

THE PKK AND THE "KURDISH QUESTION"
AS FACTORS IN TURKISH-GERMAN RELATIONS
1984-1994

By

Courtney Lukitsch-Öymen

Submitted in Partial Requirement for

the Masters Thesis in the

Department of International Relations

Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences

Bilkent University

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
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
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
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Introduction

Turkey has been plagued by an extended terrorism campaign waged by the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) since 1983. Within the past decade a separate and distinct issue, commonly referred to as the "Kurdish question" has also evolved, and has raised a debate over cultural and educational rights under a broad set of reforms for Turkish-Kurds. The Kurdish question largely revolves around guaranteeing reforms for "underprivileged" Turkish-Kurds and has received attention from Western European countries and the United States. Western focus on the Kurdish question has in turn prompted Turkey to a certain degree to be more pro-active on the issue of rights for its Turkish-Kurd population. However, PKK insurgency in southeast Turkey has greatly exacerbated the Kurdish question in Turkey so that it has come to be stigmatized with a terrorism-affiliated label and existence. For Western governments, the Kurdish question is not as laden with PKK terror overtones, because there has been a linkage established between the PKK polemic and the Kurdish question, a linkage which in the Turkish view works contrary to the Turkish government's aspirations toward eradicating PKK terror. There is a tendency in the Western media in particular, to confuse the PKK as representative of a political movement representing Turkish-Kurd rights reforms with the larger and distinct issue of the Kurdish question. The lack of differentiation over the PKK polemic and the Kurdish question has complicated Turkey's relations with Western allies. In this study, the Turkish-German relationship will be discussed, addressing the PKK polemic versus that of the Kurdish question as factors in relations

covering the period 1984 to 1994. The linkage of the two polemics in the West over the past ten years has been damaging to Turkey in terms of relations because the two issues have not been treated as mutually exclusive. In the context of the work, the inherent problem posed is that Turkey treats the PKK polemic versus the Kurdish question as two distinct issues. Therefore, the linkage of the two issues in the West has been a determining factor in the maintenance of Turkey's relations with its allies, and in this study, Germany.

The aim of this work is to discuss and analyze the PKK terror campaign in contrast to the larger Kurdish question as factors that affect Turkish-German relations. The two issues from the outset of the work are to be understood as separate and distinct entities, although as expounded in the work, overlap does occur to a certain extent. To the degree that the overlap, i.e. PKK infiltration into the Kurdish question occurs, is not elaborated in detail. The work is broad in scope, and attempts to explain the PKK terror campaign versus the Kurdish question as factors in Turkish-German relations during the 1984-1994 period. The work does not attempt to "solve" the polemics posed, but rather to discuss and analyze the dynamics involved in continuing relations in the face of difficulties posed by the two polemics from both the Turkish and German perspectives.

While no causal relation may be established between the PKK's reign of terror in Southeast Turkey and the increased attention to the Kurdish question in Western European countries and the United States, the PKK and the Kurdish question are

internal factors in Turkey that influence external relations. It will be argued that the external factor of relations between Turkey and its allies is also influenced by the factors of the PKK polemic and the Kurdish question. Therefore, through a discussion of Turkish-German relations, a profile of the PKK, the PKK-Western European connection, decisive actions by Ankara concerning the Kurdish question, and an overview of Turkish-German relations, will provide a means of better understanding how the PKK and the Kurdish question are factors in Turkish-German relations. An additional question posed in the work is how the PKK and Kurdish issues affect the democratization process in Turkey and how relations with Germany might impact the process.

The Turkish Armed Forces' efforts to cordon off the PKK's influence have escalated dramatically in the past decade and have implications for the Turkish Republic in relationship to its Western allies. The tendency to connect the PKK terrorist cause with that of the overall Kurdish question has been perpetrated by PKK-based operations in Europe and elsewhere over the past ten years and has been a factor in hindering Turkey's democratization process. PKK terror activities have been difficult to distinguish from the larger Kurdish question on the agenda of Turkish-German relations, despite the fact that distinctions are apparent.

Turkey commenced at a late date to introduce the PKK terror polemic to Europe and the U.S. largely because it could not define the threat of the pro-Kurdish insurgent force with any

precision. Relations with countries such as Germany were adversely affected because Turkey was hailed as an undemocratic state in the Western media due to allegedly harsh treatment of the Turkish-Kurd civilian population (approximately 10 million) living within its borders. The fact that the Turkish-Kurd civilian population has been considerably compromised and infiltrated by PKK militants and sympathizers was not a distinction established early enough so as to adequately explain why Turkey's Armed Forces had so harshly handled PKK terrorism in the Southeast over a ten year period. Also obscured was how thousands of Turkish-Kurd civilians would come to be caught in the crossfire.

A casualty of the successful rise of the PKK terrorist organization in Turkey is relations with other states. Of special import in this thesis is the relationship between Turkey and Germany, which has pursued a fluctuating course for the past thirty years. The course of Turkish-German relations were perhaps effected by the growing number of Turks and Kurds residing in Germany, the Turkish-German trade relationship, an integrating Europe, and Turkey's rapid growth as a developing country and a secular influence in the Middle East and Central Asia.

The PKK and the Kurdish question as factors in the Turkish-German relationship will be discussed in this study as they have serious implications for regional relations as well as the Western alliance. Germany has a Kurdish expatriot community of approximately 500,000 people who are more or less incorporated into its 1.8 million Turkish population. As time

progresses, the post-1923 republican tendency to identify one community (i.e. citizenry) with another is disintegrating, and factionalism and animosity is on the rise in both Turkey and Germany. Integration of the two communities, Turks and Kurds, who have coexisted for hundreds of years, is breaking down into an ethnic battle of words and actions that due to PKK insurgency and heightening media in both countries potentially threatens to divide the Republic of Turkey along ethnic lines, and to a certain degree, disturb Germany's civil order.

Perhaps the quintessential problem involved in the Turkish-German dynamic vis-à-vis the PKK factor, is the lack of reliable factual information regarding the terrorist and counter-terrorist maneuvers conducted over the past ten years in Turkey's Southeast and in cross-border operations into Northern Iraq. This is compounded by the fact that successive Turkish governments in the 1980s failed to convey the seriousness of the PKK problem to the Turkish public and intelligentsia, as well as to Western allies via electronic and print media. Perhaps this is because the Turkish government did not understand the emerging phenomena itself. Coupled with the shrewd strategies of PKK storefront organizations in Europe and the Middle East, the terrorist insurgency aims of the organization were able to escape closer scrutiny and be misrepresented by press coverage which intimated that the PKK was a political movement working towards the achievement of cultural rights for an oppressed Kurdish minority in Turkey.

The estimate for the number of people killed since PKK insurgency began in Turkey's southeast in 1983 is approximately 13,500. This figure is based on a comprehensive Western government estimation (i.e. Europe and the U.S.), intimating the numbers could be higher. Turkish security report figures concur with a potential variance of 1,000 (+/- 8%). Information and communication regarding these figures and events is hindered by the fact that the Turkish Armed Forces restrict access to the Southeast. Operational and casualty reports are issued from headquarters in Ankara. The PKK meanwhile, quite effectively "banned" reporters from the Southeast starting in October 1993 onwards. Assassinations of journalists and burning of newspaper offices were used as effective tools. Reliance on Western figures then, inherently reflect intelligence findings and data issued by the Turkish military, or conversely, PKK propaganda releases in Europe and the Middle East. Meting out the truth objectively regarding activities and casualties in the wake of PKK terrorism then, is complicated and inherently imprecise based on published reports.

Chapter one will define conceptual terms to be utilized throughout the work, defining the PKK terror organization and framing its role in Turkey as well as factors in Turkish-German relations. Chapter two attempts to trace significant events covering the 1984-1994 period in Turkey and Germany vis-à-vis the PKK terrorist organization's effect on the two states' relations, and to detail the nature of the Kurdish question in Turkey as a separate polemic. Chapter three will focus on how

the PKK terror campaign has affected Turkish and German positions regarding the development of armed forces, human rights and media issues. Chapter four will concentrate on a prospective future for improved relations between Turkey and Germany; particularly in light of the PKK polemic and the Kurdish question as separate issues, and how relations might impact on the coordination of efforts to work toward a potential resolution of both .

Chapter 1: A Conceptual Framework

When the term terrorism is discussed in relation to the PKK in this work, it will be taken to mean premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets (i.e. civilians and/or military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed or not on duty) by subnational groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience./**1** Such premeditated attacks also qualify as terrorism conducted toward armed state military personnel. In this work, when the PKK is referred to as a terrorist organization, this definition will be operative. In reference to "international terrorism", it should be taken to imply terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country./**2** Thirdly, the term "terrorist group" as applied here to the PKK, should be understood as any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism./**3**

Four additional significant terms will be utilized as a means of discussing Turkish Armed Forces operational strategy in combating PKK insurgency. Methods employed by the armed forces, in combating PKK insurgency, have come under criticism from Western allies. They impact on Turkish-Kurd civilians in Southeast Turkey. It is important to distinguish that the PKK poses a military threat to Turkey and therefore must be combated militarily. Standardized definitions, commonly accepted and in practice internationally, help to frame the PKK polemic within the military sphere, especially as a threat to the sovereignty of Turkey. Therefore, "antiterrorism" is defined as: defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of

individuals and property to terrorism./⁴ "Counterterrorism" should be understood as meaning offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism./⁵ "Combating terrorism" is defined as actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum./⁶ Finally, "countersubversion" will be taken to mean that aspect of counterintelligence designed to detect, destroy, neutralize or prevent subversive activities through the identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception and repression of individuals, groups or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting subversive activities./⁷

The PKK from its inception has been labelled as terrorist and all Western governments accepted the appellation. It is only pro-PKK sympathizers and militants who contest the term. For the purposes of this work, the terrorist label will be used as will the antiterrorism military terminology as a means of clarifying the distinction between the PKK, a terrorist organization with insurgent aims in southeast Turkey, as opposed to the Kurdish question, which encompasses an emerging agenda toward reforms for Turkish-Kurds along cultural, educational and media lines. An important definitional distinction must be made from the beginning between the Turkish-Kurds and the PKK terrorist organization. Turkish-Kurds as part of the citizenry of Turkey, comprise a population of approximately 10 million and have lived under the tenets set forth in the Constitution since the

Republic's founding in 1923. They are granted the rights of Turkish citizens and are educated and speak in a Turkish medium. The PKK, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2, is a terrorist insurgent organization with intentions to destabilize the Turkish republic through militant activities to achieve their aims.

It should be noted that Turkey does not conduct its census by ethnic group and therefore, an airtight figure of the number of Turkish-Kurds residing within its borders can not be concretely ascertained. Turkey does not recognize a Kurdish minority; all peoples are considered to be Turkish citizens of a unitary state. Therefore, there is a Turkish-Kurd community within the larger Turkish population. Even PKK terrorists whose birthplace is Turkey are Turkish citizens. There is no legal "Kurdish" assignation granted to the Turkish-Kurd populace residing in Turkey. Out of a world Kurdish population of approximately 20 million, the unofficial estimate of those residing in Turkey falls between 8 to 12 million. In this thesis, the 10 million figure is utilized. Perhaps one-half of that range reside in western Turkey, while the remaining are concentrated in the country's southeast region. Essential to understanding the census practice in Turkey, are the tenets of the non-ratified Sèvres Treaty of 1920 and the ratified 1924 Treaty of Lausanne. The latter formally ended World War I, and granted settlement terms to Turkey./8

Not recognizing a nationality status for Kurds (as well as in neighboring countries) in the Turkish Republic produced a series of Kurdish uprisings, which were largely religious in inspiration and went against the secular founding principles of the Turkish

state. There was the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925, the İhsan Nuri Paşa rebellion of 1929-32, as well as the Sheikh Sayyed Reza revolt of 1937-1938. All revolts were suppressed militarily, and further government controls succeeded in preventing others.

More recently the Kurdish question has come into focus in Turkey as a means of establishing its distinct character from the PKK terror polemic. A poll conducted in March 1992 by the Turkish polling institution PİAR in collaboration with the U.S. polling firm GALLUP, displayed revealing results regarding Turkish-Kurd self-identification and unitary state affiliation with the Republic of Turkey. Out of three groups of a total of 2,036 people polled, 96% of Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin stated their desire to live in peace in the same country with Turks in Turkey./⁹

Compared with earlier Kurdish political groups and revolt movements, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), beginning in incipient latent form in 1974, intentionally sought to recruit from among the lower classes of rural Turkish Kurds. The PKK, rather than working in coordination with traditional tribal leaders, sought to undermine and discredit their legitimacy./¹⁰ Perhaps this was because of its ideological affiliation with communism. The PKK can be defined as a Marxist-Leninist oriented insurgent group comprised of Turkish-Kurds. Over a ten year period (1984-1994) the organization moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to include urban terrorism. It has sought to set up an independent Marxist state in southeastern Turkey, where there is a predominantly Kurdish population. The PKK's primary targets

are Turkish Government forces and Turkish-Kurd civilians in southeastern Turkey, but it has upscaled its activities in Western Europe against Turkish targets. Its strength is approximately 10,000 to 15,000 full-time guerrillas, 5,000 to 6,000 of whom operate within Turkey, and 6,000 to 7,000 "part-time" guerrillas operating from Syria, Iraq and Iran, with additional sympathizers in the hundreds of thousands in Turkey, Europe and the Middle East. External aid and safehaven is received by the PKK from such states as Syria, Iraq and Iran./11

PKK strategy for its insurgency campaign against the Republic of Turkey may be defined as; 1) carrying out a show of strength; 2) terrorizing rural Turkish-Kurds into supporting the PKK; 3) striking civilian targets and clashing with the military if there is no other alternative; 4) training new militants; and 5) executing attacks with the use of local (southeast Turkey) support/supporters./12 The PKK's aim is to carry-out armed and action propaganda; activities involving attacks to attract public (Turkish and external) attention to the southeast region of Turkey. The PKK's aims through these attacks are to; 1) cut off intelligence from reaching the Turkish security forces; 2) prevent local cooperation with the state against the PKK; and 3) maintain open supply channels in the rugged territory of Turkey's southeast./13 The PKK's propaganda campaign may be further explained under a three-pronged strategy; 1) "encouragement visits", i.e. random PKK visits to southeastern villages through meetings with local peoples, explaining and attempting to coerce them into acting in complicity with PKK aims; 2) "warning visits" where PKK militants surround a village or

outlying southeastern settlement and send a warning, that the encirclement could lead to a confrontation if the state-supported and armed village guards do not hand over their weapons; and 3) PKK propaganda activities based abroad, acting as storefront organizations for outlawed PKK terrorist activities./14

For the purposes of this study, the PKK storefront operations based in Germany numbering 35 total which were banned on November 26, 1993 by the German government are discussed as a means of defining the PKK-Germany "connection", intimating the breadth and impact of the terrorist organization's network. It was through these organizations that the PKK became more efficient in disseminating information regarding its maneuvers in southeastern Turkey. It was also through the existence of these organizations and their effectiveness in perpetuating the PKK terror campaign in Turkey that the PKK even became a factor in Turkish-German relations. The organizations were a great source of frustration to the Turkish government(s) and inactivity on the part of German governments to ban them until 1993 made the situation worse. The PKK-affiliated organizations based in Germany include: The Federation of FG Kurdistan Patriotic Worker Cultural Associations (or Federasyona Yekitaya Karkaren Welatparezen Chandiya Kurdistan - Feyka Kurdistan), overseeing 20 additional off-shoot Kurdish organizations; The Association of Patriotic Artists from Kurdistan, and the Köln Kurdistan Committee, with (PKK) branches in Mainz, Offenbourg, Russelsheim, Olderburg and Dortmund./15

Financing -- a critical component in defining the strength of any terrorist organization -- must also be discussed before further analysis of the PKK polemic vis-à-vis Turkish-German relations may proceed. According to security force headquarters in Ankara, the methods of PKK financing are defined as: 1) voluntary donations by supporters of the PKK; 2) taxation by the PKK of various peoples; 3) protection money extorted mafia-style by PKK militants; 4) small and medium business investments; 5) robberies; and 6) narcotics smuggling income./¹⁶ The PKK leadership collects money from truck transporters, taxi drivers, car owners, businessmen, narcotics, electronics and livestock smugglers, in addition to money extracted from regional supporters in the southeast. At the Second National Conference meeting of the PKK, held between May 3-13, 1990 in the Bekaa Valley, PKK leadership elaborated other means of eliciting finances for the movement; 1) to collect customs duties at the borders (of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria), and to levy a duty fee to all smugglers according to the capacity and value of their merchandise; 2) to seize all the income of "collaborator feudal landlords" who own regional lands and to impose taxation on a significant part of the "patriotic feudal masses"; 3) to collect road and vehicle taxes; and 4) to tax private enterprises in accordance with their income. The PKK finance link with narcotics smuggling in particular bears significant testimony as to how far the terrorist organization's network extends, and how it effects the group's operations in Turkey. In 1992, of 41 narcotics sting operations carried out in Western Europe, smugglers caught in 23 of the apprehensions were part of the PKK drug network, and the

drugs confiscated had been smuggled through Turkey./17 Millions of dollars are earned by the PKK through drug trade and the PKK is thought to control 30% to 40% of the flow of heroin from Afghanistan, Iran and Lebanon through Turkey to Europe./18 A second source of PKK narcotics comes through Iran. Narcotics originating in Afghanistan are processed in laboratories located in the "no man's land" between Turkey, Iraq and Iran, with the assistance of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (*Pasdaran*). After processing, the drugs are transferred to Istanbul through southeastern cities, where the PKK has safe houses. Turkish trucks with hidden containers are loaded with narcotics, driven to Istanbul, cross the border at Edirne, and enter continental Europe. The increase of the PKK's international drug trade and market is viewed as being competitive with established western networks./19

The network established in Germany and throughout Europe in addition to the PKK's drug trafficking have contributed to the strength of the organization in Turkey. The information disseminated by the PKK has also confounded the separate issue of the larger Kurdish question in Turkey. The fact that in Turkey the PKK and the Kurdish question are mutually exclusive issues is complicated by the way the PKK over a decade has effectively managed to halt attempts in the Turkish government toward reform for Turkish-Kurds. The continued threat posed by PKK insurgency to Turkey's sovereignty in the name of freedom for "oppressed" Kurds, has caused the government to avoid addressing reforms as long as PKK terrorism continues to rock the southeast. PKK infiltration into the Turkish-Kurd population

poses the potential problem of inspiring Kurdish separatism in Turkey. Additionally, the human rights issue and its ramifications for the Kurdish question, has been used by the PKK to promote its cause of destabilizing the Turkish state which has lead to confusion in the West over the differences and nuances involved.

For purposes of this study, it will be examined as to how Germany perhaps through no fault of its own, failed until 1993 to recognize the distinction between the PKK issue and the Kurdish question to the point that it indirectly contributed to the PKK's campaign. The fact that the Turkish government(s) have not been very effective in conveying the differences and defending the Turkish Armed Forces actions also feeds into the PKK's terror machine and further confounds implications for the larger Kurdish question, including the important issue of human rights.

It is significant that the PKK was able to establish an international foothold -- in fact a storefront and safehouse network -- over a 10 year period of time. The question must be raised as to how the PKK was able to organize so effectively, and through what means can it be combated? A discussion of activities which occurred during the 1984-1994 period in relation to the rise of the PKK and its implications for Turkish-German relations merits discussion on the path toward constructing a better understanding of the events, dynamics, perceptions, and actions of the parties involved.

Chapter 2: Turkish-German Foreign Relations: 1984-1994

The number of PKK terror-related events spanning the 1984-1993 period totalled 10,879, according to Turkish Armed Forces accounts. The number of citizens and security personnel killed by PKK militants for that same period is nearly 6,000./²⁰ Both sets of figures appear to be conservative estimates in the face of an actual but unsubstantiated ten year death toll of at least 13,500. A published PKK file from the Turkish Armed Forces in June 1994 placed the total number of deaths caused by the terrorist organization at 13, 900./²¹

Essential to an explanation of how the PKK effects Turkish-German relations is the fact that in both countries, the PKK since its inception has been classified as a terrorist organization. The label assigned to the PKK was valid throughout Europe and in the U.S., but the PKK was able to work around that technicality by establishing agencies and affiliated organizations working within a network to help accomplish their terrorist campaign aims. The agencies established were legally registered as Kurdish cultural, educational, and media-oriented associations, but acted as storefronts and surrogates for the PKK's insurgency campaign in Turkey. The Kurdish agencies and organizations were considered legal under Western European constitutional tenets, and it was not acknowledged for several years that the PKK had effectively penetrated the pro-Kurdish agencies in much of Europe. Turkey was also late in conveying its intelligence findings to support the claim that the agencies were being utilized to promote the cause of PKK terrorism. For ten years, the PKK was able to install and operate a mass

communications, banking, smuggling and recruiting effort which acted in defiance of the illegal terrorist status assigned to it by the German government. In short, the PKK networks in Europe undermine Turkey's efforts to attempt to stamp out PKK influence, and terrorism raises a question regarding the predicament western liberal democracies face in upholding their constitutions. For example, the PKK-affiliated organizations in Germany were allowed to operate until 1993 due to the fact that under the tenets of Article 5 of the Basic Law, they were legal. In fact, they were acting as storefronts for the PKK which was revealed over time and through intelligence.

An interesting point in understanding how European countries, in this case Germany, must balance constitutional stipulations and accordingly define what constitutes terrorism or terroristic behavior. As the British scholar Juliet Lodge argues, it should be realized that West European states' concern with devising anti-terrorist measures whilst preserving liberal democratic practices, has led them to explore the possibilities of action through several European and Atlantic bodies, such as the Council of Europe, the Western European Union and NATO.²² Such bodies, as will be evidenced in the discussion, took very limited measures against the rise of PKK storefront organizations on European soil. The PKK was not officially banned in European countries, and was only banned in Germany and France in November 1993. Although Turkish intelligence provided information to European governments that PKK operations from European bases were largely impacting on the terrorists' infiltration into southeast Turkey and the perpetuation of its

insurgent campaign there, European governments and bodies failed to follow-up the information garnered on the Turkish side. For example, the Council of Europe and the CSCE over the past ten years have been actively engaged in discussions about the state of Turkish democracy, and yet, have not been particularly involved in the issue of PKK terrorism within Turkey and outside its borders except to highlight the ramifications it poses towards human rights violations against Turkish-Kurd civilians residing in southeast Turkey. The European Court of Human Rights, for example, receives numerous cases annually in relation to allegations resting on the poor quality and human rights in southeast Turkey. The focus has tended to be on conditions in the southeast without attention to PKK terrorism and the fight against it, which has largely inspired poor treatment to suspected PKK sympathizers and Turkish-Kurd civilians.

However, it seemed clear from the beginning stages of Turkey's insurgency problem, that the European powers would not intervene to prohibit pro-Kurdish "cultural organizations" which under their constitutions were legal. Therefore, the problem appeared to be Turkey's alone to handle. The success of PKK storefront propaganda dissemination was such that the Western European public and governments were persuaded by PKK-backed Kurdish "cultural" organizations which claimed the Turkish state was repressing Turkish-Kurds through counterterrorism and countersubversion policies in southeast Turkey.

A key supposition as applied to Turkey and Germany in the face of the PKK threat is that the greater the scale of disaster terrorists threaten to generate, the greater public fear is and the more likely it will be that an attitude change will occur./23 This may be the rationale that the Turkish government exercised from the beginning vis-à-vis Western states. The Turkish government may have surmised that the public would react negatively to PKK terrorism, and in that estimation they might have been correct in the long-term. However, a substantial group of would-be terrorists continue to be persuaded to join the ranks of the PKK within Turkish borders, indicating that some sympathy for the group exists. There is continued recruitment of PKK sympathizers and militants which defeats the supposition that the PKK terror movement was so unpopular as not to have empathizers. Conversely, the PKK regularly threatens potential recruits with death if they refuse to join the organization, resulting in a regularly replenished supply of new recruits. It may be argued that the PKK used the rationale that terrorism activities would influence the progress of the achievements of their political aims, among which are a Turkish-Kurdish federation, Kurdish political representation in the Grand National Assembly (defined along the PKK program's agenda), and Kurdish medium education and media. PKK activities were masked by the European-based storefront propaganda portraying the organization as representing liberation of a repressed Kurdish minority in southeast Turkey. Moreover, PKK-claimed human rights abuses against Kurdish civilians by Turkish armed forces in Turkey's southeast helped fuel a powerful admixture of Western European state empathy -- if not indirect

tolerance -- of the PKK's alleged "freedom fighting" while its ulterior motive was to destabilize the Turkish state and redress "oppression against Turkish-Kurds". The validity of the PKK's claims was colored by the hues of their terror campaign intentions. Little documentation in Western academic literature or media addresses this problem. The incorrect linkage of the PKK terror campaign at the governmental level and in the in European media with the larger "Kurdish question" vis-à-vis cultural and human rights violations claims greatly complicated Turkey's allied relations and has ultimately contributed to the PKK's successful rise.

The lack of treatment of the PKK's media influence in the West may be due to the fact that the PKK's campaign since 1990 is not qualifiably separatist in orientation. The stated aims of the PKK have instead more recently been directed toward establishing a federation of Kurds and Turks. The lack of attention to the real or perceived threat of PKK storefront organizations in Europe therefore, perhaps reflects the fact that the PKK continually changes its agenda, and dually pursues roles in both Turkey and Northern Iraq. If we are to consider the PKK as a separatist group with ethnic aims, such as the IRA or ETA, then it becomes all-the-more significant that the PKK organization was able to reach its current level of strength through European permissiveness toward their storefront associations and foundations, and that the Turkish government(s) did not work to more effectively convey the seriousness of the PKK threat. The same premise holds true if the PKK's objective is taken as challenging the Turkish regime, i.e.

from a unitary state, to a federation of Turks and Kurds. According to Juliet Lodge;

It is often understood that the more stringent anti-terrorist measures a state introduces, the more terrorist groups may be able to claim that such measures provide proof of the state's "fascist" (and hence reprehensible and illegitimate) intentions. Alternatively, terrorists can portray authorities who refuse to negotiate or to accede to other demands as impossibly intransigent; any subsequent decision by the authorities to bargain with the terrorists can then be construed as capitulation to terrorism, in which case terrorists can claim victory. This has led many authors to reason that government authorities are placed in a "no-win" situation. Others have suggested that therefore, governments have the upper hand: the response to a terrorist threat is what matters./24

The Turkish government(s) and the Turkish Armed Forces have faced just such a dilemma over handling the PKK and Kurdish question. Ultimately, the response to the terrorist threat posed by the PKK has determined its "no win" position in relation to allegations of human rights abuses. The human rights and use of force dimensions related to the PKK problem and the Kurdish question will be elaborated in Chapter 3. What is of concern here is to try to understand the unfolding of events which led to the exacerbation of Turkish-German relations over the course of the PKK's rise. Compounding the already extant PKK factor in the two states' relations, were dynamic changes such as the end of the Cold War, defining a new world order, increasing cohesion of the European Community into the European Union, Turkey's rising industrializing nation status, and the role the Turkish republic assumed as an even stronger anchor state in

the Transcaucasus region, the Middle East, and a potential role model for Central Asia.

In the larger scheme of events in Turkey, the PKK problem was alternatively raised and dropped, to meet the exigencies of political need, and oftentimes receded into the background of world events. Conditions prevalent in Turkey and Europe during the 1984-1994 period favored the PKK terrorist group's rise, such as Turkey's move toward stabilizing a democratic parliamentary governmental system and the end of the Cold War. It was not until 1993 that the PKK organization was dealt the harsh hand it could have been dealt earlier in Europe. An examination of the beginnings of the PKK as an incipient pro-Kurdish movement helps to provide the necessary background in understanding how the organization grew to its present strength over a ten year period. Studying the organization's growth outside of Turkey, and particularly in Germany through cultural organization storefronts, also provides a basis for analysis. The PKK's European operations, contributed significantly to the organization's financial, arms procurement, media operations, and propaganda dissemination.

I. Profile of the PKK

The 1980 coup which followed the declaration of Martial Law in Turkey effectively dealt with subversive activities that had reached an apex prior to the military takeover. The leader of the PKK, Abdullah (Apo) Öcalan, after the 12 September 1980 coup, managed to flee to Syria. Öcalan was to admit that by 1980, many PKK units had been transferred across the border

into Syria and had actually begun their first cross-border operations into Turkey. However, under Head of State General Kenan Evren, state troops claimed to capture one thousand pro-Kurdish militants (or *Kürtçü*), many of whom, it was later suspected included the PKK organization's top Central Committee members. The Kurdish militants and the PKK in its latent form had been dealt a substantial blow. However, other important PKK leaders escaped, and were able to reinstate plans from Syria in the months to follow. General Kenan Evren, in what would be among the first of many factually questionable statements, declared that the Turkish nation was guaranteed that an era of terrorism had come to an end and that the country had returned to stability. Furthermore, Ankara security force headquarters took credit for the Kurdish militant bust, stating that "the head of the snake has been crushed".²⁵ While the statements aptly reflected the status of the nearly eliminated Dev Sol radical terrorist movement, they were misleading to the public regarding Kurdish militant elements, and obfuscated an understanding of the potential Kurdish militant threat to Turkey.

The PKK set up operations in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley of Lebanon, home to other Marxist and terrorist organizations. At the end of 1981, after holding its first Congress abroad, the PKK began sending reconnaissance groups into Turkey close to the border area searching for "friendly villagers". Secondary militants -- basically PKK foot soldiers -- traveled to Northern Iraq either through Iran on false passports or in armed equipped groups through Turkey. These were relatively simple tasks

because during that period, the border was porous, with minimal security force presence. The rugged, mountainous terrain only worked to the PKK's advantage./26

By 1983, the PKK organized its force to launch a full thrust into Turkey, as the Turkish armed forces through intelligence were beginning to identify the "bandit" (PKK) threat at its border, but could not yet give it a precise name. In May of 1983, Turkish troops crossed into Iraq on their first hot pursuit of "bandits". By August 1984, the PKK, under the leadership of Öcalan, had managed to eliminate dissidents within its ranks through a series of murders, and moved to initiate a major attack into Turkey to prove that the terrorist organization had truly come into being. The plan by the PKK was to attack guerrilla style into Turkey, targeting local southeast residents who had taken up arms under the Turkish state-sponsored village guard system. The PKK concentrated its strategy through the "Kurdistan Freedom Unit", utilizing the Vietcong model of attacking villages and civilians in Turkey's southeast./27

The 1984 period in Turkey witnessed an emphasis on maintaining order in Turkey, resulting in a failure to recognize the growing numbers of PKK guerrilla strength. The PKK launched a so-called "Spring Offensive" in 1984 culminating on August 15th in the southeast border towns of Eruh and Şemdinli, where state police stations and military buildings were attacked. Two additional attacks in the Siirt and Hakkâri provinces killed eleven civilians and wounded several others. The PKK terror attacks received press attention in Turkey and

Europe. PKK activities resumed on October 10th when the PKK killed eight soldiers in the Çukurca district of Hakkâri. The Turkish armed forces by that same month had sent in a large presence of security forces to the southeast region. By December 1984, PKK high command militants returned to Syria to plan the PKK's next strategic moves.

By all estimates, the PKK's 1984 attacks, while sending an initial shock to Ankara, failed to be as impressive as they could have been. The high command, under the Kurdistan Freedom Unit, planned an annual March 21 offensive to commemorate its 1984 "Spring Offensive" activities (thereby putting that same date -- the Kurdish New Year, or *Newruz* -- on the Turkish calendar as a date to watch for escalated terror). The March attacks were to be followed by July-September raids. In 1985, Turkey's intelligence operations had substantially increased against PKK guerrilla attacks in the southeast, and many PKK militants were killed or captured. By 1986, the PKK practiced hit-and-run attacks, resulting in the deaths of 200 people in Turkey's southeast including military personnel. In October of that same year, the PKK killed 12 security personnel in Turkey's Uludere district of Hakkâri. After that attack, Turkish jets stormed into Northern Iraq and bombed suspected PKK camps. Ankara justified the raids through a "hot pursuit of terrorists" explanation (to be used consistently thereafter), and claimed that 150 PKK militants were killed./²⁸ There was approval from the Iraqi government to conduct the raids, so they were not considered between the two states as being extraterritorial. Secret advances into Iraqi border territory, the first among many to

follow, to weed-out PKK insurgents within the ten kilometer buffer zone were being simultaneously conducted.

The year 1987 witnessed increased attention paid to the PKK and Turkish armed forces activities in southeast Turkey. A State of Emergency was declared in July 1987 in Siirt, Van and the Hakkâri provinces, which was extended to nine provinces by 1989. Additionally, Turkish security forces stepped-up the village guard system; arming village recruits to help defend rural locales from PKK guerrilla raids. However, the village guard system has had more negative than positive effect in the long term due to the fact that Turkish-Kurd armed village guards have been combating PKK Kurds for the past decade, escalating the cycle of violence. The village guard system has also become prey to adjunct mercenaries that work for the aims of either "side" in the war, complicating the efficacy of and justification for the village guard system.

February 1987 witnessed the PKK's direct targeting of village guards and their families. This is a PKK strategy that continues to the present, and tremendously impacts on the civilian death toll in the southeast. Additional targets of PKK insurgency in 1987 and onward, according to the organization's leader Öcalan, would be;

people who are at the top of our political target agenda...the ruling party ANAP, rural governors, lawyers, doctors, teachers, and *muhtars*... we will use for target elimination rockets, TNT and dynamite; when they are not available we will use gas bombs./29

The 1980-1986 period evidenced the growing threat of the PKK, proving that they were not just a handful of bandits, but indeed, a fairly organized terrorist group with an international network, financing, and safe-haven infrastructure being gradually built-up to form a formidable force.

II. The PKK-Western European connection

Throughout the early 1980s, the PKK disseminated its directives through storefront operations located in Europe. The Kurdistan News Agency (KURD-HA), centered in Cologne (Köln), was one of the key command posts for printing and sending written PKK statements throughout the network in the Middle East and Turkey. The Turkish media was a prime recipient of such directives through facsimile transmission. The medium of dissemination of PKK directives has always been in Turkish. One of the most significant PKK-backed such media outlets was *Serxwebun* published in Vienna. It chronicled the 1984 activities of the PKK, and was the first to send the target area information to Turkey that Hakkâri, Van and Siirt would be among the first regions to be hit by PKK attacks in the southeast. Whenever the Turkish media was to receive an update about PKK activity in the southeast, the first contact was the European PKK-backed storefront media operations. The PKK media outlets in Germany were in essence the mouthpiece of Öcalan and the PKK. PKK-oriented information and propaganda dissemination was such a commonly acknowledged practice, that it was a source of consternation to the Turkish armed forces and media.

The death toll in the 1984-1990 period resulting from PKK insurgency activities to secure control in Turkey's southeast and the Turkish security force counterterrorism attacks against them, was 1,026 Turkish security force deaths, 233 Turkish village guard deaths, and the loss of 1,298 Turkish civilians. The PKK terrorist death toll was 1,956./**30** By June 1994 in a PKK file released to the Turkish press concerning the 1987 to 1994 death toll in the wake of the fight against the PKK, the Turkish military personnel deaths numbered 2,030, terrorist deaths numbered 5,566, and there were 4,227 civilian adult and 388 children's deaths./**31**

The increase in the number of deaths rises annually in Turkey as the result of the struggle between the PKK and the Turkish armed forces. Incidents outside Turkey rose with the establishment of the PKK's European network. Several pro-Kurdish related events occurred in Europe. For the confines and interests of this study, pro-Kurdish and PKK-related events in Germany will be discussed.

In Hamburg, Germany, a Turkish national was caught in November of 1986 with plans to assassinate the Turkish consul posted there. A message containing assassination orders, a gun, 25 bullets and 2 kilograms of explosives were confiscated by the Hamburg police. The police interrogated the suspect and extracted the information that members of the Kurdish Workers Organization of Hamburg were also involved in the plot. The organization was subsequently closed down after the would-be assassin's apprehension./**32**

A 1989 survey from the German Federal Ministry of the Interior indicated the findings that:

Approximately 97,250 aliens in the Federal Republic of Germany were members of extremist organizations or other associations influenced by extremists; of these, more than 67,450 persons were prone to left-wing extremism, 12,000 persons to right-wing extremism or extremist national groups, and approximately 17,450 fell into the group Islamic extremists./33

The survey stated that it had historically been the policy of the FRG to follow the activity of alien extremists "through determination mainly by combating the political, economic and social circumstances in their countries of origin". The survey recognized the threat to its internal security posed by the PKK when it stated;

Security forces pay particular attention to those groups who try to reach their aims by violent action...Of late, there are e.g. militant Kurds who belong in particular to the (orthodox) communist Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK) that largely operates in a spirit of conspiracy./34

Germany tracked such activities and kept permanent records in the form of "looking out" activity through the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Other evidence of Germany's cooperation in combating PKK insurgency aims within its own jurisdiction, came in the form of the prosecution in the High Court of Düsseldorf of 19 PKK members. It was the largest terrorist trial of PKK members in Germany, and commenced on October 24, 1989. The case was premised on 3 alleged kidnappings, 1 murder attempt, and 4 murders resulting

from inter-PKK conflicts. The outcome of the trial, decided in April 1994, will be discussed in Chapter 3 in relation where the criminals will serve their prison time.

Throughout the escalation of the PKK terrorist campaign in the 1980s and the Turkish military activities to combat them, there alternately was widespread criticism by Western Europe of Turkey's handling and lack of attention to Turkish-Kurd calls for the granting of civilian Turkish-Kurd cultural, language and media rights. However, because Western governments mixed the PKK terror issue into the same debate over the larger Kurdish question throughout much of the 1980s and early 1990s, the Turkish government's and armed force's position was compromised and hindered to a certain extent. Turkey's reputation and democratization process was affected as well as its relations with the West.

Although Turkish security forces aimed to stamp out PKK terrorism, and its supporters in southeast Turkey, a claim in the West was made that in the process, Turkish-Kurd civilians were suffering unduly. In particular, accusations of human rights abuses and cultural repression were featured in the German press. The Kurdish question, linked to potential reforms for Turkish-Kurds in terms of cultural rights (celebrating particular holidays and events), educational rights (pursuing a Kurdish medium education with Turkish as the primary medium of instruction), media rights (broadcasting over television and radio in Kurdish), and political representation (in the Grand National Assembly as a party not affiliated with the PKK).

The PKK's insurgency and the larger Kurdish question have been mismanaged by successive Turkish governments, as will be elaborated in Chapter 3. Proper care toward educating the Turkish and Western publics and media as to the true nature of the threat it posed was a shortfall of the 1980 and early 1990s period by Turkish governments and will be discussed within the Turkish context and within the scope of Turkish-German relations.

III. Decisive moves by Ankara on the Kurdish question in Turkey and abroad

A move by Ankara under the ANAP government of Turgut Özal attempted to soften Turkey's image through two policy shifts, which were also politically expedient in terms of Western interests at the time. Given the height of tensions in the southeast, and all the debate in Ankara, Western Europe and the U.S., Prime Minister Özal let it be known that indeed, there was a "Kurdish question" in Turkey. It is widely cited (at least in the Western literature) that the Prime Minister claimed Kurdish heritage through his mother, and put forward to the public that many high officials in Turkey were of similar descent. Previously, such open admission had not been introduced as a regular feature in the Turkish political arena. Özal also legalized spoken Kurdish in public, although Turkish would remain the official language of Turkey.

The second essential decision on Özal's part for consideration -- although today it still remains controversial in Turkey and much of the Middle East -- was the acceptance into Turkey of

hundreds of thousands of Kurds fleeing Saddam Huseyn's Iraq in 1988 for fear of reprisals against them with chemical weapons. The setting of the UN-sponsored Operation Provide Comfort to help accommodate those refugees was the outcome of Western urging to the Iraqi Kurds to push the limitations of the Iraqi regime by forming an autonomous enclave through an uprising. Thus, Özal's assumption of responsibility for the ensuing safehaven arrangement with Western allies for the Iraqi Kurds was debated and criticized in Turkey for fear that it would inspire a similar autonomy-related revolt by Turkish-Kurds.

Turkey's participation in the Persian Gulf War further served to cement its anchor position in the Middle East, and impacted on the strength it lent to the NATO alliance. The Poised Hammer Operation in Turkey (known internationally and alternately as the Provide Comfort II Operation) provided for the legal use of the Incirlik airbase for air launch sorties during the war. The use of the base continues with follow-up reconnaissance maneuvers and the operation's mandate comes up for a vote of renewal every six months in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

During the post-Gulf War period, Turkey would grant more than 60,000 Kurds asylum from Northern Iraq, whereas a mere 450 were accepted in Western European countries under asylum laws. International aid for Northern Iraqi Kurds fleeing the country amounted to \$5 million, while Turkey assumed aid appropriations of approximately \$45 million. Additionally, the

cutting-off of the Iraqi pipeline in conjunction with the Western UN-mandated embargo against Iraq cost Turkey hundreds of millions of dollars over the long term, and impacts on the country's debt today. It is claimed by the present government that Turkey loses \$6 billion annually through the Western imposed embargo against Iraq.

Because Turkey is a NATO ally, Western states were naturally appreciative that such gestures as those proffered by Prime Minister Özal were so easily put into action, but additional political trade-offs for Turkey were not far in the offing. The legitimization of the Iraqi Kurd safehaven inspired a further push by Kurdish leaders to broaden regional and Western understanding of the Kurdish question in its Turkish, Iraqi, Syrian and Iranian contexts. Turkey thereby proved its commitment to upholding its NATO role and a firm stance as a Western ally, but at the same time, the Kurdish question and the debate over it were pitched to a new height. The Turkish government's rationale was that it could not over ride the fight against the PKK toward accommodations on the Kurdish question in light of the fact that the PKK had continued to upscale its activities in the southeast and posed a formidable threat to the region. The Turkish argument continued to be premised on the idea that no reforms for Turkish-Kurds could be realistically or safely implemented without the eradication of PKK terror. That premise continues to the present, despite Western pressure on Turkey to revise it.

Turkey was unusually forward in its policy decisions taken under the Özal government, but not without some incredible turns in debate. For example, Özal had made the premature (October, 1988) proposal -- which many critics in Ankara perceived as an irresponsible move -- of a federated Iraq with the north for the Kurds, a mid-section in the vicinity of the Kirkuk oilfields for Iraqi Turkmen, and the remainder for the Arabs. This support from Turkey for a federated Iraqi Kurdistan -- albeit having been initiated singularly by Özal -- in the process elicited a promise from Iraqi Kurdish leaders to cooperate with Ankara against the PKK camps stationed in Northern Iraq. A deal was negotiated whereby 15,000 Iraqi Kurdish *peshmerga* mobilized on October 4, 1990 to drive PKK insurgents out of the Iraqi-Turkish border region. Operation Provide Comfort had been installed for 18 months up to that time, and Iraqi Kurdish leaders waited for the day when Özal's proposed federation would materialize. A discussion on federation did not evolve, and the Gulf War eradicated Ankara's involvement in any such debate, not to mention the resistance posed to it from the Turkish General Staff and the Foreign Ministry policymakers.

Perhaps the politically expedient moves made by the Özal government complicated the multidimensional Kurdish problem to an even higher degree. By proposing a federated model in Northern Iraq, then backtracking, then taking in hundreds of thousands of refugees, and helping to create a safehaven for them through a UN-mandated operation -- simultaneously conducting raids into Northern Iraq to extricate PKK terrorists and camps -- created fears in Turkey that

capitulation to Turkish-Kurd demands could easily be lumped into the proposal. In the process, Iraqi Kurds had been manipulated, Saddam Hussein had been alienated, and the Arab world was outraged by Turkey's policy shift. By conceding so much to the West it was argued in Turkey, might Özal then cross over the line into "selling out the country" on the Kurdish issue (i.e. to Western interests)? The degree to which critics perceived what had been lost and gained by Özal's maneuvering merits separate discussion, but the fact remained: there was no going back for Turkey in addressing the Kurdish question.

IV. Turkish-German relations in reaction to PKK staged events

While Turkey had taken a very active role in the Gulf War of 1991, Germany had not, much to the criticism of the NATO alliance. Germany's stance, as stipulated by its constitution in terms of non-deployment of troops outside of Germany was reiterated. Thus the Turkish government, amongst other NATO allies, was able to bask in the glory of the defeat of Saddam Hussein's forces ending in a ground war in February 1991. Given all of the limelight Turkey had received for its diplomatic and pro-Western prowess in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it continued to be criticized for its purported mishandling of Turkish-Kurd civilians in the southeast as the result of armed forces activities there to combat the PKK. The use of force and treatment of suspected PKK sympathizers were the two most prominent areas of critique. The criteria on which such criticisms were made were based on claims of human rights abuses by security forces in the region.

In January 1992, Turkish-German relations hit an all time low. In reaction to the Turkish armed forces use of German-issued armored vehicle carrier transfers for patrolling purposes in PKK activities in southeastern Turkey, the German government moved to enforce an arms "embargo" against Turkey. In Germany, footage was aired on television which alleged to depict a German-made armored vehicle used by the Turkish military dragging a PKK fighter to his death. (It was widely published later by the Turkish authorities that the militant was already dead). The "embargo", largely in reaction to such depictions to the German public, was imposed with the justification that German-issued armored vehicles were not to be used outside NATO purposes. The Turkish government denied the allegations of reported abuse of German-issued stockpile NATO equipment and reasserted that the armored vehicle carriers were used for patrolling purposes only. The "embargo" period witnessed complications in Turkish and German relations, and heightened accusations regarding human rights abuses by Turkish armed forces and police toward the Turkish-Kurd civilian population residing in the southeast. The PKK threat issue at the macro level was "lost" in the process, and debate was redirected toward alleged human rights violations in Turkey's southeast. The reorientation of the debate led to consternation on the part of the Turkish government and armed forces, which was escalating the anti-terrorism campaign against the PKK. On March 2, 1992, relations were further exacerbated when focusing on a so-called solution to the Kurdish "minority representation problem" in Turkey, then Foreign

Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher proposed a Yugoslavian federated model in Turkey. /35

Ankara reacted strongly to both the German arms "embargo" and the proposed federation model by Genscher. Reaction reached heights to the extent that there were calls for a Turkish "boycott" of German exports in Turkey. This introduced an economic angle into the debate, and German companies attempted to soften their government's position by explaining that although the German Defense Ministry had suspended arms shipments to Turkey that politics in no way should reflect to the larger scope of Turkish-German import-export relations and trade.

It is noteworthy that the Turkish government found it easier, and had throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s, to point the finger at other governments for indirectly and directly aiding the cause of PKK terrorism. The Pandora's box opened by Özal had been more than Turkey had bargained for in relation to the Kurdish question, and its ramifications for the armed forces struggle to combat PKK insurgency. By the first week of April 1992, the German government was assured by the Turkish Foreign Ministry that German-issued arms were not used and would not be used against civilian Turkish-Kurds living in southeast Turkey, and the arms "embargo" was lifted.

Although the NATO stipulations for use of transfer weapons is broad, Turkey attempted to use its own specific interpretation as a means defending its position vis-à-vis the German Defense

Ministry over the arms issue. The new NATO Alliance Strategic Concept agreed upon at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome in November 1991, reaffirmed a coordinated stand against terrorism. Article 13 of the document reaffirms that;

Alliance security interests as being affected by risks...including disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage...arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies...and where appropriate, coordination of their efforts including their responses to such risks./36

The German Defense Ministry interprets this agreement broadly, stipulating that transferred German-issued armored vehicles and tanks may be used in Turkey in the event of an external, NATO-based threat rather than for internal security (e.g. for counterterrorism purposes against the PKK), without further clarifying the criteria determining how terrorism could qualify as a NATO-based threat.

Prior to the lifting of the arms "embargo", the German Bundestag and government denounced all forms of terrorism on April 2, 1992 and stated that it would never allow "internecine Turkish conflicts to take place on German soil". The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) on the same day ratified a declaration called the "Kurdish Question", denouncing PKK terrorism and rejecting the methods used by the PKK. Further, it stated that "PKK terrorism blocks the way for Kurds to attain more rights...and that it is a clear misuse by Kurds in Germany of their guest rights."/37

An important event on April 15, 1993 occurred on the wake of the Turkish-German rift. PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan moved to extend a "ceasefire" with the Turkish armed forces that had been initiated in January 1993. The ceasefire was not unconditional and "mandated" that the Turkish security forces should halt all operations aimed at destroying the PKK. Öcalan's additional demands were that Kurdish "politics" be allowed to be exercised and that the inclusion of "Kurdish identity" be provided in the Turkish Constitution. He concluded the list of demands with the condition that a Kurdish federation be considered in southeast Turkey. In terms of political demands, it is supposed that during that period, Öcalan advocated Kurdish-medium education, cultural, and media rights for Turkish-Kurds as a means of enlisting additional recruits as well as garner sympathy in the West for Turkish-Kurd "minority rights".

The Turkish government would not negotiate with the PKK's "ceasefire" demands. The so-called PKK "ceasefire" held, and Ankara was in a quandary as to what the next step should be in dealing with eradicating PKK terror. Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel during this period was acceding to a bid for the Presidency, due to the sudden death of Turgut Özal, who held the position. The need to fill the position of Prime Minister became the heated issue in Ankara. As a consequence, the PKK issue was once again sidetracked, overshadowing gains that might have been reached toward offering a next step from Ankara in light of the "ceasefire".

A coalition government under acting Prime Minister Erdal İnönü came into power and shortly thereafter announced a limited amnesty to be granted to those PKK sympathizers and members involved in smaller acts of crime against the Turkish state (e.g. not to include murder). Upon that announcement on Sunday May 23, 1993 in the early afternoon by the Turkish government, the PKK took a bus hostage on the highway near the town of Bingöl. The PKK terrorist operatives detained 33 young Turkish soldiers for twelve hours in order to coerce Ankara into granting concessions to the PKK. Ostensibly the PKK leadership feared the loss of their operatives crossing over to the Turkish government's amnesty. By 3 a.m. the next morning the 33 soldiers were all shot in the face and killed. The Turkish government withdrew its amnesty offer, and the Turkish nation was heavy-hearted with the loss and frustration of how to counter the PKK's latest move. Öcalan claimed through the Turkish press that he had not ordered the execution of the 33 Turkish soldiers in Bingöl, leaving the question open as to who did.

Upscaled PKK attacks ensued after the Bingöl event. The so-called "ceasefire" of the PKK had been broken, although in an ad hoc fashion as events transpired. The PKK supposedly broke the "ceasefire" in this manner in response to Ankara's reticence to push for further concessions to the PKK. On June 7th, Acting Prime Minister Erdal İnönü announced a second limited amnesty to be applied to PKK terrorist organization sympathizers. He claimed that the amnesty would be proactive toward "reclamation and rehabilitation" of those potential (i.e.

young and impressionable or older but coercible) PKK sympathizers from joining the ranks of the terrorist organization against the Turkish state. European governments strongly condemned the PKK incident in Bingöl, and press coverage insured that the brutality of the PKK in this event was effectively portrayed, providing the impression that the PKK was in control in Turkey's southeast.

Diplomatic and political relations between Turkey and Germany managed to build up to a cooperative level once more despite the 1992 debates over use of force and the human rights issue vis-à-vis Turkish-Kurds. Raids on PKK camps and over-border operations continued unabated throughout the year, and 1993 witnessed a heated political campaign participating in the formation of a coalition government culminating when Tansu Çiller became Prime Minister of Turkey in September of that year. Çiller had made eradicating the PKK a major goal on the campaign trail. By October, she visited Germany in an effort to better state relations, and additionally, visited the U.S. to do the same. Apparently, although unconfirmed, the issue of PKK terrorism and the need for cooperation with Western allies to help quell its reign of terror in Turkey were on the Prime Minister's visit agenda. Similar efforts were made toward Syria, Iraq and Iran through Turkish Foreign Ministry delegation visits. Efforts by the new Turkish government were to pay off in the near term.

The PKK staged two waves of attacks on dozens of Turkish diplomatic and commercial facilities in Europe in June and

November of 1993. The first round staged on 24 June, consisted of vandalism and demonstrations. PKK militants occupied the Turkish Consulate in München for one day and Kurdish demonstrators stormed the Turkish Embassy in Bern, Switzerland. On 4 November, the PKK firebombed Turkish targets, killing a Turkish man in Wiesbaden, Germany. After the November attacks, police officials in Germany swept through Kurdish offices and apartments, confiscating PKK-related materials. French police arrested more than 20 Kurds, including two alleged PKK leaders in France. The German Interior Minister banned the PKK and 35 associated organizations on 26 November, and France banned the PKK and the Kurdistan Committee on 29 November 1993./38

The storefront organizations of the PKK banned in Germany included the Committees of Kurdistan, Feyka, Kurdish Information Agency (KURD-HA), and youth, women's, cultural and artistic associations. Adding to other Interior Ministry statements in reaction to the November 4 and June 24 events, Minister Manfred Kanther said in a written statement;

Germany can be no battleground for foreign terrorists...The PKK, in pursuit of its goals, puts pressure on Kurdish citizens to join the group, persecutes political opponents, and there are suspicions that it uses blackmail to get money for its acts of violence./39

The violent acts of the PKK in Western Europe evoked outcry in political parties in Bern, Bonn, Paris, Stockholm and Zürich. In Germany, Federal Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stated;

The reaction to the attacks by the militant Kurdish groups in various German cities as well as in some other European countries against Turkish institutions could only be disgust and outrage...we can no longer accept these militant Kurdish groups to obtain their aims in Germany through violence./40

The Interior Minister of Bavaria added;

The PKK should definitely be banned in this country...Bavaria's Interior Minister, Dr. Günther Beckstein, is outraged at the PKK's violence as it is being carried out in Germany; Beckstein reiterated his request to ban the PKK in the country to the Federal Interior Minister, Manfred Kanther. He said, "what more should happen in order to ban the PKK and the organizations around it? It's time to show that Federal Germany has resorted to the defense of democracy./41

In the Turkish press, the European ban of PKK storefront operations were hailed with the newspaper headlines, "Thank you Mr. Kohl"/42, "Good morning Europe"/43, and "Çiller forced it, and Germany hit it"/44 After the windfall of Western European action in banning the PKK, the Çiller coalition government, with its partner, the Turkish Social Democrat Party, was quick to claim diplomatic success. Western European governments in response, pointed out that measures were taken in Germany and France to maintain internal security, and were not initiated solely in response to pressure from Turkey. It is speculated that while some of the major operative points in Europe were closed down, notably in Germany where 35 storefront organizations were dismantled, the PKK was still able to reroute its network to other countries where PKK affiliated groups were not banned, particularly in Belgium, Austria and parts of Scandinavia.

On the high tide of PKK bannings in November, the January 28, 1993 secret operation into Zaleh staged by the Turkish Armed Forces occurred. The operation struck 110 kilometers deep into Northern Iraq. The strike was carried out in successive waves of four jets based on target reconnaissance models of PKK camps posted in the Zaleh region. Ankara claimed that hundreds of PKK militants were killed in underground hideaways. The strike was major, carried out in the 36th parallel region under the protection of coalition forces, and indicated that Turkey had a significant strike capability over its borders. Alternately, the PKK claimed that 7 PKK militants were killed, 2 Turkish jets were shot down during the operation, and that the Zaleh camp commander remained alive./45

Relative to the Zaleh operation is the question as to how significant the impact of the Turkish force strike on PKK bases had actually been. The height of tensions over the PKK insurgency problem in the Turkish armed forces and in the public during January was particularly high. The figures upon which the success of the Zaleh operation may be analyzed are the Turkish Armed Forces estimates versus those of the PKK. The attack by Turkish forces was timed at a politically loaded period, and its effect on the Turkish scene, not dissimilar to earlier armed forces maneuvers, had a somewhat assuaging effect on the Turkish public which was informed of its occurrence the following day. Further discussion of the Turkish armed forces anti-PKK counterterrorism strikes will be elaborated in Chapter 3.

By mid-April 1994, the German Chancellor's Office and the Defense and Foreign Ministries announced investigations into allegations purporting that Ankara had broken its promise not to use armored tanks issued by Germany in counterterrorism maneuvers against the PKK in the southeast. The investigation prompted a suspension of arms transfers to Turkey, and brought to mind the earlier "embargo", similarly enforced and then lifted just one year before. Ministry officials in both Germany and Turkey were quick to assure that this in fact was *not* an embargo, but a suspension pending investigation into human rights claims based in Turkey's southeast. Evidence in the form of pictures was presented to and analyzed by Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel asserted that no deployment of weapons in violation of NATO agreements could be proven. Arms shipments from Germany were resumed in the latter part of the first week of May 1994.

By May 9th, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel issued a statement calling for improved ties with Ankara. He also advocated that the CSCE should send observers to monitor allegations of human rights abuses against Turkish-Kurds in Turkey's southeast. A statement that was issued in the German daily *Frankfurter Rundschau*, seemed aimed at the German public in light of the lifting of a arms shipment suspension to Turkey. There was a reaction in Ankara which intimated that if the German-issued NATO arms would be suspended off and on every year based on human rights allegations, Ankara would procure stockpile arms elsewhere.

Digression into the major PKK-related events affecting Turkish-German relations paints a telling picture for the future. The two states' fluctuating relations indicate that they will likely continue to experience controversy and diplomatic entanglements over the situation in southeast Turkey, and particularly over human rights violation allegations. A discussion about the questions raised in this chapter and an analysis of how they portend for future relations between Turkey and Germany reveals the overarching question as to how the two states will manage to better communicate about the PKK threat to Turkey and separate it from the larger Kurdish question, which is premised on Turkish-Kurd cultural rights reforms. The issue of human rights violation allegations figures prominently in answering both questions. Factors greatly influencing this kind of communication rotates around the respective governments' use of armed forces, human rights and the mass media.

Chapter 3: German and Turkish Perspectives

The treatment of a "perception of a threat" and an "actual threat" is not provided in the German constitution, as opposed to the Turkish Constitution, which stipulates in broad terms what does and does not define threatening behavior to the state. What constitutes threatening behavior (i.e. terrorist-related) whether it be internal, extranational, or state-sponsored, is interpreted differently in each country. What might constitute terroristic behavior or terrorism in one country may not equate to standards set out in another. This is to say that while Germany performed "looking out" activities under the provisos laid out by its Office for the Protection of the Constitution vis-à-vis Kurdish activism with alleged backing from the PKK, it has been difficult for the government to concisely distinguish between Turks and Turkish Kurds. Moreover, no official distinction can be made between Turkish and Turkish-Kurd citizenship registration, differentiating one group from another. Germany in particular out of all European nations, would immediately be subject to charges of racism, had it attempted to step-up an anti-Kurd campaign to contain PKK terrorism.

The fact that Germany did not respond earlier to PKK terrorism and affiliated organizations on German soil, despite the Turkish government's urgings to do so raised an important question. According to the Turkish case, the German government was aiding and abetting PPKK terrorism in a way that seemed to compromise its democratic tenets and not support a NATO member ally. The question raised for liberal Western democracies, such as Germany revolved around the issue as to

whether Western democracies tolerate terrorism. This polemic is thoroughly analyzed by international terrorism scholar Noemi Gal-Or, who maintains that the combination of experience-with-terrorism and nature-of-terrorism has resulted in a rather flexible threshold of tolerance of terrorism./46 Gal-Or summarizes Germany's stance succinctly:

It is a matter of fact that there is a prevailing unanimity of ideas that lie at the basis of liberal democracy: delegitimization of non-governmental and non-political violence, along with delegitimization of violence in matters of domestic politics which include the absolute denunciation of terrorism in this normative category (clearly, governmental violence has also its moral and ideological limits here). This is an elementary common denominator of all the liberal democracies discussed by definition of their democratic virtue./47

A brief description of the German countersubversion efforts against the Red Army Faction (RAF) intimates that the experience-with and nature-of terrorism dynamic comes into play, with interesting parallels to the Turkish case with PKK insurgency:

The German experience with the Red Army Faction (RAF) points to a combination of the unpreparedness of the government and surprise. The German government responded in a way which was as close as possible to the imperatives of the 'ideal' rejection of violence in liberal democracies' political game. German revolutionary-ideological, left-wing terrorism also impinged on the very sensitive issue of the viability of the renewed German democracy, which was dependent upon the purity of the system with regard to its genuinely democratically oriented representatives: "In many newspaper articles the behavior of the sympathizers was explained by comparison to the Gestapo era, during which citizens

gave refuge to resistance fighters fleeing from the police pursuing them./48

While attempting to uphold a determined democratic stance, Germany tries to come as close as it can to the 'ideal' of practicing democracy, even if not necessarily accomplishing it to its full satisfaction, nor the satisfaction of other states. The 'ideal' and its ramifications for the upholding of human rights is a significant factor in Turkish-German state relations, and is a fundamental component in Germany's conception of a free democratic basic order. The Turkish understanding of the German conception however, is that double standards are applied on a case-by-case basis and that in relation to the case of assisting in fighting the PKK, more focused on a pro-Kurdish rather than anti-terrorist premise.

It is helpful to understand Germany's experience throughout the 1970s with the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group, which led to significant claims of "abuses" in the way the state treated the group's leaders in prison. In the early to mid-1970s, Germany experienced a wave of terrorist attacks from the Red Army Faction (RAF) whose founders were Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhof, and Horst Mahler. Because of their commitment to a program of armed revolution through urban guerilla violence, the press came to dub them as the "Baader-Meinhof Gang". The group was particularly active in 1977, which has often been referred to as the "German Autumn". There was a great deal of intellectual and mainstream sympathy for the terrorists, who had succeeded through propaganda to defend their cause against capitalism and NATO effectively enough as to garner a

great deal of public support. Upon being jailed, the Baader-Meinhof leaders conducted a hunger strike and appealed to the European Commission on Human Rights on the grounds that their human rights were being systematically violated in prison and that they were being tortured. The eventual self-strangulation of Ulrike Meinhoff in May 1976 in her prison cell by hanging herself, sent a shock wave throughout Germany and the West. A popular claim by the RAF revolutionaries was that the state had "murdered" Meinhof and that the prison forces were responsible for her death given the fact that before investigating the death, the prison management announced her suicide. Members of the group, including, Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe committed suicide in their cells in October 1977./49

The German government continued to practice the right to interrogate and imprison terrorists as they saw fit, and justified the use of means to extricate information from the Baader-Meinhof group and its sympathizers both inside and outside prison. Thus, while Germany is critical of the means employed by the Turkish security forces against the PKK, the German government has had its own experience with countersubversion. The fact remained however, that the Baader-Meinhof revolutionaries and the German treatment of them during imprisonment received wide international attention and criticism in the 1970s and beyond.

Constitutional, Criminal Code and Natural Origin laws in Turkey are a complicated and debated subject, meriting a separate comprehensive study. However, since the republic's founding in 1923, the nation has remained unitary and secular in

orientation. It is clear that Ankara has never deviated from its long-standing conviction that Turkey's future lies with a democratic Europe, as evidenced by its application to the European Community in 1987 and its commitment to a Customs Union effective in 1996. The Turkish multiparty system and elected parliament in the recovery wake of three military coup d'états since 1960, prove a strong trend toward further democratization in the country. The lingering after effects of the military regime which ruled from 1980 to 1983, however, persist constitutionally and in the Criminal Code under a number of laws which according to democratic norms, curtail basic rights and are worded so as to enable the Turkish courts and security services to interpret them at their discretion.

Some criticism by the German government toward the way the Turkish government exercises its Criminal Code has fueled the misunderstanding over the PKK, as a separate polemic from the Kurdish question. The inconsistencies between law and practice are evidenced by continued claims by Germany and other Western countries that there is systematic violation of human rights practice in southeast Turkey. It is noteworthy that most claims are directed toward the condition of justice in Turkey's southeast in relation to decisions passed by the security courts located there. Numerous cases have been filed at the European Commission of Human Rights, further intimating the notion that Turkey has exercised questionable judgement in the way it administers its state security courts, jurisdiction and the handling of accused parties.

It is significant that the Turkish constitution contains articles which stipulate the illegality of making separatist-oriented speeches, behavior or actions aimed at dividing the state, collaboration with separatist-oriented groups, and defaming the government, armed forces, or Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic. Prohibition of cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment, including torture can be found in Turkish law of national origin and in Turkish legislation implementing international treaties. Article 17, paragraph 3 of the Constitution states that no person shall be subjected to a penalty or to treatment incompatible with human dignity. Article 17 also contains a clause that has important bearing in relation to countersubversion conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces against the PKK. Two additional provisions of the Criminal Code, Articles 245 and 243, punish law enforcement officers who ill treat or cause bodily injury, or who torture an accused person in order to make him/her confess to an offense. Article 456 of the Criminal Code prohibits battery and Articles 228, 240 and 251 mete out other punishment of public officials for committing bodily abuse against suspects. Article 90 paragraph 5 of the Constitution states that international agreements duly put into effect carry the force of law. Most important perhaps for international democratic standard comparison, is the "collective offenses" section of Article 16 of Law 2845 in the Criminal Code, under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts, which states that the maximum length in police custody is 15 days. The period can be doubled to 30 days by written order of a public prosecutor or a judge in areas where a state of emergency has been declared. Under martial

law, a 15 to 30 day detention is also stipulated./⁵⁰ Turkey is bound by international treaties to which it is a signatory as stipulated in Article 15, paragraph 1. As such, the detention period beyond 15 days is clearly violated in light of antiterrorism activities conducted by the Turkish government and military.

In upholding the Turkish Constitution, the government(s) have at various times also modified certain provisos germane to political exigencies. Given the nation's experience with military intervention and building a sustainable democracy under consequent return to civilian government, the constitution has been revised in many ways. However, the founding principles of equality of peoples in Turkey has been consistently upheld. From this unitary practice stand point, and the threat posed to it by the PKK polemic, analysis of legality of operations by armed forces, the question of human rights and the treatment of the mass media is warranted.

iii. Inter-constitutionality: The case of convicted PKK criminals in Germany

An interesting example of constitution interpretation came into play with the handing down by the High Court of Düsseldorf, Germany a guilty verdict for 19 PKK-affiliated criminals in April 1994. A question arose about how to handle the prosecution. The German government is discussing the sensitive issue of extradition of the criminals to Turkey very carefully. Extradition may be considered only upon a Turkish request based upon a case before Turkish law. This request was never officially made by the Turkish government after the November 1993 PKK

events, although an unofficial request was filed. The request was posted unofficially because the Turkish Foreign Ministry anticipated that given the tenets of German and international law, the arrested PKK members would not likely be extradited to Turkey given German and international laws.

Participating in a violent demonstration in Germany does not fall into this category. The second option is expulsion, based *inter alia* on a case in Germany which would not necessarily be punishable in Turkey; under German law the expulsion of a convicted criminal would shorten the prison term. The extradition of criminals who might face the death penalty in their home country is strictly prohibited by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), to which both Turkey and Germany are signatories. Even though extradition may be the subject of review with respect to human rights conventions, there is still a wide margin of appreciation for state practice. However, the ECHR has provisions which protect the right to life, protection from inhuman or degrading treatment and are used in the European interpretation of extradition requests. The present German discussion regarding extradition of PKK-affiliated criminals to Turkey centers on a second option; the difficulty existing that Turkey might come to expect expulsion for example, of a violent Kurdish demonstrator in Germany because Turkey might presume him guilty under Article 125 of the Turkish Criminal Code, regardless as to whether he had expressed his "separatist" opinions in Turkey or Germany. Therefore, the German discussion focuses upon excluding the expulsion option from the start, or to ask for guarantees from

Turkey against potential torture or death sentence in the event that extradition is granted. While the restrictive practice since 1984 through the Turkish Parliament of confirming a death sentence remains a problem, according to Germany, so does the possibility of torture in Turkish custody and/or imprisonment. Therefore, any extradition decision will be carefully made./51

II. Use of security force

The discussion of use of security force in this section deals primarily with policies and activities as relevant to PKK terrorist insurgency. In the German case, the twice suspended transfer of arms to Turkey is explicated according to the interpretation of the German Ministry of Defense. Discussion beyond that issue is not within the confines of this study. The armed forces' policies and practices of Turkey with regard to PKK insurgency will be elaborated as a point of analysis for Turkish-German relations. The use of force, to whom it is applied, and how it is applied is a theme that runs throughout the fluctuating cycle of the two states' relations, and is perhaps the central issue at hand for Turkey's democratizing future and its relations with its Western allies.

i. Germany

The twice raised question posed by the German government toward Turkish Armed Forces improper use of German-issued arms transfers in the form of armored tanks is pivoted on the interpretation of the NATO defense assistance program and the Military Aid Program decided on after the Gulf War. There are no actual guidelines for the use of NATO weapons transferred

from Germany to Turkey. The mutual unsigned agreement between the two member NATO states was that the weapons furnished under these programs would be used in conformity with Article 5 of the NATO Treaty; meaning in defense against external threats. Germany, despite Turkey's argument under Article 13 of the NATO declaration of Rome, stated that it had no disagreement with Turkey's right to combat terrorism, but did voice its apprehension about the way the struggle against terrorism in Turkey's southeast was conducted. The German argument claimed that the Turkish-Kurd rural population in the southeast had been affected negatively, and therefore interpreted Article 13 broadly. The subsequent exchange of letters between the foreign ministers of Germany and Turkey confirmed that the assistance program weapons would be used for external threats only. Consequently, neither during the first "embargo" in April 1993, nor the subsequent suspension of arms transfers in April 1994, provided convincing proof of use of German-issued BTR-60 armored personnel carriers in Turkish-conducted anti-terrorist operations. In the Fall of 1992, it was decided to phase out the assistance program by the end of 1994 due to financial difficulties posed to Germany after reunification./52

In the brief synopsis of the purported involvement of German-issued arms in Turkish military security activities, an injection of issues beyond deployment was addressed. Namely, that combating terrorism is recognized as a non-contentious point. More importantly, the issue of *whom* (i.e. civilian population-wise) counterterrorism activities affect in the aims of hitting a

"target theater" has been raised by the German government to a significant degree. The fact that so many Turkish-Kurd civilians have been killed or adversely affected by the PKK terrorists' campaign has caused Germany and Turkey's other Western allies to express concern over who is caught in the crossfire. The issues of human rights abuses and the maintenance of international treaties to which Turkey is a signatory has received attention in the West. The countersubversion tactics of the Turkish military are not uncommon in terms of combating terrorism, but the fact that so many innocent civilians die in the process is an area for consideration. Particularly since the Turkish government's image toward the Turkish-Kurd civilian population was being adversely affected as a side-effect of anti-PKK operations is and will continue to be at the heart of the German-Turkish use of military force debate. However, the Turkish government and armed forces' response to concern over the civilian cross-fire statistics will in the long term likely be a secondary consideration to the eradication of PKK terror in the southeast. The position of the Turkish government and armed forces remains rooted to abolishing the PKK before aspects of the Kurdish question may be addressed, such as; Turkish-Kurd cultural, media or political representation.

ii. Turkey

The Turkish Armed Forces is highly esteemed and regarded as an essential component in the establishment of the Republic. It was a guiding power in resisting foreign occupation forces under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal's nationalists. Accompanying the military aspect of the establishment of the

Turkish Republic, was the set of democratic norms which were inaugurated by Atatürk. The Turkish Constitution ratified in 1924 aimed at founding and entrenching a democratic, unitary order that would come to define the Turkish state under the umbrella of Kemalist nationalism. For the sake of discussion here, the role assumed by the Turkish Armed Forces in the post-1980 period is of interest. Given the framework of the Cold War period ending in 1989, Turkey's membership in NATO largely affected its role in the Middle East region, and its position as an anchor in Southeastern Europe. Turkey has been considered in NATO terms as the southeastern Europe key member state in the region; which includes the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the northern tier of the Middle East. Turkey's relationship with the West as a regional ally was confirmed in 1952 with Turkey's signature of the NATO Alliance Charter.

The Turkish Armed Forces military portfolios and profiles have been largely based on bilateral efforts with Western allies to ensure a sufficient weaponry stockpile in the face of several threats posed to it strategically in the region. During the Cold War period, the orientation was primarily aimed at the potential Soviet threat from the north, with Iran and Iraq as the secondary defense consideration or tier, and a concentration of force in the Thracian region. The secondary and tertiary security considerations were viewed as "stepchildren" however, in light of the menacing and powerful threat emanating from the positioning of forces throughout the Soviet Union's republic outposts. The northern threat to Turkey from Russia existed for

hundreds of years, and grew in dimension when the Cold War escalated tensions to a new height and changed regional parameters significantly. The "Russian threat" to Turkey continues to be a concern in defense policy formulation today, despite the end of the Cold War, given Turkey's regional position and the waterways and trade routes that exist on the European and Asian continents.

When the specter of insurgency in the incipient and latent form of the PKK came into being, the Turkish armed forces orientation toward being prepared for the Russian threat explained the ill-equipped stature of the armed forces to conduct over-border operations in Turkey's southeast, or to be able to anticipate the strength the PKK would amass over the five year period of 1981 to 1986. The Turkish armed forces were not equipped for a threat beyond their three-pronged traditional strategy. The porous nature of the border and the fact that Turkey did not have the appropriate helicopters, armored vehicle carriers or night vision equipment in the southeast led Turkey to begin the fight against the PKK from a position of weakness which was disproportionate to the stature of the Turkish state.

The cycle of violence perpetuated in Turkey's southeast left Ankara and the armed forces with the "guesstimation" work of trying to speculate actual PKK force presence in the region. The insurgents had not yet "publicized" their name, function or purpose. Such an unknown quantity in the early 1980s was worse than a named threatening power; it was a "being" that

could not yet be qualified. Thus, the threat geared to the north of Turkey precluded a focus, or even appropriation of the necessary arms and force strength to wage a retaliatory campaign against unknown "bandits" in Turkey's southeast. What in fact favored the incipient PKK movement during the early stages, was the Turkish armed forces' lack of air mobility and night vision equipment. The mountainous terrain, replete with rocky caverns, hidden caves and treacherous cliffs, was diametrically opposed to the setting of the longstanding *conventional* threat posed from the north. The latent form of PKK terrorist insurgency would come to represent an *unconventional* threat with outside funding and bases, and would mandate a critical shift of focus to surmount the burgeoning growth of the terrorist organization in the country's southeast.

The Turkish armed forces enlisted bilateral cooperation through NATO in upping its ante of air attack mobility forces and night vision equipment over time. Budget appropriations after Özal's death and during the present government focused a significant portion of Turkey's national budget on military appropriations in the campaign to eradicate PKK insurgency. The present government claims that as much as \$6 billion a year is being allocated for the fight against the PKK. If the force strength of the PKK is truly in the range of 5,000, the implications for expenditures to "eliminate" each individual terrorist are substantial, and call into question how effectively the countersubversion campaign against the PKK is being waged by Turkish Armed Forces.

As the democratic and elected multiparty system assumed a pivotal role in Turkish politics, the Turkish Armed Forces was put on second order as a leading influence in determining the country's affairs. However, the armed forces were never far from the scene of any decision-making event, and served as a bolstering presence of upholding order and democracy in the country. It is the armed forces' mandate to maintain stability in the country, and their interdiction into civilian political debate intimates a strong hold and position in the system. Due to the fact that the armed forces had the power to intervene through three military coup d'état in the past indicates that the leverage afforded to them in terms of a reputation of having "bailed out the country" from civil anarchy is significant, and a factor to be considered in analyzing the Turkish political system. The Ankara governments from 1980 onward relied on the strong backbone provided by the armed forces in the fight against a growing PKK insurgency problem. Through the declaration of a State of Emergency in nine southeastern provinces in 1989, the Turkish armed forces were able to declare martial law in contentious areas of state security in retaliation to the over the border, hit-and-run insurgency tactics of the PKK.

To facilitate the capture, detention, and interrogation of suspected PKK terrorists, the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1982 passed a Criminal Code with anti-terrorism laws legally allowing for interpretation in the determination of terrorist suspects and terrorism-related crimes. Acts of speech or suspected affiliation with a terrorist organization, behavior of a separatist nature, and intent to destabilize the unitary nature of

the Turkish state were provided as contributory behavior for prosecution under the Criminal Code's anti-terrorism laws. Under criticism from the West for violating democratic tenets through its Criminal Code and anti-terrorism laws, the Turkish coalition governments of Demirel and İnönü, and Çiller and Karayalçın sought a revision of legislation that violated basic rights. However, no such legislation has been passed due to lack of political agreement over reforms in the Criminal Code between the True Path Party and the Social Democratic Party. The problem remains that there is a real threat posed by the PKK in the southeast of Turkey; a threat that Western governments do not face. This threat provides Turkey with the justification to combat terrorism with any means it sees fit. This stance has prompted criticism by the West because the PKK insurgency campaign necessarily overlaps with the human rights violation polemic because of the impact on the Turkish-Kurd civilian population in the southeast, as well as the violation of international treaties to which Turkey is a signatory. However, a proactive stance on modifying anti-terrorism behavior and practices in Turkey has not been concluded. Such reforms appear to have been nearly dropped off the political and judicial agendas. Basic rights violations contained in the Criminal Code allow for abuse in the system and fuel accusations by the West that Turkey is doing little to address and work to reform practices that violate international law.

A new anti-terrorism draft bill that was reviewed but not ratified in November 1993, aimed to modify provisions affecting human rights of detainees in the southeast PKK theater of conflict as

well as those individuals who are suspected of perpetrating crimes for a terrorist organization although they might not be a member. The November 1993 proposed anti-terrorism bill contained strict measures to deter terrorism. One clause included prison sentences of 2 to 5 years for terrorist or terrorist sympathizers participating in rallies, meetings or demonstrations, or who spread verbal or written propaganda advocating the secular and/or territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic. A noteworthy clause stipulated that the security police have the right to detain terrorist suspects from 2 weeks to 30 days without the presence of a lawyer during interrogations. Although the proposed November 1993 anti-terrorism bill advocated a reduction of the number of original sentences handed down to members (or suspected members) of terrorist organizations by nine-tenths, the leeway of interpretation afforded to the armed forces, security, police and security high courts remained substantial./53

The anti-terrorism bill of 1993 could not pass in the Grand National Assembly because there was political opposition to many of the provisos contained within the proposal. The Criminal Code remains in its 1982 form and will likely not be altered in light of the PKK's recent escalation of violence in the southeast. Armed forces-initiated operations continue within Turkey and over the border into Northern Iraq is proof that adaptation to the unconventional PKK threat has occurred. The exercise of broadly interpreted methods of capture, detention and interrogation however, has ramifications for the Turkish government and armed forces, particularly because they are

the criteria on which Germany and Turkey's Western allies have staked their allegations of the systematic abuse of human rights in southeast Turkey.

II. Human rights

i. Germany

The Government of Germany increasingly expressed concern about the methods employed by Turkish security forces combating PKK terrorism in Turkey's southeast throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. The concern is based on the alleged systematic violation of human and civil rights of rural Turkish-Kurds dwelling in the region. In addition to the armed forces' treatment toward suspected or affiliated terrorist elements and their methods of detention and interrogation have been criticized in Germany and by Turkey's Western allies.

It is argued by a former U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Morton Abramowitz, that NATO receded in importance during the post Cold War era, Turkey's political relations with Europe, particularly Germany, have not prospered because of its human rights record and the "low-intensity war" being conducted against the PKK.⁵⁴ The international conventions to which Turkey is party, the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) and the UN Convention Against Torture (1984), in addition to memberships in the CSCE, Council of Europe, NATO and the UN are provided as legally binding under the Turkish Constitution (Article 90, paragraph 5). However, there exists a contradiction between word and deed. The German government, in addition to other European governments and

the United States, has forged allegations against Ankara in relation to human rights abuses by Turkish security and police forces regarding counterterrorism activities conducted against the PKK organization.

In this work, in order to present a more international front vis-à-vis human rights allegations, the German governments' claims will be incorporated into a larger body of allegations from European agencies and organizations. While allegations that systematic torture is practiced in southeast Turkey are routinely denied by Ankara, promises are nonetheless made by top level Turkish officials to improve Turkey's international standing through a better human rights record. This was evident as witnessed by Prime Minister Çiller's October 1993 visits to Germany and the U.S. The allegations by Western governments maintain that human rights abuses by Turkish security forces increased in 1993.⁵⁵ Among the cited abuses are deaths of persons under suspicious circumstances (while in custody), extrajudicial killings during raids on safe houses, and retaliations for PKK attacks on villages and towns resulting in the killing of civilians and the destroying of property and livestock. There are also purported mystery killings, harassment, and intimidation of prominent members of the Kurdish community in the southeast. The U.S. State Department in 1993 also alleged that "In most cases, the government failed to initiate any public inquiry or to press charges in connection with these murders."⁵⁶ However, analysis in the Turkish press has indicated that investigations yielded the arrests of political and religious rival factions in relation to these murders. Regardless, many politically-

motivated crimes go unsolved for extensive periods of time in Turkey.

In December 1992, the Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture issued a report on the systematic use of torture in Turkey by police forces. The Committee made three visits to Turkish police custody facilities and prisons in the Anti-Terror Departments of Ankara and Diyarbakir. Allegations were made by persons suspected or convicted of offenses under the anti-terrorism law provisions. Forms of torture cited were suspension by the arms during interrogation, electric shocks to sensitive parts of the body, including genitals, beating of the soles of the feet, hosing with pressurized cold water, and incarceration in dark, unventilated cells./57

The Helsinki Watch Human Rights Commission issued a statement in 1992 alleging that 21 prisoners had died from torture. Methods used against prisoners were ascertained after medical examination, and included hanging naked victims by arms tied behind their backs, electric shock to the genitals, vaginal and anal rape, beating and pulling out of hair or fingernails./58

Such reports are but a few among a larger literature. The German government has based its judgement on its own agency investigations, which include work on the issue by the Green Party, Amnesty International and other human rights advocacy groups. The human rights problem has greatly exacerbated the progress of German-Turkish relations, and is

the pillar around which sensitive political decisions are made. The human rights issue is often highlighted to a degree in the West that it fails to differentiate that problem from the PKK polemic. This mixing of the two problems serves to escalate the larger Kurdish question in Turkey, and creates the image that Turkey is a police state, rather than a parliamentary democracy fighting a formidable terrorist insurgency. The German public is highly sensitized through the government and media about the cause of human rights. One such example supporting this claim was evidenced in the reaction to German rightist extremist murders of 3 Turks in Solingen, Germany in May 1993. Thousands of Germans took to the street to protest the racist act.

It could be speculated that the Americans, British and French have "taken up the flag" for Northern Iraqi Kurds, as displayed in their joint efforts during and after the Gulf War. It may be similarly conjectured that the Germans have taken up the cause of human rights as they affect the Turkish-Kurds in the southeast predicament posed by the PKK in Turkey. The Turkish contention maintains that the West and Germany in particular have used double standards toward criticizing Turkey for its human rights record. The Turkish view contends that the West has supported less democratic countries than Turkey in the past, notably in the Middle East. The Turks contend that the human rights issue as promulgated in the Western media overshadows the PKK terror problem and focuses more exclusively on Turkish-Kurd allegations of Turkish "state terror".

Normatively, it would seem that human rights maintenance should not be used as a political tool -- but albeit indirectly. The upholding of human rights is used as a tool for change, which is critical vis-à-vis Western relations as Turkey continues to democratize. Turkey as a Western ally has come to be expected to apply democratic norms and implement international practice regarding human rights, despite the insurgency threat it is faced with by the PKK. Systematically, so much in the Turkish political framework has been handled militarily. The fight against the PKK necessarily falls into the military counterinsurgency domain, but the larger Kurdish question should not. The PKK polemic is a separate entity from that of the Kurdish question. The Kurdish question is largely political, with tremendous future implications for Turkey. However, the understanding that both the PKK problem and the Kurdish question are being handled militarily in Turkey is a common misconception in Europe and the U.S. The lack of differentiation of the two polemics only contributes to the PKK's success in perpetuating the myth in Europe and elsewhere that it is truly representative of reforms for Turkish-Kurds rather than an insurgent movement determined to destabilize the Turkish republic. Nor should the misconception that the Kurdish question is completely premised on ethnic repression, and that the PKK is addressing wrongs committed to Turkish-Kurds in southeast Turkey. The human rights issue has been used to good effect by the PKK, thereby promoting the idea that the Turkish-Kurds are fighting some kind of cultural war, rather than an ideological or territorial one against the Turkish state. The Turkish government's position seems to be a "no win" proposition: it

must counter the threat posed by the PKK and yet uphold justice in the midst of the fray, particularly according to Western norms and international conventions.

The mixing of the PKK polemic with that of the larger Kurdish question in the West persists in hindering Turkey's progress on either issue, and confounds its relations with allies. However, as the present Turkish government has not effectively portrayed itself as willing to more directly address the debate on the Kurdish question, and fend off allegations of human rights abuses beyond denying that they occur, continued criticism in words and perhaps actions will likely be levied at Turkey. The continued image in Germany, throughout Europe and the U.S. that abuses occur against Turkish-Kurd civilians in the combat zone between the Turkish Armed Forces and the PKK is further made worse by allegations of abuses against Turkish-Kurds outside the war region.

The activities of armed forces in Turkey combined with allegations of systematic violation of basic human rights will continue to be a cause for alarm with Germany and other Western countries in its relations with Turkey. The Turkish-Kurd predicament as encapsulated in the larger Kurdish question in Turkey has cultural overtones, and is being portrayed as such in much of the current German media. Analogies to the effect that the Turkish state poses a tangential threat to Turkish-Kurds compared to that of the Serbs against the Bosnians has been widely published. The misunderstanding of the Turkish state's role in its duty to combat PKK terrorism has been obfuscated by

a cultural maintenance argument, which however valid, does not require that Turkey change its borders to allow for the formation of a "Kurdistan". It seems that if human rights and cultural preservation are political criteria to meet Germany's and the allied countries' norms -- particularly when extending military and economic aid -- then there should be a set of standards applied across the board indicating the magnitude of their significance. However, given the number of conventions that exist prohibiting the violation of human rights, it would seem implicit that a NATO member would comply without necessarily being requested to do so. Failing such a standardization of how human rights maintenance works in tandem with aid and assistance grants (not in all probability likely to evolve from the West), Turkey will continue to have its democratization progress indexed by the Allies along the vein of maintaining a more reputable human rights record.

Human rights is not just a basic rights problem in Turkey; it is a political one. It is but one component in the Turkish-Kurd, PKK and anti-terrorism triangular puzzle. Prime Minister Demirel issued statements in 1991 and 1992 concerning ceasing torture in Turkey. Prime Minister Çiller did the same in 1993 and 1994. However, the record for human rights abuses in Turkey is on record as worsening, as cited in the 1993 Report on Human Rights issued by the U.S. State Department and by several international human rights agencies; among them Helsinki Watch, Amnesty International, and the European Commission Committee Against Torture and Inhuman Treatment.

According to the Turkish Human Rights Association (IHD) in its 1993 report;

...874 villages and townships were forcefully evacuated by security forces in the southeast of Turkey. Some of the southeastern villages were burned in countersubversion campaigns by the Turkish armed forces and relocation was and continues to be a common practice. Secretary General Husnu Öndül, head of the IHD stated, "democratization in Turkey has not yet been achieved...the institutionalization at the government level or its legal framework is based on anti-democratic laws and regulation./59

ii. Turkey

Concomitant change on the issue of human rights violations accusations and how it has been comingled with the treatment of Turkish-Kurds civilians, the PKK polemic and the Kurdish question has been in a state of suspense in Turkey for the past four years. Plans for granting cultural rights to Turkish-Kurds in terms of Kurdish medium education and media, and cultural rights beyond those they already enjoy as Turkish citizens has been placed on, and taken off, the political agenda, but has more recently been side tracked given the escalating bloodbath imposed by PKK insurrection. Despite the reduced attention to the various dimensions of the PKK threat and the Kurdish question in Turkey, Western allied pressure on Turkey to improve its position on human rights and democratization continues unabated.

It is commonly feared that the unitary nature of the Turkish state would be threatened by premature reforms and would contribute to the sentiment that if Turkish-Kurds were granted

early cultural-political concessions that it would necessarily lead to the strength of the PKK, and in the process promote separatist tendencies among Turkish-Kurds. As argued by the British scholar Philip Robins, the Turkish view seemed to intimate that; "cultural rights for Turkish-Kurds leading to political rights would inexorably lead to demands for political rights, which would then lead to federation, statehood and eventually union with adjacent Kurdish lands."/60

It should not be assumed that the Kurdish question will be answered or solved any time in the near future. Turkey is justified in preserving its unity in the fight against PKK insurgency, all modern states would do the same to preserve sovereignty. However, the drain occurring in Turkey over waging a low intensity war in its southeast and a "war of words" with its Western Allies in defense of current military, political, and human rights practices is also draining on a different level. Striking a balance between maintaining the unitary nature of the Turkish state through continued maneuvers against the PKK, while conceding to some modifications toward cultural recognition will be the course Turkey will likely follow in relation to its Turkish-Kurd constituents. According to former French Ambassador to Turkey Eric Rouleau, the Kurdish problem in Turkey:

increasingly dominates domestic politics...it undermines the credibility and stability of the government. It poisons the traditionally harmonious relations between Turkey's two main ethnic groups, and in the long run could even threaten the country's cohesion./61

Turkey finds itself thus as a model in the Middle East for its human rights record, but primitive, judged by the standards set forth in Europe and the U.S., the nation's Western allies. By signing several international human rights conventions, such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Convention Against Torture, Turkey has at least nominally accepted Western human rights standards. The human rights solution and major progress on the Kurdish question in Turkey lies in the reform of the current Criminal Code and security force behavior. When such reforms can be achieved, especially in the face of PKK terrorism in the southeast remains questionable. The unpleasant tactics employed by many governments in counteracting terrorism are also being used in Turkey, but so long as the PKK continues to escalate the cycle of violence, armed forces countersubversion tactics such as burning villages, relocating villagers, and prolonged interrogation and custody periods will likely be practiced. According to Middle East specialist Graham Fuller of the RAND Corporation;

given the rising violence in Turkey's Kurdish zone, harsh Turkish army operations against the local population are rapidly alienating the broader population in what sometimes resembles an intifada-like environment...Force and repression clearly cannot be Ankara's sole response to its Kurds' political aspirations -- which are not exclusively separatist. Those aspirations must be met by political means within a democratic and pluralistic framework that already exists in other areas of Turkish political life...Only a moderate but credible alternative Kurdish political movement in Turkey will eventually be able to supplant present sympathy among many Kurds for the violent and radical PKK. Unfortunately, Turkish government and society have not yet reached this stage of acceptance of the Kurdish reality, but may rapidly be

forced to do so, in the face of even more unpalatable alternatives./62

Fuller's comments clearly advocate a political settlement whereby Turkey would concede to its Turkish-Kurd population, particularly toward approving an alternative political "voice" as opposed to the current "representation" by the PKK terrorist organization. However, Fuller's statements assume that the PKK is currently the representative political force of Turkish-Kurds. According to the Turkish view, this is a misconception. However, political representation by pro-Kurdish deputies in the Grand National Assembly in Turkey is already a reality, although the pro-Kurdish party DEP was dissolved in March 1994. The reality of a practicing pro-Kurdish party in Turkey without PKK affiliation or infiltration is not. The intifada-like environment that Fuller refers to implies that the Turkish Armed Forces under their government's mandate are somehow "occupying" the southeast, thereby alienating the Turkish-Kurd population residing there into potentially switching-over their alliance to the PKK. This is misleading. The government is granted the duty of preserving order and unity in Turkey. Moreover, the implication that the southeast of Turkey should be embraced as a part of a larger "Kurdistan" is unacceptable in the Turkish view. The struggle to maintain Turkish sovereignty will continue, and no political settlement will likely be made toward any kind of Kurdish-Turkish federation within Turkey's borders. Some cultural concessions, perhaps accompanying educational and media reforms for Turkish-Kurds might be made in the future under a representative party composed of Kurds and Turks, but will not likely reflect the "political movement" advocated by Fuller.

On May 20, 1994, it was reported that the U.S. Appropriations Committee of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs subcommittee of Congress, proposed that 25% of American direct loans to Turkey be withheld due to allegations of reported abuses against civilians in the southeast by the Turkish armed forces. The committee also recommended that the U.S. European allies should work together to bilaterally ensure that the abolition of the practice of torture in Turkey be achieved. (The proposal by the subcommittee has not gone to a vote.) In reaction to the U.S. Congressional committee's statements, the Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Nuzhet Kandemir, denied all allegations of torture in Turkey, and reiterated that; "I can tell you that we are winning this struggle against PKK terrorism...within three to five months time, the PKK will be destroyed by the ongoing operations of Turkish security forces."/63

Whether the Turkish government deems it fit to initiate cultural rights for Turkish-Kurds in addressing the Kurdish question in spite of PKK terrorism should not be the only factor in curbing human rights abuses in Turkey's southeast. Nor should the granting of cultural rights necessarily be used as a tool to contain the potential spread of PKK terrorism into further recesses of Turkey. Criminal code reform in Turkey is a major institutional means to help assuage Western criticism and abide by international norms. Statutes exist in the Turkish Criminal code regarding punishment of public officials committing bodily harm that are clearly violated on a regular basis. These statutes are common to the laws and constitutions of all Western countries, ultimately

intimating that there is a need for them to be there. However, the fact that they exist on paper is meaningless if they are not enforced on a consistent basis, as relevant to the Turkish case in the fight against the PKK.

When it is politically expedient, reform will likely occur in the Turkish system. As long as the heightened rhetoric by the government, press and public continues to accept the current policy of wiping out PKK terrorism through any means, such reform will not be realized. To bring the issue of Kurdish cultural rights to a more mainstream level toward maintaining a dialogue for a sustained period of time -- would be progress. The denial of a problem the magnitude of that posed by the PKK and the Kurdish question in regard to human rights implications causes the dilemma posed to Turkey to fester. Perhaps it is contradictory to state that not until PKK terrorism is eradicated in Turkey will a debate ensue concerning the granting of cultural reforms and rights to Turkish-Kurds in terms of educational and media language use and firm political representative parties berid of the PKK-infiltrated stigma. The point however, is that discussion should progress over the continuing Kurdish question as a separate issue meriting focus apart from the PKK polemic.

Despite progress on both the PKK threat and the Kurdish question, it is probable that Turkey could find itself with the predicament faced by the United Kingdom over the IRA, or the long-term terrorism experienced by Spain with the ETA, which ultimately resulted in the political-economic settlement

package known as the Basque Model. The Turkish government was taken by surprise by the rise of the PKK, and was equally surprised at the West's reaction to its counterterrorism campaign against it. Turkish civilians, military personnel, officials, schools, and state facilities are all violated by PKK terrorism the government argues; do not their violated rights and the defense of them count for something? In reality they do, and that basic fact is recognized by Western governments. However, the Turkish government should be held accountable to higher standards than those of the PKK and their terrorist tactics. The fight against terrorist insurgency is unequivocally justified, but the means through which innocent civilians suffer or are killed along the path toward eradication of PKK terror is not. However, it seems likely that thousands of civilians will continue to be caught in the crossfire as the Turkish armed forces' struggle against the PKK , ensues.

IV. Media in Germany and Turkey

Essential in the compendium of factors which comprise Turkey's dilemma with the PKK and the Kurdish question, is the mass media. This section will discuss the German and Turkish press responses to PKK terror, and the implications they pose for the two governments. While it should be noted that relations on a governmental level are completely distinct from exchanges and ideas posed by the media, the effect on world public opinion is nonetheless impacted by the press. The PKK polemic versus that of the larger Kurdish question as posited in the German and Turkish media is a perfect case in point. The press is utilized in state systems as a means of explicating

governmental policies and actions, and dialectically impacts on domestic and foreign political workings. A separate work on the media and the dichotomy it affords for molding public opinion to evoke Western governmental response and change regarding the PKK terror organization and its distinction from the larger Kurdish question in Turkey is beyond the scope of this study. Here, a brief discussion of German and Turkish respective handling of the PKK case versus that of the Kurdish question, examines how rhetoric has been heightened through the media.

As the specter of PKK activities came to the fore in southeast Turkey, the German press post-1986 began its coverage of the organization and Ankara's anti-terrorism campaign against it. Having somewhat incorporated the PKK terrorist campaign into the larger Kurdish question and criticism regarding Turkish-Kurd "minority repression" imposed by the Turkish state, the German press initiated a trend that would be nearly impossible to reverse. The linkage of the PKK polemic and the Kurdish question by the German press was perhaps enhanced once the onslaught of Northern Iraqi Kurds arrived in Turkey, having been encouraged by Western powers to try to form an autonomous enclave and revolt against Saddam Huseyn in Northern Iraq, and then the failure of that effort resulting in the formation of a protected safe haven under a UN mandate. Although Turkey accepted hundreds of thousands of refugees and helped to form a protective safehaven whereby Iraqi Kurds could be secure from prosecution, the orientation of the press tended to focus on the abusive tactics the Turkish armed

forces was using through over-the-border raids into Northern Iraq to eradicate armed PKK camps and their insurgents based there. The safehaven created by the Western allies was controversial in Turkey in that it allegedly aided and abetted the cause of PKK terror by protecting Kurds, some of whom were claimed to be PKK sympathizers.

The rise of PKK-sponsored storefront organizations in Germany (banned in November 1993) only fueled the belief that Kurdish minority problems and ethnic repression under the umbrella of the Kurdish question were the real issues at hand, as represented by PKK propaganda in the form of written claims, demonstrations, rallies and personal testimonials by Kurds of various national origin dwelling in Germany. The fact that such information and demonstrations were legal in Germany, and not legal in Turkey also received wide press attention. As mentioned earlier, Germany would be suspected of racism if it too actively attempted to investigatively pursue PKK-related activity provided to it through intelligence sources, due to its inability to distinguish accurately between Kurds and Turks given their identical citizenship. However, this explanation for German hesitancy to deal PKK terrorists and supporters a firmer hand is complicated by the fact that there are also non-Kurds who are sympathetic to the PKK cause. Therefore, the "racism argument" fails to explain German inaction on the PKK terror problem prior to November 1993. It is similarly argued that, Articles 5 and 9 of the Basic Law of Germany allow for freedom of expression and freedom of association, and would prohibit prosecution of "Kurds" or pro-Kurdish media, cultural, and

educational organizations, although they were acting as storefronts for the PKK terrorist organization. It was only when there was an acknowledged direct threat to internal German security that the organizations were banned and their affiliation with the PKK disclosed. Arguably, an internal threat existed during the past decade in Germany due to PKK terrorist and sympathizer use of German territory and media to promote their cause through demonstrations, drug and weapons smuggling.

The German press contributed to heightening tensions through claims of alleged systematic human rights violations by Turkish Armed Forces against Turkish-Kurd civilians in the PKK operational zone of the southeast, accusations of torture by and against the same, the shortcomings of cultural rights for Turkish-Kurds under the broad scope of the Kurdish question, the shortcomings of democracy in Turkey, and improper use of German-issued transfer weapons in Turkey's southeast. The references are too numerous to provide in detail, but the point remains that a tone was set such that the threat posed to Turkey's sovereignty by the PKK took a back seat to the more driving issue of the Kurdish question. Additionally, the mixture of the PKK polemic with the larger Kurdish question confounded the German public's understanding of the reality of Turkey's position as posed by the PKK threat.

The predicament of Kurds in Turkey and North Iraq became a focal point in the German press as the Western powers and Turkey continued to facilitate Operation Provide Comfort.

Because the Kurdish question also includes countries outside Turkey, the problematic appeared all the greater. The threat to Turkey from the PKK was viewed in Germany as a second consideration to the Kurdish question in terms of allegations of cultural repression and human rights violations against Turkish-Kurd civilians. It is arguable as to which factors allowed for the linkage of the PKK polemic and the Kurdish question in the German media. In relation to German politics, consensus on the Kurdish problem reached heights, somewhat significant in German Länder elections, vis-à-vis public opinion. Economic factors determinedly effect the tone, as Germany is Turkey's largest trading partner in Europe. The presence of 2 million Turks as guestworkers in Germany contributes to the tone, as does a changing dynamic within Germany itself. The Turkish government perspective that the 2 million Turkish workers in Germany are greatly contributing to the German economy, and that Turkey is experiencing a period of economic, political and territorial crisis, sets the stage for the converse reality of how the Turkish-German relationship is evolving. The perspectives of each country toward the other are predicated on extreme poles. In the Turkish case, the German government focuses on Turkey's human rights record as the primary index to assess the PKK polemic and the larger Kurdish question. In the German case, the Turkish government has opted to focus on the extreme of racism and xenophobia against foreigners, including Turks, and how that impacts on relations between Germany and Turkey.

Additionally, a much larger dynamic exists due to the reunification of Germany, and the consequent role that Germany will assume in the coming era. Germany will most certainly be powerful in the sense of its position in Europe and the Western alliance system. However, according to two German scholars, Thomas Kielinger and Max Otte;

Germany is strained to the breaking point by the tasks requested of it: rebuilding eastern Germany, assisting the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe, promoting the European Community (now the European Union), and redefining its own security role. Germany's new assertiveness is not a result of internal strength but rather of growing weakness. If current pressures from outside Germany persist, the result might well be German overstretch and a domestic backlash./64

Germany's aspirations to fully integrate the European Union and take a leadership position within it allow for its stance toward mandating conditions which meet European norms. Turkey, according to those norms is expected as an ally to meet those conditions. While the U.S. and Turkey have a "special relationship" through NATO and joint commercial endeavors, so too does Germany wish to define its own distinctive role with states such as Turkey. In this way, a parallel may be drawn as to why and how the PKK polemic and the Kurdish question in their many manifestations have in a sense become "personalized" through the German press and public. The Kurdish question and its linkage to the PKK polemic, with implications for human rights violations, have become a highly publicized issue in Germany, much to the incomprehension of the Turkish military and government. Consequently, the Turkish

government and military have found the German position difficult to counter, without incurring further criticism.

With the second suspension of arms shipments by the German Defense Ministry to Turkey in April 1994, the German press reacted strongly to Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel's lifting of the ban, who stated that there was no evidence of the use of German-issued armored carrier vehicles against PKK operatives in Turkey's southeast. Accusations came in the form of baiting Mr. Kinkel with questions such as, "how can you support the terror state on the Bosphorus through resuming arms shipments?"/65

The German press has injected into the PKK polemic and the Kurdish question an overly harsh critique of the Turkish government's failings, according to the Turkish perspective. This led as a result to concentrated treatment in the Turkish press of the issue of xenophobia in Germany. However, treatment on the issue has been substantial in both the German and Turkish press. The xenophobic trend, reaching its height in the August 1992 Rostock rightist anti-foreigner riots, took Germany's conscience by storm. Speculation in explanation of the Rostock, Solingen and Mölln rightist attack events affecting foreigners, among them Turks, ranged from a *Der Spiegel* cover story called "The new division: Germans against Germans", which contended that a deep depression in the East and aloofness in the West have replaced the joy about unity and created a "mental division"; to commentary by Günter Grass, who posed the question: "is the inveterate foreignness that

exists between Germans the source of the present hostility toward foreigners (whom we call "outlanders") that is covering our country with shame?"/66

Germany is faced with economic problems, an effort to redefine its role in Europe and the world, the alienation of Westerners and Easterners within its own borders, and a growing xenophobic movement. And yet, the German press in spite of these factors is generally self-critical about the country's and the government's problems. The tendency toward conservatism in the government and public however, generally contrasts with the liberal sentiments expressed on the waning left from such intellectuals as Grass.

Coverage in Germany on the PKK issue and its linkage to the Kurdish question evolved in the mid-1980s into a progressively better understanding by the mid-1990s of the terrorist threat posed to Turkey. This evolution in understanding at the government level has largely been due to exchanges at the Foreign Ministry of each country. The heightened rhetoric period has been modified with the stance of recognizing and banning PKK terror as it appeared in Germany and throughout Europe in the November 1993 PKK raids. The cause of human and cultural rights of Turkish-Kurd civilians in Turkey's southeast continues to be of mainstream interest in the German press and public, and receives continued analogous comparison to other wars premised on ethnic strife.

The Turkish media is an interesting case study, and while it is a free press, throughout the 1960-1985 period it was restricted by a series of military coup d'état regulations. As explicated in this study, a number of statutes in the Criminal Code serve to restrict written and spoken ideas as they are interpreted by the Turkish State Security Courts. However, the major Turkish dailies, including *Cumhuriyet*, *Hurriyet*, *Milliyet*, the *Turkish Daily News (TDN)*, and *Sabah* reveals an operating free expression of ideas and critique of the government's policies and activities. As mentioned in the armed forces section of this chapter, the Turkish military is highly regarded not only for its behind-the-scenes role in Turkish politics, but also as the body empowered to combat the PKK insurgency campaign. A primary concern alluded to in Chapter 2 is the way information is passed from the Turkish Armed Forces command to the press. Given the nature of low intensity warfare being conducted by the PKK and the sensitive counterterrorism activities used to combat the insurgency by the armed forces, journalists are not present during raids and therefore must rely on the data released by the armed forces. The semi-effective ban on the press by the PKK in the southeast on October 16, 1993 only compounded the source-of-information dilemma. The PKK followed through with its "ban" on Turkish journalists and newspaper offices by assassination and burning of offices, and was effective in shutting down original-source southeast independent journalistic reporting.

In light of the earlier discussion concerning the Criminal Code and anti-terrorism laws within it, human rights violation

allegations against Turkish armed forces operating in the southeast, and political stagnation over the Kurdish question and its ramifications contrasted with the PKK polemic, it should be questioned to what degree misinformation is perhaps being disseminated by the Turkish Armed Forces. Misinformation could form an inaccurate picture of what strength and occupational hold the PKK might actually possess, and would impact on the overall Turkish political scene and relations with its Western allies.

The Turkish public was improperly informed of the threat posed by the PKK to the country as early as the 12 September 1980 military coup d'état. Mentioned before, was General Kenan Evren's statement, "the head of the snake has been crushed" (reference Chapter 2), in relation to "bandits" that had been captured or executed in raids during the coup. The PKK in its incipient latent form, actually managed to regroup outside the country. The line taken by Turkish government(s) from that point onward, was that insurgent rebels were being sponsored in neighboring states such as Iraq, Iran and Syria. A name was given to the "bandits" over time -- the PKK -- and Turkish intelligence ascertained that the PKK terrorist organization's network had instilled itself not only in the Middle East, but in Europe as well. The label "terrorist" organization originated in Ankara, but was accepted by Western governments. The terrorist appellation was disputed by various Kurdish factions outside and within Turkey who initially recognized the PKK as a liberation movement. However, focus on the part of the Turkish government(s) to the PKK threat occurred as late as the 1986

period because the conventional threat orientation of the Turkish armed forces was to the north, i.e. the Soviet Union. It was some time before appropriations and release of information regarding the unconventional PKK threat filtered down into the mainstream through the government and the media.

From the beginning of what would evolve into a huge battle between the PKK and the Turkish Armed Forces, many misleading statements were made by public officials who did not understand the polemic they encountered (i.e. beyond a "perceived threat"), and who were not aware of the real scope about the PKK threat to the southeast region of Turkey (i.e. the "real threat").

There have been remarks in the Turkish press as issued by the Turkish officials, including Defense Ministers, Prime Ministers and Presidents, which followed a course of rhetoric regarding the Turkish Armed Forces campaign against the PKK anti-terrorism campaign, purporting that operations pre-dating the Zaleh maneuvers (i.e. 1986 onward, reference Chapter 2), were successful in "breaking the back of the PKK", "eliminating the PKK", and "crushing the head of the snake". These statements were issued and have continued to be issued all the way through the present government of Prime Minister Tansu Çiller. Why is rhetoric over the PKK polemic portrayed in this manner? Political exigencies seem to be at the root of the cause. Because PKK insurgency has posed a very real threat for three successive governments in Turkey following the September 12,

1980 military coup, the eradication of the terrorist organization's hold over the southeast has become not only a political reality to be contended with, but a campaign issue as well. Body bags with dead Turkish soldiers have had to be reconciled through strong rhetoric indicating that the anti-PKK fight will soon yield results leading to the eradication of the terrorist organization. While body bags are a reality, the eradication of the PKK in the near-term is not. Portraying the elimination of the stronghold and continuing threat posed by PKK insurgency has been treated by Turkish government(s) as a near-term rather than long-term political issue. Proselytizing the Turkish public, who in essence are a highly politicized society is irresponsible behavior. Irregardless of the short-term gains -- if any at all -- achieved by such misinformation, the Turkish public gains nothing. The Turkish public is not ignorant. The public is attuned to issues, and a by-product of the governmental misinformation campaign has evolved into a somewhat inured Turkish public that is cynical about the progress of "gains" by the Turkish armed forces against the PKK. Such misinformation is confusing, and will likely -- as has proven to be the case with continued PKK raids on Turkish citizens, military personnel, villages, and schools -- backfire on the government's claims of success.

What accounts for the variance in figures issued by the Turkish armed forces as opposed to those of independent journalists, and conversely, those of the PKK? Clearly, there is a propaganda war being waged on all fronts, and a mechanism through which to average-out figures does not exist. Some danger prevails in culminating a public response that does not

accurately reflect reality. An entire literature exists on this concept based on the U.S. experience in Vietnam. Conditioning of the public to accept the norms of what the armed forces of Turkey deem fit is the practice in the country today. The democratic, but strong military role and influence that prevails in the societal and governmental order in Turkey, conditioning of this type is accepted as fact. The unitary aims of holding together Turkey perhaps warrant the practice of government-issued information in the eyes of the powers that be, but the long-term gains to be achieved by such practice is questionable. The principle of the government's representation by and of the Turkish people is in question. Turkey is thus being portrayed abroad as a country where rights are systematically abused, rather than as a democratizing, Western-oriented one. Such misinformation expounded by the government thus has implications not only for the Turkish public, but for the reputation of Turkey and its relations in the West.

Armed Forces PKK death and casualty figures do not go unquestioned in the Turkish press. However, attention to armed forces information oftentimes is polarized according to extremes within the political system. That is to say, the left, and left-oriented media is divided over the Kurdish question and critical of the right's policies, of the right and the rightist media, is staunchly in favor of the military solution to the PKK polemic and criticizes the left for its utopian and unpragmatic proposals towards addressing the Kurdish question. Casualties inflicted by Turkish Armed Forces against PKK militants is often featured in articles minus the component of questioning the accuracy of

government-issued figures. The issue of PKK terrorism is a controversial topic in the Turkish media and among citizens. Oftentimes, it seems that an objective analysis of the methods employed by the Armed Forces to help eradicate the insurgency are hard to procure as a result. Invariably, the issue of terrorism evokes emotionalism, and internationally, there are no "objective" criteria by which governments must operate. Norms are defined and practiced according to the political exigencies in individual countries. The case of Germany and Turkey vis-à-vis the PKK polemic and the larger Kurdish question seem to fit into this framework. That is, there are no objective criteria which Turkey is expected to operate except adherence to international conventions on human rights. As discussed earlier, this is Turkey's biggest failing, and the human rights problem in Turkey has exacerbated the PKK and Kurdish question polemics to the extent that in the Western press, the two are not considered as mutually exclusive, but are instead inextricably intertwined and mired in the human rights issue.

The relationship to terrorism as a threat and terrorism as a tool is complex. As discussed in this work, two polemics exist under the PKK threat and the Kurdish question with an overarching target affecting the two, human right violation allegations. It is interesting that the Kurdish question has in a sense ballooned into proportions such that it acts as a factor not only in domestic Turkish politics, but in Turkey's relations with Germany and other Western allies. The present government in Turkey consistently utilizes the PKK threat polemic as a litmus test to determine political primacy, and bolster the Turkish armed

forces. A parallel reinforcing this tendency may be found in other case studies. According to scholar Noemi Gal-Or, who has studied terrorism in Italy, Germany and Israel, terrorism can be exploited as a means to win in domestic political rivalries. Given the intense political party structure of Turkey (with 16 parties participating in the March 1994 municipal elections), this is certainly a valid concern. In Germany, Italy and Israel,

terrorism was abused and exploited to enhance electoral and power-political assets. The consistent emphasis on the need to distinguish the terrorists from terrorism -- the doers from their deeds -- further manifests the politicization of the anti-terrorist disposition./67

The American scholar and intellectual Noam Chomsky has extensive commentary on the entrenching of conditioned societal responses to terrorism and how they become institutionalized as they pertain to American foreign policy./68 Chomsky's commentary bears scrutiny for a comparison to the Turkish public's response to PKK terrorism, which is controlled and filtered through the Turkish government's discretionary divulging of information. His work on the practice of governments' manufacturing of consent in their publics is also noteworthy as indexed to the Turkish case. Chomsky argues that Western governments set the agenda of events -- what has popularly become known as "spin control" in the United States -- and their portrayal so as to frame them for media "consumption". This is reflected in the way that governments issue war and conflict data (reference U.S. television coverage of the Persian Gulf War) so as to guide public opinion in a direction favorable to their policies and strategies. The notion of

who in the Turkish government is issuing the data and what mechanisms exist to countercheck the issuance of those data is relevant in the Turkish case. In this way, Chomsky's work bears scrutiny for the Turkish Government and Armed Forces issuing of PKK casualty data and their implications for the true status of the war against PKK terrorism.

The media in Turkey and Germany have both contributed significantly to disseminating their respective governments' perspectives on the PKK polemic and the larger Kurdish question. The degree to which their attention to the polemics has any determining influence is questionable. It was discussed throughout the work that the Turkish government has failed to effectively promote the concept of the differentiation between the PKK threat and the Kurdish question, and that misinterpretation has spiraled to the degree that in Germany, despite the banning of the PKK in November 1993, there is still a widespread tendency to obfuscate the PKK threat posed to Turkey with the human rights violations issue. The separation of the press from the government is operative in varying degrees as practiced respectively in Germany and Turkey. The distinction remains clear however, that no matter what the orientation of the press, governmental relations exist on a separate level from those expounded in the media. Corollaries may be posited as to the trialectic influence of the media, public opinion, and governmental action, but may never be qualified in any concrete terms. The reality of the unique case posed by PKK separatist insurrection in southeast Turkey, however, has been treated by the media in such a way as to

heighten rhetoric, form biased public opinion, and perhaps, make combating the PKK threat and finding a long-term answer to the Kurdish question more difficult. A question remains as to where the future of Turkish-German relations lie in the face of the complexity of events posed by the PKK polemic and the Kurdish question. A discussion of how German-Turkish relations might evolve in the near and long term will be discussed in Chapter 4, summarizing how as factors the PKK polemic and the larger Kurdish question influenced the two states' relations over the past decade.

Chapter 4: Future Prospects

The future of Turkish-German relations seemingly revolve around the issues discussed; use of security forces and armament, the impact on Turkish-Kurd civilians in the PKK-Turkish armed forces war zone of the southeast, and purported human rights abuses and allegations of torture by security forces. The way the issues are focused on media and public reaction to coverage will also perhaps influence the course of Turkey-Germany relations in the long term.

The tone that has been established with regard to the polemic posed by the PKK is that Turkey, a decidedly important Western ally, is experiencing an excruciating battle with an organized insurgency organization. The ethnicity argument injected into the Kurdish question by the Germans has become a major issue in addition to allegations of systematic abuse of human rights, complicating the course that Turkey will experience in its relations with Germany and other Western allies. Dialogue regarding the predicament of Turkish-Kurds in Turkey's southeast will likely continue between the Turkish government and the Western allies. The problem of how to ascertain at which point a dialogue might translate into action on the part of the Turkish government will take into consideration many variables. Any outcome over the Kurdish question in Turkey seems unpredictable in the long-term. The timetable for such a dialogue and process however, will be delayed as long as the PKK organization continues to effectively perpetuate its bloody campaign and succeeds in increasing the Turkish armed forces use of strength to combat it. The cycle is a vicious and

repetitive one; seemingly pointing in the direction of a non-resolution until "every last PKK terrorist is killed", along with thousands of civilian casualties in their wake.

It can not be established concretely as to whether political reforms would in any way impact the effectiveness rate of the PKK in garnering support or sympathy. Similarly, the benefits of such reforms might not be immediately appreciable or apparent to the Turkish government or public, because the climate is currently oriented toward eradicating PKK terrorism at any cost. Additionally, there is a great sense of tension within the country and with other states over the PKK terror campaign and its unfortunate linkage with the larger Kurdish question, as discussed in relation to the German case. The granting of a unique set of privileges to Turkish-Kurds given the non-recognition of minorities in Turkey does not appear likely in the near-term.

The continued mandate of Operation Provide Comfort will continue to be controversial, although the Turkish Government has reaffirmed through renewal of the mandate that it is the most efficient means of monitoring the various Kurdish factions in the safehaven zone, and for gleaning useful intelligence information regarding PKK terrorists in the region.

As Turkish governments have made their intentions toward democratizing and administering Western practice and norms clear, it becomes all the more significant that they continue to work toward further improving the image and record of Turkey

in terms of human rights, particularly with reference to criminal proceedings and ensuring the rights guaranteed in the Turkish Constitution. Included among the tenets in the Constitution that are not currently upheld is promoting the preservation of human rights for all citizens, eradicating the practice of torture, and guaranteeing the freedoms of speech, press, demonstration, and expression of ideas (as contained in Articles 26, 28, 34, and 25 of the Constitution respectively). Democratic and reform objectives in Turkey could be balanced with the overarching need of the government(s) to maintain civil order in the face of the terrorist threat posed by the PKK and sympathizers associated with it. Turkey's task is not an easy one, but if the government is to be held accountable for truly progressing along democratic lines and following the tenets laid out in its 1982 Constitution, it will necessarily need to continue working towards improvement in these areas of weakness.

The NATO member relationship shared by Turkey and Germany might in many ways manifest itself into helping to eradicate PKK terrorism as an international terrorist threat. While the PKK terror campaign is being waged internally in Turkey's southeast, NATO can serve to assist the Turkish Government and Armed Forces in accordance with its defined role;

In accordance with the Strategic Concept, NATO's role is not only to defend its members' territory but also to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe. The Alliance also serves as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members'

security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern./69

NATO will likely continue to work toward the eradication of international terrorism and indeed emphasizes the need for further cooperative activities between members to advance that cause;

"We condemn all acts of international terrorism. They constitute flagrant violations of human dignity and rights and are a threat to the conduct of normal international relations. In accordance with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation possible to prevent and suppress this scourge."/70

As bilateral cooperation through NATO has been exercised between Turkey and Europe, and Turkey and the United States, this duality will likely continue to be the path that is followed toward improving Turkey's image, reputation and relations with its Western allies. A sustained level of bilateral cooperation over combating the PKK both diplomatically and militarily has been exhibited over the past ten years. It is evident by the effectiveness with which European governments pursued PKK activists during the 1993 June and November raids that intelligence exchange between Turkey and Europe is significant. The fact that 35 PKK-affiliated organizations in Germany alone were banned and closed down, is also testimony to the fact that the threat of PKK activity on Germany's territory existed and was tracked through surveillance and intelligence activity. Diplomacy has been a significant factor in setting a more reasonable course for the continuation of positive relations, working to help avoid

misconceptions between the two states and their citizenry. Diplomacy has, in the case of Turkish-German relations, been instrumental in keeping the two countries on course, so as to avoid blow-ups that easily could have occurred over the rightist attacks in Germany against Turks in 1993, or the suspension of arms-transfers to Turkey over allegations of human rights abuses by the Turkish security forces in 1993 and 1994. However, diplomacy success and failure rates are scarcely measurable, and form but one component in governmental relations between Turkey and Germany. The PKK terror problem has been handled by the Turkish government(s) in a somewhat inconsistent and oftentimes unorganized manner, and has reflected into the Turkish diplomatic missions abroad, impacting substantially on their effectiveness in handling the PKK polemic amidst foreign government relations.

Contrary to the sentiment so often expressed in Turkey that "the only friends of Turkey are the Turks", there is actually a great deal of interest in the West in seeing Turkey succeed along the path toward full democratization, industrialization and regional influence. There exists little or no anxiety as to whether Turkey will take an opposite course, because Turkey has guaranteed its allies' trust through the many reforms and progresses it has exhibited in the past decade alone. The Turkish government(s) for its part, can prove further progressiveness by initiating a self-critique over its handling of the separate and distinct issues of the PKK polemic and the Kurdish question; the government may assume responsibility for finding a democratic solution to the problems posed, rather than pointing the finger at other

countries for promoting PKK interests either indirectly or directly. The answer to the problems lay within Turkey alone, and not within conspiracies plotted by foreign states to destabilize the republic. Outside interference and infiltration into the PKK polemic and the Kurdish question, solutions to the root causes of the continuing insurgency movement, lie within the borders of Turkey.

In the case of the Turkish government's accusation of direct sponsorship of the PKK, there is evidence of terrorist harboring in Syria's Bekaa Valley, and in Iran and Iraq whose regimes are hostile to Turkey's policies on a number of issues. Turkey is fully pursuing a dialogue to trigger a response favorable to expunging the PKK terrorist elements in all three countries. Such efforts have become a major push in the drive to eradicate PKK terror in Turkey's southeast. Turkey will continue to pursue that course carefully so as not to cause the undesired effect of a reverse on the gains already achieved. A case in point was demonstrated when the Syrian government told the Turkish government in 1993 that it would hand over to Turkey the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan "if it could catch him". The Iranian and Iraqi governments have been similarly enlisted to engage in the pursuit of PKK terrorists and to extradite them to Turkey, with some positive rapprochement evidenced in Turkish-Iran relations in 1993.

In the case of accusations regarding indirect assistance to the PKK, such as European-based PKK-affiliated organizations which were legal until 1993, it should be understood that those

organizations were legal under European constitutional law. When the level of diplomacy and an actual threat to European security was experienced in relation to those organizations, they were banned in November 1993 in Germany and France. The bannings exhibited the fact that the European governments were very interested in cooperating with Turkey to eradicate the PKK threat on their soil, but required a legal reason and political mandate to do so. Turkey's continued blaming of other countries and particularly Germany for its liberal constitutional ideals, missed the larger target of blaming itself for porous and insecure borders in the early 1980s, and an ill-equipped means of combating the PKK due to the fact that successive Turkish governments realized too late the threat that the insurgent group posed to the country's southeast. The political expediency afforded to blaming the PKK problem on other countries while the root cause laid in Turkey has been maximized to its full potential. However, that practice on the Turkish government's part will likely take another direction, as the European "indirect sponsors" of PKK terrorism took a firm stand in 1993 against the organization by banning it and affiliated groups.

It would be utopic to assume that Turkey could only rely on its Western allies in maintaining its sovereignty and role in the region. Turkey must at the same time pursue a course that allows it to mete out new interests and causes -- as evidenced in the role it has taken with regard to the Bosnian cause in light of the war in ex-Yugoslavia -- as well as its interest in developing mutual projects toward the development of the former Soviet

states of Central Asia. Turkey can also pursue an even-handed policy toward maintaining respectable relations with Middle Eastern states so as not to foment any more anxiety over the secular versus *shari'ah* system debate so often a point of contention as Turkey moves ever toward democratization while also working to preserve its Muslim identity. Turkey, given its geographical location and history, will continue to play out a difficult and controversial balancing act to keep its territory and democratic system in tact.

Turkish-German relations in the near-term will likely continue to be impacted by the PKK polemic and the larger Kurdish question. Despite the PKK terror problem, Turkish-German relations primarily rotate around trade, which at times intermingles with political debate but more often, remains a separate sphere. As Turkey enters the Customs Union in 1996, it will become a contender in an arena in which it may prove its competence and competitiveness. Regional cooperation will also likely be a means through which Turkish-German relations might progress, particularly in the development of the newly-emerging states of Central Asia. While Turkey has desired to take a leading role in Central Asia given its Turkic affiliation there, it does not have the economic means through which to pursue its aims of development assistance in the region. Turkey could therefore work as a guiding cultural affinity presence in Central Asia together with Germany to invest and develop, and work toward a mutually-beneficial relationship in the region. Germany's interest in such a proposition remains to be defined, as it sets its interests toward the development of and

in the East European economies. The political and foreign policy exigencies in both Turkey and Germany will determine which course such economically-tied relations may pursue.

The Turkish-German relationship can further progress toward a fruitful partnership based on intelligence and information sharing on the PKK problem. It is clear by 1993-1994 events in relation to PKK attacks in Europe that the level of intelligence was significant enough to determine where PKK-affiliated organizations existed and what kinds of operations were being conducted through them. The number of suspected connections and routes of operation connected with the PKK terror campaign are also significant enough so as to warrant even more intense cooperation between the two governments. The obvious area of narcotics smuggling is a crucial area in making a large dent in the PKK organization, as it is the means through which substantial finances are raised to procure weapons in Europe and the Middle East.

The level of intelligence cooperation being facilitated in the United States in addition to Europe regarding the PKK threat in Turkey is significant. It is suspected that the United States was instrumental in stepping-up the European response to PKK-affiliated organizations through urging stronger measures to be taken by European allies and by putting the PKK terror campaign on the agenda as a serious threat to international terrorism. This is evidenced by the fact that on the first page of its 1993 World Terrorism Report, the United States State Department cited that the PKK and its activities in Turkey,

Europe and the Middle East changed the downward trend of terrorism in the world./71

By helping to bring the PKK polemic to the forefront and expose it as the number one terrorist organization in the world, the United States prompted a strong and long-term response beginning in 1993 by Germany, France, Belgium and the United Kingdom to do their share in combating PKK terrorism. The fact that the PKK came to be perceived as an international rather than localized threat to Turkey was a huge evolution in what will hopefully continue among Western governments. The trend toward prosecution of PKK-affiliated activities and crimes perpetrated through murders, arms smuggling, narcotics trade, extortion, and propagandizing, will allow the German, French, and U.S. governments, among others to become even more active in insuring that a smaller number of recruits is enlisted to the PKK cause outside of Turkey.

Similarly, the enhanced attention paid by the West to the reality of the PKK threat internationally will likely be evidenced in the media mirroring of the true cause of the PKK and serve to separate it from the distinct issue of the Kurdish question and its ramifications for Turkish-Kurds' cultural advancement. Perhaps this will only occur in the event that targets other than Kurds and Turks are aimed at by the PKK, but that view supposes that the PKK is only a Turkish problem. It would be a sad fact that it would take additional deaths, perhaps in Europe or elsewhere, to prompt a more international full-fledged reaction. In reality, the PKK polemic has already transcended the Turkish dimension

into an international one. Increased international attention to Turkey's human rights record in relation to Turkish armed forces anti-terrorism maneuvers against the PKK will hopefully move the debate in Turkey in a more positive and less defensive direction, thereby instigating reforms in current Turkish armed forces practice. The fact that linkage has so often been made in the Western press between the PKK polemic and the Kurdish question only exacerbates the Turkish armed forces and government(s) predicament and allowed them to assume a defensive posture and self-justification of blaming other countries for assisting the rise and strength of the PKK. Self-evaluation and reform in Turkey will hopefully win out, prompting a more open and effective approach to eradicating the PKK in Turkey's southeast and in Europe, and hopefully will also lend itself toward a continued and healthier debate on the Kurdish question and its ramifications for Turkish-Kurds.

Through increased intelligence agency concentration, surveillance, and countersubversion activities among the Western allies to combat PKK terrorism in Turkey and abroad, the road toward improved state relations will increasingly be paved. Turkey's political system and economy could be significantly improved if the draining resources to combat PKK terrorism could be drawn down. Similarly, Turkey could turn its attention to fully concentrating on the advancement of its democratic system and the instillation of the beliefs and norms it has long strived toward as a secular, democratic nation.

The PKK issue will continue to be on the Turkey-Germany state relation agenda. The Kurdish question and its implications for possible reforms towards cultural, educational and media rights for Turkish-Kurds remains in mid-air in the midst of the pressing PKK threat. Much has occurred in the 1993-1994 period which demonstrates that through enhanced cooperation and coordination of political aims, Turkey and Germany can work together to diminish the number of events perpetrated by the PKK and to educate their publics that the dialogue on the Kurdish question merits continued discussion. The education element is essential and works in tandem with the struggle to eradicate the PKK, because it is only through a continued dialogue on and practice of democratization, and particularly how it is inculcated and practiced in Turkey that Turkish-German state relations will continue on a path toward understanding and cooperation.