

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE FRACTIONED NATURE OF
THE CONTEMPORARY UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

A Master's Thesis

by
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DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
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In memory of my beloved grandmother, Uğurum

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THE CONTEMPORARY UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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in

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ABSTRACT

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE FRACTIONED NATURE OF THE CONTEMPORARY UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

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The existence of a regionally divergent Ukrainian society is manifested not only in sharp regional voting differences, but also in differences in political culture, incompatible interpretations of history, conflicting choices of language and opposing preferences on country's foreign policy orientation in different regions of Ukraine. The fact that divisions mainly correspond to historical regions led to the inference that these regional differences could largely be a matter of different historical experiences, that is different historical legacies, since these regions belonged to different countries during different historical periods. Accordingly, this thesis intends to analyze the historical roots of the extensive and persistent regional differences observed within the contemporary Ukrainian society, and lays the claim that this diversity is a reflection of their ancestors' experiences in several diverse political dominations simultaneously, experiencing a life in very different environments provided by different sovereigns, and being exposed to different and sometimes even conflicting policies. Comparing the developments in different historical regions, this thesis aims at giving a comprehensive picture as to how the different experiences of Ukrainian people resulted in different self-identifications starting its analysis from the Kievan Rus' and reaching up until the modern Ukraine. The historical analysis of different historical periods performed in this thesis demonstrates and confirms the fundamental role played by centuries long diverging historical experiences of Ukrainian generations and their historical legacy on the evolution of contemporary regional distinctions.

Key Words: Ukrainian society, Ukrainian identity, historical experiences, historical legacy, regional diversities, historical regions, western Ukraine, eastern Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalism, Russification

ÖZET

GÜNÜMÜZ UKRAYNA TOPLUMUNUN BÖLÜNÜMÜŞ YAPISININ TARİHSEL KÖKENLERİ

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Ukrayna'nın farklı bölgelerinin belirgin bölgesel oy farklılıkları, politik kültür farklılıkları, birbiriyle uyumsuz tarih yorumlamaları, çelişen dil tercihleri, ve ülkenin dış politika yönelimi hakkında birbirine ters öncelikleri olması bölgesel farklılıkları olan bir Ukrayna toplumunun varlığını gözler önüne sermiştir. Bölünmüşlüklerin ağırlıklı olarak tarihi bölgelerle kesiştiği gerçeği, bu bölgeler farklı tarihsel dönemlerde farklı ülkelere ait olduklarından, bu durumun daha çok farklı tarihsel deneyimlerle, yani farklı tarihi miraslarla alakalı olduğu çıkarımına yol açmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, bu tez günümüz Ukrayna toplumunda gözlemlenen yaygın ve kalıcı bölgesel farklılıkların tarihsel kökenlerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu farklılıkların Ukrainerlerin atalarının aynı anda farklı farklı siyasi egemenlikler altındaki deneyimlerinin, farklı ve hatta bazen çelişen politikalara maruz kalmış olmalarının bir yansıması olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Bu tez, Kiev Rusyası'ndan başlayıp modern Ukrayna'ya kadar uzanan bir analiz ile farklı tarihsel bölgelerdeki gelişmeleri karşılaştırarak Ukrainerlerin farklı tarihsel deneyimlerinin nasıl farklı öz kimliklendirmelere sebep olduğunu gösteren kapsamlı bir resim sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu tezde gerçekleştirilen farklı dönemlerin tarihsel analizi günümüz Ukrayna'sındaki bölgesel farklılıkların gelişiminde Ukrainer nesillerinin yüzyıllar süren birbirinden farklı tarihsel deneyimlerinin ve bıraktıkları tarihi mirasın asli rolünü ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ukrayna toplumu, Ukrainer kimliği, tarihsel deneyim, tarihi miras, bölgesel farklılıklar, tarihi bölgeler, batı Ukrayna, doğu Ukrayna, Ukrainer milliyetçiliği, Ruslaştırma

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

In this thesis all Ukrainian and Russian names, terminology and words have been transliterated to English in line with the rules of the Library of Congress. However, terms and words from several other languages such as Turkish, Polish, German and Belorussian had to be used. Transliteration from these languages have been omitted, instead they were used as they occurred in the referred bibliography.

If a name of a person or of a place has a frequently used equivalent in English, then English form is preferred above transliteration such as Moscow, Dnieper, Galicia, Khrushchev, Gorbachev, Yanukovych, Yushchenko and so on. In a similar sense, the use of Kiev instead of Kyiv is preferred in this study. Although Kiev is the Russian transliteration of the city's name, it is not the reason for the author's choice to use it instead of Kyiv, but the reason is that Kiev is the well established form in English.

When it comes to the preference of Russian vs Ukrainian names of the districts, the criteria is, what people inhabiting these lands today call their cities. In other words, the names of Eastern and Southeastern districts of Ukraine have been transliterated not from their Ukrainian names but from their Russian names such as Kharkov, Lugansk, Donbass, Krivoy Rog and so on. Many of the names of the historical places or peoples are not used in today's languages. Those names are either well established in English such as Galicia, Volhynia, Ruthenians and so their

English forms are used or the preference of language for transliteration in terms of its relevance for respective histories of Russia and Ukraine such as using Zaporiz'ka Sich of Ukrainian transliteration instead of Zaporozhskaia Sech' of Russian transliteration and Bohdan Khmel'nytskyi instead of Bogdan Khmel'nitskii.

Ukrainian and Russian transliteration tables of Library of Congress include characters that do not exist in the English Alphabet but in Latin. Among those characters only ě and ĭ have been used. Characters such as ǐ, ī and é are not used for the convenience and instead conventional i and e are utilized since their phonetical similarity.

In this thesis, whenever a quotation is used, the author does not change transliteration of the quoted sentence(s) in an effort to refrain from infringement to the authenticity of the related citation.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Every passing year the spirit of unity in Ukraine seems to be more far a dream since the developments show that Ukrainian people are further breaking ranks with each other. The developments of summer 2012 in Ukraine were crucial enough to jolt the country. A new law on state language policy adopted by *Verkhovna Rada* (Ukrainian parliament) on 3th of July with the pushing of the party of power which represents pro-Russian southern and eastern areas, entered into force on 10th of August with the signature of President Viktor Yanukovich.¹ Within a week or two predominantly Russian-speaking southern and eastern Ukrainian *oblasts* (provinces) Odessa, Sevastopol, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, Kharkov, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Lugansk, and Dnepropetrovsk adopted the law, making Russian a regional language in their regions.² “According to the law’s stipulation, 13 out of Ukraine’s 27 regions will be eligible to officially recognize the Russian language”.³ On the other hand, western *oblasts* of historical Galicia, L’viv, Ivano-Frankivs’k, and

¹“Language Law Comes Into Force In Ukraine,” *Kyiv Post*, 10 August 2012.

²“Russian Spreads Like Wildfires In Dry Ukrainian Forest,” *Kyiv Post*, 23 August 2012.

³“Ukrainian regions Move to Officially Recognize Russian,” *RIA Novosti*, 15 August 2012, available at <http://en.ria.ru/society/20120815/175227937.html>

Ternopil' began protesting this law, refusing the recognition of the law and asking its cancellation.⁴

Since Russian is now going to be used more broadly in administrative affairs, in education and business in southern and eastern Ukrainian regions, the already considerable differences between the regions of Ukraine may increase as this law may further stimulate the cultural, linguistic, and political divide in the country.⁵ The ex-President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko's and jailed ex-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko's words on this law are worrisome. While Yushchenko argues that "this means not even Russification, because the 13 regions of which we are talking about are already Russified. ... But we are talking about ... de-Ukrainization, as there are no more legal grounds to introduce the Ukrainian language ... there,"⁶ the leader of Ukrainian opposition and reportedly nationalist and pro-West Tymoshenko further claimed that by this law "Yanukovich declared war on independent Ukraine."⁷

This latest development is one of the many demonstrating the divided nature of the Ukrainian society. Since independence, Ukrainian society proved itself to be

⁴ "Ivano-Frankivsk City Council refuses to recognize language law," *Kyiv Post*, 23 August 2012. "Ternopil Regional Council Declared Language Law as Invalid in Region, Asks Constitutional Court to Cancel It," *Kyiv Post*, 17 August 2012. "Lviv City Council to Challenge Language Law in Constitutional Court," *Kyiv Post*, 28 August 2012.

⁵ According to the survey done by Kiev-based Ukrainian research organization named "Rating," while 80 percent of the respondents in Western Ukraine believe that this law will destroy Ukrainian language, and 70 percent of them think the law further splits Ukrainians, 70 percent of the respondents from Donbass disagree and support the law. [Sociological Group "Rating," *Movne Pytannia: Za i proty*, Press Release (July 2012): 25.]

⁶ "Yushchenko: Language Law Will Trigger Ukraine's de-Ukrainization," *Kyiv Post*, 15 August 2012.

⁷ "Yanukovich Declared War On Whole Nation," *Kyiv Post*, 5 August 2012. From October 2011 till now Tymoshenko is being held in prison in Kharkov since the Ukrainian Courts found her guilty of exceeding her power in signing a gas deal with Russia in 2009, sentencing her for 7 years-term. ("Guilty!," *Kyiv Post*, 14 October 2011.) Western governments and pro-Tymoshenko camp in Ukraine perceive her situation as an unfair and politically motivated imprisonment. (European Commission, *Stefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood, Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, Case of Yulia Tymoshenko, European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg, 22 May 2012* available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/373&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>)

in trouble in developing a common unifying identity. The analysis of the results of the elections, referendums, surveys and public opinion polls held since 1991 all revealed incompatible values and attitudes inherent in Ukrainians of different regions. The geographical voting patterns that came to surface with the 1994 Presidential elections proved habitual with each election to come. While the western Ukraine was supporting those politicians (Leonid Kravchuk, later-time Leonid Kuchma, Yushchenko, and Tymoshenko) who reportedly represented nationalist, pro-independence and pro-western orientation, eastern and southern Ukraine supported those allegedly representing pro-Russian and pro-communist one (early-time Kuchma, Petro Symonenko, and Yanukovich).⁸ As for the extreme ends, Ukrainians living in the *oblasts* of historical Galicia casted 94% of their votes for Kravchuk in 1994, 91% for Kuchma in 1999, 95% for Yushchenko in 2004, and 88% for Tymoshenko in 2010, while overwhelming majority in Crimea and Donbass voted for Kuchma in 1994 (93%), Symonenko in 1999 (52 %), and Yanukovich in 2004 (88%) and in 2010 (89%).⁹

Survey and opinion polls are also indicative of the situation in Ukraine. A 2008 survey demonstrated that while 87.7 percent of western Ukrainians declared that if the referendum on independence was to be held again they would go for independence, the support fell increasingly moving towards the east of the country

⁸ In 1994, 45.2 percent of Ukrainians voted for Kravchuk, and 52.3 for Kuchma. In 1999, 56.25 percent voted for Kuchma, while 37.80 percent for Symonenko. In 2004, 51.99 percent of Ukrainians casted their votes to Yushchenko, and 44.20 percent to Yanukovich. In 2010, 45.47 percent of Ukrainians supported Tymoshenko, whereas 48.95 percent supported Yanukovich, making him the first Ukrainian president ever to be elected with less than half of the votes casted. *Tsentrāl'na Vyborkha Komisiia Ukraïny* (Central Voting Commission of Ukraine) available at <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/sekretariat/>

⁹ *Tsentrāl'na Vyborkha Komisiia Ukraïny* available at <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/sekretariat/> Tymoshenko garnered only 10 percent of the votes casted in the Crimea and Donbass, and Yanukovich garnered only 7 percent of those in Galician *oblasts*. In 2004 elections, Yanukovich garnered only 3 percent of the votes from Galicia, and Yushchenko received 8 percent from the Crimea and Donbass. In 1999, while a mere 5 percent of the votes from Galician *oblasts* were casted to Symonenko, Kuchma received 40 percent of Crimean and Donbass votes, a comparatively high figure but still less than votes given to Symonenko in these regions.

since 55.7 percent of central Ukrainians, and only 39.1 and 38.6 of southern and eastern Ukrainians thought to re-vote for independence.¹⁰ On the other hand, 65 percent of southern and eastern Ukrainians expressed their regret for the dissolution of the Soviet Union, whereas 82 percent of their western counterparts were pleased with the collapse of the Soviet state.¹¹ Regional differences come to surface also in terms of foreign policy choices. 65.5 percent of western Ukrainians prefer prioritization of relations with the European Union; however, 56.85 percent of southern and eastern Ukrainians prefer closer relations with Russia. As it is the case in many issues, central Ukraine represents a middle ground since 40.7% support close relations with the EU and 36.6 percent with Russia.¹²

Language preference and mother-tongue identification is another crucial indicator of regional differences. While Ukrainian language is the mother-tongue of 89.9 percent of western Ukrainians, it is so for 59.6 percent of central Ukrainians 29.1 of whom define both Ukrainian and Russian as their mother-tongue. On the other hand, Russian language dominates as the mother-tongue of southern and eastern Ukrainians (48 and 44.4 percent respectively), and only 14.5 of them specify Ukrainian as such.¹³ Furthermore, while 89 percent of western Ukrainians

¹⁰Razumkov Center, *Iakby referendum shchodo proholoshennia derzhavnoi nezalezhnosti Ukraïny vidbuvavsia c'ohodni, to iak by Vy na n'omu proholosuvaly? (rehional'nyï rozpodil)*, Sociological poll held on 21 August 2008 available at http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=326

¹¹Sociological Group "Rating," *"Back in USSR?": dumky ukraïntsi i rosiian*, Press Release (December 2010): 7.

¹² Razumkov Center, *Iakyï napriam zovnishn'oï polityky maie buty priorytetnym dlia Ukraïny? (rehional'nyï rozpodil)*, Sociological poll held on 31 Jenuary-5 February 2008. Available at http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=119

¹³ Razumkov Center, *Iaka mova ie dlia Vas ridnoiu? (rehional'nyï rozpodil, dynamika 2006-2008)*, Sociological poll held on 7-19 October 2008. Available at http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=436

use Ukrainian fluently; this figure drops to 70.6 in center and merely to 36 in southern and eastern Ukraine.¹⁴

Another point of differentiation in the Ukrainian society is their incompatible interpretations of history. Contradictory regional understandings of the WWII period surfaces in the celebrations of the Victory Day.¹⁵ While in celebrations in Galician *oblasts* attention is usually given to the role of the OUN-UPA and the Soviet victory is presented as mainly an alien invasion, eastern Ukrainian celebrations usually have an atmosphere similar to that in Moscow. Kiev represents a compromise, as while the celebrations are in Ukrainian, they are similar to those in eastern Ukrainian cities. In the same vein, as a 2009 Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) Survey demonstrated, while respondents from historical Galicia had positive perceptions of OUN-UPA, those from historical Volhynia, Bukovina, and Transcarpathia also possessed positive perceptions, still much less than the Galicians. On the other hand, eastern Ukrainians tended to have negative views of OUN-UPA.¹⁶ This issue remains a controversy in today's Ukraine. Only several years had passed since the dispute between the reportedly nationalist Yushchenko, whose electoral base was western Ukraine, and the allegedly pro-Russian Yanukovich, whose electoral base was eastern Ukraine, over rehabilitation of OUN-UPA insurgents and conferring of the status of "Hero of Ukraine" title to Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych.¹⁷

¹⁴ Razumkov Center, *Iak by Vy otsynly sviï riven' znannia ukraïns'koi movy? (rehional'nyi rozpodil)*, Sociological poll held on 20 April – 12 May 2006. Available at http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=778

¹⁵ 9 May is celebrated as the day Nazi Germany was defeated by the Soviet Union.

¹⁶ Ivan Katchanovski, "Terrorists or National Heroes? Politics of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine," (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, Montreal, June 1-3, 2010), 15. The survey was done by KIIS in the request of Katchanovski to be published in his study.

¹⁷ The status of "Hero of Ukraine" conferred to OUN-UPA by Yushchenko was annulled by the Yanukovich administration. ("Analysis: Ukrainian leader struggles to handle Bandera legacy," *Kyiv*

In terms of cultural identification, although overwhelming majority of western Ukrainians identify with the Ukrainian culture (79.9%), less than half of southern and eastern Ukrainians do so (45.5%), since the remaining of them identify either with the Soviet or with the Russian culture, and think of having no major differences with ethnic Russians living in Ukraine (60%).¹⁸ Furthermore, southern and eastern Ukrainians think to possess more than twice percent similar characteristics, customs and traditions with Russians rather than with western Ukrainians.¹⁹

As the above mentioned suggest, contemporary Ukraine is a country of extensive and persistent regional differences which are manifested not only in sharp regional voting differences, but also in differences in political culture, incompatible interpretations of history, conflicting choices of language and opposing preferences on country's foreign policy orientation in different regions of Ukraine. Three years of personal experience in Ukraine during 1998-2000 and trips to Kiev, L'viv, and several Crimean cities as a resident of eastern Ukrainian city of Kharkov led the author of this thesis to run into the notable differences between the people of these cities. While these childhood experiences in Ukraine meant the beginning of an interest in the reasons of such dissimilarities, a further scholarly interest has developed over the course of academic studies performed in later years.

Post, 13 April 2010. "Donetsk court deprives Shukevych of Ukrainian Hero title," *Kyiv Post*, 21 April 2010. "Update: Stapan Bandera is no longer a Hero of Ukraine," *Kyiv Post*, 21 April 2010.)

¹⁸ Razumkov Center, *Do iakoï kul'turnoi tradytsii Vy sebe vidnosyte? (dynamika 2006-2007) (rehional'nyi, vikovyï rozpodily ta rozpodil za natsional'nistiu)*, Sociological poll held on 31 May – 18 June 2007. Available at http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=693; Razumkov Center, *Nasikil'ky blyz'ki abo rizni kul'tury tradytsii abo pohliady nastupnykh hrup? (rehional'nyi rozpodil)*, Sociological poll held on 20-27 December 2005. Available at http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=745

¹⁹Razumkov Center, *Nasikil'ky zhyteli riznykh rehioniv Ukraïny ta deiakykh susidnikh kraïn blyz'ki Vam za kharakterom, zvychaiamy, tradytsiiamy? (dynamika 2006-2007) (rehional'nyi rozpodil)*, Sociological poll held on 31 May – 18 June 2007. Available at http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=720

That the Ukrainian society is innately divided in almost every aspect triggered our curiosity about the underlying reason which shaped the Ukrainian people in a way that culminated in today's regionally divergent Ukrainian society. The fact that divisions mainly corresponded to historical regions made us to reason that these regional differences could largely be a matter of different historical experiences, that is different historical legacies.

The author of this thesis thinks that history provides by narrative the roots of a present situation. That being the case, we chose historical analysis as our method and from a comparative perspective we decided to examine the historical legacy of different historical regions of Ukraine on the development of separate identities in contemporary Ukraine.

At this point, there arises the need to clarify the concept of historical legacy. Historical legacy is a combination of historical experiences and memories handed down by past generations to their descendants. It incorporates the effect of historical environment on these people, such as the events witnessed, the ways they were treated, the political, religious, and economic systems and institutions, and the policies implemented in the countries they lived in. As such, historical legacy involves the factors of religion and language, as these two factors have been evolved and transferred to future generations as an indispensable part of historical legacies. The transmission of shared past experiences and memories from one generation to the next through family, social environment, education and religious institutions help these past experiences and memories become the formative events that constitute the historical legacy of that group of people. Thus, sharing a common historical legacy helps people develop similar values, norms, and political cultures. Even if they can either be distorted or reinterpreted differently by different

sovereigns mainly with political reasons, historical legacies reach our day and shape societies. Max Weber's thinking stands with our attribution of great importance to historical legacy. Quoting from Max Weber,

The community of political destiny, i.e., above all, of common struggle of life and death, has given rise to groups with joint memories which often have had a deeper impact than the ties of merely cultural, linguistic, or ethnic community. It is this "community of memories" which, as we shall see, constitutes the ultimately decisive element of "national consciousness".²⁰

In line with such thinking, the role of historical legacies is chosen as this study's focal point.

The effect of historical factors on regional political differentiations is studied by different scholars. Daniel Judah Elazar²¹ (1966) and John Shelton Reed²² studied the United States, Derek Urwin²³ worked on the United Kingdom; Douglass C. North²⁴ focused on the North-Latin American case, Seymour Martin Lipset²⁵ and Lipset et al.²⁶ studied the United States-Canadian case, Robert Putnam²⁷ worked on the Italian case, Grzegorz Gorzelak²⁸ and Tomasz Zarycki and Andrzej Nowak²⁹

²⁰ Max Webber, *Economy and Society, Vol.2* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1978), 903.

²¹ Daniel Judah Elazar, *American Federalism: A View from the State* (New York: Crowell, 1966)

²² John Shelton Reed, *The Enduring South: Subcultural Persistence in Mass Society*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986)

²³ Derek Urwin, "Territorial Structures and Political Developments in the United Kingdom." in *The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism*, ed. Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin (London: Sage, 1982).

²⁴ Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

²⁵ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and Persistence in Social Structures* (New York: Anchor Books, 1970); Seymour Martin Lipset, *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada*. (New York: Routledge, 1990).

²⁶ Seymour Martin Lipset et al., *The Paradox of American and Canadian Unionism: Why Americans Like Unions More than Canadians Do, but Join Much Less* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

²⁷ Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

²⁸ Grzegorz Gorzelak, *Regional and Local Potential for Transformation in Poland* (Warsaw: Euroreg, 1998).

²⁹ Tomasz Zarycki and Andrzej Nowak, "Hidden Dimensions: The Stability and Structure of Regional Political Cleavages in Poland," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 33, 3 (2000): 331-354.

studied the Polish case, Juan Linz's,³⁰ Derek Urwin's,³¹ and Robert Rohrschneider's³² case was Germany, Medrano Juan Diez's³³ case was Spain, Ivan Katchanovski focused on the Crimean Tatar and the Gagauz,³⁴ and Moldovan and Ukrainian cases,³⁵ Vujačić³⁶ studied the Russian and Serbian cases, Steven D. Roper and Florin Fesnic³⁷ examined the Romanian and Ukrainian cases, and Andreas Kappeler's³⁸ focus was on the Ukrainian case.

The general literature about Ukrainian regional diversity mostly tends to divide the country into two parts along the Dnieper River as West and East Ukraine.³⁹ Some prefer to divide Ukraine as Western Ukraine, Central Ukraine, and Southeast Ukraine;⁴⁰ while some others divide it as West, East, Central, and South Ukraine.⁴¹ Within this last quadripartite division, Dominique Arel further divides

³⁰ Juan Linz, "Cleavage and Consensus in West German Politics: The Early Fifties," in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. (New York: Free Press, 1967).

³¹ Derek Urwin, "Germany: From Geographical Expression to Regional Accommodation," in *The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism*, ed. Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin. (London: Sage, 1982).

³² Robert Rohrschneider, "Cultural Transmission versus Perceptions of the Economy," *Comparative Politics* 29, 1 (1996): 78-104.

³³ Medrano Juan Diez, *Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).

³⁴ Ivan Katchanovski, "Small Nations but Great Differences: Political Orientations and Cultures of the Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz," *Europe-Asia Studies* 57, 6 (2005): 877-894.

³⁵ Ivan Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova* (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2006); Ivan Katchanovski, "Regional Political Divisions in Ukraine in 1991-2006," *Nationalities Papers* 34,5 (2006): 507-532.

³⁶ Veljko Vujačić, "Historical Legacies, Nationalist Mobilization, and Political Outcomes in Russia and Serbia: A Weberian View," *Theory and Society* 25, 6 (1996): 763-801.

³⁷ Steven D. Roper and Florin Fesnic, "Historical Legacies and Their Impact on Post-Communist Voting Behavior," *Europe-Asia Studies* 55, 1 (2003): 119-131.

³⁸ Andreas Kappeler, "The Politics of History in Contemporary Ukraine: Russia, Poland, Austria, and Europe," in *Ukraine on its way to Europe: Interim Results of the Orange Revolution*, ed. Juliane Besters-Dilger. (Peter Lang: Frankfurt am Main; Oxford, 2009).

³⁹ Examples to such a dualistic approach are, Mykola Ryabchuk, "Two Ukraines?," *East European Reporter* 5, 4 (1992): 18-22; Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997);

⁴⁰ Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zvygnyanich eds., *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 5.

⁴¹ Dominique Arel, "Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State," in *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 183.

the Central region as central-west (Right Bank) and central-east (Left Bank).⁴²

There are also those who argue about the non-existence of a clear divide but claim that Ukrainian society is far more fractured to divide into such clear groupings.⁴³

Although we prefer to refrain from accepting a specific way of division of Ukraine, we still can note that Dominique Arel's and Orest Subtelny's classifications fit to our mind the most. Similar to Arel's quadripartite division, Subtelny prefers a division as Northwest and Southeast Ukraine with each having their own subdivisions.⁴⁴ Northwest Ukraine is composed of Central and Western Ukrainian regions, while Southeast Ukraine is divided into East and South subregions. Our reason to opt for such a division as shown in the map below is that, firstly, while Northwestern Ukraine incorporates the lands which were formerly under the lengthy rule of its western neighbors, Southeastern Ukraine incorporates lands which had an experience of the rule of the Crimean Khanate, Ottoman and Russian Empires. Such a classification is also preferable because, a dichotomic division as East-West or Northwest-Southeast may lead to oversimplification, since, although differences within these regions are often tended to be overlooked, they actually do matter. As such, Subtelny's division of the main regions into two subregions is perceptive, since it reminds that despite having a great deal of similarities, the historical experiences of these subregions differ to some extent which requires separate examination. It should be remembered that Galicia, which is within the Western subregion had been under the rule of Austria and Poland until

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Yaroslav Hrytsak, *Strasti za nacionalizmom: Istorichni esei* (Kiev: Kritika, 2004); Catherine Wanner, *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998).

⁴⁴ Orest Subtelny, "Russocentrism, Regionalism, and the Political Culture of Ukraine" in *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 189-207.

the Second World War, while Kiev region which is in the Central Ukraine used to be a part of the Russian Empire since the second half of the 17th century. Similarly, Donetsk of East Ukraine and the Crimea have diverse historical experiences. Moreover, Kherson of South Ukraine and Aqmescit of Crimea also differ substantially. In fact, it would be more coherent to consider the Crimea as distinct from the South Ukraine.

Reiterating our reservation in choosing a specific classification since we think that there are considerable internal differences within each of these regional divisions stated above,⁴⁵ we do not deny that each proposition has validity in itself.



Non-administrative regional division of Ukraine used by KIIS in election polls. The Western region (orange) comprises the eight regions of the west - Volynska, Rivnenska, Lvivska, Ivano-Frankivska, Ternopil'ska, Khmelnytska, Zakarpatska, and Chernivetska regions; the Central region (yellow) is made up by Zhytomyrska, Vinnytska, Kirovohrad'ska, Cherkaska, Poltav'ska, Sumska, Chernihiv'ska, Kyiv'ska regions and the city of Kyiv; the Southern region (light blue) consists of Dnipropetrovska, Odeska, Mykolayiv'ska, Kherson'ska, Zaporizka

⁴⁵ For example, although in each of the classifications Galicia, Volhynia, and Transcarpathia remain within the same category, Western Ukraine, each of these historical regions' past experiences differ from each other and as such despite being accepted as regions constituting western Ukraine the developments and experiences of these regions were examined separately throughout this thesis.

regions and Crimea; the Eastern region (dark blue) includes Kharkivska, Donetsk and Luhanska regions⁴⁶

A Ukrainian nation and a Ukrainian homeland exclusive to them and corresponding to contemporary Ukraine's territories did not exist historically. We shall remember that "an identity that might define the population of what is now Ukrainian territory as a single entity in opposition to a 'non-Ukrainian' other" did not "exist at the time".⁴⁷ The territories which comprise today's Ukraine throughout centuries lived under a variety of political rule. The ancestors of today's Ukrainians lived without a nation state for centuries. The lands which constitute the territory of contemporary Ukraine and the peoples who lived in these lands did "come under the influence of various organized states" all through history.⁴⁸

Ukraine as we know today is a Soviet creation. While the south and east Ukraine were "never Ukrainian or Russian before the late 18th century," Sloboda Ukraine (the area around Kharkov) was never solely Ukrainian but was a mixed Russian-Ukrainian territory from the very beginning.⁴⁹ The lack of any lasting independent statehood, that could help define the essence of an all encompassing consciousness and identity for Ukrainians, spilled over into our century.

These diverse legacies form Ukraine into a country which "contains a vast array of regions with different histories, cultural outlooks, and levels of national

⁴⁶Kiev International Institute of Sociology, *Political Orientation of Ukrainian Population: Two Months Before the Elections*, Press release based on the results of the survey conducted by KIIS January 18 – 28, 2006 (February 9, 2006).

⁴⁷ Serhii Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus* (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 46.

⁴⁸ Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, "The Traditional Scheme of 'Russian' History and the Problem of a Rational Organization of Eastern Slavs," reprinted in *From Kievan Rus' to Modern Ukraine: Formation of the Ukrainian Nation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ukrainian Studies Fund, Harvard University, 1984), 361.

⁴⁹ Anatol Lieven, *Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 26-27.

consciousness.”⁵⁰ The diversity in the national consciousness of today’s people of Ukraine is a reflection of their ancestors’ experiences in several diverse political dominations simultaneously, experiencing a life in “very different milieus” and “reacting to very different stimuli.”⁵¹ As such, composed of people with varied cultural baggages handed down by their ancestors, today’s Ukraine can be described as “a country with enormous cultural and psychological diversity, with few collective experiences and little ‘usable history’ that could serve as a matrix for the future.”⁵² Instead, contemporary Ukraine’s history was shaped in the hands of foreign rulers who have written and rewritten it along the lines of their own political interests. Thus, be it Russian, Polish, Soviet, Ukrainian, or Western historiography, all of them present a different perspective on the history of Ukraine.

Quite a many scholar prefer skipping the pre-imperial period when studying the legacy of past experiences for the current fragmented Ukrainian identity.⁵³ As a result, presentation of the legacy of pre-18th century developments were seen crucial by the author of this thesis who argues that to apprehend the fragmented nature of contemporary Ukrainian society, the examination of the past few centuries will not be adequate. Since every past century took shape in the light of the former one, ignoring the legacy of the pre-18th century historical period would lead to an information gap when studying the role of past experiences over the development of present-day identities and political cultures of the Ukrainians. In such a view, we went as back as the times of the Kievan Rus’ in our search for the crucial breaking

⁵⁰ Taras Kuzio, *Ukrainian Security Policy* (Westport: Praeger, 1995), 9, 13.

⁵¹ Ilya Prizel, “Nation-Building and Foreign Policy,” in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, eds. Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zviglyanich (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 12.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 13.

⁵³ To name some of those who see no necessity to examine the role of ancient periods whose work is concentrated on historical divisions in contemporary Ukraine, Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries*, especially 39, 41. Lieven, *Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, especially 6.

points that led to the differentiation of experiences of the Ukrainian people in adjacent but still separated geographies. Although we accept that the legacy of the pre-Polish-Lithuanian period is minor as compared to later eras, ignoring the legacy of pre-Partition Commonwealth on the separate development of Ukrainians would have rendered our analysis of the historical roots of the present situation incomplete.

Ukrainian regional diversity is a fact accepted by almost all studying Ukraine. This phenomenon raises the curiosity of scholars interested in intra-state political cleavages in general and in the Ukrainian politics in particular. This thesis aims at giving a comprehensive picture as to how the different experiences of Ukrainian people resulted in different self-identifications starting from the dissolution of the Kievan Rus', the motherland in which ancestors of all Ukrainians were once bound by the same experiences, thus the inception of today's Ukraine. By historicising the past historical eras, and comparing the developments in different historical regions of Ukraine this study offers an historical analysis of the events and policies of different sovereigns, which regions of Ukraine were subject to, and examines how and why these shaped the Ukrainian society in a way that culminated in the historical outcome of today's regionally divergent Ukrainian state.

CHAPTER 2

LEGACY OF ANCIENT TIMES: FROM KIEVAN RUS' TO THE PARTITIONS OF POLAND

2.1 Kievan Rus'

The differing historical legacies of the people of Ukraine began shaping as early as the first known East Slavic state, i.e. the Kievan Rus', which came into being during the late 9th century.⁵⁴ In search for a foundation myth, all three East Slavic peoples – Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians – claim that their historical ancestry extends to the Kievan Rus'.

In the traditional Russian historiography, the theories of “*translatio* from Kiev to Moscow,” that is the “displacement of political centers”⁵⁵ and “shift in population,”⁵⁶ attempt to explain Russia’s being successor to Kievan Rus'. Russian

⁵⁴ Though the lands encompassing the Kievan Rus' can only be estimated approximately, “at its peak, circa the mid-twelfth century, Kievan Rus extended from the Carpathian mountains and the Black Sea in the south-west to the White Sea in the north-east,” incorporating the lands occupied by the East Slavic tribes. [Mikhail A. Molchanov, *Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations* (USA: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 60.]

⁵⁵ For details about Karamzin’s theory of the displacement of political centers see, Nikolay Mikhailovich Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskago: V dvenadtsati tomakh* (History of the Russian State) (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2004).

⁵⁶For Mikhail D. Pogodin’s depopulation theory see, the 7th volume of his *Issledovaniia, zamechaniia i lektsii o russkoi istorii* (Moscow: v tipografii L. Stepanovoi, 1856), 425-8; or for a brief account see Zenon E. Kohut, “Origins of the Unity Paradigm: Ukraine and the Construction of

historians of the traditionalist school view the Mongol invasions of Kievan realm in mid-thirteenth century as the reason of the fragmentation of the “single Russian people” into three.⁵⁷ Accordingly, future developments led Ukraine to emerge as “Polonized and Catholicized ‘Western Russian’ lands” which were “historically destined for reunion with Great Russia.”⁵⁸ Polish mainstream historians seem to follow “shift in populations” theory of Russians, arguing that the barren lands in the east were settled by those peasants from Polish and Lithuanian lands.⁵⁹ Many a Western scholar also adopted the Russian standpoint, while the Soviet historiography came to perceive Kievan Rus’ as the “common cradle” of all East Slavs, and the Russians as the “elder brother” who were to protect their “little brothers” from foreign control and meant to “reunite” the “brotherly peoples”.⁶⁰

On the other hand, Ukrainian nationalist perception, highly shaped by Mykhailo S. Hrushevskyi,⁶¹ is that “the real successor to Kievan Rus was Galicia and Volhynia, and that Muscovy belongs to an entirely different civilizational orbit.”⁶² Hrushevskyi asserts that “the Kievan State, its law and culture, were the creation of one nationality, the Ukrainian-Rus’, while the Vladimir-Moscow State

Russian National History(1620-1860),” *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 35, 1 (2001): 73, and Edward D. Wynot, Jr., “The Impact of Mykhailo Hrushevsky on the History of Russia, Poland, and the Eastern Slavs,” *The History Teacher* 20, 3 (1987):350.

⁵⁷ Prizel, “Nation-Building and Foreign Policy,” 15.

⁵⁸ Kohut, “Origins of the Unity Paradigm ,” 74. This view was formulated by one of the most influential historians of the nineteenth century Russia, Sergei M. Solovev, in his 29-volumed *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen* published between 1851-1879. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1959-66).

⁵⁹ Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 17.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 21-24.

⁶¹ Hrushevskyi is a leading figure in the Ukrainian history, who in 1904 wrote a seminal article entitled “The Traditional Scheme of ‘Russian’ History and the Problem of a Rational Organization of Eastern Slavs,” and then the ten-volumed *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* (History of Ukraine-Rus’, 1898-1937). Apart from being a prominent historian, he was to head the short-lived Ukrainian state of the revolutionary period of 1917-1918.

⁶² Prizel, “Nation-Building and Foreign Policy,” 15-16. See Mykhailo S. Hrushevskyi, “The Traditional Scheme of ‘Russian’ History”.

was the creation of another nationality, the Great Russian.”⁶³ Furthermore, according to the traditional Ukrainian historical approach, Kiev’s population did not entirely flee after the Mongol invasions in 1240s, but shifted towards Galicia and Volhynia, that is slightly westward, until returning as the Cossacks in the seventeenth century.⁶⁴ Hence, it was not Vladimir-Suzdal (succeeded by Muscovy) but was the ‘state’ of Galicia-Volhynia which was the true inheritor to Kievan Rus’.⁶⁵ Thus, as an antidote to the “*translatio* from Kiev to Moscow” theory, “from Kiev to Kiev” was introduced, with which Kievan Rus’ is seen as “an exclusively proto-Ukrainian state.”⁶⁶ This way, Ukrainian historiography leaded by Hrushevskyi, challenged the Russian conception of the history of Eastern Slavs.⁶⁷

The examination of the culture and religion in the Kievan Rus’ is directly related to the impact of Byzantium. As coming to existence of the Kievan Rus’ corresponds to Byzantium’s Golden Age (843-1025), Byzantium was a source of critical inspiration for the Kievan Rus’. The commercial interactions not only brought economic prosperity but also enabled the introduction of Christianity and Byzantine culture into the Kievan lands.”⁶⁸ In 988 Christianity was made the

⁶³ Hrushevskyi, “The Traditional Sheme of ‘Russian’ History”, 356-357. (Hrushevskyi, “The Traditional Sheme of ‘Russian’ History”, 357.)

⁶⁴ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 24.

⁶⁵ Serhy Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 23. See for examples considering Galicia-Volhynia as a state rather than a principality; Yaroslav Isaievych, *Halytsko-Volynska derzhava* (Lviv: Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. I. Krypiakevycha NANU, 1999), and O. S. Kucheruk, ed., *Halytsko-Volynska derzhava XII-XIV st.* (Lviv: Svit, 2002).

⁶⁶ Arel, “Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State,” 178.

⁶⁷ Ukrainian interpretation of history can be labeled as an “exclusivist and victimized conception of Ukrainian history.” (Arel, *The Temptation of the Nationalizing State*, 177.) This is not restricted to the historians but serves as a foundation for Ukrainian nationalists’ thinking. For instance, for many Ukrainian nationalists, while “Ukraine belongs to Europe ... Moscow is ... an usurper of that heritage and belonging to Asia” [Kristian Gerner, “Ukraine between East and West in History,” in *Ukraine and Integration in the East: Economic, Military and Military-Industrial Relations*, ed. Lena Jonson (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs), 22.], and let alone being an elder brother, Russia’s role in Ukraine is one of political subjugation, imperial domination, economic exploitation, denationalization, and Russification. (Arel, “Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State,” 158, 167.)

⁶⁸ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 62.

official religion of the Kievan Rus' by Vladimir the Great. In time, Kiev turned into a "Constantinople on the Dnipro."⁶⁹ Still, paganism remained widespread among many Eastern Slavs. At any rate, the late 980s were to be of great importance not only for the creation of a common identity for the Kievan Rus', but also from now on being "Rus'" began to mean belonging to the Orthodox Christian faith.⁷⁰

1054 was a very critical year for two reasons: the Great Schism and the death of Iaroslav the Wise. It was in 1054 that the European Christianity was split into two as the Catholic Church (Roman or Latin) with its seat in Rome in the west, and Orthodox Church (Byzantine Greek) with its seat in Constantinople in the east. As a "cultural foster child of Byzantium,"⁷¹ highly influenced by it in arts, religion, literature, and architecture, Kievan Rus' and its successors were to remain within the authority of the Byzantine version of Christianity, the Orthodox Church. On the other hand, in 1054 the death of Iaroslav the Wise ignited a conflict among his descendants over the issue of succession. Iaroslav decided to allocate Kievan lands into five patrimonies among his sons.⁷² With his death, each son developed their own dynasty in their own patrimonies. The different paths to be followed by each principality would have implications for the differentiation of these regions and their inhabitants from one another in the course of time.

In the Conference of Liubech of 1097, the Rus' princes, accepted that they and their offspring will rule in their own patrimony and will not interfere with each others' domains.⁷³ With, the death of Mstyslav I, the only prince who could hold

⁶⁹ Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 13.

⁷⁰ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 72-73.

⁷¹ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 21.

⁷² Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, Second Edition (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 36.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 79. With some disruption this concert continued until the death of the grand prince Mstyslav I in 1132.

Kievan Rus' together, internal strife reemerged and thus of the era of disintegration of the Kievan Rus' started. This period was marked with the decline of Kiev as the political center of the Kievan Rus' as power gradually defuses to new centers that are, Galicia-Volhynia (now western Ukraine), Novgorod (in the north in today's Russia), and Vladimir-Suzdal'(in the north-east, in present-day European Russia) and this transformation brought about further differentiation.⁷⁴ Kievan Rus' "was transformed into a loose dynastic confederation,"⁷⁵ and later on in 1136 Novgorod became independent of the Kievan Rus', while Galicia-Volhynia and Vladimir-Suzdal' (later Muscovy) struggled to unite the Kievan realm under their rule, in which they failed. However, they both began to call themselves to be the political heir to the Kievan Rus'.⁷⁶

2.2 Pax Mongolica

The real transformation of Kievan Rus' was to occur with the Mongol invasions in 1240s that "destroyed the fragile remnants of Kyivan Rus and precipitated the trend towards separate development among the eastern Slavs,"⁷⁷ thus political divergences began solidifying with the Mongol invasions. Henceforth, the Rus' lands were subordinated to the Mongol state Golden Horde (also known as

⁷⁴ According to the Primary Chronicle, the Rus' Land was located "within the boundaries of the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Pereiaslav triangle" while "other lands were viewed merely as possessions, not as part of the Rus' Land per se." It was after the Mongol invasions of Kiev region the Rus' Land "took on new political and geographic dimensions, including Galicia and Volhynia as integral parts." ("Since the Galician-Volhynian princes took possession of parts of the traditional Rus' Land without relinquishing control over Galicia and Volhynia" the concept was extended to their entire realm. (Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 38-39, 59-60)

⁷⁵ Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence* (London: Hurst & Company, 1999), 2.

⁷⁶ Yekelchik, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 23.

⁷⁷ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 2.

the Kipchak Khanate or the Ulus of Jochi), and “the princes of Rus’ recognized Batu and his successors as their overlords.”⁷⁸ As of then, Kievan Rus’ was divided into separate principalities and as long as they recognized the authority of the Mongols and paid their annual tribute, the princes were left to rule their patrimonies as before.⁷⁹ Furthermore, as the Mongols did not give much effort to spread their own religion in the Rus’ lands,⁸⁰ the Pax Mongolica provided the Rus’ with an atmosphere for the improvement of the status of Orthodoxy to the extent that in the late 13th century Orthodoxy could reach to the countryside.⁸¹ Thus, the Orthodox Church was the foremost beneficiary of the Mongol rule. However, still, the adoption of Islam by the Golden Horde in 1313 caused discomfort among the Rus’.⁸² Despite increasing political divergence, there is little wonder that the Mongol “other” promoted a sense of Rus’ unity which seemed to disappear during the inter-dynastic warfare years in the eve of the Mongol invasions.⁸³

While with the Christianization of the Rus’ land, the use of Church Slavonic in liturgical practices “helped unify the linguistic practices” of the Rus’ people,⁸⁴ Magocsi hypothesizes that during the era of political disintegration and Mongol rule did the “Slavic linguistic unity among the inhabitants of Kievan Rus’ began to break down, ... and that out of this differentiation Ukrainian, Belarusan, and Russian began to take shape in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.”⁸⁵ Thus we may guess that ethnic and linguistic differentiations among the Eastern Slavs began to develop following the Mongol invasions and became more visible with the

⁷⁸ Janet Martin, *Medieval Russia 980-1584* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 147.

⁷⁹ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 105.

⁸⁰ Martyn Rady, *The Tsars, Russia, Poland and the Ukraine 1362-1725* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990), 12.

⁸¹ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 110.

⁸² Ploky, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 113.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁸⁵ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 101-102.

incorporation of the Western Rus' lands into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish Kingdom.⁸⁶

2.3 Galicia-Volhynia

After lengthy vassalage to the Golden Horde, Vladimir-Suzdal' evolved into Muscovy in the 15th century, while the Novgorod Republic retained its existence until Muscovy absorbed it in 1478. The major principality that remained functioning on the Ukrainian territory following the Mongol invasions was the principality (later the Kingdom) of Galicia-Volhynia (1238-1349). Meanwhile, other Southern-Rus' lands were under the direct control of the Golden Horde.

During 10th century the lands of Galicia-Volhynia were undergone several invasions. These invasions by its neighbors are the reasons behind the historical debate of whose historic lands these were, as every invasion provided Poles, Hungarians or Habsburgs with pretext for future invasions and claim upon these lands.⁸⁷ During the first half of the 1240s Prince Danylo of Galicia⁸⁸ was approved as the ruler of Galicia-Volhynia by the Mongol overlords and he frequently relied on Mongol existence to deter neighboring powers Poland, Lithuania, and Hungary from meddling in Galicia-Volhynia.

⁸⁶ Molchanov, *Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations*, 170.

⁸⁷ Western borderlands of Galicia-Volhynia changed hand between the Rus' and Poles no less than five times. Similarly, following their short lasting invasions in 1189, Hungarian rulers who began to call themselves as "the kings of Galicia and Lodomeria" used this late 12th century invasions as a pretext for future Hungarian invasions and claims to these lands in the eleventh century. Legacy of this period was again a justification for annexation of Galicia by the Habsburgs in 1772. (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 115-117.) The title "King of Galicia and Volhynia" was retained by the Hungarians until 1918. [Ludvik Nemeč, "The Ruthenian Uniate Church in Its Historical Perspective," *Church History* 37,1 (1968): 369.]

⁸⁸ In 1238 he became the ruler, and took control of Kiev, losing it on the eve of the Mongol attacks.

In 1240s however, Danylo who wanted to get rid of the Mongol suzerainty was in search for an alliance with Poland, Lithuania, and Hungary against the Mongols. As such, in hope for possible mounting of a crusade against the Mongols he stated his readiness to acknowledge the Pope as the head of the church.⁸⁹ This fruitless attempt led to suspicions on the part of the Orthodox Church hierarchy and Galician boyars that he had a Roman Catholic orientation.⁹⁰ The suspicions about Danylo's religious orientation persuaded Constantinople to look for a new place of residence for the Metropolitan of Kiev and all Rus'. As a result, the new metropolitan Cyril moved to the next alternative that is Vladimir-Suzdal'. This resettlement initiated the transformation of the center of the Rus' church, as Cyril's successors first moved to Vladimir-na-Kliazma, the capital of Vladimir-Suzdal, in 1300 and then permanently to Moscow in 1326.⁹¹ Thus the year 1299 indicates the "final demise of Kiev as the center of the Rus' realm," whereas the 1326 movement of the Kievan Metropolitan See to Moscow supports the claim of the Orthodox Church hierarchy in Moscow to the Kievan heritage.⁹² Thereafter, the two power centers were contesting for primacy by both laying their claim to Kievan ecclesiastical heritage.⁹³

An important territory inhabited by the Rus' because of "a steady influx of fugitives from the Kievan lands" as a result of the Mongol attacks was the north-

⁸⁹Ludvik Nemeč, "The Ruthenian Uniate Church in Its Historical Perspective," *Church History* 37, 1 (1968): 365-388, 369. He received "a crown and the title of Rex Russae Minoris" from the Pope. (Martin, *Medieval Russia 980-1584*, 152.)

⁹⁰ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 120.

⁹¹ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 122. In 1448 the Metropolitanate of Kiev and all Rus' was renamed as the Metropolitanate of Moscow and all Rus', indicating the shift of power from Kiev to Moscow. (Molchanov, *Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations*, 64.)

⁹² Vera Tolz, *Inventing the Nation: Russia* (London & New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 207.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

eastern Carpathia.⁹⁴ The Galicia-Volhynian period is also critical for the future developments in Transcarpathia as it was during the reign of Danylo's son Lev (1269-1301) that Transcarpathian Rus' was obtained from Hungary.⁹⁵ Although with the destruction of the principality of Galicia-Volhynia the Rus' inhabitants of the area became subjects of the Hungarians,⁹⁶ this laid "the foundation for future Ukrainian claims to the Western slopes of the Carpathians."⁹⁷

With its geographic proximity, Galicia-Volhynia was the very Rus' land which was open to the interferences from its neighbors and susceptible to their Catholic faith. The situation supervened with annexations by these Catholic powers signaled the upcoming evolutions in these lands. In 1340s, when Galicia-Volhynia was in turmoil following the death of its very last ruler, and when the Golden Horde had relaxed its grip on the western territories,⁹⁸ Polish Kingdom was being ruled by one of its greatest rulers Casimir the Great and The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was experiencing a rapid growth. Consequently, while Lithuania took control of Volhynia in 1344, Poland annexed Galicia in 1349.

These developments in Galicia-Volhynia meant the beginning of a new phase in the Ukrainian history, as with the disappearance of Galicia-Volhynia the last "political entity on the territory of Ukraine to embody the heritage of Kievan Rus' ceased to exist,"⁹⁹ and hereafter most Ukrainian lands gradually came under the control of Lithuania within half a century. While the Tatar rule over the Western Rus' lands was being gradually replaced by that of Poland and Lithuania,

⁹⁴ W.E.D. Allen, *The Ukraine: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 40.

⁹⁵ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 63.

⁹⁶ Allen, 40.

⁹⁷ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 63.

⁹⁸ Martin, *Medieval Russia 980-1584*, 165.

⁹⁹ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 123. Although Tatars did not usually interfere into the dealings of their vassal Rus' princes who received Khan's *yarlık* (formal appointment to rule a domain) and paid their annual tribute, this self-ruling impression should not confuse one to think that the princes ruled independently.

one more century was to pass before Eastern Rus' lands were to be freed from the Tatar suzerainty. This was a crucial factor in "accentuating the differences in the historical development" between the ancestors of present-day Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians.¹⁰⁰

2.4 Desht-i Kipchak

While the northern and western territories of contemporary Ukraine were changing hand from the Kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland, the southern and eastern lands were experiencing different developments. It should be remembered that in this period Ukrainian-Rus' people did not populate these lands, but these lands from Dniester to the Don, which were directly ruled by the Golden Horde (and after the 1420s by one of the successor states of the Golden Horde, that is the Crimean Khanate), were called as the Desht-i Kipchak (the Kipchak Steppes). These lands were not a part of the historic Ukraine, were not inhabited by Slavs, neither by the Russians nor by the Ukrainians, but were inhabited by the Tatars and nomadic Nogays both descendants of the Kipchak Turks.¹⁰¹

By the late 1400s these lands were empty of sedentary Rus' population and those settled southward were retreating northward as a result of the Tatar raids.¹⁰² The only Ukrainian elements we can talk about in the Kipchak plain during the sixteenth century were the Zaporozhian Cossacks in the upper northern parts of the

¹⁰⁰ George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953.), 234.

¹⁰¹ C. M. Kortepeter, "Gazi Giray II, Khan of the Crimea, and Ottoman Policy in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, 1588-94," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 44, 102 (1966): 142.

¹⁰² Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 83.

plain and the “*Rus’* (Ukrainian) and *Moskoflu* (Russian)”¹⁰³ captives sold as slaves by the Tatars.¹⁰⁴ Thus, it should be kept in mind that even if these were lands with a scattered population, they were by no means no-man’s land, or barren lands of the Ukrainians. It was only after the time the Russia Empire acquired these lands that the Ukrainians arrived in the Kipchak Steppes. The Russian expansion southward was a slow process that “did not begin in earnest until the last decade of the fifteenth century.”¹⁰⁵

When the Golden Horde’s hegemony in the Kipchak Steppes began deteriorating in the mid-14th century, Lithuania, Poland and Muscovy saw this as an opportunity to expand their territory southward.¹⁰⁶ Following the assassination of Berdibek Khan (in 1359), the Golden Horde was busy with its internal turmoil, which turned into a protracted internecine war. Profiting from the situation, Lithuania systematically annexed first the core Rus’ lands and then reached further south. In the meantime, Poland annexed Chelm and Belz. On the other hand, the

¹⁰³ While the forefathers of contemporary Ukrainians during the 16th century were called by the Ottoman authorities as *Rus’* (plural *Rusian*), those of the Russians were then called as *Moskoflu* (Muscovite). See, Alan Fisher, “The Ottoman Crimea in the Sixteenth Century,” in *Between Russians, Ottomans and Turks: Crimea and Crimean Tatars*, by Alan Fisher, 35-65 (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1998), 40-41.

¹⁰⁴ On the other hand, the Tatars “nomadized across the southern edge of the steppe, just above Perekop and the Black Sea and Azov coasts” and “a smaller Tatar population sedentarized in the towns and villages of the Crimean peninsula”. [Brian L. Davies, *Warefare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe: 1500-1700* (London & New York: Routledge, 2007), 6.] Fragments of the Nogay Horde were scattered in Desht-i Kipchak. Cemboyluq Nogays inhabited the area from the Bug River to the Crimean peninsula, while Yediçkul Nogays inhabited north of Crimea and “roamed as far into the Ukraine and southeastern Poland,” and Kuban Nogays lived in the north of the Azov Sea. Those who lived on the steppes between the Dniester River and Bug were the Yedisian Nogays, and those settled on Bessarabia, from Danube to Dniester were the Bucak or Belgorod Tatars. [Alan W. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institutions Press, 1987), 24.] As such, these lands were not a *tabula rasa* upon which the Russian and Ukrainian people engraved the first words of a society.

¹⁰⁵ Brian L. Davies, *Warefare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe: 1500-1700* (London & New York: Routledge, 2007), 4.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

southward expansion of Muscovy was to begin only in the end of the sixteenth century.

However, by the 1480s Crimean Khanate, which accepted the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire by 1475, was to become an important power to hinder the Lithuanian, Polish, and Muscovite colonization of the Black Sea steppe. In late 15th century, there were a number of Crimean Tatar incursions into the lands acquired by Poland and Lithuania, such as Podolia, Volhynia, Malopolska, Rus' Czerwona, or Lithuanian Belarus'.¹⁰⁷ Crimean Tatars were also attacking the lands acquired by the Muscovy in the early sixteenth century, such as Briansk, Starodub, Novgorod-Severskii, Ryl'sk, Putivl', and Karachev, in order to "discourage Muscovite military colonization of the forest-steppe and steppe."¹⁰⁸

By the mid-sixteenth century, being in alliance with the Crimean Tatars, Ottoman presence in Eastern European scene was to become emphatic. At the same time as central Hungary was outrightly annexed to the Empire following the Battle of Mohacs in 1526, a part of it became an Ottoman vassal state called as the Principality of Erdel (Transylvania). On the other side, the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia had already become vassals of the Porte.¹⁰⁹ As such, Ottomans were to influence the future developments in the region, as the Ukraine was to remain in between the competition of the Commonwealth, Muscovy, and the Crimean-Ottoman alliance.

¹⁰⁷Davies, 4-9. In 1482 Kiev was invaded and devastated by a Crimean army. In 1494 Crimean forces attacked far up to Volhynia. [Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania, International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (15th–18th Century): A Study of Peace Treaties Followed by Annotated Documents*, (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2011), 24-26.]

¹⁰⁸Davies, 14, 17.

¹⁰⁹Kortepeter, 140.

2.5 Under the Rule of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania

As mentioned above, Lithuania gradually annexed the Rus' lands during the second half of the 14th century. It can be said that the Lithuanian forces were welcomed by the Ruthenian¹¹⁰ population, and it was the Golden Horde that fought against the Lithuanians, not them.¹¹¹ Ruthenians should have had preferred the overlordship of the Lithuanians to that of the Crimean Tatars. As a matter of fact, during the Lithuanian rule the Ruthenians could identify with the political system they lived in and most probably they did not feel to be ruled by a foreign rule, because Lithuanian rulers were not forcing their culture, religion and language to their Ruthenian population; on the contrary, it was the Lithuanians who adopted the Ruthenian cultural elements.¹¹² The new state which the Ruthenians were now living in became a kind of a Lithuanian-Rus' state using the official name of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Rus', and Samogitia.¹¹³

The Ruthenians of the Grand Duchy were not feeling alien in this new environment as alongside the Lithuanians they were seen as the ruling group of the Duchy,¹¹⁴ and the Ruthenian elite were let to function even in the highest

¹¹⁰ In the Polish-Lithuanian period, the forefathers of contemporary Ukrainians and Belorussians were called Ruthenians (*Rusyny*), while Russians were called Muscovites. [Frank E. Sysyn, "Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventieth Century: The role of National Consciousness and National Conflict in the Khmelnytsky Movement," in *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, ed. Peter J.J. Potichnyj (Edmonton, Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980.), 58-82, 73.] In this section, we will use the terms Ruthenians and Muscovites for the people living during this period.

¹¹¹ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1941), 124.

¹¹² Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 72. Let alone living the Orthodox religious and cultural structure intact, numerous Lithuanian princess adopted Orthodoxy. (Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, 124.) Furthermore, while Ruthenian became the official language of the Grand Duchy [Kolodziejczyk, 19.], the influence of the law system of the Kievan Rus' was very evident on the Grand Duchy's legal code. (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 140)

¹¹³ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 131.

¹¹⁴ During the wars of Lithuania and Muscovy for the control of the Rus' lands, Ruthenians sided with their Lithuanian sovereign against what they called the "Moskvichi." (Plokhyy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 108)

governmental posts.¹¹⁵ Actually, the very fact that the Ruthenians did not feel alien to their new overlords, an environment which we propose to be non-assimilatory, was the reason why this period “significantly retarded the development of a separate identity”¹¹⁶ as the Ruthenian elite did not feel the need to develop a separate one.

Unfortunately, the situation in the Polish ruled Rus’ lands was not that favorable, and eventually the promising conditions in the Grand Duchy were to fade out by 1385, when Lithuania and Poland entered into a “personal dynastic union”¹¹⁷ with the Union of Krewo. As of then, Lithuania, which became a Catholic state as a condition of the Union, did not provide its Orthodox-Ruthenian subjects with a favorable environment. After the Union of Krewo and with the support of the state, the Polish rival “not only removed the Lithuanian elites from the Rus’ sphere of influence but also made inroads into the ranks of the Rus’ elites themselves.”¹¹⁸

Eventually, as the Polish and Lithuanian elites drew more and more closer, the gap between the Lithuanians and Ruthenians grew. In the process Lithuanian upper classes became Polonized. In time, Roman Catholics began to be given preferential treatment at the expense of the Orthodox-Ruthenian people of the Grand Duchy.¹¹⁹ The Rus’ principalities which were “dismantled and replaced by smaller territorial entities” were given to the rule of Roman Catholic boyars.¹²⁰ Orthodox princes and nobles lost their previously favorable positions. As of then, Orthodox people were no more considered as citizens with full rights as long as

¹¹⁵ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 72.

¹¹⁶ Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 157.

¹¹⁷ Andrzej Kaminski, “Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Its Citizens (Was the Commonwealth a Stepmother for Cossacks and Ruthenians?),” in *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, ed. Peter J.J. Potichnyj (Edmonton, Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980.), 32-57, 33.

¹¹⁸ Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 97-98.

¹¹⁹ Ihor Ševčenko, *Ukraine Between East and West: essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1996), 113-115.

¹²⁰ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 133-134.

they did not convert to Catholicism.¹²¹ As such, the 16th century in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was marked with the emigration of numerous Orthodox-Ruthenian people¹²² who regarded Lithuania as “an oppressive Roman Catholic environment” to the Orthodox Muscovy.¹²³ Those who did not leave the lands of Lithuania were organizing several uprisings against the Lithuanian authorities.¹²⁴

The period also saw the incremental division of the Rus’ church, which was a vital factor for the development of distinctions in the future Ukrainian society. After the disappearance of the Kievan state, the only unified Rus’ institution that remained was the Metropolitanate of Rus’, which helped to uphold the common liturgical practices and language. However, its fragmentation began with the establishment of the Metropolitanate of Halych¹²⁵ following the departure of the Metropolitan of Kiev and All Rus’ to Northeastern Rus’ in 1299. This was followed with the establishment by the Lithuanians of their own metropolitanate ca. 1317 so as to detach their Orthodox subjects from the metropolitans of all Rus’ and Little Rus’,¹²⁶ thereby contributing to Lithuanian state’s “legitimacy and the consolidation of their authority in Orthodox territories.”¹²⁷

Henceforward, there appeared a number of metropolitans with the titles as the Metropolitan of Kiev and Lithuania, of Little Rus’ and Lithuania, of Halych, of Kiev and All Rus’, of Kiev and Great Rus’, and so on. These many titles reflected the state of chaos in the Orthodox-Ruthenian world. Furthermore, after the Union of

¹²¹ Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, 132-133.

¹²² Including people of Rus’ nobility, clergy, townspeople, and even peasants.

¹²³ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 134.

¹²⁴ One of the early examples to such uprisings was in 1481, when numerous Orthodox princes led by Prince Fedir Belsky had a failed attempt to assassinate Casimir IV of Lithuania and Poland, and to place the Rus’ territories of the Grand Duchy under the Muscovite rule. Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 78.)

¹²⁵ Also officially named as the Metropolitanate of Little Rus’.

¹²⁶ Ploky, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 101.

¹²⁷ Martin, *Medieval Russia 980-1584*, 206.

Florence (1439)¹²⁸ and then the election of Metropolitan Iona as the head of the Muscovite church without the assent of Constantinople in 1448, as a reaction to the Florence decisions, the split of the once unified Rus' metropolitanate became permanent. As of then, there were two metropolitanates claiming their jurisdiction over all the lands of the former Rus' metropolitanate, one in Moscow, one in Kiev.¹²⁹ The two Rus' became increasingly separate with the rising "competition between Vilnius and Moscow for the "gathering" of the Rus' lands".¹³⁰

While the Lithuanian state was ignoring the deteriorating status of its Orthodox-Ruthenian subjects, Muscovy emerged as a protector of Orthodoxy.¹³¹ In search for a justification for their expansion westward to the ancient Kievan lands there, Muscovites were relying on their claims of being the protector of Orthodoxy and the inheritor to the Kievan Rus' and thus the gatherer of all ancient Rus'. However, these did not mean that they genuinely felt the Orthodox-Ruthenian people of those lands were their brethren neither during the Lithuanian, nor during the Polish and Polish-Lithuanian periods of the following centuries up until the 17th and 18th centuries.¹³² The case was the same for the Ruthenians of the Commonwealth who named themselves Rus' and *Rusyn*. Although they recognized their commonalities with the Muscovites, for the Ruthenians, their eastern

¹²⁸ The Council of Florence aimed at uniting the Catholic and Orthodox worlds in the wake of the imminent Ottoman threat to Constantinople. Most of the Eastern rite Churches rejected the decisions taken in Florence. As such, rejecting the Florence decisions, the Muscovite Orthodox Church declared itself autocephalous in 1448 and was not recognized as a patriarchate by the patriarch of Constantinople until 1589. [Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (1939-1950)* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1996), 2.]

¹²⁹ Nominally in Kiev but actually in Navahrudak near the Grand Duchy's capital.

¹³⁰ Ploky, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 105-106.

¹³¹ Muscovy was laying claim to all lands previously part of the Kievan Rus', and as a consequence Ivan III of Muscovy (1440-1505) began to be called as the "sovereign (*gosudar*) of all Rus'."

¹³² "The Eastern Slavs of Poland-Lithuania were generally called *Litva* or (if Cossacks) *Cherkassy*." When referring to the Polish-Lithuanian king Stefan Bathory, Ivan the Terrible called the Orthodox-Rus' population of the Commonwealth inhabiting the border between the Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania as "your [Bathory's] borderland people (*ukrainnye liudi*)," without any reference to these people's "Rus' nationality or the Orthodox religion." (Ploky, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 152.)

neighbors were “alien” and were referred to as “Muscovites”.¹³³ That is, the “allegiance to different states reinforced by cultural, linguistic, and social differences tended to underline the distinctions between the two peoples.”¹³⁴ We can claim that dating back to the 15th century, alienation began to take shape between the Muscovite and Polish-Lithuanian Rus’, especially following the Union of Florence in 1439.¹³⁵

The rising power of the late 16th century Eastern Europe was the Grand Duchy of Muscovy,¹³⁶ which, during the second half of the century, expanded at the disadvantage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (annexing Chernigov, Starodub, Novgorod-Severskii, and Smolensk). Lithuania was not only struggling with the invasions of Muscovy, but also with the Crimean Tatar incursions, major ones accruing in 1549 and 1552.¹³⁷ Lithuania which was desperately in need of help, turned to Poland. In 1569, the Poles unilaterally annexed the Grand Duchy’s southern regions Podlachia and Ruthenian lands (Volhynia, Bratslav, and Kiev).¹³⁸ This forced the Lithuanian side to come to terms with the Poles, and the Union of Lublin which meant the emergence of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (*Rzeczpospolita*) was concluded in 1569.

Prior to evaluating the developments during the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, for understanding the changing environment of the

¹³³ Sysyn, “Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventieth Century,” 73.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Since the Ruthenian Orthodox rejected to follow them “into schism with Constantinople”, they became “less than kosher to the taste of mid-sixteenth century Muscovites.” (Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 153.)

¹³⁶ By 1547 Muscovy was renamed as Tsardom of Muscovy with the coronation of Ivan IV (the Terrible) as the Tsar.

¹³⁷ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 79.

¹³⁸ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 136. These annexations happened when the negotiation between the Polish and Lithuanian sides for a proper settlement for a firmer fusion of the two states seemed to turn into a deadlock.

Commonwealth's Ruthenians better, we should focus on the developments in the lands inhabited by the Ruthenians in the Polish Kingdom before the Union of 1569.

2.6 Under the Rule of the Polish Kingdom

Before the Union of Lublin, and thus incorporation of Volhynia, Bratslav and Kiev, the other Rus' inhabited lands Galicia, Belz, and Podolia were already part of the Polish Kingdom. Contrary to the relatively favorable environment experienced by the Ruthenians of the Grand Duchy, the Ruthenian inhabitants of the Polish Kingdom were faced with a more intolerant and imposing culture. The Polish-ruled lands inhabited by the Ruthenians were administered with the Polish legal system and used Polish as the official language.¹³⁹

16th century Poland was marked with Polish cultural achievements.¹⁴⁰ These achievements deluded the Orthodox-Ruthenian nobility. While some of the Rus' nobility converted to Roman Catholicism and opted for Polish culture,¹⁴¹ others who retained their religion but adopted Polish customs and language, gave way to the development of the concept "*gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus*" (a Pole of Rus' religion).¹⁴² In the late 16th century, Polish magnates and gentry expanded into the Rus' lands and became the new landlords. With the decline in the Polish economy in the early 17th century, the Ruthenian population was to face the intensification of

¹³⁹ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 136.

¹⁴⁰ Polish culture flourished in every aspect, i.e. in literature, arts, architecture, learning.

¹⁴¹ Oscar Halecki, "Why Was Poland Partitioned," *Slavic Review* 22, 3 (1963): 437, 439.

¹⁴² Magocsi, 149. This translation of the concept into English made by Magocsi is more a translation based on the meaning of the concept rather than being a word to word translation.

social and religious intolerance. Owing to their Orthodox-Ruthenian identity, “Rus’ were differentiated from the rest of the society.”¹⁴³

In such a Roman Catholic environment, and being abandoned by their elite, the faith of the Orthodox-Ruthenian people was tied with the stance of the Orthodox Church. Unfortunately, they were left with no resolute Orthodox Church hierarchy.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, to facilitate the spread of Roman Catholicism in the Rus’ lands (contemporary western Ukraine) Roman Catholic archbishopric of Halych and L’viv was established in 1375.¹⁴⁵ Deprived of the support of its elites and Church hierarchy, the future of the Orthodox Church was “left to its own devices” and the Orthodox-Ruthenian identity in Ukraine was left to the hands of the ordinary masses.¹⁴⁶

Beginning with the late 15th century, Orthodox Christianity in Polish controlled lands could keep alive in monasteries which encouraged ‘national consciousness.’ Possibly a more vital role was played by the Brotherhood (*Bratstva*) organizations, which were established by Orthodox-Ruthenian townsmen (mainly merchants and craftsmen)¹⁴⁷ mostly in western Ukrainian cities during the first half of the 15th century, with the aim of preserving Orthodox-Ruthenian identity and supporting the Orthodox church.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴³ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 150.

¹⁴⁴ Sysyn, “Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventieth Century,” 76. As of mid-15th century, the Rus’ territories controlled by Poland and Lithuania had no Orthodox-Rus’ metropolitan in residence, and this “lack of effective authority led to an almost total breakdown of ecclesiastical order.” (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 154.)

¹⁴⁵ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 153.

¹⁴⁶ Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “A Study of Cossack History,” *Slavic Review* 31, 4 (1972): 872.

¹⁴⁷ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 97.

¹⁴⁸ One of the most prominent Brotherhood was in the center of Galicia (renamed as the Polish palatinate of Red Rus’ since 1387), the L’viv’s Stauropegial Brotherhood. (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 137.)

2.7 The Developments during the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

The period the contemporary Ukrainian lands were ruled by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was of great importance in the evolution of the political culture of future people of Ukraine. After the Union of Lublin in 1569, all the Ukrainian lands previously controlled by Lithuania came under the control of the Polish side of the Commonwealth.¹⁴⁹ Whereas the Ruthenians were the adherents of the majority religion in the grand Duchy of Lithuania, their religion became the faith of a minority with the Union of Lublin. While considering the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a “foreign” rule could be misleading, such a labeling would better fit to the Polish rule, with its imposing religion, language, and culture, having an assimilatory effect on the Rus’ population.

“Lacking both external and internal stimuli,” Orthodox-Ruthenians were left into the hands of the Polish dominant culture and were exposed to its assimilation efforts,¹⁵⁰ which was further facilitated with the absence of Muscovite interest in the position of the Orthodox-Ruthenian people in the Commonwealth¹⁵¹ This assimilation process was felt more strongly in the densely populated western Ukrainian regions of the Commonwealth, as compared to the regions in the Dnieper River basin with a geographic remoteness to the Polish center and proximity to the Muscovites. As Poland took control of Galicia and then other parts of Ukraine, in due course, cultural and linguistic Polonization spread in the cities. For most Orthodox-Ruthenian, cities became a “foreign” territory, inhabited by the Poles or

¹⁴⁹ From 1569 onwards, predominantly Ukrainian Dnieper basin territories and Volhynia were available for settlement by the ethnic Polish nobles. (Sysyn, “Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventieth Century,” 67.

¹⁵⁰ *Subtelny, Ukraine: A History*, 93.

¹⁵¹ During the Time of Troubles (1584 up until 1613) Tsardom’s claims to be the protector of Orthodoxy were postponed.

Polonized people.¹⁵² As privilege and wealth were progressively associated with Catholicity and Polishness, many “status conscious” elites preferred abandoning their culture and religion, while those who could or would not identify with Catholicity and Polishness felt increasingly resentful.¹⁵³ In 1423, the Union of Horodlo amended the Union of Krewo and gave Catholicized Lithuanian and Ruthenian nobility equal status with their Polish counterparts.¹⁵⁴ As such, by the 15th century, an important number of leading Orthodox-Ruthenian families opted for Roman Catholicism, Polish culture and language.¹⁵⁵ As nobility was mostly lost to the Polish-Catholicism, Ruthenian culture, language, and religion became associated with the lower classes. Although few, there were also Ruthenian nobles who fought assimilation, establishing printing presses and Orthodox schools.¹⁵⁶ Apart from those efforts of the few elites, the Brotherhoods (*Bratsva*) served as important mediums for maintaining Orthodoxy-Rus’ identity.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵² Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 87. The number of Orthodox-Rus’ people permitted to reside in the cities was limited and those who could live in the cities were restricted from offices and courts, for that “the town laws applied only to Catholics.” (Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 87).

¹⁵³ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 95.

¹⁵⁴ Allen, 49.

¹⁵⁵ Frank E. Sysyn, “Recovering the Ancient and Recent Past: The Shaping of Memory and Identity in Early Modern Ukraine,” *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 35,1 (2001): 78. For a list of Rus’ princes and nobles who converted to Roman Catholicism, see, Allen, 84-85.

¹⁵⁶ Those Ruthenian gentry who remained isolated from the direct impact of the Polish culture were “politically, socially, and economically too weak to stem the process of Polonization.” (Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 95.) The most prominent one was Prince Kostiantyn Ostroz’kyi, who was the Palatine of Kiev, and who founded schools and established in 1578 a printing press which in 1581 printed the first Slavic language Bible. (Yekelchuk, 26.) The most important contribution of Ostroz’kyi was the establishment of the Ostrih Academy. (Allen, 84.) Unfortunately, all his efforts were gone down the drain with his death in 1608.

¹⁵⁷ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 98.

2.7.1 The Union of Brest and the Uniate Church

Following the arrival of the Jesuits to Poland in 1560s, the previously tolerable religious environment of the Commonwealth was disturbed.¹⁵⁸ Subsequent to the Protestants, the next target of the Jesuits was “schismatics,” that is the Orthodox. Pursuant to the Union of Florence of 1439, Jesuits promoted the idea of a local Church union to solve the “Orthodox problem” of Poland.¹⁵⁹

Still, the first initiative for a union came from the Orthodox side.¹⁶⁰ The June 1595 statement of several orthodox bishops of their intention for the union with certain prerequisites, most important of which was the inviolability of the traditional liturgies and rites, was followed by the Pope Clement VIII’s acceptance of the Ruthenians and their Church into the Roman Catholic Church in December 1595.¹⁶¹ As a result, in October 1596, a pro-union synod was held in Brest which culminated in the declaration of the Union of Brest, with which while the head of the Rus’ Church became the Pope, the church practices were left unchanged, leading to the emergence of a Church suiting neither to the Roman Catholic nor to the Orthodox fashion.¹⁶² This new Church was named the Uniate Church (later to become Greek Catholic and then Ukrainian Catholic Church).

As such, while from the Roman Catholic perspective, Uniates emerged as “half-Catholics” who could become “true Catholics” only after accepting the Latin

¹⁵⁸ Sysyn, “Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventieth Century,” 75.

¹⁵⁹ Ploky, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 162, 163.

¹⁶⁰ In 1590, a group of Orthodox bishops of the Metropolitanate of Kiev conveyed to the Polish king their intention to unite with the Catholic Church. (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* 164.) These bishops supposed that union would bring equality for the Orthodox of the Commonwealth. (Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 100.) However, other Orthodox bishops were strongly against such a union. As such, the Orthodox Church hierarchy in Poland-Lithuania was split between pro-Union and anti-Union bishops.

¹⁶¹ Oscar Halecki, *From Florence to Brest 1439-1596* (Rome: Sacrum Poloniae Millennium, 1958), 289-290.

¹⁶² Ploky, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 164.

Rite, from the Greek Orthodox perspective they became traitors who apostatized their religion.¹⁶³ The emergence of the Uniate Church caused a big commotion among the Ruthenians of the Commonwealth as Polish king approved the Union of Brest, and thus outlawed the Orthodox Church. Orthodox Church properties had been confiscated and the Orthodox bishops were pressured into joining the Uniate.¹⁶⁴ The Orthodox cause of the Commonwealth's Ruthenians was taken over by the brotherhoods and non-Polonized magnates, as the Ruthenian Orthodox ruling class and nobility was gradually converting to the Uniate side if not becoming Roman Catholics.¹⁶⁵

Following these developments, Ruthenians who retained Orthodoxy came increasingly to look at to Moscow for protection.¹⁶⁶ However, Muscovy was preoccupied with domestic problems during the Time of Troubles. Still, the Union of Brest was received by the Muscovites as a serious blow to the Muscovite 'Third Rome' idea and as an effort to separate the "Little" and "White" Rus' from the "Great" Rus' by laying the stones for the Polonization of them.¹⁶⁷

The 16th century religious developments in the Commonwealth were crucial as the period saw the conversion of quite a few Orthodox Ruthenians to Roman Catholicism and/or Greek Catholicism. At those times as religion was the main cursor of one's self-identification, being Greek Orthodox meant being Rus'. As such "Rus' faith" was the synonym for the "Greek faith." In the 17th century Commonwealth, Rus' faith was part of an entire culture, which included the

¹⁶³ Nemeč, "The Ruthenian Uniate Church in Its Historical Perspective," 385.

¹⁶⁴ Nemeč, "The Ruthenian Uniate Church in Its Historical Perspective," 372.

¹⁶⁵ J. Mirtshuk and D. G., "The Ukrainian Uniate Church," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 10, 29 (1931): 377-385, 383.

¹⁶⁶ Lieven, 19.

¹⁶⁷ Bociurkiw, *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (1939-1950)* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1996), 2.

historical traditions, ethnic characteristics and linguistic patterns” of the Ruthenians.¹⁶⁸ Because of such interrelatedness, a Ruthenian’s desertion from Orthodoxy could easily bring about his alienation from the Ruthenian culture and absorption into the mainstream Polish-Catholic culture. However, the Uniate Church did not facilitate the Catholicization and Polonization of the Greek Catholic Ruthenians. Centuries later, the Uniate Church was to emerge as a bastion of Ukrainian national movement in western Ukraine that would cause great trouble in the future eastern Poland.¹⁶⁹

Still, the Union of Brest “divided Ukrainians into Orthodox and Greek Catholics, thereby laying the foundation for the many sharp distinctions that eventually developed between East and West Ukrainians.”¹⁷⁰ Indeed, the Orthodox - Greek Catholic split persists even today, and distinguishes western Ukrainians culturally from those in south and east Ukraine. The Uniate Church played “a critical role in shaping the culture and identity of Galicia and Volhynia, and giving these regions an identity wholly separate from that of Orthodox Russia”¹⁷¹ and the remaining Russian-ruled Ukrainian lands which remained Orthodox.

Not all Orthodox-Ruthenian population of the Commonwealth supported the Union. While the Bishops of L’viv and Peremyshl’ (present day Polish city Przemyśl) refused the Union, quite a few number of priests, monastics, Orthodox magnates and Brotherhoods also did not support it.¹⁷² The Orthodox magnates and the Brotherhoods worked hard for the restoration of the Orthodox Church in the Commonwealth and their efforts culminated in 1607 the reinstate the Orthodox

¹⁶⁸ Sysyn, “Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventieth Century,” 76.

¹⁶⁹ Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, xi.

¹⁷⁰ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 102.

¹⁷¹ Lieven, 19.

¹⁷² Bociurkiw, 2.

Church.¹⁷³ Subsequent to this, after lengthy struggles with the authorities, by 1632 the Orthodox Church gained official recognition.¹⁷⁴ Still, the Greek Catholicism was indelibly being established in the Rus' lands and the scarred Orthodoxy had to wait for its curative. This was to be the Cossacks.

2.7.2 The Zaporozhian Cossacks, Khmelnytskyi, and the Cossack State

Today the term Ukraine is typically employed to the state in which the Ukrainian people live. However, during the middle ages *Ukraina* meant “borderland,” it was used to refer to the lands constituting the eastern border areas of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth.¹⁷⁵ The southeastern parts of the Commonwealth, generally called as the *Dzikie Pole* (Wild Fields) (that is the Kipchak Steppes), were comprised of an open steppe making the region vulnerable to attacks by the Crimean Tatars. To the south of these lands lay the lands of the Crimean Khanate. The Crimean Tatar slave-raiding groups mostly aimed at the provinces of Kiev and Bratslav, and during late 16th and early 17th centuries they took a much devastating form.¹⁷⁶ Thus, the region was sparsely populated and was kind of a buffer zone between the Commonwealth, Muscovy, and the Crimean-

¹⁷³ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 169.

¹⁷⁴ Halecki, “Why was Poland Partitioned?,” 440. The recognition was achieved with the Cossack pressures.

¹⁷⁵ The term “*Ukraina*” emerged not to refer to the lands which are on the border area, but actually referred to the “*krai*” lands, that originally meant mainlands, inlands. However in time since the core Kievan Rus' lands became the borderlands of the Commonwealth, the term gained this second meaning of borderland.

¹⁷⁶ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 106.

Ottoman lands. The Cossacks emerged in the middle of this triangle as “a product of the *Ukraina* in the original sense of the word.”¹⁷⁷

While Cossacks’ early ethnic composition is disputable, it can be said that it had a mixed ethnic composition. The Cossacks of 14th and early 15th centuries were most likely nomadic Tatars. However, the Cossacks of Ukraine were slavified during the mid-fifteenth century.¹⁷⁸ This probably happened especially with the emigration of Ruthenians from Galicia, Volhynia, and western Podolia to eastward beyond the reach of Polish landlords, in an effort to escape the Polish manorial system and in search for a land where they can live free from the burdens of the process of the Polish colonization of their lands.¹⁷⁹ Although there were Russians, Belarusians, Poles, Moldavian, and Tatars among the Cossacks, the majority were Ruthenians, i.e., Ukrainians.¹⁸⁰ Of Turkic-Tatar origin the word *Kazak* originally denoted a “freebooter,”¹⁸¹ meant a straggler, renegade¹⁸² and unruly. Cossacks were freebooters, adventurers, and free-lance warriors who by early sixteenth century began grouping into “small bands of armed men and engaged in trade and banditry.”¹⁸³ They enjoyed a practical independence under nominal Polish rule in the steppes, and in time they became skilled warriors attracting the attention of the Commonwealth authorities.¹⁸⁴ Hence, the Cossacks began serving the Polish and Lithuanian frontier officials as mercenaries.¹⁸⁵ As they strived to escape Polish overlordship, about 1550 the Cossacks established their *Sich* (Cossack fortified

¹⁷⁷ Rady, 34.

¹⁷⁸ Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, 154.

¹⁷⁹ Rady, 34-35.

¹⁸⁰ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 109.

¹⁸¹ Omeljan Pritsak, “The Turkic Etymology of the Word Qazaq ‘Cossack’,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 28, 1-4 (2006): 239.

¹⁸² Nozar Alaolmolki, *Life After the Soviet Union: The Newly Independent Republics of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2001), 59.

¹⁸³ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 178.

¹⁸⁴ Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, 155.

¹⁸⁵ Yekelchuk, 26.

center) on the lower Dnieper area, which became to be known as the Zaporiz'ka Sich.¹⁸⁶

With the Union of Lublin of 1569, Cossacks accepted their subjugation to the Polish king as long as their traditional liberties were to remain untouched. The Cossacks began fighting against Muscovites and the Crimean-Ottomans along with the Commonwealth forces. Yet, the presence and rapid increase of Cossacks began to disturb the authorities. As such, in 1572 they decided to reduce the number of Cossacks by introducing a registration system. Hereinafter, the period saw series of uprisings by the discontented Zaporozhian Cossacks. These uprisings unified the Cossacks more strongly and they developed a strong sense of commonality. Cossacks began to call themselves as their fatherland Ukraine's defenders, and the state-like entity they were to control in the upcoming years was named the Zaporozhian Host, the freedom and autonomy of which was to be defended not only against the Crimean Tatars but also against Polish-Catholicization.¹⁸⁷ Along these lines were the Cossacks to "provide the initiative for a strong national movement."¹⁸⁸ In future, Ukrainian nationalists were to praise the role of their Cossack forefathers, seeing the state they found as the precursor of a Ukrainian nation state.

Raiding deep into both the Polish-Lithuanian and the Ottoman lands, the Cossacks soon emerged as a power in its own right.¹⁸⁹ During the first two decades of the 17th century, Cossacks revived Ukrainian-Rus' culture. Kiev which during the 16th century became simply a purely inhabited frontier fortress emerged as the

¹⁸⁶Zaporozhia derives from *za porozhe* which means beyond the rapids. (Lieven, 18.)

¹⁸⁷Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 171-187.

¹⁸⁸Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, 149.

¹⁸⁹ Estimation is that Zaporozhian Host came to 20000 Cossack warriors by the 1590s. (Rady, 35.)

center of this revival by becoming the political and military seat of the Hetman,¹⁹⁰ and by reemerging as the religious and cultural center.¹⁹¹ While one of the factors in the Union of Brest's greater progress in what are today the Belarusian lands rather than in the Ukrainian lands is the presence of Prince Ostroz'kyi and the two Orthodox bishops who resisted the Union, the second important factor was the Zaporozhian Cossacks.¹⁹² While at the early stages the Polish-Lithuanian authorities made use of the existence of these unruly Cossacks in between the lands of the Commonwealth and the Khanate, for they were instrumental in hindering the intrusions of the Crimean Tatars, with the Union of Brest the Cossacks emerged as a threat for the Commonwealth as they seized upon the role of protection of Orthodoxy.¹⁹³ During 1600-1620s, Uniates held the Metropolitan's office and all the Eastern-rite eparchies (except L'viv) in the Ruthenian lands of the Commonwealth. However, the Uniate metropolitans were precluded by the Cossacks from taking up their seats in Kiev. Cossacks even further arranged the secret appointment of an Orthodox Metropolitan for Kiev and bishops for five Orthodox sees.¹⁹⁴

In 1632, as the Poles wanted to convince the Cossacks to participate a campaign against Muscovy, Polish Diet arranged the compromise of 1632 which was also known as the Pacification of the Greek Faith with which Eastern-rite

¹⁹⁰Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, 238-245. A Hetman was the commander of the Cossack army and the head of their state.

¹⁹¹ Sysyn, "Recovering the Ancient and Recent Past," 78.

¹⁹²Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 164.

¹⁹³Bociurkiw, 3. Outside influence was crucial in the casting of such a role to the Cossacks, because the Cossack opposition to the Union became a serious threat for the Commonwealth especially with Moscow's use of this opposition as a weapon against the Catholic Poland. (Halecki, *From Florence to Brest*, 415-416.) It was the Cossack unrest that paved the way for the Muscovite intervention into the Ukrainian steppe-region and gave the opportunity to the Tsardom to establish her own mastery to replace the Polish one. (Rady, 72.)

¹⁹⁴ Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, 243-247. These were the dioceses of Przemyśl, Polatsk, Volodymyr-Volynskyi, Chelm, and Pinsk (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 188.)

eparchies of the Kievan Metropolitanate were divided among the Uniate and the Orthodox Churches.¹⁹⁵ Still, although the Cossack pressure helped to legalize of the Orthodox Church in the Commonwealth, frictions did not halt and each time the outside danger was over the Poles embarked upon their anti-Cossack policies and Cossack rebellions proceeded.¹⁹⁶ In any case, the existence of the Cossacks helped preserve and further develop the Orthodox-Ruthenian identity creating a shelter within an imposing Polish-Catholic environment.

In such an environment Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nytskyi emerged as the man who would change the destiny not only of the Cossacks but also of the Ukrainian people yet to come. Hetman Khmel'nytskyi, who ruled the Cossack territories as if an independent state, wished to free the Cossack lands from the Polish suzerainty and "save and protect" his people "from forcible Polish Catholic assimilation,"¹⁹⁷ and as such initiated a rebellion in 1648. The rebellion turned out to be a huge threat for the Commonwealth because Khmel'nytskyi managed to combine "peasant anger at expanding serfdom, burghers' antagonism to Jewish competitors, Orthodox abomination of Catholic oppression, and much of the Ukrainian population's resistance to the misrule of the magnates."¹⁹⁸

In early 1648, in need of help he accepted the suzerainty of the Crimean Khan after which the Zaporozhian-Tatar army defeated the Poles. Following this victory, the registered Cossacks deserted to the Khmel'nyskyi forces.¹⁹⁹ The second Polish defeat in the Battle of Korsun brought about the revolt of the ordinary

¹⁹⁵ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 188-191. Accordingly, while the Orthodox were given the eparchies of Kiev, L'viv, Przymysl, and Lutsk, the Uniates were to hold the eparchies of Polatsk, Chelm, Pinsk, Smolensk, and Volodymyr-Volynskyi.

¹⁹⁶ Philip Longworth, *The Cossacks* (London: Constable, 1969), 94.

¹⁹⁷ Serhii Plokhyy, "The Ghosts of Pereyaslav: Russo-Ukrainian Historical Debates in the Post-Soviet Era", *Europe-Asia Studies* 53,3 (2001): 493.

¹⁹⁸ Sysyn, "Recovering the Ancient and Recent Past," 79.

¹⁹⁹ Hrushevskyi, *A History of Ukraine*, 280.

people, turning the revolt into a popular uprising.²⁰⁰ As “all the avenging Furies” were let loose, peasants were taking vengeance from the Polish-Catholic rule by killing any Polish landlord, Jewish estate manager, Roman Catholic and Uniate priest they came across.²⁰¹ Following these two victories the entire Dnieper region was left to the Cossacks.²⁰² With the 1649 Zboriv Treaty, Polish military and administrative personnel, Catholics, Uniates, and Jews left the Ukrainian inhabited palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav, and Chernigov to be replaced by the Cossacks and Ruthenian Orthodox nobles.²⁰³ Zboriv also brought about the recognition of the “autonomous Cossack state.”²⁰⁴ Furthermore, the Cossacks stipulated the reintroduction of Orthodoxy into the Commonwealth.²⁰⁵ Although much of the favorable conditions of the Zboriv Peace were lost with the Treaty of Bila Tserkva signed after the defeat of the Cossacks at Berestechko in Volhynia in 1651, ending up with a considerable contraction of Cossack territories,²⁰⁶ the Cossacks regained their favorable position with the 1653 Zhvanets Treaty by which the boundaries of the autonomous Cossack state were confirmed.²⁰⁷

During this period those unregistered Cossacks and Ruthenian peasants who were discontented by the actions of Khmel’nytski, the return of, albeit of Orthodox Ruthenian extraction, landlords’ rule,²⁰⁸ thus disillusioned by their disability to free themselves from servitude²⁰⁹ and disturbed by the Hetman’s alliance with the

²⁰⁰ Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 236.

²⁰¹ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 131.

²⁰² Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 207.

²⁰³ Hrushevskyi, *A History of Ukraine*, 286.

²⁰⁴ Yekelchuk, 28.

²⁰⁵ Nemeč, “The Ruthenian Uniate Church in Its Historical Perspective,” 377.

²⁰⁶ The authority of the hetman became limited to Kiev province. (Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 132.)

²⁰⁷ Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 207-208. For the boundaries of the Cossack state, see Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 232.

²⁰⁸ Longworth, 112.

²⁰⁹ Hrushevskyi, *A History of Ukraine*, 286-287, 291.

Crimean Tatars were moving to the eastern lands controlled by the Muscovites.²¹⁰ In today's Kharkov and around the Ukrainian-Russian border area, that is the lands which mostly constitute today's eastern Ukraine the Cossacks were allowed to form tax-exempt settlements (*slobody*), and these lands controlled by Muscovy but inhabited mainly by the Cossacks began to be called as Sloboda Ukraine.²¹¹ Starting from 1648 when Khmel'nytskyi had to turn to Muscovy for military assistance, the Cossacks were entering into the orbit of Muscovy step by step.²¹² Got stuck between the aggressive policies of the Commonwealth, the Ottoman Empire, and the Tsardom, and taking into account the fact that he could not rely on the Crimean Tatars for long²¹³ by early 1650s Khmel'nytskyi became convinced that the only way for the survival of the Cossacks was by entering under the protection of the Tsar. At least the Muscovites shared with them the Orthodox religion and the Rus' past.²¹⁴ Although Khmel'nytskyi relied upon religious commonality between the two people in his addresses to the Tsar when calling his help, Muscovites drew a clear religious divide.²¹⁵

Prompted by Khmel'nytskyi's threats that unless the Tsar does not accept his people he would ally with the Turks and the Crimean Tatars,²¹⁶ Muscovites dropped their previous stance of 1634 when they assured the Poles that the Tsar's title "all Rus'" had nothing to do with the Polish-Lithuanian "Little Rus'." As such, after twenty years of ignorance, Muscovites started to justify their intervention in

²¹⁰ Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 208.

²¹¹ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 205.

²¹² Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 134.

²¹³ Hrushevskyi, *A History of Ukraine*, 294.

²¹⁴ Plokhy, "The Ghosts of Pereyaslav," 496.

²¹⁵ Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 233. They considered Orthodox Ruthenians "not entirely Orthodox," and thus had to be rebaptized in Muscovite triple immersion fashion to become true Orthodox. (Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 233.)

²¹⁶ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 134.

Commonwealth affairs with the pretext of protection of their coreligionists.²¹⁷ After some months of negotiations, in March 1654 the Agreement of Pereiaslav (The March Articles, *Bereznevistatti*) was signed between the Hetman Khmelnytski and the Tsardom, whereby the Tsar accepted the Cossacks “under his high hand” and the Cossacks swore their allegiance to the Tsar.²¹⁸

Pereiaslav has been attributed a crucial role especially by traditional Russian historiography, and seen as the agreement by which Ukraine was united with Russia. However, actually this agreement was not to be permanent since the developments of the time were to see a number of changing alliances whereby the Cossacks were to fight against the Tsar they were to be loyal according to Pereiaslav. Still, in the end of the day, the territories east of Dnieper were to enter under the control of a Muscovite-Russian state, and further acquisitions were to follow that by the beginning of the 19th century all the territories except western Ukrainian lands (Galicia, Transcarpathia, and Bukovina) would be incorporated into the Russian Empire.

The Agreement of Pereiaslav was followed by Tsardom’s attack on the Commonwealth for further acquisitions. In these early periods of Pereiaslav, Khmel’nytskyi became more and more disturbed by the attitude of the Tsardom and the truce with the Poles in 1656. Although still the contemporary historians can hardly agree whether the Agreement of Pereiaslav “constituted a protectorate, suzerainty, military alliance, personal union, real union or complete

²¹⁷ Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 242-247. The term Little Rus’ which later evolved into Little Russia, emerged as a reference to core Rus’ lands. However in time the term “Little Russians” took on a derogatory meaning since it connoted that these people were not distinct from the Russians, but were a subgroup of the greater Russian nationality.

²¹⁸ Hrushevskyi, *A History of Ukraine*, 294. Hereinafter, Tsar’s title was changed from Tsar of All Rus’ (*Vseia Rusii*) to Tsar of All Great and Little Rus’ (*Vseia Velikiia ĭ Malyya Rusii*). (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 214.)

subordination,²¹⁹ what is obvious that whatever the essence of the Agreement was, Hetman Khmel'nytskyi did not hesitate from pursuing an independent foreign policy,²²⁰ and neither during his rule nor after did the Cossacks remain loyal to the Russians but changed side for numerous times between the conflicting parties who were fighting for the domination of the area.

With the death of Khmel'nytskyi in 1657 and without a finalized agreement to ensure Ukraine's security, Ukraine entered into the Period of Ruin during which where the future of Ukraine lay was far more than ambiguous.²²¹ There were Swedes who were promising the establishment of an independent Cossack state incorporating Galicia, Volhynia, and eastern Ukrainian lands.²²² There were also the Poles, to whom, in 1659 the Hetman proposed the transformation of the Commonwealth into a federation of Poland, Lithuania, and the Grand Duchy of Rus'.²²³ This plan, came to be known as the Union of Hadiach, was the last attempt "for solving the thorny Ukrainian problem within the framework of the Commonwealth."²²⁴ This Union was never realized because those Cossacks who favored Muscovy had the upper hand.²²⁵ Learning about the Union of Hadiach, Muscovy attempted to invade Ukraine, however defeated by the joint Crimean Tatar-Cossack armies in the Battle of Konotop as a result of which a stalemate

²¹⁹ Ploky, "The Ghosts of Pereyaslav," 499.

²²⁰ Hrushevskyi, *A History of Ukraine*, 298. At the moment the Commonwealth was under the attack of the Swedes who took advantage of the Polish involvement in the south and east. Hetman decided that reaching an accord with the Commonwealth's three Protestant neighbors Sweden, Brandenburg, and Transylvania could provide the necessary conditions for the independence of the Cossack state.

²²¹ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 217-219.

²²² This promise was given with a treaty signed by the two sides in October 1657 at Korsun.

²²³ Nemeč, "The Ruthenian Uniate Church in Its Historical Perspective," 378.

²²⁴ Ivan L. Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987), 55.

²²⁵ Halecki, "Why was Poland Partitioned?," 440.

emerged.²²⁶ According to the stalemate and because of their suspicion that “the khan wished to subdue Ukraine for his own”,²²⁷ The Poles and the Russians decided to reach a compromise whereby the Cossack lands were divided into a Polish sphere of influence on the Right Bank and a Muscovite sphere of influence on the Left Bank Ukraine. This division was formalized with the Treaty of Andrusovo of 1667.²²⁸

As of then there was one hetman in the Polish-controlled Right Bank, and another in the Muscovite-controlled Left Bank.²²⁹ The attempt in 1668 of Hetman Petro Doroshenko of Right Bank, who approached the Crimean Khan and asked help, thereby entered under Ottoman suzerainty and tried to unite the two sides by invading the Left Bank with the backing of the Porte,²³⁰ ended up with the Ottoman control of large parts of Right Bank by annexations of Podolia, Bratslav, and southern palatinates by the Treaty of Buchach of 1672. The Ottoman annexations led to the influx of Ruthenian peasants to the Left Bank and Sloboda Ukrainian lands.²³¹ In the meantime, Muscovites and Ottoman-Crimean Tatars recognized each others’ sovereignty in their domains with the Peace of Bahçesaray of 1681. However, the war between the Ottomans and the Poles still continued.²³² Because the Commonwealth was in great trouble with the Ottomans, they wanted to reach an accord with the Muscovites. Hence, the Eternal Peace of 1686 was established between the Commonwealth and the Tsardom. With this, it became evident that the division of Ukraine roughly along the Dnieper River was here to stay for a long

²²⁶ Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania, International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (15th–18th Century): A Study of Peace Treaties Followed by Annotated Documents*, (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2011),173.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 174.

²²⁸ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 4.

²²⁹ Nemeč, “The Ruthenian Uniate Church in Its Historical Perspective,” 378.

²³⁰ Kolodziejczyk, 176.

²³¹ Hrushevskyyi, *A History of Ukraine*, 332.

²³² Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 148.

time. Commonwealth was renouncing any claim to Left Bank, Kiev, Smolensk, Starodub, and Zaporozhian Cossack lands, while Right Bank and Eastern Galicia were to remain under the Polish control. Southern Kiev, Podolia, and Bratslav were to remain Ottoman lands until the end of the 17th century.²³³

Prior to 1648, almost all Ukrainian-inhabited lands were ruled by a single political system, that is the Commonwealth. The events ensuing the 1648 Khmel'nytskyi Uprising brought the Polish retreat,²³⁴ and meant that all Ukrainians would not live under a single political entity "again for almost 300 years."²³⁵ Still, the Khmel'nytskyi Uprising and the thus emerged Cossack state helped to the development of a "vision of Rus' as a nation endowed with a particular territory and protected by its own political and military institutions."²³⁶ Thus, the period became a "milestone in the formation of the modern Ukrainian identity."²³⁷ However, the course of events developed contrary to the hopes of the Cossacks. The Agreement of Pereiaslav never brought the wished position, but conversely it became the first step of Tsardom's absorption of the Cossack Ukraine. Although the Hetmanate (officially the Army of Zaporozhia) on the Muscovite-controlled Left Bank was autonomous, year by year the Muscovites established stricter control on the Cossack lands.

As for the position of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, in the Polish-ruled Galicia, Polissia and Right Bank Orthodox Church was under the strong Polish-Catholic influence, and thus the Uniate Church became more and more entrenched

²³³ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 228.

²³⁴ Roman Szporluk, "After Empire: What?," *Daedalus* 123, 3, After Communism: What? (1994): 33.

²³⁵ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 152.

²³⁶ Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 241.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, 236.

in these regions.²³⁸ Actually, it should be noted that the Cossack influence was not considerable for the Ruthenians of Galicia as the Cossack movement could reach there only for a brief period during the Cossack occupation in 1649. Thus the region remained within the Polish cultural orbit.²³⁹ However, in the Hetmanate, as following the 1648 revolution Roman Catholic and Uniate clergy and Polish and Polonized nobles had to flee to the Polish ruled territories as they were replaced by the Orthodox clergy and fledgling Cossack nobility and their properties were confiscated by the Orthodox Church.²⁴⁰ Hence, although the Orthodox Church was one of the foremost beneficiaries of the establishment of the Cossack rule, in time increasing Muscovite control brought its jurisdiction under the autocephalous Russian Orthodox Church from the ecumenical patriarchate in Constantinople in 1686. The jurisdiction of the patriarchy of Moscow meant the loss of the Ukrainian Orthodoxy's independence.²⁴¹

The period of rule of Hetman Ivan Mazepa (1687-1709) was crucial for it saw important developments that shaped the future of Ukraine. Since the death of Khmelnytskyi the Cossacks of the Zaporiz'ka Sich were against the hetmans and *starshyna* and their policies.²⁴² Although the Hetmans looked for different alliances to attain their goals, the Cossacks vigorously favored Muscovy. However, during Mazepa's rule the Zaporozhian position towards Muscovy began to change as a

²³⁸ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 194. The major dioceses as L'viv, Lutsk, and Peremyshl were lost to the Uniates.

²³⁹ Yekelchuk, 31.

²⁴⁰ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 249-267

²⁴¹ In 1589, the status of the Metropolitanate of Moscow was elevated to become a Patriarchate. (Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 204.) In 1654 Smolensk, Polatsk, Mahiliou, and Turau eparchies of the Kievan Metropolitanate were placed under the Muscovite jurisdiction. The last Kievan metropolitan to recognize the direct jurisdiction of Constantinople died in 1675 (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 255.), and 1686 was the year when complete subordination of the Kievan Metropolitanate to the Metropolitanate of Moscow was accomplished. As of then, Orthodox Church became "an instrument of cultural assimilation." (Yekelchuk, 30.)

²⁴² Longworth, 166.

result of the successful Muscovite campaigns over the Crimean Tatars. As the existence of the Crimean Khanate was the *raison d'être* for Muscovy's toleration of the Cossacks, they knew that in the absence of the Tatar threat Muscovy would not need them.²⁴³

However, Mazepa's decisions during the Great Northern War between Muscovy and Sweden were to shape the destiny of the Ukraine. As requested by Peter the Great, Mazepa's forces occupied Kiev and Volhynia from Poland, unilaterally appending L'viv to these occupations. Thence, the Mazepa controlled Hetmanete territories roughly corresponded to Khmelnytskyi period territories. When Peter, allied with the Poles, wanted the return of the occupied territories Mazepa procrastinated on fulfilling Peter's orders as he wished to establish an independent state in these lands and looked for an alliance with Sweden to attain this goal.²⁴⁴ Mazepa defected to Swedes, and the Zaporozhians followed him.²⁴⁵ This "defection" was catastrophic for Ukraine, because albeit Mazepa's expectations, his decision resulted in the attack of Muscovite forces, capture of Hetmanate's capital, destruction of the Zaporiz'ka Sich, Mazepa's removal from his post and replacement by Ivan Skoropadskyi who acted as a puppet of the Tsar, and gradual reduction of Cossack autonomy resulting in total incorporation of the Cossack controlled Ukrainian lands into the Tsardom.²⁴⁶

²⁴³ Hence the Cossacks rejected to assist the Muscovite attacks on the Crimean Tatar in 1687 and 1689. (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 242.) Furthermore, in 1692 Zaporozhian Cossacks revolted against Mazepa with the intention of establishing an independent state on the lands of Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine with the support of the Crimean Tatars. (Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 161.)

²⁴⁴ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 244. In return for the Cossack support Swedes offered Mazepa the establishment of an independent Cossack state incorporating Ukrainian inhabited lands of both the Right and Left Bank Ukraine. (Allen, 193.)

²⁴⁵ Longworth, 166.

²⁴⁶ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 245-247.

After the decisive defeat of the Swedish-Cossack forces at Poltava, Mazepa followed the Swedish King and took refuge in Ottoman territory.²⁴⁷ The Cossack struggle for independence continued from exile under the Ottoman protection until 1734. Following Mazepa's death in 1709, in search for the establishment of an independent state, the new Hetman Orlyk, who was under Ottoman suzerainty, invaded Right Bank in 1711, however to be suppressed by the Polish forces.²⁴⁸

After all the struggle given, by 1711 while the Commonwealth ruled most of Right Bank, Galicia, Volhynia, Podolia and Belz, most of Left Bank, the Hetmanate, and Sloboda Ukraine were controlled by the Tsardom of Muscovy. As it was since the Middle Ages uninterruptedly a part of Hungary, Transcarpathia remained a part of the Austrian-ruled Hungarian Kingdom.²⁴⁹ Bukovina was a part of the Ottoman vassal state of Moldavia, Zaporozhia was under the protection of the Ottomans until their return to the Muscovite rule by 1734, and the Ottomans ruled southern territories either directly or through the control of the Crimean Khanate.

However soon things were to change since while Tsardom was evolving into an Empire, Commonwealth was having hard times and the Partitions of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was just around the corner.

²⁴⁷ Allen, 197.

²⁴⁸Hrushevskyi, *A History of Ukraine*, 372.

²⁴⁹Szporluk, *Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State*, 87.

CHAPTER 3

THE PARTITIONS OF POLAND AND THE AGE OF EMPIRES

3.1 The Developments until the 1st Partition of Poland

This period saw the events that paved the way for the disappearance of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the political map of Europe for 123 years to come. Hence, the Polish rule of Ukrainian inhabited lands was to cease until the restoration of the Second Polish Republic in 1918. Thus, the developments of these years were preparatory for the division of the Ukrainian lands between the two major powers of their period, the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian Empires.

3.1.1 The Rise of the Russian Empire

The transformation of Tsardom of Muscovy into the Russian Empire by Peter the Great in 1721 was followed by the initiation of the policy of centralization, which meant that gradually, most Ukrainian inhabited territories were to be fully integrated into the Russian Empire. The first Ukrainian-inhabited territory to lose its status was the Sloboda Ukraine. Although never a Ukrainian

land, Sloboda Ukraine became inhabited by runaway Ukrainian peasants and the Cossacks who were offered by the Tsardom to form tax-exempt settlements there during the 17th century. The local autonomy which was granted to the area was first disturbed in 1732, and its autonomous status was totally dispensed with following Catherine the Great's decision to Russify the southern lands. Hence, Sloboda Ukraine was fully integrated to the Russian Empire by being incorporated into the imperial province of New Russia.²⁵⁰

In the meantime, Russians were approaching to the Black Sea as a result of their victories against the Ottomans. With the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774, Ottomans lost their sovereignty over the Crimean Khanate,²⁵¹ and by 1783 Russia absorbed the Khanate. As a response to the annexation of Crimea, Turks declared a new war to the Russians, in which they lost.²⁵² As a result of this war, the southern lands became totally open for the Russian imperial colonization. Thence, Ukrainian-Russian settlement of the Black Sea hinterland boomed by 1780s.²⁵³

As for the Zaporozhians, in 1734 they decided to return to the Russian suzerainty for they were offered to resettle to their former lands and establish the “New Sech” for their support of Russians against the Ottomans.²⁵⁴ However, as the lasting Russian success over the Ottomans and the signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 meant that now the Crimean Tatars were subdued, Zaporozhian

Although today we refer to the region as Transcarpathia (land beyond the Carpathian Mountains) from the view point of an observer based in Ukraine, as a land belonging to Hungary for ages the region was called by the locals as Subcarpathian Rus', that is “the land under” or “at the foothills of the Carpathians.” [Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009), 111.]

²⁵¹ Russians gained some territory in the Yedisan region, parts of the Khanate around Mariupol, east of Azov and Kerch peninsula. (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 275.)

²⁵² With this war Russians stormed Ismail, and with the Treaty of Jassy of 1792 Russia got new territories on the Black Sea littoral and the Taman peninsula. (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 275.)

²⁵³ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 187.

²⁵⁴ Allen, 214.

Cossacks became less than necessary for the Russians.²⁵⁵ They were once more considered as a potential source of rebellion and an obstacle before the colonization of the Black Sea hinterlands.²⁵⁶ Hence, in 1775 the Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed for the second time and the lands of Zaporozhia were incorporated into the imperial province of New Russia.²⁵⁷

The last to be integrated into the Russian Empire was the Hetmanate. The office of Hetman was abolished in 1765 for once and for all. Its lands were divided among the Russian imperial provinces of Kiev, Novgorod-Severskii, and Chernigov, its administration was replaced by Russian imperial bureaucracy, Cossack army was merged into the Russian imperial army, and its autonomous status was abolished altogether by 1785.²⁵⁸

With the absorption of the Cossack lands by the Russian Empire the Cossacks and the Ruthenian peasant masses were to be exposed to an ever increasing process of Russification, and by time the Cossack *starshyna* and their descendants were to be assimilated into the Russian nobility. By the same token, the Polish-ruled Ruthenian lands were under heavy Polish-Catholic influence for centuries, and by the time of the Partitions of Poland and introduction of the Habsburg rule over these territories, the Ruthenian nobility was mainly Polonized. However, the developments of the 19th century were to help them to rediscover their Ruthenian identity.

²⁵⁵ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 175.

²⁵⁶ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 5.

²⁵⁷ Longworth, 177.

²⁵⁸ Allen, 229. As the abolition of the Hetmanate corresponded with Catherine the Great's granting to the Cossack elite (*starshyna*) and their descendants equal status with the Russian nobility (*dvoriane*), (Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 82.) the liquidation of the Hetmanate caused no major resistance on the part of the elite. (Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 173.) Soon the Cossack upper class began assimilating into the Russian imperial ruling class. (Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 83.)

3.1.2 The Right Bank and West Ukraine and the Partitions of Poland

It took several more years after the suppression of the Cossack invasion attempt in 1711 for the Poles to reestablish their control over the Right Bank. The Polish comeback meant the return of the Polish magnates, Roman Catholic and Uniate Churches.²⁵⁹ With the era of Sarmatianism in the Commonwealth, there emerged an environment where there was extreme intolerance towards everything not associated with Polish-Catholicism and all Orthodox eparchies were eliminated.²⁶⁰ In these circumstances, a great amount of the Orthodox-Ruthenians of the Commonwealth sought escape in the Muscovite controlled Left Bank.²⁶¹

The intolerance shown to the Orthodox religion, Ruthenian culture, and the Cossack way of life and the increasing burden of the economic conditions evoked revolts by the Cossacks and Orthodox peasants. Bands of armed peasants were targeting the Commonwealth officials, Roman Catholic and Uniate clergy, Polish or Polonized nobility, and Jewish arendars (leaseholders) living in Right Bank territories.²⁶² These revolts came to be known as the Haidamak Revolts.²⁶³ The most infamous was the Koliivshchyna Revolt of 1768. During the Revolt which began in southern Kiev palatinate and spread to Podolia, Volhynia, and Bratslav, thousands of Poles, Jews, and Roman Catholics or Uniates were brutally massacred, most notorious of these massacres had taken place in Uman.²⁶⁴ Koliivshchyna, its

²⁵⁹ Yekelchuk, 31.

²⁶⁰ Orthodox eparchies of L'viv, Pryzemsly, Lutsk, Volhynia's Pochaiv Monastery, and even L'viv's very famed Stauropegial Brotherhood became Uniate. (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 294.)

²⁶¹ Yekelchuk, 31.

²⁶² Longworth, 175.

²⁶³ Haidamak is a word derived from Turkish meaning vagrant, robber or pillager. (Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 191.)

²⁶⁴ Barbara Skinner, "Borderlands of Faith: Reconsidering the Origins of a Ukrainian Tragedy," *Slavic Review* 64,1 (2005): 88, 108.

suppression,²⁶⁵ and the Uman massacre became the symbols of hatred between the Poles and Ukrainians.

In great trouble both inside and outside, early in 1768 the Polish *sejm* (parliament) accepted the signature of a treaty by which the *sejm* conceded to the Russian Empire all but formal sovereignty in Poland turning it into a protectorate of the Russian Empire. On the other hand, a number of confederacies were formed (with headquarters at Bar) in defense of the Catholic Church, the Sejm, and the independence of the Commonwealth against the Russian influence. Authorized to suppress the Bar confederates, Polish-Russian troops began attacking the confederates. The expansion of the events into Ottoman lands by the attack on Balta of the Cossacks in the Russian service, who followed the fleeing confederates into this Ottoman-Tatar border town and massacred Ottoman subjects, drew the Ottomans into the conflict, whereby the Ottomans first demanded the withdrawal of the Russian forces from Poland and then declared war on the Russians. In 1769, Ottoman forces invaded Russian-ruled Ukraine but had to withdraw under harsh winter conditions. The 1768 Russo-Ottoman war was to turn into a disaster for the Ottomans since successive defeats at the hands of the Russian forces were to culminate in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774. The Bar Confederation, the Koliivshchyna revolt, and the impact of the Russo-Ottoman War came along and contributed to the 1st Partition of Poland as the civil war led by these was used as pretext by the intervening powers Russia, Austria, and Prussia.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁵ The revolt was crushed by the Russian imperial forces. (Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 58.)

²⁶⁶ Jerzy T. Lukowski, "Towards Partition: Polish Magnates and Russian Intervention in Poland during the Early Reign of Stanislaw August Poniatowski," *The Historical Journal* 28, 3 (1985):564-565, 571.

Interested in territorial gains, and taking into advantage the weakening of the Ottomans and Poland's preoccupation with the civil war, Prussia, Russia, and Austria partitioned the Commonwealth first in 1772. With the 1st Partition while Russia got most of Belorussia, Prussia got Pomerania and the territories between Brandenburg and East Prussia, and Austria annexed Galicia, Belz and south of the Vistula River. The 1st Partition was followed by the 2nd (1793), and the 3rd (1795) Partitions. As a result of the Partitions, by 1795, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was wiped out of the map, thus ending the Polish rule over Ukrainian-inhabited lands, which went as back as to 14th century, at least until 1918. By 1795 of the Ukrainian-inhabited lands Galicia, Belz and Bukovina²⁶⁷ were part of Austria, Transcarpathia was a part of the Kingdom of Hungary, and in addition to formerly acquired lands, the entire Right Bank, palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav, Podolia, Volhynia,²⁶⁸ and eastern parts of Chelm became part of Russia.

Even if the Polish rule was withering away, when assessing the cultural differences within modern Ukraine, the more than four centuries-long Polish rule over Galicia, more than two centuries long direct Polish rule in the Right Bank, and even the century-long rule in Kiev and parts of the Left Bank, should certainly be kept in mind. Still, the Partitions of Poland meant that for the time the fate of Ukraine would be in the hands of the Austrian and the Russian Empires.

²⁶⁷ Bukovina was captured from the Ottomans in 1774.

²⁶⁸ Eastern Volhynia was seized in 1793, and western Volhynia in 1795.

3.2 Ruthenians of Habsburgs and Little Russians of Romanovs²⁶⁹

During the imperial era the Ukrainian lands that came under the rule of the Habsburg Monarchy were the western Ukrainian lands that are eastern Galicia(1772), Bukovina (1774), and Transcarpathia (a part of Hungary since 11th century). The Ukrainian-inhabited lands ruled by the Romanovs were reorganized into 9 provinces. Accordingly, Chernigov and Poltava provinces were formed from the territories of the Hetmanate, Sloboda Ukraine became the province of Kharkov, Zaporozhia, which was incorporated into New Russia, was divided between two new provinces Ekaterinoslav and Kherson, and the territories of the Crimean Khanate became the province of Tavrida. As for the territories on the Right Bank acquired during the Polish Partitions of 1793-1795, former Polish palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav, Podolia, Volhynia, and eastern Chelm region were renamed by the Russian authorities as the provinces of Kiev, Volhynia, and Podolia.

3.2.1 The Experiences of the Ruthenians under the Habsburg Monarchy

The period the Ruthenian-inhabited territories were incorporated into the Habsburg Empire corresponded to the reign of two important reformers: Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II. The reforming atmosphere of the Empire especially in religious and educational matters provided the Ukrainians with a favorable

²⁶⁹ During the 18th and 19th centuries, the Ukrainians under the Russian imperial rule were called as Little Russians, (Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 201.) while Ukrainians of the Habsburg Monarchy were officially designated – as was during the times of the Commonwealth – as Ruthenians (*die Ruthenen* in German. *Rusyny* was how they called themselves in their vernacular). (Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 315.)

environment that contributed to the development of a sense of self-distinctiveness, cultural awareness, and national consciousness.

Unlike that of the Russians, the Austrian nationalities policy encouraged and promoted the idea of a distinct Ruthenian nation both from the Poles and the Russians. Thus, the Habsburg imperial policies had a crucial impact on the national development of the Ruthenians. Furthermore, unlike the situation in the Russian Empire, where belonging to a common religion with the Russians, and linguistic similarities united the Little Russians with the dominant nationality, promoting a Russophile political culture in Russian-ruled Ukraine,²⁷⁰ being of the Greek Catholic or Orthodox religion in a Roman Catholic state and possessing a different language strengthened the Ruthenians' sense of separate identity.²⁷¹ Besides, the rise not only of the Polish nationalism but also of other nationalisms within the empire such as the German, Hungarian, and Czech nationalism stimulated the Ukrainian intelligentsia towards developing their own one taking "these nationalisms both as examples to follow and as threats to oppose," promoting a Ukrainophile political culture in Habsburg-ruled Ukraine.²⁷²

In a time during which the Romanovs were outlawing the Uniate Church within their domain, the Habsburg imperial government granted all religions within the Empire equal status and same rights, and responded to the abolition of the Uniate Church and forced re-"Orthodoxation" campaign of the Russian Empire by creating an independent Greek Catholic Metropolitanate of Galicia in 1808.²⁷³ The environment the Greek Catholic Church found itself in helped it to further secure its

²⁷⁰ Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries*, 131-132.

²⁷¹ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 45.

²⁷² Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries*, 129.

²⁷³ Magocsi, *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine's Piedmont* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 14-15.

position in the region and set forward the development of the Greek Catholic clergy into the new elite of the Ruthenians²⁷⁴ (since the Ruthenian elite was already assimilated into the Polish *szlachta*).²⁷⁵ The Greek Catholic Church assumed the role of “custodian and reviver of national identity,”²⁷⁶ as especially prior to 1848 national movement was comprised almost exclusively of Greek Catholic clergy.²⁷⁷ Although with a traditionalist approach, the clergy was initially hesitant to support the activities of the flourishing secular intelligentsia, by the end of the 19th century the Greek Catholic Church was to become a bastion of Ukrainianism.²⁷⁸

With the decision of the imperial government to use local languages in elementary education the language issue became the major preoccupation of the Ruthenians.²⁷⁹ As by 1818 Ruthenian was made the language of instruction in Greek Catholic education institutions,²⁸⁰ Studium Ruthenum - the first university level institution established in L’viv to offer courses only in the Ruthenian language - was established,²⁸¹ and a Ruthenian college was found in the L’viv (Lemberg) University,²⁸² Ruthenians embarked upon a process of refining and raising “the Ukrainian vernacular, free of Church Slavonic and other foreign ‘refinements,’ to

²⁷⁴ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 214.

²⁷⁵ Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 315.

²⁷⁶ Nahaylo, *Ukrainian Resurgence*, 7.

²⁷⁷ Stella Hryniuk, *Peasants with Promise: Ukrainians in Southeastern Galicia 1880-1890* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1991), 195-196.

²⁷⁸ Magocsi, *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism*, 24. The Greek Catholic Church was to become the stronghold of Ukrainism specially with the elevation of Andrei Sheptytskyi to the Metropolitan See of Halych where his services to the Ukrainian national cause would be of great importance until his death in 1944.

²⁷⁹ Hryniuk, *Peasants with Promise: Ukrainians in Southeastern Galicia*, 64-65.

²⁸⁰ Larry Wolff, “‘Kennst du das Land?’ The Uncertainty of Galicia in the Age of Metternich and Fredro,” *Slavic Review* 67, 2 (2008): 288.

²⁸¹ Paul Robert Magocsi, “A Subordinate or Submerged People: The Ukrainians of Galicia under Habsburg and Soviet Rule,” in *Nationalism and Empire: The Habsburg Monarchy and the Soviet Union* ed. Richard L. Rudolph and David F. Good (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Center for Austrian Studies, 1992), 95-107, 98.

²⁸² Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 37.

the level of a literary language.”²⁸³ The peasant vernacular written in modern Cyrillic was to become the foundation of the Ukrainian literary language,²⁸⁴ and “after protracted debate between Galician Ukrainians and their brethren in the Russian Empire, the language finally adopted was standard Ukrainian based on the Poltava dialects in Dnieper Ukraine.”²⁸⁵ The *Narodovtsi* (Populists, Ukrainophiles) favored the use of local peasant-spoken vernacular, and worked for this cause.²⁸⁶ The “first publication to use vernacular Galician Ukrainian written in the modern civil script” which was entitled as *Rusalka Dnistrovaia* (The Nymph of the Dniester, 1837) “became the orthographic model subsequently adopted for the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia.”²⁸⁷ The literary works in the vernacular helped to demonstrate that the peasant language could be used as a literary language.²⁸⁸

These positive developments however were to slow down by the second decade of the 19th century with a change in Vienna’s nationalities policy as the successors of Joseph II preferred to cooperate with the existing dominant ruling classes of the imperial provinces, which in our case meant Poles of Galicia.²⁸⁹ As the education was reverted to German or Polish, the younger generations were

²⁸³ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 240. Actually the process was hard as there were several inclinations the choice of each would have important implications for the choice of national identity: Some denied the Ukrainian peasant vernacular necessary qualities to become a literary language thus proposed adopting either Russian or Polish, others who supported the use of Ukrainian peasant vernacular were also divided as those favoring the use of the modern Cyrillic alphabet (*grazhdanka*) and those favoring Latin based on the Polish orthography. With the encouragement of the Imperial government which preferred the Ruthenians’ identification with neither the Poles nor the Russians, the choice was finally made. (Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 46.)

²⁸⁴ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 46.

²⁸⁵ Magocsi, *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism*, 23.

²⁸⁶ Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 331-332. The Galician populists were inspired by the works of Dnieper Ukrainian Taras Shevchenko, and some members of the Ukrainophile intelligentsia in Russia gave their support to the efforts of their Galician conationals in a period when publishing in Ukrainian was restricted with the 1863 Valuev decree and 1876 Ems Ukase. (Hryniuk, 89.)

²⁸⁷ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 402-403.

²⁸⁸ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 241.

²⁸⁹ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 37.

exposed to Polonization.²⁹⁰ Lacking the Imperial government's support to turn this Polonophile trend, the Ruthenians would have to wait for the 1848 Spring of Nations.²⁹¹

As for the other two regions inhabited by the Ruthenians ruled by the Habsburgs, Bukovina and Transcarpathia, the national awakening could never match Galicia. Ruthenians constituting a majority in the northern part of Bukovina were dominantly Orthodox just as the Romanians of the province were. Thus religion was not a source of differentiation here, but the indicator of differences was the Romanian and Ruthenian languages which were not mutually comprehensible at all.²⁹² However, although their languages were unintelligible, this did not create a major source of conflict among the Ruthenians and Romanians of the time who predominated separate parts of Bukovina, a fact which minimized their interactions. Under these circumstances, national awakening in Bukovina was out of question at least until 1848. The case of Transcarpathia was similar, however, the problems faced in trying to establish a separate Greek Catholic Church not subordinated to the Hungarian Roman Catholic Church promoted a sense of self-distinctiveness among the Transcarpathians, and the imperial reforms which provided the establishment of the separate Church and Ruthenian-instructing schooling helped to advance this awareness. Yet, Transcarpathians were far from developing a clear sense of national identity and began struggling among different options, among which Russophilism tended to be the dominant one.²⁹³ Living within a Magyar

²⁹⁰ Magocsi, *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism*, 15.

²⁹¹ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 400.

²⁹² Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 36.

²⁹³ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 403-405.

context, Transcarpathians' "identification with Russian culture represented resistance to alien domination and a positive effort toward self-definition."²⁹⁴

1848 was springtime for the Ruthenians as in that year alone they "established their first political organization, their first newspaper, their first cultural organization, and their first military units in modern times."²⁹⁵ The year was marked with the rebellion of the nationalities of the Empire, Hungarians and Poles above all, against the conservative Austrian imperial domination. Galicia was one of the many microcosms of the revolutionary events that spread throughout not only the Habsburg Monarchy but most of Europe.

All over the century, the Habsburgs were in trouble with the revolutionary activities of the Poles who aimed at reestablishing the Polish state. To counteract the Poles, the Austrian government supported the Ruthenian movement more than ever. In response to the creation of Polish National Council demanding autonomy for the "Polish" Galicia, the Governor of Galicia, Stadion pushed for the formation of a similar organization. Under such circumstances the Supreme Ruthenian Council (*Holovna Rus'ka Rada*) was created under the leadership of the Greek Catholic clergy and formulated a petition to the imperial government that counterweighted the Polish demands. With a manifesto, Ruthenians were declaring themselves a separate nation distinct from the Russians and the Poles, part of "the great Ruthenian people who speak one language and count fifteen millions, of whom two and one-half inhabit the Galician land."²⁹⁶ They further petitioned the emperor to recognize them as such and divide the province of Galicia into Polish

²⁹⁴ Elaine Rusinko, "Between Russia and Hungary: Foundations of Literature and National Identity in Subcarpathian Rus'," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 74, 3 (1996): 426.

²⁹⁵ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 406.

²⁹⁶ Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 320-322.

western and Ruthenian eastern parts. These demands disturbed the Poles who denounced the Ruthenians “as the mere invention of Stadion.”²⁹⁷

As the imperial government announced the abolition of serfdom in the spring of 1848, the national movement, which until then remained within the confines of the clerical and secular intelligentsia, started to penetrate the peasantry.²⁹⁸ The subsequent events were the establishment of the first Ruthenian newspaper ever to appear in all Ukrainian lands *Zoria Halytska* (The Galician Star – Galician Dawn), the formation of the first of the many to come Ruthenian cultural societies, the Congress of Ruthenian Scholars, the establishment of the Department of Ruthenian Language and Literature in the L’viv (Lemberg) University, and Ruthenian participation in a modern political process for the first time by participating to the elections of the first Austrian parliament with 25 deputies including those of a peasant extract.²⁹⁹ The activities of Ruthenian “educational, cultural, and political organizations helped to cultivate a national identity” among the peasants of Galicia.³⁰⁰ Again in 1848, by attending the Slavic Congress in Prague as Ruthenians, they gained “recognition as a distinct nationality in the eyes of their fellow Slavs. This achievement had important psychological as well as political consequences.”³⁰¹

While the Bukovinian lands were again silent to the nationalist developments of 1848, Transcarpathia witnessed greater developments in terms of culture, use of Transcarpathian vernacular of Ruthenian in schools and literary

²⁹⁷ John-Paul Himka, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (Edmonton, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988), 26, 32.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 27.

²⁹⁹ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 409-414.

³⁰⁰ Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries*, 132.

³⁰¹ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 413.

works.³⁰² During this period the contacts with the Galician Ruthenians grew rapidly. However, the close relations developed with Galicians were not with the Galician Ukrainophiles but with the Russophiles, thus again it was Russophilism that dominated the self-identification of Transcarpathian elites.³⁰³

After the suppression of the revolution, the Habsburgs decided to achieve a rapprochement with the local elites of the provinces. This meant the second come back of Polish dominance in Galicia. Poles monopolized the administration and Polish became the language of education and administration of the province, and the establishment of a Ruthenian University was prevented. As such, the educational system became an instrument of Polonization. This period also saw the immigration of Ruthenian peasants who sought an escape from the difficult socio-economic situation they live in, mostly to the United States, Canada, and Brazil.³⁰⁴ While Ruthenians were leaving their homeland, increasing number of Poles from western Galicia were migrating to the east. As such, the number of Poles especially in the cities of eastern Galicia increased steadily, turning them into “oases of Polish culture.”³⁰⁵ Under these conditions, Ruthenians were being treated as a minority group who had to struggle hard to secure their national aspirations.

This unfavorable environment and indifference of the Habsburgs gave way to a transient period during which Russophilism rose among the Galician

³⁰² Yekelchik, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 47-48.

³⁰³ Paul R. Magocsi, “The Ruthenian Decision to Unite with Czechoslovakia,” *Slavic Review* 34, 2 (1975): 362-363.

³⁰⁴ Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 63, 324, 336. It is estimated that about 600.000 (according to Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 425-426.) to 800.000 (according to Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 336.) Ruthenians emigrated from Galicia and Transcarpathia between 1881-1912. These western Ukrainian immigrants were to constitute the Ukrainian diaspora, establishing Ukrainian organizations and churches, embarking on a nation building process abroad, and even assuming the role of maintaining and developing Ukrainian culture and language in times this was impossible for their compatriots in their homeland.

³⁰⁵ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 429. L’viv (Lemberg) emerged as a leading center of Polish national revival.

Ruthenians.³⁰⁶ For a brief period, Russophiles began dominating the cultural organizations. However, eventually the Populists, who considered themselves to constitute one nation with the Little Russians distinct from the Russians,³⁰⁷ began establishing their own organizations, and in the course of time surpassed the older Russophile activities.³⁰⁸ The major achievements of the Populists were the establishment in 1879 of the popular political periodical *Bat'kivshchyna* (Fatherland) and in 1880 of the daily *Dilo* (Deed) in the vernacular which survived until the Second World War, and the formation of the Prosvita Society (meaning enlightenment) in 1868 spinning Galicia with a network of adult reading clubs and brotherhoods, and publishing books on literature and history by which vernacular Ukrainian was spreading and the national movement was penetrating the village.³⁰⁹ The cultural achievements fostered dialogue between the Populists in Austria-Hungary and the Ukrainophiles in Russia, and helped them to develop “a shared Ukrainian high culture” even before the word “Ukrainian” could “become an ethnic denominator” to embrace both sides by the very end of the century.³¹⁰

When examining the developments in northern Bukovina in this period, we can say that Populists were a source of inspiration for the Ukrainophile Bukovinians. Several works and periodicals began publishing in the vernacular, numerous cultural organizations were formed, and a department of Ruthenian Language and Literature was established in the University in Chernivtsi.³¹¹ Although the national developments in Bukovina could not compete with those in

³⁰⁶ J. Andrusiak, “The Ukrainian Movement in Galicia,” *The Slavonic and East European Review* 14, 40 (1935): 168-169.

³⁰⁷ Himka, *Galician Villagers*, 66.

³⁰⁸ Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 332-333.

³⁰⁹ Himka, *Galician Villagers*, 66, 69, 90-91.

³¹⁰ Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 49.

³¹¹ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 453.

Galicia in any sense, they were at least promising when compared to the situation in the Hungarian-ruled Transcarpathia. As following the 1867 *Ausgleich* with which the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy was established giving the Hungarian Kingdom a free hand in internal affairs, and isolating Transcarpathians from the developments in Galicia, even the previous Russophile movement had disappeared. Ruthenian schools were closed and cultural activities were suppressed by the Hungarian authorities, which initiated a policy of Magyarization and as a result the leading members of Transcarpathian Ruthenians were assimilated into the Hungarian culture leaving the Ruthenian masses unaware and confused about their identity.³¹² The tiny populist movement in Transcarpathia, which developed in isolation, “gave rise to the view that the Transcarpathians were neither Russians nor Ukrainians, but rather a distinct Subcarpathian Rusyn nationality.”³¹³ As such, in the following century Transcarpathia was to become the scene of struggle of Russophiles, Ukrainophiles, and Rusynophiles.

Turning back to the developments in the Austrian half of the Habsburg Empire, the Austrian government and Vatican decided to support the Ukrainophiles (Populists) of Galicia as they were concerned about the Russian-Orthodox expansion into the Empire’s Slavic lands during the last decade of the 19th century.³¹⁴ The part that Vatican played in supporting Ukrainophiles was to work towards the elimination of Russophile elements in the Greek Catholic Church, which thence became the stronghold of Ukrainian national cause.³¹⁵ Having the Austrian government in their corner, the Ukrainophiles embarked on publishing of

³¹² Paul R. Magocsi, “The Ruthenian Decision to Unite with Czechoslovakia,” 363.

³¹³ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 456.

³¹⁴ Magocsi, “A Subordinate or Submerged People,” 99.

³¹⁵ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 50.

the first comprehensive dictionaries of Ruthenian in Austria-Hungary,³¹⁶ and in 1893 the Austrian government accepted the Ruthenian modeled according to these dictionaries as the official language of administration and instruction in Ruthenian schools. By 1914, there were 2500 Ruthenian schools in Galicia, whereas there were none in the Russian Empire.³¹⁷

In 1894, the Austrian government appointed Hrushevskyyi to the newly created chair of Ukrainian history at L'viv (Lemberg) University where he wrote his seminal work *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.³¹⁸ He also became the head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society which guided the publishing of numerous scholarly works turning the pre-war Galician period into "the apogee of Ukrainian scholarly endeavor" in a time when Ukrainian scholarship in Russia was being stifled by the Russian government. This situation made Hrushevskyyi to consider that the relatively liberal environment provided by the Austrian rule which enables the flourishing of Ukrainian national life will make Galicia a "Piedmont for a future independent Ukrainian state."³¹⁹ The Society's works were also crucial in linking the Ukrainians across the two sides of the Russian-Austrian border.³²⁰

The progress of the national movement in Austria-Hungary was stunning as compared to that in Russia. In Russia, "there were until 1905 no legal Ukrainian political parties, no cultural organizations, no newspapers. There were never any

³¹⁶ George Shevelov, "Evolution of the Ukrainian Literary Language," in Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky and John-Paul Himka eds., *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1981), 223–226. These dictionaries took the example of Dnieper Ukrainian Panteleimon Kulish's and Taras Shevchenko's standardization based on Poltava dialects Kulish was a Ukrainophile writer in Dnieper Ukraine who among others mostly wrote historical novels in the Little Russian vernacular and who translated the Bible into his native language. [Orest Pelech, "The State and the Ukrainian Triumvirate in the Russian Empire, 1831-47," in Bohdan Krawchenko, ed., *Ukrainian Past, Ukrainian Present* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 1.]

³¹⁷ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 440, 444.

³¹⁸ Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 338.

³¹⁹ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 443, 450.

³²⁰ Andrusiak, "The Ukrainian Movement in Galicia," 171.

Ukrainian language school at any level, and the Ukrainian language itself was officially banned from 1863/1876 to 1905.”³²¹ The words of Subtelny make the point clear:

When Ukrainians from the Russian Empire visited Galicia in the early years of the 20th century, they were invariably struck by the progress their western compatriots had made. In Kiev it was still forbidden to publish a book in Ukrainian, but in L’viv one found Ukrainian learned societies, schools, headquarters of mass organizations and cooperatives, newspapers, political parties, and parliamentary representatives.³²²

The last decades of the 19th century saw an increase in the interactions between Galicia and Dnieper Ukraine. While Ruthenians of Galicia were deriving formative ideas from Dnieper Ukraine, Galicia constituted a “sanctuary from tsarist persecution,” the place where Dnieper Ukrainians could continue their cultural activities and publish their works freely. This mutual relationship both gave the modern Ukrainian nationalism much of its character, and fostered the feeling of unity among the people across the Austrian-Russian boundary.³²³

By 1890s, the national movement in Austria-Hungary had completed the cultural and organizational stages and passed into the political stage with the establishment of Ukrainian political parties.³²⁴ The program adopted by the Ukrainian Radical Party in 1895, which was founded in 1890, was the first ever to express the goal of creating an independent Ukrainian state incorporating both the western and Dnieper Ukrainian lands.³²⁵ Still, despite obtaining a consensus about their national identity and about their ethnolinguistic unity with the people to the

³²¹ Magocsi, “A Subordinate or Submerged People,” 99-100.

³²² Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 335.

³²³ Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 335.

³²⁴ Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 50.

³²⁵ John-Paul Himka, “Young Radicals and Independent Statehood: The Idea of a Ukrainian Nation-State, 1890-1895,” *Slavic Review* 41, 2 (1982): 223. The subsequent political party having the same goal was the National Democratic Party established in 1899. (Magocsi, *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism*, 20.) The goal of independence was to be specified by the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party in Russian-ruled Ukraine a decade later.

east of the border, it was “toward the end of the nineteenth century, the Galician and Bukovynian Ruthenians began to favor the adoption of a new national name – “Ukrainians,”³²⁶ and adopting this new all-encompassing term for their nation and language was not accomplished until the first decades of the 20th century.³²⁷

While the emergence of the goal of an independent statehood among the Ruthenian intelligentsia was a result of relatively benign conditions of the Austrian rule, the realization of such a goal necessitated the development of a national consciousness by the masses. Although it can be said that prior to 1914 “the idea of independent statehood had made headway” even among the masses in Galicia,³²⁸ “the great majority of the Ukrainian intelligentsia [in Russian-ruled Ukraine] could not see beyond federalism, until war and revolution opened their eyes.”³²⁹

3.2.2 The Experiences of the Little Russians under the Russian Imperial Rule

In terms of demographics of Russian-ruled Ukrainian territory, the period saw the influx of ethnic Russians especially to the eastern and southern territories. It is known that as late as 1897, 95 percent of the ethnic Ukrainians were peasants living in the countryside³³⁰ making the Ukrainians living in towns a minority (30 percent of the urban population) who were more often than not Russified (in Left

³²⁶ Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 315.

³²⁷ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 440.

³²⁸ Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “The Fourth Universal and Its Ideological Antecedents,” in Taras Hunczak, ed., *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1977), 191-192.

³²⁹ Himka, “Young Radicals and Independent Statehood,” 235.

³³⁰ Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 54.

Bank), or Polonized (in Right Bank) as a result of the assimilationist pressures in the cities.³³¹

In the Left Bank, the Russification process was supervised with the steady migration of Russians. The process gathered pace with the setting aside of the autonomy of the Hetmanate. First arrived Russian military officers, then Russian nobles who brought with them Russian peasants. By 1880s, with the start of industrialization in Dnieper-Donbass area,³³² Russian skilled-workers were to follow their factory owners into eastern Ukraine.³³³ The Russian population increased so rapidly that by 1897 they made up more than half of Nikolaev, Kharkov, and Kiev, and nearly half of Odessa, and Ekaterinoslav. As such, Russian became the *lingua franca* of the cities, which brought about disconnection between the cities and rural areas in the territory. As a result, cities emerged as isolated enclaves both ethnically and culturally from the surrounding countryside.³³⁴

While the demographic situation in the mainland Ukraine was such, a similar influx of Russians was common in the Crimea. The 19th century saw the imperial government's resettlement of thousands of Russians, Ukrainians, Germans and some other non-Tatars to the area in masses.³³⁵ Although quite a many Crimean Tatars were already in migration be it of individual kind or large waves as in 1812

³³¹ Andreas Kappeler, "The Ukrainians of the Russian Empire, 1860-1914," in Andreas Kappeler, ed., *The Formation of National Elites: Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940*, vol. 6, (New York, New York University Press, 1992), 108.

³³² While Krivoi Rog and lower Dnieper area became the centers of metallurgical industry, Donbass emerged as the greatest coal production center of the Empire.

³³³ Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies), 42. According to 1892 data, 80 percent of the workers in Iuzovka (present-day Donetsk) were coming from Moscow. (Krawchenko, *Social Change*, 42.)

³³⁴ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 319-334.

³³⁵ Edward Lazzerini, "The Crimea Under Russian Rule: 1783 to the Great Reforms," in Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917, ed. Michael Rywkin (London & New York: Mansell Publishing, 1988), 123-127. This resettlement was in such an extent that on the brink of the 1853 Crimean War they constituted approximately 70,000 of the Crimean population. (Lazzerini, "The Crimea under Russian Rule," 127.)

and 1828-29, this process turned into an exodus in the aftermath of the 1853-56 Crimean War.³³⁶ As a result of these population changes, while before the Russian conquest the Crimean Tatars constituted almost the entire population of the peninsula, by 1854 their number dropped into 60 and by 1897 merely into 34 percent.³³⁷ The end result of this process of Russian-Slavic influx and Crimean Tatar outflow was that as of then, non-natives (predominantly Russians) were to become the majority in the Crimean peninsula.

During the late 18th to early 20th century, Romanovs gradually created a highly autocratic and centralized rule that did not give way to the development and manifestation of any kind of nationalist-oriented movement. In such a suppressive environment, development of the idea of Ukraine as “a distinct national entity was for the longest time virtually non-existent.”³³⁸ Still, despite the persecutions and suppressions of the Russian imperial rule, the nationalist intelligentsia managed to keep alive the idea of self-distinctiveness and to create a nationalist movement that prepared the necessary ground for the masses to eventually embrace the idea of independent nationhood and statehood.³³⁹

In 1861, serfdom, which was instituted in New Russia in 1796, was abolished with the Great Emancipation. In the following years this process brought about the establishment of *zemstvos* that were equipped with the right to local self-government especially in social and educational affairs. However, the extension of

³³⁶ Hakan Kırımlı, *National Movements and National Identity Among the Crimean Tatars, 1905-1916* (Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1996), 6, 11. The post-Crimean War migration wave that took place during 1860-61 became the largest (other large waves which were smaller in scale took place in 1874, 1890, 1902). (Kırımlı, *National Movements and National Identity Among the Crimean Tatars*, 6,11.)

³³⁷ Mustafa Abdülcemil Kırimoğlu, *Kırım Tatar Milli Kurtuluş Hareketinin Kısa Tarihi* (Ankara: Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Genel Merkezi Yayınları, 2004), 5. According to the 1897 census data, the population of the Crimea was 546,076, and the number of Crimean Tatars living in Crimea were given as 186,212. (Kırımlı, *National Movements and National Identity* 11.)

³³⁸ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 314.

³³⁹ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 314-315.

zemstvos in the Right Bank took place almost 50 years later than its establishment in the Left Bank.³⁴⁰ The reason behind this relatively huge time gap was the hesitation on the part of the imperial government that *zemstvos* could serve to the mutinous activities in the area which was still dominated by Polish high culture, and in which the socioeconomic life rested with the Polish nobility who only recently revolted against the Russian rule twice in 1830 and 1863.³⁴¹

In this period, the main target of the Russian authorities was not the Ukrainians, who were then considered as an inert subgroup of greater Russian people and were called as Little Russians, but was the Poles. Thus, a local Little Russian identity was regarded even desirable in de-Polonizing the Right Bank. Still, the Russian government “tolerated a Ukrainian identity only in so far as it was compatible with an all-Russian one.”³⁴² In order to take hold in the Right Bank, Russian government embarked upon a process of ‘Little Russification’ if not Russification. Besides establishing Kiev University as an outpost of Russian culture in the region, to prove at least the Little Russian character of the region, the government let loose the development of Little Russian culture while heavily suppressing the Poles. As such having the backing of the Russian government, the early stages of the imperial rule saw the development of the Little Russian identity.³⁴³

In order to invalidate the Polish claims to the Right Bank, Little Russianness of the region was to be proved, and this required the development of Little Russian

³⁴⁰ While *zemstvos* were created in the southwestern territories (including Right Bank) of the Empire only by 1911, in the Left Bank they were created already in 1864.

³⁴¹ Robert Edelman, *The Revolution of 1905 in Russia's Southwest* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1987), 47-48.

³⁴² John-Paul Himka, “The Basic Historical Identity Formations in Ukraine: A Typology,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 28, 1-4 (2006): 486.

³⁴³ Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 38, 40-41.

cultural and historical studies. This thought propelled the imperial government to fund researches on Little Russian matters. The early decades of the 19th century became the period when the institutions that served to the flourishing of studies on Ukraine, Kiev and Kharkov Universities were established.³⁴⁴ By the 1820s, Kharkov emerged as the first “center of the Ukrainian ‘renaissance’ and national movement,” harboring many influential Ukrainophile scholars³⁴⁵ and becoming the first place where the term ‘Ukrainian’ was used instead of ‘Little Russian’.³⁴⁶ The Ukrainian literary movement that was revived by the writers of Left Bank (especially in the centers of Kharkov and Poltava) next spread to the Right Bank, where the movement was to become hassling for the authorities.³⁴⁷

The benign attitude of the imperial government was to change by mid-1840s. It was during the reign of Nicholas I (1825-1855) that the Russian imperial model shifted from “imperial to the nationalistic model of citizenship.”³⁴⁸ The disturbance caused in St. Petersburg by the publishing by an unknown author of *Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii* (History of the Rus’ or Little Russia), in which Little Russians were described separate from and even in opposition to the Russians and were called for the establishment of self-government, was the first spark for the change of the imperial attitude.³⁴⁹ The major blow was to come with the discovery of the Brotherhood of Saint Cyril and Methodius, the secret organization created by Little Russian patriots who believed in the distinctiveness of their people and criticized the Russian rule with a membership extending to important figures such

³⁴⁴ Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 128.

³⁴⁵ Dennis Papazian, “N. I. Kostomarov and the Cyril-Methodian Ideology,” *Russian Review* 29, 1 (1970): 61.

³⁴⁶ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 359.

³⁴⁷ R. Smal Stotsky, “The Centres of Ukrainian Learning,” *The Slavonic Review* 2, 6 (1924): 564.

³⁴⁸ Orest Pelech, “The State and the Ukrainian Triumvirate in the Russian Empire, 1831-47,” in *Ukrainian Past, Ukrainian Present*, ed. Bohdan Krawchenko (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 2, 4.

³⁴⁹ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 227.

as Taras Shevchenko, Mykola Kostomarov, and Panteleimon Kulish.³⁵⁰ The Brotherhood's members were punished by varying sentences, but the harshest one was to be that of Shevchenko who was punished not only because of his membership to the Brotherhood but mostly because of his poems³⁵¹ whereby he spread his ideas of Ukrainians' distinctiveness from the Russians and proved that their vernacular language in itself was capable of becoming a literary language.³⁵² Thence, the importance of Shevchenko laid not only in "his role in the codification of modern Ukrainian,"³⁵³ but more important thing was that Shevchenko's stance was "giving the movement an alternative to the provincial Little Russian mentality," and provided it with a *raison d'etre*.³⁵⁴ Not only Shevchenko but also the tenets of the Brotherhood as a whole "determined the ideological orientation of the Ukrainian national movement in the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries."³⁵⁵

The suppression of the Brotherhood marked the end of an era since after this the imperial authorities were to become ever cautious about all manifestations of Little Russian distinctiveness, those with patriotic feelings were silenced and all their activities were downgraded to the level of 'harmless' cultural work.³⁵⁶

After years of inertia however, following a relative relaxation in the reign of tsar Alexander II, 1860s saw a re-boost in cultural activities with the establishment of *Hromada* (Community), "a clandestine society devoted to the promotion of

³⁵⁰ Dennis Papazian, "N. I. Kostomarov and the Cyril-Methodian Ideology," 64-68. Kostomarov was a leading historian with Ukrainophile tendencies and a professor in Kiev and St. Petersburg Universities.

³⁵¹ Ivan Franko, "Taras Shevchenko," *The Slavonic Review* 3, 7 (1924): 113-114.

³⁵² Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 41-42.

³⁵³ Pelech, 1.

³⁵⁴ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 364.

³⁵⁵ Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 97.

³⁵⁶ D. Doroshenko, "Mykhailo Dragomanov and the Ukrainian National Movement," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 16, 48 (1938): 656-657.

Ukrainian culture and enlightenment of the masses.”³⁵⁷ *Hromadas* created Sunday schools where peasant masses were taught Little Russian language and culture, and began publishing the influential journal *Osnova* (Foundation) in which Kostomarov published his seminal article “*Dve russkie narodnosti*,” laying his claims about the separate nationhood of the Russians and Little Russians. During 1860s, even the Russian press began discussing if there was a separate Little Russian language, however reasoning it to be a mere Russian dialect corrupted by the intrusion of Polish words.³⁵⁸

These activities alarmed the Russian authorities, culminating in the 1863 Valuev Decree which banned the use of the Little Russian dialect in religious and educational publications,³⁵⁹ and was followed by the closedown of *Hromada* societies, Sunday schools, and the journal *Osnova*. These developments meant that from then on the Ukrainophiles were to be subject of systematic Russian imperial persecution.³⁶⁰

Since the Ukrainophiles tried to publish their works in neighboring Austro-Hungarian lands where censorship in kind was non-existent, thus increased contacts with their brethren across the Russian-Austrian border, a stricter crackdown by the Russian authorities commenced.³⁶¹ Convinced that the “Ukrainophile propaganda” was an Austrian plot, Alexander II issued the 1876 Ems Ukase (decree) as a result of which publication or importation from abroad of anything written in Little Russian was forbidden, and Ukrainophile newspapers and organizations were

³⁵⁷ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 42.

³⁵⁸ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 367, 369-701.

³⁵⁹ David B. Saunders, “Russia and Ukraine under Alexander II: The Valuev Edict of 1863,” *International History Review* 17,1 (1995): 28. Literary publications were not banned.

³⁶⁰ Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 131.

³⁶¹ Doroshenko, 657-661.

banned.³⁶² Hence, 1880s rolled by along with the Ukrainian patriots' efforts for convincing the Russian authorities of the harmless nature of their endeavors by putting aside all their political interests and concentrating purely on literary and cultural activity.³⁶³

By mid-1800s the education system in the Empire became a means of Russification since the authorities decided to use it as a “tool for unifying the Empire into a nation-state” as it was due for the new nationalistic understanding of citizenship.³⁶⁴ Still, its role in Russification was highly limited due to the limited reach of the schooling system. Coming to the last decade of the 19th century, the illiteracy rate in the Russian-ruled Ukraine was as high as 91 percent. As under the imperial Russian rule education usually meant Russification, the lack of it helped to preserve the masses from the infiltration of the Russian high culture. In the absence of schooling, it was the Orthodox Church that could reach to the peasant masses. Under the jurisdiction of the Holy Synod, Orthodox Church evolved into an agent of Russification and transmitter of the official imperial ideology. Besides, the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church which was flourishing in Austria-Hungary, and which became a bastion of Ukrainophilism in the Habsburg Monarchy, was gradually destroyed in the Romanov lands.³⁶⁵

Progressive weakening of the absolutist rule on the eve of the 1905 Revolution encouraged the intelligentsia towards imagining Ukrainian self-rule. A bold statement of these dreams came in 1900 by Mykola Mikhnovsky who wrote in a pamphlet titled *Samostiina Ukraina* his desire for “a single, united, free and

³⁶² Stotsky, “The Centres of Ukrainian Learning,” 564.

³⁶³ Doroshenko, 662.

³⁶⁴ Pelech, 3, 6.

³⁶⁵ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 373-375. First came forced Orthodoxation and paralization of Church activities, then followed permanant abolution of the Uniate Church in Romanov lands in 1839. Those who attempted to resist were exiled to Siberia.

independent Ukraine from the Carpathians to the Caucasus.”³⁶⁶ However, until 1917 his bold ideas were not shared by the most in Russian Ukraine. The uttermost that the majority could ask for was “an autonomous Ukraine in a decentralized and federative Russia.”³⁶⁷ Thus, the political parties that were to emerge in the upcoming years were to struggle between the ideas of an independent or an autonomous Ukraine.

Until 1905 the Russian government did not allow the establishment of political parties, thus the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, the first Ukrainian political party in Russian-ruled Ukraine, was found in 1900 by university students in Kharkov and aspired after an independent Ukraine remained underground.³⁶⁸ It was followed by the establishment of other political parties such as the Ukrainian People’s Party (with a nationalist orientation aiming national independence) in 1902, Ukrainian Social-Democratic Union – Spilka (with a purely socialist orientation) and Ukrainian Democratic Party (calling for Ukrainian self-rule within a federated Russian empire) in 1905.³⁶⁹ The significance of Ukrainians’ entrance into party politics is that only then it became “possible to speak in national terms of a Ukrainian political life” by which Ukrainians’ desire for self-rule (be it as an autonomous entity within a federated state or an independent statehood) became evident.³⁷⁰

The Revolution of 1905 created new opportunities by stimulating positive developments for the nationalist movement. Ukrainian political parties left the underground and participated in the first and ensuing Dumas (representative

³⁶⁶ Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 138.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁸ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 58.

³⁶⁹ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 378-379.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 315.

assembly). The Constitution of 1906 was permitting publications in non-Russian languages,³⁷¹ thus the period witnessed the first Ukrainian-language daily newspapers to be published in Russian Ukraine, *Hromads'ka Dumka* and *Rada*, which were published twenty-five years later than an equivalent, *Dilo*, was published in Austrian-ruled Galicia. On top of that, the first Ukrainian-language learned society in Russian territories, the Ukrainian Scientific Society was established.³⁷² Furthermore, in 1907 Ukrainophiles in the Second Duma went as far as voicing their calls for Ukrainian language education, creation of department of Ukrainian Studies in the universities, and even for local autonomy.³⁷³ The Revolution also allowed the legalization of Hromada societies and the establishment, in line with the Galician example, of Prosvita societies. Now, the intelligentsia had an opportunity to reach the masses and spread national consciousness among the peasants.³⁷⁴

However by 1908, with the defeat of the revolution, “the national movement again became the object of persecution and suppression.”³⁷⁵ The minister of interior Pyotr Stolypin embarked upon undoing the achievements of the period and took stringent measures against the activities suspected for separatist tendencies among which we can list Ukrainophilism. As such, the nationalist-oriented Ukrainian People's Party and the more moderate Ukrainian Democratic Radical Party were disbanded, many members were arrested, Prosvita societies were closed and Ukrainian publications were banned.³⁷⁶ Until 1917, Ukrainian language education

³⁷¹ Hrushevskiy, *A History of Ukraine*, 512. As a matter of fact, the government would not wait much to censor Ukrainian publications, highly limiting their quantity and scope.

³⁷² Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 379-380.

³⁷³ Yekelchik, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 39.

³⁷⁴ Rudnytsky, *Essays on Modern Ukrainian History*, 135.

³⁷⁵ D. S. Mirsky, *Russia: A Social History* (London: Greenwood Press, 1984), 227.

³⁷⁶ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 381-382.

was not permitted and the revision of the electoral law effectively precluded Ukrainian representation in the Duma. In consequence, “in the decade before the revolution, Ukrainian nationalists were unable to use the schools, the press, or the State Duma as a forum for national education and agitation.”³⁷⁷ Once again, Ukrainian intelligentsia was interrupted from educating the masses with a national spirit.

With all the steps taken by the Russian imperial government, the national movement in Russian-ruled territories could not prosper as it did in Austro-Hungarian-ruled lands. Still, the suppressive Russian rule could not prevent the development of a separate Ukrainian identity among the Empire’s ‘Little Russian’ subjects since the developments across the border “encouraged the leaders in Russia to continue their battle for national rights under the Russian regime as well.”³⁷⁸ Despite this, the Russian regime could prevent the penetration of the Ukrainophile ideas to the masses making it “a minority movement among the intelligentsia of Russian Ukraine,” while the Ukrainian movement in the Habsburg Monarchy, especially in Galicia, managed to penetrate “much more widely and deeply in society.”³⁷⁹ The masses in Russian Ukraine were being exposed to a constant process of penetration by the Russian imperial ideology. Whenever they got out of their villages, they were exposed to Russification be it in the cities, in schools, in the church, in the army, or in state affairs. The consequence was that it was the Ruthenians of Austria-Hungary who shouldered the nationalist movement during the 19th century.

³⁷⁷ Steven L. Guthier, “The Popular Base of Ukrainian Nationalism in 1917,” *Slavic Review* 38, 1 (1979): 31.

³⁷⁸ Hrushevskiy, 511.

³⁷⁹ Himka, “The Basic Historical Identity Formations in Ukraine,” 487

Living within the relatively liberal environment of the Habsburg Monarchy Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary had a critical advantage over their brethren in Russia in developing national consciousness. Furthermore Ukrainians living under the Habsburg regime had to fight with the dominant Polish, Magyar, or Romanian cultures for attaining their national aims and thus were pushed to develop a mutually exclusive identity. On the other hand, since they were seen as a part of the dominant nation and could reach up to the highest levels in the Russian system “Ukrainians in Russia had an incentive to retain multiple identities” that those in the Austria-Hungary did not.³⁸⁰ This “Habsburg heritage has contributed to making Galicians the most nationally conscious segment of the Ukrainian population.”³⁸¹ As such, the age of empires were crucial for the Ukrainian lands since “many of the twentieth-century developments in Ukraine were determined by dissimilarity between the Russian tradition of absolutism and social oppression and the Austrian tradition of parliamentarism and civil society.”³⁸²

The period of rule of Ukrainians by these two empires saw the accentuation of the differences between the Habsburg-ruled and Romanov-ruled Ukrainians on one hand, and their appreciation of belonging to a common Ukrainian nation on the other. As such, while their social, cultural, and political developments and national consciousness levels were shaped differently in the hands of different sovereigns with different social and political conditions, the idea that they all constitute a common nation began blossoming. The period ended with the transformation of Ruthenians and Little Russians both into Ukrainians.

³⁸⁰ Himka, “The Basic Historical Identity Formations in Ukraine,” 486.

³⁸¹ Magocsi, “A Subordinate or Submerged People,” 103.

³⁸² Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 54.

CHAPTER 4

UKRAINIAN LANDS DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE INTERWAR PERIOD

4.1 WWI and Struggle for Independent Ukraine

By the time of the outbreak of the First World War, in spite of the fact that the Ukrainian national movement got off the ground, “Ukrainian consciousness remained poorly developed” especially among the masses.³⁸³ While the Ukrainian masses of the Habsburg Monarchy could be considered as nationally-awakened, national solidarity among the Austrian Ukrainians “presented a stark contrast to the confusion about national and social allegiances in Russian-ruled Ukraine.”³⁸⁴ However, the events of 1914-1920 were to push the people of Ukraine towards national-consciousness as the collapse of the once mighty empires was to clear the path for Ukrainian nationalism.

Among the Ukrainians, it was the Galicians and Bukovinians who first faced the agony of war. At the start of WWI, Russian forces captured eastern Galicia and Bukovina taking control of the area until the joint Austro-Hungarian and German

³⁸³ Paul Kubicek, *The History of Ukraine* (Westport, Connecticut; London: Greenwood Press, 2008), 62.

³⁸⁴ Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 66.

forces drove the Russians out by June 1915. This brief period of Russian rule proved Russians' desire to Russify these 'Russian' lands by liquidating Ukrainian national movement in these areas, which were considered as "the hotbeds of Ukrainian nationalism that had been spilling over (or so they suspected) into Dnipro Ukraine."³⁸⁵ The Russians established a policy of supporting the activities of local Russophiles and began undoing the achievements of Ukrainophiles by suppressing the Greek Catholic Church, banning Ukrainian cultural organizations, cooperatives, and periodicals, and making the language of instruction in schools Russian.³⁸⁶ The hostile attitude of the Russian government against the Ukrainophiles was not limited to newly acquired lands because in the meantime the Ukrainians of Russia were also under tsarist persecution.³⁸⁷ To illustrate the position of the Russian regime toward Ukrainian movement, the Russian foreign minister Sergei Sazonov stated that "Now is exactly the right moment to rid ourselves of the Ukrainian movement once and for all."³⁸⁸

The Russification process in Galicia and Bukovina was cut short with the return of the Austrian-German forces. The ban on Ukrainian activities was lifted and the pre-Russian-occupation cultural life was reestablished. As the Austrian government sought to utilize Ukrainian nationalists as a weapon against the Russians, they not only supported further development of Ukrainian national consciousness among the Ukrainians under its control,³⁸⁹ but also sponsored the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (*Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukraïny*), Ukrainian

³⁸⁵ Ibid., 64.

³⁸⁶ John S. Reshetar, Jr., "Ukrainian and Russian Perceptions of the Ukrainian Revolution," in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter* ed. Peter J. Potichnyj, et al. (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992), 141.

³⁸⁷ Kubicek, 76.

³⁸⁸ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 343.

³⁸⁹ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 65.

nationalist organization formed by a group of Dnieper Ukrainian émigrés who worked for the creation of an independent Ukrainian state on the territories of the formerly-Russian-ruled Ukraine following the victory of the Central Powers.³⁹⁰ On the other hand, the Galician Ukrainians of Austria seem to remain loyal to their state since with the outbreak of war the Supreme Ukrainian Council declared its loyalty to the Habsburgs and its readiness to fight against the Russians. Similarly, the General Ukrainian Council (as was later renamed) declared its intention to struggle for the independence of Russian-ruled Ukraine but only for autonomy in Austrian-ruled Ukraine.³⁹¹

The return of the Austrians did not mean an end to the struggle for the area. All through the war, parts of Galicia and Bukovina changed hand for several times, and became a military zone as none of the parties was able to take hold.

4.1.1 The Bolshevik Revolution and Ukraine during the Russian Civil War

The overall environment in the Russian Empire of the period was briefly as such: The Tsar abdicated, the empire collapsed, local soviets spread throughout the country, the Provisional Government was created and then toppled by the Bolsheviks, the Red forces entered into a civil war with the tsarist White forces, outside powers meddled in the war, and nationalists tried forming self-ruling states throughout the former imperial territories. Ukraine was a microcosm of this overall picture. Not only the Ukrainian patriots of different stripes, the Whites, the Reds,

³⁹⁰ Hakan Kırımlı, "The Activities of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War," *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, 4, Turkey before and after Atatürk: Internal and External Affairs (1998): 177.

³⁹¹ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 466.

the Austrian-German and Polish forces, but also smaller and local peasant groups such as the anarchist Blacks, and Greens fought for control over Ukraine.³⁹² The one who was to emerge as the victor of this complex struggle was to determine the faith of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian revolutionary era was to start in the wake of the February Revolution whereby two centers of authority, the Provisional Government and the soviets, emerged to claim authority over all post-tsarist imperial territories. As for the Ukraine, with the inclusion of the third center to claim authority over Ukraine, that is the nationalists, the picture became even more complex. However, the Ukrainian patriotic forces were ever confused about what kind of a Ukraine they wished for. To name the prominent ideas, they considered an autonomous unit within a democratic Russia, a conservative monarchy, a nationalist military dictatorship, or an independent socialist state.³⁹³ The Ukrainian revolutionary era can be divided according to the period of rule of the successive Ukrainian governments, as the Central Rada period, Hetmanate period, and Directory period.

³⁹²Blacks: The Black Army, officially called as the Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army of Ukraine, was an anarchist-peasant army active in southeastern Ukraine led by Nestor Makhno. During the Civil War period, Makhnovits controlled a large territory in the south-eastern part of modern Ukraine which they named as the “Free Territory of Ukraine,” [Paul Avrich, *Anarchist Portraits* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 111, 121-122.] and had an important role in the victory of the Bolsheviks in the Civil War by defeating the Volunteer Army in the Battle of Peregonovka thus halting Denikin’s march towards the Bolshevik capital. [Volin, *The Unknown Revolution, 1917-1921* (Detroit & Chicago: Black & Red Publishing, 1974), 276.] Greens: Green Armies were bands of armed peasants who fought to protect their lands against requisition and were against all governments.

³⁹³ Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 67.

4.1.1.1 Central Rada (March 1917 – April 1918)

The news of revolution was followed by the creation of first soviets in Kharkov and Kiev, which were followed by the creation of Ukrainian National Council in Kiev named as Central Rada. With the freedom of speech and assembly now permitted by the Provisional government, there emerged political parties which were to constitute the Central Rada. The prominent ones were the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Federalists, Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party (which won greatest public support and was headed by Hrushevskiy), and Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party (which was to be a crucial force influencing the development during the period, headed by Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura). The revolutionary environment provided Ukrainian patriots with great opportunities to reach the peasantry. For example, the newspapers published by one of the nationalist organizations Selians'ka Spilka (All Ukrainian Peasants' Union) were in wide circulation among the peasantry and were instrumental in conveying the Ukrainian national message to the villages.³⁹⁴ Initiatives such as the the Selians'ka Spilka served to prepare the ordinary peasants for the upcoming developments.

In the early stages of the period, none of the Ukrainian political parties demanded the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state but were contended with territorial autonomy (that is the nine Ukrainian provinces – Volhynia, Podolia, Kiev, Poltava, Chernigov, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Tavrida – except for Crimea which was not part of Ukraine then – were to be autonomously ruled

³⁹⁴Guthier, 34.

and would have a separate army and school system³⁹⁵) within a federated Russian state. The difference between western and eastern Ukrainians manifested itself in the reluctance of the eastern Ukrainian nationalist leaders in breaking connections with Russia. They did not proclaim independence until they were forced to. On the other hand, with the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy their western brethren did not hesitate in proclaiming an independent Ukrainian state and fighting the Poles, never thinking of negotiating “for any settlement short of total independence.”³⁹⁶

The Central Rada, headed by Hrushevskyyi, conveyed its demand for autonomy within the Russian state, however to be rejected by the Provisional Government. The Central Rada’s reply was the issuing of the First Universal whereby Ukraine was unilaterally declared autonomous within a federated Russia. As a compromise, the Provisional Government convinced the Central Rada to take no further actions and recognized the authority of the Rada in five Ukrainian provinces (Kiev, Chernigov, Volhynia, Podolia, Poltava) until an all-Russian constituent assembly was convened.³⁹⁷

The elections held during this period were illustrative of the weakness of support given to Ukrainian parties in urban centers and that the greatest support to Ukrainian parties was garnered from the peasantry.³⁹⁸ In major cities parties hostile or indifferent to the Ukrainian cause had the upper hand.³⁹⁹ As such, industrial and

³⁹⁵ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 472,475, 479.

³⁹⁶ John-Paul Himka, “The Basic Historical Identity Formations in Ukraine: A Typology,” 487-488.

³⁹⁷ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 69-70.

³⁹⁸ In the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, while the Bolsheviks garnered merely 10 percent, 67.8 percent of the votes were given to Ukrainian parties. (Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 70.) However in the major urban centers Kiev and Kharkov only 25 and 13 percent voted for the Ukrainian parties respectively. (Guthrie, 22.)

³⁹⁹ In Kiev, Ukrainian parties were outvoted by the conservative List of Russian Voters, in Odessa and Ekaterinoslav by Bolsheviks, and in Kharkov by Kadets and Bolsheviks.

“urban centers were islands of non-Ukrainian language and culture throughout the Ukraine.”⁴⁰⁰

Furthermore, the elections made it evident that while Ukrainian nationalists garnered great support from the Right Bank, the eastern Ukrainian provinces preferred to support the Bolsheviks and pro-Russian parties. The Right Bank provinces Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia constituted the heart of Ukrainian nationalist strength in 1917.⁴⁰¹ In each of these provinces the proportion of the votes given to the Ukrainian parties corresponded to the proportion of Ukrainians living in those provinces. This situation suggests that “there was extraordinarily little crossover among Ukrainian voters on the right bank to non-nationalist parties.”⁴⁰²

The support to Ukrainian parties was low in most eastern provinces such as Kharkov and Kherson. These provinces were the most Russified regions of Ukraine with significant Russian population. They were the power bases of Russian-socialist parties and Ukrainian organizations were not well entrenched in these provinces.⁴⁰³ Chernigov and Ekaterinoslav represented middle-of-the-road, since Ukrainian parties garnered half of the votes casted in these two provinces. The situation in Chernigov “reflected the fact that the Russian-Ukrainian ethnic border passed through Chernigov and that the four northernmost districts had almost no Ukrainian population”. It can be further argued that “the poorer showing of the Ukrainian populists in Chernigov may reflect the progress of Russification along the northern

⁴⁰⁰ Guthier, 41.

⁴⁰¹ More than 70 percent of the voters in the Right Bank provinces Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia voted for Ukrainian political parties while the Bolsheviks could receive less the five percent of the votes casted. (Guthier, 38.)

⁴⁰² Guthier, 38.

⁴⁰³ To illustrate the point, while Selians'ka Spilka could establish regional organs and newspapers in Kiev, Podolia, Poltava, Chernigov, and Ekaterinoslav (Dnepropetrovsk) provinces, thereby could convey its nationalist message in these regions, it could not penetrate into Kharkov and Kherson. (Guthier, 38.)

ethnic border.”⁴⁰⁴ The case of Ekaterinoslav was significant in that it was the industrial region of the Ukraine with a significant Russian proletariat residing in the city. As such, while the city votes went to the Bolsheviks, the villages voted for the Ukrainian parties. Similarly, it was the eastern industrialized cities, Ekaterinoslav, Iuzovka, Lugansk, Mariupol’, and the Donbass where the Bolsheviks could garner majority of the votes casted in Ukraine.⁴⁰⁵

The casting of majority of the village votes in Ukraine to Ukrainian parties should not make one think that these votes were given with purely nationalist sentiments. This was more about “the success of the Ukrainian populists in linking the national and social questions in the political consciousness of the peasantry.”⁴⁰⁶ The peasantry’s great support to the Rada in 1917 was linked with their expectation that Ukrainian nationalists would solve the agrarian problem and that their socio-economic expectations could be better understood and fulfilled by a local rather than an all-Russian government.⁴⁰⁷ In any case, the one to achieve expropriation of the lands from the landlords and divide them among the peasants was to garner the peasant support. If this was not to be the Ukrainian nationalists then this could be the Bolsheviks who also promised similar land reforms.⁴⁰⁸ Still, this does not mean that the Ukrainian peasants were completely negligent of their ‘Ukrainianness.’ Although considering them as nationally conscious would be an exaggeration, it can be said that they were culturally and ethnically aware, but socio-economic considerations prevailed over ethnic ones. The reason of early peasant support to

⁴⁰⁴ Guthrie, 38.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., 39.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid., 37.

⁴⁰⁷ Iwan S. Koropeckyj, ed., *Selected Works of Vsevolod Holubnychy* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1982), 41.

⁴⁰⁸ James Bunyan, *Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia, April-December 1918: Documents and Materials* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1936), 4-5.

national autonomy should be searched not in their national consciousness or even ethnic awareness but in their belief that in case of autonomy local rather than all-Russian consideration will prevail in the reconstruction of the socioeconomic structure. As such, autonomy was not an end in itself, but was a means to attain one.⁴⁰⁹ Disaffection with the Central Rada that increased by the fall of 1917 was mainly caused by Rada's inability to carry out social reforms and its procrastination on land reform, and when it became clear that "nationalists failed to back up their own agrarian reform, support rapidly evaporated."⁴¹⁰

In November, Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government. The reflection of the Bolshevik revolution in Dnieper Ukraine was the emergence of a power struggle among the supporters of the Provisional Government, Central Rada, and the Soviets. During this struggle, with the Third Universal, the Central Rada proclaimed the creation of the Ukrainian National (People's) Republic (*Ukrain's'ka Narodnia Respublika*) (UNR), having authority over the nine Ukrainian provinces. The Republic was still to be an autonomous republic within a future federated Russian state. This proclamation disturbed the Bolsheviks who did not want to lose the industrial and agricultural regions of Ukraine. The UNR took a further step by adopting "its own flag, anthem, symbols, and currency, all of which, it is worth noting, would be readopted by Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union".⁴¹¹ The swift response of the Bolsheviks was to proclaim the Soviet Ukrainian Republic in Kharkov.⁴¹² From then on, there were two competing powers for the

⁴⁰⁹ Ronald Grigor Sury, "National Revolutions and Civil War in Russia," in *Revolutionary Russia: New Approaches to the Russian Revolution of 1917*, ed. Rex A. Wade (New York & London: Routledge, 2004), 128-129.

⁴¹⁰ Sury, 129.

⁴¹¹ Kubicek, 83.

⁴¹² Oleh S. Fedyshyn, *Germany's Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1918* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1971), 63.

authority in Dnieper Ukraine: the Soviet Ukrainian government in the east, and the Ukrainian National Republic in the west.

Concurrently, the Bolshevik government in Petrograd warned UNR that if the Republic does not suspend itself, then it would be considered a reason for war.⁴¹³ Under the attack of the Bolshevik forces advancing towards Kiev, the retreating Central Rada declared the UNR as “independent, dependent upon no one, a free sovereign state of the Ukrainian people” with its Fourth Universal in an effort to win the support of the Central Powers against the Bolsheviks.⁴¹⁴ While UNR was retreating to farther west, to Zhytomyr, Kiev was occupied by the Bolsheviks. The very day these were happening, in Brest-Litovsk, the UNR was signing a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers, whereby the authority of UNR over the nine provinces claimed by the Central Rada was recognized not only by the Central Powers but, although forcefully, also by the Soviet Russia.⁴¹⁵ In line with the secret clauses of the Treaty, the German and Austrians promised to extend military aid to UNR in return for grain and other foodstuff and Germans entered the Ukrainian territories.⁴¹⁶ With their support, UNR drove the Bolshevik forces out of Kiev and Soviet Ukrainian government was forced to flee to Russia. As such, all nine Ukrainian provinces claimed by the UNR were cleared of the Bolshevik forces.⁴¹⁷

While all these were happening, the south-eastern Ukrainian lands saw the formation of a self-proclaimed state which was established by Russian and Russified inhabitants of the area. Since they did not recognize the authority of the

⁴¹³ Ibid.

⁴¹⁴ John Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 111.

⁴¹⁵ Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920*, 116.

⁴¹⁶ Fedyshyn, 97, 99. Accordingly, German forces occupied Ukraine however giving every effort to portray this occupation as a joint undertaking of the friendly German and Ukrainian nations in order to strengthen Rada’s authority in the eyes of the Ukrainians. (Fedeshyn, 99.)

⁴¹⁷ John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk: the forgotten peace March 1918* (New York: The Norton Library, 1971), 158.

UNR, they established the short-lived Donetsk-Krivoi Rog Soviet Republic in 1918.⁴¹⁸ The territories claimed roughly corresponded to the Donbass, Kharkov, Dnipropetrovsk, and parts of Kherson.⁴¹⁹ According to Andrew Wilson, this republic “demonstrated the determination of the local population to have no truck with Ukrainian nationalism, and was a genuine expression of the desire of local inhabitants to remain part of Greater Russia.”⁴²⁰ Although this state was disbanded and incorporated in the Soviet Ukrainian government, the emergence of this short-lived state was crucial in showing that the people of eastern Ukraine were against a Ukrainian state and its Ukrainization attempts, feeling themselves not distinct from the Russian and thus saw no need to secede from the Russian whole.

Turning back to UNR, it became certain that the days of the Rada were numbered. While the inability of the Central Rada to realize its promises to the peasants was alienating the peasantry, its being ineffective in collecting the necessary amount of foodstuff requested by the Germans made the Rada undesirable for the German aims. As a result, the Germans deposed the Central Rada to install a pro-German one, led by Pavlo Skoropads’kyi.⁴²¹

⁴¹⁸ Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith*, 12.

⁴¹⁹ Theodore H. Friedgut, *Iuzovka and Revolution: Politics and Revolution in Russia’s Donbass, 1869-1924, Volume II* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 352.

⁴²⁰ Andrew Wilson, “The Donbas Between Ukraine and Russia: The Use of History in Political Disputes,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 30, 2 (1995): 280. During this period, the inhabitants of the region preferred not to support the UNR’s nationalists but gave support to the Whites, the Bolsheviks, and even to Makhno’s Anarchists. (Wilson, “The Donbass,” 280.)

⁴²¹ Kubicek, 84. He was a former tsarist general and descendent of the Cossack Hetman Ivan Skoropads’kyi. (Arthur E. Adams, “Bolshevik Administration in the Ukraine: 1918,” *The Review of Politics* 20, 3 (1958): 294.)

4.1.1.2 Hetmanate (April – December 1918)

Skoropads'kyi's Hetmanate, as it was called, meant the restoration of pre-revolutionary elites, landowners, bureaucrats, factory owners. As such, Hetmanate was disliked both by the peasantry and all left-of-center political parties be them Ukrainian nationalist or not.⁴²² However, although it was true that the Hetmanate was under German tutelage, it deserves credit for the fact that among the Ukrainian governments of 1917-1920, the greatest successes in Ukrainian culture and education were achieved during the period of Hetmanate. It was in Skoropads'kyi's Hetmanate that the first Ukrainian Corps were formed, autonomous Orthodox exarchate of Ukraine was created and efforts to gain independence (autocephaly) for the Ukrainian Orthodox met direct support of the government.⁴²³ Elementary schools were Ukrainianized, departments on Ukrainian language and history were opened in universities, 150 high schools and two new universities offering instruction only in Ukrainian and many institutions of national character such as Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the State Archive, the National Library, and Ukrainian Academy of Fine Arts, which still exists today, were established during the eight-months-short Hetmanate period.⁴²⁴

Despite these achievements for Ukrainian national development, peasant unrest was growing and the Ukrainian political opposition forces were organizing against the rule of Skoropads'kyi under the roof of the Ukrainian National Union (UNU) headed by Symon Petliura and then by Vynnychenko, and were preparing a

⁴²² Arthur E. Adams, *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: the Second Campaign, 1918-1919* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963), 9.

⁴²³ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 489, 491.

⁴²⁴ Kubicek, 85.

revolt.⁴²⁵ Seeing that the tide of war was turning against the Central Powers he desperately relied upon, Skoropads'kyi embarked on a quest for new allies. In order to attract the support of the Entente Powers and the Whites who favored the territorial integrity of Russia but were opposed to the Bolshevik rule, Skoropads'kyi gave up the idea of independent statehood and declared the Hetmanate a part of future federative non-Bolshevik Russia.⁴²⁶ In the meantime, as the Central Powers capitulated, they began withdrawing from Ukraine. German withdrawal and Skoropads'kyi's abandoning independent statehood gave way to an armed uprising of the UNU, as a result of which Skoropads'kyi had to flee behind the Germans and the new government, the Directory, formed by the UNU reclaimed the independence of the UNR,⁴²⁷ rejecting union with either a federative non-Bolshevik or Bolshevik Russia, thereby facing the opposition of both the Reds and the Whites.⁴²⁸

4.1.1.3 Unification of the 'two Ukraines': Directory in Dnieper Ukraine, Western Ukrainian National Republic in Western Ukraine

While the control of the UNR was being handed over from the Hetmanate to the Directory, in the west Ukrainians of Austro-Hungary were left to fend for themselves as the Empire was disintegrating. The situation prompted the Galician and Bukovinian Ukrainians to form the Ukrainian National Council, which proclaimed the establishment of a Ukrainian state and claimed all Ukrainian-

⁴²⁵ Reshetar, "Ukrainian and Russian Perceptions of the Ukrainian Revolution," 143.

⁴²⁶ Adams, *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: the Second Campaign, 1918-1919*, 23.

⁴²⁷ Fedyshyn, 252-253.

⁴²⁸ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 493.

inhabited lands of the former-Austro-Hungarian Empire, including Transcarpathia.⁴²⁹ On 1st of November 1918, the state was declared independent and named as the West Ukrainian National (People's) Republic (*Zakhidno-Ukrains'ka Narodna Respublyka*). However, it was only in the eastern Galicia that ZUNR could operate effectively since ZUNR could never control Transcarpathia, which remained under Hungarian control until its incorporation into Czechoslovakia and northern Bukovina was under Romanian occupation. However, as Poles were not to leave what they regarded as their patrimony to the Ukrainians, Polish forces drew Ukrainians out of ZUNR's capital L'viv whereby ZUNR had to retreat eastward, and since the Entente powers favored the Polish position, Galicia was to be incorporated into the Polish lands. Still, Galician Ukrainians formed Ukrainian Galician Army and fought vigorously against the superior Polish forces. Unlike the Dnieper Ukrainians who could not act in unison but fell out with each other, the struggle given against the Poles by the western Ukrainians was demonstrative in how they put social problems aside and unified against their archenemy.⁴³⁰ Galician Ukrainians' national mobilization was impressive when compared with their Dnieper Ukrainian brethren. Numbers are demonstrative at this point. While the Galician Ukrainian Army numbered 37.000 men, Petliura's army numbered less than half this number, that is 16.000 men. These figures are crucial considering that there were only over 3 million Ukrainians in Galicia⁴³¹ whereas over 17 million in Russian Ukraine.⁴³²

⁴²⁹ Paul R. Magocsi, "The Ruthenian Decision to Unite with Czechoslovakia," 370. Instead, Transcarpathian Ruthenians were forming their own national councils to decide the future of the Subcarpathian region. (Magocsi, "The Ruthenian Decision," 365.)

⁴³⁰ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 76-77.

⁴³¹ Himka, "The Basic Historical Identity Formations in Ukraine: A Typology," 489.

⁴³² Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine*, 4.

Developments in war-time Transcarpathia were somewhat independent from other Ukrainian-inhabited lands of the former-Habsburg Monarchy. Following the proclamation of independent republic of Hungary, which laid claim to the lands of Transcarpathia, discussions over the future of Transcarpathia set in. While some favored remaining a part of Hungary, some favored joining independent Ukraine or the new state of Czechoslovakia. After all, the decision was made and Transcarpathians declared their voluntary unification with Czechoslovakia to become an autonomous part of the new state.⁴³³

In the meantime, the desire of the Ukrainians to unite under one state was realized in January 1919, whereby ZUNR became the western province of the unified UNR. However, this first unification of ‘the two Ukraines’ was problematic since it was realized under the attack of the Poles from the West and Russians from the East. Under totally different and even conflicting conditions the two parts could not act in unison, had to fight different enemies and pursue different strategies that eventually led to a conflict of interests between them.

Coming back to the developments in the Dnieper Ukraine, the Directory which took power in the last month of 1918, quickly embarked on nation building by making Ukrainian the official language and declaring independence (autocephaly) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.⁴³⁴ However, before any advance could be made in national development, the Directory fell in the middle of the fighting of the Bolsheviks, the Whites, and the anarchist-peasant forces all of which claimed the territories of Ukraine for themselves.

To make the picture clear, we should provide the situation between 1919-1920 in Ukraine. Those years signified a period of complete anarchy, since anyone

⁴³³ Paul R. Magocsi, “The Ruthenian Decision to Unite with Czechoslovakia,” 360.

⁴³⁴ Kubicek, 88.

to claim Ukraine could not ever control the whole of it. There was a constant state of war, invasions by the Poles or Soviet Russians, and frequently changing alliances among all these forces. While Bolsheviks were invading Ukraine from the north, the Whites were dominating the south, and Makhno's Black Army was in control of south-east.

While the Poles forced the Galician Ukrainians to retreat, crossing the Zbruch river (the traditional boundary between Austrian and Russian Empires), Bolsheviks were to drive the Directory out of Kiev to set up the Ukrainian Soviet government there. The retreating forces of the two sides met in Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyi and the joint forces of the Directory (now headed by Symon Petliura since Vynnychenko resigned) and the Ukrainian Galician Army and the Whites drove the Bolsheviks out of Ukraine. In the meantime, the Whites seized power in Ukraine, and since the Ukrainians considered the Whites as a potential ally, they did not go counter this situation until the Whites reestablished prerevolutionary order, restoring the landlords, arresting the Ukrainian intelligentsia and banning the use of Ukrainian. These prompted the Directory to declare war on the Whites. The Directory was forced to look for a strong ally against both the Whites and Reds, which were to be the Poles.⁴³⁵

The actions of the West and Dnieper Ukrainians after their unification under the name of UNR were crucial in testing their solidarity. As Petliura decided to reach an agreement with the Poles to save the UNR, the Galician Ukrainians were negotiating with the Whites. Since Petliura was cooperating with the Poles which were the archenemy of the western Ukrainians, and since Galicians were favoring cooperating with the Whites, the Petliurists would never reconcile with, a rupture

⁴³⁵ Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 81-82.

was inevitable. As a result of the negotiations, Petliura accepted Polish control of Galicia and western Volhynia in return for the Polish-Petliurist joint offensive against the Bolsheviks who recently seized power in Dnieper Ukraine, and restored the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.⁴³⁶

While the Western Ukrainian forces were defeated by the Poles, losing Galicia and western Volhynia by July 1919, the White forces of Denikin were retreating to Crimea after heavy defeats at the hands of the Reds by December 1919 and despite attempts to recover under Wrangel during 1920, the Whites were defeated and were to evacuate Crimea by November. As such, the war turned into a Polish-Soviet war with the advance of the Polish-Petliurist forces into Dnieper Ukraine. This war ended with the victory of the Bolsheviks, whereby the Poles and the Soviet Republics of Russia and Ukraine recognized the territories of each other with the Treaty of Riga of March 1921. This meant that from then on, of western Ukrainian lands eastern Galicia was to be incorporated into Poland, northern Bukovina into Romania, and Transcarpathia into Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, Dnieper Ukraine and Crimea were to be incorporated into future Soviet Union by becoming the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Crimean Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

After all was said and done, neither the western nor the Dnieper Ukrainians gained anything from their decisions to side with the Whites and the Poles, respectively. They ended up not only losing trust to each other, but also losing the independence of their lands. The actions of each side were to test the solidarity of the first-time unified 'Ukraines,' unfortunately becoming a test they failed. However, one fact should not slip past the notice. Ukrainian leaders, especially of

⁴³⁶ Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1920*, 289-90, 294, 299.

Dnieper Ukraine, were to adapt themselves to the rapid developments of the revolutionary environment by moving from “what was essentially an apolitical cultural nationalism to positions of autonomy and federalism and, finally independent statehood in a matter of one year.”⁴³⁷ Sure enough, “the need for such a rapid reorientation inevitably produced some uncertainty and disagreement.”⁴³⁸

Speaking of the Crimea, it should be mentioned that none of the Ukrainian governments of the era had any authority over the peninsula. During the period Russians and Ukrainians, who constituted the majority in the Crimea and were mainly anti-Bolshevik, formed the Crimean Provincial Assembly. In the meantime, the Crimean Tatar leaders founded the Crimean Tatar Nationalist Party (Milli Fırka) and the Kurultay (The Crimean Tatar National Assembly) broadened its demands from cultural to territorial autonomy and finally to independence.⁴³⁹ The two governments existing in the Crimea did not agree on the issue of Crimean secession from the Russian whole but were on the same terms in opposing the Bolsheviks, acting cordially against them. However, they were to lose the control of the peninsula and thenceforth would have no say about the developments since the authority of the peninsula was to change hand several times among the Bolsheviks, German invaders, and the Whites until the seizure of control by the Bolsheviks in November 1920, whereby the Crimea was completely incorporated into the Russian SFSR as an autonomous unit.⁴⁴⁰ As such, the attempt of the Crimean Tatars “to establish an independent Crimean Tatar state in the Crimea which was almost

⁴³⁷ Reshetar, “Ukrainian and Russian Perceptions of the Ukrainian Revolution,” 145.

⁴³⁸ Ibid., 145-146.

⁴³⁹ Fisher, *Crimean Tatars*, 111-115. The Kurultay adopted “a Constitution which declared the principle of the ‘Crimean Democratic Republic’” and established “its rule over most of the peninsula (except for the Bolshevik-held Sevastopol) throughout December 1917.” [Hakan Kırımlı, “Diplomatic Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, 1918-21,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, 4, Turkey before and after Atatürk: Internal and External Affairs (1998): 204.]

⁴⁴⁰ Fisher, *Crimean Tatars*, 118-129.

realized in the years 1917-18” ended with the fall of the Crimea under the Soviet rule⁴⁴¹

Although the revolutionary period may seem to end with a fiasco, still, there were important gains from this period. First, the period helped the Ukrainian national movement to reach the masses, spreading national consciousness previously limited to a handful of intellectuals to the ordinary peasant masses of Dnieper Ukraine. Secondly, following the revolutionary period the Russians became compelled that they were to abandon their practice of calling Ukrainians as ‘Little Russians,’ and “to concede, at least in theory, that the Ukrainian SSR was ‘sovereign’.”⁴⁴² Furthermore, the Soviet Ukrainian government, which during the revolutionary period was the UNR’s most bitter adversary, was to find itself defending Ukrainian rights.⁴⁴³ Hereinafter, the experiences under Soviet and non-Soviet regimes were to shape the identity and political culture of the Ukrainians.

4.2 The Ukrainian Lands in the Interwar Period and Prior to the Operation

Barbarossa

In the interwar years, while the western Ukrainian lands⁴⁴⁴ were divided among Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, the rest of the Ukrainian-inhabited

⁴⁴¹ Hakan Kırımlı, “The Famine of 1921-22 in the Crimea and the Volga Basin and the Relief from Turkey,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 39, 1 (2003): 49.

⁴⁴² Omeljan Pritsak and John S. Reshetar, Jr., “The Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building,” *Slavic Review* 22, 2 (1963): 254.

⁴⁴³ Pritsak and Reshetar, 254. Some prominent members of the Soviet Ukrainian government were to become leading figures of the ‘Ukrainization’ policy. (Pritsak and Reshetar, 254.)

⁴⁴⁴ In this chapter ‘western Ukrainian lands’ designate the Ukrainian-inhabited lands outside the Soviet Union during the interwar period. [John-Paul Himka, “Western Ukraine between the Wars,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 34 (1992): 391-393.] In this connection, throughout this chapter the pre-1939 Soviet Ukrainian lands will sometimes be referred to as the ‘eastern Ukrainian lands.’

lands were being ruled by the Soviet Union as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. During this period Poland acquired eastern Galicia [named it “Eastern Little Poland” (*Malopolska Wschodnia*)⁴⁴⁵] and Western Volhynia while northern Bukovyna was transferred to Romania, and Transcarpathia became part of Czechoslovakia.

The first to witness the great changes in the following years was Transcarpathia. With the 1938 Munich Pact, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia began, and subsequently Transcarpathia, officially Subcarpathian Rus’ (*Podkarpatska Rus’*), acquired first autonomous status and then independence, but only for a brief period, since Hungary concurrent with Germany annexed Subcarpathian Rus’ in the very same day of its declaration of independence. Until 1944, Transcarpathia was to be ruled by the Hungarians.⁴⁴⁶ Hitler’s next move on Poland was to set off the Soviet occupation on 17 September 1939 of Ukrainian inhabited lands of Poland east of the San and Buh Rivers, that are eastern Galicia, western Volhynia, and western Polissia.⁴⁴⁷ Following June 1940, northern Bukovina and the predominantly Ukrainian southern part of Bessarabia were annexed to the Ukrainian SSR.⁴⁴⁸

Pre-Barbarossa Operation boundary changes in favor of the Soviet Ukraine were of great significance for the future independent Ukrainian state, as these boundaries were basically adhered to in the formation of contemporary Ukrainian state. Only following the incorporation of Transcarpathia in 1945 and the Russian

⁴⁴⁵Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 13.

⁴⁴⁶Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 131.

⁴⁴⁷In line with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Ukrainian lands west of San and Buh, that are Podlachia, Lemko and Chelm regions, which were occupied by the Germans, were to be incorporated into the *Generalgouvernement Polen*. [Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 617.]

⁴⁴⁸Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 617.

SSR's "gift" of the Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954, the contemporary boundaries of Ukraine were drawn.

4.2.1 Ukrainian Lands of the Soviet Union during the Interwar Period⁴⁴⁹

During the interwar period Soviet Ukraine passed through three stages. During the 1920-1927 period the trend was towards autonomy within the Soviet state with the "Ukrainization" program in full force. With the redefinition and restructuring of central Soviet government's priorities and policies, Soviet Ukraine entered into a transitional period between 1928 and 1932, which culminated in the third stage from 1932 to 1939 wherein the full integration of the Soviet Ukrainian society with the rest of the Soviet society was witnessed.⁴⁵⁰ The first stage of the evolution of the Soviet Ukrainian society helped the Ukrainians to develop a consciousness of being Ukrainian, a process which was already in effect as a repercussion of the post-WWI and Ukrainian revolutionary era. This period of "Ukrainization" laid the foundation for a Ukrainian culture, which had not been prevalent in Eastern Ukraine.⁴⁵¹ On the other hand, the stages that followed curbed the development of a Ukrainian national consciousness by imposing upon the society the Soviet-Russian culture. As a result, the eastern Ukrainian Soviet society evolved into a more Sovietized and Russified society as compared to the western Ukrainian society which was free from Soviet influence for twenty more years.

⁴⁴⁹By the Ukrainian lands of the Soviet Union during the interwar period, the lands meant is the contemporary Ukrainian territory which between 1920 and 1941 was ruled by the Soviets.

⁴⁵⁰Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 529.

⁴⁵¹Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 394.

Following the December 1922 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and 1924 Constitution, the subordination of Soviet Ukraine to the all-Union center was clear. Thus, the autonomists in Ukraine realized that a political autonomy was an illusion, and canalized their efforts towards the attainment of some kind of a cultural autonomy. The result was “Ukrainization” behind which lied the *korenizatsiia* (indigenization) policy of the all-Union government.⁴⁵² As of then, even if for a borrowed time, Ukrainian culture could count on some state support.

Although the presentation of “Ukrainization” of the Soviet Ukraine in this section may give the impression that “Ukrainization” was a process in which all people of the Soviet Ukraine without dispute felt Ukrainian and wanted to use Ukrainian as their native tongue, one should be aware, that not to mention the people of other nationalities living in Soviet Ukraine, not all Ukrainians felt that way. There were many Ukrainians, especially in the south-easternmost parts of Ukraine who felt no need for any kind of “Ukrainization,” let alone Ukrainizing their native tongue, which had become Russian. These lands were not Ukrainian lands but were under the control of the Crimean Tatars before the Russians incrementally gained control during the eighteenth century.⁴⁵³ Because the new settlers of these easternmost parts of Ukraine included Russian as well as Ukrainian colonizers, these areas were never solely Ukrainian in character, but harboured more Russian elements than anything else. For many in the region, the “Ukrainization” campaign disturbed the status quo, and was an abnormality, and the

⁴⁵²Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 533.

⁴⁵³ Roman Szporluk, “Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State,” *Daedalus* 126, 3 (1997): 106.

supposed Russification which took place after the war was dealing with the negative impact of the artificial “Ukrainization” of the 1920s.⁴⁵⁴

Another process that ran hand by hand with “Ukrainization” was the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Ukraine.⁴⁵⁵ As Soviet industrialization led thousands of Ukrainian peasants to migrate from the countryside to the cities, the previously Russian character of the cities was to change towards a more Ukrainian kind.⁴⁵⁶

During 1920s, Soviet propaganda aimed at convincing the Ukrainians living outside Soviet Ukraine that “their national aspirations could be better realized and their cultures better protected” in the Soviet Union.⁴⁵⁷ Apparently, the Soviet propaganda had a considerable effect on the émigré Ukrainian intelligentsia. The policy of “Ukrainization” brought about the return of prominent Ukrainian figures from emigration, the most renowned of which was Mykhailo Hrushevskyy, who with his arrival boosted the studies of Ukrainian history and language. With the flourishing of the studies on Ukrainian history the 1920s witnessed a period in which Ukrainian historians began to challenge the old Russocentric imperial conception of the past.⁴⁵⁸

⁴⁵⁴ Andrew Wilson, “The Donbas Between Ukraine and Russia,” 280.

⁴⁵⁵ One side effect of the rapid industrialization campaign was that while industrialization was concentrated in centers of eastern Ukraine where a large Russian population lived such as the lower Dnieper urban triangle (Dnepropetrovsk - Krivoi Rog - Zaporozhia) and the Donets Basin (Donbas), the rest of the Soviet Ukraine (where Ukrainians are concentrated) and the western Ukrainian lands outside the Soviet territories remained as before an agricultural-based society. (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 553.)

⁴⁵⁶ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 540. In industrial centers as Kharkov, Lugansk, and Dnepropetrovsk while 38, 7, and 6 percent of the population in 1923 were Ukrainians respectively, these figures raised to 50, 31, and 48 percent. As of mid-1930s, Ukrainians constituted the majority in most large cities. (Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 390.)

⁴⁵⁷ Jeffrey S. Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, “Who Voted Communist? Reconsidering the Social Bases of Radicalism in Interwar Poland,” *Slavic Review* 62,1 (2003): 100. In line with this argument “the Soviet leaders had frequently denounced Polish rule in these eastern territories of Poland and demanded their ‘reunion’ with the USSR.” (David R. Marples, *Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1930s* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 43.)

⁴⁵⁸ Mark von Hagen, “Does Ukraine Have a History?,” *Slavic Review* 54, 3 (1995): 663.

From this boost in “Ukrainization,” Soviet Ukrainian education system also got its share. Following 1925, Ukrainian was used in 81 percent of adult literacy schools, and 82 percent of elementary schools. As for the *vuzy*, the higher education institutions in the Soviet Ukraine, knowledge of the Ukrainian language became a prerequisite for entering and graduating from them. Along with these, all students were obliged to take courses on Ukrainian language, history, geography and culture. As the attitudes and understandings of generations are shaped by the education they receive, this short period of “Ukrainization” facilitated the emergence of an unprecedentedly large Ukrainian intelligentsia in Dnieper Ukraine.⁴⁵⁹

The use of Ukrainian language spread also to the Soviet Ukrainian party and government. By 1925, officials were instructed to use Ukrainian in all correspondences.⁴⁶⁰ Consequently, Ukrainian-language media flourished in this period. Whereas in 1922 less than 10 newspapers and just 27 percent of the books in Ukraine were published in the native language, by 1927 over 50 percent of the books, and by 1933 373 out of 426 newspapers published in Soviet Ukraine were in Ukrainian.⁴⁶¹

In terms of religion, because the program of the Soviet government was eventual destruction of it, as the first step came “divide and shatter.” The all-Union government supported the tripartition⁴⁶² of the Orthodox Church for this would further weaken its grasp of the devout people. The Soviets perceived the Russian

⁴⁵⁹Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 542-544.

⁴⁶⁰Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001) , 90.

⁴⁶¹Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 388-389.

⁴⁶²Tripartition of orthodoxy in Soviet Ukraine as Ukrainian Autocephalous (independent) Orthodox Church with a nationalist orientation, the Ukrainian exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, Ukrainian Orthodox (Synodal) Church (Living Church) supported by the Communist government.

Orthodox Church as the main danger; hence they tolerated the emergent churches that undermined its influence.⁴⁶³

Whatever great the contributions of “Ukrainization” on the penetration of the Ukrainian culture and language on the Soviet Ukrainian public may be, the point that it was aimed at building a *Soviet* Ukrainian culture, and not a national one, should not go unnoticed. In accordance with a program of social transformation, the Ukrainian language and “Ukrainianness” were being exploited for the ingraining of the Communist ideology and Soviet way of life into the Soviet Ukraine.⁴⁶⁴ Although the policy of “Ukrainization” helped eastern Ukrainians of the Soviet Ukraine apprehend their “Ukrainess,” the Ukrainian society as a whole grew into a Soviet-Russian rather than a nationally conscious one.

By 1928, while “Ukrainization” was still in full force and was bearing its fruits, the Soviet government began questioning what the goal and extent of it should be, and thus a transitional period commenced.⁴⁶⁵ As the authorities emerged

⁴⁶³ Among these churches was the nationalist oriented Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church which was supported by nationally minded Ukrainians for whom the Autocephalous Church “represented the vanguard of a free Ukraine.” (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 546.) However, the Soviet toleration of this Church was not to last long. As of 1926, official pressures on the Church became more and more evident. Extreme taxes were forced on its parishes, and its Metropolitan and some other members were arrested with the accusation of “nationalist deviation.” Obviously, the Church’s days were numbered. (Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 402) The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was destroyed in 1929. [Wolodymyr Kosyk, *The Third Reich and Ukraine*, trans. Irene Ievins Rudnytzky (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 11.] According to Magocsi, it was dissolved in January 1930. (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 565.) As for the Synodal Church, it was also banned in 1936. Since then, there remained only the Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Ukraine. Although not banned altogether, the Ukrainian exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church also suffered Soviet persecution. By the end of the 1930s, there remained about a hundred Orthodox priests in Soviet Ukraine. [Karel C. Berkhoff, “Was there a Religious Revival in Soviet Ukraine under the Nazi Regime?,” *The Slavonic and East European Review* 78, 3 (2000): 538.]

⁴⁶⁴ Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries*, 141.

⁴⁶⁵ The transitional period was marked by the initiation and acceleration of important Soviet-wide policies such as collectivization, dekulakization and the replacement of New Economic Policy with the planned command economy introduced by Stalin, and thus the introduction of the first Five-Year Plan and rapid heavy industrialization.

more repugnant than supportive of the “Ukrainization” policy, Communist Party of Ukraine [CP(b)U] began to back away from its implementation.⁴⁶⁶

In 1932-1933, an unprecedentedly devastating famine raged throughout the Soviet Ukraine. This Great Famine of 1933, which came to be known as the Holodomor (killing by hunger), cost the lives of millions because of starvation or diseases caused by malnutrition. By the winter of 1933 starvation was the norm in the Ukrainian countryside, and despite the miserable situation Soviet authorities proceed their grain procurement policy pitilessly.⁴⁶⁷

The crucial fact about this famine was that it was not an act of God. Indeed, the average of 1926-30 harvest was only 12% above the harvest of 1932.⁴⁶⁸ The main reason for the famine was Stalin’s policy to raise Ukraine’s grain procurement quotas in 1932 by 44%,⁴⁶⁹ which meant that the harvest was confiscated, irrespective of the people’s needs. Yet more, the Soviet authorities strove to erase the famine from public consciousness and denied the existence of it not only when it was happening but even for decades later.⁴⁷⁰ Even during the Khrushchev-era de-Stalinization, although Stalin’s policies on Ukraine were repudiated, there was a complete silence about the “Great Famine.”⁴⁷¹ It was possible to give voice to its occurrence only in mid-1980s, during the Gorbachev period.

As the nationality policy was being reconfigured, the efforts of Ukrainizers were being more and more undermined. The “internationalist elements” in the

⁴⁶⁶ The first victim was to be Oleksander Shums’kyi, commissar of education (1924-1927), who was deposed of his post in 1927, being replaced by another prominent figure who would also exert himself for the success of “Ukrainization,” Mykola Skrypnyk (1927-1933).

⁴⁶⁷ While the famine was sweeping through especially the main grain producing areas, the Dnieper Ukraine, northern Caucasus and the Kuban regions, the Soviet grain export continued as it was designated.

⁴⁶⁸ Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 221-222.

⁴⁶⁹ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 413.

⁴⁷⁰ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 559-563.

⁴⁷¹ Stephan M. Horak, “Ukrainian Historiography 1953-1963,” *Slavic Review* 24, 2 (1965): 271.

CP(b)U decided that the “Ukrainization” policy should be narrowed and the Ukrainian peasants migrating to the cities should be Russified, to protect the Russian character of the cities. Soviet authorities started targeting Ukrainian intelligentsia. As of then, if an intellectual was against the new approach to the nationality question, he could soon be accused of being a “counterrevolutionary bourgeois nationalist.”⁴⁷² The Ukrainian intelligentsia was suspected of “nationalist deviation” and opposition to the state, and the first big strike came in late 1929 when 45 Ukrainian intellectuals were accused of forming the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (*Spilka Vyzvolennia Ukrainy* - SVU) in order to overthrow the government and were sent to a Siberian labor camp.⁴⁷³ As the Soviet authorities claimed, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church was linked to the very formation, and so it was dissolved in January 1930, following a show trial, which “served to equate nationalism with treason.”⁴⁷⁴ As such, between 1931 and 1934 leading figures of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were deposed of their positions for being “Trotskyist” or tolerating Ukrainian nationalism. Among the early victims of the Stalinist purges were the West Ukrainian émigrés of 1920s who escaped Polish persecution and fled to Soviet Ukraine to contribute to the “Ukrainization” process. During their accusations, these West Ukrainians were called as “Galicians” to show their alien origins.⁴⁷⁵

Because the “Ukrainization” policy was now being reversed, the achievements of the period were to be erased. By late 1930s, the Ukrainian historiography that was permitted to develop in contradiction to the imperial

⁴⁷²Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 565.

⁴⁷³Yury Boshyk, ed., *Ukraine during World War II: History and Its Aftermath – A symposium* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 250.

⁴⁷⁴Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 565.

⁴⁷⁵Martin, 352.

Russian historiography was now brought in line with the latter, which as well led to the denunciation of Hryshchov's.⁴⁷⁶ As such, the Soviets rehabilitated "the imperial vantage point under the guise of the slogan 'friendship of peoples' according to which the Russians were the older brothers for the rest of the peoples."⁴⁷⁷ Any contrary attempt at interpreting history was punished for being "bourgeois" or "counterrevolutionary nationalist deviation." In this manner, authorities started "cleansing" the Academy of Sciences of the "undesirable elements."⁴⁷⁸

The process of "Ukrainization" and thus the transitional period came to an end with the death of commissar of education, Mykola Skrypnyk.⁴⁷⁹ By being a vigorous advocate of "Ukrainization," and by promoting linguistic purism and introducing in 1928 a new orthography of Ukrainian came to be known as *skrypnykivka*, Skrypnyk became the object of accusations of "nationalist deviation" as a result of which he was deposed of his post as the commissar of education.⁴⁸⁰

Actually, the Skrypnyk affair was a message to all; if even Skrypnyk could be

⁴⁷⁶The Soviet historians embarked upon a process of inventing evidence that, far from possessing the qualifications of a scientific-historian, Hrushevskiy "was a 'bourgeois nationalist' who deliberately falsified actual facts in order to prove the differences between the Russian and Ukrainian nations." [Michael Pap, "Soviet Difficulties in the Ukraine," *The Review of Politics* 14,2 (1952): 228.]

⁴⁷⁷Hagen, 663.

⁴⁷⁸Wolodymyr Kosyk, *The Third Reich and Ukraine*, trans. Irene Ievins Rudnytzky (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 13.

⁴⁷⁹In 1933 Skrypnyk committed suicide following the example of another "nationalist deviationist," Mykola Khvylovyi, a prominent Ukrainian writer who had done the same thing having been denounced for his slogan "away from Moscow." [Ivan Katchanovski, "Classic Prisoner's Dilemma: A Quasi-Experimental Test During the Great Terror," (paper presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Philadelphia, 28-31 August, 2003.), 10.]

⁴⁸⁰Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 565-567. According to the Party, as expressed by the Deputy Minister of Education Andrii Khvyliia, "Comrade Skrypnyk could not have failed to know that he had entered upon the path of isolating the Ukrainian language from Russian and bringing it closer to Polish." (James E. Mace, "The Man-Made Famine of 1933 in Soviet Ukraine: What Happened and Why," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, Vol. LI, No:5, January, 30, 1983, 10.) Ironically, Khvyliia, the denouncer of early 1930s, could not escape the fate of those he accused, and he himself became a victim of the Great Terror. He was arrested in 1937 for being among the leaders of an alleged underground Ukrainian nationalist and terrorist organization. (Katchanovski, "Classic Prisoner's Dilemma," 8, 10.)

accused of “nationalist deviation,” no national communist should feel safe anymore.⁴⁸¹

By a modest effort, in 1934 Kiev was made the capital of Soviet Ukraine⁴⁸² as “a minor and propagandistic concession”⁴⁸³ to nationalist sentiments, and there appeared some attempts to maintain a “Bolshevik Ukrainization” with a limited scope and directed toward Soviet goals.⁴⁸⁴ Still, it was obvious that reconciling the “Soviet demands for unity and conformity” with “Soviet sponsorship of local development” was impossible for the Soviet authorities. Because of this incompatibility, they reasoned that Ukrainian themes were “contributing to divisiveness and disunity in the Soviet Union.”⁴⁸⁵

In 1933, Stalin declared “local nationalism (not Russian chauvinism) the main threat to Soviet unity.”⁴⁸⁶ Under the cover of “friendship of peoples”, unity and solidarity, and internationalism began a glorification campaign of Russian ways, Russian language and culture with a stress upon the principal role the Russians played in the USSR.⁴⁸⁷ Hence came de-Ukrainization, centralization, full integration and Russification accompanied with “the ‘Great Retreat’ to the prerevolutionary Russian traditions.”⁴⁸⁸

By mid-1930s, purges became more widespread and illogical than the earlier purges. It struck so widespread that later this period was to be known as the Great

⁴⁸¹Martin, 345.

⁴⁸²As before, the capital of the Soviet Ukraine was northeastern city of Kharkov.

⁴⁸³Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 421.

⁴⁸⁴Robert S. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917-1957* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 214-215.

⁴⁸⁵*Ibid.*, 216.

⁴⁸⁶Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 422.

⁴⁸⁷Sullivant, 227. Russian cultural achievements were set superior to those of non-Russian republics, even to the point that their cultural figures were tried to be identified with the traditional Russian culture and the Soviet thought. (Sullivant, 230.)

⁴⁸⁸Serhy Yekelchuk, “How the ‘Iron Minister’ Kaganovich Failed to Discipline Ukrainian Historians: A Stalinist Ideological Campaign Reconsidered,” *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 27,4 (1999): 580.

Terror. As for the future of the Soviet Ukrainian leadership, the goal was to reorganize the CP(b)U and Union officials by cleansing all the ones identified with the Ukraine and replacing their positions with men whose loyalty to Stalin was indisputable and who were having no connection with Ukraine and the previous officials.⁴⁸⁹ Thereupon, by 1937 the purges gradually reached higher party levels,⁴⁹⁰ and as such “within a year entire hierarchy (politburo and secretariat) of the CP(b)U was purged.”⁴⁹¹

In the upshot, the prominent historian of Ukraine, Orest Subtelny argues that “over 15,000 people holding responsible positions were purged on charges of nationalism.”⁴⁹² As a result of the party purges, the complete subordination of the CP(b)U was achieved. The incursion of thousands of Russian functionaries was followed with the arrival of the new leaders of CP(b)U who were sent from Moscow and were foreigners to Ukraine.⁴⁹³ Naturally, as the new officials did not know Ukrainian, use of Ukrainian in the administrative affairs was also curtailed.⁴⁹⁴

Being probably the principal manifestation of national consciousness, language was a major concern for the Soviet authorities. As the earlier “Bolshevik principle of the supremacy of local languages in the republics” was now denounced⁴⁹⁵ and the policy of Russification commenced, the All-Union government started to show its displeasure with the language policies of the “Ukrainization” campaign, remonstrating that the Russian, Polish, and Jewish

⁴⁸⁹Pap, 224.

⁴⁹⁰Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 420.

⁴⁹¹Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 570.

⁴⁹²Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 419. Many others were charged for “Trotskyism,” “fascism,” “lack of Bolshevik vigilance,” and connections with émigrés and foreign powers. (Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 419.)

⁴⁹³*Ibid.*, 422.

⁴⁹⁴Peter A. Blitstein, “Cultural Diversity and the Interwar Conjunction: Soviet Nationality Policy in Its Comparative Context,” *Slavic Review* 65, 2 (2006): 289.

⁴⁹⁵Sullivan, 232.

minorities of Ukraine were being forced to learn Ukrainian.⁴⁹⁶ As the Russian language was considered to be “the medium through which world’s ‘first socialist state’ had been created,”⁴⁹⁷ Ukrainians were to “adopt Russian as an alternate if not a primary tongue.” As said by a new law, all Ukrainians were to “converse fluently in simple Russian and to read and write the language in an elementary way;” and accordingly Russian was to penetrate into the countryside where Ukrainian was preponderant.⁴⁹⁸ In 1938, mandatory Russian-language instruction and universal curriculum and schedule were established throughout the Soviet Union.⁴⁹⁹

Next came the efforts to make the Ukrainian alphabet, grammar, and vocabulary closer to Russian.⁵⁰⁰ In 1933, Skrypnyk-time language reforms were abolished. In 1937, a newly published Ukrainian-Russian dictionary was denounced⁵⁰¹ and a new dictionary emphasizing the similarities between Russian and Ukrainian languages was prepared, which “for the first time excluded the distinctive Ukrainian letter [‘r,’] retaining only the Russian [‘r’].”⁵⁰² In terms of printed media, while by 1931 Ukrainian language newspapers and journals constituted respectively 90 and 85 percent of the overall newspapers, in 1940 these figures had dropped to 70 and 45 percent.⁵⁰³

It would be appropriate to give a brief account of the situation of non-Ukrainian peoples of Ukraine during this period. In fact, Jews, Tatars, Poles,

⁴⁹⁶Ibid., 125.

⁴⁹⁷Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 570.

⁴⁹⁸Sullivant, 232-233.

⁴⁹⁹Blitstein, 290.

⁵⁰⁰Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 423.

⁵⁰¹Sullivant, 232. Dictionary was denounced because of being a product of fascist-nationalists who deliberately ignored the “urban” Ukrainian deplete with Russian elements, and instead “emphasized bizarre Ukrainian terms borrowed from Poland and western rural areas.” (Sullivant, 232.)

⁵⁰² Ibid, 377.

⁵⁰³Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 423. The two main newspapers of Soviet Ukraine, Ukrainian language *Sil's'ki Visti* and *Komunist* were supplemented by a Russian language newspaper, *Sovetskaia Ukraina*. (Sullivant, 232.)

Germans, and Greeks, all went through the same processes of indigenization, and then the reversal of these policies, just like the Ukrainians.⁵⁰⁴ As one might expect, the Russians who were mainly concentrated in the industrial regions of eastern Ukraine, mainly around Kharkov and Donbass, were not exposed to these ever changing processes, and felt bothered especially because of the linguistic aspect of “Ukrainization” as they never thought of being a minority in Ukraine but saw the Russian culture and language as the ever dominant one.⁵⁰⁵

The pre-WWII historical experience of different regions varied considerably. While Ukrainians living in interwar Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania were terrified by the news of the artificial famine and mass deportations which the Soviet Ukrainians were enduring, many Soviet Ukrainians who were lucky enough not to be exposed to the terror and the famine were unaware of their extent due to the “totalitarian nature of the Soviet society, censorship, and propaganda”.⁵⁰⁶

The Sovietization and Russification, purges, deportations, and executions in the Soviet Ukraine of 1930s were certainly the factors which suppressed the manifestations of Ukrainian national consciousness among the Soviet Ukrainians during the WWII period. By the end of this period, not only the most nationally conscious Soviet Ukrainians were liquidated with the purges,⁵⁰⁷ and a vacuum of

⁵⁰⁴ Of these nationalities, Crimean Tatars had a unique position, as the Crimean peninsula was not a part of the Soviet Ukraine (until the transfer of it to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954), but was an autonomous republic within the Russian SFSR. The reversal of indigenization policies is best illustrated when following 1938, the Crimean Tatar language was forcibly made to be written in the Cyrillic alphabet. (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 579-581.)

⁵⁰⁵ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 573-579.

⁵⁰⁶ Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries*, 142.

⁵⁰⁷ According to Yekelchik, let alone those who were “purged” during the 1930s, “the Soviet authorities relocated 3.5 million Ukrainian bureaucrats, intellectuals, workers, and their families to Russia and Soviet Asia” during the early months of the Nazi invasion. (Yekelchik, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 137.)

national leadership had emerged,⁵⁰⁸ but also the Ukrainian people at large was terrorized by the Soviet policies of 1930s. Moreover, the news of the developments in Soviet Ukraine contrarily fueled western Ukrainians' distaste of the Soviets and ignited their desire to struggle not to become one of the many submerged nations of the Soviet Union.

4.2.2 Western Ukrainian Lands in the Interwar Period

While the interwar Ukrainian populations of Poland and Romania were treated intolerantly, had to endure repression and were denied self-rule and the use of Ukrainian both in public life and in education, and faced Polonization or Romanization as the case may be, the Transcarpathians found themselves with a favorable political environment in a country which could be considered as “the only new state in eastern Europe that remained a liberal democracy during the entire interwar period,”⁵⁰⁹ thus “interwar era of Czechoslovak rule witnessed a true cultural and national renaissance for Subcarpathian Rus’.”⁵¹⁰

⁵⁰⁸ Bohdan Krawchenko, “Soviet Ukraine under Nazi Occupation, 1941-4,” in *Ukraine During World War II: History and Its Aftermath*, ed. Yury Boshyk (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1986), 16.

⁵⁰⁹ Yekelchik, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 129.

⁵¹⁰ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 607.

4.2.2.1 Ukrainian Lands in Interwar Romania

During the interwar period around 582.000 to one million Ukrainians lived in northern Bukovina and southern Bessarabia which were incorporated into the Kingdom of Romania following November 1918.⁵¹¹ Obviously, although its southern parts were inhabited by a considerable amount of Ukrainians, Bessarabia was not a historically and ethnically Ukrainian land.⁵¹² As such, the region was not a place to claim Ukrainian, and thus is out of the purview of this chapter.

Before WWI, predominantly Ukrainian-inhabited northern Bukovina was a part of the autonomous Austrian province of Bukovina. At that time with “extensive local self-government, and a well-developed system of Ukrainian-language education,” Ukrainians of Bukovina were said to be “the most favored West Ukrainian community.”⁵¹³ Unfortunately, all these privileges were to be lost in the hands of the interwar Romania as Romanian authorities even denied that Ukrainians were a distinct nationality and claimed that they were Romanians who lost their native tongue, and a fierce campaign of Romanization set in. Ukrainian language schools were Romanized. Furthermore, Ukrainian newspapers and cultural societies were banned.⁵¹⁴ For the Bukovinian Ukrainians accustomed to the favorable environment provided by the former Austrian rule, the oppressive Romanian rule

⁵¹¹ Magocsi states that Ukrainians of Romania numbered 582.000 according to the official statistics, and one million according to unofficial estimates. As stated by Magocsi, 461.000 of the Ukrainians lived in Southern Bessarabia, and 302.000 inhabited northern Bukovina. (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 599.)

⁵¹² Before WWI, Bessarabia was a province of the Russian Empire since the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest. Prior to that, Bessarabia was a part of the Ottoman Empire’s vassal state Moldavia. Except for its southern part which was called by the Ottomans as Bucak, the area as a whole constituted the Ottoman Vilayet of Silistre.

⁵¹³ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 447.

⁵¹⁴ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 602.

was a shock.⁵¹⁵ As a result of these repressive developments, by mid-1930s a growing number of Ukrainians in Romania joined radical nationalist underground organizations.⁵¹⁶

4.2.2.2 Ukrainian lands in Interwar Czechoslovakia

Since the Middle Ages Transcarpathia was uninterruptedly a part of Hungary. It was only in 1919 that Transcarpathia joined Czechoslovakia.⁵¹⁷ Czechoslovakia considered itself a Slavic state and the Rusyns as the “state nationality” in Subcarpathian Rus’, hence it provided a favorable environment not only for its Rusyn/Ukrainian population, but also for those Ukrainians who emigrated from Galicia and Dnieper Ukraine and settled in Transcarpathia.⁵¹⁸ Rusyns/Ukrainians of Transcarpathia were still confused about their national identity and therefore, the interwar Transcarpathia was a playground of Russophile, Rusynophile,⁵¹⁹ and Ukrainophile orientations.⁵²⁰

In the religious sphere, the Greek Catholic and the Orthodox churches were fighting for the allegiance of the interwar Ukrainians of Transcarpathia. Whereas the Orthodox Church was the stronghold of Russophiles, the Greek Catholic Church

⁵¹⁵Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 447.

⁵¹⁶Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 129.

⁵¹⁷Szporluk, “Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State,” 87.

⁵¹⁸Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 603.

⁵¹⁹According to Rusynophiles, “the East Slavic population of Transcarpathia was neither Russian, nor Ukrainian, but rather a distinct Subcarpathian Rusyn nationality.” (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 608.)

⁵²⁰Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries*, 139. As a consequence of the “unresolved problem of Subcarpathian Rusyn national identity,” the Czechoslovak authorities offered its Rusyn/Ukrainian population a variety of East Slavic language instruction schools. Thus, there were schools providing education in local Rusyn, Russian, and Ukrainian. (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 607.)

became “a bastion of the Rusyn national identity.”⁵²¹ Although by 1930s, the Czechoslovak government officially supported pro-Czechoslovak-to-be Rusynophiles and despite its relatively late appearance in Transcarpathia,⁵²² the Ukrainophile orientation became dominant in 1930s.⁵²³

Being able to express their political and national aspirations freely, Transcarpathians of 1930s did not promote much the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN),⁵²⁴ the western Ukrainian nationalist organization which took suppressed people of Galicia, western Volhynia, northern Bukovina, and even Dnieper Ukraine by storm.⁵²⁵ Yet, with the creation of firstly autonomous, then, however ephemeral, independent Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939,⁵²⁶ Transcarpathians were to mingle with the members of OUN, because “eager to protect the first Ukrainian land to gain its freedom, many young integral nationalists [that is OUN members] from Galicia illegally crossed the border and joined the [Carpatho-Ukrainian military force] Carpathian Sich.”⁵²⁷

Developing a Ukrainian national identity and a feeling of unity and solidarity with the people to the east who are said to be their co-nationals was not that easy. In the first place, it was only after Transcarpathia’s incorporation into the Soviet Ukraine in 1945 that the Transcarpathian Ukrainians for the first time ever united under one state with their co-nationals on the other side of the border.⁵²⁸

Besides, when considering the influence of the establishment of an independent

⁵²¹Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 607-608. Prior to 1930s, the Greek Catholic Church was directed by pro-Hungarian elements, but in due course Rusynophile elements surpassed. (Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 130.)

⁵²²Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 130.

⁵²³Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries*, 139.

⁵²⁴The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists will be discussed in the forthcoming pages.

⁵²⁵Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 134.

⁵²⁶The government was composed of Ukrainophiles. (Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 131.)

⁵²⁷Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 451.

⁵²⁸Szporluk, *Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State*, 87.

Ukrainian state in Transcarpathia, it should be noted that one-day independence during the chaotic war-times was most probably unknown to the Transcarpathians of the time. Still, although the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state in Transcarpathia could not have an impact on the Ukrainians of the day, we can talk about its impact on the future Transcarpathians. As the narrative of the establishment of independent Ukrainian national states during 1917-1920 period in the heartland Ukraine had a nationalizing impact on the region's future population; the way the Ukrainian historians told the story of the once independent Ukrainian state in Transcarpathia, and the thus created narrative of the establishment of the independent Carpatho-Ukraine, similarly helped most, especially the young generation of Transcarpathians, turn into nationally conscious Ukrainians.⁵²⁹

4.2.2.3 Ukrainian lands under the Polish rule

The two main Ukrainian-inhabited lands of Poland, western Volhynia and eastern Galicia, were different from each other. Volhynia was formerly a part of the Russian Empire, its Ukrainian population was mainly Orthodox and had strong communist traditions (as compared to the latter). It was subject to Russian imperial policies which suppressed Ukrainian culture and language, thus had a much weaker nationalist tradition as compared with Galicia. Although Volhynia's incorporation into Poland increased the interaction between the Ukrainians of Volhynia and their nationalistic brethren in Galicia and made them "become basically assimilated in outlook to the Galicians," still their role in nationalistic developments was

⁵²⁹Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 451.

comparatively minor.⁵³⁰ On the other hand, eastern Galicia was a former province of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until WWI and the center of the short-lived Western Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR). Eastern Galicia's Ukrainian population was predominantly Greek Catholic and had a well-developed sense of national consciousness.

The developments in the interwar Poland are the most crucial ones to be emphasized in this chapter, as it was the Polish-ruled eastern Galicia that the most crucial Ukrainian actor of the interwar and WWII period, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN – *Orhanizatsiia Ukrayins'kykh Natsionalistiv*) came out of. By having the greatest impact on not only the developments of its playtime, but also on the evolution of different political cultures in western and eastern regions of the contemporary Ukraine, the OUN deserves to be evaluated comprehensively, and thus encompasses the greatest part of this chapter.

Under the dictatorship of Jozef Pilsudski, Galicia harboured the most nationally conscious Ukrainians. The state banned Ukrainian in governmental agencies, made Polish the primary language in education, and banned several Ukrainian organizations.⁵³¹ Still, Ukrainians of Poland were organizing in cooperatives and civic organizations,⁵³² printed their own newspapers,⁵³³ and established several Ukrainian political parties of which Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (*Ukrains'ke Natsional'no Demokratychnе Ob'iednannia* –

⁵³⁰ Roman Szporluk, *Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), 113.

⁵³¹ Magocsi., *A History of Ukraine*, 594-595.

⁵³² Such as the Prosvita Societies, Audit Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives, *Tsentrosoiuz* (Union of Cooperative Unions), *Maslosoiuz* (Dairy Union), *Sil's'kyi Hospodar* (Village Farmer Association), *Soiuz Ukrainok* (Union of Ukrainian Women), *Plast* (the Ukrainian scouting movement), Native School Society. (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 589.)

⁵³³ A prominent one was *Dilo*.

UNDO) was the most prominent one.⁵³⁴ While UNDO believed that Ukrainians could attain their rights through legal means,⁵³⁵ the policies of the Polish state made the Ukrainian population feel disappointment and despair, losing their trust in legal ways.

Another issue that increased resentment toward the Polish state was the land reform laws of 1920, 1925, and 1936. With these laws the Polish government settled Polish soldiers and colonists to the Ukrainian-inhabited lands. By the law of 1936 it was stated that “a strip of land thirty kilometers from the Soviet border was directly subject to state authority.”⁵³⁶ Nay, this law laid ground for the Polish authorities to “exile individuals from this region for varying lengths of time, whenever they consider such a course of action to be in the interest of the State.”⁵³⁷

Meanwhile, hearing the bad news about the Soviet treatment of Ukrainians, such as the purges and the Holodomor (artificial famine) of 1932-33, the population started to lose its pro-Soviet sentiments. On the other hand, people increasingly began accusing UNDO for its “fruitless collaborationism” with the Polish government. As both the moderates and radical leftists were losing ground, the way was cleared for the radical nationalists.⁵³⁸

At this point, the Ukrainian Military Organization (*Ukrainska Viiskova Orhanizatsiia*, UVO), formed by İevhen Konovalets⁵³⁹ from the disbanded army of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) in 1920, came to the scene. It was a Ukrainian radical rightist resistance movement using terror, political assassination,

⁵³⁴Other important ones were Ukrainian Socialist-Radical Party, and the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU).

⁵³⁵ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 592.

⁵³⁶ Marples, *Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1930s*, 27.

⁵³⁷ Stephan M. Horak, *Poland and Her National Minorities, 1919-39: A Case Study* (New York: Vantage Press, 1961), 153.

⁵³⁸ Yekelchik, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 127.

⁵³⁹ A commander of the army of the UNR, and later leader of UVO and the first leader of OUN.

bomb attacks, and sabotage as its methods to destabilize the Polish rule and achieve its goals.⁵⁴⁰

In 1929 at a meeting in Vienna, Konovalets' succeeded in uniting nationalist organizations under the umbrella of the OUN. OUN was "an extremist underground political organization established by Ukrainian nationalists in inter-war Poland with the goal of establishing independent Ukrainian state".⁵⁴¹ It was "a highly disciplined underground revolutionary movement dedicated to the overthrow of Polish, Romanian, and eventually, Soviet rule on Ukrainian territories."⁵⁴² Soon Ukrainian students, peasant youth, war veterans, and impoverished peasants were attracted by OUN.⁵⁴³ Though it is not easy to give precise numbers, Orest Subtelny states that "on the eve of the Second World War it is estimated to have had about 20.000 members," while "the number of sympathizers was many times greater."⁵⁴⁴

In the meantime, in 1930, the Polish government responded to the assassinations and sabotages of the Ukrainian nationalists very harshly. With the "Pacification" of 1930, the Polish government cracked down on Ukrainians, and the Polish army and police occupying the region brutally searched for every Ukrainian house in a terrorist hunt. This event only served to further alienation of the Ukrainians and increase in sympathy and support for the OUN.⁵⁴⁵

⁵⁴⁰David R. Marples, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine* (Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2007), 90-91.

⁵⁴¹Oxana Shevel, "The Politics of Memory in a Divided Society: A Comparison of Post-Franco Spain and Post-Soviet Ukraine," (paper prepared for presentation at the 5th Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, 29-31 October, 2009.), 1.

⁵⁴²Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 597.

⁵⁴³Yekelchik, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 127. On the other hand, middle and rich Ukrainian peasantry favored legal political parties but not OUN as they thought their interests could be better represented this way. [Alexander J. Motyl, "The Rural Origins of the Communist and Nationalist Movements in Wolyn Wojewodztwo, 1921-1939," *Slavic Review* 37, no. 3 (1978): 420.]

⁵⁴⁴Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 444.

⁵⁴⁵Yekelchik, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 124.

During this period OUN activities became so fierce that they did not hesitate in assassinating even Ukrainians who disagreed with their activities.⁵⁴⁶ OUN's assassination of the Polish Minister of the Interior Bronislaw Pieracki in 1934, and the subsequent Polish crackdown on the *krai* (regional) leadership of OUN in Galicia fueled an increasing internal conflicts. Following the death of its leader Konovalets' in 1938⁵⁴⁷ internal strife in OUN deepened culminating in the OUN's split in the spring of 1941 into two factions as moderate OUN-M (Melnykites), headed by Andrii Mel'nyk who was the lieutenant of Konovalets', and more radical and revolutionary OUN-B (Banderites), led by the head of the Galician *krai* leadership, Stepan Bandera.

While the Soviet occupation approached, western Ukrainians led by OUN were ready to struggle for their national right, and thus were to constitute great problems for the Soviet regime to come.

⁵⁴⁶ Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, 559.

⁵⁴⁷ Konovalets', was assassinated by a Soviet agent.

CHAPTER 5

UKRAINIAN LANDS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND IN THE POST-WAR SOVIET UKRAINE

5.1 Ukrainian Lands during the Second World War

The Second World War can be divided into two periods for its importance in the evolution of the Ukrainian political culture. The first was the twenty-one-month-long occupation of western Ukrainian lands by the Soviet Union. During this period, western Ukrainians' encounter with the Soviet rule increased their dislike of the Soviet regime. The second crucial period was the Nazi rule which shaped the developments in Ukraine from the Operation Barbarossa until the return of the Soviets. Although it was a short period of time, the Nazi rule in Ukraine should be analyzed in depth for the period saw important developments that influenced the future Ukrainian society. The developments of this period provide significant insights about the regional diversities in the contemporary Ukraine.

5.1.1 Soviet Occupation of Western Ukrainian Lands (September 1939 – June 1941)

Following the Soviet occupation of Polish-ruled Ukrainian territories in September 1939, OUN from then on was to fight a new enemy, the Soviet Union. Although initially the Soviets celebrated this as the “reunification” of these newly acquired lands with their motherland and initiated a policy of “Ukrainization” in order to win the hearts of their new “subjects,” soon the oppressive face of the Soviets came to the fore. As the Soviet authorities were deeply apprehensive of the “dissemination of nationalist ideas” from the western to the eastern Ukraine,⁵⁴⁸ they could not wait much to initiate the policy of Russification and Sovietization.

As such, the intelligentsia was accused of “bourgeois nationalism,” state revealed its totalitarian nature by censorship and propaganda,⁵⁴⁹ and state and collective farms began to be formed. The Ukrainian cooperatives, political parties and “bourgeois” newspapers were banned, the Greek Catholic Church was suppressed and its landholdings were expropriated, religious instruction was suspended, but most importantly in 1940 mass arrests and deportations started. To escape arrest or deportation, great numbers of Ukrainian nationalists and intelligentsia fled to the German-occupied lands, mainly to Lemko and Chelm regions, while the remaining ones were to face arrest.⁵⁵⁰

The twenty-one-month-long Soviet rule in Western Ukraine had a historical importance, as for the first time in centuries ethnically Ukrainian territories were

⁵⁴⁸ Marples, *Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s*, 54.

⁵⁴⁹ Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries*, 140-141.

⁵⁵⁰ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 133.

united in a single, albeit Soviet, Ukrainian state.⁵⁵¹ Nevertheless, Western Ukrainians' first exposure to the Soviet system had an immediate negative impact on them so that they would naively greet the Nazis as liberators.⁵⁵²

5.1.2 Operation Barbarossa and the Nazi Rule in Ukraine

Since September 1939, OUN and the Nazis had a problem-free relationship. As Ukrainian nationalists longed for the destruction of the Polish and Soviet rule over the Ukrainian territories, they initially hoped for the victory of the Nazi Germany. The possibility of the destruction of the greatest obstacle before the establishment of a Ukrainian state surpassed all other considerations.⁵⁵³ So that, without considering possible future clashes of interest with the Germans, Ukrainian nationalists jumped into collaboration with the Germans as they thought this would help them establish their own military units to become the nucleus of the future Ukrainian army, and help them to gain a foothold in eastern Ukraine.⁵⁵⁴

“When preparing for an attack on the USSR, the Nazis first planned to make use of Ukrainian nationalists,”⁵⁵⁵ so Mel’nyk could establish “close links with the Gestapo and the Wehrmacht, whereas Bandera maintained contact and worked with the Abwehr [the German intelligence].” By the end of 1940, not only the units of

⁵⁵¹Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 17.

⁵⁵²Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 457.

⁵⁵³Taras, Hunczak, “OUN-German Relations, 1941-5,” in *German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Hans-Joachim Torke and John-Paul Himka (Edmonton; Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1994), 178.

⁵⁵⁴Yekelchik, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 141.

⁵⁵⁵Oleksandr Dergachov, et al., ed., *Ukrainian Statehood in the Twentieth Century* (Kiev: Political Thought, 1996), 239.

Ukrainian auxiliary police had been created”⁵⁵⁶ by the German Army, who were to become *Ostpolizei*, but the Germans also “surreptitiously formed military training units for Ukrainians.” Soon, in the spring of 1941, shortly before Operation Barbarossa, “the comparatively unconcealed development of Ukrainian units was begun by the Wehrmacht.”⁵⁵⁷ Unofficially called by the Germans as the Legions of Ukrainian nationalists, Ukrainian battalions *Roland* and *Nachtigall* were established by the German military and were composed of mainly OUN-B activists.⁵⁵⁸ While the officers were German, “there was a whole staff of ‘unofficial’ Ukrainian officers, headed by the leader of the ‘military tendency’ in the OUN-B, Roman Shukhevych.”⁵⁵⁹ Of these two battalions, *Nachtigall* needs a special attention as it was among the German forces that took L’viv in the beginning of the Operation Barbarossa.⁵⁶⁰

On 22 June 1941, the Nazi Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, catching the Soviets off-guard. As a result, the Nazis swept away and occupied almost all Ukrainian territories in about four months, with the exception of the Hungarian-controlled Transcarpathia and Romanian-ruled Transnistria.⁵⁶¹ During

⁵⁵⁶Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, 118.

⁵⁵⁷John Alexander Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, Third Edition (Englewood, Colo.: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990), 51.

⁵⁵⁸Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 141. According to Magocsi, these two units were of about 600 men. (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 626.)

⁵⁵⁹Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 51.

⁵⁶⁰Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 141. While *Nachtigall* marched into Galicia, reaching up to Podolia, *Roland* marched into Bessarabia. (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 626.)

⁵⁶¹Under German rule, in August 1941, the territories of the contemporary Ukrainian Republic were divided among three administrative regions. While Galicia east of San River was attached to the General Gouvernement, Crimea and the easternmost areas including Kharkov, Chernigov, and Sumy were in the German military zone as part of Rear Army Area South, the remaining Ukrainian lands including Right Bank and much of the Left Bank Ukraine were reorganized as the Reichskommissariat Ukraine administered by Erich Koch. (Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 467; Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 625, Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine Under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 37.) As a German ally, Romania not only received northern Bukovina and southern Bessarabia back, but also acquired the lands which correspond to present-day Odessa oblast, western areas of the Mykolaiv oblast, and southern parts of the Vinnytsia oblast, uniting them as Transnistria. (Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 37.)

this process, a considerable number of Ukrainians conscripted to the Red army from western Ukrainian territories left their posts despite the death penalty for desertion attempts. The Red Army and NKVD had to beat a retreat, and while retreating they not only destroyed the cities they left behind, but also slaughtered prisoners *en masse*. Unlike the rapid and destructive retreat in western Ukrainian regions, a much more planned evacuation could be secured in eastern regions, as a result of which the war experiences of western and eastern Ukrainians were varied to a considerable extent.⁵⁶² These developments added to the Soviets' unpopularity in the eyes of the western Ukrainians as they often greeted the Nazis eagerly while, eastern Ukrainians who were more on the same terms with the Soviet system received the Nazis in a more guarded way.

The early days of the Nazi occupation witnessed an important development for the Ukrainian nationalist cause. On June 30, the first group of Banderites headed by Iaroslav Stets'ko entered L'viv following the German armies and the *Nachtigall*. Here, OUN-B activists led by Stets'ko, who was speaking on behalf of his *vozhd'* Bandera, proclaimed the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. This proclamation was known as the "Act of Proclamation of the Ukrainian State" (or shortly the *Akt*).⁵⁶³ This *Akt* was proclaimed without the knowledge of Berlin, as the Ukrainian nationalists wanted to catch the Nazis with a *fait accompli*. While it can be said that Ukrainians of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia regarded the proclamation

⁵⁶²Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine Under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 12, 16, 20-21.

⁵⁶³The *Akt* was broadcasted twice on the L'viv radio station, and texts of the statement were dispatched to the leaders of the Axis states. (Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, 113.) For the text of the *Akt*, see Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 56-57.

of the *Akt* positively, it is highly suspicious that the central and eastern Ukrainians agreed with the western Ukrainians.⁵⁶⁴

Following the *Akt*, as the next step, OUN-B created mobile task forces (expeditionary groups – *pokhidni hrupy*) which were to follow the advancing German armies into eastern Ukraine in order to expand their nationalist cause, the proclamation of the *Akt*, and to be able to organize local administration in eastern Ukraine.⁵⁶⁵ These expeditionary groups were casted an important role as they were to carry the nationalist message onto the eastern Ukrainian lands, and thus the Ukrainian nationalist cause was to reach the Soviet Ukrainian masses. Their ultimate aim was to reconfigure the Sovietized and Russified Soviet Ukrainian masses as nationally conscious Ukrainians.

Unfortunately, Germans did not buy the *fait accompli* and in three days after the proclamation, an *SS Einsatzgruppe* was sent to L'viv and arrested the OUN-B leadership there.⁵⁶⁶ Although Germans attempted to reach a rapprochement by asking the OUN-B leaders to renounce the *Akt*, when they refused, Germans started the crack down on OUN-B.⁵⁶⁷ “By mid-September, mass arrests and executions of OUN-B members began, and on 25 November, the Gestapo ordered the elimination of the group on the grounds that it was preparing an uprising against the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.”⁵⁶⁸

The next to eliminate were the OUN-B expeditionary groups. While one of these groups was destined to Kiev, two were to cross the northern Ukraine, another

⁵⁶⁴Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, 119.

⁵⁶⁵Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 626.

⁵⁶⁶Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 59. Since then, Mykola Lebid', as Bandera's deputy, took the command of OUN-B. (Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 60.)

⁵⁶⁷Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, 562. In August 1941, the German military command ordered the arrest of OUN-B members in Ukraine and withdrew *Nachtigall* and *Roland* from the front (Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 142.), ultimately merging them into the *Schutzmannschaft* Battalion No. 201. (Hunczak, 180.)

⁵⁶⁸Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, 562.

had Kharkov as its destination, and one was to disperse throughout the southern Ukraine.⁵⁶⁹ Despite the measures taken against them by the Nazi authorities, these groups were able to reach their destinations.⁵⁷⁰ The expeditionary groups were vital not only for their purpose, but also as their encounter with Central and East Ukrainians helped them find out that these people possessed different views and had other concerns than the West Ukrainians. OUN members realized that eastern Ukrainians perceived western Ukrainians as high-handed, virulently anti-Russian, and sacrificing civil rights and social welfare issues on the altar of national independence.⁵⁷¹ This realization stimulated a change in OUN's ideology, which emerged from the 1943 Convention with a new and more universal program⁵⁷² incorporating "concerns of eastern Ukrainian audience and de-emphasizing racial theories."⁵⁷³

While OUN-B's influence on the local administration was setting aside as its supporters diminished following their rift with the Germans, OUN-M, which could still preserve its good relations with the Nazi authorities, filled the gap in every aspect of local administrative activities. OUN-M which also organized expeditionary groups had the German approval behind them.⁵⁷⁴ "OUN-M managed to get its representatives into key leadership posts in the organs of civil government in Kyiv, Kharkov, Zhytomyr, and other towns and smaller settlements of Central and Eastern Ukraine."⁵⁷⁵

⁵⁶⁹Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 61.

⁵⁷⁰Hunczak, 180.

⁵⁷¹ Krawchenko, "Soviet Ukraine under Nazi Occupation, 1941-4," 19, 20.

⁵⁷²Dergachov, 50-51.

⁵⁷³Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 142.

⁵⁷⁴Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 64. OUN-M's northern group was to go through Volhynia, Zhitomir, Kiev, and reach Kharkov, the central group was to reach Donbas through Vinnitsa and then Dniepropetrovsk, and the southern group was to reach Odessa and Nikolaev. (Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 67)

⁵⁷⁵Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, 120.

As a result of local initiatives by the Ukrainians, the period saw the revision of school curriculums in many cities in a way to “communicate a Ukrainian national message stressing language, history and, culture.” In Poltava, Ukrainian national songs forbidden by the Soviets were now taught to children. Books published during the “Ukrainization” period but forbidden in 1930s were now free, and “the classics of Ukrainian history could now be read.”⁵⁷⁶

The arrival of the Nazis also stimulated the revival of the religious life in the Ukraine. As soon as the authority was transferred to the Germans, people began restoring the Churches demolished during the Soviet period.⁵⁷⁷ Still, this did not mean that the religious life in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was set free from its chains. In the Reichskommissariat, there were two churches. The first was the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) with most of its members being Russophiles. The second was the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which was revived in February 1942,⁵⁷⁸ and was dominated by the Ukrainian nationalists. At the early stages of the Nazi rule, the two Churches experienced a remarkable rebirth, but because of their association with Moscow (for the former) or the nationalists (for the latter), the two Churches started to become a cause of disturbance for the Nazi authorities.⁵⁷⁹ As the German authorities wanted

⁵⁷⁶ Krawchenko, “Soviet Ukraine under Nazi Occupation, 1941-4,” 20, 21. As such, people felt that the Nazis would permit the development of all things Ukrainian. For example, Dnepropetrovsk city administration did not hesitate to use “a state seal bearing the following inscription: ‘Ukrainian State – Territorial Administration of Dnipropetrovsk’.” It seems the city administration believed that the Nazis were favorably disposed to Ukrainian statehood, and thus would not be disturbed by this action which connoted the functioning of a Ukrainian state. However, with the increase of repressive German policies, the seal was seized and the members of the Dnepropetrovsk administration were arrested by the Nazis.(Kosyk, 163.)

⁵⁷⁷ Berkoff, “Was There a Religious Revival in Soviet Ukraine under the Nazi Regime?,” 548-549.

⁵⁷⁸ It was banned in 1929 by the Soviet Union, and reinstated in early 1942 during the Nazi rule.

⁵⁷⁹ Kosyk, 206. The Greek Catholic Church was banned in the Reichskommissariat. However, it did not have much adherents in the Reichskommissariat but it was the Church the majority of the Galician Ukrainians adhered to. As Galicia was incorporated into the General Gouvernement, it was not a major concern for the authorities of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Still, any attempt of the

to “prevent the creation of a Ukrainian spiritual force that could have political importance,”⁵⁸⁰ they decided that the activities and the jurisdiction of every church eparchy should be confined to a certain *Generalbezirk* (General region-district), and that there should be no jurisdictional and hierarchical connection among them. The German policy thus brought about the division of both Churches into six jurisdictions each. As of then, in fact “the Reichskommissariat Ukraine had *twelve* Orthodox Churches.”⁵⁸¹ Moreover, each *Generalkommissar* had the right to intervene in the Church activities in his area of jurisdiction, and to dismiss the priests.

As for the influence of the Churches in the Reichskommissariat, even though the nationalist overtures of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church had an impact on the older generation, the youth who grew up under the Soviet regime was indifferent and even hostile to religion. Thus, nationalism’s identification with religion did not help but deprived the young Soviet Ukrainian generation of the nationalist cause.⁵⁸² As for the competition between the two Orthodox Churches, the Autonomous Church seems to have won the hearts of more parishioners than the Autocephalous Church. One of the main reasons for this is the conviction among the majority of the people that the Autocephalous Church was uncanonical and self-consecrated. While this served to the disturbance of the Ukrainian Orthodox people, the Ukrainophile Autocephalous Church’s practice of using Ukrainian (if this was not possible then the Church Slavonic pronounced in Ukrainian) in liturgical services further alienated the Ukrainian Orthodox people

Greek Catholic priests to enter the Reichskommissariat’s lands was thwarted by the authorities. (Berkoff, “Was There a Religious Revival in Soviet Ukraine under the Nazi Regime?,” 548.)

⁵⁸⁰ Kosyk, 281.

⁵⁸¹ Berkhoff, “Was There a Religious Revival in Soviet Ukraine under the Nazi Regime?,” 545-546.

⁵⁸² Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 215.

especially of the Dnieper Ukraine.⁵⁸³ In Poltava, 80 percent of the parishioners attended the Autonomous Church. In Dnepropetrovsk, all working churches were Autonomous. German reports state that the two Churches equally shared the parishioners in the Kiev region, while southern Kiev was dominated by the Autocephalous. Also according to the German reports, the Cherkasy and Kirovohrad regions were dominantly Autocephalous.⁵⁸⁴ Although the desire on the part of the Dnieper Ukrainians not to use Ukrainian and their preference to adhere to the Autonomous rather than the Autocephalous Church does not necessarily indicate their non-commitment to a Ukrainian national identity, still it gives us some clue about the relative strength of Ukrainian national consciousness in different regions of Ukraine.

Although Soviet historians refer to an extensive Soviet partisan movement fighting the Nazis in the Ukraine, denying any role to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)⁵⁸⁵, later Ukrainian and Western sources maintain that the effect of the Soviet partisans was confined to a limited area and thus had a moderate impact on the developments in the Nazi-ruled Ukraine at least until 1943.⁵⁸⁶ The most renowned Soviet partisan group led by Sydir Kovpak dominated northern Ukrainian oblasts, while the Soviet partisan groups in the western Ukrainian areas were hardly competing with the OUN groups.⁵⁸⁷ As a whole, the penetration of Soviet partisan groups in Ukraine prior to 1943 was too weak to give the people “the sense of a

⁵⁸³ Berkoff, “Was There a Religious Revival in Soviet Ukraine Under the Nazi regime?,” 554-555. While Ukrainians of Dnieper Ukraine were dissatisfied and resisted to the use of Ukrainian, on the other hand, in the Volhynian region, where Autocephalous Church was dominant, the parishioners were content with the use of Ukrainian in the Church services. (Berkoff, “ Was There a Religious Revival in Soviet Ukraine Under the Nazi regime?,” 555.)

⁵⁸⁴ Berkoff, “Was There a Religious Revival in Soviet Ukraine Under the Nazi regime?,” 554, 560.

⁵⁸⁵ UPA will be discussed in the upcoming pages.

⁵⁸⁶ Horak, *Poland and Her National Minorities*, 266.

⁵⁸⁷ Major partisan groups operating in Ukraine were the “detachments of Saburov, Kovpak, Fedorov, Naumov, Begma, Mel’nyk.” (Kosyk, 387.)

‘Soviet presence’ Russian leaders hoped” for.⁵⁸⁸ As such, in the early stages of the war the Soviet partisan movement had no popular base but was “a creation of the authorities and the NKVD in particular.”⁵⁸⁹ However, in 1943, when the tide of war turned towards the Soviets, the Soviet partisan movement in Ukraine began to mean something. Still, “even in the summer of 1943, a matter of months before Kiev was recaptured by the Red Army, partisan movements in Central Ukraine were minor compared to the rival insurgent movements in the western oblasts of Ukraine.”⁵⁹⁰

As popular support for OUN-M grew and exposed OUN-M’s ability to build an organization, and as in October 1941 Melnykites “created in Kiev the Ukrainian National Council as a potential nucleus of a Ukrainian national government,”⁵⁹¹ and organized a patriotic rally in Kiev to demonstrate the popular support to their cause, German authorities pressed the button for the crack down on OUN-M. Hence, “by 1942, the nationalist gamble on using the German invasion to promote Ukrainian national assertion ended in fiasco.”⁵⁹²

With Erich Koch, who favored anti-Ukrainian policies, appointed as the *Reichskommissar* of Ukraine in November 1941, the Nazi policies towards the Ukrainian civil life were brutalized.⁵⁹³ Ukrainians were subjected to discriminatory policies with the increasing number of German-only shops, by the reduction of

⁵⁸⁸ Sullivant, 239.

⁵⁸⁹ Marples, *Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s*, 54.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 56.

⁵⁹¹ Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 51.

⁵⁹² Yekelchik, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 143. While OUN-B had already decided to resume its fight against the Nazis from underground in July 1941 (Hunczak, 181.), OUN-M went underground in November, following the German dissolution of the Ukrainian National Council. (Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 78.) Whereas OUN-B declared war on Germany in September 1941, OUN-M was to follow them and declare the Germans their worst enemy in May 1942. (Hunczak, 181-182.)

⁵⁹³ John A. Armstrong, “Ukraine: Colony or Partner?,” in *German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Hans-Joachim Torke and John-Paul Himka (Edmonton; Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1994), 193.

medical services for the Ukrainians,⁵⁹⁴ and shutting down of all higher learning education institutions and schools beyond the fourth grade. As of April 1942, only 40 out of 115 newspapers which began to be published since the arrival of the Nazis were permitted. Still, those remaining were kind of “heavily censored propaganda broadsheets,”⁵⁹⁵ and were called by the locals as “German newspapers in Ukrainian character.”⁵⁹⁶ The decision to preserve collective farms (Soviet *kolkhozy*), severe shortage of food, and forced deportation of Ukrainians to Germany as forced labor with the *Ostarbeiter* program (taking them back to the times of Soviet deportations to Siberia)⁵⁹⁷ further alienated Ukrainian people.⁵⁹⁸ The sufferings caused by the twenty months of German rule “played an enormous part in the development of the nationalist movements in the East Ukraine.”⁵⁹⁹ As a consequence, “arbitrary and brutal behaviour of the German authorities played into the hands of OUN, by convincing the desperate population that their only hope (except for the Bolshevik alternative) lay in joining OUN.”⁶⁰⁰ The brutality of the Nazis also served as a basis for the legitimizing of the Soviet rule especially in pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine.⁶⁰¹ A city joke of the period is illustrative: “What was Stalin unable to achieve in twenty years that Hitler achieved in just one year? That we started to like Soviet rule.”⁶⁰²

In 1943, when the tide of war turned against the Nazis, they reconsidered rapprochement with the Ukrainian nationalists and asked them to form a volunteer

⁵⁹⁴ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 140.

⁵⁹⁵ Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 48.

⁵⁹⁶ Kosyk, 218.

⁵⁹⁷ There are different figures about the number of Ukrainian deportees to Germany. According to Magocsi, out of 2.8 million forced deportees between 1942-45, nearly 2.3 million were from Ukraine. (Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 634.) According to Armstrong, the number of Ukrainian workers in Germany was approximately 1.500.000. (Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 90.)

⁵⁹⁸ See Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 138-141; Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 633-634; Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 468-469; Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 85-90; Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries*, 142-145.

⁵⁹⁹ Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 90.

⁶⁰⁰ Hunczak, 183.

⁶⁰¹ Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries*, 143.

⁶⁰² Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 224

unit in the German army. For this purpose, they approached the only Ukrainian organization they recognized, that was the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC) in Cracow. Despite the fierce opposition by the Banderites, who no longer saw the Nazis as a power to reconcile, Melnykites and the Greek Catholic Church supported this initiative. Thus, in April 1943, with 13,000 Ukrainian volunteers, SS Volunteer Galicia Division (*14. SS-Freiwilligen Division "Galizien"*) was formed. In order not to make reference to the Division's Ukrainianness, Germans ensured that its insignia becomes the Galician Lion but not the Ukrainian trident.⁶⁰³ The *Reichsführer* of the SS, Heinrich Himmler even forbade the use of the word "Ukrainian" with regards to the Division.⁶⁰⁴ Still, most of the volunteers viewed the Division as "Ukrainian," and "either overlooked or failed to grasp the meaning of 'Galicia,' and the significant absence of the word 'Ukraine'."⁶⁰⁵

In the meantime, OUN-B was forming a "large-scale partisan force" which was to constitute the nucleus of the future regular Ukrainian army.⁶⁰⁶ In the summer of 1943, OUN-B forcibly joined all nationalist units under its jurisdiction.⁶⁰⁷ Subsequently, OUN-B ordered its members who joined the German police forces during the years of collaboration, to desert and join the UPA.⁶⁰⁸ Additionally,

⁶⁰³Myroslav Yurkevich, "Galician Ukrainians in German Military Formations and in the German Administration," in *Ukraine During World War II: History and Its Aftermath*, ed. Yury Boshyk (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1986), 77.

⁶⁰⁴Basil Dmytryshyn, "The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division 'Galicia'," *American Slavic and East European Review* 15, 1 (1956): 1-10, 8.

⁶⁰⁵Dmytryshyn, 6.

⁶⁰⁶Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 473.

⁶⁰⁷ One of these units was the *Polissian Sich* (later named UPA- *Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia*) of Taras Bulba-Borovets'. The name of the *Bulbovtsy* forces was usurped by OUN-B in 1943. [Stephan M. Horak, "Ukrainians between Nazis and Communists, 1941-1945," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, Vol. LXXXV, No:33, February 12, 1978, 6.] Polissian Sich was a resistance movement fighting both the Nazis and the Soviet partisans in the forests of Volhynia and Polissia since 1941 and which "during 1942 succeeded in controlling a large area known as 'Olevs'k Republic'." (Horak, "Ukrainians between Nazis and Communists, 1941-1945," 6.)

⁶⁰⁸Peter J. Potichnyj, "Ukrainians in World War II Military Formations: An Overview," in *Ukraine During World War II: History and Its Aftermath*, ed. Yury Boshyk (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1986), 164.

former soldiers of the SS Volunteer Galicia Division who escaped captivity joined them.⁶⁰⁹ Apart from appealing to their co-nationals to join their cause, OUN-UPA further invited Soviet partisans, volunteers in the German army, and other Soviet nationalities to join the forces of UPA.⁶¹⁰ UPA soon turned out to a “well-organized partisan army which took control of large parts of Volhynia, Polissia, and, later, Galicia,”⁶¹¹ fighting not only against the German and Soviet armies, but also against the Polish guerillas and Soviet partisans.⁶¹² While UPA was strong in western Ukraine, it did not count for much in eastern Ukraine where UPA forces were “more often than not destroyed by Soviet partisan formations.”⁶¹³

OUN today constitutes a divisive issue between eastern and western Ukrainians. Today some people argue that OUN members were Nazi collaborators, whereas others believe that they rather represented a national liberation organization that deserves the title of “Hero(s) of Ukraine”. While majority of contemporary eastern Ukrainians possess negative impressions about OUN-UPA, majority of their western Ukrainian counterparts praise OUN-UPA as a national liberation organization whose members strove for an independent Ukrainian state.⁶¹⁴ Evidence suggests that although OUN collaborated with the Nazis especially in the early months of the Operation Barbarossa, this collaboration was not an end in itself, but it was the result of their belief that the German power could be their only chance in building their own army and communicating their cause to eastern Ukrainians, ultimately establishing their own independent state. As such, “the relationship

⁶⁰⁹Subtelny, 477.

⁶¹⁰ Kosyk, 265, 372.

⁶¹¹Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 474.

⁶¹² According to Kosyk, “UPA fought the Germans forty-seven times and the Soviet partisans fifty-four times.” (Kosyk, 389.)

⁶¹³ Krawchenko, “Soviet Ukraine under Nazi Occupation, 1941-4,” 30.

⁶¹⁴ Prizel, “Nation-Building and Foreign Policy,” 13.

between OUN-UPA and Nazi Germany was far too complex to be described as collaborationist,” but in attaining their goal, Ukrainian nationalists must have seen the Nazis as the lesser evil, collaborating with them in line with the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” understanding.⁶¹⁵

It can be said that OUN-UPA meant different things not only for the contemporary but for the WWII-period East and West Ukrainians as well. Comparing the psychological differences between the western and eastern Ukrainians, one should think back on the fact that while western Ukrainians fought on the side of Nazis or OUN-UPA forces, the Red Army included over five million eastern Ukrainians.⁶¹⁶ Whereas western Ukrainians saw the WWII experience as a rare opportunity to unite Ukrainian lands within a Ukrainian state free of Russian, Polish, and German dominations, and considered Bandera, OUN, and UPA as “the embodiment of the Ukrainian love of freedom and determination to attain liberation,” outside western Ukraine Bandera, OUN, and UPA were Nazi collaborators, and the Soviets were the victors of the epic “great patriotic war”. Whilst the Red Army soldiers were glorified in eastern Ukraine, western Ukrainians charged them as “brutal oppressors.”⁶¹⁷

The influence of Western Ukrainian nationalists over the Eastern Ukrainians is an important question which is difficult to answer. The impact of the OUN groups was not in uniformity throughout the Soviet Ukraine. The fact that both Banderites and Melnykites were suppressed by the Germans well before they could establish themselves in eastern Ukraine made their impact fall short of what they

⁶¹⁵Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, 564.

⁶¹⁶Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries*, 145.

⁶¹⁷Prizel, “Nation-Building and Foreign Policy,” 13.

intended to achieve.⁶¹⁸ Thus, in most occasions nationalism in eastern Ukraine was locally led by eastern Ukrainian intellectuals. Sometimes eastern Ukrainians could form “vigorous and successful local nationalist organizations independent of, and even hostile to, the OUN.”⁶¹⁹

As a whole, the OUN’s penetration was successful in terms of influencing eastern Ukrainian intellectuals and technicians but was unsuccessful when it came to the mass of the populace who remained uncommitted to the Ukrainian nationalist cause. If there was patriotism outside western Ukraine, it was of a territorial kind. Eastern and southern Ukrainians had an “attachment to the Ukraine as a territorial entity,”⁶²⁰ but were not committed to the idea of a Ukraine based on cultural and ethnic distinctiveness vis-à-vis Russia or the Soviet Union. The general tendency of the Ukrainians of pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine seems to be the rejection of “any ethnic national creed in favor of some ideology based on territorial identity.”⁶²¹

An important issue to be discussed here is the question how western and eastern Ukrainians (pre-1939 Soviet Ukrainians) of the interwar and WWII period perceived themselves and each other. While the western Ukrainian generations came from a society which had a developed national awareness, ordinary people in eastern Ukraine could hardly differentiate between nationality and religious orientation. Many in eastern Ukraine equated Catholicism (no matter Roman or Greek) with Polishness. Their self-identification was confined with the terms “*nashi*” or “*svoi*”, meaning our people. These “*nashi*” certainly included the

⁶¹⁸ Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 201.

⁶¹⁹ Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 217.

⁶²⁰ Ibid.

⁶²¹ Ibid., 205.

Russians. What Ukrainian nationalists called the “western Ukraine” was called “Poland” by the eastern Ukrainians.⁶²²

Having grown up with the Soviet indoctrination and isolation, the young people in eastern Ukraine were predominantly believers of communism. Thus, because of their being Greek Catholic, talking in a “bizarre Ukrainian,” and coming from the Polish lands of Galicia or western Volhynia, accepting western Ukrainians as “*nashi*” was not simple to comprehend for the eastern Ukrainians. Still, although OUN-B activists realized that the eastern Ukrainians were mostly indifferent to the establishment of a Ukrainian state, they noticed that eastern Ukrainians had a memory of the Ukrainian National Republic of the revolutionary period. For example when eastern Ukrainians encountered Ukrainian nationalists they asked “about Vynnchenko (and sometimes Petliura), whether there was already a Ukrainian authority, ... a Ukrainian army.”⁶²³ Furthermore, according to the OUN expeditionary groups, east Ukrainian national consciousness was much developed as compared to 1918-1919 period. They thought this was mainly due to existence of a Ukrainian state, albeit a “Soviet” one, which implemented “Ukrainization”.⁶²⁴ On the other hand, western Ukrainians saw Soviet Russians as brutal oppressors and eastern Ukrainians as their co-nationals, they wanted to extend their nationalist views to them and belong to a common Ukrainian independent state.

⁶²² Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 206, 208.

⁶²³ *Ibid.*, 228, 207.

⁶²⁴ Krawchenko, “Soviet Ukraine under Nazi Occupation”, 1941-4,” 19.

5.1.3 Return of the Soviet Union

When the Soviets took all Ukrainian territories, they were busy in ‘sovietizing’ the west, which was in historian Roman Szporluk’s words “the least Soviet” and “the least Russian and the least Russified”⁶²⁵ region in the Soviet Union, while in the already Sovietized east they merely focused on rebuilding economy.⁶²⁶ The way OUN members realized that “for the bulk of East Ukrainian population independence could be presented as a means to the attainment of other values, but not as the ultimate value in itself”⁶²⁷ reminds one that there were similar reasons behind the support of many East Ukrainians of the December 1991 referendum for independence.

Starting from January 1943, which was the end of the Battle for Stalingrad, the Red Army advanced into the Nazi-held Ukrainian territories. As such, “in the fall of 1944, virtually all Ukrainian ethnographic territory for the first time had come under Soviet control.”⁶²⁸ This, however, did not mean the end of OUN-UPA resistance. Although Soviets could easily establish themselves in the cities, UPA units controlled the countryside for a time.⁶²⁹ “During the spring and summer 1944, the UPA became a major obstacle to the establishment of Soviet control over the area [western regions],”⁶³⁰ and even in early 1950s, they carried on their fight against the Soviets,⁶³¹ thus “bourgeois Ukrainian nationalists” confronted mass

⁶²⁵ Szporluk, *Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union*, 267.

⁶²⁶ Yekelchik, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 149.

⁶²⁷ Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 93.

⁶²⁸ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 657.

⁶²⁹ Marples, *Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s*, 59.

⁶³⁰ Yekelchik, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 146.

⁶³¹ Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries*, 144.

deportations for the expedition of “Sovietization of this recalcitrant region.”⁶³² UPA resistance delayed the Soviet reconstruction of the western Ukraine, while things went smooth for the Soviet authorities in the eastern Ukraine.⁶³³ In 1947, sick and tired of UPA resistance, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Lazar Kaganovich, “signed an agreement with Poland and Czechoslovakia for joined action against UPA insurgents in the borderland areas.” Escaping state persecution, quite a few members of the OUN and the SS Galician Division emigrated to Canada and the United States, constituting a part of the Ukrainian diaspora.⁶³⁴

As for the UPA groups who remained on the other side of the Polish-Soviet border, they fought the Polish authorities for some more years. They were liquidated with the 1947 Operation Wisla (Vistula),⁶³⁵ and the Ukrainian population of Poland was forced to “*de facto* deportation” in the 1944-1946 Polish-Ukrainian population exchange agreement between Poland and the Soviet Union.⁶³⁶

The nationalist-oriented Greek Catholic Church of Galician Ukrainians got its share from the Soviet cruelty. While by 1944 the Soviet official press increased its attacks on the Church, in 1946 its buildings and possessions were handed over the Moscow Patriarchate since the Greek Catholic Church was forced to be united with the Russian Orthodox Church by a Soviet-staged *sobor*, the L’viv *sobor*.⁶³⁷ As such, the Union of Brest of 1596 which united the then Ruthenian Church with the Catholic Church was abolished. “By forcing the Greek Catholics into the state-

⁶³²Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 15. According to Vynnchenko, 203,662 western Ukrainians were exiled to Siberia from 1944 to 1950. (Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 148.)

⁶³³ Marples, *Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s*, 61.

⁶³⁴ *Ibid.*, 68-69.

⁶³⁵ According to some estimates, 130,000 Ukrainians living in the borderland area where UPA was still active were “suddenly rounded up by Polish troops and dispersed throughout the lands which Poland had newly acquired from Germany.” (Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 17.)

⁶³⁶ Dergachov, 151.

⁶³⁷ *Ibid.*

dominated Russian-Orthodox Church,” the Soviet authorities desired to “remove the religious and ecclesiastical barriers to Russification of the Ukrainians.”⁶³⁸ The post-war Soviet policy towards the Greek Catholic Church strikingly resembled the Tsarist anti-Uniate policies of the 1770s, 1830s and 1870s.⁶³⁹ However, the suppression of the Greek Catholic Church would not culminate in its extinction since the Western Ukrainians succeeded in preserving the Church which remained functioning underground, waiting for the day to come out.⁶⁴⁰ Until that day, although remained functioning as a catacomb church, its influence on the developments were reduced to minimal as compared to its previous significant role as a bastion of Ukrainian nationalism.

5.2 The “Two Ukraines” United Under the Soviet Rule

With the incorporation of Galicia, Bukovina, and Transcarpathia to the Ukrainian SSR virtually all Ukrainian lands came under the Soviet control. Since the newly acquired western regions of the Ukrainian SSR began to be called as “Western Ukraine” with the establishment of the Soviet rule, the phenomenon of West and East Ukraine became a factual reality as of this period.

With the end of the WWII many countries initiated a policy of population transfers. The impact of these population exchanges on the Ukrainian SSR was the ethnic homogenization of the country since the Poles, Czechs, and people of other

⁶³⁸ Bociurkiw, *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church*, 235.

⁶³⁹ Bociurkiw, *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church*, 235, 237. See Chapter 3 for the Tsarist attitude towards the Uniate Church.

⁶⁴⁰ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 663.

neighboring states were deported from the western Ukrainian lands, being replaced by the Ukrainian newcomers who inhabited the lands outside the Ukrainian SSR.⁶⁴¹

The incorporation of western Ukrainian lands which were considered as the hotbeds of Ukrainian “bourgeois” nationalism was a serious challenge for the Soviet authorities since they knew that integrating these lands to the Soviet Union would not be easy.⁶⁴² Hence, the state embarked upon a campaign against the Ukrainian nationalists and rapidly extended its policy of Russification to the western Ukrainian lands. This process was accompanied by the influx of ethnic Russians and Eastern Ukrainians as officials, technical personnel, industrial workers, academicians and school teachers to the area.⁶⁴³ Since the Soviet leadership viewed Western Ukrainians generally unreliable, there emerged a practice of transferring tested East Ukrainians to leadership positions in the Western Ukraine rather than recruiting local ones. Furthermore, in order to precipitate Russification the language of instruction in higher education institutions was shifted to Russian.⁶⁴⁴

In the meanwhile, the Eastern Ukraine was under heavy assimilationist pressure with the influx of Russians to the industrial urban centers. As a result, while the Republic was becoming more ethnically Ukrainian with the outflow of the Poles and other ethnic groups, it was culturally becoming more Russian with the inflow of the Russians. The increasing industrialization of the 1950s also meant the urbanization of the Ukrainians. The period saw the Ukrainians coming out of their villages and moving into cities. Previous Ukrainian representation of the

⁶⁴¹ Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries*, 149-150.

⁶⁴² Sullivant, 282.

⁶⁴³ Yaroslav Bilinsky, “The Incorporation of Western Ukraine and Its Impact on Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine,” in *Influence of Eastern Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR*, ed. Roman Szporluk (New York, Washington, London: Praeger, 1976), 206.

⁶⁴⁴ Sullivant, 282.

countryside, Russian representation of the cities changed in 1970s. By 1979, 53 percent of the Ukrainians lived in the cities.⁶⁴⁵ While this meant that the cities were becoming more Ukrainian demographically, more and more Ukrainians who migrated to the cities became acculturated or Russified since the societal pressure in the cities was forcing them to adopt the Russian language.⁶⁴⁶

Russification could not penetrate Western Ukraine as much as it did Eastern Ukraine. While urbanized Eastern Ukrainians were opting for the Russian language, their western co-nationals urbanized without abandoning Ukrainian language.⁶⁴⁷ Still, this was natural since Western Ukrainians met with Russians only with the industrial influx of post-WWII period, while their eastern counterparts lived with the Russians side by side for centuries.⁶⁴⁸ Although it is true that there were many Ukrainians who were either acculturated or Russified in the cities, urbanization did not bring complete assimilation but contrarily facilitated cultural awareness. While one important factor in the strengthening of Ukrainian national consciousness in the Soviet Ukraine was the annexation of Western Ukraine,⁶⁴⁹ the Soviet policies were also vital since these helped the creation of “a highly educated, bilingual, nationally conscious, and largely urban population whose very existence ensured the survival of Ukrainians and their evolution into a distinct and viable nationality.”⁶⁵⁰ Since Ukrainians who came to the cities realized that it was the Russians who held the

⁶⁴⁵ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 664.

⁶⁴⁶ While an acculturated Ukrainian can be defined as one who internalized both the Russian and Ukrainian culture and has lost Ukrainian as his/her mother-tongue but retained the knowledge of it, a Russified Ukrainian is the one who further adopted Russian as his/her mother-tongue and lost any knowledge of the Ukrainian. [Bohdan Krawchenko, “Ethno-Demographic Trends in Ukraine in the 1970s”, in *Ukraine After Shelest*, ed. Bohdan Krawchenko (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1983), 112.]

⁶⁴⁷ Roman Szporluk, “West Ukraine and West Belorussia,” *Soviet Studies* 31, 1 (1979): 76-98.

⁶⁴⁸ Bilinsky, “The Incorporation of Western Ukraine,” 208. Before the incorporation of Western Ukraine into the Soviet Union, according to 1933 data, Russians constituted less than 1 percent of the population in the area. [Szporluk, *Russia, Ukraine and the Breakup of the Soviet*, 111.]

⁶⁴⁹ Szporluk, *Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union*, 127.

⁶⁵⁰ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 665.

privileged positions, Soviet urbanization policy designed to assimilate Ukrainians into Soviet Russian community, instead led to an increased ethnic awareness and communal consciousness on the part of a great many of the urbanized Ukrainians.⁶⁵¹

The Crimean Tatars received their share of Stalin's wrath. By May 1944, Stalin ordered the mass deportation of the Crimean Tatars to Central Asia (Soviet Asia), accusing them for collaborating with the Nazis. This traumatic event was proceeded with the abolition of the Crimean ASSR, and demotion of the peninsula to an oblast of the Russian SFSR, which was settled by the Russian newcomers. After the death of Stalin, the Crimea was to be transferred to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954 as a "gift" from the "elder brother" to celebrate the 300th anniversary of the "reunification" of Ukraine with Russia. Although this brought the migration of Ukrainians to the peninsula, Crimea remained predominantly Russian.

5.2.1 Post-Stalin Period

With the death of Stalin in 1953, after several years of government by a collective leadership, Nikita S. Khrushchev succeeded in becoming the leader of the Soviet Union by 1958. Post-Stalin period saw a decrease in party control, relaxation in Russification policy, de-centralization (especially in economy) and the start of a process of de-Stalinization. In search for the creation of a Soviet "normalcy,"

⁶⁵¹ Kenneth C. Farmer, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era* (The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), 184.

Stalin's heirs worked for the development of an impressive industry, and urbanization.⁶⁵²

The all-Soviet thaw was reflected to the Ukraine. Khrushchev era saw the reconsideration of nationalities policy. As Ukrainians were now considered as second after the Russians, a more sympathetic view of the Ukrainians was developed.⁶⁵³ With the establishment of economic de-centralization, "Ukrainian authorities gained operational control over 97 percent of the republic's industry." However, since all-Union authorities saw that regional authorities guarded regional interests vigorously, they contemplated that economic de-centralization nurtured regionalism, thus this process was to be reversed by mid-1960s.⁶⁵⁴

In politics, Ukrainians began to be represented in the Communist Party of Ukraine with an ever increasing degree and this trend extended into 1960s.⁶⁵⁵ However, these Ukrainians were Ukrainian more in name than in substance. They were thought to be reliable enough as they were the products of Eastern Ukrainian cities, where they were educated in Russian schools, lived within a Russian environment, and thus were more Russian than Ukrainian.⁶⁵⁶ On the other hand, Western Ukrainian representation was much lower due to both the Party's mistrustfulness towards them and their distantness to the Party itself. After 20 years of their incorporation into the Soviet Ukraine, the lack of interest to membership in

⁶⁵² Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 153.

⁶⁵³ Sullivan, 287-288.

⁶⁵⁴ Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 158. By 1958, Khrushchev leadership was to revert these processes but the process was to gather pace by 1964 when Khrushchev was to retire under the pressure of party leadership, and Brezhnev was to gather the control of the country. (Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 21.)

⁶⁵⁵ Percentage of Ukrainian working in the CPU increased from 63.1 in 1940 to 74.2 in 1956, and the percentage of those who reached upper positions in the CPU increased from 40 percent to 67.8. (Sullivan, 288.)

⁶⁵⁶ Sullivan, 289.

CPU by the Western Ukrainians was indicative to their “resentment over Russian dominance and to lack of identification with the Soviet system.”⁶⁵⁷

Khrushchev era de-Stalinization also brought about “a relaxation of cultural restraints on the non-Russian nationalities.”⁶⁵⁸ While calls for protecting the Ukrainian culture and language were voiced more openly, the limits of acceptability were being pushed by Ukrainian writers.⁶⁵⁹ This relatively benign environment of Khrushchev era gave way to the development of a group collectively called the Sixtiers (Sixties generation, *shestidesiatniki*), who were Ukrainian writers and artists coming of age during the cultural “thaw” period, who favored the restoration of Ukrainian language and cultural values which were heavily damaged by the Stalin-time Sovietization and Russification policies. The Sixtiers movement was to transform into political dissent with the stiffening of central control and acceleration of Sovietization and Russification processes during the post-Khrushchev era.⁶⁶⁰ As such, “modern Ukrainian nationalism arose out of dissatisfaction on the part of cultural elites with the official proletarian internationalism,” with a “rejection of the Russification of culture under the guise of proletarian internationalism.”⁶⁶¹

5.2.1.1 Ukraine of Shelest vs. Ukraine of Shcherbyts’kyi

The first secretary of the CPU, Petro Shelest (1963-1972) and his successor Volodymyr Shcherbyts’kyi (1972-1989) represented two different positions

⁶⁵⁷ Thomas Henry Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R, 1917-1967* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), 390.

⁶⁵⁸ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 654.

⁶⁵⁹ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 156.

⁶⁶⁰ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 23-24.

⁶⁶¹ Farmer, 105.

influencing the developments in Soviet Ukraine. The period of Shelest was marked by improvements in the position of Ukrainian culture and language under a leader concerned with the Republic's and its people's interests. On the other hand, the period of Shcherbyts'kyi represented the suppression of all things Ukrainian under a leader who favored centralization, Sovietization-Russification and thus assimilation.

The early 1960s signaled the fact that the Party was going to reassert its ideological control over the Republics. The Soviet nationalities policy which was being re-evaluated by the Brezhnev leadership was toughening with the switch from the policy of "flourishing" (*rastsvet*) of the national cultures, their "drawing together" (*sblizhenie*) and their eventual "merger" (*sliianie*), to the concept of Soviet people (*sovetskii narod*). This meant the elimination of national distinctions for the creation of "homo Sovieticus," the Soviet men whose only loyalty was to be to the Soviet state and whose language was to be the Russian language.⁶⁶²

As such, while Shelest was attempting to initiate a measure of Ukrainization, Kremlin was determined to "restore order" by re-centralization. Pro-Ukrainian reform attempts of the CPU were being blocked by the orders of Kremlin.⁶⁶³ The toughening of Kremlin meant that a collision between the central leadership and the Sixtiers was inevitable. As early as 1963, there emerged increasing accusations to the Sixtiers group that they were following the footsteps of the Ukrainian "bourgeois" nationalists.⁶⁶⁴ Kremlin was also disturbed by the publishing in neighboring Czechoslovakia of Ukrainian writings criticizing the Soviet system.⁶⁶⁵ Furthermore, since Kremlin suspected that the Sixtiers were encouraged by the

⁶⁶² Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 23.

⁶⁶³ *Ibid*, 27.

⁶⁶⁴ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 661.

⁶⁶⁵ This interaction with Czechoslovakia continued until the Soviet intervention of 1968.

Ukrainian state and Party organs, Shelest and his close associates were in the cross hairs.⁶⁶⁶

It was true that Shelest had a part in the flourishing of the Sixtiers movement. The Kiev leadership supported the development of studies on the Ukrainian history. Ukrainian journals full of articles praising things Ukrainian were permitted to be published freely. The criticisms of the Sixtiers were tolerated. Moreover, there were plans to replace Russian with Ukrainian as the language of instruction in higher education.⁶⁶⁷ Despite the moderate approach of Shelest to Ukrainian dissent, and his efforts to reach a compromise with the Ukrainian intelligentsia to keep them within the confines of the system, Moscow launched a crackdown on Ukrainian national dissent in 1965. The 1965-66 period saw mass arrests, imprisonments and exiles of patriotic Ukrainian intellectuals. As of this period, the opposition writings seek publication through illegal channels of communication such as *samvydav* (underground secret self-publishing and distribution).⁶⁶⁸ The 1965 crackdown proved counter-productive and further radicalized the Ukrainian dissent, precipitating the surfacing of open protest and dissent.⁶⁶⁹

What were the Ukrainian dissidents doing to disturb the Kremlin to this extent? During the 1960s political criticism of the dissenters in the *samvydav* became annoying for Kremlin. Around sixty intellectuals were arrested for their writings in the *samvydav*. Kiev was hosting numerous gatherings, the meeting point

⁶⁶⁶B. R. Bociurkiw, "Soviet Nationalities Policy and Dissent in the Ukraine," *The World Today* 30, 5 (1974): 220.

⁶⁶⁷ Roman Solchanyk, "Politics and the National Question in the Post-Shelest Period," in *Ukraine After Shelest*, ed. Bohdan Krawchenko (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1983), 4.

⁶⁶⁸ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 661.

⁶⁶⁹ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukrainian Dissent and Opposition After Shelest," in *Ukraine After Shelest*, ed. Bohdan Krawchenko (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1983), 31.

of which was around the monument of Shevchenko who became the symbol of the Ukrainian patriots, protesting the assimilationist policies of the government. The increasing protests and gatherings against the arrests were also alarming the authorities.⁶⁷⁰

As a reaction to the government prominent literary critic Ivan Dziuba wrote a protest letter to Shelest where he criticized the repressive Soviet assimilationist policies, enclosing his later-famed work "*Internationalism or Russification?*" he wrote in 1965 where he criticized the present state of the Soviet nationalities policy drawing a parallel between today and the assimilationist policies of the tsarist period. He criticized the gradual loss of territorial sovereignty, the de-nationalizing effect of the mass resettlements, lack of national education, the dominance of Russian language in the cities, and the second-rate position given to the Ukrainian culture.⁶⁷¹ This work which was to become the manifestation of the Ukrainian dissent caused Dziuba's expulsion from the Ukrainian Writers' Union and then arrest.⁶⁷²

There were also organized clandestine nationalist organizations some of which appeared exclusively in Western Ukraine were favoring Ukraine's secession from the Soviet Union. To name some, the United Party for the Liberation of the Ukraine (formed in late 1950s in Ivano-Frankivsk, brought down in 1958), The Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union (formed in L'viv, members arrested in 1960), Ukrainian National Front (formed in Ivano-Frankivsk in mid-1960s) were all propagating secession. The only East Ukrainian organization worth to mention

⁶⁷⁰ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 164.

⁶⁷¹ Ivan Dziuba, *Internationalism or Russification?: A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem* (New York: Monad Press, 1974), 14.

⁶⁷² Farmer, 171-172.

was the Creative Youth of Dnepropetrovsk which became known in late 1969 for drafting a letter protesting the Russification in major East Ukrainian cities.⁶⁷³

A study on the demographic breakdown of Ukrainian dissidence activity during 1960s-1970s was demonstrative. The study focused on cultural-intellectual unorganized opposition since the period saw no organized separatist organization in Eastern Ukraine to consider in such an analysis. The analysis of the data about the number of arrests for dissident activities in western and eastern Ukraine indicated that “over the last twenty years, arrests in the West Ukraine for activities associated with nationalism have outnumbered those in the East Ukraine by about two to one.”⁶⁷⁴ While “in 1956-66, two-thirds [71,4 %] of the nationalist dissident activity took place in the West Ukraine, there was a shift of activity by 1969-72, with more than half [55,5%] the activity in this period in East Ukraine.”⁶⁷⁵ It was seen that nationalist activity shifted its center from L’viv (a decrease from 46,4% to 25%) to Kiev (an increase from 21,4% to 41,7%), and since this study assumed Kiev within the category of East Ukrainian oblasts, one can notice that when Kiev is taken out of this category Eastern Ukraine becomes scene to only 13,8 percent of the dissident activity. When thoroughly analyzed, it further became evident that although there was a shift of activity toward the east, the birth places of those who have participated and been arrested for such activity helped us to infer that it was the Western Ukrainians who spread their activity to Eastern Ukraine, but not the Eastern Ukrainians who became the new nationalist dissenters,⁶⁷⁶ since more than

⁶⁷³ Ibid., 154-159.

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid., 176.

⁶⁷⁵ Ibid., 178.

⁶⁷⁶ Ibid., 178-179.

half of the nationalist dissenters were born in Western Ukraine with an overall population several times less than Eastern Ukraine.⁶⁷⁷

During this period Shelest's "autonomist" stance and seeming toleration of the Ukrainian dissidents led to an increasing conflict with Kremlin. In 1972 Brezhnev, who decided that Shelest must go, replaced him with one of his associates from among the later-to-be-called "Dnepropetrovsk mafia," Shcherbyts'kyi.⁶⁷⁸ Shelest was accused of local nationalism and his book *Ukraina Nasha Radians'ka* (Ukraine Our Soviet Country) was used as a pretext for this accusation.⁶⁷⁹ Brezhnev's new choice, Shcherbyts'kyi, served Kremlin just as it was expected from him. Again, Sovietization-Russification was in full force. Russian language education became compulsory even in the kindergartens.⁶⁸⁰ Along with such state-sponsored Russification, the share of Ukrainian-language journals and books dropped from 46 to 19 percent and 49 to 24 percent respectively.⁶⁸¹ Ukrainian historical scholarship was especially hard hit by the Soviet authorities. Ukrainian historians were accused of distorting the history, and serial historical publications were suppressed.⁶⁸² While Shcherbyts'kyi period saw the opening of ever increasing number of Russian-language schools, this pace reached to such an extent that by the late 1980s major southern and eastern Ukrainian cities such as Kharkov, Donetsk, and Odessa had no Ukrainian-language school.⁶⁸³

The early period of his rule was marked with a renewed and wider crackdown on Ukrainian intelligentsia which aimed to "terminate and, if possible,

⁶⁷⁷ Jaroslaw Bilocerowycz, *Soviet Ukrainian Dissent: A Study of Political Alienation* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1988), 112.

⁶⁷⁸ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 161, 162.

⁶⁷⁹ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 662.

⁶⁸⁰ Farmer, 133.

⁶⁸¹ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 173.

⁶⁸² Solchanyk, 14-15.

⁶⁸³ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 173.

to reverse those social processes which had brought about the revival of cultural and public life in Ukraine during the 1960s.”⁶⁸⁴ With the 1972-73 crackdown not only leading figures of the intelligentsia were arrested, imprisoned, or exiled but many member of the CPU who were associated with Shelest or were suspected for Ukrainophilism were purged, the highest leadership of the Republic was cleaned of ethnic Ukrainians, and nonconformist academicians were dismissed.⁶⁸⁵ To escape persecution many intellectuals accepted to renounce their views, but this fierce state offensive further radicalized the Ukrainian dissent.⁶⁸⁶ Many reasoned that working legally within the official structure as during pre-1970s was not possible any more.⁶⁸⁷

In this period, as a result of the steady Russian in-migration, Russian population of Ukraine increased by 28,7 percent (two million) from 1959 to 1970, and by 9,7 percent from 1970 to 1979. Of this Russian in-migration 75 percent was concentrated in southern and south-eastern Ukraine, bringing about greater Russification in Eastern Ukrainian regions. Furthermore, Russification in eastern Ukraine was reinforced as a result of inter-marriages. By 1970 close to one of every two Ukrainian married Russians in this region. Looking at the overall picture of Ukraine, unilingual Ukrainian speakers declined from 56 percent in 1970 to merely 37.3 percent by 1979. While a slim majority (51,6 %) of Western Ukrainians remained unilingual Ukrainian speakers, all other parts of Ukraine were inhabited mainly by either adapted (52%) or acculturated Ukrainians. Acculturated and Russified Ukrainians were virtually non-existent (less than 1%) in Western and Central-Western Ukraine, whereas half of the all Russified Ukrainians resided in

⁶⁸⁴ Nahaylo, “Ukrainian Dissent and Opposition After Shelest,” 31.

⁶⁸⁵ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 38, 39.

⁶⁸⁶ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 166.

⁶⁸⁷ Nahaylo, “Ukrainian Dissent and Opposition After Shelest,” 37.

Crimea and Donbass.⁶⁸⁸ Concentration of Russified Ukrainians in these regions was crucial since such increasing linguistic assimilation in a region showed that these regions were prone to further steps of national assimilation process.

By the end of 1970s, government initiated a more intensive Russification policy, Russifying almost all education system from kindergarten to elementary and secondary schools and higher education institutions.⁶⁸⁹ Shcherbyts'kyi used exclusively Russian in public hearings and referred to the population of the Republic with the geographical expression "people of Ukraine" (*narod Ukrainy*) for "de-emphasizing the ethnic factor."⁶⁹⁰ Furthermore, all state and business correspondences in Ukraine were switched to Russian.⁶⁹¹

The post-WWII Soviet period saw the Eastern and Southern Ukrainians adopting Russian ways and language, becoming increasingly bilinguals or unilingual-Russian speakers. On the other hand, Western and Central-Western Ukrainians seemed to retain Ukrainian as their primary language of communication by "maintaining an internal cohesion and developing ways to make (itself) [themselves] immune to the corroding influence of Russification."⁶⁹² These differences among different parts of the Republic were preserved as a result of the Soviet policy of residence permits (passport and *propiska*) which hindered inter-regional migration and thus "helped conserve cultural differences between Ukrainians ... living in different historical regions during the Soviet period."⁶⁹³

⁶⁸⁸ Krawchenko, "Ethno-Demographic Trends in Ukraine in the 1970s," 101-113.

⁶⁸⁹ Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Political Relations between Russians and Ukrainians in the USSR: The 1970s and Beyond," in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, ed. Peter J. Potichnjij, Jaroslav Pelenski, Gleb N. Zekulin (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1992), 167-168.

⁶⁹⁰ Solchanyk, 19.

⁶⁹¹ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 173.

⁶⁹² Szporluk, *Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union*, 101.

⁶⁹³ Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries*, 150.

Although the Ukrainian dissent was spreading, it could not grip the masses. While Kiev and L'viv emerged as the main centers of Ukrainian dissent, nationalist dissident activity was virtually non-existent in the heavily industrialized Donbass area.⁶⁹⁴ Masses seemed contented with being “simultaneously a Ukrainian and a Soviet citizen,” so during 1970s and 1980s a hierarchy of multiple loyalties dominated the minds of the Ukrainian masses.⁶⁹⁵ As for the Eastern Ukraine, the cause of dissent activity was mainly economic hardships. It was in the shape of workers' protests and strikes that mostly concentrated in the Donbass area, but had not much in common with the nationalist dissent movement that prevailed in western and central Ukrainian regions. The workers' unrest was to become a factor in the developments only with the Gorbachev period.⁶⁹⁶

In 1975 an important international development was to influence to events in the Ukraine. That year the Soviet leadership who signed the Helsinki Final Act accepted the monitoring of their compliance to basic human rights. Ukrainian dissidents (including the Sixtiers, Stalinist-period political prisoners, and devotees of the banned Ukrainian churches) were among the many who took this as an opportunity for open activity, forming the Ukrainian Helsinki Group (UHG) which became the first platform to unite the Ukrainian dissidents under an organization. The UHG assumed the task of informing the signatory countries and world public about the Soviet violations in Ukraine.⁶⁹⁷ The establishment of the UHG marked a new stage since as of then Ukrainian dissent shifted from “cultural and largely apolitical patriotic protest activity to political opposition.”⁶⁹⁸ By 1980 the leading

⁶⁹⁴ Nahaylo, “Ukrainian Dissent and Opposition After Shelest,” 37.

⁶⁹⁵ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 663.

⁶⁹⁶ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 168.

⁶⁹⁷ Nahaylo, “Ukrainian Dissent and Opposition After Shelest,” 42-44.

⁶⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 48.

members of the UHG were imprisoned, some were forced to immigrate West, and some died in the forced labor camps, making the UHG totally paralyzed. Still, the Group reemerged during the Gorbachev period.⁶⁹⁹

5.2.1.2 Glasnost' and the Road to Independence

In 1985, Gorbachev came to power and became the person to initiate wide-ranging reforms, the policies of *perestroika* (reconstruction) and *glasnost* (openness), which would bring about the transformation of the Soviet society and eventual breakup of the Soviet Union. *Glasnost'* encouraged the people to freely criticize the Soviet system without the fear of repression. Demands about official status to local languages, native-language education in all levels, rehabilitation of national histories were pursued with demands for autonomy and finally for independence. These outspoken criticisms and demands were followed by the Revolutions of 1989 in the central-eastern European states whereby communist governments in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania were overthrown. On the other hand, Soviet republics began demanding their right to secession from the Soviet Union. This process culminated in the breakup of the Soviet Union and declaration of the independence of Ukraine.

The events in Ukraine during this period followed the trails of all-Union developments. When Gorbachev came to power, Ukrainian dissident movement was suppressed, and despite their dissatisfaction especially with the economic conditions the general public seemed contented with the Soviet system. As such,

⁶⁹⁹ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 519.

although there were national mobilization and unrest, “an independent Ukrainian state emerged in 1991 not as a result of mass national mobilization or popular rebellion against Communist rule ... but as a byproduct of the Soviet collapse.”⁷⁰⁰

In April 1986, one year after Kremlin was seated by Gorbachev, Ukraine was shocked by the nuclear accident in Chernobyl, 8 miles northwest of Kiev. The efforts of the Soviet authorities first to withhold information, and then to minimize the scale and effect of the catastrophe alienated the Ukrainian public from the Soviet rule. The Chernobyl event “became a symbol of the regime’s “criminally negligent manner,”⁷⁰¹ and as said by a Ukrainian political activist this event helped them realize that they were merely “a colony.”⁷⁰²

Despite the resistance of the conservative Shcherbyts’kyi,⁷⁰³ *Glasnost*’ provided an environment whereby long-forbidden topics such as Stalinist crimes, famine of 1933, assimilation, Russification, and the ban on Ukrainian churches began to be discussed not only among the intelligentsia but also among the public.⁷⁰⁴ As a result of the protests, by 1989 Ukrainian became the official language of the Republic. UHG was reestablished as the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU). Nevertheless, the foremost pressure group of this early *Glasnost*’ period was the Ukrainian Writers’ Union, however soon other civic organizations such as the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, Green World, the Memorial Society, and most importantly the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perestroika (Rukh – The Movement) joined the struggle for Ukrainian rights.⁷⁰⁵

⁷⁰⁰ Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 177.

⁷⁰¹ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 574.

⁷⁰² Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 669.

⁷⁰³ Shcherbyts’kyi was to retire in the mid of events of 1989.

⁷⁰⁴ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 535.

⁷⁰⁵ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 670.

The banned Ukrainian Greek Catholic and Autocephalous Orthodox Churches took advantage of the *Glasnost*’ period to come up from the underground and both succeeded in achieving recognition in 1989. Not to lose its adherents to these Churches, the Ukrainian exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church was renamed as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). As such there emerged a “three-way struggle” for the allegiance of the faithful of Ukraine. While the Greek Catholic Church attracted the majority of the adherents in the Western Ukraine (it was already serving Western Ukrainians as a catacomb church before its legalization), the Autocephalous Orthodox Church prevailed in the Right Bank and Central Ukraine, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church became dominant in southern and eastern Ukraine.⁷⁰⁶ With the establishment in 1992 of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate), there emerged a four-way struggle. The most recent data on church affiliations of Ukrainians, is provided by a survey done by the Razumkov Center, “a top research institute in Kiev,”⁷⁰⁷ in 2006, whereby it is found that 38.9 percent of the believers in Ukraine were adherents of Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kiev Patriarchate, 29.4 percent of Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate, 14.7 percent of Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and 2.8 percent of Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.⁷⁰⁸ While UOC-KP dominates Central regions and Volhynia, UOC-MP’s hearthland is southern and eastern regions, UGCC and UAOC are dominant in western Ukraine.

Thousands who participated in the public rallies organized in Kiev and L’viv cheered for the restoration of Ukrainian national symbols such as the trident, the

⁷⁰⁶ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 578-579.

⁷⁰⁷ Philip P. Pan, “Kremlin Intensifies Pressure as Ukraine Prepares for Vote,” *Washington Post*, 14 September 2009.

⁷⁰⁸ Razumkov Center, *What religious group do you belong to?*, Sociology poll by Razumkov Centre about the religious situation in Ukraine (2006) available at http://razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=300

blue-and-yellow flag, and the anthem “Ukraine Has Not Died Yet.” Public discontent with the Communist Party grew steadily that in the 1989 elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies, the Party faced important losses especially in Western Ukraine. Hundreds of thousands were defecting from the CPU. When the day for the elections to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet came in March 1990, Rukh’s membership exceeded 300.000 and under Rukh’s leadership Green World, Ukrainian Language Society, democratic communists, and several other opposition groups joined forces to participate into the elections as the “Democratic Bloc.” Winning hundred seats with the elections, they were influential in the declaration of Ukrainian sovereignty in July 1990. In the meantime, the “National Communists,” among them Leonid Kravchuk⁷⁰⁹ who became the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet (Rada), began to identify with the Ukrainian opposition, and gave their support to the idea of sovereignty. Following the Rada’s decision to remove the article about the Communist Party’s guidance out of the Constitution the period of multiparty politics set in. While the UHU transformed into the nationalist Ukrainian Republican Party, Green World became the Green Party, democratic communists created the Party of Democratic Revival, and moderate nationalist intellectuals formed the Democratic Party of Ukraine. The Rukh was divided among these parties and since it became increasingly nationalistic, while its membership boosted in Western Ukraine and Galicia, its support base in the southern and eastern Ukraine declined.⁷¹⁰

⁷⁰⁹ After Shcherbyts’ky’s retirement in 1989, Volodymyr Ivashko replaced him, however with his sudden resignation in 1990 CPU decided to divide the positions of first-secretariat of CPU and parliamentary chairmanship. The number two of the Party replaced Ivashko and the Second Secretary Kravchuk was nominated as chairman. (Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 184-185.)

⁷¹⁰ Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 183-184, 187.

Following the unsuccessful coup to overthrow Gorbachev and revert the process of disintegration, Ukraine declared independence on August 24, 1991. Kravchuk assumed the role of a nationally-minded leader opposing the signature of Gorbachev's new union treaty. The fate of Ukraine was to be finally determined by the 1 December 1991 referendum on independence. Prior to the referendum the Ukrainian media embarked on a campaign of spreading the seductive claim that separating from Moscow, which had "exploited Ukrainian resources, would leave the Republic much better off economically," highly influencing the public opinion since economic conditions under the Soviet rule were deteriorating.⁷¹¹ The results of the independence referendum were impressive since over 90 percent of the Ukrainians voted for independence. Whereas more than 90 percent of the western Ukrainians supported independence, around 80 percent of the eastern Ukrainians casted their votes for independence. In the predominantly Russian-populated Crimea, more than half of the participants favored independence of Ukraine.⁷¹²

With the establishment of independent Ukraine any chance for the survival of the Union was doomed. A week after the independence referendum, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus met in Belovezhskaya Pushcha and agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union, replacing it with the Commonwealth of Independent States. As the remaining Soviet republics joined the CIS, Soviet Union was effectively abolished.

⁷¹¹ Ibid., 191.

⁷¹² Nahaylo, *Ukrainian Resurgence*, 419.

5.3 The Newly Independent Ukraine

The reason behind the pro-independence votes was different for different regions of the Republic. While western Ukrainians voted mainly with nationalist feelings, most of the eastern and southern Ukrainians voted for independence as a result of their belief that independence would bring better economic conditions. As such, the primary obstacle the newly independent Ukrainian state was to face was about finding the right way to overcome the different attitudes and self-identifications of the people of Ukraine to create a unified Ukrainian nation. The independent Ukraine was to falter in doing this.

Although overwhelming majority of the people of Ukraine voted for independence in 1991, the next years proved that Ukrainians were not like minded in many aspects relevant to future Ukraine. Following independence, forces concentrated in the Crimea and the Donbass opposed to Ukrainian independent statehood and its Ukrainization efforts, expedited their activities, asserting the “Russianness” of these lands. Republican Movement of Crimea led by İuri Meshkov began campaigning Crimean independence from Ukraine,⁷¹³ whereas among eastern Ukrainians there developed a movement calling for regional autonomy, state language status for Russian, dual Russian-Ukrainian citizenship and closer ties with the CIS.⁷¹⁴

The mounting of economic difficulties in the early years of independence facilitated social discontent. While the ever deteriorating economic conditions led the rise of radical-rightist groups in western and central Ukraine, communist and

⁷¹³ Ibid., 434.

⁷¹⁴ Andrew Wilson, “The Growing Challenge to Kiev from the Donbas,” *RFE/RL Research Report* 2, 33 (1993): 8-13.

pro-Russian forces became prominent in southern and eastern Ukraine. The discontent in eastern and southern regions gradually transformed into opposition of the state's market-oriented and pro-Western course. The year 1993 saw strikes by the Donbass miners and Kiev transportation workers. The unimprovement of economic conditions further alienated the people of southern and eastern regions. While the Donbass saw a renewed strike by the workers who extended their demands to regional administrative autonomy, railway workers in southern Ukraine also went on strike. The unrest forced the government to early elections to be held in 1994.⁷¹⁵

Whilst elections were drawing closer the pro-Russian Meshkov was elected president in the first presidential elections of the autonomous Crimean Republic in January 1994. Coming to power he did not delay in announcing that the Crimea will vote for a local independence referendum the very same day of Ukrainian parliamentary elections. These bad news coupled with the decision of the regional councils of Lugansk and Donetsk to hold local consultative referenda asking the voters if Ukraine was to become a federation, if Russian was to become country's state language and language of administration and instruction in eastern regions. The results of these local referenda in the Crimea and the Donbass signaled a grim future for the idea of a unified Ukraine, since the majority of the voters in both regions gave their support to the propositions made by Meshkov government and regional councils of the Donbass.⁷¹⁶

The subsequent presidential elections showed that Ukrainian public opinion was divided between Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, who became to represent two opposing camps. While Kravchuk appealed to nationalist, Ukrainian-

⁷¹⁵ Nahaylo, *Ukrainian Resurgence*, 450.

⁷¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 466-469.

speaking forces concentrated in western and central Ukraine, presenting himself as the defender of independent Ukraine and Kuchma as a Russian puppet, Kuchma appealed to eastern and southern regions who preferred greater local administration, use of Russian in education and administration, and closer ties with Russia, accusing Kravchuk to be ineffective in saving the country from economic disaster. The results proved that Ukraine was divided into two camps, since western and central Ukraine backed Kravchuk who received 45 percent, and southern and eastern Ukraine rallied behind Kuchma who received 52 percent of the votes casted in Ukraine.⁷¹⁷ It became apparent that central Ukrainian provinces on the Right and Left Banks “reflected the influence of west and east Ukraine, respectively.”⁷¹⁸

This dichotomic situation in Ukraine renewed itself in every election to come, L’viv in the West and the Crimea and Donbass in the South-east representing the extreme ends, while Kiev in the Central Ukraine was representing a moderate stance shifting between the two camps and emerging as the decisive factor in choosing who was to govern the country. As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this thesis, this trend of polarization persisted to our day and it was this persistence of regional diversities that stimulated us to search for the historical roots of the fragmented nature of contemporary Ukrainian society.

⁷¹⁷ Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, “Ukraine Under Kuchma: Back to ‘Euroasia’?,” RFE/RL Research Report 3, 32 (1994): 1-12.

⁷¹⁸ Stephen R. Barrant, “Foreign Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, 7 (1995): 1127.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis lays the claim that the roots of regional differences in today's Ukraine can be and should be found in the history of the people of Ukraine. The literature on regional cleavages in today's Ukraine tend to look as far back as 18th century, in not far earlier, the times of empires, to find the different historical experiences of Ukrainians which led to today's fragmentations. This thesis, however, argues that the differentiation of experiences must have started way back since the study of 18th century onwards already exhibits different historical backgrounds for different parts of today's Ukraine. Therefore, the historical analysis of this thesis goes as far as Kievan Rus', as it represents the one and only time to speak for a homogeneous experience, if at all, for the ancestors of the Ukrainian people.

It was during the period of Kievan Rus' that Orthodox Christianity was adopted by the three Eastern Slavic people. From that time on being "Rus'" began to mean belonging to the Orthodox Christian faith. Kievan Rus' was invaded by Mongols in mid-13th century. Before the Mongolian rule, Kievan Rus' was already divided into a number of principalities the prominent ones to be Galicia-Volhynia, Novgorod and Vladimir-Suzdal. The change Mongolian invasion brought about was

the duration of its hold on these lands. Mongolian (later “Tatar”) rule ended first in Galicia-Volhynia through occupations by Poland and Lithuania respectively while eastern lands of Kievan Rus’ endured another century of the Tatar rule. Thus the end of Kievan Rus’ led to the difference of experiences of Russians and Ukrainians,⁷¹⁹ as Russians experienced the Tatar, i.e., the Golden Horde rule, longer but established their own state becoming the only ruling nationality in that state, Ukrainians lived under several different sovereigns, and thus they have interacted with different cultures, religions and languages.

Ukrainians of Volhynia lived harmoniously under the rule of Lithuania as a result of indiscriminatory policies of Grand Duchy of Lithuania, thus retarding the development of their national consciousness. On the other hand, Ukrainians of Galicia endured intolerant policies of Poland. Polish policies produced an environment where Galician Ukrainians were exposed both to the forces of assimilation and national awakening, although not yet in full force since nationalism as a political thought was yet to be invented.

Lithuanian period saw the split of the Rus’ church, which was a vital factor for the development of distinctions in the future Ukrainian society. Since the Orthodox-Ruthenians of Lithuania rejected following the Orthodox of Muscovy who declared autocephaly by rejecting the Catholic-Orthodox union projected by the Union of Florence (1439), the divide became permanent.

In this period, contemporary southern and eastern Ukrainian lands, then called the Kipchak Steppes, were inhabited by the Tatars and nomadic Nogays both descendants of the Kipchak Turks, and were empty of sedentary Rus’ population until the Russian expansion that only began in the sixteenth century. The territories

⁷¹⁹ For convenience in terms of flow of the conclusion chapter, the forefathers of the Ukrainians are referred to as “Ukrainians”, although for certain they were not called as such during those epochs.

which came to be named as “Southern Ukraine” today were a part of the Crimean Khanate which was a vassal of the Ottoman Empire.

It is the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth rule that pins down the start point of differentiation of Ukrainians. The way the Commonwealth was established (in 1569) allowed Poland to be the dominant actor in the lives of Ukrainians, thus reuniting the experiences of Galicia and Volhynia. The imposing Roman Catholic environment of the Polish rule saw quite a many Ruthenian, e.i. Ukrainian, noble opting for Polish-Catholic culture, and this cultural and linguistic Polonization was to affect the future developments. The process was felt more strongly in the densely populated western Ukrainian regions of the Commonwealth, as compared to the regions in the Dnieper River basin with a geographic remoteness to the Polish center and proximity to the Muscovites. One of the most prominent events of this time was the creation of the Uniate Church (Greek Catholic-Ukrainian Catholic Church) with the Union of Brest of 1596, which became the first major breaking point of experiences of eastern and western⁷²⁰ Ukrainians. As such, the foundations of today’s differences between western Ukrainians and their brethren in the south and east Ukraine were laid in the Commonwealth period. While many of those who held their Orthodox faith and resisted the assimilatory policies of the Commonwealth started to migrate eastward, quite a many others adopted Greek Catholicism. The Uniate Church which was supported by the Commonwealth authorities as an instrument of assimilation, contrary to expectations did not facilitate the Catholicization and Polonization of the Greek Catholic Ruthenians, as time would show that centuries later, the Uniate Church was to emerge as a bastion

⁷²⁰ The division is broadly defined and do not represent a strict division of east and west as geographical entities.

of Ukrainian national movement in western Ukraine that would cause great trouble in the future eastern Poland.

This time coincides with the weakening of the Tatars and of their hold on the southern and eastern lands of today's Ukraine, which then were populated by Nogays and Crimean Tatars and were directly ruled by the Crimean Khanate. These lands gradually fell under the Commonwealth but were sparsely populated border areas, serving as a buffer zone between the Commonwealth, Muscovy and Crimea, thus under continuous intrusions by its neighbors. Ukrainians, migrating eastward to escape the Catholicism and harsh policies of the Commonwealth, inhabited these lands and came to be known as Zaporozhian Cossacks.

Zaporozhian Cossacks, by their superior military abilities, created their own state first under the Commonwealth, then briefly independent, and finally entered under the rule of Muscovy. The Cossack period, especially the time of Hetmans Bohdan Khmel'nytskyi and Ivan Mazepa,⁷²¹ became a crucial symbol of Ukrainian pride of their history and the brief period of Cossack autonomy provided the contemporary Ukrainians with an example they could regard as the precursor of a Ukrainian nation state. The Cossacks became a driving force for the conservation of Orthodoxy among the Ukrainians of the Commonwealth. While Greek Catholicism was spreading in western Ukrainian lands since Cossack movement could not expand those areas, Uniate Church was suppressed in the lands further east where Cossack control was established. As such, the Cossacks represented the eastern/Orthodox character of Ukrainian identity. Eventually however, their

⁷²¹ The perceptions of western and eastern Ukrainians about these two figures demonstrate the distinction interpretations of history by Ukrainians. While western Ukrainians see Khmel'nytskyi's decision to accept Russian suzerainty with the Agreement of Pereiaslav as a betrayal, their eastern counterparts celebrate this event as the unification of Russia and Ukraine. Similarly, while western Ukrainians tend to perceive Mazepa as a ruler who tried to establish Cossack independence, eastern Ukrainians regard him as a traitor.

preference for the Orthodox Muscovy over Catholic Commonwealth separated them from their brethren to the west in their future experiences. The non-existence of religious barriers among the Cossacks and Russians facilitated their assimilation to the latter, whereas the distinctions possessed by the Greek Catholic Ukrainians both from the Roman Catholics and Greek Orthodox helped them further develop a self-distinctive identity. Ironically, what signified Ukraininess then was Orthodoxy, while during the following centuries Greek Catholics were to emerge as the foremost bearers of the self-distinctive Ukrainian identity. While Catholicism represented a suppressive factor then, more recent history of Ukraine identifies Orthodoxy as such. While Cossacks regarded their western brethren to be assimilated then, later time western Ukrainians came to regard their brethren under the rule of Russia as too much Russified.

Nevertheless, this difference of experiences proves one of the arguments of this thesis that Ukrainians started to differ from each other before the 18th century. The Commonwealth represents as the second and the last time before the establishment of Soviet Ukraine when all Ukrainians lived under the same political entity, thus following the partitions Ukrainians further developed different self-identifications, national consciousness and definitions of the other.

When assessing the cultural differences within modern Ukraine, one should not confine such an analysis to the role of length imperial and Soviet rules, but should bear in mind that the more than four centuries-long Polish rule over Galicia, more than two centuries long direct Polish rule in the Right Bank, and even the century-long rule in Kiev and parts of the Left Bank, were crucial in the evolution of contemporary divisions. Today, the most fervent nationalist Ukrainians are the successors of Galicians who experienced the longest Polish rule of all. Likewise, the

national sentiments of the Right Bank Ukrainians are greater than those to their east where historical Polish influence gradually depotentiated.

By 1795, the Commonwealth, which had such deep impacts such as the creation of the Uniate Church, and of a Cossack state, thus the first time an east-west differentiation among Ukrainians, disappeared from the political map of Europe by what came to be known as Partitions of Poland. With the partitions Ukrainian inhabited lands went under the rule of Austria-Hungarian Empire and Tsarist Russia. After 1795, of the Ukrainian-inhabited lands Galicia, Belz and Bukovyna were part of Austria, Transcarpathia was a part of the Kingdom of Hungary, and in addition to formerly acquired lands, the entire Right Bank, palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav, Podolia, Volhynia, and eastern parts of Chelm became part of Russia.

18th to 20th century, the Age of Empires, was the time most historians studying Ukraine date the start of the diversions among Ukrainians which shaped contemporary divergences. Indeed, the time witnessed important differences in the experiences of Ukrainians under the rule of their respective empires. Up until the second decade of the 19th century, the Ukrainians (Ruthenians) of the Habsburg Empire enjoyed cultural and religious indiscrimination and liberty, whereby Ukrainians started to develop their national character *vis-à-vis* other nationalities of the Empire. On the other hand, Ukrainians (Little Russians) of the Russian Empire experienced Russification since the similarity of religion and language put them at a disadvantage for national self-awareness.

There were different levels of national awareness among the Ukrainians of the Habsburg Empire, Galicia being the first to start on the path to national consciousness to be followed by Bukovina while Transcarpathia remained

undecided with a range of intellectuals from those favoring Ukrainophilism or Russophilism to those favoring the creation of a totally distinct nationality of Subcarpathian Rusyn. Nevertheless, Ukrainians of the Habsburg Monarchy established their Greek Catholic Church as a bastion of Ukrainian nationalism. Furthermore, the Austrian government supported the Ruthenian movement to counteract the Poles, and in such an environment Ukrainians (then called Ruthenians), as they were accepted by the Habsburgs as a distinct nation both from the Poles and Russians, developed their national language, peasant vernacular written in Cyrillic. Although by 19th century, favorable conditions of the Habsburg Empire started to deteriorate, giving the upper hand to the Poles, with the Spring of Nations of 1848, Ukrainians, like the rest of the nations of Europe, started forming the nucleus of their national organizations. Their activities started not to remain exclusive to the interest of intellectuals but also the peasants, and even passed the boundary across to the lands inhabited by Ukrainians of Russian Empire.

On the other side of the border, Ukrainians under the Russian Empire, experienced serious blows to their national consciousness. Russian influx to these lands produced Russified cities with Ukrainian populated countryside. Given the importance of cities in terms of intellectual development, Russification of the cities hit hard on national consciousness of Ukrainians in Russia. Moreover, Russian historiography regarded Ukrainians, as the “little brothers” of the Great Russians, who only differed in their experience of Polish rule. Empire’s benign attitude towards their fellow brothers was conditional upon their conformity to the Empire’s policies and doctrines. Once Ukrainians started to express themselves as distinct from Russians, then started purges, suppression and Russification. This took the form of ban of Greek Catholic Church, of Ukrainian cultural organizations and

newspapers, of the use of Ukrainian language and even of the distribution of literary works originating from the lands of Ukrainians of the Habsburg Empire.

Coming to the First World War, the picture was that while Ukrainian lands under the Habsburgs were adorned with Ukrainian language schools from elementary to university level, a flourishing Church, Ukrainian newspapers, learned societies, organizations, cooperatives, political parties and parliamentary representatives, Ukrainians under the Russian rule had no Ukrainian schools, no newspapers, no legal parties and organizations, no right to publish anything in Ukrainian, and Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian language itself were banned.

Nevertheless, the age of empires was the time when Ruthenians of Habsburgs and Little Russians of Romanovs started to identify themselves as distinct from other nations they lived side by side, not only on cultural and religious level but also on political level. By the end of the imperial age, no matter how different their level of national consciousness in different geographies under different ruling classes, they came to appreciate their unity across borders and the idea of an independent state of their own as “Ukrainians.”

The First World War meant the dissolution of multinational empires of the previous period. Both Russian and Habsburg Empires were dissolved giving opportunity for self-determination to its subjects. Ukrainians were no exception. When the two Empires collapsed, Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary at first remained loyal to the Habsburgs and preferred to fight with Russia. On the other hand, for the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire, already confusing times of war was further complicated with the Bolshevik Revolution and the civil war that ensued. However, Ukrainians of the Russian Empire did not seek secession immediately, no matter

how favorable the conditions were. Still, this did not preclude them from establishing their governmental instruments that might either facilitate autonomy, self-rule under a federative system or independence, in the name of the Ukrainian National Republic either directed by the Central Rada, Hetmanate, or Directory.

Nevertheless, the reluctance or hesitation on the part of the Ukrainians of Russia to move towards independence was due to their level of national consciousness and the demographic makeup of their lands. As afore mentioned, Ukrainians of Russia, because of their similarities with the Russians and of the Russification policies, were behind in terms of national consciousness *vis-à-vis* the Ukrainians of Habsburgs. This is reflected in the electoral votes of the time. The 1917 elections made it evident that while Ukrainian nationalists garnered great support from the previously Polish-ruled Right Bank, the eastern Ukrainian provinces preferred to support the Bolsheviks and pro-Russian parties. However overall, Ukrainian votes would go to the party that would promote land reform above other political aims. Thus, votes casted for the Ukrainian parties cannot be attributed only to national sentiments but to economic considerations that autonomy would focus politicians' interests on local development. As such, whenever the Ukrainian parties failed to live up to these expectations, votes would go to Bolsheviks, as well. It is also noteworthy that Ukrainian nationalism, although limited, attracted the rural people since the cities were to a great extent Russified. The Russification of the cities might have been the main obstacle to the development of the idea of independence, since socio-economic considerations weighted far more than ideals of nationhood for the illiterate peasants. Still, the Ukrainian governments of the revolutionary era set an example of Ukrainian self-

governance sowing the seeds of independence idea among the masses which was previously limited to a handful of intellectuals.

Unlike Ukrainians of Russia, Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary were ready to declare their independence, at the first opportunity given with the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire and were determined to fight for its survival against the superior armies until the inevitable end. The difference of their opinion of a future Ukraine marks not only the level of the different levels of national consciousness between western and eastern Ukrainians but also their views about each other then and today.

The struggle of the “two Ukraines” with their respective enemies (Bolsheviks, Whites and anarchist peasants for Ukrainians of Russia, Polish army for Galicians) led them to a seemingly natural unification. However, their choices of alliances to fight their different enemies stood as a test for their continued unity. Ukrainians of Habsburgs preferred to collaborate with the Whites against Poles but Ukrainians of Russia would not cooperate since their previous experience with the Whites inhibits their sympathy. On the other hand, Ukrainians of Russia allied with the Poles, the archenemy of their Galician brethren, and offered them Galicia and western Volhynia, the motherland of Habsburg Ukrainians, in return. This inability of a unified action under a seeming unity ended up Ukrainian lands to be once more divided. Dnieper Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet state after the eventual Bolshevik victory. Galicia and western Volhynia were left under Polish rule while Bukovina entered Romanian sovereignty and Transcarpathia chose to be a part of newly established Czechoslovakia.

Interwar years witnessed the change of boundaries since the peace agreements of WWI failed to settle the disputes. For Ukraine these changes largely

meant incorporation of more Ukrainian lands to Soviet Union. Under the Soviet rule, Ukrainians first experienced a national revival as the newly born Soviet Union's leaders were then bound by the Marxist-Leninist ideology to permit nations to live under their ethnic denominations, as they were under the unity of the "proletariat brotherhood." However, this seemingly favorable environment of the Soviet nationalities policy faded away as the Stalinization sank in. With Stalinization the Soviet Ukrainian lands were far away from those of the first years that attracted Ukrainian intelligentsia living abroad to migrate. On the contrary, these lands became inflicted with purges, famine, and cultural and religious intolerance. The Soviet nationalities policy curbed the development of a Ukrainian national consciousness by imposing upon the society the Soviet-Russian culture. As a result, the eastern Ukrainian Soviet society evolved into a more Sovietized and Russified society as compared to the western Ukrainian society which was free from Soviet influence for twenty more years.

During the inter-war years among all Ukrainians only Transcarpathians living under the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia enjoyed favorable political conditions while the rest of the western Ukrainians lived under the suppressive regimes of Poland and Romania. Ukrainians living in Poland and Romania were refused cultural, religious and political autonomy and were subjected to assimilation. Yet, it was the Ukrainians of Poland to unify the efforts against their suppressive rulers by establishing underground nationalist organization, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which employed terrorist tactics such as assassinations against its enemies, in its fight for freedom.

The Second World War for Ukrainians started with the occupation of Polish-ruled Ukrainian lands by Soviet Union in line with the secret articles of Molotov-

Ribbentrop Pact. Soviet rule could not camouflage its suppressive nature, thus giving rise to purges, bans, flight of intelligentsia abroad, and cultural and religious intolerance. Western Ukrainian dislike of Soviet rule, which started with the reach of the horrible treatment of East Ukrainians and the Great Famine, was consolidated and OUN had its new enemy in the boots of Soviet Union.

Soviet-Nazi Pact did not endure the WWII and they became enemies. Western Ukrainians living under Soviet rule for a short period of time regarded Germans as liberators and thus collaborated with them in the hope of independence. When Nazis launched Operation Barbarossa, OUN members were in the ranks of the German Army. When German Army entered L'viv, OUN members announced the Proclamation of the Ukrainian State (*Akt*), a proclamation unauthorized by Nazis. As for the position of Ukrainians toward the *Akt*, while it can be said that Ukrainians of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia regarded the proclamation of the *Akt* positively, it is highly suspicious that the central and eastern Ukrainians agreed with the western Ukrainians. Since German authorities did not accept this *fait accompli*, a crackdown on OUN started. Nevertheless, OUN expeditionary groups reached far into the East Ukrainian lands, spread the nationalist message and learned from their experience with Central and East Ukrainians that they did not share many of the ideals and perspectives.

By 1943, when the tide of war turned against the Nazis, Ukrainians experienced the brutal nature of Nazi rule to such a point to come to prefer Soviet rule. National awakening flourished in eastern parts due to Nazi suppression and OUN membership widened, as no alternative was existent up until then. When the Ukrainian lands once more became a battlefield, OUN formed OUN-UPA, the military branch, to fight for an independent Ukraine against not only Nazis and

Soviets but also Polish and Soviet partisans. The period 1943-1945 is one of the major friction points in the experiences of Ukrainians since west Ukrainians regard OUN-UPA members as heroes of the nation and justify OUN collaboration with the Nazis as only available means for a good end, while east Ukrainians regard Nazis as greater evil, thereby see OUN-UPA as Nazi collaborators and Soviets as liberators, the total opposite of what west Ukrainians thought. Even more important, the OUN experience let two Ukraine's get to know and form a perspective about each other. Although nationally conscious western Ukrainians regarded eastern Ukrainians as their brethren, they realized they had few in common. Eastern Ukrainians, less developed in terms of national consciousness, simply found their western brothers different and perceived them as other, not one of themselves.

With the end of the WWII, Ukrainian lands were once more united, this time to last. Under the Soviet regime, all Ukrainians were subject to Sovietization. Transition to Soviet rule was smoother in eastern districts while western districts endured purges, Russification and ban on Greek Catholic Church. This is the time when East and West Ukraine came to be pronounced by the Soviet authorities to mark the differences between them; especially in terms of how integrated they were to the Soviet regime.

Although Ukrainian experiences of post-WWII Soviet period differed only slightly, the response of western and eastern Ukrainians to the Soviet policies differed considerably. Russian in-migration of the period was mainly concentrated on eastern and southern Ukrainian *oblasts* bringing about greater Russification to these regions. Eastern and Southern Ukrainians were adopting Russian ways and language, becoming increasingly bilinguals or unilingual-Russian speakers. On the other hand, Western and Central-Western Ukrainians seemed to retain Ukrainian as

their primary language of communication and could cope up with the influence of Russification better than their eastern counterparts. These differences among different parts of the Republic were preserved as a result of the Soviet policy of residence permits which were instrumental in preserving cultural differences between different historical regions. Western Ukrainian nationalist dissenters of the period doubled the easterners in number, and the clandestine nationalist secessionist organizations emerged exclusively within western Ukrainian lands. Once the Soviet purges and Sovietization policies reached their aims at eliminating dissent, it can be argued that both “Ukraines” had once again a history that they shared for the first time since the partitions of Poland.

Still, when the tide of the history changed against the Soviet Union, it was the Western Ukrainians that took advantage of the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a chance for independence. On the other hand, majority of the eastern Ukrainians who voted for independence did so not with national sentiments but because they thought autonomy would alleviate their economic burdens, just like they did when they supported autonomists during the revolutionary WWI years. On the other hand, western Ukrainian lands saw the return of national symbols, Greek Catholic Church and the votes casted represented a desire to secede from Soviet Union and have a nation state. This is illustrative of how western Ukrainians retained their previous memories, and guarded their culture, history, religion and language underneath their everyday Soviet identity.

These all demonstrate the role of each earlier epoch on the evolution of contemporary Ukrainian society. The Kievan Rus’ period brought about the Orthodoxation of the eastern Slavic nations. The already developing divergences among the principalities of the Kievan Rus’ were accentuated with the separate

experiences of the ancestors of present day Ukrainians and Russians following the Mongol invasions leading to their further differentiation. The Lithuanian and Polish rule over the Ukrainians created a more European worldview among them when compared with the Russians who fell under the Mongol-Tatar influence. Centuries long Polish-Catholic influence further separated Ukrainians from Russians.

The Commonwealth period signified the development of differences among the Ukrainians themselves. The religious factor became the most crucial catalyst in this development. It was this period which saw the migration of Commonwealth's Ukrainians to the east in search for an escape from imposing Polish-Catholization and its offspring, the Uniate Church. Quite a many people of the western Ukrainian lands remote from Cossack influence and vulnerable to the imposition of the Uniate Church converted to Greek Catholicism. On the other hand, those who escaped to what today came to be known as "southeastern Ukraine," became the Cossacks who assumed the role of protecting Orthodoxy of Ukrainians. As a legacy of this epoch while Greek Catholicism began dominating western Ukrainian lands and shaping the identity of this region's people completely different than their brethren to the east, the Cossack legacy of Orthodoxy and strong association with the Russian culture with the lapse of time led to the development of a pro-Russian identity among these regions' Ukrainians. Although in this period Uniates represented assimilation and Cossacks represented the protection of Orthodox-Ukrainian identity, the future centuries were to shape the Uniates into nationally-conscious Ukrainians while the children of Cossacks were to adopt Russian ways.

The post-Partitions period further disconnected the experiences of the Ukrainians living under the Habsburg and Romanovs. While the Russian imperial rule was suppressing all manifestations of a Ukrainian identity distinct from the

dominant nationality, the Ukrainians of Austria were permitted to develop their self-distinctive identity. While Russian rule left the eastern Ukrainian lands a legacy of Russification, the Austrian rule left a legacy of Ukrainian national consciousness. It was this twin legacy that shaped the actions of Ukrainians in the First World War period, which demonstrated the decisiveness of the western Ukrainians in establishing an independent state, and reluctance of their eastern counterparts to cut their ties with their “elder brother.” As the inability of the “two Ukraines” in acting in unison led to separate experiences anew during the inter-war years, the western Ukrainian lands gave life to an extreme form of Ukrainian nationalism as a reaction to the suppressive Polish rule, whereas the Soviet-ruled lands seemed to be resigned to the new regime under heavy Sovietization-Russification and purges of “unreliable” elements. The separate regional identities were being more and more consolidated during this period that these divergences were not to be erased from the political picture of contemporary Ukraine. The Second World War became the scene these differences were staged. Even the post-WWII common rule under the Soviet Ukraine was not to head off the already well established differences. With the collapse of the Soviet Union it became evident that the efforts to assimilate the western Ukrainians, suppression of their Church, purges, and Russification efforts were played off by the well-entrenchedness of national consciousness among the western Ukrainian masses. On the other hand the independent Ukraine was -and still is- to have hard times in taking the southern and eastern Ukrainians, many of whom became unilingual Russian speakers who adopted Russian culture, into the frame of a Ukrainian national state.

This analysis demonstrated that the lengthier a rule a historical region experienced under a non-Russian state, the more strong its inhabitants developed a

pro-European, nationally-conscious Ukrainian identity. As a result of this analysis we came to realize that the most fervent nationalists in contemporary Ukraine are the people of the historic Galician regions which endured the lengthiest non-Russian rule, not being a part of Russian state until the end of the WWII. Although still endowed with much more pro-nationalist sentiments as compared with the regions to the east which experienced longer Russian rule, the people of historic Volhynia, which experienced a shorter non-Russian rule than Galicia by becoming a part of the Russian Empire in the end of the 18th century, exhibit lesser nationalist tendencies than the Galicians. Similarly, while the west of the traditional Habsburg-Romanov border represent the most nationalistically minded areas, the west of the traditional border of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth represent a moderate nationalistic tendency, exhibiting the influence of lengthy Polish rule and the withering away of it in the face of Russian dominance. The gradual loss of Commonwealth authority from the Left Bank to the Right Bank corresponds to the support given to nationalist political parties in contemporary Ukraine since the tendency in pro-nationalist voting in the Right Bank is greater than the Left Bank and the tendency of supporting allegedly pro-Russian parties is greater in Left Bank than in the Right Bank. The nationalist sentiments tend to further erode in eastern and southern Ukrainian regions which experienced the longest period of rule by a Russian or its successor state. The centuries long Russification experience of southeastern Ukrainians is certainly a crucial factor in the evolution of contemporary southeastern Ukrainians into a less nationalistic, more pro-Russian people.

Since 1991 Ukraine is an independence state. Nevertheless, Ukraine is still under the process of building its common self, its shared history, and its joint

culture, since Ukrainians are yet to achieve the creation of an all-encompassing Ukrainian identity that embraces everyone. The regional political differences are still tangible given the preferences, perspectives and everyday life of the Ukrainians of different historical regions. This inherent divide was the very fact that stimulated this study and led us to search for the historical roots of the fragmented nature of contemporary Ukrainian society. The historical analysis of different historical periods performed in this thesis not only confirms the fundamental role played by centuries long differing historical experiences of Ukrainian generations on the evolution of contemporary regional distinctions, but also is a reminder that the essential role of pre-18th century historical legacy on the political culture and identity of contemporary Ukrainians is not an issue to evade.

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