

**BILKENT UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND
SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**THE INCORPORATION OF THE FOREIGN
ELEMENTS INTO THE OTTOMAN POLITICAL
CULTURE**

**BY
MUSTAFA SOYKUT**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

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
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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study which aims to explore the cultural dimensions of Ottoman politics and state tradition. The present study is an analysis of the components of the political culture of the Ottomans until the end of the sixteenth century. The components creating the *sui generis* political culture of the Ottomans treated in this thesis are that of Islamic, Byzantine and Turco-Iranian origin. An integral part of this study is also concerned with the continuity and discontinuity of the Ottoman political culture in modern Turkey. In the light of the above findings, the politico-cultural dimensions of current relations of Turkey with the West are presented from the standpoint of cultural history.

ÖZET

Bu tez Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun devlet geleneđi ve siyasi yapısının kültürel boyutlarını incelemektedir. Buradaki çalışma Osmanlıların siyasi kültürünün onaltıncı yüzyıl sonuna kadar öğelerini analiz etmektedir. Bu tezde ele alınan Osmanlıların nev-i şahsına münhasır siyasi kültürünün öğeleri İslam, Bizans ve Türk-İran kökenlerinden gelmektedir. Bu çalışmanın önemli bir parçası da Osmanlı siyasi kültürünün çağdaş Türkiye'deki devamlılığı ve kesintisidir. Yukarıdaki verilerin ışığında Türkiyenin Batıyla olan siyasi-kültürel ilişkilerinin boyutları kültür tarihi boyutundan sunulmaktadır.

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CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a study which aims at exploring the cultural dimensions of Ottoman politics and state tradition. Various foreign influences that contributed to the creation of the Ottoman political identity are analyzed using the method of content analysis in a historical context. The second chapter aims at the analysis of various forces of Islamic background which became the components of the Ottoman political culture until the end of the sixteenth century. The transformation of the use of ideals stemming from an Islamic background, as well as their outcomes and the flavour that they gave to the Ottoman state tradition are explored, taking into consideration, the historical process in which the Ottoman state gradually became a world empire.

The third chapter aims at analyzing various socialization processes pertaining to political behaviour and traditions of Byzantine and Turco-Iranian origin which deeply influenced the Ottoman political culture, especially during the course of transformation of the Ottoman state into an empire starting at the second half of the fifteenth century. The aim of this chapter is to show the heterogeneity of the components of the Ottoman political culture, of foreign origins, which resulted in creating the *sui generis*, oriental concept of an empire in the Ottoman state. The adoption of similar methods by Byzantium of cultural, political and historical symbols are especially of interest in this chapter.

The fourth chapter aims at analyzing the forces of continuity as well as discontinuity in Turkey of the Ottoman political culture, taking into consideration the cultural-crisis in which Turkey and the Middle East region find themselves. Special reference to the causes and manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism within a politico-cultural context, based on the findings of the previous chapters are among the current domestic as well as international dimensions of this study.

The concluding fifth chapter makes an evaluation of the whole study, in an attempt to comprehend the cultural dimensions of domestic and international politics, in a world where increasing cultural misunderstanding and incomprehension stands in the way of peaceful and cooperative coexistence. In this respect, the problem of coexistence that Turkey is facing with the West today - a problem that the Ottomans did not face due to their relatively isolated cultural existence from the West - is the main issue of interest. In other words, what appears to be the greatest obstacle for cooperative coexistence with the West today, is the tension created by the forces of change and continuity of the Ottoman legacy. Hence the importance of a better comprehension of the socialization processes that affected political behaviour in the Ottoman Empire.

It must be added that the aim of this thesis is not to prove the superiority or inferiority of neither the oriental nor the occidental cultures in any respect. Rather, it is hoped here that by the study of cultural dimensions of politics, an essential gap in the study of international relations could be filled.

CHAPTER 2

2. THE ISLAMIC FORCES IN OTTOMAN STATE TRADITION

Religion is one of those forces in society that shape and form people at such a deep level, that oftentimes one tends to forget its colossal effect on human life. Every society is affected to a great extent by the dominant religion practiced. Although religion is basically concerned with the human being at an individual level, to bring the individual to liberation of the soul, the way in which most religions try to do this involves practices that also concern the society in which the individual lives.

Mainly the monotheistic religions starting with Abraham and culminating with Mohammed -- the prophet of Islam -- put a lot of emphasis on the social context in which the individual lived. Judaism, Christianity and Islam set down many rules for the right conduct of life that the individual must follow (which comprise the external or formal aspect of religion), for the individual to enforce and live in faith.

Islam is certainly no exception to this rule. Moreover, perhaps Islam is the foremost among the monotheistic religions that has prescribed more rules (together with Judaism) for the individual to follow, than many other religions born on the face of the earth.

The aim of this chapter is to show how Islam affected the individual life and therefore the political identity of the Ottomans. It must be made clear from the

beginning that religions are brought and preached to people by prophets, and how that religion was intended by the carrier of the faith himself and how it gets interpreted by those who come after him are entirely different matters. Since the interpretations of a religion actualized shortly or long after the prophet's death (in the presence of the prophet he can interpret it himself), there usually occurs a need for some sort of an authority which claims to be the rightful interpreter.

The duty of researchers therefore, is not to pass value judgements on the message of Islam as it was brought by the Prophet, but rather try to see how the message carried in this religion affected the political and social identity of the Ottomans in the period from the reign of Mehmet II until the end of the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent. In other words, the task is going to be to try to understand how Islam was interpreted by the Ottomans in a period of roughly a hundred and fifty years and to what political ideas and institutions it gave birth.

The first part of this chapter is concerned with the historical and the theoretical background of Islam. In other words, the first part of the chapter, gives a picture of the cultural and religious background that gave the Ottomans the element that they could work with in the creation of part of their own culture. The second part of the chapter, examines how a certain interpretation of Islam came to be part of the official ideology of the Ottomans, taking into consideration also the change in the interpretation of Islam by the rulers and the *Ulama* from the beginning of the Empire into the sixteenth century. This period, starting with the conquest of Constantinople and its turning into Istanbul, marks the era that the Ottoman state turned gradually into an empire.

I

It can be said that Islam has three dimensions. Sachiko Murata and William Chittick mention these three dimensions of Islam as: *Islam*, *Iman*, and *Ihsan*. *Islam* refers to submission, *Iman* refers to faith and *Ihsan* refers to doing what is good and beautiful. In other words, "*Islam* refers to religion pertaining to acts, *Iman* is religion as it pertains to thoughts and *Ihsan* is religion as it pertains to intentions. These three dimensions of religion coalesce into a single reality called Islam." (1)

In other words, man needs all these three dimensions of thought, intention and action for a pure and beautiful life. The way that Islam enables the individual to reach this state of purity and bliss is through the understanding and living of the five pillars of Islam which are: *Shahadah*, *Salat*, *Fasting*, *Hajj* and *Zakat*. *Shahadah* comes from witnessing and witnessing here means the acceptance and feeling as a part of a Muslim's life, the fact that "there is no other God but one and that Mohammed is his creation (servant) and messenger". *Salat* is the prayer or encounter of the individual with God which is the duty of the Muslim to perform five times daily. *Fasting* is abstinence from food and drinks as well as sexual desire from dawn to sun set in the month of Ramadan. *Hajj* is the pilgrimage task of every Muslim that can afford it to the house of God to congregate with other Muslims. Finally *Zakat* is giving a part of every wealthy Muslim's possessions to the needy for charity. There is also the sixth element which is considered by the same authorities as the sixth pillar of Islam which is *Jihad*.

It is on this supposed sixth pillar that it would be useful to deepen the vision of Islam a little.

The word *Jihad* comes from the root *mujahada* in Arabic which means fight or struggle. The Koranic usage of the word

Jihad is far broader than the political use of the word might imply. Most commonly, the Koran uses the verb along with the expression 'in the path of God'. The 'path of God' is of course the oath of right conduct that God has set down in the Koran and the example of the Prophet. (2)

In other words, once the individual has surrendered to God his partial wisdom, to be able to make his wisdom whole and therefore holy, he should fight against the lower self (Satan) within himself to attain the Higher Self (God). Certainly, as in the time of the Prophet, outer *Jihad* has also been necessary to preserve and give the new faith in an environment inimical towards it. However, the authority to decide whether an outer *Jihad* should take place or not was the Prophet. After his death, many wars against the "infidels" came to be marketed in the name of *Jihad*, conducting a political war beneath the veil of holiness.

The place of *Jihad* in the divine plan is typically illustrated by citing words that the Prophet uttered on one occasion when he had returned to Medina from a battle with the enemies of the new religion. He said, 'We have returned from the lesser *Jihad* to the greater *Jihad*.' The people said, 'O Messenger of God, what *Jihad* could be greater than struggling against the unbelievers with the sword?' He replied, 'Struggling against the enemy in your own breast.' (3)

Aside from what *Jihad* originally meant and what it has meant to the Islamic states in history as well as what kind of connotations it still has today, it should be emphasized that for the Ottomans also, the practice of *Jihad* became a political institution. However, the Ottomans have by no means been the only Islamic state that has turned *Jihad* into a political institution. *Jihad* has been as such almost invariably in every Islamic state and to a great extent, still continues to be so for many Muslim states which have not even necessarily adopted the *Shariah* as their official state ideology.

At this point, it would be useful to have a look at the term *Shariah* which gave birth to all sorts of schisms as well as divergence within Islam such as Sunnism or Shi'ism and the different *madhhabs* that were born within Sunnism itself.

Nowadays, the term *Shariah* is taken for granted as if everyone understands for what it stands. The fact is that, even among those who know or understand what *Shariah* is, there are divergencies of opinion as to what it represents for them. Is there a uniform definition of *Shariah*?

The word *Shariah* in Arabic simply means "the road leading to water". In other words, *Shariah* represents the rules and regulations set down by the Koran and the Prophet Mohammed for Muslims for the right conduct of inner and outside life to protect and enforce the *Islam*, *Iman* and *Ihsan*, as mentioned earlier. Naturally with the passing of time after the Prophet's death, the Islamic theologians and jurists tried to create rules for the individual's inner and social life within the line set by the Koran and the Prophet. The codification of all these rules and regulations created the Islamic jurisprudence called *Fiqh*. There have been a corpus of scholars in the Islamic tradition, some of whom concentrated more on the theological and philosophical aspects of Islam and some of whom concentrated more on the jurisprudence aspect. Theology means more or less the philosophy of religion, i.e. the theory of knowledge on various aspects of religion. Jurisprudence means the science of law. The particularity of Islam that perhaps differs it from other religions is that, it is perhaps the religion on the face of the earth where these two realms of jurisprudence and theology have merged most, whereby one does not know where jurisprudence starts and theology ends and the other way around. This is a result of the historical conditions under which Islam flourished in the

Arabian peninsula, and a consequence of a particular approach to spirituality that combines this world with the other world, where the division is much more emphasised in other religions such as Christianity or Hinduism.

It is not the intent here to make a comparative analysis of Islam and other religions. However, it is necessary to note this aspect of Islam which sees the outer way that one lives as a mirror of the inner way one is.

Another peculiarity of *Shariah* (which is the rules and regulations set down by the Koran and the Prophet) is that it covers a larger extent of human life (both individual and social) than laws brought by other religions.

One of the reasons that the word law is not appropriate to refer to everything dealt with the *Shariah* is the connotations of the English word. To begin with, we think of law as commands and prohibitions. Not only does *Shariah* tell people what they must do and what they must not do, it also tells them what they should do and what they should not do, and it tells them explicitly that many things are indifferent. Hence we are faced with five categories of actions: the required, the recommended, the indifferent, the reprehensible and the forbidden. (4)

Islamic jurisprudence (*Fiqh*) is the codification of *Shariah* and it is in fact this part that needs to be studied if one wants to understand what kind of an effect Islam had on the Ottomans, or rather, what sort of an effect a certain interpretation, or the adoption of a certain interpretation of Islam had for the Ottomans. Accordingly, one should examine how the various schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam (to which the Ottomans belonged) and within these schools how the school of Abu-Hanifa (to which the Ottomans belonged) created a jurisprudence of its own, which later on, came to predominate the theological aspects of Islam.

One of the important reasons that the Ottomans made *Shariah* the backbone of their judicial system and conformed and incorporated the *Örfi Kamun* (laws emanated by the will of the Sultan) into *Shariah* is because after the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottoman state gradually became a multi-ethnic and a multi-religious empire. That is to say, although the Ottomans made use of *Shariah* before the conquest of Constantinople as well, it became the state doctrine and the umbrella under which the multi-ethnic and multi-religious peoples of the empire were covered after the conquest of Constantinople. It is not surprising to see that after the Muslims emigrated to Medina from Mecca during the Prophet's time, the community was also reorganized according to the law of "*Umma*" which was based on the sharing of the new faith and not according to the valid tribal laws until that time.(5) Similar to the Ottoman case (though not identical) the new community in Medina was organized according to the new constitution of Medina, making Mohammed the new legislator in a city whose population not only was composed of Muslims, but non-converted Arabs and Jews as well. (Jews constituted half the population in the city at that time). The alliance between the Jews and the Arabs of Medina for the common defense of Medina against the Qarish tribe facilitated the constitution whose 23rd and 42nd articles complemented each other as: "In any controversy, submit yourselves to God and Mohammed." (6) This first constitution of Medina accomplished under the legislator figure of the Prophet was called "Convention established by the messenger of God between the emigrants and auxiliaries and for the peace with the Jew." (7)

One cannot do but think that this success of the Prophet of Islam and Islam's claims to universality have affected the Islamic State tradition, including that of the Ottomans, especially after Mehmet II and the conquest of Constantinople. In other

words, Islam provided the Ottomans by the second half of the 15th century both the historical example of the Prophet in practice and the claim of Islam being a universal religion in theory. The combination of the two, made Islamic tradition and *Shariah* a perfect tool for Ottoman claims for a universal empire, that is, a perfect means of legitimacy.

To come back to the argument of the various schools of Sunni Islam (*madhhab*), it is necessary to look at how the various *Hadith* (words of the Prophet) and *Sunna* (any tradition in early Islam on any relative aspect of law and/or religion) gave birth to an elaborate and intricate Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*). By understanding the standpoint of the Hanafi school, one will be able to understand the complex state structure of the Ottomans based on Islamic jurisprudence.

From the words of the Prophet or words attributed to him, a corpus of prophetic tradition was created. The *Hadith* are about the most detailed and diverse aspects of public and private life, including judgements, acts and sentences. The *Hadith* became the natural extension of the revelation of Islam. They were passed on from generation to generation and from the Arabian peninsula onto remote corners of the world by faithful Muslims whose mission was to deliver the message of Islam to those who did not know it.

"From the second generation of the comrades of the Prophet onwards, an entire corporation of *Hadith* tellers was established. *Hadith* became *al-'ilm* (the science) par excellence and the fourteen main sources of *Hadith* gradually received a judicial character." (8) As time passed, the *ulama* speculated to resolve how the Prophet would have acted in a certain situation (as a part of the *taqlid* or imitation tradition). These speculations were extended into every detail of

daily life as well as to public and private aspects of jurisdiction, and gave definite forms to social and religious life, and institutions. The *Sunnah* provided a lot of power to the *ulama* because the *taqlid* of the Prophet (who set the perfect example) was the way that would lead to a perfect life in the name of God. These speculations of the *ulama* are called *bidà* (innovation), which meant to adapt the *Shariah* according to the needs of the times. The *bidà* tradition started as early as the 9th century. Although some traditionalists have completely been against *bidà*, some other *ulama* preferred to make a distinction between a good and a bad *bidà*.

If these traditions against innovation had completely succeeded (as in the 10th century Maghreb) it would have been impossible to live differently from the first 30 years of Islam in Medina. (9) However, a principle was formulated by the famous theologian Ash-Shafi:

An innovation that goes against the Koran, a *sunna* or a tradition that goes back to the comrades of the Prophet or that goes against common sense (*ijma*) is a heretic innovation. However when something new which is not evil in itself is introduced that does not contrast the above mentioned authorities in the religious realm, then it is a laudable innovation. (10)

Islamic jurisprudence has four main sources: 1) the interpretation of the Koran a) taken as literal meaning by the Sunnis b) taken as allegorical meaning by the Shiites and the Sufis 2) the sunna and the *Hadith* 3) *ijtihad* or commonsense reflection when a matter is left unanswered in the Koran or/and the *hadith* 4) *ijma* or consensus of the *ulama*.

Abu-Hanifa is the greatest scholar of the Hanafi school, after whom the *madhhab* is named. The Hanafi school developed *ijtihad* more than *taqlid* probably because the messengers sent by the caliph Omar to Iraq (where the Hanafi

madhhab was born) emphasized the teachings of the Koran over that of the Hadith, therefore leaving a large margin of unresolved issues for *ijtihad*. The innovation of hanafism was the emphasis put on personal opinion (*ra'y*) and preferential option (*istihsan*) in jurisprudence. This developed a jurisdiction that left a large margin of freedom to adopt reasoning which conforms itself to diverse historical and social circumstances. (11)

The aspect of Hanafism which is often criticized is that it put greater emphasis on jurisprudence (*fiqh*) than on theology (*kalam*), which came to be the reason of a sterile philosophical tradition in the countries adopting Hanafism, as well as in the Islamic world in general (since almost half of the Islamic world today belongs to the Hanafi madhhab alone). (12) There is much affinity between this claim and the fact that the Ottomans, although they created powerful states with complicated administrative structures and ideologies, did not create a *sui generis* political theory as well as failing to create an original philosophy whose origins lie purely within the indigenous Ottoman intelligentsia. (13) On the other hand, the other three madhhabs of Sunni Islam (Hanbalism, Malikism and Shafism) have been even stricter with *bida'* and the adaptation of Islam to the needs and circumstances of diverse times and conditions. In the face of these facts, it could be considered that Sufism was the only trend that made an effort to adapt Islam to the particular needs of a certain time.

Sufism is therefore, an important heterodox aspect of Islam. The political, social and the philosophical role that the sufis played in the Ottoman Empire will be discussed later in this chapter.

Sufism in Islam is what we may call mysticism in English. The Sufi approach in Islam is also based on the Koran and the acceptance of the fact that Mohammed

is God's prophet and messenger. However, as far as the attainment of the divine truth is concerned, the sufi way is that of *kashf* (discovery). In other words, faith is used only as a step towards personal discovery or experiencing of truth, through the path of love. Sufism emphasizes the *tasbih* principle in Islam (the fact that the manifest world is not separate from the creator or God, since God created the world in His own image, there is oneness between the Creator and the created). Therefore *kashf* means experiencing this oneness. The complementary aspect of *tasbih* in Islam is *tanzih* (which means that the Creator and the created are *distinct* from each other, but not separate). Sunni orthodox Islam in the Ottoman Empire, as part of the state ideology emphasizes especially *tanzih* in the figure of the sultan, him being above his subjects, in other words being "zillullah fi'l ardh"(the shadow of God on earth). This has been balanced by the *tasbih* element in the Ottoman tradition by the jannisaries(who, formally belonged to the Bektāşi *tariqa* of sufism), who shouted the following words at the beginning of each sultan's *kılıç kuşanma* (coronation) to the sultan himself:"Mağrur olma Sultanım, senden büyük Allah var!"(O my Sultan, do not be proud, there is God greater than you!).

The emphasis of the *tasbih* principle in sufism, or rather its political and social consequences got the sufis often in trouble with the political and religious authorities of their times. The most famous example is Mansur al-Hallaj who was a great sufi mystic, who was amputated and crucified in Baghdad, in 922 A.D., for his so called heretic uttering: "an al-Haqq" (I am the truth). (14)

The sufis have been revered as well as condemned on various occasions in Islamic countries, depending on the political and social implications of the *tariqa* to which they belonged. At various stages of the Ottoman history the Sufis clashed also with the official ideology of Sunni orthodox Islam.

The *tariqas* in the Ottoman Empire have been institutions where political oppositions were embodied and developed. In the Ottoman Empire, since the political power was legitimized in a religious form, also the political protest came in a religious form in the incarnation of the *tariqas*. The esoteric form of mysticism rather than the manifest aspect of religion, facilitated such a role. (15)

The Ottomans kept good relations with the *tariqas* while they were becoming a separate entity from the Selçuks, and made use of them for the legitimization of their state. However, as the Ottoman state developed and gained power, some of the *tariqas* became the focus of political opposition, making overt political demands, the state and the *tariqas* clashed.

II

It is widely accepted among historians that the Ottomans reached the height of their empire in the 16th century, concerning military might, social and religious institutions, as well as political influence, in the sense of becoming a world empire. By the time of the death of Süleyman the Magnificent, the Ottoman Empire was one of the greatest powers of the world, yet it would be oversimplistic to think that the Ottomans reached to such a degree of power solely due to supreme military ability and organization.

In a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire it usually takes more than military might to keep people together who belong to diverse groups and creeds. Legitimacy of the power of the sovereign, as well as the binding force to keep the social, political and religious institutions together, need a strong and deeply rooted ideology in which the subjects of the empire must believe.

In the process through which the Ottoman State became an empire, the uniting as well as the legitimizing power of Islam was the most important element, though not the sole force. Taking over the Byzantine state tradition, institutions, as well as a considerable part of their philosophy also played an important part in the legitimization process. Likewise, we cannot underestimate the Turkic traditions of inner Asian states. However, it seems that starting from the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottomans needed a firmer ideology which would be universal in nature. The nomadic or Turkic customs and traditions alone, were not sufficient to provide the Ottomans with such an ideological support any longer.

The transition of the Ottomans from a tribal entity, in which the influence of those who belong to the Oğuz tribe as well as of the Turks, was replaced by all sorts of non-Oğuz and non-Turks, including the islamicized converts. Although at the beginning of the Ottoman State, the descendants of Oğuz tribes enjoyed a certain role by the side of the sultan until the midst of the 14th century, they were overtaken by the mass of federates, the islamicized and new men.(17)

It is curious to note that the Ottomans started creating an ideology to give them legitimacy to rule not only within their own lands but also outside their own territories, starting shortly after when the tribal affinities began to lose influence.

By the end of the reign of Süleyman in 1566, the Ottomans had created an ideology which not only justified the Ottoman sultan's rule in his own territories, but also bestowed on him a claim to universal sovereignty. These claims, and the beliefs which supported them, had developed between the late fourteenth and mid-sixteenth centuries, becoming ever more grandiose with the continuing growth in Ottoman power. They did not derive from a single source or a single coherent set of ideas, but rather from an accretion and coalescence of myths and ideals, each of which had emerged at a different time to answer a particular political need or to appeal to a particular group of the sultan's subjects. However, all the elements in this complex ideology served the purpose of justifying the rule of

the Ottoman dynasty. ... The Ottoman dynasty, like a large percentage of its subjects, was Muslim and Turkish and it was from within Muslim and Turkish tradition, both popular and learned, that it derived its claims to rulership and sovereignty.(18)

The support of ideals coming from Islam and the Islamic traditions, were not only a powerful source of legitimacy, but they also came to dominate the other two aspects as well (i.e. the Turkic and the Byzantine dimensions). Therefore, this chapter is about how a certain interpretation of Islam became the arch-column of state ideology. In other words, this chapter is about how *Islam alla Ottomana* was created.

2. 1. ISLAM IN OTTOMAN LEGAL STRUCTURE

The *ulama* in the Islamic world claimed by the end of the 9th century that the road for *ijtihad* was closed. (19) This meant that using one's intellect for the creation of law was not the case any more, since the Koran and the *Hadith*, which were the ultimate laws sent upon humanity through the Prophet, in their most perfect form, was what the Muslims had to obey. However, looking at the Ottomans, one sees that they not only made use of the *Sharia*, but also adopted quite a number of sultanic(*örfi*) laws which stemmed from the authority of the Sultan himself.

In this respect, it would be erroneous to think of Ottoman law as merely being restricted to *Sharia*. The sultanic law represented the sovereign's attaining an absolute role in the state and it also indicated the fact that the interest of the state was held above everything.(20) As it has been earlier pointed out, the Hanafi and

the Maliki *madhhabs* in Islam put emphasis on the strict following of the Koran and the *Hadith*. Hence within an ultra-orthodox interpretation of Islam, the sultan or the caliph would not have had any power of promulgating laws, and his power would have been restricted to the preservation and the guardianship of Sharia. The case was quite different in the Ottoman Empire. The sultan was considered not only the protector and enforcer of the Sharia, but also one of the main sources of law. This was made possible based on a different concept of caliphate in Islam.

According to Taner Timur, this different concept of caliphate goes back to the Abbasid dynasty. The process of the specialization of the *kadhi* (the term used for *Shar'i* judges) institution which started at the time of the Umayyads, was completed by the time of the Abbasid dynasty. In this period, the *kadhīs* became *fukaha*(jurists), having specialized on various aspects of Islamic law. However, due to the increasing complexity of the social structure, Islamic law became inadequate to solve all the questions. These inadequacies manifested themselves especially in the areas of state government, economic issues and land administration. Under these circumstances, the caliph had the role of filling the gaps in areas where Sharia was inadequate or simply did not express any opinion.(21)

The incorporation of sultanic law within the judicial system, which was a common practice in the Ottomans, was also a common practice in the former Turkish-Islamic states. Therefore it would be oversimplistic to think that the sole law for the Ottomans was *Sharia*. In fact, also the Abbasid state (which was also a Hanafi state like most of the former Turkish-Islamic states) had brought many innovations to the *Sharia*, adapting it to an ever complex society as the conquests incorporated new peoples and customs into their state. The Ottomans, although

conforming sultanic laws into *Sharia*, always tried to increase the power of the sultan through the *fetva* system. *Fetva* was an emanation issued by the *ulama* stating that a sultanic law was in conformity with the *Sharia*. This system reached its utmost systematic form at the time of Süleyman the Magnificent and his *Şeyhülislam*, Ebussuud Efendi. However, *fetvas* were issued before Süleyman as well, not necessarily by the *Şeyhülislam* all the time, but by the *kadiasker* or the *müftü* (depending on whether we consider the *müftüs* before Ebussuud Efendi real *Şeyhülislams*. Since the title *Şeyhülislam* was used for various heads of the *ulama* i.e. the Müftü of İstanbul was called *Şeyhülislam* at the time of Mehmed the Conqueror). (22) Therefore, probably it was not a coincidence that both the Abbasids and the Ottomans adopted the Hanafi school as their official doctrine, since it was the school of jurisprudence that gave the largest margin of power to the sultan.

These considerations, however, should not mislead one to think that the sultan enjoyed unlimited power or that he could introduce any law without opposition of any kind. He was always bound by the customs and the institutions of Islam. From the very beginning of the Empire until the time when the state took its classical form under Süleyman, the rulers of the Empire formed a particular concept of Islam according to their own interests. In other words, one can assume that the margin of manipulation and active ideology- creating using Islam, when convenient, was higher than what one usually thinks in the Ottoman State. This peculiar concept of Islam is in fact *Islam alla Ottomana* that was mentioned earlier. The relationship between the Ottoman ideology-makers and Islam was a relationship of convenience where religion provided the rulers with power, and, also imposed its restrictive rules upon the player of the game. One particular

consequence of Islam in the Ottoman Empire was that it had the paradoxical effect of strengthening as well as weakening the state. The power donating effect of Islam was the fact that it legitimized the ruler's power to the utmost. Serving the state was also serving religion, as disobeying the state meant also disobeying religion. Hence someone who disobeyed the sultan's authority was not only a rebel, but was also almost an infidel. In fact, many of the manifestations of rebellions against central authority were in the form of religious heterodoxies and were charged with infidelity as in the case of Kızılbaş, Abdal and Shiite revolts, as in the case of the 16th century revolts, when persecutions heightened against the Kızılbaş in the times of Bayezid II and his son Yavuz Selim.

As to the weakening effect of Islam, it should be analyzed under two categories: the first aspect is that, for Islam to serve the purposes of the state, there had to be a firmly authoritative interpretation of the religion, but not an ultra-orthodox interpretation ; the second aspect is that since the state and religion merged indistinguishably, at times when the sultan or the ruling elite were not strong enough, religion tended to undermine the power of the state, restricting its power.

The authoritative tendencies in Islam were mentioned earlier, however , there have been incidents in the Ottoman Empire where Islam itself became a threat to the authority of the sultan, as a result of ultra-orthodox interpretations among the ulama. This category of ulama who appeared also at the time of Süleyman, were usually popular sheiks and ulama who preached and taught in the mosques, while the ulama in the higher medreses had a milder, but, always an authoritative tendency.(23) An example of the ultra-orthodox ulama is Mehmet of Birgi (1522-73) who flourished between the years 1558-1565 when persecutions against the

Kızılbaş were aflame. He condemned the visiting of tombs, shaking hands, bowing, kissing the hands or garment in greeting the sultan, payment of the religious officers for performing their services, and the institution of *waqf*, not to mention luxuries of the palace, and condemned even dancing and singing of the officially recognized and respected *Mevlevi* order. As these threats to the established order began to take hold among the poorer stratum of the society and the ulama, the *Şeyhülislam* Ebussuud Efendi had to issue a *fetva* to confirm the legality of the institutions attacked.(24)

The Empire was held back at an intellectual level to adapt itself to the world with which it interacted , as a consequence of another weakening effect of Islam on the Ottoman State. In the absence of a strong ruling class, the Ottoman concept of Islam, having reached its classical and most powerful institutionalization at the time of Süleyman, was inept of free thought (and counter-thought), partly due to the lack of charisma of the sultans who came after him and most important of all, due to inherent weaknesses stemming from having made Islam the principle legitimizing fact. Taşköprülüzade's (important figure of the Ottoman ulama, 1495-1561) ideas give a hint on these inherent weakness of Ottoman Islam in its incapacity for innovation and free thinking:

Taşköprülüzade accepted al-Gazali's *moderate views*, believing that, like religious fanatics, batinites and philosophers were in error. The batinites sought to destroy the şariat, while the philosophers worked from principles unacceptable to Islam.
(25)

The fact of the absence of free thinking and innovation was not the sole fact that prevented the Ottomans from keeping pace with their time. Religion and

administration merged to such an extent that, for example, the *kadhı*, who was the Islamic judge, was not only a part of the judicial organ, but embodied in his figure the administrative roles as well. As İlber Ortaylı puts it, the *kadhı*'s competence extended from civil and penal code to *lonca* (guild), *kale* (citadel) and army inspections, the inspection of the *tekkes* of various *tariqas* and *hass* lands. (26) It is also interesting to note that the *kadhı* had as his superior and inspector, not the *sancak beyi* but the *kadiasker* (the chief of the religious judicial system after the *Şeyhülislam*). (27) In other words, although a member of the religious-judicial institution could get engaged in administrative affairs, a secular administrative figure could interfere with the affairs of the *kadhı*. To return to the nature of the Ottoman law, as far as *Sharia* was concerned, the absence of free thinking in general is illustrated by the picture of the Ottoman *fukaha* and the Islamization process of the *örfi* laws and secular institutions.

The most renowned Ottoman jurisprudence book was *Multeka el-Ebhur* written in the 16th century, at the time of Süleyman (...) If we consider that the Ottoman Empire gave more importance to judicial order and organization than it did to philosophical thinking, one grasps the importance of this book further (...) In the Empire, the *Multeka* was under the hand of each *kadhı* in every court. However, it is difficult to conceive most of the Ottoman *kadhıs* as jurists capable of fully understanding the *Multeka*. Furthermore, in the complex social life of the Empire, there emerged always cases that the *Multeka* had not foreseen. (28)

In the Ottoman Empire, the trend that the *örfi* laws and the secular institutions reigned without the necessity of their Islamization, diminished gradually, contrary to rationale. This trend was replaced by another trend of Islamization especially in public law, particularly after the 17th century. (29)

2. 2. ISLAM IN EDUCATION AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE

The reason for extreme Islamization in state affairs should be found, to a great extent, in the fact that the Ottoman Empire did not produce an independent intelligentsia who took their ideas from independent rational thought. This was a result of the fact that philosophy was deliberately excluded from Ottoman education and the socialization of the individual. It goes without saying that the Ottomans were not influenced by the movement of the Enlightenment and Renaissance. Furthermore, the education system and indoctrination went so much hand in hand that with such a system of education it was impossible to have speculative-thought and an independent intelligentsia. The deep roots of Islamic influence in Ottoman law as well as state ideology was because there was no opposition or dialectic dynamics between the Ottoman academia and the ruling class. They tacitly agreed with each other and legitimized each other's power. Although this had the effect of a highly centralized government and firm political power, it also had the effect of a sterile philosophical tradition (if we define philosophy as speculative thought against religious dogma). It is useful, therefore, to have a look at the characteristics and structure of Ottoman education and intellectual life, to grasp the reason for the absence of an independent intelligentsia.

Philosophy means, or rather implies that, it questions all life matters, free from dogma or religious creed. Furthermore, speculative-thought means doubting everything, posing issues to questioning and looking for alternatives to ready-made

“truths”. Within the Islamic context, one may talk of such a movement of speculative-thought born in the 9th century. Farabi (870-950 A.D.) and Ibn-Sina (980-1037 A.D., called Avicenna in the West) questioned many aspects of Islam and its dogmas, in an attempt to combine Islamic thought with the Ancient Greek heritage and philosophy. In fact, the *falasifa* tradition in Islam produced some of the most sophisticated intellectuals of their time. However, this fertile period of speculative-thought or philosophy (although, it was never complete pure rationalism in its nature) regressed and fell once again under the religious dogmas in the 12th century. After this period onwards, the Islamic approach towards natural sciences, law, and philosophy has been a repetition or a re-interpretation of the former great thinkers of this tradition. The *kalam* tradition -which can be approximated to scholastic theology, in opposition to the *falasifa* tradition - is an example of an attempt to justify religious truth by intellectualizing, rather than genuinely doubting and questioning in a free spirit. The firm establishment of the four main *madhhabs*, (which coincides more or less to the 12th century) contributed to the petrification of free-thought.

If one considers these trends in relation to the Ottomans, one sees that the Ottoman State was founded after the petrification of speculative-thought in the Islamic world in the 12th century. In fact, the Ottoman State was founded almost three hundred years after the Islamic tradition in philosophy when any alternative-thought lost dynamism. It is upon this heritage that the Ottoman intellectual life was built. Members of a state could not go unaffected by the cultural heritage of their religion. Especially, if considering the degree of religion, merging within politics, and how religious some of the Sultans were (i.e. Bayezid II and Süleyman, to mention those only in the 16th century when the Empire reached its zenith) or

how religious they became towards the end of their lives, the effect of Islam will be better understood.

Although strict periodization often does not explain important unorthodox thinkers like Ibn-Khaldun in the 14th century, the Ottomans were certainly affected by the Islamic scholasticism of their age. For instance,

(....) the *falasifa-kalam* clash continued in the Ottoman Empire and the *falasifa*-tendency thinkers like Fahrettin Razi and Nasreddin Tusi have been read and interpreted. However, we can generalize that the Ottoman civilisation has not been creative in philosophical thinking, and the Ottoman *ulama* always thought with the context of "interpretations" and the interpretations of interpretations.(30)

Taner Timur points to the analogy drawn by Karl Marx between the Ottoman and the Roman Empire in Marx's work "Contribution à la Critique de l'Economie Politique", saying that there is a resemblance between the production modes of both empires and that both the Romans and the Turks continued the old production modes with great conservatism. Timur adds that, as the Roman Empire adopted the ancient Greek culture and spread it around in the lands that it conquered, the Ottomans also adopted the classical Islamic culture and spread it. He goes on to say that in spite of the intellectual awakening of Europe in the 13th century and even in spite of the Renaissance, taking into consideration that the scholastic thought reigned in Europe for centuries thereafter, the Ottomans remained a civilization of a global might until the 17th even the 18th centuries, considering that the Ottomans did not take part in the intellectual development of Europe. (31) The process that began concretely during the Renaissance against dogmatic thinking, took its definite form in Enlightenment. However, by then, the dogmas of Islam that affected Ottoman political structure which were petrified by

the end of the 16th century, continued without being affected by Europe to a great extent, with insignificant exceptions in the late 18th and 19th centuries.

Taşköprülüzade's (1552-1621) *Mevzuat-ul Ulum* which may be considered as an encyclopaedia, classifies the sciences, explains, gives the areas of interest for each of these sciences and offers a bibliography to be consulted in each of these sciences. *Mevzuat-ul Ulum* reflects Taşköprülüzade's views based on the *falasifa* tradition from Farabi to Ibn-Sina as being against the *Sharia* and degrades them. According to Ibn-Sina and Farabi, *falasifa* was a reality, however there could only be one truth, therefore *falasifa* and religion were to be reconciled. The Ottoman ulama were affected mostly by the views of al-Ghazzali (11th century) and Ibn-Haldun (14th century). Al-Ghazzali saw Plato and Aristotle as well as Ibn-Sina and Farabi who were affected by these Greek philosophers, as heretics. According to al-Ghazzali, truth could only be achieved through *wajd* or religious ecstasy. He combined mysticism or Sufi elements with Islam. Therefore it is not surprising that Sufism (or its branches which did not clash with the state) affected the Ottoman state tradition to such extent. The Sufi idea of merging of the "lover" and the "beloved" in the mystic sense, was carried to the relationship between the Sultan and his subjects, in venerating the Sultan as a figure of authority, fear, respect and paradoxically enough, as an object of love. There are many examples of this mystification of the Sultan in Ottoman literature, especially in poetry. The *gazel* of Figani (d. 1532) is a good example of devotion to the sovereign in the Ottoman tradition:

Esrar-ı 'ışkun anlayalı hayretin şeha
Terkib-i cismüm eyledi bad-ı fena gubar

Kimdür Figani dirsen eya Husrev-i zaman
Bir derd esiri 'ışk ile Ferhad-ı ruzigar

Since I came to realize the secret of the amazement of loving you, oh monarch!
The wind of annihilation has turned the structure of my body to dust.
If you ask who is Figani? Oh, Monarch of the age!
He is a prisoner of pain, through the agency of love, the Ferhad of the times/fate.
(32)

The effects of mystic-religious thought as opposed to the speculative-thought was the basis of the Ottoman *medrese* (university) system and the whole of Ottoman education in general. The Medrese education was based on the following categorization:

Taşköprülüzade recognises four stages of knowledge : spiritual, intellectual, oral and written parallel with the theory of creation in Islamic mysticism. All the sciences fall within one of the seven categories:

- A. Calligraphic sciences: writing implements, styles of writing, etc.
- B. Oral sciences: the Arabic language and phonetics, lexicography, etymology, grammar and syntax, rhetoric, prosody, poetry, composition, history and the other literary sciences.
- C. Intellectual sciences: logic, dialectics
- D. Spiritual sciences:
He divides the spiritual sciences into:
 1. Theoretical rational sciences: general theology, natural sciences, mathematics.
 2. Practical rational sciences: ethics, political science
 3. Theoretical religious sciences: the Koran and traditions of the Prophet, and the sciences devoted to their interpretation -- Koranic exegesis, the study of prophetic traditions, Islamic law and jurisprudence.
 4. Practical religious sciences: practical ethics, etiquette, ihtisab, and all subjects relating to Muslim life and worship. The goal of all knowledge and, in particular, of the spiritual sciences, is knowledge of God. (33)

It is probably because of this rigid thinking structure that the religious influences prevented the Ottomans from adopting new thoughts into their systems from Europe after the Enlightenment, not to mention the fact that few Ottomans at that stage, if any, could read a European language. This is also the reason why increasing Islamisation of the state appeared once power slipped away from the ruling class into the ever increasing power of the *ulama*.

There can be found many examples of blocking speculative-thought among the *ulama*. An example is from the time of Mehmed the Conqueror, the most broad-minded of all the Ottoman sultans up to the beginning of the 17th century. Mehmed invited Alaeddin of Tus and Hocazade of Bursa (d.1488), to reopen the controversy between religion and philosophy, to discuss the matter and to write a treatise on the subject. The *ulama* of the day judged Hocazade's work superior to that of Alaeddin. Alaeddin, feeling humiliated, returned to his native Iran. Hocazade maintained that reason was delusive in theological questions, and led to errors while its application was impeccable in mathematics. Hocazade declared openly that his aim was to protect Sharia against philosophy.(34) The second example is from the time of Beyezid II. Molla Lütfi, who was a mathematician and a theologian, angered the *ulama* by open mockery of their superstitions. The case was carried to the Sultan, a committee of *ulama* was gathered to put Molla Lütfi under cross examination and he was beheaded with the charge of heresy and polytheism.(35)

It was not enough to have a good bureaucracy and a good army to establish a world empire. The Ottomans needed a firm ideology and legitimacy as well. The most important mechanism of legitimacy was to make the religious education and judicial system function without direct interference from the ruling hierarchy, and

at the same time not to lose control over it by the ruling class. In other words, the *ulama* had to be independent enough from the civil servants and the military-civilian bureaucracy, however, it also had to be dependent upon the Sultan. Another fact indicating the legitimising role of education was that it was designed to educate the *ulama* and the servants of the Sultan as well as the upper classes but not the *reaya* (the producers). (36) Although in theory, Ottoman medrese education was open to all, the arduousness of the *medrese* system and its rigid hierarchy implied that only a chosen elite could benefit from it.

The education of the *askeri* class had also its own devices. It had two recruiting systems: a position passing from father to son and the *devşirme* system. The *devşirme* were educated in the palace school called *enderun*. The Islamization of the *devşirme* (converts) started at very early ages. Although it is true that some Christian families were enthusiastic about their sons being recruited as *devşirme*, considering the high promotion prospects as soldiers and statesmen in the Empire, their Islamization was a necessary fact. In the *devşirme* case, perhaps the "zeal of the convert" was what the Ottomans benefited, likewise, the zeal of the newly converted Turks to Islam in the 10th century made them rise to high posts in the non-Turkic Islamic states.

For both the civil servants and the *ulama*, the elementary education was given through the *sıbyan mektebi*. *Sıbyan mektebi* enabled the child's religious socialisation by giving him knowledge about the reading of the Koran, the *namaz* (daily prayer) and the surahs of the Koran necessary to perform the *namaz*, as well as elementary writing skills(36) However, the child's intellectual abilities remained rather low in the *sıbyan mektebi*.

Apart from these institutions directly related with the state, there were also the *tariqas* which had their own part in the education of the commoners as well as some part of the elite. As mentioned earlier, the *tariqas* or Sufi orders represented the heterodox aspect of Islam. The *tariqas* which came into existence in the 8th century in the Islamic world, and culminated in the 12th and 13th century in the Selçuk State, have had the very important role of maintaining social solidarity, and preventing the society from breaking up in times of the lack of central authority, i.e. the Mogolian invasions of Anatolia in the 13th century. Therefore, their influence, especially among the rural classes of the Ottoman society and their education was of utmost importance. However, they were never made part of the official education system in the Empire.

Another aspect of Ottoman political identity as a consequence of religious education, was its face where it merged with family and daily life. According to Robert Mantran, Islam as a religion was much less permissive than what Christianity had become in Europe in the 16th century. Therefore, all institutions as well as the political and social structure of the Empire, including daily life and practices were affected by the regulations of the Islamic religion.(37) He goes on to say that although the Turks still kept their ancestral tribal traditions in the society and political practice, by the 16th century, these tribal identities were almost totally replaced by Islamic traditions in the ruling class which formed the political identity in urban society.(38)

In the urban family context, children of most fine families would, from the age of 6-7 were instructed by a *lala* (caretaker), after which they went to the sibyan mektebi. The child was educated, from very early ages, to live according to Islam by parents and then climbed up the ladder of education through sibyan mektebi and

the medrese. In the daily context, the mosque also served , not only as a place of prayer, but also as a place of social-religious education and socialization. The mosques were places where the authority of the Sultan was consolidated with the *hutbe* (a special invocation whereby God was asked to extend his blessing upon the Sultan). It is remarkable that at the time of Süleyman, a *fetva* was issued obliging every village to have a mosque and measures were taken to assure that everyone attended the Friday prayer. In other words, the state not only imposed, but also controlled the quality of religion.

The sincerity of faith in Islam of most Ottoman were witnessed by two European visitors Postel and Du Loir in the 16th and 17th centuries:

Whoever sees the modesty, the silence and the reverence that they have in their mescit or places of eration, should experience great shame in seeing that our churches do not serve anything but chatting, politicising and merchandising and that they are reduced to places of thieves.(39)

At marches of the army, during which it seems that everything is allowed, and when the exercise of war proclaims that of religion, the Turkish soldiers, marching through the deserts of sandy Arabia under great heat, fast, as rigorously as if they were in their calm and tranquil homes. (...) Neither the condition of the persons, nor the length or the heat of the days, nor the fatigue of their work prevents them from abstinence (fasting)... the rigour of their observance should make most of the Christians blush. (40)

It appears that the combination of religious belief which had merged with ancient tribal and military discipline was what made the Ottoman armies so impressive.

2. 3. THE RULING AND THE RELIGIOUS CORPS

Having mentioned the merger of Islam and state in the Ottoman tradition, an analysis of what the differences and the similarities between the religious and the ruling corps were, is an extremely important one. Albert Lybyer gave a very acute analysis of the interaction between the religious and the secular corps:

“It can be observed that the ideas coming from the Islamic tradition affected the Ottoman state tradition and thought, more than the Ottomans affected the other non-Turkish Islamic peoples within and outside their territories.” (41) As a reflection of the concept of faith in Islam, both the ruling class and the *ulama* based their power and legitimacy on faith. The former was based on faith and loyalty to the state and the sultan, and the latter was based on faith to the religion. Therefore the question of loyalty of different ethnicities to the state among the Muslim peoples was solved through Islam. Especially of those recruited within the *devşirme* system was made possible through faith in the state and the sultan. This was one of the reasons for the longevity of the Empire. Both the religious and the administrative corps promised equal opportunity to those who accepted the rules of the game. Furthermore, both the *ulama* and the sultan claimed universal expansion of the Ottoman State and justified it respectively through dogma and military might. Although the *ulama* recruited its members from among Muslims, and the administrative and the military corps, to a large extent from among non-Muslims, the sultan was the master of the secular institutions and the effective head of the religious one. For it was him who appointed the *Şeyhülislam*. He was the head of the religious corps, appointed by God, and the master of the ruling and

administrative corps. From Mehmed II until the death of Süleyman, the main members of the religious corps were appointed by the sultan himself. However, after Süleyman's death, the *ulama* was left basically unattended and uninterfered by the sultans, and much less punished for any wrongdoing in comparison to the administrative and the military corps.(42)

The differences between the two corps could be enumerated as follows: the members of the secular corps were mainly chosen from among non-Muslims, the members of the *ulama* were chosen from the Muslim subjects of the Empire. The first fact is indicative of a worry about assuring fidelity to the sultan, since converts from Christian families, uprooted from their native environments would render a higher degree of fidelity. Given that once they were uprooted from their native lands, the only source of benevolence, power and promotion that they had was the sultan. In the case of the *ulama*, Islam did not justify slavery, therefore the interpreters of religion could not be *kuls* (servants or slaves) in a direct sense.(43) Furthermore, the members of the *ulama* being of Muslim origin, assured also sincerity in the faith. Another difference between the two corpora is the fact that, while the *ulama* could oppose the sultan's ideas, the Grand Vizir could hardly or rarely do it. While the former always had the authority of religion behind him, the latter had nothing but sheer obligation to obey the sultan. However, on the basis of this analysis, it would be erroneous to conclude that an inter-élite conflict existed within the Ottoman state. Since both the religious and the ruling corps had the sultan as the ultimate source of obedience in a pyramidal structure, which contributed to the prevention of such an inter-élite conflict.

2. 4.STATE IDEOLOGY AND ISLAM

When one looks at how Islamic ideals were used as a tool of legitimacy for political power in the Ottoman State, one sees a transformation from the early stages of the Empire into the 16th century. While at the beginning of the Empire in the 14th century, ideals and terms concerning political legitimacy had a more worldly connotation, starting from late 14th and early 15th centuries, the idea of *jihad* with the support of Islamic dogma, started gaining importance.

Ahmedi(1334-1412) was the first poet and moralist that legitimized the idea of *gaza* (holy war), saying that the Ottoman sultans were great *gazis* (holy warriors), whose mission was to sweep away polytheism on earth (alluding to the fact that Christians considered Christ son of God). In the words of a poet,

A gazi is one who is God's carpet sweeper
Who cleanses the earth of the filth of polytheism
Do not imagine that one who is martyred in the path of God is
dead
No, that blessed martyr is alive
.....
From there they sent an army to the abode of infidelity
to ravage the lands and slaughter infidels (44)

The *gazi* state was the most celebrated ideal of legitimacy. The Ottomans were the protectors of the Islamic faith with their swords and it was an obligation upon every Muslim to conduct war on the infidels according to *Sharia*. The word *akıncı* (raider, basically upon Christian lands) at the beginning of the Ottoman state, had a Turkic and non-religious connotation. Later in the 15th century, it was replaced by the word *gazi* (from *gaza*, as holy war). Thus the profane was sanctified in the service of the state.(45) Accordingly,

An important feature of this image was its presentation of the sultans and their followers as *gazi* heroes. (...) The ideology of holy war provided two justifications for Ottoman rule. Firstly, it portrayed the sultans as fulfilling a canonical obligation; secondly, it gave them a canonical right to rule the territories which they had conquered from the infidels.(46)

By Süleyman the Magnificent's time, The Ottomans reached the ideal of a universal caliphate and a universal empire. In 1557, the Şeyhülislam Ebussuud Efendi, engraved the following inscription on the grand mosque of Süleyman:

This slave of God, powerful with God's power and His mighty deputy on the earth, standing by the commands of the Quran and for the execution of them all over the world, master of all lands, and the shadow of God over all nations, Sultan over all the sultans in the lands of Arabs and Persians, the propagator of sultanic laws, the tenth sultan among the Ottoman Khakans, Sultan, son of Sultan, Sultan Süleyman Khan.(47)

The title " Servitor of the Two Holy Sanctuaries" was used by the Ottoman sultans referring to Mecca and Medina, after slipping into a self-styled caliph status following the death of the last Fatimid caliph of Egypt, at the time of Yavuz Sultan Selim. Although the actual title "caliph" was hardly used by the Ottomans (they made use of the above mentioned title instead), they were always conscious of their role as the propagators of Islam. In fact, it was at the time of Sultan Abdülhamid II in the 19th century that the title "Caliph" was primarily used by an Ottoman sultan, as a tool of deterrence, bluffing to promote the so-called pan-Islamism, to keep the Empire together in the face of heavy losses of territory that the Ottomans suffered in the 19th century.

2. 5. *ORTHODOX AND HETERODOX ISLAM*

There always appeared heterodoxies in kingdoms or empires which adopted an official religion. Islam, at least in doctrine, is a religion that refutes any sort of intermediary between God and the individual. Although there should not have emerged a religious class in Islam, in practice, a kind of *sacerdotium* called *ulama* emerged in Islam. On this point, a few classifications have to be made: The *sacerdotium* in Christianity, and especially in Catholicism, is a necessary and an inseparable element of the relationship between God and the individual (although the Protestants refute a *sacerdotium*, the ministers in Protestantism have played an important social, political and a cultural role). Interestingly enough, as the historical role of *sacerdotium* in the western Church (particularly that of the Catholic Church) shows, there has been a dialectic action between *sacerdotium* versus *regnum*. This duality or the continual dialectic balancing the *sacerdotium* and the *regnum*, manifested itself in the form of *sacerdotium* protecting the rights of the Church or of the clergy against the rulers. This balance was achieved through conflict as well as debate in the Western Church.(48) Likewise, the *ulama* in the Ottoman Empire also appeared to be an indispensable element for the Muslims to perform their religion; or at least a strict necessity to understand the revelation brought by Mohammed. It is not that without the *ulama* an individual did not belong to Islam, rather it turned out that to live Islam as it *should* be lived, the individual needed the *ulama*'s interpretations of the *Koran* and the *Hadith*. The most striking difference between the Ottoman *ulama* and the Western *sacerdotium* is that, the *ulama* never presented itself as an antagonistic or an alternative force to the *regnum*, in the Ottoman case to the sultan.

Where heterodoxy fits into the argument is that, it was the only asocial force in a religious dress which claimed there was no need of intermediation between the individual and God. If there were no intermediaries, the power of the *ulama* was at stake. Hence, so was the power of the state and the sultan, since the state derived its power to a great extent from religion.

There were three kinds of heterodoxies in the Ottoman Empire:

The first one was not a threat to the state authority. These were *tariqas* or various interpretations of sufi Islam which had been incorporated into the tolerance scale of the state. Tolerance was there either because the *tariqa* had followers from among the military class(i.e. the relationship between the Janissaries and the Bektaşi order) or because their doctrines did not clash with the official Sunni doctrine(i.e. the Mevlevi and the Nakshbandi tariqas). The second kind of heterodoxy presented itself in the form of tariqas, at least formally or strictly not belonging to a particular Sunni or Shiite doctrine(the Babais and the Abdal traditions), who had a more anarchic nature. The third class of tariqas were those with overt Shiite tendencies(i.e. the Alawis), which were perhaps the greatest threat to official authority, because they were perceived as representing the authority of the Shiite and rival Iran.

According to Fuat Köprülü, the most important *tariqas* belonging to the first category, at the time of the foundation of the Ottoman state were, the *Mevlevi*, the *Halveti* and the *Rifai*.(49) The Mevlevi tariqa which is named after Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi (1207-1273), was one of the most important and one of the most favoured *tariqas* by the official state authority. The sultans, at the beginning of the Empire, started their sultanate in a ceremony where a Shaikh belonging to the *Mevlevi* order girded them. The Mevlevi order which was made into an established

tariqa after the death of its founder Rumi, incorporated a large number of Muslims from all social classes, at the time when Rumi was alive. Moreover, it also had adherents from among the Jews and Christians of Anatolia due to its ecumenical nature. However, after it was turned into an established *tariqa* by Sultan Veled (Rumi's son), soon after Rumi's death, it gradually lost its ecumenical nature and turned into a Sunni *tariqa*. After Mevlana, making use of his grand fame, his followers opened various *tekkes* (*tariqa* houses) all over; gradually, the *tariqa*'s ceremonial structure came into being. "This *tariqa* which depended on the high aristocracy and the high-middle bourgeoisie, has been against heterodoxy from its earlier times, and they tried to preserve the existing social and political order." (50) Also the *Halveti* and the *Rifai* *tariqas* were part of the Sunni scan. Generally, the *Halveti tariqa* appealed to the bourgeoisie, whereas the *Rifais* appealed to the poor stratum of the society.

As to the second category of *tariqas* in the Empire, the *Babais* and the *Bektaşis* were the most important ones. The *Babai tariqa* which came into being at the first half of the 13th century around Tokat, Malatya and Kırşehir, was a synthesis of the Shamanic-Turkic-indigenous Anatolian religious beliefs, under the appearance of Islam.(51) The *Babais*, like the later *Bektaşis*, had followers from the rural classes of the society, where beliefs and practices were inspired by various indigenous Anatolian peoples, as well as by pre-Islamic Turkic traditions. Religious and political propaganda abounded in the lives of the *Turkomans*, some of whom also believed in a coming "messiah", the twelfth Imam, like the *Shiites*. Heterodoxy and political protest against the central authority was so much identified that the *ulama* in the rural regions could not cope with the *shaikhs* called "Baba", who derived their power from popular culture. (52) In fact, the *Babai* uprising of 1239-

1240 against the Selçuk State in south-east Anatolia reflects the degree of politicization of the Babais.

The *Babai* tradition gave birth, later on, to the *Bektaşî tariqa* with its founder Hacı Bektaş Veli (d. 1271). There is not a great difference in vision between the *Babai* and the *Bektaşî tariqas*, in fact, one can say that *Bektaşilik* is a continuation of the *Babai* tradition. The *Bektaşî tariqa* incorporated various *Babai* orders as well as other smaller *tariqas* within itself. The example of Osman Baba (53) is a representative example of how the Abdal tradition in heterodox Islam became a threat to Sunni Islam. Hence to the state authority. Considering that the Abdals were dervishes, usually completely independent and free from any dogma. Their tradition could be approximated to a mixture of Shamanistic and popular Islamic beliefs.

The third category of heterodoxy, namely the Alawis, represented the Shiite Iran's third arm for the Ottomans. Although popular misconceptions in Turkey still consider them a Sunni heterodoxy, they are basically a branch of Shiite Islam. (54) However, they are definitely not orthodox Shiites who adhere to the Jaafarite school. Rather it is a combination of Shiism with Anatolian traditions.

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If we were to situate the Ottomans within a broader historical and philosophical context, the following observations could be made: Although the Ottomans created one of the greatest empires of the world, ideologically, religiously, and as far as the structure of the Empire is concerned, much was taken from non-Turkic sources. As far as the role of Sunni Islam is concerned, it

probably had the supreme expression of the idea of *obedience* and authority in the Ottoman Empire. In Persian Shiism, obedience to a corrupt state should not be there, whereas in Sunni Islam, the presence of an authority of state is preferable to chaos, as it is reflected in the relatively recent *Nurcu tariqa*. The manifestation of *obedience* in the Ottoman Empire - which may be considered as the key-word as it pertains to the spirit of the Empire - was perhaps the utmost realization of the spirit of Islam. Islam, as its historical evolution and its various manifestations show, is a religion based on surrendering one's ego and individuality to the supreme authority of God. We have seen how the authority of God and the sultan were identified.

An aspect of Islam differing from Christianity, is the fact that the concept of *renunciation* in Islam - in its spirit - is not the renunciation of the material world, but rather, the renunciation of one's individuality. This very fact is seen clearly in the personalities of the founders of these religions. Christ was fundamentally a rebel and spiritually an outsider to the religion into which he was born. He brought a new message which essentially was against holding spirituality solely within the boundaries of Mosaic law. However the culmination of the new message that he brought to the world did not happen in Judea, but rather outside his homeland. In fact, he was handed over to be crucified by his own people. On the other hand, looking at the message that Mohammed brought, he could not be considered a rebel in the society into which he was born. He brought a new religion - however - he did not try to eradicate the traditions of the society that he was born into, in fact there was a continuity in social terms. The greatest enemies of the new religion that Mohammed brought, after the establishment of the religion as a social and political entity, turned out to be - not the polytheists of Arabia - but rather various Judaist and Christian communities which stood in the way of expansion. Paradoxically

enough, the other brother monotheistic religions were a greater threat to Islam than polytheism. On the other hand, once Christianity spread outside Judea, the greatest enemy to fight was not another monotheistic religion - but rather paganism - represented first by the Roman Empire, and then by the popular culture in Medieval times.

As a consequence, it is not surprising that the Ottomans had to fight with different interpretations of the same God and even with different interpretations of the same religion, as the struggle against Islamic heterodoxies shows. However, what is more important of what comes out of this observation, is, the main difference between Christianity and Islam. While the former ended up representing rebellion at the social and spiritual levels, the latter represented conformism and *obedience*. The glorification of power, military might and authority over the individual, in the name of the semi-sacred state or ruler (i.e. religion), is a most striking social characteristic of Islam - for the accomplishment of which - obedience is needed. This aspect of Islam is what the Ottomans made use of in the ablest way possible.

As a result, authority, obedience and worldly power were the key aspects that Islam offered to the Ottoman Empire. One can claim controversially that the Ottoman rulers made use of religion in quite a systematic and calculated way to shape it according to their power-legitimacy needs. This is somewhat a neglected an issue, or dealt with marginally by Turkish historians, due to ideological or nationalistic concerns. It is also worth noting - quite paradoxically - that while the counter-effects of the Christian way of worldly renunciation began to produce results in the manifestation of Enlightenment, the counter-effects of the Islamic way of renunciation (i.e. obedience to the worldly manifestation of divine

authority) also resulted in losing power against the Christian world. The main reason for this was the failure to create alternative or counter-forces to the religion-based authority. The dialectics of religious versus secular forces did not appear in the Ottoman Empire, for the religious and the secular merged in a structure, inseparable from each other.

CHAPTER 3

3. THE BYZANTINE AND THE TURCO-IRANIAN CULTURES IN OTTOMAN STATE TRADITION

Every state needs two forces for longevity and strength. These are: a firm structure and a capacity to renew itself. The structure of a state includes many components such as a stable administration, a state tradition and an ideology, and the necessary measures to enforce an order of loyalty. The Byzantine Empire had the first element, however, it lacked the second. Namely, like the Ottoman Empire, it lacked the capacity to develop alternative thought systems to renew itself. Therefore, the first part of this chapter is dedicated to the continuity between the Byzantine and the Ottoman Empires in the realm of state tradition and the inherent strengths and weaknesses that the two empires had in common because of their ideologies. The second part of the chapter is dedicated to the continuity between the inner -Asian Turkic state tradition, especially focusing on the idea of obedience to the leader or ruler, as it was found in the inner-Asian Turkic state such as the Kharahanids and afterwards in the Selçuk states.

It is most unfortunate that, there is a dearth of insightful and well-written academic work on the influence of these two different sources on the Ottomans, namely on the influence of the Byzantines and the inner-Asian Turks. The reason for the shortage of academic work written on the Byzantium-Ottoman relationship seems to stem from various reasons. The first reason is that the Ottomans themselves did not leave sufficient first-hand documents to come up with a direct continuity between the two states. Considering the trend of document-fetishism

involved with the study of the Ottomans, which tends to neglect non-official history which can sometimes be more truthful, the lack of first-hand data written by court-officials pointing at an inspiration taken from the Byzantines on state ideology, appears to be of prime importance. However, there is an even more important fact that is neglected as one thinks of the taken-for-granted-truths about Ottoman history. That is, the amount of ideology involved in academic writing. The Turkish historians, one must admit, have not approached this aspect of Ottoman history with a completely independent and inquisitive mind.

There are basically two trends on the subject of continuity between Byzantium and the Ottoman empires among Turkish academics: one is that of rejecting any continuity between Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire, and the other is that of ignoring any continuity between the two, intentionally or unintentionally. The book of Fuad Köprülü written about the influence of Byzantine institutions on the Ottoman ones is an example of the first category. (1) The reason why Köprülü rejected any continuity between the two states must be found in the period the book was written (the 1930s), as a result of the nationalistic trend that was reigning in this period which is highlighted by re-writing Turkish history, tracing back the ideals of the foundations of the modern Turkish state to the Turkish or Turkic sources. It is precisely because of this reason that the influence of Turkic states of inner Asia on the Ottomans, as well as the modern Republic have been exaggerated in a romantic trend of re-writing history.

The aim of this chapter is not to find the absolute truth about these subjects. Rather, the absolute truth (if ever such a thing exists) can be found by being exposed to different points of view. Neither does this chapter claim to be an

exhaustive study of the above mentioned subjects, but rather an exploration into a much neglected area of Ottoman history.

Among European historians, there is a variety of points of view concerning continuity between Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire. Steven Runciman says the following on the subject, in his book The Byzantine Civilization:

The Empire of the Ottoman Sultans have often been called Byzantium, erroneously, for though both were Empires governed through the army, the Ottomans all along had nothing beside their magnificent military organization. Their bureaucracy was a farce. From Byzantium they borrowed little except the Capital. Even their theocratic autocracy was derived not from Constantine the Thirteenth Apostle but from the Califs of Islam. (2)

In contrast, what Charles Diehl says on the same subject, in his book Byzantium. Greatness and Decline, is quite the opposite:

When, by the capture of Constantinople, the Turks destroyed the Byzantine Empire, they inherited not only its territories and political power, but took possession of much else in the realm that they seemed to have annihilated.

Those rough warriors were neither administrators nor lawyers, and they understood little of political science. Consequently they modelled many of their state institutions and much of their administrative organization upon what they found in Byzantium. The pomp surrounding the Turkish sovereigns of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was as elaborate as the the old Byzantine ceremonial, and the Sultan has been rightly called “a Muslim Basileus”. The hierarchy of his officials, as instituted by Mohammed II in the *Kanoun-Nameh*, is curiously reminiscent of the Greek Empire. A. Rambaud points out that the position of the two *Beylerbegs* of Anatolia and Roumelia was exactly that of the two *Domestics* of the *Scholae* of East and West, and that equal similarity existed between the *Grand Domestic* and the *Grand Vizier*, between the *Megadux* and the *Capitan-pasha*, and between the *Grand Logothete* and the *Rais-effendi*. *Logothetes* became *Defterdars*, while the *Nishanji* was the counterpart of the former imperial secretary (*επι τον χανιχλειον*). There is every reason to believe that in the provinces the Ottoman *sanjaks* corresponded fairly exactly to the old Byzantine *themes*, while the *Beg* of the *sanjak* was the equivalent of the *Logothete* of the *theme*; and it would seem that in their administration the Ottomans preserved the framework bequeathed to them by the Empire.

We may wonder how much of the Turkish system of military fiefs was borrowed from Byzantium. Certainly the *timars* and the *ziams*, the fiefs of the *spahis*, were counterparts of the old domains. As Zachariae of Ligenthal so well said, "It would be quite erroneous to consider the official institutions in the Ottoman Empire as specifically Turkish in origin". There is no doubt that in the systems and the usages of Islam there survived far more of Byzantine tradition than is commonly believed. (3)

As seen from the quotations above, Runciman and Diehl take completely opposing points of view about the influence of Byzantium on the Ottomans. It is far more likely that Diehl's point of view reflects historical reality more accurately than that of Runciman's. For claiming that the Ottomans had nothing but their formidable military organization and that their bureaucracy was a farce is a claim that any knowledgeable historian on Ottoman history would refute. There is enough evidence that the Ottomans had developed quite an intricate state ideology and a bureaucracy. As to the ideas of Diehl, it is arguable whether the Ottomans (or Turks, as he calls them) were rough warriors who did not understand anything of political science and law. It seems like an exaggeration to call the people merely "rough warriors" who built and maintained an empire which lasted for six hundred years. However, there is an element of truth in asserting that the Ottomans became an empire in the real sense of the word, only after they conquered the Byzantine capital, by whose imperial glory and state structures they were "impressed", to say the least. Furthermore, to be elaborated on later, there exists an astonishing similarity between the "theocratic autocracy" of the Ottomans and that of Byzantium, contrary to Runciman's claims, which is especially visible in the relationship between religion and state in these two empires.

Metin Kunt is one of the Turkish academics who acknowledges Byzantine influence on the Ottomans. (4) Kunt also argues that, although the Byzantine

influence on the Ottomans was refuted by Köprülü, the Ottomans have incorporated many of the administration and taxation regulations not only of Byzantium but also of the former Bulgarian and Serbian lands as well as the other captured realms of Uzun Hasan of the Akkoyunlu Türkmen. (5) Mentioning K. Zhukov and N. Oikonomides respectively, Kunt also asserts that “affinities have also been detected between specific Byzantine provincial military groupings and similar troops in Ottoman as well as other Türkmen emirates of western Anatolia” (6), and “furthermore, we now realize that the question is not just a one-sided Byzantine-on-Ottoman influence; during the century and a half of coexistence Byzantium had itself adopted certain Ottoman features of administration”. (7) Therefore, it is not surprising at all that the Ottomans have adopted ways and traditions from Byzantium, considering that the influence was not even one-sided.

One of the most curious facts indicating the Ottoman aspiration, making the Ottoman Empire seem as being the continuity of Byzantium was: “As reflected in his titles, Mehmed the Conqueror regarded himself as a sultan in the Islamic tradition and a great khan in the Inner Asian mould as well as a ‘kaisar’, ceasar, of the Romans or the Rumi, Byzantine and Turkish”. (8) Here, once again, the Ottomans were the synthesis-makers of the “trinity” of Islam-Byzantium-Inner Asia, as it pertains to the origins of their political identity.

Before embarking upon the similarities between Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire in political ideology and the tools of which they commonly made use, the common mission that these two empires shared in history should be mentioned. Lybyer says the following on this common mission:

(...) the great mission that was before the Ottomans was the mission of uniting. The lands that were united for eleven centuries under Theodosius the Great which were threatened by Slavic, Arab, Tatar and Turkish invasions; Byzantine, Persian, Muslim, the Crusades and Moghul wars.... (9)

In other words, both the empires had the common mission of keeping people of diverse creeds, ethnicities and religions together. The important thing to be recognized here is that both the empires ruled over more or less the same lands and people. Therefore the methods to keep a great empire together for both the states did not vary much; in fact it could not vary much. Following is an account of the similarities of methods and ideas that Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire had in common.

3. 1. THE USE OF RELIGION

The Byzantine emperor, as a continuity from the Roman tradition, was not only the *Imperator*, but also the commander in chief and the most important of all the Legislators. “It was in his name that the generals won victories; it was his sovereign and infallible will that made the law, of which he was the living expression.”(10) Furthermore, the Emperor was “the chosen of God, the Anointed of the Lord, the vicar of God on earth, His lieutenant at the head of armies, and as they said in Byzantium, *isapostolos* : prince equal to the apostles.” (11) In the Ottoman Empire, the sultan was also the head of the army, the supreme political power and the supreme legislator. The coexistence of sultanic law vis a vis the *Sharia* in the Ottoman Empire was a fact. The Ottoman sultans used the title *zillullah fi'l ardh* (the shadow of God on earth). The wars in Byzantium were conducted with the divine decree and the authority that God gave to the emperor

to spread the faith against the infidels; as it was in the Ottoman Empire, the sultan was not only the protector and the messenger of the Islamic faith, but also the greatest successor of the *true* Islamic faith after the four caliphs, successors of Mohammed. The rest of the Muslim rulers were either heretics or corrupt according to the Ottomans, just as according to the Orthodox the real carriers of the Christian faith was Byzantium. Hence the rivalry between the Orthodox Church and Rome.

There were two ways that Byzantium could hold the Empire together: one was the use of the Hellenic culture and the second was unity through orthodoxy. The Hellenic culture meant the adoption of Greek language as the lingua franca, and as the official language of the Empire no matter how many nationalities and religions lived in the Empire; it also meant the adoption of the Greek way of thought, behaviour and customs. The Byzantine Empire was a Christian orthodox empire, orthodoxy being one of its fundamental cornerstones, just like Sunni orthodox Islam was for the Ottoman Empire. Similar to the Ottoman case, the official religion of the Empire-Orthodoxy- was encouraged and life became more difficult for the ones who did not belong to the faith. Any citizen of the Byzantine Empire, to whichever ethnicity he belonged, could rise within the ladder of civil service of the Empire and reach the highest positions as generals, ministers, court functionaries as well as climb to prestigious places in the provincial administration. There were Arabs, and even some Turks who converted to Orthodoxy and became ministers of the imperial court. The Orthodox faith was the force keeping the Empire together. Although the official policy was to let people practice their own faith, in a fairly tolerant fashion, there have been examples of brutal religious persecutions in the case of the Paulicians in the ninth century (a heretic sect that

originated in today's Sivas in Anatolia, which did not recognize the authority of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. They were sent to exile in Bulgaria and gave rise to the Bogomil sect). Other examples of religious persecution are the Armenians in the eleventh and the Bogomils in the twelfth centuries.(12) The uniting role of Orthodoxy for Byzantium can be seen in the following passage:

Their missionaries evangelized and converted the Slavs of Macedonia and the Peloponnesus, the Turks of the Vardar, the pagan Mainotes, and the Arabs of Crete and the upper Euphrates. From the depths of Anatolia to the tip of Italy, numerous dioceses of the Greek rite were set up, whose bishops, under the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople, were the finest and most faithful workers in the dissemination of Orthodoxy. (13)

To be able to understand the place of religion in Byzantium, one must understand the unimportance of life in this world for the Byzantine citizen. The real achievement and happiness, for the Byzantine, came in "the other world" and the only way to achieve that was to follow Orthodoxy. Christianity triumphed because of people's disillusionment to find bliss and contentment in this world here and now. Therefore all the energies and attention in the religious sense were dedicated towards the end of achieving eternal life. It was not that Byzantium did not care about the worldly worries of power, money or survival, but, the theological issues of detail were of immense importance to the rulers as well as the clergy.(14)

The worldly instincts of comfort and self-advancement could never, it is true, be suppressed; and financial worries, the burden of over-taxation, always could arouse strong if negative feelings. But the main attention of the Byzantine was very reasonably concentrated on those little details that would open or close to him the gates of heaven.(15)

In such an important area as religion, certainly the role of the religious authority had to match that of the Empire. The Patriarch of Constantinople was raised to the second position among other patriarchs after Rome, surpassing the patriarchs of Antioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem by the Second Ecumenical Council in the second half of the fourth century, while before that Byzantium (Constantinople) was a bishopric. In the sixth century, the position of the Patriarch of Constantinople was made even more important by raising his position equal to that of the Pope, by taking the title the Ecumenical Patriarch in the Council of Chalcedon. After the seventh century, the Patriarch of Constantinople became the unquestioned head of Eastern Christendom and thanks to the unity of force between state and religion, it became the *de facto* most powerful religious institution in the whole of Christendom. However “the Patriarch paid for his authority. He was never long allowed to forget that he was the servant of the Emperor.” (16) In fact, the difference between the Pope and the Patriarch was that, although the Pope was independent he lacked effective political power, whereas the Patriarch of Constantinople was subordinate to the Emperor, but he had the real political power. The Patriarch of Constantinople remained the religious head of the greatest unified state of whole Christendom.

On the other hand, the two empires were inspired by different religions. One of the greatest differences between the Ottoman Empire and Byzantium in the religious sense was the fact that although the Ottomans adopted the relationship of state merging with religious power, as it was in the Byzantine state tradition, Byzantium was essentially an Empire formed and inspired by the ideals of Christianity, whereas the Ottoman Empire was essentially inspired by the ideals of

Islam. This difference can easily be seen by the role and place that monasticism played in Byzantium - an institution non-existent in Islam - although the *tariqas* in the Ottoman Empire played a similar role of limiting the state authority. The difference was that the *tariqas* were not a part of mainstream Islam whereas the monasteries were an integral part especially of, Orthodox Christianity. In fact the Iconoclasm movement of the eighth century was basically a movement undertaken by the state authority to control and suppress the power of the monasteries. Iconoclasm was apparently a theological dispute centered on the veneration of the images of Christ. The question was whether the images of Christ or of God could be venerated or not. Although it was centered on this Christological question, the main issue was to put down the excessive political power that the monasteries had gained. Therefore it may be argued, concerning the comparison between the monasticism and the *tariqas*, that the merging of state authority with religion in the Ottoman Empire was even stronger. For such an institution like monasticism was never a part of the officially recognized Islam in the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, it should be remembered that many Emperors in various stages of Byzantine history abdicated to become monks in later life.

Apart from these considerations, the similarity of the position of *Şeyhülislam* to the Patriarch of Constantinople is worth noting. Just as the *Şeyhülislam* was the official responsible for every mosque and religious institution in the Empire, the Patriarch of Constantinople was kept informed about every church and monastery in Byzantium. The whole of religious institutions were controlled strictly from Constantinople. Another striking similarity is the position of the *Şeyhülislam* vis a vis the sultan. The *Şeyhülislam* was theoretically independent of the sultan, as the head of the religious institution, being chosen from among the *ulama*. In practice,

at least until the seventeenth century, he was never chosen without the consent of the sultan, as he was subordinated to the will of the sultan. The situation of the Patriarch of Constantinople showed great similarity. Formally the Patriarch was elected by the body of bishops. In practice, the Patriarch was nominated by the Emperor and his office could be terminated by the Emperor. The only tool of threat that the Patriarch had against the Emperor was excommunication. Similarly, the *Şeyhülislam* could always use the power of *Sharia* against the sultan. Although the sultan had to abide by the *Sharia*, his de facto *örfi* power was above the *Sharia*.

After the conquest of Constantinople, the importance of the Patriarchate was duly understood by the Ottomans and it was used as a means of political power to keep most of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire under unity and control. The continuation of the Patriarchate in the Ottoman Empire under direct subordination to the Sublime Porte is not a coincidence. In fact, the Patriarchate in Constantinople was perceived in the nineteenth century by those countries which gained independence from the Ottomans, as a tool of imperialism. One of their first actions was to break with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and recognize their own national churches as the religious authority. The case of Serbia and Greece in the nineteenth century are examples.

Another example of the similarity between the Patriarchate and the *Şeyhülislamlık* is the elevation of the *müftü* of İstanbul to the position of *Şeyhülislam* by Mehmed the Conqueror and the consolidation of the institution of *Şeyhülislamlık* at the time of Süleyman the Magnificent. It is highly reminiscent of the elevation of the Bishop of Byzantium to the Patriarch of Constantinople and the consolidation of this position by the time of Theodosius I. As Runciman says: “The Byzantine Church was indeed an admirable State Church.” (17)

3. 2. THE CONCEPT OF EMPEROR AND EMPIRE

Similarity of the relationship between state and religion as well as the position of the Emperor and the sultan, in the Ottoman Empire and Byzantium, will be clearer by a few examples from Byzantine writers. The first example is from *Institutio Regia* (Παιδεία Βασιλική: *Paideia Basilike*), written at the beginning of the eleventh century. It is written by the archbishop of Bulgaria, Theophylaktos Euboka, in the form of mirror for princes, dedicated to Emperor Michael VII (1071-1078): “A real ruler, as the foundation of a church or a house, makes religion the corner-stone to himself. He gives so much importance to religion that, he does not give the upper hand even to the clergy, since he speaks and acts knowing that God sees and hears everything.” (18) The second example is from Theodoros Balsamon, the Patriarch of Antioch, who was also an authoritative canon-writer. (Canons were laws of the Orthodox Church from where the word *kamun*, representing sultanic law in Ottoman is derived):

The service of the emperors (autocrats) consists of enforcing and enlightening both the soul and the body, whereas the honour of the patriarchs is limited to the well-being of the soul and only this (since the well-being of the body does not concern them); likewise, the mercy and the concern of the Empress on the subjects also concerns the well-being of the body and only this (since women lack the power of spiritual help). Therefore the lights of the emperors (that is, the torches carried before them) are ornamented with double golden crowns; that of the patriarchs and empresses with a single crown (...) (19)

The same tradition of sanctifying the sultans in a semi-divine fashion is also present in the Ottoman Empire, particularly after they became heirs to the Imperial City.

“ ‘Nothing must be done in the Church that is contrary to the will and commands of the Emperor’ said one sixth century patriarch.” (20) The absolute ruler in the state was the Emperor, the Autokrator, the Patriarch was *elected* by his recommendation and was either deposed or forced to abdicate if he failed to obey the Emperor. The Emperor could go as far as presiding at the ecclesiastical councils, guiding debates, formulating articles of faith, confirming and implementing canons adopted in the council, charging (and punishing) those opposing them with the charge of being the enemies of faith and God. (21) “High rank was no safeguard; dismissal, imprisonment, exile, and corporal punishment were the customary means of dealing with ecclesiastics; not even Popes escaped his violence and tyranny.” (22)

The power and authority of the Emperor in Byzantium was absolute, infallible and unquestioned, and claimed universality beyond the realms of the Empire. In Byzantine court tradition, when a foreign ambassador was invited to the palace and given a letter to take back to his king or ruler, the expression used by the Emperor to address the Persian or Muslim rulers was “my brother”, whereas for the Christian rulers, it was “my son”. This shows, as it was in the Ottoman tradition, the claim to universality over the rest of the rulers that belonged to the same religion.

The tradition of the Senate and the representation of the will of the people which was inherited from Republican Rome, and could also be traced back to the Greek antiquity, was gradually replaced by a more oriental concept of sovereignty. In Byzantium, there was gradually no force which would balance the power of the Emperor. The Senate was gradually reduced to a state council consisting of officials united in devotion to their Emperor and the senatorial nobility served as an

assembly out of which the Emperor could choose the most able administrators. (23) “The people were a mob to be fed and amused, an unruly factious mob which, despite the efforts to tame it, sometimes broke out in rioting and bloody revolution.” (24) Although the Church made some attempts of limiting the Emperor’s authority, once in the ninth century, in demanding its freedom from secular power, overall, the attempt failed. However, the Church managed to compel the Emperor to take an oath at his coronation, to promise to respect the decrees of the seven ecumenical councils and not to interfere with ecclesiastical privilege. (25)

The majority of the Emperors of the Romans (...) whereas they ought to punish the ignorant and the bold who introduce new dogmas into the Church, or else commit them whose function is to know God and speak of Him, they esteem themselves even in this sphere inferior to none, and set themselves up as interpreters, judges and definers of dogma, often punishing those who disagree with them. (26)

One disadvantage of this absolute power of the Emperor was the fact that, this power could be balanced either by the military aristocracy and depositions of the Emperors by coups, or by revolts and uprisings. The depositions and revolts against the Emperor were facilitated by the fact that until the end of the ninth century Byzantium did not have a hereditary royal family. The ascendance to the throne was either through the Senate, the army or by decree of the Emperor, appointing an heir in his lifetime, as it had been the practice in the Roman Empire. It was only after the ninth century that the tradition of a royal family was established, with different dynasties following each other, such as the Macedonian, the Comneni and the Palaeologi. An established royal family and continuity in blood-line, made it more difficult to dethrone an emperor by military coups.

The “orientalization” of the Empire as it pertains to the concept of sovereignty, also helped stability and longevity. It must be remembered that this was an Empire which lasted from the fourth century up until well into the midst of the fifteenth century; and the political traditions that they adopted from the lands that they conquered made Byzantium move towards a more “oriental” concept of empire, away from the ancient Greek or Roman traditions. To be able to understand this transformation in Byzantium, the gradually decreasing role of the Senate and the political will of the people is a fundamental fact.

The role of the Senate in Byzantium was not quite like that of the role of the Senate in the Roman Empire. In Byzantium, the Senate of Constantinople consisted of all present and past holders of offices and rank above a certain level and their descendants. It was thus a vast amorphous body comprising everyone of prominence, of wealth and of a responsible position in the Empire. (27)

In 359 AD the Senate was given the privilege of becoming an elector body, but its existence and name in Byzantium was somewhat less prestigious than it was in Rome. (28) Its powers were largely undefined, but it gave certain privileges to its members who represented the wealthier classes of the society. The senate’s power declined by the seventh century due to the tyranny of Emperors like Justinian II, and even Leo the Isaurian who represented the triumph of aristocracy, could not tolerate the Senate when it interfered in his business. The Senate was finally abolished by Leo VI and “lingered as a body whom the Emperor could call as a respectable witness of his actions.” (29)

Another institution that could restrict the Emperor’s authority were the *demes* or groups into which the people of Constantinople had organized themselves. They were organized into divisions like the Blue, Green, Red and White. They were in a way, an expression of the will of the people in the form of

political parties. They became an important political force , especially at the end of the fifth and the beginning of the sixth centuries, even threatening the power of the Emperor. (30) However, their power faded away in the seventh century together with that of the Senate, due to the growing power of the Emperor, and even when they were strong, the Emperor could always play one party against each other. After the seventh century, they became a mere representational and ceremonial element of the imperial games at the Hippodrome.

Concerning manipulation of power according to ideology, the Byzantine Empire did not only make use of its Roman heritage. Quite the contrary, it had a transformation throughout its history, in the usage of political ideas from different cultures. The transformation of the Empire into an oriental autocracy is an example of this.

W. H. Haussig, in his book The History of the Byzantine Civilization, points out to different political ideologies, stemming from different cultures that Byzantium made use of in its legitimization process. (31) Haussig says that at the apex of the imperial cult that Byzantium inherited from the Roman Empire, stood the cult of the Emperor. The imperial elevation of the Emperor to the throne was a direct inheritance from the Roman times, which represented quite a military spirit in its character, rather than a religious one.

The military elevation to the throne was at first exclusive concern of the army. The soldiers raised their victorious military leader on the shield. He was then granted the triumph, and as *triumphator* he received the *corona aurea* , the crown of the triumphator, (...) this crown which became the symbol of imperial authority. (32)

Later this crown, the corona aurea, was replaced at the time of Heraclius in the seventh century, by the massive golden crown which is reminiscent of the crowns

that the Persian kings wore. “The Persian kings wore a crown of this kind. The kings of Kushana in Northern India and Afghanistan were portrayed with it, as were the later Byzantine Emperors.” (33) The difference of the concept of Emperor in Persia was that, they were believed to be crowned by God and not by the army. In fact, not coincidentally, the change of the court tradition in Byzantium in this respect, appeared with the Heraclian Dynasty (610-711), whose origins are traced back to the Armenian branch of the Persian Arsacids. So there was a shift from the fourth to the seventh century, with a change of conception in the court tradition, which in turn, reflects the change in political ideology. This may be considered as an oriental or a foreign influence in Byzantium, from Roman to Oriental autocracy, as far as political ideology is concerned. It was no longer the army which was the supreme power, rather, the Emperor.

It is also interesting to note that the Byzantine Emperors appear as being crowned by Christ in the iconography only after the Heraclian Dynasty, through the tenth and the eleventh centuries. The Byzantines did not immediately follow the Persian model of an emperor. In Persia, the Sassanid kings received the royal insignia from the highest religious authority, the chief Mobedh. The religious element in the Byzantine Empire was fully introduced in the tenth and eleventh centuries and the combination of Christianity and the power of the Emperor helped the legitimize the notion that the Emperor was crowned by Christ, and in return, he crowned the kings in his realm. Thus, the Oriental concept of the divine authority of the Emperor reached its climax.

Another fact that was significant in witnessing the transformation of Byzantium into an oriental autocracy was that, at the beginning, the army had a role of real importance in the decision of who was to become Emperor. Later, as

the idea of a royal stock, or a royal family became more firmly established, the designation of an heir by the Emperor became the most important factor. The idea of a continuous royal family was owed to the East, which was distinctly different from the Roman concept of a royal stock, as this tradition was well-established in Armenia and the Caucasian lands (i.e. the lands through which the Empire extended over to the East). It is, therefore, no coincidence that the orientalization of the Empire coincides with the ascendance to the throne of Heraclius I, of Armenian origin, who traced his origins back to the old Armenian and Parthian royal dynasties.(34)

Other ceremony such as the Receiving of ambassadors originated in Iranian-Hellenistic soil. (35) Some others, such as the representation of the *demes* at the Hippodrome games, which was of Roman origin, turned into symbolic acts of the representation of the will of the people. Another custom, the blessing of the vineyards on the 15th August by the Emperor also had Roman origins, representing the semi-divine character of the Emperor. However, this ceremony was Christianized , being performed together with the Patriarch, instead of the high-priest of the pagan Roman religion.

From a comparative perspective, there is a very significant similarity between the Byzantine and the Ottoman Empires in the way they made use of foreign political ideas and in the way they made use of religion as a tool for legitimacy. The Byzantine Empire came originally from the Roman political culture and starting from the Heraclian dynasty in the seventh century, incorporated in the Empire an oriental vision of the absolutist concept of ruling, as was seen in the transformation of the court traditions and the decreasing importance of the Senate and the *demes*. It was at the beginning, also a pagan empire pertaining to its population and even

to the background of its ruling class; although Christianity was adopted as the state religion by Constantine the Great in the fourth century, the christianization of the Empire did not happen immediately. As the Roman character of the Empire gradually left its place to an oriental absolutist autocracy, the initial moderate Christian character of it also left its place to the identification of the Empire with Christian Orthodoxy.

The dynamics were similar in the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning, the Ottomans had a more tribal character that they had brought from their Turkic tradition and they gradually turned into an empire, adopting the imperial traditions of Byzantium, which the Byzantines had in common or rather adopted from Iranian and Eastern traditions. Similarly, the moderate Muslim character of the founders of the Ottoman State was replaced by an orthodox concept of Islam, as it later became the state ideology.

Another similarity is that, both states made use of religion until they gained a genuine imperial character strong enough to consolidate their power. After this stage the power of religion that was used as a means for legitimacy, at times threatened the authority of the very state or the sultan/emperor. An example of this in Byzantium is the immense power that the monasteries gained in the eighth century and the iconoclastic movement directed against them by the secular power. Similarly, once the power and the absolutist nature of the Ottoman Empire was consolidated, *Sharia* became the means through which the old Turkish nobility fought the authority of the sultan. Likewise, the double-edged sword of *Sharia* became the symbol of resistance against the will of the sultan as well as any innovation after the Ottoman Empire lost its dynamism.

At the time of the original Oguz eruption, the Seljukids used Islamic ideology, of which the 'Iranian service aristocracy' were the

carriers, to raise themselves far above their tribal followers as Near Eastern autocrats in the traditional Byzantine or Sassanid mould (...) On the other hand, throughout the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries, the great centralizers of the Ottoman Dynasty such as Bayezid I ‘the thunderbolt’ (1381-1402), Mehmed II ‘the conqueror’ (1451-81), Selim I ‘the grim’ (1512-20) all relied on the so called customary (*örfi*) or customary-sultanic (*örfi-sultani*) law to cut the ground from under the founding aristocracy of the state and the empire, whereas for its part that the old Turkish nobility tuned to the *Sharia* precisely because it provided a bulwark against the cosmopolitization of court culture in the hands of Bayezid’s Christian advisors, against the rise of *devşirmes* (the natively deracinated slaves of the Porte), or against the conversion of the hereditary patrimonies into land for conditional distribution as service fiefs (...) Here, then, religious law played the role of a brake on absolutist centralization, as evidenced by the Islamic reaction under Bayezid II (1481-1512). It was possible therefore, for the same belief system in two different historical settings to shoulder quite opposite functions and lead to varying outcomes. (36)

Therefore it may be deduced that firstly, when the power of religion turned against them, both the Ottomans and the Byzantines made use of their sultanic or imperial decrees. Second, the important thing in both the empires was the absolute power of the ruler and using different means of legitimacy, varying at different historical settings. As Barker quite accurately observes:

“In the East people have never tormented themselves to create political theories... whereas the West is fertile with them”. There has been opposition to these words saying: “Byzantine literature is soaked with political theories... with theories of absolutism, the only possible régime for the Eastern Roman”. There is an element of truth both in the assertion and in the answer given to it. (37)

Such were the traces of continuity from Byzantium to the Ottoman Empire and the similarity of methods that these two empires adopted for the enforcement of their imperial structure pertaining to political ideas of foreign origin.

3. 3. *THE TURKIC AND THE PERSIAN HERITAGE*

The use of *örfi* law or the power of the sultan to use his personal *oikonomia* against opposing forces, brings us to search for the genealogy of the *örf* or *töre* institution in the Turkic state tradition. As İnalçık explains in his article “Turkish and Iranian Political Theories and Traditions in *Kutadgu Bilig*” (38), there were various political traditions that the Ottomans adopted from Iranian sources as well as others that they kept from their Turkic ancestors (as the Karakhanids adopted Uyghur traditions), which can be traced back to the Inner Asian state traditions. The significance of this article is that, it points out to a synthesis of Turkish and Iranian state traditions in the Karakhanid state. The relevance of it to the Ottoman state is that, this synthesis that existed in the Karakhanid state, to a large extent, also continued in the Ottoman state.

As to the political theories of Iranian origin, the absolute and the unquestioned power of the sultan seems to be the most significant concept. It is true that in the Iranian state tradition the concept of justice which was the foundation of the state, protected the subjects from the oppression and the injustice of the administrators (at least in theory). However, the absolute power of the ruler in the Iranian model - which can be traced back to the political theories of Indian origin, as seen in the *Panchatantra* of Kautilya , written in the Mauryan Empire of India, as a mirror for princes (written about 200BC- 500AD) - did not really have any other institution or force that could balance the absolute power of the ruler in the Indo-Persian state tradition. The only hope as reflected in the "mirror for

princes tradition" of the Indo-Persian culture - for protecting the subjects against unjust rule - was to rely upon the benevolence and sense of justice of the ruler. Institutions such as the *Divan* , where anyone could come at certain days and make complaints to the ruler about any injustice done by the administrators or even by the ruler himself, seems to be an institution, created for the purpose of balancing the absolute authority of the ruler. This institution was carried on by the Ottomans under the name of *Divan-ı Hümayun*. The idea of such a Divan is also encountered in the *Siyasatname* of Nizamu'l Mulk , the Selçuk Grand Vizier, and the idea was carried on to the Ottomans through the Anatolian Selçuks.

The idea of the "circle of justice" which is also found in the Iranian tradition is carried on to the Karakhanid advise literature, whose reflections we can see in the Ottoman state tradition as well. Kutadgu Bilig says:

To preserve the state, a large army and many soldiers are needed; to feed the army there is need for great riches and wealth; in order to obtain this wealth the people must be prosperous, *for the people to prosper just laws must be set forth*. If any of these is neglected, all four will cease, and if all four are neglected , the kingdom will begin to come apart as seams.(39)

However, there is a significant difference in the concept of the application of justice as it is found in the Indo-Iranian and Turkic traditions.

Paramount in the Iranian state tradition was the absolute authority of the ruler. Indeed this authority was above the law; it was limited only by the concept of justice. We have seen that in most of the *pandnames* justice was pursued as a pragmatic objective, the profit of which was constantly alluded to (the absence of justice breeds unrest and conflict, impoverishes the people, and dries up the sources of the ruler's treasury.) The execution of justice was the unique prerogative of the ruler; objective traditions limiting his absolute authority never developed. Justice manifested itself as the favor and benevolence of the ruler in the great divan. The *pandname* writers could find no other means of guaranteeing justice than to rely on such ethical principles as the rulers sense of justice and possession of moderation and gentleness. (40)

Whereas in the Turkic tradition, the törü or law is inseparable from sovereignty of divine origin. In other words, the ruler is not above the law but is subject to it. Furthermore, the ruler has duties towards his subjects, as he is bound by the customary law. One of the main duties of the Khan is to fill the bellies of the subjects and to prosper them. The continuation of this tradition is accounted for by Ibn-Batuta in the Kastamonu region in the 1330s where food is given to people by the sultan who opened his doors to everyone. Another account of this custom is by Aşık Paşazade at the Ottoman palace where food is given to people after the afternoon prayer. (41)

We can trace back the importance of tribal customary law (törü) to the Köktürk state as the passage from the Orkun scriptures says: "Except God above does not collapse, except earth below does not give away, who can destroy your El (state) and törü". (42)

It is no coincidence that notable Turkish sovereigns who founded states were promulgators of law codes (kanunname). According to the early Ottoman chroniclers, who strongly reflect old Turkish traditions, after he had declared his independence Osman Gazi established laws. Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror (1451 -81), the true founder of the Ottoman Empire, promulgated two law codes, one for the subjects and one concerning state administration. Finally, Süleyman the Law Giver (1520-66), who made the Ottoman state a world empire, also published a law code. These codes were a collection of laws relying solely from imperial decrees and had nothing to do with the Sharia; in other words they can thus be considered a result of Turkish state tradition. (43)

Another similarity between the Turkic state formation and parallel concepts between the Mongolian and Ottoman Empires have been acknowledged by İsenbike Togan in her article "Ottoman History by Inner Asian Norms" (44) The conclusion that can be drawn from Togan's article in relation to the Ottomans is

that, the Ottomans possessed flexibility between the redistributive (tribal) traditions and the accumulative (imperial) ones. The redistributive forces were those inherited from the tribal inner Asian Turkic states which depended on sharing power. This can be seen at the initial period of the Ottoman state where the alliances between the various tribal begs in Anatolia were made use of, for the consolidation of the Ottoman state. The imperial or the accumulative traditions entered into the scene once the state gradually became an empire. The origins of the accumulative forces can be traced back to Indo-Iranian and Byzantine state tradition.

According to Togan: "(...) because the state was able to accommodate both accumulative and redistributive tendencies, it was flexible. Or, maybe it was able to accommodate the two modes because of its flexibility" (45) It seems that both the statements have an element of truth. According to Talat Halman, the most striking characteristic of all the Turkic states (extending his assertion especially to the Ottomans) is the capacity of flexibility and a rapid talent for adaptation and an openness to incorporate foreign modes of thought and traditions. Halman claims that this fact is owed to the nomadic nature of the Turks, that they somehow, never lost. (46)

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The main idea and the overall picture in this chapter is the fact that, the central force to an Eastern empire is the unity of the state and the identification of its subjects to the state or to the sovereign by ties of loyalty.

The purpose in this chapter has not been to prove what amount of political ideology the Ottomans received from which source. Neither has it been to prove the superiority in quality or quantity of any political idea over one or the other, pertaining to the degree of importance; be it of Islamic, Byzantine, Turkic or Persian origin. Rather, the purpose has been to find the genealogy of the political ideas that the Ottomans made use of, and perhaps more important than that, the purpose has been to give an example of the common characteristics of the oriental concept of an empire, including the concept of sovereignty and the means of power legitimization of power of the sovereign.

One common characteristic that may be found in the empires of the Middle East, bearing a theocratic-autocratical structure is, although loyalty to the state and the sovereign was the central idea, the means to achieve it on an ideological basis, varied in time and in diverse historical settings. In the modern nation-state, the unity of the state is closely related to a more rigid and seemingly unchangeable ideology such as democracy, stemming basically from an idea of Western origin. On the other hand in the East - of whose member the Ottomans were - a less rigid concept of ever-changing and shifting ideologies were put to use at varying historical settings, till the very end of the Empire, when the Western state model seemed unchangeably firmly established. In the Ottoman Empire, it did not matter whether the uniting and the legitimizing ideology as inherited, taken over or adopted from a Turkic, Byzantine, Islamic or a Persian source. The important thing was that it served its purpose of creating a union. Similarly, so was the case with the Eastern Romans. As long as the unity of the Empire was not at stake, it did not matter whether the uniting ideology was of Roman, Persian or Christian origin.

It is not the duty of researchers, therefore, to make retrospective value-judgements - as they are often made - by Western as well as Eastern scholars, on the virtues and the vices of a certain political ideology or régime, be it the Western or the Eastern model. On the other hand, there is something that can be done by the study of the two greatest empires of the Middle East. Firstly, to appreciate the unsurpassed margin of tolerance and the capacity of co-existence with different creeds, religions and ethnicities in the continuum that existed from the fourth until the twentieth century, in a period of a thousand and seven hundred years, in the part of the world that we call the Middle East today. This assertion does not - in a romantic way - ignore the numerous wars, intolerances and conflicts that happened among these different religious and ethnic groups. However, if comparison is made of a qualitative as well as a quantitative nature between the nation-state era and what preceded it, it may be seen that the conflict and intolerance of what succeeded the Eastern empires on a Western model, surpasses its precedent far beyond. The second fact that can be understood by the study of the Eastern empires is the continuity in the state ideology of modern Turkey (not discounting the discontinuities) from the Ottoman Empire, whose origins can be traced back to the Eastern Roman Empire as well as the other sources such as the Persian or the Turkic model that the Ottomans took as examples.

The subject of the fourth chapter is this continuity and mentioning the elements of discontinuity from the Ottoman Empire, in the state ideology of modern Turkey.

CHAPTER 4

4. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE OF OTTOMAN POLITICAL CULTURE IN TURKEY

The previous chapters emphasized how the Ottoman Empire inherited and put into practice, various political models stemming apparently from diverse cultures such as the Iranian and Arabic Islamic, the Byzantine or the Eastern Roman, Persian and the Inner Asian. The political identity of the Ottoman Empire, therefore, was not the sum, or a *bricolage* of these diverse cultural forces, neither was it a monolithic entity that did not undergo variations and transformation. Political culture, as other kinds of culture such as the religious or the social ones, is a phenomenon that undergoes change and transformation, and Ottoman political culture was no exception. Furthermore, Ottoman political culture or the *Weltanschauung* was a synthesis of the foreign cultural influences that the Ottomans imbibed and made their own, despite various periods and trends of conservatism that reigned in Ottoman history. Therefore, it may be asserted that Ottoman political culture was *sui generis* with its cosmopolitanism, yet still remaining an oriental one as far as its *Weltanschauung* was concerned.

The aim of this chapter is to show the continuity and also the discontinuity in modern Turkey, of the Ottoman political culture. The first question that crosses one's mind at this point is the Westernization process that the Ottomans as well as the Turkish Republic underwent - yet again as a continuity from the Ottoman Empire - starting at the end of the eighteenth century. The work is not a study on the Westernization process of the Ottomans or of Turkey. On this subject, there exists a large variety of studies undertaken by Turkish as well as Western

academics. This is a matter of discontinuity as well as continuity from the Ottoman heritage: continuity, because the westernization process was not born with modern Turkey, but it is the continuation of a process started by the Ottomans and carried on by bureaucrats of Ottoman upbringing in Turkey. It is at the same time a discontinuity because the infiltration of the western *Weltanschauung* in the Ottoman Empire was a foreign element whose successful outcomes are debatable for the Ottoman Empire. And also because the Westernization process was not a part of the successful synthesis-making nature of the Empire, whose forces were primarily of oriental, and not of occidental culture.

It might further be questioned as to what the difference between oriental and western cultures is. There is a number of characteristics that differentiate the two cultures: while the western collective-mind (1) is analytical, the oriental one is synthetical, in other words, while the western collective-mind thinks in terms of differences, the eastern one thinks in terms of similarities. In a political sense, the oriental state usually thought in terms political unity, using cultural synthesis and obedience as a means of achieving this unity to merge the cultural differences within the subjects of a state in a single pot. Hence part of the difficulty of the western scholars in understanding the vast ethnic picture of the Ottomans as well as that of Turkey, in terms of self-identification and loyalty under a single state or authority figure. One may claim that the Ottoman as well as the modern Turkish political culture belongs to the synthetic collective mind category, rather than the analytical one. One point, however, should not be misinterpreted that the collective-identity is not the individual mind, and that the analytical and the synthetical minds need not be mutually exclusive. There is great affinity between this theory and the concept of a Turk on which the modern Turkish state is founded, as expressed by

M. Kemal Atatürk: “Happy is the one who says I am a Turk”, and not who is necessarily, ethnically a Turk. So, even in the founding ideology of modern Turkey, we encounter the oriental outlook, where identification with the state is once again connected to loyalty rather than anything else, which is quite reminiscent of the Ottoman way. The continuity between the Republican period and the Ottoman Empire has almost been totally neglected by official history in Turkey.

As Suraiya Faroqi elaborates,

Turkish historians of the Republican period generally assume the existence of a clear break between the Turkish Republic and the Ottoman Empire. But at the same time they regard the Turkish Republic as a ‘successor state’ to the Empire in a sense that is quite different from the manner in which Yugoslavia Hungary or Greece are also ‘successor states’. Therefore Ottoman and *beylik* period history are defined as a part of the national history of the Turkish Republic. However, this does not apply to classical Greek, Roman or Byzantine history, even though major sites of these civilizations are located in Anatolia and Thrace, and historians or archaeologists have occasionally suggested that the boundaries of national history be redrawn in order to include these disciplines as well. However, very few Turkish writers on history, often from outside the academic community, have emphasized continuities between the history of antiquity, Byzantium and the Ottoman period. For the most part, such continuities, mostly on the level of popular culture, have attracted the interest of journalists and literary figures opposed, in one way or another, to the notion of a Turkish-Islamic synthesis without the slightest leavening of cosmopolitan traits. Given the formidable barriers between academic and non-academic intellectuals in present-day Turkey, such currents have had almost no impact upon established Ottoman historiography. Thus the *beylik* period is regarded as part of a long and glorious imperial tradition, and the ‘primitiveness’ or otherwise of state and society during this period becomes more or less irrelevant. (2)

As seen from the above quotation, perhaps the greatest discontinuity between modern Turkey and the Ottoman Empire is the lack of recognition of the Turkish nation’s cosmopolitan inheritance from the Ottomans. The irony is that, although Turkey is established on one eighth of the territories of its predecessor

(such was the ratio also in the payment of the debts of the Ottoman Empire by Turkey, established by the Lausanne Conference in 1923), and although the people of Anatolia remain mostly the same, apart from the Greek and Armenian population migrations, the cosmopolitanism of the Ottoman Empire has been lost. Perhaps, this may be regarded as one of the most tragic cultural losses as a consequence of the nationalistic trend of the last and the present centuries, which affected all the nations in this part of the world.

So what was the reason for this radical discontinuity and to what extent has it been beneficial to Turkey? The answer to the first part is relatively easier, however, the answer to the second part is a difficult one. The main reasons for the discontinuity that exists between the cosmopolitan character of the Ottoman Empire and the nation-state based ideology of Turkey is the general trend of the destruction of the world empire. The beginning of the 20th century not only witnessed the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, but also that of the Habsburg, Russian and the British Empires. The reasons for the disintegration of these empires vary. However, it may be asserted that, the Ottoman Empire was completely at a loss and unprepared for the nationalistic developments within, because, until the very end, it hoped that the empire could be saved. It was also because of its totally different political culture from the western one, which followed a completely different course, that the new Turkish state based on the nation-state ideal (despite all its ethnic heterogeneities) had to impose this ideal from top towards the bottom. In other words, the nation-state of Turkey was not built as a consequence of the natural outcome of conflict and war among different classes within the society or of economic transformations which characterized the western nation-states. Rather, Turkey was built as a result of a war of

independence against perceived hostility from the West, whose political model Turkey copied. Ergun Özbudun analyzes the difference between the western and the Ottoman political cultures in two stages:

Two important features characterized the Ottoman political culture. One was the predominance of status-based values rather than market-derived values. This was the consequence of the bureaucratic nature of the Ottoman Empire (...) Briefly stated, the fundamental relationship under Ottoman rule between economic power and political power was essentially the reverse of the European historical experience: instead of economic power (i.e. ownership of the means of production) leading to political power (i.e. high office in the state bureaucracy), political power provided access to material wealth. (3)

This attitude can still be observed in Turkish politics of today, in the unaccountability of the politicians to the voters, and politicians from often poorly-educated backgrounds getting hold of political power as way of access to the state resources and wealth. In other words, in today's Turkey one encounters, especially after the death of the generation of the old Ottoman bureaucrats, an interpretation of democracy without the historical background of a natural evolution, and without the enlightenment of the old Ottoman bureaucratic spirit. So what Turkey seems to be left with today is, a shallow interpretation of democracy (without the historical-evolution background), and a totally unprofessional politician class without loyalty to the state and unaccountability to the people. This state of things, is naturally exacerbated by the natural oriental-cultural tendency of the Turks towards submissiveness, passivity and fatalism. A political culture that worked well for a long time, without alien-cultural elements (i.e. without secularism or/and democracy) in the Ottoman Empire, with the westernization process, produced a totally uprooted political culture in Turkey.

This has been lacking the analytical sharpness, swiftness and rebelliousness of the West, and the devotion, sincerity and loyalty of the Ottomans to the state.

The reason for this should be looked for in the very uprooting of the elite culture and leaving the functioning of the democratic mechanism into the hands of the little culture (as Özbudun calls it), which had practically little or no experience of government in the Ottoman Empire. Özbudun explains this cultural division as the follows:

Another feature of the Ottoman cultural legacy has been the dichotomy resulting from the cultural division in Ottoman society between the palace (great) culture and the local or provincial (little) cultures. They presented two very distinct ways of life, with different operational codes, different languages (highly literary and stylistic Ottoman versus simple spoken Turkish), different occupations (statecraft versus farming and artisanship), different types of settlement (urban versus rural) ... and sometimes different versions of Islam (highly legalistic orthodox Islam versus often heterodox folk Islam). (4)

As for the consequences, the current situation is not optimistic at all. The threat of Islamic fundamentalism as well as Kurdish nationalism seem to be the gravest political side-effects today. The issue of Kurdish nationalism will not be dealt with here, which may be considered as a continuity of the general trend of nationalism that affected the whole of the Middle East, starting from earlier on in this century. Rather, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism appears to be more relevant to the Ottoman political culture, due to the immense importance that Islam played in the Empire.

As seen in the previous chapters, Islam has been only *one* of the components of the political culture of the Ottomans. Although an important one, it was not what primarily and solely made the Ottoman political culture. Therefore, in the Turkish context, if Islamic fundamentalism is defined as "going back to the

roots or fundamentals", one should ask the question " which roots?". Probably, what the Turkish fundamentalists mean as their roots is a kind of idealized and romantic view of harmony and justice as well as power achieved by the Ottomans, due to their strong Islamic faith. However, we have seen that the strength of the Ottomans was not only the model they adopted from Islam, but rather from all the other forces like the Byzantine and the Turco-Iranian ones as well.

One of the causes of Islamic fundamentalism is certainly economic in nature. However, the cultural crisis that Turkey is undergoing, contributes much to fundamentalism. While the Kemalist state almost entirely turned its back on the Ottoman cultural heritage, with an antagonistic attitude towards any religious flavour in the society, especially at the beginning of the Republic, the new cultural revolution it brought could not replace the strength of the solidarity-creating nature of the old Ottoman culture. As a consequence, the secular and modern state gave a very strong cultural excuse as a tool to the fundamentalists. The fundamentalists monopolized "the glorious Ottoman cultural past" as if the rest of the Turkish nation were not its inheritors. Apart from retrospective fundamentalist fantasies, Turkey is the heir to the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, it is quite by force that the fundamentalists are adopting the legalistic orthodox version of Islam, since their ultimate aims have little in common with the interpretation of Islam of the Ottomans. The Ottomans incorporated non-Islamic political traditions under the Islamic umbrella. Although the sultans claimed to be the caliphs of all the Muslims, they were antagonistic towards other non-Sunni states. Whereas the fundamentalists not only support an all-Islamic unity, but are also known to be receiving economic support from even Shiite and Wahabi states. Understandably, the attitude may be attributed to the loss of supremacy in the Islamic world. Hence

the antagonism towards the west and its demonization, something that the Ottomans did not have as a cultural policy. The monopolization of the Ottoman culture by fundamentalists is criticized as the following by Rauf Tamer (contributor to one of the respected secular newspapers of Turkey):

Look at the political spectrum. There are more than fifteen parties. Most of them are secularism champions. They have altogether turned their back at Mehmet the Conqueror. They have left the epoch-changing 1453 junction only to Refah's (the Islamist party of Turkey) monopoly. What a complex... (They) cannot even tolerate a symbolical Mehter Band (Ottoman Military Band). How Europeanized they are. They are eating lahmacun (traditional Anatolian dish) with whisky, as if they came out of their mothers' wombs hearing the 9th Symphony (of Beethoven). We have left the mosque to them (Refah Party). We have left Newroz (spring feast) to the others (alluding to the Kurdish nationalists). I am Atatürk's child as well as Mehmet the Conqueror's grandson. (5)

The roots of the present-day picture of Turkey is explained as the following by Şerif Mardin, in the 1950s:

The first effect of the foundation of the Turkish Republic can be seen in an activity that has negative connotations: the effort of getting away from Ottoman culture and Ottomanist ideals. This was not a new tendency; it was the accumulation of a tendency that gained momentum at the beginning of the 20th century. Cultural Turkism that developed on a firmer foundation, besides utopical Pan-Turkism, won over Ottomanism. Turkism, which developed on speculations of the uniqueness and high-culturedness of the ancient Turkish societies, developed the sufficient intellectual force to be born as a strong movement, before the Ottoman Empire fulfilled its well-known final destiny. The Republican government did not have any objections to this movement as long as it stayed a purely cultural one. On the contrary, the Turkist dogma was encouraged as an ideology to be given to the people, in the reconstruction period. As we reach 1937, the majority of the Turkish historiography is filled with the ancient history of the Turks (...) They were trying to develop a theory which claimed that the peoples living in the Turan land-- where the Turks were supposed to have come from-- had developed the most ancient civilizations on earth (...) After this explanation, it will be more easily understood why research on Ottoman History coincides with the 1940's, after the death of Atatürk. (6)

The ideological appeal of not only fundamentalism, but also of milder Islamic political theories of the present day could be better understood, for Turkey, after these remarks of Mardin. The old political culture seems to be gone and the new ideology of the state fails to attract a strong involvement.

If an analogy were to be drawn, the Ottoman political culture pertaining to adherence to Islam was reminiscent of the theological nature of Hinduism, which is extremely ecumenical, the main belief of Hinduism being that of spiritual liberation or *moksha* by recognition of the various incarnations of the Divine. It matters little in Hinduism whether one adheres to one of the Hindu trinity deities or to no deity at all, as long as one confesses to be a Hindu, and does not go against the ecumenical social solidarity structure. Likewise the interpretation of Ottoman Islam (though theoretically an orthodox interpretation) was in practice certainly of an ecumenical nature and permitted co-existence with other creeds. In fact, the use of religion both in India (be it under Muslim or Hindu rulers) and in the Ottoman Empire were, and had to be based on multi-religious co-existence, both systems ruling extremely heterogeneous populations. Although exceptions occurred, both the political cultures were based on the principle of not alienating other religions different from that of the ruling elite or of the majority of the society.

Seen from a historical perspective, it is curious that fundamentalist interpretations of Islam adopt an orthodox interpretation rather than an ecumenical one. Whereas until the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries, political reactions to the Ottoman central authority often took the form of heterodoxy or even of sectarian schisms (as in the case of the Alawis today). For only after the firm establishment of the state as an empire that political opposition took the form of orthodox Islam, mainly from the sixteenth century onwards.

According to Ahmet Davutoğlu, Islamic trends arise out of the loss of the relationship of authority that Islam confers to political leadership:

Ibn Khaldun prefers the religious justification of the socio-political system together with a historical proof taken from *Asr al-Sa'adah*: (...) "In no period were the people left in a state of anarchy. This was so by general consensus, which proves that the appointment of *imam* is an imperative ... The appointment of an *imam* is required by religious law, that is, by consensus." The same way of justification of the socio-political system and hierarchy was used by Shahrastani before Ibn Khaldun via the following statement: "The institution of the Imamate is attested by catholic consent from the first generation to our day in the words: 'the earth can never be without an imam wielding authority'... Such a consensus of opinion is decisive proof of the necessity of the office... When Muhammed died none contested Abu Bakr's statement that a successor must be appointed.... The office has gone on from then until now either by general consent of the people, or by agreement and testament, or both." (7)

Davutoğlu goes on to explain the socio-political system envisaged by Islam, stating that the distinction between the profane and the sacred, of the religious from the secular, or of the temporal from the moral does not exist in Islam. (8) This may be considered as a factor of alienation for the people born within an Islamic context like Turkey, whose new face is characterized by the division of the profane and the sacred and of the secular and the religious, not only in political, but also in social life. As seen by Davutoğlu, this de-sacralization of the culture, not only in the Islamic countries but also in the West, gave birth to the latest spiritual movements, which are characterized by a holistic and an ecumenical approach towards life in general. (9)

Ursula Mihçiyazgan attributes this divisionist and dualistic character of the West to the horizontal division-line that characterizes the Christian attitude towards

the profane and the sacred. According to Mihçiyazgan, the politico-social structure of the West was built upon the horizontal division in the human being, dividing man from the waist upwards, until the modern times (alluding to the division between the human and the animal natures of the human being). She claims that the division in western society still continues, having shifted upwards from the waist-level to the head-level, dividing the individual from all what is intellectually intelligible and the rest which is not within the realm of the intellect. She goes on to explain that an individual (i.e. (in)dividual) from an Islamic background is bound to be frustrated and alienated, who is born in a political environment with a horizontal-dividing line. (10)

After having explained the horizontal division-line theory, it must be clearer how a political ideology based on Islam - a highly prescriptive and role-attributing religion, inspired by the political dimensions of the *wahdah al-wujud* (unity) principle - becomes an alternative to the alienation of the individuals, who are born within the cultural heritage of a similar oriental culture as that of the Ottomans, where social and political roles were meticulously prescribed according to deeply-rooted tradition.

As a result, one may claim that there is a paradoxical continuity as well as a discontinuity in Turkey of the Ottoman political culture. Some of the forces of continuity are: a still highly-centralized government, a submissive nation characterized by passivity and lack of intellectual inquisitiveness, and a highly unaccountable political tradition to the people. Whereas the forces of discontinuity that were mentioned, such as the religion-state relationship will, for the foreseeable future, continue to be a cultural as well as a political problem. It seems that either a reconciliation with history, or a brand-new cultural outlook is needed to get out of

the identity crisis in which Turkey finds itself. Another alternative is a solution by the synthesis of the above mentioned alternatives, which appears to be a healthier approach.

CHAPTER 5

5. CONCLUSION

All things that live long are gradually so saturated with reason that their origin in unreason thereby becomes improbable. Does not almost every precise history of an origination impress our feelings as paradoxical and wantonly offensive? Does the good historian not, at bottom, constantly *contradict*? (1)

Friedrich Nietzsche

Perhaps the greatest contradiction in the process that gave birth to modern Turkey is its Ottoman heritage. Although there are still many detectable elements of Ottoman cultural influence in Turkey, at least the official ideology seems to ignore this legacy. According to Oral Sander (2), Turkish foreign policy may be epitomized by two main principles. First, that of maintaining peaceful and cooperative relations with the eastern neighbours; second, improving cooperation and partnership relations with the West. In the light of these principles, one encounters an even greater contradiction from a historical perspective. Although both the Ottomans and the Turks, since the 1071 Manzikert battle, oriented the direction of their advancement towards the West, it was with the political and military supremacy that the West encountered the Ottomans. The situation seems to be reversed today. Since it is by the rules of the West which evolved in a natural historical development, created by the western mind and experience, that Turkey is supposed to play, not only the international politics game but also the domestic one.

One can argue whether the international game could be played by any other rules than those valid and accepted by the international community. The answer would probably be a negative one, at least until some alternative by the East is created. It seems that the alternatives proposed, such as Islamic movements, are often radical and present themselves with anti-western solutions. However, there is one important aspect that should be reconsidered, leaving behind the readily accepted dogmas that are imposed from a mono-cultural standpoint. As tried to be proven by this thesis, there is a connotational mistake often committed by the East and the West together. That is, the identification of a political culture with Islam. Islamist Weltanschauungs appear to be almost the only alternative presented against the western political culture in the contemporary era.

As seen in the previous chapters, one has a range of historical experiences of states built and successfully continued on the Eastern model, which were indeed not Islamic states. Pre-Islamic Persia from whom Byzantium took the oriental state tradition, is one of them. Byzantium, or the Eastern Roman Empire is yet another example of a state which was deeply influenced by Christianity, and at the same time was also built on the oriental model. The multi-ethnic and multi-religious Mauryan Empire in India is another example of an oriental state whose rulers accepted Buddhism in the third century B.C.(who were Hindus before) as their religion. These examples are of particular importance since the Ottomans directly or indirectly were affected by certain elements of their political culture, yet incorporating them in their Empire whose elite was certainly Muslim.

By these criteria, Islam is not synonymous with the oriental, as no other religion is either.

The capacity of synthesis-making and of coexistence with different religions and peoples, seemed to be what characterized the spirit of Anatolia from immemorable (the word is *not* used rhetorically here) times until the twentieth century, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately, the inheritors of this culture in the Anatolian lands seem to have forgotten this positive and integrating character of the Orient. Instead, the new model on which Turkey is based, i.e. the western culture, is largely a culture which had little experience with coexistence of different religions, though it had an experience of coexistence of different races.

It should be made clear that the aim of this work, was not to prove the superiority or the inferiority of either the eastern or the western cultures. The demonization of the West, on the contrary, undertaken by fundamentalist Islamists is bound to give birth to inimical and unproductive relationships in the future between the two hemispheres, enlarging the cultural misunderstanding that is already there. Ironically, one may claim that fundamentalist views in Turkey fail to understand the *Geist* of even their own culture. Especially given the fact that the Ottomans were not even *only* Muslims, but inheritors of the Eastern Romans, this misinterpretation of a modern spirit like Islamic fundamentalism should become clearer. Otherwise, the study of history would appear to be a futile intellectual exercise.

The Ottoman Empire, one might claim, certainly belonged to the oriental culture. It *interacted* but did not necessarily *coexist* with the West. On the other hand, Turkey has the task of both coexisting *and* of interacting with the West today. To make this coexistence easier, the first step to be taken is primarily to inquire and find out more about the culture with which the Turks of Anatolia are

raised. The official political culture in Turkey certainly does not encourage this, neither does it provide the necessary mind-frame and the intellectual formation to enable this process of reconciliation with one's own past, on the contrary, it creates a kind of self-denial leading up to a schizophrenic attitude. There was not a single politician in Turkey, or an official spokesman who did not, somehow, try to cover up the oriental aspect of Turkey. The first step towards a healthy outlook onto the world as well as ones own country passes through introspection. In other words, the motto of "know thyself" was neglected for too long a time, whose side-effects are visible in the ever-deteriorating Turkey-West relations.

After having determined the problematique, there may be a suggestion of two kinds of solutions:

The first one is based on the capacity of synthesis-making of the Turks in particular, due to their nomadic flexibility (3), and of all the empires that existed in Anatolia, of synthesis-making ability. In other words, Turkey may (presuming that the above mentioned reconciliation is successfully accomplished) make an organic synthesis of the eastern and the western political experiences. Some rhetoric in Turkey goes along the so-called East-West synthesis, undertaken by the intelligentsia, however, one may claim that what the Turkish intelligentsia refers to as an East-West synthesis is rather a bricolage of the two cultures going in two parallel lines and never meeting each other. This situation brings into one's mind the question: "Could the East and the West merge in a synthesis?". A mathematician would answer the question by the geometrics theory that two parallel points meet at the point of infinity. The answer to this question still remains open.

The second solution that might be suggested is that Turkey comes up with an alternative political culture to that of the West, which may be inspired by the political culture of the Ottomans. However, the obstacles standing in front of this solution are immense. Turkey is not yet stable within the political framework it promised itself to obey. So undertaking such a *grande politique* at an ideological level seems to be far beyond the grasp of the politicians, and the intelligentsia is not genuinely interested in such ideological architecture, being too much involved in the daily *petite politique*.

As a conclusion, the aim of this work has been to present the cultural dimensions of politics from a historical perspective. It is relatively easy to describe the problematique, however, much more difficult to come up with solutions. Therefore further work should be encouraged in this field by academics. Finding a feasible solution is far beyond the scope of this work. However, one fact must have appeared quite clearly, that the cultural dimensions will play an ever-increasing role in domestic as well as international politics, the ignorance and negligence of which may well lead to rather grave consequences.

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- 5)Tawfiq Fahd, “ La nascita dell’Islam” in L’Islamismo, ed. Henri-Charles Puech, trans. Maria Novella Pierini, (Roma: Editori Laterza,1991), p. 29.
- 6) Fahd, p.32.
- 7)ibid.
- 8) Fahd, p. 73.
- 9) Fahd, p. 76.
- 10) ibid.
- 11) Fahd, p. 80.
- 12) Fahd, p.82.
- 13) Talat Halman, Lecture notes: “ History of Turkish Culture”, Bilkent University, 1996-97, fall semester, Ankara.
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- 36) Tekeli and İlkin, p. 7.

37) Mantran, p.233.

38) ibid.

39) G. Postel, La Republique des Turcs, (Paris: Patiers, 1560), p.54, in Robert Mantran, La Vita Quotidiana a Costantinopoli ai Tempi di Solimano il Magnifico, trans. Maria Luisa Mazzini, (Milano: Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, 1985), p.233.

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