FREEDOM AND SOLIDARITY PARTY
(ÖZGÜRLÜK VE DAYANIŞMA PARTİSİ):
ON THE VERGE OF NEW POLITICS (?)

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

YÖRÜK İLHAN KURTARAN

In Partial Fulfillment Of The Requirements For The Degree Of
MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

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BILKENT UNIVERSITY
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I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.

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
Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun

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Dr. Fuat Keyman

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Metin Heper

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ABSTRACT

FREEDOM AND SOLIDARITY PARTY
(ÖZGÜRLÜK VE DAYANIŞMA PARTİSİ):
ON THE VERGE OF NEW POLITICS (?)

Yörük İlhan Kurtaran

Department of Political Science and Public Administration

.   Supervisor: Banu Helvacıoğlu

September 1997

This study examines the political orientations of Freedom and Solidarity Party (Özgürlük

ve Dayanışma Partisi) in terms of its organizational and political aspects. The main

question it addresses is the extent to which the party represents the new approach to

politics in Turkey. To explain the conception of the 'new', it analyzes the transformation

of the left both in Europe and Turkey since the 1960s.

ÖZET

FREEDOM AND SOLIDARITY PARTY
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Bu çalışmada Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi' nin siyasi yönelimleri, örgütsel ve politik açıdan ele alınmıştır. Partinin Türkiye' de ne ölçüde 'yeni' yi temsil ettiğini incelemek için Avrupa' daki ve Türkiye' deki sol anlayışlar örneklerle incelenmiştir.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The most popular word for the 1990s is "change", as everybody, both on the left and on the right of the political spectrum, is talking about the fact that the world is not what it used to be. At least for two centuries, ideologies have been dominated by the dualist structure of modernity which corresponded to two sets of opposition. 'Progress' has been juxtaposed with its opposite, 'reaction', while 'revolution' was justified by 'counter-revolution'. Today the conception of the world now forces us to understand the change in terms of Fukuyama's argument about the "end of history". The reason for this was the collapse of the Leninist model in Eastern Europe, which represented the opposite of the liberal, capitalist tradition in the West and the inadequacy of the social democratic tradition in the West to bring new alternatives to the re-organization of capitalism in global level. In this respect, the differences between the left and the right are eroding in the 1990s, as both the social democrat and the communist parties come up with solutions, which only slow up the process of the re-structuring of capitalism.

Although in general, the terms left and right eroded, the dynamics in Turkey were different than the European experience. The military junta in 1980 pacified the socialist movement both in its political and social terms. Not only the left in its general sense, but also the right was affected from this trend as all the political parties of the pre-1980 period were closed. The labor unions, chambers of business and the civil societal organizations

were banned from participating in political activities. The outcome was the political environment in which only some segments of the society had access to the political. The only civil alternative in the post-1983 period was the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi), that hold on to governmental posts till 1991.

With the introduction of neo-liberal policies, the economy was transformed into an export-oriented system, in which the state expenditures were minimized, and the wages were fixed. No serious counter-alternative could be developed, as the right to organize was strictly controlled. The only alternative for the remaining left circles was to join the "permitted" social democrat party, that is Social Democrat Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP).

SHP was the coalition partner with the conservative oriented True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) from 1991 to 1995. During the coalition government of DYP and SHP, the war in the southeastern region continued, costing human lives and budget deficits, the privatization wave continued to be on the agenda, and the gap between the rich and the poor has increased. The left in Turkey, which was identified with the social democrats, faced the inadequacy to bring new alternatives.

Under these circumstances, the socialist left, that faced a big defeat with the 1980 military intervention, started a debate within itself, in order to realize a program, which is believed to be based on anti-capitalism, with taking into considerations of the post-1968 developments. Although the debates started on the basis of individual organizations, the debates evolved into forming legal political parties on the basis of the mutual existence of different groups. There were three main dynamics behind the idea of the debates. Firstly, the re-formulation of Marxism in global level effected nearly all organizations that forced

them to re-evaluate the theoretical orientations of the movements. Secondly, the inadequacy of the social democratic tradition to bring alternatives to the problems of Turkey raised the expectations to form a new kind of leftism. Thirdly, the socialist left of Turkey that faced the greatest defeat in its history in 1980 re-organized itself so that it can be on the political agenda of the country. The formulation was vitalized, as the Freedom and Solidarity Party (Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi, ÖDP) came into existence, that can be labeled as the representative of the new left in Turkey.

Throughout this study, I tried examine the third road within the left, which distances itself both from the social democratic and pre-1980 socialist alternatives in Turkey. As the boundaries between the terms left and right are eroding both at national and international levels, ÖDP is trying to formulate a new conception of the term left, from the perspective of socialists.

The first chapter focuses on the communist experience that formalized itself in the real existing socialisms and the social democrat experience in Western capitalist countries. While elaborating on the Western tradition, the Eurocommunist alternative, the new left experience and the institutionalisation of the new social movements of the 1960s will be examined. In conceptualizing the term new left, I rely on Gramsci's conception of civil society, and Hayek's understanding of the impossibility of the centralization of knowledge will be elaborated in order to understand the conceptualization of the term new left.

The second chapter focuses on the transformation of the socialist left in Turkey, starting from the 1960s until the establishment of ÖDP in the 1996. In this respect, only the socialist organizations that are related to and represented in the party were taken into consideration. When elaborating on the ideological and organizational structures in

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relation to their political practices both in the pre and post 1980 military intervention, I examine the debates within the socialist left in conjunction with the conception of the term new left.

In the third chapter, the significance of ÖDP, both in terms of approaching politics, as well as its uniqueness in the organizational structure are taken into account, as these two issues represent the new approach to what constitutes 'the political'. By giving extensive examples from the magazines, meetings, declarations, and the party program, I analyze the distinguishing aspects of ÖDP from the old socialist tradition in Turkey.

In conclusion, I discuss ÖDP's place within the Marxist tradition both in Turkey and Europe. The similarities, as well as the differences will be taken into account, that would help the reader to understand ÖDP as a unique project that contains both the old and the new trends.

CHAPTER II

From the Old to the New: The Transformation of the Left in Europe

It has been argued that the left is in a legitimacy crisis in the 1990s for it can not bring alternatives to the existing social order in the global sense.[1] Kellner argued that, Marxism has been in crisis throughout the twentieth century.[2] Just as the failed revolution of the German Spartacists, suppression of the communist movements in the time of fascist regimes, the relative success of the social democratic "third way" and the anti-authoritarian 1968 movements have shown, it was Marxism that always came into the picture in order to be criticized, but it was again Marxism, in one way or another, that succeeded surviving throughout the 20th century.

It can be argued in the 1990s that Marxism is in crisis, but it must be remembered that this is something that was always experienced by the Marxist tradition. The most important difference of the present crisis, from the past experiences, is the collapse of the existing real socialisms and the inadequacy of both the social democratic and the communists traditions within the Western democracies to bring new alternatives to the changes that are taking place. In one way or another in the past, both the reformist or the revolutionary wings of Marxism channeled the discontent of the other into a gain for itself, which enabled them to continue their being. But in the 1980s, the trend was reversed, and

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[1] Here, the term "left" contains both the reformist/social democrat, and the revolutionary/communist models.

there appeared a negative attitude to both of these movements that created the existing crisis.

In this chapter, I will focus on the post-war period of three Marxist trends. The first one will be based on the Sovietic model of socialism, which is affiliated with the Eastern Bloc countries including the Soviet Russia. The other is the Western experience of social democracy which was derived from Marxism, but changed its ideological orientations in the preceding years. Within Western Marxism, when analyzing social democracy, the Eurocommunists will also be taken into account, as they can be considered within the social democratic experience. Lastly, I will delineate the new left experience, that is rooted in both Western Marxism and the anti-authoritarian movements in the former Soviet Bloc countries. In this respect, the challenge of 1968 movements and the organizations that they created will be elaborated which can be labeled as a search for a third road within the left, between the revolutionary communist and reformist social democrat experiences.

It was after the First World War that a split occurred within the social democrat parties in Europe. In very general terms, the ones who identified themselves with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 are referred to be as communists, whereas the others, that were strictly tied to the democratic understanding of liberal democratic tradition called themselves social democrats. The communists, who are in favor of a revolution against the bourgeois state argued that it was only possible by a violent uprising that a worker's state and government can be formed. In this respect, all the bourgeois ideals, and forms would

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[2]Dougles Kellner, "The End of Orthodox Marxism", *Marxism in the Postmodern Age* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1993), p. 34.

be suppressed by the newly formed state that would transform the existing capitalist society to an egalitarian and free society, that is socialism and communism respectively.

To some extent, the dream of "bread, work and peace"[3] was vitalized by the -so called- socialist/communist governments, but the lack of a free political spectrum could not be met within these "real existing socialisms", which is one of the reasons that there always arises the question of how to label these regimes. This question was raised specifically within the critical Marxist tradition in the Western developed countries.

As noted the exploitation in the bureaucratic regimes was capitalist in its nature, because the Council of Industrial Ministers replaced the private capitalist cooperation's' board of directors and the there did not exist a change in the mode of production.[4] In this respect, although the ownership of the means of production has changed, the nature of production stayed the same. The surplus value was distributed among the police, the military, and the party members, in order to secure the established social order, expand the means of production and labor power. In the post-1960 period, there appeared a crisis because the surplus could not be distributed -due to the backward technology- for the system to survive. In this case the surplus was too small for being a great power in the Cold War era, increasing the social services that were provided, catching up with the new technology, the ideological, political and economic bureaucracy for legitimizing itself on material basis and the popular hunger for individual consumption due to the developments in the information systems. The intentions of the system has changed from state oriented

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[3]The slogan of the Bolsheviks before the revolution. Food to the people, job to everybody and withdrawal from the First World War.
[4]Stephen Resnick and Richard D. Wolf, "The End of the USSR: A Marxian Class Analysis", *Marxism in Postmodern Age*, p. 328.

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central planning for the collective good of the people to the problem of securing the existing structures.

The end was not an overnight incident but was the outcome of the long process that started by the October Revolution of the Bolsheviks in 1917/The Leninist model that forced a monolithic organization of the social, economical and cultural life was under the supervision of the vanguards that blocked the way for any pluralist attempt to realize the basic socialist principles of freedom and solidarity, on the basis of equality./Freedom of the individuals was "sacrificed in the name of egalitarianism, that turned the concept of citizenship into an empty shell."[5] The attempts to reform the existing socialism from within Marxism failed to achieve success because of the "success" of the existing, party structures. The invasion of Hungary in 1956, the suppression of the libertarian movements in Prague 1968 and the 'Solidarity Movement' in Poland should be perceived in this respect, as not anti-, but pro-socialist movements that tried to bring socialist pluralism, in their own way, to the monolithic structure.

While the Soviet Bloc came to an end in 1989, it was thought that the only left alternative other than the communist tradition was the social democrats. On the other hand, one must remember that even the social democrat ideology was also unable to bring a new alternative, exceeding the limits of liberal democratic tradition. The history of welfare state, that was affiliated with the social democratic governments, was the outcome of the postwar economic boom.

After the Second World War, it was expected by the social democrats that both the conservative and the liberal wings of the political spectrum would not be as strong as they

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[5]Ralph Miliband, "Reclaiming the Alternative", *Marxism in Postmodern Age*, p. 221.

were in the pre-fascist periods. In this respect, only the communists were taken as a serious threat. In the northern parts of Europe, the social democrats did not face what they expected, and achieved the majority of the left votes in the elections. On the other hand, in the Southern Parts of Western Europe, the communist parties did better than their social democrat counterparts. This was due to their highly respected anti-fascist struggle, and the well organized party relations.

The post-war boom in the world economy, which was the largest boom in the history of capitalism,[6] helped to increase the Keynesian economics to be realized in its full sense as the state regulated the market and intervened whenever it was necessary. With the introduction of a planned market economy, it was thought that full employment could be reached. Up to the end of the 1950s, nearly all the social democrat parties tried to hold on to their 'party of the working class' ideology, although their practical orientation differed, as now they transformed themselves into 'people's parties'.

The class structure has changed in Europe in the post-war period, with the growing number of employees in the service sector. As Marx predicted, the blue-collar workers have never hold the majority in any capitalist country. The signifying aspect of the 1950s was the decrease in the number of blue-collar workers and the increase in the white-collar professionals. In order to gain the votes of the newly emerged professionals, the social democrat parties also tried to appeal to the middle classes, which effected their ideological orientations. The Bad Godesburg Conference of German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1959 should be perceived in this respect as Godesburg Programme

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[6]Mandel, Ernest. *Kapitalist Gelişmenin Uzun Dalgaları* (İstanbul: Yazın Yayıncılık, 1992).

represented the "...acceptance of the postwar order with an appeal for reform in a formula which was to typify European social democracy in the 1960s and 1970s".[7]

After the 1970s, an ideological crisis occurred due to a decrease in the votes that the social democrats received. It must be noted that the failure of the social democratic alternatives was due to their success rather than their failure. That is, they could not bring new perspectives exceeding the limits of the establishment. This was not the only determinant for the explanation of the crisis in the reformist tradition, as also the conjuncture forced the governments to give up the Keynesian managerial economics and rather apply monetarist policies that jeopardized the legitimacy and existence of the social welfare states. The two last radical alternatives within the social democratic tradition were the Meidner Plan in Sweden and the socialist government of France in the 1980s. The former proposed that all the means of production would be handed to the labor unions in a specific period of time.[8] The plan was criticized even by the social democrat members and was rejected. On the other hand the socialists with the support of the communist party started a nationalization project in France. The outcome was disastrous as unemployment and inflation raised. The antagonist character of the party basis, which was composed of Catholics, blue and white collar workers eroded as the state resources could not be mobilized against the market forces.[9] Especially with Toni Blair's Labor Party in United Kingdom, this crisis intended to be overcome by moving to the right of the political spectrum.

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[7]Stephen Padgett & William E. Paterson. *Social Democracy in Postwar Europe* (London: Longman, 1991), p. 29.
[8]Jonas Pontusson, "Sweden: After the Golden Age." *Mapping the West European Left*, ed. Perry Anderson and Patrick Camiller (London: Verso, 1994), p. 29.
[9]Padgett. *Social Democracy*, p. 166.

The most important change occurred in the economical outlook of the Labor Party as the Article Four[10] of the party program was abolished. Except the government of 1945, this article represented a continuous tradition in theory, and the practical application of this was never vitalized by any government. In this sense, it was only an article to represent the roots of the party. On the other hand, the symbolic removal of this meant that the Labor Party was trying to get rid of its labor party outlook as being the representative of the working class, and trying to have a new outlook which would in turn attract the votes of the middle classes too. This trend was even further justified by the new tax policy of the party as now the party demanded an increase of the tax rate just for the upper class, but not for the middle class.

The differentiating lines between the social democrats and the conservative parties eroded in the 1990s, as the fiscal policies were replaced by monetarist measures. While these changes were taking place within the social democratic understanding of Western left, the Communist parties of the liberal democracies were eroding both in terms of quality and quantity.

In 1953, Togliatti, the leader of the Italian Communist party, declared the approval of different national paths to socialism. This was a historical turning point in the communist tradition as for the first time, polycentrism was adopted. The roots of this trend can be dated back to the writings of Gramsci, Luxembourg, Lukacs, and even the Austro-

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[10]This article was put on the program in 1918, in which it was stated that means of production and distribution should be publicly owned by the state.

Marxist tradition[11] which tried to formulate a different interpretation of Marxism other than the Bolshevik understanding of Marxism as a science.

As Boggs argued four long-term factors contributed to the rise of Eurocommunism in Spain, France and Italy: The erosion of Catholicism, détente, the Sino-Soviet split and the onset of pluralism within world communism and the long term involvement of the Communist Parties in liberal democratic institutions.[12] Taking parliament as an active and decisive actor in transition was a step further. As Gruppi argued "political system most appropriate to socialism"[13] was liberal representative democracy. Eurocommunists viewed the state as a place for class struggle, not as an institution of class domination. In this respect, they tried to become dominant in the state apparatus in order to make structural reforms, which would be an ongoing process of democratization. They proposed the colonization of the bourgeois state, rather than mobilizing change from the grass roots level.

In the mean time, the lack of a concrete definition of the term "structural reformism" made Eurocommunism only a reaction to the Soviet way of achieving socialism. The electoral policies of Eurocommunist parties turned out to be just for votes and not for immediate changes for general socialist ideals. For popular credibility, the acceptance of the multi-nationals, mixed economies, the NATO and the EC paved the way for an erosion of the anti-system outlook of the parties that turned them into *institutional*

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[11]The school of thought within the Austrian Social Democrat Party, that tried to find a middle way between the reformist Second International and the revolutionary Communist (Third) International. The important figures were Karl Renner, Otto Bauer, Max Adler and Rudolf Hilferding.
[12]Carl Boggs, *The Socialist Tradition: From Crisis to Decline*. (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 104.

[13]ibid, p. 113.

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oppositions. The outcome of this trend was consensus at elite level and alienated politics at the mass level, which did not create an alternative for the existing situation.

Although they incorporated the ideas of the New Social Movements, their traditional basis, composed of blue collar workers, and Catholics always stood as a barrier against forming organic ties with them as they had contradictory standings. On the other hand they failed to engage in the widespread local activism of the post-1968 movements as they always had an anti-1968 outlook which they considered as being adventurous.

The most important commonality between the reformist Western tradition that both includes the social democrats and the communists and the revolutionary movements of the Marxist tradition -regardless of the different versions- was that they always tried to capture the power of the state. Political revolution was formulated as transforming the state, whereas social revolution was seen as a subordinate of the state and has not been given the importance that it deserved.

The hierarchical domination of the public over the private sphere always brought the question of "management" of the other in order to transfer the social and economical structure for the socialist goals. Another important factor, which is visible in these two versions of Marxism, the evolutionaries and the revolutionaries in very concrete terms, was the centralization of the knowledge in the public sphere in order to transform the existent structures. This knowledge was taken as *the scientific knowledge* that was shaped by the positivist understanding of social laws which move in a linear path, to reach to the level of progress. The outcome was the argument that the social laws of progress has the potential to be discovered and re-shaped by the ones who can have access to this kind of specific knowledge.

In order to understand the significance of the term new left, Gramsci's civil society understanding and Hayek's theory of knowledge should be elaborated. Although Gramsci and Hayek seem to be resting on completely opposite grounds, a deeper analysis would show us that the term new left owed them a great deal of effort to constitute a new way of approaching politics.

Any social group, according to Gramsci, must have a hegemonic world view in order to gain power. In this sense, the concept of hegemony is organic, which is created by the conscious and reflective human agents. Moreover, hegemony is not metaphysical, as it is reproduced, modified, channeled, renewed and defended which also has a praxis side that describes a process of conscious intellectual reflection.[14]

Gramsci argued that a productive communication should be developed with the other social groups which are "friendly" to the proletarian class, and assimilate them when necessary. Only with assimilation of the others the concept of hegemony can be extended. There is the dialectical strategy of the dominant group in the society. Either it can use force by the penal system of the army and police to overcome its opponents, or it persuades them to accept and assimilate the norms. The latter was more preferable as the concept of consent came into the picture. Although a non-hegemonic alliance can achieve power through a coup d'etat, it would be lacking the sufficient hegemonic legitimacy. In this respect, a historical block will be able to take power, only once it has developed a universal perspective which transcends the particular self interests of its component parts. As the hegemony needs and requires leadership that is actively created, the alternative hegemony should also develop a political, economical and moral leadership. The concept

of leadership is given a dominant role as the social group is required to exercise some kind of a leadership before the critical moment of social upheaval.

Gramsci places the civil society within the superstructure. Moreover he differentiates two levels of the superstructure; at the political and the civil society levels. The political society is for coercion. It is for the purpose of assimilating popular masses to the type of production and economics in a given period. On the contrary, in the civil society, hegemony of a social group over the entire national society is exercised through so-called private organizations such as the church, the trade unions, and the schools.[15] The state can make use of the private institutions of the civil society that would become the tools of coercive force (religion, political parties become the constituent components of the state apparatus). All institutions have an ideological and practical effect upon the individuals.

By explaining the revolutionary tactics, Gramsci indicates the importance of war of maneuver on the one hand, and the war of position on the other. The latter represents a progressive undermining of the 'trench systems', and permanent fortifications whereas the other stands for the taking control of the society in one move by overthrowing the coercive agencies of the state, and its military forces. He then further discusses that in a relatively democratic order, like the liberal democracies of the western developed countries, the war of position should be applied, at least in the first instance. The emerging group should wage a war of position aimed at both freeing the minds of the individuals from distortions of bourgeois ideals through a process of hegemonic critique and at the

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[14]Paul Ransome, *Antonio Gramsci: A New Introduction* (United Kingdom: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), p. 139.
[15]ibid, p. 132.

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same time freeing their bodies from the contradictory practices of bourgeois society through the gradual subversion of these practices.

The main argument that Hayek has put forward about the scientific knowledge is that because of its natural character of the economic knowledge, it can not be known by individual people or by collective founded organizations as his conception of knowledge changes due to time and space.[16] On the other hand he argues that scientific knowledge does not constitute the totality of *the knowledge*, but just a part of it. In this sense the knowledge can not be known wholly as it is a short lived phenomena. In this sense, the assumption that the economic knowledge, which is supposed to be pre-coded generalization, can not be centralized. Of course Hayek's argument is the means to justify his free-market orientation, that became very popular under the Conservative governments of United Kingdom and the Republican governments of USA. But there appears to be an elective affinity between his understanding of the impossibility of centralization of the knowledge-in this sense economic knowledge-and the confrontation of the new left with the old left, which gains legitimacy from the assumptions of Hayek.

From the above statements of Gramsci and Hayek, it is obvious that the political revolution which the old left has always put on the agenda became meaningless as the consent of the individuals to the existing "non-hegemonic hegemony" was never achieved within the civil society. The transformation of the society should be started from the civil society, which would inevitably became a political revolution, only if the hegemonic block can successfully achieve the social revolution first. In this respect, the new left, having been influenced by Gramsci's writings proposed that demands of groups rather than the

working class should be addressed within a political framework. Hayek's argument about the impossibility of the centralization of knowledge is also important for understanding the new left, as the concept of *the truth* was indirectly criticized by him. In this respect, there seems to appear the acceptation of different truths, which changes in time.

The Western Marxist alternative, that was influenced by the writings of Lukacs, Gramsci, Frankfurt School, Fromm, Sartre, Gorz has always been critical of the existing socialisms in the Eastern Block. Moreover it has also been critical of the liberal capitalist tradition of the Western developed countries which incorporated the social democratic tradition. Their interests were in a more wider spectrum, which included ideology, culture, psychology and everyday life of the individual, which gave birth to a different understanding of the concept of "revolution"; that is a change within the existing civil society which included ideals such as democratic self management, local autonomy and cultural transformations. This critical approach was obliterated by Stalinism, fascism and Keynesian engineered welfare state throughout the 20th century. It was only with the movements of 1968 that the new left emerged as a political actor in the social life which realized a comprehensive social upheaval against the old.

The new social movements which emerged in the late 1960s aimed to overcome the US hegemony in the post-war period and to vitalize the aims of the October Revolution, which was never achieved. As Wallerstein argued, the old left was constituted by three main actors: The Communists of the Third International tradition, reformers and social democrats of the Second International that were able to hold on governmental posts in the liberal democratic tradition of the Western countries and the nationalist movements

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[16]Hillary Wainwright, *Yeni Bir Sol Üzerine Tartışmalar: Serbest Piyasacı Sağa Cevaplar* (İstanbul:

that succeeded in gaining their political autonomies in the post-war period-especially in the so called third world countries.[17] The mistake of the old left was to over-estimate the hegemonic institutionalization power of the US in the post-war period to stop the extension of the old left take overs as it was the case in Korea, Greece and Chile. Moreover, the US deepened the conflicts that raised between the Second and Third Internationals which paved the way for a diversification of the working class movements in global sense.

On the other hand, the US, while achieving success on the two cases, concentrated on the stabilization of the radical nationalists movements in the Third World that became a success except for some minor examples, such as Vietnam.[18] While the inadequacy of the old left became a fact to confront the ideological hegemony of the US, the new left, first, tried to reform the existing old tradition from within, but as it failed to do so, it directly opposed everything that it represents that reached its peek point in the 1968 movements. The new left accused the old left for five sins:

> Degeneration... for loosing the radicalism when some kind of success
> was achieved by their anti-systemic attitudes; neglect... for not
> realizing or consciously not understanding the interests of the
> dispossed and the dis-advantageous groups (sub-proletarians, ethnic
> and racial minorities and the women); weakness... for the inadequacy
> to handle the problems of exploitation, militarism, imperialism and

> racism in the world system; together committing a crime... for gaining
> some advantage from exploitation of the disadvantageous groups; and
> confidence... for underestimating the real interests of the sub-
> categories within the social structure and a full commitment to the
> ideologies of themselves.[19]

One of the outcomes of the assault of the new left was that the power of the north over the south was declining as the former began to have some problems to control the south. The proof of this can be clearly seen in the Vietnamese, Iranian and Nicaraguan Revolutions. It is more likely that the dominant state systems, both at the national and international level have some problems in controlling the movements of the age groups, gender and the ethnic groups. This trend is stronger in the north, that is the developed countries, and to a lesser extent influential in the less developed countries of south. As long as the long-term consequences were concerned, the relationship between the capital and labor could not be achieved like in the case of the pre-1968 period, that is based on full consensus.

On the other hand, the state is less likely to have the power of controlling the civil society by the interests of the power holders. The proof of this can be the democratization wave in the post-1973 period in Argentina, Portugal, Spain and Greece. With all these developments came the crisis of the dictatorship of the proletariat in China, Czechoslovakia and Poland that speeded up the process of 1989 in the Eastern Block. The attempt to confront with the Chinese ruling bureaucracy in Cultural Revolution was a failure, just because it was stabilized by Mao, not because it failed to do so. Moreover, the

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[19]ibid, pp. 100-101.

incidents of Prague 1968 was another sign that the dictatorship of the proletariat, at least in its Soviet model, was threatened from within the existing party apparatus. These two developments, on the other hand, showed us that the old left was very eager to stabilize the existing situation by even using force against these movements.

In this context, 1968 in the global sense was both a product and a producer. It was a product as it stood against everything that the old represented -both on the left and the right. It was also a producer of new political organizations, parties and movements born out of the 'failed revolution'.[20]

The leftist opposition grew outside the established communist and social democrat institutionalization. Although a great ideological difference was vital within the movement, from Maoists to anarchists, the unifying aspect of these separate wings in Italy was a belief , which can also be generalized for the whole 1968, in that the revolution should be a deep process of social and cultural transformation, that the center of gravity should be outside the sphere of conventional politics with an orientation towards new structures of popular control, that the transition to an egalitarian, democratic order would be less a matter of economic crisis than of conscious, imaginative and bold political activity.[21] Especially, the last point was a revolutionary break through from the historical materialist conception of the "scientific socialism", which turned out to be a tendency towards what Marx would call "utopian socialism". In this sense, collective intellectual was favored rather than the cadre-based leadership of the existing political parties which was a mass based, anti-vanguardist approach. The conquest of the state power was given a secondary place, as the most important achievement was to transform the relations within the civil society first.

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[20]ibid, p. 96.

This trend also re-constructed the image of socialism on the basis of social relations, culture and politics as well as economic life. It was inevitable that the post-1968 organizations and movements would give birth to a different understanding of politics into the agenda, which were heavily influenced by this trend. The formulation of this were the new social movements and the newly formed or effected left parties of Western Europe which are trying to achieve some kind a hegemony, in Gramscian sense, in order to transform the society.

The new left and the new social movements both were rooted in the struggle against the same general conditions: bureaucratization of authority relations, industrial and urban decay, the ecology crisis, the arms race and widespread social anomie. The new social movements embraced themes that were already present, in a less developed form, in new left radicalism: A popular grass roots insurgency centered largely outside the dominant public sphere, an emphasis on qualitative or post-materialist goals, a cultural radicalism, demands around collective consumption and the most important of all, which represents a split from the established left partie; the non-classed based identities.[22]

As Duverger argued, the communist parties are based on the organizations of cells.[23] The contact of the cell to another is forbidden as the horizontal link between these organs are missing. The horizontal link can only be established with the trade unions and youth organizations in order to increase the dominance of the party over them. Moreover, the strict centralization of the communist parties led their vertical links stronger as the cell

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[21]Boggs, *Decline*, p. 193.
[22]ibid, p. 207.
[23]Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (London: Methen & Co Ltd, 1969).

is only allowed to contact with its section which is the above organization within the hierarchy of the communist parties.

It was just this point that the monolithic understanding of the communist left was widely criticized by the new movements that brought into the discussion of the existing political structures, most importantly political parties. The new social movements mobilized the people outside the established organizational framework, not on the basis of a "single" issue like class struggle. The main focus turned out to be the politics of identity and politics of opposition. This also brought its own danger as these differences in turn have the potential to become the basis of ideological differences and barriers. The old paradigm was represented by economic growth and distribution that was related to the welfare state of the post-war period.[24] The military and social security were the two priorities of the developed society against the communist threat, that brought the control of the social. Moreover, the material progress and freedom and security of private consumption were the main tools for the society to be more "civilized", which in turn brought the concept of progress. It was argued that the development process was a linear one. In this paradigm, internally organizations appeared to be formal, large scale representative entities, while the pluralist or cooporatist interests of the political party competition, which was based on majority rule, were intermediated, externally. The actors of the old paradigm were acting as socioeconomic groups which were involved in distributive conflicts. The new paradigm aims at the preservation of the environment, human rights, peace and unalianated forms of work which was grounded on the autonomy of the personal and identity. The organizations, internally, are informal and spontaneous

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[24]David Plotke, "What's So New About New Social Movements?", *Socialist Review*, no 1, pp. 81-102.

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which allows vertical differentiation. Externally, politics is based on protests that are formulated in predominantly negative terms. The actors of this new paradigm are acting on behalf of ascriptive collectivities.[25]

The closest thing to the spirit of the above statements was the establishment of the Green Parties, first in Western Germany and then in other Western European Countries. This can be conceptualized as an attempt to re-structure the post-Marxist, post-materialist tradition into a party organization and an electoral framework; that can be called as "anti-party party". Turning into an organizational institution brought the danger of making politics within the established public sphere, which forced these trends to lose ground in the grass root radical movements.

The Green Parties, throughout Europe, moved towards being typical social democratic parties. Moreover the difference between the SPD and the Green Party eroded as the social democrats started to champion green themes in their electoral campaign and legislative work. The case was more or less the same in the northern European countries, where mainstream parties started emphasizing environmental issues.

On the contrary, the southern parts of Europe saw a different trend, in which the radical left tried to be united within the same party while maintaining their different ideological orientations. This is also a tactical approach to the falling trend of the communist parties, that is heavily effected by the assault against the monolithic, democratic centralist, old left parties. In Spain, after the communist party split into three factions as pro-Moscow, social democrat and the left that was influenced by new left, a project called the 'United Left' came into existence, which positions itself in the left of

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[25]ibid.

social democracy. The minor left nationalist parties, a pro-Moscow small party and the ones that are effected by the local activism of the social movements vitalized themselves in the party without getting into the debates about the ideological unification. The importance was being there with their different identities without rendering the interest of the other. The union have 40,000 members and received 8 percent of the votes in the last elections.[26]

In Italy, the Communist Party changed its name and constituted a coalition of the traditional communists, radical and green non-communist radicals. In this sense, the ones who left the Communist Party due to the invasion of Chezchoslavakia and the pro-invasionists are in the same party, without changing and realizing their political differences.

These projects, just like the Green Parties in the Northern Europe, are trying to achieve a structural change within the civil society. This differentiates them both from the traditional social democrat and communist parties which try to change the economic structure by using the state apparatus. Moreover, in order to overcome the bureaucratization of the organizations, the horizontal links within the parties are encouraged. The local activism is another dynamic behind the idea of these newly founded parties, which is mostly implemented by the non-Marxist radicals.

On the contrary, the inadequacy of the new left and the new social movements to constitute a coherent program in order to make changes within the civil society became a fact. As the movements organized in the form of political parties, the more they become a part of the established political system. They loose their radicalization as they become vote

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[26] Boggs, *Decline*, p. 289.

oriented parties. Although some parties do not seem to place themselves within the left-right paradigm[27], they mostly are placed on the left of social democracy.

In very general terms, three main trends in Marxism became visible in the 1990s. The first one was the revolutionary interpretation of Marxism, which lost its credibility with the breakdown of the Eastern Bloc experience in 1989. Although some political parties are strictly tied to their Bolshevik heritage, it is likely that no serious alternative can be developed within this line of Marxism.

The second line of thought was represented by the social democrat experience of the Western developed countries. As the social democrats lost their ties with Marxism in the 1960s, their evolutionary character eroded. They became the parties of status quo. Especially in the 1990s, it is likely that they can not bring new visions, and only slow up the process of the erosion of the welfare state.

The communist and the social democrat experiences were unable to catch the dynamics in three ways. The first one was the inadequacy of these parties to integrate new kinds of opposition dynamics into their ideological and practical domains. In this respect the green, the women and anti-militarist activism could not be incorporated, as they became the movement of the streets. Secondly, with the process of bureaucratization of the organizational bodies, these parties became just like any other right wing party, in which the vertical dimensions of democracy were strengthened, whereas the horizontal relations were discouraged. In other words, they turned into what they fought against. Thirdly, the indifference of these parties, both in terms of discourse and practical experiences from any other political party, alienated a considerable amount of leftists from

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[27]For example, the German Green Party sits at the center of the Bundestaag, although the social democrats

these organizations. The outcome was a new interpretation of Marxism with a new organizational framework.

The third alternative was developed in the post-1968 period in Europe, as the green parties and the left of the social democrat parties came into existence. The significance of them was the importance that they gave to politics outside *the political*. In this respect, although the parliament was a tool for politics, the street radicalism on the basis of worker, green and peace movements became the means to transform the civil societal relations from grass roots. In order to be the organizations of the grass roots, the channels of democracy were opened in all respects.

This trend is more or less applicable to all parts of the world. The Worker's Party in Brazil, the United Left in Spain, Refundazione Communista in Italy, the new left experience in Sweden, the PDS and the Greens in Germany should be handled in this respect, as they all are the products and the institutionalization of the new left in global sense. What aimed was to lose ties with the bureaucratic heritage of Marxism and to re-invite the radical character of leftism into the picture.

sit on the left, whereas the conservatives sit on the right of the parliament.

CHAPTER III

The Road to Unification: The Transformation of the

Socialist Left in Turkey

This chapter will focus on the *general* history of Marxism in Turkey from the late

Ottoman period till the establishment of Freedom and Solidarity Party (Özgürlük ve

Dayanışma Partisi, ÖDP) in 1996. As there existed 49 factions in the year 1980, it would

be impossible to investigate all of them in a single chapter. Rather, the main parties and

organizations that are related to ÖDP will be taken into consideration mainly. In this

respect, only the Communist Party of Turkey (Türkiye Komünist Partisi, TKP), Worker

Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TİP), Socialist Worker Party of Turkey (Türkiye

Sosyalist İşçi Partisi, TSİP), the Liberation movement (Kurtuluş), Revolutionary Path

(Devrimci Yol, Dev-Yol) and Communist Labor Party of Turkey (Türkiye Komünist

Emek Partisi, TKEP) will be taken into account in the 1970s and 1980s as these

organizations are directly linked to the formation of the ÖDP. Moreover, the ideological

orientations of the pre-1971 TİP, the People Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (Türkiye

Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi, THKP-C) and People Liberation Army of Turkey (Türkiye

Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu, THKO) will also be analyzed, as all of them are one way or

another related to the organizations of the 1970s' and the 1980s'. Although there might

seem to be displacing the details of the trends of Marxism in Turkey, it would be better to

mention other divisions, as only in this respect, the unification of the Marxist trends in

Turkey under ÖDP can be conceived. In the last part of this chapter, a short analysis of the

socialist left, both in the 1970s and the 1980s will be given, which would try to label the socialists left of Turkey in terms of its general characteristics.[28]

Unlike Europe, the history of socialism both in the Ottoman and the Republican period is not rich. The first Ottoman socialist organization, Ottoman Socialist Party (Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası) was founded in 1910 in İstanbul and joined the Second International. In 1913, its activities were banned by the government of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki). As the First World War broke out, the left was suppressed by the government. It was only in 1918 that the left wing intellectuals headed by Şefik Hüsnü Deymer founded the Worker and Peasant Socialist Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası). It tried to constitute a left front, but failed to achieve it.

On the other hand the TKP was founded in 1920 by Mustafa Suphi and his followers. Due to the state of emergency, which was the outcome of Sheikh Said Rebellion, it was closed, and its supporters were arrested. Until 1946, except for the illegal TKP, there was no socialist party in existence. Following the transition to multi-party rule in 1945, TKP tried to legalize itself. Due to the Plennum decision of the TKP, the independent socialist Esat Adil Müstecaplıoğlu founded the Socialist Party of Turkey (Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi) in 1946. Meanwhile, another TKP member, Şefik Hüsnü did not recognize the Plennum decision and founded another organization called Turkish Socialist Laborer and Peasant Party (Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi). At the time there appeared an attempt from the basis of the two parties to be unified, the government closed them. Meanwhile, Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, who was imprisoned for the 1938 navy riot, got out

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[28]The list at the end of the thesis would be useful for following the parties and organizations.

of prison and in 1954, founded the Fatherland Party (Vatan Partisi). The aim of the party was:

> ...to put the interests of the nation above those of the state in order to bring
>
> real freedom, and put an end to the anti-democratic laws, to start the second
>
> *Kuva-i Milliye* movement against unemployment and inflation, to start the leap
>
> for heavy industry...[29]

In the last day of 1957, Hikmet Kıvılcımlı and 38 members of the party were arrested on the grounds that the party was a communist organization, which brought the end of the party.

It was only in February 13, 1961 the Worker Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TİP) was founded by 12 İstanbul trade union leaders. They did not attract any attention till Mehmet Ali Aybar became the president of the party. At the beginning, the working class did not pay attention to this new socialist party, as the non-worker strata were dominant within the party.

In the first congress of TİP, on 9-10 Feb, 1964, Aybar stated that socio- economic development was only possible through a non-capitalist path of development because the state was given a dominant role in the planned but mixed economy. According to him, the banks, foreign trade, insurance companies would be nationalized and the private sector would be re-shaped in order to make progress. TİP should win the power to fight and change the system within the legality of the 1961 constitution. Another important figure in the party, Behice Boran, stressed the importance of political independence as well as

economic self-sufficiency. In the adopted program, the word "socialist" was nowhere to be found. In the 1965 elections TİP sent 15 MPs to the parliament, which was the only success of the socialist party tradition in Turkey as in the preceding years, none of the legal socialist organizations could have attracted this amount of support on the basis of counted votes.

In the period between 1961-1965, TİP adopted the non-capitalist way of development. In the summer of 1966, Aybar stressed the importance of the indivisibility of the national liberation struggle and the struggle for socialism. In this sense, the second national liberation movement would be connected to building socialism in the country. Meanwhile, Mihri Belli who was an ex-member of the TKP formulated the two staged revolution of Turkey in the Second Congress of TİP as opposed to Aybar's formulation. Belli argued that first the full national independence of Turkey should be maintained, and it was after that the socialist program could be applied. In this sense, the stage of national independence would be a struggle against the feudal and imperialist forces. It was stated that Turkey was a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country, in which the capitalist relations were weak in character. Due to the special conjuncture of Turkey, the main contradiction was not between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but between imperialism -namely the American imperialism-, and the "enslaved" Turkish people. In this sense, the aim would be a national democratic revolution (Milli Demokratik Devrim, MDD).[30] The people were considered as the secondary force in the first stage of revolution, as the civil-military elites were given a dominant role. In this sense, the first duty of the proletarian socialists was to make national democratic revolution and then the socialist revolution.

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[29]Emin Karaca, "Türkiye'de Legal Sosyalist Partiler". *Gelenek.* No 52 (!996), pp. 93-98.

The first ideological split that was defined in clear-cut boundaries was in the Third Congress of TİP in 1968. In the congress three groups emerged within the party. The first one was the supporters of Aybar. Aybar, without consulting on the organs of the party, condemned the Soviet invasion of Prague in 1968. The "Aren-Boran clique"[31] accused Aybar of forming an authoritarian dominance within the party. They argued that Aybar was not acting as a scientific socialist, as Aybar was for a peaceful transition to the socialist society. On the other hand, both groups supported the indivisibility of the socialist and national democratic character of the Turkish revolution as opposed to the supporters of Mihri Belli, who became the third part in the debates within the party. Although Aybar and Aren-Boran's understanding of socialist revolution was accepted in the third congress, it was Belli's understanding that would influence the armed struggle tradition of Turkish Marxism.

In the 1969 elections, TİP could only send two MPs to the parliament as the election system was changed in order to avoid the small parties to form groups within the parliament. After this election, the socialist left lost its confidence in the parliamentary means to achieve power and radicalized. Idea Clubs Federation (Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu) changed its name to Revolutionary Youth (Devrimci-Gençlik, Dev-Genc). The supporters of the socialist revolution of TİP lost their ground in the organization, and the national democratic character of the revolution became more emphasized. In this respect, four main trends in Turkish Marxism can be stated. The first three, as analyzed

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[30]*Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi* vol. 7 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1988), p. 2144.
[31]Referred as the Aren-Boran clique (Aren-Boran Kliği) because of the surnames of Sadun Aren and Behice Boran, who were the important figures of the opposition within the party.

below born out of the cleavages within the Dev-Genç, whereas the fourth represents the continuation of TİP.

The first movement that emerged out of Revolutionary Youth was known as Proletarian Revolutionary Light (Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık, PDA). They had a superiority among the other movements in ideological terms at the beginning of the Revolutionary Youth days. From these days onward, they strictly stayed as Maoists. Before the 1971 intervention of the military junta, they founded the Revolutionary Worker and Peasant Party of Turkey (Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi, TİİKP), which was an illegal organization. There occurred a split within the movement in 1972, as a group which was headed by İbrahim Kaypakkaya left and formed Communist Party of Turkey-Marxist Leninist (Türkiye Komünist Partisi-Marxist Leninist, TKP-ML). The main difference of TİİKP from TKP-ML became crucial as the latter formed its armed division called Worker and Peasant Liberation Army of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu, TİKKO). TİİKP group founded Worker and Peasant Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Köylü Partisi, TİKP) in 1979. In 1988, Socialist Party (Sosyalist Parti), under the leadership of Ferit İlsever, was founded by the supporters of PDA. It aimed to achieve a unity among the socialist left but failed to do so, and later turned its name into Worker Party (İşçi Partisi, İP), this time headed by Doğu Perinçek.

The second movement was named as People Liberation Army of Turkey (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu, THKO), that was popular in İstanbul, which was mainly founded by the members of Revolutionary Student Union (Devrimci Öğrenci Birliği, DÖB). The significance of this movement was firstly to form a military organization. According to them, the political organization was to emerge out of an armed struggle. Secondly, the

popular figures among the students were in the leadership cadre of the organization.[32] After the amnesty of 1973, the remaining cadres of the organization got out of prison. A debate started within the followers of the THKO, as a split occurred between two groups. The first group that emerged out of the debate had Maoist orientations, and referred to as the People's Liberation (Halkın Kurtuluşu). Later, they adopted the views of Enver Hoca of Albania and formed the illegal Revolutionary Communist Party of Turkey (Türkiye Devrimci Komünist Partisi, TDKP) in 1980. In the 1990s, the TDKP turned itself into Labor Party (Emek Partisi). As it was closed by the state security court, the party changed its name to Labor's Party (Emeğin Partisi).

The second group that emerged out of the debates within the THKO was the Communist Labor Party of Turkey (Türkiye Komünist Emek Partisi, TKEP). The party was founded on illegal basis in the First of May, 1980. One of the aims of the party was to form the unity of the communists in Turkey. They declared their Leninist orientations and formed the Communist Party of Kurdistan (Partiye Komuniste Kurdistan), which was an autonomous organization of the Party, but was still the part of the local branches that were existing in the Turkish part of the country. In this respect, from 1980 to 1989, TKEP organized three united general congresses with the other branch of the party, and seven plennum meetings were held.[33] The Partiye Kommuniste Kurdistan, on the other hand held two individual congresses. All of these activities were held on illegal basis. It was only in 1994 that the TKEP would be legalized with other several socialist organizations under the name of United Socialist Party (Birleşik Sosyalist Parti, BSP).

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[32]The three important fugures, Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan, were later executed, being the only ones who were sentenced to death by the government of Nihat Erim.
[33]Teslim Töre, "TKEP". *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi* . vol. 7 p. 2266.

The last and the most important movement, that was born out of the Dev-Genç was People Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi, THKP-C), which was headed by Mahir Çayan. The importance of the movement became very crucial in the late 1970s, as the most widely supported socialist organizations of the period, that were Dev-Yol and Kurtuluş, claimed to be the followers of the THKP-C thesis. In this respect, the thesis of Çayan need to be explained, as both Kurtuluş and Dev-Yol are two of the major groups being represented in ÖDP.

Unlike the other movements, THKP-C stressed the importance of both theory and practice. For example, THKO has never had an intention to develop a theoretical side to their movement. On the other hand both movements represented a new interpretation of the national democratic movement of Mihri Belli that started from the concept of "people's war". The determinant factor of one movement, according to Çayan, to be revisionist was the importance of the issue of armed struggle, and how it was conceived and analyzed by that specific group.

The crisis of socialism at the end of 1960s was seen as the outcome of the pacifist tendencies of the Marxist movement, worldwide. This pacifist understanding was due to the threat of a nuclear war. In order to overcome this status quo, just like in the Cuban experience, any movement should not put the guns aside. In this sense, the approach to violence was not taken with a utilitarian conception, but it was conceived as a "must", in order to break the chain of capitalism.

The split between the national democratic revolutionaries and the group, which would form THKP-C later was due to some ideological differences. Çayan and his followers accused Belli of acting as a pacifist, both in the national and international basis.

On the other hand, Belli's conception of the incidents of 15-16 June[34] greatly differed from the conception of Çayan's. The radicalization of the workers in İstanbul decreased the importance of them in the eyes of Belli, as he took them as a threat for a united front which would be composed of the military-civil elites, petty bourgeoisie and the peasants. As the military elite's conception of Turkish society was classless, they might see a threat in the incidents, which would harm the front. On the other hand Çayan took the demonstrations as a sign for the fulfillment of the objective and subjective conditions of the working class in Turkey. The only thing missing was the lack of a vanguard, revolutionary party. His organization understanding was from top to bottom, in a Leninist model, in which he calls it democratism. The laborers need not to be the majority in the first stages of the party, as the leaders of the organization may be coming from petty bourgeois origins.

Çayan accused Doğan Avcıoğlu[35] on the other hand of repeating the economist thesis of Second International, which defended that the proletariat can not lead the revolutionary movement. In this sense, the national democratic revolution for Çayan was the continuation of Lenin and Trotsky's thesis of the post-1905 period, as they put emphasis on the ideological vanguard position of the working class in the coming revolution, which would be bourgeois democratic in character, but would evolve into a proletarian revolution automatically. Çayan generalized national democratic revolution for

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[34]In 15-16 June 1970, thousands of workers demonstrated and fought with the police and the military against a law, which would harm their right to organize that was trying to be implemented by the AP government.

[35]Doğan Avcıoğlu was the ideologist of the magazines Yön and Türk Solu. His famous book "Türkiye'nin Düzeni", influenced young leftists. Throughout his life he never considered himself as a Marxist and supported a military takeover.

all colonial and semi-colonial countries, as he thought that the world capitalism was in the final crisis.

On the other hand, against the guerrilla tactics of Regris Debray, who emphasized the militaristic side of the movement and blamed the urban cities as bourgeois, Çayan stressed the political side of the movement -although, armed struggle was a must. Moreover, he was against the distinction that the rural was proletariat and the urban was bourgeois, as it was not a Leninist statement. He argued that the route of the revolution would be from the rural to the urban, just because the proletariat was inadequate in terms of quantity. But this, according to Çayan, did not mean that the proletariat would not be guiding the movement ideologically, although the urban was seen as in the hands of imperialism.

The heritage of Çayan[36] and his followers deeply effected the cadres that were imprisoned after the military intervention of 1971. Coming from the roots of THKP-C, several organizations were formed. The most important of them were Dev-Yol, Kurtuluş, Marxist Leninist Armed Propoganda Unit (Marxist Leninist Silahlı Propoganda Birliği, MLSPB), THKP-C Emergencists (THKP-C Acilciler) and Revolutionary Left (Devrimci Sol, Dev-Sol). Among them only the Dev-Yol and the Kurtuluş would be taken into account, as they are the only two organizations that joined the ÖDP.

In 1976, the Revolutionary Youth Associations Organizations was founded in Ankara by Ankara Democratic High Student Associations, Ankara High Student Associations, İstanbul High Student Culture Association, İstanbul High Student

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[36]In March 30th, 1972, Çayan and his 10 followers were killed in Kızıldere, except Ertuğrul Kürkçu, who is now a member of ÖDP.

Association and Erzurum High Student Association.[37] The aim of the organization was to stand against the rising trend of the radical right. In other words, "the problems were taken not as student problems, but as a problem of organizing against fascism".[38]

In May the First 1977, the magazine Revolutionary Path (Devrimci Yol) started to be published, and sold nearly 100.000 copies[39], which was the greatest number among other organization or party magazines. They followed the thesis of Mahir Çayan, but tried to vitalize the theory by emphasizing different aspects. The thesis of Çayan was tried to be re-incorporated which would not be based on a dogmatic conception. In this respect "Fatsa[40] was both a critique and a continuation of Kızıldere".[41] For example Resistance Committees (Direniş Komiteleri) was a different understanding of organizing the masses against rising fascism. As "...fighting against fascistic terror should be taken into account as a problem of revolution"[42], the main theme of them was to unify the laborers in a self-defense organization. These committees would in turn provide the basis of the coming government, that would serve as the Soviets in the Russian Revolution in 1917. On the other hand, another significance of the committees, was that they were open to people coming from Justice Party (Adalet Partisi), Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and even National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP). The only commonality between them was being against the fascist attacks.[43]

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[37]İnönü Alpat, *Randevuyu Dağa Verdik*, (Ankara: Bireşim Yayınları, 1996), p.17.

[38]ibid, p. 17.

[39]Ahmet Samim, "Sol", *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*, (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1990), p. 178.

[40]A small town in the Black Sea region. The independent candidate of Dev-Yol won the local election in the late 1970s. Just before the 1980 military intervention, the state forces organized an operation and arrested all revolutionaries in the region.

[41]Oğuzhan Müftüoğlu, "Devrimci Yol Üzerine Notlar", *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansikopedisi*, vol 7, p. 2250.

[42]ibid, p. 2250.

[43]Rafet Ballı. *Sosyalist Sol Konuşuyor*. (İstanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1989) p. 101.

Another significance of Dev-Yol was the analysis that the confontrations within the society were evolving into a civil war. In this sense, the armed struggle could only be realized, if the masses would be incorporated into the fight.[44]

Moreover, there always appeared a demand to turn the organization into a party structure, as the history of Dev-Yol can be called as "a history of trying to become a party". As stated "the things that were won would be partial, as long as a party, which would be a vanguard-fighter organization, can not be realized".[45] On the other hand, it was also argued that, "...because of the subjective circumstances, Dev-Yol could not develop a party which would lead the people".[46] There was not a pre-given party model in the writings that appeared in the Dev-Yol magazine, as the party would evolve in the existing situation. The committees would be the front organizations of the emerging party organization.

The Kurtuluş movement, on the other hand, tried to bring a new outlook to Marxism in the 1970s. It was in 1975 that the major split came into existence with what was known then as the Dev-Yol supporters and the Kurtuluş movement. The supporters of Kurtuluş accused the THKP-C for not paying attention to the evolutionary side of the revolution. Çayan, according to them disregarded the importance of organizing in grass root level, which was a distinct reality within itself, apart from the political revolution. By attacking THKP-C for overemphasizing the importance of Kemalism, they attacked the Kemalists for being chauvinists. The revolution of Turkey would be an anti-oligarchic, anti-imperialist in its character.

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[44]Terörizm ve Anarşi Değil, Faşist Terör ve Faşizme Karşı Mücadele, *Devrimci Yol Dergisinden Seçmeler*, (İstanbul: Gökkuşağı, 1996), p.461.
[45]ibid, 461.

In 1976, the magazine, Liberation Socialist Magazine (Kurtuluş Sosyalist Dergi, KSD) started to be published. At the end of the 1970s, the theoretical magazine of the movement was selling 12,000 copies, while the weekly published magazine sold twice as much as the theoretical magazine.[47] In the first Congress in 1979, there appeared two main orientations within the movement. The first group that emerged out of the congress argued that the working class should be taken as the basis in organizing, but on the other hand other non-working class elements, meaning the Kurdish dynamic, should not be disregarded also. On the other hand, the second group emphasized the importance of organizing only in the working class, and argued that "the importance of fighting against fascism would be marginalized, which would make it a waste of time and energy".[48] In the post-1980 period, the latter group left the movement, and started to publish a magazine called Socialist Worker (Sosyalist İşçi) in Europe.[49] The first group founded a new organization called Liberation Organization of Turkey and North Kurdistan (Türkiye ve Kuzey Kürdistan Kurtuluş Örgütü).

In the late 1970s, the movement stressed the importance of a unity within the Marxist left of Turkey. It was argued that the theoretical debates could only be realized on the basis of practice, which would in turn bring the cooperation among the socialists. Even the existed situation in the pre-1980 Turkey signified a revolutionary party to be

[46]Oğuzhan Müftüoğlu, "Notlar", p. 2251.

[47]Ahmet Samim, "Sol".

[48]Mahir Sayın, "Kurtuluş Hareketi ve Türkiye ve Kuzey Kürdistan Kurtuluş Örgütü", Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, vol 7, p. 2262.

[49]This group became known with their Trotskyist (mainly the followers of Tony Cliff) tendencies and founded the Socialist Worker Party (Sosyalist İşçi Partisi), in April 1997.

constituted. In this sense, the aim was to unite the socialists in a single revolutionary party, that would maintain the unity of the movement, only if it was rooted on the class basis.[50]

Both Dev-Yol and Kurtuluş movements approached critically to the Chinese and the Sovietic models of socialism, which made them the independents of the Turkish Marxism in the 1970s. Unlike the other movements, they emphasized Turkey's own path to socialism, by not legitimizing their thesis on the division of the international socialist arena between the Sovietic, Chinese, Albanian, Cuban, Yugoslavian cases.

Apart from the three division, which were mainly the PDA, THKO and THKP-C within Dev-Genç in the 1970s, the heritage of TİP in terms of legal political parties came into existence. Unlike the independents such as Kurtuluş and Dev-Yol, most of these parties were pro-Soviet organizations in ideological terms.

The first legal socialist political party of the post-1971 period was the Socialist Worker Party of Turkey (Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi, TSİP), which was founded in June 16th, 1974. Just like most of the other socialist organizations, the party declared the importance of the unity of the socialists in the second congress that was held in 1976. With its pro-Sovietic orientations, the party supported the detante policy. The TSİP accused the first TİP by acting within the limits of bourgeois democracy. According to them, "the struggle should exceed the limits of legalism, that would incorporate the struggle for independence with socialism".[51] By supporting the socialist revolution against the national democratic revolution, they accused the followers of the latter by overemphasizing the

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[50]Erdal Kara, Saim Koç, Mahir Sayın, M. Yavuz, "Geçmişin Değerlendirilmesi ve Öncü Savaşı", *Sosyalist Solun Birlik Serüveninden Bir Kesit*, (İstanbul: Devinim Yayınları, 1995) pp. 8-12.
[51]Ahmet Kaçmaz, "TSİP", *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, vol 7, p. 2258.

importance of the military. In the 1977 local elections, the party won 28,850 votes. In the elections of 1979, the party increased its votes to 65,135 (1,31%).[52]

The other pro-Soviet party that emerged out of the 1970s was Behice Boran's TİP. After the party was closed in the military intervention of 1971, the second TİP was founded by the followers of Behice Boran in April 1975. It was argued that the divisions in the socialist left was not vital in the working class. The aim of the party was to organize the unity of the working class in Turkey. The party was a pro-Soviet organization that supported the detente policy of USSR. It was argued that the policy of peaceful mutual existence worked for the benefit of the revolutions in the third world, as the US was unable to intervene because of a threat of a nuclear war. Another significance of TİP policy was to "encourage the university students to confront the police with the fascists".[53]

While mentioning political parties with Sovietic tendencies, the most important pro-Soviet organization of the time, that is TKP should also be taken into account. Unlike TİP and TSİP, TKP was still illegal. In this sense, the history of TKP from the 1920s to 1990s can be regarded as a history of an attempt to become legalized. Till 1973, TKP defended a non-capitalist way of development in Turkey. After 1973, a fusion of the national democratic revolution and the progressive democracy thesis started to be emphasized in their thesis. According to them, Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) should be supported in the first stage. The CHP government, when it comes to power would legalize TKP, and in the coming elections, TKP would form a group in the parliament. Realizing the strength of TKP, CHP would move towards the left of the center and would form a coalition with TKP. In this second stage, the national

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[52]ibid, p. 2259.

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democratic revolution would be achieved. In the last stage, as the majority would be obtained in the parliament, the system would be transformed to socialism.

The thesis of TKP could never be realized. Moreover, TKP lost the popularity that it gained in the Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, DİSK). The other left organizations that tried to find a place in the confederation were strongly opposed by the TKP, which decreased the effectivity and the number of the leftists (including both the followers of TKP and the others) in the organization.

The 1980 intervention put an end to the rising trend of socialism in Turkey. All of the political parties, as well as organizations were closed by the military junta. It was after 1980 that new ideological and political orientations were started to be developed within the socialist left of Turkey.

Nearly 1000 people were arrested as being accused of Dev-Yol members, and nearly 36 cases were taken into account in the post-1980 courts of Turkey. As Oğuzhan Müftüoğlu argued, the failure of Dev-Yol was due to the fact that the amateur relations were not transformed, which meant that the revolutionary platform was not accomplished. This was largely because of the failure of the movement to turn itself into an organized revolutionary party.[54]

Following the junta of 1980, thousands of Dev-Yol supporters left the urban areas and tried to establish guerrilla warfare.[55] The first document of Dev-Yol following the intervention came out in November 1980. Generally, it was argued that the unity of left

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[53]*Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, vol 7, p. 2234.
[54]Ballı, *Sosyalist Sol Konuşuyor.* p. 79.
[55]For further details, see İnönü Alpat's *Randevuyu Dağa Verdik.*

was seen as a must against the junta, and it was believed that the military would soon leave the power. The second document came out in January 1981. This time, the power of the military was more realized, and it was stated that the number of the members of the Resistance Committees should be decreased. Moreover, the rural guerrilla movement started to be taken more seriously. The most important political maneuver was the establishment of a front[56], in order to struggle against the military in August 1982. It was composed of Dev-Yol, TKEP, Kurdistan Worker Party (Partiye Kerkeriye Kurdistan, PKK), Socialist Fatherland Party (Sosyalist Vatan Partisi, SVP), supporters of Mihri Belli, Worker's Voice (İşçinin Sesi)[57] and several smaller groups. Moreover, TİKKO joined the front not as a participant, but only as a viewer. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon, and the guerrilla camps could no longer be used by Dev-Yol, which jeopardized the existence of the organization.

Meanwhile, Taner Akçam[58], who was a member of the center committee, proposed a different argument. He thought that the movement was unable to understand the new forms of class struggle in Turkey. According to him, Dev-Yol could not be a part in the political arena of Turkey, if the same thesis of Dev-Yol would be used. He formalized his own thesis in a 32 paged document in Germany, in which he emphasized a break through from the economist interpretations of Marxism, which condemned the old thesis as "scientific socialism is out of date, it would only remain as a political utopia".[59]

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[56]The name of the front was The United Struggle Front Against Fascism (Faşizme Karşı Birleşik Direniş Cephesi).
[57]TKP's English division (İşçinin Sesi).
[58]Taner Akçam left Turkey as early as 1977, due to political reasons.
[59]"Terörizm ve Anarşi Değil...", *Devrimci Yol Dergisinden Seçmeler*, p.461.

The remaining years in Dev-Yol saw the organization split, generally, in three main parts. The first one was represented by Taner Akçam and his followers in Germany, who argued that a new organization should be established on the local and mass grounds, as Dev-Yol could not meet the demands in Turkey. The second wing was also present in Germany, Revolutionary Worker Movement (Devrimci İşçi Hareketi, DİH), which emphasized the importance of Dev-Yol, without changing the basic thesis and the organizational structure of the movement. The third part was mainly constituted by the middle way approaches that was mainly the ideas of the prisoners in Turkey. This third party became significantly important as they started a debate within the movement in Turkey, which would in return bring the co-existence of different views in a single left party.

The debates started within Dev-Yol in 1992 as a document was submitted to the sympathizers. In the document, it was stated that the left in the world transformed itself into a new direction. As Müftüoğlu argued "the traditional left has eroded: in the real existing socialisms, the ruler and the ruled relationship was institutionalized".[60] Moreover, it was argued that the debates within Dev-Yol should be handled in the grass roots of the organization, not within the realm of the leadership of the movement. The most important argument of the document was that there was an attempt from Dev-Yol to include the other segments of the left in Turkey. The debates should firstly focus on the theoretical issues of the transformation both in the world and in Turkey. By these guidelines that would be incorporated from the theoretical debates, the practical solutions should be handled.

In the first round of the debates, it was seen that Dev-Yol could no longer constitute itself as a homogeneous organization, as there appeared different understandings of the process of change by different segments of the movement. But generally, it was conceived that a new form of revolutionary movement should be achieved. In Melih Pekdemir's words "what remained behind from the romanticism of Che was: to rebel. Either you become a reformist, they would *give* it to you piece by piece, or be a revolutionary and *take* it as piece by peace".[61]

The debates soon evolve into the question of organizing as a legal political party. On this issue, İbrahim Sevimli from the Worker's Voice (İşçinin Sesi) stated that the importance should be given to what and how the people see Dev-Yol as an organization. In other words "It is not a question of legality or illegality, it is a question of a legitimacy in the eyes of the public".[62] On the other hand there were attempts to incorporate different movements into the organization. In this sense, the questions of women, environment, and national questions should also be analyzed and taken into account on the basis of class struggle.[63] Moreover, the question of revolution started to be conceived not as a one-night incident, but as a gradual process. This approach could be taken into account in parallelity to the Resistance Committees of the pre-1980 period. The building of socialism would be starting from within the system, which would root itself with the power organizations. A critical approach to the Sovietic model of socialism was re-

[60]Oğuzhan Müftüoğlu, "Geleneksel Sol Anlayış İflas Etti". *2000'e Doğru*, 9th August 1992, year 6, no 38, p. 8.
[61]ibid, p. 14.
[62]"Divan Konuştu Söz Bizde", *2000'e Doğru*, 6th December 1992, year 6, no 49.
[63]Mahmut Memduh Uyan, "Tartışma Süreci, Geçmiş ve Gelecek Üzerine...", *Tartışma Süreci Yazıları 2*, (İstanbul: Bireşim Yayınları, 1993), pp. 25-60.

vitalized with the restoration of capitalism in the real existing socialist countries. The struggle of social change would be in the realm of democracy.

While the change in Dev-Yol could even be analyzed from the outside, the same observation could be made for the Kurtuluş movement in the 1980s. In the disorganized environment of the Marxist left of Turkey, the movement stressed the importance of a unity, on the basis of accepting the differences between the groups. The reason of this was the observation that none of the groups had hegemony in the 1980s in order to unite the Marxist left. It was demanded that "The existing organizations would tie themselves to the newly established organization as the latter exceeds their limits and a consensus appears".[64] This understanding, according to them, would automatically bring unity on the basis of action, while preserving the differences among the organizations.

While the transformations were deeply felt in the Dev-Yol and the Kurtuluş Movements, the Sovietic party organizations started to transform, and adapt themselves to the newly emerged international conjuncture. The turning point in the history of TKP and TİP was the agreement of unity between these two organizations in 1988.[65] The name of the newly established party was United Communist Party of Turkey (Türkiye Birleşik Komünist Partisi, TBKP). On October 10, Boran died, and the mass support in her funeral was conceived as a green light for the political refugees of TBKP to return to Turkey.

It was stated that the newly established party would try to be a mass, democratic political party. While struggling for democracy -as it was not conceived as a means but an end in itself, which would remain as *the* target- different social classes were to be

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[64]Kara, *Sosyalist Solun Birlik Serüveninden Bir Kesit,* p. 41.

cooperated with.[66] Within this realm, the term democracy meant as a multi-class, multi ideological, multi-party regime as the president of the party Nihat Sargın and the general secretor, Nabi Yağcı[67] has stated. According to Haydar Kutlu, Leninism came to and end, and should be overcame. Taking different types of antagonisms on the basis of class struggle, was a mistake yesterday, as it was a mistake in that time.[68] In the draft of the party program, there appeared the acceptation of a democratic variant of capitalism, which was a new political orientation. In this sense, the state should be civilized, and a re-constitution of democracy should be vitalized. The concept of class interests was replaced by human interests, as the modern Turkey should find its place in the world on respectable grounds. [69] As Haydar Kutlu stated "the age of imperialism was over, as a new age emerged in the world".[70] Moreover, the unity of the socialists in Turkey was taken as the mission, which in turn meant that it was not only a project of the unity of TİP and TKP.

On the other hand Sadun Aren and some individual socialists[71] started on a project of a new socialist party. As Aren has stated "the newly established party would be a mass, civilized party"[72], which would reject the Stalinist legacy that would unite the left under a legal, pluralist, peaceful and humanist project.[73] The TBKP dissolved itself in the congress that was held in 12-14 January, and stated that Socialist Unity Party (Sosyalist Birlik

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[65] The significance of the project of unification can only be understood, if it is remembered that at the end of 1970s, some members of TİP were dismissed from the party. The accusation was that they demanded a unification between the TKP and TİP.

[66]Deniz Kavukçuoğlu, "Çağdaş Bir Komünist Parti", *2000'e Doğru*, June 12th 1988, Year 2, no 25, pp. 32-33.

[67]Nihat Sargın, "Demokrasi Süreci Gelişiyor", *2000'e Doğru*, October 23rd 1988, Year 2, no 44, p. 22.

[68]Haydar Kutlu, "TBKP Misyonu Sürecektir", *2000'e Doğru*, May 13th 1990, Year 4, no 18, pp. 28-30.

[69]ibid, 28-30.

[70]*2000'e Doğru*, December 30th, 1990, year 8, no 52, pp. 58-61.

[71]Oral Çalışlar, Serhat Baygan, Aziz Nesin, Korkut Boratav, Haluk Gerger, Muzaffer İlhan Erdost, Murat Belge.

[72]"Sadun Aren'den Yasal Parti Girişimi", *2000'e Doğru*, March 4th 1990, year 4, no 10, p. 27.

Partisi, SBP) should be the place for the socialists to go. In 15th January of 1991, SBP was founded by TBKP, TSİP , some members who left the Socialist Party, the four MPs, who left the Social Democratic People's Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP) and the individual socialists. In this sense, it was the first socialist party to have deputies in the parliament in Turkey after 1971.

It was the first time that the party with wings came into existence with this project. By defining its existence on Marxist grounds, it showed the possibility of a project of unity, and the most important of all, it did not conceive its being as an end in the unity project, as it did not place itself in the center of the left.[74]

Following the unity of different organizations of the Marxist left in Turkey at the beginning of the 1990s, there appeared another important event, which was the Kuruçesme Meetings. Except Dev-Yol[75], different segments of the socialist left of Turkey joined the meetings. Two main orientations became visible after the meetings: The first one was a Marxist party that was open to the social democrats who want to be a part in the project, which was symbolized by SBP. The other one was called the Revolutionary Socialist Block (Devrimci Sosyalist Blok, DSB)[76], that participated in the 1991 general elections, on the basis of individual candidates.[77] Parallel to the Kuruçeşme Meetings, other meetings were held in Europe also. The significance of the meetings according to Atilla Aytemur was as follows: "all the factions of the left stands on the same ground, the

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[73]*2000'e Doğru*, March 18th 1990, year 4, no 2, pp. 20-21.
[74]Atilla Aytemur, *ÖDP Kendini Anlatıyor: Partileşme, Ütopya, Sorunlar, Öneriler*, (İstanbul: Güncel Yayıncılık, 1996), pp. 23-49.
[75]Dev-Yol as an organization did not participate in the meetings, as there never was an organization in very classical sense in the 1990s. Moreover, the leader cadres of the movement such as Oğuzhan Müftüoğlu, Bülent Forta and Melih Pekdemir were still in prison.
[76]It was constituted of individual candidates from Freedom World (Özgürlük Dünyası), Labor's Flag (Emeğin Bayrağı), Kurtuluş, and Socialist Turkey Party (Sosyalist Türkiye Partisi).

truth is not in the hands of a monopolistic group, unifying the left under one roof is a must and a possibility and the form of this organization would be a pluralistic model".[78]

In the local elections following the general elections of 1991, SBP joined its forces with Kurtuluş, New Course (Yeni Yol)[79], Labor (Emek)[80] , Socialist Politics (Sosyalist Politika)[81] and the individuals that called themselves as Politics Between Floors (Zeminlerarası Politika) and named the block as United Socialist Alternative (Birleşik Sosyalist Alternatif, BSA). The bloc turned itself into a political party in June 1994, as United Socialist Party (Birleşik Sosyalist Parti, BSP). The regulation of the party realized the different platforms that were composed of different organizations, which enabled the platforms to be represented in the party organs, regardless of the sizes of them. One of the best signifier of the different approach of the party to the new social movements was the acceptance of transsexuals as members in the party.

While BSP was composed of TKP, TİP, TSİP, Kurtuluş, Emek, Sosyalist Politika, Yeni Yol and the individuals, it should not be seen as an arithmetic addition of the different groups, as the effect of unity was more in a geometrical sense. Meanwhile, the largest organization of the pre-1980 period, that is Dev-Yol, started to debate the legalization of the movement on the basis of a political party.

It was rather a movement coming from the grass roots. In Tarık Zafer Tunaya Hall, 200 people met. The following meeting was held in Mecidiyeköy Culture Center, in which around 700-800 people were participated. A committee was elected about 40

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[77]Ertugrul Kurkçu, *ÖDP Kendini Anlatıyor*, pp. 115-143.
[78]Atilla Aytemur, *ÖDP Kendini Anlatıyor*, ibid. pp. 23-49.
[79]The Trotsky's group, which is the Turkish section of Fourth International.
[80]The TKEP followers now referred to as Emek group in the 1990s.
[81]This group split from Socialist Turkey Party (Sosyalist Türkiye Partisi) and joined the bloc.

people that started to have debates with the BSP. In the following 5-6 months, in 50 cities, meetings were held. While these discussions were held, the whole segments of the left were tried to be captured into this project. For example Anatolian Democracy Movement (Anadolu Demokrasi Hareketi) and the 68'liler Vakfi were trying to establish a political party. 200 people elected a committee of 17, and these delegates joined the Dev-Yol delegates that were elected. The newly formed committee that was constituted of 47 delegates named itself as Constitute the Future Together Party Attempt (Geleceği Birlikte Kuralım Parti Girişimi, GBK).[82] Together with BSP and the independents four meetings were held in two weekends in İstanbul. The topics analysis of the world, Turkey, organization and the party were discussed. A committee that was composed of 6 GBK, 6 BSP and 3 independent members founded the newly established party called Freedom and Solidarity Party (Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi, ÖDP).

The history of Turkish Marxist groups and parties that are related to ÖDP can be placed in three different groups: The legal socialist parties, the illegal socialist parties and the illegal socialist groups that could not transform themselves into political parties.

As noted, the second TİP and TSİP saw themselves as a continuation of the first TİP, which forced them to form first a political party, then organize in the masses. In this respect, they joined the elections. On the other hand, it must be noted that not all of their inclination was towards staying or acting on legal grounds, as their tendency was to overcome the existing establishment.

Contrary to the understanding of forming legal socialist political parties, TKP and TKEP stayed as illegal throughout the 1970s. For TKP, it was not an end in itself to stay

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[82]Erkan Kayıtlı, ÖDP Kendini Anlatıyor, pp. 104-105.

illegal, as it always tried to express itself on legal grounds. For example, the DİSK experience in the late 1970s should be viewed in this respect. As TKP was *the* follower of the official Soviet line of communism, it always conceived the changes both within and outside Turkey from the eyes of Soviet thesis. On the other hand, TKEP never had an intention to turn itself into a legal organization, as its theoretical roots were based on THKO. The struggle, according to them, would be based on the illegal vanguard party. Unlike TKP, the formation of the party was in the 1980, before the junta, as it was conceived that only with an illegal party that the liberation struggle could be achieved.

Unlike the two political party lines, both legal and illegal, Dev-Yol and Kurtuluş could not transform themselves into illegal *parties*. Rather, they stayed as front like organizations. Especially Dev-Yol, with its loose organizational structure always had a tendency to form a party, and the outcome of this trend could be seen in the writings in Dev-Yol magazine. Unlike the other parties that were mentioned, both Kurtuluş and Dev-Yol supporters gathered around magazines first. It was first Devrimci-Gençlik magazine. After a split occurred, Kurtuluş Sosyalist Dergi on the one hand, and Devrimci-Yol on the other were started to be published, which was the reason that those movements were named as Dev-Yol and Kurtuluş. In this respect, the magazine names became the names of these groups.

In general terms, the legal and illegal socialist parties, as well as the illegal organizations could not exceed the limits of the Leninist tradition in the 1970s. The authority of the leadership cadres were unquestionable. The outcome of "deviant" ideas was to be labeled by being revisionist. Being "revisionist" and "anti-Marxist" were the two reasons for cadres to be dismissed from the organizational structure of the parties and

organizations. The centralization of power in the hands of the few decreased the effectivity of the cadres in the mass level. Only Dev-Yol, although they declared themselves as Leninists, can be considered as being non-Leninist, as on the mass level, the cadres had the right to form policies on the basis of local needs which were not dictated by the central organization. Moreover, there was not a pre-determined formulation of a political party to be formed, as the conjuncture would determine the structure of the vanguard party, which distanced themselves from the Leninist party structure. The outcome was the mass support, especially from the ghettos of the metropol cities.[83]

Conceiving the cleavage structure on the basis of capital and labor in the society was another determinant factor of the socialist left in Turkey. The simple formulation of "infra-structure determines the super-structure" was the thesis of the Marxist left in Turkey, throughout the 1970s. Moreover, all the parties and groups tried to justify their cleavage structure on the basis of the splits within the world communism. Parties such as TİP, TSİP and TKP can be conceived as the pro-Sovietic organizations, whereas Kurtuluş and Dev-Yol approached critically to both the Chinese and the Soviet thesis. For Kurtuluş and Dev-Yol, the road to socialism in Turkey would be based on its own path, which enabled them to develop their platform on the basis of the realities of Turkey.

Throughout the 1980s, all of the movements and parties that were mentioned above transformed themselves in several ways. First of all, the need to stay unified, with keeping their differences, was finally understood by them. The practical steps towards forming ÖDP should be conceived in this respect. Issues such as women, ecology, as well

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[83]Note that the Dev-Yol magazine was selling 100,000 copies a week in the late 1970s. In the 1997 of Turkey, only a comic magazine, Leman, can sell 100,000 copies a week. Especially, when we compare the population of the 1970s of Turkey and the 1990s of Turkey, the number would be more effective.

as socialist democracy were started to be debated by the organizations, which in turn brought both the realization of different dynamics outside the class struggle, and the horizontal aspect of democracy within the organizations. Especially, the movements and parties that are represented in ÖDP faced this transformation period, and changed their theoretical and practical orientations in this manner. The outcome was a party that both inherits the old and the new left principles in a single organization.

CHAPTER IV

ÖDP: Between the Old and New Politics.

In this chapter, ÖDP will be analyzed in terms of its new approach to politics, as its political orientations to the practical problems in Turkey will be taken into consideration. Moreover, the disagreements within the party on the basis of important issues such as the Kurdish problem will be elaborated. Lastly, in terms of realization of the party's intentions will be taken into account.

ÖDP's new approach to politics shows itself on three grounds: The political symbols that the party uses, approach to the political on the basis of issue politics, and the meetings that the party organized. Additionally, the uniqueness of the party shows itself on the organizational structure, which would be analyzed. Lastly, an analysis of ÖDP will be given, in terms of realization of its priorities.

The significance of ÖDP starts from the different approach they brought to the political symbols of socialist tradition in Turkey. Although it is important for a political party to say different things that should have a meaning for the people, it is as equal as important *how* that political party expresses itself in the media and the meetings. In this sense, the part of the socialist left that is now being represented in ÖDP has learned this process, in other words "by being consciousness of *how* we are saying what we want to say"[84], ÖDP is trying to create a new political culture in Turkey. The outcome of this view was firstly represented in the logo of the party.

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[84]Erkan Kayıtlı, *ÖDP Kendini Anlatıyor*, p. 104.

It was nearly a tradition that the socialist organizations, both legal and illegal, used red and yellow characters in their party emblems. Moreover, it has always been a rising fist, sickle, hammer or a star that was always chosen. Although they might represent a communication language in the 1970s, they had no meaning in the 1990s, as the communication means has changed. In this sense, a new political culture for ÖDP started from the logo of the party. Its rising sun, that was colored by blue and red is a revolutionary approach to the new politics understanding. The red represents the struggle, fire, love, and the solidarity understanding of the left, whereas blue stands for freedom, peace, independence, sea and the sky.[85] Even the word 'freedom' was written in a disorganized way in order to signify the 'freedom of the letters', as opposed to the word 'solidarity' as it was written in a straight way.

The outcome of this new approach has also showed its impacts on the meetings of the party. Unlike the other red and yellow placards of the other socialist parties, ÖDP's are color oriented, which serves as a message to the other socialist/non-socialist political parties that "politics can be done in a smiling way"[86]. One of the good examples of this approach was the dressings of the ecologist wing of the party in the First of May demonstrations in 1996, wearing nuclear reactor dresses, and carrying placards that condemn the nuclear energy.

The messages that were written on colorful placards also can be seen as a sign which distinguishes them from the other socialist parties. For example, in May First demonstrations in 1997, the Socialist Power Party (Sosyalist İktidar Partisi, SİP) has written the slogan of "either the gang rule, or *socialism*", whereas ÖDP puts the slogan as

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[85] Emre Senan, *ÖDP Kendini Anlatıyor*, p.93.

"either the gangs or *democracy*". This is one of the typical examples that the party tries to fill the slogans with the reality of that specific time. In this sense, the term socialism do not have one to one correspondence with the existing political reality of Turkey, whereas the term democracy does. In not any single meeting, the terms revolution and socialism were written on the placards. This kind of approach is the outcome of the party's new outlook to the concept of politics.

After the party was founded, a campaign was started in order to vitalize the political orientation of the party. The campaign was formalized in the slogans as "Do not be a dead in the war, unemployed on the street, restricted in politics" (Savaşta Ölü, Sokakta İşsiz, Siyasette Yasaklı Olmayalım). This slogan captures the main concern of the party as the establishment of peace in the south-eastern region of Turkey, to find a solution to the unemployment problem, and the democratization process. These three issues, as will be analyzed, constitute the main priorities that the party is trying to build the opposition in Turkey.

It has been nearly ten years that the PKK and the military confrontations caused thousands of deaths in the region. Nearly half of the financial budget of the country goes to the war. ÖDP seeks for a cease-fire between the fighting parties. By proposing this, they argue that the governments should take into consideration, the People's Democracy Party's (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, HADEP) MPs that could not enter the parliament in the last general elections due to the ten percent national threshold.[87] For ÖDP, HADEP is

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[86] ibid, p. 87.
[87] HADEP formed an election coalition with other political parties in the general elections of 1995, under the name of labor, peace and freedom bloc. The other political parties of the bloc were Socialist Power Party (Sosyalist İktidar Partisi, SİP), and the United Socialist Party (Birleşik Sosyalist Parti, BSP). The bloc won nearly %4,5 of the total votes in the election.

considered to be the true representatives of the people living in that region. In this respect, ÖDP tries to place itself as a third party in the confrontation between PKK and the state. For them, it is not the military means to achieve stability in the region, but the political means, that is opening the communication channels, in order to talk about peace.

The search for a peaceful solution showed itself in the campaign of "one million signatures for peace" (Barış İçin Bir Milyon İmza Kampanyası) which was initially implemented by a party member Eşber Yağmurdereli. The party supported this campaign, without representing the parties' identity, as the most important thing was not to gain political support, but a democratic opening in the system, on the issue of peace. The document was signed even by the businessman Sakıp Sabancı, which did not prevent the party to declare that they were supporting the campaign. This is a good example that the party is willing to side with the other segments of society for as long as it serves the purpose of strengthening the party policies. The campaign ended on the May 17, 1997 by the arrival of the 'peace train' to Ankara, with handing of the peace petition, to the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

By proposing civil solutions instead of military confrontations, the party, indirectly, supports issue of freedom of speech. In this respect, the demand for peace serves for two purposes. The first one is the establishment of peace in the region, and the second one is the opening of the communication channels between both the fighting sides and HADEP that serves as a tool for defending the freedom of speech in Turkey.

Another issue, which is given priority in the agenda of ÖDP was the issue of privatization wave in Turkey. Accordingly, the State Economic Enterprises (Kamu İktisadi Teşekkülleri, KİT) were making profits till the 1990s, although the investments were cut

off. The party conceives the issue, not as a means to overcome the production problems, but as a re-constitution of capitalism in global scale. In this sense, it defends the public sector against privatization. Moreover, the perspective of state owned work places would be transformed in a de-centralizing way which meant a new model of management in the work places. According to the proposed model, the employees of the work places would elect a committee in order to supervise the production process.

The committees that ÖDP supports would be constituted by every single employee that is working in that organization. The supervising process would be constituted by opening all the accounts of the work places to the employees. This supervising committees would have the right to demand technical reports from the commanding managers, which may result in the vetoing of the manager administrations.

Moreover, these supervising committees, as well as outside organizations would further be controlled by consumer, ecologist associations, which would serve as counter-power sources in the daily struggles.[88] If achieved, this kind of management would give birth to dual power structures, which would endanger the being of the system. The strategy can be seen as not expropriation of the means of production, but the enlarging of public ownership, that increases the democratization process in terms of equality.

The reasons for defending the public sector in the way ÖDP proposed, according to them, would decrease the power of the elected governments on the production process as the latter has always been subject to changes as new governments came to power in Turkey. Moreover the tax evasion, which is very common in Turkey, would eventually decrease as it is nearly impossible to do it in state owned sectors. The monopolistic

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[88]"Biz Toplumsal Olandan Yanayız", *ÖDP Broşür Dizisi.*

character of some state owned organizations, if privatized, would cause those sectors to be monopolistic in the hands of the private sector, which would increase the prices of the products.

On the national level, privatization would increase unemployment, which would in turn effect the most un-organized segments of the society, namely the women. Moreover, if the privatization would ever be successful, it would only relax the budget for a short time, that meant that there would be more spending on the war, which according to the party, links the privatization issue to the Kurdish issue and the peace.

The daily developments in the country also affected the policy orientation of the party, as it was the case in DYP and Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) coalition government. Political Islam was conceived as a threat on the way for "reaching the contemporary civilization level" especially by the left and Kemalist circles. The outcome was the indirect support of the intervention of the Turkish military that would eliminate the threat. On the other hand, the right parties of the political spectrum were giving credit to the authoritarian understanding of political Islam, as they were afraid of loosing their conservative votes. In this respect, ÖDP again tried to be a third part in the debates.

ÖDP looks at political Islam, both from a political and a social perspective. In this respect, the party sees the emergence of Political Islam as a reaction to the republican state. As the party co-president Saruhan Oluç stated, "the state in Turkey imposes the identity upon its citizens".[89] The authoritarian secularism of the state should be replaced by 'libertarian laicism', in which the sphere of freedom and democracy should be enlarged, that would automatically lead to a re-definition of the public sphere. The right to practice

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[89] Saruhan Oluç, "Yüksek Tansiyon", *HBB TV,* May 7, 1997.

religion should be protected by laws. Moreover, "Everybody should be free in choosing their life styles, as well as religion and clothes".[90]All the religious education, providing religious cadres such as imams as well as building mosques should be given to the denominations and the community. By defining a new understanding of secularism, the party sees the main solution to the revival of political Islam on the basis of democratization. In other words, "Neither the religion should determine the state, nor visa versa".[91] In order to express the political orientation of the party on practical grounds, a meeting was held on May 25, 1997 in Sultanahmet, İstanbul.

The slogan of "Not Sheria, not Intervention, free democratic Turkey" (Ne Şeriat Ne Darbe, Özgür Demokratik Türkiye), was the outcome between the two paths of authoritarianism, that is an authoritarian Islamic state and the possibility of an intervention of the military. The meeting was also supported by HADEP, DİSK, and the Public Laborers Union Confederation (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikası Konfederasyonu, KESK), in which more than 40,000 people participated.[92] Some participants brought mirrors to "enlighten the dark Turkey" by sunlight, whereas others protested the government with tolls and bells. It is also important to mention that there were children with their parents in the meeting, which is very unusual for any political party demonstrations in Turkey. After the meeting, the garbage that was left in Sultanahmet Square was put into garbage boxes by party officials -who mostly were women party members-, that has got the label of

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[90] "Demokratikleşme İçin Taleplerimiz", *ÖDP Broşür Dizisi*.
[91] Ufuk Uras, "ÖDP, Kültür ve Siyaset", *Düşler* no 13, (1997), p. 10.
[92]"Refahyol'a Tepki Mitingi", *Sabah*, May 26, 1997, p. 21.

"Prosperity-Path"[93], which signified the coalition of DYP and RP. In this respect, both the ecologist and the pro-woman status of the party was taken one step further.

Although the party was mainly founded by socialists, there were other non-socialist contributors to the making of the process. The anti-militarists, non-socialist feminists, as well as ecologists, who were mainly coming from the Green Party which was closed at the beginning of 1990s, involved in the project. The outcome was the realization of different non-class identities to be incorporated into the party, which effected the political orientations of the party. In this respect, Bergama incident is one of the good indicators of this inclination.

The firm Eurogold started to build a factory in Bergama in order to search for gold with cyanide. A committee was formed by ÖDP, CHP, KESK members and the village headmen, that was constituted by nine members, in order to organize against searching gold with cyanide in the region. In November 9, 1996, 5000 people with nearly 100 tractors closed the road between İzmir and Çanakkale to traffic for 8 hours. On November 25, a meeting was held in Bergama with coffins representing the poisonous effect of cyanide. In the following month, another demonstration was held with 1500 people, in which 200 of the males were half-naked. Lastly, in the 12th of January, a referendum was held in Bergama. Out of 3232 recorded electors, 2865 people participated in the voting process, in which all of them said no to search for golden by cyanide.[94] In May 19, 1997, a picnic was held in Bergama, in which the anti-cyanide supporters attended. The significance of the incident was the celebration of the decision of the Council of State on stopping the search for gold with cyanide. The mediatic character of the Bergama

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[93]The coalition of RP and DYP was named in the media as Refahyol government.

activities were largely founded by ÖDP members, which can be taken into consideration as the new way of doing politics, which also received the attention of the media.

The old cleavage between the labor and the capital (although it is accepted as one of the most important cleavages), is treated equally with other dynamics of change in the society. As noted, the struggle for the new society would not only mean to come to power in political terms but also means "the polarization of the daily life, that would be incorporated with the utopias".[95]

One of the best indicators of this statement was the bicycle tour that the party has organized in Bakırköy, İstanbul, at the beginning of 1996. The party members, as well as the president of the party Ufuk Uras joined the incident. It was the first time that such a "non-political" act was being organized by a political party. The signifying aspect was to show that even issues which were supposed to be resting on the private sphere of the liberal democratic tradition, have inherently, have the potential of being politicized. In this respect, just like an ordinary bicycle tour can be politicized, the other spheres of the private sphere can also be politicized, which would in turn bring the need for the re-definition of he public sphere.

Another significant indicator of this inclination was the organization of the picnics in the weekends by the party members. Those picnics, both serve as tools for integrating the party members and supporters to the party environment, as well as the politicization of another "non-political" sphere of social life. For example, after the decision of the court, on behalf of the demands of the Bergama committee, another picnic was held in Bergama, in which the peasants, as well as the party members were participated. In conjunction with

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[94]*ÖDP, Partiye Açık Mektup*, no 0.

these initiatives, the party shows its willingness to support issues which are not confined with class based conflicts.

The most debated campaign that the party organized was the campaign of "one minute of darkness for an enlightened Turkey" (Aydınlık Türkiye İçin Bir Dakika Karanlık), which requested from people to close their lights at 21:00 PM every night.[96] This campaign was the largest supported civil act in the post-1980 period. Millions of people participated in this campaign by turning off their lights. Again, the public was not informed that the campaign was originally initiated by the ÖDP cadres, as it could decrease the participation rate. In this sense, it was very successful in mobilizing the masses both in the poor and the rich areas, and surprisingly, the urban rich neighborhoods were more interested in joining the protest.

In support of protesting the Susurluk incident bills were hanged on the walls by the party and two slogans were used as "Either the gangs or democracy", and "Let Ağar, Çiller and Bucak be sued". The İstanbul branch of the party arranged a meeting that started a march from Tünel to Galatasaray in Beyoğlu, with more than 1,500 people carrying candles in their hands on December 7.[97] This campaign was also supported by a meeting in Kızılay, Ankara in which ÖDP, KESK, HADEP and some other democratic mass organizations had participated. More than 15,000 people attended the meeting.

In relation to Susurluk incident, some other mediatic meetings and demonstrations were also held by the party. In October 9, 1996, the İstanbul organization of the party arranged a press declaration in front of the city toilets of Taksim, and declared that only

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[95]ibid.

[96]The campaign was an act protesting the Susurluk incident, in which an MP, a police chief and a political murderer were caught in a car accident in the same car in Susurluk.

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the people could flush the toilets and let go off this dirt in Turkey, referring to the corruption of politics.

In October 17, the ÖDP supporters with brooms in their hands held a demonstration in Ankara. More than 8,000 people attended the meeting with placards writing as "either they will held accountable for their deed, or the people would sweep them away".[98] In December 8 of the same year, ÖDP arranged a meeting in the border gate of Kapıkule to "prevent the escape of the guilty people to other countries", who are in relation with the Susurluk incident. 500 ÖDP supporters attended the demonstrations[99], and it also was broadcasted by the media. Especially with Susurluk meetings and demonstrations, the party supports its will to do politics in a smiling way.

It is not only the party's new approach to politics that is new, but the organizational structure is unique when compared to the other political parties of Turkey. In the fourth article of the party by-laws, it is stated that the individuals, the groups or the platforms have a legal right to express their views and attitudes both to the public and to the people.[100] The significance of this article can be seen in the publications of the platforms within the party, as nearly all the platforms have a publication, that both discusses their positions in the party, and their views about the events that took place, both in the party and in Turkey. Legitimizing the publication of each platform enabled them to publish several magazines.

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[97] *Yeniden*, no 19, (1996) p. 45.
[98] ibid.
[99] ibid.
[100] Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi. *Program & Tüzük*, p.36.

Kurtuluş group publishes the Socialist Liberation (Sosyalist Kurtuluş)[101], which serves as a tool for elaborating both the theoretical and daily political orientations of the party. The youth organization of the platform also publishes a magazine called Young Liberation (Genç Kurtuluş). Some Dev-Yol supporters gathered around the magazine called Again (Yeniden)[102], which is a monthly based magazine. Moreover a theoretical magazine called Revolution Again (Yeniden Devrim), and a youth magazine called Young Friend (Genç Arkadaş) are also published by this group. On the other hand the supporters of the Left Bloc (Sol Blok) also publish several bulletins within the party, as well as publishing a theoretical magazine called Socialist Politics (Sosyalist Politika). Even Yeni Yol group, which is one of the minor groups within the organization publishes a monthly magazine called New Course(Yeni Yol). The Emek group in the party, that was composed of the ex-Communist Labor Party of Turkey supporters also publish a magazine called Labor (Emek), but it could only be published three issues from the date of the establishment of the party. As can be seen, although the different platforms publish their own magazines which can be labeled as de facto publishings of *the party*, there was only one publishing which could be considered as the direct representative of the party which was called The Word (Söz). The magazine has started to be published in the days of BSP, and declared that it dissolved itself in April 1997, so that a new magazine of the party can be published.

Within the party, one of the most important pressure group is the women. Although other groups in the party are represented in the party assembly on the basis of

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[101]Not to be confused with the weekly published magazine called Kurtuluş, as it is the publication of illegal Dev-Sol, that changed its name to Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C) at the beginning of 1990s.

negotiation based consensus, the women, if they become candidates, are given a quota of 30 percent at least, in the organs of the party. This 'positive discrimination' is only present in ÖDP, by the will of the party members. In this sense, the 30 percent quota, that CHP used, can not be considered as equal as ÖDP's, as the decision of CHP was implemented by the Socialist International. As Uras stated, "it was the women in the party who demanded a positive discrimination, which makes it, not a decision that was taken from top to down but visa versa".[103] The behavior of the women within the party gives birth to different situations sometimes, as in the meetings of women's day of March 8, 1997, the 3000 ÖDP women in İstanbul did not take the ÖDP men in their meetings.[104]

On 18-19 May of 1997, the forum of ÖDP women was held in Ankara, with 160 women participating from 20 provinces.[105] The four main headings can give us hints about the discussions of the women within the organization: Positive discrimination and the quota, women in business life, women in political Islam, and women in war. In the forum, most of the women supported the 30 percent quota, whereas it was argued that the quota alone was not enough. In this respect, the weekly meetings in the parties should consider the women also by not being so late, whereas some groups demanded financial support from the party organization for the raising of children in order to involve actively in politics. One of the good examples of decisions that was taken in favor of women was that in Çankaya Congress of the party in 15th of June, a room was given to the children to play in Çankaya ÖDP building, while their mothers would be in meetings.

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[102]*Yeniden* is selling 10,000 copies a month.
[103] Ufuk Uras, "Türkiye'de Siyasi Gündem", (Conference given at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, March 24, 1997).
[104]Nermin Özdemir, "Artık Omuz Atsanız da Düşmeyiz", *Yeniden*, no 23 (1997).
[105] Gülnur Savran, "ÖDP'li Kadınlara %30 Kota Yetmedi", *Sabah*: June 3, 1997.

Another important factor that should be mentioned when talking about the gender issues in the party is that, on any grounds violence, both in the party and in the private sphere against the members, would be punished, that is would be sent to the disciplinary committee, by the organs of the party. The members here represents mostly the women.[106] Moreover, this article is more important for the trans-sexual members of the party, as the party does not discriminate the people on the basis of sex, including how they lead their lives. There are currently registered five trans-sexual members of the party in Beyoğlu, İstanbul, which is not only a revolutionary act in the socialist left, but also in the political history of Turkey.

It should be noted that the organization of the women within the party is still a debatable issue, as there are two views concerning the issue. The first one argues that the organizational structure should be a platform based on sex discrimination, whereas the other group argues that the women and the feminists should form a pressure group within the party.[107]

The recognition of the different platforms of the party serves for two purposes. The first one is the realization of the internal democracy within the party. As Uras stated "it is an attempt to create a party on the basis of how we want to create a world",[108] meaning that the differences should be kept so that no other identity can be imposed upon the other. This approach was taken one step further, as the members of the party have the right to join the meetings of all the organs of the party, including the party assembly, the

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[106]The Çankaya organization of the party in Ankara, agreed on the decision that violence against the children should also be punished by the party disciplinary committee and will propose this to the general congress of ÖDP, in the autumn of 1997.

[107]Aynur İlyaslıoğlu, "ÖDP ve Kadınlar", *Birikim* no 82, (1996).

[108]"Ufuk Uras'la Söyleşi", *Mürekkep*, no 7, (1997) p.8.

central administration board, the women, the youth and the autonomous platform meetings within the party such as Kurtuluş and Yeni Yol.

Secondly, the realization of different autonomous platforms prevent a further split from the party, as most of the platforms agreed on the need of a unification of the socialist left in Turkey. This is further rationalized as one of the mistakes of the left in the pre-1980 period was seen as the split of the parties and the groups. In the by-laws of the party, it was stated that, action is based on the program and by-laws of the party, but vitalization of the decisions is based on willingness.[109] On the other hand, it is stated that, nobody can organize a counter-action on the decisions that were taken by the party, that reminds us the fact that ÖDP is still a *party*, with an organizational discipline.

Although the instant reactions on the basis of issue politics, can be considered as the outcome of the policy of the party, some platforms in the party were not happy with the situation. For example after the broom meeting, a document in Ankara was opened for signing by the members of Sol Blok[110], which accused the top party cadres of arranging "middle class oriented protests". The criticisms were mostly coming from the left bloc opposition within the party, that was composed of the Sosyalist Politika supporters.

Moreover, it was not only the broom meeting that was criticized. It was also the campaign of 'one million signatures for peace' which was brought into the picture by them, as it was seen as a "targetless campaign, which was not even talking about in which country the peace was demanded".[111] It was added that it was intentional that the party

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[109]*Program & Tüzük,* p. 36.
[110]This group is formed within the party by Sosyalist Politika supporters and some individuals.
[111] Cihan Keskin. "ÖDP ve Siyaset", *Sol Blok Bülten,* p. 13.

was trying to be placed within the center left of the political spectrum of Turkey, as the goal of socialism was trying to be replaced by democracy.[112]

There are also disagreements within ÖDP about the Kurdish question, that also effects the policy making process of the party. Especially the Kurtuluş platform and some independents are very eager to continue with the "labor, peace, freedom bloc" as they conceive the Kurds as "the leading dynamic of democracy"[113] in Turkey. This inclination shows its outcome in the slogans that were used by some party members in the demonstrations. For example, especially the Sosyalist Politika and Kurtuluş supporters are eager to continue the slogan of "yesterday Vietnam, now Kurdistan, down with colonialism" (Dün Vietnam, Bugün Kürdistan, Kahrolsun Sömürgecilik) in the meetings, whereas the ones who are mostly Dev-Yol supporters and the independents prefer to stay silent in those times.

In parallel to this approach, the problem of organizing in the Marshall law areas was again debated within the party. In BSP days, some platforms did not want the party to form organizations in the southeastern region as it was not taken as Turkey's land. ÖDP's approach to the incident was rather taking the middle way, as in the third Party Assembly, it was accepted that only if a demand would come, than the party would be organized in the south-eastern Anatolian regions. Moreover, in the by-local elections of June 1996, the party decided to participate the elections on its own, which was a sign that the bloc came to an end in a rather indirect way.

Of course, this was not a decision that was taken unilaterally by all the party members. As Mahir Sayın, a member of Kurtuluş platform argued in Med TV that the

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[112]ibid. p. 14.

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ones who are standing against the bloc, which he called social chauvinists, would be eliminated form the party. The social chauvinists, according to him, represents mostly the Dev-Yol supporters, who do not look at the issue of forming a bloc with HADEP in a positive way.

Moreover, it was not only the Kurtuluş platform, and the independents that supported the continuation of the bloc, but also HADEP and PKK supported this kind of tendency. In a program at Med TV, Abdullah Öcalan left the gate open for ÖDP to join a bloc in the coming elections whereas HADEP announced that "the peace bloc was awaiting for the ÖDP".[114] On the other hand Dev-Yol supporters and some independents were looking at the incident from another perspective. In 1996, İnönü Alpat, during a party conference on the question of Kurds and secularism gave the example that in the peace meeting, the ÖDP supporters were using the slogan of "do not join the army, do not spill brother blood", whereas, in the same meeting, HADEP supporters were singing guerrilla songs, in favor of PKK.[115] In this sense, Dev-Yol wing did not find HADEP confident on the issue of peace, as they oppose the bloc.

Another example of the clashing ideas about the Kurdish issue vitalized itself in the flag incident. After the Turkish flag was teared down in the HADEP congress, Erdal Kara, from the İstanbul organization of ÖDP was joining a press declaration with the HADEP leaders, arguing that it was a provocation of the state forces, whereas the Giresun organization of ÖDP was hanging a Turkish flag on the window of the Giresun district

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[113] İnönü Alpat, *Şimdi Solun Zamanı*, (Ankara: Doruk Yayınları, 1996), p. 91.
[114] Demokrasi, 22, Şubat, 1996.

[115] İnönü Alpat, in his speech at an ÖDP conference on the Kurdish question and secularism, Çankaya, June 25 1996.

building.[116] This incident shows that although there seems to be some disagreement within the party, on the basis of group identities, the same can be said for the urban and rural organizations of the party.

It is not only the political orientation of the party that is criticized, but also the party itself is being debated. On of the formulations within the party is "party being not a party"[117], that meant that the party organization was only vital for an opposition platform to be formed, in which the party is not a platform, but just a part of it. The significance of this outlook was "the struggle against hierarchy, centralism and the idea of party discipline"[118], which would incorporate not only the socialists but also the other non-socialist leftists and opposition forces. The struggle against the vertical relations, brought the importance of the horizontal relations within the party. The outcome was the acceptance of the party posts, not ends in themselves, but only ordinary places. As ÖDP leader Ufuk Uras stated, "I am so ashamed when I hear the word 'party leader'; the ÖDP has a leader because the Turkish laws require it".[119]

The other side of the coin can be seen in the formulation of the 'socialist party', in which the aim is the targeting of the rule of the *working class*. Additionally, some groups argued that the laborers should constitute the majority of the party also.[120] In very general terms, a middle path was agreed upon, which meant that no rigid expressions were used in the party program.

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[116]İnönü Alpat, *Solun Zamanı*, p. 101.
[117]Bülent Forta, "Şimdi Yeni Bir ÖDP Tanımlamalıyız", *ÖDP Kendini Anlatıyor*, pp. 63-82.
[118]Bülent Forta, "Parti Sorunlu Bir Araç Ama...", *ÖDP Tartışmaları* (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1996).
[119] Ufuk Uras, "Fetret Devri Sona Erdi", *Tartışmaları*.
[120] Uğur Cankoçak, "Bağımsız Bir Sosyalist Parti", *Tartışmaları*.

Although it is important for a party to be different in theoretical sense, it is also important how those theoretical orientations were vitalized on practical level. The same thing applies for ÖDP as it has some difficulties in the realization of its political orientations. On the other hand, some progress did achieved by the party, especially if it is considered that the party was founded only two years ago.

ÖDP had three inclinations to distance itself from; that is the socialists, the social democrats, and the other political parties of Turkey. The party stands in the center of socialist left in terms of quantity. The best places for socialists to test their support had been the May First demonstrations in Turkey. In the last two years, ÖDP throughout Turkey has the largest supporters in the meetings after HADEP. One of the reasons of this was that ÖDP stands as a party that is composed of the widely supported organizations of the pre-1980 period. On the other hand, the leftists who search for an alternative on the left of social democracy, and the ones who were not happy with the performance of the social democrats in the last years also approach sympathetic to ÖDP, that is again a contributor to numbers of the supporters. Moreover, with their organizational structure, and the importance given to the horizontal link of democracy, both within and outside the party, ÖDP was successful in distancing itself from the socialist organizations of Turkey.

By distancing itself from the other socialist organizations of Turkey, ÖDP, indirectly, criticizes the old left heritage. In the party program, it was stated that "ÖDP turned its face to socialism in a libertarian, self-administrator, internationalist, re-defining the nature human relationship, anti-militarist, without being sexist way, which would end up the rule of the capital, imperialism by establishing the government of the labor

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forces".[121] The definition of this kind of socialism distances the party from the other socialist experiences, as ÖDP considers them as the opposite of the above statement.

By not giving credit to the democratic centrist approach of Leninism, the channels of democracy are being opened within the party. The acceptation of the different platforms within the party with their own views and allowing the publishings of those platforms, without the interfering of the central party body is the outcome of this kind of an approach. The party is aware that nobody can have the potential to put itself in the center of the truth, as the truth is something that is created. The outcome is the opening of every communication channel, both within and outside the party in order to increase the horizontal organization of the concept of democracy.

Within the party, as every group and platform has the right to express their own thoughts both within and outside the party, there seems to appear different truths. Contrary to this, there is not a priority of any platform, view or group in the party. Against the state's decision on constructing a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, Uras stated that, "both the interests of the workers and the nature are being treated on equal grounds; it is not that one of them is one step ahead of the other".[122]

By accepting the redefinition of what constitutes the public and the political, automatically brings both enlarging and overcoming the limits of liberal democratic tradition and capitalism. In this respect, the process of change is not an overnight incident in the form of a political revolution, but rather a long process of transforming the relations within the civil society. The campaigns that the party got involved, such as the anti-cyanide campaign in Bergama, the campaign of "one million signature for peace", and

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[121]*ÖDP Program & Tüzük*, p. 36.

"one minute darkness for an enlightened Turkey" should also be seen in the light of the above inclination

The economic policy of the party is one way or another based on the pre-1980 theoretical roots for the different groups and parties. The publicly owned means of production has been one of the basic demands of the socialist tradition, both in Turkey and in the world. On the other hand, the building of alternative power structures, as proposed, was only vitalized by Dev-Yol in the pre-1980 period with the introduction of the resistance committees. The idea of building the counter-culture from today is a new approach to most of the socialist groups and organizations, as it was thought that once the political revolution would be achieved, the transformation of the social would follow. The Gramscian understanding of the importance of civil society is being realized by the ÖDP, as their economical program shows.

Another important indicator of the conception of the new is that the dynamic of change is not only in the hands of a specific social class. Although the party declared itself as the platform of the labor, the term labor represents more than the old cleavage of labor and capital. In this respect the party accepts the multilateral existence of different cleavages. The outcome is the importance that is the given to the issue of women, the ecology and the acceptance of trans-sexuals in the party.

On the other hand, although it seems that the party seems to be the representative of the new left in Turkey, some platforms within the party are strictly tied to their old left heritage. In this respect, being represented in ÖDP is just a conjunctural obligation. Moreover, some minor groups join the party only for gaining a greater support, which

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[122]Ufuk Uras, "Gündem", *Conference at Bilkent.*

would allow them to split from the party as they keep their organizational structures outside the party. For example some groups within the party have some professional members. These professionals are financed by the group supporters, which allow them to get involved only in political matters, as they don't have any other jobs. In this way, the professionalization of the people who involved in politics is, indirectly, being realized by some groups.

Within the party, the harmony of the different platforms could not be achieved fully. Some platforms still could not internalize being members of ÖDP, and are trying to make politics by their group identities. One of the best indicators of this trend, was the physical confrontations that the platform members face. In Ankara May First demonstrations of 1997, a youth group within the party opened an illegal placard, that ended up with a fight between the Dev-Yol supporters who were against such an act, and the Kurtuluş supporters. Another example of this trend was the fight between the youth branches of Kurtuluş and Dev-Yol in the autumn of 1997 in Çankaya ÖDP building. Whatever their reasons were, they symbolize the lack of the conception of ÖDP culture as a project. On the other hand, it must be noted that these kinds of physical confrontations are only vital among the young supporters of the party, as the old people, regardless of their political identities, condemned such acts, and tried not be parts in the fights. Additionally, although the group identities are still kept strict by some platforms, a considerable amount of job within the party are done by these groups. Without the help of the groups, the meetings, for example, would not be so crowded as it is the case.

Another problem about the party was that the party could not effect the political agenda in Turkey. It just shows its reactions to the existing situations by meetings and

declarations, but unable to create new issues. Moreover, those reactions were only effective, if the media would pay attention. For example, after Refah Partisi arranged a meeting in İnönü Stadium with 40,000 supporters in İstanbul, ÖDP arranged a democracy meeting in Fenerbahçe Stadium with the same amount of people.[123] The slogan of the meeting was "Democracy Now" (Demokrasi Hemen). Although popular figures such as Ahmet Kaya, Bulutsuzluk Özlemi and Edip Akbayram gave small concerts in the meeting, the media did not pay attention to the incident. The party was not on the headlines of the newspapers as it was the case in Sultanahmet meeting.

As the priorities of the party are taken into consideration, ÖDP was able to distance itself both from the PKK and the state forces in the last two years. Although for any socialist group to distance itself from the latter has been much more easier than distancing itself from the former, the party tried to actualize the possibility of a third way. For example in Sultanahmet meeting, the party threatened the ones who opened a PKK flag in HADEP group by ending the meeting. By demanding peace in the region, it also distanced itself from the political parties of Turkey, as they were conceived as "war parties".

The question should be raised, then, as whether with the limited amount of support, the party could realize the radical transformation of the relations in the society. In terms of support, the party, alone, does not seem to pass ten percent threshold. Only with an election coalition, there would be a chance to enter the parliament. The coalition partner would more likely to be HADEP, which would alienate a great amount of people, both from the social democrat and socialist wings of voters. On the other hand, any

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[123] "5 Temmuz'da Fenerbahçe'de", *Yeniden* no 26 (1997), p. 7.

coalition with the social democrats, as CHP seems to be the only alternative, may decrease the credibility of the party, as it would sacrifice the means in order to achieve the ends, that is entering to the parliament. The coalition with the social democrats could only be realized, if a labor based coalition program would be signed, that would also include HADEP. This alternative seems to be weak, as HADEP would alienate some voters of CHP. Additionally, some platforms in the party would stand against a coalition with the social democrats, that would also decrease the harmony within the party.

Then the question should be raised, whether it is a must to enter the parliament, in order to enlarge the sphere of democracy in Turkey. As the party has shown, as it was the case in Bergama, and the campaign of "one million signatures for peace", it is not a required thing to be represented in the parliament. The transformation of the society, could also be made possible, if the party would collaborate with the opposition outside the establishment, that would redefine the concept of the political. Moreover, the more the support of the party increases, the more likely that the society in Turkey is transformed. In other words, in a time when ÖDP enters the parliament, Turkey would not be the same Turkey anymore.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Throughout this study I tried to show the re-structuring of some part of the socialist left in Turkey. There were two motives behind the formulation of ÖDP: The transformation of the left in Europe and the re-structuring of the socialist left after the defeat of 1980 in Turkey.

Following the transformation of the left in Europe and Turkey, an alternative against the reformist and the revolutionist understandings was formalized. In order for the 'third road' to be realized in its full sense, the relations within the civil society were given priority in order to be transformed.

In this respect, it was not the state that was given a priority to be transformed. Although forming a government was also kept as an alternative, the radicalism of the streets was tried to be incorporated within the newly formed opposition platforms. Moreover a concept like worker councils were introduced, as the important thing was to change the existing relations first. Additionally, the enlarging and overriding the liberal democratic tradition brought the utility of issue politics. Especially in a country like Turkey, this approach is very likely to give its seeds in the coming future.

By applying a different understanding of the conception of what constitutes the political, three main things were tried to be done, which signifies the similarity with the European new left.

Firstly, criticizing the liberal democratic tradition in Turkey, a redefinition of the public was brought into the picture. The redefinition of the public sphere shows itself in several grounds. The Kurdish question, the economical program of the party and the views about the rising trend of political Islam should be perceived in this respect. Moreover, by not being part of the dualist confrontations within the society such as secular-non secular and pro-PKK vs pro-state, the party tries to build the opposition on its own, by widening the democratic channels of discussion. The strategy of gradual change within the civil society is something that both Green Parties and the parties that are on the left of social democracy in Western Europe try to pursue.

Secondly, as non-class dynamics were taken as different power sources for the transformation of the society, issues like women and ecology are treated equally with the worker movements. The quota for women within the organizational framework and the participation of the party in the anti-cyanide campaign in Bergama are the outcomes of this trend, although, compared to Western Europe, the new social movements in Turkey seem to be weaker in character. On the other hand, especially in the Western parts of the country, the green movement on the local level is on the rise, which signifies a new dynamic worth to be given importance.[124]

Thirdly, by distancing itself from the characterizations of what is called the old left, the party can be considered as the institutionalization of European new left of the 1960s in Turkey. The measures that increased the participation of the members in the decision making process within the party is an attempt to overcome the bureaucratic heritage of the old left. Moreover, the existence of different platforms within the party is a sign that every

individual and group do not loose their identities within the party organization. Rather they have the right to express their differences that distinguishes the party from the old left experiences.

From the perspective of the change within the socialist tradition in Turkey, the following points are also important. Throughout the 1980s, the signs of unification were always present. Especially with the introduction of TBKP, SBP, BSA, BSP and ÖDP respectively, the unification projects were finally realized at the practical level. Moreover, these projects were based on new theories that tried to grab the realities of Turkey.

One thing that the socialist left of Turkey that is represented in ÖDP learned from the past experience was that the ends do no justify the means. The outcome was the erosion of the old left heritage. The old left for the socialist left of Turkey was Leninism, that dominated the 1970s both with its organizational and ideological structure. In this respect, the organizational structure as well as the ideological orientations were not pre-determined by a grand theory regardless of time and space. Although this trend is not fully internalized by both the party members and the groups, positive signs can be seen as argued above.

While ÖDP was trying to re-formulate itself, there were other socialist organizations, both legal and illegal that tried to hold on to their old left heritage and condemned ÖDP as being revisionist. Even this treatment by the old left can be a sign that the socialists that are in ÖDP do transform themselves. On the other hand, the old socialist left was indirectly effected by the policy orientation of the party also.

The socialist left, that is outside ÖDP responded in two different ways. The issue-based politics of the party was accepted by some illegal organizations, and small illegal

meetings were held throughout İstanbul. One example of this trend can be seen in the "bread meetings", where people protested the increase in the bread prices in Okmeydanı, İstanbul in the spring of 1997.

On the other hand, there emerged a violent response targeting the party. In İstanbul, two Kadıköy ÖDP members were killed by TİKKO on June 16, 1997[125] on the accusation that they were agents working for the state.[126] Another example of this trend could be seen in the meeting protesting the Sivas massacre that was held in Ankara on July 2, 1997, in which İşçi Partisi supporters attacked the ÖDP supporters.[127] These violent acts show us that although ÖDP symbolizes the *new* in the socialist tradition in Turkey, some old cleavages between ÖDP groups and the others still remain as vital issues.

By considering the division between the old and the new left, it is more likely that ÖDP has the seeds for a new left alternative to display. By distancing itself from all political parties and organizations, both on theoretical and practical grounds, the concept of the new is accentuated by the party. Although the groups within the party seem to face a problem of identity crisis, it is more likely that time would integrate all the groups under the identity of ÖDP.

On the level of discourse, the thesis of ÖDP may seem to be in parallel with other opposition circles in Turkey, such as the radical democrats and the liberals. Especially recognition of the differences within the society is an issue which is even accepted by some Islamic fundamentalist circles. In this respect, ÖDP may seem to be defending liberal principles, in the sense that it demands the realization of the liberal democratic tradition in

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[125]"Cinayete Sol Kılıf", *Sosyalist Alternatif,* no 1, (1997), p. 5.
[126]Note that one of the murdered members, Behzat Yıldırım was a supporter of TİKKO while he was in prison, but left the organization and joined ÖDP one year ago before the murder.

its full sense. On the other hand, it is different from these groups on two grounds. First of all, although the party gives importance to partial gains within the system, it is opposed to capitalism and considers the social and economic aspects of capitalism as important problems that need to be overcome. Secondly the realization of liberal values is not an end in itself as ÖDP is aware that it is impossible to realize those principles in its full sense within the reality of today. The outcome is the re-definition of what constitutes the political without giving up the utopias of socialism. In this respect, for example, there would be the existence of green socialists and socialist greens in the same party. The feminization process would further justify the integration of different lines of thought, which would serve as a tool for embracing the multi-constituted problems of the society.

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[127]"Sivas'ın Işığı Sönmeyecek", *Yeniden* no 26, (1997), p. 5.

LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS

Anatolian Democracy Movement: Anadolu Demokrasi Hareketi

Communist Labor Party of Turkey: Türkiye Komünist Emek Partisi (TKEP).

Freedom World: Özgürlük Dünyası.

Labor's Flag: Emeğin Bayrağı.

Liberation: Kurtuluş.

Liberation Organization of Turkey and Northern Kurdistan: Türkiye ve Kuzey Kürdistan Kurtuluş Örgütü.

Marxist Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit: Marksist Leninist Silahlı Propoganda Birliği (MLSPB).

Motherland Party: Anavatan Partisi (ANAP).

New Course: Yeni Yol

People Liberation Army of Turkey: Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (THKO).

People Liberation Party-Front of Turkey: Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (THKP-C).

People's Democracy Party: Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP).

Republican People's Party: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP).

Revolutionary Communist Party of Turkey: Türkiye Devrimci Komünist Partisi (TDKP).

Revolutionary Path: Devrimci Yol (Dev-Yol).

Revolutionary Left: Devrimci Sol (Dev-Sol).

Revolutionary Socialist Bloc: Devrimci Sosyalist Blok (DSB).

Social Democrat Populist Party: Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (SHP).

Socialist Party: Sosyalist Parti.

Socialist Politics: Sosyalist Politika

Socialist Power Party: Sosyalist İktidar Partisi (SİP).

Socialist Turkey Party: Sosyalist Türkiye Partisi.

Socialist Worker Party of Turkey: Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi (TSİP).

True Path Party: Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP).

United Socialist Alternative: Birleşik Sosyalist Alternatif (BSA).

United Socialist Party: Birleşik Sosyalist Parti (BSP).

Welfare party: Refah Partisi (RP).

Worker Party of Turkey: Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP).

Worker Peasant Liberation Army of Turkey: Türkiye İşçi Köylu Kurtuluş Ordusu

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