

BILKENT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, ADMINISTRATIVE AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND BOLSHEVIK RUSSIA
(1917-1918)

BY
C. CEM OĞUZ

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

AUGUST - 1998

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
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
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Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu


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Asst. Prof. Hasan Ünal

ABSTRACT

The fear of being left alone against Russia in an environment of confronting blocs was the main factor behind the decision of the Ottoman government to enter the First World War on the side of the Central Powers. The liberation of the Muslims of Russia from the Russian yoke henceforth became one of the important war objectives of the Ottoman Supreme Command. Nevertheless, the tragic defeat of the Ottoman army in Sarikamış did not only constitute a serious obstacle against the realization of these aspirations, but it also helped the Russian army to penetrate deep into Ottoman territory. The outbreak of the revolution in Russia and the Bolshevik power seizure in October 1917 provided the Ottoman government with the opportunity of compensating war losses and realizing the strategic aims embodied on the eve and at the beginning of the Great War. The Ottoman government's policy with regard to Russia between 1917-1918 can be analyzed under two main stages. In the short-run the primary aim was the restoration of the pre-war frontier with Russia and acquisition of as much territory in Transcaucasia as possible. With the Russian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Ottoman government successfully accomplished its plans with regard to Transcaucasia. In the long-run Ottoman leaders aimed at separating Transcaucasia from Russia in order to create therein independent states that would prevent Russian aggression in the future. In spite of the peace treaty with the Bolsheviks, the Ottoman army continued its military operations in the region. The Ottoman government did everything in its power, militarily or politically, to persuade the Transcaucasian peoples to proclaim their independence. As time went on, Ottomans were not only satisfied with Transcaucasia and North Caucasia was made part of these strategic aims. There were even plans concerning the independence of the Muslims of the Volga basin and Turkestan. Consequently, the primary subject of the relations between the Ottoman and Bolshevik governments in the final two years of the war was the Ottoman activities with regard to the Caucasus region and the Muslims of Russia. These Ottoman objectives not only caused disagreements with the Bolsheviks, but also became a serious source of contention with Germany.

ÖZET

Rusya'ya karşı "yalnız kalmamak" kaygısı Osmanlı Hükümeti'nin Birinci Dünya Savaşı'na İttifak Devletleri tarafında girme kararını almasında birinci dereceden rol oynamıştır. Öte yandan, bu ülkede yaşayan Müslümanların Rus boyunduruğundan kurtarılması Osmanlı Genelkurmayı'nın Rusya'ya dönük savaş hedeflerinin ana temasını oluşturmuştur. Fakat, savaşın hemen birinci yılında Doğu Cephesi'nde yaşanan Sarıkamış felaketi bu tasarıların gerçekleştirilmesine önemli bir ket vurduğu gibi, hatırı sayılır bir Osmanlı arazisinin Rus ordusu tarafından işgaline meydan vermiştir. 1917 Şubat'ında Rusya'da patlak veren devrim ve Ekim ayında Bolşevikler'in iktidarı ele geçişi Osmanlı yöneticilerine bütün bu olumsuzlukları telafi etme ve savaşın başında şekillenen stratejik hedefleri gerçekleştirebilme yönünde hayati bir fırsat sunmuştur. 1917-1918 yılları arasında Osmanlı Hükümeti'nin izlediği Rusya politikasının iki önemli ayağı vardır. Kısa vadede Rus işgali altındaki Doğu vilayetlerinin kurtarılması ve şartların izin verdiği ölçüde ilave toprak ele geçirilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Rusya ile imzalanan Brest-Litovsk Andlaşması ile bu hedef başarıyla gerçekleştirilmiştir. Uzun vadede ise, Osmanlı yönetimi, Kafkaslar'da gelecekteki Rus saldırılarına engel olacağı düşünülen tampon devletler kurduğunu planlamıştır. Bu amaçla Brest Andlaşması'nı müteakip günlerde Osmanlı Ordusu'nun bölgedeki askeri hareketleri devam etmiştir. Osmanlı devleti Kafkas halklarının Rusya'dan ayrıldıklarını ilan etmeleri için hem askeri hem de politik yönden büyük bir baskı göstermiştir. İlerleyen günlerde Kuzey Kafkasya da bu kapsama alınmış, hatta İç Rusya ve Türkistan bölgelerinde yaşayan Müslümanların da istiklallerine kavuşturulmalarının planları yapılmıştır. Dolayısıyla, savaşın son iki senesinde Bolşevik ve Osmanlı hükümetleri arasındaki ilişkilerin ana konusunu Osmanlı Hükümeti'nin Kafkasya'ya ve Rusya Müslümanları'na dönük tasarrufları teşkil etmiştir. Osmanlı Hükümeti'nin bu yöndeki emelleri sadece Rusya ile anlaşmazlıkların doğmasına sebebiyet vermemiş, aynı zamanda Almanya ile de önemli siyasi çatışmaların temelini oluşturmuştur.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Ottoman War Aims During the First World War	4
The Talks for the Russian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the Stance of the Ottoman Government	21
Ottoman Military Operations in the Caucasus (February-May 1918) and Their Political Consequences	42
The Diplomatic Mission of Galip Kemali Bey, the Ottoman Ambassador to Moscow (April-August 1918)	64
The Contest for Baku (August-October 1918)	87
Conclusion	94
Endnotes	102
Bibliography	130

INTRODUCTION

Every historical phenomenon must have its foundations in the conditions that preceded it and its results, therefore, cannot be completely unrelated to what went on before. However, while the relations between the Republican Turkey and Soviet Russia have been dealt with in numerous well-documented studies, the diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Bolshevik Russia from 1917 to 1918 have so far received little scholarly attention. Except for Akdes Nimet Kurat's excellent work (*Türkiye ve Rusya*) on the relations between the Ottoman and Russian empires that partly focuses upon this period, no attempt has been made to describe the political and military events in those two years. Recently there emerged some Turkish scholarly monographs that have dwelt upon singular cases. Selami Kılıç's *Türk-Sovyet İlişkilerinin Doğuşu*, for instance, analyzes the Ottoman diplomacy during the Brest talks. This research covering the diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and Bolshevik Russia during the last two years of the Great War is hoped to be the first step of a work that will help to fill the gap on the subject. I first thought to work on this subject when I realized, after reading the memoirs of leading Ottoman personalities of the time, that "the sick man of Europe" was in 1917 no more sick, at least against its traditional enemy from the North.

Russia was the main factor which, above everything else, led the Ottoman leaders to enter the war in 1914. Following Turkey's intervention on the side of the Central Powers, it will be not wrong to say that the Ottoman public emphatically welcomed the government's decision regarding Turkey's entrance into the war. After the fresh enthusiasm of the early months of the war, however, the Ottomans soon realized that

in real life the distance between reality and expectations happens to be great. In the year 1917, due to the military defeats on several fronts, there were huge territorial losses. The economic conditions were rapidly worsening and it was the German economic aid that helped the government to keep its ragged armies on the field. Consequently, at a time when hopes were lost, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia provided the Ottoman government with new opportunities. Thus the central question to which this research addresses itself is how the political and strategic aims of the Ottoman government had evolved between 1917 and 1918. What were the Ottoman aims on the eve and at the beginning of the First World War and what long-range plans did the Ottoman government develop with regard to Russia in the initial months following the Bolshevik Revolution. Besides, the period under investigation is of particular importance for the Turco-German relations. The developments in the Caucasus following the Russian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk prove that Germany was not as influential or dominant in the Ottoman Empire as suggested.

I tried to utilize mainly the memoirs of the leading Turkish as well as German and Russian personalities since they are the most valuable asset in reflecting the spirit and psychology of the time. Various scholarly monographs in Turkish, Russian and German and other secondary sources were also utilized. It was relied on the published public documents of the related countries, mainly Russia. The Kızılay Arşivi in Etimesgut (Ankara) needs to be reorganized in a modern way. Therefore, under the current circumstances, the information regarding the cataloguing of the documents that are utilized in this research is confined only to file numbers.

All dates in this research are given in accordance with contemporary Gregorian calender.

OTTOMAN WAR AIMS DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

For any research dealing with the Ottoman history during the First World War, of fundamental importance has been the question which factors lay behind Turkey's entrance into the war. Paradoxically, in Turkish historiography there has been two contradictory opinions. According to the first view, Turkey's entrance into the war was inevitably caused by the anxieties of leading Ottoman cadres regarding the preservation of the territorial integrity of the empire. Indeed, this argument strongly associates with the memories of almost all the leading Unionists.¹ There is a common point in these sources that allegedly financial difficulties² and secret engagements of the Entente powers³ that can be traced to the Reval meeting⁴ between Edward VII and Nicholas II in the summer of 1908 made it inescapable to remain outside the war. The only point of conflict is related to the timing.⁵ The second view assumes that miscalculated and irredentist policies of the leading Unionists whose motives centered on the prevailing intellectual movements of the time such as Pan-Turkism and/or Pan-Turanism were the primary reason of Turkey's forceful entrance into the war. Unionist leaders, the leading troika⁶ in particular, have been accused of being romanticist daydreamers that accelerated the disintegration of the empire. There have even been some extreme claims that the Unionists had sold their country to the Kaiser or that they were under a definite obligation to subscribe to German diplomatic policies.⁷

Instead of a coherent policy based on political considerations, it was the twists and turns of CUP's diplomacy that shaped the last decade of Ottoman foreign policy. On the eve of the First World War, there were hardly any sign demonstrating that the CUP had abandoned the traditional Ottoman policy of maintaining a balance between the

Great Powers. The chief concern of the Ottoman authorities before the outbreak of the war was the Czarist Russia. The fear of being left alone against Russia in an environment of confronting blocs forced the Ottomans to look for allies to balance this traditional menace from the North. It was assumed that to save the country from Russian aggression, support of Britain and France was essential.⁸ However, due to the entangling alliances, neither France nor Great Britain was willing to risk Russia, a powerful ally against German expansion, for the sake of a disintegrating empire. When in spring 1914 it became apparent that a general war would erupt in Europe, the panic of Ottoman leaders heightened. In their view, such a war would result in Moscow's final blow on Turkey. Consequently, Ottoman leaders even attempted to seek an alliance with Russia. An Ottoman delegation headed by Talat Pasha visited the Czar in May 1914 in Livadia, in the summer palace of Russian czars in the Crimea.⁹ Additionally, Cemal Pasha, in his visit to France in July 1914, repeated the Turkish proposal regarding an alliance between the two countries.¹⁰ However, none of these efforts created any positive outcomes. Under these circumstances, the German-Ottoman alliance of 1914, instead of being the logical culmination of carefully laid German plans, became a hastily made arrangement.¹¹

Speculations concerning the fact that the alliance negotiations were initiated by a small clique of Ottoman ministers and that several members of the Ottoman cabinet were neither aware of, nor agreed to the formal alignment of their country with Germany will not be touched upon. Of primary importance, we believe, are the nature and purpose of this alignment and how and why the Ottoman leaders decided to enter the war. The Sultan, on July 12, 1914, authorized the Grand Vizier to carry on negotiations for an alliance with Germany that was supposed to "secure the Ottoman

Empire from a Russian aggression.”¹² Indeed, the Treaty of Alignment signed between the two countries on Aug. 2, 1914 was formally directed against Russia alone. While the Ottoman government accepted to enter into the German-Austrian Alliance, in case Russia would resort to military means (Article II), Germany obliged itself to defend the Ottoman Empire whenever it would be threatened by Russia (Article IV).

On August 3, the Porte ordered full mobilization, but also issued its declaration of neutrality in the rapidly broadening European war. Meanwhile, the tidal maneuvers of CUP’s diplomacy continued. In spite of the treaty with Germany, Enver Pasha initiated talks with the Russian military attaché in İstanbul concerning a possible alignment of the Ottoman Empire with the Entente.¹³ These curious overtures by Enver Pasha have been a matter of discussions. The fact that he kept the German embassy informed about his talks with the Russians have been pointed out as demonstrating his insincerity.¹⁴ Nevertheless, there is no doubt today that, combined with the British government’s requisition of the two battleships, *Sultan Osman* and *Reşadiye*, without any tangible provocation from Turkey, it was the refusal and indifference of the Russian government, of Sazonov in particular, that hindered a would-be Ottoman proximity with the Entente.

On October 27, the Ottoman fleet steamed out of the Bosphorus into the Black Sea and two days later several harbors and points on the Russian coast were shelled, mines were dropped in major shipping lanes and a number of Russian vessels were destroyed.¹⁵ In spite of the excusatory note delivered to the Russian government on November 1, the language of the message asserting that the hostilities in the Black Sea had been provoked by the Russian fleet made it clear that the Ottoman government

risked the war with Russia. Consequently, on Nov. 2, 1914, four days after the provocative attack of the Turkish fleet on the Russian Black Sea coast, the Czarist Government formally declared war on the Ottoman Empire.

Much has been written on these contradicting motives of the Ottoman leaders during these two crucial months. It has often been alleged that by the time the Turks were no longer masters of their own house because of the entrenchment of German officers in their army and the attack on the Russian Black Sea coast was Admiral Souchon's *fait accompli*.¹⁶ However, there is no doubt today that the leading Ottoman figures at the time, first and foremost Enver Pasha, were willing to fight with Russia. It was again the "Russian factor" that played the primary role in determining the fate of the Ottoman Empire. The consequences on the Ottoman expectations of German victories in the Eastern Front are deeply anchored in the last decade of the Ottoman history of constant crises and disappointments which directly contributed to the Ottoman entry into the war.

According to E. D. Ramsaur, "The conclusion to which one is forced after a study of the origins of the Revolution (of 1908) is that no foreign power supported the Young Turks or even had any advance knowledge of the Revolution."¹⁷ In that sense, it was a purely Turkish enterprise aimed at replacing the disastrous regime of the Sultan with a strong constitutional monarchy that would end foreign interference. The word "foreign" requires a particular concentration for any research dealing with the history of the Committee of Union and Progress. In its publications before the Revolution, the CUP exhibited a marked hostility and suspicion towards all the Great Powers and it did not manifest any special sympathy towards Britain and France.¹⁸ The Unionists believed

that the Ottoman Empire must eventually rid itself of foreign administrative influence, foreign capital invested under far-reaching economic concessions and foreign interference in Ottoman political affairs. But for a period of transition, during which the country could learn the secrets of Western progress and adapt them to her own purposes, it was the obvious duty of a forward-looking government to utilize European capital and European technical assistance for the welfare of the empire. An indication of this phenomenon is appointments of various British and French officials to different branches of the Ottoman government to carry on reform programs that continued until the end of the year 1909.

As in the case of their predecessors, Young Ottomans, the primary concern of the Young Turks was the salvation of the empire that was supposed to be disintegrating.¹⁹ However, in comparison to the Young Ottomans, they had a program that was less theoretical and more speculative.²⁰ A well-known Unionist journalist, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, described the Young Turks as “inexperienced young people who did not have any knowledge regarding the world, life or politics.”²¹ Moreover, the so-called Young Turks were composed of people of differing social and professional status. Consequently, except for Ottomanism –for a very short period of time indeed-- they never reflected anything resembling an ideological homogeneity. What brought these people together were their common hatred to Abdülhamid and the belief that the proclamation of a constitutional monarchy would resolve both the external and internal problems the country was facing. How naive the expectations of the Young Turks at the time were is to be understood from these reproachful words of Said Halim Pasha, one of the leading Unionists:

“We hoped that the constitution would have a miraculous strength to alter the political and economic conditions of our society; to help us forget our internal disputes which were extremely vulgar; and, to unite us altogether under one great and noble Ottoman nation which would only think of the glory and greatness of the Ottoman Fatherland.”²²

After the fresh enthusiasm of the early months of the revolution, it became obvious that in real life the distance between expectations and reality happens to be great. From the beginning of the Young Turk movement, while non-Turks were more inclined toward far reaching liberalization and decentralization, except for Prince Sabahaddin’s small fraction, their Turkish partners’ basic concern was preservation of a strongly unified empire. After coming to power this latter group, composed largely of Turkish officials, officers and professionals and centered around the Committee of Union and Progress, officially pursued Ottomanist policies of their predecessors, the leaders of the Tanzimat in particular, who hoped to establish the doctrine of *Osmanlılık* mainly based on loyalty to the common Ottoman *vatan* (fatherland) and the ruling dynasty. As time went on, however, it was the national aspirations of the non-Turks of the Empire that hastened the failure of Ottomanism. There emerged revolts in Macedonia, Albania and by Armenians that were suppressed with an iron hand; there were massacres in Adana and elsewhere in Anatolia and in Cilicia. With regard to external developments, the situation was also worsening. Bosnia-Herzegovina was annexed by Austria-Hungary; Bulgaria

declared its independence and Crete decided to unite with Greece. The news papers of France and Britain roundly denounced the Adana massacres and came to adopt a hostile attitude toward the Young Turk Revolution, which only a short time previously they had ebulliently praised. The Italian attack on Tripoli and the Balkan Wars were the two final blows. The unavoidable response of many Turkish intellectuals to these premises was the development of a strong Turkish nationalism.

It is obvious that the Young Turks had certain nationalistic feelings even before the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and, contrary to commonly held views, this policy did not begin after the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. The main source of confusion is related to the lack of a differentiation between Pan-Turkism and Turkism. According to J. M. Landau, during the early twentieth century, Ottoman Turkish interest in the Outside Turks grew to such an extent that the terms Turkism and Pan-Turkism were often confused with one another and used interchangeably.²³ Although the development of Turkism will not be examined in detail here, certain points, clarifying the emergence of Pan-nationalistic movements in the Ottoman Empire, will be mentioned briefly.

When the famous Turcologist Arminius Vambery asked for permission to deliver a lecture in the Galata College on the ethnology of the Turkish race, Abdulhamit bluntly refused, saying "We must not touch the question of nationality; all Mohammedans are brethren and any national partition wall will cause serious dissensions."²⁴ The Sultan indeed was a stubborn believer in Ottomanism and his Pan-Islamism was principally directed to the sphere of foreign policy. As a matter of fact, Turkism during the first half of Abdülhamid's reign became limited merely to cultural and linguistic issues. Because other types of discussions were banned, historical and cultural matters

assumed a great importance in the newspapers and magazines.²⁵ The principal source of inspiration of Turkism was the discoveries made by European Orientalism that directly contributed to the evolution of Turcology in the Ottoman Empire. This European interest in the Asian peoples and their culture helped the native scholars in the Ottoman Empire rediscover their past history, the riches of their language and the beauty of their literature. Particularly, Necib Asım's translation of Leon Cahun's *Introduction a l'histoire de l'Asie. Turcs et Mongols des origines a 1405* (published in 1896) had a great impact upon the Turkish intellectuals. Rather than the originality of the work, the timing of its publication played a crucial role because towards the end of the nineteenth century the situation was ripe enough for Turkism's transformation from the cultural sphere to the political one.²⁶ The Turkish-Greek War of 1897 and Armenian revolts in İstanbul accelerated this process of transformation. Among other nationalistic writers of the same generation, the widest appeal generated by the poet Mehmet Emin [Yurdakul] who was known as the poet of the Turks (*Türk şairi*). His nationalist poems strove to stir up the reader's patriotic sentiments and awaken his pride in his own race. *İkdam* founded in 1894 by Ahmed Cevdet became the most popular journal in İstanbul because it was published by a Turk.²⁷ Around *İkdam*, Ahmed Cevdet gathered a group of writers such as Veled Çelebi, Bursalı Tahir, Necib Asım and Rauf Yekta who infused the newspaper with a strong nationalist spirit.

Such publications of European Orientalism, on the other hand, stimulated interest in kindred peoples, particularly those of Central Asia, whose history, language or literature had an affinity with those of the Turks themselves. The increasing flow of intellectuals from Turkic provinces in Russia into the Ottoman Empire, especially towards the end of the nineteenth century, gave a further impetus to the growing

Ottoman interest in Turks living outside the empire. Thus the bases for Pan-Turkism were laid down at approximately the same time that Pan-Turk ideology was making headway among the Tatars and other Turkic groups in Russia. Yusuf Akcura, the most influential figure among these émigrés, published his article “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset” in the Cairo journal *Türk* in 1904 that stated Pan-Turkism’s *raison d’être*. In this article, after rejecting Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism, Turkism was lauded as offering the only real opportunity for union in the Ottoman Empire. Besides, the author concisely presented the essence of Pan-Turkism by arguing for a national union of all Turkic groups, with Turkey at its center.²⁸ The debates about this article pointed out two crucial facts: First, it was again the Turks of Russia that transferred the emphasis from the cultural level, once so ably fostered by the Crimean Tatar İsmail Bey Gaspiralı, to the political one. Second, as apparent in the reaction of some Ottoman intellectuals to Akcura’s proposal concerning Turkism, the two policies, Ottomanism and Turkism, were inconsistent and incompatible with one another and it was inevitable that one of them had ultimately prevail over the other.

The common characteristic of Pan-nationalistic movements is their reaction to external factors as a source of inspiration. While Fichte was writing about the German *Volksgeist*, he had in mind a strong reaction against French cultural hegemony and Germans’ inefficiency to resist Napoleonic armies. When Ivan Aksakov dreamed of a unity of Slavic nationalities under a mightier, more integrated and more powerful Russia, he stubbornly believed that the Catholicism of Bohemia and Poland allegedly constituted a hostile and alien element that he considered incompatible with the element of Orthodoxy among the other Slavs. Pan-Turkism at first aimed at the revival of an ancient culture as a proof of a joint heritage and a collective identity, but as time went

on, it received political overtones and turned to be a counter-movement to Pan-Slavism. Pan ideologies generally were accepted by Turkish intellectuals as a *counter-weapon* to foreign interference. Dr. Nazım, for instance, an influential figure within the CUP, used to say, “We are determined to realize the same incitements the Europeans, the Russians in particular, do in our country. We will provoke the Muslims in Tiflis.”²⁹ Pan-Islamism provided the Ottoman leaders for more than thirty years with a weapon against European imperialism. Pan-Turkism’s villain image to be negated and fought against was undoubtedly the old enemy of the Ottoman Empire, Czarist Russia.

There has been a divergence of opinions regarding when and where Pan ideologies were applied by Ottoman ruling circles. According to one source, “(Ottoman leaders) envisaged the three policies being pursued simultaneously and side by side, each one being emphasized in whatever place, at whatever time, it was the most appropriate policy to apply.” The author argues that Ottomanism continued to be the keynote of internal politics; Turkish nationalism the keynote of relations with the Tatars of Russia; Pan-Islam, that of relations with the Arabs and other non-Turkic Muslims within the empire and of the Muslim peoples of North Africa and elsewhere outside it.³⁰ This pragmatism of Turkish leaders indeed played a crucial role in the pursuit of these Pan ideologies. Notwithstanding, instead of being the initiative of the Ottoman leaders, it was the circumstances of the time, mainly influenced by external factors, that determined Pan-nationalistic motives. Consequently, the Ottoman intellectuals never managed to overcome the confusions between Turkism and Pan-Turkism or Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism.³¹ The scope and essence of these Pan ideologies could never be clarified properly and strategy and tactics missed a systematization. The only person who partly succeeded in overcoming this handicap was Ziya Gökalp. Instead,

the movements derived their strength from an idealism that is almost unique in world history. *Mefkure* (ideal), an innovation of Ziya Gökalp and an important component of Turkish romantic nationalism, occupied the corner stone of Pan-nationalistic policies. In contrast to the racial, ethnic, geographic or political interpretations, Gökalp's nation is one composed of individuals who share a common language, religion, morality and aesthetics.³² According to Gökalp, in every nation, facing a serious threat or suffering an immense disaster, individualism dies and there emerges a national will. This national will is the creative ideal of every nation and it preserves a strong enthusiasm and sacredness.³³ The political connotation of this ideal is best pictured by Gökalp's poem, "Turan," written in 1911. It was a resounding call for Pan-Turkism: "For the Turks, Fatherland means neither Turkey, nor Turkestan; Fatherland is a large and eternal country- Turan."

Under these circumstances, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 are of particular importance. Their consequences were twofold. In the past, due to an "intuitive" approach, the Turks refrained themselves from risking for the sake of an ideal what were present in their hand. Therefore, they opted for Ottomanism.³⁴ The fact that almost all the territories were lost in the European part of the empire meant for the CUP a relative purification of the Christian subjects of the "Ottoman nation." Ottomanist policies were not left aside, but Turkist activities speeded up and became openly supported by the CUP. Secondly, this new spirit of idealism began to dominate the thoughts of Ottoman intellectuals. A German political agent, entrusted with a mission to İstanbul, during 1913, in the closing days of the Balkan Wars, wrote in his memoirs that "The sense of inferiority which had pursued (the Turks) since the days of Count Ignatieff, of San Stefano fame, had died out."³⁵ In Cemal Pasha's words, dating

from the Balkan Wars, the CUP was determined to follow a more active foreign policy that would enable the country to secure an equal and peculiar place within the league of nations.³⁶ Gökalp held that Turan was the ideal country that was inhabited by the Turks and where Turkish was spoken. Thus, the guiding objective of Pan-Turkism became to strive for some sort of union, cultural or physical, among all peoples of proven or alleged Turkic origins, whether living both within and without the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. As it evolved, it increasingly assumed an irredentist character. In 1918, during the initial months following the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, it reached its zenith.

In 1894 France and Russia signed an accord of mutual defence and they engaged themselves to come to each other's aid if attacked by Germany or one of her allies. From that time the General Staff's of France, Russia and Germany concentrated on strategies that would turn the prospect of a two-front war to their best advantage. In Germany's Schlieffen Plan, the speed of the mobilization was the crucial factor because Germany had to crush France before Russia fully mobilized and then rapidly shift her armies to the East. When the war broke up, Schlieffen Plan's grand strategic design had failed and the two Russian armies deployed in the Eastern Front made good progress. Nevertheless, the German victory in Tannenberg did not only stop the Russian forces, but also inflicted heavy losses on them.

On the Eastern Front the initial months following Tannenberg were spent on intense but inconclusive fighting. Nevertheless, Ottoman public was in some measure illusioned by German war strength and neither Russian victories over the Austrians in Galicia, nor the Marne counteroffensive that saved France from German invasion echoed in

İstanbul. The impatience of Ottoman ruling circles, the members of the Central Committee of the CUP in particular, became augmented.³⁷ It was strongly believed that Germany, within a very short period of time, would crush the French and turn to Russia. Enver Pasha and his friends feared to miss this opportunity.³⁸ The members of the Central Committee, especially Celal Sahir, were mentioning the necessity to enter the war in order to occupy Caucasia and Egypt because it would enable the Ottoman Empire to come closer to both the Muslim and Turkic worlds. Besides, it was supposed that, for the economic development of the country, petroleum of Caucasia and cotton of Egypt were essential.³⁹ For the CUP, one of the important war objectives henceforth became the liberation of both co-religionists and people of ethnic relations from the foreign yoke.

The Ottoman proclamation of *Jihad* on Nov. 11, 1914 was introduced by five *fatwas* of the Seyhulislam.⁴⁰ An exceptional ceremony was held in Fatih Mosque.⁴¹ The *fatwas* called on all Muslims to join the Ottomans, with life and property, in the *Jihad* against Britain, Russia and France that were accused of enslaving millions of Muslims for their own interests and of persecuting Muslims in India, Asia and Central Africa. The Caliph, additionally, demanded from the Muslims not to serve in the military forces of these three countries, nor to take up arms against Germany and Austria, under penalties of sinning and meriting the fires of hell. The Crimea, Kazan, Turkestan, Bukhara, Khiva, India, China, Afghanistan, Iran and Africa were specifically mentioned. In the declaration of the Ottoman Parliament, Meclis-i Mebusan,⁴² as well as in the *Beyanname-i Hümayun* of the Sultan,⁴³ Russia was particularly accused of being responsible for the outbreak of the war in Europe and of trying to destroy the Ottoman Empire. Amongst these proclamations, the most interesting was the appeal of Enver

Pasha to the army, as the deputy commander-in-chief.⁴⁴ He held that the people in the lost territories of the Ottoman Empire were praying for the victories of Ottoman soldiers.

Ayşe Osmanoğlu, the daughter of Abdülhamid II, wrote in her memoirs that her father was surprised when he heard that *Jihad* was proclaimed. According to the Sultan, *Jihad* had been no more than a symbolic weapon and the British would never be deceived.⁴⁵ Nonetheless, there were great expectations from this call for *Jihad* by Ottoman ruling circles. Cabinet members, particularly Hayri Bey, were of the opinion that the proclamation of *Jihad* would have a great impact on the Muslim world. It was believed that the whole Muslim world, stretching from Mecca to Morocco, was waiting for a signal of the Ottoman Sultan.⁴⁶ Following the proclamation of *Jihad*, official and unofficial Pan-Islamic activities⁴⁷ were started by both the Ottoman and German Governments. A joint Turco-German mission was sent to Afghanistan to persuade the Emir to join the cause of Pan-Islam and make war against the British in India.⁴⁸ A secret expedition was made into India to stir trouble among the Muslims. Numerous pamphlets in different languages were published and distributed among Muslims everywhere. Agents of *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, an organization set up for clandestine work, devoted much of their energy to guerrilla and sabotage activities among the Muslim subjects of the Triple Entente, mainly in India and Central Asia.⁴⁹ In spite of these efforts, the Pan-Islamic card of the CUP failed to create any positive results. Except for some isolated cases of desertion by Muslims in British forces,⁵⁰ there was hardly any response in regions specifically mentioned in the *fatwas* proclaiming *Jihad* against the mortal enemies of Islam, namely Russia, Britain and France. Islamic solidarity had long been in existence, but Pan-Islamism manifested itself as an aspiration rather than a

consistent activity, an idea more than an organized movement. Consequently, although the Islamic card was utilised to the fullest extent, Pan-Turkism and its political implications became increasingly emphasized.

The Turks fought during the First World War on over half a dozen widely scattered fronts. In Enver Pasha's war plans, however, the two regions of priority were Transcaucasia and Sinai Desert. The fact that at the beginning of the war Enver Pasha reinforced troops on the Caucasian frontier and took over the command of the Third Army in eastern Anatolia, replacing old, obstinate officers by younger, imaginative men, sufficiently explains the particular importance attached by Enver Pasha to this front. The Third Army was assisted with troops from Thrace, which contradicted Ottoman war plans.⁵¹ A new division was set up under the command of Halil, the uncle of Enver Pasha, to be sent to Dagestan over Southern Azerbaijan to instigate the Turks and Muslims there against Russia.⁵² In addition to the existing three Turkish armies, Enver Pasha created a fourth one in the Arabic provinces of the Empire and in November 1914, entrusted its commander, Cemal Pasha, with the Pan-Islamic campaign. Between January 1915 and August 1916 the Turkish armies abortively launched two major advances and several smaller raids to the Suez Canal to reach Egypt.

The most valuable contribution the Turks made to the war effort of the Central Powers during the First World War was tying down sizeable Entente military forces throughout the Near and Middle East. The successful Ottoman resistance to the British and French at the Dardanelles in 1915 and the victory at Kut-el-Amara in 1916 were of considerable importance. However, expansionist drives of Ottoman armies in different fronts, sometimes independent from the joint plans of the Central Powers, sometimes in

accordance with them, became heavily routed. After 1916, the military operations of the Entente in the various Turkish theaters of war forced Ottoman forces, in several cases, to withdraw. In the Palestinian area, after September 1916, the British assumed the offensive, cleared the Turks out of the Sinai Desert, advanced into southern Palestine and captured Jerusalem in December 1917. In Mesopotamia the Turks lost Bagdad to the British in 1917 and were on the point of withdrawing from Mosul towards the end of the war. In the Arabian peninsula, the British-sponsored Arab revolt in the summer of 1916 provided effective assistance to the British army in its advance through Palestine and Syria. Before the break-up of the Bolshevik Revolution, Ottoman forces were on the verge of evacuation from Persia. In Transcaucasia, after the defeat of Ottoman forces in Sarikamis, the Russians penetrated deep into Ottoman territory. Consequently, part of eastern Anatolia became controlled by the Russians since 1916. In addition to these, beginning from the summer of 1916 the Ottoman Empire contributed several army divisions to the European campaigns of its allies.

The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, was ill-prepared to conduct military operations in such a great European war because the country was economically backward and state treasury was notoriously empty. It was the massive transfer of gold and money and of war material and other supplies from Germany⁵³ (and Austria) that helped the Ottoman Government to keep its ragged armies in the field. Nevertheless, daily economic conditions and living standards of the ordinary people were increasingly worsening. Combined with the rumours of bribery and territorial losses including Holy Places, the unrest was growing. The prestige of the CUP, of Enver Pasha in particular, became seriously damaged. The German ambassador to the Porte, Count von

Bernstorff, for instance, complained in his letter to von Gwinner that, due to these premises, the position of Enver Pasha was steadily weakening.⁵⁴

These were the circumstances in the Ottoman Empire when the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd and Czarist regime became totally toppled in November 1917. Consequently, the period between December 1917 and August 1918 was of particular importance for the Ottoman Government because it provided Ottoman leaders with the opportunity of realizing the strategic aims embodied during the first days of the war and compensating war losses. However, it, at the same time, signified the deterioration of relations with Germany because the initial developments following the Russian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918, caused, due to the conflicting interests, a divergence of ways between the two allies.

THE TALKS FOR THE RUSSIAN TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK AND THE STANCE OF THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT

One of the most prominent students of the field, Richard Pipes, argues that “the tsar,...., could have saved the throne if that were his supreme objective. All he had to do was to sign a separate peace, exactly as Lenin would do in March 1918.”⁵⁵ Before the war, it had been widely expected that the coming world conflict would be decided in a relatively short period of time, but it lasted for over four years. Consequently, it brought a heavy economic burden to each belligerent country. Russia alone had to spend fifty million rubles every day the war continued.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, until the summer 1917 the Russian army held together. Contrary to a widespread belief that the “February Revolution” was brought about by war weariness, anti-German sentiment ran high and the public favoured the continuation of the war until victory.⁵⁷ This was also the stand of all the leading parties in the government and in the Soviet, the Bolsheviks excepted. The party programme of the Bolsheviks declared for a general European peace based upon the dictatorship of the proletariat. The issue was so sensitive that the Bolsheviks exercised great caution in public pronouncements.⁵⁸ However, it was the failure of the June 1917 offensive of Kerensky that aided the Bolsheviks and why the Russian army disintegrated.⁵⁹ Lenin, the principal driving force behind the revolution and the only person with a plan of action, did not miss this opportunity. An Army Intelligence Report for October 2-13, 1917 stated that the defeatist agitation was increasing in the fronts; the influence of Bolshevik ideas was spreading very rapidly; and, apart from the Bolshevik not a single political movement had any popularity.⁶⁰

Stalin, in his article titled "Strategy and Tactics in Communist Thought," wrote: "During a given stage of the revolution tactics may change several times, depending on the flow or ebb, the rise or decline, of the revolution."⁶¹ The third stage of the October Revolution indeed, the objective of which was to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it as a base for the defeat of imperialism in all countries,⁶² witnessed these changing tactics of Bolsheviks.

The Bolsheviks' main concern after October was to solidify their power and to expand it nationwide. This difficult task they had to accomplish required the immediate conclusion of peace. During the debates on the Brest Treaty, Lenin presented the issue starkly simple: "Our revolution was born by the war: if there were no war, we would have witnessed the unification of the capitalists of the whole world, a unification on the basis of a struggle against us."⁶³ At the center of this capitalist world stood relations with Germany. The Russian army was not able to resist a German advance. On the basis of responses to questionnaires distributed to delegates at the All-Army Conference on Demobilization, Krylenko concluded that the Russian army retained no combat capability.⁶⁴ Furthermore, in Lenin's judgement, unless the Bolsheviks made peace, the peasant army, exhausted by the war, would overthrow the socialist workers' government.⁶⁵ Consequently, on Nov. 8, 1917, the Decree of Peace⁶⁶ was adopted at a meeting of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. It called on all warring peoples and their governments to begin immediately negotiations for a just and democratic peace- a peace without annexations and without indemnities.

This declaration of the Second Congress of Soviets proposing an armistice of three months for the negotiation of a general peace evoked no response from either enemies or allies. The Bolsheviks, therefore, made new moves. General Dukhonin was ordered to begin direct negotiations with Germans on November 21⁶⁷ and the next day Trotsky publicized the Entente secret treaties. Besides, Trotsky invited the Allies and the United States to consider the declaration of November 8 a formal offer of an armistice on all fronts and of general peace negotiations. Despite to the protests of the Allied military missions against separate negotiations, on his arrival on the sector of the front held by the Russian 5th Army, Krylenko, who had been appointed supreme commander-in-chief by decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars, arrested General Boldyrev, the army commander, and sent a delegation across the lines with an offer to the Germans to negotiate an armistice. The Germans promptly accepted and on December 2 the Russian armistice delegation chaired by A. A. Ioffe, an ex-Menshevik and a close friend of Trotsky, arrived in Brest-Litovsk.

Since the beginning of the year 1916 the Ottoman government was chiefly informed about the situation in Russia by its embassy in Stockholm.⁶⁸ When the news regarding the collapse of the Czarist regime and the emergence of Prince Lvov's Provisional Government in Petrograd in mid-March 1917 arrived at Istanbul, the Porte, through its ambassador to Stockholm, İsmail Canbolat Bey, attempted to seek ways for a conclusion of peace.⁶⁹ These developments, on the other hand, were strengthening the hope of the Ottoman public that a would-be withdrawal of Russia from the war would aid the Ottoman government to preserve the Straits and to end the war with a relatively harmless damage. Nevertheless, the well-known expansionist orientation of Russia and

the first official statements of the new foreign minister, Paul Miliukov, produced the impression in İstanbul that Russia was not ready to quit the war or to abandon its claims to the Turkish Straits. Miliukov's resignation in mid-May appears to have persuaded the leaders of the Ottoman Empire that Russia might soon agree to come to terms with its enemies.⁷⁰ Consequently, Ottoman policy with regard to Russia, from the Provisional Government to the Bolshevik seizure of power, was based upon the assumption that Russia should not be "startled." This line was in full accordance with German leaders' approach who were generally inclined to await further developments in Russia. The Ottoman ambassador to Berlin, Hakkı Pasha, in his cable to İstanbul in April 1917, pictured Germany's strategy as dependent upon the pursuit of a prudent policy. German leaders were of the opinion that the Central Powers should refrain themselves from provoking Russian soldiers on the front and await the increasing pressure of the people upon the government.⁷¹ Consequently, on June 11 Enver Pasha, in his cable to the Commander of the Third Army, Ahmed İzzet Pasha, ordered that unless being attacked by the Russians the military operations on the Caucasian Front were to be suspended upon the request of the German Supreme Command.⁷²

Due to the military defeats on several fronts, huge territorial losses and rapidly worsening economic conditions, the impatience of the Ottoman public regarding the conclusion of a peace became spontaneously augmented. Under these circumstances, the Bolshevik proposal for a peace without annexations and indemnities was met with great enthusiasm. Moreover, Trotsky's publication of the Entente secret treaties exceptionally echoed in İstanbul. Between November and December 1917 the credibility of the Bolsheviks in the Ottoman public increased to a considerable extent.⁷³ The response of Ottoman ruling circles to the Bolshevik proposal did not contradict

with the sentiments of the public. According to Kurat, the first cabinet meeting negotiating the proposal of the Bolsheviks was on Nov. 12, 1917.⁷⁴ The same day, Austro-Hungarian ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Pallavicini, visited Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmed Nesimi Bey, and tried to obtain the support of the Ottoman Government. In view of Austria-Hungary, the Bolshevik proposal was no more than a dream, but it made clear that, if the Central Powers could behave cautiously and begin negotiations with Russia, it would be relatively easy to separate Russia from its allies and to conclude a peace. This approach of Austria seemed to have been approved by the Ottoman government.⁷⁵ The next day, Ahmed Nesimi Bey cabled Hakkı Pasha, stating that he should persuade the Germans to start immediately negotiations with the Russians.⁷⁶

As time went on, the Germans had come to realize that their one remaining chance of winning was to break up the enemy alliance, preferably by forcing Russia out of the war. Having failed to realize this by military means, Germans now resorted to political measures. A *Revolutionierungspolitik* of cultivating the Bolsheviks in Russia was started. From March 1917 till the Bolshevik seizure of power, the German government organized the transport of the Russian revolutionaries through Germany and Lenin's contingent was the first of these transports. Besides, the German Treasury approved to allocate five million marks to be used for political purposes in Russia.⁷⁷ Consequently, the initial news regarding the Bolshevik victory in Petrograd was met in Berlin with great gladness. General Ludendorff requested the intercepted radio transmissions concerning the break up of revolution in Petrograd to be exploited for propaganda, because the victory of the of the Workers' and Soldiers' Council was desirable from German point of view.⁷⁸ The Germans, however, were skeptical whether the Bolsheviks

could manage to hold in power. The German embassy at Stockholm, the most valuable center of information about the developments in Russia, reported on November 8 that “the Bolshevik victory was not yet certain, since they controlled the Telegraph Agency.”⁷⁹ Furthermore, German ruling circles believed that any sign of hastiness on the side of the Central Powers could harm their interests. The State Secretary of the German Government, Kühlmann, in his cable to the Foreign Ministry Liaison Officer at General Headquarters, Lersner, wrote that it would be inadvisable for them to make any offers of peace at the front. According to further reports from Stockholm, the Bolsheviks there have said that the new government could only remain in power if it achieved a cease-fire in the immediate future. Therefore, in the event of offers of general kind being made by the enemy, these should merely be accepted and no more.⁸⁰ Exactly these arguments were presented to Hakkı Pasha, who, on the basis of Ahmed Nesimi Bey’s aforementioned cable, visited German Foreign Minister.⁸¹

Russia’s defection from the alliance, however, promised one vital benefit: the release of hundreds of thousands of troops for transfer to the West. After the Bolshevik power seizure in Petrograd, the German General Staff drew up plans for a decisive offensive on the Western Front in the spring of 1918. The Kaiser affirmed the plan.⁸² Hence, the transfer of divisions from the Eastern Front essentially required the obtainment of a quick armistice with Russia.

The armistice talks opened on Dec. 3, 1917, and the parties agreed on a cease-fire to begin on December 6 and remain in force for eleven days. The Bolsheviks did not wish to appear in the eyes of the people in the Allied countries as helpmates of Germany. The Soviet delegation, therefore, declared categorically that they were treating for an

armistice on all fronts with the view to the conclusion of a general peace on the basis already established by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.⁸³ Trotsky, on December 6, informed the Allied Governments of the course of the armistice negotiations. Before it expired, the armistice was extended to January 14, 1918. It was aimed at giving the Allies an opportunity to reconsider and join the talks. Besides, the Bolshevik delegation sought to insist that, during the period of armistice, no troops should be moved from Russia to the West. However, these moves were showpieces. Using the actual terms of the armistice,⁸⁴ several divisions were shifted by the Germans to the Western Front.⁸⁵

While the German motives regarding the armistice chiefly revolved around the transfer of troops from the Eastern Front for a decisive offensive in the West, the main concern of Ottoman leaders was the evacuation of Russian forces from the eastern Anatolia. The Bolshevik proposal regarding a peace without annexation, therefore, was of particular importance for Ottoman leaders. Enver Pasha, in his cable on Dec. 3, 1917, to the Ottoman representative at Brest-Litovsk, Zeki Pasha, stated that the evacuation of Russian troops in the Caucasian front should be included into the armistice terms. A similar cable was sent to Ludendorff. Nevertheless, the Allied representatives at Brest promptly denied the feasibility of this proffer.⁸⁶ The Germans in particular hesitated to support the Turkish insistence on the evacuation of occupied territories since they did not want to pull back its armies for the time being. In the proceeding days, Ottoman attempts of similar nature did not create any positive outcomes. Consequently, the Armistice Agreement of Brest-Litovsk⁸⁷ (Dec. 15, 1917) between Russia, on the one hand, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, on the other, failed to clarify the situation in the Caucasian Front. Article III of the agreement envisaged the conclusion of a separate arrangement between the military commanders of both sides

concerning the lines of demarcation in the Russo-Turkish theaters of war in Asia. The Armistice Agreement of Erzincan that was signed between Russia and Turkey on Dec. 18, 1917, will be dwelt on in the following chapter.

After the signing of a separate armistice between the Central Powers and Russia, the question of affairs was transferred from the military sphere to the political one. The talks to draft a peace treaty between the two sides resumed at Brest on December 22. In the first session, presided by Kühlmann, the head of the German mission, the Russian delegation was invited to state the principles on which it hoped to conclude peace. The Russian "Six Points," which had been drafted by Lenin,⁸⁸ quickly disappointed the representatives of the Central Powers, the Germans in particular. Ioffe, after reading the larger part of the Decree of Peace of November 8, repeated Bolshevik call for peace without forcible annexation of territories and war indemnities. Furthermore, the Russian delegation proposed the right of self-determination for the European nations, as well as the colonies, as a basis for peace discussion.⁸⁹

The chief ground of disagreement henceforth became the future status, under the peace settlement about to be concluded, of the areas, which included Courland and Lithuania, Russian Poland and extensive territory inhabited by the Belorussians and Ukrainians.⁹⁰ At the center of German peace proposals stood the separation from Russia of Poland, Lithuania and Courland, all of which at the time were under German military occupation. In his reply to Ioffe's statement on December 25,⁹¹ Czernin, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs and chairman of the Austrian mission, agreed to a public acceptance of the Soviet formula of "no annexations" on the important condition that the Entente should also accept the formula. Hoffmann and Kühlmann, however, made it

clear that this did not apply to Poland, Courland and Lithuania,⁹² which, allegedly, had decided to separate from Russia for the sake of German rule. This time, the Russians become irritated. Having reached a deadlock, the talks were adjourned on December 28, but the negotiations between expert legal and economic commissions went on.

During the first round of Brest talks, there appeared an important divergence of opinions among the Central Powers. Towards the end of the year 1917, Austria-Hungary was on the verge of dropping out of the war and needed the immediate conclusion of peace. Consequently, Czernin threatened the Germans to sign, if necessary, a separate peace with the Russians.⁹³ The Bulgarians, who had been promised Serbian and Romanian territory, demanded a clause stating that the acquisition of these territories should not be regarded as annexation.⁹⁴ There also appeared important disagreements between the German and Ottoman governments. Nevertheless, the difficulties, which the Germans would run into with their Turkish allies, were yet on ice.

So far it has been explained, how the Ottoman government welcomed the Bolshevik proposal of a peace without indemnities and annexations. During the Brest talks, except for the evacuation of the occupied territories in the eastern Anatolia, the Ottoman delegation hesitated to present the main tenets of their peace proposals and awaited the course of negotiations to shape further demands. The Ottoman approach during the first round of negotiations thus was based on a policy of wait-and-see. Numerous attempts were resolutely made to obtain the support of Germany, but they generally remained in vain. A researcher, investigating the German documents concerning the diplomatic correspondence between Germany and Turkey during this period, concluded

that there are no indications demonstrating that the Germans sympathized Ottoman wishes.⁹⁵ The main contribution of the German delegation to Turkish expectations was Kühlmann's proposal on December 27⁹⁶ that the withdrawal of occupation troops after the signing of peace should be effected in all those areas where popular self-determination was not at issue. His proposal seemed to imply that the Central Powers would evacuate all occupied Belorussian and Ukrainian regions, while the Russians in turn should withdraw from the Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman Empire.⁹⁷

After the initial surprise with regard to these rapidly changing circumstances, however, Ottoman expectations became shifted and widened. One of the fundamental reasons of Ottoman entrance into the war was to get back the lands they had lost to the Russians since the war of 1877 and, if possible, to expand wider. The Germans, to speed up Ottoman intervention against the Entente, especially after the Austro-Hungarian general staff needed the Turkish support regarding an amphibious landing of about 50,000 men in the Odessa region,⁹⁸ utilized this card to the fullest extent. Following the Treaty of Alignment of August 1917, a deal was signed (August 6) between the two sides, the fifth point of which stated that Germany would secure for Turkey a correction of her eastern border that would enable Turkey to come into direct contact with the Muslims of Russia.⁹⁹ Just before the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea opened fire on Russian ships and bombarded Russian coast, there had been many important conferences between Enver Pasha and the German ambassador to the Porte, Baron von Wangenheim. The Baron told Enver Pasha that "Turkey could be promised no compensation or reward in the Balkans; anything in that direction would be too productive of further trouble, as Roumenia, Austria and Bulgaria all held strong views on Balkan matters. There remained, therefore, only Egypt, Algeria and the Russian

provinces forming part of the Caucasus.”¹⁰⁰ Consequently, the Ottoman leaders, Enver Pasha in particular, had come to realize that these newly emerging premises were offering to Turkey those opportunities that the Ottoman Empire entered the war for. While the armistice talks were still underway the Ottoman government gave notice to Berlin that in the impending peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks it would not merely insist on the restoration of the 1914 border, but also lay claim to the Districts of Batum, Ardahan and Kars which had fallen to Russia after the War of 1877-1878.¹⁰¹ In his cable to Zeki Pasha, on December 21,¹⁰² Enver Pasha expressed the Turkish demand that the return of these districts should be negotiated with the Russians. Five days later, Nesimi Bey informed İstanbul that the issue in question was handled amongst the allied representatives, but it needed further elaboration.¹⁰³ To strengthen the Turkish claims to these districts Enver Pasha, towards the end of December, set up a delegation composed of people born in this region and sent it for lobbying to Berlin, Vienna and Sofia.¹⁰⁴ Kühlmann, in his memoirs, wrote that the anxieties of the Turks were rising because the actual situation with regard to the German approach on the Bolshevik proposals had brought them to think that their expansionist aims could not be realized. In order to calm these anxieties, a conference amongst the allies, where the German tactics had to be clarified, was necessary.¹⁰⁵

The second round of the Brest talks resumed on Jan. 9, 1918. This time Trotsky headed the Russian delegation. Before the delegations reassembled, however, there appeared some important signs demonstrating that the German position appreciably hardened. Throughout the conference questions of high policy were the subject of fiercest contention between the Imperial Government and the Supreme Command.¹⁰⁶ Assessing the results of the first round of the negotiations, the German general staff doubted

whether the Russians were merely playing for time to unleash social unrest in Europe, particularly in Germany. Certain Russian actions such as the Soviet government's allocation of 2 million rubles to foreign groups supporting the international revolutionary movement¹⁰⁷ were justifying these arguments. In his letter to the Kaiser on January 7, Hindenburg complained of the weak and conciliatory tactics pursued by the German delegation at Brest and stated that it was the time to act forcefully.¹⁰⁸ The Kaiser agreed.

Under these circumstances, the session of January 9 was opened with an unpleasant surprise for the Russian delegation. Kühlmann led off with a declaration that, as the Entente Powers had not seen fit to take part in the negotiations, the declarations made by the Central Powers on December 25 and 28 were null and void and formally rejected the Soviet request for the transfer of the seat of negotiations to Stockholm.¹⁰⁹ Czernin followed, saying that the Russians must now confine themselves to the question of a separate peace and that the responsibility for the continuation of the war would fall exclusively upon them.¹¹⁰ The Bulgarian and Turkish representatives associated themselves with this statement¹¹¹ since the day before Kühlmann, Czernin, Talat Pasha and Popov had conferred together about their plan of campaign and decided that attack was the best method of defence.¹¹² Hoffmann then took up the attack and protested that wireless messages and appeals signed by the representatives of the Russian government constituted a violation of the spirit of the armistice. He was joined by the Austrian, Turkish and Bulgarian military representatives.¹¹³

The second incident that hardly shocked the Russians was the presence of a Ukrainian delegation at Brest that arrived on January 7¹¹⁴ at the German invitation to open

separate talks. The Ukrainian delegation made a declaration¹¹⁵ at Brest on January 10, stating that the Ukrainian People's republic, that was proclaimed by the third Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada on Nov. 20, 1917, entered upon a course of independent international relations. Since the government of the Soviet of People's Commissars did not extend over the whole of Russia, the Ukrainian People's Republic had to participate in all peace negotiations and conferences on an equal basis with other powers. On January 12 the Central Powers recognized the Ukrainian Rada as that country's legitimate government and the prelude to a separate peace treaty with the Ukraine was laid down.

In his statement in the Special Commission on Political Questions on January 12,¹¹⁶ Kamenev repeated once more the Russian proposal of a plebiscite in Poland, Lithuania and Courland, since no democratically elected organs, expressing the will of the majority of the population, were created in them. Hoffmann, in turn, stated that the German Supreme Command considered it necessary to prevent any attempt to interfere in the affairs of the occupied territories.¹¹⁷ In the proceeding days no progress was made in adjusting the divergent points of view, but a significant event occurred. General Max Hoffmann, on January 18, unfolded a map showing the Russians the future border between Germany and Russia.¹¹⁸ This was the final blow. It called for the separation of Poland from the old Russian Empire and German annexation of extensive territories in western Russia, including all Lithuania and parts of Latvia. In reply to Trotsky's question regarding the delimitation of the occupied areas to the south of Brest, Hoffmann said this would be discussed with the Ukrainian Republic.¹¹⁹ Trotsky requested an adjournment of the political talks and undertook to return by January 29. On the night of January 18 he left for Petrograd, leaving Ioffe behind.

On Dec. 6, 1917, Zeki Pasha initiated the first meeting at Brest with the Russian delegation. The issue in question was the evacuation of the occupied territories. According to Kamenev, the Russians agreed to the evacuation on the important condition that the Ottoman government should allow the return of the deportees, regardless of religious belief or ethnic origins, under the strict control of a commission composed of delegates of both sides.¹²⁰ These words of Kamenev calmed the Ottoman leaders. In the proceeding days, however, the news concerning the formation of a separate commission amongst the German, Austrian and Russian delegations to work out the stipulations of a plebiscite in the occupied territories increased the anxieties of the Ottoman government. Especially Talat Pasha and Halil Bey became troubled because such a development signified the delay of the evacuation.¹²¹ Due to this vibrant situation, Talat Pasha decided to come to Brest to chair the Turkish mission. Likewise, the Turkish claims to the districts of Kars, Batum and Ardahan needed a stronger emphasis.

Having failed to hinder Ahmed Nesimi Bey's travel to Brest,¹²² Talat Pasha's decision to join the talks once again worried the German and Austro-Hungarian governments. Just before his departure, the Austrian ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Pallavicini, told Talat Pasha that the accomplishment of the Turkish claims seemed to be impossible and unrealistic. He feared the Turkish insistence particularly on these three districts would cause an adjournment of the talks.¹²³ Nevertheless, during the talks Talat Pasha followed a very cautious policy and carefully abstained from entering into any conflict with the Germans, saying that Czernin was doing it very "successfully."¹²⁴ Besides, he aware that the German delegates were hampered by the contention between the

German Supreme Command and the Parliament (Reichstag). Under these sensitive circumstances, the best thing to do was to wait and see.¹²⁵

In view of Talat Pasha, the resolution of the status of the occupied territories would help both sides reach a compromise over other contentious issues.¹²⁶ On January 11, however, a significant event occurred totally affecting the optimism of the Ottoman delegation. The Soviet of People's Commissars promulgated a decree¹²⁷ proclaiming the right of Turkish Armenia to national self-determination. The decree stressed that to realize this right it was essential to withdraw all troops from Turkish Armenia, to allow the deportees and refugees to return to their homes, to entrust the safety of the population to an Armenian militia and to form a provisional government of Turkish Armenia in the form of a Soviet. The Ottoman mission at Brest, as well as İstanbul, was informed of this decree by Galip Kemali Bey [Söylemezoğlu]¹²⁸ who, at the time, was in Petrograd as the head of the Turkish delegation that was to arrange an exchange of civilian prisoners of war and the resumption of economic and cultural ties. In his reply, Talat Pasha requested Galip Kemali Bey to organize protests to be done by the Muslims of Russia against this decree.¹²⁹ Additionally, Ahmed Nesimi Bey, during his meeting with Trotsky on January 18, vehemently protested this promulgation of the Soviet government saying that the responsibility for the eruption of violent acts in the region would fall exclusively upon the Russians.¹³⁰ Talat Pasha, in his cable to Enver Pasha on January 17, argued that they had two alternatives: either to seek the guarantee of Russians as well as Germans regarding the evacuation of the Russian troops from the eastern Anatolia, but this option lacked reliability; or to launch an amphibious landing in the Transcaucasian region that was supposed to enable them to

“unite with the Muslims of Caucasia, as they had planned at the beginning of the war.”¹³¹

Trotsky returned from Petrograd and the talks resumed on January 28. Nevertheless, because Trotsky continued playing for time negotiations again bogged down in rhetoric. Irrelevant remarks and propagandistic speeches of the Soviet delegation during the talks and the alarming effects of the Bolshevik propaganda on the army and domestic politics of Germany (as well as of Austria) helped the “military party” gain the upper hand in Berlin. The German military stepped in and the idea of a dictated peace began to be widely pronounced by German ruling circles. Accordingly, Kühlmann, on February 1, told the Ottoman delegation that he believed the conclusion of peace with the Bolsheviks seemed to be no more than a dream. Therefore, it was necessary to prepare the armies for military operations.¹³²

As time went on, no progress was made. The Central Powers responded to these premises with the signing of a separate peace treaty with the Ukrainian Republic on Feb. 9, 1918.¹³³ Besides, the Kaiser sent a cable to the German delegation at Brest, ordering an ultimatum to be given to the Bolsheviks. It requested Trotsky to sign until the morning of February 10 the peace treaty without procrastination. In the event of refusal, the armistice would be terminated and the German armies of the Eastern Front would move forward.¹³⁴ The next day, Trotsky made his famous declaration of “no peace and no war,”¹³⁵ stating that although Soviet Russia refused to sign the annexation peace, she was leaving the war and would proceed to demobilize her armies. The Russians then left Brest-Litovsk.

The Germans became very nervous about this postponement. A wave of political strikes organized by the socialists backing the Bolsheviks could set off civil disturbances in the industrial centers of Germany. Besides, for the decisive campaign scheduled for March on the Western Front, the frontiers in the East had to be secured and the bulk of armies shifted to the West.¹³⁶ Having these considerations, Ludendorff urged that the Brest negotiations be broken off. Instead, the army had to march into Russia to replace the Bolsheviks with a more acceptable government in Petrograd.¹³⁷ For the final decision, a conference was convened in Homburg on February 13 that was chaired by the Kaiser.¹³⁸ The recommendations of the General Staff and the Foreign Ministry clashed. The radical views of the General Staff weighted heavier than the conciliatory approach of the civilians.¹³⁹ The conference decided that the armistice would expire on February 17, following which the German army would march into Russia and resume offensive operations. The issue of overthrowing the Bolsheviks, however, remained untouched. General Hoffmann at Brest informed the Russians that Germany would recommence military operations on the Eastern Front following the termination of the armistice at noon, February 17. Consequently, on February 18, without encountering any resistance, the German troops began to advance and occupied Dvinsk.

Following General Max Hoffmann's map calling for the separation of Poland from Russia and German annexation of extensive territories in western Russia, there emerged two main contending positions in the Bolshevik leadership, represented by Lenin on the one hand with Trotsky and Bukharin, who merely differed from each other in tactical nuances, on the other. Lenin, supported by Kamenev, Zinoviev and Stalin, favored an

immediate peace on German terms. The second faction of the “Left Communists” headed by Bukharin¹⁴⁰ wanted to break off the Brest negotiations and conduct partisan warfare, while fanning the flames of revolution in Germany. This position of Bukharin enjoyed great popularity in Bolshevik ranks and Lenin’s resolutions within the party remained in minority. It was Trotsky’s conciliatory line, as in the case of his slogan “neither war nor peace,” that avoided the danger of a serious division within the party ranks. For Lenin, the German advance, nevertheless, was the final straw. On the same day when the Germans occupied Dvinsk, he convened the Central Committee. At first, his resolution in favor of capitulation to the German demands failed to win a majority. In the second vote, however, with Trotsky’s support his motion received a slender majority.¹⁴¹ A cable was sent to the Germans stating that the Russian delegation was returning to Brest.¹⁴²

The Bolshevik formal acceptance reached Berlin on February 21. Still the Germans advanced into Russia’s interior. In the north German troops entered Livonia and Estonia. In the south the Germans and Austrians were advancing into the heart of the Ukraine. In the center the German forces moved on Pskov and Minsk. Consequently, in the German reply on February 23, the German government informed the Russians of new and harsher terms presented in the form of an ultimatum. The Germans now demanded, in addition to the territories they had seized in the course of the war, also those they had occupied following the breakdown of the Brest negotiations. The evacuation of the Ukraine and Finland was another stipulation. Besides, the Russians were to pay a contribution and make a variety of economic concessions.

On February 24, Lenin convened the Central Executive Committee and presented a report¹⁴³ on the situation which pointed out two crucial facts. First the Russian army, under no condition, could oppose advancing German forces. Secondly, except for the capitulation to the German demands, they did lack any other alternatives. In the voting that followed he won a victory for his resolution to accept the German ultimatum.¹⁴⁴ Having received the approval of the Central Executive Committee, Lenin drafted an unconditional acceptance of the German ultimatum that was communicated by wireless to the Germans.¹⁴⁵

So far we have dwelt upon the evolution of the Turkish claims from evacuation to annexation. Although Talat Pasha followed a moderate approach during the negotiations, he was waiting for the appropriate opportunity for putting forward further claims regarding the regions of Transcaucasia. In case this would fail, the Turks were determined at least to create some buffer states in the Caucasus that were supposed to prevent a Russian aggression in the future. In his cable to Enver Pasha on February 1, Talat Pasha argued that the Ukrainian independence would enable the establishment of Muslim governments in the Crimea and the Caucasus.¹⁴⁶ A member of the Turkish delegation at Brest, Ahmet İzzet Pasha wrote in his memoirs that together with Rauf Bey he persuaded Talat Pasha to work for the realization of this idea.¹⁴⁷ When the talks were adjourned some members of the Ottoman delegation, including Talat and Ahmed İzzet Pashas, came to Warsaw. They met a Georgian there who was a member of the Menshevik party in Georgia and concluded with him that both sides would combine their forces and work together. It was planned to send this Georgian to İstanbul who would proceed from there with a Turkish mission to Transcaucasia to work for the independence of Georgia.¹⁴⁸

Nevertheless, two incidents significantly increased the Turkish expectations regarding the Caucasus. The first one is undoubtedly the Bolsheviks' acceptance of the harsh German demands. The second one is related to the Turkish disappointment arising from the course of negotiations with Rumania for the conclusion of peace. Their increasingly bitter dispute with Bulgaria over the disposition of the Dobruja and readjustment of their common border in Thrace forced the Turks to satisfy some of their ambitions in the East.¹⁴⁹

The Russian delegation reached Brest on March 1. Two days later, without further discussion, they signed the Russian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.¹⁵⁰ The terms of the treaty were exceedingly heavy. Russia agreed to give up Poland, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, as well as parts of Transcaucasia. She was also obliged to recognize the Ukraine as an independent republic. Besides, the Russians committed themselves to demobilize their army and navy; to desist from agitation and propaganda against the governments, armed forces and public institutions of the other signatories; and to respect the sovereignty of Persia and Afghanistan. Economic clauses embodied in the appendices¹⁵¹ granted Germans exceptional status in Russia.

During the final round of the talks, in addition to the Turkish requests regarding the evacuation of the occupied territories, restoration of the 1877 frontiers between Russia and the Ottoman Empire and abolition of the capitulations, the Turkish delegation came up with new demands. Russia should recognize the formation of an independent Muslim state in the Caucasus and guarantee the granted right of self-determination to the Muslims in the interiors of the country.¹⁵² On March 1 Enver Pasha, on behalf of

the Turkish Foreign Ministry, informed General von Seeckt of these requests of the Turkish government.¹⁵³ While a very short period of time previously the Turks were complaining of the extreme German demands,¹⁵⁴ now the Germans believed that the Turkish demands were unacceptable. Consequently, the German delegation hesitated to support the Turkish mission. The Turks themselves had to work for their realization.

OTTOMAN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE CAUCASUS (FEBRUARY-MAY 1918) AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

Article IV of the Russian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk is as follows:

“...Russia will do everything in her power to secure immediately the evacuation of the Anatolian provinces and their regular return to Turkey.

The districts of Ardahan, Kars, and Batoum shall likewise without delay be evacuated by Russian troops. Russia shall not interfere in the reorganization of the constitutional and international affairs of these districts, but shall leave it to the population of these districts to carry out the reorganization in agreement with the neighbouring States, particularly Turkey.”

Before dealing with the significance of this clause for the Ottoman Empire it is essential to dwell on the situation in the Caucasus following the Bolshevik Revolution.

Colonization has been one of the fundamental phenomena of Russian history. A prominent Russian historian, Kliuchevskii wrote: “The history of Russia is the history of a country which colonizes.”¹⁵⁵ Dating from the sixteenth century, Russian

expansionist drives brought the state vast territories, stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean. The Russian Empire, as it appeared in 1917, was the product of nearly four centuries of continuous expansion. According to the first systematic census, undertaken in 1897, the majority (55.7 per cent) of the population of the Empire, exclusive of the Grand Duchy of Finland, consisted of non-Russians.¹⁵⁶ In the late nineteenth century, while the country, experiencing a rapid economic, social and intellectual change, essentially needed new and more flexible forms of administration, the government clung to the anachronistic notion of reactionary absolutism. Consequently, besides the alienation of social classes to the regime, the unrest among the minorities was also increasing. For Lenin, determined to exploit every possible means for the downfall of the Czarist regime, the ferment of the minorities constituted an important force in his struggle for power.¹⁵⁷

A detailed emphasis on the evolution of the Bolshevik thoughts regarding the national problem is behind the scope of this research. However, it is necessary to focus on the main tenets of Lenin's theory of self-determination.

Trying to steer a middle course between the views of Rosa Luxemburg on the one hand, and Renner and Bauer on the other,¹⁵⁸ Lenin interpreted the principle of self-determination as the right to separation and creation of an independent government. This radical view had been attacked for many years by other party members on the basis of an accusation that it preserved the likelihood of Russia disintegrating into its national components. Nevertheless, as written by Trotsky, "In this the Bolshevik party did not by any means undertake an evangel of separation. It merely assumed an obligation to struggle implacably against every form of national oppression, including

the forcible retention of this or that nationality within the boundaries of the general state. Only in this way could the Russian proletariat gradually win the confidence of the oppressed nationalities.”¹⁵⁹ Stated differently, whenever the interests of nationality and the proletariat conflicted, the former had to yield to the latter and the right to separation had to go overboard.¹⁶⁰ In a similar argument, Stalin concluded that the principle of self-determination, including secession, was temporary in nature and it was necessary to approach the national question from the Soviet viewpoint, subordinating it entirely and finally to the interests of the toiling masses organized into soviets.¹⁶¹ Besides, Lenin firmly believed that he could use the right of self-determination as a psychological weapon in the struggle for power abroad. He realized that “the colonial dependencies of the great European powers contained over a billion people who were, according to his views, victims not only of capitalist exploitation but also, in a sense, of national oppression.” Thus socialism could take full advantage of the forces of popular dissatisfaction by allying itself with the liberation movements in the colonies.¹⁶²

Having these in mind, the Bolsheviks announced the “Declaration of the Rights of Nations of Russia” on November 2, 1917, that granted the peoples of Russia free self-determination, including the right of separation and the formation of an independent state. Before the Bolshevik power seizure, except for Poland and Finland, none of the border peoples seemed to be either willing or ready to separate themselves from Russia. However, following Finns (December 6, 1917), one ethnic minority after another declared independence from Russia. Due to its peculiar features and the “Turkish factor,” the situation in Transcaucasia was more complicated.

The news of the “February Revolution” reached Tiflis, the administrative capital of Transcaucasia, on March 15 and the very next day the entire fabric of Russian imperial authority crumbled.¹⁶³ In Baku the situation was not different. Public demonstrations were held and workers were calling strikes in support of the revolution.¹⁶⁴ Following the abdication of Nicholas II and the Provisional Government’s declaration dismissing all governors and their deputies, the Imperial Governor-General in Transcaucasia, the Grand Duke Nikolas Nikolaevich, resigned his post. On March 22 the Provisional Government formed the Special Transcaucasian Committee (the *Osobyi Zakavkazskii Komitet* or *Ozakom*) to restore order and to introduce civilian rule in Transcaucasia. General Yudenich assumed the military functions. Before the local agency of the new central government was designated, the workers of Tiflis and Baku had elected their own representatives to local soviets. This signified the beginning of *dvoevlastie* (dual power). Nevertheless, due to the fact that the *Ozakom* was unpopular and lacked power to solve any of the important problems that were brought before it,¹⁶⁵ real power in Transcaucasia passed to the soviets. Especially those located in Tiflis and Baku enjoyed more authority than the *Ozakom*. The soviet alone could bring crowds in to the streets, order the soldiers to fire and compel obedience to its decrees.¹⁶⁶

In comparison to the other regions of Russia, the first year of the Revolution passed in Transcaucasia with relative calm. During this period Transcaucasia represented “the realization of the Menshevik ideal of a “bourgeois” government (i.e., the Provisional Government and the *Ozakom*) controlled and directed by “proletarian” organs of self-rule (i.e., soviets).”¹⁶⁷ Unlike to the strength of the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks were very weak and enjoyed little popularity. The enthusiasm of the first days of the revolution made the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks forget their factional disputes and

reunite into a single Socialist party. During March and April they worked together, but some differences of opinion developed shortly.¹⁶⁸ Consequently, the Bolshevik power seizure in Petrograd was approved neither by the soviets, nor by the *Ozakom* nor national councils. On November 11, a new organ of government was formed by the heads of the leading political parties under the name Transcaucasian Commissariat (*Zakavkazskii Kommissariat*) to replace the defunct *Ozakom* and exercise authority pending the action of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. On November 28 the composition of the Commissariat was announced.¹⁶⁹ The Georgian Menshevik, E. P. Gegechkori was elected to the presidency. One another Menshevik, two Socialist Revolutionaries, four Musavatists, two Dashnaks and one Georgian Federalist were members of the Commissariat.

The Commissariat declared that, being a provisional government, it would attempt to solve problems only of the most urgent character.¹⁷⁰ Undoubtedly, most threatening of all these problems were the results of the complete disintegration of the Russian army on the Turkish Front. According to the Turkish estimation, the Russian Caucasian army at the beginning of the year 1917 consisted of about 250,000 persons assisted by 470 cannons and planes given by the British to strengthen Russian military operations.¹⁷¹ As time went on, however, the detrimental effects of the revolutionary chaos began also to influence the Russian soldiers on the Turkish Front. In the autumn what was left from the Russian Caucasian Army of about 250,000 men was nearly 40,000 soldiers.¹⁷² The Polish, Georgian, Armenian and Ukrainian soldiers were called back by their respective national organizations to form national regiments.¹⁷³ The remaining part of the Russian Caucasian army was not in a position to organize any effective resistance to a Turkish advance. Discipline in the army had almost completely disappeared. The war against

Turkey was quite possibly more unpopular than that against Germany and since April revolutionary crowds had been demonstrating against the imperialist war.¹⁷⁴ The effects of this propaganda were so efficient that the movement of the deserting soldiers gave the Bolshevik party in Transcaucasia its first opportunity to gain a mass following.¹⁷⁵ This “Turkish threat” combined with the threat of Bolshevism and the struggle for the Caucasian army with the Bolsheviks, forced the Commissariat to take necessary measures. The Commissariat issued orders to local soviets to disarm all soldiers entering the territory of Transcaucasia. The Armenians and Georgians, meanwhile, started to form their national armies. While the Georgians had only an insignificant national army of not more than 10,000 men, by 1 January 1918 the Armenian Corps consisted of two divisions of Armenian rifles, three brigades of Armenian volunteers who were natives of Turkish Armenia, a cavalry brigade and some battalions of militia. There was no lack of good equipment because General Yudenich’s dissolving army provided the Armenians with guns and munitions.¹⁷⁶

Shortly after the Bolshevik representatives at Brest had signed a general armistice with the Central Powers, officers of the Russian Caucasian Army and delegates of the Commissariat concluded a separate cease-fire treaty with the Turks at Erzincan (December 18, 1917).¹⁷⁷ Although the Erzincan Armistice was the implementation of the Article III of the Brest-Litovsk Armistice, Kazemzadeh argues that it was the first major act of the Transcaucasian Commissariat that could be interpreted as an act of a sovereign government.¹⁷⁸ Indeed, the members of the Transcaucasian delegation, rejecting the terms of the Brest-Litovsk Armistice on the Eastern Front to be applied to the Caucasian Front, were behaving as if they were representing an independent Caucasian state.¹⁷⁹ According to the terms of the armistice, both sides immediately

suspended their military activities. A demarcation line between the two armies was drawn on the basis of their positions on the day of the signing of the armistice. Advance notice of two weeks was required if one of the parties should want to break the armistice, otherwise it would continue until the signing of a general peace.

In the second chapter we focused upon the evolution of the Turkish claims from evacuation to annexation during the Brest talks. Especially dating from February 1918 the Turkish delegation openly expressed its desire that the three districts (Kars, Ardahan and Batum) should become attached to Turkey. Another curious component of the strategy of the Turkish government was the separation of Transcaucasia from Russia in order to create buffer states that would prevent Russian aggression in the future. Consequently, the Turks endeavored to open separate peace talks with the Commissariat in mid-January. On January 14, Vehib Pasha, the commander of the Turkish Caucasian Army, sent a letter to General Odishelidze, the commander of the Georgian contingent within the Transcaucasian army, saying that Enver Pasha wanted to know how peaceful relations could be established with the “independent government of the Caucasus.” He proposed to send a Turkish peace delegation to the capital of Transcaucasia.¹⁸⁰ Two days later Vehib Pasha, in another letter to the Georgian general, invited Transcaucasian Commissariat to the peace conference at Brest stating that the Turks would do everything possible to facilitate the recognition of the new state.¹⁸¹ In its reply to Vehib Pasha’s first letter,¹⁸² the Commissariat wrote that Transcaucasia was a component part of the Russian Republic and could only negotiate on the authorization of the Russian Constituent Assembly. According to Avalov, the Commissariat failed to give a clear answer to the Turkish proposal not only because they waited for the convention of the Constituent Assembly, but also the sense of

loyalty to the Empire and an obscure feeling of unity with Russian revolutionary democracy forced them to think in that way.¹⁸³

The Constituent Assembly was forcefully dispersed by the Petrograd Bolsheviks on January 18. The Transcaucasian deputies, after returning home, organized a Transcaucasian Diet (*Zakavskii Seim*) with residence in Tiflis. The Diet was composed of the representatives of the three major ethnic groups of Transcaucasia. The Mensheviks and Musavatists were the largest factions of the Diet, each holding thirty seats. The Dashnaksutiun held twenty-seven seats. Thus, at the beginning of February 1918 Transcaucasia was on the verge of independence with its possession of a legislative body (*Seim*) and an executive organ (*Kommissariat*). Nevertheless, none of the major political parties was yet prepared to move toward separation and the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) particularly were suspicious of any separatist tendencies.¹⁸⁴

The Porte, meanwhile, was anxiously following the Armenian outrages¹⁸⁵ against the Muslims in the eastern Anatolia. In the territories that the Russian army had conquered and which were now held by Georgian and Armenian military formations, the Muslim population was persecuted by the Armenians bent on vengeance. Enver Pasha, on January 3 and 6, ordered Vehib Pasha, the Commander of the III Army, to take necessary measures to protect the Muslim population of the region from Armenian aggressions. The legitimate objective of a would-be advance of the Turkish troops was presented by Enver Pasha as an attempt to preserve the contact with the Russian forces.¹⁸⁶ Receiving these orders from the general staff, the command of the Third Army requested the army corps to prepare for a military operation.¹⁸⁷ However, any military activity of the Turkish army on the Caucasian Front was dependent upon the

course of the Brest talks. Vehib Pasha, failing to launch a military action, sent several notes to Generals Odishelidze and Przhevalskii, requesting them to prevent these cruelties. Nevertheless, the massacres continued.

During the second half of January, Lieutenant Hüsametdin [Tugaç] accompanied by an Azerbaijani, Naki Bey Şeyhzamanlı, reached the headquarters of the Turkish Third Army in Süşehri. Hüsametdin Bey, after nearly three years of imprisonment in a Russian prisoner camp in the interiors of Russia, managed to escape and before coming to Turkey, spent a substantial period of time in Transcaucasia with the Azerbaijanis. In his report to Vehib Pasha,¹⁸⁸ he pointed out three important facts regarding the situation in the Caucasus: While deserting, the Russian soldiers were leaving a considerable amount of munitions and provisions behind (that were passing to the Armenians); the Dashnaktsutium was planning to make a massacre of the Turks in the occupied territories; on the basis of the decision taken by all the Azerbaijanian political parties and the Azerbaijani National Council in Gence the Azeri Turks were inviting the Ottoman army to interfere. The reason Naki Bey was accompanying him was to inform the Ottoman authorities formally of this decision of the Azeri Turks.¹⁸⁹ He proposed the immediate advance of the Turkish army. This intention of Azeri national leaders regarding the Ottoman military interference was strongly supported by popular masses. Cafer Seydahmet, a prominent figure in the Crimean Tatar national movement who visited Gence in those days, wrote in his memoirs that the Azerbaijanis were enthusiastically waiting for Ottoman soldiers.¹⁹⁰ That night Vehib Pasha contacted Enver Pasha and the next day he told Hüsametdin Bey the advance of the Turkish troops was to be realized on the basis of Hüsametdin Bey's report.¹⁹¹ On January 23,

the Command of the Third Army ordered the army corps to prepare for a military operation.¹⁹²

The advance of the Turkish troops into the occupied territories began on February 12. After capturing Erzincan on February 13 the Turkish troops rapidly advanced eastward all along the line, encountering only ineffective resistance from some Armenian units. On February 24 Trabzon was occupied. Witnessing the advance of the Turkish troops the Transcaucasian Commissariat was eager to enter into peace negotiations with the Ottoman Empire at the earliest moment. After tackling the problems posed by the Turkish advance, on March 1 the Diet unanimously passed a resolution defining the principles upon which peace could be made with the Turks. It approved conditions which provided for the re-establishment of the Transcaucasian frontier of 1914. Besides, it stated that an effort should be made to obtain autonomy for those Armenian districts which would pass back to Ottoman rule.¹⁹³ The Diet chose a delegation to carry on peace negotiations with Turkey, but on February 2 the departure of the delegates for Trabzon, the city selected for the negotiations, was postponed. The telegram received from Karakhan, a member of the Russian delegation at Brest, stated that Russia had decided to accept the German conditions and the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty was to be signed on the following day, in accordance with which, Batum, Ardahan and Kars were made over to Turkey. Having no information as to the further position of the Ottoman government, the delegation was obliged to wait at Tiflis until an answer was received to a question on the subject, which had been sent to Trabzon to Turkish headquarters.¹⁹⁴ The Diet promptly made a declaration, stating that the "Government of Transcaucasia" considered any agreement affecting Transcaucasia and

its borders and reached without the knowledge and consent of the government as not binding and as having no international significance.¹⁹⁵

On March 7, when a communication was received from General Kolosovsky stating that the Turkish delegates were expected on that day, the Transcaucasian delegation set out for Batum, crossing from there to Trabzon. On their side, the Transcaucasian delegation held that Trabzon constituted a neutral point, which did not lawfully belong either to Turkey or to Russia and that, therefore, no conditions of binding character could be imposed on the delegation.¹⁹⁶ But on their arrival, the Transcaucasian delegation had the unpleasant surprise of learning that on March 10 Vehib Pasha demanded the immediate evacuation of the regions of Batum, Kars and Ardahan.¹⁹⁷ At the first meeting held between the presidents thus a written question was presented to the Turks asking whether the demand made by Vehib Pasha was an intimation of a refusal to continue negotiations. Rauf Bey, the head of the Turkish delegation, replied that his mission had come to Trabzon to lay the conditions and requirements of the Porte before the Transcaucasians, knowing nothing of the demands of Vehib Pasha.¹⁹⁸

The talks adjourned on March 13 facing an important dilemma. Although having declared to be a component part of the Russian Republic, the Diet announced that Transcaucasia did not recognize the Russian Soviet Government and the peace it had made in Brest-Litovsk. Consequently, the Turkish delegation was pressing the Transcaucasian mission to state definitely and precisely whom it represented. At the first official meeting Rauf Bey asked for a true declaration of the nature, form, political-administrative organization of the government in the Caucasus.¹⁹⁹ According to the Turkish view, Transcaucasia had no right to dispute the validity of the Brest-Litovsk

settlement since it had never officially declared its independence from Russia. Ever since the Turks had made their first peace moves in the autumn of 1917, Transcaucasia, trying to steer a middle course between the two available options (i.e., to declare its independence or to continue war), was trying to convince the Turks that Transcaucasia was an *almost* independent state.²⁰⁰ Accordingly, in the answering declaration, the Transcaucasian delegation said “that, after the [B]olshevik [R]evolution in Caucasia, a new and independent government had arisen there, at present responsible to the Diet, and that Transcaucasia already constituted an independent government which had entered into international relations and which protested against the Brest Peace Treaty, which was concluded without its consent, although it had not yet declared itself and no notification had been made of its independence, to the powers.”²⁰¹ On the basis of this information, the Turkish delegation asked for official information concerning the form of government, the boundaries, the recognized language and religion of the state and also for exact information as to the situation and position of the Transcaucasian government in relation to the Ottoman Empire.²⁰²

Before the talks officially started, Rauf Bey received some of the Muslim members of the Transcaucasian delegation. In this secret meeting three issues of fundamental significance were discussed: All the Caucasian Muslims were waiting for the Ottoman army; Bolshevism and Armenian military formations constituted a serious threat for the Muslims of the Caucasus; and, the conclusion of peace depended upon the declaration of independence of the Diet. Rauf Bey, in his cable to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, concluded that the proclamation of Transcaucasia’s independence was essential, however, the chance of survival of a republic composed of the Muslims, Georgians and the Armenians seemed to be impossible.²⁰³ The divergence of opinions among the three

major ethnic groups even reflected among the members of the delegation was justifying this argument. In secret meetings with Rauf Bey, while the Georgian members of the delegation were stressing that they could soften the Armenian desires in return for Batum to themselves,²⁰⁴ the Armenians were stating that if the Ottoman government was to allow the return of the deportees, they would agree to the Ottoman claims to the three Transcaucasian districts.²⁰⁵

The debates regarding the status of the Transcaucasian government were giving the Turks a theoretical justification for continuing their military advance. Towards the end of March the Turkish forces reached the prewar Turco-Russian border and crossed it at several points. The Transcaucasian delegation, being disturbed by this exchange of notes regarding this judicial quarrel, demanded the negotiations to be of a “business nature.”²⁰⁶

Rauf Bey presented the Turkish point of view starkly simple. He argued that because the Ottoman government would not consent any Russian demands regarding the Caucasus, the question to be decided upon was whether, in the proceeding days, the Turkish frontiers would stretch from the Caspian to the Black Sea or a Transcaucasian state under the protection of the Ottoman Empire was to be established.²⁰⁷ On March 20 the Turkish delegation expressed its desire that Transcaucasia should proclaim its independence and declared that the conference had been entered into only for the purpose of preparing a basis for economic and commercial relations and deciding their practical and technical details. A negative feeling towards the Brest treaty was unacceptable. However, the Transcaucasian delegation retained their original point of view. At the fifth setting, they repeated the four points decided upon the

Transcaucasian Diet on March 1. The Ottoman delegation bitterly protested the fourth point of this resolution regarding autonomy for those Armenian districts that would pass back to Ottoman rule. It constituted an interference to the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire.²⁰⁸ Thereafter, by general consent of both delegations a suspension of the conference was announced until the receipt of further instructions from their respective governments. On March 22 part of the Transcaucasian delegation returned to Tiflis to report to the Diet.²⁰⁹

A full-scale debate ensued in the Diet on March 25. Kachaznuni, an Armenian member of the Transcaucasian peace delegation, reported that aiming at creating a buffer state between Turkey and Russia the Turks demanded the proclamation of Transcaucasia's independence. However, because they were not sure whether it could survive against Russia they wanted to keep Kars and Batum for themselves. Another member of the peace delegation, a Muslim, added that if independence were not proclaimed the Muslims would not support the Diet.²¹⁰ The Georgian and Armenian representatives of the Diet argued that attempts should be made to obtain the support of either Britain or Germany against the Turkish advance.²¹¹ Needing time, the Diet decreed that Chkhenkeli, the head of the Transcaucasian mission, was given full power to take independently any steps "to abide by its decision regarding the question of peace terms with Turkey, but to attempt to make an honourable peace, acceptable to the Caucasus and Turkey."²¹²

After the Bolshevik Revolution the primary concern of the Entente powers became the ongoing disintegration of the Russian army. This posed three dangers for the Entente: the transfer of divisions by the Central Powers to other fronts, primarily to the West;

the enemy acquisition of large amounts of military equipment, Russia was supplied with from the beginning of the war by its allies,²¹³ and, the opportunity of penetrating deep into the interiors of Russia that would enable Germany and its allies to reach some vital raw materials, including petroleum. For Britain thus, the Caucasus acquired a particular importance. It did not only possess countless raw materials, but it also was strategically vital to its powers in India, Afghanistan and Persia. From the British point of view, as far as the south Russian and Caucasian territories were concerned, Bolshevism had merely cleared the way for the Germans and the Turks.²¹⁴ Having these in mind, the British government encouraged the Christian nations of the regions to erect a firm barrier against the Turks.²¹⁵ Allied military attachés, agents and intelligent officers were actively aiding the Transcaucasian government to form such a bloc. Nevertheless, for the time being, nothing could be done to prevent Turco-German penetration into Transcaucasia. Consequently, when the Diet sounded out once again the possibility of the Allied help against the enemy, before submitting to some of the Turkish demands, it was soon realized that it was useless to expect help from England, France or United States.²¹⁶ It was Major-General Lionel C. Dunsterville, who was appointed chief of the British mission to the Caucasus and also British representative at Tiflis in January 1918²¹⁷ under the mission of “reorganizing the broken units of Russian, Georgian and Armenian soldiery and restoring the battle-line against the Turkish invasion,”²¹⁸ who partially succeeded in organizing a resistance against the Turkish advance.

In his memoirs, Major-General Dunsterville expressed his views with regard to the situation in Tiflis and the Georgians as follows:

“The inhabitants of Tiflis read their Reuters and compared them with the glorious revelations of the German wireless: Obviously Germany was going to win the war. “Therefore why should we have the British here to prolong matters ? Let the Turks take the country: we look to a victorious and magnanimous Germany to protect us from Turkish excesses and to turn them out again when the war is over. The Turkish invasion is only a temporary inconvenience from which the Germans will later relieve us.” Such was undoubtedly the Tiflis train of thought, especially among the Georgian population.”²¹⁹

Although, for the time being, exaggerated, these arguments of Dunsterville were not baseless. Indeed, there was a strong “German orientation” among the Georgian population. However, Germany at that time was so busy with the dispute between Bulgaria and Turkey over the disposition of Dobruja and readjustment of their common border in Thrace that it was forced to follow a very moderate approach with regard to Turkish wishes in the Caucasus. The German ambassador to Turkey, Bernstorff, pointed out the danger this dispute between the two allies posed to the German interests.²²⁰ On March 15, in his cable to General von Seeckt, General Ludendorff stated that the Turks had to satisfy their ambitions in the East.²²¹ When the talks adjourned at Trabzon, German position thus was based upon a policy of “wait-and

see.” Kühlmann was of the opinion that until the appropriate moment rape enough for an interference both sides had to be left alone.²²²

In the first days of April the pressure of the Turkish Caucasian army, strengthened through the transfer of the Turkish troops from the Rumanian Front towards the end of March,²²³ intensified. The Georgian military formations were slowly retreating from Batum, while the Armenians were on the verge of losing the district of Kars, the key position in the defense of the Caucasus. Combined with the deteriorating relations between the Armenians and the Muslims as a result of the March events in Baku and the rising power of the Bolsheviks, this situation on the front forced the Diet to make its first concession. On April 5 the Transcaucasian peace delegation offered the Turks some territory in the districts of Kars and Ardahan and rephrased their original demands regarding the status of the Armenians in Turkey. Nevertheless, they continued to refuse to recognize the validity of the Brest-Litovsk treaty.²²⁴ The Turks in response issued an ultimatum on April 6 that restated their view that only the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk could serve as a basis for further negotiations and requested the Transcaucasian delegation to return a definite answer within the next forty-eight hours.²²⁵ Chkhenkeli contacted his government and stressed that the Turks should be informed of the maximum concessions Transcaucasia would be willing to make. He advised to accept the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk only when all the other means of reaching an agreement had been exhausted.²²⁶ The Diet accepted Chkhenkeli’s advice. However, two days later, when Chkhenkeli admitted that the tactics of the Transcaucasian delegation had failed and urged the proclamation of independence, the Diet hesitated to do this. Without awaiting further instructions,²²⁷ Chkhenkeli informed the Turkish delegation on April 10 that the Transcaucasian mission was accepting the Brest-Litovsk treaty and

was ready to carry on further negotiations on this basis.²²⁸ The declaration of the Transcaucasian delegation requesting that Turkey's allies should take part in the negotiations for a friendly conference was refused by the Ottoman delegation. According to the statement of Rauf Bey, in order to make it possible for the representatives of the other Central Powers to join the talks, Transcaucasia had to proclaim its independence.²²⁹

Though the decision of the Transcaucasian delegation to accept the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had been unanimous,²³⁰ there appeared bitter discussions in the Diet. Except for Azerbaijanis, the members of the Diet recommended to follow a more radical approach.²³¹ Consequently, on April 14 Gegechkori telegraphed Chkhenkeli to terminate negotiations and to leave Trabzon.²³² The Diet risked the war with Turkey. It published an appeal to the peoples of Transcaucasia, explaining its policy: "The destinies of our common fatherland are at stake...we are confronted with the choice: either a shameful peace or slavery, or war...That choice we made without hesitation. We did not sign a shameful peace, and peace negotiations were broken off. From now on the conflict must be decided by force of arms on the battlefield."²³³ Nevertheless, the weak attempts at resistance by the Georgian and Armenian troops could not stop the victorious march of the Turkish army. Batum, the third largest city in Transcaucasia, fell on April 15. Between the Turkish army and Tiflis stood only a handful of loyal Russian troops and a few Armenian volunteer detachments. On April 22, in his cable to Chkhenkeli, Vehib Pasha accused Transcaucasia of breaking the Trabzon negotiations and stated that the question of peace depended entirely upon Transcaucasia. He asked whether the Transcaucasian government wanted to resume the peace talks.²³⁴ The sensitive premises were pressing for the acceptance of the Turkish proposal. At the

session of the Diet on April 22 two resolutions were accepted: a proposal to the Turkish government to resume negotiation and a formal declaration of the independence of Transcaucasia.²³⁵ The Turkish government accepted both resolutions on April 27 and peace discussions reopened at Batum on May 11.

The Batum Conference took place on May 11, 1918. The Turkish delegation was chaired by Halil Bey, Minister of Justice and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was accompanied by Vehib Pasha. The Transcaucasian delegation of forty-five persons, headed by Chkhenkeli, included representatives of all political parties and factions of Transcaucasia because no one trusted anyone else.²³⁶ Halil Bey informed the Transcaucasian delegation that the Ottoman government was no longer satisfied with the Brest-Litovsk settlement and would claim some additional territories east of the 1877 border line, since it was Transcaucasia who had broken the negotiations at Trabzon and had replied to the original Turkish proposals by armed resistance. In a Turkish draft treaty, consisting of twelve articles²³⁷ and three appendices, Ottoman territorial demands included the Ahıska and the Ahilkelek districts where the Muslim population was already ready to proclaim independence in accordance with Lenin's right of self determination, city of Gümrü [Aleksandropol], the larger part of the Ecmiyadzin district, as well as the control of Gümrü-Culfa railway. To accept the cession of the Armenian districts like Gümrü meant to give Armenia to the Turks.²³⁸ The Turkish claims were in full accordance with Talat Pasha's views that neither the Armenians nor the Georgians should be allowed to remain powerful.²³⁹ Nevertheless, the Turkish government was at the same time worried about the possibility that the harsh Turkish demands would cause an alignment between the Georgians and Armenians. The Azerbaijani delegates at the conference warned Halil Bey that this

posed a vital threat to the Muslims of the Caucasus. Consequently, Halil Bey, under the instructions from İstanbul, proposed to the Georgians the partition of the Armenian territories between the Porte and Tiflis. The Georgians refused.²⁴⁰

While discussions were held amongst the badly divided members of the Transcaucasian delegation regarding these Turkish claims, the Turks suddenly broke the existing armistice and marched into the regions they claimed. Ottoman troops entered Gümrü on May 15.²⁴¹ They continued to move beyond Gümrü in the direction of Lori and Tiflis. The new military objective was Baku. Consequently, realizing that they could take by force what Transcaucasia refused to give up at the conference tables, on May 26 Halil Bey issued a new ultimatum, claiming this time the district of Nahcivan. Avalov wrote that allegedly the Turks were motivated by the desire to come to the rescue of the Muslim population of Transcaucasia, especially Baku. Chkhenkeli was given seventy-two hours to answer the ultimatum.²⁴² Enver Pasha ordered the command of the Turkish army to advance towards Tiflis, in case the Turkish ultimatum be rejected.²⁴³

At Batum, seeing their inefficiency to resist the Ottoman claims, the Georgian members of the delegation were seeking ways to involve Germany in the negotiations. It was believed the use of German prestige and authority could contain the Turks.²⁴⁴ When the Transcaucasian delegation suggested that the treaty should be concluded not between Turkey and Transcaucasia alone, but rather between the Quadruple Alliance on the one side and Transcaucasia on the other, however, the Turkish delegation strongly refused this idea, saying that they could not recognize the right of Transcaucasia to express itself on the matter of who was or was not going to sign the peace treaty.²⁴⁵ The Tiflis

government then turned to General von Lossow who had been sent by the German government to the conference to make sure that the German interests in the region would be properly respected by the Turks.²⁴⁶ On May 18 when the negotiations had reached a deadlock, von Lossow offered German mediation. His efforts at mediation proved futile, especially since the Azerbaijanis strongly opposed this act and refused to become involved in a German-sponsored settlement.²⁴⁷

Facing the increasing pressure of the Turkish army, on May 21, a meeting was held among the representatives of the three major nationalities of the Transcaucasian delegation to discuss what to do. When the Azerbaijanis argued that it seemed to be very difficult for the Republic of Transcaucasia to survive the present crisis and, instead, a “dual state” should be established, the Georgians replied that if such a blow befell Transcaucasia, Georgia would consider itself free to act as it pleased.²⁴⁸ The next day when the Georgian delegates met alone to discuss their next step, it was decided that Germany was the only hope of Georgia’s salvation. Once Georgia was independent, she could invite the Germans to protect her against the Turks.²⁴⁹ Indeed, the turn toward Germany was defended by Georgian leaders as the only alternative left after Russian withdrawal and Turkish advance.²⁵⁰ On May 24 in a secret meeting between the Georgians and von Lossow an agreement was reached.²⁵¹ The next day, in his cable to Tiflis, Chkhenkeli wrote that the German representative to the Georgian government would be Count Schulenburg and a series of agreements with Germany was ready to be signed.²⁵² On May 26, 1918, the Georgian National Council issued a declaration of independence. Two days later the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis followed the suit. The Confederation was formally dissolved. While the Georgians turned to Germany for protection, the Azerbaijanis looked to Turkey.

On May 31 the Porte issued an ultimatum to the Georgian government in which it demanded the immediate Georgian acceptance of the Turkish peace terms. The Turks, moreover, asked that a definite answer to their ultimatum be given not later than the midnight of 31st May. The Georgians, not feeling strong enough to defy the Turks, promptly replied. The Georgian government agreed that its southern frontier be determined by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk; announced its willingness to let Turkey use its railways; and, accepted in principle the separation of Ahıska and Ahilkelek.²⁵³ On the basis of these principles, on June 4 the peace treaty was concluded between Georgia and the Ottoman Empire. In the treaty, the Georgian government abandoned its claim to two districts of Ahıska and Ahilkelek and accepted various limitations of its sovereign rights such as the Turkish right to use and if necessary to protect with their own troops the Georgian railroad lines or the Georgian obligation for determining the size of their army by an agreement with the Porte. In the Turco-Armenian treaty, signed on the same day, the terms the Turks imposed on the Armenian government were more severe. There were huge territorial losses, including Kars, Ardahan, parts of the district of Ecmiyadzin, as well as the larger part of the district of Nahcivan. Besides, the Armenian government was forced to accept the continuation of the Ottoman control of the Gümürü-Culfa railroad line. The third treaty that the Porte concluded on June 4 was with Azerbaijan. It reflected a spirit of solidarity. Besides the promise of economic aid, under the Article IV of the treaty it was agreed that Azerbaijan would receive Ottoman military assistance for restoration of security and order.²⁵⁴ This was an obvious reference to the recovery of Baku.

THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION OF GALİP KEMALİ BEY, THE OTTOMAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW (APRIL-AUGUST 1918)

In 1917 Galip Kemali Bey was a forty-four-year-old career diplomat with considerable experience in Ottoman diplomacy. He came from a wealthy family whose members filled important administrative posts within the Ottoman ruling oligarchy. Before having been appointed to Moscow, he had spent a substantial period of time (1902-1911) in Bucharest as the first secretary of the Ottoman embassy. Thereafter he had served as councilor in the Ottoman embassies in Athens and Berlin. Particularly his activities in Athens (i.e., his warnings of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry regarding the Balkan alliance against Turkey) helped him improve his career. After the Balkan Wars he was promoted to the Ottoman ambassador to the capital of Greece. In 1917 he was appointed to Teheran, but the fever of Russian affairs destined him to go to the East.²⁵⁵ In his books²⁵⁶ written in the Republican years he particularly stressed that he had never been a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, though he ebulliently praised the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Nevertheless, as claimed by Kurat,²⁵⁷ the significance of this mission to Bolshevik Russia proves that he should be an ardent pan-Turkist and a diplomat who gained the confidence of Talat and Enver Pashas.

The first time Galip Kemali Bey went to Russia was in December 1917 when he headed the Turkish mission²⁵⁸ that was to arrange an exchange of civilian prisoners of war and the resumption of economic and cultural ties. The decision regarding a "joint committee" for that purpose was taken during the armistice talks at Brest. Paradoxically, however, until arriving in Petrograd neither the Turkish government nor the members of the delegation were aware of the exact purpose of this mission.²⁵⁹

Count Mirbach, who since the armistice had been in the Russian capital negotiating agreements on the matter in question, informed the Ottoman delegation of the purpose of this joint committee. Only Enver Pasha seemed to have a definite expectation from the Turkish delegation. In his visit to Enver Pasha before his departure for Petrograd, Enver Pasha wanted Galip Kemali Bey to collect in Petrograd as much information as possible regarding the situation of Ottoman war prisoners in Russia and ordered to give him 50,000 lira to be used for this purpose.²⁶⁰

Among other things the main concern of Germany as well as Austria-Hungary was the opening and regulations of commercial relations without any delay. However, the attitude of the Russian delegates in Petrograd was not contradictory to that of the Russian mission at Brest talks. After the initial sessions the representatives of the Central Powers soon realized that the primary aim of the Bolsheviks was to play for time, while fanning the flames of revolution in Germany and particularly amongst the German soldiers on the front. The Bolshevik delegation thus refrained to enter into any engagements regarding the economic relations, but an agreement was signed on Feb. 9, 1918 between the two sides concerning the exchange of civilian prisoners of war.²⁶¹ This was of particular importance for the Ottoman government, since Russian authorities, following the occupation of eastern Anatolia, departed some Muslim residents of the region and of the three districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batum, chiefly the Ajarians, into the interiors of Russia. The treatment of the Ajarians by the Russian government at that time evoked a harsh reaction of the Muslims of Russia. The Muslim Fraction of the Duma presented a report for a general questioning in the parliament and this report was published by *II*. In the proceeding days other Muslim newspapers republished that article. In a very short period of time the issue turned to be the

common cause of all the Muslims in Russia. Under the organization of *İl* millions were collected to extend aid to the Ajarians. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, disturbed by these developments and pressed by the Georgians and Armenians, decided to close down the *İl* after a short investigation. The decision was implemented on March 27, 1915.²⁶² Suffice it to say that the Turkish claim to the three districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batum made the issue of the return of civilian prisoners of war particularly sensitive for the Ottoman government, while the notion of plebiscite was increasingly pronounced at Brest. Additionally, among those civilians who were interned in the prisoner camps in the Far East were Ottoman citizens, mainly from the Black Sea region, who settled before the war along the Russian Black Sea coast, primarily in the Crimea, for business purposes.

Until 1917 the living conditions of the Ottoman prisoners of war in Russian camps were extremely bad. According to a report concerning the camp in Saratov, the Turks settled there were suffering serious shortages of food and clothing.²⁶³ The worse of all the camps, however, was on the island of Nargin in the Caspian Sea. The report of a commission investigating the camp in Nargin pointed out the danger the health conditions posed to the lives of the prisoners.²⁶⁴ Mehmed Asaf, a Turkish prisoner of war interned in a small town near Kazan, wrote in his memoirs that they contacted a member of the Ottoman delegation whose name he did not mention. This person recommended them not to escape since the Ottoman prisoners of war, small in amount in comparison to the Germans and Austrians, were to be subject to the first exchange.²⁶⁵ The Ottoman mission could not manage to include the Turks to the first exchange program, since the transport of them heavily depended upon the will of the Germans, but with the agreements concluded with the Bolshevik delegation, substantial

improvement was achieved with regard to the living conditions of Ottoman prisoners of war. Besides, the Ottoman delegation succeeded in securing the return of some invalid Turkish prisoners to their homes.²⁶⁶ In another agreement, this permission was also granted to those who were younger than 16 and older than 45 years old.²⁶⁷

Besides this issue of prisoners of war, another achievement of the Ottoman delegation of crucial importance was the contacts they established with the Muslims of Russia. The Muslims of Russia warmly welcomed the Ottoman delegation. Following the visit of a group of Muslims of different ethnic origins, including Alimcan Barudi Efendi, the mufti of Kazan, and the imam of Great Mosque in Petrograd, and their performance of Friday prayer together,²⁶⁸ Galip Kemali Bey wrote to Talat Pasha that the prestige of the Ottoman Empire among the Muslims of Russia was very strong.²⁶⁹ In the proceeding days, due to the relations of Remzi Bey who had been to Russia some time ago²⁷⁰ and Yusuf Akçura, these contacts of the Ottoman delegation with the Muslims of Russia widened although they were strictly controlled by the Bolsheviks.²⁷¹

The Muslims in the interiors of Russia who were affiliated by the right of self-determination appealed to the Ottomans for help. In the Tatar country of the Volga and in Turkestan the Bolshevik threat to Muslim unity was greater than anywhere else. In March 1917, the Muslim deputies of the Fourth Duma set up the Central Provisional Bureau for the Muslims of Russia. On May 1 the Bureau convened the First (post-revolutionary) Congress of the Muslims at Moscow. During this meeting delegates were divided into two groups: those for federation and those for centralization. While the former, represented by the Caucasians, the Turkestanis, the Crimeans and a few Tatars, advocated the federal principle, the latter, comprising primarily the Tatars of the

Volga basin, supported the notion of the extraterritorial cultural autonomy of the Muslims in a unified, but democratic Russia. The federalists won by 446 votes to 271.²⁷² The Second Congress of the Muslims of Russia was convened by the Tatar leaders at Kazan in July 1917.²⁷³ Compared to the first one, the attendance to the second congress was very weak. Only the Tatars and the North Caucasians were present, with a few Crimeans and Bashkirs. The delegates proclaimed the national cultural autonomy of the Turks and Tatars of Russia and Siberia. In accordance with the plan of Muslim military units, *Harbi Şura* was set up to raise military formations. *Milli İdare* was formed at Ufa to give effect to this autonomy. In the proceeding days *Milli İdare* paved the way for a national assembly and the *Millet Meclisi* assembled in Ufa on December 4.²⁷⁴ There were two main factions within this assembly that consisted of 120 representatives: territorialists and turkists.²⁷⁵ While the former, comprising primarily some officers, soldiers, the representatives of the *Harbi Şura*, young revolutionary or socialist writers, teachers and a few Bolshevik Tatars, were not satisfied with the notion of the extraterritorial cultural autonomy, the latter, chiefly represented by the progressive mollahs and elder intellectuals, retained their original point of view with regard to the centralization. A full-scale debate ensued in the *Millet Meclisi* following the draft project of Alimcan Şeref concerning a Tatar-Bashkir national state (*İdil-Ural Devleti*). After bitter discussions, the assembly set up a committee to work out the implementation of this project. A significant event, however, occurred at the Second Military Congress of the Muslims of Russia, opened at Kazan on Feb. 8, 1918. The congress confirmed the decision to create this national state.²⁷⁶ Galip Kemali Bey wrote in his memoirs that, following this military congress, the Ottoman delegation was informed of the decision of the *Millet Meclisi* in Ufa to send its representatives to Brest.²⁷⁷ He added that even the “Khanates of Bukhara and

Khiva” appealed to join the peace talks.²⁷⁸ The realization of these demands was, for the time being, behind the scope of the mandate in hand. Seeking other ways, Galip Kemali Bey proposed to the Ottoman government to give some of the Ottoman prisoners of war to the service of the Muslims in Turkestan, the Crimea and the Caucasus²⁷⁹ to help organize their military formations.

The Turkish mission left Petrograd for Berlin on February 15. They did not have enough time to improve these relations, but their reports would have a great impact on the evaluation of the Ottoman leaders regarding the situation in Russia. Consequently, during the final stage of the talks at Brest, the Ottoman delegation would demand the guarantee of the right of self-determination to the Muslims in the interiors of the country. As mentioned before, the Ottoman delegation failed to receive the support of its allies, therefore, they made new maneuvers. They succeeded in including a provision to the treaty stating that the Muslims of Russia were granted the “right of free and safe migration” to the Ottoman Empire. When Galip Kemali Bey came to Moscow towards the end of April, this time as the Ottoman ambassador to Soviet Russia, he would base his entire strategy with regard to the Muslims of Russia upon different interpretations of this term of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. However, one thing was clear: the Ottoman Empire would play the role of the protector of these people before the Bolsheviks.

On Apr. 23, 1918 the train of Count von Mirbach, the unfortunate German ambassador to Bolshevik Russia, arrived in Moscow,²⁸⁰ carrying also the Turkish diplomatic staff. The Germans were the first foreign mission accredited to Bolshevik Russia. They took over a luxurious private residence on Denezhnyi Pereulok, off Arbat, the property of a German who wanted to keep it out of Communist hands. The Turkish mission was

settled temporarily in a palace of a Russian aristocrat. The first impressions of both ambassadors are of particular interest. Mirbach, a few days after his arrival, reported to Berlin that the supremacy of the Bolsheviks in Moscow was principally upheld by the "Livonian" battalions and then also by the large number of motor vehicles requisitioned by the government. It was impossible to see where these conditions would lead; for the moment one could only say that they bid fair to remain much of the same.²⁸¹ Galip Kemali Bey, in turn, wrote to the Ottoman Foreign Minister, Ahmed Nesimi Bey, that the situation in Moscow as well as in Petrograd was under the control of the Bolsheviks. However, under no conditions the Bolsheviks could resist a foreign aggression, particularly that of the Germans.²⁸²

On April 26 Galip Kemali Bey was received by Iakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov, the head of the Executive Committee (*Ispolnitenyi Komitet* or *Ispolkom* for short) to present his letter of credentials. Chicherin and Karakhan were also present. This meeting was reflecting precisely the spirit of relations between the two countries that would shape the course of the diplomatic mission of Galip Kemali Bey in the following months. When the Turkish ambassador wanted to stress the friendship between Russia and Turkey, Sverdlov replied that it would be useless to speak of a friendship since the Turkish army was launching military operations in the Caucasus. Accordingly, Sverdlov requested Galip Kemali Bey to report to the Turkish government to stop this violation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. The Ottoman ambassador answered that he knew nothing of the military operations in the Caucasus. If this was true, the reason of these operations was undoubtedly related to the intention of the Ottoman government to protect the Muslim population from Armenian aggressions.²⁸³ In the proceeding days

this argumentation would constitute Galip Kemali Bey's official diplomatic line with regard to the military operations of the Turkish army.

In May, due to the continuing advance of Ottoman troops across the lines fixed by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire rapidly deteriorated. Particularly, the talks at Trabzon and the proclamation of independence of Transcaucasia raised the danger of further complications with the Bolsheviks. On May 8 Galip Kemali Bey, as part of a move to hinder more distrust, sent a note to Chicherin stating that the proposal regarding the peace negotiations was initiated by Transcaucasia. Allegedly, in accordance with the Article IV of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Ottoman government decided to determine its northern border, if possible by peaceful means, and accepted this proposal.²⁸⁴ Three days later the Bolsheviks applied to the German ambassador to Moscow, stressing that the Bolshevik government did not recognize the independence of Transcaucasia and the negotiations regarding the arrangements on the Turkish front should be carried on with Moscow.²⁸⁵

In his letter to von Bussche on March 1918, Count Bernstorff was complaining of the approach of the German Supreme Command with regard to Turkey's *kaukasische Politik*. According to the ambassador, the Germans, failing to clarify what they themselves wanted, supported the Turks unconditionally.²⁸⁶ This line of the German ambassador is in full accordance with the views of a scholar who investigated the period. Zürrer argues the fact that the German government failed to clarify at the Trabzon talks how far the Turkish territorial, economic and political demands with regard to Transcaucasia could extend was a serious mistake.²⁸⁷ The German government at first had no particular objections to the spread of Ottoman influence

amongst the Muslims of Transcaucasia. As April proceeded, however, the disintegration of the Transcaucasian Confederation and the continuing advance of Ottoman troops across the Turco-Russian border of 1877 were watched with growing alarm in Berlin. There were several factors Germany was worried about. First and foremost, however, the German government was disturbed by the Porte's apparent determination to bring all of Transcaucasia under its control. Particularly in May German anxieties increased. General von Lossow warned Berlin that the Turks were obviously attempting to gain the control of the entire Caucasus region.²⁸⁸ This conflicted with Germany's own ambitions in the region that offered valuable economic opportunities for German business and industry. Millions were spent for the formation of a friendly Transcaucasian state that would enable the Germans to reach Central Asia.²⁸⁹ Consequently, when the German aim at preserving, under German tutelage, the Transcaucasian state, with Georgia at the center, failed, the German-Georgian relations rapidly acquired a form of an exclusive German political and economic dominance in Tiflis. The agreement concluded at Poti between Georgia and Germany following the proclamation of Georgian independence gave the Germans such rights as the free circulation of German money in Georgia or the use of Georgian railways for the transportation of men and materials, for which purpose the port of Poti as well as all railroad stations were to be occupied by German troops. Lossow, in turn, pledged himself in writing to do everything in his power to mobilize Berlin's support to the young republic in gaining recognition as well as in the delineation of her borders.²⁹⁰ On June 3 two German battalions arrived in Poti. Nevertheless, Germany had neither sufficient military power nor any other means to stop the Turkish advance. Consequently, the German government decided to concentrate on the consolidation of the Georgian state.

Berlin was also of the opinion that the military developments in Mesopotamia and Persia required an immediate concentration of Ottoman troops on those theaters of war. On May 25 Ludendorff wrote to General von Seeckt that the Turkish government, in pursuit of political interests in other areas, neglected the defence of its own national territory and was causing the Germans troubles in the Caucasus.²⁹¹ For more than twenty years the Near East occupied the cornerstone in Berlin's *Drang nach Osten*. There were vast resources of some of the most essential raw materials in the Near East, including petroleum. With the peaceful penetration into the region, it was assumed that Germany could become an economically self-sufficient unit, freed from dependence upon British sea power. The Bagdad Railway project that was supposed to help the Germans to appropriate some of the region's enormous wealth speedily became an integral part of the national *Weltanschauung*.²⁹² Undoubtedly, one of the long-term causes of the First World War had been the imperialistic competition among the Great Powers regarding the control of the region. However, in 1918 the Ottomans had withdrawn in various theaters of war in the Near East. Such crucial cities as Jerusalem and Bagdad were lost to the British. For Germany, the loss of the region was unacceptable. In creating a new operational force, the Ninth Army, under the command of Yakup Şevki Pasha, and giving it the operational direction of Northern Persia, Enver Pasha pretended to satisfy German general headquarters. This, however, did not calm the Germans. Besides, the German government feared that the Turks, satisfied with their gains in the Caucasus, could conclude a separate peace with the British.²⁹³

Another concern of Berlin was the fact that the crossing of the Ottoman army of the lines fixed by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty raised the danger of complications with the Bolshevik government in Moscow. It was feared in Berlin that the advance of Ottoman troops would endanger the Brest settlement.²⁹⁴ The German government indeed was very prudent in his policy towards Moscow regarding the Caucasus. During the negotiations in Batum, for solving Transcaucasia's relations with Russia, Germany proposed to act as a mediator between Moscow and Tiflis. There were even talks between the two sides regarding the Russian participation in the Batum Conference, although Russia continued to refuse to recognize the "self-styled government" of Transcaucasia.²⁹⁵ The Turks, in contrast, hardly cared much about the Bolshevik government in Moscow. In his cable to Halil Bey on May 24, Talat Pasha argued that if Russia were to be as strong as in the past, Turkey could do nothing. However, because Russia was not in a position to resist the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus, Turkey should exploit this opportunity to the fullest extent.²⁹⁶ The primary aim of the Ottoman government thus became the acquisition of as much territory as possible and the separation of Transcaucasia from Russia in order to create buffer states that would prevent Russian aggression in the future. Ottomans were not satisfied merely with Transcaucasia and external factors provided them with new opportunities. This was the case with regard to the new Muslim republic established in the North Caucasus.

The proclamation of independence of the North Caucasian Mountaineers' Republic on May 11, 1918,²⁹⁷ and, upon its request to the Ottoman government,²⁹⁸ the inclusion of its delegates to the talks at Batum added fuel to the smoldering fire. Even before this declaration of independence the Ottoman authorities were seeking ways of including the representatives of the North Caucasus to peace negotiations with Transcaucasia.

Vehib Pasha was of the opinion that this would enable the Ottomans in the proceeding days to help the North Caucasians materially.²⁹⁹ Following the independence, the representatives of this newly created republic in Istanbul promptly applied to Enver Pasha for an alliance between the two countries to form a powerful bloc against Russian aggression in the future.³⁰⁰ This opened the way for possible Turkish intervention on behalf of the North Caucasian Muslims. Consequently, neither the Germans,³⁰¹ nor the Bolsheviks granted it recognition. On May 30 Chicherin sent a note to Galip Kemali Bey claiming that this “organization” which proclaimed the independence of the North Caucasus lacked a popular support.³⁰² The day after Chicherin applied to the German government and repeated the same argument.³⁰³

Another source of further complications in relations, indeed a stronger one than that of the North Caucasus or Transcaucasia, became the Turkish advance toward the Caspian Sea. Ottoman troops entered Gümrü on May 25 and continued to move in the direction of Lori and Tiflis. The occupation of Gümrü made it clear that the new military objective was Baku. The Ottoman hastiness for Baku stemmed from several factors. Troops of the Baku Soviet, after having succeeded in defeating the anti-soviet Muslim forces within the city in March, pulled back the forces of Imam Gotsinskii from Dagestan, the north Caucasian allies of the Baku Muslims, and continued their push westward, in the direction of Gence.³⁰⁴ There appeared a strong need of an immediate Ottoman assistance to the Muslims of the region before it would be too late. The Ottoman government was also concerned of the danger of a British invasion of Baku. Towards the end of June a further source of anxiety became the increasing activities and propaganda of the Armenians in Berlin and particularly in Moscow. Galip Kemali Bey, in his cable to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry on June 20, noted the need for an

immediate occupation of Baku since it was necessary to break the Armenian resistance in the Caucasus.³⁰⁵ On July 25 Galip Kemali Bey once again urged the immediate occupation of Baku. He added that because this would enable to break the connection between Moscow and the local Bolsheviks, it would be extremely easy to impose their terms upon the Bolsheviks.³⁰⁶

The Bolshevik government disturbed by the apparent determination of the Ottoman army to bring Baku under the control of Turkey appealed to the Ottoman ambassador at Moscow. On May 28 Chicherin sent a note to Galip Kemali Bey protesting the advance of the Turkish army towards Baku. It was particularly stressed that the renunciation of the three districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batum in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was realized by the Soviet government "as a great sacrifice." Therefore, any other claims of the Ottoman government were unacceptable.³⁰⁷ The next day Galip Kemali Bey, in his reply to Chicherin, wrote that he knew nothing of the military operations of the Turkish army in the Caucasus.³⁰⁸ Facing this diplomatic answer of the Ottoman ambassador and their helplessness before the Turks, the Soviet government made new maneuvers. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs applied to the German government that eastern Transcaucasia was part of Russia and the advance of Ottoman troops constituted a violation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.³⁰⁹ Additionally, the Baku Soviet issued two declarations on May 29³¹⁰ and June 1³¹¹ appealing to the people to defend the soviet power by armed resistance. Being worried about these developments and the rumors in Moscow regarding the realignment of the Red Army and the Entente, Galip Kemali Bey, in his cable to the Ottoman Foreign Minister on June 4, stressed the necessity to find an immediate solution to this problem of the Caucasus.³¹²

At the beginning of June, due to these sensitive premises, the disagreements with the Germans regarding the Turkish aspirations in the Caucasian affairs were steadily increasing. On June 8 Ludendorff sent an extremely surly message to Enver Pasha calling the Ottoman government to respect the borders fixed by the Brest Treaty since otherwise the Germans had to reserve the right to take further decisions.³¹³ The next day Hindenburg followed up with another message to Enver Pasha stating that the German Supreme Command expected the Ottoman army to withdraw forthwith to the borders fixed at Brest-Litovsk.³¹⁴ Enver Pasha took two measures as a skillfully conceived political move to counter the Germans. In his reply to these aforementioned messages he noted that the demand regarding an Ottoman withdrawal to the Brest line was impossible and threatened the Germans to resign if Germany persisted in its negative attitude.³¹⁵ Besides, as part of an effort to calm the Germans and to find a legal justification for the military operations in the Caucasus, Enver Pasha forwarded the "Army of Islam."

This idea was part of a well-prepared initiative of the Ottoman general staff with regard to the developments in Russia. The Pan-Turkic aspirations of Enver Pasha included the unification of all Muslims in the Caucasus, the Volga basin and Turkestan. On Feb. 16, 1918 Enver Pasha issued an order to the Command of the Turkish VIth Army requesting the formation of an organization in Teheran that would coordinate the transfer of Turkish officers to the Muslim regions of Russia, particularly to the Caucasus and Turkestan, to support and organize the Muslim population therein. He appointed Nuri Bey, his half-brother, to the head of this organization.³¹⁶ The developments in the Caucasus in the proceeding days gave Enver Pasha the opportunity

he was waiting for enthusiastically. He sent Nuri Bey, who had already distinguished himself as a partisan leader in Libya, to Musul towards the end of March to proceed over there to Azerbaijan to organize an armed force of local Muslims. Nuri Bey arrived in Gence with his headquarters on May 25, 1918. Once local Azerbaijani irregular units had been formed, Nuri Bey was promoted to the rank of Pasha and was named the commander of the new "Army of Islam." Additionally, Enver Pasha gave his uncle, Halil Pasha, command of the Eastern Army Group. Upon the request of Nuri Pasha, the Army of Islam was strengthened through the transfer of the Turkish 5th Caucasian division.³¹⁷ In the initial days of July the contest for Baku started. This mixed Ottoman-Azerbaijani task force, numbering about 6,000 Turkish regulars and 10,000 to 20,000 Azerbaijani volunteers and militia members, reached Kurdemir, halfway between Elizavetpol and Baku, by the middle of July.

According to the Soviet point of view, Baku had to remain within the Russian Soviet Republic, since its oil was necessary to the economy of Russia. Seeing their inefficiency to resist the advancing Ottoman forces the panic of the Bolshevik leaders augmented. There were two other available forces to be applied to for political help: Britain and Germany. British help was at that time suspect as capitalist and imperialist intervention.³¹⁸ Germany, however, realizing that the key to the Baku problem was lying in Moscow, was ready to enter into a rapprochement with Moscow for the sake of some economic concessions. It was of vital importance for Germany's war effort to get hold of the Baku oil. The talks opened in Berlin at the beginning of July. In his cable to Stalin on July 7, Lenin wrote the German proposal that, in return for oil, Germany could stop the Turkish advance on Baku, was fully acceptable to the Bolshevik government.³¹⁹ Germany at the same time was trying to cement the German-

Georgian bond even further. Ioffe, the German ambassador to Berlin, reported to Moscow that the Germans were willing to “take away” only Georgia, that’s why their relations with Turkey were rapidly becoming “strained.”³²⁰ The Georgian delegates who had come to Berlin with Lossow the previous month signed a number of agreements on July 12 that offered the Germans a wide-range of further economic concessions. Avalov, in an interview with a German diplomat, was told that the German approach with regard to Georgia would be similar to that of the British in India.³²¹

On June 24, upon the request of the Georgian government, a conference was convened in Istanbul between the Central Powers and the Transcaucasian states to tackle the Caucasian question.³²² The conference was organized by the Germans. The Germans proposed to invite the Soviet delegates to join the conference, but the Ottoman government strongly opposed to this idea.³²³ This conference was of particular importance for the Ottomans to determine further steps in their Caucasian policy. Consequently, the Ottoman Foreign Minister, Ahmed Nesimi Bey, sent a telegram to Galip Kemali Bey advising to follow a very prudent diplomacy in Moscow until concrete results could be obtained in the conference. Moreover, the Porte reported to Galip Kemali Bey to present the purported aim of the conference to the Bolshevik government as an attempt to determine the frontiers between the Ottoman Empire and the Transcaucasian states.³²⁴ However, the conference failed to create any positive outcomes.

By the end of July the Army of Islam reached the Caspian Sea south of Baku and began to close in on the city. On July 25 Chicherin sent a telegram to Ioffe where he pointed

out that the danger expecting Baku became grown.³²⁵ The same day a note was given to the German diplomatic mission at Moscow stressing that, in spite of the German guarantee, the Turkish advance continued. Germany was requested to help stop this violation of the Brest treaty.³²⁶ Meanwhile, there emerged another danger for the Bolshevik government with regard to Baku. Faced with the increasing Turkish threat, the non-Bolshevik majority of the Baku Soviet voted to call in British help. Shaumian reported to Moscow that this decision destroyed the morale of the soldiers defending the city against the Turkish army and the situation in the city was very tense.³²⁷ This move also alarmed the Germans. While having achieved a considerable progress in its talks with Moscow regarding the delivery of Baku oil to Germany, the appearance of British forces in Baku was unacceptable to the German government. Germany immediately resorted to diplomatic means. On July 30 Karl Helfferich, Mirbach's successor,³²⁸ visited Galip Kemali Bey. He requested the Ottoman ambassador to report to the Porte to stop the military operations, since he was informed of the presence of German troops in the region.³²⁹ The same day when the Dunsterville's force arrived in Baku (August 4), Ludendorff sent a message to Enver Pasha stating that, due to the risk of a new war with Russia, the Turkish advance on Baku should be halted at once. He threatened Enver Pasha with recalling the German officers in the Turkish High Command.³³⁰ The Bolsheviks, being aware of the importance of oil to the German war effort, were determined to utilize this card to the fullest extent. On August 2 Chicherin told Galip Kemali Bey that the workers at Baku would set fire to the oilfields of the city unless the Turkish advance continued.³³¹ Galip Kemali Bey warned the Porte that the Germans were extremely troubled about this threat.³³²

Besides the Baku problem, another subject of diplomatic correspondence between Galip Kemali Bey and the Bolshevik Foreign Affairs Commissariat was the journal *Yeni Dünya*³³³ (*Novyi Mir* in Russian) that was published by Mustafa Suphi.³³⁴

Before escaping to Russia in 1914,³³⁵ Mustafa Suphi had been one of the most prominent opponents of the Committee of Union and Progress. At the beginning of the world war he was arrested in Batum by Russian authorities and was sent, together with the Turkish prisoners of war, into the interiors of Russia. In these prisoners camps he became familiar with the Marxist ideals. Following the Bolshevik Revolution, he managed to come to Moscow and applied to the Bolsheviks to work for the revolution. He was the first Turk offering his service to the Bolshevik government.³³⁶ On Jan. 19, 1918, the Council of the People's Commissars decreed to set up the Central Commissariat for Muslim Affairs (*Muskom* in short).³³⁷ The purpose of existence of this newly created body that was responsible to Stalin, the People's Commissar for the Nationalities, was to bolshevise the Muslim masses. Within a very short period of time Mustafa Suphi gained the confidence of Stalin.³³⁸ Thus Stalin consented Mustafa Suphi's proposal concerning the publication of a communist journal in Turkish that would conduct an effective Bolshevik propaganda amongst the Turks as well as Muslims of Russia. Mollanur Vahitov, the chairman of the *Muskom*, and the two vice-chairmen, Şerif Manatov and Alimcan İbrahim, were the names behind the scenes.³³⁹ Coinciding with the arrival of Galip Kemali Bey at Moscow, the first number of *Yeni Dünya* appeared towards the end of April 1918.

Yeni Dünya posed a serious threat to the Ottoman government: the spread of Bolshevik propaganda among the Turkish prisoners of war as well as the Muslims of Russia. Three days after his arrival, on April 26, in his cable to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, Galip Kemali Bey pointed out the detrimental effects of the Bolshevik propaganda amongst the Muslims of Russia.³⁴⁰ Under the Article II of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty the Bolsheviks committed themselves to desist from agitation and propaganda against the governments, armed forces and public institutions of the other signatories. Nevertheless, in the first number of *Yeni Dünya*,³⁴¹ Mustafa Suphi bitterly attacked the CUP and its government. It was alleged that the only way to save the Turkish people from this tyranny was a revolution of the people. Dating from the fourth number, there appeared new criticisms regarding the military operations of the Turkish army in the Caucasus. The first time Galip Kemali Bey reported to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry about the publication of *Yeni Dünya* is on April 29.³⁴² In the proceeding days, after an interview with Chicherin, Galip Kemali Bey succeeded in having closed down the newspaper. However, it soon reappeared.³⁴³ On May 22 Galip Kemali Bey officially appealed to the Foreign Affairs Commissariat. After protesting the publication of the journal, Galip Kemali Bey demanded its immediate suspension in accordance with the Article II of the Brest treaty.³⁴⁴ The next day, Karakhan, in the Bolshevik reply to this note, stated the publication of this journal could not be related to the Article II, since it was merely applicable to the existing political institutions. The press, however, could not be taken under control.³⁴⁵ Mustafa Suphi, in his editorial in the third number of the newspaper,³⁴⁶ wrote that the implementation of the Article II was not feasible because *Yeni Dünya* was a private-owned newspaper. Galip Kemali Bey followed up with another note on June 3³⁴⁷ once again protesting the publication of the newspaper. On June 6 he visited Chicherin and repeated the Turkish arguments.³⁴⁸ Moreover, Galiyev

wrote that he organized a bitter campaign against Mustafa Suphi within the communist circles. Allegedly, the person responsible for a report to *Muskom* where a Bosnian Muslim was describing the dark sides of Suphi's life was the Ottoman ambassador.³⁴⁹ Nevertheless, in spite of all these efforts of Galip Kemali Bey the publication of *Yeni Dünya* continued.

At his meeting with Chicherin on April 30, Galip Kemali Bey stressed that he regarded the Muslims of Russia as the main source of a close friendship between the two countries. He added that the Ottoman government would enthusiastically welcome every Bolshevik attempt to improve the national, cultural and religious interests of the Muslims.³⁵⁰ However, the Bolshevik acts with regard to the Muslim population shortly became another source of further tension in diplomatic relations.

In the initial months following their power seizure the Bolsheviks launched a bitter attack on the institution of private property. In accordance with their aims of nationalizing the means of production and imposing a single plan on the entire national economy, the Bolsheviks passed several laws and decrees which systematically prepared the ground for the abolition of private property. With the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and disappearance of external threat, the Bolshevik efforts working towards the realization of their economic plans frequently increased.³⁵¹ These Bolshevik attempts at nationalization were followed with a growing anxiety within Russia as well as abroad. The unrest of the Muslims of Russia, however, was exceptional, since the Bolshevik ideals were heavily contradicting with their religious beliefs. Particularly, the decree outlawing inheritance on May 1, 1918, significantly annoyed the Muslim population. On May 2, Galip Kemali Bey requested the Ottoman

Foreign Ministry to send immediately sufficient amounts of stationery, since the Muslims started to apply to the embassy for their nationalized properties.³⁵² The ambassador, on May 6, asked the Ministry whether he was allowed to help the Muslim traders to transfer large amounts of money through Berlin to the Crimea.³⁵³

Besides this nationalization, the Bolshevik treatment of such Muslim intellectuals as Ayaz İshaki resulted in an increasing interference of the Ottoman ambassador on behalf of the Muslims of Russia. During the Brest talks, the Bolshevik government, hampered by the threat of foreign intervention, forcefully accepted the prevalence of an actual dual power. In the Volga basin, for instance, there was a coexistence of two authorities, namely the *Milli İdare* and the new soviet administration. The Bolshevik leaders, in accordance with Lenin's interpretation of self-determination, held that the right of secession could be considered only where the Soviets seemed to have already lost power such as in the Baltics. However, in the regions, particularly in the interiors of Russia where the soviets continued to assert partial control, the implementation of the right of self-determination was unimaginable. Consequently, once freed from the threat of foreign intervention, the Bolsheviks started the liquidation of the Muslim nationalist bodies. On March 26, the People's Commissariat for the Nationalities ordered the closure of *Harbi Şura*. On April 2, the Bolshevik government suspended all non-Bolshevik organs, particularly the nationalist press. Accordingly, the Bolshevik authorities began to arrest national leaders.

On May 11, Sadri Maksudi and Alimcan Barudi, the mufti of Kazan, requested the immediate help of the Ottoman ambassador, since İlyas Alkın Efendi, a member of *Millet Meclisi*, was arrested by the Bolsheviks. They informed Galip Kemali Bey that

the next arrest would be Ayaz İshaki. Galip Kemali Bey decided to utilize Article XI of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty that granted the Muslims of Russia the right of free and safe migration into the Ottoman Empire. Its implementation could help them to save the Muslim intellectuals and national leaders from Bolshevik arrest. This article, in addition, stated that those who wanted benefit this right could sell out their properties without facing any restrictions. Therefore, it was at the same time the most appropriate way to help those Muslims who were suffering nationalization of their properties. On May 18 Galip Kemali Bey sent a note to Chicherin stating that the lists of the Muslims, who applied to the Ottoman embassy for migration, would be sent without delay. He requested the Bolshevik government to respect this right of the Muslims.³⁵⁴ On June 10, in his visit to Chicherin, he advised of reviving the *Milli İdare* since it should not be “preferable” for the Bolshevik government to lose its Muslim subjects. The next day he reported to Ahmed Nesimi Bey that Chicherin seemed to have found his proposal extremely suitable.³⁵⁵ The Bolsheviks, however, apparently disturbed by these continuous appeals of the Ottoman ambassador, replied very harshly. Following the Turkish notes of July 29 and 30, Karl Radek sent a letter to Galip Kemali Bey on August 3 where he wrote that, while the Ottoman government had abolished the capitulations in Turkey, it was unacceptable for the Bolshevik government to consent the Ottoman demands regarding the annulment of nationalization. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty did not give the Ottomans the right of interfering in internal affairs of Russia as well as occupying Caucasia.³⁵⁶

The appeals of the Muslims were not merely restricted to the nationalization. In the initial days in Moscow, Galip Kemali Bey writes, a group of Muslims expressed their will regarding the Ottoman occupation of the Crimea, the Caucasus as well as Kazan.³⁵⁷

Alimcan Barudi and Sadri Maksudi, in their aforementioned visit to Galip Kemali Bey, added to these regions Turkistan and urged the immediate occupation of Baku, since it constituted the passage to Central Asia.³⁵⁸ On July 11 a Muslim delegation from Turkestan contacted Galip Kemali Bey. It was sent by Yusuf Ziya Bey who was in Turkestan to help the Muslim population to organize the local branches of the Committee of Union and Progress. The Turkestani delegates requested the immediate Ottoman material assistance before the region would be occupied by the British. On July 19 Galip Kemali Bey informed the Porte of this demand and added that its realization seemed to be very difficult since Baku was not occupied “yet.”³⁵⁹

After the assassination of Mirbach on July 6, the diplomatic staffs of the Central Powers believed that the assault signaled a general attack on the embassies. The Bolshevik government succeeded in suppressing the uprising of the Left SRs in Moscow, but in the countryside pro-Allied SRs and anti-regime forces of the White Russians were taking energetic measures to crush the Bolsheviks. Due to the insecure circumstances, the diplomatic missions of the Central Powers decided to leave Moscow. Galip Kemali Bey departed for Berlin on August 9.³⁶⁰ From that time the diplomatic correspondence between the Bolshevik and Ottoman governments were to be realized by their embassies in Berlin. Nevertheless, military forces had to say more than the diplomats sitting on the tables.

THE CONTEST FOR BAKU (AUGUST-OCTOBER 1918)

Ioffe, the Bolshevik ambassador to Germany, arrived in Berlin on April 19. One of the fundamental missions he had to accomplish was to neutralize the German generals by appealing to the interests of the business and banking community and negotiating a commercial treaty that would give Germany economic privileges in Russia.³⁶¹ Following the Brest Peace, except for the generals, no one in Germany demanded a break with the Bolsheviks. Big business enterprises and the Foreign Office were the two most enthusiastic supporters of the Bolshevik regime. Towards the end of June the Czechoslovak uprising gave the military party its final opportunity to press for removing the Bolsheviks. The Czechs seized on June 29 Vladivostok and on July 6 Ufa. Ludendorff pressed to have the Bolsheviks liquidated. Kühlmann and the foreign service, however, with the backing of many politicians and most of the German business community, once again advocated to follow a moderate policy in Russia. For the Bolsheviks, the German assurance that the Germans did not have any designs on Russia was of fundamental necessity, since this would make it possible to shift the troops from west to east to fight the Czech Legion. The Kaiser decided to side with the Foreign Office. He demanded the Soviet government be informed that it could safely withdraw troops from Petrograd and deploy them against the Czechs.³⁶² Immediately after Kaiser's decisions Kühlmann instructed the German embassy at the end of June to continue collaborating with the Bolshevik regime.³⁶³ After the assassination of Count Mirbach the relations between the Bolsheviks and Germans faced a serious crisis. Nevertheless, contrary to Lenin's fear, the German government did not take the opportunity provided by this assassination to destroy the Bolshevik regime by military intervention. Helfferich, Mirbach's successor, arrived in Moscow instructed to

implement the pro-Bolshevik policy of his government, at the center of which stood a conciliatory approach of commercial rapprochement. According to the German point of view, the Bolsheviks were not friends, but they abundantly took care of German interests by helping to paralyze Russia militarily.³⁶⁴

The Bolshevik government, hampered by the uprising of the Left SRs following the murder of the German ambassador, was particularly prudent with regard to its German policy. In the middle of a civil war they were encircled by hostile anti-regime troops and the possibility of a German collaboration with these forces as well as opposition parties was regarded by Bolshevik circles as a matter of their survival. Besides, as the beginning of large-scale Allied intervention in Russia, the Entente troops landed on Murmansk and Archangel on August 1-2. There were plans regarding an expedition for Vladivostok. While these military operations of the Entente in Russia aimed at reactivating the Eastern Front against the Germans, the Bolshevik belief that the Allies intended to overthrow the Bolshevik government was growing so strongly that on August 1 the Bolsheviks requested German military intervention.

In this friendly atmosphere, the two countries were initiating talks on a commercial agreement.³⁶⁵ The accord, known as the Supplementary Treaty,³⁶⁶ was signed on August 27 in Berlin. The two terms of Part VI of the agreement covered territorial questions in the Caucasus. Under Article 13 Russia acknowledged the independence of Georgia. Since Germany pledged not to interfere with the relations between Russia and her border regions (Article 4), under Article 14 Germany committed to respect Russia's sovereignty in the Caucasus, Georgia excepted. Furthermore, Germany affirmed its obligation to give no assistance to any third Power in any military operations in the

Caucasus as well as to take measures to prevent the military forces of this Power, in case it would overstep the fixed lines³⁶⁷ in the treaty. The Germans thus eventually consented to leave Baku in Russia's hands, but the Soviet government in turn promised the supply to Germany of one quarter of Baku's annual production of oil.

On the same day the treaty was signed Hintze sent a confidential letter to Ioffe where he emphasized Germany's intention to secure the withdrawal of the Ottoman army from the Baku area. He added that in case the Bolsheviks would fail to expel the British from Baku, the British penetration would be eliminated by German troops.³⁶⁸ In fact, this had been a matter of bitter discussions between the two sides during the talks for draft treaties. The draft treaties³⁶⁹ were already initialed in the midst of August. The appearance of British troops in Baku was watched with growing alarm in Berlin, however, under the provisions of these draft treaties neither a unilateral Turkish nor a joint Turco-German march on Baku was permissible. The German government thus pressed Moscow for a modification. Moscow in turn consented the expulsion of the British from Baku by German forces. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks stated that, instead of the Turkish occupation of the city, they would prefer the British remain there.³⁷⁰ Seeing this answer of the Bolsheviks, Ludendorff urged on Enver Pasha the need regarding the immediate withdrawal of Ottoman troops from the region. Besides, General Kress in Tiflis was instructed to assemble as quickly as possible a German task force which was to be supported by the transfer of troops from the Ukraine.³⁷¹

In a second note, as an explanatory commentary on Article 14 of the official treaty, Hintze wrote that, as long as the Russian troops did not violate the 1877 Russo-Turkish frontier or the borders of Georgia, Germany would not assist the third Power

even “it should come unfortunately to an armed conflict with the Russian troops.”³⁷²

Ioffe, in his reply,³⁷³ confirmed these obligations of both sides.

Following the Supplementary Treaty the divergence of ways between the two allies, Germany and Turkey, became so apparent as it had never been before. The Turks were particularly outraged and the Turkish suspicion regarding a German betrayal reached its peak. Talat Pasha, in his message to Berlin, stated that “Germany’s arrangements with the enemy of yesterday and the enemy of tomorrow at the expense of its Ottoman ally might induce the Porte to go its own way altogether.”³⁷⁴ To settle the Transcaucasian issue Talat Pasha arrived in Berlin on September 6. Four days later he presented a note to the German government and demanded the German recognition of independence of the North Caucasian Muslim Republic; Germany’s help to organize the 14 million Muslims in Turkestan militarily to be used in the war against both the English and Russia; and, German consent to the incorporation of Baku into the Azerbaijani Republic. Besides, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were to be made into buffer states against Russia and Georgia should cede a few districts to the Ottoman Empire. Hintze’s reply on September 12 was precisely reflecting the German approach with regard to Bolshevik government since the beginning of the Batum Conference. He stated that Germany could recognize the independence of neither Azerbaijan and Armenia nor the North Caucasian Mountain Republic without prior arrangements with the Soviet government. He proposed that the Porte return some of the Georgian territory that it acquired by the Batum Treaty of June 4 and the Turkish army should withdraw from the Baku area and leave it to German troops to drive the British out of the city. Although Turkestan constituted part of Russia, Germany had no objections if the Porte wished to carry out its plans in Turkestan at its “own risk and expense.”³⁷⁵

Meanwhile, seeing the complexity of relations, Enver Pasha ordered the army commanders to strike rapidly to complete a de facto situation. On September 14 the Army of Islam, strengthened by the transfer of Ottoman 36th division, attacked Baku. By the end of August 1918 Dunsterville had already concluded that the further defense of Baku was a waste of time and life.³⁷⁶ At the beginning of September, moreover, he told the Baku authorities that no power on earth could save the city from the Turks.³⁷⁷ On September 15 the Baku volunteers attempted to launch a counter-attack to throw back the enemy, but they failed. More important, the Turkish forces crushed the will to resistance among the city's defenders.³⁷⁸ The next day, when the last effort to organize a counter-attack in force had failed, Dunsterville loaded his men on ships and left the city to its fate. On September 16, the Turkish forces entered the city and gradually restored order. The Azerbaijani government officially installed itself in Baku under the protection of the Army of Islam. With the capture of Baku, nevertheless, the military operations of the Turkish army did not come to an end. While the 5th Caucasian division remained in Baku the 36th moved northward along the railway on Derbent.

Before Baku had fallen, the German Supreme Command did everything in its power to organize a German expeditionary force for the conquest of Baku. Ludendorff, on September 10, cabled to General von Kress in Tiflis that the advance to Baku was to be started as soon as possible and the capture of the city should be realized, if possible, without direct participation of Turkish or Azerbaijani troops.³⁷⁹ Seeing the impossibility of capturing Baku by German forces alone, several notifications were sent to Halil Pasha by Kress requesting the participation of some German troops to the army advancing on Baku. Halil Pasha in turn answered to each with waste messages. He

even instructed the bridge that the Germans had to pass through to approach the Turkish troops be exploited.³⁸⁰ Following the seizure of Baku by Turkish troops the Germans, without delay, demanded that the administration of the city should be handed over to German troops that were to be sent immediately. Enver Pasha issued two orders to Nuri Pasha stating that General von Kress should be informed of the impossibility of this demand. He added that the resistance to the entrance of German soldiers into the city should be realized “by every means.”³⁸¹

On September 15 Enver Pasha informed Talat Pasha of the capture of Baku.³⁸² Meanwhile, the negotiations between Talat Pasha and the German Foreign Office continued. On September 21 the Bolshevik government dispatched a note to the German government protesting the Turkish occupation of Baku and violation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.³⁸³ The Germans, being aware that the resolution of the Baku question was dependent upon a compromise between the two allies, speeded up the talks. After bargaining for a while, Talat Pasha signed a protocol with von Hintze on the Caucasian question (Sep.23, 1918). The Turkish side agreed to a general withdrawal of Turkish troops from the Armenian and Azerbaijani Republics. In turn, although denying the recognition of independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the German government committed itself to work for Russia’s recognition of these two states following the withdrawal of the Turkish army from the region. The oil industry in Baku, the Batum-Baku pipeline and the Tiflis-Baku railroad would be administered by German personnel. Berlin acknowledged the importance the Porte attached to the protection of the rights of the Muslims of the “Crimea and Russia.” The Porte, at its own risk and expense, could help the Muslim population of the North Caucasus and Turkestan to form independent states.³⁸⁴

Due to the rapid deterioration of the military situation of the Central Powers and particularly the collapse of Bulgaria, Talat Pasha should have thought of the necessity regarding a compromise with the Bolshevik government. Consequently, in the final days of September he met in Berlin Ioffe. Ioffe presented to the Grand Vizier two stipulations: The withdrawal of Turkish troops to the lines fixed by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and an indemnity to be paid by the Ottoman government for the violation of the Brest settlement. Talat Pasha replied that both stipulations needed to be discussed in the Ottoman cabinet and an answer would be communicated by wireless to the Bolshevik government. On October 3 the Ottoman ambassador to Berlin, Rifat Pasha, notified Ioffe that the evacuation of Transcaucasia had already begun. Nevertheless, he did not touch upon whether Russian stipulations were accepted. Consequently, Ioffe handed a note to Rifat Pasha in which the Bolshevik government formally declared the Brest-Litovsk peace settlement with the Ottoman Empire as being null and void.³⁸⁵

CONCLUSION

During the years of decline the fundamental principle of Ottoman foreign policy was the conduct of balance of power politics that helped the empire to preserve its political independence. It was Great Britain during the first half of the nineteenth century that served as the protector of the country. However, after the Eastern Question had again become acute in 1875, there appeared a drastic change in British foreign policy with regard to the Ottoman Empire. In contrast to Disraeli, Gladstone insisted that the central issue was not between support of Turkey or support of Russia, but between "Turkish misrule and Balkan liberty." Consequently, if Britain ranged herself on the Turkish side, all the Christians of the Near East would be automatically driven into the arms of Russia.³⁸⁶ This radical shift in British foreign policy was to be noticed by a cunning diplomat of the time, the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Dating from the Congress of Berlin Bismarck started to play the role once performed by conservative Disraeli. Nevertheless, the rapid development of political and economic relations between the two countries was waiting for Wilhelm's *Weltpolitik*.

After Wilhelm II came to the throne in 1888, besides the divergence of approach in internal affairs, there appeared strong differences of opinion between the new emperor and Bismarck over foreign policy. The new Kaiser wanted to abandon the self-imposed restraint implicit in Bismarck's *Kontinentalpolitik* and to expose a policy of colonial expansion, to be supported by the construction of a great German navy. *Weltpolitik* represented a desire to catch up with the other Great Powers in imperialistic activity, something that had been neglected by Bismarck. In 1890 Bismarck resigned and the major obstacle to the Kaiser's *Weltpolitik* was removed. The second step for a world

policy was generally related to the assertion of personal rule by Wilhelm II, which marked a clear break with the past, and changes of personnel in the German government.³⁸⁷ Indeed, the Kaiser evinced a keen interest in the Ottoman Empire as a sphere in which his personal influence might be exerted on behalf of German economic expansion and German political prestige. Moreover, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, a former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was sent to İstanbul as the new ambassador. Von Bieberstein was known as a person who was a frank believer in a world policy for Germany and an ardent supporter of colonialism.

Kaiser's second visit to the Ottoman Empire in late autumn 1898 is of particular importance. In Damascus he publicly proclaimed himself the friend and the protector of the Sultan and the Muslim world. After the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 this claim of the Emperor had far-sighted consequences. From that time, in the eyes of Muslims, the action of the European concert, headed by Great Britain, often assumed the aspect of a religious crusade directed against the ascendancy of the Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. Germany, however, had practically no Muslim subjects and therefore had no reason to fear Muslim discontent. Besides, there were strong indications that the emperor honestly supported Turkey in case it faced another unjust move. During the Cretan crisis of 1897, for instance, he even forwarded the idea of a naval blockade on Greek Piraeus in order to help the Turks.³⁸⁸

There is a consensus among the students of the field that the rise of German influence in Turkey at the turn of the last century was due to the German military missions and concessions granted to German enterprises for the construction of railways.³⁸⁹ In 1898 the Bagdad Railway concession was awarded to the German Anatolian Railway

Company. Despite Germans denied that they had any intention of utilizing the Bagdad Railway as a means of acquiring an exclusive sphere of economic interest in the Ottoman Empire, the economic consequences of the project were enormous. Within a very short period of time, German banks opened offices in various cities of the empire. The rapid expansion of German financial interests in the Near East and the established policy of the German banks to encourage and assist export trade were factors in a remarkable development of German trade in the Ottoman Empire.³⁹⁰ German industrial enterprises were pushing their commercial operations in the Near East. In the military field, on the other hand, with the introduction of German training system and equipment, the Ottoman army became integrated into the German military foundation. Particularly, Ottoman officers, who were sent to Germany for military education, have been shown as the primary factor for establishing German influence in the Turkish army. This German influence was so remarkable that Turkish officers even twisted their mustaches according to the German style.³⁹¹ Henry Morgenthau, the American ambassador to İstanbul, wrote in his memoirs that he was impressed and disturbed just before the outbreak of the world war by the apparent Prussianization of the Turkish army, especially after he witnessed a parade of Turkish troops.³⁹²

A solid foundation was being laid for the eventual affiliation of Turkey with the Triple Alliance. Abdülhamid precisely knew that the Germans were playing a shrewd game for their own advantage. However, after the hostile attitudes of other European powers, he had come to look upon Germany as virtually the only country friendly to Turkey. He used to say of them, "The Germans do me as much good as they are permitted to do, whereas the rest of Europe do me as much harm as they can."³⁹³

Abdülhamid's reign thus signified the beginning of a love-hate relationship between

Germany and Turkey that dominated the Turkish political life until the end of the First World War. How the Turks looked upon the relations with Germany and what their expectations from this mutual cooperation were is excellently reflected by the Sultan saying, "The material benefits [the Germans] reap are a just return for the services they render to the material future of Turkey and for the more example they furnish to my people."³⁹⁴

In his massive study, *Griff nach der Weltmacht*, Fritz Fischer developed the thesis that Germany willed the war in 1914 in order to realize expansionist ambitions in Europe as well as overseas as part of its bid for world power. It may be an exaggeration to say that the Turks, in 1914, behaved with the same motives as the Germans did. Before the outbreak of the Great War the main concern of Ottoman leaders and intellectuals was the preservation of the territorial integrity of the empire. The fear of being left alone, particularly against Russia, in an environment of confronting blocs shaped the twists and turns of CUP's diplomacy. Under these circumstances, the treaty of alignment with Germany became a hastily made arrangement. Nevertheless, Pan nationalist ideologies and irredentist aspirations were prevalent in the thoughts of Ottoman leaders. In spite of the German pressure, they refrained from entering the war hastily; they waited for the most appropriate moment. In September the Ottoman authorities concluded that Germany, in a very short period of time, would crush the French and turn to Russia. The fear of missing this opportunity became grown.

After bringing the Ottoman Empire into the war against the Entente, the primary war objective of the Ottoman government was the liberation of both co-religionists and people of ethnic relations from the foreign yoke. It was strongly believed that the

whole Muslim world was waiting for a signal of the Ottoman Sultan. There were plans regarding the occupation of the Caucasus and Egypt. Muslims' sympathy for the Ottoman Empire, however, was based on sentiment rather than on rational arguments or on any conception of clarified self-interest. Consequently, shortly after the proclamation of *Jihad*, the Ottoman government became disappointed. As time went on, the burden the war brought upon the Ottoman Empire unexpectedly became a serious damage to the prestige of the Unionist government. While Enver Pasha and his colleagues miscalculated the military strength of the Central Powers, they repeatedly overextended the slender resources of the country in the pursuit of expansionist goals. There were huge territorial losses, including the Holy Places, and daily economic conditions were steadily worsening. It was the Bolshevik power seizure that saved the government from collapsing and provided Ottoman leaders with the opportunity of realizing the strategic and expansionist aims embodied during the initial days of the war and compensating war losses. The plans the Ottoman government did develop with regard to Russia in the final two years of the Great War can be divided into two main stages.

In the short-run the primary issue was the restoration of the Caucasian frontier with Russia. The Bolshevik proposal for a peace without annexations and indemnities exceptionally echoed in Istanbul. It strengthened the hope of the Ottoman public that the withdrawal of Russia from the war would aid the Ottoman government to preserve the Straits and to end the war with a relatively harmless damage. While the German motives regarding the armistice with Russia chiefly revolved around the transfer of troops from the Eastern Front for a decisive offensive in the West, the main concern of the Porte was the evacuation of Russian forces from its occupied territories. With

these instructions in hand the Ottoman delegation was sent to Brest. Dating from the midst of February 1918, however, the Ottoman government announced that it would not merely insist on the restoration of the 1914 border, but also lay claim to the Districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batum which had fallen to Russia after the War of 1877-1878. The Bolshevik renunciation of these three districts in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was met with great enthusiasm in Turkey.³⁹⁵ Pan-Turkic aspirations became increasingly emphasized. During this first stage which lasted until the Russian treaty of Brest-Litovsk the Ottoman government as well as the Turkish delegation at Brest carefully abstained from entering into any conflicts with the Germans. The disagreements, which shortly after the Brest settlement would result in a divergence of ways between the two allies, were still on ice.

The primary objective of the second stage that lasted until the end of the First World War was the acquisition of as much territory in the Caucasus as possible since the Russian government was under no condition able to resist the Ottoman forces. As part of the long-range plans, on the other hand, the Ottoman government did everything in its power, militarily or politically, to separate Transcaucasia from “the enemy of yesterday and the enemy of tomorrow” in order to create buffer states that would prevent Russian aggression in the future. Ottomans were not satisfied merely with Transcaucasia and external factors provided them with new opportunities. Especially, Galip Kemali Bey’s reports to the Ottoman government, who spent a substantial period of time in Russia during these two years, would result in an increasing Ottoman interest in the Muslims of Russia. Pan-Turkism was born under the reciprocal influence of the Outside Turks threatened by the Russification and Ottoman Turks exposed to Russian expansion. The Turks of Russia considered the Ottoman Empire the only

independent and powerful ruler among the Turks. Long before the war, the natural attractiveness of İstanbul as a center of the Islamic and Turkish world produced many links between both groups and in consequence, tinted them with Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic concepts. Nevertheless, it was the consequences of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia that gave them the opportunity of realizing their political aspirations. During the period following the Bolshevik Revolution the Porte was bombarded with the appeals of the Muslims of Russia for help. At the time when the Mudros Armistice was signed Turkish troops were in Dagestan and there is no doubt today that if the war were to continue they would proceed from there to Kazan as well as Turkestan.

After the Turkish abolition of the capitulations, on the other hand, this period witnessed a more serious deterioration of relations between Germany and Turkey, at the center of which stood the disagreements over the Transcaucasus question in 1918. As mentioned before, the Unionist leaders have been accused for many years of having sold their country to the Kaiser or of being under a definite obligation to subscribe to German diplomatic policies. Nevertheless, their approach with regard to Germany was not different from that of the Abdülhamid. The American ambassador to the Porte, Henry Morgenthau, made a quotation from Talat Pasha that precisely reflects how the Unionists evaluated the cooperation with Germany:

“...We cannot put this country on (Germany’s) feet with our own resources. We shall, therefore, take advantage of such technical and material assistance as the Germans can place at our disposal. We shall use Germany to help us

reconstructed and defend the country until we are able to govern ourselves with our own strength. When that day comes, we can say good-bye to the Germans within twenty-four hours.”³⁹⁶

ENDNOTES

¹ In Turkish terminology, the term *ittihadçı* is applied to people who were members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). In the course of this research we will use the English translation of the word.

² After the end of the war Cemal Pasha told Falih Rıfka Atay ironically that Turkey entered the war to pay the salaries. There was no money in the treasury and to find the necessary amount the Unionist leaders had two alternatives: either to submit to the Entente powers or to unify with Germany. See: Falih Rıfka Atay, *Zeytindağı* (İstanbul, 1981), p.93.

³ After the Bolsheviks came to power, Trotsky publicized on Nov. 22, 1917 all the secret treaties and agreements among the Entente powers. For the best account of these secret treaties regarding the partition of the Ottoman Empire, see: *Razdel Aziatskoy Turtsii*, ed. by E. A. Adamov (Moscow, 1924).

⁴ This meeting in Reval was forwarded by the Unionists as the primary reason of the outbreak of the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. Stated differently, it was assumed to have inflamed the revolution in Macedonia. Consequently, this view has deeply affected the evaluation of academic circles regarding the period. In the last decade, however, there appeared some works claiming that the role of the meeting in Reval has been exaggerated and that the Reval meeting, in fact, had played a secondary role. See: Feroz Ahmed, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914* (İstanbul, 1995).

⁵ Leading Unionists accused Enver Pasha of having decided too hastily as a result of which Turkey had to enter the war in a very early stage. Cemal Paşa, *Hatırat* (İstanbul, 1995), pp. 126-127; Mithat Şükrü Bleda, *İmparatorluğun Çöküşü* (İstanbul,

1979), p.79; *Talat Paşa'nın Hatıraları* (İstanbul, 1958), pp.26-27; Arif Cemil, *İttihadçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları* (İstanbul, 1992), pp.130-131.

⁶ Talat, Enver and Cemal Pashas.

⁷ This line particularly originated from the trial of leading Unionists between November and December 1918. For the proceedings of this trial, see: *Harb Kabinelerinin İsticvabı* (İstanbul, 1933).

⁸ Cemal Paşa, pp.107-110.

⁹ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya* (Ankara, 1990), pp.217-224; S. D. Sazonov, *Vospominaniia* (Moscow, 1991), pp.159-166.

¹⁰ Cemal Paşa, pp.112-116.

¹¹ Ulrich Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918* (New Jersey, 1968), p.16.

¹² Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi* (Ankara, 1991), vol.II, part IV, p.632.

¹³ F. I. Notovich, *Diplomaticheskaiia bor'ba v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny* (Moscow, 1947), vol.I, pp.283-287.

¹⁴ Trumpener, p.25.

¹⁵ For the best account of these actions in the Black Sea and Admiral Souchon's moves, see: Th. Kraus and K. Donitz, *The Kreuzerfahrten der Goeben und Breslau* (Berlin, 1933), pp.135-157.

¹⁶ Carl Mühlmann, in his work of Turco-German alliance during the First World War, clearly demonstrates the fact that Enver Pasha himself organized the attack of Admiral Souchon. Carl Mühlmann, *Das Deutsch-Türkische Waffenbündnis im Weltkriege* (Leipzig, 1940), pp.22-23. This argument is also supported by Pomiankowski who at

the time was the Austro-Hungarian military attaché to İstanbul. Joseph Pomiankowski, *Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches* (Vienna, 1928), pp.85-86.

¹⁷ Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, *The Young Turks. Prelude to the Revolution of 1908* (New Jersey, 1957), p.143.

¹⁸ Hasan Ünal, *Young Turk Assessments of International Politics, 1906-1909* (London, 1997), p.31.

¹⁹ Tark Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952* (İstanbul, 1952), pp.167-174.

²⁰ Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908* (İstanbul, 1994), p.11.

²¹ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, *Siyasal Anılar* (İstanbul, 1976), p.22.

²² Said Halim Paşa, *Buhranlarımız* (The date and the place of the publication is not given), p.51.

²³ Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation* (Indianapolis: 1995), p.30.

²⁴ A. Vambery, "Personal Recollections of Abdul Hamid II and His Court," *The Nineteenth Century and After*, vol.LXVI, July-December 1909, p.83.

²⁵ David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism. 1876-1908* (London, 1977), p.15.

²⁶ Taner Timur, *Osmanlı Kimliği* (İstanbul, 1994), p.135.

²⁷ Ahmed İhsan Tokgöz, *Matbuat Hatıralarım* (İstanbul, 1993), pp.207-208.

²⁸ The article has been republished by the Turkish Historical Society in the proceeding years. See: Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Ankara, 1991).

²⁹ Tokgöz, p.174.

³⁰ Harry Luke, *The Old Turkey and the New. From Byzantium to Ankara* (London, 1955), p.147.

³¹ Pan-Turanism had as its chief objective rapprochement and ultimately union among all peoples whose origins are purported to extend back to Turan, an undefined Shangri-La-like area in the steppes of Central Asia.

³² Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (İstanbul, 1977), pp.20-21.

³³ Ziya Gökalp, *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak* (İstanbul, 1994), pp.48-52.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.12.

³⁵ *The Near East From Within* (London, 1915), p.38.

³⁶ Cemal Paşa, p.105.

³⁷ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, p.217.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.216-217.

³⁹ Yahya Kemal, *Çocukluğum, Gençliğim, Siyasi ve Edebi Hatıralarım* (İstanbul, 1986), p.132.

⁴⁰ For both the proclamation and the *fatwas*, see: Metin Hülagü, *Pan-İslamist Faaliyetler, 1914-1918* (İstanbul, 1994), pp.35-38.

⁴¹ Muammer Tuksavul, *Doğudan Batıya ve Sonrası* (İstanbul, 1981), p.164. The author's observations, who participated on this ceremony as a schoolboy, are of particular interest.

⁴² Hülagü, pp.39-41.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp.42-46.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.48.

⁴⁵ Ayşe Osmanoğlu, *Babam Sultan Abdülhamid (Hatıralarım)* (İstanbul, 1994), p.231.

⁴⁶ Mithat Şükrü Bleda, p.89.

⁴⁷ For German and Ottoman Pan-Islamic propaganda during the war, see: Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam. Ideology and Organization* (Oxford, 1990), pp.103-121; Peter Hopkirk, *İstanbul'un Doğusunda Bitmeyen Oyun* (İstanbul, 1995); Hülagü, pp.58-78.

⁴⁸ At first, this mission was entrusted by Enver Pasha to Rauf Orbay alone, but Orbay could only reach Iran. Thereafter, he came back to İstanbul. Rauf Orbay, *Cehennem Değirmeni. Siyasi Hatıralarım* (İstanbul, 1993), vol.I, pp.17-18.

⁴⁹ On the activities of *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* during the First World War, see: Arif Cemil, *I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* (İstanbul, 1997).

⁵⁰ G. Wyman Bury, *Pan-Islam* (London, 1919). The author mentions a few cases from personal experience.

⁵¹ Fahri Belen, "Binlerce şehide malolan Kafkas Seferi ve Sarıkamış Savaşı," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, no.39, December 1970, p.7.

⁵² Halil Paşa, *İttihat ve Terakki'den Cumhuriyet'e Bitmeyen Savaş*, ed. by Taylan Sorgun (İstanbul, 1997), pp.136-137; Rahmi Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları* (Ankara, 1988), pp.95-96.

⁵³ On the German material and economic assistance to the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, see especially the relevant chapters of: Veli Yılmaz, *I nci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk-Alman İttifakı ve Askeri Yardımlar* (İstanbul, 1993).

⁵⁴ Johann Heinrich Graf von Bernstorff, *Erinnerungen und Briefe* (Zurich, 1936), p.138.

⁵⁵ Richard Pipes, *Three "Whys" of the Russian Revolution* (New York, 1997), p.27.

⁵⁶ *Politicheskaiia Istorია Rossia-SSSR-Rossiyskaia Federatsia* (Moscow, 1996), vol.I, p.461.

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- ⁵⁷ Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution* (New York, 1991), p.328.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁹ Pipes, *Three...*, p.48.
- ⁶⁰ James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918* (California, 1934), pp.24-26.
- ⁶¹ Cited in, *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, ed. by Alvin Z. Rubinstein (New York, 1966), pp.21-27.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*
- ⁶³ V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow, 1958-1965), vol. XXXV, p.324.
- ⁶⁴ John Erickson, "The Origins of the Red Army" in *Revolutionary Russia*, ed. by Richard Pipes (Cambridge, 1968), pp.232-233.
- ⁶⁵ Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol.XXXV, p.250.
- ⁶⁶ *Sovetsko-Germanskie Otnosheniia, ot peregovorov b Brest-Litovske do podpisaniia Rapall'skovo dogovora* (Moscow, 1968), vol.I, pp.1-3; on the English translation of the text of the decree, see: Rubinstein, pp.55-57; Jane Degras, *Soviet Documents in Foreign Policy* (London, 1951), vol.I, pp.1-3.
- ⁶⁷ Dukhonin's refusal to carry out the order caused a conflict with Smolny which ended in the Bolshevik occupation of the Stavka on December 3 and the assassination of Dukhonin.
- ⁶⁸ Kurat, p.312.
- ⁶⁹ Selami Kılıç, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkilerinin Doğuşu* (İstanbul, 1998), pp.36-37.
- ⁷⁰ Trumpener, p.159.
- ⁷¹ Kurat, pp.321-322.

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- ⁷² *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı* (Ankara, 1993), vol.II, p.418.
- ⁷³ Uygur Kocabaşoğlu and Metin Berge, *Bolşevik İhtilali ve Osmanlılar* (Ankara, 1994), p.105.
- ⁷⁴ Kurat, p.358.
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.353-354.
- ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.356.
- ⁷⁷ Z. A. B. Zeman, ed. by, *Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915-1918* (London, 1958), p.24.
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, document no.76, p.75.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, document no.73, p.74.
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, document no.74, p.74.
- ⁸¹ Kurat, p.356.
- ⁸² Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht* (Düsseldorf, 1984), p.417.
- ⁸³ John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk, The Forgotten Peace, March 1918* (New York, 1971), p.89.
- ⁸⁴ According to the actual terms of the armistice, no transfers should take place except those already ordered.
- ⁸⁵ Brian Pearce, *How Haig Saved Lenin* (Hampshire, 1987), pp.6-9.
- ⁸⁶ Kılıç, pp.61-64; Kurat, pp.363-364.
- ⁸⁷ For the text of the agreement, see: *Dokumenty vneishnei politiki SSSR* (Moscow, 1957), vol.I, document no. 27; *Sovetsko-Germanskie...*, pp.75-80.
- ⁸⁸ Pipes, *The Russian...*, p.578.

⁸⁹ *Mirnye peregovory v Brest-Litovske, s 22/9 dekabria 1917 g. po 3 marta (18 fevralia) 1918 g.* (Moscow, 1920), vol.I, pp.6-8.

⁹⁰ Wheeler-Bennett, p.104.

⁹¹ *Mirnye peregovory...*, pp.9-11; *Sovetsko-Germanske...*, pp.148-150. This reply of Czernin was drafted by the German delegation (Fischer, p.429).

⁹² Winfried Baumgart, *Deutsche Ostpolitik, 1918* (Vienna, 1966), p.17; Fischer, pp.430-431.

⁹³ Fischer, p.431; Richard von Kühlmann, *Erinnerungen* (Heidelberg, 1948), p.532.

⁹⁴ Bunyan and Fisher, p.479; “[From Nesimi Bey] to the Foreign Ministry, 22 December 1917,” in Tülay Duran, “I. Dünya Savaşı Sonunda Türk Diplomasinin İlk Başarısı. Brest-Litovsk Hazırlıkları,” *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, no.67-68 (April-May 1973), pp.47-48; Wheeler-Bennett, p.120.

⁹⁵ Kılıç, p.121.

⁹⁶ *Mirnye peregovory...*, pp.28-32.

⁹⁷ Trumpener, p.170.

⁹⁸ Mühlmann, p.20; Cemal Paşa, p.139; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, p.222; Pomiankowski, p.81.

⁹⁹ Trumpener, pp.28-29; Jehuda L. Wallach, *Bir Askeri Yardımın Anatomisi* (Ankara, 1977), p.150; Mühlmann, p.192.

¹⁰⁰ *The Near East From Within*, p.237.

¹⁰¹ Trumpener, pp.168-169.

¹⁰² Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Paşa* (İstanbul, 1992), vol.III, pp.370-373.

¹⁰³ "From Nesimi Bey to Halil Bey, 26 December 1917," in Duran, no.69 (June 1973), pp.22-23.

¹⁰⁴ On more information regarding the activities of this delegation, see: Kılıç, pp.124-129.

¹⁰⁵ Kühlmann, p.523. The expression Kühlmann used in the proceeding pages (pp.549-550) with regard to the Turks is more interesting: "Insbesondere die Türken hatten weitgehende Expansionswünsche im Kaukasus angemeldet, denen ich persönlich wenig Wohlwollen entgegenbrachte, da ich von meiner Taetigkeit in Konstantinopel her zu genau wusste, dass die türkischen Augen stets erheblich grosser waren als der Magen, und dass die Möglichkeit für die Pforte, Gebiete im Kaukasus gegen die russische Übermacht zu halten, in meinem sehr betrüblichen Gegensatz stand zu den Wünschen der türkischen Nationalisten in bezug auf papierne Eroberung."

¹⁰⁶ Wheeler-Bennett, p.104.

¹⁰⁷ On the text, see: Degras, p.22.

¹⁰⁸ *Sovetsko-Germanskie...*, pp.194-198.

¹⁰⁹ *Mirnye peregovory...*, pp.45-46.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.47.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp.47-48.

¹¹² Wheeler-Bennett, p.155.

¹¹³ *Mirnye peregovory...*, p.48.

¹¹⁴ Wheeler-Bennett, p.166.

¹¹⁵ *Mirnye peregovory...*, pp.49-51.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.92-94.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.95.

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- ¹¹⁸ Wheeler-Bennett, pp.173-174; Baumgart, p.21.
- ¹¹⁹ *Mirnye peregovory...*, p.126; Wheeler-Bennett, p.174.
- ¹²⁰ Kurat, p.364.
- ¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p.366.
- ¹²² Bernstorff, p.135.
- ¹²³ Kurat, p.367.
- ¹²⁴ Emin Ali Türkgeldi “Brest-Litowsk Konferansı Hatıraları,” *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, no.13, March 1986, p.49; Duran, no.69, June 1973, p.26.
- ¹²⁵ “From Talat Pasha to Halil Bey, 15 January 1918,” in Duran, no.69 (June 1973), p.25. This contention stemmed from the Peace Resolution of the Reichstag in July 1917, stating that Germany was not animated by any desire for conquest; demanded a peace by mutual agreement and reconciliation; protested against all possible acquisition of territory and all political, economic and financial oppression (Wheeler-Bennett, p.99).
- ¹²⁶ “From Talat Pasha to Halil Bey, 15 January 1918,” Duran, no.69, June 1973, p.25.
- ¹²⁷ *Dokumenty vneishnei...*, document no.43. The first sign of this decree is to be found in the Appeal of the Council of People’s Commissars to the Muslims of Russia and the East (*Documenty vneishnei...*, document no.18) declaring that, immediately after the cessation of military operations, the Armenians would be guaranteed the right freely to determine their political destiny.
- ¹²⁸ Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, *Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene, 1892-1922* (İstanbul, 1949), pp.435-436.
- ¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.442-443.
- ¹³⁰ Kurat, pp.370-371.

¹³¹ “From Talat Pasha to Enver Pasha, 17 January 1918,” in Duran, no.69 (June 1973), pp.25-26.

¹³² “From Talat Pasha to Enver Pasha, 1 February 1918,” in Duran, no.70 (July 1973), pp.31-32.

¹³³ On the Russian text, see: *Sovetsko-Germanskie...*, pp.298-308; for the English translation, see: Wheeler-Bennett, pp.392-492.

¹³⁴ *Sovetsko-Germanskie...*, pp.311-312.

¹³⁵ *Mirnye peregovory...*, pp.207-208.

¹³⁶ Kühlmann, pp.543-544.

¹³⁷ *Sovetsko-Germanskie...*, pp.289-290,

¹³⁸ Kühlmann, pp.546-548; Fischer, pp.441-443; Baumgart, pp.23-26; *Sovetsko-Germanskie...*, pp.326-327.

¹³⁹ In his memoirs, Kühlmann wrote that he opposed the idea regarding the termination of the armistice because Germany’s allies, Austria-Hungary in particular, were not able to meet the heavy burden that the restart of the war would brought upon them (pp.545-546).

¹⁴⁰ On the position of Bukharin regarding the Brest talks, see: Donny Gluckstein, *The Tragedy of Bukharin* (Colorado, 1994), pp.22-25.

¹⁴¹ Seven members voted in favor of Lenin’s motion, six opposed it (Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol.XXXV, pp.486-487).

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, pp.339.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp.376-380; *Sovetsko-Germanskie...*, pp.346-349.

¹⁴⁴ While 116 members voted for Lenin’s resolution, 85 opposed it and 26 members abstained (Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol.XXXV, pp.490-491).

¹⁴⁵ *Sovetsko-Germanskie...*, p.350.

¹⁴⁶ “From Talat Pasha to Enver Pasha, 1 February 1918,” in Duran, no.70 (July 1973), pp.31-32.

¹⁴⁷ Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım* (İstanbul, 1992), vol.I, p.283. In his memoirs, Rauf Orbay allocated a very small part regarding his experiences at Brest and did not touch upon this argument of Ahmet İzzet Paşa.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*; “[From Talat Pasha] to Enver Pasha and the Foreign Ministry, 3 February 1918,” in Duran, no.70 (July 1973), p.32.

¹⁴⁹ On the Bucharest negotiations and the disputes emerging between Bulgaria and Turkey, see: Emin Ali Türkgeldi, “Bükreş Andlaşması,” *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, no.14 (April 1986), pp.51-55; Ahmet İzzet Paşa, pp.288-290. Both authors were members of the Ottoman delegation. Also see: Kühlmann, pp.549-568.

¹⁵⁰ On the Russian text, see: *Dokumenty vneishnei...*, document no.78; for the English translation, see: *Caucasian Boundaries, Documents and Maps, 1802-1946* (Oxford, 1996), ed. by Anita L. P. Burdett, pp.463-465 and Wheeler-Bennett, pp.403-408; for the Turkish text, see: Tülay Duran, “Bolşeviklerin Batılılarla İlk Diplomatik İlişkileri, Brest-Litovsk Andlaşması ve Türkiye,” *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, no.38 (November 1970), pp.16-20.

¹⁵¹ *Sovetsko-Germanskie...*, pp.370-490.

¹⁵² Akdes, p.383.

¹⁵³ Mühlmann, pp.190-191.

¹⁵⁴ Bernstorff, p.164.

¹⁵⁵ V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Russkaia Istoriia* (Moscow, 1995), vol.I, p.20.

¹⁵⁶ Cited in: Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union, Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923* (Cambridge, 1964), p.2.

¹⁵⁷ With his characteristic sense for political realities, Lenin's line with regard to the national problem was a very pragmatic, but also opportunistic one. To prove this argument, one has to look to Richard Pipes (*The Formation...*, p.35) who argues that in the development of Lenin's approach to the national program, there are three clearly distinguishable phases: from 1897 to 1913, from 1913 to 1917 and from 1917 to 1923. "In the first, he formulated his basic views on the problem; in the second, he developed a plan for the utilization of national minority movements in Russia and abroad; and in the third, after having, for all practical purposes, abandoned this plan, he adopted a new scheme derived from his practical experience as ruler of Russia."

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.41.

¹⁵⁹ Leon Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution* (New York, 1996), vol.III, p.38.

¹⁶⁰ Pipes, *The Formation...*, p.45.

¹⁶¹ Cited in: *Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927* (Stanford, 1957), ed. by X. J. Eudin and R. C. North, document no.3, pp.46-47.

¹⁶² Pipes, *The Formation...*, pp.48-49. The logic behind the Russian proposal regarding the right of self-determination for the European nations, as well as the colonies, as a basis of peace discussion at the beginning of the Brest talks was related to this expectation of Lenin.

¹⁶³ Firuz Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917-1921* (New York, 1951), p.32.

¹⁶⁴ Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Baku Commune, 1917-1918* (New Jersey, 1972), p.70.

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- ¹⁶⁵ Z. Avalov, *Nezavisimost' Gruzii v mezhdunarodnoi politike 1918-1921 g.g.* (New York, 1982), pp.7-8; Kazemzadeh, p.35.
- ¹⁶⁶ Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (London, 1989), p.186.
- ¹⁶⁷ Pipes, *The Formation...*, p.98.
- ¹⁶⁸ Kazemzadeh, p.39.
- ¹⁶⁹ One the Formation of the Transcaucasian Regional Government, see: Bunyan and Fisher, p.452.
- ¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.453.
- ¹⁷¹ Fevzi Çakmak, *Büyük Harpte Şark Cephesi Hareketleri. 1935'de Akademide Verilen Dersler* (Ankara, 1936), p.260. This estimation is also supported by Kazemzadeh (p.42).
- ¹⁷² *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi...*, p.428.
- ¹⁷³ E. K. Sarkisian, *Ekspansionistskaia politika Osmanskoi Imperii b Zakavkaz'e* (Yerevan, 1962), p.328.
- ¹⁷⁴ W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields. A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921* (Cambridge, 1953), p.457.
- ¹⁷⁵ Pipes, *The Formation...*, p.103.
- ¹⁷⁶ Allen and Muratoff, p.458. In Turkish sources, the number of Armenian military formations are estimated around 40,000-50,000 persons (see: *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi...*, p.438).
- ¹⁷⁷ On the text of the armistice treaty, see: *Dokumenty vneishnei...*, document no.30 and 31; for the Turkish text, see: Tülay Duran, "Bolşeviklerin Osmanlı Devleti ile Yaptıkları İlk Anlaşma," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, no.37 (October 1970), pp.16-20.

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- ¹⁷⁸ Kazemzadeh, p.81.
- ¹⁷⁹ *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi...*, p.426.
- ¹⁸⁰ Bunyan and Fisher, p.454.
- ¹⁸¹ Kazemzadeh, p.84.
- ¹⁸² Bunyan and Fisher, p.454.
- ¹⁸³ Avalov, pp.30-31.
- ¹⁸⁴ Suny, *The Making...*, p.191.
- ¹⁸⁵ On the Turkish archival documents regarding the Armenian outrages during that period, see especially the relevant chapters of the two publications of the archives of the Prime Ministry and of the Turkish General Staff: *Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Kafkaslar'da ve Anadolu'da Ermeni Mezalimi, 1906-1918* (Ankara, 1995), vol.I; *Belgelerle Ermeni Sorumu* (Ankara, 1983); also see: Muammer Demirel, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Erzurum ve Çevresinde Ermeni Hareketleri (1914-1918)* (Ankara, 1996).
- ¹⁸⁶ *Belgelerle Ermeni...*, p.271; *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi...*, p.438.
- ¹⁸⁷ Ali İhsan Sabis, *Harb Hatıralarım. Birinci Dünya Harbi* (İstanbul, 1991), vol.IV, p.168.
- ¹⁸⁸ Hüsametdin Tugaç, *Bir Neslin Dramı* (İstanbul, 1975), pp.210-211.
- ¹⁸⁹ On additional information regarding this decision, see: *Ibid.*, pp.195-196.
- ¹⁹⁰ Cafer Seydahmet Kırimir, *Bazı Hatıralar* (İstanbul, 1993), p.302.
- ¹⁹¹ Tugaç, p.212.
- ¹⁹² *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi...*, p.440.
- ¹⁹³ Allen and Muratoff, p.460; Kazemzadeh, p.90.

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- ¹⁹⁴ “Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet Respecting the Peace Negotiations With Turkey,” in *Caucasian Boundaries, Documents...*, p.500.
- ¹⁹⁵ Bunyan and Fisher, p.455.
- ¹⁹⁶ “Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet..., p.500. Trabzon at that time was governed by a soviet.
- ¹⁹⁷ Bunyan and Fisher, p.450.
- ¹⁹⁸ “Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet..., pp.500-501.
- ¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.501.
- ²⁰⁰ Kazemzadeh, p.95.
- ²⁰¹ “Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet..., p.502.
- ²⁰² *Ibid.*, p.503.
- ²⁰³ Kurat, pp.468-469.
- ²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p.470.
- ²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.471-472.
- ²⁰⁶ “Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet...,” p.503.
- ²⁰⁷ Sarkisian, p.346.
- ²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p.347.
- ²⁰⁹ ”Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet...,” pp.504-505; Kurat, p.471.
- ²¹⁰ Kazemzadeh, p.97.
- ²¹¹ Kurat, p.473.
- ²¹² “Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet..., p.505.
- ²¹³ One of the primary reasons of Allied landing on Murmansk, for instance, was to prevent the Germans from acquiring military materials deposited there.

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- ²¹⁴ Bülent Gökay, *A Clash of Empires: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism 1918-1923* (London, 1997), p.17.
- ²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.16; Stefanos Yerasimos, *Milliyetler ve Sınırlar. Balkanlar, Kafkasya ve Orta-Doğu* (İstanbul, 1995), p.291.
- ²¹⁶ Kazemzadeh, p.97.
- ²¹⁷ L. C. Dunsterville, *The Adventures of Dunsterforce* (London, 1920), p.3.
- ²¹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.4-5.
- ²²⁰ Bernstorff, pp.160, 172.
- ²²¹ Mühlmann, p.193.
- ²²² Werner Zürer, *Kaukasien 1918-1921* (Düsseldorf, 1978), p.43.
- ²²³ Mühlmann, pp.194-195.
- ²²⁴ "Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet...", pp.505-506.
- ²²⁵ "Ultimatum From the Turkish Government, 6 April 1918" in *Caucasian Boundaries, Documents...*, p.507; "Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet...", p.506.
- ²²⁶ "Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet...", p.506.
- ²²⁷ *Ibid.*; Kazemzadeh, p.98.
- ²²⁸ "Answer From the Transcaucasian Delegation, 10 April 1918," in *Caucasian Boundaries, Documents...*, p.507.
- ²²⁹ "Declaration of the Ottoman Delegation of Summoning Its Allies to Take Part in the Negotiations, 13 April 1918," in *Caucasian Boundaries, Documents...*, p.507.
- ²³⁰ "Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet...", p.506.
- ²³¹ Kazemzadeh, pp.99-100.

²³² “Telegram From the Government Recalling the Delegation,” in *Caucasian Boundaries, Documents...*, p.508.

²³³ Bunyan and Fisher, pp.457-458.

²³⁴ Kazemzadeh, p.103.

²³⁵ The pro-Turkish Musavat enthusiastically supported the decree of independence. The Mensheviks and Dashnaks joined it reluctantly. The Kadets, Russian SRs and Bolsheviks opposed the declaration. On April 26 Chkhenkeli, who in addition to the post of Prime Minister assumed the duties of the Foreign Minister declared his cabinet. The three main peoples of Transcaucasia, the Georgians, the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis were evenly represented in the cabinet. Each received four ministerial positions.

²³⁶ Avalov, p.37.

²³⁷ On the text of this draft treaty, minus two of the appendices, see: *Caucasian Boundaries, Documents...*, pp.511-519.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.41-42.

²³⁹ Kurat, p.474.

²⁴⁰ Halil Menteşe, *Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Halil Menteşe'nin Anıları* (İstanbul, 1986), pp.228-229.

²⁴¹ Allen-Muratoff, pp.471-472.

²⁴² Avalov, p.61; Halil Menteşe, p.229.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴ Avalov, p.38.

²⁴⁵ Kazemzadeh, pp.111-112.

²⁴⁶ Mühlmann, pp.195-196.

²⁴⁷ Kazemzadeh, pp.113-114.

²⁴⁸ Avalov, p.57.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.58.

²⁵⁰ Suny, *The Making...*, p.193.

²⁵¹ Avalov, p.59.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

²⁵³ Kazemzadeh, p.125.

²⁵⁴ M. E. Resulzade, *Azərbaycan Cumhuriyyəti* (Baku, 1990), p.39.

²⁵⁵ For a brief biography of Galip Kemali Bey (Erzurum 1873-İstanbul 1960), see: Yılmaz Öztuna, *Devletler ve Hanedanlar, Türkiye (1074-1990)* (Ankara, 1996), vol.II, p.862.

²⁵⁶ Although grown up in an environment of Eastern culture, which does not praise the leaving of written accounts behind, Galip Kemali Bey was a very proliferate writer and, besides many translations, he collected his memoirs in four main books; *Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene, 1892-1922* (İstanbul, 1949); *Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatıralarımın Üçüncü ve Son Cildi, 1918-1922* (İstanbul, 1953); *Yok Edilmek İstenen Millet* (İstanbul, 1957); *Başımıza Gelenler. Mondrostan, Mudanyaya, 1918-1922* (İstanbul, 1939).

²⁵⁷ Kurat, p.400.

²⁵⁸ The other members of the Turkish delegation were Yusuf Bey [Akçura], Turhan Bey, Remzi Pasha and Tevfik Bey.

²⁵⁹ Söylemezoğlu, *Hariciye Hizmetinde...*, pp.423, 431.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p.424.

²⁶¹ For the text of the agreement or initial draft treaties, see: Türkiye Kızılay Derneği Genel Merkezi Arşivi (Etimesgut), Dosya: 529, “1333-1334 (1917-1918) Rusya’da Esir Düşen Umara ve Zabitandan Haber Alınamayanlar Hakkında Yazışmalar.”

²⁶² M. Ayaz İshaki, “Gazetecilik İşinde 25 Yıl,” in *Muhammed Ayaz İshaki. Hayatı ve Faaliyetleri* (Ankara, 1979), pp.234-235.

²⁶³ “Rapport über die Taetigkeit in Kriegsgefangenenlagern zu Saratow für das Jahr 1917,” Türkiye Kızılay Derneği Genel Merkezi Arşivi (Etimesgut), Dosya: 529, “1333-1334 (1917-1918) Rusya’da Esir Düşen Umara ve Zabitandan Haber Alınamayanlar Hakkında Yazışmalar.”

²⁶⁴ “Bericht des Herrn phil. kand. Ragnar Tennman über die Verhaeltnisse auf Nargin bei Baku, datiert den 7. Oktober 1917,” Türkiye Kızılay Derneği Genel Merkezi Arşivi (Etimesgut), Dosya: 529, “1333-1334 (1917-1918) Rusya’da Esir Düşen Umara ve Zabitandan Haber Alınamayanlar Hakkında Yazışmalar.”

²⁶⁵ Mehmed Asaf, *Volga Kıyılarında ve Muhtıra* (İzmir, 1994), ed. by Murat Cebecioğlu, pp.134-136.

²⁶⁶ On the text of the agreement, see: Türkiye Kızılay Derneği Genel Merkezi Arşivi (Etimesgut), Dosya: 529, “1333-1334 (1917-1918) Rusya’da Esir Düşen Umara ve Zabitandan Haber Alınamayanlar Hakkında Yazışmalar.”

²⁶⁷ On the text of the agreement, see: *Ibid.*

²⁶⁸ Söylemezoğlu, *Hariciye Hizmetinde...*, p.434.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p.442.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.434.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.443.

²⁷² On the proceeding of this congress, see: İhsan İlgar, *Rusya'da Birinci Müslüman Kongresi* (Ankara, 1990). For background information how the conference was convened or how delegates were elected, see: Zeki Velidi Togan, *Hatıralar* (İstanbul, 1969), pp.155-158.

²⁷³ On this second congress, see: Tamurbek Devletşin, *Sovyet Tataristan'ı* (Ankara, 1981), pp.173-200.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p.243.

²⁷⁵ Abdullah Battal Taymas, *Kazan Türkleri* (Ankara, 1966), pp.192-193; Abdullah Battal Taymas, *Rus İhtilalinden Hatıralar* (İstanbul, 1968), pp.92-93.

²⁷⁶ For more information regarding this military congress, see: Devletşin, pp.253-257.

²⁷⁷ Söylemezoğlu, *Hariciye Hizmetinde...*, p.453.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.436. The reliability of this information seems to be extremely difficult. Nevertheless, at that time there was a close contact between the Turkestani national leaders and the *Millet Meclisi*. The *Meclis*, for instance, decided to send a delegation to Turkestan to help the Muslim population there organize their national organization (see, Battal Taymas, *Rus İhtilalinden...*, pp.20-50. The author was a member of this delegation). These applies of both khanates could be a reflection of their determination to coordinate their course of action with the *Millet Meclisi*.

²⁷⁹ Söylemezoğlu, *Hariciye Hizmetinde...*, p.445.

²⁸⁰ Karl von Botmer, *S Grafom Mirbakhom v Moskve* (Moscow, 1996), p.11; Söylemezoğlu, *Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatıralarımın...*, p.19.

²⁸¹ Zeman, document no.120, pp.120-121.

²⁸² Söylemezoğlu, *Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatıralarımın...*, p.22.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, p.24.

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- ²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.30-32.
- ²⁸⁵ Kazemzadeh, pp.112-113; *Dokumenty vneishnei...*, document no.170 and 171.
- ²⁸⁶ Bernstorff, pp.165-166.
- ²⁸⁷ Zürrer, p. 43.
- ²⁸⁸ Mühlmann, p.199.
- ²⁸⁹ Baumgart, p.177.
- ²⁹⁰ Avalov, pp.65-67, 71-72.
- ²⁹¹ Mühlmann, pp.198-199.
- ²⁹² Edward Mead Earle, *Turkey, The Great Powers, and The Bagdad Railway* (New York, 1923), p.123.
- ²⁹³ Baumgart, p.177.
- ²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.183. For instance, Ludendorff, in his cable to General von Seeckt, pointed out that the Ottoman advance in the Caucasus could be perceived by the Bolsheviks as demonstrating the collapse of the Brest settlement (Mühlmann, p.198).
- ²⁹⁵ See: endnot 270.
- ²⁹⁶ Kurat, p.476.
- ²⁹⁷ The declaration of independence of Transcaucasia had a great impact upon the decision of the North Caucasians regarding the proclamation of independence of the North Caucasus. On related arguments of North Caucasian leaders, see: H. Emirov, *Ustanovlenie sovetskoi vlasti v Dagestane i bor'ba s germano-turetskimi interventami (1917-1919 gg.)* (Moscow, 1949), p.89.
- ²⁹⁸ Kurat, pp.671-672.

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- ²⁹⁹ Mesut Ersan, “Birinci Dünya Harbinde Osmanlı Devleti’nin Kuzey Kafkasya Siyaseti (1914-1918),” Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Atatürk University (Erzurum, 1995), p.47.
- ³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.50-55.
- ³⁰¹ Pipes, *The Formation...*, p.197.
- ³⁰² *Dokumenty vneishnei...*, document no.211; also see: Söylemezoğlu, *Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatıralarımın...*, p.45.
- ³⁰³ *Dokumenty vneishnei...*, document no.213.
- ³⁰⁴ Suny, *The Baku...*, p.263.
- ³⁰⁵ Söylemezoğlu, *Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatıralarımın...*, p.66
- ³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.119-120.
- ³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.46-47.
- ³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.47-48.
- ³⁰⁹ *Dokumenty vneishnei...*, document no.212.
- ³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, document no.208.
- ³¹¹ *Ibid.*, document no.216.
- ³¹² Söylemezoğlu, *Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatıralarımın...*, p.51.
- ³¹³ Mühlmann, pp.200-201.
- ³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.201-202.
- ³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.202-203; Aydemir, vol.III, pp.423-425.
- ³¹⁶ *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi...*, p.553; Nasır Yüceer, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı Ordusu’nun Azerbaycan ve Dağıstan Harekatı* (Ankara, 1996), p.42; Erol Kürkçüoğlu, “1918-1920 Türkiye-Azerbaycan İlişkileri,” Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Atatürk University (Erzurum, 1994), pp.167-168;

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- ³¹⁷ *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi...*, pp.555-556.
- ³¹⁸ Allen and Muratoff, p.481.
- ³¹⁹ *Dokumenty vneishnei...*, document no.276.
- ³²⁰ “Report of Ioffe from Berlin to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow, June 1918,” in Nadezhda Ioffe, *Moi otets Adol’f Abramovich Ioffe* (Moscow, 1997), pp.65-68.
- ³²¹ Avalov, p.97.
- ³²² For more information regarding the conference, see: Kürkcüoğlu, pp.218-228.
- ³²³ Allen and Muratoff, p.478.
- ³²⁴ Söylemezoğlu, *Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatıralarımın...*, p.105.
- ³²⁵ *Dokumenty vneishnei...*, document no.285.
- ³²⁶ *Ibid.*, document no.284.
- ³²⁷ *Ibid.*, document no.287.
- ³²⁸ On July 6, the German ambassador Mirbach was killed by Iakov Bliumkin and Nicholas Andreev. The Left SRs who accused the Bolsheviks of betraying the Revolution hoped that this assassination would cause the abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and a declaration of war on Germany. Helfferich succeeded Mirbach.
- ³²⁹ Söylemezoğlu, *Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatıralarımın...*, p.127.
- ³³⁰ Mühlmann, p.207.
- ³³¹ Söylemezoğlu, *Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatıralarımın...*, p.130.
- ³³² *Ibid.*
- ³³³ On a detailed analysis of *Yeni Dünya* and for the transcriptions of most of its numbers, see: Mete Tunçay, *Mustafa Suphi ’nin Yeni Dünya’sı* (İstanbul, 1995).

³³⁴ For a brief biography of Mustafa Suphi, see: Y. N. Rozaliyev, *Mustafa Suphi, Kavgası ve Düşünceleri* ([Brussels], 1974); Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar, (1908-1925)* (İstanbul, 1991), vol.I, pp.98-103.

³³⁵ For the adventurous escape of Mustafa Suphi and his initial ideals, see: Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İnkılap Hareketleri ve Milli Mücadele* (İstanbul, 1956), pp.549-556. The author was a member of the group who escaped with Mustafa Suphi to the Crimea.

³³⁶ Sultan Galiyev, "Mustafa Suphi ve Yapıtı," in *Ant* (İstanbul), no.182/9, January 1971, p.51.

³³⁷ On the formation and activities of this Commissariat, see the relevant chapters of: Stephen Blank, "The Unknown Commissariat: The Soviet Commissariat of Nationalities 1917-1924," Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, The University of Chicago (1979). The author states that the advent of the Muskom successfully accelerated the process of fragmentation that affected the Muslim community.

³³⁸ Şerif Manatof [Manatov], "Mustafa Suphi Beş Sene Evvel Moskova'da," *Mustafa Suphi ve Yoldaşları* (Brussels, 1975), p.25.

³³⁹ Taymas, *Rus İhtilalinden...*, pp.108-109.

³⁴⁰ Söylemezoğlu, *Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatıralarımın*, p.25.

³⁴¹ Tunçay, *Mustafa Suphi'nin Yeni...*, pp.15-25.

³⁴² Söylemezoğlu, *Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatıralarımın...*, pp.25-26. Galip Kemali Bey sent to İstanbul together with this report two numbers of the journal.

³⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.39.

³⁴⁴ Kurat, p.434.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.678.

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- ³⁴⁶ Tuncay, *Mustafa Suphi 'nin Yeni...*, pp.45-56.
- ³⁴⁷ Kurat, pp.679-681.
- ³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.439.
- ³⁴⁹ Galiyev, p.52.
- ³⁵⁰ Söylemezoğlu, *Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatıralarımın...*, p.27.
- ³⁵¹ On more information regarding the economic policies of the Bolsheviks, especially see: Pipes, *The Russian...*, pp.671-713.
- ³⁵² Söylemezoğlu, *Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatıralarımın...*, p.28.
- ³⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.30.
- ³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.32-38.
- ³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.60-61.
- ³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.130-131.
- ³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.30.
- ³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.32-33.
- ³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.99-102.
- ³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p.134.
- ³⁶¹ Pipes, *The Bolshevik...*, p.619.
- ³⁶² Baumgart, p.84.
- ³⁶³ *Ibid.*
- ³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.245. This was the expression of Paul von Hintze.
- ³⁶⁵ The Brest Treaty called for a supplementary accord to regulate Russo-German economic relations.
- ³⁶⁶ On the text of the treaty, see: *Sovetsko-Germanskie...*, pp.605-613; for the English translation, see: Wheeler-Bennett, pp.427-434.

³⁶⁷ This lines were the Kuban, from its mouth to Petropavlovskoje; from there onwards, the boundaries of the district Shemakha to Agrioba; thence a straight line to the point where the boundaries of the district of Baku, Shemakha and Kuban meet; thence along the northern boundary of the district of Baku to the sea.

³⁶⁸ Trumpener, p.192.

³⁶⁹ On more information concerning these draft treaties, see: Wheeler-Bennett, pp.345-346.

³⁷⁰ Mühlmann, p.209.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 210.

³⁷² Wheeler-Bennett, pp.435-438; Trumpener, p.193.

³⁷³ Degras, pp.96-98.

³⁷⁴ Trumpener, p.193.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.194-195; Kürkçüoğlu, pp.272-275.

³⁷⁶ Dunsterville, p.275.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.279

³⁷⁸ Allen-Muratoff, pp.494-495.

³⁷⁹ Mühlmann, p.210.

³⁸⁰ Halil Paşa, pp.223-224.

³⁸¹ Kürkçüoğlu, pp.275-276; Aydemir, pp.448-451.

³⁸² Kürkçüoğlu, p.275.

³⁸³ *Dokumenty vneishnei...*, document no.347.

³⁸⁴ Bayur, vol.III, part IV, pp.243-245.

³⁸⁵ *Dokümenty vneishnei...*, document no.346 and 358. The former note was to be given to the Turkish government on September 21, but, due to Ioffe's meetings with Talat Pasha, it was postponed.

³⁸⁶ R. W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question. A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics* (London, 1971), p.563.

³⁸⁷ John Lowe, *The Great Powers, Imperialism and the German Problem, 1865-1925* (London, 1994), pp.141-142.

³⁸⁸ Emil Ludwig, *Wilhelm der Zweite* (Berlin, 1925), p.209; Paul Imbert, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Yenileşme Hareketleri* (İstanbul, 1981), p.166.

³⁸⁹ İber Ortaylı, *İkinci Abdülhamid Döneminde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu* (Ankara, 1981); Lothar Rathmann, *Berlin-Bağdad. Alman Emperyalizminin Türkiye'ye Girişi* (İstanbul, 1982).

³⁹⁰ Earle, p.104.

³⁹¹ Apak, p.50.

³⁹² Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (New York, 1918), pp.46-47.

³⁹³ Vambery, p.81.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁵ Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim* (İstanbul, 1997), vol.I, pp.333, 352, 361. The impressions of the author, who has been one of the most prominent journalists in the Ottoman as well as Republican years, regarding the mood of the Ottoman public at that time are of particular interest.

³⁹⁶ Morgenthau, p.34.

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