

NATO'S THIRD PARTY ROLE IN
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of
Economic, Administrative
and Social Sciences
of Bilkent University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Science
in International Relations

by

H. Yonca Bırdülz

Bilkent University

February 1995

15
JX
7393
.N67
G86
1995

**NATO'S THIRD PARTY ROLE IN
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT**

**A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of
Economic, Administrative
and Social Sciences
of Bilkent University**

**In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Science
in International Relations**

by

H. Yonca Gündüz


**Bilkent University
February 1995**

H. Yonca Gündüz -
tarafından bağışlanmıştır

JX
1393
.N67
G86
1995

B027770

**Approved by the Institute of Economics and Social
Sciences**

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "A. L. Karaosmanođlu", written over a horizontal line.

Prof. Dr. Ali Karaosmanođlu

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science in International Relations.

**Asst. Prof. Serdar Güner
Thesis Supervisor**




I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science in International Relations.



Asst. Prof. Gülgün Tuna

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science in International Relations.



Asst. Prof. Ayse Kadioğlu

ABSTRACT

This study is an attempt to analyze NATO's third party role in international conflict management in post Cold-War Europe which targets to supplement the UN's regime in this regard. Firstly, an international conflict and its management by third parties, particularly governmental organizations, is examined within the framework of the UN Secretary General Ghali's theoretical outline called "An Agenda For Peace". This aims at clarifying the concepts on which the analysis is built. Secondly, NATO's gradual adaptation to third party role in conflict management, from late 1990 to June 1994, is sequentially presented together with its implementation in Bosnia-Herzegovina to demonstrate that NATO has genuinely aspired to assume such a role in European conflicts. Thirdly, the possible third party roles that NATO could perform in the management of international conflicts are contemplated within the theoretical framework summarized in the first part. Finally, NATO's structural strengths and weaknesses are discussed to illustrate that NATO is still the unique regional organization which can assist the UN in managing international conflicts in Europe.

ÖZET

Bu çalışmada, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Avrupa'da NATO'nun üçüncü taraf olarak, Birleşmiş Milletlerin uluslararası anlaşmazlıkların yönetimine yönelik çabalarını tamamlayıcı nitelikteki rolü incelenmektedir. Öncelikle bu çalışmanın temel kavramlarını tanımlamak amacıyla, uluslararası anlaşmazlıklar ve bu anlaşmazlıkların üçüncü taraf olarak uluslararası kuruluşlarca yönetimi kavramları araştırılmaktadır. İkinci olarak, uluslararası anlaşmazlıkların yönetiminde NATO'nun üçüncü taraf rolü üstlenebilmek için nasıl bir değişim geçirdiği 1990 - 1994 dönemini kapsayacak biçimde anlatılmakta ve bu çerçevede NATO'nun Bosna-Hersek sorununda üstlendiği görevler, sözkonusu teorik iddiaların bir uygulaması olarak ele alınmaktadır. Üçüncü olarak, ilk bölümde ortaya konan teorik çerçevede, NATO'nun uluslararası anlaşmazlıkların yönetiminde üçüncü taraf olarak üstlenebileceği roller hakkında bir model çıkarılmaktadır. Son olarak da tüm yapısal zayıflıklarına rağmen NATO'nun Birleşmiş Milletlerin uluslararası anlaşmazlıkların yönetiminde etkili olabilecek yegane bölgesel örgüt olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmaktadır.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to first express my appreciation for the encouragement, interest and academic guidance afforded by Asst. Prof. Nimet Beriker, Asst. Prof. Serdar Güner and Asst. Prof. Gülgün Tuna.

I thank all my friends who never give up providing me with moral support. I should, however, particularly mention Yonca Argüden, Berrin Meral, Nurtan Meral who have helped me a lot in my difficult times.

I am also grateful for the sustained patience, support and encouragement which my mother, my sister Çimen have provided.

To Mehdi who is always with me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	i
ÖZET	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
LIST OF FIGURES AND CHARTS	vi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	vii
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER II: INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT BY GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AS THIRD PARTIES	
2.1 International Conflict and Its Management	5
2.2 International Conflict Management by Third Parties	12
2.3 International Conflict Management by Governmental Organizations As Third Parties	14
CHAPTER III: NATO'S ADJUSTMENT TO THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTY IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT	
3.1 NATO's Third Party Role In International Conflict Management in Europe	26
3.2 A Chronological Analysis of NATO's Third Party Involvement in International Conflict Management	37
CHAPTER VI: AN ANALYSIS OF NATO'S THIRD PARTY ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT FROM A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE	
4.1 A Model for Possible Third Party Roles For NATO In International Conflict Management In Europe	51

4.2. An Appraisal of NATO's Possible Third Party Roles Model from a Structural Perspective	64
CONCLUSION	74
APPENDIX I	77
APPENDIX II	81
APPENDIX III.....	83
NOTES	92
BIBLIOGRAPHY	99

LIST OF FIGURES AND CHARTS

FIGURE 1 Phases of a Conflict	7
FIGURE 2 Third Party Intervention by Governmental Organizations	11
CHART 1 Third Party Intervention	22
CHART 2 UN's Third Party Intervention.....	25
CHART 3 NATO's Third Party Intervention	53
CHART 4 UN-NATO Coordinated Third Party Intervention	62

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- **CJTF** Combined Joint Task Forces
- **CIS** Commonwealth of Independent States
- **EU** European Union
- **NAC** North Atlantic Council
- **NACC** North Atlantic Cooperation Council
- **NATO** North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- **OAS** Organization of American States
- **OAU** Organization of African Unity
- **OSCE** Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe
- **P for P** Partnership for Peace
- **UN** United Nations
- **UNPROFOR** United Nations Protection Force
- **WEU** West European Union

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In course of the Cold War years NATO was a classical example of a defense alliance formed against a determined threat. As the security organization of the Western countries it was a principal party to the inter-bloc rivalry. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent fall of the Eastern bloc has shattered the Cold War security balances in world politics. The direct military threat to the Allies' security has disappeared. Small scale conflicts, liberated from chains of the bloc politics, have re-emerged in Europe. NATO who strove to continue to preserve peace and stability in Europe has been compelled to adjust itself accordingly.

NATO's adjustment to new threats gave rise to two fundamental changes in its self-perception as a defense alliance. First, since new threats would emerge as regional conflicts outside the Alliance territory, NATO could only involve in these conflicts as a third party. Second, in delineating the limits of its involvement, NATO should specify what kind of third party involvement it would conceive for itself. With the assets it possessed, the officials in Brussels decided that it could skillfully participate in the management of these conflicts.

With these in mind, this study attempts to analyze NATO's possible contribution to the international conflict management in Europe as a third party. The first step is the elaboration of the

theoretical framework. Concepts such as international conflict, conflict management, conflict resolution, third party intervention and its dynamics are sought to be clarified through a survey of the literature. These concepts are, then, operationally defined. Some graphs, charts and tables are introduced to make these abstractions easier to comprehend.

Following the presentation of the concepts, NATO's evolutionary move towards conflict management as a third party is dealt with through the review of major NATO documents issued from the end of the Cold War to June 1994. This is followed by the NATO decisions that enabled the implementation of these abstractions in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The texts of some of these documents and decisions, which seem significant for the scope of this study, are presented as appendices.

Finally, within the framework of the definitions made in the first part, possible third party roles that NATO could assume in international conflict management in Europe are illustrated. Tables are employed once more to more explicitly convey the meanings of these descriptions. Since no precedent of such a work existed on this subject by the time this study is done, the model in the final part is visualized by the writer.

The theoretical points raised in this study are displayed in the second and the fourth chapters. First, the meaning of international conflict is probed and why the term 'conflict' is preferred to 'crisis' is explained. A conflict is assessed in four phases as pre-crisis, crisis, war and post-war in order to readily display several forms of third party intervention for conflict

management. Furthermore, the difference between conflict resolution and conflict management is elucidated to avoid confusion. Second, the third party intervention for the management of an international conflict is handled. The conflict management and resolution regime of the United Nations (UN) is categorized as 'a third party intervention in international conflict by a governmental organization'. The theoretical revision of this management regime by the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in a study called "An Agenda For Peace" (1992), calling the regional security organizations to active participation, is regarded as the theoretical and legal guideline for NATO's contribution to the regime. Third, NATO's own management regime within the area sketched by the UN is postulated.

Reflections on this study's theoretical analysis constitute the third chapter and some parts of the fourth chapter. NATO's decisions towards adjustment to a new role in the management of international conflict as a third party, beginning from the 1990 London Summit until the 1994 Brussels Summit, is covered in detail in the third chapter. The Alliance's intervention in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is also reviewed in relation to the roles that NATO has played. The involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina is also treated as a case which shows the successes and failures of NATO's emerging conflict management regime as a third party. Accordingly, NATO's weaknesses and strong points as a credible third party are evaluated.

As a study done in the field of international relations, this work, firstly, aims at clarifying the conceptual confusion on the subject of third party intervention to international conflicts, observed particularly in the use of the terms crisis and conflict or peace-keeping and peace-enforcement. Secondly, it targets to combine the concept of third party intervention with NATO's new role in conflict management in Europe. Thirdly, it intends to draw a broad sketch for possible third party roles that NATO could assume in this regard. Finally, as regards the theoretical considerations it endeavors to present the academic literature on the third party intervention and practitioners' decisions for a better comprehension of the subject.

CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT BY GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AS THIRD PARTIES

2.1 International Conflict and Its Management

Conflict can be defined as a "form of severely escalated natural competition between two or more parties about scarce resources, power and prestige" where "parties to a conflict believe they have incompatible goals and their aim is to neutralize, gain advantage over, injure or destroy one another"¹. Yet, a definition of an international conflict requires some additional attributes. First, the participants should be international entities such as states or ethnic groups fighting for independence etc. Second, an international conflict should constitute a challenge to the existing international political system- regional or global. It "[should affect] power distribution, actors \ regimes, rules and alliance configuration" of a system.²

Regional conflicts, frequently seen in the emerging security environment in the post-Cold War era, are those posing a threat to regional systems. Hence, they are international conflicts, in effect. From a structural point of view any change in the system constitutes a challenge, as by definition an international system is composed of regional systems which are in interaction.

An international conflict is not a stagnant event. It evolves and passes through different phases. They are pre-crisis, crisis, war and post-war (see Figure 1). At the pre-crisis phase a conflict is latent. There is an unresolved problem at least from one party's point of view and it carries a potential to transcend into a crisis. Anything which seems to challenge the existing structure, or, any deliberate or unintentional act by either party may alter the prevailing situation in terms of the perceived interests of the protagonists. This can bring a conflict to the crisis phase.

A crisis usually covers a very limited time span in which the parties rapidly escalate their conflict. After reaching the climax, the conflict either de-escalates or moves further towards a war. Should conflict end with the efforts of at least one of the parties a new pre-crisis phase arises. Due to the vitality of the decisions rendered during the crisis phase for the future of conflict, the decision-making procedures at this phase has always been the major focus of attention in the academic literature.

A war constitutes the third phase at which at least "one of the party's major objective has become harming the other[s]"³ through use of force. What differentiates a war from a crisis is the use of force. Consequently, halting of the use of force among the parties, that is securing a cease-fire, becomes the beginning of the post-war period.

The post-war phase of a conflict might be either a new pre-crisis period or a phase during which conflict resolution attempts are initiated for the removal of the real sources of a conflict through




Figure 1

negotiations. If problem(s) causing a conflict are managed to be resolved, then a post-war phase might be labeled as a genuine peace. Otherwise, it becomes a new pre-crisis phase as the past experience of the principal parties would constitute a seed for a conflict which might break out at another time in another form.

The definition of a crisis is significant as in academic writings and sometimes in daily journals the term crisis refers to the conflict as a whole. This is actually a heritage of the Cold War years.⁴ Since the bipolar world system ended, the international conflicts are to be evaluated from a different perspective. The Cold War conflicts were usually in the form of proxy wars between the parties supported by either of the superpowers. They usually occurred and were contained in the Third World in order to eliminate the risk of a global nuclear war. Without following their natural pattern, these conflicts were stabilized at a point where they would not disturb the existing balance between the blocs. In sum from a superpower point of view they were contained at the crisis phase. This bipolarity mentality dominated academic and journalistic writings for over 50 years.

In the post-Cold War period, what is sometimes called as crises are the conflicts where parties defend their positions with all available instruments, with no superpower support. It is this difference between crisis definitions that led to confusion in terminology. 'Crisis' could be a proper term for describing the Cold War conflicts as they were managed at the crisis stage by the

superpowers, but in the post Cold-War period it connotes a phase of an international conflict (see Figure 1).

Similar to the use of the terms 'crisis' and 'conflict', the management attempts had also been viewed with the Cold-War mentality before 1990. Accordingly, the crisis management literature produced in the course of the Cold War period, concentrated on the decision making analysis, have handled the issue as "foreign policy crisis" of the superpowers .⁵

Actually in academic literature the attempts for managing or resolving international conflicts are categorized under two headings: Conflict resolution and conflict management (see Figure 2). Some international relations specialists assert that 'conflict management' is a proper term for describing a situation in which there exists an agreement among the persons with shared goals and values on making a choice among the alternative ways to reach shared goals or values . They claim that these are everyday experiences in the management of business and social life and so not appropriate for the terms dispute or conflict.⁶ They continue that conflict requires in-depth analysis of its sources and problem-solving in ways that do not compromise values and human needs.⁷ Therefore, to recognize initially the sources of conflict, and, to develop the ways to remove them are effective in resolving them.

Laue, following this line of thought maintains that people who use conflict management language "argue that they want to increase the abilities of parties to manage or self-regulate their conflicts

themselves because if conflicts escalate, external agents or agencies will step in and they try to bring the conflict within their own definitions of acceptable boundaries of social control."⁸

On the other hand, the scholars using the conflict management terminology claim that "managing a conflict involves making collective decisions, mounting field operations, exercising leadership, and building consensus"⁹ among the disputants and it could be appropriate for all conflict analysis at any level.

The conflict management concept, here, will be treated as all sorts of efforts, initiated by either the parties to a conflict or third parties, aiming at ending the conflict at any phase without seeking to remove its real sources. Thus, a conflict resolution is taken as a broader area of operation embracing not only all the conflict management efforts but also the attempts to resolve problem(s) that initially led to the conflict (see Figure 2). Consequently, the underlying goal of conflict management efforts at all phases is rather to prevent escalation than to find a plausible solution to the core problems perceived. Therefore conflict management constitutes a large part of a conflict resolution process that lays the groundwork on which the real resolution efforts can be initiated.

With regard to the exclusive targets of conflict management at the different phases of a conflict it can be said that a pre-crisis period is the time span in which all efforts are devoted to prevent a potential crisis to transcend into an active one. These efforts, indeed, are complementary to the conflict resolution efforts if they are carried out




Figure 2

with the concerns of removing the reasons of conflict perceived by the parties. A crisis is, then, managed through various initiatives short of war to return to the pre-crisis phase or to create a new one which is more convenient for resolution initiatives regardless of time pressure or war risks. In the course of a war, the endeavors are directed towards regulating and/or halting the use of force by either parties as soon as possible. The post-war management actions, on the other hand, are targeted to establish a regulatory mechanism, principles, and guidelines to arrange the post war relations among the protagonists on the particular issue area that yield to the war. It should be noted that all these efforts can be conducted by both principal and third parties.

2.2 International Conflict Management by Third Parties

A conflict has been defined as a kind of interaction between at least two parties who have incompatible interests on an issue. Once conflict manifests itself it might be managed through one or more of the following means: the use of force by the principal parties (both psychological and physical); various forms of direct or indirect negotiation; or the involvement of an external party in a binding or non binding fashion¹⁰. Among these possible means of conflict management only the third party involvement in international conflicts will be briefly examined for the purpose of this study.

The term "third party" represents an intervention to a conflict situation by an exterior actor to the conflict. Rubin simply defines the

third party as an "individual [who] is in some way external to a dispute between two other parties, and who interposes (or is interposed) between them [disputants]." ¹¹ Whichever form third party intervention takes, the relationship between the principals and the third party has certain characteristics. First, "the role and involvement of the third party are ... typically peripheral to primary relationship..." and "the basis of the third party's involvement is necessarily different than that of the disputants." ¹² Young says that "third party intervention does not cover acts amounting to entry by a party into the crisis [conflict in general] as a participant on the same level as the original opponents." ¹³ Laue adds that the third party is the one which is involved in a conflict by having "indirect stakes" (such as reputation or professionalism as intervention) unlike the first or the second parties who have direct stakes. ¹⁴

Second, if the third party becomes centrally involved in the relationship between the two principals, this would transform a "dyad" into a "triadic interaction". ¹⁵ Incorporation of a third party in a conflict between the parties might lead to the formation of coalitions among the parties such as a coalition between the two principals to exclude the third party if they believe that the third party has a hidden agenda, or another one between one disputant and the third party if the third party favors one (or believed to favor). Even if the possible coalitions do not form, the possibility of their existence affects the perceptions of the principals and turns a bilateral relation into a trilateral relationship. ¹⁶

Third, the third party has in one way or another an aim to change, influence or reform the natural course of the events. Therefore, the term "intervention"¹⁷ is used for the involvement of a third party in a conflict. Laue defines the party intervention as follows:

"Conflict intervention occurs when an outside or semi-outside party self-consciously enters into a conflict situation with the objective of influencing the conflict in a direction the intervenor defines as desirable. All intervention alters the power configuration among parties, thus all conflict intervention advocacy."¹⁸

That is why conflict management by third party intervention cannot be described as 'neutral' as it often is. A third party may be impartial (i.e. disinterested), but not neutral (i.e. having no effect on outcome).¹⁹

Rubin notes that even the mere presence of the third party alters the structure of a conflict and may have at least two effects on the natural course of the events. It may create a "pressure for movement from the stable stagnation of intractable conflict.. or it may make it possible to disrupt this pattern of conflict intensification , by shifting the disputants' exclusive focus away from each other."²⁰

2.3 International Conflict Management by Governmental Organizations as Third Parties

There are only five groups of third parties, which might participate in an international conflict management: individuals - such as a special envoy of UN Secretary General or leader of trusted state,

states, non-governmental organizations - charity or religious organizations, international or regional governmental organizations, supra-national bodies such as European Union (EU) or Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Governmental organizations specifically can be categorized in two in terms of their contribution to conflict management: an international organization, the United Nations (UN) and regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The developments in the post-Cold War era have shown that an effective third party intervention targeting to manage an international conflict requires to secure coordination and cooperation among both kinds of governmental organizations.

The necessity of coordination and complementary functioning of regional and international organizations is theoretically expressed in the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali's study called "An Agenda For Peace", written in 1992. The rising number of the international conflicts in world politics and the failure and inadequacy of both regional and international organizations in the management of these conflicts have demonstrated the necessity of arranging new conflict management mechanisms in which different organizations can take several roles in a coordinated and complementary fashion.

NATO, as a regional organization, has aspired to contribute to the management of the international conflicts in Europe as a third party. NATO adjusting to the international conflict management has

always stayed in the functioning area delineated by the UN Charter. This stemmed from the fact the basic failures of either organization might be overcome only through the complementary functioning of both in this regard. NATO's need for legitimacy for any kind of intervention can only be provided by the UN's consent. Whereas the UN, which proved to be inadequate in resolving and managing the rising number of the conflicts all around the world, should be supported by regional organizations such as NATO.

This urge for such a cooperation between the UN and regional organizations is explicitly defined in Ghali's "An Agenda For Peace":

"The United Nations has recently encouraged a rich variety of complementary efforts....in this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements or agencies can render great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, and if their relationship with the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is governed by the Chapter VIII." ²¹

Ghali's statement reveals that the basic premise of the Alliance's involvement in international conflicts as a third party is derived from the UN Charter. Therefore, a general review of the international conflict regime delineated by the UN is considered a necessity to properly assess NATO's role in this regard.

The UN acts as a third party in its conflict management regime because of the concept of collective security. As a supranational body the UN is considered impartial in conflict management or conflict resolution attempts as it is backed by the delegated consent of the sovereign states. Within this framework, the conflict management

regime which is embodied in the Charter envisages two broad approaches against violators of the principle of "refraining from the threat or use of force in any manner."²² They are *peaceful settlement of disputes* and *collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace or acts of aggression*.

The pacific settlement of disputes which is handled in Chapter VI of the Charter provides a logical progression of steps to be followed by states involved in disputes. It says if a dispute does arise, the parties should, before submission to a UN organ, "seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice."²³ However the substitution of peaceful settlement for the reliance on force in resolving or managing conflicts had been disappointing in the UN record. Many conflicts are not submitted to the UN channels but handled through other means. This reluctance to use UN channels results as much from a desire by the parties to maintain their freedom of action as it does from a lack of confidence in UN processes.²⁴

The second way of managing international conflicts by the use of the UN is the collective measures of the Chapter VII of the Charter against the prevention and removal of threats to peace and acts of aggression. According to the collective security system drafted in Chapter VII, the Security Council is assigned the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace. No automatic sanctions

are foreseen in the Charter but under Art. 25, UN members are legally obligated to accept and carry out all Security Council decisions.

If the Security Council finds a threat to peace or breach of the peace or act of aggression in a particular case, it invokes Art. 39. An explicit determination of this kind indicates that the issue is considered appropriate for measures under Chapter VII. It will decide on a course of action to maintain or restore peace. The measures are calling on the parties concerned to comply with "provisional peace", typically, a cease fire or withdrawal is a provisional measure (Art. 40), resorting to the non-forcible measures for applying economic, communication, and diplomatic sanctions - such as economic embargo (Art. 41), or calling for military sanctions if the non-forcible measures outlined in Art. 41 would be inadequate.

In addition to these two broad approaches to conflict management, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter recognizes regional arrangements and agencies as appropriate means for maintaining peace and security, provided that these activities are consistent with the purpose and principles of the Charter. Indeed, Article 52 of the Charter requires states to make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of "local disputes" through regional arrangements or agencies before referring such disputes to the UN Security Council. This proves that the Security Council had been initially intended to be the forum of last resort when states were unable to resolve conflicts between them through the peaceful means listed in Chapter VI or through regional instrumentalities.

The Charter expressly directs the Security Council to utilize the regional arrangements or agencies covered by Chapter VIII for enforcement action where appropriate, in Art. 53. The regional bodies are indirectly authorized to undertake enforcement action in as much as Art. 53 states that they may not do so without the authorization of the Security Council. Thus, in principle, the failure of the Council to grant permission for enforcement action would obstruct such action.²⁵

These clauses aim to equip the UN with necessary tools to manage international conflicts endangering international peace and security. The amalgam of its structural deficiencies and the bipolar nature of the international system hindered proper functioning of this management regime during the Cold War years. Accordingly, the necessity for an effective management regime led to a UN activity called as 'peacekeeping'.

The classic UN peacekeeping and the development of techniques to control violence through means other than enforcement or counter violence derives largely from the experience of UN operations during the Cold War. " Peacekeeping has traditionally been described as various forms of legitimized collective intervention by UN members aimed at avoiding the outbreak or resurgence of violent conflict between disputants. " ²⁶ Peacekeeping activities, though not included in the Charter, are the most significant and common form of a third party intervention to international conflicts.

The 13 operations launched by the UN between 1948 and 1988 produced a body of principles for peacekeeping operations. These principles are:

- exclusive authority of UN
- impartiality of the troops
- non-use of force or coercion except self defense
- consent of the parties involved in the conflict
- national character of the participating troops i.e. non-existence of a standby UN force.²⁷

Besides peacekeeping which has been added to the UN's conflict management due to the practical reasons the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has theoretically revised it in accordance with the changing dynamics of the world politics. In the pamphlet entitled as "An Agenda for Peace" the general course for action in conflict management by the UN is categorized in four headings:

"Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. Peace-making is action to bring hostile parties to agreement essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally incoming United Nations military and or place personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace. Peace-building action to identify and support structures which will tend

to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict." ²⁸

Moreover, another category of action called peace-enforcement is also examined under the heading of peace-making. It is described as a mission to restore peace and maintain cease-fires through use of force. Actually, this intervention mechanism is different from the other forms of peace-making in that it envisages to secure a compliance to cease-fire among parties through enforcement. It entails the use of ground troops or air forces. Therefore, even if it ultimately serves to lay the necessary groundwork for the peace-making efforts, it is a distinct category of action.(see Chart 1)

Peace enforcement also differs from peace-keeping. The definition of peace-enforcement contradicts with some of the basic principles of the UN in this regard. Peacekeeping troops are entitled to disengage the fighting parties. They have never been deployed with the aim of forcing parties to comply with any kind of action whether negotiated or not. Peace keepers never use force except in self-defense. However, a peace-enforcement action involves the use of force by a third party for the sake of halting aggression among warring parties.²⁹. Therefore, peace-enforcement, here, is examined as distinct category of third party intervention mechanism.

These categories are the general definitions of the legitimate patterns of third party intervention by international or regional governmental organizations. To complete the picture, now, the corresponding methods of conflict management will be incorporated

PHASES OF CONFLICT	THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION				
	Preventive Diplomacy	Peace-making	Peace-keeping	Peace-enforcement	Peace-building
<i>Pre-crisis</i>	✓	✓			
<i>Crisis</i>	✓	✓			
<i>War</i>		✓	✓	✓	
<i>Post-war</i>			✓		✓

with the conflict analysis derived in the first part of these general guidelines.

Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out. Hence, it basically refers to the attempts initiated in the pre-crisis period of a conflict. Peacemaking efforts are various kinds of third party activities to reach temporary peace that protagonists could negotiate. In other words, they are the initiatives taken to reach a real peace through negotiation. Peace building follows peacemaking efforts in order to consolidate the peace or the post war status quo achieved at the end of a war. All efforts in this phase are devoted to the removal of the real sources of conflict. Hence, peace building actions are theoretically analyzed as conflict resolution attempts. It is actually the peace-building efforts which explicitly delineate the concept of conflict resolution from 'the concept of conflict management'.

The most delicate definition, in this context, is of peace-keeping activities. They can be required for the first three phases of conflict each serving the aim of preparing a conducive ground for a resolution. At the pre-crisis phase the preventive deployment, that is the physical separation of the potentially hostile parties through the UN peacekeeping forces, targets to prevent the escalation of a conflict. In a crisis or a war period peacekeeping aims at halting violence and the preservation of peace, once it is attained in order that peace-building measures could be initiated to avoid the recurrence of violence (see Chart 2) In sum the UN, which is based on the concept of

collective security, has a complete theoretical picture of the resolution and the management of international conflicts. In response to the rising demand in UN's conflict management actions since the end of the Cold War, the UN Secretary General Ghali has revised this regime and increased third party intervention mechanisms by the governmental organizations. Ghali's contribution is significant in the sense that besides giving the definitions for several third party interventions, he calls the regional organizations to actively participate in these actions in a complementary manner.

This situation has concurred with NATO's aspirations to adopt such a third party role in international conflicts in Europe. This elaboration of the UN management system has provided the necessary legal framework for NATO. NATO has, consequently, altered its forty-five years old defense alliance identity and added a new dimension which is presented as a regional security organization which seeks to contribute international conflict management in Europe, as a third party in supplementing UN's role in this regard. In the next chapter NATO's adaptation to this new identity is elaborated.

CHAPTER III

NATO'S ADJUSTMENT TO THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTY IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

3.1 NATO's Third Party Role in International Conflict Management in Europe

Following the end of Cold War the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which was originally a defense alliance has been gradually transformed into a regional security organization. Its basic orientation has accordingly shifted to conflict management. This transformation, under the pressing urges of the changing nature of threats perceived by the Alliance, has taken place in a laggard manner. The demise of the single threat against the security of the Allies has yielded to a deliberate initiative within the organization to develop theoretical and practical tools for an effective conflict management in Europe.

As a defense organization NATO managed to prevent an intra alliance conflict, with some exceptions such as Cyprus, along with averting any outside aggression against its members for 40 years. In the post-Cold War era NATO needs to be responsive to possible

conflicts among non-members to preserve peace and stability in Europe for the common benefit of all members.¹ This entails the necessity of carrying out operations outside the alliance territory, thus, intervening in conflicts as a third party whose interest lies at the preservation of peace and stability in the region.

A careful review of the evolution of NATO since its inception shows that it has always been in a mood of change in response to the developments in international arena. In the course of Cold War years, these changes were directed by the events on the East-West agenda, respectively championed by the two superpowers. The Alliance was faced only with the Soviet threat and its ability to attack an ally. The changes in the nature of this threat were directed by either technological developments in conventional and the nuclear weapon production or the Soviet expansionist maneuvers. NATO strategies were contingent upon the Soviet capability to inflict damage upon the alliance countries and a possible expansionist assault. Accordingly it was easier for NATO strategists to formulate defense plans for the Allies. The sudden fall of the Soviet Union, also leading to the dismemberment of Eastern bloc, however, altered the nature of threat in two radical ways. First, the threats to stability and peace in the Alliance area have become multidirectional: nobody would easily predict from where threats might emerge. Second, threats were no longer solely military in nature. Economic, social, environmental

challenges inflaming ethnic tensions within states, and nationalist aspirations made contingency planning a tougher work to handle for NATO strategists.

This situation urged a fundamental change in the strategy of the alliance which, otherwise, would be charged with being obsolescent within the newly emerging international security structure. Some circles started to joke about NATO saying that the acronym NATO stood for "No Alternative To Obsolescent".² Thus a series of transformation attempts commenced within the Alliance immediately after the traces of a radical change in world politics had surfaced.

Under the guidance of these changing dynamics of the international security system, NATO has altered its priorities on the basis of the principles of its founding Washington Treaty (1949) and the UN Charter. Indeed, NATO has always been a prolongation of the UN security regime as summarized in the first chapter. The Washington Treaty setting up a defense alliance was concluded in reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter which acknowledges individual or collective self defense as nations' inherent right in case of an aggression.

During Cold War years NATO has always tended to operate within the legal framework of the UN Charter. This tendency continued under the recent drives of change that led NATO to adjust itself to a new role in international conflict management. NATO's new role as

third party is envisaged in functioning area framed by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which authorizes the regional security organizations in this regard. NATO's intervention to conflicts takes place in reference to the Art. 52 and Art. 53 of the UN Charter that entitle regional security organizations to manage conflicts through either peaceful means or through various enforcement mechanisms including the use of force conditional upon a request by the UN Security Council.

Internally, NATO's adjustment to conflict management in Europe has occurred in a two-track fashion. With a political approach NATO has planned to prevent possible conflicts with and among the former adversaries through integrating them into the alliance security system. Through a military approach it has targeted to manage international conflicts ranging from civil wars to ethnic conflicts by means of military assets.

The former conflict management method used by NATO which might be called prevention by integration targets to contain possible hostilities among the newly independent states and NATO countries through integrating them in some kind of a cooperation structure which would enable NATO countries to control these conflicts. It has been manifested with the newly established security forums like North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) (1991) and the Partnership for Peace (P for P) (1994) scheme. The Allies themselves are the members of these forums, they attempt to prevent conflicts through

such cooperation forums at which conflicts can be managed or resolved.

On the other hand NATO has also launched to re-structure its military assets in order that it could more effectively intervene in the conflicts endangering peace and stability in the region. The reduction in nuclear and conventional weapons, the shrinkage in number of troops through various international arms reduction treaties, and the designs towards the formation of new forces called Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF, 1994), for more rapid and flexible intervention, are the efforts which ultimately serve this end.

International political transformation attempts within NATO initially started to be chartered at the London Summit, of the NATO heads of the state and government, July 7-8 1990. 16 leaders declared that the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbors. The alliance consequently became an institution in which 16 participating states not only continued to provide for their common defense but also to build new relationships with all the nations of Europe including former adversaries. At this summit the NATO leaders also declared their intention to enhance the political component of the Alliance.³ The Summit was the beginning of NATO's gradual adaptation to its conflict management role in Europe. Surrounded by the rapidly evolving European geopolitical

landscape, it prepared the Alliance for a cooperation with the Warsaw Pact nations.

The turning point in the Alliance history as regards conflict management took place in Rome in December 1991. The meeting of state and government heads of 16 NATO members changed the strategy of the Alliance and issued 'A New Strategic Concept'. Unlike the previous strategies which were designed for a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union in Europe, the new strategy is a general guideline for NATO as to how it would adapt itself to the role of conflict management. This document which outlines NATO's future political and military approaches towards conflict management in Europe is analyzed in detail below to demonstrate the theoretical preparation of NATO.

This document expressively states that NATO's perception of threat has changed. The Allies enunciate that "the risks to Allied security are multi-faceted in nature and multidirectional which makes them hard to predict and assess" and add that these risks might emerge from "the serious economic, social and political difficulties including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes which can be faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe". These risks are expected to either directly threaten the Allies or to come forth as conflicts which are "inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts which could involve outside powers or spill over into

NATO countries, having direct effect on the security of alliance". Therefore NATO should be ready to respond to such risks whichever form they might take for the security of the Allies (See Appendix III paragraph #10).

The New Strategic Concept also defines the essential purpose of the alliance as follows:

"The means by which the Alliance pursues its security policy to preserve the peace will continue to include the maintenance of military capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective defense; and overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its members and the pursuit of political efforts favoring dialogue with other nations and the active search for a cooperative approach to European security including in the field of arms control and disarmament."⁴

Even if the defense purpose of the alliance is preserved, NATO's fundamental objective is, now, described as the "successful management of the crises" affecting the security of its members.

This shift in the alliance priorities is unveiled when the fundamental task is outlined. While "deterrence and defense against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state" is enumerated as the third, achieving the essential purpose of;

"[providing] one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force"

is given the top priority. (See Appendix III, paragraph # 21)

The military approach to conflict management is explicitly displayed in the force posture. The missions of the Alliance military forces are enumerated as guaranteeing the security and territorial integrity of member states and responding to "diverse and multi-directional risks Alliance forces have in performing different functions in peace, crisis and war" (See Appendix III paragraph # 41).

The Allies signal that they might undertake several functions in such periods through the differentiation of the missions of the military forces in the course of peace, crisis and war. In peace "the role of Allied military forces is to guard against risks to the security of Alliance members". In time of crises "which might lead to a military threat to the security of Alliance members the Alliance's military forces can complement and reinforce political actions within a broad approach to security and thereby contribute to the management of such crises and their peaceful resolution." War referred as a general war in Europe is regarded as "highly unlikely [but] it cannot finally be ruled out". Hence, the "appropriate mix of [Alliance's military] forces" and capabilities "which have as their mission to protect peace, have to provide the essential insurance against potential risks at the minimum level necessary to prevent war of any kind, and should aggression occur, to restore peace". (See Appendix III paragraphs 42,43,44)

NATO's new force posture is designed in response to the changing nature of the threats. The effective response to international

conflicts in Europe necessitates an alliance which will be able to flexibly respond to a wide spectrum of contingencies. They, thus, properly contribute to crisis management, peacekeeping and war prevention while maintaining the means to defend the security and territorial integrity of member states.⁵

A smaller, more flexible, and mobile new force posture is foreseen. The new forces can generally be maintained at lower states of readiness focusing on the protection of peace and the management of conflicts. They include a greater role for multinational formations.⁶

Indeed all categories of the main defense posture are structured to respond to the required conflict management function effectively. Three types of essential forces are designed for an effective functioning of the conflict management: the main defense forces, the reaction forces and the augmentation forces. Even the defense forces are designed in a form that could effectively be used for the conflict management. These forces will also be multinational in nature.

In addition to the military approach, the successful management of conflicts threatening stability in Europe was then intended to be handled intensely through the prevention by integration scheme. This tendency caused a significant initiative toward the conflict management in Europe via setting up security forums between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries . This special security arrangement, which is called the North Atlantic Cooperation Council

(NACC) is formed as "a forum for dialogue and consultation on political and security related issues and for partnership in practical cooperation activities, in areas of NATO competence" in 1991.⁷ Formerly an expression of the prevention by integration policy NACC was intended to contribute "as the primary consultative body between NATO and liaison states on security issues and [subsidiary] body in controlling crises in Europe" as then the US Secretary of State Baker stated in 1992.⁸ However, NATO countries tend to view this forum basically as a consultation mechanism while the liaison partners have been stressing the cooperative dimension. NATO countries acted as a unified body as opposed to the new partners on various initiatives for common security cooperation schemes which put them into the position of a principal party.⁹

As regards the changes brought by the New Strategic Concept the terminology used in the document is worth being stressed. The role that NATO attempted to assume in the European security system is termed as a conflict management in this study due to the reasons referred in the second chapter. However NATO documents or the writings in the international press described it as crisis management or peacekeeping. In fact in several paragraphs of the New Strategic Concept the terms of conflict and crisis are used interchangeably while in some others they are differentiated in line with the analysis of this paper. For instance in paragraph 10 of the New Strategic

Concept the term 'crises' is differentiated from 'armed conflicts' which are, here, termed as war . In some paragraphs such as #14, 20, 30, 32, 38 (see Appendix III) the term 'crisis' is used vaguely. In some other paragraphs such as #33, 43 (see Appendix III.) "resolution of crisis [instead of conflict] at an early stage" is mentioned whereas the term crisis management is stated in the following sentences of the same paragraph.

As the missions of the alliance military forces are outlined in the New Strategic Concept (see Appendix III, paragrah # 41-47), it is stated that the forces would be used in peace, in crises affecting the security of the Alliance, and in wars in which NATO is involved. This explicitly demonstrates what is meant by 'war'. War would be an armed conflict where NATO is a principal party. That's why the term "crisis" seemed to be used to differentiate the conflicts which requires an effective management as a third party. In conclusion the term crisis is employed to refer to the different phases of a conflict that affect the security of the Alliance. In consequence, the New Strategic Concept, though displaying the Cold War mentality, and contributing to the terminology confusion, actually foresees a complete course for action for the management of conflict at all phases.

3.2 A Chronological Analysis of NATO's Third Party Involvement in International Conflict Management

The historic decisions taken at London (1990) and Rome (1991) Summits are succeeded by two other bold decisions by NATO. One was taken at the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in Oslo in June 1992. NATO Foreign Ministers announced their readiness "to support , on a case by case basis in accordance with their own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This includes making available Alliance resources, expertise and coordination capabilities for peacekeeping operations".¹⁰ Thus, NATO committed itself to support international peacekeeping by offering to make its capabilities and assets available 'on a case-by-case basis' at the specific request of the OSCE. It was a carefully worded statement of political intent , taking account of misgivings about any expansion of NATO's role beyond the collective defense commitment enshrined in the Washington Treaty. Against the background of this initial decision , NATO military authorities began to examine the resources and modalities of the Alliance for support for the international conflict management.

Initially this took the form of generic planning under the auspices of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) aimed at developing a doctrinal basis for a mixture of missions ranging from

humanitarian relief and low-intensity conflict to war. The original intention was to produce a catalogue of NATO 'assets and capabilities' and to develop a low -level doctrine for operations with which NATO was highly unfamiliar.

Political authorities within NATO soon after Oslo Decision became occupied with the continuing conflict in the Balkans. They recognized that NATO could not optimize its new role of supporting crisis management and peacekeeping if it placed itself exclusively under the OSCE umbrella. The failure of the OSCE Secretariat in Prague, let alone its Conflict Prevention Center, to coordinate actions with NATO and provide guidelines for planning over Yugoslavia, led to search for more effective mechanism for the management of this conflict. Thus in December 1992, the North Atlantic Council also committed itself to supporting operations under the authority of the UN Security Council.¹¹

Following this December 1992 statement which put NATO assets in support of peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council, NATO Foreign Ministers reviewed peacekeeping and sanction enforcement measures already being individually undertaken by NATO countries and as Alliance to support the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions relating to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. This indicated that the Alliance was ready to respond positively to further initiatives that the UN

Secretary General might take in seeking Alliance assistance in this field.¹²

Naturally, this decision had implications for NATO defense planning. The Defense Ministers of NATO countries participating in the Defense Planning Committee meeting in December 1992 reiterated an Alliance commitment to peacekeeping. In a permanent session, specific measures in such areas as command and control, logistic support , infrastructure, and training and exercises which would enhance NATO's peacekeeping capabilities were outlined and decided to be refined through NATO's force planning process. It was agreed that support for the UN and the OSCE peacekeeping should be included among the missions of NATO forces and headquarters.

The NACC, which was initially set up for political purposes, took a decision which had military implications. Foreign Ministers of participating countries to NACC agreed to share experience and expertise in peacekeeping and related matters with one another and with other OSCE states. They also expressed their determination to contribute to OSCE goals in prevention and management of conflicts and settling disputes peacefully as well as their readiness to support and contribute on a case by case basis to peacekeeping operations under the UN authority or OSCE responsibility.¹³

NACC members also decided to form an "Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping". This group prepared a report, in

Athens, in June 1993, aiming to develop a common understanding on third party intervention to the conflict management in the area covered by NACC countries. These decisions aimed at combining the prevention by integration approach with the military approach and build an active conflict management system for NATO. The report produced by Ad Hoc Group is significant in terms of summarizing the conceptual and practical guidelines for the conflict management as a third party.

In describing the conceptual connotations of the peacekeeping activity the report used five categories of action which would be employed at different phases of a conflict. They are conflict prevention, peacemaking , peacekeeping , peace enforcement, and peace-building as was the case in the UN Secretary General Ghali's 'An Agenda for Peace'. They include a whole range activities from fact finding missions to using military means.

This document is remarkable in the sense that it specifies NATO's vague interpretation of crisis management in New Strategic Concept . It proves that official rhetoric as "participation to the peacekeeping activities under the OSCE or UN mandate" indeed refers to a wide spectrum conflict management activities by the third parties ranging from preventive deployment to the use of military means.

The conceptual approaches outlined by the Ad Hoc group have additionally two notable aspects from NATO's third party intervention view. First, the Group has taken the UN Charter Chapter VI and Chapter VII as the main operation area and used the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali's 'An Agenda on Peace' definitions as the basis of the conceptual understanding of the NACC's management regime proving NATO's commitment to the UN principles. Second, these definitions display what NATO mean by peacekeeping operation under UN or OSCE mandate. Thus they constitute the principal guide to NATO's future operations in conflict management as third party.¹⁴

These series of decisions toward setting up a conflict management regime, in general, were continued with another summit meeting of the state or government heads of the 16 nations in Brussels on January 10-11 1994. At this summit, NATO countries maintained their two track approach to conflict management. As an extension of the prevention by integration approach the 16 nations offered to the NACC members, which were not satisfied with the NACC cooperation scheme, as well as to other European states a new strategic cooperation channel called "Partnership for Peace" (P for P). This proposal was actually a kind of compromise between the former Warsaw Pact countries specifically Visegrad Countries, Poland , Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary which were seeking full membership and the Russian Federation which stated that it would

perceive such an expansion of Alliance as a threat to itself.¹⁵ Through this cooperation mechanism, all eligible states would form closer political and military relations with NATO at a level determined by their own will. The Partners for Peace might actively participate in both the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meetings at the political level and be active on the military side of the Alliance through permanent liaison officers in NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) under the authority of the NAC.

'Partners' would be able to participate in military planning and common maneuvers if they desire.¹⁶ Then, NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner in describing the Partnership for Peace mechanism stressed the military aspect of the cooperation and noted that:

"Partner states would work towards the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations."¹⁷

The Partnership for Peace initiative has become very popular and 23 Eastern European and former Soviet Republics signed it. This compromise even attracted the Russian Federation and it declared its intention to join. However Russia claimed that it could not participate on equal terms with the others. Russia's integration into the conflict management system of NATO actually has a great importance since in the absence of Russia, having extra territorial interests in all the former Soviet Republics and Eastern and Central

European States, NATO's political approach to conflict management would be insufficient.

The military dimension of the management regime was decided to be reinforced at the Brussels Summit through the formation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). This is the establishment of multinational task forces of NATO and non-NATO troops that would conduct joint military exercises and be ready to move quickly in conflict management. These forces involve troops from different branches of the armed services and from different countries - six West European NATO members along with Poland and Hungary. The operative principle of CJTF will be "separable but not separate" forces. According to this program some NATO countries might not take part in specific task force action, even if the North Atlantic Council (NAC) would have to approve such an action.

The formation of the Combined Joint Task Forces has indeed three consequences in terms of NATO's conflict management role as third party. First, it is a genuine effort towards the accomplishment of conflict management as the military restructuring is the primary condition for the effective conflict management regime. Second, this approach is the combination of political and military approaches which enhances NATO's ability to respond to the conflicts in the region. It is a political attempt because the CJTF would be composed of the troops from the signatories of the Partnership for Peace if they desire, which

make them an integral part of this military arrangement. Third, the separable but not separate characteristic of the CJTF signifies the importance of the internal dynamics of change in the organization's transformation to the conflict management system. This is designed to solve the problem of burden sharing and aimed at satisfying a desire of France and other European nations to establish a more independent defense identity. Hence, European nations without the US would be able to take part in the international conflicts endangering the regional stability on their own.

.Under these monitoring operations NATO forces have reported the has, thus, adjusted itself to the role of conflict management in Europe. The prevention by integration scheme continues in political platforms, whereas NATO's military involvement in the conflict management as a third party is tested on the ground, in the conflict in former Yugoslavia. The Alliance's active involvement to a conflict as third party started with the implementation of UN resolutions for the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, rather than OSCE's. In July 1992, one month after the Oslo Meeting, NATO put its assets in service of the implementation of the UN resolutions. This was five months earlier than the December 1992 decision of the NAC to support peacekeeping operations under UN authority. This practice elucidates the futility of the concept such as OSCE peacekeeping which reveals nothing but the discrepancy between its means and mandate.

NATO's contribution to conflict management in former Yugoslavia have taken place in four basic forms: monitoring, enforcement, ground operations and contingency planning. Monitoring operations began with NATO ships belonging to the Alliance's Standing Mediterranean Naval Force in the Adriatic in support of the UN economic embargo against Serbia and Montenegro and the UN arms embargo against all republics of the former Yugoslavia according to Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. From October 1992, this operation coordinated with a parallel monitoring operation under the auspices of the Western European Union, has been supported by NATO airborne early-warning aircraft (AWACS) and maritime patrol aircraft monitoring the UN mandated NATO fly-zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Under these monitoring operations NATO forces have reported the possible violations on a daily basis to the Headquarters of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Zagreb, which were passed to UN Headquarters in New York as the basis for bi-weekly reports to the UN Security Council. These monitoring activities undertaken by NATO are peacekeeping operations launched in the war phase of the conflict.

Enforcement operations in support of UN sanctions, involve the fulfillment of peace-enforcement which differs from other third party intervention mechanisms in that it involves the use of force. Such

operations of NATO naval forces in the Adriatic, began in November 1992 as an extension of naval monitoring operations of July 1992. They were conducted in cooperation with the Albanian authorities in order to prevent the circumvention of UN embargoes through the use of Albanian territorial waters.

On 31 March 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 816 authorizing enforcement of the no-fly-zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina and requested the assistance of regional organizations such as NATO to help UNPROFOR to implement the tasks of the no-fly-zone and the protection of safe areas under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UN Resolution 816 extended the ban to cover flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina except those authorized by UNPROFOR. In the event of further violations, it authorized member states to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the ban. An enforcement operation involving fighters and reconnaissance aircrafts from various Alliance nations and NATO airborne early-warning aircraft flying mainly from air bases in northern Italy and from an aircraft carrier in the Adriatic, began in early April 1993.

As far as ground operations are concerned the Allies have undertaken peacekeeping operations NATO expressed its willingness to support actions undertaken under UN responsibility to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including

personnel or other resource contributions such as transportation, communications and logistics. In addition , NATO declared its readiness to support the UN to monitor heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina and offered to the UN and OSCE to provide contingency planning for these tasks.

On July 22 1993, NATO stated that it was ready to offer "protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR in the performance of its overall mandate, if it is requested." The North Atlantic Council reiterated this commitment at a special meeting on 2 August 1993. On 9 August 1993 NAC clarified that air strikes foreseen by the Council decision of August 2 were limited to the support of humanitarian relief, and it must not be interpreted as a decision for military intervention.¹⁸

At the declaration following the North Atlantic Council held in Brussels on 10-11 January 1994, the heads of state and government reaffirmed their readiness under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and in accordance with the Alliance decisions of 2 and 9 August 1993 , to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁹ Any decision to launch such air strikes would require the approval of the North Atlantic Council and then the UN Security Council.

The no-fly-zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina was violated by warplanes which attacked a Muslim controlled ammunition factory in Central Bosnia and two US F-16 fighters brought down four Bosnian-Serbs' light attack bombers on 28 February 1994. It was the first time the no-fly-zone was violated by warplanes. The overwhelming majority of the violations that NATO detected were occasional helicopter flights by the various sides.²⁰

Between February and May 1994 NATO actively continued peace enforcement actions in the former Yugoslavia. Following a mortar attack into a crowded market in Sarajevo on 5 February 1994, which caused 61 killings and 200 woundings, NATO issued a ultimatum on 9 February 1994 that it would order air strikes against Bosnian Serbs' artillery or heavy weapons involved in the siege of Sarajevo unless they were withdrawn or placed under UN control in 10 days.²¹ Bosnian Serbs complied with the NATO ultimatum to pull back their heavy guns and NATO did not launch air strikes against the Serb forces around the Sarajevo.

In the beginning of April 1994, upon a request by the UN Secretary General to authorize air strikes in defense of UN "safe areas" in Bosnia- Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica, Gorazde, Tuzla, Zepa according to UN Resolution 824, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) issued another ultimatum, on April 22 1994, warning that it would launch air strikes against heavy weapons and other military targets

within 20 km of the besieged eastern Bosnian city of Gorazde unless Bosnian Serbs immediately stopped their attacks against this city. This was the active implementation of peace enforcement through the threat of use of force. Bosnian Serbs retreated in compliance with NATO's ultimatum. Upon the request by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali on 18 April 1994, The Allies also issued ultimatums on 23-24 April 1994 analogous to the ones for Gorazde which put in effect four other "safe areas" (Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzla and Zepa) under NATO protection in expectation of providing successful third party protection in these areas in a similar way.

Finally, NATO Military Authorities has been carrying out contingency planning for a range of options to support UN activities relating to the conflict in former Yugoslavia in parallel with the developments taking place. The contingency plans for the enforcement of a no-fly-zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina; the establishment of relief zones and safe havens for civilians in Bosnia; and ways to prevent the spread of the conflict to Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, are prepared under the authority of the NATO, and passed to the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's request to access in December 1992.²²

Additionally, early contingency planning with respect to the Alliance's role in support of UN initiatives to restore peace in former Yugoslavia was also undertaken by NATO military authorities. Since

March 1993 they have also been planning for contingency options for possible implementation of a UN peace plan for Bosnia- Herzegovina, which might be signed by all parties to the conflict.²³ These constitute NATO's contribution to peace-making during a war.

In brief NATO's adjustment to international conflict management in Europe which started in London (1990) found its full theoretical expression in the "New Strategic Concept" in 1991. The progress towards the implementation of this initiative was launched in 1992 in support of the UN peacekeeping activities in the conflict in former Yugoslavia. This rough commitment for international conflict management is theoretically refined in the NACC's Ad Hoc Committee's document dated June 1993 which has demonstrated that NATO fully advocated the UN definitions of third party intervention in international conflicts. The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina has also provided NATO with a case by which it could test the limits of its capabilities in this regard. From a theoretical perspective this involvement has two additional points of significance which is handled in the next chapter. First, it assisted observers to speculate on possibilities for NATO's third party roles that it could take in the management of international conflicts. Second, it has shown that NATO should secure a better coordination mechanism with the UN upon whose consent it is contingent for intervention.

CHAPTER IV

AN ANALYSIS OF NATO'S THIRD PARTY ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT FROM A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

4.1 A Model for NATO's Possible Third Party Roles in International Conflict Management

NATO's intervention in international conflicts in Europe as a third party is designed to be complementary to the UN's. This stems from two reasons: First, the capacity of UN is inadequate to manage all conflicts which occur simultaneously in several regions of the world. Therefore regional security organizations should assist the UN in its mission of maintaining world peace. Second, NATO needs to legitimize its third party intervention so as to not to be blamed for militarily intervening in conflicts in pursuit of the Allies' interests. This would put it into the position of a principal party which NATO is particularly avoiding. Thus, it adheres to the consent of the UN Security Council and the request by the UN Secretary General on a case-by-case basis.

Correspondingly, the possible third party roles that NATO can assume in conflict management will be parallel to the UN's which are generally outlined in Ghali's 'An Agenda For Peace'. The UN's roles as regards the different phases of conflict have been summarized in the second chapter. Furthermore, NATO's participation in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in line with its adaptation to the conflict

management since 1991 has been handled in the third chapter. On the basis of the conflict analysis in the second chapter and the roles that NATO took in its intervention in this conflict , here possible third party roles that NATO could assume in international conflict management will be handled.

There are four general categories in which NATO might take active role: preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peace-enforcement and peace-making.(See Chart 3) Preventive diplomacy aims at preventing a potential conflict escalate into a crisis, or should it is on crisis phase, to a war .It is practiced at either the pre-crisis or the crisis phases of a conflict. Ghali foresees five types of action to serve at preventive diplomacy: confidence building measures, formal and informal fact-finding, early warning, preventive deployment and the creation of demilitarized zones.¹

In promoting confidence building measures, NATO has devised political forums such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (P for P) schemes where the systematic exchange of political and military information take place. However they are part of the political approach. NATO has little to do in fact finding missions compared to the established mechanisms of the UN in this regard. As far as early warning is concerned NATO can be particularly serviceable with its advanced intelligence and reconnaissance systems. This function has utmost importance for military and environmental activities in issue areas.²

THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION	
PHASES OF CONFLICT	
	Preventive Diplomacy
	Peace-making
	Peace-keeping
	Peace-enforcement
	Peace-building
<i>Pre-crisis</i>	√ NATO
<i>Crisis</i>	√ NATO
<i>War</i>	√ NATO
<i>Post-war</i>	√ NATO

NATO'S THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION

In the category of preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment and the monitoring of demilitarized zones are the tasks that NATO could forcibly contribute. The concept of the deployment of multinational forces in a preventive mode, as a means of both deterring cross-border (inter-state) attacks and preventing hostilities from erupting within a country, has long been advocated by observers as well as UN officials. This kind of deployment has been firstly implemented in Macedonia along the border with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia since December 1992.³ Although NATO did not participate in the mission in Macedonia, it could adequately perform such a function in case of a request because the Alliance's forces are being re-designed for providing stand-by forces for this purpose. It is among the tasks of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). Similar to preventive deployment, defending demilitarized zones serves as a means of separating potential belligerents at the request of one party. It can be significant in demonstrating the international community's concern that conflict be prevented there. NATO's involvement in monitoring such zones through its advanced military reconnaissance techniques and the deployment of troops could be determining (see Chart 3)

Peace-making activities entail the responsibility of seeking to bring the hostile parties peacefully to the terms by means of the techniques listed in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. These actions can be employed at the first three stages of conflict- pre-crisis, crisis, and war, aiming at reaching a new political settlement (see Chart 3). The

record of the UN has shown that as to the lack of political will by the parties, the lack of enough leverage by the third parties or the indifference by the international community has made the peaceful means of conflict settlement unsuccessful. Therefore the Secretary General suggested the mixture of different conflict management methods ranging from adjudication to resort of force in "An Agenda For Peace". These methods are bringing the issue before the International Court of Justice, working for improvement of the conditions leading to conflict, the imposition of sanctions under Art. 41 of the UN Charter and the use of force in accordance with Art. 42.

In the implementation of the peace-making actions which ultimately targets to reach a peace agreed by the parties, NATO can play a role in the monitoring of the sanctions including the use of force against a declared aggressor. In the implementation of the economic embargo against the former Yugoslavian states and the arms embargo against Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO has carried out such a monitoring function. Moreover, it plays a credible role in the monitoring of the no-fly-zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

NATO has also assumed a new role in international peace-making efforts. This is contingency planning for a political settlement in the conflict in former Yugoslavia. It is a category of action which brings NATO's political and military capabilities together at the disposal of UN authority. This role is remarkable in terms of potential conflicts in Europe. Such plans prepared and discussed by the parties before they resort to aggression can be very functional in coordination

with the UN authorities. Such a work seems more active and credible than similar attempts initiated by the OSCE which could not go beyond a diplomatic meeting forum. Furthermore, such a plan would combine the military and political experience of NATO under the impartial framework provided by the UN. Thus potential conflicts can be dealt with more properly before they transcend into full-scale wars.

As indicated earlier peace-keeping has been invented by the United Nations. It is the deployment of the UN troops in field aimed at preventing the outbreak or resurgence of aggression between the parties. Peace-keeping activities have been guided by the principles of non-use of force except self-defense, consent of parties, impartiality and being conducted under the UN Security Council authority. Various collective peace-keeping operations can be carried out during the war and post-war phases of a conflict (see Chart 3). During a war peace-keeping troops can disengage the warring parties through their physical existence in the field. They do not use force except self-defense. This traditional peace-keeping function i.e. to support peace-making efforts by helping to create conditions in which political negotiation can proceed, involves monitoring of cease-fires, controlling buffer zones and so on.

Increase in demand for the peace-keeping troops and the changing nature of conflicts particularly civil ones have constituted new tasks for the peace-keeping troops in the field. Maintenance of the delivery of humanitarian relief is the most significant new function

that peacekeeping troops are expected to perform. Specifically, at the post-war phase of a conflict peacekeeping troops are required for:

"demobilization of the troops; the destruction of weapons and the formation and training of new armed forces; monitoring existing police force and forming new ones; supervising or even controlling existing administrations; verifying respect for human rights, observing, supervising or even conducting elections; undertaking information campaigns to explain the settlement the opportunities it offers the people concerned and the role of the United Nations".⁴

NATO's third party intervention to the European conflicts in form of peacekeeping is prominent. All NATO documents refer to peacekeeping as a major form of the third party intervention it aspires to perform. Actually the 1991 Oslo Decision and December 1992 documents respectively put NATO's assets into the service of the OSCE and UN in peacekeeping operations. NATO can support the UN peace-keeping operations in logistic and procurement activities in the performance of all these functions. It can particularly be functional in providing troops for the traditional peacekeeping functions, that is the delivery of humanitarian relief and the monitoring of cease-fires. In other words NATO can be more effective in the peace-keeping operations conducted during the war phase. Whereas in the post-war phase of a conflict peace-keeping activities require a more sensitive approach since the third party should be genuinely impartial in the eyes of the principal parties to the conflict for the success of an operation. Despite its functioning under the auspices of the UN , NATO could still be considered the security instrument of the Western powers hence the parties may not be willing to host NATO troops in

their territories after a political settlement is reached. Therefore NATO's third party involvement in international conflict whether it be inter-state or intra-state ought to be halted after the settlement is reached.

Peace enforcement is a newly emerged concept developed by the UN due to the practical requirements that UN peacekeeping forces have confronted in the course of their post-cold war involvement such as Somalia or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some scholars analyze peace-enforcement as a part of the peace-keeping activities where UN forces are authorized to use force except self- defense. Whereas in Ghali's categorization peace-enforcement is considered as a part of peacemaking activity. Ghali mentions that the peace-enforcement activity requires when agreed cease fires are not complied with. He states that when

"the UN has been called upon to send forces to restore and maintain a cease-fire this task can on occasion exceed the mission of peace-keeping forces and the expectations of peace-keeping force contributors and this is the peace-enforcement rather than peacekeeping."⁵

However in this study peace-enforcement has been treated as a separate category of conflict management. Indeed, the use of force, except self defense is viewed as distinct from the mission of peacemaking. Enforcement activity differs from peacemaking in that the third party conflict manager actively involves in war making activity at the expense of the impartiality principle against the violator of the cease-fire. In this respect this study completely agrees with

Ghali's definition of peacekeeping, however, here, it is not considered as peacemaking activity because the latter serves to bring hostile parties around a table through peaceful means not through the use of force.

Peace-enforcement activity can be restored at the war phase of a conflict since any violation of truce is treated as the resumption of a war (see Chart 3). Peace-enforcement ultimately aims at preparing proper ground for effective functioning of the peace making efforts by principal and third parties.

In describing the peace-enforcement activity Ghali continues that

"such units from Member States would be available on call and would consist of troops that have volunteered for such service, have to be more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces..... The deployment and operation of such forces would be under the authorization of the Security Council and would , as in the case of peace-keeping the Security Council be under the command of the Secretary- General."⁶

These assets that the peace-enforcement units ought to have in Ghali's categorization perfectly corresponds to the assets of NATO. NATO actually intended to set up such forces called Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) which would carry out such functions as well as peace-keeping and preventive deployment.

In effect, peace-enforcement is crucial from NATO's point of view. NATO carried out this mission once in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina exactly in the way described by Ghali. NATO aircrafts

launch air-strikes against the Serbs who violated the agreed cease-fire on 18 February 1994. This confrontation was initiated in the form of NATO ultimatums which foresaw the use of air strikes against the violator of truce, the Serbs in this case. Undoubtedly, these strikes were launched under the authority of the UN in coordination with the UNPROFOR in Zagreb.

Peace-building actions theoretically start following the genuine settlement and aim at removing the real sources of a conflict. They are actually a part of the conflict resolution scheme since peace-building activities should be launched at a pre-crisis phase or post war phase (see Chart 4). They target to remove the sources of conflict and put in action what differentiates the resolution from the management activities therefore they are not categorized as management activity.

Peace-building actions are, indeed, the most important phase of conflict resolution efforts for the "peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful". These are "comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people." All initiatives taken by either principal third parties are conditional upon the peace building efforts' credible handling of the real sources leading to the conflict.

"(Depending on the nature of the peace) if it ends the a civil strife these activities may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for

security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation. In the aftermath of international war post-conflict peace-building may take the form of concrete cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace."⁷

Peace-building actions can be launched at any phase of a conflict where hostile parties decide not to inflame the issue. If a conflict ends at a crisis phase then the parties de-escalate the situation to a new pre-crisis phase where peace-building activities can be resorted to. Should a conflict reach to the war phase then peace-building efforts can be utilized after genuine peace is reached through negotiations by the parties to a conflict.

"In surveying the range of efforts for peace, the concept of peace-building as the construction of a new environment should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy, which seeks to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions. When conflict breaks out, mutually reinforcing efforts at peace-making and peace-keeping come into play. Once these have achieved their objectives, only sustained cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation. Preventive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict peace-building is to prevent recurrence."⁸

These efforts are vital for the real settlement of international conflicts.

Peace building is a kind of third party intervention mechanism where NATO could not assume a role. Similar to the peace-keeping efforts in the post-war, peace-building activities could not be

THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION	
PHASES OF CONFLICT	
	Preventive Diplomacy
	Peace-making
	Peace-keeping
	Peace-enforcement
	Peace-building
<i>Pre-crisis</i>	NATO UN
<i>Crisis</i>	NATO UN
<i>War</i>	NATO UN
<i>Post-war</i>	UN

UN-NATO COORDINATED THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION

performed by the NATO personnel because NATO forces would be viewed as the agents of Western powers and once more NATO would suffer from the problem of impartiality. Therefore, NATO actions under this category should be minimized compared to UN's which are more impartial in the eyes of conflicting parties.

NATO's intervention in the post-war phase of conflict would have additional side-effects. The peace-building attempts in the post-war phase of a conflict would serve conflict resolution instead of conflict management. This is an area where NATO would not like to act in a form described by Ghali. It has political mechanisms like Partnership for Peace and NACC which target to manage conflicts before they burst into full fledged war. However initiatives taken in a post-war phase of a conflict would serve to resolve a conflict with its real sources where the political forums of NATO would not be sufficient. Even if NATO intends to get involved in such conflicts in the post war phase through its political mechanisms, this would make NATO a principal party into a conflict from which it particularly abstains.

This is an area of functioning in which NATO has never intended to take any initiative. Since the end of Cold War, the ultimate aim of NATO's transformation has always been to adjust the Alliance in conflict management rather than resolution. This is obvious in the official documents issued after that date.

4.2 An Appraisal of NATO's Possible Third Party Roles Model from a Structural Perspective

NATO's possible involvement in international conflict management as a third party is analyzed within a theoretical framework on the basis of the documents issued after the Cold War . However practice usually differs from theory. NATO has, actually, striven to perform such functions under considerable constraints which might sometimes be so influential that they might hinder the performance of such a role or create unavoidable problems. These constraints for the successful and credible third party intervention from NATO's point of view can be grouped into four: the impartiality problem, inadequate theoretical and practical preparation, structural problems between UN and NATO and the lack of political will among the Allies.

1) **impartiality:** One of the important constraints for regional organizations even when operating as a group on behalf of the UN is to maintain impartiality in the eyes of the parties to a particular dispute."⁹ Particularly for NATO having more than 45 years of experience as a defense organization of the Western bloc it is almost impossible to justify its involvement in a conflict on its own behalf free from connotations of partiality. This deficiency is actually one of the principal advantages of the UN as a vehicle for collective action. The UN has been able to disassociate itself as an intervening force from the politics of a particular conflict, thus preserve its impartial status. NATO officials keeping this in mind chose to act within the functioning

area delineated by the UN and used the UN's offer for action in order to provide the required legitimacy.

Yet the UN's offer to act might not be sufficient. For instance NATO's air strikes against the Serbs on 18 February 1994 were criticized by the Russian Federation. This indicates that if similar cases occur in Eastern or Central Europe Russia will most likely to react similarly and attempt to direct the world public opinion to take a negative stand against such intervention.

ii) **Inadequate theoretical and practical preparation:** An intervention to an international conflict as a third party needs a well prepared guideline for action. Firstly, principles should be established at the theoretical level. The principles and norms on which such action would be based should be searched and determined beforehand. Following these principles and norms, rules and the decision making procedures should be determined.¹⁰ Finally, after the implementation of these principles, rules and norms the failures and deficiencies faced in action should constitute feedback to the international conflict management regime of this institution to develop a well equipped and adequate functioning of a regime. NATO's preparation to the international conflict management regime as a third party does not suffer from the lack of well established principles. They were explicitly stated in the Alliance Strategic Concept in 1991. The basic principles are enumerated as "the fundamental tasks of Allies". They are;

" to preserve peaceand provide for effective defense; an overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its members and the

pursuit of political efforts favoring dialogue with other nations and the active search of a cooperative approach to European security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament."¹¹

The norms are stated as the protection of peace in Europe, dialogue, cooperation, collective defense, management of crisis and conflict prevention under the heading of " A Broad Approach to Security".¹² Naturally, a general strategic concept does not go beyond the principles and norms level. The rules and the decision making procedures were to be created in the following meetings of the established mechanisms of the Alliance. Even though such a tendency is observed in several decisions following 1991 document they failed to give clear cut definitions of the rules applied in the conflict management as a third party. For example NATO decided to put its assets under the aegis of the UN and OSCE peacekeeping activities without specifying in which cases or under which circumstances peacekeeping or peace enforcement or any kind of third party intervention mechanisms would be launched. Finally, the decision-making procedures between NATO and the UN or OSCE have not been established.

In spite of the lack of predetermined criteria for involvement along with delegating final authority for intervention to the UN or OSCE mandates theoretically which constitutes a problem, this vagueness is in the interest of the NATO countries which would not like to assume such a role in the management of conflicts. That seems the reason why NATO strategists prefer to design such a regime. It supplies NATO with the luxury of being selective. This a political tact

which expands NATO's area of operation. The "separable but not separate forces" principle which enables the Allies as well as partners to individually detach themselves from collective actions of NATO in conflict management is a reflection of this political maneuver in the military field.

iii) Structural problems between the UN and NATO: This constitutes one of the primary failures in practice. Even if NATO decided to actively involve in conflicts to prevent the harsh violations of human rights or to prevent the human sufferings in various situations during the Bosnia conflict, the UN Security Council hesitated to let NATO to undertake enforcement action against the obvious aggressor. A consensus between the UN and NATO could not be achieved on time, since the definite terms of intervention in conflicts did not determined between Brussels and New York due to the different political considerations of respective member countries. Accordingly the aggression could not be stopped at the shortest possible time. This failure is explicitly stated by the former Secretary General of the NATO as follows:

"We must further develop the Alliance's capabilities, forces, structures and procedures for crisis management, peacekeeping, and peacemaking . And we must achieve a more structured relationship with the United Nations in order to generate the conditions that are essential for future crisis between humanitarian and peacekeeping-peacemaking missions, and unitary chain of command."¹³

NATO's declaration of intention stating that it is ready to supply air coverage or strikes against aggressor Serbs in Bosnia Herzegovina

where defenseless civilian Muslims were attacked on 5 February and 18 April 1994 were the typical examples of such failures in terms of processes leading to these ultimatums.

Besides the theoretical unreadiness for a credible third party intervention, NATO has not been equipped with the necessary tools for intervention. The Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) which are intended to be formed and trained for a credible third party intervention mechanisms have not been fully developed.

iv) The lack of political will: The most important failure of NATO's third party involvement in international conflicts which has reflections on all other problems appears as the lack of political will among the Allies. The past record of intra-alliance consultation, even conducted under the shadow of the Soviet power, suggests that the possibility of NATO members, let alone NATO and its Eastern European partners, disagreeing on specific policy issues is extremely high. In reality, NATO does not remotely resemble a great power, with well-defined interests over a range of issues and a well-developed will of its own. Each major European power and the USA has its own interests and concerns; what Germany deems as vital to its security and prosperity, the USA or France may regard as peripheral. To insist on joint intervention in such a case would only create friction where none previously existed.¹⁴

It is evident that the lack of political will is closely tied to deep seated apprehensions, especially among Western governments about becoming embroiled in open-ended commitments that may involve

high casualty rates and substantial economic costs. It remains very difficult for any government to justify why its own nationals should die in distant land for causes not clearly related to perceptions of national interest, especially when the conflicting parties themselves appear to show little interest in peace resolutions. It is important to stress that unpalatable prospect of 'open-ended commitments' and unacceptable casualty rates is a particularly important consideration in US policy and therefore likely to decisively influence all future third party involvement especially in peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations.

From the US point of view, the reluctance in taking more active role in overseas engagements can be clearly seen in the Clinton administration's new policy in peacekeeping operations. This policy orders that the following elements will guide the US involvement in possible deployments of US military units in UN operations: very well defined threat to interests of US; existence of distinct end point; equitable sharing of peace operations' costs and well designed plan for carrying out peace operations effectively.¹⁵ These elements clearly demonstrate that US being the sole superpower which is expected to take the lead in initiation of conflict management in the world is putting tougher conditions for participation to UN operations in the world. It is even tougher for US administrations to persuade the public and the Congress to embroil in conflicts in Europe where Europeans want to assert their own defense and security identity as a

reaction to US presence in the continent since end of the Second World War.

Despite all these negative attributes, in view of the theoretical framework outlined in the first part of this chapter, NATO could still play a credible third party role in international conflict management particularly in comparison to other security organizations. A successful third party conflict management by international organizations as third party requires some unique assets that NATO possesses. They can be described as follows:

i) **To be a regional organization:** In comparison with the UN, NATO has the advantage of being a regional organization so it does not suffer from the mismatch between the means and mandates as much as the UN does. Mats Berdal specifies UN's problem in this regard as follows:

"The former concerns the discrepancy between decisions made in New York and the provision of resources to effect them. More than 40 resolutions and no less than 15 mandate enhancements had been adopted since the Vance Plan [for the Bosnia-Herzegovina problem] was approved by the Security Council on 21 February 1992. This had placed impossible demands on UNPROFOR and has generated legitimate criticism from field personnel to the effect that the Security Council treats resolutions as if there were sold -executing."¹⁶

NATO has institutionally lesser problems in the sense that its area of functioning is limited with Europe though its borders is not defined. Thus, NATO can abstain from some conflicts provided that they do not pose direct threats to the core interests of the Allies or Peace Partners. However, the UN as a global security organization is

expected to find solutions to all international conflicts in the world. NATO officials act prudently in rendering decisions for action. Since NATO delegated its final authority in intervening into a conflict to the UN, the responsibility of taking final decision for the imposition of the sanctions rests on the UN.

ii) To be the key forum for coordinating and harmonizing transatlantic policies in conflict management efforts: NATO brings US and Europe together in spite of the existing friction among them. This transatlantic relationship is still the most stable geopolitical asset in the world for the management of an international conflict. NATO provides the key forum for coordinating and harmonizing transatlantic policies in the broadest sense. The Atlantic Alliance has also put the Europeans together. The American presence has provided for a stable balance between former rivals and enemies. It has not only prevented them from fighting each other but also enabled them to put their efforts together for the management of conflicts.

iii) To have a stabilizing influence in Europe: NATO, as a strong alliance embracing various states in the region, by its very existence exerts a stabilizing influence around its periphery. This is particularly significant in pre-crisis phases of conflicts. According to a study conducted by the Oxford Research Group in 1992 62 potential and active conflicts exist in Europe.¹⁷ The mere existence of NATO as well as its intention to develop an effective conflict management regime might constitute a deterring factor for the parties. Most probably the absence of a possibility of third party intervention by

NATO under UN auspices would dramatically increase the risks of conflicts in Europe.

iv) **To be a powerful politico-military instrument:** As regards the need for an effective management of the major conflicts, it is clear that diplomacy should be backed by a powerful politico-military instrument. Certainly, NATO requires the political will of its members to act. However, once the political will to act is reached NATO becomes a very effective instrument for action since no other institution can offer such an integrated structure for politico-military consultation mechanisms as well as unique military capabilities which still make the difference between success and failure.¹⁸

In terms of military capabilities, NATO remains unique in possessing an integrated structure with uniform command, control and communications procedures, collective assets and infrastructure facilities. Equally significant, NATO also possesses both a tested decision-making structure and a contingency-planning mechanism which can respond to changing mandates and developments on the ground. Accordingly, NATO might increase the effectiveness of UN mechanisms and structures for military actions and field support. Owing to the 45 years of experience of its integrated military structure NATO has already overcome problems such as from logistics and procurement; command, control and communications training and quality of staff that UN troops suffer.

In sum an effective conflict management for the future conflicts in Europe depends on close cooperation between the UN and NATO.

They can complement each other for securing peace and stability in the region. Therefore this study attempts to develop a model for NATO's possible intervention to the conflict management regime in a complementary manner to the UN's. The model foresees several third party roles at the different phases of a conflict ranging from preventive deployment to the use of force against an aggressor.

To assess the practicability of the model possible problems that NATO might confront are grouped as the impartiality problem, theoretical and practical unreadiness, structural problems in coordinating intervention mechanisms with the UN and the lack of political will among the Allies. Nevertheless, NATO has some unique assets- like securing transatlantic cooperation, being a deterring factor, being a regional organization and possessing an integrated military structure- in comparison to other security organizations for an effective international conflict management. In conclusion if NATO manages to overcome these problems it might develop an effective conflict management regime of its own. The model developed here is a kind of speculation on the forms which NATO's possible intervention can be in the future conflicts in Europe.

CONCLUSION

In this study, designing a new role for NATO in the emerging security landscape in the post-Cold War Europe has been treated as a third party intervention to the international conflicts. NATO's involvement in European conflicts has been theoretically categorized as a third party intervention because the demise of the Soviet Union remarkably reduced the likelihood of NATO's being a principal party to a conflict in the region. A NATO, which intends to preserve peace and stability in Europe, could only be involved in the conflicts outside of its territory, as a third party. This new perspective to NATO's role in European security requires an impartial intervention which could be obtained under UN auspices.

The concepts partly foreseen in the Charter, partly derived from the UN practices have constituted the general framework for regional organizations such as NATO according to which it could operate. These are grouped as preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-enforcement and peace-building.

The roles that NATO could assume as a third party under these categories are also differentiated in relation to the several phases of a conflict, such as pre-crisis, crisis, war and post-war. With the combination of these analyses, a model which is illustrated in Chart 3 is derived. From a review of the model following consequences can be drawn: First, NATO can participate in conflict management in Europe in a complementary manner to the UN's engagement because the UN

provides NATO the required impartiality and legitimacy. NATO's independent political approach to conflict management which is embodied in the NACC and the Partnership for Peace are no exception to this generalization due to the fact that in such forums NATO is a principal party, not a third party. Second, the crucial factor that makes the difference for NATO's involvement as a third party is its military force backed by the support of the 16 nations among whom some of the strongest nations of world politics exist. Third, though NATO can intervene in conflicts in all categories of action as a third party, its remarkable contribution could take place in the performance of peace-enforcement and peace-keeping in war phase, and the preventive deployment of troops in the pre-crisis where it could more effectively make use of its integrated military structure.. Finally, NATO cannot act in the area of peace-building because peace-building efforts are the part of conflict resolution initiatives which aspire to remove sources of conflict. This is an area that NATO has not preferred to operate in.

An evaluation of the possibility of successfully performing the roles foreseen in the model has revealed that there are two factors: First, a genuine commitment and common political will of its members should be secured before NATO's involvement. Second a general design for an effective conflict management regime in Europe ought to be handled in depth within NATO, along with clearly determining the terms of coordination with the UN. The absence of a clear rule of

conduct arranging the relation between the two reduces the possibility of success.

In general, the aim of NATO's third party conflict management model is to create an immature outline of the possible roles which NATO could assume. This model and its critics can be accepted as the main contribution of this study because it is a synthesis of all the concepts and cases under consideration. It is designed to contribute to the discussions on the practicability and attainability of NATO's new role within the existing structures. This study has also presented some of the arguments while it assesses the deficiencies and strengths of NATO in performing such roles.

As this study is produced, there exists no similar published work written from such a point of view. Therefore this is initiated as an attempt to bring the theoretical model of third party intervention and NATO's possible involvement in the conflicts in Europe together. However, it has been handicapped by two constraints which disabled the writer to give a more detailed picture of the subject. First, the information on NATO's conflict management role in Europe could not be accessed easily owing to its military character. Second NATO practice in the management of conflicts is restricted to only one example. Making generalizations on the basis of a unique case can be a strong point of criticism. However as mentioned earlier this study is just an attempt to look at such an issue from an already existing theoretical view and to add an embryonic model to be challenged and criticized.

APPENDIX I

CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

CHAPTER VI

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF

DISPUTES

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

CHAPTER VII
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS
TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE
PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace and security

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or positions of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall dully take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communications, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of the maintaining international peace and security

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43. invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable to United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special

agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the applications of the armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of the forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work .

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out of the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security .Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

CHAPTER VIII
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council .

4. This Article in no way impairs the applications of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

APPENDIX II

AN AGENDA FOR PEACE

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

I. Definitions

The term preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping are integrally related and used in this report are defined as follows:

- **Preventive diplomacy** is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.
- **Peacemaking** is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.
- **Peace-keeping** is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.

The present report in addition will address the critically related concept of post-conflict **peace-building** action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peace-keeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples.

These four areas for action, taken together, and carried out with the backing of all Members, offer a coherent contribution towards securing peace in the spirit of the Charter. The United Nations has extensive experience not only in these fields, but in the wider realm of work for peace in which these four fields are set. Initiatives on decolonization, on the environment and sustainable development, on population, on the eradication of disease, on disarmament and on the growth of international law - these and many others have contributed immeasurably to the foundations for a peaceful world. The world has often been rent by conflict and plagued by massive human suffering and deprivation. Yet it would have been far more so without the continuing efforts of the United Nations. This wide experience must be taken into account in assessing the potential of the United Nations in maintaining international security not only in its traditional sense, but in the new dimensions presented by the era ahead.

VII. Cooperation with regional arrangements and organizations.

The Covenant of the League of Nations, in its Article 21, noted the validity of regional understandings for securing the maintain of peace. The Charter devotes Chapter VII. to regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action and consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The cold war impaired the proper use of Charter VIII. and indeed, in that era, regional arrangements worked on occasion against resolving disputes in the manner foreseen in the Charter.

The Charter deliberately provides no precise definition of regional arrangements and agencies, thus allowing useful flexibility for undertakings by a groups of States to deal with a matter appropriate for regional action which also could contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. Such associations or entities could include treaty-based organizations,, whether created before or after the founding of the United Nations, regional organizations for mutual

security and defense, organizations for general regional development or for cooperation on a particular economic topic or functions, and groups created to deal with a specific political, economic or social issue of current concern.

In this regard, the United Nations has recently encouraged a rich variety of complementary efforts. Just as no two regions or situations are the same, so the design of cooperative work and its division of labor must adapt to the realities of each case with flexibility and creativity. In Africa, three different regional groups—the Organizations of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference—joined efforts with the United Nations regarding Somalia. In the Asian context, Association of South-East Asian Nations and individual States from several regions were brought together with the parties to the Cambodian conflict at an international conference in Paris, to work with the United Nations. For El Salvador, a unique arrangement—“The Friends of the Secretary-General”—contributed to agreements reached through the mediation of the Secretary-General. The end of the war in Nicaragua involved a highly complex effort which was initiated by leaders of the regions and conducted by individual States, groups of States and the Organization of American States. Efforts undertaken by the European Community and its member States, with the support of States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, have been of central importance in dealing with the crisis in the Balkans and neighboring areas.

In the past, regional arrangements often were created because of the absence of a universal system for collective security; thus their activities could on occasion work at cross-purposes with the sense of solidarity required for the effectiveness of the world Organization. But in this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements of agencies can render great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, and if their relationship with the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is governed by Chapter VIII.

It is not the purpose of the present report to set forth any formal pattern of relationship between regional organizations and the United Nations, or to call for any specific division of labor. What is clear, however, is that regional arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilized in serving the functions covered in this report: preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building. Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.

Regional arrangements and agencies have not in recent decades been considered in this light, even when originally designed in part for a role in maintaining or restoring peace within their regions of the world. Today a new sense exists that they have contributions to make. Consultations between the United Nations and regional arrangements or agencies could do much to build international consensus on the nature of a problem and the measures required to address it. Regional organizations participating in complementary efforts with United Nations in joint undertakings would encourage States outside the region to act supportively. And should the Security Council choose specifically to authorize a regional arrangement or organization to take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region, it could serve to lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity of the regional effort. Carried forward in the spirit of the Charter, and as envisioned in Chapter VIII, the approach outlined here could strengthen a general sense that democratization is being encouraged at all levels in the task of maintaining international peace and security, it being essential to continue to recognize that the primary responsibility will continue to reside in the Security Council.

APPENDIX III

THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Agreed by the Heads of State and Government

participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic

Council in Rome on 7th-8th November 1991

1. At their meeting in London in July 1990, NATO's Heads of State and Government agreed on the need to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in Europe. While reaffirming the basic principles on which the Alliance has rested since its inception, they recognized that the developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which its aims would be met in future. In particular, they set in hand a fundamental strategic review. The resulting new Strategic Concept is set out below.

PART I- THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The New Strategic Environment

2. Since 1989, profound political changes have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe which have radically improved the security environment in which the North Atlantic Alliance seeks to achieve its objectives. The USSR's former satellites have fully recovered their sovereignty. The Soviet Union and its Republics are undergoing radical change. The three Baltic Republics have regained their independence. Soviet forces have left Hungary and Czechoslovakia and are due to complete their withdrawal from Poland and Germany by 1994. All the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West. They have, in varying degrees embraced and begun to implement policies aimed at achieving pluralistic democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and market economy. The political division of Europe that was source of military confrontation of the Cold War period has thus been overcome.

3. In the West, there have also been significant changes. Germany has been united remains the full member of the Alliance and of European institutions. The fact that the countries of European Community are working towards the goal of political union, including the development of a European security identity; and the enhancement of the role of the WEU are important factors for European security. The strengthening of security dimension in the process of European integration and the enhancement of the role and responsibilities of European members of the Alliance are positive mutually reinforcing. The development of European security identity and defense role reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.

4. Substantial progress in arms control has already enhanced stability and security by lowering arms levels and increasing military transparency and mutual confidence (including through the Stockholm CDE Agreement of 1986, the INF Treaty of 1987 and the CSCE Agreement and Confidence and Security Building Measures of 1990). Implementation of the 1991 START Treaty will lead to increased stability through substantial and balanced reductions in the field of strategic nuclear arms. Further far-reaching changes and reduction in the nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union will be persuaded following President Bush's September 1991 initiative also of great importance Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) signed at 1990 Paris Summit; its implementation will remove the Alliance's numerical inferiority in key conventional weapons systems and provide for effective verification procedures. All these developments will also result in an unprecedented of military transparency in Europe, thus increasing predictability and mutual confidence. Such transparency would be further changed by the achievement of an OPEN SKIES regime. There are welcome prospects for further advances in arms control in conventional and nuclear forces, and for the achievement of a global ban on chemical weapons, as well as restricting de-stabilizing arms exports and proliferation of certain weapons technologies.

5. The CSCE process which began in Helsinki in 1975, has already contributed significantly overcoming the division of Europe. As a result of Paris Summit it now includes new institutional arrangements and provides contractual framework for consultation and cooperation that can play a constructive role, complementary to that of NATO and the process of European integration in preserving peace.

6. The historic changes that have occurred in Europe, which have led to the fulfillment of a number of objectives set out in the Harmel Report, have significantly improved the overall security of Allies. The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the principal concern of the Alliance in its first 40 years has disappeared. On the other hand, a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance remain.

7. The New Strategic Concept looks forward to security environment in which the positive changes referred to above have come to fruition. In particular, it assumes both the completion of the planned withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Central and Eastern Europe and the full implementation by all parties of the 1990 CFE Treaty. The implementation of the Strategic Concept will thus be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment and in particular progress in fulfilling these assumptions. Further adaptation will be made to the extent necessary.

Security Challenges and Risks

8. The security challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in nature from what they were in the past. The threat of simultaneous full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy. Particularly in Central Europe the risk of surprise attack has been substantially reduced and minimum Allied warning time has increased accordingly.

9. In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature multi-directional which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and security of Alliance members are to be preserved. The risks can arise in various way.

10. Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The tensions which may result as long as they remain limited should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could, however, lead to crisis inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct impact on security of Alliance.

11. The particular case of the Soviet Union, the risks and uncertainties that accompany the process of change cannot be seen in isolation from the fact that its conventional forces are significantly larger than those of any other European state and its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the US. These capabilities have to be taken into account if stability and security in Europe are to be preserved.

12. The Allies also wish to maintain peaceful and non-adversarial relations with the countries in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East. The stability and peace of the countries on the Southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as 1991 Gulf War has shown. This is all the more so because of the build up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance.

13. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction would be covered by the Article 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However the Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of their efforts including their responses to such risks.

14. From the point of view of the Alliance strategy, these different risks have to be seen in different ways. Even in a non-adversarial and cooperative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the right strategic balance in Europe. The end of East-West confrontation has, however, greatly reduced the risk of major conflict in Europe. On the other hand there is a greater risk of crises arising, which could develop quickly would require a rapid response, but they are likely to be of a lesser magnitude.

15. Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the strategic context. The first is that the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity. The second, on the other hand is that the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security.

PART II- ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES AND SECURITY FUNCTIONS

The Purpose of the Alliance

16. NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged.

The Nature of the Alliance

17. NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests.

18. The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance and effect by NATO's daily work in both the political and military spheres ensures that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and due to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defense. The Alliance enables them through collective effort to enhance their ability to realize their essential national security objectives.

19. The resulting sense of equal security amongst the members of the Alliance regardless of the differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities relative to each other, contributes to overall stability within Europe and thus to the creation of conditions conducive to increased cooperation both among Alliance members and with others. It is on this basis that members of the Alliance, together with other nations are able to pursue the development of cooperative structures of security for a Europe whole and free.

The Fundamental Tasks of the Alliance

20. The means by which the Alliance pursues its security policy to preserve the peace will continue to include the maintenance of a military capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective defense; and overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its members; and pursuit of political efforts favoring dialogue with other nations and the active search for a cooperative approach to European security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.

21. To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following security tasks:

I. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.

II. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect the vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

III. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.

IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

22. Other European Institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE also have roles to play, in accordance with their responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The creation of a European identity in security and defense will underline the preparedness of the European to a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce

transatlantic solidarity. However the extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can perform all four core security functions. NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.

23. In defining the core functions of the Alliance in the terms set out above, member states confirm that the scope of the Alliance as well as their rights and obligations as provided for in the Washington Treaty remain unchanged.

PART III- A BROAD APPROACH TO SECURITY

Protecting Peace in a New Europe

24. The Alliance has always sought to achieve its objectives of safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of its members and establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, through both political and military means. This comprehensive approach remains the basis of the Alliance's security policy.

25. But what is new is that, with the radical changes in the security situation, the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before. It is now possible to draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social environmental elements as well as the indispensable defense dimension. Managing the diversity of challenges facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to security. This is reflected in three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy; dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of defense capability.

26. The Alliance active pursuit of dialogue and cooperation, underpinned by its commitment to an effective collective defense capability seeks to reduce the risks of conflict arising out of misunderstanding or design; to build increased mutual understanding and confidence among all European states; to help manage crises affecting the security of the Allies; and to expand the opportunities for a genuine partnership among all European countries in dealing with common security problems.

27. In this regard, the Alliance's arms control and disarmament policy contributes both to dialogue and to cooperation with other nations, and thus will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. The Allies seek, through arms control and disarmament, to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defense. Thus, the Alliance will continue to ensure that defense and arms control and disarmament objectives remain in harmony.

28. In fulfilling its fundamental objectives and core security functions the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. In this respect, it recognizes the valuable contribution being made by other organizations such as the European Community and the CSCE, and that the roles of these institutions and of the Alliance are complementary.

Dialogue

29. The new situation in Europe has multiplied the opportunities for dialogue on the part of the Alliance with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Alliance has established regular diplomatic liaison and military contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as provided for in the London Declaration. The Alliance will further promote dialogue through regular diplomatic liaison, including an intensified exchange of views and information on security policy issues. Through such means the Allies individually and collectively, will seek to make full use of the unprecedented opportunities afforded by the growth of freedom and democracy throughout Europe and encourage greater mutual understanding of respective security concerns, to increase transparency and predictability in security affairs, and thus to reinforce stability. The military can help to overcome the divisions of the past, not least through intensified military contacts and greater military transparency. The Alliance's pursuit of dialogue will provide a foundation for greater cooperation throughout Europe and the ability to resolve differences and conflicts by peaceful means.

Cooperation

30. The Alliance are also committed to pursue cooperation with all states in Europe on the basis of the principles set out in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. They will seek to develop broader and productive patterns of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in all relevant fields of European security, with the aim, inter alia, of preventing crises or, should they arise, ensuring their effective management. Such partnership between the members of the Alliance and other nations in dealing with specific problems will be an essential factor in moving beyond past divisions towards one Europe whole and free. This policy of cooperation is the expression of the inseparability of security among Alliance members that the persistence of new political, economic or social divisions across the continent could lead to future instability, and such divisions must thus be diminished.

Collective Defense

31. The political approach to security will thus become increasingly important. Nonetheless, the military dimension remains essential. The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defense remain central to the Alliance's security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity is required in order to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee that military aggression directed against the Alliance can never be perceived as an option with any prospect of success. It is equally indispensable so that dialogue and cooperation can be undertaken with confidence and achieve their desired results.

Management of Crisis and Conflict Prevention

32. In the political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the Alliance's policy of preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the past on the effectiveness of crises affecting the security of its members. Any major aggression in Europe is much more unlikely and would be preceded by significant warning time. Though on a much smaller scale, the range and variety of other potential risks facing the Alliance are less predictable than before.

33. In these new circumstances there are increased opportunities for the successful resolution of crises at an early stage. The success of Alliance policy will require a coherent approach determined by the Alliance's political authorities choosing and coordinating appropriate crisis management measures as required from a range of political and other measures, including those in the military field. Close control by political authorities of the Alliance will be applied from the outset and at all stages. Appropriate consultation and decision making procedures are essential to this end.

34. The potential of dialogue and cooperation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help to defuse crises and to prevent conflicts since the Allies' security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. To this end, the Allies will support the role of the CSCE process and its institutions. Other bodies including the European Community, Western European Union and United Nations may also have an important role to play.

PART VI- GUIDELINES FOR DEFENSE

Principles of Alliance Strategy

35. The diversity of challenges now facing the Alliance thus requires a broad approach to security. The transformed political and strategic environment enables the Alliance to change a number of important features of its military strategy and to set out new guidelines, while reaffirming proven fundamental principles. At the London Summit, it was therefore agreed to prepare a new military strategy and a revised force posture responding to the changed circumstances.

36. Alliance strategy will continue to reflect a number of fundamental principles. The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defense, and it does not consider itself to be anyone's adversary. The Allies will maintain military strength adequate to convince any potential aggressor that the use of force against the territory of one of the Allies would meet collective and effective action by all of them and that the risks involved in initiating conflict would outweigh any foreseeable gains. The forces of the Allies must therefore be able to defend Alliance frontiers, to stop an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack

and withdraw. The role of the Alliance's military forces is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence of its member states, and thus contribute to peace and stability in Europe.

37. The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. Alliance solidarity and strategic unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites for collective security. The achievement of the Alliance's objectives depends critically on the equitable sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defense. The presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. As the process of developing a European security identity and defense role progress, and is reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, the European members of the Alliance will assume a greater degree of the responsibility for the defense of Europe.

38. The collective nature of Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the renationalisation of defence policies, without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. The arrangements are based on an integrated military structure as well as on cooperation and coordination agreements. Key features include collective force planning; common operational planning; multinational formations; the stationing of forces outside home territory where appropriate on a mutual basis; crisis management and reinforcement arrangements; procedures for consultation; common standards and procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined exercises; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics cooperation.

39. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a significantly reduced level. Both elements are essential to Alliance security and cannot substitute one for the other. Conventional forces contribute to war prevention by ensuring that no potential aggressor could contemplate a quick or easy victory or territorial risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must response options. But the Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure the prevention of war. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.

The Alliance's New Force Posture

40. At the London Summit, the Allies concerned agreed to move away, where appropriate, from the concept of forward defence towards a reduced forward presence, and to modify the principle of flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The changes stemming from the new strategic environment and the altered risks now facing the Alliance enable significant modifications to be made in the missions of the Allies' military forces and in their posture.

The Missions of Alliance Military Forces

41. The primary role of Alliance forces, to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of member states, remains unchanged. But this role must take account of the new strategic environment, in which a single massive and global threat has given way to diverse and multi-directional risks. Alliance forces have different functions to perform in peace, crisis and war.

42. In peace, the role of Allied military forces is to guard against risks to the security of Alliance members; to contribute towards the maintenance of stability and balance in Europe; and to ensure that peace is preserved. They can contribute to dialogue and cooperation throughout Europe by their participation in confidence-building activities, including those which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well as in verification of arms control agreements. Allies could, further, be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations missions.

43. In the event of crises which might lead to a military threat to the security of Alliance members, the Alliance's military forces can complement and reinforce political actions within a broad approach to security and thereby contribute to the management of such crises and their peaceful resolution. This requires that these forces have a capability for measured and timely responses in such circumstances; the capability to deter action against any Ally and, in the event that aggression takes place, to respond to and repel it as well as to reestablish the territorial integrity of member states.

44. While in the new security environment a general war in Europe has become highly unlikely, it cannot finally be ruled out. The Alliance's military forces, which have as their fundamental mission to protect peace, have to provide the

essential insurance against potential risks at the minimum level necessary to prevent war of any kind, and, should aggression occur, to restore peace. Hence the need for the capabilities and the appropriate mix of forces already described.

Guidelines for the Alliance's Force Posture

45. To implement its security objectives and strategic principles in the new environment, the organization of the Allies' forces must be adapted to provide capabilities that can contribute to protecting peace, managing crises that affect the security of Alliance members, and preventing, while retaining at all times the means to defend, if necessary, all Allied territory and to restore peace. The posture of Allies' forces will conform to the guidelines developed in the following paragraphs.

46. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance's military forces will continue to reflect its strictly defensive nature and will be adapted accordingly to the new strategic environment including arms control agreements. This means in particular:

- (a) that the overall size of the Allies' forces and in many cases their readiness, will be reduced;
- (b) that the maintenance of a comprehensive in-place linear defensive posture in the central region will no longer be required. The peacetime geographical distribution of forces will ensure a sufficient military presence throughout the territory of the Alliance, including where necessary forward deployment of appropriate forces. Regional considerations and, in particular, geostrategic differences within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, including the shorter warning times to which the northern and southern regions will be subject compared with the central region and, in the southern region, the potential for instability and the military capabilities in the adjacent areas.

47. To ensure that at this reduced level the Allies' forces can play an effective role both in managing crises and in countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary. For these reasons:

- (a) Available forces: will include, in a limited but militarily significant proportion, ground, air and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements able to respond to a wide range of eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable. They will be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to deter a limited attack and, if required, to defend the territory of the Allies against attacks, particularly those launched without long warning time.
- (b) The forces of the Allies will be structured so as to permit their military capability to be built up when necessary. This ability to build up by reinforcement, by mobilizing reserves, or by reconstituting forces, must be in proportion to potential threats to Alliance security, including the possibility- albeit unlikely, but one that prudence dictates should not be ruled out- of a major conflict. Consequently, capabilities for timely reinforcement and resupply both within Europe and from North America will be of critical importance.
- (c) Appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that would provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces quickly and discriminately, will be developed to permits measured, flexible and timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly in peacetime.
- (d) In the event of use of forces, including the deployment of reaction and other available reinforcing forces as an instrument of crisis management, the Alliance's political authorities will, as before, exercise close control over their employment at all stages. Existing procedures will be reviewed in the light of the new missions and posture of Alliance forces.

Characteristics of Conventional Forces

48. It is essential that the Allies' military forces have a credible ability to fulfill their functions in peace, crisis and war in a way appropriate to the new security environment. This will be reflected in force and equipment levels; readiness and availability; training and exercises; deployment and employment options; and force build-up capabilities, all of which will be adjusted accordingly. The conventional forces of the Allies will include, in addition to immediate and rapid reaction forces, main defence forces, which will provide the bulk of forces needed to ensure the Alliance's territorial integrity and

the unimpeded use of their lines of communication; and augmentation forces, which will provide a means of reinforcing existing forces in particular region. Main defence and augmentation forces will comprise both active and mobilisable elements.

49. Ground, maritime and air forces will have to cooperate closely and combine and assist each other in operations aimed at achieving agreed objectives. These forces will consist of the following:

(a) *Ground forces*, which are essential to hold or regain territory. The majority will normally be at lower states of readiness and, overall, there will be greater reliance on mobilization and reserves. All categories of ground forces will require demonstrable combat effectiveness together with an appropriately enhanced capability for flexible deployment.

(b) *Maritime forces*, which because of their inherent mobility, flexibility and endurance, make an important contribution to the Alliance's crisis response options. Their essential missions are to ensure sea control in order to safeguard the Allies' sea lines of communication, to support land and amphibious operations, and to protect the deployment of the Alliance's sea-based nuclear deterrent.

(c) *Air forces*, whose ability to fulfill their fundamental roles in both independent air and combined operations-counter-air, air interdiction and offensive air support- as well as contribute to surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic warfare operations, is essential to the overall effectiveness of the Allies' military forces. Their role in supporting operations, on land and at sea, will require appropriate long-distance airlift and air refueling capabilities. Air defence forces, including modern air command and control systems, are required to ensure a secure air defence environment.

50. In light of the potential risks it poses, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction should be given special consideration. Solution of this problem will require complementary approaches including, for example, export control and missile defenses.

51. Alliance strategy is not dependent on a chemical warfare capability. The Allies remain committed to the earliest possible achievement of a global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable ban on all chemical weapons. But, even after implementation of a global ban, precautions of a purely defensive nature will need to be maintained.

52. In the new security environment and given the reduced overall force levels in future, the ability to work closely together, which will facilitate the cost effective use of Alliance resources, will be particularly important for the achievement of the missions of the Allies' forces. The Alliance's collective defense arrangements in which, for those concerned, the integrated military structure, including multinational forces, plays the key role, will be essential in this regard. Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Defense Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common defence. Allies' efforts to achieve maximum cooperation will be based on the common guidelines for defence defined above. Practical arrangements will be developed to ensure the necessary mutual transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity and the Alliance.

53. In order to be able to respond flexibly to a wide range of possible contingencies, the Allies concerned will require effective surveillance and intelligence, flexible command and control, mobility within and between regions, and appropriate logistics capabilities, including transport capacities. Logistics stocks must be sufficient to sustain all types of forces in order to permit effective defence until resupply is available. The capability of the Allies concerned to build up larger, adequately equipped and trained forces, in a timely manner and to a level appropriate to any risk to Alliance security, will also make an essential contribution to crisis management and defence. This capability will include the ability to reinforce any area at risk within the territory of the Allies and to establish a multinational presence when and where this is needed. Elements of all three force categories will be capable of being employed flexibly as a part of both intra-European and transatlantic reinforcement. Proper use of these capabilities will require control of the necessary lines of communication as well as appropriate support and exercise arrangements. Civil resources will be of increasing relevance in this context.

54. For the Allies concerned, collective defence arrangements will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO. Multinational forces demonstrate the Alliance's resolve to maintain a credible collective defense; enhance Alliance cohesion; reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the European pillar. Multinational forces, and in particular reaction forces, reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of

deploying more capable formations than might be available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use of scarce defence resources. This may include a highly integrated, multinational approach to specific tasks and functions.

Characteristics of Nuclear Forces

55. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfill an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

56. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangement. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies' strategy in preventing war. They be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.

57. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation, including conventional force levels in Europe maintained in relative balance and increased reaction times, NATO's ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence will significantly improve. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are therefore even more remote. They can therefore significantly reduce their sub-strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the trans-Atlantic link. These will consist solely of dual capable aircraft which could, if necessary, be supplemented by offshore systems. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines. There is no requirement for nuclear artillery or ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles and they will be eliminated.

PART V- CONCLUSION

58. This Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the resolve of its members to safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alliance's security policy is based on dialogue; cooperation; and effective collective defence as mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. Making full use of the new opportunities available, the Alliance will maintain security at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. In this way, the Alliance is making an essential contribution to promoting a lasting peaceful order.

59. The Allies will continue to pursue vigorously further progress in arms control and confidence-building measures with the objective of enhancing security and stability. They will also play an active part in promoting dialogue and cooperation between states on the basis of the principles enunciated in the Paris Charter.

60. NATO's strategy will retain the flexibility to reflect further developments in the politico-military environment, including progress in the moves towards a European security identity, and in any changes in the risks to Alliance security. For the Allies concerned, the Strategic Concept will form the basis for the further development of the Alliance's defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence planning arrangements.

NOTES

CHAPTER II

1. James H. Laue, "The Emergence and Institutionalization of Third-Party Roles in Conflict", in John Burton & Frank Dukes (Ed.). Conflict : Readings in Management and Resolution (Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1990), 256.
2. James H. Laue, "The Emergence and Institutionalization of Third-Party Roles in Conflict", in John Burton & Frank Dukes (Ed.). Conflict : Readings in Management and Resolution (Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1990), 256.
3. Michael Brecher & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Crisis, Conflict and Instability, (New York : Pergamon Press, 1989), 19.
4. Benjamin Miller , "Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management," World Politics, 45 (October 1992) 1 , 1-46; Alexander L.George , "Crisis Management : The Interaction of Political and Military Considerations," Survival, 26, (1984), 223; Alexander L. George (Ed.), Avoiding war : Problems of Crisis Management, (New York : Westview Press, 1991), 6; Gilbert R. Winham (Ed.), New Issues in International Crisis Management, (Boulder : Westview Press, 1988),7.
5. Michael Brecher & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Crisis, Conflict and Instability, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1989), 5.
6. John Wear Burton & F. Dukes, Conflict : Practices in Management Settlement and Resolution, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990),1.
7. John Wear Burton & F. Dukes, Conflict : Practices in Management, Settlement and Resolution, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990),2.
8. James H. Laue, "The Emergence and Institutionalization of Third-Party Roles in Conflict", in John Burton & Frank Dukes (ed.). Conflict : Readings in Management and Resolution (Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1990), 259.

9. Ernst Haas, "Regime Decay : Conflict Management and International Organizations, 1945-1981," International Organization, 37, (1983), 197.
10. Jacob Bercovitch, J. Theodore Anagnoson & Donnette L. Wille, "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations," Journal of Peace Research, 28,1,(1991), 7.
11. Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Dynamics of third party intervention : Kissinger in the Middle East, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981),5.
12. Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Dynamics of third party intervention : Kissinger in the Middle East, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981),5.
13. Oran R. Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises. (New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1967),35.
14. James H. Laue, "The Emergence and Institutionalization of Third-Party Roles in Conflict", in John Burton & Frank Dukes (Ed.). Conflict : Readings in Management and Resolution (Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1990), 257.
15. Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Dynamics of third party intervention : Kissinger in the Middle East, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981),6; Jacob Bercovitch, "International Mediation," Journal of Peace Research, 28, 1, (1991), 4; William I. Zartman & Saadia Touval, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics" Journal of Social Issues, 41, 2, (1985), 39.
16. Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Dynamics of third party intervention : Kissinger in the Middle East, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981),7.
17. Oran R. Young, The intermediaries : third parties in international crises. (New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1967),34;James H. Laue, "The emergence and institutionalization of third-party roles in conflict", in John Burton & Frank Dukes (Ed.). Conflict : readings in management.

- and resolution (Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1990), 261; William Zartman & Saadia Touval (Ed.), International mediation in theory and practice, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 7.
18. James H. Laue, "The Emergence and Institutionalization of Third-Party Roles in Conflict", in John Burton & Frank Dukes (ed.). Conflict : readings in management and resolution (Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1990), 260.
 19. Jacob Bercovitch, "Third Parties in Conflict Management : The Structure and Conditions of Effective Mediation in International Relations," International Journal, 40, (1985), 739; Oran R. Young, The Intermediaries : Third Parties in International Crises. (New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1967), 81.
 20. Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Dynamics of Third party Intervention : Kissinger in The Middle East, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 7.
 21. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York : UN Department of Public Information, 1992), 36.
 22. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (New York : Office of Public Information, 1987), Chapter I.
 23. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (New York : Office of Public Information, 1987), Chapter VI)
 24. Leroy Bennet, International Organizations (New Jersey: Printence Hall International Inc., 1988), 140-1
 25. Oscar Schachter, "Authorized Uses of Force by the United Nations and Regional Organizations," Fidler L. Damrosch & David J. Scheffer (Ed.). Law and Force in the New International Order, (Boulder : Westview Press 1991), 67.
 26. Mats R. Berdal, "Whither UN peacekeeping?", Adelphi Paper, (October 1993), 281, 3.
 27. Marroch Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping", International Affairs, 69, 3, 453-4.

28. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York : UN Department of Public Information, 1992), 11.
29. Mats R. Berdal, "Whither UN peacekeeping?", Adelphi Paper, (October 1993), 281,10-1 ; Marrock Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping", International Affairs, 69,3, 455; Kim R. Holmes, "New World Disorder: A Critique of the United Nations", Journal of International Affairs (Winter 1993),46, 2, 328.

CHAPTER III

1. Ted Greenwood, "NATO's Future," European Security, (Spring 3 1993),2-3.
2. Douglas Stuart, "NATO's Future as a Pan-European Security Institution," NATO Review, (August 1993), 15.
3. Peter Corterier, "Transforming the Alliance", The Washington Quarterly, (Winter 1991), 28.
4. NATO Handbook, " The Alliance Strategic Concept", (NATO Office of Information and Press:Brussels, 1992), 151.
5. NATO Basic Fact Sheet No.5, "NATO's Force Structures," (NATO Office of Information and Press: Brussels, September 1993), 1.
6. NATO Basic Fact Sheet No.5, "NATO's Force Structures," (NATO Office of Information and Press: Brussels, September 1993), 2.
7. NATO Basic Fact Sheet No.1, "The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)," (NATO Office of Information and Press: Brussels, May 1993), 2.
8. Guido Gerosa, "The North Atlantic Cooperation Council," European Security, (August 1992), 278.
9. Guido Gerosa, "The North Atlantic Cooperation Council," European Security, (August 1992), 281.
10. Michael Ruhle, "NATO's Evolving Role In Europe," European Security, (August 1992), 270.

11. Mats R. Berdal, "Whither UN peacekeeping?", Adelphi Paper, (October 1993), No: 281, 73.
12. NATO Basic Fact Sheet No.4, "NATO's Role in Crisis Management and Peacekeeping," (NATO Office of Information and Press: Brussels, September 1993), 1.
13. NATO Basic Fact Sheet No.4, "NATO's Role in Crisis Management and Peacekeeping," (NATO Office of Information and Press: Brussels, September 1993), 3.
14. "Report to Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping," NATO Review, (August 1993), 30.
15. "US Sees Self-Selection By East on Joining NATO," (An interview with US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin conducted by Joseph Fittchett), International Herald Tribune, (10 January 1994).
16. "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participation in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held At NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on January 1994," NATO Press Communique M-1(94)3, (Brussels: NATO Press Service, 1994)
17. Manfred Worner, "Shaping the Alliance for the future," NATO Review (February 1994),
18. "Press Statement by the Secretary General Following The Special Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 2 August 1993," NATO Review, (August 1993), 26.
19. "Decisions Taken at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 9 August 1993," NATO Review, (August 1993), 26.
20. International Herald Tribune, (1 March 1994)
21. International Herald Tribune, (10 February 1994).
22. Mats R. Berdal, "Whither UN peacekeeping?", Adelphi Paper, (October 1993), No: 281, 72-3.
23. NATO Basic Fact Sheet No.4, "NATO's Role in Crisis Management and Peacekeeping," (NATO Office of Information and Press: Brussels, September 1993), 3.

CHAPTER IV

1. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York : UN Department of Public Information, 1992), 17-9.
2. NATO Basic Fact Sheet No.4, "NATO's Role in Crisis Management and Peacekeeping," (NATO Office of Information and Press: Brussels, September 1993), 1
3. Mats Berdal, "Peacekeeping in Europe," Adelphi Paper, (1994), No, 284, 65.
4. Marrock Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping", International Affairs, 69,3, 456.
5. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York : UN Department of Public Information, 1992),26.
6. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York : UN Department of Public Information, 1992),26-7.
7. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York : UN Department of Public Information, 1992),32.
8. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York : UN Department of Public Information, 1992),33.
9. Mats Berdal, "Peacekeeping in Europe," Adelphi Paper, (1994), No,284, 72.
10. Stephan Krasner,"Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regime as Intervening Variable," International Organization, (Spring 1992), 188.
11. NATO Handbook, " The Alliance Strategic Concept", (NATO Office of Information and Press:Brussels, 1992), 151.
12. NATO Handbook, " The Alliance Strategic Concept", (NATO Office of Information and Press:Brussels, 1992), 152-4.
13. Manfred Worner, "A New NATO for A New Era," Global Issues in Transition,(November 1993), 65.
14. Owen Harries, "The Collapse of "The West," Foreign Affairs, (September/October 1993), 40.
Manfred Worner,"Shaping the Alliance for the future," NATO Review (February 1994),

15. Antony Lake, "Yes to an American Role in Peacekeeping, but with Conditions," International Herald Tribune, (7 February 1994).
16. Mats Berdal, "Peacekeeping in Europe," Adelphi Paper, (1994), No, 284, 67.
17. Oxford Research Group, "New Conflicts in Europe: Prevention & Resolution," Oxford Research Group Current Decisions Report (July 1992), 34-5.
18. Manfred Worner, "NATO's Role in a Changing Europe", Adelphi Paper, No.284, 100-2.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bennett, Leroy. International Organizations. New Jersey: Printence Hall International Inc., 1988.
- Bercovitch, Jacob. "International Mediation." Journal of Peace Research. 28:1, (1991), 3-6.
- Bercovitch, Jacob, Anagnoson J. Theodore & L. Wille, L. Donnette. "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations." Journal of Peace Research. 28:1, (1991), 7-17.
- Bercovitch, Jacob. "Third Parties in Conflict Management : The Structure and Conditions of Effective Mediation in International Relations." International Journal. 40, (Autumn 1985), 736-752.
- Berdal, Mats. "Peacekeeping in Europe." Adelphi Paper. (1994), 284, 60-78.
- Berdal, Mats. "Whither UN peacekeeping?" Adelphi Paper. (October 1993), 281, 2-73.
- Brecher, Michael & Wilkenfeld, Jonathan. Crisis, Conflict and Instability. New York : Pergamon Press, 1989.
- Burton, John Wear & Dukes F. Conflict : Practices in Management, Settlement and Resolution. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.
- Burton John & Dukes Frank, ed. James H. Laue, "The Emergence and Institutionalization of Third-Party Roles in Conflict", in

- Conflict : Readings in Management and Resolution.
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990, 256-311.
- Cortier, Peter. "Transforming the Alliance." The Washington Quarterly, (Winter 1991), 14:1, 27-37.
- Damrosch, Fidler L. & J. Scheffer, David, eds. Oscar Schachter, "Authorized Uses of Force by the United Nations and Regional Organizations" in Law and Force in the New International Order. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, 65-110.
- Fittchett, Joseph. "US Sees Self-Selection By East on Joining NATO," An interview with US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin conducted by author in International Herald Tribune. (10 January 1994).
- George, Alexander L. ed. Avoiding war : Problems of Crisis Management. New York : Westview Press, 1991.
- George, Alexander L. "Crisis Management : The Interaction of Political and Military Considerations." Survival. 26, (1984), 223-324.
- Gerosa, Guido. "The North Atlantic Cooperation Council." European Security. 1:3, (August 1992), 273-294.
- Ghali-Boutros, Boutros. An Agenda for Peace. New York : UN Department of Public Information, 1992.
- Goulding, Marroch. "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping." International Affairs, 69:3, (1993), 451-464.
- Greenwood, Ted. "NATO's Future." European Security. 2:1, (Spring 1993), 1-14.

- Haas, Ernst. "Regime Decay : Conflict Management and International Organizations, 1945-1981." International Organization. 37, (1983), 189-256.
- Harries, Owen. "The Collapse of "The West." Foreign Affairs, (September/October 1993), 41-53.
- International Herald Tribune, (1 March 1994)
- International Herald Tribune, (10 February 1994).
- Krasner, Stephen. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regime as Intervening Variable." International Organization. 36:2, (Spring 1992), 185-205.
- Lake, Antony. "Yes to an American Role in Peacekeeping, but with Conditions." International Herald Tribune. (7 February 1994).
- Miller, Benjamin. "Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management." World Politics. 45:1, (October 1992), 1-46.
- NATO Office of Information and Press. "NATO's Force Structures." "NATO Basic Fact Sheet No.5. Brussels, (September 1993).
- NATO Office of Information and Press. "NATO's Role in Crisis Management and Peacekeeping." NATO Basic Fact Sheet No.4. Brussels, (September 1993).
- NATO Office of Information and Press. "The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)." NATO Basic Fact Sheet No.1. Brussels, (May 1993).
- NATO Office of Information and Press. NATO Handbook. Brussels, 1992.

- NATO Office of Information and Press. "Report to Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping." NATO Review. (August 1993), 30-35.
- NATO Office of Information and Press. "Press Statement by the Secretary General Following The Special Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 2 August 1993." NATO Review. (August 1993), 26.
- NATO Office of Information and Press. "Decisions Taken at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 9 August 1993." NATO Review. (August 1993), 26.
- NATO Press Service. "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participation in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held At NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on January 1994." NATO Press Communiqué M-1(94)3. Brussels, 1994.
- Oxford Research Group. "New Conflicts in Europe: Prevention & Resolution." Oxford Research Group Current Decisions Report. 10, (July 1992).
- Stuart, Douglas. "NATO's Future as a Pan-European Security Institution." NATO Review. (August 1993), 15-19.
- Rubin, Jeffrey Z. Dynamics of third party intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981.
- Ruhle, Michael. "NATO's Evolving Role In Europe," European Security. 1:3, (August 1992), 262-272.
- UN Office of Public Information. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. New York, 1987,

- Winham, Gilbert ed. New Issues in International Crisis Management.
Boulder : Westview Press, 1988.
- Worner, Manfred. "Shaping the Alliance for the future." NATO Review. (February 1994), 3-6.
- Worner, Manfred. "A New NATO for A New Era." Global Issues in Transition. 5, (November 1993), 59-66.
- Worner, Manfred. "NATO's Role in a Changing Europe." Adelphi Paper. 284 (1994), 97-104.
- Young, Oran R. The intermediaries :Third Parties in International Crises. New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1967.
- Zartman, William I. & Touval, Saadia. "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics." Journal of Social Issues, 41:2, (1985), 27-45.
- Zartman, William & Touval, Saadia eds. International Mediation in Theory and Practice. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985).