

THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE FORMATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY
IN POST-1980 TURKEY

A Dissertation
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Political Science and Public Administration
of
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In Partial Fulfillment of the
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

This study aims to draw a theoretical discussion on the features of the Turkish feminist groups and their contributions to the development of civil society in post-1980 Turkey.

It has been reached to the conclusion that Turkish feminist groups have created a new set of politics in Turkey through the success of changing many women's and men's thinking. Through the focus on conciseness raising, on non-oppressive relations between man and woman, on creating a counter-culture and alternative institutions, Turkish feminist groups have represented a new politics in Turkey.

Turkish feminist groups have incorporated into particular as well as universal discourses. With respect to their particular discourses feminist groups serve for the aims of the Turkish state. However, With respect to the common discourses which they share with their Western counterparts they constitute a substantial element of civil society in Turkey. These discourses are particular to their own interest as well as differentiate feminist women from the "man-like" generation of the women who once served for the aims of the Republican Turkey.

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın amacı 1980 sonrası Türkiye'de ortaya çıkan feminist hareketin Türk sivil toplum gelişimine katkısı üzerine teorik bir tartışma açmaktır. Türk feminist gruplarının ve söylemlerinin ayırdedici özellikleri ve bunların Türk siyasi hayatındaki yeri çalışmanın özünü oluşturmaktadır.

Türk feministleri, kadın ve erkeğin düşünce modüllerini değiştirmek suretiyle yeni bir politikaya öncülük etmektedirler. Bilinç yükseltme, kadın erkek arasındaki eşitsizliği giderme ve alternatif kültür ve kurumlar geliştirme yönündeki söylemleri bu politikaya hizmet etmektedir.

Türk feministleri hem yerel hem de evrensel söylemler geliştirmektedirler. Yerel söylemleri, bağlamında değerlendirildiğinde Türk feminist grupları, Türk devletinin Çağdaş medeniyetler düzeyine ulaşma yönündeki amacına hizmet etmektedirler. Fakat Batı feminizmi ile paylaştıkları söylemleri ile sivil toplum gelişimine büyük bir katkı sağlamaktadırlar. Bu söylemler Türk tarihinde ilk defa sadece kadınlara ait olmakla beraber feminist kadınları bir zamanlar Cumhuriyet ideolojisinin öncülüğünü yapan "erkeksi-kadınlar" dan da ayırmaktadır.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study aims to draw a theoretical discussion on the contribution of the feminist movement to the development of the civil society in Turkey. Political discourses of the Turkish feminist groups, which emerged after 1980, are taken as the substantial focus from the vantage point of the theoretical discussions on civil society. What is so particular to the Turkish feminist groups and discourses and their precise implications in the Turkish political context of the 1980s is the essential quest of this study. It is assumed that the feminist political discourses can successfully be analyzed only when they are held up together with the analysis of the paramount characteristics of the political context, against which feminists are setting up their attack fronts. Therefore, the development of the feminist movement from the post-1980 will be analyzed together with a thorough analysis of Turkish politics within the framework of a historical perspective in the following chapters. For now, in this introductory chapter the research problem and the research methods will be briefly illuminated.

1.1. RESEARCH PROBLEM

Starting from 1980 onwards we have begun to hear feminist voices in Turkey. The feminist way of thinking has gained a substantial ground in Turkish everyday life through informal meetings, various demonstrations, and through discussions in the daily newspapers and the weekly, bimonthly and monthly reviews and magazines. This new issue, in Turkish politics, has awoken interest not only among the educated intellectuals but also among the young girls, students and ordinary citizens.

Feminism, in Turkey, has created changes so influential that they cannot be reversed. It has had a broad and profound impact on the Turkish society and in the way people think. Moreover, young women have, in the last decades, been influenced by feminist writings to support themselves, to enhance their self-respect and to raise the consciousness of their existence. Moreover, being feminist or thinking in the feminist mode, nowadays, yields a substantial amount of respect for many women especially for women academicians in universities. The impact of feminism on the Turkish cultural and intellectual life has been extraordinary. Feminist issues are dealt with in books, in magazines, in movies and in such type of similar activities. Today, these issues are not only being dealt with by those who claim themselves to be feminists, but also by those who are not feminists.

This is not the first time that Turkish women have become involved in politics. They were first involved in politics during the second half of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth centuries on the basis of a strong challenge to their traditional status. Moreover, they took an active role in the struggle for national independence during the years following the First World War when parts of the country had been occupied by foreign armies. Women then participated in a series of activities outside their traditional roles: they organized public meetings, addressed the masses and fought actively in the war. Indeed, beginning from the second half of the nineteenth century until 1935 (the date of the abolishment of the Union of the Turkish Women) women constituted the main alternative discourse to the existing authority on the basis of their indigenous problems. Once they gained the right to vote women gradually began to devote all of their energy to the Kemalist reforms until 1980. But beginning from 1980 onwards women again became engaged in politics promoting the issues and voices supporting their own interest and the values and rights that are particular only to women in the post-1980 period. Women's involvement in politics during the Republican period was identical with their self-sacrificing to the collective goals of the country. It is an interesting point that in those countries that intend to change in the direction of the Western institutions, women constitute the main subject and even the dynamics of social change. It was the case also in Turkey in the beginning years of the Republican period that women experienced the excitement of being the pioneers of

1
modernization.

During the earlier years of the Turkish Republic the essential contribution expected from women was their having as many children as they could to compensate for the enormous loss of man during the war. When women then devoted their full energy to the development of the country it was the state that tried to approve the legal arrangements in order to enhance women's status. Therefore, the government prepared the most radical reforms ever attempted in any Muslim society. The Civil Code adopted in 1926, which was translated from the Swiss Civil Code replaced Islamic law and aimed to give women an equal status with men. The previous legal status of women was actually defined by Islamic law, which was supplemented by the law of the Sultan. This law assumed that women were naturally dependent on men thereby meaning that since they were not men's equal they needed the protection of men. This law was radically removed and women gained a new status by means of the state's² hand.

Following the adoption of the Civil Code the government enfranchised women for local elections in 1930 and in 1934 women were given equal political rights with men for national elections. This right, in fact, brought to an end the women's movement which was developed mainly on the basis of the demands for rights concerning their particular status and put women in an obligatory position under Kemalist principles. The state's

interference in woman issue in Turkey continued at least until the 1980s. This interference prevented the emergence of a feminist movement developing outside the corridor of the state and also promotion of women's special rights and issues. Women's participation in politics between 1934-1980, therefore, was hardly more than that of "devoted participation" meaning that women devoted their actions to the collective goals, which in no way are related to their special conditions.

The years following the 1980s have brought a change for women from their previous position and have forced women to stand on their own feet. Women, therefore, have begun to push for an "interest oriented participation" in politics. Feminist theories in different versions have gradually been incorporated into the Turkish political context. On the one hand, these theories have created substantial grounds for discussion about women's problems, and on the other hand have motivated women to create political issues and practices pertaining to their own conditions. Feminist groups thereby have been able to grasp the political initiative on behalf of their requirements thus asserting certain interests particular to them and they have established a significant presence in national policy making. It is clear that not only in Turkey, but also in almost all of the countries in the world, feminism has developed along with various aspects and versions. Feminism is not a unique theory but the collaboration of different theories and practices. It is only the political aspect of the feminist movement that

interests us in this study. How the feminist political discourses produced in the Turkish context can contribute to the development of civil society in the post-1980 is the essential question of this study.

The main point underlying the basic assumption of my thesis is that in all varieties of feminist versions (either being egalitarian, radical, socialist or postmodernist) there are certain set of discourses and values, each creating a contribution to the development of the intermediate components of the civil society. Since feminism is not limited to a territory it creates discourses on the basis of two levels: the universal and the local levels. The universal creation of discourses are common to feminists in almost all societies. Issues such as the gender differentiation of sexes; the subordination of women; the men's domination of women in the various spheres (economical, social, educational and cultural); and the historical construction of the patriarchy are examples of this. Whereas, on the local level each feminist version deals with particular problems such as the problems generating from sex discrimination under particular cultural impacts, ie., the husband as the head of the family, legal provisions against women, wife battering, and so forth.

I will not view civil society in the sense that it was viewed by the political thinkers of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel and Marx. The definition of civil society was formulated by the

hands of almost all on the basis of the separation of the public realm from the private sphere.³ However, through this study civil society will be understood as an alternative milieu to the state.⁴ The elements of a civil society, according to that perspective, create and develop challenges through the alternative discourses emphasizing their own interests. This definition of the civil society, indeed, is more realistic in analyzing a country like Turkey, in which one always observes a substantial difference on the basis of the norms and values placed between the state and society. Therefore, feminism becomes meaningful when it is undertaken as an element of the civil society in Turkey more so than the Western societies, which experience a relatively greater affinity between the state and society.

Since the 1970s the feminist theorists, in general, have been examining the familiar texts of political theory. Their readings and interpretations have implications not only for understanding the political theorists, but also of such central political categories as citizenship, equality, freedom, justice, the public, the private, democracy and the like. In collaboration with all of these studies, the task for feminists comes to developing a democratic theory that secures equality among the sexes as well as develops the democratic issues particular to women. These democratic issues clearly constitute the elements of a civil society. These feminist issues contribute to the development of the civil society in three interrelated and substantial aspects.

First of all, feminism constitutes an element of civil society as a social movement. It is obvious that each social movement proclaims an ideology, that is, a doctrine or a set of beliefs, which explains the need for change in the society's institutions. Through ideology, a social movement encourages its members to develop a group consciousness and prepares themselves to mentally challenge the state authority. A set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures comes to existence through the actions of a social movement and these operate systematically for the benefit of certain groups. Thus, a social movement, feminism in our analysis, expands its participation and increases its impact on policy. Through different discourses developed by feminists, an alternative cultural pattern comes into existence and it stands⁵ as not being more than an element of civil society.

Secondly, feminism develops a version of civil society on the basis of political discourses, which it raises through arguments on the public-private distinction. The feminist slogan, "the personal is political" denies a social division between the public and private spheres with different kinds of institutions, activities and human attributes. Mainly, two principles follow from this slogan: no social institutions or practices should be excluded from public discussion and expression and no person's action or aspects of a person's life should be forced into privacy. The public life is supposed to allow freedom for sex, ethnicity, age and so on, and all of

this should enter into the public life and allow for its discussions on identical terms. In modern political theory there is a sharp distinction between the public realm of the state and the private realm of needs and desires. Indeed, the public realm of the state in modern political theory attains its generality by the exclusion of particularity and privacy. Moreover, it establishes its assertions on objectivity common to all. This understanding of the public in modern political theory is fundamentally reversed by feminist groups. Feminism has claimed to develop and foster a distinctive women's culture, which requires attention in the public to special needs. Feminism, briefly, attempts to create a public viewpoint based on difference and particularity and thus constitutes a distinctive element in the public realm which was taken by the eighteenth century political thinkers as the total identity of civil society. Not public but publics are salient to feminism. The plurality of the public means, in that sense, that a collaboration of alternatives can exist together, not as a process eroded by the state, but as a milieu which accommodates a harbor of alternatives to the state.⁶

Finally, one can see a contribution to the development of civil society in the feminists' right seeking attempts. Modern democracy holds, as the basic principle, that the rules and policies of the state ought to be blind to race, gender and other differences and treat all citizens equally in the same way. But the feminists argue that with the achievement of equal rights for all groups, the group inequalities never end.

The rights and rules that are universally formulated and thus are blind to race, culture, gender, age or disability perpetuate rather than undermine oppression. Therefore, some feminists insist on special rights which generate from their special conditions. These special conditions of women in the workplace, pregnancy, birthing, unpaid household labor are all considered by feminists as "special" rights. Having a claim on different rights, indeed, brings and opens up another front in civil society.⁷

It is a matter of question how feminism can be placed within the civil societal elements in Turkish politics, which has a distinct history of its political culture. The history of the Turkish political culture has a substantial experience of a strong state tradition. The center of power centered around the norms and values perpetuated by statesmen. When analyzing the Ottoman and the Republican Turkish politics therefore it is not so difficult to find the subsequent contribution of power under the domination of the state sphere. During the Ottoman Empire the central power holder was only the Sultan, all of the other elements, either the religious institutions or the guild system, or even the millet system were controlled by his power. The political culture functioned to maintain that structure, its characteristics being non-individualistic, and being divided into two different cultures: the central and the peripheral ones. The peripheral culture could never be able to develop and grasp a power as an alternative to the central culture in the state sphere.⁸

However, the center of power holding shifted into the state elite with the beginning of the Tanzimat (Reform) period (1839-1876). The students educated in the West constituted a new phase of the state as soon as they returned to Turkey. These intellectual elites later led the Republican revolution in Turkey and guided the nation toward the goals formulated by their hands. This picture was maintained at least until the 1950s, when the Democratic Party, the true representative of social groups, came into power. Indeed, during the Ottoman Empire there was a "particularistic" politics which delivered the specificity of each group on the basis of their own identity and culture. Through the millet system each minority could hold its own particular legal status as well as set up its own educational institutions. The Ottoman sultanate, in such a structure, allowed the participants especially the women participants of different minorities to have their own ethnic dress. Although there was an official language each minority had the right to be educated in his/her own language. But one of the essential breaks of the Republican Turkey from the Ottoman-Empire politics was that the latter promoted the "universality" of citizenship in the sense that it took everyone to be involved and to participate in the public life and in the democratic process on the basis of equal treatment. The full inclusion and participation of all in the law and in the public life was impeded however by the formulation of laws and rules in universal terms, that is, they are applied to

all citizens in the same way. This, in fact, resulted in a process by which some social groups came to be smothered; neither women nor any other social group was able to grasp power differently. That gap was not closed even during the multi-party period which emerged after 1950. Although a slight move was experienced on the part of some social groups, in the period after the 1950s, the true political conflict was gradually channeled into a "party centered" political system.

But in the years after 1980, Turkish politics promised a new chapter in state-society relations. The traditional vertical relations between the state and society have been, slightly, changed to a more horizontal relations not only between the state and society but also among different groups: feminists, environmentalists, homosexuals, leftist groups, religious groups, the groups approving issues of human rights and the like. Particularly the feminist case is very interesting in the sense that it dissociates itself radically from the norms formulated by the state elites. Turkey has devoted itself, at least from Tanzimat Period onwards, to reaching the level of "contemporary civilization", a project for which the greatest political energy of Turkish politicians has been spent. But the most outstanding bases of the contemporary civilization such as "reason", "science", "power", "development", "progress" and "universalism" are suspected and sometimes strongly criticized by feminists. Especially the postmodern feminists who aroused a great suspicious to these institutions since they thought that these institutions created

a historical process in which women have come to be dominated by men in every respect.

It is interesting to place emphasis on Turkish feminism to see what kind of discourses it produces and what place these discourses occupy in Turkish politics. The paramount question is whether or not Turkish feminism has any particular issues which are different from the ones developed by other feminist groups elsewhere and whether the issues of the Turkish feminist groups constitute a contribution to the development of civil society in Turkey. Therefore, the 1980s is thoroughly analyzed in this study.

1.2. METHODOLOGY

1.2.1. The Selection of the Research Topic

In this study the role of women in the Turkish political system is examined from the vantage point of the arguments on the civil society which emphasizes the essential roles of interest groups or social movements as components of a civil society. It is our belief that the emerging groups, in Turkish politics after the 1980s, under the banner of the feminist movement, provide a unique example of political mobilization, social group development and political discourse rising. Therefore, the examination of the Turkish feminism, as a particular case, is important in the sense that it can only be seen together by examining the civil society.

Feminist discourses are more radical than the others produced in Turkey after the 1980s. In arguing that all women, potentially at least, are vulnerable to choices and conditions regarding them, the feminists take women's direct interests as their discursive starting point. A women's choice, therefore, has to be final and decisive and cannot not be legally interfered with by medical, institutional or political veto. The argument of women's choice constitutes an essential element of the democratic ideal of liberty.

Moreover, the feminist movement produces and emphasizes its discourses not by means of attempting to take a place within the political system nor by means of attempting to hold power itself, rather by standing outside the system and challenging the essential bases of the system. When compared with other movements, i.e., the religious, the leftist or the ethnic groups, in Turkey we see that it is only the feminist movement that sets up, on the basis of civil societal discourses, a fundamental alternative to the state authority. The religious groups, which are thought as another element of civil society, indeed, have not been successful in separating themselves from the idea which is based on a strong will to attain and hold power. Taking a part in the state, in general, is the essential ideal of the religious groups in Turkey. The environmentalist, leftist or ethnic groups, which predominated the 1980s Turkish politics, are not so far away from the ideals shared by the religious groups. They also produce

discourses by holding power within the state sphere. For instance, they respond to democracy with another definition of democracy. They both have the ideals put forward by the state as displayed in "reaching to the level of contemporary civilizations". Even some environmentalist groups are on the fringe of an auxiliary unit of the state.¹⁰ Furthermore, the economic groups in Turkey who place emphasis on special rights, i.e., only those rights which they illuminate, do not constitute challenges to the political system and culture. Rather the economic groups in Turkey have always been a component of the state enterprise working within the direction of the official ideals. Therefore, it is only the feminist movement that takes up challenge from the outside and even against the state and produces issues which challenge the dominant principles underlined in the state sphere.

One can also see the distinctive characteristics of the feminist movement in terms of its being the provocative of a particular interest group. While almost all the other groups produce more general and total issues, the feminists produce issues pertaining only to their own conditions. Whereas all of the religious, economic, leftist, ethnic and even the environmentalist groups are proclaiming their total issues to produce whole scale projects for the rest of the country.

One last point underlying the distinctive feature of the feminist movement from the others is that of having multidimensional issues. It poses critical points of views to both the existing political system and dominant social institutions and

emphasizes special rights in different aspects. The Feminist groups' insistence on postmodern issues is important in that respect. A set of substantial challenges and strong critiques to the dominant institutions of "Enlightenment" are developed through the discourses of these groups. "Science", the notion of "self", of "progress" and the notion of "universalism" all have come under a strong attack. Indeed, from the eighteenth century onwards these notions have constructed the main ideals for almost all the states in the world. The Turkish state too has indicated from then on a vigorous effort on these goals. Beside these critiques, feminists desire some rights which are seen under the guise of free choice for women on issues related to their body, sexual freedom, abortion, special rights particular to women, etc. In short, all these characteristics of the feminist movement make it important for this study.

Through this study mainly four interrelated questions are analyzed:

(1) How feminist discourses constitute elements of a civil society in general.

(2) What was so particular to civil society and women in Turkish politics before 1980.

(3) What is so particular to the discourses undertaken by Turkish feminist groups in the post-1980.

(4) What are the general impacts and implications of the feminist groups on Turkish politics.

All these questions are viewed within the framework of a

historical perspective. In drawing a historical perspective the previous developments must be conducted in relation to both the Turkish civil society and Turkish women before 1980. By doing this the developments in the post-1980 period are understood better.

1.2.2. Data Collection

The range of studies stressing woman issue in Turkey can be divided mainly into two: the non-feminists and the feminists. Indeed, there have been a great number of non-feminist women's studies beginning in the Republican period and continuing through the post-1980 period. These have been committed to protecting their present legal and social rights, the main basis of which was underlined by the Kemalist reforms. Also these non-feminist women have had a variety of organizations with certain revenues, membership, meeting places and even receiving official state funds. A variety of associations can be counted as non-feminist, such as "the Association of the Turkish Mothers", "the Foundation For Elevating the Turkish Woman", "the Association of University Women", etc. Moreover, one can also say that some of the religious women's groups are non-feminist. After the 1980s a wide range of their activities has been witnessed i.e., demanding political and social rights to attend the universities with their traditional dress. However, in this study only those women who proclaim themselves as being feminists are included.

It is too difficult to gather all the feminist groups

under one banner because we have different version of feminism in Turkey. Some feminists articulate for woman's rights as individual and woman's opportunities in the workforce. Others insist on the radical implications of a woman's experience in society as a whole while arguing that women have a different way of thinking than men and would order the world more humanely than men. Still, others point out and criticize the various kinds of universal institutions such as science, power and history as the basis of patriarchal power, which has given opportunity for men to gain domination over women. A study projected on feminist groups, should necessarily include all branches of that movement in the study. Therefore, the data collected then has been drawn from different versions of the feminist movement in Turkey.

The data through this study has been collected mainly from publications. political actions, associations and interviews. The publications which include feminist writings either in the form of a book or an article, and specific feminist magazines constitute the essential sources of my data. The feminist discourses of the post-1980 period have been analyzed on the basis of the writings of three magazines in particular: Kadinca, Feminist and Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus. All the series of the monthly Kadinca in the period between 1978 (the date of its initial publication) up to 1992 constitutes the specific data for analyzing the discourses of the Turkish liberal feminists. Moreover, the writings in irregularly published magazines Feminist and Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus (both

published between 1987-1990) constitute the bases of the data for analyzing the discourses of radical and socialist feminists. In addition to these magazines all collections of the monthly magazines committed to feminist issues like Kim and Cagdas Kadin have been thoroughly analyzed to reach a true analysis of feminist discourses. Moreover, I have placed emphasis on demonstrations and campaigns enacted by feminist groups. The issues proclaimed and the slogans raised throughout these campaigns are designed to capture the kind of discourses feminist groups produce in Turkey. Finally, the institutions which have come into existence under the heavy impact of feminist groups is of concern in order to analyze the feminists' specific implications in Turkish politics.

The information that has been extracted from these resources is mainly related to issues which seem to be an ingredient of the civil society, such as discussions on women's rights in the public-private distinctions and critiques to the modern dominant institutions. How these issues have contributed to the development of civil society are analyzed, in detail, in the following chapter. The question, relevant here, is to what degree Turkish feminist groups produce specific arguments on these issues and what are their implications on Turkish politics.

1.2.3. The Design of the Study

This study includes four further chapters, each dealing

with different but interrelated questions pertaining to the study. The following chapter draws a theoretical discussion on the civil society, feminism, and the feminist contributions to the development of a civil society. In the third chapter the condition of the Turkish civil society and of women beginning from the Ottoman period until the 1980s is highlighted within its historical perspective. Four main stages are enumerated here: the "sultan centered" politics, the "state elite centered" politics, the "political party centered" politics and relatively the recent "social group centered" politics. The changing status of women and women's struggle for the adoption of new rights, parallel with the Ottoman-Turkish modernization, is analyzed in detail in that chapter. In the fourth chapter the development of the Turkish feminism is considered with a brief analysis of the civil society in the post-1980. In that chapter the emergence of feminism in the post-1980 period, the feminist discourses, actions, and implications on Turkish politics are thoroughly analyzed. Finally, the fifth chapter draws a theoretical discussion on the specificity of the Turkish feminism and its distinctive politics in Turkey.

CHAPTER II

CIVIL SOCIETY AND FEMINISM

This chapter aims to analyze how the arguments on the civil society came into being during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries through the theoretical framework of the contract theories and the theories formulating the separation of the civil society from the state. It then discusses how feminist politics contribute to the development of a civil society in a version different from the one formulated by well-known political thinkers i.e., Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Frederick Hegel and Karl Marx. It pays attention to the writings of feminist thinkers on issues such as theory and politics; equality and difference; and public and private and tries to bring to light how discussions on these issues put women at the center of the civil society. Women have always been ignored in the theoretical studies of the masters of civil society and are formulated as being suitable only to the private sphere, that is, the actions done within the family. However, some feminists have attempted to reverse this definition of civil society through developing one which puts women at its center. All of these are the central argument of this chapter.

2.1. CIVIL SOCIETY

The separation of the civil society from the state was an intellectual effort of the eighteenth century thinkers. Until the middle of the eighteenth century European political thinkers used the term "civil society" to describe a type of political institution which placed its members under the influence of its laws and thereby ensured a peaceful order and good government. This term formed a part of an old European tradition traceable from modern natural law back to the classical political philosophy, above all, to Aristotle, for whom civil society (koinōnia politiké) was that society, the polis, which contains and dominates all others. In this old European tradition civil society and the state were interchangeable terms. To be a member of a civil society was to be a citizen, a member of the state and thus obliged to act in accordance with its laws and without engaging in acts harmful to other citizens.¹ But the term civil society gained a new meaning in the hands of the political thinkers during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The following two parts look at how civil society was formulated during the eighteenth century and how a place was assigned to women in it.

2.1.1. Civil Society in Contract Theorists

Civil society is, in its very general sense, identified, by contract theorists, to what is called "public", which

operates on a basis of rules different from that of the private domestic life. This distinction, therefore, comes as civil society and domestic private life. The family or domestic life, in particular for Hobbes and Locke, was based on natural ties of sentiment and blood line while the public life was governed by universal, impersonal and the conventional criteria of achievements, rights, equality and property. The most striking assumption about Hobbes' theory is that the growth of individualism requires a centralized authority, one in which individuals must sacrifice their sovereignty when entering society in order to enjoy the benefits of peace. However, for Locke, who saw individualism as grounded in labor, the sovereignty resided in the individual and his property, from which even the government derived its authority. Rousseau, urged a further different hypothesis: once individuals accept an agreement they lose their individuality and should be obliged to obey the rules of the common will. As Elizabeth F. Genouese emphasizes that they all together assumed that the individual was male and thereby they then discussed the relationship of the female to that male.²

Hobbes' theory is then generally based on the necessity of the organization of a society and the establishment of the commonwealth so that peace and civilization can be attained. In the state of nature there is a war among individuals who seek self-preservation and attainment. Naturally man exists in this state of war and has passion and reason. It is, thus,

man's passions which bring about the state of war. But at the same time fear of death, the desire of such things as are necessary to "commodious" living and the hope of obtaining these things by industry are passions which incline man to seek peace.³ Man seeks self-preservation and security, but he is unable to attain this goal in the natural condition of war. The laws of nature are unable to achieve the desired end by themselves alone unless there is a coercive power capable of enforcing their observance by sanctions.⁴ This means that a plurality of individuals should confer all their power and strength upon one man or upon one assembly of man that may reduce all their wills by a plurality of voices unto one will. This transfer of rights takes place in Hobbes' as follows:

...by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my Right of Governing myselfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of man, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorize all his Actions in like manner. This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH...This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently), of that Mortal God, to which we owe⁵ under the Immortal God, our peace and defence.

The theory of the covenant of man enables Hobbes to make

the transition from the condition of atomic individualism to organized society. Self-interest, according to him, lies at the basis of organized society, in which the self-destructive attempts are checked by the fear of the sovereign's power. As is understood from these one can clearly see that civil society, as stated by Hobbes, allows individuals to seek self-preservation on the principles of their particular interests. This essential unit is, on the contrary, the state or the public uniting warring individuals. If men are naturally egoistic and always remain so then the only factor which can hold them together effectively is a centralized power vested in the sovereign.

Now, the question arises as to how women are formulated by Hobbes in civil society. Hobbes began from the premise that there is no natural dominion of men over women. In the state of nature female individuals are as free as, and equal to, male individuals. Both marriage and family, for Hobbes, are artificial political institutions rather than natural forms. The roles given to the members of the family are gained in civil society. For Hobbes, "A father with his sons and servants, grown into a civil person by virtue of his paternal jurisdiction is called a family"⁶. His families are ruled by men not as fathers but as masters. Masters of families rule by virtue of contract not by their paternal, procreative capacity. Men as masters enter into the original contract that constitutes civil society. Women, now in subjection, no longer have the necessary standing to take part in creating a

new civil society.⁷ Thus, for Hobbes, conjugal rights are not natural, rather are created through the original contract and so are political right. The rights are therefore, deliberately, created by men who brought civil society into being. Hobbes states that in civil society the husband has dominion "because for the most part the commonwealths have been created by the fathers not by the mothers of families."⁸

Matrimonial law takes a patriarchal form because men have made the original contract. Through the civil institution of marriage, men can lawfully obtain the familiar "helpmate" and gain the sexual and domestic services of a wife, whose permanent servitude is now guaranteed by the law and sword of Leviathan.⁹ Shortly, in Hobbes's political theory all individuals including women have self-protection rights in the state of nature. But in the civil society women as wives who have given up their right in favor of the "protection" of their husband or husbands, are now protected by the sword of Leviathan. The civil society thus comes into being as a contractual agreement among men on behalf of the representation of men and on behalf of the subjection of women.

Locke also extended this definition of civil society. He, accordingly, began with the state of nature and resulted with a society established by the consent among free individuals. In his view all men are naturally in the state of nature and remain so until, by their own consent, they make themselves members of some political society. Unlike Hobbes, he argues that the state of nature is the state of liberty and it has a

law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone to be equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, liberty or possessions.¹⁰ To him, God put men under strong obligations of necessity, convenience and inclination to force him into society. The family as a part of society is natural to men and civil society is natural in the sense that it fulfills human needs. Although, in the state of nature, all men enjoy equal rights and are morally bound to respect the rights of others, it does not necessarily follow that all men actually respect the rights of others. It is in men's interest, therefore, to form an organized society for the more effectual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates which he calls property.

The civil society thereby, came to be closely identical with the political society. "where-ever...any number of Men are so united into one Society, as to quit every one his Executive Power of the law of Nature and to resign it to the publick,¹¹ there and there only is a Political, or Civil society." A civil society comes into being for Locke "...wher-ever any number of Men, in the state of Nature, enter into Society to make one People, one Body Politick, under one Supreme Government, or else when anyone joyns himself to and incorporates with any Government already made"¹² Men being, by nature, all free, equal and independent no one can be subjected to the political power of another without his own consent. Even though civil society, as an historic event, grew out of the family and tribe it is the fact that the

rational foundation of civil society and government is consent. Civil society and government are created on the basis of two covenants. By the first compact a man becomes a member of a definite civil or political society and obliges himself to accept the decisions of the majority, while in the second compact the majority of the members of the newly-formed society agree either to carry on the government themselves or to set up an oligarchy or a monarchy, hereditary or elective.¹³

In short, Locke treats civil society as the sum of independent moral beings whose rational choices place them in the Commonwealth. In other words, it is a voluntary organization of individuals set up as the result of the social contract and centered around moral purposes, to which they desire to give a political dimension in public life.¹⁴ Unlike Hobbes, Locke considers individuals and groups as those whose moral convictions give them a strong feeling of autonomy, and independence from the official system. The common features of the civil society, then, should be understood as such newly arisen norms and values by which the members of these groups and movements want to replace the official ones.¹⁵ It is interesting that while Locke placed individuals and groups at the center of his civil society he excluded women from that arena and indicated the family as the most suitable place for them.

Locke, analyzed the relationship of man and woman, in civil society, on the basis of conjugal and political rela-

tionships. Both were grounded in consent and existed for the preservation of property. Yet conjugal society was not a political society because it conferred no power over the life and death of its members. Men and women, in the state of nature, were free to determine the terms of the conjugal contract. But, in the civil society, these terms could be limited or created by the Customs or Laws of the country.¹⁶ He analyzed several nonpolitical relationships including those of master-servant, master-slave, parent-child, and husband-wife. Each of these forms of associations is distinguished from the political relationship of ruler-subject. The status of women in Lockean theory was formulated in nonpolitical relationships.¹⁷ Thus the conjugal society is a natural unit which is based on a voluntary compact between man and woman. Although the conjugal relationship began for the sake of procreation it continued for the sake of property.

[Men's power] leaves the wife in the full and free possessions of what by Contract is her Peculiar Right and gives the Husband no more power over her Life, than she has over his. The power of the Husband being so far from that of an absolute monarch that the Wife has, in many cases, a Liberty to separate from him; where natural Right or their Contract allows it, whether that Contract be made by themselves in the state of Nature or by the Customs or Laws of the Country they live in; and the Children upon such Separation fall to the

Father or Mother's lot, as such contract does
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determine.

Locke distinguished also between the property rights of husband and wife. All property in conjugal society was not automatically under the husband's control. Because of certain inconveniences, men quit the state of nature to form civil society through an act of consent. In short, Locke's insistence on the relationship between men and women was based on that in the state of nature whereby man dominated woman since he was naturally the abler and stronger. However, in civil society man dominated woman not because he was stronger rather on the basis of consent of the two to preserve women's right. Thus, Locke, like Hobbes, stated that the civil society is an agreement among free men who at the same time, represent women whose roles are as the home-maker in the civil society.

Rousseau, in relation to the condition of women, developed the same definition of civil society with Hobbes and Locke. He also began with the natural state of man. Natural man, for Rousseau, was somehow a tabula rasa an awareness of nothing, not a culture gainer and therefore, in peace with his environment. Since natural men think that coming together enables them to overcome natural disaster and to have a more fruitful life, they come together to form society. But, once society comes into being there starts a
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conflict, a war and a struggle among men. Therefore, they

see a need for a government in order to protect their property on the principle of peace. Civil society, thus, for Rousseau, came into being on the basis of man's needs and desires. In that way a social contract enables man to leave his particular will into the common will. By submitting his particular will to the Common Will he loses little but gains, in return, the assurance that he will be protected by the full force of society against the enrichment of individuals and groups. He is now a member of a new society of equals in which he has gained a new form of equality on a higher level than the one he enjoyed in the state of nature.²⁰

Rousseau insisted that the inequality of power and wealth transformed the expression of the drive for self-preservation into rational egoism. Since all develop different concerns, different interests are necessarily in constant opposition. It is, therefore, apparent that Rousseau's views on women create a response to feminist arguments today and he was a severe critic of particularistic and individualistic thought.²¹ For Rousseau the supreme being as denounced as the "Common Will" was the essential unit and woman could take her save under such a general will.

The Supreme Being wanted to do honor to the human species in everything. While giving man inclinations without limit, He gives him at the same time the law which regulates them, in order that he may be free and in command of himself. While abandoning

man to immoderate passions, He joins reason to these passions in order to govern them. While abandoning women to unlimited desires, He joins modesty to these desires in order to constrain them.²²

The timidity and weakness of the woman, according to Rousseau, inspired her to be pleasing to a man. If this is the case there will be less likeliness for a man to be violent. To act, to please man, is a quality of woman directly derivable from her nature. Within the civil society the man was stronger and dependent on the woman only through desire, whereas woman depended on man through desire and need. The habit of living together gave rise to man's conjugal and paternal love. Within the family, as the little society, women became more sedentary and grew accustomed to tending the hut and the children, while the men sought their common subsistence.²³

"Natural" man and "natural" woman implied quite different things for Rousseau. Natural man, for him, was a man in the original state of nature; one of total independence of his fellows, devoid of selfishness, and equal to everyone else. Natural woman, however, was defined according to her role in the golden age of the patriarchal family: dependent, subordinate and naturally imbued with those qualities of shame and modesty which served to make her sexually appealing to her husband.²⁴

The virtues of women in the civil society were characterized as closer to "nature" than man. The man could be transformed and denatured in a good society. As such, women could form a necessary link between the supreme artifice of the good society and nature.²⁵ Otherwise, if women attempt to act in a society according to their particular interest they will be oppressed by the men. In civil society "particular interest" of women is disastrous, for Rousseau. He proposed for women a sphere of their true competence; childcare, household tasks and recreation for men. In a good society, women should contribute to the development of a patriot notion, thereby against one's self interest for the civil state. The love of the self, therefore, should be in turn for the love of the nation, in other words, for the common will. In short, like Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau formulated a family in which women were dependent on men in a way that they were devoid from any particular interests and rational egoism.²⁶

In conclusion, according to contractarian theorists' the civil society is identical, in the last analysis, with the public life of the state coming into being on the basis of the agreement among individuals, who are assumed to be men. The chief principles of the civil society functioned under the rule of the male individual. Women, treated as being close to nature, were represented in the civil society through their husbands, who were recognized in their roles of being masters. In a sense women were hidden or were accounted as being absent

in the civil society.

2.1.2. The Separation of Civil Society From the State

In fact, the distinction between the state and the civil society was first made by Hegel in his Philosophy of Right, published in 1821. The civil society (bürgerliche gesellschaft) in Hegel's philosophy represented a "stage" in the dialectical development from the family to the state which contradicted the type of ethical life found in the human micro-community in order to be itself contradicted and overcome by the macro-community of the politically independent, sovereign nation. While social life typical of civil society was different from the ethical world of the family and different from the public life of the state it formed a necessary element within the totality of a rationally structured modern political community.²⁷ In Hegel, civil society is conceived not as a natural condition of freedom but as a historically produced sphere of ethical life "positioned" between the simple world of the household and the universal state. It includes the market economy, social classes, corporations and institutions concerned with the administration of "welfare" (polizei) and civil law. Civil society was a mosaic of private individuals, classes, groups and institutions whose transactions are regulated by civil law and, as such, are not directly dependent upon the political state itself.²⁸

For Hegel civil society was an aspect of the modern state which emerged in Western Europe in the eighteenth century and

became strikingly apparent after the French revolution of 1789. It was a specialized and highly complex network of rules, institutions, agencies, groups, practices and attitudes evolved within the legal and political framework of the nation-state to satisfy individual needs and safeguard individual rights.²⁹ In the Philosophy of Right Hegel subdivides the sphere of ethical life into family, civil society and the state. They are "moments" of the ethical order and are the ethical powers which regulate the life of individual. In the family as in the Greek polis the individuality of its members is submerged in a transcendent unity. Ethical duties are determined by one's place in the family, which ultimately depends on the natural factors of sex and birth. Love, altruism and concern for the whole are the dominant features of ethical dispositions in the family community. In civil society this type of "natural" ethical unity disintegrates. Men are primarily concerned with the satisfaction of their private, individual needs by working, producing and exchanging the product of their labor in the market. This creates bonds of a new kind. While individuals behave selfishly and instrumentally towards each other they can not help satisfying other men's needs furthering their interests and entering into various social relations with them.³⁰ Hegel points out the transition of individual from family to civil society in the following way:

Originally the family is the substantive whole whose function is to provide for the individual on

his particular side by giving them either the means and the skill necessary to enable him to earn his living out of the resources of society, or else subsistence and maintenance in the event of his suffering a disability. But civil society tears the individual from his family ties, 'estranges the members of the family from one another, and recognizes them as self-subsistent persons. Further, for the paternal soil and the external inorganic resources of nature from which the individual formerly derived his livelihood, it substitutes its own soil and subjects the permanent existence of even the entire family to dependence on itself and to contingency. Thus the individual becomes a son of civil society which has as many claims upon his as he has rights against it.³¹

Hegel identifies the system of needs as a distinct level of experience within civil society. "The concrete person who is himself an object of his particular aims, is a totality of wants and mixture of caprice and physical necessity, one principle of civil society."³² The system of needs is the complex of reciprocal relationships which promotes the satisfaction of individual interests; men become dependent upon one another for mutual satisfaction. The satisfaction of personal interests involves using others as a means and competing with them.³³ Thus, for Hegel civil society enables man to become fully an individual by acting primarily on his

personal, subjective opinions and by promoting his private happiness.³⁴

Hegel cannot be fairly analyzed without paying enough attention to his concern on the "state". The state becomes for Hegel as the final actualization of civil society by which individuals realize their subjectivity. The state is the concrete human embodiment of the ethical Idea, of mind "Geist" developing from a stage of immediate, undifferentiated unity (the family), through that of explicit difference and particularity (civil society), to the concrete unity and synthesis of the particular in the state. "The universal state conceived by Hegel must be regarded as a secular deity whose claims upon its male citizens and female and other subjects are always for their benefit and ultimately unquestionable and irresistible."³⁵ Hegel conceives the state as a new moment which contains, preserves and synthesizes the conflicting elements of the civil society into a higher ethical entity. The state represents society in its unity.³⁶ Hegel insists that "it is within the state that the family is first developed into civil society and it is the Idea of the state itself which disrupts itself into these two moments. Through the development of civil society, the substance of ethical life acquires its infinite form, which contains in itself these two moments."³⁷

Hegel, thus, puts the state over civil society. The relationships between the state and society are based not on a "contract" but naturally on the individuals' obligation to

accept state authority. The important thing is to realize the "reason", which is actualized only through the accomplishment of the state. Since civil society cannot realize its emancipation due to the contradiction it bears in its institutions, it must depend on the state. Thus, with joining to the state civil society loses its autonomy.³⁸ The freedom of members of civil society can be guaranteed and synthesized with the state's articulation and defence of the universal defence. As a concluding remark one can easily say that in Hegel's hands the term civil society assumes a less positive meaning; it is viewed as a self-crippling entity in constant need of state supervision and control.

Hegel's political philosophy developed the concept of the public realm of the state as expressing impartiality and universality as against partiality and substance of desire. For Hegel, as a member of civil society, the individual pursues private ends for himself and his family. Conceived as a member of the state, on the other hand, the person is not a locus of particular desire, but the bearer of universally articulated rights and responsibilities. The point of view of the state and law transcends all particular interests to express the universal and national spirit of humanity. State laws and action express the general will, the interests of the whole society.³⁹ It is this particular desire, that Hegel, like contract theorists puts woman at its center. Hegel's analysis of woman is restricted with the particular world, while he puts only male citizens at the center of universal

spirit of humanity, or state. Woman, in short, is formulated, in Hegel's political philosophy as the guardian of the private realm of need, desire and affectivity.

Women in Hegel are viewed as representing the principles of particularity, naturalness and substantiality, while men stand for universality, freedom and subjectivity. Hegel formulates the nuclear family of Europe as the only one set of family relations and one particular division of labor between the sexes as rational and normatively right. It is a family type in which the woman is confined to the private sphere and the man to the public. He invokes the superiority of man to woman.⁴⁰

... one sex is mind its self-diremption into explicit self-subsistence and the knowledge and volition of free universality, i.e. the self-consciousness of conceptual thought and the volition of the objective final end. The other sex is mind maintaining itself in unity as knowledge and volition in the form of concrete individuality and feeling. In relation to externality, the former is powerful and active, the latter passive and subjective. It follows that man has his actual substantive life in the state, in learning, and so forth, as well as in labor and struggle with the external world and with himself so that it is only out of his diremption that he fights his way to

self-subsistent unity with himself. In the family he has a tranquil intuition of this unity, and there he lives a subjective ethical life on the plane of feeling. Woman, on the other hand, has her substantive destiny in the family, and to be imbued with family piety is her ethical frame of mind.⁴¹

To Hegel men's lives are concerned with the state, science, and work in the external world. Women's lives, by contrast, are in the family and in the unity of the private sphere. They are incapable of the spiritual struggle which characterizes the lives of men. The man, individuates his desires and since "he possesses, as a citizen, the self-conscious power of universality, he thereby acquires the rights of desire and, at the same time, preserves his freedom in regard to it".⁴²

Geist, in Hegel, as a transindividual principle that unfolds in history and whose goal is to make externality into its action, externalizes itself in history to make it embody its own objectivity, that is, reason and freedom. The process through which nature is humanized and history is constituted is the activity followed by externalization, that is, the objectification of human purposes and institutions. Since women cannot overcome unity and emerge out of the life of the family, they are excluded from history - constituting activity. Their activities in the private sphere such as reproduction, the rearing of children, and the satisfaction

of the emotional and sexual needs of men, place them outside
the world of work.⁴³ This, briefly, means that women can not
create a history.

Another intellectual separating civil society from the
state was Marx, for whom, civil society was just the reverse
of what Hegel conceived. Marx rejected the view that the state
was an all-inclusive political community with a distinct
ethical character and denied its primacy in social and
historical life. He reversed the Hegelian relation of the two
and made civil society the ground of political life and the
source of political change.⁴⁴ For Marx, the economy as a
context of man's primary interaction with nature, is a
paradigm of all social life and human activity. Religion,
family, state, law, morality, science, etc. all are only
particular modes of production and fall under its general
laws.⁴⁵ Marx explains the civil society as the following:

Civil society [bürgerliche gesellschaft] comprises
the entire material interaction among individuals at
a particular evolutionary stage of the productive
forces...The term 'civil society' emerged in the
eighteenth century when property relations had
already evolved from the community of antiquity and
medieval times. Civil society as such only develops
with bourgeoisie.⁴⁶

The state, in Marxian thought, is taken as an

institution of the dominant class, instead of being the expression of a universal and national need. It is both the repetition and reinforcement of particularistic interests. Unlike Hegel, he views the state not as the transcendence of civil society but merely as its reflection: as civil society is, so is the state. The state incorporates civil society not in order to transform it into something else but to keep it as it is. The civil society, which is historically determined, does not disappear into the state but reappears in the state in all its concrete manifestations.⁴⁷ For Marx civil society embraced "...the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage and, hence, transcends the state and the nation..."⁴⁸ Marx strongly insisted on that legal relationship as well as forms of state to be grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human mind, but rather have their roots in the material conditions of life. Therefore, to him "...the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy."⁴⁹ One should bear in mind that the arguments about civil society among Marxists in the last decades borrow its crucial elements from Gramsci's writings on civil society.

Gramsci's theory introduces a profound innovation to whole Marxist tradition. Civil society in Gramsci does not belong to the structural sphere, but to the superstructural-⁵⁰ sphere. He means, briefly, by civil society the political and cultural hegemony which a social group exercises over the whole of society, as the ethical content of the state.⁵¹ Gramsci

takes both the civil society and the state as two major superstructural levels of the "hegemony". His argument comes like the following:

What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural 'levels': the one that can be called 'civil society', that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private', and that of 'political society' or 'the state'. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises throughout society, and, on the other hand, to that of 'direct domination' or command exercised through the state and 'juridical' government.⁵²

Gramsci gives a great importance to intellectuals in the realm of hegemony. Within the realm of the superstructure the intellectuals perform organizational and connective functions within both the area of civil society or hegemony and the area of political society or the state. By intellectuals, it must be understood that in general the entire social stratum which exercises as an organizational function in the wide sense whether in the field of production, in that of culture, or in that of political administration. The intellectuals have a role in all levels of society, not merely in spheres which are explicitly cultural, in the economic base and in both civil society and political society in a restricted sense.⁵³

Consequently, one can see obviously that Gramsci attributes not a negative meaning to civil society as it was under the hands of Hegel and Marx but rather uses it as an explanatory category of the term "hegemony."

The place, Marx attributed to women in civil society indeed, is nothing different than what Hegel did in his political philosophy. It should be remembered that the first class division, for Marx, arose over the struggle for appropriation of the surplus of food and objects. It is obvious that the definition of class as such, as was urged by Linda Nicholson, eliminates from consideration conflicts over other socially necessary activities such as childbearing and childrearing. The activities of "reproduction" thus become nonhistorical aspects of human existence or as by-products of change in the economy. It is well known that Marx's concept of class relies on the narrow transition of "production" and economic activities that concern with the making of food and objects or goods. The theory accepts the "relation of production" as the matter of the historical development.⁵⁴ Accordingly, this theory too rejects that women can create a history.

As a concluding remark one can obviously see that there is not so much substantial difference between the contract theorists and the theorists who later separated the civil society from the state, in respect to the same place they both attributed to women in civil society. As aptly argued by Carole Patemen and Mary L. Shanley the tradition of Western

political thought rests on a conception of the "political" that is constructed through the exclusion of women and all that is represented by femininity and Women's body. They maintain that "manhood" and "politics" go hand in hand, everything that stands in contrast to political life and virtues has been represented by women and the roles fulfilled by their capacities.⁵⁵ Moreover, Pateman argues that the early modern discussion of civil society and the state always supposed the exclusion of women from civil society and their confinement to the privacy of the household. She demonstrates that the political thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries took women and domestic sphere as inferior to the male-dominated public world of civil society and its culture, property, social power, reason and freedom.⁵⁶ In short, civil society is established after the image of civilized male individual who at the same time was given the role of masters for women.

However, in modern society we see clearly that women, as a social group with particular values, norms and political discourses put their hands strikingly on the fate of civil society. They demand a civil society which is aware of both their equality and their difference from men as well as their autonomy against the state authority. Therefore, there is a substantial need to leave the classical definitions of civil society, in order to develop a new definition which considers the specificity of social groups, particularly feminism in our analysis, with their special claims as well as their striking

influence on the state authority.

2.2. CIVIL SOCIETY AS A MILIEU OF THE ALTERNATIVES

In civil society which was formulated by the political thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel and Marx, it seems clear that women have stood outside the boundaries not only of the political community but also of civil society itself. Since the very concept of civil society, for almost all of them, refers to an association whose members are bound together by common laws, women in this sense were not properly citizens. In the eyes of the laws laid down on their understanding, women, in fact, are not appear independently, rather are dependent upon others to represent them in voting, in court, to administer their property and to make decisions for their children.⁵⁷ However, in modern society there is an institutional interdependence and a public/private mix rather than a public private split. Moving from the experience of the Scandinavian countries, Helga M. Hernes, brilliantly observes that the state, the market, the public sphere of opinion and the family are interrelated institutional settings. While until the 1960s women had mainly been confined to the family, now they move increasingly among all four settings. Women's evolving profile of citizenship reflects the institutional interface between state and family, their employment in public sector and their political mobilization.⁵⁸

Maria Markus, goes further, with relation to women and civil society, to claim that the elevation of economic activity into the public sphere and its transformation into an arena of socially recognized success means the separation of household and family from being a private sphere which is assigned naturally to women as the only proper location of their activities. She goes on to urge that the distribution of social status and the recognition of success is restricted to the arena of socially organized work. Therefore, she takes the programs or attempts for social change promoting the liberation and social recognition of diverse human potentialities and ways of life as "the potential civil society". Modern women's attempts to gain success in public life places them at the center of the potential civil society.⁵⁹

With the term civil society it will be understood, through this study, the existence of social groups having the potentialities economically, ideologically and organizationally to produce alternative structures, meanings, definitions, values, programs, and so forth to the state authority. Social groups as such will reconstitute, change and even restrict, if necessary, the direction of the authoritative institutions. There are mainly three ultimate goals that social groups, at least in the modern world, particularly feminist groups, attempt to reach: equality, difference and autonomy. These terms are taken, in this study, as the principles of civil society and each of these

principles results with different implications.

First, consider the "equality principle" among the citizens regardless of class, race, religion, ethnicity and similar social categories. The equality principle is inevitably based on the law. It regards all individuals equal in being a member of the political society. This equality does not mean to "have equal" what so ever exists, rather it means to create the equal chance of opportunity and the possibility, legally, for citizens in every respect. The claim on equality has an explicit implication: it results with the emergence of a "homogeneous" civil society. A homogeneous civil society unites society through the claims to make different groups equal by erosion or assimilation of less privileged groups into the norms and values of the privileged groups and thus emerges a "unique" type of society. Therefore, the egalitarian feminist groups' insistence on the equality principle, brings women, in the last analysis, to be integrated with a cultural atmosphere being set up by the norms of men.

Second, the most important principle of civil society with respect to a study on feminist groups, is the "difference principle". This principle brings under discussion to make law recognizes and appoints the difference of the different categories and assigns the duties and rights under that principle. Particularly the demands made by some radical feminists, by postmodern feminists, and by the French feminists, to develop a different language and discourse bearing meanings particular

to, and with an advantage to, women, has opened a new phase among feminist groups. A set of particular rights and duties has come under discussion. The implication of this principle, for us is that it leads to the emergence of an "heterogeneous civil society", which serves better, in the last analysis, to the democratization of the society. An assertion based on the difference principle results also in a plurality of legal rights.

Finally, think about the "autonomy principle" of civil society. The autonomy of social elements grips with it an open way for the emergence of different groups on different issues and holds to create alternative discourses and values in the public life to the existing powers, discourses and values. The critiques raised by Marxist and socialist feminists, on the one hand, and the total demands of radical feminists, on the other hand, are essential to create such alternative discourses. The implication of the autonomy principles, results for us, with an "autonomous civil society". As David Held brilliantly emphasized this arises out of two interdependent processes: the expansion of social autonomy and the restructuring and democratization of the state institutions. State and civil society in that sense must become the condition for each others democratization. State institutions must be viewed as necessary devices for enacting legislation, promulgating new policies, setting down conflicts between particular interests and preventing civil society from falling victim to a new form of tyranny.⁶⁰ Civil society, on

the other hand, must be perceived as a social body regulating the mis-order of the state, checking their functionality, directing their policies in behalf of their particular interest (when conceived as harmful to civil society) and preventing any authoritative decision.

In conclusion, civil society must be understood to mean those individuals and groups whose moral convictions gives them a strong feeling of autonomy, independence, and difference from the official system. The common features of civil society understood as such arises discourses, structures, meanings, values and norms through the members of different social groups. This allows social groups to include within civil society various groups regardless of the number of their members, the extent of their demands for change and the character of their activity. Feminism, indeed, is the most outstanding example of these groups. Therefore, feminism will be analyzed within the framework of the vantage point of these principles of civil society, both in the following part and in the remaining chapters concentrating mainly on the case of Turkish feminism.

2.3. FEMINISM

Feminism is a political movement directed at changing existing power relations between men and women. These power relationships structures all areas of life: the family, education and welfare; the worlds of work and politics; and culture and history. Feminism is a politics whose basic goal

is to remove the discrimination and degradation of women and to break down the male dominance of society.

In a very general sense feminism can be divided into two major branches: "the women's rights" movement and "the women's liberation" movement.⁶¹ Women's rights movement works predominantly for political reforms by means of traditional pressure group tactics. It becomes an aim to be acknowledged and to be respected by the political establishment. It embraces the primacy of a companionate, non-hierarchical, male-female couple as the basic unit of society. This kind of feminism has long historical roots going back to the suffrage movement of the nineteenth century and the successful campaigns for women's access to education, to qualified work and to legal majority. The aim of new wave feminism which has emerged basically since the 1960s, however, is a completely different kind of feminism usually labeled as the "women's liberation movement". These were radical, left-wing and postmodern feminists who rejected the idea of equality with men, instead they advocated the emancipation of women from the aggression of a patriarchal society. The new wave feminism celebrated the quest for women's independence in all aspects of life, dismissed as significant all socially defined roles and minimized discussion of sex-linked qualities which included childbearing and its attendant responsibilities. The main activities of the women's liberation movement consist of consciousness-raising activities, experimentation, in new way life-style, creation of a counter culture and feminist literature (feminist

theater, music bands, women's festival etc.) and the formation of alternative institutions (crisis centers, women's centers, self-help clinics, etc.). All of these aspects of feminist groups is analyzed in this part with a vantage point of their contribution to the development of civil society. It is analyzed mainly as to how feminism constitutes a political body, what feminist groups' claims on equality are, how they stress on concept of difference and how an autonomy is idealized by them.

2.3.1. From Feminist Theory to Feminist Politics

Juliet Mitchell argues that feminism arose in England in the seventeenth century as a series of demands by women who saw themselves as a sociological group that was completely excluded from the principles of new society. She claims that the seventeenth century feminists were mainly middle-class women who wanted to take part in a changed society which came about with the end of feudalism and the beginning of capitalism. As the new bourgeois argued for freedom and equality, these women wondered why they were being left out.⁶² As it is well-known during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in particular after the French revolution, a new understanding of man, civil society, political society and so forth were institutionalized. In political theories women were appropriated as being identical with private household. However, households were no longer a safe place for them,

since the industrialization particularly in Britain brought a substantial change in the role they traditionally had. With the industrialization the forces of industrial capitalism began to draw labor out of the private home and into the public workplace. This process of industrialization indicated its first impact on the married bourgeois women. These women, indeed, were the first to find themselves at home with little productive, or little income-generating work.⁶³ Therefore, many of these women attempted to gain a proper place in the new public and its workplace.

The first feminist demand was to get the vote. Therefore, the first wave of feminism is best known for the suffrage campaign. Indeed, women's suffrage movement's aim was only to get admission to citizenship and through this the admission to the public sphere. Ellen Dubois perceptively observed that nineteenth century suffragist women accepted the suitability of women to domestic activities and their responsibility for the private sphere and did not project a recognition of the division of labor within the home.⁶⁴ Antoinette B. Blackwell, one of the pioneer suffragists and a minister, said that "the paramount social duties of women are household duties, avocations arising from their relations as wives and mothers."⁶⁵ A striking shift in feminist politics appeared with the second wave which immediately followed the suffragist movement. Drude Dahlerup brilliantly emphasized that the second wave feminism simply indicated a new impetus to this

movement which experienced periods of bloom, strength and visibility alternating with periods of more quiet dogged struggles to better women's position in a male-dominated society. The women's movement as a collective activity, she asserts, by women to better women's position and change the male dominance of society started in the USA in the 1840s, in England in the 1850s, in France and Germany in the 1860s and in the Scandinavian countries in the 1870s.⁶⁶

The most striking shift in feminist politics was observed in the 1960s. This time marks the beginning of the third wave in feminism, better known as the new feminism. Since then, the new feminist movement has grown rapidly in the number of members, the range of goals, and most strikingly in the number of organizations. Indeed, the present day feminist movement consists of thousands of interrelated but essentially independent groups.⁶⁷ The issue of abortion on demand was at the center of political protests and campaigns of the feminist groups of the 1970s and the issue of gender analysis was at stake in feminist theoretical studies. Free abortion on demand became a symbol of women's fight against the patriarchal society and its institutions. Moreover, it was, for women, the means by which can be gained legislatively the right of decision and control over their own bodies. Another important issue at the center of feminist groups was the analysis of the gender issue. Simon de Beauvoir's assertion on gender gained a motivation to feminist thinkers. She asserted that "one is not born a woman, but, rather, becomes one."⁶⁸ Feminist theory

took gender relations as its central issue to analyze how gender relations are constituted and experienced and how we think or, equally important, do not think about them. To adopt "gender" as an analytical category means to focus on the social and cultural construction of sexual difference among humans. It means that every culture, society and historical epoch constitutes and interprets sexual difference in a certain way and very often in more ways than one, which may themselves be contradictory.⁶⁹ It is assumed, by gender analysis, that men and women are behaviorally and psychologically different and the causes of these differences can be found in their growing process. The psychological factors of growing leads to a comprehensive development of gender differences and even gender identity.⁷⁰

Feminists, "have gone further and identified the 'gender subtext', in visions of the political subject, in the definition of the political realm and in the logic of terms like 'participation', 'autonomy', 'consent' and 'rights'.⁷¹" Feminists, in the last decade have shifted their attention from social analysis to discourse analysis, from power itself to the politics of its representation. In short, one of the most important results of the third wave of feminism is its success in changing many women's and men's way of thinking about women. Moreover, through the focus on conciseness-raising, on experiments in different ways of living, on non-oppressive relations between men and women at home and in society, and

creating a counter-culture and alternative institutions, feminists as a paramount modern social group have attempted to develop new ways of doing politics.

Now, the question concerning this study is that of what place feminism constitutes as a social movement between the state and civil society. Indeed, social movements, feminism in our analysis, raises important questions about the distribution and legitimacy of macro power relations. Moreover, it challenges the deep-rooted codes of social interactions within civil society and puts new forms in their place. The main task of a social movement is to raise collective activity in order to promote social change thus representing a protest against the established power structure and against the dominant norms and values. As Paul Wilkinson brilliantly emphasized "a social movement's commitment to change and the raison d'être of its organization are founded upon the conscious volition, normative commitment to the movement's aims or beliefs, and active participation on the part of the followers or members."⁷² In the collective action of women, in the last decades, the issues of "gender", "rights", "inequality", "exclusion" and "liberation" constitute a large part of the mobilization process. What women, along with other contemporary collective actors, have achieved is, above all, to practice alternative definitions of sense. In other words, they have created meanings and definitions of identity which contrast with the increasing⁷³ determination of individual and collective life. Feminism as

a social movement contributes to the development and consolidation of civil society at least upon three interrelated grounds. First, it brings about an issue as in the case of abortion from the back streets into the open and raises it to public discussion. Second, it redefines the deep-rooted codes of social institutions as in the case of gender analysis and replaces them with new meanings. Its largest impact, in that sense, is on the grass roots structures or in the socio-cultural field. Finally, feminism as a social movement puts pressure on the political parties and the governments to take a stand in Europe to pass new abortion laws after the 1970s,

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2.3.2. Feminist Claim on Equality

Egalitarian feminists attempt to develop a democratic theory based on civil equality that undermines the differences between the sexes so that full citizenship for women can be secured. They aim to achieve full equality of opportunity in all spheres of life without radically transforming the present social and political system. The realization of its aim means the transformation of the sexual division of labor and norms of femininity and masculinity, in particular for contemporary egalitarian feminists.

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Egalitarian feminism received its classic formulation in liberal feminist Mary Wallstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792). Egalitarian feminists' main emphasis,

still shared by contemporary liberal feminists, is that female subordination is rooted in a set of customary and legal constraints that prevent women's entrance in the public sphere. Since society has the false belief that women are, by nature, less intellectual and less capable physically than men, it excludes women from the academy, the forum, and the marketplace. As a result of this policy of exclusion, the true potential of many women goes unfulfilled. If women and men are given the same educational opportunities, and given equal civil rights they will overcome their subordination in the society.⁷⁶

In the book A Vindication of the Rights of Women Wallstonecraft presented an argument for the Enlightenment's understanding of human nature, that is she insisted that women shared the same nature with men, as having the same reason. The distinction between the sexes is entirely social thereby all other human activities should be governed by the principles of reason which are the same in all. Women can be dutiful or rational only when they are treated with the same dignity and allowed to share the same privileges as men.⁷⁷ She claimed that the perfection of our nature and capability of happiness must be estimated by the degree of reason, virtue and knowledge. From the exercise of knowledge and virtue which naturally flows,⁷⁸ the sexes should be equally undeniable. Moreover, she insisted on freedom for women and claimed that when you make women free "they will quickly become wise and virtuous as men become more so."⁷⁹ In short, Wallstonecraft

denied that women, were by nature, more pleasure seeking and pleasure giving than men. She wanted women to be treated as autonomous decision-makers. An equal education and equal opportunity for entrance into citizenship will allow a woman to assume responsibility for her own development and growth and will give her chance to have the same virtue with man.

John S. Mill, accordingly, in The Subjection of Women (1869), insisted that women should have equal educational and economic opportunities as well as the same civil rights with men. It is his liberal idea that the ordinary way is to maximize aggregate utility (happiness or pleasure) and to permit individuals to pursue whatever they desire. The only way for women to maximize their pleasure is to have the same rights with men in civil society. But he argues that sexual division of labor within the family is made by consent and he defends this as the most suitable division of labor between the two. When a woman marries it might be understood that she like a man chooses a profession, she makes a choice of the management of a household.⁸⁰ Mill believed that even given the same education, economic opportunities, and civil liberties as men women will still choose marriage and motherhood over other competing occupations. In short, although he regards women as having the same natural endowments with men he accepts that the most suitable occupation for women⁸¹ is their natural duties as homemakers and mothers.

The contemporary liberal feminists have gone further to say on equality. One of the prominent forerunners of the

twentieth century liberal feminists, Betty Friedan, insists in her book The Feminine Mystique (1963) that woman can find satisfaction exclusively in the traditional role of wife and mother which has left modern woman feeling empty and miserable. Therefore, even if, she proposes, contemporary liberated women want to stay at home with their husbands and children they should not be allowed to do so. Otherwise not only they will lose their productive capacity, they will also lead their children, in particular the sons to grow up passive and immature.⁸² But she in her later book The Second Stage changed her view in a radical shift. In that book she argues that women should have the right to be either in the market or to choose motherhood. She attempts to create a liberal condition which makes it possible for women to be able to work and have equality with men and choose, if they so desire, to have children.⁸³

Contemporary liberal feminists have maintained their position at the center of the same issue formulated by Friedan's first book. Their common argument is that the most important goal of women is sexual equality. They aim to free women from oppressive gender roles which prevent women from taking a place in the academy, in the forum and in the marketplace. Contemporary liberal feminists argue that patriarchal society thinks women are ideally suited only for certain occupations such as teaching, nurturing, caring and cleaning and are largely incapable of other tasks such as ruling, preaching and

investing.⁸⁴ Egalitarian feminist Zillah R. Eisenstein fights to guarantee equal sexual relations between men and women. This, for her, does not mean that men and women are pressured to be the same sexually, rather it means they are politically the same by guaranteeing that sexual difference has nothing to do with how much sexual freedom, economic independence, radical equality and intellectual opportunity one has. Sexual egalitarianism, for Eisenstein, can be achieved only under the condition that sexual difference is no longer the basis of her secondary political status.⁸⁵

In short, egalitarian feminists drive toward liberty, equality and fairness for women. The implication of equality for them will morally transform not only those who have been deprived of their rights but also those who have held rights on the basis of might.⁸⁶ Feminist writer Catherine A. Mackinnon emphasizes the result if there could be sexual equality for women in the following terms:

If the sexes were equal, women would not be sexually subjected. Sexual force would be exceptional, consent to sex could be commonly real and sexually violated women would be believed. If the sexes were equal, women would not be economically subjected, their desperation and marginality cultivated, their enforced dependency exploited sexually or economically. Women would have speech, privacy, authority, respect, and

more resources than they have now.

The root meaning of equality formulated here is negative egalitarianism, an abolitionist politics in its origins. Its aim is to eliminate both differences between categories and to restrict the authoritative oppression.⁸⁸ It holds as the basic principle that the rules and policies of the state, and rules of private institutions ought to be blind to race, gender, and other group differences. The public realm of the state and law should express its rules in general terms that abstract from the particularities of individual and groups, needs and situations and should recognize all persons equally and treat all citizens in the same way. Equality as such, obviously, is blind to group differences and blind to differences of race, culture, gender, age or disability. Moreover, women who formulate equality in this way are serving to privilege the male standards. Equality as such embraces the principle of sameness with men due to the fact that the present norms of the patriarchal state or the principles of patriarchal culture are institutionalized on the terrain of male-centered values. Such an equality, in the last analysis, integrate women with the world of men.

It is clear that such an integration serves to the development of civil society as well. But it will contribute to the emergence of a civil society principled one dimensionally, that is it will leads to a homogenization in the civil society. It contributes to civil society in the sense that men's values are restricted to be the only source of

virtue at the same time it adjusts the mis-ordered norms of the men-centered culture.

2.3.3. Feminist Politics of Difference

In feminist thought a shift has emerged from the "politics of equality" to the "politics of difference" which, in the last analysis, leads to the idea of an heterogeneity. Many feminists, in the last decades, have begun to assert a positiveness and pride in group specificity against ideals of assimilation which is idealized by egalitarian feminists. They have questioned whether justice always means that law and policy should enforce equal treatment for all groups. Feminist groups as such bring a concept of differentiated citizenship as the best way to realize the inclusion and participation of every one in full citizenship.

It became increasingly clear, among feminists, that it was not possible simply to include women in patriarchal discourses, laid down particularly by the masters of the theory of civil society, from which women have been excluded. For Elizabeth Gross, an advocate of the idea of the politics of difference among feminists, many patriarchal discourses were incapable of being broadened or extended to include women without radical upheavals and change. There is no space, to her, within these discourses to accommodate women's inclusion and equal participation.⁸⁹ Therefore, the political, ontological and epistemological commitments underlying

patriarchal discourses should be re-evaluated from the feminist perspective for such an integration to be realized. It is argued by her, otherwise, that the a priori assumptions of sameness or interchangeability, sexual neutrality or indifference, the complete neglect of women's specificities and differences could not be accommodated in traditional theoretical terms. Gross maintained that the whole social, political, scientific and metaphysical underpinning of patriarchal theoretical systems needed to be shaken up.⁹⁰

Feminists, proclaiming difference, raise a strong critique to the universal aspect of modern law and modern political thought. It is to this distinct feature of modern law that it applies uniform standards to different individuals in different situations. Ursula Vogel urges that if we believe that women have interests and needs significantly different from those of men and, furthermore, that these constitute not disabilities but sources of identity and strength, then the construction of a uniform genderless agent and the central premise of modern legal thinking must become significantly problematic.⁹¹ Another feminist writer, Beverly Thiele goes further to argue that the concept of citizenship in the modern political thought gives everyone the same status in the public life. However, to her, the values and norms of citizenship as such are structured in the concern of "male-stream" conception. She maintains that women are hidden in "male-stream" conceptions through mechanisms such as decontextualism, which implies the

distance of female from their actual being; universalism, rejecting the particularity of sexes; naturalism, which is based on men's nature; dualism, which takes the dualities as its essence; and appropriation, by which each sex is appropriated to certain roles framed through male-stream values.⁹² Masculine experiences, which are the mainstream of the modern state and its public realm, are labeled by feminists as militarist norms of honor, competition and bargaining among independent agents. Thus, it is claimed by some feminists, that modern man, by extolling to the virtue of universal public realm, fails to recognize the sexual difference, another kind of existence that they could not entirely understand and the morality that women represent.⁹³

Feminist theorist, Iris M. Young, argues that there are often group-based differences between men and women, whites and blacks, able-bodied and disabled people, therefore, any equal treatment puts these groups in a disadvantageous position. The generalized equal treatment usually disadvantages these groups in their opportunity to develop their capacities thus giving them particular experiences and knowledge. Thereby, where there are group differences in capacities, socialization, values and cognitive and cultural styles, only attending to such differences can enable the inclusion and participation of all groups in political and economic institutions. Therefore, instead of right and rules in universal terms, some groups deserve special rights.⁹⁴ For instance, the issue of a right to pregnancy and maternity

leave and the right to special treatment for nurturing mothers is highly fashionable among this group of feminists.

In respect to the issue of difference there are mainly two approaches in feminist thought. In the first, it is considered that the differences from men leads to the inferiority of women and keep them relatively powerless and means inequality and continued oppression for women. Therefore, some feminist writers insist that arguments on difference should be left in feminist literature. A prominent feminist of that viewpoint, Shulamit Firestone, stresses the chief difference between men and women as pregnancy or a woman's childbearing activity. She holds that women will never entirely be the equals of men until they are able to get rid of that activity.⁹⁵ Likewise, Zillah R. Eisenstein claims that the issue of sexual difference has been used to reject woman's notion of freedom and equality. Man and woman are sexually different from each other, but, she claims, they are not as much as man claims that they are different. Eisenstein maintains in her book Feminism and Sexual Equality (1984) that woman's different potential of childbearing constitutes the basis of the institution of motherhood, of the woman's economic dependence on man, of her secondary wage-earner status, of the system of heterosexual controls and of restrictive notions of sexuality. Difference, as such, she asserts, constitutes the basis of secondary position for women in every respect and therefore should immediately be left by women.⁹⁶

However, another, and importantly increasing number of

feminist women are emphasizing the differentiation of women as the privileges of women and thus, they argue, these differences strengthen the status of women. Moreover, there has been a tremendous growth of interest in a separate "women's culture" in the sense having to create artistic, literal, philosophical and spiritual forms of self-consciousness created by women warning from a sense of difference, not taking women as men's equivalent but different than men in a plurality of meaning.⁹⁷ A prominent of that view Joan W. Scott puts it very clear: "Feminists cannot give up 'difference'; it has been our most creative analytic tool."⁹⁸ Furthermore, Caroline Ramazanoglu insists that if they reject the positive aspects of womanhood then women's liberation has much to lose. Women, she maintains, should have special claims on nurturing, co-operation, caring, creativity, and closeness to nature.⁹⁹ Another advocate of that view Gerda Lerner tried to show that women have been thought to be nurturing, affiliative and cooperative, the traits of which would be endowed with more truly human qualities than men.¹⁰⁰ Adrienne Rich took a further look at the positive side of motherhood. Arguing against Firestone she proclaims that a feminist revolution would not liberate women from motherhood, on the contrary, would liberate women into a truly nurturing motherhood. Briefly Rich saw female physiology as a source of strength.¹⁰¹

A psychoanalytic feminist Carol Gilligan pays attention to the knowledge and behavior that are constructed differently

in men and women. Time, space, self, and other such concepts all arise out of the active interchange between the individual and the physical and social world in which he or she lives. Moving from this Kantian assertion, she develops an idea that women develop a living experience and thus a morality different from men.¹⁰² The separation and autonomy in men's lives often leads them to focus the discussion of morality around issues of justice, fairness, rules and rights, whereas the family lives lead women to emphasize people's wants, needs, interests and aspirations.¹⁰³ The male reason is taken, by the advocate of that view, as instrumental, and women's knowledge as intuitive, emotional, engaged and caring, and they claim that only these features of women can save humanity from the dangers of unconstrained masculinism. In short they indicate that much of women's history has been concerned with private matters: the bearing and raising of children, the cooking of food, the carrying of water, the tilling of the soil etc. This leads one to conclude that women should, in a democratic society, gain not rights on the principles of neutral and universal citizenship, rather on the principle of women's deep experience.¹⁰⁴

Feminists have opened a new epoch in arguments on difference by articulating postmodern concepts to the feminist thought. As it is well known postmodernism embraces a skepticism regarding generalizable and universal claims of any sort.¹⁰⁵ Postmodern feminists, similarly, have begun to suspect that all transcendental claims of Enlightenment reflect

and reify the experience of a few persons mostly white western males in the name of universality. Therefore, they have tried to formulate the notions such as self, knowledge and truth differently than those that were done by Enlightenment thinkers.¹⁰⁶ They, like postmodernists, have criticized modern moral and political theories, exposing the contingent, the partial and the historically situated character of what has passed in the mainstream for necessary, universal and historical truth. They have called into question the dominant philosophical project of seeking objectivity which transcends any situation or perspective.¹⁰⁷ Postmodern feminists developed the recognition that to live in Western culture resulted with the fact that one always finds oneself located within structures of dominance and subordination. Dominance and subordination are structured through the construction of a hierarchical duality of social construction and one of these polarity of duality has been given the values of domination. The duality of male/female is a discursive formation which results with women's subordination.¹⁰⁸ Therefore, postmodern feminists are seeking how it could be possible to create a different discourse or culture based on particular experience and which does not bring the subordination of a partner.¹⁰⁹

2.3.3.1. Politics of Difference In French Version

French feminism has been highlighted mainly through the studies of Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray and H el ene Cixous¹¹⁰

which promise a great revolt against the institutions of patriarchy which are reconstructed in the language. The term "difference" in the work of French feminist writers has a revolutionary meaning that is, the goal of a feminist enterprise is not to achieve socioeconomic equality with men but to disrupt and subvert Western patriarchal language and thought themselves.

French feminists have made us read language as a dense web of metaphors, displacements and silence as the embodiment of difference and the source of meaning, at the same time, a source of women's subordination. Kristeva, Irigaray and Cixous aptly argue that women's oppression does not merely exist in the concrete organization of economic, political or social structures. It is embedded in the very foundation of Logos, in the linguistic and logical process through which meaning itself is produced. What we perceive as the real, they maintain, is a manifestation of the symbolic order as has been constituted by men. Thus only by exposing this phallogentrism, by deconstructing it can we transform the real and thus subvert the subordination of women in any fundamental way.¹¹² They point to the problems involved in women's struggles for equality to men. They both assert that there is an irreducible difference between masculine and feminine and then, an equality can only be postulated by the reduction of one, subordinating one to the other. Therefore, they strongly nominate in contrast to feminists proclaiming the

sameness or equality, a feminism or a politics of difference, of specificities, a politics involving the recognition of the differences between men and women.¹¹³ For both sets of feminists the act of speaking and of writing as a female represents a fundamental revolt in the traditional systems of not only its material, economic, social and political manifestations, but the generative system which determines the production of meaning.¹¹⁴ This is why they have equated the recognition of the specificity of female unconscious with the free access to a specific discourse in the feminine mode and have defined this as the central focus of their struggle.¹¹⁵

All of the feminist writers Kristeva, Irigaray and Cixous are under the influence of two intellectual backgrounds; that is they bring together Freudian psychoanalytic account of psychic and Lacanian social production of subjectivity with a post-structural analysis of sexual or discursive production. Kristeva places a human infantile into two different phases: Semiotic and Symbolic order. The semiotic is equated with the energetic, rhythmic, bodily contributions of the pre-social individual. The symbolic, by contrast, is the domain of definite positions and propositions, the social side for the creation of unified texts, discourses and knowledges subsuming individual energies into collective social forms.¹¹⁶ The semiotic order derives its energy from the realm of the preodipal and it first occurs in the infant's attachment to the mother's body. However, the symbolic order plays the role of Logos, it is initiated in the "minor" stage, with

infant's need to deal with abstraction, that is, with the uses of language. She considers the pre-oedipal or Semiotic phase as feminine and maternal. It is dominated by the mother's body, it is pre-phallic, pre-paternal, existing before the father, and is regarded as the symbolic source of authority.¹¹⁷ Women in their experience are not be able to articulate the semiotic forces into the symbolic context. Men alone can represent, speak and symbolize the subversive underside of social unities. Poets, artists, theorists, avant-gardists, the transgressor of social, artistic and representational norms are necessarily male. Men alone, to her, occupy the position of speaking subjects.

Therefore, she argues that no sociopolitical transformation is possible which does not constitute a transformation of subjects. Subject for her is the postulation of a female principle, which she calls the Semiotic. Kristeva insists that only the eruption of the semiotic into the symbolic can give reign to difference, to heterogeneous meaning and thus subvert the existing system of language.¹¹⁹ The historical work for her involves the analysis of the work of language. This theoretical work can be looked at from the point of view of its ideological representation in writing.¹²⁰ She maintains that women are, in language, something that cannot be represented, something that is not said, something above and beyond ideologies. Then, she advises women to go beyond the male-centered language of Western culture.¹²¹ In Western societies, Kristeva asserts, sexual pleasure is

granted to women. It is the fact, for her, a speaking or a writing subject cannot depart himself or herself from the meaning of text he or she is using. If women have a role in this ongoing process it is only in assuming a negative function: reject everything finite, definite, structured, looked with meaning in the existing state of society.¹²² The following passage indicates what is found at the center of her message: "Woman is here to shake up, to disturb, to deflate masculine values, and not to espouse them. Her role is to maintain differences by pointing to them, by giving them life, by putting them into play against one another."¹²³ In short, only such an attitudes can place women on the side of the explosion of social codes with revolutionary moments.

Irigaray pays attention, like Kristeva, to the situation of women in Western culture. Influenced by Lacan she differentiates female imaginary from male imaginary. What we, imaginarily, know about woman including her sexual desire has been told to us from a male point of view. The only women type we know is the "masculine feminine". There may be, however, a "feminine feminine", a non-phallic feminine type. Moreover there may be a way to bring women to selfhood and language that does not have to be mediated in any way through men.¹²⁴ Woman, for her, is seen in Western philosophy as an opposite to man, as man's other, as the negative of the positiveness in the polarity of masculine/feminine dichotomy.¹²⁵ Since women are marked phallically by their fathers, husbands and procures, woman then is never anything

more than the scene of more or less a rivalry of exchange
between two men.¹²⁶ Women, signs, goods, currency, all
pass from one man to another. The genealogy of patriarchal
power, its laws, its discourse, its sociality is
institutionalized in father-son relations. These relations
which are operative everywhere can neither be disappeared in
the abolition of the family, nor of monogamic reproduction,¹²⁷
but only with a transition in language.

To Irigaray the phallogentric discourses and practices
have been appropriated by men universally. But men are unable
to represent themselves, as completely universal, therefore,
women are seen to compensate for the absences of what in the
male body. They are considered the corporeal, badly material
the substratum supporting male intellect, reason, theoretical
structures that is male immateriality. Moreover, woman
functions to complete man's fantasies. The pleasure that she
lives is not her own and it leaves her in her well-known state
of dependency. Women's pleasure, for her, is denied by
Western civilization that give privileges to phallogormorphism,
a culture in which woman represents the cheapest of
everything, she has no proper name. She is taken as the
negative, the opposite and reverse of what man is.¹²⁸
Moreover, she maintains that it is man who has been the
subject of discourse, whether in the field of theory,
morality or politics. Discourse is always paternal and
masculine in the West. For women, however, there remain the
so-called minor art-forms: cooking, knitting, sewing and so

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forth.

Therefore, Irigaray attempts to clear a space within language for another voice, body, pleasure, other forms of sexuality and desire, other forms of discourse and other forms of reason. As Elizabeth Gross aptly puts, "she desires to create discourses and representations of women and femininity that may positively inscribe the female body as an autonomous concrete materiality."¹³⁰ Irigaray emphasizes the need for a language which asserts positive meaning to femininity. She states, as a concluding remark, her desire like the following: "For the work of sexual difference to take place, a revolution in thoughts and an ethics is needed. We must reinterpret the whole relationship between the subject and discourse, the subject and the world, the subject and the cosmic, the microcosmic and the macrocosmic."¹³¹ It is only possible in this way to her that the male discourses are reinserted back and femininity and women may be able to establish a discursive space or position which is their own.

A further analysis of women's relation to language was put forth by Cixous who argues that everything is word, that culture is grasped by the word. She claims that as soon as we are born into language it dictates us with its laws. Traditionally, throughout the history of Western thought, the logos has been founded on the structure of the binary oppositions such as Sun/Moon, Nature/History, Passion/Action, High/Low, and so forth. For her, everything said;

everything organized as discourse such as art, religion, family, language, are organized on the basis of hierarchical oppositions which come back to the opposition man/woman.¹³²

All these dichotomies, for Cixous, associate man with all that is positive and women with all that is generally negative. Thus woman exists in man's world on his terms, she is either the other for man or she is unthought. The phallogentrism is to her the origin of all kinds of power: property, masculine domination, the constitution of the state, the ideological apparatuses and the like.¹³³ Therefore, Cixous emphasizes on the need for a transformation that emerges and invents a new history, which is opposite to the phallogentrism. For her the categories of "man" and "woman" are nothing more than the imaginary order coming into existence in the multiplications of representations, images, reflections, myths and identifications. Then a transformation is identical with the deforming of that imaginary order.¹³⁴ Moreover, she gives importance to women's writing as a device to put themselves into the text as well as into the history. She maintains that women should write about femininity, about their sexuality, about their erotization, about the adventure of their drives and about everything belonging to women.¹³⁵ An alternative, she insists, propounded by women would constitute the movement of a transformation of social and cultural structures. Cixous urges that "it is by writing, from and toward women and by taking up the challenge of speech which has been governed by the phallus, that women will confirm women in a place other

than that which is reserved in and by the Symbolic, that is, in a place other than silence."¹³⁶ In, short, like Kristeva and Irigaray, Cixous too argues for a particular perspective and culture coming to terms through appropriation of a different meaning system that is language, particular only to women.

Now, it is the central concern of that part to analyze what implications are observed in arguments pertaining to the principles of civil society by having a review of arguments on the politics of difference. Indeed, concentrating on the difference seems to get feminists in a pendulum swing between the "same as" and "different from". It is the first concept which, in the last analysis, brings all of those who require equality along the same line with men. However, the second one differentiates women from men and creates an area of heterogeneity and multiplicity enhanced by women's experience and values. It proposes a kind of "separation" which implies that it separates women from men and from institutions, roles and activities which are male-defined and male dominated exclusively operating for male privilege. This separationist attempt brings one to observe a kind of plurality in the public life. Seen as such we can claim that feminists, by appealing to the notion of multiplicity, are creating an increasingly different epoch in civil society, which at the same time, creates a challenge to the dominant unitarian power. In other words it serves to break down the "unitarian type" of any society coming into being as an outcome of unitarian meaning

systems. Moreover feminists by embracing the concept of difference serve to create a need for a justice which is sensitive to variations of gender, race, class and other sociological categories. Such a justice, clearly, will foster a conception of the public which in principle excludes no person, no aspect of a person's lives, nor topic of discussion and which encourages aesthetical as well as discursive expression.

To conclude one should bear in mind that different social groups have different needs, cultures, histories, experiences and perception of social relations, all of which influence their interpretation of the meaning and the consequences of policy proposals as well as the forum of their political reasoning. The participation of citizens in the political system over the principles of their particular interests also create a richness in political system which might be accounted as a functional contribution to the development of civil society. Indeed, this is the most important feminist contribution to civil society.

2.3.4. Feminist Autonomy In the Public Life

The distinction between public and private life has gained strong attacks by many feminists in last decades. They sought to indicate that the distinction traditionally made between public and private life brings nothing more than the oppression of women in the household. The household as the chief sphere

of private life is accepted by some feminists as the extension of the political sphere of public life. This opened a new epoch on the terrain of these concepts.

What we traditionally know about the public and the private is their having different modes of functioning and their being governed by different rules. The private sphere is known as the world of particularism, subjection, inequality, natural emotions, love and partiality; where as, the public sphere is known as the world of universalism, independence,¹³⁷ equality, reason, rationality and impartiality. However, feminists have objected that the distinction and the argument that the concept of privacy, as such, has created a place of battery, marital rape and women's exploited domestic labor. It has preserved the control and self-definition. Catherine A. MacKinnon asserts that when women are segregated in private they are isolated from each other and from the public resources. Therefore, she claims that the distinction between the public and the private, embraced particularly in liberal thought, is an ideological division that mystifies the unity among women and assures women's subjection within it.¹³⁸ An advocate of that view, Carole Pateman, raises strong criticism to the liberals, particularly to Locke, who formulates civil society on the basis of public life, a domain of the male individual. She argues that Locke conceptualizes civil society in abstraction from ascriptive domestic life, and, therefore, women are forgotten in his theoretical discussion. The separation between public and private is

represented as a division within the world of men, within civil society. The separation is then expressed as "society and state", or "economy and politics", or "social and political". Domestic life has tended to fall outside both state and civil society.¹³⁹

Radical feminists raise an argument about the roots behind the division between the public and the private realm. Many radical feminists argue that it is the patriarchal system that creates such a distinction in order to oppress women. It is the patriarchal system that brings power, dominance, hierarchy, and competition. They claim that the natural order attributed to women is nothing more than a patriarchal trap giving men and women naturally different personhood, characteristics and attitudes. Kate Millet is one of the prominent radical feminist who thinks that the roots of women's oppression are hidden in patriarchy's sex/gender system. She argues that sex is political because the male-female relationship is the paradigm for all power relationships. Patriarchal ideology makes it certain that men always control the public and private worlds and makes men to always have the dominant or masculine roles and that women always have the subordinate or feminine ones. It produces that ideology through the academy, the church and the family each of which justifies and reinforces women's subordination to men.¹⁴⁰

Michelle Z. Rosaldo observed that common to all known societies was some type of separation between a domestic sphere and a

public sphere, the former associated with women, the latter with men, therefore, women's power is always viewed, in many societies, as illegitimate, disruptive and without authority.¹⁴¹ Moreover, radical feminist Mary O'Brien attempts to indicate that patriarchy in all parts of the world has divided up men's work and women's work along evaluative lines with works done in separate places. Men, she maintains, make history in public, women are the handmaidens of nature in private, men achieve, women serve, and women's work takes place under the supervision of men. To her, the private is not private, it is institutionalized and has an elaborate set of myths, ideologies and practices to prepare a set which is called patriarchy. In short, the private for her is the locus of power for every man and the locus of patriarchy which is a crude form of biological determinism.¹⁴²

Radical feminists give answer to the division between the public and the private with the slogan "the personal is political". The earlier claim that the personal is political came from those radical feminists of the 1960s and 1970s who argued that since the family was at the root of women's oppression it must be abolished.¹⁴³ Indeed, that the "personal is political" has become much more than a slogan for recent feminists, the personal is epistemologically political, which means that philosophy, poetry, language, science and all scholarly inquiries are political.¹⁴⁴ That the personal is political challenges the separation of the public and the private spheres and also challenges their identification with

men and women, which is so fundamental to liberal political thought. It implies an emancipationist demands for a progress of women into the public sphere.¹⁴⁵ It imagines taking the form of a demand for the inclusion of women in the category of the individual which has traditionally been esteemed in the formulation of civil society.¹⁴⁶ Since, feminists think that the private sphere is a common ground of women's inequality, they do not keep it out of the state intervention for the safety of individual liberty, rather they politicize it. As MacKinnon aptly states the politization of the private is nothing more than producing a public not isolated from difference, but consisting of the ingredients of diverse modes of living.¹⁴⁷ In short, feminists insist that the separate liberal worlds of private and public life are actually interrelated and connected by a patriarchal structure. The family, as a social unit of civil society, for feminists, is regulated politically by the state through legislation concerning marriage, sexuality and so forth. The family, as such, contributes to the justification of the state's and the court's growing role in private relations.¹⁴⁸ Therefore, to include women alongside men in the public life, according to feminists, implies that the traditional generic division of patriarchal society should be diminished.¹⁴⁹

In order to take a full part in public life women should escape from the roles assigned to them as childbearer and as childrearer. An advocate of that view, Ann Oakley, argues that motherhood is a myth produced within the patriarchal

discourses to institutionalize the oppression of women. Girls, she claims, are not naturally positioned to be mothers, rather women are socially and culturally conditioned to be mothers.¹⁵⁰ Another radical feminist Firestone strongly argues that women's liberation requires a biological revolution by which women seize control of reproduction in order to overcome the sexual class system. She claims that when there is no distinction between the productive and reproductive roles for men and women it will be possible to overcome all of the relationships, structures and ideas that have always divided the human community: oppressing /oppressed, exploiting /¹⁵¹ exploited, master / slave and so on. In short she proposes a new technique of reproduction which is only under the control of women, a technique like a test tube baby, which will stop women from being the only center of childbearing.

Another way radical feminists propose to take a place thus a female autonomy in the public life is that to sexually depart themselves from men. For these radicals it is the lesbian sexuality that serves as a paradigm for women to depart from men. Lesbianism, for radical feminists is not a personal choice, rather it is the symbol of patriarchal rejection. For instance, radical feminist Charlotte Bunch argues that sex is not a private matter it is a political matter of oppression, domination and power. Therefore, lesbianism, for her, is the only way for women to challenge the ideological, political and economic basis of male supremacy.¹⁵² Moreover, radical feminist Marilyn French develops the image of community which

has androgynous values. She argues that men traditionally have the ideology of "power-over", however, women have the concept of "pleasure with". This "pleasure with" is the most humanly way of living and this is only possible in an androgynous culture.¹⁵³ In short, for radical feminists, the only way in which women can assert their autonomy from men in the public life and recover their true and natural femininity is to separate from men and the patriarchal structures of society.

Another project to include women in public life has been produced by Marxist and socialist feminists. Beginning with Frederich Engels, Marxist feminists have claimed that women's oppression has been originated by the introduction of private property. Private ownership of the means of production by relatively few persons, originally all male, created a closed system whose contemporary manifestations are imperialism and capitalism. Based on that state of affair they claim that capitalism itself is the cause of women's oppression. In order for women to be liberated, the capitalist system must be replaced by a socialist system in which no one would be economically dependent on anyone else.¹⁵⁴ Contemporary marxist feminist Margaret Benston calls attention to the economic situations of men and women in industrialized capitalist society. She claims that women are primarily producers of single-values in those activities associated with the home and family, however men are the producers of essential products associated with the factory and the public. Therefore, she

claims that unless a woman is freed from her heavy domestic duties, including child care, her entrance into public work will not remove her from liberation. Not only an equal entrance to the public work is necessary for women, but also the socialization of the domestic labor. As long as work in the home remains a matter of private production and is the responsibility of women they will never achieve a liberation.¹⁵⁵

Socialist feminists attempt to link the radical feminists' concept of "patriarchy" and marxist feminists' concept of "production" by paying attention to the material base of patriarchy which brings men's control over women's labor power. That control is maintained, for socialist feminists, by excluding women from access to necessary economically productive resources and by restricting women's sexuality.¹⁵⁶ Juliet Michell's Woman's Estate is one of the prominent studies in the socialist feminist framework. She argues that women's condition is overdetermined by the structures of production, reproduction, sexuality and the socialization of children. Woman's status and function in all of these structures must change if she is to achieve full liberation in the public life.¹⁵⁷ In fact, one can easily see that both the marxist and socialist feminists, like the radical feminists, see the liberation of women by the abolition of the private sphere and in women's taking an appropriate part in the public life.

One can see that as an extension of the politics of

difference the feminists' demand to take part in the public on the basis of female oriented modes of political behavior, communication and decision - making styles will lead them to create an autonomy in the public life. The feminists' claim on an autonomous body in the public life will lead to the emergence of an autonomous public which rejects the creation of a unified public realm in which citizens leave behind their particular group affiliations, histories and needs to discuss a general interest or common good. An autonomous public assigns difference positive meanings and acknowledges them as necessary ingredients of the civil society. In such a public it is more likely that different groups will have communication among themselves and this will likely create an equilibrium among groups. An autonomization in civil society leads to at least three implications: first, it contributes to self-organization of group members who are aware of their identity, collective interest and group consciousness. Second, it protects the individual by appealing to its norms against the oppression of the authority. Finally, it develops a veto power regarding specific policies which threaten the group interest about special issues. The feminists' demand to develop and foster a distinctively women's culture and women's specific needs both opens in the public life a special place and contributes to strengthen the position of women. Moreover, it subverts the universal public project of the modern political thought excluding particularity, desire, feeling and those aspects of life associated with the body.

In conclusion, one can clearly see that feminist politics of equality, difference and autonomy is in a way that each is interrelated with one another and they complete each other. It is only on the basis of equality that a location can be opened for the demands of difference in civil society. As long as the principle of equality is institutionalized legally, politically and economically no segment of different categories can find a chance to maintain its existence within a civil society. Therefore, feminists contribute to the development of civil society firstly by their claim on equality, secondly their commitment to difference and finally by their idealization of an autonomy in the public life. Equality opens the way; the difference functions to institutionalize the existence of different groups; and the autonomy functions to stay against authority on behalf of the members of the social groups. It should be remembered that the feminists' commitment to the concept of autonomy contributes also to the autonomy of other groups in civil society.

CHAPTER III

CIVIL SOCIETY AND WOMEN IN TURKISH POLITICS

The basic aim of this chapter is to analyze the condition of civil society and women in Turkish politics. It begins with an analysis of the earlier period of the Ottoman-Turkish politics and then, through the reforms of the Republican Turkish period up to the 1980s, it then seeks to bring to light the place of civil society in Turkish politics and the particular role of Turkish women. The point of departure is that beginning from the Ottoman times to the 1980s Turkish politics experienced the tradition of a strong state and a relatively weak civil society. Either in the name of the Sultan or of the intellectual-bureaucratic elite one always sees a strong center at the focus of Turkish politics. In this political tradition, women were seen almost as the first potential element of civil society during the last half of the nineteenth century when statesmen were raising demands for the modernization of the Ottoman state. Later, when the intellectual-bureaucratic elite occupied the center of politics, women were once again smothered under the heavy impact of the aims put forward by the state elites. The following part concentrates on a detailed analysis of that argument.

3.1. THE EARLIER OTTOMAN HERITAGE

3.1.1. The Condition of Civil Society

The Ottoman state is well known as a kind of imperial bureaucratic regime with its characteristics indicating a cultural rift between the center and the periphery. The distinctness and autonomy of the center gave way to its ability to develop and maintain its own specific symbols and criteria of recruitment and organization.¹ Thus, it lacked the basic intermediate structural component that Hegel termed "civil-society", a part of society that could operate independently of the central government and was based on property rights.² The Ottomans opted for a central government staffed by loyal slaves, who were socialized to the secular and state-oriented norms of the center.³ Therefore, the traditional distance between the state and society created a relation based on the domination of social groups by the state.⁴

In the Ottoman Empire initially the state was governed by one ruler and the others were his servants. The power was held by the Sultan in the Ottoman Empire, who was the ultimate power, appointed by God to hold together the parts of society, the "zillullahi fil alem" (shadow of God in the world) in popular literature.⁵ Indeed, neither the Sultan nor his administrators constituted a class in the process of

production, but rather were consumers of products. The status, role, and appointment of the administrators under the Sultan were fulfilled not according to their functionality in special roles but according to their loyalty to the Sultan, a process which genuinely strengthened the Sultan's post.⁶ In the classical period (from the establishment of the Empire until sixteenth century) the person of the Sultan was identical with the state. However, in later centuries, particularly after the sixteenth century, when the Sultan became a puppet in the hands of the military, civil and religious bureaucracies and various cliques in the palace, he lost his charisma; this was then gradually attributed to the state. Thus, the Sultan could now be deposed in the name of the state, which was seen as the provider of order.⁷ In the Ottoman Empire, after the sixteenth century, power gradually came to be wielded by four major groups: military, bureaucracy, religious institutions and the palace. All of these groups or institutions reflected the state in various aspects. Indeed, no bourgeoisie, hereditary landed aristocracy or non-governmental clergy existed as an independent source of power.⁸ In short, the domination of the Sultan, and of a strong state, constituted the essential obstacles to the development of the autonomous social classes which constitute the basic component of civil society.

These features of the Ottoman-Turkish culture were also incongruent on the grounds by which the civil societal elements are furnished. The notion of opposition in the Ottoman-Turkish

culture was deeply repugnant. A predilection has been shown for the organic theories of the state and society and solidarist doctrines which found easy acceptance in the Turkish culture throughout its history. "Thus it appears that the notion of a loyal and legitimate opposition has not been fully institutionalized at the cultural level."⁹ A further related tendency in the Ottoman-Turkish culture was that, primacy was not given to the individual but to the collectivity, be it the nation, the state or one of its sub-units. Individuality came to be attributed as a deviance and was to be punished.¹⁰ In the case of collectivity the Ottoman culture was under the impact of eastern thought which elevates the collectivity over individuality. The Ottoman subjects were termed as "reaya",¹¹ which meant those people looked after by a herder. The folk literature of Ottoman culture is full of stories referring to grand sultans or states, not individuals.¹² The upshot was that in the Ottoman-Turkish culture individuality and 'being different' were identified with deviant behavior, while the state was accepted as the highest prosperity granted by God.¹³ This is why Metin Heper finds the typology of liberalism and authoritarianism less satisfactory in analyzing Ottoman politics. Rather he describes Ottoman politics as transcendentalism, which meaning by state elites to transcend particularistic interests.¹⁴ One should be aware that in folk culture the state is termed as "father state", a term referring to respect. Perhaps this is the reason, as perceptively observed by Heper, why Turkish politics is not hostile to the state.¹⁵ The political culture as such predominantly

prevented the development of intermediate structures engaging in particular interests, vis-a-vis the collective one.

The three potential elements of civil society in Ottoman-Turkish politics might be described as the millet system, the guilds, and the religious institution. However, each of these institutions overwhelmingly depended on the state. Non-Muslim groups were organized under the millet system, which functioned as a component of the state rather than of civil society. The religious heads of these communities worked closely with the Ottoman government as partners in the administration of their respective ethno-communal system. Although they were economically powerful they were weak politically, and they were completely dependent on the state.¹⁶ The guilds also constituted an administrative link between the ruling institutions and the town population. The state controls over the price and quality of goods were fulfilled by means of the guilds.¹⁷ The chief officer of the guilds (known either as kethuda or kahya) was elected by the artisan members of the guild, but the genuine acceptance of any candidate as the chief officer depended on the "berat-i serif" (Imperial license) given by the central administration.¹⁸ The guilds administered various branches of the crafts, provided raw materials to the artisans and controlled whether or not they followed the essential rules; they even educated the artisans, giving them certificates as well as collecting taxes.¹⁹ These functions of the guilds led the Ottoman merchants to represent

the state rather than a particular interest.

The religious institution, in Ottoman society, also depended on the state. Islam, in theory, enjoys the unity of the state and the community. Islam and the state are, therefore, considered one and the same entity.²⁰ The religious members were appointed by the Sultan and could be easily dismissed, on any occasion, by him. The top of the religious institution, the "Seyhulislam", completely depended on the Sultan and had no right to interfere directly in the government or the legal administration.²¹ The fact that their attainments were made by the state generated a source of loyalty to the state among the ulema (Islamic theologians).²² The ulema were also managers of the "vagfs" (religious foundations) and assisted the Ottoman regime in taxation and the performance of complex administrative and juridical tasks, at the same time as educating the Ottoman subjects through these foundations.²³ Religion, thus, through the functional actions of the ulema and the vagfs constituted an administrative link between the state and the Ottoman subjects, and was, at the last analysis, an administrative component of the state rather than an element of civil society.

Like the ulema, the local notables in the Ottoman society could not constitute an element of civil society. The ayan (local notables) were, at least before the sixteenth century, simply influential local residents who served as intermediaries

between the local populace and the government. Following changes in the sixteenth century, the word ayan, was used to refer to groups that were tax farmers, holders, and eventually ²⁴ de facto land owners.

In short, with the absence of a strong bourgeoisie and an aristocracy, the components of civil society could not develop ²⁵ in the Ottoman-Turkish context. It is clear that the existing potential civil societal elements in Ottoman politics, as analyzed above, fulfilled an administrative function rather than producing alternative norms, meanings, values and discourses to those developed by the state.

3.1.2. Women in Ottoman Society

The Ottoman law regulating basic institutions was obviously based on Islamic principles. Islam divides society basically into two sub-universes: the universe of men and the universe of women. Fatima Mernissi emphasizes the dual world that exists in Islamic society. She argues that the social division according to sex reflects the division between those who hold authority and those who do not, those who hold spiritual powers and those who do not. This division is based on the physical separation of the public sphere from the domestic universe. While the members of the public are umma (men) the members of the domestic sphere are women. Mernissi claims that the regulation between its members is based on these principles: in the public sphere the principles of equality, reciprocity, unity,

aggregation, brotherhood, love, trust and the like exist. However, in the domestic sphere the principles of inequality, lack of reciprocity, segregation, separation, subordination, and mistrust exist.²⁶

Indeed, Islam gave women very radical rights compared to its contemporaries, making them equal with men in various respects.²⁷ The condition of woman in the Ottoman-Turkish politics was previously so good that woman was free and had the same rights as man, at least until the sixteenth century. Women were free in the clothing they wore, went to war with men, rode horses, worked on the land and participated in the decision making process.²⁸

However, following the development of the Ottoman state into a near theocratic state after the sixteenth century (and especially after the conquest of Byzantium which brought the Ottomans into close contact with the structures of the Byzantine state)²⁹ women's place in society changed drastically. The Byzantine experience was particularly influential on the Ottomans. The Byzantine empire was a class society made up of slaves working on the land and the ruling classes. Those women belonged to the ruling classes and lived in the cities were secluded in the harem, a practice already observed in the Muslim Ummayyad and Abbasian empires as well as the non-Muslim Persian state and later adopted by the Ottoman ruling classes. In the Ottoman harem there existed polygamy,

and women lived among themselves and came into contact only with the male members of their family. Their social life was limited to reproduction and domestic labor. After the sixteenth century, with the emergence of a strong state in Ottoman politics, the Saray (Palace) and the ulema began to interpret the Muslim religion in such a way that it justified³⁰ the complete exclusion of women's social and economic life. One should be aware of the fact that the harem life of the Ottoman-Turkish was restricted to Istanbul. In the rural part of Ottoman-Turkish society, no experience of harem was felt and man and woman worked side by side in the fields. The woman was³¹ a producer and a helper to her husband.

It was after the sixteenth century that we see a large number of fermans (imperial edicts) limiting women's social and economic life. Since the impacts of edicts are important in the Ottoman-Turkish women's life it is necessary to emphasize these in more detail. Imperial edicts restricted women's life mainly in three areas: the clothes they wore, their appearance in public and their relations with men in their social life. The manner of dress of Ottoman-Turkish women was specified through the imperial edicts. One published in 1725 was worded in the following manner:

...certain brazen women have begun to be seen in the streets dressed in finery, affecting all kinds of innovations in their garments and giving strange bizarre shapes to their headdress in imitation of

shameless women, in order to corrupt the population. Their audacity in lifting the veil of virtue in defiance of decrees to the contrary: their improvisation of modes of dress which violate all notions of propriety; and appearance in diverse unseemly costumes, has reached the stage where even women of virtue have begun to fall under their influence. These outlandish clothes are prohibited... If any woman is seen out in the streets or in excursion places wearing one of these newfangled feraje with a white collar, the collar will be cut there and then in public, and if any person persists in wearing them and offends for a second or third time, they will be exiled to the provinces.

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The imperial edicts also dealt with the places that women could go for amusement. When the Sultan was informed that some women were meeting with men in distant places of Istanbul like Kisikli, Akbaba and Bulgurlu he forbade women from going to these places. The edict related to that prohibition is worded as follows: "From now on, women are prohibited to go to distant amusement places in carriages. Those women who go to these places, despite the prohibition, and those men who take them with their cabs will be exiled from Istanbul." Furthermore, excursions of young women together with young men in boats were prohibited. An edict of the Sultan to the boat officer of Istanbul declared that "as denounced before, confine the

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excursion of young women together with boys in boats and
proclaim this edict to all the boatmen."³⁴

This issuing of so many imperial edicts followed the close contact of the Ottoman population with Western products. After the sixteenth century the Ottoman empire constituted an attractive market for western products, particularly for textiles. Ottoman women had an imprudent desire to follow the current fashion and try new costumes.³⁵ One needs to remember that religion in Ottoman politics was absorbed into the state institutions, importantly, more than that was individually felt. This is why the imperial edicts were reinforced and justified through the religious doctrines and why they were unsuccessful in persuading the women who behaved with their individual initiatives.³⁶ Perhaps another reason why the imperial edicts failed to overcome the situation was that beside the Muslim population there were a large number of women from non-Muslim communities (Jews, Greek and Armenian Christians) who were excluded from these edicts and remained free in their style of life. They then had a greater impact on the surface of the streets of Istanbul as well as influencing³⁷ the Muslim women, particularly with their styles of clothing.

The Ottoman women were also limited in their education. They were educated only up to the age of 11 or so, in subyans (primary schools) which were found only in the large cities. These Female students were given mainly a religious education,

receiving only a small amount of the science of their time. They were educated together with male students or separately in schools particular to females.³⁸

Despite all of these restrictions one can encounter in history a large number of famous Ottoman women who were writers, poets, calligraphers and so forth. Another area where they were prominent was in the founding of religious institutions beginning from the earlier years of the Ottoman empire up to the last decades.³⁹ In Istanbul six libraries were founded by Ottoman women, in Tarsus one and in Baghdad three between 1583-1871.⁴⁰ In Istanbul alone women endowed 69 schools, and 13 medreses (religious schools) between the years 1667-1882.⁴¹ They also founded about 1533 religious foundations in Istanbul, dealing with various social issues.⁴² Ottoman women brought into being similar foundations in other Anatolian cities as well. Halit Organ found that 43 of the total 151 foundations, founded in Ankara between 1585 and 1924 were endowed by women.⁴³ Finally, one can see from the imperial edicts that Ottoman women were also active in merchant life. They had shops and were active in the exchange of goods and slaves.⁴⁴

In conclusion, one needs to remember that women in Ottoman-Turkish politics did not organize against the state authority. Nevertheless, at least from the sixteenth century onward, women as a social category gradually occupied the chief attention of the state authority. Based on external

relations (trade with West), internal dynamics (non-Muslim estates) and their own choice they frequently reversed the values the government tried to impose upon them. From time to time they ignored the governmental prohibitions and replaced them with habits of their own. This aspect of women as well as the aspect that they were active in various parts of the social life is significant when analyzing the role of women in civil society. Their conditions lead us to reach the conclusion that although a strong civil societal element was not seen through women they, in fact, stood always as an hidden potential element in the earlier period of the Ottoman-Turkish political context.

3.2. WOMEN AS A LINK TO THE WESTERN CIVILIZATION

The nineteenth century of the Ottoman Empire was ranked by the dynamic effort of state elites to turn the face of the Empire toward Western institutions. The Ottomans, for a long time, were aware of their backwardness versus the rapid developments accomplished in various aspects in Western societies. In order to overcome that backwardness, there was felt a need for a change in the military , administrative, legal and educational institutions.

As we have seen, the early Ottoman Sultans pursued vigorously to keep society together. However, from the

nineteenth century onwards the bureaucratic elite acted in the belief that they were the only ones responsible for modernizing and developing their country.⁴⁶ Indeed, modernization during the nineteenth century was taken synonymously with Westernization, which was perceived from the perspective of the Enlightenment tradition. The state's salvation was the main target pursued by the intellectual-bureaucrats and the substitution of reason for religion was regarded as the central premises for public policy making.⁴⁷ The vanguard of the modernization effort was rooted in the state layer, far more than the civil societal elements. The state, in fact, as of the nineteenth century, turned into an agent of change. The state-⁴⁸ whoever resisted it was labeled as opposed to progress.

Three main aspects of modernization during the nineteenth century were the emergence of a constitutional government, the emergence of an intellectual-bureaucratic elite and the importance granted to women's education. These efforts resulted in a progress towards a constitutional government in the Ottoman polity. The Sened-i Ittifak (Deed of Alliance) of 1808, the Gulhane Hatt-i Humayunu (Imperial Rescript of Gulhane) of 1839, the Islahat Fermani (Reform Edict) of 1856, the creation of central and provincial assemblies and councils throughout the Tanzimat Period of 1839-1876, and the establishment of the first Ottoman parliament in 1877, are taken as the major developments of the nineteenth century.⁴⁹ A second layer of modernization was the importance of the new roles given to journalists and intellectuals by the Young Ottomans who would

later constitute an element of elite politics in Turkey. The third and no less important aspect of modernization, in the last period of the Ottoman empire, was the attention given to woman issue by the political elite: the efforts of the government to create new institutions with the aim of educating women, and the roles given to women in modernization of the Ottoman society. Indeed, regarding women as a link to Western civilization was not an attitude practiced only by the Ottomans but rather, as Leila Ahmed correctly argues, a common attitude in Middle Eastern societies. Since the late nineteenth century, when feminist ideas first began to develop in Middle Eastern societies, "a Middle Eastern society's formal stand on the position of women has often been perhaps the most sensitive index of the society's attitude to the West -its openness to, or its rejection of Western civilization."⁵¹ To assure women's education, their being integrated into social life and their visibility in the streets was accepted by the intellectuals of the time as a symbolic link to contact with Western civilization and to overcome the cultural problems of the Empire. The woman issue was, in fact, the focus of the arguments between two predominant sections: the Westernizers and the traditionalists. A Turkish student of political science, Nilufer Gole, puts it very aptly by saying that during the Tanzimat Period the woman issue coincided with the distinctions between the public and private spheres. While the Westernizers associated social corruption with the non-education of women, the traditionalists stressed that a new

corruption would come if they destroyed the secret life surrounding women. The education of women and their participation in the public life was regarded as having a corrupting effect on Ottoman society.⁵² Traditionalist-religious thinkers like Mahmud Esad argued that if the Ottomans turned the face of society back to the Asr-i Saadet (the 'Golden Age' in Islamic society during the Prophet's lifetime) it would be possible to 'save' society.⁵³ However, prominent thinkers of the Tanzimat Period (1839-1876) like Namik Kemal, Semseddin Sami, Fatma Aliye and Ahmet Mithat, advocated women's education and their equality with men in public life.⁵⁴ The basic theme of Semseddin Sami's book "Kadinlarimiz" (Our Women) is that happiness and the progress of family life and civilization are dependent on women. Therefore, women should be given as much education as men if Ottoman society was to reach a genuine civilization.⁵⁵ Ahmet Mithat, meanwhile, "accounted the ideal of an educated girl as a genuine indicator of modernization."⁵⁶

With the advent of the Tanzimat Period women's status in Ottoman society drastically changed. The Islahat Fermani of 1856 announced that no one could be dominated sexually by anybody else.⁵⁷ Two new regulations beginning from that time were particularly important to women: the "Arazi Kanunu" (Land Code) of 1858 and the "Sicill-i Nufus Nizamnamesi" (Regulation of Population Register) of 1881. With the Land Code the previous regulation concerning heritage, that in cases where a male heir existed the female could not benefit from the

heritage of her parents, was abolished and female heirs were given the same right as male.⁵⁸ Moreover, based on the Population Regulation the state began to interfere with the marriage institution for the first time in Ottoman history. Before this law, marriage among the Ottoman subjects was regulated by imams (prayer leaders men) independent of the state. But now, the Regulation enforced the spouses to receive legal permission for marriage, and it cast an official role to the religious men in the marriage.⁵⁹

Indeed, education was the most important means by which the Ottoman women managed to break away from their traditional role. The Tanzimat Period was the first in which women were educated by the government in different areas. Midwifery education for women was provided for in medical schools in the year 1842.⁶⁰ This was followed immediately by the "Kiz Rustiyeleri" (Secondary Schools For Females) in 1858, and by industrial schools for females in 1869 opened to train the female population for industry, and by the "Dar-ul Muallimat" (Teacher's School for Females) in 1870. Students who graduated from these schools were sent by the government to different parts of the country to educate the rest of the Ottoman women.⁶¹ With the edict of the "Maarif-i Umumiye Nizamnamesi" (Regulation of Public Education) in 1868 the government required the entire Ottoman population to send female children aged between 6-11 to primary schools.⁶²

Later the "Kanun-i Esasi" (Constitution) of 1876 directed that "all the Ottoman population would compulsorily receive primary education."⁶³ When coming to the year 1905 we see that in the Ottoman Empire there existed 3,621 primary schools for female students.⁶⁴ In 1909 with the addition of 84 secondary schools approximately 10,000 female students were being educated.⁶⁵ All these developments motivated the intellectuals of the time to pay more attention to women's present status. The "Terakki", the first newspaper published in the Ottoman Empire in 1868, dealt with woman issue and later published a separate paper, "Muhadderat", for women in 1888.⁶⁶ A series of new papers and magazines followed in the following years. Sefika Kurnaz lists 13 magazines pertaining to woman issue being published in the Ottoman society between 1868 and 1900.⁶⁷ The basic themes of these magazines brought to light the importance of women's education in the development of the country. By attacking the institution of polygamy which was widespread among the ruling class and by calling for equality between men and women these magazines defended women's rights. The struggle for a new role in the society for women was worded in Sukufezar, one of the prominent women's magazines, in the following way: "We have been accepted for a long time as 'long-haired, short-witted' by men. We will indicate that the reverse is correct, without preferring womanhood to man or the reverse,⁶⁸ we will be in a path of a hard study. These women, thus, tended to reverse the values traditionally attributed to them and to take a place in the social life equally with men. Many women's magazines of the time were published by men. However,

the Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete (Paper Belonging to Women) was completely written by famous women writers including Fatma Aliye, Sair Nigar and Makbule Leman. Many women were taught by this magazine how to write, to learn how to look after children and were mobilized to go to schools. Its three basic principles were to train women to be a good mother, a good wife and a good Muslim.⁶⁹ Nora Seni has analyzed the themes stressed through caricatures in these and the later magazines and found that three important issues were commonly emphasized: women's⁷⁰ clothing, polygamy and the education of young females. Indeed, the ideas formulated by intellectual men were immediately shared by women; they required these rights not only for themselves but for the development of the country.

As it was previously mentioned the Ottoman-Turkish women worked on the land but were not employed in civil service until the Tanzimat Period. A woman was appointed first in 1873 and ten years later, in 1883, some other women were appointed to schools as officiarie.⁷¹ Moreover, during the same time women began to participate in factory work. In 1897, 121 of 201 workers in a match factory of Istanbul were women. In another Ottoman city, Bursa, hundreds of women began to work in different private businesses.⁷²

During the same period that Ottoman intellectuals were challenging the traditional status of Turkish women there was a strong feminist movement in Europe demanding the right of

enfranchisement. It is obvious that the Western feminist movement influenced the Turkish male elite, who in turn influenced Ottoman women. In short, two basic agents of Westernization or modernization in Ottoman-Turkish politics during the second half of the nineteenth century were first, the adoption of new institutions in the military and the bureaucracy, second, the attempt to educate women and change their traditional roles.

3.3. WOMEN AS A POTENTIAL ELEMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY

When coming to 1908 the "İkinci Mesrutiyet" (Second Constitutional Period) was proclaimed under the enforcement of the Young Turks. The first parliament was prorogued by Abdulhamid II because of the war with Russia immediately following his coming to power in 1876. The term Mesrutiyet was regarded as being synonymous with the declaration of freedom, particularly freedom for women by the generation of the time.⁷³ As soon as the Mesrutiyet was proclaimed women (particularly in Istanbul) abandoned their veils and went into the streets.⁷⁴ Bernard Caporal talks about women's reaction to the Mesrutiyet in the following terms: "After the proclamation of the Mesrutiyet women took red-white flags and pennants and marched into the streets of Istanbul shouting 'long live the country', 'long live freedom', and 'long live the nation'."⁷⁵ The Young Turks gave stronger emphasis to the woman issue. As described by Tarik Z. Tunaya they "took the woman issue as an economic and

cultural issue of the nation." ⁷⁶ With the "Ittihat ve Terakki" (Union and Progress) government of the Young Turks a new phase was opened in the Ottoman-Turkish politics.

3.3.1. The Guidance Role of Intellectuals

Following the Ittihat-Terakki governments Turkish intellectuals began to hold the center of politics. They were mainly educated in the West and they imported Western ideas into the Ottoman empire. Three main measures taken to solve the problems of the Empire were importing technical experts from the West, educating Turkish students in the technical universities of Western countries and establishing a variety of educational institutions training students in the direction of Western technical knowledge. ⁷⁷ As soon as Turkish students returned to the country they constituted a strong power against the government from the Tanzimat period on; coming to power, with the proclamation of the Mesrutiyet, they introduced projects to save the state from collapse. They regarded themselves not only as the symbol and agent of change but as its beneficiaries. They dominated all the social and political organizations and considered the state as a private institution of their own. ⁷⁸ The intellectuals' often-used idea of populism, despite its democratic connotation, did not go beyond being an ideology of mobilizing the society towards the "ideal society" they had in mind, which can be described as being Westernized. These intellectuals took women as the instrument of their ideal society and created a large number of arguments concerning the

status of Turkish women.

Arguments over the condition of woman during the mesrutiyet period can be organized under three different perspectives. Westernism, Turkism and Islamism. The three paramount names among the Turkist intellectuals were Ziya Gokalp, Halide Edip and Ahmet Agaoglu. They presented new projects concerning woman issue to the government. Gokalp paid a great attention to woman issue in his different writings and poems. For him, the old Turkic style of life should be taken as the basic criteria for understanding the existing condition of woman in Turkish politics. He urged that there was a feminist tendency in the old Turkish nomads and women were completely equal with men. To him the corruption in the social life of the Turkish women began immediately after the Turkish nomads migrated to Anatolia under the impact of Arabian and Persian cultures. He attacked the existing Islamic law and denounced that it be replaced with a completely new one giving equality to women.⁷⁹ He idealized a future in which Turkish ethics would be founded upon democracy and feminism as well as nationalism, patriotism, work and the strength of the family.⁸⁰ According to Gokalp there are three basic elements of the society: the family, the state and the nation. He argues that the center of the family is woman, that of the state man, while the creation of the nation is the work of both men and women. He emphasized the basic place occupied by women in society in the following terms:

Since in our society woman obtain no good education, the family does not develop. When the family does

not develop, the nation automatically begins to go backward. Then the first step of advancement lies in girls being well educated and women being trained. Well schooling of females might suddenly revive a nation because a good woman brings about a good family, and a good nation comes into being on the basis of a good family.⁸¹

For Gokalp, "woman's duty was not to educate only their children but also to educate the nation, and it is their duty as well to lead men in the true direction."⁸² One should remember that Gokalp had similar views with Hegel in imposing the basic familial roles on woman, but he extends Hegel's ideas by supporting woman's taking new roles in public life.

Halide Edip, another extreme exponent of the Turkic perspective, raised four features as being basic characteristics of the new Turkish woman: she should be intelligent, nationalist, and patriotic; she should be conscious of her political rights and her liberty; she should be well educated, having the right to equal education with man; and she should be a Muslim and a modern woman.⁸³ Similarly with Gokalp, she regarded woman as the basic element of society and the improvement of her status must necessarily precede the progress of the country. She urged that "the right of the country is a thousand times higher and more esteemed than that of a woman; when a woman requires new rights she should

remember that this is not for herself but for the children that she will produce for the country." ⁸⁴ Compared to Gokalp she was more passionate in connecting woman's interests with the national interests. Another Turkist thinker, Ahmet Agaoglu, also perceived the traditional role of woman as the genuine reason for the backwardness of the Ottoman society. To him two basic problems of the Ottoman society were the need for the adoption of a Latin alphabet and the need to change woman's traditional status. Only with reforms in these two fields could the Ottoman society solve its problems and take a proper place among the developed nations. ⁸⁵ In short, the woman issue for Turkist intellectuals meant not just women's particular interests but the country's advancement.

The Westernizers went further on this issue. They were obviously under the impact of the Western feminists. Tevfik Fikret, the most famous poet of the time, used poetry to convey the common idea of the Westernizer intellectuals in regard to the status of woman. The following part of one of his poems was the common idea of the Westernizer intellectuals:

The destiny of womanhood is certainly not
humiliation
When woman becomes miserable the humanity will
⁸⁶
certainly subside."

Abdullah Cevdet, an extreme Westernizer, strongly attacked the veiling of Ottoman women. His famous slogan was "open Koran and recover the woman", at the same time this was the slogan

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of his family law proposal. Cevdet was strongly in favor of the adoption of Western institutions and a lover of Western civilization, going so far as to propose the "importation of stud men from West for the purpose of reviving and strengthening the new Turkish generation."⁸⁸ His basic ideas might be summed up as follows: the Sultan should have only one wife, monogamy should be accepted legally as a basic principle of family law; women should be free of state intervention in their clothing; woman should be accepted as the paramount virtue of the country and man should consider them according to that virtue; woman should be freely schooled in every field; and the existing family law should be replaced with a Western civil code.⁸⁹ To Cevdet "there is no second civilization meant European civilization, and it must be imported with both its roses and its thorns."⁹⁰

Another consistent exponent of that idea, Ahmet Muhtar wrote in 1912 that "either we Westernize, or we are destroyed".⁹¹ Still another strong advocate of this view, Selahaddin Asim, fundamentally rejected all Islamic principles concerning the family and woman. According to him the main reasons behind the inferior status of women were mainly Islamic principles concerned with such issues as polygamy, wedding, marriage, heritage, equality and veiling. The only way to emancipate women was to give up all these principles.⁹² Even the right to vote for women was demanded by Westernizers during that time which might be regarded as too extreme in a society

in which women still did not have the right to appear freely in the public realm. The right of enfranchisement was first demanded by Halil Hamit, a Westernizer thinker. He wrote in his book, Islamda Feminizm (Feminism in Islam) the following: "Your sons should support the emancipation of women and your daughters should not only know their rights but also have enough courage to put them into practice, that is, to use their rights politically"⁹³ Humanity was identical for him with women's equality with men a principle which would immediately incorporated her into the Ottoman-Turkish society.

Moderate Westernizers raised arguments on woman issue. Intellectuals like Celal Nuri and Riza Tevfik took religion as the basis and argued for the adoption of the technical side of Western civilization. To them the inferior condition of women originated not from Islam but from the present conditions of the Ottoman society; therefore, by the adoption of the technical aspects of Western civilization they would be able to overcome the problem.⁹⁴

Another perspective, during the Mesrutiyet Period was raised by some religious intellectuals like Mustafa Sabri, Musa Kazim, Said Halim Pasa, Mehmet Akif, and Hamdi Akseki who embraced a conservative point of view. The basic tenets of their argument might be summed up as follows: society should immediately return to the Seriat (Islamic Law) and the family law should be regulated according to the tenets of the Islamic religion. The education of women must not serve for

their being articulated into public life but rather for raising more religious generations in the home. Therefore, they supported the restriction of women in the private sphere, as the central keeper of the secret life of the family.⁹⁵

In conclusion, one can obviously see that the basic tenets pertaining to the status of women in the Ottoman-Turkish society were laid down by the intellectuals of the Mesrutiyet period, particularly, by the exponents of the view which stressed the adoption of Western institutions. The Westernizer intellectuals in particular opened the door of Turkish society to the Western institutions and by doing so created the ground for women to raise arguments on their status. The path opened up by the Westernizer elites allowed the Western feminist point of view to be incorporated into the Ottoman-Turkish context. The feminist point of view was immediately taken up by a large number of women in major Ottoman cities leading to the emergence of a women's movement raising issues regarding to their particular conditions.

3.3.2. The Emergence of an Indigenous Feminism

Beginning with the arguments raised by the intellectuals and with the atmosphere of relative freedom created by the revolution of 1908, the first feminist women entered the scene in the Ottoman-Turkish context. Educated woman from the intellectual circles of the big cities, like Istanbul, Salonica

and Izmir started to publish magazines and express their reaction against the deep oppression of women. They founded the first woman's association, increased the number of magazines and protested against the existing status of women through panels and meetings. This created an alternative ground for the government that the Ottoman-Turkish context had never experienced.

After the revolution of 1908 women were permitted to found associations pertaining to their own interests.⁹⁶ Serpil Cakir observed that eight different types of associations were established by women from 1908 up to the proclamation of the Republic in 1923. She divides these associations into the following categories: associations for aid, for education, for culture, for solving national problems, for political aims, for patriotic actions, associations as branches of political parties and associations for stressing feminist issues. There were about 40 of these associations, not including branches in the rural areas.⁹⁷ The actions of those associations founded with the purpose of aid, education and culture might be summed up as the collection of money and its distribution to the needed people, the opening up of new schools, the financing of poor students and the training of women through seminars,⁹⁸ panels, and conferences for new roles in social life. Associations devoted to the national problems encouraged, among others, the Ottoman population to buy the national products in order to develop the Ottoman economy.⁹⁹ The Union and Progress Party also encouraged the establishment of woman's

associations in order to educate and socialize women as well
as to increase the number of its defenders.¹⁰⁰

The patriotic associations occupied an important role during the First World War and the Turkish War of Independence. They were established either voluntarily by women or were supported by the government. One prominent group was the "Ottoman Association for Running the Women to Work" which was established by the prime minister, Enver Pasha, in 1916. Its aim was to push women to work as well as promote the young to marry properly in order to overcome the moral disease following the wars the Ottomans had experienced.¹⁰¹ In the following years after its establishment it helped to put about 7,000 women into work in the manufacturing sector.¹⁰² This association motivated women also to join the military service. With that aim it formed a woman's labor battalion, which enabled some women to obtain the status of sergeant and sergeant-major. The "Birinci Kadin Isci Taburu" (First Woman Labor Battalion) recruited women aged between 18-30, years, some who were employed as the official staff, others as laborers and some were temporarily employed. This battalion, as a component of the military, gave important background service especially during the Balkan War.¹⁰³

Women also took an important role during the War of Independence (1918-1923). They were the major participants in marches in big cities as well as taking part during the war on

different fronts. In Istanbul alone 10 of the 50 associations founded as national fronts by 1918 belonged to women.¹⁰⁴ A large number of meetings and demonstrations against the occupation of the country by Western armies were enhanced by women in Istanbul. They were also active in the Anatolian cities. The first organized women's revolutionary movement in Anatolia took place in Erzurum. After a gathering in a mosque, telegrams were sent to the government in Istanbul, to the United State Senate, and to the Allied powers, protesting against the occupation.¹⁰⁵ The second mass movement of women in Anatolia was seen in their effort to found the "Anadolu Kadınları Mudafa-i Vatan Cemiyetleri" (Anatolian Women's Association for Patriotic Defense) first in Sivas province and then in 14 other Anatolian cities.¹⁰⁶ In addition to these activities, women founded a large number of similar associations in different cities.¹⁰⁷ They also participated in the war together with men.¹⁰⁸ Indeed, woman in the Turkish War of Independence "became the symbol of the Turkish nation's ideal of liberty...she did this as a patriotic duty."¹⁰⁹ One might remember that the consistent leaders in this movement were the known feminists; the foremost example was Halide Edip, a feminist writer who went to Anatolia from Istanbul and took part in the war.

Beginning from 1908 up to the formation years of the Turkish Republic, which was established in 1923 in Ankara, Turkish women constituted a significant political movement of their own. The paramount characteristic of their movement as

distinct from the feminists movement in the European countries was their emphasis on their indigenous problems. Turkish feminists founded the "Osmanli Mudafaa-i Hukuk-u Nisvan Cemiyeti" (Ottoman Association for Defense of Women's Rights) in 1913 and published the magazine "Kadinlar Dunyasi" (Women's World) which circulated until 1921. Kadinlar Dunyasi sought to reform existing family law with the aim of creating an egalitarian family. Members of the association stressed their indigenous problems and attacked the traditional privileges given to men in such areas as marriage and divorce and particularly the practice of polygamy. They also attacked the obstacles preventing women from participating in public life.¹¹⁰ Their demands were expressed in the following manner: "We want progress, to become greater, we want to be happy. We want to see and understand everything. We want to convert our life to a civilized one and to revive our inertion into an action. This is possible only through our participation in the public life, by means of having equal rights with men."¹¹¹ They also rejected men's contribution to their struggle, arguing that they were unable to conceive of woman's internal world and their genuine problems.¹¹² The most revealing message of their proclamation is seen in the following passage:

...on July 10 [the date of the proclamation of the Mesrutiyet] the men of our society took the right of sovereignty, of a civilization of their own, and the right of their humanity... O womanhood, do you still

stay in obscurity?... The freedom was not given to our men, they took it by force... The right is not given, but it is actually taken. Let us demand our natural rights and civilization. If we are not given our right let us take it by force.¹¹³

Gaining a place in the public work for women was regarded as being identical to gaining their liberty. A rich member of the association, Bedr Osman Hanim applied to the Telephone Company in Istanbul to be employed. When her application was rejected Kadinlar Dunyasi launched a campaign against the company, resulting in her being given work together with a large number of women.¹¹⁴ Another member of the association, Belkis Sevket Hanim, decided to fly over Istanbul. The association lobbied on her behalf: the government approved her demand even providing an aircraft. She flew over Istanbul in 1914, was officially honored and her picture was hung in the military museum.¹¹⁵ Women also demanded, for the first time, the right of enfranchisement. According to the Kadinlar Dunyasi "as we see woman laborers, woman office staff, woman artists, and woman merchants we will certainly see woman deputies in the near future, talking in parliament on issues regarding the universe. This, will definitely be realized as a right."¹¹⁶ Indeed, these demands by women were revolutionary in the Ottoman society.

Women also published a large number of magazines and books between 1908 and 1920. Kurnaz lists 27 magazines published

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either by men or women, which deal with female issues.
Although these magazines dealt with different aspects of woman
issue they all stressed the idea of equality between men and
women in all fields of social life. 118 As a result of these
efforts women experienced drastic changes in their life in
terms of legal regulations, education, and employment. Women
also benefited from a new family law governing the family life
of Muslim as well as the non-Muslim Ottoman minorities. The
"Hukuk-i Aile Kararnamesi" (Family Law Decree) was prepared and
approved by the government in 1917. It brought new rights to
women, which can be summed up in the following way: the wedding
was taken as a legal procedure, the age of marriage 18 for men
and 17 for women, marriage was controlled by the state through
a proper staff and two witnesses, polygamy was restricted and
women were given (like men) the right to divorce on
occasion. 119 But this law was abolished two years later since
it was perceived as being too radical by the religious
intellectuals as well as unsatisfactory by the Westernizers. It
was applied in Syria and in Iraq until recently and is still in
use in Lebanon. 120

The other area where women gained ground was in education.
The previous secondary schools were followed in 1911 by a great
number of the "Idadis" (High Schools), later (in 1913) to
become lycee. The high schools were immediately followed by the
"Inas Darulfununu" (University for Women), established in
Istanbul in 1914. 121 After 1908 the number of private schools,
founded either by Ottoman Muslims, Ottoman minorities, or

foreigners such as the British, French or Americans rapidly increased. Bayram Kodaman has successfully observed that in 1910 the Armenians, the Jews and the Protestant Christians created 406 private schools throughout the empire; 140 were created by foreigners, and only 65 by Muslims.¹²²

After 1908 a large number of veiled women entered public life. A law was prepared by the Ottoman Ministry of Trade in 1915 which allowed the creation of a female labor force.¹²³ Women were thereafter employed in the food industry, in the tobacco industry, the clothing industry, in the chemical and in the print industry. The British Oriental Manufacturers employed 60 thousand women in Anatolian cities alone in 1913.¹²⁴ Sehmus Guzel found that in Sivas alone approximately 10 thousand female were employed in workshops belonging to foreign companies. In addition the majority of the workers on industrial machines were women.¹²⁵ Guzel also brought to light the fact that in Bursa in 1908 20,000 women were employed in 165 spinning mills.¹²⁶ Guzel claims that during that year women constituted thirty percent of the industrial labor force in major Ottoman cities.¹²⁷ Fusun Tayanc also found the same percentage of woman laborers in Ottoman industry in 1915.¹²⁸ Also, women were employed largely in agriculture, particularly in the area of tobacco growing, grape and fig cultivation and cotton production around Izmir, Adana, Aydin and other cities.¹²⁹

One should bear in mind the effect of European industries

on both the Turkish government and Turkish women's associations. They sometimes supported the associations financially in order to motivate them by stressing more strongly the cause of women's employment. Indeed, the Ottoman authorities permitted British companies to build their industries freely in Ottoman territory under the Trade Agreement of 1839 between the Ottoman and British governments.¹³⁰ The British companies established in the Ottoman territory were mostly textile industries in which women were paid only half of the salary of men.¹³¹ This is the reason for a number of strikes by women. According to Guzel between July 24 and October 31, 1908, in the major cities of the Empire i.e., as Istanbul, Salonica, Izmir, Beirut, Konya and Adana some 40 different strikes were recorded in industries where women were employed.¹³²

In fact, there were mainly two forces which stood behind the women's movement: foreign industrial companies and the newly rising native bourgeoisie. The aim of the first was to create a cheaper labor force while the second might be ascribed to the fact that they wished to produce a new social class of woman who demanded their products. That is, the products of the time were mainly those consumed in the family and more specifically by women. If women had more economic power to buy the bourgeoisie would likely gain more.¹³³

Either for this or that reason, indeed, one can see clearly that after the proclamation of the Mesrutiyet Period a

strong women's movement emerged in the Ottoman-Turkish context. The movement can be termed as "indigenous" feminism because women of that time stressed explicitly their specific problems. They emphasized, in particular, two issues related to their status: the right to take part in public life through education and work; and equal rights with men in the family life, particularly marriage and divorce. These rights had been gained by women in European societies a long time before, following the industrial revolution. Therefore, a more extended right was explicitly demanded by these women: the right to vote. One should appreciate that in a society where women had no public life it is too fantastic to stress the right to vote. Contrary to the European societies the family was maintained in the Ottoman society with all of its strong traditional dynamics. This is why the Ottoman women so strongly stressed the need to take an equal part in the public life and to gain new roles in the family. These issues were, definitely, as important for Turkish feminists as the vote was for Western feminists.

In conclusion, woman issue was the central issue of the Ottoman-Turkish politics from 1908 until the establishment of the Republican Turkey. The discourses of opposition were organized according to the discourses virtually affiliated with the values directly concerning women. Another related fact is that they were only the women who created alternative meanings, values and discourses to the official ones. Either by male or female intellectuals the alternative discourses were

developed mainly in relation with woman issue. No other issue occupied the political context so long as women issue took part. Accordingly, to shape a new society it was thought to model according to the roles women would play in the public life. The distinction between the public and private spheres was associated with the women's going out of the home or stay at home. The central point of the argument was whether the public life would come to exist or not for women. This meant that the sacredness of the family life would be violated. This sacredness, in fact was the basic style of life of the Ottoman society. In short, this is why we accepted women as the basic element of civil society of that time. The ground of liberty created during the Mesrutiyet Period was made primarily for women to be the beneficiary. But as soon as the Republic was proclaimed in Turkey the phase of elite politics once again revived and these politics created a new tendency in the condition of women.

3.4. WOMEN AS A SYMBOL OF THE REPUBLICAN TURKEY

With the establishment of the Republic in 1923 a concern began to develop in creating a nation with a new culture and values alongside the state. At the beginning of the Republic state elites (the military the bureaucratic and the intellectual elites) stressed such issues as the formation of the nation, the integration and the identity and loyalty to the new government. The military, the bureaucrats, the

intelligentsia and the women were regarded in this phase as the chief groups performing key political roles.¹³⁴ As previously mentioned in the last period of the Ottoman empire mainly three problems were raised: finding an appropriate national identity, determining a viable political structure and resolving the issue of modernization. These were solved altogether with the establishment of the Republic. The national identity was conceived as Anatolian Turkish, the political structure was accepted as republican secular and democratic, and the commitment to modernization at least for the elites was realized.¹³⁵

The state, not civil society, maintained its higher position in political culture. The political culture of that time was described by Arnold Toynbee in the following manner: "The political idea on which the Turkish state is constructed derives from a conception of a nationally homogeneous, administratively centralized, absolutely sovereign state which must be served by its citizen as a Jealous God intolerant of variety and autonomy in any form."¹³⁶ It was the essential part of the elites' mentality that the state came first then came society and society was to follow the path of state elites. Despite their success in changing bureaucratic and administrative institutions the leaders of the Republic were, in fact, the successor of the Ottoman imperial bureaucratic tradition.¹³⁷ The ideal of the supremacy of the state was similar to the values of state tradition in Ottoman empire.¹³⁸

The Turkish revolution always remained as a political rather than a social revolution; it did not produce a horizontal line among different identifiable interests.¹³⁹ As soon as the revolution succeeded Republican leaders began to move against the religious institutions, which were widely diffused throughout society. Religion began to be gradually replaced by Kemalism, the outstanding ideology of the early years of the Republic. Popular Islam lost the whole of its institutional foundations through the banning of the tarikats (Islamic brotherhood), the closing down of secret tombs, and the prescription of traditional dress. Secularism was taken as the major project of the new state. But as Caglar Keyder put it secularism "came to signify the political control over the religious life by the bureaucrats, rather than the separation of church and state,¹⁴⁰ as the term usually implies." Religion, thus, as one of the chief elements of civil society, came under the control of the state. Reforms concerning woman issue were taken as an important attempt to replace religion. The main project of the new government was to create a fundamental break from the Ottoman-Islamic tradition and direct the nation toward the aims displayed as if to "reach to the level of the contemporary civilization". New regulations concerning women's rights were taken as a symbol of being Westernized and as an indicator of a radical break from the traditional life.¹⁴¹ Gole argues that women were taken by Kemalists as an agent to reach to the Western civilization. Her argument is worded in the following terms:

With the purpose to change the civilization Kemalists made women gain a 'social visibility'. In other words, women's participation into the public life and their appearance in social life signified the replacement of the civilization. Women's separation from their domestic life and the abolition of the previous sexual boundaries meant that the life which was regulated by Islam began to come under the influence of the Western values.¹⁴²

It is evident that the newly established states make reforms concerning woman's rights in order to take a place in the international platform as well as to achieve a break from the old traditions. It is a common attitude in the Third World Countries that the individual rights and the rights of social groups are substantially given by the state with the aim to remove social groups from their ethnic, social, or sexual communities and direct their attention towards the ideal of "common interests."¹⁴³

The Kemalist woman's identity was composed, in general, as a synthesis of the ideas of the Westernizer and Turkist thinkers. The basic tenets of that identity was laid down specifically by Ziya Gokalp, the ideologist of the newly established Republican Turkey, as "educated-professional" woman.¹⁴⁴ Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic,

pronounced that women should have equal rights with men in every respects. He declared that they should include Turkish women as a component of their struggle during the early years of the Republic. Ataturk proclaimed that "there are more honorable paths for us to follow. We have to take the great Turkish woman and walk with her in the social, moral, economic and scientific fields."¹⁴⁵ But later, he paid attention to the issue particularly in the line that women would constitute a great contribution to the development of the country:

Is it possible that one half of the nation can be developed and the other half neglected if we are to have a truly developed country? Is it possible that one half of the nation can be uplifted while the other half remains on the ground? No doubt, as I said, the development steps follow the equality of the two sexes in the development and in the renovation.¹⁴⁶

The central message of this passage is clearly that woman should be given equal rights for the purpose of developing the country. It was thought that women would constitute the needed potential for the development of the country, projected by the revolution with a different set of symbolic resemblances. Women, in fact, were seen as the most important element for achieving this aim. Therefore, the revolution was immediately regarded as being the main supporter of women, therefore new regulations were enacted within this new political strategy.

3.4.1. Reforms Related to Woman Issue

With the establishment of the Republic, Turkish women gained rights mainly in two areas: new rights coming with the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code and women's being enfranchised and allowed to stand as candidates . Following the abolishment of the caliphate on March 3, 1924, the Swiss Civil Code was immediately accepted by the government in February 17, 1926 as the most suitable sort of bill for the secularism as well as the transformation of Turkey into a modern social system. The adoption of this Civil Code was for Ataturk and his supporters "a symbol to the world that the new Turkey was adamant about 'reaching the level of contemporary civilization'." ¹⁴⁷ This was beneficiary mostly for the elite to indicate to the West that replacement of the Islamic legal system with a Western one thereby Turkey's transfer to a new civilization. Being Westernized was not only symbolized with the attribution of new rights to women but also with changes in the dress of men. It was even before the adoption of the Civil Code (in 1925) that Turkish men were obliged to wear hats on their heads. The reason for this was explained in the following terms: "In fact, the hat is virtually not so important, but it has a special importance for Turkey which idealizes to enter the family of contemporary societies." ¹⁴⁸ This rule indicates more thoroughly the importance of dress for the rulers as a symbolic instrument during the earlier years of the Republican period.

The new rights given to women through the adoption of the Civil Code might be summed up as the following: the polygamy was abolished, the women also gained the right to divorce, they were given the right of equal inheritance with men, the age of marriage was set at 18 for men and 14 for women, the wedding was legalized by the state by an official who presided over marriage contract and woman was given equal right with man in court.¹⁴⁹

Indeed, some of these rights were already obtained by the Turkish women through previous regulations during the Ottoman time, in the areas like the age of marriage, equal share of inheritance and the state control over marriage. The most important characteristic of the Civil Code was in its principle that of preventing polygamy, assessing woman as equal to man in court and giving her the right to apply to the court to obtain a divorce.

The Civil Code, in fact, did not create an absolute equality between man and woman in the family. The following articles are still disadvantageous to woman: the husband alone is entitled to choose a domicile and the wife must follow him (Art.152.II). The wife is stated as responsible for the family and for the care of children (Art.153/2).¹⁵⁰ The husband is the head of the family and he represents the marital union (Art.154). If the wife wants to assume profession or work outside the household she must obtain her husband's approval (Art.155). In the case of a conflict between spouses the

children are left to the father (Art.160. II). The wife is required to participate in the expense of the household by contributing financially or by assuming tasks in the household (Art.190).¹⁵¹

The most revealing message of the Civil Code was to see woman as a wife and a housewife. Indeed, the Swiss Civil Code was too far from the reality of the Turkish society then as it did not properly solve the problems of Turkish women. On the contrary, it contradicted with some rights previously given to women.¹⁵² One should remember that women were, for a long time, politically in a secondary position in Switzerland. They were given the right to vote as later as 1973.¹⁵³ Even nowadays in Swiss cantons women have no right to vote, only men can participate in the voting in relating to the local issues.¹⁵⁴ One should appreciate that a regulation borrowed from a country like that would not be accounted as democratic in essence nor would it create equal conditions between men and women.

Inequality for women remains also in the Turkish Penal Code. When a prostitute is raped and kidnaped a sentence is applied which reduces the penalty by two-thirds (Art.138). Moreover, for a married man to be legally charged with adultery he must be caught in his own home. However, for a woman to be charged with adultery she can be caught anywhere.¹⁵⁵

Another important right given by Republican leaders to the

Turkish women was the right to be enfranchised and being allowed to stand as candidates. They were given this right locally with the approval of the Local Government Law in the parliament in 1930, which assumed only being Turkish was enough for voting and being voted for at the local level.¹⁵⁶ Some years later (in 1934) women were given the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in the general elections.¹⁵⁷ In the following election of 1930 18 women, amounting to 4,5 percent, were elected to the parliament. The Prime Minister Ismet Inonu stressed the importance of this right as follows: "The paramount characteristics of our revolution is hidden in our attempt endowing a high status to women and accepting their rights...Whenever the Turkish revolution is mentioned it will be regarded as being identical with the revolution of women's emancipation."¹⁵⁸

Women's rights according to the ideologists of Kemalism also included feminism or womanism. Then, there was no need for another agent to emphasize woman issue.¹⁵⁹ This is why many women articulate the view that the Republican leaders (during the 1930s) represented the voice of a state feminism.¹⁶⁰ State feminism means nothing more than the "result of negotiations and 'contracts' between the state and women; it represents the result of an alliance between women and the state."¹⁶¹ However, there was no natural negotiation between state and women on behalf of women. Women were, in reverse, taken as an instrument which enabled the government to reach the aims put forward by the state elite. Despite the fact that the upshot of the

reforms was beneficial mostly to women it was also beneficial to the state elites. Another point taken by those who attributed Turkish reforms as state feminism is that time that women were enfranchised in Turkey. It is also argued that Turkish women were enfranchised so early that many European countries did not give their women such a right.¹⁶² However, it becomes increasingly clear that this is not true. Women in many European countries were given this right earlier than Turkey except for France and Italy; already in the last one there was a fascist government in power. Even in several non-Western countries the voting right was given to women before 1935. Needless to say 1935 was not an early time for Turkish women when the existence of the previous Turkish indigenous feminism is taken into consideration.¹⁶³

Indeed, Republican leaders sought to demonstrate that they were democratic with women's enfranchisement. As Sirin Tekeli argues, at the beginning of the 1930s the Republican People's Party was the single party in power. Critics of that regime both from within and from abroad were accusing Ataturk of becoming a "dictator." Moreover, at that time fascist parties were coming to power in Europe. Therefore, it was possible through women's enfranchisement to indicate to the European countries that the Turkish single party regime was typically a democratic regime.¹⁶⁴ This is why "women's political rights played an important symbolic role. They symbolized the fact that the Turkish Republic was a democratic regime, or at least, one that was evolving in that

direction."¹⁶⁵ One further fact, in that respect, is that two different revolutions in the world were previously experienced: the French revolution of the peasants and the Bolshevik revolution of the working class. Both were devoted to social classes. The Turkish Revolution, on the other hand, was the revolution from upside of mainly the military elite and intellectual-bureaucrats. Therefore, there was a substantial need to take the support of a social class in order to survive the revolution. It was not possible to take the support of the working class because of the absence of a powerful working class which was able to undertake a revolution. Moreover, Turkish politicians were anxious to remove themselves from being represented as a revolution of the working class. The peasants were also not suitable to undertake the revolution since the Kemalists attributed the Turkish peasant as ignorant and a section which needed to be educated through the principles of the revolution.

Women were the proper social section for Kemalists to undertake the revolution for two reasons: they were firstly, the chief opposite group to the previous government (because of their seclusion from society for centuries) and secondly, they were politically and organizationally (inherited from their previous experiences) the group of most conscious of their own rights and interests. Perhaps this is the most plausible reason why the Kemalists sought to entrust the revolution to women; indeed, women have, since then, been the most loyal group to

the Kemalist principles. One should explicitly remember that it is the most important characteristic of newly established governments, immediately after a revolution, to suppress all possible centers of opposition based on either communal, religious, ethnic, or sexual emotions. By giving women new rights the Turkish government broke women's resistance on the one hand, and on the other hand, strengthened the control of the state upon society.

3.4.2. Women's Struggle For the Vote

At the beginning of the Republican regime some women defined the enfranchisement right as the central focus of their struggle just as it was in some European societies. This active role of women was always ignored by the analysts of the time, in particular, by the female generation which had loyalty to the Kemalist principles.¹⁶⁶ Women, in fact, were so active in Turkish politics during the early years of the Republic that they helped to establish the first political party in Republican Turkey. Those women who were the active participant of the first feminist movement during the Mesrutiyet period came together immediately after the War of Independence and established the "Kadinlar Halk Firkasi" (Women's People Party) on June 16, 1923. It aimed to "struggle for women's rights in social, economic and political fields and motivate women to be conscious of these rights."¹⁶⁷ But the party was officially not permitted. Therefore, the members of the party prepared a new,

relatively moderate, regulation to found an union substituting for the party. Thus, they, established the "Türk Kadınlar Birliği" (Union of Turkish Women) on February 7, 1924.¹⁶⁸

Nezihe Muhittin, the founder of the Party and the new chairman of the Union, attacked the government for women's being refused the right to vote in the following terms: "Is it possible that a right given to those men who spend their time crazily in the corner of the coffee-houses be denied to women having a true self-consciousness and having been perfectly educated?"¹⁶⁹ The demand for the enfranchisement right was strongly emphasized by association through meetings, congresses and panels.

The Union of Turkish Women held a congress in Istanbul in March 1927, in order to make a radical change in its regulation with the aim of giving more emphasis on the right to vote. The chairman of the Union pronounced a radical speech in congress: "Revolutions are created through struggles and efforts. We too will struggle from election to election up to the day we gain our rights like every citizens. Laws should be adopted to the requirements of the existing conditions."¹⁷⁰ The members of the Union sent a message to the parliament that they require the right to vote but the parliament rejected their demand. The decision of the parliament was strongly protested by the Union through the following statement:

We will never renounce our ideal to get the vote. If we renounce this there will be no true reason why our union exists. We will study for the victory of

our claim for the rest of our lives. If our life is not enough for that we will at least have changed the present conditions for the coming generations.¹⁷¹

The Union's demand was attributed to be radical and was criticized strongly by the press. According to Cumhuriyet, the prominent newspaper representing the official ideology, the Union's demand was so extreme that it would never be accepted. The demands of the Union disturbed both the government and the press. Therefore, a relatively moderate group was supported by the government to come to power in the Union.¹⁷² The new leaders of the Union also maintained their work for the vote but unlike the previous leaders through face to face contact with the government. Iffet H. Oruz, one of the leaders of the Union, said that they visited Ataturk in 1930 and wanted him to give women the enfranchisement right. But Ataturk advised them to educate the peasant women. Ataturk told them that the village men are educated when they come to the military, however, the government cannot reach the village women. Therefore, duty of such voluntarily established unions should be to carry out that burden.¹⁷³ This indicates that the Republican leaders did not want to give women the right to vote at least until 1930.

The actions of the Union of Turkish Women influenced other existing association to demand this right. The prominent association of the time was the "Turk Ocaklari" (Turkish

Hearts), which had various branches in different cities. Sureyya Hulusi, a member of the Trabzon Branch of the Turkish Heart Club, denounced in a conference held in 1926 in Trabzon that they require the enfranchisement rights for women. She argued that "everyone agrees that women are second to none in patriotism. So why should they be ignored when the government and the future of our country is concerned?"¹⁷⁴ Affet Inan, one of the prominent women of the Republican regime, also advocated the issue through various conferences she held. She announced in a conference held in Turkish Hearts in 1930 that they should immediately be given this right:

Women can feel themselves free only on the occasion when they are given their political rights. This is also a basic principle of democracy. Turkish women, in fact, have deserved the enfranchisement right for a long time; but it was not expected from a monarchist government to entitle that right. We hope that it would not take too much longer for women to be given this right by the honorable democratic Republican Turkey.¹⁷⁵

A march by women for enfranchisement right in 1934 was reported by Burhan Goksel. He said that in 1934 a large number of leading women met at the Ankara Branch of the Turkish Heart and held various impassioned speeches. After this meeting they marched to the Turkish Grand National Assembly. When Ataturk heard their slogans and learned about their demands he agreed

that the women were right. Immediately after that demonstration Ataturk recommended to his close friends to make a study on a bill concerning the voting system; thus, one year later women were given the enfranchisement right.¹⁷⁶

In 1935, when women gained the right of vote some leaders of the Union of Turkish Women decided to abolish the union because they thought that there was no further need for its existence. However, others opposed it and tried to demand further rights. An international congress was organized by the Union in Istanbul on April 18, 1935. About 40 countries were represented in the congress.¹⁷⁷ Two different groups came against each other during this congress: those who were in sympathy to the Kemalist principles and who came to the congress to abolish the Union and make women devote their energy to the Kemalist principles, and those who found the given rights less satisfactory and demanded further rights. Since the former group was attractive to the government it gained official support. Just during this time the "Halk Evleri" (People's Houses) were established by the government to undertake the Kemalist reforms known as republicanism, secularism, populism, nationalism, reformism, and statism. The Kemalist leaders advised women to go under the banner of People's Houses and to devote their energy to the defense of the Kemalist principles. They advised women that "there should not be any more need to such issues of men and women, there should only be a tendency towards reforms, you should come to the People's Houses and undertake the Republican reforms."¹⁷⁸

The majority of the leaders of the Union decided to abolish the union and to follow their male fellows' advice. Thus the Union was abolished and women in favor of Kemalist principles began to serve Kemalism. Oruz, an extreme exponent of that idea stated her feelings later in the following terms: "The People's Houses were established. There men and women would hold together the social and cultural issues and then we would go hand in hand follow our beloved Ataturk's way." ¹⁷⁹ Thus an opposition and a potential element of civil society was destroyed, from then on only Kemalist principles have remained and have constituted the chief element of the official ideology.

From 1935 onwards women carried out the services of the new regime through new missions given to them by the state elite. While the Ottoman debates constituted women primarily as wives and mothers in need of an education, the Republican debates on women issue constituted them as patriotic citizens. The new patriotic woman was still a wife and a mother but also she had another mission, that of educating the nation. In fact, the "muallime hanimlar" (teacher ladies), as the most privileged group of the time, became an important symbol for the Turkish Republic. ¹⁸⁰ The privilege was given primarily to professional women particularly to women teachers. The female students in schools were the most privileged group since they were the coming teachers of the Republican regime. A woman of the first generation, Hamide Topcuoglu, offered her notions as follows:

We were really 'privileged' and had an extra prestige as female students. All elder men showed us so much extreme esteem that they had never shown to the male students. We were the genuine pioneers of the Republic which aimed at encouraging women's participation into the public life with a full and a free competency and personality."¹⁸¹

She maintains that they were not differentiated as men or women rather together they carried out the burden of the Republic. Gaining a profession was not only the aim to earning their living but also for the aim to carry out a mission, that is to serve the goals of the Republic. She says that "being employed, and gaining a profession was not just for getting bread rather it was for serving the country."¹⁸² Women contributed to the new nation also to advance its economy. During the 1930s the government motivated citizens to use only national products. Women took the burden in that respect and motivated citizens toward that aim through seminars, panels and conferences.¹⁸³ One should remember that the genuine beneficiaries of the Republican time were a minor group, the previously educated women the metropolitan centers. The rest of the women particularly those living in the rural areas even until 1980s have not been beneficiaries of these rights.

From the 1930s to 1950 the nation was taken as a cohesive unity through bureaucracy. Then, at that time, no burden was loaded onto the social groups and no particular interest was

allowed; the state institutions were taken as the center of all institutions. As an extension that project during the years 1930-1946 a variety of direct and indirect efforts were spent by the government to "tutor" the nation towards the goals formulated by the state elite, the modernization if mentioned. Ataturk said that "I will lead my people by the hand until their feet are sure and then they know the way. Then they can choose for themselves [and] then my work will be done."¹⁸⁴ His basic aim was to create a modern and democratic society. However, after his death (in 1938) the state elite took Ataturkian thought as a closed system of thought and saw themselves as the only guardians of the ideology in question.¹⁸⁵ The goals put by Ataturk himself, as reaching to the level of the contemporary civilization, were changed in a different direction. While Ataturk pointed to the need to rise to the level of contemporary civilizations and pointed to the West as being its most advanced end, the West was taken as a model to be imitated without qualification by the state elite. In short, The attempts of the state elite came to be completely departed from the reality of the society after Ataturk's death. An ideal society was formulated in the state elite's mind; from then onwards women have been taken as the chief agent of that ideal.

3.5. WOMEN AND POLITICS IN THE POST-1950

The period 1950-1980 promised, in Turkish politics, a shift in the center of power holding. The center of power

shifted to the political parties from its traditional usage in the hand of state elite. The emergence of the Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party) with the support of various social groups created a challenge to the traditional position of the state elite. Moreover, a variety of social groups with interest of their own came to play a significant role in Turkish politics. The politics of that period changed the conditions of Turkish women. They gained a greater extent of improvement in their social and educational conditions on the one hand, and lost their previous symbolic role in politics and thus numbered gradually less in politics, on the other hand. The following part analyzes the role of social groups and that of women in Turkish politics in period between 1950-1980.

3.5.1. Politics of Social Groups

Turkey realized a transition to the multi-party politics in the late 1940s. With the election of 1950 the earlier bureaucratic-intellectual cadre of the Republican People's Party was replaced by a new political elite of the Democratic Party which was supported by business groups, local notables and liberal intellectuals.¹⁸⁶ The Democratic Party reflected the anger of various groups, either economic or ideological, to the center. Even the illegal Communist Party actively supported the Democratic Party in the 1950 election.¹⁸⁷ It received 53 percent of the vote and 408 of 487 seats and thus, governed the country until 1960.¹⁸⁸ The Democratic party represented

those groups whose direct influence in the government had been negligible until 1950, such as religious groups, business groups, landowners, peasants and workers. Since the Democratic Party opened a new phase in Turkish politics a great attention has been paid to it through the studies of Turkish political science.¹⁸⁹ After 1950 the political elite came to substitute a "party-centered" polity for a "state-centered" polity. A party-centered polity refers, as put brilliantly by Heper, to "a party system functioning largely autonomously from social groups."¹⁹⁰ The political elite of the Democratic Party were autonomous to the social groups and constituted a bridge between social groups and the traditional state elite through representing the interest of the former group in front of the latter. The Democratic Party appropriated the fundamental populist themes in defense of a platform of economic incorporation of the peasantry. Populism as such, was a major factor fascinating the political history of the 1950-1980 period. Indeed, it was used as an outstanding means by which the political elite contacted with the people in Turkey, a country with no genuine political impact of social groups on political parties.¹⁹¹ The Democratic Party was dismissed from politics by the military elite by a coup in 1960.¹⁹² But some years later the Adalet Partisi (Justice Party), the follower of the Democratic Party, came to power, thus, Turkish politics after 1960 experienced once more the populist discourse.

The liberal politics created by the Democratic Party led

to the emergence of a large number of social groups having interest of their own. The Turkish society after 1950 was constituted not as a harmonious whole held together by common values, as Ottoman and the early period of Republic, but one that had its share of a relative conflict.¹⁹³ As it is pointed out by Kemal Karpat the statist and economic groups with different cultural backgrounds determined Turkey's politics after 1950 and especially after 1960. The statist group was composed of mainly the military, the intellectual and the bureaucratic elites, performed the traditional symbolic role of modernity. However, the economic groups which composed most of the commercial, agrarian, entrepreneurial and labor groups¹⁹⁴ were strongly in favor of a more liberal social environment. The Conservative and the religious groups also played a significant role in Turkish politics in the post-1950 period. The two pillars of the opposition platform were, in fact, the economic and the religious freedoms, which upheld the market against the statist intervention and the local traditions over the political and ideological oppression of the center.¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, there existed a great number of voluntary associations. While numbering 1,300 in 1946, they increased tremendously to reach to 37,806 in 1968, under the impact of the multi-party politics.¹⁹⁶ Besides, with the passage of the Trade Unions Act of 1947, the workers gained the right to unionize without realizing any strike. Under that condition they could not flourish well, at least, until 1970. They were given the right of strike after 1960, but they could not act as they saw necessary. Strikes, however, continued to be illegal,

unions were frequently closed down and their leaders jailed whenever they were suspected of putting the economic interests of the workers above the national interest. Despite these restrictions the unions constituted another group rooted in society after 1950.¹⁹⁷

Social groups also developed on ideological sentiments in Turkey after 1950. The ideological discussions in Turkey after 1950, especially after 1960, fall into two distinctive categories: the nationalism and socialism. The new nationalism realized a significant break from the secular nationalist philosophy of the early Republic, which was importantly alien to its folk culture.¹⁹⁸ Through nationalism after 1950, the superiority of the nation, the territory and the state over the individual was emphasized. It also drew considerable strength from the glories of Turkish history and collaborated some religious sentiments into these notions.¹⁹⁹ However, the leftist groups took the place of early modernizing elite through similar discourses, values and symbols. The Turkish left between 1950-1980 by emphasizing secularism created a new version of the state ideology known to reach the level of contemporary civilization.²⁰⁰

Despite all these developments, social group politics were generally characterized by regulation from above. If mentioned with Heper's term, "the state in Turkey has placed emphasis on rule from above; keeping civil societal elements at

bay has not been a major issue; no need has been felt to let civil societal elements participate in government; the state has not felt itself obliged to be responsive to civil society." ²⁰¹ Indeed, the public needs were not created directly through the balancing and aggregation of the interests of social groups. When the rulers, governmental leaders and public officials claimed to act as the re-formulators or carriers of the public norms and values, they were taken as constituting the locus of the state. Thus social groups in Turkey between 1950-1980, remained in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the state elite. Their vertical ties with the state did not allow them to develop wider universal values, which would substitute for the state ideology rather they became satellites of ²⁰² political parties.

In short, after 1950 one can see an obvious increase in social groups, on the one hand and the maintenance of the traditional state elite, on the other hand. Between the two pillars were the political parties, which represented the interests of the former against the latter group. The distinctive characteristics of the period from 1950 until 1980 was that of the political parties' grasping the center of power in Turkish politics.

3.5.2. The Condition of Women in Post-1950 Turkey

With the beginning of the Republic women received a place

in every field of social life, in particular a wider place in the economic and cultural life. One can see Turkish women in banking, in the universities, in parliament, in schools and in private business. With the enactment of the Unification of Education Act of 1924, female students began to gain education together with male students.²⁰³ This brought a drastic change in the education of women. In 1927 only 4.7 percent of Turkish women were literate, while men were 17.4%.²⁰⁴ When coming to 1985 this percentage increased tremendously to 68% for women and 86% for men.²⁰⁵ During the 1986-1987 educational term the percentage of female students in primary schools was 47%, in secondary schools 35% and in high schools 43%, while that of male students were successively 53%, 65% and 57%.²⁰⁶ Besides, in the 1987-1988 term the percentage of female students in university was 32% and in graduate programs was 35%.²⁰⁷ These data, in fact, indicate a radical change in the condition of women in education.

Turkish women have succeeded a substantial shift also in the labor force participation during the Republic. In 1985 the percentage of women in agriculture was 53%, in industry 23% and in services was 8%. The percentage of men was successively 46%, 87% and 92%.²⁰⁸ 32 percent of women aged 12 and over, are economically active, against 68 percent of the male population. But, about 85% of women are still employed in agriculture.²⁰⁹ These numbers seem relatively less when compared with the number of men, but one should remember that it is a great success for Turkish women when their old status

is taken into consideration.

It is clear that Turkish women have gained success in economy and education, but one needs to admit that there are other areas that the modernization process did not bring a considerable change in their traditional status. Two faces of modernization seen in Turkey are that a small number of women (as a symbol of the Republic) entered freely to education and labor, while the rest of the women maintained their traditional roles and still are unconscious of their rights. It is truly argued by Deniz Kandiyoti that Turkish women with the reforms applied during the Republican period have been emancipated but have not been liberated. Despite the secular reforms of the Turkish Republic, women in Turkish society, she maintains, have been under the control of cultural habits, therefore they could not be liberated.²¹⁰ Further, Carol Delaney has thoroughly observed that woman in the Turkish culture represents the values and sentiments close to nature while man is taken as the symbol of culture. This, according to Delaney,²¹¹ leads man's values to surround and control that of woman.

Perhaps this is the reason why Turkish women at work occupy mostly those jobs that are the extension of the housewife and mothering in the public life. Oya Ciftci has perceptively observed that in 1976, 70% of women in public life were employed in only three sectors: health, education and communication. About 39% of women were employed in education,

but 75% of these were primary school teachers.²¹² Moreover, Mubeccel Kiray has recorded that 80% of employed women in Turkey work because of their economic needs, otherwise, they wish to leave their jobs.²¹³

The Republican women have gained the appearance of "asexual" or "men-like" woman in public life. Since "...the honor of man, in Turkish culture, is associated to the behavior of woman, only by being eroded from their sexuality could women succeed to enter public life."²¹⁴ In short, despite the fact that women entered public life during the Republican period they never realized a fundamental break from the values culturally attributed to women.

Turkish women have indeed been faced with several problems under the influence of the modernization of Turkey. Rapid migration to cities after 1950 created a new female identity, which Tekeli calls the Gecekondu kadini (Slum Woman). Hence the difficulty of life conditions in urban life they have to work, but not enough position in industry caused them to work in the houses of the middle class working women. This brings, according to Tekeli, the "exploitation of woman by woman."²¹⁵ Moreover, in urban life the working women have been employed mainly in unorganized jobs. Their absence in the membership of organizations, particularly the unions has brought women's labor to be exploited by businessmen.²¹⁶ Furthermore, Cigdem Kagitcibasi has observed that deeply remaining social tradition in the unconscious mind of women in

the urban context creates a form of identity and value crises. Incompatibility with modernity results, in the urban context,²¹⁷ in a negative notion of their being autonomous.

A further negative impact of modernization during the Republican period was experienced in the lifestyle of the rural women. The attempts of the Turkish governments to claim the Turkish language as the unique official language has led a large number of non Turkish speaking rural women to dissociate themselves from the modern institutions. Therefore, most of these women maintained their traditional roles, which, at the last analysis, brought about their dependency on men.²¹⁸ In addition, the modernization of agriculture in the post-1950 Turkey caused women to leave their land because of the presence of a large number of tractors. This caused women to return to their home where their traditional roles are strengthened.²¹⁹

Besides, modernization has also created a negative impact on Turkish women through the media, which has caused women to be perceived as a commodity. First of all, women as the basic element of the family have become the basic element of consumption and this has been seen to be the basic subject of advertisement. In particular, the fashion and the cosmetic sectors use women's sexuality as an instrument to reach the consumer as well as to make women the basic purchasers of their products. Furthermore, women's being seen as the central figure

of sexuality brought about the emergence of a large number of prostitutes.²²⁰ As can be seen, women's being removed from their traditional roles results in happiness, but not for all women. Instead, modernization has created a more vigorous face of male control over the life of some Turkish women.

Still another tension coming with modernization is felt by veiled women. Feride Acar has observed that the contradiction of the patriarchal family life with the role imposed upon women in the public life, has caused some women to turn back to Islam and to the veil. According to Acar the virtue of secularism and of the republic reached only a limited number of women. The rest of the women stayed between two different roles: the domestic and public roles. The upshot is that women have turned to Islam since they cannot overcome the problems they face in public life.²²¹ In terms of our analysis it is important to pay attention to the exclusion of veiled religious women from the public life by the exponents of the official ideology. The exclusion process of the short-dressed women of the Ottoman women now turned against the veiled women. Women previously were prohibited from public life since they was thought as blessed, however, veiled women are now dismissed from public life since they are thought as ideological. It is evident that there is a considerable tendency among educated Turkish women toward veil, if it remains so and if they are not permitted officially to articulate into the public life, then it comes to the mind whether or not modernization efforts of the Turkish Republic truly serves for all women?

Turkish women have been successively given less importance in politics and they have gradually lost their significance in being a symbol of the republican regime. As soon as Turkey became a multi-party democracy, after 1950, the previous symbolic role played by women deputies lost its significance. Tekeli argues that the evolution of the regime into a multi-party system meant two things for women: first the woman candidates lost the privilege of being elected quasi-automatically, which they enjoyed under one party rule, second, the competition between parties for more seats in the parliament tended to be a disadvantage for women.²²² In the last election of 1991 only 6 women deputies entered the parliament, in fact, very little comparing with the 1935 election when women gained 18 seats.²²³ Another reason why women have been far from politics is hidden in the fact that the Turkish parliament in the last decades has shifted towards a more vigorous figure. That is, women having the values of kindness, love and emotion could not adapt to a parliament which figured as an area of strong conflicts among the deputies of different parties.

From 1950 to 1980, Turkish women have devoted their energy mainly for two ideologies: Kemalism and the Turkish left. After 1950 a variety of associations were founded by Turkish women mainly to preserve the rights given them by Ataturk as well as to struggle for Kemalist principles. One of the first

associations founded with that purpose was the Union of Turkish Women (which struggled for the vote two decades ago) but this time was re-established by Kemalist women in 1949 with the purpose under question. The Union struggled against traditional dress of women and motivated women towards a modern dress. It even distributed various fashioned clothes to women in poor districts of major cities in order to remove the traditional dress.²²⁴ Another association with the similar aim was founded in the name of the "Meslek Kadınları Derneği" (Association of Professional Women), in Istanbul in 1948 and later organized in other cities. It also tried to preserve the rights given to women by Ataturk.²²⁵ When coming to the 1970s there existed 27 such associations aiming to advance women in different areas parallel to the principle to develop the country. Almost all these were very strong in loyalty to the Kemalist principles whose basic aim was to bring the country to the level of a contemporary civilization. The following passage denounced by Turkan Aksu, one of the leaders of the "Association of Turkish Mothers", is a most prominent example:

All of our successes are realized through the rights given by our beloved Ataturk under a democratic and republican regime. Our basic aim is to reach our nation to the level of a contemporary civilization under the light of his principles and introduce a more happy and powerful Turkey to the world.²²⁶

These associations came to organize under the "Federation

of Women Associations" in 1976 after the denouncement of the Women's Decade including the time between 1975-1985 as announced by the United Nations. This Federation organized the studies of all associations founded with the above purpose.²²⁷ Indeed, they have devoted women's energy to the defense of Kemalist principles rather than to develop interests particular to women.

The proclamation of the Women's Decade by the United Nations motivated also the leftist groups to pay more attention to woman issue in Turkey. Particularly working women were taken at stake by leftist groups in order to take their support in creating a socialist revolution. It was written in a leftist magazine that "what falls to the working women is to organize not as women but as proletarian, not as female competitors of their laborer husbands but as their struggling fellow."²²⁸ Fatmagul Berktaş argues that during the 1970s the leftist groups wanted to control women since they thought that women were naturally more closer to the capitalist's aims which were known to mobilize women to be extreme consumers. Therefore, she maintains, a sexless image of woman was formulated by the leftist through the discourse of the "sisterhood". Sisterhood, in the last analysis, meant, according to Berktaş male control²²⁹ over the working women.

Leftist groups organized women in different women's associations. Turkish communist party founded the "Ilerici Kadınlar Derneği" (Progressive Women's Society) in 1975 to

mobilize women, in particular working women, towards their aim which was hidden in the guise of establishing a socialist society. The Society, for the first time in Turkish history, celebrated the "International Women's Day" on March 8, 1976. It was the most significant association during the 1970s which mobilized a large number of Turkish women. In 1976, the Society began a campaign throughout the country to force government, businessmen and local governments to open nurseries for working women. Its campaign was followed by various actions and about 50,000 petitions in the country.²³⁰ It published a magazine the "Kadinlarin Sesi" (Voice of Women) which was circulated (about 30 thousands) up to the 1980 military intervention. The Ilerici Kadinlar Dernegi had 33 branches and 35 representative agents in different cities of Turkey with around 20,000 members.²³¹ The basic slogan of the Society was "equality, social progress and peace" was emphasized regularly in its magazine. The Society organized a large number of meetings, demonstrations and campaigns particularly against fascism until 1979, the date at which it was closed down by the government.²³² Another leftist association of the 1970s was the Ankara Association of Women, it later became the Federation of Revolutionist Women's Associations. It also began a series of campaigns and demonstrations against fascism. This association concentrated, in particular, on the women of slum areas and opened courses to make women literate and thus find supporters for their conflict.²³³ In short, the leftist groups saw women as a component of their struggle and combined woman

issue in the struggle for the socialist revolution. Women, too, accepted that role, and had no issue particular to themselves and therefore, perceived themselves as proletarian rather than women; being women in fact came later for them.

In conclusion, women constituted the first genuine civil societal element from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards until 1935. During that period they both struggled for the rights particular only to their conditions and created a different set of values, as alternatives to the ones developed by the existing government. Particularly beginning from 1908 onwards women had occupied the central focus of Turkish political context and organized politically until they were given the right of enfranchisement. But once they were given this right the government succeeded immediately to direct women's energy to the defense of Kemalist principles. Beginning from 1935 to 1980 the women devoted their energy either to the official ideology or to the aims operated by the left, but never stressed on rights particular to their own interest. This period, therefore, is the time that Turkish women lost their potentiality of being an element of the civil society and of being smothered by the state elite. Beginning from 1980 onwards a new phase has been opened in Turkish politics. Civil societal elements once come to play a role in political context. Women in particular again started to occupy the central focus of the Turkish political context. This argument is the central focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND FEMINISM IN POST-1980 TURKISH POLITICS

The chief aim of this chapter is to analyze the condition of the civil society in post-1980 Turkey together with the special role of feminism as a central element of the Turkish civil society. It questions how a shift has been accomplished in Turkish politics after 1980 and brings to light the contributions feminism, as a social as well as a political movement embracing issues against the official ideology, has provided for this shift. The point of departure is that Turkish politics has undergone a substantial change since 1980 and feminism has a special role in this change on the basis of the values it produced as opposed to the cultural norms provided through the official institutions. The discourses raised through feminist women's actions have diversified the universal norms of Turkish political culture. Such issues in particular as being different and autonomous in the public life function to make a contribution to the development of a particular voice which constitutes a crucial element of civil society. This argument will be analyzed in detail in the following parts.

4.1. A NEW PACE PROMISING THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKISH POLITICS

The 1980s promised to be a turning point for civil society in Turkey. After 1980 the release of the civil societal elements from the grip of the center became more pronounced. Their autonomization was based first, on new trends emerging in the Turkish politics; and second, on the emergence of more autonomous social groups proclaiming values different from those formulated by the state elites. This part will analyze this bifurcational development in Turkey.

4.1.1. New Trends in Turkish Politics After the 1980s

In Turkey of the 1980s the traditional structure of the state was transformed. The most striking aspect of this change was reflected in the change and attitudes to the paternal state (the father state). The state "lost some of its respectful image and was now being seen as the instrument of different and competing interests."¹ This resulted with the fact that the concepts along the state and societal relations came to gain definite meaning and the role on the part of the state elite or the political elite is defined once more clearly. Security issues, in general, were carried out by the state elite while the economic issues were under the control of political elite.

The post 1980 state elite (now represented mainly by the president and the military hierarchy) came up with a narrow definition of responsibility, which based on the responsibility for the internal as well as the external security of the country.² The 1982 Constitution gave the President's office the role as the formal representative of the state. After 1980 the presidents, however, came to play the role of an intermediary between the state and civil society. With this in mind, President Kenan Evren used to travel around the country to foster national unity and social solidarity. In his speeches he emphasized the traditional symbols in mobilizing people, such as the Koran. President Turgut Ozal, the first genuine civil president, went further by giving priority to social initiative against the state.³ This new picture was the complete reverse of the attitude of the state elite in the 1930s, who left the traditional symbols to one side and strongly emphasized the creation of a new mentality. The appeal by the state elite to traditional symbols in the 1980s represented a fresh attempt to close the gap between the state and society.

Furthermore, the official ideology of the state gained a new dimension. As Metin Heper has pointed out the most important development is the fact that Ataturkism is no longer taken as a political manifesto.⁴ There has been a softening of attitudes towards Ataturkian principles (republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, reformism and etatism).

Indeed, etatism was completely dropped when populism and nationalism came under attack.⁵ Ataturkian thought is no longer regarded as the source for all public policies; rather, it serves as a justification for rejecting radical ideologies of both the left and the right. An additional shift, after 1980, could be observed in the role of the state elite (the military, bureaucrats and the intelligentsia). Each has taken a position fundamentally different from their roles during the Ottoman empire or the early years of the Republican Turkey. The military, the chief actor of the 1980 intervention, stayed in its barracks.⁶ Its frequent interventions into Turkish politics had been strongly criticized by social groups, particularly the press, and by . the end of the decade the military seemed to have decided to leave the political issues completely to the political elite. The bureaucrats also came to depend on the government and to realize the government's projects, which were mostly on behalf of the society itself. Finally, one can clearly see a fundamental transformation in the traditional role of the Turkish intelligentsia. Many Turkish intellectuals, particularly those who were and are employed in the press became strong supporters of the civil society. The present intellectuals, in contrast to the immediate post-Ataturkian bureaucratic-intellectuals, do not presume that they are an inherently superior group in sole possession of the truth.⁷

Two new issues coming under discussion in Turkey after 1980

are the civil society and liberalism. Both were raised first by the political elite. The prime minister, Turgut Ozal (1983-1989), was one of the pioneers in raising these issues. The programs of the Motherland party governments (between 1983-1991) created a strong impetus towards shifting the attention from the state to society. The privatisation of the state's economic enterprises, the devolution of authority, the transference of funds to the municipalities and the increasing emphasis placed on market forces, are crucial in this regard. It is clear that privatisation and the stress on market forces had the potential of strengthening the hands of civil societal elements.⁸ Prime Minister Ozal advocated the principle that the state should exist to serve the people and not the people for the state. Moreover, he denounced the view that the state is responsible for providing an economic infrastructure and a political framework for protecting the rights and freedoms of the individual and ensuring public security. The state envisioned by Ozal had a role only in fields such as education, public health and national defense; outside these areas it should not impose itself as an interventionist power.⁹ Ozal strongly emphasized basic freedoms, of thought, conscience and beliefs as well as freedom of free enterprise. Such an attitude by a prime minister was, indeed, the first in Turkish politics.

A new aspect of post-1980 Turkey is the development of arguments around liberalism, either in the economic sense or the cultural, implying freedom of thought. Liberal thought, in fact, is strongly rooted in modern Turkish history. It was one

of the arguments raised to save the state in the last decades of the Ottoman empire. However, it was smothered by the success of a centralist ideology during the Republican period. Although some arguments over liberalism came into the picture between 1950-1980 they were not freely developed. In the last decade, however, it was rediscovered gaining strong support among intellectuals, political parties of the left and right and in society generally.¹⁰ As an extension of the liberal arguments pluralism gained pace, generating various discourses. As a result, as Nilufer Gole has observed, political and cultural pluralism has been furthered: in addition civil societal elements have freed themselves from state domination.¹¹ In conclusion, as put by Gole, "in Turkey of the 1980s, first, the political dynamics shifted from ideological confrontation to a pursuit for pluralism, and, secondly the political discourses were 'liberated' from the 'system questioning' political doctrines, and tended to be characterized by a 'policy questioning' stance."¹² This trend in Turkish politics led to the emergence of some autonomous social groups after 1980, particularly feminism in our analysis, which constitute an intermediate component of civil society.

4.1.2. The Development of Autonomous Social Groups

After 1980 the conflict around such grand issues as modernization, national identity, secularism and national solidarity tended to be replaced by debates on more immediate

problems (pollution, public health, tourism, environment, human rights, woman's rights, etc.). These issues were dealt with on the social agenda by different groups operating independently of the state or political parties. This development has enabled social groups to challenge as well as to control state policies. Moreover, to a certain extent, they also came about to share the functions of the state. Social groups such as feminists, environmentalists, religious activists as well as homosexuals and transsexuals were of the same nature and further contributed to the emergence of a plurality of identities at the civil societal level. These groups, with their different values and norms, represented the ¹³ autonomization of social forces from the grip of the center.

Islam as a significant dimension of the Turkish civil society also began to be rediscovered by the elite and to occupy a significant focus of politics. It contributed to the pluralization of sources for public policy-making and provided additional themes for political participation and political ¹⁴ protests. An outstanding example of social protests on the part of the religious groups was the campaign by veiled girls for the right to attend school wearing 'Islamic' dress. Their activities were extended to different parts of the country in the last years of the decade and finally they gained this right to a certain extent.

Another element of civil society coming to prominence in

the 1980s was the ethnic Kurdish movement in the south east part of Turkey. Arguments on the Kurdish issue were raised on the basis of human rights, and advanced by the PKK (Kurdish Labor Party) through terrorism. The issue brought the political elite to the point of accepting that the Kurdish language be accepted as legal and that Kurds be given their own identity.¹⁵

Still another component of civil society is the press which has gained an important place in the democratization of the country. It has become the symbol of liberty, the catalyst for trouble, and the watchdog of government policies. As the intermediary between government, organized groups and citizens, journalists and intellectuals writing for the press regarded themselves as the chief guardians of democracy and civil society.¹⁶ Some columnists devote all their energy to the complaints of citizens against the government and occasionally disclose the party under question in their columns.

The Turkish environmental groups brought a definite relativization into the state policy in regard to environmental issues. The environmentalist groups in Turkey mainly act in two ways: in voluntarily established organizations and under the banner of the Green party. The first performs the function of an auxiliary unit of the state, through scientific projects and studies underlying the essential environmental problems. Reference to the environment in the 1982 Constitution and the Environmental Act were

formulated by voluntary environmental associations. On the other hand, the members of the Green party have initiated a series of campaigns against the government policies which they regard as having a negative effect on the environment. These campaigns have mostly succeeded in replacing outdated policies with new ones. This process clearly indicates a certain relativization in state policy.¹⁷

The most significant element of the civil society in post-1980 Turkey has arisen in the form of feminist groups. These groups have opened a fundamentally new chapter in Turkish politics, constituting a strong challenge to the dominant institutions. Unlike all other social groups, feminists broke all compromising links with the state, criticizing not only the present policies but also the essential traditional institutions such as patriarchy and family, which are two significant components of the Turkish national identity strengthened especially during the Republican period. As it is well known, the Republican ideology was based on Durkheimian sociology, taking the family as the essential unit of national solidarity. This version of sociology was taken as the essence of official ideology of the Republic through Ziya Gökalp, the theoretician of the Young Ottomans and of the Republican regime. Feminist criticism of the family then is identical with the criticism of the state or the nation itself. Feminist ideas have had a great impact at the grass-roots level, at the same time creating a challenge to the state

institutions, and thus, constituting an element of the civil society. This argument is the central focus of the following part.

4.2. TURKISH FEMINISM

4.2.1. The Emergence of Feminism in Turkey

After a long break, feminism, revived in Turkey with recent versions, immediately following the 1980 military intervention, which temporarily suspended democracy and brought political life to a complete halt. "Feminism soon became a central issue, leading people to believe that it will occupy an important position on the political agenda of the country during the 1980s."¹⁸ Immediately after the military intervention of 1980 a spontaneously structured type of feminist movement developed, independent of the state or the political parties and involving a broad cross-section of women. They included writers, artists, journalists, university teachers, etc. At the beginning feminism involved professional groups of women from the wealthy section of the society living mostly in cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. But it later soon prevailed among young girls mostly university students as well as in different sections in the Turkish society.¹⁹

The development of feminism has followed four basic phases: the confidential preparation period, the revival period, the legacy seeking period and the period it converted

to an action.²⁰ In the first period, Sirin Tekeli, a leading feminist, points to the translation of various books from Western feminists into the Turkish language during the 1970s. The writings of consistent feminist writers such as Simone de Beauvoir, Kate Millet and Shulamit Firestone were incorporated into the Turkish context during the time under question. Furthermore, Tekeli points to the importance of native studies on Turkish women, particularly the edited book "Turkiye'de Kadın" (Woman in Turkey) (1979), which embraced a sociological point of view.²¹ One should bear in mind that there were additional factors, in that period, contributing to the development of feminism in Turkey. Among them were attempts by leftist groups to encourage socialism among women. As emphasized in the previous chapter, the Turkish left took its cue from the declaration of the UN for the Decade of Women in 1975. Its attempts were successful, as most of the feminist leaders of the 1980s were active participants in the leftist groups of the 1970s.²² Still another factor behind the development of feminist ideas during the confidential preparation period was the publication of "Kadınca" (1978), a monthly magazine devoted completely to woman issues, the first in its kind. On the one hand it directed women toward the traditional roles in the family, but on the other hand it embraced a critical view of the present status of women. Kadınca gave special importance to the professions by which women could improve their status. Moreover, it raised various critiques of traditional values socially attributed to women, strongly criticizing the preservation of virginity as well as

protesting against the ban on abortion.

Although there were feminist ideas, the Turkish context still was not ready in the 1970s for a movement like feminism to develop in a way that it could dissociate itself completely from the grip of the center as well as that of the mainstream groups. There were significant barriers standing in the way of this process. Tekeli stresses two of them as structural and ideological. She regards the first structural barrier as a less-developed capitalism, which could not employ sufficient numbers of women and left the family as the basic economic unit. The second structural barrier she concentrates on is the family. She argues that the extended family is still the most esteemed institution in the Turkish culture; however, feminism develops in countries having a type of nuclear family. She, finally, points to an educational system, in which there are fewer women than men as last of the structural barrier against the development feminism in Turkey of the 1970s. Turkey. In addition to the structural barriers Tekeli points to the three ideological obstacles as Kemalism, Islam, and the Turkish left.²⁴ In short, the 1970s was an important period in the sense that feminist views were able to take root, but the factors mentioned above carried it to the post-1980 period.

The early years of the 1980s were a turning point in the development of feminism in Turkey. In 1980 the military regime abolished post and abolished all links between the state and

society. The unions, the voluntarily established organizations, the trade associations and even the political parties were banned from taking part in politics. The absence of these links led women to seek a new alternative to participation in politics.²⁵ The Kemalists are traditionally sympathetic to women in Turkey. This is the reason why the military rulers (as the chief preserver of Kemalist principles) smothered other groups after the intervention, but tolerated actions held by women. As an extension of that women were allowed in May 1981 to organize a symposium on woman issue under the banner of the "YAZKO" (Cooperation of Writers and Translators). A non-used concern was given to that symposium then immediately a new one was organized by the same group.²⁶ The central focus of these symposia was to question the unequal status of women in Turkish society despite the substantial improvements made during the Republican Turkey.²⁷

In addition to the political factors created by the military intervention, sociological factors were also critical to the emergence of the feminist movement in the 1980s. Among others urbanization, which reached its peak in the 1980s, is important to mention. Urbanization in Turkey brought about an awareness among a variety of different social sections of their status and led them to demand special rights. This was particularly true of liberal feminism, which takes the "right" as the cornerstone of its struggle.²⁸ Based on the development of the educational and communicational possibilities, women were able to claim special rights.²⁹ The most outstanding sort

of this was profession. Women, who sought for prestige and career under the banner of the ideological groups of the 1970s, shifted their attention to profession and success as means for the realization of themselves. More than being an instrument for surviving, indeed, profession has been taken by Turkish women, in post-1980, as a means of constructing an identity.³⁰

The revival period of the feminist movement in Turkey was accomplished through the attempts of women who were strong participants of the left in the 1970s. Tekeli says she left university in 1981 under the enforcement of the military regime and was employed by YAZKO. She constructed a nuclear cadre of approximately 50 women who devoted their full energy to research into woman issue, including a series of translations from Western feminists writings into Turkish. The revival of feminism in the hands of these women made it necessary for them to question their past. Tekeli mentions out how they pondered Marxism and succeeded in breaking with that tradition:

During that time [the early years of the 1980s] we radically questioned our past, particularly, the Marxism which was the basic tenet for most of us, and reanalyzed our daily experience in a more detailed and sophisticated manner. We reached a true definition of those concepts, which are important parts of the Turkish culture, such as the patriarchy, gender and male domination over women

and we, thus, gradually, became feminists.³¹

Tekeli points out that they publicized their views after 1982, immediately following a symposium held by the French feminist writer Giselle Halimi in Istanbul. Halimi encouraged them to publicize their ideas as feminists without feeling a fear and restriction upon themselves.³² This brought the revival period to an end and led feminists to seek a legacy in society.

The legacy-seeking period for feminist women began with the attempts to publicize their ideas. At the end of 1982, feminist women decided to present their ideology before the public opinion in an orderly way. Efforts to obtain a page in different daily papers resulted in a page in Somut, a weekly magazine, published by YAZKO. The first feminist page was prepared according to assertively feminist principles, that is every women (famous or not) had the right to appear in print. Articles covered such issues as abortion, women's day, women and advertising and ideas inimical to women in folk proverbs, etc.³³ Beside these issues a variety of translations from Western feminists particularly Simone de Beauvoir were published on this page.³⁴ These writings attracted many women but at the same time made others angry. Kemalist, socialist and religious women reacted against these feminist women and after four months they were forced to leave the magazine. Sule Torun, the editor of the page, explains how feminists had the opportunity for the first time to discuss the ethical rules imposed upon women from their childhood onward and to set new

definitions of their own. Torun describes that they went beyond the traditional roles attributed to women such as "good wife", "good mother" and "ideal sexual object" and raised among women a self-consciousness.³⁵ Another prominent feminist writer, Stella Ovadia, describes how Somut, was used to developed an intellectual base for solidarity among women. She maintains that Somut took women not as the "other" but as "we women", the subject of their own discourses.³⁶ Since this page was greatly attractive to women it continued to stress woman issue even after the feminists left the magazine in the hands of new writers (mostly men).³⁷

The Somut experience brought feminist groups to agree on the need to create an autonomous political force, independent of the state, the political parties, or other social movements. Thus, from 1983 onwards, a new strategy appeared among feminists. The main initiative of this period was the foundation of the Kadin Cevresi (Woman's Circle), which was a publishing venture as well as a service and consultation company whose aim was to "evaluate the work of women, paid or unpaid, outside or within the home."³⁸ The Woman's Circle was founded when national politics made it impossible to establish any sort of formal association or foundation. However, it was clearly tolerated by the military regime. It concentrated on publishing activities aiming at creating self-awareness among women as well as constituting a consultative body for their legal problems.³⁹ With the participation of female students,

feminism gained further ground throughout the country. Thus, during the 1980s, publications about and by women ranked among the best-selling books. Duygu Asena's novel "Kadinin Adi Yok" (Woman Has No Name) went into its 26th edition a year after its publication in March 1987.⁴⁰ Moreover, close attention was paid on to woman's films which ranked among the most attractive to the public. Indeed, the 1980s is accepted in the Turkish cinema literature as the period of woman's films. Through these films a new image of the "independent woman", aware of her sexuality and determined to struggle against society's sexist norms and rules developed. The central message of these films was to create an independent woman whose basic stance was based on individualistic volition⁴¹ contesting for the problems of herself. A variety of films have been created as an extension of this attempt under the impact of feminist movement. Atif Yilmaz, the chief director of several of these films points to the feminist impact on the emergence of these films in the following manner:

A feminist movement has culminated recently in Turkey, which has led women to become more conscious of themselves as compared to the past. Turkish women began to question, in recent years, matters such as the place she occupies in society, her relationships with man and her status at work. Since these concern⁴² me, I produce such films.

One might see a reciprocal relationship between woman's films and feminism in Turkey. The central figure created

through these films directs women to criticize their present status and, thus, to concern themselves with feminism. On the other hand, feminism, drawing attention to woman issue directed the attention of the society generally to films dealing with women's problems. Turkish television also began to pay attention to this issue. In 1985, for the first time in Turkey, television prepared a program for women "Hanimlar Sizin Icin" (For You Ladies), emphasizing the problems women faced in their daily lives. This was followed by many others throughout the decade. With the addition of the private channels after 1989, woman issue took the central focus of the television programs in Turkey. This led feminist ideas to be publicized further around the country.

Although feminism was rooted in metropolitan cities at the beginning of the decade, toward the end it extended along the country from Adana to Antep and from Edirne to Denizli; in fact, to all corners of the country. Concern with feminism has been maintained through a large variety of panels, symposia, and conferences. Feminists, for the first time in Turkey, celebrated the International Women's Day on March 8, 1985. In the same year the feminist movement crystallized into three distinct streams, liberal, socialist and radical feminists, each attempting to create different institutions and developing different discourses in their own magazines. Feminists devoted their energy to various actions in the streets of different cities from 1986 onwards. The "legacy-

seeking" attempt of feminist women was, thus, replaced by a new chapter unfolding the way for feminist actions.

4.2.2. Feminist Versions and Discourses

From 1985 onwards feminism developed through different versions advocating completely different discourses in Turkey. The mainstream version of feminism in Turkey is liberal feminism, embracing specifically the liberation of woman and her equality with man. The liberal version of feminism was represented in Turkey after 1984 mostly by writings in Kadinca. By contrast socialist and radical feminists went beyond equality and took the emancipation of women as the center of their struggle. These two groups of feminists engaged in a joint struggle against the oppression of women up to 1987, but later parted company. Socialist feminists published the Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus magazine, while radicals published the Feminist. The following analysis of feminist versions and discourses is based on a detailed study of these three magazines.

4.2.2.1. Liberal Feminism and the Claim on Equality

Liberal issues concerning woman began to be emphasized in Turkey mainly by Kadinca, from 1984 onwards. However, before that time Kadinca had obviously demonstrated a "Kemalist" attitude toward woman issue, idealizing Westernization and modernization as the basic aim. This changing trend could be

easily observed in the discourses handled by Kadinca after that time.⁴⁴

Liberal feminists take the equality of women with men and liberty for women as the center of their struggle. The equality they demand can be summed up in three basic points: equality in professional life, equality in marriage life, and equality in social life.⁴⁵ Business life is seen by liberal feminists as the means by which a woman gains her liberty. Gaining work is regarded as being synonymous with being successful. Liberal feminists insist that the profession life brings freedom and happiness not only to woman but also to her family and her country.⁴⁶ The meaning given to work by liberal feminists is the mainstream of the following passage:

Getting work through the approval of legal principles is the natural right of women. Having an occupation is the most essential requirement not only for the welfare of a woman but also for her family. It is the time that women should gain their economic independence and stand on their feet without any help from men. Economic independence inevitably⁴⁷ brings to women freedom of action and expression.

Liberal feminists strongly stress the need for legal principles to be adjusted in such a way that women can have equal treatment at work. As an extension of this they point to "equal payment for equal work" as a basic principle in business

life. Moreover, they demand public a nursery in every business employing women as well as insurance for women employed in agriculture or doing work at home.⁴⁸ Liberal feminists point out the lack of work and the traditional division of labor within the family as the basic barriers standing in the way of Turkish women obtaining an occupation. Therefore, they favor a more developed capitalism in Turkey. The most prominent Turkish liberal feminist, Tekeli, argues that they should struggle against a less-developed capitalism as it lacks the chance for women to be properly employed.⁴⁹

Turkish liberal feminists also advocate equality in marriage life. They defend a marriage that does not restrict woman's freedom; otherwise, they say, women should dissolve their marriage bonds. The basic principle, they argue, is an equal division of labor in the family and the same freedom for woman as for men.⁵⁰ Kadinca's editor, Duygu Asena, strongly emphasizes freedom of woman in married life, arguing that "it is impossible to react against marriage since it is the basic principle of social life, a form of solidarity which makes life easier and more comfortable."⁵¹ But she maintains that women should not devote their full energy to serve their husbands. Asena frequently advises her readers to preserve their liberty in their domestic life and never lose the principal elements of their personality.⁵² Free choice in married life, for her, clearly means woman's emancipation. The following argument that she raises against radical feminists who seek a radical transformation of the entire social

relations toward the end of woman's emancipation is interesting with regard to our argument:

Emancipation... Yes there is such a concept but only when young girls are able to reject any marriage compulsorily imposed upon them by their parents will women be emancipated in Turkey. When parents stop forcing their daughters to marry those whom only they approved will women be emancipated. When a woman feels herself so strong that she might dissolve her marriage bonds if she does not enjoy life with her husband any more or is suppressed and battered in the home solely, then she will be truly emancipated.⁵³

Woman, to liberal feminists, should not be perceived from the gender point of view anymore but rather as the female part of humanity. Therefore, they demand a legal arrangement of the family in a way that no woman is conceived of as being the servant of her husband. Liberal feminists regard spouses as equal partners, and realize marriage on the basis of mutual love and respect. Otherwise, marriage, they argue, turns into a consistent barrier to woman's participation in the public life.⁵⁴ Liberal feminists also require that the government introduce laws granting divorce on demand. As it is well known the Turkish Civil Code does not allow the dissolution of the marriage bonds unless five serious actions are accomplished during the marriage.⁵⁵ This process is criticized strongly by

the liberal feminists, as they think it forces women to prolong an unenjoyable marriage.⁵⁶ They criticize also the payment of alimony to a woman by her husband after divorce. They argue that this action ignores a woman's honor, and that the state should pay an allowance as well as provide insurance to the divorced woman.⁵⁷

The Liberal feminists give a special meaning to equality in the social life for women. Equality as such means to be able to act socially without restriction. It is argued, through the issues developed in the writings of the liberal feminists, that woman in the Turkish society has always been treated as the "other" of man. To transform this definition they say that woman must realize herself on the basis of her own personality and individuality.⁵⁸ By articulating this view, it is clear that the Turkish liberal feminists are influenced by the feminist point of view developed by the French existentialist feminists, particularly Simone de Beauvoir. The Turkish liberal feminists identify a woman's existence with being dissociated from her traditional roles and thus being able to make her own choices. This point of view is defended by Asena, who advises women to liberate their behavior without fear of the consequences that might follow. She pronounces this as follows: "Not to be afraid do whatever you want; touch whom you never touched; love whom you never loved; say what you never said; defend what you never defended; do what you never did; and try what you never attempted."⁵⁹ As this clearly indicates a very existential point of view is proposed for

women by the liberal feminists. They have also accomplished a radical shift in view from those women who served the country during the War of Independence and were later committed to the ideological mainstream like Kemalism or socialism before 1980. This attempt to seek a strong personality to women is the central message of the following passage:

Live for nobody but only yourself. It should not be of interest what others think about that. Do not delay any more in loving yourself. It is in your hand to attain dignity and reach a higher status. Find your true identity and make men appreciate that.
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The strong insistence by liberal feminists on developing a strong personality clearly resembles the desire to articulate the interests of a special social category. Moreover, it accomplishes a substantial break from the traditional image of women indicating an existence for the service of others than their own. The basic notion behind this kind of existence put forward for women is implicitly hidden in the feminists' demand of equal status for women and in their refusal of the values formulating women as the "other" of men.

In addition to equality, liberal feminists stress the concept of "liberty" as the central focus of their struggle. The term liberty is mainly used in reference to sexual freedom. Liberal feminists emphasize sexual freedom mainly in two phases: outside marriage and within married life. Un-limited

sexual freedom is posited for any unmarried woman, beginning with dating which may include sexual relationship with a man. Zuleyha Guvener, a writer for Kadinca, argues that those who have no experience in dating in their daily lives are potentially close to deviance bearing elements of corruption for the society.⁶¹ Another writer, Oya Ozdilek, points to a future in which the Turkish women would be able to break the destiny formerly shaped by their sexuality. She argues that in the near future a woman will be able to call a man whom she enjoys and offer to have sexual intercourse with him. Ozdilek persists that this is the basic right of a free woman, and that every free woman should experience this action.⁶² This is, in fact, why Turkish liberal feminists strongly criticize the value in Turkish culture attributing a sacred meaning to the virginity of women. The Liberal feminists conceive this as a strong social and cultural barrier to a woman's liberty as well as to the key indigenous factor behind the serial problems of Turkish women. Tulin Kolukisa announces this in the following terms: "The history of all restrictions on women are based on the wall of virginity. This impediment is likely responsible from all other walls persisting for women."⁶³ In short, the liberal feminists demand unrestricted sexual freedom for unmarried women.

However, they are ambivalent on this concept when it comes to married woman. Some articulate the view that a married woman should be limited to the sexual relationship of married

life. Yet others argue that women should be free to go beyond married life and experiencing other sexual relations. For the former, marriage provides enough source for sexual pleasure. Their argument might be summed up in the following manner: "Marriage gives us every sort of possibility to enrich our sexual life, enough to evaluate the opportunities offered in that good unity."⁶⁴ But some feminist women assert that the sexual life of a woman should not be restrained even if she is married. The exponents of this view insist that "just as sexual intercourse is not a matter for guilt before marriage it should not be regarded as wrong for a woman to fall in love with someone else after getting marriage."⁶⁵ The Turkish feminist Stella Ovadia defines this as the most considerable right that could be gained by Turkish women. In support of her argument, she quotes a feminist woman living with someone else and forcing her husband to accept that relationship:

The alternative to this type of living is to return to the traditional way of life. I do not want to fall backward. This is a successful step in destroying the structure of the traditional family. I have taken an encouraged step for our generation. This was not so easy at the beginning but I have succeeded and I want to perpetuate it as a symbol of freedom, which is the most necessary stance for our generation.⁶⁶

This view, is not so broad among Turkish feminists, Yet by all feminists, sexuality, either within marriage or outside

it, is regarded as being crucial to woman's liberty. This, indeed, separates feminist women from the "sexless" or "man-like" women categorized in the mentality of the Kemalist woman's associations or from the women regarded as "sister" of the leftist and among the religious groups.

As an extension of the sexuality argument the liberal feminists place a great significance on the preservation of private life. A writer for Kadinca, Candan Aslanbay, defines four areas which the state should leave women alone: marriage, reproduction, divorce and homelife.⁶⁷ Moreover, Tekeli, as a part of preserving one's private life, defends the subsistence of the family as long as there is an equal division of labor between the partners. Her argument runs as follows: "The demand to destroy the family is nonsense; it is meaningless to destroy a family, in which man and woman are equal and free. We should transform rather than abolish the family."⁶⁸ This point is particularly important when comparing liberal feminist discourses with the discourses of radical feminists calling for the abolition of the family.

Liberal feminists are also sympathetic to men. They argue that feminism cannot be regarded as being synonymous with hostility to men or with transcending woman's values. Men who suppress women are victims of the general system and its education.⁶⁹ Asena strongly accuses radical feminists of undermining feminism by setting up men as the central object

of their struggle.⁷⁰ She illustrates men as their close associates as follows: "Our husbands, our lovers, our close friends all are men; if so, why do we perceive men as our enemy?"⁷¹ One can obviously see here the impact of Western egalitarian feminists, particularly Mary Wollstonecraft, on Turkish liberal feminists. Reha Isvan, a passionate advocate of this perspective, argues that the roles attributed to the man in the Turkish culture develop his ability and provide him to pursue a free personality. However, woman's personality in this culture is being equated with her sexuality, which brings about a passive personality. She goes on to urge that women should struggle for liberty, democracy, and peace in cooperation with men in order to extend the traditional values burdened upon them. Isvan concludes that in a genuine democratic type of society and education the present image of man and woman would no longer be taken as the central figure of power relations.⁷² Furthermore, Tekeli formulates a discourse demanding democracy and political participation as the central focus of the feminist struggle. Her argument runs as follows:

What is expected from us [as feminists] is to stress the problems interesting all people and not just ourselves. It is also expected of us to direct our struggle towards democratic, egalitarian and participatory institutions. Moreover, it is expected from us to utilize the present political channels not distant from the center of our struggle.⁷³

The concepts of diversity and plurality are the central issues in the struggle of the Turkish liberal feminists. As an extension of that view, most of their energy is spent in regulating the state norms and legal principles on behalf of women's interests. All problems women face, liberal feminists say, can be solved through legal arrangements. This is why feminists strongly stress the need to establish a woman's ministry in Turkey.⁷⁴

To conclude, liberal feminists in Turkey have formulated a liberal democratic society, in which men and women are equal and free in their actions. "Being like men" is the essential ideal put forward for women by liberal feminists, with the ultimate goal being pronounced as being "as good as man." Values such as competition and success in one's professional life, equal division of labor in family, freedom of action and expression in social life, and freedom in sexual behavior are formulated as the means by which women can articulate the public life. Integration of women into such a public world means, indeed, nothing more than masculinizing women.

4.2.2.2. Radical Feminism and the Politics of Rejection and Difference

Radical feminists in Turkey displayed their voice through an irregularly published magazine the Feminist (published between 1987-1990), which stressed a completely rejective and reversal discourse. The usage of a non-used language in

the writings of the magazine of a print type and colors means to separate radical feminists from the mainstream. A purple colored paper is commonly used in the magazine symbolizing femininity, and no writer of the magazine uses her surname because it symbolizes masculine domination of women.

Turkish radical feminists aim at emancipating women from men's domination in a way that goes beyond the liberal feminists who regard male values as the basic model. Radical feminists condemn male values which they say reside in conflict, competition and war. Unlike liberal feminists, radical feminists argue that women's emancipation can be accomplished only by the replacement of overall definitions of the male-oriented values with ones based mainly on the female-oriented values, which are seen as peaceful behavior and the like.⁷⁵ They talk about patriarchy and analyze woman issue from this point of view. Handan, the most consistent exponent of the radical feminist view and the editor of the Feminist, argues that all aspects of social life, whether economic, cultural, historical, artistic or scientific, are characterized by male-oriented values. Man and his values, she urges, have constructed the basic subject of history. Only men have realized true revolutions, have achieved great transformations and have brought about broad social changes. In short, it is men who have created history. Women, Handan maintains, have always been the subject of private life which allotted to them⁷⁶ the activities such as washing, cleaning and caring.

Patriarchy, according to the radical feminists has separated the private sphere of women (the realm of reproduction) from the public domain of men (realm of production). This division is, to radical feminists, based on a patriarchal ideology rather than economic factors and has brought about the domination of men over women.⁷⁷ A prominent advocate of this view, Stella Ovia, argues that patriarchal ideology has put the phallus at the center of its cultural norms. All values ordering society have been dispensed⁷⁸ according to the norms produced in the phallic system. This system, she maintains, grants man, during his socialization, such qualities as activity, strength, initiative, production, rationality, etc. Women are socialized into a behavior characterized by passivity, weakness, lack of initiative, reproduction of the male children and irrational emotionalism. The norms of the patriarchal culture socialize a male in such a way that it integrates him into public life, giving him creativity and power; however, the phallic system socializes a female in such a way that she is expected to follow up only the various activities of domestic life such as child bearing and rearing and household duties.⁷⁹ Moreover, this culture develops notions such as shame and honor as tactical instruments separating women from the public and restricting them to familial life.⁸⁰ It is clear that radical feminists have come to create a strong challenge to the basic principles of the theory of civil society formulated specifically according to the division of man's and woman's realms by both the

contractual theorists (Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau) and by the theorists who divided the civil society from the state on the basis of national state and production (Hegel, Marx and Gramsci). Radical feminists dispute the attempts of these thinkers to allot only household duties to women in a civil society. They are producing a new definition of a civil society which gives women a full role.

Unlike the liberal feminists, the radical feminists strongly reject the articulation of women with institutions of public life as the way of women's emancipation. They argue that the public institutions such as the state bureaucracy, the military and the police are on the peak of man's values; therefore, no woman should participate in these spheres.⁸¹ Moreover, they criticize the liberal feminist view that women's emancipation can be achieved through equality in the public and democratic institutions. To radical feminists democracy is, in the final analysis, characterized by power relations rooted in the state and is therefore unacceptable to genuine feminists.⁸² Furthermore, the radical feminists utilize the concept of emancipation instead of equality and liberty. S. Nur, a radical feminist, says that women have already achieved equality in many societies but no woman has been emancipated from patriarchal oppression.⁸³ Another exponent of this view, Ayse, points to what is at stake in the following terms:

The struggle for liberty is significant, but it is

equally important to denounce a struggle for emancipation in order to overcome man's domination. Liberty, indeed, is necessary for us but it is not enough; we cannot be satisfied with limiting man's domination over us, we should also abolish it. Men do not use only visible power institutions to suppress women in the public sphere such as the state, the law, and the military; they use also "innocent" concepts such as love, "shelter" such as family, and a "natural" drive such as sexuality. Women's emancipation aims at transpation also follows up the removal of the oppressive institutions which provide man's authority such as the state, the military and particularly the family as well as class and nation.

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Radical feminists are not satisfied with "special" rights as long as the patriarchal culture remains; rather they formulate an overall transformation of the male-based cultural system. This view is very clearly enunciated as follows: "When women become aware of their subordination they can construct a concept of a radical upheaval affecting all the institutions of history, of the world, of life and of subordination. This concept is feminism." More than stressing the present situation, they refer to the politics of the future, which they say will be characterized by a woman's values. This point is the central message of the following argument:

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There are many reasons for women to oppose social

conventions, the state, the family, capital, the language, the dominant ethic, the history and the process of the historical writings. If the future is to be different it will probably be ours too; the woman will be the future.⁸⁶

These Radical feminists engage strongly in elevating woman's values over the values of man. They even regard feminism as being identical with women's consciousness of their existence as well as their love of values which are potentially rooted in femininity.⁸⁷ They strongly reject being similar to men whose values symbolize the hierarchal power and domination of others. Nevertheless, these radical feminists urge that women ponder other things than power or oppression. Their arguments are as follows: "As women we never involve ourselves in negative actions. We are distant to violence and we signify other things than hierarchy in social life."⁸⁸ The Radical feminists object to the liberal feminists' attitude of masculinizing women in public life. They say that feminism undertakes the politics of "feminizing" women as well as men through genuine feminine values. The following argument, raised by Vildan, is interesting from the point of view under question:

It is necessary for us to invert all things men define as good, important and esteemed. To me it is better to direct men towards the realm occupied by women because men's realm is the place that confirms

their domination over women. Therefore, it seems better to invite men to the grounds providing that the erosion of their domination over women in order to be truly able to create a reversal transformation process towards the female sphere.⁸⁹

Vildan insists that even under the existing conditions a women's values are more worthwhile when compared to those of men. She asks how it becomes possible to view fighting as good, which is, from a woman's point of view, immoral and harmful to humanity.⁹⁰

Turkish radical feminists also draw attention to a woman's writing, which constructed totally from the daily experience of women. Like their French counterpart they view writing as the necessary tool for setting up a different framework of values, otherwise women will unavoidably be integrated with writings that essentially serve for men's discourse.⁹¹ Women, radical feminists maintain, should "like" themselves whether they are thin or fat, attractive or unattractive. Women should develop new norms for their bodies and take them at the center of their writings. Only in this way, they insist, can women be able to transform man-based values.⁹²

The Turkish radical feminists proclaim that solidarity among women as a political discourse implicitly carries the function of a means for women's emancipation. Solidarity among

women, to them, should be maintained through the associations such as women's businesses, women's unions, women's shelters, etc.⁹³ Women would thus be able to create a feminine revolution while abolishing men's domination over women.

Another point politicized by the radical feminists is the need for full liberty which rejects all kinds of barriers to women. Ayse points out that she wants no baby since it constructs a barrier to her liberty. She manifests the attitude of a "liberal stranger"⁹⁴, who has no interest outside herself in an article entitled "I'm Afraid, Baby", in Feminist. A baby, she says, prevents a free woman from behaving in an irregular way, that is, to go around the country from time to time and to passionately go from one corner to another without any restriction.⁹⁵ Another prominent supporter of this view, Minu, pronounces that she "wants to be a sweet daughter, wife or mother of nobody."⁹⁶ In short, radical feminist women in Turkey create a politics completely particular to women. Their politics no longer includes women in other social categories but rather directs them towards developing a quite develop a quite autonomous identity.

In conclusion, the Turkish radical feminists take their struggle against a history whose basic dynamics are formulated by men as the central focus of their struggle. This point of departure brings feminists to question not only the patriarchal culture but also the male-oriented definition of civil society.

The concept of a civil society formulated by Hegel, as a transitory moment ending in a strong state, comes to be fundamentally inverted by the feminists. They demand a new state and society with relationships that take into account women's interest. They reject all institutions, definitions, concepts and principles regarded as the male norms and are struggling for a different voice, setting up new values and definitions. This is clearly symbolized in "feminizing" men on the basis of different values, which, in the final analysis, opens a new door in the civil society. This difference, as such, obviously develops a contribution to the plurality of the society. The feminist alternative, thus, creates a significant basis for the development of the civil society in Turkey.

4.2.2.3. Socialist Feminism and the Politics of Participation in the Public Life

The socialist feminists opened a further chapter in Turkish feminism after 1987 through the irregularly published magazine Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus. Socialist feminists have been trying to synthesize radical versions of feminism and socialism, aimed at making feminists socialist and socialist males feminist. Nukhet Sirman rightly points out that the efforts of the socialist feminists in Turkey come, in the last analysis, to legalizing feminism in the eyes of Turkish socialists.⁹⁷

At the very core of the socialist feminists is a struggle

against the division between the public and the private spheres which are equated with production and reproduction. They raise arguments against the radical feminists who assume that the patriarchal culture is the only ideological factor behind women's subordination. However, the socialist feminists insist that the inferior status of women is a historical outcome of a definite economic model, namely capitalism. This is why they utilize the term "capitalism" as the key concept behind women's oppression instead of the term "patriarchy".⁹⁸ The socialist feminists argue that capitalism has historically placed women at the center of private life and men at the center of public life. The reproductive activities such child bearing, the socialization of children, and housework are all left to women in the capitalist system. Capitalism, they insist, has transformed the family into a nuclear form, which is the best unit for the reproduction of new generations serving capitalists as labor force. Capitalism divides the sphere of work from the household and leave this realm to men. Since the production is dominant to the reproductive activities,⁹⁹ capitalism leads to women's subordination.

Socialist feminist Gulnur Savran argues that the daily rest of workers, as well as the reproduction and socialization of new generations, are assured by the capitalists to maintain cheapness in the household. Therefore, she underlines the necessity of reaching a socialist mode of production if women are to be emancipated.¹⁰⁰ Savran says socialism is structured on the drive of "need" rather than of "gain", and regards the

equal division of labor as being superior to benefit. Moreover, the socialist system socializes all activities of the family and thus creates the possibility of women converting the ongoing social dynamics on behalf of their own interests.¹⁰¹

The socialist feminists in Turkey draw a strong attention to the slogan "personality is political", meaning that they publicize the issues at the center of the private life, i.e., they attack the politics of privacy, of personality and of sacredness. The attributes of privacy, they argue, bear the potential elements of women's oppression. They define the seclusion of women within the family and their need to partake in public life as the central focus of their struggle.¹⁰² The socialist feminists insist that only with the politization of these private issues such as the gender-based division of labor within the family, sexuality, wife battering and motherhood can women be saved from men's oppression.¹⁰³ Savran argues that the family suppresses women by casting them in three basic roles: the housewife, the wife and the motherhood. However, she persists, there is no genuine reason why only women should carry out these tasks, they might easily be carried out by men as well. Therefore, Savran strongly insists on the abolition of the family, which means to "give woman the initiative for controlling her own identity and different aspects of this identity such as her labor, her body, her sexuality and her capacity for birth."¹⁰⁴

In addition to the politization of the private life the socialist feminists concentrate heavily on the politics of public life. They embrace a point of view fundamentally different from that of the radical feminists who reject all public institutions. The central point is to join the public and the private spheres in such a way as to overcome women's oppression. The Socialist feminist Yelda claims that the state forces women to stay in the home through the socially defined norms it develops for women. The concept of chastity, she asserts, is one of these norms, dividing women between those who are delegated to the family life and those who are not.¹⁰⁵ The sanctified meaning attributed to the concept of chastity in the Turkish culture is strongly opposed by Savran: "Some of us are given the identification card while others are certified as prostitutes. Both are the professional documents symbolizing our divided identity. Actually neither is worthier than the other."¹⁰⁶

Another socialist feminist, Banu Paker, draws attention to the roles ascribed to women in the public world as an extension of the roles attributed to women in the family. The relations between a nurse and a doctor in public Paker gives as the most outstanding example. The doctor represents "science", "rationalism" and "knowledge"; the nurse, however, symbolizes "emotion" and the "practical" knowledge of serving.¹⁰⁷ In the present public life, the socialist feminists insist, women are employed according to their sexuality. Nursing, secretarial work and air hostesses are occupations dictated by women's

sexuality.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, they go on to argue that modern towns are designed on the principle of the distinction between the public and the private spheres, explicitly making it difficult for women to be assimilated into public life. Basic social and economic activities such as education, commerce and production are all left to certain areas of the modern towns which are distant from homes. Therefore, socialist feminists conclude that in addition to the norms developed for women in the family the physical design of space in the urban areas according to male criteria,¹⁰⁹ also forces women to stay at home.

Despite all these restrictions socialist feminists strongly insist on the necessity of taking a correct part in the public sphere. Their argument is articulated in the following manner: "It is necessary to enter the public institutions but only through questioning and criticizing their present status and through forging a power implicitly allowing us to transform them."¹¹⁰ Sedef Ozturk, in an extension of this view, argues that there are two kinds of public institutions: transformable and non-transformable. The transformable are those of education, health and communication; the non-transformable institutions are the parliament, the military and the police. As feminists, she maintains, they live a dichotomy. On the one hand they have to occupy proper public institutions; on the other, they must struggle for the conversion of these institutions on behalf of women.¹¹¹ Savran goes further, proposing that women participate even in the

military, the center of man's domination, claiming that this would help women to break the private chains as well as grasping a part of man's realm.¹¹² The socialist feminists also point to the importance of public institutions for women. These include shelters for battered women, female communes, new social organizations, women's papers, coffeehouses for women, women's libraries, research centers for woman issue,¹¹³ museums and a ministry devoted to woman issue.

One needs to bear in mind that liberal discourse is the central issue of the post-1980 Turkish politics. The three basic concepts of liberal thought are the freedom to action, individuality and privacy. Socialist feminist attacks on the politics of privacy, indeed, constructs a substantial challenge to liberalism as such. This refers to a great handicap on the Turkish socialist feminists. A social movement, like feminism, clearly needs liberal circumstances in order to develop into a particular interest; however, socialist feminists question basic the principles of liberalism. They also have a paradox with their proposal for women's participation in public realm. It is evident that proposing integration within the public life for women in a way that still does not give them enough power to transform public institutions means nothing more than masculinizing women as liberal feminists did.

Socialist feminists, like their radical counterparts, are strongly against equality. They conceive that equality is not enough for women having been oppressed for centuries; rather

they should benefit from positive discrimination. Socialist feminist Nesrin Tura points to this demand in the following terms:

Our perspective is not equality because equality is not a perspective but a deception. Our being invited into equal participation in the public life by those who have put their hands on our bodies, our labor and our identity for hundreds of centuries means nothing more than making fun of us. It strengthens our further oppression, weakens our power, assures our inadequacy and leads to feelings as if we are delinquent. We should not to talk about abstract principles. We, very clearly, demand not equality but indemnity and positive discrimination for women in every respect.¹¹⁴

Tura maintains that when they reverse the basic definitions of the Turkish cultural norms, only then will women be emancipated. In an extension of this argument she points to the following: "Whenever we own the right of gaining a child from whomever or from how many number of men we want, only then we will be truly emancipated."¹¹⁵ Criticizing the liberal feminist demand for a participatory democracy, the socialist feminists argue that "even the most feminist parliamentary bourgeois democracy will produce no ultimate solution to women's problems, since the bases of women's oppression are the unavoidable ingredients of that system."¹¹⁶ In short, the socialist feminists conceive that women have seen that what men

have is not worth getting. Women's goals are already being phrased in terms of a global rejection of established sexual patterns, frustrating for males and degrading for females. Indeed, this implies a revolutionary recognition of the entire society, starting from its economic structure and ending with its grammar.¹¹⁷

The socialist feminists criticize the attempts of their radical counterparts to elevate women's values. These values, argues Hacer Ansal, endowing women with being good-natured, tender-hearted and compassionate, are actually chains tying women to labor within the home. These have neither economic meaning nor prestige. She then urges that "feminist politics must not be based on the elevation of women's value."¹¹⁸ Ansal goes on to insist that if they espouse different values women will never gain a proper part in public life. Women's emancipation, she concludes, is only possible in the abolition of all definitions implying women's exclusion from the public realm.¹¹⁹ Ayse Kokuoz extends this view by claiming that if they, as feminists, support different values as of women they will create a type of oppressive ideology. To her this means to nothing more than losing their claim at the very beginning of their struggle.¹²⁰ The socialist feminists conclude that a notion such as peace is not close to women because of their nature, but rather women are against war since they rationally think that fighting is not worth getting for humanity. In short, instead of elevating women's values they propose to minimize man-based values as a way to emancipate women.¹²¹

But it is a matter of question how it is possible to create a distinct identity for women in the public realm if they reject values originated from femininity. In fact, the refusal of women's particular values puts the socialist feminists in the same line with the liberal feminists who took man-based value as the basic criteria for women to be emancipated. In conclusion, concentrating on the politics of sharing public life on the basis of man-based values grants nothing original to women's emancipation.

4.2.3 Feminist actions

Beginning in 1986 the Turkish feminists have publicized their views through a variety of actions in the country. The feminist actions have brought together all groups of women around specific issues. The petition became the first mass action of the feminist groups in Turkey. In 1986 the feminists organized a petition campaign to the president with the aim of persuading the government to comply with the United Nations' agreements, to which Turkey had been signatory, under whose terms citizens would be accorded equal rights regardless of sex. This campaign was expanded through a new petition campaign, in March 1986, to the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The petition was signed by 7000 women from different sections of the society such as artists, parliamentarians, housewives, teachers and the like.¹²² Following this campaign

the feminists established the "Women's Association Against Discrimination" in order to organize other activities also aimed at persuading the government to comply with the UN agreements under question. This association strongly stressed this issue as well as rejecting any discrimination against women at the social level.¹²³ Following the activities of the feminist women, Turkey signed the agreement in 1987. This agreement subsequently was given the force of an article in the Constitution obliging the signatory country to end discrimination against women either in law or in daily life.

The presence of Turkish feminism in the streets was made visible through a campaign launched by feminist groups against the battering of women. The starting point of this campaign was the use of a Turkish proverb by a judge in court: "You should not leave woman free without a stick on her back and a baby in her womb." Feminists invited other women very passionately to join against men's oppression, generating a solidarity among women which was demonstrated by a march in Istanbul on May 17, 1987. Around 3000 women marched through the streets of the city and encapsulated the slogan "No I'm Formerly Woman" against the phrase "I'm Formerly Human then Woman".¹²⁴ This spirit was also echoed in the words of the feminist song "Kadinlar Vardir" (Women Are Here): "we are here to stand up and raise our voices against oppression."¹²⁵ The feminists took their place beside groups of homosexuals and transsexuals, however, they left the group of men behind. Ayce Atikoglu, analyzing this march, described that "these women never looked like Halide

Edip", the genuine woman leader and the symbol of women who devoted their full energy to the nation during the War of Independence.¹²⁶

This meeting was regarded as important by the feminists because it was a means of allowing them to break out of their traditional roles. According to Vildan "the feminist march of the 17th of May was an indication of the fact that Turkish women, for the first time, did something just for themselves."¹²⁷ The battering of women was equated by feminists with their being forced into the private sphere. Going beyond battering means, to feminists, to open the way of public life for women. Therefore, the dominant aim behind this march rested in the demand of the feminist women to take a part in the public life.¹²⁸

In an extension of this campaign, different individuals and groups organized a festival at Kariye, Istanbul, on October 4, 1987. At this festival, which brought together a broader range of women and issues, it was decided to establish a temporary women's museum, in which a variety of artifacts indicative of a woman's daily life were exhibited.¹²⁹ The revenue from the exhibition was directed towards the publication of a booklet entitled "Bagir Herkes Duysun" (Shout and be Heard by Everybody).¹³⁰ The booklet, basically a collection of testimonies from women who had been battered, argues that violence against women in the home is endorsed by

the state and is part and parcel of male domination. It indicates that women in Turkey suffer from systematic physical abuse primarily at the hands of fathers, brothers and husbands, educated as well as uneducated men. The battering of the wife is thus regarded as a product of patriarchal culture.¹³¹

In solidarity with the campaign against the battering of women a group of feminists in Ankara raised a protest against Mother's Day in one of the main squares of the city drawing attention to the fact that women who are revered as mothers were very often confronted with domestic violence as wives. In June 1987 this group joined environmentalist groups to launch a campaign against the Ankara municipality's plan to convert a park in the center of town into a multi-story car-park. These women aimed at raising the question of the quality of urban life and the way women were affected by it.¹³² They later established the Association for the Solidarity of Women and publicized activities held on International Women's Day on the 8th of March of every year. As an extension of this activity this group of women organized a large meeting in March 1988, in Ankara, to celebrate the day in question. A large number of women (around 2000) from different professions participated in the meeting, which resembled an open forum. Fatma Berktaş, in her opening speech, pronounced that "the future will be women because they are mostly women who demand roses together with bread."¹³³ All participant women were encapsulated in the following feminist song:

We were silent and waited
We only watched what was lived
Said we enough at last
Never will we keep silent again. ¹³⁴

Another Ankara-based feminist group was involved in running a woman's coffeehouse that served as a meeting place for a small number of women. They regularly came together and discussed various issues, particularly the reasons behind women's oppression in the Turkish society. ¹³⁵ In February 1989, two Ankara-based feminist groups, the Group for the Solidarity of Women and the Thursday Group together with an Istanbul-based feminist group held the "First Feminist Weekend." in Ankara. After the meeting they issued a "Declaration for Women's Emancipation", which rejects all kinds of oppression originating from man's values. It proclaimed a very radical discourse equating all relations between man and woman with men's domination over women and rejecting this strongly. A part of their argument ran as following:

We feminist women want to control our own bodies, our identity, our labor, and our future by using the right that we naturally have in order to shape our fate. We invite all women to be aware of their oppression, and call them to stand against that oppression and to obtain solidarity with us in ¹³⁶struggling for our interest.

The development of feminism in Turkey was strongly resisted by the leftist groups since they thought that feminism divided the forces of the left. The feminist women came face to face with the women of the leftist groups in the First Feminist Congress organized by a large varied group of women in Istanbul on May 19-21, 1989. The participant groups reacted against each other through two different slogans. While feminists shouted "Women Are Here" the leftist women shouted "Cooperation With Men for Free Days." The feminist women declared that if they were truly to exist as women, equipped with their own interest, they should leave the groups of men and organize differently. However, the leftist women proclaimed that women's problems were part of the problems faced by the proletarians in the capitalist system; therefore, the solution is only hidden in a socialist society coming into being through the joint struggle of men and women against capitalism. Ultimately the feminists rejected the demand for cooperation with men and left the Congress.¹³⁷

Despite this clear contradiction with the leftist women, the feminists support the leftist groups when an action is directed against the state. The feminist action entitled "Black Protest" is an outstanding indicator of that. In protest against a new regulation concerning prisoners, implemented by the government on August 1, 1989, feminist women of different groups launched a campaign proposing that women wear black colored costumes and that the press use only black color in their print on August 12, 1989.¹³⁸ Different women's

groups pronounced this day as the "Black Day" and launched a march in Istanbul against the regulation. They took the new regulation as an extension of the violation women have experienced for a long time; therefore, as an oppressed group, they felt themselves obliged to react against it.¹³⁹ Indeed, this action, among others, indicates the close contact of feminist groups with the left, which constitutes the background of many feminist women. Another fact is that one foot of the feminist movement is in the civil society itself. This is why the feminists actively support an action rooted in society against the state.

As an extension of the First Feminist Weekend in Ankara, the feminist groups decided to launch a campaign against the physical abuse of women under the name of "Our Body is Ours" in October, 1989. They distributed rosettes on which feminist slogans were written in different squares of the city and held a variety of seminars and panels as part of the campaign.¹⁴⁰ This campaign was immediately shifted to Istanbul with the cooperation of various feminist groups on November 2, 1989 under the name of "Our Body is Ours no More Sexual Trouble" on a more extended base.¹⁴¹ The campaign was held particularly against the physical abuse of women in public life.

Feminist women announced that the sexual harassment of women in the public realm points clearly to the refusal of women in the public life. Molestation of a woman in the

streets, feminists argue, refers to the domination of men over women in a patriarchal culture, which always reminds women that they would be degraded if they were to attempt to participate in the public sphere.¹⁴² The most vivid side of the campaign was the distribution of pins to women tied with purple ribbon in order to protect themselves against men's attacks. For that reason the campaign was announced by the press as the "Purple Pin Campaign". These pins, indeed, symbolized the equipment by means of which women could be able to participate in public life. A part of the campaign's declaration was expressed in the following manner:

We women are always troubled in all areas of social life, in the streets, in business, and at home. We are abused in buses, on ships, in trains and in cinemas through actions held with the eye and with phrase. Let us not be silent any more: let us refuse all together to be modest.¹⁴³

The Izmir-based feminist groups paid great attention to the campaign. One feminist association, the "Cagdas Kadin Dernegi" (Association of the Contemporaneous Women), established in 1987, undertook the campaign in Izmir and involved a large variety of women in the issue. They also distributed pins to women in order to protect themselves against men's attacks. This association constructed the center of feminist actions in Izmir with its monthly publication the "Cagdas Kadin" (Contemporaneous Women) as well as of a large variety of feminist actions.¹⁴⁴

A further street demonstration was held by feminist groups against Article 438 of the Turkish Penal Code, which allows a two third sentence reduction to a man if it is proven that the raped woman was a prostitute. A prostitute affected by this article in Antalya led feminists (mostly from Istanbul) to start a campaign against this article in January 1989. They refused to accept the attributes of chaste or unchaste in a way that divides women's identity. The concept of unchaste is developed, feminists say, by men's power in order to hold some women in the private sphere.¹⁴⁵ This campaign, indeed, means the rejection of male-based meanings accorded to women and the deliberate usage of their bodies.

The feminist attempts to take part in the public realm is most clearly revealed through the reversal action of a feminist group employed in Kadinca. Almost every month two or more women attempt actions traditionally accomplished by men in public. As an example a woman wearing male clothes went into the streets of Istanbul, later writing that looking like man meant freedom in the public world.¹⁴⁶ A further reversal action accomplished by Kadinca was the organization of a competition for Miss-Turkey among young boys. This was aimed at imposing women's roles on men and putting men under the observation of women.¹⁴⁷ Moreover, feminist groups frequently went to the coffeehouses with the aim of encouraging women to develop attitudes perpetuated in the public by men. Turkish coffeehouses, one needs to bear in mind, are the only places that women do not

maintain.¹⁴⁸ Finally, feminist women either individually or in groups are going to football matches and traveling around the country to show to the women that they need not feel any fear in attempting to partake of public life.¹⁴⁹

Feminist groups have also accomplished some critical actions at the grass-roots level. For example feminists hold visits frequently to the magazines which use women's bodies as a sexual object.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, feminists protest against the state regulations that they think are disadvantageous to women. Such an action was held by 30 feminist women who applied to court for the dissolution of their marriage bonds, pointing to their resistance against the foundation of the Family Research Institution under the Prime Ministry. This institution, giving importance to the family, they argued, would smother women in the house-work and thus strengthen their traditional roles.¹⁵¹ Finally, different articles of the Civil Code have been frequently criticized as well as protested against by feminists through various actions.¹⁵² All these remind us that feminists constitute a critical potential element against what degrades women, demonstrating the civil-societal face of Turkish feminist groups.

These feminist actions have been followed up by the foundation of a variety of different associations either dependent or independent of official bodies. One such foundation is the women's shelters for women physically abused

within their families, which opened in cooperation with the local governments. After strong feminist pressure the first women's shelter was founded in Izmir in 1988 under the title "Kadinlar Icin Barindirma Unitesi" (Accommodation Unity for Women).¹⁵³ This was followed by another one in Istanbul in cooperation with the Bakirkoy local government under the name of the "Bakirkoy Kadin Siginma Evi" (Bakirkoy Shelter for Women) in 1990. In a year it sheltered about 280 women and their 320 children.¹⁵⁴ A further shelter built with the same aim was "Sisli Kadin Siginma Evi" (Sisli Shelter for Women) under the Sisli local government.¹⁵⁵ Still another shelter founded after feminist pressure was the "Kadin Evi" (Women's House) under the Kadikoy local government in 1992.¹⁵⁶ These shelters aimed basically at giving women the possibility of gaining their liberty from the degrading actions of men within their families. The most important of these is the independently founded "Mor Cati Kadin Siginagi Vakfi" (Violet Roof Foundation for Women's Shelter), in 1990, in Istanbul. It serves to solve women's psychological and legal problems as well as to set up new shelters for women.¹⁵⁷

Moreover, the feminist groups founded a library with the name "Kadin Eserleri Kutuphanesi ve Bilgi Merkezi" (Library of Women's Works and Information Center), which collects only women's works or works related to the female issue. It performs the function of a large archive of women's work as well as a meeting center for women.¹⁵⁸ Finally, feminist women established a department devoted to woman issue at Istanbul

University under the title "Kadin Sorunlari Arastirma ve Uygulama Merkezi" (Center for Research and Application of Women's Problems). This center researches women's specific problems and organizes seminars and symposia.¹⁵⁹ The Turkish feminists also have close contact with their counterparts abroad. They frequently go to Germany and Cyprus for conferences or symposia on woman issue. A large group of the readers of Turkish feminists are active in these countries. They even founded a center for research into woman issue in Cyprus.¹⁶⁰ All these clearly indicate that feminism in Turkey is not just an agency for a critical or rejective discourse but also has institutionalizing significance. Its emergence in Turkey began with protests but it is maintained now through institutions concerned with more specific issues. The existence of these institutions necessarily constructs a front for plurality in a democratic society.

In conclusion, the central message of the feminist actions is hidden in their demand to take part in the public life. Turkish women, beginning with the Republican regime, have gained a substantial place in the public life, but importantly on the basis of male-based values. However, feminist women after 1980 have tended to integrate with the public on the basis of their own values, in other words, they try to feminize women in the public life. This, in fact, creates a new type of identity in the public resembling the prevalence of a different category to be visible. The different identity as such brings

about the plurality of the public, which is the most necessary element of a democratic society. Unification of the public, has increasingly become clearer that it creates an authoritarian type of political regime. Feminism, providing plural elements in the public sphere, constructs one of the crucial elements of a civil society. Feminism, therefore, can not be attributed only as a rejective discourse, on the contrary, it should be perceived as an important component of civil society representing the identity of plurality in the public sphere.

4.3. THE IMPLICATION OF FEMINIST GROUPS IN THE POST-1980 TURKISH POLITICS

The feminist movement in the 1980s in Turkey constituted the first genuine opposition to the military regime by using the advantage of being women that have officially been tolerated in the mentality of the Republican cadre.¹⁶¹ Feminism formed a new political outlook that attempted to sustain the civil society in the shadow of a powerful Turkish state. As such, it occurs essentially outside the corridors of the state, outside the political organizations and within society itself.¹⁶² Tekeli claims that with the development of the feminist movement the "commitment to liberate women from a patriarchal social structures carries with it an orientation not only for change but to change within the recesses of civil society."¹⁶³

The basic characteristic of this movement is visible in

its participatory, democratic and individualistic nature. The individualistic aspect of the feminist movement, indeed, carries with it a substantial contribution to the institutionalization of liberal thought in Turkey. This perspective in Turkey (particularly during the beginning years of the Republican regime) was perceived by Republican leaders as a sort of deviation that was then not tolerated. A centralized type of society was accomplished, accompanied by a ban on individualistic attempts. Feminism, paying attention to sexual freedom and individuality of women, constituted the very core of liberal discourse in Turkey as well as the discourse of decentralization. A great number of issues such as abortion, alternative living, consciousness-raising, the full liberation of a sexual life etc. all created the voice of a plural society.¹⁶⁴ The feminist women's orientation, developing not under the banner of the state or political parties but within the recess of society, creates variety in civil society.

The most clear impact of the feminist movement is observed in the mainstream social groups, particularly on the leftist groups in Turkey. At the beginning of the 1980s a large number of leftist magazines, obviously under the impact of feminism,¹⁶⁵ published special copies about woman issue and feminism. A variety of women's associations were also founded by leftist groups struggling for women's rights but within the framework of a socialist perspective. Three of these are the "Democratic Kadın Derneği" (Association of Democratic Women), the "Demokratik Mucadelede Kadın Derneği", (Association of women in

Democratic Struggle), and the "Kadınların Kurtuluşu Grubu"¹⁶⁶ (Group for Women's Emancipation). The Association of Democratic Women has its own publication, the "Sesimiz" (Our Voice), which regards woman issue basically as a problem arising from capitalism. Women who organized under the banner of this association argue that they should struggle neither for socialism nor for feminism separately but rather for women's emancipation in cooperation with socialism.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, the members of the "Association of Women for Democratic Struggle" condemn feminists as not being aware of the social problems of the country. They maintain that the struggle for women's problems should be accomplished according to the present conditions of the country.¹⁶⁸ Finally, the "Group for Emancipation of Women" published a bulletin entitled the "Kadınların Kurtuluşu" (Emancipation of Women). This group argued that there are mainly two kinds of feminisms: the bourgeois and proletarian. The former, they insist, developed mainly in America and in many Western countries while the later developed genuinely in Russia. They strongly criticize Turkish feminism as being a part of bourgeois feminism. However, a truly women's movement, they maintain, should be proletarian.¹⁶⁹ Both groups agree that women's problems are the part of the problems the proletarians face in a capitalist society. This is why they are against the feminists' celebration of the 8th of March as the "International Women's Day", these groups celebrate it as the "International Day of Proletarian Women".

Mainly, two reactions among the Turkish leftist groups can be observed in their reaction to feminism: the rejective and the approving ones. Feminism is criticized by the rejective groups for several reasons. First of all, it is argued by the rejective leftist group that feminism has been fostered in Turkey by the military in order to divide the forces of the left. Fusun Ozturk, in advocating this view, argues that three issues are defended by the feminists, each performing the function of preventing socialism in Turkey. The feminists, she urges, replace the concept of a class struggle with the concept of the gender struggle; they also develop an antagonistic attitude to men which only divides leftist groups into men and women; and finally, Ozturk goes on to say, by insisting on complete sexual freedom and liberty and individualistic behavior, the feminists strike a blow against the socialist insistence on the communal bonds.¹⁷⁰

Another leftist reaction against feminism is on the basis of the argument that feminists have attempted to take the place of the Turkish left which was banned by the military regime. This criticism is mostly raised by the magazine Yarin during the early years of the feminist development in Turkey. It accuses feminists of being dishonest. The magazine says that at a time when the leftist warriors needed the loyalty and support of their sisters, some dishonest women from the left betrayed them and turned their back on their male counterparts by raising new issues.¹⁷¹

Still another reaction against feminism, coming from the leftist side is based on the insistence that feminism is not a revolutionary movement against capitalism and is in fact an artificial discourse. Based on this assertion Aytunc Altindal urges that feminism cannot challenge the capitalist system for four basic reasons: first, it is not a philosophical movement; second, it is not scientific; third, it has no genuine methodology; and finally, feminism is closed to class reality. These reasons, he maintains, make feminism a superfluous movement dealing with artificial issues in Turkey.¹⁷²

The most severe critic of feminism, Sibel Ozbudun, declares her views against feminism in a booklet entitled "Neden Feminizm Degil?" (Why Not Feminism?), which accuses feminists of dealing only with manifestations of the capitalist system. She argues that since women's problems are the product of capitalism there is no need to raise a specifically female discourse; women she says should struggle against capitalism in cooperation with their male friends: once capitalism is abolished there will be no problems for women anymore.¹⁷³

Finally, feminism is criticized by the leftists on the basis that it puts all women in a unique category it ignores the variety among them. This group argues that the feminist recognition of society is fundamentally wrong. They ask whether it is possible to put a proletarian woman and a bourgeois one in the same category. However, they maintain, women are divided

among themselves on the basis of wealth rather than ideological standpoints.¹⁷⁴ Therefore, Sehmus Guzel, an advocate of this view, proposes that feminist women take a part in present organizations such as labor unions, political parties and local governments around more specific issues. Thus, Guzel urges,¹⁷⁵ feminist women would be able to reach a higher status.

Nevertheless, some members of the leftist groups favor feminism mainly for the reason that it constructs a functional element for Turkish socialists. Two leaders of the Turkish Labor Party, Mehmet A. Aybar and Dogu Perincek, pronounce that feminism is not opposed to leftist groups in the struggle for socialism. Feminism, by raising special rights will still serve their purpose.¹⁷⁶ This argument is extended by Nedret Sena who points to two common points between feminism and socialism. Feminism's key concepts of equality and liberty, he asserts, are the basic tenets of socialism as well. Sena maintains that feminism might provide equality for women but true independence is obtained only through socialism. Therefore, feminism and socialism, he concludes, should join their forces.¹⁷⁷

Furthermore, Feyza Zileli appreciates that they should support feminism since it deals with consciousness-raising activities among women, which obviously serve socialism.¹⁷⁸ She goes on to claim that feminists are in a struggle with the regime on two bases: the basis of production and the basis of

culture. With regard to the former feminists protest against women's unequal status in production which is, at the same time refused by the left. Moreover, the feminists' conflict with a culture, which sees women as the center of sexuality, the same culture is actually struggled with by socialists. Therefore, Zileli concludes, they, as socialists, can easily take feminist groups beside them for the purpose under question.¹⁷⁹

One needs to remember that despite the socialist attempts to cooperate with feminism, feminist women strongly reject any collaboration with the socialist groups proclaiming their aims to be different from the emancipation of women. As such, they try to set up a quite "different" and "autonomous" discourse, which stresses the specific interests of women.

Beside the leftist reaction one also perceives a reaction by the religious groups to feminism. Two different reactions have been observed among the religious groups concerning the feminist movement. One is what is known as "turbaned" feminism, publicized themselves in the daily Zaman and then organized around a monthly Ayce. Turbaned feminists sketched what was at stake in articles published in Zaman in 1987. They basically portrayed the idea that the traditional roles of women did not originate from Islam but rather from a male culture. They criticized religious men's attempts that accorded the roles of housewife and of motherhood only to women. However, they argued, Islam does not bring such a division of labor based on gender definitions. Therefore, turbaned

feminists insisted that their being in the struggle for participating in the public life should be tolerated by the religious men.¹⁸⁰ These women later published Ayce which advocated a quite reactionary discourse to women's traditional roles and stressed particularly the need for women to participate in the public sphere.¹⁸¹

The demands of these women were strongly reacted against by a large number of religious intellectuals. They were criticized as being unconscious of the Turkish context and for talking from a different setting.¹⁸² Abdurrahman Dilipak responded to these women by arguing that a Muslim woman cannot be feminist. Above all, he argued that feminism, by using concepts such as equality and liberty, serves to provide cheaper labor for capitalists. Dilipak also says that a Muslim woman should not be misled by capitalists if she really wants to obtain her freedom.¹⁸³

The other reactions to feminism are based on the intellectual ideas of popular religious writers like Huseyin Hatemi, Ali Bulac, Cihan Aktas, etc. The very focus of their idea is that God created man and woman with responsibilities placed divinely upon them. The difference of responsibility is not a sign of inequality but a difference based upon creation. Man and woman are created according to their fitrat (nature) to carry out social functions in a way bestowed upon them by God. The relationship between man and woman is based on natural need, best described in terms of complementary rather than

equality.¹⁸⁴ This issue still occupies the central focus of religious books and magazines.

The clearest impact of the feminist movement is observed in the Kemalist woman's associations. While these associations were dealing, in previous decades, with social problems other than those of women and were engaged actively to defend Kemalist principles they came to stress woman issue after the 1980s. The local problems lived by Turkish women have been taken up by these associations and they have paid attention to such issues as articles in the Civil Code opposing women's interest, the need for women's participation in politics and the right of governance denied to women in districts and provinces.¹⁸⁵ Moreover, these associations began, from 1986 onwards, to celebrate International Women's Day on the 8th of March every year while they previously celebrated Women's Day on the 5th of December, the day on which Turkish women first received the franchise.¹⁸⁶

An important implication is evident in the feminist impact on mainstream social groups. Feminism by incorporating woman issue into the literature of these groups, created an important common point among them. Their being concerned with similar issues has contributed to breaking the wall around social groups in Turkey. The social groups of the 1960s or of the 1970s were, indeed, distant from each other in a way that no group demonstrated a consideration to understand the message

of others. However, after 1980 one has observed clearly a more "tolerated" and "softened" outlook in each group in perceiving the central message of others.

As an example of the contribution to the development of the civil society, the feminist groups have created a great impact on the state regulations concerning women after the year 1980. The first impact in this respect was observed by the state approval of abortion. This was the central issue of Kadinca from the first date of its publication onwards.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, the first feminist page in Somut paid great attention to the issue before the implementation of the Abortion Law. Somut argued very passionately against the official ban on abortion and insisted that it was for woman only to decide whether she would give birth or not.¹⁸⁸ These demands were, indeed, influential on the Abortion Law, which was approved by the government in 1983.

The establishment of two official institutions in 1990 by the Motherland party government is noteworthy to mention as emerging from the impact of feminist groups' struggle for woman issue. The "Aile Arastirma Kurumu" (Family Research Institution) and the "Kadinin Statusu ve Sorunlari Genel Mudurlugu" (Directorate of the Women's Problems and Status) were established to deal with woman issue. The former is especially concerned with the question of how the Turkish family can be strengthened. For that purpose it has undertaken a large variety of researches in cooperation with various

universities. It sees the woman as a member of the family and deals with her problems within that perspective. The Directorate of Woman's Problems and Status also cooperates with other women's organizations to solve women's problems. It mainly researches for grounds to obtain equality of opportunity for women.¹⁸⁹ Indeed, both institutions came into being as outcomes of the 1980s context stressing woman issue as one of the most crucial discourses in Turkey.

Furthermore, feminist women in various platforms struggled to gain the right for women to be appointed as governor to districts and provinces. In 1990 this right was given to women and a woman governor was appointed, for the first time in Turkish history, to Mugla province in 1991.¹⁹⁰ This was, in fact, a revolution in Turkish politics, which was accomplished completely under the impact of women being aware of their special rights.

The most substantial feminist impact has been observed in the decision of the newly established government in 1991 to form a ministry devoted to woman issue, in line with the program of the government which was constructed upon the coalition of two central parties, the True Path party and the Social Democratic Populist party.¹⁹¹

The feminist groups influenced the government to amend the articles in the Civil Code and the Penal Code which

degraded women. Two such amended articles were Article 155 (charging woman's right to work outside the home on her husband's permission) and Article 134 (arranging the principles of divorce).¹⁹² From 1992 onwards spouses have been able to dissolve their marriage bonds on demand.¹⁹³ Finally, Article 438 of the Penal Code, which places prostitutes in a separate category in the event of rape,¹⁹⁴ was amended under the strong pressure of feminist groups.

The feminist impact on state regulations indicates, above all, the construction of an alternative voice against official policies. This refers further to the body of a political force adjusting state policies toward the direction of the interest of a special social group.

Political parties in Turkey came to arrange new principles on behalf of women in their programs. First of all, the Social Democrat parties began to set aside quota number for women candidates from 1986 onwards during the elections.¹⁹⁵ The impact of the feminist movement on this regulation is appreciated by Perihan Ergun, the Istanbul chair of women commission of SDPP, which is still in government. She pointed out that they learned the term quota from the feminists and¹⁹⁶ then they espoused it as a principle in their program.

Moreover, the prime minister's wife Semra Ozal, as a part of the activities of the Motherland party, started to deal with woman issue through the "Turk Kadinini Guclendirme Vakfi"

(Foundation for the Elevation of the Turkish Women) throughout the country. The foundation paid great attention to the daily problems of Turkish women, particularly in the eastern part of the country. An egalitarian framework was at stake in the activities of the foundation, which aimed basically to elevate women to the level of men.¹⁹⁷

A quite new trend under the impact of feminist movement in Turkey has been experienced in the role of Turkish men. Indeed, the feminization of men has been perceived in the Turkish culture.¹⁹⁸ Two new definitions gained currency among Turkish men after the 1980s are the "Kilibik" (Hen-Pecked) man and the "Kazak" (Severe) man. The former describes the man who resembles a woman through house-works; the later refers to a severe man retaining his traditional role.¹⁹⁹ Kadinca points to this new development as the "glasnost" in the attitudes of Turkish men.²⁰⁰ Those who are married to feminist women say that they have been mentally changed and have come to the point where there is such a thing as a woman's perspective. As such, one man explains that he has gained a new perspective which taught him to think differently when he now reads a book or watches a movie.²⁰¹ Another describes how pleased he is when he helps his wife with housework and looks after their baby.²⁰² He maintains that feminism made him proud of doing this. The changed role of Turkish men has been observed also in advertisements, which utilize mainly female sexuality. In recent years this image has been based not only on female

sexuality but also on the man's role within the family. This new trend, as perceptively observed by Emre Kongar, has come into the sphere under the impact of the feminist movement in Turkey.²⁰³

A further aspect of this development can be observed in the attitudes of a large variety of Turkish men refusing to be a "man". The feminization of male is well observed in the increasing number of transsexuals, transvestites and homosexuals. Many of these do not transform to a new sexuality to experience a new pleasure but do so rather as a sign of the rejection of masculine ideology. This posture is clearly pointed out by a transvestite who said he was not experiencing a new way of sexuality but rejecting the masculinity, the ideology of oppression and of power.²⁰⁴

This new trend, indeed, means nothing more than the abolition of the distinction between the public and the private spheres, which were defined by the theoreticians of civil society as drawing attention to the roles cast by man and woman in different spheres. The public sphere was accorded to men by a series of thinkers formulating civil society beginning with Hobbes and ending with Gramsci. However, they accorded the private sphere only to women. On the contrary, it increasingly became clear that the changing trend in the role of the male in the family and of the female in the public life brought about need to leave these definitions of civil society.

In conclusion, feminism developed in Turkey after 1980 as an important component of the civil society through the discourses pronounced as equality, difference and autonomy. Moreover, the actions undertaken by feminists with the aim at participating in public life converted the definition of civil society attributing the public sphere as the realm of men. The feminist discourses and actions obviously have created an alternative ground for alternative perspectives and discourses to be operated against the ones undertaken mainly by the state. The state elite's goal, which is formulated as "raising the country to the level of contemporary civilization", came to be rejected by feminists, who perceived this goal as being an extension of masculine ideology. This rejection brings about women's being dissociated from the roles bestowed upon them through the mainstream ideologies of Turkey such as Kemalism, Socialism and Islam. The energy devoted by women to these ideologies came to be organized around a more specific interest, which is quite new in the Turkish culture, thereby culminating the notion of a universal and a diversified public realm.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

I have analyzed in the previous chapters that the characteristics of the modern state make it no longer possible to accept the definition of civil society whose basic principles were laid down by such masters as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, Marx and Gramsci. The institutional interface between the state and family, women's evolving profile of citizenship, their mobility and employment in the public have brought an end to the definition of a civil society, one based on the distinction of the public realm from the private sphere. Therefore, civil society should be understood as a milieu of the alternatives through which alternative discourses, meanings, actions and structures coming into being. This is possible only with the existence of economically, culturally and organizationally powerful social groups as the carrier of alternative institutions.

Feminism as a paramount social group has contributed to the development of civil society in the West on the bases of at least three principles: the principle of equality, the principle of difference, and the principle of autonomy. Feminists' insistence on equality functions in a way that men's values are restricted to be the only source of virtue as

well as one which adjusts the mis-ordered norms of the male-centered culture. Moreover, it functions in a way that women are getting a full profile of citizenship and the rights accompanied with that citizenship. However, the feminist politics of difference is a substantial critique to the demand on equality. Postmodern feminists, particularly in the example of the French case, are seeking the possibility of creating a different discourse or culture based on women's particular experiences. They object to all transcendental claims of the "Enlightenment" reflecting and reifying the experience of Western males and resulting in women's subordination. French feminists promise a great revolt against the institutions of patriarchy which they think are reconstructed in the language. Then, difference in French feminist writers has gained a revolutionary meaning implying and not achieving a socioeconomic equality with men but disrupting and subverting Western patriarchal language and thought itself.

Finally, Western feminists have committed to an autonomy in the public life. Feminist emphasis on the politics of the "personal is political" commits to a strong desire for breaking women's links from their private domains and taking a part in the public life. The general politics as a means of partaking in the public life is represented, in the West, by the politics of lesbianism. It is used particularly by American radical feminists to dissociate women from men's world and what ever values and meanings associated with the masculinity.

Unlike a long tradition of women's struggle for particular political rights in Western societies, Turkish women were seen by the government as a link to the Western civilization. First, during the second half of the nineteenth century; later, during the Republican period. Women's being educated, their being articulated into the social life and thus being visible in the streets were accepted by the Ottoman intellectuals as a symbolic link to used to make contact with Western civilization and to overcome the cultural problems of the empire. The attempts to educate women and to change their traditional status were important means for the state elites to save the state, beside the adoption of new institutions to bureaucracy and military. These attempts resulted with Abdulhamid II's great reforms pertaining to women's education throughout the country.

Intellectual emphasis on women issue later resulted with the emergence of an "indigenous" feminism rooted particularly in the big cities like Istanbul, Salonica and Izmir. Women in that wave created the first woman's associations and published a large number of magazines. They created an alternative ground to the official discourses which were represented mainly by the government that had never previously been experienced. Moreover, Women during the earlier years of the twentieth century constructed the most important potential element of civil society in Turkey. They constructed the central discourse of opposition against the authority whose cultural values were rooted in traditional Islamic principles. The first wave of

feminism in the Ottoman society emphasized strongly two issues which were closely related with the Ottoman women's particular status: to take part in the public life through education and work and to have equal rights with men in domestic life through regulation of marriage and divorce. These characteristics of the indigenous feminism was maintained at least until the early years of the republic. This is the reality behind the fact why women established the first political party during the Republican period.

With the establishment of the Republic, Turkish women once more were seen as being a symbol of a link to reach Western institutions. Woman issue was seen by the state elite as a means to create a fundamental break from the Ottoman-Islamic background and to lead the nation toward the aim displayed as to reach the level of contemporary civilization. New regulations concerning woman's rights were taken as a symbol of being Westernized and of indicating a break from the traditional society. Two reforms that held with that respect were the adoption of the Civil Code and the right of enfranchisement to women. The struggle of feminist women to obtain the right to vote was mainly ignored by the analysts of that time. However, feminist women gave a strong struggle for the vote as well as for the commitment undertaken by the Western feminists. The abolishment of the Union of the Turkish Women ended the indigenous feminism in Turkey, and women, from then onwards, served for aims other than those of themselves.

Turkish women until 1970 served for the

institutionalization of the Kemalist principles. However, in the 1970s the concern on women issue in the platform of the United Nations led socialist groups also to pay attention to this issue. Thus, throughout the decade a large part of the Turkish women served the aim of the leftist groups which were displayed as realizing a socialist revolution. This decade is important also in the sense that Turkish women were confronted with feminist ideas which were raised mainly in the Western societies.

The post-1980 period is, indeed, a turning point for Turkish women. After 1980 woman issue was re-observed once again in the Turkish context but this time with a different outlook. Women, after a long break (from 1935 until 1980) once again began to develop political issues particular to their own interest. Developing discourses different from those which are officially formulated, paying attention to specific rights and enacting a variety of campaigns for new institutions serving for women, refer to the development of a feminist movement which we term "civil" feminism. Unlike the earlier indigenous feminism, the civil feminism in Turkey after 1980 not only stresses women's problems in local forms but also the struggles against the grand issues such as "patriarchy", "science", the notion of "self", "progress", "universalism", the "family" in any form and the like. Civil feminism in Turkey attacks the basic institutions which the Turkish state undertook during the Republican period known as progress and development. It criticizes these projects as being male-point

and male values ending with the subordination of women. Turkish civil feminism has specific characteristics as well as common points with its Western counterpart. In the sense of its specific characteristics, feminism serves for the aim of modernization in Turkey. However, with respect to the common characteristics it shares with Western feminisms, Turkish feminism constitutes a substantial element of civil society. It is this bifurcating function of the Turkish feminism that will be discussed below.

5.1. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TURKISH FEMINISM

The main particular characteristics of Turkish feminism is visible in its vigorous attempt to represent itself as an element of the public life. Either liberal, radical or socialist, Turkish feminist groups strongly reject being a part of the private life, the privacy which they urge has created a place of assault and battery, marital rape and woman's exploited domestic labor. With that respect Turkish feminists have abolished the boundaries of the public and private worlds whose basic principles were laid down by liberal thinkers mainly on the basis of the idea that it attributes to women only a domestic life. They briefly argue that what is known as the "private" is the locus of power for every man and the locus of patriarchy, which is a crude form of biological determinism.

As an extension of the politics of partaking in the public

life the Turkish feminists imposed a greater credit over the equality of women with men in the public realm. Participating into the public life means mainly two things for Turkish feminists: preserving their liberty and achieving an equal status with men. They attempt mainly to develop a democratic theory based on civil equality that undermines the differences between the sexes so that full citizenship for women can be secured. The realization of its aim means the transformation of the sexual division of labor and norms of femininity and masculinity. Although this seems a unique characteristics of liberal feminists both radical and socialist feminists articulate this view as the base of "rights" for women.

A further particular feature of Turkish feminism is its being strongly against political lesbianism.¹ Turkish feminists project emancipation not through institutions separating women from men but through strengthening the links between men and women on the basis of sexual relations. As previously analyzed, the radical feminists in the West took lesbian sexuality as a way to challenge the ideological, political and economic bases of male supremacy. Lesbianism, for them was the symbol of patriarchal rejection. However, Turkish feminists formulate the rejection of a patriarchal culture through sexual liberty. Sexual liberty for the Turkish feminists means mainly to have enough opportunity in deciding whatever they want to do with their own bodies. In other words, they demand to have full control of their bodies in giving or not giving birth and in entering sexual relations with men. Indeed, emancipation for

almost all Turkish feminist groups means sexual liberty, the sexuality which is experienced mainly with men.

Still another distinctive characteristics of Turkish feminism is its being in favor of secularism. In being against Islamic domination in the Turkish context, feminist women denounced that they should remain against Islamic-religious groups and preserve a secular type of government in Turkey. They feel themselves indebted to the virtue of a republican-secular society whose basic principles were laid down by the Kemalists on behalf of women. A feminist woman denounced that even though one manifests herself as a feminist she "can not share the same political struggle with a religious woman."² Turkish feminists, briefly, see Islam as a strong challenge to women and they prefer a secular society in which women would easily achieve their aims.

Emphasizing either equality in the public life, sexual liberty, or secularism, Turkish feminists' most vigorous goal is to gain a prevalence in the public life. One can easily observe two interrelated factors (both rooted in the Turkish cultural background) behind the particular characteristics of the Turkish feminist groups.

Firstly, it is originated in the sharp contradiction between the public and private spheres in the Ottoman-Turkish culture. This culture was clearly based on the viewpoint of the public sphere as the world of universalism, independence, equality, reason, rationality and impartiality which were

attributable only to men. However, the privacy was, in that culture, restructured on the basis of the world of particularism, natural emotions, love and partiality, which were best known by the natural characteristics of women. In short, there was a strong separation between the two spheres and no woman could be able to attempt to enter the boundaries of the public life.

The modernization process during the nineteenth century of Ottoman society restrengthened this distinction more extensively on the basis of a more disadvantageous position to women. As previously mentioned beginning from the proclamation of the Tanzimat (1839) until the earlier years of the Republican Turkey, a large number of new Acts were amended in the legal, bureaucratic, administrative, economic and educational systems resulting in radical changes in the techniques of the military, economy and politics. The most outstanding prevalence of this new restructuring was the emergence of a constitutional government in the Ottoman empire in 1877. These internal developments created a drastic change in the traditional role of the household in the Ottoman society, which was under the domination of the privacy, culturally known as the secret life.

With the beginning of the attempts for the modernization of the country and for the adoption of modern institutions a new understanding of man, political society, public life, education, development and so forth were institutionalized. In

politics a large series of ordinary men were given the right to vote and thus the right of citizenship. On the other hand, women were appropriated as being identical with a private household, which was no longer a safe place for Turkish women. The newly increased industry began to draw the female labor force out of the private home and into the public workplace. This process, indicated its first impact on women living in large cities. Although they had to participate the public life under the economic conditions and under the heavy impact of modern institutions degenerating the previous boundaries between the public and private spheres, the legal arrangements were still not appropriate for that transition. Turkish feminism, thus, first emerged on the dynamics of the internal conditions rather than an imitation of Western feminism. The first feminist women demanded to take part in the new society on the basis of an equal status with men. The importance of equality and of taking part in public life in this special condition of the Ottoman-Turkish context developed as being contradictory to women. This is, indeed, one of the plausible reasons behind the fact why Turkish feminists are still vigorously demanding participation into the public life on the basis of an equal treatment with men.

Secondly, and most importantly, women were culturally secluded from the public on the basis of the norms of their sexuality. As it is well known, the Islamic interpretation in the Ottoman society divided society basically into two sub-

universes: the universe of men and the universe of women. The social division according to sex resulted in the Ottoman society in the division between those who hold authority and those who do not, and those who hold spiritual power and those who do not. This division after the sixteenth century of the Ottoman empire resulted in the emergence of the harem life which secluded women from social life and leading them to live among themselves, coming to contact only with the male members of their family. Further, upon the attempts of the Ulema justifying women's exclusion from the public sphere women were completely segregated from social and economic life. This special condition is, indeed, another factor behind the emergence of the Turkish feminism stressing the importance of the public life particularly in the large cities. Since peasant women did not live this particular experience, feminism still has not reached to the women living in rural areas. This particular experience of the Turkish women is the most plausible reason behind the fact why Turkish feminist groups are against political lesbianism and are formulating sexual liberty as the means of their emancipation. Political lesbianism they thought would turn Turkish women back to the harem life. Even the "Turbaned" feminists (religious women emphasizing feminist issues) are against this kind of division in society and demand to take a proper part in the public domain.

Now, the question is what sense the peculiar characteristics of the Turkish feminism makes for us. My thesis is that

the distinctive feature of the Turkish feminism serves clearly for the modernization project of the Turkish state, the project displayed in the aim at reaching the level of contemporary civilization in particular, under the hand of the republican leaders. The main project of the Republican leaders was to create an equal status for women with men in Turkish society, as well as to obtain a full participation of women into the public life so that Turkey might be Westernized. By objecting to the traditional roles imposed upon women and by emphasizing their articulation into the public life, in fact, Turkish feminists serve for the modernization of Turkey, which was at the same time the main project of the state elites. Moreover, their special emphasis on the sexual liberty serves for the institutionalization of the liberal behaviors in Turkey. The Turkish case clearly indicates that gaining the right to public life does not result with the emancipation of women but rather with the process in which women serve for things other than their emancipation.³ However, Turkish feminists have another feature, which bears the notion of a strong rejection of universal categories and creates a contribution to the development of the civil society in Turkey. This argument is the central point of the following part.

5.2. FEMINIST POLITICS IN TURKEY

Feminists, as a paramount social group, have created a new set of politics in Turkey through the success of changing many women's and men's way of thinking about women in post-1980

period. Through the focus on conscious-raising, on non-oppressive relations between man and woman in the family and in social life, on creating a counter-culture and on alternative institutions, Turkish feminists have developed new way of doing politics. Feminism, in Turkey, has raised important questions about the distributions and legitimacy of macro power relations and has challenged the deep-rooted codes of social interactions. In the collective action of feminist women in the post-1980 period, the issues such as gender, right, inequality, seclusion and liberation have constituted a large part of arguments in Turkish context. What they have briefly achieved is the meaning and definition of identity, which contradicts with the "man-like" Republican women.

Turkish feminist politics have been seen at least in three different and interrelated areas. First, it brings some important issues from the back streets into the open and raises them to public discussion. Issues such as abortion, wife battering, marital rape and molestation are examples of this kind. Second, Turkish feminism redefines the deep-rooted codes of social institutions as in the case of gender analysis, women's sexuality, etc. and replaces them with new meanings. In fact, one can clearly observe an increasing shift in the sexist norms of the Turkish culture after 1980. If one factor behind this is the liberal context emerged in the post-1980 another factor is clearly the feminist women's political struggle against the traditional sexual norms. The feminists' greatest impact is, in that respect, observed on the grass-root

structures or on socio-cultural fields. As argued in the previous chapter the increasing tendency in the emergence of "feminine men" and "masculine women" is the general outcome of this politics prevailed in grass-roots in the post-1980. Finally, Turkish feminists have put pressure on political parties and the government to stand in emphasizing woman issue and in creating new institutions with that respect. The last attempts to found a woman ministry is one of the conclusion of that politics.

Turkish feminists like their French counterparts articulate the politics of "difference". However, the Turkish feminists, unlike their French counterpart, engage the meaning of difference as a terrain of political struggle, rather than a justification of dissociation of women from men. This feature of Turkish radical feminists is again closely related with the particular experience of the harem life Turkish women lived in the past. Radical feminists insist upon the need for the development of a "women's perspective" whose aim is to research the political, ontological and epistemological commitment underlying patriarchal discourses. They argue that there is a different kind of existence and reality which is represented only by women. Through elevating women's values and norms feminists create a great reaction to the patriarchal characteristics of the Turkish state articulating the Enlightenment view of development and progress. Since women are different in capacity, socialization, values, and cognitive and cultural styles only the recognition of such differences can

enable the full inclusion and participation of women in political and economic institutions. This politics clearly bears a potential challenge to the universal category of the Turkish state.

In Turkish politics the importance is always given to the need for "homogeneity" of citizens, fearing that group differences would tend to undermine commitment to the general interest. Therefore, the existence of leftist, religious, sexist and ethnic groups are always taken as a threat to the common interest and then the politics of assimilation has been asserted by the Turkish state. The recognition of these groups in public with their own cultures, values and norms has never been an option.⁴ With the period witnessed, particularly the gradual development of republican political system, the leading Turkish state has created a political voice stressing a "unified" public toward the direction that was projected to reach the level of the contemporary civilization. Indeed, in reaching such a goal it was not the society that was being emphasized but the country which at the same time reflects the inclusion of the society.

This picture in the politics of the Turkish state has actually been reversed by women in the post-1980 period. Two groups of women are important to mention briefly in that respect. The veiled women and the feminist groups. The veiled women either deserving strong religious notions or articulating feminist views reversed the attempts of the Turkish state to

create a unified public. They, in reverse have attempted to take part in a public world with values of their own. Value put here as the instrument of their identity is their veil symbolizing the prevalence of the religious elements in the public life.⁵ Moreover, feminist women have contributed to that attempt by articulating in post-modern discourses developed mainly against universal categories of the Enlightenment. They reacted to the basic institutions that the state elite appropriated as worth getting for their purposes. The feminists' critique to the family, to the state, to the authority, to science, and to the male-history all serve to that aim. Moreover, like the religious women they insist on the public life, which is blind to the specificities they represent in their life. As a part of their struggle feminists supported social groups prevailing the visibility of a difference in the public realm. The feminists' support to female religious students in struggling to attend their school with their dress wearing, to the leftist prisoners struggling against the state's arbitrary treatment, to the prisoners and to homosexuals and transsexual groups in gaining a public prevalence with their own identity are of the same kind. These are clearly serving the creation of a "heterogeneous" public. Unlike the Enlightenment assertion of a universal public this heterogeneous public asserts that the only way to ensure that political life will not exclude persons or groups which it has excluded in the past but is hidden in recognition of specific histories in the public life. In such a public the recognition and the appreciation of differences in the

context of configuration with power become the ultimate goal.

The feminist women's emphasis on difference creates an area of heterogeneity and multiplicity enhanced by women's special experience and value. Feminism in that way develops a notion of "separation" which implies that to separate women from men and from institutions, roles and activities which are male-defined and operating for male privilege. We can easily claim that feminism by appealing to the notion of multiplicity, is creating an increasingly different epoch in civil society which at the same time makes a challenge to the "unified" characteristics of the Turkish state. Moreover, it creates, by embracing the concept of difference, the need for a justice sensitive to variations of gender, race, class, religion and other sociological categories. Such a justice will clearly foster a public excluding no person, no aspect of person's lives or issue for discussion. This feature of the Turkish feminism is important for the purpose under question since it leads also to the representation of other social groups having different needs, cultures, histories, experiences and discourses in public life. Feminists' contributions to the development of a richness in the public life is, indeed, its most sensitive contribution to the development of civil society.

In conclusion, Turkish feminist groups are serving mainly for two purposes. They, by attempting to take part in the

public life on the basis of an equal status, serve the aim of the Turkish state. On the other hand, their being vigorous on utilizing the international concepts puts feminist groups in front of the Turkish state and prevails them as a representative of an alternative discourse. In both respects feminism contributes to the development of civil society in Turkey.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. For a detailed and sophisticated analysis of the role of women in social change see Ayla Buffoun, "Women and Social Change in the Muslim Arab World", Women's Studies Int. Forum, 5, 2 (1982). For the case of Turkey in that respect see Sehmus Guzel, "Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Toplumsal Degisim ve Kadin", Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Turkiye Ansiklopedisi, Vol.3. (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1985).
2. For a detailed analysis of the legal status of women in the Ottoman society see Emel Dogramaci, Turkiye'de Kadinin Dunu ve Bugunu (Ankara: Turkiye Is Bankasi Yayiinlari, 1989). See also Tezer Taskiran. Cumhuriyetin 50. Yilinda Turk Kadin Haklari (Ankara: Basbakanlik Kultur Mustesarligi Cumhuriyetin 50. Yildonumu Yayinlari, 1973).
3. The distinction between the state and civil society is elaborated in the second chapter in more detail. For Hegel's argument on civil society see T. M.Knox, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, T.M. Knox, trans. (New York, Oxford and London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
4. The argument on civil society as a miliue of the alterna-

tives is extensively elaborated in the second chapter.

5. For a brief analysis of the role of social movements in civil society see Alberto Melucci, "Social Movements and the Democratization of Everyday Life", in Civil Society and the State, John Keane, ed. (London and New York: Verso, 1988). See also Charles Tilly, "Social Movements and National Politics", in State Making and Social Movements, Charles Bright and Susan Harding, eds. (The University of Washington, 1984).
6. For a detailed and sophisticated analysis of the plurality of public in feminist theory see Iris M. Young, "Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral and Political Theory", in Feminism as Critique, Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
7. For a detailed analysis of feminist insistence on special rights see Idem, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship", in Feminism and Political Theory, Cass R. Sunstein, ed. (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990).
8. For a broad and thorough analysis of the state in Turkish politics see Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Washington and England: The Eothen Press, 1985). For a brief analysis of civil society and culture in the Ottoman Empire see Serif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire", Comparative Studies in Society and History, 11/13 (June 1969).

9. Universalism refers, here, to an equal treatment to all citizens, on the other hand, "particularism" indicates treatment to social groups, differently, according to their special conditions. For a discussion on particularism in the Ottoman Empire and the universalism in the Republican Turkey see, Ahmet Insel and Cengiz Aktar, " 'Devletin Bekası' İcin Yurutulen Çağdaşlaşma Sürecinin Toplumsal Sorunları", Toplum ve Bilim, 33/39 (Fall 1985-Fall 1987).
10. See Omer Caha, "Environmentalism and the Relativization of State Policy in Regard to Environment in Turkey", Unpublished Master's Thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara, 1989.

CHAPTER II

1. John Keane, "Despotism and Democracy - the Origins and Development of the Distinction Between Civil Society and the State 1750-1850", in Civil Society and the State, John Keane, ed. (London and New York: Verso, (1988), p. 36. For a more detailed and sophisticated analysis of the historical roots of civil society in Europe see Antony Black, Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought From the Twelfth Century to the Present (Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1984). Alan Macfarlane traced back the roots of civil society, in the case of an individual European society, to the Middle Ages. See The Origins of English Individualism: The Family, Property and

- Social Transition (Oxford: 1978). In order to see different cases of civil society in different countries in a comparative framework see Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, Arthur Goldhammer, trans. (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago, 1983).
2. Elizabeth F. Genouese, Feminism Without Illusions (Chapelhill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 176-177.
 3. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. C.P. Mcpherson, ed. (Penguin Book, 1968), Part I, Chap. 14, pp. 189-190.
 4. Ibid., Part II, Chap. 17, p. 223.
 5. Ibid., p. 227.
 6. Thomas Hobbes, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society (London: John Bohn, 1841), Vol. 2, Ch. 8, p. 109. Quoted in Carole Pateman, "'God Hath Ordained to Man a Helper': Hobbes, Patriarchy and Conjugal Right", in Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, Mary L. Shanley, and Carole Pateman, eds. (U.S.: The Pennsylvania State University, 1991).
 7. Ibid., p. 66.
 8. Pateman, "'God Hath Ordained to Man a Helper'", p. 67.
 9. Ibid.
 10. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett, ed. (New York etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Here book look at The Second Treaties of Government, Chap.II, pp. 270-271.
 11. Ibid., Chap. IX, pp. 350-351.

12. Ibid., Chap. VII, p. 89.
13. Frederic Copleskon, A History of Philosophy, Vol.5, Part I, (Garden City and New York, 1964), p. 145.
14. Zbigniew Rau, "Some Thoughts on Civil Society in Eastern Europe and the Lockean Contractarian Approach", in Political Studies, XXXV (1987), pp. 582-583.
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16. Melissa A. Butler, "Early Liberal Roots of Feminism: John Locke and the Attack on patriarchy", in Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, p. 86.
17. Ibid., p. 84.
18. Quoted in Kathleen B. Jones, "Towards the Revision of Politics" in The Political Interests of Gender: Developing Theory and Research With a Feminist Face, Kathleen B. Jones and Ana G. Jónasdóttir, eds. (London, Newbury Park and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1988), pp. 14-15.
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21. Lynda Lange, "Women and the General Will", in Patriarchal Attitudes, ed. Eva Figes (London: Panther, 1972), p. 105.
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23. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and

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25. Lynda Lange, "Rousseau and Modern Feminism", in Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, p. 101.
26. Ibid., p. 107.
27. Z.A. Pelczynski, "Introduction", in The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy, (London, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 1.
28. Keane, "Despotism and Democracy", p. 50.
29. Z. A. Pelczynski, "Nation, Civil Society, State: Hegelian Sources of the Marxian non-Theory of Nationality", in The State and Civil Society, p. 263.
30. Idem., "Introduction", p. 10.
31. T. M. Knox, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, T.M. Knox, trans. (New York, Oxford, and London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 148.
32. Ibid., p. 123.
33. A. S. Walton, "Economy, Utility and Community in Hegel's Theory of Civil Society", in The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy, p. 255.
34. Pelczynski, "Nation, Civil Society, State", p. 265.

35. Keane, "Despotism and Democracy", p. 55.
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40. Seyla Benhabib, "On Hegel, Women and Irony", in Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, p. 134.
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58. Helga M. Hernes, "The Welfare State Citizenship of Scandinavian Women" in Ibid., p. 203.
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103. See, Idem., In a Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 2-23. Nancy J. Chodorow also concentrates on the psychological difference between men and women. See, "Gender Relations and Difference in psychoanalytic perspective" in The Future of Difference. Sigmund Freud was another thinker emphasizing the difference between men and women. His studies, in that respect, directed some feminist writers to shift their attention to the concept of difference. For a brief review of his view in that respect see sigmund Freud. "Some Physical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes", in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, J. Strachey, ed. (London: Hogarth Press, 1961).
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116. Gross, "Philosophy, Subjectivity and the Body", p. 128.
117. Gallop and Burke, "Psychoanalysis and Feminism in France", pp. 111-112.
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CHAPTER III

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33. Resat E. Kocu, Tarihinizde Garip Vakalar, (Third. ed.) (Istanbul: Varlik Yayinlari, 1972), p. 86-87.
34. Ibid., p. 82. In order to see different areas that the Ottoman women were prohibited from social life see "Osmanli Toplum Yasayisiyla Ilgili Belgeler-Bilgiler: Kadin-I", Tarih ve Toplum, Vol.I, No.3 (March 1984), and, "Osmanli Toplum Yasayisiyla Ilgili Belgelr-Bilgiler: Kadin-II", Ibid., Vol. I, No. 4 (April 1984). pp. 49-56. Tuglaci reported 11 Imperial edicts related with the point under the question written either in Latin alphabet or originally in Ottoman alphabet. See, Turkiye'de Kadin: Osmanli Doneminde Osmanli Kadini.
35. In order to see a detailed analysis of the impact of Western products on Ottoman subjects see, Janos Hovani, "Western Goods in the Ottoman Empire of the Early Sixteenth Century: the Dynamics of the Change", in Turkic Culture: Continuity and Change, Sabri M. Akural, ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1987).
36. To see a brilliant argument on the impact of religion in Ottoman society see Nora Seni, "Osmanlidan Cumhuriyete Kadin", Yapit: Toplumsal Arastirmalar Dergisi, 9 (February-March 1985).
37. For a detailed and sophisticated analysis of the women of the minorities of the Christians, Jews and Armenians in the Ottoman society in demanding the Western products and their impact on Muslim women see, Robert Mantran, "Foreign Merchants and the Minorities in Istanbul during

- the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", in Christians and Jews in Ottoman Empire, Benjamin Brande and Bernard Lewis, eds. (New York and London: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1981).
38. For a thorough analysis of the women's education in the Sibyan schools in the Ottoman society see, Faik Resit Unat, Turkiye Egitim Sisteminin Gelismesine Tarihi Bir Bakis (Ankara: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1964), pp.6-9. In related to the education of the Ottoman women see also Emel Dogramaci, "Osmanli Devletinde Kadin Egitiminin Genel Gorunumu", Hacettepe Un. Sos. Bil.Dergisi, 1 (1978).
39. Afet Inan has listed the names of the famous women lived in Turkish society in period beginning from the Seljukian times to the late Ottoman period in her book, Ataturk ve Turk Kadin Haklarinin Kazanilmasi: Tarih Boyunca Turk Kadininin Hak ve Gorevleri, (Third ed.) (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Basi mevi, 1975), pp. 41-76.
40. Ibid., p. 77.
41. Inan has listed all these institutions. See Ibid., p. 80.
42. Taskiran, Cumhuriyetin 50 Yilinda Turk Kadin Haklarinin Kazanilmasi, p. 23.
43. Halit Organ gives the names of all the foundations found ed in Ankara by women together with their times. See, "Ankara Ser'iyeh Mahkemesi Sicillerinde Kayitli Vakfiyeler", Vakiflar Dergisi, 5 (1962), pp. 213-222.
44. Moving from two different Imperial edicts Muhaddere Tasci oglu indicates that women in Ottoman society had different business in social life. See Turk Osmanli Cemiyetinde

- Kadının Sosyal Durumu ve Kadın Kiyafetleri (Ankara: Kadın Sosyal Hayatını Tetkik Kurumu Yayınları, 1958), pp. 10-12.
45. Kucukomer, Düzenin Yabancılaşması, p. 14.
46. Heper, "The State Tradition in West Germany and Turkey", p. 9.
47. Idem., "The State, Political Party and Society in Post-1983 Turkey", Government and Opposition, 25 (1990), p. 1.
48. Ahmet Insel and Cengiz Aktar, "'Devletin Bekası' İçin Yürütülen Çağdaşlaşma Sürecinin Toplumsal Sorunları", Toplum ve Bilim, 31/39 (Fall 1985-Fall 1987), p. 27. See also Frederic T. Bent, "The Turkish Bureaucracy as an Agent of Change", Journal of Comparative Administration, Vol. 1, No. 1 (May 1969).
49. Heper, "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire With Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century", International Political Science Review, 1, 1 (1980), pp. 81-82. For a further analysis of the modernization of the Ottoman society see F. M. Lapidus, "Islam and Modernity", in Patterns of Modernity, (Vol. I: The West), S.N. Eisenstadt, ed. (London: Frances Printer Publishers, 1987). See also Robert Bellah, "Religious Aspects of Modernization in Turkey and Japan", American Journal of Sociology, 64 (July 1958). For a more detailed and sophisticated analysis of the modernization of Turkey more specifically after the Republic see, Walter F. Weiker, The Modernization of Turkey, (New York and London: Holmes and Meier

- Publishers, Inc., 1981), and, Dankwart A. Rustow, "Turkey: The Modernity of Tradition", in Political Culture and Political Development, Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1965).
50. Koker, Modernlesme, Kemalism ve Demokrasi, p. 12.
51. Leila Ahmed, "Feminism and Feminist Movements in the Middle East, a Preliminary Explanation: Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen", in Women and Islam, Azizah al-Hibri, ed. (Oxford, etc.: Pengamon Press, 1982), p. 153.
52. Nilufer Gole, Modern Mahrem: Medeniyet ve Ortunme (Istanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 1992), p. 24.
53. Ekrem Isin, "Tanzimat Kadin ve Gundelik Hayat", Tarih ve Toplum, Vol.9, No.51 (March 1988), p. 26.
54. Gole, Modern Mahrem, pp. 20-24.
55. Ozer Ozankaya, "Laiklik Oncesi Donemde Semseddin Sami'nin Aile Duzenine Iliskin Gorusleri", Turkiye'de Ailenin Degisimi: Toplumbilimsel Incelemeler, (Ankara: Turk Sosyal Bilimler Dernegi, 1984), p. 122.
56. Isin, "Tanzimat, Kadin ve Gundelik Hayat", p. 25.
57. Zehra Altinbas, "Anayasalarimizda Kadin Haklari", Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi Dergisi, Vol. 5, No. 14 (1989), p. 25.
58. Omer L. Barkan, Turkiye'de Toprak Meselesi (Istanbul: Gozlem Yayinlari, 1980), pp. 352-363.
59. Bayram Kodaman, "Tanzimattan Sonra Turk Kadini", Ondokuz mayis Un. Egitim Fak. Dergisi, 5 (1990), p. 143. For a more

- detailed analysis of the legal status of the Turkish Women see, Mehmet O. Alkan, "Tanzimattan Sonra Kadının Hukuksal Statüsü", Toplum ve Bilim, 50 (Summer 1990).
60. Sefika Kurnaz, Cumhuriyet Öncesinde Türk Kadını: (1839-1923) (Ankara: Basbakanlık Aile Araştırma Kurumu Yayınları, 1991), p. 18.
61. For a more detailed analysis of the Rustiyeye and Dar-ul Muallimat schools see, Unat, Türkiye'de Eğitim Sisteminin Gelişmesine Tarihi Bir Bakış, pp. 42-44.
62. Emel Dođramacı, Türkiye'de Kadının Dünyası ve Bugünü (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1989), p. 20. See also Idem., Status of Women in Turkey (Ankara: Meteksan Ltd. Sti., 1984).
63. See Article 114 of the Kanun-ı Esası in, Suna Kili and A. Seref Gözubuyuk, Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Sened-i İttifaktan Günümüze (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1985), p. 43.
64. Kodaman, Abdulhamid Devri Eğitim Sistemi (İstanbul: Otügen Yayınları, 1980), pp. 146-147.
65. Idem., "Tanzimattan Sonra Türk Kadını", p. 150.
66. Sehmus Güzel, "Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Toplumsal Değişim ve Kadın", Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, Vol: 3. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), p. 858.
67. Kurnaz, Cumhuriyet Öncesinde Türk Kadını, pp. 39-44.
68. Taskiran, Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Türk Kadın Hakları, p.33.
69. Ibid.
70. Nora Seni, "19. Yüzyıl Sonu İstanbul Basınında Moda ve Kadın Kıyafetleri", Kadın Bakışından 1980'ler

- Turkiye'sinde Kadın, Sirin Tekeli, ed. (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1990), pp. 45-46. In order to see other themes of these magazines see Zafer Toprak, "Osmanli'da Alafranga: Evlenme Ilanlari", Tarih ve Toplum, Vol. 9, No. 51 (March 1988)
71. Kodaman, "Tanzimattan Sonra Turk Kadini", p. 266.
 72. Kurnaz, Cumhuriyet Oncesinde Turk Kadini, p. 98.
 73. Toprak, "Osmanli Kadinklari Calistirma Cemiyeti, Kadın Askerler ve Milli Aile", Tarih ve Toplum, Vol. 9, No. 51 (March 1988), p. 34.
 74. Sehmus Guzel, "1908 Kadınlar", Tarih ve Toplum, 7 (July 1984), pp. 6-7.
 75. Bernard Caporal, Kemalizmde ve Kemalizm Sonrasinda Turk Kadini (Ankara: Turkiye Is Bankasi Yayinlari, 1982), p. 152.
 76. Tarik Z. Tunaya, Hurriyetin Ilani: Ikinci Mesrutiyetin Siyasi Hayatina Bakislar (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 1959), p. 50.
 77. Murat Belge, "Tarihi Gelisme Sureci Icinde Aydinlar", Cumhuriyet Donemi Turkiye Ansiklopedisi, (Vol: I) (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1983), p. 124. See also Iskender Savasir, "Aydinlari Kibri:", Toplum ve Bilim, 24, (Winter 1984).
 78. For an extensive and a thorough analysis of the role of Turkish students, educated in West, on Ottoman politics see Sukru Hanioglu, Osmanli Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jon Turkluk (1889-1902), (Vol. II) (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1986). See also Kemal Karpaz, "Structural Change,

- Historical Stage of Modernization and the Role of Social Groups in Turkish Politics", in Social Change and Politics in Turkey, Kemal H. Karpat, ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973), p. 264. For a further analysis of the role of intellectuals in Turkish politics see Gunes, "Aydinlarin Diktatorlugu", Hur Vatan, (February 20, 1962).
79. Uriel Heyd, Turk Ulusculugunun Temelleri, Kadir Gunay, trans. (Ankara: Kultur Bakanligi Yayinlari, 1979), pp. 111-114.
80. Taskiran, Women in Turkey (Istanbul: Redhouse Press, 1976), p. 45.
81. Fevziye A. Tansel, Ziya Gokkalp Kulliyat-i: Siirler ve Halk Masallari (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1952), p. 121.
82. Ziya Gokkalp, Limni ve Malta Mektuplari (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Yayinlari, 1965), p. 42.
83. Inci Engunun, "Turk Kadin Yazarlari ve Halide Edip", Turk Yurdu Dergisi, 217 (1980), pp. 41-55.
84. Ayse Durakbasi, "Cumhuriyet Doneminde Kemalist Kadin Kimliginin Olusumu", Tarih ve Toplum, Vol. 9, No. 51 (March 1988), p. 39.
85. Ahmet Agaoglu, Islamiyet'te Kadin, Hasan A. Ediz, trans. (Ankara: Birey ve Toplum Yayıncılık, 1985), p. 60.
86. Tevfik Fikret, Rubab-i Sikeste (Kirik Saz): Butun Siirleri:II, Asim Bezirci, ed. (Istanbul: Can Yayinlari, 1984), p.358.
87. Niyazi Berkes, Turkiye'de Cagdaslasma (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1973), p. 391.

88. Dogan Avcioglu, Turkiye'nin Duzeni, (Fifth ed.) (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1971), p. 162.
89. Abdullah Cevdet listed his demands on the status of women in an article entitled "A Very Wakeful Sleep" in Ictihat Magazine. He demanded amendments in related to 27 issue concerning the status of new Turkish women. See, Peyami Safa, Turk Inkilabına Bakışlar (Istanbul: İnkilap Kitapevi, 1959), pp. 55-58.
90. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (second ed.) (London, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 235-2236.
91. Ibid., p. 35.
92. Kodaman, "Tanzimattan Sonra Türk Kadını", p. 163.
93. Taskiran, Women in Turkey, p. 43.
94. For a detailed analysis of their arguments on Westernization see Sefika Kurnaz, Cumhuriyet Öncesinde Türk Kadını, p. 69.
95. Kodaman, "Tanzimattan Sonra Türk Kadını", p.162.
96. Emine Özhan, "İkinci Meşrutiyet'ten Cumhuriyet'in İlanına Kadar Kadın Cemiyetleri", Unpublished Master's Thesis, Atatürk Üniversitesi, Erzurum, 1990, p. 10.
97. Serpil Çakır, "Osmanlı Kadın Dernekleri", Toplum ve Bilim, 53 (Spring 1991), p. 139.
98. Ibid., pp. 139-144.
99. Ibid., p. 145.
100. Zafer Toprak, "İttihat ve Terakki ve Teali-i Vatan Osmanlı Hanımlar Cemiyeti", Toplum ve Bilim 43/44 (Fall 1989),

pp. 183-190.

101. Tulin Sumer, "Turkiye'de ilk Defa Kurulan Kadnlari Calistirma Dernegi", Belgelerle Turk Tarihi Dergisi, 10 (Temmuz 1968), p. 62.
102. Fusun Tayanc and Tunc Tayanc, Dunyada ve Turkiyede Tarih Boyunca Kadin (Istanbul: Dusunce, 1981), p. 115.
103. Toprak, "Osmanli Kadinini Calistirma Cemiyeti, Kadin Askerler ve Milli Aile", p. 35.
104. Sehmus Guzel, "Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Toplumsal Degisim ve Kadin", p. 872.
105. Taskiran, Women in Turkey, p.52.
106. Inan, Anadolu Kadnlari Mudafaa-i Vatan Cemiyeti (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, VIII. Turk Tarih Kongresi, III. Ciltten Ayribasim, 1983), pp. 1993-2000. IInan has also listed the other cities in which the branches of the association were founded. For an extensive analysis of that issue see also Bekir S. Baykal, Milli Mucadelede Anadolu Kadnlari Madafaa-i Vatan Cemiyeti (Ankara: Kultur Dil ve Tarih Yuksek Kurumu, Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi, No date).
107. Kurnaz, has nominated two other Anatolian associa tions founded by women. These are "Kasaba Islam Kadnlari Cemiyeti" in Ankara and "Mudafaa-i Hukuk Kadnlar Subesi" in Kastamonu. See Cumhuriyet Oncesinde Turk Kadini, pp. 115-119. Ozhan reported two further Anatolian associations of women: "Hilali-Ahmer Kadnlar Cemiyeti" in Konya and Akse hir, and "Hilal Kadnlari Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi" in Aksehir. See Ikinci Mesrutiyet'ten Cumhuriyet'in Ilanina Kadar Kadin Dernekleri, p. 25.

- Kadin Dernekleri, p. 25.
108. Inan has reported the names of 12 women who actually participated the war in Eskisehir front. See Ataturk ve Turk Kadin Haklarinin Kazanilmasi, p. 104.
109. Idem., The Rights and Responsibilities of Turkish Women, p. 241.
110. Cakir, "Bir Osmanli Kadin Orgutu: Osmanli Mudafaa-i Hukuku Nisvan Cemiyeti", Tarih ve Toplum, (June 1989), p.18.
111. Ibid., p.20.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Kodaman attributes these attempts revolutionary for Ottoman society. See "Tanzimattan Sonra Turk Kadini", p. 114.
115. Ibid., pp. 169-170.
116. Cakir, "Bir Osmanli Kadin orgutu", p. 20.
117. Kurnaz, Cumhuriyet Oncesinde Turk Kadini, p. 95.
118. Taskiran, Cumhuriyetin 50. Yilinda Turk Kadin Haklari, pp. 51-52.
119. For a more detailed analysis of that law see Orhan Ceker, Aile Hukuku Kararnamesi (Istanbul: Ebru Yayinlari, 1985).
120. Ibid., p. 9.
121. Taskiran, Cumhuriyet'in 50. Yilinda Turk Kadin Haklari, pp. 43-45.
122. Kodaman, gives a substantial document of all these schools. See "Avrupa Emperyalizminin Osmanli Imparatorlu guna Giris Vasitalari", Milli Kultur: Kultur Bakanligi Yayinlari, Vol. II, No. 1 (June 1980), pp. 24-28.

123. Nermin A. Unat, "Social Change and Turkish Women", in Women in Turkish Society, Nermin A. Unat, ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), p. 8.
124. Kurnaz, Cumhuriyet Oncesinde Turk Kadini, p. 99.
125. Guzel, "1908 Kadınları", p. 8.
126. Ibid., p. 9.
127. Idem., "Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Toplumsal Degisim ve Kadın", p. 870.
128. Tayancs give the document of the working women in different industries according to their salaries. See Dunyada ve Turkiyede Tarih Boyunca Kadın, p. 111.
129. Caporal, Kemalizmde ve Kemalism Sonrasinda Turk Kadini, p. 137.
130. Altindal. Turkiye'de Kadın, pp. 161-162.
131. Turker Alkan, Kadın Erkek Esitsizligi Sorunu (Ankara: A.U.S.B.F. Yayinlari, 1981), p. 64.
132. Guzel, "1908 Kadınları", pp. 9-11.
133. This is why Banu Avar claims that feminism was imported to Turkey by foreigners and native freemasonry lodges. She saw lodges as a chief element behind the development of feminist ideas in Ottoman society. See "Feminizmin Turkiye'ye Ge(tiri)lisi", Surec, Vol. 2, No. 7 (1981), pp. 69-75.
134. Karpal, "Structural Change", p. 51.
135. Frey, "Patterns of elite Politics in Turkey", p. 49.
136. Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P.Kinkwood, Turkey (New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1927), p. 4. Quoted in Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, p. 53.

137. Ali Kazancigil, "The Ottoman Turkish State and Kemalism", in Ataturk Founder of a Modern State Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Ozbudun, eds. (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1981), p. 48.
138. For the similar values of the state in both the Ottoman and Republican leaders see, Bertil Wälstedt, State Manufacturing Enterprise in a Mixed Economy: The Turkish Case (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. 71.
139. For a more detailed analysis of the Turkish revolution see, Ozbudun, "Established Revolution Versus Unfinished Revolution: Contrasting Patterns of Democratization in Mexico and Turkey", in Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds. (New York and London: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1970), p. 378.
140. Caglar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development (London and New York: Verso, 1987), p. 121.
141. Nilufer Cagatay and Yasemin N. Soysal, "Uluslasma Sureci ve Feminizm Uzerine Karsilastirmali Dusunceler", Kadin Bakisacisindan 1980'ler Turkiye'sinde Kadin, Sirin Tekeli, ed. (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1990), p. 309.
142. Gole, Modern Mahrem, p. 64.
143. Deniz Kandiyoti, "Kadin, Islam ve Devlet: Karsilastirmali Bir Yaklasim", Toplum ve Bilim, 53 (Spring 1991), pp. 29-33.
144. Durakbasi, "Kemalist Kadin Kimliginin Olusumu", p. 43. For

a detailed analysis see also Idem., "The Formation of Kemalist Female Identity", Unpublished Master's Thesis, Bogazici University, Istanbul, 1987. Moreover, see Senol Memisoglu, Cumhuriyet Doneminde Kadin Haklari", Unpublished Master's Thesis, Istanbul Universitesi, Istanbul, 1988.

145. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Ataturk'un Soylev ve Demecleri: II "Konya Kadinlari Ile Bir Konusma", (Fourth ed.) (Ankara: Turk Inkilap Enstitusu Tarihi, 1989), pp. 154-155.
146. Ibid., "Kastamonu'da Ikinci Bir Konusma", pp. 226-227.
147. Unat, "The Legal Status of Turkish Women", Turkish Review Vol. 1, No. 6 (Winter 1986), p. 76.
148. Cihan Aktas, Tanzimat'tan Gunumuze Kilik Kiyafet ve Iktidar, (Second ed.) (Istanbul: Nehir Yayinlari, 1991), p. 143.
149. Taskiran, Cumhuriyet'in 50. Yilinda Turk Kadin Haklari, pp. 120-121.
150. Oya Ciftci, "Turk Kamuyonetiminde Kadin Gorevliler" in Turk Toplumunda Kadin, ed. Nermin A. Unat (Ankara: Turk Sosyal Bilimler Dernegi, 1979), p. 242.
151. Unat "The Legal Status of Turkish Women", pp. 79-80. See also Perihan Onay, Turkiye'nin Sosyal Kalkinmasinda Kadinin Rolu (Ankara: Turkiye Is Bankasi Yayinlari, 1969), pp. 85-86.
152. Guzel argues that during the First Economic Congress in Izmir, in 1924, labor women were represented and they were given some rights later abolished with the adoption of Civil Code. See, "Kadin Sorununun Neresindeyiz?", Sacak,

- 32/3 (Nisan 1984), p. 42.
153. Unat, "Legal Status of Turkish Women", p. 154.
154. Kadinca gives a photograph of a local election held in a Swiss Canton by men and watched by women. See "Kadınların Oy Haklarına Hayır", (Temmuz 1984), p. 48.
155. Altınbaş, "Anayasalarımızda Kadın", pp. 462-463.
156. Taskiran, Cumhuriyet'in 50. Yilinda Turk Kadın Hakları, p. 129.
157. Ibid., pp. 135-136.
158. Quoted in Ibid., p. 138.
159. Nukhet Sirman, "Feminism in Turkey: A Short History", New Perspectives on Turkey, 3, 1 (Fall 1989), pp. 13-14.
160. For an argument on the concept of "state feminism" see Sirin Tekeli, "Women in Turkish Politics", in Women in Turkish Society.
161. Helga M. Herness, "The Welfare State, Citizenship of Scandinavian Women", in The Political Interests of Gender: Developing Theory and Research With a Feminist Face, Kathleen B. Jones, and Anna G. Jónasdóttir, eds. (London, Newbury Park, and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1988), p. 210.
162. Unat argues that during the time that Turkish women took enfranchisement right women in many European countries did not take that right. She stressed specifically on the condition of German women under the Nazi government which advocated the "Three K" formula attributing three places to women as Kinder, Kirche, and Kuche. Then comparing

with these she concluded that 1935 was a very early time for vote to women in Turkey. See Unat, "Toplumsal Degisme ve Turk Kadini", p.27. However, it became increasingly clear that many of the European countries including the fascist Germany attributed to their women this right more earlier than 1935. When coming to 1935 almost all of the European countries attributed that right. For the list of the countries indicating the dates of the enfranchisement right see Unat, "The Legal Status of Turkish Women", Table I., p. 86.

163. Even a large variety of non-Western countries attributed the right for vote to women earlier than Turkey. Some of these are New Zealand (1893), USSR (1917), United States (1920), Mongolia (1924), Ecuador (1929), South Africa (White 1930), Thailand (1932), and Brazil (1932). See, Ibid.
164. Tekeli, "Women in Turkish Politics", p. 298.
165. Ibid., p. 299.
166. For instance Unat argues that Turkish women gained that right without any attempt from women. See, "The Legal Status of Turkish Women", p. 76.
167. It is quoted in Cakir, "Osmanli Kadin Dernekleri", p.152.
168. Ibid., pp. 152-153.
169. Ibid., p. 153.
170. Capporal, Kemalizmde ve Kemalizm Sonrasinda Turk Kadini, p. 692.
171. Ibid., p. 693.
172. Ibid., p. 694.

173. Iffet H. Oruz, Ataturk Doneminde Turkiyede Kadin Devrimi (Istanbul: Gul Matbaasi, 1986), p. 33.
174. Taskiran, Women in Turkey, pp. 72-73.
175. Inan, Ataturk ve Turk Kadin Haklarinin Kazanilmasi, pp. 200-201.
176. Burhan Goksel, "Ataturk ve Kadin Haklari", Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi Dergisi, Vol. 1, No. 1 (November 1984), p. 229.
177. This congress is attributed by Zafer Toprak as Feminist congress. See "1935 Istanbul Uluslararası 'Feminizm Kongresi' ve Baris", Dusun: Bizim Belde Toplum ve Sanat, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1986).
178. Oruz, Ataturk Doneminde Turkiye'de Kadin Devrimi, p. 30.
179. Ibid., p. 36.
180. Sirman, "Feminism in Turkey", p. 9.
181. Hamide Topcuoglu, "10. Yil 10. Sinif", Sumerbank: Ataturk Ozel Sayisi, (1974), p. 67.
182. Ibid., p. 68.
183. For instance see the conference held by Oruz in Diyarbakir Branch of Turkish Club. She invited women to use only the national products. See "Ataturk Doneminde Turkiye'de Kadin Devrimi", p. 28.
184. Weiker, gives that quotation from Kemal Ataturk at the beginning of his book, Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and Its Aftermath (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973), p. 4.
185. Heper, "State, Democracy and Bureaucracy in Turkey", in The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Per

- spective, Metin Heper, ed. (New York etc.: Greenwood Press, 1987), p. 135.
186. Idem., "Negative Bureaucratic Politics in a Modernizing Context: The Turkish Case", Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, (September-October 1977), p. 72. For a more detailed analysis of the Multi-Party period in Turkey see Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).
187. Keyder, State and Class in Turkey, p. 122.
188. Ozbudun, "Established Revolution Versus Unfinished Revolution", p. 382.
189. Yahya Tezel, "Turkiye'de Aydin-Burokrat Tahakkumu Ideolojisiinde Son Degismeler", Toplumcu Dusun, 4 (1978), p. 304.
190. Heper, "The State and De-bureaucratization: The Turkish Case", International Social Science Journal, 126 (1990), p. 12.
191. Elizabeth Ozdalga "CHP Halk Ile Iktidar Arasinda", Toplumcu Dusun, 9 (1979), p. 293.
192. Mardin urges that the old polarization of center against periphery acquired a new form with that intervention. To him Democrats once represented the value of periphery, mainly at the dynamics of change and Republicans the center. See "Center and Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?". Deadalus, 102 (Winter 1973).
193. Sunar, "A Preliminary Note on the Politics of Civil Society Formation In Turkey", A.U.S.B.F.Dergisi Vol. 28,

- No. 3-4, (September-December 1973), p. 81.
194. Karpas, "Social Groups and the Political System After 1960" in Social Change and politics in Turkey, pp. 227-228.
195. Keyder, State and Class in Turkey, pp. 117-118.
196. Tunaya, has listed the voluntary associations founded after 1946. See Turkiye'de Siyasi Dernekler (Ankara: Basbakanlik Devlet Matbaasi, 1950), p.548. For the list of the associations after 1968 see Ahmet Yucekok. Turkiye'de Orgutlenmis Dinin Sosyo-Ekonomik Tabani (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Yayinlari, 1971), p. 119.
197. Ozbudun, "Established Revolution Versus Unfinished Revolution", p. 399.
198. Karpas, "Ideology in Turkey After the Revolution of 1960: Nationalism and Socialism", in Social Change and Politics in Turkey, p. 312.
199. Ibid., p. 319.
200. Gunes Araba Devrilmeden once, p. 99.
201. Heper, "The State and Interest Groups With Special Reference to Turkey", p. 22.
202. Heper, "Extremely 'Strong State' and Democracy: The Turkish Case in Comparative and Historical Perspective", in Democracy and Modernity, Deborah Grenium, ed. (Leiden: Brill, Forthcoming), p. 11. See also Sunar "Dunyada ve Turkiye'de Democراسiye Gecis Sorunlari", Journal of Economics and Administrative Studies, (Bogazici Univer sitesi), Vol. I, No. 1 (Winter 1987).

203. Dogramaci, Kadının Dunu ve Bugunu, p. 92.
204. Inan, Ataturk ve Turk Kadın Haklarının Kazanılması, p. 149.
205. Fatma Gok, "Turkiye'de Eğitim ve Kadınlar", Kadın Bakisacısından 1980'ler Turkiye'sinde Kadın, p. 174. See also Feride Acar, "Turkish Women in Academia: Roles and Careers", METU Studies in Development, 10, 3 (1983).
206. Gok, "Turkiye'de Eğitim ve Kadınlar", p. 174.
207. Dogramaci, Turkiye'de Kadının Dunu ve Bugunu, p. 114.
208. Gulden Kazgan, "Labour Force Participation, Occupational Distribution, Educational Attainment and the Socio-Economic Status of Women in the Turkish Economy", in Women in Turkish Society, p. 140.
209. Ferhunde Ozbay, "Kadınların Evici ve Evdisi Uğraşlarının Daki Değişme", Kadın Bakisacısından 1980'ler Turkiye'sinde Kadın, p. 119.
210. See, Kandiyoti, "Emancipated But Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case", Feminist Studies 13, 2 (Summer 1987).
211. See Carol Delaney, "Seed and Soil: Symbols of Procreation-Creation of a World (An Example From Turkey)", Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1984.
212. Ciftci, "Turk Kamyonetiminde Kadın", pp. 247-250. For a more detailed and extensive analysis of the Turkish women in Public life See Idem., Kadın Sorunu ve Turkiye'de Kamu Dorevlisi Kadınlar (Ankara: Turkiye ve Ortadoğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü, 1982).
213. Mubeccel Kiray, (Eregli: Ağır Sanayiden Önce Bir Sahil Kasabası (Ankara: 1964), pp. 82-87.

214. Kandiyoti, "Ataerkil Oruntuler: Turk Toplumunda Erkek Egemenliginin Cozumlenmesine Yonelik Notlar", Kadin Bakisacisindan 1980'ler Turkiyesinde Kadin, pp. 351-352.
215. Tekeli, "Turkiye'de Feminist Ideolojinin Anlami ve Sinirlari Uzerine", Yapit: Toplumsal Arastirmalar Dergisi, 9 (Subat-Mart 1985), pp. 56-57. See also Tansi Senyapili, "Metropol Bolgelerin Yeni Bir Ogesi: Gecekodu Kadini", Turk Toplumunda Kadin Semineri (Istanbul 16-19 Mayıs 1978) (Ankara: Sosyal Bilimler Dernegi, 1978).
216. See, Yildiz Ecevit, "Kentsel Uretim Surecinde Kadin Emeginin Konumu ve Degisen Bicimleri", Kadin Bakisacisindan 1980'ler Turkiye'sinde Kadin. See also Ozbay, "Turkiye'de Kadin ve Cocuk Emegi", Toplum ve Bilim, 53 (Spring 1991).
217. Cigdem Kagitcibasi, "Modernity and the Role of women in Turkey", Bogazici Universitesi Dergisi: (Sosyal Bilimler-Idari Bilimler), Vol. 3 (1975), pp. 83-90.
218. See Yakın Erturk "Dogu Anadoluda Modernlesme ve Kirsal Kadin", Kadin Bakisacisindan 1980'ler Turkiyesinde Kadin.
219. Tekeli, "Turkiye'de Feminist Ideolojinin Anlami ve Sinirlari Uzerine", pp.55-56. However, Sirman and Lale Yalcin argue that based on the traditional structures women in rural areas create a power sphere for themselves, then unlike the common point of view, women are powerfull at least as men and sometimes more than men. See Sirman "Koy Kadının Aile ve Evlilikte Guclenme Mucadelesi", and, Lale Y. Heckmann, "Asiretli Kadin: Gocer ve Yari-Gocer

- Toplumlarda Yeniden Uretim Ve Cinsiyet Rollerini", both in Kadin Bakisacisindan 1980'ler Turkiye'sinde Kadin.
220. See, Zeynep Kilicaslan, Nicin Kadinsiz Cagdaslasma Degil? (Istanbul: Surec, 1986).
221. Feride Acar, "Turkiye'de Islamci Hareket ve Kadin: Kadin Dergileri ve Bir Grup Universite Ogrencisi Uzerine Bir inceleme", in Kadin Bakisacisindan 1980'ler Turkiye'sinde Kadin, pp. 70-71. See also Yesim Arat, "Feminizm ve Islam: Kadin ve Aile Dergisinin Dusundurduklari", in Ibid.
222. Tekeli, "Women in Turkish Politics", p.300. Indeed, she is one of the prominent student of political science studying on the women in Turkish politics. Her following studies sketches a detailed analysis on the matter under the question. Kadinlar ve Siyasal Toplumsal Hayat, (Istanbul: Birikim Yayinlari, 1982), "Siyasal Iktidar Karsisinda Kadin", Toplum ve Bilim, 3 (Fall 1977), Kadinlara Oy Hakkinin Verilisinin 50. Yili: Siyasal Haklar Kadinlara Ne Getirdi, Ne Getirmedi?", Iktisat Dergisi, 243 (February 1985). Unlike Tekeli Arat argues that patriarchy maintains in Turkish society in all viable institutions like the family, the society, the economy and the polity. The patriarchal structure of Turkish politics, Arat argues, caused women gain an apolitical role. This patriarchal structure subordinates women to men also in politics. See The Patriarchal Paradox: Women Politicians in Turkey (Rutherford, London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1989). Turkish women particularly in rural areas participate into politics on

- the preferences of their husbands. Ozer Ozankaya found that in Turkish Rural area over 80 percent of women's party preferences are determined by their husbands. See Koyde Yapi ve Siyasal Kultur (Ankara: Ank. Un. SBF. Yayinlari, 1971), p. 86. See also Nedret B. Kumas, "Turk Kadinin Siyasal Hayata Katilimi ve Siyasal Davranisi", Unpublished Master's Thesis, Ege Universitesi, Izmir, 1989.
223. Meryem Koray, "Kadin ve Politika", Milliyet, December 7, 1991.
224. Cihan Aktas, Kilik kiyafet ve Iktidar, pp. 219-220.
225. Sevinc Karol, "Ankara Meslek Kadinlari Dernegi ve Sorop-
tomistlik", Ka-De-Fe, 1 (March 1977), pp. 11-13.
226. Turkan Aksu, "Turk Anneler Dernegi Amac ve Faaliyetleri" in Ibid., p. 20.
227. Enise Arat, "Kadin Dernekleri Federasyonu, Kadin Dernekleri Federasyonu'nun Amaci ve Ka-De-Fe Dergisi Cikarken", in Ibid., pp. 1-4.
228. It is quoted in Fatmagul Berktay, "Turkiye Solunun Kadnlara Bakisi: Degisen Bir Sey Var mi?", Kadin Bakisacisindan 1980'ler Turkiye'sinde Kadin, p. 294.
229. Ibid., p. 291
230. Kadinlarin Sesi, (August 1979), pp. 1-5.
231. Ibid.
232. Ibid., (April 1979), p. 12.
233. Aysegul Devecioglu, "Bir AKD'li Ile Gorusme", Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, 3 (September 1988), pp. 24-29.

CHAPTER IV

1. Sirin Tekeli, "Women in the Changing Political Associations of the 1980s" in Turkish State, Turkish Society Andrew Finkel and Nukhet Sirman, eds. (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 266.
2. Metin Heper, "The State and De-bureaucratization: The Turkish Case", International Social Science Journal, 126 (1990), p. 16.
3. Idem., "The State, the Military and Democracy in Turkey", The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 9, 3 (1987), p. 62.
4. Idem., "The State and Pluralism in a 'Muslim' context: The Turkish Case", Typescript, Ankara, p. 23.
5. See Idem., "State and Society in Turkish Political Experience", in The State, Military and Democracy: Turkey in the 1980s, Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds. (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1988), p. 9. Some of the Kemalist principles have lost their traditional respect in political outlook after 1980. Social groups either economic or ideological have substituted some Kemalist principles with new values. The most outstanding example is the free market economy against the etatism. Kemalism was regarded as means for rejection of the ideologies of both left and right during the 1980's. However, it is, particularly, in 1990s, regarded as being identical with secularism against Islam.
6. Ahmet Evin, "De-Militarization and Civilianization of the Regime", in Consensus and Conflict in Turkish Politics: Dilemmas of Transition to Democracy, Metin Heper and Ahmet

- Evin, eds. (In Preparation), p. 6.
7. Heper, "State and Society in Turkish Political Experience", p. 9.
 8. Idem., "The State, Political Party and Society in Post-1983 Turkey", Government and Opposition, 25 (1990), p. 6.
 9. Evin, "De-Militarization and Civilianization", p. 15.
 10. Nilufer Gole, Muhendisler ve Ideoloji, (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1986), pp. 8-9.
 11. Idem., "Towards an Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey", Typescript, Istanbul, p. 2.
 12. Ibid., p. 6.
 13. Ibid., p. 12.
 14. Ibid.
 15. The right gained on the part of the Kurdish citizens was firstly seen in the government's decision to allow the Kurdish language be free in communication in 1990. Secondly, and most importantly, prime minister Suleyman Demirel proclaimed that Turkish government should accept from now on the Kurdish reality, the first official description in that respect. For Demirel's description see Sabah, December 9, 1991.
 16. For a detailed analysis of the Turkish press see Gerard Groc, "The Press", in Consensus and Conflict in Turkish Politics.
 17. For a detailed analysis of the Turkish environmental movement see Omer Caha, "Environmentalism and the Relativization of the State Policy in Regard to the

- Environment in Turkey", Unpublished Master's Thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara, 1990.
18. Tekeli, " Emergence of Feminist Movement in Turkey", in The New Women's Movement, Drude Dahlerup, ed. (London, etc.: Sage Publications, 1986), p. 179.
 19. Yesim Arat, "1980'ler Turkiye'sinde Kadin Hareketi: Liberal Kemalizmin Radical Uzantisi", Toplum ve Bilim, 53 (Spring 1991), p. 10.
 20. I borrow these phases from Tekeli, " '80'lerde Turkiye'de Kadinlari Kurtulusu Hareketinin Gelismesi", Birikim, 3 (July 1989).
 21. Ibid., p. 37.
 22. See Tekeli, Kadinlar ve Siyasal Toplumsal Hayat Istanbul: Birikim Yayinlari, 1982). See also Idem., "Siyasal Iktidar Karsisinda Kadin", Toplum ve Bilim, 3 (Autumn 1977). Although the main frame of both studies is Marxism there is a feminist perspective as well.
 23. For the special copy on virginity see Kadinca, (August 1979).
 24. Tekeli, "Turkiye'de Feminist ideolojinin Anlami ve Sinirlari Uzerine", Yapit: Toplumsal Arastirmalar Dergisi, 9 (February- March, 1985), pp. 60-64.
 25. Idem., "Women in the Changing Political Associations", pp. 260-263.
 26. See Yazko Edebiyat, "Edebiyatimiz ve Kadin", 8 (June 1981).
 27. Necla Arat, Kadin Sorunu (Istanbul: Say Yayinlari, 1986), p. 190.
 28. For the argument on the development of the concept of right together with urbanization see Emre Kongar, "Turk

- Feminizmi", Hurriyet Gosteri, 32 (July 1983), p. 73.
29. Tekeli, "Cumhuriyet donemi Kadin Hareketleri", Ibid., p. 83.
 30. Ayca Atikoglu, "80'lerden 2000'lere Kadin", Milliyet, March 19, 1992.
 31. Tekeli, " '80'lerde Turkiye'de Kadinlarin Kurtulusu Hareketinin Gelismesi", p. 37.
 32. Ibid.
 33. Tekeli, "Women in the Changing Political Associations of the 1980s", pp. 278-279.
 34. For the example of the translations from Western feminists see Somut, 36\10 (April 8, 1983), p. 4.
 35. Sule Torun, "Genel Bir Degerlendirme", Somut, 43\17 (May 27, 1983), p. 4.
 36. Stella Ovadia, "Bu Yazı Son Yazı mi Olacak?", Ibid.
 37. The page maintained for about seven further months even after feminists' leaving the magazine but with different issues. For the summary of the issues defended during that period see Murat Celal, "Feminizm'in Gerceklesmesi ve Konuya Yaklasim Sorunu", (June 24, 1983), p. 4.
 38. Tekeli, "Women in the Changing Political Associations" of the 1980s", p. 280.
 39. Kadinca, (April 1984), p. 79. For a detailed analysis of the establishment of the Woman Circle see Juliet Mitchell, Kadinlik Kadinlik Durumu, Gunseli and others, trans. (Istanbul: Kadin Cevresi Yayinlari).
 40. Tekeli, "Women in the Changing Political Associations" of the 1980s", p. 282.

41. Analyzing woman's films in Turkish cinema Dilek Cindoglu argues that these films depict a men-made type of emancipation which has nothing to do with women's needs or oppression. Woman's films promote liberty not as an alternative ideology to the existing patriarchal attitudes and gender relations. On the contrary, they remain as a part of patriarchal culture. See, "Re-viewing Woman: Images of Patriarchy and Power in Modern Turkish Film", Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of New York, Buffalo, 1992. See also Asuman S. Nalcacioglu, "Sociological and Semiological\ Psychological Approaches in Feminist Film Theory: "Woman's Films" in Turkish Cinema During 1980s" , Unpublished Master's Thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 1991. She argues that there is an ambivalent in these films. They on the one hand, bring freedom to women, on the other hand, objectify woman's sexuality.
42. Oya O. Halvasi and Filiz Kocali, "Turkiye'nin Gundeminde Kadin Var", Kadinca, (December 1988), p. 49.
43. Ibid., p. 47.
44. For a detailed and sophisticated analysis of Kadinca magazine see Candan Yenigun, "Feminist Themes After 1980 in Turkey: A Study of Two Magazines", Unpublishe Master's Thesis, Bogazici University, stanbul, 1989. See also Ayse Saktanber, "Turkiye'de Medyada Kadin: Serbest, Musait Kadin Veya Iyi Es, Fedakar Anne", in Kadin Bakisacisindan 1980'ler Turkiye'sinde Kadin, Sirin Tekeli, ed. (Istanbul: Iletisim

Yayinlari, 1990).

45. For a brief analysis of the equality in Kadinca see, Kadinca, "Dunya Kadınlar Gununde Bir Kez Daha istiyoruz", (March 1988), pp. 34-35.
46. Duygu Asena, "Kararli Olmaya Karar Vermek", Kadinca, (January 1988), p. 5.
47. Birsen Dorduncu, "Beylerin Otolarina Park Var Hanimlerin Cocuklarına Kres Yok", Kadinca, (February 1983), p. 83.
48. Kadinca, "Dunya Kadınlar Gununde Bir Kez Daha Istiyoruz", p. 34.
49. Kocali and Nurcan Cakiroglu, "Feminizmi Feministler Tartisiyor", Kadinca, (December 1989), p. 56.
50. Kadinca, "Evlilik, Seks... Ve Ozgurluk", (September 1988), p. 69.
51. Asena, " '... Camasir Yikarken Mutlu Olabiliriz...' ", Kadinca (October 1985), p. 5.
52. Idem, "Ozveri mi Oz verilmemeli mi?", Kadinca (April 1986), p. 5.
53. Idem, " 'Zeynep Evlenip Kurtulacak...!' ", Kadinca (August 1985), p. 5.
54. Figen Yildirim, "Ben Bir Ev Kadiniyim", Kadinca, (May 1989), p. 60. Also, Serpil Gulgun and Kocali, "Ey Turk Kadini Birinci Vazifen Kocani Saymak...", Ibid., (January 1989), p. 45.
55. For the five major factors which lead to the divorce see Kim, (May 1992), p. 85.
56. For the struggle in softening of the divorce see Asena, "Evet Bosanma Kolaylasmalıdır", Kadinca, (February 1985),

- p. 5. See also Idem., "Hadi Canim Siz de", Ibid, (June 1987), p. 5.
57. For feminist demand on this issue see Diler Basut, "Medeni Kanundaki Yeni Duzenleme Ile Nafaka", Cagdas Kadin Dergisi, 4 (1989), pp. 19-20. See also Kocali and Figen Yildirim, "Bosanmak Felaket Olmasin", Kadinca (February 1991), p. 63.
58. Piraye Serdaroglu, "Feminizm, Erkek Dusmanligi, Digerleri...", Somut, 42\16 (May 20 1990), p. 4.
59. Asena, "Korkmayin Ne Olur!", Kadinca, (January 1989), p.5.
60. Kadinca, "Once Kendinizi Sevin", (September 1987), p. 75.
61. Zuleyha Guvener, "Yasanmasi Gereken Bir Duygu: Flort...", Kadinca, (February 1991), pp. 76-77.
62. Oya Ozdilek, "Bir Erkekke Bedeni Icin... Why Not?", Kadinca, (August 1989), p. 74.
63. Tulin Kolukisa, "Berlin Duvari, Bekaret ve Cag Atlamak", Kadinca, (December 1989), p. 24. For other reaction to the virginity see Sema Dincer, "Be-ka-ret", and "Toplumumuzda Bekaret", Kadinca, (January 1986).
64. Kadinca, "Evlilikte Seks", (June 1983), p. 41.
65. Asena, "Eşaretin Kurallari", Kadinca, (December 1991), p.5.
66. Ovadia, "Kapionu Muhabbetleri", Kadinca, (February 1986), p. 71.
67. Candan A. Kilic, " Bu Hayat Benim, Beni Rahat Birakin", Kadinca, (February 1990), pp. 82-83.
68. Quoted by Kocali, "Feministler Ne Istiyorlar", Kadinca, (February 1988), p. 69.
69. Asena, "Karinin Sirti Sopasiz Karni Sipasiz!...", Kadinca,

- (April 1987), p. 5.
70. Tekeli, "Yeni Feminizme Yakistirilan 'Erkek Dusmanligi' Uzerine", Somut, 43\17 (May 27, 1983), p. 4. See also Asena, "Benim Kocam Yapmaz Demeyin", Kadinca, (February 1983), p. 5.
 71. Asena, " '...Camasir Yikarken Mutlu Olabilliriz...' ", p.5.
 72. Reha Isvan, "Kadinin Disiligi ve Kisiligi", Kadinca, (November 1986), p. 79.
 73. Tekeli, "Kadinlara Oy Hakkinin Verilisinin 50. Yili", Iktisat Dergisi, 243 (February 1985), p. 46.
 74. For liberal feminists' demand on woman ministry see Kadinca, "Kadin Bakanligi Istiyoruz", (June 1986).
 75. For a general analysis of the discourses of radical feminists see Yenigun, "Feminist Themes After 1980 in Turkey"
 76. Handan, "Kadinlarin Tarafini Tutmak Butun Dunyaya Baska Turlu Bakmaya Yol Acabilir", Feminist, 1 (March 1987), p. 13
 77. For a brief argument of radical feminists see Sedef Ozturk, "Radikal Feminizm", Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, 7 (June 1989), p. 48.
 78. See Gulgun, "Kadinin Penisi Yok", Kadinca, (March 1989), p. 80.
 79. Ibid.
 80. Feminist, "Konuk Degil Ev Sahibi", 2 (May 1987), pp. 24-25.
 81. Vildan, "Ordunun Memesi Yok", Feminist, 7 (March 1990), p. 4.
 82. Ayse " Aptal dostun Olacagina", Feminist, 6 (1989), p. 3.
For an argument between radical and liberal feminists see Kocali, "Feministler Ne Istiyor", Kadinca, (February 1988),

- p. 88.
83. S. Nur, "Fenizm Kendisi Icin Var", Feminist, 4 (March 1988), p. 5.
84. Ayse, "Aptal Dostun Olacagina", p. 2.
85. Defne Sandalci, "Feminizmin Adi", Feminist, 1 (March 1987), p. 6.
86. Handan, "Feminist Haftasonu", Feminist, 5 (March 1989), p. 10.
87. For an argument approving woman's value see Baris Tutun, "Yeni Bir Kimlik Ararken Ahlakciliga Dusmemek", Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, 7 (June 1989), p. 19.
88. Kocali, "Feministler Ne Istiyor", p. 70.
89. Vildan, "Kadinlara Yapilan Dusmanlik Erkeklerin Cikarina", Feminist, 4 (March 1988).
90. Vildan, "Niye Feminizm", Feminist, 1 (March 1987), p. 26.
91. For feminist argument on woman's writing see Ayse, "Bizi Morganlar Yakti", Feminist, 4 (March 1988). See also Idil, "Bilim? Politika? Yazmak-Konusmak?", Feminist, 3 (October 1987).
92. Minu, "Cinselligin Politiklesmesi", Feminist, 6 (August 1989), p. 16.
93. See Feminist, "Kurtulusumuz Kendi Elimizde", 5 (March 1989).
94. For the concept of 'liberal stranger' see Alfonso J. Damico, "Democratic Consequences of Liberalism", in Liberals on Liberalism, Alfonso A. Damico, ed. (U.S.A.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1986). Dincer also draws the figure of a liberal stranger in defining new feminist woman. She

tells that if your wife as a new feminist leaves you and meets somebody else when you are going to home never mind about that and try to find a new one. This is a normal action of a new feminist woman according to Dincer. This indeed, calls for a radical revolution in the existing values of the Turkish society. See "Yeni Kadınlara Yeni Yontemler", Kadinca, (September 1989).

95. Ayse, "Korkuyorum cocuk", Feminist, 4 (1988), p. 15.
96. Minu, "Babalara Dairdir", Feminist, 1 (March 1987), p. 9.
97. Nukhet Sirman, "Femnism in Turkey: A Short History", New Perspectives on Turkey, Vol. 3, 1 (Autumn 1989), pp. 21-22.
98. Gulnur Savran, "Stella'nin Mektubuna Cevap", Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, 5 (1989), p. 29.
99. Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, "Biz Sosyalist Feministiz", 1 (1988), pp. 8-9.
100. Savran, "Bir Kez Daha 'Kadınların Kurtuluşu ve Sosyalizm' Uzerine", Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, 11 (1990), p. 6.
101. Ibid., p. 8.
102. Tekeli, "Kadınlara Oy Hakkının Verilisinin 50. Yili", Iktisat Dergisi, 243 (February 1985), pp. 43-44.
103. Filiz K., "Ozel Olan", Feminist, 2 (1987), p.29.
104. Savran, "Ailenin Sorgulanması", Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, 7 (June 1989), p. 59.
105. Yelda, "Magdureleri Cezalandirin", Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, 9 (December 1989), pp. 8-10.
106. Savran, " 'İffetli Kadın' Olmak İstemiyorum", Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, 10 (February 1990), p. 11

- 17.
121. Savran, "Kadının Gorevi Barış Türküleri Soylemek mi?", p.15.
122. For the document of the petition see Arat, Kadın Sorunu, pp. 209-210.
123. Tekeli, " '80'lerde Türkiye'de Kadınların Kurtuluşu Hareketinin Gelişimi", p. 39.
124. Atikoglu, "80'lerden 2000'lere Kadın", Milliyet, March 22, 1992.
125. Sirman, "Feminism in Turkey", p. 18.
126. Atikoglu, "80'lerden 2000'lere Kadın".
127. Vildan, "Hep Birlikte Yuruduk", Feminist, 3 (October 1987), p. 7.
128. Ovadia, "Kadınlar Dayığa Karşı Dayanışmaya", *Ibid.*, p.11.
129. Kadınca, (May 1987), p. 15.
130. Sahika Yüksel, "Es Dayığı ve Dayığa Karşı Dayanışma Kampanyası", in Kadın Bakışından 1980'ler Türkiye'sinde Kadın, p. 322.
131. For a more detailed and sophisticated analysis of that booklet see Banu Pakar et. al., Başlı Herkes Duysun, (Istanbul: Kadın Çevresi Yayınları, 1988).
132. See Aksu Bora, "Ankara'da Feministler Ne Yapıyorlar?", Interview by Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, 1 (1988), pp. 52-53.
133. Kadın Dayanışma Grubu, "Ankara 8 Mart Senliği: Kadınlar Susmayacak", Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, pp. 54-56.
134. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
135. Sirman, "Feminism in Turkey", p. 18.

136. Feminist, "Kadınların Kurtuluşu bildirisi", 5 (March 1989), p. 11.
137. For a detailed and sophisticated analysis of the congress see the following resources: Ayşe-Handan, "Kadınlar Vardır", Feminist, 6 (August 1989), Çağdaş Kadın Dergisi, 5 (1989), Tekeli, "1. Kadın Kurultayı'nın Ardından", A. Cankocak, "1. Kadın Kurultayı ve Kadın Tarafı Olmak" and Devin Kuzu, "Kurultay ve Sağlıksız Bir Ayrışma", Birikim, 2 (June 1989).
138. Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, 8 (September 1989), p. 9
139. For the reason why feminists held Black Protest see Nesrin Tura, "Bugün İsyanımız Siyahla", Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, 8 (September 1989).
140. Aksu Bora, "Ankara'da Feministler Ne Yapıyorlar?", pp. 50-51.
141. See Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, "Kadınlar! Cinsel Tacize Karşı Dayanışmaya", 9 (December 1989).
142. For this argument see Parker, "Cinsel Taciz: Bize Ragmen", Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, 9 (December 1989).
143. Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, 9 (December 1989), p. 19.
144. See Alev Camkiran, "Kadın örgütlenmesinin Perspektifi ve Gündemi", Çağdaş Kadın, 5 (1989).
145. Ovadia, " 'Butun Kadınlar 438'e Karşı!' ", Feminist 7 (March 1990), p. 22.
146. For the example of a reversive action see Serap Çakır?, "Erkek Kiligi ile Gelen Özgürlük", Kadınca, (March 1986).
147. Candan Aslanbay and Zuleyha Guvener, "1991 Güzellik Krallarını Seçtik...", Kadınca, (April 1991), pp. 38-44.

148. For such an action of feminists see Kadinca, (April 1986), pp. 40-43.
149. For the example of that action see Sema Dincer and Kolu-kisa, "Maca Gittik Maca", Kadinca, (May 1984), pp. 66-69. See also Dincer, "Iki Kadin Tatilde", Kadinca, (August 1985), p. 45.
150. For the example of such a reaction against magazines, which use woman's body as the image for sexuality see Sosyalist Feminist kaktus, 3 (September 1988), and against the control of virginity see Ibid., 5 (January 1989), p. 75.
151. See Kocali, "Aile Arastirma Kurumu'na Tepki: Otuz Kadin Bosaniyor", Kadinca, (December 1990), p. 40.
152. For the example of the protest of the Civil Code See Dincer, "Artik Yalniz Yasayacagim", Kadinca, (April 1986), pp. 64-66. Also see Kadinca "Medeni Kanun 'Medenilesiyor' ", (March 1985).
153. Kadinca, (October 1988), pp. 60-63.
154. Kocali, "Bakirkoy Siginak Evinde Yeni Bir Yasam... 'Merhaba Dunya' ", Kadinca, (November 1990), pp.68-69.
155. Kadinca, (October 1990), p. 12.
156. Kadinca, (July 1992), p. 11.
157. Kadinca, (December 1990), p. 24.
158. Kadinca, (August 1990), p. 10.
159. Arat, "1980'ler Turkiye'sinde Kadin Hareketi", p. 12.
160. For feminist actions in Germany see Fadime Gok, "1980'ler Turkiye'sinde Kadin", Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, 7 (June 1989). For their actions in Cyprus see Kadinca, (April 1992), p. 14.

161. Tekeli, "1980'ler Turkiye'sinde Kadin" in Kadin Bakisacisindan 1980'ler Turkiye'sinde Kadin, p. 22.
162. Idem., "Women in the Changing Political Associations of the 1980s", p. 284.
163. Ibid., p. 264.
164. Arat, "1980'ler Turkiye'sinde Kadin Hareketi", p. 14.
165. Some of the leftist magazines preparing special copies on woman issue or feminism are the following: Bilim ve Sanat, 15 (March 1982), Yarin, 21 (May 1983), Sacak, 30\1 (February 1984), Zemin, (May 1987), and Yeni Oncu, (February-March 1988).
166. For more information about these three associations see the followings: Kadinca, (January 1988), Sesimiz, 1 (October 1989) and Kadinlarin Kurtulusu, (March 8, 1992).
167. For a more detailed and sophisticated analysis of their discourses see R. Sen Suer, "Ignenin Ucu Kime?", Sesimiz, 1 (Ekim 1989) and also Ibid, 2 (March 1990).
168. As an example for such a critics see Yeni Cozum, (December 1989), p. 45.
169. See Kadinlarin Kurtulusu, (March 8, 1992).
170. For this class of arguments see Fusun Özturk, "Feministler Ne Istiyor?", Yarin, 21 (May 1983).
171. Ibid., p. 2.
172. Aytunc Altindal, "Nicin 'Feminizm' Degil?", Bilim ve Sanat, 15 (May 1982), pp. 6-7.
173. See Sibel Ozbudun, Nicin Feminizm Degil?, (Istanbul: Surec Yayinlari, 1984).

174. Latife Tekin, "Kadınların Kaybolan Bilgisi", Interview by Zemin, (March 1987).
175. See M. Sehmus Guzel, "Kadın Sorununun Neresindeyiz?", Sacak, 32\3 (April 1984).
176. Gulgun, "Feminizm Siyasetin Neresinde?", Kadinca, (October 1988), p. 59.
177. Kadinca, (October 1988), p. 59.
178. See Nedret Sena, "Sosyalizm mi? Feminizm mi?", Yeni Oncu, (July- August 1987).
179. See Feyza Zileli, "Neden Bagimsiz Bir Kadın Hareketi", Sacak, 30\1 (February 1984). For a further analysis of that view among leftist groups see also Necati Gul, "Evet Erkek Egemen Duzen", Yeni Oncu, 5 (July- August 1987) and Esin Cag, " 'Bagimsiz' Kadın Orgutlenmesi'ne Iliskin Birkac Soz", Ibid., (February- March 1988).
180. For a further analysis of this view by the religious groups see Mualla Gulnaz, "Ali Bulac'in Dusundurdukleri", Zaman, September 1, 1987, Tuba Tuncer, "Kimin Akli Kisa?", Ibid., Elif H. Toros, "Feminist Kime Derler?", Zaman, September 15, 1987, Tuba Tuncer, "Kadınlar, Yine Kadınlar", Ibid., Yildiz Kavuncu, "Islamda Kadın Ya da Ipekbocegi", Zaman, Septembber 29, 1987, and Mualla Gulnaz, "Biz Kimiz?", Zaman, September 15, 1987. The most detailed and sophisticated analysis of the demands of the turbaned feminists is held by Gole, Modern Mahrem: Medeniyet ve Ortunme (Istanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 1992).
181. However, these women rejected that they are feminist. A consistent exponent of that wave Nesrin Avsar said that they

once had problems with their professional and marriage lives. Then they were feminist. But once they solved their problems feminism no more graded a worth for them.(From an interview I held with her on January 5, 1992).

182. Ali Bulac, "Feminist Bayanlarin Kisa Akli", Zaman, March 17, 1987.
183. Abdurrahman Dilipak, "Musluman Bayanlar Feminist Olamazlar", Interview by Gulgun, Kadinca, (October 1988), p. 57.
184. For a detailed analysis of women issue by religious intellectuals see the following references: Cihan Aktas, Kadinin Seruveni: Elestirel Bir Bakis (Istanbul: Girisim, 1986), Somuru Odaginda Kadin (Istanbul: Acar Matbaasi, 1984) and Tesettur ve Toplum (Istanbul: Nehir Yayinlari, 1991). Abdurrahman Dilipak, Bir Baska Acidan Kadin (Istanbul: Risale, 1988). Huseyin Hatemi, Kadinin Cikis Yolu (Ankara: Fecr Yayınevi, 1988).
185. See Halvasi and Kocali, "Turkiye'nin Gundeminde Kadin Var", Kadinca, (December 1988).
186. Tekeli, "Women in the Changing Political Associations of the 1980s", p. 281.
187. For the impact of Kadinca on the improvement of this law see Kadinca, (Temmuz 1983), p. 30. Even in the first number it dealt with the issue. See Kadinca, (February 1979).
188. See Somut, 35\9 (April 11, 1983), p. 4.
189. I have gained information about these institutions through personal conduct from their staffs.

190. The coalition government even appointed a minister to construct a woman ministry in Turkey. During 1993 it is planned by government to be established.
191. For a detailed and sophisticated analysis of the program for this ministry see Kadinca, Resmi Kadin Hareketi Nereye Gidiyor?", (April 1991).
192. Kim, (September 1992), p. 28.
193. Kim, (May 1992), p. 85.
194. Arat, 1980'ler Turkiye'sinde Kadin Hareketi, p. 12.
195. Halvasi, "Turkiye'nin Gundeminde Kadin Var", p. 43.
196. Tekeli, "Kota...Kota...Kota...", Feminist, 7 (March 1990), p. 10.
197. Semra Ozal, "Esitlik Karsilikli Saygidir", Interviewed by Asena, Kadinca, (November 1986), pp. 24-28.
198. See Aydin Ugur, "Feminizm, Erkeklik ve Kimlik", Argos, (September 1988).
199. See Kadinca, "Kilibiklik-Kazaklik", (June 1986).
200. See Nurcan Cakiroglu, "Kadin-Erkek Iliskisinde Glasnost", Kadinca, (February 1990).
201. Cakiroglu and Ayla Kaplan, "Feministlerle Yasayan Erkekler: 'Birlikte Calisiyoruz'", Kadinca, (May 1992), p. 64.
202. Ibid., p. 63.
203. See Kim, (May 1992), pp. 86-87.
204. Feminist, 7 (March 1990), p. 15.

CHAPTER V

For the reaction of the Turkish feminists against the political lesbianism see Sirin Tekeli, "Feminism Nedir Ne Degildir?", Interview by Kadinca, (April 1984). See also Filiz Kocali, "Feministler ne Istiyorlar?", Kadinca, (February 1988).

For a thorough analysis of the secular aspect of the Turkish feminists See Gul, "Hem Mumine Hem Feminist", Feminist, 4 (March 1988). See also Sedef Ozturk, "Elestiriye Bir Yanit", Sosyalist Feminist Kaktus, 4 (November 1988). The factors behind the reason why Turkish feminists make a preference on behalf of secularism can briefly be observed in Idem., "Fransa'da Komandolar Hastanelerin Kurtaj Bolumlerini Basiyor", Kim, (April 1992).

However Deniz Kandiyoti argues that Turkish women have emancipated through the secular reforms of the Republican government in Turkey but unliberated. The distinctive characteristics of Islam still maintains alive in Turkish culture with its vigorous control over the definition of the sexuality bring under discussion the unliberated aspect of Turkish women. For a detailed analysis of Kandiyoti's argument see "Emancipated But Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case", Feminist Studies, 13 2 (Summer 1987). Contrary to this argument, indeed, it is evident in the example of the Turkish case that the sexual norms of the Turkish culture have come under question by feminist groups, the attacks by means of which the liberation of women are the matter. Needless to say it is in no way correct to ascribe emancipation to women only by

their inclusion into public life. This maintains still as a question if we are to identify the emancipation of women with total revolution of the male-based institutions. In fact the feature of the Turkish women in public life is a respond also to the severe critic of liberal theory Carole Pateman who argued that once women abolish the boundaries of the public and private spheres they would be emancipated. For a detailed analysis of her critique of the domestic sphere as an obstacle to women's emancipation see "The Fraternal Social Contract", in Civil Society and the State, John Keane, ed. (London, New York: Verso, 1988).

4. Indeed, the attempts of the female religious students are in the direction of the aim of the Turkish state to penetrate women with the public sphere. Their attempts to take part in the public domain reminds one clearly that they are an element of the modernization project of the Turkish state. However, religious women come to conflict with the state over the symbol of their representation. This contradiction brings female religious students to challenge the state norms. Since secular-oriented Kemalist rulers and intellectuals are in no way in tolerant to the Islamic values they do not subdue the prevalence of the "veil" in the public realm. In its very essence religious women are serving to the modernization aim of the Turkish state even though they are rejected by the state elite to the public realm.

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