

BILKENT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

UNITED STATES MEDIATION IN THE POST COLD - WAR ERA:
THREE CASE STUDIES

A THESIS PRESENTED BY
TUBA KESİM
TO

THE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN PARTIAL FULLFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

NOVEMBER, 1997
ANKARA.

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I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quantity, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science in International Relations.



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ABSTRACT

United States Mediation in the Post Cold-War Era: Three Case Studies

By

Tuba Kesim

A thesis presented for the Degree of Master of International Relations

Bilkent University, November 1997

This study aims to compare and contrast the United States' mediation attempts in the Bosnian conflict, in Palestinian-Israeli and Haitian conflicts. For this purpose, the following components of the literature on mediation are utilised as the analytical tools of this thesis: The power of the mediator, stakes of the mediator, roles played by the mediator, entry and timing of the mediator. In addition, certain indicators are chosen; namely, the relative power of the parties, redistribution of resources, policy or position changes, duration of the conflict, establishment of ongoing mechanisms, the use of media in order to observe the changes realised during or as an outcome of the mediation attempts. According to the analyses of these three mediation attempts, this thesis reveals that "mediation" stands as an important foreign policy making tool of the United States in the Post Cold-War era. In addition, this study underscores the importance of mediator's power in international mediation attempts.

Lastly, the study intends to make a contribution to the literature on mediation through defining a new concept called indirect mediation.

Key words: International Mediation - The United States Mediation Attempts - Bosnian Conflict - Palestinian and Israeli Conflict - Haitian Conflict.

ÖZET

Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Arabuluculuğu Girişimleri: Üç Vaka Çalışması

Tuba Kesim

Bilkent Üniversitesi, Kasım 1997

Bu tezin amacı, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Bosna ihtilafı, Filistin-İsrail ihtilafı ve Haiti ihtilafı üzerine yürüttüğü arabuluculuk girişimlerini karşılaştırmaktır. Bu analizi yapmak için, arabuluculuk literatürünün aşağıda belirtilen önemli bileşenleri değerlendirilmiştir: Arabulucunun gücü, arabulucunun çıkarları, arabulucunun üstlendiği roller, arabulucunun ihtilafa giriş tarzı ve arabulucunun ihtilafa giriş zamanı. Buna ek olarak, tarafların birbirlerine göre değerlendirilen güçleri, kaynakların tekrar bölüşümü, politika ya da tutum değişiklikleri, ihtilafın süresi, ihtilafın şiddetlenip şiddetlenmediği, süregelen mekanizmaların kurulması, medyanın kullanımı gibi göstergeler, arabuluculuk girişiminin getirdiği değişimleri incelemek amacıyla seçilmiştir. Bu üç arabuluculuk girişiminin analizi sonucunda, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin dış politika oluşturma araçları arasında arabuluculuğun önemli bir yeri olduğu gösterilmiştir. Ayrıca, bu çalışma, arabulucunun gücünün arabuluculuk girişimindeki öneminin altını çizmektedir. Son olarak, bu çalışma, "dolaylı arabuluculuk" adında yeni bir kavram tanımlayarak arabuluculuk literatürüne katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası Arabuluculuk - Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Arabuluculuğu - Bosna İhtilafı - Filistin ve İsrail İhtilafı - Haiti İhtilafı.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to compare and contrast three international mediation attempts conducted by the United States (US) during the post cold war era. These cases, namely the US mediation attempts in the Bosnian conflict, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Haitian conflict, are analysed in accordance with the framework borrowed from the literature on international mediation.

1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

Conflict has been an integral part of human lives and likewise of international relations. There are several ways to deal with conflict peacefully. Negotiation, arbitration, preventive diplomacy and mediation are major mechanisms used for peaceful resolution of disputes. The focus of this study is the process and outcome of international mediation.

International mediation can be seen as a nonbinding process of peacemaking, involving the intervention of a third party, aiming to resolve or at least de-escalate a conflict among parties.

International mediation, in practice, has a long history. However, the same can not be claimed for its systematic study. Only for the last thirty years, students of the field have been studying the dynamics of international mediation. *Young*,¹ *Burton*² and *Stenelo*'s³ studies are the pioneers of the field.

In the literature, there are various definitions of international mediation, ranging from general to detailed. *Doob*'s definition can be shown as an example for a general one. He sees mediation as "the efforts of one or more persons to affect one or more other persons when ...the former, the latter or both perceive the problem requiring a solution."⁴

Like *Doob*'s definition, there are definitions stressing the objectives of a mediation attempt, such as necessity of achieving a solution or an agreement in the end. For example, *Dryzek and Hunter* define mediation as "a process in which the parties to a dispute attempt to reach a mutually agreed solution under the aegis of a third party by reasoning through their differences"⁵ Along the same line, *Stenelo*, while underlining the changeable character of mediation, defines it "as the process initiated by a third party in his attempts to facilitate the solution of other parties' disagreements in order to ensure the achievement of a negotiated settlement"⁶ On the other hand, there are scholars like *Mitchell* who widen the range of mediation objectives and, therefore stressing the fact that mediation is not static, but dynamic. He defines mediation as "any intermediary activity...undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive conflict behaviour"⁷ *Touval and Zartman*'s definition, despite being a broader one, is also along these lines:

“Mediation is a form of third party intervention in conflict for the purpose of abating or resolving that conflict through negotiation.”⁸

In the literature, there are also definitions which focus on the characteristics of the third party- the mediator. For example, *Bingham*, sees mediation as the “assistance of a neutral party to a negotiation”⁹ and *Moore*, defines it as

the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute.¹⁰

One of the broadest definitions in the literature is *Bercovitch and Houston's*. Underscoring the dynamic nature of the international mediation, in which “a reciprocal relationship”¹¹ between the mediator and the parties exists they define it as,

a reactive process of conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group or organisation to change their behaviour, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law.¹²

An indispensable factor in a mediation, is certainly the mediator who may be an individual, a state or an institution or organisation.¹³ The students of mediation

analysed different aspects of the role of and the process of mediation. Issues such as the stakes of the mediator, role/strategies of the mediator, power/resources of the mediator, timing of the mediator and the entry of the mediator are important components of the literature on mediation.

1.1.1 POWER OF THE MEDIATOR

A mediator's ability to make an impact on a dispute, which can be called leverage, is linked with its power thus its resources, such as, money, status, expertise, access and prestige.¹⁴ As *Carnevale and Pruitt* put it, a mediator's power sometimes stems from its reputation and authority and sometimes from the capacity to reward and punish the disputants.¹⁵ The previous accomplishments of the mediator, its economic, military and political power in the international arena are important sources of power which may enable the mediator achieve its objectives.

Contrary to some scholars, such as *Bercovitch*¹⁶, *Touval and Zartman*¹⁷, who stress the importance of leverage for an effective mediation, there are some scholars who remind that the lack of political power of a mediator might facilitate success as her/his credibility and sincerity may be enhanced.¹⁸ In addition, *Slim*¹⁹ argues that the non-threatening stance of small states lead to their acceptability as mediators.

The scholars seem to have consensus over the idea that the overuse of leverage or exerting power frequently in a mediation attempt carries risks. For instance, *Rubin*²⁰ claims that a third party should not exert its full power in small scoped conflicts because a settlement achieved under strong pressure from the mediator may not endure. Likewise, the extreme use of **carrots** (like rewards,

incentives) and **sticks** (like punishments, ultimatums or withholding carrots) as the conceptual components of leverage,²¹ may not produce any positive outcome. *Touval and Zartman* stress that “a too strenuous use of sticks can cause a party to withdraw its acceptance of mediation, and leave the mediator without a role”.²² Besides, an overuse of carrots may result in a situation in which the concessions are only achieved through these rewards.

1.1.2 STAKES OF THE MEDIATOR

In the literature, there are different views about stakes of the mediator. Some scholars, like *Davis and Dungan*²³, *Moore*²⁴ moving along the traditional line, do not consider the mediators’ having a stake in the outcome of the process. On the other hand, some scholars like, *Touval and Zartman*²⁵, *Bailey*²⁶, *Kleiboer*²⁷ do not regard the mediators’ that altruistic but interest-oriented as well. For example, *Touval and Zartman* have labelled two kinds of motives a mediator may have at stake: **Defensive** and **expansionist motives**. Defensive motives may arise when a dispute threatens the interests of the mediator and expansionist motives may emerge if the mediator has a desire to extend and increase its influence, resources and power.²⁸

In a more detailed manner, *Bercovitch* lists five types of motives that a mediator may pursue. Like *Touval and Zartman’s* distinction, he mentions the motive stemming from a negatively affected interest due to a conflict and the motive arising from an aim to extend its influence over the parties. The other three may arise from a mandate, like the constitutions of the Organisation of American States;

from the demand of one or both of the parties and from a desire to keep a structure to which they belong intact.²⁹

1.1.3 ROLES/STRATEGIES OF THE MEDIATOR

In the literature, typologies of **mediator** roles/strategies by *Kressel* and *Touval and Zartman* are well-known. *Kressel* developed three kinds of strategies ranging from passive to active as follows: **Reflective behaviour**, **nondirective behaviour** and **directive behaviour**. The reflective behaviour can be accepted as the preliminary activities on which the mediator builds its later work. It involves discovering issues and facilitating better interactions.³⁰ The purpose is to reduce the degree of complexity and uncertainty inherent in any international conflict.³¹ Nondirective behaviour is a more active category and aims to produce a favourable climate for mediation³² with the contribution of the mediator. Directive behaviour, implies a mediator aiming to manipulate the parties toward a specific settlement.

By the same token, *Touval and Zartman* classified mediation behaviour along a continuum ranging from low to high intervention,³³ but with different labels: Mediator as a **facilitator** within which **communicator** and **formulator** roles are present and mediator as a **manipulator**. The most passive role is facilitator which is usually acquired when communication between the parties is broken.

Within the range of passive facilitator and active formulator, the mediator may serve as a channel of communication, carry proposals of concessions thus become a communicator as the parties can not contact each other directly. A more active role is formulator by which the mediator may “redefine the issues in conflict

or find a formula for the conflict's resolution or management".³⁴ Therefore it may submit proposals in an effort to persuade the parties to conflict.³⁵ As *Touval and Zartman* state, mediator along this role works on perceptions, doing nothing to change the nature of the problem.³⁶

Mediator as a formulator may also determine the mediation place, the number and type of meetings with the disputants.³⁷ Moreover, it may help in providing a neutral environment, deciding on who will participate in the negotiations and in controlling outside pressure.³⁸

The most active role is manipulator in which a mediator uses its leverage, resources of power, influence and persuasion to move the parties into agreement.³⁹ Mediator as a manipulator changes the structure of the conflict⁴⁰ by **empowering** the weaker side of the conflict through using carrots and sticks. In conflict cases where there is significant power asymmetries between the parties, the mediator may make a deliberate effort to enhance the power of the weaker party in order to decrease power discrepancies between the parties. In an effort to prevent the stronger party "to impose an unsatisfactory settlement on another" the mediator may assist the weaker party.⁴¹ The idea here is to create a conducive environment for the resolution of the conflict.

In the mediation literature, there are other roles listed by other scholars as well. For example, *Rubin* lists a number of roles such as formal as opposed to informal roles, individual in contrast to representative role, invited to non-invited role, advisory to directive roles, content to process roles, permanent to temporary

roles and conflict resolution to conflict prevention roles. Moreover, *Rubin* numerates three functions for a mediator: Modification of physical and social structure within which the conflict is waged, modification of issue structure and increasing the motivation of the parties to reach agreement.⁴² *Moore* enumerates a number of roles and functions that a mediator may acquire, such as opener of communications channels, legitimiser, process facilitator, trainer, resource expander, problem explorer, agent of reality, scapegoat and leader.⁴³ Though in much the same vein, *Stulberg's* list of mediator's roles is a little narrower: Catalyst, educator, translator, resource expander, bearer of bad news, agent of reality and scapegoat.⁴⁴ The variety of roles, strategies and functions of a mediator show the diversity of international mediation and stress the importance of analysing each case within its uniqueness.

In the mediation literature, the concepts of **impartiality** and **neutrality** of a mediator have received significant attention by scholars of the field. The definitions on impartiality seem to stress the unbiased nature of a mediator.⁴⁵ According to *Moore*, impartiality refers to an unbiased opinion or lack of preference in favour of one or more parties in conflict.⁴⁶ Therefore a partial mediator can be regarded as closer to one side than the other, politically, economically, culturally.⁴⁷

On the other hand, **neutrality** refers to pursuing no personal preferences that the dispute be resolved in one way or another.⁴⁸ *Carnevale and Arad* regard the neutrality of a mediator as having no opinion about the conflict.⁴⁹

Contrary to these views, *Bercovitch* rules out the possibility of a neutral mediator on the grounds that the mediators' entry changes the structure and setting of the dispute by turning a dyad into a triad. Besides, he also shows mediators' own interests to intervene as a reason to exclude the possibility of a neutral mediator. In addition, *Bercovitch* also stresses that "depending on their conduct and perceived qualities of outcome", a mediator may be partial or impartial but can not be neutral.⁵⁰

In the literature of international mediation there is a heated dispute concerning whether or not the impartiality is a must for effective mediation. Some scholars following the traditional line consider mediator impartiality as a critical quality for successful mediation.⁵¹ On the other hand, some scholars like *Faure*,⁵² *Kressel and Pruitt*⁵³ *Smith*⁵⁴ *Touval and Zartman*⁵⁵ do not consider impartiality a necessary condition for a mediator. Furthermore, some analysts view impartiality as an exception.⁵⁶ *Bercovitch* and *Houston* stress the mediators' ability to influence, protect, or extend the interests of each party in conflict as the reason for their acceptability, not their impartiality.⁵⁷ For example, the mediator might favour the weaker party, in other words empower the weaker party, in order to force the more powerful disputant to come to the negotiation table.⁵⁸

1.1.4 ENTRY OF THE MEDIATOR

Several motives may lead the disputing parties to become willing to seek or accept mediation. Some political interests of the parties like seeking a certain mediator so as to achieve a favourable agreement over the adversary, aiming to guarantee an eventual agreement with the inclusion of a third party, trying to improve its relations

with the mediator or accepting a mediator as a face-saving device to protect their domestic and international reputation⁵⁹ can be cited among these motives.

The entry of a mediator can be realised in two ways. The mediator might be either invited by the disputants, or imposed by its own initiative. It will obviously be for the benefit of the resolution of the conflict if the mediator is invited by the disputants since this invitation can be regarded as a sign to work on the problem by peaceful means. By this way the third party occupies a unique position to exercise influence.⁶⁰ Concerning the imposed way of entrance, *Rubin* underlines the importance of the disputants' perception of the third party's initiative.

1.1.5 TIMING OF THE MEDIATOR

Timing can be regarded as crucial in a mediation attempt. As stressed by *Bercovitch*,⁶¹ the duration of a dispute and the timing of initiating mediation may to a large extent determine the likelihood of its success.

Scholars of the field to a large extent agree that a mediator should intervene in a conflict when the timing is “ripe”. However, there are different views concerning the timing of this ripeness. Edmead favours the realisation of the mediation attempt at an early stage, “before the adversaries cross a threshold of violence and begin to inflict heavy losses on each other”.⁶² On the other hand, scholars like *Northedge and Donelan*, *Frei*, *Koh*, stress that timing of the mediation should match the signs of willingness to ease the positions of the parties and therefore favour a late entry.⁶³ *Bercovitch*, on the other hand, claims the dispute

becomes ripe for mediation at around seven to thirty-six months, at a stage when the adversaries presumably exhausted other modes.⁶⁴

Zartman, takes into account certain events while deciding for the ripe time to intervene and enumerates three conditions to decide:

1. The existence of a mutually hurting stalemate;
2. The efforts of both parties to impose unilateral solutions should be blocked and bilateral solutions should become conceivable
3. The power relations between the adversaries should be changed in such a way that a party which previously had the upper hand in the conflict starts slipping and the underdog starts running.⁶⁵

1.1.6 CHANGES REALISED

The entry of a mediator may cause some changes in the conflict system:

The mediator may increase, decrease or may not affect **the relative power of the parties**. In this manner, it may change the power balance between the parties by providing or not providing certain resources, such as financial capital, arms and recognition.

As an outcome of the mediation, **resources** may be **redistributed** between the parties or the mediator may provide resources in an effort to achieve certain changes during the mediation process. For example, territory and power may be

redistributed between the parties. The mediator may offer financial capital or its support in an international organisation to the disputants.

Another **change** may be realised **in the policies or the positions** of the parties during or as a result of the mediation attempt. The parties may give up their previous policies or positions such as agreeing on one another's existence, the withdrawal from a territory and creating communication.

The mediator's entry may or may not change **the duration of the conflict**. Mediator may shorten, prolong or may not affect the process of the conflict with its activities.

Another change that may be realised with a mediation attempt is related to **the existence of an overt conflict**. The mediator's activities may increase, decrease or may not change the state of conflict. For example, a mediator may intensify or de-escalate the conflict by using brute force or offering resources in an effort to gain concessions from the parties.

The entrance of a mediator may result in **establishing ongoing mechanisms**, such as a joint committee, a state, democracy, or a periodically organised summit can be cited as one of the other changes that may result during or as an outcome of the mediation attempt.

Sometimes the mediators, by **using the media** may change the power structure of the parties. Therefore the media can be an important tool in the process of mediation.

1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

Based on the above literature review, this thesis compares and contrasts three mediation initiatives of the United States which were over the Bosnian conflict, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Haitian conflict, respectively. For this purpose, the following components of the literature on mediation are used as the analytical tools of this study: Power of the mediator, stakes of the mediator, roles/strategies of the mediator, entry of the mediator, timing of the mediator. Besides, such indicators are depicted in an effort to observe the changes realised during or as an outcome of the mediation attempts: The relative power of the parties, redistribution of resources, policy or position changes by the parties, duration of the conflict, existence of an overt conflict, establishment of ongoing mechanisms and use of the media.

With this purpose, the first chapter of this study described the literature concerning the above mentioned components of mediation theory.

The second chapter analyses the United States' mediation attempts over the Bosnian conflict. The third chapter analyses the United States' mediation attempts over the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The fourth chapter analyses the United States' mediation attempts over the Haitian conflict. In the second, the third and the fourth chapters a brief historical background concerning the conflicts are presented. Then the analysis of disputes with respect to the above mentioned tools are conducted.

The fifth chapter comprises the findings derived from the analyses of three mediation attempts. The last chapter is the conclusion chapter in which the comparisons between the findings are stated.

CHAPTER II

US MEDIATION IN THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT

2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

As one of the republics of former Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence on March 3, 1992, as a result of a referendum on February 29-March 2, 1992. Despite the referendum, the Bosnian Serbs, radicalised by the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, proclaimed “the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina” on March 27, and demanded to remain within Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the Bosnian Croats, with Croatia¹ firmly behind them, proclaimed the “Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia” on July 4, 1992. The armed struggle which began in March in Sarajevo was intensified with the international recognition of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 6, 1992.

The first mediation attempt which was realised by the mediators of the European Community and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, namely by Lord Carrington and Jose Cutiliero, did not produce fruitful results. Following the London Peace Conference of August 1992, the second mediation attempt was launched by the European Community and the United Nations headed

by Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance, representing the European Community and the United Nations, respectively. The Vance-Owen Plan, despite its acceptance initially, faltered as the previous attempt. The European Community's and the United Nations' second attempt was headed by Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg. The negotiation process, despite achieving a provisional agreement in Geneva on June 13, 1993, faced severe hindrance as the result of a mortar bomb attack by the Bosnian Serbs on a marketplace in Sarajevo, on February 5, 1994. The third mediation attempt which was led by the United States, was an initiative aiming to find a solution to a crucial part of the dispute. The United States' mediator, Charles Redman managed to achieve a Muslim-Croat Federation by which the fighting between the Bosnian Croats and the Muslims had come to an end and a Muslim-Croat front against the Bosnian Serbs was achieved.

The fourth mediation attempt targeting an overall solution to the dispute in Bosnia was launched by five states, namely the Contact Group comprising the USA, UK, Russia, France and Germany on April 25, 1994. The Contact Group plan called for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into two, giving the Muslim-Croat Federation 51% and the Bosnian Serbs 49% of the territory, but the plan was rejected by the Bosnian Serbs who held 72% of the territory at that time.

On the other hand, the concept of 51% - 49% introduced by the Contact Group plan formed the basis of the mediation initiative of the USA (August 14, 1995), led by the US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke. The change in the balance of power in favour of the Muslim-Croat Federation vis a vis the Bosnian Serbs, as a result of the successful Croat offensive in Krajina of Croatia

and Bosnia and of the persistent bombings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation against the Bosnian Serb positions paved the way to the negotiations and eventually to the signing of the Dayton agreement in Paris on December 14, 1995.

2.2 ANALYSIS

2.2.1 POWER OF THE MEDIATOR

The power of the mediator, that is the United States, stemmed first of all from its being the only superpower of the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. With its political, economic and military superiority, the United States has unquestionable leverage to be utilised over international issues, in particular in mediation efforts. Therefore, the United States, by using its considerable impact within the international organisations, such as NATO, IMF and World Bank in particular, had the ability to manipulate the direction of the dispute effectively. The second source of the United States' power was its previous successful mediation attempt, which was finalised in a Muslim-Croat alliance, in May 1994.

2.2.2 STAKES OF THE MEDIATOR

When the war broke out in Bosnia in April 1992, the United States policy under the Bush administration was to accept the European argument which claimed what was happening in Bosnia was simply a "European problem"² and to avoid getting itself entangled in such an adventure on the brink of the coming elections in November 1992. Contrary to his predecessor's, the Clinton administration vowed for an active policy called "lift and strike" but was defied, several times, by the Europeans who claimed that it was inappropriate. Following the victory of the Bosnian Serbs in the

United Nations designated “safe-haven” town of Srebrenica in early July, 1995, the Clinton administration left this passive policy.

Behind this change there laid United States’ interests, particularly of the Clinton administration. The primary reason was to secure the outcome of the coming elections in November 1996. The worsening situation in Bosnia was harming to Clinton’s presidency as the Congress accused the administration for the ineffective US stand taken in the Bosnian conflict.³ For example, the bill which was prepared by the majority leader Bob Dole (Republican), the major adversary of Clinton in the coming elections, was targeting to lift the arms embargo over the Bosnian government unilaterally.⁴ Although the bill passed both the Congress and the House of Representatives, Clinton vetoed it.

Clinton’s veto aimed at the elimination of a drawback his own words created. In an effort to calm down its European allies whose soldiers were taken as hostage by the Bosnian Serbs in retaliation to NATO air strikes in late May 1995, Clinton had promised to deploy 25.000 US ground troops to assist NATO if a full-scale UN withdrawal was realised.⁵ As lifting the arms embargo would intensify the fighting, this situation would lead the Europeans to withdraw their troops within the UNPROFOR, eventually paving the way for the deployment of the United States’ ground troops in Bosnia. Clinton vetoed the bill due to the fresh memories of Somalia.

Combined with primary concern to end the war in Bosnia before the elections, the threat of United States’ combat troops inclusion due to the

intensification of the fighting in Bosnia led the United States to announce its peace initiative headed by the Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke in August 1995, following the successful offensive by the Croats against the Bosnian Serbs in Krajina.

The complementary concerns were to increase the diminishing prestige of the United States due to the downfall of the United Nations' safe-havens of Srebrenica and Zepa,⁶ and try not to lose its influence region⁷.

2.2.3 ROLES PLAYED BY THE MEDIATOR

The United States' peace plan was based on the division of Bosnia between the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serb entity, along the notion of 51% - 49% respectively. The plan tried to find a middle way by preserving the unitary nature of Bosnia as a federation but also called for the establishment of confederal links between the parties and neighbouring countries.

Within this context, the main objective of the mediator was to end the conflict. In order to realise this aim, the United States played several roles within this dispute ranging from **facilitator** to **manipulator**. The United States Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, as the leader of the United States delegation for the initiative assumed the role of **communicator** since the parties had refrained from holding direct talks with each other. Holbrooke, by shuttling among Sarajevo, Zagreb, Belgrade⁸ briefed the parties about what was in progress, discussed the positions of the parties and paved the way for several breakthroughs throughout the process, such as the Geneva meeting (September 8,1995), New York meeting

(September 26, 1995) and Dayton meeting (November 1, 1995). Considering the fact that the parties were not talking to each other for quite a long time, the United States had also acted as a **facilitator** by bringing them around a negotiation table. The mediator had also issued a visa for the President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, so as to remove an obstacle in front of the peace talks in Dayton and therefore facilitated the peace process.⁹

However, it would be wrong to argue that communication, solved alone the whole problem. As the only superpower of the world, the United States also used its **leverage** by which it became a manipulator. It managed to keep the parties within the process and to extract the necessary concessions with its power. The most significant example is, the United States' assumption of leadership in moving NATO allies to decide pounding the Bosnian Serbs' positions after the brutal shelling of a marketplace in Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs.¹⁰ As a consequence of the use of force, the Bosnian Serbs stopped refusing to negotiate over the notion of 51% - 49% and came to the negotiation table in Geneva, on September 8, 1995. In addition, with an effective and coordinated use of the NATO air strikes, Holbrooke managed to get a deal lifting the siege around Sarajevo from the Bosnian Serbs.¹¹ With this move the United States acted as a **manipulator** as it pioneered to change the stream of the conflict.

Towards the end of the Dayton talks, the United States announced three deadlines.¹² By imposing a deadline, the mediator had put a time pressure over the delegates in an effort to move them towards an agreement. The last deadline was reinforced by the president's agreement to a letter written by the Secretary of State,

Warren Christopher. The United States made it clear that if the deadline was not met at 15.00 (CET) on November 21, 1995, the United States would call off the talks and would definitely withdraw from the process. The delegates were also made known that if the United States withdrew, they would be left with the Europeans who kept announcing: "If the United States withdraws, we will withdraw too"¹³. Under the pressure of the last deadline, parties reached a compromise concerning the issue of Brcko which had previously caused a deadlock in the negotiations. Therefore the reinforced deadline made the expected impact and the United States, again, manipulated the process.

As manipulative tactics, the United States had often used **carrots** and **sticks** in order to make the parties act in desired ways. The most effective use of sticks was NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, as stated above. The United States, at the very beginning of the initiative, offered the parties to give some **carrots** like lifting trade sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs and rewarding the Bosnian Muslims with economic aid if a settlement was reached.¹⁴ In addition, the United States, as an effort to achieve the acceptance of the Bosnian Muslims concerning the notion of 51% - 49%, offered another **carrot**, arming and training the Bosnian army, if an agreement was attained. Besides, the Bosnian government was convinced to declare a cease-fire on October 6, 1995, only by promises of large amount of economic aid and military assistance in the event of peace. An important **carrot** for the Bosnian Muslims was the United States promise to participate in the NATO peace enforcement force.¹⁵ Finally, the most important **sticks** to both sides was the imposition of a serious deadline for the talks in Dayton.

The United States had also acquired the role of **formulator** through deciding on the participants to the talks. There was a procedural problem concerning the question of who would speak for the Bosnian Serbs during the future peace talks. Neither the United States nor the Bosnian Government wanted to get into contact with the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb Army general Ratko Mladic, both indicted as war criminals by the International Court of Justice. Holbrooke, in a separate meeting with the President of Yugoslavia,¹⁶ Slobodan Milosevic, achieved a procedural breakthrough according to which Milosevic would lead the joint negotiation team composed of Serbian and Bosnian Serbian delegates.¹⁷ Another example for its **formulator** role, in the sense of reducing outside pressure during the talks, was realised when it chose the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, in Dayton, Ohio, the USA.¹⁸ Due to the nature of the base, the delegates felt free from the pressure of the media during the talks.¹⁹ Besides, the United States was generous in providing technological facilities, like the “Nintendo Room”²⁰, by which the delegates could easily negotiate, therefore the United States acted as a **formulator** through reducing the procedural complexities.

Another important contribution of the United States was that it acted as an enforcer of the deals and agreements reached throughout the process. Concerning the deal on lifting the siege over Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs, the United States, made it clear that unless the Bosnian Serbs complied with the deal, NATO air strikes would be resumed.²¹ Another enforcement was realised after the cease-fire agreement among the parties. One of conditions for the implementation of the cease-fire was clearing the roads of Sarajevo, but the Croats seemed to be postponing this in order to gain more territory. Holbrooke intervened and pressured

the President of Croatia who backed the Croats in Sarajevo. Consequently, the Croats started to clear the mines.²² During the Dayton talks, the agreement which had established the Muslim-Croat Alliance under the pressure of the United States in 1994, was enforced by signing a pact to revitalise the Muslim-Croat Alliance on November 11, 1995.²³

The United States can not be deemed as a neutral mediator since it had a personal preference that the dispute should be resolved by punishing the Bosnian Serbs in one way or another.²⁴ This preference can be seen in its position towards the Vance-Owen Plan. The plan could not gain the political backing from the United States on the grounds that it was unfair to the Bosnian Muslims.²⁵ Therefore, the United States can not be considered as a neutral mediator.

The United States can not be regarded as an impartial mediator either, stemming from the fact that it did not treat the sides equally and mostly sided with the Muslim-Croat Federation, the Bosnian Muslims in particular. For instance, as the United States had supported the legitimacy of the Bosnian government, statements like “opposing any partition of or secession from Bosnia” were mostly spelled out by high ranking officials of the United States.²⁶ By this way, the mediator had empowered the Bosnian Muslims against the Bosnian Serbs who advocated secession from Bosnia. Another **empowerment** of the Bosnian Muslims by the United States was realised after the signing of the cease-fire agreement. Holbrooke, in line with a demand coming from the President of Bosnian Presidency Alia Izetbegovic, announced that in case of an attack towards safe havens, “the United States would request NATO action”.²⁷ Similarly, the United States had also

preferred to overlook the Muslim-Croat offensive so as to give them “time to gain more ground against the Bosnian Serbs”²⁸ before the Dayton talks. In the opening session of the Dayton talks, the Secretary of State Warren Christopher, again empowered the Muslim-Croat Federation by emphasising the internationally recognised borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and²⁹ pushed for the removal of Karadzic and Mladic from office, in line with the demands from the Muslim led Bosnian government.³⁰

On the other hand, there were times when the United States seemed to be siding with the Bosnian Serbs. For example, the United States prevented the joint Croat-Muslim offensive against Banja Luka,³¹ a Bosnian Serb controlled town, as it could bring Serbia into the conflict. Although it seemed to be siding with the Bosnian Serbs, the United States was actually trying to secure the peace initiative. For this reason the United States was not an impartial mediator.

2.2.4 TIMING OF THE MEDIATOR

When the duration of the conflict is taken into account, the mediation attempt of the United States may seem as that of latecomer; but as the changing circumstances on the ground is considered, with the victory of the Croats in Krajina, timing of the United States was ripe. The United States administration which was heading towards the coming elections, had already been under pressure from the Congress concerning Bosnia. For this reason, the United States did not miss the opportunity provided when “the underdog started running” while the Bosnian Serbs “that held the upper hand previously, started slipping”³².

The parties were also ready to resume the process of diplomatic activities. Despite starting to get the upper hand, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats were open to negotiate as three years of a state of war was very costly for all of the parties.³³ The Serbs having faced a severe blow in Krajina were also sympathetic towards a peaceful solution.³⁴ However, the Bosnian Serbs showed intransigence about starting to negotiate over the notion of 51% - 49%, by shelling a marketplace in Sarajevo. Therefore, the United States' taking the lead in deciding to pound the Bosnian Serbs by using NATO air strikes, was very timely and eventually led the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table, in Geneva. In sum, it would not be wrong to argue that these timely interventions of the United States put the initiative on track.

2.2.5 ENTRY OF THE MEDIATOR

The United States did not intervene in the conflict upon invitation. Domestic concerns of the Clinton administration necessitated some action concerning Bosnia. The United States shied away from a military involvement and opted for a diplomatic one. For this reason, the United States entered as a mediator when it found a suitable timing. However, this entrance was not an imposed one, because all of the parties welcomed the initiative. The President of Croatia, F. Tudjman,³⁵ the President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic³⁶ and the President of the Bosnian Presidency, Alia Izetbegovic,³⁷ had stated their compliance with the initiative. There were no problems encountered in gaining acceptance from the parties. However, as the talks proceeded, the perception of the Bosnian Serbs of the United States changed, due to the mediator's partial attitude towards the Muslim-Croat Federation.³⁸

2.2.6 CHANGES REALISED

The most important change realised as a consequence of the United States' mediation was achieving an end to the state of war. When the United States entered as a mediator, there was **an overt conflict** continuing in the battlefield. Although the initiative started in a peaceful manner, the intransigent attitude of the Bosnian Serbs caused an increase in the fighting. Having the presidential elections at stake, the United States managed to eliminate this intransigent attitude by using its military leverage within NATO at the right time. Without a third party intervention, it would be impossible for the parties to negotiate, as the adversaries were not coming face to face since the failure of the Contact Group mediation attempt. Later on the mediator had also brokered a cease-fire agreement among the parties and therefore tried to stop the fighting although minor clashes continued to take place.³⁹

The United States, **increased the relative power** of the Muslim-Croat side by pounding the positions of the Bosnian Serbs decisively,⁴⁰ and by making public announcements siding with the Bosnian Muslims position.⁴¹ The United States had also promised to arm and train the Federation after the agreement so as to achieve a military balance against the Bosnian Serbs.⁴² On the other hand, the Bosnian Serbs had a psychological gain, which was an official international recognition under the name of Republika Srpska in an effort to keep them within the process.⁴³

Through the mediation of the United States, the parties made some **redistribution in resources**, like territorial adjustments. For example, the President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs was obliged to give up Sarajevo and accept the deployment of NATO forces in Bosnia.⁴⁴ As a

result of such concessions, Yugoslavia freed itself from the United Nations' sanctions.⁴⁵ Under pressure from the United States, Croatia managed to regain the region of Eastern Slavonia from the rebel Croatian Serbs.⁴⁶ During the mediation process, there were other **resources available** to the parties, particularly to the Muslim-Croat side, a total of \$ 600 million to be given to the Federation for the reconstruction of Bosnia⁴⁷ and most importantly, 20.000 US ground troops to Bosnia for the enforcement of the peace.⁴⁸ By promising these incentives, the United States ended up with the agreement.

The Bosnian Muslims were previously ruling out Serbian confederal links with Yugoslavia. In the agreement, the parties were assigned the right to form "special parallel relations" with neighbouring countries if only such relations honoured the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia.⁴⁹ The parties accepted one another's right of existence within a single state. The Bosnian Muslims **recognised** the Republika Srpska as a separate entity within the Bosnia-Herzegovina State while the Bosnian Serbs gave up their demands of secession. Diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Bosnia were established.⁵⁰ Bosnia became the 181st member of the International Monetary Fund.⁵¹ Another important change was prohibiting war criminals, namely, the President of the Serbian leadership, Radovan Karadzic, and the general of the Bosnian Serb Army, Ratko Mladic, from standing for office. With the help of the United States' mediation, such **policy changes** were realised by the parties.

Concerning **the duration of the conflict**, the United States' intervention, particularly the one in which it used NATO air strikes, was influential in

accelerating the peace process. With this move, the Muslim-Croat side felt more confident⁵² and the Bosnian Serbs accepted to start negotiating over the notion of the 51% - 49% and to lift the siege over Sarajevo. In addition, the deadline scheduled for the afternoon of November 21, gave momentum to the talks and can even be accepted as saved the process.

The media had shown great interest in the conflict, especially towards the talks held in Dayton, Ohio. The United States had also used this interest to change the power balance in favour of the Bosnian Muslims and to weaken the Bosnian Serbs. The most striking example appeared when there were three days left for the Dayton talks. The United States supplied evidence of the Bosnian Serb forces' crimes against the Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia to the public.⁵³

The United States helped the parties to establish the State of the Bosnia-Herzegovina with constitutional arrangements. Furthermore, it aimed to enforce peace by taking the leadership for deployment of Implementation Forces (IFOR) in Bosnia, as an **ongoing mechanism**. Besides, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank were pulled into the process for Bosnia's reconstruction.⁵⁴

The findings related to this mediation attempt will be presented in the fifth chapter.

CHAPTER III

US MEDIATION IN THE PALESTINIAN - ISRAELI CONFLICT

3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:

The conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians may be regarded as one of the most complicated disputes in the international arena. The roots of this long-running problem go back to the establishment of Israel with the support of the United Nations, in 1948. Eventually, the Arab States' rejection of the new status quo paved the way for a series of wars and a great amount of hostility between the Arabs and the Israelis.

The 1967 Arab-Israeli War during which Israel occupied the whole of Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, forms the crux of the dispute between the Israelis and Palestinians. The Six Day War had ended with the occupation of almost all of the Palestinian lands and therefore the immigration of the Palestinians to Arab States. In response, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 242 which called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories occupied in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Following the 1973 War between the Arabs and Israelis, the United Nations Security Council had

also adopted Resolution 338 which called for negotiations in order to realise Resolution 242.

Hostility culminated had embraced the beginning of a peace process with the President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat's, visit to Jerusalem and eventually ended in the Camp David Agreement in 1978. The agreement which was achieved under the mediation efforts of the United States gave the Sinai peninsula back to Egypt and opened the way for autonomy talks to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Palestinians were by then politically and militarily organised under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which was neither recognised by Israel nor the United States. The primary reason behind this was the Palestine Liberation Organisation's guerrilla warfare with the intention to destroy the State of Israel and establish an independent Palestine state in that area. Therefore, the Camp David Accord which enabled the Palestinians to have autonomy talks with the Israelis did not satisfy the Palestinians. Following this agreement, Israel occupied Lebanon in an attempt to force the Palestinian guerrillas to leave their bases.

As years went by, the frustration of the Palestinians living under Israeli military occupation had grown and led to a popular uprising in 1987. The impact of the uprising or *intifada* was so intense that it started to affect the domestic politics of Israel. The Palestinian problem became an important topic affecting the election propaganda of the parties. The Labour Party had announced that it accepted the principle of "land for peace" while the conservative Likud Party, staying firm on its hard-line position, stressed that no concessions should be made to the Palestinians. On the side of the Palestinians there were clear signs of flexibility, like declaring to

rule out their determination to destroy Israel. Following such a flexible declaration, the United States resumed its contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organisation in 1988, and proposed a plan in 1989 but was rejected by both of the parties of the dispute.

The conducive political environment for a peace initiative in the region following the Gulf War, led the United States to launch an initiative to convene a Middle East Peace Conference in 1991. The initiative was based on the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the principle of “territory for peace”. Besides, the security and recognition of Israel and the political rights of Palestinians were to be provided.

The negotiation process started with the convention of the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid. This had become feasible due to the intensive shuttle diplomacy of the United States Secretary of State, James Baker, and produced an important result like breaking the taboo of “no negotiations” between the parties.

The Declaration of Principles on Palestinian self-rule in the Gaza Strip and West Bank was achieved after a series of clandestine meetings between the parties in the light of secret Norwegian mediation. Following the signing of the accord in September 1993, the parties started to negotiate over its implementation. Eventually, they signed the Protocol on Economic Arrangements in April 1994, the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho areas in May 1994, the Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip in September 1995 and the Hebron Agreement in January 1997. The process is still continuing.

3.2 ANALYSIS

3.2.1 POWER OF THE MEDIATOR

The United States' most important source of power was its status in the international arena at that time. The impact of the former Soviet Union over the Middle East eroded while the prestige of the United States was enjoying its peak as an outcome of the Gulf War. As a consequence, the United States found a suitable political atmosphere to exert its influence so as to convene a Middle East Peace Conference.

The United States, being the sole superpower of the world, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union undoubtedly constituted a considerable degree of leverage in the eyes of the disputing parties. The United States' superpower utilities was welcomed by the parties whenever they needed military or economic assistance during the thorny peace process.

However, the decisions and therefore the power of the United States over Israel, particularly during the Clinton administration, have been limited due to the effective Jewish lobby and the strategic importance and preponderance of Israel in comparison to the Arab States'.

3.2.2 STAKES OF THE MEDIATOR

The Middle East is a region that carries vital importance for the United States. This fact did not change with the end of the Cold War. For this reason, the United States had certain interests to be pursued when intervening to the conflict.

The primary concern of the United States is its access to oil from the area where it imports half of its petroleum needs.¹ The existence of a conflict or a source of instability in the region that may threaten the flow of oil constitutes a crucial danger to the United States' interests. Stemming from this fact, the United States stood firmly against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait during the Gulf Crisis and War.

The United States also pursues a containment policy towards extremist Islamist regimes like Iran that are considered as origins of exporting terrorism, in an effort to eliminate sources of instability. In addition, the United States view Iran, Iraq and Libya as threats because of these countries' intention to become nuclear powers of the region.

In line with this concern over stability in the Middle East, the United States has long been aiming to resolve another source of instability: The Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore, the Post-Gulf War era was suitable enough to intervene for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement.

Another interest for the United States at stake was economic. The hostility present in the region, required the United States to make financial aid to the Middle East for a long time. As its strategic ally Israel is surrounded by unfriendly states, the United States has been channelling a great amount of financial capital to Israel, reaching \$3 billion each year.² Moreover, the United States has been investing financial and political capital³ during the peace process so as to achieve stability in the region, like organising an international donor conference for the Palestinian infrastructure and promising \$ 500 million between 1994 and 1998 for its share.

Therefore, the elimination of this hostility between the Arabs and the Israelis may lead to a considerable cut in the flow of financial capital to the region and eventually may result in the achievement of stability, with less cost to the United States.

The dispute between the Palestinians and Israelis which worsened due to the terrorist activities of the Islamist extremists has been constituting a threat to the United States' interests. For this reason, it would not be wrong to argue that the mediator has been pursuing **defensive motives** rather than altruistic ones while deciding to intervene in the conflict.

3.2.3 ROLES PLAYED BY THE MEDIATOR

The United States' peace initiative over the Middle East envisioned a two track approach according to which Israel would negotiate with the Arabs and the Palestinians separately. The initiative did not bring a specified, detailed proposal for the solution to the problem, but set a framework for the beginning of the negotiations among parties.

The initiative called for a solution based on the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 on the principles of land for peace so as to guarantee the security and recognition of Israel and legitimate political rights of the Palestinians.⁴

The mediator's primary objective was to bring the parties around a negotiation table as there existed no negotiation among the parties, namely Syria,

Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, the Palestinians and Israel. For this reason the United States under the Bush administration, aimed to facilitate the whole process, in an attempt to convene a Middle East Peace Conference.

In its **facilitator** role, the mediator acted as a **communicator** between the Palestinians and Israelis since they did not recognise each other. The United States Secretary of State, James Baker, held several separate meetings with the Palestinian and Israeli delegation during his intense shuttle diplomacy to the region, started in early 1991 and lasted until late 1992.

Other than acting as “a telephone wire”⁵, the United States had suggested several proposals that might change perceptions and as a result change the positions of the parties over the main rules of the Conference, and therefore served as a **formulator**.⁶ For example, Israel was ruling out the possibility of residents from East Jerusalem to be represented in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation while the Palestinians were insisting on their representation. The United States made a proposal according to which a Palestinian from a well-known Jerusalem family, residing currently in Jordan may be included in the joint delegation.⁷ By this way, the Palestinians would agree that the East Jerusalem residents were represented while the Israelis would not be threatened that Jerusalem might appear as topic of discussion during the talks. To give another example to its **formulator** role, the United States had also tried to make an impact over the way the parties’ thought on the issue of the United Nations’ representation during the Conference. While Israel objected, the Palestinians insisted on the representation of the United Nations. The

United States Secretary of State, James Baker, proposed for a United Nations representative as an observer, whose rights were limited taking notes only.⁸

A mediator as a formulator may also try to diminish outside pressure over the parties⁹ in an effort to protect the process, just like it was in Baker's secret diplomacy. Baker preferred to hold private talks with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Shamir, without accepting even a note-taker in the room. During his separate meetings with the Arabs, mostly a translator was present. This protection against leakages might be seen necessary to impede the leaders to back off from fundamental concessions in the face of domestic opposition.¹⁰

When parties failed to name the date and venue for the next round of talks, the United States can be viewed to have served as a **facilitator** in the sense of **formulator** due to its efforts to move the parties to the negotiation table, by doing the job in proxy.¹¹ On the other hand, such announcements on the date and venue may also be viewed as an open sign of impatience of the United States about deadlocks over procedural matters, and therefore may be considered as **manipulating** the process by imposing a solution to the impasse.

United States under the Bush administration sometimes, applied **manipulative** tactics like **sticks** and **carrots** when the process faced impasse. The most striking example of the United States' appearance as a **manipulator** occurred over Israel's settlement policy in the territories which belonged to the Palestinians before the 1967 war, namely the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. This

policy has been causing strains and deadlocks throughout the whole process, as the Arabs and particularly the Palestinians have been very sensitive on this issue.

In an effort to protect the peace process from faltering, the Bush administration exerted pressure over Israel. Firstly, the United States Secretary of State, James Baker, labelled the settlements as “an obstacle to peace”¹². However, such words were not enough to persuade the hard-liner Shamir government, committed to its settlement policy. Secondly, the United States used its **economic leverage** against Israel when the Likud government announced another settlement in Eshkolot, the West Bank, during Baker’s intense efforts to convene the Conference. Thirdly, the Bush administration tried to force Israel to stop building new settlements in the disputed territories by calling the United States Congress to delay for 120 days its approval of loan guarantees to Israel. Furthermore, the President of the United States, George Bush vowed veto if the loan guarantees were approved by the Congress on September 6, 1991.¹³ Although the Congress acted in line with the president’s will, Israel kept on building while bilateral talks were going on between the parties in Washington, DC. As this situation led to the Palestinian reaction, Baker announced that the United States would not provide \$ 10 billion in loan guarantees to Israel unless settlement building was halted in the disputed territories by February 24, 1992.¹⁴ By this way the United States created a direct link between an economic need of Israel to halting of settlements which would eliminate an important source of conflict in the dispute.

The United States’ **sticks or withholding carrots policy**, aiming to change the policy of Israel over settlements, did not lead to the expected outcome until the

victory of the Labour Party headed by Yitzak Rabin over the Likud. The Rabin government which was supported by the United States administration due to its flexible views on the peace process, announced a freeze on new building contracts by Israel on July 16, 1992.¹⁵ Following this move, the United States stopped withholding the carrots and agreed to grant \$ 10 billion in loan guarantees to Israel.¹⁶ The mediator's **manipulative tactics** over the settlement issue resulted in a change in the actions of Israel.

The deportation policy of Israel against the Palestinians constituted another issue that created pauses during the process. The Bush administration had used **sticks** against Israel and therefore acted as a **manipulator** by not vetoing the two United Nations Security Council Resolutions condemning Israel's deportation decisions of Palestinians, on March 27, 1991 and January 6, 1992 respectively.¹⁷

United States under the Clinton administration, continued to support the negotiation process by acquiring the roles ranging from facilitator to manipulator. United States assumed the role of **facilitator** in the sense of **formulator** by presenting proposals in an attempt to achieve a difference in the perceptions of the parties during bilateral talks, held under the framework of the Madrid Process. For example, the United States offered different versions of draft proposals on the Palestinian authority in disputed territories.¹⁸ However, it was the secret Norwegian mediation that secured the Declaration of Principles between the two adversaries. On the other hand, it is necessary to stress that the United States had an impact over this outcome by tacitly working on the perceptions of Yasser Arafat, in other words by assuming the role of **formulator**. Having knowledge about the Oslo clandestine

meetings, the United States Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, deliberately gave the impression that Israel and Syria were heading towards an agreement during his shuttle diplomacy. Alarmed over the prospect of repeating the Israeli-Egyptian experience of Camp David Accord, Arafat moved quickly towards the agreement.¹⁹

Following the Oslo Accord, the United States mostly continued to leave the Israelis and Palestinians negotiate directly, in line with Israel's demand, without being present in the negotiation room.²⁰ The mediator enabled a difficult process keep going. The United States intervened at times when the process came across impasses. In the aftermath of the tension created by Israel's decision to build new settlements in the West Bank, and by a series of suicide bombings against Israelis in 1995, the process started to falter and eventually the talks collapsed. The United States swiftly organised a meeting for the parties so as to bring the parties together and resume the talks, in other words acted as a **facilitator**. During this meeting, the United States pressurised the Palestinians to take necessary actions against terrorism and at the same time offered important financial benefits to them in order to ease their severe economic difficulties.²¹ Therefore, by using **carrots and sticks policy** the mediator changed the stream of the conflict and restored the peace process. In sum, it can be regarded as manipulated the process.

The mediator tried to act as a **manipulator** by using its resources as the sole superpower when the peace process was endangered due to a series of bombings by the Islamic extremists in March 1996. In order to protect the process, the United States pledged to provide a kind of advanced technology against terrorism to Israel which was a **carrots** policy.²² The United States also arranged an anti-terrorism

summit in an attempt to give political backing to the advocator of the peace process, the prime minister of Israel, Shimon Peres. Peres seemed to be losing his domestic backing due to an increase in the terrorist activities and facing an early election against his main adversary, the hard-liner Benjamin Netanyahu.²³ The mediator tried to influence the dynamics of the conflict by making it clear that the United States with its whole economic, military and political superiority threw its full support behind the peace process and therefore behind Peres.

Communication channels were not always open throughout the process. For example, stemming from the tension in the aftermath of the Hebron massacre in February 1994²⁴ and from the stubborn position of the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu against opening a direct channel with the Palestinian National Authority,²⁵ the United States acted as a **communicator** for a while between the parties.

The United States can not be regarded neutral throughout the process stemming from the fact that it had certain preferences concerning the outcome of the process. For example, the United States did not favour a Palestinian state in the region,²⁶ was opposing Israel's settlement policy in the disputed territories,²⁷ and the redivision of Jerusalem²⁸.

Commenting on the mediator's impartiality necessitates analysing the stances of the two United States administrations, namely the Bush and the Clinton administration separately. During the Bush administration, viewed as the most pro-Arab of post-War United States presidents, the mediator may be regarded as having

acted in a relatively balanced way in comparison to the Clinton administration which has been regarded as pro-Israeli.²⁹

The Bush administration pursued almost **a balanced policy** towards both parties. It severely pressurised Israel against the latter's settlement policy in the disputed lands in 1991,³⁰ and used its leverage in the United Nations Security Council in favour of a resolution condemning Israel for its deportation policy in 1992.³¹ However, the mediator was not continuously on the Palestinian side. In order to convene the Conference, it also pressurised the Palestinians to get some concessions over the main rules of the Conference.³² On the other hand, it might be thought that the United States would mostly have sided with the Palestinians, taking into consideration the fact that they were the weak side. But the Bush administration's domestic concerns, like securing the Jewish votes in the 1992 general elections, had also made an impact over some of its decisions which are viewed as biased by the Arabs. For example, it urged the United Nations to abrogate "Zionism is racism" article³³ and promised to help the Israelis "maintain their qualitative edge" in conventional arms.³⁴

The Clinton administration has clearly pursued **a partial policy** in favour of Israel. In the aftermath of a deportation crisis which stalled the negotiations in 1993, the mediator prevented the United Nations Security Council from imposing sanctions against Israel.³⁵ The United States pressured the Palestinians, the injured party, to come to the negotiation table following the Hebron massacre during which forty Palestinian worshippers were killed by an Israeli settler³⁶. However, it immediately issued an executive order to freeze the assets of twelve Middle East

terrorist groups in the United States after twenty-one Israelis were killed in a suicide bomb attack by the Islamic Jihad.³⁷ The United States did not pursue a similar action in similar crises in which both the Palestinians and the Israelis were victims. Following an Israeli decision to approve new settlements in East Jerusalem in 1997, the United States considered the action as complicating the situation³⁸ but vetoed a United Nations Security Council Resolution labelling the Israeli decision illegal and a threat to the Middle East process.³⁹ Although the Clinton administration has generally pursued a **pro-Israeli stance**, it has sometimes stood by the Palestinian side in an effort not to lose the process, facing conservative policies of the Netanyahu government. For example, following Netanyahu's rejection of Clinton's request to delay the above mentioned settlements, the United States decided to attend an international forum, organised by Yasser Arafat, to which Israel was not invited in March, 1997.⁴⁰

3.2.4 TIMING OF THE MEDIATOR

The time was definitely **ripe** for the United States to intervene, for various reasons. First of all, the Cold-War which led to the two superpower rivalries in several parts of the world, including the Middle East had come to an end.⁴¹ Some Arab states' "big brother", the Soviet Union's influence was eliminated to a considerable degree with the end of the Cold-War. Moreover, the Gulf War alliance in which the Arabs and Israelis stood side by side, resulted in a great prestige for the United States in the eyes of the moderate Arab states,⁴² an important feature which lacked previously.

There was a **hurting stalemate situation** concerning the parties. The Israelis were living with terrorism since the intifada broke out in 1987. The Palestinians had become aware of the fact that violence did not bring statehood and therefore were ready for a political channel. Besides, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation faced diplomatic isolation and severe economic difficulties as a result of its support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War.⁴³ It was looking for a way that could break this deadlock. As a consequence, the parties' need in a negotiation process in addition to the conducive international atmosphere, made the timing ripe for the United States' intervention.

3.2.5 ENTRY OF THE MEDIATOR

The United States was invited to intervene in the Arab-Israeli conflict by some Arab countries present in the Gulf alliance, to help them organise a peace conference on the Middle East in the aftermath of the Gulf War.⁴⁴ Besides, it had certain stakes that required the convention of such a conference, like achieving stability in the region. Consequently, the United States entered into the dispute by announcing its initiative on March 1, 1991.

Concerning gaining acceptance from the parties, the United States' initiative was welcomed by the Palestinians. However, the Israelis viewed it with a little concern due to the initiative's "land for peace" formula, although they, too, accepted the initiative.⁴⁵

Throughout the process, some changes occurred in the perceptions of the parties about the mediator. The United States' pressure over Israel about its

settlement policy in the disputed lands during late 1991 and early 1992 led to accusations of anti-Semitism against President George Bush.⁴⁶ The Clinton administration's inability to take tough actions against Israel unlike the Bush administration, caused reactions from the Palestinian side especially after the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as the Israeli prime minister.⁴⁷ However, such changes in perceptions did not lead to a declaration demanding exclusion of the United States from the process.

3.2.6 CHANGES REALISED

The most significant change as a result of the United States' intervention was achieving the beginning of a negotiation process between the long time adversaries. Getting them around a negotiation table constituted a remarkable change considering the fact that there was no direct communication between Israel and the Palestinians since 1967.

When the United States intervened to organise a conference, the weak party was the Palestinian side. They were the ones deprived of their lands in the aftermath of the 1967 War, having no economic, military and political power. For this reason, the Palestinians' **relative power was increased** due to being called for a Middle East Peace Conference, especially after the Gulf War isolation. Bush administration's firm attitude against Israel's settlement policy had further empowered the Palestinians in 1991. Besides, the United States voted in favour of a United Nations Security Council Resolution condemning Israel because of its deportation policy in 1992. Therefore, it would not be wrong to state that the United States under the Bush administration mostly empowered the weak side against the

stronger side. However, this increase in the relative power of the Palestinians did not lead to an agreement.

The same empowerment in favour of the Palestinians can not be seen during the Clinton administration. In contrast, it was the Israeli side that has been empowered. United States acted in favour of Israel within the United Nations Security Council in the aftermath of several crises like the deportation crisis of 1993, the land expropriation crisis of 1995, the tunnel crisis of 1996 and the settlement crisis of 1997. United States indicated that there was an important source of power in favour of Israel in the Security Council. United States, sometimes increased the power of the Palestinians as well, like attending a regional conference to which Israel was not invited following the settlement crisis of 1997. Nevertheless, it was considerably less in comparison to **Israel's empowerment**.

The most important policy change was the parties' recognition of one another following the signing of the Declaration of Principles of 1993. Israel changed its policy of no communication with "the Arab population of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza"⁴⁸ and the Palestinian National Council repealed the clauses in its Charter calling for the destruction of Israel and guerrilla warfare against the Jewish state.⁴⁹ Another important policy change by Israel was agreeing to withdraw its troops from the Gaza Strip and certain parts of the West Bank which constituted, from then, the self-rule areas of the Palestinian National Authority. In particular, the Likud which has been the ruling party in Israel since 1996, abandoned its ideology of Greater Israel by signing the Hebron Deal of 1997.⁵⁰ Moreover, the prime

minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, softened his attitude over the creation of a Palestinian state.⁵¹

As a consequence of the process, there was a **redistribution of resources**, like land. The Palestinians started to exert self-rule over the Gaza Strip and several cities of the West Bank.⁵² Moreover, the parties received certain resources ranging from intangible to tangible during the peace process. The most important psychological benefit extended to the Palestinians under the Bush administration was being recognised as a people by the world and having the tacit leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation to negotiate on their behalf.⁵³ On the other side, the Bush administration's clear influence in favour of Israel within the Security Council, the repeal of "Zionism is racism" article by the United Nations with the United States' urging constituted important intangible resources available to Israel.

The parties had also the chance to benefit from tangible resources during the United States' mediation. Israel received military aid like jets and missiles under the Bush administration⁵⁴ and advanced technology against terrorism under the Clinton administration⁵⁵ other than its usual \$ 3 billion a year. The Palestinians achieved a channel of financial capital through a donor conference organised by the United States under the Bush administration.⁵⁶ Besides, they received the United States' preferential trade treatment to imports from the Palestinian self-rule areas under the Clinton administration.⁵⁷

At the time of intervention there was **an overt conflict** stemming from the intifada. For this reason, Israel's main motive to go to the negotiation table was to

free itself from violence. However, terrorist actions continued to take place after the United States' intervention, but this time were directed against the peace process. The Islamic extremists, namely Hamas and the Islamic Jihad launched several terrorist activities in Israel for the collapse of the process. Moreover, public opinion in Israel started to show frustration about the process, because of the continuous violence. Therefore, it can not be stated that the mediation effort of the United States led to a decrease in overt conflict, let alone to an end.

The United States' entrance into the conflict as a mediator did not lead to an important change in **the duration of the conflict**. However, the mediator's insistent attitude towards the parties had sometimes shortened the process to resume the talks or to achieve an agreement, like it happened in resuming talks after the tunnel crisis of 1996⁵⁸ and in the Hebron Deal of 1997.⁵⁹

The United States guided the parties to establish **ongoing mechanisms** for different purposes. For example, after a series of terrorist activities in early 1996, the United States organised an anti-terrorism summit in Sharm el-Shaikh, to be followed up later on.⁶⁰ Moreover, a high level joint committee concerning economic and political issues would be established between the Palestinian National Authority and United States.⁶¹

The peace process which was produced as a result of the United States' intervention led to an immense **media** attention. From the beginning of the process, the media showed remarkable interest. The White House ceremony of 1993 and 1995, several suicide bomb attacks by the Islamic Jihad and Hamas, the

assassination of Yitzak Rabin by an Israeli extremist, the election of Benjamin Netanyahu were important headlines in the media. Besides, such an interest brought about a global awareness concerning the conflict which previously lacked.

The fifth chapter will reveal the findings derived from the analysis of the United States mediation in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

CHAPTER IV

US MEDIATION IN HAITIAN CONFLICT

4.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected the President of Haiti on 16 December 1990. He was Haiti's first freely elected president and had taken office in February 1991. Aristide was ousted and forced into exile after a military coup led by General Raoul Cedras, on September 30, 1991

Immediately after the coup, Haiti under the rule of a military led government had become subject to economic sanctions of the United States. Under the influence of the United States, the Organisation of American States also imposed a trade embargo by which the de facto Haitian government accepted mediation of the Organisation of American States. However, these economic sanctions acted as a double-edged sword due to the worsening economic conditions in Haiti when boats full of Haitians started to flee to the United States.

Despite its leverage firmly fortified by the United States, the Organisation of American States' mediation could not produce the expected outcome. Consequently, the United States, under the Clinton administration, enabled the

intervention of the United Nations as a mediator. The outcome of this mediation was the Governor's Island Agreement between Aristide and Cedras, brokered by the United Nations and the Organisation of American States, on July 3, 1993. However, as the army and police sponsored violence continued inside the country and blocked Aristide's return to Haiti, the agreement had become unenforceable. The United Nations, particularly under the influence of the United States, reimposed the economic sanctions which were suspended due to the signing of the agreement, but this did not result in the restoration of Aristide to power.

It is imperative to state that it would be an oversimplification to accept the Organisation of American States and later on accompanied by the United Nations as mediators. Since, from the very beginning of the dispute, the United States acted as the third party who intervened in an influential manner. Although it did not prefer to launch a peace initiative unilaterally, stemming from its previous, unpopular interventions in the area, the United States was the "concealed mediator" during **the first stage** of the mediation attempts.

Following the failure of the Governor's Island Agreement, the United States intervened more "visibly" and gradually increased the quality of pressure over the military junta, like getting the United Nations to extend its sanctions and trying to deter the junta through threats of military invasion by the United States. **The second stage** of the mediation attempts started when the United States, convinced that even tougher economic sanctions did not make the expected impact, sent a last-chance delegation led by the former president Jimmy Carter to Haiti. While Carter's role in the mediation was continuing, Clinton ordered the dispatch of a number of United

States fleet carrying American soldiers to Haiti. Eventually, the imminent danger of invasion by the United States, accompanied by Carter's appeasing attitude towards General Cedras paved the way to an agreement between the United States and the military junta on September 18, 1994. On September 19, 1994 the United States soldiers started to occupy Haiti to compel the junta to keep their word and assist the country in its journey to restoration of democracy. Consequently, President Aristide returned on October 15, 1994 to Haiti and a new government was formed on November 8, 1994.

4.2 ANALYSIS

4.2.1 POWER OF THE MEDIATOR

As it is cited in the previous section, the Haitian case can be analysed in two stages: The first stage and the second stage mediation. In the first stage mediation attempt, the United States had a concealed mediator role and in the second stage of the mediation attempt, the United States had sent Carter as its representative to Haiti.

In this context, during the first stage, the power of the mediator stemmed from its being the superpower with its overwhelming political, economic and military preponderance. Its remarkable leverage within the international organisations, like the Organisation of American States and the United Nations made a considerable impact and changed the structure of the conflict. The United States, drew these two international organisations into the picture and directed their impact over the dispute, like the imposition¹, extension² and eventually the globalisation of economic sanctions.³

However, the power of the United States against the military junta had started to erode as the dispute continued, because of a series of reasons. First of all, the devastating impact of the economic sanctions was only felt by the ordinary, poor Haitian citizens, not by the military junta. It took nineteen months to impose sanctions that would be particularly harmful to the junta which by that time formed a structure for surviving under the sanctions.⁴ Secondly, the actions and therefore credibility of the United States were also affected due to its domestic concerns. For example, the Bush administration eased the economic sanctions against Haiti when it became subject to the pressure of an American business elite⁵ and the administration pressured Aristide because of its need to have an end to the refugee crisis.⁶ Such actions clearly led to the encouragement of the military junta which eventually was not deterred by numerous threats of military invasion by the United States.

The mediator's power over Aristide was limited as well, though it achieved some changes on the stubborn attitude of Aristide. This limit stemmed from the fact that Aristide was the democratically elected but ousted president of Haiti. The United States, labelling itself as the defender of democracy could not exert much pressure on the ousted president.

In the second stage, the power of the mediator came mostly from its representative Carter's good relations with Cedras and Aristide. Both had confidence in Carter and even had asked for his mediation efforts at the beginning of the conflict.⁷

The mediator's second source of power depended on its being a superpower. The United States' military blockade around Haiti continued while the former president of the United States, Carter, was negotiating with the junta. Carter made it very clear that the invasion was imminent and a massive military force of the United States, whose mission could cause physical harm to the families of the junta and the army.⁸ The apparent existence of such a blockade around the island constituted an important source of power for the mediator. The confidence felt towards Carter enabled the junta to comprehend that an invasion was really imminent if they did not step down and that this was not a bluff.

4.2.2 STAKES OF THE MEDIATOR

The stakes that made the United States enter as a third party proliferated throughout the dispute. Chronologically speaking, its first stake was to restore democracy in Haiti in an effort not to set a bad precedent to potential threats to the other democratic states in the backyard of the United States. Both the Bush administration⁹ and Clinton administration¹⁰ underscored the significance of this factor for the United States.

Chronologically the second but as for its quality, the primary stake of the United States was to eliminate the refugee problem caused by the conflict. The forcible repatriation policy towards the refugees which was started by the Bush administration¹¹ and continued to be applied by the Clinton administration, faced criticisms from domestic and international arena. Clinton was even accused of being racist¹² due to this policy.

The last but as crucial as the previous stake of the mediator was to restore its loss of credibility in the eyes of the military junta. The ineffectiveness of the economic sanctions against the coup leaders and its supporters, repatriation policy, implicit signals to the junta by the United States that Aristide was not much trusted¹³ had resulted in a loss of credibility for the United States.¹⁴ These **defensive motives** that seem to be perceived as threatening the national interest of the United States, were the driving force behind the mediator's actions. During the second stage of the mediation attempt the stakes of the mediator did not show any changes.

4.2.3 ROLES PLAYED BY THE MEDIATOR

The United States, as the concealed mediator of the first stage had mostly acquired the role of **manipulator** by changing the structure of the conflict drastically. It enabled the beginning of the mediation process which was previously rejected by the military junta. By imposing economic sanctions over Haiti¹⁵ and using its influence within the Organisation of American States to do the same,¹⁶ the United States paved the way for negotiations which had started under the framework of the Organisation of American States.

The United States had also manipulated the course of events by offering **carrots and sticks**. For example, the Clinton administration offered **carrots** like, giving \$ 50 million in non-lethal aid to the military in January 1993¹⁷ and \$ 1 billion project for the revitalization of the Haitian economy in March 1993 if the junta agreed to step down.¹⁸ However, as the junta did not show positive signs for the expected outcome and refused to negotiate, the United States used its leverage within the United Nations for a global oil and arms embargo against Haiti.¹⁹ Such a

sticks policy manipulated the process and restarted the negotiations²⁰ which ended up with the Governor's Island Agreement, on July 3, 1993. The United Nations' sanctions, which were suspended in accordance with the agreement, were resumed upon the recommendation of the United States²¹ when the junta did not honour the agreement. However, reimposing **the sticks** did not bear fruit despite the fact that they were fortified by a United Nations' approval for a military invasion of Haiti by the United States.²²

The mediator had also acquired the role of **formulator** by making specific proposals for the resolution of the conflict. For example, as part of the negotiations held under the framework of the United Nations and the Organisation of American States, the United States proposed the deployment of an international police force to oversee transition to democracy in Haiti.²³ Another example for its formulator role in an attempt to influence perceptions of the parties was realised during the early 1994. The United States' proposal was to find a compromise solution to the problem, but this was rejected by Aristide.²⁴

The United States, as the concealed mediator of the first stage, can also be regarded as a **communicator**, on the grounds that it, despite in an implicit manner, enabled the beginning of the indirect negotiations between Aristide and the junta.

In the second stage of the mediation, the United States can be regarded as having manipulated the dispute by creating a military blockade around Haiti during Carter's negotiation with the junta since the blockade changed the dynamics of the conflict. Moreover, Carter, as the representative of the United States, acquired the

role of **communicator**. He carried the message that an invasion was imminent. He may also be viewed as having acted as a **formulator** working on the perceptions of the junta that an invasion was imminent.

In the first stage, the mediator can not be accepted as neutral, because it had a certain, specified solution to the dispute: Securing democracy in its backyard through restoring Aristide to power²⁵ and ending the Haitian refugee flood to its own territory.²⁶ Since the United States had these preferences concerning the resolution of the dispute, it can not be regarded as a neutral mediator.

United States can not be accepted as an impartial mediator either. From the very beginning of the conflict its position was clear. It demanded an end to the coup and eventually the return of the ousted president Aristide to power. For this reason, throughout the process it mostly sided with Aristide. For instance, the United States immediately suspended its military and economic aid to Haiti,²⁷ encouraged the Organisation of American States to take a similar action,²⁸ called the United Nations to impose a worldwide oil and arms embargo on Haiti,²⁹ urged the United Nations to reimpose the global embargo for the application of the Governor's Island Agreement,³⁰ and tried to deter the junta through a series of threats of invasion³¹.

However, the United States had sometimes pressured Aristide and therefore can be regarded as having sided with the junta. For example, the Bush administration, in an effort to solve the conflict before the general elections in November 1992, pressured Aristide to meet and therefore recognise the military backed prime minister of Haiti, Marc Bazin.³² The Clinton administration also

pressurised Aristide to grant amnesty to the military in an effort to secure the enforcement of the Governor's Island Agreement which had become inapplicable due to Cedras' amnesty demand.³³ Furthermore, Aristide accepted to meet a Haitian delegation under the pressure of the United States in early 1994.³⁴ However, it is imperative to state that the main motive behind these scarce pressures over Aristide was to put an end to the conflict through restoring him to power. The United States' main position did not change, but it tried to achieve some minor alterations in Aristide's position in order to resolve the conflict quickly. For this reason, the United States was mostly **biased** towards Aristide throughout the conflict.

During the second stage of the mediation, the United States can not be regarded as neutral because it continued to pursue the same stakes. As for its impartiality, although there was a relative increase in the power of the junta as a result of the second stage mediation, the United States can be accepted as **partial** towards Aristide stemming from the fact that there was a blockade around Haiti while Carter's negotiation continued.

4.2.4 TIMING OF THE MEDIATOR

The United States' manipulative actions³⁵ with the aim of paving the way for the Organisation of American States' mediation attempt can be viewed as being early. The parties, particularly the junta had not yet started suffering from the consequences of the conflict. Besides, the economic sanctions were solely affecting the ordinary Haitian people rather than the coup leaders and their supporters. Being the ousted president of a country, Aristide was also in a rigid position. The conflict

had not reached the hurting stalemate situation when the United States started its manipulative actions.

The timing of the second stage mediation can be regarded as **ripe**. The conflict had reached its third year by the time Carter's role in the mediation started. Throughout the second stage of the mediation attempt the pressure of the United States and that of the international community particularly over the junta continued. The pressures had reached their peak point, like the imposition of a global embargo by the United Nations, freezing of the coup leaders' assets and threats of an imminent United States' invasion to Haiti. Aristide who had been waiting to be reinstated for three years was also under the pressure from the United States, though it took place rarely. There was a **hurting stalemate situation**. For this reason, the timing of the second stage mediation was right and eventually avoided an imminent invasion.

4.2.5 ENTRY OF THE MEDIATOR

The United States, as the concealed mediator, was not invited to solve the conflict by any of the parties. Its interests such as, protecting a democracy in its backyard and eliminating the refugee crisis forced the United States to intervene as a third party to the dispute. Therefore, in the first stage the mediator's entry can be regarded as **imposed** on the parties. Aristide, the weaker party in the dispute, was in need of the United States' support. For this reason, he welcomed the intervention of the United States and its contribution to internationalise the matter through the Organisation of American States and the United Nations. However, Aristide had sometimes hardened his attitude towards the United States during the dispute. For

example, Aristide had become critical about the Bush administration's forcible repatriation policy of the Haitian refugees and its decision to ease economic sanctions on Haiti in favour of the American businessmen.³⁶ There was also tension between Aristide and the United States under the Clinton administration when the former rejected the proposals prepared by the United States to break the impasse between the ousted president and the military junta in February and March, 1994.³⁷

In the second stage, the entry of the mediator can be regarded as an accepted one, in the figure of Carter. Aristide had asked the Carter Centre to mediate at the outset of the dispute.³⁸ Besides, the coup leader General Cedras had asked for Carter's mediation to avoid a United States military invasion of Haiti.³⁹ These acceptances enabled the Clinton administration to try a last-ditch attempt.

4.2.6 CHANGES REALISED

Although it was the second stage mediation that achieved the expected changes, like the reinstatement of Aristide and stepping down of the junta, there were some changes realised during the first stage mediation attempt as well.

The most striking change is related with **the duration of the conflict**. The first stage mediation can be regarded as having extended the duration of the conflict. The primary reason behind this was the United States' loss of credibility in the eyes of the junta because it sent contradictory signals during the dispute. For instance, economic sanctions imposed by the United States in October 1991⁴⁰ were eased in order to protect the interests of the American businessmen in February, 1992⁴¹. Moreover, the United States' pressure over Aristide was also encouraging the junta

not to step down. Under the Clinton administration, Aristide was forced to grant an amnesty to the military which was a point that he had previously rejected.⁴² Besides, the ineffectiveness of the economic sanctions which were harming only the poor Haitians had also contributed to this loss of credibility and therefore caused prolongation of the conflict.

Being deprived of his power and living in exile, Aristide was the weaker party of the dispute. On the other hand, the junta was relatively more powerful, because it held the power in Haiti through its military and police force. From the beginning, the United States generally sided with the weaker party and tried to empower him, by suspending economic aid to Haiti and refusing to recognise the military junta on October 1, 1991; by freezing all Haitian government assets in the United States;⁴³ and influencing the Organisation of American States to impose a trade embargo on Haiti. Another example of **empowering the weaker side** was realised when the military regime in Haiti ratified the formation of a new civilian government on May 11, 1994. The United States immediately declared the new government illegal and cancelled the visas of all nominated ministers.⁴⁴

In the first stage, the mediator had sometimes played the card in favour of the military junta in order to compel Aristide not to block the way leading to a resolution. For example, it pressurised Aristide over granting amnesty to the coup leaders in October, 1993 and it forced the ousted president to meet the junta backed de-facto prime minister Marc Bazin in June 1992. The United States had even welcomed an alternative set of proposals prepared by an ad-hoc anti-Aristide congressional “crisis committee”.⁴⁵ However, throughout the dispute, the United

States can be considered as mostly **increased the relative power** of Aristide in comparison to the junta's.

In comparison with the previous mediation attempt, the power of the junta was relatively increased during the second stage mediation. For example Carter denounced claims that Cedras was a dictator.⁴⁶ Moreover, the agreement had provided the junta "honourable retirement"⁴⁷ by which Carter tried to change Cedras' image in the public opinion which was tarnished due to well publicised human rights abuses during the first stage mediation attempt. However, when the big picture is observed, there was an overt **empowerment** of Aristide as there was a military blockade around Haiti while Carter was negotiating.

During the dispute, the United States mostly tried to change the intransigent position of the military junta by offering some tangible and intangible **resources**. The intangible and the most important resource was granting amnesty to the military leaders by Aristide if the junta agreed to step down, in October 1993. Among the tangible ones, United States offered to give \$ 50 million in nonlethal military aid and a \$ 1 billion grant over five years to the Haitian military. In the first stage, the mediator's only resource for Aristide could be his reinstatement which was realised as a result of the second stage mediation.

When the United States intervened through economic means, there was oppression over the supporters of Aristide by the military. Since the coup, the military and the police force tightened control in Haiti by enforcing curfews and arresting pro-Aristide Haitians.⁴⁸ The military junta had the control of the Haitian

National Assembly by way of using brute force. Its armed soldiers had pressurised the law makers to declare the presidency vacant on October 7, 1991.⁴⁹ During September 1992, there was an escalation of violence towards the Aristide nominated Malval government by the military leaders and opponents of Aristide. Moreover, a joint United Nations-Organisation of American States observer mission in Haiti charged the Haitian military of committing “numerous and grave” human rights abuses in 1993. The aim of the junta was to erase traces of Aristide. For this reason, despite the fact that there was an **increase in violence** during the conflict, it can not be argued that it was a result of the intervention.

At the outset of the dispute, the junta’s position was to rule out any possibility to start negotiations on the reinstatement of Aristide. However, with the imposition of sanctions on Haiti, the junta changed its position and agreed to negotiate. Therefore, the Organisation of American States’ mediation attempt started as a consequence of the United States’ intervention.

During the dispute, there were some **changes** in the **positions** of the parties as a result of the first stage mediation, though they did not lead to an agreement in the end. For example Aristide, under the pressure of the United States, agreed to meet the military backed de-facto prime minister Marc Bazin in 1992. Such a change in his position paved the way for the resumption of negotiations.

Another important change stemming from the first stage mediation was the signing of the Governor’s Island Agreement in July 1993. The junta was blocking important diplomatic activities which aimed to solve the dispute for a long time. In

an effort to force the junta to come to the negotiation table, the United States called the United Nations to impose a worldwide arms and oil embargo over Haiti. As a result of these sanctions, the junta agreed to negotiate. During the negotiation, the junta had also agreed on a timetable for Aristide's return under the pressure of the United States.⁵⁰

The second stage mediation paved the way for important changes over the dispute. As **an ongoing mechanism**, transition to a democratic rule was secured. The democratically elected president was restored to power. In exchange for Aristide's reinstatement, the military junta got amnesty including all military leaders involved in the coup. This transfer constituted an important **position change** for Aristide who was previously insisting on punishment or exile, let alone amnesty, for the coup leaders. Moreover, this exchange led to **the redistribution of main resources**, like power and amnesty. Aristide, reattained his power and the military junta saved their lives from being lynched with the help of amnesty. The agreement which was achieved as an outcome of the second stage mediation led to **the international recognition** of Aristide's presidency and **the cessation of hostilities** which ruled throughout the process.

The following chapter presents the major findings derived from the three mediation cases.

CHAPTER V

FINDINGS

Based on the above analysis, the following is an account of the major findings. A summary of the findings is also presented in Table 1.

5.1 POWER OF THE MEDIATOR

Regarding the power of the mediator in the Bosnian conflict the United States had two main sources of power: Its being a world power and its previous successful mediation attempt of 1994.

Similarly, in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the United States' status in the international arena following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War victory were its main sources of power.

For the Haitian conflict, in the first stage, the power of the mediator, that is of the United States, stemmed from being the superpower of the world. In the second stage, together with its being the superpower, confidential relations of its representative Carter with General Cedras and the ousted president Aristide in addition to his credibility were sources of the mediator's power.

5.2 STAKES OF THE MEDIATOR

The primary stake of the United States about the Bosnian conflict was domestic which was related with the coming elections of November 1993. Its secondary concerns were to straighten the damaged prestige of the United States as a consequence of the downfall of the United Nations' safe-havens and to try not to lose its influence in the region.

For the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, all the concerns of the United States were primary. In this sense, its access to the Middle Eastern oil and its objective of securing stability with low cost in the region may be considered as the stakes of the mediator.

Like in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the United States' concerns were all primary for the Haitian conflict. Its stakes were securing democracy in its backyard, eliminating the refugee problem and restoring its lost credibility during the conflict.

5.3 ROLES PLAYED BY THE MEDIATOR

During the Bosnian conflict, the United States played several roles like manipulator while pioneering NATO air strikes and imposing deadlines on the Dayton talks. It was also a formulator in the sense of overcoming procedural difficulties and reducing outside pressure during the Dayton talks. The United States had also acted as a communicator among the parties during Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke's shuttle diplomacy.

During the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, the United States had experienced two different administrations, the Bush Administration and the Clinton Administration, respectively. United States under the Bush administration acquired the role of manipulator in its above mentioned sticks policy against Israel's settlement policy in the disputed territories, and in its negative attitude against the Israeli deportation policy within the United Nations Security Council. It also acted as a formulator by working on the perceptions of the parties and by reducing outside pressure during the Madrid process. Under the same administration, the United States had become a communicator through the United States Secretary of State, James Baker's shuttle diplomacy between the parties.

United States under the Clinton administration was also a manipulator during its pressure forcing Arafat to crackdown on the terroristic activities against Israel. It acted as a formulator by presenting draft proposals on the Palestinian authority to the parties during the bilateral talks in the Madrid Process. During the Clinton Administration the United States was also a communicator between the parties for a time in the aftermath of the Hebron massacre of 1994.

During the Haitian conflict, in the first stage mediation attempt, the United States acted as a manipulator by imposing economic sanctions over the junta and moving the Organisation of American States to act along the same lines. Besides, it had become a formulator by presenting a proposal for the deployment of an international police force to assist transition to democracy in Haiti. In addition, the United States acquired the role of communicator through creating an indirect communication channel between the junta and Aristide.

In the second stage, the United States acted as a manipulator with its military blockade around Haiti. Besides, Carter, as the representative of the United States, acted as a communicator by carrying the United States' message of imminent invasion to Haiti. Carter had also acquired the role of formulator by convincing the junta that a United States invasion was imminent.

Concerning the neutrality of a mediator, the United States can not be accepted as neutral in neither case because of the fact that it had certain preferences concerning the resolution of these conflicts. For the Bosnian conflict, the United States' preference was to secure a resolution that would punish the Bosnian Serbs. Concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the United States' resolution to the conflict was not favouring a Palestinian state in the region. Another preference was its objection to the Israeli settlement policy in the disputed territories and to the redivision of Jerusalem. For the Haitian conflict, the United States preferred a resolution that would restore democracy in Haiti and end the refugee problem.

In the Bosnian conflict, regarding the impartiality of a mediator, the United States can not be accepted as an impartial mediator due to siding mostly with the Bosnian Muslims against the Bosnian Serbs. Because it strengthened the positions of the Bosnian Muslims, threatened to launch renewed NATO air strikes if the Bosnian Serbs attacked the United Nations safe-havens despite the cease-fire agreement, and overlooked the Muslim-Croat offensive against the Bosnian Serbs in an effort to let the former get the upperhand.

In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the United States under the Bush administration may be regarded as mostly impartial towards the parties. While pressuring Israel for its settlement policy over the disputed territories and criticising its deportation policy in 1992, the United States had also pressurised the Palestinians during the negotiations over the main rules of the Conference.

On the other hand, the United States under the Clinton administration can not be accepted as an impartial mediator as it acted mostly to Israel's advantage. Preventing the imposition of sanctions against Israel by the United Nations Security Council in the aftermath of a deportation crisis in 1993 and blocking a United Nations Security Council Resolution criticising an Israeli settlement decision in East Jerusalem in 1997, may be cited as examples that demonstrate the partial policy of the United States under the Clinton administration.

During the Haitian conflict, the United States was not an impartial mediator either. The United States had mostly sided with the ousted President Aristide by imposing economic sanctions against Haiti under the rule of military junta, calling the United Nations to impose a worldwide oil and arms embargo over this Caribbean country and also threatened to invade it. The United States had sometimes pressurised Aristide as well, such as forcing him to grant amnesty to the military in 1993. Nevertheless, the United States can be regarded as mostly having sided with Aristide throughout the conflict. Likewise, during the second stage mediation, the United States can not be viewed as an impartial mediator as Carter was negotiating while a United States' blockade was executed.

5.4 TIMING OF THE MEDIATOR

In the Bosnian conflict, the timing of the mediator can be viewed as ripe due to the successful Croat offensive against the Bosnian Serbs and the parties' need for a solution. The timely United States initiative, based on the notion of 51% - 49% was further strengthened with another timely intervention which was NATO air strikes.

For the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the timing of the United States was definitely ripe as Soviet influence over the Middle East was drastically diminished with the dissolution of the Soviet Union; the prestige of the United States was risen as a consequence of the Gulf War Alliance and the parties were in need of a resolution for this long-lasting dispute.

Regarding the Haitian conflict, the timing of the first stage mediation can be regarded as having been early. The negotiations which started off under pressure of sanctions pioneered by the United States, began early because the parties, particularly the junta, were not at the hurting stalemate situation. On the other hand, the timing of the second stage mediation was ripe. The parties were facing the hurting stalemate situation. The assets of the junta were frozen, a global embargo was imposed by the United Nations against Haiti. For Aristide, it had been three years since he was ousted.

5.5 ENTRY OF THE MEDIATOR

For the Bosnian conflict, the entry of the mediator, the United States, can be viewed as having gained acceptance from the parties to the dispute. In the same way, the

entry of the United States to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was an invited one, and therefore was welcomed by the parties. On the other hand, the United States' entry to the Haitian conflict at the first stage mediation can be regarded as having been imposed but, the second stage mediation gained the acceptance of both parties.

5.6 CHANGES REALISED

Regarding the Bosnian conflict, the mediator had firstly intensified **the overt conflict** via NATO air strikes and then tried to diminish the state of war by a cease-fire agreement, and consequently achieved an end to the state of war with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

As for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, **the overt conflict**, intifada, which was present before the mediation attempt did not cease to exist with the beginning of the initiative, on the contrary it worked against the peace process. Therefore, the mediation attempt did not lead to a change in the state of overt conflict.

In the Haitian conflict, oppression of the pro-Aristide people by the military had already been present when the first stage mediation began. As time went by, this oppression turned out to be **an overt conflict** and resulted in a joint United Nations-Organisation of American States observer mission in Haiti. However, such a change can not be regarded as a consequence of the first stage mediation but the product of inner dynamics of the conflict, itself. On the other hand, the second stage mediation can be viewed as having put an end to overt conflict.

Regarding the Bosnian conflict, **the relative power** of the weak side, the Muslim-Croat side, was increased through realising NATO air strikes, supporting their arguments and offering to arm and train the Federation following the Dayton Agreement by the mediator. The mediator had sometimes increased the power of the Bosnian Serbs as well, like agreeing to give them the name of Republika Srpska. However, the United States can be regarded as having increased the relative power of the Muslim-Croat side throughout the process.

For the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, **the relative power** of the weak side, the Palestinians against the Israelis was increased under the Bush administration. The mediator empowered the Palestinians through inviting them to an international conference, criticising Israel's settlement and deportation policies. The United States under the Bush administration had sometimes empowered the Israelis as well, such as supplying jets and missiles and helping for the repeal of the United Nations clause equating Zionism with racism. However, the Bush administration can be viewed as having created a favourable setting for the Palestinians when compared with the Clinton administration.

Under the Clinton administration, **the relative power** of the Israelis against the Palestinians increased. The mediator strengthened Israel through its support within the United Nations Security Council during the deportation crisis of 1993, the land expropriation crisis of 1995, the tunnel crisis of 1996 and the settlement crisis of 1997. The administration increased **the relative power** of the Palestinians by attending to a conference organised by Arafat to which Israel was not invited in 1997.

Regarding the Haitian conflict, the power balance changed to the advantage of the weaker side, the ousted president Aristide, during the first stage mediation. The United States empowered him by not recognising the junta, suspending economic aid to Haiti, pioneering an Organisation of American States embargo and a United Nations oil and trade embargo against Haiti and freezing assets of the junta within the United States. The mediator had sometimes empowered the junta as well, like pressuring Aristide to grant amnesty to the coup leaders and considering the realisation of alternative proposals prepared by an anti-Aristide committee. However, the United States can be regarded as having **increased the relative power** of Aristide against the junta during the mediation attempt.

During the second stage mediation, **the relative power** of the junta increased as opposed to the first stage mediation. Carter, as representative of the United States, empowered General Cedras, ruling out the accusations that Cedras was a dictator and enabling the general's "honourable retirement". However, the existence of a military blockade around Haiti empowered Aristide against the junta during the second stage as well.

As an outcome of the United States' mediation in Bosnia, territory, Sarajevo in particular, was **redistributed** in exchange for lifting economic sanctions over Yugoslavia. In an effort to reach an agreement, the mediator had also offered resources to the Muslim-Croat side, such as \$ 600 million for the reconstruction of Bosnia and 20.000 ground troops for the enforcement of peace during the mediation process.

During the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the mediator offered certain resources to the parties, ranging from tangible to intangible, in an effort to move the initiative. Under the Bush administration, the Palestinians achieved international recognition with convening of the Madrid Conference. Moreover, they started to receive financial capital through a donor conference organised by the United States. On the other hand, the Israelis received United States' support in repealing the United Nations article equating Zionism with racism. Besides, the mediator had provided jets and missiles to the Israelis.

Under the Clinton administration, the Palestinians gained a preferential trade agreement with the United States while the Israelis received advanced technology against terrorism and the clear support of the mediator within the United Nations Security Council.

In addition to these changes realised during the process, land was **redistributed** as part of the initiative. Under the Clinton administration, the Palestinians received the right of implementation of Palestinian self rule over the Gaza Strip and various cities of the West Bank.

As for the Haitian Conflict, in the first stage, the mediator offered certain resources, such as granting amnesty, \$ 50 million in nonlethal military aid and \$ 1 billion grant over five years to the Haitian military, in an effort to stir change in the rigid position of the junta. As a result of the second stage mediation, certain **resources** were **redistributed** such as power to Aristide and amnesty to the coup leaders.

At the end of the mediation in Bosnia, certain **position changes** were realised. Both parties agreed on one another's right of existence. The Bosnian Serbs dropped their secession demand. In exchange, the Bosnian Muslims recognised the Republika Srpska as a separate entity inside Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnian Muslims accepted the notion of forming "special parallel relations" with the neighbouring states if such actions did not harm the sovereignty of Bosnia. Besides, the Bosnian Serbs accepted the removal of the President of the Serbian leadership, Radovan Karadzic, and the General of Bosnian, Army Ratko Mladic, from power.

During the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, the parties had displayed certain **policy changes**. Both sides recognised each other with the signing of the Oslo Accord of 1993. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation ruled out its determination to destroy the State of Israel while the Israelis agreed to withdraw militarily from certain cities of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

As an outcome of the first stage mediation in the Haitian conflict, certain **position changes** of the parties were realised. For example, the junta agreed to start negotiating over Aristide's reinstatement and Aristide accepted to meet with the military backed de-facto prime minister Marc Bazin in 1992. The second stage mediation had produced important **position changes**. Aristide agreed to grant amnesty to the coup leaders and the junta accepted Aristide's reinstatement.

In the Bosnian conflict, intervention of the mediator, accomplishment of NATO air strikes and the imposition of a deadline to the Dayton talks in particular,

had accelerated the process. Therefore this can be regarded as having shortened **the duration of the conflict**.

As for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the United States enabled the process move at times when it might halt, like it was the case during the tunnel crisis of 1996 and the Hebron deal of 1997.

Regarding the Haitian conflict, the first stage mediation can be regarded as having prolonged the conflict through pressure over Aristide that encouraged the junta and the ineffective and arbitrary economic sanctions against Haiti. On the other hand, the second stage mediation can be viewed as having shortened **the duration of the conflict** as it impeded a very near invasion by the United States of Haiti.

Regarding the Bosnian conflict, the United States had also used **the media** in achieving change in the power balance in favour of the Bosnian Muslims by providing evidence in displaying the crimes of the Bosnian Serbs just before the beginning of the Dayton talks.

With the beginning of the United States' initiative concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a global awareness related to the conflict has emerged due to **the media** attention diverted to the peace process.

As the Haitian conflict did not receive worldwide public attention, no changes can be cited as a product of **media** attention.

As a consequence of the mediation attempt in Bosnia, **new ongoing mechanisms** like the establishment of the Bosnia-Herzegovina State, the deployment of Implementation Forces (IFOR) were achieved.

The United States' initiative for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has produced certain **ongoing mechanisms** such as, the Palestinian National Authority, a donor conference for the Palestinians, an anti-terrorism periodical summit starting in Sharm el-Shaikh and a joint committee between the Palestinian National Authority and the United States to deal with political and economic issues

While there was **no ongoing mechanism** established as a result of the first stage mediation, the second stage mediation produced the revitalization of democracy as an **ongoing mechanism** in Haiti.

The coming chapter is the conclusion chapter which presents the comparisons of these three cases.

Table 1. A Summary of the Findings

		CASES				
		Bosnian Conflict	Palestinian-Israeli Conflict		Haitian Conflict	
			Bush Adm.	Clinton Adm.	Ist Stage	IInd Stage
Power of the mediator		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Superpower • Previous Attempt 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Superpower • Economic power 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Superpower • Economic power 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Superpower 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Superpower • Confidential relations and credibility of the representative
Stakes of the mediator	Primary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Domestic concerns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oil • Low cost stability in the Middle East 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oil • Low cost stability in the Middle East 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democracy • Refugee crisis • Credibility concerns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democracy • Refugee crisis • Credibility concerns
	Secondary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional power concerns 	-	-	-	-
Roles of the mediator	Manipulator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO air strikes • Deadlines during the Dayton Talks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anti-Settlements policy • Anti-Deportations policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pressure against Islamic terrorism • Supports Peres against Netanyahu 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic sanctions • UN oil and trade embargo 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military blockade
	Formulator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical problems solver 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical problems solver • Worked over perceptions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Worked on perceptions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Worked on perceptions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Worked on perceptions
	Communicator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shuttle diplomacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shuttle diplomacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revitalized communication 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Created communication 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Created communication

Table 1. Continued

		CASES				
		Bosnian Conflict	Palestinian-Israeli Conflict		Haitian Conflict	
			Bush Adm.	Clinton Adm.	Ist Stage	IInd Stage
Neutrality		• Not Neutral	• Not Neutral	• Not Neutral	• Not Neutral	• Not Neutral
Impartiality		• Pro-Muslim Croat	• Balanced	• Pro-Israeli	• Pro-Aristide	• Pro-Aristide
Timing of the mediator		• Ripe	• Ripe	• Ripe	• Early	• Ripe
Entry of the mediator		• Accepted	• Invited	• Invited	• Imposed	• Accepted
Changes realized	Overt Conflict	• Ended	• Continued	• Continued	• Increased	• Ended
	Relative Power	• An increase in the Muslim-Croat side	• An increase in the Palestinian side	• An increase in the Israeli side	• An increase in Aristide's	• An increase in Aristide's
	Redistribution of resources	• Territory • Lifting of economic sanctions	-	• Territory	-	• Power • Amnesty

Table 1. Continued

		CASES								
		Bosnian Conflict		Palestinian-Israeli Conflict				Haitian Conflict		
				Bush Adm.	Clinton Adm.		Ist Stage	IIInd Stage		
Changes realized	Policy/ position changes	<u>B. Muslims</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recognition • Special parallel relations with neighbours 	<u>B. Serbs</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No secession • No power to Karadzic and Mladic 	-	<u>Palestinians</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recognition • No destruction of Israel 	<u>Israel</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recognition • Withdrawal of Israeli troops 	<u>Junta</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Started negotiating 	<u>Aristide Bazin</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Met 	<u>Junta</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accepted the reinstatement 	<u>Aristide</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gave amnesty
	Duration of the conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shortened 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enabled the process move 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prolonged 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shortened 				
	Establishment of ongoing mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The State of Bosnia-Herzegovina • IFOR 	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PNA • Anti-terrorism summit • A joint committee between the USA and the PNA • A financial capital channel 	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democracy 				
	The use of media	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Changed the power balance in favour of the Muslim-Croat side 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brought a global awareness about the conflict 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brought a global awareness about the conflict 	-	-				

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States remained the sole superpower in the international arena. The United States utilised “mediation” as a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of international disputes, in an effort to secure its interests. For this purpose, the United States has employed various kinds of sources available, such as threatening to use or exerting brute force, imposing embargoes, working on the perceptions of the parties, solving technical problems of the process and creating communication between the parties.

As it can be observed throughout this study, this mechanism was used by the United States and served its purpose in the Bosnian conflict, in Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in the second stage of Haitian conflict, except in the first stage mediation of Haitian conflict.

In this context, a general observation can be derived from the analyses which is the fact that the United States has been utilising muscle mediation¹ as one of its foreign policy tools in the Post Cold-War era.

Another conclusion can be derived from the mediation attempt executed during the Haitian conflict. As it can be observed in the analyses, neither the

mediation of Organisation of American States nor of the United Nations could be realised without the influential activities of the sole superpower, the United States.

Although the Organisation of American States and then the United Nations seemed as the visible mediators, in fact, the United States was the real but concealed mediator during the first stage mediation attempt. Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that, a mediation attempt can either be direct as it was the case in the Bosnian conflict, in Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in the second stage mediation of the Haitian conflict or indirect as it was the case in the first stage mediation of the Haitian conflict. It is imperative to state that there is no such difference cited in the literature on mediation.

In direct mediation, the mediator itself initiates the process, sends its representative to the parties. The visible mediator and the real mediator stand as the same entity. However, in indirect mediation, the real mediator is not the visible mediator. The real mediator stands as the driving force behind the mediation attempt undertaken by the visible mediator.

Within this context, stemming from the fact that the United States has been an influential member of the Organisation of American States and the United Nations, it could influence the initiation of the Organisation of American States and the United Nations mediation in the Haitian conflict. Here, the visible mediators were the Organisation of American States and the United Nations but the real mediator was the United States. By this way, the United States had undertaken indirect mediation during the first stage of the Haitian conflict.

Another general conclusion is the fact that mediation is one of the important tools of international relations because in all the cases studied here, it is seen that mediation attempts led to certain changes in the conflict systems. During or as an

outcome of the mediation attempt, a change in the power balance between the parties, a redistribution of resources, changes in policy or positions of the parties, an extension or shortening in the duration of the conflict, the establishment of ongoing mechanisms can be realised.

Another interesting finding is regarding the interests of the mediator. When Table 1 is observed, it is seen that the United States had certain stakes in the Bosnian case, in Palestinian-Israeli case and in Haitian case. It had certain preferences related to the resolution of these conflicts. The United States intervened as a mediator in order to secure its interests. For this reason, theoretically it can not be accepted as neutral. Within this context, we can conclude that a mediator who has stakes can not be accepted as a neutral mediator.

A detailed analytical comparison of the findings gives us a fine grained picture of the mediation attempts conducted by the United States. For that purpose, first of all, a comparison is made between the United States mediation in the Bosnian conflict, Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the second stage mediation attempt in Haitian conflict and the first stage mediation in the Haitian conflict. The main reason behind this selection is that the Bosnian conflict, Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the second stage mediation in the Haitian conflict ended up with agreements, whereas the first stage mediation in Haitian conflict did not.² Therefore, in effort to understand why the first stage mediation of the Haitian conflict could not succeed in reaching an agreement while the mediation in the Bosnian, Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the second stage mediation of the Haitian conflict succeeded, the first stage mediation of Haitian conflict can be used as a control group in deriving conclusions.

In each one of these four mediation attempts (See Table 1) the United States attained certain power; pursued certain stakes; manipulated the conflict; worked on perceptions of the parties and was not neutral. Three variables, namely impartiality, timing of the mediator and entry of the mediator demonstrate diversities when these four mediation attempts are compared.

When Table 1 is observed, it is seen that the mediator pursued a partial policy during the Bosnian conflict, Palestinian-Israeli conflict under the Clinton administration, in the second stage of Haitian conflict and then reached agreement. On the other hand, the mediator also pursued a partial policy during the first stage mediation of the Haitian conflict, but could not reach an agreement. Therefore, such a diversity can not be used as a tool to derive an answer to the above question.

On the other hand, the imposed way of entry and early timing of the mediator stand as critical variables in terms of the outcome of the mediation and they help us to derive the answer to the question.

The way the mediator enters a conflict is an important variable for the outcome of the mediation. The acceptance or invitation of the mediator by the parties is definitely to the advantage of the mediation process, as it was the situation in the Bosnian case, Palestinian-Israeli case and the second stage mediation of the Haitian conflict. On the other hand, the mediator's imposed way of entrance to the first stage of the Haitian conflict stood as an impediment against the smooth ongoing of the process.

Timing of the mediator is another important variable for the outcome of mediation. The precondition for the timing of the mediator is the existence of a

hurting stalemate situation. In particular, parties' need for a solution and any remarkable change in the external factors related to the conflict are the most important criteria for the determination of the hurting stalemate situation. When we look at the Bosnian, Palestinian-Israeli conflicts and the second stage mediation of the Haitian conflict, it is seen that both criteria are realised. On the other hand, in the Haitian conflict these criteria are not met. Neither Aristide nor the junta was suffering from the state of affairs at the time mediation started. Parties were not in an exhausting need to find a solution to the conflict. Besides, there was no remarkable change in the external factors that would press the parties to make concessions. Within this context, we can conclude that in the first stage mediation of the Haitian conflict the imposed way of entry and early timing of the mediator led to non-agreement.

A second comparison is made between the first stage and the second stage mediation of the Haitian conflict in order to understand the dynamics of this switch realised during the conflict. The first stage mediation which had an imposed entry and early timing did not produce an agreement despite increased manipulative tactics. As the United States became aware of the fact that its credibility was diminished in the eyes of the junta and the conflict was heading towards an overt confrontation, it started the second stage mediation by sending its representative, Carter, who had confidential relations with the junta. Therefore, the United States maneuvered from the first stage to the second stage mediation in an effort to break the deadlock for the resolution of the conflict.

This finding is important on the grounds that such an effective tactic which is used in real world conflicts is not cited in the theoretical literature on mediation.

More research is needed to understand how widely this tactic is used in other similar cases.

A third comparison is made between the United States mediation in the Bosnian conflict, in Palestinian-Israeli conflict and in Haitian conflict stemming from the fact that they are clear examples of mediation attempts in which solid power has been utilised. In these three cases, the United States stood as the superpower, entered in the ripe moment, was an accepted or invited mediator, used manipulative tactics, worked on perceptions of the parties, acted as a technical problem solver and a communicator and was not neutral. Therefore, it can be concluded that the United States demonstrated, in these three cases a typical muscle mediation by using all the power in its hand and in each case these muscle mediations resulted in agreements.

This finding has implications for the theoretical debate regarding the role of power in mediation attempts.³ Based on the above findings, it can be stated that “power” is an important component of international mediation.

ENDNOTES

Notes for Chapter I

¹ Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40:2 (June 1996), 360-389.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, "The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence," in Resolving International Conflicts Ed. J. Bercovitch (Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder London, 1996) 13.

⁵ J. Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations," in Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin, eds., (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 5.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in Theory" in International Mediation in Theory and Practice, S. Touval and I.W. Zartman, eds.(Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1985), 7.

⁹ J. Bercovitch, Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to

Conflict Management, J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin, eds., (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 6.

¹⁰ Charles W. Moore, The Mediation Process (San Francisco; Jossey-Brass, 1987), 14.

¹¹ J. Bercovitch and A. Houston, "The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence," Resolving International Conflicts Ed. J. Bercovitch (Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder London, 1996), 16. This term implies, the parties are in the aim of influencing the mediator and the mediator is in the aim of influencing the parties at the same time.

¹² *Ibid.*, 13.

¹³ J. Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations," Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin, eds., (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 10.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁵ Peter J. Carnevale and Dean G. Pruitt, "Negotiation and Mediation," Annual Review of Psychology, 43 (1992) 531-582.

¹⁶ J. Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations," Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin, eds., (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 19

¹⁷ S. Touval and I.W. Zartman, *op. cit.*, 13.

¹⁸ Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40:2 (June 1996), 360-389.

¹⁹ R.M. Slim, "Small State Mediation in International Relations: The Algerian mediation of the Iranian hostage crisis," Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin, eds., (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 207.

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- ²⁰ Jeffrey Z. Rubin, "Introduction," Dynamics of Third Party Intervention, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 40.
- ²¹ S. Touval and I.W. Zartman, *op. cit.*, 13.
- ²² *Ibid.*
- ²³ J. Bercovitch, Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin, eds., (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 6.
- ²⁴ C. Moore, *op. cit.*, 15.
- ²⁵ S. Touval and I.W. Zartman, *op. cit.*, 8.
- ²⁶ Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40:2 (June 1996), 360-389.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, 370.
- ²⁸ S. Touval and I. W. Zartman, *op.cit.*,8-9; S. Touval, "The Superpowers as Mediators," Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin, eds., (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 232-233.
- ²⁹ J. Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations," Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin, eds., (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 9.
- ³⁰ Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40:2 (June 1996), 360-389.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, 375.
- ³² Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40:2 (June 1996), 360-389.
- ³³ S. Touval and I. W. Zartman, "Mediation In Theory," The Study of International

Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence, J. Bercovitch and A. Houston, Resolving International Conflicts Ed. J. Bercovitch (Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder London, 1996), 11-35.

³⁴ S. Touval and I. W. Zartman, *op. cit.*, 12.

³⁵ Brian Mandell, "The Limits of Mediation: Lessons from the Syria-Israel Experience, 1974-1994," Resolving International Conflicts Ed. J. Bercovitch (Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder London, 1996), 135.

³⁶ S. Touval and I. W. Zartman, *op. cit.*, 11-12.

³⁷ J. Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations," Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin, eds., (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 17.

³⁸ Nimet Beriker -Atiyas, "Mediating Regional Conflicts and Negotiating Flexibility: Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Annals, AAPPS 542 (November 1995), 189.

³⁹ S. Touval and I.W. Zartman, *op. cit.*, 12.

⁴⁰ N. Beriker-Atiyas, *loc.-cit.*

⁴¹ C. Moore, *op.cit.*,34-35.

⁴² Jeffrey Z. Rubin, "Introduction," Dynamics of Third Party Intervention, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 3-43

⁴³ C. Moore, *op. cit.*, 18.

⁴⁴ J. Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations," Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin, eds., (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 1-29.

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- ⁴⁵ Marieke Kleiboer, *op. cit.*, 369; Peter Carnevale and Sharon Arad, "Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation," Resolving International Conflicts Ed. J. Bercovitch (Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder London, 1996) 40; C. Moore, *op.cit.*,15.
- ⁴⁶ C. Moore., *op. cit.*, 15.
- ⁴⁷ Peter Carnevale and Sharon Arad, "Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation," Resolving International Conflicts Ed. J. Bercovitch (Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder London, 1996) 40.
- ⁴⁸ Peter Carnevale and Sharon Arad, "Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation," Resolving International Conflicts Ed. J. Bercovitch (Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder London, 1996) 40.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁰ J. Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations," Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin, eds., (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 27.
- ⁵¹ Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40:2 (June 1996), 360-389
- ⁵² J. Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations," Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin, eds., (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 1-29.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁴ Peter J. Carnevale and Dean G. Pruitt, "Negotiation and Mediation," Annual Review of Psychology, 43 (1992) 531-582.
- ⁵⁵ S. Touval and I. W. Zartman, *op. cit.*, 15.

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- ⁵⁶ Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40:2 (June 1996), 360-389.
- ⁵⁷ J. Bercovitch and A. Houston, "The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence," Resolving International Mediation, Ed. J. Bercovitch (Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder London, 1996), 26.
- ⁵⁸ J. Z. Rubin, "Introduction" Dynamics of Third Party Intervention, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 40.
- ⁵⁹ S. Touval and I.W. Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in Theory" in International Mediation in Theory and Practice, S. Touval and I. W. Zartman, eds. (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1985). 9-10. M. Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40:2 (June 1996), 367. P.J. Carnevale and Sharon Arad, "Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation" Resolving International Conflicts, Ed. J. Bercovitch (Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder London, 1996) 39-53.
- ⁶⁰ J. Z. Rubin, *op. cit.*, 11-12.
- ⁶¹ J. Bercovitch and A. Houston, "The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence," Resolving International Conflicts, Ed. J. Bercovitch (Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder London, 1996), 23.
- ⁶² Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40:2 (June 1996), 360-389.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁴ J. Bercovitch and A. Houston, "The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence," Resolving International Conflicts, Ed. J. Bercovitch (Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder London, 1996), 23.
- ⁶⁵ Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40:2 (June 1996), 360-389.

Notes for Chapter II

- ¹ Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from Yugoslavia and internationally recognized in January, 1992.
- ² N. Malcolm, Bosnia A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1994), 240.
- ³ International Herald Tribune, 1 September 1995, 8.
- ⁴ Facts on File, 1995, 514.
- ⁵ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1995, 40607; Facts on File, 1995, 514.
- ⁶ International Herald Tribune, 12 September 1995, 1.
- ⁷ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1995,40607.
- ⁸ Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 August 1995, EE/2386 C/1; International Herald Tribune, 17 August 1995, 6.
- ⁹ International Herald Tribune, 1 November 1995, 5.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., 30 August 1995, 1; Ibid., 29 August 1995, 1.
- ¹¹ Ibid., 20 November 1995, 2.
- ¹² The first deadline was scheduled for the midnight of November 18, the second was for 10 am of November 20 and the last one was for the morning of November 21.
- ¹³ Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 November 1995, EE/ 2475 A/4.
- ¹⁴ International Herald Tribune, 24 August 1995, 7.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., 2 September 1995, 2.
- ¹⁶ Yugoslavia is composed of Serbia and Montenegro.
- ¹⁷ International Herald Tribune, 1 September 1995, 1

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- ¹⁸ Facts on File, 1995, 814.
- ¹⁹ International Herald Tribune 24 November 1995, 2
- ²⁰ The Nintendo Room was a room in which the negotiators could easily see the effect of the territorial concessions or gains by the help of the computers.
- ²¹ Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 September 1995, EE/2412 C/7.
- ²² International Herald Tribune, 7 October 1995, 2.
- ²³ Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 November 1995, EE/ 2459 A/1.
- ²⁴ International Herald Tribune, 10 August 1995, 8.
- ²⁵ Nimet Beriker Atiyas, "Mediating Regional Conflicts and Negotiating Flexibility: Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina," ANNALS, AAPSS, 542, (November 1995), 194.
- ²⁶ Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 September 1995, EE/ 2421 A/2.
- ²⁷ Ibid., 5 October 1995, EE/ 2428 A/1.
- ²⁸ Richard Holbrooke, "The Road To Sarajevo," The New Yorker, October 21-28 1996.
- ²⁹ Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 November 1995, EE/ 2451 A/1.
- ³⁰ International Herald Tribune, 3 November 1995, 1.
- ³¹ Ibid., 20 September 1995, 1.
- ³² I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa. New York: Oxford University Press, 232.
- ³³ Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 August 1995, EE/2380 C/6.
- ³⁴ Ibid.,17 August 1995, EE/2386 C/1.

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- ³⁵ Ibid., 21 August 1995, EE/2387 S1/1.
- ³⁶ Ibid., 17 August 1995, EE/2386 C/1.
- ³⁷ Ibid., 24 August 1995, EE/2390 C/1.
- ³⁸ Ibid., 13 October 1995, EE/2435 A/6.
- ³⁹ Keesing's, Record of World Events, 1995, 40781.
- ⁴⁰ Facts on File, 1995, 629.
- ⁴¹ Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 September 1995, EE/ 2421 A/2.
- ⁴² Ibid., 11 September 1995, EE/2405 C/12; International Herald Tribune 11 December 1995, 1; International Herald Tribune, 8 December 1995, 10.
- ⁴³ Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 September 1995, EE/ 2405 C/12.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., 28 November 1995, EE/2472 A/3.
- ⁴⁵ Facts on File, 1995, 867.
- ⁴⁶ Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 November 1995, EE/2460 A/2.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid., 2 December 1995, EE/2477 A/2.
- ⁴⁸ International Herald Tribune, 7 December 1995, 1.
- ⁴⁹ Keesing's, Record of World Events, 1995 40830
- ⁵⁰ Ibid., 40830
- ⁵¹ Ibid., 40833.
- ⁵² Ibid., 40691.
- ⁵³ International Herald Tribune 30 October 1995, 1.
- ⁵⁴ Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 November 1995, EE/2468 A/3.

Notes for Chapter III

- ¹ Steven R. David, "The Continuing Importance of American Interests in the Middle East after the Cold War," Israel Affairs Volume 2 Numbers 3 & 4 Spring/Summer 1996, 98.
- ² "Arab-Israeli Negotiations and Interests in the Middle East: Second-Term Imperatives," Ed. Aaron D. Miller, David L. Mack, James Zogby, Alon Ben-Meir. Middle East Policy Volume V, No. 1, January 1997, 16.
- ³ Alon Ben-Meir, "The Battle over Israeli and Palestinian National Character," Middle East Policy, Vol. V, No. 1, January 1997, 28.
- ⁴ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 8 March 1991, FBIS-NES-91-046.
- ⁵ Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in Theory" in International Mediation in Theory and Practice, S. Touval and I. W. Zartman, eds. (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1985), 11.
- ⁶ International Herald Tribune, 20-21, April 1991, 1 & 4.
- ⁷ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 25 September 1991, FBIS-91-186.
- ⁸ Ibid., 19 June 1991, 17.
- ⁹ Nimet Beriker Atiyas, "Mediating Regional Conflicts and Negotiation Flexibility: Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina," ANNALS, AAPSS, 542, (November 1995), 189.
- ¹⁰ International Herald Tribune, 24 April 1991, 2.
- ¹¹ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1991, p.33717
- ¹² International Herald Tribune 23 May 1991, 1 & 2.
- ¹³ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1991, 38452.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., 1991, 38787.

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- ¹⁵ Ibid., 1991, 39028.
- ¹⁶ Facts On File, 1992, 584.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., 1991, 257 ; International Herald Tribune, 8 January 1992, 4.
- ¹⁸ Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 March 1993, ME/1625i; Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 July 1993, ME/1730i; International Herald Tribune, 13 May 1993, 5.
- ¹⁹ International Herald Tribune, 31 August 1993, 6; International Herald Tribune, 2 September 1993, 5; Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 August 1993, ME/1768 A/4.
- ²⁰ Facts On File, 1994, 42.
- ²¹ Facts On File, 1995, 99.
- ²² International Herald Tribune, 7 March 1996, 2.
- ²³ Facts On File, 1996, 130.
- ²⁴ International Herald Tribune, 15 March 1994, 2.
- ²⁵ Ibid., 12 October 1996, 5.
- ²⁶ International Herald Tribune, 18 May 1994.
- ²⁷ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 24 May 1991, FBIS-91-101, 18.
- ²⁸ Ibid., 17 September 1991, FBIS-91-180, 28.
- ²⁹ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1992, 39211; Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 November 1992, ME/ 1537 A/8.
- ³⁰ International Herald Tribune, 13 September 1991, 1 & 2.
- ³¹ Facts On File, 1992, 9.
- ³² Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 21 October 1991, FBIS-91-203, 9.

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- ³³ Facts On File, 1991, 709-710.
- ³⁴ International Herald Tribune, 1-2 June 1991, 4.
- ³⁵ Ibid., 1 February 1993, 1 & 4.
- ³⁶ Facts On File, 1994, 133.
- ³⁷ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1995, 40380.
- ³⁸ Facts On File, 1997, 118.
- ³⁹ Ibid., 1997, 157.
- ⁴⁰ International Herald Tribune, 17 March, 1997, 4.
- ⁴¹ Ibid., 16-17 March 1991, 4.
- ⁴² Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 14 March 1991, FBIS-NES-91-050, 23.
- ⁴³ International Herald Tribune, 21 October 1991, 1 & 6.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., 2-3 March 1991, 1 & 4.
- ⁴⁵ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1991, 38117.
- ⁴⁶ International Herald Tribune, 16 September 1991, 1 & 4; Facts On File, 1991, 685.
- ⁴⁷ Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 May 1997, ME/ 2923 MED/13.
- ⁴⁸ Before the peace process, Israel was not even spelling the word "the Palestinians". Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 12 March 1991, FBIS-NES-91-048, 30.
- ⁴⁹ Facts On File, 1996, 273.
- ⁵⁰ International Herald Tribune, 17 January 1997, 8.
- ⁵¹ Ibid., 21 December 1996, 5.

⁵² Facts On File, 1994, 318-9 & 615.

⁵³ Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 September 1992, ME/1485 A/3-4.

⁵⁴ International Herald Tribune, 31 May 1991, 4.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 15 March 1996, 1

⁵⁶ Ibid., 1 October 1993, 4.

⁵⁷ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1995, 40477.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 1996, 41342.

⁵⁹ International Herald Tribune, 2 January 2, 1997, 1 & 4.

⁶⁰ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1996, 41022.

⁶¹ Facts On File, 1997, 157.

Notes for Chapter IV

¹ Keesing's Record of World Events, 199, 38522.

² Facts On File, 1992, 398

³ International Herald Tribune, 12 July 1994, 3.

⁴ Ibid., 3 May 3, 1994, 3.

⁵ Ibid., 8-9 February, 1992, 3.

⁶ Ibid., 16 February 1994, 2.

⁷ Michael Kelly, "It All Codepends," The New Yorker (October 1994), 86.

⁸ International Herald Tribune, 19 September 1994, 1 & 5.

⁹ Ibid., 5-6 October, 1991, 1 & 4.

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- ¹⁰ Ibid., 15 September 1994, 1 & 7.
- ¹¹ Facts On File, 1992, 85.
- ¹² International Herald Tribune, 9 May 1994, 3.
- ¹³ Ibid., 12-13 June, 1993, 8.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., 16 May 1994, 8.
- ¹⁵ Keesing's Record of World Events, 199, 38430.
- ¹⁶ International Herald Tribune, 14 February 1992, 3.
- ¹⁷ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1993, 39264.
- ¹⁸ Facts On File Weekly World News Digest, 1993, 255.
- ¹⁹ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1993, 39504.
- ²⁰ International Herald Tribune, 10-11 July 1993, 6.
- ²¹ Ibid., 12 October 1993, 7.
- ²² Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 August 1994, AL/2063 L/1.
- ²³ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1993, 39455.
- ²⁴ Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 February 1994, AL/1925 L/5.
- ²⁵ International Herald Tribune, 5-6 October 1991, 1 & 4.
- ²⁶ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1991, 38569
- ²⁷ Ibid., 1991, 38430.
- ²⁸ International Herald Tribune, 3 October, 1991, 2.
- ²⁹ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1991, 39504.
- ³⁰ Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 October 1993, AL/1826 L/3.

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- ³¹ Facts On File, 1994, 673.
- ³² Keesing's Record of World Events, 1992, 39090.
- ³³ Ibid., 1993, 39680.
- ³⁴ Ibid., 1994, 39856.
- ³⁵ Suspending economic aid to Haiti and using its influence within the Organisation of American States to achieve economic sanctions against Haiti can be cited as manipulative actions of the United States.
- ³⁶ International Herald Tribune, 14 February 1992, 3.
- ³⁷ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1994, 39905.
- ³⁸ Michael Kelly, "It All Codepends," The New Yorker, (October 3, 1994), 85.
- ³⁹ "Mission to Haiti," http://www.emory.edu/Carter_center.
- ⁴⁰ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1991, 38522.
- ⁴¹ Ibid., 1992, 38758.
- ⁴² Ibid., 1993, 39680.
- ⁴³ Facts On File, 1991, 805
- ⁴⁴ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1994, 40001.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., 1993, 39680.
- ⁴⁶ International Herald Tribune, 21 September 1994, 1&3.
- ⁴⁷ Facts On File, 1994, 673.
- ⁴⁸ International Herald Tribune, 9 October 1991, 2.
- ⁴⁹ Facts On File, 1991, 754.

⁵⁰ International Herald Tribune, 10-11 July 1994, 6.

Notes for Chapter VI

¹ A kind of mediation in which power is used in all cases.

² The Bosnian conflict and the second stage mediation of Haitian conflict ended up with a peace agreement. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been continuing with the agreements of Oslo Accord (1993), the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Areas (1994), the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (1995) and Hebron Agreement (1997).

³ Some scholars, such as Touval and Zartman advocate that the role of power is an important component of mediation attempts. On the other hand, some others such as Burton advocate power-free third party interventions.

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