

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION  
IN CENTRAL ASIA: TURKESTAN REUNION

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## ***ABSTRACT***

The existing conceptual and terminological anarchy in the literature about the Central (Inner or Middle) Asian region was a starting point of this dissertation. Thus, the basic objective for this study was to review the literature as to which terms were used by whom, when and with what kinds of motives? With the final objective of trying to bring some clarifications to the field.

This is a historical study with an eventual international relations repercussions in mind. Historically, the term Turkestan has been used by many. It differs from most of its contemporary alternatives. It is not only a geographic and political term but also a politico-ethnic one, in Persian, Turkestan means “the country of Turks.” The term has also been used in the literature to cover four different names and areas: Western or Russian (then Soviet) Turkestan, Eastern or Chinese Turkestan, Southern or Afghan Turkestan as well as the Greater (Uluğ) Turkestan to encompass all.

Extensive review of encyclopedical and primary sources and the researcher’s numerous interviews and long-time field observations on the subject reveal significant findings. First of all, the region was called with different names by different peoples throughout its history. However, from the 7th Century AD on, the name Turkestan has been the longest survived one. Furthermore, toward the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th centuries, the rise of Turkestanism among the political elite of Turkestanis was witnessed. It is most likely that the liberal atmosphere of February 1917 Revolution resulted in the declaration of Turkestanist national statehoods in the region, namely Turkestan Autonomy, Bukharan and Khorezmian People’s Soviet Republics and Alaş Orda Government. The 1924 national-territorial demarcation (*razmezhevanie*) was not totally a product of central planning in Moscow but have had an important native initiative too. During the period between 1924 and 1991, Turkestani *intelligentsia* at home and abroad continued their Turkestanist stance at different levels while reaching its height when Nazi Germany decided to establish Turkestan Legions to “liberate” Turkestan from the Bolshevik tyranny. Even after 1991, when all five Union Republics gained their independences, a search for regional integration and strengthening already existing common Central Asian-Turkestani solidarities continued with an increasing degree on the both ruling elite and opposition camps in the regional states.

Although, historically, while there exists: no “Turkestani nation” in western meanings of the term, no single “Turkestanish language” in modern terms, no contemporary political entity called Turkestan, and no consensus over its geography; the concept of Turkestan has survived through the centuries and its heritage has been claimed by the modern political cadres of the region.

It is hoped that, the study may provide new visions for those bewildered by the complexities of the daily politics of the region. This study explains that history and common Turkestani identity are key to understand increasing integration efforts of Central Asian leaderships in the post-Soviet period. However, in this process the Soviet legacy and the very definitions of the ethnic identities during the Soviet period are still quite in affect despite the efforts to re-write Turkestani history by the regional administrations in the 1990s. It is also underlined that just like all three Turkestani movements at beginning of the 20th century, Basmacıs, Jadids of Turkestan Autonomy and Alaş Orda and National Communists were all Turkestanists in different levels, in the post-Soviet period, leaderships and oppositions of the independent Central Asian states use Turkestan idea and Turkestanism in different levels as well. Thus, ultimate purpose of this work is to outline the dynamics of the Turkestani regional identity and its reflections on the daily politics of Central Asian states.

## ÖZET

Bu tezin başlangıç noktası literatürde Merkezî (Orta veya İç) Asya bölgesi hakkında var olan kavramsal ve terminolojik karmaşayı incelemek idi. Bu sebeple çalışmanın temel amacı literatürün detaylı bir araştırmaya tabi tutulması yolu ile bu bölge için hangi terimlerin, kimler, ne zaman aralıklarında ve ne tip motifler ile kullanıldığını tesbit etmektir. Elbette bunu takip eden amaç ise saha çalışmalarındaki terminolojik kargaşaya biraz olsun son vermektir.

Bu çalışma sonuç olarak uluslararası ilişkiler merkezli bir tarih araştırmasıdır. Tarihi olarak Türkistan terimi pekçok şekilde kullanılmıştır. Bu terim pekçok modern alternatifinden ayrıdır. Çünkü Türkistan sadece bir coğrafi ve politik kavram değil aynı zamanda etno-politik bir kavramdır. Farsça bir kelime olan Türkistanın sözlük anlamı “Türklerin ülkesi” dir. Literatürde bu kavram dört ayrı terimi ve bölgeyi kapsayacak şekilde kullanılmıştır. Batı veya Rus (Sovyet) Türkistanı, Doğu veya Çin Türkistanı, Güney veya Afgan Türkistanı ve bunların hepsini kapsayan Uluğ (Büyük) Türkistan.

Konu hakkında detaylı ansiklopedik ve birincil kaynak taramalarının yanı sıra araştırmacının röportajları, uzun süreli saha gözlemleri bir dizi önemli bulgu ile neticelenmiştir. Öncelikle bu bölge tarih boyunca farklı halklar tarafından farklı kavramlar ile adlandırılmıştır. Ancak Milâttan sonra 7. asırdan bu yana kullanılan Türkistan terimi tüm bu adlar ve kavramlar içinde en uzun süre yaşayan olmuştur. Öyle ki 19. asrın sonu ve 20. asrın başlarında Türkistanlıların siyasi seçkinleri arasında, Türkistancılık adı konulmamış bir siyasi hareket haline dönüşmüştür. 1917 Şubat ihtilalinin liberal atmosferinden yararlanan Türkistanlılar millî-Türkistancı devletlerini kurmuşlardır. Bunlar Türkistan Muhtariyeti, Alaş Orda Hükümeti, Horezm ve Buhara Halk Cumhuriyetleri idi. Bu tezin bir başka bulgusu ise 1924 yılında gerçekleşen millî-sınırların tesbiti(*razmezhevanie*)nin şimdiye kadar sanılanın aksine sadece Moskova'nın değil aynı zamanda önemli ölçüde yerli millî Komünistlerin inisiyatifleri ile gerçekleşmiş olduğudur. 1924-1991 yılları arasında hem Türkistandaki hem de sürgündeki Türkistan seçkinleri farklı düzeylerde Türkistancılıklarına devam etmişlerdir. Bu hareket İkinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında Nazi Almanyasının Türkistanı Bolşevik zulmünden “kurtarmak” için Türkistan Lejyonlarını kurması ile doruk noktasına ulaşmıştır. 1991 yılında Orta Asya devletlerinin bağımsızlıklarını kazanmalarından sonra dahi Türkistan merkezli entegrasyon ve birleşme arayışları hükümetler ve muhalefetler nezdinde mevcut entegrasyonu artırma siyasetine dönüşmüştür.

Her ne kadar tarihi olarak batı standartlarında bir “Türkistan milleti”nden, modern anlamda bir “Türkistan dili”nden, yaşayan ve Türkistan adını taşıyan siyasi bir yapıdan, hatta ve hatta terimin anlamı ve kapsadığı coğrafya hakkında mevcut bir fikir birliğinden bahsetmek mümkün olmasa da, Türkistan kavramı yüzyıllar boyunca yaşamış ve bölgedeki modern siyasi kadrolar tarafından şu anda sahiplenilmektedir.

Bu çalışmanın bölgedeki gündelik siyasi hayatın karmaşık yapısından açmaza düşen araştırmacılara yeni vizyonlar sunması ümit edilmektedir. Bu çalışma Sovyet sonrası dönemde bölgedeki liderliklerin entegrasyon çabalarını anlamada tarihin ve ortak Türkistanlı kimliğinin anahtar olduğunu açıklamaktadır. Ancak aynı zamanda 1990'larda bölgedeki hükümetlerin yeni tarih yazımındaki çabalarına karşın Sovyet mirası terminolojinin mevcut etkisine de dikkat çekilmektedir. Ancak aynı 20. asrın ilk çeyreğinde olduğu gibi farklı kamplardaki Türkistanlı seçkinler, aynı Basmacıların, Cedidlerin ve Millî Komünistlerin farklı seviyelerde Türkistancı olmaları gibi, Sovyet sonrası dönemde de Orta Asya ülkelerinin liderlikleri ve muhalefetleri arasında farklı seviyelerde Türkistancılığın ve Türkistan fikrinin kullanıldığı gözlemlenmektedir.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

ASSR	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
CAEC	Central Asian Economic Community
CAEU	Central Asian Economic Union
CAU	Central Asian Union
CENTRALAZBAT	Central Asian Battallion (TsentrAlAzBat)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CU	Customs' Union
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
EEU	Eurasian Economic Union
ET	Erkin Too
EU	Eurasian Union
GUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
KPT	Communist Party of Turkestan ASSR
MT	Milliy (Milli) Türkistan
NYT	The New York Times
OA	Ozbekistan Avazi
PSR	Peoples' Soviet Republic
QE	Qazaq (Kazak) Eli
RFE-RL	Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty
RKP	Russian Communist Party
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
SWB	Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC)
TIP	Turkestan Islamic Party
TMB	Türkistan Milli Birligi (Turkestan National Union)
TsIK	Central Executive Committee
TsK	Central Committee
TTGB	Türkistan Türk Gençler Birligi (Union of the Turkestani Turkish Youth)
Turkrespublika	Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
UTO	United Tajik Opposition
YeT	Yeni Türkistan
YT	Yaş Türkistan
ZhN	Zhizn Natsional'nostei

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Problem**

The break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in an unexpected independence for the five Soviet Asian Union Republics: Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The International community saw new flags being raised at the UN, competitions for national anthems, a writing of new constitutions and the a re-writing of history by these “new nations”. Were they really new? Or, were they really already “nations”?

At the time, there was even a problem in describing these republics and their region as a whole. Was it Central Asia? Middle Asia? Inner Asia? The Near East? Or the traditional and conventional term Turkestan? There were also the Soviet versions, which were readily bought by Western academia as the “politically correct” terminology during 1960s and 1970s, such as “Middle Asia and Kazakstan” or “Central Asia and Kazakstan.” These last terms were intended to draw clear lines between the two parts of a region. All these developments gave a new question to students of the region. Do the countries of the region constitute historically, culturally and organically integrated parts of a larger whole or are they practically lands and peoples which just happened to be neighbors? Does one have to find a single term to refer to the whole of this geography or not? It is not a continent like Europe. It is not a group of united states

or under one state rule any longer. However, among all others, there is a single and a very particular term for the region: Turkestan.

It was clear from a review of the literature that there was a conceptual and terminological lack of consensus among scholars on the issue of naming the “region” as a whole. Students of the history and politics of the region recognize the fact that different terms used for the region usually represent the political stance of their authors on the issue of national identity and regional integration. Sometimes, even the different spellings of the word Turkestan may be used to indicate a somewhat differing historical and political views.<sup>1</sup>

As a physical entity, the region is quite well defined and circled by natural borders. For instance, compared to the so-called Middle East, the region under analysis in this dissertation is easily distinguished from its neighboring countries. As for the term Middle East, one might easily ask, “whose East?” and “whose Middle?” Quite similarly, questions concerning the terms like “Central”, “Inner” and “Middle Asia” could be asked without incontrovertible answers.

The term Turkestan differs from most of the contemporary alternatives. It is not only a geographic and political term but also a politico-ethnic one. In Persian, Turkestan means “the country of Turks”. It is usually accepted as the legendary land of Turan. The latter, being a mythological country of the Turks, did not imply a concretely defined region or geography. In fact, the term Turkestan was also subject to gradual changes in its defined borders. Together with the advance of Turks, its borders shifted towards the southwest; whereas Iran retreated even further to the southwest. The term Turkestan

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<sup>1</sup> The term Turkestan is spelled differently in different languages, such as Türk'astan, Turkistan, Türkistan, Turkesztan, Türkisztan, Toorkisthan, Turquestan , Turkestan. However, the usage of Turkistan for a long time in 19<sup>th</sup> century by scholars was a sign of its adoption by the British through firstly Afghan Turkestan. Russians, most probably adopted the term from Western academia, decades after its first uses in Western literature, in the form of “Turkestan.” The latter version, in turn, seems to be adopted by the Anglo-Saxon literature from the Russians in the late-19<sup>th</sup> century.

was also used for other geographical areas populated by the Turks, such as Western and Central Anatolia, and even Egypt at some point. The term was also used in the literature to cover four different names and areas: Western or Russian Turkestan, Eastern or Chinese Turkestan, Southern or Afghan Turkestan as well as the Greater (*Uluğ*) Turkestan to encompass all of them. In the past and contemporary scholarly writings, when the term Turkestan was used, unless otherwise stated, it meant “Western Turkestan”, which covers more or less the contemporary territories of Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

Throughout history, the term Turkestan co-existed with other terms used by foreigners for the lands that were meant to include parts or the whole of Turkestan. Such as: *Deşt-i Kıpçak* (Kipchak Steppes), *Siberia*, *Mā warā' al-Nahr*-Transoxiana, *bilād al-Turk* (land of the Turks), *la Grande Turchia*, country of *Dokuzoğuz*, Fifth Climate, *Turān*, *Türk İlleri*, *Türkelî*, *Türkîli*, *Harkavat* (Tents') Lands, Steppe of the ten thousand Kirghiz, Great *Turquie*, *Tartary*, Greater *Tartary*, *Tataristan*, *bilād-ı Turkistân*, *Turan Zamin*, *Asya-yı Vüsta*, etc. However, though at times along with these other names, for the natives, throughout the course of history, the term has consistently remained “Turkestan”. Even before the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, when Russians established their Turkestan Governorship, the people of the region had a Turkestani identity, which was a loose regional identity, nothing comparable to the modern definitions of the term “nation”. Thus, this is a concept, which seems to have survived through centuries, since the 7<sup>th</sup> century AD, along with the local, tribal, religious, dynastic changes in the region.

There have been two different modes of life in Turkestan. One is of the settled portion of the population, Uzbeks and Tajiks, who historically shared the irrigated oases of the region. Another is the semi-nomadic Kyrgyz, Kazaks and Turkmens who shared the arid and semi-arid steppes and deserts of this vast territory. Their identities and

politics change accordingly. The first two based their identities and politics on a city-based localism whereas the latter three still live in a manner oriented towards clan and tribe.

The first step taken by the natives of Turkestan during the 1917 revolutions was to set up a short lived independent Turkestan State in Khokand. One of the most important turning points in its history was the 1924 national-territorial delimitation of borders in Soviet “Middle Asia”, which eventually produced the contemporary “nation” states and “national identities” in Turkestan. From 1924 on, the Soviet power made a great effort to erase this term from the minds of the natives. New national identities, states, autonomous regions, minorities were created. Turkestan became the “melting pot” for the nations of the Soviet Union, with a view to the fusion of all these different peoples into a stereotype; *homo Sovieticus*. In 1991, many agreed that this policy had not succeeded-achieved the reverse as it strengthened a series of tribal, local and other new identities.

However, the period between 1924-1991 witnessed a very important trend amongst the Turkestani intelligentsia at home and abroad. This is called “Turkestanism” in this dissertation. Started with the émigré efforts of Mustafa Çokayoğlu, Osman Hoca, Zeki Velidî Togan and others, Turkestanism was at its height when Nazi Germany decided to establish Turkestan Legions to “liberate” Turkestan from the Bolshevik tyranny. The Cold War facilitated the survival of Turkestanism through Western efforts to keep the struggle warm. However, at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, Turkestanism resurrected surprisingly in the “Soviet” Central Asia, mainly due to the efforts of native intelligentsia led by Olcas Süleymanov, Muhammed Salih, Rauf Parfe and Çingis Aytmatov. Following the full oppression of all democratic-Turkestanist opposition within the country, Turkestanism has been a major



foreign policy tool since the mid-1990s, albeit in rhetoric, at the hands of the Uzbek leadership.

## **1.2 Purpose of the Study**

The major purpose of this study is to illustrate the historical development of the Turkistan Concept in Central Asia. Specific questions intended to be addressed are:

1. How the Turkistan Concept has developed in the course of its history?
2. What have been the basic factors or motives shaping the concept? Which groups and/or nationalities influenced or tried to influence the concept, and in which directions and why?
3. How for the present developments reflect or do not reflect the historical development of the Turkistan Concept in Central Asia?

The problem under review is a conceptual one. It is aimed at finding out how a traditional politico-ethnic term, Turkestan, has survived through the centuries, especially the 20<sup>th</sup> century, during which it became a hope for native elites to create a “Turkestanian nation”, a “Turkestanish” language and an independent “Turkestan Statehood” in line with the modern definitions of the term “nation”

This study deals with vastly differing definitions of the term Turkestan in world literature - the long history of the concept from its first uses until modern times. It also covers the stories of the struggles of the native elites against the colonial Russian elements during the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century; as well as the émigré political struggles of these native elites, together with the issues concerning the national-territorial demarcation of the region by the Soviets, which have shaped today’s map of Turkestan. The study also deals with the other side of the coin: tribalist and localist struggles among the native elites, which were mainly fueled within the USSR after the Second World War. The last and probably one of the most important segments of the history covered is the 1990s, the post-Soviet period. It was during this period that all of the

independent states of Central Asia tried very hard to produce new formulas of unification amongst themselves - such as the already functioning Central Asian (Economic) Union, the Customs Union which became the Eurasian Union. At this point, the main question to ask may be: “why should one give this region a single name at all? And why should these countries [Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan] need economic, political, regional and other forms of unification?”

### **1.3 Methodology**

The thesis is basically a historical study, which based on various sources and individuals whom had been available and accessible to the researcher.

Conceptually, the two prominent names having written about the history of Central Asia, V.V. Barthold and Zeki Velidî Togan produced volumes of historical material on “Turkestan”. Barthold’s “Turkestan” article, first published in *Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar* and then in his *Sochinenie* and in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*’s first edition, remains the best account ever produced on the history of the term. Zeki Velidî was a very special character, a scholar of Turkestani history and a tireless supporter of his own version of “Turkestanism” in the field. He contributed an enormous amount to scholarly knowledge by producing several articles, pamphlets, a map and chapters on the conceptual problems of modern Turkestan history, including the very term Turkestan itself. Zeki Velidî also contributed to the terminological anarchy by inserting his own version of the term, a Turkified form of the term Turkestan, *Türk İli* or *Türkili*.

Apart from these, there is a vast amount of literature on the subject, with different definitions of the term Turkestan, together with different names for the region.

However, most of them failed to develop a scholarly conceptual framework adequate to developments in the region.

In many respects, the works of these two scholars (Barthold and Togan) provided the groundwork for this thesis because appropriate conceptualization of the matter is vital if we are to understand likely future developments in the region.

With a view for clarifying the concept, the thesis starts with a review of the encyclopedic literature on the different definitions of the term Turkestan. In the following chapters primary-sources have been deployed as far as possible. To accomplish this, travel books, memoirs, contemporary geography books, contemporary annals, archival documents, contemporary journals and the like have been used extensively. Naturally, due to the time period covered, in the last chapter, a considerable amount of secondary sources were utilized as vast amounts of information had at the time of writing become available on the subject.

The lack of consensus among scholars of the region on a unified form of transcription as to the names, terminology and languages of Turkestan, necessitated the employment of a rather unique system of transcription. All of the Western, including Russian, words were transcribed using the standard Library of Congress system. However, Turkic, Turkish and Muslim terminology and names were transcribed in accordance with the current Turkish Alphabet, which is the most suitable for the task.

Methodologically, in the text, a chronological order of events has been followed to make it easier to trace the development of the term Turkestan along with other terms used for the region historically. A special sensitivity had shown as regards the usage of not only Western Russian and Turkish texts but also native Turkestani original sources as well. Additionally, a substantial amount of the researcher's first-hand personal field observations, pertinent interviews with the individuals and experience with the

Turkestanī intelligentsia have also been employed in gathering, analyzing and interpreting the data on the subject.

## CHAPTER 2

### “TURKESTAN” IN THE ENCYCLOPEDICAL-REFERENCES

#### 2.1 Introduction

The basic objective of this chapter is to review the concept of “Turkestan” in existing encyclopedias, encyclopedical dictionaries and other reference sources published in different languages in late the 19<sup>th</sup> and mostly the 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries. Basic, definitions, descriptions and explanations of the concept of “Turkestan” in light of the geographical-political and historical framework of the last century, were listed, analyzed and compared to each other in a chronological order. Thus, through these basic sources, it can be assumed that, the most common perception of the world’s intellectuals towards the concept of Turkestan is described.

#### 2.2 Definitions, Descriptions and Explanations

The region referred to as Turkestan in most of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century sources had a rather limited meaning in political sense. This was simply because of the existence of the Russian Turkestan General Governorship as an administrative unit and the loosely defined Northern Afghan province of Turkestan in Afghanistan.<sup>1</sup> This limited-political definition of the region can best be observed in many other western reference sources.

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<sup>1</sup> *Histoire Générale, 1815-1847. Tome X* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1898). See pages 963-9 for a detailed sketch of the region in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the beginnings of the “Great Game” in Turkestan, also for the then-limited definition of the region of Turkestan as the Russian General Governorship, Khiva, Bukhara and Herat.

Towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the Russian general-reference source, *Bol'shaya Entsiklopediya* was first published. There were a series of articles about Turkestan, including *Turkestanskaya Tuzemnaya Gazeta*, *Turkestanskiy Basseyn*, *Turkestanskiy Khrebet*, *Turkestanskaya Vidomosti*, *Turkestan* (both the town and the region), *Turkestan Afganskiy*, *Turkestan Vostochniy*, and *Turkestan Russkiy*. The article “*Turkestanskiy Basseyn*” points out a geographical description of the Turkestan basin, including Northern Afghanistan in the South and Turkmen-Khorassan Mountains in the Southeast up to the Balkash-Irtish line on the North, excluding the Northwest and Southeast of what was defined before as Turkestan in a broader geographical context.<sup>2</sup> However, it was still a rather geographical approach to the term.

In the article entitled Turkestan, the term is used to mean the land of Turkic peoples (*stranatyurkov*).<sup>3</sup> The concept is described as a common geographical name for what is called *Turkestanskiy Basseyn* in the West and The Tarim Basin in the East and the Northern tier of Afghanistan as the Southern part of Turkestan.<sup>4</sup> There are different articles defining the boundaries of Afghan and Eastern Turkestan-Kashgaria. Russian Turkestan, however, defined as the land of the Imperial Russian Colony of Turkestan including the oblasts of Syr-Darya, Samarkand, Ferghana, Semirechie and Zakaspi. An important part of Northern Turkestan, which was then called Steppnaya Guberniya, has not been included in the political definition of the concept.

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<sup>2</sup> *Bol'shaya Entsiklopediya: Slovar obschedostupnyh' cvidiniy po vsem' otraslyam znaniya. Tom. 18* (S. Petersburg: Tipo-litografiya knigozgatel'skogo T-va 'Prosvishchenie', 1896). (However this volume, 18, has been published sometime at least after 1899 and probably after 1902, because there is a reference to the dictionary of *Brokgauz' and Efron'*, in which Turkestan article was published in 1902.) pp. 41-42 or 656-657.

<sup>3</sup> The difference between the Russian words *Turok* and *Tyurk* should be noted carefully here. The first term means “Turk” and the second one “Turkic”. However it is difficult to assume that, at the end of the last century, there could be a very clear line of separation between these two terms: Turk and Turkic.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42 or 657.

The first and a quite detailed Turkestan article in various reference sources of the 20<sup>th</sup> century appeared in the famous *Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar'* in 1902.<sup>5</sup> This article starts with a definition calling the Western-Central Eurasian plain, with all the lands on it “*Turan*” or “Turkestan,” simply meaning the land of “Turkic” peoples.<sup>6</sup> The boundaries of this land were drawn as almost a square of Urals, Caspian Sea, Persia, Afghanistan, Chinese Frontiers, Altay, Tobolsk and Tomsk.<sup>7</sup> With this first definition, being heavily geographic in nature, Barthold made a distinction between the northern steppes and the southern part of the region, which is divided into two different administrative units by the Russian Empire.<sup>8</sup> While explaining the old history of the region, Barthold used the term to mean “the land of Turk” (*strana Turok*)<sup>9</sup> rather than the Turkic peoples. He explains broader - geographical and rather limited political meanings of the concept. However, this approach has not been followed by most of the other sources seen in successive years.

One of the first Western encyclopedias of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was the French *La Grande Encyclopedie* of 1885-1902. It has an eight page long Turkestan article in addition to a full two-page map of Turkestan. The concept first described the common geographical name of the two basins of Central Asia: Aral-Caspian Basin and Lob-Nor Basin. Southern boundaries of the concept were the Tibet-Tien-Shan-Pamir-Iran line leaving the Northern boundaries of the concept undefined.<sup>10</sup> Russian Turkestan was

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<sup>5</sup> *Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar'. Tom' XXXIV* (S. Peterburg': Tipografiya Akts. Obsh. Brokgauz'-Efron', 1902). This Encyclopedical dictionary, also known as the dictionary of Brokgauz' and Efron', started in 1890. Turkestan article was written by W. Bartold' and it is 33 pages long, containing many subtitles. There are also separate articles on the town of Turkestan, Afghan Turkestan, Eastern Turkestan in the same source. This article also contains a good list of reference sources published before 1902 about Turkestan.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 174.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 174.

<sup>8</sup> Also the map between the pages 199-200, basically shows us the area from east of the Aral Sea to Eastern Turkestan town Aksu and the area from north of Narin in Afghanistan to the north of Akmola Oblast.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 203.

<sup>10</sup> *La Grande Encyclopedie, Inventaire Raisonne. T. 31* (Paris: Societe Anonyme de la grande Encyclopedie. 1885-1902). This volume in 1902, p. 503.

simply the territories of Russian Turkestan General Governorship plus the lands of Khanates. Chinese Turkestan was described rather as the lands of ancient Kashgaria around the Tarim basin.<sup>11</sup> It is possible to see several references to ancient term Turan, applied in the text for the region. The map is a square one with Oren burg, Semipalatinsk, Khotan and Astrabad in each corner. North of the Aral Sea is marked Steppe Government General but most of the Southern Step Government General was included with Turkestan in the map. P. Lemosof wrote this article on Russian Turkestan. There is also a separate article about the town of *Turkstan* (p. 540), which describes it as a “village” in the Siberian region.

### **2.3 A Geographical, Political and Ethno-National Concept**

Turkestan is a unique concept with geographical, political and ethno-national meanings. That makes its definition quite difficult compared to other similar terms. One of the main English-language history references of the beginning of the century had a long volume about Central Asia, which contained mainly four separate parts about Turkestan, Tibet, Afghanistan and Baluchistan.<sup>12</sup> The source used the Middle and Central Asia terms quite interchangeably at the beginning. However, the authors also used the term “Tartar” quite often just to imply different types of Turkic peoples. The terms like Kyrgyz, Kurd, Kalmuck, Sart, Turkoman, Uzbek, Tajik, Hazara also existed in the text just to underline the colorful ethnic structure of the region. Kashgar is referred to as the capital of Eastern Turkestan.<sup>13</sup> In the Turkestan part, authors made a

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<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 505.

<sup>12</sup> *Harmsworth History of the World. Second Volume. Ed. Arthur Mee* (London: Carmelite House, 1908). The part about Central Asia is between the pages: 1437-1552. This part divided Turkestan into Chinese and Russian Turkestan. And the Northern part of Chinese Turkestan is limited by the undefined borders with Zhungaria.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1461.



clear distinction between Eastern or Chinese Turkestan and the Western or Russian Turkestan.

*Révai Nagy Lexikona*, an early Hungarian Source used both *Turkesztan* and *Turkisztan* spellings, explaining the meaning of the word as the land of Turks in Çağatay (Dzsagataj).<sup>14</sup> This article underlines that the whole of Eastern and Western parts are called Turkestan, while defining the Eastern Part only as The Tarim Basin and the western part as the former Tsarist General Governorship.<sup>15</sup> This political approach to the definition was one of the first examples in this sense. In fact, this approach may be called a “limited-political definition” of the concept.

The famous Spanish reference source, *Encyclopedia Universal* of 1929 had a thirty-eight page long Turkestan article. This article included political and geographical maps of the region too. However, the political map included only the boundaries of the Former Tsarist General Governorship oblasts of Syr Darya, Semirechie, Samarkand and Ferghana. Even the lands of Emirates-Emirates were excluded from the political definition of the concept.<sup>16</sup> The term was considered a Persian word meaning the ‘land of Turks’. Authors used the terms Turquestan and Central Asia as synonyms, highlighting the term ‘Asia Centrale’ which was introduced in the first half of 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>17</sup> Even the broad geographical definition of the concept excluded the Northern Chinese Sinkiang by calling it Zungaria, as a separate historical-political entity.

In one of the first German general reference sources of the century, *Meners Lexikon*, Turkestan is defined as the ‘land of Turks’ which is a part of the central Asian region. A specific description of the exact boundaries of the Russian General

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<sup>14</sup> *Révai Nagy Lexikona: Az Ismeretek Enciklopédiája. Kötet XVIII* (Budapest: Révai Testvérek Irodalmi Intézet Részvénytársaság, 1925), p. 534. This is the first and last source, which explained the roots of the term in Chagatai-Turkî rather than in Persian.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 534.

<sup>16</sup> *Encyclopedia Universal Illustrada. T. LXV* (Madrid&Bilbao: Espasa-Calpe, S. A., 1929), pp. 450-1.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 448. However the rough boundaries of the loose geographical concept was defined as Caspian, Siberia, Mongolia and Tibet, leaving the southern boundaries undefined. In the text, the former names of the region as Alta Tartaria, Alta Asia and Asia Interior can also be found.

Governorship in Central Asia<sup>18</sup> has appeared as the only geographic description in the text. Turkestan being a part but not a synonym of Central Asia, started to become a separate approach roughly after these years.

In the 1933 edition of the *Larousse*, there were five different articles about Turkestan; including Turkestan Town, Turkestan General Governorship, Turkestan Region, Afghan Turkestan and Eastern or Chinese Turkestan. This article clearly separated the definitions of the General Governorship and the Region. Turkestan is defined as a part of Central Asia from the Caspian Sea to Mongolia and Tibet roughly, which includes the Northern Afghan provinces of Mazar, Balkh, Koundouz, Tash-Kourgan and the whole of Eastern Turkestan (Chinese Sinkinag). Russian Turkestan was specifically defined as the lands of Kazak, Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Turkmen SSRs.<sup>19</sup> This article, while considering Turkestan as a part of the Central Asian region, still stuck with the broader geographical definition of the concept.

W. Barthold wrote one of the best articles on the concept for the *Encyclopedia of Islam* published in 1934. This article is a summary of Barthold's Turkestan article in his collected works and an earlier article in *Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar*. Both spellings of the word as Turkistan and Turkestan were used in this article, meaning 'land of the Turks' in Persian, which was exactly the southern frontier of the land of the Turks to the Persians, the frontier against Iran.<sup>20</sup> One of the best instances on the first uses of the term can be found in his short historical piece:

Tabari (i. 435 sq.): the Oxus was settled by an arrow-shot of Irash as the frontier between the Turks and the 'territory (amal) of the Persians'. According to the Armenian Sebeos (seventh century A.D.) the Vehrot, i. e. The Oxus, rises in the land of Türkastan (Historire d'Heraclius par l'evêque Seveos, trans. By Fr. Macler, Paris, 1904. P. 49.; J. Marquart, Eransahr, p. 48): in another passage in

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<sup>18</sup> *Meners Lexikon. B. 12* (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1930), p. 204. There is a separate article on the town of Turkestan in p. 205.

<sup>19</sup> *Larousse Du XXe Siecle en six volumes. V. 6* (Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1933), p. 845.

<sup>20</sup> *The Encyclopedia of Islam: A Dictionary of the Geography, Ethnography and Biography of the Muhammadan Peoples. V. IV* (Leyden: Late E.J. Brill Ltd., 1934), p. 895.

the same work (p. 43; Marquart, p. 73) T'urk'astan is associated with Delhastan i.e. Dehistan (in the neighborhood of the Caspian Sea, North of Artek)... By the victories of the Arabs, the Turks were driven back to the north; for the Arab geographers of the third (ninth) and fourth (tenth) centuries, Turkestan therefore began, not immediately north of the Oxus, north of the area the Arab culture knew as the 'lands beyond the river' Mā wārā al-nahr. The town of Kasan in Ferghana north of the Sir-darya was where the land of Turkistan begins (Yakut, IV. 227)<sup>21</sup>

For the conqueror Russians the name Turkistan implied a more arbitrary meaning than the first Persian-Arab geographers. After the Uzbek conquests in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the south of Amu-Darya also became Turkistan. Barthold, in this article, suggests that especially the British, who were quite active in the region already, introduced the concept of Turkistan to the scientific literature of the 19th century, underlying the fact that it was not a choice of Russians but the British. The use of the term in the general references of English language as Turkistan, not in its Russian form Turkestan, might be an interesting support to the Barthold's comment in this respect. However, Barthold explains the introduction of the term *Srednyaya Aziya* (meaning Middle Asia, but Barthold translated it as Central Asia) quite weakly by saying "mainly on ethnographical grounds the word Turkestan has gradually dropped out of use in Soviet Russia... for Turkestan in such cases the expression Central Asia (*Srednyaya Aziya*) is used".<sup>22</sup>

The use of the term Middle Asia by the Soviets was a political decision from 1923-1924 on, especially after the national territorial delimitation (*Razhmezhevanie*) of 1924, rather than a decision on ethnographical concerns.

In 1931, renown Persian scholar Allameh Ali Akbar Dekhoda started the publication of his *Loghat Nameh Dekhoda* with its first chapter. Its last chapter was published in 1981. It is simply an encyclopedic Dictionary of Persian language, in

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<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 895.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 896.

which there is a long and explanatory Turkestan article. According to this reference source, the term Turkistan means all the lands Northeast of Iran, populated by Turks. Although Southern (Afghan) Turkestan and Eastern Turkestan were not included into the concept, Kazak steppe was shown as a part of the geographical meaning of Turkistan.<sup>23</sup>

The *Encyclopedia Italiana* is also one of the first general-reference sources, which has a quite long Turkestan article with many details in it. The Turkestan maps in several pages exclude southern and eastern parts of the region but interestingly enough include the whole of Kazak SSR into the region.<sup>24</sup> The article described the boundaries of Turkestan region as the Siberian Steppe in the north, Altay-Gobi line in the East, Hindukush Range in the South and Caspian-Ural line in the west. The meaning of the word was given as the Persian version of “*Turchia*”, Turkey. It was referred in Marco Polo as *la Grande Turchia* (or Greater Turkey).<sup>25</sup> The article considers Turkmen, Kazak, Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz SSRs’ lands as the former lands of Turkestan.<sup>26</sup> This is also an example of the broader-geographical approach to the definition of the boundaries of the region.

*Der Neue Brockhaus* of 1938 separated the Russian and Chinese Turkestans but pointed out that the word Turkestan was a common term both for the Western and the Eastern Turkestans.<sup>27</sup> The absence of Afghan Turkestan in the definition and by referring to the parts as Russian and Chinese Turkestans, the source in this article seems to follow the limited political approach.

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<sup>23</sup> Allameh Ali Akbar Dekhoda, “Turkistan,” *Loghat Nameh Dekhoda*, CD Version, no page numbers.

<sup>24</sup> *Encyclopedia Italiana: Di Scienze, lettere ed arti. T. 34* (Roma: Istituto Della Encyclopedia Italiana Fondata da Giovanni Trecciani, 1937). See the maps in pages 562-3 and 4.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 559.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 560.

<sup>27</sup> *Der Neue Brockhaus. V. 4* (Leipzig: F. U. Brockhaus, 1938), p. 493.

In 1942, Hungarian *Uj Idök Lexikona* published a very exceptional Turkestan article under which the word ‘*Türkisztan*’ was given as a synonym for Turkmen SSR. There was no word of Russian Turkestan at all. The second meaning of the word was given as the land of Eastern Turkestan, Sinkiang or ‘*Türkisztan Kinai*’, with its capital Urumichi.<sup>28</sup> It is quite difficult to understand this ‘mistake’ simply because of the existence of broader explanations of the term in the previous Hungarian literature.

In the first 1947 edition of *Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, the Turkestan concept was used as a term in Russian geography, including all regions of Middle (*Srednyaya*) Asia, Western China and Northern tier of Afghanistan and Tsarist Middle Asian Province of Russian Turkestan. The territory of pre-Soviet Turkestan was described as the lands of Turkmen, Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz SSRs.<sup>29</sup> It is interesting to see at this point, the geographical-broader approach began to co-exist with the limited-political definition of the term in the Soviet literature at the height of Stalinism.

The 1948 edition of *Quillet* described Turkestan as a region of Central Asia. Russian Turkestan was described as the area between the Caspian Sea in the West and the Pamir Range in the East - basically Turkmen, Uzbek, Tajik, Kirgiz SSRs and Southern Part of Kazak SSR. There is also a definition of Chinese Turkestan under the general Turkestan article. This definition did not include the Afghan part of the land.<sup>30</sup> *The American Family Encyclopedia* of the same year defined Turkestan as a vast region of Central Asia, surrounded by Mongolia, China and Tibet in the east and the Caspian

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<sup>28</sup> *Uj Idök Lexikona. V. 12* (Budapest: Singer Es Wolfner Irodalmi Intezet Rt. Kiadása, 1942), p. 5945.

<sup>29</sup> *Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya. T. 55* (Moskva: Gosudarstvennyy Nauchnyy Institut “Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya”, 1947). Started in 1926, p. 238. The exclusion of all of Kazak SSR lands from the literature describing Turkestan started at this point very clearly. Because the former limited approach to Tsarist General Governormship, being the boundaries of Turkestan included at least the Southern part of Kazak SSR into the definition.

<sup>30</sup> *Dictionnaire Encyclopedique Quillet: Edition du cinquantenaire. T. 5* (Paris: Librairie Aristide Quillet, 1948), p. 4875.

Sea in the West.<sup>31</sup> In the same year a *Spanish Encyclopedical Dictionary* defined the town of Turkestan in Southern Kazak SSR, leaving the geographical-region definition untouched.<sup>32</sup>

All of these different approaches in different reference sources of the same year were marking the beginning of the conceptual anarchy on the concept that was to become effective in coming decades.

*The Columbia Encyclopedia* of 1950 used the English spelling ‘Turkistan’ rather than the Russian spelling of ‘Turkestan’ but implied that they were the same words. It defines it as a geographical region including the lands of Turkmen, Uzbek, Tajik, Kyrgyz and Southern Kazak SSRs. The article made the distinction between Western and Eastern-Chinese Turkestan too and called the two a single region, despite the existence of political-historical reasons to separate them.<sup>33</sup> Another American encyclopedia of the same year described the region as a part of Central Asia circled by Caspian Sea, Siberia, Mongolia and the Gobi desert, Tibet, India and Afghanistan.<sup>34</sup> Northern Kazakh SSR, or Northern Turkestan (Steppe), as a geographical concept, was excluded from this time on in many sources, which try to give a historical-geographic and political definition in a combined form.

However the efforts of keeping the rough-broader geographical approach alive, continued to exist. *Encyclopedia Judaica Castellana* of 1951 defined Turkestan roughly

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<sup>31</sup> *American Family Encyclopedia: A Library of World Knowledge. V. 8* (New York: Unicorn Publishers, Inc., 1948), p.2302.

<sup>32</sup> *Diccionario Enciclopédico Salvat: Segunda Edición. T. XII* (Barcelona: Salvat Editores, S. A., 1948), p. 325.

<sup>33</sup> *The Columbia Encyclopedia in One Volume*. Ed. By William Bridgwater and Elizabeth J. Sherwood (Second Edition. New York: Clumbia University Press, 1950. P. 2023.

<sup>34</sup> *New Masters Pictoral Encyclopedia. V. 8* (New York: Book, Inc., 1950), p. 1364. The second edition of this encyclopedia was published in 1956 with a different name, *The World Wide Encyclopedia*. Turkestan article in Vol. 9 (New York: Books, Inc., 1956). No page numbers in this edition. There are no changes made in the article.

the lands between the Caspian Sea and Tibet, including the whole of Eastern Turkestan (Chinese Sinkiang) and all of Russian Middle Asia including Kazakstan.<sup>35</sup>

A Spanish source in 1952 defined the term as a region in Central Asia. He made the distinction between Western and Eastern Turkestan, included only southern part of Kazak SSR into the definition and limited the boundaries with the Tsarist General Governorship's boundaries.<sup>36</sup> From the early 1950s on, the absence of a political entity called Turkestan in the region made it difficult for many to give concrete descriptions of the region. In the following years, a strong emphasis on the historical-geographical nature of the concept was made.

#### **2.4 A Historical or Contemporary Term?**

By the mid-20th Century, the problem about the term Turkestan was simply to determine whether it was an ancient-historical concept which did not exist anymore or a contemporary-living term with a certain group of supporters. The *Encyclopedia of Geography of XXth Century* in 1953 defined Turkestan as a part of the Central Asian region and also limited it with the boundaries of Former Tsarist General Governorship, despite the geographical nature of the source.<sup>37</sup> In the same year, a Danish source also defined the term as a region in Central Asia, but included a rather different geographical concept with Southern Siberia being a part of the term. The term was also used to mean to represent the 'land of Turks'. The word 'Turan' used as a synonym and this definition included the whole of Eastern Turkestan (Chinese Sinkiang).<sup>38</sup> The use of this

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<sup>35</sup> *Encyclopedia Judaica Castellana: En Diez Tomos. T. X* (México: Editorial Encyclopaedia Judaica Castellana, S. De R. L., 1951), p. 329.

<sup>36</sup> *Neuva Encyclopaedia Sopena: Diccionario Ilustrado. T. V* (Barcelona: Editorial Ramón Sopena, S. A., 1952), p. 836.

<sup>37</sup> *Encyclopédie Géographique Du Xxe Siècle* (Paris: Fernand Nathan, 1953), pp. 150-3.

<sup>38</sup> *Hagerups Illustrerede Konversations Leksikon. B. X* (København: H. Hagerup, 1953), p. 215.

word ‘Turan’ was quite common in the reference sources, especially in those about the ancient history of the region.

The New York edition of 1954 *Grolier* also used ‘Turkistan’ spelling rather than Turkestan, highlighting that both meant the same thing: the ‘Turk-land’ in Persian. The region was defined as a part of Central Asia, where Western Turkistan was Russian Turkistan plus Afghan Turkistan, which is the area between the Amu-Darya or Oxus and the Hindu-Kush Range - an ancient Bactria. Russian Turkistan was defined as the lands of five SSRs in Central Asia; and Eastern Turkistan was defined as the Chinese Sinkiang province.<sup>39</sup> One of the first modern Turkish reference sources of the 20<sup>th</sup> century *Resimli Yeni Lügat ve Ansiklopedi* had a short ‘Türkistan’ article drawing its boundaries as Afghanistan, the Caspian and the Aral Sea, roughly as the lands of The Turkestan Autonomous Republic or Turkestan General Governorship. Distinction between Eastern and Western Turkestan was made without any detailed explanations.<sup>40</sup> This Turkish source was one of the rare examples of the sources giving a most-limited description of the region.

The second edition of *Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* in 1956 came out with a series of differences. Turkestan (land of Turks) was defined as a historical-geographical term for the regions of Middle (*Srednyaya*) and Central (*Tsentrlnaya*) Asia. Southern Kazak SSR was included in the definition of Western Turkestan in addition to the concept of ‘Modern Middle Asia’ This article described the Eastern Turkestan as the whole of Chinese Sinkiang and Southern Turkestan as Northern

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<sup>39</sup> *Grolier Encyclopedia. V. 10* (New York: The Grolier Society Publishers, 1954), pp. 222-3.

<sup>40</sup> *Resimli Yeni Lügat ve Ansiklopedi (Ansiklopedik Sözlük). C.5* (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1954), p. 2851. (Started in 1947)



Afghanistan. It was also stated that Northern Turkistan included the most of Kazak SSR.<sup>41</sup>

This explains the reasons for calling Turkestan Central Asia and Kazakstan. Simply because they started to call The Tsarist Turkestan General Governorship first Middle Asia (by an official decree) and then Central Asia (in the literature), which in fact did not cover most of Kazakstan as an administrative unit. Probably, it was a painful task for the authors of these articles to name the region geographically and politically in different manners.

*The World Book Encyclopedia* of 1956 pointed out that Turkestan had no definite boundaries.<sup>42</sup> The ‘Turkistan’ spelling was preferred in this volume again. It was called a vast region in Central Asia and a geographical region in the Soviet Union, China and Afghanistan. It is roughly circled by Siberia, China proper(excluding Eastern Turkestan, Mongolia and Tibet), Tibet, Afghanistan and the Caspian Sea.<sup>43</sup> These were the last examples of descriptions to include the whole lands of Chinese Sinkiang, to be exact, even a broader definition of Turkestan in a detailed sketch.

In 1957, *Der Grosse Brockhaus* defined Turkestan as the ‘land of Turks’ in Persian and called Western-Soviet Turkestan Kazak, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek SSRs’ lands, while East (Chinese) Turkestan was described to be roughly the Tarim basin.<sup>44</sup> An American encyclopedia of 1957 used the terms Turkestan and Central Asia to mean the same thing. It was pointed out that the Tien-Shan range divides the region into two: Eastern and Western parts. Afghan Turkestan was included in Western Turkestan while the rest of it was called Russian Turkestan or Soviet Central Asia,

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<sup>41</sup> *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya. T. 43* (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Nauchnoe Izdatel'stvo "Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya", 1956). (Started in 1949). P. 439. See also pages 439-442 for other articles about Turkestan.

<sup>42</sup> *The World Book Encyclopedia. V. 16* (Chicago: Field Enterprises, Inc., 1956), p. 8207.

<sup>43</sup> See the map on the same page, which includes most of Kazak SSR, all other Soviet Central Asia, Chinese Turkestan excluding its northern part and Northern Afghanistan.

<sup>44</sup> *Der Grosse Brockhaus. B. 11* (Weisbaden: F.A. Brockhaus, 1957), p. 696.

which includes the Kazak SSR. The root of the name represented the population, Turks.<sup>45</sup>

In another American encyclopedia of the same year, there was a more concrete definition of the land excluding Northern Sinkiang from the Eastern Turkestan, including Soviet Central Asia and most of Kazakstan into Western Turkestan but leaving northern Afghanistan outside.<sup>46</sup> A Canadian Encyclopedia of 1957 also preferred to use the spelling Turkistan and defined it as a large region of Middle Asia, circled by the Caspian Sea, Iran, Afghanistan, and the Chinese province of Sinkiang.<sup>47</sup> However, the same volume excluded the northern part of Kazakstan and important amount of land of Eastern Turkestan (Chinese Sinkiang) from the definition.<sup>48</sup>

In 1959, with different spelling, the term “Turkistan” was used instead of “Turkestan” in an encyclopedia. It was defined as a region in Western and Central Asia, roughly East of the Caspian Sea. Western Turkistan was defined as the lands of five SSRs in Central Asia in addition to Northern Afghanistan, whereas Eastern Turkistan was defined as Chinese Sinkiang.<sup>49</sup>

In the same year, another encyclopedia explained that ethimologically the name Turkestan meant “the territory occupied by Turkish peoples.”<sup>50</sup> The region was said to be circled by Siberia, Mongolia, and the Gobi desert, Tibet, India, Afghanistan and

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<sup>45</sup> *Compton's Pictured Encyclopedia and Fact-Index. V. 14* (Chicago: F.E. Compton & Company, 1957), pp. 247-8.

<sup>46</sup> *The Home University Encyclopedia. V. 12* (New York: Books Inc. Publishers, 1957), p. 4578.

<sup>47</sup> *The New Educator Encyclopedia. V. 10* (Toronto: General Press Service Ltd., 1957), p. 3682.

<sup>48</sup> In fact it is said only “*the Western part of Sinkiang has been known as Turkestan*” in p. 3682. Which is quite unusual simply because all other limited definitions of Turkestan excluded only the northern part of Sinkiang.

<sup>49</sup> *The American College Encyclopedic Dictionary. Edited by Clarence L. Barnhart. V. 2* (Chicago: Spencer Press, Inc., 1959), p. 1307.

<sup>50</sup> *World Scope Encyclopedia. V. 11* (New York: World Scope Encyclopedia Corp., 1959). (no page numbers in this volume)

Caspian Sea. However, Kazak SSR 's lands were not included at all in the Russian Turkestan. Finally, Eastern Turkestan was defined roughly as the Tarim basin.<sup>51</sup>

One year later, another encyclopedia used the “Turkistan” spelling again.<sup>52</sup> It meant the ‘land of Turki.’<sup>53</sup> There was a separate second Turkistan article describing Southern Turkestan only: “the northern division of Afghanistan with the Amu Darya (Oxus River) on the North, Badakshan on the East, the Hindu-Kush and the Kohi Baba Mountains and the Hari River on the South and the USSR on the West and Northwest.”<sup>54</sup>

*Encyclopedia Britannica* of 1962 also used the ‘Turkistan’ spelling of the word. It was described as being the home of the “Turkic Peoples”. Turkestan was also described as a region in Central Asia. A distinction was made between the Eastern and Western parts; and Kazak SSR was included into the Western (Russian) part completely.<sup>55</sup> As it can be seen from the debate between the mostly unknown authors of these articles, the inclusion of Northern Kazakstan was quite common in different sources.

## **2.5 Turkestan: Central Asia or Middle Asia?**

In 1963, a Russian Encyclopedical Dictionary defined Turkestan as the whole Middle and Central Asian regions, including the western part of China and northern Afghanistan. This definition did not include any part of Kazak SSR into Turkestan.<sup>56</sup> The combined use of Middle and Central Asian terms in a Russian source was a good example of the different meanings given to the two separate terms. However, the

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<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> *The American Peoples Encyclopedia. V. 19* (Chicago: Spencer Press, Inc., 1960), p. 141.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 141.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 142.

<sup>55</sup> *Encyclopedia Britannica. V. 22* (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 1962), p. 620.

<sup>56</sup> *Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar' v dvuh tomah. T. 2* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo “Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya”, 1963), p. 535.

authors were always careful about the inclusion or exclusion of Southern (or sometimes the whole) Kazak SSR into the broad definition of the term. In the same year, another encyclopedia again used the Turkistan spelling and described it as a historic region of Central Asia. In this definition, Western or Russian Turkestan included Southern Kazak SSR. Chinese and Afghan Turkestan were described separately. The meaning of the word was explained to be the “land of Turks” in Persian.<sup>57</sup>

Another Russian source, published in 1964, included most of the Kazak SSR into Turkestan by defining its northern boundaries as Caspian-Aral-Irtish line. But in the same source, it was pointed out that Turkestan was called Middle Asia after the Great October Revolution. This article also made the distinction among Western, Eastern and Southern Turkestan.<sup>58</sup> At this point, it is quite interesting to see that the Soviet authors continued to suffer quite extensively as they tried to find the proper name for the region.

*Everyman's Encyclopedia* of 1967 had definitions of both Turkestan as a town and as a region. As a region, it was described as an area consisting of Russian (Turkmen, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik SSRs), Chinese (Sinkang) and Afghan (Northern) Turkestan.<sup>59</sup> This kind of rough description continued to appear in many other western sources, but still, there was a total absence of Kazak SSR in the definition of Russian Turkestan.

In 1968, a British Encyclopedia argued that, in modern geographical usage “the name Turkestan is only applied to a small town 150 miles Northwest of Chimkent in South Kazak SSR.”<sup>60</sup> In the same article, it was also said that the term was the former name of Soviet Central Asia, including the Southern Kazak SSR. While, the Eastern or

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<sup>57</sup> *The Columbia Encyclopedia. Third Edition* (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 2182.

<sup>58</sup> *Entsiklopedii Slovari Spravochniki* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo “Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia”, 1964), p. 160.

<sup>59</sup> *Everyman's Encyclopedia. Fifth Edition. V. 12* (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1967), p. 153. The exact same article appeared in the *International Everyman's Encyclopedia. V. 19* (Sixth Edition. New York: Encyclopedia Enterprises, Inc., 1970), p. 7283.

<sup>60</sup> *Chamber's Encyclopedia: Newly Revised Edition. V. 14* (London: International Learning Systems Corporation Limited, 1968), p.1.

Chinese Turkestan was mentioned briefly, the Afghan part was not mentioned at all.<sup>61</sup> Of course, in a modern geographical usage, it was quite appropriate to say that the term is used for the town of Turkestan, and also for the Turkestan Military District in Uzbekistan; but both the broader geographical and limited-political meanings of the concept continued to appear in many other sources in the literature. Therefore, it is quite difficult to see the logic of limiting the use of the term to the town of Turkestan.

For example, *Encyclopedia International* of 1970, while calling Turkestan a part of Soviet Central Asia, included Northern Afghanistan in the historical Turkestan definition. Chinese Turkestan was mentioned separately as Sinkiang in the same source.<sup>62</sup> But, what was called Soviet Central Asia at that time was basically four SSRs excluding Kazak SSR, which was only a part of the term Turkestan. In this respect, calling Turkestan a part of Soviet Central Asia does not make any sense.

*An Encyclopedical Area Handbook* for the Soviet Union published by the American Government in 1971, it was said that the arrival of Turks after the Seventh Century A.D. in the region was the simple reason for the region to be still called Turkestan.<sup>63</sup> This kind of ethnic emphasis on the name has appeared in most of the articles on history.

A Russian Encyclopedia of 1973 had a different feature in its definition of the concept. It was stated that Turkestan (land of the Turkic peoples) was a historical-geographic term for the Middle and Central Asia of Turkic peoples. The authors draw the northern boundaries from Ural-Caspian-Tomsk-Tobolsk-Altay-China line, covering

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<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>62</sup> *Encyclopedia International. V. 18* (New York: Grolier Incorporated, 1970), p. 276.

<sup>63</sup> *Area Handbook of the Soviet Union* (Washington D.C.: Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 175.

most of Kazakstan.<sup>64</sup> However, Kazak SSR, in this article, was excluded from the term Soviet Middle Asia.<sup>65</sup> Still, all the efforts to exclude Kazak lands from the concept was in vain; for the simple fact that even the most limited historical-political definitions of the concept included at least Southern Kazak lands.

*Brockhaus* of 1974 defined Turkestan as a historical-geographical term, while Russian or Western Turkestan was basically called Soviet Middle Asia and Kazakstan. Chinese or Eastern Turkestan was called the Tarim Basin.<sup>66</sup> From the early 1970s on, even a more conscious Western approach to the Soviet-creation of new and constantly changing conceptualizations for the geography of region is observed.

The third edition of *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* of 1977 also described Turkestan as a historical-geographical term of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. The territories of modern Middle Asia and Kazakstan (Southern) were defined as the historical-geographical Turkestan, which was still populated by Turkic people<sup>67</sup>, which was called Central Asia. The distinction between Eastern, Western and Southern Turkestan was made. And it was also stated that, after the *Razhmezhevaniye* of 1924-5, the region was called Middle (*Srednyaya*) Asia.<sup>68</sup> The emphasis on the concept being historical in nature and belonging to the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> and beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was one of the last Soviet positions on the issue.

Just two years later, an article appeared in a German encyclopedia which stated that the term was originally in Russian and meant the area surrounded by the Caspian Sea, Siberia, Chinese Turkestan, Afghanistan and Iran. Eastern Turkestan was defined

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<sup>64</sup> *Sovetskaya Istoricheskaya Entsiklopediya. T. 14* (Moskva: izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya", 1973), pp. 524-5. See also articles about Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (p. 525-9), Turkestan Commission (p. 529-30) and Turkestan Commissars (p. 530-1).

<sup>65</sup> See also the map in p. 525 of Turkestan Autonomous SR, Excluding Northern Kazakstan.

<sup>66</sup> *Brockhaus Enzyklopädie. V. 19* (Weisbaden: F. A. Brockhaus, 1974), pp. 136-7.

<sup>67</sup> *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya. T. 26* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," 1977), p. 338 (1002).

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 338 (1002).

as the Tarim Basin and Sinkiang.<sup>69</sup> The broader-geographical description approach continued to exist, or even achieved some progress in Western literature even in late 1970s, after more than fifty years of the disappearance of the last political entity in Russian, Turkestan referred to with the specific term Turkestan.

In 1981 a Turkish encyclopedia described ‘Türkistan’ as a region in Middle Asia, covering all five SSRs in the West and all of Sinkinag in the East.<sup>70</sup> This was in fact a good example of the Turkish intellectual approach of accepting the broadest possible political definition, while it was also a good example of the acceptance of the Soviet version of the Middle (Orta) Asia term for the region.<sup>71</sup>

In 1982, an article by Elizabeth E. Bacon in *Encyclopedia Americana* stated that Turkestan or Turkistan, as a region in Central Asia, “politically includes the Uzbek, Tadzhik and Kyrgyz SSRs, the Southern Part of the Kazak SSR and the Eastern Turkmen SSR; Northern Afghanistan; and in China, the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region.”<sup>72</sup> However, in the same article, Turkestan was also described geographically as the area north of the Kun-lun Mountains, the western Himalayas and the Hindu-Kush and Paropamisus Ranges in Afghanistan.<sup>73</sup> In the same year, a Turkish encyclopedia described the same region as a vast area in Middle Asia populated by Turks, which was also called *Türkeli* or *Türkili*.<sup>74</sup> *The World Book Encyclopedia* of the same year uses both Turkestan and Turkistan spellings of the word and states that the region had no

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<sup>69</sup> *Meyers Enzyklopädisches Lexikon. V. 24* (Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut, 1979), pp. 37-38.

<sup>70</sup> *Görsel Genel Kültür Ansiklopedisi. C. 6* (İstanbul: Görsel Yayınlar, 1981), pp. 1207-8. The 1984 edition of the same encyclopedia in V. 14. pp. 8540-41 had the same definition but included a bit longer historical data.

<sup>71</sup> In most instances of the Turkish literature, the term ‘Orta Asya’ is used for Middle Asia. However also the term ‘Central Asia’ (Merkezi Asya) was commonly translated into Turkish as ‘Orta Asya’. There exist no nuances between these two in Turkish literature.

<sup>72</sup> *The Encyclopedia Americana International Edition. V. 27* (Danbury, Connecticut: Grolier Incorporated, 1982), p. 246. (Same article appeared in the 1984 edition of the same encyclopedia.)

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 246, but also see the map in p. 247 for a limited description of Turkestan.

<sup>74</sup> *Yeni Hayat Ansiklopedisi. C. 6* (İstanbul: Yeni hayat, 1982), p. 3072. See also the map of greater Turkestan in the same page. In this article Turkestan included Soviet (whole Middle Asia including whole Kazak SSR, Eastern and Afghan Turkestans.) Some very important part of Turkish Intelligentsia stuck with rather Turkified forms of the term, like *Türkeli* and *Türkili*, rather than using the Persian word *Türkistan*.

definite boundaries. The boundaries roughly described were: Siberia, Tibet, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.<sup>75</sup> Among these, Bacon's article was the representative of the most limited-political definition of the term, but Southern Kazak SSR and Some important parts of Turkmen SSR were still included in the concept.

It was interesting to observe that, in 1983, two important *Soviet encyclopedias* had no articles about the term Turkestan as such. One of them had several articles about Turkestan-related subjects, like the Turkestan Army, the Turkestan Soviet Republic, Turkestan Commissars for five pages but not a description of the term itself.<sup>76</sup> The other encyclopedia also had no direct explanatory article about the term itself but thirteen other articles about Turkestan-related subjects like *Turkestan Kommissars*, *Turkestan Viloyatining Gazeti*, etc. the term used here was the former Tsarist General Governorship and the area of Turkestan Soviet Republic.<sup>77</sup> In the same year, in another source, the term was described as a geographical region in Asia divided between the USSR and China – with the English spelling as Turkistan and the French spelling as Turkestan.<sup>78</sup> In another source of the same year, Turkestan was defined as the former name of the area of Soviet Central Asian Republics plus Eastern Turkestan (Sinkiang of China) and Northern part of Afghanistan,<sup>79</sup> or as the region covering the four SSRs in Middle Asia and Southern part of Kazak SSR. The Eastern Turkestan was referred to as Chinese Sinkiang, whereas the Southern Turkestan was named Northern Afghanistan.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> *The World Book Encyclopedia. V. 19* (Chicago: World Book-Childcraft International, Inc., 1982). The author of this article is named as Theodore Shabad. (This volume is the new edition of 1956 World Book Encyclopedia)

<sup>76</sup> *Grazhdanskaya Voyna i Voennaya Interventsiya v SSSR Entsiklopediya* (Moskva: "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya", 1983), pp. 601-6. The only surviving one among the articles about Turkestan was the one about the Turkestan Military District, established by a degree of Peoples Komissars in 4<sup>th</sup> of May 1918.

<sup>77</sup> *Tashkent Entsiklopediya* (Tashkent: Glavnaya Redaktsiya Uzbekskoy Sovetskoy Entsiklopedii, 1983), pp. 345-8.

<sup>78</sup> *Okyanus Ansiklopedik Sözlük C. 9. By Pars Tuğlacı* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1983), p. 2922.

<sup>79</sup> *Companion to Russian History. By John Paxton* (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1983), p. 404.

<sup>80</sup> *Gelişim Hachette: Alfabetik Genel Kültür Ansiklopedisi. C. 11* (İstanbul: Gelişim Yayınları, 1983), p. 4390-1.



The article by Cevat R. Gürsoy in *Türk Ansiklopedisi* of the same year emphasized the use of the term Türkistan for only Soviet Turkestan.<sup>81</sup> This type of limited uses of the term, constantly excluding Eastern and Southern parts of the region were only seen in some Turkish sources.

The 1984 *Encyclopedia of Asian Civilizations* made an effort to limit the region to the area between the Aral Sea in the North, the Caspian in the West, Afghanistan in the South and China in the East. Here, the Türkistān spelling was preferred.<sup>82</sup> A Turkish encyclopedia of the same year included Azerbaijan and excluded Tajikistan from the exact definition of the region of Turkestan.<sup>83</sup> This was most probably done so by mistake, or as a result of a conscious effort to include another Turkic-speaking country into the concept.

A rather nationalist Turkish encyclopedical publication in 1985 had a quite long article about the concept, calling Turkestan the land of Eastern Turks, the area covering the whole of Western Middle Asia and a bit of the Eastern European Continent.<sup>84</sup> A rather interesting expression in the text stated that “Turkestan is connected with the real Western Turkestan-(Turkey) through the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan.”<sup>85</sup>

An article by Rhoads Murphy in 1986, excluded Northern Kazak SSR and Northern Chinese Xinjiang but included Northern Afghanistan into the definition of the concept.<sup>86</sup> As it can be seen in the previous definitions of the Eastern Turkestan, the

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<sup>81</sup> *Türk Ansiklopedisi*. C. 32 (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi-Devlet Kitapları, 1983), pp. 309-11. There was also a detailed description of the boundaries of the region as: Lower Volga, the Caspian Sea in the West, Mongolia and the Altay Range in the East, Kopet-Hindu Kush- Kuenlun Mountains in the South and Aral-Balkash line towards Kyrgyz Steppes in the North. The region in this article was also called a geographical and historical one and did not include all Kazakistan.

<sup>82</sup> *Encyclopedia of Asian Civilizations*. V. 9. By Louis Frederic (London: Editions Jean-Michel Place, 1984), p. 245. In the same article not all of Xinjiang was included with Eastern Turkestan and it is emphasized that the region is currently called Middle Asia by the Soviets.

<sup>83</sup> *Baskan Lexikon: Alfabetik Genel Kültür Ansiklopedisi*. C. 4 (İstanbul: Baskan Yayınları A.Ş., 1984), p. 931. But despite this, the article separated the Chinese, Russian and Afghan Turkestans.

<sup>84</sup> *Yeni Türk Ansiklopedisi*. Cilt 11 (İstanbul: Ötüken, 1985), pp. 4289-92.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid*, p. 4290.

<sup>86</sup> *Merit Students Encyclopedia*. By Rhoads Murphy (New York: Macmillan Educational Company, 1986), p. 403.

emphasis on the Tarim Basin, being the core of it, meant the exclusion of Northern Xinjiang from the concept, which was separately called Dzungaria in many sources.

In 1988, the same approach to exclude Northern Kazak SSR and Northern Chinese Xinjiang but to include Northern Afghanistan was used by another source. However, the same article by Elizabeth E. Bacon used a strange definition of the term by saying that “Originally the name applied to the vast area extending from the Muslim lands of Southwest Asia to China.”<sup>87</sup> It seems to be quite wise to include such a statement into a brief article on the description of the concept, simply because this name really applied independently to almost everywhere in the Western Asian continent by various authors in different times.

Two main Kyrgyz encyclopedias were published in 1990. In the first one, the Kyrgyz spelling of the word Turkstan was defined as the name of a region in Central, Middle Asia and Kazakstan at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> and beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> centuries where Turkic people lived. Turkstan in this article was divided into two main parts. The Western Turkstan was Middle Asia and Northern Afghanistan and Eastern Turkestan was Chinese Sinkiang.<sup>88</sup> However, the second Kyrgyz encyclopedia did not have any separate article about the Turkstan word although it is a more specialized encyclopedia on the geographical names of Middle Asia.<sup>89</sup> In the same year, three significant Turkish-language encyclopedias provided different approaches to the definition of the region. *Ana Britannica* defined the region by excluding Northern Kazakstan but including the whole of Chinese Sinkiang and underlined the meaning of the concept as the ‘land of

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<sup>87</sup> *Collier's Encyclopedia with Bibliography and Index. V. 22.* By Elizabeth E. Bacon (New York: Macmillan Educational Company, 1988), p. 524.

<sup>88</sup> *Kırgız Tarihi: Kısaça Entsiklopediyalık Sözdük* (Frunze: Kırgız Soviet Entsikloediyasının Başkı Redaktsiyası, 1990), pp. 178-180. There are six in total articles about Turkstan.

<sup>89</sup> *Kırgız Jergesi: Entsiklopediya. Jer-Suu attarı* (Frunze: Kırgız SSR İlimler Akademiyası, 1990), pp. 299-300. In these pages there are only two articles about Turkstan mountain ranges and geobotanical provinces.

Turks.<sup>90</sup> *Büyük Lûgat* of the same year contained three different Turkestan articles. The first one described it as a region in Northern Afghanistan, as the region north of Paropamisus and the Hindu Kush mountains. The second one was about Eastern Turkestan and referred to the Sinkiang article of the same volume. The last one defined Türkistan as a region in Asian USSR and included all five SSRs in the region.<sup>91</sup> The third encyclopedia gave a description of the region including all of Kazak SSR and stated that it is a region in Middle Asia partitioned among USSR, China and Afghanistan.<sup>92</sup>

An encyclopedia published in 1991, defined Turkestan as the region north of the mountain wall of India, and stated that was usually called Central Asia. In this description, all of Kazakstan was included in Turkestan and it was stated *that* “its boundaries were never clearly defined.”<sup>93</sup> In 1992, Türkistan was defined as a region in Middle Asia, including Kazakstan and Chinese Sinkang as a whole.<sup>94</sup>

The 1993 edition of the *Macmillan Family Encyclopedia* used the Turkistan spelling again and gave the Turkestan spelling in parentheses and defined it as a historical name for the Central Asian region, also covering the whole of Kazakstan and the Sinkang province of China.<sup>95</sup> In the same year, a Turkish encyclopedia published a rather long and detailed Turkestan article defining it as a region in Asia. This article was different from the others as it brought the concept of the division of Turkestan into four

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<sup>90</sup> *Ana Britannica Genel Kültür Ansiklopedisi. Cilt 21* (İstanbul: Ana Yayıncılık A.Ş. ve Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1990), pp. 279-80. In this article the boundaries of Turkestan defined as; Siberia, Gobi Desert, Tibet, India, Aghanistan, Iran and Caspian Sea.

<sup>91</sup> *Büyük Lûgat ve Ansiklopedi. Cilt 12* (İstanbul: Meydan yayınevi, 1990), pp. 352-3. In the same article it s stated that “despite the soviet geographers called it as Middle Asia, Turkestan term remained as a geographical concept.” There is also a small section about the usages of the word during the different periods of history.

<sup>92</sup> *Alfabetik Okul Ansiklopedisi. Cilt 11* (İstanbul: Görsel Yayınlar, 1990), p. 307.

<sup>93</sup> *Compton's Encyclopedia and Fact-Index. (A new edition of the 1957 volume) vol. 33* (Chicago: Compton's Learning Company, 1991), p. 317. On the same page a detailed description of Afghan Turkestan is given by counting the Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan and Samangan provinces.

<sup>94</sup> *Grand Master Genel Kültür Ansiklopedisi. Cilt 6* (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1992), p. 1469.

<sup>95</sup> *The Macmillan Family Encyclopedia. V. 19* (London: Academic American Encyclopedia, 1993), p. 347.

main pieces, mainly Eastern (Chinese), Western (Russian), Afghan (Southern) and Iran (Southeastern) Turkestan. The western part included the whole of Kazakstan and the Iranian part - including the Esterabad and Deregiz provinces of Iran.<sup>96</sup> The Turkish edition of *Grolier International Americana* of the same year defined the term as the historical name of the Turkish populated areas of Middle Asia - however, including only the Southern Part of Kazakstan.<sup>97</sup> Also in 1993, another source defined Turkestan as the former name of the historical area of Soviet Central Asia, Sinkiang and Northern Afghanistan.<sup>98</sup> However, the 1993 edition of *Brockhaus* has a rather shorter article on Turkestan including all Kazakstan and Northern Afghanistan into Western Turkestan but limiting the Eastern Turkestan only to the Tarim Basin.<sup>99</sup>

Another source published in 1994 has excluded Kazaks from the Turkestani concept while including the Uzbek, Tajik, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Karakalpak and Pamiri peoples. It was stated that, “the term Turkestani is an older, generic reference to the indigenous peoples living in what used to be known as Turkestan including today’s Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzia.”<sup>100</sup> This exclusion may be considered as a serious “mistake”. Because, taking even the most limited definition of the concept into consideration, there were still many Kazaks in Jetisu (Semirechie) and around Aral. Also the ethnographic differences between the Kazak and Kyrgyz were only set by the Soviets clearly after the Revolution.

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<sup>96</sup> *Yeni Rehber Ansiklopedisi. Cilt 19* (Istanbul: Türkiye Gazetesi, 1993), p. 247. The article is between the pages 247-253. The article included the Tajiks into the Turkic family and has a map of Greater Turkestan in p. 248.

<sup>97</sup> *Grolier International Americana Encyclopedia. Cilt 12* (İstanbul: Grolier Incorporated-Sabah, 1993), p. 319.

<sup>98</sup> *Encyclopedia of Russian History: From the Christianization of Kiev to the Break-up of the USSR. By John Paxton* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1993), p. 408.

<sup>99</sup> *Brockhaus Enzyklopädie. V. 22* (Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus, 1993), pp. 501-2.

<sup>100</sup> *An Ethnohistorical Dictionary of the Russian and Soviet Empires. Ed. By Jhames S. Olson* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 645.

In 1995, a Turkish source defined ‘*Türkistan*’ as a region in Middle Asia and interestingly called the “part in Siberia” Russian or Western Turkestan.<sup>101</sup> Britannica of the same year used the Turkistan spelling and defined it as the regions of Central Asia circled by Siberia, Tibet, India, Afghanistan, Iran, the Gobi Desert and the Caspian Sea - excluding northern Kazakstan but including all of Chinese Sinkiang.<sup>102</sup> Another English language source of the same year excluded the Northern part of the Chinese Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous province from the definition of the region.<sup>103</sup> An Italian encyclopedia of the same year spelled the word as Turchestan, and gave the Russian version as Turkestan with the Persian version as Turkistān in parentheses. It defined the term as a vast region in Central Asia encircled by Siberia, Altay, Gobi, Nan Shan, Altındag, Hindu-Kush, Kopet Dag, Caspian and China.<sup>104</sup>

The 1996 edition of *Encyclopedia Americana* also preferred a limited definition of Turkestan (Turkistan). In this volume, most of Kazakstan and Turkmenistan and Dzungaria in Northern Eastern Turkestan (Sinkiang) were excluded from the area described as Turkestan.<sup>105</sup>

*A Historical Dictionary of Russia*, published in 1998, defined the term as a “rather old name for Central Asia, which in practice did not exist anymore”.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> *Medya Alfabetik Genel Kültür Ansiklopedisi. Cilt 7* (İstanbul: Görsel yayımlar, 1995), p. 1526.

<sup>102</sup> *The New Encyclopædia Britannica. V. 12* (15<sup>th</sup> edition. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1995), p. 61. Same article stated that “western Turkistan was known as Soviet Central Asia, administratively excluding Kazakstan.”

<sup>103</sup> *The Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia. V. 7* (Oxford: Helicon, 1995), p. 2968. In the same article it has been said that “Stalin subsequently carved up the area into separate republics to prevent a resurgence of separatist sentiment.”

<sup>104</sup> *La Piccola Treccani: Dizionario Enciclopedico. V. 12* (Roma: Istituto Della Encyclopedia Italiana Fondata da Giovanni Treccani, 1995), pp. 438-9. The definition of Turkestan in this article included the whole of Kazakstan and Northern Afghanistan in Western Turkestan but only the Southern Part of Chinese Sinkiang into Eastern Turkestan.

<sup>105</sup> *The Encyclopedia Americana International Edition. V. 27*. Article by Elizabeth E. Bacon (Danbury, Connecticut: Grolier Incorporated, 1996), p. 245. “Turkestan: a region in Central Asia. The political units that make up Turkestan (also Turkistan) include the republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan; Southern Kazakstan, Eastern Turkmenistan, Northern Afghanistan and in China the Sinkiang Uighur Region.” However the northern Sinkiang was excluded in the map. See also the map in p. 246.

<sup>106</sup> *Historical Dictionary of Russia. By Boris Raymond & Paul Duffy* (London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1998), p. 330. This type of definition shows us the pure political approach to the nature of the term.

The latest edition of the *Encyclopedia of Islam* made slight changes in the Barthold's article in the 1937 edition but still kept the Türkistân spelling. In this edition the term was defined as a Persian word meaning simply the lands to the north of modern Persia.<sup>107</sup>

## 2.6 Summary

Most of the encyclopedical reference sources examined here, use different definitions, descriptions and explanations about the term Turkestan. The region has been variously referred to with the names like Tartary, Greater Turkey, Middle (Srednyaya-Orta) Asia, Central (Tsentralnaya- Merkezi) Asia, Inner Asia, Near East and various spellings of the word Turkestan in different languages, such as Turkistan, Turchestan, Türkistan, Türkestân, Türkisztán, Turkezstán, Turquestan or Turkestan'. All of these names have been used in the literature mostly interchangeably, for varying territorial and political entities then called "Turkestan" at different times in the history of the region.

However, while using the same or similar terminology, there are serious difficulties faced in locating the exact geographical borders for Turkestan in the context of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century in different reference sources. Some describe the region as extensively as the whole "Central Asia" or "the area extending from the Muslim lands of Southwest Asia to China" and yet some as a small town. It is quite interesting to see that Soviet authors suffered quite extensively, for finding the proper name for the region. However, almost all of the sources connect the term to the ethnic presence of Turks in the region, at least as the historical ("original") homeland of the Turks.

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<sup>107</sup> *The Encyclopedia of Islam. New Edition. Vol X* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 679-80. The meaning of the word as "the land of the Turks" also appears in this volume.

Almost a century has passed since the publication Barthold's first Turkestan article in the *Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar*, but apparently there is still no better alternative to this first and interesting Turkestan article in the reference literature. Students of the region still have to start with his explanations, definitions and descriptions. Apart from the common perceptions of the Western Academia, the Barthold school somehow survived among the Soviet authors of different encyclopedias, which could easily be seen from their "suffering efforts" in trying to write on the lines of Bolshevik propaganda but at the same time stating the minimal amount of truth in their articles. Barthold himself, a bit painfully, stated the same thing in his contribution to first Encyclopedia of Islam. The very common "Turkistan" spelling in the Western sources can also be taken as a support for Barthold's argument that the concept had not been directly imported from Russian literature.

As a conclusion, it is quite possible to argue that there had been two mainstream lines in the encyclopedical literature of the last century, concerning the Turkestan concept. The first one may be called the limited-political approach, which also underlines the historical nature of the concept. This approach limits the geographical boundaries with the territories of former Tsarist Turkestan General Governorship and Eastern Turkestan with the Tarim Basin-Kashgaria. The term Turkestan was used alone for the Western Turkestan or Russian Turkestan in general. Eastern Turkestan was called Sinkiang, Xingiang, Kashgaria or basically the Tarim Basin. Southern Turkestan was called Afghan Turkestan. There were also many cases in which Afghan or Southern Turkestan was included in the concept of Western Turkestan or Turkestan alone. The main characteristic of this approach was to mix historical terms with the new ones.

The very term Turkestan was usually referred to as a historical one in nature, which does not exist politically anymore. However its former territories were defined with the territories or parts of the territories of new political entities.

The second line of thought might be called the broader-geographical approach. This is a more of a historical in nature. It either sets very narrowly defined boundaries or leaves some or all boundaries undefined. At times, strictly defined examples a square of Orenburg-Mongolia-Tibet-Astarabad can be seen, while at some other times all Northern Turkestan Steppe, Northern Eastern Turkestan, Northern Afghanistan and even Northeastern Iran might be incorporated into the concept.

However, most of the encyclopedical literature of the 20<sup>th</sup> century seems to be as a mixture of these two approaches, which in fact, has created serious sets of problems in using the terms. At this point, these findings can only be considered as to provide a good starting point for in-depth diagnoses of the problem on terminology used in the political, historical and geographical contexts: so that, not only the historical and present paradigm used by public at large about Turkestan, but also feasible future political options might be envisioned.



## CHAPTER 3

### A BRIEF HISTORY OF TURKESTAN UNTIL THE 1917 REVOLUTION

#### 3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, a chorological history of “Turkestan” is summarized from the very beginning to the 1917 revolution for its “territorial” and “national” identity. It covers the developments before the Mongols to the Russian Empire, including the first arrivals of Turks and the relations with Arabs, Persians and the likes. There is no scholarly consensus established on various issues of early history of Central Asian region, such as the clear ethnic roots of its early inhabitants. This lack of consensus, concentrated especially on the issue of the ethnicity of the early or first inhabitants of the region.

The major objective of this historical review is to shed light on the conceptual development of the term Turkestan. Thus, all historical data provided in the chapter have been scrutinized mainly to support this objective.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Some classics about the early history of Central Asia are; J. Marquart. *Eransahr Nach der Geographie des Ps. Moses Xorenac'i* (Berlin: Wiedmansche-Buchhandlung, 1901); A. Zeki Velîdî Togan. *Umûmî Türk Tarihine Giriş* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları No: 1534, 1981); A. Zeki Velîdî Togan. *Bugünkü Türkîli (Türkistân) ve Yakın Tarihi* (İstanbul: Enderûn Kitabevi, 1981); Denis Sinor (Ed.) *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Herodotus. *The History*. Trans. By David Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987); Tamara Talbot Rice. *The Scythians* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957); Peter B. Golden. *An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Tribes* (Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992); V.V. Barthold. *Moğol İstilasına Kadar Türkistan*. (Hazırlayan: Hakkı Dursun Yıldız) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1990); L. V. Bazhenov. *Srednyaya Aziya v Drevniy Period* (Tashkent: 1937); V. V. Barthold. *Vostochno-Iranskiy Vopros* (Peterburg: IGAIMIK, 1922); V. V. Barthold. *Istoriya Turetsko-Mongol'skikh Narodov* (Tashkent: 1928).

### 3.2 Turkestan: Until the Mongols of Chengiz Khan

There is no scholarly consensus on various issues of the early history of the Central Asian region. This lack of consensus especially concentrated on the issue of the ethnicity of the early or first inhabitants of the region.

Togan believes that, Arians arrived in Turkestan around 2000 BC and then in 1700 BC they captured India and renamed the Indus River the Sind. They established themselves in the Northern Afghanistan-Bactria, Mā warā' al-Nahr <sup>2</sup>-Soghdiana and Khorezm.

In classical history, it is assumed that the origin of the Bactrians goes back to Persians, Soghdians as Scythian and Khorezmians as Massaget, respectively. In the 9<sup>th</sup> century BC, Scythians<sup>3</sup> and Cimmerians fought near Amu Darya for the hegemony in the region. According to Herodotus, it was after this battle the Cimmerians fled to the Northern Black Sea coasts.<sup>4</sup>

#### 3.2.1 The Flux of Arian-Persian Conquerors

In the 6<sup>th</sup> Century BC, the Achaemenids of Persia, under Darius I and Cyrus, invaded Transoxiana<sup>5</sup>. From the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC on, the Sarmatians<sup>6</sup> began to absorb the Scythians.<sup>7</sup> Writing in the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC, Herodotus defined a plain in Asia surrounded

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<sup>2</sup> This term extensively used by the Arabs in later periods basically meaning the lands beyond the river. Here used with the Encyclopedia of Islam transcription, but hereafter Mawaraannahr.

<sup>3</sup> A. Zeki Velidî Togan, *Umûmî Türk Tarihine Giriş* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları No: 1534, 1981), See p. 33, especially around 8<sup>th</sup> century BC there was an important Scythian existence in middle Tien Shan. See also p. 34, where Togan agreed with Minns, Tiedler and Lauferle in accepting that Scythians with common Turkic roots.

<sup>4</sup> A. Zeki Velidî Togan, *Bugünkü Türkîli (Türkistân) ve Yakın Tarihi* (İstanbul: Enderûn Kitabevi, 1981. Written in 1947), p. 91-93.

<sup>5</sup> A. Zeki Velidî Togan, *Umûmî Türk Tarihine Giriş*, p. 38-39.

<sup>6</sup> They were the other large group of Iranian-speakers, in fact kin to Scythians, somehow they have co-existed in the steppes from the 7<sup>th</sup> century BC to the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC. See A.I. Melyukova, "The Scythians and Sarmatians," in Denis Sinor (Ed.) *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 97.

<sup>7</sup> However, Emel Esin argues that there was a Turkic presence in the region even in the first millennium BC, and she is quite certain of this presence especially from the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC on. See Emel Esin.

by mountains, where *Chorasmians*<sup>8</sup> live with other people like *Parthians*<sup>9</sup>, *Soghdians*, *Gadarians* and *Dadicae* as well as *Bactrians*.<sup>10</sup> This was the rough definition of the Turkestan basin at that time. Although most of the remnants of the Scythian civilization were found in the area of the Kuban-Dineper line, evidence shows that there were also Scythian existences in the Northern Mongolian, Central Asian and Altay regions. In fact, the whole of Transoxiana as well as the Eastern and the Western parts of the region was subject to Scythian rule in different times.<sup>11</sup> Although they never had strictly drawn boundaries, their territories can roughly be estimated through archeological findings.<sup>12</sup> However, their race-roots have still been debated among the scholars.<sup>13</sup>

In 328-9 BC, the invasion of the Transoxiana and the capture of Samarkand by the Greeks of Alexander the Great who established the city of *Alexandria Eschate*<sup>14</sup> there<sup>15</sup>(today's Hocend), resulted in the Greek Seleucids' rule in Bactria<sup>16</sup> and

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*İslâmiyetten Önceki Türk Kültür Tarihi ve İslâm'a Giriş*. Türk Kültürü El Kitabı, II, Cilt 17b'den Ayrıbasım (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaası, 1978), p. 28.

<sup>8</sup> Khorezmians, Herodotus, *The History*. Trans. By David Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), See Book III, verse 117: 'there is a plain in Asia shut in on every side by mountains. This plain was once owned by the Chorasmians; it lies on the borders of Parthians, Sarangians, and Thamaneans; afterwards, when the Persians conquered, the land became the property of the Great King.'

<sup>9</sup> They were a nomadic people settled in the ancient province of Parthia. They have disappeared after the rise of Selucid power in Iran. Their boundaries were limited with Oxus and they did not cross to Transoxiana. See Chester G. Starr, *A History of the Ancient World* (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 627.

<sup>10</sup> Herodotus, *The History*. Trans. By David Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), see Book VII, verse 66 for different peoples of the region then.

<sup>11</sup> Tamara Talbot Rice, *The Scythians* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957). See p. 20-40 and see the maps in p. 41 and 105. See also N.N. Bondan, "Targovye snoshleniya olvii so skifii v 6-5 v.," S.A. XXIII, 1955 and S. I. Rudenko "Skifskaya problema i Altayskaya nahodka," Izvestiya AN SSSR Seria Istorii i Filosofii, 1944, No 6. Renate Rolle. *The World of the Scythians* (Trans. By F.G. Walls from German Die Welt der Skythen) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

<sup>12</sup> See the map in Ekrem Memiş, *İskitlerin Tarihi* (Konya: Selçuk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1987), pp. 15-19 for the exact geographical locations of Scythian archeological sites in Central Asia.

<sup>13</sup> Memiş p. 22. Mullenhaff, Tomaschek, Rostotzeff argued that they were Persian originated. Grigoriev, Zabelin, Ilovaiskiy argued that they might be Slav originated. Geza Nagy and Mins argued that they were of a Turanid-Mongolian Stock. See also M. Rostowzew, *Skythien un der Bosporus, Band II* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1993), for the Western Schyrians.

<sup>14</sup> Meaning Alexandria the furthest or the last one. (another version of spelling is eskhate)

<sup>15</sup> See also Peter Green, *Alexander of Macedon. A Historical Biography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 353 In fact Alexander had crossed Oxus several times, for campaigns on Samarkand, and the towns on the shores of Jaxartes.

<sup>16</sup> For a detailed analysis of the annals of the Alexandrian conquest of Central Asia and the historical Greek historiography of the region, See I.V. P'yankov, *Srednyaya Aziya v antichnoy geograficheskoy traditsii: istochnikovebcheskiy analiz* (Moscow: Izdatel'skaya firma Vostochnaya literature, RAN, 1997).

Soghdiana.<sup>17</sup> It was from this time on that the other side of Transoxiana (Northern Jaxartes-Turkestan) became a safe heaven for the fugitives.<sup>18</sup> In 250 BC, the Parthians took Soghdiana from the Greeks leaving only the Bactria<sup>19</sup> for them to live in. It was around 200 BC the Hsiung-nu (i.e. Huns) emerged on the Western borders of China. During the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC, the Huns attacked Yüeh-chih (Tocharians)<sup>20</sup> in Central Asia. Fleeing from the Huns, they overran the Bactrian Kingdom and renamed it Tocharistan. The Chinese defeated the Huns in 121 BC, and started their westward drive. In 102 BC, the Huns captured the Khokand region, but soon, in 51 BC, they split into two hordes and in AD 48 their empire disappeared completely from the sources seen. In AD 50, the Kushan<sup>21</sup> Empire with a Buddhist tradition was established.<sup>22</sup> During this century, the Chinese drive to the west continued from the north and in AD

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<sup>17</sup> In fact, Sogdians resisted against Alexander quite long. See Frank L. Holt, *Alexander the Great and Bactria* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), pp. 54-55. See also pages 58-9 for the resistance of the remnants of Scythians in the region fighting against Alexander the Great.

<sup>18</sup> Peter Green, *Alexander of Macedon. A Historical Biography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 356 and 367. "... Marcanda [Samarkand] and Jaxartes [Syr-Darya] marked the furthestmost north-eastern boundary of the Persian empire." And "for Soghdian leaders" they kept their soldiers in Turkestan, waiting for Alexander to go. Although Alexander did not cross the Jaxartes, he had soldiers form the other side of the river. P. 393. In the Alexanders forces there were "... cavalry units from Bactriana and Turkestan and a special force of Schtyian horse-archers." See also N.G.L Hammand, *Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman* (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1980), pp 190-207 for a detailed sketch of Alexander's activities in Central Asia. And see also Quintus Curtius Rufus, *The History of Alexander*. Trans. By John Yardley (London: Penguin, 1984), parts about years 329 and 327.

<sup>19</sup> Greco-Bactrian kingdom survived for almost another century. For details about the Greco-Bactrian State see S.P. Tolstov (Ed.), *Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR*. (Tom I. Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoy SSR, 1955), pp. 74-82.

<sup>20</sup> In some linguistic bases, Tocharians are suggested to have important commonalities with Indo-Europeans, even with Hittites. See A.K. Narain, "Indo-Europeans in Inner Asia". P. 154. In Denis Sinor (Ed.) *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia* (Ambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

<sup>21</sup> Kushan ethnic identity is still a matter in controversy. There have been attempts to explain it in Mongolian, Iranian, Tocharian and Turkic roots. They were speaking an eastern Persian language and using Greek script. This might lead us to think a continuation of the Bactrian tradition. See Peter B. Golden, *An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Tribes* (Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992), p. 55.

<sup>22</sup> It was the Kushans who carried Buddhism to Central Asia. See Chester G. Starr, *A History of the Ancient World* (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. P. 633. See also S.P. Tolstov (Ed.) *Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR*. Tom I. (Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoy SSR, 1955). For more details for the Kushan period in Central Asia see pp. 94-102.

97, they reached the Caspian Sea. In the 3<sup>rd</sup> Century AD, the Parthian and the Kushan<sup>23</sup> empires were dissolved as they were captured by the Persian Sasanian dynasty.<sup>24</sup>

Although there exists no strong evidence, one might argue that these Persian Sasanians could have first used the term Turkestan,<sup>25</sup> given the Persian suffix of the word. Following this, in the 4<sup>th</sup> Century, the Mongolian Juan-Juan Empire was established roughly in what is today Mongolia. Simultaneously a new Hun drive towards Europe took place. In the 5<sup>th</sup> Century, the Hephthalites (either the Ak-Huns or Avars) moved south from the Altay range and captured the Khurasan region and Bactria and moved further south to India.<sup>26</sup>

### 3.2.2 Turks Arriving in Turkestan

Ancient Turks were living around the Altay range and north of the Irtish River at the end of the 5<sup>th</sup> century as subjects of the Juan-Juans. The Turkic Kagan [Hakan] Tümen revolted in 546, and destroyed Juan Juan state in 552. Tümen appointed his brother İstemi to the Western part of his land. In 25 years, the Turkic Khaganate extended its lands from Manchuria to the Crimean peninsula.<sup>27</sup> Bukan and İstemi, allied with the Persian Sasanian ruler Khusrev Anushirvan in 566, destroyed the Hephthalites (Ak Huns or Avars). Taking advantage of this power vacuum in the region, Turks

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<sup>23</sup> We can still see the examples of modern Turkish historiography considering the Kushans as a native Turkic population of the region, which are mostly nationalistic in nature. See Zekeriyâ Kitapçı. *Türkistan Milli Tarih ve Kültür Davamızın Temel Meseleleri* (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1933), pp. 258-260. He argues not only Kushans but also even Hephthalites and other so-called Persian speakers were all Turkic natives of Turkestan.

<sup>24</sup> Peter B. Golden. *An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Tribes* (Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992), p. 55-56.

<sup>25</sup> *Central Asian Review*, No.1 1965. As an appendix to Eugene Schuyler, *Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Kokand, Bukhara and Kuldja* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 285. "It was first used by the Persians during the Sasanian dynasty (226-637) as referring in a derogatory sense to the land of the Turks lying beyond the Amy Darya [Oxus]."

<sup>26</sup> S.P. Tolstov (Ed.), *Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR*. (Tom I. Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoy SSR, 1955), pp. 103-113.

<sup>27</sup> Ahmet Taşağıl, *Gök Türkler* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1995), p. 31. Turks dominated the lands from Mediterranean to China only after conquering the Soghdian populated cities of Western Turkestan by İstemi Yabgu.

captured Bactria, Bukhara and Samarkand. The southern frontier was Oxus (Amu-Darya).<sup>28</sup> The Hephthalites, fleeing from the Turkic conquest, moved northwards to Russian steppe and established the Avar Khanate. Soon, the relations between the Turks and the Sasanid Persians were worsened and finally broke down completely. Turks continued their conquests while exchanging a number of embassies with the Byzantine Empire<sup>29</sup> for establishing an east-west alliance.<sup>30</sup> Finally they conquered Tocharistan<sup>31</sup> at the end of the century from Persians and established their rule all over the region.<sup>32</sup> Towards the end of the century, the Khaganate was split into two parts and weakened enormously. At the beginning of the 7<sup>th</sup> century, the Tang dynasty in China occupied the Eastern Turkic Khaganate in Mongolia and entered the Tarim Basin.

### 3.2.3 Arabs in Turkestan: Mā warā' al-Nahr

Between 642-51, the Sassanians suffered heavy defeats at the hands of the Arabs and consequently dissolved. Arabs entered Herat in 651 and Bactria in 652, whose name was changed to Balkh. When Chinese forces entered Transoxiana (Western Turkic Khaganate) and reached the Oxus River, news of the political struggle in the Arab peninsula stopped the Arabic advance temporarily. Termiz was captured twice in 689 and in 704 by the Arab armies. During the reign of Caliph Umar (634-43), after defeating Byzantium in Syria, The armies of Islam turned to Iran. Quoting Taberī, Kitapçı argued that Caliph Umar strictly banned Arab armies from crossing Amu Darya

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<sup>28</sup> László Rásonyi, *Tarihte Türklük* (Dördüncü Baskı. Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1996), p. 96. See also the part titled 'The Motherland of Turks', pp. 1-7.

<sup>29</sup> It was the question of silk trade, which brought the two together. See George Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*. Trans. By Joan Hussey (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), p. 74. (In mid- 6<sup>th</sup> century) "Like the Byzantians, they had fallen out with the Persians over the Silk trade. Justinian's successor Justin II, concluded a treaty with them, and they supported Byzantium against the Persian Empire."

<sup>30</sup> It should also be noted here that, P. B. Golden argues that Byzantians called Hungary western Turkia and the Khazar lands eastern Turkia. See P. B. Golden, "The Peoples of the Russian Forest Belt." In D. Sinor (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 38.

<sup>31</sup> Note that the use of -istan, meaning basically land of Tochars.

<sup>32</sup> Rásonyi, p. 97.

(Oxus) - what was then the southern border of Turkestan.<sup>33</sup> The first attack on Lower Turkestan was in 673 by an army commanded by Ūbeydullah bin Ziyad.<sup>34</sup> Kitapçı also provides a good account of the first conversions among the Turkic nobility in the region.<sup>35</sup>

Barthold starts the history of the region from this time on.<sup>36</sup> He argued that Mawaraannahr was not included in the concept of Turkestan by the Muslim geographers in the middle ages. For them, Turkestan or *bilād al-Turk* was the land between China and the Islamic world, populated by Turkic and Mongolian nomads in the steppes.<sup>37</sup> Amu Darya was also the classical border between the historical Iran and the legendary-mythological Turan.<sup>38</sup> In an attempt to find the first usages of the term Turkestan, Barthold quotes Marquart<sup>39,40</sup> where Marquart in turn quoted from the book of 7<sup>th</sup> century Armenian priest Sebēos<sup>41</sup> who referred to the region as Tūr'astan.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Zekeriya Kitapçı, *Türkistan'da Müslüman Olan İlk Türk Hükümdarları* (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1988), p.15. Kitapçı in this book uses the term Lower Turkestan in p. 32 for the cities like Bukhara and Baykent in Mawaraannahr and also p. 69 he uses Turkestan for the Arab controlled territories, still south-west of Mawaraannahr.

<sup>34</sup> Kitapçı, p. 15. Taberī also uses Lower Turkestan term for Baykent when explaining Kutaybe's tough conquest, quoted in Kitapçı p. 15-6, Taberī, Volume IV. P. 424. According to Kitapçı, the lands beyond the river (actually beyond the Arab realm) were basically Lower Turkestan. Which is quite acceptable.

<sup>35</sup> But still, one may argue that the examples Kitapçı is giving are quite extreme ones, simply because of the continuing "Turkish" struggle against the Arabs.

<sup>36</sup> V.V. Barthold, *Moğol İstilasına Kadar Türkistan* (Hazırlayan: Hakkı Dursun Yıldız) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1990 - İlk Baskıları 1900 ve 1928, orjinalleri), see pages 1-66 for the early sources on the history of Turkestan, including Arab, Persian, Turkic and other travelers' accounts as well as geography books.

<sup>37</sup> Barthold, p. 67.

<sup>38</sup> Barthold, p. 67. See also pages 195-344 for a detailed sketch of history of Turkestan from Arab conquest to 12<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>39</sup> J. Marquart, *Eransahr Nach der Geographie des Ps. Moses Xorenac'i* (Berlin: Wiedmannsche-Buchhandlung, 1901).

<sup>40</sup> Turkistân. W. Barthold, *The Encyclopaedia of Islam: A Dictionary of the Geography, Ethnography and Biography of the Muhammadan Peoples* (Leyden: Late E.J. Brill Ltd., 1934), p. 895.

<sup>41</sup> J. Marquart, p. 45-75.

<sup>42</sup> Sebēos. *Historie d'Héraclius par l'évêque Sebēos*, transl. By Fr. Macler (Paris: 1904), p. 43 and 49 where he has associated Turkestan with two locations, first was along with the oxus river a second was the Dihistan locality near the Caspian. Barthold quoted both as the first uses of the term. This text was not checked from an original Armenian copy, though and not very reliable for our sake.

From the 680s on, Arabs have attacked the region in the north of the Transoxiana.<sup>43</sup> It was before then, from 667 on that the Arabs crossed the Oxus and started their raids. In 691, the Eastern Turkic Khaganate was re-established in the Tarim Basin as a result of Turkic revolts against Chinese during the 680s.

Umayyads<sup>44</sup> appointed a new governor to the Khurasan province in 705, Kutayba Bin Muslim. This wise commander was especially skilled at causing intrigues between the Soghdian princes and the Khorezmian rulers. In two years, he captured Bukhara. In 712, he captured Samarkand and Ferghana, while the Turks launched an attack on Soghdiana. Arabs managed to hold on in Samarkand for another year. However, having received fresh reinforcements in 714, they crossed Jaxartes (Syr Darya) and captured Kesh [Tashkent]. After Kuteybe's execution in 715, Arabs started to retreat, while the Chinese encroachments into the region began. The Chinese commanders supported the Turkic and Soghdian nobility in the region in the latter's struggle to recover their statuses and privileges. From 719 to 727, the Turks in Soghdiana rebelled continuously. The Arabs heavily punished all of these. The Arabs established a defense line from the Zarafshan Valley and to Kashga Darya-Demirkapı [Irongate]. In 728, the Arabs declared that everyone who converted to Islam would be exempt from all taxes. The treasury was empty; but mass conversions took place. However this was not enough to stop the Turkic influx into Soghdiana in the 730s. Also, Su-lu, Khan of Turgish (or Turgesh), resisted very decisively against the Islamic armies until 737-8.<sup>45</sup> On the East of the region, Dokuzoğuz-Uygurs settled themselves in

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<sup>43</sup> Jean-Paul Roux, *Orta Asya: Tarih ve Uygarlık* (İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2001). Çeviren: Lale Arslan. (Original: *L'Asie Centrale-Histoire et Civilisations*. Fayard, 1997) p. 180-5.

<sup>44</sup> Umayyad (Emevi) Dynasty ruled over the Islamic Realm after the period of Four Caliphs, the name of a major Arabic Tribe.

<sup>45</sup> Barthold, p. 202-3.



Karabalasagun in the Orkhun Basin and started their rule from 745 on, which lasted almost a century.<sup>46</sup>

After years of war, a terrible famine began. From 734 till 747 several rebellions in the region weakened the position of the Arabs and resulted with the re-emergence of former-religions. In 747, the new governor Ebū Müslim of Khurasan arrived in Merv and established a just and tolerant rule, immediately gaining the support of local population. It was in 748, he started his march against the Umayyad governor of Nishaphur and arrived in Iraq in 750. The Umayyad Caliph escaped from Iraq and Abbasids captured control of the region. Then, Ebū Müslim was appointed the Governor of Khurasan Province. He suppressed the Mazdeist and the great Shia uprisings, both quite ruthlessly, massacred thousands and destroyed several cities. In the same year, Chinese armies attacked Kesh (Tashkent) and sacked the city. Kesh asked for aid from the Arabs and Karluqs.<sup>47</sup> In 751, Arabs from the South and Karluqs from the North attacked the Chinese armies and destroyed a whole army in Talas. This heavy defeat seems to have postponed the Chinese ambitions over Turkestan for several centuries to come. However, Ebū Müslim was too powerful for Baghdad; the Abbasid Caliph executed him in 755, when he was only 35. Suddenly, he became a legend in Turkestan. Between 755-783 many of his followers and friends organized uprisings against the Abbasids in Mawaraannahr, none of them with any considerable success.<sup>48</sup> At the end of the 8<sup>th</sup> century, Karluqs were in Eastern Syr-Darya while the Oğuz were

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<sup>46</sup> A. Zeki Velidî Togan, *Umûmî Türk Tarihine Giriş*, p. 56.

<sup>47</sup> *Kazak SSR Tarihi: Köhne zamannan Buginge Deyin*. In five volumes (Almatı: Kazak SSR-ining Ğılım Baspası, 1980), T. I, p. 381 explains the political environment of the time by quoting el-Ya'kûbî, *Kitâb al-buldân*, p. 295, "Turkestan and Turks is divided into a number of countries and peoples, including Karluk, Dokuzoğuz, Kimak and Oğuz. They all have their own domains and keep fighting each other." See for a contemporary explanation of the population of Turkestan Zeki Velidî Togan. *İbn Al-Fakih'in Türklere Ait Haberleri*: 45 Sayılı Bellekten'den Ayrı Basım (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1948).

<sup>48</sup> Roux, p. 185-94. See also A.N. Frye, "The Role of Abu Muslim in the Abbasid Revolt," *The Muslim World*, New York: 1947, p. 28-38. Gibb, *The Arab Conquests in Central Asia* (London: 1923). (New York: AMS Press, 1970.) Le Strange, *The Lands of Eastern Caliphate* (London: 1966).

on the western side of the river, while in Eastern Turkestan, the Uygurs were converted to Manichaeism.<sup>49</sup>

### 3.2.4 Samanids and Islamization of Turkestan: Muslim geography in 10<sup>th</sup> Century

In the 9<sup>th</sup> Century, the Tahirid Emirate of Persia extended its lands to Transoxiana while the Kirghiz<sup>50</sup> drove Uygurs out of Mongolia and forced them to re-establish themselves in Turfan. Tahir fought in 811 on the side of the Caliph Me'mūn and he became the governor of Khurasan in 821, but died in the following year. His son Talhā succeeded him and ruled the region up to 828.<sup>51</sup> *Bilād al-Turk* [country of Turk] concept was introduced by the Arab geographers such as *al-Cāhiz* in 820s; according to him the term basically had a meaning of the lands beyond (north and northeast of) the province of Khurasan.<sup>52</sup> In the mid-century, the Shia Safarid dynasty started to rule in Persia. After a period of continuously changing governors, from 820 on a dynasty from Sāmān<sup>53</sup> in Bactria) captured Ferghana, Samarkand, Kesh (Tashkent) and Herat. In 875, Samanid Naser Bin Ahmed, in the name of the Caliph,<sup>54</sup> declared himself the ruler of Mawaraannahr; and the Persian Sunni Samanid Kingdom was established.<sup>55</sup> In 886 *İbn Hurdādbih* defined the limits of the country of Dokuzoğuz, as bordering China, Tibet, Karluqs, Kimaks, Oğuz, el-Jifr, Pechenegs, Turgish, Ezgish, Kipchak and Kirghiz

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<sup>49</sup> A. Zeki Velîdî Togan. *Umûmî Türk Tarihine Giriş*, p. 56. It was their famous Khan Böğü (759-780) who accepted Mani religion.

<sup>50</sup> Although there are several explanations about the root of the term Kirghiz, current Kirghiz historiography sticks somehow centuries old explanation of Kırk-Kız or Kır-gız. See Yuliy Khudyakov, "Enisey Kırgızdarının Tarihi; Kırgız etnonimi jönündö." In Keneş Yusupov (Ed.) *Kırgızdar: Şanjıra, Tarih, Muras* (Bishkek: Kırgızstan Baspası, 1993), pp. 118-144.

<sup>51</sup> Barthold, p. 224-5.

<sup>52</sup> Ebû Osman Amr b. Bahr el-Cāhiz, *Manākib Cund el-Hilâfa ve Fazâil el-Etrāk*. In *Hilâfet Ordusunun Menkıbeleri ve Türklerin Faziletleri*. Trans. By Ramazan Şeşen (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1988). Although he uses *bilād al-Turk* for the lands beyond Khurasan, in p. 59 he claims that Turks were natives of Khurasan.

<sup>53</sup> The roots of Samanids were from the Sāmān village in Belh. Their forefathers were the Sasanian political fugitives to Turks in 591 under Bahram Chūbin. Barthold, p. 225.

<sup>54</sup> This also meant that the complete control of Mawaraannahr by the Islamic armies was achieved this year by the efforts of both Samanids and Tahirids. See Barthold, p. 227.

<sup>55</sup> Roux, p. 194-6.

lands.<sup>56</sup> *Ya'kûbî* writings, in 891, used the word Turkestan very exceptionally, basically to imply the northern borders of the Arab realm.<sup>57</sup>

At the beginning of the 10<sup>th</sup> century, Samanids defeated Saffarids and captured Persia. By this time, most of the groups in the south of Mawaraannahr, Khurasan, Khorezm, Bactria, Soghdiana, Persia were Iranian or New Persian (Farsi-Dari) speakers, better to name as the first Tajiks.<sup>58</sup> Writing in 903, İbn Rusteh used bilād al-Turk for the region and described it as the lands starting from the country of Ye'cûc and Me'cûc (China) were also called Uygur (Dokuzoğuz) and "Turk lands."<sup>59</sup> In 924, Mongol Khitays defeated Kirghiz and drive them off southwards. In 920s, another Muslim geographer, *Mes'ûdî*, also used bilād al-Turk to describe the regions between Khurasan and the land of Dokuzoğuz.<sup>60</sup> He also pointed out that the region around Balkash was populated by Turks.<sup>61</sup> He was one of the first geographers arguing that some Turks were quite advanced and had cities and forts.<sup>62</sup> Almost simultaneously,

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<sup>56</sup> İbn Hurdâdbih, *El-Mesâlik ve'l-memâlik* (886) (Leyden: De Goeje, 1967), p. 30. Parts published in Ramazan Şeşen, *İslâm Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1998), p. 184.

<sup>57</sup> *Ya'kûbî*, *Kitâb el-büldân* (891) (Leyden: De Goeje, 1892), pp. 288-295. Parts published in Ramazan Şeşen, *İslâm Coğrafyacılarına göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1998), p. 187. However in p. 186 explains to us that Ferghana had a large Turkic population. And the border with Turkistan was drawn simply as the Amu-Darya line as Tokharistan, Sogd, Semerkand, Shash, Ferghana, Khurasan and Sicistan.

<sup>58</sup> N.N. Negmatov, "The Samanid State". In *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*. Volume IV. Part One. M.S. Asimov and C.E. Bosworth (Eds.) (Paris: UNESCO, 1998), p. 77. "... although such middle Iranian languages as Khwarizmian and Soghdian were still in use in certain regions-in case of the former, for some four centuries, subsequently. The terms Tazik/g (Middle Persian) and Tazi (New Persian-Dari), originally coined in Western Persia to denote the conquering Arabs, now came in Khurasan and Transoxiana to be applied to all the Muslims there,..., in distinction to the largely pagan Turks of the adjacent steppe lands... very soon it became used for the Persians as against the incoming Turkish tribal or military ruling class."

<sup>59</sup> İbn Rusteh, *El-a'lâk el-nefîse* (Leyden: M.J. de Goeje, 1892), p. 98.

<sup>60</sup> *Mes'ûdî*, *Mürûc el-zehab*. (Paris: Barbier de Meynard, 1861-74), p. 262. Parts published in Ramazan Şeşen, *İslâm Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1998), pp. 43-44.

<sup>61</sup> *Mes'ûdî*, *El-tenbîh ve'l-işrâf* (Leyden: De Goeje, 1894), pp. 62-64.

<sup>62</sup> *Mes'ûdî*, *Acâ'ib el-dünyâ*. (Bursa: Hüseyin Çelebi), 746(H), pp. 63-64. Parts published in Ramazan Şeşen, *İslâm Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1998), p. 57.

writing in 926, *Kudāme b. Cafer* used rather bilād al-Türk or the country of Dokuzoğuz interchangeably.<sup>63</sup>

According to Lazslo Rasonyi, however it was not until 996, when Karahanids conquered Khoten and Yarkend and dominated Tarim Basin, this region was called Turkestan.<sup>64</sup> The Karahanid<sup>65</sup> dynasty was established in Kashgar in 932.<sup>66</sup> In the mid-century, conversion to Islam of the Karahanid-Uygurs was begun under Satuk Buğra Khan (d. 955). In 962, the Turkic Ghaznavid<sup>67</sup> dynasty was established in Afghanistan. It was around this time, in the 950s, *el-İstahrī* also used the term bilād al-Türk for the Turkish lands to the north of Khurasan.<sup>68</sup> However the north of Khorezm is also called as the land of Oğuz too.<sup>69</sup> For Ghaznavids, of course, Turkestan meant far North, after Mawaraannahr, a safe place for the fugitives again and a source for the Turkic slaves-*gulam*.<sup>70</sup> Ebu'l-Kāsim Muhammed b. Havkal, in 977 used again bilād al-Türk version for the region and called Ozkend in Ferghana as the main Gate to the Turks.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Kudāme b. Cafer, *Kitāb el-harāc*. Leyden: De Goeje, 1967. p. 264. Parts published in Ramazan Şeşen, *İslām Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1998), p. 190.

<sup>64</sup> L. Rasonyi. *Dünya Tarihinde Türklük* (Ankara: İdeal Matbaa, 1942), p. 97.

<sup>65</sup> See E.A. Davidovich, "The Karahanids". In *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*. Volume IV. Part One. M.S. Asimov and C.E. Bosworth (Eds.) (Paris: UNESCO, 1998), pp. 119-143. For the further details about the history of Karahanids, being solely Eastern Turkestan state.

<sup>66</sup> See Svat Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 83. "Arabic Muslim sources called this dynasty al-Khaqaniya, 'That of the Turkic Khaqans,' while Persian sources often preferred the name Al-i Afrasiyab, 'The Family of Afrasiyab,' on the basis of the legendary kings of pre-Islamic Transoxiana."

<sup>67</sup> For Ghaznavids see Clifford Edmund Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran 994-1040* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1992).

<sup>68</sup> El-İstahrī, *Mesālik el-memālik* (Leyden: de Goeje, 1927), pp. 245, 253 and 286. Parts published in Ramazan Şeşen, *İslām Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1998), p. 161. Interestingly he also tells us about the existence of a huge Turkic population in Afghanistan between Kabul and Vakhān and the lands down to Mongolia, Halaç Turks. P. 160.

<sup>69</sup> El-İstahrī, p. 292, in Şeşen, p. 161-162.

<sup>70</sup> Erdoğān Merçil, *Gazneliler Devleti Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989). See pages 35-36, 56 and 61.

<sup>71</sup> Ebu'l-Kāsim Muhammed b. Havkal, *Surāt-el-arz*. (977) (Beirut: Dār Mektebet al-Hayāt), pp. 419-421. Parts published in Ramazan Şeşen, *İslām Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1998), p. 173.

For the first time, it was an anonymous Persian geography book of 982, *Hudūd al-'Ālam* used the term Turkestan in several occurrences. In this book, Khurasan,<sup>72</sup> the whole of Transoxiana,<sup>73</sup> the towns of Isbijab,<sup>74</sup> Kath,<sup>75</sup> and Gurganj<sup>76</sup> were all considered to be either the frontiers or the “*Gates of Turkistan*”.<sup>77</sup> Only twice did the unknown author use the term Turkestan alone, in one case he drew its northern frontier<sup>78</sup> as Taraz and Shilji and in the second case it was defined to be a single region ruled by the Dokuzoğuz [Uygurs]<sup>79</sup> in history. The comment of Minorskiy at the end clarifies that the term Turkestan that was applied extensively to the lands beyond Transoxiana.<sup>80</sup> In 985, Seljuks moved into Bukhara. Towards the end of the century, pro-Shia Buwayhis captured Iraq and Iran and ended Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad. In 999, the Ghaznavids defeated the Samanids in Khurasan and the Karahanids captured Bukhara, then Samanid capital.<sup>81</sup>

### 3.2.5 The Advance of Turkification in Middle Asia

Early in the 11<sup>th</sup> Century, the Ghaznavid rule was extended from Iraq to India. Turkestan was divided between the two Turkic dynasties: Ghaznavids in the south and southwest and Karahanids in the north and northeast. This was the real period when

<sup>72</sup> *Hudūd al-'Ālam*. 982AD. The Regions of the World. An Anonymous Persian geography. Trans. By V. Minorskiy (London: Messrs, Luzac & Co., 1937), p. 102 “This country (Khurasan) produces horses and its people are warlike, it is the gate of Turkistan.”..“The Mir of Khorasan resides at Bukhara; He is from the Saman family and from Bahram Chubin’s descendants.”

<sup>73</sup> *Hudūd al-'Ālam*, p. 112 (Transoxiana) “is the Gate of Turkistan and a resort of merchants.”

<sup>74</sup> *Hudūd al-'Ālam*, p. 118. “Isbijab, a region on the frontier between the Muslims and the infidels. It is an extensive and pleasant locality on the frontier of Turkistan, and whatever is produced in any place of Turkistan is brought here.”

<sup>75</sup> *Hudūd al-'Ālam*, p. 121. “Kath, the capital of Khwarizm and the Gate of the Ghuz Turkistan. It is the emporium of the Turks, Turkistan, Transoxiana and the Khazar.”

<sup>76</sup> *Hudūd al-'Ālam*, p. 122. “The town abounds wealth, and is the Gate of Turkistan and resort of merchants.”

<sup>77</sup> *Hudūd al-'Ālam*, see Barthold’s Preface in p. 38 too.

<sup>78</sup> *Hudūd al-'Ālam*, p. 61. “...between the towns of Transoxiana and the towns of Turkistan up to the confines of Taraz and Shilji...”

<sup>79</sup> *Hudūd al-'Ālam*, p. 94. “The kings of the whole of Turkistan in the days of old were from the Toghuzghuz.”

<sup>80</sup> *Hudūd al-'Ālam*, p. 351.

<sup>81</sup> However it is still a mystery for us who were the exact fathers-roots of the Turkic Khagans who ended Samanids. See Barthold, p. 273.

Turkestan began being Turkified.<sup>82</sup> At that time, another Muslim geographer, *İbn el-Fakih*, in 1002 used the term Seventh Climate for the land of Turks, or bilād al-Turk.<sup>83</sup> Written between 980-1003 and completed around 1003-4, Firdevsī's<sup>84</sup> *Shahnameh* is one of the main references on the history of Iran-Turān relations. Turkestan in *Shahnameh*<sup>85</sup> was well defined: united political entity<sup>86</sup> under one Shah,<sup>87</sup> with a homogenous Turk-Tatar<sup>88</sup> population, however always inferior to Iran<sup>89</sup> and backwards.

Towards the mid-century the Karahanid state was split into two: one in Transoxiana and one in the Tarim Basin. And in 1040, Seljuks defeated the Ghaznavids in the battle of Dandanakan. The Ghaznavid historian *Gerdāzī* of Afghanistan, in 1041, in his *Zeyn el-ahbār* used the term Turkestan extensively for the region.<sup>90</sup> In 1051, *Bīrūnī*, used the term Fifth Climate for Turkestan and limited it with China (the county of Ye'cūc) goes through Kashgar, Balasagun, Rast, Ferghana, İsbicab, Shash, Samarkand, Bukhara, Khorezm to Caspian Sea.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Wilfried Nölle, *Türkistan Tarihinin Yazımında Karşılaşılan Sorunlar*. Trans. By Gültekin Oransay. Belleten Cilt XLIV, sayı 174 (Nisan 1980)'den Ayrıbasım (Ankara: Türk tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1980), p. 366. See also p. 348 where the author argues that Iranians used to call the region as Turan, which was basically the land of Barbarians.

<sup>83</sup> Ibn el-Fakih, *Kitāb el-buldān* (Leyden: De Goeje, 1885), p. 6 Parts published in Ramazan Şeşen, *İslām Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1998), p. 191.

<sup>84</sup> Firdevsī, born in Täberan village of Tūs. His real name was Ebül-Kāsim. He has presented his book to Muḥmud of Ghazna but not appreciated much, probably because of the humiliation of Turks extensively in the book. Died around 1020-1025.

<sup>85</sup> Although there are many translations of *Shahnameh*, here used is the Şerīfī translation made by Hüseyin bin Hasan bin Muhammed el-Hüseynī el Haneff in 1510 for the Memlük Sultan of Egypt Kansu Gavri. Şerīfī. *Şehname Çevirisi*. Cilt III. (metin) Hazırlayanlar: Dr. Zühal Kültürāl and Dr. Latif Beyreli (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları: 717, 1999).

<sup>86</sup> Firdevsī, Şerīfī translation, p. 1729, verse-beyt 48869.

<sup>87</sup> Firdevsī, Şerīfī translation, p. 1628, verse-beyt 45985. Here, the term Tatar is added by the translator.

<sup>88</sup> Firdevsī, Şerīfī translation, p. 1665, verse-beyt 47046.

<sup>89</sup> Firdevsī, Şerīfī translation, p. 1745, verse-beyt 49320.

<sup>90</sup> Ebū Sa'īd Abdülhayy b. Dahhāk el-Gerdāzī, *Zeyn el-ahbār* (1041) (Tahran: Abdülhayy Habībī, 1347 H), pp. 255-256. Parts published in Ramazan Şeşen, *İslām Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1998), p. 71. "...because it was far from being a wealthy country, Turkistan country was named after Turk.." and in p. 72. We can also see Turkistan being a safe heaven for the bandits, etc. Turkestan was a country, which was, united under one Khan. But interestingly at the same page it is said that Dokuzoğuz country was excluded from Turkistan. Whereas in many other sources, Turkistan was defined as the lands of Dokuzoğuz.

<sup>91</sup> Ebū'l Reyhān Muhammed b. Ahmed el-Bīrūnī, *El-Tefhīm li evā'ili sinā'at el-tencīm* (London: 1934), pp. 144-145. Parts published in Ramazan Şeşen, *İslām Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1998), p. 200.

Another example of native Turkestani literature of the time, *Kutadgu Bilig*,<sup>92</sup> in 1069, used the term Turān for the region.<sup>93</sup> Just after a couple of years, another example of the native literature, *Divān-ī Lūgat-et Turk* of *Mahmud al-Kashgārī*,<sup>94</sup> the first encyclopedical dictionary of the Turkish Language did not contain an entry under the term of Turkestan. The entry "Türkmen", however, has been associated with Alexander the Great's naming of the Oğuz "similar to the Turk".<sup>95</sup> Describing the Turkic world in the 11<sup>th</sup> century, al Kashgārī did not use the term Turkestan but preferred to use Turkified versions like "Turkish Lands" [Türk İlleri],<sup>96</sup> or specific terms like "Uyгур Lands" [Uygur İlleri].<sup>97</sup>

It was in 1055, the Seljuks captured Baghdad from Buwayhids and established a sultanate protecting the Caliph. In 1073, the Seljuks defeated the Karahanids. Following the death of the Seljuk Sultan Melik Shah in 1092, the Seljuk Empire broke up into three successor states: in Anatolia, in Persia and in Transoxiana-Khurasan.

### 3.2.6 Turkestan Before the Mongols in the 12<sup>th</sup> Century

In 1124, the Mongolian Khitais were driven out of China by Tungustic Juchen; they then established a Kara Khitai state in what is now known as eastern Kazakstan. In 1137, Kara Khitais defeated Seljuk-vassal Karahanids in Hocend. In 1140, Kara Khitais

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<sup>92</sup> *Knowledge of Happiness*, written by Yusuf Has Hâcib in 1069/1070 and dedicated to Karahanid Khagan Ebu Ali Hasan bin Süleyman Arslan, one of the first examples of Muslim Turkic literature.

<sup>93</sup> Yusuf Has Hâcib, *Kutadgu Bilig II: Tercüme* (Trans. into Turkish by Reşid Rahmeti Arat) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınlarından II. Seri, No. 20 TTK Basımevi, 1959). Although in p.1A there is a Turkestan word in the facsimile copy, this part is an anonymous introduction probably written in later periods in order to multiplying the copies of the text. Yusuf Has Hâcib rather used four terms for the world's regions, İnan, Turan, Maçin and Çin.

<sup>94</sup> Written in 1071-1073 for teaching Arabs Turkish language and basically showing that Turkish is as rich as Arabic. Only complete copy is dated from 1266, copied by Mehmed bin Ebu Bekr of Damascus.

<sup>95</sup> Mahmud Kaşgari, *Divanğ Lūgat-it-Türk*. C.I. Faksimile, C.II&III Trans (Ankara: TDK Yayınları, 1941), p. v, iii, 415. This Türkmand or Türkmen version is also associated with Alexander the Great in many other sources of Islamic geography.

<sup>96</sup> Reşat Genç, *Kaşgarlı Mahmud'a Göre XI. Yüzyılda Türk Dünyası* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1997), pp. 36-49.

<sup>97</sup> Reşat Genç, p. 48. For example, Ötüken was a place name in the deserts of Tataristan and very close to Uygur lands.

defeated Seljuk Sultan Sancar in Katwan and captured Transoxiana. In 1153, the Seljuks were overthrown by the Oğuz in Merw. Towards the end of the century, the Seljuks in Khurasan and Persia were dissolved and the Turkic Khorezmians became the new rulers of Transoxiana. A History of the Seljuks, written towards the end of this century, never used the term Turkestan but rather an interesting term as *Harkavat Lands*, which meant the land of tents.<sup>98</sup> Khorezmian power started to shine in this century that was in the middle of western Turkestan and had a strategic location from the beginning.<sup>99</sup> Under the Khorezmians, the difference between Khurasan and Turkestan became clearer.<sup>100</sup>

### 3.3 Unification Under the Mongols

Born in 1167 as Yesügei's eldest son, Temujin, Chengiz Khan was first a vassal to Kereyits, then allied himself with Wang-Khan and conquered the lands of Kereyit.<sup>101</sup> He has achieved the unification of Mongols just after the conquest of Nayman country.<sup>102</sup> In 1206, Chengiz Khan became the Khan of Mongols. In 1209, the Mongols defeated the Kirghiz and forced them to flee south of Tien Shan. Within the same year, Uygurs accepted Mongol rule. In 1210, Khorezm defeated Kara Khitais. The conquests of Northern China and then the Old Kara Khitai Empire made Chengiz Khan a neighbor of the Khorezmian Empire in 1218<sup>103</sup>. He destroyed this young empire in 1220. "His

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<sup>98</sup> Şadrüddîn Ebu'l-Hasan Ali İbn Nâşır İbn Ali El-Hüseyni, *Ahbar üd-Devlet is-Selçukiye*. Trans. By Necati Lugal (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1943. Around 600 H.), p. 50. "When Melikshah attacked to Land of Tents (*Harakavat*) and captured the ruler of Taraz, Surhab... made his preparations in Rey, moved towards Mā warā' al-Nahr and arrived Samarkand...".

<sup>99</sup> İbrahim Kafesoğlu, *Harzemşahlar Devleti tarihi (1092-1229)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1956), p. 30. Kafesoğlu here argues that Khoream existed as a center of trade and culture from the very early ages on. See also Z.V. Togan, *Harezmi Kültürü Vesikaları I, Horezmce Tercümesi Mukaddimat al-Adâb* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1961).

<sup>100</sup> Kafesoğlu, p. 143. He quotes from *Kâmus-u Turki* here as calling Khurasan, Iraq and Turkestan were the names of different Islam lands. See also Fuad Köprülü. *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Harizmşahlar article.

<sup>101</sup> René Grousset (trans. Naomi Walford), *The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia*. P. 189-209.

<sup>102</sup> Grousset, 213-6.

<sup>103</sup> Grousset, p. 236.



yasaq established throughout Mongolia and Turkestan a ‘pax Jenghiz-Khana’...’<sup>104</sup> In 1218, Mongols captured Jetisu and the Tarim Basin-Kashgar. In the same year, Khorezm Shah Muhammad executed the Mongol envoys; then Mongols started their westwards run. In 1219, Mongols crossed Syr Darya and invaded Transoxiana. In 1220, they captured Samarkand and Bukhara; and defeated Khorezmians. The height of Khorezm power was in 1215 when famous Celâleddîn was appointed as the governor of Gûr, Herât, Garcistân and Sicîstân by his father Sultan Alaâddîn. In 1221, he defeated the Mongols of Chengiz Khan twice. In the third battle, in the fall of 1221, he was defeated but managed to escape. The following years were spent with the re-establishment of the Khorezm state in different places and Mongols kept an eye on him, attacked him at any time he surfaced himself. After 1228, his end is still a mystery and subject to many legends. Somehow, he had managed to disappear!<sup>105</sup>

### **3.3.1 Geographers’ Turkestan concept During the Chengizid-Çağatay Rule**

Mongols conquered Khurasan and Afghanistan in 1221 and finished their conquest of Turkestan as a whole. After the death of Chengiz Khan in 1227, the empire was divided among his successors. The successor of Chengizid rule in Transoxiana, Tarim Basin and Jeti Su was the Çağatay Khanate. Under the strict Mongolian rule, in 1270, the Uyğur Kingdom was incorporated into the Çağatay Khanate. This was probably the first time in recorded history, when the Eastern, Western, Southern and Northern Turkestan were united under one central rule.

The *Secret History of the Mongols*, which was written in 1240, does not use the term Turkestan for the region, and however used terms like the *steppe of ten thousand*

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<sup>104</sup> Grousset, p. 252.

<sup>105</sup> Aydın Taneri. *Harzemşahlar* (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları/114, 1993). For Khorezm Shahs also see *Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha* by Melik Ata Juvainî.

*Kirghiz* or the *Southern country*.<sup>106</sup> An Arab history-geography book of 1245 defined Turkestan as the north of Syr Darya, from Ferghana on.<sup>107</sup> In many cases, the whole of smaller Khorezm country and all the lands north of Syr Darya was included into the term Turkestan<sup>108</sup>- while Transoxiana (Mawaraannahr)<sup>109</sup> as a rule was always excluded.

One of the best accounts of the Chengizid period has been the *Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha* of Juvainî. He defined Turkestan as the lands between Mawaraannahr and Machin.<sup>110</sup> He limited the countries of Islam from the frontiers of Turkestan to the uttermost of Syria.<sup>111</sup> He was always careful enough to use the terms Mawaraannahr and Turkestan separately.<sup>112</sup> Explaining about the Mongolians' approach to Turkestan from Northeast, he claims that the city-region of Balasagun was also a realm of Turkestan.<sup>113</sup> At the same time, he also pointed out similarities in the geography and culture of the two regions.<sup>114</sup> Apart from these general usages, he also used the term in a limited way as a province too, an entity, probably around Sayram and Yassi.<sup>115</sup> The undefined nature of the term made it difficult for the reader, but still, Turkestan was both a local unit (country and/or province) as well as a broader name of a region.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> *Manghol-un Niuça Tobça'an. Moğolların Gizli Tarihi*. (Originally 1240) Trans by. Ahmet Temir (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1948), p. 160. But apparently for Mongols the region did not represent any special, limited meaning.

<sup>107</sup> İbn Abîl-Hadîd Al-Madâ'inî, *Sharh Nahj Al-Balâgha. Les Invasions Mongoles en Orient* (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1994 -completed in 1245), p. 18.

<sup>108</sup> İbn Abîl-Hadîd Al-Madâ'inî, pp. 22-23

<sup>109</sup> İbn Abîl-Hadîd Al-Madâ'inî, see pp. 23 and 25.

<sup>110</sup> Ala-ad-Dîn Ata Malik Juvainî, *Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha*. (1260s) (Translated from the text of Mirza Muhammad Qazvini by J.A. Boyle) (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 9-10.

<sup>111</sup> Juvainî, p. 25.

<sup>112</sup> Juvainî, p. 44. "... the qara-Khitai subjugated Mâ warâ' al-Nahr and Turkestan".

<sup>113</sup> Juvainî, p. 58. "...when he had come to the boundary of Turkestan he beheld a pleasant plain with abundance of grass and water. He himself settled here and founded the town Balasaqun..."

<sup>114</sup> Juvainî, p. 109. "For in Mâ warâ' al-Nahr and Turkestan many persons, especially woman, claim to have magical powers".

<sup>115</sup> Juvainî, p. 597. "..., there fell the whole of Transoxiana [Mâ warâ' al-Nahr], Turkestan, Otrar, the land of the Uighur, Khotan, Kashgar, Jand, Khorazm and Farghana."

<sup>116</sup> Juvainî, p. 609. "And in all the countries from Turkestan to Khurasan, and uttermost Rum and Georgia..." also see p. 703 for the broader mean including Moğulstan. "They said that when the world-emperor Chinghiz Khan set out from Turkestan, before he came to the countries of Islam..."

In 1271, an Armenian priest Grigor of Akner wrote “as we heard from some Mongols, their race went to East by leaving their motherland Turkestan, and spent a very poor life there, occupied in basically plundering by”.<sup>117</sup> This is the only case in the text he used the word Turkestan. In a 1278 copy of *Mesnevi* of Rûmî,<sup>118</sup> the term Turkestan was very rarely used and mostly in a less than sympathetic sense, as a source of traps and wrong doings.<sup>119</sup>

In 1282, Ebülferec-Ibnülibrî described Turkestan as an administrative unit, like a principality around Otrar through the northern shores of Syr Darya.<sup>120</sup> However, the term Turkestani was still used in a broader sense, including all the Turkics and even everyone south of Syr Darya.<sup>121</sup> In this book, the adjacent territories in the region were named as Turkestan, Mawaraannahr and Khurasan.<sup>122</sup>

Marco Polo, after 26 years of his travels in Asia, writing his memoirs in 1298, called Turkestan Great *Turquie*.<sup>123</sup> For him Great Turquie started from Kashgar and extended to the Aral Sea.<sup>124</sup> This region is on the northwest of Hormuz(?), and was ruled by Kaidu.<sup>125</sup> He called all the natives of Central Asia Tartars, and included Transoxiana into Great Turquie.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Aknerli Grigor, *Moğol Tarihi* (Trans. Into Turkish by Hrand D. Andreasyan) (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi yayınları/582, 1954. (Originally written in 1271, a collection of memoirs, other history books and interviews with other travelers) p. 3.

<sup>118</sup> This 1278 copy is copied by Mevlana's son Sultan Veled's student Dervish Abdullah bin Muhammed of Konya and still in the Mevlana Museum of Konya.

<sup>119</sup> Mevlana Celâleddin Rûmî, *Mesnevi ve Şerhi*. Vol. IV. Şerheden: Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı (İstanbul: Başbakanlık Kültür Müsteşarlığı Kültür Yayınları, 1974), p. 337. Verse-Beyit 2375. "Many folks arrived Türkistan from China and saw traps, false but nothing else..."

<sup>120</sup> Ebülferec-Ibnülibrî, *Tarihi Muhtasârüddüvel* (Trans. Into Turkish by Şerafettin Yaltkaya) (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1941 - completed in 1282 by Assyrian Bishop Ebülferec, mostly in Assyrian and Arabic) p. 9.

<sup>121</sup> Ebülferec-Ibnülibrî, p. 17.

<sup>122</sup> Ebülferec-Ibnülibrî, p. 21.

<sup>123</sup> Marco Polo, *The Travels*. Trans. By Ronald Latham (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1987). In this version, Latham translated the term *Turquie*, the original term used by Polo, as *Turkestan*. See also Marco Polo, *The Description of the World* (London: George Routledge & Sons Limited, 1938). In the facsimile copy, Marco Polo called Anatolia as Turcomanie and Eastern Turkestan as Icoqusritan (Uyguristan?).

<sup>124</sup> Marco Polo. *The Travels*., p. 83. Khotan and all Uyguristan are also included to Great Turquie.

<sup>125</sup> Marco Polo. *The Travels*., p. 313.

<sup>126</sup> Marco Polo. *The Travels*., p. 317.

A vizier of the Iranian-Mongol Court, Rashidüddin Fazlullah, in early 14<sup>th</sup> century (around 1304) used the term Turkestan extensively in his *Jami'ut-Tawārikh*.<sup>127</sup> He used the terms Turkestan and Uyguristan<sup>128</sup> as adjacent territories. By this time, Turkestan was still a safe place for fugitives politically.<sup>129</sup> The city of Otrar<sup>130</sup> was basically the southern frontier of Turkestan<sup>131</sup> to Mawaraannahr. This Turkestan region was neighboring Kirghiz in the Northeast. His usage of the term included the meanings of the word as a region,<sup>132</sup> as a province,<sup>133</sup> and as a country.<sup>134</sup> As a realm, Turkestan was between the two Ulusses of Qubilai and Hulagü,<sup>135</sup> and was devastated by Mongols several times.<sup>136</sup> As a region, Turkestan was a region like Anatolia or Azerbaijan.<sup>137</sup> In this text, for the first time the city of Yassi was called as Turkistan<sup>138</sup>

<sup>127</sup> Rashidüddin Fazlullah, *Jami'ut-Tawārikh*. (1304) Compendium of Chronicles. A History of the Mongols. Trans. By W.M. Thackson (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1998).

<sup>128</sup> Rashidüddin Fazlullah, p. 22 of Part I "... the vicinity of the territories known as Turkistan and Uyguristan." This is one of the first instances we find the word eastern neighbor of Turkestan as Uyguristan.

<sup>129</sup> Rashidüddin Fazlullah, p. 155 of Part I. "... fled from there and emerged in Qirgiz and Uygur territory and Turkistan... seized the entire area of Turkistan... [Gürkan] was Genghis Khan's contemporary in Turkistan..." This is also providing us the eastern and northern limits of Turkestan.

<sup>130</sup> Rashidüddin Fazlullah, p. 145 of Part I. "... had fled to Turkistan..., taken over the whole province of Turkistan..., had taken Turkistan..., seized all of the realm of Turkistan along with Otrar, the frontier..., set out immediately for Turkistan and Iran." This can be taken as a concrete evidence of the dual usage of the term both in regional and provincial meanings.

<sup>131</sup> Turkistan in this context should not be a bigger regional identity because, there are several descriptions with words like, approaching to Turkistan, passing through Turkistan etc. See Rashidüddin Fazlullah, p. 430 of art II. "When he reached Turkistan nearly a hundred fifty thousand horsemen gathered around him".

<sup>132</sup> Rashidüddin Fazlullah, p. 229 of Part I. See Khorezmshah's piece of territory in Turkestan. (A part of Turkestan). See also p. 235 of Part I. "... in the region of Turkistan..."

<sup>133</sup> Rashidüddin Fazlullah, p. 374 of Part II, Chengiz Khan sending his commanders to seize and conquer Otrar and other cities of Turkistan. (surrounding Otrar.)

<sup>134</sup> Rashidüddin Fazlullah, p. 410 of Part II. "The countries of Turkistan and Transoxiana, the lands of the Uygur, Ferghana and Khwarazm he gave to Amir Mas'ud Beg."

<sup>135</sup> Rashidüddin Fazlullah, p. 521 of Part III. "Between these two Ulusses [Ulus of Qubilai in Cathay and Machin and Ulus of Hülagü from Syria to Abaqal] lies the territory of Turkistan and Qipchakbashi, which is under your control."

<sup>136</sup> Rashidüddin Fazlullah, p. 455 of Part II. "It is well known that the realm of Turkistan was first devastated by Alghu, then by Qaban, Chübai..."

<sup>137</sup> Rashidüddin Fazlullah, p. 756 of Part III. "... Places that have been devastated in other territories by killing like follow lands of Baghdad, Azerbaijan, Turkistan, Iran, Anatolia..."

<sup>138</sup> Rashidüddin Fazlullah, p. 756 of art III. "[Massacres in cities] Balkh, Shebergan, Taliqa, Marv, Sarakh, Herat, Turkistan, Tay, Hamadan, Qum, Isfahan, Maragha, Ardebil, Barda, anja, Baghdad, Mosul, Arbala and most provinces attached to these places..." These are the names of well-known cities of history and also provinces. So we might conclude that there was a defined territory of a province around the city of Turkistan.

Ibn Batuta, while not having or giving a concrete idea where exactly Turkestan was,<sup>139</sup> noted that, it was certainly neighboring China<sup>140</sup> and Transoxiana.<sup>141</sup>

Sir John Mandeville,<sup>142</sup> an English Knight who claimed to have met the great Khan in the first half of the 14<sup>th</sup> century, wrote his controversial memoirs in 1356.<sup>143</sup> For him Anatolia was *Turkye*,<sup>144</sup> realm of the Golden Horde was *Tartary*<sup>145</sup> (or Lesser Tartary) and Central Asia was *Greater Tartary*. However only once in the text, the word *Turquesten*<sup>146</sup> [Turkestan] was used, with a definition of its rough borders. It was basically a province from Khurasan to Ferghana-Eastern Turkestan.

### 3.3.2 Unification Under Timur and the "Golden Days of Turkestan"

In the early years of the 14<sup>th</sup> century, the Çagatay Khanate was split into two parts, one in the West (i.e. Transoxiana), and the other in the East (i.e. Moghulistan).<sup>147</sup> In 1326, the Çagatay Khan Tarmashirin was converted to Islam. The assassination of Emir Kazghan, in 1357, had brought anarchy to Transoxiana.<sup>148</sup> Taking advantage of

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<sup>139</sup> Ibn Batuta, *Travels in Asia and Africa 1325-1354* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 148 "... this Sultan Uzbeg, the Sultan of Turkistan and the lands beyond Oxus..."

<sup>140</sup> Ibn Batuta, p. 171, "...Almaliq, which is on the frontiers of Turkistan and China..."

<sup>141</sup> Ibn Batuta, p. 300 "...he choose to make his capital at the city of Qaraqorum, on the account of its proximity to the territories of his cousins, the kings of Turkistan and Transoxiana."

<sup>142</sup> It is still not known whether Mandeville really made all the travels he is writing about. However it is possible to see from the content of the book, he used mostly other travel accounts of the time and probably not made most of the travels in reality. It is still a valuable source for us in order to understand the basic terminology used in Europe about the region.

<sup>143</sup> Sir John Mandeville, *The Travels of Sir John Mandeville*. Trans. By C.W.R.D. Moseley (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987). Original French circulated through Europe between 1356-1366, written after more than thirty years of travels-however most of the book is quite full of controversies and its trustworthiness is open to debate.

<sup>144</sup> Sir John Mandeville, p. 53.

<sup>145</sup> Sir John Mandeville, p. 103. "...so to Tartary. This Tartary is under the suzerainty of the Great Khan of Cathay...The prince who governs that land is called Baco [Batu] and he dwells in a city called Orda." See also p. 44 of "*the lesser and Greater tartary*." And pages 112 and 144 for Tartary. (lesser)

<sup>146</sup> Sir John Mandeville, p. 160. "This land of Cathay is in deepest Asia, and in the west it borders the kingdom of Tarse...On this, the western, side of that kingdom, is the land of Turquesten [Turkestan], which reaches as far west as the Kingdom of Khorasan. In the country of Turquesten are only a few cities, the best of them being Eccozar [Farab]." Also see p. 161 for Turquesten.

<sup>147</sup> After years of succession struggles among the members of the house of Chengiz, the split was inescapable. See Grousset, p. 326-46. Especially p. 342. "The ruler of Transoxiana was Khan Kazan (ca. 1343-46), Yassawur's son, whose capital was Karshi." However He could not guaranteed the support of Turkic nobility in Turkestan and soon assassinated.

<sup>148</sup> Grousset, p. 409.

this, the governor of Ili,<sup>149</sup> Tuğlug Timur became last declared Çağatay Khan and ruled in Transoxiana. However, years of struggle between the Mongolian aristocracy and the Turkic nobility weakened both.<sup>150</sup> It was only after Timurlane and his comrade Mir Husain found Kabil Shah,<sup>151</sup> a great great grandson of Chengiz, and declared him the Khan, thus ending the anarchy.<sup>152</sup> In 1363, Timur expelled Khan Tuğlug Timur replacing him with Kabil Shah, a puppet. By 1369, Timur became the sole ruler of the Transoxiana and between 1380-87 he conquered Iran. Towards the end of the century, the Turfan Uyghurs also accepted Islam. In 1395, Timur defeated Khan Toktamış of the Golden Horde; and in 1398, crushed the Delhi sultanate; and in 1401, destroyed Baghdad. After defeating the Ottomans in 1402, Timur died in 1405.

An Arab history-geography book of 1345 by Al-Umarī, differentiated *Mā warā' al-Nahr* and *bilād al-Turk* sharply; but used the term Turkestan only once in the text as to mean them both.<sup>153</sup> He counted the provinces of Turkestan as Şaharkand, Gand, Bergand, Otrar, Sayram, Giçil, Gaşkin, Barsaka, Ardaba, Yanki, Kanyak, Taraz [Talas], Yangi Kent, Sikül, Almaka, Bişbalık, Hamül, Qarshi, Hutan, Kashgar, Badakshan, Gawran and Balasagun.<sup>154</sup> In other places, he used the term *bilād al-Turk* simultaneously for a limited province in the north of Syr Darya as well as the Greater Turkestan as a whole.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> Historical Ili was claimed by some contemporary Kyrgyz authors as exactly the territories of today's Kyrgyzstan. See Ömürkul Karaev, "Bayırkı Turk Estelikleri jana Arab-Pers Avtorloru Kırğızdar jana Kırğızistan Jönündö," In Keneş Yusupov (Ed.) *Kırğızdar: Sanjıra, Tarıkh, Muras* (Bişkek: Kırğızstan Baspası, 1993), p. 85.

<sup>150</sup> Grousset, p. 409-10.

<sup>151</sup> See Karl-Heinz Golzio, *Regents in Central Asia Since the Mongol Empire* (Köln: E.J. Brill, 1985), pp. 21-23. For a detailed list of Chaghataid rulers from 1227 to 1402. In fact after Kabul Shah Timur had two-orther puppet Khans, Suyurgatmış (1370-88) and Mahmud Khan (1388-1402).

<sup>152</sup> Grousset, p. 411.

<sup>153</sup> Al-Umarī, *Masālik al-absār fī mamālik al-amşār*. (trans. By Klaus Lech) *Das Mongolische Weltreich* (Weisbaden: Otto Harrowitz, 1968). Al-Umarī born in Syria in 1301 and finished his work most probably around 1345. P. 116.

<sup>154</sup> Al-Umarī, p. 116. However still excludes *Mā warā' al-Nahr* and Ferghana.

<sup>155</sup> Al-Umarī, see pages 123, 132 and 164.

Just a century later than Marco Polo, a Spanish-Castellian ambassador traveled to Turkestan at the very height of Timur's power in 1404.<sup>156</sup> In his memoirs, de Clavijo, the Spanish envoy used the term *Tatar* for all the Turkic population of Turkestan, *Ajem-Farsi* for the Persian speakers and kept *Tajik* as a separate term.<sup>157</sup> In this text the term *Tataristan* was used both for the Turkestan region and for a much larger entity to include all northern lands neighboring Turkestan. Clavijo also used the term Turkestani for a group of people in the current day Armenia,<sup>158</sup> most probably for the Turkic speaking Karapapaks. According to him the south of Oxus spoke Persian, and the North spoke Turkic.<sup>159</sup>

A unique piece of native Turkestani chronicle, Nizamüddin Şami's *Zafernâme* was completed in 1401-2. Again, here Turkestan was said to be a safe heaven for the political fugitives,<sup>160</sup> with ghost towns.<sup>161</sup> However, at the height of the golden days of Turkestan, the author uses Turan<sup>162</sup> much more extensively than the term Turkestan.<sup>163</sup> He considers Turkestan as a part of the Turan provinces.<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> Ruy Gonzales de Clavijo, *Mememoirs: Anadolu, Orta Asya ve Timur. (Embajada a Tamor Lan) Timur Nezidine Gönderilen İspanyol Sefiri Clavijo'nun Seyahat ve Sefaret İzlenimleri* (İstanbul: Ses Yayınları, 1993). (First Edition in Seville, by Andrea Piscioni, 1582) Trans. by Ömer Rıza Doğrul. See this book for the details of Timurid court in the height of its power. For Timur also see İsmail Aka, *Timur ve Devleti* (Ankara: Türk tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991).

<sup>157</sup> Clavijo, p. 124.

<sup>158</sup> Clavijo, p. 203.

<sup>159</sup> Clavijo, p. 127-8.

<sup>160</sup> Nizâmüddin Şâmi, *Zafernâme* (Trans. By Necati Lugal from Persian) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları-Basımevi, 1949). (original completed in 1401-2 with the orders of Timur, this can be considered as an official Timurid history book). P. 73. Although Turkestan was considered as a safe heaven for fugitives, it was simply because of Timurid tolerance to the people of the region, he kept appointing other people to Turkestan as governors as a promotion. See p. 107.

<sup>161</sup> Harold Lamb, *The March of the Barbarians* (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1941), p. 291. "It was out of such a Turkestan, with its ghost cities and memories, that Tamerlane emerged."

<sup>162</sup> See also Şerafettin Ali, *Timur ve Tüzükâtı*. By Mustafa rahmi and Kevser Kutay (İstanbul: Academyplus Yayınevi, 2000), p. 37 the lands conquered by Timur. "Iran and Turan, Rum Gilan, Şirvan, Azerbaycan, Fars, Horasan, Cidde, Büyük Tataristan, Harezm, Hutin, Rabelistan, bahtar zemin, Mağrib, Suriye, Mısır, Irak-ı Arab, Irak-ı Acem, Mazderan, Hindistan..." aslo see p. 94 "... Fergana'da Andican ve Türkistan vilayetleri..." and p. 96. "Turan'ı feth ile Semerkand tahtına oturduktan sonra..."

<sup>163</sup> Nizâmüddin Şâmi, see pages 9. (Iran and Turan, p. 10, Iran and Turan, p. 11, Iran and Turan. However it is explained that these two terms meant the total realm of Timur in his life time.

<sup>164</sup> Nizâmüddin Şâmi, p. 343, 307, 347.

Beatrice Manz named the Timurid Empire the Ulus Çağatay.<sup>165</sup> For Manz, Turkistan was farther north than the Ulus Çağatay, whose center was Samarkand.<sup>166</sup>

### 3.3.3 Timurid Heritage and the Arrival of Shaybanid Uzbeks to Turkestan

From 1407 to mid-century, Timur's son Shah Rukh<sup>167</sup> in Herat and Shah Rukh's son Uluğ Beg in Samarkand had ruled the Timurid Empire. As an excellent piece of Turkestani history of the century, Mirza Uluğbek completed his *Tarikh-i Arba' Ulus* in 1425. As the fashion of the time, he started his history of Turkestan with Noah and made the classical genealogical connection of Noah with the Turkic Khans of the region.<sup>168</sup> He also used the term Turan<sup>169</sup> extensively in the text for all Turkic-Oğuz lands.<sup>170</sup> But still, the North and the East of Mawaraannahr was considered as Turkestan for sure.<sup>171</sup> In order to explain the arrival of the Shaybanids, he claimed that the people of Turkestan had joined the Uzbeks<sup>172</sup> easily and voluntarily.<sup>173</sup> He also used western

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<sup>165</sup> Beatrice Forbes Manz, *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). See also the map in p. 8 for an example of broader-undefined borders of Turkestan where Turkestan was marked in the North of Aral Sea and Lake Balkash, somewhere exactly called as Kirghiz Steppe in the later centuries.

<sup>166</sup> Manz p. 80. Quoting Ibn Arabshah, she points out that: "To garrison the forts on the borders of Turkistan, he brought in soldiers from almost all the regions he had conquered..." and also see p. 87. "...and he installed Shahrukh's other son, Uluğ Beg, on the Turkistan frontier, to guard the regions of Tashkent, Sayram and Ashbara."

<sup>167</sup> See İsmail Aka, *Mirza Şahrüh ve zamanı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994). For more information about the life and environment of Shah Rukh (1405-47).

<sup>168</sup> Mirzo Uluğbek, *Türt Ulus Tarikhi*. Tashkent: Çolpan Nashriyeti, 1994. (Original: *tarikh-i Arba' Ulus*. completed in 1425) It is also known as Şejeret-it Türk. P. 15-30. "Turkhan ibn Yafes ibn Nuh..." See also p. 36. "Turkiston zamin mamlakati" exists from the time of Noah on according to him.

<sup>169</sup> However Mirzo Uluğbek excludes Turkestan term from Turan at one instance in, p. 297. When he counts the names of "*Turan-zamin mamlakatlar*" as Kashgar, Balkh, Badakshan, Kabil, Gazna, and the lands down to the Sind Darya. (Indus)

<sup>170</sup> Mirzo Uluğbek, p. 51 and several other places. Also see p. 49, according to him Oğuzkhan conquered China, Kara-Khitai, Turkistan and Saklab (Slav-lands) where Turkestan was from Sayram to Samarkand and Bukhara. Here we see an open inclusion of Mā warā' al-Nahr into the concept of Turkestan. However in the following pages, p. 57, Mā warā' al-Nahr and Turkestan used separately. North of Turkestan was Dasht-i Kipchak.

<sup>171</sup> Mirzo Uluğbek, p. 115. Also note that the extensive usage of Iran & Turan in the text. Also the words Tacik and Kazak appear all over the text.

<sup>172</sup> Arguably the name Uzbek(Özbek) was related to the Ozbek Khan, the Khan of the Golden Horde (1305-1337), a descendant of Chingiz Khan through Chaghatai. According to Caferoğlu the name Uzbek was an ethnonym given by the Golden Horde Khan Özbek to his own people until 1340. See Ahmet Caferoğlu, *Türk Kavimleri* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1983).

<sup>173</sup> Mirzo Uluğbek, p. 226. He underlines the Turks of Turkestan tough. And calls it "Türkistan diyârı".



(Soldüz) Turkestan term for the shores of Murghab River.<sup>174</sup> In his last page, he said that he tried to count all the names of Turkestan rulers.<sup>175</sup>

In the meantime, from the early 15<sup>th</sup> century on, the Shaybanid Uzbeks moved southwards to Transoxiana under Abul Khayr Khan (1413-69).<sup>176</sup> Abul Khayr's power was at its height in the mid-century, but soon, in 1456-7, his lands started to be invaded by the Oirat-Kalmucks.<sup>177</sup> Almost simultaneously, two of his vassal chieftains Karai and Canibeg, left him and found refuge in the domain of Esen-Bugha of Çağatay, whose tribes<sup>178</sup>, later on, were called as Kazaks or Kirghiz-Kazaks.<sup>179</sup> Abul Khayr was killed in 1468 in fighting against these "dissident Uzbeks." It was Abul Khayr's grandson Muhammad Shaybani, who succeeded him, as the vassal of Tashkent Khan Mahmud. Soon, his power in Turkestan was increased. However, the Shaybanids of Siberia continued to exist until the 1580s.<sup>180</sup>

By the late 15<sup>th</sup> century, the Kazak Empire was established in Northern Turkestan steppes, whereas in the south, in 1497, the ruler of Ferghana, Babür, last of the Timurids, had captured Samarkand.

At the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, the Ottoman historians were quite sure as to the geographical location of Turkestan. In Kitâb-ı Cihân-Nümâ, Neşrî explained that Turks

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<sup>174</sup> Mirzo Uluğbek, p. 275.

<sup>175</sup> Mirzo Uluğbek, p. 326. "... Türkistan zamin hakanlarning namları şu risalada darj kilingandır."

<sup>176</sup> Note that although Uzbeks were the Turkic stock of Northern Turkestan, Shaybanids were truly a Chingizite dynasty. They have descended from the grandson of Cenghiz Khan Shayban, who was the brother of both Batu and Berke. See Grousset, p. 478-9, "At Jenghiz Khan's death, Shayban was allotted the territories east and southeast of the southern Ural river, including a large part of the province of Aktyubinsk and Turgai.... About the middle of the fourteenth century, the hordes subject to the Shaybanids took the name of Özbeg..... although the origin of the name is still obscure." See also Mehmet Alpargu, *Onaltıncı Yüzyılda Özbek Hanlıkları* (Ankara: 72 Ofset, 1995). For a detailed genealogical list of the Uzbeks. p. 8.

<sup>177</sup> Grousset, p. 479.

<sup>178</sup> See Abdülkadir İnan, "Türk Kabile İsimlerine Dair," *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, Cilt I, p. 258-265, 1925 In *Makaleler ve İncelemeler* (Ankara: Türk tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1968), Cilt I. P. 1-7. For a good and detailed list and historical genealogy of Turkic tribal names.

<sup>179</sup> Grousset, p. 480. Kazak here means "adventurer" or "rebel". Grousset basically calls them as "dissident Uzbeks."

<sup>180</sup> In fact it was somewhere near Tobol when in 1428 Abul Khayr, first Shaybanid Khan was proclaimed as Khan in Siberia. Russians in 16<sup>th</sup> century, from 1580s on conquered and re-conquered the Khanate and ended the Shaybanid rule in the North.

were descended from Yafeth son of Noah and lived in a country between Oxus and China, which was called *bilâd-ı Türkistân* (lands of Turkestan). The capital of Turkestan was Talas city; and Sayram, Karshi, Karakum and Bursun were included in the Lands of Turkestan.<sup>181</sup> However, Neşrî also included all other Turkics of the region into this realm and called it a country like China, Sind-Hind or Rum.<sup>182</sup> Completed his *Muhâkemetü'l Lugateyn* in 1499, the renowned poet and scholar Alî Şîr Nevâyî, did not use the term Turkestan at all in his book.<sup>183</sup> Instead, he used the terms like Sart,<sup>184</sup> *Türk İli*,<sup>185</sup> İrân and Tūrân,<sup>186</sup> *Türk Ulusu*<sup>187</sup> quite extensively in the text.

Covering the events between 1494 and 1530, in the memoirs of Babur, one can find the usages of the term to mean both a city,<sup>188</sup> i.e. Yassi/Türkistan, and the region.<sup>189</sup> When describing the borders of his first realm, Ferghana,<sup>190</sup> he did not use the term Turkestan. He rather used phrases like a "Qipchak from Turkistan,"<sup>191</sup> "Shaybani Khan

<sup>181</sup> Mehmed Neşrî, *Kitâb-ı Cihân-Nümâ-Neşrî Tarihi*. I. Cilt. Hazırlayanlar: F.R. Unat and M.A Köymen (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1949 - Neşrî Completed his book in 1492), p. 9 "... this group is very brave-heroic and comes from Bulcan Khan bin Yafes bin Noah and Bulcas Khan had two sons: Turk and Mongol. Their grandsons were very populous in number that can be only known by the God. Their place was between Ceyhun and China which was called bilâd-ı Türkistân..."

<sup>182</sup> Mehmed Neşrî, p. 13.

<sup>183</sup> Alî Şîr Nevâyî, *Muhâkemetü'l Lugateyn. İki Dilin Muhakemesi*. Hazırlayan: F. Sema Barutçu Özönder (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları: 656, 1996). Contains also a facsimile copy of the Topkapı Nüshası.

<sup>184</sup> Alî Şîr Nevâyî, p. 161. Here Sart is used basically for all Persian speakers.

<sup>185</sup> Alî Şîr Nevâyî, p. 169, (B7b in facsimile) *Türk İli* meaning the whole Turkestan. However almost around the same time, in the very early 1500s, (before 1512) an Ottoman historian Firdevsî-i Rumî in his *Kutb-nâme* was using the term *Türk İli* exactly for Anatolia, especially Western Anatolia while explaining about Ottoman attacks to capture Aegean Islands and Midilli. See Firdevsî-i Rumî, *Kutb-nâme* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları XVIII Dizi-Sayı.5, 1980). Hazırlayanlar: İbrahim Olgun, İsmet Parmaksızoğlu. P. 29b-7, 31b-10, 39a-2.

<sup>186</sup> Alî Şîr Nevâyî, p. 168, (B5b in facsimile) Meaning the two main parts of the world in fact.

<sup>187</sup> Alî Şîr Nevâyî, p. 179, (B23a in facsimile) "*Türk Ulusı*..." Note the use of Turkish Nation as a single identity here, however in the meaning of the Mongolian Ulus, basically a federation of Clans.

<sup>188</sup> Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur Mirza, *Baburnama* [Parts I, II and III. By W.M. Thackston, Jr.] (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1993), pp. 2-3 and p. 44 of Part I. "... the direction of Turkistan" and "... governor of Turkistan city..."

<sup>189</sup> Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur Mirza, p. 265. Turkistan is a region-province like Badakhshan, Ferghana, Samarkand, Bukhara, Balkh.

<sup>190</sup> Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur Mirza, p. 1. "The province of Ferghana is in the fifth climate, situated on the edge of civilized world. To the east is Kashgar, to the west Samarkand, and to the south the mountains that border Badakhshan. To the north, although there were cities like Almalyk, Almatu and Yengi (Otrar)..."

<sup>191</sup> Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur Mirza, p. 18 "a qipchak beg of Turkistan", p. 56 "One was Khusrawshah, a qipchak from Turkistan", p. 170, "... a Turkistani tarkhan..."

in Turkistan,"<sup>192</sup> as the source of the enemy Uzbeks arriving somewhere from north - in fact not very far north.

### 3.3.4 The Concept of Turkestan Under the Rule of Shaybanid Uzbeks

In 1500 the Uzbeks captured Samarkand under Muhammad Shaybani Khan (1451-1510), destroying the Timurid house in Turkestan.<sup>193</sup> For Shaybani, Turkestan was a vast area, covering all Central Asia with the City of Turkestan (Yassi), where Hoja Ahmed Yassavi was buried, being its center.<sup>194</sup>

Muhammad Shaybani, attacked first Khorezm and then turned to conquer Khurasan.<sup>195</sup> His next target was to destroy the remnants of the Çağatayite house in Turkestan, the Mahmud Khan of Tashkent. Mahmud inflicted on him a defeat, receiving aid from his relatives in İli.<sup>196</sup> Shaybani was killed in a battle against Shah Ismail in Merv in 1510. "Muhammad Shaybani, master of Western Turkestan, Transoxiana, Ferghana, and Khurasan, had made the Uzbek Empire the chief power in Central Asia."<sup>197</sup> Again, after years of power struggle, Babur's influence and Persian attacks on

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<sup>192</sup> Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur Mirza, p. 15, p. 90. "During this time Baysungur Mirza was constantly sending people to Shaybani Khan in Turkistan requesting assistance. Shaybani Khan hastened from Turkistan and reaching our camp" [near Samarkand]. p. 170. and p. 173. "...and his Uzbeks' kith and kin had come from Turkistan."

<sup>193</sup> The most important impact of this conquest was the ethnic and social '*Uzbekification*' of Central Asia after this point. See Vincent Fourniau, *Özbek Fethi: Orta Asya'da Toplulukların ve Siyasal İktidarların Teması*. X. Türk Tarih Kongresi'nden Ayırbaşım (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), p. 808. All other groups, Kirghiz, Turkmen, and Tadjik just scattered either on the mountainous or desert areas of the region, leaving the agricultural areas under Uzbek domination.

<sup>194</sup> *Şiban Han Dîvânı: İnceleme-Metin-Dizin-Tıpkıbasım*. Yakup Karasoy (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları: 614, 1998 - From the 16<sup>th</sup> century Mā warā' al-Nahr copy in İstanbul Topkapı Museum, Ahmed III kitaplığı.) See p. 149-150 Beyt 70a 1-15. It seems that being a faithful follower of Yassawi faith, Shaybani praised his Sheikh being the light and guide of all Turkestan who established himself in the city of Turkestan.

<sup>195</sup> Grousset, p. 481.

<sup>196</sup> Grousset, p. 482.

<sup>197</sup> Grousset, p. 482. Note that Western Turkestan was somewhere north of Transoxiana.

Turkestan, the throne of the Uzbek Khanate of Transoxiana passed to another line, the Janids, or Astrahanids.<sup>198</sup>

Between 1501 and 1511, Babur fought against the Uzbeks for the control of Samarkand. In 1504, Babur established himself in Kabul. In 1506 the Uzbeks captured Bukhara, in 1507 Herat, thus bringing a real end to the Timurid dynasty in Turkestan. Between the years 1514-33, the Eastern Çagatay Khan Sayid, a claimant to the Eastern Çagatay throne, moved his capital from İli to Kashgar. In 1522, Babur captured Kandahar and moved southwards.

In 1546, Kashmiri Mirza Haidar Dughlat finished his *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, a detailed history of Çagatays and Timurids. He was very careful in distinguishing Mawaraannahr and Turkestan terms.<sup>199</sup> Although, the town of Yassi was already Turkestan by this time,<sup>200</sup> he used the term also as a local administration unit-*vilayat* in his text.<sup>201</sup> But in some other places of the text, he tends to separate the town of Turkestan from the town of Sayram,<sup>202</sup> the twin town of the former. Still, his Turkestan concept was inclusive of at least the territories between Syr Darya and the Mongolian motherland, Mongolia.<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>198</sup> See Grousset, p. 486. "When in 1554 the Russians annexed the Khanate of Astrakhan, a prince of the Jenghiz Khanite dynasty of Astrakhan named Yar Muhammad, and his son Jan, took refuge in Bukhara, with the Shaybanid Khan Iskander(1560-83), who gave his daughter to Jan, in marriage. As the male Shaybanid line became extinct in 1599 with the death of Abd-al Mumin, the throne of Bukhara passed in the regular manner to the 'Astrakhanid' Baqi Muhammad, son of Jan and of the heiress of the Shaybans".

<sup>199</sup> Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī* (A History of the Moghuls of Central Asia) Trans. By E. Denison Ross (London: Curzon Press, 1972 - original completed in 1546), p. 29. "...when the countries of Mā warā' al-Nahr and Turkistan together with all their dependencies..." This is also a broader usage simply because of the consideration of the all the lands beyond Mā warā' al-Nahr as Turkestan.

<sup>200</sup> Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 53. "...Amir Timur sets out from Samarkand and for that winter took up his quarters [kishlak] in Turkestan."

<sup>201</sup> Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 68. "... In those days the Moghuls were constantly attacking Turkistan, Shash and Andijan..."(speaking of 1440s)

<sup>202</sup> Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 79. "Having done this, he went forth to lay waste Turkistan and Sairam." If it was a local principality, Sairam should have been included to the term, no need of repeating it, then here he implies the town of Turkestan again.

<sup>203</sup> Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 91-2. "... and the Moghul Ulus moved towards Turkistan, spending the winter at a place in Turkistan on the banks of the Sihun, called Kara Tukai..., when [the inhabitants] of Turkistan learned the news of the advance of the Moghuls on their territory..." However from this description one may also understand that other side of Syr Darya was also Turkestan.

In this text, the *Turkistan* was located at the North and outside the realm of Tashkent,<sup>204</sup> neighboring<sup>205</sup> but not covering Farghana.<sup>206</sup> This definition covered Mawaraunnahr too. It was also the name of the town Yassi.<sup>207</sup> Turkestan was a land where political fugitives could find themselves safe heavens,<sup>208</sup> a place to re-concentrate and unify before launching an attack,<sup>209</sup> a location between Mawaraunnahr and Moghulistan.<sup>210</sup> Additionally, he counted Sairam, Andijan and Akshi as the territories of Turkestan.<sup>211</sup>

A regional history book by Mir Ghiyaseddin Muhammed Huseyni Khwandamir, dated 1524, used the term *Turkistan*, only twice in the whole text.<sup>212</sup> Although he was a local historian, he used the terms Mawaraunnahr and Khurasan very extensively.

The British merchant, Anthony Jenkinson traveled through Turkestan in 1558.<sup>213</sup> He referred to all the natives as "Tartars,"<sup>214</sup> and following the age-old European geographical conceptions, for him, Bukhara was still in the realm of Bactria.<sup>215</sup> The whole region was called "Tartary."<sup>216</sup>

The last Shaybanid ruler of Bukhara, Abdullah Khan, died in 1598 and the power was transferred to the Astarhanid dynasty in Turkestan. In the North, Russians

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<sup>204</sup> Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 118.

<sup>205</sup> Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 134.

<sup>206</sup> Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 367. "... musulmans of Turkistan, Shash and Farghana..."

<sup>207</sup> Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 349.

<sup>208</sup> Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 245. "...when the Uzbek Sultans who were assembled in Samarkand heard this news, they were suddenly filled with terror and fled, scattered and dismayed to different parts of Turkistan..." "The pursuers drove the Uzbeks out of Bukhara into the deserts of Turkistan..." Here we see a broader, undefined Turkestan but surely covering north, east and west to the steppes, and deserts in both directions.

<sup>209</sup> Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 250 "The Uzbek all collected together in Turkistan".

<sup>210</sup> Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 293. In this page Dughlat explaining the realms of Chaghatai counts Moghulistan, Kara-Khitai, Turkestan and Mā warā' al-Nahr.

<sup>211</sup> Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 358. Another example of the broader description but also the anarchy on the concept.

<sup>212</sup> Khwandamir, *Habību's-Siyār*. (Tome Three Part I Ghenghiz Khan-Amir Temür) Trans. By W. M. Thackson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), p.1 "*On the Khans of Turkistan...*" and p. 3 "... he conquered all the lands of Moghulistan and Turkistan as far as Samarkand and Bukhara." It is interesting here the author includes Samarkand and Bukhara to the lands of Turkistan.

<sup>213</sup> Anthony Jenkinson, "The Voyage of Master Anthony Jenkinson, made from the city of Moscow in Russia to the city of Bokhara in Bactria, in the year 1558" In Richard Hakluyt, *Voyages and Discoveries* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972). See pages pp. 77-90. (A travel report)

<sup>214</sup> Richard Hakluyt, p. 77 and in p. 78 see "...land of Tartars called Turkmen..."

<sup>215</sup> Richard Hakluyt, p. 84 and also in the title of the report in p. 77.

<sup>216</sup> Richard Hakluyt, p. 87, 88 and 89. "...the kings of Tartary...", "...long time in Tartary..."

destroyed Sibir Khanate. Kuçum Khan (the last Shaybanid ruler of Sibir Khanate) died in 1598. In the late 16<sup>th</sup> century, the Kazak confederation in the steppes was also divided into three Hordes: Lesser Horde (Kiçi Cüz-West), Middle Horde (Orta Cüz-Center), and Greater Horde (Ulu Cüz-East).

### 3.3.5 The Russian Advance and the Changing Dynasties in Turkestan

In the mid-16<sup>th</sup> century, the Russians conquered all Siberia and reached the Pacific Ocean. After the death of Muhammad Shaybani near Merv in 1510, his Shaybanids in Khiva drove the Safavids out of Khorezm and continued to exist in Khiva until 1920. Their most famous Khan was Abul Ghazi Bahadır Khan<sup>217</sup> (1643-65), the author of *Şecere-i Terakkime*.<sup>218</sup> In this genealogical source, he used the terms "Turk" and "Turkmen" almost interchangeably. He started with the classical story about the origins of Turks, being the descendants of Noah's son Yafeth's son Türk.<sup>219</sup> He used the word "Tajik" for the Persian speakers of Mawaraannahr, in order to distinguish them from the other peoples of the Persian stock.<sup>220</sup> He used the word "Turkestan" three times in the original text. The first usage was in reference to the city of *Turkistan* and the surrounding area.<sup>221</sup> The second one was for a province on the same footing as the provinces such as Yangi Kent or Andijan.<sup>222</sup> And finally he used the term "Turkestan" as a country but did not mention its borders.<sup>223</sup>

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<sup>217</sup> For the life of Ebul Ghazi Bahadır Khan(1603-63), see EbulGazi Bahadır Khan, *Şecere-i Terakkime*. Hazırlayan: Zuhâl Kargı Ölmez (Ankara: Simurg, 1996), pp. 21-7. This history of Turks book was finished by his son, soon after his death.

<sup>218</sup> Grousset, p. 487.

<sup>219</sup> Ebul Ghazi Bahadır Khan, p. 234-6. He also uses Turan, Iran and Hindistan quite often, however Turan meaning mostly Turkestan.

<sup>220</sup> Ebul Ghazi Bahadır Khan, p. 255.

<sup>221</sup> Ebul Ghazi Bahadır Khan, p. 138-Facsimile text. But still he does not limit the 'surrounding area'.

<sup>222</sup> Ebul Ghazi Bahadır Khan, p.182-Facsimile text. Here too the borders left undefined but the city in the center probably.

<sup>223</sup> Ebul Ghazi Bahadır Khan, p. 201. Turkestan in here is a country like Iraq or Hindustan.

The Ottoman traveler Evliya Çelebi, curiously used the term "Türkistan" for the Turkish populated parts of Anatolia, especially of Central Anatolia.<sup>224</sup> He also pointed out that he spoke the language of Türkistan, but there is another realm in Anatolia, which was called Yörükistan.<sup>225</sup> He also separates Türkistan from the Eastern Anatolia,<sup>226</sup> implying that his idea of Türkistan comprised mostly the Turkmen populated Central Anatolia.

In the first half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Ottoman author Koçi Bey used the word Turkestan for Anatolia proper.<sup>227</sup> An Ottoman history book of the second half of 17<sup>th</sup> century by Müneccimbaşı Ahmet Dede uses the term Mawaraannahr for the whole Central Asian region.<sup>228</sup>

From 1680 up till 1718, Khan Teuke of Kazaks reunited the Kazak Hordes in the Steppes. The Astrakhanid dynasty ruled Transoxiana (mainly Bukhara) from 1599 to 1785.<sup>229</sup> In the early 18<sup>th</sup> Century Oirat raids on Kazaks in the steppes. In 1710, a Shaybanid called Shah Rukh defeated the Khojas of Ferghana<sup>230</sup> and established Khokand Khanate in the Ferghana Valley.<sup>231</sup> In 1715, Peter the Great organized the first Russian campaign to the Steppes. In 1717, the Russian military expedition troops in Khiva were massacred. It was actually a Russian Embassy under Prince Alexander Bekevitch sent by Peter the Great with several thousands escort troops, ordered to seize

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<sup>224</sup> Evliya Çelebi b. Derviş Mehmed Zillî, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*: Topkapı Sarayı Bağdat 305 Yazmasının Transkripsiyonu (İstanbul: YKY, III. Kitap. 1058 H.), p. 13. "...[Akşehir] Because it is a Türkistan province, they have a special dialect..."

<sup>225</sup> Evliya Çelebi, p. 225. And at the same page he separates Tatar from Türkistan.

<sup>226</sup> Evliya Çelebi, p. 285.

<sup>227</sup> A. K. Aksüt (ed.), *Koçi Bey Risalesi* (İstanbul: 1939), p. 28.

<sup>228</sup> Müneccimbaşı Ahmet Dede, *Müneccimbaşı Tarihi* I. Cilt. (Çev. İsmail Erünsal) (Sahâif-ül Ahbar fî vekâyî-ül-a'sâr, in arabic) (İstanbul: Tercüman, 1977 - completed originally in 1673). See especially pages 49-53. Although in p. 49 there is a title like " the migration of Kayı tribe from Turkestan to Khurasan and Iran", this might be used by the translator, because in no other place of the text Turkestan word is not used at all. This is not checked from the original or facsimile copies.

<sup>229</sup> Grousset, p. 486.

<sup>230</sup> Basically a famous clan in Ferghana, Kashgar and all over Turkestan, claiming the heritage of Prophet and Arab conquerors of the region, also called as Sayyids.

<sup>231</sup> See Grousset p. 488-9. From 1800 on Khans of Khokand annexed Tashkent and Turkestan cities and then stepped up to the Balkash. However in 1876 Russians conquered Khokand and the Khanate was annexed same year.

the gold mines in Khiva. Khivans responded to this de-facto occupation by dividing these troops into several villages for the heavy winter conditions; and then slaughtering them all, except a few, who became slaves in the Khivan court.<sup>232</sup> In 1718, Oirats defeated Kazak Middle Horde near Lake Balkash. In the years 1723-5, Kalmuks and Oyrats raid into northern Transoxiana. In 1731, Kazak Little Horde accepted Russian protection. In 1734, Russians established their first fort in Orenburg. In 1740, Kazak Middle Horde also accepted Russian protection.<sup>233</sup> Nadir Shah of Persia conquered Transoxiana and stayed there between the years 1740-7.<sup>234</sup> In 1742, a part of the Kazak Greater Horde also accepted Russian protection. In 1747 the Uzbek Mangit dynasty started to raise its power in Turkestan, especially in the Bukharan Khanate.

The first signs of resistance to the Russian advance appeared in Turkestan during the years 1752-4 with the Bashkir uprisings when Kazak Abılay Khan promised refuge in the steppes to the fugitive Bahkirs.<sup>235</sup> In 1757, Chinese defeated Oyrats in Jungaria.

It was during the reign of the last Astrakhanid, Abu'l Ghazi (1758-85) when the chief of Mangits Mâsum Shah increased his power. He was married to the rulers' daughter and after Abu'l Ghazi he took the throne and his Mangits ruled over Bukharan lands until 1920 as the descendants of Chenghiz Khan.<sup>236</sup>

In 1759, Chinese invaded Tarim Basin. In 1763, Uzbek Kungrat Dynasty captured power in Khivan [Khorezm] Khanate. In 1768, the Chinese officially named

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<sup>232</sup> *Progress and Present position of Russia in the East* (London: John Murray, 1838), pp. 4-5

<sup>233</sup> For an extensive account of this debated issue see, Shahmatov, Kraev and Shoinbayev, *Kazakhskoe-russkie otnosheniya v XVI-XVIII vekakh* (Alma-Ata: 1961), pp. 35-45. Kazak khan of Abulkhayr asked for Russian protection in 1730 but most of the Sultans did not obey his decision. Tsaritsa Anna Ivanovna sent a muslim representative, Mehmet Tevkelev who stayed among Kazaks between 1731-1733 and bribed Kazak elders and sultans. However, the mission failed and apart from Abulkhayr, Russian protection was not accepted by the Kurultay. For the memories of Tevkelev see M. Bijanov, "Drevnik M. Tevkelova kak istochnik po istorii Kazakhstana" (Alma-Ata: IAN AN, 1967), no. 4. pp. 83-87.

<sup>234</sup> According to Togan the most important event of 18<sup>th</sup> century Turkestan was this conquest by Nadir Shah, destroying the authority of the Chengizhid House in the region. Although Nadir Shah was a Turkmen (Azeri?) himself, his failure to control Yomut and Göklen Turkmens was notable. See Togan, p. 198-9.

<sup>235</sup> Togan, p. 307.

<sup>236</sup> Grousset, p. 486-7.



the Eastern Turkestan as Xinjiang. In the years 1784-5, the Mangits succeed the Astarhanid dynasty in Bukhara and gained the title of Emir. From then on, he was called the Bukharan Emir. In 1798, an Uzbek Khanate in Khokand was established.

In 1707 Bukharan ruler Ubeydullah Khan, writing to the Sultan Ahmed III of the Ottomans, was calling his land the *Turan Country*.<sup>237</sup> In another native source, in the *Mukim Han's History* by Muhammed Yusuf Munşi in 1702, the northern limits of Turkestan were defined as Bulgar and *Desht-i Kipchak*, where Munşi also called this region as historical Turan.<sup>238</sup>

It is interesting that a manual of Safavid Administration, dated 1725 did not use the term Turkestan even once, but preferred to use single city-state or province names like Bukhara, Goklen, Herat, Çiğ, etc., when explaining the region.<sup>239</sup>

In the middle of this century, in fact, the word Turkistan entered into British political literature. This was basically because of the Persian officials in the Afghan Courts who were referring Balkh and the wilayat [province] surrounding it as Turkistan.<sup>240</sup> It was after more than a century when Sir Henry Rawlinson, in his famous '*Memorandum on the Frontier of Afghanistan*,' opposed to the use of the term Turkistan and proposed the use of Afghan Turkestan instead.<sup>241</sup>

Applying to Sultan Abdülhamid I, Bukharan ruler Seyid Ebülğazi Khan in 1783 and in 1785, used the term *Türkistân Country* for his land and called the rest of the

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<sup>237</sup> Mehmet Saray, *Rus İşgali Devrinde Osmanlı Devleti ile Türkistan Hanlıkları Arasındaki Siyasi Münasebetler* (İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1984), p. 14. Quoted from Name-i Hümayun Defteri, nr. 6, p. 116-119. "...Turan ülkesi..."

<sup>238</sup> Muhammed Yusuf Munşi, *Mukim Khanskaya Istoria*. Trans by A.A. Semenov (Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk Uzbekskey SSR, 1956), pp. 49-87.

<sup>239</sup> *Tadhrikat Al-Mulūk*, A Manual of Safavid Administration. (1725) Trans. By V. Minorsky (London: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., 1943).

<sup>240</sup> J.L. Lee, *The Ancient Supremacy: Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battle for Balkh, 1731-1901* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), p. xxxi. "When the British and European sources began to be interested in the region during the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, they followed the Southern-Persian tradition and favored the term Turkistan."

<sup>241</sup> Lee, p. xxxii. However, native representatives of British (in the Afghan court) continued to use Turkistan for Balkh or even in some cases *Lesser Turkistan*.

region *Türkistân Provinces*.<sup>242</sup> In his Answer, Abdülhamid I, called Seyid Ebülğazi Khan the ruler of *Turan Country* but also used the terms *Deşt-i Kıpçak* and *Türkistân* among Ebülğazi's dominions.<sup>243</sup>

### 3.4 Russian Empire in Turkestan and Kazak Resistance

In 1804, Kungrats in Khiva adopted the title of “*Khan*”. In the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> Centuries, the basic local administration in all over Turkestan was realized in the hands of local Khalifas and Shaykhs in addition to local landlords and officials. However the practical power of a Khalifa was much more than any landlord or appointed tax collector.<sup>244</sup>

By the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> and beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Russian progress in the east was directed towards Turkestan, which at the same time included Eastern Turkestan, which in most of the official documents haven't been separated from the Western Turkestan.<sup>245</sup> Eastern Turkestan was as much a target as Western Turkestan.

In the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, Russians started the conquest of the steppes. Abılay's grandson Ubeydullah allied himself with China and launched attacks on the Russians. Slowed down in advance, Russians built their fort in Kokche Tau in 1824.<sup>246</sup> Almost simultaneously Kaybalı Sultan revolted in Yayık and Bükey Orda from 1818 to 1829, aiming to enter into Khivan suzerainty. In 1829, he was arrested by Russians but escaped from Orenburg Fort in 1832 and joined the Adays of Khiva. In 1836 Bukey

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<sup>242</sup> Mehmet Saray, *Rus İşgali Devrinde Osmanlı Devleti ile Türkistan Hanlıkları Arasındaki Siyasi Münasebetler* (İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1984), p. 19. Quoted from Nâme-î Hümâyûn Defteri, Hatt-ı Hümâyûn, p. 72-73. "...Türkistân ülkesinin...Türkistân vilâyetlerini.."

<sup>243</sup> Mehmet Saray, p. 21. "Devlet-î aliyemiz ile Turan ülkesi hâkimi arasında ... bir taraftan Deşt-i Kıpçak ve Türkistân bölgelerinde..." Quoted from Nâme-î Hümâyûn Defteri, nr. 9, p. 196.

<sup>244</sup> See Baxtiyar M Babadzhanov, "On the history of the Naqshbandiyya muğaddidiya in Mawara'annahr in the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries," pp. 385-414 In *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18<sup>th</sup> to the early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries*. By Michael Kemper (Ed.) (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1996).

<sup>245</sup> For details see, Döletbek Saparaliyev, *Vzaimootnoşeniya Kyrgyzskogo Naroda c Russkim I Sosednim Narodami v XVIII v.* (Bishkek: Ilim, 1995), pp. 83-93 and 160.

<sup>246</sup> Togan, 308-11.

Orda leader İsetay Batır and Muhammed Batır rebelled; but soon, in 1838, they also ended up by joining the Adayas of Khiva.<sup>247</sup>

None of the Russian travelers and expeditioners of this century argued about an important regional unity-identity and/or Turkestan concept.<sup>248</sup> Spending several months in Turkestan, Alexander Burnes<sup>249</sup> in 1832, did not use the term Turkestan for the Bukharan, Khivan realms but used it rather for only the Afghan Turkestan.<sup>250</sup> Burnes was accompanied by a Cashmere, Mohan Lal<sup>251</sup>, whose memoirs were much more informative about Turkestan.<sup>252</sup> Although Lal uses Tartary<sup>253</sup> for Turkestan a couple of times in the text in his memoirs, *Turkistan* as a term covers almost the whole of Central Asia<sup>254</sup> with Bukhara being its center.<sup>255</sup>

In 1822, the Khanate of Kazak Middle Horde and in 1824 the Khanate of Kazak Lesser Horde were abolished by Russians. From then on Kazaks started to revolt against

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<sup>247</sup> Togan, p. 311-12

<sup>248</sup> F. Nazarov (Kokand-1813), N.N. Murav'yev (Turkmen Steppes and Khiva-1819), A.F. Middendorf (west and south Siberia-1841-7), N.V. Khanykov (Bukhara-1841-1842), G.I. Danilevskiy (Khiva-1842), M.N. Galkin (East Caspian and Turkmen Steppes-1859), N.M. Prezheval'skiy (Central Asia, Tibet, Mongolia-1871-1872). See Mary Holdsworth, *Turkestan in the Nineteenth Century: A Brief History of the Khanates of Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva* (Oxford: Central Asian Research Centre, 1959).

<sup>249</sup> Alexander Burnes, *Travels into Bokhara* (Baltimore: E.L. Cares & A. Hart. 1835. See v. II, p. 39 on. The 1834 London edition of the same book was rather more unique in its language and detailed descriptions of the region; See Alexander Burnes, *Travels into Bukhara: the Account of a Journey from India to Cabool, Tartary and Persia* (London: JM, 1834). Here Bukhara meant only the name of the Bukharan Emirate where Tartary was used for the whole Central Asia. The term Toorkistan was also used in a meaning within the concept of Tartary. See V. 1, p. 312 and V. 2, p. 153. Also all over the book Tartar and the term Toork (Turk) were used interchangeably.

<sup>250</sup> See also M. Anwar Khan, "Burnes' Mission to Central Asia 1831-1832" *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Pakistan*, Vol. XI, No: 1, April 1966. pp. 109-119. According to Khan, Kashmir is also included into Central Asia.

<sup>251</sup> Alias Hasan Jan, an active member of secret British military expeditions.

<sup>252</sup> Mohan Lal, *Travel in Punjab, Afghanistan and Turkistan to Balkh, Bokhara and Herat and a Visit to Great Britain and Germany* (Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Company, 1977 – the first edition in London, 1846). As it can be understood from the title he used the Turkistan spelling for the regions from Northern Afghan province of Balkh on.

<sup>253</sup> Mohan Lal, p. 80 "Bokhara... the whole region of Tartary.." But in page 81 he says for the Kushbeyi of Bokhara "... the most religious man in Turkistan."

<sup>254</sup> Mohan Lal, for the whole historical Timurid region also. P. 74. "... the great king of Turkistan..."

<sup>255</sup> Mohan Lal, p. 84. See the whole of the book for the different usages of Turkistan also.

the Russians (1820-40). Kenesary Kasimov<sup>256</sup> resisted the Russians (1837-47). In 1838, in some English publications the region was still considered to be Tartary.<sup>257</sup>

In 1838, Kenesary achieved local victories against the Russians in Siberia and Orenburg.<sup>258</sup> By 1839, people were rebelling all over the Steppes. Countless chieftains declared themselves Khans or Sultans. Being the grandson of Abılay Khan too, Kenesary was the most popular among the natives of the steppes.<sup>259</sup> However, a cousin of Kenesary Kasimov, Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov (1835-1865) was a prominent figure with Ibray Altynsarin (1841-89) and Abai Kunanbayev (1845-1904) who defended a Russian-Kazak rapprochement.<sup>260</sup>

There were instances Russians called Turkestan as Middle Asia in the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>261</sup> However, these instances remained as exceptions in the overall literature about the Turkestan region.

During this period, Mustafa Reşit Paşa of the Ottomans was using the term Turkistan for the whole of Ottoman Empire.<sup>262</sup> Soon after that, in 1856 the Paris Peace

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<sup>256</sup> See Han Kene, *Kazak Halkının Tevelsizdiği uşın Küresken Han-Batırlar Turalı Tarihi Tolğamdarmen, Dastandar* (Almatı: Jalın, 1993). For the examples of post-soviet Kazak nationalist approach to this Kazak Hero and note the emphasis on the Kene Sary being a hero of Turkistan, Şıgıs (Eastern) Turkistan, etc. Kenesary was elected as the Khan of all Kazak in a kurultay convened in 1841.

<sup>257</sup> *Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East* (London: John Murray, 1838), p. 145.

<sup>258</sup> For a detailed sketch of Russian colonial expansion and Kenesary revolt see M.K. Lyubavskiy. *Obzor Istorii Russkoy Kolonizatsii s Drevneyshikh vremen do XX veka*, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1996. pp. 521-530. See also A.M. Mokshev. *Istoricheskoy Obzor Turkestana i nastupatel'nogo Dvizheniya no nego Russkikh*, St Petersburg, IzDr, 1890.

<sup>259</sup> Togan p. 313-25. See also E. Smirnov, *Sultany Kinesary i Sadik* (Tashkent: 1889), pp. 23-26.

<sup>260</sup> Kermit E. McKenzie, "Chokan valikhanov: Kazak Princeling and Scholar," *Central Asian Survey*. Vol. 8. No. 3, 1989. P. 4-8. See in p. "Ablai had no fewer than 12 wives and 30 sons, and one of his grandsons, Kenesary Kasimov, was to lead a stubbornly fought ten-year revolt against Russian rule during 1837-1847. These were precisely the years of Chokan's childhood and in the revolt Chokan's father, now an officer in the Siberian line Cossacks, was pitted against his cousin, Kenesary, and later awarded a medal in recognition of his loyalty." Chokan was a promising scholar of orientalism and served in Russian Imperial court for various times, including being a secret agent to Kashgar between 1958 and 59.

<sup>261</sup> See L. Kostenko, *Srednyaya Aziya i Vodvorenje v Ney Russkoy Grazhdanstvennosti* (S. Petersburg: Tipografii v bezovrazova i komi, 1981). However in this book Kostenko also used historical Turan name for the aral-caspian basin. He also differentiates between Kaysak (kazak) and Kara-Kyrgyz (Kyrgyz) in p. 29-31. He classifies the peoples of Middle Asia as Tajiks, Kyrgyz-Kazaks, Karakalpaks, Turkmens, Uzbeks, Araps and Sarts. At this point he underlines that Sarts are not Tajiks at all, Sart are the settled townspeople and mostly from Turkic stock. See pp. 30-71. Kostenko also included Tarançı and Dungsans into the population of Turkestan and defends a dynamic Russian foreign policy to include Eastern Turkestan and Southern Turkestan to the Empire's realms. see pp. 342-354.

Conference's Turkish version, the word Türkistan is again used to imply the Ottoman State.<sup>263</sup> From this time on, during the Tanzimat period, the term Turkistan, in the ottoman literature is mostly used for the Ottoman empire/state.<sup>264</sup> The Ottoman intellectual Namık Kemal translated their western name of *Jenues Turcs* or Young Ottoman Party as "*Türkistan erbab-ı şebabi*".<sup>265</sup>

In 1848, the Russians abolished the Khanate of Kazak Greater Horde. It was in 1853 that the then Governor-General of Orenburg succeeded in establishing Russian military forts on the Syr-Darya, one of them later named after him.<sup>266</sup> In 1855, the Russians completely reached the Syr Darya line. By 1852, the Russians had an Aral fleet of five war ships. They navigated through Syr Darya quite effectively and were ready to contribute the conquest of Amu Darya too.<sup>267</sup>

### 3.4.1 Turkestan as a Russian Colonial Province

Although the Russian dominance in Central Asia had been considered as a very nominal one,<sup>268</sup> they continued to strengthen their power in the north. The Russian

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<sup>262</sup> R. Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat* (Ankara: 1954), p. 610. Quoted in Hakan Erdem. "Türkistan: Nerede, Ne Zaman?" *Toplumsal Tarih*. Ekim 1998. No. 58. P. 40. Erdem argues that Reşit paşa simply translated French delegate's word of Le Turquie as Türkistan into Turkish.

<sup>263</sup> For the text of Paris Peace Conference see. M. Aktepe, *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmet Lütfi Efendi Tarihi* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1988), pp. 230-4, Its 1984 Istanbul edition is cited in Hakan Erdem, "Türkistan: Nerede, Ne Zaman?" *Toplumsal Tarih*. Ekim 1998. No. 58. P. 39.

<sup>264</sup> Hakan Erdem, "Türkistan: Nerede, Ne Zaman?" *Toplumsal Tarih*. Ekim 1998. No. 58. P. 40-41.

<sup>265</sup> Hakan Erdem, "Türkistan: Nerede, Ne Zaman?" *Toplumsal Tarih*. Ekim 1998. No. 58. P. 42. See same article for the further usages of Türkistan term in the articles of Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi or in the other Ottoman printed Press for Ottoman State and Anatolia.

<sup>266</sup> Alexander Kornilov, *Modern Russian History* (London: Alfred A. Knoph, 1924), p. 227. Same Governor General Perovsky failed in his expedition against Khiva in 1839 mostly because the heavy winter and absence of proper roads.

<sup>267</sup> Ali Suâvî, *Hive Hanlığı ve Türkistân'da Rus Yayılması*. Hazırlayan: M. Abdülhâlik Çay (İstanbul: Orkun Yayinevi, 1977 - original published in Paris in 1873 as "*Le Khiva en Mars*"), pp. 27-37.

<sup>268</sup> Friedrich Engels, "Russia in Central Asia" *The New York Times*, 3.11.1858. "Russia's domination over three ordas, or Kirgiz is only nominal." Cited in Baymirza Hayit "Türkistan'ın Kazakistan Bölgesinin Rusya'ya İlhakı Meselesi Üzerine Bazı Oylar" IV. Uluslararası Türkoloji Kongresi Tebliği. In this paper, Hayit argued that well until the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, it was difficult to argue about a total Russian administrative rule over the Kazak steppes.

strategy in the 1860s<sup>269</sup> was to save Bukhara's territorial integrity strictly and the Tsar himself opposed the annexation of Bukhara, taking the height of the so-called Great Game with Britain into account.<sup>270</sup> However St. Petersburg did not oppose the capture of Tashkent by Colonel Cherniaiev in 1864 and annexed the region-Khokand.<sup>271</sup> Khiva, on the other hand, created much more trouble for the Russians. Khan Muhammed Rahim II (1864-1910) rejected all Russian demands. The Russians launched an attack in 1873 and soon Khiva was conquered and became a formal Russian protectorate in humiliation. But for the Khivan Khan it was still difficult to control the freemen of the desert, the Turkmen.<sup>272</sup>

Writing in 1873, Ali Suâvî separated Turkistan from the Khivan Khanate and pointed out that there were four ethnic groups in Turkistan: Sart, Uzbek, Turkmen and Karakalpak, considering Sarts as Tadjiks-Persian speakers.<sup>273</sup>

The American consul in St. Petersburg Eugene Schuyler, traveled the region in 1873 and wrote his detailed memoirs.<sup>274</sup> He used the term Turkistan both for the Russian province and for the whole region from Khazar to Turfan.<sup>275</sup> According to him the common language in Turkistan was Turkî, having the ethnic groups like Uzbek,

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<sup>269</sup> It is also possible to claim that the nature of the Russian advance in Central Asia was not classically colonial or economic but rather it was strategically oriented. See S.A. Pokrovskiy, *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya i Vneshnyaya Torgovaya Politika Rosii* (Moskva: AN, 1947), pp. 242-251. In the mid- of 19<sup>th</sup> century, there were very little revenues and too much spending in Central Asia. And M.K. Rozhkova, *Ekonomicheskaya Politika Tsarskogo Pravitelstva na Srednem Vostoke* (Moskva: M-L, 1949), p. 314. The competition of Russian and British 'tavari' in Central Asia.

<sup>270</sup> Seymour Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 46.

<sup>271</sup> Alexander Kornilor, p. 228.

<sup>272</sup> Becker, p. 65-78.

<sup>273</sup> Ali Suâvî, p. 47.

<sup>274</sup> Eugene Schuyler, *Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Kokand, Bukhara and Kuldja*. (Ed. With an introduction by Geoffrey Wheeler) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966).

<sup>275</sup> Eugene Schuyler, see the map in p. xxxvii. Turkistan here is from Khazar to Turfan and from Merv-Pamir line to Orenburg-Irtish line.

Tadjik, Liuli [lôlî-Gypsy], city dweller Sarts, Kafirs, Kirghiz, Karakalpaks, Turkomans, Tartars (and the Nogai) Persians, Arabs, Hindoos, Jews, etc.<sup>276</sup>

For Russians, Turkestan had never meant a single ethnic identity,<sup>277</sup> and they were in the process of understanding the nature of the conflicts between the armies of the Khanates and Turkmen of the desert.<sup>278</sup> It was in fact before the creation of the Governor-Generalship that there were ideas of spreading Russian settlers among the circles in Petersburg.<sup>279</sup>

Following the fashion of the time, in 1860s, Cevdet Paşa used the term *Türkistan* as rather implying the Ottoman Empire, simply all the lands of the *Devlet-i Aliyye*.<sup>280</sup>

Traveling through Turkestan in 1863, the famous “Dervish” Arminius Vambéry provided important details about the political and daily life of *Tartars* of Central Asia.<sup>281</sup> His usage of the term Turkestan was rather for a general far-off<sup>282</sup> and big “country”.<sup>283</sup> Also the Hadjis<sup>284</sup> and Amir of Bokhara,<sup>285</sup> while interviewed by Vambéry, were calling whole of Central Asia Turkestan including Bukharan and Khivan realms. Khokand and Kashgar together were called Chinese Tartary.<sup>286</sup> Naming

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<sup>276</sup> Eugene Schuyler, p. 51-54. Here he also underlines the importance of the city-identity among the Uzbeks like being a Tashkendi, Samarkandi, Khodzhendi, etc. As well as surviving clan identity.

<sup>277</sup> N. A. Khalfin, *Politika Rossii v Sredney Azii(1857-1868)* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoy Literaturi, 1960), p. 20.

<sup>278</sup> N. A. Khalfin, *Politika Rossii v Sredney Azii(1857-1868)*, p. 92-93.

<sup>279</sup> N. A. Khalfin, *Politika Rossii v Sredney Azii(1857-1868)*, p. 175. See also the map of Turkestan in p. 18-19. Covering South of Kirghiz Steppe and Northern Afghanistan, From Caspian to Gobi desert in China made for the Russian Ministry of Roads and Communications.

<sup>280</sup> Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir 1-12*. (Yayınlayan Cavid Baysun) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991 - Original is 1860s), p. 55 in a context of Ottoman ambassador in Paris having a conversation with Napoleon on the Ottoman Empire. See also Tezâkir 13-20 for this usage of *Türkistan* for Ottoman empire p. 23.

<sup>281</sup> Arminius Vambéry, *The Life and Adventures of Arminius Vambéry* (ninth edition. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1914). See the book for the general usage of Tartar for the Turkics of Central Asia.

<sup>282</sup> Arminius Vambéry, p. 134. “...guests from far-off Turkestan..”

<sup>283</sup> Arminius Vambéry, p. See pages 134-140, his interviews with the Hadjis.

<sup>284</sup> Arminius Vambéry, p. 138. “...the roads of Turkestan are not so safe as those of Persia and Turkey.”

<sup>285</sup> Arminius Vambéry, p. 226. When the Amir asks him “Hadji, I hear thou hast come from Roum to visit the graves of Bahaddin and other holy men of Turkestan?”

<sup>286</sup> Arminius Vambéry, p. 136, but also see p. 134 where he calls “Chinese Tartary or Eastern Turkestan”. And also p. 214.

Karakum desert as being the heart of Tartary,<sup>287</sup> which leads to the old usage of the Tartary for the whole of Turkestan.

Although there were already regular diplomatic contacts between Russia and the Khanates,<sup>288</sup> in 1852, Khivan Khanate, during the negotiations with the Governor General of Orenburg Perovsky, asked for permission for the establishment of a Turkish-British base in the lower Syr Darya.<sup>289</sup> It was first Kaufman who urged a common Turkestanian identity-in the shape of a Central Asian coalition was a threat to the Empire.<sup>290</sup> And the solution was to apply a more economic-oriented program in the region.<sup>291</sup> From the very beginning, viceroy Kaufman and the Russian administration in Turkestan took the ethnographic classification in the region as a primary task.<sup>292</sup> Arriving at the region in significant numbers, Russian ethnographers, linguists and anthropologists, tried to find out what Sart, Uzbek, Kirghiz, etc were about.<sup>293</sup>

In 1865, Russians created the Province of Turkestan. In the same year, they captured Tashkent. In 1867, Russians created the Governorate-General of Turkestan, with Tashkent as its capital and in 1868 the Governorate-General of the Kazak-Steppe, with Orenburg being its capital. In 1868, the Russians captured Samarkand and Bukhara, making the Bukharan Emirate a Russian protectorate.

The Russian empires' borders in Turkestan were set on the 20th of October 1869 at the meeting of Milyutin and Forsight, during which the delimitation of Afghan

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<sup>287</sup> Arminius Vambéry, p. 204. Note also the very common usages of the terms Uzbek, Tadjik, Kirghiz and Turkoman (with several tribal names like Yomut, Tekke, Ersoy, Lebab, etc).

<sup>288</sup> N.A. Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie Sredney Azii k Rosii: 60-90-e gody XIX v* (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1965), p. 59.

<sup>289</sup> N.A. Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie Sredney Azii k Rosii*, p. 74. The Russian perception then was that, British Empire was using the Ottomans for infiltrating into the region.

<sup>290</sup> N.A. Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie Sredney Azii k Rosii*, p. 289.

<sup>291</sup> N.A. Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie Sredney Azii k Rosii*, p. 410.

<sup>292</sup> Daniel Brower, "Islam and Ethnicity: Russian Colonial Policy in Turkestan," p. 128. *In Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and peoples, 1700-1917*. (Ed by) Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini. Pp. 115-137.

<sup>293</sup> Daniel Brower, p. 129.



borders, Russian-Bukharan suzerainty relations and Russian-Kashgar suzerainty relations were agreed between the Russian and British Empires.

In 1868, an English publication about the region used the term Central Asia<sup>294</sup> only, however it called Eastern Turkestan, Chinese Tartary<sup>295</sup>, and using the term Turkistan and Khokand once<sup>296</sup> in a long text as well as underlining Captain Burslem's spelling of Toorkisthan.<sup>297</sup>

Apart from the politics, this was also the time when the Russians started to apply Il'minskii method for the sake of separating Tatar from the Turkestan Kazak-Kirghiz languages by forcing a Cyrillic Alphabet for the latter.<sup>298</sup> His colleague Ostromov, took one more step by applying the so-called Sart language-in fact a Tashkent dialect, into the literature of Turkestan by publishing the famous *Turkistan Vilayetining Gazeti* or *Turkestanskaya Tuzemniya Gazeta* from 1883 to 1917.<sup>299</sup>

Although the Russian presence was increasing in Turkestan quite rapidly, the freemen of the dessert, Turkmen<sup>300</sup> were independent in the deserts.<sup>301</sup>

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<sup>294</sup> "The Sea of Aral and the Russians in Central Asia," *The New Monthly Magazine*. (Ed. By William Harrison Ainsworth) Vol. 143 (London: Hard Bentley New Burlington Street, 1868), pp. 123-144. Note an interesting approach to Russian advance in Central Asia in p. 125: "...failing our power in Asia to civilize these vast countries-one of the cradles of the human race- it is unquestionably of greater advantage to a general humanity and civilization that the Russians should bring races of bigoted, fanatic, slave-holding, predatory and murderous propensities, and practices into subjection, than that they should be for ever left to their lustful and ferocious seclusion."

<sup>295</sup> "The Sea of Aral and the Russians in Central Asia", p. 132.

<sup>296</sup> "The Sea of Aral and the Russians in Central Asia", p. 132.

<sup>297</sup> "The Sea of Aral and the Russians in Central Asia", p. 142. Note that Captain Burslem called the region as Toorkisthan in 1846.

<sup>298</sup> Hasan B. Paksoy, *Alpamysh: Central Asian Identity under Russian Rule* (NY: Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Reserach Monograph Series, 1989), p.19. See also Isabelle T. Kreindler, *Educational Policies toward the Eastern Nationalities in Tsarist Russia: A study of Il'minskii's System* (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1969.)

<sup>299</sup> Hasan B. Paksoy, p. 19-20. See Also Robert Geraci, "Russian Orientalism at an Impasse: Tsarist Education Policy and the 1910 Conference on Islam," p. 138-167. In *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917*. Ed by Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzarini (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).

<sup>300</sup> See also Ağacan Beyoğlu, *Türkmen Boylarının Tarih ve Etnografyası* (İstanbul: İstak, 2000). Beyoğlu in this book provides us a detailed history of the development of Turkmen ethno genesis, tribes, based on mostly popular historical legends in Turkestan. However it is worth to note that the author includes all Turkmens to a common Turkestan concept especially in 19<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>301</sup> See Y. E. Bregel', *Horezmskie Turkmény v XIX veke* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoy Literatury, AN SSSR, 1961), see pp. 21-45 for the role and place of Turkmens in Khivan Khanate.

### 3.4.2 Khanates Surrendering

In 1873, the Khanate of Khiva became a Russian protectorate<sup>302</sup> and in 1876 the Khanate of Khokand was annexed by Russia. One year later, the Ottoman Administration was involved in Central Asian politics by establishing diplomatic relations with Afghanistan.<sup>303</sup>

However, the Russians were still unable to come to the terms with the Turkmen. Their ruling-elite (AkSakals or in Russian Starchina) and social organizations were always unreachable to the Russians.<sup>304</sup>

A Turkish Traveler to Central Asia (Asya-yı Vüsta) began to call the region Turkestan after he landed at Krasnovodsk on the Caspian.<sup>305</sup> He also made a distinction between Khorezm, Mawaraannahr,<sup>306</sup> the Turkestan General Governorship, but still, used Turkestan<sup>307</sup> as a greater geographical concept.

Russian railway building in Turkestan began in 1880 from Krasnovodsk or Kızılsu and reached Tashkent in 1898. This changed the intellectual, commercial and political life of the region.<sup>308</sup> In the mean time, though, in 1881, the Russians massacred Turkmen in Gök-Tepe and created the Transcaspian province.

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<sup>302</sup> See the account of the correspondent of New York Herald, A. Mac gahan, *Campaigning on the Oxus and the fall of Khiva* (New York: 1874). For the details of this event. Mac Gahan traveled with the Russian armies conquering the Khanate. Its Turkish is first published in 1876 as Hıve Seyahatnamesi ve Tarihi Musavver. Trans. by Kolağası Ahmed. Note the usage of the terms like Uzbeg, Kirghiz, Kazak (Cossack), Turkmen, Karakalpak in huge amounts. He does not use a united Turkestan concept at all.

<sup>303</sup> See Dwight E. Lee, "A Turkish Mission to Afghanistan, 1877," *The Journal of Modern History*. Vol. XIII, March-December 1941 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1941), pp. 335-356. See this piece for the pan-Islamist, then, intentions of the Ottoman administration in Central Asia's Great Game.

<sup>304</sup> See Bregel', pp. 118-175 for the Turkmen ruling elite, starchina and their social-political structure in the desert.

<sup>305</sup> Mehmet Emin Efendi, *İstanbul'dan Asya-yı Vüsta'ya Seyahat* (İstanbul'dan Orta Asya'ya Seyahat) Hazırlayan: Rıza Akdemir (Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2000 – first edition in 1878), p. 12. East of Khazar is named as Turkistan.

<sup>306</sup> Mehmet Emin Efendi, p. 127 and p. 135.

<sup>307</sup> Mehmet Emin Efendi, p. 108, calls all of Khiva as Turkestan, p. 45, calls all of deserts as Turkestan and in p. 36, calls all Turkmen lands as Turkestan.

<sup>308</sup> See Togan p. 263. Also for Becker too, the arrival of the railroads was important in order to end the centuries old isolation of the region from outside world.

Traveling the region in 1881-2, Gabriel Bonvalot became a strong supporter of Russian terminology; and provided a detailed picture of the complex cosmopolitan ethnic structure of the region.<sup>309</sup> It is interesting to see the complete separation of terms Turkestan and Kashgar<sup>310</sup> and the use of the term Central Asia for the whole region.<sup>311</sup> In 1884, Russians started cotton agriculture in Turkestan. In the same year, they invaded Merv Oasis, completing the conquest of Turkestan; while having the Ferghana rebellion in 1885.

For some western travelers to the region, natives were still all Tartars and it was thanks to Russians the region was united and the bloodshed among the native tribes was stopped.<sup>312</sup> In 1887, the Russians and British set the Afghan border.

George Curzon traveled through the new Transcaspian railway in 1888 and wrote his recollections in 1889. He clearly separated the Turkmen lands from Turkestan, in line with the Russian administrative divisions of the time.<sup>313</sup> However his usage of the term Afghan Turkestan<sup>314</sup> leads one to think that, the term still had geographical connotations.<sup>315</sup> Curzon also provided very important and detailed information about the administrative and political situation in Turkestan.<sup>316</sup>

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<sup>309</sup> Gabriel Bonvalot, *Eski Yurt*. Trans. By: M. Reşat Uzmen (İstanbul: Tercüman, 1979 - Original in 1884), p. 35.

<sup>310</sup> See Sir Aurel Stein, *On Ancient Central-Asian Tracks: Brief Narrative of Three Expeditions in Innermost Asia and Northwestern China* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964). For the usage of the words Kashgar and Eastern Turkestan interchangeably at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> and at the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, pp. 33, 41-50. It is also interesting to note Sir Stein calls all the Turkic inhabitants as the Turkî people rather than calling them with different tribal names.

<sup>311</sup> Gabriel Bonvalot, p. 62-63.

<sup>312</sup> Henri Moser, *A Travers L'Asie Centrale: La Steppe Kirghize, le Turkestan Russe, Boukhara, Khiva, le Pays Turcomans et la Perse* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1885). He traveled the region during 1883-4 with the Russian General Cherniaev, pp. 68-75.

<sup>313</sup> George Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1967 - first ed. in 1889), p. 34 "...I must ask my readers, to bear very closely in mind the distinction between Turkestan or Central Asia proper, the capital of which is Tashkent, and Turkomania, or the country of Turkmens, which extends from the Caspian to Merv...", see also pp. 273-274 for this separation.

<sup>314</sup> George Curzon, p. 124-5.

<sup>315</sup> George Curzon, p. 273-274. See the part about cotton industry in Turkestan as a whole, not only Governorship.

<sup>316</sup> George Curzon, p. 257. Here he criticizes the military rule in the region, making it a real colony.

The use of Turkestan as a Russian administrative and a broader geographical term continued to exist for some time in the West.<sup>317</sup> But, it should be noted that, the term was also used for the Turkmen lands as such.

From 1890-2 on, the first Russian and Ukrainian mass settlers arrived at Kazak Steppe and Turkestan. This was followed by a number of uprisings against the Russians. The first one was by Andijans in 1878. Others were: Andijan and Margilan uprising in 1882; Khokand Şakir Can uprisings, one of the greatest uprisings of the century, in 1893; the Dukchi Ishan uprising in 1898. They were all over the Ferghana valley. Dukchi Ishan, a 52 year old village khalifa Mehmed Ali, one of the last Yassawi Sheikhs of the region, had taken part in the rebellion for three years. He first attacked the Russian army barracks. After the usual slaughtering of Russian soldiers about, he wanted to turn to other cities. However, the city dwellers were not so enthusiastic. Being unsuccessful, soon, he was hanged by the Russians.<sup>318</sup>

In the Ottoman historiography of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, the term Turkestan was widely used in its broader geographical meaning. *Solak-zâde tarihi* (1880), a History of the Ottomans until 1657, is a good example of this. However, Solakzâde used the term in both senses: the geographically greater Turkestan,<sup>319</sup> containing many countries in it, and also the countries inside the greater area – i.e. the Central Asia.<sup>320</sup>

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<sup>317</sup> Le Comte De Cholet, *Excursions En Turkestan: La Frontière Russo-Afghane* (Paris: Librarie Pon, 1889). See this book for also for sketches from the daily lives of Turkmens, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Bukharans, etc. However the map in the last page of this book marks only the lands between Ashgabad and Merw (Turkmen Oasis) as Turkestan. Another example of conceptual misuse.

<sup>318</sup> Togan, p. 332-5.

<sup>319</sup> *Solakzâde Tarihi* (1880). Hazırlayan: Dr. Vahid Çubuk. Cilt 1 (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı yayımları, 1989), see pp. 109-110, Timur inviting an Anatolian Sheikh with him back to Turkestan. Or p. 120, Timur is retreating back to Turkestan.

<sup>320</sup> Solakzâde p. 100. “the shahs of Sistan and Mazderan, rulers of Bedakhshan, Geylan and Turkistan filled this valley with all their soldiers...” Here Turkestan means rather a local province probably based on Otrar region. Also see p. 343. Speaking of Azak, Solakzâde explains that it is a popular stop for the traders from Turkestan and Mā warā' al-Nahr, still excluding it from a greater Turkestan concept.

In Redhouse's first Turkish-English Lexicon, published in 1890, one of the definitions of Turkestan was Turkey and the Turkish Empire.<sup>321</sup>

The last census made in Turkestan prior to the revolution was the 1897 census, where Central Asians were categorized as Kirghiz, Turkmen, Sart, Uzbek and Tajiks.<sup>322</sup> According to the census which excluded Bukharan and Khivan territories, it was estimated that there were nearly four million Kirgiz (Kirgiz-Kaisaki and Kara-kirgiz) and almost one million Sarts and less than 750 thousand Uzbeks in the empire.<sup>323</sup>

### 3.4.3 Jadidism and National Reform Among the Turkestanis

According to Kafadar, it is known from the Latin sources of the 12<sup>th</sup> century to the 20<sup>th</sup> century that, many western accounts of Anatolia and/or the Ottoman Empire used different versions of the word Turchia or Turkiya. However, there were no widespread uses of these terms by the natives, neither as a political concept nor as a geographical description.<sup>324</sup> A similar situation was also valid for Turkestan itself. The existence of a common and well-defined Turkestan identity is difficult to claim, especially prior to the 19<sup>th</sup> or early 20<sup>th</sup> century, when the Jadid education model introduced Western values to the natives.

In 1900, Russia annexed Eastern Pamirs, thus ending the Russian advance in the region, reaching the English-Afghan realm. In 1905, the Russian revolution took place and ended with the declaration of constitutional Monarchy. Tribal and social structure

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<sup>321</sup> J.W. Redhouse, *A Turkish English Lexicon* (Istanbul, 1890), p. 536.

<sup>322</sup> K. Fortunatov', *Natsional'niya Oblasti Rossii. (Opyt' statisticheskogo izsledovaniya po dannym' vseobschey perepisi 1987 g.)* (S.-Peterburg: Knigoizdatel'stvo Trud i bor'ba, 1906), p. 15. In p. 14 Fortunatov put an information note that "apart from Tajiks, who is a Persian stock, all others were Tyurco-Tatars among which only Uzbek and Sart are settled.

<sup>323</sup> Curiously, in p. 19, Fortunatov made a table which shows the ethnic distribution in the oblasts, where Samarkand's population is %58,8 Uzbek and %26,9 Tajik, but Fergana's population is %50,0 Sarts and %9,7 Uzbeks and %12,8 Kara-kirgiz. The valley Uzbeks were almost totally considered as Sarts in this census, without pointing out any difference between the two.

<sup>324</sup> C. Kafadar, *Between Two worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley: University Press, 1995), p. 4.

of Turkestan was very complex at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and most of the energy of the newly emerging Jadid local intelligentsias was spent on the determination and elimination of the ethnical differences.<sup>325</sup> Following the year 1905, a serious power vacuum occurred in Turkestan causing several peasant revolts against the Russian presence in the region as well as to local Russian settlers supported by the Governorship General. “One guerilla leader, Namaz Piri, soon became a legend in his life-time. Years later, Lenin himself praised Piri as a ‘Robin Hood of the desert’ and a veritable revolutionary leader of his people.”<sup>326</sup> Although most of these rebellions were judged as the “nationalist” uprisings in the later Turkestani émigré literature and historiography, they were rather economic as well as religious in nature. 1905 reforms in Russia resulted with the liberalization of Tsarist censorship over the native education and publishing activities in Turkestan. The young Jadid intellectuals started to open one school after another, following the pattern of their mentor, İsmail Bey Gaspıralı, in Crimea.<sup>327</sup> So, from 1905 on, an important influx of Jadid-Turkic periodicals started to appear in Turkestan after the first issue of *Orta Asiya'nın Ömürgüzarlığı*(1905).<sup>328</sup> The terms Turkestan and Turan, in their historical, geographical and broader meanings survived during this period, irrespective of the existence of Tsarist Turkestan General

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<sup>325</sup> See Togan p. 39-41 for a list of Kazak Tribes and social organization. P. 42-45 for a list of Uzbek tribes and social organization. P. 68-72 for a list of Kyrgyz tribes and social organization. p. 73-76 for a list of Turkmen tribes and their social structure. P. 76-81 for a good description of Taciks and their social structure. And p. 80-81 on the roots of the term Tacik explaining different approaches.

<sup>326</sup> Amir Taheri, *Crescent in a Red Sky: The future of Islam in the Soviet Union* (London: Hutchinson, 1989), p. 84.

<sup>327</sup> İsmail Bey Gaspıralı visited Turkestan and Bukharan Emirate in 1893. While he was in Samarkand, he opened a Jadid school in the city using the new method of teaching reading and writing in forty days to the pupils. In Bukhara, he established very close and warm relations with the Bukharan Emir, but failed to open a new method school in this traditional city. However, this visit became a source of inspiration for the local notables and intelligentsia, who, soon, became close followers of Gaspıralı's new method teaching system. See Hakan Kırımlı. *Kırım Tatarlarında Millî Kimlik ve Millî Hareketler (1905-1916)*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1996, p. 56.

<sup>328</sup> Çağatay Koçar, *Türkistan ile ilgili Makaleler* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı yayınları/1272, 1991). Following, we see Tarakkiy (1906), Hurşid (1906), Şûhrat (1907-1908), Asiya (1908), Buhâra-î Şarîf (1912-1913), Samarkand (1913), Ayna (1913-1915), Sadâ-yı Türkistân (1914), Sadâ-yı Fergana (1914), Al-İslâh (1915-1918), Tüccar (1907), Uluğ Türkistân (1917-1918), Al-İzâh (1917), Turan (1912), Buhâra (1913). All of them were closed either by the Russian censorship or by the Bukharan Emir's pressures.

Governorship as an administrative unit over these territories. At the beginning of the century, even for some Russian officials, north of Syr Darya was still '*Turanian Steppe*'.<sup>329</sup> Jadids, who were the part of the reformist intelligentsia of the natives, were soon to be confronted by the reactionary and traditionalist Kadimist intelligentsia.<sup>330</sup> The Jadidist-Kadimist struggle over the educational system and Muslim publications continued until the 1917 revolutions.

In 1905, Ismail Bey Gaspıralı noted that Abdürreşid [İbrahim] was calling the natives of Turkestan Sarts, however Gaspıralı used the terms Turkestanis and Kyrgyz Kazakis for the natives of the region.<sup>331</sup> The widespread usage of the term Sart by the Russians for the whole settled population of the region, apparently was accepted by the native intelligentsia up to a certain degree. However, Gaspıralı's emphasis on the use of Turkestani, Kyrgyz-Kazak identities showed the authentic approach of him to the issue. However Abdürreşid İbrahim continued his stand on the ethno-politics of the region quite opposite from Gaspıralı's stand. According to Abdürreşid İbrahim, in 1907, the residents of Bukhara were all Tajiks who also spoke some Uzbek too.<sup>332</sup> However, Samarkand was completely a Turkic populated city whose residents could also speak some Persian.<sup>333</sup> He separated the Kazaks and Kyrgyz of the Yedisu region from each other. That was probably one of the first categorical separation of Kazaks [Kirghiz-in Russian literature] from the Kyrgyz [Kara Kirghiz in Russian literature]. He cleared his

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<sup>329</sup> A. Polovtsoff, *The Land of Timur: Recollections of Russian Turkestan* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1932). He was a white Russian émigré in Paris then.

<sup>330</sup> For the national composition of Turkestan before 1917 and the Jadidist-Qadimist struggle in the region See R.G. Landa, *İslam v İstorii Rossii* (Moscow: Izdatel'skaya Firma Vostochnaya Literature, 1995), pp. 141-170, and 171-188.

<sup>331</sup> See İsmail [Gastrula], "Hurried ve Cabin-i Türkistan," *Tercüman*, No: 91, 7 November 1905, p. 1.

<sup>332</sup> Abdürreşid İbrahim, *20. Asrın Başlarında İslam Dünyası ve Japonya'da İslamiyet, volume I* (İstanbul: Yeni Asya Yayınları, 1987), p. 48.

<sup>333</sup> Abdürreşid İbrahim, p. 51.

stand on the Sart terminology in this book, by identifying them as the “townspeople” of Turkestan, irrespective of their ethnic origins.<sup>334</sup>

An important part of Kazak intelligentsia was rather isolated in the North, concentrated in Orenburg, and were under direct Russian influence. Most of them attended Russian schools in the region. One of the early products of Russian schooling, the renowned Kazak scholar, Chokan Valikhanov claimed that the historical and blood relation with the Russians was enough for Kazaks who would voluntarily accept Russian suzerainty over the step.<sup>335</sup> However, the Southern Kazaks in Jetisu and Syr-Darya regions were completely a part of the rest of the Turkestanian Jadid movement, along with the upcoming Turkestanist positions of the Turkestanis. After 1905 the Revolution Kazak intelligentsia was divided into two major groups. The first one was the Southern based, the pan-Turkist group which created a circle around the *Ay-Qap* Journal. The other group was rather concentrated around the *Kazak* newspaper, who were against any unification with the “Tatars” and were rather *Kazak* nationalists.<sup>336</sup> The nationalist-reformist intelligentsia, though, was isolated from the scattered Kazak masses of the vast Steppe region until the 1917 revolution. Even after the 1917 Revolution it is seen that their quantity, quality, organizational capabilities and influences over their own masses were not enough to run an efficient governmental structure.<sup>337</sup>

One of the causes of the 1905 reforms in Russia was the defeat at the hands of the Japanese Armies in the Far East. Accelerating the Russian efforts to connect all parts of their huge lands, this defeat also had its two-fold impact on Turkestan. In 1906, the Russians completed the Orenburg-Tashkent railroad, connecting Turkestan with

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<sup>334</sup> Abdürreşid İbrahim, p. 60.

<sup>335</sup> Ch.Ch, Valikhanov, *Stati* (Alma-Sata: Perepiska, 1947), p. 5.

<sup>336</sup> S. Asfendiarov, *İstoriya Kazakhstana s Drevneyshikh Vremen* (Alma-Ata: Kazak Üniversitesi, 1993), pp. 273-5.

<sup>337</sup> S. Asfendiarov, p. 276.



European Russia. That was the first railroad line opening Turkestan to the outside world, especially more Tatar Jadids as well as traders. The second impact of the defeat was the fact that Jadids, first time started to think that this European giant, Russia, could be fragile to an Asian nation, Japanese, who shared the unfortunate destinies of the rest of Asians but overcame all difficulties through reforms and an excellent educational system.

By 1907, the spelling Turkestan, instead of its original previous version Turkistan, as discussed above, was promoted in the English language sources. Even for the Northern Afghan provinces and the area north of the Afghan territories Turkestan term was widely employed.<sup>338</sup> The use of Central Asia also increased in frequency, in most cases covering a vast area including Thibet, Eastern and Western Turkestan as well as Afghan (Southern) Turkestan.<sup>339</sup>

Count Pahlen, who spent a year in 1908-9 in the region, said that Turkestanis should have appreciated Russian rule, which was too tolerant compared to the native rulers.<sup>340</sup> He had a point of truth, while one takes the fugitive Turkestani intelligentsia living in the Russian quarters of the cities like Kagan, Samarkand or Tashkent, who found safety only in these places, all over Turkestan. Interestingly, for Pahlen, Turkestan meant a bit more than the classical Russian Governorship, an area which "is separated from the rest of the world by waterless deserts in the west, by uninhabited deserts [Steppe] in the north, and by the lofty ranges of the Tyan-Shan, Altay, Pamir and Hindu Kush in the East..."<sup>341</sup> His approach to the Jadids organizing themselves and launching publication of journals, newspapers and books was rather skeptical. All the

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<sup>338</sup> David Fraser, *The Strategic Position of Russia in Central Asia*, p. 11-12. Proceedings of the Central Asian Society. Annual Meeting of the Central Asian Society. Read in June 12, 1907.

<sup>339</sup> David Fraser, *The Strategic Position of Russia in Central Asia*. P. 9 and 10.

<sup>340</sup> Count K.K. Pahlen, *Mission to Turkestan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). His memoirs of 1908-9, when he was at an inspection duty in Turkestan, p. 16.

<sup>341</sup> Count K.K. Pahlen, p. 1.

Muslim organizations in Turkestan, were perceived by Pahlen, as having direct connection to the “center” in Istanbul - probably the Young Turks - standing for a Muslim unity all over Asia.<sup>342</sup>

As it was well inserted by Ismail Bey Gaspıralı and his follower Jadids in several instances, the Russians also equated the terms Musulman (Muslim) with Turkic people, Tatar etc. A Belorussian newspaper, *Nasha Niva*, was informing its readers in 1910 that Tyurk and Musulman meant the same nation and the Musulmans of the empire were either Tyurks or Tatars, *Tyurkskih* (Turkic) people. The same issue also included that the Chinese controlled territories in western China were in fact called Eastern Turkestan,<sup>343</sup> thus a politico-geographical continuation of Russian Turkestan.

The first known political activities of Turkestani intelligentsia was started in 1910-12 in Istanbul by a group that arrived in the capital secretly from the Bukharan Emirate, which included notables like Abdurrauf Fitrat, Osman Hoca, Sadık Aşuroğlu and others.<sup>344</sup> Their secret society *Terbiye-i Etfal* (education of children) sent fifteen students in 1911 and thirty more in 1912 to both Istanbul and Germany.<sup>345</sup> The period they spent in Istanbul was the height of pan-Turkist propaganda of Union and the Progress Party and Enver Pasha’s power. They returned to Turkestan with a fresh exiting pan-Turkist idealism. The foundations of the Young Bukharans and Alaş Orta Parties in 1909 and 1912 were realized in such an atmosphere of the Young Turk reformation in the Ottoman Empire and the rise of pan-Turkism all over Turkic lands.

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<sup>342</sup> Richard Pierce (ed), N.J. Couris (trans.), *Mission to Turkestan: Being the Memoirs of Count K.K. Pahlen*, 1908-9 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 51.

<sup>343</sup> G. Alisova, "Musul'mane v Rasey," *Nasha Niva* (18 November 1910). No. 47, pp. 708-9. But the Russian Turkestan was called as Middle Asia rather than geographically Turkestan.

<sup>344</sup> Timur Kocaoğlu, "Türkstanlı Göçmenlerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri Tarihine Bir Bakış," in *Dr. Baymirza Hayit Armağanı*. Ed by Rasim Ekşi and Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Turan Kültür Vakfı and Hoca Ahmed Yesevî Vakfı, 1999), p. 159.

<sup>345</sup> Kocaoğlu, p. 159.

### 3.4.4 World War I and Turkestan

The Imperial Tsarist administration of Turkestan was a heavily military administration, with no access to the natives for any kind of local self-government. It was only within the realms of the Bukharan Emirate and the Khivan Khanate, internal affairs of these states were left to the hands of autocratic rulers.<sup>346</sup>

A western traveler who visited Turkestan in 1914 noted that "...Turkestan and Russian Central Asia are extremely loyal, peaceful and happy Russian colonies."<sup>347</sup> In these accounts of S. Graham, one can find a new Turkestan concept, which meant simply the lands of the Turkestan Governorship General, Bukharan and Khivan realms. The concept for the north of "Turkestan" was subsidized by the introduction of a rather inclusive concept, Central Asia, in fact Russian part of Central Asia. This was at the time the usages of the term Turkestan was quite popular to mean only the Russian Governorship.<sup>348</sup> Ethnically, Turkestan was basically a cosmopolitan Russian colony in Asia.<sup>349</sup> Quite similar to Hindustan (India), it was cosmopolitan, and it needed a super-western power to be administered. Although the region was closed to general immigration prior to the War, there was still an influx of new settlers until the war,<sup>350</sup> thus contributing to the cosmopolitan nature of the area.

Between the years 1914-1916, Russians doubled all the taxes they were collecting in Turkestan, creating a further pressure on the native *dikhans* class, given the

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<sup>346</sup> For more on the Turkestan under late Tsarist administration see V. I. Masalskiy, *Turkestanskiy Kray* (St. Petersburg: Izd. F. Devriena, 1913).

<sup>347</sup> Stephen Graham, *Through Russian Central Asia* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), p. 74. This author uses Chinese Tartary for Eastern Turkestan and uses Turkestan not only for the exact borders of the Russian governorate general but also for Bukhara and Khiva as well. See p. 52.

<sup>348</sup> Edward Hallett Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923*. Volume One (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), pp. 329-30.

<sup>349</sup> Stephen Graham, *Through Russian Central Asia* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), p. 24 (Notes of a journey to the region in 1914)

<sup>350</sup> Stephen Graham, p. 154-156 and p. 166.

colonial Russian settlers kept themselves free from the center's taxation.<sup>351</sup> On the 25<sup>th</sup> June 1916, the Russian Emperor ordered the conscription of all males between the ages 19-43 into the labor units of the Russian army.<sup>352</sup> The 1916 uprising started just after these measures. Because, firstly it was humiliating for them to work for the labor units only and secondly the Caliph-Ottoman Sultan was fighting against Russians.<sup>353</sup> The Russian army was ruthless in dealing with this uprising. As a result, probably several thousands of Turkestanis were killed.<sup>354</sup> Most of the nomadic portion of the population subject to the Imperial conscription fled to Eastern Turkestan. The forced conscription continued until the 1917 Revolutions. However a very small number of the conscripted regiments arrived at the fronts.

The 1916 rebellion, together with the growing concerns about the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire accelerated the growth of the Turkestani and Turkic consciousness among the members of the Turkestani Jadid intelligentsia.<sup>355</sup> The very existence of the Turco-Russian rivalry in the War, together with the Tsar's 1916 *prikaz* caused the 1916 July rebellion in Turkestan, resulted with great intellectual and psychological complexities among the Turkestanis.<sup>356</sup> One of the best examples of these

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<sup>351</sup> Çağatay Koçar, *Türkistan'daki 1916 Yılı Milli Ayaklanmasının 70. Yıldönümü*. X. Türk Tarih Kongresinden Ayıbasım (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), pp. 773-774. See also H. Tursunov, *Özbekistan'da 1916 Yılı Halk Qozğalanı* (Tashkent: ANUZSSR, 1966), pp. 33-41.

<sup>352</sup> For the full text of the "Ukaz of the Russian Emperor Nikolai II on the conscription of the male aliens to the labor units," see, *Vosstanie 1916 g. v Sredney Azii i Kazakhstane; Sbornik Dokumentov* (Moscow: İzd. AN SSSR, 1960), pp. 25.

<sup>353</sup> According to Koçar, Turkestanis did not have any intention to work and/or fight against their fellow Muslim brothers. P. 775.

<sup>354</sup> For an extensive account and Russian and Kazak archival documents concerning the 1916 rebellion see *Kaharlı 1916 jil: Kujattar men materialdar jinağı* (Almaty: Kazakistan, 1998). See also Çağatay Koçar, p. 782. Koçar gives a death toll like 673,347, which is very doubtful taking into consideration, the Tsar's order only covering 485 thousand male population of Turkistan (Turkestan and Steppe Governorships in joint) that time.

<sup>355</sup> For a Turkish account of the 1616 rebellion and life in Turkestan in 1915-17 period see Fahrettin Erdoğan, *Türk Elllerinde Hatıralarım* (Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1954). Erdoğan was an Ottoman soldier in the first year of the war and spent 1915-17 period in Turkestan as a POW. He was an Uzbek himself from Divriği's Yağbasan village. He counts the ethnic groups in Turkestan as Uzbeks, Turkmens, Taciks, Sart-Uzbeks and Kyrgyz-Kazaks, which supports the idea of clear-cut ethnic identities, existed prior to the revolution in Turkestan.

<sup>356</sup> See Bagali Kasymov, *Revolutsiya I Literatura: zarozhdeniye I razvitiye uzbekskoy revolyutsionniy poezii 1905-1917 gody* (Tashkent: Fan, 1991), pp. 17-29.

complexities could be observed in Cholpan's (Abdülhamid Süleyman) poem at the end of the First World War, for the Turks of Turkey. It was a good example of strong pan-Turkist movement among the members of the Uzbek intelligentsia of the time:

My brother, far away, so greatly suffering,  
My brother, alike a tulip broken,  
Is not Altai our common mother?  
Have we not played on her slopes,  
Did not the cool mountain springs  
Splash for us, run for us through the rocks,  
Were not our horses the wild steeds,  
Running like the whirlwind?  
In the golden days thou didst part from me  
And go to the Middle [Mediterranean] and Black Seas?  
But I remained like a bird,  
Opening not my wings,  
And none was left to show me the way.  
The enemy's bullet struck my heart and I sank down:  
I was thrust into a dark prison and shut in.  
And than, O Master?  
Have we Turks lost the heart of the lion?  
Because cowards and weary of war?  
Is the fire in our hearts put out?  
And our fathers' blood dried up?  
Oh brother, thou there and I here,  
Both in dire distress.  
Come, let us go again to the Altai,  
And mount the golden throne of our fathers.<sup>357</sup>

Prior to the revolution, Kazak, Kyrgyz, Turkmen and Shibanid Uzbeks (or Taza [Fresh]-Uzbeks) had their strict tribal structures. "Sart" Uzbeks and Tajiks as a sedentary population lost their tribal affinities.<sup>358</sup> The tribal groups of Mangyt, Kungrat, Kitay and Nayman were the major common groups among the Kazak, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. The Çağatays of Fergana consisted of Karluks, Kypchaks, Turks<sup>359</sup> and Kuramans would claim a rather different "Turk" heritage different from other tribal

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<sup>357</sup> Translation by Sir Olaf Caroe, in his volume; *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism* (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1967), p. 228.

<sup>358</sup> Alexandre Bennigsen, *The Evolution of the Muslim Nationalities of the USSR and their Linguistic Problems* (London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1961), p. 5.

<sup>359</sup> Turks of Fergana Valley still exists as a completely separate tribal group, who both identify themselves as Turks, not Tjurks, and also their nationality on their passports were written as Turok or Turk.

groups.<sup>360</sup> However, just prior to the 1917 revolution it was possible to speak about the existence of three main ethnic groups in Turkestan: the Kazak-Kyrgyz group, the Uzbek-Tajik group and the Turkmen group.<sup>361</sup> All these groups, were claiming “Turk” or Turki identity as well as historical heritage.

### 3.5 Summary

The territories covered by the Turkestan concept have changed throughout history, mainly together with the movement of Turkish tribes from the northeast toward the southwest direction in Asia. To the native Persian stock of the region, anywhere populated by the Turks would naturally be called Turkestan, “the country of the Turk(s).”

Probably one of the first usages of the term Turkestan was by the Armenian priest Sebēos in the 7<sup>th</sup> century AD, which coincided with the expansion of the Turkic Kaganate towards the west. From that time on, “ancient Turan” was known as Turkestan. While several other names and terms had been introduced by the pieces of Persian, Arab, Russian, Assyrian, Mongol, English literatures on the region, only the term Turkestan has survived to the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The region became the possessions of several native and alien empires throughout its history. Each and every one of them needed to call it by one single name. This name was mostly the “Turkestan” region, province, district, country, land, etc. It was lastly conquered by the Russian Empire and named the “Turkestan Governorship General” in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The repeated uses of the term for different places in the world populated by Turks, like for the whole territories of the

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<sup>360</sup> Alexandre Bennigsen, p. 15.

<sup>361</sup> Alexandre Bennigsen, p. 27.

Ottoman Empire, Central Anatolian plateau also reflects the fact that the term Turkestan has been used to designate almost anywhere populated by Turks.

Throughout the centuries, several different definitions of the limits of the region were appeared. However by the end of 18<sup>th</sup> and beginning of 19<sup>th</sup> century, just prior to Russian conquest, its rough meaning covered the huge area from Siberia to Northern Afghanistan, and from Caspian Sea to Lob Nor desert. It was in fact after the Russian advance in the region and the establishment of Step and Turkestan General Governorships, Turkestan concept was limited with a new political meaning, the territories of the Empire's Turkestan Governorship, which were subject to constant changes as the Russian advance to South continued until the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. From then on, the usages like "Turkestan and Step," "Turkestan and Bukhara," "Turkestan and Khiva," reflected rather political entities in the broader region of "Russian Turkestan." For the natives residing in Step Governorship, Bukharan Emirate or Khivan Khanate, there was no such a problem either or not belonging to a common Turkestani identity. They were Turkestanis [Türkistanlıklar] in general, residing in different administrative units within the broader geographical region of Turkestan under the rule of White Tsar [Ak Padişah].

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **TURKESTAN UNITED AND DISUNITED**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

In this chapter, the unification and division processes of Turkestan are examined. Both the February and October revolutions of 1917 played very special roles in 20th century Turkestan. The liberal atmosphere of the first one resulted in the creation of national states in Turkestan, Turkestan Autonomy and Alaş Orda, whereas the latter destroyed these states. Probably as important as these, was the planning and implementation of the national-territorial delimitation of Soviet Central Asia which destroyed traditional states like Bukhara, Khiva (Khorezm) as well as Turkestan ASSR and produced new “national” national units in the region.

#### **4.2 Turkestan On the Eve of the 1917 Revolution**

Under the Tsarist Russian rule, two important administrative regulations were made in Turkestan. The first one was the establishment of the Step General Governorship, and the second one was the establishment of the Turkestan General Governorship combining the lands of Khokand, Khiva and Bukhara conquered by the Russians. Although populated by nomadic Kazaks, Jetisu (Semirechie) was included into Turkestan. So, when the 1917 revolution took place, there were five administrative entities in Central Asia: The General Governorships of the Steppe and Turkestan, the Transcaspian Province, the Bukharan



Emirate and the Khivan Khanate. The Transcaspian Region was associated with Turkestan the General Governorship from 1905 on, but remained as an autonomous part of it in administrative matters.

The political and geographical concept of Russian or Western Turkestan covered the lands of the Bukharan Emirate and Khivan Khanate, irrespective of both being politically separate entities. Published in 1917, an American intelligence report on Turkestan defined the limits of the region as:

Western or Russian Turkestan is bounded on the west by the Caspian Sea, on the South by Persia and Afghanistan, on the east by China, and on the north by the Russian provinces of Semipalatinsk, Akmolinsk, Turgai and Uralsk. For administrative purposes this area is divided into five provinces, i.e. Transcaspia, Syr-Darya, Samarkand, Fergana and Semirechensk; there are in addition the two semi-independent Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara.<sup>1</sup>

To them, there was no one single Turkestani nation with a standard European definition of the term “nation”. However, there were Turkestani “peoples” with minor differences in language and life styles. These “peoples” of Turkestan, as they were considered by the above-mentioned report, were: the Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Sarts, Turkomans, Karakalpaks, Taranchis, Kipchaks,<sup>2</sup> Tajiks and Dungans. It is also underlined that Sart was completely an economic term, not a name for an ethnic group.<sup>3</sup> These “little differences” among the “peoples” of Turkestan and their historical and cultural commonalities with the Turks of Turkey caused anxiety on the part of those concerned with American security.

The importance of Turkestan in the development of the Pan-Turanian Movement, and its significance to the German plans for world dominion, are considerable... Pan Turanian emissaries from Constantinople have been active ever since the war began and the disturbances may be in part the result of their efforts.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Roland B. Dixon, “Western or Russian Turkestan, March 8, 1918,” MC 1107, Inquiry Doc. 134. The *National Archives* (Washington D.C.: Records of Department of State, Inquiry Documents “Special Reports and Studies” 1917-1919), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> That should mean either Uzbek or Kazak Kipchak tribes in central Turkestan.

<sup>3</sup> Roland B. Dixon, part III, p. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Roland B. Dixon, part IV, p. 1-2.

Given the ever-increasing political instability in the Russian Empire and the ending of the First World War, the potential Pan-Turanian was one of Ottoman Turkey's last cards in her war plans. Turkestan would be the first fragile piece of the Empire to break away. Arnold Toynbee prepared a *Report on the Pan-Turanian Movement* for the British Intelligence in October 1917, in which he argued that:

The problem of Turkish Nationalism in Central Asia was infinitely remote before the Russian Revolution; the Revolution has made it imminent... If Russia falls to pieces, Central Asia will be the first fragment to break away...the pan-Turanian problem in Central Asia thus gives the British Empire a vital interest in the internal evolution of Russia-a permanent interest apart altogether from the war. Turkish speaking Central Asia may either remain part of Russia and gravitate towards Baku and Kazan, or break away from Russia and gravitate towards Constantinople, and the latter alternative would directly prejudice our security.<sup>5</sup>

Current scholarly works established the idea that, prior to 1917 revolution, Turkestanis would not identify themselves only by their dialects (languages) as Uzbek, Kazak or Tajik;<sup>6</sup> the primary and most important element of self-identification was religion. Muslim identity was effective together with all other types of identification elements. Prior to the Revolution, W. W. Barthold argued that the settled population of Central Asians had only a religious and territorial-local identity, and there was nothing like a national or common Turkestani solidarity.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, the nomadic portion of the population was rather identified by tribal federations and sub-clans. Zeki Velidî [Togan], in this respect, classified the natives of Turkestan as the "settled" and "nomadic". The precondition for identification was one's mode of life, and whether it was nomadic/semi-

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<sup>5</sup> A[mold] J T[oynbee], "Report on the Pan-Turanian Movement" (London: Intelligence Bureau Department of Information, 1917); "Special Reports and Studies" 1917-1919, MC 1107, Inquiry Doc. 458, *The National Archives* (Washington D.C.: Records of Department of State, Inquiry Documents).

<sup>6</sup> Alexandre Bennigsen, "The Nature of Ethnic Consciousness in Soviet Central Asia" A paper prepared for delivery at conference on *Soviet Central Asia: trends and changes* (Washington D.C.: International communications agency, October 31, 1978), p. 12.

<sup>7</sup> See V.V. Bartol'd, "Sart," *Sochineniya*, V. 2-2 part I (Moscow: 1964), p. 528-9.

nomadic (Kyrgyz-Uzbek) or settled Sart. Zeki Velidî considered all Sarts with Turkic roots. According to him, Sarts, in general, identified themselves with city-locality names such as *Tashkentlik* (Taškendî), *Kokandlik* (Hokandî), etc. In this sense, the use of the name Uzbek had very limited meaning.<sup>8</sup> There were also observable racial differences among the natives.<sup>9</sup> Despite all these differences and classifications, there existed a common Turkestani identity among the natives, which appeared first during the 1905-1917 period, but much persistently and clearly in the 1917-1924 period.

#### 4.3 Turkestan Between February and October 1917

One of the first steps taken by the Kerenskiy's government about Turkestan was to issue an amnesty for the Kyrgyz-Kazak rebels in the 1916 events.<sup>10</sup> This step simultaneously turned into a source of hope for the Turkestani Jadid intelligentsia on the matter of the democratization of Russia. Under the Tsarist rule, the Turkestani Muslims were considered as aliens (*inorodtsy*),<sup>11</sup> Whereas, the February 1917 revolution and the provisional government of Kerenskiy provided certain rights – such as the rights to form organizations and publish newspapers free from censorship.

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<sup>8</sup> A. Zeki Velidî [Togan], "Türkistan Matbuatı," *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, volume 2, 1928, p. 606.

<sup>9</sup> Generally accepted racial features of the peoples of Turkestan in Modern times explained by Wheeler as: "The Uzbeks and Tadjiks are members of the Caucasoid race. Their type is what we call as Central Asian riverain. Mongoloid characteristics can be observed among the Tadjiks (mostly of plain areas), Karategin and Darvaz mountaineers and also among the Uzbeks of the Northern Khorezm and Kypchal Uzbeks in Fergana. Kazaks and Kirghiz are of the South Siberian type. They are formed in the process of the intercourse of Central Asian Mongoloids with the Kazaks of Caucasoid type. Turkmens have predominantly Caucasoid physical features, but unlike the Caucasoid Uzbeks and Tadjiks, they are dolichocephalic and considerably taller" See Geoffrey Wheeler, pp. 9-10.

<sup>10</sup> "Amnistiya po vosstaniyu 1916 g." *Vestnik Vremennogo Pravitel'stva*, 18 March 1917, cited in S.M. Dimanshteyn (ed.), *Revolutsiya i Natsional'nyi Vopros*, Volume III (Moscow: Iz. Kom. Ak., 1930), pp. 70-71.

<sup>11</sup> The empire regarded all non-slavic stock as the aliens legally, whose low level of civic culture necessitating that.

The first Muslim revolutionary organization established in Turkestan was the Bureau of Turco-Tatar Organizations of the Turkestan Region, which had its first meeting on the 13-20<sup>th</sup> of April 1917 in Tashkent.<sup>12</sup> However, this was an exclusively Tatar revolutionary organization and had no or little native elements within it. Meeting in Tashkent on the 4-8<sup>th</sup> of April 1917, the first congress of the Turkestani Muslims established the Turkestan Muslim Central Council (*Türkistan Müslüman Merkezi Şurası*),<sup>13</sup> electing Mustafa Çokay as its president. In their resolution, on the 8<sup>th</sup> of April 1917, they demanded autonomy for Turkestan and called themselves “the Muslims of Turkestan”. They also explained that the very aim of the organization was to unite “all the patriots of Turkestan”. The conservative wing of the organization, headed by Şir Ali Lapin, later separated and established: the *Ulema Cemiyeti*. The reformists under Münevver Kari continued with the Council of Islam (*Şûrâ-yı İslâm*). This first Congress of the Muslims of Turkestan in Tashkent dealt, mostly with the questions of native religion, education and political representation within the Russian Democratic Republic.<sup>14</sup> With the efforts of Zeki Velidî, some Turkestanis decided to separate themselves from the Tatar unitarist wing in Petrograd and Moscow. It was also Zeki Velidî, who formulated and wrote the statute of Şura.<sup>15</sup>

The debate among the Muslim intelligentsia was on the type of autonomy. There were two different views: demanding a non-territorial cultural autonomy for all Muslims of

<sup>12</sup> *Kaspiy*, 7. May 1917, cited in Dimanstayn, p. 345. That was only a Tatar organization despite the name Turco-Tatar, aimed to organize Tatars in Turkestan.

<sup>13</sup> For the Bolshevik version of the story see, L. Z. Slivkin. *Ocherki Istorii Kommunisticheskoy Partii Turkestana II*. Tashkent: Gos. Iz. UzSSR, 1959, p. 71. According to Slivkin there was never a unity in the Şura and the representatives of the workers class within Şura and Ulema cooperated with the Bolsheviks in order to eliminate all nationalist elements in the near future.

<sup>14</sup> See the details of the congress in “S’ezd Turkestanskikh Musul’man,” *Kaspiy*, 30 April 1917, cited in Dimanstayn, pp. 345-46.

<sup>15</sup> Zeki Velidî Togan. *Hatıralar*, pp. 128-9.

the Russian Empire, or demanding a federal-territorial autonomy aimed at achieving full independence at the end. Along with the decisions of First all-Russian Congress, the Second all-Russian Muslim congress gathered on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of July 1917 in Kazan. There it was demanded a full spiritual, cultural and national autonomy for the Muslims of the former Empire.<sup>16</sup> The Turkestan Committee of the provisional government at the capital (Petrograd) was far from having any control over the Bolsheviks of Tashkent; and complaints about the Tashkent commune rose from the very first days of revolution.<sup>17</sup> The Kerenskiy government, unable to assert any political authority in Turkestan, kept its support for the Muslims to establish their own socio-cultural organizations.<sup>18</sup>

Even before the organization of the Council of Islam (*Şûrâ-yı İslâm*), the newspapers *Turan* and *Turan Society* were established under the auspices of the nationalist Musavatist Azeris in Tashkent.<sup>19</sup> The ideas of a pan-Turkic unity and a Turkestani union, for the sake of struggling against “the common enemy”, were propagandized in both *Turan* and then *Türk Eli* newspapers in Tashkent.<sup>20</sup> *Uluğ Türkistan* (Greater Turkestan), which was the organ of the Council of Islam and *Şûrâ-yı Ulemâ* at the same time, remained on its pan-Turkestanist stand especially with the anti Bolshevik issues on the 11<sup>th</sup>, 15<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> of November 1917, which soon led to its closure by the Turkestan ASSR *Sovnarkom*.<sup>21</sup> The very name *Uluğ Türkistan*, as the name of the official organs of Muslim intelligentsia in

<sup>16</sup> "organizatsiya musul'man" *Novaya Zhizn*. 30 October (12 November) 1917, no: 167 (161), p. 4.

<sup>17</sup> "sobytiya v Turkestan: soobshenie chlena Turkestanskago komiteta" *Novaya Zhizn*. 20 September (3 October) 1917, no: 132(126), p. 4.

<sup>18</sup> See "Sobytiya v Turkestan" *Rech'*. 21 Sept 1917. No: 222, p. 4. For Kerenskiy's telegram dated 20<sup>th</sup> of September to the congress of Muslim civil organizations in Tashkent, celebrating them for their faith in greater democratic freedoms and autonomy, concerned about economy.

<sup>19</sup> "Turan", *Turan*, 5 May 1917, Azeris in the organization included Abdullah Kasımzade, Muhammed Emin Efendizade.

<sup>20</sup> "Turk Ademi Merkeziyeti," *Türk Eli*, 28 October 1917, p. 2.

<sup>21</sup> Editorial, "Uluğ Türkistan," *Uluğ Türkistan*, 18 November 1917. But it continued its publication in Khokand afterwards.

Turkestan, was simply a sign of the unitarist stand of both the Council of Islam and Council of Ulema, concerning the political division of Turkestan general. Greater Turkestan (*Uluğ Türkistan*) also meant the unification of Eastern (Chinese), Northern (Steppe), Southern (Afghan) and Western (Russian) Turkestan.<sup>22</sup> According to the editors of *Uluğ Türkistan*, “all Muslims of Russia are one single nation and not separate groups, like Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Sart or Tatar.”<sup>23</sup> The early views of the Turkestani intelligentsia on the nationalities question can best be summarized with this approach of an Upper Muslim Identity.

The Russian civil war was away from Turkestan. Turkestan was expected to fall into the hands of either Whites or Reds depending on the results of the battle between the two on the Orenburg and Siberian fronts. Only the Aral fleet, in the Aral Lake and on the rivers during 1917, were involved in the fighting against the revolutionaries on the side of Tsarist forces.<sup>24</sup>

While the Tsarist policy of nationalities concentrated mostly on the Polish and Finnish questions, the Bolsheviks tried to prepare a comprehensive program to deal with the problems of all the peoples within the borders of the former Tsarist Empire.<sup>25</sup> That included Turkestan too. Even their earlier approach to the nationalities issue in Turkestan included a specialized division of ethnic groups. According to the earlier Bolshevik reading of the situation in Turkestan; “The former Tsarist colony of Turkestan had three distinct ethnic groups, that is, the Uzbek, Turkmen and Kyrgyz, and revolutionaries were ready to

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<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> See the issues of *Uluğ Türkistan* no. 1, 28, 29, 30 in 1917 for the details of the speeches of Ubeydulla Hoca, Münevver Karı and Şir Ali Lapin in the 14-22 April 1917 All Muslim Congress in Tashkent.

<sup>24</sup> Most probably on the side of whites. "Na Aralskom More" *Novaya Zhizn* 3 October (16 October) 1917, no: 143(137), p. 4.

<sup>25</sup> N. Turyakulov (Dervish). "Kirgizskiy vopros v Turkestane" *ZhN* no: 42 (98) 31 December 1920, p. 1. Tsarist policy of nationalities was only concentrated on Polish and Finnish problems. Kirghiz struggle against colonizer kulaks and national classes, especially in Semirechie oblast too many Russian settlers and double standards.

give all the nations of Turkestan their own identities”.<sup>26</sup> In 1917, the Russian colonial Kulaks were the main targets of the revolutionary propaganda in Turkestan.<sup>27</sup> The Kazak youth in the North, open to Russian influence much more than southern Turkestanis, was organized by the Bolsheviks as early as 1917 and by 1920 all these previous Jadid<sup>28</sup> associations were in the service of Revolution.<sup>29</sup>

In the early 1917-8 revolutionary literature, the Turkestan term, in some instances reflected the lands of former Tsarist General Governorship and the two “Middle Asian Khanates” Bukhara and Khiva. The widespread use of the term “Turkestan and Bukhara” should be read with political-administrative perspectives, as the two being separate administrative entities.<sup>30</sup>

#### 4.4 National(ist) Statehood in Turkestan, 1917-1924

##### 4.4.1 Turkestan [Khokand] Autonomy

Following the October Revolution, the leading native intellectuals met in Khokand and formed the first nationalist government in Turkestan. They established the “Turkestan Autonomous Government” on the 10<sup>th</sup> of December 1917. For the reasons of its limited *de facto* power on the field and influence all over Turkestan, this government was also referred to in the literature as the Khokand Autonomy.

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<sup>26</sup> R. Dingel'shgodt "Turkestan i oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya," *ZhN*, No. 24(122) 5 Nov 1921, p. 3-4.

<sup>27</sup> "Iz Turkestana" *ZhN* no: 38 (95) 2 December 1920, p. 2. 5<sup>th</sup> regional congress of Communist Party Turkestana on 12.10.1920 opened. Attacks on colonizer kulaks and nationalist bourgeois traditions of Russian settlers.

<sup>28</sup> A.N. "Uspekhi Kirgizii" *ZhN* no: 32 (89) 17 October 1920, p. 3. See for organization of Kirgiz youth etc.

<sup>29</sup> M Zorskiy (Munni) "Dvizhenie molodezhi v Sovetskoy Kirgizii" *ZhN* no: 36 (93) 17 November 1920, p. 1-2. Talep (in omsk), Igillik (in Orenburg) Jas Kazak (in Uralsk) Umut (in Troitsk) Talep (in Atbasar), Ukagaydar (in Kokchetau), Ilm Yuli (in Pavlodar), *Jas Azamat* (in Omsk) they were very active and should be coordinated. Kazak youth activists.

<sup>30</sup> See *Novaya Zhizn'*, "V Turkestane," 17(4) May 1918, no. 92(307), p. 2.

After February 1917, the Tashkent Soviet refused the calls for native representation in Turkestan, which was totally composed of non-natives as the former Tsarist army officers. The Tashkent Soviet was an exclusive representation of the Russian and European minority in Turkestan. The Tashkent Soviet's negative response to ideas of sharing any power forced Muslims to meet at the Fourth Congress of Muslims of Central Asia in Khokand in December 1917. There, the conservative Council of Ulema (*Ulema Cemiyeti*) and the reformist Council of Islam (*Şûrâ-yı İslâm*) allied with each other and also invited the anti-Bolshevik non-Turkestanis to the conference to achieve a full representation of the country. The result was the election of a *Halk Şurası* (Peoples' Council) composed of 36 Muslim and 18 non-Muslims, headed by Şir Ali Lapin. On 11<sup>th</sup> of December they established a ten-member cabinet of this parliament, declaring Turkestan an autonomous territory within the Russian Federal Democratic Republic. The declaration of Turkestan Autonomy was the practical result of the Turkestani Jadids' nationalist-democratic program.<sup>31</sup>

The Turkestan Autonomous Governments pan-Turkestanist stand was its most prominent feature. Its founding fathers claimed not only the territories of the former Tsarist General Governorship of Turkestan but also the territories of the Steppe General Governorship and the territories of the Bukharan Emirate and Khivan Khanate. Three seats in the Khokand government were left empty in case unification with the Alaş Orda and Turkestan (Khokand) governments was realized.<sup>32</sup> In fact, one of the first steps for the government was to organize a meeting with the leaders of Alaş Orda to discuss the details

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<sup>31</sup> The best book ever written on Turkestan Autonomy describes comprehensively how Cedid reform program turned into a political Turkestanist independence program in the course of events in Turkestan Autonomy. See Saidakbar Azamhocayev. *Türkistan Muhtariyati* (Tashkent: Manaviyat, 2000), pp. 125-35.

<sup>32</sup> Baymirza Hayit, *Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadeleleri Tarihi* (Ankara, TTK, 1995), pp. 247-8.



of this unification. To this end, the representatives of Alaş Orda and the Turkestan governments met in Turkestan City (Yesi) in January 1918.<sup>33</sup> Mustafa Çokay was the Foreign Minister of both the Alaş Orda and Turkestan governments; whereas the President of Turkestan Autonomy Tınışbay also acted as the Interior Minister of the Alaş Orda Government. Tınışbay resigned on the 15<sup>th</sup> of January 1918 due to financial difficulties; and Çokay became the president of the Turkestan Autonomy.<sup>34</sup> However, Mustafa Çokay's proposal to unite both governments and their claimed territories was not welcomed by the Kazak representatives. There were two different approaches among the Alaş Orda members on the issue. The president of the Alaş Orda, Alihan Bökeyhan, refused to unite with the Turkestan Autonomy in Khokand whereas Ahmet Baytursun's group demanded unification with Turkestan.<sup>35</sup> According to Olzsca-Cleinow, Bökeyhan was a radical reformist and didn't want to unite with conservative-reactionary Turkestan.<sup>36</sup> However, prior to the establishment of the Bolshevik power in the region, there seems to be no evidence to support this argument. It would be a rather hasty analysis to evaluate his manner in refusing unification with the Turkestan Autonomy with his later Kazak nationalist stand. Eventually, Bökeyhan's power and authority in Alaş Orda overcame Baytursun's demands for unification. After this important meeting, Bökeyhan increased the level of his Kazakism although Çokay's and Tınışbay's positions in the Alaş Orda government continued.

The Khokand government, calling itself the government of Autonomous Turkestan, asked the Bolsheviks of Turkestan to stay away from Khokand and accused them of being the local-colonial bourgeois class of the former regime with the same imperialist

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<sup>33</sup> Mambet Koygeldiyev, *Tutas Türkistan Ideası Cane Mustafa Şokayoğlu* (Almaty: 1997), pp. 33-38.

<sup>34</sup> Baymirza Hayit, *Türkistan*, p. 249.

<sup>35</sup> Baymirza Hayit, *Türkistan*, pp. 252-4.

<sup>36</sup> Olzscha-Cleinow, *Turkestan*, p. 385. See also Alihan Bökeyhanov, *Şıgarmalar* (Almaty: 1994), pp. 3345-55.

ambitions.<sup>37</sup> Çokay was quite successful in agitating Bolsheviks in Petrograd and Moscow against the continuation of the prestige and dominance of the former Tsarist officers in the Tashkent Soviet. In the lack of supplies and political power, Bolsheviks were unable to intervene in the situation in Turkestan. They were determined to negotiate with the winning side in Turkestan at the end of the civil war.<sup>38</sup> Appealing to Stalin to resolve the Tashkent Soviet, the Khokand Government received a reply advising them to use force to dissolve the Tashkent Soviet, if such a force was available to them. The Bolshevik central government never believed that the circumstances in the reactionary and backward Turkestan would allow them to promote a native Bolshevik movement in the region. That was the reason why no Turkestani delegate was invited to the meeting where the Muslim Commissariat was established in Moscow.<sup>39</sup>

*Zhizn Natsional'nostei*, the organ of the Peoples Commissariat for Nationalities, published articles highlighting the commonalities among the peoples of Turkestan. According to this Bolshevik propaganda, it was possible to speak about the existence of a single "Turkestani nation".<sup>40</sup> This Turkestani nation, suffered at the hands of colonial Tsarist officers, now found a democratic atmosphere to claim its own identity. However it

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<sup>37</sup> See. "Illyuzii i fakty: k sobytiyam v Turkestane," *Novaya Zhizn*, 2 January (3 February) 1918, no: 15(229), p. 15. See also in the same issue a telegram from Khokand, which was sent on 26<sup>th</sup> of December 1917 and signed by the first congress of Muslim workers and soldiers of Turkestan. The members of the congress declared that they were joining the forces of Russian Democratic Republic against "Tashkent anarchists" who will soon cause a catastrophe in Turkestan. The telegram was sent to Petrograd Soviet of Peoples Commissars from Khokand. In an article by Ahmed Salikhov "rezolutsiya kraevogo s'ezda voinov, rabochnikh musul'man po otosheniyu k avtonomii Turkestana," *Novaya Zhizn*, 2 January (3 February) 1918 no. 15 (229), p. 15-16, Turkestani "workers" were asking: "...we would like to ask Peoples Commissars, don't you against now your own principles when you support hegemonic policy of Russian colonists here?" [in Turkestan] And they have asked for immediate retreat of red guards and their replacement by their own Turkestan militia.

<sup>38</sup> For details of the short-lived Turkestan Autonomy and Çokay's account of the events, see Mustafa Çokay. *1917 Yılı Hatura Parçaları* (Ankara: Yaş Türkistan Neşriyatı, 1988).

<sup>39</sup> Only delegates from Murmansk, Petrograd, Caucasia, Crimea and Turkey were invited, including Sultan Galiyev and Mustafa Suphi, in 3 November 1918. See *ZhN*, no. 2, 17 November 1918, p. 6. Stalin's speech in this meeting, full of instructions published in the next issue "Rech' t. Stalina," *ZhN*, no. 3, 24 November 1918, p. 2.

<sup>40</sup> Editorial, "ocherk istorii razvitiya revolyutsii v turkestane I," *ZhN*, no. 3, 24 November 1918, p. 2.

was the Russian workers and soldiers who realized the revolution in Turkestan,<sup>41</sup> and that was their right to claim domination over the party. The arrest of General Kuropatkin was a turning point,<sup>42</sup> which helped Bolsheviks in Turkestan to persuade the native intelligentsia that they were not a continuation of imperialist Tsarist cadres.

The Government in Khokand was also in contact with the only White armed forces in Turkestan, which was Ataman Dutov's Cossack army, guaranteed the balance between the Bolshevik-led Tashkent Soviet and Khokand for a very short while. However, Dutov's idea of forming a South-Eastern anti-Bolshevik alliance did not find enough support among the Turkestanis.

By December 1917, all "bourgeois nationalist" periodicals in Tashkent, including *Türkistan Mecmuası*, *Uluğ Türkistan*, *Türkistan Sözü*, *Türkistan Kurveri*, *Yeni Türkistan* were closed in order to stop the Turkestanist propaganda.<sup>43</sup> Of course, it was quite meaningful for the revolutionary periodicals of the time to use the name Turkestan and even Greater Turkestan. The next step for the Tashkent Soviet was to destroy the Turkestan (Khokand) Autonomy. It resolved to liquidate it on the 31<sup>st</sup> of January 1918 and attacked Khokand on the night of 7<sup>th</sup> of February. Until 22<sup>nd</sup> of February the battle continued and with the support of the Armenian *Tashnaksutyun* militia the city was captured by the Bolsheviks, leaving over ten thousand dead and a city leveled to the ground.<sup>44</sup> The members of the government fled in different directions, while the remaining armed forces of the government started the *Basmacı* resistance in remote areas.

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<sup>41</sup> Editorial, "oчерk istorii razvitiya revolyutsii v turkestane II," *ZhN*, no. 4, 1 December 1918, p. 8.

<sup>42</sup> Editorial, "oчерk istorii razvitiya revolyutsii v turkestane III," *ZhN*, no. 5, 8 December 1918, p. 8.

<sup>43</sup> Slivkin, p. 146.

<sup>44</sup> Baymirza Hayit, *Türkistan*, pp. 250-51.

Years later, the Bolsheviks accused those who were responsible for this massacre, namely the *Tashnaksutyun* militiamen, of causing the subsequent native's strong support of the *Basmacı*.<sup>45</sup> That massacre marked the beginning of the Turkestani armed struggle against the Soviets, and in many cases with the demands for the restoration of Turkestan Autonomy.<sup>46</sup> Even during the later phases of the *Basmacı* movement, the main motto of the *Korbaşıs* (*Basmacı* commanders) remained the same: not recognizing the Bolshevik *Turkespublika* (Turkestan ASSR) and demanding the restoration of Turkestan Autonomy, as announced by Şirmet (Şirmuhammed) Korbaşı in 1921.<sup>47</sup>

While the Turkestan (Khokand) Autonomy more or less brought the representatives of all ethnic groups of the region within the *Şura* [Parliament] and in its government, it was only the Turkmens who preferred to stay away from all these developments. Turkmens stayed away from both the Turkestan Autonomy and then from the subsequent Turkestan ASSR; they even kept minimal attendance within the organs of the subsequent Khorezmian Peoples Soviet Republic. Their leaders, like Atabayev, were trying to establish their own statehood in the *Zakaspi*<sup>48</sup> region as early as the 1917-1918 period.<sup>49</sup> The Kyrgyz and Kazak representatives within the Parliament of the Turkestan Autonomy also fell into a serious tribal competition among themselves. Turkmens did not respond at all to the

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<sup>45</sup> Dervish. "Basmachestvo i ferganskaya problema," *ZhN*, no: 18 (116), 16 September 1921, p. 2-3. Population density, feudal structure, commercial bourgeois of Bukhara, backwards social-economic situation, conservative national-religious structure, hunger were all results of this [*Basmacı*] movement. The author also accused Armenian Tashnaksutyun militiamen for massacre and plunder of the city, which made Bolsheviks unpopular in the eyes of the natives and caused their support to the *Basmacı*s.

<sup>46</sup> Yu. Ibragimov. "Krasniy Turkestan," *ZhN*, no: 12 (20), 6 April 1919, p. 1. Ergash Korbaşı, who was the police chief of the Khokand government was the first to organize these armed guerillas against the Soviets, who kept repeating his demands for the restoration of Turkestan Autonomy and claimed the heritage of this government.

<sup>47</sup> Şirmet Korbaşı was not recognizing *Turkespublika* even for the peace negotiations, he was asking for the restoration of Turkestan Autonomy. See Editorial, "Borba s basmachestvom," *ZhN*, no. 21(119), 10 October 1921, p. 3.

<sup>48</sup> *Mavera-yi Bahri Hazer* in Turkish.

<sup>49</sup> Sh. Tashliev, *Ustanovlenie i uprochenie sovetской vlasti v Turkestane, 1917- iyun 1918 gg.* Ashkhabad: Turkmenskoe gosudarstvennoe izadatel'stvo, 1957, p. 92 and 143-4.

invitations of the Government for Turkmen representatives.<sup>50</sup> In addition to its failure to achieve the representation by all peoples in Turkestan, the *de facto* influence of the Turkestan Autonomy remained confined to the city of Khokand or rather a quarter of the city of Khokand itself.

The importance of this short-lived government, however, lies in its heritage. The fact that such an autonomous body was formed in one way or another first strengthened the positions of the natives within the Turkestan ASSR, and secondly showed the natural stands of the native intelligentsia to form a unified independent Turkestan in the region. Furthermore, the legacy of Khokand provided all Turkestani émigré politicians with the precedent of the existence, albeit a short-lived one, of a national autonomy. Mustafa Çokay himself became an émigré, who worked until his death in 1941 for the restoration of a free and independent Turkestan, as practiced in late 1917 and early 1918.

#### 4.4.2 Alaş Orda

Alaş<sup>51</sup> Party name was adopted during the 21-26 July 1917 Kazak Congress in Orenburg, replacing the name of the Kazak Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party, established in 1906. That was at exactly the same time as the July crisis of the Provisional government, which began to loose its control over the vast lands of the former Russian Empire. Bökeyhan left the Kadet Party in July because of the Kadet Party's negative

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<sup>50</sup> Mustafa Çokay, *1917 Yılı Hatıra Parçaları* (Ankara: Yaş Türkistan Neşriyatı, 1988).

<sup>51</sup> Alaş is a common battle cry among the nomadic Kazak and Kyrgyz tribes of Turkestan. A Kazak Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party was established by a group of Kazak intellectuals, taking advantage of the Russo-Japanese war and the first constitutional reforms in Russia. Some of the founders of the party were: Alihan Bökeyhanulı, Muhammetcan Tınışbayulı, Ahmat Birimcanulı, Ahmet Baytursunulı, Mircakıp Dulatulı, Ömer Karaşulı, Mustafa Çokayulı, Halil Abbasulı. See Hasan Oraltay, *Alaş: Türkistan Türklerinin Milli İstiklal Parolası* (İstanbul: Büyük Türkeli Yayınları, 1973). Alaş Orda government officially established on 13<sup>th</sup> of December 1917 and declared its autonomy. Although Oraltay argues that Alaş Orda Government declared "National Turkestani Independence" on this date, Alaş leaders only declared their autonomy from the central former Tsarist and contemporary revolutionary governments.

attitude towards the autonomous government plans of the Kazaks within the party.<sup>52</sup> The anarchy caused by this lack of control resulted in the October Bolshevik coup d'état, which meant more anarchy and political chaos for the Kazaks. Almost simultaneously with the declaration of the Turkestan Autonomy in Khokand, in December 1917, the Alaş Party established the Alaş Orda Government, which claimed sovereignty over the former Tsarist Steppe General Governorship's lands. Although, with almost no military and political control over the vast territory it claimed, it survived until March 1920. Following the Kazak Congress in Orenburg on the 18-26<sup>th</sup> of December 1917, the Alaş Orda Government was established theoretically as an autonomous body within Russia, under the Prime Ministry of Alihan Bökeyhan. Ataman Dutov was also there to support this government to secure his southeastern alliance plans. One of the first steps the Alaş Orda took, was to set up a military unit to be trained by the Cossack officers of Dutov,<sup>53</sup> which temporarily fought on the side of White armies after the shock caused by the massacre in Khokand.

Alaş Orda<sup>54</sup> was the only political representation for the Kazaks of the Steppe.<sup>55</sup> However, local Alaş politics were far from having any control over the vast Steppe; and the Kazak population remained open to the influences from both Whites and Reds.<sup>56</sup> The

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<sup>52</sup> Gülnar Kendirbai, "The Alash Movement in Kazakhstan," *The Turks* (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2002), Vol. VI, p. 857.

<sup>53</sup> N. Martynenko, *Alash Orda: Sbornik Dokumentov* (Alma-Ata: Kazakstan, 1992), p. 72.

<sup>54</sup> See the party program of Alaş Orda in Dimanstayn, pp. 363- 365. In the 10<sup>th</sup> article of the program, where Kazak-Kyrgyz lands were included into the concept of Turkestan.

<sup>55</sup> Baytursunov, "Revolutsiya i Kirgizy," *ZhN*, no: 29 (37), 3 August 1919, p. 1. In this article Ahmet Baytursun tried to justify Alaş Orda's policy of playing between the Whites and Reds during the course of 1917-1920 period while he explained the reasons of their entry into the Bolshevik service. Main reason was the disrespect to and humiliation of Alaş Orda Governments by the Whites in the region and their refusal to cooperate. Bolshevik program for nationalities and respect is much appreciated by Baytursun in this article. However, here Baytursun fails to mention the existence of *Uş Cüz* Party established in November 1917 as a Socialist party. Its leader Kólbay Togis had a reputation of being the member of Tsarist secret police in Omsk. This party, after the Soviet demonation in the Steppe joined the Bolsheviks.

<sup>56</sup> Editorial, "Tretiy oblastnoy s'ezd sovetov Bukeevskoy i Kirgizskoy stepi," *ZhN*, no: 26 (34), 13 July 1919, p. 2. See this article also for association of Kirgizia with Russia.

“bourgeois nationalist”<sup>57</sup> nature of Alaş Orda was already declared by the Bolsheviks, and for the latter, its historical role in the revolution was over by 1920.<sup>58</sup>

One of the main agenda of the arguments in the government was to decide whether to declare an independent statehood or to remain an autonomous part of Federal Russia. Bökeyhan and Baytursun agreed on organizing negotiations with both the Russians of the Steppe region as well as the Kazaks of the Turkestan Autonomy to discuss this matter.<sup>59</sup> However, the long-awaited answer from the Syr Darya Kazak Congress on the 5<sup>th</sup> of January 1918 was rather a disappointing one, as they preferred to stay within the Turkestan Autonomy.<sup>60</sup> The Kazak population of the lands claimed by Turkestan (Khokand) Autonomy was around three million residents in the Syr Darya and Jetisu districts.<sup>61</sup> Bökeyhan’s persistent Kazakism, apparently was not much appreciated by the Southern Kazaks.

In the person of Muhammed Tungaçin, who was the former carter of the Tsarist Governor General in Orenburg, Stalin found the single member of the non-existent “Kazak proletariat,” and appointed him as the Commissar of Nationalities in the Kazak Department.<sup>62</sup> Quite similar to the Turkestan (Khokand) Autonomy, the Alaş Orda Government in Jetitam (Semipalatinsk) was a moderate local Government in a quarter of the city. The *Kirrevkom* (Kyrgyz Revolutionary Committee) demanded the abolishment of Alaş Orda on 3<sup>rd</sup> of June 1920. Lenin ordered the creation of the Kyrgyz (i.e. Kazak) Autonomous SSR on 26 August 1920, and it was officially established in October in

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<sup>57</sup> In all post-revolutionary Soviet literature both Turkestan (Khokand) and Alaş Orda governments were labeled as “bourgeois nationalist” governments, as a stage of the revolution in the east.

<sup>58</sup> A. Liyanov, "Avtonomnaya Kirgiziya," *ZhN*, no: 30 (87), 1 October 1920, p. 1. The role of bourgeois Alaş Orda is finished like all counter revolutionary elements.

<sup>59</sup> Kendirbai, p. 858.

<sup>60</sup> Kendirbai, p. 859.

<sup>61</sup> Kendirbai, p. 859.

<sup>62</sup> Togan, *Bugünkü Türkili*, p. 377.

Orenburg. However, none of the members of the Alaş Orda government submitted to this demand and continued their activities in Jetitam. The Alaş members surrendered when the Frunze's Red army arrived in the region on 20<sup>th</sup> of December 1920.

The Alaş Orda Autonomy was much luckier than Turkestan Autonomy in terms of its choices and proximity to the theatre of war between the Whites and Reds. Most probably, this was the simple reason for its survival for three years in the middle of a bloody civil war. Although the three members of Alaş Orda and Turkestan Autonomous governments were the same persons, no strong evidence seems to exist to support the idea that the Alaş leaders had any consensus on their Turkestanist stand.

Bökeyhan's anti-unitary choice, although not supported by Baytursun and Devlethan, was a decisive point in the history of 20<sup>th</sup> century Turkestan. Apparently many in the contemporary Kazak intelligentsia were not much Turkestan-oriented.<sup>63</sup> In any case, the unification of both Turkestan (Khokand) and Alaş (Jetitam) governments could hardly have any immediate practical consequences for both, which were suffering from political, military and financial weaknesses then.

#### **4.4.3 Bukhara**

The chaos, which dominated the territories of the former Tsarist Empire after the 1917 February revolution resulted in the *de-facto* independences of the two subordinate states in Turkestan: the Bukharan Emirate and the Khivan Khanate. The Jadids of Bukhara were rather a secret society until the February revolution and voiced their demands for reform thereafter, taking advantage of the new circumstances. The Bukharan Emir Mir Alim Khan, under the pressure of both the Bukharan Jadids and the Tashkent Soviet,

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<sup>63</sup> Editorial, "O Kirgizskoy intelligentsii," *ZhN*, no: 37 (94), 25 November 1920.



published a “Declaration on the Liberties” on 30<sup>th</sup> of March 1917.<sup>64</sup> However, the Emir had no intention of letting these new liberties be used in real life. The Young Bukharans<sup>65</sup> under the leadership of Osman Hoca and Abdurrauf Fitrat organized a mass demonstration on the 8<sup>th</sup> of April 1917 to force the Emir to realize their reform program, which came under fire from the Emir’s soldiers. Young Bukharans were reformist liberals, escaping from the Emir’s prosecution, but by no means Communists or even revolutionaries.<sup>66</sup>

After the events on the 8<sup>th</sup> of April 1917, all prominent Jadids fled to Kagan and re-organized themselves to establish a cooperative relationship with the Tashkent Soviet. They presented a detailed project to the Tashkent Soviet in April 1917, enumerating the types of reforms and liberties they stood for.<sup>67</sup> Until the destruction of the Turkestan (Khokand) Autonomy in late February 1918, the Tashkent Soviet did nothing but promised its support for the reformists, now in Kagan, against the regime of the Emir. Just after storming Khokand, the Red Army proceeded to Bukhara with euphoria on the 15<sup>th</sup> of March 1918 where it faced defeat at the hands of the Bukharan Emir’s army. The Tashkent Soviet recognized the independence of the Bukharan State on 25<sup>th</sup> of March 1918.<sup>68</sup> The Tashkent Soviet’s Red Army’s attack to Bukhara coincided with Ataman Dutov’s Orenburg

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<sup>64</sup> For the full text of this declaration see Hocayev, *K Istarii*, pp. 20-21.

<sup>65</sup> For more detailed information on Young Bukharans see Fayzulla Khodzhaev, “O Mladobukhartsakh,” *Istoriik-Marxist*, no. 1, 1926, pp. 123-141. And also see S. Aini, *O Moei Zhizni, Sobranie Schinenii*, volume I, 1971, after page 81. Earlier, in 1911-12 both Fitrat and Aini were far from being “pan-Turkists”, they both called the language of Bukhara as Persian and the language of the first Bukharan newspaper *Bukhara-i Şerif* was Persian. This was strongly criticized in pan-Turkist *Türk Yurdu* of the time as Komatsu also pointed out. See “Buhara-yı Şerif Gazetesi,” *Türk Yurdu*, volume I, 1911-12, p. 376 and volume II, 1912-13, p. 631.

<sup>66</sup> Yu. Ibragimov, “Krasniy Turkestan: Bukhara,” *ZhN*, no: 13 (21), 13 April 1919, p. 1. Young Bukharans were simply liberals who wanted to reform Shariah rule with a parliament, to open modern schools and to have freedom of press. However these “liberal” demands were more than enough to make them the sworn enemies of the Emir.

<sup>67</sup> “Proekt reformy v Bukhare Komiteta mlado-bukhartsev,” *Dimanstayn* pp. 353-360.

<sup>68</sup> Baymirza Hayit, *Türkistan*, pp. 261-2.

Cossacks' march against Tashkent.<sup>69</sup> So the fragile position in the region stopped the Tashkent Soviet awaiting reinforcements.

By the end of 1919, the Emir raised an army of fifty thousand men, the largest armed force in the region but an ill equipped one. This alarmed the Tashkent Soviet who immediately invited the Red Army to Turkestan to intervene. Most of the reports sent by the Tashkent Soviet to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party were exaggerations about the forces of the Emir. In the same reports, it was stated that there was only one group, Young Bukharans for the Soviets, which would cooperate in overthrowing the Emir.<sup>70</sup> The impossibility to find Communist groups in both Bukhara and Khiva, the two feudal-reactionary countries, forced the Bolsheviks to search for channels with both "nationalist-bourgeois", Young Bukharans and Khivans.<sup>71</sup>

Unable to remove the Emir from Bukhara, the Tashkent Soviet increased the volume of aid to the Young Bukharans. A Bukharan Communist Party was created in Tashkent in June 1919. The non-communist Young Bukharans were also permitted to establish the Young Bukharan Party in Tashkent in January 1920.<sup>72</sup> Getting prepared for a final offensive against the Soviets, the Bolshevik propaganda claimed that the Emir was receiving British aid and Bukharans were subject to the agitation of the British agents in the region.<sup>73</sup> The Emir's regime was already declared a feudal one, a "puppet at the hands of British-Tsarist imperialists". The common goal in the programs of the Young Bukharans and the Bolsheviks in Turkestan was the abolishment of the regional commercial bourgeois

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<sup>69</sup> "V Turkestane," *Novaya Zhizn'*, 17(4) May 1918, no. 92(307), p. 2.

<sup>70</sup> "Report from Tashkent Soviet to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Part," *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 122, op. 1, d. 47, l. 266.

<sup>71</sup> "Anonymous Report to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party," *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 122, op. 1, d. 47, l. 246.

<sup>72</sup> Baymirza Hayit, *Türkistan*, p. 263.

<sup>73</sup> "Field Report to the CC of the RCP," *UzRMDA*, f.R-17, op. 1, d. 87, ll. 47-52.

in Bukhara. Accordingly, it would be only possible through the efforts of the Young Bukharans to destroy this ancient regime.<sup>74</sup>

The second Red Army offensive against Bukhara was launched on the 28<sup>th</sup> of August 1920. The Bolsheviks, together with a group of Young Bukharans who accompanied them, attacked the city on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of September 1920. Upon seizing the city, they hastily created the Bukharan Peoples Congress; and declared the establishment of the Bukharan People's Republic under the Presidency of Mirza Adülkadir Muhiddin together with the Prime Ministry of Feyzullah Hoca and Finance Ministry of Osman Hoca on 6<sup>th</sup> of October 1920.

Most of the Jadids were satisfied with the creation of a relatively free atmosphere for realizing their educational projects. The Bukharan People's Republic, from its first days on, was providing the best opportunities to the Jadids under the educational system designed by Fitrat himself.<sup>75</sup> On the political side, the Second Congress of Bukharan Soviets on 23<sup>rd</sup> of September 1921 elected Osman Hoca as the President of the Republic. He would, however, in December 1921, ally himself with Enver Pasha and the *Basmacıs*. Enver Pasha was especially active in Eastern Bukhara then.<sup>76</sup> Osman Hoca's decision to join *Basmacıs* left all power in Bukhara at the hands of Feyzullah Hodayev, who continued to act as the Prime Minister.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Editorial, "Bukhara," *ZhN*, No. 7 (14), 23 February 1919, p.1.

<sup>75</sup> Bukharan Peoples Soviet Republic being established under the progressive Cedids, including Fitrat, who designed the education system there. "V bukhare," *ZhN*, no. 27(125), 26 November 1921, p. 2.

<sup>76</sup> Turhta "sredi natsional'nostey federatsii," *ZhN*, no. 16(151), 21-30 July 1922, p. 8.

<sup>77</sup> After the third All Bukharan Kurultay, Feyzullah Hodayev became the sole leader of the Republic, who was successful in engaging Enver Pasha's attacks on Bukhara. Editorial, "tretyi vsebukharskiy kurultay," *ZhN*, no. 18(153), 11-20 September 1922, p. 16.

According to Feyzullah Hocayev, the *Tyurkburo* consisted mostly of the Young Bukharans under the banner of “unity against the oppressors”.<sup>78</sup> For Hocayev, there was no question about Bukhara being part of a Greater Turkestan, in the politico-geographic sense.<sup>79</sup> However, Bukhara was an ancient and traditional state in the region and the most prestigious politico-administrative unit. By 1922, the number of *Basmacı* forces operating only around Bukhara exceeded 20 thousands regular troops.<sup>80</sup> Especially after Osman Hoca’s decision to join the *Basmacı*s, the Bukharan government lost its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens.

From then on, Feyzullah Hocayev thought that the situation necessitated a re-designing of the borders in the region - letting different socio-economic groups (represented by different ethnicities) live separately. The national-territorial delimitation (*Razmezhevanie*) was a very important task in order to re-arrange economic, cultural and political lives of the natives.<sup>81</sup> He considered the current (1922-24) borders of the Turkestan states (Turkestan ASSR, Bukharan PSR and Khorezmian PSR) as an artificial one.<sup>82</sup> He believed that they did not correspond to the socio-economic realities of the region. In his memoirs published in 1932, Hocayev stated that “although ‘pan-Turkists’ and ‘pan-Islamists’ were opposing the delimitation, accusing me [Hocayev] by re-dividing the historical unity of Turks and Turkestan, for me the arrangements were heavily economic in nature”.<sup>83</sup> As early as 1922, in order to guarantee political, cultural but more importantly economic rights of its members, Hocayev argued that the multi ethnic Bukhara (of Uzbeks,

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<sup>78</sup> Khodzhaev, p. 77.

<sup>79</sup> Khodzhaev, p. 131.

<sup>80</sup> Khodzhaev, pp. 35-6.

<sup>81</sup> Khodzhaev, p. 160.

<sup>82</sup> Khodzhaev, p. 161.

<sup>83</sup> Khodzhaev, p. 163.

Tajiks, Turkmens and Kyrgyz) should be divided among the existing ethnic groups.<sup>84</sup> According to him, the imperialistic Russian Empire forced very different groups like settled Uzbeks and Tajiks to live together with the nomadic Kyrgyz and Turkmens thereby causing decades-long conflicts between them.<sup>85</sup> The important task here was to unite 2,5 million Bukharan Uzbeks with the 5,5 million Turkestan (ASSR) Uzbeks by creating a single and powerful country, which would mean the correction of the former “sins” of the Tsarism.<sup>86</sup>

One of the first decisions of the government of the Bukharan PSR was to declare *Turki* (Turkish) as the official language of the state in March 1921. It was when Sadridin Ayni<sup>87</sup> wrote his poem the *March of Turan*. Established on 26<sup>th</sup> of June 1923, one of the first decisions of the Bukharan Communist Party was to establish a Turkmen Vilayat within the borders of the Bukharan PSR.<sup>88</sup> On the 13<sup>th</sup> of January 1924, the Ferghana communist representatives to the Middle Asian Buro Central Committee Russian Communist Party proposed giving autonomy to their region.<sup>89</sup> So *razmezhevanie* was under way in creating the national-economic autonomies in the region.

By February 1924, the Bukharan PSR government declared her support for the national territorial delimitation (*razmezhevanie*) process.<sup>90</sup> Feyzullah Hocayev’s plan for *razmezhevanie* was presented to the Bukharan Communist Party Central Committee plenum on 25<sup>th</sup> of February; and it was adopted as a resolution on 10<sup>th</sup> of March.<sup>91</sup> The

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<sup>84</sup> Khodzhaev, p. 167.

<sup>85</sup> Khodzhaev, p. 168.

<sup>86</sup> Khodzhaev, p. 168.

<sup>87</sup> Sadreddin Ayni was a Cedit with Tajik ethnic origin, who later became the national hero of Tajik SSR and the father of Tajik nationalism. However, here it is important to note his ambitious Turanist position as well as his pan-Turkism.

<sup>88</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 62, op. 1, d. 82, l. 3. “Resolution of the 17 June 1923 Plenum of the TsK Bukharan Communist Party”

<sup>89</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 62, op. 1, d. 98, l. 26. “Resolutions of Central asian Buro TsK RKP, 13 January 1924”

<sup>90</sup> *UZRPDA* f. 60, op. 1, d. 4269, l. 5-9. “Records of the Congress of BPSR TsK”

<sup>91</sup> *UZRPDA* f. 60, op. 1, d. 4269, l. 39-44. “Records of the Bukharan KP TsK Plenum, 25 february 1924”

Soviet forces established their full control over Bukhara only at the beginning of 1924. On the 19<sup>th</sup> of September 1924, Bukhara became a Socialist (Bukharan PSSR) Republic a day before its abolishment for *razmezhevanie*.<sup>92</sup> On the 20<sup>th</sup> of September 1924, the 5th All-Bukharan Congress of the Soviets adopted Feyzullah Hocayev's following proposal:

Aiming to rise the historical Great Uzbek civilization, Great Uzbek Republic should be formed among the Uzbek populations of the Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm, and from the Tajiks living in these regions a Tajik autonomous region should be created.<sup>93</sup>

This was the end of the ancient and traditional Bukharan statehood and the rise of a new, stronger but ethnically Uzbek state, the Uzbek SSR.

Despite the calls of the Turkestan ASSR to the Bukharan PSR to join forces and territories, the Bukharan leaders, as described by Hocayev, followed a completely different track. It was a policy aimed both at separating different socio-economic groups (mostly represented by different tribal groups) and to establish a rationally designated economically strong territorial unit, which later became Uzbekistan.

Whether it was through Faizulla Khojaev's skills, the weight of the Bukharan Uzbek lobby, the influence at the 'Center' of Khojaev's patrons like Kuibyshev, or the correlation of his project with Stalin's objectives, Uzbekistan emerged from the delimitation as the strongest unit...Apart from a huge population Uzbek SSR acquired the most fertile and biggest bit of the Ferghana Valley.<sup>94</sup>

In order to maximize their territorial gains, Bukharan and other Uzbek Bolsheviks were enthusiastic about demarcation, which would finally create a Greater Uzbekistan.<sup>95</sup> According to a field report presented to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, Hocayev was planning to establish a Greater Uzbekistan by dividing Kirghiz into

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<sup>92</sup> Baymirza Hayit, *Türkistan*, pp. 265-6.

<sup>93</sup> *UzRMDA*, f. 47, op. 1, d. 563, l. 7. "Records of the all-Bukharan Congress of Soviets, 20 September 1924"

<sup>94</sup> Donald S. Carlisle, "Soviet Uzbekistan: Satate and Nation in Historical Perspective," in Beatrice F. Manz (ed.), *Central Asia in Historical Perspective* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 119.

<sup>95</sup> "Field Report of German to Chicherin," *RTsKHIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 24.

Kara Kyrgyz [Kyrgyz] and Kyrgyz [Kazak] in order to liquidate Khorezm's Kyrgyz populated region of Karakalpakistan into the Uzbek republic.<sup>96</sup> Hocayev and other (mostly Uzbek) native Bolsheviks were categorically against the establishment of a Soviet Middle Asian Federation, whereas the Kyrgyz were in support of this idea.<sup>97</sup> The leading Communist Uzbeks were against to any kinds of economic union proposed by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and the Central Committee of the Turkestan Communist Party.<sup>98</sup> Furthermore, the Uzbek Communists were planning to increase their advantages by taking the possession of irrigation networks, cotton growing valleys and heavily populated areas. "The Communist Uzbeks [The group of Rahimbayev, Hocayev and Muhiddinov] always played a leading role in the repartition."<sup>99</sup> These were at least the perceptions of the non-native Bolsheviks in the region, reporting the developments in Turkestan to the center. It must be kept in mind that, almost all of the non-native Bolsheviks in Turkestan were the employees of the Turkestan ASSR and were under the influence of Turar Riskulov, who stood for the survival and even expansion of the Turkestan ASSR in the region.

#### **4.4.4 Khorezmian PSR**

The Khivan Khanate was also a subordinate state of the Tsarist Empire in Turkestan since 1873. Compared to the Bukharan Emirs, Khivan Khans were much tolerant of the Russian professionals arriving in Khiva to reforming economic, agricultural and health infrastructures of this state. There was a historical ethnic tension between the Turkmens

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<sup>96</sup> "Field Report of German to Chicherin," *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 24.

<sup>97</sup> "Field Report of German to Chicherin," *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 25.

<sup>98</sup> "Field Report of German to Chicherin," *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 25.

<sup>99</sup> "Field Report of German to Chicherin," *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 27.

and the Uzbeks of the Khanate over the sharing of water resources. Additionally, from 1912 on, the local conflicts between the Yomud Turkmens and Khivan “Uzbeks” (or rather Khorezmian Turks as they have been called since then) were taking place, because of a famous blood feud, which continued until 1916.

Living through a less conservative and reactionary regime, in comparison to the case in Bukhara, the Young Khivans were active throughout the 1910-1912 period in the Khanate. Their demands, which paralleled those of the Young Bukharans, were rather welcomed by the Khivan Khan on the 5<sup>th</sup> of April 1917, who allowed the opening of a parliament. By the end of April, the Khivan Parliament was already active. The president of the parliament, Pehlivan Niyaz Hoca, the Prime Minister Mat Murad and all other ministers were Young Khivans. However, from 1916 on, the claims of the Yomud tribal chief, Han Cüneyd, over the Khivan throne continued. Other tribal chiefs joined Han Cüneyd by mid-1917 to force İsfendiyar Khan to expel Young Khivans from the parliament.

Following the October revolution, in December 1917, the Tashkent Soviet recognized the independence of Khiva under İsfendiyar Khan. The Young Khivans then contacted the Tashkent Soviet and the Soldiers’ Soviet in Khiva for the continuation of their activities underground. Since the Yomud Turkmens of Han Cüneyd<sup>100</sup> were the staunchest anti-Bolshevik and anti-Russian elements in the Khivan Khanate, Bolsheviks had no other chance but to cooperate with the Uzbek intelligentsia of the Young Khivans.<sup>101</sup> Ethnic tensions between the Turkmen and Uzbek residents of the Khanate

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<sup>100</sup> Editorial, "Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v Khive," *ZhN*, no: 9 (66), 21 March 1920, p. 1. Han Cüneyd wanted to become a real khan but he could not, because of his non-royal tribal origins. However he was the sole ruler of Novyi Urganç, the second biggest center of the country. See this article also for the preference of the Soviets to work with the Uzbeks in Khorezm against the Turkmens of Han Cüneyd.

<sup>101</sup> D.M., "K Khivinskoy revolyutsii" *ZhN* no: 24 (81) 25 July 1920, p. 3. Two nationalities: administrative Uzbeks and Yomud Turkmens of the desert. Han Cüneyd and his struggle against the soviets.



persuaded Moscow, from 1917 on, of the necessity for separating these two groups at least by means of different autonomous regions.<sup>102</sup>

After the murder of Ísfendiyar Khan by Ířim, the son of Han Cüneyd, the latter became the *de facto* ruler in the country until the Tahta Agreement with the Turkestan ASSR on the 9<sup>th</sup> of April 1919. This agreement stipulated an amnesty for Han Cüneyd's tribe and it constituted another recognition of the independence of Khiva by the Soviets. The Soviet forces occupied Khiva on 25<sup>th</sup> of January 1920 to end Han Cüneyd's *de facto* Khanate. On the 1<sup>st</sup> of February 1920, the Khorezmian People's Soviet Republic was declared. The Young Khivan Pehlivan Niyaz Hoca was elected President and Baba Ahun was appointed Prime Minister in April 1920.

However, a communist coup brought the arrests of the president and other Young Khivan members of the cabinet in March 1921 in the city. Ata Mahdum, from Khorezmian Communist Party, was elected president in May 1921. The period until spring 1924 was practically a period of independence for the Khorezmian PSR (Khorezm is the ancient name of the Khivan region). However, the Khorezmian communists were still under the heavy influence of both the clergy and "bourgeois-nationalist" Young Khivans.<sup>103</sup> In some reports from Khiva and Tashkent to Moscow, the suspicions of a conspiracy in which F. Hocayev, Z. Validov [i.e. Zeki Velidi Togan] and Han Cüneyd were involved against the Soviet power in Khorezm and Turkestan in general were voiced.<sup>104</sup> Feyzullah Hocayev, in 1922, was quite active in Khorezm too, dealing with the Uzbek population on the issues of

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<sup>102</sup> See K, "V khive" *ZhN* no. 4(10)139 22-30 march 1922, p.11.

<sup>103</sup> See the speech of Broydo at the Khorezmian Communist Party, *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 62, op. 2, d. 83, l. 47-49.

<sup>104</sup> See *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 133, ll. 1-2. "Intelligence Report telegram from Khiva to TsK RKP, Molotov"

unification, which in Soviet intelligence records was considered “suspicious” as well.<sup>105</sup> All these Soviet concerns, at the bottom line, pointed at the possibility of a sham fight between the intelligentsia of the natives in Turkestan to achieve an anti-Soviet alliance in the region.

Along with the instructions of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, in March 1924, the Khorezmian Communist Party agreed on the division of Khorezm into separate national-autonomous regions, and started the national delimitation process. Simultaneously, during the 5th All-Khorezmian Congress of the Soviets, a resolution was adopted for the Turkmen, Uzbek and Karakalpak-Kazak people of the republic to unite with newly created republics and regions.<sup>106</sup> After quite a stiff quarrel within the Khorezmian Communist Party Central Committee, on the 15<sup>th</sup> of March 1924, it was accepted that the “Khorezmian PSR would go along with the Russian Communist Party Central Committee’s decisions on delimitation of the national bases.”<sup>107</sup> In mid-May 1924, the Khorezmian Communist Party accepted a resolution establishing Turkmen and Karakalpak-Kazak Vilayats, as the last attempt to stop delimitation.<sup>108</sup> Following this, on the 9<sup>th</sup> of June 1924 the Central Committee of the Khorezmian Communist Party agreed to abolish the republic and accepted the new regulations proposed by the Central Committee Russian Communist Party.<sup>109</sup> However, the abolishment of the republic took some time and faced some opposition from the native communists. It was only after almost four months, on the 29<sup>th</sup> of September 1924, the Khorezmian PSR abolished itself; its territories were

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<sup>105</sup> See the text of an intelligence report from Khiva to Molotov in 2 December 1921, *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 133, l. 3.

<sup>106</sup> *UzRMDA*, f. 71, op. 1, d. 31, l. 32. “Resolutions of the all-Khorezmian Congress of Soviets, 29 September-2 October 1924”

<sup>107</sup> *UzRPDA* f. 14, op. 1, d. 1229, p. 20-21. “Khorezmian KP Congress Records, 13 March 1924”

<sup>108</sup> *UzRMDA*, f. R-17, op. 1, d. 31, l. 15. “Resolution of the Khorezmian Communist Party Central Executive Committee, May 1924, 4<sup>th</sup> Session”

<sup>109</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 62, op. 1, d. 155, l. 156. “Resolution of Executive Committee of the Khorezmian Communist Party, 9 June 1924”

divided between the Uzbek SSR and the Turkmen SSR, against the will of some of the prominent leaders of the republic.<sup>110</sup>

The meaning of *razmezhevanie* was to put all the traditional states of Turkestan into a big cauldron and then to re-divide them in ethno-linguistic terms. According to Georgiy Chicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Feyzullah Hocayev's ambitions for the "best and delicious" pieces of the Khorezmian PSR and Turkestan ASSR, aimed at establishing a Greater Uzbekistan, prosperous and wealthy, having gotten rid of all the impoverished parts<sup>111</sup> The destruction of Khorezm, like Bukhara meant the destruction of one of the two oldest states in the region, which would inevitably influence the position of the Soviets in the eyes of rest of the Muslim world.<sup>112</sup> The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs argued that the preservation of the Turkestan ASSR and even, if *razmezhevanie* would certainly take place, the inclusion of Bukharan PSR and Khorezmian PSR into the Turkestan ASSR would be a much rational solution.<sup>113</sup>

The Chicherin files in the Russian archives show that there was a concrete and strong opposition to delimitation within the Khorezmian Communist Party. Accordingly, the Khorezmian Bolsheviks were categorically against the partition of their state among the three new national units. This republic with three ethnic groups, according to an intelligence report, had one single and a very unique economic structure of its own.<sup>114</sup>

Comrades from Khorezm ascertain in their "note" that "the main reason of national animosity in Khorezm was of economical in nature" while "there is not any national intolerance in the masses." Following these ideas, Khorezmian Comrades and Khorezmian Communist State are against the partition of Khorezm. Because, from a national point of view, Khorezm as a whole represents a colorful scene in the desert.

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<sup>110</sup> See Hayit, *Türkistan*, pp. 273-4.

<sup>111</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, ll.13-14. "Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, 5 April 1924"

<sup>112</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l.15. "Letter from Chicherin to Politburo Central Committee of Russian Communist Party, 16 May 1924"

<sup>113</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 18. "Letter from Chicherin to Zinov'ev, 28 May 1924"

<sup>114</sup> "Report from German to Chicherin," *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 23.

Uzbeks and Turkmens here admit the existence of economic concerns and demand national independence. Khorezmian comrades oppose such a partition. They desire to keep the historical-traditional economic structure which belongs to all of the three peoples of Khorezm. For them Khorezm is their a commonly owned republic.<sup>115</sup>

Khorezm, while protesting this partition, was ready to accept the creation of three national autonomous oblasts, if only the economic and political unity is maintained.<sup>116</sup> Thus, Khorezm should be preserved as a unified whole albeit with inner autonomies. The questions concerning the issues of the establishment of Turkmenia and further delimitation should have been left to the development of a Middle Asian Federation.<sup>117</sup> However, the project of the Middle Asian Federation remained on the paper for the rest of demarcation period.<sup>118</sup>

#### **4.4.5 Turkestan: As An Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic**

Turkestan ASSR-Turkrespublika was the most mixed politico-administrative unit in the region hosting all the groups in the region, Uzbek, Kyrgyz Kazak), Kara-Kyrgyz (Kyrgyz), Sart, Tajik, Turkmen, as well as all Slavic- European peoples who had been settled in the region due to the Tsarist colonial policy.

By December 1917, there were two governments in the former Turkestan General Governorship claiming authority over the region, the purely Russian and European Tashkent Soviet and the Turkestan Autonomy in Khokand of the natives. The destruction

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<sup>115</sup> "Report from German to Chicherin," *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 23.

<sup>116</sup> "Report from German to Chicherin," *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 26.

<sup>117</sup> "Report from German to Chicherin," *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 26.

<sup>118</sup> Middle Asian Economic Union or Middle Asian Federation (*sredazEKOSO*) was established during the 1<sup>st</sup> Economic Conference of Middle Asia on 5-6 March 1923. Its aim was to unite three Soviet states of Middle Asia economically, the Turkestan ASSR, the Bukharan PSR and the Khorezmian PSR. In fact it was an inheritor of the Turkestan Economic Union, established in March 1921, by a resolution of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. Its practical function was to regulate economic relations between the center and three Turkestan states. The Central Committee of the Communist Party abolished it in October 1934.

of Turkestan Autonomy in February 1918, left all authority in the hands of the Bolshevik-led Tashkent Soviet. However, the rising volume of *Basmacı* attacks as well as Muslim communists lobbying in Moscow attracted attention toward Turkestan. "Moscow saw in the persistent refusal of the Tashkent Bolsheviks to grant the natives self-rule the principal reason for the dismal situation".<sup>119</sup>

By March 1918, Soviet power was dominant all over Turkestan, except the Bukharan Emirate and the Khivan Khanate. Bolsheviks, however, were a minority even during the Fifth Congress of the Soviets of Turkestan in April 1918, constituting only one fourth of the delegates. (The rest were predominantly Socialist Revolutionaries and former Tsarist officers, *Bezpartynnye* - non-party- groups of the colonists). To balance their position, Bolsheviks started to recruit Muslims on their side in Turkestan. They were trying to include Muslims in the *TsIK* (Central Executive Committee) of the Turkestan ASSR and the *Sovnarkom* as their new allies. However, the natives were preoccupied with trying to get some help for their compatriots who were suffering from famine. The famine, which hit Turkestan and the Step during the winter of 1918-19, caused heavy casualties especially among the Kazaks.<sup>120</sup> While large numbers of natives perished in Turkestan, new Russian settlers continued arriving, which angered the native Bolsheviks. The latter started to rally for the unification of all Turkestan. At the 5th regional congress of the Soviets in Tashkent on the 30<sup>th</sup> of April 1918, a resolution was passed to include Bukhara, Khiva in the Turkestan ASSR.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp.178-9.

<sup>120</sup> Hunger in the steppe killed thousands. A. Baytursunov. "Golod v Kirgizskoy Respubliki," *ZhN*, No. 22 (120), 17 October. 1921, p. 3.

<sup>121</sup> *Nasha Gazeta*, no. 89, 5 May 1918, cited in Slivkin, p. 165.

The Turkestan ASSR was established on the 30 April 1918 as a result of the Fifth Congress of the Soviets of Turkestan. It was a territorial inheritor of the former Tsarist Turkestan General Governorship. It was a better-organized, more prosperous territory in comparison with the lands of the Bukharan Emirate and the Khivan Khanate, where the reformist Jadids aspired to develop a similar socio-economic system.<sup>122</sup> The association of the Turkestan ASSR with Russia changed the Bolsheviks' weak position on the Turkestan front (*Turkfront*) against the White armies. This enabled the Reds to sandwich the White forces of Dutov and Kolchak in Northern Turkestan and, by sending the special Turkestan commission of Sh.Eliava, M.Frunze, V.Kuybishchev and Ya.Rudzutak, Moscow intervened in the work of the Tashkent Soviet and dominated the region.<sup>123</sup> The main task of the commission was to end the ongoing anarchy in Turkestan.<sup>124</sup>

In the spring of 1919, a Turkestan Commission (*Turkkomissiya* or *Turkestanskaya Cherezvychaynaya Komissiya*)<sup>125</sup> was formed by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and sent to Turkestan to inspect the situation there. The Turkestan Commission, in turn, established the Muslim Buro-*Musbuuro* (*Musulmanskoe Byuro*) which opened the ranks of the Communist Party to the Muslim cadres like Turar Riskulov and Nizam Hocayev in April 1919. This drive for the nativization of the cadres, which was called *korenizatsiya*, caused the rise of a new problem for Moscow - the so-called "National

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<sup>122</sup> Ahmed Salikhov, "Rossiya i aziatskie narody," *Novaya Zhizn*, 18 June (1 July) 1917, no. 52, p. 1.

<sup>123</sup> Fayzulla Khodzhaev, *K Istorii Revolyutsii v Bukhare i Natsionalnogo Razmezhevaniya Sredney Azii* (Tashkent: Gos.Izd. UzSSR, 1932), p. 73.

<sup>124</sup> Khodzhaev, p. 74.

<sup>125</sup> Turkestan Commission (*Turkkomissiya*), although operational by the spring 1919, was officialized on 8 October 1919, as an organ of the Russian Communist Party and All Russia Central Executive Committee. Its native members were A. Rahimbayev, A. Turyakulov, K. Atabayev, T. Riskulov and S. Hocabov. This Commission was the practical government of Turkestan and worked independently from the Communist Party of Turkestan ASSR. With the establishment of Russian Communist Party Central Committee's Turkestan Bureau, its operations were stopped. It was completely abolished in 1923 with a resolution of Central Committee.

Communism". Most of these native cadres of the Communist Party of Turkestan were Jadids with semi-clad nationalistic tendencies. During 1918-1919, Bolsheviks made a temporary peace with the Muslim elements within the party. In March 1919, Stalin declared that Turkestan would be the banner of revolution in the East,<sup>126</sup> which would unite all the oppressed peoples of the colonies.<sup>127</sup> That argument soon became popular among the Muslim Communists as well.<sup>128</sup>

The Russians themselves appear to have been undecided at that time on one important point: whether Turkestan should become a politico-ethnic unit, or whether it should be divided up into smaller specific units. In fact, the question even transcended that of Turkestan in the administrative and political sense: many Muslim leaders viewed all of Central Asia in the broadest sense as Turkestan, including Kazakstan, Bashkurdistan and Tatarstan.<sup>129</sup>

In the early July 1919, Lenin and Zeki Velidi worked together on the future of the Muslims in Soviet Russia in general, and Turkestan in specific. Lenin had already received a project written by Muhammed Barakatullah, the Indian pan-Islamist revolutionary, to establish a single Muslim region. Zeki Velidi submitted his own version of the project. Zeki Velidi's proposals were welcomed by Lenin and cabled to Tashkent on the 12<sup>th</sup> of July 1919.<sup>130</sup> These increased the tensions in the Tashkent Soviet. Turar Riskulov, on the other

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<sup>126</sup> The need to export the regime to neighboring countries was a popular theme. See the book by ZhN A. Pozdnyshnev, *Zavoevanie Oktyabr'skoy Revolyutsii* (Tashkent: Izdanie p'otdela pechati TsK Kompartii v Turkestane, 1922), pp. 1-25. See also N. Borisov. *Oktyabr' v Turkestane* (Tashkent: Izdanie p'otdela pechati TsK Kompartii v Turkestane, 1922). See for a good account of the colonial nature of the Russian Empire and collaboration between Russian and Muslim bourgeois. This was basically a propaganda book targeted the leaders of Khokand autonomy. In another book, the new history of the October Revolution, with the contribution of imagined struggle of Turkestani peasants and workers to it, was already written. N. Paskutskiy, *K istorii grazhdanskoy voyny v Turkestane* (Tashkent: Izdanie p'otdela pechati TsK kompartii Turkestana, 1922).

<sup>127</sup> Stalin, (Speech of the Peoples Commissar for Nationalities. Moscow 12 February 1919.) "Sovdepam i partiynym organizatsiyam Turkestana," *ZhN*, no: 7 (15), 2 March 1919, p. 2. "Turkestan will be the core of the united-east under communist banner."

<sup>128</sup> Nariman Narimanov, "Nasha politika v Turkestane," *ZhN*, no: 9 (66), 21 March 1920, p. 1. Turkestan was the center of Bolshevik plans for the east. It is going to be an example. Nationalization of Turkestan as a term used and necessity to work on the spiritual-religious matters also underlined.

<sup>129</sup> Soucek, p. 219.

<sup>130</sup> For details see Zeki Velidi Togan, *Hatralar* (Ankara: TDV, 1999), pp. 221-3.

hand, was introducing his own version of the project, proposing to strengthen the autonomy of Turkestan, with its own army, finances, and native cadres in the form of one indivisible Turkestan. Natives, increasing in numbers on the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan ASSR, aimed first to diminish the power of Russian *kulaks* in the region. By September 1919, the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan ASSR ordered party workers to “take every measure possible” to eliminate the colonial Russian elements in Turkestan and to attract the natives into the ranks of the party.<sup>131</sup> By mid-1919, there were Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz departments both in *Sovnarkom* and in the Commissariat for Nationalities’ Affairs of the Turkestan ASSR.<sup>132</sup>

The highest platform for Bolshevik propaganda and policy making in the nationalities affairs was the official organ of the Commissariat for the Nationalities Affairs, the journal *Zhizn Natsional’nostei*. For *Zhizn Natsional’nostei*, the concept of Turkestan had two different meanings: the territory exactly within the borders of the Tsarist Turkestan Governorship General and the broad region, including Northern Afghanistan as Southern Turkestan as well as Eastern Turkestan. According to this journal, by and large, there were three basic groups of natives in Turkestan: Sarts (Uzbeks) Tajiks and Kyrgyz.<sup>133</sup> Turkestan was the historical “Turan” and was a steppingstone for the revolutionaries to extend the revolution to other nations of the East.<sup>134</sup> The editors of the journal were quite well informed about the tribal problems in the region. Among the Kyrgyz, tribalism had been a determining factor in revolutionary politics. Especially the Noble *Ak Süyek* (White Bone) and the commons *Kara Süyek* (Black Bone) differentiation has been protested in the

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<sup>131</sup> *UzRMDA*, f.R-17, op. 1, d. 249, l. 116.

<sup>132</sup> "Iz deyatel'nosti Turkestanskogo komissariata po natsional'nym delam" *ZhN* no: 20 (28) 1 June 1919, p. 4.

<sup>133</sup> S Pestkovskiy, "Turkestan i mirovaya revolyutsiya" *ZhN* no: 20 (28) 1 June 1919, p. 1. Peoples: Kirghiz, Sart, Tajik.

<sup>134</sup> Palyukaytis "Turkestan i revolyutsii vostoka" *ZhN* no: 19 (27) 25 may 1919 p. 1-2. Muslim neighbors of Turkestan should adopt revolution. "Turkestan, which is historical turan,..."



revolutionary literature.<sup>135</sup> The regional meaning of the concept in 1919, for instance, “Turkestan Republics” meant Turkestan ASSR, Bukhara and Khorezm. So, it is possible to argue the co-existence of broader regional and limited administrative meanings of the concept.<sup>136</sup> In a long and anonymous article, in *Zhizn Natsional'nostei*, the historical Kyrgyz lands, together with the Steppe region in the North even Siberia, were considered to be the historical parts of Turkestan.<sup>137</sup>

Complaining about the increasing control held by Mir Said Sultangaliyev over the nationalities affairs among the Muslims and his unitarist stand, Stalin changed the name of the Muslim Buro in March 1919. The new organization was the Central Buro of the Communist Organizations of the East; and the Central Muslim Commissariat was divided into departments of the Tatar-Bashkir Commissariat, Turkestan Commissariat and Transcaucasian Commissariat.<sup>138</sup> In early 1919, the Bolsheviks appreciated Kyrgyz (Kazak) and Kara Kyrgyz as well as Bashkir services to the revolution.<sup>139</sup> However, Turkestan was still problematic, where native cadres were still not volunteering to cooperate with the Bolsheviks.

At the fifth regional Congress of the Communist Party of Turkestan ASSR, which was held in January 1920 in Tashkent, national communists won their first victory against the Tashkent Soviet.

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<sup>135</sup> "Kirgizy" *ZhN* no: 14 (22) 20 April 1919, p. 2. See for kara-süyek versus ak-süyek social phenomena.

<sup>136</sup> Yu. Ibragimov, "Krasniy Turkestan-Khiva" *ZhN* no: 14 (22) 20 April 1919, p. 1. In khiva, religious fanaticism was much less than Bukhara.

<sup>137</sup> "Kirgizy" *ZhN* no: 13 (21) 13 April 1919, p. 2. "Among all Turkic or Turkish peoples of Russia (i.e. speaking in Tatar or similar languages) most of them is called Kirghiz." "Historical Kirgizia is a part of historical Turkestan, better to call then as Kaysak. Historically they are Turkic and live in northern part of Turkestan and southern part of Siberia. See this article for tribalism and social structure too."

<sup>138</sup> For details of this split see Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, *Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR* (NY: The Free Press, 1990), pp. 33-36.

<sup>139</sup> "Kirgizskiy narod i Sovetskaya Rossiya" *ZhN* no: 9 (17) 16 March 1919, p. 2.

It was decided that, in the interests of international unity of the workers and oppressed peoples, they would oppose by means of communist agitation the strivings of Turkic nationals to divide themselves into various national groups such as Tatars, Kyrgyz, Kazaks, Bashkirs, Uzbeks and others and establishing small separate republics. Instead, with a view to forge the solidarity of all Turkic peoples, who so far had not been included within the RSFSR, it was proposed to unite them within a Turkic Soviet Republic; if this is not possible, it is then proposed that different Turkic nationalities be united according to their territorial proximities.<sup>140</sup>

Ryskulov also demanded the renaming of Turkestan ASSR to the Turkic Republic. By then, the majority of the party membership was already in the hands of the natives. On March the 8th 1920, Moscow opposed this proposal. However, in the following 6th congress, the Ryskulov group kept its strength.<sup>141</sup> At the 9th congress of Turkestan, the Soviets decided on the liquidation of colonization kulaks and confiscation of their lands, the end of land reform, and also decided to continue attacks on pan-Turanists and pan-Turkists.<sup>142</sup>

The organization of the Soviet power depended heavily on the cooperation of the native elements in the region.<sup>143</sup> There was a strong sense of nationalism among the Muslims of Turkestan. It was not only tribalism or localism of the natives but an important

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<sup>140</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 2, d. 130, l. 25. For the details of the Ryskulov's proposals for the establishment of a united Turkic republic of all Muslims of Turkestan see, T. R. Ryskulov, *Izbrannye Trudy* (Alma-Ata: GIG, 1984), pp. 21-36.

<sup>141</sup> "6-y s'ezd kommunisticheskoy partii Turkestana," *ZhN*, no: 18 (116), 16 September 1921, p. 3. There were 231 delegates, 178 Musulman (%56), 71 Uzbek, 64 Kirghiz, 6 Turkmen, 5 Tajik, 20 Tatar, 2 Azeris, 1 African-black and 9 other Muslims.

<sup>142</sup> Editorial, "V turkestane," *ZhN*, no: 11 (109), 28 May 1921, p. 4.

<sup>143</sup> G Broydo, "Turkestanskije problemy II," *ZhN*, no: 23 (80), 18 July 1920, p. 1. See for the organization of Soviet power in Turkestan in cooperation with native elements.

solidarity in being the same nation as the Muslims of Turkestan.<sup>144</sup> The term Middle Asia, which was used in the revolutionary literature, represented the same Tsarist concept, considering the region as a part of Russian “Middle East”.<sup>145</sup> Despite all these, probably under the influence of native Bolsheviks over the Stalin’s Nationalities Commissariat, the common usage of the term was in the broader meaning of Turkestan.<sup>146</sup>

In the Turkestan ASSR, national communists had lost their power by March 1920. T. Riskulov, N. Hocayev and Bek-Ivanov arrived in Moscow in May with many complaints. The Politburo examined the issues in the meetings held on the 25<sup>th</sup> of May 1920 and on the 13<sup>th</sup> of July, where Lenin instructed the *Turkkomissiya* (Turkestan Commission) to combat pan-Turkism and Islamism in the region and to study the ethnic structure of the region in order to decide whether a fusion (*sliyanie*) or delimitation (*razmezhevanie*) would be a better solution.

These orders from Lenin, were the real beginning of the *razmezhevanie*. The reasons for its postponement until 1924 were the continuing *Basmacı* resistance, as well as other complexities that the Politburo had to deal with. Lenin took the issue to the Central Committee on the 20<sup>th</sup> of June 1920, where they decided to draw the national borders of Turkestan.<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>144</sup> M. "K usloviyam raboty v kirgizskom krae," *ZhN*, no: 21 (78) 4 July 1920, p. 2.

<sup>145</sup> Editorial, "V sredney Azii," *ZhN*, no: 19 (76), 20 June 1920, p. 4. Turkestan region is also called as Middle East (*sredniy vostok*) in a broader sense. Russian Middle East concept was rather an inclusive one, including India, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and Arab world in it.

<sup>146</sup> Editorial, "Prodovol'stvennaya problema Turkestana," *ZhN*, no: 17 (74), 9 June 1920, p. 2. Use of the broader geographic meaning of the word Turkestan.

<sup>147</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 79, op. 1, d. 158, l. 4. "On the fundamental duties of RKP in Turkestan, RKP TsK Political Buro Resolution, 20 June 1920"

Riskulov, in Moscow, May 1920, was practically proposing the total separation of Turkestan from Russia as an independent Muslim entity.<sup>148</sup> Lenin's response to this was to order the preparation of a politico-ethnic map of Turkestan, divided into Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan and to prepare the details of this division. This was basically the first step for the upcoming *razmezhevanie*.<sup>149</sup> When Riskulov proposed his plan for a single Turk(ic) Republic, separate from the RSFSR, Turkkommissiya immediately declared its opposition. Kuybyshev was the first to react Riskulov's project "on the creation of a single Turkrepublic" describing it as a "nationalist ambition".<sup>150</sup> The creation of a Turkic Soviet Republic project was based on Riskulov's argument that:

Turkestan consists of five regions [Syrdarya Region, Transcaspian Region, Semirech'e Region, Samarkand Region and Fergana Region]; of all populated with Turkic peoples; Kirghiz, Sarts, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Karakalpaks, Kipchaks and Tajiks in addition to foreign elements like Russians, Jews, Armenians and others.... The Turkestan Republics [Turkestan ASSR, Bukharan PSR and Khorezmian PSR] have already a core and dominant Turkic people.<sup>151</sup>

In the broader meaning of the term<sup>152</sup>, the Sarts (Uzbeks), Kyrgyz, Tajiks, the Transcaspian Turkmens and Russians were considered the nations of Turkestan.

The Tsarist administrative division of Turkestan served the interests of both imperialist Russia as well as the oppressor feudal Khans in the region, in accordance with the imperialist "divide and rule" principle. That was simply why the architects of

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<sup>148</sup> Kh. T. Tursunov, *Ocherki Istorii Kommunisticheskoy Partii Turkestana: Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Turkestana v Period Inostrannoy Voennoy Interventsii I Grazhdanskoy Voyny* (Tashkent: Gos.Izd. UzSSR, 1964), pp. 150-1.

<sup>149</sup> V.I. Lenin, *O Sredney Azii i Kazakstane* (Tashkent: UzGosIzdat, 1960), pp. 505-506.

<sup>150</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 122, op. 1, d. 20, l. 24. "Letter from V.V. Kuybyshev to TsK RKP, TsK KPT and T. Ryskulov"

<sup>151</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 122, op. 1, d. 40, l. 2. "M.V. Frunze's Report to TsK KPT and TsK RKP"

<sup>152</sup> G. Broydo, "Turkestanskije problemy I," *ZhN*, no: 22 (79), 11 July 1920, p. 1. See for ethnographical and socio-economic structure of Turkestan. "Turkestan nationa" were Kirghiz, Sart and Tajiks, Turkmens of Zakaspi and Russians (Uzbeks were within the category of Sarts)

*razmezhevanie* decided to create ethnically pure republics.<sup>153</sup> Established in March-April 1919, the *Musburo* under the Turkestan Communist Party was trying to raise Muslim native Bolshevik cadres for the revolution. However, soon, it fell into the hands of “pan-Turkist” nationalists already practicing their ideals with the power of the bureau provided for them. They were even claiming to establish a separate Communist Party of Turkestan, free from the Russian one and intended to declare its independence. The *Musburo* was closed in June 1920.<sup>154</sup> The *Musburo* proposed the establishment of not only a Turk(ic) Communist Party but also the reorganization of the Turkestan ASSR as the Turk(ic) Soviet Republic in January 1920. The critical point in this proposal was the regulation that “each new Turk(ic) republic could join the Turk(ic) Republic.” That was overt pan-Turkism. The authors of the proposal were declaring that, Turk(ic) peoples should not be separated into pieces as Tatar, Kyrgyz, Bashkir, Uzbek and should not create their own national states.<sup>155</sup> Frunze was first to oppose Riskulov’s plan to create “an artificial Turk(ic) nation”. The rest of the Turkkomissiya supported Frunze.<sup>156</sup> In order to oppose Riskulov’s plan, however, Frunze, Kuybyshev and Rudzutak argued that it was necessary to keep the historical unity of the Turkestan ASSR.<sup>157</sup> The establishment of Soviet power in Bukhara and Khorezm was a *de facto* creation of a united Turkestan including Turkestan ASSR, Bukharan and Khorezmian PSRs and Kyrgyz ASSR. According to Stalin, national-territorial delimitation was basically a process for achieving the re-union of the divided states of Uzbeks and Turkmens by the

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<sup>153</sup> Kh. T. Tursunov, *Ocherki Istorii Kommunisticheskii Partii Turkestana, Bukhary, Khorezma v Period Natsional’no-gosudarstvennogo Razmezhevaniya v Sredney Azii*. Tashkent: Gos.Izd. UzSSR, 1959, p. 10. See also this book for a comprehensive Bolshevik version of the history of Turkestan between 1920-24.

<sup>154</sup> For details see, “Izvetia TurkTsIK,” *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 122, op. 1, d. 40, l. 11, no. 166, 27 July 1920g.

<sup>155</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 122, op. 1. d. 40, l. 2.

<sup>156</sup> Kh. T. Tursunov, p. 13-14.

<sup>157</sup> See *Izvestiya TurkTsIKa*, no. 76, 6 April 1920.

feudal and imperial lords.<sup>158</sup> The new territorial proposals, along with the plans to unite all the Turkic nations of Russia were presented as the signs of Bolshevik good will to help these highly segregated nations to unite.<sup>159</sup>

The USSR was formed in December 1922. A circular letter to Turkestan ASSR Central Executive Committee from the Russian Communist Party Central Committee, instructed that the Russian minority in Turkestan was not the elder brother, and the national solidarities and interests of Uzbek, Turkmen masses should not be the hostage of bourgeois slogans of the colonial period, it was the time to join forces in equal standing.<sup>160</sup>

According to a leading party worker in Turkestan, Broydo said:

The Soviet ethnography should work on the differences between the people rather than commonalities among them. There are ethnic groups of Karakirghiz, Kirgiz-Kalpakov, Kaysaks, etc which are not nations yet.<sup>161</sup>

This was the panacea for the national communists.

G. Skalov, who was another non-native Bolshevik, thought differently. For Skalov:

The Middle Asian republics of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva were a whole as they shared the same ethnic groups (Uzbek, Turkmen, Kyrgyz) who were the parts of a one greater nation and economical space. Middle Asian Economic union was practically there. Concerns about ethnic problems should not overcome (override) the economic interests in order to keep them together.<sup>162</sup>

Riskulov, throughout 1923, used all his power to persuade Stalin that *razmezhevanie* would be a disaster for Turkestan and there was no pan-Turkist conspiracy

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<sup>158</sup> See I.V. Stalin, *Sochinenie*, T. 7., p. 137.

<sup>159</sup> "Vserossiyskoe soveshchanie kommunistov Tyurkskikh narodov" *ZhN* no: 9 (107) 23 April 1921, p. 3. See this article for the theme on Turkic unity.

<sup>160</sup> "Tsirkularnoe pismo Ts.K. RKP k kompartii Turkestana," *ZhN*, no. 3(132), 26 January 1922, p.1.

<sup>161</sup> G.I. Broydo, "Esche o soyuze Koshchi" *ZhN*, Kniga V (Moscow: 1923), pp. 19-27.

<sup>162</sup> G.Skalov, "Ekonomicheskoe ob'edinenie sr.-Aziatskikh Respublik, kak faktor natsional'noy politiki" *ZhN*, Kniga V. Moscow 1923. p. 40-45.

involving himself, Sultangaliyev and Zeki Velidov.<sup>163</sup> Riskulov also accused Soviet authorities in the region of ignorance and disrespect to the local notables, who, under the circumstances, supported the *Basmacı* “gangs”.<sup>164</sup> Especially during the Central Committee’s June 1923 special meeting on the Turkestan questions, T. Riskulov, F. Hocayev and A. Ikramov briefed the Bolshevik leaders on the situation in Turkestan. There, Riskulov stood fast in his position to keep the Turkestan ASSR intact; Hocayev and Ikramov defended the necessities of making new territorial arrangements in the region. However, all three Turkestanis were united in their briefings that the Bolshevik atheist propaganda as well as struggle against *Basmacı*s were on the wrong track and they all demanded broader powers to develop a better Bolshevik policy in the region.<sup>165</sup>

#### **4.5 National Territorial Delimitation-Demarcation (*Razmezhevanie*) of Turkestan**

At the meeting of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party in Moscow on the 31<sup>st</sup> of January 1924, it was decided to carry out the national-territorial demarcation of Central Asia. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkestan ASSR handled the issue of national-territorial delimitation of Turkestan on the 10<sup>th</sup> of March 1924 meeting. At the meeting, in his opening speech “On the National-Territorial delimitation of Turkestan”, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of Turkestan Communist Party A. Rahimbayev instructed them to support the idea.<sup>166</sup> Some members like S. Hocanov opposed the idea of delimitation arguing that “there exists no Uzbek or

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<sup>163</sup> *Tainy natsional'noy politiki TsK RKP: Vosproizvedeno po tekstu 1-go izdaniya (Chetvertoe soveshanie TsK RKP s otvetstvennymi rabotnikami natsional'nykh respublik i oblastey v Moskve )9-12 iyunya 1923 g.* Moskva: Byuro Sekretariata TsK RKP, 1923g. (Moscow: Insan, 1992), p. 296 and after.

<sup>164</sup> *Tainy natsional'noy politiki TsK RKP*, p. 14-25.

<sup>165</sup> For the full texts of their briefings see, *Tainy natsional'noy politiki TsK RKP*, p. 160-233.

<sup>166</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 62, op. 1, d. 151, ll. 5-40. “Speech of the secretary TsK Kompartii Turkestana A. Rakhimbaev-O natsional'no-territorial'nom razmezhevanii Turkestana.”

Turkmen nations, they are all from the same Turkic background, so why divide Turkestan?"<sup>167</sup> On the same day, the 10<sup>th</sup> of March 1924, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party approved Rudzutak's project and on the 11<sup>th</sup> of May the Central Committee's Central Asian Buro decided to establish an Uzbek SSR and a Turkmen SSR as the members of USSR. The same resolution included the creation of a Tajik Autonomous Oblast within the Uzbek SSR and a Kara-Kyrgyz (i.e. Kyrgyz) Autonomous Oblast whose status to be decided later.

The Kirghiz are drastically against the transfer of the Amu-Darya oblast and the Kirghiz-Karakalpak sector of the Khorezm Republic to Uzbekistan. Their consent is on the separation of the Kirghiz part of the Hungry Steppe. However, they do not seek the transfer of this part to Kirgizia, which could be seen in the text of the project "the question on the attachment to this or another republic is left open."<sup>168</sup>

The Kyrgyz (i.e. Kazaks) of the Turkestan ASSR, with the same resolution, were to be included into the framework of the already existing Kyrgyz ASSR. However most of the reports arriving in from the region verified that the project was very ill- prepared and it had important drawbacks in the technicalities of the issue.<sup>169</sup> Even in June 1924, there were serious concerns about the possibility of resistance by the Turkestan ASSR to the delimitation. Apparently F. Hocayev provided all the guarantees to the Central Committee about the safety of the project.<sup>170</sup> On 12<sup>th</sup> of June 1924, the Central Committee approved the project. Two commissions were formed to carry out the fieldwork: The Central Territorial Commission and the Commission on National Delimitation. In this meeting the

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<sup>167</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 62, op. 1, d. 122, ll. 30-36. "Speech of the TsK KPT member S. Hodzhanov-Turkestan: ekonomicheskaya edinitsa."

<sup>168</sup> "Report from German to Chicherin," *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, ll 23-24.

<sup>169</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 16. "Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, 22 May 1924"

<sup>170</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l.19. "Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, 6 June 1924"



Kyrgyz delegates protested the absence of a project to create a Kara-Kyrgyz region.<sup>171</sup> However, the Amu-Darya regional committee of the Turkestan Communist Party left the issue of the creation of a Karakalpak region to the decisions of the Middle Asian Buro of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. In accordance with a proposal presented on 5<sup>th</sup> of September 1924 as a last move, which was appreciated by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, a decision to create a Karakalpak region was taken by the Middle Asian Buro on 6 September 1924.<sup>172</sup> On 16<sup>th</sup> of September 1924, during the meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan ASSR, the use of the terms “Turkestan” and “Turkrespublika” were prohibited in the official documents. The name Turkestan was replaced by a Central (*tsestralnaya*) Asia concept, which, in the literary circles of the world then, meant rather Eastern Turkestan, Tibet and Mongolia.<sup>173</sup>

The Uzbeks are trying to establish a Greater Uzbek Republic due to [the inclusion of] Khorezm and the oblasts inhabited by the Kirghiz, while simultaneously implementing a policy of splitting of the Kirghiz [among themselves] through the establishment of an autonomous Kara-Kirghiz [Kyrgyz] oblast. The Resolution of the Middle Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on this matter, § 12, articles 2 and 3, proposes to transfer the Kirghiz inhabiting the Turk[estan]republic to the Kir[ghiz]republic and at the same time "to establish.... a Kara-Kirghiz [Kyrgyz] Autonomous Oblast while leaving the question to which republic it will be attached unresolved." This reduction brings the Uzbek projects and even make the Kirghiz be left. The latter, became of the ongoing tribal [clanic] quarrels between Kaysak-Kirghiz [Kazak] and Kara-Kirghiz [Kyrgyz], cannot come to a unanimous merge of that Kara-Kirghiz [Kyrgyz] oblast with the rest of Kirghizia.<sup>174</sup>

On the 5<sup>th</sup> of April 1924, the Russian Communist Party ordered the Turkestan Communist Party, the Bukharan Communist Party and Khorezmian Communist Party to prepare their own versions of *razmezhevanie* maps and present them to the 13th congress of

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<sup>171</sup> Kh. T. Tursunov, p. 38-39.

<sup>172</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 64, op. 1. d. 152, ll. 39-41.

<sup>173</sup> Zeki Velidî Togan, *Türk-Türkistan* (Istanbul: Toprak Dergisi Yayınları, Nu: 6, 1960), pp. 1-11.

<sup>174</sup> “Report from German to Chicherin,” *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, ll 23-24.

the Russian Communist Party. On the 10-11 May 1924, during the meeting of the Middle Asian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee, all the national-territorial delimitation plans were combined and the following resolution was adopted:

1. Turkestan [the exact borders of the Tsarist Turkestan Governorship General, H.A.K.], Bukhara and Khorezm are to be necessarily subject to delimitation without later federal unification among them, 2. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan republics are to be established and to be entered in to the USSR with their sovereign statuses. A Tajikistan autonomous region is to be created within the Uzbek SSR. A Kara-Kirghiz [i.e. Kyrgyz] autonomous region is to be created but the issue of which republic it is to be associated with would be left for further work. 3. The Kirghiz [i. e. Kazaks] of the Turkestan ASSR are to be included into the current Kirghiz [Kazak] ASSR.<sup>175</sup>

A territorial commission was set up with the members from these newly created national republics and regions. It worked out the details of the division of Turkestan according to the national and economic principles.<sup>176</sup> However, in practice, it was too problematic to meet the requirements of the both principles at the same time to form new politico-administrative entities. The region was too much integrated both economically and ethnically. That was why S. Hucanov came up with the idea of the establishment of a Middle Asian Federation within the union.

The attitude of the Muslim national circles to the repartition is very cautious. Chauvinistic and Pan Islamic groups keep silence, do not express their concern audibly, as if they try to preserve their ignorance. But according to some signs and information it is possible, nevertheless, to conclude that these groups closely follow the development of discussions and even inspire the local communist vanguard. Pan Islamists say "it would not be worse, " suggesting that the formation of national republics would provide them with more freedom of national-cultural activity and bourgeois-capitalist savings, than it is now available.<sup>177</sup>

Given the poor state of the Middle Asian Economic Union, this was not taken too seriously; also by taking into consideration that all the new entities were in any case to be

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<sup>175</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 62, op. 1, d. 151, l. 193. "Resolution of Central Asian Buro TsK RKP, 28 April 1924"

<sup>176</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 62, op. 2, d. 100, ll 9-39. "Records of the Central Asian Buro Territorial Commission"

<sup>177</sup> "Report from German to Chicherin," *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, ll 25.

members of the Union. The territorial commission completed its fieldwork by September and presented its plan on the 14<sup>th</sup> of September 1924 to the organs of Turkestan ASSR Central Committee.<sup>178</sup> At the meeting of the Turkestan ASSR Central Committee on 15-16 September 1924, Turkestan ASSR adopted its last resolution on *razmezhevanie* as follows:

1. The Uzbek people are given the right to exit from the Turkestan ASSR and to establish an independent Uzbek SSR. 2. The Turkmen people is given the right to exit from the Turkestan ASSR and to establish an independent Turkmen SSR. 3. The Kirghiz people is given the right to exit from the Turkestan ASSR to unite with the Kirghiz [Kazak] ASSR under the RSFSR. 4. The Kara Kirghiz [Kyrgyz] people is given the right to exit from the Turkestan ASSR and to establish a Kara-Kirghizstan autonomous region. 5. The Tajik people is given the right to exit from the Turkestan ASSR and to establish a Tajik autonomous region. 6. These decisions are to be presented to the RSFSR all-Russia Central Executive Committee's next meeting.<sup>179</sup>

Some reports also claimed that this project was basically establishing a cotton-rich Uzbekistan, in accordance with the interests of the Uzbek commercial bourgeois, represented by F. Hocayev.<sup>180</sup>

The prevailing position, of course, is retained by the Uzbeks, who even now expect commercial advantages from developments including the possession of the irrigation network, cotton areas and the most populated oblasts. As a result, the whole campaign is against economic unification and regulatory centers. The Communist Uzbeks always played a leading role in repartition. Among whom the most active group was that of comrades Rakhimbayev, Fayzulla Hocayev, Abdulzhapar Mukhiddinov and others.<sup>181</sup>

By the 25<sup>th</sup> of September 1924, the chair of the Central Asian Buro, I. A. Zelenskiy finalized the project; and the latest version of the project was approved by the Central Committee on 14<sup>th</sup> of October, including the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast within the

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<sup>178</sup> *RTsKhidNI*, f. 60, op. 1, d. 3863, ll. 22-25. "Records of the meeting of Central Asian Buro, TsK RKP, September 1924"

<sup>179</sup> *UzRMDA*, f. 17, op. 1, d. 139, ll. 250-57. "Records of the meeting of TurkTsIK, 16 September 1924"

<sup>180</sup> *RTsKhidNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, ll. 17-17 obr. "Letter from Chicherin to Politburo Central Committee of Russian Communist Party, 28 May 1924"

<sup>181</sup> "Report from German to Chicherin," *RTsKhidNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 26.

RSFSR. The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party approved the final resolution on 26 October 1924.

Although the *razmezhevanie* was already being carried out, the creation of a Soviet Middle Asian Federation and assigning Tashkent as its center was still strongly supported by the party workers in Tashkent and by the Kirghiz Communist Party, who opposed the transfer of Tashkent to the Uzbek republic.<sup>182</sup> The idea of Federation was also “inevitable” simply because of the economic necessities.<sup>183</sup> The demarcation of Middle Asia could be rationalized only with such an economic union.<sup>184</sup>

The process of *razmezhevanie* could be divided into three phases. During the first phase, between January-June 1924, the decision to imply the policy of delimitation was taken. During the second phase, June-October 1924, the fieldwork of demarcation was completed. In the third phase, between October 1924 and May 1925 the national republics and regions were established and both the Uzbek and Turkmen SSRs became members of the USSR.<sup>185</sup> Just prior to the application of delimitation, the Central Committee of the Turkestan ASSR Communist Party issued a declaration “to all peoples of Turkestan”, explaining its position on the issue of delimitation by saying that: “We are protecting all the rights of the peoples of the region, which were violated through the application of Tsarist imperial policies, and the new regulations will help solving these problems.”<sup>186</sup>

Although Zakaspi oblast of the Turkestan ASSR was unofficially accepted as the Turkmen autonomy by 1921, it was still under the strict control of the Turkestan

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<sup>182</sup> “Report from German to Chicherin,” *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 24.

<sup>183</sup> “Report from German to Chicherin,” *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 25.

<sup>184</sup> “Report from German to Chicherin,” *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 28.

<sup>185</sup> Kh. T. Tursunov, p. 30.

<sup>186</sup> *UzRMDA*, f. 17, op. 1, d. 842, ll. 33-36.

Communist Party.<sup>187</sup> There were even instances in the literature naming the oblast as Turkmenia and Turkmen land.<sup>188</sup> On the 7<sup>th</sup> of July 1921, a Turkmen congress was held in Bukhara, with 70 Turkmen delegates from different parts of Turkestan. Complaints about Uzbek being the official language both in Bukhara and Khiva as well as complaints about the situations of Turkmens living in Iran and Afghanistan were voiced. That was how a Turkmen movement within the region for autonomy started.<sup>189</sup> As early as 1922, the borders of "Turkmeniya" was first described as "from Khorezm in the east the west, to the southern Üst-Yurt to Karabucak at the Eastern shores of Caspian Sea in the west; from Karasu river in Persia and Afghan borders in the south, to Bukharan territory on the north to Amu Darya River."

However just after this definition, it is strongly pointed out that Turkic roots of the Middle Asians, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Karakalpak and Turkmen populations are from the same stock. The reason why Khorezmian Turkmens should be separated and associated with Turkmenia was basically Uzbeks of Khorezm were assimilating them.<sup>190</sup> For Safarov, the ethnically heterogeneous structures of all states in Turkestan in 1922, Turkestan ASSR, Kirghiz ASSR, Bukharan PSR and Khorezmian PSR, was the proof of the artificiality of the borders in the region. He continued that agricultural, political and administrative reasons dictate two alternatives: a) Political and economical reorganization of all national groups under individual states like Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan and Turkmenistan and b) Unite

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<sup>187</sup> Editorial, "V Turkestane," *ZhN*, no. 20(118), 3 October 1921, p. 3.

<sup>188</sup> Editorial, "V Turkestane," *ZhN*, no: 20(118), 3 October 1921, p. 4. Zakaspi region already being called as Turkmenia.

<sup>189</sup> Kh. M., "Bukhara," *ZhN*, no: 15 (113), 3 July 1921, p. 4.

<sup>190</sup> Kara İlkul. "turkmeniya i polozhenie turkmen v khorezme (khive)," *ZhN*, no. 2(8)137, 6-20 March 1922, pp. 4-7.

all Turkestan but divide it into federal oblasts (regions).<sup>191</sup> By 1923, they had achieved a full autonomy just prior to *razmezhevanie*.<sup>192</sup> The Turkmenification of Zakaspi and the town population was a natural result of the emigration of Turkmen to Turkmenistan after *razmezhevanie* from Bukhara, Khorezm and Turkestan ASSR's other regions.<sup>193</sup> By mid-1924, the Turkmen party was active and influential over the Central Committee of Russian Communist Party in order to persuade Stalin the necessity to include Turkmen populated territories of Iran and Afghanistan with the newly created Turkmen SSR.<sup>194</sup> However, the negative impacts of delimitation on the neighboring countries were another matter of concern, especially for the members of the Foreign Policy apparatus.

From the point of views of international relations and their reflections in the Middle Asian circumstances, I ought to state that the demarcation would provide reactionary-bourgeois neighboring countries-China, India, Persia and Afghanistan-with a new excuse to accuse the Soviet power of the liquidation of Muslim statehood and national rights. The elimination of Khorezm and Bukhara would be considered violence against Islam. At this moment, I suppose, we should especially avoid hastily and unscrutinized decisions which could weaken the international position of the USSR. In case of the implementation of the demarcation, we should create only the Uzbek and Turkmen republics and to retain Khorezm in its former boundaries and to establish inevitably, economic union of new republics through coordination of their economic plans in accordance with the resources and the actual needs.<sup>195</sup>

#### 4.6 Post-Razmezhevanie Turkestan-Conclusions

Following the 1924 arrangements, the national territorial delimitation process was not over yet. In 1929, the Tajik ASSR was turned into a Tajik SSR and then joined the

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<sup>191</sup> See G. Safarov. "k voprosy o prisoedinenii syr-dar'inskoy i semirechenskoy oblastey k kirrespublike," *ZhN*, no. 10(16)145, 19-20 May 1922, p. 4-5.

<sup>192</sup> Turkmen were semi-independent by 1923 even within the party organization of the Turkestan ASSR, with a greater territorial autonomy too. Editorial, "po avtonomnym respublikam i oblastyam RSFSR i po respublikam SSSR," *ZhN*, kniga vtoroya, 1923, p. 138-9.

<sup>193</sup> Sh. Kh. Kadyrov, *Narodnoselenie Turkmenistana: Istoria i Sovremennost!* (Ashkhabad: Ilym, 1986), p. 40.

<sup>194</sup> *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 20. "Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, Kamenev, Zinov'ev, Trotsky, Molotov and Rudzutak, 30 October 1924"

<sup>195</sup> "Report from German to Chicherin," *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 28.

USSR as a union republic. In 1932, Kara Kalpak region was re-structured as an ASSR under RSFSR and in 1936 it became the Karakalpak ASSR within the Uzbek SSR. From 1926 to 1932 Kyrgyz (Kara Kirghiz first and then Kyrgyz) ASSR was also under RSFSR like the Kazak ASSR. In 1936, with the new Soviet constitution they were restructured as SSRs and became union republics too.

The territorial exchanges and border delimitations continued throughout the Soviet period, leaving several enclaves of neighboring republics on the territories of the adjacent SSRs. The period between 1917 February and 1924 October was one of the breaking points of the history of Turkestan and the concept of Turkestan itself. This period witnessed the creation of a national and independent Turkestan State Khokand and also the Turkestan ASSR within the framework of the RSFSR. These were the only two short-lived states in history with the name Turkestan. The very process of Razmezhevanie had been another interesting episode of the history of the region. It resulted in the creation of two national republics, Uzbek and Turkmen, in addition to a number of Autonomous republics and regions, all designed with the ethnic criteria. The so-called economic criteria to fit into the different modes of lives of the natives have become a full propaganda but nothing else.

The idea of Turkestan, though, lived a long time after delimitation, among the national communists. Mağcan Cumabayulı wrote his famous Turkestan poem in 1929, the best piece of literature ever written explaining a native's view of Turkestan.

Turkestan is the portal of two worlds,  
It is the core of Turks,  
This country is god-given to the Turk  
And there happened great works of the Turk.  
They called Turkestan as Turan previously,  
Heroic Turk was born and grown here...

With the purges of 1936-1937, very few national communists in Turkestan survived, and a new page in the history of Turkestanism is opened: the page of Émigré Turkestanism. Although during the purges both Feyzullah Hocayev and Ekmel Ikramov were accused with a conspiracy to re-establish Turkestan unity through their two underground organizations, there exists, still, no evidence to support this view.



**CHAPTER 5**  
**ÉMIGRÉ POLITICS AND THE "TURKESTANIST" POSITION**  
**(1925-1945)**

**5.1 Introduction**

In this chapter, the development of the émigré life of Turkestanis out of their fatherland is examined. By 1925, numerous Turkestan political figures, escaping from Bolshevik oppression, ended up either in neighboring countries or in Turkey and Europe. However it should be noted that the largest part of the Turkestan intelligentsia remained in the region, many becoming native national communists in the service of Soviet State.

**5.2 Early Émigré Organizations**

The first signs of an organized émigré political struggle by the Turkestanis against the Bolshevik invasion of their country appeared in Istanbul in 1925. After a long and adventurous five years, Zeki Velidî, Mustafa Çokayoğlu, Osman Hoca (Kocaoğlu) and some other Turkestanis resolved to organize the political struggle for the independence of Turkestan during a meeting in Istanbul, in 1925.<sup>1</sup> There, they decided to launch a comprehensive émigré program for informing the international public on the events going

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<sup>1</sup> Timur Kocaoğlu, "Türkistanlı Göçmenlerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri Tarihine Bir Bakış," *Dr. Baymirza Hayit Armağanı*. Edited by Rasim Ekşi and Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Turan Kültür Vakfı and Hoca Ahmed Yesevi Vakfı, 1999), p. 160.

on in Turkestan. The result was the publication of *Yeni Türkistan*<sup>2</sup> [New Turkestan] in Istanbul from 1927 on and then *Yaş Türkistan* [Young Turkestan] in Paris from 1929 onward. Another component of their planned program was to organize Turkestanis who had emigrated to Turkey, Europe, Iran<sup>3</sup>, India<sup>4</sup> and Arabia under émigré political associations. The first example of these associations was established in Turkey under the name *Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği* (TTGB) [Union of the Turkestan Turkish<sup>5</sup> Youth] in September 1927.<sup>6</sup>

The Émigré political organization in Istanbul was run by the efforts of both Osman Hoca and Zeki Velidî, until the problems between Zeki Velidî and Çokayoğlu surfaced in the first half of the 1930s. The very definition of the term Turkestan in TTGB and *Yeni Türkistan* had three components: Uzbek lands, Bashkir<sup>7</sup> lands and Kazak-Kyrgyz lands.<sup>8</sup> Apparently in this initial period of émigré life there was a consensus on the leadership of

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<sup>2</sup> *Yeni Türkistan* was published until 1932.

<sup>3</sup> Quoting from *The Times*, 22.05.1934 issue, see "İran'da Türkistan Kaçkınları" *YT*. June 1934. no. 55. p. 41. Stories about folks escaping from disastrous famine in Turkestan to Iran. Exodus of Uzbek and Turkmen refugees to Iran continued until 1935. However, most of these refugees passed to Iran because of the disastrous famine going on in Turkestan in the first half of 1930s.

<sup>4</sup> For Turkestanian immigrants in Iran and India see Editorial. "Türkistan Kaçkınları Faciası" *Yaş Türkistan (YT)*. April 1932. no. 29. pp.1-4. And several other articles and news appeared in *Yaş Türkistan* pages. Initial years of émigré life in these countries were probably very painful.

<sup>5</sup> It should be noted here that the use of *Türk* in this literature covers both Turk(ish) and Turk(ic). The use of *Türki* (Turkic) was quite unusual in both émigré and pan-Turkist publications. So in most of the translations, the original form *Türk* is translated as Turkish rather than Turkic. That is simply because the authors never intended to make any differences between the two terms.

<sup>6</sup> *Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği* was established in the former Bukharan or Özbekler Tekkesi and continued its activities there until July 1940. In 1940, its name was changed into *Türk Kültür Birliği* [Turkish Cultural Union] and it became an important pan-Turkist association in Turkey. After 1950, its name has been changed again to *Türkistanlılar Kültür ve Sosyal Yardımlaşma Derneği* [Association of Cultural and Social cooperation of Turkestanis]. It is still operational.

<sup>7</sup> Apparently, the inclusion of Başkurt lands to the concept of Turkestan was closely associated with the very existence of Zeki Velidî's among the Turkestanian émigré circles. Otherwise there seems to be no serious evidence showing any attempt by Turkestanis, including Başkurtistan, into the concept of Turkestan. Most probably Zeki Velidî's anti Kazan Tatar stand made him to include his Başkurtistan into the Turkestanian geography rather than Volga-Ural union.

<sup>8</sup> See the parts titled as "Türkistan Haberleri" in each issue.

Mustafa Çokayoğlu for the united émigré front.<sup>9</sup> With the TTGB's<sup>10</sup> efforts there was the beginning of a non-communist young national cadres for an independent Turkestan rose up in Turkey.<sup>11</sup> This was the main service of TTGB to the political program of émigré.

Çokayoğlu started the publication of *Yaş Türkistan* in Paris in 1929. His publication efforts were united with his (or common Turkestani) political platform called *Türkistan Milli Birliği*<sup>12</sup> (TMB) [Turkestan National Union]. The new objective of the TMB in exile was declared to be "to free Turkestan from Russian Proletariat and/or Russian hegemony and the establishment of a free national Turkestan state."<sup>13</sup> But there was still lack of unity among the Turkestanis. For the émigrés; thus, the formation of a unity remained the primary aim.<sup>14</sup> His call to all Turkestanis in an emotional manner aimed at helping them to understand the importance of uniting under TMB.

O Young Turkestani! Never forget the great weight of your sacred duty and the greatness of your responsibility. Get prepared, day and night, non-stop, for freeing your land from the Russian invasion and horror and for establishing a Free Turkestan! The needs of your land and nation demands you this before everything!<sup>15</sup>

The highest number of Turkestani refugees would be found in Afghanistan during the course of the 1920s, and they soon became residents. However, Bukharan Amir's

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<sup>9</sup> See Editorial. "Türkistan'da Mefkure Mücadeleleri," *YeT*, no. 2-3, July-August 1927, pp. 1-5. Editorial "Birleşen Uç," *YeT*, no. 4, September 1927, pp. 1-3. Suklu Kayoglu, "Rus Muhaceret Siyasetiniñ Yangi Devresi Muvacehesinde Türkistanlıların Vazifesi," *YeT*, no. 8, Mart 1928, pp. 1-7. Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Rusların Muhaceret Siyaseti Hakida," *YeT*, no. 9, April 1928, pp. 6-10.

<sup>10</sup> The decisions and news of Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği appeared in *Yaş Türkistan* pages quite often and its enlargement by including more and more Turkestanis every year were praised. See Doktor İlder, "Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği'nin Onuncu Umumi Yığılışı," *YT*, October 1933. no. 47. pp. 27-32.

<sup>11</sup> It was Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği, which facilitated significant numbers of Turkestani students to receive their higher education in Kemalist Turkey, and this was done for the sake of raising national cadres for the future independent Turkestan. See *Yaş Türkistan*, "Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği," *YT*, August 1933. no. 45. pp. 7-8.

<sup>12</sup> Although TMB was originally established back in Turkestan several years ago, Çokay continued to use its legacy of being a common Turkestani platform. See A. Çokaybay, "Türkistan Milli Birliği'ni Ta'kib," *YeT*, no. 7, December 1928, pp. 11-15.

<sup>13</sup> Editorial. "Kozgalıştan Kuruluşga," *YT*, August-September 1930. no. 9-10. p. 4.

<sup>14</sup> Editorial. "Kozgalıştan Kuruluşga," *YT*, August-September 1930. no. 9-10. p. 5.

<sup>15</sup> Editorial. "Kozgalıştan Kuruluşga," *YT*, August-September 1930. no. 9-10. p. 7.

continuing claims for his throne was a source of discomfort for the nationalists.<sup>16</sup> Amir was a popular target of other émigré political leaders not only in terms of political matters but also in terms of financial ones.<sup>17</sup> From the early days of émigré life, Turkestanian leaders declared him the enemy of the Turkestan's Liberation Movement.<sup>18</sup>

In Afghanistan, the *Encümen-i Saadet-i Buhara ve Türkistan* [Committee for the Salvation of Bukhara and Turkestan] was established for the sake of uniting Turkestanis in this country and organizing them to launch a final offensive against the Reds in Turkestan.<sup>19</sup> However, Afghanistan itself was far from being a stable favorable émigré country.<sup>20</sup> Turkestanis in Afghanistan continued their pre-soviet life-style freely and enjoyed the atmosphere of Jihad of Basmacıs, which was politically quite popular until the end of the 1930s.<sup>21</sup> As expected, most of the Bukharan refugees in Afghanistan and some main Mujahedeen groups were still loyal to Emir, rather than the nationalist movement.

By 1934, the Turkestanian émigré flow to India was still continuing.<sup>22</sup> Most probably Turkestanis who spent a couple of years in Afghanistan and could not find a better life left

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<sup>16</sup> Praising Afghan hospitality for the Turkestanian immigrants, *Yaş Türkistan* was also critical about Bukharan Amir's residence there and his continuing claims on the throne. *Yaş Türkistan*, "Afganistan ve Milli Türkistan," *YT*, October 1931. no. 23. pp. 21-23.

<sup>17</sup> Quite similar to Whites running after their wealth in Europe, Turkestanis were after the wealth of their kinsmen in European banks. See Toktamışoğlu, "Bir Türkistanlının servetige Hıyanet...", *YT*, April 1932. no. 29. p. 31. Especially about this matter, Emir and his circle were the primary targets for criticism.

<sup>18</sup> S. Çökayoglu, "Türkistan İstiklâl Hareketine Karşı Buhara Emiri," *YeT*, no. 5-6, October-November, 1927, pp. 1-7.

<sup>19</sup> Motivated by the independence of Eastern Turkestan, émigrés in Afghanistan convened a series of meetings with the Afghan groups as well as all ulema and Amir's circles, where a series of agreements signed for the purpose of supporting the national cause in Turkestan. See Seyyid Abdullah Taşkendi, "Encümen-i Saadet-i Buhara ve Türkistan'ın Maksudları," *YT*, August 1933. no. 45. pp. 32-35. This organization had also an office in Peshawar.

<sup>20</sup> The news of the murder of Afghan King Nadir Khan in Kabul on 9<sup>th</sup> of November 1933, caused an alarm among the Turkestanis in Afghanistan about the threat of terror in the country. See "Afganistan'da" *YT*, November 1933. no. 48. pp. 37-38.

<sup>21</sup> See Kemimzâde, "Kabil'deki Muhacirlerin Turmuşundan," *YT* November 1934. no. 60. pp. 38-39 for some details about the lives of the refugees in Afghanistan and for an interesting marriage news where many Mujahedeen attended.

<sup>22</sup> As late as mid 1934 there was still a flow of refugees from Turkestan to Delhi-India, whose community leaders there were quite well organized themselves. See Hoca Mesud, "Hindistandaki Türkistan Muhacirleri Fa'aliyetinden," *YT*, August 1934. No 57. p. 33.

there and ended up in Indian cities. Émigré activities in India mainly concentrated in Peshawar and Delhi.<sup>23</sup> The name of the Turkestan organization in India was *Encümen-i İttihadı-ı Muhacirin Türkistan* [Committee for the Unity of Turkestan Émigrés]. This organization had offices and representatives in both Peshawar and Delhi.<sup>24</sup> In 1935, Turkestan émigrés in Bombay organized themselves under the name *Türkistan Muhacirler Birliđi* [Union of Turkestan Émigrés], and started to publish their monthly *Türkistan Kuyası* [Sun of Turkestan].<sup>25</sup> Both organizations continued their activities until the Second World War.

In Germany, the Turkestan community was limited to a few dozens of students or graduates from German Universities. Among them, were Tahir Çađatay and Ahmetcan Oktay, two of the students sent by the Bukharan Republic in 1921, who mainly worked with Çokayođlu in publishing *Yaş Türkistan*.<sup>26</sup> This small but very active community enjoyed the attention and help of researchers of Turkestan like Dr. Gerhard von Mende.<sup>27</sup> Unlike their other European counterparts, the German press was not totally ignorant about the causes of Turkestanis.<sup>28</sup> Under the auspices of Gerhard von Mende, Nazi press started

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<sup>23</sup> Even after the break-up of India Turkestan immigrants continued their activities both in Peshawar and in Delhi. See H.M. Ziyae'ddin, "Hindistandadı Türkistan Muhacirleri Arasında," *YT*, March 1934. no. 52. pp. 34-37.

<sup>24</sup> For the activities of émigrés in India and their organization Encümen-i İttihadı-ı Muhacirin Türkistan, see "Hindistandadı Türkistan Muhacirleri Arasında," *YT*, October 1934. no. 59. pp. 36-37.

<sup>25</sup> By 1935 the Turkestan émigrés in India organized themselves quite well in Bombay too. They have established an association under Taceddin Kari, named Türkistan Muhacirler Birliđi and published a monthly magazine called *Türkistan Koyası*. Their primary target was to inform Indian Muslims about Bolshevik atrocities in Turkestan. See "Hindistandadı Türkistan Muhacirleri turmuşundan," *YT*, April 1935. no. 65. p. 32.

<sup>26</sup> Timur Kocaođlu, p. 160.

<sup>27</sup> In 1935 there was a quite active Turkestan Diaspora in Berlin, organizing regular conferences and seminars. Some of them included names like Dr. İshak's son Oktay, law student Zahid Kasım and Doktor Tahir Şakir. See "Almanyadadı Türkistan Yaşları Faaliyetinden," *YT*, February 1935. no. 63. pp. 37-38.

<sup>28</sup> Also in 1930s, in German press articles and news about Turkestan started to appear as a preparation of Nazi plans about Turkestan. Under the auspices of Gerhard Von Mende, in fact, many Turkestanis found platforms to tell people the situation of their country. "Alman Matbuatında Türkistan," *YT*, February 1935. no. 63. pp. 39.

to become interested in the Turkestan question, especially around the circles of Anti-Comintern organization in Berlin.<sup>29</sup>

There was also a considerable Turkestani émigré community in Hijaz, Arabia. However, according to the *Yaş Türkistan*, the members of this community were deeply polarized among the town-based identities like Bukharan and Samarkandi. This lack of unity was criticized in *Yaş Türkistan*.<sup>30</sup>

### 5.3 Relations with Russian and Other Émigré Organizations

This was also the period, during which "White" Russian émigré organizations were very active in Europe as well as in Turkey. However, Turkestani leaders were cautious to keep their distance from those "still-imperialistic" circles.<sup>31</sup> "White" Russians never recognized self-determination rights of Turkestanis. For them, Çokayoğlu and his comrades were no more than rebel colonial peoples. The "White" Russian émigré organizations, many of which enjoyed a significant prestige or influence in several European platforms actually weakened the possible performance of the Turkestani groups there.<sup>32</sup> Russian and Turkestani émigrés in Paris and throughout the world stayed as enemies.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> See "Almanca Neşriyatda: Türkistan Sovyet Cumhuriyetindeki Yirli Halk Vaziyeti," *YT*, April 1937. no. 89. pp. 37-38.

<sup>30</sup> There was also a Turkestani colony in Hijaz, Mecca and Madina who kept struggling among them, divided with city-identities like Tashkendi, Bukharan or Samarkandi, which was criticized in the pages of *YT*. See Muhammed Cavid Bin Abidcan Oğlu, "Türkistan Muhacirleri Arasında," *YT*, April 1937. no. 89. pp. 27-29.

<sup>31</sup> "Either White or Red Russian dictatorships..." From the very beginning there was an important antipathy between the Russian and Turkestani émigré groups. See Editorial, "Rusya'nın İstiklaline Nazarlar," *YeT*, September-October 1938, no. 14-15, p. 4.

<sup>32</sup> However there were also non-Russian publications attacking and even teasing Turkestani émigrés and refusing any Turkestani identity. One of them being *New Japanese Immigrant* journal, in its 15<sup>th</sup> issue not only attacked Turkestanis but also praised "White" Russian remnants in Siberia and China as the heroic Siberian leaders, which caused anger in the pages of *Yaş Türkistan*. See Taşbalta, "Namussuzlar," *YT*, May 1934. no. 54. pp. 24-27.

<sup>33</sup> It is understood that there were no good relations between white Russian émigrés and Turkestani émigrés in Paris or anywhere else in the world, simply because of the perceptions of both sides. For Russians, they were their former colonies; and for Turkestanis, they were their former colonists. Turkestani émigrés perceived

However, Turkestanis were not alone. There was a natural alliance between Turkestanian émigrés and Ukrainian, İdel-Ural, Caucasian, Crimean and Azerbaijani émigré leaders, to balance the Imperial Russian émigrés. *Yaş Türkistan* pages were also used as a forum for Azerbaijani, Crimean even Ukrainian nationalist émigrés.<sup>34</sup> Turkestanis in Paris were the active participants of the famous Committee for the Friendship of Ukraine-Caucasus and Turkestan.<sup>35</sup> Both *Yaş Türkistan* and *Yeni Türkistan*<sup>36</sup> strongly supported the Caucasian independence cause,<sup>37</sup> as well as the Crimean, Ukrainian and İdel-Ural ones. Apparently, relations between the Turkestanian and the Kazan Tatar émigré groups were very good all over the world.<sup>38</sup> In their struggle against the "Great Russian Chauvinism" of the Soviet power, Ukrainian Diaspora was the most helpful one for Turkestanian émigrés in Paris. During a conference by Ukrainian nationalist Maksim Antonovich Selavinskiy for the Committee for the Friendship of the Peoples of Ukraine-Turkestan and Caucasus, the issue of national state was separated from the issue of National Republics and Nationalities Policy just for the sake of Turkestanis.<sup>39</sup>

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them as not very different than then-Bolshevik Moscow leaders in their desires to enslave their people and their country. See *Yaş Türkistan*l, "Bulantırılğan Bir İrtek," *Yaş Türkistan*, June 1935. no. 67. pp. 17-20.

<sup>34</sup> As in the case of Ahmed Sadık (an ex-deputy), "Yaş Türkistan Mecmuası Muhterem Müdirine," *YT*, August 1934. no. 57. pp. 38-39. Demanding clarification about the problems among the Azeri émigré conflicts.

<sup>35</sup> Another organization in which Turkestanis were represented was the famous Committee for the friendship of Ukraine-Caucasus and Turkestan" headed by former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Alexander Sholgin. Their activities in Paris continued during the 1930s and Turkestanis actively participated their meetings. "Ukrayna-Kafkasya-Türkistan Dostlugu Komitesi Faaliyetinden," *YT*, March 1935. no. 64. pp. 28-29.

<sup>36</sup> See Kırımlı Cafer Seydahmet, "Ukrayna Milli Hareketi ve Kırım-Ukrayna Münasebâti," *YeT*, no. 16, Kasım 1928, pp. 8-12.

<sup>37</sup> Émigrés were also careful to support independence causes of other nations. See Kıvançlı, "1918-Mayıs-1935" *YT*, June 1935. no. 67. pp. 36-37.

<sup>38</sup> There were close relationships between the İdel-Ural Diaspora and Turkestanian émigrés. Tatar émigré publication *Milli Bayrak* and their activities in Japan were very much praised in the pages of *Yaş Türkistan*, "Milli Bayrak," *YT*, November 1935. pp. 33-35.

<sup>39</sup> See Mustafa, "Sovyetler İttifakında Milli Devlet Meselesi," *YT*, June 1937. no. 91. p. 14.

### 5.3 Propaganda Tactics of the Émigré Movement

There was no doubt that some of the Turkestanis in the emigration harbored positive feelings about the Soviet "progressive policies" in Turkestan. So the main aim was to explain to Turkestanis that the entire Soviet moves which sounded quite promising and positive were everything but real.<sup>40</sup> This Soviet propaganda for national self-determination rights was also propagandized by the western media too which was under the illusion of Soviet "progressive policy" in the East.<sup>41</sup> So the most important duty for the émigré leaders was to keep Turkestanist idea alive and motivate their fellow émigré Turkestanis.<sup>42</sup>

As the imperialists attacking Turkestan, Soviet or Tsarist Russians were of the same source for Çokayoğlu. Their approaches to Turkestanis were the same in terms of the motives of exploitation but the Soviets were much organized.<sup>43</sup> This anti-imperialistic stand taken by Çokayoğlu forced him to develop also an overt anti-British policy, blaming the British for agitating Turkestanis for their own imperialistic interests.<sup>44</sup> That was probably a

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<sup>40</sup> Changes made by Moscow in 1931 in the Central Asian Bureau were taken as a positive sign by some Turkestanis. However, Yaş *Türkistan* responded this very harshly and repeated the policy that the only way was to obtain a complete independence. Hokandlı, "Orta Asya Bivrosu," *YT*, June 1931. no. 19. p. 15.

<sup>41</sup> Complaining about the tolerant approach of western media to the Bolshevik Dictatorship, Osman Kocaoğlu was explaining that all the slogans were empty not only about nationalities but also all other respects. Osman Kocaoğlu, "Aldamçı Moskova," *YT*, July 1931. no. 20. pp. 13-14.

<sup>42</sup> Keeping the hopes of émigrés alive was one of the main causes of Yaş *Türkistan*, where many articles appeared quite often to serve this objective. See Timuroğlu, "Milli Tulkun," *YT*, October 1933. no. 47. pp. 6-13.

<sup>43</sup> For the émigrés, there was not much difference between the Tzarist and Soviet Colonial policies in Turkestan. In fact, Soviets were much organized and exploitation-oriented. They have even not intervened into the Kazak-Kyrgyz famine simply thinking that these weak social stratas were destined to be extinct from the point of view of the Marxist dialectic. See Tobolin's comments on Kazak-Kyrgyz famine quoted in Timuroğlu, "Imperialist Çar ve Milletler 'Halaskarı' Sovyet Hükümetinin Türkistan Siyaseti," *Yaş Türkistan*, December 1933. no. 49. pp. 10-11. The second part of the article published in the next issue. Timuroğlu, "İmperyalist Çar ve Milletler 'Halaskarı' Sovyet Hükümetlerinin Türkistan Siyaseti II," *YT*, January 1934. no. 50. pp. 42-46. This part is mostly about economic exploitation of the region both in Tsarist and Soviet times as a cotton plantation.

<sup>44</sup> Çokayoğlu was very much against any open foreign aid other than Turkish. Interestingly, he was quite harshly criticizing British attempts to agitate Turkestanis against the Russians. See Editorial, "Türkistan Milli Küreşinin Sebebi ve Maksadları," *YT*, August 1931. no. 21, pp. 1-7.



reaction to the Soviet propaganda that accused him of being a British agent.<sup>45</sup> In response to the Soviet allegations about Çokayoğlu being a Japanese agent, he wrote "we have been far from British and French military in the past and as much as that we are far from the Japanese fascists now. And our view and sympathy about Trotskist-Zinovievists is not much different than our view and sympathy about Stalinists..."<sup>46</sup> However, Turkestani sympathies for Japan from the 1905 on was still observable, and many leaders thought that Japan was the only power which could struggle against the Bolshevik Russia as well as imperialist China.<sup>47</sup> Russia's retreat from Manchuria was interpreted as the beginning of Russia's retreat from the whole Asia.<sup>48</sup> However Soviet accusations against Çokayoğlu and his supporters for being Japanese agents continued.<sup>49</sup> Apparently, Soviet intelligence was reading *Yaş Türkistan* carefully.

For the Turkestanists, the Soviet regime was a disease, which could not be cured but should be rooted out totally.<sup>50</sup> The 1937 famine was an open failure of the Soviet Kolkhoz and Solhoz policy in Turkestan, which cost the lives of hundreds of thousands.<sup>51</sup> This was nothing but an overt massacre. *Yaş Türkistan* also interpreted Stalin's rule over the rest of

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<sup>45</sup> Soviet propaganda was telling people that émigrés and representatives of independence idea are in fact tools of British and other imperialist powers. See Editorial, "Türkistan Yaşları Arasında," *YT*, August 1933. no. 45. p. 5. Çokayoğlu harshly denied this and stood up for full and real independence.

<sup>46</sup> See "Bolşeviklerin İftiraları Hücumlari," *YT*, June 1937. no. 91. pp. 24-25.

<sup>47</sup> Some had the tendency to see Turkey as the western Asiatic superpower where Japan would be the Eastern Asiatic superpower in order to struggle Russian and Chinese empires. See İlder, "Asya'da İki Dost Millet," *YT*, March 1931, no. 16. pp. 26-28.

<sup>48</sup> Russian retreat from Manchuria and leaving this territory was interpreted as a great development for the future Russia-less Asia. See Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Yırak Şarkda," *YT*, December 1934. no. 61. pp. 24-29.

<sup>49</sup> Soviets propagandized that Çokayoğlu and his friends were Japanese and other Imperialists' agents and were spreading fascism among the Turkestani youth outside. See "Türkistan Sovyet Gazıtalarında bizge ve Umumen Türkistan Milli Hareketige Karşı Yazılğan Makaleler Parçası," *YT*, April 1937. no. 89. pp. 20-23.

<sup>50</sup> Émigrés never thought that there would be any possibility to come to terms with the Soviet government. See Timuroğlu, "Hastalık Nigizdedir" *YT*. April 1936. no. 77. p. 31.

<sup>51</sup> "Sovyet Rusyada Açlık," *YT*, May 1937. no. 90. pp. 37-39.

the Soviet Union as being equally disastrous for the Russian people and peasants, who lost their lives in millions.<sup>52</sup>

Émigré leaders were thinking that Turkestanis never accepted the rule of foreign imperialists and rebelled at every opportunity. Çokayoğlu was mourning on the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the invasion of Turkestan (Tashkent) by the Russian armies.<sup>53</sup> The year 1865 was declared to be the black-year of Turkestan's history. Çokayoğlu was even declaring the Turkestanis that lost their lives during the 1916 uprising to be the martyrs of the Turkestan independence cause,<sup>54</sup> though it was by then a well-known fact that it had not much to do with an overall Turkestan independence movement. Turkestanis in the 1916 uprising were even untrained about using weapons that they have captured from Russian barracks.<sup>55</sup> The 1916 uprising caused a massive exodus of Kazak ("Kyrgyz") tribes to Eastern Turkestan escaping from Tsarist punishment as well as conscription to the Russian army.<sup>56</sup> Even the minor events, like the 1929 rebellion, in Turkestan were exaggerated in the pages of *Yaş*

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<sup>52</sup> There was also emphasis on dictatorship of Stalin leading Russian workers to a disaster, not only other nations under Soviet domination. See Baltabay, "Sovyet Rusya'da vaziyet," *YT*, September 1935. no. 70. p. 18.

<sup>53</sup> The 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the conquest of Tashkent by the Russian armies was declared as a mourning day for the émigrés, however although both the map and ethnic structure of the region has changed much, émigré leaders kept their faith for the unity of Turkestan as well as the desire of Turkestanis to fight back to Russians. Editorial, "15.6.1865-15.6.1935," *YT*, June 1935. no. 67. p. 9.

<sup>54</sup> According to Çokayoğlu, 1916 uprising in Turkestan was a very unexpected event both for Russians and for other Turkestanis. A preparation for that was out of question. It was of course nothing to do with the class struggle between the workers of Turkestan and Tsarist exploiters. It was completely against the Russian administration and the ones who lost their lives in that uprising were declared as the martyrs of Turkestan independence cause by Çokayoğlu. See Editorial, "1916 ıncı yıl," *YT*, August-September 1936. No 80-81. pp. 2-11.

<sup>55</sup> It is known that although during the 1916 uprising some Turkestanis succeeded in the capture of some Russian weapons, none of these people knew how to use them. Especially in Cizzak and Namangan there had been incidents some Russian military barracks were completely destroyed. See "Bir Alman zabitiniñ 1916ıncı Yılı Cezah Kozgalanına Aid Hatıraları," *YT*, August-September 1936. no. 80-81. pp. 23-24.

<sup>56</sup> After the 1916 uprising, more than 60 thousand Kyrgyz familys passed the border to Eastern Turkestan. The total Russian death toll was 2325 with a counted loss of 1384 persons. More than 9 thousand villages were destroyed completely and tens of thousands killed. See "1916. Yılı Kozgalışga Aid Bazı Bir Malumat," *YT*, August-September 1936. no. 80-81. pp. 12-15.

*Türkistan*.<sup>57</sup> It should be noted that most of the "rebellion" news were received from pieces of Soviet press and interpreted with an important optimistic subjectivity by the émigré leaders as nationalist rebellions for a free and national Turkestan.

However, as all other émigré leaders, Çokayoğlu was receiving most of the information on Turkestan from European sources.<sup>58</sup> Their direct connection with the motherland was very limited. The émigré activists were quite successful in interpreting this limited news from the Soviet sources in accordance with the nationalist causes. For example the non-existing "westernism" in Turkestan being popular among the masses was used as a propaganda issue in *Yaş Türkistan*.<sup>59</sup> Like most of the other émigré leaders, when leaving his country, Çokayoğlu declared that his intention was to return to Turkestan in a matter of months' time; at least just after the defeat of the Bolsheviks, which never happened.<sup>60</sup> Of course, most of the emotional poems and calls to Turkestani Youth in the pages of *Yaş Türkistan* to rebel had no opportunity to reach the real Turkestani youth.<sup>61</sup> For

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<sup>57</sup> For a brief account of the 1929 uprising in Turkestan see the memoirs of Muhammed Ali Hasan Ali, "Türkistan Milli Kozgaliş Tarihinden Bir Parça," *YT*, August 1934. no. 57. pp. 15-21.

<sup>58</sup> Apparently émigrés were learning about the height of Red Terror in Turkestan from some European sources. This shows us the limited nature of their contacts with the motherland. Apart from that some articles in émigré publications, it seems that they were quite unaware of the context and details of the red terror for sometime. See Editorial, "Türkistanda Kanlı Terror," *YT*, December 1934. no. 61. pp. 2-5.

<sup>59</sup> Very successful presentation of Hamlet in Turkish in Turkestan was perceived as the victory of so called "Westernists" (?) in Tashkent, where also many Russians appeared in the theatre to see Hamlet while not understanding any word of it. "Hamlet-Türkistan'da Garbçılık Akımının Muvaffakiyeti," *YT*, May 1935. no. 66. p. 18.

<sup>60</sup> When Çokayoğlu was leaving Turkestan, his thought was to return back to his country after couple months, at least after the defeat of Reds. Mustafa Çokay Oğlu, "1936," *YT*, January 1936. no. 74. p. 5.

<sup>61</sup> It is time to unite Oh Turkestan Youth,  
It is time to work day and night without any rest  
It is time to fight by taking the path of Chengiz  
It is time to put our all efforts to send Russians out.  
T. Yolçı, "Türkistan Yaşlarına," *YT*, April 1936. no. 77. p. 36.

the editors of *Yaş Türkistan*, the victory of Soviets in Turkestan in terms of economic, social and cultural developments would directly mean the defeat of Turkestanian patriots.<sup>62</sup>

The sharpest criticisms and attacks of the Soviet "progressive" policy and propaganda targeted the religious masses of Turkestan and all kinds of Islamic institutions. Émigrés, in fact, celebrated this deadly Soviet policy claiming that these policies would only arouse more reactionary feelings among the Turkestanians.<sup>63</sup> Sometimes, even the straightforward Soviet attacks on traditional Muslim clergy and their students in Turkestan were presented by *Yaş Türkistan* as attacks against Muslim nationalist organizations.<sup>64</sup> *Yaş Türkistan* had an open policy to show all anti-Soviet forces as parts of an organized Muslim nationalist movement. It was right that the most resistant group in Turkestan to Bolshevik atrocities as well as everything "Soviet" was the class of local Khalifa and especially Sheikhs-Khojas of Ferghana.<sup>65</sup> Harsh criticism by the Soviet newspapers about the religious activities in Turkestan like the continuing prestige of Khalifas, un-attendance of pupils to schools and workers to their jobs during the religious holidays and rally-like visits to cemeteries and saints' tombs, led émigrés to propagandize that Soviet regime's policy towards Turkestan was a clear continuation of Ilminskiy-Ostromov line.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> For the "Turkestan Nationalists" all kinds of developments in Turkestan (cultural, industrial, economic, etc) would have a negative meaning for the people of Turkestan. See Timuroglu, "Sovyet Hükümetinin Yutugu-Türkistan Üçün Beladır," *YT*, September 1935. no. 70. p. 13.

<sup>63</sup> Conservative-religious nature of the population of Turkestan was seen as the main obstacle for the Bolshevik ideology in Turkestan. Émigrés, several times repeated that the Bolshevik attacks to religion and national values would not help Bolsheviks but rather cause more reactionary tendencies among the Muslims of Turkestan. Editorial, "Türkistan'da Dinge Karşı Muhakime," *YT*, January 1936. no. 74. pp. 2-5.

<sup>64</sup> Early in 1936, about 32 Turkestanians were arrested by the Soviet authorities and 7 of them were shot to death immediately while the rest was sent to an unknown destination in Siberia. They were the "gang" of Abdülmuttalib Sheikh and his Khalifas who were continuing all their religious and nationalist activities in the countryside. See Oktay, "Türkistanda yaşırın Milli Uyuşmalar," *YT*, February 1936. no. 75. p. 19.

<sup>65</sup> Taşbalta, "Ruhanilerimiz Milli Küreş Cephesinde," *YT*, December 1937. no. 97. pp. 31-34.

<sup>66</sup> A, "Türkistan'da Dini Hareketler," *YT*, June 1937. no. 91. pp. 28-32.

#### 5.4 The Emphasis on Soviet-Russian Colonialism and Diplomatic Efforts

The most practiced tactic in *Yaş Türkistan* was to highlight colonial features of the Russian-Soviet rule over Turkestan. Quoting a French Newspaper *Le Matin* in Paris, dated the 17th of June 1930, "Soviet government executing a heavy colonial policy in Turkestan,"<sup>67</sup> Çokayoğlu desired to convince his own Turkestanis as well as the international public that Turkestan should be counted among the colonial regions of the world. Apparently, some of the leading émigré leaders such as Tahir (Çağatay) initially wholeheartedly believed in the Soviet promises of national self-determination and as late as 1936 they were complaining about how they were fooled.<sup>68</sup> Prior to the Second World War, there were two centers in Europe, Berlin and Moscow, for Turkestanis.<sup>69</sup> And Soviet patriotism was becoming a serious alternative to Turkestan nationalism.<sup>70</sup>

The émigrés interpreted the Soviet propaganda on how sincerely "they were trying to destroy the remnants of imperial-colonial Russian chauvinism in Turkestan" as a proof of the surviving Russian chauvinism in the region. In fact, they never believed in the sincerity of the Soviets in solving this problem.<sup>71</sup> For Çokayoğlu it was a matter of "colonization".<sup>72</sup> The very failure of nativization was also a proof of existing foreign

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<sup>67</sup> Yaş Türkistan, "Türkistanlılar Nazarı Dikkatine," *YT*, June-July 1930. no. 7-8. p. 1.

<sup>68</sup> Apparently some of the émigré leaders believed Bolshevik propaganda about the national self-determination and their right to secede from the Soviets at the beginning of the revolution. As late as 1936 they were still writing about how they were fooled by this. Tahir, "Bolşeviklerin Milli Siyaset Oyunı," *YT*, May 1936. no. 78. pp. 2-7.

<sup>69</sup> Turkestani émigrés were carefully observing European public opinion prior the WWII, some of which was Moscow and the rest was Berlin oriented in the growing power struggle within Europe. "Berlin mi, Moskova mı?" *YT*, March 1935. no. 64. pp. 29-32.

<sup>70</sup> The dilemma between Soviet patriotism and nationalism was one of the issues, which wondered émigré leaders. In fact, Soviets propaganda on patriotism was quite successful in absorbing nationalist tendencies some of Turkestani natives. Editorial, "Sovyet Vatanperverliği," *YT*, May 1935. no. 66. pp. 2-5.

<sup>71</sup> Quoting *Kızıl Özbekistan* newspaper no. 59, Russian chauvinism in Turkestan was still alive. See Kızıl Özbekistan'dan. "Rus Bolşeviklerin Türkistandagi Milli Siyaseti Küreşni Köçeytirmez," *YT*, June 1931. no. 19. pp. 29-30.

<sup>72</sup> For Çokayoğlu there was little difference between Tzarist Russian colonialism and Soviet Russian colonialism. See Editorial, "Kızıl Müstemleke," *Yaş Türkistan*, June 1932. no. 31. pp. 1-6.

colonial rule in Turkestan.<sup>73</sup> Çokayoğlu used to compare British and Russian style colonialism; he found the Russian one to be very brutal and military.<sup>74</sup> The anti-colonial rhetoric of Bolshevism among the young Turkestanis during the revolution turned most of them into so-called "national communists." And it was a vain hope on the part of Soviets to expect from them to become directly the servants of "Muscovite Russians" like their feudal predecessors.<sup>75</sup> Émigré leaders were quite sure that their compatriots back home would never surrender to the pressure of the center-Moscow as easily as the Khans and Emirs of Turkestan.

Another form of the same sort of propaganda was based on a new tactical campaign launched in émigré publications: *Yaş Türkistan* started to publish news of several rebellions in Turkestan against the Bolshevik atrocities. Apparently, the scale of such "rebellions" were quite exaggerated; if not, as was the case occasionally, manufactured product of wishful thinking.<sup>76</sup> The basic aim in this sort of propaganda was, as always, to keep the Turkestanist nationalists' motives warm and popular among the Turkestanis in emigration.

However, the Bolsheviks were winning victory after victory in the diplomatic field, including in the League of Nations.<sup>77</sup> Certain Western intellectual circles reflected Soviet

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<sup>73</sup> The failure of nativization of all cadres was a source of propaganda for the émigrés, publishing and reminding all foreign ruling elements in Turkestan for the sake of demonstrating their compatriots that foreigners were in power. Editorial, "Türkistan'da Bolşevik Fırkasının İç Yüzi," *YT*, March 1935. no. 64. p. 8.

<sup>74</sup> For a comparison of British and Russian style colonialism, see Mustafa, "Rusya'da Milli devlet Mes'elesi Münasebetiyle," *YT*, August-September 1937. no. 92-93. pp. 10-14. Where the author finds Russian colonialism as a military and settlement-oriented farming-exploiting type.

<sup>75</sup> See Mustafa, "Bolşeviklerin 12 yıldan soñına itiraf itdikleri bir hakikat," *YT*, December 1937. no. 97. pp. 19-21. See also quotation of an open letter published in *Enbekçi Kazak* in 1925 by the Young Communists, who in 1930s become high-level party officials. The content of the letter is highly Kazak-nationalist oriented. *Enbekçi Kazak'dan "Açık Hat"* *YT*. December 1937. no. 97. pp. 21-24.

<sup>76</sup> Émigré publications were quite filled up with the rebellion news against Russians and victory news of the Basmacıs. This was creating an important amount of optimism among the Turkestani leaders outside. See Editorial, "Milli Küreş Yolında," *YT*, February 1931, no. 15. pp. 1-3.

<sup>77</sup> Turkestani émigrés in Europe were following the activities and development of League of Nations from the beginning. However most of them were very much disappointed by the Bolshevik diplomatic victories in Europe and the ignorance of their cause. Editorial, "Dünya Sulh Buhranı," *YT*, June 1934, no. 55. pp. 2-4.

pretensions as liberators of Eastern peoples in the Western media. This had forced Çokayoğlu to clarify their progressive-nationalist position again.<sup>78</sup> *Yaş Türkistan* was protesting the friendship between the democratic regimes of Europe and the totalitarian dictatorship of the Soviet Union. In fact, Turkestani émigrés were far from understanding the very basics of international politics of Europe.<sup>79</sup> When Soviets became a member of the League of Nations, Turkestanis saw this as an opportunity to carry their cause to this international platform.<sup>80</sup>

### 5.5 Geography and Ethnical Identity

Another issue was to create a consensus on the geography and ethnicity of Turkestan. This was tried to be achieved mostly by Osman Hoca (Kocaoğlu). He defined Turkestan, to mean "the land of Turkic Peoples;"<sup>81</sup> being located between Asia's Northern and Southern parts and between China and Western Asia-Europe.<sup>82</sup>

Osman Hoca defined the boundaries of Turkestan as:

Suchu (Northwest of Kansu) and Kara Ula regions in the East. Altay-İrtiş line in the North. Ural river and Caspian Sea in the West. Atrek and Gurgan rivers, Khurassan Mountain range, Hindukush, Muztag, Künlün ranges in the South. Greater Türkistan is equal to 5,300,000 square kilometers.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Against the Soviet propaganda in the western press about the backwardness of the Bukharan Khanate and Turkestan before the Soviets, émigrés responded as their aim was not to return back the days before the Soviet invasion but to establish a modern Turkestan. See MÇ, "Türkistan hakkında Fransız Tilinde Bir Makale," *YT*, September 1935, no. 68. pp. 29-30.

<sup>79</sup> For a protest of Democratic European regimes friendship with the Soviet Dictatorship, see "1917-Aralık 1936," *Yaş Türkistan*, November 1936. no. 84. pp. 6-9.

<sup>80</sup> Soviet membership to the League of Nations have been seen as an opportunity by the émigrés to take their issues to the International public and force Soviets to make changes in their policy on the Ukrainian, Caucasian and Turkestani populations. See Editorial, "Türkistan, Kafkasya ve Ukrayna Protestosu," *YT*, October 1935. no. 71. pp. 7-10.

<sup>81</sup> Osman Kocaoğlu, *Türkistan*. Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliğinde verilen konferanslar (İstanbul: Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği Yayını no. 1 1936), p. 8.

<sup>82</sup> Kocaoğlu, p. 6.

<sup>83</sup> Kocaoğlu, p. 9 also sees the map of Greater Turkestan in p. 16.

Osman Hoca argued that since the ancient times, geographic divisions of Turkestan had remained quite similar.<sup>84</sup> Tien-Shan range was the natural border between Eastern and Western parts of Turkestan.<sup>85</sup> Turkestani émigré leaders apparently were well informed about the ancient history of the region.<sup>86</sup> That was basically why they had put up a stiff resistance to the Soviet “manufactured” versions of the history of the region.

The realistic use of the term Turkestan was meant to be "golden days" of Turkestan at the Height of Timurid Empire when the whole Turkestan was united under one political authority, as a rich and prosperous country.<sup>87</sup>

In terms of ethnicity of Turkestan, Osman Hoca was keen to include Tajiks into the common Turkestani identity.<sup>88</sup> Tajiks were openly considered as the natives of Turkestan and a part of Turkestani identity.<sup>89</sup> It is difficult to find any example of exclusive émigré approach to the issue of Tajik and Sart identities within the context of *Yaş Türkistan*.

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<sup>84</sup> Kocaoğlu also explains that, according to Greek philosopher Ptolemeos lived in 2<sup>nd</sup> century AD and Arab geographers of 9<sup>th</sup> century, Turkestan was divided into 11 main regions: 1. Hirkania: Southeastern Turkestan, Cürcan-Gürgân region. 2. Khorezm: Khiva and areas around Amudarya river. 3. Soghdiana: Upper Zarafshan. 4. Transoxiana: Bukhara and lower Zarafshan. 5. Margiana: Marw and Ashgabat region. 6. Arriana: Herat and Herirud region. 7. Bactriana: Belh region. 8. Inner Scythia: The region between Aral Lake and Caspian Sea. 9. Outer Scythia: Yedi Su and Congaria regions. 10. Srika: Ferghana and Kashgar region. 11. İshrusene: Ora Tepe region. See Kocaoğlu p. 15.

<sup>85</sup> For the division of Eastern and Western Turkestan also see Kocaoğlu p. 15. “In the center of Turkestan, Tanrı (Tianshan) mountains range rise and separate the region into two parts. 19<sup>th</sup> Century European geographers called the eastern part as Eastern Turkestan or Kashgaria.”

<sup>86</sup> For the visions and perceptions of Turkestani immigrants about the term and its history see Muharrem Feyzi Togay, *Türkistan'ın Dünya Politikasındaki Mevkii*. Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliğinde verilen konferanslardan (İstanbul: Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği yayını no. 3, 1936), p. 4. “In the old times, real Turkestan was what is now called Mongolia and Eastern Turkestan. Travelers like Marco Polo called this region as Greater Turkey.”

<sup>87</sup> For a good example of the use of the term “Turkestan” implying the idealistic vision of the height of Central Asian civilization and history in Timurid period, see the pamphlet by Dr. Alimcan İbrahim Okay, *Büyük Temir*. Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği'nde verilen konferanslar (İstanbul: Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği Yayını no. 2, 1936).

<sup>88</sup> In this conference Kocaoğlu explains that Turkestan term was first used by Arab geographers in the 8<sup>th</sup> century, then Turkestan was the area North of Transoxiana, the land between China and Islamic Iran. Kocaoğlu, p. 8. And in p. 9 he explained that Turkestan Turkish culture is a common product of nomadic tribes and city dwellers Turks and Tajiks.

<sup>89</sup> For Tajiks being a Turkestani tribe and their integrity with Turkestani national identity, Kocaoğlu, p. 7.



However, this issue remained a political as well as practical problem between the Turkestani émigrés and the rest of the Turkish pan-Turkish circles based in Turkey.

### 5.6 Political Affiliations-Program

The most favorite name used by the émigré leaders out of Turkestan was "vatancı" [patriot] and "Cedidçi".<sup>90</sup> The pages of *Yaş Türkistan* was a platform: for both keeping Turkestanis out of Turkestan united (intact), and providing media support to the Turkestani political figures in exile to carry out their political activities.<sup>91</sup>

Çokayoğlu was already in Europe and launched his renowned *Yaş Türkistan* publications from December 1929 on. In the first issue, he explained their identity and objectives as follows:

We, the independence fighters of Turkestan, are fighting for the salvation of our race and our motherland Turkestan.<sup>92</sup> Our aim is to establish a national state in Turkestan in spirit and in appearance.... Free and independent Turkestan.<sup>93</sup>

Unification remained as the first and greatest problem among the émigré Turkestanis, while Çokayoğlu's line changed his stand swiftly. He began to criticize the political history of Turkestan, blaming Khans, as being responsible for the backwardness of their country by having stopped the people to unite and set up barriers among the natives.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Mustafa Çokay, "Türkistan'da Siyasi İntibalar", *Yeni Türkistan (YeT)*, July-August 1927, no. 2-3, pp. 6-7.

<sup>91</sup> See Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Türkistan'da Sovyet Hükümetinin Açlık Siyaseti", *YeT*, September 1927, no. 4, p. 9. Çokayoğlu, in his first articles, was explaining why they have failed to secure Turkestani independence. He was still complaining about the famine of 1917-1921, which was used by the Bolsheviks as a source of their propaganda to win over what is left from Turkestani intelligentsia. In fact, this famine was one of the most important obstacle for the nationalists to activate population. Heavy employment of cotton-monoculture from early 1920s on in Turkestan made the famine continue in lesser extends and become a part of daily life in Turkestan. Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Türkistan'ı Açlık Tehdit Ediyor", *YeT*, October-November 1927, no. 5-6, p. 10.

<sup>92</sup> *Yaş Türkistan*, "Bizniñ Yol," *YT*, December 1929. no. 1. p. 1.

<sup>93</sup> *Yaş Türkistan*, "Bizniñ Yol," *YT*, December 1929. no. 1. p. 3.

<sup>94</sup> Even in 1931 unification was one of the most repeated problems in *Yaş Türkistan*. Çokayoğlu was always quite suspicious that their movement was not receiving enough support from even the émigré Turkestanis. He

By 1931 both Çokayoğlu and *Yaş Türkistan* declared that their political affiliation concept was Turkism (Türkçülük).<sup>95</sup> The 1920 revolution in Bukhara apparently was under the fire of Emir's circles, while *Yaş Türkistan* considered it to be neither socialist nor proletariat, but mainly a national revolution.<sup>96</sup> This was surely a part of the heritage of Khans in Turkestan, which was seen as a barrier to nationalization of the tribes.

Turkestan Khans, Kara Tigin and Shahrizabz Begs were behaving by themselves and tried to defend themselves against the foreign enemies in front of their capital cities by themselves. Our fathers did not have a feeling of being Turkestanis. The divided hatred of Khokand, Bukhara and Khiva, etc against Russia was just not enough to defend Turkestan against Russia. If there was a united Turkestan patriotism through the unification of Khokand, Bukhara, Khiva, Kara Tigin, Shahrizabz, Turkmen, Kazak, Kyrgyz tribes, Turkestan would be independent and destiny would free us from foreign domination. After Russia established herself in Turkestan, she started to agitate tribalism among the Turkestanis. We have seen that their success was not little during the 1917 revolution period. We have all started to defend our common goal Turkestan autonomy program, Kazak, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Turkmen, all of us, in different ways. When the Bolsheviks captured power, we Turkestanis couldn't have found a common ground among us and we have wasted the opportunity to fight back common enemy for the problems among us. Bukhara and Khiva could have stayed as Russian vassals. There might still be people who might recognize these two Khanates as national independent states. But this is certainly wrong. Their name was saved but they did not exist at all... This was a public-relations game for Russians for hiding Russian horrors in Turkestan from the eyes of the Foreigners. Even if Turkestan would have become an independent state through the Basmacı movement, the existence of the Russian vassal Bukharan and Khivan Khanates would make Turkestan a Russian colony again... Without territorial integrity, national unity in Turkestan cannot be achieved. Turkestan can only be saved by taking Bukharan and Khivan realms into it, and it will. Not only for the interests of our continuing struggle against Russia now, but also for the national independence too, we should never say Turkestan and Bukhara or Turkestan and Khiva. And we do not have the right to use these words. We do not refuse the existence of Khanates within the territories of Turkestan who were enemies of each other. We know very well the disastrous results of these historical mistakes. Now is another era, of the uniting the divided parts of the nation. Every

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was covertly blaming late Khans, especially Khudayar Khan for the backwardness of Turkestanis as well as political and tribal polarization among the Turkestanis. See Editorial, "Milli Hareketimizin Muvaffakiyeti Üçün-Siyasi Hatt-ı Hareket Meselesi," *YT*, June 1931. no. 19. pp. 3, 6, and 10.

<sup>95</sup> It was clear that *Yaş Türkistan* accepted Turkism (Türkçülük) as a national idea (hars). Editorial, "Bolşivizm Türkçilik Düşmanıdır," *YT*, July 1931. no. 20. pp. 1-6.

<sup>96</sup> In fact after the September 1920 revolution in Bukhara, the Bukharan peoples republic was not Bolshevik in nature at all. There were not any single emphasis on the terms like proletariat or bourgeois, it was a republican structure based on law. See Editorial, "Buhara Inkılabı," *YT*, September 1931. no. 22. pp. 1-8.

Turkestanian patriot, every Turkestanian understanding the seriousness of current national struggle and future establishment of national state, should regret the usages like "Turkestan and Bukhara" or "Turkestan and Khiva" or "Turkestan and Kazakistan." But they should declare the integrity of Turkestan from national, economic and all other aspects... Such usages would not only cause a spirit of differentiation among us but would also cause a false perception in the outside as if two different countries and peoples as Turkestanian and Bukharan exist. ... Our national salvation and our peoples' future depend on our national unity alone. A national Turkestan, which has gotten rid of common enemy, can solve its organizational problems itself. It is an internal issue whether to call provinces as Bukhara, Khiva or Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakistan... So, it is not Turkestan and Bukhara or Turkestan and Something. It is only Turkestan.<sup>97</sup>

This long quotation explains very well the main political issue among the Turkestanians in emigration. The basic issue was to create a united Turkestanian front, ignoring the city and tribal identities, as well as the Bukharan Emir's authority over the émigrés. So Çokayoğlu's nationalist stand had two important facets: first, the Soviet-Russian propaganda, and second, the Emir and conservative Turkestanian elements. Nationalism, for Turkestanians was Turkism; the idea of Turkic unity and it never meant tribalism.<sup>98</sup> The stand by the nationalist Turkestanians was by all means Turkism (*Türkçülük*). That was probably why Çokayoğlu was proud of Bolsheviks naming reactionary elements in Turkestan as Çokay-Fascists.<sup>99</sup> His pan-Turkist stand became quite clear and apparent in the pages of *Yaş Türkistan*, especially in the second half of the 1930s. In 1937, he announced his political position once more as being a Turkic (Turkish) nationalist and standing for a

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<sup>97</sup> Editorial [Mustafa Çokay], "Türkistan ve Buhara mı Yoksa Togrıdan Togrı Türkistan?" *YT*, March 1932. no. 28. pp. 1-4.

<sup>98</sup> On tribalism and nationalist idealism see Cafer Seydahmet Kırımer, *Mefkûre ve Mefkûrenin Fert ve Cemiyet Hayatındaki Tesiri*. Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliğinde verilen konferanslardan (İstanbul: Türkistan Türk gençler Birliği Yayını no. 4, 1936), p. 21. "If we say we are nationalists (milliyetçiyiz), it must mean we are Turkists (Türkçüyüz), not tribalists (kabileci)."

<sup>99</sup> Bolsheviks named counter-revolutionaries in Turkestan as Çokay-Fascists, which was taken as a pride by Çokayoğlu himself and a parameter showing their well-established network within the motherland. Editorial, "Düşmanlarımız Bizniñ Faaliyetimiz Hakkında Nime Dideler?" *YT*, February 1937. no. 87. pp. 2-6.

Turkic (Turkish) Union.<sup>100</sup> Çokayoğlu's this late pan-Turkist stand was appreciated much by other Turkestanî émigré groups and the émigré leaders.<sup>101</sup>

However, the ideal-ideology of *Yaş Türkistan* was formulated as to pursue the "Turkic (Turkish) Union of Turkestan."<sup>102</sup> So Çokayoğlu's primary objective remained to be limited with the creation of a united national independent Turkestan. The heritage of the Khokand Autonomy, Çokayoğlu hailed, was a gigantic step towards the unity of the whole of Turkestan. Its holy spirit was alive with *Yaş Türkistan*.<sup>103</sup> And the upcoming Great War was a potential opportunity to free Turkestan.<sup>104</sup>

Although the name of the basic nationalist political movement in Turkestan was "Turkism",<sup>105</sup> "Turanism" was another and still broader approach to the political program. Following the fashion of the 1930s, among the Turkestanis there was a tendency to consider themselves to be part of Greater Turan, where geographically Turkestan occupied the heartland and the core.<sup>106</sup> Turan was a very loosely defined term with a strong emotional context,<sup>107</sup> especially given the Persian (literary) influences on the Turkestanî

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<sup>100</sup> Aware of the difficulties of forming a Turkestanî identity alone and separate from the rest of the Turkish groups, Çokayoğlu argued that they were standing for a Turkish Union "Türk Birliği" more than anything. And he was underlined the fact that the name of their nation was Turkish nation. Editorial "Düşmanlarımız Bizniñ Faaliyetimiz Hakkında Nime Dirler?" *YT*, March 1937. no. 88. pp. 4-5.

<sup>101</sup> Quoting Ayaz İshaki's words from Ana Milli Yol, "How would it be good if we had the opportunity to live together, Turkestan and İdel-Ural..." Oktay, "İki yapışık Kardeş Ülke," *YT*, M1937. no. 88, p. 18.

<sup>102</sup> See Tahir, "Türkistan'da Rusya İmperyalizmine Karşı," *YT*, May 1937. no. 90. p. 5.

<sup>103</sup> Khokand autonomy was a step towards the Unification of Greater Turkestan. Although it was a small step, its spirit and ideal was big and it was supposed to become the source of Turkestan National Unity movement. Editorial, "Hokand Muhtariyeti," *YT*, December 1937. no. 97. pp. 2-4.

<sup>104</sup> Expected new war in Europe was also a hope for the émigrés who thought that this would cause a great chaos within the Soviet Union and they might have an opportunity free their lands. See article titled "1935" *YT*, January 1935. no. 62. pp. 7-13.

<sup>105</sup> See Oktay, "Türkistan'da Türkçülük," *YT*, September 1938. no. 106. pp. 27-36.

<sup>106</sup> Muharrem Feyzi Togay, *Turanî kavimler ve siyasî tarihlerinin esas hatları*. Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliğinde verilen konferanslardan (İstanbul: Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği Yayını, no. 6, 1938), p. 4 See also the map of Greater Turan in p. 2.

<sup>107</sup> For a definition of Turan popular in Turkey in 1930s see Togay, p. 6. "It is from Pacific to Northwestern Europe to Atlantic, from Northern Ocean (Arctic) to Yellow River, Himalayan ranges, deserts of Iran and Arabia, Mediterranean, up to the Alp range."

intellectual circles. In short, as the heart and core of Turan,<sup>108</sup> Turkestan was considered as the source of all the nations of Turan.<sup>109</sup>

### 5.7 Çokayoğlu versus Zeki Velidî and Atsız<sup>110</sup>

Although there were minor disputes over the independence issues between the Zeki Velidî and the Çokayoğlu camps, the real bone of contention apparently was over the use of terms the Turkestan, *Türk İli* (Turkic Land) and *Türk Yurdu* (Turkic Homeland). Zeki Velidî and his pan-Turkist comrades in Turkey started to use Zeki Velidî's concept of *Türk İli* for Turkestan, which was a Turkified form of the Persian word Turkestan.<sup>111</sup> Almost simultaneously, *Atsız Mecmua* declared the language of *Yaş Türkistan* the "Sart language."<sup>112</sup> It should be noted that the very word "Sart," among Kazaks, Kipchaks and pan-Turkists of the time had very offending connotations. Atsız accused Çokayoğlu of being assimilated by the Persian culture and language.<sup>113</sup> The continuing attacks of *Atsız Mecmua* on Çokayoğlu and *Yaş Türkistan* forced Çokayoğlu to write an open letter to

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<sup>108</sup> There were four main departments of Turan tribes according to Togay: Turco-Tatar, Tungus, Finno-Ugric and Mongolian. Togay, pp. 4-5-6.

<sup>109</sup> Togay, p. 7.

<sup>110</sup> Hüseyin Nihal Atsız (1905-1975), a well known Turkish nationalist and pan-Turkist, who heavily involved with the Turkestani, Azerbaijani and İdel-Ural émigré circles throughout 1930s.

<sup>111</sup> Zeki Velidî was explaining his stands as: "The Uluğ Türkistan newspaper published in Tashkent in 1917-18 was using this concept for both Russian Turkestan and the eastern part of Turkestan under Chinese occupation. From then on, I used the same concept for Turkestan and Russian Turkestan as well, because Tsarist Turkestan General Governorship's borders were subject to constant changes." Zeki Velidî Togan, *Türklüğün Mukadderatı Üzerine* (İstanbul: Kayı Yayınları, 1970).

<sup>112</sup> In a response to Atsız Mecmua's charges of *Yaş Türkistan*'s language as a Sart-language, under Persian influence, *Yaş Turkestan* openly declared that it was the language of Turkestan. See İsen Tursun, "Mecmû'amızın Tili Hakkında," *YT*, February 1932. pp. 17-20.

<sup>113</sup> See H. Nihal Atsız, *Sart Başına Cevap: Yerli Doktorlar Olmadığı İçin Ölen Merhum Atsız Mecmua Müdüründen Ecnebi Doktorlar Sayesinde Yaşayan Yaş Türkistan Müdürüne* (İstanbul: Arkadaş Matbaası, 1933), pp. 1-4. "What made Çokayoğlu mad and others who call themselves Turkestani rather than Turk was that I showed Sarts as primitive and unbrave, ..., they are just the same as the Jewish converts in Turkey."

Atsız.<sup>114</sup> Most of the arguments were on the issue of Sartness of the Turkestani nationalists, among whom a considerable Tajik group always existed.<sup>115</sup> Both sides were accusing each other by being tribalists. The "Kipchak-wing"<sup>116</sup> led by Zeki Velidî and Atsız increased their accusations of Çokayoğlu being a Sart-Uzbek nationalist.<sup>117</sup> The immediate reaction of Çokayoğlu was to declare all "tribalists," who were in fact represented by the "Kipchak wing" of Zeki Velidî, as the enemies of the nation and the national unification.<sup>118</sup>

Probably after these first major problems with Zeki Velidî and *Atsız Mecmua's* attacks, in 1932, Çokayoğlu declared that pan-Turkism was an unrealistic cause.<sup>119</sup> However, in the late 1930s he turned to the pan-Turanian and pan-Turkist stands again.

The problems between Zeki Velidî and Çokayoğlu were not confined to the political stands of the two. Zeki Velidî's historical-ethnographic categorization of the Kazak sub-tribes (Uruvlar) was protested and harshly criticized by Çokayoğlu.<sup>120</sup> The latter claimed that, Zeki Velidî was in fact a foreigner to the region. While being very unkind to each

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<sup>114</sup> See Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Atsız Mecmuada KA harfleri astıga yaşıringan efendige açık mektub," *YT*, May 1932. no. 30. pp. 24-25. For the details of the problem between Atsız and Çokayoğlu and Zeki Velidî's interference.

<sup>115</sup> It should also be noted here that among the Turkestanis such a clear distinction between Tajik and Turkic was never existed even under the circumstances a separate Tajik identity is accepted. The acceptance of Tajik-Persian as the mother tongue would never mean the acceptance of a different identity other than Turkestani. Especially, among the city dwellers who were usually bi-lingual. Such distinguishing identities as of being Sart, Tajik or Turk were never attempted to be used but a common Turkestani identity was greatly respected.

<sup>116</sup> This represents the concept of the Atsız-Velidî camp, named by the author to underline their Kipchak-oriented approach against the so-called "Sart" stand of Çokayoğlu.

<sup>117</sup> However, it should also be noted that no single notable "native" Turkestanis is known to support Atsız-Velidî camp in this debate at the beginning! However this debate later became one of the sources of so called "Kipchak-Sart" separation in the ranks of émigré political organizations.

<sup>118</sup> All kinds of tribalism were among the main obstacles for the émigré leaders in achieving unification. In fact, many blamed Yaş Turkestan circles for being Sart or Uzbek oriented. For the Çokays answers to those see Editorial, "Türkistan Türklüğü," *YT*, September 1932. no. 32. pp. 1-5. "During today's struggle for national salvation, we call all tribalists as the enemies of our Turkestan nationalism and our national salvation". p. 4.

<sup>119</sup> For Çokayoğlu there is an interesting difference between Turkism and political unification among all Turks. He finds Pan-Turkist or pan-Turanic approaches quite unrealistic. See Mustafa Çokayoğlu, *YT*. June 1932. Number: 31. pp. 6-10.

<sup>120</sup> Çokayoğlu criticized Zeki Velidî's categorization and comments about Kazak tribes (uruglar). In fact he used very agitative sentences like Zeki Velidî's lack of information and use of Russian ethnographers methods leading him to make shameful mistakes, etc. Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Kazak Urugları," *YT*, October 1932. no. 35. pp. 18-23.

other, Çokayoğlu published one of the most unpleasant letters of Atsız in his *Yaş Türkistan* as a proof of Zeki Velidî's involvement.<sup>121</sup> According to Çokayoğlu Atsız was an Anatolian chauvinist and Zeki Velidî was a falsifier of history.<sup>122</sup> That was why Zeki Velidî was providing Atsız with the material to launch an agitative campaign against Çokayoğlu.

Most probably the origins of these problems between Çokayoğlu and Zeki Velidî went back to the times of revolution when Çokayoğlu had sided with the unitary Idel-Ural camp of Sadri Maksûdi. It was the exact time period when Zeki Velidî and "three Tatars" were in deep conflict over the issues of independence and unitary nature of the nation. Zeki Velidî had never forgotten "three Tatars" who worked for a non-territorial cultural autonomy within the Russian and then Soviet Empire. Çokayoğlu was in defense against Zeki Velidî's accusations of the unitarist group of Jadids who worked with Russian Kadets before and during the revolution and who were mostly against full independence of Turkestan or federalism.<sup>123</sup>

Although Çokayoğlu was very careful in using the term Turkestan for Central Asia, there were instances in *Yaş Türkistan* when the terms *Türk İli* and *Türk Yurdu* also appeared, surely with an explanation that they both meant Turkestan.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> Atsız replied to Çokayoğlu in *Atsız Mecmua* in 5 October 1932 but basically postponed the arguments between the two for a near future, after the victory against the common enemies. This was basically a problem between a Turkestani nationalist and a pan-Turanist who would not value Turkestan more than a part of greater Turcic homeland. H. Nihal. "Çokayoğlu Mustafa Bige Soñ Cevab" *YT*. November 1932. no. 36. pp. 6-10.

<sup>122</sup> See Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Merhum Atsız Mecmua Müdürü Nihal Big'niñ Uyatsız Çıkışıya Karşu Cevabum," *YT*, December 1932. no. 37. p.10. Çokayoğlu here harshly criticizes Atsız for being an Anatolian Chauvinist and in pages 14-15 attacks Zeki Velidî for being protected by Atsız but still the owner of "unashamed scientific lies".

<sup>123</sup> Çokayoğlu was again critical about Zeki Velidî's comments on the unitarists position before and during the revolution against the federalists. For Çokayoğlu, unitarist or federalist, opposition members should unite under one front, rather than continuing older enmities between them. See Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "17 at Kum astıda kalğır yaramasız bir hareket," *YT*, February 1935. no. 63. pp. 20-21.

<sup>124</sup> "Türkistan-Türk İli yahud Türk Yurtu demektir. Bu büyük ülke şarkî ve garbî Türkistan namıyla başlıca iki kısımğa bölüngendir." Doktor İshakoglu, "Türkistan," *YT*. August-September 1936. No 80-81. p. 43. It is

## 5.8 Alaşism

In *Yaş Türkistan, Alaşçılık* (Alaşism) was identified with Turkestan nationalism in all aspects.<sup>125</sup> One of the most important problems before the Alaş leaders was to draw the limits of Kazak land. However, in a meeting with the members of the Bashkir government in Samara, the same leaders also showed their desire to unite with all other parts of Turkestan as early as August 1918. Çokayoğlu always included original Alaş Orda as an organ of Turkestan nationalism in the north.<sup>126</sup> Simply because he was a member of the both Khokand and Alaş Orda governments, Çokayoğlu saw no single difference between the political stands of the two, in terms of their commitment to the Turkestani independence cause.

## 5.9 Jadidism

Jadidism, was a Muslim enlightenment movement, fueled by nationalist tendencies. Claiming the legacy of Gasprinskiy's Jadid movement in his paper *Tercüman*, Çokayoğlu was using every opportunity to underline Jadidism's great role on their enlightenment.<sup>127</sup> Early Russian propaganda in Turkestan, presented the Jadids as the reactionary rebels

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interesting how Çokayoğlu accepted the usages of *Türk İli* and *Türk Yurdu* terms in his journal, which were quite identified with Zeki Velidi.

<sup>125</sup> Timuroğlu, "Alaş Orda," *YT*, September 1932. No. 32. pp. 18-21.

<sup>126</sup> Çokayoğlu always separated the first leaders of Alaş Orda from latecomers; most of them turned Bolshevik soon. His vision of Alaş Orda was basically an organizational tool of Turkestan nationalism among the Kazaks. Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Tübe Kılğan Alaş Ordacılar," *YT*, September 1932. no. 34. p. 13.

<sup>127</sup> In a congratulatory article for the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of İsmail Bey Gaspiralı's *Tercüman*, Münevver Kari's memoirs were quoted; "there were no signs of any Cedit schools in the year 1900 in Turkestan... Same year the program of a new Cedit school opened in Bahçesaray was published in *tercüman*. I read that. From that day on I had the idea of opening up such a school. ... In June 1901 I have gathered 30 pupils in the mahalla and get the necessary permission for the school. ... That was the first regular Cedit school opened under a program.



against Bukharan Amir and the reactionary religious circles.<sup>128</sup> However soon they, Jadids of Turkestan and Alaş Orda, became the scapegoats of the Bolshevik press.<sup>129</sup> The Soviets, however, had to wait until 1937 for the execution of famous Jadid-nationalist Turkestani figures like Çolpan, Fitrat, İlbeg, Nasir, Haşim etc.<sup>130</sup>

### 5.10 Nativization

Çokayoğlu's prior optimism about the national cadres holding high ranks in Turkestani republics soon turned out to be a source of apprehension among the émigré leaders. Nativization was perceived as a new success of the nationalities policy of the Soviet government.<sup>131</sup> This also created a worry among the émigré leaders who needed to re-remind the people that, this was originally their idea to have the native cadres.<sup>132</sup> The same Turkestanis who had revolted against the Tsar's 1916 prikaz for the conscription into the Russian army, applauded the conscription of Turkestanis into the ranks of Red Army, thinking that this was the only practical way to prepare the cadres of the future national army.<sup>133</sup> By 1932, the emphasis on nativization was based on the argument that true

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<sup>128</sup> Russian Bolsheviks used Jajdidsm and its reaction to traditional ways as a tool for its advance in Turkestan. In fact most of the Cedids refused to work with Bolsheviks. However leaders like Feyzullah Hoca joined Bolshevik ranks, which would later be blamed for using Bolshevism as a mask for achieving his Cedit-nationalist aims. See Editorial. "Ceditçilik Korkısı," *YT*, April 1935. no. 65. p. 7.

<sup>129</sup> Although Bolsheviks declared their victory over Cedids and Alaş Orda supporters many times after the revolution, as late as 1935 they were still complaining about the existence of the remnants of the both groups and were quite often referring to them for anything going wrong in Turkestan. Editorial, "Boşevik Yalğan ve Bühtanları," *YT*, September 1935. no. 68. p. 2, 6.

<sup>130</sup> Famous Turkestani writers could not escape terror either. During the Uzbek Sovyet Writers Congress in Tashkent in early September 1937, Bolsheviks declared İlbeg, Çolpan, Abdullah Kadri, Fitrat, Osman Nasir, Atacan Haşim and Rıza Ankabay as the bourgeois nationalists who succeeded to infiltrate to Bolshevik ranks during the chaos of Revolution in Turkestan and who also continued to defend their causes till 1937. See Oktay, "Neşriyatta Ziyancılık ve Ziyancı Muharrirleri," *YT*, November 1937. no. 96. p. 26.

<sup>131</sup> Canay. "Türkistan'da Yirtilendiriş Nimesden İbaret?" *YT*, January 1930. no. 2. p. 5.

<sup>132</sup> Canay. "Türkistan'da Yirtilendiriş Nimesden İbaret?" *YT*, January 1930. no. 2. p. 13.

<sup>133</sup> The conscription of Turkestanis to the Red Army ranks was interpreted as an important and positive development by many Turkestanis. In fact they had seen this as a preparation for the future national army. See Editorial. "Türkistanlılar Askerlikde" *YT*, October 1931. no. 23. pp. 1-5.

nativization was a complete nativization of all cadres.<sup>134</sup> In the mean time, there was a fair appraisal of the achievements of the Soviet rule in Turkestan.<sup>135</sup>

By 1933, the Turkestani émigrés realized that nativization was another Bolshevik failure.<sup>136</sup> By mid-1930s, the native cadres of Turkestan were still largely stuffed by the Jadids.<sup>137</sup> Great Russian chauvinistic imperialism was the main source of the failure of nativization.<sup>138</sup> The first requirement for entering the Soviet Higher education machine was to be a Russian-speaker, which was somehow supported by *Yaş Türkistan*.<sup>139</sup> The basic dilemma was the Russians' ignorance of native languages of Turkestan while simultaneously campaigning for nativization!<sup>140</sup> Soviets were mostly dealing with the problems of Russian settlers and leaving the native affairs to the natives.<sup>141</sup>

The students sent to Germany by the Bukharan government were back in Turkestan in the 1930s. Only a small number of them remained in Germany to continue further

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<sup>134</sup> Nativization was under heavy criticism among the émigrés. See Taşbalta. "Millileştirilme İşleri" *YT*. June 1932. no. 31. pp. 27-30. Where the author argued that nativization would only be achieved through a complete nationalization of the cadres.

<sup>135</sup> See "Bugünkü Türkistan Ahvalinden" *YT*. February 1933. no. 39, pp. 32-35. Here *Yaş Türkistan* praises the level of scientific advancement among the cadres as well as Turkestanis being in the command ranks of Turkestan based red-army, as much as %88.

<sup>136</sup> The failure of nativization projects in Central Asia were criticized harshly and found unrealistic and propaganda oriented by the émigré leaders. See Çağatay. "Yirileştirilme Etrafında" *YT*. November 1933. no. 48. pp. 36-37.

<sup>137</sup> As late as the mid 1930s there were still Cedids among the national communist ranks holding some power in Turkestan. One of them was Sadullah Hoca, one of the Cedit members who served quite effectively before the revolution. He was not a leader like Kari or others but respected by the Bolsheviks for a long time. Editorial, "İftira Okları," *YT*, February 1935. no. 63. p. 2.

<sup>138</sup> In order to use the failure of *Korenizatsiya* in Turkestan as a tool for more agitation, émigrés claimed that Russians would never give up their Russian-Imperialist-colonial assimilation project in Turkestan. They have used terms like "Moskova ve Neva Bataklıkları Sülüklerinden, Ruslardan Kurtuluşunu Talep İtedir." Oktay, "Her Yerde Rusçuluk," *YT*, April 1935. no. 65. p. 21.

<sup>139</sup> The most important barrier to Turkestanis for entering into higher education was the Russian language proficiency. However émigrés were quite sure that without those national cadres there would never be any hope for returning back to national sovereignty. So, they supported the raising of national cadres even at the "cost" of having them as Russian-speakers. Canay, "Her Kaday Kadrlar Emes, Milli Kadrlargına," *YT*, June 1935. no. 67. p. 13.

<sup>140</sup> Illiteracy of the Russian Bolsheviks about the native languages of Turkestan was also protested by Bolshevik leaders. Timuroğlu, "Yirileştirilme İşleri 1935inçü Yılı Hali," *YT*, June 1935. no. 67. pp. 13-17.

<sup>141</sup> It was also confessed by the leading Bolsheviks in Turkestan like Formanov and Viletskiy that they were always quite far away from the real proletariat of Turkestan, dealing with the problems of Russian settlers. See Mustafa Çökayoğlu, "Muştumuzırlar-Kolonizatörler Oyası," *YT*, August 1935. no. 68. pp. 12-13.

education.<sup>142</sup> In fact, most of the émigré leaders kept their optimism about the raising of national cadres through Soviet higher education system.<sup>143</sup>

### 5.11 Linguistic Policies

*Yaş Türkistan* made it known that they were after a common Turkic language.<sup>144</sup> Quite similar to Republican Turkey in Soviet Turkestan, language policy was based on eliminating Persian and Arabic words from the Turkic language.<sup>145</sup> This language policy caused many protests among the émigrés.<sup>146</sup> The introduction of the Cyrillic alphabet came unexpectedly.<sup>147</sup> Until then, even the Soviets were claiming that linguistic similarities among the peoples of Turkestan were by chance, as was the case in other nations.<sup>148</sup> The

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<sup>142</sup> All the students sent to Germany from Turkestan graduated by the end of 1922. Most of them stayed there for further academic education, while preferred to return back to their countries. Tahir, "Türkistan Yaşlıgı Üçün İşlerlik Bir Kün," *YT*, January 1934. no. 74. p. 16.

<sup>143</sup> The importance of preparing national cadres within and outside Soviet Turkestan was one of the most popular issues dealt with in the pages of *Yaş Türkistan* as well as in the agendas of émigré leaders. Canay, "Milli Kadrlar Hazırlaş," *YT*, May 1936. no. 78. p. 8. They were interestingly optimistic about the education of Turkestani youth in the Russian higher education institutes and thought they would be the skeleton of the future independent Turkestan. See also Canay, "Milli Kadrlar Hazırlaş," *YT* June 1936. no. 79. p. 11.

<sup>144</sup> It was praised in *Yaş Türkistan* that the Turkish Minister of Education, in the Congress of Turkish Language in İstanbul, declared that their aim was to make Turkish such a language, a newspaper printed in İstanbul should be read and understood in Samarkand. See İsen Tursun, "Türk Dili Kurultayı Münasebetile," *YT*, November 1932. no. 36. p. 5.

<sup>145</sup> For the so-called Red Professor Atacan Haşim, the creation of the new Uzbek language should be made through the local dialects, rather than using old Chaghatay, or Cedit literature nor the language of Chagatai Goringi. The local dialects were the best ones in terms of cleanliness from Persian and Arabic words. See İsen Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til Siyaseti," *YT*, September 1933. no. 46. pp. 15-19.

<sup>146</sup> Bolshevik language policy caused many protests among the émigrés and called as the destruction of the most important national pride and wealth. See İsen Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til Siyaseti II," *YT*, October 1933 no. 47. pp. 16-20.

<sup>147</sup> The change of alphabet from Latin to Cyrillic and the application of different Cyrillic alphabets to each tribal group, from the first days on, caused strong protests among the émigrés. See Va. Nu, "Türklük Sesi," *YT*, November 1933, no. 48. pp. 19-20.

<sup>148</sup> For the Soviet language policy, the people of Turkestan did not have any linguistic relations, commonalties or similarities with anyone else in the world. İsen Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til Siyaseti IV," *YT*, February 1934. no. 51. p. 16.

language policy was considered to be one of the main tools of assimilation,<sup>149</sup> as it was systematically destroying the means of communication among Turkic groups.<sup>150</sup>

Turkestanis had showed similar reactions when Latin script was first introduced in Turkestan.<sup>151</sup> Language policy was closely linked to the falsification of history and new attempts to create "national" and "soviet" cultures. This was the beginning of the Russian "doppa-Turkestan head cap" policy.<sup>152</sup> Rightly so, the émigrés realized that the Soviet linguistic policies<sup>153</sup> in Turkestan were directly linked to their "divide and rule" policies. To this end, the Russian linguistic policy was cleverly used in eastern classics.<sup>154</sup>

Despite Russian attempts to popularize a Soviet literature in Turkestan, national local literature remained the most popular one.<sup>155</sup> The attempts at elimination of Arabic and Persian words from the central Asian Turkic languages were supported as they lead to the entrance of Russian terminologies into these languages.<sup>156</sup> Although there was a strong emphasis on the necessity of learning native languages for the European colonists in

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<sup>149</sup> For the policy on language issue, see also İsen Tursun, "Türkistanda Til Siyaseti," *YT*, June 1934. pp. 5-11.

<sup>150</sup> The changes in alphabet and policy of languages, caused a natural feeling that Moscow not only stopping Turkestanis to get in contact with the western culture but also destroying all kinds of inter-Turkic relations which would bring a completely new picture. See İsen Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til Siyaseti," *YT*, July 1934. no. 56. pp. 6-13.

<sup>151</sup> Linguistic policy was a part of a total cultural policy in Turkestan. During the introduction of Latin alphabet in Turkestan, Latin was seen as a tool of the Bolsheviks and many Turkestanis wanted their Arabic script back and they were called counter revolutionaries by the Soviets. İsen Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til Siyaseti," *YT*, August 1934. no. 57. pp. 9-14.

<sup>152</sup> Falsification of language, history and their culture by the Soviets created lots of anger among the émigré leaders. İsen Tursun, "Tarihi Hakikat ve Soviet Siyaseti," *YT*, October 1934. no. 59. pp. 20-26. Doppa policy means emptying national values and reduction of national identity to very simple costumes.

<sup>153</sup> In many instances, the linguistic policies of the Soviets were identified as to be assimilationist in nature. İsen Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til Siyaseti," *YT*, November 1934, no. 60. pp. 27-32.

<sup>154</sup> The response of the Soviets about the charges on the linguistic policy in Turkestan was simple. They were not against Eastern classics like Firdevsi or Hoca Nasreddin, etc. They even wanted Turkestan workers to sign their own songs rather than trying to learn classical Russian literature. İsen Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til Siyaseti," *YT*, February 1935. no. 63. pp. 13-15.

<sup>155</sup> The failure of the popularization of the Soviet Literature in Turkestan was not questioned much in the politburo. Because it would directly mean the questioning of the Soviet colonial policy in Turkestan. See Tahir, "Türkistan'da Milli Edebiyat ve Edibler Faciası," *YT*, June 1935. no. 67. pp. 28-29.

<sup>156</sup> During the Alphabet Congress convened in Moscow in 1936, Soviet linguists pointed out their success in clearing Central Asian Turkic languages from Persian and Arabic influence and they were proud of the import of International-Russian terminology into those languages as well as better grammatical and punctuation (Russian) rules. See İsen Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til Siyaseti," *YT*, June 1936. no. 79. p. 21.

Turkestan, Moscow kept appointing Russian-Ukrainian Party apparatchiks to even to the Kolhoz-Sovkhoz level, who had never bothered to learn local languages.<sup>157</sup> Russian language classes only became compulsory after the start of dismissal of national communists, from the 1<sup>st</sup> of September 1937 on in Uzbekistan.<sup>158</sup>

### 5.12 Russification

Another kind of response to nativization was a rather negative one, claiming that it would speed-up the assimilation process.<sup>159</sup> Bolsheviks were promising everything possible to the farmer-dikhans during 1920s to keep them on their side.<sup>160</sup> Increasing Soviet criticisms about the Jadids were another cause of anger.<sup>161</sup> Influx of Slavs in Turkestan was a sign of irrecoverable assimilation.<sup>162</sup> Defending a Turkestani amalgam, émigré leaders were strongly opposing the Soviet amalgam of nations, which would directly mean assimilation.<sup>163</sup> Soviet education was seen as the strongest means of assimilation.<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> See "İdarelerini Yirileştirir Mes'alesi Etrafında," *YT*, June 1938. no. 103. pp. 49-50.

<sup>158</sup> Taşbalta, "Kırgından Soñraki Kõrünüşler," *YT*, August-September 1938. no. 104-105. p. 38.

<sup>159</sup> The first responses of the émigrés to nativization, interestingly, were quite negative, arguing that it was one more step to help assimilation Russian hegemony. See İlter, "Türkistan'da Millileştirir Meselesi," *YT*, October 1931, no. 23, pp. 27-30.

<sup>160</sup> Especially during their fight against the Basmacı, Bolsheviks promised Turkestanis land, free markets, etc, especially to the dikhans; but by 1930s it became clear that they used all these promises to stop layman joining enemy ranks. See Çağatay, "Saglam Fikirge Karşu Bolşevik Hücümü," *YT*, March 1932. no. 28. p. 19.

<sup>161</sup> Bolshevik applications of modern educational methods for the sake of propaganda and assimilation of Turkestanis were quite often protested among the émigré intelligentsia. However, the criticisms of the older Cedid systems by the Bolsheviks were found to be quite unnecessary. See Çağatay, "Tenkid mi Ahmaklık mı?" *YT*, December 1932. no. 37. p. 22.

<sup>162</sup> Actually waves of Russian-Ukrainian colonists to Turkestan in 1920s and early 30s consisted mostly of peasants, kulaks and mostly "dangerous aspects" of central Russia, who suddenly became the best bases for the Soviet power in the region. See Yaş Türkistanlı, "Rus Muhaceret Siyaseti Tehlikesi," *YT*, June 1933 no. 43. p. 11.

<sup>163</sup> The attempts to create Soviet People through amalgam of nations also caused fear among Turkestanis, who defended the rights of smaller nations rather than creating an amalgam with the "Great Russians", which would directly mean assimilation. Tahir, "Milliyet ve Amalgam Meselesi," *YT*, July 1934. no. 56. pp. 20-23.

<sup>164</sup> Soviet type of enternasyonel education has been perceived as the strongest tool for assimilation. See Yaş Türkistanlı, "Türkistan Mektebleride," *YT*, January 1935. no. 62. pp. 17-21.

The famous "wall of interpreters" between the natives of Turkestan and foreign Russian rulers in Turkestan was to the advantage of Turkestanis.<sup>165</sup> Çokan Valihanov was always suspected to be a cultural-missionary agent of the Russians. Soviet appraisal of Valihanov was deliberately a disadvantageous choice for them.<sup>166</sup> Soviet schooling until the Second World War in Turkestan was nothing but a carbon copy of the Tsarist-Russian native schooling.<sup>167</sup> Soviet change of toponyms in Turkestan was also a part of Russification-Sovietization of the region.<sup>168</sup> Thinking that it would lead to the mass conversion of Turkestani youth into Orthodox Christianity, the émigré leaders were very much concerned about the anti-religious campaigns of the Soviet regime.<sup>169</sup>

According to Çokayoğlu, given the low level of education and culture in Turkestan, introduction of Russian civilization into Turkestan was more than enough for a speedy assimilation.<sup>170</sup> Soviets wrote the constitutions of each Turkestan republic, which were seemingly increasing their sovereignties.<sup>171</sup> The Soviet colonization drive into Turkestan

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<sup>165</sup> Safarov's lines about Bolshevism having a wall of translators in Turkestan were very much appreciated in the pages of *Yaş Turkestan*. Because émigrés, just like Bolsheviks in the region were very well aware of the negative attitude of these "interpreters" to Bolsheviks and they were basically a social class standing between the native Turkestani population and the Bolshevik Russians in the region. See 7Canay, "Bolşevik Tilmaçları," *YT*, May 1935. no. 66. pp. 10-14.

<sup>166</sup> Although his talents were very much admired by other Kazak leaders, most of the chiefs of Kazak society during the Tsarist times put important barriers between themselves and Çokhan Valihanov, who was perceived as a missionary-cultural agent of Russian imperialism. See Editorial, "Rus Misyonerligi," *YT*, September 1935. no. 70. pp. 6-8.

<sup>167</sup> Actually Soviet schools in Turkestan were, in a sense the carbon copies of Tsarist missionary Russkiy-tuzeminiy schools. Taşbalta, "Ruslaştırma Siyaseti Küçeymekte," *YT*, January 1936. no. 74. p. 12.

<sup>168</sup> Renaming of Hojend as Leninabad and Evliyaata Mirzoyan in 1936 were both interpreted as the continuation of Tsarist colonial, re-naming policy of the geography of Turkestan for the sake of assimilation. See Baltabay, "Ruslaştırma Siyaseti Devam İtedir," *YT*, February 1936. no. 75. pp. 20-22.

<sup>169</sup> In most cases, Soviet anti-religious propaganda has been taken as a preparation for the future or even current propaganda for Orthodox Christianity. Émigrés were all alarmed about some Turkestani youth would convert. However, most of this was for propaganda purposes. Abdolvahab, "Türkistan'da Hristiyanlık Propagandası," *YT*, February 1936. no. 76. p. 21.

<sup>170</sup> Even the translation of Pushkin into Turkic dialects was interpreted as another step of Russian attempt to assimilate under Soviets. See M.Ç., "Medeni Esaret Silahı," *YT*, March 1937. no. 88. pp. 5-7.

<sup>171</sup> Çokayoğlu had interpreted Soviet efforts for the declaration of different constitutions for each Turkestan republic as nonsense and considered it as a very inefficient way to keep these republics within the union. Editorial, "Türkistan Cumhuriyetleri Kanun Esasisi Etrafıda," *YT*, April 1937. no. 89. pp. 2-5.

was accelerated during the second half of 1930s and this also created a protest among the émigrés.<sup>172</sup>

At the beginning of the war, the Russian transfer of some of the industry to Turkestan was perceived very negatively by Zeki Velidî. Russians, while claiming to industrialize the Northern Turkestan and Western Siberia, were actually carrying their strategic industries to this region for safety reasons – keeping them far from German and Japanese fronts. This had also generated a huge Slavic migration into the region. Ural, Northern and Western Kazakstan were no more Russian borderlands but had become the heartland and Central Russia in the eyes of Zeki Velidî.<sup>173</sup>

### 5.12 Historiography

Another pressing concern for Çokayoğlu was the Bolsheviks' re-writing of the history of Turkestan, not the least, that of the recent events, including those that related to the Khokand Autonomy. The article by Soviet Historian Alekseenkov on the Khokand Autonomy caused indignity on the part of Mustafa Çokayoğlu. Alekseenkov just invented new names and history, which motivated Mustafa Çokayoğlu to start writing a series of articles about Khokand Autonomy.<sup>174</sup> For Çokayoğlu, the 10<sup>th</sup> of December, the day they had declared Turkestan's Autonomy was certainly a step towards full independence.<sup>175</sup> Bolshevik falsification of their history greatly offended the Turkestani émigrés.<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> Timuroğlu, "Sovyet Rusya Muhaceret Siyaseti," *YT*, June 1938. no. 103. p. 39.

<sup>173</sup> Zeki Velidî Togan, 1940, p. 36.

<sup>174</sup> Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Bolşevikler Tarihni Kandy Yazadılar?" *YT*, February-March 1930. no. 3-4. pp. 31-33.

<sup>175</sup> Editorial. "Muhtariyetden İstiklalga," *YT*, December 1930. no. 13. pp. 1-3.

<sup>176</sup> For the reactions of émigrés for the falsification of their history by the Bolsheviks see Yaş Türkistanlı, "Bolşevikler tarihi hakikatını Sevmeydirler," *YT*, September 1935. no. 68. pp. 18-20.

### 5.13 The Great Russian Chauvinism

Çokayoğlu saw the Great Russian chauvinism in and out of the Soviet Union as the most serious threat against the independence of all non-Russian nationalities.<sup>177</sup> Çokayoğlu, in fact, admitted that this Great Russian chauvinism of the Soviets in Turkestan, would facilitate the spread of the Turkestani cause.<sup>178</sup> Çokayoğlu always thought that the Soviet patriotism was another form, or even a step towards the Great Russian nationalism.<sup>179</sup>

### 5.14 The Geography of Eastern Turkestan

The main geographical demarcation between Eastern and Western Turkestan was drawn with the Tien-Shan Mountains. The North of Eastern Turkestan was called Jungaria while the South was historical Kashgaria.<sup>180</sup> Çokayoğlu complained about Uygur merchants using the name of Eastern Turkestan for their own profits all over the world.<sup>181</sup> One of the most important events in the period of 1929-1940 was the de-facto, and for a while *de jure*, Turkestani independence as well as increasing Soviet influence in Eastern Turkestan<sup>182</sup> and

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<sup>177</sup> See Editorial, "Buhran," *YT*, April 1933. no. 41. pp. 5-6. "As long as the Russian threat which takes all the national movements in the world under fear and we Caucasus, Ukrainian, Turkestani, İdel-Ural and Crimean people under its direct influence, continues, there would not be peace on earth and cannot be." pp. 5-6.

<sup>178</sup> For Turkestanis, it was also good that Soviets were following a Russian nationalist policy in Turkestan simply because of the reason that it would be easier to be observed by the natives. In fact, even some Soviet authors like Vitechenko agreed that Soviet policy in the matter of nationalities was disastrous in terms of national security. See Editorial, "Sovyetlet İttifakıda Milli Mesele," *YT*, August 1935. p. 7.

<sup>179</sup> According to Çokayoğlu, Soviet Patriotism was completely a step towards great Russian nationalism, which became a reality by the mid 1930s, especially concerning the former-colonial lands. See Editorial, "Sovyet Patriotizminden Rus Milletçiliğine," *YT*, February 1936. no. 76. p. 7.

<sup>180</sup> Tañırbirdi, "Şarki Türkistan," *YT*, June 1933. no. 43. p. 17. "Tien Shan mountains divide Eastern Turkestan in two parts, in the North Zhungaria and in the south Kashgariya."

<sup>181</sup> "Şarki Türkistan ismi bilen dünyanıñ her bürçeginde ticarat kılıb yurüci mesuliyetsiz kişilerniñ yüzindeki maskalarını yırtıp taşlav... zamanı kildi." Editorial, "Şarki Türkistan Meselesi Münasebetiyle," *YT*, September 1938. no. 106. p. 9.

<sup>182</sup> See Velidi-1940, pp. 16-31 for the details of events in Eastern Turkestan between 1929 and 1940.



its possible future integration with the Western Turkestan under one administration (Soviet).<sup>183</sup>

### 5.15 Independence of Eastern Turkestan

Independence of Eastern Turkestan was a great motivation for the émigré leaders.<sup>184</sup> Independent Eastern Turkestan was the best example to justify the continuation of the Turkestanis' struggle for freedom.<sup>185</sup> In 1934, there was a massive disappointment among the Turkistanis, as Eastern Turkestan was losing her independence. However, Çokayoğlu's continued optimism helped them to overcome and instead use it as a case in assessing their own struggle.<sup>186</sup>

### 5.16 National Communists and Red Terror

Although it was accepted that national communists were running a passive resistance campaigning against the center, they were harshly criticized by Çokayoğlu for their considering national republics as being inseparable parts of the Soviet Union.<sup>187</sup> This was also the time when some of the Turkestanis in exile had started to give credit to the

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<sup>183</sup> Velidi-1940, p. 16.

<sup>184</sup> A letter sent to ash Türkistan started with the cry "Long live new Islamic Government in Eastern Turkestan!" "We wholeheartedly desire the creation of Uluğ Türkistan in Central Asia with the independence of Western Turkestan and its unification with free Eastern Turkestan. Long Live Uluğ Türkistan!" See Mirza Azmi, "Yaş Türkistan'ga Mektub," *YT*, August 1933. no. 45. p. 20.

<sup>185</sup> The independence of Eastern Turkestan from China was the cause of all hopes for western Turkestanis. Its survival was a great boost for all Turkestanis to continue their struggle for independence. Türkistanlı Yılmaz, "Yılmayacağız, Yıkacağız," *YT*, April 1934. no. 53. pp. 38-40.

<sup>186</sup> The destruction of Eastern Turkestan in 1934, caused a great disappointment among the western Turkestanis too. Editorial, "Şarkî Türkistan Feciası ve Onun Bizge Birdigi Ders," *YT*, September 1934. no. 58. pp. 2-7. Here quite an emotional article, Çokayoğlu argued that the lessons learned from the Eastern Turkestanis experience would help them in the future.

<sup>187</sup> MÇ, "Türkistan Fırka Kurultaylarında," *YT*, November 1930. No. 12. pp. 7-11.

Bolshevik promises for so-called national self-determination policies.<sup>188</sup> Just before the 16<sup>th</sup> Soviet CPSU Congress there were party congresses of all Central Asian republics, in late 1930.

Although the issue of Central Asian Federation had lost its popularity for Moscow after 1924-5, it was still a popular argument for the National Communists of Turkestan. Çokayoğlu, while preserving all possible accusations he made against National Communists, argued that this would be another gigantic step towards the establishment of one single independent Turkestan.<sup>189</sup>

In this respect, it was noteworthy to underline the fact that he was calling for the "amalgamation" of all the tribes of Turkestan for the establishment of a nation state. According to Çokayoğlu, there was no chance to compromise with the Soviets.<sup>190</sup> *Yaş Türkistan*, continuously followed-up and observed Red Terror in Turkestan.<sup>191</sup> Çokayoğlu's hope for a national communist take-over or a coup in Turkestan continued.<sup>192</sup> Red terror in the party ranks started to become known in Turkestan by 1934 when more than three

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<sup>188</sup> The Bolshevik promises for national self determination has been taken seriously by many Turkestanis. See M.Ç., "Milli Mesele Tivere Gide," *YT*, August-September 1930. no. 9-10. pp. 7-15.

<sup>189</sup> Mustafa Çokayoğlu was one of the leaders who opposed Bolshevik project for a Central Asian Federation. However, his interpretation of this project was that Turkestani national communists would be able to use this unification as a step towards united national Turkestan. See MÇ, "Sovyet Orta Asya Federasyonudan Milli Mütehhid Türkistan Devletine," *YT*, March, 1930. p. 9 "we do not thing the idea of federation would be better than the current idea of national republics. Our aim is indivisible Turkestan. We are thinking about our future national free Turkestan state as an indivisible nation state. One of the most important task of the future national independent Turkestan government would be the creation of the single nation of the single state after the amalgamation of all tribes of Turkestan.. We also believe that national communists would use the idea of federation for our final aim of united national independent Turkestan."

<sup>190</sup> Çokayoğlu did not think that there would be any chance to agree with the soviets on a common principle. Editorial, "Kızıl Şovinizm," *YT*, May 1932. no. 30. pp. 1-4.

<sup>191</sup> Red terror in Turkestan had been closely observed by the émigrés and the news about constant protests had been published in different publications. Editorial, "Türkistanda Milli terror," *YT*, September 1932. no. 34. pp. 1-6.

<sup>192</sup> But there were always hope that national communist Turkestanis would capture the power and see the Bolshevik atrocities soon. "Bolşevikler Yaş Türkistan'ga Karşı," *YT*, March 1934. no. 52. pp. 37-38.

quarters of the native party workers were replaced by the "trusted" elements.<sup>193</sup> National communists were the only remaining national elite left in Turkestan. Consequently they were the only targets of Moscow's policy on the region.<sup>194</sup> Feyzullah Hoca and Ekmel İkrâm were the sole responsible figures for the Red Terror killing thousands for failing to fulfill cotton quotas.<sup>195</sup> One of the leading national communists, Turar Rıskulov, was blaming Alaş leaders for opposing Russian settlement in Turkestan in 1935.<sup>196</sup> By 1936 Çokayoğlu was blaming national communists who were under the attacks of Red Terror as the loyal Bolsheviks.<sup>197</sup> An increasing volume of Red Terror meant basically clearance of the remnants of national cadres in Turkestan and their replacement by Russians.<sup>198</sup> The clearance of Party from the national communists caused protests among the émigré leaders, however the existence of fresh young cadres was taken as a positive development.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> The renewal of KP members in Turkestan in 1934 was made for the sake of cleaning chauvinist and nationalist elements from the rank of the party. In some local cases up to %60 to %90 of the party members were driven out of the party. See Editorial, "Türkistan'a ırka Tazeleşî Netîcelerinden," *YT*, October 1934. no. 59. pp. 2-7.

<sup>194</sup> Existence of active opposition against Moscow's Russian-centered policies on Turkestan among the intellectuals and national communists of Turkestan was the source of hope for the émigré Turkestanis. They even exaggerated the westernist and easternist tendencies among the national communists in Turkestan and interpreted the existence of both as a unified front against assimilationist policies of Moscow. Yaş Türkistanlı, "Türkistan'da Gerbçılık ve Şarkçılık Akımları," *YT*, November 1934. no. 60. pp. 24-27.

<sup>195</sup> According to Çokayoğlu most of the victims of Red Terror in Turkestan were killed simply because of their inability to fulfill the cotton quotas provided by Moscow and he blamed Feyzullah Hoca and Ekmel İkrâm for this bloodshed, for their inability to stop that. Mustafa, "Türkistandagı Soñ Terrör Mes'ulları," *YT*, March 1935. no. 64. p. 11.

<sup>196</sup> In 1935 Turar Ryskulov blamed Alaş Orda leaders and especially Alihan Bukeyhan for the Turkestanian opposition in the party for the new Russian immigrants to Turkestan. In fact, that kind of a decision was taken in 1926 in Kızıl Orda during the 5<sup>th</sup> party Congress as stopping Russian immigration to Kazak lands until the settlement of all nomad and semi nomad Kazak-Kyrgyzes. See Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Bilçirak Bihtan ve Yalğanlarga Karşı," *YT*, September 1935. no. 68. pp. 13-14.

<sup>197</sup> Soviets promoted a number of Turkestanian party workers Lenin Orders at the end of 1935. Among them there were: Mirzoyan and Uraz İsaullı from Kazakistan, şadurıs and Abdullah Rahimbayof from Tajikistan, Popon and Kaygısız Atabayev from Turkmenistan, Ekmel İkrâm and Feyzullah Hocayev from Uzbekistan. İsaullı, Rahimbayov, Atabayev and Hocayev were all the heads of Peoples Commissars in their country, all national communists but also quite loyal Bolsheviks too. They were immediately declared as the greatest enemies of Turkestan nationalists. See Tahir, "Nefret Tamgası," *YT*, February 1936. no. 76. pp. 8-12.

<sup>198</sup> The year 1937 was the height of cleaning up Party and Comsomol cadres from the alleged "nationalists and saboteurs" especially in Kazakistan. "Komsomol Katarında," *YT*, March 1937. no. 88. pp. 23-25.

<sup>199</sup> See for the reactions of the émigrés to Cleaning and refreshing Party Cadres in Turkestan. Taşbalta, "Türkistan'da Komminst Fırkası Saflarında," *YT*, April 1937. no. 89. pp. 16-20.

The fate of Feyzullah Hoca, his execution in 1937, had not been applauded by the émigrés. He was the only representative of the Young Bukharans and National revolutionaries among the Bolshevik ranks. Çokayoğlu thought that Russians kept him until they had prepared their own local loyal cadres and then they got rid of this “half-Bolshevik” – as they had considered him to be. Çokayoğlu said "although we hated former the Bukharan emir and his regime, we have never allied with any foreign power, and with Bolsheviks against him."<sup>200</sup>

Ekmel İkrâm was seen as a tool for the Russian policy of dividing Turkestan Turks into tribal groups. His continuous emphasis on the Uzbek identity and their superiority in Central Asia had been widely protested by the émigrés who has declared themselves Turkish nationalists.<sup>201</sup> *Yaş Türkistan* had called the purges political programs. While being very concerned about the future of the Turkestani elite in the country, especially Çokayoğlu found them as the justice of history.<sup>202</sup> Feyzullah's group was the second generation of national communists who replaced the Turar Riskul group in early 1920s while the latter was rather called the Turkist group.<sup>203</sup> Çokayoğlu made it very clear that they would have no sorrow for those who served Bolshevik murderers, at all.<sup>204</sup>

Although having no sorrow for the Feyzullah group, Çokayoğlu said that Soviet accusations of them being enemies of people should be read to mean the enemies of Great

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<sup>200</sup> See Editorial, "Feyzullah Hocanın Akıbeti," *YT*, August-September 1937. no. 92-93. pp. 2-5.

<sup>201</sup> Timuroğlu, "Rus İmperyalizmine Karşı Türk Birliği," *YT*, August-September 1937. no. 92-93. pp. 10.

<sup>202</sup> For the dismissal of Feyzullah Hoca and other peoples Commissar in Turkestan republics see Editorial, "Türkistan'da Siyasi Pogrum, Onun Mana ve Ehemniyeti," *YT*, October 1937. no. 95. pp. 2-7.

<sup>203</sup> In fact the first group of National Communists who were pacified in 1920s were called groups of Turar Ryskul, Sultan Beg Hocaoglu, Said Vakkasoglu. They were simply replaced by Feyzullah Hoca, Şirinşah Şahtimur, Abdullah rahimbay, İsa Kayoglu, etc. And this second group, less Turkist, more national communists were dismissed in 1937. "Türkistan'da Milletçi Gruplar," *YT*, October 1937. no. 95. pp. 7-12.

<sup>204</sup> We do not have a bit of sorrow for the ones who served .... (Bolshevik murderers)... in order to massacre our people.." Çokayoğlu never felt sorry about the executions of the second-generation national communists who were declared as either fascists or as the agents of fascists. See Editorial, "Türkistan'da Siyasi Pogrum," *YT*, November 1937, no. 96. p. 7.

Russian Chauvinism.<sup>205</sup> The execution of Ekmel İkrām with Feyzullah Hoca was a surprise simply because everyone thought that he would stay in his post while Feyzullah Hoca would be shot by the Soviets.<sup>206</sup>

During his questioning by Vyshinskiy in the Show trials of 21s, Feyzulla Hoca repeatedly "confessed" that he was first a member of the bourgeois organization "Millî İttihad" from 1920 on, then from 1927 on became affiliated with the former Turkestan nationalist circles and finally from 1930s on became a part of the rightist conspiracy of Rykov's and get the promise of an independent Uzbekistan from them.<sup>207</sup> In the same trial, Ekmel İkrām "confessed" that he became one of the leaders of the national organization called "Millî İstiklal", for gathering force and preparing national cadres, and continued to support Turkestani students entering into higher education institutions, etc.<sup>208</sup>

*Yaş Türkistan* had interpreted Feyzullah and Ekmel's confessions of fighting for the "bourgeois" independence of Uzbekistan, as the existence of a high national consciousness among the Uzbek party elite by.<sup>209</sup> Kazaks never appeared in show trials in large numbers. Due to the continuing terror there, the accused ones were not brought to trials at all.<sup>210</sup>

Replacement of executed native national communists by the "foreign" Bolsheviks from Russia was supporting the émigré's arguments about the assimilationist-colonial

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<sup>205</sup> Declaring the old servants of Soviet Bolshevism in Turkestan as the enemies of people, interpreted by Çokayoğlu as declaring them as the enemies of Russian nationalism. The basic reason for Moscow for getting rid of these cadres was their opposition of the domination of Great Russian chauvinism among the party cadres. "Siyasi Pogrum Devam İtedir," *YT*, December 1937. no. 97. p p. 15 and 18.

<sup>206</sup> See Editorial, "Feyzullah Hoca ve Ekmel İkrām'nın Akıbeti," *YT*, April 1938. No 101. pp. 2-3.

<sup>207</sup> Quoted from *Izvestiya* of 5.3.1938. "21 ler mahkemesi," *YT*. April 1938. no. 101. pp. 3-4-. See pages 3-43 for full manuscripts.

<sup>208</sup> Quoted from Pavda of 7.3.1938, "21 ler mahkemesi," *YT*, April 1938. no.101. pp. 23-24. See pages 3-43 for full manuscripts.

<sup>209</sup> For the last words and full "confessions" of both Ekmel İkrām and Fayzullah Hoca see "21 ler mahkemesi" *YT*. April 1938. no. 101. pp.40-43. Where they openly confess that they were the members of right Trotskyist conspiracy and were fighting for the nationalist independence cause for Uzbekistan in "bourgeois" terms.

<sup>210</sup> Terror and trials in Kazakstan was much more behind the closed doors but it was possibly worse than anywhere in Turkestan. By early 1938, Chairman of Central Executive Committee Kolumbetulı Uzakvay, Head of Peoples Commissars Uransary İskaraulı and Alma-ata Party Committee Head Said Vakkasulı Canaydar were already shot.

policies of Moscow.<sup>211</sup> In the mean time, Çokayoğlu, while trying to be just, was trying hard to remind people that the Feyzullah group were “murderer servants” of Moscow.<sup>212</sup>

### 5.17 Turkey

Çokayoğlu identified himself with Turkey and defended Turkey against Soviet propaganda.<sup>213</sup> Ignorance of the Muslim World even of the terrible famine in Turkestan was a source of another great disappointment for him.<sup>214</sup> Turkey's cautious reaction toward the independence of Eastern Turkestan was also not encouraging for the Turkestanî émigrés.<sup>215</sup> Turkestanis could not find any nation, even Turks, to take their cause to the League of Nations.<sup>216</sup> The ban on the distribution of *Yaş Türkistan* in Turkey was interpreted as "punching the one on the floor".<sup>217</sup> Turkish ignorance about the Bolshevik atrocities in Turkestan created an important disappointment among the émigré leaders.<sup>218</sup> In the

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<sup>211</sup> See Taşbalta. "Türkistan'da Sovyet Kadro Siyaseti" *YT*. May 1938. no. 102. p. 21.

<sup>212</sup> Çokay urged Turkestanis repeatedly, observing the sympathy for Hocayev and İkrarov after their murder by the Stalinist terror. "not to forget they being the agents of Moscow and their attacks on the Turkestan independence." See Editorial, "Feyzullah Hoca ve Ekmel İkrarov Hakikaten de Kızıl Moskova'nın Düşmanı mı idiler?" *YT*, June 1938. no. 103. p. 5.

<sup>213</sup> Émigré publications tried to answer negative propaganda campaign of some Russian media about Turkey being at the hands of barbaric, backward conservative Muslims. See Mustafa, "Bir Tarihi İftiraga Karşı," *YT*, February 1933. no. 39. pp. 18-22.

<sup>214</sup> The worst scenes of the Famine in the USSR had been amongst the nomad Kazak and Kyrgyz hordes in the step. Comparing western churches campaigns to aid the Christian folks of Soviets, émigrés were very much disappointed by their fellow Muslims' silence for the sufferings of Turkestan. See Tahir Şakir, "Aç ve Kimsesiz Bir Halk," *YT*, November 1933. No 48.ç pp. 2-5.

<sup>215</sup> Apparently, Turkish government did not have any information about the independence of Eastern Turkestan; however, its officials kept saying that this would make Turkey happy but nothing else. Anadolu Ajansı Muhabirinden, "Tevfik Rüşdi Big'in Şarkî Türkistan'a Da'ir Beyanati," *YT*. February 1934. no. 51. pp. 10-11.

<sup>216</sup> There were of course efforts of Turkestanis to influence Turkey for taking Turkestan matter to the League of Nations. Doktor Mustafa Ali "Türk Mes'elesi" *YT*. May 1934. no. 54. pp. 5-7.

<sup>217</sup> The prohibition of *Yaş Türkistan* in Turkey on 6<sup>th</sup> of October 1934 with the pressure of the Soviet government caused great disappointment among the authors of *Yaş Türkistan*. It was in fact found unfriendly to the relations between Turkey and Soviet Russia. See Mustafa. "Yaş Türkistan Türkiye'ye Giritilmeyetorgan Buldu...(yıkılıganga yumırık)" *YT*. November 1934. no. 60. pp. 6-11.

<sup>218</sup> The ignorance of public opinion of Turkey to the atrocities in Turkestan created an important amount of disappointment among the émigrés; and Turkish intelligentsia was blamed for it's undesire to understand the conditions in Turkestan. See Oktay. "Türkiyelilerin Sezmedikleri ve Bilmedikleri" *YT*. January 1936. no. 74. p. 30.

emigration, white Russians in Europe were calling Mustafa Çokay a “Kemalist” because of his pro-Turkey positions.<sup>219</sup>

Çokayoğlu noted this ban on *Yaş Türkistan* in Turkey as the worst disastrous thing in his émigré life.<sup>220</sup> In 1939, the İnönü government in Turkey, with the diplomatic pressures of the Soviet government deported some of the Turkestani leaders from Turkey, including Osman Hoca, who first went to Poland and ended up in Iran at a time when the Second World War was just starting.<sup>221</sup>

### 5.18 Tribalism

*Yaş Türkistan* criticized tribalism. There was a point of truth in this criticism.<sup>222</sup> Tribalism in *Yaş Türkistan* also appeared in its underestimation and humiliation of the development of the Turkmen national language.<sup>223</sup> Tribal union was very important.<sup>224</sup> Soviet nationalities policy of supporting local-tribal nationalism in Turkestan with the

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<sup>219</sup> Mariya Çokay, *Yash Turkestan: Pamyati Mustafa Chokay-Beya* (Paris: 1950), p. 25.

<sup>220</sup> For Çokayoğlu, prohibition of *YT* in Turkey was one of the worst disappointment during the whole history of his émigré life. See *Yaş Türkistan*, "Yaş Türkistanın sekiz yaşğa Kirişi Münasebetile," *YT*, December 1936, no. 85. pp. 2-3.

<sup>221</sup> Timur Kocaoğlu. "Türkistanlı Göçmenlerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri Tarihine Bir Bakış," in *Dr. Baymirza Hayit Armağanı*. Ed by Rasim Ekşi and Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Turan Kültür Vakfı and Hoca Ahmed Yesevi Vakfı, 1999), p. 162.

<sup>222</sup> Despite every attempt to unite the tribes, there was open Uzbek favoritism in some articles of *Yaş Türkistan*. See *Yaş Türkistan*l, "Ruslukka Karşı Türkistan Yaşları," *YT*, July 1933, no. 44. p. 20-25. Our leader (başbug) should "prove that he is really from Timuroğulları with his powerful race faith." p. 25.

<sup>223</sup> One of the first pioneers of the creation of a completely separate tribal language and literature was realized under the Turkmen Börioğlu Kömüş Ali and his comrades, which was declared to be an enemy by *Yaş Türkistan* authors. In fact Türme's such a movement from Turkestan was unacceptable for the Uzbeks at the center. See İsen Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til Siyaseti," *YT*, November 1933, no. 48. pp. 24-26.

<sup>224</sup> *Yaş Türkistan*, "1929-Aralık 1934," *YT*, December 1934, no. 61. pp. 5-9. "*YT* defends the unity of Turkish tribes, thinks about the future of Turkish people, and wants to help political, ideal and cooperative unity among the Turkish tribes." p. 8.

objective of weakening Turkestani unity and identity was one of the most destructive acts realized in Turkestan.<sup>225</sup>

By 1936, the Soviets had imposed "passport nationalism" and tribalism among the émigrés in Afghanistan. As a result, the tensions were raised and the unity was broken up.<sup>226</sup>

During the revolutionary period in Turkestan, the Kazaks of Alaş Orda and all other Kazak intelligentsia were strongly affected by their tribal ties and established their political positions accordingly.<sup>227</sup> Émigrés were in chaos and lack of unity stemmed from tribal differences as well as political polarization between the Islamists and Turkists.<sup>228</sup>

### 5.19 Demarcation

Although there was a considerable discomfort among the Turkestani leaders about the on-going national-territorial demarcation of Turkestan, they were following the developments with great interest.

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<sup>225</sup> The signs of Russian-Soviet patriotism, according to émigrés, was creating a local-national patriotism, even in some cases supporting nationalist tendencies. Editorial, "Milli Vatanperverlige taman bir Adım," *YT*, February 1936, no. 75. p. 6.

<sup>226</sup> Apparently both émigré leaders and the Turkestanis in Afghanistan were quite happy with the hospitality shown to them by the Afghan authorities. However, there was no "national" unity among the émigrés and tribal differentiation was still active among them. Azmi Haşimi, "Millet Yolbaşçılarına Bir Müracaat," *YT*, October 1936, no. 83. p. 38. In an answer to this application Çokayoğlu wrote that national unity among the Turkestanis was one of the main causes of their struggle and he opposed the Soviet imposed "passport nationalism" meaning the tribal affiliations. See Editorial (Azmi Haşimi), "Muhacerattaki Milli Vazifemiz," *YT*, November 1936, no. 84. pp. 2-6.

<sup>227</sup> Tribalism among the Alaş Orda Kazaks was very widespread. In fact, it caused many troubles among themselves. "At the end, ... İvan İstepnov=Ali Cangeldin, who fakely called himself as Alaş Orda member and 'Kıpçak'... he was also with Russian Red Guards. After a while 'Kıpçak' İstepnof-Cangeldin, 'töre' millikhan and 'argın' Ahmed united against Mir Yakıb and raised 'kıpçak' Amangeldi as their candidate. Both kıpçaks united and gathered Red guard and Russian mujiks around themselves. Hot fight started. Amangeldi, who said 'Bolshevik' is the Russian form of 'kıpçak' was killed in a fight against Alaş Orda. ... Today Bolsheviks are claiming that 'bolshevik hero Amangeldi' is killed by nationalist, counter-revolutionary Mir Yakıb Dulat..." See Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Batır Bolşevik Amangeldi Hakkında Hakikat," *YT*, December 1936, no. 85. p. 33.

<sup>228</sup> Even in 1937 there was no sign of unity among the émigrés, who kept falling into conflicts especially on political matters like being a Turkist or Islamist etc. See "Milli Birlik Teşkilatımız Üçün," *YT*, September 1937, no. 94. pp. 5-9.



Russians, especially under the Bolshevik regime, are sensitive about the term Turkestan, which might become a slogan and has the potential to unite native Turks of Central Asia. Turkestan is now only a name for a locality in the Syr Darya basin of Kazakistan where the tomb of Hoca Ahmed Yassawi is...<sup>229</sup>

Apparently there was a silent discussion going on among the Turkestani political leaders in exile about the confusion created by the Russian policies in Turkestan. In these discussions, the issue of the very meaning of the term Turkestan was also included. By 1927, according to Zeki Velidî, they had come to a conclusion on how they call the region and its parts.

We have decided with the comrades that... the use of Turkestan only would mean Western Turkestan and Kazakistan. For the both Eastern and Western Turkestan we would employ the term Two Turkestans. Separately for the Chinese Turkestan, the use of Eastern Turkestan, and for the Western Turkestan and Kazakistan in joint the use of Western Turkestan would be employed. For Maverâünnehr, according to current limitations, Uzbekistan, for the Step Governorship, Kazakistan, for Zakaspi (Mavera-yı Bahri Hazer) Governorship, Turkmenistan, for Çungarya, as the older version, Çungarya, for the Koca, Kumul, Urumchi, Köçen and Yargöl regions would be named as older version Uyguristan. It is thought that the employment of the extension of -ili instead of -istan for the meaning of country would be more convenient.<sup>230</sup>

Zeki Velidî made these remarks in the *Yeni Türkistan*. These were about to become the most important issues of his future conflicts with Mustafa Çokayoğlu, who was naturally standing for a unified Turkestan and its historical name. Soviet national-territorial demarcation policy was completed by the creation of a Tajik SSR on a great scale. Quoting a German author, Kelaynov, *Yaş Türkistan* protested the creation of Tajik SSR<sup>231</sup> and

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<sup>229</sup> Ahmed Zeki Velidî, "Türkistan İsmi, Hudûdu ve Müsâhası Hakkında," *YeT*, October- November 1927, no. 5-6, pp. 30-31. In this article Zeki Velidî argued that the term Türkistan was first used during the Sasanid period and also by the 8<sup>th</sup> century Armenian author Musa Harinaki's book, which called this geography as Turkastanok for the Schytia of Ancient Greeks. See p. 31. However he does not show any footnotes in this journal article.

<sup>230</sup> Ahmed Zeki Velidî, "Türkistan İsmi, Hudûdu ve Müsâhası Hakkında," *YeT*, October- November 1927, no. 5-6, pp. 35-36.

<sup>231</sup> N.M., "Bolşeviklerin Türkistan Siyasetine Bir Alaman Nazarı," *YT*, April-May 1930, No 5-6. p. 19.

interpreted this as a new Soviet attempt to fortify the southern borders of Central Asia as well as attracting Tajiks of Afghanistan to the Union.<sup>232</sup>

Soviet deportation of Ukrainian and Russian peasants to Northern Kazakstan resulted in disaster not only for the natives but for themselves too.<sup>233</sup>

...National delimitation [*millî cigereleş*] is the second disaster after falling into hands of Soviet power... We have entered into the revolution of 1917 with different tribal names like Kazak, Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Turkmen. Outside, we have been identified as Turks of Turkestan. However we stayed separately with those tribal names at the motherland and this was the worst point of our national disaster... we know that both Islamic Union and Turkic Union are only words-promises but nothing else. Our primary task should first unite among ourselves and get rid of this foreign Russian prisonership.<sup>234</sup>

Çokay was thinking that the imminent result of the razmezhevanie would be an unfortunate situation, which would make Turkestanis “national minorities” in the “national republics” of each other.<sup>235</sup>

Zeki Velidî one of the scholars who was aware of the simple but critical terminological changes in accordance with the Russian policy, also realized of the fact that the nationalities policy of the Bolsheviks was irreversible.<sup>236</sup> The poets what he called the “poets of Stalinist appraisal” (or in Zeki Velidî’s words Stalin meddahları) have been found in each tribe and are named “popular poets”: Jambul from Kazaks, Ata Salih from Turkmens, Farrah Devletşan from Başkurts and so on. Russians, through the legends

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<sup>232</sup> N.M., "Bolşeviklerin Türkistan Siyasetine Bir Alaman Nazarı," *YT*, April-May 1930, No 5-6. p. 20.

<sup>233</sup> Russian policy of placing Russian and Ukrainian peasants to the northern steppe of Turkestan was not out of necessity but out of nationalities policy. However from the early days of the revolution on, those peasants were not as eager to come as the previous ones during the Tsarist times. In fact in most cases their immigration resulted quite disastrously for themselves too. Yaş Türkistanlı. "Rusya Muhaceret Siyasetine Bir Kuş Bakışı" *YT*. April 1934. no. 53. pp. 12-18.

<sup>234</sup> Editorial, "1917-1924-1934," *YT*, November 1934. no. 60. pp. 2-6.

<sup>235</sup> Mariya Çokay, p. 20-22.

<sup>236</sup> See A. Zeki Validî [Togan], *1929-1940 Seneleri arasında Türkistanın Vaziyeti*. Türkistan-Bilik no. 4 (İstanbul: Türkiye Basımevi, 1940), See p. 3 footnote 1: "I have used the term “Kazaçi” to separate Russian Kazaks from Türk Kazaks in my book “Bugünkü Türkistan.” Now Russians, for the sake of separating the two, introduced “Kazah” (Kazakh) and “Kazahıstan” (Kazakhstan) concepts for Türk Kazaks and we can also accept this made-up form.”

produced by these creatures, were succeeding in portraying Stalin as a fatherly figure in the hearts of Turkish tribes.<sup>237</sup>

According to Zeki Velidî, on the 10-22<sup>nd</sup> of September 1922 in Tashkent, Kazak and Uzbek pan-Turkists met with the attendance of Tınışbayoğlu, Dostmuhammedoğlu of Kazaks and Münevver Karı and Talibcan of Uzbeks for the Seventh Secret All Turkestan Congress. They decided that the word Turkestan should mean all Turkestan ASSR, Alaş Orda, Bukhara, Khiva and Zakaspi and should be replaced with the term Greater Turkestan, and for the future, its territorial integrity should be kept at any cost.<sup>238</sup>

In 1943, Zeki Velidî published his *The Map of Türkili and Its Explanations*. He said “we use *Türkili* instead of Türkistan”. The use of Persian – stan as if there was no Turkish word for that - is inconvenient especially at a time when the Turkish nationalism was on the rise. The Turkestan concept was also used to imply the Syrdarya basin for a long while and did not seem to be convenient to use the term to imply the whole Türkili from Volga-Caspian line to the western end of Chinese wall... For the first time, a pan-Turkist Uzbek intellectual Aşuralı Zahiri used the word Türkili for Turkestan in 1917; in the same year, the Azeri Emin Efendizade and his friends started to publish the Türkili newspaper in Tashkent. They said: “We are following their path, which we find right. However, we also use Maveraünnehr [for Zakaspi], Türkistan or Western Türkistan for the Tsarist general governorship and Kaşgarya for Eastern Turkestan.”<sup>239</sup>

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<sup>237</sup> Velidî [Togan], 1940, p. 15.

<sup>238</sup> Zeki Velidî Togan, *Türklüğün Mukadderatı Üzerine* (İstanbul: Kayı Yayınları, 1970), p. 148-9.

<sup>239</sup> Zeki Velidî Togan, *Türkili Haritası ve ona ait İzahlar* (İstanbul: Türkili-Bilik, no 6., 1943), p. 1. See the 1:4,200,000 map of Turkestan at the end of the pamphlet, prepared by Zeki Velidî and drawn by cartographer Behçet Begit.

Collectivization in Turkestan caused another wave of emigrants from Turkestan to Afghanistan.<sup>240</sup> The settlement of Turkestani nomads, Kazak and Kyrgyz, ended up in another disaster.<sup>241</sup> These administrative adjustments to Turkestan were carefully monitored by the Turkestani émigrés.<sup>242</sup>

### 5.20 Basmacıs

Although many émigré leaders hold the view that the Basmacı resistance was over by 1926,<sup>243</sup> Çokayoğlu's optimism about the former comrades in arms, national communists in the high party ranks in Turkestan was a source of hope.<sup>244</sup> The Russian paranoia about the fate of Basmacıs and Enver Pasha's movement was welcomed by the émigré and even taken as evidence to the existing resistance against the Soviets. In 1930 there were still articles appeared in the Russian press, creating conspiracy theories about the heirs of Enver

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<sup>240</sup> One of the main reasons for the continuing Turkestani refuge flux to Afghanistan in the early 1930s was basically Bolshevik policy of land and production quotas for each farmer, which also helped many young people joining the remnants of Basmacı groups in the mountains. See "Türkistan'da Kozgalış harekâtı" (excerpts from Russian Newspaper *Dni*, *YT*, February 1932, no. 27. pp. 26-30.

<sup>241</sup> The replacement of nomad Kazak and Kyrgyzes in Turkestan started from 1929, but continued quite slowly until 1933. For the émigrés no one was against this replacement but everyone was against its Bolshevik version. For them the interests of Russian mujik were observed more by the Soviets. The settlement policy was a disaster for the Turkestani nomad and semi-nomads. See Editorial, "Sovyet Hükümetinn Türkistan Göçebelerni Urnaştırı yani Dühkan halğa gitüri Siyaseti," *YT*, July 1934, no. 56. pp. 2-6.

<sup>242</sup> Turkestani émigrés were following the progress of Razhmezhavanie quite carefully. They updated their leaders about the changes in the administrative structure of the Union. See "Sovetler İttifakınıñ İdari Bölünüşü," *YT*, June 1936, no. 79. pp. 7-40.

<sup>243</sup> Even the strongest nationalist Turkestanis, believed that Basmacı resistance was over by 1926. Quite without any real information about the organization and nature of Basmacıs, most of the émigré were praising the heroic struggle of Turkestani peasants against Bolsheviks but thinking that they were so much unorganized and weak for a guerrilla warfare. See Abdullahzade Tevekkül, "Basmacılık," *YeT*, March 1928, no. 8, p. 11.

<sup>244</sup> Çokayoğlu was very optimistic about the national Turkestani communists for the struggle against Bolsheviks inside the country and even declared them as the future cadres of independence struggle. Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Rusların Muhaceret Siyaseti Hakkında," *YeT*, April 1928, no. 9, p. 10. Interestingly, in the same article Çokayoğlu used terms like Özbekistan and Kazakistan more extensively than the term Turkestan.

Pasha in Afghanistan organizing new Basmacı movements in cooperation with the Afghan state.<sup>245</sup>

Most of the Basmacı prisoners and Turkestanı Kulaks ended up in Siberian Gulag Solovskiy from the beginning of the 1920s. Solovskiy became a very well organized forced labor camp sometime around 1927-29 when thousands of Turkestanı prisoners lost their lives because of illnesses and hard conditions.<sup>246</sup>

Most of the Basmacıs left their arms against Bolshevıks after the local treaties in the early 1920s were subject to political repression and eventually arrested by the authorities in the early 1930s.<sup>247</sup> *Yaş Türkistan* was trying to explain that Basmacıs were not bandits at all but they have declared their aim as the establishment of a free-independent Turkestan and establishment of a Turk-Islam republic.<sup>248</sup> Çokayođlu was also declaring Enver Pasha as the Martyr of Turkestan and promised to re-bury him in the capital of a future independent Turkestan.<sup>249</sup> Çokayođlu viewed Basmacıs as being the fighters for Turkestanı independence.<sup>250</sup>

Small skirmishes between Red Army troops and remnants of some Basmacı groups on the Afghan border were interpreted as the active resistance continuing against the

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<sup>245</sup> One of them quoted in *Yaş Türkistan* from Russian Posledniye Novosti of 3<sup>rd</sup> of October 1930; PN., "Türkistan ve Afganistan'daki İş," *YT*, October 1930, no. 11. pp. 21-23.

<sup>246</sup> Azarbaycanlı Ağaođlu, "Sürgün Yiri Solofkiy'de Türkistan Mücahidleri," *YT*, January 1931, no. 14. pp. 18-22 (taken from *Yeni Türkistan*, year 4, no. 30).

<sup>247</sup> Even in 1931 there were Basmacıs in Tashkent teahouses and in villages running propaganda against Russians and communists. Their arrests were quite often appeared in émigré publications. Mektüb, "Türkistanın bugünkü feci ahvalı," *YT*, July 1931, no. 20. pp. 34-36.

<sup>248</sup> In fact 8<sup>th</sup> article of the declaration of the 2nd Congress of Muslims of Turkestan, convened in 1922, openly declared that the fight was for the independence of all Turkestan. Its 12<sup>th</sup> article said an independent Turk-Islam Republic was the main goal. (Basmacıs) See "Bir Tarihi Vesika," *YT*, April 1932, no. 29. p. 6.

<sup>249</sup> Mustafa Çokayođlu, "Merhum Enver Paşa Hakkında Hatıra Parçaları," *YT*, August 1932, no. 33. p. 12.

<sup>250</sup> Although Çokayođlu was sure that Basmacı was a popular-national uprising against the Soviet colonial policy in Turkestan, he was also in agreement with Safarov about Basmachestvo having connection with the Fergana Valley dikhans' unhappiness with the Soviet land policy, which drastically diminished their profits. Editorial, "Basmacılık...", *YT*, February 1933, no. 39. pp. 4-5.

Bolshevik invasion.<sup>251</sup> Out of the tens of thousands of Basmacı that ended up in the Gulag Solovskiy, very few survived.<sup>252</sup> As late as 1935, the Red army was continuing its "hot pursuit" of the remnants of Basmacı groups in southern Turkestan, Northern Afghanistan.<sup>253</sup>

Basmacı leaders like Lakaylı never became subjects of show trials; they were mostly shot in jails without any trial.<sup>254</sup> Turkmens of Cüneyd Khan and his former Basmacı comrades were in Herat until he died in 1937.<sup>255</sup> For the émigrés, anything going wrong in Turkestan was a resistance movement against Soviet power.<sup>256</sup> There was still a considerable effort to keep Basmacı legends alive.<sup>257</sup>

Çokay's sympathy for the Nazis was no different than other members of promethee and he was very suspicious about cooperation with the Nazis. However, his death in 1941,

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<sup>251</sup> Émigré propaganda about the responses of the natives to Red terror were full of rebellion stories, most of which were not true at all, and some of them relied on the news in western sources which were quite conscious about the dicta regime in the Soviet Union. See Mustafa, "Yurt Vaziyati," *YT*, January 1935 no. 62. pp. 4-6. However there were real clashes between the soviet troops and some remnants of the Basmacı groups in the Afghan-Tajik border area, in which, Mujahedeen really received some support from the Dikhans of Turkestan. See quotation from Daily Express (19.12.1934), *YT*, January 1935. no. 62. p. 7.

<sup>252</sup> Most of the arrested Basmacı shipped to Solovskiy, Ural and Novosibirsk gulags. Only in Solovskiy Gulag in total 30 thousand Turkestanis lost their lives. And many got lost in different exile destinations. See *Biş Arıklık*, "Esaret Hatıratımdan," *YT*, February 1935, no. 63. pp. 26-27.

<sup>253</sup> In a letter to *YT* from Afghanistan, it is understood that in 1935 Red army troops were continuing their pursuit of Basmacı in Southern Turkestan. According to that letter, many Turkestanis were waiting for the war to break up, for a general rebellion. See "Afganistan'a sığınan bir yurttaşın mektubu: Türkistan'da vaziyet," *YT*, October 1935, no. 71. pp. 42-45.

<sup>254</sup> İbrahim Beg Lakaylı has been captured by the Red soldiers in the middle of 1931. Everybody waited for another open trial to show all the enemies of the people and saboteurs, however this did not take pace at all. He was taken to a Tashkent Jail and probably shot without any show trial. Canay, "İbrahim Bey Lakaylı Kalay tutulgan idi?" *YT*, January 1936, no. 74. pp. 22.

<sup>255</sup> Cüneyd Khan dominated most of the territories of Khivan Khanate from 1916 until 1928 and fought against both Khivan Khan Esfendiyar, Tsarist Russians and Bolshevik red Army. The only reason he could not establish a government in Khiva in 1918 was the basic reason of Turkmen-Uzbek tribal competition, when Uzbeks allied with Red troops in 1919 and forced Turkmen Cüneyd Khan to retreat desert. Canay, "Herat'dan bizge Cüneyd hanıñ vefâtı haberini bildirdiler," *YT*, August-September 1937, no. 92-93. pp. 18-20.

<sup>256</sup> Passive resistance of the farmer-peasant population of Turkestan to Industrialization and all kinds of Soviet Great projects in the region has been taken as a resistance to Soviet Colonialism in the pages of *YT*. See Timuroğlu, "Kızıl Rusya İstismarcı Müstemleke Siyasetine Karşı Türkistan Dühkan Halkı Milli İradesi," *YT*, September 1937, no. 94. p. 19.

<sup>257</sup> "In a letter written in mid February from Turkestan to our journal it is said that; 'We have learned that a one-thousand strong Basmacı movement launched in the Karadağ region of our motherland. Among them, some 300 hundred are the former Red Army soldiers and the rest are the fugitive Turkestanis from the Dushanbe prison...' See "Türkistanda Basmacılık," *Yaş Türkistan*, April 1938, no. 101. p. 58.

because of a plague he caught during a visit to a German prison camp filled by the Turkestani soldiers of the Soviet Army, left the leadership position for the Turkestani émigrés empty for a long while.

### 5.21 Turkestanis between Nazis and Soviets: Turkestan Legions

During the First World War, German efforts to mobilize Turkestan against Britain was concentrated in the efforts of a diplomat, Otto von Hentig, who traveled across Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, and planned to send German representatives to Tashkent, which was never realized.<sup>258</sup> However, the pan-Turkist stand of the Union and Progress Party and especially the martyrdom of a respected ally, Enver Pasha in Turkestan during his fight to liberate Turkestan from the Bolshevik Russians, caused the concentration of academic attention to this region.

In the 1930s the Nazi Party was not completely ignorant about Turkestan. There was at least one Turkestani working for the Foreign Relations Department of the Party's APA (*Aussenpolitisches Amt*), Veli Kayyum. He was sent by the Bukharan Peoples Republic to Germany as a student in 1921-2,<sup>259</sup> when he was only seventeen years old. He first studied agriculture and then studied political science in *Hochschule für Politik*. From the mid 1930s on he was preparing reports, mainly on agriculture, for the Party's APA. He usually didn't have much contacts with Prométhée Turkestan émigrés simply because he

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<sup>258</sup> Patrik von zur Mühlen, *Gamalıhaç ile Kızılyıldız Arasında: İkinci Dünya savaşı'nda Sovyet Doğu Halkları'nın Milliyetçiliği*. Translated into Turkish by Eşref Bengi Özbilen (Ankara: Mavi Yayınları, 1984). Original Name: *Zwischen Hakenkreuz und Sowjetstern. Der Nationalismus der sowjetischen Orientvölker im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Düsseldorf: Droste publ., 1971), p. 28. Quoted from Fritz Fischer, *Der Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegspolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18* (Düsseldorf: 1961), p. 750. Werner Otto von Hentig, *Mein Leben eine Dienstreise*, Göttingen, 1962.

<sup>259</sup> According to Kocaoğlu he was sent in 1921. See Timur Kocaoğlu, "Türkistanlı Göçmenlerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri Tarihine Bir Bakış," in *Dr. Baymirza Hayit Armağanı*, Ed by Rasim Ekşi and Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Turan Kültür Vakfı and Hoca Ahmed Yesevî Vakfı, 1999), p. 162.

was much younger and they were not many in Germany.<sup>260</sup> Most of the Prométhée supporters were on the side of Poland and the Western Allies before the War. There were even German reports blaming the former President of Bukharan People's Republic, Osman Hoca, fleeing from Warsaw by a British Plane in 1939 and serving Britain as an orientalist in Iran.<sup>261</sup>

One dilemma that the Nazis faced in integrating Turkestanis into their war machine was that, Turkestanis were members of *Untermensch* (Lower race-men) Asiatic stock were the enemies of the Arian race according to the dominant ideological propaganda. In the first phases of the war against the Soviet Union, many of the Turkestani and Tatar POWs couldn't escape death simply because Nazi commanders thought they were Jews by just looking at their circumstation.<sup>262</sup> This, of course, decreased the rate of Turkestanis being volunteers for the legions dramatically. Although some precautions were taken by the Nazis, the racist attacks against Turkestanis continued till the end of the War, because of their Asiatic appearance. A letter of Kayyum asking the release of one of his friend, Mansur Atabekov, from Auschwitz is an evidence of this situation. Atabekov was probably one of the victims killed in 1943 by an order of Himmler for the creation of a skeleton collection.<sup>263</sup> Racist German hatred against Turkestanis was so evident in many cases, even the former President of the Turkestan Autonomy, Mustafa Çokayoğlu was beaten badly

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<sup>260</sup> Mühlen, pp. 32-3. Quoted Fritz Arlt, *Zu Kajum-Chan*, "Thorwald-Material" collection, Institut für Zeitgeschichte München.

<sup>261</sup> Mühlen, p. 36. Here Mühlen quoted Papen's report to Foreign Ministry dated 9.8.1941. *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen/Amtes; PA AA, Pol XII Allgemeine Akten Bd, 12*, pp. 190-756.

<sup>262</sup> Hans Adolf Jacobsen, *Kommissarbefehl und Massenexekutionen sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener Hans's bucheim, Anatomie des SS-States, Bd. II*, Freiburg/Br., 1965, p. 165, cited in Mühlen, p. 41.

<sup>263</sup> Mühlen pp. 41-43.



once in a Berlin street, by an SS member agitated by a propaganda film about the Asiatic lower race.<sup>264</sup>

Between 1941-1945 Turkestanis in the legions published many pamphlets and periodicals like *Yengi Türkistan*, *Milli Türkistan* and *Milli Edebiyat*.<sup>265</sup> Both *Yengi Türkistan* and *Milli Türkistan* were using the common Turkestani (Turkestanish) dialect, which was a heritage of Çokay from 1929 on.<sup>266</sup>

The Nazis considered “Soviet Eastern Nationalities” as one single concept; while they were eager to separate Slavic and Baltic Soviet nationalities by their own terms. In the *Ostministerium* and SS Centers, they had a Turan-Caucasus department (*Lietselle Turan-Kaukasus*) to deal with all these “nationalities”. However there existed separate departments for Russians, Belorussians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians.<sup>267</sup>

By November 1941, there were at least more than two million Soviet POWs in German hands. One of the first two battalions created was the 450<sup>th</sup> Turkish battalion, probably and practically at the beginning of 1942. It had a special statute until the end of 1943. When the resistance of the German Army to legions was broken in November 1941, Rosenberg advised Hitler the creation of “Turkish” legions and after Hitler’s acceptance in 22 December 1941 OKW ordered officially the creation of Turkestani, Armenian, Georgian and Muslim Caucasian legions.<sup>268</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> Mühlen, pp. 50-51.

<sup>265</sup> See” Report by Malik Kimal,” T354/161/3807030-1 for the periodicals published for the members of legions. *Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police* (Washington: National Archives, Captured German Documents).

<sup>266</sup> Timur Kocaoğlu, "Türkistanlı Göçmenlerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri Tarihine Bir Bakış," in *Dr. Baymirza Hayit Armağanı*, Ed by Rasim Ekşi and Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Turan Kültür Vakfı and Hoca Ahmed Yesevî Vakfı, 1999), p. 162.

<sup>267</sup> Mühlen, pp. 50-53.

<sup>268</sup> Mühlen, pp. 53-54.

It was Von Papen who organized the visits of two Turkish Generals Hüsnü Emir Erkilet and Ali Fuat Erden<sup>269</sup> to the war fronts (in Crimea) and Nuri Pasha (Enver Pasha's brother) to Berlin at the beginning of war.<sup>270</sup> That was when they met with Gerhard Von Mende and first talked about the establishment of Turkestan legions. Most of the independent departments as well as ministry tables created for dealing with Soviet eastern nationalities, but mainly Turkestanis were under the supervision of Professor Gerhard Von Mende. Actually the first of such departments was established for Turkestanis, much earlier before for Volga Tatars and Caucasians. Mende's departments operated in an increasing rate till the April of 1945, even after the bombing of Ostministerium and many other official buildings in Berlin.<sup>271</sup>

Germans were quite comfortable with the activities of Turkestanis because of the this region had the least importance in the after-war plans of the German expansion. However places like Crimea and Caucasus were within the German post-war colonial plans and their representatives were facing important limitations in their activities.<sup>272</sup> *Millî Türkistan Birlik Komitesi* (National Turkestanian Unity Committee) was active since the spring of 1942.<sup>273</sup> Bukharan President Osman Hoca was an anti-Nazi. So, German Eastern Ministry got into contact with Mustafa Çokayoğlu, despite the efforts of an employee of the German Foreign ministry Tatar Alimcan İdrisoğlu to stop that. According to him Çokayoğlu was half Russian by blood and cooperated with the Jewish Marxist democrats during the revolutionary era.<sup>274</sup> But through the invitations sent by Veli Kayyum and then

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<sup>269</sup> Then commander of Turkish War Academy.

<sup>270</sup> Mühlen, p. 67.

<sup>271</sup> Mühlen, pp. 73-75.

<sup>272</sup> Mühlen, p. 83.

<sup>273</sup> For an extensive list of the publications of Soviet Eastern Nationalities in Germany during the war, see Alexander Dallin, *The German Occupation of the USSR in World War II: A Bibliography* (New York: 1955).

<sup>274</sup> Mühlen, p. 92.

quite unpleasantly Çokayoğlu came to Germany in the fall of 1941 and chose Veli Kayyum as his translator. However, he died in the Christmas of 1941 and Kayyum became the only person to organize Turkestanis in the concentration camps for the Germans.<sup>275</sup>

The first thing Kayyum did was to take the “Han” (Khan) title and renamed himself Veli Kayyum Han. He was given an official residence, a car and German diplomatic passport then. In August 1942 he published the first issue of *Millî Türkistan*. The Committee was in the structure of an exiled government of Turkestan with 21 members in its cabinet. In addition to a budget received from the Germans, the Committee collected a sum of money from the Turkestani members of the legions, which made it quite free from German financial aid. *Millî Türkistan* was printed initially at 15,000 and then its tirage became 80,000. Its last issue under the Nazi banner was published in April 1945.<sup>276</sup>

However, in a short while serious ethnic discrimination and problems appeared within the committee. Kyrgyz and Kazaks protested Kayyum Han’s policy of making the committee an Uzbek dominated organization. Finally, they applied Rosenberg for the creation of their own committee; but Germans refused this. Support of Kazaks and Kyrgyz came from a Tatar leader Dr. Ahmet Temir, who planned a common Tatar-Kirgiz and Kazak committee and refused Kayyum’s leadership. However, they lost again; and Dr. Temir went back to Turkey in deep disappointment.<sup>277</sup>

In October 1943, Baymirza Hayit officially became the deputy of Kayyum Han, but there was still an opposition. The decision by the SS, to create its own Turkestani legions and choosing Capitan Andreas Mayer-Mader as the commander of this legion, was protested by Kayyum. Mayer-Mader was a pan-Turkist and was planning to organize

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<sup>275</sup> Mühlen, p. 93.

<sup>276</sup> Mühlen, pp. 93-94.

<sup>277</sup> Mühlen, p. 95.

guerilla warfare in Turkestan just as was done by Lawrance in Arabia. Kayyum thought that he would be able to steal the loyalty of legionnaires from him. In the winter of 1944 an Azeri Aslan Abdullayev and a Kyrgyz Sülaymanov were organizing the opposition against Kayyum among the legions and distributed brochures signed by Turkestan National Government. Planning a coup, they sent a legionnaire to kill Kayyum in March 1944, but Kayyum was in Paris then. Kayyum's aide Gulam Alimov suppressed the rebel and six Turkestanis including Abdullayev and Sülaymanov were hanged. Mayer-Mader was also executed.<sup>278</sup>

By the summer of 1944, Kayyum's prestige was seriously damaged among the Turkestanis. He organized a congress to rehabilitate the committee's prestige but didn't accept opposition to take part in this congress. He even stopped Gulam Alimov speaking to the Congress, who suppressed the rebels. The First Turkestan National Congress met in Vienna between the 8 and 10<sup>th</sup> of July 1944. The height of the organization was the arrival of the Führer's telegram announcing the promotion of a medal to Kayyum. However the competition between Turkestanis was going on, especially the Leitstelle in SS central administration becoming more and more concentrated with the Kazak and Kyrgyz opposition to Kayyum. SS starting to promote Pan-Turkism openly towards the end of 1944 alarmed the anti-Pan-Turkist Kayyum. He appointed one of the harsh opponents to himself, Haris Kanatbay to the General Secretary post of the Committee. But from the other side, Kayyum continued to attack the opposition even in February 1945. Kayyum blamed a Turkmen, Kurban, who was openly criticizing Uzbek tribalism in the committee, by trying to establish contacts with western allies. SS did not take it seriously. Finally, SS's president for the "Turan-Caucasia" Leitstelle Reiner Olzscha planned the firing of Kayyum. Being

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<sup>278</sup> Mühlen, pp. 97-98.

good at intrigues and having an oriental ability to be seen as sympathetic, Kayyum stayed at his position. Towards the end of the war, in 24 March 1945, Kayyum achieved the thing he was trying to for the last five years. Rosenberg, while considering all other committees as national representations, recognized National Turkestan Unity Committee as the Temporary Turkestan National Government and the legion as the National Turkestan Army.<sup>279</sup>

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Kayyum always thought that he was continuing the legacy of the former nationalists of Turkestan, and their struggle was mainly against the colonialists of the West.<sup>280</sup> SS established a “Turkestan Study Group” in January 1944. Most of the opposition against Kayyum was in this group. They were working under the Berger’s SS Central Administration with the leadership of SS Obersturmführer (SS rank for Captain) Dr. Reiner Olzscha. In November 1944, this group established a Molla Mekteb (Religious School) in Dresden, just like the one of the Wehrmacht in Göttingen. The main objective of the school was to eliminate Sunni-Shia problems among the Muslims.<sup>281</sup> Most of the German officialdom was against the idea of pan-Turkism, but the development of the war eliminated this. Although the interpretations of professors Spuler and Jäschke pointed out that Pan-Turkism was only alive in Azerbaijan with little power, this had not stopped Olzscha in continuing on with the Pan-Turkist project.<sup>282</sup>

The SS began to publish a journal called “Türk Birliği” (Turkish Unity) from the end of 1944 on, for the “Eastern Turkish Armed Force” (Doğu Türk Silahlı Gücü). Despite all the opposition of the Kayyum, it was in Latin and just like İsmail Bey Gaspıralı’s

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<sup>279</sup> Mühlen, pp. 100-102.

<sup>280</sup> Mühlen, pp. 136-137.

<sup>281</sup> Mühlen, pp. 141-143.

<sup>282</sup> Mühlen, p. 145.

Tercüman, in a common Turkish dialect.<sup>283</sup> This wing inserted a common Turk identity among the legions, overriding Kayyum's prestige by putting him as the representative of a limited part of the Turkish world.<sup>284</sup> The primary aim of the journal was to eliminate "Tatar, Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Kazak" identities, and unite all Turks under the banner of Turkness.<sup>285</sup> Türk Birliği represented the ideological breaking point among the members of the legions, by leaving Uzbek dominated Turkestanism to Kayyum group and moving further to Turkism and pan-Turkism.<sup>286</sup> However, Türk Birliği had also claimed the heritage of Mustafa Çokayoğlu.<sup>287</sup>

Wehrmacht was uncomfortable with the legions, finding them unreliable elements. After some negotiations with Wehrmacht in November 1943, 450, Türk battalion of Andreas Mayer-Mader was transferred to Waffen-SS. Mayer-Mader, unable to persuade Wehrmacht to his plans for para-dropping to Turkestan and launching a guerilla warfare, volunteered to transfer his troops under the command of the SS. He was a general of Chiang Kay Shek in China before the war; but after the Japanese attack, he found himself fighting on the side of aggressors. He used to speak all Turkic dialects and had a desire to convert into Islam. This made him a good candidate for the SS to command the Turkish legion.<sup>288</sup>

In January 1944, he was in the Waffen-SS and his battalion was raised to a regiment. Many Kazak and Kyrgyz opposition to Kayyum concentrated in this regiment. His demise is still unclear. There are some documents about his being killed in combat; but

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<sup>283</sup> Mühlen p. 148 and footnote 29.

<sup>284</sup> Türk Birliği was also a heavily Kipchak dominated journal, under the Redactorship of Hakim Tımbek, Secretariat of Çingis Amitov. See "Editorial Board List of *Tyrk Birliđi*," T354/161/3807063.

<sup>285</sup> S. Niqmetij, "Sen kim? Men Tyrk-Tyrk bolup qalacaktın," *Tyrk Birliđi*, Nr. 3, 20 December 1944, p. 1.

<sup>286</sup> Tymenli, "Tykcilik neme?" *Tyrk Birliđi*, Nr. 2 (5), 12 January 1945, p. 1. See this article for a detailed explanation of the anti-Kayyum wing for their adoption of pan-Turkism.

<sup>287</sup> See the 5 January 1945 issue of *Tyrk Birliđi*, Nr. 1(4), which was a special Mustafa-Çokay issue.

<sup>288</sup> Mühlen, p. 149.

in the opinion of the people of his time, he was most probably executed by the SS.<sup>289</sup> After him, a comrade-in-arms of late Enver Pasha, Kernel (*SS-Standartenführer*) Harun el Reşid Bey became the commander of the Waffen-SS legion. His real name was Wilhelm Hintersatz and he was a prominent German Pan-Turkist figure of the time.<sup>290</sup>

The pan-Turkist *Eastern Türk Armed Force* had four regiments of Turkestanian, Azeri, Crimean and Volga Tatars.<sup>291</sup> Gulam Alimov being the commander of the Turkestan regiment, Kayyum finally was forced to accept this situation.<sup>292</sup> With its nationalist, anti-Russian and Islamic motives, the Waffen-SS became very attractive for the members of Wehrmacht legions. Also the opportunity to serve as an officer in the SS caused many Turkestanians to escape from Wehrmacht and join into the ranks of the Waffen-SS.<sup>293</sup>

Gulam Alimov joined Slovak resistance on 25<sup>th</sup> of December 1944 after executing some of the German officers, together with nearly 300 of his men. Alimov was a religious man; Germans gave him many medals; but, because they were cross shape, he always refused to wear them.<sup>294</sup> Uzbek circles around Kayyum and Alimov were uncomfortable with the supports of SS Central Administration and Olzscha for Kyrgyz and Kazaks who were isolated by the committee. That caused a new alliance between Kayyum and von Mende, alienating Olzscha.<sup>295</sup> The creation of “Komitet Osvobozhdeniya Narodov Rosii” (KNOR-The Liberation Committee for the peoples of Russia) in November 1944 and “Russkaya Osvoboditelnaya Armiya” (ROA-Russian Liberation Army) in January 1945

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<sup>289</sup> Mühlen, pp. 150-1.

<sup>290</sup> Mühlen, p. 152.

<sup>291</sup> In a message to Harun el Reşid bey, Himmler, on 20 October 1944 proposed the use of these soldiers heavily in construction labor jobs during their doctrinization through the necessary tools of propaganda. T-175/70/folder 233/2586542.

<sup>292</sup> Mühlen, p. 153.

<sup>293</sup> Mühlen, p. 155.

<sup>294</sup> Mühlen, p. 157.

<sup>295</sup> See an intelligence letter to Dr. Olzscha in 12 October 1944 about von-Mende Kayyum rapprochement, Captured German Documents, 1-175/162/2695662.

caused a significant unrest among Turkestanis. Kayyum resisted sending any representatives to this committee. He even said that this was the main for Gulam Alimov's joining the Slovak's resistance. Only five Turkestanis under Haris Kanatbay joined KONR and Kayyum succeeded in keeping Turkestanis concrete and united against Russians.<sup>296</sup>

Although the SS propaganda, with Kayyum's efforts directed towards the elimination of all kinds of tribal differences among the Turkestanis, the secret and closed-circle Nazi documentation was classifying the Turkestanis, just like the Soviets, as Uzbeks, Kazaks, Kyrgyz, Turkmen and Tajiks.<sup>297</sup> Kayyum was aware of this and became more careful in the equal representation of each tribal group, especially in the propaganda machine of the Turkestan legion, without sacrificing leadership role for the Uzbeks.<sup>298</sup>

In the beginning of the war, according to the decisions of Ostministerium, pan-Turkism propaganda was not allowed; but they desired to create a unified feeling among the members of the five "tribes" of Turkestan.<sup>299</sup> Turkestan was not a direct target for German sabotage and underground activities because of geographical distance. However, we know that there was at least one paratroop operation<sup>300</sup> realized (like Karl in Kazan or Tamara operations).<sup>301</sup>

A group of twelve Turkestanis, trained by German counter-intelligence, infiltrated into Turkestan in May 1943 with fake documents. Until December 1944, they were the main source of German intelligence from the region. They were divided into five

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<sup>296</sup> Kayyum was called as a "Turkestan nationalist" by A.A. Vlasov, the commander-in chief of the Russian legion. See the "Questioning Protocol Steno Records of Vlasov," *GARF*, f. 2401, op. 1, d. 2213, ll. 110- 151. See the same document for the confessions of Vlasov on the details of ROA and KONR.

<sup>297</sup> For a good example see, Letter from SS Kerne l Spaarmann to Dr. Olzscha, dated 1 September 1944. T-175/162/2695671-2.

<sup>298</sup> Letter to Dr. Olzshca, T-175/162/2695674.

<sup>299</sup> Mühlen, p. 171.

<sup>300</sup> I have first learned about this operation during an interview with Ruzi Nazar, 10 November 2000, Washington D.C.)

<sup>301</sup> Mühlen, p. 179.



underground operational groups in: Tashkent, Stalinabad, Alma-Ata, Calalabad and Guryev. Their operations were covered by Mir Kasım, who was a Turkestanı General in Belo-Russia. In December 1944, they ended their operation and went underground, or became integrated within the ranks of Red Army.<sup>302</sup> In the aftermath of the war, Turkestanı soldiers escaped from being sent to Soviet authorities and mostly concentrated in KZAB (*Koordinationszentrum des antibolschewistischen Kampfes*) and Paris Block. Veli Kayyum was found innocent in the Nurenberg trials and released. Re-organizing Turkestanis left in Europe, he started to publish Milli Türkistan again in 1950, which continued till 1975. However in 1951, first separation was lead by Haris (Keres) Kanatbay, a non-Uzbek who started to publish the journal Türkeli until 1955.<sup>303</sup> From 1951 to 1953, the Voice of America and from March 1953 on Radio “Liberation” (then became Liberty) had become their “émigré” centers. This radio had initially a Turkestanı department with two sections, reflecting the continuation of all the problems experienced in the Committee during the war.<sup>304</sup>

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## 5.22 Summary

The nationalist-Turkestanist intelligentsia and political leaders of Turkestan evacuated their country between 1918-1923, while national statehood achieved by Turkestan Autonomy, Alaş Orda, Bukharan People’s Republic and Khorezmian People’s Republic, one after another fell into the Bolshevik control. Evacuation was in all directions

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<sup>302</sup> Mühlen p. 218. Mühlen’s interpretations are heavily depended on German sources and archival document. This information is quoted from “Tätigkeitsbericht über die, Hauptnachrichteneinsatzgruppe ‘T(urkestan)-Stab’ vom 20.5.1943-20.5.1945.”

<sup>303</sup> Timur Kocaoğlu, "Türkstanlı Göçmenlerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri Tarihine Bir Bakış," in *Dr. Baymirza Hayit Armağanı*, Ed by Rasim Ekşi and Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Turan Kültür Vakfı and Hoca Ahmed Yesevî Vakfı, 1999), p. 162.

<sup>304</sup> Mühlen, p. 236.

- to Europe, to Turkey, to Afghanistan, to India and to Arab countries. In fact to anywhere they could reach and find safety from the Bolsheviks. In these locations, they were organized under associations and began to publish journals, first to keep émigrés intact and close to each other, in order to keep Turkestanist ideals alive; but more importantly to explain to the international public that their countries had been invaded by the Bolsheviks.

*Yeni Türkistan* until 1932 and *Yaş Türkistan* until the Second World War were both the major Turkistani émigré journals. Mustafa Çokayoğlu emerged as the only and recognized leader of Turkistani émigré in exile. He was also accepted as the leader of a government in exile, Turkestan Autonomy.

Their information channels to the motherland were almost non-existent by the 1930s, and they were able to follow developments within the Soviet Central Asia only through Soviet sources. Every bit of news was subject to interpretations and a special treatment of infiltration to clean it from the Bolshevik propaganda but to find out what was really going on in the motherland. It was also in the 1930s Çokay and other émigré leaders launched their policy of presenting Turkestan as one of the world's oppressed colonies. This policy was followed by the émigrés of the post-war period.

Among the “real” Turkestani émigrés, the term Turkestan was not to be challenged at all. However “outsiders,” like Zeki Velidî, broke the consensus by proposing a new term *Türkili* for Turkestan. From the early 1930s on, an important disintegration among the émigrés emerged. Zeki Velidî lead a rather pan-Turkist “Kipchak wing” whereas Çokayoğlu, Osman Hoca and other prominent leaders kept their Turkestanist positions intact. This secession from the mainstream Turkestanist position became clearer during the War, especially within the Turkestan legions, when the accused “Sart”-Uzbek clique became dominant over the émigrés after the death of Mustafa Çokayoğlu.

The story of Turkestan Legions is rather the story of the rise of Veli Kayyum “Han” as the strongest leader that the Turkestani émigré had ever seen. Numbers of the armed legion members, once reached two hundred thousands, based in Slovakia, Poland, Belorussia and some in Ukraine. However, they never played an important role in any decisive battle. They were established late and were dissolved in accordance with the Yalta decisions. Most of them were forcefully sent back to the Soviet Union and were executed there after “the trials”. However, several thousands had succeeded in fleeing and continued the Çokayoğlu’s heritage of émigré Turkestanism in the post-war period.

**CHAPTER 6**  
**NATIONALISM, TRIBALISM AND TURKESTANISM:**  
**A STORY OF POST-WAR TURKESTAN**

**6.1 Introduction**

The ending of the Second World War had influenced two groups of Turkestanis; those who were living in Turkestan and those who were already in exile. The post-war history of Turkestan is marked by the nativization of cadres within the national republics of the Soviet Central Asia. This trend followed a rather clanic-tribalist pattern in each Central Asian republic, causing the development of a number of “ruler” clans and a new “ruling elite”. On the émigré front, Uzbek-Kazak controversies surfaced in the 1950s, when a Turkestanist and a pan-Turkist polarization accrued among the émigré.

**6.2 Global Picture: “Razmezhevanie”**

The natives of Turkestan have gained their “nationhood” through *razmezhevanie* (as called) or national territorial demarcation. This was started in 1924. It was a process not only planned and directed by the center but with a rather active participation of the national communist elite of Turkestan itself.

However, the appearance of the “Islamist” and “Turkestanist” *Basmacı* movement until the mid 1930s was certainly a sign of resistance to the new order in Turkestan. In any case, Turkestanis, were for the most part proud and quite loyal subjects of the USSR just

after the Second World War. The Second World War was an important turning point in the history of region, during which millions of Turkestanis lost their lives on both sides of the front. In every village of Turkestan, one can still see the memorial stones erected to the memories of the so-called Great Patriotic War (i.e. the Second World War) upon which several dozens of names of the martyrs of the villages are carved. Probably, since the “Golden Ages” of Turkestan, that was the reign of Timur, it was the first time that Turkestanis were somehow united against a common enemy and lost too many lives in order to protect their “common home,” the Soviet Union.

One of the most frequent claims of the post-war Sovietology was the artificiality of the borders drawn by the *razmezhevanie*. The Turkestani émigré literature of the Cold War period simply supported the idea of “one and indivisible Turkestan”. Many Western analysts also pointed out the artificiality of the borders as well as the potential of inter ethnic conflicts in the region; not only conflicts between natives and Slavs but also among the natives as such.

The “politically correct” approaches in the Western academia were changed towards the new Soviet classifications of the peoples of Turkestan. Soon after, the re-naming of the regional politico-geographic terms in accordance with the new Soviet versions was begun.

### **6.3 Tribal or Regional Groups and Political Fractionalism**

As Olivier Roy pointed out, the post-war political history of Turkestan was much identified with the struggle of regionalist/tribal fractions within the state apparatus of the

Central Asian republics.<sup>305</sup> Following the deaths of Bukharan Feyzullah Hocayev, Tashkendi Akmal Ikramov and Margilani Yoldaş Ahunbabayev, at the end of 1930s, a Fergana fraction with non-*Cedid* roots took over the power in Uzbekistan. This fraction of Osman Yusupov (1937-50) and Amin Niyazov (1950-55), which ruled Uzbekistan for more than fifteen years, carried out an important task for Uzbekization<sup>306</sup> as compared to the preceding Bukhara and Samarkand groups, which were rather Tajik oriented. The reign of N.A. Muhiddinov (1955-57), a Tashkendi, was considered to be a continuation of this “Uzbek” fraction. His successor Sabir Kamalov (1957-59) was also a Tashkendi. He followed strictly the traditional Ferghana-Tashkent alliance. In 1959, when Şeref Reşidov became the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR, a *Jizak* (Samarkand) clan started its long-lasting reign in the country. For a decade, Reşidov was unable to replace the members of the Fergana-Tashkent clan in the high bureaucratic and political structure. From the very beginning, Russian masters kept themselves outside the political and bureaucratic struggle in Uzbekistan.<sup>307</sup> The transfer of the three major border districts to Uzbekistan as a “gift” on the part of Kazakstan was the source of important propaganda for the Reşidov group in Tashkent.<sup>308</sup>

However, Reşidov’s internal popularity within his republic could not stop the heavy attacks in the Soviet press for the slow progress in learning the Russian-language in Uzbekistan.<sup>309</sup> The insistence of the Uzbek party bureaucrat R. Nişanov that Russian was

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<sup>305</sup> Olivier Roy, *The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations* (London: I.B. Turis, 2000), pp. 109-124. See this part for further details on the political struggles between regional and tribal struggles between the fractions in Central Asian republics.

<sup>306</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110.

<sup>307</sup> C. Royster, "From Tashkent," *Wall Street Journal* (6 August 1962), p. 4.

<sup>308</sup> *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (15 January 1963). These regions included the famous cotton-growing regions of Kirov and Pakhta-Aral. This fact was criticized in the *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (16 January 1963).

<sup>309</sup> See *RL Research* note No. 1527 (June 6, 1963). These criticisms on Reşidov appeared in especially 1962 issues of *Uchitelskaya Gazeta* of 17, 20 and 22 November and *DIB* (19 December 1962).

the second native language of Uzbeks was also questioned.<sup>310</sup> The alleged ghost of a *Cedidist* and nationalist fractions operating in the ranks of Uzbek Communist Party was also a popular story brought in by the press both in the West and in the Soviet Union.<sup>311</sup> There were even some Western authors like Kolarz, who imagined the existence of a united Kazak and Uzbek nationalist front which tried to overthrow their Russian oppressors for the sake of establishing a free independent Turkestan modeling, free Persia, Pakistan and Afghanistan.<sup>312</sup>

Prominent Uzbek authors of the time wrote that, although the Tsarist government had ignored the national and religious rights of the natives of Turkestan, it was significantly “progressive in nature”.<sup>313</sup> However, there must had been something within the Uzbek society that prevented Russification. The Uzbek traditional neighborhood, *mahalla*, for sure, was a great obstacle to the communal way of life as well as Russification.<sup>314</sup> In public speeches, Reşidov complained about the ongoing traditionalism in Uzbek society during the first years of his rule, which he saw as a kind of nationalism separating the brotherly nations of the union.<sup>315</sup> Indeed, Uzbek nationalism manifested itself in its discrimination

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<sup>310</sup> *RLR Notes*, No. 1625 (October 28 1963). "The Russian Language in Uzbekistan" Quoted Nişanov's speech published in *Pravda* of October 22 of same year.

<sup>311</sup> *RL Research note*, no. 1556 (July 22 1963). "The lost of shortcomings in the Uzbek ideological front" see also *Pravda* of 17 July 1963 on Uzbek TsK on nationalism.

<sup>312</sup> Walter Kolarz, *Communism and Colonialism* (New York: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 12-20.

<sup>313</sup> D. Adildiyev, "150 god put," *Komsomolets Uzbekistana* (26 March 1964), p. 6. Quoting Fitrat, was very popular that time who accordingly wrote that "If the Russian people suggest that we learn their language and literature, they mean us no harm. On the contrary, they wish our country to thrive, and our people to prosper."

<sup>314</sup> Reşidov in 1964 was attacking the Uzbek mahalla, old housing with big backyards and high walls keeping privacy, as being feudal and reactionary to the communist styles. See *London Times* (25 September 1964) for "Passive Acquiescence in Russianization".

<sup>315</sup> See James Critchlow, "More on Central Asian Nationalism," *Radio Liberty Research* paper No. 2169 (January 25 1966). See especially large quotations from Reşidov's writings and speeches published in *Kommunist*.

towards Crimean Tatars and Ahıska Turks [Meskhetians], latecomers after Stalin's deportation of them to Central Asia, from the 1960s on.<sup>316</sup>

Only after the 1969 *Pahtakar* events, Reşidov found the solution to eliminate the Fergana-Tashkent clan, accusing this "Uzbek" clan of showing tolerance towards nationalists. These disturbances at the same time provided him the bases for the dismissal of the head of state Yadgar Nasruddinova and the Premier, Bukharan, Rahmankul Kurbanov, who was sentenced to six years in prison.

### **6.3.1 The Pahtakar Events: Nationalism or Hooliganism?**

The *Pahtakar* events were one of the darkest and unexplored parts of Soviet Turkestan's history. Apart from the bits and pieces of information in the Soviet and Western media about these events, the most detailed and probably the accurate information about them has been acquired from the notes of the Uzbek republican deputy Prosecutor, Boris Kamenetskiy, who fled to Israel after his dismissal in the mid-1970s.<sup>317</sup> On 2 June 1969, in the Pahtakar Stadium (Tashkent), the popular local soccer team Pahtakar was playing against Dynamo Moscow. There were over a hundred thousand Uzbek football spectators in the stadium which was designed for sixty thousand. In the middle of the game, posters appeared with slogans "*samarskie, ubirayets von!*" (Samarškiye [Russians] go home!). Russian spectators tore down the posters and a huge fight broke out causing the game to be stopped. The entire Tashkent militia of fifteen thousand strong men and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], who were mostly Slavs, forces were deployed. The order was restored within two hours and the game resumed. However, the disorder was not

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<sup>316</sup> James Critchow, "Nationalism in Uzbekistan in the Brezhnev era," pp. 306-15.

<sup>317</sup> Boris Kamenetskiy (b. In 1922, was the Uzbek Republican deputy prosecutor from 1966 to 1973), "Crime and Corruption in Uzbekistan," *RFE-RL Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research* (26 October, 1979).



over. As the game ended, the Uzbeks attacked the Russians. The Uzbek crowd went into Navai Street; stopped the traffic; took Slavs out of the busses and tramway cars; and killed at least ten of them. People shouted slogans: "Go back to your Russia, we did not ask you to come here!" ("*My vas ne zvali syuda!*"). Following the events, more than one thousand "hooligans" [*Bazarilar* in Uzbek] were arrested. Reşidov called it petty hooliganism and group hooliganism. The events very caused great fear among the Tashkent Russians who wrote several thousands of letters to Moscow, complaining about the tolerance of the Uzbek authorities toward this fascistic event that took place. This time the Uzbek authorities were quite successful in closing the case by giving half a dozen prison terms to the "hooligans".

As the complaints from the Tashkent Russians continued, cases were re-opened after a year. Now, some of the cases were politically upgraded to "malicious hooliganism inciting national antipathy and hatred". According to Kamenetsky who worked with Nasruddinova for several years, she hated everybody other than Uzbeks. She was a member of the bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR. She was also the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a ceremonial presidential post. Kamenetsky reported that she fired all Jews from the high offices and replaced them with Uzbeks. As the head of state of Uzbekistan she had the power to pardon, and she exploited this power by accepting huge amounts in bribes and pardoning Uzbek criminals.<sup>318</sup>

Only a few days after the Pahtakar events, a huge public trial for ten Crimean Tatar political activists was scheduled in Tashkent. Kurban Ruzetov was a judge famous for his

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<sup>318</sup> Ibid., the same report.

show trials of Crimean Tatars. He was quick to accuse the Crimean Tatars of being behind the events, whom he alleged agitated the crowds to postpone their own political trials.<sup>319</sup>

The whole Pahtakar events need much further investigation to find out exactly what had happened and also what the exact motives of the Uzbeks were in attacking Russians in the streets of Tashkent. While, the “hunt for *samaritsy*” lasted for two days, on the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> of June 1969, and left more than ten Russian civilians dead, surely, Pahtakar was not considered a national uprising. It had strong nationalistic and anti-Russian motives. The “tolerance” of the republican authorities would rather be interpreted as their hurried attempt to close the cases without causing much trouble for themselves at the center.

In his remark on Uzbek nationalism and Turkestan, Kamenetsky, a contemporary observer, said::

Every Uzbek dreams of independence and ask when is Russian going back to his Samara?.. The focus of Uzbek nationalism is Uzbekistan, and not any supranational entity such as Turkestan or Central Asia, nor yet any sub national tribal or local affinity.<sup>320</sup>

Although Kamenetsky was not aware of the inter-Uzbek clan relations in depth, his evaluations as a close witness to the events are valuable. The political power in Uzbekistan remained in the hands of this “nationalistic” Samarkand clan until the death of Brezhnev and the establishment of Andropov’s power.

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<sup>319</sup> See David Nissman, "Hooliganism in Uzbekistan," *RL Research* CRD 270/69 (6 August, 1969). For Pahtakar events of 2-3 June 1969, see also *Peking Review* (4 July 1969), Report by Hung Chuan-yu, "The new Tsars," Henry S. Bradsher, "Violent clashes in Tashkent reported troubling Russians," *Washington Evening Star* (24 July 1969). "Bezorilar jazolandi," *Sovet Ozbekistoni* (10 June 1969).

<sup>320</sup> Boris Kamenetskiy, "Notes on life in Uzbekistan," (*RFE-RL* Soviet area audience and opinion reserach, 26 October 1979).

### 6.3.2 Tolerance in Nationalist Literature

In the 1970s, there appeared a group of Uzbek authors, who used extensive Chaghatayisms in their literary works.<sup>321</sup> From early the 1960s on, historical films about Timur, Navai, Mahdumquli, Manas, Babur, and other Turkestan historical heroes were financed by the republican Communist Parties. Equally important, the translation of historical texts and the idealization of some selected figures of the Turkestan history were carried out despite harsh criticism by the Moscow press.

*Mirasism* ["Heritagism"] was rather an elite Soviet-Turkestan movement aimed at rehabilitating the native historical heroes in the post-Stalin era.<sup>322</sup> In some cases, the representatives of this movement, although being part of the Soviet establishment and living within the Soviet Union, were quite successful in providing important pieces that somehow demonstrated their sympathies towards Turkestanism and the Turkestan identity. The first open idealization of the term "Turkestan" in the post-war Soviet literature was seen in an article written by a renowned Kazak poet and novelist, Dukanbay Doscanov, in 1963.

History's family tree, Turkistan, with your whirlwind, you sign in distance, with your whirlwind, emerge our ancestors, who fought their enemies in the agony of death.<sup>323</sup>

A similar example was Çingiz Aytmatov's article in *Izvestiia*, in 1974, in which he defined the Soviet Central Asia as Turkestan, his native-homeland.<sup>324</sup> The appearance of

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<sup>321</sup> For examples and the arguments in the Uzbek press of the time see John Soper, "Uzbek Writers look to the past for inspiration," *RFE/RL reserach* RL 129/79 (April 24 1979).

<sup>322</sup> See the issue of *Dergi* in 1965, No. 41, on the details of literary reflections of Uzbek, Kazak, Kyrgyz, Tajik and Turkmen nationalisms.

<sup>323</sup> See Dukanbay Doscanov, "Turkistan Elesteri," *Juldz*, no. 11 (1963), p. 38 Although this could be considered as a rare and exceptional example of Turkestanist approach and heritage in Soviet-Turkestan literature in 1960s, its concrete and clear statement that it has been the fatherland of (at least Kazaks) is worth to note.

the article coincided with a period when almost in every Central Asian state, historical heroes, such as Timur (Tamerlane) and Uluğ Beg in Uzbekistan, were rehabilitated in official documents too.<sup>325</sup> In the meantime, the idea of the historical and traditional distinctiveness of Turkestan was being recognized in the Western press.<sup>326</sup> However the Cold War period Soviet historiography launched its own propaganda campaign for historical and modern separation of Central Asia and Kazakstan, in which the original population of the former was an Iranian-Persian stock and the latter was of a highlander nomadic stock.<sup>327</sup> Some of this propaganda was digested by some Turkestani intellectuals and brought new phenomena - the fusion of local identities with an Islamic consciousness.

Soviet national policies in Central Asia implanted the idea of separate national cultures and identities. This in turn led to the fusion of Islamic sentiment with national consciousness.<sup>328</sup>

At the height of Reşidov's power in 1978, the renowned Uzbek author, Pirimqul Kadirov published his Turkestanist and nationalist novel, *Yulduzlu Tunlar* [Stary Nights].

... the Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kazak, Kyrgyz don't you know that all these are Turkic people? Like the children of one father, our land is one, our religion is one, our history is one... now our hearts must also be one...my dear sir Qopaqbiy, just understand the meaning of the word Turkistan. Turkistan means the country of Turks.<sup>329</sup>

The theme of common Turkic and Muslim roots of the peoples of Turkestan was brought up openly by Kadirov, whereas he also highlighted the meaning of the concept as

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<sup>324</sup> Chingiz Aytmatov, "Turkestan," *Izvestiia* (October 31, 1974). "Turkestan... Oh! My native land, part of my great-Soviet country!" This piece is more important than the previous one simply because this was published in one of the primary Russian language daily, *Izvestiia*, not like *Julduz*, a rather local literary journal.

<sup>325</sup> See Hedrick Smith, "Temarlane Still Haunts Moscow's Rulers," *IHT* (3 June 1974), for the details of Soviet and Western reactions to the rehabilitation of historical heroes in Turkestan.

<sup>326</sup> David Satter, "The Sickle and the Crescent," *The Financial Times* (December 1, 1976). Many in the Western public was for a long time ignorant to the distinct identity of Turkestan and considered the region as a former Tsarist and then Soviet region with predominant Russian existence.

<sup>327</sup> Davendra Kaushik, *Central Asia in Modern Times* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970).

<sup>328</sup> Diloram Ibrahim, *The Islamization of Central Asia: A Case Study of Uzbekistan* (NY: The Islamic Foundation, 1993), pp. 21-22.

<sup>329</sup> Pirimqul Qadirov. (b. In 1928 a well known Uzbek author), "Yulduzli Tunlar," *Sharq Yulduzi*, no. 5 (1978), p. 34.

being the “country of Turks”. That was very important simply because, that showed the continuing Turkestanism, although in some rare instances, among the Central Asian intelligentsia. This novel was written more than half a century after the *razmezhevanie* and could be seen as a good piece of Turkestan consciousness of an Uzbek intellectual with unusually strong emphasis on the unity of the peoples of Turkestan.

### 6.3.3 Political Tribalism Revisited

Only after the death of Brezhnev in 1983 was Reşidov replaced by an Andropov figure, Inamcan Osmanhocayev, a representative of the Fergana-Tashkent faction.<sup>330</sup> Refik Nişanov replaced Osmanhocayev in 1988, again a fierce supporter of the Tashkent-Fergana faction. Soon, in mid-1989 though, Islam Kerimov, who was from the rival Samarkand faction, replaced him.

In Kazakstan, the last remnants of the *Alaş Orda*'s *Cedid* cadres - including non-*Cedids* like Turar Riskulov - were eliminated by the end of 1930s. During the course of the war, the first secretary of the Kazak Communist Party was a Russian, N. Skortsev (1939-46). Following the War, a member of the Kazak Southern Greater Horde<sup>331</sup> (*Ulu Cüz*) became the First Secretary for eight years. The next first secretary of the Kazak party, Cumabay Şayakmedov (1946-1954) was the representative of probably the first non-*Cedid* and non *Alaş-Orda* raised political cadres in the Soviet Kazakstan. He was also the one who not only established but also formalized the traditional Greater Horde domination in the political cadres of the Kazak Communist Party. His two successors, Brezhnev (1954-

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<sup>330</sup> For a detailed sketch of Rashidovchina, see Demian Vaisman, “Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistané,” in Yaacov Ro’I, (ed.) *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 105-121. See also Kamil Ikramov, “I probil chas”, in *Rashidov i rashidovshchina, Sbornik statei* (Perm: 1992), pp. 18-25. See also T. Pulatov, “Pod sen’iu ottsa natsii,” in *Rashidov i rashidovshchina*, pp. 38-55.

<sup>331</sup> For a comprehensive history of tribalism and tribes among the Kazaks see Sh. Kudayberdi-Uly, *Rodoslovnaya Tyurkov, Kirgizov, Kazakov i Khanskikh Dinasty* (Alma-Ata: Jazushy, 1990), pp. 67-112.

56) and Yakovlev (1956-59) served at the post of first secretary for rather short terms before leaving the post to a classical Brezhnevite figure Dinmuhammed Kunayev who was the first secretary of the Kazak Communist Party between 1959-1986. The liquidation of the *Tselnyi Krai* on the 26 of December 1960 was the first victory of the Kazak Party apparatus in stopping “Russian federal expansion”.<sup>332</sup> During this period, Kazak intellectuals were quite openly demanding more nativization of cadres and native language instruction for the youth.<sup>333</sup> Kunayev also supported Kazak writers, advocating the employment of native cadres into the managerial positions within the republic.<sup>334</sup> Kunayev was always very careful to define his policies in terms of the Lenin’s nationalities policy.<sup>335</sup> He was also a member of the Greater Horde, whose thirty-seven year rule over the country was almost identified with the total domination of Greater Horde over the whole administrative and bureaucratic apparatus. That was probably why the December (*Jeltoksan*) Events took place when he was replaced by a non-Kazak, Gennadi Kolbin (1986-89). The last first secretary of the Kazak SSR and then the first president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev (1989 to present), was again a member of Greater Horde. So, in the Kazak case, the political struggle was rather between the representatives of the huge Slavic population of the republic and the representatives of the Kazak Greater Horde.<sup>336</sup>

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<sup>332</sup> See Christian Duevel, “Liquidation of Tselny Krai-A Fillip for Kazakh Nationalists,” *RFE-RL Research Report*, no. 2110 (25 October 1965).

<sup>333</sup> N.D. Dzhandiddin, *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (September 8 1964). Dzandiddin also published a book titled “kommunizm i natsionalniy vopros” same year by Almaata-mysl.

<sup>334</sup> For details of this argument and Kunayev’s policy see, S. Tolibekov, L. Slavin, N. Kiybayev and N.D. Candildin, *Kommunizmi razvitie natsional’nykh otnosheniy* (Moscow: Mysl’, 1964). See also this book for the Kazak perception of the Virgin Lands project.

<sup>335</sup> D. Kunayev, “Torzhestvo Leninskoy natsional’noy politiki,” *Pravda* (1 April 1970), p. 2.

<sup>336</sup> Tribalism remained one of the most important obstacles of the creation of a Kazak ethnic and or national consciousness too, see Anwar Galiyev, “Zhuzy Kazakov: Proshloye, Nastoyasheye, budusheye,” in N. Zh. Shahanov, *Kul’tura Kochevnikov na Rubezhah Vekov*. Almaty: TDMK, 1995, pp. 34-6.

In Kyrgyzstan the fractions were on the north-south axis, where in Turkmenistan Teke-dominated tribal political structure was effective. The tribal/clan structure of the political/administrative apparatus in Tajikistan was more complex, rather resembling the situation in Uzbekistan. The more “Uzbek” *Leninabad-Hocend* clan started its reign by Babacan Gafurov’s (1946-56) appointment to the post of the first secretariat of the republican Communist Party. This process was continued with Tursunbey Ulcabayev (1956-61), Cabbar Resulov (1961-1982), Nabiyeu (1982-85), and Kahhar Mahkamov (1985-1991). All being representatives of the *Hocend* clan. The pre-independence Tajik nationalism was based on the reactions of the *Garm* and *Kulyab* clans to this *Hocend* clan’s domination over the political and administrative cadres.

The extensive appearance of political tribalism among the party elites in post-war Turkestan shows the existence of “sub-national” identities, which are strong enough to challenge the “national” identities as well as a common Turkestani identity. Indeed, it was quite on the same parallel with Stalin’s “amalgamation through particularization” theory. However, the “secret of the success” of the Soviet Nationalities policy rested in the Leninist principle of rapprochement and then total fusion of the Soviet peoples, which could only be achieved with the development of material wealth equally among all these peoples.<sup>337</sup>

#### **6.4 Eastern Turkestan: Where is Western Turkestan?**

According to the Chinese press in 1962 and 1963, Soviet agents organized the mass exodus of Uygurs to Soviet Central Asia, as a hostile act.<sup>338</sup> In fact, these Uygurs were

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<sup>337</sup> *Tashkentskaya Vysshaya Partiyaya Shkola. Respubliki Sredney Azii v Period razvitogo sotsializma* (Moscow: Mysl, 1980), p. 218.

<sup>338</sup>For further details of Uygur exodus to Kazak SSR in 1962 see A. Kaşın. “Doğu Türkistanda Sovyet Yayılması,” *Dergi*, No. 35/36 (1964), p. 39.

fleeing from the systematic massacres of the Chinese government, and Soviets took the advantage of the situation to accuse China of violations of basic human rights. So, starting from 1962 on, an increasing number of Uygurs found refuge in eastern parts of the Kazak SSR. Uygurs, active in Kazakstan, enjoyed the freedom of using the term Eastern Turkestan for their country, throughout this period.<sup>339</sup>

Beginning in the early 1970s, articles in the Soviet-sponsored Uygur newspapers in Alma-Ata began the extensive use of *Şarkiy Turkistan* [Eastern Turkestan] (*Şığıs Turkistan* in Kazak and *Vostochniy Turkestan* in Russian issues) instead of the Chinese name for the region *Sinkiang*. One can observe the persistent and repeated usage of the term and the concept of Eastern Turkestan in the pages of the Uygur periodical *Kommunizm Tughi*: “How can the Chinese invaders call Eastern Turkestan Sinkiang-the New Land, the New Territory?”<sup>340</sup> Alma-Ata of the 1970s was the center of the Soviet sponsored Uygur anti-Chinese publishing, broadcasting and organization activities under the banner of a “free Eastern Turkestan”. Kazak tolerance of the issue has been seen in several Kazak publications as well as Kazak interest in their kin in Eastern Turkestan.<sup>341</sup> Some even

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<sup>339</sup> See. A. Vakhidov, "Sharqiy Türkistan," *Kommunizm Tughi* (February 21-22 1979). An Uygur Newspaper published in Alma-Ata. Uygurs enjoyed this freedom from the first signs of Sino-Soviet struggle over the borders. Vakhidov in this article argued that, "Sharqiy Türkistan was the original historical name of the Sinjang Uygur autonomous region, where Kazakh, Kirgiz, Uzbek, Dungan and Eastern Turkestanis speak without translators." See also John Soper, "The first Uigur Studies Conference" RFE-RL reserach. RL 183/79 (June 15 1979). On Uygurology, Uygurshinasliq or Uygurology. People called simply as Uygurs however their country generally called as Eastern Turkestan, both in the soviet central asian literature and in western reports.

<sup>340</sup> See Ziya Samedi. "Maoçılar qabi sayaseti: Sahtilaşturulğan Avtonomiya," *Kommunizm Tughi* (19 March 1974). See also Z. Teyinov and I. Muklisov, "Şarkiy Turkistan Respublikası ve Maoizm," *Kommunizm Tughi* (14 November 1974). Ziya Samedi was the Director of Uygur National Liberation Committee in Exile and his comrade Zunnun Taipov, who was a former general of the Chinese Army, was the commander in Chief of the Army Free Turkestan, both deployed in Alma-Ata. According to an interview at *Der Spiegel* in (11 February 1974), "Eine Schwarze Wolke hangt über uns," p. 84, their aim was to free Eastern Turkestan and unite with Western Turkestan. For further information on the development of Soviet aid to Uygur nationalists from 1969 on, see also David Staats, "A New Victim of the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict?" *RL Research*, RL 289/74 (18 September 1974).

<sup>341</sup> See Ötegen Kumişbayev, "Qazaq Folklorı Türkiyada," *Qazaq Adebıyati* (16 August 1974). In this article the author also used the concept of Eastern Turkestan extensively.



argued that during the Brezhnev era, Soviet-Chinese tensions necessitated the loyalty of Turkestanis, which resulted in the appointment of Kunayev a politburo member, who decreased the influx of Slav migrants and tolerated Turkestan solidarity.<sup>342</sup>

Apart from all that, if there was an Eastern Turkestan, suffering at the hands of Chinese oppressors, then, where was Western Turkestan? The widespread employment of the term Eastern Turkestan, then, was an another aspect, which helped the survival of the concept of Turkestan during the post-war period.

### 6.5 Émigré Turkestanism

The post Second World War years witnessed an influx of Turkestani émigrés in Europe. The Turkestani émigrés in Europe no longer consisted of a few dozen of intellectuals, as it had been the case before the war. But there were at least a couple of thousand Turkestanis in Europe, mostly remnants of the Turkestan legions. The first thing they did after the Nuremberg trials was to launch publication activities to create public support for themselves in Europe.

The most important and influential Turkestani émigré journal was *Milliy* (then *Millî Türkistan*), which was published between 1952-1975 in Berlin and then in Düsseldorf (a total of 134 issues). Its language was “Turkestanish”<sup>343</sup> in Latin script. For more than thirty years, this journal remained the official organ of the “National Turkistianian Unity Committee for the Struggle of National Liberation of Turkistan”.<sup>344</sup> Its chief publisher and editor was Veli Kayyum Han for most of its life. In 1951, a group of Turkestani émigrés in

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<sup>342</sup> Allen Hetmanek. "National Renaissance in Soviet Kazakhstan: The Brezhnev era" pp. 295-305. In George W. Simmonds (ed.), *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the era of Brezhnev and Kosygin* (Detroit: The University of Detroit Press, 1977). Papers and porceedings of the symposium held at university of Detroit on October 3-4 1975. P. 303.

<sup>343</sup> That version is how the editors of the journal translated the word “Türkistança” into English.

<sup>344</sup> That is also the original editorial translation of the journal.

Europe under the leadership of Haris Kanatbay, an ethnic Kazak, who also had been at strife with the “Kayyum wing” during the war, separated themselves from the Committee and started to publish their own Journal, *Türkeli* in Munich between 1951-53. Its name was important because they preferred to use the name *Türkeli*, instead of Turkestan,<sup>345</sup> according to them, it was the Turkified form of the Persian term Turkestan. The Kanatbay wing was more pan-Turkist and less Turkestanist in this respect. Another important difference was the use of every different Turkestani dialect in the journal rather than sticking to one “Sart” version or a united “Turkestanish” language. This line was continued by the publication of *Büyük Türkeli* by Hasan Oraltay in İzmir in 1962 for only ten issues and then in 1974 in İstanbul for only two issues.<sup>346</sup> There were also several single issues of this journal published in different years during the 1980s.

### 6.5.1 Türkeli, Türkili, Türkistan and Uluğ Türkistan

Zeki Velidi published a pamphlet in 1960 about the history of the Turkestan concept and the Soviet-Russian affect on it. He was questioning the idea of using *Türkili* for the region, simply because of the misuse of the concept in different publications, such as *Türkeli*. For him, the conventional term Turkestan was much better to stick with, only if the form Greater Turkestan is also kept. He informed that:

Under the circumstances we have concluded that the sole use of Turkestan would mean Western Turkestan and Kazakstan, Eastern (Chinese) and Western Turkestans

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<sup>345</sup> However, the use of the concept of Turkestan continued extensively in *Türkeli*. The editors were not persistent on using the concept of *Türkeli* instead of Turkestan in the literary language at all. The use of *Türkeli* in the name of the journal was rather a demonstration of the political preference. See Uluktuk, “Yeni Sovet Takdirine Göre Türkistanda Mîli-Kurtuluş Hareketleri,” *Türkeli*, No.1 (1951), p. 27.

<sup>346</sup> For a detailed list and additional information on the Turkestani émigré literature, see Timur Kocaoğlu, “Türkistanlı Göçmenlerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri Tarihine bir Bakış,” in Rasim Ekşi and Erol Cihangir (eds.) *Dr. Baymirza Hayit Armağanı* (İstanbul: Turan Kültür Vakfı and Hoca Ahmed Yesevi Vakfı, 1998), pp. 159-170.

would be called *Uluğ* (Greater) Turkestan; For the separate use, Chinese Turkestan would be called Eastern Turkestan...<sup>347</sup>

By 1970, Zeki Velidî was also critical about the misuse of the term *Türkeli* by the Kanatbay group. According to him, *Türkeli* meant “Turkish Nation” whereas *Türkili* meant Turkestan, such as the newspapers used it in 1917 Khokand. Zeki Velidî from 1917 on, defended the use of *Türkili* for Turkestan. However, the Kanatbay group publishing *Turkeli* in Munich was using *Turkeli* for Western Turkestan and *Türkili* for Greater (*Uluğ*) Turkestan.<sup>348</sup> Zeki Velidî protested the conceptual misuses of these terms.

### 6.5.2 Decolonization of Turkestan

Following the Second World War and throughout the Cold War period, the Turkestani émigrés were trying to argue the problem of Turkestan to be the colonial question (starting from 1949 and onward).<sup>349</sup> The colonies of Great Britain and France in Africa and Asia were granted their freedom one after another in the period of 1945-1950. Turkestani émigrés believed that their diplomatic efforts could persuade the international public to include Turkestan into the decolonization drive. The anti-colonial move in the 1950s and 1960s provided an important hope on the side of émigrés who celebrated the independence of former western colonies and carried the hope that the UN would facilitate a similar drive for the Soviet colonies too.<sup>350</sup> However, these hopes, soon, proved to be shallow and wishful thinking. One can easily follow the difficult balance of peaceful diplomatic methods to explain the Turkestanist stand and the repeated battle-cries for the

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<sup>347</sup> Zeki Velidî Togan, *Türk-Türkistan* (İstanbul: Toprak dergisi Yayınları Nu: 6, 1960), pp. 38-9.

<sup>348</sup> Zeki Velidî Togan, *Türklüğün Mukadderatı Üzerine* (İstanbul: Kayı Yayınları, 1970), p. 144.

<sup>349</sup> See Jurci. “Mustamlakalar Mas’alası,” *Milliy Türkistan* (15 September 1949), no. 63, pp. 7-10.

<sup>350</sup> See Taşkentli, “Sovet-Rus Mustamlakaçılığı Keskin Qaralanmaqda,” and “Nigeriya va Türkistan,” *MT* (November-December 1962), no. 93A, pp. 31-35.

liberation of Turkestan in *Millî Türkistan*. On the academic front, Baymirza Hayit was producing voluminous academic literature on their version of “colonial thesis”<sup>351</sup>

Most probably as a result of their efforts, the decolonization of Turkestan issue was even voiced once in the UN General Assembly. Sir Patrick Dean, British spokesman at the UN, was arguing in the General Assembly that de-colonization of the Soviet Empire was necessary. He argued that, Britain and the Russian empires colonized the world at the same times, but Russia was refusing to grant their independencies.<sup>352</sup>

### 6.5.3 The Languages of Turkestan

The language of the *Milliy (Millî) Türkistan* was officially called “Turkestanish” (Türkistanca).<sup>353</sup> It was basically a Kipchak dialect of Uzbek. This was a direct continuation of Çokay’s language policy in *Yaş Türkistan*. And policy to handle different tribes of a single Turkestani nation was also the same as Çokay’s policy. In the issues of *Milliy Türkistan*, all individual peoples of Turkestan, that is, the Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazak, Kyrgyz and Tajik were referred to as *urugs* (tribes).<sup>354</sup> These “tribes” were the equal partners of Turkestani nationhood. However, it is interesting to see the inclusion of the Persian speaking Tajiks into the tribes of the Turkestani nation. This must have much to do with the existence of a considerable number of Tajik soldiers in the Turkestan legions and their survivors in Europe.

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<sup>351</sup> See Baymirza Hayit, *Soviet Russian Colonialism and Imperialism in Turkistan as an Example of the Soviet Type of Colonialism of an Islamic People in Asia* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1965).

<sup>352</sup> Lawrence O’Kane, “Colonies of Soviet Derided by Britain,” NYT (27 November 1962), pp.1-2. The author in this article uses the term as followingly; “...the conquest of the three Uzbek states of Turkestan was completed by 1876...” he did not include Kazak and Turkmen lands to this concept at all.

<sup>353</sup> See “Muraçaatnama (Türkistanca ve İngilizce),” *MT* (July-August 1950), no. 68, p. 3.

<sup>354</sup> See above issue, pp. 14-15. “Taçik urugimiznin musiqası...Türkmen urugimiznin halq calgu, Qazaq ve Qirgiz uruglarımıznin...”.

#### 6.5.4 Millî Türkistan and Veli Kayyum's Turkestanism

Turkestanî émigrés and their leader Veli Kayyum Han argued in the pages of *Milliy Türkistan* that their struggle continued on both sides of the front, before and during the war. According to Veli Kayyum Han, Turkestan was a well-defined and united country. Veli Kayyum Han delivered a speech at the Congress of Anti-Bolshevik Peoples on 12<sup>th</sup> of June 1950. In this speech, he explained that:

Turkestan, the country of Turks, is located between the Caspian Sea, Idel-Ural line and the northern Asian Kararakurum Desert and the Tarim Valley. In the south it neighbors Iran and Afghanistan, in the east it neighbors Tibet and Mongolia and in the north Siberia... Turkestanî national movement at the homeland ended with the executions of Akmal İkrâm, the leader of the National Independence (*Milliy İstıqlal*) fraction and Feyzullah Hocayev, the leader of the National Unity (*Milliy İttihad*) fractions... Our struggle for independence is not only for ourselves but it is a struggle for the whole Islamic world too...<sup>355</sup>

The basic political line of *Milliy Türkistan* was Turkestanism, and it carried out this task from the early times of the Second World War, through a huge campaign to train Turkestanî POWs of the Red Army who would instantly became the soldiers of the Turkestan Legions of the Waffen-SS. According to the memoirs of a soldier of these legions, the journal played an important role in their indoctrination during the war,

The journal *Milliy Türkistan* was an important weapon in our hands [during the war] strengthening the ideas of Turkestan, the independence of Turkestan and the unity of Turkestan. The journal was our coursebook, sourcebook, our national feeling, and our national ideal.<sup>356</sup>

Kayyum Han's National Turkistanian Unity Committee was organized all over the world quite well - among the Turkestanî émigrés, all over Europe, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,

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<sup>355</sup> Veli Kayyum-Han, "Türkistan," *MT* (October-November 1950), no. 69A, pp. 9-17.

<sup>356</sup> [Kamil Haşimođlu], Türkistan Millî ordusunun askeri, "Millî Türkistan 10 Yaşğa Toldı," *MT* (June-July 1952), no. 79A, pp. 6-9.

Pakistan, Afghanistan,<sup>357</sup> as well as in Turkey.<sup>358</sup> He monitored not only a wide range of political issues in these countries, but also most of the Soviet literature and the developments within Turkestan herself. For example, he was closely monitoring the Reşidov's remarks in the Soviet press; his attacks on Islam, on pan-Turkism and on Turkestanism were severely criticized by Veli Kayyum Han, in the pages of *Millî Türkistan*.<sup>359</sup> In most issues of the journal, Kayyum Han published long articles analyzing the anti-Turkestanist drive of the native apparatus in Turkestan.

As in all other émigré journals, the Turkestani émigré publications used every news item about local corruption, sabotages and the inadequate use of Russian language which appeared in the Soviet press as the evidences of the resistance of the Turkestanis to the Soviet-Russian rule.<sup>360</sup> According to Kayyum Han, there were two major movements in Turkestan during 1960s. The first one was the Russification drive by Moscow. This was also united with the Soviet efforts to separate Kazakstan from the rest of Turkestan, which was called "Middle Asia" in the Soviet press of the time.<sup>361</sup> The second one was the resistance of the native Turkestanis to this trend within the limits of the regime.<sup>362</sup> He

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<sup>357</sup> In fact these Turkestani refugees in Afghanistan and Pakistan were the ones best preserved their identities throughout the cold war era, for details see Audrey C. Shalinsky, *Long Years of Exile Central Asian refugees in Afghanistan and Pakistan* (NY: University Press of America, 1994).

<sup>358</sup> For the Turkestani émigré organizations all over the world and the activities of *Türkistan Millî Birlik Komitesi* among them see the special issue of *Millî Türkistan* (October-December 1953), no. 87A.

<sup>359</sup> For a detailed analysis of the Reşidov's new nationalities policy see V. Kajum-Han, "45 Yıl İçinde Türkistan," *MT* (September-October 1962), no. 92A, pp. 5-13.

<sup>360</sup> V. Kajum-Han, "45 Yıl İçinde Türkistan III," *MT* (January-February 1963), no. 94A, p. 3.

<sup>361</sup> To this separation émigrés never replied with an alternative approach. However the Institute for the Study of the Soviet Union and its journal *Dergi* developed an alternative approach by calling Soviet Middle Asia and Southern Turkestan and Kazakstan as Northern Turkestan. See Y. Mironenko, "Sovyet Türkistanının Demografik Yapısı," *Dergi*, No. 39/40 (1965), pp. 8-25.

<sup>362</sup> See the No. 41, 1965 issue of the *Dergi* for a comprehensive study of native's nationalisms in Soviet Turkestan in the post-war period. Edige Kırimal in this issue argues the unnecessary of employing any other terms than Turkestan to the region, and objects the use of Northern Southern terminology by Mironenko in the pervious issue. He also interprets the existence of the whole "otvet k falsifikatoram" literature in the Soviet press as a sign of existing Turkestani nationalism and the need to provide replies by the official authorities. See Edige Mustafa Kırimal, "Sovyet Türkistanında Milliyetçilik," *Dergi*, No. 41 (1965), pp. 3-21. By then the name Turkestan was employed, administratively, only for the Turkestan (Yesi) town in Southern

mentioned the Kyrgyz Çingiz Aytmatov, the Kazak Olcas Süleymanov and the Turkmen Inayet Kılıçev as the representatives of the Turkestanist movement in the homeland.<sup>363</sup> Apparently, the quasi-nationalistic, *Mirasist* literature of the time was enough to provide some extra hope to the émigrés, who had lost almost all contacts with their homeland and were only able to follow the developments through the Soviet press reaching the West.

In order to clarify his and the Committee's Turkestanist position in comparison to the Reşidov regime in Uzbekistan, Veli Kayyum Han published an open letter addressed to Reşidov in 1963. There, Veli Kayyum Han wrote:

The difference between you and us is basically that we are in defense of our people and working to liberate an indivisible Turkestan from Russian and Chinese oppressors, to give our people fortune and happiness and free them from the chains of prisonership. You? You are helping the ones who are oppressing our people. Our army [legion] came as close as Astrakhan to free our homeland during the war, following the path of our great ruler, Timur.<sup>364</sup>

Meanwhile, the Soviet press organized campaigns against the Turkestanists and Kayyum Han underlying their loyalty to the German fascism and accusing them being the spies and servants of the US intelligence.<sup>365</sup> Even during the wartime, there was hearsay about the involvement of Kayyum Han in the alleged poisoning of Çokay in 1941. At that time no one dared to question authority of Kayyum Han. Probably with some Soviet help,

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Kazakistan and for the Turkestan Military Okrug, centered in Tashkent. Soviet retention of the name Turkestan for the military district in central Asia might be for the reason for the its tsarist military past rather than a concession to local nationalism. It was first created in 1867 by the Tsarist conquering campaign and then it carried out all the conquest and the rule of the region until 1917 revolution. However it did not cover steppes. It was in 1918 Soviet power collapsed in Turkestan and until 1926 Soviet army was connected with the Turkestanfront or Turkfront. In June 1926 Turkfront is renamed as Central Asian Military district. At the end of WWII, it was re-named as the Turkestan Military District, given the Russian-nationalist storm of the time, it was rather a concession to Russians in the army. In fact in 1946 steppe military district too was absorbed into Turkestan military district. However in 1969, Kazakistan was removed from it and established an independent Central Asian military district. Geographicaly, its use for the Turkestan ranges in Kyrgyz SSR continued.

<sup>363</sup> V. Kajum-Han, "45 Yil İçında Türkistan IV," *MT* (March-April 1963), no. 95A, pp. 3-15.

<sup>364</sup> V. Kajum-Han, "Şaraf Raşidoviç Raşidovga Açığ Mektüb," *MT* (November-December 1963), no. 99A, p.4.

<sup>365</sup> See pp. 21-22 for a detailed list of Soviet Publications on Veli Kajum-Han and the Committee in the above issue of *MT*.

these allegations became one of the main tools of anti-Kayyum Han propaganda among the émigrés throughout the post-War period.<sup>366</sup> In 1964, Uzbek artists performed a play called “Qanlı Serab” in several places in Uzbekistan as well as in Moscow. The play depicted the alleged bloody plans of Veli Kayyum Han and pan-Turkist fascists who tried to overtake Central Asia and massacre of all progressive cadres there.

Although most of the issues of the émigré journals as well as *Millî Türkistan* were filled with unproven information about insurrections, there were also long theoretical articles about the status of Turkestan as a Russian colony, including the different definitions of the concept colony.<sup>367</sup> The employment of concepts like Central Asia, Middle Asia and Kazakstan were the tools of Russian-Soviet colonial policy, which aimed to destroy, not only the nation or the country, but also the very name of the country.

Türkistan means Turk[ic] country or Turk[ic] homeland. This is not a newly invented name. It has thousands of years history. In the last decades, it is not used properly in the literary and political works and a new tradition of using the word Central Asia took place... It is wrong to employ the geographical concept of Central Asia to the place of the national and historical concept of Turkestan. It is equally wrong to name only a part of Turkestan as Turkestan itself... Since the Chinese has changed the name of Eastern Turkestan to Sinkiang, only Western Turkestan has been known as Turkestan... It is necessary to employ the concepts of Eastern and Western Turkestan properly. Just like how we call Eastern and Western Germany, North and South Korea, etc.<sup>368</sup>

As the leading representative of Turkestanism in Turkey, Zeki Velidî protested dispersed nature of the émigré organizations in Europe and the tensions between Kayyum and Kanatbay wings.

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<sup>366</sup> See Ali Kantemir, “Mustafa Bey Çokay Hakkındaki Hatıratım,” *MT* (November-December 1963), no. 99A, pp. 23-26. Here Kantemir published the original death certificate of Çokay issued by Auguste-Viktoria City Hospital. Apparently Kajum-Han was trying to persuade Turkestanis accusing him with the murder of Çokay. In this article Kantemir wrote unusually positive sentences about Kajum-Han too.

<sup>367</sup> V. Kajum-Han, “Müstemelekeçilikni Yanglış Tüşüngenler ve Türkistan Meselesi,” *MT* (January-February 1965), no. 106A, pp. 3- 11.

<sup>368</sup> Çobankır, “Türkistan İsmi,” *MT* (April-July 1968), no. 124A, pp. 29-31.



Turkestanis in Europe are publishing two journals now. One is *Millî Türkistan* in Uzbek language, the other is *Türkeli* in Kazak, Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen languages. Both groups established Committees to Liberate Turkestan and working separately. These unpleasant struggles between them, especially throughout their publications in English and Russian are causing a perception in the eyes of the peoples reading these publications as Turkestanis are a simple people in lack of unity.<sup>369</sup>

### 6.5.5 Fall of a Movement: Turkestanism Monopolized

According to Zeki Velidî, some Uzbeks tried to monopolize the use of the term Turkestan and that was why Abdullah Recep Baysun, in his book *Türkistan Millî Hareketleri*, published a map excluding northern and western Kazakstan from the Turkestan region. On the other hand, some Kazan Tatars also tried to expand the borders of *Idel-Ural* concept such as Ayaz İshaki, who in his book *Idel-Ural*, published in Berlin in Russian and French languages, included Bashkiria and Western Kazakstan to this concept.<sup>370</sup>

There was also another debate happening on the Voice of America radio during the 1960s. Some were arguing the use of Uzbek language and calling it Turkestanish (*Türkistanca*); the others were arguing to classify all Turkic languages in two groups as Tatar and Turkestanish. *Türkeli* group, on the other hand, was arguing that each and every separate dialect of Turkestan be used, but called “Turkestan languages” as a whole.<sup>371</sup> That was probably the most favored solution for Zeki Velidî, whose personal sympathy to Kanatbay was much higher than his sympathy for Kayyum, whom, he declared to be an Uzbek nationalist earlier.

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<sup>369</sup> Zeki Velidî Togan, *Türklüğün Mukadderatı Üzerine* (İstanbul: Kayı Yayınları, 1970), p. 142.

<sup>370</sup> Zeki Velidî Togan, *Türklüğün Mukadderatı Üzerine* (İstanbul: Kayı Yayınları, 1970), p. 143.

<sup>371</sup> Zeki Velidî Togan, *Türklüğün Mukadderatı Üzerine* (İstanbul: Kayı Yayınları, 1970), p. 147.

By the end of 1970s, the former *Waffen-SS-Millî Türkistan* cadres, as well as Kanatbay's *Türkeli* wing disappeared from the scene. Even the US sponsored "*Dergi*" and the Institute for the Study of the Soviet Union was no more active. Most of the émigré leaders, tired of decades of struggle, were scattered all over the world waiting for the unforeseeable collapse of the mighty Soviet Empire. However the 1970s witnessed another important development for the émigrés, the rise and popularity of the *Azatlık Radyosu* (Radio Liberty). It was not an émigré organization and the relatively "politically correct" stand of the Radio was followed by a rather Soviet pattern in classifying the peoples of the Soviet Turkestan. The establishment of separate departments for each "people" of Turkestan was an important blow to the unitarist stand of the previous Turkestanist émigrés. Additionally, most of the people employed in these departments were not émigré leaders and/or politically active cadres organized under any leading organization. Employees were young career oriented professionals, and in the most favorable cases the descendants of the émigrés. In any case, from the mid-1970s on, a united Turkestanist stand started to disappear in the émigré circles. There was basically a lack of the young cadres to continue the *Cedid - Alaş Orda - Turkestan (Khokand) Autonomy - Yeni Türkistan - Yaş Türkistan - Waffen SS - Millî Türkistan - Dergi* line.

Only thanks to the persistent efforts of Baymirza Hayit, the great scholar of the history of Turkestan, and probably the last great activist of Turkestanism and the only political successor of Kayyum Han, the idea of Turkestanism and the concept of Turkestan survived the heavy Soviet anti-propaganda of the 1970s and 1980s. By the early 1980s, the words Turkestanism and Turkestan, by no means acceptable to the "politically correct" terminology, started to be identified with only a part of the Uzbek emigration in Europe and Turkey.

## 6.6 The Road to Independence: Turkestan in the 1980s

By the beginning of the 1980s, Turkestan was one of the most stable regions in the Soviet Union. Except for the public disorders in 1969 and 1979 in Tashkent and Alma-Ata, the whole region was under the strict rule of the “Brezhnev” gang.<sup>372</sup> At the beginning of the decade, the first shock in Turkestan was the assassination of the Kyrgyz Premier Sultan Ibragimov by an unidentified person in a sanatorium.<sup>373</sup> The rumor had it that certain “Muslim nationalists” or “fundamentalists” were responsible for the murder.<sup>374</sup> By then, the first impacts of the Afghan War on the region began to be observed. Especially in both sides of the Valley region, in Ferghana and Osh, where mullahs were attending public religious ceremonies with the official figures openly. Civil servants would complain to the Western observers about the working hours which were not designed to fit the prayer times; and explain Ibragimov’s assassination as a result of a “private feud”, closely related with the corruption within the state.<sup>375</sup> However, it was soon discovered that the Premier was killed by an ethnic German, who attempted to leave the country, but stopped by the Kyrgyz authorities.<sup>376</sup>

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<sup>372</sup> L. Alexeeva and V. Chalidze, *Mass rioting in the USSR*. (Silver Spring: Foundation for Soviet Studies, 1985). There were Kazak demonstrations in June 1979 against the idea of granting Soviet Germans an autonomous territory, Kazaks gathered in Tselinograd (Akmola, contemporary Astana) to protest the project and shouted slogans of "Kazakstan is one and indivisible" (*Vesti iz SSSR*, 1979, 18/19 no. 4 cited).

<sup>373</sup> Sultanov was killed in 4 December 1980 while sleeping in a sanatorium. “Probably murdered by Muslim nationalists; Down in Kirgizia Something Stirs,” *The Economist* (17 January 1981).

<sup>374</sup> David Satter, "Moscow Shows Concern Over Order in Kirgizia," *The Financial Times* (8 January 1981), p. 3.

<sup>375</sup> Mark Wood, "Soviet Muslims Puzzled by Events in Afghanistan," *Reuters* (13 July 1983). People attending mosques in launch hours and complaining that they cannot (civil servants) come for the ikindi (afternoon). Kyrgyz premier Sultan Ibragimov in 1980 was assassinated "as a result of a private feud" but it was corruption.

<sup>376</sup> David Martin, "Riddle of a Primiers's Death," *The Far Eastern Economic Review* (13 February 1981). Kyrgyz Premier Sultan Ibrahimov killed by an ethnic German who had been frustrated in his attempt to leave the country.

### 6.6.1 The Politics of Literary “Turkestanism”

The famous novel by Uzbek author Mamadali Mahmudov, *Olmes Kayalar* was published in *Sharq Yulduzi* in 1981. The novel had a strong nationalist and anti-Russian tone. The Russian “conquest” of Turkestan was no more than a colonial empire’s invasion and exploitation of the region, Mahmudov publicly announced, as early as 1981. During the same year, alarm bells were ringing in both the Soviet and Western press about the unusually high birth rates of Turkestan Muslims. Western predictions that by the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Soviet Union would have a Muslim majority were answered by the Soviet press with the usual “*otvet k falsifikatoram*” literature.<sup>377</sup> But this term was not a new invention of the 1980s Soviet authors, short in imaginative power. It was inserted into the literature in the 1950s. From 1956 on, a new phrase “falsifiers of the history of the Soviet Middle Asia and Kazakstan” entered into the Soviet academic literature and press.<sup>378</sup> Western scholarship was arguing that Soviet homo Islamicus was not basically an adversary to the regime, not even a critique of the regime but a silent but sure existence of a separate part of the Soviet society or even some part other than all other Soviets.<sup>379</sup>

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<sup>377</sup> Anastasia Gelischanova, "Demographic Policy, a Touchy Subject in the USSR," *RFE-RL Research RL* 316/81 (August 13 1981). See also V. Kiyutin "Fal'sifikatory ot Demografii," *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya* (July 9, 1981). Answers the anti-soviet conclusions of the western publications on the issue of population growth among the Muslims of Turkestan.

<sup>378</sup> For a comprehensive analysis of this literature see Baymirza Hayit, *Some Problems of Modern Turkistan History: An Analysis of Soviet attacks on the alleged Falsifiers of the History of Turkistan*. Düsseldorf: East European Research Institute, 1963. Some of the famous pieces of this literature were: *Protiv Falsifikatorov istorii Sovetskogo Kazakstana*, Alma-Ata, 1961, *Falsifikatory istorii narodov Sredney Azii*, Tashknet, 1960, *Falsifikatory pobedy sovetskoy vlasti v Turkestane*, Tashkent, 1962, *Protiv burzhuznykh falsifikatorov istorii sredney azii i Kazakstana*, Ashkabad, 1962, Khamid Inoyatov, *Otvet falsifikatoram istorii sovetskoy Sredney Azii i Kazakstana*, Taşkent, 1967, etc.

<sup>379</sup> H el ene Carr ere s'Encausse, *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt*. Trans. By Martin Sokolinsky and Hary A. La Farge (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979), p. 263. Although many "otvet"s were published in the Soviet press to this book. One was claiming that all the freedoms and self-imposing national rights of the people of the soviet central asia was because of the existence of true democracy in the Soviet Union and claiming that this was far from crating a danger to the Soviet system, on the contrary it was its strength. See Albert Pin, "Otvvet," *Novoe Vremya* (22.2.1980). p. 31. "razgovor s chitatelem".

Çingis Aytmatov's numerous short stories and articles about the history and then the current state of Issyk Kul was putting the lake in the very center of Kyrgyz nationalism. Aytmatov, along with Olcas Süleymanov, pioneered environmental nationalism in Turkestan.<sup>380</sup> Glorification of the non-Russian past of Turkestan started with the Tolegen Kasimbekov's famous historical novel, *Singan Kılıç* in 1966, glorifying the free and happy life of the Kyrgyz under the Khokand Khanate.<sup>381</sup> This trend grew faster in the first half of 1980s, with the encouragement of Çingis Aytmatov and some other Kyrgyz literary figures. However, it was clear that the Kyrgyz Communist Party was not happy about that and kept its critical position about the glorification of the past and nationalistic tendencies.

Brezhnev paid one of his last visits in his life to Tashkent in March 1982, when he awarded the Uzbek SSR with the Order of Lenin.<sup>382</sup> Reşidov's Uzbekistan was one of his closest allies within the Soviet system and his personal links with Central Asia, and especially his affinity with the leaderships of the Kazak and Uzbek CPs, who were actually his appointees, were well known.<sup>383</sup> He was quite well informed and aware of the rise of nationalist tendencies through the glorification of the Turkestani past. He warned his Uzbek comrades by saying that "there are not a few glorious pages in the many-centuries history of the Uzbek people but the golden time of their development is not in the past, comrades, but in the present and future". Another issue that he touched during his speeches and visit

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<sup>380</sup> Anastasia Gelischanova "Is Issyk-Kul any Nearer Salvation?" *RFE-RL Research RL* 215/83 (31 May 1983). Chingiz Aytmatov's complains about (for) Issyk Kul was the center of Kyrgyz nationalism.

<sup>381</sup> Ann Sheehy, "Usubaliev Scores Kirghiz Historians and Cultural Figures for Nationalistic Errors" *RFE-RL Research, RL* 216/83, 1 June 1983. Criticized local historians and cultural figures for continuing to hold erroneous views of a nationalistic nature about the history of the Kirghiz people. *Sovetskaya Kirgizia* (20 May 1983) Criticized the Novel *Singan Kılıç* (broken sword) of the author Tolegen Kasimbekov, published in 1966, v. 1. and 1971 v. 2. in Kyrgyz.

<sup>382</sup> Bess Brown, "Brezhnev Mixes Praise and Criticism of Uzbekistan in Tashkent Speech," *RFE-RL Research RL* 140/82 (March 25, 1982). He was a bit critical, he presented to Uzbekistan the order of Lenin on March 24. Urged then to send labor surplus to the other areas of the Soviet Union.

<sup>383</sup> TASS, "Beseda Tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva v TsK Kompartii Uzbekistana," *Izvestia*, 26 March 1982, p. 3. Very few criticisms but much appraisal to Uzbek SSR

to Uzbekistan was the transfer of the excessive labor surplus of the Republic, especially in the Valley region, to the other regions of the USSR. That might be taken as a sign of Moscow's seriousness in handling the Turkestanti population growth rates. During the Brezhnev era, the psychology of the natives were: Islamic, traditionalist, conformist, anti-Russian nationalist, pan-Islamic and with a desire for fair treatment.<sup>384</sup>

### 6.6.2 Corruption and Native Cadres

Western observers noticed the fact that Turkestanti officials and politicians now constituted a clear majority in the power structures of the Central Asian Soviet Republics. Their shares in the council of ministers and bureaucracy were exceeding their shares in the populations of the republics. This was true even in the Kazak SSR, where Kazaks did not have an ethnic majority at all.<sup>385</sup> The present author has personally observed several former employees of the Central Asian Communist Parties, who stated that the only positive product of the long-lasting Brezhnev period was a real nativization (*korenizatsiya*) which was achieved through the employment of local-native cadres in the party structures.

The corruption charges against the CP officials in Turkestanti were quite common from the second half of the 1970s on. Brezhnev's death in 1982 marked a new era in Turkestanti. The "Brezhnev Gang" was no longer feeling secure, and Moscow-based CP investigators started to appear in the capitals of Soviet Central Asia one after another. This was the beginning of the famous "Cotton Affair" which continued until the very end of the 1980s. The scandal was publicized at the highest level at the CPSU congress in Moscow in

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<sup>384</sup> M. Vol'Per. "Nekotorye Aspekty Psikhologii narodov Turkestana" April, 1973 (A machine copy of 9 pages long report in *RL Research* papers Middle Asia archive. P. 2-7.

<sup>385</sup> Bess Brown, "The National Composition of the Governments of the Central Asian Republics" (August 4, 1982), *RLR-RL* 313/22. From 1980 on, shares of Muslims in the council of ministers were advantageous and clearly much more than their shares in the republic's population in CA states. See the tables in 2 and 3 except Tajikistan.

February 1986, where Gorbachev singled out Uzbekistan for sharp criticism on the corruption issue. He announced that, between 1978-83, the Soviet state had paid more than one billion rubles for cotton that had never been produced. Immediately a purge in the Uzbek Communist Party started and tens of thousands of party members were expelled, including three thousand police officers being fired from their jobs. Uzbeks, on the other hand, accused the “ethnic-Russian troika” in Tashkent for all the purges and corruptions.<sup>386</sup>

The early 1980s also marked an interesting circulation of a unique piece of underground *samizdat* literature in Turkestan. It started first in Uzbekistan, in the form of the multiplication of magnetic tapes of *Holy Kur'an*, stories of prophets and the saints, legends (*dastans*), and even voice-recordings (“letters”) from the relatives abroad.<sup>387</sup> Similar materials seen in Turkmenistan and Kazakstan in the mid-1970s; however, the Uzbek experience, apparently, was much organized and well done.

Reşidov, just before his death, continued his so-called “Russian for everyone” campaign, urging Uzbek youth to learn Russian at least before they serve in the military.<sup>388</sup> Following his death, in 1983, Usmanhocayev succeeded Reşidov. Usmanhocayev was a representative of Andropov’s cadres who were determined to end the “Brezhnevite Gang”’s domination over the cadres in Central Asia. He put his main stance on the issue of Central Asian unity, Turkism and Turkestanism in one of his early speeches follows;

Towards the end of his long speech, however Usmankhojaev, blamed the bourgeois falsifiers who show that the national delimitation of Central Asia was actually the

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<sup>386</sup>For a comprehensive account of the corruption and the “Cotton Affair” see, James Critchlow, "Further Repercussions of the Uzbek Affair", *RFE-RL Report on the USSR* (May 4 1990), pp. 20-22. (See also, RL 202/90, April 1990)

<sup>387</sup> Bess Brown, "Profitable Unofficial Religious Publishing Operation uncovered in Tashkent," *RFE-RL Research RL 420/82* (20 October 1982). Such materials were usually in the form of multiplication of Islamic texts as well as magnetic tapes.

<sup>388</sup> Bess Brown, "Measures to Integrate Central Asians into the Soviet Armed Forces Discussed in Uzbekistan," *RFE-RL Research RL 93/83* 23 February 1983. Russian language skills prior to introduction takes on an ever greater urgency, said Reşidov, urged youth to attend officer training institutes.

destruction of Turkestan and the united fatherland of the Turkic peoples. Usmankhojaev claimed that new socialist nations of Central Asia were formed by rejecting the lies such as a single Turkestan and a single Turkic nation as advocated by bourgeois ideologists.<sup>389</sup>

Usmanhocayev's strong emphasis on the "bourgeois falsifiers" claims of one united Turkic homeland, Turkestan, came during an interesting time when the Premiers and First Secretaries of other Central Asian Soviet Republics, at the very same meeting, made strong references to the common history and brotherhood among the peoples of the region. One of them was the young Kazak Premier Nazarbayev, who declared Uzbeks the blood brothers of the Kazaks.<sup>390</sup>

### 6.6.3 Gorbachev in Power

The first official full-text publication of the Kyrgyz epic *Manas* in 1984 was considered as the victory of nationalist literary figures over the party bureaucracy.<sup>391</sup> The Kyrgyz party chief T. Usubaliyev was by no means an associate of Gorbachev and was highly critical of the local KGB, which he thought was too harsh on the party workers in

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<sup>389</sup> T. Kocaoğlu, "The Ethnic Ties of Central Asians Brought Out at a Soviet Anniversary: Both Anniversary of Uzbek SSR and the Communist Party," 27 December 1987, *RLS-PS Research*, F 586-591. At the anniversary of the both Uzbek SSR and CP of UzSSR. "Usmankhojaev, the first secretary of the Uzbekistan CP CC, focused on the question of the national delimitation of Central Asia among other topics in his speech. Mentioning establishment of Turkestan ASSR within RSFSR in 1918, as a step, and Bukharan and Khivan Soviet Peoples' Republics, another step. And October 27 1924 historical resolution on national delimitation for the establishment of republics, failed to mention national governments of Alaş Orda and Khokand in 1917." (Quoted from *Sovet Ozbekistani* (9 December 1984), p. 5. And *Pravda Vostoka* (9 December 1984), p. 4.

<sup>390</sup> *Sovet Ozbekistani* (9 December 1984), p. 5. And *Pravda Vostoka* (9 December 1984), p. 4. Kazak Premier Nazarbayev said: "we know well that Kazak and Uzbek peoples are blood brothers with each others from ancient times." (Kocaoğlu) in Uzbek version, in Russian version: "it is root of the brotherhood of our peoples go back to distant centuries." Tajik and Turkmen leaders draw attention to the historical/cultural and ethnic ties between Central Asians.

<sup>391</sup> E. Tenişev, "Iz reki po imeni Manas," *Sovetskaya Kirgizia* (28 June 1985), p. 9. Heroic epic was published first as a great national victory, first volume, was celebrated by Nauka in 1984.



the charges of corruption.<sup>392</sup> Usubaliyev was a minor member of the “Brezhnev Gang” in Turkestan, being the party boss in the Kyrgyz SSR from 1961 on, was relieved from his post in November 1985 and replaced by Absamat Masaliyev, in accordance with the Gorbachev’s plan to dismiss all remnants of *Brezhnevite* cadres in Turkestan.<sup>393</sup> Gorbachev simply tried to reverse the Brezhnevite policy of nativization of Central Asian cadres, “the expansion of local autonomy for native elites in the national territories” as well as growing non-Russian participation to the center’s politics.<sup>394</sup>

The problems concerning the Central Asians serving in the Soviet army continued in the course of the 1980s. Apart from the language problems, they were increasingly becoming the targets of Russian chauvinism in the army, were humiliated and mostly employed in the construction battalions.<sup>395</sup>

However, the knowledge and instruction of the Russian language was indeed very poor in Central Asia, especially in the Valley region.<sup>396</sup> Gorbachev openly accused local authorities in Turkestan of being tools of localism, which stopped the integration process of the Union.<sup>397</sup>

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<sup>392</sup> Bess Brown, "Party Chief of Kirgizia Acknowledges Problems in the Republic," *RFE-RL Research RL* 238/85 (2 July 1985). Usubaliyev criticized local KGB being harsh on KP members. Critical of general *glasnost - perestroika* but sympathized to Gorbachev.

<sup>393</sup> Turdakun Usubaliyev, in 2 November 1985 announced that he had been relieved of his post of the first secretary of the TsK of KP Kirgizia, replaced by Absamat Masaliyev. Usubaliyev was a Brezhnevite figure from May 1961 on. .

<sup>394</sup> Steven L. Burg, “Nationality Elites and Political Change in the Soviet Union,” in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Baissinger, pp. 24-42.

<sup>395</sup> Albert Weeks, "Russian Officers, Ethnic Soldiers Sharply Split in Soviet Military," *FPI News Service* (25 February 1985). Lack of language skills of non-Russians went along with, racism in the Russian army ranks and a certain distrust towards Central Asians.

<sup>396</sup> G. Ivanov, "Primen' synok, shinel," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (13 February 1986), p. 4. And 14 February 1986, p. 4. Youth in Namangan oblast do not speak Russian well as a source of problem in soviet army. Detailed report about the preparation of the youth in Namangan for the military service.

<sup>397</sup> An Sheehy, "Gorbachev's Speech to the 27<sup>th</sup> Party Congress: Nationality Relations," *RFE-RL Reserach, RL* 99/86 (26 February 1986). In the 27<sup>th</sup> party congress of the CPSU, Gorbachev criticized *mestnichestvo* (localism) underlined the importance of nationalities relations as a sign of rising nationalism.

Whereas nationalism is an ideological movement, localism refers to administrative action aimed at promoting the interests of one's own administrative unit, regardless of its composition. Localism is an inherent feature of any bureaucracy, since all bureaucrats prefer more resources to carry out their programs. But nationalism intersects with localism when the interests of an administrative unit come to be identified with the interests of a particular national group resides in it.<sup>398</sup>

Usmanhocayev adapted himself to Gorbachev's ideas quickly, especially on the issue of the nationalities policy of the union. He became the strongest critic of the period of 1960-1980 during which the so-called *Rashidovshchina* was alleged to have been quite tolerant on local nationalism movements. Suddenly, Timur, Babur, Navai, and the Soviet-imposed historical heroes of the Uzbek history became the "cults of nationalists". The Uzbek Party, according to him, had worked to polarize and disintegrate the Soviet society for the last two decades, rather than working to integrate and amalgamate.<sup>399</sup> It was also the peak of the Afghan War and the *Mujahedeen* were progressing, causing very heavy casualties on the Soviet forces. One of the main impacts of the Afghan war on Turkestan was the resurrection of religious and nationalist tendencies among the natives, which were criticized by the center.<sup>400</sup> The on-going war on the south of the border was undermined by

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<sup>398</sup> Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Baissinger (eds), *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 310.

<sup>399</sup> Ann Sheehy, "Nationalistic Tendencies in Recent Uzbek Historiography and Historical Fiction Under Attack," *RFE-RL Research RL* 11/87 (December 23, 1986). Reşidov rule was criticized, being tolerant on nationalism. Usmanhocayev criticized for the idealization of past during the past two decades. National pride etc. *Pravda Vostoka* (5 October 1986) idealization of Timur, Babur. See also Mavlān Vakhobov in *Pravda Vostoka* (December 4 1986,) criticized 1960s literature Declaring all the poets of the feudal period as the classics of Uzbek literature "Golden age" of Timur is a pan-Turkist label of 1920s, he says. Olmas Qayalar (Eternal Rocks)of Mamadali Mahmudov was about Uzbekistan at the time of Russian conquest, strong nationalistic and anti-Russian overtone. (published by *Sharq Yulduzi*, 1981) urges that Uzbeks are becoming too nationalist.

<sup>400</sup> "Internatsionalizm-nashe znamiya: vsesoyuznaya nauchnaya konferentsiya v Tashkente" *Pravda Vostoka*, 4 April 1986, p. 1 and 3. Unity of the soviet peoples stands on Russian language. Bourgeois propaganda speculating on Islamic factor, tried to resurrect nationalist tendencies.

the center and Gorbachev's campaign to replace Brezhnevite cadres faced with the first important blow in Kazakhstan in December 1986.<sup>401</sup>

#### 6.6.4 December (Jeltoksan) 1986

Dinmammed Kunayev, "a patriot of Kazakhstan,"<sup>402</sup> was the last but the strongest Brezhnevite leader remained in power by the end of 1986 in Turkestan. When Moscow replaced him with the ethnic Chuvash Gennady Kolbin,<sup>403</sup> in December (*Jeltoksan*) 1986, streets of Alma-Ata were taken by students and workers protesting their leader's dismissal. In the literature of the independent Kazakhstan, this "protests were to be written as the first "independence-oriented popular uprising" in Central Asia. One of the main reasons of his replacement was his nationalistic tendency, which was creating circles of Kazak nationalists, protected by the Party.<sup>404</sup> Later, he was also accused of tribalism and

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<sup>401</sup> See *The NYT*, December 20 1986, *The Sunday Times*, December 21 1986 and *Le Monde & The Guardian*, December 22 1986 said that: demonstrations in Alma-Ata were more than 10 thousand broke into the local CP headquarters, two prisons and inmates were freed.

<sup>402</sup> The best reports explaining his Kazak patriot stand are written by a former employee of the Kazak radio, Pyotr Perejinsky, born in 1918 in Kiev and fled the USSR in 1982. He worked in the Kazak radio from 1959 until 1982. See Pyotr Perejinsky. "Observations on Affirmative Action in Kazakhstan," *RFE-RL* archive BGR #4-82, August 1982. "Kunayev favored Kazaks in cadre policy, entrance into educational institutions, in graduation, science, arts, industry, media, trade, housing, travel, etc. Kazaks were all favored during 1970s and early 1980s." He quotes an anonymous "famous" Kazak comrade as telling him as such; "Many Kazaks still feel that Russian domination is a temporary thing, and that the time will come when we will chase them back over Volga." In another quotation from a "famous" Kazak film producer an interesting explanation of the Soviet Kazaks appear; "There are two layers of a Kazak, the top layer represents the opportunity to make a good career which is there for taking, provided you are a Kazak and party member. The second layer is hatred for the Russians who have seized and defiled our territory. I think that this layer is the one closest to the Kazak's true feelings. On one day, he thinks, we will get it all back..."

<sup>403</sup> In most sources he was labeled as ethnic-Russian. However for the Kazak protesters his ethnic affiliation did not matter at all. He was firstly a non-Kazak and secondly non-Turkestanian. Moreover, Kunayev succeeded in establishing a quite effective clan network around himself, which would even rebel in the case of a challenge to the Kunayev clan by even another Kazak clan.

<sup>404</sup> G. Kolbin, "Bol'she printsipial'nosti," *Pravda* (9 March 1987), p. 1 and 3. Kolbin, in this article attacks Dusetay Bekecanov who was Kunayev's personal aide for cadres' policy. According to Kolbin, Bekecanov established a broad nationalistic circle consisted of writers, artists, intellectuals not only to share the corrupt money of the regime but also destroying Soviet power in Kazakhstan.

establishing traditional clan networks among the Kazaks.<sup>405</sup> After all, Kunayev was the one who achieved the “Kazakization of Kazakstan at the cost of the declining economy of the republic”.<sup>406</sup>

*Jeltoksan* was a serious blow to Gorbachev’s Central Asian policy and in two years ended up with the replacement of Kolbin by another member of the Kazak *Ulu Cüz*, Nursultan Nazarbayev. It was interesting to observe that, Kunayev’s premier and then the first aide, Nazarbayev was the only party apparatchik who did not surrender to Kolbin’s anti-nationalism campaign.<sup>407</sup> The Soviet Kazak and Russian press were alarmed over the rise of nationalism in Turkestan after the *Jeltoksan* events. The tone even turned at some points to heavy criticism of the Russification and Sovietization of Turkestan, which was not in line with Lenin’s nationalities policy.<sup>408</sup> Southern Kazakstan Oblast and Chimkent were the center of Kazak nationalism and had relatively free press and nationalist organizations.<sup>409</sup> The Soviet press took the issue to the agenda and accused the party workers in this region of corruption and mismanagement as well as being too ignorant about the flow of nationalist literature in the region. In 1987, the newly published History of the Kazak SSR in Kazak idealized the traditional Kazak *Cüzs*. Moscow feared that this might lead to patriotism and nationalism. One of the main figures of this increasing Kazak nationalism was the Chimkent party boss, A. Askarov. It was alleged that under the

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<sup>405</sup> This accusation was directly made by G.Kolbin in a later interview, see A.Ladin, “Ot razobshechennosti-k ob’edineniyu usiliy,” *Pravda* (1 April 1989), p. 1 and 2.

<sup>406</sup> Bess Brown, “The Fall of Kunayev,” *RFE-RL*, RL 7/87 (2 January 1987).

<sup>407</sup> However he defended himself after Kunayev with such words; “Kunayev questioned my Kazak nationalism when I presented evidences of corruption in the party ranks...” “Soviet Kazakh Prime Minister Says He Received Death Threats,” *Reuters* (29 August 1987).

<sup>408</sup> “Druzhiba narodov SSSR-sila i krepost' nashego sotsialisticheshogo gosudarstva” *Pravda Vostoka*, 10 February 1987, p. 2. Russification and Sovietization of Middle Asian republics was under heavy fire. Soviet nationalities policy was a chance after colonial imperialistic policy.

<sup>409</sup> “Ne suzhat' ramki temy” *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (2 September 1987), p. 3. On the nationalism in the newspapers of Chimkent oblast, Chimkent being the center of Kazak nationalism.

leadership of Askarov, this “bourgeois nationalism” was spreading all over Kazakstan. Askarov and his circle was best organized in a small town called Turkestan in Chimkent Oblast, which was the historical-spiritual center of Turkestan, where the highly revered medieval religious mentor Hoca Ahmed Yesevi’s mausoleum was located.<sup>410</sup>

In 1987, the Kyrgyz press also started arguing whether or not internationalism meant anti-nationalism. There were serious arguments to support and respect national rights of the native peoples of the Kyrgyz SSR.<sup>411</sup> During the party congress at the end of the year, Aytmatov raised the question of more Kyrgyz language schooling in the republic, even for the Russians. Aytmatov suddenly became a political activist supporting the idea of sovereignty, fulfilling the rights given to the republic by the Soviet and republics own constitutions.<sup>412</sup> Also following the Jeltoksan events in the neighboring Kazakstan, it was reported that students established nationalist organizations. In January and February many foreign (especially Russian) students at the universities were attacked in Frunze (Bishkek) and Osh.<sup>413</sup> Aytmatov gave an interview to the popular Russian journal *Ogonek* in 1987, openly declaring his stand on the national issues. It was only after this that the Kyrgyz press found enough courage to publish readers’ letters, demanding more national rights and

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<sup>410</sup> A. Tursunbaev, "Sledovat' istoricheskoy pravde" *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (10 September 1987), p. 3. In 1987 by Mektep Izdatelstvo, new *Istorii Kazakskoy SSR* is published and it was idealizing Cüzs. Idealization of Cüz would lead to patriotism, one of these patriots was Chimkent obkom party first secretary A. Askarov, bourgeois nationalism in Kazakstan was spreading everywhere.

<sup>411</sup> K. Bokonbaev, "Mosty vzaimoponimaniya," *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya* (24 October 1987), p. 3. Bokonbayev here argued that internationalism should not mean anti-nationalism and national rights should be respected.

<sup>412</sup> John Soper, "Nationality Issues under review in Kirgizia," *RFE-RL research*, RL 49/88 (January 29, 1988). More schools in Kirghiz demanded ("the latest plenum of the Kirghiz party central committee held in December 5, 1987 dealt with nationality presentation in the party ranks-quoted from *Sovetskii Kirgizstan*, December 5, 1987) participation in industry, workforce etc. Aytmatov was demanding more Kirghiz schooling for the republic and also more national rights.

<sup>413</sup> "Nationalist Incidents Reported in Soviet Kirgizia," *Reuters* (3 March 1987). "In Frunze last autumn Kirghiz leader Absamat Masaliyev said: nationalist outbreaks on the part of the young people and an incorrect attitude to foreign students (after Jeltoksan) against Russians too."

native education.<sup>414</sup> Interestingly, not only the Kyrgyz readers but even some Russian army officers who were then serving in the republic sent letters to the Soviet press, explaining the miserable state of Kyrgyz in their own countries.<sup>415</sup> Kyrgyz party officials started to appear at religious funerals and ceremonies officially in the Osh region the same year.<sup>416</sup> Simultaneously, the Turkmen press started to publish similar themes, accusing local Russians of ignorance towards the languages and cultures of the region and even of humiliating the natives. The Turkmen intelligentsia proposed a compulsory instruction of the Turkmen language to Russian students in the schools in Turkmenistan. Moreover, there were cases when local Russians were accused of being imperialists.<sup>417</sup>

#### **6.6.5 Turkestanism Resurrected in Turkestan**

In Uzbekistan, of course, the movement towards sovereignty was very strong. “Lenin’s Nationality Policy” was also under heavy criticism from Uzbek literary figures. By 1987, literary figures like Muhammed Salih and Rauf Parfe were well respected and quite active in organizing the Uzbek intelligentsia under a Turkestanist opposition. Although most of the 1980s, for Parfe, were spent in a constant struggle for cultural and national rights, Turkestanism was always at the top of their agenda. According to Parfe, “Many in Uzbekistan were united and working together to achieve more rights and unite

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<sup>414</sup> Aytmayov was a pioneer. Only after the journal *Ogonek* published an interview with Aytmatov, did the Kirghiz press begin to publish articles in the form of readers letters in Kirghiz language instruction matter, see *Ogonek* 28/87.

<sup>415</sup> I. Esyutin, "Prityazhenie Stroya" *Krasnaya Zvezda* (29 March 1987), p. 2.

<sup>416</sup> V. Stavitskiy and V. Khrustalev, "Double dealing," *Sovetskaya Kirgizia*, 15 August 1987. *SWB SU/8677/B/5*, 19 September 1987, on "Participation by party officials in religious funerals in Kirgizia".

<sup>417</sup> O. Musaev, "Torzhestvo Leninskoy natsional'noy politiki KPSS," *Turkmenskaya Iskra* (24 November 1987), p. 2. “Russians being too ignorant to the language of the people among whom they live. This causes protests among Turkmen intelligentsia. This is called ideology of imperialism, rather than friendship of Soviet peoples. Turkmen language should be thought in Russian schools too.”

Turkestan under one flag with enthusiasm at the time”.<sup>418</sup> Official attempts to introduce a Soviet-type brotherhood and friendship between the Soviet nations were met with anger and protests.<sup>419</sup> “Moscow’s mouthpieces in the region, usually local Koreans, Russians or other Slavs, were blamed by the native journalists as the enemies of Uzbekistan, who tried to re-assert imperialist and chauvinistic Russian claims.”<sup>420</sup> The Uzbek “motherland” and Turkestanism topics have been openly discussed in the literary organs of the republic quite continuously.

The out-migration of Slavs, in the Kyrgyz SSR was observed as a misfortune, but according to the Kyrgyz it was also an opportunity to raise new Kyrgyz cadres to run their own country by themselves.<sup>421</sup> The Stalinist Kyrgyz poet Tokombayev, the strongest critique of Aytmatov died in 1988. Although he was the founder of the modern Kyrgyz literature and the author of the first “nationalistic” Kyrgyz novels about the Kyrgyz struggle for independence in early 20<sup>th</sup> century and the Kyrgyz migration to China, became an anti-nationalist figure in the 1980s.<sup>422</sup> In Turkmenistan, demands for more national and religious rights continued in 1988.<sup>423</sup> The Kazak poet and novelist S. Ademov, issued a long statement in *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, demanding more *razmezhevanie* for creating nationally homogeneous regions in Turkestan in 1988. According to him, the Kazak

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<sup>418</sup> Interview with Rauf Parfe (August 1999).

<sup>419</sup> G. Rashidov, "Natsional'nye protsessy v SSSR" *Pravda Vostoka* (7 February 1988), p. 4. A critical review of the book : R.A. Salihov, I. Ya Halilov and E. Yu. Yunusov, *Natsional'nye protsessy v SSSR* (Moscow: Nauka, 1987). This book supports old "falsificators" and enemies of Soviet unity.

<sup>420</sup> N. Ganyukhina, "Soyuz Bratsva," *Pravda Vostoka* (1 May 87), p. 2. Uzbeks were accusing Korean-Soviet journalists of being internationalist because of having no motherland. “Russia is yours and Uzbekistan is ours”. See this piece for organized Uzbek nationalism quite openly Declared by several citizens.

<sup>421</sup> N. Kumsikova, "Pereezhaet sem'ya, chto za faktom?" *Sovetskaya Kirgizia*, no: 4 (6 January 1988). Outmigration of Slavs gave an upper hand to Kirghiz to form a national working class-proletariat.

<sup>422</sup> John Soper, "Controversial Kirghiz Poet Tokombaev Dies," *RFE-RL Research RL 284/88* (June 22 1988). Tokombaev (born in 1904) was the founder of Soviet Kirghiz literature, his novel *Before the Dawn* (1962) concerning the national liberation of the Kirghiz in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, 1916 rebellion and exodus to China was greatly appraised.

<sup>423</sup> "Vospityvat patriotov-internationalistov," *Turkmenskaya Iskra* (13 January 1988), p. 1. For nationalist rights and argument going on all over the USSR, standing for moderate rights to nations and religions.

nationalism, which he claimed to represent, was an outcome of the Great Russian Chauvinism.<sup>424</sup> 1988 was also the year when the first signs of ethnic disorders began to be seen in Turkestan. By then, Uzbek-Tajik tensions surfaced in Northern Tajik regions of Hocend, Karategin and Kurgantübe.<sup>425</sup> Moscow was on the side of Tajiks, at least according to Uzbeks, demanding the protection of the rights of the Tajiks and Turkmens in Uzbekistan.<sup>426</sup> Another expedient of the center were the charges of corruption against the local part elites.<sup>427</sup> The democratic opposition group *Birlik* (Unity) was established in Tashkent this year, in November 1988. The first criticisms of the group were directed against the cotton-monoculture in the republic, corruption over the cotton production and the unusual deaths of the Uzbek Red-Army conscripts.<sup>428</sup>

In August 1989, a large-scale massacre of the Ahiska (Meskhetian) Turks by Uzbek gangs took place in the Ferghana Valley region ended up with the mass out-migration of over seventy thousand Ahiska Turks to Kazakstan and other Soviet republics. Although the Uzbek press claimed that the events were a result of the center's provocations,<sup>429</sup> Moscow accused *Birlik* and Uzbek nationalists.<sup>430</sup> Many in the Soviet press blamed *Birlik*,

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<sup>424</sup> S. Adenov, "Natsionalniy vopros i sistema upravleniya obshchestvom," *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (4 February 1988), p. 2. He was producing brochures-Kazak nationalist-only Kazak samizdat that we see. He argued to stop population movements in Russian immigration, but to re-draw boundaries to create ethnically homogenous republics (more *Razmezhevanie*) he says Kazak nationalism is a product of Great power (i.e. Russia) chauvinism. His critiques published in the same issue of *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (February 4, 1988), p. 3. By N. Zhandil'din "po povodu bolezennogo natsional'nogo chustva" S. Adenov was criticized whose article was published in the same issue together with this critique.

<sup>425</sup> "S positsiy otkrovennosti" *Kommunist Tadzhikistana* (15 March 1988), p. 3. Tajik-Uzbek ethnic tensions exist both in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

<sup>426</sup> Timur Pulatov, "Begushchie Vpered: Arby," *Moskovskie Novosti*, no: 14 (3 April 1988), p. 10.

<sup>427</sup> Arkadiy Sakhnin, "Korrupsiya," *Izvestiya* (2 November 1988), p. 3. Corruption in Uzbekistan being so serious and almost able to stop the operation of the state.

<sup>428</sup> Gregory Gleason, "Birlik and the Cotton Question," *RFE-RL* 264/90 (8 June 1990). RL Report of June 15 1990.

<sup>429</sup> Lev Levin, "Pylayushchee leto Fergany," *Zvezda Vostoka*, no: 10 (October 1989) p. 1-7. See this article for a long and good account of provocations and failure of the Uzbek militiamen to stop the atrocities.

<sup>430</sup> D. Usatov, V. Kamalov, "Komu eto na ruku?" *Pravda Vostoka* (4 November 1989). *Birlik* was accused for most of the Fergana and Khokand events and labeled as a provocative and nationalist extremist group.



nationalists, as the agitators of Ferghana attacks on Ahiskas.<sup>431</sup> Taking the news mostly from the Soviet press, some western media also even blamed population-demographic pressures in Fergana-Uzbekistan for this latest ethnic violence.<sup>432</sup> However, Birlik was the only organization in Uzbekistan which tried to stop events, with an overwhelming emphasis on the Turkic and Muslim brotherhood. To many Uzbeks it mattered not that he deportee Ahiska Turks also happened to be coreligionists and ethnic Turkic kinsmen, they were still outsiders and New Comers.

It was as early as 1990 July that *Türkistan Khalq Kharakati* (Turkestan Peoples Movement) was established in Uzbekistan, with the slogan of "*Bütündür Türkistan Bütündür!*" (Turkestan is a united whole!).<sup>433</sup> The supporters of this Turkestan-i movement, declared that due to the territorial division of the region all the disasters-ethnic- that the region face are.<sup>434</sup> The leader of the movement Bahrom Goyib was stressing "who can deny that we are Turks?... It is out of suspicion that we are the children of one people... we will surely unite. Turkistan is already united in our hearts."<sup>435</sup>

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<sup>431</sup> TASS, General V.K. Pankin, "K sobytiyam v Fergane: Nakazanie-Neotvratimo," *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (15 June 1989), No 138, p. 4.

<sup>432</sup> Scott Share, "Population explosion sparked Uzbek riots, demographer says," *Baltimore Sun* (19 June 1989). Evets break up over the price of some strawberries.

<sup>433</sup> *Türkistan, Türkiston Khalq Kharakati Nashri*, No. 1-August 1990 Tashkent, p.1. Muharrir Rauf Parfi. The deputies from all Turkestan republics hold a congress in July. Tajiks refused to join the movement. Kazak and Uzbek deputies agreed on establishing the movement. President elected as Bahram Goyib, deputy Seyitbay Baydullaev, Izzetullah Nuriddinov and Rauf Parfi. Olzhas Suleimanov was the hakem-... By then there were deputies from Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Karakalpakistan.

<sup>434</sup> *Türkistan.*, p. 1. "Petition of Turkestan Popular Movement to the Turkestans." It was stressed that the region is an ethnically, religiously and historically unified one and attempts to divide it causes all the troubles. In p. 2 it was also pointed out that "all the Turkestanis are brothers and sisters." See pages 2-4 for the ustav of the movement, very pan-Turkist and unionist in nature.

<sup>435</sup> *Türkistan.*, p. 4, message from the president.

### 6.6.6 The Case for Turkmenistan: A Separate History and Identity

The ghosts of Cüneyd Han and of *Basmacı*s were still alive in Turkmenistan in the mid-1970s.<sup>436</sup> Although there was no hint of any existing “pan-Turkist” or “pan-Turanist” movement in the Turkmen SSR, Western observers interpreted that soviet propagandists constant attacks on “pan-Turkism” and “pan-Turanism” in the soviet press as a clear sign of the existence of movements in the region.<sup>437</sup> However, Turkmen tribal structure was the only resistance to the proposed Soviet way of life. Traditionalism, sourced from this tribal structure, among the layman as well as the intelligentsia was rather the determining factor in Turkmenistan.<sup>438</sup> At the end of 1969, on December the 24th, the Turkmen party Chief Balysh Ovezov was dismissed from his post with nationalist charges and Gapurov replaced him. The arrest of a leading Turkmen poet and writer in a mental hospital in 1971, was understood to be because of her independency-oriented thoughts by the West. However as early as 1963, the Turkmen language literary newspaper *Edebiyat ve Sungat* was launching discussions about honoring of native language and pride.<sup>439</sup>

A well-known nomenclature to the Turkmen SSR, Pereudin, in duty since 1947, was released from his post of second secretary of Turkmen Communist Party central Committee in 1980.<sup>440</sup> That could be a sign of an important change in the Turkmen

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<sup>436</sup> In 1976, Turkmenskaya Iskra published a whole book on the end of *Basmacı*s, an important anti-*Basmacı* book in Russian by Yu.A. Polyakov, A.I. Chugunov. *Konets Basmachestva*. Moskva: Nauka, 1976.

<sup>437</sup> Teresa Rakowstra-Harmstone, "Nationalism in Soviet Asia since 1964," pp. 272-3. In.... George W. Simmonds (ed.), *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the era of Brezhnev and Kosygin* (Detroit: The University of Detroit Press, 1977). Papers and proceedings of the symposia held at university of Detroit on October 3-4 1975.

<sup>438</sup> Tirksh Dzhumagel'diev, "Obnovlenie Traditsiy," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* No: 15 (8 April 1981), p. 4.

<sup>439</sup> Amanberdi Murat and George W. Simmonds, "Nationalism in Turkmenistan since 1964," pp. 316-321. In George W. Simmonds (ed.), *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the era of Brezhnev and Kosygin* (Detroit: The University of Detroit Press, 1977). Papers and proceedings of the symposia held at university of Detroit on October 3-4 1975, p. 318-20. It was underlined that Ethnic self-assertion was never separatist in Turkmenistan tough.

<sup>440</sup> Bess Brown, "Changes in Party Leadership in Turkmenistan," *Radio Liberty* Reserach paper RL/20/81, January 13, 1981.

leadership. Under Gapurov, tribalism reached its height in Turkmenistan where clan and personal loyalties were the only necessary qualifications for the cadres.<sup>441</sup> Gapurov was retired on December 21, 1985 and Saparmyrat Niyazov took over as an anti-corruption figure who was already the chairman of the council of ministers. However, Gapurov's clan was fighting back by appointing Stalinist cadres to the leading positions as in the case of Gurbansakhadov's appointment to the chairmanship of the writers' union.<sup>442</sup> By then, especially the countryside Turkmenistan was taken over by local *lukmans* (traditional healers), mollas (mullahs), Ishans (religious guides) and ocaks (holy families) who were practicing miracles and medicine together with the people's tomb worshipping tradition.<sup>443</sup>

In Gorbachev's speech to the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on January 27 1987, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and southern Kazak oblasts were mentioned as the core of corruption in the USSR.<sup>444</sup> A known Turkmen tribalist and nationalist Khudayberdi Durdyev was appointed as the propaganda and ideology chief of the Turkmen party in 1988 who was an expert on Mahdumkuli and Sufi brotherhoods.<sup>445</sup> It was still possible to speak about the open reaction of the Turkmen intelligentsia to the falsified version of their history for the sake of soviet propaganda.<sup>446</sup>

In September 1989 a group of Turkmen intellectuals in Ashgabad established association of "*Agzybirlik*"-Unity for continuing their activities on the promotion of

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<sup>441</sup> Patrick Cockburn, "Patrick Cockburn visits Soviet Turmenistan," *The Finacial Times* (February 25, 1986), p. 6.

<sup>442</sup> John Soper, "Older generation leader choosen as head of Turkmen writer's union," *Radio Liberty reserach paper*. RL 416/85 (December 11, 1985), Krasnyi Arkhiv.

<sup>443</sup> See T. Atayev, "Din ve Mucize," *Sovet Turkmenistany in Turkmen*. (4 January 1986). *SWB SU/8196/B/1* (1 March 1986).

<sup>444</sup> See for the full text of this report and speech *Pravda* (January 28, 1987). Which leaded an ati-corruption campaign in Turkmenistan, see Bess Brown. "The Anti corruption campaign in Turkmenistan" *Radio Liberty Research paper*. RL 49/87. Krasnyi Arkhiv (January 30, 1987).

<sup>445</sup> Bess Brown, "A new kind of Ideological secretary in Turkmenistan?" *Radio Liberty reserach paper*, RL 29/88 (January 21, 1988), Krasnyi Arkhiv.

<sup>446</sup> See Sh. Annaklychev, "Istoriya i My," *Turkmenskaya Iskra* (19 June 1988), p. 2.

Turkmen language, national customs and environmental rights. Although it was popular among the masses, in November 1989, Niyazov attacked the organization heavily and in the January of 1990 the organization was banned. It had a very similar program to *Birlik* of Uzbekistan.<sup>447</sup> The absence of a democratic nationalist movement was strongly associated with the strong-continuing influence of the Teke tribe in central Turkmenistan, Ersary alongside the Turkmen-Afghan border and Yomud in western Turkmenistan. The low level of economic and social development, the absence of a sizeable intelligentsia and the Turkmen officials' fear of perestroika made it almost impossible for the Turkmen intellectuals to continue this nationalist movement.<sup>448</sup>

There was, like all other Muslim union republics, state controlled, *Vatan* association in Turkmenistan whose deputy president V. Gafurov attacked *Agzybirlik*, blaming it for promoting divisiveness, not unity.<sup>449</sup> *Agzybirlik* organized a huge meeting in Ashgabad in January 1990, the anniversary of the Tsarist invasion of the country.<sup>450</sup> *Agzybirlik* leaders Nurberdy Nurmamedov, Shirali Nurmuradov and Mehmet Sakhatov faced with harsh fines and harassment when they tried to collect signatures for the official registration of the organization.<sup>451</sup> After mid-1990 the leaders of this movement were forced to flee the country, continuing their struggle in Moscow.

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<sup>447</sup> Charles Arlson, "Inching towards Democratization," *RL-RFE Research report* (January 4, 1991). No 15, p. 35-36.

<sup>448</sup> Annette Bohr, "Turkmenstan under Perestroika: An overview," *RFE-RL report on the USSR* (March 23, 1990), pp. 20-30.

<sup>449</sup> V. Gafurov, "Kago azobshcaet Edinenie," *Turkmenskaya Iskra* (21 January 1990).

<sup>450</sup> "Probuzhdenie," *Atmoda*, 26 February 1990. No. 9(66) p. 21.

<sup>451</sup> "Delo chlenov neformalnyi organizatsii agzybirlik" (their letter to) *Ogonek*, No. 30, 1990. July. P. 3.

## 6.7 Summary

After the Second World War, which united the “Soviet People” against the common enemy, we observe a gradual increase in the tribal and local self-identification in Turkestan. In most cases throughout the post-war period the power remained in the hands of one tribe or local clan in every Soviet Central Asian republic. These sub-“national” identities, especially in politics, challenged the new “national” identities. However “amalgamation through particularization” was not so successful as seen in the native’s hatred against the Central Asian Russians in the Pahtakar events. The post-war and especially the Brezhnevite period also witnessed an important development; the tolerance of nationalist literature and the rehabilitation of the Turkestani past in several instances referred to as Mirasism.

The émigré literature out of the Soviet Union continued hardliner Turkestanist stance until the mid-1970s. However the weakening of this movement, caused by the lack of cadres to continue *Cedid-Alaş Orda-Turkestan (Khokand) Autonomy-Yeni Türkistan-Yaş Türkistan-Waffen SS-Millî Türkistan-Dergi* line. By the 1980s, remaining Turkestani associations and publications were monopolized in the hands of a few Uzbek idealist émigrés in the West.

The post-Brezhnev anti-corruption drives, during both Andropov and then Gorbachev periods resulted with gradual dismissal of long lasted Brezhnevite cadres in Central Asian republics. Both Kunayev and Reşidov were charged of nationalism. Kunayev lived long enough to see the uprising of Kazak crowds when he was replaced with an outsider and the glorification of this event in the history of independent Kazakistan. On the other hand, Reşidov died before the Soviet authorities crushed his cult which would be partially reinstated in the independent Uzbekistan.

The whole history of post-War Turkestan inside and outside the Soviet Union, was a story of an ongoing war between the two ideologies. Turkestanist and pan-Turkestan stands of the émigrés and the amalgamation of people's policy of the Soviet authorities, which achieved far less than the Western predictions about the assimilation of Soviet Muslims. Although the concept of Turkestan was glorified and praised in some literary instances, on the level of the politics, tribal and local identities played an important role.

**CHAPTER 7**  
**REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND UNIFICATION EFFORTS**  
**IN THE POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA**

**7.1 Introduction**

In this chapter, significant initiatives in regional integration during the post-Soviet era (the 1990s) in Central Asia are presented. The basic emphasis is on the “summit diplomacy” trying to create a united Central Asia out of the post-Soviet chaos. The “unusually close” relations among the leaders of Central Asian states might provide a good picture of “unification for necessities” approach to the students of the region.

**7.2 The First Phase: Official Initiatives - Summit Diplomacy 1990-1991**

Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was a common practice of the Republican leaders in Central Asia to hold summit meetings to discuss regional problems and the problems emanating from Moscow.<sup>1</sup> First Secretaries Niyazov of Turkmenistan, Makhamov of Tajikistan, Kerimov of Uzbekistan, Masaliyev of Kyrgyzstan and the host Nazarbayev of Kazakstan attended the noteworthy June 23, 1990 summit meeting in Alma-Ata. It was noteworthy, because, during the Soviet Period, Kazakstan used to be included in a separate geographical and economic category by Moscow. Even for the practical

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<sup>1</sup> Jon Anderson, *The International Politics of Central Asia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 198.

necessities, when they wanted to emphasize Kazakstan's commonalties with the rest of Turkestan, the terms “Sredniaia Azia (Middle Asia) and Kazakstan” were used. In June 1990, the Kazak leadership joined the Middle (and later Central) Asian group, with an important emphasis on regional integration and the need for further cooperation. The mandates of the summit were the establishment of regional joint councils and committees in almost every field to tackle the common regional problems.<sup>2</sup>

The second summit was only a few weeks before the collapse of the Soviet Union, in Tashkent on 14<sup>th</sup> of August 1991. The resolutions of this meeting were more concerned about the activation of regional councils and committees and the inclusion of Azerbaijan into this regional gathering.<sup>3</sup> At this meeting, Askar Akayev, who replaced former Party Secretary Masaliyev in October 1990 just after the Osh events, represented Kyrgyzstan. While many of the leaders were uncomfortable with the fact that speedy transition in Moscow would cause greater dangers for themselves, these two summits, held before independence, were rather efforts to create a Muslim-Southern bloc within the Soviet Union. Especially after August 1991, "Central Asia's leaders were now orphans; their common 'fatherland' had died in the hands of Slavic brothers".<sup>4</sup>

### **7.3 The Second Phase: Post Soviet Chaos 1991-1993**

It was only after three Slavic Republics decided to form a Commonwealth on the 8<sup>th</sup> of December 1991 that Central Asian leaders met in Ashkhabad on the 12<sup>th</sup> of December and decided to apply for membership to this Commonwealth. On the 21<sup>st</sup> of December

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<sup>2</sup> Martha Brill Olcott, *Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy and Regional Security* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 52-53.

<sup>3</sup> There were controversial reports in the Western press whether if this meeting was a pan-Turkestan one. "...They should unite into a single Central Asian State, to be known as Turkestan." "Central Asian Republics Aim to Keep Moscow at a Distance," *Financial Times* (14.8.1991), p. 2

<sup>4</sup> Olcott, p. 54.



1991, eleven former Soviet States met in Alma-Ata and formed the Commonwealth of Independent States.<sup>5</sup> The speedy collapse of the Soviet Union seemed for a long time unbelievable to the Central Asian leaders - in 1991 and even in 1992 - after they all had declared their independence! Since the collapse of the Union and the creation of the CIS took place almost simultaneously, many leaders and many observers believed that CIS would be the new name of the Union.

The Ashkhabad summit was the third Central Asian regional summit. Nursultan Nazarbayev was the first one in Ashkhabad meeting on 12 December 1991 to propose a Turkic or Central Asian Union.<sup>6</sup> According to some observers, the resolutions of this meeting and Nazarbayev's hard stand for a separate "Central Asian Union" were rather a part of political tactics to balance Slavic Union already established by Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus, and persuade them to establish a greater commonwealth including the rest of the former Soviet States. How sincere Nazarbayev was in this stand is not known. However, one can conclude that the Alma-Ata meeting on the 21<sup>st</sup> of December establishing CIS was an outcome of Nazarbayev's initiative on the issue keeping the unity of the former Soviet space.

By then, none of the Central Asian Presidents had established their strict rules over their countries. Nazarbayev was under heavy pressure by the Kazak nationalists who were demanding a new status for the Kazak language and new regulations concerning the inter-ethnic balances in the country.<sup>7</sup> In Uzbekistan Kerimov was rather paralyzed with the growing support of the masses to the democratic opposition Erk and Birlik, both championing Pan-Turkist and Turkestanist political programs. In Turkmenistan, Niyazov

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<sup>5</sup> Anderson, p. 198.

<sup>6</sup> Anderson, p. 138.

<sup>7</sup> Kamal Smailov, "Radi Spravedlivosti ...," *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (8 February 1992), p. 2.

had his own version of secular culture but insisted that Turkmens do have unique ways in every aspect of life.<sup>8</sup> He was at the very beginning of building his own personality cult and strict authoritarian regime, while acting very quickly to crush newly developing democratic and pan-Turkist opposition, *Agzybirlik*. Akayev of Kyrgyzstan was rather a new-comer to the political arena, and had little to tell his people. Erkin and Egemen groups were the democratic pan-Turkist groups already offering Kyrgyz a pan-Turkestan program.

Under these circumstances, a fourth summit was held in Bishkek on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of April 1992. The agenda was again “how to achieve greater regional cooperation and integration?” However, fears of emerging Uzbek hegemony in the region prevented the leaders from discussing further integration.<sup>9</sup> The Bishkek meeting also marked the first signs of Tajikistan's reservations about such a union in Central Asia, as Tajikistan was the only absentee in Bishkek. Another important feature of this meeting was the attendance of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrey Kozyrev as an observer. This was clearly a sign of Russia's interest in what was happening in the region. However, Niyazov was still there and hadn't made up his mind yet about the integration issue. Grown up in an orphanage, called himself Turkmenbashi and Serdar (not only *vozhd* like Stalin), in 1989, he tried to promote a plan for bilingualism but soon, retreated as he feared the reactions of Turkmen intellectuals and elders.<sup>10</sup> By the beginning of 1992, Niyazov's cult had been recognized<sup>11</sup> as a product of Turkmen culture. It was best formulated in the words of the Turkmen ambassador to Moscow: “How we pray to one God we are loyal to one

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<sup>8</sup> Saparmurat Niyazov, "Turkmenistan ne budet nikommunisticheskimi ni islamskim," an interview by Andrey Mesharin, *Turkmenskaya Iskra* (24 February 1992), p. 1-2.

<sup>9</sup> "Integratsiya...," *Izvestiya* (23 April 1992), see also B. Brown, "Regional Cooperation in Central Asia?" *RFE/RL, Research Report*, 2:5 (29 January 1993), p. 32.

<sup>10</sup> Christopher J. Panico, "Turkmenistan Unaffected by winds of democratic change," *RFE/RL research report* (January 22 1993), Vo. 2. No. 4. pp. 6-10.

<sup>11</sup> See especially several letters published, which praise, thank and even pray for the health of the President Niyazov, "Desyat' let blagopoluchiya," *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (23.1.1993), p. 2.

president".<sup>12</sup> Niyazov, declaring Islam and national culture as the spirit of Turkmen people, was promising land reform "as soon as possible".<sup>13</sup> The Russian press was alarmed over the Turkmen's desire to share their wealth with Iran and Turkey. The term "second Kuwait" began to be used then.<sup>14</sup> However, he was the one who first resisted the "colonial demands" of the Kozyrev diplomacy, which was insisting on the right of dual citizenship for the Slavs in Turkestan.<sup>15</sup>

The fifth summit was opened on the 4<sup>th</sup> of January 1993 in Tashkent. This time the Uzbek leadership invited Tajik<sup>16</sup> counterpart on purpose to strengthen the Tajik commitment to regional integration. The adoption of the term "Tsentralnaya Azia" (Central Asia) for the whole region replacing the Russian term "Srednyaya Azia (Middle Asia) and Kazakstan" was one of the main achievements of this summit.

Leaders of Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, attending a summit in Tashkent, have declared their intention to use Central Asia as the collective term for their five republics... they had taken appropriate steps to create a common market of Central Asian states... an inter-republican coordinating council would be established to coordinate actions... The creation of a regional information network, including a regional newspaper and a television service, were also envisaged under the agreements.<sup>17</sup>

At this Tashkent summit, Central Asian leaders developed a plan for the regional integration - an imitation of the European Union system: foreseeing a common currency, free movement of goods, labor and capital as well as the elimination of all trade barriers all

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<sup>12</sup> Interview with Pasol Turkmenistana Niyaz Nurkylychev in Moscow. "Odin narod-odin prezident," *Vechernaya Moskva* (29.01.1993), p. 2.

<sup>13</sup> Saparmurat Niyazov, "Interview: Vremya Pokazhaet kto prav," *Vechernaya Moskva* (15.03.1993), p. 2.

<sup>14</sup> Yuriy Vasilyev, "Karakumskie Sheykhi," *Rossiya*, No 15. 7-13 (04.1993), p. 4.

<sup>15</sup> "Dual citizenship the main subject at Kozyrev-Tereschenko talks," *Interfax* (17 nov 1993).

<sup>16</sup> We can divide Tajik people into seven different regional-clan groups: the northern (Leninabad Region), the people of Kulob (in the western part of the Khatlon Region), the people of Kurgantepe (the western part of the Khatlon region), the people of Garm (east of Dushanbe several districts at the center), the people of Hisor (Centre, west of Dushanbe), the people of Dushanbe (capital), the people of Badakshan (in the Badakshan A. Region). Apart from these differences, one third of the population in Tajikistan is consisted of Ethnic Uzbeks, left on the other side of the border during the national-territorial demarcation of Turkestan.

<sup>17</sup> *SWB* (6 January 1993), SU/1579, *ITAR-TASS* (4 January 1993). For further on this see also "V Tashkente," *Izvestiya* (6 January 1993), p. 3.

over the region.<sup>18</sup> Some leaders, like Kerimov, even made it clear that the CIS was not a tool for further integration, but a tool for stable disintegration (a soft divorce) of the Soviet Union.<sup>19</sup>

In an appeal to the heads of states of Central Asia, the representatives of Uzbek institutions said: " We believe that Central Asia will always be a welcoming common home for all peoples inhabiting it, an example of peace and progress, inter-ethnic accord and political stability."<sup>20</sup> For leaders like Akayev, an integration of the "core" CIS states, Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was necessary,<sup>21</sup> and this summit was a step towards this integration. These "gigantic" steps created excitement in the Tajik leadership too – in fact, Tajiks were welcoming this development more than anyone:

Clearly, the implementation of this project is a task for the future but it is completely realistic. This confidence is based on the aspiration of fraternal peoples for unity and on their aspiration to live in their large country in peace and prosperity.<sup>22</sup>

However, the same Central Asian leaders, after weeks, met in Minsk for the CIS summit and signed the contradictory documents: strengthening CIS structures but weakening regional attempts to unite. It was in fact after this Minsk summit, Rakhmanov of Tajikistan and Niyazov of Turkmenistan both distanced themselves from each other and with the rest of the Central Asian leaders. It was here, Nazarbayev declared his Eurasian

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<sup>18</sup> See Serik Primbetov, "Regionalnaya Integratsiya Tsentral'noaziatskikh Gosudarstv: Itogi, Opyt, Problemy, perspektivy," Gribert Diter (izd.) *Regionalnaya Integratsiya v Tsentralnoy Azii* (Berlin: Germanskiy Fond Mezhdunarodnogo Razvitiya, 1995), pp. 113-131. See also for a common perception of regional cooperation theories by the Central Asians, El'mar Al'tfater, "Regionalizatsiya Mirovogo Rynka," Ibid, pp. 59-112.

<sup>19</sup> "President Criticizes CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly but Says CIS Necessary", *SWB* (5 January 1993), SU/1578 B/4, *Interfax*, Moscow in English 1639 gmt (31 Dec 1992).

<sup>20</sup> "Uzbek Representatives Welcome Central Asian Unity", *SWB* (21 January 1993), SU/1592 B/9, *Tajik Radio*, Dushanbe in Russian 0400 gmt 19 January 93.

<sup>21</sup> "Akayev Urges Integration of Core CIS States," *SWB* (9 January 1993), SU/1582 B/5, *Izvestiya* (Moscow: 7 January 93).

<sup>22</sup> *SWB* (9 January 1993), SU/1582 B/4, *Tajik Radio*, Dushanbe in Russian 0400 gmt (7 January 93).

Economic Union idea to the public for the first time.<sup>23</sup> Championing economic integration, Nazarbayev claimed "Alma Ata could become a Mecca for the developers and planners of the integration of the Eurasian Economic Zone."<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, Niyazov was not that optimistic, he declared that Turkmenistan "rejects the creation, in the CIS, of strict centralized structures whose activities will have a super-state character".<sup>25</sup>

As 1993 wore on, meetings of the Central Asian 'five' increasingly became gatherings of a regional 'troika'. Subsequent regional meetings took the form of consultations among Nazarbayev, Akayev and Karimov; meeting jointly and separately, while the idea of a full-fledged Central Asian regional organization disappeared from most people's minds.<sup>26</sup>

The most important feature of this second phase of official attempts for integration was the fact that each Central Asian leadership had different ideas in mind concerning the issue. Niyazov was the first leader to refuse any further integration and super-state structures, which would eventually limit state sovereignty.<sup>27</sup> Kerimov was trying to change Niyazov's stand on this by asserting his political weight and assuring him that "the possible unification of the Central Asian states on a regional basis would not damage their independence."<sup>28</sup> Interestingly, although Nazarbayev was the first to announce his desire to create a Central Asian Union in 1991, he was again the first who publicly denounced the

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<sup>23</sup> Eurasianism or Eurasian Union ideas have a long history in the Soviet literature. It is best described as a quasi-political intellectual movement of Soviet intelligentsiya. "Its representatives state that Russia is a unique blend of Slavic and non-Slavic cultures and ethnic groups. Eurasianists also emphasize the corporate nature of the Russian state which makes it quite different from the West. Eurasianism emerged in the 1920s as an anti-Bolshevik movement. Yet, through its evolution, Eurasianism has become closer and closer to the Soviet brand of Marxism. In its blending of Marxism with nationalism, Eurasianism was one of the precursors to the present-day ideology of post-Soviet Russia". See the best piece on this idea by Dmitry V. Slapenkoth, "Eurasianism: Past and Present," *Communist and Post Communist Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 129-151.

<sup>24</sup> "Nazarbayev Says Kazakstan Leading Way to Greater CIS Economic Cooperation," *SWB* (28 January 1993), SU/1598 B/3, *Interfax* in English 1632 gmt (26 January 1993).

<sup>25</sup> "Niyazov on CIS summit," *SWB* (29 January 1993), SU/1599 B/5, *Interfax* in English, 1633 (26 January 93).

<sup>26</sup> Olcott, p. 56.

<sup>27</sup> For Niyazov, "horizontal, bilateral ties, rather than blocs and consultative, not coordinating bodies" were much favourable. See "Ashkhabad Central Asian leaders meeting cancelled," *SWB*, SU/1664 B/16 (16 April 1993), *Interfax* 1320 gmt (9 April 1993).

<sup>28</sup> "Turkmen and Uzbek Presidents comment on CIS and Central Asian Unity," *SWB* SU/1670 B/11 (23 April 1993), *ITAR-TASS* 1335 gmt (15 April 1993).

possibility of a Central Asian confederation on the political bases.<sup>29</sup> When Nazarbayev, Akayev and Kerimov met in Chimkent on 28<sup>th</sup> of May 1993, at a commemoration ceremony for the Kazak national figures Tolebi, Kazbekbi and Aytekebi, they jointly declared these three Kazak heroes as common historical heroes of all three states.<sup>30</sup> Kerimov was still too reluctant about Russia and explained his commitment to bilateral relations with Russia, as he summarized this stand with such words; "we need Russia like air, like water."<sup>31</sup> Rakhmanov was in power in Tajikistan only with the help of the CIS "peace-keepers" among whom considerable number of Uzbek, Kazak and Kyrgyz draftees existed. It was also no secret that, in Tajikistan, Tajik opposition had an important enmity towards the very term Turkestan and the Turkic Union.<sup>32</sup> The idea of a Central Asian Union was still too much a "paper project", with lots of good will but nothing on the ground yet. Kerimov was yet at that stage trying to understand the motives of the Turkestanist opposition and the best way to increase Uzbekistan's regional role. Nazarbayev, by all means a champion of formulas for the resurrection of the Soviet Union in a more civilized manner, was still after developing his Eurasian Economic Union idea. Akayev of Kyrgyzstan was a close follower of Nazarbayev and was one of the advocates of Russia's leading role in every kind of new association among the former Soviet States. Disappointed by the ignorance of Slavs of Central Asians in their efforts to keep the unity of the former Soviet peoples, the second phase of the regional summit diplomacy was more concentrated on developing a means of integration. However, members of the "troika", Kazakstan,

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<sup>29</sup> "Nazarbayev rules out idea of Central Asian confederation," *SWB* SU/1682 B/3 (7 May 1993) *ITAR-TASS* 1352 gmt (5 May 1993).

<sup>30</sup> "Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan sign friendship declaration," *SWB* SU/1702 B/12 (31 May 1993), *Kazak Radio* 2300 gmt (28 May 1993).

<sup>31</sup> "Karimov defends his policies against accusations of strong-arm tactics," *SWB* SU/1713 B/11 (12 June 1993). *Trud* (26 May 1993).

<sup>32</sup> As early as May 1992, slogans like "Curse Turkestan and Turks" were common among the Tajik opposition rallies in Dushanbe. See Vanora Bennett, "Tajikistan: Clans, Mafias and Poverty," *Reuters* (07 May 1992).

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, were also following their own agendas in their bilateral relations with the CIS and Russia.

#### **7.4 The Third Phase: Summit Diplomacy of the "Troika" 1993-1998**

It was at the second ECO summit in Istanbul, Nazarbayev "expressed his conviction that a "Central Asian Common Market" will one day come into being".<sup>33</sup> Simultaneously, *Egemen Kazakstan* and *Kazakstanskaya Pravda* were accusing the leaderships of three Slavic states, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, for exploiting Kazak President's ideas on integration while isolating Central Asia from this new union. "The newspaper interpreted the formation of the alliance as a response to the recent establishment of an economic alliance of Turkic-speaking countries in Istanbul."<sup>34</sup> At the same time, the renowned Kazak poet, Olcas Süleymanov, as the leader of the Peoples Congress Party, proposed to form a Russian-Kazak confederation.<sup>35</sup> The failure of three Slavic states to invite Kazakstan to their Economic Union [claiming that Kazakstan preferred membership to ECO, with Pakistan and Turkey] in fact "bewildered" Kazak political circles.<sup>36</sup>

At the sixth Central Asian summit, which was held on the 29<sup>th</sup> of July 1993 in Alma-Ata, both Nazarbayev and Kerimov called for further integration and signed a six-year economic integration treaty between their states.<sup>37</sup> This was followed by the August 1993 Moscow summit of Russia and the Central Asian states on the Tajik issue. With Nazarbayev's proposal, the summit "had adopted an appeal to CIS to move further towards

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<sup>33</sup> *SWB*, ME/1735 c/1 (8 July 1993). Turkish Agency Report on First Session.

<sup>34</sup> "Kazak newspapers criticize economic alliance of Russia, Ukraine and Belarussia," *SWB*, SU/1743 B/4 (17 July 1993).

<sup>35</sup> *SWB*, SU/1743 B/5 (17 July 1993), *Interfax* 1818 gmt (5 July 93).

<sup>36</sup> "Kazakstan bewildered by failure to invite it to economic union," *SWB*, SU 1754 C1/5 (30 July 1993).

<sup>37</sup> "Kazakstan and Uzbekistan sign agreements on economic cooperation," *SWB* (2 August 1993), SU/1756 C2/7. *ITAR-TASS*, 1440 gmt (29 July).

the creation of an economic union".<sup>38</sup> At this summit, Nazarbayev initiated the re-integration idea, which was also supported temporarily by Kerimov, who desired more stability in the region even at the cost of the continuation of the Russian existence in the region.<sup>39</sup>

The seventh summit of the "troika" was held on the 26-27<sup>th</sup> of August 1993 in Kokchetav. This was mainly on mutual economic ties and called for further economic cooperation.<sup>40</sup> Forced out of the Ruble Zone, just prior to the introduction of national currencies, Kerimov hoped to introduce a single currency in Central Asia, at least both in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.<sup>41</sup> However, Nazarbayev had a quite different agenda; he was more concerned about keeping the territorial integrity of Kazakstan and was quite alarmed by the danger of disintegration due to tribal and clan differences. He said: "relative independence of the regions is being taken advantage of by the local elite to establish tribal ideology and clan-related-protectionism".<sup>42</sup> Then, in an election speech in November 1993, the Russian nationalist leader Zhirinovskiy's proposed the creation of a "Tashkent Province" out of five Central Asian states. Taken very seriously by the Central Asians, Zhirinovskiy's remarks were condemned by many; while countless references were made to the great past of Turkestan in the Central Asian press.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> "Moscow summit adops appeal for CIS economic union," *SWB* SU/1762 (9 August 1993), *ITAR TASS* (7 August 1993).

<sup>39</sup> "Nezavisimaya Gazeta on Unprecedented Meeting with Central Asian States," *SWB* SU/1762 C2/1 (9 August 1993). Vitaliy Portnikov. "Russian Turkestan Union," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (6 August 93).

<sup>40</sup> "Informal Kazak, Kyrgyz and Uzbek Summit on strengthening economic ties," *SWB* SU/1783 G/1 (2 September 1993), *ITAR-TASS* 1209 gmt (30 August).

<sup>41</sup> "Uzbek president hopes Kazakstan and Uzbekistan will have the same currency," *SWB* SU/1793 G/1 (14 September 1993). *Interfax* in English 0900 gmt (4 Sept 1993).

<sup>42</sup> "President Nazarbayev alarmed by rise of tribal differences," *SWB* SU/1823 G/1 (19 October 1993). *Holos*, Kiev in Ukrainian (13 October 93), p.1.

<sup>43</sup> "Condemnation of Zhirinovskiy's idea of Tashkent Province," *SWB* SU/1859 g/6 (30 November 1993). Ostankino Chanel 1 TV, 1500 gmt (26 November 93).



#### **7.4.1 Uniting Central Asia: Single Economic Zone and Central Asian Economic Union (CAEU)**

A significant milestone in the search for a Central Asian integration was the eighth summit which took place on the 10<sup>th</sup> of January 1994, when Kazak and Uzbek presidents in Tashkent agreed to set up a single economic union and strengthen their cooperation in all fields.<sup>44</sup> The next day in Nukus, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and the Russian Deputy Premier Yuriy Yarov met to discuss the ecological situation of Aral Sea.<sup>45</sup> The ecological disaster in the Aral-Turkestan basin had then become another component, providing Central Asian leaderships a common platform for working out the common problems of the region.

In 1994, Nazarbayev ratified the agreement on the creation of a single economic zone with Uzbekistan, which called for abolishing the customs checkpoints on the borders with Uzbekistan and encouraging the free circulation of goods between the two countries.<sup>46</sup> By April 1994, Akayev was the only supporter of the Nazarbayev's Eurasian Union project.<sup>47</sup> Kerimov, considering it a path to the past, was categorically rejecting this project of a Eurasian Union.<sup>48</sup> This situation heated up the relations between the two presidents, Nazarbayev and Kerimov. At this point, Akayev played the role of the mediator and organized a summit in the Kyrgyz resort Cholpon Ata at the weekend of 30<sup>th</sup> of April - 1<sup>st</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> "Kazak and Uzbek presidents agree single economic space," *SWB* SU/1896 G/1 (15 January 94), *ITAR-TASS* 0632 gmt (11 January 94).

<sup>45</sup> "Central Asian Summit agrees measures to save Aral Sea," *SWB* SU/1896 (15 January 94), *ITAR-TASS* 1408 gmt (11 January 94).

<sup>46</sup> "Nazarbayev ratifies economic agreement with Uzbekistan," *SWB* SU/1947 G/6 (16 March 1994). *ITAR-TASS* 1709 gmt (14 March 94). Author was at the Kazak-Uzbek border during the very time customs checkpoints were removed on both sides.

<sup>47</sup> "Eurasian Union a promising Idea, says President Akayev," *SWB* SU/1965 G/2 (7 April 1994), *ITAR-TASS* 0834 gmt (1 April 94).

<sup>48</sup> "France and Uzbekistan sign economic cooperation agreements," *SWB* SU/1989 G/6 (05 May 1994). *APN* Uzbek News Agency, 0000 gmt (27 April 1994).

of May 1994, where a prospect for a reconciliation was reached.<sup>49</sup> This was the ninth official summit of the "troika". Kerimov criticized Nazarbayev quite harshly, by stating that this Eurasian project "is merely a new slogan, purposefully declared to strengthen this leader's personal authority, which would lead to Yugoslavization of the former Soviet space".<sup>50</sup> At the summit, although the relations between the two presidents were better, both kept their earlier stands concerning the Eurasian Union idea.

#### **7.4.2 Nazarbayev the Eurasianist**

Nazarbayev was enthusiastic about his project; and he refuted the accusations that it was a plan for resurrecting the Soviet Union.<sup>51</sup> On the same day he declared his commitment to the project, Nazarbayev arrived in Tashkent for the celebration of a Kazak cultural festival, where he echoed Kerimov in calling for further integration between their countries as well as within all CIS countries.<sup>52</sup> While some argued that sensitive ethnic balances in Kazakhstan had required such a policy,<sup>53</sup> Nazarbayev was insisting on the

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<sup>49</sup> "Kazak-Uzbek relations improve after Kyrgyz summit," *SWB* SU/1991 G/1 (02 May 94), *Izvestiya* (4 May 94), p. 3. By Vladimir Ardayev and Shakhbuddin Zaynutdinov.

<sup>50</sup> "Karimov rejects Nazarbayev's Eurasian Union Plan," *SWB* SU/1997 G/2 (14 May 1994), *ITAR-TASS* 0722 (11 May 94).

<sup>51</sup> "Kazakhstan reiterates commitment to idea of Eurasian Union," *SWB* SU/2007 G/1 (27 May 94). *ITAR-TASS* 0910 gmt (25 May 94).

<sup>52</sup> "Kazak and Uzbek leaders call for closer cooperation," *SWB* SU/2009 G/1 (30 May 1994), *ITAR-TASS* 1004 gmt (25 May 94).

<sup>53</sup> V. Moiseev, "Ne inostrantsy, no i ne svoy," *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* (27.8.1993), p. 7. Anti-russian historian in mass communication, it is a struggle of emographic majority although it is said we, people of Kazakhstan not peoples of Kazakhstan.

unification of all of the “structures” of the union members.<sup>54</sup> Kazak Foreign office also declared this idea as being their new foreign policy concept.<sup>55</sup>

Like Kerimov, Turkmen president Niyazov also opposed Nazarbayev's project, finding it “premature, unnecessary and separatist” within the CIS.

What is Eurasian Union? Does anybody know what sort of union it is? Is it just a sign to replace the CIS or is it a new, natural kind of commonwealth or a new confederation? What is it? I simply do not see the mechanism, function or task of that Eurasian Union and I fail to understand why a group rose up immediately that supported it, and a group rejected it.<sup>56</sup>

Probably the original engineer of the project, Olcas Süleymanov, then the leader of the People's Congress Party, was claiming that a confederation or a union of independent countries in Eurasia was historically inevitable.<sup>57</sup> Nazarbayev, for the rest of 1990s, adopted this view and kept his stand concrete.

The tenth summit of the troika was planned for Chimkent on the 1<sup>st</sup> of July 1994, but moved to Almaty on the 8<sup>th</sup> of July. The meeting was to concentrate on the issues of regulating the free economic zone and the free circulation of labor among the three states.<sup>58</sup> Prior to this summit, Kerimov had made himself clear once more on his opposition to the idea of the Eurasian Union. According to him, the union was basically a political

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<sup>54</sup> *Interfax* (31 March 1994). "Nazarbayev: concept of Eurasian union is a subject for discussions with common wealth partners". It is just an idea, not an official proposal, to replace CIS with single coordination, economic and military policies and a single currency, single parliament, council of defence ministers, defence complex, a single citizenship, with official Russian language. During his visit to Moscow in his speech in Moscow state university.

<sup>55</sup> *Interfax* (15 april 1994). "Former Soviet Republics will unite Kazakhstan" Kazak foreign minister Terleutai Suleimanov; Eurasian Union is declared as the new foreign policy goal modeling EU structures.

<sup>56</sup> "Russian reporters question Turkmen President on Economy, personality cult," *SWB* SU/2009 G/4 (30 May 1994), *Ostankino Channel 1 TV*, 1120 gmt (22 May 1994).

<sup>57</sup> "Leader of People's Congress Party on Eurasian Union," *SWB* SU/2028 G/1 22 (June 1994), *ITAR-TASS* 0635 gmt (21 June 94).

<sup>58</sup> "Central Asian presidents to hold economic summit," *SWB* SU/2035 G/1 (30 June 1994). *Kyrgyzkabar*, 1000 gmt (28 jun 94).

superstructure to replace the dead Soviet Empire.<sup>59</sup> Irrespective of Kerimov's opposition, Nazarbayev submitted the plan for the Eurasian Union<sup>60</sup> to the UN General Assembly on the 1<sup>st</sup> of July 1994.<sup>61</sup> However, the summit was not a failure. There, an interstate council, an intergovernmental commission and other bodies of integration were set up among Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, where the Kyrgyz president expressed his continuing support for a Eurasian Union.<sup>62</sup> At this meeting, the agreements concerning the establishment of a common Central Asian Bank, joint ministerial councils<sup>63</sup> for the implementation of the common economic zone plans were signed. To accomplish these, an intergovernmental commission and interstate council were set up. At this meeting, Nazarbayev declared his strong opposition to the Russian “Near Abroad” policy and concept. Akayev was rather supportive of everything Nazarbayev said and announced his strong support for Nazarbayev's Eurasian Union plan. Kerimov was rather trying to assert that this Central Asian trilateral integration would have no contradiction with their devotion to the progress of commonwealth treaties.<sup>64</sup>

Within the troika, Kerimov was left alone. He was very uncomfortable with Akayev's support for Nazarbayev's Eurasian Union plan, and ruled it out by declaring it a

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<sup>59</sup> “Karimov interviewed on Eurasian Union,” *SWB* SU/2040 G/1 (06 July 1994), *Ostankino Mayak Radio*, 0211 gmt (4 July 94).

<sup>60</sup> For the program of this project see *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (8 June 1994).

<sup>61</sup> “Nazarbayev submits Eurasian Union Plan to the UN,” *SWB* SU/2043 G/1 (09 July 1994). *ITAR-TASS* 2056 gmt (1 July 94).

<sup>62</sup> “Uzbek-Kazak-Kyrgyz summit held in Alma-Ata,” *SWB* SU/2045 G/1 (12 July 1994) *ITAR-TASS* 0530 gmt (8 July 1994).

<sup>63</sup> Following the summit, a council of primiers, a council of ministers of foreign affairs, and a council of ministers of defence were established. And after few days, Serik Pirimbetov, perivious head of the CIS department in Kazakstan's presidential office was appointed as the Chairman of joint Kazak-Kyrgyz-Uzbek interstate council. See the text of joint comminque, “Uzbek, Kazak, and Kyrgyz leaders issue statement after summit,” *SWB* SU/2048 G/1 (15 July 1994), *Narodnoye Slovo*, Tashkent (12 July 1994), p. 2, and *SWB* SU/2048 G/2 (15 July 1994) “Chairman appointed to new Central Asian joint Committee,” *ITAR-TASS* 1236 gmt (13 July 1994).

<sup>64</sup> “Uzbek Kazak Summit held in Alma-Ata,” *SWB*, SU/2045 G/1-G/4 (12 July 1994), *Narodnoye Slovo*, (Tashkent: 9 July 1994), p. 1, *Kazak Radio* 1400 gmt (8 July 1994).

“new attempt to create a super-state structure”, and also an intrigue against the idea of Turkestan:

They [certain forces] don't want the idea of Turkestan to be prevalent among us, they don't wish to see it implemented and they cannot accept it... To reach this goal political matters must not be rushed. Nothing can be achieved with hustle.

About the idea of the Eurasian Union he was quite clear:

What is this talk? I personally think there are many factors and aims behind these moves-recreating the old former USSR. I recall a saying...'to once again tie a rope round our necks and be taken off and tied up in a cattle shed'. Our aim is first and foremost for every country and state to be independent. It is necessary for us to strengthen our independence, and then we will naturally get closer to each other in the economic, intellectual and cultural fields, and if necessary in other areas, and there will be many possibilities for this. First of all it is necessary for the state to be independent, and then one can create a formation, like the European Union in Europe. The word union is good word but it has different meanings... The peoples of Central Asia, Middle Asia must first be brought closer to each other so that they live together, and then we will look into other things.<sup>65</sup>

Kerimov's paranoia about the other two leaders led the two unite against him at the summit, which in turn necessitated another intermediation by Akayev. Only ten days after this summit the three presidents met again at the summer residence of Kyrgyz president on the shores of Issyk Kul.<sup>66</sup> Again, another temporary reconciliation was reached during this two-day meeting. There, they decided to leave the working out the details to the premiers of the three countries.

For this purpose, Kazakstan's premier Sergey Tereshchenko, Uzbekistan's premier Abul Kasim Mutalov and Kyrgyzstan's premier Apas Cumagulov held a meeting in

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<sup>65</sup> “Uzbek leader seeks closer Central Asian ties but no recreated USSR,” *SWB*, SU/2045 G/10 (12 July 1994), *Uzbek Radio*, Tashkent, 1000 gmt (8 July 1994).

<sup>66</sup> “Central Asian presidents to rest at Issyk Kul,” *SWB*, SU/2053 G/1 (21 July 1994), *ITAR-TASS*, 1251 gmt (18 July 1994). This was an un-official meeting and no joint communique were declared.

Bishkek on the 5<sup>th</sup> of August to work out the details of the integration – namely the setting up of the Central Asian Bank for Development and Cooperation, the statutes of Councils of Ministers and other details.<sup>67</sup> The Central Asian Economic Union was now officially registered and became active.

However, the plan for a Eurasian Union was still the first priority of Nazarbayev's diplomacy. The Kazak officials were trying to assert that the plan was rather economic than political. For the Kazak deputy premier Akecan Kacegeldin, the idea of the Eurasian Union was purely economic, which would facilitate the best market for Kazak exports.<sup>68</sup> However, the devotion of the Kazaks' desire to establish political and legal bases of the plan was unshakable. The Kazak leadership even organized an international conference to materialize the plan for the Eurasian Union.<sup>69</sup> Despite Kerimov's hysterical protests, Nazarbayev proceeded with his plan of advanced CIS integration and the creation of a Eurasian Union.

Strategically Kazakstan cannot do without Russia, just as Russia cannot do without Kazakstan... Our idea of Eurasian Union has pushed all politicians and presidents to adopt fair decisions on setting up the CIS Interstate Economic Committee, on working out a customs and payments union, and on more vigorous activity by the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> "Central Asian Premiers approve two Kazak officials for interstate bodies," *SWB*, SU/2071 G/1 (11 August 1994). *Kazak Radio*, 1400 gmt (5 August 1994).

<sup>68</sup> "Kazak deputy premier reports on state of republic's economy," *SWB* SU/2090 G/2-4 (2 September 1994). *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (19 August, 1994), p.1 and 3.

<sup>69</sup> *SWB* SU/2110 G/1 (26 September 1994). Kazakstan hosts conference on idea of Eurasian Union, *ITAR-TASS* 1002 gmt (22 September 1994). "A- three-day conference on President Nursultan Nazarbayev's Eurasian Union proposals, ended in Kazak capital on 22<sup>nd</sup> September with calls for greater integration between the CIS republics... The conference also suggested specific steps to bring about integration between the former Soviet states, including setting up a Eurasian institute of legal insurance of economic integration and to set up an International Nongovernmental foundation on the problems of Eurasian economic integration."

<sup>70</sup> "Nazarbayev on greater integration among CIS states," *SWB* SU/2193 G/1 (5 January 1995), *Interfax*, 1427 gmt (30 December 1994).

The Turkmen leadership, promoting bilateral relations with Russia, always declared the "present democratic Russia" as the key partner for Turkmenistan; and even explained the close ties with Iran in this connection.<sup>71</sup> For Niyazov, Russia was the sole guarantor of the Turkmen independence in the region.<sup>72</sup> However, Niyazov was always cautious - underlining consultative rather than coordinative nature of the CIS.<sup>73</sup> The Turkmen establishment had used this as a propaganda item to show the sensitivity of the "Turkmenbaşy" about their independence. On the other hand, Akayev was complaining about Russia's ignorance of Central Asian affairs.<sup>74</sup>

The only concrete result of the tenth summit was the actual establishment of the Central Asian Bank. The first Chairman of Central Asian Bank was appointed in late August 1994 by a decree of the three presidents, the name was the former deputy chair of Kazak *Alem Bank* [Kazak Eximbank], Satıbaldı Sazanov.<sup>75</sup> Even before the official establishment of *Tsentrallazbank*, Central Asian national banks set up a coordinating body to promote integrated economic structure among the Kazak, Kyrgyz and Uzbek economies.<sup>76</sup> The need for a common financial and monetary policy in the region was apparent and the establishment of the common bank was the first step towards achieving this objective.

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<sup>71</sup> *SWB*, SU/2090 G/9 (2 September 1994), *ITAR-TASS* 1107 gmt (24 August 1994).

<sup>72</sup> "Turkmenistan sees Russia as guarantor of independence," *SWB* SU/2117 G/1 (4 October 1994), *ITAR-TASS* 0817 gmt (1 October 1994).

<sup>73</sup> "President Niyazov stresses independence within CIS," *SWB* SU/2131 G/3 (20 October 1994) *ITAR-TASS* 2257 gmt (17 October 1994).

<sup>74</sup> "Akayev: Russia cannot abandon Central Asia," *SWB* SU/2126 G/1 (14 October 1994) *Izvestiya* (5 October 1994), p. 4.

<sup>75</sup> "First Chairman of Central Asian Bank appointed," *SWB* SU/2092 G/1 5 September 1994, *Kazak TV*, 1400gmt (29 August 1994).

<sup>76</sup> "Central Asian national banks set up coordinating body," *SWB*, SUW/0358 WB/3 (11 November 1994), *Slovo Kyrgyzstana* (27 October 1994), p. 1.

In October 1994, the presidents of Turkmenistan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan arrived in Istanbul for the second Turkic Summit, which was quite a show of unity against the Russian Ministry of Foreign affairs' protests to the summit.<sup>77</sup> Although many have debated the nature of these Turkic Summits, it was still a sign of joint will to attend the summit in spite of strong reactions from the Russian officials.

Kerimov, while hailing bilateral ties with Russia and praising the CIS integration, ruled out the idea of a Eurasian Union once again. He blamed the opponents of this idea as being saboteurs of CIS integration.<sup>78</sup> Nazarbayev's disappointment with the ignorance of Kerimov to his Eurasian plan led him to develop closer ties with Russia.<sup>79</sup> Thus, he distanced himself even further from the Islamic and Turkic organizations. When Kazakstan was invited to full membership into the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Nazarbayev said that the organization was too politicized; and added "Neither Pan-Turkism nor Pan-Islamism could be accepted by Kazakstan. We have made a different choice".<sup>80</sup>

Kerimov, being in an undeclared battle against the Eurasian [or Nazarbayev] Union plan, just before departing from Tashkent for the CIS summit on 9<sup>th</sup> of February 1995 in Alma Ata, once again, declared the Nazarbayev's plan "as an attempt to resurrect the USSR":

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<sup>77</sup> "Turkic states issue declaration at the end of summit," *SWB* SU/2133 G/1 (22 October 1994). *TRT TV* 1200 gmt (19 October 1994) and "Russia Warns Turkic states against isolationism," *ITAR-TASS* 1722 gmt (18 October 1994).

<sup>78</sup> "President Karimov says no alternative to CIS, dismisses idea of Eurasian Union," *SWB* SU/2173 G/3 (8 December 1994), *Interfax* 1657 gmt (29 November 1994).

<sup>79</sup> "Kazak and Russian presidents meet," See *SWB* SU/2207 G/1 (21 January 1995) *Interfax* 1046 gmt (20 January 1995), and "Russia and Kazakstan to set up joint armed forces this year," *Interfax* 1212 gmt (20 January 95), *SWB* SU/2210 G/1 (25 January 1995), "Russian and Kazak presidents hail closer integration," *Ostankino Radio Mayak* 1538 gmt (20 January 1995).

<sup>80</sup> "Kazak President says OIC too politicized," *SWB* SU/2218 G/7 (3 February 1995), *ITAR-TASS* 0024 gmt (1 February 1995).



...And if at the next meeting there are attempts, if our friend [Nazarbayev] again speaks about his Eurasia, we have said clearly and we are ready once more to express our opinion: independence, independence and once again independence.<sup>81</sup>

During the CIS summit, three leaders agreed on the establishment of the Interstate Council on 10<sup>th</sup> of February 1995 in Alma Ata, as a permanently functioning body of the Central Asian Union with a standing executive committee. It had three structural bodies: councils of prime ministers, foreign ministers and defense ministers.<sup>82</sup>

The eleventh Central Asian Summit, attended by all five leaders, convened in Turkmen city Tashauz on the 3<sup>rd</sup> March 1995 for a conference on the status of the Aral Sea and the environmental problems.<sup>83</sup> They set up a bank called the Aral-Eco Bank to coordinate projects for the Aral Sea.<sup>84</sup> Aral issue continued to provide a common platform for the meetings of the all five leaders of the region.

Around the same time, Kyrgyzstan was taking steps to join Russian-Kazak-Belarus customs union by signing a series of documents in March 1995.<sup>85</sup>

#### **7.4.3 Kerimov the Turkestanist**

The twelfth official summit of the Troika leaders was held in Chimkent on the 14<sup>th</sup> of April 1995 to discuss the economic integration and the prospects of Uzbek and Kyrgyz memberships to the Customs Union created by Russia-Belarus and Kazakstan.<sup>86</sup> However,

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<sup>81</sup> "Uzbek President again objects idea of Eurasian Union," *SWB* SU/2225 G/7-8 (11 February 1995). *Uzbek TV* 1530 gmt (9 February 1995).

<sup>82</sup> "Kazak-Kyrgyz-Uzbek agreement on interstate council," *SWB*, SU/2233 G/1-2 (21 February 1995), *Express*, (15 February 1995), p. 2.

<sup>83</sup> For the details of this meeting see "Kazak and Uzbek leaders review Aral Sea conference," *SWB* SU/2248 G/1-2 (10 March 1995), *Kazak TV* 1600 gmt (5 March 1995).

<sup>84</sup> "Central Asian summit on Aral Sea sets up Aral-Ecobank," *SWB*, SU/2245 G/1 (7 March 1995), *Interfax* 1012 gmt (4 March 1995).

<sup>85</sup> "Kyrgyzstan to join Russian-Kazak-Belarus Customs Union," *SWB* SU/2260 G/1 (24 March 1995), *ITAR-TASS* 0820 gmt (21 March 1995).

<sup>86</sup> "Central Asian Summit-text of communique," *SWB* SU/2279 G/1 (17 April 1995) *Narodnoye Slovo* (15 April 1995), p. 1.

the emphasis of the summit remained the same: promoting further regional integration. One of the main concerns of the leaders was the escalation of the civil war in Tajikistan. The details of this summit were worked out by the summit of the troika premiers on 24<sup>th</sup> of April 1995 in Bishkek, including the issues of economic integration program, common investment projects and the creation of a single economic zone.<sup>87</sup> In this meeting, they have prepared a scheduled program to create a single economic zone in the region by the year 2000.<sup>88</sup>

It was not until May 1995, after crushing the last bids of the democratic - Turkestanist opposition in Uzbekistan in the 26<sup>th</sup> March referendum extending Kerimov's mandate until 2000, that Kerimov was public vocal in "his Turkestan union ideas". In his address to the Uzbek parliament, he delivered his critically important new slogan "Turkestan our common home". President Karimov, on 5 May 1995, during the second session of the *Oliy Maclis*, announced his "*Turkiston-umumiy uyimiz*" (Turkestan Our Common Home) policy.<sup>89</sup> It was the Uzbek approach to the issue of Turkestan-Central Asia integration.<sup>90</sup>

Dear citizens, just imagine our fatherland Turkistan as a big house, a big household, and a big family. The closer the members of this family are to each other, and the more accord there is between them, the more prosperity there will be in their household. This boils down, as I see it, to the most vital issue today, that is the creation in the Central Asian region of a single zone of economic, spiritual and if necessary political unity... I have not the slightest doubt that all our peoples will support the slogan of a single Turkistan. Life itself tells us this, and it should be clear to all of us. Thousands of people who cherish peace in Central Asian region, stability and its future development, will certainly welcome this idea wholeheartedly. I would like to say one more thing- I don't know whether it necessary to

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<sup>87</sup> "Central Asian premiers begin meeting in Kyrgyz capital," *SWB* SU/2286 G/1 (25 April 1995) *ITAR-TASS* 0533 gmt (24 April 1995).

<sup>88</sup> "Central Asian premiers agree economic integration programme," *SWB* SU/2288 G/2 (27 April 1995) *ITAR-TASS* 0939 gmt (24 April 1995).

<sup>89</sup> Narzulla Curaev and Tursunboy Fayzullayev, *Uzbekistonning Yangi Tarihi: Mustakil Uzbekiston Tarihi* (Toshkent: Shark Nashrieti, 2000), p. 549.

<sup>90</sup> See *Ibid*, p. 549-51 for details.

broadcast this on the television or not- but if I do not open my heart to you on this matter I will not be at peace... But be clear that, if Uzbekistan does not regard its neighboring countries in the region, which is called Turkistan, with the same eye, if we do not concern ourselves about peace amongst our neighbors now, if we do not assist them and not contribute to defending them when it is necessary, then Uzbekistan's security will be in great danger... When we lived in Uzbekistan at the times of the former USSR, we were under a kind of shield, we were under protection. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, it looked as if a vacuum had appeared on the territory of the Central Asian region. At that time, when we hardly freed ourselves from one Big Brother, others started to act as if to occupy the Big Brother's vacancy... If they conquer us, they will conquer us one by one. If we are united, like a fist, then can any force conquer us?... Just think how rich this region is: Central Asia, its potential, both economic and spiritual. We have a thousand-year history, culture and morality. We have faith and will in our blood from our forefathers. If we stand as one, then others will speak to us quite differently... I hope that, if we could create such a public movement which would work for integration and unification of the regional countries, where representatives of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan irrespective of their social origins ready to struggle for our fraternal peoples' unification, then this would be most welcome. It would be appropriate to call the movement "Turkistan is our common home"... Indeed, it is our common home. It is time to say this openly. How long are we going to keep silent, to be afraid of someone... of a Big Brother, how long?<sup>91</sup>

Arriving in Alma Ata on 20<sup>th</sup> May for the Days of Uzbekistan in Kazakstan, Kerimov made another contradictory statement, proposing to remove all the borders between Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.

Today we are returning to our roots, and it is important for us to understand first and foremost that the roots that are feeding us all-both Kazaks and Uzbeks-are a single root... The main aim is for us to demonstrate again that we drink from a single spring, live on a single land, that our thoughts are similar, our aspirations are similar, and that we have one destiny... I think we should have no borders. We should have nothing separating us... Our common aspiration is to do away with these borders. And the Days of Uzbekistan in Kazakstan must set as a task this wish of Kazaks and Uzbeks to remove all borders and to live together.<sup>92</sup>

Both Niyazov and Kerimov openly dismissed the idea of economic and political cooperation among the Turkic countries at the Turkic summit in Bishkek. In his address to

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<sup>91</sup> *SWB* SU/2297 G/3-4-5 (8 May 1995), *Uzbek Radio* 0630 gmt (5 May 1995).

<sup>92</sup> "Uzbek leader wants no borders between Kazaks and Uzbeks," *SWB* SU/2310 G/5 (23 May 1995) *Kazak Radio* 0730 gmt (20 May 1995).

the Turkic summit in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek on 28<sup>th</sup> August 1995, Niyazov said that "a common language, being an important humanitarian aspect of regional cooperation, cannot become a platform to create a political bloc" while praising Russia's role in the region.<sup>93</sup> At the same summit Kerimov was quick to reject the idea of economic cooperation among Turkic countries, but promoted his own idea of a Central Asian economic zone.<sup>94</sup> Here, we understand that Kerimov's slogans about the Turkic roots and the fraternity of the peoples of Central Asia were all based on rather Soviet type slogans like the "common home", "eternal friendship of the peoples", etc.

Kerimov's efforts concentrated on asserting a common, but not self-defined, identity for the Central Asians. In September 1995, he organized the Central Asia Games, a regional Olympics in Tashkent, inviting more than one thousand athletes from all Central Asian republics.<sup>95</sup> Possibly, as anywhere else in the world, with this regional sport games and Olympics, the objective was to strengthen a regional identity.

The thirteenth summit was another Aral Summit in 1995 (September 18-20) in Nukus, with the attendance of all leaders except Niyazov. The achievement of this summit was the adoption of common policies on the Aral issue, the use of water resources in the region, and the need for the introduction of an advanced irrigation technology as well as new methods of environmental protection.<sup>96</sup> The Aral summits were rather popular among the leaders simply because they were non-political in nature, and received important

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<sup>93</sup> "Turkmen leader says common language is not enough to form a block," *SWB* SU/2394 G/1 (29 August 1995) *ITAR-TASS* 0929 gmt (28 August 1995).

<sup>94</sup> "Karimov ensure about effectiveness of Turkic economic cooperation," *SWB* SU/2394 G/1 (29 August 1995) *Interfax* 0816 (28 August 1995).

<sup>95</sup> "Uzbek president opens Central Asian Games," *SWB* SU/2399 G/1 (4 September 1995) *Uzbek TV* 1430 gmt (2 September 1995).

<sup>96</sup> "Aral Sea conference ends with declaration by Central Asian leaders," *SWB* SU/2415 G/1 (22 September 1995) *Interfax* 1302 gmt (20 September 1995).

western-international attention. With his absence, Niyazov was announcing simultaneously that Turkmenistan was joining the non-aligned movement in October 1995.<sup>97</sup>

Working on the details of the economic integration in the region, Kerimov met with the foreign ministers of Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan in November 1995, where he stated "the good-neighborly relations of friendship and cooperation between the peoples living on the ancient soil of Turan going back to the distant past".<sup>98</sup> His usage of the very term Turan indeed was no different than his usage of the term Turkestan. These concepts were only subsidiaries for the former Soviet mottos with a slightly more reference to the history of the region.

The fourteenth summit of the Troika leaders was held on 15<sup>th</sup> of December 1995 in Cambul, a Southern Kazak town. While the agenda was heavily on security issues of the region and on a common defense system, in this summit, the funds of Tsentralazbank were increased to 9 million dollars.<sup>99</sup> The prospective central bank of the Union was now operational with a considerable budget in Central Asian standards. However three leaders were well aware of their dependency on Russia in security matters in the region.

The fifteenth summit of the Troika leaders was held on the 12<sup>th</sup> of January 1996 in Kokchetav to discuss the agenda for the CIS summit in Moscow to be held on 19<sup>th</sup> of January. However, in the communiqué they asserted that they discussed the "progress in the fulfillment of integration programs in Central Asia on the basis of the programs for harmonizing the economies of these countries in the period up to 2000".<sup>100</sup> This time, in the

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<sup>97</sup> "Turkmenistan joins Non-Aligned Movement," *SWB* SU/2441 G/5 (23 October 1995) Turkmen Press 1330 gmt (21 October 1995).

<sup>98</sup> "President Karimov discusses economic ties with Kazak and Kyrgyz Ministers," *SWB* SU/2451 G/3 (3 November 1995) *Uzbek TV* 1300 gmt (1 November 1995).

<sup>99</sup> "Central Asian leaders seek creation of new peacekeeping force," *SWB* SU/2490 G/1 (19 December 1995), *Kazak TV* 1500 gmt (15 December 1995).

<sup>100</sup> *SWB*, SU/2509 G/1 (15 January 1996), *Narodnoye Slovo* (13 January 1996), p.1.

CIS summit, there appeared to be no crisis between Nazarbayev and Kerimov on the issue of the Eurasian Union because the issue was not taken to the agenda of the summit at all!

The Kurgan Tübe rebellion by Uzbek colonel Mahmud Kudayberdiyev caused a sudden collapse in Uzbek-Tajik relations from February 1996 on. The distrust between the two leaderships continued until 1998, Tajikistan's membership to the Central Asian Union.

The Foreign Minister publicly announced Uzbekistan's dissatisfaction with the CIS in February 1996. The CIS was unable to deal with the regional economy and conflicts; and unable to contribute to the stability, but CIS was rather trying to assert its will through an interparliamentary assembly.<sup>101</sup> Kerimov was especially, opposing the establishment of these kinds of supranational bodies within the CIS.<sup>102</sup>

#### **7.4.4 A Step Towards Eurasia: CIS Customs Union**

On the 29<sup>th</sup> of March 1996, Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan signed the Customs Union integration treaty, formalizing the "deepening integration in the economic and humanitarian spheres".<sup>103</sup> Naturally, it was Kerimov who condemned this treaty first.<sup>104</sup> This was followed by the official condemnation of these accords by the Uzbek parliament.<sup>105</sup> Nazarbayev's reply to this was to pass the treaty from the Kazak parliament's

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<sup>101</sup> "Foreign Minister explains Uzbekistan's dissatisfaction with CIS," *SWB*, SU/2544 G/1 (24 February 1996), *Pravda* (22 February 1996).

<sup>102</sup> "President rejects notion of supranational bodies in CIS," *SWB*, SU/2569 G/2 (25 March 1996) *Uzbek TV*, 1430 gmt (23 March 1996).

<sup>103</sup> "Four CIS members sign integration treaty," *SWB*, SU/2575 A/1 (1 April 1996), *NTV*, 1600 gmt (29 March 1996). For the English translation of the text of this treaty see "Text of integration treaty between Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan," *SWB*, SU/2578 A/2-5 (4 April 1996), *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (2 April 1996).

<sup>104</sup> "President Karimov condemns CIS integration accords," *SWB*, SU/2588 G/1-2 (17 April 1996), *Narodnoye Slovo* (13 April 1996).

<sup>105</sup> "Uzbek parliament condemns moves to restore Soviet Union," *SWB*, SU/2598 G/4 (29 April 1996), *Uzbek TV* 1530 gmt (25 April 1996).

approval immediately<sup>106</sup> and declaring the European Union as a model for this new Customs Union.<sup>107</sup> The very modeling of the EU for both Central Asian Economic Union and the CIS Custom's union is worthy of attention here. However these reactions did not stop the meeting of the premiers of the troika in Tashkent on the 5<sup>th</sup> of April 1996 to sign the agreement package on economic cooperation in line with the December-Cambul summit of the presidents.<sup>108</sup>

The sixteenth Central Asian summit was an official summit of the Central Asian Economic Union, held in Bishkek on 6<sup>th</sup> of May 1996 with the attendance of Troika presidents.<sup>109</sup> Apart from the plans for the implementation of the economic integration, there were three important items in the agenda. They were: an agreement on the cooperation in industrial production, a declaration on the use of water and energy sources and a resolution on a Central Asian peace keeping battalion under UN auspices.<sup>110</sup>

ECO summits continued to provide a platform for all Central Asian leaders to meet, including Turkmen and Tajik leaders. During the ECO summit in Turkmen capital Ashkhabad on the 14<sup>th</sup> of May, all Central Asian States declared their unrest with the politicization of the organization, especially in issues concerning Russia.<sup>111</sup> It was

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<sup>106</sup> "Kazakh Assembly approves CIS integration treaty," *SWB*, SU/2600 G/1 (1 May 1996), *ITAR-TASS*, 1343 gmt (29 April 1996).

<sup>107</sup> "President Nazarbayev looks to Europe for model of integration," *SWB*, SU/2600 G/1 (1 May 1996), *Interfax*, 0947 gmt (29 April 1996).

<sup>108</sup> "Central Asian premiers sign trilateral cooperation accords," *SWB*, SU/2581 G/1 (9 April 1996), *Uzbek TV*, 1430 gmt (5 April 1996).

<sup>109</sup> For the full English translation of the text of the communique of this summit see "Text of Central Asian heads of state summit communique," *SWB*, SU/2608 G/1 (10 May 1996), *Narodnoye Slovo* (7 May 1996). Apparently during this summit leaders decided to publish a new weekly magazine called "Central Asia: Problems of Integration", however the author could not reach any copy of that magazine.

<sup>110</sup> "Three Central Asian leaders agree closer economic ties," *SWB*, SU/1606 G/1 (8 May 1996), *Interfax*, 1048 gmt (6 May 1996).

<sup>111</sup> "Economic Cooperation Organization Summit Held in Turkmen Capital," *SWB*, SU/2613 G/1 (16 May 1996), *Interfax*, 1606 gmt (14 May 1996). In this meeting Kerimov, Niyazov and Nazarbayev said that they see the organization as a purely economic forum and they would oppose any attempts to politicize this objective. Kerimov even threatened other members with the withdrawal of Uzbekistan if that trend continues.

especially Kerimov who loudly threatened other members with the withdrawal of his country from the organization if that trend continued.

Although CA(E)U was a bit faster than the CIS and Customs Union in terms of achieving integration in the region, it was only after Kyrgyzstan signed the agreement to enter into the Customs Union (established by Russia, Kazakstan and Belarus in 1995) in March 1996, on the 25<sup>th</sup> of May 1996 that customs control points between Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan were removed.<sup>112</sup> The Kyrgyz leadership was too quick to implement the conditions of the Customs Union compared to the CAU. The next step within the CIS was to set up the long-desired Interparliamentary Committee of the four "mostly integrated" CIS states, the four members of the customs union - Russia, Kazakstan, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan.<sup>113</sup> Although, protested by both Kerimov and Niyazov, this committee's establishment meant Kazak and Kyrgyz determination would stand with Russia closely within the CIS affairs. While the customs control points between Kazakstan and Uzbekistan were removed earlier, the economic integration within the CAU was far slower than the one within the Customs Union. Despite every attempt to increase political and economic integration in Central Asia, the two largest economies of the region, Uzbekistan and Kazakstan signed necessary agreements to avoid dual taxation in June 1996.<sup>114</sup>

The seventeenth summit of the troika was held in Alma Ata on the 6<sup>th</sup> of July. Kerimov, Nazarbayev and Akayev spent two working days on the questions of deepening the economic union among the three and the implementations of the previous decisions. They also considered the plans to establish a joint Central Asian peacekeeping force under

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<sup>112</sup> "Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan Lift Customs Controls," *SWB*, SU/2623 G/1 (28 May 1996), *Kyrgyz Radio*, 1130 gmt (25 May 1996).

<sup>113</sup> "Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan set up Interparliamentary Committee," *SWB*, SU/2625 S1/1 (30 May 1996), *ITAR-TASS*, 1316 gmt (28 May 1996).

<sup>114</sup> "Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan Conclude Dual Taxation agreement," *SWB*, SUW/0442 WA/3 (5 July 1996), *Nalogovyye i Tamozhennyye Vesti* (28 June 1996).



the UN auspices.<sup>115</sup> The Central Asian battalion, established as a result of this summit, as a joint peace-keeping force of the CAU, made up of 500 armed men and located in Kazak-Uzbek border in Southern Kazakstan started with the name Tsentralazbat, and was sent to the NATO military exercises that took place in North Carolina in the same year.<sup>116</sup>

During this time, Uzbekistan was eager to have Tajikistan enter the CAU, and the first concrete step was taken by the economic cooperation agreement signed between the two countries on the 17<sup>th</sup> of July 1996.<sup>117</sup> And this opened the way to Tajikistan to get closer to the CAU and then become a member in the spring of 1998.

Then the eighteenth summit of the troika "plus two" (Tajikistan and Russia) was held in Alma Ata on 23<sup>rd</sup> of August 1996. This time Tajikistan and Russia were accepted into Central Asian Union in "observer" status. This was the first time, after a long-time, Tajik president Rakhmanov attended a Central Asian summit, with enthusiasm.<sup>118</sup> Agreements creating a single economic zone among the troika by 1998 were signed in this meeting.

Kerimov was still keen on developing multilateral relations with the rest of the Turkic states. That was why he hosted the 4<sup>th</sup> summit meeting of the Turkic speaking states with great enthusiasm on 21st of October 1996.<sup>119</sup> At the beginning of the summit he made his purpose clear by labeling the summit prompted by "a common history, not political or

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<sup>115</sup> "Three Central Asian Presidents Discuss Economic Ties," *SWB*, SU/2658 G/1 (8 July 1996), *Kazakh TV*, 1400 gmt (6 July 1996).

<sup>116</sup> "Central Asian Battalion to Take Part in NATO Military Exercises," *SWB*, SU/2686 G/1 (9 August 1996), *ITAR-TASS*, 1110 gmt (7 August 1996).

<sup>117</sup> "Tajikistan and Uzbekistan Sign Agreement on Economic Cooperation," *SWB*, SU/2668 G/1 (19 July 1996), *ITAR-TASS*, 1406 gmt (17 July 1996).

<sup>118</sup> "Three Central Asian Leaders Discuss Economic Cooperation," *SWB*, SU/2700 G/1 (26 August 1996), *Kazakh TV*, 1400 gmt (23 August 1996). And "Russia and Tajikistan admitted to Central Asian Union as observers," *SWB*, SU/2700 G/1, *Interfax*, 1237 gmt (23 August 1996).

<sup>119</sup> "Uzbek President opens Turkic summit in Tashkent," *SWB*, SU/2750 G/1 (23 October 1996), *Interfax*, 1044 gmt (21 October 1996).

even less so military-political cooperation,” and by calling all leaders to cooperate against terrorism.<sup>120</sup> In the text of the declaration of the summit, despite the urges by Kerimov on non-political features of the summit, 17 different articles exist, each about deepening the integration among each other.<sup>121</sup>

Kerimov was determined to achieve Uzbekistan’s leadership position in Central Asia. This was one of the reasons why the Uzbek leadership kept itself away from other regional initiatives, especially the ones under either Iranian or Turkish control.<sup>122</sup> Uzbekistan was not a part of a greater space; it was the center, the very initiator of the Turkestan Union itself.

#### **7.4.5 Security and the Taliban Threat**

Having taken the consent of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Central Asian governments were rather relaxed in the issues related to the NATO’s Partnership for Peace program as well as the preparations for the Central Asian Battalion, which was under way in the Kyrgyz capital with the support of Turkish, American and Danish NATO officials.<sup>123</sup> The Kyrgyz side, who was the most excited by the establishment of such a peace-keeping force, offered the Interstate Council of the Central Asian Union to deploy this force in the mountainous Karabağ.<sup>124</sup> The function of this new

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<sup>120</sup> “Turkic Summit ends With Joint Declaration on Economic Cooperation,” *SWB*, SU/2750 G/1 (23 October 1996), *Interfax*, 1619 gmt (21 October 1996).

<sup>121</sup> See the full text of the English translation of the document at “Text of the Declaration at Turkic Summit in Tashkent,” *SWB*, SU/2752 G/1-3 (25 October 1996), *Narodnoye Slovo* (22 October 1996).

<sup>122</sup> “Four Central Asian States Attend Afghan Conference in Tehran,” *SWB*, SU/2756 G/1 (30 October 1996), *ITAR-TASS*, 1137 gmt (29 October 1996). In this meeting the only absentee in the region was Uzbekistan, claiming direct role in the settlement of Afghan problem.

<sup>123</sup> “First Central Asian Peacekeeping Exercises Planned for 1997,” *SWB*, SU/2763 S1/3 (7 November 1996), *ITAR-TASS*, 1243 gmt (5 November 1996).

<sup>124</sup> “Central Asian Peacekeepers Could be Deployed in Karabakh,” *SWB*, SU/2770 G/1 (15 November 1996) *Interfax*, 2009 gmt (12 November 1996).

unit would be free from the CIS bureaucratic structures, at least in issues concerning the region itself. Kazaks were rather complaining about the slow bureaucratic functioning of the customs union and the security agreements between Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan; and had a desire to activate their structures.<sup>125</sup> So, there was still no consensus among the Central Asian states on the security issues.

However, the rapid advance of the Taliban towards the North worried Central Asian leaders. Nazarbayev called a Central Asian summit in Almaty on the 4<sup>th</sup> of October 1996 with the attendance of the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakstan and Russian premier Chernomyrdin, adopting a communiqué reminding Taliban the Collective Security Treaty of Central Asian states with Russia.<sup>126</sup> During this summit, Kerimov's major concern was to stop the Taliban somehow at the Salang Pass and to prevent them from gaining a foothold in Northern Afghanistan.<sup>127</sup> Strategically and geographically, there was nothing to stop Taliban infiltrating Central Asia if it could make a stronghold in Northern Afghanistan, which is historically Southern Turkestan. The anti-extremism campaign of the leaderships in each country supported Russian-dominated or secular opposition movements as in the case of the Russian-dominated Kazak democratic opposition (*Azamat*), which was calling for further CIS integration to halt the influence of religious extremism in the region.<sup>128</sup>

These concerns over regional security accelerated the CAU's efforts in the field of defense cooperation. During a meeting in Almaty, the Kazak, Uzbek and Kyrgyz defense

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<sup>125</sup> "Kazakhstan Concerned about Customs Union Implementation," *SWB*, SU/2734 G/1 (4 October 1996), *Izvestiya* (2 October 1996).

<sup>126</sup> "Russian and Central Asian leaders Call on UN to Discuss Afghan Crisis," *SWB*, SU/2736 G/1 (7 October 1996), *Khovar*, 1000 gmt (5th October 1996).

<sup>127</sup> "Taleban must not reach CIS Borders," *SWB*, SU/2736 G/3 (7 October 1996), *Interfax*, 0611 gmt (5 October 1996).

<sup>128</sup> "Kazakh Opposition calls for closer CIS Integration," *SWB*, SU/2736 G/3-4 (7 October 1996), Russian TV, 0610 gmt (4 October 1996).

chiefs decided to unite their countries' intelligence, counterintelligence, anti terrorism, anti-drug trafficking frameworks through an interstate defense body.<sup>129</sup>

This was exactly the time when a hot debate over the issue of NATO expansion was in the agenda. Several Russian and Central Asian figures proposed setting up a new military bloc to counter NATO's eastward expansion and it was only Kerimov who opposed this proposal.<sup>130</sup> Surprisingly, Akayev, arriving in Tashkent for an official visit on the 24<sup>th</sup> of December 1996, joined Kerimov in this opposition. He especially made it clear that they would not offer their territories to any power for attacks against any of their neighbors, namely Afghanistan.<sup>131</sup> The defense chiefs of the troika met in Almaty in the late January 1997 to finalize the preparation for the Central Asian maneuvers and the last checks of the troika's Tsentralazbat.<sup>132</sup> On the issue of defense, Central Asian leaders were quite decisive on creating a "Troika plus Russia" defense alliance to counter the Taliban threat.<sup>133</sup>

#### 7.4.6 CAU versus Customs Union

In November 1996, Kerimov ordered the re-writing of Turkestanian and Uzbek history by independent historians, and "not by the former Kremlin and Communist Party sycophants".<sup>134</sup> These four volumes represented the new version of Uzbek history, based on

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<sup>129</sup> "Central Asian Security Chiefs Discuss Cooperation in Alma-Ata," *SWB*, SU/2744 G/1, 16 October 1996, *ITAR-TASS*, 1012 gmt (14 October 1996).

<sup>130</sup> "President Karimov Addresses Parliament Opposes Military Bloc to Counter NATO," *SWB*, SU/2805 G/5 (31 December 1996), *Uzbek Radio*, 1708 gmt (26 December 1996).

<sup>131</sup> "Uzbek and Kyrgyz Presidents sign Friendship and Cooperation Treaty," *SWB*, SU/2805 G/6 (31 December 1996), *Interfax*, 1240 gmt (24 December 1996).

<sup>132</sup> "Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek Chiefs of Staff Discuss Cooperation," *SWB*, SU/2828 S1/3 (28 January 1997), *ITAR-TASS*, 1626 gmt (23 January 1997).

<sup>133</sup> "Russian, Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz defense Ministers Meet in Tashkent," *SWB*, SU/2853 G/2 (26 February 1997), *Interfax*, 0726 gmt (25 February 1997).

<sup>134</sup> "New Reference Book to Portray Uzbek History in Objective Light," *SWB*, SU/2785 G/3 (3 December 1996), *Khalq So'zi* (Tashkent: 27 November 1996).

the Turkestan heritage and Uzbekistan's progressive role in Central Asia. That was why Uzbekistan was protesting any union between CIS states [Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan] constantly, as a step backwards toward the restoration of Soviet rule.<sup>135</sup>

In the last days of 1996, Nazarbayev reiterated his pet Eurasian Union plan again: "Trade confederations will not give us anything. If Russia continued to advance on the path of democratic changes, kind feelings would arise about it, and then Eurasian Unity will become a reality".<sup>136</sup> His plan had more than economical concerns; it was indeed a political action plan to create a mythical union of the peoples of Eurasia politically. Nazarbayev simultaneously launched a program to have 4.5 million diaspora Kazaks living in 44 different countries come back to Kazakhstan to achieve the demographic superiority for the Kazaks in the country. Nazarbayev wanted to have them all back. Between 1992-1997 only 138 thousand of them returned to Kazakhstan.<sup>137</sup> Another sign of Nazarbayev's "nationalist" drive was seen in his decree changing the name of Jambul city to its original Taraz.<sup>138</sup>

In 1997, in his *Kazakhstan-2030* Manifesto, he said:

Our greatest weapon to satisfy our peoples short and long term national interests is integration. It is necessary to develop and strengthen a Central Asian alliance-union among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan with the principle of the non-interference to internal affairs of each other.<sup>139</sup>

The first armed conflict in the region, which became an "interstate" debate, was the Uzbek-Tajik confrontation in Tajikistan. It was in early January 1997 that the major

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<sup>135</sup> "Premier Sultanov rules out more integration with CIS," *SWB*, SU/2799 G/3 (19 December 1996), *Kyodo News*, 0953 gmt (16 December 1996).

<sup>136</sup> "Nazarbayev on Prospects for Closer CIS Integration," *SWB*, SU/2807 G/3, 3 January 1997, *Interfax*, 1327 gmt (30 December 1996).

<sup>137</sup> "President Nazarbayev Orders State Programme of Support for Kazakhs Abroad," *SWB*, SU/2811 G/1-2 (8 January 1997), *ITAR-TASS*, 1304 gmt (6 January 1997).

<sup>138</sup> "City of Dzhambul Regains Name of Taraz," *SWB*, SU/2816 G/4 (14 January 1997), *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (10 January 1997). Jambul was named after Kazak composer of odes to Stalin, Jambil in 1936. Previously had been called Aulia Ata by the Russian conquerors. It was the Karakhanid capital with the name of Taraz in 11th and 12th centuries, until the Mongol invasion.

<sup>139</sup> Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev, *Kazakhstan-2030* (Alma-Ata: Izdatelstvo Bilim, 1997), p. 123.

problem between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan broke out, a rebel Uzbek colonel of the Tajik army, Hudaberdiyev, seized the city of Tursunzade and the factories around it.<sup>140</sup> From then until 1999, both Hudaberdiyev and the Uzbek minority in Tajikistan became an important issue in Uzbek-Tajik relations.

The nineteenth summit was held on the 9<sup>th</sup> of January 1997 in Bishkek. The Summit was a working meeting of the troika leaders for two days on the details of the Central Asian Bank and the establishment of the peacekeeping forces in the region.<sup>141</sup> In the treaty of eternal friendship between the three Central Asian nations, it was stated that “the three Central Asian states have undertaken not to allow their territory to be used for armed aggression or any other activities hostile to their cosignatories”.<sup>142</sup> The very same day the summit started in the “Switzerland of Central Asia”, the major opposition party Erkin Kyrgyzstan’s chair Topçubek Turgunaliyev was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for campaigning against the “Akayev’s character”.<sup>143</sup> Akayev was the loyal supporter of the further integration of the CIS, emphasizing economic motives, deeming it as the only market for Kyrgyz products.<sup>144</sup>

#### **7.4.7 A New Approach Against the Taliban**

In June 1997, Karimov was awarded with the highest order of Kazakstan for his efforts and contributions to the integration of Central Asia and the eternal brotherhood of

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<sup>140</sup> “Rebel Commander’s Forces Reportedly Seize Aluminium Plant,” *SWB*, SU/2813 G/1, *Interfax*, 1626 gmt (8 January 1997).

<sup>141</sup> “Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek leaders to meet in Bishkek,” *Reuters News Service-CIS and East Eyrope* (08 January 1997).

<sup>142</sup> “Central Asian Ledaers Sign Eternal Friendship Treaty,” *SWB*, SU/2816 G1 (14 January 1997), *Interfax*, 1145 gmt (10 January 1997).

<sup>143</sup> “Opposition Leader Receives 10-year Sentence,” *SWB*, SU/2814 G/2, *Nasha Gazeta* (3 January 1997), p. 2.

<sup>144</sup> “President Akayev calls for increased CIS Integration,” *SWB*, SU/2836 G/2-3 (6 February 1997), *ITAR-TASS*, 1033 gmt (5 February 1997).

the two peoples.<sup>145</sup> This was Karimov's first official visit to Kazakstan since independence.<sup>146</sup> In July 1997, the Cholpan Ata summit was a celebration of the integration in the post independence of Central Asia.<sup>147</sup> Here, most of the technicalities of integration were worked out.<sup>148</sup>

The twentieth regional summit was held in Alma-Ata on the 28<sup>th</sup> of February 1997. The announced agenda was the ecological situation of the Aral Sea. In practice, the whole agenda was devoted to the "Taliban threat".<sup>149</sup> Seeking a solution to counter the approaching Taliban threat, all Central Asian leaders attended this summit. Kerimov was greatly concerned. He said: "it is difficult to imagine the consequences of the euphoria in which Afghanistan's Taliban forces will be, should they come close to the Amudarya".<sup>150</sup> Following the summit, as traditionally, Kazak, Kyrgyz and Uzbek premiers met on the 14<sup>th</sup> of March 1997 to sign the documents strengthening the economic cooperation between their respective countries. They signed all the necessary documents at this meeting to set up a single economic space by the year 1998.<sup>151</sup>

However, Kazakstan was not free from anti-Russian sentiments, especially after the deployment of the Russian Cossack units on and along the Russian border with Kazakstan

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<sup>145</sup> *Ozbekistan Avazy* (5 June 1997), p. 1. "Biz adadiy elkadosh khalqlarmiz" Karimov in Kazakstan in 2-3 June, Nazarbayev in 2 June 1997 with a *farman* awarded Karimov with *Altın Kiran* (Golden Eagle) orden for his contribution to the friendly, brotherly relations between the peoples of both countries and strengthening with further economic security and other fields in the central asian region, more economic integration on, centrtrazbank etc.

<sup>146</sup> *OA* (3 June 1997), p. 1. "Prezident Almatiga zhunab ketdi" This was Karimov's first official visit to Almaty-Kazakhstan. "Eternal friendship and cooperation among Uzbekistan Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan".

<sup>147</sup> A. Aşırakhmanov. "Bir tuugan elderdin baktısı uçun" *Erkin Too* (ET) (30 July 1997), p. 1. Çolpan-Ata summit the Central Asian Union anniversary was celebrated by the leaders.

<sup>148</sup> "Kun tartibinde: integratsiya" *ET* (25 July 1997), p. 1. Çolpan-Ata summit for the integration; finances, Central Asian Bank, integration mechanisms.

<sup>149</sup> See the full English translation of the declaration of this summit at "Central Asian States Issue Declaration on Aral Sea," *SWB*, SU/2864 G/1 (11 March 1997), *Narodnoye Slovo* (4 March 1997), p. 1., signed by all the five presidents of Central Asian Satates.

<sup>150</sup> "Central Asian Leaders Voice Concern at possible Taleban Advanve," *SWB*, SU/2858 G/1 (4 March 1997), *Interfax*, 2137 gmt (23 February 1997).

<sup>151</sup> "Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek Premiers Sign Cooperation Accords," *SWB*, SU/2869 G/1 (17 March 1997), *Kyrgyz Radio*, 1200 gmt (14 March 1997).

in March 1997.<sup>152</sup> Apart from that, the Russian Cossack organizations within Kazakhstan itself were quite active in politics and demanding an autonomous region in the North, even union with Russia. This was basically the reason why Nazarbayev,<sup>153</sup> who had been hitherto the champion of integration, joined Kerimov<sup>154</sup> in protesting Belorussian attempts to strengthen the CIS structures through the sophistication of the Customs Union. Akayev was again a close follower of Nazarbayev whereas Niyazov refused any attempts to create supranational organs within the CIS.<sup>155</sup> Economically, during the 1992-1997 period, Kazak and Kyrgyz policy of trade was heavily oriented to the CIS-markets; whereas, Uzbekistan preferred to strengthen trade ties with non-CIS countries.<sup>156</sup> So, Nazarbayev and Akayev would not be as independent as Kerimov in terms of regulating their relations with Russia. The 1997 events in Eastern Turkestan had created a tension in Kazakhstan; some Russian media covered the events as an organization of the Kazakhstan-based Uygur Associations,<sup>157</sup> which created fear and protest on the Kazak side.<sup>158</sup>

The advancing Taliban threat together with the activities of the so-called “Islamists” movement in the Central Asian states accelerated further defense cooperation between the CAU countries, especially helping them to explain their stands on the Central Asian

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<sup>152</sup> “Kazakhstan Criticizes Russia for Placing Cossack Units on Border,” *SWB*, SU/2879 G/1 (28 March 1997), *RIA News*, 1930 gmt (25 March 1997).

<sup>153</sup> “Kazakh President Warns Forced Integration Could Ruin CIS,” *SWB*, SU/2880 A/6 (31 March 1997), *Interfax*, 1747 gmt (28 March 1997).

<sup>154</sup> “Uzbek Leader Seeks CIS Cooperation Without Supranational Elements,” *SWB*, SU/2880 A/6 (31 March 1997), *Interfax*, 1716 gmt (27 March 1997).

<sup>155</sup> “President Niyazov reiterates Objections to Supranational CIS,” *SWB*, SU/2879 G/3 (28 March 1997), *ITAR-TASS*, 1708 gmt (26 March 1997).

<sup>156</sup> For a detailed Report and analysis of this issue see “Kazakh Newspaper Views Central Asian Foreign Trade,” *SWB*, SUW/0479 WE/3-5 (28 March 1997), *Ekspress* (18 March 1997), p. 3.

<sup>157</sup> In the post-soviet Turkestan, there were several Uygur associations, in Kazakhstan; *Uyguristan Azatlık Teşkilatı*, *Uygur Halıkara İttifakı* and *Şarki Türkistan Azatlık Milli Birlik Satı*, in Kyrgyzstan; *Kırgızistan Cumhuriyetlik Uygur İttifakı* and in Uzbekistan; *Uygur Medeniyat Merkezi*. See *Doğu Türkistan'da Öğrenci Hareketleri Sempozyumu: Bildiriler* (Ankara: Türk Yurdu Yayınları, 1995), see pp. 50-51 for a full list of Uygur associations all over world.

<sup>158</sup> “Kazakhstan Criticizes Russian Coverage of Xinjiang Unrest,” *SWB*, SU/2915 G/2, *ITAR-TASS*, 1419 gmt (7 May 1997).



Battalion and NATO Partnership for Peace program.<sup>159</sup> The relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were very tense; there were mutual accusations of supporting terror. The successive Tajik governments persistently claimed that Uzbekistan was supporting the renegade colonel Hidayberdiyev and attempts on the life of the Tajik president Rakhmanov.<sup>160</sup> Uzbekistan, on the other hand, accused Tajik authorities of supporting the Uzbek armed Islamic armed opposition, which was based in the mountains along the Uzbek-Tajik border.

For Russia and pro-Soviet forces within her, the CAU was not perceived as a threat at all; because it was open to any country and Russia could become a member whenever she desired to and could even sabotage this regional grouping merely by becoming a member.<sup>161</sup> However, according to Russian press, along with the Russia-Belarus Union, the CAU too was a barrier to CIS member to integration.<sup>162</sup> The CIS was basically slow to integrate its members but the CAU was quite effective compared to it. However, a regional grouping of China, Russia, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and even Tajikistan was realized in 1997 as Akayev formulated it in a speech.<sup>163</sup>

The twenty-first summit was held on 24<sup>th</sup> of July 1997.<sup>164</sup> The Troika presidents met again in Cholpan Ata to discuss security issues in the region and the formalization of the

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<sup>159</sup> "Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz Defence Ministers Meet in Tashkent," *SWB*, SU/2907 G/2-3 (1 May 1997), *Uzbek TV*, 1430 gmt (28 April 1997).

<sup>160</sup> "Uzbekistan Reportedly Denies Involvement in Attempt to Assassinate Rahmanov," *SWB*, SU/2908 G/2 (2 May 1997), *Voice of Free Tajikistan*, 0300 gmt (1 May 1997).

<sup>161</sup> "CIS: Three Interesting Spheres-Regional Groupings," Jane's Information Group, *Foreign Report* (15 May 1997).

<sup>162</sup> Mehman Gafarli, "Novaya Organizatsiya," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (11 July 1997), p. 3.

<sup>163</sup> "President Akayev Says China, Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan main Partners," *SWB*, SU/2963 G/3 (5 July 1997), *Interfax*, 1642 gmt (2 July 1997).

<sup>164</sup> *OA* (26 July 1997) no: 87, p. 1. "Markaziy Aziye: integratsiya yanada mustahkamlanadi" In Chulpan Ata summit: Nazarbayev, Akayev, Kerimov met in 24-25 July. They have established Centrazbank and discussed Afghanistan problem. Kerimov there stated that; "economic integration is key to further integration."

Tsentralazbat, a joint peacekeeping force of the CAU countries.<sup>165</sup> In this summit, surprisingly, it was Nazarbayev, who persistently stand for the development of CAU structures to promote integration among the three states.<sup>166</sup> One of the important outcomes of the summit was the decision of the three leaders to set up a common policy on the Afghan question.<sup>167</sup> Following this summit, as it had already become a tradition, the premiers of the three countries met in Almaty to sign the official documents on the decisions taken during the summit.<sup>168</sup> The agreements signed in this meeting covered harmonization plans on the “population migration, railways tariff policy, the establishment of a coordination council for scientific and technological development and the work of the Central Asian Bank for Cooperation and Development, as well as the creation of an intergovernmental commission to draw up projects for international consortiums”.<sup>169</sup> From this summit on, the collective use and management of the scarce water sources of the region slowly became another asset of the regional cooperation in Turkestan.<sup>170</sup>

The official or semi-official Uzbek media, as well as many commentators in the international media were interpreting Kerimov’s move to call two thousands Uzbek students back from Turkey as a move against the Islamic Welfare Government in Turkey.<sup>171</sup> The underlying story was much more complex, however. Kerimov’s hysteria for any Islamic movements was well known. But, more importantly these students affiliated

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<sup>165</sup> Alisher Niyazov, "Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia discuss integration," *ITAR-TASS World Service* (24 July 1997).

<sup>166</sup> Olga Dzyubenko, "Central Asia Leaders Call for Afghan Peace," *Reuters News Service* (24 July 1997).

<sup>167</sup> "Central Asian Leaders Approve Plan for Afghanistan Conference," *SWB*, SU/2981 G/2-3 (26 July 1997), *Kyrgyz TV*, 1430 gmt (24 July 1997).

<sup>168</sup> "Central Asian Premiers Sign Cooperation Accords," *SWB*, SU/2993 G/1 (9 August 1997), *Khabar TV*, 1200 gmt (7 August 1997).

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>170</sup> "Central Asian States Seek Common Strategy for Water Sources," *SWB*, SU/3037 G/1 (30 September 1997), *Interfax*, 1712 gmt (26 September 1997).

<sup>171</sup> "Students Recalled From Turkey Over Fears of Islamic Influence," *SWB*, SU/3008 G/2 (27 August 1997), *ITAR-TASS*, 0918 gmt (25 August 1997).

themselves both with the democratic system and the pan-Turkist and Turkestanist circles in Turkey, including the Erk Democratic Party of Muhammed Salih. Indeed, a considerable number of these students were supporters of Erk already.<sup>172</sup> This democratic environment provided by Turkey was becoming more and more unacceptable to the Kerimov regime, which was trying to strengthen strict controls over freedom of thought and human rights.

The Turkestan Peoples Movement, established in 1991, under the leadership of Bahram Gayeb, went far beyond Erk or Birlik in order to propagandize the idea of a Turkestan union, without confronting Kerimov in internal politics, as the sole program of the movement.<sup>173</sup>

Nazarbayev's Eurasianism was very lucid in 1997; he even at one time explained that one of the reasons for moving the capital to Akmola-Astana was establishing a great capital right "at the heart of Eurasia, closer to Russia."<sup>174</sup> He was trying to persuade the international public the very decision to move the capital had nothing to do with ethnopolitics but it rather about very practical concerns. It is believed that, if there was a political side in this move, it was only his Eurasian concerns. However, the calls for regional (Turkestan) integration were voiced from Kazak and Kyrgyz sides as well.<sup>175</sup> The CAU's anniversaries became regular celebration days in the republics.<sup>176</sup> The issues handled at the Cholpan Ata summit were celebrated as gigantic steps towards the rising of a new regional

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<sup>172</sup> Author himself personally witnessed several Erk activities in Turkey.

<sup>173</sup> For more on the issue see William Fierman, "Political development in Uzbekistan: Democratization?" in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, pp. 381.

<sup>174</sup> "President Nazarbayev Denies Breach of Ethnic Russian's Rights," *SWB*, SU/3061 G/4-6 (28 October 1997), *NTV*, 1540 gmt (22 October 1997).

<sup>175</sup> A. Asan. "Integratsiya: Bul aktivduu ish-arakter," *ET* (10 Dec 1997), p. 2. Central Asia's common energy-economy integration concept has been developed. 3 republics are agreed to integrate their countries further in economic means and also social-cultural side. And primers asked for Tajikistan and Turkmenistan to join this union.

<sup>176</sup> A. Aşırakhmanov. "Bir tuğan elderdin baktısı uçun," *ET* (30 July 1997), p. 1.

power.<sup>177</sup> There were even times the CAU acted as the intermediary in solving internal conflicts in Tajikistan.<sup>178</sup> Kyrgyzstan was also trying to rehabilitate the victims of the 1930s repression as the “sons of the nation”.<sup>179</sup> In Uzbekistan, the memory of Basmacis was resurrected and the official ideology declared them to be the “freedom warriors of Turkestan”.<sup>180</sup> It was said that the descendants of these Turkestani warriors should be aware of the heritage they possess.<sup>181</sup> The peoples of troika, according to Kerimov, were eternally brothers.<sup>182</sup>

The relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were at their worst during this time given the repeated Tajik accusations against the Uzbek leadership of aiding the rebel Uzbek elements dominant in Northern Tajikistan under the command of colonel Hudayberdiyev.<sup>183</sup> The Uzbeks of Northern Tajikistan in this period organized themselves both politically and militarily. The political wing of the movement was the Azad Tajikistan Party, a former ally of the president Rakhmanov. The military detachments of colonel Hudayberdiyev had been forming regular units by the time.<sup>184</sup> The Tajik leadership’s

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<sup>177</sup> "Kun tartibinde: integratsiya" *ET* (25 July 1997), p. 1.

<sup>178</sup> *ET* (21 May 1997), p. 1. (16-18 May 1997) Rakhmanov and Molla A. Nuri met in Bishkek with Akayev being the inbtermediator see for Bishkek memorandum.

<sup>179</sup> "Ul uuldarı unutulbayt," *ET* (9 may 1997), p. 1. An obelisk was opened for the victims of repressions of 1930s.

<sup>180</sup> Kahraman Racabov. "Bosmachilar Bosmachi edi mi?" *Vatan* (8 May 1997), p. 3. They were patriotic heroes who fought for expelling the bandit-bolsheviks out of motherland. Idealization and celebration of Basmacis. High Turkestanism "Türkistan halkları" See for the Stories of Little Ergash, Molla Ergash, Madamin Bek, Şermukhammed Bek. Their cause was the national independence and sovereignty of all Turkestan. Uzbeks now all Basmacı movement as *İstiklolçilik Harakati* (independence movement) for Turkestan independence.

<sup>181</sup> "Türkston ga Türkiston Jamlandi" (Turkestan gathered in Turkestan) *Vatan* (22 May 1997), p. 1. Representatives from Kazakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are joined to the Cultural Assembly of Central Asian Peoples in the Uzbek Capital's Turkestan palace.

<sup>182</sup> "Karimov: Biz abadiy elkadash halqlarmiz," *Vatan* (5 June 1997), p. 1.

<sup>183</sup> "Uzbekistan Denies Helping Tajik Rebels," *SWB*, SU/3006 G/2 (30 October 1997), *Interfax*, 1411 gmt (27 October 1997). See also "Uzbek President Denies Involvement in Tajikistan Unrest," *SWB*, SU/3065 G/2 (1 November 1997), *Interfax*, 1548 (30 October 1997).

<sup>184</sup> Author hosted the president of the Azad Tajikistan Party's ledar Yaraş Kurban on several occasions in Ankara and met with Colonel Khudayberdiyev in Uzbekistan same year.

response was tolerating the cooperation between UTO (United Tajik Opposition) and the IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan).

In early December 1997, the premiers of the Troika met to prepare the leaders' summit to be held on the 12<sup>th</sup> of December 1997 in Akmola, Kazakstan.<sup>185</sup> This was the twenty-second summit. At the summit, the CAU member states decided to set up five regional consortiums in energy, agriculture (and water), industry, oil extraction and security.<sup>186</sup> The summit also coincided with the inauguration of the new Kazak capital Akmola, the future Astana.<sup>187</sup>

The Eurasianism of Nazarbayev and "some Russian circles" were the primary targets of criticism by the Uzbek Foreign Ministry.<sup>188</sup> The same day, the Uzbek Foreign Minister Kamilov said that the Uzbek government opposed any Eurasian plans; Nazarbayev declared his desire for greater integration among the CIS countries under the Eurasian flag.<sup>189</sup>

#### 7.4.8 Revisiting History and Brotherhood

Nazarbayev had declared Uzbekistan to be the "brother state" and considered the existence of almost one million Kazaks in Uzbekistan as a "bridge between the two peoples" in 1998.<sup>190</sup> In December 1997, in the new Kazak capital Akmola, the three leaders

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<sup>185</sup> "Kyrgyz, Kazakh, Uzbek Premiers hold talks in Tashkent," *SWB*, SU/3099 G/2 (11 December 1997), *ITAR-TASS*, 1525 gmt (8 December 1997).

<sup>186</sup> "Central Asian Leaders to Hold Summit on Friday," *Reuters News Service-CIS and Eastern Europe* (11 December 1997).

<sup>187</sup> "Central Asian Leaders Mark Inauguration of New Kazakh Capital," *SWB*, SU/3103 G/1 (16 December 1997), *Khabar TV*, 1000 gmt (13 December 1997).

<sup>188</sup> "Uzbek Foreign Minister Says Government Opposes Establishment of Eurasian Union," *SWB*, SU/3114 G/1-2 (1 January 1998), *Interfax*, 1554 gmt (29 December 1997).

<sup>189</sup> "President Nazarbayev Calls for Greater Intergration Among CIS States," *SWB*, SU/3114 G/2 (1 January 1998), *Interfax*, 1335 gmt (29 December 1997).

<sup>190</sup> *Qazaq Eli*, Karaşan 6-12 (1998), p. 1. "Mengilik Dostik Mızğımaydı" Elbası Nazarbayev stated that more than one million Kazaks live in Uzbekistan.

met to celebrate Kazakstan's transfer of the capital from Almaty to this Northern city of Akmola.<sup>191</sup> In Uzbekistan, criticisms about the sacrificing of Uzbek soldiers during the WW II were voiced during this time.<sup>192</sup> The national ideology of Uzbekistan, “freedom at any cost”, has been explained as a non-controversial point in Turkestan Union idea.<sup>193</sup> The very idea of the “Türk Birliđi” (Turkish Union) was declared as the spiritual cause of the nation.<sup>194</sup> The Uzbek-Kazak fraternity was the leading force of the Turkistan Union idea,<sup>195</sup> and the patriotism on both sides were valued as the faiths serving this greater Turkestani cause too.<sup>196</sup> And the only way to achieve full independence was seen as the achievement of full economic sovereignty.<sup>197</sup> That was why the leaders of troika wanted to establish an economic union before having a political one.

Even among the Kirghiz, who are considered to have the least Turkestani consciousness, an important Turkestanist stand started to be observed among the laymen.<sup>198</sup> In the meantime, however, there appeared a new version of the official Kyrgyz history. Although recognizing the fact that the Kyrgyz were part of the greater Turkish identity, instead of Turkestan, Kyrgyz intellectuals initiated another ethno-geographical concept for

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<sup>191</sup> *OA* (16 December 1997), No: 147, p. 1-2. "Kordosh Khalkning kushalok bayrami" 12-13 December in Akmola Karimov Nazarbayev, Akayev met.

<sup>192</sup> Habibulla Olimjanov, "Uluđ Vatan Uruđi ve biz," *Vatan* (14 August 1997), p. 3. See this for criticism of Soviet-Uzbek historiography and the massacre of Uzbek youth on the both sides during the War.

<sup>193</sup> Baktiyar Isabek "Erkinlik... Demokratiya," *Vatan* (16 October 1997), p. 3. See for greater national cause is saving independence.

<sup>194</sup> Şuhrat Suyunov, "Jondoş, Kondoş, Ekadoş: Turk Birliđi," *Vatan* (27 November 1997), p. 1. After a week of Karimov's visit to Ankara, a very pan-Turkist article appeared.

<sup>195</sup> Akbar Aliev. "Uzbek-Kozok kardaşlar: Turkiston-Umumiy uyimiz" *Vatan* (16 October 1997), p. 3. See this article for the theme of historical brotherhood and kinship of Uzbek and Kazak peoples.

<sup>196</sup> "Adolat, Diyanat, Yurtperverlik," *Vatan* (6 March 1998), p. 2. Karimov's 25 February speech to the cabinet.

<sup>197</sup> Sodikov, Şamsutdinov, Ravşanov, "Turkistonning gallasi Sibirga, pahtasi Amerikaga," *Vatan* (5 June 1998), p. 3. See for the “New history of Uzbekistan.” It was very anti-colonial and blaming Russian Empire being very exploitive in all respects.

<sup>198</sup> K. Bayalinov, "Kirgizy v Kitae i doma" (a trip to Torogurt-Artush-Kashgar-Bishkek) *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (21.4.1993), p. 7. Interviews with many laymen who unitedly said, "Until the revolutionary period, there were no Kazak, no Kirghiz... we were united under one entity Turkestan... united Turkestan... we are one single Turkic people and our home is Turkestan" (interviews)

the use of the Kyrgyz public: the Turan.<sup>199</sup> Similar to the Kazak nationalist approach over the course of time, Kyrgyz claimed the heritage of the Turkic Empire and the Orkhun Turkic language.<sup>200</sup> As in the official Turkish historiography, Kyrgyz historians were eager to associate themselves with the Huns and presented them as being their forefathers.<sup>201</sup> Additionally, Kyrgyz people's past was related to the Timurid-Baburid heritage as well as the Kokand Khanate.<sup>202</sup> This concept was also strengthening the Kyrgyz claims over Osh at the same time.<sup>203</sup>

#### **7.5 The Fourth Phase: CAU Enlargement and the Central Asian Economic Community 1998-1999**

The twenty-third Central Asian summit was held on January the 5th-6th, 1998 in Ashkhabad with the basic objective of persuading Turkmenistan and Tajikistan to join the CAU - with a "three plus two" (CAU+Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) formula. At this summit, which was attended by all five leaders, the Tajik president Rakhmanov announced his country's desire to become a member, while Niyazov of Turkmenistan did not display any interest in joining in.<sup>204</sup> In Ashgabat, attempts to develop a common CIS policy on the regional countries also failed due to the differences of opinion among the neighbors.<sup>205</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> Kocoş Musaev, "Uluu Kırgız Tarihi," *ET* (2 Oct 1998), p. 14. See this article for its interesting terminology; Turan Memleketi=Orta Asiya. Kırgız (Turk) tilinde... Türk tilderi, Türk-Kırgız tili, Kırgız Türk tili, a pan Turkic approach.

<sup>200</sup> Il'giz Talip, "Tamır bir Tarih," *ET* (15 July 1998), p. 6. See nationalism in Kirghiz literature, novel poetry and also association with orkhun Turkic literature.

<sup>201</sup> Kocoş Musaev, "Uluu Kırgız Tarihi," *ET* (17 July 1998), p. 13. Association of Kyrgyz with historical Huns.

<sup>202</sup> Doolotbek Saparaliyev, "Timur, Timuridy i Kyrgyzy," *ET* (8 May 1998), p. 15.

<sup>203</sup> Askar Akayev, "Oshtun 3000 jıldık maarakesi-jalpy uluttuk masale," *ET* (11 February 1998), p. 1 and 6. In his long speech, Akayev underlined that Osh is Kırgız land and everything about Osh is a national matter.

<sup>204</sup> Anna Kurbanova and Lyudmila Glazovskaya, "Five Central Asian Leaders Discuss Regional Cooperation," *ITAR-TASS* (05 January 1998).

<sup>205</sup> "Central Asian Leaders Agree on Individual Approach to CIS," *Interfax*, 1031 gmt (6 January 1998).

Almost simultaneously, Kazak nationalists were declaring Kazakstan to be an indivisible part of Greater Turkestan with its spiritual capital, the city of Turkestan.<sup>206</sup> Apart from the persistent emphasis on the Turkness of the Kazaks, the importance of Turkestan city for the Kazak national identity was also much praised.<sup>207</sup>

For the forerunners of Turkestani unity in the 1990s, namely the Uzbeks, it was quite clear that the last 130 years of their history was a story of colonial<sup>208</sup> rule under the Tsarist and then the Soviet Russians.<sup>209</sup> In the literature, more than anything else, the pride and honor of being Uzbek was glorified; and “nomad-settled” or Uzbek-Kazak differences were attempted to be minimized.<sup>210</sup> Thus, the new national ideology was based on an anti-colonial policy with a strong nationalist development model. From 1996 onwards, Karimov's "Turkestan Our Common Home" approach had become the basis of Uzbek policy for inter-Turkestani relations.<sup>211</sup> A poem by Bozor Melik in the *Ozbekistan Ovozi* of August 7, 1997, summarized literary propaganda of this policy very well:<sup>212</sup>

Sun is your heart, Turkestan  
Blood brothers, Turkestan  
Table is in the middle  
A legend in the tongue Turkestan  
Uzbek-Kazak like one  
Tajik-Kyrgyz allied  
With the Turkmen friend  
Great land Turkestan

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<sup>206</sup> Qazaq Eli (QE) Mamır, (29-Mausım 4 1998) no: 22 (150), p.1 "Jumıla Köterer juk jetkilikti..." Hasen Khoja Akhmet (Azat Party President). See also p. 3 Kh. Joliş. "XXI Gasırdı Türkistan kalay karşı aladı?" considering all Kazakhs and Kazakstan as an indivisible part of Greater Turkestan. About the Turkestan city he says that "Not only of the Kazak, but it is the spiritual capital of all the Turkic peoples"

<sup>207</sup> QE Jeltoksan (25-Kazan 7, 1998), p. 1 and 4. Rahmankul Berdibay "Eki dunie esigi eskerusiz kale bere me?"

<sup>208</sup> OA (15 January no: 6 1998), "Imperiya siyasiy razvedkasi arkhivindan Jadidlar ve rus demokratlari" p. 1. By Khandam Salihov, Rustam Şamsuddinov and Poyon Ravşanov, "Türkistan ülkesi, müstamlaka," used in both governorship and grater meaning, see this article also for Cedids and Russian democrats.

<sup>209</sup> OA (8 January 1998), p. 3. More on "Jadidlar ve Rus demokratlari"

<sup>210</sup> OA (27 May 1997), p. 3. "Men Uzbekman" by Tolkin Kozokboev. Concept of motherland, cholpan and Fitrat were glorified, A kazakh declaring himself Uzbek.

<sup>211</sup> Akbar Aliev, "Uzbek-Kazak kardaşlar: Turkistan-Umumiyy uyimiz," *Vatan* (16 October 1997), p. 3. Historical brotherhood and kinship of Uzbeks and Kazakhs nations.

<sup>212</sup> OA (7 August 1997), no: 92, p. 1. A poem by Bozor Melik "Türkistan"



It has a city called Gürügi  
It has a hero like Manas  
It has a man like Alpomish  
Beautiful motherland Turkestan  
Its fortune sun is the source of light  
It has the greater respect  
It has all bread and food ready always  
It is the light of the darkness  
It is the land of Yasavi  
Its past is victory and pride  
A Rich place Turkestan  
It has the word of Emir Timur  
It has the signs of the forefathers  
Ancient Turan, Turkestan.

It was just prior to the Customs Union Leaders' summit in Moscow on 22<sup>nd</sup> of January 1998 that Nazarbayev reiterated his call for a Eurasian Union at least for the four standing Customs Union members, which would mean a full and "final integration" phase.<sup>213</sup> Apparently, during the summit, none of the other leaders, including Akayev, responded to this call.<sup>214</sup>

Another integration attempt was made at the preparatory meeting for the March CAU summit, where the Tajik, Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Kazak foreign Ministers met in Dushanbe on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of March 1998 to discuss Tajikistan's upcoming official admission as well as the rising threat of Islamic extremism in the region.<sup>215</sup> The twenty fourth summit was convened in Tashkent in March 1998.<sup>216</sup> The four leaders of Central Asia officially invited the Turkmen leadership to join the Central Asian Union, the existence of which was believed to strengthen economic and political integration.<sup>217</sup> This summit also signified the growing ties and cooperation between Tashkent and Dushanbe, particularly on the anti-

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<sup>213</sup> "Nazarbayev Reiterates Call for Eurasian Union," *SWB*, SU/3128 G/2 (19 January 1998), *Interfax*, 1223 gmt (16 January 1998).

<sup>214</sup> "President Akayev Praises Results of Moscow Summit," *SWB*, SU/3138 G/3 (30 January 1998), *ITAR-TASS*, 2015 gmt (27 January 1998).

<sup>215</sup> "Tajik, Kyrgyz, Uzbek Foreign Ministers Discuss Islamic Extremism," *SWB*, SU/3167 G/1 (5 March 1998), *Interfax*, 1603 gmt (3 March 1998).

<sup>216</sup> *OA* (28 March 1998), no: 38, p. 1.

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*

terror and security issues.<sup>218</sup> The five leaders of Central Asia were celebrated as the architects of a new and strong region.<sup>219</sup> The scarcity of water and energy sources was another factor forcing the Central Asian governments toward further integration; the Kyrgyz saw this as an inescapable “fraternal” cooperation with the Uzbeks.<sup>220</sup> At this summit, Tajikistan was officially admitted into the CAU.<sup>221</sup> In the joint statement by the four presidents, one can see that the political side of the integration had as much weight as the economic one:

The heads of state ..., on the basis of the historical and cultural community of their peoples, recognizing the important role of interstate cooperation in various spheres, wishing to create conditions for the creation of a common economic space and acting in the name of the peace, security and socioeconomic progress of the peoples of Central Asia... They consider the integration of Central Asian States as a natural and objective process... to strengthen eternal friendship... and fraternal relations.<sup>222</sup>

While Tajikistan became a member of the CAU, the Turkmen leadership felt the necessity to activate her foreign policy and gave more weight to the ECO meetings and activities.<sup>223</sup> By 1998, Iran had become the most active member of the ECO, allocating a huge building to the organization's secretariat in Tehran; and having closer relations with Turkmenistan<sup>224</sup>, who also became one of the most active members of the ECO, by then.

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<sup>218</sup> *OA* (5 January 1998), no: 2, p. 1. Rakhmanov arrived Uzbekistan in 4<sup>th</sup> January for bi-lateral talks on security and further integration, one day working list.

<sup>219</sup> Akil Adamaliyev, "Gensek zamani ötkon emi prezidentter dooru," *ET* (9 January 1998), p. 4. Karimov, Rakhmanov, Nazarbayev, Niyazov and Akayev's biographies and their friendship.

<sup>220</sup> T.U. Usubaliyev, "Pust' voda Kyrgyzstana skretim druzhbu republik Tsentral'noy Azii," *ET* (10 July 1998), pp. 10-11. See for sharing of water and energy sources in CA as a source of enforced-integration (economic) among all the states of CA theme for the unescapable brotherhood with Uzbeks.

<sup>221</sup> "Central Asian Union Admits Tajikistan," *SWB*, SU/3189 G/3 (31 March 1998), *Interfax*, 1541 gmt (26 March 1998).

<sup>222</sup> "Central Asian Presidents Issue Post-Summit Statement," *SWB*, SU/3189 G/4 (31 March 1998), Tajik Radio, 1000gmt (28 March 1998).

<sup>223</sup> "Turkmenistan Hosts Successful ECO Summit in Ashkhabat," *US PR Newswire* (20 May 1997).

<sup>224</sup> "Alma-Ata Declaration Issued at end of ECO Summit in Kazakstan," *BBC Monitoring Service: Middle East* (19 May 1998).

At this time, Tajikistan also applied to Customs Union for membership to balance her position in Central Asia.<sup>225</sup> This way, Tajikistan was trying to satisfy both Uzbekistan and Kazakstan in terms of regional cooperation alternatives. The ECO summit on the 11th of May 1998 was another platform that brought the Central Asian Leaders together in Alma-Ata. There, problems of regional cooperation were discussed with a special emphasis on the non-political nature of ECO by all Central Asian presidents.<sup>226</sup> It was around this time, Uzbekistan started to ask for the handing over the Uzbek “terrorist” groups based in Tajik opposition governorships.<sup>227</sup> From May 1998 on, Uzbekistan started a punitive campaign against the Islamic circles in the country, which were mostly based in Valley-Namangan regions.<sup>228</sup> This was the time, when the famous “Wahhabi”<sup>229</sup> cases in the courts started to be opened by the public prosecutors one after another.

The Turkic Summit in Astana on the 9th of June 1998 ended up with disappointments, without any decision for integration or whatsoever. Also, there was a warning from Kerimov saying that any relations with Uygurs would upset the relations with the “great” China.<sup>230</sup> (China, had openly used every means possible to influence the Central

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<sup>225</sup> “Tajikistan to Enter Four-Nation Customs Union,” *SWB*, SU/3193 G/2 (4 April 1998), *Interfax*, 1555 gmt (2 April 1998).

<sup>226</sup> “Summit of Economic Cooperation Organization Leaders Opens in Alma-Ata,” *SWB*, SU/3225 G/1 (13 May 1998), *ITAR-TASS*, 0552 gmt (11 May 1998).

<sup>227</sup> “Rahmonov Asks Opposition to Hand Over Uzbek Terrorists,” *SWB*, SU/3237 G/1 (27 May 1998), Tajik Radio, 0800 gmt (25 May 1998).

<sup>228</sup> “Trial of Seven More Uzbek Islamic Extremists Begin,” *SWB*, SU/3237 G/3 (27 May 1998), *Uzbek TV*, 1430 gmt (25 May 1998).

<sup>229</sup> One may see a very repeated and persistent usage of the term “Wahhabi” for every kind of religious movement in the Russian and Central Asian literatures. Traditionally, of course, there is no one single Wahhabi in the borders of Turkestan in the true sense of the word. It is also a fact that authoritarian and anti-Islamic regimes of the region favor the use of the term for even very moderate Islamic circles as well as the democratic oppositions, because of the negative meaning of the word perceived in the Turkestani public. However, author observed that at least among some of the Islamic movements in the region there is a “Wahhabi” fundamentalist approach to the traditional religion, cursing the pilgrimage to saints tombs, even destruction of some of these tombs in the rural areas.

<sup>230</sup> “Growing Economic Cooperation Welcomed, Scope for More Noted,” *SWB* SU/3251 G/1 (12 June 1998), *Interfax*, 1617 gmt (9 June 1998), and also See “Uzbek Leader Warns Helping Uighurs Could Upset Relations With China,” *SWB*, SU/3251 G/1 (12 June 1998), Uzbek Radio, 1000 gmt (9 June 1998).

Asian leaders to follow an anti-Uygur policy, speculating also the existence of Uygur “Wahhabi” terrorist organizations in Central Asia.)

The five nations summit of China, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan in Almaty on 3<sup>rd</sup> of July 1998 was the third step towards the creation of a new security pact in Eurasia, after the Shanghai Summit in 1996 and then the Moscow Summit in 1997.<sup>231</sup> The joint communiqué of the summit was a text of deepening cooperation, in exactly Nazarbayev’s Eurasian terms.<sup>232</sup> It was at the end of this summit that Nazarbayev agreed on the transfer of 407 sq kms of Kazak territory to China, thereby ending the territorial disputes between the two countries.<sup>233</sup> This border deal was ratified by the Kazak parliament on 3<sup>rd</sup> of February 1999.<sup>234</sup>

The twenty-fifth summit was held on the 17<sup>th</sup> of July 1998 in Cholpan Ata. This summit marked the final stage for the establishment of the Central Asian Economic Union for further economic integration among the three republics. The three leaders agreed on establishing a Central Asian (Central) Bank for common monetary policies and a special security system for eliminating terrorist threats, emanating from Afghanistan. During this summit in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan joined the Troika, and this new quadripartite economic union was named as Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC). So, after this date

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<sup>231</sup> “Five Nation Summit Meeting a Success,” *SWB*, SU/3272 G/1 (7 July 1998), *Interfax*, 1245 gmt (3 July 1998).

<sup>232</sup> See the full English translation text of the communique at “Five Nation Summit Issues Joint Statement in Alma-Ata,” *SWB*, SU/3272 G/2-3 (7 July 1998), *Xinhua*, 1346 gmt (3 July 1998).

<sup>233</sup> “China and Kazakhstan Reach Final Agreement on Border,” *SWB*, SU/3272 G/4 (7 July 1998), *Interfax*, 0744 gmt (4 July 1998).

<sup>234</sup> “Kazakh Parliament Ratifies ‘Advantageous’ Border Agreement with China,” *SWB*, SU/3452 G/2 (6 February 1999), *Interfax*, 1140 gmt (3 February 1999).

Central Asian Union and all multilateral treaties signed under it were adapted into CAEC, modeling a sort of EU model.<sup>235</sup>

Meanwhile, the defeat of the Uzbek General Reşid Dostum in Northern Afghanistan and the rapid Taliban march towards the North of the country alarmed all Central Asian leaders. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan strengthened ties with Russia in order to prepare to halt any possible Taliban attack.<sup>236</sup> Uzbeks were more concerned about the fate of their kin in Northern Afghanistan.<sup>237</sup> Russian troops in Tajikistan were reinforced to stop any Taliban infiltration into the country. This new development was accompanied with the cries of Central Asian leaders to struggle against Islamic “terror”. Defense ministers of Russia and CAEC met in Dushanbe on the 20<sup>th</sup> of August to decide on joint action against the new threat.<sup>238</sup> This was also an opportunity for Nazarbayev and Akayev to call for further CIS integration in defense and security policies.<sup>239</sup>

### 7.5.1 Ideology and Integration: the Kyrgyz View

In this process, Kyrgyz nationalism was developing along the same lines as Uzbek and Kazak nationalisms - all emphasizing the historical roles of their respective nations in the region.<sup>240</sup> In addition to the Turkestanist position of the official nationalism, terms like

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<sup>235</sup> "Four Republics Unite in Central Asian Economic Community," *BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR* (21 July 1998).

<sup>236</sup> "Uzbekistan and Russia warn Taleban to halt Military Action in North Afghanistan," *SWB*, SU/3302 G/1 (11 August 1998), *Interfax*, 0800 gmt (5 August 1998).

<sup>237</sup> *OA* (22 May 1997), p. 3. "Afganiston: yuk otişlar, fozhiçlar, kulfatlar" by Şuhrat Mahmudbekov. Uzbek foreign policy is very much concerned about Afghanistan for both Uzbeks in the north and about the regime there.

<sup>238</sup> "Russian and Central Asian States Consider Reinforcing Afghan Border," *SWB*, SU/3312 G/1 (22 August 1998), *Interfax*, 0953 gmt (20 August 1998).

<sup>239</sup> "President Akayev Urges Deeper CIS Integration in wake of Russian Crisis," *SWB*, SU/3322 G/2 (3 September 1998), *ITAR-TASS*, 1406 gmt (31 August 1998).

<sup>240</sup> Cumagul Saldanbekov, "Bizge Kandy Ideologiya Kerek?" *Erkin Too (ET)* (7 October 1998), pp. 4-5. See for the formation of new Kyrgyz nationalism on ideological legs of; 1. Principals of social bases of national ideology, 2. National base for national ideology like Manas, 3. Practical political program.

Turan and *Türk Elleri* (Turkic Lands) were also commonly used in the literature. The genealogical tables of the Kyrgyz tribes were shown as the proofs of the unity of the Turkestan peoples.<sup>241</sup> Akayev, on the other hand, was asserting his poorly tailored “Jibek Jolu” (Silk Road) project as an alternative to Eurasianist and Turkestanist stands.<sup>242</sup> According to Akayev, the Silk Road project was basically a promotion of peace and security through enhancing commercial ties among the nations. However, Kyrgyzstan’s being part of Central Asia had never been discussed.<sup>243</sup> The commonalities and common heroes were not only historical elements but heroes like Cengiz Aytmatov were the signs of the continuing close interactions among the peoples of the region.<sup>244</sup> The new historical approach was even calling Kyrgyz history an indivisible part of Turk(ic) history.<sup>245</sup> The idealization of the Kyrgyz national-communists murdered by the Stalinist terror, was another element in the new ideology.<sup>246</sup> Despite governmental warnings, an anti-Russian Kyrgyz nationalism was also rising.<sup>247</sup> It is also interesting to note that Kyrgyz, living in the rural areas of the country and in China were calling the lands they inhabited Turkestan, rather than any other regional or governmental name.

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<sup>241</sup> Kocoş Musaev, "Uluu Kırgız Tarihi," *ET* (23 September 1998), p. 14. See the Kirghiz genealogical table of tribes etc. In which Uzbek, Turkmen, Mongol, Kerey etc included. See for common hordes tribes among the Turkic tribes like nayman kongurat merkit etc.

<sup>242</sup> Askar Akayev, "Jibek yolunun diplomatsiyası: Kırgız Respublikasının prezidenti Askar Akaevdin Doktrinası," *ET* (18 September 1998), pp. 4-5. Akayevs doctrine is declared as the resurrection of the silkroad through diplomatic means. Like Nazarbayev's Eurasian idea, he said that stability can be achieved regionally by creating a silk-road diplomatic alliance of anti-narcotism, anti-extremism and anti-terrorism.

<sup>243</sup> Kocoş Musaev, "Uluu Kırgız Tarihi," *ET* (11 September 1998), p. 14. Part of central asia-urta aziya concept.

<sup>244</sup> Ural Agaydarov, "Karakalpak jergesinde," *ET* (4 December 1998), p. 60. Celebrating Cengiz Aytmatov's 70<sup>th</sup> birthday there in Nukus. Kırgız-Karakalpak being close kins. See the same issue for nationalist novels.

<sup>245</sup> Kudaykul Junusov, "Kırgız ideologiyası Kırgız Tarihında," *ET* (27 November 1998), p. 9. Re-writing history according to Kyrgyz ideology calls it ancient Turkish history, Kırgız-Turk history.

<sup>246</sup> Ernis Tursunov, "Ata-Beyit," *ET* (4 November 1998), p. 13. For the Kyrgyz national communists killed during 1938 terror of 5 November.

<sup>247</sup> A. Mambetov, "Uluttuk önuguunun, ar-namıstın jana ideologiyanın taluu meseleleri" *ET* (2 September 1998), p. 5. See for nationalism and anti-russian reactions for the creation of a national state.

Just as in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan, re-writing of the official history, free from Soviet propaganda, was the center of local Slavic criticism.<sup>248</sup> The idealization of Kazak hero Kenesari by the Kyrgyz was basically a sign of their commitment to sharing a historical heritage with the Kazak brethren.<sup>249</sup> Apart from that, the very practical reasons like sharing the water and energy resources of the region were presented to the Kyrgyz public as the basis for regional integration.<sup>250</sup> The heritages of historical Huns,<sup>251</sup> the Orkhun Turkic Khaganate and language were also accepted during this time.<sup>252</sup> The New Kyrgyz history also claimed the heritage of the Timurid dynasty, especially of Babur who first ruled in the Ili and Fergana regions. The Kyrgyz intelligentsia became very committed to the necessity of an “only and clear” national ideology.<sup>253</sup> However there were also problems like the heritage of the cities. Just as Uzbeks celebrated the 2nd millennium of the city of Samarkand, and Kazaks celebrated the 2nd millennium of the city of Turkestan, the Kyrgyz also celebrated the 3rd millennium of the city of Osh, as an ancient Kyrgyz city.<sup>254</sup>

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<sup>248</sup> *ET* (19 June, 1998), p. 7. A letter by T.U. Usubaliyev, Kirgiz upper house deputy. Wrote that journalists of Russian *Vecherniy Bishkek* were sending several letters to the parliament criticizing *Erkin Too*, historical pages being too extreme, black and white approach. A two pages article by T.U. Usubaliyev, "Ochevidna ocherednaya popytka perepisat' istoriyu. Komu eto nuzhno?" pp. 7-8 *ET* (19 June 1998). It Says Soviet-Russian falsified version of their history has been corrected by their historians and it is necessary to teach people this Turkic version through mass media. Soviet propaganda machine has been the real falsification.

<sup>249</sup> Orman Han, "Kenesarynyn çabuulun makaloo," *ET* (1 July 1998), p. 15.

<sup>250</sup> T.U. Usubaliyev, "Pust'voda Kyrgyzstana skretim druzhbu republik Tsentral'noy Azii," *ET* (10 July 1998), pp. 10-11. See for sharing of water and energy sources in Central Asia as a source of enforced-integration (economic) among all the states of CA theme for the unescapable brotherhood with Uzbeks.

<sup>251</sup> Kocoş Musaev, "Uluu Kirgız Tarihi," *ET* (17 July 1998), p. 13.

<sup>252</sup> Il'giz Talip, "Tamırı bir Tarihi," *ET* (15 July 1998), p. 6. See nationalism in Kirghiz literature, novel poetry and also association with Orkhun Turkic literature.

<sup>253</sup> Dayır Asanov, "Bizge jalpı uluttuk ideologiya kerekpi?" *ET* (1 April 1992), p. 12. For a reply by Major General Soviet hero to these .

<sup>254</sup> Askar Akayev, "Oştun 3000 jıldık maarakesi-jalpı uluttuk masale," *ET* (11 February 1998), p. 1 and 6.

### 7.5.2 The Uzbek-Tajik Confrontation Revisited

In early November 1998, Uzbek colonel Hidayberdiyev re-attacked Tajikistan's second largest city Hocend, seizing all government buildings, which led to another great crisis between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.<sup>255</sup> This time, Kerimov offered his full support to Rahmanov, causing rebels to retreat from the city.<sup>256</sup> However the Tajik media continued to accuse Uzbekistan of involvement in the seizure of the city.<sup>257</sup> Kerimov in his turn accused the Russian FSB of provoking an interethnic and interstate confrontation in the region.<sup>258</sup> Infuriated by these allegations made by the Tajik leadership, Kerimov cut gas deliveries to Tajikistan immediately.<sup>259</sup> A one month-long gasless cold winter forced Tajikistan to pay all her debts to Uzbekistan in early January 1999 before receiving gas again.<sup>260</sup>

As the CIS's collective security treaty was to expire in April 1999 and Uzbekistan was the first nation to declare her desire officially to withdraw from this treaty.<sup>261</sup> The main reason for the Uzbek discontent was the Moscow's "too close" relations with the Tajik leadership and the unfair treatment of Uzbekistan's security concerns within the system.<sup>262</sup> Kerimov was increasingly becoming critical of Russia's "lack of policy" on the Central

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<sup>255</sup> "Rebel Commander's Gunmen Seize Strategic Buildings in Second City," *SWB*, SU/3376 G/1 (5 November 1998), *Interfax*, 0511 gmt (4 November 1998).

<sup>256</sup> "President Rahmanov Says Rebels defeated at Khujand," *SWB*, SU/3378 G/1 (7 November 1998), *Interfax*, 0628 gmt (6 November 1998).

<sup>257</sup> "Tajik Radio Accuses Uzbekistan of Involvement in Uprising," *SWB*, SU/3379 G/2 (9 November 1998), *Tajik Radio*, 0900 gmt (6 November 1998).

<sup>258</sup> "Karimov says Russian Intelligence Provoking Uzbek-Tajik Friction," *SWB*, SU/3399 G/2 (2 December 1998), *Russian Public TV*, 1500 gmt (30 November 1998).

<sup>259</sup> "Uzbekistan Suspends Gas Deliveries to Tajikistan," *SWB*, SU/3405 G/5 (9 December 1998), *ITAR-TASS*, 1124 gmt (5 Dec 1998).

<sup>260</sup> "President Karimov, Tajik premier sign agreements on debts, gas," *SWB*, SU/3428 G/1 (9 January 1999), *Uzbek TV*, 1400 gmt (7 January 1999).

<sup>261</sup> "Uzbekistan to Withdraw from CIS Security Treaty," *SWB*, SU/3452 G/1 (6 February 1999), *ITAR-TASS*, 1246 gmt (4 February 1999).

<sup>262</sup> "Discontent at CIS Security Treaty Linked to Relations with Tajikistan," *SWB*, SU/3452 G/1-2 (6 February 1999), *Izvestia* (4 February 1999).



Asia.<sup>263</sup> He argued that, not only the economic treaties were not working<sup>264</sup> but the security treaty and almost all the rest of the CIS were not functioning at all.<sup>265</sup>

In an interview given to *Turkistan* newspaper in February 1999, Kerimov stated:

Certain political forces are propagandizing the “virtues” of this [Russian Belarussian] union in order to attract other CIS countries and peoples.... Another ideological threat, which could have a negative impact on us, is distortion of the history of the Uzbek nation. Pseudoscholarly interpretations of history and some political slogans are intended to deprive us of our history. In accordance with the statements of certain foreign politicians and scholars, there is no such a nation as Uzbeks but there are in general Turkish people. That is, why should there be an end to such concepts as Uzbek, Kazak, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Tatar, Bashkir, Uighur and others? We can never agree with such views... Of course, we recognize that our historical roots are connected with Turkish people; we have the same language, religion, traditions and values. But we have always thought ourselves as an independent nation-the Uzbek people, and we are proud of this.<sup>266</sup>

Only a few days later, on the 16<sup>th</sup> of February 1999, four blasts shook Tashkent, destroying a bloc of flats as well as main prospects of the city.<sup>267</sup> These blasts totally changed the agenda not only of the Uzbek leadership but also for the whole region. This had influenced the Central Asian politics for the next two-and-a-half years, until 11 September 1999. This period of two-and-a-half years can be called as the reign of terror, for the governments and oppositions alike, in Central Asia.

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<sup>263</sup> “President Kerimov says Russia has no Clear Policy on Central Asia,” *SWB*, SU/3458 G/3 (13 February 1999), *ITAR-TASS*, 1041 gmt (11 February 1999).

<sup>264</sup> “Karimov Says CIS Economic Agreements do not Work,” *SWB*, SU/3458 G/4 (13 February 1999), *ITAR-TASS*, 1415 gmt (11 February 1999).

<sup>265</sup> “Karimov Says Security Treaty not Working,” *SWB*, SU/3458 G/4 (13 February 1999), *ITAR-TASS*, 1259 gmt (11 February 1999).

<sup>266</sup> “President Interviewed on Elections, Islam, CIS,” *SWB*, SU/3454 G/3-6 (9 February 1999), *Turkiston* (2 February 1999).

<sup>267</sup> “Four Blasts Shake Tashkent, deaths reported,” *SWB*, SU 3461 G/1 (17 February 1999), *Uzbek Radio*, 0910 gmt (16 February 1999).

## 7.6 The Fifth Phase: Reign of Terror 1999-2001

The bomb blasts took place at exactly the same time as Colonel Hudayberdiyev's rebel forces were getting ready to cross the border from Uzbekistan into the Hocend region of Tajikistan.<sup>268</sup> With the bombings, an emergency summit of the troika presidents, held in Astana on the 19<sup>th</sup> of February, which was dedicated to the second anniversary of the eternal friendship treaty, signed by the three states.<sup>269</sup> In fact, the twenty-sixth summit was called for discussing the latest events in Uzbekistan.<sup>270</sup> These events also were the end of the series of the Uzbek incursions onto Tajik soil.

Tajikistan's entrance to the Customs' Union was certainly a blow to Kerimov's Central Asian policy. He criticized this new grouping as a sabotage of the CIS itself.<sup>271</sup> Alarmed by the bomb blasts in Tashkent, Central Asian states started dialogue with the Taliban.<sup>272</sup> The same year, not only the Kazak and Kyrgyz diplomats but also the Uzbek Foreign Minister met the Taliban leader Molla Muhammed Ömer in Kandahar.<sup>273</sup>

Kerimov's first accusations against Turkey and certain Turkish circles operating in Uzbekistan whom he linked with the bombings had frozen Turkish-Uzbek relations. Turkish President Demirel took the initiative and went to Tashkent on 15<sup>th</sup> of March.<sup>274</sup>

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<sup>268</sup> "Commander Says Rebels Planning New Incursion from Uzbekistan," *SWB*, SU/3464 G/2 (20 February 1999), *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran*, 0230 gmt (18 February 1999).

<sup>269</sup> "Summit of Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek Presidents," *SWB*, SU/3466 G/1 (23 February 1999), *ITAR-TASS*, 1503 gmt (19 February 1999).

<sup>270</sup> For a detailed analysis of the "reign of terror" from February 1999 to September 2001, see Hasan Ali Karasar, "Bağımsızlıklar Sonrası Türkistan'da Rus Siyaseti," *Avrasya Dosyası*, V. 6, No. 4 (Winter 2001), pp. 220-271.

<sup>271</sup> "Karimov Criticizes Five-Nation CIS Customs Union," *SWB*, SU/3476 G/3 (6 March 1999), *Interfax*, 1504 gmt (2 March 1999).

<sup>272</sup> "Foreign Minister Tokayev in Talks with Taleban in Pakistan," *SWB*, SU/3479 G/1 (10 March 1999), *Khabar TV*, 1600 gmt (5 March 1999).

<sup>273</sup> "Foreign Minister Komilov, Taleban Leader meet in Southern Afghanistan," *SWB*, SU/3551 G/2 (3 June 1999), *Radio Voice of Shariah*, 1500 gmt (1 June 1999).

<sup>274</sup> "Turkish President Demirel Arrives in Tashkent," *SWB*, SU/3485 G/1 (17 March 1999), *Uzbek Radio*, 1000 gmt (15 March 1999).

During the visit, Demirel declared his open support for Kerimov in his war against terror.<sup>275</sup> Despite all of the preventive measures that have tried to be taken, bombings marked the beginnings of an anti-Turk, anti-Islamic and even anti-Turkestanian policy by the Uzbek leadership. Kerimov's Turkestanist stance was shifted to a pure "Central Asian" union plan, without even mentioning the word Turkestan.

Simultaneously, the IMU declared Kerimov's regime a an "evil government" and asked for a peaceful retreat; and made threats of further aggression against the Uzbek regime through Iranian radio.<sup>276</sup> In late March, a small IMU detachment raided a bus in Ürgenç and got into an armed conflict with the local police, leaving nine dead and a dozen wounded.<sup>277</sup>

The decision by Russia and Tajikistan to set up a new permanent military base for the 201<sup>st</sup> motor rifle division caused a protest by Kerimov who opposed the idea by asking "who is the base is aimed at?"<sup>278</sup> Tajik response by a high-ranking source in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was interesting. He said: "Uzbekistan should finally accept the idea that Tajikistan is a sovereign state, and not an autonomous area within its influential neighbor".<sup>279</sup> Kerimov's response was even more interesting, he said: "... they [Uzbeks and Tajiks] are one nation speaking two different languages".<sup>280</sup>

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<sup>275</sup> "Uzbek, Turkish Presidents Pledge to Join Forces Against Terrorism," *SWB*, SU/3487 G/1 (19 March 1999), *ITAR-TASS*, 1956 gmt (15 March 1999).

<sup>276</sup> "Islamic Movement Says Government Must Go or to be Removed," *SWB*, SU/3490 G/1 (23 March 1999), *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran*, 0200 gmt (19 March 1999).

<sup>277</sup> "Bus Incident Leaves Nine Dead and Several Wounded," *SWB*, SU 3500 G/2-3 (5 April 1999), *Uzbek TV*, 1430 gmt (31 March 1999).

<sup>278</sup> "President Karimov Questions Motives for Setting up Russian Army Base in Tajikistan," *SWB*, SU/3505 G/3 (10 April 1999), *Interfax*, 0953 gmt (8 April 1999).

<sup>279</sup> "Ledareship annoyed at Uzbek Reaction to Russian Base in Tajikistan," *SWB*, SU/3507 G/4 (13 April 1999), *ITAR-TASS*, 1506 gmt (9 April 1999).

<sup>280</sup> "President Karimov says Misunderstandings Settled with Tajikistan," *SWB*, SU/3507 G/4 (13 April 1999), *Uzbek TV*, 1430 gmt (9 April 1999).

The five presidents of Central Asia met at the twenty-seventh summit, in Ashkhabad on the 9<sup>th</sup> of April 1999, to discuss the status of the Aral Sea. Presidents supported Niyazov's decision to withdraw from the CIS visa-free regime.<sup>281</sup> Through the Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran Radio, the IMU leader Tahir Yuldas' officially threatened Kerimov to quit or face more bombings.<sup>282</sup> The first positive response from Russia to Nazarbayev's pet Eurasian Union plan came from a high ranking military figure, Col-Gen. Leonid Ivashov, who said "Russia should set up a Eurasian Union as a counterbalance to NATO".<sup>283</sup> Bombings in Tashkent also caused the tightening of the security along the Uzbek-Kazak, Uzbek-Kyrgyz, Uzbek-Tajik and Uzbek-Turkmen borders.<sup>284</sup> Practically, these latest developments represented serious backlashes against creating a single Central Asian region concept.

The CAEC premiers met on Bishkek on the 17<sup>th</sup> of June 1999, signing several documents on regional cooperation on mining, common monetary policy, and joint ventures funded by the Central Asian Bank for Cooperation and Development.<sup>285</sup> Following this meeting, the presidents of the four members of the CAEC met in Bishkek on 24<sup>th</sup> of June 1999, for the Interstate Council of the CAEC meeting.<sup>286</sup> This was the twenty-eighth summit. At this meeting, Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine were granted the status of

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<sup>281</sup> "Central Asian Leaders Back Aral Sea Rescue Plan," *SWB*, SU/3507 G/1 (13 April 1999), *Turkmen TV*, 1330 gmt (9 April 1999).

<sup>282</sup> "Islamic Opposition Leader Warns Present Leadership to Quit or Face More Bombs," *SWB*, SU/3521 G/1 (29 April 1999), *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran*, 1539 gmt (24 April 1999).

<sup>283</sup> "Russian general Proposes Eurasian Union as Counterbalance to NATO," *ITAR-TASS*, 1935 gmt (26 May 1999).

<sup>284</sup> "Kazakhs to reinforce, delimit borders with Uzbekistan," *SWB*, SU/3560 G/2 (14 June 1999), *Interfax*, 0941 gmt (12 June 1999).

<sup>285</sup> "Central Asian Premiers Sign Accords on Energy and Investment," *SWB*, SU/3566 G/1 (21 June 1999), *Kabar*, 1127 gmt (17 June 1999).

<sup>286</sup> "Central Asian Presidents Seek Progress on Single Economic Space," *SWB*, SU/3572 G/1 (28 June 1999), *Kyrgyz TV*, 1430 gmt (24 June 1999).

observers in the CAEC. The emphasis was on the single economic union in the Central Asian region.<sup>287</sup>

Meanwhile, the six death sentences for the suspects of car bombings in Tashkent caused a great anger on the side of the “mujahedeen” of the IMU, who warned Central Asians to rebel against the Kerimov regime.<sup>288</sup> Tashkent was trying to win the hearts of Uzbek Muslims by imposing long prison terms against the local missionaries called “Incil Massikhiylar”.<sup>289</sup> Kerimov also ordered to erect a memorial monument in Tashkent to honor the Martyrs of the Soviet colonialism and “aggression by the Soviet-Russian oppressors.”<sup>290</sup> The Bomb trials during 1999 were also used as a means to attack and destroy the remaining fragments of democratic opposition in Uzbekistan.<sup>291</sup> Indeed, the terror acts in Tashkent gave the Kerimov regime a free hand for the next two-and-a-half years to oppress the whole opposition.<sup>292</sup> The members of the IMU and their families had taken refuge in Tajik territories since the winter of 1992-1993 in the Jirgatal district and Karategin regions, which had been under the UTO control. The Uzbek air force started to bomb this region from mid August on.<sup>293</sup> The same day, several hundred the IMU gunmen entered Kyrgyzstan through the mountain passes. On the 17<sup>th</sup> of August, Tajikistan decided

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<sup>287</sup> For the full english translation of the Joint Statement of the presidents at the end of the summit see “Central Asian Leaders Issue Statement at the end of the Summit,” *SWB*, SU/3574 G/1 (30 June 1999), *Khovar*, 11000 gmt (25 June 1999).

<sup>288</sup> “Islamic Opposition Warns of Dire Consequences of Trial Verdict,” *SWB*, SU/3576 G/6 (2 July 1999), *Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran*, 1530 gmt (29 June 1999).

<sup>289</sup> “Court Sentences Three Local Christians Lengthy Prison Terms,” *SWB*, SU/3576 G/6 (2 July 1999), *Uzbek TV*, 1430 gmt (29 June 1999).

<sup>290</sup> “Memorial to Honour Martyrs of Soviet Colonialism,” *SWB*, SU/3596 G/4 (26 July 1999), *Uzbek TV*, 1430 gmt (22 July 1999).

<sup>291</sup> “Solih Says Bomb Trials Used for Attack on Opposition,” *SWB*, SU/3598 G/3 (28 July 1999), *Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran*, 1530 gmt (24 July 1999).

<sup>292</sup> “Opposition says President Hit the Jackpoint with Bombings,” *SWB*, SU/3603 G/4 (3 August 1999), *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran*, 1530 gmt (28 July 1999).

<sup>293</sup> “Tajikistan Accuses Uzbekistan of Carrying out Air Raids,” *SWB*, SU/3617 G/1 (19 August 1999), *Interfax*, 0630 gmt (16 August 1999).

to repatriate Uzbek refugees.<sup>294</sup> Also, on the 16<sup>th</sup> of August 1999, Uzbekistan started to bomb the Kyrgyz territories neighboring Tajikistan, as Kerimov criticized Tajiks and Kyrgyz for failure to control bandits.<sup>295</sup>

Muhammed Salih, becoming too critical of the US, accusing the US of supporting the aggressive regime on the *Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran Radio*, began to lose his chances of being recognized as the leader of the democratic opposition in Uzbekistan.<sup>296</sup> By the 23<sup>rd</sup> of August, the IMU guerillas were settled in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan, capturing four Japanese geologists and several Kyrgyz citizens, including the commander of the Kyrgyz Ministry of Interior troops Major General Şamkeyev.<sup>297</sup> The first estimates were that there were around fifty IMU guerillas in Batken but within a few days it was understood that there were more than one thousand guerillas who had infiltrated into the region.<sup>298</sup> Kyrgyzstan asked Russia to help her overcome this crisis with all kinds of military intervention.<sup>299</sup> Shanghai Five leaders met in a summit in Bishkek on 25<sup>th</sup> of August 1999 for discussing this new situation.<sup>300</sup>

The Foreign and Defense Ministers of the four CAEC states met in Osh on 28<sup>th</sup> of August 1999 to sign a joint anti-terrorism declaration and to work out plans for a common

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<sup>294</sup> "Tajikistan to Repatriate Uzbek refugees Following Bombing Raid," *SWB*, SU/3617 G/1 (19 August 1999), *Tajik Radio*, 0800 gmt (17 August 1999).

<sup>295</sup> "Karimov Criticizes Tajiks for Failure to Control Bandits," *SWB*, SU/3620 G/4 (23 August 1999), *ITAR-TASS*, 1244 gmt (19 August 1999).

<sup>296</sup> "Opposition Leader alleges US aid to maintain Regime," *SWB*, SU/3621 G/1-2 (24 August 1999), *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran*, 1530 gmt (21 August 1999).

<sup>297</sup> "Kyrgyz, Tajik, Uzbek security Chiefs meet Over Hostage Incident," *SWB*, SU/3622 G/1 (25 August 1999), *ITAR-TASS*, 1112 gmt (23 August 1999).

<sup>298</sup> "Over 1,000 Islamists Now Believed to be Fighting Government," *SWB*, SU/3625 G/1 (28 August 1999), *Russian TV*, 1700 gmt (26 August 1999).

<sup>299</sup> "Kyrgyzstan asks Russia to Help it Overcome Rebels," *SWB*, SU/3625 G/2 (28 August 1999), *ITAR-TASS*, 0556 gmt (27 August 1999).

<sup>300</sup> "Shanghai Five Summit Discuss Cooperation, regional Security," *SWB*, SU/3624 G/1 (27 August 1999), *Khabar TV*, 1110 gmt (25 August 1999).

security policy to tackle rebels.<sup>301</sup> From the end of August on, Uzbek air raids in Kyrgyzstan were stepped up, and Kazakhstan began arms shipments to Uzbekistan to continue fighting against rebels.<sup>302</sup> However, for the first time in the 1990s, Kazakhstan began to establish military posts along the Uzbek border.<sup>303</sup> The Kyrgyz leadership and public were highly scared by the events and were trying to solve the problem with the guerillas through negotiations after several defeats in the skirmishes with the mujahedeen.<sup>304</sup> Uzbeks accused the UTO of helping the guerillas.<sup>305</sup> On the 24<sup>th</sup> of September, the Customs Union (CU) presidents met in Astana to sign final documents on establishing a single economic union among themselves.<sup>306</sup>

The Russian response to the Kyrgyz call for help came from the PM Putin vowing to fight against terror and ammunitions only.<sup>307</sup> Towards the end of September, the mujahedeen attempted to cross the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan, with the objective of establishing an Islamic Emirate there.<sup>308</sup>

On the other hand, Nazarbayev, in a cultural and scientific forum of Central Asian explained on the 29<sup>th</sup> of September 1999, that:

The republics of Central Asia must enter the 21<sup>st</sup> century as independent states; this does not mean that we cannot unite the region in geopolitical and geo-economic

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<sup>301</sup> "Central Asian States Sign Antiterrorism Document," *SWB*, SU/3626 G/1 (30 August 1999), *ITAR-TASS* 1230 gmt (28 August 1999).

<sup>302</sup> "Kazakhs to Send Ammunition to Uzbeks to Help Fight Kyrgyz terrorists," *SWB*, SU/3628 G/2 (1 September 1999), *Khabar TV*, 1110 gmt (30 August 1999).

<sup>303</sup> "Troops start to Take Up Posts on Uzbek Border," *SWB*, SU/3635 G/3 (9 September 1999), *Interfax*, 1037 gmt (7 September 1999).

<sup>304</sup> "Kyrgyzstan May Become Jihad Target If Militants Evicted," *SWB*, SU/3643 G/2 (18 September 1999), *Slovo Kyrgyzstana* (7 September 1999).

<sup>305</sup> "Uzbek Minister Accuses Tajik Opposition of Collusion with Kyrgyz Militants," *SWB*, SU/3645 G/2 (21 September 1999), *Uzbek TV*, 1400 gmt (17 September 1999).

<sup>306</sup> "CIS Customs Union States Reach Accords in Astana," *SWB*, SU/3650 G/3 (27 September 1999), *Interfax*, 0939 gmt (24 September 1999).

<sup>307</sup> "Putin Vows to Help Kyrgyzstan fight Terrorism," "SU/3650 B/15 (27 September 1999), *ITAR-TASS*, 1127 gmt (24 September 1999).

<sup>308</sup> "Gunmen Succeed in Break-Out into Uzbekistan," *SWB*, SU/3652 G/2 (29 September 1999), *Kommersant* (25 September 1999).

terms... Our strategic and economic goal is to form a common economic space, a common trade and customs zone, a common currency union and a common economic strategy... We are talking about achieving the kind of integration of states that Western Europe already has... The countries of the region have more solid preconditions for that than European countries once had... including the following common factors: external threats, cultural and historical roots, religion and ecological problems...we inherited common economic, financial, educational and ecological standards from the Soviet Union...<sup>309</sup>

In this year, Uzbekistan became a member of GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) in order to balance CU with this grouping.<sup>310</sup> By mid-October, guerillas in Batken started to retreat to their bases in the Tajik Mountains.<sup>311</sup> They released all of the hostages.

Uzbeks were by no means happy with the Kyrgyz “peaceful” handling of the crisis, especially with the negotiations between the mujahedeen and the Kyrgyz officials.<sup>312</sup> Thus, Uzbekistan unilaterally started border demarcation with Tajikistan, and setting up huge mine fields in the border regions.<sup>313</sup>

After the IMU mujahedeen’s retreat to their Tajik bases, Uzbekistan put an enormous pressure on the Tajik side threatening a cross border operation.<sup>314</sup> However the IMU members resisted Tajik governments’ promises to force them out of the country and

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<sup>309</sup> “President Calls for Integration of Central Asian States,” *SWB*, SU/3654 G/4-5 (1 October 1999), *Interfax*, 0912 gmt (29 September 1999).

<sup>310</sup> “Ukrainian, Uzbek Presidents Sign Cooperation Agreements, Criticize CIS,” *SWB*, SU/3661 D/3 (9 October 1999), *STB TV*, 1600 gmt (7 October 1999).

<sup>311</sup> “Army Starts Offensive, rebels Reportedly Move Back to Tajikistan,” *SWB*, SU/3665 G/2 (14 October 1999), *Uzbek TV*, 1430 gmt (12 October 1999).

<sup>312</sup> “Foreign Ministry Warns Kyrgyzstan Rebels May Invade Again Next Spring,” *SWB*, SU/3668 G/4 (18 October 1999), *Uzbek TV*, 1430 gmt (15 October 1999).

<sup>313</sup> “Concern Over Unilateral Demarcation by Uzbekistan,” *SWB*, SU/3680 G/2 (1 November 1999), *Tajik TV*, 1400 gmt (29 October 1999).

<sup>314</sup> “Islamic Militant to Leave Tajikistan in Next Few Days, Tajik Official Says,” *SWB*, SU/3682 G/1 (3 November 1999), *Asia-Plus*, 0815 gmt (1 November 1999).



the UTO leaders began to mediate.<sup>315</sup> After that, in months, the IMU members started to leave in convoys to Northern Afghanistan that was already in Taliban hands.

In the mean time, the ethnic Russian public associations confederation (ARSC - “Association of Russian, Slavic and Cossack Public Associations”) in Kazakstan started to demand a referendum on Kazakstan joining Russia-Belarus Union.<sup>316</sup> Tashkent just relaxed from the tension of the Batken invasion, suddenly on 15<sup>th</sup> of November, the IMU mujahedeen attacked police stations in the Yangiabad district of Tashkent, where several dachas of the Uzbek nomenclature were located.<sup>317</sup> Armed clashes continued for more than two weeks in the region, leaving at least twenty dead in Yangiabad.<sup>318</sup> The OSCE Summit in Istanbul on 18<sup>th</sup> November 1999 was attended by all Central Asian presidents, each of whom emphasized the importance of struggling with Islamic “terrorism” in the region.<sup>319</sup>

### 7.7 Eurasian Dream Realized

The five members of the CU signed the Treaty establishing Eurasian Economic Community on 10<sup>th</sup> of October 2000 in Astana.<sup>320</sup> It was exactly at this moment that Putin found the long dreamed of ideological atmosphere for his policies: the Eurasianism of Nazarbayev.<sup>321</sup> After the ratifications of the treaty in the parliaments, the first meeting of

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<sup>315</sup> “Opposition Leader to Visit East to Persuade Uzbek Fighters to Leave,” *SWB*, SU/3685 G/2 (6 November 1999), *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran*, 1430 gmt (4 November 1999).

<sup>316</sup> “Kazakh Slavs Propose Referendum on Joining Russia-Belarus Union,” *SWB*, SU/3691 G/3 (13 November 1999), *Interfax*, 1148 gmt (10 November 1999).

<sup>317</sup> “Militants Infiltrate Uzbekistan, six dead in Tashkent Region,” *SWB*, SU/3695 G/3 (18 November 1999), *Uzbek TV*, 1430 gmt (16 November 1999).

<sup>318</sup> “Armed Clashes Near Uzbek Capital Leave 13 Dead,” *SWB*, SU/3703 G/2 (27 November 1999), *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran*, 1500 gmt (25 November 1999).

<sup>319</sup> “President Akayev Urges Need for Action on Terrorism at OSCE Summit,” *SWB*, SU3699 G/2 (23 November 1999), *Slovo Kyrgyzstana* (19 November 1999), p. 2,3.

<sup>320</sup> Alla Dementiyeva, “Climbing up the Stairs, Leading to Eurasian Community,” *Kazakhstankaya Pravda* (20.10.2001), *Reuters*.

<sup>321</sup> “Putin Turns to Eurasianism,” *IPR Strategic Business Information Database* (19.10.2000), *Reuters*.

the Interstate council was held in mid September 2001 in Almaty.<sup>322</sup> The Uzbek president criticized and protested this new step.<sup>323</sup> Niyazov soon joined Kerimov in protesting the new union. The stance of the Turkmen intelligentsia with regard to the pan-Turkestan ideas of the time was considered rather obscure and unclear. However Saparmurat Niyazov, the “Türkmenbaşı,” in his last book, *Rukhnama*, argued that Turkestan was the country given by Noah to his son Yafes, who was believed to be the first known ancestor of the Turks and Turkmens.<sup>324</sup>

The five members of the Eurasian Economic Community (Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) met in a regular session of the Interstate Council on 13<sup>th</sup> of May 2002 in Moscow where Nazarbayev said, “I’d like to dream aloud. We should turn the community to Eurasian Union with real integration processes”.<sup>325</sup>

At the twenty-ninth summit of the CAEC, which was held on 5<sup>th</sup> of January 2001 in Almaty, regional political stability was the first item on the agenda.<sup>326</sup> In this summit, the four Presidents decided to establish a permanent economic forum as an organ of the CAEC in Tashkent.<sup>327</sup> At the December 2001 summit in Tashkent (on the 28th of December 2001), the decision was made to transform CAEC into a Central Asian Cooperation

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<sup>322</sup> Nicolay Sergeev, “Eurasian Economic Community-realities and Outlooks for Cooperation,” *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (14.09.2001), *Reuters*.

<sup>323</sup> “Uzbek Leader Criticizes Eurasian Union as arrives for CIS Summit,” *Uzbek TV*, 1430 gmt (02 June 2001), *Reuters*.

<sup>324</sup> Saparmyrat Türkmenbaşı. *Rukhnama* (Aşgabat: 2001), pp. 9-15.

<sup>325</sup> Vadim Makhin, “On the Way Towards the Eurasian Community,” *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (14.05.2002), *Reuters*.

<sup>326</sup> “Uzbek Head Chides Central Asian Economic Community,” *Interfax*, 1230 gmt (5 January 2001), *BBC MS* (08.01.2001).

<sup>327</sup> “Four Cooperation Documents Signed at Central Asian Summit,” *Interfax*, 1258 gmt (5 January 2001), *BBC MS* (08.01.2001).

Organization [according to Uzbek sources] or Central Asian Forum [according to Kazak sources].<sup>328</sup>

By the 11<sup>th</sup> of September 2001, Central Asian countries were already in a “reign of terror” for the last two-and-a-half years, struggling to stop IMU (in May 2001 IMU changed its name to Turkestan Islam Party-TIP) to dominate Ferghana Valley region.

### **7.8 Turkestan re-Divided or re-United-Conclusions**

For many, in the Western academia or even in the “Newly Independent States,” the decade of 1990s was a decade of the “rising of new nations.” Turkestanism was already an out-dated Uzbek émigré ideology by the beginning of the 1990s, out of the Soviet Union. Only thanks to the efforts of renowned scholar and activist of Turkestanism, Baymirza Hayit, it was in a state of survival. Its rebirth came from Turkestan again, at the end of 1980s, but especially at the beginning of 1990s. For the first half of the 1990s, Turkestanism remained as one of the most dominant and main arguments of the Central Asian democratic opposition parties, especially in Uzbekistan, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan. Democratic oppositions had little chance within the still surviving Soviet style apparatchik politics and soon, disappeared from the political scenes. However their legitimacy continued and even claimed by the Central Asian leaderships.

Central Asian leaders re-positioned themselves after the elimination of democratic oppositions in their countries and strengthening of their own powers. Kerimov, Nazarbayev and Akayev met in more than thirty summits privately in the course of ten years following independences. They also met in a higher number of international gatherings and in the meetings of other regional groupings. In fact, Central Asian leaders met with each other

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<sup>328</sup> “Kazakh President Hails Friendship of Central Asian States,” *Khabar* TV, 1500 gmt (28 December 2001), *BBC MCA* (28.12.2001).

more than with their own cabinets. Kerimov was the champion of Central Asian Unity and Turkestan Union ideas during the 1990s. Nazarbayev's response to that was to launch a program of Eurasian Union idea, which would give Uzbekistan no way to become a regional hegemon. Akayev's Kyrgyzstan was rather a satellite of Nazarbayev's Kazakhstan in many respects. Tajikistan joined the Central Asian Union lastly but integrated its structures with the union quite quickly, irrespective of being the most pro-Russian administration within the region. Turkmenistan remained the outsider to all these developments whereas attended, especially after 1996, most of the summits with an observer status.

The end of the 1990s and the beginning of the second millennium marked a new and fresh beginning in the region concerning the strengthened regional economic and political alliances. However it also marked the rise of Afghanistan-sourced fundamentalist terror that forced the regional countries to unite their security and defense networks as well. All Central Asian Leaderships made it clear that they have modeled their plans for their Central Asian Union on European Union structures, aiming to have a single currency, a customs union, a common armed forces and even a common foreign policy in the region in the close future.

## **CHAPTER 8**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

The conceptual anarchy in the literature about Central Asia is not a new, 20th Century phenomenon. However, western and to some extent Turkish scholars have not dealt with the issue to any significant degree. In general there has been a kind of willful ignorance and even to some extent a negative attitude towards the Turkestan concept as such. For some, this was even “forbidden” territory: not to deal with it at all! For some others, it was a sacred term, not to be discussed but to be accepted as a dogma. Especially, Western revisionist scholars refused to deal with the “dark history” of the region; but accepted the current main stream terminology and the “new born nations” as granted.

The prohibited has its attraction, of course, which account for the present work. The observed ignorance had become one of the strongest motivation for the researcher to study this topic.

One of the basic objectives of this study was to bring conceptual clarifications to the uses and misuses of the concept of Turkestan which would clear the way to the explanation of the related terms used in the literature - such as Central-Inner-Middle Asia, Sart, Turks (of Khorezm and Fergana), Uzbek, Kazak, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Tajik, etc.

With a comprehensive literature review conducted mainly from the primary sources, first hand observations and interviews in the region, the writer trusts that this study may

provide new visions for those bewildered by the complexities of the daily politics of the region.

The evidence, and overall impression revealed in this study suggest that, while there exists: no “Turkestani nation” in western meanings of the term, no single “Turkestanish language” in modern terms, no contemporary political entity called Turkestan, and no consensus over its geography; the concept of Turkestan has survived through the centuries and its heritage has been claimed by the modern political cadres of the region.

Extensive review of the encyclopedical and general reference sources has shown that there is no single definition of the concept which enjoyed an overall scholarly consensus. In defining the term Turkestan, there have been two main approaches in the literature: a limited political approach and a broader-regional approach. These represent different stances, different camps over the issue. The limited political approach defined Turkestan as the political identities of historical Turkestan - Governorship General and Turkestan ASSR - whereas the broader-regional approach employed a rather inclusive definition with a greater geographical, ethno-linguistic and political meaning, *Uluğ* (Greater) Turkestan.

Outsiders have had a decisive effect on the use of such terminology. Their impact was twofold. For the first group, terms such as “*Bilād-ı Türk*,” (the lands of Turks) were given to the region by the conquering armies, in their own languages, as exact synonyms for Turkestan, the land of Turks. Other terms such as the Steppe of Ten Thousand Kirghiz etc. can also be considered in this category. They all covered the whole of Western Turkestan. The second category of such terms was given or rather imposed by the political wills of the conquering empires as well as by the studies of their scholars. For example, the Steppe and Turkestan *Gubernias* were the creations of the Tsarist administration. [the

Bukharan Emirate and the Khivan Khanate were the two traditional crypto-states that survived until the revolution.] Uses such as Turkestan and Steppe, Central Asia and Kazakstan, Middle Asia and Kazakstan are similar examples of such attempts.

However, for many scholars, the term Turkestan remained as an ancient-historical name representing the whole or parts of Central Asia. For some others, it reflected contemporary circumstances in that it had its partisans, and that there was *de facto* native consciousness. Positions taken on this issue had been highly correlated with the political stances of scholars of the subject. On the “politically correct” Western side, Soviet-Russian literature was the sole source of information on the region, where, use of the term Turkestan had been ruthlessly suppressed so as to eliminate any chance the natives might re-unite. For the “nationalist” émigré historians and the native intelligentsia within Soviet Central Asia, however, Turkestan was a sacred term, emanating a golden glow from a past, when all Turkestanis were united under one flag and “ruled the world.” It was also a sacrosanct term in the contemporary sense, as being most inclusive ethnically and geographically for the natives. So, it is quite a political choice to use any of the terms for the region. For example, if one uses the term Turkestan to cover the whole region, this can be called as a Turkestanist position. If one calls the region Middle Asia and Kazakstan, that is the other end of the spectrum; one might possibly call it the anti-Turkestanist position.

Meaning simply “the country (land) of the Turks,” the term Turkestan was even used, at times, for the whole of the Ottoman Empire, for Central Anatolia, for Central Asia and/or for Middle Asia. Especially, during the Tanzimat period the term *Türkistan* was used to refer the Ottoman Empire by some leading Ottoman officials and intellectuals. For the last quarter of the 19th and the first quarter of the 20th centuries, the term Turkestan meant politically either the Tsarist Turkestan Governorship General or (between 1918-1924)

Turkestan ASSR of the RSFSR. However, its political territories did not match the geographical and ethno-national boundaries of the Turkestan region at all.

The expressions, “Central Asia,” “Middle Asia” and “Inner Asia” had not been inventions of the Soviet regime as such. They were not necessarily reflections of Russian imperialism over the region at all. There were instances where these were being used in Western literary sources, especially in the course of the 19th century. However, they had no clear cut borders that would match the term “Turkestan.” Furthermore, these expressions were not presented as alternative pieces of terminology to be used for Turkestan. They were rather used for political purposes with broader or more limited meanings of the term. However, the Bolsheviks in the 1920s employed these terms, solely for political purposes, simply to eradicate the concept of Turkestan. In the current scholarship on the region, the term Inner Asia reflects the territories of Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Eastern Turkestan and Mongolia. The term Central Asia is more inclusive adding Tibet, Kashmir, Northern Afghanistan, Gorno-Altai, Tuva, Buryatia and Inner Mongolia to the above mentioned list. However the concept of Middle Asia is much more limited, in affect to the territories of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and the Southern Kazakstan region which were the Syr Darya and Jetisu (Semirech’e) oblasts of the former Tsarist Governorship General. On the other hand, the concept of Turkestan (if applied not as Greater, Eastern or Southern Turkestan, the concept means Western Turkestan) matches with the geographical and political boundaries of the five former Soviet republics in the region. Controversially, all terms mentioned above are subject to new definitions by authors writing about the region. This has become another source of ongoing conceptual anarchy.



The separation of Turkic ethnic identities in 1924 was the continuation of a previous Tsarist policy of artificially interfering with the ethnic identities in the region. In the literature, this policy was labeled as the “Il’minskii-Ostromov line” with the basic objective of diversifying the Turkish elements in the region: creating different languages from different Turkic dialects and different national identities out of the different tribes living in the region. It was simply a policy of deepening the existing differences even more, while trying to eliminate the existing common factors among the peoples of Turkestan in culture, literature, customs, scripts as well as politics. The level of knowledge in the West about the region was far less than any prediction. Just to give an example, in many Western sources, all inhabitants of the region were referred to as Tartars even at the beginning of 20th century!

Although, most of these issues were discussed in the journal of the Commissariat for Nationalities during the revolutionary period, *Zhizn Natsional’nostei*, many national communists, apparently stood for a unified federal Turkestan model, rather than a total disintegration of Turkestan ASSR. One of the most important findings of this dissertation is the fact that *razmezhevanie* was supported, and even initiated by the will of several Turkestani national communists led by Feyzullah Hocayev and Ekmel İkrarov, who managed to establish a cotton rich-Greater Uzbekistan at the outcome of *razmezhevanie*. It is also understood from the archival documents used in this study that delimitation was realized despite the constant resistance and opposition of some leading Bolsheviks in the region, in Moscow and in the party elite in general, with the will of Stalin and his “trusted”

native comrades in the region.<sup>1</sup> It is important to note that this thesis has not been deployed either by Western academia or by the Soviet and current Turkestani or even past émigré Turkestani literature.

From the 1924 on, the Soviets began to wage a war to eliminate the usages of the term Turkestan for the region. Politically correct approach of Western academia and the mass media quickly adapted to the new Soviet policy in the post-Second World War period. Even in Turkey, there was a silent consensus in some universities in employing the terms Central or Middle Asia (Orta Asya) instead of the term Turkestan.

The worst blow to the usage of the concept in the literature came of course after the 1924 delimitation which destroyed a Turkestani state (with the name Turkestan in it) - Turkestan ASSR. While the concept was never clearly defined, in some literature, the Turkestan Gubernia and later the Turkestan ASSR were accepted as the rough borders of the term Turkestan. This was so, in spite of the fact that their territories were subject to constant changes. The destruction of the Turkestan ASSR ended the political meaning of the term; thus abandoning the term to history alone! However, Turkestanism never died out completely among the natives, both in the émigré and within Soviet Central Asia. Until 1991, when five Soviet Central Asian states gained their independence, Turkestanist tones in literature and even in politics appeared. Again until 1991, a Turkestanist émigration, somehow, survived the Cold War era against all difficulties and the varying ideas which developed among them.

Scattered all over the world, Turkestani émigré groups formed one organization after another. However in the efforts of Mustafa Çokayoğlu, Zeki Velidî Togan and Osman

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<sup>1</sup> Despite all these findings in this study, the author argues that it is still too early to label Feyzullah Hocayev and Ekmel İkrarov as the “sole responsables” of the national and territorial delimitation of Turkestan in 1924, unless the analysis of a huge amount of archival fonds are complete.

Hoca (Kocaoğlu) the émigré struggle continued quite successfully until the Second World War. The publications of *Yeni Türkistan* and then *Yaş Türkistan* marked an almost fifteen years long émigré re-grouping for the liberation of the motherland from enemy invasion. Then came the usual émigré intrigues and fights over “nothings”. However, this time the problem was an academic one: the very name of the homeland, Turkestan became the issue. The pan-Turkist group favored, Zeki Velidî’s “Türkili” version [a Turkified version of the Turkestan term] whereas the Turkestanist Çokayoğlu group remained loyal to the traditional version, Turkestan. From the early days of their émigré struggle, Turkestanis tried to persuade the Western public that their country had been a colony first of Tsarist Russia and then of the Soviet Empire, not much different from the overseas colonies of Britain and France.

The last chance to unite the Kazak-Kyrgyz of the Steppe and the Sart-Uzbeks of Turkestan was missed in January 1918, when they failed to unite with each other under an autonomous Turkestan, when Northern Kazak Alaş Orda leader Alihan Bükeyhan refused to unite with Turkestan. By 1924, Uzbek national communists were promoting the disintegration of the Turkestan movement. The Uzbek initiative to dissolve Turkestan in *razmezhevanie* and the Kazak (i.e. Turar Ryskulov in KPT) opposition to delimitation were not the permanent positions of the two tribal groups. The “father of Turkestanism” Mustafa Çokayoğlu in emigration was a Kazak just as was Mağcan Cumabayuli, author of the “Turkestan” poem in 1929, who later became one of the millions of victims of the Great Terror of Stalin in 1930s. By the end of the 1970s, Turkestanism had become more of an Uzbek phenomenon in the émigré circles, after the secession of the Kazak wing of Haris Kanatbay and the establishment of a distinctly pan-Turkist stream among the émigrés.

A review of the émigré literature suggested that “this region was Turkestan from the time immemorial and is accepted as Turkestan by the natives.” Although Çokayoğlu once argued that the worst sin of their ancestors was failing to unite under one political banner and national identity, the main stream émigré literature used the term extensively for the whole region, i.e. *Uluğ* (Greater) Turkestan.

The findings of this study show that a common Turkestani identity, although very loosely defined, came after several other identities such as a Muslim-religious identity, or a city or tribal one, or even sub-tribal-clanic ones. Moreover, a Turkestani nation, in the Western meaning of the term, never existed; instead, a loosely defined, politico-geographic term, Turkestan, with an unquestionable ethnic connotation was used extensively. Thus in the 1980s Turkestanism among the native elites of the Soviet Central Asia flourished anew and became an important political movement by the early 1990s.

The very story of the Turkestan Legions within the *Waffen SS* started with the death of Mustafa Çokayoğlu in 1941, following his visit to a Turkestani POW camp in Poland. His leadership was succeeded [because Osman Hoca was on the anti-Nazi camp] by the youngish pro-Nazi Veli Kayyum “Han” who performed his duty until his death in early 1990s. The Turkestani Legions were late comers in the war theatre and they did not perform well in battle. However, with the help of the Nazi propaganda machine, they managed the introduction of several thousands of Turkestanis with Turkestanist and in some cases pan-Turkist ideals, but always in the service of Reich. Some of these young men entered the service of the US during the Cold War, as did many other former Nazi collaborators, and continued their Turkestanism through different means.

The period between 1917-1924 in Turkestan can be summarized as the era of Turkestanist struggle against the Bolsheviks. The anti-imperialist tone of this idea needs

stress. As in the case of many other anti-colonial nationalisms, Turkestanism represented common ground for a very diverse socio-political community of Turkestani elites.

Virtually all the anti-imperial movements of any significance could be, and in the metropolises generally were, classified under one of the three headings: local educated elites' imitation European 'national self-determination (as in India) [read Jadids and Alaş-Khokand political activists in Turkestan, H.A.K.], popular anti-western xenophobia (an all-purpose heading widely applied, notably in China) [read nationalist native communists in Turkestan, i.e. Turar Riskulov, Feyzullah Hocayev and Ekmel İkramov, H.A.K.], and the natural high spirits of martial tribes (as in Morocco and deserts of Arabia) [read Basmacis in Turkestan, H.A.K.]<sup>2</sup>

The three different categories established by Hobsbawm in his theory on the rise of anti-imperial nationalisms, in fact, co-existed in the Turkestan of the 1917-1924 period and fit the three different stratas of native population. However, as Hobsbawm also pointed out very openly, in most anti-colonial nationalisms the very term "unity" was closely related to the very existence of the colonial power.

On the other hand territory-oriented movements for liberation could not avoid building on the foundation of what common elements had been given to their territory by its colonial power or powers, since often this was the only unity and national character the future country had.<sup>3</sup>

It must be added that as in the case of Turkestan after the fall of the colonial power, (either the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union) what was left to the national elite as concepts and self definitions were mostly inherited from the colonial power itself.

Turkestanism became a main regional foreign policy tool of the Uzbek leadership throughout the second half of 1990s. Although it was understood by the Kazak, Kyrgyz and even Tajik neighbors as a tool of Uzbek hegemony in the region, they did not dissent from the Uzbek leadership's efforts at further economic and political integration in the region. In

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<sup>2</sup> E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 151.

<sup>3</sup> Hobsbawm, p. 138.

the process, with this concept in mind, regional leaders developed different formulas which also included the unification of Central Asian states - such as the “Central Asian Union movement” and “Eurasianism”. For the layman on the streets of the Central Asian capitals, Turkestanism is still a sacred term referring to a “golden past” of the region, with connotations as the “zenith of Muslim power” in the world. Even for the class of Communist Party’s *otvetchiks* (repliers to the 1bourgeois falsifiers”) before 1991, the very concept Turkestan itself implied a great potential for the nationalist and anti-Soviet movements in the region. It is true that every “new nation” in the region has developed its own version of nationalism – i.e. as Kazak nationalism, Uzbek nationalism and Kyrgyz nationalism. It is also true that, however, probably the most respected common element is their similar Turkestanist positions. The study of the “nationalisms” of Kazak, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Turkmen and even Tajik states during and after Soviet rule demonstrated the existence of an important phenomenon, tribalism and/or localism, which overwhelmed nationalist tendencies. More importantly, this phenomenon, though causing tension among the elites of the same “ethnic group,” did not imply any negative attitude towards Turkestanism.

For the Turkestanists, the Turkestani nation consisted of sub-tribes of Kazak, Turkmen, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik and Karakalpak. However from 1924 on, after the Tajiks first gained an autonomous status within the Uzbek SSR, Tajik ethnic identity became increasingly separated from a common Turkestani identity and in the 1990s there were even some hostility among the Tajik political circles towards the very concept of Turkestan.

Turkestan is a concept that has come out of a necessity, rather than as a luxury. Ethnically and geographically, the region has constituted a whole; and throughout history, people needed to call it by an overall umbrella name. The term Turkestan has been the most

popular and the longest surviving one. This was why the post-Soviet leaders of Central Asian states felt an urgent need to combine their political decision-making structures. Their economies were obviously united throughout history; and the Soviet period made this even more the case. They have also, more or less, a common literature with no need for translators to communicate with each other.

Maybe one of the most important reason for the survival of the term Turkestan among others, from the 7th century AD on, is the simple fact that the term was used and preferred by the natives themselves. This is the first name ever known to delineate the region as a whole.

In this study, the common perceptions of Western academia as to the proper uses of the term Turkestan are challenged, in so far as they use the concepts Central, Middle and Inner Asia on two grounds. First, it seems that Western academia did not assimilate the changes in Russian and Soviet literature as the metamorphosis of the concepts; rather they imitated and even directly promoted its conceptual anarchy. Second, the Soviet-Russian literature was heavily ideologically oriented as was most of the other literature on the region. This was so, especially after 1920 when the decision to launch a national-territorial delimitation of Turkestan was taken and especially after 1924 when the national-territorial delimitation plans began to be implemented. The process of *razmezhevanie* coincided, of course, with the writing of a new history for the region and for each new “nation” there.

The concept of Turkestanism has been analyzed with a special emphasis. The concept simply represents the political stance of the Cedit-Turkestan Autonomy (Alaş Orda as well up to certain degree)-*Yeni Türkistan-Yaş Türkistan*-Turkestan Legions-*Milli Türkistan-Dergi* line discussed in the previous chapters. Alaşism, Ceditism, Bukharanism, Khorezmizm, *Basmacılık*, were all united under one banner “Turkestanism”, each claiming

the true heritage of Turkestan Autonomy and Turkestani independence. It is possible to define it as an ethno-political nationalist movement aimed at the unification of the peoples of Turkestan within one political unit - Turkestan - as the members of a unified “Turkestani nation”– or as “The United States of Turkestan.”

It is hoped that, all of the evidence and discussions presented in this study will contribute to a better understanding of the semantics of the concept of Turkestan, including native and foreign attitudes towards the concept and its potential power to unite the natives of the region.





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