the attempt of purifying existing terminology.

However, this time the Kemalist linguists of the Society faced considerable criticism mainly from university professors and other literates whose everyday vocabulary was intended to be abolished.¹⁴¹ They rejected the TLS's orientation to change technical and scientific terms (most of them of foreign origin) with that of newly invented *öz Türkçe*. In fact their stance was questioning the position of the Society as a sole dictator in language issue. Unlike the previous events, the debate did not end with a complete victory of the radical purists. Ignoring such an ongoing debate, the TLS continued its work to publish the *Türkçe Sözlük* (Turkish-Turkish Dictionary) and “translate” the Turkish Constitution into the new language. The former indeed was the last of all searches for a complete dictionary, which included the living Turkish

¹³⁹ See *Felsefe ve Gramer Terimleri* [Terms of Philosophy and Grammar] (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1942).

¹⁴⁰ For the discussions, see *Dördüncü*, 224-239. Even the textbooks had been written in new terms for the last two years. As claimed in the report of General Secretary of the TLS, it was necessary for creating “enlightened” and “civilized” future generations. *Ibid.*, 20.

¹⁴¹ Especially university professors refused the new attempt that would distort the meaning of the existing scientific terms, for they were willing to have common terminology with a world of “science”. For their claims and the counter-claims of the linguistic engineers taking place in the discussions in the Terms Committee, see *ibid.*; *Beşinci*, 241-267.

vocabulary of modern Turkey, and the newly coined words (expected to be used in the near future) and technical terms. With a more puristic approach it was aimed to eliminate all words of foreign origin, which would “save” the younger generation from the suffocating effects of the “old” language.¹⁴²

The purism of the period¹⁴³ reached its zenith with the translation of the Turkish Constitution into a more pure form, which later became one of the aspects of the hottest political debate in the multi-party period. The translation was regarded urgent and inevitable because it was a principal political text with direct influence on all matters related to the public institutions and the whole public. Thus, as a political text, the Constitution had to reflect the new political discourse of the Republic. The work began in 1942 together with the efforts to create neologisms. After some drafts prepared at the initial stages of the work, the final version was adopted by the Parliament in January 1945.¹⁴⁴ The Constitution was now called *Anayasa* replacing *Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu*,

¹⁴² In the preface to the Dictionary, it was implied that “The Society did not intend to grant (the foreign words) a living right in the language... It considers it its duty to seek Turkish substitutes for all those foreign words for which substitutes have not yet been found, and it hopes that in future editions of this Dictionary it will be fortunate to replace many more foreign words by genuine Turkish equivalents.” Quoted in Heyd, *Language*, 41. In the Dictionary, as stressed by the language engineers, priority was given to the Turkish origins. *Beşinci*, 12.

¹⁴³ As in the first purist one of the 1930s, this period witnessed an effort to maintain the secularizing reforms. These included that the criminal Law passed in June of 1941 multiplied the penalties of the Hat and Alphabet Laws, and the call to prayer (*ezan*) in Arabic (was replaced with its Turkish translation in 1932) was made punishable with jailing for up to three months. Heyd, *Language*, 37.

¹⁴⁴ The Constitution with its new dress was hugely differentiated from that of 1924, including a lot of new words and terms in place of Arabic and Persian origins. For the new version, see *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. 7, C. 15, S. Sayısı: 39, 22-31. For example, Article 26 of the new version contained 37 Turkish words, which were a few in the same article of the 1924 Constitution. *Ibid.*, 24; Tahsin Banguoğlu, “Devlet Dili

the name of the 1924 Constitution. Following that, in April of 1945, the *Dahilli Nizamname* (Standing Order) of the Parliament translated as *İçtüzük* was also Turkicized.¹⁴⁵ Some foreign words which had historical connotations for the Republic remained, though the new language of the Constitution included many *öz Türkçe* words and terms, some religious and popular.¹⁴⁶

“Turkicization of the Constitution” was seen in relation to the nationalization of the state language. Herein lies a separation between the state language on the one hand and literary and scientific one on the other. In the official discourse, it was implied that, although since 1932 literary and scientific language had been turkicized to a greater extent, the state language signified with the language of the Constitution and Law was still under the hegemony of *Osmanlıca*. Tahsin Banguoğlu claimed that this hegemony was ended with the adoption of new Constitution by the Parliament in 1945 and the State Language became Turkish.¹⁴⁷ It is obvious that its translators’ attitude toward language

Türkçe” [The State Language Is Turkish], *Beşinci Türk Dil Kurultayı*, 59. For the new words, terms and phrases used in the new version, see *ibid.*, 3-21 and 32-33.

¹⁴⁵ For a Turkicized version of *TBMM İçtüzüğü*, see *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D. 7, C. 16, S. Sayısı: 68, 3-27.

¹⁴⁶ E. g., *can* (soul), *mal* (property), *din* (religion), *vicdan* (conscience), *aile* (family), *cumhuriyet* (republic), *hürriyet* (freedom), *vatan* (homeland), *devlet* (state), and so on. Banguoğlu, “Devlet,” 64. The intention of the TLS was announced that they would be purged from the Turkish language in the course of time.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 65. In fact the change in the State Language came to being first with new terminology created from Turkish roots and then with the *Anayasa* and *İç Tüzük*, which constituted the basis of the Law language. For a more detailed account, see *ibid.*, 58-59. For Saim Ali Dilemre, this effort had to be treated within the desire to create a common language comprising people, science and state languages. To gain a common language would be only possible with a revolutionary attempt that had been taken as a principle in the Turkish language reform. *Ibid.*, 78-79. For a more chauvinist view on the issue, see İ. Hakkı Baltacıoğlu’s speech, *ibid.*, 125-126; Besim Atalay’s speech, *ibid.*, 147-148.

was highly politicized, while the intended aim was declared to make it understandable to the people.

The period after 1945 was the escalation of considerable criticism on the grounds that it was leading to the corruption of the language. By raising the criticism coupled with political opposition, the government turned toward a more moderate position with regard to language reform. The TLS, with its highly politicized stand, became the issue of the ongoing political battlefield between the ruling party and its opposition, the Democrat Party (DP). The DP, after coming to power in 1950, in the first instance questioned the position of the TLS and its role on the issue of the language reform, and weakened it by withdrawing from government support. In addition, in 1952, it canceled the 1945 version of the Constitution and re-instituted that of 1924, changing several names previously turkicized.

As a conclusion, there were two principal steps in the language revolution during the formative decades of the Republic: The first was the formation of the new Turkish, called *öz Türkçe*, to provide a break with the past. The second was the standardization and generalization of that language to assimilate local dialects and local/ethnic languages. In other words, the alphabet change and later purification and standardization attempts were based on a political impetus associated with the multiple task of breaking with the past and interpreting the present and the future through renaming or redefining.

In fact, this process manifested to some extent what other “national” languages undergoing the process. Thus newly formulated Turkish language should be taken as a “cultural artifact” of the Kemalist nation-building project rather than “the basis of

national consciousness.”¹⁴⁸ The goal of the project was to “liberate” Turkish from “ten thousand years of subordination” and “restore” it to its rightful place among the civilized and cultured nations. This was to be realized through elevating the status and advancing the use of *öz Türkçe*. In this respect *öz Türkçe* had to assume its proper role of projecting a civilized and cultured Turkish personality. As a sole valid language in the public realm, it came to acquire a superior status, such that even speakers of other languages and dialects among the Kemalist elite group developed negative attitudes to their possessions.

The official language policies began to spawn a group of elite, which continued to benefit from its monopoly of mastery of the official language. In this determined status, the use of language as a symbol had utmost importance. It seemed to be a symbol of a high, cultured and civilized life. That was why access to it meant at the first sight to have the right to take part in that life. It came to be the language which was, in the words of Eugene Weber, “about status and access and success and, sometimes, revenge.”¹⁴⁹ Taking into account in nation-building process, it was also a tool and symbol for forming and strengthening within the borders of the homeland a collective sentiment of belonging. It was part and parcel of the main official line disregarding all particularities which were seen as dangerous for the healthy formation of a high life under the concept of culture. In short, *öz Türkçe* appeared to be judged symbolizing the Turkish nation as having its own culture.

The Kemalist quest for building up a new future, inspired from Jacobin utopianism, came with the creation of *öz Türkçe* which was aimed to be entirely value-

¹⁴⁸ For the process, see Eric Hobsbawn, *Nations and Nationalism since 1879* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 111.

free. What was common with this aim was that it would be ready to be filled with the new meaning world of secularized moral discourse of Kemalism, and in such a way, the people's view of themselves would be re-shaped. Here language was subject to the process of the production of meaning which would in fact provide for the Kemalists to interpret and re-construct the interests and "ethos of future generations"¹⁵⁰ of the Turkish nation. This act came with "scienticization" of language that was inherently politicization, or ideologization, of language. In this way the Kemalist language engineers viewed Arabic and Persian –or even literacy in the Arabic script- as a political statement.

It is in this sense that the Kemalists' evaluation of language as an another "man-made" object seemed to be largely differentiated from that of Romanticism, which saw language as the sole constitutive aspect of culture, a tool for expressing all belonging to living traditions and manners. For example, in Herder's formulation, language as a basic aspect of culture was the product and expression of the collective experience of the group having its own unique way. So it could not be invented in anyway by a group of individual through coining new words.¹⁵¹ This difference stemmed from the historicist view constituting the Kemalist conception of language; it was a progressive and futurist idea.

There emerged the zigzag in the process of revolutionizing language. This might be seen as a political control which ended in periodic acts of renaming. This made language one of the most contested issues during the early Republican era and the multi-

¹⁴⁹ Eugene Weber, "What Rough Beast?" *Critical Review*. 10/2 (1996), 296.

¹⁵⁰ Jordan, *Second Stories*, 14.

party period. In fact it was inherent to the process itself in which language came to be contested and historically contingent.

¹⁵¹ See Robert Reinhold Ergang, *Herder and The Foundations of German Nationalism* (New York: Octagon Books, 1976), 87.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The early Republican period in Turkey shows a process of nation-building accompanying the processes of society-making and order-making. Throughout this dissertation, I have highlighted this process and demonstrated that of culture production through focusing on the new literature on politics of culture, nationalism, politics of identity and state. This analysis has been maintained on the bases of a new conceptual framework emerging as a result of the crisis of modernity and a new socio-political reality led by the rising tide of identity politics during the last two decades in Turkey. In this regard, I have argued that culture came to be the end-product of a modernist political project, and has, in turn, became one of the most debated issues in the political arena throughout the history of the Republic. Culture-making, initiated by the state in the early Republican era, reflected the processes that paved the way for a civilizing pressure on the people from above. These occurred around a specific political project initiated in a specific society, the “Turkish society” of the second quarter of the twentieth century, of which the state came to be the sole legitimate designer and actor. The official discourse on culture as a vision of the “new society” constituted the backbone of the Kemalist project of modernization. The product was the politicization, or the ideologization, of all aspects of “culture”, and so through the state mechanisms, these aspects ranging from fine arts to language were used

as “agents of civilizing discipline”.¹ This was in fact one of the radical “modernist” programs of culture launched in a non-Western context.

Two Projects of Modernity

In the West, the history of “the modernist program of culture” went back to the late eighteenth century, coupled with the emergence of a modern political will, or new state formation, to re-construct society. Nowadays, almost all analyses concentrating on the relation of culture to the state and politics have taken into account this specific historical process. It has been possible only through embedding power and history in the analyses of culture or grounding culture in unequal power relations; such an effort for historicizing or contextualizing came out to expand the scope of the concept of culture. In this way I have tried to highlight the historico-political development of the concept of culture in one way or another appearing with the idea of civilization. It is in this respect that the notion of culture as an idea and a process is a modern invention. At that point, it came to be a vision of the formation of “cultivated” and “ordered” society and “civilized” individuals on the basis of new standards and certainties. The modern state, personified, symbolized and imagined, from the beginning has been closely associated with such an *order-making* notion of culture used as an effective vehicle for both legitimating and cultivating. That is to say, the modern system of legitimization and the efforts for cultivation revolved on the part of the rulers of a nation-state especially around the construction, dissemination, and imposition of a form of cultural identity on which the

¹ This is Toby Miller’s expression. See Toby Miller, *The Well-Tempered Self: Citizenship, Culture, and the Postmodern Subject* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 21.

political belonging or membership is based. Only to a greater extent has this occurred by means of its monopolization of “legitimate use of culture”. In this regard, nationalism as an ideology of “culture” has been inherent in the process of culture production directed by the state’s apparatuses. Thus the formulation of nationalism gains utmost importance. Only by going beyond the civic/ethnic dichotomy, the place of “culture” in the nationalist formulations of the modern state becomes clear. Employing Tilly’s conception, nationalism is classified as *top-down* and *bottom-up* formats. Both seem more explanatory to understand the role and dynamics of culture in nationalist projects, because they do not try to prove whether nationalism is culture-embedded or politics-oriented, but in its general sense they tell us the direction of processes of culture production. Put simply, the top-down form reflects the political will to construct a new nation by targeting and transforming all ways of life, whereas the bottom-up form is concerned more with state-building and coincidentally with “rejuvenation” and improvement of “submerged” cultural values. In fact, both are related to the formation of culture in a given time and space.

Throughout the dissertation, I have shown that these two modern projects accompanied the development of two dominant notions of culture. The first one was the hierarchical-assimilative, Enlighthenist-Jacobin notion of culture signifying a modernist program for the construction of a new order and new society. From the beginning, culture was here associated with the idea of civilization. Flourishing from the Enlightenment philosophy, both concepts reflected an ontological and epistemological rupture and the leaning to construct a new symbolic universe based on the new secular “Truth” and new patterns in which the “enlightened” and “civilized” rulers came to be the unique culture-

builders. At the heart of this quest there was the idea of the construction of an “ordered” society and “civilized” citizens. This understanding turned into an extensive political project under the rule of the Jacobins in the post-revolutionary period in France. For the sake of the project, all forms of life became the objects of cultural crusade maintained from above by the “civilizing” rulers. Here, the “new way of life” determining all aspects of the modern public sphere were extended to the private one through assaulting particular attachments, family relations, artistic and musical taste, and so forth. The state and its actors with a determined “civilizing” mission played a decisive role in this attack revolved around the Republican quest for equalizing everybody. In short, culture that was produced in a nationalist endeavor as top-down format was disseminated and imposed on the people seen at the bottom of hierarchical structuration. This notion of culture was therefore assimilationist coexisting with both inclusionary and exclusionary tendencies.

The second was the organic, unique notion of culture, led by Romanticism. It was, first of all, based on a clear distinction between *kultur* (culture) and *zivilisation* (civilization). The former denoted the system of values shared by all the members of a definite community, here the community of Germans; that is, it manifested a collective and organic whole. It was, therefore, the main source for the development of personality and the very identity of everybody in that community. However, civilization represented the secondary aspects of life and continued foreign elements (often associated with the French way) seen harmful to the harmonious structure of culture. In Germany, the organic, differentialist notion of culture became the cornerstone of nationalistic ideas during the nineteenth century. That is to say, the idea of nationalism, developing from the bottom upward, came with the state-seeking endeavor of the intellectuals and later the

state elite to establish a political structure for “German” culture. In turn, through the state agents and intellectual/artistic works in the hands of nationalist intellectuals it was attempted to be revitalized and improved. Then it became the name of the defined community signifying the collective personality of all citizens. This differentialist nature made it difficult for the outsiders with “different” cultures to access membership, or citizenship of the German state. In this sense, it is exclusionary and non-assimilative.

The above-mentioned models have had a determining effect on almost all modernist/nationalist projects in non-Western societies. The Turkish case was one, and the most unique, of the first projects of the non-Western world. The Republican regime, during its formative decades, initiated a modernist project to civilize the society, on the basis of a sort of state-led, or top-down, nationalism, akin to the French type. Two concepts, culture and civilization, constituted the baseline of the project, coming as a vision of “human-self cultivation” and “ordered society”. Here, the cultural institutions of the Republic, which symbolized and manifested the monopolization of the legitimate use of culture, came to the fore as producers, carriers, and disseminators of the state discourse on culture. These institutions were planned as the basic agents for promoting and imposing “the modern way of life” to cultivate and order the society, to create future-generations and tame the masses. The rationale for culture production was the will of the Kemalists to find out their ideal image in the future, but not mainly the past and the present, as with Jacobin revolutionary utopianism. It seemed to be that the construction of culture was inherent to the projection of the planned future-life. The ideological and institutional roots of the Kemalist will to construct a new way of life may be related to the development of the idea of “society-making” in the Ottoman reformist movement

with its civilizing mission. By its nature and revolutionary characteristic, the civilizing mission in the hands of the Republicans turned into a wholesale cultural crusade to create a new society.

The ruling group of the Kemalist regime attempted to attribute high, civilized life forms and a “cultivated” state of mind to the concept of culture. In this regard, culture, claiming universal validity for itself, became their self-image, or a way of their identification. The civilizing elite detached themselves from the rest of the people with particularistic and traditional affiliations, with their distinct language, historicity, dress-style, taste of art and music, education, way of thinking, notion of honor, and so on. In this way, their “elitist categorization of culture”² denoted at the first glance a social and cultural status, based on various qualities and patterns, ranging from artistic taste to training, from dress to manner of eating, which reflected the inner structure of the Kemalist perception of “the modern way of life”. This culture was on the part of the civilizing rulers and intellectuals the entire source of all-good values, Truth, and identity. This was also true for the Romantic notion of culture, but the difference was that, unlike the Romantic-German definition, the Kemalists did not regard “living culture” as a spiritual, organic entity giving true essence to human beings. Also, setting up a strict *hierarchy* between life forms, it anticipated *revolutionizing* every sphere of life considered to belong to the “old”, that is, primitive, archaic. In this sense, the Kemalist notion of culture was different from Gökalp’s formulation that stressed the inevitability of “living” and “local” values for the definition of culture. It does, however, seem to be very close to the Westernists’ proposal to re-construct new forms of life for “enlightened”

² Jack David Eller, “Anti-Anti-Multiculturalism”, *American Anthropologist*, 99/2 (1997), 249.

and “civilized” future-generations. In the Kemalist formulation, the standards of the “civilized” world, by which the knowing elite judged all existing aspects of life, were set for the society.³ These standards became obviously uncontested subject matters of the Kemalist political project of cultural, political and social transformation, coming to terms as a process of *culturalization*. In the process, then, instead of the “old”, a new system of politics and education were instituted, new forms of public and private life were set in motion, and new family types and gender roles were introduced. The Turkish state came to be the sole protector of “the new way of life”. The life woven around culture also demonstrated political life, that is, expressed political convictions as well as social and cultural ones. In this discourse, politics and all forms of life could not be separated; here, culture emerged as a whole surrounding politics. The result was the politicization of all aspects of life: language, education, art, literature, history, and so on. In short, culture was the outcome of the constant process of cultural production, and so became the vehicle of projecting a vision of “the modern way of life”, a good life, promoted by the cultural doctrine of the rulers.

The Public Sphere

In this respect, I have argued that the ruling group formed a public sphere, the public which was surrounded by the political and the cultural. Thus, it became a milieu

³ These standards, establishing mainly the base line of the new Turks’ identification, were, as Kadioğlu argues, especially symbolized through “modern images” rather than philosophic-historical and ethical underpinnings. See Ayşe Kadioğlu, *Cumhuriyet İradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi* [The Will of Republic, the Judgement of Democracy] (İstanbul: Metis, 1999), 22, 31, 129. In this regard, the prescriptions for how to talk and listen, how to dress, how to eat, and so on, all were necessary for being publicly visible.

where the Kemalists' concepts of art, politics and pleasure were displayed. The way of access to the culture that determined all belonging to the public realm passed only through assimilating into it, that is, it was only open for those who held and internalized these manners, or those who became "culturally" matured. In this way, it was a unifying force forming an imagined community of "cultured" equals; here, making equal means making similar, and distancing from non-equals mentally and spatially. As the Jacobins had done in France, the Kemalist mission of inclusion attributed to transform all that belonged to the private realm, a realm of particularities and tradition. It seemed to be a cultural crusade. This was attempted to be realized through expanding the public into the private. Any resistance to that mission had to be silenced.⁴ In this regard those who reject internalizing new manners and behavioral norms were excluded. Exclusion here means to be deprived of gaining a new public identity, that is, of benefiting from the advantages of the state and participating in the public sphere. This position has defined who belongs and who does not to culture. Membership to the Turkish culture meant the internalization of a set of manners manufactured by the official cultural institutions. For example, the People's Houses came to the fore being places where the practices of patterns of new style and taste were introduced to the ordinary people; the Houses were therefore the agents for taming them through creating a proper network of practicing new modes of behavior. In such a way, in general, the institutions provided the technologies of the formation of citizenry; that is, the modern Turkish citizen signifies the status of a subject

⁴ On this mission, Giesen writes, "every act of resistance on the part of outsiders not only puts the inclusion of an individual at risk but also challenges the entire mission of inclusion. Outsiders cannot resist inclusion, neither by right nor by reason. Whoever questions the mission has to be overwhelmed and destroyed." Bernhard Giesen, "Cosmopolitans, Patriots, Jacobins, and Romantics." *Deadalus*. 127/3 (1999), 247.

matured in the discourse formation during the early Republican period. To put it briefly, this dissertation identifies that the Kemalist “society-making” notion of culture based on the logic of assimilation is inclusionary and exclusionary at the same time.

All these mean to establish the rigid boundaries between insiders and outsiders. In the official discourse those who were not able to assimilate into the culture were deemed as “internal” outsiders (insisting on the norms and manners belonging to the Ottomans, Kurds, Circassians, Bosnians, Jews, Armenians, *aşirets*, etc.). The result was the process of internal exclusion. In fact, this was a *homogenizing* account of how the new culture delegitimized and marginalized those outsiders and assigned their values to the past as “past” or made them “prehistoric” as only “folkloric” and “mythic” objects of museums. Here, the main stress was placed on the supposition of “artificiality” and “backwardness” of the old life forms. This was based on a model reflecting a set of relations between the civilized and the savage, the modern and the traditional, the West and the East.

Herein lies the Kemalist perception of authenticity. Contrary to the Romantic formulation, it did not include the patterned aspects of life evolved especially around Islam and tradition over the centuries. In the official discourse, those aspects were regarded “artificial”, “imitated”, “archaic”, which had overwhelmed the true essence of the Turkish nation, while newly constructed culture was presented as “true” and “authentic”. Her true essence could only be discovered in the endless-progressive march of modern civilization. It was for this reason that traditional dress form and music, the Arabic alphabet, “old” words, rituals in gender relations and family, traditional public rites, ceremonies and festivities, were not seen as aspects of the Kemalist notion of

“authenticity”. Regarding their artificial, imitated and archaic nature, the civilizing rulers excluded these aspects from the new past of the Republic.

Throughout the dissertation, I highlighted that this “fact” stemmed from the official history and language theses, which were developed as the most significant cultural products through the works of the THS and the TLS. Both provided suitable ground for “authenticity” of the new Turkish culture with a relative distinct historical experience and language form; that is, they helped to maintain a “unique” Turkish identity. Nevertheless, in accordance with the cultural goals of the new regime, the above two theses traced the genealogy of the West representing the most developed form all over the world. Correspondingly, Turkish history began to be rewritten from the point of historicism of Jacobenist and positivist understanding, preaching a linear and progressive view of history. The Turkish language, developed through this history, had to be purified from all elements of languages, of old and archaic life forms. In this way, both made it possible, on the behalf of the civilizing elite, to claim Turkish culture as one of the authentic cultures belonging to the universalized modern civilization, but not that of non-Western ones. However, it does not imply a substantial difference with that of languages and histories of the West in the sense that Kemalist historicism tried to demonstrate the history of the Turks having been part of the genealogy of Western civilization and culture from the beginning, and the Turkish language, being also at the roots of the Indo-European languages (of Western civilization), would be a language of a modern life and science.

As part of the official project of *detraditionalizing* the past, in the Kemalist history-writing, history was “politicized”, “ideologized”. The invention of a new history,

which did not have any connotations with living dominant traditions, only justified a historical perspective tightly bound up with the political authority. Here the aim was to rediscover the civilized and cultured essence, the talent of the Turks, and to tie the new culture to their pre-historic past by following the traces of “Western civilization and culture”. In that, history was preoccupied primarily with discovering and formulating the affinity between Turkish history and the history of Western civilization through which the role of the Turks was emphasized as culture-creator, civilization-creator. This was almost an imaginary and romantic quest in nature, but the lost world that the Kemalist politician historians strove to re-invent in this way was not similar to the Romantic historians’ yearning to authentic and unique pastoral world in combat with modern civilization.⁵ On the contrary, the effort to bring the past into the present reflected the will to participate in this civilization. This included mostly “forgetting” or negating through the invention and selection of some specific moments in history. One might argue that the result was a weak historicity constituting one significant part of the process which made the Kemalist notion of culture contested throughout the history of the Republic.

In a similar vein, the Kemalist language policy had a central place in determining the boundaries of this culture. Language, with its new alphabet and vocabulary, attributed a different world of meaning to the patterns of the new style and taste and so came to be the main vehicle to decipher new signs and images. At that point, education in the new language, which was essentially limited to those who accepted to be assimilated, would

⁵ The Romantics promoted a “counter-model of European Antiquity based on culture” rather than the abstract, political model of the Enlightenment thinkers and Republicans. See John Rundell and Stephen Mennell, “Introduction: Civilization, Culture and the Human Self-Image”, in *Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization*, eds. J. Rundell and S. Mennell (London: Routledge, 1998), 14.

make “cultured” citizens of the Republic taking part in and managing the new public discourse. The most viable means of codifying and implementing language policies was mainly through legislation including constitutional provisions, laws, decrees, ordinances, regulations, and guidelines regarding language subsidy or language use. This was the act of re-naming, which had occurred periodically. Nevertheless throughout the Single-Party period the issue of language was not settled. Every step in the language revolution became subject to the hottest debate both among politicians and between politician linguists and academicians. The principal opposition was, in particular, part of the Kemalist elite; the basic reason for that was the fact that language change was felt strongly in every sphere of life. Consequently, during this period and the following years, language as a political tool in the hands of the political and intellectual elite seemed to become one of the most contested issues in the public realm and of dividing aspects in ideological proliferation in the political arena.

The dispute over the history and language theses and policies exemplified to what extent culture had been a contested issue in the period from 1923-1945. Nevertheless, by passing to the multi-party period after 1945, it became more and more subject to harsh political debate. The reason behind the debate was that the degree of success or failure of cultural policies engineered from above had a direct relationship to the country’s social and political structure. As Keating argues, if a nation-building project is tied to only one social group or a single party imposing monolithic cultures by their notion of nationalist ideology, it will undermine the support base for its constructed values.⁶ This was true for

⁶ Michael Keating, *Nations against the State* (London: MacMillan Press, 1996), 62.

the post-war period in Turkey. In order to mobilize voters and citizens, the opposition party, the DP, carried the official definition of (national) culture as a chief objective of political debate by stressing the significance of local-Islamic traditions and continuities with the near past (the Ottomans). Discussion went on around the definition of culture: whether it was originary/authentic or derivative/foreign. The result was cultural wars waged by the strongholders or interpreters of Kemalism: it has also been a war dominating Turkish political life up till now, which caused to some extent four military interventions (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997) in politics. Consequently, (Turkish) culture projected through a modernist program has come to be a process, and so it has been constantly formed and re-formed, contested and struggled for in accordance with the changing political and social situations.

In this dissertation I have attempted to conceptualize the official notion of culture prevalent during the early Republican regime from a political science perspective; thus concentrated on the institutional bases of the discursive formation of the Kemalist cultural understanding for which the state agents and institutions pursued a set of policies. I have showed that the state and its civilizing agents played the active role in the process of *culture production*, formed and spread new life forms, and also that it was the nature of this process which made culture the most contested issue. Nevertheless, resistance (in general intellectual rather than popular) to the policies is to some extent elaborated throughout this dissertation. Such an attempt, in fact, makes it difficult to understand the needs, premises, hopes, aspirations and interests of ordinary people, which in the last instance seem to be the determining factor in the policies of a modern state. That is why it seems essential for future-research to focus on the activities of the People's Houses and

Rooms and the Village Institutes and Schools especially at the local level, the relationships between these agents and the ordinary people, and the dynamics of popular resistance to the state cultural policies. Such analyses will provide to grasp the clues as to how the ordinary people imagined themselves via the forged identity. In addition to this, in order to trace the line of the contested nature of the official discourse on culture and to make a comparison between its formative years and its later reformulation, it appears to be necessary to examine the politics of culture initiated during the DP period. Such analysis will help us to better grasp today's controversies over the official definition of culture.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdullah Ziya. "Köy Mimamrisi" [Village Architecture]. *Ülkü*. 7 (August 1933), 37-41.
- Adams, Vincanne. "Dreams of a Final Sherpa." *American Anthropologist*. 99/2 (1997), 85-98.
- Adıvar, Halide Edip. *Conflict of East and West in Turkey*. Delhi: Jamia Millia, 1935.
- Afet İnan. "Tarihten Evvel ve Tarih Fecrinde" [Before History and Dawn of History]. In *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi, 1932*, 18-41.
- _____. "Türk-Osmanlı Tarihinin Karakteristik Noktalarına Bir Bakış" [An Overview of Genral Characteristics of Turkish-Ottoman History], in *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi, 1937*, 756-765.
- _____. "Türk Tarih Kurumu'nun Arkeoloji Faaliyeti" [Archeological Activities of the Turkish History Society]. *Bellekten*. II/5-6 (1938), 5-12.
- _____. "Atatürk and Tarih Tezi." *Bellekten*. III/10 (1939), 243-246.
- _____. *L'Anatolie, le pays de la "race" turque. Recherches sur les caractères anthropologiques des populations de la Turquie*. Cenevre: Georg and Cie, 1941.
- _____. "Contribution to Turkish History through the research Activities of the Archeological Section of the Turkish Historical Society." *Bellekten*. XIII/13 (1949), 479-495.
- _____. *Atatürk Hakkında Hatıra ve Belgeler* [Memoires and Documents on Atatürk]. Ankara: T. İş Bankası Yay., 1959.
- _____. *M. Kemal Atatürk'ten Yazdıklarım* [My Writings from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk]. Ankara: Altınok Matbaası, 1969.
- Ahmad, Feroz. *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London: Routledge, 1993.
- _____. "Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925." In *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, eds. Metin Heper and J. M Landau, 65-82 . London: I. B. Tauris, 1991.

- Ahmet Ağaoğlu. “Yeni Nesil Arasında Dil Meselesi” [Language Issue among the New Generation]. *Cumhuriyet*. 27 January 1933, 3. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2* 131-134.
- Ahmet Asım. “Türk İnkılabının Mana ve Mahiyeti” [The Meaning and True Nature of the Turkish Revolution]. *Vakit* (March 22, 1934). Reprint. *Ayın Tarihi* (March 1934), 74-75.
- Ahmet Şükrü. “Osmanlıcadan Türkçeye Geçiş İnkılabı” [The Revolution of Passing from *Osmanlıca* to Turkish]. *Milliyet*, 27 Eylül 1932. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 97-98.
- _____. “Dil Bayramı” [Language Festive]. *Milliyet* (September 27, 1933), 1. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 161-162.
- _____. “Üniversitede İnkılap Tarihi Dersleri” [Lectures of Revolution History at the University]. *Ayın Tarihi* (March 1934), 71?.
- _____. “Tarama Derneği.” *Milliyet* (May 12, 1934), 1. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 500-501.
- _____. “Dil Değişiminde *Milliyet*” [*Milliyet* in Language Change]. *Milliyet* (November 19, 1934), 3. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 50-51.
- Aktar, Ayhan. *Varlık Vergisi ve ‘Türkleştirme’ Politikaları* [‘Capital Tax’ and ‘Turkification’ Policies]. İstanbul: İletişim, 2000.
- Akyüz, Kenan. *Encümen-i Daniş*. Ankara:?, 1975.
- Al-Azmeh, Aziz. *Islams and Modernities*. London: Verso, 1993.
- Ali Ekrem Bey. “Turkish Language Changing Rapidly.” *Uyanış* (February 19, 1931). In *The Turkish Press, 1926-1932*, 149-150.
- Ali Suavi. “Lisan ve Hatt-ı Türki” [Language and Writing in Turkish]. *Ulum* (1870). In *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe tartışmaları*, 60-89.
- Allen, Henry Elisha. *The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and Religious Development*. Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1935. Reprint. New York: Greenwood Press, 1968.
- And, Metin. *Culture, Performance and Communication in Turkey*. Tokyo: ILCAA, 1987.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd rev. ed. London: Verso, 1991.
- _____. “Introduction.” In *Mapping the Nation*, ed. G. Balakrishnan, 1-16. New York: Verso, 1996.

- Arıkan, M. Saffet. "Kongre Başkanı, Maarif Vekili Saffet Arıkan'ın Nutku [The Congress President, Minister of Education Saffet Arıkan's Speech], in *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi, İstanbul, 20-25 Eylül, 1937, Kongrenin Çalışmaları ve Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler*, 1-3.
- Arsan, Nimet, ed. *Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri* [Atatürk's Circulars, Telegraphs and Declerations]. Ankara: T. İ. T. Enstitüsü Yay., 1964.
- Aslanapa, Oktay, ed. *1933 Yılında İstanbul Üniversitesinde Başlayan İlk İnkılap Tarihi Ders Notları* [Notes of First Lectures on the Revolution History Given at İstanbul University from 1933]. İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1997.
- Atatürk*. İstanbul: T. C. G. Harp Tarihi Encümeni Basımevi, 1939.
- Atatürk'ün Maarife Ait Direktifleri* [Atatürk's Orders about Education]. İstanbul: Maarif Vekilliği, 1939.
- Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri* [Atatürk's Speeches and Statements], 3 vols. Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1989.
- Atatürkçülük* (Birinci Kitap) [Atatürkism (First Book)]. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1983.
- (Atay) Falih Rıfkı. "Yazı, Dil, Kafa" [Alphabet, Language, Mind]. *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*. 2 October 1932. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 103-104.
- _____. "Büyük Dile Doğru" [Toward Great Language]. *Ulus* (March 26, 1935), 1 and 3. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 259-260.
- _____. "Dil Kurultayı" [Language Congress]. *Ulus* (August 24, 1936), 1. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 517-518.
- _____. *Çankaya*. İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş, 1969.
- Avni Ali (Çandar), "Dil Kurultayından Sonra" [After the Language Congress]. *Hakimiyeti Milliye*. 19 October 1932. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 495-497.
- Ayvazoğlu, Beşir. "Devletin Kültüre Düşen Gölgesi" [Shadow of the State on Culture]. *Dergah*. 28 (1992), 12-13.
- Balhasanoğlu Necip Asım (Yazıksız). "Dil Heyeti" [The Language Committee]. *Türk Yurdu*, 22 Teşrin-I evvel 1926. Transcribed in *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı II*, 26-32.

- Balibar, Etienne. "Culture and Identity (Working Papers)." In *The Identity in Question*, ed. John Racjzman, 173-196. London: Routledge, 1995.
- Baltacıođlu, İsmail Hakkı. *Halkın Evi* [The People's House]. Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1950.
- Banarlı, Nihat Sami. *Türkçenin Sırları* [Secrets of Turkish]. İstanbul, 1972.
- Banguođlu, Tahsin. "Devlet Dili Türkçe" [State Language Is Turkish]. In *Beşinci Türk Dil Kurultayı, 1945*.
- _____. "Halkevleri: Milli Kültür Ocakları" [The People's Houses: The Hearts for National Culture]. *Ulus* (February 20, 1944), 2.
- Başar, Ahmet Hamdi. *Attürk'le Üç Ay ve 1930'dan Sonra Türkiye* [Thre Months with Atatürk and Turkey after 1930]. İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1945.
- Başgöz, İlhan. *Türkiye'nin Eğitim Çıkması ve Atatürk* [Turkey's Dilemma of Education and Atatürk]. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1995.
- Başlangıç, Celal. "Bunu da mı W'apacaktınız!" *Radikal* (April 1, 2000), 19.
- (Başman), Avni. "Latin Harleri Meselesi" [Question of Latin Letters]. *Hayat* (30 December 1926). In *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete alfabe tartışmaları*, 244-255.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. *Culture as Praxis*. London: Routledge, 1973.
- _____. *Lagislators and Interpreters*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987.
- _____. *Intimations of Postmodernity*. London: Routledge, 1992.
- _____. *Hermeneutics and Social Science, Approaches to Understanding*, 2nd ed. Hampshire: Gregg Revivals, 1992.
- _____. *Postmodernity and Its Discontents*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997.
- Baydar, Mustafa. *Atatürk ve Devrimlerimiz*. İstanbul: T. İş Bankası Yay., 1973.
- Baykara, Tuncer. "'Nizam', 'Tanzimat', ve 'Medeniyet' Kavramları Üzerine" [On the Cpncepts of 'Order,' 'Tanzimat,' and 'Civilization']. In *Tanzimat'ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu* [International Symposium on the 150th Anniversary of the *Tanzimat*], 61-65. Ankara: Milli Kütüphane Yay., 1991.
- Bayraktutan, Yusuf. *Türk Fikir Tarihinde Modernleşme, Milliyetçilik ve Türk Ocakları* [Modernization, Nationalism and the Turkish Hearts in the History of Turkish Thought]. Ankara: Kültür Bak. Yay., 1996.

- Bayur, Hikmet. "Atatürk." *Bellekten*. III/10 (1939), 247-286.
- Belge, Murat. "Kültür" [Culture]. In *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* [Republican Period Encyclopedia of Turkey], 1288-1304. İstanbul: İletişim, 1983.
- Bendix, Reinhard. *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule*. Berkley: University of California Press, 1978.
- Bennett, Tony. *Culture: A Reformer's Science*. London: Sage Publication, 1998.
- Berkes, Niyazi. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964.
- _____. "‘İhtilal’, ‘İnkilap’, ‘Devrim’." In *Atatürk ve Devrimlerimiz* [Atatürk and Our Reforms]. İstanbul: Adam, 1982.
- Berlin, Isaiah. "Volkgeist'in Dönüşü [Return of *Volkgeist*]." *NPQ Türkiye*. 3 (Kış 1992), 6-11.
- _____. *Vico and Herder, Two Studies in the History of Ideas* (London: Hogarth, 1976), 150-7.
- Bernstein, John A. *Progress and the Quest for Meaning*. London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1993.
- Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1983
- Beşikçi, İsmail. *Kürtlerin Mecburi İskanı* [Compulsory Re-settlement of the Kurds]. İstanbul: Komel Yayınevi, 1978.
- Beşinci Türk Dil Kurultayı, 1945* [The Fifth Turkish Language Congress, 1945]. İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Basımevi, 1946.
- Birinci Türk Dil Kurultayı: Tezler Müzakere Zabıtları* [The First Turkish Language Congress: Theses, Discussion Minutes]. İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1933.
- Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi: Konferanslar Münakaşalar Zabıtları* [The First Turkish History Congress: Minutes of Papers and Discussions]. Ankara: T. C. Maarif Vekaleti, 1933.
- Black, Anthony. *Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought to the Present*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.

- Bora, Tanıl. "Cumhuriyetin İlk Döneminde Milli Kimlik" [National Identity in the Early Republican Period]. In *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik* [Republic, Democracy and Identity], ed. Nuri Bilgin, 53-62. İstanbul: Bağlam, 1997.
- Bosworth, C. E. "The Concept of Dhimma in Early Islam." In *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire - the Functioning of Plural Society*, ed. Braude and Lewis, vol. I, 37-51.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field." *Sociological Theory*. 12/1 (1994), 1-18.
- Bozdoğan, Sibel and Kasaba, Reşat, eds. In *Rethinking Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997.
- _____. "Introduction." In *Rethinking Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 3-14.
- Bozkurt, Mahmut Esat. *Atatürk İhtilali* [Atatürk Revolution]. İstanbul Üniv. Yay., 1940. Reprint. İstanbul: Kaynak Yay., 1995.
- Braude, Braude. "Foundation Myths of the Millet System." In *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, eds. B. Braude and B. Lewis, vol. I, 69-89.
- Braude, Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds. *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, 2 vols. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982.
- _____. "Introduction." In *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, vol. I, 1-32.
- Brown, David. "Are There Good and Bad Nationalism?" *Nations and Nationalism*. 5/2 (1999), 281-302.
- Brubaker, William R. "Immigration, Citizenship and the Nation-State." *International Sociology*. 5/4 (1990), pp.
- Brown, David. "Are There Good and Bad Nationalism?" *Nations and Nationalism*. 5/2 (1999), 281-302.
- Burhan Asaf (Belge). "Kurultay" [Congress]. *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (September 26, 1932), 2.
- Burian, Orhan. "Hümanizma ve Biz" [Humanism and We]. *Yücel*. 62 (1935).
- Celal Nuri. "Latin Harfleri Meselesi" [The Question of the Latin Letters]. *İkdam* (May 5, 6, 7, 1928). In *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe Tartışmaları*, 285-301.

- Celal Nuri. "A New Phase of the Turkish Revolution." *İkdam* (May 5, 6, 7, 1928). In *The Turkish Press 1925-1932*, 90-91.
- Cevdet Nasuhi. "Halkevinin Çatısı Altında" [Under the Canopy of the People's Houses]. *Ülkü*. 3 (Nisan 1933), 194-197.
- Chattarjee, Partha. *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota press, 1992.
- CHF *Halkevleri Talimatnamesi* [The RPP's Regulations of the People's Houses]. Ankara: CHF, 1934.
- CHF *Halkevleri Çalışma Talimatnamesi* [The Working Program of the RPP's the People's Houses]. Ankara: CHF, 1940.
- CHP *Dördüncü Büyük Kurultay Görüşmeleri Tutalgası* [Proceedings of the Fourth National Convention of the RPP]. Ankara: n. p., 1935.
- Cicioğlu, Hasan. *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde İlk ve Ortaöğretim* [Primary and Secondary Education in the Republic of Turkey]. Ankara: DTCF Yay., 1985.
- Clogg, R. "The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire." In *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*. eds. B. Braude and B. Lewis, vol. I, 185-208.
- Conklin, Alice. *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.
- "Constitution of the Republic of Turkey." Appendix D in Donald Everett Webster's *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation*, 297-236.
- Copeaux, Etienne. "Hizmet: A Key Word in the Turkish Historical Narrative." *New Perspectives on Turkey*. 14 (1996), 97-114.
- _____. *Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931-1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Tezine* [From the Turkish History Thesis to Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in History Textbooks (1931-1993)]. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yay., 1998.
- Creel, Frank W. "Abdullah Cevdet: A Father of Kemalism." *Int. Journal of Turkish Studies*. 4(1980), 9-26.
- Cumhurbaşkanları, Başbakanlar ve Milli Eğitim Bakanları'nın Milli Eğitim ile ilgili Söylev ve Demeçleri* [Speeches and Statements of Presidents, Prime Ministers and Ministers of Education on National Education], 3 vols. Ankara, 1946.

- Cumhuriyetin XXI. Yıldönümünde Yayınlanan 105 Klasik ve Modern Eserin Listesi* [The List of 105 Classics and Modern Writings in the Sixteenth Anniversary of the Republic]. İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1944.
- Cumhuriyetin XXII. Yıldönümünde Yayınlanan 129 Klasik ve Modern Eserin Listesi* [The List of 129 Classics and Modern Writings in the Seventeenth Anniversary of the Republic]. İstanbul: MEB, 1945.
- Çağlar, Behçet Kemal. “Halkevleri Çalışmaları” [The Activities of the People’s Houses]. *Ülkü*. 73 (March 1939), 85-87.
- (Çamlıbel), Hasan Cemil. “Hars Tebdili” [Cultural Change]. *Yeni Ruh*. İstanbul, 1929, 96-102. In *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı II*, 66-68.
- Çambel, Hasan Cemil. “Atatürk and Tarih” [Atatürk and History]. *Bellekten*. III/10 (1939), 269-272.
- Çapa, Mesut. “Giyim Kuşamda Medeni Kıyafetlerin Benimsenmesi ve Trabzon Örneği” [The Adoption of Modern Clothes as Garments and the Case of Trabzon]. *Toplumsal Tarih*. 5/30 (1996), 22-28.
- Çavdar, Tevfik. *İttihat ve Terraki* [Order and Progress]. İstanbul: İletişim, 1991.
- _____. “Serbest Fırka” [The Free Party]. In *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* [Republican Period Encyclopedia of Turkey], vol. 8, 2052-2059. İstanbul: İletişim, 1983.
- Çaycı, Abdurrahman. “Atatürk’ün Uygarlık Anlayışı” [Atatürk’s Understanding of Civilization]. *Bellekten*. 204 (1988), 1105-1117.
- Çiçek, Kemal, and et al., eds. *The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilization*, 4 vols. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000.
- Çıkar, Mustafa. *Hasan-Ali Yücel ve Türk Kültür Reformu* [Hasan-Ali Yücel and Turkish Cultural Reform]. Ankara: T. İş Bankası, 1997.
- Çolak, Yılmaz and Ertan Aydın. “Encountering Identities: Kemalism versus Islamism in Turkey in the 1990s.” Paper Presented at GSSA Conference on “Society at the Turn of the Century.” University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, April 14-15, 1999.
- Darnton, Robert. *The Kiss of Lamourette*. New York: Norton, 1990.
- Davison, Roderic H. *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact of the West*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990.

- Davison, Andrew. "Secularization and Modernization in Turkey: Ideas of Ziya Gökalp." *Economy and Society*. 24 (1995), 189-224.
- Davudođlu, Ahmet. *Alternative Paradigm*. Lanham: The University Press of America, 1994.
- De Cillia, Rudolf, Martin reisigl and Ruth Wodak. "The Discourse Construction of National Identities." *Discourse and Society*. 10/2 (1999), 149-173.
- Deringil, Selim. *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909*. London: I. B. Tauris, 1998.
- "Dil Anketi Bařlıyor: Osmanlıca Kelimelerin Tam Karřılıđı Bulunacak" [The Language Survey Begins: Accurate Equivalents of Ottoman Words Will Be Found]. *Cumhuriyet* (March 10, 1933), 1 and 6.
- Dil Kolu Tarafından Birlik Üyeleri İçin Çıkarılan Aylık Broşür* [Monthly Brochure Published by the Language Section for the Members of the Unity]. Ankara: Türk Basın Birliđi, 1942.
- (Dilmen), İbrahim Necmi. "Şive İři İçin İki Söz" [Two Words About the Issue of Accent]. *Hakimiyeti Milliye* (October 27, 1932), 3. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 28-30.
- _____. "Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti Nasıl Çalışıyor?" [How The Turkish Language Research Society Works?]. *Kurun* (February 7, 1935). In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 505-506.
- _____. "Dil Kurumunun Çalışmaları" [The Works of the Language Society]. *Kurun* (September 19, 1935), 6. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 514-515.
- Dirks, Nicholas B., G. Eley and S. B. Ortner. "Introduction." In *Culture/Power/History*, eds. Dirks, Eley and Ortner. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Dodd, C. H. *Democracy and Development in Turkey*. Walkington: The Eothen Press, 1979.
- Dördüncü Türk Dil Kurultayı* [The Fourth Turkish Language Congress]. Ankara: TDK, 1943.
- Dubois, Laurent. "La République Métissée: Citizenship, Colonialism, and the Borders of French History." *Cultural Studies*. 14/1 (2000), 15-34.
- Duman, Dođan. "Cumhuriyet Baloları" [Republican Balls]. *Toplumsal Tarih*. 7/37 (1997), 44-48.

- Duman, Doğan and Pınar Duman. “Kültürel Bir Değişim Aracı Olarak Güzellik Yarışmaları” [Beauty Contests as an Element of Cultural Chgane]. *Toplumsal Tarih*. 7/42 (1997), 20-26.
- (Duru), Hüseyin Kazım. “Her Türk’ün Adı Türkçe Olmalıdır!” [Name of Every Turk Has to Be Turkish!]. *Öz Dilimize Doğru*. 17 (12 March 1934), 11.
- _____. “Humanisma” [Humanism]. *Ülkü*. 17 (1934), 333-336.
- Durukan, Hüseyin, ed. *Türkiye Nasıl Laikleştirildi* [How Turkey Was Secularized]. İstanbul: Şule, 1998.
- Eisenstadt, S. N. “The Cultural Programme of Modernity and Democracy.” In *Culture, Modernity and Revolution: Essays in Honor of Zygmunt Bauman*, eds. R. Kilminster and I. Varcoe. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Elias, Norbert. *The Civilizing Process: History of Manners, and State Formation and Civilization*, trans. Edmund Jephcott, two volumes. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.
- Elias, Norbert. *The Germans*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996.
- Elias, Norbert. “Civilization, Culture, Identity: “Civilisation” and “Culture”: Nationalism and Nation-State Formation’: an Extract from *The Germans*.” In *Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization*, eds. J. Rundell and S. Mennell, 225-240. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Eller, Jack David. “Anti-Anti-Multiculturalism.” *American Anthropologist*. 99/2 (1997), 249-260.
- (Emre), Ahmed Cevad. “Muhtac Olduğumuz Lisan İnkılabı” [Language Revolution That We Need]. *Lisan İnkılabı*, III-VIII, 174-183. İstanbul, 1928. In *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe Tartışmaları*, 271-284.
- _____. *Yeni Bir Gramer Metodu Hakkında Layiha* [Text On A New Grammar Method]. İstanbul, 1931.
- _____. “Dilimizi Öz Benliğine Kavuşturmaya Başlarken” [Beginning to Discover the True Essence of Our Language]. *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*. (November 16, 1932), 3. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 122.
- _____. *Atatürk’ün İnkılap Hedefi ve Tarih Tezi* [Atatürk’s Goal of Revolution and History Thesis]. İstanbul: Ekin Basımevi, 1956.
- Eren, Güler, ed. *Osmanlı* [Ottoman], 12 vols. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye.

- (Engin), Mehmet Saffet. "Kültür İnkılabımız" [Our Culture Revolution]. *Ülkü*. 6 (June 1933), 351-354.
- _____. "İnkılap Terbiyesi" [Revolutionary Education]. *Ülkü*. 8 (September 1933), 105-114.
- _____. "Anadolu'da en Eski Türk Medeniyeti ve Cihan Medeniyetlerine Hakimiyeti" [The Oldest Turkish Civilization in Anatolia and Its Hegemony of World Civilizations]. *Ülkü*. 16 (April 1934), 263-267.
- _____. *Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri* [The Principles of Kemalism's Revolution], two vol. İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1938.
- Enginün, İnci. "Tanzimat Sonrası Çeviriler." In *Tanzimat'ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, 433-439.
- Ercan, Yavuz. "Ottoman Rule over the Non-Turkish and Non-Muslim Communities." *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest*. 2 (1985), 67-81.
- Ergang, Robert R. *Herder and The Foundations of German Nationalism*. New York: Octagon Books, 1976.
- Eroğlu, Hamza. "Atatürk's Conception of Nation and Nationalism." In *Atatürk's Way*, 145-181. İstanbul: Otomarsan, 1982.
- Ersanlı Behar, Büşra. *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye'de "Resmi Tarih" Tezinin Oluşumu* [Power and History: The Formation of "Official History" Thesis in Turkey]. İstanbul: Afa, 1996.
- Ertem, Rekin. *Elifbe'den Alfabe'ye: Türkiye'de Harf Yazı Meselesi* [From Elifbe to Alfabe: The Question of Letters in Turkey]. İstanbul: Dergah Yay., 1991.
- Eryılmaz, Bilal. *Osmanlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi* [Millet System in the Ottoman Empire]. İstanbul: Ağac Yay., 1992.
- Esenbel, Selçuk. "Medeni Davranışın Aczi-I." *Toplumsal Tarih*, 47 (Kasım 1997), 6-14.
- Fabian, Johannes *Time and the Other: How Antropology Makes its Object*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
- Fairclough, N. and R. Wodak. "Critical Discourse Analysis." In *Discourse as a Social Interaction, Discourse Studies: a Multidisiplinary Introduction*, ed. T. van Dijk, vol. 2, 258-284. London: Sage, 1997.
- Febvre, Lucien. *Uygarlık, Kapitalizm ve Kapitalistler* [Civilization, Capitalism and Capitalists]. Ankara: İmge, 1995.

- Febvre, Lucien. "History and Civilization: 'Civilization: Evolution of a Word and a Group of Ideas.'" In *Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization*, eds. J. Rundell and S. Mennell, 160-190. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Feigenbaum, Harvey B. "Centralization and National Integration in France." *Mediterranean Quarterly*. Winter 1997, 60-76.
- Kelime ve Gramer Terimleri* [Terms of Philosophy and Grammar]. İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1942.
- Feyerabend, Paul. "Democracy, Elitism, and Scientific Method." *Inquiry*. 23 (1980), 3-45.
- Findley, Carter V. *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- Fleischacker, Samuel. *The Ethics of Culture*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994.
- Fletcher, Jonathan. *Violence and Civilization: An Introduction to the Work of Norbert Elias*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997.
- Fontana, Biancamaria. "Introduction." *The Invention of the Modern Republic*, ed. B. Fontana, pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Foucault, Michel. "The Subject and Power." In *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, eds. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinows, 208-226. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982.
- Friedman, Jeffrey. "Nationalism in Theory and Reality." *Critical Review*. 10/2 (Spring 1996), 155-167.
- Galanti, Avram. *Arabi Harfler Terakkimize Mani Değildir* [Arabic Letters Do Not Hinder Our Progress]. İstanbul, 1925. Reprint. İstanbul: Bedir Yay., 1996.
- Gawrych, G. W. "Tolerant Dimensions of Cultural Pluralism in the Ottoman Empire." *Int. J. Middle East Studies*, 15 (1983), 519-536.
- "Gazi Türkçesi" [Gazi Turkish]. *Hakimiyeti Milliye* (November 3, 1932). In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 144-146.
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- _____. *Culture, Identity and Politics*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- _____. *Encounters with Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.

- Geertz, Clifford. "Ideology as a Cultural System." In *The Interpretation of Cultures*, pp.
- Genç, Mehmet. "Osmanlı'da Zanaat, Ahlak, İktisat İlişkisi." In *Anatomi Dersleri: Osmanlı Kültürü*, 107-114. İstanbul: YKY, 1995.
- Gencer, Ali İhsan. "Encümen-i Daniş ve Mustafa Reşid Paşa" [*Encümen-i Daniş and Mustafa Reşid Pasha*]. In *Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Dönemi Semineri* [Seminar on Mustafa Reşid Pasha and his Period]. Ankara: TTK, 1994.
- Giesen, Bernard. "Cosmopolitans, Patriots, Jacobins, and Romantics." *Deadalus*. 127/3 (1999), 221-250.
- Gillis, John R. "Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship." In *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, ed. John R. Gillis, 3-24. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Goloğlu, Mahmut. *Devrimler ve Tepkiler, 1924-1930* [Revolutions and Reactions, 1924-1930]. Ankara: Goloğlu Yay., 1972.
- Gökalp, Ziya. *The Principles of Turkism*, translated by Robert Devereux. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968.
- (Göker), Muzaffer. "Türk Soy ve Türk Tarihi" [Turkish Race and Turkish History]. *Ülkü*. 22 (December 1934), 249-254.
- _____. "İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi" [Second Turkish History Congress]. *Bellekten*. II/5-6 (1938), 1-4.
- _____. "Türk Tarih Kurumu'nun Çalışmaları Hakkında" [On the Works of the Turkish History Society]. *Bellekten*. VIII/29 (1944), 19-36.
- Göle, Nilüfer. "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey." In *Civil Society in the Middle East*, ed. Richard Norton, 17-43. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995.
- _____. "The Freedom of Seduction for Muslim Women." *New Perspectives Quarterly*. 3/15 (1998), 43-51.
- Gözüböyük, Şeref and Suna Kili. *Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Senedi İttifaktan Günümüze* [Turkish Constitutional Texts from *Senedi İttifakt* to the Present]. Ankara: A. Ü. SBF Yay., 1957.
- Grantay, İbrahim. *Elifba Raporu* [Alphabet Report]. İstanbul, 1928.
- Greenfeld, Liah. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.

Günaltay, Şemsettin. “Türk Tarih Tezi Hakkındaki İntikatların Mahiyeti ve Tezin Kat’i Zaferi” [The Aims of Critiques on Turkish History Thesis and Absolute Victory of The Thesis]. *Belleten*. II/5-6 (1938), 337-365.

_____. “Türk Tarih Kurumu Başkanı Prof. Şemseddin Günaltay’ın Açış Nutku” [The Opening Speech of Prof. Şemsettin Günaltay, the President of the Turkish History Society]. *Belleten*. VIII/29 (1944), 5-10.

Günaltay, Şemsettin and Tankut, H. Reşit. *Dil ve Tarih Tezlerimiz Üzerine Gerekli Bazı İzahatlar* [Some Explanations on Our Language and History Theses]. İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1938.

“Güzel Bir Emir” [A Good News]. *Cumhuriyet* (March 7, 1933), 3.

“Halkevleri’nin Yedinci Yıldönümü ve 158 Halkevi’nin Daha Açılışı – Halkevleri’ne Toplu Bir Bakış” [The Seventh Anniversary of the People’s Houses and The Opening of 158 New Houses – A General Outlook to the People’s Houses]. *Ülkü*. 73 (March 1939), 79-84.

Halkevleri ve Halkodaları [The People’s Houses and the People’s Rooms]. Ankara: CHP, 1943.

“Halkevlerimizin Son Yıl İçindeki Çalışmalarına Bir Bakış” [A General Outlook to the Activities of the People’s Houses in the Last One Year]. *Ulus* (February 20, 1944), 3.

Hall, Stuart. “Cultural Identity and Diaspora.” In *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*, eds. P. Williams and L. Chrisman, 392-403. New York: Harvester, 1993.

Handler, Richard. “Is ‘Identity’ A Useful Concept?” In *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, ed. John R. Gillis, 27-40. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.

_____. *Nationalism and The Politics of Culture in Quebec*. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.

Hahn, H. J. *German Thought and Culture: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Present Day*. Manchester and NY: Manchester University Press, 1995.

Halil Nimetullah. “Osmanlıca Anlayıştan Türkçe Anlayışa” [From the Ottoman Understanding to Turkish One]. *Cumhuriyet* (March 27, 1933), 3.

Hanioğlu, Şükrü. *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet* [Abdullah Cevdet as a Political Thinker]. İstanbul: Ücdal Neşriyat, 1981.

- _____. "Osmanlıcılık" [Ottomanism]. In *Tanzimat Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, 1389-1393. İstanbul: İletişim, 1983.
- _____. "Batıcılık" [Westernism]. In *Tanzimat Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, 1382-1388. İstanbul: İletişim, 1983.
- Heller, Agness. "Omnivorous Modernity." In *Culture, Modernity and Revolution: Essays in Honour of Zygmunt Bauman*, eds. Richard Kilminster and Ian Varcoel. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Heper, Metin. *The State Tradition in Turkey*. Walkington: Eotheon Press, 1985.
- _____. "Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective." *Middle East Journal*. 35 (1981), 345-363.
- Heyd, Uriel. *Foundation of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp*. London: Luzac and Company, 1950.
- Heyd, Uriel. *Language Reform in Modern Turkey*. Jerusalem: The Israel Oriental Society, 1954.
- Hobsbawn, Eric. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Holod, Renata and Ahmet Evin, eds. *Modern Turkish Architecture*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984.
- Holod, Renata and Ahmet Evin. "Introduction." In *Modern Turkish Architecture*, eds. R. Holod and A. Evin, 1-8.
- Holbrook, Victoria Rowe. *The Unreadable Shores of Love: Turkish Modernity and Mystic Romance*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994.
- Houminer, Ehud. "The People's Houses in Turkey." *Asian and African Studies*. 1 (1965), 81-121.
- Hunt, Lynn. *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*. Berkley, CA: California University Press, 1984.
- _____. "The Sacred and the French Revolution." In *Durkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies*, ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander, 25-43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

- İçduygu, Ahmet. "Türkiye'de Vatandaşlık Kavramı Üzerine Tartışmaların Arkaplanı" [Background of the Discussions on Citizenship in Turkey]. *Diyalog*. 1/1 (1996), 134-147.
- İçduygu, A., Y. Çolak and N. Soyarı. "What is the Matter with Citizenship? A Turkish Case." *Middle Eastern Studies*. 35/4 (1999), 187-208
- İğdemir, Uluğ. "Atatürk ve Belleten" [Atatürk and Belleten]. *Belleten*. III/10 (1939), 355-356.
- _____. "III. Türk Tarih Kongresi"[Third Turkish History Congress]. *Belleten*. VIII/29 (1944), 1-4.
- _____. *Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Türk Tarih Kurumu* [Turkish History Society in the 50th Anniversary of the Republic]. Ankara: TTK, 1973.
- "İkinci Türk Dil Kurultayı" [The Second Turkish Language Congress]. *Türk Dili*. 8 (September 1934).
- İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi, İstanbul, 20-25 Eylül, 1937, Kongrenin Çalışmaları ve Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler* [The Second Turkish History Congress, İstanbul, 20-25 September, 1937, Works of the Congress and Papers Presented at the Congress]. İstanbul: Kenan Matbaası, 1943.
- İmece, Mustafa Selim, ed. *Atatürk'ün Şapka Devriminde Kastamonu ve İnebolu Seyahatleri, 1925* (Atatürk's Trips to Kastamonu and İnebolu during the Hat Revolution, 1925). Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1959.
- İnalçık, Halil. "The Nature of Traditional Society. Turkey." In *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, eds. R. Ward and D. Rustow. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964.
- _____. *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600*. London: Phoenix, 1973.
- _____. "On the Social Structure of the Empire." In *From Empire and Republic: Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History*. İstanbul: The Isis Press, 1995.
- _____. "Osmanlı Tarihine Bakış." In *Osmanlı*, ed. Güler Eren, 37-132. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 1999.
- İsmail Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu). "Dil" [Language]. *Milliyet*. 16 March 1933, 5. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 149-150.
- İsmet (İnönü). "İsmet Pasha's Address." In *The Turkish Press, 1926-1932*, 147.

- _____. “İnkılap Kürsüsünde İsmet Paşanın Dersi” [İsmet Pasha’s Lecture at the Institute of the Revolution]. *Ülkü*. 14 (April 1934), 81-87.
- İzet Ulvi (Akyurt). “Yeni Türk Harfleri Münasebetiyle” [On the Occasion of New Turkish Letters]. *Türk Yurdu*, XXI/1 (1928), 1-3. In *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı II*, 51-55.
- Jefferson, Thomas. “Civilization, Enlightenment and the New World: Extracts from *Notes on the State of Virginia*.” In *Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization*, eds. J. Rundell and S. Mennell, 61-72. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Jordan, Cynthia S. *Second Stories: The Politics of Language, Form, and Gender in Early American Fiction*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
- Kadıoğlu, Ayşe. “Milletini Arayan Devlet: Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Açmazları” [State Seeking its Own Nation: Paradoxes of Turkish Nationalism]. *Türkiye Günlüğü*. 33 (March-April 1995), 91-100.
- _____. *Cumhuriyet İradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi* [The Will of Republic, the Judgement of Democracy]. İstanbul: Metis, 1999.
- Kafadar, Cemal. “The Visibility of Sufism in Turkish Studies and Cultural Life.” In *The Dervish Lodge: Architecture, Art, and Sufism in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Raymond Lifchez, 307-322. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.
- _____. *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
- Kahraman, Hasan Bülent. “A Journey of Rupture and Conflict: The Culture in Purgatory.” *Privatview*. 1-2/ 4-5 (1997).
- Kantarcıoğlu, Selçuk. *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümet Programlarında Kültür* [Culture in Republic of Turkey’s Government Programs]. Ankara, Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1987.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz. “Gendering the Modern: On Missing Dimensions in the Study of Turkish Modernity.” In *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, 113-132.
- _____. “Identity and its discontents: Women and the Nation.” In *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*, eds. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, 376-391. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993.
- _____. “Women and the Turkish State: Political Actors or Symbolic Pawns?” In *Woman-Nation-State*, eds. N. Y. Davis and F. Anthias. Londra: The Macmillan Press, 1988.

- Kansu, Şevket Aziz. "Antropoloji'nin Tanımı ve Programı Hakkında (1)" [On the Definition and Program of Anthropology]. *Ülkü*. 37 (March 1936), 34-40.
- _____. "Atatürk." *Bellekten*. III/10 (1939), 275.
- Kaplan, Mehmet, and et al., eds. *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı II* [Ideational Life of the Atatürk Period]. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1992.
- _____. "Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Yeni Aydın Tipi" [Mustafa Reşid Pasha and New Type of Intellectual]. In *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Dönemi Semineri* [Seminar on Mustafa Reşid Pasha and his Period]. Ankara: TTK, 1994.
- Kara, İsmail, ed. *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi, Metinler/Kişiler* [Islamist Thought in Turkey, Texts/Persons]. İstanbul: Risale, 1986.
- _____. *İslamcuların Siyasi Görüşleri* [The Political Ideas of the Islamists]. İstanbul: İz Yay., 1994.
- Karal, Enver Ziya. "Atatürk'ün Siyaset Üzerine Düşünceleri" [Atatürk's Views on Politics]. In *Atatürk Hakkında Konferanslar* [Conferences on Atatürk], 37-54. Ankara: TTK, 1946.
- _____. "Atatürk'ün Türk Tarih Tezi" [Atatürk's Turkish History Thesis]. In *Atatürk Hakkında Konferanslar*, 55-65. Ankara: TTK, 1946.
- Karaömerlioğlu, M. Asım. "The People's Houses and the Cult of the Peasant in Turkey." *Middle Eastern Studies*. 34/4 (1998), 67-91.
- _____. "The Village Institutes Experience in Turkey." *British Journal of Middle East Studies*. 25/1 (1998), 47-73.
- Karpat, Kemal. *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to A Multi-Party System*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.
- _____. "The People's Houses in Turkey, Establishment and Growth." *The Middle East Journal*. 17 (1963), 55-67.
- _____. "The Stages of Ottoman History: A Structural and Comparative Approach." In *The Ottoman State and Its Place in the World History*, ed. Kemal Karpat. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974.
- _____. "Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era." In *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, eds. B. Braude and B. Lewis, vol. I, 141-271. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982.

- _____. "The Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East." In *Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East*, eds. M. J. Esman and I. Rabinovich, 35-53. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.
- Kaya, B. Şükrü. "Halkevleri'nin Açılış Konferansı" [Opening Speech of the People's Houses]. *Ülkü*. 61 (March 1938), 1-9.
- _____. "Önsöz" [Preface] to *Spor-Sağlık-Kültür* [Sport-Health-Culture]. Ankara: CHP Yay., 1938.
- Kazancıgil, Ali and Ergun Özbudun, eds. *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*. London: Hurst & Company, 1997
- Kazancıgil, Ali. "The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism." In *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, eds. A. Kazancıgil and E. Özbudun, 37-57.
- Kazım Karabekir. "Latin Harflerini Kabul Edemeyiz" [We Can't Accept Latin Letters]. In *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe Tartışmaları*, 90-93.
- Keane, John. "Nations, Nationalism and Citizens." *ISSJ*, 140 (1994), 170-184.
- Keating, Michael. *Nations against the State*. London: MacMillan, 1996.
- Kedourie, Elie. *Nationalism*, 4th ed. London: Hutchinson, 1985.
- Key, Kerim K. *An Outline of Modern Turkish Historiography*. İstanbul, 1954.
- Kinross, Lord. *Atatürk: The Birth of A Nation*. Nicosia: K. Rustem and Brother, 1984.
- Kirby, Fay. *Türkiye 'de Köy Enstitüleri* [The Village Institutes in Turkey]. Ankara: İmece, 1962.
- Korkmaz, Zeynep, ed. *Atatürk ve Türk Dili: Belgeler* [Atatürk and Turkish Language: Documents]. Ankara: TDK, 1992.
- Korkmaz, Zeynep, ed. *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2: Atatürk Devri Yazarlarının Türk Dili Hakkındaki Görüşleri* [Atatürk and Turkish Language 2: The Atatürk Period's Writers' Views on Turkish Language]. Ankara: TDK, 1997.
- (Koşay), Hamit Zübeyir. "Halk Terbiyesi Vasıtaları" [Vehicles for Taming People]. *Ülkü*. 2 (February 1933), 152-159.
- _____. "The Results of the Excavations Made on the Behalf of the Turkish Historical Society at Alaca Höyük in the Summer of 1936." *Bellekten*. I (1937), 534-542.

- Köprülü, Mehmed Fuad. "Harf Meselesi" [Question of Alphabet]. *Milli Mecmua* (December 1, 1926). In *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe tartışmaları*, 233-236..
- _____. "Dil İnkılabı Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler II" [Some Thoughts on the Language Revolution II]. *Cumhuriyet* (February 8, 1933), 3. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 140-142.
- _____. "Lisanımıza Dair" [On Our Language]. *Hayat*. 51 (1927), 481-482. In *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı II*, 33-37.
- _____. "Alfabe İnkılabı" [Alphabet Revolution]. *Ülkü*. 67 (1938), 1-2.
- Köy Enstitüleri, 1* [The Village Institutes, 1]. İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1941.
- Köymen, Nusret. "Kemalizm ve Politika Bilgisi" [Kemalism and Knowledge of Politics]. *Ülkü*. 41 (July 1936).
- Kuban, Doğan. "Coservation of Historical Heritage during the Republican Era." *Turkish Review*. 2/7 (1987), ??65.
- Kushner, David. *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908*. London: Frank Cass, 1977.
- Küçük, Cevdet. "Osmanlılarda Millet Sistemi" [Millet System in Ottomans], in *Osmanlı* [Ottoman], ed. Güler Eren, vol. IV, 208-216. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 1999.
- Kymlicka, Will. *States, Nations and Cultures*. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1997.
- Kymlicka, Will. "Misunderstanding Nationalism." *Dissent*. (Winter 1995), 130-137.
- Landau, Jacob M. "The First Turkish Language Congress." In *The Earliest Stage of Language Planning: The 'First Congress' Phenomenon*, ed. Joshua A. Fishman. Berlin: Mouton: De Gruyter, 1993.
- "Latin Harflerini Kabul Etmeli mi, Etmemeli mi?" [Whether the Latin Letters Will Be Accepted or Not?]. *Akşam* (March 28, 1926). In *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe Tartışmaları*, 194-232.
- Lehning, James R. *Peasant and French: Cultural Contact in Rural France during the Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Levend, Agah Sırrı. *Türk Dilinde Gelişme ve Sadeleşme Evreleri* [Phases of Development and Purification in Turkish Language], 3rd ed. Ankara: TDK, 1972.
- Levonian, Lootfy, ed. and tran. *The Turkish Press, 1925-1932*. Athens: School of Religion, 1932.

- _____. *The Turkish Press, 1932-1936*. Beirut: The American Press, 1937.
- Lewis, Bernard. "History-writing and National Revival in Turkey." *Middle Eastern Affairs*. (June-July 1953), 218-229.
- _____. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. London: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- _____. "Watan." In *The Impact of Western Nationalisms*, eds. Jehuda Reinharz and George L. Mosse (London: Sage, 1992),
- _____. "The Ottoman Roots of the Turkish Republic." In *The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilization*, vol. III, 221-228.
- Lewis, Geoffrey L. *Modern Turkey*. New York: Preager, 1974.
- _____. "Atatürk's Language Reform and Modernization." In *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, ed. Jacob M. Landau, 195-213. Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.
- Linke, Lilo. *Allah Dethroned: A Journey through Modern Turkey*. London: Constable, 1937.
- Llobera, Josep R. *The God of Modernity: The Development of Nationalism in Western Europe*. Oxford: Berg, 1994.
- Lowenthal, David. "Identity, Heritage, and History." In *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, ed. John R. Gillis, 41-57. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- M. Nermi. "Nermi Bey Diyor ki: "Öz ve Ulu Yol Tutulmuştur!" [Nermi Bey Says: "True and Great Way Held!"]]. *Cumhuriyet*. 1 Ağustos 1930, 3.
- M. Nermi. "Dil Bayramı Yaklaşıyor" [Language Festive Coming]. *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (September 23, 1934), 1-2.
- M. Nermi. "Dil bayramı Yarın" [Tomorrow Language Festive]. *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (September 25, 1934), 1 and 4.
- Mardin, Şerif. *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962.
- _____. "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Transformation." *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 2 (1971).
- _____. *Religion and Social Change in modern Turkey: the Case of Bediuzzaman Saidi Nursi*. New York: State University, 1989.

- _____. "Just and Unjust." *Daedalus*. 120 (1991), 117-129.
- _____. "Patriotism and Nationalism in Turkey." In *Nationality, Patriotism and Nationalism*, ed. Roger Michener, 191-222. St. Paul: Paragon House, 1993.
- _____. "Religion and Secularism in Turkey." In *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, eds. A. Kazancıgil and E. Özbudun, 191-219.
- _____. *Türk Modernleşmesi* [Turkish Modernization]. İstanbul: İletişim, 1997.
- _____. *Türkiye 'de Toplum ve Siyaset* [Society and Politics in Turkey]. İstanbul: İletişim, 1997.
- Martin, D. C. "The Choices of Identity." *Social Identities*. 1/1 (1995), 5-20.
- Mason, Andrew. "Political Community, Liberal-Nationalism, and the Ethics of Assimilation." *Ethics*. 109 (January 1999), 261-286.
- McGuigan, Jim. *Culture and the Public Sphere*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Meadwell, Hudson. "Republics, Nations and Transitions to Modernity." *Nations and Nationalism*. 5/1 (1999), 19-51.
- Mediha Muzaffer. *İnkilabın Ruhu* [The Spirit of the Revolution]. İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1933.
- Mennell, Stephen. *Norbert Elias: Civilization and the Human Self-Image*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.
- Meriç, Cemil. *Umrandan Uygarlığa* [From Umran to Civilization]. İstanbul: İletişim, 1996.
- Miller, Toby. *The Well-Tempered Self: Citizenship, Culture, and the Postmodern Subject*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.
- "Millet Mektepleri Talimatnamesi" [Nation School Statue]. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili: Belgeler*, 84-102.
- Milli Eğitimle İlgili Söylev ve Demeçler* [Speeches and Statements on National Education], vol. 1. Ankara: TDTE Yay., 1946.
- "Milli Şeften Halkevleri'ne Direktifler" [National Chief's Orders on the People's Houses]. *Ülkü*. 75 (May 1939), 195-196.
- Miraç. "Anadolu" [Anatolia]. *Ülkü*. 37 (Mart 1936), 32-33.

- Mitchell, Timothy. "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their Critics." *American Political Science Review*, 85/1 (1991), 77-96.
- Mosse, George L. *The Nationalization of the Masses*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.
- Mommsen, Wolfgang J. *Imperial Germany 1897-1918: Politics, Culture and Society in an Authoritarian State*. London: Arnold, 1995.
- "Mustafa Kemal Pasha' Address on Launching the New Characters." *Vakit* (August 22, 1928). In *The Turkish Press 1925-1932*, 86-87.
- Mustafa Şekip. "Yeni Harflerimize Dair Darü'l-Fünun'da Yapılan Konuşmanın Metni" [On Our New Letters, Text of Speech Delivered at Istanbul University]. *Vakit* (August 22, 1928). In *Türkiye Nasıl Laikleştirildi*, 353-362.
- Münif Paşa. "İmla Meselesi" [Problem of Orthography]. *Mecmua-I Fünun* (July 1863). In *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet Alfabe Tartışmaları*, 25-28.
- Navaro-Yashin, Yael. "Travesty and Truth: Politics of Culture and Fantasies of the State in Turkey." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, January 1998.
- Namık Kemal. "Kıraat ve Islah-ı Huruf Meselesi" [Reading and Alphabet Rreform]. *Hürriyet* (August 23, 1869). In *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe tartışmaları*, 48-59
- Necip Ali. "Kültür ve Medeniyet" [Culture and Civilization]. *Ülkü*. 3 (April 1933), 244-245.
- Necmettin Sadık. "Laiklik Nedir?" [What is Laicism?]. *Ülkü*. 11 (December 1933), 370-377.
- Neşet Ömer (İRdelep). "Kültür İnkılabımız" [Our Culture Revolution]. *Varlık*. 17 (15 March 1934), 257-258.
- Nieguth, Tim. "Beyond Dichotomy: Concepts of the Nation and the Distribution of Membership." *Nations and Nationalism*. 5/2 (1999), 155-173.
- Nomer, Ergin. *Vatandaşlık Hukuku* [Citizenship Law], 9th ed. İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1993.
- Nusret Kemal, "Terbiye Meselesi" [The Issue of Training/Education]. *Ülkü*. 6 (July 1933), 437-436.
- Oakes, Guy. "Translator's Introduction." In *Political Romanticism*, trans. Guy Oakes, ix-xxxv. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986.

- Ortaylı, İlber. "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Millet." *Tanzimat Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, 996-1001. İstanbul: İletişim, 1983.
- _____. *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* [The Longest Century of the Empire], 3rd ed. İstanbul: Hil Yay., 1995.
- "Osmanlıcadan Türkçeye Geçerken Düşünülecek Bir İş: Osmanlı Sözlerini Olduğu Gibi Türkçeye Çevirmekten Çekinelim" [One Thing during Passing from *Osmanlıca* to Turkish: Avoiding to Translate Ottoman Words in Turkish as They Are]. *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*. 6 November 1932, 3. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili* 2, 117-119.
- Outhwaite, William. "Historicism." In *The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought*, 261-262. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
- Ozouf, Mona. *Festivals and the French Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.
- Öksüz, Yusuf Ziya. *Türkçenin Sadeleşme Tarihi Genç Kalemler ve Yeni Lisan Movement* [History of Simplification of Turkish: Young Pens and New Language Movement]. Ankara: TDK, 1995.
- Öymen, Hıfzırahman Raşit. "Köy Eğitimi ve Bize Göre Yeni Köy Pedagojisi" [Village Education and a New Village Pedagogy for Us]. *Varlık*. 82 (December 1936), 146-147.
- Öymen, F. "Atatürk." *Bellekten*. III/10 (1939), 281-283.
- Özbudun, Ergun. "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime." In *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, eds. A. Kazancıgil and E. Özbudun, 79-102.
- Özerdim, Sami N. *Yazı Devrimin Öyküsü* [The Story of Alphabet Revolution]. Ankara: TDK, 1978.
- Öztürkmen, Arzu. "The Role of People's Houses in the Making of National Culture in Turkey." *New Perspectives on Turkey*. 11 (Fall 1994), 159-181.
- Parekh, B. "Ethnocentricity of the Nationalist Discourse." *Nations and Nationalism*. 1/1 (1995), 25-52.
- Patten, Alan. "The Autonomy Argument for Liberal Nationalism." *Nations and Nationalism*. 5/1 (1999), 1-17.
- Peker, Recep. "Halkevleri Açılma Nutku" [The Opening Speech of the People's Houses]. *Ülkü*. 1 (February 1933), 6-8.

- _____. “Recep Peker’in Yeni Halkevlerini Açma Nutku” [Recep Peker’s Opening Speech of New People’s Houses]. *Ülkü*. 37 (March 1936), 1-4.
- _____. “Dersnotları”. In *İlk İnkılap Tarihi Ders Notları*, ed. Oktay Aslanapa, 203-290.
- Perin, Cevdet. *Atatürk Kültür Devrimi* [Atatürk’s Cultural Revolution], 4th ed. İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1987.
- Poulton, Hugh. *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*. London: Hurst and Company, 1997.
- Pratt, John. “Norbert Elias and the Civilized Prison.” *British Journal of Sociology*, 50/2 (June 1999), 271-296.
- Price, M. Philips. *A History of Turkey: From Empire to Republic*. London: G. Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1956.
- Program of the People’s Party of the Republic* (official translation). Ankara: CHF, 1935.
- Pryke, Sam. “Nationalism as Culturalism: A Critique.” *Politics*. 15/1 (1995), 63-70.
- Quotations from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk*, tran. Yılmaz Öz. Ankara: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1982.
- Ragıp Hulusi (Özden). “Düşünceler.” *Öz Dilimize Doğru* (4-15 August 1932), 49-56.
- Ranciére, Jacques. *On the Shores of Politics*, trans. Liz Heron. London and NY: Verso, 1995.
- Ranciére, Jacques. “Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization.” In *The Identity in Question*, ed. John Rajchman, 63-70. New York and London: Routledge, 1995.
- Reed, Howard. “Tanzimat Ne Zaman Başladı ve Bitti? Zamanlaması ile İlgili Görüşler” [When did Tanzimat Begin? The Views on its Taming]. In *Tanzimat’ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu* [International Symposium on the 150th Anniversary of the *Tanzimat*], 21-25. Ankara: Milli Kütüphane Yay., 1991.
- Reşit Galip. “Türk Irkı ve Medeniyet Tarihine Umumi Bir Bakış” [General Outlook on History of Turkish Race and Civilization]. In *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi*, 99-161.
- _____. “Türk Tarih Tezi ve Yabancı Tezler” [Turkish History Thesis and Foreign Theses]. *Ülkü*. 9 (October 1933), 164-177.

- Reşit Saffet (Atabinen). "Milli Tarih" [National History]. In *Türklük ve Türkçülük İzleri* [The Traces of Turkishness and Turkism]. Ankara, 1930. In *Atatürk Dönemi Fikir Hayatı II*, 235-237.
- Revel, Jacques. "Forms of Expertise: Intellectuals and the 'Popular' Culture in France (1650-1800)." In *Understanding Popular Culture, Europe from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Steven L. Kaplan. London: Mouton, 1984.
- Robertson, Ronald. *Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture*. London: Sage, 1992.
- Robins, Kevin. "Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe." In *Questions of Cultural Identities*, eds. S. Hall and P. du Gay, 61-86. London: Sage Publications, 1996.
- Robinson, Richard D. *The First Turkish Republic, A Case Study in National Development*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963.
- Rodrigue, Aron. "Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire." *Stanford Humanities Review*, 5/1 (1995).
- Roth, Guenther. "Introduction." In *Economy and Society*, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, xxxiii-cx. Berkley: University of California Press, 1978.
- Rousseau, J. J. "Discourse on Political Economy." In *Social Contract and Discourses*, trans. G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1975.
- Roy, Larry. "'Fundamentalism', Modernity and the new Jacobins." *Economy and Society*. 28/2 (1999), 198-221.
- Rundell, John and Stephen Mennell. "Introduction: Civilization, Culture and the Human Self-Image." In *Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization*, eds. J. Rundell and S. Mennell, 1-38. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Rustow, Dankwart A. *The Founding of a Nation-State: Atatürk's Historic Achievement*. Ankara: TTK, 1981.
- Rustow, Dankwart A. "Atatürk as an Institution Builder." In, *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, eds. A. Kazancıgil and E. Özbudun, 57-77.
- Sadri Maksudi (Arsal). *Türk Dili İçin*. Ankara: Türk Ocakları İlim ve Sanat Heyeti Yay., 1930.
- _____. "Dil Düzeltme İşinde Yazıcıların Borçları." *Öz Dilimize Doğru*. 19 (19 June 1934), 12.

- Safa, Peyami. *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar* [Perspectives on the Turkish Revolution]. İstanbul, 1938. Reprint. İstanbul: Ötüken, 1993.
- Saffet Arıkan. "Türk Dili Araştırma Kurumunun Bildirği" [The Turkish Language Research Society's Declaration]. *Ulus* (March 26, 1935). In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili* 2, 508-509.
- Said, Bobby. *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentricism and the Emergence of Islamism*. London: Zet Books, 1997.
- Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.
- Said Halim Paşa. "İslamda Siyasi Teşkilatı" [Political Organization in Islam]. In *Türkiye 'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi*, 79-157.
- Saim Ali. "Türk Filolojisi-Türk Dili Bir Hint-Avrupa Dilidir" [Turkish Philology-Turkish Language is an Indo-European Language]. In *Birinci Türk Dil Kurultayı*, 71-81.
- Samih Rifat. "Türkçe Diğer Lisanlar Arasında İrtibatlar" [The Relationship of Turkish with Other Languages]. In *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi*, 60-67.
- Sarı, Kemal. *Büyük Mücadele* [Great Exchange]. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yay., 1995.
- Sarıncay, Yusuf. *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Tarihi Gelişimi ve Türk Ocakları, 1912-1931* [The Historical Development of Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Hearts, 1912-1931]. İstanbul: Ötüken, 1994.
- Schmitt, Carl. *Political Romanticism*, trans. Guy Oakes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986.
- Schudson, Michael. "Culture and the Integration of National Societies." In *The Sociology of Culture*, ed. Diana Crane, 21-43. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.
- Seton-Watson, Hugh. *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1977.
- Shaw, Stanford. "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Azınlıklar Sorunu", *Tanzimat Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, 1002-1006. İstanbul: İletişim, 1983.
- Shaw, Stanford J. "Sultan Abdülhamit II: Last Man of Tanzimat." In *Tanzimat'ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, 199-211.
- Sherril, Charles H. *A Year's Embassy to Mustafa Kemal*. New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934.

- Shorter, Frederic C. "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Nüfus Yapısı ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Değişmeye Etkisi." In *Türkiye'de Sosyal Bilim Araştırmalarının Gelişimi* [The Development of Social Science Researches in Turkey], ed. Sevil Atauz, 339-364. Ankara: Türk Sosyal Bilimler Derneği, 1986.
- Sinanoğlu, Suat. *Türk Hümanizmi* [Turkish Humanism], 2nd ed. Ankara: TTK, 1988.
- Sirer, Reşat Şemsettin. *Klasik Kültürü Tanımının ve Dilleri Öğrenmenin Faydaları* [Benefits of Knowing Classical Culture and Learning Its Languages]. Ankara: TTK, 1942.
- _____. "Halkevlerinin Bugünkü ve Yarınki Vazifeleri" [Today's and Tomorrow's Functions of the People's Houses]. *Ulus*, (February 20, 1944), 2.
- Smith, Anthony D. "State-Making and Nation-Building." In *States in History*, ed. J. A. Hall, 228-263. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
- _____. "Gastronomy or Geology? The Role of Nationalism in the Reconstruction of Nations." *Nations and Nationalism*. 1/1 (1995).
- "Some Extracts from the Address of Mustafa Şekip Bey, Professor of Psychology in the University of Constantinople." *Vakit* (August 22, 1928). In *The Turkish Press 1925-1932*, 87-88.
- Somel, Akşin. "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Türk Kimliği" [Turkish Identity from the Ottoman to the Republic]. In *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik* [Republic, Democracy and Identity], ed. Nuri Bilgin , 71-83. İstanbul: Bağlam, 1997.
- Sorguç, Bahir. *1920'den 1981'e Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı* [The Ministry of National Education from 1920 to 1981]. İstanbul: MEB, 1982.
- Sonyel, R. Salahi. *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire*. Ankara: TTK, 1993.
- Sönmez, Sabaheddin. "Halkevleri Bayramımız" [The People's Houses Festives], *Ulus*, 20 February 1944.
- Söz Derleme Dergisi*. I. İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1939.
- Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustafa Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic*. Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1929.
- Strong, Tracy B. "Introduction: The Self and the Political Order." In *The Self and the Political Order*, ed. Tracy B. Strong, 1-21. New York: NYU Press, 1992.

- Şapolyo, Enver Behnan. "Anadolu'da Kumuklar Tarihi" [History of Kumuks in Anatolia]. *Ülkü*. 31 (September 1935), 66-69.
- Şeref. "Türk Dilidir Osmanlıca Değil" [It Is the Turkish Language, not *Osmanlıca*]. *Milliyet*. 17 August 1934, 4. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 186-187.
- Şimşir, Bilal. *Türk Yazı Devrimi* [Turkish Alphabet Revolution]. Ankara: TDK, 1992.
- T. C. *Hükümet Programlarında Kültür Politikası* [Politics of Culture in T. C. Government Programs]. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1990.
- Tachau, Frank. "Language and Politics: Turkish Language Reform." *Review of Politics*. 26/2 (1964), 191-204.
- Tambini, Damian. "Explaining Monoculturalism: Beyond Gellner's Theory of Nationalism." *Critical Review*. 10/2 (Spring 1996), 251-270.
- Tankut, Hasan Reşit. "Atatürk'ün Dil Çalışmaları" [Atatürk's Language Studies]. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili*. Ankara, 1963.
- Tanrıöver, Hamdullah Suphi. *Seçmeler* [Selections], ed. M. N. Sepetçioğlu. İstanbul: MEB Yay., 1971.
- Taras, Ray. "Nations and Language-Building: Old Theories, Contemporary Cases." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*. 4/3 (Autumn 1998), 79-101.
- Tarih I* [History I]. İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931..
- Tarih II: Ortazamanlar* [History II: Middle Ages]. İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931.
- Tarih III: Yeni ve Yakın Zamanlarda Osmanlı-Türk Tarihi* [History III: Ottoman-Turkish History in Modern Ages]. İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931.
- Tarih IV: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti* [History IV: Republic of Turkey]. İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931.
- Taylor, Charles. *The Ethics of Authenticity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991.
- _____. "Politics of Recognition." In *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition: An Essay by Charles Taylor*, ed. Amy Gutman, 25-73. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.
- Tekin Alp. *La Kamalism*. Paris: Alcan, 1937.
- Tengirşek, Yusuf Kemal. "Türk İnkılabı Dersleri Ekonomik Değişmeler" [Lectures on Turkish Revolution: Economic changes]. In *İlk İnkılap Tarihi Ders Notları*

- [Lecture Notes of the First Revolution History Lectures], ed. Oktay Aslanapa, 291-332.
- Tilly, Charles. "States and Nationalism in Europe, 1492-1992," *Theory and Society*, 23 (1994).
- Tilly, Charles. "The State of Nationalism." *Critical Review*. 10:2 (1996), 299-306.
- (Togan), Zeki Velidi. "Türklerde Hars Buhranı" [Crises of Culture among the Turks]. *Türk Yurdu* (December 1926). In *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe Tartışmaları*, 237-243.
- Trimberger, Ellen Kay. *Revolution From Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1978.
- Trix, Frances. "The Stamboul Alphabet of Shemseddin Sami Bey: Precursor to Turkish Script Reform." *Int. J. of Middle Eastern Studies*. 31 (1999), 255-272.
- Tonguç, İ. Hakkı. "Köy Eğitimi ve Öğretiminin Amaçları" [The Goals of Village Education and Instruction]. In *Köy Enstitüleri: 2* [The Village Institutes, 2], 1-76. Ankara: Maarif Matbaası, 1944.
- Tunaya, Tark Zafer. *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri* [The Movements of Westernization in the Political Life of Turkey]. İstanbul: Yedigün Matbaası, 1960.
- _____. *İslamcılık Cereyanı I* [Islamist Movement I]. İstanbul: Cumhuriyet, 1998.
- Tunçay, Mete. *T. C. 'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923-30)* [The Establishment of the Single Party Regime in T. R.]. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992.
- "Türk Tarih Araştırma Kurumunun Programı" [The Program of the Turkish History Research Society]. *Ülkü*. 31 (September 1935), 8-12.
- "Türk Tarih Kurumu'nun Bir Yıllık Çalışmalarına Ait Rapor" [An One-Year Report about the Works Of the Turkish History Society]. *Bellekten*. VI (1942), 128-136.
- Türk Tarih Kurumu* [Turkish History Society]. Ankara: THS, 1970.
- Türk Tarihinin Anahatları* [Outlines of Turkish History]. İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1930. Reprint. İstanbul: Kaynak, 1996.
- Türk Tarihinin Anahatlarına Methal* [Introduction to The Outline of Turkish History]. İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1932.

- Türköne, Mümtaz'er. *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu*. İstanbul: İletişim, 1994.
- Tyonbee, A. J. "The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement." *Survey of International Affairs*, Part I, 1925.
- Umumi Nüfus Tarihi, 1927* [General Population History, 1927]. Ankara: İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, 1929.
- Üçüncü Türk Dil Kurultayı* [The Third Turkish Language Congress]. İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1937.
- Ülkütaşır, M. Şakir. "Dil Üzerine Atatürk'ten Üç Hatıra" [Three Memoires on Language from Atatürk]. In *Türk Dili İçin* [For the Turkish Language], vol.1, 212. Ankara: T. Kültürü Araş. Enst., 1966.
- Ülkütaşır, M. Şakir. *Atatürk ve Harf Devrimi* [Atatürk and Language Revolution]. Ankara: TDK, 1973.
- Ünal, Kemal. "C. H. P. Beşinci Kurultayı" [The RPP's Fifth Congress]. *Ülkü*. 77 (July 1939), 387-390.
- _____. "Halkodaları" [The People's Rooms]. *Ülkü*. 79 (September 1939), 13-15.
- Ünaydın, Ruşen Eşref. *Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti'nin Kuruluşundan ilk Kurultaya kadar Hatıralar* [Memories from the Foundation of the Turkish Language Research Society to the First Congress], 2nd ed. Ankara: TDK, 1943.
- Üstel, Füsün. *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları, 1912-1931* [Turkish Nationalism from the Empire to the Nation-State: The Turkish Hearts, 1912-1931]. İstanbul: İletişim, 1997.
- Volkan, Vamık D. and Norman Itzkowitz. *The Immortal Atatürk*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984.
- Wacquant, L. J. D. "Positivism." In *Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought*, eds. W. Outhwaite and T. Bottomore, 495-498. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
- Walzer, Michael. "On the Role of Symbolism in Political Thought." In *The Self and the Political Order*, ed. Tracy B. Strong, 64-76. New York: NYU Press, 1992.
- _____. "Nation and Universe." In *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990.
- Warren, Kay B. "Introduction: Revealing Conflicts Across Cultures and Disciplines." In *The Violence Within: Cultural and Political Opposition in Divided Nations*, ed. Kay B. Warren, 1-23. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.

- Weber, Eugen. *Peasants into Frenchman*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.
- _____. *My France: Politics, Culture, Myth*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.
- _____. "What Rough Beast?" *Critical Review*. 10/2 (1996), 285-298.
- Weber, Max. *Economy and Society*, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkley: University of California Press, 1978.
- Webster, Donald Everett. *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation*. Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political And Social Science, 1939.
- Weiker, Walter F. *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and its Aftermath*. Laiden: E. J. Brill, 1973.
- Widmann, Horst. *Atatürk Üniversite Reformu* [Atatürk's University Reform], trasn. A. Kazancıgil and S. Bozkurt. İstanbul: İ. Ü. Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fak., 1981.
- Williams, Raymond. "Culture and Civilization." In, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards. New York: Collier and MacMillian, 1967.
- _____. *The Sociology of Culture*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- Wortham, H. E. *Mustafa Kemal of Turkey*. New York: William Edwin Rudge, 1930.
- Yack, Bernard. "The Myth of the Civic Nation." *Critical Review*. 10/2 (1996), 193-211.
- Yalçın, Hüseyin Cahit. "Latin Hurufu ile Türkçe Yazı Yazmak Mümkün müdür?" [Is It Possible to Write in Turkish with the Latin Letters?]. *Resimli Gazete* (September 22, 1923). In *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe Tartışmaları*, 94-97.
- Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Umumi Yerlerde Türkçe" [Turkish in Public Places]. *Tan* (March 4, 1937). In *Varlık Vergisi ve 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları*, 122-124.
- Yalman, Nur. "Some Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Turkey." *Deдалus*. (1973), 139-168.
- Yaşar Nabi. "Dil Devriminde Ülkü Söz Kıtlığı Değildir" [The Ideal in the Language Revolution Is Not The Scarcity of Words]. *Ulus* (June 14, 1935), 4. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 261.
- _____. "Turizm Meselesi ve Türkiye" [The Question of Tourism and Turkey]. *Ülkü*. 67 (September 1938), 53-64.

- _____. “Halkçılık ve Halk Dili” [Populism and People’s Language]. *Ulus* (May 30, 1938), 2.
- _____. “Halkevleri’nin Dil, Tarih, Edebiyat Youndaki Çalışmaları” [Language, History, Literature Works of the People’s Houses]. *Ülkü*. 73 (March 1939), 44-48.
- Yazı Devriminin 50. Yılı Sergisi* [50th Anniversary of Alphabet Revolution]. Ankara: TTK, 1979.
- Yediyıldız, Bahaeddin. “Osmanlının En Önemli Mirası: Türk Toplumunu” [The Most Important Ottoman Inheritance: Turkish Society]. In *Osmanlı* [Ottoman], ed. Güler Eren, vol. V, 17-33. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 1999.
- Yeğen, Mesut. “Türk Tarih Tezi Bir “Kaza” An’ı mıdır?” [Was the Turkish History Thesis an Accident?]. *Mürekkep*. 6 (1996), 19-24.
- _____. *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu* [Kurdish Question in the State Discourse]. İstanbul: İletişim, 1999.
- “Yeni Türkçe Sözcükler” [New Turkish Words]. *Milliyet*. 1 March 1929, 4. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 70.
- Yıldız, Ahmet. “Search for an Ethno-Secular Delimitation of National Identity in the Kemalist Era.” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Bilkent University, May 1998.
- Yiftachel, Oren. “Nation-Building and the Division of Space: Ashkenazi Domination in the Isreali ‘Ethnocracy’.” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*. 4/3 (1998), 33-58.
- Yorulmaz, Hüseyin, ed. *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe Tartışmaları* [Discussions on Alphabet from the Tanzimat to the Republic]. İstanbul : Kitabevi, 1995.
- _____. “İslah-ı Huruf’tan Tebdil-i Hurufa” [From Reforming Alphabet to Alphabet Change]. In *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe Tartışmaları*, 7-23.
- Yunus Nadi (Abalıoğlu). “Yeni Yazı” [New Alphabet]. *Cumhuriyet* (December 1, 1928), 1. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 7-8.
- _____. “Yazı İnkılabı” [Alphabet Revolution]. *Cumhuriyet* (August 4, 1929), 1. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 11-13.
- _____. “Dilimiz Hakkında” [On Our Language]. *Cumhuriyet* (August 13, 1929), 1. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 14-16.
- _____. “Türk Dili İçin İlk Kurultay” [The First Congress for Turkish Language]. *Cumhuriyet*. 4 September 1932, 1. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 467-468.

- _____. “Dil İnkılabına Dair Bir İki Deyiş” [One or Two Words on Language Revolution]. *Cumhuriyet*. 1 February 1933, 1. In *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 134-135.
- _____. “Türk Dili Türkçeye Doğru” [Toward Turkish, Language of the Turks]. *Cumhuriyet*, 20 February 1933, 1. *Atatürk ve Türk Dili 2*, 144-146.
- _____. “Niçin Dilimizi Düzeltmeye Çalışıyoruz?” [Why We Try to Correct Our Language?]. *Cumhuriyet* (March 3, 1933), 1.
- Yusuf Akçura. “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset” [Three Ways of Politics]. *Türk*, 1904, 24-34. Reprint. *Türkiye Günlüğü*. 31(1994), 9-18.
- _____. “Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi” [First Turkish History Congress]. *Ülkü*. 1 (February 1933), 23-30.
- (Yücel), Hasan Ali. “Dil İnkılabımızın Karakteri” [Characteristics of Our Language Revolution]. *Ülkü*. 22 (November 1933), 255-257.
- _____. “Önsöz” [Preface]. *Tercüme Dergisi*. 1 (1940).
- Zeki Mesut. “İnkılabımız Cihanşü mudür” [Our Revolution is Universal]. *Hakimiyeti Milliye* (March 23, 1934). Reprint, *Ayın Tarihi* (March 1-31, 1934), 75-77.
- Zürcher, Erik Jan. *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984.
- _____. *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991.
- _____. *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris, 1993.
- III. *Türk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara 15-20 Kasım 1943, Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğlere* [III. Turkish History Congress, Ankara 15-20 November 1943, Papers Presented at the Congress]. Ankara: TTK, 1948.
10. İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1933.
- 17inci Yıldönümünde Halkevleri ve Halkodaları [the People’s Houses and the People’s Rooms in the Seventeenth Anniversary]. Ankara, 1949

APPENDIX A

MEDENİYET NE DEMEKTİR?

Medeniyetin ne olduğunu başka başka tarif edenler vardır. Bence medeniyeti harstan ayırmak güçtür ve lüzumsuzdur. Bu nokta-i nazarımı izah için hars ne demektir tarif edeyim:

a. Bir insan cemiyetinin devlet hayatında; b. Fikir hayatında, yani ilimde, içtimaiyatta ve güzel sanatlarda; c. İktisadi hayattta yani ziraatte, zanatta, ticarete, kara, deniz ve hava münakalatçılığında yapabildiği şeylerin hululasıdır.

Bir milletin medeniyeti dendiği zaman hars namı altında saydığımız üç nevi faaliyet muhassalasından hariç ve başka bir şey olamayacağını zannederim. Şüphesiz her insan cemiyetinin hars, yani medeniyet derecesi bir olmaz. Bu farklar devlet, fikir ve iktisadi hayatların her birinde ayrı ayrı göze çarptığı gibi bu fark üçünün muhassalası üzerinde de görülür. Mühim olan muhassalalar üzerindeki farktır. Yüksek bir hars, onun sahibi olan millette kalmaz diğer milletlerde de tesirini gösterir. Büyük kıtalara şamil olur. Belki bu itibarla olacak, bazı milletler yüksek ve şamil harsa, medeniyet diyorlar. Avrupa medeniyeti, asrı hazır medeniyeti gibi.

Hars mefhumunda milletlerin geç ve güç değişen bazı ırki, fitri hasletlerine, karakterlerine hasrederler ve buna çok kıymet ve ehemmiyet verirler. Mesela, İstanbul'un zaptı hadisesini mütala ederken, diyenler vardır ki: Bizanslılar Türklerden daha medeni idiler, fakat Türk'lerin harsı kuvveti olduğu için galip ve muvaffak oldular. Bu telakki ve izah doğru değildir. Hakikatte Türk'ler Bizanslılardan hem daha medeni idiler, hem de ırki karakterleri onlardan yüksekti. Medeniyet dediğimiz harsın, üç mühim unsurunu göz önünde tutarak hadiseyi mütalaa edersek, fikrimiz kolaylıkla izah edilmiş olur:

İstanbul'u zapteden Türk'ler devlet hayatında elbette Bizans İmparatorluğundan çok yüksekti. Türk'lerin İstanbul fethinde inşa ve icadettikleri gemiler, toplar ve her nevi vasıtalar, gösterdikleri yüksek fen iktidarı, bilhassa koca bir donanmayı Dolmabahçe'den Haliç'e kadar karadan nakletmek dehası, daha evvel boğaziçinde inşa ettikleri kaleler, aldıkları tedbirler Bizans'ı zapteden Türk'lerin fikir ve fen aleminde ne kadar ileri olduklarının şahitleridirler. Bizans Prenslерinin Türk ordugahlarında staj yaptıkları, her hususta ders aldıklarını da hatırlatmak isterim. Daha Atilla zamanındaki şarki Roma İmparatorluğunun Türk'lerin haraçgüzarı olacak kadar siyasette ve

askerlikte dun mertebede bulunduđu malumdur. Bizansı zapteden Türklerin iktisadi hayatta Bizanslıların çok ilerisinde olduğunu izaha bile hacet görmüyorum. Hülasa medeniyet harstan başka birşey değildir. Hars medlulünü seciye diyebileceğimiz karakter mefhumuna indirmemelidir. Bu arz ettiğim telakki birbirinden ayırt edilmesi güç olan, medeniyet ve harsın tarif, izah ve anlasılmasında kolaylığı da mucip olur.

Mustafa Kemal (1930).

KÜLTÜR NE DEMEKTİR?

Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin temeli kültürdür. Bu sözü burada ayrıca izaha lüzum görmüyorum. Çünkü bu, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin okullarında birçok vesilelerle eser halinde tespit edilmiştir.

Kültür, okumak, anlamak, görebilmek, görebildiğinden mana çıkarmak, intibah almak, düşünmek, zekayı terbiye etmektir.

Yine insan, enerjisiyle ve fakat tabiatın ona iltifat edildikçe tükenmez yardımıyla, yükselen, genişleyen insan zekası, hudursuz kavrayış anlamında “insanım” diyen bir vasf-ı mahsusu olur.

İnsan hareket ve faaliyetin, yani dinamizmin ifadesidir. Bu böyle olunca kültür, yukarıda işaret ettiğimiz, insanlık vasfında insan olabilmek için bir esasi unsurdur.

Bunu kısaca izah edelim. Kültür, tabiatın yüksek feyizleriyle mesut olmaktır. Bu ifade içinde çok şey mündemiçtir. Temizlik, saflık, yükseklik insanlık vb... bunların hepsi insanlık vasıflarındandır. İşte kültür kelimesini mastar şekline soktuğumuz zaman, tabiatın insanlara verdiği yüksek vasıfları kendi çocuklarına, hafidlerine ve atisine vermesi demektir.

Buraya kadar anlatmak istediğimiz, bugünkü Türkiye Cumhuriyeti çocukları , kültürel insanlardır. Yani hem kendileri kültür sahibidirler, hem de bu hassayı muhitlerine ve bütün Türk milletine yaymakta olduklarına kanidirler.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1936)

Afet İnan, *M. Kemal Atatürk'ten Yazdıklarım*, 48-50

APPENDIX B

OSMANLI
İMPARATORLUĞUNDAN.....

**TÜRKİYE
CÜMHURİYETİNE.**



NASILDI?

NASIL OLDU?

10

DEVLET MATBAASI
İSTANBUL, 1933



Şehzade



Şehzade



Padıřah namzetleri

SARAYLARIN dört duvarı içinde halayıklar ve haremağaları arasında yetişen nazlı efendiler kuş beyinli kalmaga mahkûmdular.

Bunlar daha beşikte iken rütbe ve nişan sahibi olurlar ve sünnet düğünlerinde portakal oğlunun hünerlerine gülerken müşür kılıçları kuşanırlar ve murassa nişanlarla bezenirlerdi. Bıyıkları terlemeğe başlayınca da hayatın manasını odalıklar, halayıklar, saraylılar ve gözdeleler arasında aramaga koyulurlardı.



Harenağ

Örümcekleli kafa!

Örümcekleli kafa, Osmanlı vatandaşının kafasıdır. Bu kafanın içinde iki kocaman örümcek otururdu. İslâm taassubu ve garp hayranlığı:

Fetva Örnekleri:

Mesele — Müslüm müsün denilâdikte zekerini gösteren kimsseye ne lâzımgelir?

Elcevap — Eger sünnetli idüğü için öyle etti ise küfrüne hükmolunmaz.



Mesele — Zeyt, muallim yahudiler müslümanlardan hayırlıdır, çünkü çocuklarının muallim haklarını verirler dese ne lâzımgelir?

Elcevap — Küfürdür.



Mesele — Kızılbaş taifesinin şer'an kıtallı halâl olup, katleden gazi ve kızılbaş taifesinin ellerinden maktul olanlar şehit olurlar mı?

Elcevap — Olurlar, gazayı ekber ve şehadeti azimedir.



Mesele — Zeydi müslüm kâfir dilince zaruretsiz tekellüm eylese nikâhına zarar olur mu?

Elcevap — Zararı mahzûd. Küfrüne hükmolunup avretî tefrik olunmaz. Tazirî şedit ve zecrolunur.



Mesele — Musavver aynanın beyü şirasından olan kisb, halâl olur mu?

Elcevap — Halâl ve tayyip değıldir.



Mesele — Deva için birkaç kadeh hamr içmek halâldir deyene ne lâzımgelir?

Elcevap — Tecdidî iman lâzımdır.



Mesele — Zeyt, bigayri zaruretin başına yahudi şapkasını giyse şer'an zeyde ne lâzımgelir?

Elcevap — Küfür lâzımgelir.

20

Ümmet leşi

TAASSUP örümceğinin ördüğü ağlar, milleti daima ahirete bağladı. Türk cemiyeti şeriatin, mecellenin ve fetvanın taşlaşmış kalıpları içinde hapsolünürdü.

Bu teokratik nizam kendini devam ettirmek ve insanların kendi ihtiyaçlarına göre yetiştirebilmek için bütün müesseselerini de kurmuştu.

Meselâ, kabinede dünya işlerini temsil eden sadrazamın yanibaşında daima ahiret işlerini temsil eden kellifelli bir şeyhülislâm yer alırdı.



Osmanlı cemiyetinin ahiret işleri sadrazamı!

İşıklı kafa!

İnkılâp Türkiyesinin insanı, ışıklı bir kafa taşıır.

Bu kafada hiçbir yabancı hayatı telâkki tarzına yer yoktur.

Bu kafayı işleten motör, inkılâbın yüksek menfaatleridir.


Bu kafa, müstakil bir kafadır. Her hâdiseyi inkılâbın zaruretlerine göre tahlil ve terkip eder ve her karara inkılâbın prensiplerine göre varır.

MİLLET DİRLİĞİ

Cümhuriyet Türkiyesinde vatandaşın hayatı milletin istiklâline, milletin menfaatlerine, milletin dirliğine bağlanmıştır.

Cümhuriyet Türkiyesinin cemiyeti lâik bir cemiyettir.

Fakat bu lâiklik sadece din ve dünya işleri arasında Fransada olduğu gibi, bir mütareke manasını ifade etmez. Yani passif bir



Yeni rejimde karşılığı yoktur!

lâiklik değildir. Türk lâikliği hayatın, yani milletin menfaatlerini ve dirliğini her şeye hâkim kılan aktif bir telâkkisidir.



İnkılâp hükümetlerinde başvekil, milletin yüksek hayati menfaatleri namına olan iktidarı, hiçbir ahiret ve ukba mümessili ile paylaşmaz.

“Tarihimizi okuyunuz, görürsünüz ki milleti mahveden, esir eden harap eden fenalıklar, hep din kisvesi altındaki küfür ve mela'netten gelmiştir..”

Gazi

“Köhne zihniyetlerle, maziperstlikle muhafazai mevcudiyet mümkün değildir..”

Gazi



“Din telâkkisi vicdanî olduğundan, Fırka, din fikirlerini devlet ve dünya işlerinden ve siyasetten ayrı tutmayı, milletimizin muasır terakkide başlıca muvaffakiyet amili görür..”

Cümhuriyet Halk Fırkası programından

Ummet Maarifi

OSMANLI İmparatorluğunun içtimai bunvesindeki ikilik ve tezatlilik (şark ve garp) maarifinde de yaşıyordu.

Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun maarifi bir taraftan teokrasinin isteklerine cevap vermek lüzumunu duyarken, diğer taraftan garbi sadece taklit etmek, yani garp ilmini olduğu gibi ithal etmekle milleti terakkiye götüreceğini sanıyordu.

Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda iki tip mektep vardı:

Din mektepleri ve dünya mektepleri.

Fakat dünya mekteplerindeki tedrisatta da teokratik terbiye esastı.

Bu terbiye, Türk cemiyetine ruh ve fikir bakımından ikiye bölünmüş insanlar veriyordu.


Mesela, bir idadi talebesi bir taraftan hikmet, kimya, jeolojya gibi müspet tabiat ilimleriyle kâinatın oluşunu ve seyrini öğrenirken, diğer taraftan aynı mektepte ve aynı sınıfta tabiatın 1300 sene evvelki bir ukba görüşüne göre izahına inanmak mecburiyetinde bırakılırdı.

Osmanlı maarifinde mektep, çocuğun kafasına bir takım basmakalıp nazariyeler dolduran bir müessesesi idi.

Çocukta müstakil araştırma, tahlil ve terkip yapma kabiliyetleri büyük bir meharetle öldürülürdü.

Mektepte en muvaffak olan çocuk, hafızası en kuvvetli olan bir ezber makinesidi.

Mektep mi?




Çocuk kümesi mi?

ESKİ MEKTEP:



Bir hapisaneden farkı var mı?

Türk, anasını böyle bırakabilir mi?



Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda kadın, kümes hayvanı telâkki olunurdu. Peçenin ve kafesin arkasında hapsedilir ve Allahın huzuruna bile (camilerde) ancak kayıt ve şartla çıkabilirdi.

Cemiyette onun yeri daima erkeğinkinden ayrılmıştı.

Mahal'ebici dükkânında, tramvayda, tiyatrodâ, hulâsa hayatta o, tecrit edilmiş ve cinsi ihtilâçlarına teslim olmuş bir mahlûktu.


Bu zihniyet, onu mektepte de bulmuştu.

Esasen kadının tahsil görmesi lüzumsuz ve hatta zararlı sayılırdı.

Millet Maarifi

Millî terbiye ile inkişaf ve ilâ edilmek istenilen genç dimağları bir taraftan da paslandırıcı, uyuşturucu, hayalî zevaitle doldurmaktan dikkatle içtinap etmek lâzımdır.

Gazi



Görerek ve anlıyarak öğrenmek

İNKILÂP Türkiyesinin içtimai bünyesindeki birlik ve tezatsızlık maarif siyasetinde de hâkimdir. Teokratik nizâmı, devlet telâkkisinin dışına atan Cümhuriyet rejimi kendisine has maarif sistemini de yarattı. Tevhidi tedrisat prensibinin kabulü ile Türk cemiyetinin lâik esası maarifte de ifadesini buldu.

Böylelikle vahdetli bir terbiye vermek ve Türk insanının ruhunu ve kafasını ikiye bölünmekten kurtarmak imkânı doğdu.

İnkılâp Türkiyesi, vatandaşları cinslerine göre kıymetlendirmek gibi patalojik bir illetle malûl değildir.

Cümhuriyet Türkiyesinde kadın vatandaş, hayatın bütün cephelerinde erkek vatandaşın yoldaşı tanınmıştır.

Avrupanın daha birçok memleketlerinde tatbik edilemeyen muhtelit tedrisat usulü, Türk inkılâbının daha ilk anında tahakkuk ettirdiği fütuhattan biridir.

Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanunundan :

1 — Türkiye dahilindeki bütün müessesatı ilmiye ve tedrisiye Maarif Vekâletine merbutur.

2 — Şer'îye, Evkaf Vekâleti veya hususî vakıflar tarafından idare olunan bilcümle medrese ve mektepler Maarif Vekâletine devir ve raptedilmiştir.



Eli ve kafayı işleterek öğretmek...

İnkılâp maarifinde mektep, çocuğa bütün hayat ve meslek bilgilerinde lâzım olan tecrübeleri, ölçüleri ve metotları veren bir müessesedir. Onda gaye tufeyli ezberciler, ukalâ nazariyeciler yetiştirmek değil, cemiyet için faydalı, faal ve yaratıcı unsurları çoğaltmaktır. Tedrisatta iş prensibi, maarifimizin ana vasıtalarından biridir.

NASILDI?

TEOKRASI hayatın yalnız manalarının değil, şekillerinin de ardında kalmıştı. Onun için herhangi bir yeni manaya geçmek kadar, yeni bir şekli kabul etmek te küfürle birdi.


Meselâ : Namahrem olan kadını herhangi bir arkadaşına gösteren bir insan büyük günah işlemiş sayılırdı. Gusül makbul olmadığı için diş dolduran keza. Ramazanda oruç bozan keza.

Dişini diş fırçasile temizliyen keza.

Ve bunun gibi. Fesin nereden geldiğini bilmediği halde fes ve sarıktan gayrı bir başlığı bir küfür alâmeti sayardı.

Mevlevinin sikkesi bile sofu müslümanın gözünde bir nevi zındıklık alâmeti idi.

Bu iğrenç ve kötürüm zihniyet, Türk cemiyetinin zahiri manzarasını da müzelik bir hale sokmuştu.



Durgun

(ANLI!



İNKILÂP Türkiye'si, Türk cemiyetini içinden olduğu gibi, dışından da hayat akışının en ileri icaplarına uydurdu.

Bununla beraber fesin yerine şapkanın getirilişi, Tanzimat Devrinde olduğu gibi bir kıyafet merakından ilerigelmemiştir.

Bazı mütereddit ağızlar şapka meselesini (medenî serpuş) tekerlemesi sayesinde hoş göstermeğe çalışırken, Gazi Kastamonuya giderek oradaki halkın karşısında şapkasını başına giymiş ve demiştir ki:



Foto: Cemal



HAREKETLİ!

"Buna medenî serpuş filân demezler. Bunun adı şapkadır. Ve bu, işte, böylece giyilir. Çünkü gayet rahattır.."

Gazi, bu sözlerle fesin yerine konan şapkanın, kafa kıyafetinin değiştiğine değil; eski kafanın içinde bütün bir zihniyetin yıkıldığına delâlet ettiğini anlatmıştır.

Bu itibarla şapka inkılâbı, kafaların içinde yapılan bir inkılâbın remzidir.

Ariyet fikir Ariyet kültür

Osmanlı cemiyeti iki çeşit sohta yetiştirdi
Biri, şeriatçı sohta, diğeri, Avrupacı sohtadır.
Bunların ikisinde de milletin şahsiyet ve asaletini koruma ve onun namına şahsiyetli ve asliyetli bir fikir ve kültür yaratma hassası yoktur. İkisi de yabancı âlemlerin esiridiler. Bu esareti bir şeref ve milletin benliğini ve özluğunu yadırgamayı da bir meziyet sayarlardı.
Yukarıda teşrih masasına yatırdığımız teokrasî mahsulü olan şeriatçı sohtayı bir kenara bırakırsak, Avrupacı sohtanın ayırt edici vasıflarını şöylece sıralayabiliriz:

Hiçbir millet, diğer bir milletin yaptığı usulleri telâkki ve taklit etmek cihetini iltizam etmemelidir.

Gazi

Bin yarım adam bir tam adam değildir;
Siyasette ve idarede en muzır şey, milletler ve cemiyetler için telâfisi en zor olan felâket, yarım bilgili adamların salâhiyet sahibi olmasıdır.

İsmet Paşa

•

Avrupa hayranlığı:

Her iyi, her doğru, her güzel Avrupalı olandır.
Ve bunlar irişilmez birer mazhariyettir.
Osmanlı münevverinin indinde Türk milleti en kabiliyetsiz bir ekalliyetten de aşağılık bir kalabalıktır.

•

Taklitçilik:

Hangi diyardan olursa olsun, yeter ki Avrupalı olsun.

•

Sathilik:

İlmin ve ihtisâsın kaynaklarına giderek derinleşmeğe lüzum yoktur. Altında Avrupa damgası olmak şartile Osmanlı ülkesinde her iddia ilmin kendisi gibi geçer. Çünkü bir ilim an'anesi ve bir ilim ahlâkı teessüs etmemiştir.

•

Kendi milletini tanınamazlık:

Osmanlı münevveri İstanbul saksısında yetişen bir kozmopolittir.
Onun için Türkiye, uçsuz bucaksız ve hiç cazip olmayan bir meçhuldür.

•

Bu vasıflarla bekelenmiş bir Osmanlı münevverinin kendi milletile ve kendi memleketile göbek bağı kesilmiş ve köksüzleşmiş olması tabii'dir.
Bu itibarla o, millet ve memleket hesabına yabancıya karşı her türlü tavizi yapmaktan çekinmez.

Öz fikir Öz kültür

İnkılâp' Türkiye'sinde her münevver için asıl olan, kendi milletine ve kendi memleketine inanmak ve kendi talihini bunların talihine bağlamaktır.

İnkılâpçı Türk münevveri için medeniyet taklit olunacak bir şey değildir.

Medeniyet, yerinde yapılan, yerinde yaratılan bir cemiyet eseridir.

Avrupa medeniyetine iltihak veya intibak diye bir şey yoktur.

Hangi devirde bulunursa bulunsun o devrin medeniyetine has olan ileri kıymetleri ve bu kıymetleri yaratan ileri metotları idrak edip kendi medeniyetini yaratmak vardır. Taklit edilecek bir örnek yahut iltihal olunacak birtakım müesseseler yoktur.

İdrak edilip alınacak ve kendi ihtiyaç ve zaruretlerimize göre tatbik sahasına geçirilecek metotlar vardır.

İnkılâpçı Türk münevverinin ayırt edici vasıflarını şöylece sıralıyabiliriz:



Millete inanmak:

İyi, doğru ve güzel, Türk dehasının da bir ifadesidir. İnkılâpçı Türk münevveri, milletine sevgi ve inanla doludur.



Yaratıcılık:

Türk medeniyetinin yaratıcısı, yalnız Türk kafasıdır.



Derinlik:

Yaratıcı olmanın şartı, bilgi ve ihtisasta derine gitmektir.



Memleketçilik:

İnkılâpçı Türk münevverinin indinde memleketin her parçası mukaddesdir. Ve tanınmaya, anlaşılmaya ve sevilmeğe değer bir kıymettir.

Memleketi yeniden kurmak işi, onu ancak çok yakından ve çok derinden tanımakla kabildir.



Bu vasıflarla bezenmiş bir inkılâpçı münevverin memleket ve millet sevgisi sadece coşgun bir duygu işi değil, aynı zamanda hesaplı ve bilgili bir şuur hâdisesidir.

Bu itibarla o, memleketin ve milletin üstüne titrer ve bu uğurda yapılabilecek en büyük fedakârlıkları bile en tabii bir vazife bilir.

Bilelim ki, millî benliğini bilmeyen milletler, başka milletlerle çıkârdır.

Gazi



İhtisim halkımız çok temiz kalpli, çok asil ruhlu, terakkiye çok kabiliyetli bir halktır. Bu halk, eğer bir defa muhataplarına samimiyetle kendilerine bâdim olduklarına kani olursa her türlü bareketi derhal kabule amadedir. Bunun için gençlerle, her şeyden evvel millete emniyet bahşetmesi lâzımdır.

Gazi



Büyük şeyleri, yalnız büyük milletler yapar.

Gazi

Osmanlıca

OSMANLI münavevlerinin dili yalnız filler ve edatlarla tevcellimmiş bir sürtü Arap ve Acem kelimelerinden ibaretti.

Türkçe kendi meclisinde evinden kovulmuş ve bir otele sığınmış bir yabancı gibiydi.

Arap ve Acem dilleri Türkçenin evini yalnız kelimeleri ile değil, kaideleleri ile de basmışlardı.

Böyle bir iğreti dilde yazılan yazıların da küçük bir Osmanlı münaveveri zümresinin ihtiyacı halinde kalması mukadderdi.

Osmanlı cemiyetinin edebiyat ve sanat havatı da kendisi gibi sun'i ve iğreti idi. Uzun bir müddet Arap ve Acem tesirleri altında Divan Edebiyatının tasannularında otladıktan sonra, Tanzimat ile beraber kendisini garbin fikir ve görüş boyunduruğuna kapırdı.

Edebiyatta da, bütün öteki sahalarda olduğu gibi, gayet sathi bir taklitçilik alıp yürünmüştür.

Edebiyatı Cedide bunun en göze batan örneklerini vermiştir:

Osmanlı kafası gibi

Senin vesin gibi bir aksınatı ruhnüvaz
Bir in'ikâsı niyaz
Gecenin sinei ulâlıtından
Süzülüp, dağlara, sahabelere teraneler serper.
O dem ki bülbülü şeyda sanevberanı terin
Şu mavi gölgelerin
Şebi amakı pürhayaından
Güşü ruhu levalı bihabere
neşidele kövler.
Hüseyin Suat

Osmanlılığın herbiri bir nümunei fazaili ahlâki sayılmağa ispatı kemali istihkak etmiş olan askerimizin askerliğe ait meziyatı meşhuresi muharebe ahirede uyunu âlemiyane daha şaşaalı, daha vazih bir surette tecellisaz olduğundan dünyanın elbinei takdiri, aklamı sitayışı bu meziyatı âliyeden lüzumu kadar bahsettiler ki, tekrarı malûmu ilâm kabûinden ve binaenaleyh abes olur.

Recâizade Mahmut Ekrem

Tatlı, hafif bir tebessüm ince dudaklarını açtı, şu handei melekâneyi derince bir nefes takip etti. Yedi kudretin en mükemmel bir nümunei san'ati olan başını bir tacı zerrin gibi tezyin eden saçlarında seri seyyalâtı ihtizaz cereyan etti; şiir ile ulviyetten mürekkep bir âlemi ruhaniye nazır olan gözlerini setreden perdeler kemali bataatle kalkarak bir çift mavi göz arzetti. Bu gözler, pişigâhında bağteten açılan âlemi hakikatten tahaşi ile mümtaziç taaccüp alâimi izhar ediyordu: genç kız uyandı..

Uşakizade Halit Ziya

Desünöz ey semayı şita tude tudedir.
Bekir şeman, cenahı kebuter, sahabı ter...
Çok ey şema- revanı tabiat gunuðedir; -
Haki şivâhın üstüne safi şükûfeler.

Ner şahsar emdi - ne bir yaprak ne bir çiçek -
Bir tudei şahi şehrengü naümit
Ey desti usmanü şita, örma örma çek
Her şahsarın üstüne bir sütrei sefit.

Cenap Şahabettin

İktisat bir ilimdir, müruru saman ve tetabüü tecrübe ve ezman ile emsalı sabite ve düsturati sahibaya istinaden tertibü tedvin olunmuştur.

Esası, cemiyeti beşeriyein maddii maddiyelerini idare eden kavanini tabiiyeyi tahkik ve emsali beşeriyein istihsali havayiş emrindeki mesalimü ve ziyade semeredar eden tariki marifeti irae ile husulü rehbü saadetine delâlet etmektir. Biliriz ki beni âdem mazharı tecrübe kudret bir vücudu zikuvettir, fakat bu sahai gabraya ihtiyacı ile tev'em gelir.

Hikmet
(Meclis Kebiri Maarif Azasından)

Türke yabancıydı!

Türkçe:

İnkılâp, Türk dilinin de, Türk milletinin olduğu gibi, kayıtsız ve şartsız istiklâlini ilân etmiştir.

Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun son yıllarında Türk dilinin kurtuluşu namına düşünülmüş çare, sadece kaide'leri Türkçeleştirmekten ibaretti.

Gazinin yüksek reisliği altında toplanan Dil Kurultayı davayı geniş bir dil inkılâbı halinde ortaya atmıştır.

Artık Türk dili davası bir Türk rönesans an'anelerinden biri olmuştur. Şimdi Türk dili kelimelerile, sarf ve nahvi, kısaca bütün bünyesile yeniden inşa olunan içtimalî bir müessesedir.

Bu büyük davanın olgunlaşmasına millet içinde bir seferberlik manzarası veren yeni dil hareketi, Gazinin kendi ehle idare ettiği bütün davalar gibi, milletin en derin kaynaklarında kuvvetler ve hamleler uyandıran bir inkılâp manası taşımaktadır.

Bu artık bir dil reformu değildir. Bu, bir dil inkılâbıdır.

Bu hareket yemişlerini şimdiden vermeğe başladı.

İnkılâp Türkiyesinin edebiyatı, milletin içtimalî örgüsünü aksettirmeğe ve köklerini memlekete bağlamağa doğru giden canlı bir harekettir.

Cihan edebiyatına orijinal bir Türk edebiyatı katmak şerefi inkılâp san'atkârına nasip olacaktır.

"Aşk,, diye ne bir Tanrı adına varacağız
Ne gözleri yeşil bir kadına varacağız.
Ergenliğin düşünüyü gören genç adam gibi
Toprağı alttetenin tadına varacağız.

Behçet Kemal.

Türkiye nasıl zenginleşir ?

Bu suale cevap vermek için düşünüyorum: gözümlün önüne zenginleşecek güzel yurdum geliyor. Cennet gibi ovalar, şen, mes'ut yuvalar, parlak mavi gökünü fabrika dumanlarından bulutlar kaplamış şehirler, şen şarkılarla çalkanan güzel evli köyler.

Bu hayali hakikat yapmak yoluna büyük öncümüzün işaretile girdik. İkinci hedef: İktisat. Şu saydıklarımı hepimiz yapacağız. Yurdumuzun mallarını, milli mallarımızı kullanacağız. Ham madde yetşitiren memleketimiz sanayi yuvası olacak, çiftçinin eline para girecek, işsizlik, sefalet kalkacak. Ziraat yeni aletlerle daha geniş yapılacaktır. Kasabalarda, yerine göre dokuma tezgâhları, iş yuvaları, konserve fabrikaları kurulacaktır.

Behire

Ankara Ticaret Lisesi talebesi

Gözlerimde parıltısı bakır bir tasın
Kulaklarım komşuların ayak sesinde.
Varsın bana bir yudum su veren olmasın
Bağ ucumdan biri bana su yok desin de.
Kemalettin Kümi.

Türkçe örnekler:

Tek mektep dokuz yaşındadır.

Arap harfi bilmiyen okumuş çocukların sayısı 400,000 - i geçti.

Dolaba attığımız son feslerin kırmızı çuhaları ve kara püskülleri çürüdü.

Tecvit ve şedde, Acem terkipleri ve Arap bapları, eski şark işlemelerine döndü.

Son medreselinin saçı ağardı.

Bizim bütün gençliğimizce süren kavganın adı, eski-yeni kavgası oldu. Bu ad yanlış konmuştur. Bu kavganın asıl doğru adı eski ve yeni değil, iki medeniyet, iki kültür, iki çağ kavgasıdır. Bizim ismimiz gâvur, karşımızdakilerin ismi mürteci idi: Haç ve hilâl gibi çarpışıyorduk.

Fatih Rifki.

"Yaban,, dan :

Geçen gün bir cephanenin cepheye nasıl taşındığını gördüm. Uzun bir kağıt kafilesi, ah, ne bazındı. bu kağıt kafilesi... Gıcır, gıcır... Ve sıksa mandaların kalça kemikleri o kadar sıvırmıştı ki, yer yer derilerini delmişti. Bu deliklerin üstünde sineklerin yüzü kalkıp yüzü oturuyor. Kafileyi sevkeden insanlar ise bu sineklerin azmanı gibidir. Ne şekilleri insan şekline, ne yürüyüşleri insan yürüyüşüne, ne sesleri insan sesine benzer. Bu iki direk iki tekerlekten ibaret arabalar sanki onların gövdelerinin bir ekidir. Bunların içinde yatarlar. Yatakları, yorganları, yiyecek ve içecekleri bunların içindedir. Kaplumbağanın kabuğu belki kaplumbağadan ayrılabilir, fakat, bu arabaları bu adamlardan ayırmanın imkânı yoktur.

Yakup Kadri.

NASILDI?

Osmanlının Tarih Telâkkisi:

OSMANLININ tarih telâkkisi üçe bölünmüştür.

Osmanlı tarihi.

İslâm tarihi.

Umumi tarih (Abdülhamidin son devirlerinde mekteplerde okutulması yasak edilmişti).

Osmanlı tarihi, Osmanogullarının bir aile masalından ibaretti. Türk milletinin varlığından Osman oğullarının tarih sahnesine çıkması dolayısıyla haber verildi.

Türk milletinin varlığı, Osmanlı tarihinin başlangıcına arızı olarak karıştığı gibi, bu tarihin bütün seyri müddetince de arızı olmaktan kurtulmamıştır.

Türklük bu tarih telâkkisi indinde gizlenmesi, unutulup bir kenara bırakılması icap eden bir mefhumdu. Ve bunun üzerinde durmak Osmanlılık için adeta bir tehlike sayılırdı.



İslâm tarihi, Osmanlı cemiyetinin teokarasiye verdiği mevki dolayısıyla mühim sayılırdı. Baştan aşağı araplara ve Araplığa ait olan bu tarihin mukaddemesi ise "Kıyası Embiya,, idi. O "Kıyası Embiya,, ki, Yahudi peygamberlerinin masallarından başka bir şey değildir.

Umumi tarih, insanlık tarihinin ancak bir faslıdır. Ondan evvelki kısımlara Avrupalılar "Tarih ötesi,, adını vermişlerdir. Buna sebep te tarihin Avrupalılara göre telâkkisinde, ona, Avrupalıların ırkı faikiyetlerine göre bir hareket noktası ve Avrupalının tahakküm siyasetine göre bir mühür verilmesidir.

Osmanlı cemiyetinin "Umumi tarih,, adı altında okuttuğu şeyler, gerek hareket noktası, gerekse verdiği hükümler bakımından tamamile gayri ilmi ve keyfi olan bir "Avrupalılık,, tarihidir. Görülüyor ki, Osmanlılığın tarih telâkkisi hem bölüm pörçük hem de gayriilmi idi ve Türklük ile hiçbir alakası yoktu.



İnkılâpçı Türkün Tarih Telâkkisi:

İNKILAP Türkiyesinin tarih telâkkisi, hareket noktası olarak Türk milletinin tarih sahnesine çıkışını, mihver ve varış noktası olarak ta büyük milletin insanlık tarihinde oynadığı ve oynamakta olduğu medeniyet rolünü almıştır.

Yeni tarih telâkkimiz, bizi milletimizin öz kaynaklarına götüren ve onun cihan içindeki seyrini anlatan ışıklı bir kavrayıştır.

Bize, Türk tarihile insanlık tarihinin birbirleriyle olan karşılıklı ve içli dışlı münasebetlerini bir bütünlük halinde verir.

Osmanlı tarihi, islâm tarihi, araplılık tarihi v. s., v. s. Türk tarihinin içine ancak dolayısıyla alınmış birtakım fasıllardır.

Yeni Türk tarihi, bizi bize Avrupalıların istedikleri ve işlerine geldiği gibi değil, tarihî hakikatin gösterdiği gibi anlatmaktadır. Yani Türk tarihinin en büyük vasfı herşeyden önce "ilmî,, oluşudur.

Bu Yeni telâkki, Türk milletinin başta gelen mevkiini geriye doğru olduğu gibi ileriye doğru da gösteren bir esastır.

Yeni telâkkiye göre, Türk milleti onbinlerce senelik bir medeniyet ve tarih devresinin mirasçısı oluyor. Ve bütün bu devir içinde göstermiş ve insanlık tarihine hediye etmiş olduğu eserleri tevsik için büyük bir tarihî tetkik davasının karşısına getirilmiş oluyor.


Büyük Gazinin eseri olan yeni tarih telâkkisi, tıpkı dil davası gibi, manen ve maddeten milletçe bir seferbirliğin manzarasını almış ve ardı gelmiyen arkeoloji ve tarih tetkikatının anahtarı olmuştur.



Bu davanın bir güzel tarafı da, kendisine muvazi olarak ilerliyen dil işine doğrudan doğruya bağlı olması ve Türk milletinin tarih içinde yeniden uyanışını ve kendi benliğine kavuşmasını müjdelemesidir.

Bir Türk arkeolojisile, bir Türk filolojisinin bu kadar özlü ve köklü bir surette ortaya konuşu, bu iki harekete yeni bir Türk rönesansının kıymet ve şumulünü vermiştir.

Osmanlı



OSMANLI cemiyetinde kadın, sadece bir dişi idi.

Kadına yalnız fizyolojik bir rol verildiği için, onun cemiyet içinde başka türlü kıymetler edinmesine cevaz yoktu.

Kara bir taassup, onu evinin içine tıkamişti.

Ve kadının cahil, görgüsüz kalması, islâm ahlâkının tutunabilmesi için şarttı.

Basit bir çadır ve çöl hayatının insanların ahlâkını gemalında tutabilmek için lüzumlu gördüğü içtimai tedbirler, sarsılmaz naslar halinde inkılâba kadar sürüp gelmiş ve cemiyeti kadından ayırarak kuvvetini yarı yarıya düşürmüştü.

Osmanlı cemiyetinin ahlâk mefhumu, bizzat ahlâka karşı itimatsızlıktan başka bir şey değildi.

Cemiyetinde

K
A
D
I
N

İNKILÂP TÜRKİYESİNDE KADIN

İNKILÂP Türkiye'sinde kadın erkeğin dengi tanınmış tam hukuklu bir insandır.

Bizim kadınlık davamız, Avrupadaki feminizmin semtine bile ugramamıştır. Bazı en medenî Avrupa memleketlerinde bile hâlâ tahakkuku için uğraşan kadın haklarını, Türk kadını toptan elde etmiştir. Bizdeki kadınlık davası, Avrupa feminizminden şu itibarla daha derin ve şümüllüdür ki, oradaki kadın birtakım siyasi fırkaların intihabat dalaverelerine alet telâkki olunmuş, bizde ise kadının kurtuluşu bir insanlık ve bir millet davası olarak tahakkuk ettirilmiştir. İslâm cemiyetinde, cinsi ahlâk, peçe, çarşaf, kafes, harem, selâmlık gibi birtakım ihtiyat tedbirlerine havale edilmişken, Yeni Türk Cemiyetinde kadınlık erkeğin şuurlarından gelen faziletlerine bırakılmıştır. Bu itibarla bizde kadının azatlığı doğrudan doğruya ahlâk mefhumunun azatlığını ifade eder.

"Anaların bugünkü evlâtlarına vereceği terbiye eski devirlerdeki gibi basit değildir. Bugünün anaları için evsafı lâzımlı huiz, evlât yetiştirmek, evlâtlarını bugünkü hayat için faal bir uzuv haline koymak pek çok yüksek evsafın hâmil olmağa mütevakıftır. Binnensaleyh kadınlarımızı; hatta erkeklerimizden çok münevver, daha çok feyizli, daha fazla bilgili olmağa mecburdurları; eğer hakikaten milletin anası olmak istiyorlarsa..."

Gazi

KADIN HAYAT VE İŞ




Foto Cerral

ARKADAŞIMIZDIR!

APPENDIX C



KÜLTÜR İNKİLÂBIMIZ

MEHMET SAFFET

“EĞER bir vatandaş yalnız birini yap- saydı namına millet hafızasında onu ebediyen yaşatacak tunçtan bir hey- kel dikmeğe değerdî.

Ya bir vatandaş bunların hepsini yaparsa ona ne yapmalı? Onun en büyük mükâfatı bütün milletin nesil- den nesle geçen ebedî bir şükran ve muhabbet duygusunu kazanmış olma- sıdır.,,

Evet onlardır, onun en büyük mükâfatı budur. Fakat daha fazlası, onun bu büyük işleri her türlü mü- kâfattan müstagni olarak yapmış ol- mak büyüklüğünü haiz olmasıdır. Bunları sadece yapmış olmasının bir milleti kurtarıp yükseltmenin manevî zevki onun yüksek vicdanını tatmine kâfidir. Kaldı ki büyük bir millet ve onun bütün müstakbel nesilleri ve hatta beşeriyet onu daima derin bir muhabbet, sonsuz bir şükran ve min- netle yadedecektir.

Yapıcısını bu yüksek mazhariye- te nail eden bütün bu inkılâplar için- de hiç şüphesiz en büyüğü kültür in- kırâbımızdır.

Kültür ne demektir?

Kültür bir milletin ruhudur, ha- yatının iksiridir, kurtuluş ve yükse- lişin en büyük bir âmilidir. Ruhsuz bir vücut nasıl yaşyamazsa kültürü akim kalmış bir millet de payıdar o- lamaz. Kültür yaşyan ve yaşatan bir

ruhtur. Bir milletin maneviyatıdır.

Daha açık bir ifade ile, kültür, bir milleti meydana getiren uzuvla- rın düşünüş, duyuş ve gidisinde bi- kinmesi icap eden en iyi şeyleri bil- mesi, en iyi duygulara malik olması ve en iyi bir tarzda hareket etmesi demektir. Bu bilgilerin, duyguların ve hareketlerin milli bir “bünyesi mil- li ve içtimâî bir kaynağı,, vardır. Bu bünye millettir bütün mazisiyle olan varlığı, bu kaynak bütün istikbaliyle beslenen mefkûreleridir.

Bizim mazimizle olan varlığımız bütün beşeriyet tarihinin yekta bir simasını arzettiği, tarihin en büyük dehasının sezisinin bir işaretiyle a- raştırılarak meydana çıkmıştır. Kül- tür inkılâbımızın en başında işte bu büyük hakikatin keşfini görüyoruz. Muhayyilemiz önündeki bütün o ge- niş beşerî faaliyet sahalarında Tür- kün büyük ruhunu, yüksek zekâ ve kabiliyetini görüyoruz. En eski za- manlardan beri beşeriyetin talim ve terbiyesini deruhte etmiş olan bir mil- letin evlâtları olmak, bunu hakika- ten şuurla idrak etmek ne büyük bir kültür bünyesine malik olmak, ne mu- azzam bir manevî inkılâp vücuda ge- tirmek demektir. Bu büyük millet böylece kendi kendisinin azametini anlamış oluyor, başkalarının kendi- sine harika diye izafe ettiği işleri

o bu idrak sayesinde pek tabii buluyor. Eğer bu millet dahî ve büyük adam yetiştirmezse başka hiçbir millet yetiştiremez. Bunu tarih inkılâbımızla anladık.

Kültür inkılâbımızın bünyesine taallük eden ikinci büyük safhası düşünüşümüzün, duygumuzun ve hareketlerimizin ifadesi olan dilimizin zenginliğini ve büyüklüğünü anlamış olmak inkılâbıdır. Dilimiz de tarihimiz gibi dünyaya hâkim olmuş bütün kavimlere en esaslı bir medeniyet unsuru vermiştir. Zaten büyük medenî bir milletin başka türlü bir dili olmazdı. Bu hakikati de öğrendik ve bir zühul eseri olarak bir zamanlar kullandığımız Osmanlıcadan dilimizi tasfiye etmeğe büyük zengin Türk diline dönmeğe cehtettik. Bu da gene Onun sezişinin, Onun iradesinin mahsulüdür. Ve onun için tahakkuk etmemesine, akim kalmasına hiçbir imkân olmadığını düşünmek, ruhlarımıza büyük bir sevinç membar oluyor. Çok geçmeden bütün münevverler, bütün irfan hayatımız büyük ana diline hakikî Türk anasının diline kavuşacaktır.

Gerek tarih, gerek dilce bu benliğimize doğru gidiş bizim millî şahsiyetimizi tamamlayacak, bizi geniş aydınlık ufuklara doğru yürütecektir. Kendi kendisini öğrenen bir insan nasıl haysiyet ve şuurunun icabı olarak yükselirse kendi benliğini en yüksek bir hakikat olarak öğrenen bir millet de bu inkişafa behemehal mazhar olur.

“Tarlada çapası üzerine eğilmiş duran yorgun argın Türk köylüsü! Sakit, mütehammil, asil Türk köylüsü..

Şimdi sana dönüyoruz. Ancak senin kucağında, kollarında senin dilinde en yüksek, asil duyguları bulmak mümkün olabilir. Seni asırlarca ihmal ettiler. Fakat bu şaşkın evlâtların senin en büyük evlâdının irşadiyle şimdi huzurunda eğiliyorlar. Her şey sendedir, her şey senindir!., Çapası üzerine eğilmiş yorgun argın Türk köylüsünün bu manzarasına, derin manalı bakışlarındaki suale nasıl cevap vereceğiz? Tek bir cevap var: Onun hizmetine, onun yükselişine koşmak...

Kültür inkılâbımızın bünyesi onda, onun bütün şerefli mazisinde mündemiçtir. Bu maziye baktığımız zaman muhayyilemiz önünde ne şerefli ve geniş bir “millî hayat,, “insanî hayat,, manzarası canlanıyor.

Kültür inkılâbımızın “kaynağına,, gelince — bu istikbale ait parlak mefkûrelerimizde mündemiçtir. Bu mefkûreleri bir ana mefkûreye irca edersek onu şöyle ifade edebiliriz: “Muasır medeniyetin en ileri safında lâyük olduğumuz mevkii almak,, Bunun için tek ve aynı zamanda zevkli bir çare var: Müspet ve çok çalışmak. İnsan için hayatta en zevkli şey nedir? Sualine en büyük mütefekkirler, filesolar, peygamberler “çalışma vardır,, cevabını vermişlerdir. Çalışmayı zevksiz addeden bir insan saadeti dünyanın neresinde hangi vâsıtada arasa katiyen bulamaz. “Saadet, yüksek içtimaî bir mefkûre uğrunda çalışmaktır,, Avrupanın en büyük filesof şairi olan Göte Faostunda insanî saadeti böyle bulduğunu büyük bir hakikat olarak anlatmıyor mu? Ciddî çalışmak bizim mefkûremizdir.

Mefkûremiz için çalışmak mefkûremizdir. Kültür inkılâbımızda bu safha idrak edilmiştir. Çok uzun sürmeyecek bir zamanda bunun azametli neticesini, Türk milletinin şanlı istikbalini medeniyetin ta ön safında göreceklerdir.

Niçin çalışıyoruz? Milletimizi her safhada yükseltmek için değil mi? İlim, irfan, sanat ve aletlilik yaşayış seviyesinde yükseltmek için çalışıyoruz.

O halde, büyüklerimizin bunlar üzerinde ne hamleler hazırladıklarını bir görelim. Bunları düşünürken bu millî yükselişimizin aydınlanan fecrini görmemek ve karşımızda doğan yeni günün ışıklarını seyretmekten derin hazlar duymamak mümkün değildir.

İsmet Paşa Hazretlerinin yüksek tarihî şahsiyetlerinin reisliği altında çalışan liyakatli kabinede irfan inkılâbını eline almış olan idealist yüksek karakterli Maarif Vekilimiz Dr. Reşit Galip Bey, geniş ve şaşmaz ihata ile bu işi katî bir surette halle karar vermiştir. Ne lâzımdır? Dedik ki ilim, irfan ve sanatte kültürümüz yükseltilecektir. İlk iş ilim kaynağı olan ve inkılâbımızın ölçüsüyle müte-nasip olan bir darülfünun kurmaktır. Bunun bütün hazırlıkları ikmal edilmiş yeni ve liyakatli bir inkılâp darülfünunu kurulmak üzeredir. Bu darülfünun Türk ilmîni yapacak, Türk âlimlerini yetiştirecek evsaf ve mahiyeti haizdir. O kadar güzel ve o kadar etraflı düşünülmüş bir müessese-dir.

Bundan sonra umumiyetle herkesin irfanına hadim olacak büyük

millî kütüphanemiz kurulacaktır. Bu millî kütüpane Türk milletinin en büyük bir irfan hazinesi olacaktır. Bilgimizi yükseltmek, muhitimizde kuvvetli bir manevî hava yaşatacak bütün eski ve yeni eserler orada herkesin istifadesine açık bulundurulacaktır.

Millî müzeye gelince — bu, her türlü şubatiyle başlı başına bir sanat hazinesi olmakla kalmıyarak aynı zamanda darülfünun derecesinde ve hatta ondan daha müessir bir bilgi müessesesi olacaktır. Amerikan âlimlerinden Gilman müzeleri, bu sözlerimizi teyit edecek mahiyette, darülfünunun bile fevkinde müşahhas bir terbiye müessesesi addetmektedir. Oralara ilham membarıdır. İnsaniyetin iptidai devirlerinde, içinde vahşî kasırgalar esen koyu ormanlar arasında bir hayat hamlesi halinde fıskırıp yükselen sanat ruhu bize o yeşil, güzel tabiatın ilhamlarını verir. İlim müzeleri ve sanat müzeleri iki ayrı ayrı müessese olmakla beraber eşyalarını teşhir vasıtasıyla terbiye vermek hususunda müsterektirler. Ve onun için her ikisine de müze ünvanı verilmiştir. İlim müzesi bilgi verir, bilgi iştiaqları uyandırır. Sanat müzesi zevk ilhamları verir, zevki inceltir. Hayatın manasını daha derinden anlamağı ve yaşamağı öğretir. İçimizde en tatlı hisleri uyandıran, insanın hayvandan farklı olarak en büyük meziyeti olan, muhayyilesini besliyen ve büyüten müessese sanat müzesidir.

İşte cemiyet içinde böyle yüksek bir kültür ef'ulesi olan büyük mil-

li müzemiz de milletimizin şerefiyle mütenasip bir şekilde pek yakında Ankarada kurulacak ve kültür inkılabımızın mühim bir boşluğunu yapacağı hizmetlerle dolduracaktır.

Bunların hepsinin fevkinde bir de ilim ve irfan süzgeci olan millî akademimiz kuruluyor. Akademiler her sahada büyük millî ve insanî hizmetler yapan, eserler meydana getiren simaları şerefli sakafı altında toplıyan bir müessesedir. Her yeni bilgi, her büyük iş o kanaldan geçerek, onun tasvibine iktiran ederek emniyetle, milletin huzuruna çıkacak ve sahibi böyle bir şerefe liyakat kesbedecektir. Görülüyor ki akademiler bir milletin ilim ve irfanını, ibdalarını kontrol ve teşvik eden en yüksek ve lüzumlu bir salâhiyet makamıdır.

İşte kültür inkılabımızın bu yeni, esaslı ve mühim hamlelerinin hazırlandığını serin rüzgârlı tepelerden fevkalbeşer denecek hayatî bir hamle ile yeni Türk medeniyeti ışıklarının yükseldiği bu aydınlık güzel Anado-

lu yaylasına meçlûp olammak mümkün müdür? Bu hamleleri, bunu âşk, zekâ ve kabiliyetle geceli gündüzlü çalışarak hazırlıyanı ve yapacak olanı düşününce makalemizin başındaki cümleye tekrar dönmek arzusuna mukavemet edilemez.

'Bir vatandaş bunlardan yalnız birini yapsaydı milletin en büyük marifçisi diye millet hafızasında ebediyen yaşatmak üzere namına bir heykel dikmeğe değerdi. Eğer bir vatandaş bunların hepsini yaparsa irfan ve kültür hayatımızdaki kazanç namına onun mükâfatı ne olacaktır? Onun en büyük mükâfatı nesilden nesle milletin bütün irfan müntesiplerinin, bütün münevver evlâtlarının derin muhabbet ve şükranını kazanmış olmaktır. Hatta bundan da fazla onun en büyük mükâfatı milletine yaptığı hizmetlerin, yüksek vicdanına verdiği payansız tatminkârlıktır. Büyük adamlar her türlü mükâfattan müstağnî olarak millî rollerini yaparlar.

