

BILKENT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS
(1948-1980)

BY
M. TOLUNAY SARAÇ

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SEPTEMBER 2000
ANKARA

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To my family

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
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ABSTRACT

The thesis aims to highlight the background of present Turkish-Israeli relations and revealing the historical roots of Turkish-Israeli relations within the context of the Middle East. Turkish Israeli relations are analyzed mainly within the framework of the period between 1948 establishment of the State of Israel and 1980 reducing Turkish representation level in Israel. This study gives a chronological account of the relations and analyzes them in four phases; firstly, the historical background of Turkish-Jewish relations; secondly the period of the establishment of Israel and its impact on the relations with the U.S., Middle East States and Turkey; thirdly Turkish-Israeli relations after the establishment of Israel mainly from 1950 up to 1960; and fourthly Turkish-Israeli relations from the 1960s up to 1980s are examined. As international incidents and relations are interdependent, Turkish-Israeli bilateral relations are examined by analyzing the main international incidents in the specified period. The relations with the Arab States and dominant powers in the Middle East are briefly explained and a brief summary of today's relations is also included to the study.

ÖZET

Bu tez, bugünkü Türkiye İsrail ilişkilerinin geçmişini ve Orta Doğu çerçevesinde Türkiye İsrail ilişkilerinin tarihi temellerini ortaya koymak amacıyla hazırlanmıştır. Tezde Türkiye İsrail ilişkileri, İsrail devletinin kuruluş tarihi olan 1948 ve İsrail'deki Türkiye temsilciliğinin derecesinin düşürüldüğü 1980 tarihleri arasındaki dönem çerçevesinde incelenmiştir. Bu çalışma ilişkilerin kronolojik sıralamaya göre dökümünü vererek, ilişkileri dört bölümde incelemektedir. Birinci bölümde Türk Yahudi ilişkilerinin tarihçesi verilmekte; ikinci bölümde İsrail devletinin kuruluşu, ve A.B.D., Orta Doğu devletleri ve Türkiye üzerindeki tesirleri ve ilişkileri ele alınmaktadır. Üçüncü bölümde ise; İsrail'in kuruluşundan sonraki 1950 ile 1960 yılları arasındaki Türkiye İsrail ilişkileri incelenmiştir. Dördüncü bölümde ise 1960-1980 dönemindeki Türkiye İsrail ilişkileri ele alınmıştır. Uluslararası olaylar ve ilişkiler birbirleri ile bağlantılı oldukları için Türkiye İsrail ikili ilişkileri, söz konusu belirli zaman dilimindeki başlıca uluslararası olaylar ele alınarak incelenmiştir. Bu çalışmada, Arap ülkeleri ile ilişkiler ve Orta Doğu'daki egemen güçler kısaca açıklanmış ve bugünkü ilişkilere de çok kısa olarak değinilmiştir.

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INTRODUCTION

In this study, the period between the establishment of Israel on 14 May 1948 up to 1980s, when Turkish representation level in Israel was reduced, is analyzed with the aim of highlighting the background of present Turkish-Israeli relations and revealing the historical roots of Turkish-Israeli relations within the context of the Middle East. As international incidents and relations are interdependent, when analyzing specific bilateral relations, it is very difficult to isolate bilateral factors from multilateral relations. When the Turkish-Israeli relations are analyzed, Turkey's relations with other Middle East countries and Arab-Israeli conflict, and its impacts on Israelis relations with the Middle East countries stand out to be the main determinant factors.

In the first chapter, before starting to examine the relations between Turkey and Israel between 1948 to 1980s, the historical background of the relations is examined by firstly reviewing the history of Jews and the emergence of the Zionist ideology briefly as the roots of the State of Israel goes back to Judaism and Zionism. Then, Turkish-Jewish relations during the Ottoman Empire period are taken into hand. The relations during the Turkish War of Independence and at the period, between the establishment of Turkish Republic and the Second World War are analyzed in order to lay out the roots of the relations between Turkey and Israel in the pre-establishment period of Israel.

In chapter two, relations after the establishment of the state of Israel are analyzed. On 14 May 1948, at the end of the British Mandate in Palestine, the State of Israel was established. But the establishment of a new state in Palestine gave rise to strong reactions from the Arab and other Middle East States. In order to highlight the factors that led to the emergence of a new state in the Middle East, pre-establishment period of Israel is examined. After the establishment of Israel, balance of power in the Middle East changed, the Arab-Israeli conflict emerged and the struggle for power between the U.S. and the Soviet Union increased. As this thesis analyzes Turkish-Israeli relations between 1948-1980s, in order to be able to clearly analyze the period, international relations of Israel during the first years of establishment and the attitudes and policies of the Middle East States, the U.S. and Turkey towards Israel is examined in the second chapter.

In chapter three, the period between 1950 to 1960 is examined and the eminent determinant factors in Turkish-Israeli relations are seen as Turkish western-oriented foreign policy and Israel's isolation in the Middle East, which leads Israel to seek an ally in the region in order to safeguard its security. The U.S. and western support behind Israel and pressure on Turkey were also the major factors in Turkish-Israeli bilateral relations. The consequences of the external pressures were the formation of the Balkan Pact, the Baghdad Pact and the Peripheral Pact. The Suez Crisis was also an important event, which affected all the relations. These pacts, as well as the Suez Crisis and their impacts on Turkish-Israeli relations are reviewed in the third chapter.

In chapter four, Turkish-Israeli relations from 1960 up to 1980s are analyzed. From the end of the Second World War up to the rise of the Cyprus conflict in the 1960s, Turkey pursued western oriented policies. But after Turkey's isolation by the major powers in the Cyprus issue, Turkey began to reconsider its foreign policy and make amendments. Therefore, it can be said that as a result of the Cyprus conflict, Turkey began to give more priority to safeguard its national security and its interests like other states. In the 1960s, the Cyprus issue became the major factor in Turkish Foreign Policy and hence, affected Turkey's domestic policy and international relations. In order to provide support for the Cyprus issue from the Middle East States, Turkey had to keep her relations in balance with both the Arab states and Israel. During this period, two Arab-Israeli wars broke up, which were, the Six-Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur War in 1973. Also at the time of the war, Turkey had to be especially careful in order to keep the continuance of the economic and political support, and maintain stability in the region. During the period between 1970s till 1980s, changes occurred in Turkish-Israeli relations. The impacts of the Cyprus issue, as well as the impacts of the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973 on Turkish-Israeli relations are examined. These events are observed by trying to trace their effects on the present developments in Turkish-Israeli bilateral relations.

CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH ISRAEL RELATIONS

In order to be able to clearly analyze and comprehend Turkish-Israeli relations and highlight the grounds of contemporary good relations between the two countries, a brief review of Jewish history before the establishment of Israel and the account of Turkish-Jewish relations during the Ottoman period with regard to the emergence of Zionism and British policies is necessary. According to my point of view, this brief historical perspective will primarily provide another dimension to the framework of this study as well as exposing the roots of present relations.

1.1. The History of Jews Before The Establishment of Israel

Some sources on Israel's history start to study the Jewish history from the beginning of Zionism. But some others prefer to study this history from the beginning of the 17th century B.C., which is also my preference, as I believe this historical perspective will provide an objective approach to this study and place the survey in right dimensions.

As in other societies, Jewish history plays an important role in the formation of the Jewish identity and social psychology. Jewish identity is also affected by the lessons of the Old Testament where Jews are considered as the chosen people. ¹

¹ Davutoğlu, 1994: 91

Jewish history begins in the 17th Century B.C. with the prophet Abraham, his son Isaac and grandson Jacob at Egypt. The Book of Genesis relates how Abraham was summoned from Ur of the Caldeans to Canaan to bring people to the belief in One God.² Isaac ruled after Abraham, then Jacob became the leader of the Jews and Jews were named as the Israelites or the tribe of Israel. During Jacob's period, Jews were oppressed very harshly, therefore they had to migrate from Egypt to the Sinai Peninsula.³ They wandered 40 years in the Sinai desert, where they were forged into a nation and received the Torah, which consists of the Ten Commandments and giving form to their monotheistic faith. According to the biblical narrative, Moses was chosen by God to take the Israelites from Egypt to Palestine⁴ in 13th-12th centuries B.C.⁵ Jewish Kingdom was established in Palestine in 1020 B.C., by the first king Saul, formed by loose tribal organizations, which turned into a full monarchy under the reign of his successor, David. David's son Solomon who succeeded him, further strengthened the kingdom between 965-930 B.C. After the death of Solomon, insurrections broke up and he divided the country into two kingdoms as, Israel, the Northern Kingdom and Judah, the Southern Kingdom.⁶

The Kingdom of Israel, with its capital Samaria, lasted more than 200 years under the reign of 19 kings, while the Kingdom of Judah was ruled from Jerusalem for 350 years by 19 kings of the lineage of David. The Assyrian and Babylonian Empires brought first Israel and later Judah under their control. The Kingdom of Israel was destroyed by the Assyrians in 722 B.C. and its people were exiled. Over a hundred

² Facts About Israel, 1997: 10

³ in Old Testament this event is named as; Exodus; Armaoğlu, 1989:7-8.

⁴ as Jews call; the Land of Israel or *Eretz Israel*

⁵ Facts About Israel, 1997:10.

years later, the Babylonian Empire conquered the Kingdom of Judah and exiled most of the natives and destroyed Jerusalem in 586 B.C.⁷ The Babylonian conquest brought an end to the First Jewish Commonwealth (First Temple Period) in 586 B.C. The exile, which followed, did not eradicate the Jewish people's connection with Palestine. This event marked the beginning of the Jewish Diaspora, the spread of Jews to other countries. During the exile period, Judaism began to develop a religious framework and way of life outside the land, which ensured people's national survival and spiritual identity.⁸

From 535 till 331 BC, Persia dominated Palestine and according to the book "Facts About Israel", the period is determined as between 538-333 B.C. The Jews were allowed to have varying degrees of self-rule under Persian rule, also during the later Hellenistic (Ptolemaic and Seleucid) overlordship (332-142 B.C.). After 539 BC when Cyrus the Great, founder of the Persian Empire conquered the Babylonian Empire. Jews constructed the Second Temple on the site of the First Temple, refortified Jerusalem's walls and established the Knesset Hagedolah (Great Assembly) as the supreme religious and judicial body of the Jewish people, which marked the beginning of the second Jewish Commonwealth (Second Temple Period). Under the restrictions of the Persian Empire, Judah became a nation centered in Jerusalem whose leadership was entrusted to the high priest and the council of elders.⁹

⁶ Facts About Israel, 1997:10.

⁷ Armaoğlu, 1989:8-9.

⁸ Facts About Israel, 1997:13.

⁹ Facts About Israel, 1997:15.

In the late 4th century BC, Judea became a province of Alexander the Great's Empire.¹⁰ The land remained as a Jewish theocracy under Syrian-based Seleucid rulers. The Seleucid rulers began a campaign to replace Judaism with Hellenism and Jews were prohibited from practicing Judaism and their Temple was desecrated as part of an effort to impose Hellenic culture and customs.¹¹ In 166 B.C., the Jews revolted under the leadership of the Jewish priest, Mattathias from the Hasmonean family and his son Judah the Maccabee. After a military struggle, Jewish forces defeated the Syrian forces. Then, the Hasmonaean dynasty or Maccabees became the leaders and kings of an independent Jewish state.¹² The Hasmonean Dynasty lasted about 80 years. During this period, political consolidation under Jewish rule was attained and Jewish civilization flourished. When the Romans replaced the Seleucids as the great power in the region, they granted the Hasmonean king, Hyrcanus II, limited authority. Under the Roman governor of Damascus, Jews were hostile to the new regime and there were frequent revolts in that period (63 B.C.-313C).¹³

Hasmonean rule ended in 40 B.C. and the Land became a province of the Roman Empire. In 37 B.C. Herod, the Romans appointed the son-in-law of Hyrcanus II, as a king of Judea. He was granted almost unlimited autonomy in the country's internal affairs. Despite his many achievements, Herod lost the trust and support of his Jewish subjects. Ten years after Herod's death (4 B.C.), Judea came under direct Roman administration.¹⁴ The Roman governors of Judea were despotic and had

¹⁰ Glatzer, 1995: 5

¹¹ Facts About Israel, 1997:15.

¹² Glatzer, 1995: 6.

¹³ Facts About Israel, 1997:15-16

¹⁴ Facts About Israel, 1997:16

neither respect for the Jewish religion nor for the newly emerging Christianity.¹⁵ In 66 A.D., Jewish revolts broke out. By the 70 A.D., the revolt was crushed by Roman forces under the leadership of General Vespasian and Jerusalem was razed off. This situation led to the Jewish diaspora.¹⁶ Judea was silent under the strict Roman control for a long time. But when Roman Emperor Hadrian rebuilt Jerusalem as a pagan city, a violent revolt broke out in Judea. From 132 to 135 A.D., the Jews fought against the Romans and were, for a while, successful. Finally the rebellion was put down by Rome and Judea was prostrated. By the order of the Emperor, the name of the province was changed into Syria Palaestina. The decree of death penalty was applied to any Jew who entered into the gates of this district. The fall of Judea also created a greater conflict between Jews and Christians. The Jews considered the loss as a disaster, but the Christians considered it as a manifestation that God had abandoned the Jews and viewed Christians as the true bearers of divine grace.¹⁷

During the first three centuries of the Christian era, Christianity spread increasingly. By the end of the 4th century Constantine I, Emperor of the Byzantine Empire, adopted Christianity, both personally and for his empire.¹⁸ The Palestinian region became predominantly a Christian country and Jews were deprived of their former relative autonomy as well as their right to hold public positions and were also forbidden to enter Jerusalem except once a year (on a day of Tisha b'Av-to mourn the destruction of the "Temple").¹⁹ But these circumstances and anti-semitic policies did not break up the Jews. In contrast, it led to Jewish unity, which was based on religion,

¹⁵ Glatzer, 1995:7

¹⁶ For the meaning of the Jewish Diaspora, see p.6.

¹⁷ Glatzer, 1995:7

¹⁸ Glatzer, 1995:7

¹⁹ Facts About Israel, 1997:19

a common language, literary heritage, a well-knit community life and organization and their hope of returning to Palestine.²⁰

Four years after the death of the prophet Muhammad in 632, Arabs entered into Palestine under the rule of Caliph Ömer and ruled for more than four centuries with caliphs ruling from Damascus then from Baghdad and Egypt. During this period, the Jewish community was permitted to settle in Jerusalem and they protected their status of non-Muslims under Islamic rule, their lives, properties and freedom of belief were safeguarded, in return they had to pay land taxes. This period marked Islamic tolerance between Muslims and Jews. But the imposition of heavy taxes on agricultural lands led many Jews to move from rural areas to towns and increasing social and economic discrimination forced some of the Jews to leave the country.²¹

In July 1099, the First Crusade army captured Jerusalem and massacred the city's non-Christian inhabitants. During the next few decades, the Crusaders extended their power over the rest of the country. After a while, the Crusaders opened up transportation routes from Europe, pilgrimages to the Holy Land became popular and increasing numbers of Jews sought to return to Palestine. At that period, 300 rabbis from France and England arrived in a group, some of them settled in Acre (Akko) and others settled in Jerusalem.²²

When a Muslim army overthrew the Crusaders under the rule of Selahaddin Eyyubi in 1187, the Jews acquired certain measures of freedom. Although the Crusaders regained a foothold in the country after Selahaddin Eyyubi's death in 1193, their presence was limited to a network of fortified castles. Finally, the Crusaders'

²⁰ Facts About Israel, 1997:8.

²¹ Facts About Israel, 1997:19.

authority in the land ended when the Crusaders were defeated by the Mamluks, who had come to power in Egypt in 1291. The land, under the Mamluks was ruled from Damascus. By the end of the Middle Ages, the country's towns were ruined and Jerusalem was abandoned. Mamluk rule declined because of political-economic upheavals, plagues and devastating earthquakes.²³ In 1517, Palestine was conquered by the Ottomans and the land was divided into four districts which were administratively attached to the province of Damascus and ruled from Istanbul.

1.2. Ottoman Period

The Ottoman Turkish presence in Palestine began in 1516 and extended to the British mandate of Palestine in 1918. During the Ottoman period, there was Jewish migration to the Ottoman Empire, which also played an important role in Turkish-Jewish relations. During the 16th century there were 1.000 Jewish families living in the Ottoman Empire, mainly inhabiting in Jerusalem, Nablus (Shehem), Hebron, Gaza, Safed (Tzfat) and in the villages of Galilee. The Jewish community was composed of the descendants of Jews who had always lived in this land as well as immigrants from North Africa and Europe²⁴. Thousands of Spanish Jews migrated to the western part of today's Turkey in order to escape from Jewish massacres in Europe. For this reason, Istanbul became the dwelling place of the largest Jewish community in Europe during the 16th century.²⁵

²² Facts About Israel, 1997:20.

²³ Facts About Israel, 1997:21.

²⁴ Facts About Israel, 1997:21.

1.2.1. Ottoman and Jewish Relations:

In the Ottoman Empire, relations between Muslims and non Muslims reflected broad political tolerance and policies were implemented in response to the economic and social needs of the state and the general population. On the whole, Ottoman attitude towards the minorities was very tolerant and above all pragmatic.²⁶ Ottoman Sultans paid special attention to Jerusalem, which was considered as the holy city of the three faiths. Ottoman policies towards non-Muslims seldom varied from one community to another. The most fundamental basis of Ottoman relations with Jews and Christians was the Islamic one, which put these minorities into the status of dhimmis.²⁷ Jews and Christians were considered as “people of the book” and therefore their lives and properties were guaranteed. But there were some restrictions, which included special taxes and sumptuary regulations.²⁸ In general the Jews enjoyed the tolerant rule of the Sultans. Turks accepted Jews fleeing from the persecution of Christian Europe, even before the historical action of Sultan Beyazıt II to accept the Jews, which were expelled from Spain in 1492.²⁹ The Jews who were persecuted elsewhere took refuge in the Middle East under Turkish rule and were granted residential districts in cities and towns or some privileges.³⁰ They could settle anywhere they wanted and the 1914 census indicated that the population of Palestine was 689. 272 people of whom 60.000 were Jews.³¹

²⁵ Glatzer, 1995:9.

²⁶ Weiker, 1996:32.

²⁷ Weiker, 1996:23.

²⁸ Weiker, 1996:130.

²⁹ Gruen, 1996.:112.

³⁰ Weiker, 1996:22.

³¹ Ataöv, 1979:15.

It can be said that until the death of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent in 1566, Ottomans encouraged Jewish immigration. Some of them settled in Jerusalem but most of them went to Safed where the Jewish population had risen to about 10.000 by the mid 16th Century.³² Over the centuries, Jews immigrated to the holy cities of Jerusalem, Safed, Hebron and Tiberias to pray, study and to be buried in the Holy Land, which was known as the Old Yishuv. The Ottoman sultans respected this traditional Jewish religious practices.³³ Another basis of relations with all Ottoman subjects, Muslims and non-Muslims, was the “millet system” under which each religious community was given a large amount of autonomy to regulate its internal affairs. According to Ottomans, since the minorities were allowed considerable self-rule, they would administer their economic, social and judicial affairs as well as religious matters. The ability to fulfill obligations and to settle internal disputes without involving the government was one of the criteria, which officials used in forming government policies towards millets.³⁴ Millet reform would also respond the growth of internal turmoil within each of the minorities under the continued dominance of religious authorities who were usually very conservative in their attitudes regarding non-religious as well as religious affairs.³⁵

During the 16th Century, most of the Ottoman foreign trade was carried out mainly through non-Muslim intermediaries. They established the contact of Ottoman Empire with European traders and a trading network with their expertise and knowledge of European commercial practices and capital. It was also convenient for Europeans, as these Ottoman agents knew the local language, customs and

³² Facts About Israel, 1997:22

³³ Gruen, 1996: 113

³⁴ Weiker, 1996:23-24.

bureaucracy as well as other Ottoman subjects. In the 15th and 16th centuries, Jews monopolized the positions of brokers among the Ottoman administration and foreign merchants and also, with bankers and money exchangers they had the opportunity of having close contacts with the foreigners.³⁶ We can say that under the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, the Jewish community of Palestine enjoyed a large measure of autonomy over its communal life.³⁷

In the 19th century, Palestine became the crossroads for the commerce of three continents, which gained more preponderance by the opening of the Suez Canal. In this period, Britain, France, Russia, Austria and the US opened consulates in Jerusalem. Consequently, the circumstances of Ottoman Jews gradually improved and their numbers increased substantially. By 1880, Jerusalem had an overall Jewish majority. In order to cultivate as farmers, Jews began to purchase land throughout the country, new rural settlements were established and the Hebrew language, which was restricted for a long time, revived.³⁸ The Zionist movement, which emerged in 19th century aimed to unite the Jewish people of the Diaspora (exile) and settle them in Palestine.³⁹

Zionism began to develop as a nationalist movement, which was modeled on other European ethnic and national movements in the 19th century.⁴⁰ The Arabs, the overwhelming majority of Palestine population, opposed Zionism as well as the Ottoman Government opposition towards Zionist aspirations in Palestine. In 1885, Sultan Abdulhamit II issued an edict against aliens who were holding or acquiring real

³⁵ Weiker, 1996:28-29.

³⁶ Weiker, 1996:29-30.

³⁷ Gruen, 1996: 113.

³⁸ Gruen, 1996: 113.

³⁹ Cohen, 1995: 1.

estate in Palestine and against the creation of any further Jewish colonies there. After November 1900, Jews coming from other places were allowed to stay in Palestine only for three months as pilgrims and were prevented from buying land.⁴¹ Without a special permit (which could be obtained from Istanbul) construction was banned. But while these difficulties continued, they kept on migrating. At the outbreak of the First World War I, the Jewish population in the land became 85.000 as compared to 5.000 in the early 1500s. During Sultan Abdulhamid II's period, Theodor Herzl, an Austrian Jewish journalist, demanded permission for Jews who migrated from persecution in Czarist Russia and other Eastern European countries. His aim was to establish a Jewish Homeland in the form of an autonomous province in Palestine. After the negotiations, Jews were accepted to immigrate to any district in the Ottoman Empire except Palestine (but they could establish settlements in Mesopotamia).⁴²

In the middle of the 19th century, the era of Tanzimat (reform) began, wherein the Ottomans sought the reasons and remedies for their decline vis-à-vis Europe. One of the remedies was to offer equality to the non-Muslims. As a result, as equal subjects of the Empire, minorities were entitled to certain rights and certain obligations, such as, military service. Poll tax (jizye) was abolished, in return military exemption tax, in order not to do the military service was also abolished. But the implementation of poll tax continued until the twentieth century.⁴³

From the middle of the 19th Century onward, when Jews were compared with the Ottoman Christians (Greeks, Armenians and other populations in the Balkans), Jews had no political separatist ambitions and the Christian minorities were generally

⁴⁰ Gruen, 1996: 113.

⁴¹ Ataöv, 1979: 17-20.

⁴² Facts About Israel, 1997:23.

considered as agents of the European powers which were increasingly penetrating into Ottoman economic and political affairs.⁴⁴ In the 19th century especially, the Greek, Armenian and Balkan separatist movements grew. And when the Ottoman power declined in the Balkans, there was an increase in Christian discrimination against Muslims. But on the other hand, Jews remained loyal to the Ottoman state.⁴⁵

When the First World War broke out, Turkey was on the German side and Russia was an ally of Britain. At the end of the war, the allies imposed harsh peace terms on Turkey and Ottoman Christians who were strongly supported by the European powers sought to be included in the Lausanne Peace Treaty. The treaty foresaw strong guarantees for the minorities under European supervision and recognized many rights including a proportionate share of government funds and programs⁴⁶. The Jews shared the same ideas with the Turkish representatives in considering such guarantees as both unnecessary and unacceptable for Turkey's sovereignty. This Jewish attitude was partly based on not being supported by any European powers, like the Greeks and the Armenians (who were supported by them).

1.2.2. Zionism and the Balfour Declaration

“Zionism” is the Jewish nationalist movement, which aims to create and support a Jewish national state in Palestine or as they call *Eretz Israel* (Land of

⁴³ Weiker, 1996:27.

⁴⁴ Weiker, 1996:21.

⁴⁵ Gruen, 1996:113.

⁴⁶ Weiker, 1996:132

Israel).⁴⁷ The movement's name is derived from Zion, the hill on which the Temple of Jerusalem was located and which symbolizes Jerusalem itself. The idea of Zionism is believed to be an inherent part of the Jewish existence in the Diaspora through the centuries.⁴⁸ Over the centuries, the Jews of the Diaspora associated with the hope of the return with the coming of the Messiah, a savior whom God would send to deliver them.⁴⁹

The Austrian Jewish philosopher Nathan Birnbaum first applied the term Zionism to the movement in 1890. Zionism is an organized national liberation movement of the Jewish people. It emerged in the late 19th century and culminated in 1948 with the establishment of the State of Israel. But its roots go back to the 6th century BC, when the Jews were carried off to captivity in Babylon and their prophets encouraged them to believe that one day God would allow them to return to Palestine, or *Eretz Israel*.

Political Zionism emerged in response to the continued oppression and persecution of the Jews in Eastern Europe and increasing disillusionment in Western Europe, which had neither put an end to discrimination nor led to the integration of Jews into local societies. But at the same time, in the second half of the 19th century, organized anti-Semitic parties emerged in Germany and Austria-Hungary. In Russia, after the assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881, a wave of nationalist feelings and anti-Jewish riots spread across the country. The 1881 movements were a turning point for Russian Jewry as the French Revolution had been for the French and

⁴⁷ Encyclopedia Britannica, 1971,23:974.

⁴⁸ Facts About Israel, 1997:23

⁴⁹ Cohen, 1995:1.

Western European Jewry. In order to escape from persecution, large numbers of Russian Jews migrated to the West, primarily to the United States. A smaller number went to Palestine, which was then under the Ottoman rule.⁵⁰

In 1896, Theodor Herzl published a book called “The Jewish State”, in which he analyzed the causes of anti-Semitism and proposed the creation of a Jewish state. He then demanded help for his projects from the German Emperor William II and Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II. Neither Sultan Abdülhamid II nor the wealthy Ottoman Jews supported his project. When Herzl failed to obtain a charter from the Sultan, he directed his diplomacy towards Britain. The British offered to investigate the possibility of establishing Jewish colonization in East Africa-the so-called Uganda scheme, which had nearly split the Zionist movement. After Herzl’s death, the 7th Zionist Congress convened in 1905 and rejected the East Africa scheme. Israel Zangwill, who formed and led the Jewish Territorial Organization, had the goal of seeking a suitable territory anywhere for Jewish colonization. But the movement never attracted people and faded with Zangwill’s death.

Zionism found formal expression by the establishment of the Zionist Organization in 1897 at the First Zionist Congress, which was convened by Theodor Herzl in Basel, Switzerland.⁵¹ The congress formulated the Basel Program, which remained the basic platform of the Zionist movement. The program defined Zionism's goal as the creation “for the Jewish people of a home in Palestine secured by the public law.” The congress also founded a permanent World Zionist Organization (WZO) and authorized it to establish branches in every country with a substantial

⁵⁰ Cohen, 1995:2.

Jewish population.⁵² The Zionist movements program contained both ideological and practical elements that aimed to promote the return of Jews to the Land; facilitating the social, cultural, economic and political revival of Jewish national life and attaining an internationally recognized, legally secured home for the Jewish people in Palestine where Jews would be free from persecution and be able to develop their own lives and identity.⁵³

In July 1922, the League of Nations entrusted Great Britain with the mandate on Palestine. Recognizing “the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine”, Great Britain was called upon to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. Two months later, in September 1922, the Council of the League of Nations and Great Britain decided that the provisions for setting up a Jewish national home would not apply to the east of the Jordan River area, which constituted three fourths of the territory included in the Mandate and eventually became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

As communicated by Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour (1917), motivated by Zionism and encouraged by British “sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations”, waves of immigrants arrived in the Land between 1919 and 1939. The immigrants mainly settled in Tel-Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem. The immigrants were mainly from Russia and Poland and the last major wave of immigration before World War II took place in the 1930s following Hitler’s rise to power in Germany. During World War I, the British wooed the Zionists in order to secure strategic control over Palestine and to gain the support of world Jewry for the Allied cause. The declaration, contained in a

⁵¹ F.A. Israel, 1997:23.

⁵² Cohen, 1995: 2

⁵³ F.A. Israel, 1997, p.23

letter from Foreign Secretary Arthur J. Balfour to a British Zionist leader approved the establishment of a “national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine. As Palestine had passed from Turkish to British control, this provided Zionists with the charter they had been seeking.⁵⁴

The British Mandate authorities granted the Jewish and the Arab communities the right to run their own internal affairs. Utilizing this right, the Jewish community, known as the yishuv, elected (1920) a self-governing body based on party representation, which met annually to review its activities and elected the National Council (*Vaad Leumi*) to implement its policies and programs. In 1922, a Jewish Agency was constituted to represent the Jewish people vis-à-vis the British authorities, foreign governments and international organizations.

The Jewish national revival and the community’s efforts to rebuild the country were strongly opposed by Arab nationalists. Attempts to reach a dialogue with the Arabs were unsuccessful and this polarized Zionism and Arab nationalism turned into a potentially explosive situation. Recognizing the opposing aims of the two national movements in 1937, the British recommended the partition of the country into two states; Jewish and Arab. The Jewish leadership accepted the idea of partition and empowered the Jewish Agency to negotiate with the British government in an effort to reformulate some aspects of the proposal. The Arabs were uncompromisingly against any partition plan. After a while the British government changed its Palestine policy in an effort to appease the Arab world on. In May 1939, Britain issued a White Paper which imposed drastic restrictions on Jewish immigration and the beginning of World War II caused David Ben-Gurion, later Israel’s first prime minister to declare:

⁵⁴ Cohen, 1995: 3.

“We will fight the war as if there were no White Paper, and the White Paper as if there were no war”.⁵⁵

The White Paper of May 1939 terminated Britain's commitment to Zionism and provided the establishment of a Palestinian state within ten years. The Arab majority in Palestine was guaranteed by a clause that provided for the further immigration of 75,000 Jews during the following five years, after which additional entry would depend on the Arab consent. The White Paper broke the traditional Anglo-Zionist alliance and provoked a violent protest. In May 1942, Zionist leaders met in New York City and demanded a Jewish Democratic Commonwealth which is believed to be a state in all of western Palestine as part of the new world order after the war. This “Biltmore program” marked a radical departure in Zionist policy.

During the period of the British mandate (1920-48), the Yishuv grew from 50,000 to 600,000 people. Most of the new immigrants were refugees from Nazi persecution in Europe. In 1935, a revisionist group led by Ze'ev Vladimir Jabotinsky seceded from the Zionist movement and formed the New Zionist party. During the late 1930s, Jabotinsky, who advocated a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan River, devoted himself to fruitless arrangements for the mass evacuation of European Jews to Palestine. On the other hand, coexistence with the Arabs of Palestine became an increasingly intractable problem. Recurrent riots in the 1920s culminated in full-scale rebellion from 1936 to 1939. The Zionist movement adopted various approaches, including that of Judah L. Magnes, president of the Hebrew University, who advocated the foundation of a joint Arab-Jewish state, and that of future Israeli

⁵⁵ F.A. Israel, 1997:28.

prime minister David Ben-Gurion, who argued that accommodation with the Arabs could come only from a position of Jewish strength, after the Yishuv had become a majority.⁵⁶

The Holocaust, “the systematic murder of European Jews by the Nazis”, finally convinced Western Jewry of the need for a Jewish state. In 1944, the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization), a Zionist guerrilla force led by the future Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin began an armed revolt against British rule in Palestine. On 14 May 1948, the British mandate over Palestine ended and the Jews declared their independence in the new state of Israel on the same day, which will be analyzed in detail in Chapter Two.

The purpose of Zionism during the first years of statehood seemed clear—which was to consolidate and defend Israel, to explain and justify its existence. Nahum Goldmann, head of the WZO from 1951 to 1968, argued that Zionism must preserve Jewish life in the Diaspora. American Zionists, notably Rabbi Mordecai Kaplan, founder of the Reconstructionist movement, urged a redefinition of Judaism and warned about the dangers of creating a schism between Israel and Diaspora Jewry. During the 1970s, much Zionist activity focused on Soviet Jewry, who was finally allowed to emigrate in restricted numbers. Again, differences arose between Zionist and Jewish relief agencies; whether immigration to Israel should be the only option offered to Soviet Jews or not. A massive wave of immigration by Soviet Jews to Israel began in the late 1980s.

Zionism has been repeatedly denounced by the Arab nations and their supporters as a “tool of imperialism.” In 1975, the UN adopted a resolution equating

⁵⁶ Cohen, 1995: 3.

Zionism with racism; in 1991, the General Assembly voted 111 to 25 for repeal. Today Zionism is based on the unequivocal support of two basic principles—the autonomy and safety of the state of Israel and the right of any Jews to settle there (the Law of Return) which provides a guarantee of a Jewish nationality to any Jew in need of it.⁵⁷

1.3. Turkish-Jewish Relations (1923-1947)

1.3.1. Relations During The Turkish War Of Independence

Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War and after the Armistice of Mondros in 30 October 1918, Turkish society faced a very important problem which was the high probability of the division of the homeland. In order to survive with sovereignty and independence, Turks had to fight on two fronts; against the sovereignty of the Sultan and against allied invaders.⁵⁸ The primary aim of the Turkish War of Independence was to rescue the Ottoman Empire from the destruction of Western colonialism and to build a Nation-State. According to Mustafa Kemal, the main principle of the Turkish War of Independence's foreign policy was to introduce to the world "the nation's external and internal sovereignty" and the nation's ability to determine its future.⁵⁹ Turkish War of Independence defined the geographical boundaries of the Turkish State which limited its political and military goals.

On 28th January 1920, a manifesto called the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli) was adopted. It officially stated the aims of the resistance movement and was based on

⁵⁷ Cohen, 1995: 4.

⁵⁸ Tamkoç, 1961: 5-6.

⁵⁹ Armaoğlu, 1964: 627-628.

the earlier resolutions of the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses.⁶⁰ With the declaration of the National Pact, Mustafa Kemal mobilized the Turkish society against the invaders and between 1919 and 1923, the Turkish War of Independence movement was carried out.⁶¹ During the war of independence, Mustafa Kemal Pasha had asked the Kuva-yi Milliye to deal with the religious minorities with “kindness and in a humanitarian manner” soon after his arrival to Samsun on 19 May 1919.⁶² The Jewish community had witnessed these tolerant attitudes and other humanitarian policies. They were also affected as well as the Turkish society from the Ottoman’s defeat after World War I and the invasion of Turkish territories by the allies.⁶³

The conclusion of Mondros Armistice Treaty on 30th October 1918 gave rise to the reaction of the Turkish society against the foreign powers. In May 1919, this movement gained its ideological, sociological and political grounds under Mustafa Kemal’s leadership. This movement was based on realistic grounds and objectives. Unlike other minorities, the Jewish society accepted the ideology of “Turkish Nationalism”. Therefore, during the Turkish War of Independence, Jews contributed to Turkey’s acquisition of independence with their heroic contributions during the war, their resistance by various means and their decisive attitudes mostly as a whole society against the common enemies while certain minorities rioted in cooperation with the invaders. So it can be said that during the national struggle period of Turkey, Jews expressed their loyalty and support to the Turkish movement and to Mustafa Kemal against the Allies at both organizational and individual levels.

⁶⁰ Zürcher, 1993: 144.

⁶¹ Gönlübol, 1974:1-2.

⁶² Öke, 1991:176.

⁶³ Tanır, 1996:181.

The years of 1919-1922 consisted of wars and struggles with many states (with the Istanbul Government, districtive forces and Great Britain, France, Italy, the Soviet Union, Armenia and Greece).⁶⁴ Invaders imposed discriminatory policies towards the Christian community during the Turkish War of Independence and especially Jews living in İstanbul faced many difficulties due to these policies. Therefore they supported the Ottoman Empire's war efforts. After the war, most of the Christian minority was expelled from Turkish territories because of the support they had given to the allies during the war. But the Jews stayed in Turkey and were considered as the unique loyal minority of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish War of Independence.⁶⁵ Mostly from the general anxiousness, by the end of 1922 there was an increasing rate of emigration. Turkish Jews settled in many countries and the rate of emigration was very high. Therefore the ratio of Jews living in Turkey reduced by 50 percent.⁶⁶

In May 1919, during the invasion of Izmir, Greeks killed both Turks and Jews. During this period as before, Jews supported Mustafa Kemal's Anadolu Movement.⁶⁷ Especially Greeks who were living in Turkish territories put pressure on Jews and harmed them. On the other hand unlike other minorities, Jews remained loyal to Turks and refrained from collaborating with Greeks. In Nutuk, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk defined collaborators (with allies) as "Christian" elements, instead of calling them "Non-Muslims" which indicated the exclusion of the Jewish community from this

⁶⁴ Levi, 1998:14-15

⁶⁵ İsrail-Türkiye İlişkilerinin Dünü-Bugünü-Yarını, 1997: 101.

⁶⁶ Levi, 1998:64.

⁶⁷ İsrail-Türkiye İlişkilerinin Dünü-Bugünü-Yarını, 1997: 101.

category.⁶⁸ After the Turkish War of Independence, during a conference in Izmir, a lycee student asked Mustafa Kemal about his opinion about Jews' life in Turkey and his answer was:

“... by proving their loyalty to this people and country till now, Jews continued their life in welfare and will continue their life in welfare and loyalty.”⁶⁹

Jews were anxious, after the dissolution of an empire in which they lived freely and comfortably for decades. Because of being expelled from many states in their history, they were afraid of being expelled from these territories again by the new regime. Another point of concern of Jews was, the possibility of Greeks domination of Anatolia, because in the past they had killed more than 5000 Jews in Mora and Selanik (an issue which could never be forgotten).⁷⁰

In the beginning, Turkish newspapers accused Jews of Jewish desire to dominate Turkey economically and not using or talking Turkish language. But during the Laussane Agreement, the priviledges of minorities were put forward and Jews decided to give up their rights. As a result of this attitude, the criticisms of the Turkish public opinion was reduced and the perspective of the Turkish public opinion changed. The collaboration between Turks and Jews was established in the National Struggle Period and reached a highly surprising level which surprized especially the European Media (when Ankara initiated to establish Turkish Commercial Union with Jews just before the Great Attack).⁷¹ The Turkish War of Independence was won in 1922 and politically confirmed by the Laussane Treaty in 1923 when the Allies made

⁶⁸ Atatürk, 1963:1-2.

⁶⁹ Musevilerle 500 Yıl:1992.

⁷⁰ Öke, 1991:451-470

peace with Turkey and accepted the emergence of an independent national Turkish State.⁷²

Mustafa Kemal's emphasis on territorial integrity and political independence was the main objective of his tactful and foresighted diplomacy during this period (1919-1922) more specifically at the Lausanne Conference where Turkey was considered as an equal state with the allies and also reversed the dictated Sevres Treaty of 10th August 1920 very successfully.⁷³ Although the Turkish delegation faced many difficulties during the negotiations, at the end they achieved their objectives. Three main issues were negotiated which were territorial and military issues as well as economic and financial issues and the position of foreigners and minorities. On the minorities issue, Turkey had to protect its citizens regardless of their beliefs, nationality or language, but there had to be no supervision on Turkey's policies towards minorities.⁷⁴

The question of "what will be the status of minorities in the new Turkish State" had already been answered in the National Pact. This document stated that "the legal rights of minorities are guaranteed to them, provided the Muslim populations of the states surrounding us are also extended the same rights and protection. These minority rights are determined by the political agreements between the victorious and the vanquished nations and their respective partners".⁷⁵ In the Sivas Congress with one difference it was declared that, "settling the problem of the four minority groups by means of accepting their separate sovereignty is absolutely unacceptable". As

⁷¹ Levi, 1998:66.

⁷² Gönübol, 1974: 2.

⁷³ Tamkoç, 1961:6.

⁷⁴ Zürcher, 1993:168-170.

⁷⁵ Zürcher, 1993:177.

stated above, the Jewish minority accepted these principles and collaborated with the resistance movement. So in general and in return, Turks were tolerant to Jews and protected them from Greek and Armenian restrictions and pressures. At the end of the Turkish War of Independence Jews were satisfied with the result.⁷⁶

1.3.2. Establishment of the Turkish Republic and Minority Policy Till the End of the Second World War

The Ottoman Sultanate was abolished on 1 November 1922 and the country was ruled by the National Assembly. The president and the ministers were elected directly by the Assembly. The legal relations between the Caliph, Abdülmecit Efendi and the Assembly were unclear. During this period, Mustafa Kemal declared his intentions about changing this confused situation and the establishment of a republic. He submitted a proposal to establish a republic with an elected president, a prime minister that would be appointed by the president and a conventional cabinet system. The majority of the representatives in the assembly accepted the proposal and on 29 October 1923, the Turkish Republic was established. The first president was Mustafa Kemal and the first prime minister was İsmet İnönü.⁷⁷ During the transition period, there were anti-republican movements based on the concern of the future of the caliph but, with developments and reforms, these movements were settled.

After 29 October 1923, Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues as a first mission began to consolidate the power of the new state.⁷⁸ In 1924, the caliphate was

⁷⁶ Levi, 1998:20.

⁷⁷ Zürcher, 1993:173-174.

⁷⁸ Gönlübol, 1974:2.

abolished and the Ottoman dynasty was sent to exile. The first steps of the principles of Atatürk began to be taken, especially towards secularism. There were also other contributions which strengthened the relations between Turkey and Europe, some of them were, secularization of all levels of administration, judicial reforms, the adoption of the Latin alphabet and the Western calendar and the prohibition of the dressing of traditional and religious costumes. The Caliphate and Şeyhülislam institutions, tekkes and tarikats were abolished, foundations were put under government control and religious administrators acquired the status of government officials.⁷⁹ These reforms brought Turkey closer to the European countries' structure and the policies became westernized. Mustafa Kemal believed that if they would take Western developments as a model, Turkey could develop and become more civilized.⁸⁰

In the new Turkish Republic due to being a sovereign nation-state, the existence of independent minorities was unacceptable. But they had nearly the same rights with other citizens. The 1924 Constitution accepted the principle of equality between religions and races in article 88.⁸¹ But in practice, there were some limitations on the minorities. For example, they were not allowed to work in any political organization, in the army and were not allowed to take part either in national or regional level decision-making. *But they had the right to vote and to be elected.* On the other hand, during the negotiations for the Constitution, the Jewish community demanded equality and integration with the Turkish society rather than demanding any other rights or guarantees. When the Jews asked for the rejection of the application of article 42 of the Lausanne Treaty to their community, the Turks established closer

⁷⁹ Levi, 1998:45.

⁸⁰ Sander, 1993: 31.

⁸¹ For detail of the article: Levi, 1998: 166.

relations with the Jewish community. This article foresaw to solve the conflicts among the minorities in regard to their own procedures and customs. So by rejecting the article, Jews gave all the missions of the clergymen concerning the social life issues to the secular institutions to the Turkish Republic.⁸² The press and the majority of Turkish society admired this attitude and better relations were established and sympathy towards Jews increased.⁸³

In the 1927-33 period, the Turkish Republic was recognized by other states and there was no objection to its independence and sovereignty. The Mousul conflict was partially solved, the debts of the Empire were paid and commercial companies were bought from foreigners. The population began to increase and trade developed. There was no possible threat expected from the minorities, therefore the status of minorities became better. As a result of mostly tolerance and economic revival, from 1927 onwards-Jewish migration to other countries decreased and especially in 1930s it had stopped. In 1933, when the Nazis came to power in Germany, Jews migrated to Turkey. Turks considered Western democracy as an ideal model. Therefore, Hitlerism and anti-Semitism were not supported in Turkey. At this period most of the Jews living in Germany thought that the crisis was temporary and therefore did not want to give up their citizenships. As a result, the migration of Jews into Turkey in 1933 was unlike the mass migration in 1492 into the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁴ As in the past, the Turkish Republic again fought against any pressure on Jews and they continued their support in every field.⁸⁵

⁸² Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını, 1997: 101.

⁸³ Levi, 1998:68-69.

⁸⁴ Levi, 1998:96-99.

⁸⁵ Weiker, 1996:133-134.

Turkish foreign policy in the 1923-1939 period can be divided into two phases, the first phase was between 1923 and 1930 which was a period of status-quo and the second phase was between 1930 and 1939 which comprises a period of crisis.

In general, the main principles of the Turkish Foreign Policy were:

- to maintain and strengthen its existence, sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- to guard vital interests;
- to establish and promote friendly and harmonious relations with all states especially with neighbors and international co operations;
- to promote peace.⁸⁶

The new policy of the Turkish Republic since its establishment until the Second World War can be characterized as: realistic, cautious, defensive and aimed to preserve the status-quo and the victory of 1923.⁸⁷ Also the principle of “peace at home, peace in the world” was formulated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and became the cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy. In order to consolidate its security, Turkey entered into bilateral and multilateral security arrangements with its neighbors and other powers.⁸⁸

When the danger of Western invasion was eliminated, Turkish policies turned towards the West and parallel to this movement in the domestic politics, there was an attempt of transition to a “multiparty system”. With these attempts in 1930, the Liberal Party was established and according to Lord Kinross, this was a step taken by Atatürk in order to have the West recognize Turkey.⁸⁹ These features, reforms in its traditions and institutions of the old order and transformation into a Western nation

⁸⁶ <http://www.byegm.gov.tr. REFERENCES /forpal-98.htm>, “Foreign Policy of Turkey”: 1.

⁸⁷ Zürcher, 1993: 209.

distinguished Turkey from the Asian-Arabic culture.⁹⁰ From the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 till the beginning of the Second World War, Turkey remained far from the events that took place in the Middle East.⁹¹

Until 1930, Turkey had to deal with the problems that were left from the Laussane Treaty and after 1930 Turkey was affected by the “World Economic Crisis” and the expansionist and aggressive “fascist” and “Nazi” regimes in Europe. In this conjuncture, between 1930 and 1939 Turkish foreign policy changed in order to maintain Collective Peace and Security and by being a member in the League of Nations in 1932, Turkey began to work on collective security efforts and to establish a place in the international community as a modern state.⁹² After the death of Atatürk on 10th November 1938, İsmet İnönü who had been the prime minister for a long time during Atatürk’s time, was elected as the president after a few months. İsmet İnönü kept Celal Bayar as the prime minister, but basically because of having different perspectives, Celal Bayar resigned and after a couple of months Dr. Refik Saydam became the prime minister.⁹³ Despite changes in the administration, Turkish foreign policy and policies towards the Jews remained same.

In August 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was announced in which Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia mostly divided and shared Eastern Europe between them. With this attempt France and Britain became more anxious about securing Turkish support and on 19 October 1939, the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty of mutual

⁸⁸ Tamkoç, 1961:8-9.

⁸⁹ Ülman and Sander, 1972:4.

⁹⁰ Sander, 1993:37

⁹¹ Gözen, 1995:71.

⁹² Dilan, 1998: 6-7.

⁹³ Zürcher, 1993:193.

support was signed.⁹⁴ According to the treaty, if a European state attacked Turkey, Britain and France would come to its assistance and Turkey would ally itself with Britain or France if a war in which they were involved spread to the Mediterranean (i.e. if Italy became involved). But despite this alliance, Turkey was making an effort to clarify its relations with the Soviet Union. Turkey refrained from the Soviet Union's consideration of the alliance as directed against its existence.⁹⁵

The war spread to the Mediterranean on 10 June 1940, when Italy declared war on France and Britain. Turkey succeeded in remaining out of the war.⁹⁶ But there was an increasing pressure from the allies to have Turkey involved in the war and Turkey resisted to remain actively neutral. Throughout the war, both press and domestic politics were kept under strict control and were manipulated as a part of Turkey's effort to stay out of the conflict. After imposing such pressure on Turkey, the allies stated that if Turkey stayed out of the war for a long time, it would be completely isolated after the end of the war. If Turkey would be isolated, it had to face the Red Army and any demands of Stalin. After the assessments, president İnönü decided to take part on the allied side and declared war on Germany.⁹⁷

When Turkey broke its relations with Germany in 1944, the aid to Jews became publicised and migration to Turkey in mass began. Especially Jews from Bulgaria and Romania were permitted to migrate to Palestine and thousands of Greek and Rhodian Jews were given the right of asylum. Apart from these, thousands of

⁹⁴ Zürcher, 1993:212.

⁹⁵ Gönübol, 1974:5.

⁹⁶ Zürcher, 1993: 212.

⁹⁷ Zürcher, 1993: 213-214.

Jewish citizens of Turkey were rescued from France, Italy, Belgium and Netherlands.⁹⁸

Throughout the Second World War, Turkey had established closer ties with the West and especially with the United States of America. The relations developed more when the United States extended its foreign aid to Turkey firstly under the Truman Doctrine and secondly under the Marshall Plan.⁹⁹ In general, the defeat of the Axis powers brought a victory for democratic values and Turkey had a rapid transition to a democratic multi-party system. The general trend was a movement of liberalization and this challenge positively affected the Jewish community both in political and economic areas. At the end of World War II, Turkey became a founding member of the United Nations (UN) and this was followed by the membership in the Council of Europe in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 and the OECD in 1960.

⁹⁸ Zürcher, 1993: 149.

CHAPTER 2

ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAEL

2.1. Establishment of Israel

Jews began to build the infrastructure of their longed for dream, a Jewish state in Palestine¹⁰⁰ and began to publish their various works, make propaganda and develop their language, Hebrew. In 1907, the British Commonwealth conference convened and as a result, the delegates agreed unofficially to accept the establishment of a foreign state (later this state would be Israel) in the Middle East. After this conference, Britain began to concentrate its policies on the issues of Palestine and the Jews.¹⁰¹ After a while, Britain began to direct Jews towards Palestine and supported the migration of Jews into Palestine. The immigration rate increased greatly and these immigrants began to buy land in Palestine.¹⁰²

In 1917 and 1918, the Arabs helped Britain to capture Palestine from the Ottoman Turks and the Arabs revolted against the Turks because Britain had promised them to grant independence after the war. With the Balfour Declaration on 2 November 1917, Britain again officially declared its support to the Jews in order to establish a nation-state in Palestine. But the Arabs opposed this declaration. The declaration was followed by a Contract of the League of Nations on June 1919, which

⁹⁹ Gönlübol, 1974: 6

¹⁰⁰ Zionism mostly aimed to gather all Jews and return to their own land -Palestine and establish a nation state in the region.

¹⁰¹ Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını: 8-9.

¹⁰² Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını: 10.

also included an article that recognized the temporary independence of the Arab provinces under the former Ottoman Empire under the authority of the British mandate. Parallel to the Balfour Declaration, Britain continued to apply other organized plans and supported large scale of Jewish immigration to Palestine and published a document, which stated the proclamation of Jewish-Arab State in Palestine on September 1921. But this document, which was prepared with the ideology of Zionism, was not applied due to the Arab opposition. In 1922, the League of Nations ratified the administration of the British mandate in Palestine and also accepted the document of mandate.¹⁰³

During this period, the Jews settled in new centers of Palestine. In 1925, the Jewish population was nearly 110.000 but with British support, Jewish migration increased rapidly and began to unbalance and decrease the ratio of the Palestinian population over the Jewish population. Mostly because of the increasing migration rate, conflicts began between the two populations.¹⁰⁴ It can be said that during the British mandate period between 1922 and 1948, it was almost impossible for Britain to reconcile the Jewish and Palestinian communities as, Britain openly supported the Jews. As a result, anti-zionist attacks occurred both in Jerusalem in 1920 and Jaffa in 1921. The immigration rate was intentionally growing and at the same time they were developing at economic, cultural and social levels with the support of Britain. In 1929 after the first conflict broke out between Arabs and Jews, under the leadership of Lord Passfield a commission convened and as a result, Britain foresaw to impose limitations over the Jewish migration into Palestine and over the purchase of land of Jews in Palestine. The commission also decided to establish a legislative organ, which

¹⁰³ Mattar, 1995: 3-4.

consisted of both Arab and Jewish communities. But due to the demands of the Jews and Jewish migration from the Nazi massacre, the decisions could not be imposed and the situation increased the tension between Arabs and Jews. In 1933, especially when Nazis came to power in Germany, Jewish immigration increased.¹⁰⁵ In 1935, nearly 62,000 Jews migrated to Palestine. Both Muslim and Christian Palestinians revolted in 1936 and the migration continued until 1939. As a result of these movements, finally Britain imposed limitations over Jewish immigration and the purchase of the land.¹⁰⁶

On April 1936, Arab leaders convened and established the High Committee of Arabs, which would lead Palestinian Arabs struggle against the Jews. General strikes began with the Committee's support and at the end of the year, the struggle changed its form into a national riot. Under the leadership of Lord Peel, a commission went to Palestine in order to examine the conflict and on July 1937, the commission decided that the Arabs and Jews could not live in a common state and published a report, which proposed the partition of Palestine. As a result of this partition plan, Arab riots in Palestine increased and the riots continued until 1939. During this period, thousands of Arabs and hundreds of British soldiers and Jews died.¹⁰⁷

The riots of the Palestinians and Arabs and opposition in Palestine made Britain anxious before the outbreak of the Second World War. In order to maintain the Arabs' support on their side, Britain published a declaration, which abandoned the partition of Palestine and foresaw the establishment of an independent "Palestine State" within 10 years. The declaration also restricted Jewish migration into Palestine

¹⁰⁴ Mattar, 1995: 3-4.

¹⁰⁵ Mattar, 1995: 11.

¹⁰⁶ Mattar, 1995: 4.

¹⁰⁷ Mattar, 1995: 11.

and the purchase of land by Jews. When World War II began, both Arabs and Jews opposed to this report and therefore it was not implemented. After the end of the Second World War, Britain became powerless in the region and could not perform its mandate authority. Therefore on February 1947, Britain applied to the United Nations in order to solve the Palestine conflict.¹⁰⁸

In 1918, the Jewish population in Palestine was nearly 85.000, between 1919 and 1948 the population increased to 580.000, between 1948 and 1985, 1.750.000 immigrants were added and in 1987, the Jewish population increased to 3.349.997 and reached a ratio of 82.97 percent over the aggregate population rate.¹⁰⁹

In order to find a solution to the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine, various plans were initiated at different times. The Peel Commission Report in 1932 foresaw the partition of Palestine between Arabs and Jews and if this solution could not be applied, they recommended a federal system of cantons. In 1938, the Woodhead Commission Plan also recommended partition and in 1939 Britain declared that it would give independence to Jews within 10 years in Palestine. But both Arabs and the Jews opposed this declaration.¹¹⁰ Arab States, which had gained their independence around the Palestine region, established the Arab League in 1945 and declared their opposition towards any possibility of Jewish statehood.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Mattar, 1995: 12.

¹⁰⁹ Ortadođu Barış Süreci ve Türkiye Üzerine Etkileri, 1996: 8.

¹¹⁰ Kocaođlu, 1995: 156.

¹¹¹ Gilbert, 1998: 153.

2.1.1. The UN Partition Plan and the Establishment of Israel

At different time periods, various plans for solving the Palestine conflict were initiated, but these attempts were unsuccessful. On 18th February 1947, in order to determine the future of Palestine, Britain finally applied to the United Nations (UN). The UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was established in order to draft the proposals concerning the future of Palestine and delegates began to make investigations in Palestine.¹¹² During UNSCOP's five weeks in Palestine, the delegates wrote reports and had hearings. On 31 August 1947, UNSCOP finished its report and laid down eleven principles, some of them were; the mandate should be ended and independence should be given at the earliest applicable date; the political structure of the new state or states should be "basically democratic", the economic unity of Palestine must be maintained; the security of holy places and access to them should be assured; the General Assembly should immediately carry out an arrangement to solve the urgent problem of a quarter million of Jews in Europe. On the application of these principles, UNSCOP was divided seven to three. As a majority; Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay recommended partition and as a minority; India, Iran and Yugoslavia recommended federation. The Australian delegate abstained.¹¹³

The Majority Plan foresaw to end the mandate regime and division of Palestine in order to establish one Arab and a Jewish State. The city of Jerusalem would be independent, but it would be under the observation of the UN and would

also have international status. According to the plan, the new status of Jerusalem would also enhance economic cooperation between the Arab and Jewish states. On the other hand, the Minority Plan foresaw the establishment of a federative state, which would be composed of Jewish and Arab cantons with Jerusalem as a capital. The cantonal authority would dominate the internal politics but issues like immigration, international relations and national defense would be under the authority of the central government, which would consist of a bicameral legislature in which one house would function by equal representation and the other by proportional representation.¹¹⁴ However the Arabs opposed both the “Majority Plan” considering it as a destruction of Palestinian integrity and the “Minority Plan” considering it as separatist and its suggestion of the establishment of a democratic state.¹¹⁵ They wanted to solve the problem through the international court. After a while, a special committee was organized to investigate these plans and these proposal plans were presented to the UN.¹¹⁶

On 29 November 1947, as a result of the UN General Council’s voting, the UN decided the partition of Palestine into two states as one Arab and one Jewish State (the Majority Plan) and agreed to give Jerusalem international status. This decision not only gave the right to the Jews to establish a state in Palestine, but also gave more rights than their low ratio of population. Arabs again reacted to this decision.¹¹⁷ This decision was taken at the UN General Assembly with 33 votes, while

¹¹² Sachar, 1998: 284.

¹¹³ Sachar, 1998: 282-284.

¹¹⁴ Sachar, 1998: 284.

¹¹⁵ Türkiye-İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını, 1997: 12.

¹¹⁶ Kocağlu, 1995: 156.

¹¹⁷ Türkiye-İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını, 1997: 12-13.

13 votes were against it (including Turkey) and there were 10 neutral votes. Consequently, Britain decided to withdraw its forces from Palestine.¹¹⁸

On 14 May 1948, the British Mandate ended and under the leadership of Ben Gurion, the Jewish National Council convened in Tel Aviv and the State of Israel was established.¹¹⁹ On the first day, the new state was recognized by the United States, within one or two days by the Soviet Union and within a month by nine states. In the same month (May) Israel was accepted to the United Nations as a member state with the decision of the General Council on 11 May 1949, number 273 (III).¹²⁰ On 9 March 1950, Turkey recognized Israel *de jure* and became the first Muslim state to recognize Israel. Therefore, Turkey had to face many reactions from the Arab States (especially from Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen).¹²¹ This declaration caused Arabs to move to other regions and changed the map of the Middle East. It also constituted the basis of strifes and challenges for the Middle East Peace Process.

As a result of the emergence of the Israeli State, the Palestine conflict gained new dimensions. The Palestine Question became the main element of conflict between Arabs and Jews; among Arabs themselves; between Arabs and the West; between Israel and the West as well as between the United States and the Soviet Union. This issue caused instability between regional states' relations on political, social and military grounds.¹²² On the other hand, the West transformed the Jewish-Christian

¹¹⁸ Ortadoğu Barış Süreci ve Türkiye Üzerine Etkileri, 1996:8.

¹¹⁹ Kocaoğlu, 1995: 156.

¹²⁰ Israel was accepted as a member by 12 for and 9 neutral votes and Afghanistan, Birmania, Egypt, Habeshistan, India, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen voted against Israel's membership and Turkey abstained. Armaoğlu, 1989:105.

¹²¹ Ortadoğu Barış Süreci ve Türkiye Üzerine Etkileri, 1996:9.

¹²² Orta Doğu Barış Süreci..., 1996:9.

conflict to the Middle East in the form of a Jewish-Muslim conflict. Israel owed its existence to the Western sympathy and remorse for Jewish suffering, the political influence of American Jews in securing the support of President Harry S. Truman and to Britain's loss of will to continue its rule in Palestine.¹²³

2.1.2. International Relations of Israel During the First Years

During the early years of the state of Israel, its main objective was to consolidate and defend Israel and to explain and justify its existence to the whole world. The establishment of Israel caused worldwide repercussions especially in the Middle East because of being located in the center of a region where the religions of Islam, Christianity and Judaism were born and spread to the world and because of the status of the holy city of three faiths: Jerusalem. Therefore from that date up to the present, it has retained its importance and consists of the major basis of the Arab Israel conflict.¹²⁴

2.1.2.1. Relations with the Middle East Countries

Before and after the establishment of Israel, the Arab states opposed the existence of the Jewish population on Arab and Muslim lands. The reactions rose especially with the partition decision of the UN and continued.¹²⁵ A day after the

¹²³ Cohen, 1995:4.

¹²⁴ Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını, 1997:60.

¹²⁵ On 11 December 1947, Iraq Foreign Minister Fadıl Cemali declared that they chose to die rather than accepting the decision. On 8-12 December 1947 Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen foreign ministers convened in Cairo and declared that they would struggle

proclamation of the State of Israel on 15 May 1948, an army consisting of Egypt, Transjordan (now The State of Jordan), Syrian, Iraqi and Lebanese forces attacked Israel, named as the First Arab-Israeli War.

In order to solve the conflict between Israel and the Arabs, the UN Swedish mediator Cont Benodotte was appointed on 20 May 1948 and succeeded in maintaining a ceasefire between the parties. In his report he stated the importance of the recognition of Israel by other states and recommended the determination of the borders according to the principle of “geographical homogeneity and integration”. He also proposed the establishment of a compromising commission.¹²⁶ The Arabs were against the report, but the US and France supported it. On 12 December 1948, a commission composed of representatives from the US, France and Turkey, called the Palestine Compromisory Commission, was established. Under the supervision of the commission, four Arab States and Isreal convened and negotiations began on the future of the Palestinian refugees, giving Jerusalem international status and the determination of boundaries. But the parties to the negotiations could not agree on the referred points and on 25 July the negotiations ended.¹²⁷

In spite of the active attempts of the UN, the war continued until the end of summer 1949 and the war ended with a cease-fire. At the end of the war, Israel defeated the Arab States and acquired some parts of the Arab lands, considered as well as politically important. The war was concluded with four armistice agreements

against the UN's decision and apply precise precautions. They also declared that the partition plan was breaching the principle of “self determination”. Armaoğlu, 1989:90.

¹²⁶ Armaoğlu, 1989: 98.

¹²⁷ At the commission Arabs voted against the decision, but Turkey voted for the decision. Therefore the decisions affected and changed relations between Turkey and Arab States for worse. Armaoğlu, 1989:101.

between Israel as one party and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria as the other party by the assistance of the UN arrangements. In the armistice agreements, the frontiers were defined and remained until they were changed during the Six Day War in 1967.

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After the establishment of Israel, Egypt entered in small scale conflicts with Israel and joined the Arab efforts to prevent Jewish immigration. After the establishment of Israel, Egypt entered into wars against Israel and terrorist activities took place in both states. In the First Arab-Israeli War, firstly Egypt was defeated and this caused the beginning of the rise of "Arab Nationalism".¹²⁹ On 24 February 1949, the Israel-Egypt General Armistice Agreement was signed on the island of Rhodes. According to this agreement during the period of armistice, both parties were to refrain from acquiring advantages both militarily and politically and attacking each other from land, sea and air. The terms and conditions of this agreement were the same with other armistice agreements that were signed between Israel and Egypt.¹³⁰ As a result, Egypt would have responsibility for the Gazza Strip, in which there was a high rate of Palestinian refugees and West Jerusalem would be under the control of Israel. As a result of this war, millions of Palestinians had to leave their homelands and became refugees.

Lebanon, like other Arab States did not want a Jewish presence in the Middle East. Lebanon was also among the states which were affected the most from the struggles and instability in the Middle East. Also, Lebanon lands became a place where Palestinian refugees and guerillas became powerful. Therefore it had to face

¹²⁸ Peretz, 1995:9.

¹²⁹ Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü Bugünü, Yarını, 1997:61.

¹³⁰ Armaoğlu, 1989:101.

interventions from Israel and Syria. On 23 March 1949, Lebanon signed the armistice agreement with Israel in Ras Nakura. According to this armistice, Israel-Lebanon borders remained the same as the Lebanon Palestine border in the past. But the border would be demilitarized and as a first step both sides would keep less than 1500 soldiers at the border zone.¹³¹

Jordan had a boundary with Israel. Therefore, it was threatened by the establishment of the Israel-Jordan-Palestine Confederation. In general, Jordan wanted to have peaceful relations with Israel, but on the other hand there was Arab pressure and Palestinian refugees which would demonstrate against Jordan with the support of the Arab States. As a result of this situation, Jordan chose to follow a moderate and balanced foreign policy in its relations with Israel. But before Israel's establishment, Jordan was against the Jewish settlement centres and when Israel was established, Jordan acted with the Arab States.¹³² On 3 April 1949, Israel and Jordan also signed the armistice agreement on the island of Rhodes. With this agreement, Western Sheria (today under the control of Israel) and the east of Jerusalem would be under the control of Jordan. With this agreement, most of the holy places remained on the Jordanian side.¹³³

Since Israel's foundation, Syria did not want and did not recognize the Jewish existence in the Middle East. After the establishment of Israel, Syria followed the same policies with the other Arab states such as trying to prevent Jewish migration to Palestine and also the establishment of Israel. Like other Arab States, Syria entered into war against Israel in 1948 and was defeated like the rest. The following wars also

¹³¹ Armaoğlu, 1989: 102.

¹³² Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını, 1997: 71.

¹³³ Armaoğlu, 1989: 102-103.

led Syrians to increase their enmity towards Israel and Arab Nationalism also increased in Syria. So due to these policies and the internal problems of Syria, the armistice agreement between Israel and Syria was signed at the end on 20 July 1949 in Mishmar Hayerden. With this armistice, the Israeli-Syrian border would be approximately the same as the previous Palestine-Syrian border. But three regions which were sensitive for both sides of the border would become demilitarized.

Iraq and Saudi Arabia did not sign an armistice agreement as Saudi Arabia did not have borders with Israel. But, when the UN mediator called Saudi Arabia for negotiation, it accepted the invitation and Iraq declared that it would accept the armistice agreements which would be signed by the other Arab states. These armistice agreements ended the First Arab-Israeli War, but did not solve the Palestine conflict. Israel's defeat of the Arabs at the end of the war and its acquisitions of new territories deepened the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since the establishment of Israel, there had been wars between Arabs and Israel and in general Arab states acted as a whole in every conflict against Israel. Iraq and Libya like Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon had strongly opposed Israel and these countries supported the countries that fought against Israel either economically or logistically. Besides the above mentioned countries, Yemen, Umman, Kuwait and Qatar also opposed Israel.¹³⁴

¹³⁴ Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını, 1997: 76-77.

2.1.2.2. Relations with the U.S. and Other Countries

As stated above, before and after Israel's establishment, Israel faced anti-zionist reactions against it and was isolated in the Middle East. This situation still partly continues today. Therefore in order to preserve its existence, Israel established better relations with non-Middle Eastern countries, especially with the U.S. By the help of Jewish lobbies and the sympathy of the people towards the Jewish community especially after the massacres of the Nazis, forming good relations with the U.S. and the European countries was easy for Israel.

The decision to establish an Israeli State was strongly supported by the U.S. from the beginning and even after its realization at the same night, the U.S. recognized Israel. With the establishment of Israel, the U.S. acquired a foothold to intervene or enter the region actively. Therefore the U.S. supported the existence of Israel in order to gain power in the Middle East. On the other hand, from Israel's point of view, to maintain the continuous support of a super power was crucial for its existence. During and after the Arab-Israel Wars, Israel continuously relied on the economical, military and political support of the U.S.

Israel also pursued to form good relations with other major countries outside the Middle East. Britain supported Jews right from the beginning, in order to establish their own state and its support still continues. Like the U.S., Britain also wants Israel to have a powerful status in the region. Therefore, Britain supported and supports Israel by providing an essential flow of capital, investment and weapons. The

relations between Germany and Israel were not good because of the Nazi massacres that happened in the past. But after the Second World War, when Germany accepted the responsibility for massacres and signed a reparation agreement in 1952, the relations became better. Relations with France developed after 1956. But after blaming Israel for its 1967 attack, France ended its open support. With the exception of the named three countries, Israel had better relations with other Western European countries.¹³⁵

The relations between Israel and the Soviet Union began with its recognition of the State of Israel on 15 May 1948, after the attack of five Arab States towards Israel. During the first Arab-Israel War, the Soviet Union sent aid to Israel by air and also provided other support. But, when Israel formed close relations with the U.S., the Soviet Union also began to have closer relations with the Arab States, and these close relations and support continued until the dissolution and disintegration of the Soviet Union.¹³⁶

2.2. Turkish Foreign Policy towards the New State

Between 1945 and 1947; during the discussions about the resolution of the Palestine Question in the United Nations, Turkey supported the Arab states. Also, on the decision concerning partition at the United Nations, Turkey voted against the partition. After the emergence of Israel, first Arab-Israel War broke out and during this war Turkey officially remained neutral, but the press supported the Arab states.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını, 1997: 80.

¹³⁶ Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını, 1997: 81

¹³⁷ Levi, 1998: 156-157.

Based on Stalin's territorial demands on Kars and Ardahan and bases at the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, Turkey was expecting a possible threat from the Soviet Union. After the establishment of the Republic, Turkey began to turn towards the West and followed a "Western Line" policy in its foreign relations¹³⁸ and based all of its bilateral relations on an "East-West" context. After the Second World War, Turkey's main aim became to remain in a Western Defence System against the Soviet threat and to gain the support of the West and the U.S. When Israel declared its independence on 14 May 1948, the Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett requested their recognition from Turkey. Because of the Soviet Union's support in the establishment of Israel and the masses of Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union to Israel,¹³⁹ Israel's "left-wing" character and its neutrality in the East-West conflict, Turkey had hesitations in recognizing the Israel State at the beginning.¹⁴⁰ But, Turkey pursued a dignified policy towards Israel after its establishment. It can in general be said that the Turkish Foreign Policy during the 1945-1950 period was shaped by its security concerns.

On 30th June 1948, Turkey concluded a Postal Agreement with Israel, but did not recognize Israel with this agreement. The Arabs protested this agreement and Turkey declared that with this agreement it could reestablish relations with Israel, where 10.000 Turkish citizens were inhabiting.¹⁴¹ But after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine and by the implementation of the Marshall Plan, Turkey began to pursue a more neutral policy on the Palestine conflict and also during the First Arab-

¹³⁸ Soysal, 1994-1995: 69.

¹³⁹ Köni, 1994: 45-46.

¹⁴⁰ Nachmani, 1987: 45.

¹⁴¹ Gruen, 1996: 115.

Israeli War in 1948.¹⁴² During the war period, under the government of Hasan Saka, Turkey prohibited its citizens who wanted to help either the Arabs or the Israelis traveling to this region. After a while this restriction was loosened and only traveling to Israel was restricted. At the end of the war, on 15 September 1948, Turkey lifted its restrictions concerning travels to Palestine.¹⁴³ After lifting restrictions on traveling to Israel, most of the Jews living in Turkey migrated to Israel.

After the armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab States signed on 28 March 1949, Turkey by appointing a *chargé d'affaires* to Tel Aviv, *de facto* recognized this country and on 9 March 1950 by upgrading this representation level to a rank of “minister plenipotentiary” Turkey this time recognized Israel as *de jure*¹⁴⁴ and Ambassador Seyfullah Esin was appointed to Tel-Aviv. The reason behind Turkey’s recognition of Israel was to establish close relations with the West and the U.S and to gain their support. On the other hand Turkey faced strong reactions from Arab nations. While on 11 May 1949, voting on Israel’s membership to the U.N., there were 12 votes against, 37 for and 9 abstention votes, and Turkey was one of the abstaining states in this voting. Turkey also pursued its neutrality during the negotiations in the ad hoc committee. But the Arabs’ reactions towards Turkey did not change.¹⁴⁵ As a reaction to Turkish-Israel relations, Arab States have the strong tendency to isolate both nations from the Middle East, but primarily Israel.

¹⁴² Ülman, 1968: 270.

¹⁴³ Gruen, 1996: 115. According to A. Levi; this restriction was lifted in 1949 by the government of Şemsettin Günaltay. Levi, 1998: 158.

¹⁴⁴ Soysal, 1994-1995: 69.

¹⁴⁵ “Ortadoğu ve Geleceği”, 1992: 182.

Arabs reacted against Turkey's recognition and blamed Turkey for acting with the West. After Turkey's recognition, Turkish Foreign Minister N.Sadak declared that:

“Israel is a reality. More than thirty countries have already recognized it. The Arab representatives are themselves holding talks with their Israeli counterparts.”¹⁴⁶

According to Türkaya Ataöv, Turkish Foreign Policy changed in accordance with the political and military collaboration of Turkey with the group of NATO countries. Because of the Turkish preference to join the group of “western states”, Turkey recognized Israel and became the first Moslem country among the states that recognized Israel. Therefore, it was inevitable for Turkey to face reactions from the Arab states.¹⁴⁷ According to George E. Gruen, the basis of Turkish recognition was to gain financial and political support from the U.S. When Israel was established, the U.S. at the same day recognized the new state with the support of Truman. After this recognition in order to indicate to the West and the U.S. that Turkey was a secular and a modern state, Turkey recognized Israel. The reason behind this diplomatic initiative was to change the West's and the U.S.' anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim perspectives.¹⁴⁸

On the other hand, according to Hakan Yavuz, Turkey recognized Israel because of the requirement to acquire Western support against the Soviet threat that existed in the years of 1945 and 1947, and with the supporting views of the Turkish elite to establish relations as an alternative to the Arab countries. There was a need for alternative relations in the Middle East. Because in 1916 the Arabs revolted against

¹⁴⁶ Kürkcüoğlu, 1976: 22.

¹⁴⁷ Ataöv, 1979: 209-211.

¹⁴⁸ Gruen, 1996: 117.

the Turks and Turkey began to pursue a secular policy and also aimed to de-Arabize and de-Islamize the Turkish society. Another reason for recognition was the moral point of view, which was aimed to help end the Jewish persecution and to support the Jewish community. In general, this recognition was supported by the Turkish elites and Israel was considered as a modern and democratic state in the Middle East region.¹⁴⁹

Besides the reasons that are explained above, the recognition of Israel by the Turkish Republic would have been beneficial for both states. From the Turkish perspective, Israel had power over the U.S. media (Jews own the best known TV channels in the U.S. which are: NBC (National Broadcasting Company) and CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System) and the best known newspapers which are; “New York Times”, “New York News” and “Washington Post”¹⁵⁰ and the Jewish lobby in the U.S. on political areas. Therefore, with the support of Israel, Turkey could acquire financial and other sort of support from the West and the U.S. From Israel’s point of view, by the recognition of Turkey, Israel would gain an ally in the region which it desperately needed because of being surrounded by hostile neighbours.

To keep in balance the relations with Israel and Arabs at the same time was very difficult for Turkey. Because, before the proclamation of the State of Israel, Turkey had good relations with the Arab states and after the emergence of this new state and for a while, in order not to face the Arabs’ reactions any more and due to having a neutral status in the Palestine conflict, Israel and Turkey had continued their relations secretly. In general, it can be said that, Turkish-Israel relations were always affected and determined by the relations between Turkey and the Arab States.

¹⁴⁹ Yavuz, 1991: 45-46.

CHAPTER 3

TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAEL (1950-1967)

3.1. Relations Between Turkey and Israel During 1950s

After the U.S., Britain and France recognized Israel in March 1949, the Turkish and Israeli state ministers exchanged visits. On 4 July 1950, a “Modus Vivendi on Commerce and Agreement on Payment Bases” and “Air Transportation Agreement” on 10 December 1951 were signed and the first and formal diplomatic steps were taken for recognition. The initial diplomatic relations were open to the influences of “external factors” and especially “the Arab factor”. Due to this, the two countries were enforced to follow “low profile” policies and from time-to-time outwardly relations appeared to reach to an “end” or to a “breaking” point. But in reality, Turkey and Israel cooperated especially on the issues of security and intelligence and implicitly developed this cooperation mostly in this period. During this period Turkish-Israel relations improved especially in social and cultural fields, as well as in sports.¹⁵¹ So, the development of relations between the two countries were characterized by sensitivity and attempts of both parties to reach to a balance.

¹⁵⁰ Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını, 1997: 112.

¹⁵¹ Relations between Israel and Turkey developed progressively in various ways. Turkish and Israeli soccer teams (‘Fenerbahçe’ and ‘Hapoel’) exchanged visits. In the presence of Israel’s president, the Hebrew University in Jerusalem celebrated the 500th anniversary of the Turkish rule in Constantinople. Nachmani, 1987: 56.

During the 1950s, trade between Turkey and Israel was extensive. Israel's imports from Turkey covered its entire cotton consumption and one half of its wheat requirements (150,000 tons). In addition, Israel also imported from Turkey a variety of other products such as dried fruit, fish, cattle and associated byproducts (cattle bones), oil, various grains, etc. On the other hand, Israeli exports to Turkey were equally varied, including pharmaceuticals, electrical appliances, cooking and heating stoves, refrigerators, cooking utensils, tyres, fertilisers, cement and building material. Israel refined Turkish crude oil and exported its products, constructed apartment buildings and laid out airports in Turkey. Although there is a scarcity of information about the scope of military equipment commerce between Turkey and Israel, Israeli goods and services offered to Turkey ranged from aerial photography and provision of topographical maps for military purposes, the delivery of uniforms, ammunition, explosives, optical instruments, automotive spare parts etc.¹⁵² In 1954, Israeli exports to Turkey amounted to 12,000,000 US Dollars and increased steadily.¹⁵³

Israel's desire to sell its industrial and military products and its own know-how to Turkey also contained the purpose of impressing the West with the picture of Israeli-Turkish strategic cooperation. But in attempting to achieve strategic cooperation, Israel not only had to contend with Turkish national sensitivity but also had to compete with the Arabs. So this situation exacerbated the already complicated Israel-Turkish-Arab triangle.

Turkey has also shared a *de facto* security interest with Israel stemming from mutual distrust of radical forces in the Middle East. In addition, Turkey has been well aware of Israel's strong support in the U.S., particularly in the Congress where

¹⁵² Nachmani, 1992: 21.

Turkey had sought support too. Owing to the fact of highly tolerant attitude of the Ottoman Empire towards its Jewish subjects over the centuries, Israel itself had always been sympathetic towards Turkey. Turkey began to form early and fairly close cooperation with Israel, after the fall of the monarchy in Iraq in 1958, extensive intelligence exchanges on issues of terrorism and Arab subversive movements took place. Exchange of intelligence on Lebanon has always been useful to Turkey as it provided opportunity to observe and assess anti-Turkish radical groups' usage of the Bekaa Valley.¹⁵⁴

On May 1950, Turkey applied to NATO. At first, the application of Turkey was not supported by any of the NATO members, especially by Britain, but Italy was the only state to support the Turkish application. With the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, the Security Council declared that the attack of the Northern Korean forces to the territory of Southern Korea breached peace. On 27 June, the UN called its members to give assistance in order to maintain international peace and security in the region. Turkey welcomed the Security Council's decision on this particular subject and decided to send an armed force, which consisted of 4500 military personnel.¹⁵⁵

After the outbreak of the Korean War, U.S. applied pressure on Britain in order to persuade her to support Turkey's application. After a while, Turkey informed London that on condition of being accepted to NATO, she would be interested in and deal with the Middle East issues. With this political commitment, Britain was

¹⁵³ Nachmani, 1992: 62.

¹⁵⁴ Gruen, 1985: 25.

¹⁵⁵ Türkiye-İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını, 1997: 228.

persuaded and supported Turkey's application to NATO membership.¹⁵⁶ On 16-20 September 1951, NATO Council of Ministers met in Ottawa and decided to accept both Turkey and Greece as NATO members. Turkey formally became a NATO member on 18 February 1952. After being a NATO member, Turkey started to receive aid for its military defense and began to pursue policies in the Western lines. At the United Nations, Israel and Turkey concluded voting pacts. Israel was among the states which actively lobbied South American representatives to support Turkey's election to the Security Council.¹⁵⁷

Following the Korean War, Turkish relations with the United States and also with Israel flourished more. Israeli-Turkish relations gained priority. From Israel's point of view this meant, in addition to the political benefits of improving relations with a Moslem nation in the region and having commercial and other ties with Turkey, using the advantage of Turkey's international links and geographical position in the Middle East. In 1954, Turkey was the only country who was allied to three separate defence treaties which were NATO, the Balkan Pact and the Baghdad Pact. This unique position also strengthened Turkey's political and military status in the region. Over the years, Turkey became aware of the need for finding the right balance between its interests and the role it should play in the Middle East.¹⁵⁸

After Turkey became a NATO member in 1952, Turkey began to pursue world politics rather than the Middle East politics. Turkey, considered the conflicts in the Middle East as conflicts between the blocks, Israel and the Arab states considered the basis of conflicts from a narrow and concrete perspective. According to Israel,

¹⁵⁶Gönlübol-Ülman, 1966: 168.

¹⁵⁷Nachmani, 1987: p.57.

¹⁵⁸Ergüvenç, 1995: 4.

Arab states aimed to destroy Israel and according to the Arab states, Israel struggled to have its existence recognized by other states. For Turkey, NATO was not only just a security alliance, but also enhanced the Turkish-U.S. relationship at military, social and economic fields. Turkey began to get more involved in Middle Eastern issues and began to play an active role in the name of the West. So this situation affected the relations between Turkey and the regional states for the worst.¹⁵⁹ With the active role assigned to her by her allies, Turkey began to take part and to lead the Pacts in the region as mentioned above. But the only exception to the Western oriented Turkish Foreign Policy was the Cyprus issue, where Turkey unilaterally created a new status quo. However this status quo failed to receive any international legitimacy and support, while it served Turkish national interests.¹⁶⁰

After 1950 Turkey pursued an anti-communist policy due to the serious Soviet threat. For Turkey, there was a world, which consisted of communist and non-communist states. Turkey began to view all of its bilateral relations within this context. Israel remained neutral in its foreign policy at the beginning, Turkey was suspicious about Israel's tendency and was afraid of Israel in the sense that it could constitute a communist threat in the future. It was apprehended that the neutral policy of Israel would serve the Russian aims. But in order to convince Turkey that Israel did not have a communist tendency, during the Korean War, Israel declared that it would support the policy of the UN General Assembly, which foresaw intervening to the Korean War. Commercial and military co-operation between the Turkey and Israel had improved, but military cooperation had continued in secrecy.¹⁶¹ Turkey and Israel

¹⁵⁹ Kürkçüoğlu, 1972: 50.

¹⁶⁰ Kirişçi, 1993: 10.

¹⁶¹ Nachmani, 1992: 39.

exchanged military information. Therefore, Arabs interpreted the exchange of information as the existence of a military agreement and from time to time, Arab states accused Turkey for signing a military agreement with Israel. But, Turkey kept on rejecting this accusation.

Between 1950 and 1955, Arab nationalism developed while struggling with Israel. During this period, Turkey did not face any reactions from the Arab states since she did not play an active role in the region. But after taking an active role in the Baghdad Pact and getting involved in the region, Turkey faced rivalry from the Arab world for the leadership of the region. So all of these factors led to the increase of a sharp Arab nationalism.¹⁶²

3.1.1. The Balkan Pact

In the spring of 1951, despite Turkey's promise to Britain "to deal with the Middle East issues" before its membership to NATO, she began to establish diplomatic relations with the Balkan states. At the same time, the US was anxious about the tense relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and was looking for a solution to provide the security of Yugoslavia. The solution considered to save this state was to establish a Balkan Pact among Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece. With this aim, the U.S. encouraged Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia to establish closer relations.¹⁶³ On February 1953, the Balkan Treaty was concluded and as a result of

¹⁶² Duman, 1995: 196.

¹⁶³ The cooperation among the Balkan states was not a new issue. Before the Second World War, Turkey also gave importance to the Balkans and led the establishment of the Balkan Pact against the revisionist desire of Bulgaria in 1934. The Balkan Pact, which was established in 1954, was the Second Balkan Pact that was led by Turkey.

this, the Balkan Pact in August 1954 was concluded between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. The Pact provided mutual entente and a cooperation among the three countries which were threatened by Moscow and by other communist neighbors.

After Turkey's membership to NATO, the Soviet Union changed its policy negatively towards Turkey and this now directly started to threaten the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. So this new threat concept led Turkey to establish a new defense pact in order to protect its security. Because Yugoslavia was no more in the Soviet Block since 1948, and based its economy and defense power on the U.S. aid, it was possible to include Yugoslavia in a new alliance system. From the Turkish-Greece side before being NATO members, both states made efforts to enter into NATO and during this period, they became closer. So on 28 February 1953, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Ankara. This was not an independent alliance agreement, but an important step towards a clox partnership. According to the agreement, the three states would cooperate on economic, defense and on common defense issues. Also according to the article 6 of the agreement, "parties should not join to any alliance or movement, which was against the interests of any of the parties".¹⁶⁴

In 1953 and 1954, the Turkish government tried to transform the cooperation and friendship agreement into an alliance. But during this period, Greece began to play an active role in the activities in Cyprus, and Turkey was against these activities. Despite Turkey's difficult status, in order to establish the Balkan Pact, Turkey ignored the situation. As a result, on 9 August 1954, the Balkan Pact was signed by Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia in Bled, Yugoslavia. The Pact was concluded for a period of

twenty years and according to this alliance, in the case of an armed attack towards one of the parties, the contracting states would consider this attack as directed towards them and will use their right to collective self defense. Member states would also establish a “Permanent Council”, which would consist of the ministers of foreign affairs of the parties.¹⁶⁵

Despite the belief of Balkan Pact’s strengthening the eastern flank of NATO, from the spring of 1955 the Balkan Pact began to lose its power. After the death of Stalin, Soviet Russia attempted to establish closer relations with Yugoslavia. Yugoslavian leaders were ready to revise their relations with the Soviet Russia. But at the same time, in case of necessity they also wanted to keep the Balkan Pact as a leverage to Soviet Russia. After the visits of Khruchev and Bulganin to Belgrade in May 1955, Yugoslavia lost its belief in the Balkan Pact and with also Greece’s attempt to use the Pact for its imperialistic aims on Cyprus. Therefore, especially from 1955 with the Cyprus issue, Turkey and Greece got involved in a struggle and the alliance lost its effectiveness and aim.¹⁶⁶

When the Cyprus conflict grew in intensity, the understanding between the three Balkan countries lost all of its substance. But, Israel perceived the Balkan Pact as an ideal objective for securing military assistance. Israel hoped that Turkey’s advanced position in the Balkans would lead Ankara to neglect the Middle East. So when Turkey’s attention would be directed towards the Balkans, Israel hoped that Turkey would lose its interest in the Middle East, which would make it less vulnerable to the Arab influence. In other words, Israel’s hope vis-à-vis Turkey soared in

¹⁶⁴ Armaoğlu, 1964: 813-814.

¹⁶⁵ Armaoğlu, 1964: 815.

¹⁶⁶ Armaoğlu, 1964: 816.

consequence of that country's adherence to the Balkan Pact.¹⁶⁷ Because from Israel's perspective, while Turkey and Israel were Western backed alliances, Israel would be strengthened by Turkey's adherence to the Balkan Pact and weakened through Turkey's approach to the East.¹⁶⁸

After the changes in relations between the members of the Pact, although the Pact was established for twenty years, one year after its foundation, the Balkan Pact existed as *de jure* but it was abolished as *de facto*. The Pact formally continued until June 1960 till the declaration of denouncing the Pact.

3.1.2. The Baghdad Pact

After the Korean War, the U.S. began to get interested in the defence of the Middle East due to a possible Soviet threat in the region; just as the Soviet Union's threat to the allies during the Korean War. Another threat was the Soviet Russia's closeness to the Middle East and the region's non-integration to the western block. The U.S. rather than Britain, began to deal with the security issues of the region. In order to establish a defense pact in the Middle East, it would not be suitable for Western states to take part in the establishment of a new pact, because Arab states were hostile to France and Britain and therefore they were also against the U.S. Therefore, a Middle Eastern state should lead a defense pact that would be established in the Middle East. Because, Turkey was the most powerful state in the region and at the same time the only NATO member among the Middle Eastern countries. Those

¹⁶⁷ Nachmani, 1992: 28.

¹⁶⁸ Nachmani, 1987: 249.

were the best possible causes for Turkey to lead the defense pact. Also while entering NATO, Turkey promised to play an active role in defending the Middle East. So it was Turkey's turn to play an active role in the establishment of a new pact. After Turkey began to lead and play an active role in the Middle East, the U.S. began to increase its relations with other states in the region. As a first step, the U.S. signed an Economic and Technical Aid Convention with Pakistan on 28 December 1953 and on 19 May 1954, an Agreement for Mutual Defense. Within this parallel, on 2 April 1954, an agreement on Friendly Relations was signed. So these agreements became the basis of the new Pact.¹⁶⁹

After Turkey concluded an agreement with Pakistan, Turkey this time commenced diplomatic initiatives to persuade the other Middle Eastern states to join the agreement, which was concluded with Pakistan. In order to establish a real pact in the region, the membership of the Arab states was necessary, otherwise such a pact could not really be established. At the end of 1954, Turkish and Iraqi bureaucrats exchanged visits. During the visits between Turkish and Iraqi bureaucrats, there was a positive atmosphere and in the meetings, the issues were based on an agreement signed between Britain and Egypt on the Suez issue. On 6 January 1955, Menderes visited Iraq and on 12 January a security agreement between Turkey and Iraq was signed. On 14 January, Menderes this time visited both Syria and Lebanon, but the two states rejected the idea of collaboration. On the other hand, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia started a campaign against the Turkish-Iraqi Defense Agreement. Despite these challenges, on 24 February 1955 Turkey and Iraq this time signed

¹⁶⁹ Özalp, 1992: 40-41.

Mutual Assistance Agreement. Britain, Pakistan and Iran joined this agreement and by these accessions, the Baghdad Pact was established. As a result, Turkey, Iraq, Britain, Pakistan and Iran became the members of the Baghdad Pact and the U.S. acquired an “observer” status.¹⁷⁰

The aim of the establishment of the Baghdad Pact was to provide an anti-communist block in the Middle East. But Arabs were against Israel and anti-western. So Arabs reacted against the Pact; Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia collaborated to establish a counter organization, whereas Lebanon and Jordan remained neutral. The Baghdad Pact negatively affected Turkish-Arab relations. Turkish relations with the Arab States declined except with Iraq, but relations of Turkey with Egypt and Syria became strained.¹⁷¹ When Turkey signed the Baghdad Pact, a declaration was also signed and its articles relating to military assistance in times of crisis were to be valid for and specifically in the Palestinian conflict. Turkey tried to persuade other Arab States to join the pro-Western defense treaties in vain. As by being allies to such a pact, they would be considered as accepting Israel’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

According to article 5 of the Baghdad Pact, the future candidates to become a member of the pact should be a member of the Arab League and be a recognized state by the members of the Pact. Although Israel was kept out of the Pact, by this clause the Arab-Jewish conflict escalated. In 1956, when Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula, Turkey declared Israel as a major threat directed towards the Middle East peace and order. On 20 November 1956, Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Tel-Aviv. Therefore, the level of representation was reduced to the level of “*charge d’affaires*”.

¹⁷⁰ Nachmani, 1987: 42.

Then it was considered that by these actions, Turkey intended to calm down the Arabs.¹⁷² Turkey thought that by this policy, it would be possible to strengthen the position of the Baghdad Pact. But the balance of power in the region changed and the relations between Israel and Turkey got worse.

Israel was concerned for Turkey itself in the Baghdad Pact, about Turkey's opening to the Middle East. Weapons, which were delivered to Iraq were liable to fall into the hands of the Kurdish insurgents in Turkey. So in case of Iraq's weakness, the alliance would be worthless for Turkey. Therefore, Israel argued that it would be cheaper and safer in times of emergency to occupy Iraq rather than arming them and expecting from them to defend themselves against a communist enemy with the strong possibility that the weapons would fall into anti-western hands. Neither Iraq nor Pakistan was vigorously anti-communist and Turkey was unlikely therefore to gain a great deal from these two countries in that respect. On the contrary, Pakistan would enjoy taking the arms it received through its alliance with Turkey and directing them against India; Iraq would do likewise against Israel. In this manner, Turkey might find itself embroiled in a confrontation with India or with Israel. Finally, Israel was anxious about Turkish secular and pro-European character, which would be adversely affected by Ankara's policies particularly with regard to its alliance with Iraq and Pakistan.¹⁷³

Since Turkey was a member of NATO, due to this legal link, Iraq was also but implicitly linked to NATO. But other Arab states were defending a pact, which had neutrality between East and West and consisted of only the Arab states. Therefore, Iraq was under a pressure of other Arab states and this pressure resulted with the Iraq

¹⁷¹ Armaoğlu, 1964: 46.

¹⁷² Yılmaz, 1997: 21.

¹⁷³ Nachmani, 1987: 73.

Revolution on 14 July 1958. After the Iraqi revolution (14 July 1958), Iraq left the Baghdad Pact the same year and the Pact's name was changed into Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which aimed to found the relations that were based on economic, cultural and technical mutual cooperation.

As a result, the Baghdad Pact damaged the interests of Turkey and became fruitless and Turkey's regional relations were affected negatively as well as harming the western world's interests in the region and attracted the Soviet threat. With the establishment of the Pact, the alliance between the Arabs and the Soviet Union began, radical dialogues increased and Israel considered the Pact as a negative development.

¹⁷⁴ Turkey was affected to become a member of the Pact by excluding Israel, which led a decline in Turkish-Israeli relations.

3.1.3. The Peripheral Pact

In the summer of 1958, Israel and Turkey entered into an alliance with an agreement for co-operation in the diplomatic, military and intelligence fields as well as in commerce and science, which came to be known as the "peripheral pact". The pact included Iran, Turkey, Ethiopia, Israel and even was extended to certain Christian parts of Sudan. On 29-30 August 1958, Israel's Prime Minister Ben Gurion and Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes reached to an understanding to establish a Peripheral Pact. This understanding stemmed from the need to take common action against the Soviet and Nasserist subversion applied to four of the Middle Eastern countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Iraq) combined with Israel's obsessive efforts

to break out of its diplomatic isolation. This isolation had been recently exacerbated by Israel's confrontation with the U.S. over the Suez War. These factors led both Israel and Turkey to overcome their respective inhibitions and mutual misgivings. With the Kassemite *coup d'etat* on 14 July 1958, the republic was proclaimed in Baghdad, Iraq. Maneuvers were conducted by 24 Soviet divisions near the Turkish border in order to rid Turkey and Israel of their residual hesitations.¹⁷⁵

In the August 1958 agreement (Peripheral Pact), the Turks adopted the notion of "complementary nations". This concept would have a number of beneficial effects when implemented; the provision of Israeli know-how in laying an oil pipeline from Iran to Turkey, scientific cooperation in highly sensitive fields (especially through the meetings in Geneva), Israeli expertise would be employed in development of Turkish industry and agriculture. Israeli military equipment would be exported to Turkish armed forces. In return, it was agreed that Israel would enjoy the support of the Turkish Army, numbering hundreds of thousands of troops. By the 1958 treaty, Turkey also undertook an assignment, which prior to the Suez crisis of 1956 had traditionally fallen to Israel. Following the Suez Crisis and worsening the U.S.-Israel relations, Turks would act on Israel's behalf in Washington, in particular by asking the Pentagon to supply Israel arms. On top of this, there should be frequent consultations, coordination between Turkish and Israeli diplomats accredited in various capitals, cooperation and mutual assistance at the UN (with the stress on the Cyprus issue), as

¹⁷⁴ Aras, 1997: 133.

¹⁷⁵ Nachmani, 1987: 74-75.

well as agreement on joint military action on with regard to Aden, which lay on the route of the oil tankers, fell under the control of Nasser.¹⁷⁶

In the realm of foreign policy, Turkey and Israel shared the same concerns about certain Arab states. Because, Turkey and Israel were the only non-Arab, secular and democratic countries in the Middle East and the Middle East was also dominated by military dictatorships and theocratic regimes. The “periphery strategy” of Israel i.e., seeking alignment with Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia and supporting non-Muslim minorities, overlaps with Turkey’s wariness regarding Syria’s imperial dreams. Syrian borders with Turkey and Israel had always been in dispute since a long time. The Syrians have not forgiven Turkey for “ceding” Hatay in 1939, nor Israel for the annexation of the Golan Heights in 1952. Compounding the situation, Turkey implicitly supported the Israeli annexation by abstaining for the UN Resolution that condemned Israel.¹⁷⁷ After 1957, Turkey and Israel came closer to each other and the two states signed in secrecy a Peripheral Pact. Israel’s aim was to establish better relations with states, which were out of the Arab area and these were Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia. But this pact did not last long and became ineffective.

By the 1958 alliance, according to Israel, Turkey existed in the Middle East in a friendly and balancing character, prevented Israel to face the Russian army through Syria and led to the realization of Ben-Gurion’s strategy. This strategy foresaw to balance the enmity of Arabs that live like in the internal part of the moon shape in the

¹⁷⁶ Nachmani, 1987: 75.

¹⁷⁷ For more details on this subject see: Mylroie, 1987: 25; Mylroie, 1989: 56. Cited from N.Tavlaş, 1994.

Middle East with Turkish friendship, which existed in the external part of the shape of the region.¹⁷⁸

As mentioned above, Turkish-Israeli relations during the 1950s developed in social, commercial and military fields. But the military cooperation was carried out covertly and Turkey and Israel exchanged military information. Israeli construction firm Solel Boneh, which had constructed all kinds of buildings for the State of Israel in the strategic areas, also constructed airports in Turkey as a firm with confidential references, within the frame of Joint NATO Defence Organisation. It was claimed that at the same time this collaboration meant an alliance agreement between Israel, Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia and the U.S. supported the Peripheral Pact. Although the Arab states accused Turkey of signing a military agreement with Israel, Turkey kept on rejecting this accusation.¹⁷⁹

The common denominator of the members of the Peripheral Pact (1958) was having conflict with the Arab neighbors and being under the threat of the Soviet invasion. Turkey had preponderance because of being located in the center of the Arab states that surrounded Israel and geographically located at the “external point” of the region.¹⁸⁰ Israel’s security strategy in the Middle East was based on an “outflank” strategy (to siege the enemy by going back) and in this pact, Israel decided to give their organizational authority to the Israeli Military Intelligence; AMAN (*Agaf Ha Medi’i/* Israeli Armament Forces’ Unit of Intelligence) and in this collaboration Turkey was responsible for intervening Syrian and Lebanon areas.¹⁸¹ In order to apply this strategy, Israel began to collaborate with Iran’s Shah regime and prevented the

¹⁷⁸ Tavlaş, 1994: 5.

¹⁷⁹ Duman, 1995: 169.

¹⁸⁰ Lukacks-Battah, 1998: 23.

military coup against the Ethiopian government and began to give military training to the new Ethiopian army.

At the beginning, Turkey considered the idea of cooperation with Israel very objectively in order not to add any more problems to Islamic states' accusations of Turkey as collaborating with the imperialist members to NATO. But the US realized that, without Turkish participation, a security pact could not become a real one. Therefore, the US kept encouraging Turkey to establish cooperation with the U.S. in order to establish a security pact in the Middle East. The basis of Turkish timidity towards improving relations with Israel was mainly due to the new conflicts that emerged in the Middle East and the abolishment of some of the old administrations. An internal war had broken out in Lebanon, the monarchy in Iraq was abolished, under the influence of Nasser the Jordanian regime was also abolished and lastly during Egyptian president's visit to Damascus the Egyptian president declared that Egypt would support the revolutionary administration in Iraq.

After Turkey's decision of establishing cooperation with Israel, on August 1957, Israel appointed Eliahu Sasson (the chief of the Middle East unit in MOSSAD) (in Hebrew language "Le Biyyun U'Let Afkidim Meyuhadim"- Unit of Espionage and Special Tasks) a very experienced intelligence staff, to Ankara as an ambassador in order to persuade Turkey to establish closer ties with Israel. After Sasson's appointment, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Sasson had a meeting and worked on collaborative issues. Turkey demanded to keep their

¹⁸¹ Katz, 1994: 141.

collaboration as a “secret” and Israel accepted this demand. But Turkey was still hesitating to begin to collaborate.¹⁸²

On December 1957, when Sasson with a “special agent status” visited Turkey’s Prime Minister Adnan Menderes before his assignment to Ankara as an Israeli Ambassador, they discussed the issue of collaboration in matters of intelligence and decided to meet seven months later with both states’ intelligence staffs. The meeting took place in Ankara and led by Turkish Intelligence Organizations’ (MIT) chieftain Hüseyin Avni Göktürk and the chieftain of MOSSAD Reuven Shiolah. Israel was decisive in establishing a “security trident” in the region and demanded the assistance of the US for persuading Turkey. After discussions between Washington and Ankara, the Turkish government was persuaded to collaborate with Israel.¹⁸³ On 28 August 1958, the Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion with the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Golda Meir, with the councillor of the Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres and the chief of the General Staff Zui Zur paid a visit to the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. In order to keep this visit’s aim secret, especially from the Islamic World the visit was declared to the public to be a *force majeure* landing to Ankara due to an “incident” in the motor of the ELAL airplane. In the meeting, economic, political and the military issues were discussed. But the decision of regularly exchanging intelligence was kept secret.¹⁸⁴

According to a CIA report, extracted from an “Israel’s Secret Service and Foreign Intelligence” report, an agreement among MOSSAD, MIT and Iran’s Secret Service (SAVAK) was concluded and called as a trident cooperation period.

¹⁸² Tavlaş, 1994: 8.

¹⁸³ Tavlaş, 1994: 8-9.

¹⁸⁴ Tavlaş, 1994: 9.

According to this report, Israel would follow the activities of the Soviet Union over Turkey and in return, Turkey would follow the activities of the Arab states; especially Syria. With this agreement, Israel promised to give “technical aid” on educating Turkish intelligence staff, the counter-intelligence and the efficiency of communicational devices. According to the Trident Agreement, twice a year the chiefs of the intelligence services would join the meeting and make assessments on the intelligence issues.¹⁸⁵ The agreement was based on the following activities of the Soviet agents in these countries. According to the agreement, the collected information about the attitudes of Syrian Arab regime towards Israel would be shared with MOSSAD. The most important fact of the agreement between Turkey and Israel was to promise to share the same intelligence that they gave to Iran.¹⁸⁶ Another important factor of the agreement was the occasion of necessity; the parties to the agreement would provide the necessary easiness to the friendly intelligence organizations. For example, while Israel was following the developments in Sudan in September 1955, Israeli officials met Sudanese opposition leader (Umma Party) in Turkey.¹⁸⁷

3.2. The Suez Crisis

After the year 1949, Egypt began to control the ships that were passing through the Suez Canal in order to find out if they were transporting goods to Israel

¹⁸⁵ CIA Report, “Israel, Foreign Intelligence and Security Services”, Washington, March 1976, Secret, This report was published by students that invaded the US embassy. Cited from: N.Tavlaş, 1994. Cited from N.Tavlaş, 1994.

¹⁸⁶ Raviv-Mediman, 1990: 83.

¹⁸⁷ Black-Morris, 1991: 185.

or not. With these controls Egypt increased its control over the canal and in 1954 decided to ban the ships to transport food to Israel. Egypt, in the same year, seized one of the Israeli ships. Upon this, Israel applied to the U.N. Security Council. Most of the members declared that Egypt violated the terms of Istanbul Agreement (1888) which had foreseen the free transportation through the canal. The members also declared that Egypt had no right to investigate the ships. On the other hand, during these years Egypt demanded credit from the Western States to construct the Aswan Dam. At first, Britain and the U.S. accepted the Egyptian demand, but when they had realized that Egypt was also waiting the reply of the Soviet Union for financial support and they declined their promise on 19-20 July 1956. Another reason of the withdrawal of this aid was Egypt's recognition of People's Republic of China, on May 1956. Upon this political development, the U.S. public opinion turned against Egypt. On 26 July 1956, the U.S. Senate rejected to give loan to Egypt and then Egypt, the same day, declared the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. It was declared formally that the aim of the nationalization was to find the necessary financial support for the construction of the Aswan Dam.

Egypt declared that the passage through the canal would be conducted in accordance with Istanbul Agreement of 1888, and the necessary reparations to the British and French companies, which were managing the canal, would be paid. But the problems were not solved and France, Britain and Israel decided to prepare a joint plan to attack to Egypt. According to the plan Israel would attack as a first step and then call Britain and France in order to establish a cease-fire. From both states, Britain and France would demand to withdraw their forces 16 km. back from the Canal.

Egypt would most probably reject this demand and then Britain and France would intervene and invade the Canal.¹⁸⁸

On 25 October 1956, in order to maintain collective defence against any possible British, French and Israeli attacks the Joint Command was established among Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Due to this development, Israel began a campaign and when the Soviet Union began to turn its attention towards the riots in Hungary, Israel found an opportunity to attack Egypt and placed the Sinai Peninsula under its control. Parallel to this plan, when Nasser rejected France and Britain's demands of intervening and invading the Canal, Britain and France joined to the military action. Egypt sank the ships and therefore the Canal was blocked to navigation. But the aim of Britain and France was to keep the canal open to navigation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was against this attack and sent a message to Israel, France and Britain demanding to end the armed hostilities immediately. The Soviet Union also sent a message to the U.S. and proposed the establishment of a joint force with the U.S. in order to give an end to the conflict. But this proposal was rejected by the U.S. and the U.S. this time threatened the Soviet Union that if the Soviet Union would send its military forces to Egypt, the U.S. would apply counter-measures to the Soviet Union. The U.S. not only just criticised the Soviet Union, but also France and Britain for intervening to the crisis. In spite of the fact that both France and Britain were NATO members, they secretly commenced to organize an operation and they had even hidden this from the U.S. and also from the other allies. As a result, the U.S. decided to end sending military and economic aid to Israel and demanded from France and Britain to withdraw their forces from Egypt. In March 1957, both states withdrew

¹⁸⁸ Gönübol-Ülman, 1966: 278-280.

their forces from the region and the Canal was opened to navigation.¹⁸⁹ Consequently, it was seen that Egypt was not militarily successful, but the allies politically proved their strength in the Middle East.

The U.S. wanted to solve this conflict in the U.N. Due to this demand, twenty four states which were using the Canal frequently were invited to the meeting of 16 August 1956 in London. Turkey was also among the invited states. Egypt and Greece did not participate in the meeting. The U.S. Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Dulles declared their plan to solve this conflict. According to the U.S. plan, Egypt should have sovereign rights over the Canal while free navigation through the Canal should be ensured. Suez Canal should be administered by an international administration consisting of the representatives of Egypt and other regional powers. This plan was supported by Turkey but rejected by Egypt. On the other hand, due to its non participation to the meeting, Greece gained the sympathy of the Arab States. Although Turkey accepted the U.S. plan, Turkey with Pakistan, Iran and Ethiopia recommended an ammendment to this plan in which they underlined the condition of “not violating the sovereign rights of Egypt in the Canal”. The U.S. accepted the amendment proposal of Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Ethiopia. But Egypt declared that, when Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal would be accepted and the idea of leaving the control of the Canal under an international administration would be given up, Egypt would be ready to guarantee the free navigation of states through the Canal.¹⁹⁰ On 19-22 September, the Second London Conference convened in order to discuss the status of the Suez Canal. Among the states which were using the Suez Canal, a union was established. The union had eighteen members which were; Australia,

¹⁸⁹ Duman, 1995: 227-228.

Denmark, Turkey, Ethiopia, France, Federal Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Iran, Spain, Sweden, Britain and the U.S.¹⁹¹ On October 1956, Turkey condemned Israel for attacking Egypt and also condemned Britain and France for supporting this aggression.

After Britain and France declared a cease-fire on 6 November 1956, the Baghdad Pact convened on 7 November in Tehran in order to assess the crisis. Britain was not invited to this meeting and at the end of the meeting Israel was condemned by the members of the Pact, but on the other hand, Britain and France were not condemned. The members of this Pact demanded from France and Britain to withdraw their forces from the Canal. Again on 18-20 November, the muslim members of the Baghdad Pact convened in Baghdad and discussed the possible measures to maintain peace and security in the Middle East. At the end of the meeting, the members decided to improve relations in the region not only among the Muslim states, but also among the other regional states. The members also agreed on the fact that, Israel constituted an important threat to the Middle East peace and the members began to put pressure on Turkey in order to give an end to its diplomatic relations with Israel.¹⁹²

Turkey was in a very difficult status during the Suez Crisis in the Middle East. Turkey on one hand was a NATO member and had a Western tendency in its policies and on the other hand began to lose its credibility among the Arab States. At the beginning of this crisis, Turkey pursued the western policy, but after a while

¹⁹⁰ Gönübol-Ülman, 1966: 280-281

¹⁹¹ Gönübol-Ülman, 1966: 281-282.

¹⁹² Duman, 1995: 230-231.

condemned the aggression to Egypt.¹⁹³ During the crisis, there were some challenges to the Turkish-Israeli relations, as well as among the regional powers. During the war, Nasser accused Iraq of collaborating with Israel (in connection with the Baghdad Pact) and also accused Turkey of establishing good relations with Israel, but Iraq never applied pressure over Turkey regarding its policies towards Israel. Iraq preferred to reject the Egyptian accusations.¹⁹⁴ Despite Turkey's new policy towards Israel, she faced criticism from the Arab States due to its western tendency. On 22 November 1956, Turkey withdrew its ambassador in Israel H.E.Şevket İstinyeli, to Ankara and Israel's ambassador in Ankara returned back to Israel. With this mutual diplomatic actions the mutual representation at the ambassador's level was reduced to the level of "*charge d'affaires*". On 26 November 1956, the Turkish Ambassador Ş.İstinyeli visited the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs and declared them that;

“In order to strengthen the Baghdad Pact, the decision of reducing the level of diplomatic representation level is taken by my government. This diplomatic action should not be interpreted as a hostile action against the State of Israel.”

By reducing the diplomatic representation level, Turkey aimed to gain the support of the Arab States. Turkish policy became ineffective among the Arab States by the statement of the Turkish Ambassador, which was disclosed by some sources. So, these developments led to the decline of the Baghdad Pact. Because Turkey supported the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, applied contradictory policies towards Syria in 1957 and Iraq in 1958 and let the U.S. use the NATO base in Adana during the Lebanon crisis in 1958, Turkey lost the Arab support and faced the reactions of

¹⁹³ Aras, 1997: 133.

these states. This led Turkey to turn towards Israel and as mentioned above, the Peripheral Pact was signed between Turkey and Israel due to these developments.¹⁹⁵ So at the end of the crisis, Israel expected diplomatic support from Turkey. Within the framework of cooperation, Turkey would support Israel during the provision of weapons from the U.S. and Israeli diplomats would act similarly especially on the Cyprus issue in the U.N. with Turkish diplomats.¹⁹⁶

Following the Suez Crisis, Turkey's relations with Syria and Egypt got worse and Syria became a close ally of the Soviet Union. During the Suez Crisis, the Baghdad Pact was the most important factor in the determination of Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East. So, the relations between Turkey and Israel were greatly affected by the other challenges to its foreign policy. On the other hand, at the end of the crisis, the Soviet Union began to support Egypt. With this support, the Soviet Union gained the sympathy of the Arab States.

At the end of the Suez Crisis in 1956, there were some challenges in the Middle East and with the withdrawal of Britain and France at the end of the war, the U.S. became effective in the region and the Soviet Union was against the U.S.' gaining power in the region. Hence, Soviet Union increased its activities in the region as a counter measure. Due to the rivalry of the two states in the Middle East and specifically on the Palestinian conflict, the influence of both states increased.¹⁹⁷

On 5 January 1957, the U.S. President Eisenhower made a declaration on the Middle East, in order to guide the Middle Eastern Countries to protect their

¹⁹⁴ Yavuz, 1991: 52.

¹⁹⁵ For details on reactions of the Arab States towards Turkey during the Suez Crisis see: Karaosmanoğlu, 1992: 3.

¹⁹⁶ Nachmani, 1987: 70.

¹⁹⁷ Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını, 1997: 85.

independence and to lay down the basis of cooperation between the states and assist them. The declaration consisted of three steps:

- a. The U.S. should have the authority to cooperate with all states which would demand or be ready to give military aid and comply with cooperation programme for the Middle East and with the states which would need and demand aid.
- b. When one or more of the regional states faced an attack by any of the communist states and demanded aid for a counter-attack or to protect its sovereignty and freedom, if it deemed necessary, the U.S. should have the right to use its armed forces.
- c. According to the Mutual Security Act, between the years 1958-1959, in order to provide economic and military aid to the Middle East, the management authority of 200 million US dollars aid was given to the US government.¹⁹⁸

After Eisenhower's above declaration, this declaration was called as the "Eisenhower Doctrine" and accepted in the Senate on 9 March 1957. Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia announced that they were against this doctrine. But after a while, Saudi Arabia accepted this doctrine. Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Pakistan were among the first supporters and later, Israel, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Afghanistan became the other supporters of this doctrine. During this period, Turkey began to cooperate more with the West and the Turkish Prime Minister A.Menderes considered the U.S. as a unique power against the Soviet Union. With the approval of

¹⁹⁸ Gönlübol-Ülman, 1993: 288.

the Eisenhower Doctrine, Britain lost most of its influence in the region and the U.S. became one of the important and influential states in the Middle East.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁹ Gönlübol-Ülman, 1993: 289.

CHAPTER 4

TURKISH ISRAELI RELATIONS FROM THE 1960s UP TO 1980s

4.1. The Cyprus Issue

The roots of the Cyprus conflict can be traced back to the 16th century, but as our theme is Turkish-Israeli relations between 1948 till 1980s, I would like to briefly review the Cyprus issue from 1950s onward. The control of Cyprus was taken over from the Venetians by the Ottomans at 1571. Since that date Cyprus was under Ottoman rule until the end of the Russian War (1877-1878) when Ottomans were defeated on 3 March 1878 and the Ottoman Empire had to sign the the St. Sophia (Ayestefanos) Agreement on 23 May 1878. On 4 June 1878, an agreement was signed between the Ottoman Empire and Britain. With this agreement, the authority to govern the island was left to Britain. In 24 July 1923 with the Lausanne Agreement, the control of Cyprus was given to Britain.

Cyprus was the only place under the full control of Britain in the Middle East. After the Second World War, Greeks living in Cyprus began demonstrations against the British rule. Greece began to interfere in Cyprus and encouraged armed struggles in order to annex the island.²⁰⁰ At the early stages, the Turkish government considered the issue as Britain's problem and was not concerned with it. But, the Turkish press had taken it up as a national issue. In 1950, the main problem of Turkey, and Greece was to enter into the western alliance. Also as Turkey gave preeminence to the

²⁰⁰ *Enosis* is the union of Cyprus with Greece. Armaoğlu, 1964: 821.

continuation of the Baghdad Pact and tried to ignore the events which would ruin the pact, both states abstained from a strife on the Cyprus issue. From the Turkish perspective, the main threat was communism. Therefore, Turkey wanted to collaborate with Greece in order to prevent any possible attack of the Soviet Union. The main reason bringing these two old enemies together was not being a NATO member and their common anxiety about the Soviet threat. Therefore, despite Greek demonstrations in the island, the Cyprus issue did not consist a conflict between Turkey and Greece at that time. After Papagos came to power in Greece in 1953, the Greek government began to play an active role in the island. From May 1954 upto 22 August, Greece demanded to take over the rule of Cyprus from Britain. If Britain would not give up its authority on the island, Greece would take the issue to the United Nations and the issue would gain an international status.

On 16 August 1954, with the demand of “self-determination” for Cyprus, Greece applied to the United Nations and the issue was incorporated into the agenda of the United Nations (U.N.) on 24 August 1954. In September 1954, the U.N. negotiated this issue, but failed to recommend any decision on this subject. According to Menderes, the negotiations over Cyprus were ended with this decision of the U.N. But, Greeks escalated their terrorist activities in the island, which disturbed Britain. The violence in the island started to attract the attention of the international fora and Turkey due to these events started to get involved with the Cyprus issue. Therefore, it can be claimed that the Turkish government began to get seriously involved in the Cyprus issue, after the summer of 1955.²⁰¹

²⁰¹ Armaoğlu, 1964: 822-823.

As a result of violent riots, which broke up in the island, the British government called Turkey and Greece again to a conference in London on 29 August 1955. But the parties could not reach to any consensus as Turkey demanded keeping the status-quo, Greece advocated self determination and Britain wanted to give an autonomous status to the island. At the London Conference, Turkey assigned its sovereign rights on Cyprus to Britain. Cyprus was under Turkish rule for a long time, but never ruled by Greece. Until the First World War, the majority of the population consisted of Turks; 60 percent of registered lands were owned by Turks, also the island was strategically very important for Turkey as well as Greece. Although under these circumstances, Turkish government had abstained from her rights in favour of Britain, but, if Britain would not accept these rights, Cyprus would belong to Turkey. Greece was surprised with Turkey's assignment. According to the Report of Radcliff on 19 December 1956, the British Government accepted the partition of the island as a solution to the conflict, after the report that the Turkish government had begun to accept partition as a solution, while Greece defended the application of "self-determination" principle to the island. So, each one of the three states had different approaches to this issue. On 6 September, bombs began to explode mostly in Istanbul and at the house of Atatürk in Selonica, and consequently riots against Greeks broke out in Ankara and İzmir.²⁰² So the London Conference was influenced by the 6-7 September events and the conference ended. After the conference, the clashes between Turks and Greeks took place in Cyprus and violence increased.

At the end of the year 1957, Britain offered to establish a regime of partnership on the island. But this suggestion was rejected by Turkey and Greece, and

²⁰² Armaoğlu, 1973: 165-169.

Greece kept on taking the Cyprus issue to the United Nations. In September and December 1957, Greece presented draft resolutions to the U.N. in which Greece declared that the human rights were violated in Cyprus by the British Colonial Administration. In 5 December and 14 December 1957, when the Greek draft resolution was voted, Greece was of course in favour of it while Turkey and the United Kingdom rejected it. Israel and the U.S. abstained from the voting of the draft resolution.²⁰³ The U.N. refrained from imposing any solution to the conflict, but recommended to solve the conflict through negotiations among Turkey, Britain and Greece. In 1958, violence increased on the island and Turkish-Greek and Greek-British relations became tense. So NATO's right flank of the Eastern Mediterranean was affected from these conflicts. Consequently, under the pressure of NATO and the U.S., Turkey and Greece began bilateral negotiations. On 5-11 February 1959 in Zurich, both states' prime ministers decided to establish the Republic of Cyprus (which would be a binational state and based on the existence of two ethnic communities)²⁰⁴ and agreed on the principles of a constitution to ensure the right of independence and existence of Turkish Cypriot community and other related matters. These were incorporated into agreements and these agreements were signed by the representatives of Turkey, Greece, Britain, Turkish Cypriot Community and Greek Cypriot Community.

On 19 February 1959, another conference convened in London, and at the end of the conference the decision that was taken at Zurich was accepted. So Zurich and London Agreements established organic ties and relations between Britain, Turkey, Greece and the independent State of Cyprus. With the Guarantee Agreement, Britain,

²⁰³ For more details, see: Yearbook of the U.N., 1957: 76.

Greece and Turkey ensured the right of freedom, territorial integrity, security and the main principles of the Constitution and safeguarded the interests of the guarantor powers.²⁰⁵ With this agreement, the Republic of Cyprus guaranteed to protect its recognized constitutional rights. But, if a threat arises against the guaranteed rights and principles and if the principles of the agreement would be violated, Greece, Britain and Turkey would consult each other in order to take the necessary actions.²⁰⁶ If the parties could not agree on taking possible common actions or continue to violate the constitutional order, each of the three states would have the right to intervene. According to the Alliance Agreement, Greece would deploy 950 and Turkey would have a right to deploy 650 military personnel on the island. Also according to these agreements enosis or partition of the Republic of Cyprus was forbidden.

On 16 August 1960 with the provisions of 1960 Treaties of Nicosia, the Republic of Cyprus was officially established which would last until 21 December 1963 and entitled Turkey with the right to intervene to the island.²⁰⁷ At the U.N., Turkey faced difficulties in finding support for the Cyprus issue. Therefore, Turkey begun to reassess its relations with the West. After the Greek attacks (on 21 December 1963), the future of Cyprus and the Turks living in Cyprus became the major factor in Turkish foreign policy. Under the rule of Makarios in Cyprus, on December 1963, attacks were redirected towards the Turks.²⁰⁸ Firstly, in compliance with the agreement, Turkey decided to ask from the Cyprus government to end the

²⁰⁴Yearbook of the U.N., 1976: 291.

²⁰⁵ Yearbook of the U.N., 1964: 152.

²⁰⁶ İsrail Türkiye İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını, 1997: 104.

²⁰⁷ Gönübol, 1974:9.

²⁰⁸ Gönübol-Ülman, 1966:329.

hostilities. (According to the agreement, first the parties of the conflict were to try to take joint peaceful actions). But, when Turkish attempts for peaceful solution were unsuccessful, on 25 December 1963, Turkey decided to intervene and Turkish air forces landed on the island.²⁰⁹ In order to maintain peace, on 27 December, under the British Command a trident force was established and on 13-31 January 1964, the London Conference convened. But at the end, the parties could not reach to any solution. NATO forces were assigned to protect security and peace on the island, but the Cyprus government objected to the deployment of NATO forces on the island. Therefore, Turkey decided to take the conflict to the U.N.²¹⁰

With the decision of the U.N. Security Council on 4 March 1964, the U.N. Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was assigned to maintain peace and security in Cyprus. UNFICYP was financially supported by Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and Israel as well as other states.²¹¹ But the U.N. Peace Force was unsuccessful in preventing the armed conflicts. So with the continuation of strife, Turkey realized that diplomatic initiatives were all in vain and on June 1964 decided to intervene the island unilaterally. After this decision of Turkey, the U.S. President (5 June 1964) Lyndon Johnson sent a letter to the Prime Minister İnönü and recommended to hold back intervention to Cyprus and invited İnönü to the U.S. When this letter was received, Turkey gave up its decision to intervene. After İnönü's visit to the U.S. at the end of June, a joint declaration was accepted in which both states agreed on solving the

²⁰⁹ Yearbook of the U.N., 1963: 50.

²¹⁰ Armaoğlu, 1973: 270.

²¹¹ For more information, see: Yearbook of the U.N., 1976: 300.

Cyprus issue by multilateral negotiations (in reference to the validity of the agreements).²¹²

With the involvement of the U.S. in the Cyprus issue, negotiations among the concerned parties began in Geneva on 20 July 1964. But the attacks of Greeks to the Turks in Cyprus continued, and on 8-9 August 1964, Turkish air forces bombed the military basis at Cyprus. Just after this, the Security Council called for a cease-fire and Turkey, acting in compliance with the resolution, gave an end to its operations on the island. During this period, the relations between Turkey and the West were stretched, especially with the U.S. The challenges in Turkish-American relations were mainly related with the Lyndon Johnson letter.²¹³

With Johnson's letter, it was declared that in case of an intervention to Cyprus, Turkey was not permitted to use the U.S. military ammunitions and it was also emphasized that as a result of military intervention to Cyprus if a Soviet attack occurred, NATO might not defend Turkey.²¹⁴ So, this declaration caused crisis in Turkish-American relations, anxiety towards NATO and the U.S. was arose and decreased Western States' credibility in the Turkish opinion.

²¹² Armaoğlu, 1973: 270.

²¹³ The Lyndon Johnson letter, which was sent to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü, was as follows;

"I must call your attention, also, Mr. Prime Minister, to the obligations of NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish involvement in Cyprus would lead top a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, declared in a recent meeting of the Ministerial Council of NATO in the Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered as "literally unthinkable".

Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have buried centries of animosity and hostilities in becoming NATO allies. Nothing less can be expected from Greece and Turkey.

Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey would lead direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union. If Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent of understanding of its NATO allies." Gönlübol, 1974: 8-9.

²¹⁴ Karaosmanoğlu, 1983, 158.

On 18 December 1965 at the U.N. General Council, Political Commission, members voted about the Cyprus issue. At this voting, it was decided that foreign intervention (Turkey) to the island would be unacceptable and the decision was against the articles of 1960 Guarantee Agreement. The voting was concluded by 47 votes in favour of the decision, 6 against and 54 abstentions.²¹⁵ So it can be said that, Cyprus issue has been one of the determinants of the Turkish Foreign Policy. On this issue, Turkey was isolated by NATO members and especially by the U.S. (even when it had a right to intervene). Then, Turkey began to question its foreign policy towards the West and the U.S. When the idea of the self governing system for Cyprus was supported on 29 May 1964 in Algeria in the Council of Asia-Africa, Turkey was also isolated by Third World countries due to its Western oriented foreign policy.²¹⁶ Cyprus issue indicated Turkey's loneliness in the international fora. As a result of these events, Turkey began to make the necessary amendments in its foreign policy.

In 1965, Turkish Foreign Policy was reconsidered under the leadership of Foreign Minister Hasan Esat Işık. Then, Turkish foreign policy was rearranged and acquired a multi-dimensional perspective. With this policy the effectiveness of the U.S. on Turkey did not change, but Turkey gave priority to its interests and needs and decided that interests of Turkey should not necessarily have to overlap with the U.S. Turkish policy pursued in the Middle East especially towards Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and Africa were altered. Turkish multidimensional foreign policy was crystallized by a great increase in oil prices in 1973 and the crisis in Cyprus. There were three new objectives. First one was to become a member and an active player of the Organization of the Islamic Conference

²¹⁵ Gönlübol-Ülman, 1966: 143.

(OIC). Second, was increasing the economic relations with the Arab States and third, to refuse to join to the U.S. led diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran and to adopt an increasingly critical stance towards Israel.²¹⁷

After the Cyprus crisis, Turkey decided to establish closer relations with the Soviet Union and rearranged its security policy especially by basing its policy on prioritizing the provision of weapons programme, which would let Turkey to invade the island in case of necessity. On 14 January 1965, when the U.S. declared that Turkey should refrain from participating in the Multilateral Forces (MLF) and withdraw its eleven officers which were sent in 1964 from the destroyer “Claude Ricketts” (staffed by seven NATO nations), Moscow revised its pro-Makarios attitude on the Cyprus issue. Then, the Soviet Union accepted the idea of “two separate communities” in Cyprus and supported “a federative” administration for the Island in parallel with the Turkish policy.²¹⁸ Turkey also decided to establish better relations with the Arab States but on the other hand, had to balance its good relations with Israel.

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, Turkey preferred not to intervene and to keep in balance its relations with both the Arab States and Israel. Therefore, Turkey refrained from being always on the side of the West and from leading and joining separatist pacts in the region.²¹⁹ In the middle of 1960s, Turkey and the Arab States became closer and in order to gain support for Turkish Cypriots, in 1969 Turkey joined the Organisation of Islamic Conference in an observer status. With Turkey’s membership to the Organisation of Islamic Conference, Turkey began to benefit from its

²¹⁶ Armaoğlu, 1973:273-274.

²¹⁷ Yavuz, 1991: 52-53.

²¹⁸ Gönlübol, 1974: 18.

membership and through the Turkish membership, the importance of the conference in western eyes were risen. On the other hand, the Arab States began to get interested in the muslim Turkish minority in Bulgaria and Turkish Cypriots.²²⁰ The Cyprus issue and the need of diplomatic support in international arena led Turkey to improve its relations with the Arab States. Therefore during the Cyprus issue, Turkey tried to strengthen its political and economic relations with the Arab States. But neither Turkey nor the Arab States reached to a consensus or eliminated the differences between them.²²¹

During Greece-Turkish conflicts on the Cyprus issue, generally Israel remained neutral. But pro-Turkish status was predominant in Israeli policies and in Israeli-Greek relations, Israel in general did not have any biased approach against Greece. There were for and against opinions for supporting *enosis*. Supporting approaches of *enosis* were; “Israeli traditional acknowledgement of the right of self determination” and “Israeli moral debt” to many of the island’s inhabitants who aided immigration of Jews into Palestine during the rule of the British Mandate. Between for and against arguments, Israel had to balance its relations. They were supporting Turkish demand of maintaining the status-quo in the island, but on the other hand the relations with Greece should not burden Israel excessively.²²²

The Greek idea of *enosis* in Cyprus was based on communism and was the dominant ideology in the Greek Cypriot part. Therefore, Israel refrained from showing to Turkey that Israel was supporting this idea and some of the Israeli Foreign Ministry officials and diplomats supported the Turkish side. According to them,

²¹⁹ Nachmani, 1987: 135.

²²⁰ Karaosmanoğlu, 1986: 162.

²²¹ Ergüvenç, 1995: 4.

Turkey had good relations with Israel and they were keeping their promises in order not to alienate the possible Arab votes in the UN for Greece on the Cyprus issue. Greece promised to recognize Israel and in this parallel, Israel would support Greece in the Cyprus issue. But as the promise was not realized until the end of the Cyprus crisis, Israel reassessed which country it would support and decided to support Turkey in 1960s, as it would lose nothing by anti Greek policy while the reversal could harm the deep rooted Israeli-Turkish relations. Despite Israel's decision to support Turkey in Cyprus issue, Israeli attempts remained limited.²²³

In order to change the image of Turkey on global media in the Cyprus issue, Turkey requested assistance from Israel; Israel could help Turkey especially through its powerful lobby in the U.S. and through the U.S. press. Thus, with Israel's assistance, Turkey would be recognized in international financial markets and could maintain support for the recognition of Cyprus. In response, Israel promised to support Turkey through its press and to provide assistance through loans, which would be provided by the private U.S. bankers. Also Israeli diplomats from Ankara, Nicosia and Athens reported to Israel to support and give assistance to the Turkish side.²²⁴ But during this period, Turkey tried to hide its relations with Israel from the public in order to keep in balance and develop its relations with the Arab States.

In general it can be said that in maintaining international support, Turkish Cypriots always faced difficulties and even the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (T.R.N.C.) did not change this pattern. At the beginning, the Arab States declared that they could possibly recognize T.R.N.C., but not the new

²²² Nachmani, 1987: 68.

²²³ *Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını*, 1997: 104.

²²⁴ Nachmani, 1987: 100.

state (The Republic of Cyprus). Turkish Cypriots aimed to proclaim a federal state in a state joint with the Greek Cypriots. But the aim of Turkish Cypriots was prevented by the Greek Cypriots. In order to solve the conflict, Turkish Cypriot community needed to maintain the same political status with the Greek Cypriots and therefore should be recognized internationally. The Arab States could not recognize T.R.N.C. and the reasons was firstly; the existence of different threats for Turkey and the Arab States. Secondly Turkey's geostrategic location and Turkey's active and important political role in the Middle East. Thirdly Turkey did not interfere any states, but some of the Middle East States interfered in Turkish domestic politics and its security policy. Turkey's main principle of secularism was misunderstood by the Arab States and the Iranians and they misinterpreted secularism as rejecting or alienating Islam. Lastly, Turkey's alliance with the Western States disturbed the interests of the Arab States and Iranians.²²⁵ Due to these reasons, as mentioned above, close relations between Turkey and the Arab States remained temporary and limited.

As a reaction to Greece, the Turkish Cypriots established a Turkish Federative State of Cyprus in 1975 and Turkey supported bicomunal, bizonal and federal state in Cyprus. In the same year, Turkey decided to give the equal level of representation of Rauf Denktaş, the President of the Turkish Federative State of Cyprus at the meetings of the Islamic Conference. So the Turkish Federative State of Cyprus acquired the observer status in the Islamic Conference and the conference adopted a resolution which gave an equal status to Turkish Cypriots as same as the Greek Cypriots in international forums.²²⁶ But in 1974, bi-communal negotiations broke out in Cyprus and *coup d'etat* took place against the Cypriot government. Then Turkish military

²²⁵ Karaosmanoğlu, 1986: 162-163.

intervened into Cyprus in order to pave the way for a new constitutional order, to protect the Turkish Community and to divide the island into two zones.²²⁷ But Turkey neither maintained the western support nor the Third World support. The third world states, which were mostly composed of Islamic States refrained from supporting Turkish status politically. Because from the third world states' point of view, Turkey was an ally of the Western States and therefore served to the western interests. This perspective of the Islamic States changed with the U.S. arms embargo of July 1975 to Turkey.²²⁸

4.2. The Arab- Israeli Wars (1967- 1973)

4.2.1. Six-Day War (1967)

Tension between Israel and Syria had increased when Syria was involved in sabotages directed to the borders of Israel. As an outcome of Nasser's policies, Six Day War broke out in 1967. So in June 1967, between Israel and the Arab nations of Egypt, Jordan and Syria which were aided by Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Algeria an armed conflict occurred. When Egypt blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba which was an important transportation route for Israeli shipping, Israel regarded it as an act of aggression. On 5 June 1967, Israel led a massive, preemptive strike and Israeli forces moved quickly to occupy the Gaza Strip and push into the Sinai Peninsula. At the same time Israelis fought with Jordanians in Old Jerusalem and advanced into Syria. On 10 June, the entire Sinai Peninsula, all Jordanian territory of the west of the

²²⁶ Yavuz; Khan, 1992: 8-9.

²²⁷ Yearbook of the U.N., 1976: 294.

²²⁸ Kirişçi, 1993: 7.

Jordan River and the strategic Golan Heights of Syria were all under the control of Israel.²²⁹ As a result of the war, Israel gained the Western Shariya, Gazze Strip, Golan Heights and whole of the Jerusalem. So Israel invaded whole of the Palestine and by the end of the war, the Palestinian conflict gained a new dimension. Before the war, the Arab states had lost their interests towards the Palestinian conflict, but by the end of the war their attention was turned towards the lost lands of the Arab states.

On 28 June 1967, Israel declared the annexation of Jerusalem but the UN rejected this declaration. As a result of the Six-Day War, the Arab-Israel conflict was brought to the UN and on 22 November 1967 the US (which was supporting Israel) and the Soviet Union (which was supporting the Arab States) reached a consensus in accepting the UN Resolution of 242.²³⁰ According to the resolution, Israel would withdraw its forces from the invaded lands and sovereignty and national integrity of all of the regional states should be recognized. Also, the refugee problem should be solved and free transportation through the canals should be guaranteed. Because of opposing views and interests of the parties to the conflict, the parties could not reach a consensus.

As a result of the Six Day War and the UN Resolution 242, Palestinian Arabs realized that they could not ignore the existence of Israel anymore, but on the other hand kept on believing in the necessity of rescuing Gaza and Western Shariya from Israel. So this new challenge for Palestinian Arabs would play an important role on future Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreements. The defeat of the Palestinians at the end of the 1967 war had also great impact on Palestinians and led to an increase in

²²⁹ "Six Day War", 1994: 1.

²³⁰ Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını, 1997: 87.

terrorism.²³¹ On the other hand, Turkey supported the UN Resolution 242. Turkey underlined the necessity of the recognition of all regional states' right of survival in security, but made a reservation on the first article of the resolution which defined Israel as an aggressor state. In order not to harm its bilateral relations with Israel, Turkey refrained from being at the same side with the Arab states on this issue.²³² But after the War of 1967, Turkey expressed its sympathy towards the Arab states and at the same time was able to keep in balance its relations with Israel.

In the determination process of Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Israel, Israel's actions were assessed. As Israel occupied most of the Arab lands in the 1967 war and led the Palestinian conflict to its peak, Turkey voted in favour of all of the resolutions in the UN in 1967 and made amendments in its relations with Israel and the Arab states. Turkey emphasized the unquestionability of the existence of Israel and on the other hand, because of the need of maintaining international support in Cyprus conflict, Turkey had to promote and keep in balance its relations with the Arab states.²³³ So after the War of 1967, Turkey began to establish closer relations with the Arab states.

During the war period, Turkey did not let its bases in Adana be used by foreign forces. On 5 June 1967, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil declared that "the military bases in Turkey were not going to be used against the Arabs by way of a *fait-accompli*".²³⁴ After the end of the war, Çağlayangil again made a statement and declared that, "Turkey was against territorial gains... by

²³¹ Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını, 1997: 88.

²³² Gürkan, 1993: 102.

²³³ Karaosmanoğlu, 1992: 3-4.

²³⁴ Kürkçüoğlu, 1987: 18.

use of force”.²³⁵ Also at the end of the war, Turkey played an active role in humanitarian aid projects and food, clothing and medicine were sent as an aid through the Turkish Red Crescent to the Arab States, which were badly affected from the outcome of the war.²³⁶ So the Arab States appreciated the Turkish support and following the War of 1967, therefore Turkey was kept out of the petroleum embargo.

4.2.2. Yom Kippur War (1973)

When Israel refused to return Arab territories, which were occupied during the Six-Day War of 1967, on 6 October 1973 Egypt and Syria decided to launch a joint surprise attack on Israeli forces. Syria attacked the Golan Heights and Egypt, the Sinai. The Syrians were aided by Jordanian and Iraqi troops and they initially gained some land in the north, but by 11 October the situation turned vice versa and Israel defeated Syria. On the other hand, in the south the Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal and penetrated about 10 km into the Israeli-occupied Sinai before they were stalled. On 16 October, Israel counterattacked and invaded Egypt and on 22 October a ceasefire was arranged by the U.N., which had an important impact on the Syrian front and in Egypt after two days. Although Israel militarily won the war, Egypt by the initial performance of its army, managed to turn the war into a psychological victory. After the end of the war, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir was blamed for unpreparedness and was forced to resign in the following June. The Yom Kippur

²³⁵ Dışişleri Bakanlığı Bülteni, 1967: 19.

²³⁶ Dışişleri Bakanlığı Bülteni, June 1967: 20-21; Dışişleri Bakanlığı Bülteni, August 1967: 47-49.

War²³⁷ marked the beginning of the use of oil as a weapon in the Middle East struggle. From October 1973 till March 1974, the Arab States applied an embargo on oil exports to Western nations, which were friendly to Israel. But the embargo was not applied to Turkey due to her friendly attitude towards the Arab States during the Six-Day War.²³⁸

During the War of 1973, the Ambassadors of Syria and Egypt requested political public support from Turkey on 9 October 1973. Then on 10 October, the spokesman of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that, "Turkey does not approve forceful occupation of Arab territories by Israel and that it feels a lasting peace settlement can only be reached upon the satisfaction of the legitimate demands of the Arab nations on this matter". Also on 14 October, some of the Arab Ambassadors in Ankara asked for Turkish humanitarian aid to the regions, which were damaged during the war.²³⁹ On 18 October, Turkey announced to the U.S. government that: "the military bases in Turkey can not be used to assist and send logistic support to Israel during the current war". Turkey also did not allow the US to use refueling and reconnaissance facilities during the American airlift to Israel and did not let any Soviet planes carry arms to the Arab States over the Turkish airspace. On the other hand on 24 October, the American delegation at NATO claimed that: "The Russians were sending arms to the Arab countries over Turkey".²⁴⁰

During and after the Six Day War and Yom Kippur War, Turkey supported the Arab states in the UN votings. On 10 November 1975, Turkey joined in the UN

²³⁷ Yom Kippur War was the fourth armed conflict between Israel and the neighbor Arab States. The War is called as Yom Kippur War because the war began on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. Also in the Muslim calendar it is called as the Ramadan War.

²³⁸ "Yom Kippur War", 1994: 1.

²³⁹ The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 1975: 184.

General Assembly's resolution with the Arab States, which defined Zionism as "a form of racism and racial discrimination"²⁴¹

Since the 1970s, Turkey had also developed its relations with the Arab states in economic and cultural fields. But the political factors were the main determinants in Turkish Arab relations. In 1970s, Turkey began to establish and promote economic cooperation with the Gulf States, Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Turkish-Arab rapprochement had also political and military impacts. Turkey was also interested in developing cooperative military programs with the Arab States, mostly in training area. Most of the programs were performed with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Tunisia.²⁴² On the other hand during this period, Turkey conducted a low-profile policy towards Israel.

Turkish-Israeli relations were also influenced by the policies of the Israel government towards the Palestinian issue. From the Turkish perspective, the Arab-Israel conflict caused destabilization, radicalization and heavy armament in the region. Therefore Turkey considered the solution of the Palestinian conflict as the unique solution in Arab-Israel conflict.²⁴³ In the same period, Turkey had to follow a pro-Arab and pro-Palestinian policy due to Turkey's concern at the effective use of the oil weapon by the Middle East members of OPEC and the commercial opportunities opening up in the oil producing countries. In 1976, Turkey became a member of the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) and after Turkish membership, Turkey began to reconsider its foreign policy towards the Middle East. So in this regard, Turkish policy towards Israel was fundamental to Turkish-Arab relations. In general, Turkey

²⁴⁰ Kürkçüoğlu, 1987: 19.

²⁴¹ Kürkçüoğlu, 1976: 25.

²⁴² Karaosmanoğlu, 1983: 163.

supported the Arabs and in particular, the PLO continued through and beyond the bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel.²⁴⁴

From the Turkish point of view, peace in the Middle East can only be reestablished when Israel would evacuate the Arab lands which was invaded in 1967 and when the Palestinians would gain the right of establishing their own state. Turkey also emphasized that no lasting settlement can be reached without the participation of the legitimate representative of the Palestinians in the negotiations. Also the settlement of the Arab- Israeli conflict would eliminate most of the conditions, which would lead to an increase in the Soviet influence in the Middle East.²⁴⁵ So to sum up, on the Palestinian issue Turkey believed that the legitimate right of the Palestinians, which was the right of establishing their own state, should be recognized. In parallel with the resolution adopted on 26-27 October 1974 by the Arab Summit held in Rabat, Turkey recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the “legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in all liberated Palestinian territory” in 1976²⁴⁶ and on August 1979 Turkey let the PLO open an office in Ankara.

In the Palestinian conflict, Turkey had a different position from the US and Israel. Turkey had rather closer position to the Western European position. From the Turkish perspective, the Palestinian conflict was a very important cause of instability in the Middle East. So Turkey supported the establishment of an independent State of Palestine and considered the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians.

²⁴³ Yavuz, 1991: 18.

²⁴⁴ Gürkan, 1993:104.

²⁴⁵ Karaosmanoğlu, 1983: 175.

²⁴⁶ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1974:26813. Cited from Kürkcüoğlu, 1987: 19.

It can be said that if the Arab-Israeli talks would be successful, then Turkey and Israel would have more developed relations.²⁴⁷

Despite the US efforts to establish consensus between the parties to the conflict, Israel did not recognize the existence of the PLO, the efforts of the US became unsuccessful. On 22 November 1974, the UN recognized the right of “self-determination”, national independence and the right of sovereignty of the Palestinians and then the PLO acquired the observer status at the UN. With the decision of UN, the PLO became an independent entity and a legal party in the Middle East Peace Talks. After 1974, the PLO had initiatives towards being recognized by international entities. In the following years, the efforts of the US to establish peace continued and on 17 September 1978, Camp David Agreement was signed between Egypt and Israel in the US. The agreement foresaw to make arrangements in Egypt-Israel relations and to settle the Palestinian conflict. According to the agreement, Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Palestine would solve the conflict through three leveled negotiations. First level was to have elections in Western Sharia and Gazza for an autonomous administration, which would replace the Military Administration of Israel for five years. Second level was with the governance of autonomous administration for five years period would begin and the administration would establish its own police organization and the third level was after the beginning of the transition period at most in three years in which Egypt, Israel and Jordan would begin negotiations in order to determine the latest status of the Western Sharia and Gazza. So with this agreement a solution for the

²⁴⁷ Karaosmanoğlu, 1992: 4-5.

Palestinian conflict was recommended. But through the negotiations parties could not reach any solution.²⁴⁸

On 15 November 1988, Independent State of Palestine was established by Yasser Arafat and he declared that they accept the UN Resolution of 242 and they would give up engaging in terrorist activities. He also declared that they recognize the existence of Israel on the Palestinian lands. Even the Palestine did not have sovereign lands, the Arab states recognized the State of Palestine but the existence of Palestine was rejected by Israel. As mentioned above, Turkey was also among the first states to recognize Palestine. After these developments, the US began contacts with the PLO, but for a long time in peace talks the parties to the conflict did not reach any solution.²⁴⁹

4.3. Turkish-Israeli Relations up to the 1980s

After the mid-1960s and onward, Turkish- Arab relations and ties began to develop especially in political, economic and cultural fields. By the enactment of the "Jerusalem Law" in Israel on 30 July 1980, Israeli Parliament Knesset declared that; "Jerusalem (El Kuds) was united and it was to be the permanent capital of Israel". The law proposal was submitted by a member of Knesset; Guela Cohen, and accepted by 69 to 15 against votes with 3 abstentions.²⁵⁰ At the beginning of July 1980, before the formal enactment of the law, Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel met the ambassadors of the Islamic countries and criticised Israel's actions as being against

²⁴⁸ Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını, 1997: 89-90.

²⁴⁹ Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını, 1997: 91.

²⁵⁰ For the text of the "Basic Law"/"Jerusalem Law" see Middle East Review, Spring 1981:71.

international law and justice. On the other hand, the partner of the coalition government National Salvation Party also applied pressure to the prime minister to react severely against Israel on this event.²⁵¹

The National Salvation Party and Republican People's Party accused Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hayrettin Erkmen of being pro-Israeli and not reacting against Israel. The debate on this subject continued in the Turkish Parliament until 28 August decision with 230 to 2 votes and with 180 abstentions. H.Erkman was withdrawn from his position.²⁵² This event shows the power and influence of domestic dynamics on Turkish Foreign Policy, especially in relation to Middle East issues. The Arab States also applied pressure to Turkey to cut off its relations with Israel. In response to both internal and external pressures, Turkey officially considered the Israeli Law as a *fait accompli* and requested repeal from Israel.

Turkey reacted swiftly against this law, and refused to recognize the new capital of Israel and on 28 August 1980, the closure of the Turkish Consulate General in Jerusalem was announced by Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²⁵³ In October, Turkey began to take further measures by substantially diminishing its diplomatic relations with Israel. On 2 December 1980, in order to acquire internal and external credibility, Turkish Military regime (military take over that took place on 12 September 1980) decided to further diminish its relations with Israel and Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that "Turkey decided to limit its relations with Israel and mutually reduced the level of representation" because "Israel would not

²⁵¹ Yavuz, 1991:53-54.

²⁵² Dodd, 1983:20-21.

²⁵³ Kürkçüoğlu, 1987:20.

retreat from its insurgent policy regarding the legal status of Jerusalem".²⁵⁴ As the military coup faced reactions from the West for violating the democracy, it turned towards the Middle East Islamic States to acquire support.

When the decision to close the Turkish General Consulate in Jerusalem was taken, reactions against this decision increased in Turkey. Hasan Esat Işık who was the former and experienced foreign and defence minister of Turkey also opposed this decision and considered Turkish latest decision as a diplomatic and political mistake. According to H.E. Işık, 20 August 1980 UN Security Council Resolution 478 called the member states to withdraw their diplomatic missions from Jerusalem. But the history of Turkish Consulate in Jerusalem went back to the Ottoman Empire period and therefore was not accredited to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. So the Turkish Consulate in Jerusalem did not have a diplomatic mission and legally there was no reason to close the consulate.²⁵⁵ Also Israeli declaration violated the resolutions of the UN Security Council concerning the partition of Palestine between Arabs and Jews on 1947 and foresaw an international status for Jerusalem; a *corpus seperatum*-existence of separate entities.

On 14 December 1981 Israel annexed the Golan Heights, which gave rise to fierce reactions from the Islamic world. Also the UN Security Council rejected the Israeli actions as being against international law.²⁵⁶ Along with the majority, in order to protest Israel's annexation and occupation of Arab territories the Golan Heights, Turkey protested Israel and downgraded its representation level to Second Secretary, but kept its embassy in Tel Aviv. This annexation turned Turkish public opinion

²⁵⁴ Yavuz, 1991:54.

²⁵⁵ Gruen, 1996:121.

²⁵⁶ Armaoğlu, 1991:7.

against Israel and it was defined as an aggressor state.²⁵⁷ Turkish policy of calling back all of its diplomats but leaving only the Second Secretary at the embassy was considered as "freezing the relations". On the other hand with Israel's enactment of "Jerusalem Law", the UN and the US also condemned the action of Knesset and Latin American Catholic countries decided to move their embassies from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv.²⁵⁸

During this period it can be said that, cultural relations between Turkey and Israel were cut off and commercial relations were downgraded. When Turkey downgraded its representation level in Israel at the beginning, in contrast with most of the Western States that changed the places of their embassies to Jerusalem, Turkish embassy remained in Tel Aviv.²⁵⁹ Turkey also began to criticise Israeli policies at the UN and at other international organisations. So the new Turkish Foreign Policy towards Israel led to a new period in Turkish-Israeli relations.

Israel began to seek solutions in order to persuade Turkey to change its decision of downgrading relations with Israel by using its connections and Jewish lobby in the U.S. After a short while, in January 1981, sixty-nine American senators sent a letter to the Turkish Embassy in Washington declaring that Turkish recent decision might also have negative impacts on Turkish-American relations. The letter caused many reactions in Turkey and Turkish Embassy in Tel Aviv indicated its reaction by refusing to issue visas to an Israeli sports team. Then, American Ambassador in Turkey informed Turkish Government about the possible

²⁵⁷ Hubel, 1987:110. But according to N.Tavlas; at the UN General Council voting, Turkey abstained in protesting Israeli forces' annexation of the Golan Heights. See Tavlas, 1994:16.

²⁵⁸ Gruen, 1996:121.

²⁵⁹ Ortadođu ve Geleceđi, 1992:187.

consequences of breaking diplomatic relations with Israel.²⁶⁰ Also at the same period under the influence of Jewish and Greek lobbies, the American Congress decided not to pay 100 million dollars financial support to Turkey in order to again indicate to Turkey the consequences of its decision. As a result of the US pressure, on 14 February 1982 Turkish President Kenan Evren visited Jewish religious leader David Aseo in Turkey.

Turkish decision to downgrade Turkish-Israeli relations was grounded on two reasons which were: the need to maintain Islamic and Arab State's support in the Cyprus issue and the need to provide economic support from the Islamic and Arab States. Also according to H.Yavuz, there was a dialectical relation between the Arab State's policies toward Cyprus and Turkey's position on the PLO's status. According to H.Yavuz the factors that led Turkey to establish closer ties with the Arab States were: Turkish need for support in the Cyprus issue, Turkish need of Arab oil resources and Turkish public opinion against Israel, particularly international criticism against Israel.²⁶¹ When Turkey allowed the PLO to open an office in Ankara in October 1979, in the same year Turkish Federated State of Cyprus acquired the observer status at the Organization of Islamic Countries and a resolution, which entitled equal status to Turkish Cypriots as the Greek Cypriots in international forums, was established.²⁶² As Turkey tried to strengthen its ties with the Arab World, in order to maintain support for the Cyprus issue, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister, İlder Türkmen visited the Arab States.²⁶³ When Turkey recognized the State of

²⁶⁰ Spain, 1986:66.

²⁶¹ Yavuz; Khan Mujeeb R., Fall 1992:4.

²⁶² Yavuz, 1991:57.

²⁶³ Aydın Tarihi, 1981:245.

Palestine, as the first state in the Western World, Israel expressed its disappointment in Turkey.

Turkish recognition of the PLO and its allowance to them for opening an office in Ankara did not mean that the period was with lack of problems. When Israel realized that Turkey was establishing closer ties with the Arab States and losing the western support, its MOSSAD offered to assist Turkey to stop the terrorist activities of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), which had assassinated many Turkish diplomats and which was financed by Libya and members trained at the Palestinian camps. But in order to avoid harming Turkish-Arab relations, Turkey refused the Israeli offer for cooperation. After a while, when Turkey was informed by the assistance of MOSSAD, about Armenian, Kurdish and left oriented terrorists which were trained at the PLO camps, then Turkey began to cooperate with Israel. Israel kept on providing information to Turkey about the actions of terrorists and during the Lebanon crisis, Israel bombed the ASALA camp and killed the leader of ASALA.²⁶⁴ In response to this collaboration, when the decision of considering 1982 intervention of Israel as genocide in U.N. was voted, Turkey abstained from voting. Even if that collaboration against PLO had not taken place, it was impossible for Turkey to cut its relations with Israel as Turkey was acquiring military and financial aid from the US.²⁶⁵

One of the reasons of Turkey's decision of downgrading its relations with Israel was the suffering of the Turkish economy from the shortages of foreign currency and oil during 1978 and 1981. After the fall of Shah in 1978, there was a sudden rise in international oil prices, which caused many hardships in Turkish daily

life. By the end of 1979, import rates were greater than the export rates and the US arms embargo and the absence of economic assistance had a severe pressure on Turkey. The US arms embargo was lifted on 26 September 1978, but the first part of the US assistance did not arrive until May 1979. During economic crisis in 1979 and in the winter, schools and hospitals were closed due to scarcity in oil imports in Turkey. Turkish oil exports decreased, but the cost of imported oil was 30 percent higher than the total value of Turkish exports.²⁶⁶ So the 1980 military government of Bülent Ulusu tried to provide enough oil in order to prevent another disastrous winter and requested assistance from Saudi Arabia. For a short while, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs İlder Türkmen announced that Saudi Arabia had positively responded to Turkish demand and would provide oil to Turkey. In August 1980, Saudi Arabia sent two million tons of oil with 75 million dollars economic aid. But in return, Saudi Arabia applied heavy pressures on Turkey to downgrade its relations with Israel. Besides Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya and the OIC Secretariat also applied pressure on Turkey to end its relations with Israel.²⁶⁷

According to G.Gruen, the Saudi economic aid of 250 million dollars was sent to Turkey on 2 December and at the same date, Turkey declared that it would downgrade its relations with Israel.²⁶⁸ After the Turkish declaration, in 1980-1981 Turkish exports to the Middle East had risen to 40.3 percent of its total export, in contrast with 0.4 percent export rate to Israel and by 1982, Turkish export rate to the Middle East increased from 40.3 to 44.2 percent. It can be said that, Turkish leaders

²⁶⁴ For more information, see: Tavlaş, 1995.

²⁶⁵ Yavuz, 1991:57.

²⁶⁶ Yavuz; Khan, 1992:7.

²⁶⁷ Yavuz, 1991:57.

²⁶⁸ Gruen, 1996:38.

considered the Middle East Islamic States as economic alternatives to Israel.²⁶⁹ In order to take advantage of the booming economies of the oil producing states and reduce the foreign trade deficit, Turkey expanded economic ties with the Arab and Islamic States. The determinants of Turkish-Israeli relations have varied, as Turkey has tried hard to overcome its economic problems and balance its national interests between the intensive opposing pressures of the western and Arab States.

In the middle of the 1980s, Turkish-Israeli trade relations improved and Turkish public opinion was also turning in favour of Israel. On September 1986, Israel sent an ambassador to Ankara and upgraded the representation level to *charge d'affaires*. But with the emergence of *Intifada* (Palestinian uprising), Turkish policy with regard to Israel and Palestine was again reversed. The media showed the brutal attacks of Israeli armed forces to innocent Palestinians. As a result of these scenes, Turkish public opinion turned in favor of the Palestinians. Therefore in the middle of the 1980s with the emergence of *Intifada* the relations between Israel and Turkey again deteriorated.²⁷⁰

Few years later, with the decline in Arab economic wealth and an increase of anti-secular movements in Turkey, Turkey decided to upgrade its relations with Israel by sending a senior experienced Turkish diplomat Ekrem Güvendiren to the head of legation in Tel Aviv in September 1986. Although, this diplomat was sent as *charge d'affaires*, he had an ambassadorial position in Ankara.²⁷¹ Then, Israel upgraded its relation by appointing Yehudo Milo to Ankara. From 1986 onward, Turkish-Israeli relations again began to improve. In 1988 at the UN voting, Turkey voted against an

²⁶⁹ Yavuz, 1991:56.

²⁷⁰ Aras, 1997: 143.

²⁷¹ Yavuz, 1991:58.

Arab resolution that called for the rejection of Israeli diplomatic credentials at the UN. Turkish-Israeli trade increased from 29 million dollars in 1986 to 140 million dollars in 1990. The reason behind this development in Turkish-Israeli relations was the internal sources of the US foreign policy and the influence of the Jewish lobby in the US Congress, which provided support for Turkey through the strong Jewish lobby against the Greek and the Armenian lobbies.²⁷² Turkey again upgraded its diplomatic representation level in Israel to the full ambassadorial position on 19 December 1991 and at the same date the representation level of the PLO was upgraded to the same level.²⁷³ Agreements between Turkey and Israel in the fields of culture, tourism, education, technical and science were signed in 1992 and these agreements promoted cooperation in Turkish-Israeli relations.²⁷⁴ In November 1993, Mutual Commercial and Technical Cooperation agreement was signed between Turkey and Israel. In 1994, collaboration between Israel and Turkey developed more, especially in military, economic and security fields. But also, in order to balance its relations in the Middle East, Turkey had to continue its relations with the Arab States without neglecting the pressure of Western States.²⁷⁵

In 1995, another agreement was signed between Turkey and Israel, which provided opportunities especially for Turkey to use and acquire know-how of the modern technological devices and acquiring opportunities of training in the field of agriculture. Besides, unlike Iraq and Syria, Israel declared its open support for the

²⁷² Yavuz, Khan, 1992:10.

²⁷³ Gürkan, 1993:107.

²⁷⁴ Aykan, 1999: 70.

²⁷⁵ Aykan, 1999:55.

GAP Project. On March 1996, Free Trade Agreement was signed between Israel and Turkey, which increased the mutual trade by 50 percent.²⁷⁶

Turkey demanded to establish mutual strategic and intelligence cooperation with Israel, especially with regard to PKK. On 18 February 1996, military cooperation agreement was signed between Turkey and Israel covertly and the agreement was based on cooperation in the fields of strategy and intelligence. But Arab and Islamic States reacted to this agreement by proclaiming that this agreement threatened their security. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that, this agreement had only one aim, which was training and incompliance with this, in the middle of April, mutual training begun in Turkey.²⁷⁷ By the assistance of the Israeli intelligence, Turkey was informed about the activities of PKK in Bekaa Valley. Apart from supporting Turkey against PKK, Israel also supported Turkey and provided information about Hizbollah and Hamas organizations, which were mainly supported by Syria.²⁷⁸

In 1996-1997 period, Turkish-Israeli relations reached its peak (especially with the 1996 Military Agreement) and developments in bilateral relations were directly related with the security issue. Within this framework, it can be said that after the Cold War period, Turkish national security began to be threatened by the Middle East Arab States, especially through the support they gave to terrorist organizations in Turkey. After the Cold War, the common threats, which Israel and Turkey faced in the Middle East were terrorism, increase in fanatic so called Islamic trends and dissemination of the Weapons of Mass Destruction. Therefore, in order to maintain balance and

²⁷⁶ Aykan, 1999:68-70.

²⁷⁷ Aras, 1997:151

²⁷⁸ Aykan, 1999:69.

stability in the region, Turkey developed its relations with Israel. There were also other common factors with Israel, such as being a non-Arab State, being a democratic and secular state. The existence of the U.S. and the Western support behind Israel and Turkey's isolation from the Islamic World, led Turkey to establish closer ties with Israel. On the other hand, Turkish-Israeli-American cooperation also led to the emergence of counter-alliances. In the period of 1997-1998, Iraq and Syria began to support Radical Islamic groups and Hizbollah, in addition to PKK, which subverted against the Turkish government.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁹ Aykan, 1999:103-104.

CONCLUSION

After the establishment of Israel, the balance of power changed in the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict began. In this context, Turkey had to pursue a balancing policy in the region in order to establish peace and stability. During the first years of Israel's establishment, Turkey was rather hesitant towards Israel, because at the beginning Israel was neutral and had close relations with the Soviet Union. But after Israel persuaded Turkey that it was non-communist, Turkey recognized the State of Israel on 9 March 1950 as *de jure* and became the first Muslim State that recognized Israel.

Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkey pursued pro-western policy. Especially after becoming a NATO member in 1952, Turkish foreign policy was even more integrated with the Western States. There was pressure from the western allies to support Israel as a regional power. This was the main reason behind Turkey's recognition of Israel. On the other hand, from Israel's point of view, as it was surrounded by hostile neighbours, Turkey's support was indispensable and desperately needed. But during this period, Turkey was severely criticised by the Arab states for recognising Israel, as the Arab states rejected the establishment of Israel in Palestinian territories. Thus, Arab-Israeli conflict began and relations between the Arab states and Israel were strained. In Arab-Israeli conflict, Turkey preferred to remain neutral.

Turkish-Israeli relations were developing upto 1956. But, when Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula in 1956, Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Tel-Aviv and downgraded its representation level. With this decision Turkey aimed to calm down the reactions of the Arab states, but Turkish efforts were all invain. So in 1958 Turkey and Israel concluded the Peripheral Pact, which led both states to collaborate in the fields of intelligence and military as well as in commerce and science. The pact was again denounced by the Arab states as in the past.

In the Cyprus issue of 1965, Turkey was isolated by NATO members and especially by the U.S. Therefore Turkey began to reassess its foreign policy towards the west. As a result of this reassessments, Turkey decided to make the necessary ammendments in its foreign policy, which were; to become a member and an active player of the O.I.C., increase the economic relations with the Arab States in order to acquire financial support, maintain international support for the Cyprus issue and not to act always in parallel with the U.S. Therefore in the middle of 1960s, Turkey and the Arab States became closer and in order to acquire Arab economic and political support for Turkish Cypriots in 1969, Turkey joined the O.I.C as an observer. But as Turkey and the Arab states could not reach a consensus and eliminate the differences between them, the expected outcome could not be achieved. During the Cyprus issue in the beginning, Israel remained neutral but had a dominant pro-Turkish status in its policies. Then after Turkey's request for Israeli assistance, Israel promised to support Turkey through its press, lobby and loans. Despite this collaboration between Turkey and Israel, Turkey tried to keep its relations with Israel in secrecy in order not to lose the Arab support.

After the middle of 1960s, Turkish-Arab relations began to develop especially in the fields of economy, politics and culture. When Israeli Parliament Knesset declared Jerusalem as Israel's permanent capital on 30 July 1980, by the enactment of Jerusalem Law, Turkey refused to recognize the new capital of Israel. On 28 August 1980, Turkish Consulate General in Jerusalem was closed. On 14 December 1981, Israel annexed the Golan Heights and Turkey with the Islamic states and the U.N. Security Council rejected Israeli action as being against the international law. Then, Turkey downgraded its representation to the level of the Second Secretary, but kept its embassy in Tel Aviv. Besides, genuinely considering Israel's action as against the international law, the other reasons behind Turkey's action was to maintain Islamic support in the Cyprus issue and the necessity to provide economic support from the Islamic states.

In response to MOSSAD's offer for assistance and collaboration to end the terrorist activities of the ASALA and to follow Armenian, Kurdish and left oriented terrorists, which were trained at the PLO camps, Turkey decided to cooperate with Israel. On September 1986, Israel sent an ambassador to Ankara and upgraded the representation level to *charge d'affaires* and with the decline in Arab economic wealth and an increase of anti-secular movements in Turkey, Turkey decided to upgrade its relations with Israel by sending a diplomat to Tel-Aviv on September 1986. Although the Turkish diplomat was sent as *charge d'affaires*, he had an ambassadorial position in Ankara. From 1986 onward, Turkish-Israeli relations again began to develop. On 19 December 1991, Turkey upgraded its diplomatic

representation level in Israel to the full ambassadorial level. In the years 1993 and 1995, agreements were concluded between Turkey and Israel in the fields of technology, commerce and agriculture. On 18 February 1996 as a result of the Turkish demand for establishing a mutual strategic and intelligence cooperation with Israel, with regard to PKK, the military cooperation agreement was signed between Turkey and Israel in secrecy and with this agreement as both states collaborated against PKK, Hizbollah and Hamas, Turkish-Israeli relations reached its peak. But the Arab states condemned this collaboration.

In spite of its ups and downs, Turkish relations with Israel continued without any cessations. Relations were never cut off. But, Turkey preferred to pursue its Israeli policy covertly in order not to lose the support of the Arab States. While it maintained its collaboration with Israel on defence, intelligence and security issues. During 1948-1980, Turkish Israeli relations developed mostly in the fields of defence, economy, agriculture, education and culture. So it can be said that diplomatic relations with Israel began to develop after the 1990s. Therefore, during the analysis of the period between 1948-1980, while the relations were established mostly in secrecy, overt evidences of it were very scarce.

Isolation of Israel in the region by the Arab States forced Israel to seek an ally in the Middle East in order to safeguard its security and Turkey was the most possible ally. As both states had more common factors when compared to other states in the region, such as being a democratic and secular state, being non-Arab and pursuing west-oriented policies as well as being supported by the U.S. and the other Western States. The good relations were considered to be beneficial for each state in order to

maintain stability in the Middle East. But beside these developments during 1948-1980, Turkey also tried to keep good relations with the Arab States, for example Turkey recognized the PLO as the first western state and became a member of the O.I.C. In conformity with Turkey's historical experience with both the Arab States and Israel (with Jews), Turkey always tried to keep in balance its relations with these Middle East powers, but according to the domestic or international circumstances, sometimes more preponderance was given to one side.

After the conclusion of the Defence Industrial Cooperation Agreement between Turkey and Israel, relations flourished rapidly. Current close relations with Israel can be focused around four fundamental topics such as-water issue; prospective Israeli (agricultural) investments at GAP. Cooperation in defence and modernization, the process of Middle East peace and stability, and solution of the Palestine problem, especially after the Camp David talks. Some observers think Turkey could take a more active role in seeking solutions and could mediate between Palestine and Israel. Recent frequent visits of Israel and Turkish statemen to Turkey and Israel also give indication of a more intense relations between the two countries in future.

This study shows that Turkish-Israeli relations were pursued under the shadow of Arab states although, Turkish-Israeli close ties were considered by the U.S. as one of the important factors of keeping peace and stability in the Middle East, they could not be openly declared and developed during the period under the scrutiny in this study.

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APPENDIX

**U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 181
(PARTITION PLAN)**

**UN General Assembly Resolution 181
(Partition Plan)**

November 29, 1947

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 called for the partition of the British-ruled Palestine Mandate into a Jewish state and an Arab state. It was approved on November 29, 1947 with 33 votes in favor, 13 against, 10 abstentions and one absent (see list at end of document).

The resolution was accepted by the Jews in Palestine, yet rejected by the Arabs in Palestine and the Arab states.

Text:

The General Assembly,

Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a Special Committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future Government of Palestine at the second regular session;

Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and

Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364) (1) including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee,

Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;

Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948;

Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future Government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;

Requests that

The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation;

The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;

The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;

The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan;
Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect;

Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and

Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission referred to in Part 1, Section B, Paragraph I below, on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Commission by the General Assembly.*

The General Assembly,

Authorizes the Secretary-General to draw from the Working Capital Fund a sum not to exceed 2,000,000 dollars for the purposes set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on the future government of Palestine.

PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION

Part I. - Future Constitution and Government of Palestine

A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE

The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the mandate and to evacuate each area. The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.

Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in Part III of this Plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in Parts II and III below.

The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period.

B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE

A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of each of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible.

The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission, which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under

the guidance of the Security Council. The mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent coordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer areas which have been evacuated. In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required. The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly.

On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless, the boundaries as described in Part II of this Plan are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary.

The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organizations of the Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission. If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members of the United Nations.

Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during the transitional period the Provisional Councils of Government, acting under the Commission, shall have full authority in the areas under their control including authority over matters of immigration and land regulation.

The Provisional Council of Government of each State, acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State's independence.

The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of Government of both the Arab and Jewish States, after their formation, to proceed to the establishment of administrative organs of government, central and local.

The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within the shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes.

This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, be under the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general political and military control, including the choice of the militia's High Command, shall be exercised by the Commission.

The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, not later than two months after the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines.

The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by the Commission. Qualified voters for each State for this election shall be persons over eighteen years of age who are (a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State; and (b) Arabs and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State. Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States respectively.

Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies.

During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave of the Commission.

The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The Constitutions of the States shall embody Chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C below and include, inter alia, provisions for:

Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive body responsible to the legislature;
Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;
Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations;
Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association;
Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its borders.

The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co-operation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below.

During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces. The Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions. Similarly the mandatory Power shall co-operate with the Commission in the execution of its functions.

With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, the whole administration shall be in the charge of the Provisional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, acting under the Commission, there shall be a progressive transfer, from the mandatory Power to the Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of government, including that of maintaining law and order

in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power have been withdrawn.

The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the General Assembly and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue.

The measures taken by the Commission, within the recommendations of the General Assembly, shall become immediately effective unless the Commission has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council.

The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the Security Council.

The Commission shall make its final report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously.

C. DECLARATION

A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the Provisional Government of each proposed State before independence. It shall contain, inter alia, the following clauses:

General Provision

The stipulations contained in the Declaration are recognized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

Chapter I: Holy Places, Religious Buildings and Sites
Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit, and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizen of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.

Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum.

Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious, building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Government may carry it out itself at the expense of the community or community concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the State. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.

The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine whether the provisions of the Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and the religious rights appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and respected, and to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall receive full co-operation and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the State.

Chapter 2: Religious and Minority Rights

Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all.

No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex.

All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.

Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.

The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions. The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the State of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.(3)

No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State)(4) shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be said previous to dispossession.

Chapter 3: Citizenship, International Conventions and Financial Obligations

1. Citizenship

Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights. Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt, within one year from the date of recognition of independence of the State in which they reside, for citizenship of the other State, providing that no Arab residing in the area of the proposed Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Jewish State and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Arab State. The exercise of this right of option

will be taken to include the wives and children under eighteen years of age of persons so opting.

Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that State, but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside.

2. International conventions

The State shall be bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which Palestine has become a party. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by the State throughout the period for which they were concluded.

Any dispute about the applicability and continued validity of international conventions or treaties signed or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf of Palestine shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

3. Financial obligations

The State shall respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on behalf of Palestine by the mandatory Power during the exercise of the Mandate and recognized by the State. This provision includes the right of public servants to pensions, compensation or gratuities.

These obligations shall be fulfilled through participation in the Joint Economic Board in respect of those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and individually in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable between, the States.

A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic Board, and composed of one member appointed by the United Nations, one representative of the United Kingdom and one representative of the State concerned, should be established. Any dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respecting claims not recognized by the latter should be referred to that Court.

Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of Palestine prior to the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be valid according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession-holders and the State.

Chapter 4: Miscellaneous Provisions

The provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of the declaration shall be under the guarantee of the United Nations, and no modifications shall be made in them without the assent of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Any Member of the United Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the General Assembly any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the General Assembly may thereupon make such recommendations as it may deem proper in the circumstances.

Any dispute relating to the application or interpretation of this declaration shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

D. ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT

The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter into an undertaking with respect to Economic Union and Transit. This undertaking shall be drafted by the Commission provided for in section B, paragraph 1, utilizing to the greatest possible extent the advice and cooperation of representative organizations and bodies from each of the proposed States. It shall contain provisions to establish the Economic Union of Palestine and provide for other matters of common interest. If by 1 April 1948 the Provisional Councils of Government have not entered into the undertaking, the undertaking shall be put into force by the Commission.

The Economic Union of Palestine

The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall be:

A customs union;

A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange rate;

Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis of railways inter-State highways; postal, telephone and telegraphic services and ports and airports involved in international trade and commerce;

Joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation; Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a non-discriminatory basis to water and power facilities.

There shall be established a Joint Economic Board, which shall consist of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The foreign members shall be appointed in the first instance for a term of three years; they shall serve as individuals and not as representatives of States.

The functions of the Joint Economic Board shall be to implement either directly or by delegation the measures necessary to realize the objectives of the Economic Union. It shall have all powers of organization and administration necessary to fulfil its functions.

The States shall bind themselves to put into effect the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The Board's decisions shall be taken by a majority vote. In the event of failure of a State to take the necessary action the Board may, by a vote of six members, decide to withhold an appropriate portion of the part of the customs revenue to which the State in question is entitled under the Economic Union. Should the State persist in its failure to cooperate, the Board may decide by a simple majority vote upon such further sanctions, including disposition of funds which it has withheld, as it may deem appropriate.

In relation to economic development, the functions of the Board shall be planning, investigation and encouragement of joint development projects, but it shall not undertake such projects except with the assent of both States and the City of Jerusalem, in the event that Jerusalem is directly involved in the development project.

In regard to the joint currency system, the currencies circulating in the two States and the City of Jerusalem shall be issued under the authority of the Joint Economic Board, which shall be the sole issuing authority and which shall determine the reserves to be held against such currencies.

So far as is consistent with paragraph 2(b) above, each State may operate its own central bank, control its own fiscal and credit policy, its foreign exchange receipts and expenditures, the grant of import licences, and may conduct international financial operations on its own

faith and credit. During the first two years after the termination of the Mandate, the Joint Economic Board shall have the authority to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that - to the extent that the total foreign exchange revenues of the two States from the export of goods and services permit, and provided that each State takes appropriate measures to conserve its own foreign exchange resources - each State shall have available, in any twelve months' period, foreign exchange sufficient to assure the supply of quantities of imported goods and services for consumption in its territory equivalent to the quantities of such goods and services consumed in that territory in the twelve months' period ending 31 December 1947.

All economic authority not specifically vested in the Joint Economic Board is reserved to each State.

There shall be a common customs tariff with complete freedom of trade between the States, and between the States and the City of Jerusalem.

The tariff schedules shall be drawn up by a Tariff Commission, consisting of representatives of each of the States in equal numbers, and shall be submitted to the Joint Economic Board for approval by a majority vote. In case of disagreement in the Tariff Commission, the Joint Economic Board shall arbitrate the points of difference. In the event that the Tariff Commission fails to draw up any schedule by a date to be fixed, the Joint Economic Board shall determine the tariff schedule.

The following items shall be a first charge on the customs and other common revenue of the Joint Economic Board:

The expenses of the customs service and of the operation of the joint services;
The administrative expenses of the Joint Economic Board;
The financial obligations of the Administration of Palestine, consisting of:
The service of the outstanding public debt;
The cost of superannuation benefits, now being paid or falling due in the future, in accordance with the rules and to the extent established by paragraph 3 of chapter 3 above.

After these obligations have been met in full, the surplus revenue from the customs and other common services shall be divided in the following manner: not less than 5 per cent and not more than 10 per cent to the

City of Jerusalem; the residue shall be allocated to each State by the Joint Economic Board equitably, with the objective of maintaining a sufficient and suitable level of government and social services in each State, except that the share of either State shall not exceed the amount of that State's contribution to the revenues of the Economic Union by more than approximately four million pounds in any year. The amount granted may be adjusted by the Board according to the price level in relation to the prices prevailing at the time of the establishment of the Union. After five years, the principles of the distribution of the joint revenue may be revised by the Joint Economic Board on a basis of equity.

All international conventions and treaties affecting customs tariff rates, and those communications services under the jurisdiction of the Joint Economic Board, shall be entered into by both States. In these matters, the two States shall be bound to act in accordance with the majority of the Joint Economic Board.

The Joint Economic Board shall endeavour to secure for Palestine's exports fair and equal access to world markets.

All enterprises operated by the Joint Economic Board shall pay fair wages on a uniform basis.
Freedom of Transit and Visit

The undertaking shall contain provisions preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents or citizens of both States and of the City of Jerusalem, subject to security considerations; provided that each State and the City shall control residence within its borders.

Termination, Modification and Interpretation of the Undertaking

The undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall remain in force for a period of ten years. It shall continue in force until notice of termination, to take effect two years thereafter, is given by either of the parties.

During the initial ten-year period, the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom may not be modified except by consent of both parties and with the approval of the General Assembly.

Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court Of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

E. ASSETS

The movable assets of the Administration of Palestine shall be allocated to the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem on an equitable basis. Allocations should be made by the United Nations Commission referred to iii section B, paragraph 1, above. Immovable assets shall become the property of the government of the territory in which they are situated.

During the period between the appointment of the United Nations Commission and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power shall, except in respect of ordinary operations, consult with the Commission on any measure which it may contemplate involving the liquidation, disposal or encumbering of the assets of the Palestine Government, such as the accumulated treasury surplus, the proceeds of Government bond issues, State lands or any other asset.

F. ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this plan has become effective and the declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this plan, have been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations in accordance with article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Part II. - Boundaries

A. THE ARAB STATE

The area of the Arab State in Western Galilee is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and on the north by the frontier of the Lebanon from Ras en Naqura to a point north of Saliha. From there the boundary proceeds southwards, leaving the built-up area of Saliha in the Arab State, to join the southernmost point of this village. There it follows the western boundary line of the villages of 'Alma, Rihaniya and Teitaba, thence following the northern boundary line of Meirun village to join the Acre-Safad Sub-District boundary line. It follows this line to a point west of Es Sammu'i village

and joins it again at the northernmost point of Farradiya. Thence it follows the sub-district boundary line to the Acre-Safad main road. From here it follows the western boundary of Kafr-I'nan village until it reaches the Tiberias-Acre Sub-District boundary line, passing to the west of the junction of the Acre-Safad and Lubiya-Kafr-I'nan roads. From the south-west corner of Kafr-I'nan village the boundary line follows the western boundary of the Tiberias Sub-District to a point close to the boundary line between the villages of Maghar and 'Eilabun, thence bulging out to the west to include as much of the eastern part of the plain of Battuf as is necessary for the reservoir proposed by the Jewish Agency for the irrigation of lands to the south and east.

The boundary rejoins the Tiberias Sub-District boundary at a point on the Nazareth-Tiberias road south-east of the built-up area of Tur'an; thence it runs southwards, at first following the sub-district boundary and then passing between the Kadoorie Agricultural School and Mount Tabor, to a point due south at the base of Mount Tabor. From here it runs due west, parallel to the horizontal grid line 230, to the north-east corner of the village lands of Tel Adashim. It then runs to the northwest corner of these lands, whence it turns south and west so as to include in the Arab State the sources of the Nazareth water supply in Yafa village. On reaching Ginneiger it follows the eastern, northern and western boundaries of the lands of this village to their south-west corner, whence it proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Haifa-Afula railway on the boundary between the villages of Sarid and El-Mujeidil. This is the point of intersection. The south-western boundary of the area of the Arab State in Galilee takes a line from this point, passing northwards along the eastern boundaries of Sarid and Gevat to the north-eastern corner of Nahalal, proceeding thence across the land of Kefar ha Horesh to a central point on the southern boundary of the village of 'Ilut, thence westwards along that village boundary to the eastern boundary of Beit Lahm, thence northwards and north-eastwards along its western boundary to the north-eastern corner of Waldheim and thence north-westwards across the village lands of Shafa 'Amr to the southeastern corner of Ramat Yohanan. From here it runs due north-north-east to a point on the Shafa 'Amr-Haifa road, west of its junction with the road of I'billin. From there it proceeds north-east to a point on the southern boundary of I'billin situated to the west of the I'billin-Birwa road. Thence along that boundary to its westernmost point, whence it turns to the north, follows across the village land of Tamra to the north-westernmost

corner and along the western boundary of Julis until it reaches the Acre-Safad road. It then runs westwards along the southern side of the Safad-Acre road to the Galilee-Haifa District boundary, from which point it follows that boundary to the sea.

The boundary of the hill country of Samaria and Judea starts on the Jordan River at the Wadi Malih south-east of Beisan and runs due west to meet the Beisan-Jericho road and then follows the western side of that road in a north-westerly direction to the junction of the boundaries of the Sub-Districts of Beisan, Nablus, and Jenin. From that point it follows the Nablus-Jenin sub-District boundary westwards for a distance of about three kilometres and then turns north-westwards, passing to the east of the built-up areas of the villages of Jalbun and Faqu'a, to the boundary of the Sub-Districts of Jenin and Beisan at a point northeast of Nuris. Thence it proceeds first northwestwards to a point due north of the built-up area of Zie'in and then westwards to the Afula-Jenin railway, thence north-westwards along the District boundary line to the point of intersection on the Hejaz railway. From here the boundary runs southwestwards, including the built-up area and some of the land of the village of Kh. Lid in the Arab State to cross the Haifa-Jenin road at a point on the district boundary between Haifa and Samaria west of El-Mansi. It follows this boundary to the southernmost point of the village of El-Buteimat. From here it follows the northern and eastern boundaries of the village of Ar'ara rejoining the Haifa-Samaria district boundary at Wadi 'Ara, and thence proceeding south-south-westwards in an approximately straight line joining up with the western boundary of Qaqun to a point east of the railway line on the eastern boundary of Qaqun village. From here it runs along the railway line some distance to the east of it to a point just east of the Tulkarm railway station. Thence the boundary follows a line half-way between the railway and the Tulkarm-Qalqiliya-Jaljuliya and Ras El-Ein road to a point just east of Ras El-Ein station, whence it proceeds along the railway some distance to the east of it to the point on the railway line south of the junction of the Haifa-Lyddá and Beit Nabala lines, whence it proceeds along the southern border of Lydda airport to its south-west corner, thence in a south-westerly direction to a point just west of the built-up area of Sarafand El 'Amar, whence it turns south, passing just to the west of the built-up area of Abu El-Fadil to the north-east corner of the lands of Beer Ya'aqov. (The boundary line should be so demarcated as to allow direct access from the Arab State to the airport.) Thence the boundary line

follows the western and southern boundaries of Ramle village, to the north-east corner of El Na'ana village, thence in a straight line to the southernmost point of El Barriya, along the eastern boundary of that village and the southern boundary of 'Innaba village. Thence it turns north to follow the southern side of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road until El-Qubab, whence it follows the road to the boundary of Abu-Shusha. It runs along the eastern boundaries of Abu Shusha, Seidun, Hulda to the southernmost point of Hulda, thence westwards in a straight line to the north-eastern corner of Umm Kalkha, thence following the northern boundaries of Umm Kalkha, Qazaza and the northern and western boundaries of Mukhezim to the Gaza District boundary and thence runs across the village lands of El-Mismiya El-Kabira, and Yasur to the southern point of intersection, which is midway between the built-up areas of Yasur and Batani Sharqi.

From the southern point of intersection the boundary lines run north-westwards between the villages of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the sea at a point half way between Nabi Yunis and Minat El-Qila, and south-eastwards to a point west of Qastina, whence it turns in a south-westerly direction, passing to the east of the built-up areas of Es Sawafir Esh Sharqiya and 'Ibdis. From the south-east corner of 'Ibdis village it runs to a point southwest of the built-up area of Beit 'Affa, crossing the Hebron-El-Majdal road just to the west of the built-up area of 'Iraq Suweidan. Thence it proceeds southward along the western village boundary of El-Faluja to the Beersheba Sub-District boundary. It then runs across the tribal lands of 'Arab El-Jubarat to a point on the boundary between the Sub-Districts of Beersheba and Hebron north of Kh. Khuweilifa, whence it proceeds in a south-westerly direction to a point on the Beersheba-Gaza main road two kilometres to the north-west of the town. It then turns south-eastwards to reach Wadi Sab' at a point situated one kilometer to the west of it. From here it turns north-eastwards and proceeds along Wadi Sab' and along the Beersheba-Hebron road for a distance of one kilometer, whence it turns eastwards and runs in a straight line to Kh. Kuseifa to join the Beersheba-Hebron Sub-District boundary. It then follows the Beersheba-Hebron boundary eastwards to a point north of Ras Ez-Zuweira, only departing from it so as to cut across the base of the indentation between vertical grid lines 150 and 160.

About five kilometres north-east of Ras Ez-Zuweira it turns north, excluding from the Arab State a strip along

the coast of the Dead Sea not more than seven kilometres in depth, as far as 'Ein Geddi, whence it turns due east to join the Transjordan frontier in the Dead Sea.

The northern boundary of the Arab section of the coastal plain runs from a point between Minat El-Qila and Nabi Yunis, passing between the built-up areas of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the point of intersection. From here it turns south-westwards, running across the lands of Batani Sharqi, along the eastern boundary of the lands of Beit Daras and across the lands of Julis, leaving the built-up areas of Batani Sharqi and Julis to the westwards, as far as the north-west corner of the lands of Beit-Tima. Thence it runs east of El-Jiya across the village lands of El-Barbara along the eastern boundaries of the villages of Beit Jirja, Deir Suneid and Dimra. From the south-east corner of Dimra the boundary passes across the lands of Beit Hanun, leaving the Jewish lands of Nir-Am to the eastwards. From the south-east corner of Beit Hanun the line runs south-west to a point south of the parallel grid line 100, then turns north-west for two kilometres, turning again in a southwesterly direction and continuing in an almost straight line to the north-west corner of the village lands of Kirbet Ikhza'a. From there it follows the boundary line of this village to its southernmost point. It then runs in a southerly direction along the vertical grid line 90 to its junction with the horizontal grid line 70. It then turns south-eastwards to Kh. El-Ruheiba and then proceeds in a southerly direction to a point known as El-Baha, beyond which it crosses the Beersheba-El 'Auja main road to the west of Kh. El-Mushrifa. From there it joins Wadi El-Zaiyatin just to the west of El-Subeita. From there it turns to the north-east and then to the south-east following this Wadi and passes to the east of 'Abda to join Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh, Wadi 'Ajrim and Wadi Lassan to the point where Wadi Lassan crosses the Egyptian frontier.

The area of the Arab enclave of Jaffa consists of that part of the town-planning area of Jaffa which lies to the west of the Jewish quarters lying south of Tel-Aviv, to the west of the continuation of Herzl street up to its junction with the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, to the south-west of the section of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road lying south-east of that junction, to the west of Miqve Yisrael lands, to the northwest of Holon local council area, to the north of the line linking up the north-west corner of Holon with the northeast corner of Bat Yam local council area and to the north of Bat Yam local council area. The question of Karton quarter will be decided by the

Boundary Commission, bearing in mind among other considerations the desirability of including the smallest possible number of its Arab inhabitants and the largest possible number of its Jewish inhabitants in the Jewish State.

B. THE JEWISH STATE

The north-eastern sector of the Jewish State (Eastern Galilee) is bounded on the north and west by the Lebanese frontier and on the east by the frontiers of Syria and Trans-jordan. It includes the whole of the Huleh Basin, Lake Tiberias, the whole of the Beisan Sub-District, the boundary line being extended to the crest of the Gilboa mountains and the Wadi Malih. From there the Jewish State extends north-west, following the boundary described in respect of the Arab State. The Jewish section of the coastal plain extends from a point between Minat El-Qila and Nabi Yunis in the Gaza Sub-District and includes the towns of Haifa and Tel-Aviv, leaving Jaffa as an enclave of the Arab State. The eastern frontier of the Jewish State follows the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Beersheba area comprises the whole of the Beersheba Sub-District, including the Negeb and the eastern part of the Gaza Sub-District, but excluding the town of Beersheba and those areas described in respect of the Arab State. It includes also a strip of land along the Dead Sea stretching from the Beersheba-Hebron Sub-District boundary line to 'Ein Geddi, as described in respect of the Arab State.

C. THE CITY OF JERUSALEM

The boundaries of the City of Jerusalem are as defined in the recommendations on the City of Jerusalem. (See Part III, section B, below).

Part III. - City of Jerusalem(5)

A. SPECIAL REGIME

The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations.

B. BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY

The City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, 'Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern Shu'fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map (annex B).

C. STATUTE OF THE CITY

The Trusteeship Council shall, within five months of the approval of the present plan, elaborate and approve a detailed statute of the City which shall contain, inter alia, the substance of the following provisions:

Government machinery; special objectives. The Administering Authority in discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special objectives:

To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian, Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and especially religious peace, reign in Jerusalem;

To foster cooperation among all the inhabitants of the city in their own interests as well as in order to encourage and support the peaceful development of the mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the Holy Land; to promote the security, well-being and any constructive measures of development of the residents having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the various peoples and communities.

Governor and Administrative staff. A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality. He shall not, however, be a citizen of either State in Palestine.

The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the City and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of administration, including the conduct of external affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever practicable from the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis. A

detailed plan for the organization of the administration of the city shall be submitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it.

3. Local autonomy

The existing local autonomous units in the territory of the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local government and administration. The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of the Trusteeship Council a plan for the establishment of special town units consisting, respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new Jerusalem. The new town units shall continue to form part of the present municipality of Jerusalem.

Security measures

The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted within its borders.

Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-cooperation or interference of one or more sections of the population the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of administration.

To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order, especially for the protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites in the city, the Governor shall organize a special police force of adequate strength, the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine. The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force.

Legislative Organization.

A Legislative Council, elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation. No legislative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them. The Statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the Council fails

to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration.

Administration of Justice.

The Statute shall provide for the establishment of an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal. All the inhabitants of the city shall be subject to it.

Economic Union and Economic Regime.

The City of Jerusalem shall be included in the Economic Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the undertaking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in the territory City. The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling within the regime of the Economic Union, on the basis of equal treatment and non-discrimination for all members of the United Nations and their nationals.

Freedom of Transit and Visit: Control of residents.

Subject to considerations of security, and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence within the borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States. Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.

Relations with Arab and Jewish States. Representatives of the Arab and Jewish States shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connection with the international administration of the City.

Official languages.

Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working languages, as may be required.

Citizenship.

All the residents shall become ipso facto citizens of the City of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the Arab or Jewish State respectively, according to Part 1, section B, paragraph 9, of this Plan.

The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for consular protection of the citizens of the City outside its territory.

Freedoms of citizens

Subject only to the requirements of public order and morals, the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion and worship, language, education, speech and press, assembly and association, and petition.

No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex.

All persons within the City shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.

Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.

The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish communities respectively, in their own languages and in accordance with their cultural traditions.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the City may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the City of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

Holy Places

Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum.

Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Governor may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Governor may carry it out himself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the City. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.

Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the City and in any part of Palestine.

The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall be a special concern of the Governor.

With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the city, the Governor shall determine, on the ground of powers granted to him by the Constitution of both States, whether the provisions of the Constitution of the Arab and Jewish States in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected.

The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine.

In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity.

D. DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME

The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council the aforementioned principles shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948. It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the

Trusteeship Council finds it necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to examination by the Trusteeship Council in the light of experience acquired with its functioning. The residents the City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of regime of the City.

Part IV. Capitulations

States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the re-establishment of such privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem.

Adopted at the 128th plenary meeting:

In favour: 33

Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian S.S.R., Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian S.S.R., Union of South Africa, U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: 13

Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Yemen.

Abstained: 10

Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia.

(1) See Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session Supplement No. 11, Volumes I-IV.

* At its hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting on 29 November 1947 the General Assembly, in accordance with the terms of the above resolution, elected the following

members of the United Nations Commission on Palestine: Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, and Philippines.

(2) This resolution was adopted without reference to a Committee.

(3) The following stipulation shall be added to the declaration concerning the Jewish State: "In the Jewish State adequate facilities shall be given to Arabic-speaking citizens for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, in the legislature, before the Courts and in the administration."

(4) In the declaration concerning the Arab State, the words "by an Arab in the Jewish State" should be replaced by the words "by a Jew in the Arab State."

(5) On the question of the internationalization of Jerusalem, see also General Assembly resolutions 185 (S-2) of 26 April 1948; 187 (S-2) of 6 May 1948, 303 (IV) of 9 December 1949, and resolutions of the Trusteeship Council (Section IV).

Partition Plan 1947 (U.N. Resolution 181)

