

THE CRIMEAN KHANATE
UNDER THE REIGN OF GAZI GIRAY II

A Master's Thesis

by

AHMET TÜRK

Department of
HISTORY
Bilkent University
Ankara
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A Thesis

Submitted to the Institute for Graduate Studies in Economics and Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

The Crimean Khanate was originally a successor state of the Golden Horde. For one century it competed with the other successor of the Golden Horde, the Kazan Khanate, for the inheritance of the Golden Horde. After one century none of the competing powers but a third power, Muscovy, succeeded to recover the former territory of the Golden Horde. The Crimean Khanate had to survive within a far more hostile after the Russian annexation of Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556). It was now under the attack of the Eastern Slavs. The Cossacks replaced the Turkic nomads of the Kipchak steppes. The Crimean Khans turned their faces to their overlords, Ottoman Empire, in order to stop Russian offense. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire was engaged in a deadly struggle with the Habsburgs in the West and the Safavids in the East. The Ottoman Empire could not focus their attention in the region except the brief Astrakhan campaign in 1569 and focused in the Eastern and Western fronts. Gazi Giray II. reigned during this period of transformation, when the influence of the Ottoman Empire began to increase in the Crimean Khanate. The Ottoman Empire requested the continuous presence of the Crimean forces in the front in order to fill the gap that the long and costly wars created in the military might of the Empire. Gazi Giray II. managed to survive in this environment. He fulfilled the requests of the Ottomans but followed an independent policy whenever it was possible. He succeeded to expend the influence of the Crimean Khanate to the Danubian Principalities and Transylvania. This ambitious policy costed to his throne but thanks to his political skills he managed to reassume his seat. Despite the fact that his relations with the Ottoman Porte did not normalise after his dismissal, he managed to remain in the throne because he was strong in the Crimea. He obtained the support of the Crimean people with his reforms and his successes in the wars. According to Crimean Chroniclers, his reign was one of the golden era of the Khanate.

Özet

Kırım Hanlığı özünde Altın Ordu'nun bir devamıydı. Bir yüzyıl boyunca Altınordu'nun diğer bir mirasçısı, Kazan Hanlığı'yla, Altınordu'nun mirası için mücadele etmişti. Bu mücadelenin galibi ise üçüncü bir güç, Moskova Prensiği oldu. Moskova Prensiği Altın Ordu'nun eski arazisini ele geçirmeğe muvaffak olduktan sonra Kırım Hanlığı daha tehlikeli bir çevrede yaşamak zorundaydı çünkü artık Doğu Slavları'nın tehdidi altındaydı. Kazaklar Kıpçak Bozkırlar'ında Türk göçebelerinin yerini almaya başlamıştı. Kırım Hanlığı çare olarak yüzünü metbu olduğu Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na dönmekte buldu. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ise Batı'da Habsburglarla Doğu'da Safevilerle ölümüne bir mücadeleye girişmişti. Bunun sonucu olarak kısa bir Astrahan Seferi (1569) dışında bölge ile ilgilenemeyip bütün dikkatini Doğu ve Batı'daki savaşlara yöneltti. II. Gazi Giray işte bu kritik devrede tam Kırım'da Osmanlı hakimiyeti kendini hissettirmeğe başladığı zamanda hüküm sürdü. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu devamlı olarak Kırım kuvvetlerinin cephede olmasını istiyordu böylece uzun ve masraflı savaşların yol açtığı açıkların bir kısmını Kırım kuvvetleri ile kapatmayı düşünüyordu. Gazi Giray bu kritik devrede ayakta kalmayı başardı. Osmanlılar'ın asker isteklerini yerine getirdi ama diğer yandan bağımsız bir siyaset sürdürmeye de çalıştı. Kırım Hanlığının etki sahasını Eflak, Boğdan ve Erdel'e yaymaya çalıştı. Bu ihtiraslı siyaseti sonunda tahtına mal oldu ama Osmanlı Siyaseti'ni dengelerini çok iyi bildiği için tahtını kısa zamanda geri almağa muvaffak oldu. İkinci Hanlığı sırasında Bab-ı Ali ile olan ilişkileri hiç düzelmemiş olmasına rağmen tahtta kalmaya devam etti çünkü yaptığı reformlar ve savaşlarda kazandığı başarılarla Kırım Halkı'nın sevgisini kazanmıştı. Kırım Vakanüvisleri Gazi Giray'ın devrini Hanlığ'ın altın devirlerinden biri olarak göstermişlerdir.

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I Introduction

The nature of the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate has been a major problem for the students of the field because it was still covered with unsolved puzzles. The beginning of the Ottoman rule in the Khanate is the first one of these puzzles. Thanks to the work of Halil Inalcık; “Yeni Vesikalara Kırım Hanlığının Osmanlı Tabiliğine Girmesi Ve Ahidname Meselesi”, *Belleten*, VIII, Ankara, 1944, it is demystified. However, there are still many puzzles to be solved such as the Tatar betrayals to the Ottomans. These puzzles are mainly related to the approaches of Ottoman chroniclers that considered the Khanate as one of the other vassal states of the Empire and the Khans as Kul of the Sultan. Thus, they reflected every conflict between the Khans and the Empire as a disobedience to the wish of the Sultan.

However, the Crimean Khanate had its own legacy and institutions that the Khans were very keen on to protect. The Khanate was the heir of the ancient Turco-Mongol steppe tradition which was epitomised in the Yasa of Cengiz Khan with its all positive and negative effects. The Khanate had an effective military organisation and could mobilise considerable amount of military force within a short time. However, this military organisation depended totally on the tribes. The tribal aristocracy that controlled large armies and held the real power in the Khanate. They were very

conservative and did everything to stop any change that was likely to harm their interests. The Khans had to perform an important task: they should obtain the confidence of the tribal aristocracy, they should satisfy the demands of the Sultan and finally, they should govern the country. Another problem was the difference between the military objectives of the Tatars and the Ottomans. The Ottomans wanted to incorporate a region to their system and did not want to harm people or the land. The Tatars were following a scorched earth policy and aimed to gather slaves and booty. Thus, a conflict between the armies was inevitable.

The reaction to the approach of the Ottoman chroniclers came after the rise of Turkish Nationalism. Some scholars, mostly of Tatar origin, began to criticise the traditional approach. They concentrated on the question that since both Ottomans and Crimeans were from the same ethnic background, why the Ottomans did not help their brothers in their struggle against the Russian domination. Their second criticism was that the Ottomans could not understand the rise of Muscovy and the threat that it posed to the Turkic world. However, the Ottoman Empire was a world power and had its northern politics. They may be criticised because they entrusted their steppe politics to the Crimean Khans nearly for a century. When they decided to implement their politics they did not find the cooperation of the Khans and they were on the eve of a long and costly struggle in the East and the West that occupied the Empire for a century.

One final approach to the history of the Khanate evolved within the last few decades. It considers the Khanate as a single domain with its own social, political and

economic institutions and tries to regard it from inside. Some of them argued that the Khanate had a different ethnic (Tatar) background from that of the Ottoman Turks and should have pursued its own objectives. However, they seem to forget that the Crimean Khanate managed to survive thanks to the support of the Ottoman Empire for another two centuries, otherwise it would have fallen to the Russian domination much earlier. I suggest that it is better to look at the history of the Khanate and its relationship with the Ottoman Empire from a different perspective. First of all, it should be noted that the Ottoman-Crimean relations did not follow a straight line. It transformed as a result of the shifts within the balance of power in the region and the structural changes within both the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate.

The reign of Gazi Giray II is very important because he reigned just at this critical moment when the balance of the power in the region and the structural changes within the Ottoman Empire occurred. The Ottoman Empire had entered a long struggle with the Habsburgs in the West and the Safavids in the East for the domination of the region. The Ottoman Empire met several difficulties to finance and to ensure the steady outflow of manpower to continue this long struggle. They thought that the Crimean Tatars could have been an adequate match for their need of soldiers. Therefore, they began to request regular presence of the Crimean forces in the front. On the other hand, the Crimean Khanate had its own problems. The Russian annexation of the Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556) Khanates showed that the Khanate was not able to revive the Golden Horde. The Khanate that lost its *raison d'être* had to accept to be a regional power. The Russian offensive in the Caucasus and the rise of Cossackdom showed that from now on, the Khanate had to defend itself rather than to expend. The Khanate needed the support of the Ottoman

arquebusiers and artillery to defend it self from the Cossack encroachments. The increasing influence of the Ottomans and their requests about the presence of the Crimean forces in the front caused to the great reaction of the Crimean society. First, the Khans did not want that the Ottomans to interfere their internal affairs. Second, the Crimean army did not want to remain in the front for long terms because the peninsula was open to the invasions of Cossaks and Nogays during their absentee. The reaction of Mehmed Giray I (1577-1588) to the Ottoman requests and presence costed to his seat and life. Islam Giray II (1584-1588); the following Khan, came to the throne only with the help of the Ottoman forces. Therefore, he remained under the auspices of the Ottomans that he owed his seat and could not become a popular Khan in the eyes of the Crimean population. The Ottoman influence and presence in the Crimea began to increase during his reign.

Gazi Giray II became the Khan of Crimea under these circumstances. He had to establish several delicate balances that his brothers Mehmed Giray and Islam Giray failed to do. First, he should determine the nature of his attitude towards the Porte. Second, he should satisfy the needs of the aristocracy which determines the future of a Khan. Third, he should protect and prosper the Crimea. Finally, he would realise his ambitions as a Khan. He was successful in many respects. He could establish a balance between the Ottoman requests and the security of the Crimea. He could counterbalance the influence of the aristocracy. The Khanate lived one of its richest and most stable times of its history. He tried to centralise the power in his hands in the model of the Ottoman Empire, he made some important reforms in order

to realise this project. The subject of this work would be to understand how could Gazi Giray II managed to survive and become successful within this environment.

II The Crimean Khanate During the Second Half of the 16TH Century:

At the time of Gazi Giray's accession to the throne, the course of the Crimean history had already entered a new phase. Russian annexation of Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556) and their attempts to penetrate into the Northern Caucasus demonstrated that the Crimean Khanate was no more able to realise its major goal: the revival of the Golden Horde under its leadership. The annexation did not only put an end to the Crimean aspirations but also began to pose a serious threat to the existence of the Khanate since it was cut from its connection with the Eastern part of the Turco-Muslim world. Its immediate consequence was the opening of the Volga-Ural region that for centuries had been a Turco-Muslim center to the Russian settlement. Besides, it meant the inability of the Crimeans to attract the support of any tribe that was using the traditional ways of nomadic people from the East.¹ The Deşt-i Kıpçak has been the passage of the wandering tribes from Central Asia to the West for centuries. Their pressure prevented the Slavs to settle in the region.

¹ This argument might seem quite contradictory because the existence of the Crimean Khanate is on the one hand closely related to the attraction of the wandering tribes in Deshti Kıpçak. On the other hand the same tribes was one of the main causes of the internal strife in the Khanate. For further information on the subject refer to Halil İnalçık, "The Khan and the Tribal Aristocracy: The Crimean Khanate under Sahib Giray I", *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* III/IV, Massachusetts, 1979-1980 p.445-466 and Beatrice Forbes Manz, "The Clans of the Crimean Khanate, 1466-1532", *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, II/3 Massachusetts, 1978 p.282-309 and Alexandre Bennigsen, ed, *Le Khanat De Crimée dans les archives du palais de Topkapı*, Paris, 1978 pp.4-29.

Under these circumstances, it was natural that the Crimeans turned to their overlords, namely the Ottomans. Traditionally, as long as the Crimean Khans were strong enough to control the region, they did not want the Ottomans to get the upperhand in the steppe politics. The failure of 1569 Astrakhan campaign is closely related to Devlet Giray's (1551-1577) lack of cooperation, since he was not willing to share the control of the region with the Ottomans.² The Ottomans that were heavily engaged with Western and Eastern fronts preferred to leave the steppe politics to the hands of the Crimean Khans unless their security was not endangered. Once they have completed the conquest of the Black Sea region that was vital for the security of Istanbul the Ottomans followed a policy of status quo. This policy was based on a principal of vital importance: to preserve the existing balance of power in the region so that none of the competitive powers could become strong enough to threaten the Ottoman supremacy.³ However, following the Russian offensive in the Caucasus Ottoman interests in the region were hampered. They had to reconsider their traditional attitude on delegating their northern politics to the Khans.

On the other hand, Ottomans, being engaged with a long-lasting war against the Safavids (1578-1590) for the control of Caucasia, soon realised the importance of the region. The Caspian Sea could be used to contact their allies in Turkestan and could put a pressure on the Safavids through the existence of a navy in the region. More important, due to the hostile eastern Anatolian environment, they persisted to control Demirkapı as a safe way of supply to the army. But this time they faced several difficulties caused by the Russians (or Cossacks).

² Halil İncik, "The Origin of the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal (1569)", *Les Annales de l'Université de l'Ankara*, vol. I, Ankara, 1947 p. 47-106. Also see: Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve İdil Boyu*, Ankara, 1966.

Depending on their strategic supremacy and geographical proximity the Russians tried to interfere with the Crimean politics. Following Mehmed Giray's revolt against the Ottomans and his murder in 1584, one of his sons, Saadet Giray, retreated to the steppe and with the support of Nogays and Don Cossacks started a war against the new Khan Islam Giray II (1584-1588) who was appointed by the Ottomans. Meanwhile his other son, Murad Giray, went directly to Moscow. The new Tsar Feodor (1584-1598) appointed him the commander of Astrakhan to prepare an attack on the Crimea with the support of Nogays and Cossacks.⁴ As a response the Ottomans planned a joint attack on Astrakhan with the Crimeans and Ulu Nogays in 1587.⁵ Additionally, the Uzbek Khan of Buhara, Abdullah (1560-1598), promised to attack both Safavids and Russians as well. However, this plan proved to be futile from the beginning, because both Crimeans and Ottomans had their own separate approaches to the issue and differing priorities. The Crimeans feared of a sudden Russian invasion of the Crimea, while they were in Astrakhan and thought that they could solve the issue in question by putting a direct pressure on the *Principality* of Moscovy. The Ottomans, although having promised to send a fleet to protect the Crimea, were under the pressure of a two frontal war.

³ İnalçık, *ibid.*, p. 53.

⁴ Selaniki Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selaniki*, ed., Mehmet İpşirli, Ankara, 1999, p.190.

⁵ Ulu-Nogay Ulusu refers to the part of the Nogay Horde that remained in the eastern bank of the Volga River. During the great famine of 1577-1578 some of the Nogays that were against the pro-Russian tendencies of Ismail Mirza, the leader of Ulu-Nogays, reconciled with Crimean Tatars and were settled around Kuban river and Azov by Devlet Giray Khan, they are called Küçük Nogay Ulusu. Ulu-Nogays after the death of İsmail Mirza and the Russian control of the region began to pursue a pro-

While the Safavid war continued, due to the atrocities on the Western front, there also emerged the possibility of a war with the Habsburgs. Only the Uzbek Khan Abdullah kept his promise and successfully attacked the eastern provinces of Persia and invaded Kherat (1588).⁶ Thus, Ottoman efforts were not in vain because the Safavids realised that they could not continue the war under these joint attack and accepted the peace. Nevertheless, the Russian problem remained unsolved. The Ottomans had to postpone their plans since the war with the Habsburgs was inevitable and they needed the Crimean Tatar military support on the front. However, the Crimean Khan tried to solve the problem in traditional ways, which means, by a raid directed to Moscow itself. But he died on the way to campaign. Gazi Giray II was appointed as the Crimean Khan in 1588, under these circumstances since he was the right man in the right place.

Ottoman policy. For the activities of Nogays see: Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türk Kavimleri ve Devletleri*, Ankara, 1992, pp.281-289.

III The Life of Gazi Giray II Before His Reign

Gazi Giray was the right man for the Ottomans because he proved his loyalty and capabilities during the 1578-1590 Ottoman-Persian war. According to *Al-Sab' al-sayyar* Gazi Giray was born in 1554.⁷ Although we don't know much about his youth, it is possible to argue that as a *Hanzade* he was given to an *Atalık* (most probably in Circassian tribe Besleni) that was responsible for the training of hanzades in horsemanship, use of weapons and military training.⁸

His name is first mentioned as the commander of a Tatar contingent during the Tatar raid into Podolia (1575).⁹ It was one of the raids that was launched following the revolt of Ivan I vonia, Voivode of Moldavia (1572-1574), who was supported by Poles and Zaporozhian Cossacks.¹⁰ Some Polish magnates that were

⁶ M.Fahrettin Kırzioğlu, *Osmanlılar'ın Kafkas Ellerini Fethi (1451-1590)*, Ankara, 1999, p.376.

⁷ Muhammed Rıza, *Al-Sab' al-Sayyar fı ahbar al- mulük al-tatar*, ed., Kazım bey, Kazan, 1832, p.111.

⁸ Carl Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism During the Reformation: Europe and Caucasus*, New York, 1972, p.34. , Claude Cahen, "Atalık (Atabeg)" *E.I.*, second edition, I, p.731-732 and Kefeli İbrahim bin Ali, *Tevarih-i Tatarhan ve Dağıstan ve Mosku ve Deşti-Kıpçak Ülkelerindedir*, ed., Cafer Seydamet, Köstence, 1920, p.34.

⁹ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.32.

¹⁰ Aurel Decei argues that the campaign was launched because Voivode did not accept to raise the tribute and Cossacks and Poles joined his revolt. Aurel Decei, "Boğdan", *IA*, II, p.700. Selaniki states that the Tatars were allowed because of the Cossack activities in Ocakov and the revolt of Moldavia was related with the Poles. *Tarih-i Selaniki*, I, p.214.

supported by the Habsburgs wanted to spark a conflict between the Ottomans and Poland-Lithuania, so that they could establish Polish authority in Moldavia that would enable them to obtain a direct outlet to the Black Sea. For the Ottomans this action was not acceptable and should be punished by every means. Consequently, they encouraged the Crimean Tatars to respond to the Cossack activities in Moldavia. The conflict was not settled until the newly elected King of Poland Stephan Bathory (1578-1584) realised the critical turn of the events and ordered the Cossacks to stop their activities. The Ottomans renewed the peace only after they executed in Lvov the Cossack commander Ivan Pidkova who succeeded to unseat the Moldavian Voivode (1575-1579 and 1583-1590).¹¹ Now the Poles could concentrate on the Danzig revolt and the Ottomans could turn their face to the eastern front.

IV The Emergence of the Cossacks

However, there appeared a new actor in the scene: the Cossacks. They were not totally loyal to their “lords” and continued their raids in the Ottoman territory. The Cossacks that were heavily influenced by the Tatar military tactics and organisation began to pose a serious threat to the Ottomans and the Tatars. It was very difficult to deal with the Cossacks that were successfully using guerilla tactics.¹² According to the Ukrainian chronicles, the first Cossack raid against the Ottomans took place around 1540 under the leadership of Karpo Maslov of Cherkassy. They attacked Ocakhov and burned it.¹³ Gradually, the Cossacks began to attract many followers to their ranks and acted as a buffer between the Ottomans and their northern neighbours. The emergence of Cossackdom in the steppe was a major blow to the future of the Crimean Khanate and the security of the Black Sea trade. Giving up the fertile lands of Deşt-i Kıpçak to the Cossacks meant further isolation of the Crimean Khanate and a might-be Slavization of the region as it happened in the Volga region.¹⁴ The Tatar army proved

¹¹ Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, ed., O.J.Frederiksen, New Haven, 1948, p.163.

¹² For the Military tactics of the Cossacks see: Philip Longworth, *The Cossacks*, New York, 1969. The Author argues that while the Don and other Cossacks were expert on horsemanship, the Zaporozhian Cossacks distinguished themselves as soldiers on foot and their skills in sea.

¹³ Michael Hrushevsky, *A History*, p.155. He is also giving information about previous Cossack activities but he prefers to start with this date because of the uncertainty about the origins of Cossacks that attacked.

¹⁴ For the course of rise of Cossackdom see: Philip Longworth, *The Cossacks*, that represents the Russian perspective, see: Hrushevsky, *A History*, for the Ukrainian perspective and see: Kefeli İbrahim, *Tevarihi*, for the Tatar perspective.

to be ineffective against the Cossacks. Thanks to *Şayka* (Çayka or Chaika: seagull in Russian) that they used to sail along Dnieper and Don rivers, the Cossacks remained aloof from the Tatar bows.¹⁵ The Crimean army was not allowed to hold artillery as a precaution against the Crimean claims on Kefe. An increase of the Ottoman presence within the peninsula became inevitable. Furthermore, the Ottomans were in desperate need of the Crimean cavalry in their long campaigns both in the East and West and undermined the Cossack threats.

¹⁵ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve*, p.249. According to Beauplan an engineer that worked for Poles describe *Şayka* (Çayka in Russian) as a small boat about forty five feet long, ten to twelve feet wide,

V Gazi Giray II in the Ottoman-Safavid War (1578-1590)

Bora Gazi Giray spent the second stage of his career as a warrior on the eastern front. He joined to the campaign in November 1578. The Crimean Khan Mehmed Giray II (1577-1588) finally realised that he could no more ignore the Ottoman proposals to join the army.¹⁶ He sent a contingent led by his brother Adil Giray, the Kalghay, who was accompanied by his brothers Gazi Giray and Şakay Mübarek Giray and by his son, Saadet Giray.¹⁷ The army arrived to the front at a critical point. The Ottoman army under the leadership of Özdemiroğlu Osman Paşa, Serdar of Shirvan, was surrounded by the Safavid army in Shemakha, the capital of Shirvan (9 Ramazan 986/9 November 1578).¹⁸ Unexpected arrival of the Crimean forces that attacked the enemy without losing time resulted in the defeat of the Safavids (11 Ramazan 986/11 November 1578). Even the commander of the Safavid army, Arus Khan, and his son, Dede Khan, were taken prisoners and sentenced to death.

and of the same depth each of which accommodates fifty to seventy men. Beauplan G., *A Description of Ukraine*, ed., A.B. Pernal, Massachusetts, 1993, p.64.

¹⁶ The Crimean forces consisted of 15.000 Tatars, 5 or 6 thousands Nogays and Circassians including 10 cannons and 300 janissaries under the leadership of Mehmed bey of Azov. Kırzioğlu, *Osmanlılar'ın*, p.331.

¹⁷ Abdülğaffar notes that Bora Gazi was sent to campaign by Islam Giray II (1584-1588) that is not true. In Abdülğaffar, *Umdetü'-t-tevarih*, supplement to TOEM, Istanbul, 1924, p.115.

Soon after the victory, the first quarrel appeared between the Ottomans and the Crimeans. The Ottoman leadership was not willing to let the Tatars to raid the country for booty. The conflict was a typical example of the problems that often arouse between the Tatars and Ottomans. The booty was the primary objective of the Tatars in their wars. The Tatar army was not consisted of salaried soldiers like that of the Ottomans. Therefore, the booty that they would gather in a campaign was very important for the Tatar soldiers. Even, their military tactics were aimed to gather booty. The yearly *Çapkul* (booty raids) to the neighbouring countries was crucial for the livelihood of an ordinary Tatar.¹⁹ The Ottoman leadership wanted to treat them as an ordinary division of their armies. The attitude of the Serdar caused great reaction among the Tatars that wanted to raid for booty.²⁰ The Tatars did not want to enter the discipline of the Ottomans and preferred to fight in their traditional manners. The Serdar warned them under the pretext that it was customary for the Ottomans to protect the lives and the properties of the Muslims even in the war zone. The Kalghay replied that they could not accept it because raiding is a necessity for them.²¹ Soon an occasion arose to settle the conflict. It was learned that a group of fleeing Safavid dignitaries together with their retinues including the treasury of Aras Khan encamped across the Kura River. Tatar forces quickly raided the camp and acquired booty more

¹⁸ Abdurrahman Şeref, "Özdemiroğlu Osman Paşa", *TOEM*, III/IV, İstanbul, 1329/1913 p.1364.

¹⁹ For the importance of *Çapkuls* see: Collins, L.J.D., "The Military Organisation and Tactics of the Crimean Tatars, 16th-17th centuries", *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, ed., V.J.Parry and M.E.Yapp, London, 1975, pp.257-276. The Tatar army was formed from ordinary Tatars that needed the subsidies of the Khan or their Mirzas. Some even doesn't have a horse or a weapon to fight. The money that was sent to the Khans when they were invited to the campaigns was very important for the preparation of the army. For the description of *Çapkul* and the Tatar tactics during a *Çapkul* see: Beauplan, *A Description*,.

²⁰ Halil İnalçık, "Kırım", *IA*, VI, p.749.

²¹ Şeref, *TOEM*, p.1365.

than they had expected and could carry, including the wife and daughters of Aras Khan.²²

Meanwhile, the main Persian army was now moving towards Shemakha to siege Özdemiroğlu. The besieged Serdar tried to send word to the Kalghay that was turning back. Unfortunately, the Safavids captured the messenger. The commander of the army, Selman Khan, Vizier of Shah, made a critical decision and decided to send the bulk of his army against the Tatars. The Safavids and Tatars clashed near the Menla Hasan River on 30 Ramazan 986/30 November 1578.²³ Tatar army that obliged to fight with a superior force was defeated following three days of fierce battle.²⁴ The Kalghay Adil Giray was taken prisoner but Gazi Giray managed to escape.

The following year, the Khan Mehmed Giray II joined the campaign in person upon the concessions of the Porte. First of all, he was appointed as the commander of the Ottoman army in Dagestan.²⁵ More important, he was allowed to appoint his son Saadet Giray as *Nura'l-din* (Nurettin). The office of *Kalghay* (heir apparent to the throne) existed before the Crimean Khanate. According to the Cengizide tradition (*Kanun-ı Cengiziye*), he should be one of Khan's younger

²² Ibid. p.1366.

²³ Ibid.p.1369. Kortepeter quoting from 'Ali's *Künhü'l-ahbar* states that war took place near Mahmudabad. In Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p. 78.

²⁴ Ibid.p.1369. According to 'Ali's *Künhü'l-ahbar* following their successful ride only Adil and Gazi Giray remained with Serdar the others departed for the Crimea. Thus, only a portion of the army fought with the Safavids, in Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.78.

²⁵ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.63.

brothers and when the throne fell vacant he became the Khan.²⁶ However, this tradition caused many problems. Firstly, the Ottoman authority would be nominal if the Kalghay were to become the Khan. Secondly, the tribal aristocracy that held the real power in the Khanate could cause to a *fait accompli* depending on another Cengizide tradition (Töre or Türe); *Kurultay* and elect a Kalghay as Khan. Thirdly some of the Khans wanted to appoint their sons as Kalghay to ensure that the Khanship remain in their lines.²⁷ Thus, if the Sultan did not appoint the Kalghay as Khan or did not confirm a Kalghay elected by the Kurultay the conflict became inevitable. Mehmed Giray II making use of the critical situation obtained the right to appoint a Nura'l-din (the second heir to the throne) that meant further weakening of Sultan's authority in the Crimea.²⁸ The Khan who could not appoint one of his sons Kalghay because of the tradition appointed his brother Alp Giray Kalghay and his son Saadet Giray Nura'l-din in order to ensure a position for him.

The Khan spent whole summer in the front. After a successful raid Shirvan once again had cleared of Safavids. Upon the news that Serdar of the eastern front Lala Mustafa Pasha would not join them, the Crimean war council decided to return back but Özdemiroğlu Osman Pasha convinced the Khan to remain by suggesting a raid on Gence.²⁹ The raid was very successful because the Safavids had

²⁶ According to İnalçık the post of Kalghay was a precaution taken by Mengli Giray to stop the quarrels between the claimants of the throne and became a *Türe* later. Halil İnalçık, "Kalgay", *IA*, VI, pp.131-132.

²⁷ Halil İnalçık, "Giray", *IA*, IV, p.786 and Kortepeter, "Kalghay", *EI*, second edition, V, pp. 499-500.

²⁸ The Ottomans did not always followed the rules for their choice but protected the rights of Kalghays and Nura'l-dins in their appointments of Khans. Out 40 Khans 25 were Kalghays and 5 were Nura'l-dins. In İnalçık, *ibid.* p. 786.

retreated and the Tatars stormed the whole region easily.³⁰ Now the Tatars that acquired more booty than they had expected were willing to return to the Crimea. This time the Khan refused all the proposals of the Serdar and argued that he is not a *Beyleybeyi* but an independent ruler.³¹ To make things more difficult the Khan ordered the return of his son Saadet Giray soon after his departure.

Gazi Giray remained on the command of a small force at the front.³² In the Ottoman army anti-Crimean feelings began to be expressed openly. They argued that the Tatars were fighting only for the booty and already got the lion's share.³³ The Serdar Osman Pasha was in a difficult position; he had to defend the region with a small force during the winter. It was also an opportunity for Gazi Giray to show his skills in the war. The Serdar decided to launch a pre-emptive attack to the Safavid Kışlak. Gazi Giray that was accompanied with many Ottoman soldiers launched a surprise attack to the Safavid camp in Gence and the disordered Safavids were defeated and Selman Khan managed to escape at the last moment (winter 1579).³⁴

²⁹ Şeref, *TOEM*, p.1424.

³⁰ *Ibid.* p.1434. For the success of the raid he notes that slaves were abundant that they were sold only for a few dirhems.

³¹ Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, *Peçevi Tarihi II*, ed., Bekir Sıtkı Baykal., Mersin, 1992, p.83. It is obvious that it was one of the main causes of the dismissal of the Khan in 1584 but it also reflects the extent of the Khan's power at the time.

³² According to Muhammed Rıza; Gazi Giray opposed to the untimely return of Mehmed Giray II and remained in the front with 300 soldiers and entered to the service of the Serdar. Rıza, *Al-Sab'*, p.107.

³³ Şeref, *TOEM*, p.1435.

³⁴ *Ibid.* pp.1457-1458.

The victory obtained by 2.000 or 3.000 soldiers did not escape from the eyes of the Sultan and Gazi Giray received a promotion of 50.000 akçes.³⁵

The Safavids lost little time to setback and Gazi Giray was decisively defeated in Shemakha in the spring of 1581.³⁶ Osman Pasha expected that Safavid offensive was inevitable and appointed Gazi Giray the commander of the expeditionary forces. When the armies met somewhere around Shemakha, he was defeated and imprisoned by the Safavids.³⁷ Safavids tried every means to persuade him to cooperate with them against the Ottomans. He refused all the proposals and was sent to the castle of Alamut where he remained during his captivity. The Safavids that planned to send him to the Crimea after the dismissal and the revolt of his brother Mehmed Giray II liberated and took him to the palace (1584 or 1585).³⁸ In Tabriz, he was able to escape and he joined to the Serdar Osman Pasha in Erzurum.³⁹ Gazi Giray that was received very well by the Serdar remained in the Eastern Front until the death of the Serdar, his protector, (30 November 1585) and then went to Istanbul. In Istanbul he was given a *Salyane* in Yanbolu where he had a quiet life. On May 1588 he learned that he was appointed the Khan instead of his brother Islam Geray II (1584-1588).

³⁵ Ibid, p.1429. For the transcription of the document see: Appendices document no:1

³⁶ Ibid.p.1430. It is stated that the Safavids acted very cautiously and did not allow Gazi Giray to launch surprise attack.

³⁷ Ibid.p.1431. According to Ottoman accounts Gazi Giray had 2.000 or 3.000 soldiers while the Safavids had 15.000 soldiers.

³⁸ Ibid.p.1432.

³⁹ Ibid.p.1499. According to the tradition Gazi Giray managed to escape by saying that he will join to Shah who was out of town. He crossed the border as a Dervish and joined to the army in Erzurum.

VI The Crimean Khanate in the beginning of Gazi Giray II's

Rule

The Ottomans had many incentives to appoint Gazi Giray Khan of the Crimea. First he proved his military skills and loyalty to the Ottomans during the 1578-1590 Safavid war. The Ottomans understood once more the risks that an independent Khan might cause in the Crimea after the revolt of Mehmed Giray II. Therefore Gazi Giray II who was familiar with the Ottoman politics and bureaucracy was the most logical choice.⁴⁰ He was sent to the Crimea with enough Ottoman soldiers and sat to throne without any reaction. The Crimean aristocracy accepted the choice of the Sultan at that critical moment. They did not want to cause a trouble with the Porte despite the fact that they had already chosen the Kalghay Alp Giray as the Khan and asked the Sultan to confirm.⁴¹ According to the Ottoman historian Selaniki Bora Giray was coincidentally in Istanbul and did not aim to become the Khan when he

⁴⁰ According to Smirnov, Sultan Murad III (1574-1596) and Gazi Giray II were friends and the Sultan promised to make him and his sons Khan. V.D. Smirnov, *Krımskoye Hanstvo I*, St. Petersburg, 1887, p. 444.

⁴¹ *Selaniki I*, p.201. “Ve evası-ı şehri cumadelulada Kırım Hanı İslam Giray Han Leşker-i Tatar-ı saba-reftar ile Vilayet Rus üstüne gazaya niyyet ü azimet idüb, akına çıkup, iki menzil gitmiş iken *bi-iradeti'l-Hayyi'lezi la yemut* maraz-ı sekt arız olup, harekete mecali olmayub, sefer-i ahiret ihtiyar eyledüğü haber Südde-i sa'adete gelüp ve anda olan leşker-i Tatar kağılgay olan Alp Giray Sultanı hanlayub, sa'adetiü Padişah'dan reca vü niyaz eyledükleri arzları Paye-i serir-i saltanata okundukda Rızay-ı şerifleri olmayub mukaddema Şirvan-zeminde Kızılbaş-ı bed-ma'aş ile ceng idüb, bahadırılık ve dilaverlik ile me'mur olup ve Kızılbaş'da giriftar oldukda habs olunup derd ü ana çeken Gazi Giray Sultan Han olsun buyurılıp ...”.

was appointed the Khan of Crimea.⁴² It is more feasible to interpret his arrival as an attempt to lobby for his appointment of the Khan than to consider it the grace of God as Selaniki had done. Gazi Giray II was considered to be one of the more Ottomanised Khans.

However, as stated above, the process of Ottomanisation had already started. A rather significant event took place under the rule of his predecessor. Islam Giray II under the pressure of Murad and Saadet Giray's revolt that could be suppressed only by the Ottoman presence and his failure to deal with the raids of the Nogays in Boğdan (Moldavia) introduced or forced to introduce a new practice. He ordered that the name of the Sultan should be mentioned at first place during the Friday prayer (*Hutbe*) and the name of the Khan at second place. These meant further increase of the Ottoman influence.⁴³ The Ottoman sovereignty over the Crimea did not follow the traditional pattern. The Ottomans followed a policy of three steps to a vassal state before its incorporation to the Ottoman system.⁴⁴ First, they sent an army during the campaign. Second, they forced them to send a *Rehin* (hostage) to the capital. Third, they asked the payment of a fixed sum as tribute. The first principle was applied to the Crimea relatively late. Except, Mengli Giray's (1467-1474, 1475-1476, 1478-1514) presence in the Moldavian campaign of Bayezid II (1481-1512) in

⁴²... Yanbolı'da sakin iken ol esnada Asıtane-i sa'adete mülazemete gelmiş bulunup, Sadrı'zam Siyavuş Paşa hazretleri ikram u ihtiram ile götürüp, sa'adetlü "Padişah-ı alem-penah hazretleri size aba vü ecdadınız makamını, Kırım Hanlığın tevcih buyurdular" diyüb kadırgalar ile kifayet mikdarı asker hazırlayup Karadenizden Kefe'ye irsal ü isal buyurdular. Kemal-i şevket ü haşmet ile çıkup hezaran acz u iftikar ile Dergah-ı Ahadiyyet'e yüz tutup gitdiler. Hanlık ümid u recası hatırlarına gelmeyüp, ancak işlemiş ulufelerin, alup, erbab-ı ma'rifet ü kemal ile ömr geçirmek arzusunda idiler." Ibid.,pp.210-202.

⁴³ Rıza, *Al-sab'*, p.106. But the Giray's preserved their privilege to mint coin until the end of their rule.

1484. The Tatars joined the campaigns of Süleyman I (1520-1566) in the Balkans (1538-1543-1566). Only, after the Safavid War (1578-1590) the Ottomans began to request their continuous presence in the front. The second one became customary after Saadet Giray (1524-1532).⁴⁵ It was an action taken to ensure the liability of the Khan. They wanted to prevent the independent actions of the Khans by using the Rehin as a check. Instead of applying the third principle, the Ottomans preferred to subsidise the Crimean Khans. The Khan was given 1.500.000 akçe *Salyane* under the name of *Kaftan-beha* from the income of customs of Kefe.⁴⁶ Since it was customary for the Ottomans to adopt the privileges of the conquered lands to their systems in different names, it may be regarded as the continuation of tribute paid by Genoese to the Khan.⁴⁷ When the Khans were invited to the war he was given 40 000 akçe *Çizme Baha* that he distributed to his Kapıkulu and Mirzas. During the campaign he was also given money such as *Teşrif-i Kudüm*. These were mainly to ensure the Crimean presence in the campaign but it should be noted that for the ordinary Tatars it was a heavy burden to equip for the campaign and they should be subsidised to join the army.⁴⁸ More important, the Crimean aristocracy, the *Karaçi Beys* and *Mirzas* (sons of the Karaçi beys) including the *Kalghay*, *Nura'l-din*, *Oghlans* (other members of the

⁴⁴ Halil İnalçık, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest", *Studia Islamica*, III, Paris, 1954, pp.103-129.

⁴⁵ İnalçık, *IA*, IV, p.786.

⁴⁶ Ibid.p.786. *Salyane* refers to the part of the empire that is not applied the *Timar* system such as the Arab provinces of Algeria, Mecca or Christian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia.

⁴⁷ Halil İnalçık, "Yeni Vesikalara Göre Kırım Hanlığının Osmanlı Tabiliğine Girmesi ve Ahidname Meselesi", *Belleten*, VII, Ankara,1944, p.198 He quotes from Heyd *Histoire Du Commerce Au Levant II*, that the Genoese were paying tribute both Ottomans and Tatars in 1465. According to Alan Fisher, the *Salyane* was not a fixed sum but increased in time. The Ottomans believed that the Crimean Tatars were not able to rely on their incomes and tried to compensate their losses because of the stopping of slave trade as well as to ensure their loyalty. Alan Fisher, "Les rapports entre l'Empire Ottoman et la Crimée", in Alan Fisher, *Between Russians, Ottomans and Turks: Crimea and Crimean Tatars*, Istanbul, 1998, pp.19-34.

⁴⁸ L.J.D.Collins, "The Military ", p.259.

royal family) and *Nökers* (or *nökörs*) who holds the real power in the Khanate, should be convinced to join the campaign.⁴⁹

The aristocracy that controlled the majority of the common Tatars was able to resist the Khan and refuse to obey his orders. The power of the aristocracy depended on two factors. Firstly, the hereditary rights of them that were epitomised in *Türe*. It can be summarised under three principles: a- Cengiskanid descent: the strict Tatar notion that required direct lineage to Djodji (Cuçi d.1224), the eldest son of Cenghis Khan, who was assigned to rule the western part of the empire by his father.⁵⁰ b- factual allegiance of the *Ulus* or the powerful tribes under four *Karaçu* beys.⁵¹ c- actual possession of *Uluğ-Yurt (Taht or Saray)*, the capital region of the empire.⁵² The Crimean Khans had a Cengiskhanid descent and they always claimed their right over *Uluğ-Yurt*. The title that are used by the Crimean Khans reflects it: “ Uluğ Orda, Uluğ Yurtın, ve tahtı Kırım’ nın...”⁵³ After Mengli Giray’s devastation of Saray in 1502, they felt themselves free to claim to be the successor of the Golden Horde. However,

⁴⁹ Ibid.p.258.

⁵⁰ According to the tradition Coçi was given all the lands that were masticated by Mongolian horses. For Chenghiskhanids right to rule refer to B.Y. Vladimirtsov, *Moğolların İçtimai Teşkilatı*, ed., Abdülkadir İnan, Ankara, 1987, pp. 210-212.

⁵¹ Halil İnalçık, “Power relationships between Russia, the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire as reflected in the titulature”, *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman rule: Essays on economy and Society*, Bloomington, 1993, pp. 371-372.

⁵² The Uluğ-Yurt in the time of Cenghis Khan was in the Kelüren river in Mongolia that the Kurultay convened to elect the Khan. The Uluğ-Yurt in Golden Horde was in the middle Volga River that Batu Khan (1237-1256) the founder of the Golden Horde had established his capital Saray. The term Taht-İli was fictitious. It did not refer to a definite place any place that the *Küryen* (the camp) of the Khan located could be defined Taht-İli. For more information see: B.Y. Vladimirtsov, *Moğolların İçtimai*, and A.Y. Yakubovski, *Altın Ordu ve Çöküşü*, ed., Hasan Eren, Ankara, 1992.

⁵³ V.Veliaminov Zernov, *Kırım Yurtına ve Ol Taraflarına Dair Bulgan Yarlığ ve Hatlar*, Saint Petersburg, 1864, p.1038. The letter of Canıbek Giray Khan to the Russian Tsar Michael Feodorovich.

they had to obtain the approval of the Karaçi Beys and vice versa. According to the Turco-Mongol tradition the authority invested in *Altan-Urugh* (the royal family) or in a particular Khan from this family was considered to be derived from divine will and no human arrangement could change it.

In reality it was the leader of the tribal aristocracy, *Uluğ-Bey*, in agreement with the leaders of the other tribes determined who would become Khan.⁵⁴ The Karaçi tribes were consisted of Şirin, the leader of the aristocracy, Barın, Argın, Kıpçak, Sicivut and Mangıt tribes.⁵⁵ The influence of the tribes varied in time. Mangıt tribe, despite the fact that they settled later in the Crimea, quickly began to play a prominent role but the Shirins always remained the most influential clan.⁵⁶ Military forces under the command of the Clans were around 10.000.⁵⁷ The four Karaçi Beys were always present in the state councils, *Körünüş* or *Körünüş*, and their consent was required in every important matter.⁵⁸ A Karaçi bey abstained from taking part in the meetings to

⁵⁴ İnalçık, *Harvard Ukrainian*, p.449.

⁵⁵ Karaçi meant commoner or those outside the royal family. For more information see: ed., Ahmet Temür, *Moğolların Gizli Tarihi*, Ankara, 1995, p.8.

⁵⁶ Manz, "The Clans ...", p.287. Also see: İnalçık, "The Khan ...", and V.E. Sroeckovsky, *Muhammed Geray Han ve Vassalları*, ed., Kemal Ortaylı, Ankara, 1978. It is necessary to note that Sroeckovsky insisted on the feudal character of the Khanate. B.F. Manz who depended on Russian and Polish-Lithuanian sources, argued that the clans were not the sole and also not the most influential contenders for the power in the Khanate.. The service beys or the Kuls of the Khan played the most important role. İnalçık argues that the nökorship was the strongest element in the society that overrides kinship ties and gave it's "feudal character".

⁵⁷ İnalçık, "The Khan", p.448. During the second Circassian campaign of Sahip Giray Khan (1532-1551) in 1543 the tribal forces were as follows: Shirins 5.000, Arghins and Kıpçaks 3.000 and Mangıts 2.000. In Remmal Hoca, *Tarihi Sahib Giray Han*, ed., Özalp Gökbilgin, Ankara, 1973, p.73. İnalçık argues that the total amount of the tribal forces was 10.000 contrary to the tradition that presented only the forces of Shirins 20.000.

⁵⁸ Abdülgaffar, *Umdet*, Istanbul, 1924, p.193. For the transcription of the text see: appendices document no:2.

protest the Khan's policy. The Khan remained powerless when all the Karaçi beys abandoned him. In this situation the Beys went to a sacred place called *Kayalar-Altı* that the seals (*Tamga*) of the Crimean clans were printed on the rocks.⁵⁹ Furthermore, the foreign powers had to make separate agreements with the Beys.⁶⁰ They had the right to disapprove an agreement or individually launch an attack to a neighbouring state. Therefore the support of the Karaçi Beys was extremely important for the Crimean Khans. They used several means to obtain it including the marriage, granting lands and the right to collect taxes.⁶¹

The second factor that determined the influence of the Karaçis was the military forces at their disposal that was closely related with the Turco-Mongol tradition of *Nökör-ship*.⁶² The Nökörs were the military commanders under the service of a bey that did not leave him even under the worse conditions. The logic of the system was to organise the military in an effective way that through raids into the lands of the Christian prosperity and wealth could be taken into the Crimea. Therefore an energetic leader was the choice. Thanks to their Nökörs, a defeated Bey could become a *Kazak* (*Kazağa Çıkmak*) and wait for the appropriate moment to continue the struggle. Therefore, it was almost impossible to eliminate a rival completely. More important, the Karaçi's were very keen on to protect their privileges and any attempt

⁵⁹ İnalçık, "The Khan" p.448.

⁶⁰ Manz, "The Clans", p.286. She states that Lithuanians often asked ambassadors from Shirins and once asked from both Shirins and Argins.

⁶¹ İnalçık, "The Khan", p.450 and Manz, *ibid.* p.286. She notes that Shirins and Manghuts often intermarried with Girays. The Shirins had the right to collect a special tax, part of the transit tax in Perekop were given to them.

⁶² For more information on Nökör or Nöker see: Vladimirtsov, *Moğolların*, pp.74-146.

to alter it had a harsh opposition from the Karaçi beys.⁶³ The third factor behind their influence was their economic power. The wealth of the Crimea mainly depended on slave trade. It is estimated that thousands of captives were sold as slaves after the Tatar raids.⁶⁴ The Ottoman as well as the Crimean economies required slave labour. As a result of the fierce resistance in the West, the Ottomans turned towards North and South for slaves. Thus, the Crimean raids became very important not only for the Crimea but also for the Ottomans and any failed raid caused a crisis in the land.⁶⁵ The slaves were used for military purposes, in the personal services and in the domestic economy.⁶⁶ A Khan who tried to pursue a peaceful policy and wanted to control individual raids of the clans inevitably faced with the reaction of them. A Khan's success is closely related with his ability to satisfy the aristocracy.

First of all Gazi Giray II had to settle the situation in the Khanate. His first step was to appoint his brother Feth Giray Kalghay and his nephew Baht Giray as Nura'l-din. Former Kalghay Alp Giray and Nura'l-din Şakay Mübarek Giray after an unsuccessful struggle fled from the Crimea. Alp Giray went to Istanbul and Şakay

⁶³ For the struggle between Sahib Giray Khan that aimed to centralise the power at the Ottoman model and the tribal aristocracy that reacted him see; Remmal Hoca, *Tarih-i Sahib*,.

⁶⁴ Halil İnalçık, "The Black Sea and Eastern Europe", *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, ed., Halil İnalçık with Donald Quatert, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 271-314. He states that during the period 1500-1650 the number of slave brought from Poland-Muscovy and Circassia exceeded 10.000 every year. For the influence of the raids on the Ukrainian people and rise of Cossackdom refer to Hrushevsky, *A History*, pp. 144-164. Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine A History*, Toronto, 1992, p.106. He notes that from 1450 to 1568 eighty-six raid were recorded and from 1600 to 1647 seventy. He further notes that although the number of captives had reached 30.000 in a single raid, the average was 3.000.

⁶⁵ İnalçık, *ibid.* p.284.

⁶⁶ V.E.Sroeckovsky, *Muhammed Geray*, pp.25-54. He gives many examples of slaves or former slaves living and working in the Crimea.

Giray went to Circassia.⁶⁷ His second step was to break up the rival coalition consisted of the sons of Mehmed Giray II, Ulu-Nogays who were supported by Russians and the Don Cossacks. He convinced the Sultan to declare an amnesty for the sons of Mehmet Giray II. His policy was so successful that even Murad Giray, the puppet Khan of Astrakhan, wanted to return to the Crimea.⁶⁸ But his policy vis-à-vis the Nogays was partially successful. He dissuaded the Nogays from the Russian influence but could not win them in his cause.⁶⁹ Therefore, the Volga region in a sense was left completely to the hands of the Russians.

The Cossack raids that brought the Ottomans on the brink of a war with Poland–Lithuania (spring 1588) was another problem that Gazi Giray faced upon his accession. The death of Stephan Bathory in 1586 relaxed the Polish control on the borders. The Zaporozhian Cossacks that benefited from the situation began to cause problems in the border area. As a result of the Cossack raids, the Sultan ordered the mobilisation of the forces in the border. The Ottomans started the construction of a new fort at the mouth of river Dnieper, the usual place of passing for Cossacks. Finally, the Porte decided to combine the sanjaks of Özü, Bender and Akkerman in to one larger sanjak to block the penetration of Cossacks to the Black Sea.⁷⁰ Bora Gazi

⁶⁷ Rıza, *Al-Sab' al-sayyar*, p.108.

⁶⁸ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.102. Murad Giray died of poisoning sometime around 1590; thereafter Russians and Tatars accused each other of murdering him.

⁶⁹ Ibid.p.104. Some of the Nogay Mirzas responded positively to the amnesty and left Astrakhan but did not want to subjugate to the Crimean Khan. Therefore they asked for the Ottoman intervention but the Sultan did not interfere and let the decision to the Khan.

⁷⁰ BOA, Mühimme Defterleri, 64/365 (Zi'l-Hicce 996/Nov.1588).

was ordered to raid into Podolia in order to punish the Poles and the Cossacks.⁷¹ Ottomans and Polish-Lithuanians were very close to war but the situation had radically changed on 17 Cemaziyü'l-evvel 997/3 May 1589 when the Sultan replaced Siyavuş Pasha with Koca Sinan Pasha after a janissary revolt. The Polish-Lithuanians felt compelled to accept Ottoman conditions under the threat of an attack that became inevitable. Since the Ottoman-Safavid war was very likely to end with an Ottoman victory the Ottomans seems to have more troops to use against Polish-Lithuanians. A preliminary agreement was made on 15 May 1590 and confirmed in the following year.⁷² Now, the Ottomans could turn their attention to the Hungary where the tension between the Ottomans and Habsburgs was increasing. Polish-Lithuanian turned to its internal affairs, mainly to the Cossacks that began to pose a threat for them. Bora Gazi making use of the situation came to an agreement with Polish-Lithuanian.⁷³

Bora Gazi had one other task to accomplish: to settle the situation with Muscovy. It was already noted that under their energetic Tsar Ivan IV, the Russians engaged an offensive in the Caucasus and tried to put a puppet regime in the Crimea during and after the revolt of Mehmed Giray II. The new Tsar Feodor (1584-1598) and especially the regent and future tsar Boris Godunov (1598-1605) continued their activities. In the Caucasus, they attacked Dagestan and tried to increase their influence among the Circassian tribes. The increasing Cossack raids in the area between Azov

⁷¹ *Selanik I*, p.214. He notes that after the successful raid, the Khan was rewarded with a jewelled sword and a robe.

⁷² Hrushevsky argues that the agreement was signed as a result of the Ottoman unwillingness to fight because of the Cossack raids. Hrushevsky, *A History*, p.181. This statement did not seem to be realistic.

among the Circassian tribes. The increasing Cossack raids in the area between Azov (Azak) and the Northern Caucasus caused great concern both in Istanbul and the Crimea.⁷⁴

Apart from Ottomans, Bora Giray found a new ally against Muscovy: Sweden that claimed Baltic lands in order to control the trade of Muscovy.⁷⁵ The Swedish King sent an ambassador to the Crimea and promised rich gifts and subsidies. He assured that he would send a large Swedish army in the North in order to take the bulk of the Muscovite army from the capital. Muscovy that heard the preparations of the war sent an ambassador to the Khan. However, the efforts of the ambassador, Bibikov, remained fruitless. On 11 January 1591, his property was confiscated because the Tsar failed to send an adequate gift of furs to the Khan and he contacted with the Müftü of the Crimea without the consent of the Khan. On 5 May 1591, he was notified that the Khan was preparing an attack on Polish-Lithuanians and Russians could realise that the campaign was against Muscovy only at the end of July.⁷⁶ On 13 July 1591, the Crimean attacked the capital defended by the Muscovite forces including Lithuanian and German mercenaries. After one day of fierce combat without result, the Khan suddenly decided to withdraw.⁷⁷ It was mainly because he realised that it was futile to attack to a well- fortified town. However, Russian

⁷⁴ Under Godunov's leadership Muscovy made important gains in the south he founded new outposts on Don, Donets and Volga rivers even one appeared on the river Terek. Robert O. Crummey, *The Formation of Muscovy 1304-1613*, New York, 1987, p.208. He argues that the outposts were built for two purposes. Firstly to counter the Crimean raids and to control the unruly Cossacks.

⁷⁵ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.110.

⁷⁶ Ibid. p.110.

⁷⁷ Ibid. p.111.

historians considered the withdrawal as a complete defeat and attributed it to the effective defence system established by Muscovy that consisted of a connected set of small fortifications.⁷⁸ In general the Russian approach was not wrong because this was the last time that the Crimean forces attacked directly to Moscow. The Crimean cavalry was not effective vis-à-vis the fortified towns and the firearms were also an obstacle for them.⁷⁹ The Khan who was wounded in the war returned to the Crimea on 9 August 1591 on a cart. The Kalghay Feth Giray had already returned at the end of July.

The Sultan reacted negatively to this withdrawal and accused him of having dishonoured the accompanying Ottoman troops.⁸⁰ Meanwhile, the Muscovite envoy in the Crimea, Bibikov, was treated kindly. The Khan informed him that the raid was overdue.⁸¹ It was understood that the conflict had three reasons: First the Cossack raids, second the Russian activities and third the sending of *Tiyiṣ* (Tıyş) to the Khan by Muscovy. When the Tsar declined to come to an agreement, the Kalghay Feth Giray attacked Ryazan and Tula, south of Moscow. The raid was very successful and he returned with lot of captives.⁸² Finally, Muscovy realised that under the threat of a

⁷⁸ For example see: Smirnov, *Krımskoye Hanstvo*, p.445. He argues that Turco-Tatar historiography neglects the defeat and did not even talk about the campaign. Also Robert O.Crummey, *The Formation*, p.207.

⁷⁹ The Russian version of the withdrawal is that the Tatars were discouraged by the effective use of defence made by the arquebuses and to the news that the Khan acquired about the arrival of Russian army from north from the prisoners. In Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.120.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*p.120.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*p.111.

two frontal war it was necessary to consent Crimean demands. On October 1593 the Muscovite ambassador Prince Shcherbatov made a preliminary agreement with Ahmed Agha (the Bash Agha or the Crimean equivalent of Vizier). The Tsar accepted to send a *gift* (10.000 rubles) to the Khan under the condition that the Khan, the Kalghay and other beys agreed not to attack Muscovite territory during the summer of 1594. Furthermore the Tsar would remove the Cossacks from Don and Terek.⁸³ Distribution of the *gift* caused a conflict between the Khan and Kalghay which testifies that how fragile was the Crimean politics. The Kalghay accused the Khan of having received too much money and he stated that very soon the Khan would go to Hungary and he would remain in the Crimea and attack Muscovy next summer.⁸⁴ Meanwhile, Muscovite diplomacy was also active in Istanbul. The Muscovite envoy Podjacy asked to destroy the forts on the Terek River and the activities of the Cossacks and of course to return of Kazan and Astrakhan. But these were promises that would never be kept.⁸⁵ After the agreement the Khan could join the Hungarian campaign that the Sultan was asking him for a long time and the Tsar could concentrate on northern affairs.

⁸² Ibid.p.111. The Russian defence system was not always effective to check the Tatars but it should be noted that on the eve of a war with Sweden, Russians could not afford much power to control the southern frontier.

⁸³ Ibid.p.113. Russian answer to the question was traditional that the Cossacks were fugitives that acted contrary to the wishes of the Tsar.

⁸⁴ Ibid.p.113.

VII Gazi Giray II and the Ottoman-Habsburg War (1593-1606)

Bora Gazi was now ready to join the Ottoman campaign in Hungary. He secured the frontiers by agreements with Muscovy and Polish-Lithuanian. The Clans were not against him and were willing to join the campaign that promises much booty. However, the Cossacks could still pose a problem while the army was out of the Crimea. The Papacy and Habsburgs that aimed to form an anti-Ottoman league contacted several powers. While the greater forces, namely Venice, Spain, Poland and Moscow remained aloof, the smaller ones, Transylvania, Danubean principalities and Zaporozhian Cossacks were sympathetic to revolt against Ottomans and Tatars.⁸⁶ The Papal envoy Alexander Komulovich could not contact directly the Cossacks and the Cossacks ignored the mediation of the Poles. However, the Cossacks welcomed Emperor's representative Erich Lassota in 1594.⁸⁷ The Cossacks accepted the terms and attacked the Ottoman territory in Moldavia. The attack caused the intervention of

⁸⁵ İnalçık, "The Origins", p.97. Kortepeter gives the name of Russian envoy as Naschokin in: *Ibid.* p.114. He also notes that in 1594 the Russian envoy Islenyev argued that the Circassians and Dagestanis were the subjects of the Tsar that fled long ago to Northern Caucasus.

⁸⁶ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.133.

⁸⁷ Hrushevsky, *A History*, p.185. He notes that Lassota presented gifts from the Emperor Rudolph II, a flag bearing the imperial emblem, silver horns and eight thousands marks. He also notes that an envoy

the Polish-Lithuanians and defeated the Cossacks. The Polish victory caused to the pacification of the Cossacks until the end of the war.⁸⁸ There are still some reports about the small problems caused by the Cossacks while the Crimean army was on its way to Hungary.⁸⁹

The Khan had now one other problem: how to go to Hungary. The Khan had two options that were previously used by the Tatars to go to Hungarian plains: the first one across Moldavia and Wallachia and then along the southern shores of Danube, the other through southern Poland and across Transylvania.⁹⁰ Under normal circumstances, the Danubian route was easier. The Khan preferred the second one because of the unsettled situation in the Danubian principalities as a result of the activities of Papacy and Habsburgs.⁹¹ Katip Çelebi has written a chapter about the journey of the Khan and also there is the personal letter of the Khan to the Kefevi Mevlana Hüseyin Efendi in the history of Selaniki with the help of which it is possible to understand the course of the events.⁹² Since, he considered using the Danubian route riskier he decided to go through Poland. In 8 Şevval 1002/28 April 1594 the

from Muscovy had also come because the Emperor thought that the Cossacks were the subjects of the Tsar.

⁸⁸ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.134. Hrushevsky argues that Zaporozhian Cossacks that agreed with the Emperor attacked to Ottoman cities not to Moldavia but it was the Cossacks of Semerin Nalivaiko (?-1597), a Cossack leader in Volynia that attacked to Moldavia. Later the Zaporozhians also joined him and they have forced the Moldavian Hospodar Aaron to break with Turks and join to the Emperor. Ibid. pp.184-186.

⁸⁹ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, pp.136-143.

⁹⁰ Ibid.p.137.

⁹¹ *Peçevi II*, p.137. He notes that the Khan passed the river Turla (Dniester) and then the Polish territory and appeared near the fort Solnuk (Szolnok?). İnalçık quoting from Naima argues that the Khan made an unprecedented move and send his army from Polish and Transylvanian territories in Halil İnalçık, "Gazi Giray II", *LA*, IV, p.735

army entered the Polish territory. They stormed the country successfully that they took the revenge of the damage inflicted to all Crimea. When the army passed the passage called Balkan they saw that its mouth was blocked. Transylvanian Voivode Sigismund Bathory (1581-1602) ordered to Kaspar Kornis, commander of the castle, to close the passage. Kaspar Kornis choose the castle Host (Huszth) that was located on the river Tisza (Theiss) near the pass still called "Tatars pass" or Per Yablonitse to stop the Tatar army. The pass was on the Carpathian Mountains and connected Prut with Tisza; Tatars could easily reach the Hungarian plains through it.⁹³ After *müşavere*, the Khan decided to attack the enemy that blocked the pass on foot and the enemy was defeated so badly that they could even not reach the castle. In Hungary the Tatar expeditionary forces were attacked in Devirşin (Debrecen?) by the forces of Baştuvan, a Hungarian commander, and defeated them.⁹⁴

On 24 Zi'l-kade 1002/11 August 1594, Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Pasha ordered a full-dress parade in honour of the arrival of the Khan.⁹⁵ After the formalities they went to the tent of Sinan Pasha and feasted together. The fact that the Grand Vizier had seated the Khan on his right that means to treat him as his equal seemed unfit to some people.⁹⁶ Theoretically, the Khan was a ruler whose ancestors possessed

⁹² *Selaniki II*, pp.399-404. Also in Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, Istanbul, 1871, pp.34-35.

⁹³ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.140.

⁹⁴ Katib Çelebi states that the Crimeans were attacked in Debrecin near Düştüyal by Baştuvan the Hungarian. Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke.*, p.34.

⁹⁵ According to the reports of Lassota, the envoy of the emperor, the Khan began his journey around 18th of June with 80.000 men that only 20.000 were warriors. While the Khan was accompanied two of his sons the Kalghay remained with 15.000 to protect the Crimea. In Kortepeter, *Ottoman ...*, p.139. Peçevi gives the date of the parade as 19 Zi'l Ka'de 1002/6 August 1594. *Peçevi II*, p.138.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* p.139. In Khan's letter there is not reference to this event.

rights of Hutbe and Sikke (he still had the right of Sikke) and was higher than the Grand Vizier. But the Khan was a practical man and did not pay attention to this action. However, this scene could be considered as an example of the changing relations between the Crimeans and Ottomans. The equilibrium began to change in favour of the latter.⁹⁷ After the feast, the Khan received a number of gifts and 5.000 gold pieces as *Teşrif-i Kudüm*.⁹⁸ The presence of the Khan was very important for the Ottomans. The Tatar cavalry increased the striking force of the Ottoman army and the fame of the Crimean army to be invincible provided them a psychological supremacy.⁹⁹ The Khan had also many advantages to join the campaign. First, the Khan true to his name Gazi was a believer of the Ghaza. Second, the campaign promised much booty and gifts that he could use to satisfy his Beys and Mirzas. Third, he was aware of the fact that the disobedience could cost him very expensive; the intrigues of the Porte could replace him with another Khan. However, there was a conflict between the Serdar and the Khan and some other commanders. The Serdar who wanted to incorporate the region within the Timar system did not allow the Tatars to apply the “scorched earth” policy that meant lesser raids and lesser booty.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Peçevi gives two other examples; first one is during the Wallachian (Moldavian?) campaign (1538) of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566) that the Sultan treated the Khan Sahib Giray I (1532-1551) as an equal and called him his brother. The second is about Cambek Giray Khan (1610-1623, 1624 and 1627-1635) that kissed the hands of Kaptan Hasan Pasha. Ibid.pp.138-139.

⁹⁸ Teşrif-i Kudüm refers to the money given to Khan when he join to the campaign the amount of the gift varied according to the importance of the campaign.

⁹⁹ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.139. In his letter to the Sultan the Grand Vezir that talked about the hardships in the front requested the immediate arrival of the Khan. Selaniki Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i ...*, p.347.

¹⁰⁰ *Peçevi II*, pp.144-145.

The Ottoman forces camped near the river of Raab where the castle of Yanık (Raab) was located at the opposite side on 13 Zi'l Kade 1002/31 July 1594. In his letter, the Khan says that at first he did not want to send the Tatar army to the other side because of the Tabur (enemy fortification) near the river. He argued that the Tatar cavalry was not effective against the fire weapons but the Grand Vizier did not accept his proposal. The following day the Tatars and Janissaries crossed the river and stormed the enemy fortification but they were not successful against the firearms, as the Khan had said before. Finally, the Grand Vizier decided to build a bridge on the river in order to ensure the passage of *Tüfenkçiler*. The final assault of the Tatars supported by the *Tüfekçiler* and the cannons was successful and the fortification was crushed. The defenders of Yanık accepted to surrender on 12 Muharrem 1003/27 September 1594.¹⁰¹ However, the account of other historians is quite different. Since the castle was protected by the river and a moat in the land Tatar cavalry was not effective. It was not the Tatars but it was the *Serdengeçdiler* (enfants perdus) that built the bridges and *Lağımçılar* (sappers) that mined the walls caused to the decline of the castle on 17 Muharrem 1003/2 October 1594.¹⁰² Therefore, the role of the Tatar army that was not effective against the fortifications could not be decisive.¹⁰³

Another confusing point is about the conquest of Papa, a small castle near Raab. The Khan in his letter states that while storming the tabur in Yanık he learned

¹⁰¹ *Selaniki II*, p.404..

¹⁰² *Ibid.* p. 142. He notes that thanks to the grace of the god the fear entered to the hearts of the enemy and they declined.

¹⁰³ Abdülgaffar claims that the Crimeans played the decisive role during the conquest of Yayık. In Abdülgaffar, *Umdet*, p.115.

that soldiers from Papa were attacking the Ottoman forces. Then he decided to send some soldiers to Papa to check the enemy movements. The garrison in Papa decided to surrender when the news about the decline of Yanık arrived and the Khan conquered it at the same day with Yanık. According to Ottoman historians, when the surrender of Yanık became evident the Khan was sent to Papa. The fort was empty and he conquered it without fighting.¹⁰⁴ V.D.Smirnov, depending on the Ottoman historian Gelibolulu 'Ali makes a different interpretation. He argues that the Khan was sent to the Papa because the Grand Vizier did not want to share the glory of the conquest with him but the Khan who founded the fort empty was lucky and the plan of the Grand Vizier failed.¹⁰⁵

After the conquest the army sieged the castle of Komran (Komaron) but since the winter approached the siege was lifted and the Grand Vizier decided to return to winter quarters.¹⁰⁶ The Khan was allowed to go to winter quarter, but 1.000 Tatars remained with the son of the Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha, Beylerbeyi of Budin, in Istoyni Belgrad (Szekeshfehervar) and 1.000 remained in Papa with İdris Pasha, Sancak Beyi of Papa.¹⁰⁷ Whatever was his role in the campaign and his

¹⁰⁴ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p.39.

¹⁰⁵ Smirnov, *Krimskiye*, p.446.

¹⁰⁶ There is a discrepancy between the Ottoman historians about the end of the siege. 'Ali and Hasan Beyzade argued that the Grand Vizier left the siege because he wanted that his son Mehmed Pasha Vizier and Beylerbeyi of Budin conquered the castle. However the defenders of the castle wanted to surrender to Sokulluzade Hasan Pasha and Grand Vizier refused the proposal saying that if they want they should surrender to my son. In *Peçevi II*, p.143. Peçevi opposes to this argument and says that even if the Serdar made such a decision the army would not accept it. However if the statement of 'Ali and Naima is true Smirnov's argumentation about the Grand Vizier's jealousy against Khan became important.

relations with the Grand Vizier, the Khan wanted to make use the situation. The fact that the Khan initially received a promotion of 500.000 akçe shows that he was successful in Hungary but the ratification of the promotion postponed until the end of the campaign.¹⁰⁸ Some historians argues that the Khan relying on his services during the campaign requested the appointment of his brothers as Voivodes of Wallachia and Transylvania but his proposal was rejected by the Porte, mainly by the Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Pasha.¹⁰⁹ Meanwhile, according to Ottoman historian Selaniki a conflict aroused between the Khan and Grand Vizier because of the Grand Vizier's decision to execute some Tatar soldiers who had stolen animals of the *Re'aya*. The fundamental cause of the confrontation was the fact that the Grand Vizier wanted to execute the Tatars without consulting to the Khan.¹¹⁰ The Khan considered this action as interference to his authority as a ruler.

The next year did not promise much to the Ottomans that had to deal with the palace intrigues and the death of the Sultan Murad III (1574-1596). More important was the revolt of the tributary principalities of Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia. The Voivodes of three principalities agreed with the Habsburg Emperor at

¹⁰⁷ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p.40. Also in *Selaniki II*, p.415. On 15 Rebiü'l-evvel 1003/28 November 1594 the Agha of the Khan came to the Porte to ask the permission of the Sultan to allow the Khan to return. The response was that Erdel (Transylvania) was selected his quarter and he was ordered to winter it. The same information exists also in Katip Çelebi.

¹⁰⁸ *Selaniki II*, p.405. He wrote that the Çavuş of the Grand Vizier brought *'arz* (petitions) including those about the Khan to the Porte but the Sultan refused to handle them.

¹⁰⁹ Smirnov, *Krimskoye*, p.446. Smirnov argues that the Khan made the proposal after the conquest of Raab but the Porte that considered it a reflection of the Khan's separatist feelings rejected it. He argues that this proposal was one of the important steps that were going to the dismissal of the Khan in 1596.

¹¹⁰ *Selaniki II*, p. 450. The comment of the Sultan that learned the event is also interesting. The Sultan Mehmed III (1596-1603) said that Grand Vizier was right to protect to re'aya but he should have given the Tatars to the Khan.

the end of 1594.¹¹¹ Voivode Michael Viteazul of Wallachia (1593-1601) made the first break and exterminated the Ottoman creditors.¹¹² Voivode Aaron Tiranul of Moldavia (1591-1594) followed suit.¹¹³ Meanwhile the Sultan had died and Mehmed III (1595-1603) came to the throne. At the time of accession, Ferhad Pasha (1591-1592, 1595) had also replaced Koca Sinan Pasha (1580-1582, 1589-1591, 1593-1595 and 1596) as Grand Vizier. Although the threat was serious Ottomans could not react immediately. Koca Sinan Pasha once more became Grand Vizier, while Ferhad Pasha was on the road to Wallachia. The turmoil had also effected the journey of the Khan. The Tatar army waited until the ice was frozen solid on the Danube and started its journey at the end of January 1595. When they reached the Southern Danube, they realised the critical turn of the situation. The principalities were at revolt, the Ottomans had strong garrison on the region and they were laden with booty that meant they were less manoeuvrable. The Tatars that crossed the Danube and entered Wallachia were attacked by the forces of Voivode Michael and defeated severely.¹¹⁴ When the Tatars returned to the South of Danube they came across with Mustafa Pasha, former Beylerbeyi of Maraş, who was going to install Bogdan (Boğdan Beyzadesi) to the seat of Moldavian Voivode.¹¹⁵ There is also reference to the

¹¹¹ *Peçevi II*, p.146. He notes the influence of the Pope (Clement VIII) in the realisation of the plan.

¹¹² *Ibid.* pp.147-150 and Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p.42.

¹¹³ *Peçevi II*, p.147.

¹¹⁴ *Selaniki II*, p.450. He states that the Khan had entered to Moldavia despite the fact that there is a revolt. During the night he was attacked by the enemy consisted of Vlachs, Transylvanians, Poles and Hungarians. He could just manage to escape and reached to Rusçuk (Ruse) and Silistre (Silistria). According to the reports of the Venetian Bailo, Marco Venier, on 20 February 1595 24.000 Tatars that entered in to Wallachia were attacked after two days and massacred. Another report states that the Tatars entered Wallachia from Nicopolis. In an other report it is stated that the Khan was wounded in arm a treated by a barber in Silistria. Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.144.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.* p.144. It is also stated from the Italian reports that the Khan upon the generous promises of Bogdan detached some 4.000 Tatars to him. In another report it was stated that one of the sons of the Khan that went with Bogdan died in the war. In the Ottoman accounts the meeting with Bogdan does

Crimean forces that remained to protect the peninsula. Ottoman historian Selaniki notes that the Khan send a letter to the Porte. In the letter he wrote that the enemy: Transylvanians, Poles and Russians gathered numerous soldiers to support the revolt of the Danubian principalities. He urged the Grand Vizier Ferhad Pasha to immediately send a fleet to Özü (Ocakov) to help to the passage of 100.000 Tatar soldiers commanded by Kalghay Feth Giray to the Balkans.¹¹⁶ As a result, the Grand Vizier ordered to the Kapudan Pasha Halil to send a fleet to Ocakov on May 1595. However Halil Pasha failed to send the navy to Ocakov and this time Şa'ban Pasha, Beylerbeyi of Cezayiri Garb was appointed to perform the duty.¹¹⁷ On September 1595 it was reported that the Crimean forces successfully crossed the Balkans.¹¹⁸

The Khan spent the summer of 1595 in the Crimea. During the summer the Ottomans were not successful. While the Grand Vizier Sinan Pasha was unsuccessfully trying to put pressure on Wallachia the Habsburg sieged Estergon (Gran) and forced it to capitulate and Sigismund Bathory, the Prince of Transylvania sieged the castle of Temeşvar (Temesvar).¹¹⁹ The Ottomans could lose Moldavia and

not exist instead Peçevi accuses Mustafa Pasha because he did not wait the Khan that was around. *Peçevi II.*, p.146. Bogdan and Mustafa Pasha were unsuccessful and were defeated and killed by the rival Voivode Aaron.

¹¹⁶ *Selaniki II*, p.476. The reference to the large armies of the Poles and Russians in the letter is interesting because the Poles did not involve to the war because they feared from the Habsburg encroachment in the region and pursued a status-quo policy. The Russians that were dealing with the problems in the North did not join the war. The reference could have done because the Ottomans thought that the Danubian principalities could not revolt without the assistance of a foreign power or what was meant by the Russians and Poles was the Cossacks. Selaniki states that the morale of the army was very low because of the rumours about the large Polish and Russian forces that were coming to help the rebels. *Ibid.*p.482.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.* p.483.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*p.508. He also notes that Şaban Pasha was appointed the Beylerbeyi of Trablusşam.

Wallachia to Transylvania.¹²⁰ Under these circumstances, the Ottomans made a radical decision and decided to change the status of Moldavia and Wallachia. The two principalities that existed as buffer states until now would be incorporated in to the Ottoman system and became Beylerbeyiliks. Satırcı Mehmed Pasha was appointed to be the first Beylerbeyi of Eflak (Wallachia). Since, the Khan's presence was very important for the Ottomans; he was able to manoeuvre. Despite the fact, he was one of the most Ottomanised Crimean Khans; he had ambitions for his power. He asked from the Porte the appointment of his brothers or someone from his family to the Beylerbeyiliks of Wallachia and Moldavia.¹²¹ The Porte could make some concessions and accept his proposal at this critical point. The Khan who entered to Moldavia easily defeated the forces of Sigismund Bathory Prince of Transylvania and Stephan Razvan Voivode of Moldavia.¹²² In order to announce the victory the Khan sent a committee to the Porte. The committee stated that the re'aya of Moldavia declined to the Khan and accepted to capture and to return the rebel Voivode to the Khan. More important, the re'aya stated that from now on they would prefer that the Voivode be a Muslim and most preferably one of the Mirza's of the Khan.¹²³ The

¹¹⁹ The Tatars were heavily criticised after the fall of Estergon because they did not come to the rescue of the besieged castle and accuses those in the castle to flee. Poet, Abdi Çelebi, feels sorry because they were in a position to ask the help of the Tatars during the siege. Refer to the poem of Abdi Çelebi in *Selânikî II*, pp. 519-523. However there were only some 1.000 Tatars in Papa. It seems that there was a great conflict between the Tatars and the Ottoman regulars and the Tatars were the scapegoats.

¹²⁰ The Voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia accepted the Voivode of Transylvania their overlord and joined to the anti-Ottoman Holy League. For the politics of the period refer to; Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, Aurel Decei, "Boğdan", *IA*, II, pp.697-705, Aurel Decei, "Eflak", *IA*, IV, pp.178-189 and Aurel Decei and M.Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Erdel", *IA*, IV, pp.293-306.

¹²¹ The issue about the Khan's proposal is not clear. Ottoman historians did not refer to the proposal after the conquest of Raab. If Smirnov is right it was Khan's second proposal.

¹²² Sigismund Bathory suspected Aaron Tiranul, Voivode of Moldavia, cooperated with the Ottomans and killed him and replaced with Stephen Razvan (Dönme Rıdvan) in 1594. Aurel Decei, "Boğdan", p.780.

¹²³ "Bu eşnada tatar han gazi giray namesi ile ağaları gelüb han 'asker-i tatar ile boğdan'a dahil olub re'ay a iṭṭa'at inkiyada kail ve ba'ış-i fesad olan mihal ile mürte-dd rızvanī ele getürmeğe mütekeffil

Porte did not consider the proposal convenient because in case of the appointment a relationship between the Crimea and Moldavia would be established and the Crimean Khans would have a right on Moldavian affairs in the future.¹²⁴

Bora Giray's activities in Moldavia did not end after the refusal of his project. This time with the consent of the Porte he managed an agreement with the Poles for the appointment of the new Voivode. Polish-Lithuanians that tried to remain out of the turmoil were alarmed upon the news of the Ottoman-Tatar advance in Wallachia and Moldavia because they wanted neither the Habsburgs to penetrate in the region nor to see the Danubian principalities turned to Ottoman Beylerbeyiliks. In Moldavia, the Polish forces commanded by the Chancellor, Jan Zamoyski, tried to check Tatar influence.¹²⁵ Meanwhile, Bora Giray accompanied by Kalghay Feth Giray arrived at Bender (Tehine) to join the Sancak Beyi Ahmed.¹²⁶ Together they marched to Moldavia in order to make Ahmed Bey the Voivode of Moldavia and then to go to Wallachia.¹²⁷

oldukların b'ade-l-yevm ümera-i tataran biri kendülere hâkim naşb olunmak istida' ittiklerin namesinde derc idüp ağaları daği ağızdan taqrir itdi ama bu tevcihe irza virilmeyüb iğmaz olundu." KatipÇelebi, *Fezleke*, pp.61-62. *Peçevi II*, p.162.

¹²⁴ *Peçev II*, p.162. It is very interesting that the Moldavians themselves asked the appointment of Khan's candidate. It seems that the Khan knew the politics of the region and made a compromise with the Boyars of Moldavia.

¹²⁵ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.145.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.* p.145. He also notes that according to the European reports Ahmed bey was a relative of the Khan, the son of his sister. In *Selaniki* there is a reference to an Ahmed Pasha, man of the Khan, Sancak Beyi of Silistre. Since Bora Gazi received estates in Silistria after 1598 he could be the same Ahmed. *Selaniki II*, p.782, 785,797.

The Tatar and Polish army met at the juncture of Cecora (Tutova) and Prut rivers. Both armies did not want a full-scale combat and after a while the negotiators from both sides met and concluded an agreement.¹²⁸ According to the Cecora agreement signed on October 22 1595, the parties agreed to recognise Jeremia Movila (1595-1600) the Voivode of Moldavia. It was also agreed that the Poles and Moldavians would suffer no damage and the Tatars would evacuate Moldavia in three days while the Poles promised to eliminate the Zaporozhian Cossack raids.¹²⁹ As a result, the Khan was able at least to seat a pro-Ottoman as well as pro-Tatar candidate to the throne that can be considered as an attempt to increase the Crimean influence in Moldavia with the support of the Poles and the confirmation of the Sultan. Since the agreement was subject to the approval of the Porte, Ahmed Agha Vizier of the Khan was sent to Istanbul. On 25 Rebiü'l-evvel 1004/28 November 1595 the Porte confirmed the appointment.¹³⁰ Meanwhile the Grand Vizier, unsuccessful and defeated, was withdrawing from Wallachia. In his report to the Sultan he argued that the Khan's failure to come to his help was one of the reasons of his defeat.¹³¹ The Ottoman plan was that the Grand Vizier would quieten Wallachia while the Khan did the same in Moldavia and together they would go to Transylvania. Thus, the Grand Vizier may be right because the Khan might have thought that the Grand Vizier would

¹²⁷ Ibid.p.145. According to a letter wrote by a certain Siaban Pasha the Vizier of the Khan.

¹²⁸ Ibid.p.145. The chief negotiator for the Khan was Uluğ-Ağa Ahmed.

¹²⁹ Ibid.p.145. It is also interesting to note that the Chancellor surprised very much that the Khan accepted easily he agreement when he accepted to eliminate the Zaporozhian Cossacks raids. It is possible that the Khan already knew that the Porte would not allow his candidate to become Voivode regarded the security of the Crimea and tried to receive a guarantee from the Poles for his own benefit when he was out of the peninsula. The reaction of the Khan is also interesting because it shows the effects of the Cossack threat to the Crimean Tatars.

¹³⁰ *Selaniki II*, p.540.

¹³¹ Ibid.p.533. The other reasons were the undisciplined Kapıkulu, the wrong actions of the former Grand Vizier Ferhad Pasha.

be successful in Wallachia and he waited for the instructions of the Grand Vizier after pacifying Moldavia. Or he might have waited because he wanted that the Grand Vizier be unsuccessful in order to obtain some concessions from the Porte. The Sultan did not accept the pretexts of the Grand Vizier and dismissed him.¹³² The Khan took the winter quarters around Bender (Tehine) and Akkerman (Belgorod) and continued to interfere with the politics of the Danubian principalities. After a surprise attack, Ottoman and Tatar forces defeated the Wallachian forces. According to Selaniki, Michael Vitezaul, Voivode of Wallachia (1593-1601) sought the mediation of Kalghay Feth Giray to remain in his post.¹³³ The Tatar forces successfully served the Ottoman causes and balanced the Habsburg and Transylvanian bid in the region.¹³⁴

The Ottomans who were not successful during the year 1595 wanted to change the situation in 1596. The Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Pasha persuaded the Sultan to go to campaign personally but soon after he died and Damad Ibrahim Pasha (1596) and (1596-1597 and 1599-1601) became the Grand Vizier. The Imperial army under the command of the Sultan camped in Belgrade. The Ottomans made a courageous decision and decided to attack the castle of Eğri (Erlau) that controls the narrow passage between Austria and Transylvania in order to cut their

¹³² The new Grand Vizier was Lala Mustafa Pasha (1595) the tutor of the Sultan in Manisa. He died soon and once again Koca Sinan Pasha became Grand Vizier.

¹³³ *Selaniki II*, p.564. At the beginning the Ottoman wanted to seat son of the former Voivode Mihnea II (1585-1591) Radu (Radval) but Michael that thought the expedition was against him and sent his excuses to the Porte in order to remain Voivode.

¹³⁴ Selaniki gives many examples of successful Tatar raids in the region. *Ibid.* p.590, 597, 603. He also notes that the Tatar Khan received 30.000 hasene sikke, a jewelled sword and robes in order to go to campaign. He denotes that this excessive sum was not traditional. It became a rule only after the Tatars contribution to the Safavid war. It is possible to understand the inevitability of the Tatar presence in the war for the Ottomans.

communications.¹³⁵ A Tatar army under the command of Kalghay Feth Giray was also present in the siege.¹³⁶ The Imperial army succeeded and forced the defenders of Erlau to decline on 19 Sefer 1005/12 October 1596. The Khan did not personally come to the siege but he remained in Wallachia and ravaged the region.¹³⁷ He kept busy Wallachians with his diversionary tactics during the siege.

While the Ottomans were in the siege of Erlau the Habsburg managed to penetrate in the marshlands of the area and began to pose a serious threat to the Ottoman army. The Ottoman Divan decided that it is not feasible to wait the Habsburgs in Erlau and the army marched towards the enemy camp. The Tatars were to be *Çarhacı* or *Pişdar* (Pioneers) of the army.¹³⁸ Cağalazade Sinan Pasha and Beylerbeyi of Diyarbakır Murad Pasha (Kuyucu) would be the commanders of the pioneers and the Tatars would be behind them.¹³⁹ Both Cağalazade and Kalghay played the decisive role during the combat. The Tatar forces at a critical point were able to attack the enemy fortification from the rear and to draw sufficient numbers of the enemy from the fortification. While the main body of the army pushed back the

¹³⁵ Peçevi argues that the main objective was to control the mines around Erlau. *Peçevi III*, p.179. Katip Çelebi notes that the objective was to control the mines. However he also notes that initially some Viziers wanted to attack Transylvania but it was not accepted because the land was muddy and forested and after the news about the siege of Hatwan (Hatvan). Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p.71.

¹³⁶ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p.78. Selaniki notes that Kalghay Feth Giray was ready with 10.000 cavalries. *Selaniki II*, p.625.

¹³⁷ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.149. In a letter written by the Khan to Jeremia Movila, Voivode of Moldavia, about the exchange of prisoners on 26 December 1596. Selaniki noted that the Khan did not come to the front in order to check the forces of Michael Vitezaul, Voivode of Wallachia. *Selaniki II*, p.637.

¹³⁸ The Tatar forces served as *Pişdar* or *Çarhacı* in the Ottoman army. Especially after the defeat of Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Pasha in Wallachia the Ottoman *Akıncı* forces disappeared and the Tatars assumed their roles.

enemy Cağalazade that waited in the trap defeated them.¹⁴⁰ The Ottoman victory in Haçova (Mezo-Keresztes) on 5 Rabi I 1005/26 October 1596 was the sole ground battle that had a definite outcome during the 1593-1606 Ottoman-Habsburg war. The Ottoman won a decisive victory like the one in Mohaç (Mohacs) in 1526.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p.86 and *Peçevi II*, p.185.

¹⁴⁰ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, pp.86-93, *Selaniki II*, p.643-648 and *Peçevi II*, pp.182-186.

¹⁴¹ Peçevi argues that if the Sultan remained in the front the gains of the battle would be numerous *Peçevi II*, p.186.

VIII The dismissal of Gazi Giray II and the reign of Feth Giray

1596

Cağalazade Sinan Pasha benefited from his decisive role in Haçovası, he convinced the Sultan to appoint himself as Grand Vizier.¹⁴² The short Grand Vizierate of Cağalazade influenced the Crimean affairs very much. Cağalazade's decision to dismiss Gazi Giray II and to make Feth Giray the Khan of Crimea caused a tragedy.¹⁴³ Cağalazade Sinan Pasha had enough pretexts to dismiss the Khan. First of all, he did not join the campaign of the Sultan in person despite all the invitations. Moreover, he sent less force than he was asked for. More important was the fact that his grandiose plans on Wallachia and Moldavia caused a great concern in the Porte. The new Sultan Mehmed III (1595-1603) was not familiar with Bora Giray. In contrast, however, the former Sultan Murad III (1574-1595) had been a personal friend of the Khan. Thus the Sultan could easily fire the Khan who did not come to the front and suspected that he had separatist tendencies. There is also at least one Ottoman historian, 'Asafi, who

¹⁴² Cağalazade Sinan Pasha that arrived to the tent of the Sultan before the Grand Vizier Damad İbrahim Pasha stated that he was the primary actor of the victory. Since Hoca Sa'deddin, the tutor of the Sultan, and Gazanfer, Kapu aghası, supported him the Sultan agreed to make him Grand Vizier. However it is also stated that later the Sultan changed his mind and did not want to replace Damad İbrahim Pasha but in fear of a revolt he confirmed the Grand Vizierate of Cağalazade. Peçevi stated that Kapu Agahası Gazanfer was a compatriot of Cağalazade and supported his cause. Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p.93 and *Peçevi II*, p.191.

¹⁴³ Ottoman historian Peçevi considered the short Grand Vizierate of Cağalazade, less than two months a time of troubles. His decision about Crimea and his treatment of the soldiers that fled from the battle of Haçova considered as a catastrophe. *Peçevi II*, p.192 and Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p.94.

mentioned that there was a personal animosity between the Khan and Cağalazade.¹⁴⁴ Cağalazade Sinan Pasha served as the Beylerbeyi of Van during the Ottoman-Safavid war (1578-1590). In 1585, while he was in the defence of Tabriz a Safavid army attacked his army. Cağalazade had let himself be tricked by a feigned withdrawal of the enemy, against the advice of Bora Giray, and caused a defeat. 'Asafi wrote that Cağalazade did not listen to advises of the Khan because he considered them to be the result of jealousy.¹⁴⁵ It is possible that Cağalazade developed a personal animosity against the Khan after this event.

Anyway, the Khan was dismissed and Feth Giray became the Khan at the end of 1596.¹⁴⁶ The immediate reason of the dismissal was the Khan's failure to join the campaign despite all the invitations made by the Sultan.¹⁴⁷ Bora Giray responded in a letter to the Porte; he claimed that he did not join to the campaign because the Sultan wanted him to protect Wallachia from the threat caused by the rebel Voivode Michael Vitazeul (1593-1601).¹⁴⁸ Some of the Viziers had also supported his argument but the Sultan did not take it in to consideration.¹⁴⁹ Bora Giray in his letter

¹⁴⁴ 'Asafi Mehmed Bey or Defterdar Mehmed Pasha personally been in the war and wrote Şeca'atname that described the Ottoman heroism during the war. He was together with Bora Giray during his captivity in Alamut.

¹⁴⁵ Abdurrahman Şeref, "Özdemiroğlu", pp.1503-1504.

¹⁴⁶ Selaniki wrote that Feth Giray became Khan at the *Evasıt* of Cemaziyü'l-evvel 1005. *Selaniki II*, p.664.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.p.663-664. "... bu gaza vü cihadda guzat u mücahidini ehli İslam bile olmak için kaç kerre hattı hümayunumuz ile da'vet eyledük, her gönderilen ahkama ta'allül ve bahane eyleyüp bu denli muntazır olduk gelüp hizmette bulunmadı ...".

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.p.664. "... vilayeti Eflak içinde Tergovişte nam mahalde fermanı Padişahi ile kesret ve izdihamı leşkeri Tatar memaliki ile memaliki İslamiyye'yi düşmeni dinden muhafaza idüp nıgehban olmak hizmet değil midür ? ..."

to the Viziers argued that the Khans could be deposed under three conditions: bribery, oppression of re'aya and revolt. Since he did not commit any of them, his dismissal was unjust.¹⁵⁰ Therefore, it is possible to argue that the dismissal of the Khan was not an outcome of his absentee in the front but it was rather the result of his personal relationship with the Porte. It has to be underlined that the Sultan was suspicious of his separatist tendencies and the Grand Vizier disliked him. His personal friends in the Porte could not stop his dismissal. In other words, he was victim of a palace intrigue.

At first, Feth Giray did not want to accept the post but when the Sultan stated if he would not accept there were other candidates that are ready to accept. Consequently, Feth Giray had to accept Sultan's offer.¹⁵¹ Despite the support of the Sultan the Khanate of Feth Giray I started very problematic. First he was outside the Crimea with a relatively small force around 20.000 soldiers. More important, the Ottomans were not able to support him (or in other words, to unseat Bora Giray) because they were under the pressure of the Ottoman-Habsburg war (1593-1606). Feth Giray managed to ensure his position. He appointed Baht Giray, son of his brother 'Adil Giray and Nura'l-din of Bora Giray, Kalghay and his brother Selamet Giray Nura'l-din.¹⁵² In turn, he attracted the support of the new appointees, including their relatives. In other words, he established his network of *Nökers*. However his

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.p.663.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. p.664. "Hanlar ma'zul olmaz meğerki üç husus vaki'i ola; biri budurki, irtişa eyleye; ikinci budurki, re'ayaya cevri u zulm eyleye; ve üçüncü, padişahı İslam-penah hazretlerine bagy eyleye. Haşa bende bunların birisi yoktur."

¹⁵¹ Ibid.p.663.

¹⁵² Rıza, *Al-Sab'*, p.108.

brother, Bora Giray, had more advantages since he controlled the home territory. He learned his deposition upon his return from Wallachia to the Crimea.

The dismissal of Cağalazade at the end of 1596 further complicated the events. Damad Ibrahim Pasha became Grand Vizier once again and wanted to reinstall Bora Gazi to the Khanate. A civil strife in the Crimea was inevitable. However, this time there arose a war of Fetvas. Damad Ibrahim Pasha convinced the Sultan and the Divan that the deposition of Bora Giray would cause a great conflict in the Crimea since the Tatars were supporting him.¹⁵³ The Sultan, in contrast, insisted on Feth Giray. Soon a contemporary solution was found that was to satisfy both sides. Two different *Mukarrername* (letter of confirmation), one in the name of Feth Giray and the other in the name of Bora Giray, were prepared and was given to the Müteferrikabaşı Çerkes Handan Agha. Handan Agha had been ordered to observe the tendencies of the Crimean people. He was obliged to give the mukarrername to that candidate who had the largest following. He was also instructed to invite Bora Giray to the capital if Feth Giray had the largest following. It could be considered as a just decision if only Handan Agha was not an *emekdar* (old servant) and friend of Bora Giray. Moreover, Handan Agha came across Bora Giray in Kefe before his departure to Istanbul.¹⁵⁴ As a result Handan Agha, an old friend and servant of Bora Giray, gave

¹⁵³ According to Selaniki a letter from Feth Giray arrived to the Porte. In the letter he wrote that when he arrived in the Crimea the army did not welcome and did not obey him and stated that they want Bora Giray to remain Khan. “Ve bi’l-cümle Hanımızdan hoşnudur, ref’ u nasba ba’is ü sebeb nedir”. *Selaniki II.*, p.677.

¹⁵⁴ There is a disagreement between the historians on the place that Bora Giray and Handan Agha met. Muhammed Rıza wrote that they met in Sinop (Sinope). “Kefe’ye ‘azimetinde rakib olduğu sefine badı muhalif ile limanı sinob’a duhul ve gazi giray dahi ... mahall-i mezburda teşadüf eylediklerinde.” Rıza, *Al-Sab’*, p.109. Another historian Halim Giray Sultan does not refer to meeting. V.D.Smirmov argues that Muhammed Rıza was wrong because according to Naima, Muhammed Rıza’s source, Khan and

him the Mukarrername.¹⁵⁵ Selaniki explained the course of the events in a completely different manner. He said that the Tatar Mirzas mediated between the candidates in order to end the conflict. As a result Feth Giray agreed to abdicate on his will and the aristocracy confirmed Bora Giray's khanate. Meanwhile, Feth Giray went to Kefe (Kafa) to visit his mother upon the permission of the Khan. However, when he arrived at Kefe he put forward the menşur (the ferman of the Sultan) and claimed that he is the legitimate Khan. Then the Tatars turned against Bora Giray and supported Feth Giray. Now Bora Giray was in a difficult situation and wanted to go to Istanbul. At this moment Handan Agha came with the mukarrername, hil'at-ı fahire (valuable robe), and şemşir-i zerrin (jewelled sword) to reinstall Bora Giray to the Khanate. Seeing this, people once again turned to Bora Giray. Feth Giray who was left alone obliged to flee from the Crimea and went to Taman in Circassia to hide.¹⁵⁶ Selaniki precisely reflects the approach of the new administration in Istanbul that preferred Bora Giray to Feth Giray. He stated that the Kurultay approved Bora Giray's khanate, in other words, inclined towards him and Feth Giray abdicated. Therefore, it is possible to say that Handan Agha, who was ordered to give the mukarrername to the choice of the army, was right to give it to Bora Giray.

¹⁵⁵ Muhammed Rıza argues that Handan Agha gave the mukarrername to Bora Gazi in order to obtain a reward. "...teşadüf eylediklerinde handan bi-ıza'n'ın gazi giray ile ülfet-i sabıkası olmağın el'İf-ı lahiğe ümidi ile muğarremesin teslim..." Rıza, *Al-Sab'*, p.109. Halim Giray Sultan argues that Handan gave the mukarrername because he was an emekdar of Bora Giray. "handan ağa ise zaten gazi giray'ın emekdarlarından bulunduğu cihetle ibka beratını doğruca gazi giray han'a teslim itti." Halim Giray Sultan, *Gülbün-i Hanan*, Erzurum, 1990 p.70.

¹⁵⁶ *Selaniki II*, pp. 681-682. The story does not seem to be realistic because the Tatars did not always welcome the choice of the Porte. Therefore Selaniki's explanation of switching allegiance according to the wishes of the Sultan reflects the Ottoman's approach to consider Tatars part of their ordinary re'aya. However it fits to the other events Feth Giray was forced to go to Kefe and received a document from the Sultan that supported him and claimed his khanate. Also the information about the fled of Feth Giray to Circassia is interesting.

According to other historians, the course of the events was more complicated. The Tatars were divided into two opposing parties. Both candidates had a document showing that they were the legitimate khans. Moreover, they brought the issue to the jurisdiction and tried to have a legal base for their claims. Feth Giray applied to the Kadı of Kefe Abdurrahman Efendi. Kadı decided that since the document (Temessük) obtained by Feth Giray was newer (the menşur in Selaniki?), Feth Giray was the legitimate Khan.¹⁵⁷ Meanwhile Bora Giray applied to the Müftü of Kefe, Mevlana Azaki Mehmed Efendi: the supreme religious leader of the country. Apart from being a supporter of Bora Giray the Müftü was able to throw out the decision of the Kadı Abdurrahman Efendi on the basis of a technicality. He argued that the Kadı was correct but the menşur of Feth Giray lacked one thing: the tuğra (imperial seal). Since the tuğra was the great seal of the Sultan upon which the administration of the empire depended, the menşur of Bora Giray that carried the tuğra was the real one. If any would not obey it, he said, this person would be considered as a rebel to the Sultan.¹⁵⁸ The Ottoman historian Naima wrote that as a response to the mukarrername of Bora Giray Feth Giray obtained a new *hatt-ı hümayun*, which stated that he was still the legitimate Khan of the Crimea. The Kadı of Kefe decided that since the document of Feth Giray was newer he was the legitimate Khan. On the other hand the Müftü of Kefe decided that although the

¹⁵⁷ Rıza, *Al-Sab*, p.109. "... manşib-ı kaza olan 'abdu'l-rahman efendi feth giray'ın şofıra tedarik ittiği temessüğü müteahhir olmağla mukarrername oldur deyü hüküm imza etmiş iken ...". Halim Giray, *Gülbün-i*, p.70. He wrote that the Sultan wanted Feth Giray to remain Khan and wrote his hattı hümayun on a special manner.

¹⁵⁸ Rıza, *Al-Sab*, p.109. "... müftüyi belde olan mevlana azaki'nin gazi giray ibka olunması mezağı olmağla ibtida-i zuhur-ı devlet-i 'osmaniye'den ila haze'l-an memaliki mahrusede olan menaşib Tuğrayı emri hümayun ile zabı olunmağın haTT-ı şerif mazmununu müeyyed ferman-ı münif olmadıkça feth giray'ın senedine 'itibar olunmaz ve gazi giray'a iTa'at itmek bağı ü 'işyandır deyü ifta itmekle ..." Halim Giray, *Gülbün-i*, p.70. "... müfti azaki mehmed efendi. haTT-ı hümayun

document of Feth Giray was newer it was not reliable because it lacked the *tuğra* (the seal) of the Sultan that should be taken into consideration.¹⁵⁹ Therefore Bora Gazi became Khan for the second time. The deposition and the appointment of Bora Giray are related to the Ottoman politics rather than to the Crimean affairs. The Sultan and the Grand Vizier Cağalazade Sinan Pasha deposed Bora Giray. The new Grand Vizier Damad Ibrahim Pasha preferred Bora Giray and convinced the Sultan to reinstall Bora Giray. Bora Giray, thanks to his friends in the Porte, obtained the menşur to claim his khanate. Since the bulk of the Crimean aristocracy supported Bora Giray and the supreme religious authority in the Crimea, the Müftü of Kefe who decided in line with the Porte he could become the Khan for the second time.

Apart from all of these technical details, a closer analysis of the events shows that the unfortunate Feth Giray lost his seat and life as a result of the palace intrigues. The tragedy started when Bora Giray made a fatal mistake and decided to send his Kalghay Feth Giray to the first campaign of the Sultan. Former Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Pasha's words in order to convince the Sultan to go to the campaign are very significant and help to understand intrigues of the time. He suggested that without his presence it was impossible to expect a victory. Because if Grand Vizier had been the *Serdar*, the *Kaymakam* (the acting Vizier in the Porte) would try to

imzasız ve mühürsüz olduğundan şer'an ma'mul bih olamayacağı ve binaen'aleyh tarihi muahhar ve tuğrayı hümayun ile mu'anven fermanı 'ali ile hüküm virilmek lazım ve icab ittiğini ...".

¹⁵⁹ "... ve muqarrernamesin izhar idüb hanlık da'vasın 'ilan eyledi feth giray han bu kaziyeyi his ettikde muqaddema çare-cuyluğu taqdim idüb kendiyi hanlıkda taqriri müştamil bir haTT-ı hümayun götürmüştü gazi giray emr-i şerifi ibraz ittikte feth Giray dahi haTT-ı hümayunu izhar idüb hanlık niza'ına düşüb cumu' Tatar iki fırka oldu bi'l-ahire şer'-i şerife müraca'at olundukda müteqallid-i manşib-ı kaza olan 'abdu'l-rahman efendi feth giray'ın temessük ki haTT-ı şerifdir sonra gelmeğin muqarrername oldur deyü gazi giray'ı hanlıktan red itmeği taşrih itmişken kefe müftisi mevlana azaki gazi giray ile ülfetine binaen ibtida zuhur-ı devlet-i 'osmaniyeden bu ana gelince memalik-i islamiye emr-i hümayun ile zabT oluna geldiğinden ma'ada feth giray'ın elinde olan temessük haTT-ı şerif olduğu şübhelidir şayed muşanna' ola eğer mazmununu müeyyed bir emr-i şerif olaydı 'amel olunurdu vela-yalnız haTT ile olmaz i'tibar tuğrayadır öyle olacak müktezayi emr-i hümayun üzere gazi giray

replace him and make intrigues. Or if a Vizier had been the *Serdar* this time the Grand Vizier would intrigue, fearing that he would replace him in case of a success.¹⁶⁰ The Grand Vizier thought that no intrigue would happen since the Sultan would be together with him. Another contemporary source, Baron Wratislaw, provides us with an interesting information. He notes that the *Valide Sultan* (the mother of the Sultan) Safiye Sultan (1550?-1605) did not want that his son goes to the campaign.¹⁶¹ Safiye Sultan opposed the campaign not only because she feared of the damages that might occur in case of a defeat, but also she did not want to loose control over his son, the Sultan. The events that occurred during and after the war of Hacova (Mezo-Keresztes) show that there existed at least two opposing parties in the Ottoman court: the party of Safiye Sultan and the party around Hoca Saadettin (the tutor of the Sultan, 1536-1599).¹⁶² After the war it became obvious that Safiye Sultan was right on her suspicions. His son Mehmed III (1595-1603) who was far away from her influence made changes contrary to her will.¹⁶³ Damad İbrahim Pasha was her protégé and the

han ve iṭa'at itmeyenler 'aşi ve bağıy idiği ...". Naima Mustafa, *Tarih-i Naima*, vol. I., Istanbul, 1280/1863, p.176.

¹⁶⁰ "Padişahım min b'ad kişver-i a'daya serdar ta'yin itmek mahz-ı haṭadır zira ikiden ḥali değıldirki ta'yin olunan ya şadr-ı a'zam veya sair vüzeradan biri ola vezir-i a'zam olursa asitane-i devlette kaim-maḳam olan onun şadaretine Ṭalib olub yüz ağırttığın istemeyüb mühimmat görmekte takşir ittiğü için iş bitmez vüzeradan biri olur ise vezir-i a'zam ḥasede zaḥib olub şayed ḥudmeti maḳbul ola ol ecilden vezaret-i a'zamiye layık görüle deyü ḥavf idüb iş gördüğün murad itmez bu sebebden nice saldirki bunca ḥazain ve 'asakir telef olur maşlaḥat görülmez ...". Naima, *ibid.*, p.140.

¹⁶¹ Wenceslaw Wratislaw, *Baron Wratislaw'ın Anıları*, ed. M.Süreyya Dilmen, Istanbul, 1996, p.148. Wenceslav Wratislaw was a member of the Austrian delegation to Istanbul in 1591. Their unsuccessful mission was to pay the yearly tribute, to renew the peace treaty with Ottomans and to gather information about Ottoman activities. After the beginning of the war they were imprisoned and spent many years in prison. He also wrote that Safiye Sultan was one of those that provided them with information about Ottoman war plans. However the Grand Vizier Damat İbrahim Pasha discovered their reports and covered it up.

¹⁶² One should bear in the mind that the parties were only temporary alliances and could easily change according to the circumstances. For example Hoca Saadettin cooperated with the Grand Vizier Damad İbrahim Pasha to convince the Sultan to go in campaign but it was also him that helped Cağalazade to become Grand Vizier at the expense of Damad İbrahim Pasha. For the formation of parties and the intrigues of the time see; Naima, Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke*,.

husband of her daughter Ayşe Sultan (as well as the sister of the Sultan). Therefore she took the action and wrote a letter to the Sultan, asking the revision of his decisions. As a result Damad İbrahim Pasha reassumed the Grand Vizierate after 45 days. He immediately managed to take his revenge because he considered every action made by his predecessor to be against him and tried to reverse it. Since Feth Giray became Khan thanks to his rivals, he should be punished. Therefore he convinced the Sultan to reappoint Bora Giray as the Khan of the Crimea.

When he lost the throne to Bora Giray, Feth Giray decided to go to Istanbul to save his life. Feth Giray was convinced by some people to visit his brother before leaving the Crimea. It was a fatal decision because during the visit a Mirza from the Mangıt tribe killed him in Nakşı Elvan near Kefe.¹⁶⁴ His Kalghay Baht Giray managed to escape but he was captured and was also killed.¹⁶⁵ The Nura'l-din Selamet Giray that was in Circassia did not interfere to the struggle and saved his life.¹⁶⁶ Feth Giray's khanate lasted only three months. His short life, thirty-nine years at all, gave way to a new contradiction in the history of the Crimean Khanate, the Çobangiray.

¹⁶³Safiye Sultan (Baffo in Western source) was very influential over his son. She played an important role on both the internal and external affairs of the time. She played the key role in the appointments of the high ranked officials. For example Hoca Saadettin could reobtain his status only after the mediation of Safiye Sultan.

¹⁶⁴ Rıza, *Al-Sab'*, p.109 and Halim Giray Sultan, *Gülbün-i*, p.71. He also notes that some historians argued that Feth Giray was killed by the initiative of the Mirzas without the decision of Bora Giray.

¹⁶⁵ Rıza, *ibid*, p.109. Halim Giray gave the name of Kalghay, Devlet Giray but previously he wrote Baht Giray. Halim Giray, *ibid*, p.71. Muhammed Rıza noted that nine children from the family of Feth Giray were also killed.

¹⁶⁶ Rıza, *ibid*, p.110.

IX Feth Giray and the emergence of Çobangiray

According to the tradition, when he was Kalghay Feth Giray captured the daughter of a Polish boyar during a raid. Later he agreed to give back the girl for a ransom and she was sent to Jassy (Yaş) with a Kapu Ağası, Ahmed Agha. Since the required amount was not paid on time the girl and Ahmed Agha stayed in Yaş for a while. When she was returning to Poland she gave birth to a child and died. Feth Giray refused the child and ordered Ahmed Agha to kill the child. However, Ahmed Agha hid the child in Moldavia and brought him to the Crimea after the death of Feth Giray.¹⁶⁷ Since the child worked as a Çoban (shepherd) in the Crimea his branch of the Girays were called Çobangiray. The other Girays did not consider them to be part of the family and tried to hinder the prominence of Çobangirays in the Crimean politics. However, when all members of the Giray family fled from the Crimea in (1623) no one could be found to be Nura'l-din. Thus, one of the sons of the Çobangiray was

¹⁶⁷ The information about the emergence of Çobangirays is contradictory in the sources. 'Abdüllgaffar Kırımı stated that the child was born in Poland and spent his youth there and then fled to Moldavia that he became a shepherd. He also stated that it was the Girays that found and invited him to the Crimea. 'Abdüllgaffar, *Umdet*, p.116. Halim Giray that was a Giray denied that Çobangiray was from Cengiskanid descent. He wrote that Feth Giray did not marry the girl and she became pregnant while she was with Ahmed Agha. The Kalghay ordered the execution of both the girl and the Agha when he learned the incident. Ahmed left the child to a certain Tatar and fled from the Crimea. He could only return after the death of Feth Giray and raised the child that he called Mustafa. Mustafa had two children, Kolbuldı and Çolbuldı. When all the Girays fled from the Crimea and no one remained to make Nura'l-din Mustafa that named Devlet Giray, Kulbuldı that named Feth Giray and Çolbuldı that named 'Adil Giray were incorporated to the Giray family. He considered this act degradation of the Giray dynasty. Halim Giray, *ibid*, p.84.

named Devlet Giray and became Nura'l-din. Only 'Adil Giray became the Khan of Crimea from the Çobangirays (1666-1671).

X The Second Reign of Gazi Giray II (1596-1608)

The second reign of Bora Giray was more difficult. This time he knew that his future depended on his relations with the Porte. He had two options to be secure in his throne. First he had to satisfy the demands of the Porte that was engaged in a long and costly war with the Habsburgs. Second he had to be self reliant in the Crimean throne. Since he was well aware that he would not be able to obtain his previous position in the Porte, he chose to demonstrate the inevitability of the Crimean forces for the Ottoman campaigns.¹⁶⁸ In 1597, he remained in the Crimea despite the fact he was invited to join the campaign, in accordance to the ancient tradition (Usul-i Kadim üzere), by the personal letter of the Sultan. Instead, he managed to contact Christian powers. He sent envoys to Jeremia Movila (Voivode of Moldavia), the King of Poland, Stephan Bathory and Michael of Wallachia in order to re-establish relations and to obtain concessions.¹⁶⁹ He offered an alliance to the King and even hinted to switch his allegiance to the Poles.¹⁷⁰ He threatened Michael of Wallachia to send an appropriate gift or else to suffer devastation worse than 1596. He sought ways to act

¹⁶⁸ Baron Wratslaw has a description about the reputation of the Tatars at that time. He briefly explains how the Tatars terrorised the entire people including the Ottoman forces. The Janissary that accompanied them during their journey to the Austria said that he could not help them if they came across to the Tatars because even his own life would be in danger in such case.

¹⁶⁹ Kortepter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.163.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.* p.163.

as intermediary between the warring parties in return of compensation. For this purpose, after having the consent of the Porte, he exchanged envoys with the Prince of Transylvania Sigismund Bathory.¹⁷¹ The Khan showed himself to be completely disillusioned with the Ottomans. He stated that he spent years in captivity for the Ottomans in Persia and showed his skills at the conquest of Raab. But yet his reward was the dismissal. The Imperial ambassador realised that the Khan was playing a double role, both the promoter of his interests and the delegate of the Sultan.¹⁷² The Habsburgs decided to try their chance and sent a mission to Khan in order to seek the means to convince him to make an alliance with them.¹⁷³ The Khan did not refuse the proposal and sent a Greek, Alexander Paleologus, from his entourage to Prague. Meanwhile, he managed to renew the peace treaty with Muscovy. Once again the Khan did not want to leave the Crimea before he resumed the negotiations with his neighbours and ensured security.

The year 1597 was a failure for the Ottomans. The Grand Vizier Damad Ibrahim Pasha realised that he should remain in the Porte for the safety of his post. Thus, he appointed Satırcı Mehmed Pasha the commander of the Western front but Satırcı Mehmed Pasha accomplished very little. He recovered the castle of Tata or Totis; a small castle that fell to the Habsburgs and marched on Gran (Esztergom or Estergon). But after a Janissary revolt his march came to an end he was forced to enter into negotiations with the Habsburgs on an island in Vaç (Waitzen or Vac). When he

¹⁷¹ Ibid.p.164. The Crimean envoys were Alexander Paleologus and Sefer Agha.

¹⁷² Ibid.p.164.

¹⁷³ Ibid.p.164.

was criticised for his failure he put the blame on the Khan who did not come to the campaign¹⁷⁴ Thanks to this pretext Satırcı Mehmed Pasha saved his post but the Grand Vizier Damat İbrahim Pasha could not save. The Sultan appointed Hadım (Eunuch) Hasan Pasha Grand Vizier in 3 November 1597/23 Rebi'ü'l-evvel 1006. According to Ottoman historians the reason beyond the replacement was the Khan. The Sultan was still angry of Damat İbrahim Pasha because of the death of Feth Giray.¹⁷⁵ Once again it became obvious that Bora Giray was an inevitable element of the Ottoman politics, the conflicting parties used him in their intrigues.

Despite all invitations Bora Giray did not join to the Ottoman campaign until the summer of 1598. Finally, he left the Crimea and went to Hungary following the Danubean route in July 1598.¹⁷⁶ During the journey, he once again contacted the Wallachian and Moldavian Voivodes and threatened them to prepare appropriate gifts for his return or to suffer the consequences. The Habsburgs for their side put a great pressure on the Khan in order to gain him on their side. They argued that the Sultan's provinces in Anatolia were in revolt and it was up to the Khan to make a peace. They urged the Khan to join the Christian League and the partition of the Ottoman lands

¹⁷⁴ “çün saTırcu paşa seferde bir iş görmedi bahaneyeye salık olub memur olan ‘asker cümleden tatar han gelmedi deyü feryadnameler gönderdi.” Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, *Peçevi Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1281-1283/1864-1867, p.209. “çün serdar saTırcı mehmed paşa bu sene tatar han gelmediğinden gayri memur olan ‘askerden daħi gelen kalilü’l-mıkdar idi deyü ‘arz ü ‘itizar itmişdi.” *Naima*, pp.184-185.

¹⁷⁵ “çün serdar bu sene han-ı tatar gelmedüğünden gayri memur olan ‘askerden kalilü’l-mıkdar idü deyü ‘arz ü i’tizar itmişdi padişah-ı ‘alempenah muqaddema han maddesi için şadr-ı ‘azam ibrahim paşa’ya muğberr olub bu defa’a ‘asker varmadığı zamime ve valide sultan Tarafına mumaileyhin takşiri ve hadım’ın bezl-i emvalle iltiyam ve tedbiri ona redif ve tetimme olub bu eşnada müfti bostanzade huzur-ı padişahiye da’vet olunduğda veziri tebdil muradıdır kime tevcih eylesem derler müfti daħi vezir’iñ ‘azli icab ider cürmi var mıdır didikde cürmüne nihayet yok cümleden gazi giray han’ı ibka ittirüb feth giray gibi bir vücuduñ telef ü ifnasına ba’iş oldu buyurdular...” Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p.102. Other Ottoman historians Naima, Selaniki and Peçevi repeat the same information.

and they promised him that he would be able to keep all the lands that he had conquered if he would join the Christian League.¹⁷⁷ One final effort was made in August 1598 Bernardfius, the envoy of the Emperor, received clear instructions. At first, he should try to convince the Khan to join the League. Otherwise, he would try to ensure the neutrality of the Khan by stating that the longer he remained neutral, the more money he would receive. Finally, if the other means failed he was requested to use 10.000 ducats that were already in his disposal to bribe the Viziers in order to disrupt the war efforts.¹⁷⁸ The middleman Sigismund Bathory, Prince of Transylvania, reported that according to the envoy of the Khan in Prague: Alexander Paleologus. Allegedly, the Khan was reluctant to commit himself for an open alliance with the Christians, although he had an inclination because of his religious considerations and his doubts about the reaction of his army.¹⁷⁹ The most important point in the report was that the Sultan asked the Khan to act intermediary between him and the Emperor in order to be free to suppress Celali revolts in Anatolia. The Khan once again tried to make use of the situation in order to obtain the maximum of what he can get by playing a double role.

The Porte was now in a serious danger since to suppress the Celali revolts required a large army. The Khan could make use of the situation if he would not be under the indirect pressure of the Celalis in a recent future. For the moment the mediation or the forces of the Khan were extremely needed by the Ottomans. The

¹⁷⁶ Korteper, *Ottoman*, p.165. *Selaniki II*, p.752.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*p.165.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*p.166.

Khan joined the Ottoman forces on 26 Muharrem 1007/29 August 1598 in Beçkeray (Beckerek).¹⁸⁰ Ottoman historians wrote that the arrival of the Khan created a positive effect in the army and he and his Mirzas were welcomed and received valuable gifts.¹⁸¹ The Porte aimed to reassure its control over Erdel (Transylvania) for this year because they realised that it would be impossible to control Eflak (Wallachia) and Boğdan (Moldavia) without it. Thus, the Serdar Satırcı Mehmed Pasha received enough provisions and personal letters of the Sultan to the campaign invited the Tatar Khan. The campaign was the last chance for the Serdar Satırcı Mehmed Pasha that last year saved his post and life by accusing the Khan and the bureaucrats in the Porte. Meanwhile the Grand Vizier once again was changed in the Porte. Hadım Hasan Pasha (November 1597-April 1598) that was accused of being too corrupt was executed and Cerrah Mehmed Pasha became Grand Vizier (April 1598-January 1599).

During the *Meşveret Meclisi* (War council) it was decided that it would be better to march first on Transylvania and then to deal with the Habsburg, according to the wishes of the Sultan. Ottoman historians wrote that Bora Giray that was considered to be the expert of the land played an important role on the planning of the

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.p.166.

¹⁸⁰ *Naima*, p.195.

¹⁸¹ "... mah-ı muharremiñ yirmi altıncı günü kırk ellibiñ tatar 'askeri ile ğazi giray han hazretleri gelüb serdar dañi müretteb ve mükemmel alaylar ile istikbal idüb otağına indirdi ve 'azim ziyafetler ve hıla'-ı fahire-i padişahi ile ria'yetler eyledi han hazretleri dañi vaz'-ı mülükane ile serdar ve 'ayan zevi'l-miğdara enva'i nevazeş ve iltifatlar gösterdi b'ade-hu serdar önüne düşüb han hazretlerini ihzar olunan bar-gah'a götürüb döndü serdar otağına karib bir 'ali otağ han için ve bir otağ haremi için kurulub cümle levazımı ihzar olundu ve yüz nefer mirzalar'a hil'at ve han'a mükemmel Taşra ve içerü libasları fahire olmak üzere samur kürkleri ile zer-duz boğçalar içre ve iki mücevher eğerli muraşsa' rahtı at verildi. Ibid.p.195.

campaign.¹⁸² The plan was first to take Varad (Gross Wardein, Nagy Varad, Oredea), the key castle in Transylvania and then to raid the country. The army marched along the rivers Körös and Mörös (Mures or Mureşul) through Transylvania. On the road, they besieged the small castle of Çanat and conquered it without much resistance.¹⁸³ Meanwhile an emissary from Transylvania came to the Tatar army and asked the help of the Khan to make peace with the Ottomans.¹⁸⁴ The Tatar forces left the army after Çanat and used a different road and raided through the country. The siege of the Varad started on 26 Safer 1007/1 October 1598 but soon it became a failure for the Ottoman forces. First of all, the army was late to enter Transylvania. It took four and half month to combine the forces and to arrive in Varad.¹⁸⁵ Second, since it was late the army had to fight with the climate as well as the enemy. Ottoman historians wrote

¹⁸² “... mah-ı muharremiñ yirmiyedinci günü serdar ve beyler ve bölük ağaları tekrar han hazretlerine varub mülaqat ittüklerinde der devlet'ten gelen haṭṭ-ı hümayun kıra'at olunub tamam olunca han ve serdar ve sair ayağ üzere Turub du'adan soñra mefhumunda meşveret için serhad ihtiyarları ve ehl-i vukuf olanlar ilerü geldi ne yoldan erdelistan garetine varulmak gerekdür deyü vafar müşavere olunduğda serhad şahib-i vukufları ağaz-ı kelim idüb erdel vilayetine girecek üç yol vardır biri qala'-i lipova yolu ile ve biri şebes ve lugoş yolu ve biri varat yoludur didiler gazi giray han eytti ma'kul olan bir yoldan varılmağdır ki münasib delil ile ağırlık ve a'rabalar ile ibṭal-i rical ile hem-rah kılınmak mümkün ola eğer 'ada muqabale iderse cenge imkan ola dedikde serhadlulardan ihtiyarlar eytti şebes ve lugoş ve lipova yolları şa'b olmağla buyurılan vech üzere mürura kabiliyeti yoğdur düşman bulursa cenk ve muqabele taşavvur olunmaz ol şaffet ile muttaşif olan cadde-i vesi'a rah varat'turki her vechle fesih ve 'arizdir gazi giray han dañi eytti varat qala'sında olan küffar çıkıp rah-ı 'askeri bağlayub hasarata qadirlermidir ve ol ihtimal var ise evvela qal'a feth olunub b'ade-hu gidilmek iktiza idermi ve qal'ayı muhaşara ettiğimiz şurette mekş-i Ṭavil lazım gelirmi olğalde haṭṭ-ı serdar'a ri'ayet ile ba'zı müdahanece 'ammiler iki üç Ṭob ile qal'anın fethi kabildir diyüb evvela hişar feth olunub ba'de-hu jigmuna (Sigismund Bathory) üzerine gidilmek ...” Ibid. pp.196-197.

¹⁸³ Ibid, p.197. Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p.109.

¹⁸⁴ “... ve erdel oğlundan ilçi gelüb han hazretleri bizi şevketlü padişahla barışdırasın deyü mektublar gönderdi ...” Ibid.p.109. The Erdeloğlu, son of erdel, in the text could be Cardinal Andreas Bathory (d.1599) because the Voivode Sigismund Bathory left Andreas in his place while fleeing in 1598. He was pro-Polish and pursued a pro-Ottoman policy during his reign according to the Polish attitude of the time. For the Transylvian politics of the time see: Deceu, “Erdel”, IA, IV, pp.302-303.

¹⁸⁵ “... bu eşnada han gelince belgraddan çıkmalı iki ay kadar zaman geçüb seferiñ vaḫtı nişfa qarib olmuştı ba'de-hu beçkerek'de elli beş gün oturulduğdan soñra geçilüb şafer'in altıncı gününde ...” Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p.109.

about the difficulties caused by the heavy rain on the way and during the siege.¹⁸⁶ Third, the lack of the fire weapons and the gunpowder was a major difficulty. The whole army had only three cannons that were inefficient vis-à-vis Varad that was a well-fortified castle. The cannons that were requested from the Sofu Sinan Pasha, the new Beylerbeyi of Anadolu and the former Bey of Eğri (Erlau), could not be transported due to the lack of the oxen to pull them.¹⁸⁷ The lack of provisions was not limited with the firearms; there was also the lack of food. It seems that the Khan who arrived late at the battlefield has also contributed to the failure of the campaign because the season of the rains had already started (October) when the army was in Varad. However, it should be noted that it was not only the Khan who was late, the Ottoman army gathered very late in general. Ottoman historians noted the arrival of many commanders after that of the Khan. It seems that the Ottoman campaign was not well planned and that the Khan was right on his suspicions about the planning of the campaign. A final but traditional problem appeared between the Tatar forces and the Serdar. The Serdar did not allow the Tatars to raid in the country and asked them to wait until the capture of the castle.¹⁸⁸

More important, the news that arrived from the Western border was alarming. The Habsburgs that benefited from the lack of the main army sieged Budin

¹⁸⁶ "...bir aydan ziyade ale't-tevali yağmurlar yağmağdan hali olmayub kal'a eṬrafı mülayim Toprak ve ekşer yerler bataklık olmağla 'asker-i islam mütehayyir olub..." Katib Çelebi, ibid, p.110.

¹⁸⁷ "...bu eşnada eğriden Toplar gelmeğe halk intızarda iken şofu sinan paşa tehi dest çıka gelib Top çekecek camus bulunmadı deyü cevap verüb..." Ibid.p.110.

¹⁸⁸ "...yirmi güne dek Varad nevaḥisiniñ mekulatı kalmayub tatar mesafe-i ba'ideden getürmeğe muhtaç olmağla bir kile şa'ir üçer beşer altuna şatılır oldu muḳaddema han 'asker-i tatar akına gitmek

(Budapest) and captured the castles of Paluta (Varpalota), Tespirim (Veszprem) and Tata. Therefore, it was decided that it is better to postpone the siege and to send a detachment of the Tatar to the rescue of Budin. The situation became worse on the way to Budin. Moreover, it was learned that the Voivode Michael attacked to the forces of Hafız Hadım Ahmet Pasha (the commander of Nicopolis) and defeated in Niğbolu (Nicopolis). Since the problems: the rain and the lack of provisions persisted on the way to Budin, the Janissary revolted and attacked to the Serdar. The Serdar was forced to give up the idea to save Budin and ordered to return the winter quarter in Belgrade. The Khan was also ordered to remain in the frontier area with a personal letter of the Sultan.¹⁸⁹ The winter quarter for the Khan was Sonbor (Szombor) and for the Tatar army was Segedin (Szeged).

This failure was enough for the Porte both the Grand Vizier Cerrah Mehmed Pasha and the Serdar Satırcı Mehmed Pasha were dismissed and replaced by Damad Ibrahim Pasha (it was considered necessary that the Grand Vizier assumes both posts). The Khan did not remain inactive during his wintering in Sonbor. He received communications direct from the Emperor and the Archduke Maximilian. The Archduke urged him to return to the Crimea if he wanted to gain the friendship of the Christians forever. The Emperor vaguely confirmed his desire to make a peace with the Khan.¹⁹⁰ Meanwhile, the Khan sent an envoy to Moldavia and expressed his anger towards the violation of peace and threatened them with an invasion if they broke the

istedikçe serdar inşallah bir kaç güne dek bile giderüz diyerek bu ümniyye ile evkât geçdi ne murad üzere aķın oldu ve ne al'a alındı..." Ibid.p.112.

¹⁸⁹ "Serhadd-i mansurede Tatar Hanı Gazi Giray Han'a kışlamak ferman olunub, şemşir-i zerrin ve hilat-ı fahire ve üç kise altuh gönderildüğüdür." *Selaniki II*, p.791.

peace again.¹⁹¹ This time, the Khan was not interested with Moldavia for the tribute because he was able to convince his friend Satırcı Mehmed Pasha to appoint one of his servants, the Bey of Silistre (Silistria).¹⁹² It was maybe this appointment that cost to the life of the Satırcı Mehmed Pasha. The new Serdar received an envoy of the Khan, Abdulaziz Agha, who requested the confirmation of Khan's possession of Silistre. The Serdar that feared from the revolt or the departure of the Khan confirmed it. However, at the same time he wrote an immediate note to the Porte to explain the reasons why he confirmed the appointment and asked for the refusal it. The Porte's reaction was of course negative and immediate, Khan's possession of Silistre where he might form a base of power was not acceptable and Satırcı should be punished for this mistake.¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.168.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.p.169.

¹⁹² Ottoman historians wrote that the Khan and the Serdar were very good friends despite the fact that Satırcı openly accused the Khan for the failure in 1597 and the Khan quarrelled with him when he did not allow the Tatar army to raid in Varad.

¹⁹³ "...hasan beyzade tarihinde nakl iderki serdar filibe şahrasına nüzul ettikde şonbor muhafazasında olan gazi giray han tarafından asıtane'ye revane olan 'abdü'l-'aziz ağa pa-buş-ı vezir'e irüb saTırcı mehmed paşa silistre eyaletini tatar han müşarileyhe arpalık Tarihiyle viridiğin bildirdi ve saTırcı mehmed paşa kalemiyle muvaqqa' menşur ibraz idüb serdar'dan dahı muqarrername rica ittikte eğerçe müsa'adeden i'raz üzere idi. ama han 'işyan idüb şayed şonbor muhafazasın terk eyleye deyü eğerçe saTırcı mehmed paşa viridiği emre bina Tarihi üzere bir emr-i şerif verdi. ama asıtane'ye hafiyen mektub gönderüb verilan emr olub fi'l-haқиka haTayı mahz idüğün bildirib eğer tahkiğ ve taqrir olunursa han-ı bed-peyman saTırcı ile vifağ üzeredir kendüye hem-rah idüb firar itmeleri ihtimali olduğın ifham eyledi hadd-i zatında tatar han'ın saTırcı ile firarı muqarrer iken bu tedbir ile ibrahim paşa'nın hab-ı harguşuna ve mekatib-i dil-firibine firifte olub kalmıştır." *Naima*, p.216. Hasanbeyzade referred in the text is the Ottoman historian Ahmet Hasanbeyzade. He personally joined to the Ottoman-Habsburg war between 1598-1601 first as the secretary of Serdar Satırcı Mehmed Paşa then as the Reisü'l-küttab (Chief of the clerks). The second volume of his Tarih-i 'Ali 'Osman was the major source for the Ottoman historian such as Naima and Katip Çelebi. For more information on Hasan Beyzade see: Franz Babinger, *Osmanlı Tarih Yazarları ve Eserleri*, ed. Çoşkun Üçok, Ankara, 1982, p.192.

The forthcoming events showed that the Grand Vizier was not wrong in his scheme in which he considered the Khan and the dismissed Serdar were co-operating in their actions. The Grand Vizier appointed the Agha of Janissery, Tırnakçı Hasan, for the execution of the former Serdar. The Agha met with Satırcı in Hisarcık (Grocka) near Belgrade and executed him. Ottoman historians noted that the former Serdar did not listen to his friend Bora Giray and failed to join him in Sonbor thanks of the clever plan of the Grand Vizier.¹⁹⁴ Although Satırcı was caught unawares, his Kethüda (Steward) İbrahim managed to escape and sheltered to the camp of the Khan. The first reaction of the Khan to the execution was to immediately return to the Crimea. However the Mirzas opposed to this decision and convinced him to stay in the front.¹⁹⁵ The reaction of Mirzas to the decision of the Khan maybe interpreted in two different ways. First they might have thought the future of the Khanate because they knew that the Sultan would inevitably dismiss the Khan if he return to the Crimea at this critical moment and this would cause a civil war. Second they might have acted for their benefits because they did not want to give up the booty that they were likely to obtain during the new season of campaign. Although, the Khan remained in the front during the campaign season his distrust to the Grand Vizier persisted and all the attempts made by the Grand Vizier to change the situation remained in vain.¹⁹⁶ It is not difficult to understand that the Khan's attitude was

¹⁹⁴ "... zî'l-hiccenin onikinci günü belğrad'a qarib hisarcık nam menziline vardıkda serdar-ı sabık ağaların ve o'nda bulunan zabiŧleri istikbale gönderüb alay ile belğrad şahrasına kondurdu kaza ve kader hükümünden gafil olub şadiŧ-ı kadimi olan gazi giray han d'avet tenbih itmişken başireti bağlanub mütenebbih olmadı..." Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke.*, p.117.

¹⁹⁵ "... kethüdası ibrahim ağa hasta iken bir gemiye binib paşa'nın müezzin'i hüseyin nam nedim'i ile başka yakasına geçdi ve şonbor'da gazi giray han yanına varub şıgındı niçe fasid haberler ile han'ı tenfir eyleyüb han kırım canibine gitmek tedarikinde iken bazı mirzaları mani' olub tehir ettirdiler..." Ibid. p.118.

concerned with his personal security in other words his fear from coming across to the destiny of his friend Satırcı Mehmed Pasha. For that purpose, he did not visited the tent of the Serdar or he preferred to stay on the right bank of the Danube while the Serdar was on the left bank or managed to have always a group of armed force close at hand.¹⁹⁷

The Khan still served to the Ottomans even under these circumstances but this time as a mediator between them and the Habsburg. On 11 Sefer 1008/2 September 1599, the Khan informed Damad İbrahim Pasha that he received an envoy from the Habsburgs that asked from him to mediate to begin to the peace talks.¹⁹⁸ According to Ottoman historians the meeting took place on island in Danube near Vaç (Waitzen) between 24 to 26 Rabi' I/ 14 to 16 October 1599.¹⁹⁹ Since both parties

¹⁹⁶ "...sabıka saTırcı katlinden ğazi giray han mü'nfail olub seferde hem-rahlık töhmeti ıraş-ı su-i zan eylemiş ve vehme tabi' olmuş idi bu defa' sefere gelmemek ve şonbor'dan kalkub gitmek haTırasında olduğu ba'zı evza'ından istişa'r olunduğda def'-i vahşet için ağır pişkeşler ile menzil-i mezburdan miħaliçli aħmed paşa ve sivas beylerbeyi'si mahmud paşa ve silahdar ağa'sı şonbor'a irsal olunub ta'zim ile sefere da'vet ittiler ... yevm-i mezburda han'a mükemmel at ve raħt ve ħıla't ve muraşsa' şimşir ve ina'mat-ı şahiye i'Ta olunub ... bi'l-cümle han'ıyla serdar meyana şeker-ab idi ibrahim paşa ne denlü kılnub tevazu' itti ise han 'alicensablık gösterüb bir kerre otağına gelmedi ekşer at arkasında görüşürlerdiydi ..." Ibid.pp.122-125.

¹⁹⁷ Carl Max Kortepeter refers to a Venetian report that states that the animosity between the Khan and the Grand Vizier was not related with the Satırcı affair (it was even not mentioned) but it was because of the separate negotiations of the Khan with the Habsburgs and Transylvania. Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.170.

¹⁹⁸ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p.123.

¹⁹⁹ "...Yirmibirinci günüVaç karibine nüzul olunduğda Taburdan adem gelüb şulh için üç güne dek 'asker hareket itmışler deyü mehil Taleb olunub üçüncü günü elçi evvel han'a gelüb ba'de-hu serdar'a vardı beri Tarafdan murad paşa ve han'ın aħmed ağası ve mehmed kethüda Tabura isal olunub iki günden sonra 'adem-i şulh haberi gelmekle geçüldü ...a'da-yı ħakisar şulh bahanesiyle anda 'asker-i islamı birkaç gün 'avk murad idüb rehin namıyla nemçe ümerasından bir kaç me'lun gönderdiler murad paşa ve mehmed kethüda ve aħmed ağa öte yakaya geçüb hersek matiyaş ve balfigrof ile esterğon'a bedel eğri verilmek üzere bir kaç kelam-ı barid söyleşib ğayr-i barid i'tirazlar eylediler a'da mahza 'asker-i tatar uyvar diyarını ğaret itmemek için oyalar idüğünü bilürken girü vücud verilip varima-i kelime oldu bi'l-aħare iki Tarafeynin rehinleri 'avdet ittiler... ". Ibid.,p.124. According to Hammer Purgstall Habsburgs were represented by the Archbishop of Gran, Jan Kutassi, the generals Nadazdi

insisted on their terms the negotiations resumed after three days. After the failure of the peace talks the Grand Vizier ordered the Tatar forces to raid the country. However, the Habsburg plan to delay the Tatar raid was successful and the booty did not satisfy both the Serdar and the Khan. The successful withdrawal of the Habsburg and the approaching winter forced the Ottoman army to return its winter quarters. This time, Khan decided to return to the Crimea and returned despite all requests of the Grand Vizier that wanted to keep him on the front for one more year. His pretext was the lack of provisions in the Tatar army.²⁰⁰ The Khan once again managed to play an important role. He was not only the one that brought the two parties in the table but also reaffirmed the importance of the Tatar forces for the fate of the war. Therefore, he resumed his traditional role started to ask more funds both from the Emperor and the Sultan to finance his forces (He asked 10.000 ducats from the Emperor to leave the war). It seems that the Habsburgs were partially successful, maybe they could not gain the Khan to their side but they succeeded to get the Khan and the main Tatar army out of Hungary. It was already stated that the Habsburgs had a three-step policy vis-à-vis the Khan. At first to gain him in their side, if it failed to neutralise him and finally at least to bribe him to use his influence in the Porte for a peace. The events between the years 1598-1599 show that the Habsburgs had at least succeeded to slow the movements of the Tatar army and to use the Khan's influence in the Porte for the peace. Bora Giray continued to communicate with the European powers during 1600.

and Palfi and Pezzen. The Ottomans represented by Mehmed Kethüda, Kadi of Buda, Habil Efendi; Ferhad, the Agha of Janissary; the envoy of the Khan Alexandre Paleologus. Alexandre Paleologus seems to be an important man for the Khan. In European sources he was described as the omnipotent representative of the Khan.

Bora Giray spend the years between 1599-1602 in the Cirmea. He knew that the Porte did not welcome his decision to leave the war but he had important problems to settle before his return to Hungary in autumn 1602. First of all, he had to deal with the Cossack raids that once again became a danger for the stability of the region. The Poles gained two important victories against the Cossacks during the last decade of the 16th century: the Union of Brest (1596) and the battle of Lubyn (May 1596). The Union of Brest was technically an attempt to end the division of the churches but its objectives and outcomes were far more important. First of all the Union aimed to divert the Ukrainian people from the Orthodox Church in order to assimilate them in to Catholic Polish society.²⁰¹ The Union created a great conflict and division among the Ukrainian society that still exists even today. While the Uniate Church had long term effects in Ukraine the defeat at Lubyn had its immediate effects. The Cossack forces did not only lost the battle but were also divided. The registered Cossacks: well established, town based Cossacks, preferred to compromise with the Poles.²⁰² The ordinary Cossacks: poor, non-registered and under the threat of becoming again a serf, preferred to fight. The conflict manifested itself many times in open conflict.²⁰³ The Cossack could recover these setbacks only after 1600 under the leadership of Hetman

²⁰⁰ "...ğazi giray han istizan idüb tatar 'askeriniñ min b'ad firara mecalleri maħaldır deyü kırım'a müteveccih oldu bu sene dahı alıkoymağa serdar külli sa'yler idüb mümkün olmadı..." Ibid.p.125.

²⁰¹ The Uniate Church was founded in 25-December-1595 in Rome, however the official declaration was made in 6-October-1596. The Union set a Greek-Catholic church that preserved its Orthodox ritual but officially related to the Papacy. It is important to note that the request for the Union came from a faction of the Orthodox Clergy that were willing to enjoy the privileges of the Catholic Clergy. For more information on the Uniate Church and its impact of the Ukrainian society from a socialist perspective see; Hrushevsky, *A History*, and for a liberal perspective Subtelny Orest, *Ukraine*.

²⁰² The Poles that realised the difficulty to control the Cossacks tried to make use of them. Meanwhile they could use the Cossack forces as a check against Tatar and Ottoman encroachments. They have also used the Cossacks in their campaigns. The Cossacks were first registered by Sigismund August in 1572. The decision had important effects. On the hand the Cossacks were officially recognised by the Poles. On the other hand it created a division in the Cossack society. The registered Cossacks gained important privileges that they were keen to preserve. Therefore a conflict with the non-registered Cossacks became inevitable. For more information on the subject see: Subtelny, *Ukraine*.

Sameilo Kishka (1600-1602) that organised a series of successful raids in to the Black Sea region and Moldavia.²⁰⁴

Bora Giray turned his face to the Poles in order to check the revived Cossack threat. The Poles were also willing to contact with the Khan in order to persuade him to allow them a secure outlet to the Black Sea.²⁰⁵ They have already contacted with the Kalghay Selamet Giray in 1599 when the Khan was still in Hungary. The Khan agreed not to touch any Polish merchant who paid the proper dues in exchange of the payment of traditional *Tıyış*. The Poles decided to send an embassy to the Crimea to reaffirm their bid on Black Sea upon the positive approach of the Khan. King Sigismund III. Vasa (1587-1632) appointed his secretary and Vice-Chancellor in Breslau, Laurin Piaseczinski, as ambassador to the Khan.²⁰⁶ The Polish mission had three objectives. First objective was the extension of the peace with the Khan. Second objective was to have a formal approval of the Khan and other Tatar notables for the access of Polish merchants to the Black Sea. Third objective was to ensure the support of the Khan in case of a war with Muscovy. Finally these conditions were set as the precondition for the payment of the customary annual gift (*tıyış*). Piaseczinski was instructed on two other issues: the Cossacks and the delivery of the *tıyış*. First of all he should clearly state that the King could not be hold responsible for the actions of the *outlaw* Cossacks. The instruction seems to be one of the old pretexts that were used both by Russians and Poles against the Tatars and Ottomans. However, the

²⁰³ Subtelny, *Ibid.*p.115.

²⁰⁴ Hrusevsky, *A History*, p.217. He exactly wrote that Kishka revived the “old Cossack spirit”.

²⁰⁵ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p. 181.

second instruction shows that the at least for this time the Poles were right. Piaseczinski was instructed that the delivery of the *tıyış* that was traditionally made in Akkerman in the last day of November would be made in Kamanetz.²⁰⁷ The second instruction provides us with two important details the *tıyış* was formerly delivered on the last day of November in Akkerman. From a letter of Kalgay Selamet Giray to the Polish King it is possible to understand the reason why the Poles wanted to change the location of the delivery. In his letter Selamet Giray says that since the roads were not secure the King could send the money to Kamanetz and he would send men to take it.²⁰⁸ The Polish embassy arrived to Yaş (Jassy) on 27-June-1601 and started to gather information about the situation in the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire as a whole. The first point was that the Sultan sent gifts and enough money to pay the Mirzas and invited the Khan to Hungary. When the Khan decided to comply he learned of a plot by his Nura'l-din Devlet Giray and some Şirin Beys.²⁰⁹ Therefore he responded in a traditional manner and executed his cousin and the plotters on a banquet. Piaseczinski gives also information about the intentions of the Khan to eliminate his Kalgay Selamet Giray. He wrote that he learned from two Tatars that were sent to escort him that the Khan was planning to kill his brother and Kalgay Selamet Giray.²¹⁰ These informations could be very important in order to understand the events that would be analysed later.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.p.182.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.p.182.

²⁰⁸ Veliaminov-Zernof, *Kırımğa*, pp.18-19. See also appendices documents no: 5.

²⁰⁹ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.183.

Piaseczinski gave one more important information about the politics of the Khanate at that time. He reported that Muscovy was renewing its treaty with the Khan. A Muscovite embassy had arrived to the border with the *tıyıs* and was asked an escort against the Cossacks. It is very interesting that Muscovy that was on the eve of the Time of Troubles sent the present to the Khan despite all the difficulties. The Time of Troubles (Smutnoe Vremya 1598-1613) represents one of the most turbulent phases of the Russian history. It starts with the accession of Boris Godunov in 1598 to the Russian throne and ends with the election of Michael Romanov to the Tsardom in 1613.²¹¹ When the Tsar Fedor (1584-1598) died, leaving neither heir nor will and his regent Boris Godunov, the man that hold the real power, assumed the title of the Tsar on 3 September 1598. The most important problem of the new Tsar was to prove his legitimacy therefore; he turned inside tried to eliminate his rivals and followed a peaceful policy towards the foreign powers and made or renewed the peace agreements. It is also interesting to note that Boris Godunov used the Tatar threat to become the Tsar. In spring 1598 he mobilised an army in Serpukhov on the ground that Muscovy was on the risk of an invasion from the South in other words from Crimea.²¹² Godunov's success to eliminate his rivals and to have peaceful relations with foreign powers achieved very little because he could not stop the social unrest inside Muscovy. The peasantry under the constant threat of taxation and oppression of the gentry preferred to flee from their lands to the free areas, worse the famine in 1601

²¹⁰ Ibid.p.183.

²¹¹ For more information on the Time of Troubles refer to; Robert O. Crummey, *The Formation*, pp.205-233 and Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, New York, 1984) pp.157-174. Depending on the work of Russian historian Platonov, both authors argue that the Muscovite state and society went through three subsequent crises; the dynastic, the social and national that arouse one after the other and that finally became intertwined. The dynastic crisis was the lack of the legitimacy for the regimes of the Boris Godunov and his followers. The social crisis was the increasing proportion of discontent in the society. Many people tried to flee rather to be enserfed by the gentry that the regime supported. The national crisis was the enemies that took advantage of their opportunity.

and 1602 devastated the live stock of the peasantry. The Muscovite society was on the verge of explosion and it exploded in 1603 when a series of peasant revolt struck Moscow but the major blow came with the appearance of the False Dimitriy in August 1604.²¹³ The fact that Godunov sent the present to the Crimea, despite all of the economic and social difficulties in Muscovy maybe considered as a reflection of the importance of the Tatar threat to the Russians. The fact that the Crimean Tatars that claimed to be the heir of the Golden Horde did not try to make use of the situation in Muscovy to recover the territory of the Golden Horde is another question that still needs to be answered.

The Khan finally received the Polish embassy on August 23. According to the accounts of Piaseczinski the Khan was ill at that time and the meeting lasted very short. The Khan's illness partially explains the absence of the Khan from the Hungarian front in 1601. Neither Ottoman nor Crimean sources refer to the illness of the Khan.²¹⁴ The illness of the Khan could have been serious because Piaseczinski wrote that when he visited the Kalghay Selamet Giray, he saw that the Kalghay dwelled outside in a tent because of the bad air (Kortepeter noted that the bad air meant an epidemic ie plague).²¹⁵ Actually the Khan send his nephew Baht Giray to the

²¹² Crummy, *Ibid.* p.211.

²¹³The event of False Dimitriy is one of the most tragic events of Russian history. The real Dimitriy, son of Ivan IV died suddenly in 15 May 1591. The rivals of Godunov argued that it was him that killed the boy to clean the path for the throne. However the historical analysis's showed that Godunov had no motive to kill Dimitriy. The False Dimitriy was a venturer that made the use of the situation.

²¹⁴ Crimean Historian Muhammed Rıza even wrote that the Khan angered the Sultan because he did not join to the campaigns with disorderly pretexts. "ber nöbet-i Taraf-ı şehriyar-ı cihan muṭa'dan sefere da'vet olmuş iken ızhar-ı 'ögr-i na-berca ile mütteka-yı balin istirahat olmağın merba'-nişin serir-i ihmal olması muḳtezi-yi teneffür-i Ṭab'-ı hümayun olması ..." Rıza, *As-sab'*, p.110.

²¹⁵ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.184.

Hungarian front in 1600.²¹⁶ The Tatar forces joined to the siege and the conquest of Kanije (Nagykanisza) in September 1600.²¹⁷ Piaseczinski complained about the Tatar raids and the slave trade during his meeting with the Khan. The Khan replied that the Tatar raids were the result of the Cossack raids and insisted that he would not allow the Tatar when the Cossacks would be punished and the proper gift were send. The arguments in the meeting were quite accustomed while the Khan complained about the payment of the gift and the Cossack raids the Polish ambassador refused any relationship with the Cossacks and related the payment of the gift to the proper behaviour of the Khan. At the end of the meeting the Khan assigned an ambassador to return to Poland with Piaseczinski. On September 4 Piaseczinski paid a visit to Kalghay Selamet Giray near Kızıl Kaya. The fact that the Kalghay received Piaseczinski in Kızıl Kaya is also important because Kalghay's residence was in Akmesid (Simferepol).²¹⁸ The Kalghay could have been in Kızıl Kaya because of the epidemic as Kortepeter suggested or because he was aware the intentions of his brother the Khan or simply for the summer. Shortly after the visit, the Kalghay fearing from the plans of his brother fled the country and went to Istanbul. Piaseczinski that was on his way to Poland took the opportunity that the Khan's camp was near and bid a personal farewell to the Khan. During the visit the Khan showed that he understood the essence of Polish proposals and said that the Black Sea does not belong to him and he could not give it away without the consent of the Sultan.²¹⁹

²¹⁶ "... çün muqaddema Taraf-ı devlet-i 'aliyye'den han-ı 'ali-şan hazretlerine evamir-i 'aliye şadır olmuştı han-ı 'ali-şan ğazi giray han canibinden irsal olunan sulTan ile bir kaç biñ tatar 'askeri daħi karib geldikleri haberi vaşıl oldu ...". *Naima*, p.235.

²¹⁷ "... orduda mevcut olan bir iki biñ tatar hilaf yollardan varub küffar Taburuna gelen zahire 'arabaların alub ..." Ibid. p.241.

²¹⁸ İnalçık, "Giray", *LA*, V.

Piaseczinski turned back to Crimea in March 1602 and learned that the Khan was still ill but this time it was claimed that one of his wives bewitched him. She and her accomplices were immediately and severely executed.²²⁰ The Khan did not welcome Piaseczinski this time because of two traditional problems. First the Poles failed to send the gifts in time and second the Cossack raids in Crimean territory. He noted that Akkerman was attacked by the thirty Cossack *şaykas* just before his arrival and the Ottoman Bey of the city did not receive him because the Bey related the Polish desire for an outlet to the Black Sea with the Cossack raids.²²¹ Piaseczinski arrived to the camp of Khan in Gözleve on May 26 but waited until June 24 to have an audience with the Khan. He argued that he was forced to wait until the end of the reception of the Muscovite ambassador, Gregory Volkovsky, that brought twenty wagonloads of gifts to the Khan. It is important to note again that Volkovsky asked from the Khan an escort from the southern border to the Crimea as a precaution against the Cossack encroachments. The evidences show that the Cossacks were very active at that moment because both Muscovy and Poland had their own problems and could not control them.²²² However this does not mean that they did not use Cossacks for their own goals. For example according to the letters of Piaseczinski some Polish noblemen of Podolia wanted to attack the Tatars and the Cossacks were their natural

²¹⁹ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.185.

²²⁰ *Ibid.* p.186.

²²¹ *Ibid.* p.186.

²²² Muscovy was on the verge of Time of Troubles as it was already discussed and the Poles were in war with Sweden for the control of Livonia (Latvia). The Livonian war devastated the Polish economy and the King exacted a special poll tax from the Jews to pay the tribute to Khan. The Poles also used the Cossacks in the war. 2000 Cossacks fought for the Polish army in Latvia. For the situation and the

allies. It seems that the delay of Piaseczinski's visit to the Khan is related with the Cossack raids and Polish failure to pay the gifts in time rather than to the presence of the Muscovite ambassador. Some other points show that Piaseczinski was not received well during his second visit in general. He noted that he was isolated during the whole visit and no one was allowed to speak with him.²²³ In his audience the Khan stated clearly that it was not in his power to give Poles an access to the Black Sea and his forces would raid and take whatever they want if the Poles fail to pay the gifts and Piaseczinski dismissed. The mission of Piaseczinski ended without any formal agreement.

The Khan faced a serious threat to his rule in 1601. His Nura'l-din Devlet Giray (son of Saadet Giray and rival Khan to Islam Giray II 1584-1588) conspired against him. He agreed with some Şirin Mirzas to kill Bora Giray and to become the Khan. According to the report of Laurin Piaseczinski: the Polish Ambassador to the Crimea (1601-1603), the Khan learned about the incident and solved it in a traditional manner.²²⁴ The Khan invited Devlet Giray and the Mirza's to a banquet on the occasion of a feast.²²⁵ During the feast the arquebusiers (according to Piaseczinski the arquebusiers were trained by former Janissaries) of the Khan killed the Nura'l-din and two of the Şirin Mirzas even though one of them was his own son-in-law and the

role of the Cossacks on the eve and during the Times of Trouble see: Crummey, *The Formation*, pp.205-231.

²²³ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.187.

²²⁴ Ibid.p.183.

²²⁵ Ibid.p.176. Kortepeter states that the banquet took place on the 12-June-1601/10-Zi'l-hicce-1009 and before the feast of Kurban but on a different case he states that it was the feast of Ramazan. Since the Kurban begins on 10th of Zi'l-hicce it should be the feast of Kurban.

remaining Şirin beys escaped to Kefe. On the other hand Crimean historian ‘Abdu’l-gaffar noted that Bora Giray eliminated Devlet Giray on an occasion and did not mention to the plot.²²⁶ The brothers of Devlet Giray: Şahin Giray and Mehmed Giray realised that it was their turn and escaped.²²⁷ Mehmed Giray took refuge in Circassia and Şahin Giray passed to Anatolia where he joined to the rebel Karayazıcı. Soon Selamet Giray, the Kalghay and the brother of Bora Giray, followed the example of his nephews. First he escaped to Akkerman than he joined to Celali Deli Hasan Paşa in Anatolia. According to the accounts of the Polish ambassador to the Crimea the reaction of the Khan was immediate. He mobilised his army and summoned the Ottoman Bey of Kefe (Feodosiya) to his camp near Gözleve (Yevpatoria). The Bey ensured the Khan that he will seek the extradition of Selamet Giray from the Porte.²²⁸

It is possible to argue that the Khan tried by every possible mean to refrain Selamet Giray to gain the support of the Sultan and became the new Khan of the Crimea. It appears that he was successful in his effort because Selamet Giray that could not obtain the support of the Sultan fled and joined to Celalis. Later the Khan sent a letter to the Sultan that he asked the execution of Selamet Giray but the Sultan instead removed him either to Bythinia or Rhodes.²²⁹ From the Ottoman documents we learn that Selamet Giray was in Bursa in March 1602 (Ramazan 1010).²³⁰

²²⁶ “...ba’de zaman Devlet Giray’ın devlet ‘ayş ve zindeganesini izale ve ifna idecek...” Rıza, *Al-Sab*, p.110.

²²⁷ Kortepeter stated that according to the report of Piaseczinski the Sultans were warned of the Khan’s intentions and managed to escape. Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.176.

²²⁸ *Ibid.* p.184.

²²⁹ *Ibid.* p.186.

Therefore he was most probably sent in Bursa (Bythinia) by the Sultan and than joined to the Celalis when he did not obtain the support of the Porte to become Khan. The Ottoman historian Mehmed Said Efendi's *Zübde't-tevarih* helps us to understand the adventure of Selamet Giray in Anatolia. He wrote that Selamet Giray first came to Istanbul and was send to Yanbolu: the usual place for the hostage (rehin) and the members of the Giray family who fled from the Crimea.²³¹ However, he was later transferred to Bursa upon the insistence of Bora Giray. Selamet Giray realised that he would not be safe in Bursa and joined to Celali Deli Hasan in 1010/1602.²³² It is possible that the Porte that did not want to create another problem in Crimea wanted to use him to check Bora Giray. If the Porte considered Selamet Giray as a danger he would be executed or sent to Rhodes, the usual place of the exile, for the Girays that were considered to be dangerous.

Celali was the general name given to the rebels that posed a serious threat to the stability of the Ottoman Anatolia during the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th centuries.²³³ Some relatives of Bora Giray decided to try their chances with the Celalis. The Porte that was engaged in a long and costly war with the Habsburg neglected the Celali threat for a long time. When they finally decided to suppress the

²³⁰ Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı Tarihine Aid Belgeler, Telhisler 1597-1607*, İstanbul, 1970 p.60.

²³¹ The other places for the settlement were İslimye, Tekirdağ and Çatalca. For more information see: Halil İnalcık, "Giray", *IA*, IV.

²³² İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi Vol. III*, Ankara, 1995 p.8

²³³ The term Celali most probably comes after Şeyh Celal that started a small revolt in Anatolia in 925/1519. Celalis became a serious threat after 1590 and could only be pacified after 20 years. For a general overview of the Celali revolts refer to Griswold William J., *Anadolu'da Büyük İsyân 1591-1611*, İstanbul, 2000 and for the reasons of the Celali revolts see: İnalcık Halil, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire 1600-1700" *Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic History*,

revolts it became obvious that it was not an easy task.²³⁴ The inability of the Ottomans made the situation critical for Bora Giray. The Porte realised that it is not possible to get rid off the Celalis by force and decided to compromise with them. For that reason Karayazıcı was pardoned and appointed first the Beylerbeyi of Amasya and later the Beylerbeyi of Çorum. The aim was to pacify Karayazıcı by incorporating him in to Ottoman system. The solution failed because of the suspicion that the actions of Karayazıcı created in the Porte and Karayazıcı's insistence to act independently. The Porte decided to settle the situation by force and finally the Serdar Sokulluzade Hasan Pasha succeeded to defeat Karayazıcı near Kayseri on 12 Safer 1010/12 August 1601. Karayazıcı was forced to escape in the mountainous area of Samsun. Some of the refugees from the Crimea were already joined the Celalis at that moment and according to the Venetian reports of the time persuaded Karayazıcı to cross to the Black Sea maybe to go to the Crimea to join the Tatar forces.²³⁵ However, Karayazıcı died soon and the plan was never realised.

Most probably, Selamet Giray wanted to use Celali forces as a mean to obtain the Crimean throne but it was also showing the extent of Bora Giray's authority in the Crimea. The contender for the throne could not find enough followers among Tatars to achieve his goal or was aware that he could not defeat Bora Giray by

London, 1985, pp.284-337. He shows that the Celali revolts were a result of the combination of changes in demographic, military and fiscal conditions within the Ottoman Empire and the world.

²³⁴ The Ottoman faced important problems against Celalis. The first Ottoman commander Karamani Hüseyin Pasha, Beylerbeyi of Karaman, joined to the Celalis instead of fighting them. The second commander Koca Sinanzade Mehmed Pasha was also unsuccessful only the third commander Sokulluzade Hasan Pasha could be successful.

²³⁵ Griswold William J., *Anadolu'da Büyük*, p.30. The reports in question were the reports of Venetian Council of Syria.

traditional means and needed a trained force like that of the Celalis.²³⁶ The danger was not over for Bora Giray, Karayazıcı was dead but the Celalis were still strong. More important, his rival Selamet Giray was still alive. His brother Deli Hasan Pasha soon replaced Karayazıcı. Deli Hasan that reunited the Celali forces became a greater danger for the Ottomans. Moreover, the Sipahis of Anatolia that were forced to abandon their land because of the Celalis revolts in January 1603.²³⁷ The Porte was once more in a difficult situation because the war in the West was still going on and there were rumours about Shah Abbas (1587-1628) of Persia's intentions to attack to the Ottomans. Under these conditions, the Porte did not have many options and decided or in other words felt compelled to compromise with Celalis. The Grand Vizier Yemişçi Hasan Pasha (1601-1603) appointed Deli Hasan Pasha Beylerbeyi of Bosna in Zi'l-kade 1011/April 1603.

The decision of the Porte had important consequences for Bora Giray because his rival Selamet Giray was also pardoned and became a real threat.²³⁸ However, Bora Giray's efforts were not fruitless Selamet Giray was brought to

²³⁶ The main Celali forces were consisted of Sekbans or Sarıcas: infantryman of reaya origin that used arquebuses. The Ottomans under financial pressure preferred to use Sekban groups that were cheaper and fit to the changing military technology of the time. However Porte's desire was to use Sekbans only when necessary and did not incorporate them in its military system. As a result independent Sekban bands that were looking for money and food supplies began to wander throughout Anatolia. But Celalis lacked staff and Cağalazade Sinan Pasha's decision to dismiss all absentees after Haçova war (1596) that caused many Sipahis to flee to Anatolia might have provided it.

²³⁷ Ibid.p.34. It should be noted that the Celali terror was not the sole cause of the revolt. The corruption of the palace officials and the increasing influence of the Janissaries were also influential. For more information see: *Naima*, pp.320-324.

²³⁸ Halim Giray, *Gülbün-i*, p.72. Halim Giray talks about the history of Selamet Giray as follows: "bir kaç gün sonra selamet giray, fetih giray ve devlet giray'ın idam olunduklarını anlayarak kırın'dan firarla o zamanlar devlet-i 'osmaniye'ye karşı 'işyan iden karayazıcı biraderi hasan paşa'ya iltica itmişdi. bir müddet sonra padişah tarafından hasan paşa'nın kabahati 'afv olduğundan selamet giray

İstanbul after the amnesty of Deli Hasan and jailed in Rumeli Hisarı with Mehmed Giray, Khan of the Crimea 1610 and 1623-1627 and grand son of Semiz Mehmed Giray II (1577-1588), until the death of Bora Giray. Bora Giray was not secure yet because his previous experiences showed him that Selamet Giray, now pardoned, could influence the Sultan and could be rewarded for his revolt instead of being punished. The reward would surely be the seat of the Khan.

According to Ottoman historians the arrival of Gazi Giray to the front was a great surprise for the Ottoman army because he arrived just at the closing of the campaign season and they relate it to his fear from dismissal.²³⁹ In order to be more precise it should be noted that Bora Giray left the Crimea before the amnesty of Deli Hasan Pasha therefore his action was a precaution rather than to an immediate reaction. Bora Giray once more proved his cautiousness before his departure to the Hungarian Front. He renewed the peace treaty with Muscovy and made some retaliatory raids to Poland to punish the Cossacks. More important, he left his son Kalghay Toktamış Giray with a large army and a portion of his personal Circassian guards.²⁴⁰ He also entrusted responsibility to his sister's son Şahrak Bey, the new Mirza of the influential Şirin tribe. The identity of the new Şirin Mirza shows that the

daği 'afv olunub iltifat-ı padişahi'ye nail olmuş ve faқаТ gazi giray iltimasıyla dört sene kadar rumeli hisarı zindanında habs olunmuşdu."

²³⁹ "çün vezir-i 'azam hasan paşa varat köprüsün geçüp zemun (semlin) şahrasına geldi uzaktan bir 'asker nümayan olub gazi giray han geldi deyü haber virdiler seferden 'avdet zamanında bi-vaқt gelmeğe ba'is međer biraderleri olan selamet giray mehmed şahin giray ezhar-ı ... idüb kimi rumili ve kimi anaТoli'ya deli hasan yanına varmışlar deli hasan iTa'at itmeğle şayed ki bile bulunanı hanlığa rica eyleye ve bir iki seneden berü sefer'e gelmediğinden ayine-i zamir-i padişahi muğberr olmuş olub virile diyü hemme düşüb serhadd manşurına varub muhafaza hüdmetinde olmağa gelmiş" Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p.183.

²⁴⁰ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.187.

Khan did not only try to eliminate his rival in the family but also managed to control the influential Şirin tribe.²⁴¹ The Şirin bey that assumed the title of *baş-karaçı* or *baş-bey* was the leader of the aristocracy and since they were generally married with the members of Giray family most of them were called Giray. He was the most important man after the Khan and the other members of the dynasty. According to Halil Inalcık, it was the Şirin bey rather than the Ottoman Sultan that determined the election of the Khan in most of the cases.²⁴² As a result the Ottomans preferred to obtain the support of the Şirin bey and co-operated with him in order to control the Crimea. Therefore Bora Giray while massacring Devlet Giray with some other Şirin Mirza did try to subjugate the Şirin to his will. The identity of the new Şirin Mirza; his sister's son, seems to be closely related with his effort to centralise the power in the Crimea. The final and more important incentive for the Khan seems to be the 30.000 flori that were send to the Crimea to convince him to join to the Ottoman forces.

According to a report written by the Grand Vizier Yemişçi Hasan Pasha to the Sultan: the Khan was asking the payment of an important sum of money to recover his expenses in order to join to the campaign.²⁴³ It is possible to interpret this

²⁴¹ For the influence of the Şirin tribe see; Inalcık Halil, "Giray", *LA*, IV, Baron de Tott, *Türkler ve Tatarlar arasında*, Istanbul, 1985.

²⁴² Inalcık, "The Khan" p.447.

²⁴³ "Telhis-i Vezir Yemişçi Hasan Paşa: Arz-ı bende-i bi-mikdar budur ki, sa'adetlü padişahum Han'ın sefer-i humayuna gitmesi hususu ve taleb eylediği hazine ve aba ahavali mufassalen rikab-ı hümayuna arz olundukda hanlar şimdiye dek bu teklifi edegelmemişlerdür. Bu kadar hazine verilmek sen münasip görür misin ? Hazinenün ahvalini hüd bilürsin deyü buyurulmuş; sa'adetlü padişahum; bu kulunuz hazinenin ahvalini künhüyle bilürem; faraza, hazine de kemal mertebe vüs'at dahı olsa mahza adet ve kanun olmamak için bu kadar hazine ve bu deñlü esbab verilmek münasib değıldür; amma han'ın bu senede sefer-i humayuna varmaması da münasib görölmez. Kabil ve mümkün olan (seferde) görölme gerekdür ve bi'l-cümle bir halet-i mutavassıta ri'ayet olunmak gerekdür ki hazineye de gadr-ı fahiş lazım gelmeye. Han'ın dahı fi'l-cümle hatırı hoş olup bunun gibi mahall-i dayk da sefer-i humayuna

document in several ways. First, the Khan had a good relationship with the Grand Vizier that asked the fulfilment of his request. Second, Khan's relationship was not at the same level with the Porte because the Grand Vizier warned the Sultan about the danger of a revolt in case of the failure of the payment. Third, the Ottomans were aware of the separate relationship of the Khan with the Habsburgs. Fourth, the presence of the Tatar forces seemed inevitable for the Ottoman army due to the reputation of the Tatar cavalry as ruthless and invincible fighters. Finally, it is worth to analyse another interesting document the letter of the Grand Vizier Yemişçi Hasan Pasha to the Sultan.²⁴⁴ The letter was not dated but it is possible to understand that it was written long before the arrival of the Grand Vizier to the Porte in 23 Şaban 1011/05 February 1603 when the Serdar was in Hungarian front since he wrote that rumours about the dismissal of the Khan appeared and he did not know what was happening in the Porte. The document is important in two aspects; first it shows under

varmasına ba'is ola. Benüm sa'adeti padişahum hak budur ki, bu hanlarda hazine ve kuvvet ve kudret olmaz hususa bu hanın katı fakri vardır deyü varub gelen çavuşlar ve kapucular kullarunuz haber verürler bu kulunuzun havfı budur ki, hala han'a cüzi nesne gönderilüp sefer hıdmeti teklif oluna; ol dahı şey kalildir deyü çıkıp gitmeye; ba'dehu han emr-i humayuna ita'at edüp sefer-i nusret-esere gitmedi deyü a'daya münakıs olub bu ma'nanın şüyü'undan a'da kuvvet-i kalb hasil ederler ve han dahı geçen sene gitmedi bu def'a da gitmeyecek olursa hatırına niçe vehm ve hayalat düşüb bi'z-zarure ita'atdan kalmak iktiza eder, kadimden dost iken taraf-ı hilafa düşmesinden ihtiyat olunacaktır. Bu mebhâş çok fikr-i daқиka mütehammildir tedbir-i devlet esnasında münadi-i devlet ahvalda devlet-i aliyyedendür. Dünkü gün arz olunduğı gibi Müfti Efendi du'acınıza ve Kapudan Paşa ve sair vüzera kullarunuza birer hatt-ı hümayun gönderüp bu babda anların dahı netayic-i rey ve tedbirleri nedür ma'lum edindikden sonra geç kalup fırsat fevt olunmak olmamak için her ne verilmeli ise ihsan buyrula ki han'a ale'l-acele gönderilsün. Bu hususa sa'adeti padişahum dahı taharri eylemek lazımdur; din ü devlete hayr ve nafi' ne ise ümidür ki, Hak celle ve ala kalb-i şerifinize anı ilham eyleye; inşaallahu te'ala baki ferman padişahumundur. Merhum Sultan Mehemed Han hazretlerinin cevabı şerifleridir: Yarı inşaallahu te'ala 30.000 flori gönderilür bundan ziyade göndermeğe ihtimal yoktur." Cengiz Orhonlu, *Telhisler*, pp.52-53.

²⁴⁴ "... Sa'adeti padişahum, inşaallahu te'ala Tatar Hanı dahı evvel baharda sefer-i humayuna gelmek gerekdür; mukaddema dahı arz olunmuş idi; bilmezüz bu canibde Tatar hususunda dahı dürlü dürlü güft ü gu peyda edüp hanlık karındaşına verüldi deyü istima' olunur. Sa'adeti padişahum, bu husus az nesne değıldür, mülâhaza ve teemmül olunacak kıssadır; her canibde fitne ve fesad variken bir fitne dahı zuhur eylemek ihtimali olmasun; hele sa'adeti padişahum, bu husus kıati mülâhaza yeridür bu babda fikr ve teemmül buyurub din ü devletinüze layık olan ne ise müşavere edüp aınla amel buyurasun; ve be-her-hal Tatar han sefere gelmek lazımdur eger eskisi yeründe ise, Name-i humayun ile bir söz anlar müte'ayyin adem irsal olunup karındaşı ve akrabası hususunda kendüye istimalet verilüp ve gönderülecek kadırgalar dahı gönderilüp heman mu'accelen sefere çıkarmak lazımdur. Ol

which conditions the Khan went to the front and second the inevitability of the Crimean forces for the Ottomans.

Contrary to the surprise of the Ottoman historians the journey of the Khan to the front is not obscure. According to the Polish sources of the time the Khan entered to the Transylvania in order to go the front, once he was there he supported Simeon Movila. Movila family was known to be pro-Polish but the Khan considered supporting him more feasible for his sake. It appears that he was successful initially, according to an Ottoman document; men of the Khan arrived in Istanbul on 02 Rebi'ü'l-ahir 1011/ 02 September 1602. In the document it is written that the Khan came across and defeated between 10.000.000 to 15.000.000 Hungarians in Wallachia.²⁴⁵ However during the battle near Telzayn that lasted two days between 23-24 September 1602 he was unsuccessful and forced to retreat.²⁴⁶ After the failure the Khan retreated to Silistria and followed the south shore of Danube route to reach the Ottoman forces.

The Khan joined to the Ottoman forces at the end of Rebi'ü'l-ahir 1011/mid October 1602 when Grand Vizier Yemişçi Hasan Pasha (1601-1603) entered to Belgrade. The Serdar, Hasan Pasha, received the Khan with full honour and made

babda dahı mühkem takayyüd-ı humayunları reca olunur; ferman devletlu padişahıdır.” Orhonlu, *Ibid*, pp.69-70.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p.26.

²⁴⁶ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.177. Kortepeter relates the defeat of the Khan to the existence of the Walloon mercenaries and four well-placed cannons in the army of Radu Serban, Voivode of

arrangements for his stay in the residence of Defterdar Ekmekçizade Ahmet Pasha. After several days of feasting, Peçoy (Pecs or Fünfkirchen) was assigned winter quarters to the Khan.²⁴⁷ Despite the fact, the Khan spent the whole winter in Pecs with entertainment the affairs were turning to a critical point for him as the spring approaches. According to the testimony of the Ottoman historian İbrahim Peçevi that spent the winter with him, the Khan was still worried about the situation of his brother Selamet Giray.²⁴⁸ However, the priority of the Khan was very different for that time. In a letter to the Sultan he explained his services and asked for the payment of money to satisfy his soldiers that fought under difficult conditions.²⁴⁹ More important, he

Wallachia (1602-1611). He also concluded that the brother-in-law of the Khan was also dead during the battle.

²⁴⁷ “şahra-yı mezburda a’yan-ı tatar ile serdar hasan paşa bi’l-zat mülakat itti ve hem rikab olub rebii’l-ahir evahirinde belgrada dahil oldular gazi giray defterdar etmekçizade menziline nüzul eyledi ve bu defa’a han hasan paşa ile üns ve ülfet ve iki günde bir münavebe ile birbirine ziyafetler ittiler ba’de-hu kendüye peçoy ve ‘asker-i tatarı sigetvar ve çopan ve mohac ve gayrı drava nehriniñ maverası kışlağ ta’yin ol canibe gitti”. Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p.183.

²⁴⁸ “ama karındaşı selamet giray’dan emn üzere değil idi meclisinde çok añılırdı hatta bir defa’a ahmed ağası ki tatar’ın ta’birinde çapu ağası dirler vezir-i a’zami maķamındadır eşna-i kelamda yad olundu hey padişahım beni halime komadıñ seniñ karşuñda başub şarı öküz boğazlar gibi boğazlamış olsam şimdi bu efkardan ve haṭıradan kurtulmuş olurduñ didi taķdire havale itti”. *Peçevi II*, p.251.

²⁴⁹ “Kırım Hanı Gazi Giray Han’un arzıdır: Hala bu bendeleri tatar askeri ile gelüp Belgrad’a (1011 Rebiülahır’ında) serdar ve Vezir-i a’zam Hasan Paşa kullarıyla mülaki olup, ol hin de Budin üzerinde küffar askeri var iken bu bendelerine Peçuy’da kışla ta’yin olunup tatar askerinin ol caniblere geldiğün iştirmekle Budin’i bırakup gitmişlerdür. Ba’dehu bir kaç gündən sonra sular doñdukda buz üzerinden Medyemorya’ya iki def’a akın etdirilüp ve bir def’a dahı Karka nam mahal urulur ve bir def’a dahı Rabe suyu üzerinde olan memleketleri urulup ve bir def’a dahı Şarvar ve Tokay ve Seçen canibleri ve bir def’a dahı Sebeş ve Lugoş vilayetleri garet ve hasarat etdirilüp azim yüz aklıkları olup, lakin bu zemanede değin Astane-i sa’adet’den bir haber ve olcanibe gönderilen Ali Mirza nam ademimizden dahı bir eser zuhur etmemekle azim ızdırab üzereyüz. Şimdiye değin kış olmağla düşmenün harekete kudreti olmayub hala kış geçüp ve hevalar mülayim olup Peşte kal’esi dahı ellerinde olmağla her canibden hücum edüp taburların Budin üzerine getürmeleri mukarrerdür ve Budin’de olan az asker mezburlara cevabâ kadir olamayub tatar askeri ise topa ve tufenge karşı duramayub heman şimdiden yeniçeri taifesin ve Rumeli ve sair me’mur olan askeri göndermek mühimmatdandır. Bu zemana değin sular buz olmağla tatar askeri küffar memleketine akınlar edüp ve Budin kal’esine zahire ulaşıdurup mümkün olduğı mertebe hıdmetde kusur konulmamışdur; sonra buzlar çözüldükde tatar askeri bir vahşi taifedür iltifat olmayıcak bir vechile zabt olunması müşkildür sonra niçün i’lam etmedinüz deyü itab olmamak için tatar ahvali ve düşmenin tedarüki ve Budin’de kapanan askerün za’f-ı hali tafsil üzere arz olundu. Fırsat fevt olmazdan mukaddem bir tedarük görölür ise murad üzere hıdmet olunur eğer olmaz ise teessüf ve nedamet mukarrerdür; ve bu hıdmet için kullarımız ağası Mustafa Ağa irsal olundu deyü arz eder. Sa’adetlü padişahım Rumeli askerinin ve sair Budin serhaddine me’mur olan askeri mu’accelen sürmek için ve sair sefer mühimmatı tedarik için her tarafa bir kaç def’a müekked evamir-i aliyye ile kapucular gönderilüp asker ihracına ikdam ve

described the critical situation of the front and warned the Sultan that he should send soldier and ammunition to the front before the spring or otherwise to face the consequences. Depending on the letter it is possible to argue that Bora Giray was not only familiar with the traditional Tatar warfare methods but was also very well acquainted with the new warfare techniques. Moreover it seems that he knew very well the functioning of the Ottoman military administration and its weaknesses. For that reason he warned the Sultan to start the preparations as early as possible. The letter shows that contrary to the testimony of Ottoman historians at least the Tatar army was not inactive during the winter 1602. The Tatar army raided twice Medyemorye (Medumurje Mountains) and went as far as Karka (River Krka) in Croatia. Later they raided the environs of River Rabe (Raba) and the region of Tokay (Tokaj), Şarvar, Seçen (Szecseny?). Finally, they raided Lugoş (Lugoy) and Sebeş in to Romania. Ottoman Historians referred only to the first raid and they wrote that it was not successful and did not satisfy the Khan.²⁵⁰ The compromise between the Ottomans and Celali Deli Hasan changed the situation once again and provoked the suspicion of the Khan about his life. Moreover, Deli Hasan was appointed the Beylerbeyi of Bosna and sent to the front to fight with Habsburgs. Meanwhile, the ex-rebels Selamet Giray and Şahin Giray were in Istanbul to seek their promotions.²⁵¹

ihtimamda ziyade dikkat olunmuşdur; min ba'd dahı geceyi gündüze katıp lazım olan hususlarda ikdam olunmakda daқиқа fevt olunmaz; baki emr ü ferman sa'adetiü padişahumundur. Mrehum ve mağfur Sultan Mehemmed Han hazretlerinin cevab-ı şerifleridür: Her tarafa tekrar müekked emirler ve yarar kapucılar gönderesin askeri sefere sürmeğe cehd eylesünler." Orhonlu, *Telhisler*, pp.53-54.

²⁵⁰ "... han hazretleri hırvat memleketine aқına gitmiş idi ve-illa murad üzere iş göremedi ve ganimet alamadı ..." *Peçevi II*, p.352.

²⁵¹ "Sa'adetiü padişahum Han-zade'nin büyüği Selamet Giray kulunuz haliya kapuya varmışdur. Ol kulnuza ihsan-ı şerifinüzle ri'ayetinüz olsun; öbür küçüği ki müşarileyhin karındaşı oğludur, geçen de kapuya vardukda ri'ayet buyurulmuşdı. Haliya mezbur Selamet Giray anların büyüğüdür buña dahı ziyadece ri'ayet lazımdur. Bu makulelere her ne gelür ziyade ri'ayet buyurulursa ol denli istiyorlar; sa'adetiü padişahum az nesne çok maslahat bitürür ümididir ki ol kulunuza artıcaқ ihsan-ı şerifinüzle ri'ayet buyurula. ..." Orhonlu, *Telhisler*, p.81. The document is not dated but the Grand Vizier wrote about an executed Ali Anға. it should be the former agha of Janissary Ali Aға that was executed when

The Grand Vizier suggested to the Sultan not to reverse their requests and to satisfy them so that they could be used in future. The Khan was most probably aware of the efforts of the fugitives in the Porte and reacted immediately.

The sudden return of Bora Giray from the Hungarian front likes his arrival constitutes a rather obscure episode of his activities. Different factors might have effected his decision but it is better to start with the testimony of Peçevi İbrahim Efendi who stayed with the Khan in Peçoy.²⁵² According to Peçevi four factors

wrote about an executed Ali Ağa. it should be the former agha of Janissary Ali Ağa that was executed when he returned from the front on February 1603. For more information Ali Ağa and his execution see; *Peçevi II*, p.256. The nephew of Selamet Giray that was referred in the text is not certain. Cengiz Orhonlu noted that according to Ottoman documents Selamet Giray was in Bursa with his brothers Şahin and Saadet Giray in 1010/1601-1602. However Şahin Giray was not the brother but the nephew of Selamet Giray. More important all the brothers of Selamet Giray were already dead. Adil Giray was killed by the Safavids, Mehmet Giray II was killed by Alp Giray, İslam Giray II was dead in 1588, Feth Giray was killed by Bora Giray, Alp Giray fled to the Istanbul and dead in Edirne, Şakay Mübarek Giray fled to Circassia and dead there. Moreover none of the nephews of Selamet Giray could have been in Bursa with him. At that time the sons of Mehmet Giray II; Saadet Giray was long before killed by Alp Giray and Murad Giray was most probably dead and the sons of Şakay Mübarek Giray; Devlet Giray was killed by Bora Giray, Canbek Giray was in Circassia with his mother. The members of the Giray family that were referred in the document should be the sons of Saadet Giray the rival Khan to Islam Giray II (1584-1588).

²⁵² “ bu ‘abd-i fakiri merhum (Lala Mehmed Paşa) seksar (Szekszard) nam menziline han’a göndermiş idi sıkloş (Siklos) nahiyesinde drava nehri yalısında ‘asker-i tatar ile bir sebze-zara konmuşlar buldum ve merhumun mektubların virdim bir nice lütfuna ve muhabbetine mazhar düşdüm mektublarıñ mazmunu çün devlet ile ‘asker-i islama mülaķi olmasına müte’allik idi bila-tereddüd cevabında ‘an-ķarib gideriz didi ve takrib ile celali ahvalin sual itdi ve anıñla bizim içtima’ımız nice olur didi rıza sulṫanımızdır siz şahralarda anlar orduda murad-ı şerifiñiz olmayıcaķ yüzlerin mürde-suy görsün dırsız ve çehre-i murdarların görmezsiniz didim lakin nev’an tereddüdü var idüğün gördüm muķaddema karındaşı selamet giray han kendüden ru-gerdan olub celali’ye itdiğü nitekim sebķ itmiş idi eğerçe soñra celaliden müfarekatı hadd-i tevatür itmiş idi lakin han buña vakıf iken yine fi’l-cümle vehmden ħali değil idi çün merhuma vardım ve ahval şöyledir dedim etmekçizade eğerçi ibrahim efendi kendü kuluñuzdur varması münasibdir ama canib-i salṫanatdan beylerbeyilerden bir adem gönderilmek hem kendülere ta’zim olunur hem sözi dahṫ müessir olur deyü neylediyse eyledi kendüsi bir kaç gün misafiri oldıđı ve niçe huķuk-ı sebķ itdiğü muķarrer olmağla kendüsi ta’yin itirdi ama be-şarṫan ibrahim efendi bile olsun didi fakir ħayli ö’zr itdim ħalaş olmadım çün han’a vardık zahiren bir kaç kelam söyleşdiler soñra ihfaya fıslıdıya girişdiler irtesi celali drava’dan geçince tevakkuf iderüz ve defterdar efendi ile ma’en gideriz deyü bizi mektublar ile şavdı gönderdi çün merhuma geldim ħaķıķat-ı ħali didim gelürmi gidemi ne añlarsın buyurdılar zann-ı ħalibim gider zira evza’ın etmekçizade mülaķatından soñra evvelki evza’a muvafik buldum ve korķarım kapukethüdası’nuñ sözi bundan şübut bulur didim ol söz dahṫi bu idi ki yemişçi’ye ‘asker için iķdam idicek yanına getürdüb kulağına dir ki dünya’yı feth mi itse gerek ħalli şallu varub geldiğüne razıyuz ol yüz aķlığı iderse benim ħilafda olanları görmezsiniz bu niçün itmedi deyü başım aldırırılar ama ol her nice varub gelürse ben an

determined the decision of the Khan. First, the possibility the Selamet Giray came to the front with the new Beylerbeyi of Bosna and ex-rebel Deli Hasan's forces. Second, was Khan's jealousy towards Serdar Lala Mehmed Paşa. Thirdly, the words of Ekmekçizade Ahmed Pasha that guaranteed that the Khan would not be punished if he returns to the Crimea. Finally, the failure to satisfy his monetary requests. It is not difficult to understand Bora Giray's worry about the arrival of Selamet Giray with a large army but we also know that Selamet Giray was not with the army. Therefore, the other factors become important, why did the Khan did not want Lala Mustafa Paşa to succeed. According to the correspondence of Serdar Lala Mehmed Pasha with the Porte there should not be a personal animosity between the Khan and him.²⁵³ Serdar

himayet iderim üşenmesün dimiş ola ya'ni yüz akkığı itdüğün istemedüğü muqarrer idi ve etmekçizade ile daği ağı bir idi belki hılafında olmağı aña sipariş itmiş idi ya'ni han 'avdet itmekle canibi padişahi'den mu'ateb olmayacağıın bildirdi han'a bunu ilka ve beyan itmekle ve kendüsü ma'an kalkub gitmekle han'ın gitmesine sebep oldu fakirden bir gün sonra kalkub giderler etmekçizade'nin eşvab ve erzağı ve cümle ağırlığı orduda kalmış idi metubları ve ademleri geldi beş biñ altun merhum biñ altun daği 'abdi kethüdasına hıdmet itdi hüsn-i icazet virildüğünden gayri terbiye-nameler daği virdi sonra merhum vefat itdiği gün heman sa'atiyle 'abdi kethüdaya virdüğü biñ altunı aldı fi-nefs-il-emr hanın bu sefere zehab ü iyabı gayetde bi-faide oldu gelişi sefer sonunda gidişi sefer evvelinde kışlamakda altı pare sancağın re'ayasın hakisar itdi ve ancak gane bir defa' akına gitdi barın bolluk iş görmedi ve asitane-i sa'adetde olan ina'm-ı padişahiden gayri bir defa' hakirle merhum kırkk biñ gurus ve bir defa' otuz biñ gurus gönderdi güçle aldurdım cevabında bi-hamdi'l-lahi te'ala ben buña muhtac değilim tatar'a birer gurus virsem 'arzım tahammül itmez ikişer virmek istesem bu kifayet itmez elbette yine getir deyü ikdam itdi kah elin kah ayağın öpe öpe a'kübet ecdadı ervağın yad idüb böyle yemin- bi'l-kesr itdiki senin haTırın için bu kadar keredir gelür gidersin bize nev'an intisab itdiñ alalım ve gice icre hazine-darı 'abdü'l-'aziz çelesiye virdim mebada tatar görüb i'nam-ı padişahi gelmişdir deyü üzerine gelüb tağa itmeyeler gane andan ihtiraz iderler idi ve bu maqüle sitemden gayri beylerbeyilik ve sancak ve gün geçmez ki bir iki adama ya kendi tatarlarına bölük rica itmeye virilirse alıverir virmezlerse anın bi-huzurluğı ve 'adem-i muvafaqatı olmaz haşıl-ı kelam engürüs seferlerine bir kaç defa' geldiler gitdiler bir yad olunacak hıdmet itmediler ela her seferde cana geçdiler." *Peçevi II*, pp.267-270.

²⁵³ "Telhis- Merhum ve Mağfir Vezir Yemişçi Hasan Paşa'ya Mehemed Paşa'dan gelen arzdır: Haliya Üngürüs canibine serdar olan Mehemed Paşa kullarının arzıdır: Bu kulları mukaddema Budin muhafazasında iken serdarlık hizmeti ferman olunmağla Budin'den çıkup Peçuy'da Gazi Giray Han hazretlerine mülaki olup ahval-ı sefer müşavere olunup tafsil üzere söyleşilmişdir; küffar-ı haksarın Budin kal'ası üzerine tam' u hırsları müstedd olup kışdan berü azim tertibler ve tedarükler askerlerin serhadlerine götürülmüşlerdür; an karib Budin'e ve yahud ahar yere yapışmaları mukarrerdür. Her kangı taraftan mukaddem asker ile hareket olunursa anın başı ilerüye varur ve mel'unların askerleri ekser piyade ve tüfeng-endaz olmağla asakir-i islamin ekseri atlu olup piyadesi az olduğundan gayri tüfenge mü'tad üstadları nadir olmağla hin-i mukabelede ve kal'a muhasarasında azim ızdırab çekilür. Bu kulları Budin'den Peçuy'a dahil olmazdan mukaddem Gazi Giray Han kulları kendüsü asakir-i tatar ve Peçuy ve Sigetvar ve Pojega sancakları asker(leri) ve Bosna beğlerbeyisi Mehemed Paşa kulları ile ve Bosna'dan gelen piyade asker ile Idlovin ve Medyumerye caniblerine akın edüp eyyam-ı devlet-i

that was under the high pressure of Habsburgs needed desperately the forces of Bora Giray and did not want to loose his assistance. Thus, it is possible to understand why the Serdar considered the *unsuccessful* raid of the Khan as an unprecedented success. Therefore, the other factors should be analysed. Financing the long and costly Habsburg war was already a big problem for the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the Porte had to finance the struggle with the Celalis and was on the verge of a war with the Safavids. Therefore, it was very natural that the Porte failed to comply with the continuous monetary requests of Bora Giray.

However, the most important factor that brought the Khan and the Grand Vizier in line may be completely different. As far as, the Grand Vizier Yemişçi Hasan was concerned he could have wanted that Serdar Lala Mehmet Pasha failed because there was a risk that the victorious Serdar replace him. It is also possible that the Grand Vizier wanted the failure of the Serdar in order to make a peace with the Habsburgs. If one considers the critical situation of the Empire, the Celali rebellions, the Safavid threat and the turmoil in Istanbul Grand Vizier was not wrong to seek a peace. An Ottoman document of the time shows that the Habsburgs made a proposal of peace to the Ottomans.²⁵⁴ However, it was difficult to persuade the Sultan to accept the peace because it required the surrender of some territories such as Erlau and Raab that were once under the Ottoman rule. The same proposal was already made during the last Grand Vizierate of Ibrahim Pasha in 1599 but remained in vain at that time. It was possible that one more year of fruitless campaign could force the Sultan to accept

padişahi'de bi-hadd ü şumar palanğa ve ve kasabat kariyyeleri ihrak olunup zükur ve inasdan hayli esir çıkarıp külli yüz aklıkları eylemişlerdür; müşarunileyh han kulları bu def'a varduğı yere şimdiye değın asker-i islamdan bir ferd varmak müyesser olmamışdur. ...” Orhonlu, *Telhisler*, pp.71-72.

the peace. It is known that Bora Giray was a proponent of this offer and Lala Mehmed Pasha was against it.²⁵⁵

Since we don't know any specific reason that might turn the Khan against the Serdar, the reason that brought the Khan with the Grand Vizier became important. It is possible to enlist several factors that encouraged the Khan for the realisation of a peace. First it was possible that the Habsburgs offered a *gift* to the Khan. It was already referred to the efforts of the Habsburgs to gain the Khan on their side or at least to neutralise him however there is not a document showing that the Habsburgs contacted with the Khan for the moment. The financial aspect should also be considered to be influential. It was already noted that the Khan complained about the low rate of rations among the Tatars and warned the Porte it would be very difficult to control them unless the necessary actions (a *hazine*) were immediately taken. It is also important to note that the failure of the Medumurje campaign caused more difficulties to the Khan. Most probably the Khan realised that this long and costly war was no more profitable for him and he had better to return to the Crimea than to remain in the front. Since the situation in the Crimea was of primary importance for him at that moment there should be an important threat that required his immediate return. At first glance, the possibility that his relatives could return to the Crimea while he was

²⁵⁴ Ibid, pp.70-71

²⁵⁵ "... a'kıbet mukaddema ibrahim pařa'nun zaman-ı serdarlığında ve tatar han'ın ve mir-i miran ve ümera-i zi-řan ve u'mumen a'sker-i islamiñ rey-i hasen gördükleri vech üzere ki eğre'niñ budun'dan bu'dı ve memalik-i islama çendan zarar ve sudı yokdur deyü estergon ile istibdale rey itmişlerdi ve ibrahim pařa kethüdası ve vezir murad pařa ve tatar han'ın vezir-i a'zamı namına olan ahmed ađa ve budun kazısı mevlana habil efendi Tabur-ı küffara varub ve bu rey üzere řulh müna'kid olmađla iki Tarafıñ řevab didi olmuş iken bir qarardada olmamađla hatta merhum efendimiz (Lala Mehmed Pařa) dađl Taraf-ı hilafa zahiib olmađla a'kd olunmamıř idi..." *Peçevi II*, pp,296-297.

absent seems to be feasible. The Cossack raids could be another reason but it should be noted that a portion of the Cossack forces were fighting with Poles in Livonia and returned only after the end of 1603. An Ottoman document of the time provides a logical reason for Bora Giray to hurry to return to the Crimea; it is the threat of a Nogay invasion.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁶ “Telhis-Mrhum ve Mağfur Vezir-i a’zam Mehmed Paşa’nındur: Kırım Hanı Gazi Giray Han’ın arzıdır: bu kulları ferman-ı humayun üzere bu sene serhadd-i küffarda kışlayub memalik-i islamiye’yi zarar-ı küffardan hırsat eyledüğümüzden gayri memalik-i a’daya tatar gazilerini defa’atle gönderüp enva’ akınlar edüp Medyemorya ve sair memalik-i a’dayı harab ve hasarat eyleyüb gereği gibi düşmene guşimaller verüp mela’in hudud-ı İslamiyeye zarar kasdın etmek değil kendü hallerin ancak tedarük etmeğe imkan kalmışdır. Bu vechile uğur-ı humayunda sa’y u ictihad olunduğı mukaddema südde-i sa’adet’e arz olunmuşdır; bi’l-cümle sa’adetlü padişah hazretleriyle ahd etdiğimiz hıdmet ve ubudiyeti bi-kusur eda eyleyüb şart-ı ubudiyet ve hıdmeti tasavvurdan ziyade yerine getürmüşüzdür. Lakin bu sene-i mubarekede bu kulları Kırım’da olmamağla Nogay taifesi ki, Büyük Nogay demekle ma’ruflardır, Moskov keferesiyle ittifak edüp Kırım vilayetin garet eylemeğe kasd eylemişler. El-ıyazubillah bu kullarınun bu hududda eğlenmenüz ma’lumları olursa bila şübhe Kırım vilayetine zarar kasd edeceklerinde şübhe olmaduğın cümle Kırım vilayetinde olan erbab-ı vukuf ve oğlumuz Toktamış Giray sultan kulları bu kullarına i’lam edüp şöyle ki, bir mikdar dahı eğlenürse min-ba’d Kırım vilayetinin hıfz u hırsatine imkan yokdur deyü enva’-ı tazarru’ eylemişler. Zahir budur ki, Kırım vilayeti dahı devletlü padişahumundur ve ırz-ı saltanatı siyanet farzdur. Kırım vilayetine düşmeden bu maqüle zarar olıcak umumen Tatar vilayeti tezelzül bulup tevaif-i tatar’ın birer arabaları vardur yüklenüp vilayetten gitdikden sonra Kırım hali kalup azim ihtilale sebeb olmak mukarrerdür. Bu kulları memulden ziyade hıdmetimiz eda eyleyüb sefer-i humayun hıdmetin makdurdan ziyade vücuda getürmüşümdür. Kırım fukarasını paymal olmak layık değıldür; bu kulları Kırım canibine teveccüh ettiğim takdirce bu canibde oğlumuz Sefer Giray sultan kulların müstevfa tatar askeriyile bu serhaddin hıdmetünde alıkoyup umur-ı sefer dahı avk ve te’hire düşmeyüp Kırım vilayeti dahı mahfez olur; bahusus şimdi ki halde bunda mevcut olan tatarın ekserinin atları zayı’ olup kuvvet ve kudreti olanların cümlesin alıkoyup bu kulları Kırım’a vardukda anda Kırım muhafazasında olan taze ve dinç müstevfa tatarı oğlumuz ıalga Toktamış Giray kullariyle gönderüp memulden ziyade hıdmetler ettirmek mukarrerdür. Bu ahvali i’lam için Ahmed Ağa kulları gönderilmişdir; vusulünde bu kullarına mu’accelen ferman-ı şerif inayet buyurula ki fırsat fevt olmadan ve Kırım vilayeti elden gitmeden bu kulları Kırım’a yetişüp serhad hıdmetine oğlumuz Sefer Giray kulların müstevfa tatarla alıkoduğumuzdan gayri Kırım’a varduğumuz gibi oğlumuz Toktamış Giray dahı dinç askerle gönderüb serhadd-ı islam tarafını muhafaza etdürevüz deyü i’lam eder. Sa’adetlü padişahum han kulları bu kulunuza kendü hattı ile gönderdüğü mektubunda Kırım’a gitmeğe icazet taleb eylemiş, bu babda emr-i şerifinüz nedür işaret-i aliyye buyurula ki, aña göre cevap verile. Sa’adetlü padişahum müteveffa Vezir İbrahim Paşa’nun han’a arpalık tevcih etdüğü beratı aynı ile rikab-ı hümayunlarına irsal olundu; nazar-ı humayunlarına müte’allik olmak babında ferman devletlü padişahumundur. Merhum ve mağfur Sultan Ahmed Han hazretlerinin cevap- şerifleridir: Cengden sonramı gider yohsa evvelmi gider; sefer dönüşünden sonra gitse caiz değılmü aña göre i’lam edesün.” Orhonlu, *Telhisler*, pp.92-94. It appears that there are some problems in the document. First of all the telhis seems to be written during the Grand Vizierate of Mehmed Paşa (1604-1606) not in his commandership of Hungarian front (1603). Second according to Orhonlu was submitted to Sultan Ahmed I (1603-1617) not to the Sultan Mehmed (1595-1603) because he wrote that in the original text it was wrongfully written that it was submitted to the Sultan Mehmed III. I think that Orhonlu was mistaken because he considered that since the text was labelled as the telhis of the Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha it should be submitted to Ahmet I. However from the historical evidences we know that Bora Giray did not return to the front after 1603 it should

Finally Etmekçizade Ahmet Pasha's role in the course of the events needs to be clarified. It appears that he played the scapegoat in this affair because both the Khan and Crimean historians put the blame on him as an agent of the Grand Vizier.²⁵⁷ The Crimean historians argued that the return of the Khan was a result of the evil deeds of Grand Vizier Yemişçi Hasan Pasha that exploited the fears of the Khan and Defterdar Etmekçizade was his tool. In the light of the analysis of the several sources it would be feasible to argue that the Khan had already decided to return to the Crimea before his meeting with Etmekçizade. He certainly doubted about the reaction of the Sultan to his departure but his fear from the danger that he would face if the Serdar became victorious does not seem to be convincing. The Khan was more likely to be in a serious danger if he left the front without a viable pretext or without the existence of someone to support him in the Imperial Divan. Thus, the words of Etmekçizade gave him the support that he needed and he immediately returned to the Crimea. However, the Khan did not directly turned to the Crimea, he entered to Wallachia and devastated the countryside according to the foreign sources of the time he aimed to place Radu Serban to the seat of Voivode in return of the payment of an annual tribute. The Khan seems to be successful in his efforts since Radu Serban was officially recognised by the Porte in 1604. The fact that the Khan did not returned to the Crimea shows that the

be submitted to the Mehmed III. The confusing point is the heading, I think that the telhis was written when Lala Mehmed Pasha was the Serdar but classified later when the Mehmed Paşa was dead.

²⁵⁷ “şadr-ı a'zam hasan paşa ru-be-rah asane-i padişah-ı devlet-penah olub muhafız-ı budin lala hasan paşa'yı serdar ta'yin itdikde muvafık-ı nuşret olur mülâhazasıyla garaż-ı fasidine mübteni hanın orduya a'dem-i luhuq maqsudı oldıgın ... nifaq-amizi ile ima ve işaret itmiş idi lala mehmed paşa dek ve hile-i vezirden muhbir olmağla mektub-ı şadağat üslub ile iki defa' hanı da'vet eyledikde vekil-i salTanat yemişçi ile hazinedar-i emval-i devlet olan defterdar etmekcizade meyanlarında münasebet iktizası haqq-ı nime'ti hüdavendigara küfran ve defterdar mezbur ile hem-zeban olmağla han hazretleri kırım'a giderler ise mani' yokdur bütün dünyayı feth ü güşad ve memalik-i küffarı anlarını berbad itse gerekdir deyü a'vd ve insirafı babında tedarik itdikleri igva ve ifsadlarından naşi diyar-ı kırım'a imale-i ligam

Khan had other considerations than Nogays. An important detail is about the fact that the Khan's envoy to Radu Serban made apparent that a rupture had taken place with the Khan and the Sultan thus it seems that the Sultan did not welcome Khan's departure.²⁵⁸

The year 1603 was the last time that the Khan joined to any Ottoman campaign in person. The next year he sent his son and Kalghay Toktamış Giray to the Hungarian front and the Tatar contribution to the Ottoman campaigns began to diminish because the Ottoman-Habsburg war 1596-1606 came closer to an end. According to the Ottoman documents the Ottoman army did not benefit much from the presence of Toktamış Giray. The Grand Vizier Lala Mehmet complained about the independent movements and the monetary requests of the Tatar forces.²⁵⁹ More important was the danger that the absence of the Tatar army created in the front.²⁶⁰

rica't eyledi lakin men yezre'u şevk lem yehşud i'naben mefhumunca yemişçiniñ ğars-ı mezra'a derun itdiği şecere-i habiše-i vesvesesiniñ haşılı zehr-i katil olub ...” Rıza, *al-sab* , p.111.

²⁵⁸ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.179.

²⁵⁹ “Telhis-Merhum Vezir-i a'zam Mehmed Paşanundur: Arz-ı bende-i bi-mikdar budur ki, devletlü padişahum sefer-i humayundan avdet olunup Belgrad'a gelindikden sonra Tatar taifesin Belgrad etrafında olan kasabat ve kuraya tevzi' edüp memleket halkından olı geldiği üzere yem ve yiyecekleri ta'yin olunup ve Han-zade Toktamış Sultan'a dahı Alaca-hisar (Krusevac) sancağına tabi' Ürgüb nahiyesi kışlak verilüp ve kendü ile bile sefer-i humayunda olan bölük halkının ulufeleri dahı verilüp, nihayet babası Han yanında olan bölük halkına hazine olmamağla, anlara ulufe yetişmemiş idi. Hala müşarünileyh Han-zade kışlağa ta'yin olunan tatar taifesi ile kalkup Kırım canibine gitmişdür deyü haber gelmişdür. Devletlü padişahum tatar taifesi bir garib taifedür her ne kadar ri'ayet olunsa kana'at gelmez; ulufeleri verilüp ve her birine kışlak ta'yin olunmuşken hala Han-zade ile kalkup gitmişler; ma'lum-ı humayunları oldukdan sonra emr ü ferman devletlü ve sa'adetlü padişahumundur. Merhum Sultan Ahmed Han hazretlerinin cevab-ı şerifleridür: Tedarük görünsün.” Orhonlu, *Telhisler*, pp.95-96.

²⁶⁰ “... Devletlü padişahum iki canibin dahı tedarüki görülmek mühimmat-ı din ü devletdendir; bu kulları Belgrad'da ve Han-zade Tatar taifesile ol caniblerde kışlakda iken Beç kralı ve aña tabi' olan kefereler mela'inleri memalik-i mahruse'ye hücum etmeğe havf ederlerdi. Bu kulları emr-i padişahi ile Astone-i sa'adet'e gelüp ve Han-zade kulları Kırım canibine gitdüğü kefereler ta'ifesinin ma'lumları olmuşdur. Fırsat mahallidür deyü el-ıyazubillahü te'ala ol serhadlerde bir mahalle zarar erişdirmeğe sa'y ve ikdam etmelerine şübhe yokdur. ...” The Telhis was not dated but it should be written at the

The attitude of the Kalghay maybe interpreted in several ways; first of all it was possible that the Kalghay reacted to the failure of the deliverance of the hazine but could be also related with the efforts of the Habsburgs. When the balance of power began to change in favour of the Ottomans after the revolt of Stephen Bocskay (Voivode of Transylvania 1604 and King of Hungary 1605), the Habsburgs once again tried to convince the Khan to make a separate peace.²⁶¹ In 1604 the Khan sent Ahmed Agha to Klausenberg (Cluj) to negotiate a separate peace with the Habsburgs. Ahmed Agha proposed three conditions to make a peace. First, the emperor would send a separate embassy to Khan for peace talks. Second, the right to appoint the Voivode of Wallachia would belong to the Sultan and the Khan would contribute by sending other trappings of the appointment. Third, the emperor would pay 40.000 ducats per year to the Khan to keep his cities free from Tatar raids.²⁶² The Habsburg delegation accepted the first and second conditions but refused the third one on the ground that the Khan requested too much money. However, the emergence of Stephan Bosckay changed the course of events. It was the Emperor who proposed 20.000 ducats to the Khan when Bosckay began to drive the Habsburg forces out of Transylvania and the Ottoman recaptured Estergon (Gran) in 1605.²⁶³ There is no evidence that the Khan played an active role neither during the last stages of the Ottoman-Habsburg war 1593-1606 nor to the realisation of the Szitva-Török treaty (1606) that ended the war.

end of 1014/1605-1606 when Grand Vizier turned to Istanbul after the conquest of Estergon 20 Ca. 1014/03 10 1605. Ibid., p.100.

²⁶¹ Stephen Bocskay was a Protestant nobleman of Hungarian origin. He was initially pro-Habsburg but switched allegiance after 1600 when Habsburgs began to apply a Catholic policy and disenfranchise the Protestant nobility. For more information on Bocskay see: Deceu, "Erdel", *IA*, IV, p.300.

²⁶² Hammer, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, Vol.4., ed., Mehmet Çelik, Istanbul, 1990, p.385.

²⁶³ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.179.

XI The Role of the Tatars during the Ottoman-Habsburg

War (1593-1606)

The Ottoman historians heavily criticised the presence and the role of the Crimean Tatars in the 1593-1606 War.²⁶⁴ Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, the witness of the war argued that the Tatar forces achieved very little during the campaigns and more important their devastation of the countryside caused to the alienation of the local people to the Ottoman rule. It should be stated that his critics were true from an Ottoman perspective. The Tatar cavalry was hardly stand against the firearms and was not effective in siege warfare that often occurred during this long war.²⁶⁵ More

²⁶⁴ “ve min meaşirü’-la’dl ve’l-müdarat ilm-i şerif-i a’lem şumul erbab-ı u’kula vazıh ve ruşendir ki bir sene eşer-i sulṭan süleyman ğazi ḥan merhum’a süluk olunmağla boçkay merķumuñ iṭa’tuna ba’iş oldılar bu sebeb ile bu sene-i mübarekede a’sker-i islama bu kadar ğazavat ve fütuḥat müyesser oldu engürüs seferleri olalı onüçüncü sefer idi cümlesi buña mu’adil değil idi üç dört defa’ tatar ḥan a’sker-i tatar-ı fıraḩan ile ve bir defa’ oğlı ve her sene mirzaları serḥadd muḥafazasına kaldı küffar’a bu mertebe değil a’sr-ı a’siri kahr itmediler ve bir kerre daḩi kahr ü ğalebe Ṭariķine gitmediler bu sene-i mübarekede kahr ü ğalebeden kaṭi’ naḩar a’sker-i islam bu mertebe ile ğanaim bir seferde muğtenim olmamışlardır re’aya’ya müdara ve istimalet olunmağla uyvar Ṭarafında olan kuradan ruz-merre ordu-yı hümayuna kocı kocı zāḩire gelür idi ve a’sker daḩi ordu’ya varub işıra itmeğre muḩtac değiller idi macar kızları a’vratları putun putun taze pişmiş çipü didikleri macar çörekleri ve enva’i meyve ve zāḩire maķulesin çadır çadır gezdürüb alıñ deyü minnet iderler idi ve hem ol ḩinde ki henüz a’sker-i islam estrerğon’ı döğmek üzere idi bölük bölük re’aya gelüb vire kağıdların alub iṭa’at iderler idi ḩatta ol maḩalde Ṭuna üzerinde bina olunan cisr-i a’zimi kırk elli üstad değirmenci zımmiler gelüb bina itdiler anda daḩi ehl-i islam’a binalarında zahmet çekdirmediler ve eski budun’a koyun aṬasına geçmekde ve sair varoşa üç dört ḩane varub Ṭavattun itdiler aşar-ı a’dl ü müdara böylece zāḩir oldu evvelki serdarlarımız daḩi böyle itmiş olsalar ve teberrüken sulṭan süleyman ḩan ğazi Ṭariķatdır deyü gitmiş olsalar ne seferler bu kadar uzar ve ne a’sker ḩalkı canlarından bezerdi belki her biri a’düvv-i din-i devletiñ başını ezerdi.” *Peçevi II*, pp.309-310.

²⁶⁵ However, according to Bora Giray’s own words the Tatars stood well against the gunfire during the siege of Jatik in 1602. Orhonlu, *Telhisler*, p.59.

important, was the difference between the strategic goals of the Ottoman and Tatar forces. The Ottomans aimed to control and to incorporate the region in to their system in order to exploit the resources, for that reason they did not want to devastate the region. The Tatars were away from their homeland. They had come to the front for booty and they were by no means interested with the extent of devastation they caused in the country. In fact the Tatars because of their nomadic tactics did not care about the harm that they have done to the land they raided.²⁶⁶ Moreover, their whole strategy depended on capturing people and their livestock. The attitude of the Tatar cavalry may be analysed form a completely different perspective. The Tatars were asked to remain in the front for long terms. However, the Crimea was not a secure place, it was frequently attacked by the Nogays and the Cossacks. Therefore, the Tatars were always willing to return to the Crimea as soon as possible. This was one of the major subject of confrontation between the Ottoman commanders and Tatar mirzas.

The weaknesses of the Tatar cavalry was not strange to the Ottoman elite but they preferred to use it as a pretext whenever they were unsuccessful. A letter of Hoca Saadettin, the tutor of Mehmed III shows that the Ottoman commander many times used the Tatar forces in a wrong way and than accused them.²⁶⁷ In his letter,

²⁶⁶ For the military tactics of the Tatars see: Beauplan, *A Description*,.

²⁶⁷ "mektub-ı hoca sa'deddin efendi be-canibi serdar saṭurcu meḥmed paṣa:

... ol vechle serḥadden a'rızlar gelmekle telafi-i ma-fat ile ve def'-i mücafāt ümidi ile ḥan ḥazretlerine teklif-i muzafat ve irsal-i a'sker ile kaşd- def'-i afat olunub sene-i şaniyede cemi' muradatiñıza sa'y olunarak leşker-i bi-şumar gönderilmişken köprüyü erdel semtine ḳurb elli beş gün ba'de'l-u'bur ḥan ḥazretlerine intizar namıyla oturub meḳs olunmaḡla a'daya semt-i tevcih l'lam olunub ve hem yürimeḡe iḳdam olunmaḡla ḥavf ve a'cz ve kılllet-i a'sker a'lametin düşmana ḡuyurub bi-vech geḗidde bu ḳadar oṭurmaḡla işḳal ve ihmalin cebele ḡeküb şalt ve sebük-bar muḥafaza-i miḡal deyü

Hoca Saadettin first explains the mistakes that the Serdar Satırcı made during the campaign then, he argues that he can not blame the Tatars because he did not use them *comme il faut*. It is possible to understand from the letter that the Serdar accused the Tatars of being useless and non-disciplined. However, the Khan wrote a similar letter within which he explained the events from his perspective. Hoca Saadettin considered the pretexts of Bora Giray more relevant and wrote a letter which condemned the Serdar. Another interesting point is about the services of the Tatars during the campaign. The Khan stated clearly that his forces were not functional in siege warfare and they could be useful in raids and transportation.

In order to judge the overall performance of the Tatar forces during the 1593-1606 Ottoman-Habsburg war it is better to look to the functions they performed

u'bur ve gūzar itdiler der-devlet'den tahır ve irsali tekrar olunan nameha-yi padişahide bu sal k̄ala'-girlik yılı değildir erdelistan içine aqın şalub tahrib idesün deyü buyurulmuş iken iki k̄ala' ile oyalanub kışa k̄alub naire-i fitne-i a'dayı daire-i memalik-i islamiyeden münkati' ve fitnelerin müntefi itmedin bir iki k̄ala'ların almak muqtezayı vaqt değil idi alındığı şürette alınan k̄ala'larımıza bedel olmaz anıñla düşman zebun olmaz eğri fethi ile ne ateşleri süyündü ve ne yürekleri göyündü esterğon ve komran k̄ala'ları alınmış olsa yanık dañi mahfuz ve budin ehli dañi mahzuz ve kurbundaki k̄ala'mñ dañi istirdadı melhuz olurdu Taburları karşı gelmezdi ise erdelistan içine guruh guruh a'sakir-i rumiye ve cünud-ı o'smaniye ve efvac tatariye gönderüb ve aqınlar şalub zira'at ve zer'in ve aşl ve fer'in yakub yakub hanedanların viran ve hanmanların talan ve pir ve civanların esir ve nalan ideler ve budin ve eğri ve üstüni belgrad Taraflarını muhafaza itmede fikr ve mülahazadan hali olmıyasız deyü tekid ile haT̄T-ı hümayun gönderilmiş ülü'l-emre muhalefet şeameti ile bir iş görülmeyüb k̄ala'-girlik esbabını kayırmadin üç Tob ile varat gibi düşvar k̄ala'ya şarqub mebbe-i nüzuldan müntehayı nıhlete dek baran ve küll müslimin alayların zebun ve serhaddler hıfzına muqayyed olmamağla budin'i ve eT̄rafını viran ve mağbun itmeğe sebep olub varat altında a'sker-i islami eğleyüb tatarı dañi habs ve ilḡar Taleb idenleri yasağ ile tebs idüb erdelistan içi salim ve emin k̄alub erdel voyvodası haib ve a'skerimiz galib iken fırsatı fevt idüb memleketleri asude olmağın mihal muhtal dañi k̄ala' ile a'skeriñ bağlandığını görmekle erdel canibinden bi-bak olub memleketimize koyuldu ve ol diyar ehliniñ derisi şoyuldu bu zaman al-o'sman'a olan zarar ve gezend-i bi-şumar bu iki yılda su-i tedbir ve a'dem-i müsa'de-i taqdir ile zuhura geldi rabbü'l-a'lemin beterinden şaklıya han hazretlerine i'tiraz olunduğda cevab-ı ma'kul ve ö'zr-i maqbul yazarlar k̄ala'-girlik danışığı tatar karı değildir ama ilḡar ile tahrib-i diyar ve nehb ü ğaret-i memalik-i küffar ve üsera ile zehair ihzar itmek vazife-i tatardır ol babda taqsirimiz mi oldu ver vechle emre imtişalden ğayri işimiz yokdur gel didiñiz geldik dur didiñiz durduk ur didiñiz urduk otur didiñiz oturduk kışla didiñiz kışladık bekle didiñiz bekledik uğruñızda ısılar şoğuklar çekdik ahur damlarında yatdık emr-i serdar'a muT̄i' ol didiñiz olduk deyü ö'zrler yazarlar bu taqdirce padişah-ı islam emri Tutulmayub a'dem-i müsa'de-i esbab ile kal'a-i düşvar üzerine düş-var dinlemedin düşüldi taht-ğah-ı

in the war scene. It was already stated that the Khan or the Kalghay served several times in the battlefield with large armies. More important, they wintered in the Hungary four times: 1594, 1598-1599, 1602-1603 and 1604-1605. The stay of the Crimean forces in Hungary was very important for the Ottomans. The Ottomans had difficulties to find enough soldiers to garrison in the front. Therefore, they decided to use the Crimean Tatar cavalry to check the entire frontal zone. Despite the fact that, the Tatar cavalry was not a match for Habsburg forces, they could hinder Habsburg offenses in early spring until the arrival of the main Ottoman army. The Ottoman soon realised that subsidising the wintering of Tatars was a heavy burden for the treasury and decided to decrease the number of Tatars that wintered in Hungary. But, they were still forced to garrison a permanent amount of 1000-2000 Tatars in Hungary.²⁶⁸

The wintering in Hungary was very profitable for the Tatars. Apart from the yearly *Hazine* that was send by the Sultan, they could obtain large amount of slaves in the raids. It was already stated the slave trade played an important role in the Crimean economy. During their first years the Tatars preferred to brought back their slaves to sell in the Crimea However, when they were defeated by the Voivode Michael of Wallachia in early 1595 and lost all of their booties, they preferred to sell their slaves in Hungary. Tatars performed other services rather than patrolling the front and helping the Ottoman garrisons. The highly mobile Tatar forces supplied food for the Ottoman army either by trade or simply by plundering the enemy.

engrüs ve yetmiş yıldan berü mahrus olan belde-i islamiyenin ab-ı ruyını pay-mal-ı a'da idüb ...”
Naima, pp.304-306.

XII The Last Years of Gazi Giray II

There is not very much information about the last years of Bora Giray. He did not personally join any of the Ottoman campaigns despite all the invitations. It is possible to argue that his relationship with the new Sultan Ahmed I was not good. However, the Ottomans were heavily needed the assistance of Crimean forces and invited him to their campaigns in the East. First, he was asked to send 10.000 soldiers to the campaign of Grand Vizier Lala Mehmed Pasha in 1606.²⁶⁹ Second, he was invited to the campaign of Kuyucu Murad Pasha (1606-1611) against the Celali Canpolatoğlu Ali.²⁷⁰ However, the Khan preferred to send a far more lesser force than

²⁶⁸ Maria Ivanics-Ress, "The Role Of The Crimean Tatars In The Habsburg-Ottoman War 1593-1606" ed. Kemal Çiçek, *The Great Ottoman Civilization*, I, Ankara, 2000, p.304.

²⁶⁹ The campaign was not realised because Lala Mehmed Paşa died just after the preparations began (22-June-1606).

²⁷⁰ "şadr-ı a'zam murad paşa Tarafından ğazi giray han canibine yazılan metubuñ suretidir: ... zat-sa'adetinize daħi ol canibde ne Tarafa tevcih iktiza ider ise aña göre cüret itmek muşammem olub ... bu sene- a'mimetü'l-müyemmenede daħi zuhura getirilüb bedel-i nefsi celadet maħalleri olan ferzend-i ercmend-i devlet-mendleri toħtamiş sulTan ğazretlerini on biñ miğdarı cüyüş-ı derya-huruş tatar'a serdar ve sipah-salar idüb memul olmağın ol babda varaka-i ihlaş bedreka taħrir olunub gönderilmiştir ğaħkan ki bu maħlaşlarınñ şavab-didi ve ol hanedan-ı a'li-şan ve deħaiķ şinasın feraset-i zihn-i af-tab iktibaslarından ümidi budur ki sene-i salifede eğer ferzend-i ercmendlerinin ve eğer zat-serbülendlerinin a'zimetine mani' olan a'vaiķ ve a'layık bu sene-i mübarekede sebep-i teħir ve tevcih-i şeriflerine damen-gir olmayub melħuz olan aşar-ı şeca'at ve ferzane-gi ve eTvar- şadaķat ve yegane-gi ve muktezasınca'sakir-i tatar-ı şaba-reftara müşarileyh veled-i emced esa'dlarını serdar ve sipah-salar naşb ve ta'yin buyurub sinob iskelesinden bu Taraflara irsal ve işaline himmet ve illa munaķķabatlarına maşruf ola bu babda vücuda gelen ğidemat pesendidelerinin ..." Feridun Ahmed, *Münşe'atü's-selatin*, İstanbul, 1864, pp.21-22. The document was not dated but Grand Vizier Kuyucu Murad Pasha wrote it. In the letter he wrote about the defeat of Canpolatoğlu and the conquest of Halep, therefore it should be

he was asked for. Finally, he was invited to the campaign against Shah Abbas who attacked Azerbaijan and invaded Gence and Şirvan.²⁷¹ Bora Giray could not respond to this final call because he was already dead in 16-Za.-1016/03-March-1608.²⁷²

According to the Crimean historian Seyyid Muhammed Rıza; Bora Giray spent his last years in the Crimea since he was fearing that the new Sultan Ahmed I would punish him because of his previous actions.²⁷³ He constructed a castle, Gazikerman, in Circassia in order to obtain the favor of the Sultan again. He died from *ta'un* (plague) when he arrived to Temrük (Temryuk) after he completed the construction of Gazikerman.²⁷⁴ Contrary to Seyyid Rıza, Ottoman historian Katip Çelebi wrote that Bora Giray started building Gazikerman earlier in 1596 when he came to the throne for the second time.²⁷⁵ It is possible that Bora Giray had different considerations to complete Gazikerman rather than fear from the Sultan. First, it was possible that he wanted to control the region and free it from Cossack accroachments or from the Nogays. It was possible that Bora Giray could not interest in the region during the Ottoman-Habsburg wars and the Cossacks that were more free thanks to

written at the end of 1607 when Kuyucu Murad Pasha was wintering in Syria. For the Haleb campaign of Kuyucu Murad Pasha see: William J. Griswold, *Anadolu'da*,

²⁷¹ Feridun Bey, *Münşe'at*.

²⁷² It was the date when the new about the death of Bora Giray and the selection of his son Toktamış Giray, Khan of the Crimea. Bora Giray was dead in Şaban 1016/November 1607.

²⁷³ "... (after the events of 1603) şarşar-ı kahr-ı padişahi a'kıbet-i şah-i kam-ranisi riyaz-i nüzhet-asa-yi hayatdan ba'id ideceğin teyakkun itmeğle zeman-ı Tufan mu'ahaze- padişahide maqarr ve penah olmak üzere çerkes canibinde gazikerman nam bir palanqa bünyad ve itmam ve maqarr-gahına a'vdet idüb temruk kıala'sına vuşüli hengamina biñ on altı şa'banıdır sera-çe-i vücudı şadme-i Ta'un ile münhedim ve bağçesaray'da pederi türbesi zir-hakında müna'dim oldu ..." Rıza, *al-sab'*, p.111.

²⁷⁴ The castle Gazikerman should not be confused with the other Gazikerman (Kakhovka, Tavan) that was located on the left bank Dnieper. Gazikerman that was built by Bora Giray was in Circassia.

the Muscovy's Times of Troubles could easily penetrate in the region. Second, he might have considered to guarantee a secure passage to Azerbaijan that the Ottomans were fighting for with the Safavids. The hardships that he witnessed during the previous Ottoman-Safavid war might have forced him to back himself up. The fact that he never left the Crimea without pacifying his rivals and securing the environment supports this theory.

²⁷⁵ "... ğazi giray gerü ħaniyetde karar itdikden Őnra çerkes vilayeti ortasına fermanla bir ħiřar binasına bařlamıř idi ..." Katip Ćelebi, *Fezleke*, p.96.

XIII Gazi Giray II and his Reforms

Bora Giray did not only prove himself as an able warrior. He also made important changes in the Crimean politics. He developed a project from his experiences during his long relations with Ottomans. More important, he partially became successful to realise his project. Bora Giray knew that the weakest point of the Crimean Khanate was its feudal like character. The influence of the Crimean aristocracy on the fate of a Khan was the fundamental cause of the instability in the Khanate. He had an excellent example; the Ottoman Empire, to ensure the stability in the Khanate. He was aware that he should centralise the power in the Crimea both for his own sake and for the future of the Khanate. The instability that was likely to happen during the election of every new Khan could be stopped, if his line could peacefully assume the seat for one or two generations. Therefore, he began to implement Ottoman institutions to the Khanate. He wanted to entrust the seat of the Khan to his sons. It should not be coincidental that he eliminated most of his brothers and nephews.²⁷⁶ Finally he managed to appoint his own sons as Kalghay (Toktamış Giray) and Nureddin (Sefer Giray) in 1602. The fact that his son Toktamış Giray was

²⁷⁶ According to the testimony of Piaseczinski, Bora Giray was a very suspicious man, he always consulted his seers and acted according to the advices of them. In Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.185. Kortepeter uses the term Hafiz for seer but Hafiz had a different and broader meaning in Crimea. A hafiz could be a diplomat, a translator, an escort or a councillor. For more information on Hafiz see: Sroeckovsky, *Muhammed Geray*, p.78.

selected by the Kurultay the new Khan after his death shows that Bora Giray was successful enough to convince the aristocracy that the Khanship remained in his line.

Second important step towards centralisation was the founding of the post *Baş Ağa* (Kapı Ağası) similar to the Ottoman Sadrazam.²⁷⁷ It is difficult to determine when did Ahmed Agha was appointed Baş Ağa, but it is possible to estimate that he became Baş Agha as soon as Bora Giray became Khan because he was present during Bora Giray's first appearance in Hungarian front in 1594. Another point, was that Ahmed Agha was an *emekdar* (old servant) of Bora Giray. It seems that the Khan and Ahmed Agha had been together for a long time and he had the personal confidence of the Khan who entrusted him very important duties. In theory, Baş Agha assumed the roles Yeniçeri Ağası (Agha of Janissary) and Ihtisab Ağası.²⁷⁸ First, he was the commander of the personal guard of the Khan. Second, he regulated the rules of the markets and prices applied in Bahçesaray. Finally, he levied and collected taxes. Since he was able to punish anyone that failed to obey his regulations or failed to pay the taxes, he became very strong. It appears that Ahmed Agha was more than a simple Baş Agha thanks to his relationship with Khan. His name appears in every important action of the Khan. He represented Bora Giray during the peace talks with the Habsburg and Poles. He was sent to Istanbul on many occasion to represent the Khan. Finally, Ahmed Agha was appointed the custodian of the Khan's treasure that he housed in Inkerman in 1602, before the Khan departed to the Hungarian front.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁷ "... ve emekdarlarından ahmed ağayı vekil ve vezir ma'nasına baş ağa ve kapu ağası didikleri manşibi ta'yin idüb ..." Rıza, *al-sab'*, p.110.

²⁷⁸ Smirnov, *Krimskoye*, p.465.

There is one final detail about the relationship of Bora Giray with Ahmed Agha in Piaseczinski's writings. He wrote that Ahmed Agha was not only the Baş Agha but also was a cousin of Bora Giray.²⁸⁰ It is quite interesting because the Baş Ağa was generally appointed among the slave servants (kul) from Circassian origin. The divan (*görüüş*) of the Khan did not change very much except the inclusion of Baş Agha. Ottoman historian provides us a description of the Khan's divan when he received Moses Szekely in Hungarian front in 1602.²⁸¹ The presence of Circassian Beys shows that the influence of Circassian service beys went a head with the increasing influence of the Ottoman influence.

In order to centralise the power in his hands Bora Giray needed a personal army for that reason he established an alternative army; *tüfekçiler*.²⁸² The most significant peculiarity of the tüfekçi was that they were infantryman contrary to the traditional Crimean cavalry. In order to finance the tüfekçi, he imposed a special tax.²⁸³ The recruitment of tüfekçi was not a new practice for the Crimean Khans. It

²⁷⁹ Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, p.187.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.p.187.

²⁸¹ "... bunlarıñ kibarından sikel mojeş didikleri bir büdd heykel kış içinde kaçub serdar'a geldi ve u'budiyyet a'rz idüb iltica itdi ve erdeliñ fethine ba'zı asan Tarih ilka itdi andan peçoy'a geldi ve tatar han'a buluşdı hatta han hazretleri'niñ divanında hazır idim cümle şehirden mevcut olan mirzaların ve çerakese'den han kulları a'd itdikleri ağvatiñ ve baş veziri makamında olan kapu ağası didikleri ahmed ağası ve yine veziri ve hazinedarı olan a'bdü'l-a'ziz çelevi ve kazıa'skeri ve nişani ağası getürmüşler ayag üzere mukabelesinde Tururlardı ama yerluden biz bir kaç adem oturduk silahları ber tiğ-i zer nişanı yaqasında iki eli üzerine vaz' itmiş dururdu bu Tarih ile mezkur sikel mojeş'i buluşdırdılar ve el öpdürdiler ve bir müddet müşahabet itdiler ..." *Peçevi II*, p.244.

²⁸² "... gazi giray han eğerçi hıfz-ı cah-ı bi-şebat için tiğ-i gadr engizin ser-tiz ve maṭbah-ı han için sal be sal iki biñ küsfünde beşyüz nefer tüfenkçi mevacibi namıyla tekalif ve ceraim ihdaş eyledi ..." Rıza, *al-sab*, p.110.

²⁸³ According to Smirnov the other tax that was imposed for the kitchen of the Khan was 20.000 sheep per year and suggests that it be for the supply of the Tüfekçi. In Smirnov, *Krimskoye*, p.467.

was known that Sahib Giray I (1524-1532) recruited tüfekçi among the Tatars.²⁸⁴ However, Bora Giray tried to institutionalise tüfekçi by imposing a special tax to finance the expenses. The implementation of the tekalif shows that Bora Giray was serious in his plans to centralise the power because he set the preconditions to create a central government; the taxation and a permanent army.

XIV CONCLUSION

During the second half of the sixteenth century several changes that would effect the future of the Crimean Khanate appeared. Crimean Khans were forced to give up their *raison d'etre*; the revival of the Golden Horde, after the Russian annexation of Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates. Muscovite and Polish kingdoms with the support of new warfare technology were more effective against the Tatar cavalry. Moreover, Muscovy began to pursue an imperialistic policy under the energetic Tsars such as Ivan IV and Boris Godunov. Meanwhile, a new but determined enemy; the Cossacks, emerged on the borders of the Khanate. They were familiar with both the Tatar military tactics and modern military tactics. The emergence of the Cossackdom determined the future of *Deşt-i Kıpçak*, the slavisation of the steppes. The Crimean peninsula was encircled by hostile powers and was vulnerable to their encroachments. It was the turning point of history of the Crimean Khanate. From now on, it was the Crimeans that was obliged to defend itself from the Slavic offenses. Yet, the Crimean Khanate was still powerfull enough to stop and even to offend their regional rivals. However, it became obvious that the Khans were not able to subdue their rivals without the assistance of a greater power. Bora Giray's failure near Moscow in 1591 could be considered as one of the first signs of the changing balance of power in the region.

²⁸⁴ Remmal Hoca, *Tarih-i Sahib*, p.72.

The Ottoman Empire left the formulation and implementation of the Northern politics to the Crimean Khans, during the first century after their annexation of the Crimea in 1475. When the Ottomans realised that the Khans were no more able to deal with the Russian threat, they changed their traditional steppe politics. Until 1560's the Ottoman policy towards the Crimea was related with the security of the Black Sea. When Muscovy began to emerge as a regional power and to threaten Northern Caucasus, the Ottoman Empire decided to interfere. However, it became obvious that there was a great conflict between the Ottoman and Crimean approaches to the region. The Khans considered that the region was their realm and did not want to share it with the others. The failure of the Ottoman campaign to Astrakhan in 1569 is closely related with the lack of Crimean cooperation. Thus, the Porte decided that the Crimean Khans should be disciplined. As a result, the Porte began to appoint Khans from among the Sultans that resided in Istanbul. After Devlet Giray (1551-1577) and Mehmed Giray I (1577-1578) who was appointed from the Crimea, Feth Giray (1596) who reigned only for three months but proved his loyalty in Haçovası and Toktamış Giray (1608) who was selected by the Kurultay but refused by the Porte. Four Khans; Islam Giray (1584-1588), Gazi Giray (1588-1596), Selamet Giray (1608-1610) and Canbek Giray (1610-1623) had been several years in the Ottoman Empire and were appointed when they resided in the Empire.

The loyalty of the Khan became more important for the Ottomans, when they had to postpone their plans in the North. The Ottomans that entered in a long and costly struggle for supremacy in the East with Safavids and Habsburg in the West

needed the permanent presence of the Tatar force in the front. Therefore, the new Ottoman policy towards the Crimea was to have a loyal Khan in the Crimea in order to ensure the presence of the Crimean forces in Ottoman expeditions. During this period two Khans, Mehmed Giray I and Gazi Giray II were dismissed because they failed to join the army. The Ottoman influence on the Crimean Khanate began to increase with reigns of the Khans that were educated in the Porte. The most significant sign of this increasing influence happened during the time of Islam Giray II. It was the introduction of the rule of mentioning first the name of the Sultan in the the Friday prayer (hutbe) which was a symbol of sovereignty in the Islamic tradition.

Bora Giray came to the Crimean throne under these circumstances. A part from the external conditions he had another important handicap. He had to deal with all of these negative factors with a very conservative aristocracy (Karaçu Beyleri). The Crimean aristocracy that hold the real power in the Khanate was very keen on to pursue the *Yasa* (Cengizide code) that guaranteed there rights and reacted any revision of it. Bora Giray had to follow a very cautious policy. He should satisfy the demands of the Sultan, he should satisfy the needs of the aristocracy and he should assert his rule in the Khanate. He already proved his military skills and loyalty during the Ottoman-Safavid war (1578-1590). Now it was the turn to prove his administrative skills.

When Bora Giray came to the throne, his nephews Sa'adet Giray and Murad Giray were still in revolt. Muscovy was aiming to annex the Crimea by making Murad Giray puppet Khan as it was already done in Kazan and Astrakhan. At first, Bora Giray suppressed the revolt and turn to the Muscovy which was the real cause of

the tension. Until the beginning of the Ottoman-Habsburg war (1593-1606), he fought with Muscovy and signed the peace only after he was invited to the front. He planned to attract the Great Nogays (Ulu Nogays) to the Ottoman-Crimean side and to use them against Muscovy. However, he was only partially successful in his wise plan; he could detach the Great Nogays from Muscovy but could not support them with necessary force and equipment because of the Ottoman-Habsburg war.

The Ottoman-Habsburg war (1593-1606) determined the shape of Bora Giray's reign. After the beginning of the war, he turned his face to the West. The presence of the Crimean forces in the war was not only important for the Ottomans. The war was beneficial for the Khan in many respects. First, he personally received a considerable amount of money in order to join the campaign. Second, he could finance and employ his army thanks to the war. Third, he found a new sphere of influence in the West; the Danubean principalities: Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania. The Crimean Khanate might have lost its supremacy in the North but could penetrate in the West. He also used his journey to the front as a mean to exert pressure on Poland to pay tribute and to suppress Cossacks. Bora Giray was at the peak of his prestige in Istanbul, until he made a fatal mistake and did not personally join the campaign in 1596. The new Sultan Mehmed III (1595-1603) did not excuse this mistake his Kalghay and brother Feth Giray became the new Khan. It was the turning point of his relationship with the Porte. The reign of his personal friend Murad III (1574-1595) was over and the new Sultan worried about the ambitions of the Khan on Danubean principalities. The fact that the Khan asked the Voivodeships of Moldavia and Wallachia for his relatives caused great concern in the Porte.

The reaction of the Porte was related with a traditional attitude of the Khan. The Crimean Khans always considered whole Crimean peninsula as part of their realm and requested the deliverance of Ottoman forts (Kefe, Sudak, Mankup) to them whenever they felt they were strong or the Ottomans were weak. On the other hand, Ottomans wanted to increase their domain when they perceived that the Khan was weak. It was a major problem between the Ottomans and the Crimeans because whenever, a Khan revolted; he first attacked one of the Ottoman cities mainly to Kefe. Especially, Kefe which was a great trade center was the main target of the Khans. It should not be coincidental that Mehmet Giray I. first attacked and invaded Kefe, after his dismissal in 1588. Therefore, the Porte interpreted the requests of Gazi Giray II. as a continuation of this tradition of the Khans and decided to get rid of him. There is no evidence that Gazi Giray II. made a request about the Ottoman forts in the Crimea. Only, according to Piaseczinski he camped near Kefe when his brother and Kalghay, Selamet Giray fled from the Crimea in 1603. Most probably, he planned to attack Kefe in case of a negative decision of the Porte.

Despite the fact that his relations with the Porte did never normalise again until his death, Gazi Giray II. had enough experience about the Ottoman politics and the palace intrigues. He succeeded to reassume the throne only three months after his dismissal. From that day on, he went to the front only when he felt his seat in danger. As a result of his distrust to the Porte and the fact that the Habsburg war became less profitable as long as it continued; he felt compelled to search alternative ways. He contacted with the Habsburgs and sought a separate peace with them. The Khan could

not agree with the Habsburgs mainly because he asked too much money (40.000 ducats). Although, the Khan failed to realise his desires in Balkans, his active involvement to the Ottoman-Habsburg war had important results for the Crimean Khanate. The Khanate became an important actor of the Eastern European politics and continued this role until the treaty of Karlowitz (1699). His absentee from the front proved to the Ottomans once again that the cooperation of the Crimean Tatars was very important for them. Finally, his ambitions in Balkans was not in vain, he succeeded to have a right on the appointment of the Moldavian and Wallachian Viovodas and institutionalise the payment of a tribute.²⁸⁵

The Khan was more successful inside the Crimea. He could eliminate his rival and brother Feth Giray without much resistance. However, he became very suspicious and cautious after his dismissal. He managed to eliminate mercilessly all of his relatives that he considered to be a potential threat to his rule. Starting by Feth Giray, Devlet Giray, Baht Giray were killed by him. Only those who could escape to Istanbul or Circassia could save their lives. Gazi Giray's cruelty was not only related with his concerns about his seat but it was also related with his ambitions.

He wanted to centralise the power of the Crimean Khanate in his hands. Moreover, he wanted that the Crimean throne remained in his line and became

²⁸⁵ Maria Ivanics-Reiss, "The role" p.308.

hereditary.²⁸⁶ In order to realise his desires he had to fulfill three conditions; to obtain the approval of the Porte, to obtain the support of the aristocracy and to have military and administrative power to pursue his plans. It is known that the Porte did not support this idea. His relation with the aristocracy requires more information. However, it is possibly to argue that Bora Giray could control the aristocracy. The facts that all of his rivals were forced to flee from the Crimea and did not return until his death and they selected his son Toktamış Khan after his death show that Gazi Giray II. was influential over aristocracy. It seems that he used several means to balance the power of aristocracy. First, he must have used his income and booty to get their support. Second, he could have treated them harshly like he did to his relatives. Finally, his personal guards; tüfekçi corpses, could have balanced the military power of the aristocracy. The Ottomans were also aware of his power in the Crimea and did not attempt to replace him after 1596 despite the fact that they have many members of the Giray family at their disposal in Istanbul. They have even imprisoned Selamet Giray upon the request of the Khan when Gazi Giray spent the most critical years of his reign after 1596. It was between the years 1602-1603 when his brother Selamet Giray was pardoned by the Sultan. However, the Ottomans were needed his forces and he used this opportunity very well. He went to the Gaza to the Hungarian front. Thus, he satisfied the Sultan and his Mirzas but he returned without joining a major combat.

Bora Giray made some important changes in the administration of the Crimean Khanate in order to centralise the power. He founded the post of *Baş*

²⁸⁶ Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı wrote, without reference, that Bora Giray received a diploma that entrusted the Khanship of the Crimea to his sons from the Sultan Ahmed I in March 1608. However he

Agha similar to the Ottoman Grand Vizier. He also established a personal army; *tüfekçiler*, similar to the Ottoman Janissary that helped much to the Ottoman Sultan to overwhelm their rivals. Finally, he levied an extraordinary tax (*tekalif*) in order to finance the *tüfekçi* corps. Initiation of *tekalif* and *tüfekçi* shows that Gazi Giray II. set the preconditions to form a central government in the Khanate. Although, his institutions survived, his desire to centralise the power and to entrust the succession to his line did not survive and failed immediately after his death. The last years of Bora Giray shows that he was also a practical ruler. When the Ottoman-Habsburg war ended in 1606 and the Ottomans focused in the East, he also turned his face to the East and completed building the castle Gazi Kerman just before his death.

Gazi Giray II reigned at a critical juncture when the Crimean Khanate was losing its supremacy in the Kıpçak steppe and its dependence on the Ottoman Empire was increasing. It was obvious that the future of the Crimean Khanate would be decided upon the decision of the Porte. Gazi Giray II. was successful because he ensured that the transformation of the Crimean Khanate from a successor of Golden Horde to an important Eastern European power with as few confrontation as possible with the Porte. His authority in the Khanate and his prestige in the Porte prevented direct Ottoman involvement to the Crimean politics. The Ottomans who found an important ally in the person of Gazi Giray II. could focus on the Habsburg War and did not spend time with the Crimean affairs.

died before receiving it and the diploma did not come to effect. In I.H.Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*

vol.III/I, Ankara, 1993, p.171.

XIV APPENDICES

Document no:1

han hazretlerinin karındaşı olup şirvan muhafazasında kalan gazi giray sultan'a yazılan hükm-i şerifdir

hala vüzera-i nam-dar ve vükela-yı a'l-i miqdarımızdan düstur-ı mükerrem vezirim o'sman paşa edam-allahü te'ala iclalihu dergah-ı nuşret penahıma mektub gönderüb şah-ı zalalet penah bir nice biñ mülahide-i güm-rahe ile selmas hanı serdar eyleyüb vilayet-i şirvan'a istila kaçdıyla gönderdikde ol fırka-i zalleniñ hareket-i bi-bereketlerinden haber aldugunuz gibi ahlaf-ı hanan-ı i'zam murad giray sultan ve şafa giray sultan dame u'lüvvuhalar ile ve a'sakir-i manşuremiz ve tatar şaba-reftar ile a'le'l-gafle başub kızılbaş-ı evbaşñ ekşerin hedef-i tir ü serlerin tu'me-i şir-i şemşir eyleyüb selmas han mecruhen firar idüb a'sakir-i müslimin ve cünud-ı muvahhidin ile ganimin ve salimin a'vdet ve müraca'at müyesser olub uğur-ı humayun-ı nuşret maqrunumuzda her biriñüziñ enva'i dilaverliğı ve merdaneliğı zuhura geldüğün a'rız ve i'lam itmeğün mezid-i a'vatıf-ı a'liyye-i padişahanemizden mutaşarrıf olduğñuz salyaneñüz üzerine elli biñ o'smani akçe dağı teraqqı i'nayet olunmuşdur yüzüñüz ağ olsun zat-ı şeca'at-simatıñuzdan memul olan bunuñ gibi aşar-ı hamıyyet hamide ve eçvar-ı pesendide idiki zuhura getirilmiş gerekdirki min ba'd dağı mumaileyh o'sman

pařa ile yek-dil ve yek-cihet olub kema-kan din ü devlet-i ebed-peymend-i
hüsrevanemize müte'allik umurda bezl- maqdur ve sa'y-i na-meřkur eylesin inřa-
allah girü vaq'i olan olan hıdmet-i hayr-ı hatemiñüz zayı' olmayub mağall-i irtizada
vaqi' ola.

Document no:2

“h andan-ı Őirin’in beyleri ve sair mirzaları ve aŐl uruĐları beyanındadır”

ma’lum olaki kırırım hanlarının tertib-i divan ve sair umur-ı rasih ’l-erkanları d rt r kn beylerinin keff-i kifayetlerine tefviz olunub anların rey-i olmadık a bir emr-i a’zime m baŐeret olunmak  anunları deĐildir. d rt r kn n evveli Őirin, saniyen mansur oĐlu ve rabi’an barın ve rabi’an sicivut ta’bir olunub lisan-ı tatarda bunlara d rt  ara i dirler.  a anki umur-ı memleketden bir iŐ zuhur iderse d rt oca  ta’bir olunan u’lema-i i’zam ve meŐayih-i kiram ki evvela zaviye-i g lec Őeyhi ve saniyen revn- a ı Őeyhi ve ŐaliŐen zaviye-i taŐlı Őeyhi ve sair u’lema-i kırırımın eŐherleri da’vet olunub ve d rt  ara i beyleri ve mirzaları ve sair uruĐ mirzaları ve  apu halkı ihtiyařları da’vet ve Őavereh m? fi el-emr ma-Őadıkı  zere m kalemeye m baderet iderler. umur-ı hariciye aŐhabı olan  mera-i ulu (...) mukalemeye hitam virecek Őer’-i Őerife mu abık mıdır ? dey  u’lemaya a’rz iderler. eĐer muvafık gel r ise imza olunub hazar-ı han ve mekarim-Őan canibine a’rz olunub mucibince a’mel olunur. iŐbu diyar-ı kalil ’l-i’tibarın nizamını cenab-ı perverd-gar bu tarz  zerine istikrar eylemiŐdir. allah  te’ala efendilerimizi ve cemi’  mera-i Őada at-ara hazretlerini Őer’-i Őerif  zere kamil a’mel m yesser id b tarik-i ha ik-i m stakim  zerine Őabit- adem naŐib eyleye amin !

Document no:3

Hüve

Bi'l-kuvveti'l-ahadiyye ve'l-mu'cizati'l-muhammediye

Bismillahi'r-raḥmani'r-raḥim la ilahe illallah muḥammed resulallah

uluğ ordu uluğ ḥanı ğazi giray sözüm

allah ve ḥüday izim ve ized ü ogan tingri te'ala ḥazretleriniñ vaḥdaniyeti ve a'zameti birle başlansun öñ kolnuñ ve şol kolnuñ ve şol kolnuñ ve uluğ ulusnuñ ve tuman bilgen ve miñ ve yüz ve on bilgen oğlanlalarınña ve binlerinñe ve mirzalarınña ve rus ve brus knazlarınña ve aqbaşlı ve qaraṭunlarınña meşcanlarınña ve barça uluğ kınnaş panlarınña ve içki ve dışkılarınña ve köplük qara ilge barça tüzünce bilgenlerinñe. basa min ki şansız ve köplük deşt-i kıpçaqnıñ uluğ padişahı ğazi giray ḥan min ḥaqq-ı sübhanehu ve te'alaniñ ulüvv-i i'nayetleri şan-ı şerifimizge muqarin ve mu'avin bulub uluğ atalarımıznıñ orunlarınña taht-ı ḥakan'ğa cülus müyesser buldı irse iş bu yarlıg-ı şerif-i ḥakanimiz birlen beyan ve aşikare kılarımız kim evailden uluğ atamız ve uçmaqlık ḥacı geray ḥan ve öteği ḥavaqinü'l-i'zam ve selatinü'l-kiram raḥmetullahi a'leyhim ecma'in zamanlarında vilayet-i ilah memleketi qralları olan kazimir qral ve zigmot qral ve ahust qral ve sair qrallar çağlarında biri birisi birlen muḥabbet ve barış yarış bulub iki curt arasında öksüz ve oğul ve tul ḥatun ve yarlı yerince başlarınña altun tac urub yürür bulsalar ve aşlamcı tacir ve bazargan varub

kilür bulsalar zarar ve ziyân kürmey emin barub aman kilür irdiler amma ahust kral fevt olduĝda ilah memleketi ĝe kral bulur oĝul ħalmay on ikiyil ħralsız bulub memleket iinde olan ħırsuz ve ħaramileri ilah memleketiniñ voyvodaları ve panları ve kerman bekleri tirgamay ve zabt kılmay zahire azuĝ virüb gemi virüb özü ŝuyuna kilüb tataruñ tavarınsın alub ve tavar ve yılmısın sürüb ŝoñ macar ħralları uruĝundın iŝtefan kral ilah memleketiĝe kral bulub özü ŝuyunda olan ħristiyanıñ ħırsuz ve ħarami ħazaĝlarıñna ri'ayet itken üçün özü ŝuyunda ħarami ve ħırsuz ħazaĝlar köplik bulub özü ŝuyundan inüb devletlüĝ ve sa'adetlüĝ padiŝah ħond-kar ħazretlerininñ özü ŝuyı boyunda olan cankerman ve aĝkerman ve bender kermannıñ arasında olan koycı ve tavarıcı ve bazargan fakirlerinñe zarar ve ziyân kürgeszgenleri üçün raĝmetlik babamız devlet giray ħan ve aĝaçalarımız ħanlar ve özümüz ve sultānlar ve biŝ baŝ tatar ħazaĝları ilah memleketini her yıl ve her kıŝ ħabub iki curt biri biriñe dūŝman olurĝa öĝü ŝuyı iinde olan ħarami ħırsuz ħristiyan ħazaĝları sebeb olınmıŝlardır ħala ilah memleketi kralı bulĝan isveŝke kral oĝlu ħarındaŝımız zigmut kral devlet iŝĝimizĝe uluĝ ilçisi branovska'nı bölek ħazinesi birlen yiberüb burunĝı barıŝ ve yarıŝ ve dost ve muĝabbet yosunca iki curtmuz barıŝ ve yarıŝ bulub bazargan emin varub aman kilüb kim kimesnedin zarar ve ziyân olmasın didiler irse yiberĝen bölek ħazinesin ħoŝ ĝörüb alub ħabul kılandı ve ħarındaŝımız zigmut birle dost ve muĝabbet ve barıŝ ve yarıŝmızını daĝı ŝol ŝart üzerene kılamız ki özü ŝuyı iinde olan ħarami ve ħırsuz ħristiyan ħazaĝların barınsın sürüb özü ŝuyundın ıĝarub tirkeb zabt itkeyler ve taĝı yibre turĝan bölek ħazinesin her yıl yiberĝeyler ve deftermiz üzere kiŝilerimizniñ tıyıŝların bölek ħazinesiyle bilĝe yiberkeyler ve taĝı ħalĝay sultān olan ħarındaŝımız fetĝ giray sultānĝa daĝı altmıŝ bostan ekman bölek ħazinesiyle bilĝe

yiberkeyler ve on iki kişiğe daħi tıyış yibergeyler bu üslub üzere bölek ħazinesin virüb ve tıyışların bilge yiberür bulsalar barış ve yarış ve dost ve muħabbet bulub eğer min özüm ħazi giray ħan bulay ve uluğ kiçik ħalğa sultan başlık barça sultanlar bulğaylar ve bekler ve mirzalar bulsun tatar çerümüz birlen çaparğa ve yaqub yıkarğa ve zarar ve ziyan kılarğa bir kimesne barımasın eğer sin ħarındaşımız zigmut bu a'hd ve şart üzerine tırar bulsalar vallahi billahi ve tallahi dostunuzğa dost ve düşmanınızğa düşman bulurumuz ve taķi biş baş ħazaqlar barub il astındın şılañız çabub esir kiltürür bulsalar min ħarındaşñız ħazi giray ħan kiltürgen esirlerini kayta alub yiberirmiz ve biş baş ħazaqlarınıñ taķi ħaqlarındın kilürmiz özü şuyı içinde turğan ħristiyan ħazaqlarñıznı çıkarımas bulsañız tatar tıvarcısığa ve tıvar ħarağa zarar ve ziyan kılar bulsalar siz ħarındaşımız zigmut bilmiş bulsun kim dostluk ve muħabbet ve barış ve yarış olmay iki curt emin ve aman bulmaslar ve taķi siz zigmut ħarındaşımız özü şuyı içinde ħristiyan ħazaqlarñıznı çıkarır bulsañız özü şuyı boyunda bulğan ħara ra'iyet il kişilerñiz kelüb çurķa tızmuzdan aqçaları birlen eminmüzden tız şatun alub kitsün sin zigmut ħarındaşımıznıñ memleketiğe ve bizim memleketimizğe bazarganlar ħorķmay ve üşenmey emin varub aman kilgeyler ħala uluğ ilçiñiz branovskiniñ közünde bu ant ve şart ve a'hd idüb bu a'hd-name-i yarlıg-ı şerif-i ħaħanimüzğe altun nişanlıg müħrni başub özümüzniñ uluğ ilçimiz olan içki bekmiz olub vezirmüz olan ħasım bu ant ve şart ve a'hdimizni ħarındaşımız zigmut bildirir üçün yiberdik ve taķi siz ħarındaşımız maşku düşmanınızğa atlanğanıñızda min ħazi giray ħan ħarındaşınızdan yardım üçün tatar çerüyin tiler bulsañız ħarçlık flori yibergeysiz ki çerümüzğe virüb düşmanınız üstüne çıbarkaymız ve taķi biz ħazi giray ħan ħarındaşınızın varan uluğ ilçimizi iki aydan artuķ tutķan kılmay bölek ħazinesi ve tıyışlar birlen kayta tizok biz

karındaşnızğa yiberkeysin ve siz zigmut kral karındaşmızdın bizge kilgen uluğ
ilçinizni tağ iki iki aydan artuğ tutkar kılmay sin zigmut kral karındaşımızğa tizok
cıbarmız imdi sin zigmut kral karındaşımız bilmiş bulsunlar kim özü şuyını içinden
kazaqlarınızni çıkarmay ve tirmey zabt kılmaz bulursañız biz karındaşnıznıñ
tavarcılarına ve tavar karağa zarar kılub ve devletlüğ ve sa'adetiğ padişah hond-kar
hazretleriniñ kermanlarına ve re'ayasığa zarar ve ziyan kılar bulsalar dostluğ ve
muhabbetlik ve barış ve yarış bulmay iki curtnıñ re'ayası ve berayası zahmet körüb
devletlüğ padişah hond-kar hazretlerindin dañi uyat bulursız bu a'hd ve şart ve ant
üzerine turulmaq gerekdir deyü a'hd-name-i yarlıg-ı şerif-i haqani bitildi fi şehr-
cumadiyyü'l-evvel min şuhur-i sene elf

be-mağamı elmasaray darü'l-haqani

han gazi giray bin han devlet giray

Document no:4

Hüve

Ebu'l-feth el-ğazi giray han sözüm

uluğ ulusnıñ ve köb rusnıñ ve brusnıñ ve ilahnıñ ve mazavşnıñ ve milyanıñ ve kraqovnıñ ve barça kristiyanlarınıñ uluğ kristiyan padişahı qarındaşmız zigmut kral köbdin köb selam merfu' (...) yahşımısız ve hoşmısız diyib halñiz ve hatırñuz şorganmızdın şonıñ i'lam-ı yarlıg-ı şerif-i muhabbeti haqani oldur kim eğer biz qarındaşñuz sarı sorar bulsañuz elhamdillahi memleketmiz emin ve aman bulub barça çerümüz töz ve yasanlı hoş hal bilgeysiz hala siz zigmut qarındaşmız bilmiş bulsun kim mundin burun min ğazi giray han köblik ve şansız deşt-i kıpçaqnıñ uluğ padişahınıñ uluğ atamız uçmaqlık hacı giray hannıñ hanlıqları çağındın rahmetlik babamız devlet giray hanlıqları zamanığa kilkençe ilah kralları bulğan zigmut kral ve ahust kral qarındaşlarımız dost ve muhabbet ve barış ve yarış bulub iki curtnıñ arasında öksüz oğul ve tul hatun ve yirince yarlılar başlarınña altun tac urub yürür bulsalar kim kimesnedin zarar ve ziyan körmey ve aşlamçı bazarganlar iki curtnıñ arasında emin varub aman kelib padişahlarğa alkış turur irdiler ve taqi hanlar ve sultanlar çerü birlen kral qarındaşlarımız memleketlerin çapmay ve aqın kılmay turur irdiler eğer biş baş tatar қазақları yörtüb barub qarındaşlarımıznıñ memleketlerindin esir çıkarub kırım memleketiñe kiltürseler kırım hanları ve sultanlar

qayta yiberirler irdiler ve eęer řatub bazarganlar esirni řatub alub istanbul'a alub barsalar devletlög uluę padiřah hond-kar hazretleriniń hökmi řerifleri birlen esirni bazargandın tartıb alub qayta yiberir irdiler ahust kral qarındařımız ölgendin řonıń ilah memleketięe ... bulur oęlı qalmay barça ilah memleketi on iki yıl qaklı kralıız ve padiřahsız qalıb turęanda kiręavda bulęan křıstyan voyvodaları ve banları ve kerman beylikleri hırsuz ve harami bulęan křıstyan qazaqların tirkamay ve zabt kılmay azık ve gemiler virüb özü řuyıęa yiberüb tatarınıń tavarısın ve tavarın alęanlarındın řonıń devletlög uluę padiřah erkli kiři hond-kar hazretleriniń kiręa ve kermanları bolęan cankerman ve aķkerman ve bender kermanı aralarında yörügen qoyların ve tavarların ve yilqıların alub müslümanlaręa zarar ve ziyanları iki curt biri birinře düşman bolub uçmaqlık babamız devlet giray han ve aęaçalarımız hanlar ve min ğazi giray han ve uluę ve kiçik sultanlar ve tatar qazaqları ve biř bařları barub ilah cutın qabub yaqub yıqıb ve harab idüb ve křıstyan kiřilerin köblik esir idüb kiltürgenlerinře harami ve hırsuz křıstyan qazaqları tatarınıń burundın uruři ve kışlavı olan özü řuyındın gitmekenleri sebeb olunmıřdır ve taķi ... qarındařımız bilmiř bulsun kim křıstyan harami ve hırsuz qazaqlarınız özü řuyındın çıkmay özü řuyındın barub devletlög uluę padiřahayamız erkli kiři hond-kar hazretleriniń kermanları arasında yörüken qoycı ve tavarıcı yarlı faķirlerin incidüb üřendirkenlerin padiřah hond-kar hazretleri bilüb qahręa gilib men ğazi giray han ğa hökmi řeriflerin qavuşları birlen yiberib mende düşman bolub memletetimęe zarar ve ziyan tigürken ilah memleketi křıstyanlarınıń halin ve ařlın sin ... yahři bilürsinki deř-i kıpçak hanı ğazi giray hansın qapum kullarındın köblik kullarım ve toblar ve darbenler yeniçeriler ve rumili pařasın ve anaolı pařasın barça köblik çerümi senęe qořub yiberirmin ilah memleketin yaqub ve

yıkub ve zabt olunur uluğ şehirlerin ve kermanların alub içine kişiler koyub zabt itkeysin diyib hond-kar hazretleri buyurmuşlar irdiler men gazi giray han karındaşınız taği bulay sözüm söz ve cevab kılib devletlüg padişah hond-kar hazretlerinñe kağıdım yiberüb bildirdim ki ahust kral ölgendin şonın ilah memleketi on iki yıl kırsız turub memleket tirkevsiz ve zabtısız olungan üçün özü şuyuna kelüb zarar ve ziyan iderler irdi ve on iki yıldan şonın macar kırallarından iştefan kral ilah memleketiğe kral olub macar kıralları burun ve burundın devletlüg padişah hond-kar hazretleriniñ eski düşmanları olğanlar üçün özü şuyında bolğan kıristyan kazakların tirkemey artuğıyla harami ve hırsuz kazaklar köblik buldılar hala burundın burun ilah memleketi kıralı bolub ölken ahust kıralnıñ hiyanları olan isveške kral ve karındaşmıznıñ oğlu zigmut karındaşımız ilah memleketiñe kıral boldılar taği kilmey ve kıral tahtığa keçmey bu gün yarın kelüb tahta keçüb devletleriyle kıral olurlar zigmut karındaşımız kilüb kıral tahtığa giçkendin şonın harami ve hırsuz özü şuyında olğan barça kıristyan kazakların özü şuyındın çıkarub burunğı zigmut ve ahust kırallardın köblik devletlüg padişah hond-kar ve min gazi giray han karındaşlarınña dostluk ve muhabbet ve barış ve yarış ve karındaşlıknı yahşi kılarlar ve devletlüg uluğ padişah hond-kar hazretlerinñe ve min gazi giray karındaşlarınña olan bölek hazinesin her yıl artuğıyla yiberüb dost ve muhabbet ve karındaş ve barış ve yarış bolub curtlar padişahlar devletlerinde emin aman bolub yarlı fakirler zarar ve ziyan körmey du'a ve alkış kılarlar tiyib devletlüg padişah erkli kişi hond-kar hazretlerinñe bildürüb min devletlüg padişah hond-kar hazretleri min gazi giraynıñ bu sözni yahşi kördiler imdi sen karındaşımız zigmut bilmiş bolsun kim özü şuyı içinde bolğan harami ve hırsuz kıristyan kazakların bir kazak özü şuyında kımay çıkarğaysın yahşi yasaq ve tirkev itkeysin ve taği min gazi han karındaşınızge bölek

hazinesin her yıl tötqar kılmay birib yibergeysin ve defter itken kişilermüznin tıyış bir nesin eksiksiz yibergeysin ve taqi kağılka sultanımız bolgan kağılka fetih giray sul'an her yıl altmış bustaf çekman bölek hazinesiyle yiberkeysin imdi sin ki zigmut kral karındaşımızsin özü şuyında fesad itken hırsuz ve harami kristyan qazaqlarını barçasın özü şuyından çıkarub tirkeb koyıcı ve tavarcımız zarar ve ziyan kıldırmay ve şartımız üzerine bölek hazinesin ve tıyışların berür bolsañız ve kağılka sultan fetih giray sultan karındaşımızga her yıl altmış bustaf çekman ve on iki kişisiğe tıyış berür bolsañız vallahi ve billahi ve tallahi min ki özüm gazi giray han ulug şansız deşt-i kıpçaqñın ulug hanı min ve kağılkay sultan fetih giray sultan başlık ve nure'd-din sultan ulug küçük sultanlar çerümüz birlen sen karındaşımız zigmutñın ilah ve sair memleketlerinñe barmasmız ve ve çabasmız ve yakub yıkmasmız ve esir kılmasmız diyib içki ve dışkı ve ulug karaçi olan kiyan ve bek ve mirza çinlik üzerinde ant ve şart idüb ve brenovski ulug ilçinüz birlen taqi yiberkenñiz bölek hazinesin hoş körüb alub kabul kıldım ve brenovski ulug ilçinüz körünce a'hd kıldık ve a'hd namenizni taqi yazub ve ant ve şart kılib sin karındaşımız zigmut kral huzurlarınña yiberdim eğer kristyan qazaqlarınıñ barçasın özü şuyından çıkmay ve çıkarmay zabıt ve tirkev kılmaz bolsañız hazine bölek yibermek ile dost ve muhabbet ve karındaş ve barış ve yarış olunmas tengri kimge berür bolsa ol alur ve taqi şart üzerine turub qazaqlarınızdan tavarcılarımızga zarar ve ziyan olmay özü şuyından çıkarır bolsañız kırım vilayeti qazaqları barub ilah memleketindin esir kiltürür bolsalar esirleri tutub çabarurmız ve qazaq ve biş başlarınñ haklarındın gilürümüz ve dostñızga dost ve düşmanñızga düşman bulurmız ve taqi sen zigmut karındaşımız bilmiş bolsun kim masku memleketi beği olan yovan oğlu knaz fedor min gazi giray han deşt-i kıpçaq

hanıġa kaġıdın ve ilçisin yiberüb ve bölek hazinesin tondan ve aqçadın köb nime gönderüb bu günden şonın ika ve dost ve ve barış ve yarış bölelik ve her yıl otuz kerre yüz biñ nokraç aqçasın ve naqd bölek hazinesi birlen berub yiberirmin tiyib söz kılmış irdi siz zigmut kral karındaşımızdan dostluk idüb bölek hazinesin virürmiz tiyib (...) tilmacı yiberkeniñizden maşku ilçisi ve sözün kabul itmeyüb böleġin hoş körmey (...) tilmac közünce maşku ilçisin tutdurub zindanġa şaldırub habs kıldırdım ve kırım çerüy ve noġay çerüy ve çerkes kıllarım çerüy barça üç yüz biñ çerü birlen maşku tahtına varub yolda koyġan çerüyin ve kırıġolın kırıp öldürüb tahtın bilge yakub ve yıkub ve esirin ve malın kıltürüb elhamdillahi barça çerümüz şaġ esen keldik şöyle bilkeysin inşallahi te'ali evvel baharda yaz olduġda taķi çerümüz ile varub çabub çavlarımız sin zigmut karındaşımızdan köblik dilek kıllarmız sefer ve çerü harcı üçün biz ġazi giray han karındaşınızga yok dimey beş biñ flori harçlık çıkarub burun kilgen bizim sizniñ çabkunlarımızın kıldırmay çeberkeysin burun bolġan hanlarġa ve uçmaķlık a&açamız mehmed giray hanġa beş biñ flori sefer harcı üçün kral karındaşlarımız virgenlerdir sin zigmut kral daġi yok dimey beş biñ florini virüb tizok çabkunlar ile burun cebrkeysin hala sen zigmut kral karındaşımız birlen bolġan dostluk ve muhabbet ve barış ve yarış ve karındaşlıķımızı siz zigmut kral karındaşımızġa bir bir eytib bildirmek üçün uluġ içki bekmiz bolub vezirmiz bolġan yaġşı kişimiz kısım bek ni uluġ ilçı beymiz kılib sin zigmut kral karındaşımızniñ huzurlarınıña ceberdim (...) ve baġşısı birlen tengri birse şavlık ve esenlik birlen barġanda taķi öz sözlerimizi taķi şorar bolsañız barçasın ey tiyib sin zigmut kral karındaşımızġa ey tiyib bildirirler inşallahi kilürde şavlık ve esenlikniñizni min karındaşınız ġazi giray hanġa bildirkeysin ki süyünüb gönenib dostnızna dost düşmannızna düşman bolub köb yıllar barış ve

yarıř ve muħabbet ve tatu ve ħarındař bolġanmız birlen iki curtmız emin ve aman yerli
faķirler ika ve padiřahġa ħarındař padiřahġa alkıř artura turġaylar tiyü aġır selam ve
yingil bōlek birlen yarlıġ-ı řerif-i muħabbet-i ħaķani bitildi vesselam a'la men ittiba'
el-hūda fi řehr-i cemaziyyü'l-evvel min řuhur sene biñ yılında tariħniñ

elma sarayında bitildi ħan ġazi giray bin ħan devlet giray

Document no:5

Selamet Giray sultān sōzümüz

Ulu ordanĭn ulu ħanı ğazi giray ħan edame allahu te'ala ma'aliĥu ĥazretleriniĭn kaĝılĝası olan selamet giray sultāndın ĥarındařım leh ĥralına kōbdin kōb selam (...) i'lam-ı yarlıĝ-ı biliĝ-i muĥabbet encam budur ki bundan aĥdem mektub řerifniz kelüb her ne yazılmıř ise bi'-t-tamam ma'lum-ı sa'adetz olmuřdur inřallahü te'ala sa'adetzlü ħan-ı a'zam ve ĥaĥan-ı mu'azzam ĥazretleriniĭn ĥuzur-ı řeriflerinde eyülik ve dostluĝdan yaĥa sōz sōyleyüb madem ki sizden ol a'hd ü peyman bozulmıya bu canibden bozulmaĝ ihtimali yokdur aĥa binaen ĥabĝun elĥimiz ĥıdvetü'l-eĥarin ĥulum řoteneĝni? irsal olundı vuřül bulduĝda gerekdir ki fi'l-vaĥi yollar aman deĝildir ĥazine gönderilürdi dimiřsin öyle ise ĥamaĥe'ye getürüb ĥoyasın adem gönderilüb ĥamaĥe'den alınur řöyle ma'lum-ı řerif ola biz daĥi ħan a'zimle miĥal üzerine varmaĝ muĥarrerdir baĥi ve's-selam

Be-maĥam-ı orda-yı sultān sultān selamet giray bin devlet giray ħan.

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