UNDERSTANDING TURKISH FOREIGN AFFAIRS
IN THE 21st CENTURY:
A HOMEGROWN THEORIZING ATTEMPT

A Ph.D. Dissertation

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A HOMEGROWN THEORIZING ATTEMPT

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I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations.

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ABSTRACT

UNDERSTANDING TURKISH FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE 21STCENTURY:
A HOMEGROWN THEORIZING ATTEMPT

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For Turkish scholars, understanding especially the last decade of Turkey's international politics has been a great challenge. Answering fundamental questions, -and many others-, requires collection of reliable, complete and uniform data and interpreting them on conceptual terms. The purpose of this thesis is to understand and explain Turkey's foreignl affairs in a holistic way and offer a homegrown model based on original data. Building an original event dataset, this thesis accounts for the empirical observations made out of Turkey's international practice and conceptualizes it as a complex system. It accounts for foreign policy change in complex systems, introduces concepts such as domestic responsivity, domestic, international nodes as well as intermestic and international nexus, and puts forward a helical model of power accumulation, as an outcome of successful foreign policy change.

Keywords: Turkish foreign affairs, event data, homegrown theory, theory building, Turkish foreign policy, foreign policy analysis, power

ÖZET

21. YY. TÜRKİYE DIŞ İLİŞKİLERİNİ ANLAMAK: BİR ÖZGÜN KURAMSALLAŞTIRMA DENEMESİ

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Türkiye akademisyenleri için Türkiye'nin özellikle son on yıldaki uluslararası ilişkilerini anlamak zorlu bir iş olmuştur. Konuya ilişkin en temel sorulara dahi cevap vermek, tam, güvenilir ve benzer biçimli verilerin toplanmasını ve bu verilerin kavramsal düzeyde yorumlanmasını gerekli kılmıştır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye'nin uluslararası ilişkilerini bütüncül biçimde anlamak ve açıklamak ve özgün verilere dayanarak yerli bir model önermektir. Bu tez çalışmasında, Türkiye'nin uluslararası pratiklerini örnekleyen özgün bir olay veri kümesi oluşturulmuş ve incelemeler ışığında Türkiye'nin uluslararası davranışlarının bir "kompleks sistem" meydana getirdiği öne sürülmüştür. Tez, bu tür kompleks sistemlerde dış politika değişiminin nasıl gerçekleştiğini açıklamakta; bunu yaparken yurtiçi/uluslararası düğümler ve içarasıl/uluslararası kavuşumlar ile iç duyarlılık gibi yeni kavramlar ortaya atmakta, başarılı bir dış politika değişiminin güç birikimine yol açtığı bir sarmal güç birikim modeli öne sürmektedir.

Anahtar sözcükler: Türk dış politikası, olay veri yöntemi, özgün kuram, kuram inşası, Türk dış ilişkileri, dış politika analizi, güç

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I am also thankful to members of my initial thesis proposal committee Ali Karaosmanoğlu and İbrahim Kalın, for their unparalleled encouragement, to members of my Thesis Supervisory Committe, Özgür Özdamar and Haluk Özdemir as well as Pınar İpek and Julie Mathews, for their invaluable criticism and enthusiasm, my project companion Belma, for her jokes on long days of reading a thousand news and Philip Schrodt and Jay Yonamine of Penn State Event Data Project for helping out almost all event data diggers worldwide. Special thanks go to my parents, Musa and Nerkiz, sister Seval and brother-in-law Doğuş, my cousin Saliha and my friends Aslı, Seher and Seda.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

For those who study Turkish foreign affairs, understanding especially the last decade of Turkey's international politics has been a great challenge. After 48 years, Turkey has been given a seat in the UN Security Council, taken the very first steps to renormalize relations with Armenia, openly and deliberately confronted Israel about its treatment of Gaza, clearly stated its positive opinion on Iran's nuclear program, and ended visa requirements with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon reciprocally. On a broader plane, Turkey has taken an active interest in formerly neglected relations with states such as Costa Rica, Eritrea and Mongolia. For the first time in history, a Turkish president visited several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Looking at this overall hyperactive diplomacy in its totality, the observers are utterly puzzled. What is happening? Is it because of Europeanization or because Turkey's Western orientation shifted? Does it pursue economic advancement or religious solidarity? Is it only Turkey or has there been a systemic change? Is Turkey balancing against some major

powers, or has its global integration increased pace? Is this foregn policy change the result of an economic boom, or is it its cause?

Answering these questions, -and many others-, requires collection of reliable data and interpreting them on conceptual terms. There are two ways of doing this. The first and most taken route is to import conceptual frameworks originated in the theory-producing Western core and struggle to apply them to various phenomena one encounters in Turkey's affairs. The second route is to collect and rigorously analyse a wide sample of Turkish foreign and domestic behavior, and strive to come up with operational clusters, which would presumably be the building blocks of an indigenous account of international politics from Turkey. This study takes this second route, because there are significant setbacks in the first course of action.

In the first course of action, a research question is formulated, one or two Western originated IR theories are picked up, hypotheses are deduced and tested with the Turkish case to see whether they fit. Based on hypothetico-deductive model of inference, this route limits the scholar to a pre-determined set of concepts at the expense of others, and leads to a "selective blindness." Several phenomena, which may be related to the original question, are discarded because they are not accounted for in the chosen theory. So, despite the seeming richness in the field, the theoretically engaged scholar tries to answer the above questions in an idiosyncratic manner. Despite the increasing number of studies, proper operationalization of concepts is almost never discussed and replications are virtually non-existant. Therefore, the implications of one study are seldom confirmed or refuted by other independent studies. Accompanied by lack of intra-

disciplinal communication, this idiosyncratic treatment leaves no room for comparisons and systematic accumulation of knowledge. Secondly, the scholar who follows a hypothetico deductive model, could only marginally contribute to global disciplinal knowledge. The Turkish IR scholar plays – like most of his/her colleagues in non-Western world- the part of "the native informant" to Western theorists, and with each "application", this part is reified.

This study, however, aims to work from the opposite end: its foremost purpose is to understand and explain the empiricial observations about Turkey's international practice, but it tries to do so without limiting itself to pre-chosen concepts. With this choice, the goals are doubled: not only to account for the empiricial observations about Turkey's international practice, but also to do it with an original conceptualization. Accordingly, rather than chosing a delimited, specific question, this study tries to answer the rather broad question "How could Turkey's foreign affairs in 21st century be understood in scientific terms?"

The formulation of the question as such requires justification on two grounds. The first one is about the broadness in the formulation of the research question, i.e., focusing on Turkish foreign affairs in its totality as opposed to focusing on particular aspects of Turkish foreign affairs such as behaviour by some actors (government, civil society, etc.), a particular type of behaviour (economic, miitary,diplomatic) or with specific foreign policy targets. The second justification is related to choice of Turkey as the focus of study.

The reasons for formulating a broad question are due to technical requirements for building concepts and investigating relationships inbetween. The broadness of the question allows for collection of a wide range of data, which increases the possibility of finding hidden patterns. Better-grounded abstractions are sought by asking each empirical observation the question: "Of what is this an instance?"[1] and patterns are built by answering "how they (the emprical observations) all hang together." In the 21st century, the volume and complexity of human interaction has reached an unprecendented level. Scrutinizing all available data widens the search for patterns, which only become visible by looking at various dynamics and after several aggregation trials. As such, a broad formulation helps to avoid the "selective blindness" that is imposed by "application".

The choice of Turkey as the study focus is also inspired by the same complexity, which brings about transformation for every actor at every level. Turkey seems to be one of the many, who both resists and adapts to this transformation. In that sense, the developments in Turkey's domestic and foreign affairs are reflective of wider changes in the world. Turkish experiences are not unique: For example, Turkey is not certainly the only country which has become more independent and assertive in foreign affairs in recent years. Brazil, Russia, India and China are increasingly assuming a

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[1] James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee (eds) *Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World* (Oxford: Westview Press, 2000), 3.
[2] Leslie E. Armijo,"The BRICs Countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) as an Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?"*Asian Perspective,* Vol. 31, No. 4 (2007), pp. 7-42.
[3] Stanford Shaw *From Empire to Republic - The Turkish War of National Liberation 1918-1923 A*

more active role in the changing global system.[2] Turkey also struggles with domestic or international problems, endemic to developing world. Problems such as ethnic and religious tensions, disparity in income and development, inequality in fulfilment of rights and freedoms are hand in hand with promising prospects such as willingness for a more open and democratic society, a more interconnected youth, cultural heterogenity, and a prospering economy. In other words, Turkey seems like the ideal petri dish for both challeneges and opportunities common to most of the developing world. Moreover, Turkey is located in a region quite rich in terms of historical precedents of various political behaviors and ideas: this legacy includes first cities, states and empires, codification of rules, invention of money, international maritime trade, as well as first known peace agreement. The history of Ottoman Empire is also opulent in terms of the processes and dynamics of modern transformation in the non-Western context. All these precedents and experiences shape not only Turkey's but also a group of modern societies' frames of reference for future interactions. Similarly, the Turkish War of National Liberation is the first of many struggles against colonial or imperial domination in 20th century,[3] and inspired similar struggles in the post-colonial world.

Looking at Turkish context may contribute to the disciplinary knowledge in various ways. Firstly, a peripheral position may illuminate different meanings of fundamental concepts of international relations -

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[2] Leslie E. Armijo,"The BRICs Countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) as an Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?"Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2007), pp. 7-42.

[3] Stanford Shaw *From Empire to Republic - The Turkish War of National Liberation 1918-1923 A Documentary Study*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000

which are usually defined and studied from a hegemonic perspective- and how they play out in the periphery. More specifically, it can provide less Western-centric insights about how 'domestic' and 'international' are intermingled, the relevance and power of state in a globalized world, the overall weight of ideational and material factors in international politics, sovereignty and its diverse definitions, the question of shifting loyalties, democratization and changing discourses on security at domestic, regional and global realms, as well as the place of norms and principles in international relations. These are already hot topics discussed by the mainstream IR, but new concepts, which reflect different shapes that these dynamics take in different political and regional contexts, can provide novel insights.

Secondly, looking at Turkey can present new issue areas and problems that mainstream approaches fail to see, either because of the relative absence of those phenomena in the theory-building core or due to "selective blindness", which inherently jeopardizes "internationalness" of International Relations theory. Including Turkish experience would presumably augment IR theory's "internationalness."

Thirdly, and most importantly, conceptualization of the ways, approaches and principles a Turkey utilizes to overcome its domestic and international problems may provide a 'real-world' oriented, 'policy' knowledge that might -at least partially- remedy the lack of practical guidance, that developing world might need.

The reasons for and the consequences of failure of the Western mainsteam core's to include non-Western experience into IR theory are complex and dealt with in the following chapter. The chapter begins by a brief illustration of how demands for homegrown theorizing came to the fore, and how they are justified, both politically and philosophically. Many non-Western scholars are puzzled with the incongruencies between the Western-originated theoretical constructs and the practical issues and problems they face. Therefore search for novel, homegrown conceptualization is actually not uncommon across the world. The chapter concludes by providing examples of homegrown theorizing attemtps from across the world and draws some conclusions about their specific ways of building new conceptualizations.

Drawing on the second chapter, the third chapter systematically analyzes homegrown theorizing attempts, and categorizes them according to their methods in building theories. Comparing these methods against each other allows us to assess effiency of each theory building method in building better theories in terms of explanation, reception and applicability. This categorization and comparison is a theoretical analysis of the body of methods and principles associated with theory building, and as such conveys a preliminary *methodology of theory building,* which is virtually absent in global IR. More specifically, the chapter highlights the importance of observation in building theories, and concludes by asserting the efficiency of large-N studies in identifying patterns, and conveying those patterns in a more comprehensible manner.

The fourth chapter provides a discussion and description of a large-N data collection method, event data. Event data are a formal method of measuring the political behavior. It quantifies the empirical observations and as such provides an efficient tool for scrutinizing a wide range of behavior by multiple actors and identifying patterns in political behaviour. As such, it is particularly convenient for conceptualization.

The fifth chapter outlines arguments about Turkish foreign affairs and concludes that while individual researchers focus on individual aspects of Turkish foreign affairs, a comprehensive analysis is missing in Turkish foreign policy literature. The chapter concludes by claiming that the assumptions and findings of individual studies on Turkish foreign policy are based on idiosyncratic treatment of several fundamental questions, and employ different definitions of fundamental concepts, which hinder concept development and accumulation of knowledge.

Sixth chapter presents the data, pertaining to questions frequently asked in Turkish foreign policy literature by employing correlational and time series tools to reveal patterns in time, actors, event volume and event type. The chapter provides operational definitions for activism and proactivism, and presents findings as to *which* foreign actors Turkey has become more active and/or proactive, *when* it has become more active/proactive, and what sorts of associations exists between Turkey's relations with one group of foreign actors and with another.

Based on arguments in Turkish foreign policy literature about how Turkish foreign affairs might be related to domestic factors, the seventh

chapter focuses on identity related factors such as Islam, and shared Ottoman past, as well as two domestic processual dynamics, i.e. civil-military relations and domestic terrorism. The chapter presents findings as to their relevance for Turkish foreign affairs with different foreign actors.

The concluding chapter offers an alternative conceptualization of Turkish foreign affairs, i.e. a model of data, based on longitudinal observations about Turkey's foreign and domestic affairs. It defines Turkish foreign affairs as a complex system and introduces concepts of *international* and *intermestic nexus*, which are comprised of interrelationships between *domestic* and *international nodes*. The intermestic nexus of volume points to a negative relationship between Turkey's *domestic responsivity* and level of activism in foreign affairs. Based on the model, the chapter conceptualizes foreign policy change as a process of helical power accumulation in a complex system. Concluding chapter also summarizes the findings and presents study's implications pertaining to policy, theory making, methodology and discipline building.

CHAPTER 2

HOMEGROWN THEORIZING

> If problems are value laden, if theories
> are constructed to explain problems, if
> methodologies are always theory-laden,
> and if observations are methodology
> laden, can there be value-neutral design
> and interpretation of research?[4]

Any attempt for building an original homegrown theory of IR is born into a philosophical dilemma. On the one hand, there is a need to redress several perceived shortcomings of Western IR: The theories of "the core" are dismissive of "the periphery," or Western-centric, and more often not, reiterative of the international political status quo. On the other hand, the very same critical attitude bears the question: what makes it sure that any theory from the non-West would be better than one from the West? Wouldn't it be equally dismissive, egocentric and biased against the status quo? If the biases, interests and values of Western researcher contaminate his/her "science," wouldn't the non-Westerners'?

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[4] Sandra Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986), 22-23

In this chapter, a solution is seeked to the above meta-theoretical dilemma. The chapter begins by a brief discussion of the place of values in science and its reflection on the discipline of International Relations. The second part deals with how the debates on values and science have evolved into a criticism of mainstream theories for their parochialism and consequently gave way to vocalization of a demand for homegrown theory building. The third part suggests an epistemological position, which may provide a key to overcome the above dilemma surrounding homegrown theory building: *Standpoint epistemologies* regard values as intrinsic to scientific study; yet perceive them as objectivity-increasing mechanisms. Three IR approaches, which use standpoint epistemologies, are also discussed. Finally, the chapter suggests criteria to define what homegrown theory is and reviews a sample of actual homegrown theory building attempts from across the world.

2.1. Theory- Building, Methodology and Knowledge Production

At first sight "homegrown theory" seems like an oxymoron: what is "homegrown" is particular by definition, as it is inherently related to a particular community, people, or region, and consequently to their values, culture and beliefs. A theory, on the other hand, is presumably universal, devoid of what is particular, parochial and subjective. Therefore, question of values in social science is central to any discussion about homegrown theorizing, as it is the inherent value-ladenness of "the homegrown", and apparent eradication of values in "scientific" theory, that gives rise to this dilemma.

A closer look on the place of values in (social) science, however, may reveal "homegrown theory" is not only possible, but probably the most common form of theory production. It is particularly positivist conception of science, which gives rise to this apparent dilemma. With the advent of positivism, the criteria what makes a collection of knowledge "science" has become its objectivity, attained by methodological rigor, which supposedly erases the effect of the values of the researcher upon the study. As such, it is believed that knowledge takes a more scientific/objective aspect when it moves from personal values, norms and beliefs, assured by observation of measurable data.

The question of values –or normativity- in social science, can be analyzed in four components of scientific inquiry: the purpose of knowing, the observer, the observed, and the outcome- the knowledge produced. With respect to these components, positivism maintains that a) science is an endeavor in understanding and explaining which emanates from an impartial curiosity. b) The observers' values or common sense should be given no place in scientific inquiry. c) The social world can be analyzed with the same scientific method used with respect to the natural world. (naturalism). d) The outcome of scientific inquiry is 'the universal, objective truth.' Therefore, through positivist lenses, there is no place for values in any component of scientific production of knowledge.

Nevertheless, the development of natural sciences attests to the fact that the purpose of knowing is far from being impartial; it is intrinsically

related to the desire to change and improve conditions of human life.[5] Max Horkheimer, one of the founders of Frankfurt School of Critical Social Theory, argued that traditional (positivist) theory separates knowledge from human interests through establishing an absolute distinction between fact and value. For him, the purpose of social theory is to facilitate and support a process of emancipatory social transformation. Social theory would create a debate between all interested parties, which "must unfold as a process of interaction in which growing consciousness develops into a liberating and practical force."[6] Secondly, he argued that empiricism treats active human beings as mere facts and objects within a scheme of mechanical determinism. Such treatment underplays human agency, and conceals the fact that both observer and the very social facts the observer studies are socially and historically constructed by human beings. As such, the observer is also an accomplice in the construction of social reality. And lastly, he argued that positivistic representation of social reality as devoid of human values, reifies the status quo, as if such social facts are not constructed but inherent. All in all, all four components of scientific inquiry in social sciences are inherently embedded in values. Therefore, Critical Social Theory's criticisms to positivism in social science revealed that knowledge production has a fundamental value-laden aspect to it.

Despite the criticisms, however, the appeal of positivism for social sciences has not vanished. Social scientists have tried to pursue their work in the midst of an ever-growing dilemma. On the one hand, the knowledge the

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[5] Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism*, 16.
[6] Max Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," in *Critical Theory and International Relations,* ed. Steven Roach (New York: Routledge, 2008), 139.

scientist produces continued to be assessed on the grounds of its methodological rigor, defined as being free from values.[7] On the other hand, the researchers have increasingly come to an understanding that

> What we took to be humanly inclusive problematics, concepts, theories, objective methodologies, and transcendental truths are in fact less than that. Instead, these products of thought bear the mark of their collective and individual creators, and the creators in turn have been distinctively marked as to gender, class, race and culture.[8]

As the scientist's normative and philosophical concern for the world, society, geography s/he lives, embodied in his/her theory[9] come to clash with the scientific expectation of "objectivity," a crisis in science became inevitable.

In the discipline of International Relations, long before the post-structural turn, concerns about normativity in scientific inquiry were embedded in the great debates.[10] The very first debate between realism and idealism was marked by a critical inquiry about what to do with the values of the researcher and the practitioner. Most classical realists argued that values should be given no place in the explanations of international affairs. E.H. Carr, in his critique of utopianism, believed that any project based on a non-partial universal good is basically a lie since "intellectual theories and ethical standards of utopianism, far from being the expression of absolute

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[7] Christian Brueger, "From Epistemology to Practice" *Journal of International Relations and Development* 15, no. 1 (2012): 97-109, 104.
[8] Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism*, 15.
[9] Petr Drulak, "Introduction to the International Relations (IR) in Central and Eastern Europe Forum" *Journal of International Relations and Development* 12, no.2 (2009): 168–220.
[10] Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era", *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 3, (1989): 243.

and a priori principles, are historcally conditioned, being both products of circumstances and interests..."[11] Thought, he claimed, is not only relative, but also purposeful. Theories are reflexion of practice.[12]

Yet, one could discern a normative quality to the Morgenthau's and E.H Carr's own work. While both rejected that foreign policy practitioners should be attributed normative concerns, they, as scholars, had their own normative concerns; laying the foundations of a new discipline, avoiding war, revealing the hypocrisy of the so-called "benevolent."

> The 'personal equation' of the political scientist both limits and directs his scholarly pursuits. The truth which a mind thus socially conditioned is able to grasp is likewise socially conditioned. The perspective of the observer determines what can be known and how it is understood.[13]

For them arriving at scientific/objective truth was not only possible, but also preferable since it would help as the best normative advice.[14] Therefore, in Hoffmann's words, the first debate revealed "the impossibility, even for opponents of a normative orientation, to separate the empirical and the normative in their own work; and about the pitfalls of any normative dogmatism in a realm which is both a field for objective investigation and a battlefield between predatory beasts and their prey."[15]

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[11] Edward H. Carr, *Twenty Years Crisis* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 65.
[12] Carr, *Twenty Years Crisis*, 68-71.
[13] Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Nature and Limits of a Theory of International Relations," in *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations,* ed. William T.R. Fox, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), 21.
[14] Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations", *Daedalus* 106, no. 3, (1977): 45.
[15] Hoffmann, "An American Social Science ", 43.

Methodology was at the epicenter of the second debate, as efforts once again were directed towards a more scientific/objective IR. Behaviorialists' push for quantitative methodology was certainly a move towards a more value-free research. The third debate (inter-paradigm debate), was seemingly more about criticisms regarding realism's image of the world, i.e. its ontology. As regional integration, transnationalism, interdependence and study of non-state actors come to the fore, realism's simple ontology of state-based international system was challenged from various grounds.[16] Yet, the debate slowly evolved from a debate on ontological parochialism of realism, to methodological and epistemological parochialism of the field[17] as it coincided with the first depiction of IR as an "American social science."[18]

The dilemma between the scientific and the normative in International Relations has been ever garnering attention since Richard Ashley's article *Poverty of Neorealism*[19] and Robert Cox's *Social Forces, States World Orders*.[20] These early criticisms point to "the straightjacket of neorealism"[21] in defining what is proper knowledge production. In asserting "theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose."[22] Cox acknowledged that the production of knowledge, hence the theoretical lens employed by the "haves" and "have-nots" would be profoundly different. Reflecting

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[16] Ole Wæver, "The Rise and Fall of The Inter-paradigm Debate"in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, Marysia Zalewski, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002).
[17] Lapid, "The Third Debate", 238.
[18] Hoffmann, "An American Social Science".
[19] Richard Ashley, "Poverty of Neorealism" *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (1984): 225-286.
[20] Robert W. Cox "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory" *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2, (1981): 126-155.
[21] Pınar Bilgin "Thinking past 'Western' IR?" *Third World Quarterly* 29, No. 1, (2008): 10.
[22] Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders", 128.

Horkheimer's criticism of traditional science, Cox criticized the problem-solving theories because of their status-quo oriented normative basis and argued that they are antithetical to critical theories, used by the agents of change. Therefore, the mid-1980s of the discipline looked like a battlefield, with a multitude of players on several fronts. On the one hand, there were (neo) realists versus its critics[23] where debate was more or less focused on shortcomings of realism and its response, on the other hand there was a more generalized debate between traditional, behavioral and radical approaches (paradigms), which marked the emergence of "inter-discipline of International Relations"[24]. Finally, with questions of knowledge, power and values, debates can be seen as a series of " 'intensely political happenings' (Ashley, 1989) occurring between vested cultural, economic, and political interests (Biersteker, forthcoming)"[25].

Ashley and Walker, who were the first self-acclaimed dissenters of current knowledge building in IR, argued that IR was in a crisis, which was intertwined with a "crisis of human sciences, a crisis of patriarchy, a crisis of governability, a crisis of late industrial society, a generalized crisis of modernity"[26] In some ways, IR has always been in crisis. From the First World War onwards, that is, since the emergence of IR as a discipline, the great debates of IR surged one after another. The researchers were

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[23] Robert O. Keohane, *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986)

[24] Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Thomas J. Biersteker, "The Dialetics of World Order: Notes for a Future Archeologist of International Savoir Faire" *International Studies Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (1984): 121-142. Kal J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline* (Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1985).

[25] Lapid "The Third Debate", 238, Footnote 4.

[26] Richard K. Ashley and Robert B. J. Walker "Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies" *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3, (1990): 377.

increasingly frustrated by the "amount of debris on the battlefield of international relations theory"[27] and felt that there were "few guides on making choices"[28] about the best method, theory or paradigm to study a particular phenomena. The so-called third debate, however, ruled out the very possibility of having such foundations or criteria[29]. "Anti-foundationalists" claimed there could be no foundational criteria for attaining objective truth.[30] For Waltz, "Nothing seem[ed] to accumulate, not even criticism."[31] The state of the discipline is described as in a "process of paradigm deterioration"[32] or "anarchy."[33] Consequently, it is even concluded, "in both theory and practice international politics can bring on despair. This is an occupational hazard in the field for which there is no remedy." [34]

Once it is revealed "theory is always the product of the theorist's position in time and place,"[35] the hope for a universally generalizable theory is lost. Ferguson and Mansbach reflect on such loss as follows:

> Many students of international relations, like the
> present authors, were once convinced that they were
> participants in a quest for theory, which would, in

27 James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 11.
28 Gene M. Lyons, "The Study of International Relations in Great Britain: Further Connections", *World Politics* 38, no. 4, 643.
29 Christine Sylvester, *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), 140.
30 Chris Brown "Turtles all the Way Down: Anti-foundationalism, critical theory and international relations" Millennium 23, no.2, (1994): 213-236
31 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 18.
32   James N. Rosenau, *The Study of Global Interdependence* (New York: Frances Pinter, 1980), 129.
33 Robert Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism" *International Organization* 38, no.2, (1984): 287.
34 Patrick M. Morgan, *Theories and Approaches to International Politics*. (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987), 301.
35 John M. Hobson, "Is Critical Theory Always for the White West and for Western Imperialism? Beyond Westphalian Towards a Post-racist Critical IR", *Review of International Studies* 33, No S1, (2007): 91-116.

time, unravel the arcane secrets of world politics.
Knowledge and understanding would be gradual and
cumulative, but in the end, they might even enable us
to overcome age-old scourges like war… Yet, our
understanding of key phenomena is expanding only
very modestly, if at all. [36]

The third debate's pessimistic vision, however, instigated flourishing
of new theoretical endeavors such as feminism, post-modernism, post-
structuralism, and historical sociology. This was due to the new
understanding that "There is …no such thing as theory in itself, divorced
from a standpoint in time and space. When any theory so represents itself, it
is the more important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its concealed
perspective."[37] These critical approaches advocated self-reflexivity, that is, to
reveal and acknowledge the underlying assumptions that inform one's own
analyses.[38]

2.2.   Western Theories and non-Western Phenomena

Although the initial responses to call for self-reflexivity comprised of
revealing epistemological and ontological foundations, a simultaneous effect
of these criticisms was also to question the geo-cultural parochialism
(Westernism) of mainstream theories.

The first criticisms to mainstream theory in terms of its Western-
centred focus, was in the field of security studies. In the post-1945 period the

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[36] Yale H. Ferguson ve Richard W. Mansbach, *The Elusive Quest: Theory and International
Politics*, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 3.
[37]   Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders", 128.
[38]   Mark Neufeld, *Restructuring of International Relations Theory*, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 3-6. Lapid, "The Third Debate", 241.

rise of the United States to a position of global leadership and the challenge

from the Soviet Union coincided with the consolidation of realism as the

normal science of International Relations and with the dominance of

American scholars of the field. Strategic Studies, informed by realism's

ontological assumptions and concepts, has been concerned almost

exclusively with the national security needs of the United States.[39]

> Strategic Studies is for the most part an off-spring of
> Anglo-American defence policy needs, and as such it
> bears conspicuous signs of its parentage. Its
> attachment to security is heavily conditioned by the
> status quo orientations of hegemonic countries safely
> removed from the pressure of large attached
> neighbors. Strategic Studies is policy oriented, and
> therefore both empricially bound and consrained not
> to wander much beyond the imperatives of the
> national policy level. In this sense Strategic Studies
> exists within the confines of the classical Realist model
> of the struggle for power"[40]

While the East-West struggle affected many parts of the world, the

concepts and theories emerged out of it lacked substantial relevance to what

has been experienced in these diverse places.[41] For example, one African

scholar argues that "Had the mid 1990s war in the Great Lakes

Region…been fought in Europe, it would have been legitimately termed a

'third world war.'"[42] The concepts that were generated, like "small wars" or

"proxy wars" was inadequate in terms of representing the experiences of

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[39]   Mohammed Ayoob, "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective" in *Critical Security Setudies: Concepts and Cases*, eds. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 137.

[40]   Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda For International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era,* (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 8-9.

[41]   Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, "The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies" *Review of International Studies* 32, (2006): 329–352. Robert B. J. Walker, "Realism, change and international political theory," *International Studies Quarterly* 31, No. 1, (1987): 65–86.

[42]   Cirino Hiteng Ofuho, "Africa: Teaching IR Where It's Not Supposed to Be", in *International Relations Scholarship Around the World,* ed. Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver (New York, Routledge, 2009), 77.

people in other parts of the world.[43] In the post-Cold War context, the representation of post-colonial states as 'rogue' 'weak', 'quasi', 'collapsed' and 'failed' states, has offered little analytical benefit for those who have an indigenous interest in alleviating the human conditions there, but they "enable certain policies which serve the economic, political and security interests of those who employ them."[44]

The inefficacy of conceptual tools in analyzing diverse non-Western political settings was not particular to realism. Most mainstream theories "are presented as universal theories, and might, indeed, be accepted as such by many, all three (i.e. Liberalism, Realism, and the English School pluralists) can also be seen as speaking for the West and in the interest of sustaining its power, prosperity, and influence."[45] While most mainstream (positivist) international theories failed to deliver the promise of a value-free theory which would supposedly be applicable to other parts of the world, the post-positivist theories offered limited benefit because of their "simplified and Westernized description of the situation that does not take into account the specific local socio-political context"[46] or because "Post-positivist and postcolonial discourse share a complex, specialized language that is largely inaccessible to individuals who lack academic training in the

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43 Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 21; Tarak Barkawi, "On the Pedagogy of 'Small Wars'", *International Affairs* 80, No.1 (2004): 19–38.
44 Pınar Bilgin and Adam David Morton "Historicising representations of 'failed states': beyond the cold-war annexation of the social sciences?" *Third World Quarterly* 23, No. 1, (2002):56. Pınar Bilgin and Adam David Morton "From 'Rogue' to 'Failed' States? The Fallacy of Short-termism" *Politics* 24, no. 3 (2004): 169–180; Mohammed Ayoob, "Defining Security", 138.
45 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan "Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? An introduction*" International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, No. 3 (2007): 287–312.
46 Claire Wilkinson "The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?" *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 1, (2007): 5.

core and is of limited use for grappling with 'real world' situations."[47]

Despite their "emancipatory intent"[48] the relevance of post-structuralist theories to real world situations remains limited. For example, Hoffman states that Ashley's "Dialectical Competence Model", while being critical against previous conceptions of international relations, does not offer principles for "self-realization or emancipation of human potential."[49] If one looks at Ashley's later turn into post-structuralism, it is rather unsurprising for Ashley's work to lack this normative element, since post-structuralism denies any possibility of finding a universal normative foundation for emancipation. Sankaran presents frustration of non-Western scholars with post-modernist IR as follows:

> 1) Many postmodernist writings…are oblivious to the intimate dialogue between "Western and non-Western economies, societies, and philosophies that underwrite the disenchantment with modernity."
> 2) Some post-modernist work tends to be so preoccupied with practices of representation and signification that one is in danger of losing a vital and physicalistic sense of the violence that accompanies war;
> 3) Epistemological positions that have been espoused by some postmodernist international relations theories themselves reproduce dichotomous choices that are not very politically enabling
> 4) In political terms, the postmodernist suspicion of subjectivity and agency may be problem for peoples that are not so advantageously placed in the global hierarchy of late capitalism
> 5) There is a need, despite the very compelling historicization of the socially constructed nature of subjectivity, to carve out spaces for enabling political action within and outside the discipline of international relations.[50]

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[47] Tickner, "Seeing IR Differently", 324.

[48] Stephen Eric Bronner *Of Critical Theory and Its Theorists*,(Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing, 1994), 3.

[49] Mark Hoffman, "Critical Theory and Inter-paradigm Debate", *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 16, No. 2, (1987): 233.

[50] Krishna Sankaran, "The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical

Normative theories, which deliberately posit 'a world project' as preferable, and thus provide a set of principles for emancipation in Kantian/Habermasian fashion, were also problematic due to the Western-inspired nature of such worlds.[51]

All in all, whether positivist or post-positivist, almost all mainstream theories were dismissive, indifferent, or ineffective with respect to problems of the non-Western world.

> …theory has never quite been borne out by events in the Third World. Some paradigms appear to explain some cases but not others. Even central concepts…are troublesome when applied to the Third World. Most perplexing, however, have been the unstated normative and empirically unsubstantiated assumptions that underlie much of what is written the field…Mainstream IR theory…is Eurocentric theory, originating largely in the US and founded, almost exclusively, on what happens or happened in the West. If the published record is any measure, then most IR theorists believe that studying the Western experience alone is empirically sufficient to establish general laws of individual, group, or state behavior irrespective of the point in time or the geographical location.[52]

This ontological dismissal of the non-Western phenomena in theory building also had political implications. If Cox's famous assertion that "theory is always for someone and for some purpose" is taken to be serious, then one can argue that core-produced theory was for core-based purposes.

International Relations Theory", *Alternatives* 18, No 3, (1993): 388.

[51] Acharya and Buzan, "Why is there no non-Western international relations theory?", 289-290, Hobson, "Is critical theory always for the white West"; Chandra T. Mohanty, "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses" *Boundary 2* 12, No. 3, (1986): 333–58.

[52] Stephanie G. Neuman, "International Relations Theory and the Third World: An Oxymoron?" in *International Relations Theory and the Third World* ed. Stephanie G. Neuman, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 2.

The dissidents of the third debate argued that Western-centered approaches are complicit in reproduction of a certain reality and reification of status quo. The debates revealed "the ways in which dominant knowledge of the world reinforces power in international practice itself."[53] As Ayoob points out, IR theory and international practice reinforced each other so much so that "monopoly over the construction of theoretical knowledge depicts fundamentally the problem of inequality in both international relations and International Relations. It shapes the thought patterns of policymakers and analysts alike across much of the globe."[54] These political implications of ontological dismissal of non-Western phenomena, turned into a call for "marginalized populations and perspectives" to raise their voice, which would supposedly "provide a basis for alternative conceptualizations."[55]

Marginalized both as objects and subjects of study, non-Western scholars are left with two choices: either to import conceptual frameworks originated in the West and struggle to apply them to various and mostly unfitting phenomena they encounter in non-Western parts of the world, or to build home-grown conceptual tools from local experiences. For the change-oriented non-Westerner, then, the quest becomes one of producing knowledge about oneself, by oneself. The incongruence between Western theories and non-Western phenomena "demands that we seriously attempt

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[53] Arlene Tickner "Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World" *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 32, no. 2 (2003): 295.

[54] Mohammed Ayoob, "Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism" *International Studies Review* 4, no. 3 (2002): 27-48.

[55] Thomas J. Biersteker, "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations", *International Studies Quarterly* 33, No. 3, (1989): 264.

to present conceptual alternatives to the dominant theories in IR."[56] Calling

into "question the principles underpinning the orthodox approaches" and

refraining from simply providing data for "an existing framework of

analysis,"[57] scholars who have an interest in periphery, should thus develop

a framework based on concepts, variables, or principles that are derived

from local experiences, that is, achieve some "theoretical autonomy."[58] Since

knowledge in IR theory is as constitutive of reality as it is "autistic,"[59] it is

clear that periphery scholars should take an active interest in building

international relations theory that would speak for them. It may be argued

that homegrown theories may lead to particularism and parochialism,[60]

since "(D)ifference can be a slippery and dangerous rallying point for

inquiry projects and for politics."[61]A self-reflexive parochialism -however

much irrational it may sound- becomes the only venue to vocalize an

autonomous perspective. This might, indeed be the only way for

International Relations to be more "international":

> "It is perverse that a discipline called International
> Relations should be so manifestedly parochial, but the
> usual diagnosis (too little participation from, and
> acknowledgement of, IR research outside the Anglo-
> American core) is suspect. Paradoxically, if IR were
> *more* parochial, in the sense of multiple, nationally
> defined, conceptions of the discipline, it would be
> more inclusive."(emphasis original) [62]

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56   Ayoob, "Inequality and Theorizing", 27.
57   Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin, "Still Waiting after all these Years: 'The Third World' on the Periphery of International Relations" in *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 6, (2004): 249.
58   Karen Smith "Can it be Home-Grown? Challenges to Developing IR Theory in the Global South" *Paper presented at the International Studies Association's 47th Annual Convention,*22-25 March, 2006, San Diego.
59   Tickner, "Seeing IR Differently", 300.
60   Drulak, "Introduction to the IR".
61   Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism*, 18
62   Robert M.A. Crawford, "Where Have All Theorists Gone- Gone to Britain? Everyone? A Story of Two Parochialisms in International Relations," in *International Relations—Still an*

While homegrown theories may be criticized for being parochial and relying on the distinctiveness rather than similarities, it must be pointed out that what seems to be distinctive at the onset, may indeed be a pattern throughout ages and peoples. A homegrown theory cannot claim to be universal by definition, but still it can be relevant for previously overlooked phenomena. For example, any theory that might be build upon teachings of Indian philosopher Kautilya, would not be diametrically opposed to the any theory that drives inspiration from Hobbes, Machiavelli or Sun Tzu. Yet, they may prove different enough to illuminate the necessity to include intermediary variables, which would help better explain various international phenomena. For example, Kautilya's vision of international system may be similar to that of realism as both rely on power as a crucial determinant of international status; nevertheless, Kautilya also includes "happiness" as another determinant, and thus points to the importance of the benevolence of the emperor.[63] One may wonder whether there are indigenous conceptions of international relations, foreign policy or strategy, which govern international affairs of a people, and may also be useful in understanding the phenomena in another part of the world. It is not unlikely that an explanation to Latin American transnationalism might remedy the scholarly confusion surrounding the Arap Spring. Conceptualizations based on ethnic, religious and linguistic affinity that spread across a region, might be more conceptually useful in bringing about emancipation than "domino theory" and provide insights about agency in international relations.

American Social Science?: Toward Diversity, ed. Robert M.A. Crawford,Darryl S.L. Jarvis, 222-223. Albany: SUNY University Press, 2001.

[63] George Modelski, "Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World." *The American Political Science Review* 58, no. 3 (1964): 551.

Therefore, those researchers who live in or study the politics of non-Western world, should take an active interest in building homegrown theories, in which concepts are based on local experiences, indigenous philosophies or cultures. Homegrown theorizing is desirable, not only because it may actually help alleviate the mainstream IR's deficiency in explaining what is going on in most parts of the world, but also it would enable non-Western scholars to achieve theoretical and practical autonomy from Western dominance, which would bring about a global social transformation.

Although, demands for homegrown theories are justified both politically ("Non-Western should be a producer of knowledge") and ontologically ("Non-Western world should also be an object of study"), an epistemological justification ("How to theorize by focusing on the particular?") is still needed. The next part deals with this epistemological question and offers a way to overcome the metatheoretical dilemma that arises from the superficial distinction between fact and value by a universalist conception of theory. Already utilized in international relations, standpoint epistemologies arose from the need to converge political agency and production of knowledge, and provide epistemological justification upon which homegrown theories can be built.

2.3. How to Overcome the Meta-theoretical Dilemma: Standpoint Epistemologies

While in the past, innovation in IR might have stemmed from a genuine interest in novelty, the scholars who try to account for

transformation tried to overcome the epistemological dilemma by deliberately and self-reflectively establishing a normative standpoint as the basis for their knowledge production. This normative standpoint, namely betterment of human condition, has provided the philosophical basis to various forms of knowledge production endeavors which would reflect experiences of denizens, to make them visible, and in some cases offer ways to counteract the suppression, erasure, or ignorance that they face. In doing so, the studies that are based on a standpoint can also increase objectivity in science by providing the other half of the story. As previously claimed, the mainstream IR, despite its claim for objectivity, is indeed partial. Once inherent value-ladenness of social research is acknowledged, one cannot claim to produce "universally applicable, objective truth" but s/he can still strive for increasing objectivity. Vocalizing the experiences, issues, problems and perspectives of the "uninteresting" may act as an "objectivity-increasing" mechanism.[64] Therefore, standpoint epistemologies are necessarily and self-reflectively politicized, while they still commit to increasing the objectivity of inquiry in their respective fields.[65]

There are a few approaches -namely post-colonialism, subaltern studies and standpoint feminism- which deliberately use an identity-based standpoint as the foundation for their theoretical claims. While most of these approaches originated in other fields, they found their way into study of international relations and attained important but limited reception. The following section describes these approaches, and illustares how identity-

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[64]   Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism*, 22.
[65]   Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism*, 24.

based standpoints may be used a foundation for theoretical arguments in international relations.

2.3.1.   Post-Colonialism

Post-colonialism first emerged out of an attempt to redress the shortcomings of writing about the non-Western subject without referring to its colonial past and relationship with the colonizer. Thus, postcolonial writers share a common interest in showing the ways how colonialism shaped not only the material conditions of the colonized, but also its cultural conditions, mainly through representation and knowledge production. Based on works by Foucault and Gramsci, Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1979) marked the advance of postcolonial criticism firstly in literature and humanities, and then other disciplines.

Said argued that the concept of "the Orient" was constructed by the "imaginative geography" of Western scholarship, which is complicit in the colonization and domination of non-Western subjects. Inspired by poststructuralism, some post colonial theorists, like Homi K. Bhabha, have focused on the binary modes of thought and the dichotomies, which are used to justify domination.[66] Among them, Gayatri C. Spivak has specifically dealt with the question of representation of the colonial "Other." She also scrutinized the relationship between the production of discourse/representation and postcolonial subjectivity/political agency. [67]

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[66]   Homi Bhabha, *The Location Of Culture,* (New York: Routledge, 1994).
[67]   Gayatri C. Spivak "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, eds. C. Nelson and L. Grossberg, (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press,

Postcolonial studies owe much the methods of post-structuralists in showing and subverting the binary oppositions established between the Western self and subjected others. On the other hand, the works of postcolonial theorists are distinguished from those of post-structuralists with their deliberate ethical concern, so much so that postcolonial discourse is inseparable from an ethical project.[68] This normative basis, i.e. the purpose, is usually opening up space for the subaltern to speak.

To move beyond the normative aloofness, and hence, impracticality of post-structuralism, most postcolonial writers value resistance and agency, both in theory and practice. Postcolonial scholars resist totalizing and discriminating representations of or generalizations about the non-West by framing their own "counter narratives". Since explanation and interpretation from a different perspective necessitates a perspective, some form of generalization with an inevitable dose of essentialism becomes obligatory. This presents an ethical dilemma for postcolonial theorists, where they engage in the same activity they are denouncing. The postcolonial thinker, Spivak responds to this dilemma by the concept of *strategic essentialism* which is a "strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest"[69]. On the methodological and theoretical level, Spivak calls for self reflective utilization of the idea of essence -albeit with a recognition of and critique of the essentialist nature of all generalizations. In other words, to "move beyond the deconstruction of knowledge" to its

1988), 217–313.
[68] David Theo Goldberg and Ato Quayson, *Relocating Postcolonialism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), xiii.
[69] Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean (eds) *The Spivak Reader* (New York and London: Routledge, 1996): 214.

reconstruction, she encourages a temporary yet self reflective period of "post-poststructuralist positivism". On the practical level, strategic essentialism is used as a means of using group identity as a basis of struggle and resistance, thus, enabling the subject to have agency, while also debating issues related to group identity within the group.

Although postcolonialism firstly started as an endeavor in literary studies, a specific understanding of international relations formed the origin of postcolonial theory. Nevertheless, its impact on the study of international relations has only been felt in 2000s. The earliest calls for bridging post colonialism with international relations came from Krishna[70] and Darby & Paolini.[71] The utilization of concepts central to postcolonialism in the analysis of international relations came afterwards. First one was studies of Darby and Paolini, where they aim to "take account of the perspectives and interests of non-European peoples."[72] Several chapters in the volume focus on non-Western experiences of globalization with respect to gender, race, and sexuality. Drawing on earlier attempts to bridge postcolonialism and international relations, Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair, specifically focused on intersections of race, gender and class, and offered a re-conceptualization of power in international relations in such manner.[73] Discussing the venues that postcolonialism may provide for a novel approach to international relations, they argue that power of representation;

[70] Sankaran Krishna, "The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory," *Alternatives* 18, No.3 (1993): 385-417.
[71] Philip Darby and A. J. Paolini, "Bridging International Relations and Postcolonialism", *Alternatives* 19, no. 3 (1994): 371–93
[72] Philip Paolini and A.J. Darby, *At the Edge of International Relations: Postcolonialism, Gender and Dependency,* (London and New York: Pinter 1997).
[73] Geeta Chowdry and Sheila Nair *Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender and Class,* (London:Routledge, 2002).

the intersections of race and gender; global capitalism, class and postcoloniality; and finally recovery, resistance and agency may be used as the central themes, all relevant for study of international relations. For example, L.H.M. Ling points to the racial understanding behind Western responses to Asian crisis of 1997-98.[74] Drawing on Homi Bhabha's concept of "mimicry" Ling argues that Asian economies surpassed a phase of "formal mimicry", where the colonized mimics the colonizing in order to survive, to a phase of "substantive mimicry" where the colonized not only mimics but also challenges and competes with the colonized. With respect to Asian economic development, the Western elite welcomed the mimicry by Asian capitalism as long as it does not subvert the power status between "West and the rest." But when Asian capitalism hyper-masculinized the competition, that is, catching up with the West became an issue of manhood, bravery, pride and patriarchal domination of the domestic society, the Western elite denounced Asian development as "crony capitalism" which was deemed faulty since the beginning and punished it through financial means. In her account, Ling does not dismiss the complicity of the patriarchal domestic elite in subjugation of domestic society.[75]

Apart from several concepts, such as mimicry, hybridity and hypermasculization which are introduced to IR, postcolonial insights have also provided specific methodologies which might be used to reshape the ways of looking into IR. Edward Said's concept of "contrapuntal reading" –

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[74] L.H.M. Ling, "Cultural Chauvinism And The Liberal International Order: 'West versus Rest' in Asia's financial crisis'" in *Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender and Class* ed. Geeta Chowdry and Sheila Nair, (London:Routledge, 2002). 115-142.

[75] Ling, "Cultural Chauvinism", 115.

reading a text by taking into account what is central to the narrative, but is left untouched, and revealing the perspectives of both the colonizer and the colonized-[76] might be used as a means to involve third-world voices and experiences to the Western-centered histories, which are ripe with omissions.[77] Similarly, Spivak's strategic essentialism, offers not only a way to vocalize a distinct discourse but also act on that discourse. Both of these philosophical "methods" can be used in laying foundations upon which localized knowledges, i.e. "homegrown theories" can be built.

2.3.2.   Subaltern Studies

The second approach, which is distinctively based upon a standpoint epistemology, is India-based Subaltern Studies Group. It is a school of history established by a number of Indian historians in 1982. They "have focused on writing history from below, discovering new forms of political action and opposition, that do not appear on the screen (at least not as "political") when viewed through the lens of categories derived from Western political philosophy."[78] While it is hard to distinguish subaltern studies from post-colonial studies in their principles and methods, one can argue that the normative basis of subaltern studies is much more local-oriented. While postcolonialism is attuned to intersections of several subalternities, Subaltern Studies Group are much more interested in questioning not only the relationship between the above and the below at

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[76]   Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993), 66-67.
[77]   Geeta Chowdhry "Edward Said and Contrapuntal Reading: Implications for Critical Interventions in International Relations" *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 36, No. 1 (2007):101-116.
[78]   Tickner and Waever, *International Relations Scholarship,* 7.

the interstate level but they basically look at the experiences of the below within the below, and how their problems are aggravated by the international power hierarchies.[79] They also put much more emphasis in the actual political agency and resistance by these domestically marginalized groups.

Since their ontological focus is the everyday problems and experiences of the domestically exploited, the convergence of Subaltern Studies with study of international relations are more problematic than that of postcolonialism. Nevertheless, there are some works in international relations literature, which are either substantially or self-acclaimedly subaltern. For example Mohammed Ayoob, in his theory of Subaltern Realism, account for the security problems of the Third World, whom he regards as the "subalterns in the international system."[80] He argues that the origins of most conflicts in the international system are domestic and related to the ongoing state-building processes of the Third World states. He states that internal conflicts are not truly 'internal' because the sovereignty and borders of the state are not recognized as legitimate by the society. Therefore, a state-society nexus is at the center of all conflicts, a point which most mainstream theories miss because of their Western-centered bias. He also states that conflicts that take place in the Third World are seldom immune to the external effects. Great powers' interference in internal, and regional conflicts exacerbate the problems. Although Ayoob calls his approach as Subaltern, and openly acknowledges his Subaltern School

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[79]   Spivak "Can the Subaltern Speak?", 220.
[80]   Mohammed Ayoob "Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism" *International Studies Review* 4, no. 3 (2002): 40.

inspiration, his approach has little concern for the marginalized within the domestic sphere, while maintaining some form of postcolonial sensitivity.

Another subaltern work by an international relations scholar is Fantu Cheru's account of various forms of resistance in different parts of Africa. He states that forms of everyday resistance, which aimed at subsistence, are mostly neglected by political scientists and international relations scholars because they are deemed irrelevant to the workings of the states system. He states that such forms of resistance not only breaks down the international system inch by inch, but they also provide innovative and transformative strategies from below against the forced upon obligations by the indigenous state. These obligations, i.e. tax increases, cut in wages, dislocation of the peasantry, and engaging the poor by production of primary commodities for the export market, are mostly legitimated as necessary for national development projects.

>]T]hose in a position of power and privilege not only ignore the demands of the poor for fundamental change, they hate the poor. The peasantry on the other hand regards elite initiated development as a threat to their existence. In an environment of mutual suspicion, the poor take matters in their own hands since they know from experience that the oppressors never make change; only the oppressed do.[81]

They resist by sabotaging government projects, undertaking unofficial jobs, running underground shops, forming local cooperatives for agriculture, working independently from state institutions and stealing state

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[81] Fantu Cheru, "The silent revolution and weapons of the weak: transformation and innovation from below," in *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies*, ed. Stephen Gill James H. Mittelman, 153-69. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

property. Since local poor has long lost any hope of help from the state, they do not refrain from such activities.

While seemingly domestic, the conflict between the poor and the lite has an important international dimension. The obligations, enforced upon the poor result from the inequality and domination in the international system. The inequality in the international system is translated into domestic sphere, whereby the lowest strata of the society pay the costs. Therefore grass-roots resistance against the indigenous state also transforms into resistance against external domains of power.

Looking from the subaltern perspective, highlights the experiences of the below within the below, and makes the observer more alert against the dangers of totalizing generalizations, which are common in the discipline of international relations. Taking into account the experiences of the subaltern, may help home-grown theorist not only to focus on previously undertheorized phenomena, but also to avoid the trap of "domestic universalism,"i.e. the argument that one's perspective applies to each and every body within the confines of the proposed standpoint identity.

2.3.3. Standpoint Feminism

Feminist standpoint epistemology initially developed in the social sciences, primarily in works by philosopher Sandra Harding[82] and political

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[82] Sandra Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986; Sandra Harding, *Whose science? Whose knowledge?: Thinking from women's lives.* Cornell University Press, 1991. Sandra Harding, *Is science multicultural?: Postcolonialisms, feminisms, and epistemologies*. Indiana University Press, 1998.

scientist Nancy Hartsock.[83] Based on Hegel's thinking about the relationship between the master and the slave, and later by Marx, Engels, and the G. Lukacs, standpoint feminism asserts that socially and politically marginalized groups are epistemologically privileged with respect to hegemonic social structures. This informs the epistemological basis of knowledge production. Similar to subaltern thinking, feminist standpoint theorists argue that those on the "outside" of dominant social and political groups are trapped in a nexus whereby they not only try to get along in their respective worlds, but also cope with the dominant society. Therefore, their status as an "outsider" allows them to perceive social structures and their functioning in ways unavailable to members of the dominant group.

Harding argues that "starting thought out" from the experiences of the marginalized leads to formulation of new research questions and re-determines the priorities: "The questions an oppressed group wants answered are rarely requests for so-called pure truth. Instead, they are queries about how to change its conditions; how its world is shaped by forces beyond it; how to win over, defeat, or neutralize those forces arrayed against its emancipation, growth, or development; and so forth."[84] However, she emphasizes that one does not need to be a member of a marginalized group to employ their standpoint. It comes through active and critical engagement about one's experience and the relationship of this experience with social and political structures.

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[83] Nancy Hartsock, *The feminist standpoint revisited and other essays*. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press,1998.
[84]   Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism*, 8.

With respect to women's experiences, feminist standpoint epistemology argues "men's dominating position in social life results in partial and perverse understandings, whereas women's subjugated position provides the possibility of more complete and less perverse understandings." Like postcolonialism, feminism has an emphasis on social and political action. Indeed, Harding explicitly states that political action is the basis for scientific inquiry: "Feminism and the women's movement provide the theory and motivation for inquiry and political struggle that can transform the perspective of women into a standpoint, a morally and scientifically preferable grounding for our interpretations and explanations of nature and social life."[85]

Despite its focus on women's experience standpoint feminism does not "try to substitute one set of gender loyalties for the other. They try instead to arrive at hypotheses that are free of gender loyalties."[86] While acknowledging that some form of generalizable, hence essentialist hypothesis of womanhood is obligatory for establishing such a standpoint, she defines goal of feminist knowledge seeking as "to achieve theories that accurately represent women's activities as fully social and social relations between the genders as a real –an explanatorily important- component in human history" since from the feminist perspective, it is mainstream, traditional forms of thought that is "subjective in its distortion by andro-centricism."[87]

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[85] Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism*, 26
[86] Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism*, 138.
[87] Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism*, 138.

Feminist research in IR has gained momentum since 1980s, although there has been limited convergence between the works of feminist and mainstream scholars.[88] Nevertheless, many feminist theorists have attempted a feminist re-construction of central concepts in IR. For example, broadening of security studies owes much to the feminist thinking which stipulates that security should be understood in multidimensional and multilevel terms, i.e., the elimination of physical, structural, and ecological violence at individual, domestic, international and global levels.[89]

As much as the previous epistemologies, feminism in international relations employ a sensitivity to political agency by the marginalized, i.e. women. According to Christine Sylvester,[90] contrary to conceptualizations of security by mainstream IR, security is not an end to be achieved at once, but a continuing process where struggle and contention is involved. This insight is usually inferred from the experiences of women under "security practices" by states. As such feminist IR questions definition and meaning of war, internal conflict, migration, environmental hazards, and the effectiveness and viability of security measures by states from a woman's perspective. Accordingly, even when dealing with the classical notions of security, feminists tend to focus on the consequences of what happens during wars rather than on their causes.[91]

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[88] J. Ann Tickner, "You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists" *International Studies Quarterly* 41, No. 4 (1997):611-632.

[89] J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); V. Spike Peterson, Anne Sisson Runyan *Global Gender Issues* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993).

[90] Christine Sylvester, *Feminist theory and international relations in a postmodern era.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

[91] Jan Jindy Pettman, *Worlding Women: A Feminist International Politics* (London: Routledge,

The standpoint epistemologies outlined in this section share some common characteristics, which are conducive to homegrown theory building, i.e. production of knowledge about oneself, by oneself. These are:

a) They all set the basis of the knowledge on social, economic and political differences, rather than assuming that a "universal objective truth" can be attained. As such, they neither accept domination of positivist criteria nor engage in normative aloofness/ relativity of post-structuralism.

b) They all engage in strategic essentialism with respect to specific, mostly disadvantanged groups.

c) They all prioritize political agency, emancipation and action.

These common tenets of standpoint epistemologies might provide a philosophical starting point for scholars, who try to provide an indigenous account of international politics from non-Western parts of the world. The next section reviews these homegrown theorizing attempts.

2.4.   Call for Homegrown Theorizing

The previous sections outlined the ontological, political and finally epistemological justifications for homegrown theory building. This section deals with actual homegrown theory building attempts from around the world.

1996), 87–106

Once it became clear that Western theory and practice were so interwoven that it was of limited use to non-Westerners,[92] a call for pluralism in terms of the geographical locations where knowledge about international relations is produced was made. Accordingly, cosmopolitanism was called upon as way to transcend the boundaries between core and periphery.[93]

Nevertheless, this call for a truly "international" IR, has not been fully materialized. There have been several structural obstacles for equal participation of the periphery in global knowledge production. Firstly, the knowledge production in the periphery is so immersed with the Western paradigms, that there is little room for originality.[94] Although there are significant IR communities in non-Western world, some with considerable material opportunities, there has been little independent theory-building in these places. Probably because they were the only game in town, core-produced theoretical tools, however much unfit they may be, were used by the non-Westerners in their attempts to understand, explain and solve the problems faced by the periphery. For example, in Japan, China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and all of Africa, a relatively realist orientation is dominant.[95] The area studies, where problems and experiences of the non-

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[92] Howard Wiarda, "The Ethnocentrism of the Social Science Implications for Research and Policy", *The Review of Politics* 43, (1981):163-197. Tony Smith, "Requiem or New Agenda for Third World Studies", *World Politics* 37, No. 4, (1985): 532-562.

[93] Tickner and Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship*; Alker and Biersteker, "The Dialectics of World Order".

[94] Tickner and Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship*; Ersel Aydınlı and Julie-Ann Matthews, "Are the Core and Periphery Irreconcilable? The Curious World of Publishing in Contemporary International Relations", *International Studies Perspectives* 1, No 3, (2000): 289–303. Drulak, "Introduction to the International Relations"; Josiah A.M. Cobbah, "African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective" *Human Rights Quarterly* 9, No 3, (1987): 309-331.

[95] Ole Wæver, "The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and

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Western world were most covered, theoretical engagement with data has been rare.[96]

The second obstacle is related to material conditions in the periphery. Defiencies in communication and differences in institutional structure, the language and the material conditions of teaching, publishing and conducting research, are not conducive to equal and productive participation of the periphery into global knowledge production about international relations.

Finally, there seems to be a neglect on the part of core IR scholars in hearing out the voices from the non-Western world. Western centered IR community mostly treated non-Western scholars are either "native informants"[97] or "social science socialized"[98], hence they are denied the status of knowledge producers. This was deemed similar to denying "the non-Western" agency status in conducting international relations. The claim for universality of core-based knowledge is accompanied by a normative stance where they are also considered to be superior to both political concepts and arrangements in non-Western parts of the world. Behera explains the reasons for lack of original theory building in India as follows:

European Developments in International Relations', *International Organization* 52, No 4, (1998):696. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline.*

[96] For examples of the degree and type of theoretical engagement within the non-Western world, see Ersel Aydınlı and Julie-Ann Mathews, "Periphery theorising for a truly internationalised discipline: spinning IR theory out of Anatolia", *Review of International Studies* 34, No 4, (2008): s. 693–712; Tickner and Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship;* Neuman, *International Relations Theory and the Third World.*

[97] Anna M. Agathangelou and L. H. M. Ling "The House of IR: From Family Power Politics to the Poisies of Worldism", *International Studies Review* 6, No 4, (2004): 31.

[98] Donald J. Puchala, "Third World thinking and contemporary International Relations" in *International Relations Theory and the Third World* ed. Stephanie G. Neuman, (London: Macmillan, 1998), 139.

> The structural reason why traditional IR in India has not, indeed, could not produce a non-western IR theory is because it has fought that intellectual battle on a turf chosen by the west, with tools designed and provided by the west and rules-of-game set by the west enforced, as they were, by not just its political and military might but more importantly, its all-pervasive discursive power.[99]

Despite these obstacles, the epistemological space provided by the third debate, improvements in the material conditions of research in non-Western world, and increasing cooperation between policy makers and academia instigated an increase in the number and geographical expansion of attempts to build theory out of local characteristics or contexts. With respect to IR, while certainly not absent before, such works have shown a steady increase in the past ten years. Works from Africa,[100] China,[101] Japan,[102]

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[99] Navnita Chadha Behera, "Re-Imagining IR in India" *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, No. 3, (2007): 341–368.

[100] Neuman, *International Relations Theory and the Third World*. Kevin C. Dunn ve Timothy M. Shaw, (ed) *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). Tandeka C. Nkiwane, "Africa and International Relations: Regional Lessons for a Global Discourse", *International Political Science Review* 22, No 3, (2001): 279-290. Kathryn C. Lavelle, "Moving in from the periphery: Africa and the Study of International Political Economy" *Review of International Political Economy* 2, No 2, (2005): 364-379.

[101] David C. Kang, "Getting Asia wrong: the need for new analytical frameworks", *International Security* 27, No 4, (2003): 57–85. Yaqing Qin, "Theoretical Problematic of International Relationship Theory and Construction of a Chinese School", *Social Sciences in China* (English Version), (2005): 62-72. Weixing Hu, Gerald Chan and Daojiong Zha, *China's IR in the 21th century*, (Lanham, Oxford University Press of America, 2000). Victoria Tin-bor Hui, "Toward a dynamic theory of international politics: insights from comparing ancient China and early modern Europe", *International Organization* 58, No 1, (2004): 175–205. Gerald Chan, *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis,* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999). Xinning Song, "Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics", *Journal of Contemporary China* 10, No 26, (2001): 61-74. Studies in Chinese language, which attempt to build a theory, are many, yet the fact that they are unavailable to non-speakers of the language prevents one from evaluating them in terms of their theoretical contribution.

[102] Takashi Inoguchi, "Are there any theories of international relations in Japan?" *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, No 3, (2007): 369-390. Graham Gerard Ong, "Building an IR Theory with `Japanese Characteristics': Nishida Kitaro and `Emptiness'", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33, No 1, (2004): 35-58. Susanne Klein, *Rethinking Japan's Identity and International Role: An Intercultural Perspective, (*London: Routledge, 2002). Takashi Inoguchi ve Paul Bacon, "The study of international relations

India,[103] and Latin America[104] have been developed out of particular
contexts, where knower, known and the place of knowing have a common -
usually geographically defined- aspect. These scholars attempted to theorize
for themselves and for their locally defined purposes.

These homegrown theories are like any other theory: homegrown
theories have concepts, suggest a particular relationship between those
concepts, and they rely on observation in support of their arguments. Hence,
what delimits homegrown theory from mainstream theories, are
independent from their formal structure. The distinctive quality of
homegrown theory stems from the *standpoint* they use in their formulation.
In other words, the novelty of homegrown theory comes from use of an
indigenous experiential standpoint in time, place or culture.

The theories dealt with in this chapter are selected based on the above
criteria, i.e. they should have a specific standpoint as their basis, they should
have concepts, suggest relationships between concepts and at least
illustratively deal with data. If authors do not support their arguments with

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in Japan: towards a more international discipline", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 1, No 1, (2001):1-20.

[103] Kanti Bajpai, "Indian conceptions of order and justice: Nehruvianism, Gandhianism, Hindutva and Neo-liberal" in *Political ideas in modern India: thematic explorations,* ed. Vrajendra Raj Mehta and Thomas Pantham (New York: Sage, 2006), 367-392. Amitav Acharya, "Why is there no NATO in Asia? The normative origins of Asian multilateralism," Harvard University Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Working Paper No. 05-05, 2005. Behera "Re-imagining IR in India". Benoy Kumar Sarkar "Hindu theory of international relations", *The American Political Science Review* 13, No 3, (1919): 400–414. Benoy Kumar Sarkar, "The Hindu Theory of the State", *Political Science Quarterly* 36, No 1, (1921): 79–90.

[104] Arlene B. Tickner, "Latin American IR and the Primacy of lo práctico," *International Studies Review* 10, No 4, (2008): 735-748. David L. Blaney,"Reconceptualizing Autonomy: The Difference Dependency Makes," *Review of International Political Economy* 3, No 3, (1996): 459–497. Arlene B. Tickner, "Hearing Latin American Voices in IR," *International Studies Perspectives* 4, No 4, (2003): 325–350.

data, then their conceptualizations are not scientific theories, but philosophical theories. Most scholars, who have a keen interest in building homegrown theories, suggest possible sources or starting points for such an attempt, but do not engage in rigorous data collection.[105] Without substantial engagement with data, however, these studies remain what they are, i.e. proposals for developing homegrown theories, not homegrown theorizing *per se*.

The following is a review of homegrown theory building attempts, grouped in terms of the standpoint they employ. Both within and across these groups, these theories have almost nothing in common. Their problematique, their ways of achieving originality, their resources for concepts, the forms of data they use are various and very much different. While this chapter presents these attempts and deal with their content, their differences are the subject matter of the next chapter.

2.4.1.   Russia

In many ways, the dominant approach in Russian IR is realism. Contrary to experiences in other countries where realist concepts are imported from the West, Russian realist school has developed rather independently even as early as late nineteenth century. In geopolitics, despite effected by the Western concepts, Russian scholars had a rather

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[105] See Amitav Acharya, "Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories Beyond The West" *Millenium: Journal of International Studies* 39, no. 3 (2011): 619-637, especially pp. 633-636 for Buddhism and Hinduism as possible sources of non-Western IRT. Behera "Re-İmagining IR in India." Chimni also enumerates possible sources but does not develop any of them into applicable conceptualizations. B.S. Chimni "Alternative Visions of Just World Order: Six Tales from India" *Harvard International Law Journal* 46, No. 2, (2005): 389-402.

independent thinking, which blended in norms and institutions as well. The same is true for Marxism, where Lenin adapted the German philosophy in an original way.

Once shaped by Marxist teachings on the one hand, and pressured by East/West dichotomy during the first half of the Cold War, late socialist and then post-socialist Russian scholars, has come "to conceptualize the two cultural entities as in dialogue with one another."[106] Engaging with Western perpectives, Russian IR theory has incorporated a few Western-derived concepts,[107] which gave way to Russian versions of related paradigms.

The adaptation of liberal concepts, however, has been mixed in terms of originality. Tsygankov and Tsygankov argues that while most liberal thinking in Russian IR is not only Western dependent, but also uncritically pro-Western, there is a national liberal school, where some Russian liberal scholars adapted liberal concepts to Russian experiences, interests and realities. For example, while pro-Western liberals think that U.S.-dominant institutions as a factor of peace/stability, national liberals draw both on international institutions and non-unipolar world as a means to achieve peace.[108] Unlike pro-Western liberals, national liberals emphasize the risks of globalization, while not denying the opportunities associated. While pro-Western liberals regard democratization in its Western form as a must,

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[106] Andrei P. Tsygankov "Self and Other in International Relations Theory: Learning from Russian Civilizational Debates" *International Studies Review* 10, No. 4, (2008): 762–775

[107] Alexander Sergouinin, "Russia: IR at a Crossroads" in *International Relations Scholarship* ed. Tickner and Waever, 224.

[108] Andrei P. Tsygankov ve Pavel A. Tsygankov, "A Sociology of Dependence in International Relations Theory: A Case of Russian Liberal IR", *International Political Sociology* 1, No 4, (2007): 318.

national liberals think that the process must reflect local conditions. As policy options, pro-Western liberals point to a full integration with the West, while national liberals opt for a pluralist Russia as cross-cultural synthesis, which is neither Western nor Eurasian oriented.[109]

Tsygankov and Tsygankov note that such division between pro-Western liberals and Russia's alternative liberals is built on a long historical dispute between so-called Old and New liberals. In the late 19th–early 20th century, the New liberals, saw Russia as a distinctively strong, but also socially responsible state. Therefore, today's national liberals are also products of a long indigenous intellectual tradition, giving birth to concepts where their Western meanings are transformed and acquired a context-specific one. Like current national liberals, the new liberals were progressive since they remained committed to reformist agenda, but they also opted for a strong Russian state which would assist the society during reforms at the domestic level and continuing to be a strong power in international relations. Therefore, both "nationalism" and "liberalism" acquire a different meaning in Russian context than that of employed by Western theorists. Kantian liberalist argument, which holds that republicanism will foster peace and cooperation between states, is not relevant with respect to Russian national liberalism, since liberalism is deemed as a way of empowering the state domestically and internationally balancing against unipolarity while maintaining distance and independence against major democratic powers.

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[109] Tsygankov and Tsygankov, "A Sociology of Dependence", Andrei P. Tsygankov and Pavel A. Tsygankov, "New Directions in Russian International Studies: Pluralization, Westernization, and Isolationism", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 37, No 1, (2004): 1-17.

Another home-grown theory building attempt from Russian IR, has been introduction of "grammatological geopolitics" by Kuznetsow.[110] Building on A. Toynbee's and more recently S. Huntington's theory of "clash of civilizations," Kuznetsow argues that division of civilizations into eight separate clusters based on denominational affiliations of the nations, might be further improved. While Huntington's theory proposes that the potential zones of conflict are the fault lines of these civilizations, Kuznetsov's grammatological geopolitics define civilizations in terms of the alphabets the nations use and argue that a much accurate prediction of conflicts can be attained by the resulting fault lines.[111] By looking at their alphabets, Kuznetsov identifies seven more, "smaller" sub-cultures, like Greek, Hebrew, Armenian, Georgian, Mongolian, Korean and Ethiopian. He argues that these subcultures are more prone to conflicts than civilizations because of their rather fast developmental potential. Unlike Huntington's, Kuznetsov argues, this new definition of civilizations explains wars better than Huntington's: Between Serbia (Cyrillic) and Croatia (Latin) in 1991-1995, as well as Georgia's (Georgian) war with Russia (Cyrillic) in 2008, South Ossethia (Cyrillic) in 1991-1992, 2004, and 2008, and with Abhazia (Cyrillic) in 1992-1993, 1998 and 2008.

In both cases of Russian attempts, a particularly Russian standpoint is used to redefine the concepts introduced in the West. While not entirely

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[110] Arthur Kuznetsov, "A New Model for Traditional Civilisations" *International Affairs* (Moscow) 41, No 4-5, (1995): 95-100.

[111] Artur Kusnezow "Die geopolitische Bedeutung von Kultur und Schrift" Lecture at the Institute for
European Constitutional Studies, *IEV-Online*, No.2, 17 March 2009, URL = http://www.fernuni-hagen.de/imperia/md/content/rewi/iev/kusnezowievonline2009nr2.pdf

original, Russian liberalism and grammotological geopolitics offer novel insights about international politics.

2.4.2.   China

Since 1990s, IR theory has become a highly debated field among Chinese scholars, and Western theories have created strong resonance.[112.] Critical engagement with the Western theories led to the agreement that "Western IR theory cannot solve all Chinese problems and puzzles –that Chinese should have their own theories to explain the world, especially to theorize Chinese diplomatic practice (or foreign policy)."[113]

As one of the ways to "building IR theory with Chinese characteristics" –as it is often termed in discussions- Chinese thinker, Hsun Tzu (Sun Tzu or Xun Zi) and his political teachings are considered as a source of understanding and explaining Chinese foreign policy behaviour.[114] Especially his thoughts on types of great powers and international order inspired frameworks to explicate China's "peaceful rise."[115]

For Xun Zi, the type of leader, nature of policy, and the resulting form of international order were three systemically consistent manifestations of one thing. There were three types of rulers: True King, whose power is based on morality and ethics irrespective of his military strength, hegemon

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[112] Yiwei Wang, "China: Between Copying and Constructing" in Tickner ve Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship*, 103-119
[113] Wang, "China", 107.
[114] Dawa Norbu, "Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations: The Centrality of Marginality" *Asian Survey* 37, No 11, (1997): 1084; Yan Xuetong, *Ancient Chinese Thought and Modern Chinese Power*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011).
[115] Yan Xuetong, "Xun Zi's Thoughts on International Politics and Their Implications", *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 2, No 1, (2008): 135–165

(Lord-protector), who is morally fair but also militarily strong, and Might (Powerful) whose power is solely based on military strength.[116] The type of international order is based on these three types of rulers. True King, "tries to win men" through ethics and mores, and establishes a peaceful and stable international order, based on voluntary submission of other states. Hegemon, on the other hand, tries to acquire allies through trust and honesty. Yet such international order comprises two zones; allies benefit from peace and stability, whereas enemies suffer disorder and chaos. Might tries to capture land through military power, which only leads to disorder and chaos.[117]

To determine the responsibilities and obligations of different nations, Xun Zi describes Five Ordinance System, which is a hiearchy of power between nations that are under the rule of the emperor. The obligations of nations are based on their geographical proximity to the emperor and their individual power status.[118] More distant and less powerful nations have less reesponsibilites, whereas closer and more powerful nations take on more responsibilities. Yan argues that for contemporary international system, a similar differentiation among states should be sought with respect to international norms: If a state's power status is more central, that state should be given extra responsibilities and should more strictly follow international norms. With respect to peripheral states, however, International norms should be applied more flexibly.[119]

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[116] Xuetong, "Xun Zi's Thoughts", 149.
[117] Xuetong, "Xun Zi's Thoughts", 138.
[118] Xuetong, "Xun Zi's Thoughts", 156-157.
[119] Xuetong, "Xun Zi's Thoughts", 164.

Xun Zi saw change in any nation's power and subsequent change in international politics as the direct result of leaders' ability to select talent.[120] Accordingly, Yan argues that an appropriate human resource strategy, is the main tenet of a successful rise. Firstly, "a high level of openness [in the recruitment] as regards selection of people from all over the world, based on high competence and moral standards enhances a government's ability to make the right decisions"[121] and increases its political power. Accordingly, rapid adjustment and corrective action to remove unqualified officials, would reduce the probabilities of decision-making errors. Based on Xun Zi's conceptions of power, Yan builds a formula to differentiate between different forms of power and their contribution to the nation's comprehensive power.[122]

$$\text{Comprehensive national power} = (\text{Military power} + \text{Economic power} + \text{Cultural power}) * \text{Political}$$

Figure 1 Xuetong's Formulation of Comprehesive Power

He differentiates his concepts of political power and cultural power from Western conceptions of soft power, and argues that while concept of soft power subsumes the two, but political power, which is based on the ability of decision-makers, is the decisive factor in determining nation's overall power, as shown in the formula.

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[120] Xuetong, "Xun Zi's Thoughts", 162.
[121] Xuetong, "Xun Zi's Thoughts", 162.
[122] Xuetong, "Xun Zi's Thoughts", 161.

Another attempt by a Chinese scholar to build homegrown theory is the adaptation of English School concepts to Chinese historical context by Suzuki.[123] Drawing on nineteenth century Chinese experience with the European powers, Suzuki states that Chinese incorporation into European international society a) is not a post-1980s phenomenon as claimed by most, and b) was counterproductive in terms of achieving a more benign pattern of relationship. Suzuki states that English School fails to acknowledge the role played by imperialism. When China was faced with the adoption of international law, the European diplomatic system, and participation in conferences, Chinese experience was one of growing suspicion and mistrust, not cooperation and socialization as English School might predict. As such, Suzuki points to the Eurocentric bias of the English school, in showing that non-Europeans' encounters with "civilized manners" of Europe might not lead to a more cooperative relationship which is based on a moral understanding of order, but might lead to adoption of a *realpolitik* defensive attitude by the non-European power, due to the imperialistic tone of the encounter.[124] As such Suzuki shows that "Western diplomacy" , an intermediary tool used in creation of a formation of international society, may not be seen as benign, and may lead to an opposite effect in different contexts. When integration to international society is regarded as an attempt to dominate, neither "international society" nor "diplomacy" retains the original meaning that is ascribed by English School theorists. In the Chinese context, "international society" is hardly different from international system,

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[123] Shogo Suzuki, "China's perception of International Society in the Nineteenth Century: Learning More About Power Politics?" *Asian Perspective* 28, No 3, (2004):115-144.
[124] Suzuki "China's perception".

since the social relations between states magnify the differences between states and aggravate the antagonism, let alone remedy it.

Another attempt to look at Western concepts in order to highlight their changeable meanings in Chinese context is Cai Tuo's work on global governance.[125] Cai defines global governance as a cooperation of official and non-official agents (domestic, international and transnational) over a global problem, who work within the borders of a country. Hence, he argues, global governance is internalized as transnational cooperation on national territory. Drawing on Chinese experience, he argues that in developing nations, civil society is usually weak, thus unable to project its influence transnationally. Moreover, sovereignty is a concern and they are mostly "apprehensive of non-territorial politics and globalism."[126.]Thirdly, they are accustomed to dealing with global problems through established intergovernmental institutions and mechanisms. Therefore, Chinese civil society takes part in transnational networks, only when the global problem in question is addressed locally. In most cases, Chinese government also takes part in these networks, since without state support or recognition, global governance is hardly effective.[127]

Cai argues that transnational cooperation at the national level is the only outlet for domestic civil society to learn how to increase its influence in addressing global problems. It is also a learning mechanism for domestic

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[125] Tuo Cai, "Global Governance: Chinese Angle of View and Practice" *Social Sciences in China* 25, No 2, (2004): 57-68.
[126] Cai, "Global Governance", 58.
[127] Cai, "Global Governance", 63.

government, where a top-down understanding of management is slowly giving way to more open one.

Through his analysis, Cai explains what global governance means in Chinese eyes, given historical, cultural and material circumstances the Chinese government and the civil society work. As such, he reveals the discrepancy between the developing societies and developed societies in terms of both attitude and ability. His analysis also offers practical guidance as to the improvement of civil society and argues that involvement of host state institutions may serve improving global consciousness and global values.

Homegrown theory building with respect to governance is also stimulated by Chinese conceptions of world order in ancient Chinese philosophy, which is inspired by Confucius and Mencius among others. As a system of both thought and belief, Confucianism shapes the thought patterns and practices of Chinese.

Confucian conception of international order is *Tianxia*, which means 'space under the heaven'. It designates a combination of nature, super-nature, and morality. It is basically a cultural concept, containing the system of morality, or "the way of the heaven."[128] It presents a distinct worldview, where harmony, rather than chaos or anarchy, is the default order of things.[129] Therefore "the metaphysical ground of Confucianism is that the

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[128] Qin Yaqing "Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?" *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, No.3 (2007): 313–340.

[129] Jeremy Paltiel, "Mencius and the World Order Theories" *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3, No. 1 (2010): 49.

nature of the universe is harmony or a process of harmonization. Conflict is not ontologically true."[130] This holistic worldview does not presuppose an *ego* and *alter*, rather everything is a continuation of ego. As such, conflict is neither inevitable nor natural.[131]

Qin argues that this holistic view of relations may prove more useful in understanding global world, contrary to the Western IR Theory's focus on "international-ness of world politics," which he claims, is a discussion of "politics in a non-world." Accordinlgy, in his attempt to explain East Asian governance practice, Qin draws on the Confucian philosophy, sociological theories, and theories about relational governance in business management, and argues that theories of International Relations focus on rule-based governance and excludes relational governance, which is "a process of negotiating socio-political arrangements that manage complex relationships in a community to produce order so that members behave in a reciprocal and cooperative fashion with mutual trust evolved over a shared understanding of social norms and human morality."[132]

Reviewing governance literature in International Relations, Qin Yaqing states that most theories of governance rely on a rule-based governance, with the underlying assumption that individuals are rational, cost-calculating actors with exogenous self-interests. Rules govern these individuals, and shape their preference ordering by setting opportunities

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[130] Qin Yaqing, "Development of International Relations theory in China: progress through debates" *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 11, No.2, (2011): 231–257.
[131] Yaqing, "Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?", 330.
[132] Qin Yaqing, "Rule, Rules, and Relations: Towards a Synthetic Approach to Governance" *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 4, No.2, (2011): 133.

and limitations. Yaqing argues that while in more individualistic societies, rule-based governance dominates, in communitarian societies, relational governance is the main practice. While elements of rule-based governance are rationality, egoism, and contractual rules, the essence of relational governance is composed of relationality, morality, and trust, all of which are drawn from Confucian philosophy. He argues that rule-based governance take tangible results as the objective, whereas relational governance emphasize process, i.e. maintaining a relationship which makes participation, strengthening of ties, and developing a shared understanding possible. He states that while a combination of both sorts are expected in each community; in individualistic Western societies rule-based governance dominates, whereas in communitarian East Asian societies, relational governance would dominate. He argues that ASEAN and APEC are not based on same governance model with the EU or NATO, but they are judged as ineffective when seen through rule-based governance models. The merit of ASEAN and APEC may not be achieving tangible results, but maintaining continuous dialogue and negotiation.

The specific parts of Qin Yaqing's theory of relational governance, is not original. He is inspired by business management studies which try to explain governance forms of Asian firms, but his conceptualization differs from theirs, in terms of his understanding of trust as a genuine social norm, rather than as another cost-reducing mechanism. He is not the first to introduce "relational" and "processual" ontology to the study of IR,[133] but

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[133] Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon argue that many constructivists are actually relationists. See, "Relations before States: Substance, Process and the Study of

his attempt to reconceptualize "relational" with respect to governance and criticize rule-based (and norm-based) governance with their focus on individualistic conception of interests and rationality is new. As such, elements of Confucianist philosophy, trust and morality, become the binding glue that integrate two theories from different disciplines.

The last and probably most developed example from Chinese efforts to build a home-grown theory out of Chinese practice is "theory of superficial friendship" by Yan Xuetong, who analyzed China-US bilateral relations from 1950 onwards, and tried to explain the "sudden deteriorations followed by rapid recoveries [which] have been the norm in China–US relations since the 1990s."[134]

He argues that fluctuating relations, characterized by "short-term improvements in China–US relations that have followed each short-term dip" are neither because of rising nationalism in China, nor attributable to Chinese overconfidence built upon China's fast economic growth.[13564]

Showing that the fluctuating pattern of China–US relations started after the Cold War, he argues that the discrepancy between hightened expectations of the two sides and the actual policy inclinations derived by their interests, was the underlying cause. He states that the good will by both sides actually worsened the balance in their bilateral relations, because it impeded their ability to pinpoint realistic policies based on their

World Politics", *European Journal of International Relations* 5, No. 3 (1999): 291–332.
[134] Yan Xuetong "The Instability of China–US Relations" *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3, No. 3, (2010): 263.
[135] Xuetong, "The Instability of China–US Relations", 264-266.

interests.[136] It actually gave way to establishment of a superficial friendship, "where two nations imagine that they have more mutually favourable than unfavourable interests, when the reality is the opposite. Inconsistency between knowledge and the reality is a main destabilizing factor in bilateral relations."[137]

He builds a typology of bilateral interests, and analyzes China-US bilateral interest based on such typology.

Table 1 Xuetong's Typology of US-China Bilateral Interests

	Same in Content	Different in Content
Mutually Favorable	Common Interests *Military Allies*	Complementary Interests *Trade Partners*
Mutually Unfavorable	Confrontational Interests *Maritime Disputes*	Conflicting Interests *Ideological Rivalry*

Xuetong states that with respect to different sectors of China-US relations, the ratio of mutually unfavorable interests to mutually favorable interests differ, which aggravates the inconsistency. With respect to security, there are more mutually unfavorable interests than mutually favorable ones. As regards to economy and culture, however, China and the United States have more mutually favourable than mutually unfavourable interests, so much so that Xuetong defines them as "cultural friends."[138]

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
[136] Xuetong, "The Instability of China–US Relations", 267-269
[137] Xuetong, "The Instability of China–US Relations", 280.
[138] Xuetong, "The Instability of China–US Relations", 274-275

He states that since Chinese and Americans are friends on an individual level, where people are more concerned about economic and cultural interests, there is optimism as to the future relations between governments. But at the government level, the focus is usually on politics and security, where mutually unfavorable interests dominate.[139]

Table 2 Patterns in US-China Relations over Time

	Mutually Favourable Interests > Unfavourable Interests	Mutually Favourable Interests < Unfavourable Interests
High Expectations of the Other's Support	Friendship (1978-1988)	Superficial Friendship (1995-2010)
Low Expectations of the Other's Support	Superficial Enmity (1971-1977)	Enmity (1950-1970)

Xuetong also differentiates between cooperation types. Both mutually favorable interests and mutually unfavorable interests can be the basis on which cooperation is established. He posits that whereas shared interests leads to positive cooperation, mutually unfavorable interests lead to preventative cooperation where each side try to hold the danger of their interests to their relationship at a minimum.

IR discipline in China is very rich in terms of attempts to build home-grown theories. The Chinese problematique seems to find peaceful but assertive ways to engage with the outside world, while maintaining integration at the domestic sphere. In the their search for novel conceptualizations, they either relying on ancient Chinese thinkers, redefine

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[139] Xuetong, "The Instability of China–US Relations", 275.

mainstream concepts through critical engagement, or put forward totally new concepts. Although the lively debates within Chinese IR are seldom in English, there is a certain level of interest in the core about the developments in Chinese IR.

2.4.3. India

In much resemblance to China, India is rich with local traditions and approaches to international relations. Kautilya, who was also regarded as an Indian Machiavelli,[140] has been a source of inspiration for attempts to reach at original conceptualizations. Before dwelling into individual conceptualizations, however, a brief summary of Kautilya's ideas might help to provide a background.

Kautilya wrote his famous work Arthastra (Science of Polity) after Alexander the Great's conquests of India, and explained the logic behind the building of the first empire in the Indian sub-continent.[141] His work was discovered in 1915, and presented to international academic community.[142] This early presentation, however, was not more than a description of Kautilya's ideas on state, war and foreign policy.

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[140] Herbert H. Gowen ""The Indian Machiavelli" or Political Theory in India Two Thousand Years Ago" *Political Science Quarterly* 44, No. 2 (1929): 173-192.

[141] Rashed uz Zaman, "Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Indian Strategic Culture" *Comparative Strategy* 25, No.3, (2006): 236.

[142] Benoy Kumar Sarkar wrote three pieces about Kautilya immediately after discovery of Arthastra, which are published in American Political Science Review and Political Science Quarterly. Sarkar, "Hindu Theory of International Relations", Sarkar, "The "Hindu Theory of the State" and Benoy Kumar Sarkar, "Hindu Political Philosophy", *Political Science Quarterly* 33, No 4, (1918): 482-500.

Kautilya's view of state comprised of six elements –Ministers, People, Fortifications, Armies, Treasury and Allies- at the center of which lies the king, *vijigishu*. Vijigishu is not an ordinary king but a "king desirous of fresh conquests." Kautilya's purpose is to lay bare the strategies to make the *vijigishu* a *chakravartin,"* universal monarch who can put an end to the perpetual struggle of the contending states and lead his army to the farthest horizon unchallenged."[143]

The vijigishu is at the centre of mandala, a State of Circle. Mandala operates through the law of *matsya-nyaya*, "the law of the fish" where "the big ones eat the little ones." Similar to Hobbessian nature, matsya-nyaya is a system in which territorial expansion and power consolidation is the only remedy against threats.

Mandala is a circular geographical construct, comprised of enemies and allies. The immediate neighbours of a state is the first circle and it is entirely composed of enemies, or *ari*. The immediate neighbour of *ari*, by the same logic, is the enemy of the ari, hence is likely to be *vijigishu's mitra* or friend. Mitra's are surrounded by ari-mitra (friend of the enemy) which are surrounded by *mitra-mitra.* Therefore, mandala resembles a chess board of whites and blacks, resembling aris and mitras of the central king. Kautilya differentiates between an ordinary *ari* and *parshnigraha,* rear enemy, which would attack only when the central king is attacked by another *ari*.[144] There is also the *madhyam,* a neutral neighbour and *udasina,* a neutral but very powerful non-neighbour.

[143] Zaman, "Kautilya," 236.
[144] Zaman, "Kautilya", 237

Based on this description of Mandala, Kautilya enumerates six-principles of foreign policy to *vijigishu*:

> (i) *Sandhi* (peace): "Whoever is inferior to another shall make peace (with him)."
>
> (ii) *Vigraha* (war): "Whoever is superior in power shall make war."
>
> (iii) *Asana* (neutrality): "Whoever thinks 'No enemy can hurt me, or am I strong enough to destroy my enemy' shall observe neutrality."
>
> (iv) *Yana* (march): "Whoever is possessed of necessary means shall march against his enemy."
>
> (v) *Samshraya* (seeking alliance or shelter): "Whoever is devoid of necessary strength to defend himself shall seek the protection of another."
>
> (vi) *Dvaidhibhava* (double policy): "Whoever thinks that help is necessary to work out an end shall make peace with one and wage war with another."[145]

Kautilya's principles are familiar to students of IR, with its emphasis on power and agression. Although his principles were prescriptions for achieving preponderance, they also resemble modern realist theories and may be interpreted as explanations how states behave. For example, *sandhi*: hegemonic peace theory, bandwagoning. *vighara*: offensive realism. *asana*: defensive realism. *yana*: offensive realism. s*amsharaya*: alliances, security regimes. *dvaidhibhava*: hard balancing. Nevertheless, it also has a few unheard conceptualizations such as covert and silent war.[146] Covert wars are those in which guerilla tactics are pursued, whereas in silent wars spies and magicians are used instead of armed forces.

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[145] Zaman, "Kautilya", 238.
[146] Zaman, "Kautilya", 237.

Kautilya's Arthastra has been of use to Indian IR scholars in two distinct ways. First group of work conceptually engaged with the Kautilya's teachings and tried to locate his ideas in a broader perspective. Nevertheless, they seldom presented empirical evidence for its contemporary relevance. The second group of scholars has drawn empirical evidence for Kautilya's relevance in contemporary Indian international relations, but they do not develop original frameworks from his concepts, but use them in their original form.

In line with the first type of engagement with Kautilyan thinking, Modelski argues that Kautilya's circle of states is a framework for understanding and explaining international system. He thinks Arthastra's high abstraction and relative lack of reference to the historical circumstances and events of the past, gives its concepts "a timeless quality."[147] Yet, in his analysis, he pertains to Kautilya's framework employing a Westphalian lens. For example, he argues that, Kautilya's ambitious king does not seek to take total control of the conquered territories, but expects simple obedience. Since the king gives up the opportunity to exercise exclusive sovereign rights on the conquered territory, he interprets the king's behaviour as similar to a hegemon. Moreover, conflating cooperation with submission, Modelski asks whether the Kautilya's state system was one of international order, where some sort of mutual understanding prevails. However, it is apparent that in Kautilya's framework, order is pursued as long as superiority of the conquering king is served. Since it is never a system of equal rights, cooperation is possible if and only if the weaker party is forced to do so. He

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[147] Modelski, "Kautilya", 550.

concludes that Kautilya's system of states does not resemble an international order, but an anarchy, which is remedied by relative stability in domestic sphere, provided by brahmans.

Other scholars who take an interest in Kautilya's thinking refer to India's contemporary foreign policy to explicate how his ideas shaped strategic thinking in India. Rashed uz Zaman, acknowledged that Kautilya's teachings were popular amongst Indian decision-makers and it is possible to trace its effect on India's policies.[148] He argues that Nehru was inspired by Kautilya's mandala, apparent in India's friendly relations with countries like Afghanistan, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, and its enmity with Pakistan and China during his time.[149] Moreover, India's military actions against the states of Junagadh (1948), Hyderabad (1949) and the Portuguese colony of Goa (1961) shows that Gandhian principle of non-violence was forsaken at the expense of Kautilyan *matsya-nyaya*. Uz Zaman argues that India's cold-War relations with the US, China and the Soviet Union were also illustrative of how Kautilyan principles of "neutrality against a powerful neighbour" and "seeking help from a distant but powerful non-neighbour." Although uz Zaman does not develop original concepts out of Kautilyan teachings, he illustrates how they might have shaped Indian foreign policy and strategic thinking.

Drawing on works by Indian scholars on international law and institutions, Chimni outlines six distinct visions of just world order. These perspectives are designated as establishment, left, Dalit, subaltern, anti-

[148] Zaman, "Kautilya", 243-244.
[149] Zaman, "Kautilya", 241.

modernist, and spiritual.[150]Chimni argues that each of this Indian
perspectives deal with issues central to international law and institutions
and that "they provide rich critical resources not only to think through
alternative strategies to establish a just world order, but also to
conceptualize its contours and content."[151]

However, his review of these six perspectives falls short of
delineating such contours in terms of IR theory. Rather than theorizing,
Chimni proposes policy prescriptions for makers of a new world order, i.e.
legislators of international practice, and highlights the priorities that they
should take into consideration. These priorities are regulation of
transnational corporations to ensure that it does not lead to creation of
international rules at the expense of host state's development objectives;
finding remedies for democracy deficit in international institutions; re-
strengthening ideas of sovereignty against intrusions from great powers or
international institutions; the need for a strategy of complex internationalism
to oppose "absolute power" in international relations; development of a
discourse on human rights as the only universal solution to protest against
the state; and spiritual transformation of peoples and institutions, which he
deems as vital as political/material reconfigurations for a just world order.[152]

Another compilation of Indian perspectives on world order, is by
Kanti Bajpai who reviewed four perspectives of Indian international
thought: Nehruvian internationalism, Gandhian cosmopolitanism, political

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[150] Chimni, "Alternative Visions", 389.
[151] Chimni, "Alternative Visions", 389.
[152] Chimni, "Alternative Visions", 401-402.

Hinduism or Hindutva and neo-liberal globalism.[153]While first three perspectives are originated in India, the fourth is gaining a foothold in Indian international thought more recently. He argues that Nehruvian internationalism is very similar to a Westphalian conception of order, yet it is differentiated by non-alignment. While Nehruvianism is not naïve in the use of force in international relations,[154]"Jawaharlal Nehru rejected power-politics and the Western concept of maintaining security and international order through balance of power."[155] Therefore, non-alignment was both a principle of exercising autonomy in foreign affairs, and an 'order-building' instrument through which a 'third' area of peace outside the two power blocs were to be created to secure the establishment of a just and equitable world order.[156]

Gandhian cosmopolitanism, with its emphasis on non-violence (ahimsa) presented a world order, where rights of the individuals, emancipation and freedom are prioritized. In Gandhian thought nation-state and nationalism was only an instrument to ensure human liberation from imperial powers, and state should be a radically decentralized body. International system was important to the extent that it gave way to a world order, where small, autonomous groups of people interact on the basis of non-violence, truth power and economic equity. Gandhian conception of

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[153] Bajpai, "Indian conceptions", 367.
[154] Bajpai, "Indian conceptions", 371.
[155] Behera, "Re-imagining IR in India", 346.
[156] Behera, "Re-imagining IR in India", 346.

world order was ontologically original in that it placed small communities as the primary actors of world politics.[157]

Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva, sees Hinduism as an overarching civilization, which comprises all peoples of Indian peninsula, irrespective of their religion, language, or caste. As Behera points out, Hindu culture embraces a non-dualistic mode of thinking, where belonging to one group does not necessarily lead to exclusion of another. Moreover, a person need not be "characterized as *first* a Hindu or a Muslim, or a monk. Select tenets of more than one religious faith could be simultaneously followed" (*emphasis original*).[158]Behera argues that exclusionary self-other dichotomy with respect to traditional identities was introduced by British, through figures, maps, numbers, i.e. census.

With respect to world order, Hindutva emphasizes civilizations. Yet, a hierarchy of civilizations is drawn, with Hindu civilization occupying the first place among other civilizations. Hindu conception of world order would be comprised of sovereign nations based on their indigenous culture under the framework of a global dharmic regime, rules and institutions which avert great power domination but succumb to universal tenets of Hinduism. Despite its focus on values, Hindutva does not ignore power, since material strength and civilizational greatness was deemed mutually dependent. Unlike Gandhian cosmopolitanism, Hindutva embraces inequality as a social fact, both domestically and globally.

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[157] Bajpai, "Indian conceptions", 375.
[158] Behera, "Re-imagining IR in India", 362.

Like China, India is very rich in terms of the philosophical resources to construct home-grown concepts. Unlike Russia, homegrown theorizers in India are less interested in redefining Western conceptions. The main problematique, on the other hand, is similar to those of Russian and Chinese IR: how to achieve autonomy and equality in international sphere. Prescriptions, rather than explanations dominate the homegrown theorizing attempts. As such, most of them offer world-views with principles to follow, rather than arguments about how one category of phenomena is related to another.

None of these worldviews however, was given much consideration in mainstream IR Theory. Behera argues that aside from its policy implications, "non-alignment was never accorded the status or recognition as a 'systemic' IR theory because it did not suit the interests of powers that be."[159]Nevertheless, this lack of engagement by mainstream IR, may result from the rather prescriptive nature of these world-views: as policy suggestions, they are evaluated by the decision-makers –rather than theorists- on the grounds of their pratical consequences, as opposed to their explanatory power. For example, even Nehru disregarded the ideas of Gandhi, which he found dangerous to sovereignty and security of the nascent Indian state. Similarly, Hindutva was deemed as a form of Indian fascism.[160]Therefore, despite the rich tradition and innovative practice, Indian home-grown theory attemtps have rather been less successful in terms of global reception.

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[159] Behera, "Re-imagining IR in India", 347.
[160] Prabhat Patnaik, "The Fascism of Our Times" *Social Scientist* 21, No 3-4, (1993): 69-77.

2.4.4. Latin America

Unfortunately, the works of most home-grown thinkers do not usually constitute a party in cutting edge theoretical debates of mainstream IR. Yet, Latin American contribution to political economy and international relations is one –if not the only- exception. Dependency theory, which emerged out of Latin American context in 1950s, argues that terms of trade for underdeveloped countries relative to the developed countries had deteriorated over time. This argument later led to world-systems theory by Immanuel Wallerstein.and adopted by neo-Marxist theorists of international relations.

Dependency theory emerged as a refutation of the central argument of modernization theory, which is: the values, institutions, and attitudes characterizing traditional society constituted the primary causes of underdevelopment.[161] Dependency theorists argued that "it is not internal characteristics of particular countries so much as the structure of the international system -particularly in its economic aspects- that is the key variable to be studied in order to understand the form that development has taken in non-communist industrializing countries."[162]

The development of Dependency School of Economics has emerged as a response to not only theoretical shorcomings of the modernization theory but also to economic policy failures of Latin American states. Dependency writers often identified themselves as being "unambiguously

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[161] Tickner, "Latin American IR", 736.
[162] Tony Smith, "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory" *World Politics* 31, No 2, (1979): 247-288.

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on the side of change in the South in order to benefit the poorest and most oppressed members of society there."[163]Failure of Latin American economies to attain self-sufficiency after the WWII was the driving force behind establishment of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) under the UN in 1948.[164] With economic development of Latin America as the primary motive, the analyses and recommendations by those who work under ECLA,[165]were the pioneers of dependency theory. They argued that "exogenous factors, namely, the international division of labor and the role occupied by the Latin American economies as primary goods exporters, produced asymmetrical relations between the large core countries and the nations of the periphery."[166]

The underlying theory behind dependkency studies was an economic one. Contrary to David Ricardo's thesis that free trade would benefit both parties because of the comparative advantage, Raul Prebisch, an Argentinian economist who worked as the first director of ECLA, argued that there is a "declining terms of trade" for Third World states, because peripheral nations had to export more of primary goods to get the same value of industrial exports. Through this system, all of the benefits of technology and international trade transfer to the core states.[167]

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[163] Smith, "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature", 248.
[164] Fernanda Beigel, "Dependency Analysis:The Creation of New Social Theory in Latin America," in *The ISA Handbook on Diverse Sociological Traditions,* ed. Sujata Patel (London: Sage, 2009), 189-200.
[165] The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNECLAC) Webpage, http://www.eclac.cl/cgi-bin/getprod.asp?xml=/noticias/paginas/4/43024/P43024.xml&xsl=/tpl-i/p18f-st.xsl&base=/tpl-i/top-bottom.xsl
[166] Tickner, "Latin American IR", 737.
[167] Joseph L. Love, "Raúl Prebisch and the Origins of the Doctrine of Unequal Exchange,"*Latin American Research Review* 15, No 3, (1980): 45–72.

Dependency theorists integrated Prebisch's thesis with their observations regarding Latin American society and the global relations of production. The expectations after the Second World War was that with the expansion of domestic market, the industrialization of the Latin American countries would get to a point where self-sufficiency and sustained growth would follow.[168] Dependency theorists argued that looking beyond domestic determinants of economic growth and development is not sufficient. An international outlook, which takes into account historical and sociological variables, along with interactions between and across domestic and international realms is also needed.

Although they rest on similar assumptions, there have been several approaches to dependency. While works of Paul Baran, Patrick Sweezy and Andre Gunder Frank added upto a North American originated neo-Marxist tradition of dependency, works by scholars from Latin America, like Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, constituted the structuralist tradition of dependency.[169]The main reason for disagreement between the two schools was the determinism associated with neo-Marxist accounts, which posit that external dependency relations inhibit any form of development.[170]Latin American structuralists argued that structures not only constrain the agents, but they are historically changed by them, so the pessimism of the North American scholars is exaggerated. For Latin

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[168] Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979)

[169] Matias Vernengo, "Technology, Finance and Dependency: Latin American Radical Political Economy in Retrospect", *Review of Radical Political Economics* 38, No 4, (2006): 551-568.

[170] Fernando Henrique Cardoso "The Consumption of Dependency Theory in he United States" *Latin American Research Review* 12, No 3, (1977): 7-24.

American structuralists, dependency and autonomy were two ends of a political continuum, as development and underdevelopment were two ends of the economic continuum. Therefore, dependency and development were not mutually exclusive. They argued that the local political elites in peripheral states have structured their domestic rule on a coalition of internal interests favorable to the international economic structure. Therefore, inernational capitalist structure, by itself, does not lead to a single form of depedency; it is raher the sociological consequences and the subsequent alliances which shapes the dependent status of the South.[171]

Since their elaboration focused on "historically changing relationships between specific national and international structures of political and economic domination, and political alliances and struggles among distinct social groups"[172]Latin American originated structuralist dependency theory could be applied to a wider scope of countries from economically developed ones in East Asia to underdeveloped countries in Africa.[173] The emphasis on alliances and struggles within and across national borders, made the theory more historically nuanced and more conducive to social change, at the expense of predictive power.

World system analysis is based on previous accounts of dependency theorists. For Wallerstein, current capitalist world-system is continually expanding by inclusion of people external to the system. Moreover, it is also deepened, by further polarization between the bourgeoisie and the

[171] Smith, "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature", 251.
[172] Tickner, "Latin American IR", 708.
[173] Vernengo, "Technology, Finance and Dependency".

proletariat. The polarization is due to the nature of capitalist system. Bourgeosie, determined to accumulate surplus to survive in the competitive system, needs further markets and new recruits to proletariat class. The new-comers are usually part-life-time working class, whose main income is the wages, but also able to support themselves through extra activies, like doing domestic work and growing vegetables in the backyard. Some receive gift income from relatives and neighbours. By this addtional support, the employer is able to give less than is required for the subsistence of employee. The additional support comes from either another producer or another employer, who give away the surplus they might have retained. Therefore, any core-periphery relationship may have consequences for another dyad, creating a complex web of interrelationships within and across borders.

This inequality between the receiver of and producer of surplus, lies at the core of dependency theory. It begins but by no means restricted to the economic realm, giving way to political systems. Core and periphery are used as adjectives to depict sides of the inequality. As such, state borders are mostly transversed in unequal relations. There are multiple layers of coreness and peripheriality, from which one can differentiate multiple dyadic relationships in different levels. Wallerstein states that there is a "lack of co-incidence between the economic processes and the state boundaries. That is the reason why unit of analysis for the world-systems analysis is the system, not individual states." [174]

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[174] Immanuel Wallerstein, "World Systems Analysis: Theoretical and Interpretative Issues,"

Wallerstein and his associates offer designing quantitative methodologies in order to account for their theories emprically. Unlike critical theory of inernational relations, their chosen methodology is not anti-positivist; on the contrary, they offer designing hypotheses in accordance with their theories, building empirical datasets and testing those hypotheses. Their methodological innovation consists of having world-systems as the unit of analysis, not the states, since they argue that the agents in the world-system are not confined to any state's borders.

Both dependency theory and world-system analysis is inspired by neo-Marxist school of economics. Wallerstein extended Marx's depiction of class and division of labour and applied it in a global level, where classes across state borders form groups, who behave as the structural determinants encourage and constrain them. As such, both are Marxist in origin, but the key concepts of Marxism are revitalized drawing on the experiences of late-coming capitalist socities; Latin America in the case of Dependency School, mostly Africa and Asia in world-systems analysis. Both schools had strong connections to disciplines of history and economy, and used their relevant insights, and applied them with a more nuanced focus on political and social relations within and between states. As such, the novelty they introduced does not stem from a break away with the Western-originated schools, nor from sticking to disciplinary boundaries, but from exactly the opposite. They combined the concepts that has already been built, but applied them in different levels, in different geographical contexts and introduced new

in *World-Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology*, ed. Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, (London: Sage, 1982), 92.

definitions of such concepts or reaarrange them in accordance with empirical findings.

2.4.5.   Japan

Japanese attempts at home-grown theorizing in IR is more recent compared to other countries and regions in this section. Like Chinese studies on Xun Zi and Indian studies on Kautilya, Japanese scholar Graham Gerard Ong draws on ideas by modern Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitaro, especially his "logic of emptiness."[175] in his attempt for defining international relations from within a Japanese perspective.

Ong begins by defining Chinese dialecticism which inspired the work of Nishida Kitaro. Distinct from Hegelian dialecticism, where contradiction is resolved, by thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis, Chinese dialecticism uses contradictions to understand relations between events, to transcend, integrate or sometimes embrace clashing viewpoints. Contrary to Western forms of knowing, which involve categorization and isolation, Chinese dialecticism sees objects and events constantly changing and rearranging themselves, constituting an irreducible whole. If any element of this whole is studied in isolation, it is considered prone to extreme and mistaken conclusions.

Nishida Kitaro, drawing on such dialecticism, argued that the act of knowing should not be separated from being known. Active reflective grasp and passive intuition, in which one is grasped by things, occur

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[175] Ong, "Building an IR Theory", 60.

simultaneously. Since Western dichotomy of Self and Other does not allow thinking in these terms, he argues for cultivation of a new relationship in which self and the world inter-act and inter-tuit each other. He then applies this to interaction of Japan with the West and notes that "I think we can distinguish the [W]est to have considered being as the ground of reality, the [E]ast to have taken nothingness as its ground'"[176] By having nothingness as the ground, Ong argues that, Nishida provided for a formation of identity for Japan, where self-other dichotomy no longer exists, and "through the emptiness of its culture, Japan was said to have the ability to assimilate all 'unresolved contradictions', including Western culture." Logic of emptiness also "allows it to 'eventually internalize its exterior and swallow the historical world into its totalising system'"[177]

By suggesting a concept of political being, Ong explains Japan's political behavior and identity in contemporary world. It also corresponds to other vocalizations of Japanese IR thought. For example, Ogata Sadako argues that the concept of interdependence which purports a mental image where transactions across borders take place are not conducive to Japanese thinking of IR. The process of "internationalization" on the other hand, is much more familiar, since it is "used to describe 'the current process of change taking place *in* Japan as well as the desired course of direction that Japan should follow' in its relation with other states and international

[176] Nishida Kitaro, quoted by Ong, "Building an IR Theory", 49.
[177] Iida Yumiko, *Rethinking Identity in the Modern Japan: Nationalism as Aesthetics,* (London: Routledge, 2002), 40, quoted by Ong, "Building an IR Theory", 52.

actor."[178] reflecting the twin process of inward and outward thinking in Kitaro's "logic of emptiness."

Apart from an explanatory motivation, Ong's re-conceptualization of Kitaro's ideas also prescribes a policy of identity for Japan in its foreign relations, therefore supplying an answer to post-WWII domestic discussion in Japan as to what it means to be Japanese.

Ong's reconceptualization of Nishida's ideas in the context of IR reflects a rather inward looking perspective, which is endemic to IR theorizing in Japan according to Inoguchi.[179] The main problematique of Japanese International Relations was to understand the dynamic that led to Japan's involvement and defeat in World War II, and how this defeat is related to Japan's limited international influence despite its huge economic capability.

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter began by the meta-theoretical dilemma intrinsic to "homegrown theorizing": how to build generalizable knowledge by focusing on the particular. A brief discussion on the place of values in (social) science and IR, however, revealed that "homegrown theory" is not only possible, but probably the most common form of theory production. All the knowledge production that has been made since the advent of the

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[178] Sadako Ogata, "Interdependence and internationalization", Glenn D. Hook and Michael A. Weiner (der.) *The Internationalization of Japan*, New York, Routledge, 1992, s. 63, quoted in Ong, "Building an IR Theory", 36.

[179] Takashi Inoguchi "Are There Any Theories of International Relations in Japan?" *International Relations of The Asia-Pacific* 7, (2007):369-390.

discipline was, as shown earlier, was indeed particularistic and parochial. Accordingly, the road to better theories is not aiming for "universal, objective truth", but to "increase objectivity" by multiple parochialisms.

These multiple parochialisms may help to increase "internationalness" of International Relations and contribute to the disciplinary knowledge in various ways. Firstly, a standpoint position may illuminate light upon different dimensions of some core concepts of international relations. More specifically, it can contribute to discussions about how 'domestic' and 'international' are intermingled, the relevance and power of state in a globalized world, the overall weight of ideational and material factors in international politics, sovereignty and its diverse definitions, the question of shifting loyalties, democratization and changing discourses on security at domestic, regional and global realms, as well as the place of norms and principles in international relations. While these are already hot topics, discussed by the mainstream IR, new concepts which reflect different shapes that they take in different political and regional contexts can provide novel insights. Secondly, it can present new issue areas and problems that mainstream approaches fail to see, due to conceptual shortcomings. Thirdly and most importantly, conceptualization of the ways, approaches and principles a mid-range power utilizes to overcome its domestic and international problems may provide a 'real-world' oriented, 'applicable' knowledge that might -at least partially- remedy the lack of practical guidance, which have plagued the critical approaches.

A homegrown theorizing endeavor, firmly based on a standpoint epistemological basis, may help acknowledge the inherent value-ladenness

of research, and establish truth claims, on the basis of their specific standpoint in time, place and circumstances. As the alternative to universalist schemes of mainstream IR, homegrown theorizers, may embrace situated knowledge, or a standpoint epistemology, which "proceeds from specificities and works upward to comparative generalizations, rather than downward from a priori assumptions."[180]

The sample of homegrown theory building attempts from around the world provided in this chapter, reveals that these theories originate from a practical and political need to conceptualize local experiences in an original manner. Even though most of theorists rarely acknowledge the underlying epistemological basis of their attempts, their distinctive quality is the result of the *standpoint* they use in their formulation. In other words, the novelty of homegrown theory comes from use of an indigenous experiential standpoint in time, place or culture.

Nevertheless, the homegrown theorizing attempts are widely differentiated in terms of not only their geographical origins, but also in their conceptual origins, theory-building methods, and data collection methods. While some of them redefine previously established mainstream concepts, others refer to culture-specific concepts. While most of them suggest a novel relationship between concepts, others reshape previously established relations between those concepts. While some refer to qualitative data to substantiate their claims, others use quantified data. This wide range of differentiation calls for a recategorization of these theories, apart from

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[180] Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "Presidential Address: The Imperialism of Categories: Situating Knowledge in a Globalizing World" *Perspectives on Politics* 3, No. 1, (2005): 5-14.

their geographical origins. Such recategorization may help to understand their particular strategies, i.e. methods, to build theories. Accordingly, the next chapter compares these methods against each other and assesses effiency of each theory building method in building better theories in terms of explanation, reception and applicability.

CHAPTER 3

METHODS OF HOMEGROWN THEORIZING

In the previous chapter, the political and epistemological basis for building a homegrown theory has been provided along with examples of homegrown theory building attempts from around the world. In this chapter, their methods of theory building are analyzed in order to find an appropriate methodology to theorize Turkish foreign practice.

Since every homegrown theory is a theory, the first part deals provides an analysis of theory in general, and provides main tenets of methodology of theory building. In the second part, I analyze the homegrown theories, and locate their specific methodology in building theories. In the third part, I provide a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of these methods in terms of their potential for further development, and conclude that quantitative analysis of data is the most appropriate method for initial collection of data. In the last part, I discuss quantititative analysis, with respect to its effectiveness in answering questions about Turkey's international affairs in a comprehensive manner.

3.1. Methodology of Theory Building

In philosophy of science, there are two basic approaches to theories. First one is a lingusitic approach, used by logical positivists, the second is a semantic approach.[181] Logical positivism, which dominated studies of political science and international relations as the underlying philosophy of science, posits that theory is a lingusitic entity, i.e. "a systematically related set of statements",[182] which can either be true or false. The semantic view, on the other hand, posits that theories are collection of models, which are representational maps of reality. Therefore, for semantic view, theories are collections of representations that are more or less similar to reality. [183]

3.1.1. Elements of Theory

In both linguistic and semantic approaches, the basic element of theories is *concept*s. They are classes of phenomena with respect to a specific property.[184] Since concepts organize phenomena with respect to their properties, concepts are abstractions in the form of definitions. Descriptions can be categorizations, classifications, taxonomies or typologies. A theory, which only has such descriptions, is a descriptive theory. Since descriptions are axiomatic, that is, presupposed, descriptive statements are the purely

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[181] Kevin A. Clarke and David M. Primo "The Theoretical Implications of Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models" Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago IL, September 2004.

[182] Richard S. Rudner, *Philosophy of Social Sciences*, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966), 10.

[183] Clarke and Primo "Theoretical Implications", 12.

[184] Elizabeth Steiner, *Methodology of Theory Building* (Sydney:Educology Research, 1988).

philosophical.[185] However, since the objects of theory-building are ideas, there can be no theory with concepts; and since all concepts are philosophical abstractions, this philosophical level is also theoretical. For example, a discussion of "power" on the basis of its definiton is a philosophical-theoretical endeavour.[186]

In empirical sciences, however, theories move beyond definitions, they also have an explanatory component. Explanatory theoretical statements are descriptions of contingent relations between properties of the object of the study.

Figure 2 Elements of Theory

As with theories, two approaches to theory also have different views about models. Model is something that bears a similarity to something else. "Model-of" is derived from observation of phenomena. For example, a road map that is drawn looking at the actual roads in the terrain is a model-of roads.

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[185] Nuri Yurdusev, "'Analiz Seviyesi' ve 'Analiz Birimi' bir Ayrım Argümanı" *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 4, no. 16 (2008): 3- 19.
[186] Yurdusev, "Analiz Seviyesi", 5.

Figure 3 Semantic View of Models (Models of Data)

There are also models-for, which are derived from theories, so that theories are operationalized in the empirical world. For example, rational choice model is derived from assumptions of rationality, unifiedness of actors, etc. and applied to decision-making in foreign policy. For logical positivism, a model is a model-for, that is, models are derived from theories and they inform subsequent hypotheses.[187] Hence, they are usually models-for-data collection.[188] In semantic approach, models are models-of-data, [189] ie. descriptions of *relations* between concepts, not in the forms of statements, but by representational maps.

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[187] Jim Granato and Frank Scioli, "Puzzles, proverbs, and omega matrices: The scientific and social significance of empirical implications of theoretical models (EITM)" *Perspectives on Politics*, No. 2, (2004): 315; Rebecca B. Morton, *Methods and models: A guide to the empirical analysis of formal models in political science* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 280.

[188] Gary King, Robert Owen Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[189] Roman Frigg and Stephan Hartmann, "Models in Science", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/models-science/>

Figure 4 Logical Positivistic View Of Models (Models for Data Collection)

3.1.2.   Reasoning in Theory

Every theory in science has to have a mechanism, a type of reasoning, which makes scientific inference from empirical phenomena possible. The reasoning makes relationship between abstracts (concepts and their relationships) to empirical observation, possible. With respect to reasoning, the English philosopher Francis Bacon stated that

> There are and can exist but two ways of investigating and discovering truth. The one hurries on rapidly from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms; and from them as principles and their supposed undisputable truth derives and discovers the intermediate axioms… The other constitutes its axioms from the senses and particulars, by ascending continually and gradually, till it finally arrives at the most general axioms, which is the true, but unattempted way.[190]

In both cases, the process of linking theory to observation begins by observation. In the first case, the theorist observes a few particulars, then

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[190] Francis Bacon, *The New Organon and The Related Writings*, trans. F. Anderson (New York: Liberal Arts Press,1960), 43.

forms theory (the most general axioms) from which hypotheses (intermediate axioms) are derived. This is usually called *deduction*. In the second case, the theorists observe a few particulars, then form hypotheses from least general to most general. This is usually called *induction*.

Over time, philosophers extended and developed these two basic forms of reasoning. Carl Hempel argued that an event can be explained by "covering" it under a law. For him, one of the ways this can be done is through the 'deductive-nomological model' in which explanation of the observed event is deduced from a *a priori* general law.[191] The second way is 'inductive-statistical model' in which statistical laws based on probabilities are established by observation of events.[192]

While induction and deduction are two basic forms of reasoning, neither of them is unanimously accepted as the appropriate form for scientific inference. With respect to induction, the philosophers who favor deduction claimed that since exhaustive induction is impossible –one cannot observe every single instance of his/her object of study-, any generalizations through induction would be unreliable. Even with statistical models, where probabilities are established, the outcome would be a statement that two concepts are interrelated. Therefore an explanation of the phenomena is not sufficiently presented. For example, in international relations, although there is a statistically significant negative relationship between war and

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[191] Steve Smith " Positivism and Beyond" in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond,* eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 15.
[192] Steve Smith, " Positivism and Beyond", 15.

democracy, such relationship only does not lend itself to a sufficient explanation of why this is the case.

On the other hand, deduction is also criticized for its exclusively rationalist focus. Since engagement with empirical evidence is a requisite of scientific inference, pure deduction based on reason, is not sufficient.[193] To overcome this problem, Karl Popper introduced hypothetico-deductive model of scientific inference. Since building concepts out of induction is deemed unreliable, Popper suggested that hypotheses are formed through "intuition" but then they should be either confirmed or disconfirmed by inductive process, i.e. by testing those hypotheses through looking at particulars, which are gathered through induction.

Figure 5 Hypthetico-Deductive Model of Scientific Inference

Nevertheless, hypothetico-deductive model does not help to build concepts or theories, but only to test them. Popper argued that scientific theories arise "genetically in many different ways, and the manner in which a particular scientist comes to formulate a particular theory may be of biographical interest, but it is of no consequence as far as the philosophy of

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[193] Clarke and Primo, "Theoretical Implications."

science is concerned."[194] Refinement and improvement of theory is possible, but hypothetico-deductive model does not offer explanations as to how one comes to build concepts at the first place.

In addition to deduction and induction, philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce introduced the concept of *abduction* as a form of reasoning through which theories are built. While induction is to make generalizations about the population by looking at the sample, and deduction is to attribute pre-conceived properties of the general to the sample, abduction "consists in examining a mass of facts and in allowing these facts to suggest a theory. In this way we gain new ideas; but there is no force in the reasoning"[195] Peirce argued that abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis, and that it is the only operation which introduces any new idea, because induction is only reliable in testing an existing hypothesis, while deduction is probable in an already established closed system of logical calculus. As such, "deduction proves that something *must* be; Induction shows that something *actually is* operative; abduction merely suggest that something *may be*."[196] For Peirce, there is no justification for abduction, since it is only a suggestion, from which deduction can draw a prediction, that would be tested by induction.

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[194] Stephen Thornton, "Karl Popper", Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2013 Edition), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/popper/>.

[195] Charles Sanders Peirce, "A Letter to Calderoni" in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce- 8*, ed. Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1931), 209.

[196] Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce- 5*, ed. ", Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1931), 171-172.

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  │ │                    ╭──────╮                                             │
  │ │ UNIVERSE          Sample B  ◄ Hypothesis Testing  Hypothesis (Prediction) │
  │ │                    ╰──────╯          ──────────►         ▲              │
  │ │                               INDUCTION (III)       DEDUCTION (II)       │
  │ │        ╭──────╮                                                         │
  │ │       Sample A      Hypothesis Forming                                  │
  │ │        ╰──────╯           ──────────►  Hypothesis (Emergent Theory)      │
  │ └────────────────────────ABDUCTION (I)─────────────────────────────────┘  │
  └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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
Figure 6 Types of Scientific Inference

From the discussion on abduction, one can conclude that the preliminary step in building any new theory is observation of a sample of facts. Indeed, what logical positivists (i.e. deductivists) suggest in terms of the origin of theory, i.e."intuition", is not different from a process of abduction from observation. Inductivists also emphasize observation as the only source of scientific knowledge. Abduction also fits in the actual daily process of making generalizations through observation.[197] As Verba suggests, building theory in political science is impossible without "knowledge of prior work on the subject and the collection of some data."[198] Therefore, as the first step of theory-building, one should also look at methods of observation.

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[197] Evan Heit "Properties of Inductive Reasoning" *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review* 7, No. 4 (2000): 569-592

[198] Gary King, Robert Owen Keohane and Sidney Verba *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 19.

3.1.3.   Methods of Observation

A third dimension of theory building is observation. In most cases observation is analyzed as a phase of theory-testing, and separate from theory-building. However, as explained in the previous section, observation is an intrinsic part of abduction, i.e. to discern possible relationships between concepts. Therefore, observation and the data that is generated through observation is important not only in terms of testing theories, but also building them.

Two general approaches to generate data in social sciences are qualitative and quantitative approaches. Based on numerical measurements of properties of specific phenomena, quantitative researchers "abstract from particular instances to seek general description or to test causal hypothesis." Most quantitative research lends itself to be replicable by other researchers.[199]

Qualitative research, on the other hand, does not rely on numerical measurements, but provide verbal accounts of particular events. "Such work has tended to focus on one or a small number of cases, to use intensive interviews or depth analysis of historical materials, to be discursive in method, and to be concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account of some event or unit."[200]

Beyond this general division, however, it is hard to depict a single method as exclusively generating quantified or non-quantified data. For

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[199] King et. al. *Designing Social Inquiry*, 3.
[200] King et. al. *Designing Social Inquiry*, 4.

example, case study method is usually regarded as a "qualitative method". However, as long as the data generated through case study research is quantified, it can also be a "quantitative method."[201] For example, an analysis of US-Soviet cooperation is a case study of international cooperation. But if the cooperation behavior of the US-Soviet dyad is quantified on a continuum, such case study generates quantitative data. Another example can be content analysis. The data generated by content analysis can either be quantitative or qualitatitive. Therefore, the use of "quantitative" and "qualitative" as adjectives before method or data requires more elaboration.

A scientific method is usually a data processing mechanism to deal with raw data and translate them into processed data, from which patterns can be discernible.[202] Raw data as well as the processed data may either be qualitative and quantitative. Therefore, types of data analysis methods can be illustrated as follows:

[201] Larry M. Dooley, "Case Study Research and Theory Building" *Advances in Developing Human Resources* 4, No. 3 (2002): 335-354.
[202] Harvey Russell Bernard *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2000), 419.

Table 3 Types of Data and Data Analysis

Raw Data / Processed Data	Numerical	Non-numerical
Numerical	Quantitative Analysis of Quantitative Data	Quantitative Analysis of Qualitative Data
Non-numerical	Qualitative Analysis of Quantitative Data	Qualitative Analysis of Qualitative Data

In international relations, examples for qualitative analysis of qualitative data are "ethnography, elite interviews, macrohistorical analysis, and 'qualitative comparative analysis' based on Boolean and fuzzy set methods."[203] In these methods, raw data in the form of verbal statements are translated into verbal processed data. Some of the case study research is also in this group.

Quantitative analysis of qualitative data is to translate verbal record of events, units into numeric form. Surveys, with closed ended questions are of this sort. Freedom or democracy indexes are also similarly developed.

Qualitative analysis of quantitative data is when raw numerical data is processed into non-numeric form. Research that produce graphs, schemas, maps or visualization of any other sort from numerical data is in this category. Translation of numerical foreign trade or foreign aid data to graphic form is an example. In some cases, this sort of analysis follows from quantitative analysis of qualitative data.

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[203] Jack S. Levy "Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference" *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25, no. 1 (2008):1–18.

Quantitative analysis of quantitative data is conducted when inferential-statistical methods are used to infer patterns from numerical data.

As explained in the prevous section, observation is required in the first and third phases, in scientific studies: the initial observation which would lead to form an emergent theory (I –Abduction) and when deduced hypothesis is being tested (III-Induction). In the first phase, the observation can comprise of raw (unprocessed) data or processed data (either qualitative or quantitative). In the third phase, however, usually processed data (either qualititative or quantitiative) is required. Since our focus is on theory building, only observation in the first phase is dealt with.

For theory building purposes, qualitative and quantitative data has different merits and disadvantages. Most "leaps of abduction" is usually done after observing raw data. These data are usually presented as illustrations of emergent theory. In international relations, for example, plausibility probe case studies, which "fall short of the degree of detail needed either to explain a case fully or to test a theoretical proposition" are used to illustrate "the empirical relevance of a theoretical proposition by identifying at least one relevant case"[204]

This form of qualitative raw data facilitates a faster formulation, provides a pilot study, reduces costs and saves energy. On the other hand, more rigorously processed data may prove more useful for identifying patterns. Quantitative analysis allows for a larger number of observations, and makes possible to identify patterns between properties of phenomena.

[204] Levy, "Case Studies", 6-7.

For example, Rosenau argues that even in a single country study, if number of observations are sufficient, one can infer patterns embedded in a number of data points across-time.[205] Moreover, quantitative analysis is easier to replicate, which increases the chances for criticism and development of the emergent theory by other researchers.

Qualitative analysis of data, on the other hand, provides rich details, and provides a greater diversity.[206] As such it may help to think about more carefully about the operationalization or definition of concepts. It can also help to generate different concepts, which may have been overlooked in extant theories. However, they may be less facilitating in identifying patterns since too much diversity in data may not be conducive to inference.[207]

Therefore, while qualitative analysis is more useful in developing conceptual (definitional) component of theories, quantitative analysis is more useful in explanatory component of theories, i.e.establishing relationships between concepts.

3.2.   Homegrown Theorizing as Theory-Building

In previous chapter, several homegrown theory building attempts from all over the world were indentified. These homegrown theories are like

[205] James N. Rosenau, "Toward Single-Country Theories of Foreign Policy: The Case of the USSR" in *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy,* ed.
Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr. and James N. Rosenau, (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 53–74,

[206] Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield" *Comparative Political Studies* 40, No. 2 (2007): 178.

[207] Heit "Properties of Inductive Reasoning," 570. See Table 1, "Touchstone Results in Inductive Reasoning"

any other theory: they have concepts, suggest a particular relationship between those concepts, and they rely on observation in support of their arguments. All of them originated from a specific community who share a sociological standpoint. All authors built on such standpoint in their production of novel knowledge and particularly draw their data from the part of the world they experience. While all pursue originality in concept-building, they vary in their way of achieving originality.

Nevertheless, the common characteristics of homegrown theories end there. Their conceptual origins, theory-building methods, and data collection methods differ fundamentally. Some of the scholars build on works by local thinkers, writers or scholars of a different discipline and operationalize their previously developed concepts with an IR outlook. Most of these studies refer to indigenous intellectual and/or philosophical approaches as the starting point of their theoretical framework. Second group of scholars transform mainstream Western ideas or concepts in a manner that it is no longer part of the mainstream, since they reflect indigenous meanings attached to them by particular societies. The third group of theorists develop their concepts out of local values and commonly used concepts of daily life and use them in an IR theory framework. Each of these ways resembles how international relations concepts have developed in the West. Following is a table of previously illustrated homegrown theories, categorized in terms of the above parameters.

Table 4 Homegrown Theories and Methodology

Country/ Region	Theorist	Concept	Data	Form of Data	Concept Borrowing (Specific Source)
Russia					
	Kuznetsov	Grammatological geopolitics	Ethnic conflict in Europe and Caucasia	Qualitative	Redefiniton of Western Concepts (Huntington)
	Tsygankov and Tsygankov	Russian liberalism	Russian foreign policy	Qualitative	Redefiniton of Western Concepts (Russian liberal tradition)
China					
	Yan Xuetong	Power	China's Peaceful rise	Qualitative	Redefiniton of Homegrown Concepts (Xun Zi)
	Yan Xuetong	Superficial friendship	China-US relations	Quantitative	Original Concepts
	Cai Tuo	Global governance	Chinese experience in global governance	Qualitative	Redefiniton of Western Concepts (global governance literature)
	Qin Yaqing	Relational governance	Chinese Foreign policy	Qualitative	Redefiniton of Western Concepts (TC Confucianism)
India					
	Rana	Non-alignment	India's non-alignment policy	Qualitative	Redefiniton of Homegrown Concepts (Nehru) [208]

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[208] Rana, (1969) considers non-alignment as a balance of power strategy, based on security and interest. Nevertheless, interest and security is understood as identical with those of international society. Siddharth Mallavarapu, "Development of International Relations Theory in India: Traditions, Contemporary Perspectives and Trajectories" *International Studies* 46, no.1-2, *(*2009):165-183

Table 4 (Cont'd)

(as portrayed in Bajpai and Behera)	Political Hinduism (Hindutva)	Global dharmic regime	Indian history and culture	Qualitative	Homegrown Concepts (Hindu texts)
	Rashed Uz Zaman	Kautilyan Principles	India's foreign policy	Qualitative	Homegrown Concepts (Kautilya)
	Mohammed Ayoob	Subaltern realism	Conflict in the Third World	Qualitative	Redefiniton of Western Concepts (Subaltern school, classical realism)
Latin America					
	Cardoso	Dependency	Latin American experience with capitalism	Quantitative	Original Concepts
	Wallerstein	World-systems	African experience with capitalism	Qualitative	Redefiniton of Western Concepts (Marxism)
Japan					
	Gerard Graham Ong	Logic of Emptiness	n's foreign policy	Qualitative	Homegrown Concepts (Nishida Kitaro, Buddhism)

While initially, the above sample of theories is selected as *attempts* at homegrown theories, now it is possible to analyze them with greater depth. As stated earlier, the preliminary step in building any new theory is observation of a sample of facts. The data used at first phase of (I. Abduction) theory building, should be based on indigenous experience. This alone, however, is necessary but not sufficient for a theory to be called as homegrown theory. The distinctive character of homegrown theories lies in its translation of the novelty derived from data into concepts.

Figure 7 Methodology of Homegrown Theory-Building

The second step is building concepts. After the researcher collects data, and then he/she may prefer to conceptualize his/her own homegrown theory (A). In other cases, s/he prefers to engage with some pre-existing conceptualization on the basis of his/her findings, in other words, homegrown theorizers may borrow from previously established concepts. As long as some novelty has been attained; borrowing does not disqualify homegrown theorizing.

Borrowing concepts occurs in three ways. Theorists may borrow from mainstream theories. If they restructure mainstream concepts, then they may qualify as homegrown theory. (B) This can either be done through redefinition of concepts, or applying them in a different level of analysis. If there is not a restructuring, then it is not homegrown theorizing, but mere application, which either refutes or confirms the original mainstream theory. They may also borrow from homegrown conceptualizations (indigenous philosophies, ideas, culture). This can be done with (C) or without any restructuring (D). If there is no restructuring, the resulting homegrown theories are mostly vague, and hard to generalize across places.

In some cases, the resulting theories are derived from a combination of both mainstream and homegrown conceptualizations. So, while categorizing them, one should look at the resulting homegrown theory, and determine the primacy of such pre-established concepts in bringing about its distinctive novelty. If its distinctive novelty comes from previous indigenous conceptualizations, then they are categorized as redefinitons of homegrown concepts, if it comes from mainstream theories, then it is categorized as redefinitions of mainstream concepts.

Finally, the proposed relationship between concepts can either be original or non-original. Coming from original concepts guarantees originality of the theory, but borrowing from either mainstream or homegrown conceptualizations do not necessarily lead to original theory production. Therefore, all these attempts should also be analyzed in terms of the originality in the proposed relationship between concepts. The following is systematic categorization of homegrown theory building pathways through all three levels.

I. A. X. *Authentic Homegrown Theory Building*: This way, original concepts are established out of local experience and an original relationship is proposed. e.g., Theory of Superficial friendship and dependency theory.

I. A. Y. Not Applicable (If concepts are original, there is no way that the explanatory component can be non-original)

I. B. X. *Homegrown alteration of mainstream theories.* It is usually redefinition and application of an extant concept in a different level of analysis. Examples are world-systems theory and relational governance. In other cases, concepts are rearranged in a different manner. For example, in subaltern realism states are categorized as subaltern and non-subaltern. Subaltern states are in the process of nation-building, and have different security environments in which security of state and security of people reinforce each other. The resulting theory offers novel insights, but alters an extant theory. This group of theories is semi-homegrown.

I. B. Y *Homegrown Improvement of Mainstream Theory:* In these cases, the extant concepts and their relationship remain same, but defined in different manner. For example Kuznetsov defines civilization in terms of alphabet, Tsygankov defines liberalism in line with Russian experience. The resulting theory is not actually homegrown theory, but an homegrown improvement of mainstream theory.

I. C. X. *Referential Homegrown Theory Building:* Ideas of a homegrown thinker/culture are redefined to make inferences from homegrown experiences. Redefinition helps to make homegrown ideas more relevant for contemporary phenomena. Example, Xuetong redefines power in line with

Xun Zi's ideas to account for China's "peaceful" rise. Such redefiniton helps to explain why accumulation of power does not lead to conflictual balancing behaviour.

I. C. Y. *Mainstream Assimilation of Homegrown Theory* In this case, homegrown concepts are redefined in a way that the resulting explanation is subsumed under a mainstream theory. For example, Rana treats non-alignment as a form of balancing, which emanates from interests and security considerations. The resulting theory is not homegrown.

I. D. X. *Insular Homegrown Theory Building* In these cases, homegrown ideas are not redefined, but employed without change**.** Although the resulting explanation is original, it is mostly vague to non-indigeneous researchers, and hardly generalizable. Examples are Hindu understanding of global dharmic order and Ong's "Logic of emptiness." The resulting theory is homegrown, but unlikely to generate further development.

I. D. Y *Anachronistic Assimilation of Homegrown Theory* In these cases, homegrown ideas are not redefined, but employed without change**,** but still the resulting explanation is subsumed under a mainstream theory. For example, Rashed Uz-Zaman, states that Kautilya's principles dictate Indian foreign policy. But since "Kautilya was a realist" Indian foreign policy can also be explained through realism. The resulting theory is not homegrown. It is assimilated into mainstream theory by way of anachronism.

3.3. Evaluation of Homegrown Theory Building Attempts

From above categorization, one can discern that; only three group of homegrown theory building attempts satisfy the criteria to be emergent home-grown theories. These are Authentic Homegrown Theories, Referential Homegrown Theories, and Insular Homegrown Theories. Following is an assesment of these types of theories.

Table 5 Emergent Homegrown Theories

Theory Type	Theorist	Major Concepts	Data Source	Data Type	Concept Type
Authentic Homegrown Theory	Cardoso	Dependency	Latin American experience with capitalism	Quantitative	Original Concepts
Authentic Homegrown Theory	Yan Xuetong	Superficial friendship	China-US relations	Quantitative	Original Concepts
Referential Homegrown Theory	Yan Xuetong	Power	China's Peaceful rise	Qualitative	Redefiniton of Homegrown Concepts (Xun Zi)
Insular Homegrown Theory	Gerard Graham Ong	Logic of Emptiness	Japan's foreign policy	Qualitative	Homegrown Concepts (Nishida Kitaro, Buddhism)
Insular Homegrown Theory	Political Hinduism (Hindutva)	Global dharmic regime	Indian life and culture	Qualitative	Homegrown Concepts (Hindu texts)

There are many established criteria to evaluate theories. Parsimony, predictive power, explanatory power, coherence, completeness, tentativeness (sometimes termed as testability or falsifiability), and applicability are some of them. In international relations, no single IR theory qualifies for all criteria. They are mostly ideals that theorists try to attain. For the purpose of evaluating an emergent theory in terms of its potential for development, a few of these criteria are more relevant than others. These are explanatory power and applicability.

At the onset, no new theory is complete or accurate. Since an emergent theory needs continuous refinement and development, it should be applied, and confirmed or disconfirmed by other researchers, which makes theory building a collective exercise. Therefore, for development of any emergent theory, other researchers' engagement with the concepts is necessary. More engagement helps clarify, transform and refine the concepts, so that the theory would account for more of the empirical observations. Applicability of the emergent theory is important for its later development.

Since building a robust theory requires engagement, the foremost quality of a new theory is that it can be understood and applied by other researchers. As Lynham points out, "an important function and characteristic of theory building is to make these explanations and understandings of how the world is and works explicit and, by so doing, to

make transferable, informed knowledge for improved understanding and action in the world tacit rather than implicit."[209]

When assessed in terms of their applicabiltiy, Insular Homegrown Theories are poor canditates. For example, "logic of emptiness" used by Gerard Ong, fails short of transmiting to the mind of the reader, one is confused where one can apply "logic of emptiness" to foreign policy behaviours of states. How can we infer from our empirical observations that the logic of empiness is at work? Original concepts are good, but those whose meaning is too blur for others to understand are unproductive.[210]In the Japanese case, "the logic of emptiness" is hard to grasp, more so if one thinks of how it can be applicable to foreign relations of a state. If nobody else is able to apply the concept, then the theory is doomed to isolation, and its development would halt. Referential Homegrown Theories have more potential for applicability than Insular Homegrown theories, but it is dependent upon theorist's level of capacity for clarification. A poor clarification of concepts may limit its transferability to the people cognizant of the referent culture or ideas. Limited transfreability may also be one of the reasons why such theories are only discussed within communities of culturally homogenous scholars. Applicability of Authentic Homegrown Theories, on the other hand, also depends on author's particular capacity for clear articulation.

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[209] Susan A. Lynham "The General Method of Theory-Building Research in Applied Disciplines" *Advances in Developing Human Resources* 4, No 3, (2002): 223.
[210] Stephen M.Walt, "The Relationship Between Policy and Theory in Internnational Relations" *Annual Review of Political Science* 8, No 1, (2005): 28.

Closely associated with applicability is capacity for generalization, i.e. explanatory power. If theory is highly applicable to other cases, then its explanatory power is high. Definitions of concepts should be clear, and distinct but they should not be too specific which would inhibit their applicability to phenomena found in various environments.

Explanatory power is an important concern for emergent theories for further development. Although homegrown theories are based on indigenous experience, any theory with too limited a capacity for generalization ceases to be a theory. Insular Homegrown theories are poor candidates also for further generalization. Are there any other states where logic of emptiness might work? Referential Homegrown Theories have more potential for applicability than Insular Homegrown theories but their generalization capacity might be limited to the referent culture. Is "global dharmic regime" general enough to account for experiences of non-Hindu societies? The explanatory power of Authentic Homegrown Theories, on the other hand, depends upon theorist's definition of concepts.

From above evaluation, one can conclude that, Authentic Homegrown theories have much more potential for development than Insular or Referential Homegrown Theories. A closer look at those theories, reveal that the data Authentic Homegrown theorizers use at their abductory stage, are quantititative data of bilateral relations. While dependency theorists based their theoretical innovation on foreign trade data, Xuetong used a quantititative analysis method to generate quantitiative data from international behaviour of China and the US toward each other. This is

probably not a coincidence since quantitative data is more conducive to infer patterns from otherwise perplexing data.

The use of quantitative methods is also important for applicability of the theory. Since theorists, transparently displays the data that gave way to original concepts, other researchers are given a first –hand and replicable example to operationalize those concepts in their hyppthesis-testing studies. The quantititave method enable others grasp the boundaries of the concepts, irrespective of their cultural background. Once concepts and patterns are clearly displayed, the readers actually understand the puzzle in question, and how operationalization might take place, that is, how concepts are converted into observable and confirmable components."[211]

3.4. Turkish Foreign Affairs and Quantitative Analysis

Since quantitative analysis of bilateral relations are more conducive to infer patterns and clarify concepts, building a homegrown theory of Turkey's international relations is more likely when a similar method is used. Following is a discussion of quantititative analysis, with respect to its effectiveness in answering questions about Turkey's international affairs in a comprehensive manner.

Especially in the last decade, Turkey's foreign policy actors, the foreign actors they engage with and the relations established, have not only numerically increased but have grown ever more complicated. Accordingly, there has been growing debate about the nature of the evolution of Turkish

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[211] Lynham, "The General Method of Theory-Building Research," 232.

foreign affairs and whether it involves dramatic new changes. Despite numerous research inquiries, primarily of a qualitative nature, there remain few firm, consensus-based answers to such pivotal questions about Turkish foreign affairs as to its current ideological and physical direction, the nature and type of its main actors, and its primary motivations. [212]

Obviously, a longitudinal assessment of Turkish foreign policy is needed to answer such questions. Although there have been several studies concerning the matter, a quantitative study would signicantly improve our understanding of specific periods in comparison to each other. It would also help better specify the changing and constant parameters in Turkish foreign policy behavior.

The most cutting edge debate about recent Turkish foreign policy concerns the new geographical focus of new Turkish foreign policy. The "new" focus of Turkey's international relations has variously been defined as the Muslim World, the neo-Ottoman World, Eurasia, the neighbourhood, or the whole world. [213] Often dubbed as "the axis shift," the primary indication of a new focus has been Turkey's changing bilateral dynamics with the Western countries [214] and its increasing engagement with non-

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[212] Ersel Aydınlı, Gonca Biltekin, Musa Tuzuner "Time to Quantify Turkey's Foreign Affairs:
 Setting Standards for a Maturing International Relations Discipline" (forthcoming); Ersel Aydınlı, Gonca Biltekin and Musa Tuzuner "Quantification of Turkey's Foreign Affairs via Event Data" (Paper presented at Workshop on Quantifying Security Studies and Foreign Policy Analysis in Turkey and the Greater Middle East, 2-4 December 2011, Istanbul)

[213] Mesut Özcan and Ali Resul Usul "Understanding the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Changes within Continuity, Is Turkey Departing From The West?" *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Dış Politika* 6, no. 21 (2010): 101-123; Bülent Aras and Hakan Fidan, "Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiers of a New Geographic Imagination," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 195-217.

[214] Tarık Oğuzlu and Mustafa Kibaroğlu, "Is the Westernization Process Losing Pace in

Western societies.[215] The arguments as to whether such "axis shift" exists, and if so, explanations as to the primary characteristics and reasons for such change are numerous, but the collection of arguments are far from constituting a systematic, all-encompassing, thorough debate.

While individual researchers focus on individual aspects of this activism, a comprehensive analysis is missing in Turkish foreign policy literature. The assumptions and findings of individual studies are based on idiosyncratic treatment of several fundamental questions, and there are disagreements over the reasons, the nature, the rationale, the sustainability, and the orientation of Turkey's 'new' foreign policy. [216] All these questions require an integrative analysis, substantiated by a comprehensive description. Without answering those questiions, it would be impossible to generate viable theoretical frameworks, which would explain foreign policy activism. Such questions may be addressed by examining Turkish foreign policy and its presumed newness with previously neglected quantitative analysis methods, that would enable the theorist to look at the subject matter in a more longitudinal and holistic manner and provide opportunities for broad comparative analyses.

Turkey: Who's to Blame?" *Turkish Studies* 10, no. 4 (2009): 577–593, Tarık Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?", *Turkish Studies* 9, no. 1 (2008): 3–20; Fiona Hill and Omer Taspinar, "Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?" *Survival* 48 no. 1 (2006): 81-92; Ziya Meral and Jonathan Paris "Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity, " *The Washington Quarterly* 33, no.4, (October 2010):75-86.

[215] İbrahim Kalın, "Turkey and the Middle East: Ideology or Geo-politics?", *Private View* (2008): 29.

[216] Ersel Aydınlı, Gonca Biltekin, Musa Tuzuner "Time to Quantify Turkey's Foreign Affairs: Setting Standards for a Maturing International Relations Discipline" (forthcoming); Ersel Aydınlı, Gonca Biltekin and Musa Tuzuner "Quantification of Turkey's Foreign Affairs via Event Data" (Paper presented at Workshop on Quantifying Security Studies and Foreign Policy Analysis in Turkey and the Greater Middle East, 2-4 December 2011, Istanbul)

Qualitative methods, which are commonly used in Turkish foreign policy studies, would be best complemented with the introduction of some quantitative methods. When the scope of questions are considered, it is obvious that a quantitative methodology may help to tackle some of Turkish foreign affairs' still pressing questions in a practical and efficient manner. A homegrown theory of Turkey's international relations can be built to understand and explain Turkey's recent activism in intenational relations.

Event Data Analysis, which quantifies bilateral relationship between two actors, is one of the most appropriate methods for such concerns. Following chapter is a description and brief history of this method.

CHAPTER 4

EVENT DATA METHOD

In this chapter, I provide a simple introduction to Event Data Analysis, a quantitative data collection and analysis approach that has been used extensively for compiling broad datasets of foreign policy and other international behaviors. In the second part, the steps taken in the building up of Turkish Foreign Affairs Event Dataset (TFAED) have been defined. TFAED is built by using a single news source (Agence France Presse) and covers a 23-year period (1991-2013) of Turkish foreign and domestic affairs.

4.1.   Event Data Research

Event data are a formal method of measuring the foreign policy phenomena. "Event data are generated by examining thousands of newspaper reports on the day to day interactions of nation-states and assigning each reported interaction a numerical score or a categorical

code."[217] As such, it is a form of content analysis, which analyzes the contents of a report by a news source, and transforms them into codes. For each event datum, the coded output usually includes the date of action, the source of action (the actor who initiated the action), the target of the action (the actor at which the action is directed), the type of action (verbal, material, conflict, cooperation, economic, military, diplomatic, etc.).[218]

Event data research has a long history in several academic disciplines,[219] and has been used quite extensively in international relations research.[220] The approach first saw a rapid growth in the 1960s and 1970s, leading to formation of major event datasets by late 1970s. Event datasets that has been built so far can be grouped under two categories. *Actor-oriented* datasets focus on all interactions among a set of actors in a specific period of time. *Episode-oriented* datasets on the other hand focus on a specific historical incident, such as an international crisis or use of force, and collect event data about all actors involved in that incident.

McCleland and his collegues built World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) in 1978.[221] Their coding scheme classifies events into 22 general

[217] Philip A. Schrodt "Event Data in Foreign Policy Analysis" available at
       http://www.parusanalytics.com/eventdata/papers.dir/Haney.pdf

[218] Deborah J. Gerner and Philip A. Schrodt "Chapter 1: International Event Data" in
       Analyzing International Event Data: A Handbook of Computer-Based Techniques
       October 2000, (last edited March 2012)
       http://eventdata.psu.edu/papers.dir/automated.html

[219] Franzosi R., "The Press as a Source of Sociohistorical Data" *Historical Methods* 20, no.5,
       (1987):16; Rucht, D., Koopmans, R., Neidhardt, F. (eds), *Acts of Dissent*, Rowman &
       Littlefield, New York, (1999).; Susan Olzak, "Analysis of Events in Studies of
       Collective Actions" *Annual Review of Sociology* 15, (1989): 119-141.

[220]   Philip S. Schrodt "Twenty Years of the Kansas Event Data System Project" June 12,
       2006 http://www.ku.edu/~keds/KEDS.history.html

[221]   McClelland, Charles A *World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) 1966-1978.* (ICPSR5211)

categories such as "Consult", "Reward", "Protest" and "Force", which are further specified into 63 specific categories. The general categories form a very general cooperation-conflict continuum. WEIS coding was the *de facto* standard used by the U.S. government-sponsored projects during the 1970s, and consequently a number of the data sets available in the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) archive use the WEIS scheme.

The WEIS dataset originally covered eleven years (1966-77) and contained approximately 90,000 events. Their source text is *The New York Times*. The dataset is later extended to cover events after 1977, most recently by Rodney Tomlinson at the US Naval Academy.[222]

The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) dataset, developed by Azar in 1980,[223] comprises about 350,000 international events for the period 1948-78. The event records include the actions of approximately 135 countries, both toward one another and domestically. COPDAB uses several news sources, including some regional sources to cover events outside of North America and Europe.[224] Unlike WEIS, COPDAB uses an ordinal coding scheme that goes from 1 to 15. While "1" signifies the most cooperative behaviour, "15" means the most conflictual behavior. Azar and

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Ann Arbor: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1978.

[222] Rodney G. Tomlinson, *World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) Coding Manual.* Mimeo, Department of Political Science, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, 1993.

[223] Edward E. Azar, "The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) Project" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24, no. 1, (1980):143-152.

[224] For the degree of overlap between WEIS and COPDAB, see "Symposium: Events Data Collections: Editor's Introduction" *International Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (1983): 147-148; Llewellyn D. Howell"A Comparative Study of the WEIS and COPDAB Data Sets." *International Studies Quarterly* 27, No. 2, (1983): 149-159; Jack E. Vincent, "WEIS vs. COPDAB: Correspondence Problems." *International Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (1983):161-168.

Sloan also developed a scale which assigns numerical value to each code on a cooperation-conflict intensity scale.[225] COPDAB scheme also classifies an event into one of eight issue-types, for example symbolic political relations; cultural and scientific relations; human environment, demographic and ethnic affairs. The Global Event Dataset (GEDS) project augmented the original COPDAB data in 1990s, using machine-assisted coding methods.[226]

The Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) dataset[227] is designed for the study of foreign policy interactions and processes. CREON's event coding scheme is similar to that of WEIS, but it also codes 167 variables dealing with the context of the event, such as indirect targets, the resources used in the action, time required for the action or who announced the action. CREON does not code all the interactions that happened in a period of time: instead the data were coded for randomly selected quarter-years of the 1959-1968 period for 36 nation-states. Therefore CREON is more conducive to study the linkages between the foreign policy decision-making environment and the related foreign-policy outputs, but it is less suitable for longitudinal comparative studies of foreign policy behaviours of different countries.

Protocol for the Analysis of Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA) Project, which focused on measring the frequency and impact of non-violent

225 Edward E. Azar and Thomas Sloan. *Dimensions of Interaction*. Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1975.
226 John L. Davies "The Global Event-Data System: Coder's Manual", Revised in August 1998, available at http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/~alexseev/RussiaInAsia/GEDSCodebook800_3.pdf
227 Charles Hermann, Maurice A. East, Margaret G. Hermann, Barbara G. Salmore, and Stephen A. Salmore. *CREON: A Foreign Events Data Set.* Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 1973; Charles Hermann, Maurice A. East and Stephen A. Salmore (eds.). *Why Nations Act.* Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978.

behavior globally, began in late 1980s in Harvard University. The main purpose of the study was to determine the conditions under which contemporary nonviolent struggle had been successful in effecting social, political, or economic change. Accordingly, PANDA Project included sub-state and non-state actors. Since it focused on domestic affairs, it has developed a more nuanced system for coding actors and events, which culminated in Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) coding system in 1997. PANDA also helped spawn VRA Reader, an automated parsing program, which automatically coded the relevant news reports. Currently, the developers of VRA Reader operate as a private firm, and their data is not accesible to public.

Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) Project began in early 1990s and focused on regions that have experienced protracted conflicts. KEDS Project also developed its own automated parsing software. Initially, the project developed a dataset for 12 years times-series dataset for Arab-Israeli conflict using WEIS coding scheme. Later it produced regional data sets for about thirty countries, including those in Levant, Balkans, Central Asia and West Africa. KEDS Project later improved its parsing software into TABARI (Text Analysis by Augmenting Replacement Instructions), and developed its coding scheme, CAMEO (Conflict and Mediation Event Observations). Like IDEA, CAMEO coding scheme differentiates between sub-state actors and but it also develops specific event categories for third-party intervention to conflicts. Currently, the project continues in Penn State University and their data and software is open to free public access.

The most current global event dataset comes from the Global Data on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT) project by Kalev Leetaru of Georgetown University, Philip Schrodt and John Beieler of Penn State University, and Patrick Brandt of the University of Texas at Dallas.[228]

GDELT dataset comprises almost 250 million georeferenced events, which captures behavior of actors from all around the world in more than 300 event categories and covers 1979 to present.[229] Based on a variety of cross-section of all major international, national and local news sources in both English and local languages. Largest dataset uptodate, GDELT also introduces georeferencing and provides numerical latitude and longidute coordinates for each actor and event. It also employs an "importance" indicator, which signifies the tone for each event, ranging from -100(very negative) to 100 (very positive). GDELT is designed to help support new theories and describe global affairs in multiple levels.

While WEIS, COPDAB, CREON, PANDA and GDELT are the largest actor-oriented data sets, other smaller sets exist. For example, the South Africa Event Dataset[230] is a collection that focuses on southern Africa for the period 1977-88 and covers behaviors of non-state actors such as guerrilla movements. Ashley also developed a dataset, which comprises of the interactions of the USA, USSR and PRC between 1950 and 1972. It contains

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[228]   GDELT Project Website, http://gdeltproject.org/about.html#creation.
[229] Kalev Leetaru and Philip A. Schrodt,"GDELT: Global Data on Events, Language, and Tone, 1979-2012." International Studies Association Annual Conference, April 2013. San Diego, CA.
[230]   Koos Van Wyk and Sarah Radloff, "Symmetry and Reciprocity in South Africa's Foreign Policy." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, no.2 (1993):382-96. Christian Hirschi, "Ending Apartheid in South Africa: Domestic, Regional and International Factors" Paper presented at the 50th annual meeting of the ISA "Expolring the Past, Anticipating the Future", New York City, USA, Feb 15, 2009.

about 15,000 events, which are coded in accordance with a scale similar to COPDAB. [231]

The Correlates of War Project was founded in 1963 by J. David Singer, a political scientist at the University of Michigan. The project aims to collect data on various facets of war and conflict all over the world. The Behavioral Correlates of War dataset [232] codes a sample of over 600 major international crises over the period 1816-2007. BCOW utilizes a version of the WEIS scheme containing about 100 categories and differentiate between verbal, economic and military behavior.[233] BCOW uses different sources of information, including newspapers, diplomatic histories, and chronologies[234].

Other crisis-oriented datasets include CASCON (The Computer-Aided System for the Analysis of Local Conflicts),[235] SHERFACS, [236] *The World Handbook*,[237] PRINCE Project data set[238], The International Political

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[231] Richard K. Ashley, *The Political Economy of War and Peace*. London: Francis Pinter, 1980.

[232] Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman *Resort to War: 1816 - 2007*. Washington: CQ Press, 2010.

[233] Russell J. Leng, *Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816-1980.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1993.

[234] Leng, Russell J. *Behavioral Correlates of War Data: User's Manual*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1987, 1.

[235] L.P. Bloomfield and A. Moulton, *Managing International Conflict.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.
L. P. Bloomfield and A. Moulton, *CASCON III: Computer-Aided System for Analysis of Local Conflicts,* Cambridge: MIT Center for International Studies, 1989.

[236] Frank L Sherman and Laura Neack, "Imagining the Possibilities: The Prospects of Isolating the Genome of International Conflict from the SHERFACS Dataset," In *International Event-Data Developments: DDIR Phase II*, ed. R. L. Merritt, R. G. Muncaster, and D. A. Zinnes, 1993, 87-112. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; Hayward R. Alker and Frank L. Sherman, "Collective Security-Seeking Practices Since 1945," in *Managing International Crises*, ed. Daniel Frei, Sage, Beverly Hills, CA., 1982; Frank L. Sherman, "SHERFACS," *International Interactions* 20, No.1-2 (1994). See also http://www.usc.edu/dept/ancntr/Paris-in-LA/Database/sherfacs.html.

[237] Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson. *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 2nd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972.

[238] William D. Coplin, Michael K. O'Leary, Howard B. Shapiro, and Dale Dean "The Quest

Interactions Project,[239] The International Crisis Behavior dataset, [240] and European Protest and Coercion dataset.[241] Other datasets have been built to focus on a specific type of conflict, such as global terrorism (ITERATE – International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events and TKB – Terrorism Knowledge Base), and domestic or regional terrorism (e.g. TWEED – Terrorism in Western Europe[242] and PCSTERROR – Project Civil Strife-Terror)[243].

Early event data studies made use of human coding. In other words, hundreds of undergraduate students coded data from open sources by hand. Human coding was both time-consuming and expensive. This problem was alleviated in the 1990s when machine coding computer programs were developed. The earliest such software program was the Kansas Event Data System (KEDS).[244] KEDS is later upgraded and led to creation of TABARI (Text Analysis by Augmenting Replacement Instructions) and VRA CODER (Virtual Research Associates). All of these programs provide relatively easy ways of extracting data from international

for Relevance: Quantitative International Relations Research and Government Foreign Affairs Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly* 18 (1974): 211-237

[239] Will H. Moore and David R. Davis. "Ties that Bind? Domestic and International Conflict Behavior in Zaire," *Comparative Political Studies* 31, (1998): 45-71.

[240] Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1997.

[241] Llewellyn D. Howell and Gillian Barnes, "Event Data for Region-Specific Interactions: A Research Note on Source Coverage," In *International Event-Data Developments: DDIR Phase II*, ed. R. L. Merritt, R. G. Muncaster and D. A. Zinnes, 45-54. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993.

[242] Jan Oskar Engene, "Five decades of terrorism in Europe: The TWEED dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no.1, (2007):109-121.

[243] S. M. Shellman, "Quantifying Violence and Nonviolence: Terrorism & Political Violence Events Data Sets," *Electronic Newsletter of the ECPR-SG on Extremism & Democracy* 9, no. 2, (2008). Available at http://www.tufts.edu/~dart01/extremismanddemocracy/newsletter/Article7_4.htm (last access 19 Aug 2011)

[244] Philip A. Schrodt, Shannon G. Davis and Judy L. Weddle "Political Science: KEDS—A Program for the Machine Coding of Event Data" *Social Science Computer Review* 12, no. 3, (1994): 561-588.

wire news sources by coding the lead sentences in press releases – or in the case of VRA, coding the first few sentences.[245]

The main purpose of most academic event data research is to find statistical regularities. To this end, some event datasets may be specifically designed to operate under assumptions of a pre-chosen theory. Major event data collection efforts point to a strong linkage between theory, coding and data collection. The early WEIS and COPDAB schemes, for example, were built at a time where realism was predominant and accordingly, placed major emphasis on diplomatic and military behavior. In contrast, the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) dataset is inspired by the theories developed in James Rosenau's "Inter-University Comparative Foreign Policy Project".[246] As such, both datasets provide good indicators of conflict behavior, yet they mostly omit behaviors related to contemporary international economic or environmental issues. Therefore, when researchers want to broaden and change the scope and focus of their study, they usually need to update the coding schemes of previous studies, as happened when the PANDA project extended WEIS coding scheme, which was not conducive to study "non-violent direct action" in domestic contexts.

In TFAED, I tried to escape "theoretical jails" to the extent possible, therefore in terms of actors and their behaviours, I employed an extended

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[245] See http://vranet.com/ for information on VRA, and http://gking.harvard.edu/data for replication data of King and Lowe's study using VRA.

[246] Charles Hermann, Maurice A. East, Margaret G. Hermann, Barbara G. Salmore, and Stephen A. Salmore. *CREON: A Foreign Events Data Set.* Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973.

set of ontological assumptions. Not only state actors, but also non-state actors are included in this study. In terms of behavior type, I found that latest version of CAMEO coding scheme to be sufficient for my purpose, although further research may demand to build a more encompassing scheme similar to IDEA.

4.2. Event Data about Turkey

When we look at event data studies in general, we observe that some event data concerning Turkey has been gathered. These data were usually part of region-specific studies, generally focusing on conflicts. For example, under the KEDS project, while gathering data about conflicts in the Balkans, data about Turkey's Kurdish conflict were also coded, and as part of the same project, a dataset about Turkey was established,[247] focusing on conflicts between domestic actors in Turkey.[248] The event data studies at Harvard University, which focused on profiling conflict zones in the world, have also generated data about Turkey.[249] Nevertheless, there is no event dataset specifically designed for understanding Turkey's foreign relations, neither in Turkey nor abroad.

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[247] Ömür Yilmaz. *Turkey Data Set*, (2006).Available at http://web.ku.edu/~keds/data.html (last accessed on 19 Aug 2011). Turkey Data Set covers Turkey for the period 3 January 1992 to 31 July 2006 using the CAMEO coding scheme. It is based on Agence France Presse reports.

[248] Ömür Yilmaz, "The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey: Pre- and Post-Ocalan," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Chicago, USA, Feb 28, 2007. Ömür Yilmaz, "Turkish Military: the Key to Credible Commitment to Democracy" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, California, USA, Mar 22, 2006.

[249] Douglas Bond and W.B. Vogele, "Profiles for International 'Hotspots'", Harvard University, 1995. Available at http://vranet.com/papers.html (last accessed on 19 Aug 2011)

The first event dataset research in Turkey (although not about Turkey) is done by Aydinli and Tuzuner, who focused on US international intelligence cooperation behaviours and generated the United States International Intelligence Behavior dataset (USIIB). USIIB is the first collection of event data specifically intended for exploring international intelligence cooperation in quantifiable manner.[250] Using open sources, they coded 293,615 events, covering the years 2000–2009. The primary activity occurring with respect to event data research in Turkey is actually an ongoing attempt by Biltekin, Aydinli and Tüzüner to generate a Turkey dataset, which would cover behaviours of all actors in Turkey and their relationships both with each other and with foreign actors. Turkey's foreign affairs dataset (TFAED) will comprise of years 1991-2013 and will use Agence France Presse and Turkey-based Anatolia News Agency (AA) reports.[251] The event dataset created in this dissertation is a pilot study of TFAED and is developed by the current author. It covers years 1991-2012 and uses Agence France Presse news reports only.

4.3. Steps to Build Event Datasets

In event data method, before building a dataset, the researcher should decide whether human-coding or machine-coding will be employed. For the purposes of this study, machine-coding is used, since it is less costly and

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[250] Musa Tüzüner, *The State-Level Determinants of the United States' İnternational Intelligence Cooperation*, (Ph.D. Thesis), Kent State University Political Science Department, 2009. Ersel Aydinli and Musa Tüzüner "Quantifying Intelligence Cooperation: The United States International Intelligence Behavior (USIIB) Dataset", *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 48, No: 5, (2011):673-682.
[251] Musa Tuzuner and Gonca Biltekin "A Pilot Study of Quantifying Turkey's Foreign Affairs: Data Generation, Challenges and Preliminary Analysis" *All-Azimuth* Vol.2, no.2 (2013):47-70.

time-consuming. TABARI (Version 8.4b1), developed and provided by Schrodt, is a free access program and it is used in this study.[252]

A second task is to decide on the news source that will be used as the source of raw/textual data. Previous event datasets were generated using *New York Times* (WEIS), Reuters (IDEA and KEDS)[253], and Agence France Presse (AFP) (CAMEO)[254]. In this project, AFP news reports are used. This choice emanates firstly from limitations of the TABARI. TABARI can only parse English-language text and necessitates a certain format as text input, which can only be generated using additional formatting programs prior to coding by TABARI. While these formatting programs are not complex, programming expertise is required to make them out of scratch. Currently, free access formatting programs are found for news text by AFP downloaded from LexisNexis database and news text by Reuters News Agency downloaded from Factiva. However, several attempts to download Reuters news text from Factiva database have failed, probably due to Factiva's recent decision to provide .html links to news text, instead of providing the actual news text. This decision rendered Reuters news text as unavailable for reformatting and thus, coding by TABARI. Secondly, trials with Reuters and AFP showed that AFP is concentrated more on political

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[252] Latest version of TABARI had been downloaded from Penn State Event Data Project Web site http://eventdata.psu.edu in April 2012. By August 2014, the site moved to http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/index.html.

[253] Philip A. Schrodt, A., Shannon G. Davis and Judy L. Weddle "Political Science: KEDS—A Program for the Machine Coding of Event Data" *Social Science Computer Review 12*, no. 3, (1994): 561-588; Deborah J. Gerner and Philip A. Schrodt, "Validity Assessment of a Machine-Coded Event Data Set for the Middle East, 1982-1992."*American Journal of Political Science* 38, (1994): 825-854.

[254] Deborah J. Gerner, Philip A. Schrodt, Ömür Yilmaz, and Rajaa Abu-Jabr. "Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO): A new event data framework for the analysis of foreign policy interactions." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, March 2002.

events, whereas Reuters mainly reports events that are relevant for business and economics. For example, in USIIB project, the authors compared number of reports on intelligence from Reuters and AFP between 01.01.2009 and 12.31.2009 and showed that AFP provided more news reports than Reuters, irrespective of the search term that is used.[255]

Additionally, using Anadolu Agency (AA) news reports has also been considered. Since AA is the official news agency of Turkey, and provides English-language reports, using it might have been efficient for extracting Turkey-related news. Nevertheless, there is no reformatting program for AA news report format. Moreover, although AA was established in 1920s, it only made its news reports available online for the period after 2008. Contact with AA authorities revealed that there is an ongoing attempt to open all AA archives to online databases.

Consequently, for the purposes of this study, AFP news reports, downloaded from LexisNexis database are used as the news source. The following is the usual format of AFP News reports:

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[255] Aydınlı and Tüzüner, "USIIB".

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                    1524 of 2997 DOCUMENTS



               Agence France Presse -- English

           August 25, 2011 Thursday 12:54 PM GMT

Turkey urges UN to urgently unfreeze Libyan assets

LENGTH: 111 words

DATELINE: ISTANBUL, Aug 25 2011


Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu urged the United Nations Thursday to
take action to unlock frozen Libyan assets.

Davutoglu made this statement at the start of a Libya Contact Group meeting of
senior diplomats in Istanbul who are discussing the next steps for the country.

"We need to take action within the Security Council" to meet the needs of the
National Transitional Council (NTC), he said, urging the international community
to unlock frozen assets for the use of the Libyan people.

Davutoglu extended Turkey's full support to the NTC as the legitimate
representative of the Libyan people and suggested its flag be hoisted at the UN
headquarters in New York.

LOAD-DATE: August 26, 2011

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

PUBLICATION-TYPE: Newswire


               Copyright 2011 Agence France Presse
                      All Rights Reserved

                    1525 of 2997 DOCUMENTS
```

Figure 8 Unformatted AFP News Record

In the following section, steps to build an event dataset are defined.
These steps consist of developing actor lists and search terms to find
relevant news reports, to download relevant news and transform them into
machine-readible forms, and lastly coding in terms of actors, events and
target actors according to pre-established standards.

Figure 9 Steps to Build Event Data with TABARI

4.3.1. Developing actor lists

The first step of the project has been to determine all the government and non-state actors in Turkey. For this phase, actors that are active between the years 1990 and 2010 were determined by looking at websites of government organizations, websites, newspapers, and official documents. The list, which amounted to over 200 actors, covered both government actors and non-governmental actors. Once this phase was done, key search terms were developed by scanning AFP news through the LexisNexis database. Key search terms were different from original actor lists, since the phrases used in news reports to denote each actor are usually different from their official titles. For example, in the AFP reports, for the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, following phrases were used: Turkish PM, Turkey's PM, Turkey PM, Turkish Premier, The Turkish and Iraqi premiers, Turkey's Poet Premier, Turkey's Prime Minister, Turkish Prime Minister, etc. Moreover, there are some recurrent spelling mistakes such as Tukey's Prime

Minister, Turkish Prime Mininster, Turkey's Premiere, etc. The different phrases, including the mistaken ones, have been identified for each actor.

4.3.2.   Search Terms and Downloading AFP news

To find the appropriate search terms, several inquiries have been made in LexisNexis Academic with different options available in Advanced Search. For example, search term "Turk!" searches for all words that begin with "Turk". When news source is selected as "Agence France Presse," section search is determined as "LEAD", date is specified as "between 1 Dec, 2012 to 31 Dec 2012," the query brings 458 news reports. These include, however, news reports about city of Turku in Finland, Turkana herdsmen in Kenya, Saudi Arabian writer Ahmed Turki, former Slovenian President Danilo Turk, Turkmens in Iraq and Turkmenistan. While all these actors can be given their proper codes in the TABARI coding process, downloading irrelevant news reports should be avoided due to considerations about conserving time and memory space. Therefore, after several trials, the following search line has been found as the most efficient "Turkey OR Turkish OR Turk OR Istanbul OR Ankara OR İzmir."

At this step, at the LexisNexis Academic database, I chose Advance Search and select Agence France Presse as news source, section search is not determined to allow every report about the search terms to be included, and search line "Turkey OR Turkish OR Turk OR Istanbul OR Ankara OR İzmir" is entered. LexisNexis do not show full results for queries that bring more than 3000 news reports. To restrict the results to under 3000 for each query, date specifications were entered consisting of 3 to 6 month periods from 1

Jan 1990 to 31 Dec 2012. LexisNexis allows for 500 news reports at most in a single document for download. For each period, the news reports found through search terms are downloaded as simple text documents, each containing approximately 500 news reports. In addition, the following options have been selected for downloading; Format: text; Document View: Full document.

4.3.3.   Reformatting News Reports

All documents are saved in a single folder. For reformatting them, the following three programs are also put in the same folder: nexisreverse.pl, NewNexisFormat.pl and LNAFP.seqsort.pl. Like TABARI, these addtitional programs were downloaded from Penn State Event Data Project Website. In the Terminal (for Mac) or Command Prompt (for Windows), I moved to that folder. Since the Nexis downloads have a file name of the form "Agence_France_Presse_-_English2012-09-14_16-31.TXT" the command "ls Agence_Fr* > format.files" is entered to generate a list of all documents beginning with "Agence_Fr". Then the command "perl NewNexisFormat.pl TFP" is entered to chop each downloaded document into separate paragraphs.

```
110825  AFPN-0018-01  ISTANBUL, Aug 25 2011
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu urged the United Nations Thursday to
take action to unlock frozen Libyan assets.

110825  AFPN-0018-02  ISTANBUL, Aug 25 2011
Davutoglu made this statement at the start of a Libya Contact Group meeting
of senior diplomats in Istanbul who are discussing the next steps for the country.

110825  AFPN-0018-03  ISTANBUL, Aug 25 2011
Davutoglu extended Turkey's full support to the NTC as the legitimate
representative of the Libyan people and suggested its flag be hoisted at the
UN headquarters in New York.
```

Figure 10 AFP News Report Separated into Paragraphs

The formatting program chops news stories into separate paragraphs, excludes paragraphs that begin by quotation marks and give them a tag line:

```
yymmdd  AFPN-"the number of news report"-"number of paragraph"  Place, Mmm  dd YYYY
```

Figure 11 AFP Record Tag Line

At this phase, program runs with the dates and headlines of the various stories scrolling past as they are processed. Sometimes, if there is a format problem in the original downloaded documents, the program stops working. The program assumes that the story begins two lines following a line containing "DATELINE:..." This is present in most but not all downloads. With an extensive search, I determined that various news stories in late 90s do not have it, so manually entered "DATELINE:..." to the proper place in the downloaded news reports. Additionally, although they included a "DATELINE:" the reformatting program did not filter several news reports about Turkey from July 1996 to January 1997. I found out that the program also assumes that the very first line in each news report is "Agence France Presse -- English". In the aforementioned period, AFP decided to change this heading into "Agence France Presse" only. So heading of each news item has been manually changed into "Agence France Presse –English." By this change, 2088 news leads, which had previously been skipped, were added.

Moreover, no AFP news articles about Turkey can be found in LexisNexis before April 1991 and there were no AFP news reports about any country in February 1992, March 1992, August 1992 and October 1995. Since they were missing in the original news source nothing can be done to restore them.

After chopping with NewNexisFormat.pl, a filelist of the newly generated files is made with "ls TFP* > filelist" command. The command "perl nexisreverse.pl" is entered to get only the first paragraph of the story, i.e. The "number of paragraph" in the story's tagline should be "-01". The resulting TABARI input sentences are united in a single file called "reverse.output". At this point, the separate paragraphs (records) are usually not ordered chronologically so the command "perl LNAFP.seqsort.pl reverse.output" is entered to sort the records if they are out of order. Sorted output is in "seqsort.reverse.output". However, the last program still puts records of 2000s at the beginning of the document, followed by 90s. After the formatting, the news reports are reduced to the following form.

```
110825  AFPN-0014-01
Hardened fighters stream into Tripoli as Libya's rebels try to deliver a
knockout punch to Moamer Kadhafi's remaining forces and to flush out the
strongman, dead or alive.

110825  AFPN-0015-01
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu urged the United Nations Thursday to
take action to unlock frozen Libyan assets.

110825  AFPN-0016-01
Silvio Berlusconi on Thursday met the head of Libya's rebel National
Transitional Council for talks aimed at securing Italian business interests
in post-conflict Libya.
```

Figure 12 AFP New Leads After Formatting

Overall 91,542 news reports between April 1991 and 09 December 2012, are reshaped into above format. Almost half of these reshaped records do not contain actors from Turkey because the parts that mentioned Turkey in some news reports had been in the later paragraphs, which were cut out in the filtering process. Since only the first paragraph of each story is taken to construct the TABARI input file, those records lack actors from Turkey.

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4.3.4. Event Data Coding Categories

TABARI, while coding relations between actors, used 22 Coding categories, developed by the WEIS project. WEIS coding categories are reorganized by TABARI's creator in CAMEO project.[256] With new upgrade, the number of main coding categories were reduced to 20, whereas overall number of event codes, including sub-categories, were 293. As such, with CAMEO, some event categories, which are difficult to differentiate by the machine, are reduced, while number of subcategories is increased. For example, under 'cooperation' category there was 'engage in diplomatic cooperation' in WEIS coding scheme. With CAMEO, it is possible to differentiate the type of event one step further, since there are subcategories like 'grant diplomatic recognition', 'apologize', and 'sign formal agreement' all of which are some sort of diplomatic cooperation. On the other hand, WEIS coding scheme had both "WARN" and "THREATEN" as high order categories, which are hard to distinguish in an individual sentence. With CAMEO, "WARN" category is eliminated.

4.3.5. Updating CAMEO project Dictionaries

TABARI recognizes the sentence structures in the lead sentences of the report in the subject-verb-object form. For TABARI to do this, it requires dictionaries for subjects, verbs, objects as well as adjectives. With files that contain those dictionaries, TABARI distinguishes each element of the sentences as actors, events, and targets and codes them accordingly.

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[256] Gerner et al. "Conflict and Mediation Event Observations"; Schrodt, "Twenty Years of the Kansas Event Data System Project."

Since CAMEO dictionaries were originally generated for scanning all global actors, its actor dictionary contains terms for Turkey's actors. But these terms are limited in number and differentiation for the purposes of this study. Therefore, additions to these dictionaries are required for TABARI to recognize all actors from Turkey. Following is a table for comparison of previously generated datasets and TFAED:

Table 6 Comparison of Event Data Sets

	LEVANT DATASET	OMUR YILMAZ'S TURKEY DATASET	TFAED DATASET (COMMA:ON, with AGENTS)
TIME FRAME	Apr 1979–Nov 2011	Jan 1992–Jul 2006	Apr 1991–Dec 2012
TOTAL ACTORS	6099 Lines	3950 Lines	43125 Lines
TURKISH ACTORS	59 Lines	564 Lines	6012 Lines
TOTAL VERBS	15787 Lines	N/A	17675 Lines
TOTAL NOUNS	820 Nouns	280 Nouns	2254 Nouns
TOTAL ADJECTIVES	114 Adjectives	50 Adjectives	324 Adjectives, 328 Agents
TURKISH ACTOR CODES	12 Codes	49 Codes	405 Codes

For actor dictionaries, extensions are made by adding command lines for additional phrases to be coded as TUR***. Most of the phrases that begin with "Turkey's..." and "Turkish..." have been coded according to their roles, rather than simply coding them as "TUR." This allowed us to differentiate between actors. For example, the phrase "A boy of Turkish origin" would previously be coded as "TUR,"- a code which is also given to "Turkey's artists" or "Turkish officials." With expansion of actor dictionary, it is possible to give "A boy of Turkish origin" the code "TRK" (ethnically Turkish) whereas "Turkey's artists" are coded as "TURCUL" (Cultural

actors from Turkey) and "Turkish officials" as "TURGOV" (government of Turkey). Different codes were also established for government agencies, ministries, associations and foundations, armed rebel groups, opposition parties, civilians, ethnic and religious groups, Turkish cities and different branches of the military.

Because this study focuses on actors from Turkey or people of Turkish origin in other countries (both as targets and sources), we used specific and new codes for all actors from Turkey. For all other individuals, countries, and organizations, we retained the original CAMEO codes. For transnational actors affiliated with Turkey, however, we used a different scheme. All individuals, businesses, vessels with Turkish nationality, multinational corporations whose headquarters are in Turkey, non-governmental transnational movements or organizations that originated in Turkey, Turkish branches of non-governmental organizations, members of ethnic or religious groups who are Turkish nationals, and refugees from other countries who have settled in Turkey are all coded as actors from Turkey, hence their respective codes begin with "TUR". Their codes differentiate at the second tier; rather than assigning "NGO" to all non-governmental actors, these organizations are further differentiated by their type: ASS if an association, FOU if a foundation, AID if a relief agency, RES if a think tank or research group, MED if private media, CVL if a non-affiliated individual, etc. We also coded each Turkish city separately.

For governmental actors, we differentiated between president, prime minister, and individual ministries, as well as between state-owned enterprises and media. Political parties in office or that take part in the

government are coded using their Turkish initials as the last three letters, for example, "TURGOVAKP" (Justice and Development Party) and "TURGOVDSP (Democratic Left Party)." Opposition parties are coded as "TUROPPMHP" (Nationalist Movement Party), "TUROPPDYP" (True Path Party), etc. "TURGOV" is only retained for general phrases, such as "Turkish officials" or "Turkish authorities," which are created automatically from the agents' dictionary.

PHRASE	TFAED CODE	CAMEO CODE
TURKISH_RED_CRESCENT	[TURAID]	[NGOTUR]
TURKISH_GOVERNMENT	[TURGOVDSP/TURGOVANP/TURGOVMHP 980529-021101] [TURGOVAKP > 021102]	[TURGOV]

Table 7 Comparison of Codes

We expanded the verb dictionaries to include over 2000 new patterns and updated the verb codes to comply with the newest CAMEO Codebook standard.[257] We also generated an agents file, which is composed of generic nouns like "police," "student," "woman," etc., with each noun corresponding to a code. When TABARI finds an "agent" adjacent to an actor in a news report it combines both codes to specify it. For example, suppose there are codes for "Turkish" (TUR) and "Danish" (DNK) in the actor dictionary and for "police" (COP) in the agent dictionary. If the news report contains the phrase "Danish police and Turkish police will cooperate..." then TABARI codes the actors as DNKCOP and TURCOP respectively, even though the actor dictionary does not contain "Danish police" and "Turkish police." For this purpose, we scanned the noun codes

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[257] See Cameocodes Wiki Space, 2009, http://cameocodes.wikispaces.com.

from previous actor dictionaries and moved the relevant nouns into a separate document.

4.3.6.   Machine Coding of Lead Sentences

After the necessary additions, thousands of reformatted news reports become ready for machine coding. For each input, TABARI generates corresponding event data. In some cases, the input does not contain all the items of the regular event data form: "who did, what, to whom, and when." In such cases, no event data is generated from that record. In others however, a single record, like a multilateral meeting, contains more than one event data, since all the actors are interacting with each other. So, several event data can be generated from a single record.

```
110825  AFPN-0015-01
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu urged the United Nations Thursday to
take action to unlock frozen Libyan assets.
```

Figure 13 TABARI Input

```
110825     TURMFA   IGOUNO   124 (Decline to yield)   URGED THE UNITED NATIONS
```

Figure 14 TABARI Output

After machine coding, manual changes are made for "raw reports" which TABARI fails to read. These errors usually occur because either there are too many verbs (since TABARI only distingushes seven verbs at most in a single sentence) or dictionaries do not contain the relevant terms (for actors, verbs, etc.) With required manual additions, all reports are converted into event data.

4.3.7. Processing and Aggregating Event Data

To process the resulting event data, we used an open-access R program, specifically, the Events package created by Will Lowe in January 2012.[258] This package allows the researcher to aggregate event data in terms of date, source or target type, and event type. It also enables the researcher to create scales by assigning numerical values to each event type or to use pre-established scales like CAMEO's or WEIS's Goldstein scale. Additionally, the package filters the data to exclude repeated reportings of the same event. If in the same day, the same interaction of the same two actors is reported more than once, only one of those reports is retained.

There are various options to aggregate event data in terms of actor type, and the selection depends on one's empirical object of study. For bilateral interstate relations, for example, data about a country's relations with other countries in a particular region or continent are available. For intrastate relations, data about interactions among a country's domestic actors are available. The data can be aggregated in terms of the actor's initiative, that is, either who initiated the action (source) or who the action is directed at (target). Therefore, for any form of bilateral relationship, there are at least two groups of data: from Actor A to Actor B, and from Actor B to Actor A.

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[258] Will Lowe *Events: Store and manipulate Event Data.* (R package, Version 0.5, 2012) http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=events

Data can also be aggregated in terms of time and event type.[259] For the former, weekly, monthly, quarterly, and yearly aggregations can be made, and for the latter, there are basically two strategies. The first is to assign a number value to each event type, making a scale. The second is to differentiate between cooperative and conflictual events and between verbal and material actions. Then, for each dyad and time frame, the events that correspond to the resulting combinations (namely, "Verbal Conflict," "Material Conflict," "Verbal Cooperation," and "Material Cooperation") are counted. Other aggregation possibilities also exist, such as grouping event types in terms of content (namely, political, economic, or military).

After the data are aggregated, various visualization options can be considered to display it. Time-series graphs are the most common form of display. In this study, time-series graphs, and correlation tables are used, utlizing visualizing options in Microsoft Excel. In a recent project, a dataset was created that also included actors' geographical locations, making it possible to display the data in map form.[260]

4.4.   Validity and Reliability of Dataset

The validity and reliability of event data, generated from open news sources for analyzing actors behavior is an important concern. Several

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[259] James E. Yonamine, "Working with Event Data: A Guide to Aggregation Choices," (unpublished paper), accessed 25 April, 2013, http://jayyonamine.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Working-with-Event-Data-A-Guide-to-Aggregation-Choices.pdf .

[260] Kalev Leetaru and Philip A. Schrodt, "GDELT: Global Data on Events, Location and Tone 1979-2012" (paper presented at the International Studies Association meetings, San Francisco, April 2013).

studies has questioned the reliability and validity of datasets from newspapers, arguing that '"selection bias"(the subjective judgments of editors and reporters while deciding which events will be reported) and "description bias" (Representation of news in a manner that will invoke strong audience interest) may impede the study.[261]

On the other hand, some of the past studies established validity of event data by designing tests. For example, Howell and Barnes (1993) and Schrodt and Gerner (1994) coded the US and Middle Eastern actors political cooperative behaviour through KEDS. In these studies, they illustrated the exhaustiveness of news from global resources in documenting their foreign policy cooperation and conflict by providing evidence. A similar test has not been done for this study, yet it can be argued that news reports are a justified source for similar analyses.

There are two basic concerns for reliability of the Turkey's dataset. First one is about the reliability of machine coding system in general. Second one is about the reliability of coding categories. The studies established that there are no substantial differences in terms of reliability between machine coding and human coding of event data.[262] Indeed, it may be argued that machine coding is more reliable because it is immune to exhaustion, political and cultural biases experienced by human coders. Moreover, it is consistent

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[261] (Earl et al, 2004; McCarthy et al. 1996; Ortiz et al, 2005; Wilkes & Ricard, 2007).
[262] Hillard et al, "Computer-assisted topic classification for mixed-methods social science research," *Journal of Information Technology & Politics* 4, no.4 (2008): 31-46. Gary King and and Will Lowe, "An Automated Information Extraction Tool For International Conflict Data with Performance as Good as Human Coders: A Rare Events Evaluation Design," *International Organization* 57, no.3 (2003): 617-642, 2003; Gerner and Schrodt, "Validity Assessment."

about following the rules of coding across time and different contexts and it rules out differences that can emanate from different coders.

4.5.   Conclusion

By building Turkey's event dataset, this study seeks to shed light on several empirical questions about the subject matter, e.g. Whether and how is Turkey is more active in its foreign relations? Has Turkey has changed its foreign policy orientation? Whether and how is Turkey more proactive? What is the role of non-state actors in foreign affairs? Does ideology (Islamism, Ottomanism, etc.) have an impact on Turkish foreign policy making? Providing answers to these empirical questions in a consistent manner, however, requires clarification of terms used (what is activism, proactivism, etc.) and present extant prevalent and rival positions on these matters. The following chapter provides a general overview to recent scholarship on Turkish foreign affairs pertaining to the arguments about recent developments in Turkey's foreign affairs.

CHAPTER 5

DEFINING TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter provides a broad overview to recent scholarship on Turkish foreign affairs pertaining to the arguments about Turkey's axis shift in foreign affairs. Before any analysis, however, one should clarify why the primary focus of the chapter is the debate about axis shift in the first place.

Firstly, the debate is highly controversial, which interests almost everybody who studies Turkish foreign affairs. Such high level of interest is particularly conducive to theory development. Secondly, the debate cuts across several disagreements, which is a productive ground for raising various theoretical questions. Finally, it is rather a new phenomenon, with strong policy implications. Therefore, the debate is not only theoretically but also practically relevant.

The chapter begins by a review of general arguments about the existence and nature of the axis shift. Three distinct views are presented. These views, however are not coherent within themselves since each observer may define various properties of the axis shift, even if they agree

on whether there is an axis shift or not. Accordingly, the remainder of the chapter is allocated to such disagrrements. The second part deals with arguments about the reasons for an axis shift. The third part of this chapter is allocated to the discussion about Turkey's supposed geographical orientation. The fourth part is concerned with the disaggrements over timing of the axis shift. In the fifth part, the question of activism and proactivism in Turkey's bilateral relations are addressed. Finally, discussion of the role of sub-state actors in Turkish foreign affairs is addressed. The chapter concludes by pointing out the incongruences in Turkish foreign affairs literature about the basic features of Turkish foreign affairs and its implications for theory building as well as theory testing.

5.1. What is the "Axis Shift"? Three perspectives

After the end of the Cold War, Turkey's relations with its neighbourhood have been strained, especially with Armenia in 1992, Greece in 1996, and Syria in 1998. The conflicts occasionally took a military nature, as in the military operations in Northern Iraq in the pursuit of PKK, "dogfights" between Greek and Turkish air forces over the Aegean, and Turkish military build up on Turkish-Syrian border. Relations with Russia and Iran were also challenging due to a range of issues from Kurdish conflict to political Islam. Turkey's relations with European countries were also problematic due to differences over Cyprus, human rights, democratization and civil-miltary relations. Relations with Israel and the USA were not devoid of problems, yet Turkey was adamant in pursuing closer cooperation with them. Turkey's image in the wider Middle East was also not very

positive, as exemplified in strong criticisms against Turkey in 1997 Summit of Organization of Islamic Conference.[263] In other regions, like sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, Turkey had very limited, if any, interest.

For many observers, the picture in 2000s was in sharp contrast to the above one.[264] Beginning in 1999, Turkey's relations with Greece and Syria gradually improved. In 2004 the Turkish government diverted from its status quo oriented policy on Cyprus and supported island's unification in the context of Annan Plan. After years of distance, it established official relations with the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq. From 2009 onwards, more than twenty new Turkish embassies have been opened in Sub-Saharan Africa.[265] Following a successful campaign at garnering majority of votes from sub-Saharan African countries, Turkey has been elected as non-permanent member at the UN Security Council first time after 48 years.[266] It has also taken the very first steps to renormalize relations with Armenia and ended visa requirements with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon reciprocally. On a broader plane, Turkey has taken an active interest in formerly neglected relations with states such as Costa Rica, Eritrea and Mongolia. Relations with Latin American states have also gained pace, and

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[263] Kemal Kirişçi, "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No. 40 (2009): 31.

[264] Kirişçi, "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy". Juilette Tolay and Ronald H. Linden, "Understanding Turkey's Relations with Its Neighbours," in *Turkey and Its Neighbours: Foreign Relations in Transition*, Linden et al. (eds), Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2012, 2. Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey:Redrawing the Middle East Map or Building Sandcastles?"*Middle East Policy* 17, No.1, (2010):115-136; Bülent Aras, *Turkey and the Greater Middle East*, İstanbul:TASAM Yayınları, 2005; Çağaptay, " The misnomer of 'Neo-ottomanism'"; Öniş and Yılmaz, "Between Europeanization and Eurasianism"; Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkish Foreign Policy", İlker Aytürk, "The Coming of an Ice Age? Turkish-Israeli Relations since 2002", *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 4, (2011): 675-687.

[265] Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afrika-iliskileri.tr.mfa

[266] Kılıç Buğra Kanat, "AK Party's Foreign Policy: Is Turkey Turning Away from the West?" *Insight Turkey* 12, No.1(2010): 205-225, p.214.

the opening of two new diplomatic missions is currently being considered. Bilateral trade and investment surged with Russia and Iran, culminating in improved relations with both.

Turkey's relations with the world increased in volume, but it also embodied a change of mindset and vision. Concept of "rhythmic diplomacy," which refers to the willingness of Turkish government to augment Turkey's involvement with the world, prioritized the sheer volume of interactions. Concept of "zero-problem neighbourhood" was used to define Turkey's willingness to be more cooperative with its immediate region. Accordingly, in most cases, Turkey's engagement was cooperative, it emphasized common interests, shared values and involved instruments like bilateral visits or treaties, multilateral platforms, negotiation, and mediation. With respect to Russia, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu stated that the government considers no barriers or limits to bilateral cooperation[267] and looking towards the Arab world, Prime Minister Erdoğan has proclaimed that intensifying cooperation with Saudi Arabia is as important as EU membership.[268] In other cases though, Turkey did not refrain from confrontation: denounciations, refusals, threats, reducing level of diplomatic and economic relations have also been used. Erdoğan openly and deliberately confronted Israel about its treatment of Gaza. Turkey also defied its Western allies with its position on Iran's nuclear program by rejecting any policy options that include embargo or military intervention.

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[267] "Ahmet Davutoğlu Moskova'da" *TRT News Agency* July 2, 2009.
[268] "İstanbul ile Riyad'ın Kaderi Ayrı Olur mu?" (Can Fates of İstanbul and Riyad be Separable?," *Milliyet*, 20 January 2010.

In the Turkish foreign policy literature, this admixture of cooperative and conflictual interactions led to a puzzle. Scholars, who try to discern patterns in Turkey's positions and behaviours, have been divided over whether Turkey's cooperative and conflictual interactions are confined to specific regions of the world. It is possible to identify **three positions out of** such arguments: The first proposition is that there is an axis shift, in the sense that relations with Western allies have deteriorated whereas relations with others (Muslim World, the Middle East except Israel, neighbours) have become more cooperative. The second proposition is that Turkey's relations with the West did not change significantly; what appears to be axis shift is just Turkey's increasing level of activity, not just with the Middle East, but with other non-Western parts of the world. Third proposition is that Turkey relations with both the West and the non-West have expanded in a mutually reinforcing manner.

The first group of scholars argued that Turkey's behavior show a specific delineation: bilateral dynamics between Turkey and the EU and/or the US has taken a downturn, whereas Turkey intensified its relations with the "non-West." Some of the observers argue that such reorientation was mainly caused by the frustration and disappointment that Turkey faced with respect to its Western allies.[269] The stagnation of the EU membership process, the suggestions for a specialized status instead of full membership, coupled

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[269]Tarık Oğuzlu and Mustafa Kibaroğlu, "Is the Westernization Process Losing Pace in Turkey: Who's to Blame?" *Turkish Studies* Vol. 10, No. 4, (2009):577–593,; Tarık Oğuzlu "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West? *Turkish Studies* Vol. 9, No. 1, (2008):3–20; Fiona Hill and Ömer Taspinar "Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?" *Survival* (Spring 2006): Ziya Meral and Jonathan Paris, "Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity," *The Washington Quarterly* 33, no.4, (2010): 75-86.

with the differences of opinion among member states about defense, enlargement and a common constitution, paved the way for alienation from the EU by both the Turkish public and elite. Similarly, the disagreements over Northern Iraq, the Middle East, and Iran's nuclear program served to further estrange Turkey and the US. These disturbances with respect to Turkey's long-term and historically valued relations with the West may help explain the reasons for Turkey's tendency to strengthen its relations with non-Western societies.[270] Some of the observers, however, think there is more to reorientation than so-called disappontment with the West: they think that there is an ideological reason for Turkey's reorientation. Whether it is an "Islamist backbone,"[271] or more specific ideology based on worldviews of the AKP leaders,[272] these scholars think Turkey's reorientation shows a definite preference for one group of states over others. Therefore, for all proponents of the first view, there is actually an "axis shift" in the sense that Turkey has less cooperative relations with the Western countries and more cooperative relations with the states in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

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[270] İbrahim Kalın, "Turkey and the Middle East: Ideology or Geo-politics?", *Private View,* (2008): 29.

[271] Soner Çağaptay "Is Turkey Leaving the West?" *Foreign Affairs,* available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65661/soner-cagaptay/is-turkey-leaving-the-west?page=show; Mustafa Türkeş "Türk Dış Politikasında Bölgesel Meseleler ve Obama Yönetiminin Olası Politikaları" in *Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası: Uluslararası IV. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri,* Dincer, Osman Bahadır, Habibe Özdal, Hacali Necefoğlu (eds) (Ankara:USAK)2010

[271] Daniel Pipes, "Ambitious Turkey," *National Review Online,* April 12, 2011 http://www.danielpipes.org/9671/ambitious-turkey; Habibe Özdal, Bahadır Dinçer, Mehmet Yeğin (eds), *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası.* Ankara: USAK Yayınları, 2009, 355.

[272] Mesut Özcan and Ali Resul Usul, "Understanding the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Changes within Continuity Is Turkey Departing From The West?" *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Dış Politika* 6, No. 21 (2010): 101-123; Bülent Aras and Hakan Fidan "Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiers of a new geographic imagination," *New Perspectives on Turkey* no. 40 (2009): 195-217

The second group of scholars however, argued that there is not a direct relationship between Turkey's seeming departure from the West and its concurrent attraction towards "the Rest". For example, Oğuzlu argues that responding and preventing security threats from the Middle East, is one of the most important reasons for Turkey's active interest in the region.[273] Particularly, growing concern over Kurdish separatism brought Ankara closer to the governments of Iran and Syria. [274] Similarly, Larabee argues that "Turkey's new activism is a response to structural changes in its security environment since the end of the Cold War."[275] Realization of the current system as a multipolar one, rather than a unipolar one, eased the hands of the Turkish political elite and encouraged them to take bolder steps. [276] Kalın also points to a geopolitical mindset underlined by a realpolitik attitude, which triggers the new TFP activism.[277] He argues that while Turkey's former reluctance towards Middle Eastern affairs was due to ideological preferences, currently, "geo-political considerations are inviting it back to the backyard of the Ottoman Empire."[278] He argues that amidst accelerating globalization, Turkey's foreign policy has acquired a decentralized, multidirectional and, most importantly, interest-based nature. The dynamism of eastern economies in general, and the developments in the Middle East, together with pessimism over the economy and demography in

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[273] Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkish Foreign Policy"
[274] Stephen Larrabee "Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East" *Foreign Affairs,* (2007): 103-114.
[275] Larrabee "Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East."
[276] Ziya Öniş, "Multiple Faces of the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique" *Insight Turkey* 13, no. 1 (2011): 47-65
[277] İbrahim Kalın, "From History to Realpolitik in Armenian-Turkish Relations," *Today's Zaman*, September 11, 2008.
[278] Kalın, "Ideology or Geopolitics."

Europe, might have led Turkish leaders to beileve that chances in becoming a more powerful actor lay in Turkey's relations with the non-West.[279]

This view, therefore, implies that there is not a trade-off between Turkey's relations between the West and "the Rest." Self-confidence and autonomy on the part of Turkish foreign policy makers might have led to deviations "from transatlantic political agenda"[280] as Turkey determines its priorities independently from its Western allies.[281] Nevetheless, there is not a pattern which is identified as having more conflictual relations with one group and more cooperative relations with the others. Basically, Turkish government embraced *realpolitik*.[282] Each foreign policy decision is made and implemented with certain priorities and interests in mind, which may or may not involve steering relations with other regions. In other words, Turkish government does what needs to be done, based on individual circumstances and environment surrounding a foreign policy issue. In some cases, such circumstances necessitate a friction with certain Western actors, such as Turkey's refusal to allow US troops on its soil in 2003; in other cases they lead to cooperation, such as EU-Turkish energy security cooperation in the Caspian region.[283]

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[279] Suat Kınıklıoğlu, "Turkey's Neighbourhood and Beyond: Tectonic Transformation at Work?" *The International Spectator*, Vol. 45, No. 4, (2010): 93–100; Mehmet Babacan, "Whither an axis shift: A perspective from Turkey's foreign trade." *Insight Turkey* 13, no.1 (2011): 129-157.

[280] Kardaş, "Building Sandcastles."

[281] Şaban Kardaş, "Türk Dış Politikasında Eksen Kayması mı?" *Akademik Ortadoğu* 5, no.2, (2011): 20.

[282] Nicholas Danforth, "Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 7, No. 3, (2008): 83-95.

[283] Barçın Yinanç, "Turkey got more than it wanted on Nabucoo" *Hurriyet Daily News*, July 11, 2009.

This alternative view also implies that Turkey is in the process of establishing itself as a major regional, even maybe "global power"[284]: the Middle East or Arabs are just part of the equation. For example, Öniş states that the claims about Turkish foreign policy's Middle Easternization are exaggerated since "there has been a very strong impetus throughout this period to develop bilateral relations with, in particular, the Russian Federation, as well as other key countries in the Caucasus, as well as opening up to the African continent and Latin America."[285] Kınıklıoğlu also argues "there is no difference for Turkey between the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus or the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. They are all equally significant for Turkey as they all represent different vectors or dimensions of its multidimensional foreign policy."[286] In a conference, Davutoğlu also said "There is no diplomacy axis, but a diplomacy plane, and that plane is the whole world,"[287] referring to government's interest in establishing contact with every part of the world. Gul also reiterated Turkey's global outlook: "Turkey, surely, is moving in every direction, towards East and West, North and South."[288]

The third view is an amalgam of the previous two views: Like the first view, it perceives Turkey's relations with the West and its relations with "the Rest" as interrelated, but like the second view, it proposes that they are not antagonistic. Indeed, they complement and boost each other. Similar to

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[284] Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007" *Insight Turkey* 10, no.1, (2008): 83.
[285] Ziya Öniş, "Multiple Faces," 50.
[286] Kınıklıoğlu, "Tectonic Tranformation," 97.
[287] Sami Kohen, "Muhalefet Dış politikaya Nasıl Bakıyor?" ("How does opposition see the foreign policy") *Milliyet,* 9 January 2010
[288] Quoted in Cengiz Çandar ""Turkey's "soft power" strategy: A new vision for a multi-polar world." *SETA Policy Brief* 38 (2009): 3-11.

earlier accounts of Turkish foreign policy, which often apply metaphors such as "barrier", "bridge", or "model," this view does not propose a trade-off between Turkey's Western alliance and its engagement with others, they are seen as mutually reinforcing.

This seems to be mindset of a group of Turkish foreign policy makers, who regard an admixture of conflict and cooperation in various parts of the world as not only normal, but even European.[289] Despite the claims that a more Middle East oriented policy contradicts Turkey's Western orientation; the government's primary goal is furthering relations with the West, because "a proactive and visionary approach towards the Middle East … is the only way for Turkey to increase its credibility in the eyes of both the West and the Islamic world. The goal now is to demonstrate Turkey's relevance to the West by helping contribute to Western efforts to deal with the security threats emanating from the Middle East."[290]

Such a mindset is probably best exemplified in bow and arrow analogy of Turkish foreign policy.[291] The more Turkey expands its Eastern outreach, the more leverage and impact it will have over the West. Therefore, Turkey's engagement with both East and West are, as Foreign Minister Davutoğlu put it, "complementary not in competition."[292]

In 1990s, Turkey's relations with Central Asia, the Caucasus and Caspian Sea, or the Middle East was seen as complementary to Turkey's

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[289] Tolay and Linden "Understanding Turkey's Relations with Its Neighbours," 4.
[290] Tarık Oğuzlu, "Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy" *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no.1, (2007): 89.
[291] Burak Bilgehan Özpek and Yelda Demirağ "Davutoğlu Effect in Turkish Foreign Policy: What if the Bowstring is Broken?" *Iran and the Caucasus* 16, no. 1, (2012):117-128.
[292] Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision," p. 42.

Western orientation. [293] In the 2000s, a similar view is put forward: Turkey was a "bridge," "a model" or "spearhead" of Western liberal ideas and practices, in other part of the world.[294] It has been argued that "Turkey is a natural key to any plan or concept that aims to promote democracy and raise living standards, thanks to having both European and Middle Eastern identities, political and social modernization, and rising democratic standards." [295] As such, Turkey is seen as an "unequivocal asset for the EU's external policies."[296]

While "Turkey as a model" did not lose its appeal for some observes, others criticized such a perspective for portraying Turkey as an instrument of others' foreign policy, rather than as an autonomous actor.[297] Even when Turkey's agency is highlighted as in the bow-arrow analogy, it still perceives the non-West as secondary and relations with them as instrumental to European connection, which is the ultimate goal.[298]

Yet, it is possible that the reverse is also true: Turkey's relations with West might have a positive impact on Turkey's relations with the rest of the

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[293] Oral Sander "Turkey and The Turkic World" *Central Asian Survey* 13, No.1, (1994): 37-44. Ian Pryde, "Kyrgyzstan: Secularism vs Islam." *The World Today* (1992): 208-211; Ziya Öniş, "Turkey in the post-Cold War era: in search of identity." *The Middle East Journal* 49, no.1, (1995): 48-68; İdris Bal, "The Turkish Model and The Turkic Republics" *Perceptions Journal of International Affairs* 3, no.3 (1998): 105-129, Thomas Straubhaar, "Turkey as Economic Neighbour" in Linden et. al. 173-194.

[294] Kemal Kirişçi, "Democracy Diffusion: The Turkish experience" in Linden et al. 145-172. Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci, "Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead: Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy," *CEPS EU-Turkey Working Papers* No. 1, August 1, 2004; Ömer Taşpınar, *An Uneven Fit? The "Turkish Model" and the Arab World.* Analysis Paper no.5 The Brookings Institute, 2003.

[295] Bülent Aras "Turkey and the GCC: An Emerging Relationship" *Middle East Policy* 12, no.4, (2005): 93-94. For a similar view, Selma Mujanović "Turkey`s Harmless Tango Between East and West," *Epiphany* 6, No. 2, (2013): 205-217.

[296] Emerson and Tocci, "Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead"

[297] Tolay and Linden "Understanding Turkey's Relations with Its Neighbours."

[298] Özpek and Demirağ "What if the Bowstring is Broken?", 118.

world. For example, Turkey's democratization and Europeanization processes "have had commercial and diplomatic effects into its relations with its Central Asian neighbors."[299] A public opinion survey by TESEV in Arab countries also showed that majority (39%) of the respondents support Turkey's EU accession process.[300] When asked, why they think Turkey could be a model for the region, Turkey's economic capacity, democracy ad secularism are the first three reasons. Accordingly, many believe that "the success in the greater re-engagement with the East depends to a large extent on the firmness of Turkey's European vocation."[301] Altunisik also stipulates that decision to start EU accession negotiations in December 2004, have had a positive impact in Arab public opinion on Turkey.[302]

For some observers, the positive effect of Turkey's Western connection to its relations with "the Rest" is not necessarily welcome: Turkey is still playing the role it has been given by the West: "Frenzied activity abroad points not to active or new foreign policy, but to loss of priorities." One scholar argues that even the most-celebrated foreign policy principle of the AKP government, the "zero-problem with neighbours" principle, is a new term for old foreign policy actions. She states that talking with neighbours "with whom the US officially does not talk or with those over which Washington no longer has leverage" has been something Turkey

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[299] Mustafa Kutlay and Salih Doğan "Turkey and Central Asia: Modern Economic Linkages along the 'Silk Road'" *Turkish Weekly*, January 13, 2011.

[300] Mensur Akgün and Sebiha Senyücel Gündoğar, *Ortadoğu'da Tükiye Algısı 2012*, TESEV, İstanbul, 2012.

[301] Fuat Keyman "Realistic Proactivism in the Era of Global Turmoil: In Search of a Viable and Sustainable Turkish Foreign Policy," *Today's Zaman*, Feb 3, 2010.

[302] Meliha B. Altunisik, *Turkey: Arab Perspectives*, TESEV, İstanbul, 2010. See also Kemal Kirişci, "Turkey's 'Demonstrative Effect' and the Transformation of the Middle East." *Insight Turkey* 13, no.2 (2011):33-55.

used to do under previous governments. Hence, Turkish foreign policy is neither new, nor more independent, only "the parameters of Turkish foreign policy have been broadened in tandem with American strategic interests."[303]

Therefore, three distinct approaches to Turkey's foreign policy orientation can be summarized as follows: 1) Turkey's relations with the non-West and Turkey's relations with the West are negatively correlated, 2) that they are not correlated at all, or 3) that they are positively correlated. Of course, this categorization is an abstraction and simplification of more sophisticated positions. Disagreements over several other parameters of new foreign policy cut across positions: reasons for supposed axis shift, definitions of "the West" and "the Rest," the timing of the supposed axis shift, how to define activism and proactivism in Turkey's foreign affairs, as well as nature and volume of involvement by sub-state actors in foreign affairs. The following parts deal with these issues, so as to provide a guideline for further empirical comparisons of the positions.

5.2.   Why is the "Axis Shift"?

One of the major disagreements over Turkey's new foreign policy is the reasons behind the supposed "axis shift." Those who think Turkey's deteriorating relations with "the West" improving relations with "the West" are not particularly interrelated, state that some systemic factors generated the impulse behind any seemingly new directions. They argue that the realization of the current system as a multipolar one, rather than a unipolar

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[303] Nur Bilge Criss, "Parameters of Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Governments" UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. 23, May 2010.

one, eased the hands of the Turkish political elite and encouraged them to take bolder steps in foreign affairs. The dynamism of eastern economies in general, and the developments in the Middle East, together with pessimism over the economy and demography in Europe, showed that Turkey's chances in becoming a more powerful actor lay in its relations with the East.[304] In particular, developments such as replacement of the G-8 with the G-20 shows "the key organizational nexus in debates concerning the future of global finance and global economic governance" has become more non-Western,[305] and Turkey is simply responding to such global developments.

Other scholars, who think the reasons for change are international rather than global, look at the bilateral dynamics between Turkey and the EU/US. They argue that while systemic changes in general can account for new activism, the "shift" is mainly caused by the frustration and disappointment that Turkey faced with respect to its Western allies.[306] The stagnation of the EU membership process, the suggestions for a specialized status instead of full membership, coupled with the differences of opinion among member states about defense, enlargement and a common constitution, paved the way for alienation from the EU by both the Turkish public and elite. Similarly, the disagreements over Northern Iraq, the Middle East, and Iran's nuclear program –which are given precedence over Western alliance because of their immediate effect on Turkey's security—served to

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[304] Kınıklıoğlu, "Tectonic Transformation" ; Babacan, "Whither an axis shift."
[305] Öniş "Multiple Faces."
[306] Tarık Oğuzlu, Mustafa Kibaroğlu "Is the Westernization Process Losing Pace in Turkey: Who's to Blame?" *Turkish Studies* Vol. 10, No. 4, (2009):577–593,; Tarık Oğuzlu "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West? *Turkish Studies* Vol. 9, No. 1, (2008):3–20; Fiona Hill and Omer Taspinar "Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?" *Survival* (Spring 2006): Ziya Meral and Jonathan Paris "Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity " *The Washington Quarterly* 33, no.4, (October 2010):75-86

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further estrange Turkey and the US. These disturbances with respect to Turkey's long-term and historically valued relations with the West may help explain the reasons for Turkey's tendency to strengthen its relations with non-Western societies.[307]

There is a third group of scholars who claim that there are some sub-state actors *in* Turkey, whose dynamic interaction with each other have repercussions for Turkey's foreign affairs. The AKP's identity as a "conservative democratic" party along with its basic economic and ideological values, were important factors in bringing society's various demands to the foreign policy arena. Since the AKP's main electorate consists of a culturally conservative, trade-oriented group of local Anatolian capital holders, it is likely that the AKP give their demands a due consideration in shaping foreign policy. The emphasis on Turkey's relations with its immediate neighbours, and policies like border trade and lifting of visas with most of those neighbours, may point to such domestic demands in particular, and an economic mindset in general.

The interrelationships between not only the government, NGOs, or Anatolian-based conservative economic actors, but also Islamic groups[308] and Turkish military,[309] ethnic and religious minorities in[310] and outside

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[307] İbrahim Kalın, 'Turkey and the Middle East: Ideology or Geo-politics?', *Private View*, (2008):29.

[308] Hakan Yavuz "Turkish identity and foreign policy in flux: The rise of Neo-Ottomanism", *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 7, no.12 (1998): 19-41; Bill Park "The Fethullah Gulen Movement and (Turkish al Qaeda) as Transnational Phenomena" in *Modern Turkey: People, State and Foreign Policy in a Globalised World,* Routledge: New York, 2012, 185-203. Zeynep Atalay, "Civil society as soft power: Islamic NGOs and Turkish foreign policy." in *Turkey Between Nationalism and Globalization*, Kastoryano, R. (ed) Routledge: New York, 2013, p.165

[309] Ali Soner, B. "The Justice and Development Party's policies towards non-Muslim

Turkey[311] as well as Turkish rebel groups[312] had important effects on Turkey's foreign policy. Especially the dramatic change in civil-military relations under the AKP and the resulting balance, led to a reconsideration with respect to definitions of national security. A new security conceptualization that is less military-based and more focused on economy and diplomacy have begun to shape Turkish foreign policy. With the help of the institutional and normative adjustments that Turkey has gone through during its EU membership process, the civilian elite has gained a more assertive voice with respect to matters concerning security and foreign policy. Coupled with a growing civil society, whose resource and influence generating mechanisms have strengthened during the process, Turkey's foreign policy making has been shaped more in line with a broader definition of national interests. The capture of Öcalan, decreasing PKK violence, and the launching of the Kurdish-Turkish peace process might have helped Turkey's relations with its neighbours. The change in the law on non-Muslim minority foundations' property rights, as well as government's Alevi Opening are domestic processes with links to Turkey's EU accession and neighbourhood policies.

minorities in Turkey." Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 12.1 (2010): 23-40.CI Discussion Papers, no.23 (May 2010) available at http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/redalyc/pdf/767/76715004003.pdf

[310] Chris Rumford, "Failing the EU Test? Turkey's National Programme, EU Candidature and the Complexities of Democratic Reform," *Mediterranean Politics* 7, no.1 (2002): 51-68. Şule Toktaş and Bülent Aras. "The EU and minority rights in Turkey," *Political Science Quarterly* 124.4 (2009): 697-720. Ali Soner, B. "The Justice and Development Party's policies towards non-Muslim minorities in Turkey." *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 12, no.1 (2010): 23-40.

[311] Baser, Bahar. "Kurdish diaspora political activism in Europe with a particular focus on Great Britain." Diaspora Dialogues for Development and Peace Project, Berlin: Berghof Peace Support, June 2011. Lilia Petkova, "The ethnic Turks in Bulgaria: Social integration and impact on Bulgarian   Turkish relations, 1947–2000," *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 1, no.4 (2002): 42-59.

[312] Kemal Kirişçi, "The Kurdish question and Turkish foreign policy," in *The Future of Turkish Foreign policy,* ed. Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004): 277-314.

Therefore, global, international and domestic factors are variously given as reasons for why Turkey has experienced an "axis shift" in its foreign affairs.

5.3. Definitions of the "West" and the "Rest"

Before making any arguments about the "axis shift," each observer has to make a working definition of both of the ends: Shift from where to where? In the Turkish foreign policy literature, "the West" -the "previous" target of Turkish foreign policy- usually includes the US, the EU and Israel. Such a definition implies that "non-West" is composed of non-EU European countries, all Africa, South America, Asia, as well as English-speaking countries such as Australia, New Zeland and Canada. At other times, "the West" is only the US and Israel, and excludes the EU. For instance, Çağaptay states that Turkey reorientation involves cooperating more with the EU, less with the US.[313] A recent study by Tezcür and Grigorescu seems to confirm this argument.[314] "Indeed a EU-centered foreign policy seemed to be an alternative to a Washington centered one for a while but realizations fell short of expected benefits."[315] Whether more recent members of the EU should be included in the definition of "the West" is usually left untouched.

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[313] Soner Çağaptay "Where Goes the U.S.-Turkish Relationship?"*Middle East Quarterly* 11, No.4 (Fall 2004): 43-52.

[314] Güneş Murat Tezcür and Alexandrou Grigorescu "Activism and Turkish Foreign Policy: Balancing European and Regional Interests" *International Studies Perspectives* (2013):1-20.

[315] Bahadır Kaynak, "Dilemmas of Turkish Foreign Policy" *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* 8, No.32, (2012):77-96,

The supposed new target of Turkish foreign policy is also variously defined. Taking clue from concept of "zero-problem with neighbours"[316], some of the scholars think that Turkey's relations with its neighbours is the new focus.[317] Studies on foreign trade data confirm this hypothesis.[318] Yet there are discussions as to the outcomes of this policy: stalling of Turkish-Armenian rapproachment, Turkey's distancing with Azerbaijan, and more recently Turkey's souring relations with Syria.[319]

Others state that Turkey's foreign policy has been more focused on the previously Ottoman territories,[320] whereas others challenge this view and argue that Turkey new focus is the intersection of predominantly Muslim states[321] and formerly Ottoman states, or even the Islamists.[322] They state that Turkey's increasing relations with its neighbors is an ideological and identity-based restructuring of Turkish foreign policy principles. They point to the sources of this identity restructuration as Islamist ideology and a

[316] Ahmet Davutoğlu "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy" *Foreign Policy*, May 10, 2010.
[317] Kadri Kaan Renda "Turkey's Neighbourhood Policy: An Emerging Complex Interdepence" *Insight Turkey* 3, no.1 (2011): 89-108; Kemal Kirişci "Turkish Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times" *Chaillot Paper* no. 92, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006, 19; Kemal Kirişci, "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No. 40 (Spring, 2009), pp. 29-57; Kınıklıoğlu, "Tectonic Transformation." Kemal Kirişci "Turkey's Engagement with Its Neighbourhood: a "Synthetic" and Multidimensional Look at Turkey's Foreign Policy Transformation" *Turkish Studies* 13, no.3, (2012):319-341.
[318] Tezcür and Grigeorescu "Balancing European and Regional Interests," Kirişci "Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy", Kemal Kirişci "Turkey's Engagement with Its Neighbourhood: a "Synthetic" and Multidimensional Look at Turkey's Foreign Policy Transformation" *Turkish Studies* 13, no.3, (2012):319-341
[319] Gencer Özcan "Policy of Zero Problems with the Neighbours" *IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook: Med.2012*, Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2012, pp.59-63; Richard Falk "Zero Problems with Neighbors Revisited" *Today's Zaman*, Februray 5, 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-270478-zero-problems-with-neighbors-revisited-by-richard-falk*.html
[320] Nora Fisher Onar, "Neo-Ottomanism, Historical Legacies and Turkish Foreign Policy," Centre for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies, Discussion Paper Series, 2009.
[321] Soner Çağaptay, "The AKP's foreign policy: the misnomer of 'Neo-ottomanism'." *Turkey Analyst* 2, no.8 (2009).
[322] Daniel Pipes,"Ambitious Turkey" *National Review Online,* April 12, 2011 http://www.danielpipes.org/9671/ambitious-turkey

revived interest in Ottoman past, and argue that in practice, such a mindset has led to solidarity with neighbours on the basis of Islamic values.[323][134]

Based on a study of high-level visits by AKP officials to the Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus, Çağaptay argues that "the [AKP] party focuses asymmetrically on Islamist Arab countries and Iran, while it ignores Israel, the Balkans and the Caucasus."[324] He argues that the AKP has indeed a "two-pronged strategy" towards Muslim actors: Writing before the shake-ups of the Arab Spring, he claimed that the AKP has been expressing solidarity with Islamist and anti-Western regimes like Qatar and Sudan, while dismissing the secular, pro-Western Muslim governments like Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia. Therefore, it is not "being Muslim" per se, but "being Islamist" which underlies the AKP's choices in the foreign policy arena. A similar view is shared by Türkeş, who states that the outlook behind the axis shift in Turkey's foreign relations is shaped by Davutoğlu's idea of an "Islamic backbone," which was lacking in previous Western-oriented, secular foreign policy.[325]He argues that the AKP's political elite is deliberately trying to insert this new "backbone" to Turkey's new foreign policy anatomy.

Similarly, Pipes attributes the new activism and shift in Turkish foreign policy to the Islamist ideology of AKP.[326][137]Referring back to the

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[323] Soner Çağaptay "Is Turkey Leaving the West?" *Foreign Affairs*, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65661/soner-cagaptay/is-turkey-leaving-the-west?page=show

[324] Çağaptay,"The misnomer of 'Neo-ottomanism'"

[325] Mustafa Türkeş, "Türk Dış Politikasında Bölgesel Meseleler ve Obama Yönetiminin Olası Politikaları" in *Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası: Uluslararası IV. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri,* ed. Dincer et al. (Ankara:USAK, 2010).

[326] Pipes "Ambitious Turkey."

Turkish parliament's refusal to permit American troops to traverse Turkish territory in the war against Iraq, he states that from the very beginning of AKP rule, it was evident that the new Turkish government would choose a different path in its relations with the West. He argues that "Turkish foreign policy became increasingly hostile to the West in general," and especially turned against the United States, France, Israel. As evidence, he cites the warming of relations with governments in Syria, Iran, and Libya, along with Turkey's refusal to name Iran as the adversary in NATO documents concerning the missile defense program.

While most of the observers who point to an ideology-based rationale are critical of the AKP's foreign policy, a few others are less so. For example, Tremblay argues that the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations, especially after they surpassed the most important obstacles and reached an agreement over military cooperation, is due to the impact of religious ideas/identity on foreign policy.[327] She states that even the "elitist world of diplomats is not insulated from religious ideational influence." Consequently she claims that religious ideas, i.e. Islam, are deeply entrenched in Turkish mentality and have direct implications for Turkish foreign policy.

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[327] Tremblay, Pinar. "Searching for the Soul: Explaining the Impact of Islam on Turkish Foreign Policy toward Israel" *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA*, Mar 26, 2008, last Accessed on 2011-04-18 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252200_index.html>

Finally, "the Middle East"[328] or Eurasia[329] are also offered as the new focus, although they are defined differently by different authors. The definitions of the Middle East, usually include states with predominantly Arabic-speaking populations and Iran, and exclude Israel, whereas Eurasia refers to a large and very heteregenous group of states. Therefore, it is imperative to deconstruct what is meant by both "the West" and "the Rest" in order to determine to what extent each proposition is empirically accurate.

5.4.   When is the "Axis Shift"?

One of the most debated questions in the study of Turkish foreign policy activism has been its historical antecendents in Turkish foreign affairs. The international circumstances of the Second World War and the Cold War together with Turkey's domestic social, economic and political problems limited Turkey's outreach to non-Western societies.[330] Nonetheless, Turkish foreign policy has witnessed brief periods of attempts at a more active and multidimensional foreign policy. Especially after the Cold War, countries in North Africa, newly independent states of Former Soviet Union and the Middle Eastern countries have emerged as a new focus of interest

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[328] Oğuzlu, "Middle-Easternization of Turkish Foreign Policy," Ziya Öniş "Turkey and The Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest" *Insight Turkey* 14, no. 3, (2012): 45-63.

[329] Pınar Bilgin and Ali Bilgic "Turkey's" new" foreign policy toward Eurasia." *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 52.2 (2011): 173-195; Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yilmaz, "Between Europeanization and Euro‐asianism: Foreign policy activism in Turkey during the AKP era." *Turkish Studies* 10, no.1 (2009): 7-24. Mesut Özcan and Ali Resul Usul "Understanding the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Changes within Continuity, Is Turkey Departing From The West?" *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Dış Politika* 6, no. 21 (2010): 101-123; Bülent Aras and Hakan Fidan, "Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiers of a New Geographic Imagination," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 195-217.

[330] Nasuh Uslu, *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period,*(New York: Nova Publishers, 2004)

for Turkish foreign policy. For example, discussions about "Turkey as a model" started in early 1990s: shortly after the end of the Cold War, Turkey was willing to facilitate Western penetration into the Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia.[331] Therefore, several studies point to similarities of vision and practice in Özal's foreign policy in late 1980s/early 1990s and AKP's foreign policy.[332] Martin and Altunisik also argue that Turkish activism in foreign policy can be dated back to late 1980s and early 1990s.[333] Evidently, discussions about Turkey's "new" activism are far from being novel.[334]

For some observers, Turkey's newest activism in 2000s has actually begun in late 1990s.[335] Turkey's attempts at opening to its neighbours and other parts of the world have been dated back to late 1990s, to the policies

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[331] Saban Kardaş "Turkey: Redrawing Middle East Map or Building Sandcastles?" *Middle East Policy* 17, no. 1, (Spring 2010):

[332] Sedat Laçiner, "Özalism (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign Policy?" in the *Journal of Administrative Sciences* Vol 1 (2003), p. 182-185. Insel, Ahmet. "The AKP and normalizing democracy in Turkey." *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102.2 (2003): 293-308. Atli, Altay. "Business associations and Turkey's foreign economic policy: From the 'Ozal Model 'to the AKP period." *Bogaziçi Journal* 25 (2011): 171-188. Heper, Metin. "Islam, Conservatism, and Democracy in Turkey: Comparing Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan." *Insight Turkey* 15, no.2 (2013). Nicholas Danforth, "Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP." *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 7.3 (2008): 83-95. Alexander Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 6 (2006), p. 947. Tezcür and Grigeorescu "Balancing European and Regional Interests," Mesut Özcan and Ali Resul Usul "Understanding the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Changes within Continuity Is Turkey Departing From The West?" *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Dış Politika*, Cilt 6, Sayı: 21 (2010): 101-123; Pınar Bilgin and Ali Bilgic "Turkey's" new" foreign policy toward Eurasia." *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 52.2 (2011): 173-195, p. 184.; Bahadır Kaynak, "Dilemmas of Turkish Foreign Policy" *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* 8, No.32, (2012):77-96

[333] Meliha B. and Lenore G. Martin, "Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the middle east under AKP" *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 4 (2011): 570.

[334] Philip Robins, "Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis: Adventurist or Dynamic?" in Clement H. Dodd, ed., *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects*. Cambridgeshire, UK: Eothen Press, 1992); Alan Makovsky, "The new activism in Turkish foreign policy." *Sais Review* 19, no.1 (1999): 92-113. Sabri Sayarı "Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era: The challenges of multi-regionalism." *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no.1, (2000): 169-182.

[335] See Kirişçi "Transformation of TFP"; Tarık Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2008), p. 16.

and vision of then Foreign Minister İsmail Cem.[336] For example, Turkey's

active involvement in Alliance of Civilizations Initiative[337], Turkey's

raproachment with Greece and Syria, and Turkey's initial attempts to

strengthen relations with sub-Saharan Africa[338] are dated back to his term as

Foreign Minister.[339]

Others argue that AKP's foreign policy represents departures from

the past periods of activism. Özal's neo-Ottomanism never stressed Islam or

the Middle East in particular[340], nor İsmail Cem's policies downplayed

Turkey's Western orientation.[341] Another view suggests that there are

specific periods *within* AKP's term, each of which resembles the past

practices in differing degrees: Between 2002-2007 AKP has pursued more

pro-European attitude similar to previous governments, whereas after 2007

it pursued a more Eurasian orientation.[342] Still others detect another shift in

the aftermath of Arab uprisings.[343]

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[336] Kemal Kirişçi "Turkish Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times" *Chaillot Paper* no. 92, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006, 19. Tarık Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2008), p. 16; Özlem Tür and Ahmet K. Han. "A Framework for Understanding the Changing Turkish Foreign Policy." in *Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy* Oktav, Özden Zeynep (eds), Farnham: Ashgate, 2011, 16.

[337] Ali Balcı and Nebi Miş "Turkey's Role in Alliance of Civilzations Initiative: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?" Turkish Studies 9, no.3 (2008): 387-406, p.391.

[338] Birol Akgün and Mehmet Özkan "Turkey's opening to Africa." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 48, No.4, (2010): 525-546.

[339] Özden Zeynep Oktav "Introduction" in *Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy* Oktav, Özden Zeynep (eds), Farnham: Ashgate, 2011, 1-2. See also Ismail Cem, "Turkish foreign Policy: Opening new Horizons for Turkey at the beginning of a new Millennium." *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 1, no.1 (2002): 1-6.

[340] Çağaptay, "The AKP's foreign policy: the misnomer of 'Neo-ottomanism'."

[341] Ozan Örmeci "İsmail Cem's Foreign Policy" *SDU Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Social Sciences*, No:23, (2011): 223-245.

[342] Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yilmaz, "Between Europeanization and Euro-asianism: Foreign policy activism in Turkey during the AKP era." *Turkish Studies* 10, no.1 (2009): 7-24.

[343] Meliha B. Altunisik and Emillio Alessandri "Unfinished Transitions: Challenges and Opportunities of the EU's and Turkey's Responses to the "Arab Spring"" *Global Turkey in Europe, Working Paper* No. 4, 2013, 4; Aylin Güney and Nazif Mandaci "The meta-geography of the Middle East and North Africa in Turkey's new geopolitical

Several other turning points are also suggested: "the tectonic changes" that occurred after September 11, 2001,[344] immediate aftermath of AKP's electoral victory in November 2002,[345] or "transformational moment,"[346] of March 1, 2003. Tezcür and Grigeorescu look back since 1980, and propose different turning points for Turkey's Foreign Policy Affinity (FPA-based on UNGA voting patterns) with different countries. Turkey and the US seem to be growing apart in 1996-2008 period, whereas lowest FPA with Israel has been in 2001. Turkey's FPA with Iran has slightly decreased since 2003, whereas it has been pretty steady with the Middle East as a region since 1993.

Since each of three propositions about Turkey's axis shift may be relevant for different time frames, any empirical study should take into account several turning points to determine 1) to what extent Turkish "new" policy is actually new 2) what kind of historical precedents can be found.

5.5.   Proactivism and Activism in Turkish Foreign Affairs

Another much-debated characteristic of the "axis shift" is the supposed activism and proactivism in Turkish foreign affairs. The controversy about these concepts is more like a point of confusion than a disagreement. Usually the concepts are used interchangeably, and without clear definitions.

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imagination*" Security Dialogue* 44, no. 5-6(2013): 431-448.

[344] Özden Zeynep Oktav "Introduction" in *Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy* Oktav, Özden Zeynep (eds), Farnham: Ashgate, 2011, 1-2

[345] Ali Balcı and Nebi Miş "Turkey's Role in Alliance of Civilzations Initiative: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?" Turkish Studies 9, no.3 (2008): 387-406

[346] Richard Falk ""Zero Problems with Neighbors Revisited"

Davutoğlu defines proactivism as "pre-emptive peace diplomacy, which aims to take measures befor crises emerge and escalate to a critical level. "[347] He claims that the main foreign policy purpose of proactivism is not only averting crises but also actively seek to strengthen "prosperity, stability and security in a neighborhood which spans the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Caspian basin, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, from the Gulf to North Africa."[348] Therefore, in a sense, proactivism is intimately related to expansion of interest to wider regions.

In Turkish foreign policy literature, Davutoğlu's remarks on Turkish foreign policy proactivism is widely accepted, yet understood differently.[349] For Keyman, "proactive", "constructive" and "multidimensional" are all interrelated terms, as they are defined in contrast to Turkey's "reactive, passive, bilateral and security-oriented" policies in the Cold War. Nevertheless, he tends to equate proactivism with activism, failing to refer to the inherent meaning of the word, "acting in advance." He argues that as opposed to before, "Turkey's new foreign policy behavior now tends to be more *active*, more multi-dimensional, as well as more constructive and problem-solving-oriented"(emphasis-added). [350] For Yılmaz and Öniş, proactivism also seems to be a mixture of constructive attitude and

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[347] Ahmet Davutoğlu "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy."

[348] Ahmet Davutoğlu "Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 2010" *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 8, no.3 (2009):11-17, 12.

[349] Ziya Meral, and Jonathan Paris. "Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity." *The Washington Quarterly* 33.4 (2010): 75-86; Fuat Keyman, "Globalization, modernity and democracy: in search of a viable domestic polity for a sustainable Turkish foreign policy." *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 40, (2009):7-27; Yılmaz and Öniş, "Between Europeanization and Eurasianism."

[350] Fuat Keyman "Globalization, modernity and democracy: in search of a viable domestic polity for a sustainable Turkish foreign policy." *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 40, (2009):7-27.

activism.[351] Combined with proposed cooperativeness, this activism –it has been argued- results in being proactive, i.e. Turkey being initiatior or instigator of several processes of dialogue, from Alliance of Civilizations to Syria-Israel indirect negotiations.[352]

However, activism, on its own, refers to an increase in the sheer volume of interaction. Conceptually, activism necessitates neither a cooperative attitude, nor an intentional pursuit for heightened level of activity: a country's activism may just be a response to foreign behavior. Moreover, when it is intentional, activism can be pursued with respect to certain foreign actors on multiple grounds, but not toward others. Therefore, it does not automatically mean a geographical expansion of interest in foreign affairs, nor does it mean expansion of interest in all spheres of conflict or cooperation.

Proactivism can also be understood differently, and not necesarrily multilateral or cooperative. In 1990s, Turkish assertive -and sometimes aggressive- policies towards Syria were also defined as "proactive."[353] Turkey's recent bahaviors concerning Arab Uprisings has also been defined as "self-attributed unilateral over-pro-activism"[354] It has been argued that its proactivism has led Turkey to a "worthy solitude" in its surrounding region.[355] Proactivism can also be associated with unpredictability and crisis:

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[351] Öniş and Yılmaz, "Between Europeanization and Eurasianism," 3.
[352] Ahmet Evin, "Commentary: Turkish foreign policy, limits of engagement" *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 40 (2009): 225-232.
[353] Sabri Sayari, "Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26.3 (1997): 44-55.
[354] Öniş "Between Ethics and Self-Interest"
[355] Nick Tattersall, "Analysis- Turkey's 'worthy solitude' sidelines Erdogan in Middle East" *Reuters,* Sep 18, 2013

"In recent decades, reflecting the proactive and independent course of its foreign policy, Ankara's relationship with Washington has also started on an unpredictable course and has been characterized by a growing number of differences of opinion and occasional crises."[356]

Therefore, activism, defined as an increase in foreign interaction, is analytically different from proactivism. Activism is analytically dichotomous to passivism, which means reduced level of interaction. Passivism has usually negative connotations, as it implies risk-avoidance, isolation and ineffectiveness in conducting foreign policy.[357] Reduced level of interaction usually makes countries isolated and problems protracted. For example, European countries were criticized for their lack of action in the face of Bosnian war, the US and European countries are criticized for not taking action to stop genocide in Rwanda, "appeasement" policy in 1930s was nothing but a policy of non-action.

Proactivism, on the other hand, is conceptually different from activism and refers to "acting in advance", whether it has been pursued bilaterally or multilaterally. Proactivism is taking action beforehand, in anticipation of crises or in simply establishing relations. Therefore, it is the analytical opposite of reaction.

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[356] Şaban Kardaş, "Charting the New Turkish Foreign Policy." *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 67, no.1 (2012): 1-6.

[357] Kent Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State", *World Politics* 40, no.4, (1988): 517-541. Keiko Hirata, "Japan as a reactive state? Analyzing Japan's relations with the socialist republic of Vietnam." *Japanese Studies* 18, no.2 (1998): 135-152.

Proaction is preferred over reaction, because averting crises reduces costs and harms to human life. However, majority of crises in international politics are hard to predict, forcing countries choose between inaction and reaction after the fact. Therefore, reaction, on its own, is not negative. Conversely, reaction to a bilateral rapproachment, a particular event or crisis, is the second best choice after proaction. Reaction, in this sense, may be better defined as responsiveness, which is far from being passive, risk-avoidant or ineffective.

Turkey's foreign behavior with respect to proactivism may be investigated by looking at whether Turkey's behavior surpasses those of others to Turkey, or precedes them when it comes to bilateral relations. Other states behavior before and after the "turning points," as discussed in the previous part, can help to gauge Turkey's responsiveness to other actors, and their responsiveness to Turkey's foreign policy behaviors. Such an analysis may help to determine to what extent Turkey's level of activity increase because of Turkey's independent will (proaction), or whether it was simply responding to the increasing level of activity from outside (responsiveness). Moreover, Turkey's involvement in third party mediation, as well as Turkey's behavior *prior* to international crises can also be investigated to understand Turkey's proactivism.

As such, proactivism, activism, and responsiveness (reactivism) would not be necesarrily dichotomous and questions with respect to them can be investigated individually in a more clear way.

5.6. Sub-State Actors and Foreign Policy

In most studies on foreign policy, what "a state" does is usually defined by government or bureaucratic elite behaviour. Hence, for many analysts, the change in Turkish foreign policy is mainly instigated by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President Abdullah Gül and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. The underlying assumption is that the political elite decides on and makes foreign policy, and they direct the bureaucratic elite accordingly. In such studies, the leaders' character, vision, personal history and background are taken as the main factors which shape the country's foreign policy.[358]

On a behavioral level, a state centered approach would mean, Turkish foreign policy is mainly composed of behaviours of bureaucrats and politicians, pursuing government policies. Turkey's increasing activity in IOs, the number of high-level international visits, the vigorous attempts at mediation over several conflicts, new bilateral talks and agreements, all of which are components of a "rhythmic diplomacy" as pursued by Ahmet Davutoğlu, can all be regarded as behavioural reflection of new activism in Turkish foreign policy.[359]

Still, government officials stress that one of the key components of Turkey's new activism is "to encourage more people-to-people contact

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[358] Mesut Özcan and Ali Resul Usul "Understanding the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Changes within Continuity Is Turkey Departing From The West?" *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Dış Politika*, Cilt 6, Sayı: 21 (2010): 101-123; Bülent Aras and Hakan Fidan "Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiers of a new geographic imagination" *New Perspectives on Turkey* no. 40 (2009): 195-217

[359] Oğuzlu, "Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy," Ziya Meral and Jonathan Paris "Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity " *The Washington Quarterly* 33, no.4, (October 2010):80..

between [Turkey] and its neighbours."[360] Kalın states that the new foreign policy outlook is not only discussed or questioned but also "formulated and eventually shared by a growing number of domestic and foreign policy circles, diplomats, analysts, academics, journalists, businessmen, NGOs, community leaders, and others."[361]

In this scheme, not only the government, but also ordinary citizens became implementers of Turkish foreign policy. For Davutoğlu "Turkey's success is not only the result of state policies, but also the activities of civil society, business organizations, and numerous other organizations, all operating under the guidance of the new vision. The state's macro strategy is in conformity with the micro strategies of individual people, corporations, and civil society organizations." [362] Sports, tourism, trade, humanitarian aid, and culture are the main venues to which non-state actors involvement in Turkish foreign policy is encouraged. "Turkish football teams, singers, soap operas, and movies have wide resonance throughout the neighbourhood."[363] Tourists from Russia and the Ukraine in particular, and now increasingly from the Middle East (with the exception of Israel) are growing in number.

Accordingly, several studies point to increasing involvement of non-state actors in Turkish foreign policy,[364] and argue that in many cases

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[360] Kınıklıoğlu, "Tectonic Transformation," 94.
[361] Kalın," Ideology or Geopolitics" *Private View* (Autumn 2008): 26-27.
[362] Davutoğlu "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision."
[363] Kınıklıoğlu, "Tectonic Transformation," 95.
[364] Kemal Kirişçi, "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No. 40 (2009): 29-57; Kınıklıoğlu "Tectonic Transformation"; Kemal Kirişçi, "Turkey's Engagement with Its Neighbourhood: a 'Synthetic' and Multidimensional Look at Turkey's Foreign Policy Transformation," *Turkish Studies* 13, no.3, (2012): 319-341. Ahmet Hüsrev Çelik "Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarının Türk Dış Politikasına Etkileri" Unpublished Master Thesis, Selçuk

Turkish foreign policy efforts are a mixture of formal initiatives by the government and the informal activities of NGOs. The issue of disagreement however, is to what extent civil society's foreign behavior is -not just encouraged- but shaped by the Turkish policy makers. While some analysists argue that non-state activism in Turkish foreign policy is mainly instigated by increasing capabilities of business and civil society organizations in Europeanization process, others point to suspicious level of congruity between government's and civil society's policies, which amounts to "guidance" by the government.

Kirişçi traces the first instance of cooperation among Turkish foreign policy authorities and civil society organizations to the time of the signing of the Customs Union Treaty, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought the support of civil society organizations.[365] The business elite was especially adamant in promoting Turkey's EU accession process, often beacuse they find Turkey's economic intergration with the union would be beneficial for their private interests.[366] Atlı argues that business associations have begun to assume a more active role in Turkey's economic life, which has translated into their formal participation in policy making. The liberalization wave of the 1980s and the EU membership process has greatly enhanced the leverage that civil society has, not just through transfer of know-how but also

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Üniversitesi İİSBF Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, Konya, 2007; Öniş, "Multiple Faces"; Bahar Rumelili, "Civil Society and the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish Cooperation," *South European Society and Politics* 10, no. 1 (2005): 45-56; Diba Nigar Göksel, "Europe's Neighbourhood: Can Turkey Inspire?" *GMF Analysis,* May 5, 2011; Sedat Laçiner, "Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikasının Felsefesi, Fikri Altyapısı ve Hedefleri," in *Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası: Uluslararası IV. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri*, ed. Dincer et al, (Ankara:USAK, 2010), 39. Fidan and Aras,"New Geopolitical Imagination," 202.

[365] Kemal Kirişçi, "Turkish Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times" *Chaillot Paper* no. 92, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006

[366] Altay Atlı, "Businessmen as Diplomats: The Role of Business Associations in Turkey's Foreign Economic Policy," *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 13, No.1, (2011): 109-128.

through considerable amounts of funds and grants. While maintaining its role as the policy maker, the state has gradually made room for the private sector to play a role in the process, "because it is deemed to be capable of administering specific functions more efficiently than the state." Öniş also points to the *transnationalization* of small- and medium-sized businesses in Turkey, popularly known as the "Anatolian tigers". These firms from rising centers of Anatolian capital, are also often labeled as 'Green Money' (a reference to their conservative roots) and argued to be a primary basis of the AKP's political support.[367] The enthusiasm of these firms for finding new markets has made them increase their activity in foreign policy matters. Öniş states that "key civil society organizations representing the aforementioned rising centers of industrialization and capital accumulation in Turkey, such as TOBB, MÜSİAD and TUSKON, have emerged as central actors in Turkey's foreign policy initiatives." He goes on to argue that foreign policy is increasingly being driven from below, so much so that it is "no longer the monopoly of politicians and diplomats." [368] In this line of argument, the involvement of non-state actors is instigated by their increased capacity and independent will, which translated into a hightened activism in foreign affairs. Turkish government's worldview, variously defined as economy minded[369] or "globalizationist"[370] might have accelarated the process, but it

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[367] Burhanettin Duran, "JDP and Foreign Policy as an Agent of Transformation," in *The Emergence of A New Turkey*, ed. Hakan Yavuz, (Utah: Utah University Press, 2006).
[368] Öniş, "Multiple Faces."
[369] Dincer et al.*Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası,* 314.
[370] Dincer et al.*Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası,* 300.

does not directly steer non-state actors' foreign affairs. Accordingly, such congruence has been depicted as "the best expression of domestic peace."[371]

Others find such congruence not as genuine as depicted: Some argue that Turkish NGOs operating in foreign countries are handpicked for financial support by the government to legitimate official foreign policy. [372] It has been argued that "allegiance" has become the guiding feature in the selection of which actors would benefit from governmental support such as providing necessary legal and infrastructural background' exemption from prior permission for fundraising, as well as giving them Public Benefit Status, which leds to tax deductions or exemptions.[373] Moreover, their actions may be operationally steered by governmental agencies like Diyanet, TIKA or Kizilay. Hence, the activism of non-state actors is instigated by not their independent will, but they follow the footsteps of the government.

Despite the differences, both views claim that there would be high parallelism between government's and civil society foreign affairs on a behavioral level.

When we look at the studies on foreign policy with the question of agency in mind, sub-state actors has play an important role, depending on the issue, domain or geographical region in question. Given their evidence,

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[371] Mehmet Özkan, "Turkey's Religious and Socio-Political depth in Africa" *Emerging Powers in Africa, LSE IDEAS Special Report* 016 (2013): 45-50.

[372] Diba Nigar Göksel, "Can Turkey Inspire?"; Erhan Doğan "AB Katılım Süreci, Neo-Korporatizm ve Türk Siyasetindeki Korporatist Kalıntılar" in *Sivil Toplum ve Dış Politika*, ed. Semra Cerit-Mazlum and Erhan Doğan, (İstanbul: Bağlam, 2006).

[373] Yaşama Dair Association, "Cluster Analysis for Improving Co-operation between the NGOs and the Public Sector in Turkey," 2008, available at http://www.yasamadair.org/Adminjkl/2.pdf

each perspective and study has merit in pointing to the importance of various actors, and their links to certain foreign policy initiatives. Nevertheless, comprehensive historical comparisons between activities of conventional and non-conventional actors are missing.

5.7.   Conclusion

Above review of recent Turkish foreign policy literature reveals that the observers do not agree on fundamental questions regarding Turkish foreign policy. Some argue that Turkey's geographical orientation has expanded, whereas others assert that it shifted from the West to "the Rest", whatever these terms indicate. Some argue that Turkey's increasing activity was a reaction to its changing environment, whereas others see Turkey as being "proactive" rather than reactive. While a group of scholars perceive Turkey's axis shift as a consequence of its deteriorating relations with the West, others point to domestic processes as shaping foreign policy. Some see that Turkey's foreign policy transformation began in 1990s, others attribute it to ruling AKP, which came to power in 2002, still others see 2007 or 2009 as a turning point. Finally, there has been disagreement over whether Turkey's sub-state actors played an independent role in Turkish foreign policy activism, or they were merely following footsteps of the government.

The review of literature suggests that, there is an abundance of concepts, as well as propositions about the relations between them. Nevetheless, there is not a systematic elimination or confirmation of these propositions, which stems from two reasons. Firstly, the evidence posited by each perspective, is too different from each other to allow for cross

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comparisons: some illustrate Turkey's increasing activism with reference to a series of high profile undertakings mainly by Turkish government, others use foreign trade or immigration data. At other times, their evidence refers to different time frames. TFAED, which is composed of day-to-day behaviours of all Turkish actors across 21 years, may help remedy this problem as it provides longitudinal and common foundation against which such claims can be tested.

The second reason relates to the wide discrepancy in the literature about definitions of fundamental concepts such as "the West", "axis shift," proactivism, activism, "rhytmic diplomacy", which are sometimes used interchangeably. Lack of agreed-upon definitions is a major problem for testing their claims against each other. More importantly, it hinders theoretical development. Without explicit definitions, the relationship between concepts (the supposed explanation) also becomes blurry. Building large N datasets may help remedy this lack of clarification. Trying to operationalize the concepts used the literature helps to understand and better define them, and when they are found to inoperationalizable, to redefine them. The following chapter attempts to do that by investigating claims about Turkey's foreign affairs and draws a descriptive, yet quantitative map.

CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS 1: MAPPING TURKISH FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The primary motivation for this project was a widely perceived change in Turkish foreign policy in the past decade. This chapter tries to build a map of Turkish foreign affairs by presenting data concerning the most contested phenomena of Turkey's foreign affairs: axis shift. Since axis shift is defined as reorientation of Turkey's foreign affairs from one group of actors to another, the chapter is organized as a detailed presentation of Turkey's foreign affairs with respect to several regions.

The first part of this chapter is an attempt to define and measure Turkey's foreign policy activism. It compares different time periods in terms of the volume of all Turkey's affairs, as well as foreign affairs. The second part looks more closely to the geographical orientation of Turkish foreign policy, both before and after AKP governments. It also provides answers to the question of reciprocity and proactivity in Turkey's relations with specific regions, by using correlational and time series tools to analyze patterns in time, actors, event volume and event type. The chapter concludes by a summary of the findings.

6.1.   Measuring "Activism"

The most fundamental question regarding Turkish foreign policy is the level of activism in foreign policy. The initial step to answer to such question is to measure the overall volume of Turkish foreign behaviour, irrespective of the nature (state/non-state) of the agency, direction (foreign policy target) or the nature of the behaviour (conflictual/cooperative). The following graph ahows the number of events related to Turkey per year.

Figure 15 Turkey Event Counts

On average, there are 1814 events about Turkey per year (aproximately 5 events per day). The number of Turkey-related events shows a steep rise after 1994, reaches a regional peak around 1999, continues to rise until 2003, where it reaches an all time peak; gradually declines until 2008, and stabilizes thereafter just below average. Overall, it seems that Turkey has been more active from 1996 to 2007. However, it is possible that

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apparent rises of Turkey related event counts may not be because of

Turkey's activism, but simply because reporters of the Agence France Presse

worked hard, i.e. there were more news reports about *everyone* in those

years. Actually, overall number of AFP reports shows variation, both per

year and per month.[374] Except a downturn in 2000, AFP news articles

steadily increases from 1992 to 2001, then shows a slow decline until

December 2012.

AFP News Reports per Year

Figure 16 Number of AFP News Articles per Year

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[374] Within the confines of this project, only a small part of all AFP news items –which
mention Turkey, Turks or major Turkish cities in full text- have been downloaded. So, an
independent estimation about volüme of all AFP news reports has been made by
randomly selecting two 3-5-10 day intervals per month in LexisNexis, which amounted
to more than 500 blank queries. My estimations are found to be congruent with an
independent review of monthly variations in AFP News Reports, although their queries
were not blank. They limited the number of results by eliminating several sports and
finance news: Leetaru and Schrodt "GDELT: Global Data on Events, Language, and
Tone, 1979-2012" International Studies Association Annual Conference, April 2013. San
Diego, CA.

Therefore, a better assessment of Turkey's affairs would require a comparison of Turkey's event counts with number of articles by AFP.[375] Figure 14 shows Turkey's combined foreign and domestic affairs as percentages of overall AFP news articles per year. On average 1,13 events are generated about Turkey per 100 AFP article. In all years between 1995-2000, and 2002-2006 events generated about Turkey surpasses that average (1,36 % and 1,23 % respectively). The lowest points are 1994 (0,76 %) and 2008 (0,77 %). Therefore, these two periods are the more likely canditates for periods of "Turkey's activism."

Figure 17 Volume of Turkey's Affairs (As % of all AFP News Reports)

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[375] I choose number of Turkey related *events*, not Turkey related *news reports* to compare with all AFP news reports because my original search query did not eliminate Turkey related news reports that do not generate events ,such as natural disasters, accidents, news about turkey (the animal), and other happenings which either do not have a perpetrator or a target or a relevant action. They may be reported, but they are not instrumental to measuring Turkey's activism. Leetaru and Schrodt report that 1.21 % of all AFP news report mention Turkey, making it the 19th most mentioned country by AFP.

However, several domestic and international circumstances, which do not necesarily underline an "activist" attitude, may account for the rise and fall of Turkey's volume of activity. For example, the lowest points correspond to major economic crises: 1994 and 2001 domestic, and in 2008 global. 1998 economic crisis in Asia-Russia, also seems to have repercussions for Turkey. Conversely, coverage of Turkey's domestic terrorism, rise of political Islam, or coalitional politics may account for peaks in 1990s.

Therefore, a better way to depict "Turkish foreign policy activism" would be to analyze Turkey's foreign behaviour (TFB), foreign behaviour to Turkey (FBT) and Turkish domestic affairs (TDA) separately (Figure 15). On average, TFB, FBT and TDA correspond to 0,46 , 0,44 , and 0,22 events of all AFP News respectively.

Figure 18 Volume of Turkey's Foreign and Domestic Affairs

In 1995-2000 period, TFB (0,50 %) was higher than average but less than FBT (0,56 %). TDA was also higher than average (0,31 %). In 2002-2006 period, however, TFB (0,53 %) makes up the majority of "Turkey's activism," whereas FBT is 0,49 %. Coverage of TDA was slightly less than average throughout the period (0,21 %). In this regard, although overall activity level of Turkey was higher in 1995-2000, Turkey-initiated foreign behaviour (TFB) were more prominent than ever in 2002-2006.

A closer look at the interrelationship between Turkey's foreign and domestic affairs may reveal more. There is a strong correlation between TFB and FBT , $r(252) = 0.76$, $p < .001$, which suggests a high FBT would predict high TFB. Therefore, changing FBT/TFB ratio in 1998-2000 begs an explanation. TFB and TDA are also moderately correlated, $r(252) = 0.40$, $p < .05$. Interestingly, correlation between FBT and TDA is even stronger, $r(252) = 0.56$, $p < .001$. Moreover, volume of Turkey's domestic affairs in year t, and volume of foreign actors' behaviour in year $t-1$, are also moderately correlated, $r(19) = 0.435$, $p < .05$, which suggests TDA increases and decreases in *response* to FBT, not vice versa. Therefore, whenever there is high FBT, there would also be a high TDA not only in the same year, but probably next year also. How all of this would reflect on TFB, however, remains unclear since all three type of behaviours seems to correlate with each other. It is imperative to remove the effect of the third on the pair in question. Table 9, compares simple and partial correlation coefficients[376] for Turkey's foreign and domestic affairs for 1991-2012.

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[376] Partial correlation is the correlation of two variables while controlling for a third or more other variables on both. Semi-Partial correlation controls for the third or more other variables on *only the second* variable. Events are counted on a monthly basis and adjusted to monthly AFP news output. Months with missing data are removed.

Table 8 Partial and Semi-partial correlations between TFB, FBT and TDA

Var1	Var2	Semi-Partial Cor. 1991-2012 n=251	Partial Cor. 1991-2012 n=251	Semi-Partial Cor1991-1998 n=73	Partial Cor 1991-1998 n=73	Semi-Partial Cor 1999-2012 n=178	Partial Cor 1999-2012 n=178
FBT	TFB	0,578***	0,698***	0,459***	0,601***	0,664***	0,754***
TDA	TFB	-0,028	-0,033	0,143	0,187	-0,120	-0,136
TFB	FBT	0,638***	0,698***	0,491***	0,601***	0,721***	0,754***
TDA	FBT	0,388***	0,424***	0,322**	0,395***	0,393***	0,411***
TFB	TDA	-0,022	-0,033	0,124	0,187	-0,086	-0,136
FBT	TDA	0,278***	0,424***	0,262*	0,395***	0,261**	0,411***

Relationship between FBT and TDA is strong when FBT's variation by TFB is controlled for. Relationship is still strong when TDA's variation by TFB is controlled for, too. When TFB's effect on both is removed, there is an even more significant correlation between TDA and FBT. Similarly when TDA's effect was removed on FBT, there would still be s strong correlation between TFB and FBT. Again, when TDA's effect were removed on TFB, there would still be strong correlation between TFB and FBT. When FBT's effect is removed, however, the apparent correlation between TDA and TFB disappears, (even turns *negative*) suggesting FBT's independent relationship to both makes it appear as if they are correlated. The argument that there is a strong positive relationship between FBT and TDA is valid for all periods.

In 1998-2000, when FBT stabilized just above average, and TDA begun to decline, Turkey was able to show greater initiative in its foreign affairs. The boost continued until 2004, where FBT and TFB balanced each other. The increasing TDA in 2007, coupled with decreasing FBT due to global economic crisis, though not disturbing the FBT/TFB balance,

decreased Turkey's foreign policy activity. From 2009 onwards, although not particularly active, Turkey's seems to hold on to the greater initiative pattern. This dynamic between Turkey's and foreign actors' initiative may also account for the perceived similarity between Turkish foreign policy under Özal's presidency (1991-1993) and under AKP.

In conclusion, 1999-2000 seems to be a turning point for Turkey's foreign affairs. From that point on, volume of others' behaviour to Turkey almost never surpasses Turkey's foreign behaviour. Even 2001 crisis seems to decrease foreign actors behaviour to Turkey more than Turkey's behaviour to them. Changing levels of Turkey's domestic affairs did not make much difference on TFB before 1998. After 1998, however, TFB become more reflective of domestic repercussions of FBT, which suggests that the mediating factor of FBT has increased.

6.2. New Geographical Orientation

There is a discrepancy when it comes to definitions of Turkey's geographical focus in foreign policy. Most of these definitions inherently carry value judgements about what constitutes "the West." To have a closer look at Turkey's geographical focus, I have aggregated countries and global actors into nine geographical/political groups to present Turkey's geographical orientation in the past twenty-two years. Following rules are followed while categorizing. Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR) is composed of all African countries except Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Libya, all of which are included under North Africa and the Middle East (MEA). MEA also includes all other Arab countries; Iran and Israel are excluded. Western

Europe (WEU) consists of all EU member states[377], as well as Norway and Switzerland. Eastern Europe (EEU) is composed of all other non-EU member European countries, Turkish Cyprus, Caucasia and Russia. Asia (ASA) includes from Iran to Japan: Central Asia, China, India, and all Southeast Asia. Latin America (LAM) includes all South and Central American countries as well as the Carribbean. Ocenia, the US, Canada, and Israel are grouped under non-European West. (WST). If an intergovernmental or transnational organization's membership is region-specific (like the EU), the organization has been included in the corresponding region. If not (like NATO or IMF), it is grouped under intergovernmental organizations (IGO). The ethnic or religious groups whose nationalities were not identified in the news reports, and transnational organizations/movements (both armed and peaceful) are grouped under non-state actors (NST). All individuals, businesses, vessels with Turkish nationality, multinational corporations whose headquarters are in Turkey, non-governmental transnational movements or organizations and members of ethnic or religious groups who are identified as Turkish nationals in the news report, Turkish branches of non-governmental international organizations, and refugees from other countries who have settled in Turkey are all grouped under Turkey (TUR).

Although less political definitions, such as UN geoscheme, could have been considered. However, grouping Israel under "Western Asia" with Arab countries or grouping Arab-speaking North African countries separately from "Western Asia", as UN geoscheme suggests, would be less effective in

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[377] As of 2013. Same definiton has been kept for different time frames, to ease comparison. i.e. any change between two time periods, should not be attributable to changing composition of regions.

testing arguments. Grouping foreign actors in terms of their political/historical affinity as well as geographical proximity is found to be more compatible with prevalent definitions in the Turkish foreign policy literature.

First part is a general overview of Turkey's relations with nine groups of foreign actors. Volume of events with these groups, proactivism towards them, reciprocity in relations, as well as how Turkey's relations with one group affects the other is given consideration. Several methods are used to test them against each other, to see whether which groups are more prominent with respect to Turkish foreign policy activism, proactivism or reciprocity.

In the following table, events (irrespective of their nature as conflictual or cooperative) are counted on a yearly basis and adjusted to yearly AFP news output. Table shows averge number of events per 10.000 by region in 1991-2012.

Table 9 Event Count by Region per 10.000 AFP Reports per Year (1991-2012)

Region	Event count per 10.000 AFP per year
Western Europe	28,30
Middle East and North Africa	18,10
West (non-European)	11,12
Non-state Actors	8,74
Asia	8,72
Eastern Europe	8,61
Intergovernmental Organizations	4,25
Sub-Saharan Africa	1,39
Latin America and the Caribbean	0,56
Total	89,79

Western European countries have long been important in Turkey's foreign affairs. Almost one third of all Turkey-related international event is between Turkey and a Western European country. Second most important region is the Middle East and North Africa, comprising of one fifth of Turkey's international affairs. Other Western countries comprise of 12 %, whereas relations with Asia, Eastern Europe and non-state actors are each one tenth. One twentieth of Turkey international affairs were with intergovernmental organizations. Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America comprise 2%, and 1% respectively. Therefore, on average Turkey's international affairs has been predominantly Western oriented (44%). To determine whether there have been changes under AKP governments in that regard, the time frame is divided into two parts; 1991-2002 and 2003-2012.

Figure 19 Volume of Affairs with Regions Before AKP

Figure 20 Volume of Affairs with Regions under AKP

Both before and after AKP, the primacy of Western European countries remained constant, despite a 3% decrease in the latter period. Middle East and North Africa, still occupy the second place despite a 5 % increase. The third place changed however: in the pre-AKP period, relations with Asia, non-European West and and Eastern Europe each comprised 11 % of all Turkey's international affairs. Under AKP, non-European West came the third with 14 %, followed by Asia (9%) and Eastern Europe (8%). Non-state actors and Sub-Saharan Africa decreased by 1 %, relations with intergovernmental organizations and Latin America rose by 1 %.

A comparative look at first and second halves of the AKP rule can shed some light on the different arguments about the timing of Turkey's shifting geographical orientation. In the first and more "activist period" of AKP foreign policy, Turkish foreign affairs seems to be even more Western oriented than the previous governments. More than half of Turkey's international relations were with Western countries. Relations with the Middle East was also prominent, yet not significantly more than before.

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Relations with Eastern Europe and Asia were significantly less intense than previous governments.

Table 10 Turkey's Foreign Affairs with Regions by Period

%	1991-2002	2003-2007	2008-2012
AFR	2	1	2
ASA	11	7	10
EEU	11	6	10
IGO	5	5	5
LAM	1	0	1
MEA	18	19	29
NST	10	10	9
WEU	33	38	20
WST	11	15	14
TOTAL	100	100	100

The second five year of AKP, however shows a restoration of interest with both Eastern Europe and Asia. While relations with Western Europe lost prominence, relations with the non-European Western(WST) countries remain the same. Relations with Middle East and North Africa become denser than ever, comprising almost one third of Turkey's foreign affairs. Therefore, arguments about a shift in Turkey's geographical orientation after 2007 seem to be confirmed.

Nevertheless, prominence of one set of relations over the others may not be reflective of Turkey's initiative but other actors' initiative or international circumstances. Following table shows how much of relations with each region is initiated by Turkey or a foreign actor. FBT indicates foreign behavior to Turkey by corresponding region, as percentages of all international behavior by or to Turkey in the time period. TFB indicates Turkey's foreign behavior to each corresponding region as percentages of all

international behaviour by or to Turkey in the time period. Table shows that increasing prominence of MEA compared to others in the later periods is mostly due to Turkish behavior. In both AKP periods, Turkish behavior superseded that of MEA behavior, which was not the case in pre-AKP period. A comparison of two AKP periods reveals that Turkish preference for MEA as the primary foreign policy target was not due to Arab uprisings because even before uprisings began, Turkey was more proactive towards MEA.

Turkey's behavior to WEU was never above WEU behavior to Turkey, yet after 2002, Turkey's behavior was significantly lower than WEU's behavior to Turkey. Considering Turkey was more proactive in the last period (TOTAL TFB > TOTAL FBT), the prominence of MEA, and loss of importance of WEU are more highlighted.

Table 11 Turkey's Foreign Behaviour and Foreign Behaviour to Turkey by Period

%	1991-2002		2003-2007		2008-2012	
	TFB	FBT	TFB	FBT	TFB	FBT
AFR	0,5	1,2	0,5	0,3	1,3	0,9
ASA	5,5	5,1	3,4	3,6	5,2	5,2
EEU	6,1	5,0	3,1	3,0	5,2	4,6
IGO	2,0	2,5	2,2	2,7	2,4	2,7
LAM	0,2	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,7	0,6
MEA	7,9	9,9	10,8	8,3	16,7	12,1
NST	6,1	4,0	5,8	3,8	5,7	3,3
WEU	16,1	16,7	17,2	20,4	9,2	10,4
WST	5,2	5,7	7,5	7,0	7,1	6,8
TOTAL	49,6	50,4	50,7	49,3	53,5	46,5

Turkey has become more proactive with some other regions, as well. Although still occupying 2% of all international behavior, Turkey has

become more proactive towards sub-Saharan Africa under AKP. Similarly, Turkey's behavior toward Latin America has also increased in 2008-2012. Relations with Non-European West, not only become more prominent under AKP, but Turkey has shown more initiative than previous periods. With EEU, Turkey has already been more proactive since the end of the Cold War, and continued to be so, although it has less prominence in Turkey's foreign affairs compared to the past, as is the case with non-state actors.

Of course, the volume of activity does not show whether the actions were conflictual or cooperative, or spefic targets and sources of these actions. Neither intensity nor proactivity means more cooperation or more conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to look at cooperative and conflictual nature of Turkey's relations with regions in comparison to others. To assess Turkey's cooperation with each region, all events with that region are divided into a) Turkey's behavior to the region, (e.g., TUR.MEA) and b) region's behavior to Turkey (e.g. MEA.TUR). Then with each dyad, event types are aggregated into four categories: Firstly, as conflict or cooperation, then as verbal and material. Then, each type of event is assigned a numerical value; Material Cooperation 2, Material Conflict 2, Verbal Cooperation 1 and Verbal Conflict 1. For each dyad, separate scores are obtained for cooperation and conflict within a quarter year. Following two charts show quarterly average cooperation and conflict scores for each dyad.

CONFLICT WITH REGIONS (AVERAGE)

Dyad	Value
Weu.Tur.CONF(W)	-30
Tur.Weu.CONF(W)	-26
Tur.Nst.CONF(W)	-23
Tur.Mea.CONF(W)	-18
Mea.Tur.CONF(W)	-15
Nst.Tur.CONF(W)	-14
Tur.Wst.CONF(W)	-10
Wst.Tur.CONF(W)	-8
Tur.Asa.CONF(W)	-6
Asa.Tur.CONF(W)	-6
Tur.Eeu.CONF(W)	-6
Eeu.Tur.CONF(W)	-5
Igo.Tur.CONF(W)	-4
Tur.Igo.CONF(W)	-2
Afr.Tur.CONF(W)	-1
Tur.Afr.CONF(W)	-1
Tur.Lam.CONF(W)	0
Lam.Tur.CONF(W)	0

Figure 21 Average Quarterly Conflict Score By Dyad

COOPERATION WITH REGIONS (AVERAGE)

Dyad	Value
Weu.Tur.COOP(W)	45
Tur.Weu.COOP(W)	42
Tur.Mea.COOP(W)	31
Mea.Tur.COOP(W)	28
Wst.Tur.COOP(W)	20
Tur.Wst.COOP(W)	20
Tur.Eeu.COOP(W)	15
Tur.Asa.COOP(W)	15
Asa.Tur.COOP(W)	14
Eeu.Tur.COOP(W)	13
Tur.Nst.COOP(W)	10
Igo.Tur.COOP(W)	9
Tur.Igo.COOP(W)	7
Nst.Tur.COOP(W)	6
Afr.Tur.COOP(W)	3
Tur.Afr.COOP(W)	2
Lam.Tur.COOP(W)	1
Tur.Lam.COOP(W)	1

Figure 22 Average Quarterly Cooperation Score By Dyad

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To assess reciprocity in cooperation and conflict with different regions, partial correlations have been computed for each region's behaviour to Turkey and Turkey's behaviour to each region. Variations by all other dyads have been controlled for. Following table shows the partial correlation values and ranking. Overall, Turkey's cooperation reciprocity with all regions is higher than than its conflict reciprocity. The only exception is foreign non-state actors, with whom Turkey's cooperation reciprocity is lower than its conflict reciprocity.

Table 12 Reciprocity in Turkey's Affairs

	Dyad 1	Dyad 2	Partial Correlation (n=87)	Coop rec. rank	Conf rec.rank
COOPERATION	Weu.Tur.COOP	Tur.Weu.COOP	0,9031	1	
	Eeu.Tur.COOP	Tur.Eeu.COOP	0,8512	2	
	Asa.Tur.COOP	Tur.Asa.COOP	0,8496	3	
	Igo.Tur.COOP	Tur.Igo.COOP	0,8045	4	
	Wst.Tur.COOP	Tur.Wst.COOP	0,7867	5	
	Mea.Tur.COOP	Tur.Mea.COOP	0,7406	6	
	Lam.Tur.COOP	Tur.Lam.COOP	0,5985	7	
	Afr.Tur.COOP	Tur.Afr.COOP	0,5768	8	
	Nst.Tur.COOP	Tur.Nst.COOP	0,4393	9	
CONFLICT	Weu.Tur.CONF	Tur.Weu.CONF	0,6021		1
	Asa.Tur.CONF	Tur.Asa.CONF	0,5977		2
	Mea.Tur.CONF	Tur.Mea.CONF	0,5749		3
	Nst.Tur.CONF	Tur.Nst.CONF	0,4550		4
	Igo.Tur.CONF	Tur.Igo.CONF	0,3906		5
	Wst.Tur.CONF	Tur.Wst.CONF	0,3680		6
	Eeu.Tur.CONF	Tur.Eeu.CONF	0,2026		7
	Afr.Tur.CONF	Tur.Afr.CONF	-0,0655		8
	Lam.Tur.CONF	Tur.Lam.CONF	-0,0045		9

6.2.1. Western Europe

Based on averages, the most cooperative dyad is WEU to TUR, followed by TUR to WEU. This holds true for both pre-AKP and AKP

periods. Indeed, cooperation-wise, Turkey and Western Europe is also the most reciprocal couple. Turkey's cooperation to Western Europe is strongly correlated with Western Europe's cooperation to Turkey, (TUR.WEU.COOP and WEU.TUR.COOP, $r(85)= 0.903$, $p<.001$). However, Turkey and Western Europe is also the most conflictual dyad; WEU.TUR.CONF and TUR.WEU.CONF ranks first and second in conflict scale, compared to other dyads. This is also true for both pre-AKP and AKP periods. There is also conflict reciprocity in Turkey-Western Europe relations: Turkey's conflictual behavior to Western Europe is strongly correlated with Western Europe's conflictual behavior to Turkey, (TUR.WEU.CONF and WEU.TUR.CONF, $r(85)= 0.602$, $p<.001$).

Both Turkey and Western Europe osciliates with respect to each other. (Tur.Weu.CONF, Tur.Weu.COOP $r(85)= 0,4458$ and Weu.Tur.CONF, Weu.Tur.COOP $r(85)= 0,3733$). Yet there are positive feedbacks with in bilateral relations (Tur.Weu.CONF, Weu.Tur.COOP, $r(85)=-0,3158$ and Tur.Weu.COOP, Weu.Tur.CONF. $r(85)= -0,2689$). In other words, When Turkey cooperates more with Western Europe, Western Europe conflicts less with Turkey, when Western Europe cooperates more with Turkey, Turkey conflicts less Western Europe.

6.2.2.   The Middle East

Based on averages, the third most cooperative dyad is TUR to MEA, followed by MEA to TUR. The ranking is slightly different in pre-AKP and AKP periods. In pre-AKP period, MEA.TUR was the third, whereas TUR.MEA was the fourth, indicating Middle Eastern cooperation to Turkey

was more than Turkey's cooperation to the Middle East in the pre-AKP period. Cooperation-wise, Turkey and MEA is a reciprocal couple, (Mea.Tur.COOP, Tur.Mea.COOP r(85)=0,7406, p< .001) yet level of cooperative reciprocity is lower than TUR-WEU(0,9031), TUR-EEU(0,8512) TUR-ASA (0,8496), TUR-IGO (0,8045) or TUR-WST(0,7866).

In terms of volume of conflictual behavior between Turkey and the Middle East; TUR.MEA.CONF and MEA.TUR.CONF ranks fourth and fifth in conflict scale, after Turkey's average conflict towards non-state actors. In both pre-AKP and AKP periods, TUR.NST.CONF was the third. In pre-AKP period however, NST conflict to Turkey was higher than either TUR.MEA.CONF or MEA.TUR.CONF, which fell back to fifth and sixth place respectively.

Accordingly there is also conflict reciprocity in Turkey-Middle East relations: Turkey's conflictual behavior to the Middle East is strongly correlated with the Middle East's conflictual behavior to Turkey, (TUR.MEA.CONF and MEA.TUR.CONF, r(85)= 0.5749, p<.001). Conflict reciprocity with the Middle East is the third highest, lower than with Western Europe (0.602), or with Asia (0,5977).

Neither Turkey nor the Middle East osciliates with respect to each other. (Tur.Mea.CONF, Tur.Mea.COOP r(85)= -0,0321 and Mea.Tur.CONF, Mea.Tur.COOP r(85)= -0,0334). There are no positive feedbacks in bilateral relations (Tur.Mea.CONF, Mea.Tur.COOP, r(85)= 0,1454) but actually a negative feedback loop on Middle Eastern side. Tur.Mea.COOP, Mea.Tur.CONF. r(85)= 0,3302). In other words, when Turkey cooperates more with the Middle East, Middle East conflicts more with Turkey,

whereas there is no association between Turkey's conflict to the Middle East and Middle Eastern cooperation to Turkey. Coupled with a rather average cooperation reciprocity compared to other regions, Turkey's cooperation to the Middle East is met with mixed responses.

6.2.3.   Non-European West

In terms of cooperation volume, Non-European Western behavior to Turkey and Turkey's behavior to non-European West comes the fifth and sixth, respectively. The ranking is slightly different in pre-AKP and AKP periods. In pre-AKP period, WST.TUR was the sixth, whereas TUR.WST was the seventh, both coming after Turkey's cooperative behavior to Eastern Europe, which occupied the fifth place. In other words, on average, Turkey's cooperation to Eastern Europe was more than WST cooperation to Turkey, as well as Turkey's cooperation to WST in the pre-AKP period. Whereas in AKP period, Turkey's cooperation to Eastern Europe fell back to ninth place. In terms of cooperative reciprocity, TUR.WST.COOP is strongly correlated with WST.TUR.COOP (0,7867), yet it is only the fifth highest among other dyads.

TUR.WST.CONF and WST.TUR.CONF ranks seventh and eighth in conflict scale. In both pre-AKP and AKP periods, TUR.WST.CONF has been higher than WST.TUR.CONF, but in the pre-AKP period, WST.TUR.CONF was even lower, occupying the ninth place after Turkey's conflictual behaviour to Asia.

There is also conflict reciprocity in Turkey/non-European Western relations: Turkey's conflictual behavior to the Non-European West is strongly correlated with the Non-European West's conflictual behavior to Turkey, (TUR.WST.CONF and WST.TUR.CONF, r(85)= 0,3680, p<.001). Conflict reciprocity with the Non-European West is only is the sixth highest, lower than with Western Europe (0.602), or with Asia (0,5977), Mea (0,5749), Nst(0,4550) and IGO (0,3906).

Turkey's behaviour osciliates with respect to Non-European West, but Non-European West's oscilliates only slightly. (Tur.Wst.CONF, Tur.Wst.COOP r(85)= 0,4212, and Wst.Tur.CONF, Wst.Tur.COOP r(85)= 0,1804). There are is one weak positive feedback in bilateral relations (Tur.Wst.CONF, Wst.Tur.COOP, r(85)= -0,1935) but no negative feedback loops. (Tur. Wst.COOP, Wst.Tur.CONF. r(85)= -0,0086). In other words, when Non-European West cooperates more with Turkey, Turkey conflicts slightly less with Non-European West, whereas there is no association between Non-European West's conflict to Turkey and Turkey's cooperation to Non-European West.

6.2.4. Eastern Europe

In terms of cooperation volume, Turkey's behavior to Eastern Europe comes the seventh, whereas Eastern Europe's cooperation to Turkey comes tenth. There is a difference in pre-AKP and AKP periods. In pre-AKP periods, Turkey's cooperation to Eastern Europe was the fifth largest, under AKP it fell to ninth. Eastern Europe's cooperation to Turkey was the ninth in pre-AKP period, under AKP it fell to tenth position. In other words, Turkey

has always been more cooperative to Caucasian and Eastern European regions then they were to Turkey, yet the discrepancy inbetween decreased under AKP, because Eastern Europe lost prominence in Turkey's foreign agenda under AKP. Cooperation reciprocity with Eastern Europe is the second highest, Eeu.Tur.COOP, Tur.Eeu.COOP r(85)=0,8512, p< .001.

In terms of conflict volume, Turkey's conflict to EEU is the eleventh, EEU's conflict to Turkey is the twelveth. In Pre-AKP period, both of them were one rank higher, compared to AKP periods. In terms of conflict reciprocity, Eastern Europe and Turkey is one of the least reciprocal dyads. (Eeu.Tur.CONF, Tur.Eeu.CONF r(85)=0,2026, p< 0.1.

Turkey's behaviour does not osciliate with respect to Eastern Europe, but Eastern Europe's oscilliates. (Tur.Eeu.CONF, Tur. Eeu.COOP r(85)= -0,0953 and Eeu.Tur.CONF, Eeu.Tur.COOP r(85)= 0,3700). There are is one positive feedback loop in bilateral relations (Tur. Eeu.COOP, Eeu.Tur.CONF r(85)= -0,2209), and no negative feedback loops (Tur. Eeu.CONF, Eeu.Tur.COOP, r(85)= 0,0686). In other words, when Turkey cooperates more with Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe conflicts less with Turkey, whereas there is no association between Eastern Europe's cooperation to Turkey and Turkey's conflict to Eastern Europe.

The relationship patterns between Turkey and Eastern Europe shows an important potential for cooperation since cooperation reciprocity is high, conflict reciprocity is low, cooperation volume is high and conflict volume is low. Turkey's post-cold war opening to Caucasia and Eastern Europe seems to have paid off: although their cooperation volume fell short of Turkey's

(which means Turkey invested more than it got) the investment proved to be not risky, because Turkey most certainly receives some cooperation back, whereas conflict was not as reciprocal.

6.2.5.   Asia

On average, Turkey's cooperation volume to Asia is the eighth, whereas Asia's cooperation to Turkey is the ninth. In pre-AKP, Turkey's cooperation to Asia was the eighth, under AKP it raised to seventh place. Asia's cooperation to Turkey was tenth in pre-AKP, under AKP it raised to eighth. Under AKP then, overall cooperation with Asia has increased. Cooperation reciprocity with Asia is the third highest after Eastern Europe: $r(85)=0.8496$, $p< 0.001$.

In terms of conflict volume, Turkey's conflict to Asia came ninth, whereas Asia conflict to Turkey came the tenth. In pre-AKP, average conflict score from Asia to Turkey was twelth, whereas from Turkey to Asia was eighth. Under AKP, Turkey conflictual behavior to Asia fell to the tenth position, whereas Asia's conflict to Turkey rose to ninth. Conflict reciprocity with Asia is also high, the second highest after Western Europe. Asa.Tur.CONF, Tur.Asa.CONF, $r(85)=0.5977$, $p< .001$.

Asia's behaviour does not osciliate with respect to Turkey (Asa.Tur.CONF, Asa.Tur.COOP $r(85)= 0,0063$) whereas Turkey's oscilliates slightly (Tur.Asa.CONF, Tur.Asa.COOP $r(85)= 0,2018$, $p<0.1$) There are neither positive nor negative feedback loops in bilateral relations

(Tur.Asa.CONF, Asa.Tur.COOP, r(85)= 0,0154, Tur.Asa.COOP,

Asa.Tur.CONF. r(85)= -0,1627).

Like relations with Western Europe, Turkey's both cooperation and
conflict reciprocity with Asia are high. The relations are less dense, though.
Although both cooperation and conflict is met in kind and in volume, the
lack of positive feedback loops implies a compartmentalized, tit-for-tat type
of relations unlike with Western Europe. Under AKP, cooperation volume
increased due to Turkey's initiative. Conflict volume has also increased in
the same period, because of Asia's initiative. Yet under AKP, conflict from
Asia rose more than cooperation from Asia, although Turkey's conflictual
behaviour decreased in the same period.

6.2.6.   Non-State actors

The eleventh most cooperative dyad in terms of volume is TUR.NST,
whereas foreign non-State actors' cooperative behavior to Turkey is only the
fourteenth. In terms of ranking, Non-State actors' cooperative behavior did
not change under AKP, whereas Turkey's cooperative behavior was twelth
in pre-AKP periods. Therefore, overall cooperation level with Non-state
actors increased because of Turkey's cooperative behavior under AKP
period. Nevertheless, Turkey/Non-State actors is the least reciprocal dyad
in terms of cooperation. Nst.Tur.COOP, Tur.Nst.COOP, r(85)= 0,4393, p<
.001.

Overall conflict volume with Non-State actors also decreased under
AKP due to NST behavior: whereas Turkey's conflict level remained the

third in both pre-AKP and AKP periods, Non-State actors conflictual behaviour to Turkey was the fourth highest before AKP, and fell to sixth place under AKP. Conflict reciprocity with Non-State actors is the fifth highest, Nst.Tur.CONF Tur.Nst.CONF, $r(85)=0,4550$, $p< 0.001$.

Neither Non-State actors's behaviour nor Turkey's osciliate with respect to each other (Nst.Tur.CONF, Nst.Tur.COOP $r(85)= 0,0098$ and Tur. Nst.CONF, Tur. Nst.COOP $r(85)= 0,1163$) There is no positive feedback loops, but one negative feedback loop in bilateral relations (Tur.Nst.CONF, Nst.Tur.COOP, $r(85)= 0,2120$, Tur.Nst.COOP, Nst.Tur.CONF. $r(85)= -0,0628$). In other words, non-state actors' cooperate more with Turkey, when Turkey conflicts more with non-state actors'. There is no association between non-state actors' conflict to Turkey and Turkey's cooperation to non-state actors'. Coupled with a rather average cooperation reciprocity compared to other regions, Turkey's cooperation to the Middle East is met with mixed responds.

6.2.7.   Intergovernmental Organizations

On average, intergovernmental organizations' cooperation to Turkey is the twelfth highest, whereas Turkey's cooperation to intergovernmental organizations is the thirteenth. Turkey's cooperation volume was the same for both pre-AKP and AKP periods. IGO's cooperation volume was the eleventh in pre-AKP period, whereas it is the twelveth under AKP. Therefore, overall cooperation volume decreased due to decreasing IGO cooperation, not Turkey's.

In terms of cooperation reciprocity, Turkey and intergovernmental organizations is the fourth most reciprocal dyad. Igo.Tur.COOP, Tur.Igo.COOP r(85)= 0,8045, p< 0.001. Overall conflict volume with intergovernmental organizations did not change. Both before and after AKP, intergovernmental organizations' conflict to Turkey is one rank higher than Turkey's conflict to intergovernmental organizations', which occupy thirteenth and fourteenth rank respectively. Conflict reciprocity with intergovernmental organizations is the fifth highest Tur.Igo.CONF, Igo.Tur.CONF r(85)=0,3906, p<0.001.

Neither intergovernmental organizations' behaviour nor Turkey's oscilliate with respect to each other (Igo.Tur.CONF, Igo.Tur.COOP r(85)= 0,0052 and Tur.Igo.CONF, Tur.Igo.COOP r(85)= 0,0651) There are no positive or negative feedback loops in bilateral relations (Igo.Tur.CONF, Tur.Igo.COOP r(85)= 0,0404 and Tur.Igo.CONF, Igo.Tur.COOP r(85)= 0,1587).

6.2.8. Sub-Saharan Africa

In terms of cooperation volume, Turkey's behavior to sub-Saharan Africa is the sixteenth, whereas Sub-Saharan Africa's cooperation to Turkey is the fifteenth. Under AKP, the ranking is reverse. Turkey's cooperation was less than Africa's cooperation to Turkey before AKP, whereas under AKP Turkey's cooperation is more than Africa's cooperation. In terms of cooperation reciprocity, Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa is the 8th most

cooperative dyad, surpassing only Turkey/non-state actors dyad
(Tur.Afr.COOP, Afr.Tur.COOP r(85)= 0,5768, p< 0.001)

Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa is also the least conflictual dyad.
Turkey's conflict to Africa is sixteenth highest, whereas Africa's conflict to
Turkey is the fifteenth highest. There is no difference in rankings between
pre-AKP and AKP periods. There is no conflict reciprocity between Turkey
and Sub-Saharan Africa. Afr.Tur.CONF Tur.Afr.CONF, r(85)= -0,0655.

Turkey's behaviour does not osciliate with respect to Sub-Saharan
Africa, but Sub-Saharan Africa's oscilliates. (Tur.Afr.CONF, Tur. Afr.COOP
r(85)= -0,1756 and Afr.Tur.CONF, Afr.Tur.COOP r(85)= 0,4680). There is no
positive feedback loop (Tur.Afr.COOP, Afr.Tur.CONF. r(85)= -0,1380), but
one negative feedback loop in bilateral relations. (Tur.Afr.CONF,
Afr.Tur.COOP, r(85)= 0,2580). In other words, when Sub-Saharan Africa
cooperates more with Turkey, Turkey conflicts more with Sub-Saharan
Africa. There is no association between Turkey's cooperation to Sub-Saharan
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa's conflict to Turkey.

6.2.9.   Latin America and the Caribbean

Cooperation volume with Latin America is the lowest among regions.
Turkey's cooperation to Latin America is the eighteenth, whereas Latin
America's cooperation to Turkey is the seventeenth. The rankings do not
differ before and after AKP. In terms of cooperation reciprocity, Turkey and
LAM dyad is the seventh, higher than sub-Saharan Africa and Non-state
actors.(Lam.Tur.COOP, Tur.Lam.COOP r(85)= 0,5985, p< .001)

In terms of conflict volume, Turkey's conflict to LAM is the seventeenth, whereas LAM conflict to Turkey is eighteenth. Under AKP, the ranking was reverse: Turkey's conflict to LAM is the eighteenth, whereas LAM conflict to Turkey is the seventeenth. The change suggests that, Turkey's conflictual behavior to LAM has decreased in AKP period. There is no conflict reciprocity between LAM and Turkey (LAM.Tur.CONF, Tur.LAM.CONF r(85)= -0,0045.

Turkey's behaviour osciliates with respect to Latin America, but Latin America's does not. (Tur.Lam.CONF, Tur.Lam.COOP r(85)= 0,3604 and Lam.Tur.CONF, Lam.Tur.COOP r(85)= -0,1596). There is no positive feedback loop (Tur.Lam.CONF, Lam.Tur.COOP, r(85)= -0,0459) but one negative feedback loop in bilateral relations. (Tur.Lam.COOP, Lam.Tur.CONF. r(85)= 0,4797), In other words, when Turkey cooperates more with Latin America, Latin America conflicts more with Turkey. There is no association between Turkey's conflict to Latin America and Latin America's cooperation to Turkey.

6.2.10.   Inter-relationships Between Dyads

Considering the debates about Turkey's diminishing relations with "the West" and improving relations with "the Rest", a correlational analysis of associations between Turkey's cooperation and conflict with each region against the others may reveal more. Analysis of this type may help to understand whether and to what extent Turkey sees a trade-off between its relations with one region and another.

The following table shows trade-offs in Turkey's foreign behavior. A trade-off between Region A and Region B exists a) When Turkey's cooperation to region A is negatively correlated with Turkey's cooperation to Region B. b) Turkey's conflictual behavior to region A is negatively correlated with Turkey's conflictual behavior to Region B. c) When Turkey's cooperation to region A is positively correlated with Turkey's conflictual behavior to Region B. *a)* and *b)* are true trade-offs whereas *c)* points to a less direct but probably deeper negative relationship.

Table 13 Trade-offs in Turkey's Foreign Behavior

Dyad1	Dyad2	P.Cor	Sign. Level
Tur.Afr.COOP	Tur.Igo.COOP	-0,2952	P<0.01
Tur.Afr.COOP	Tur.Nst.CONF	0,3332	P<0.01
Tur.Afr.COOP	Tur.Weu.CONF	0,2189	P<0.05
Tur.Afr.COOP	Tur.Wst.COOP	-0,4074	P<0.001
Tur.Asa.CONF	Tur.Eeu.CONF	-0,2387	P<0.05
Tur.Asa.COOP	Tur.Eeu.CONF	0,2859	P<0.01
Tur.Asa.COOP	Tur.Mea.COOP	-0,2548	P<0.05
Tur.Eeu.CONF	Tur.Asa.CONF	-0,2387	P<0.05
Tur.Eeu.CONF	Tur.Asa.COOP	0,2859	P<0.01
Tur.Eeu.COOP	Tur.Igo.CONF	0,2612	P<0.05
Tur.Eeu.COOP	Tur.Lam.CONF	0,2421	P<0.05
Tur.Igo.CONF	Tur.Eeu.COOP	0,2612	P<0.05
Tur.Igo.COOP	Tur.Wst.COOP	-0,2812	P<0.01
Tur.Igo.COOP	Tur.Afr.COOP	-0,2952	P<0.01
Tur.Lam.CONF	Tur.Eeu.COOP	0,2421	P<0.05
Tur.Mea.COOP	Tur.Asa.COOP	-0,2548	P<0.05
Tur.Nst.CONF	Tur.Afr.COOP	0,3332	P<0.01
Tur.Nst.CONF	Tur.Wst.COOP	0,2434	P<0.05
Tur.Nst.COOP	Tur.Weu.CONF	0,2204	P<0.05
Tur.Weu.CONF	Tur.Afr.COOP	0,2189	P<0.05
Tur.Weu.CONF	Tur.Nst.COOP	0,2204	P<0.05
Tur.Wst.COOP	Tur.Nst.CONF	0,2434	P<0.05
Tur.Wst.COOP	Tur.Afr.COOP	-0,4074	P<0.001
Tur.Wst.COOP	Tur.Igo.COOP	-0,2812	P<0.01

In general, there is not a trade-off between Turkey relations with the West (Weu and Wst) and the East (Asa, Eeu, Mea).

Turkey's cooperation to sub-Saharan Africa however, is negatively correlated with Turkey's cooperation to Non-European West, and more importantly, positively correlated with Turkey's conflictual behaviour to W.Europe. The associations imply, Turkey increases its cooperation to sub-saharan Africa, when it does not cooperate as much with non-European West, and when it actually behaves conflictually against W.Europe.

There is another trade-off between the non-European West and foreign non-state actors. When Turkey conflicts more with non-state actors, it cooperates more with the Non-European West. Moreover, when Turkey cooperates more with foreign non-state actors, it conflicts more with W.Europe.

There is also a trade-off between Turkey's cooperation to non-European West and its cooperation to intergovernmental organizations. When it cooperates more with one, it cooperates less with the other. There is not a trade-off between Turkey relations with W.Europe and Non-European West.

When we look at "the East", the trade-offs are mostly between E.Europe and Asia. Turkey's conflict to E.Europe is not only positively correlated to its cooperation to Asia, but also negatively correlated to its conflict to Asia. Although cooperation to one does not hinder cooperation to the other, Turkey tries not to have conflictual relations with them at the same time. Moreover, either Turkey behaves less conflictually against

E.Europe and less cooperatively to Asia, or behaves more conflictually against E.Europe and more cooperatively to Asia.

Turkey's cooperation to Asia is also negatively correlated with Turkey's cooperation to the Middle East. Whenever Turkey cooperates more with one, it cooperates less with the other.

Turkey's cooperation to intergovernmental organizations also positively correlates with Turkey's conflict to the Middle East. In other words, when Turkey cooperates with IGOs more, it behaves more conflictually against the Middle East. The reverse, however, is not true: there is not a positive relationship between Turkey's cooperation to the Middle East and its conflictual behavior to the IGOs.

Lastly, Turkey's cooperation to Eastern Europe is positively correlated with conflict against Latin America. Yet, since data concerning Turkey's conflictual relations with Latin America is very sparse, the association may not be as reliable.

There are also mutually reinforcing associations in Turkey's foreign behavior. A mutually reinforcing association exists between Turkey's relations with Region A and Region B a) When Turkey's cooperation to region A is positively correlated with Turkey's cooperation to Region B. b) Turkey's conflictual behavior to region A is positively correlated with Turkey's conflictual behavior to Region B. c) When Turkey's cooperation to region A is negatively correlated with Turkey's conflictual behavior to Region B. a) and b) are true mutually reinforcing associations where as c) points to a more indirect association.

Table 14 Mutually Reinforcing Associations in Turkey's Foreign Behavior

Tur.Afr.CONF	Tur.Mea.CONF	0,3884	P<0.001
Tur.Afr.COOP	Tur.Mea.COOP	0,7542	P<0.001
Tur.Asa.CONF	Tur.Igo.CONF	0,2263	P<0.05
Tur.Asa.CONF	Tur.Lam.COOP	-0,2912	P<0.01
Tur.Asa.CONF	Tur.Nst.COOP	-0,3171	P<0.01
Tur.Asa.CONF	Tur.Eeu.COOP	-0,4242	P<0.001
Tur.Asa.COOP	Tur.Weu.COOP	0,3696	P<0.001
Tur.Asa.COOP	Tur.Nst.COOP	0,2593	P<0.05
Tur.Asa.COOP	Tur.Weu.CONF	-0,2162	P<0.05
Tur.Eeu.CONF	Tur.Weu.CONF	0,43	P<0.001
Tur.Eeu.CONF	Tur.Nst.COOP	-0,2521	P<0.05
Tur.Eeu.COOP	Tur.Weu.COOP	0,2177	P<0.05
Tur.Eeu.COOP	Tur.Asa.CONF	-0,4242	P<0.001
Tur.Igo.CONF	Tur.Asa.CONF	0,2263	P<0.05
Tur.Igo.CONF	Tur.Wst.COOP	-0,2215	P<0.05
Tur.Igo.COOP	Tur.Weu.COOP	0,2743	P<0.05
Tur.Igo.COOP	Tur.Mea.COOP	0,219	P<0.05
Tur.Lam.CONF	Tur.Wst.CONF	0,3483	P<0.001
Tur.Lam.CONF	Tur.Wst.COOP	-0,2534	P<0.05
Tur.Lam.COOP	Tur.Mea.COOP	0,2113	P<0.05
Tur.Lam.COOP	Tur.Asa.CONF	-0,2912	P<0.01
Tur.Mea.CONF	Tur.Afr.CONF	0,3884	P<0.001
Tur.Mea.COOP	Tur.Afr.COOP	0,7542	P<0.001
Tur.Mea.COOP	Tur.Wst.COOP	0,3638	P<0.001
Tur.Mea.COOP	Tur.Weu.COOP	0,3071	P<0.01
Tur.Mea.COOP	Tur.Igo.COOP	0,219	P<0.05
Tur.Mea.COOP	Tur.Lam.COOP	0,2113	P<0.05
Tur.Mea.COOP	Tur.Nst.CONF	-0,2364	P<0.05
Tur.Mea.COOP	Tur.Weu.CONF	-0,2877	P<0.01
Tur.Nst.CONF	Tur.Mea.COOP	-0,2364	P<0.05
Tur.Nst.COOP	Tur.Asa.COOP	0,2593	P<0.05
Tur.Nst.COOP	Tur.Eeu.CONF	-0,2521	P<0.05
Tur.Nst.COOP	Tur.Asa.CONF	-0,3171	P<0.01
Tur.Weu.CONF	Tur.Eeu.CONF	0,43	P<0.001
Tur.Weu.CONF	Tur.Asa.COOP	-0,2162	P<0.05
Tur.Weu.CONF	Tur.Mea.COOP	-0,2877	P<0.01
Tur.Weu.COOP	Tur.Asa.COOP	0,3696	P<0.001
Tur.Weu.COOP	Tur.Mea.COOP	0,3071	P<0.01
Tur.Weu.COOP	Tur.Igo.COOP	0,2743	P<0.05
Tur.Weu.COOP	Tur.Eeu.COOP	0,2177	P<0.05
Tur.Wst.CONF	Tur.Lam.CONF	0,3483	P<0.001

Table 14 (Cont'd)

Tur.Wst.COOP	Tur.Mea.COOP	0,3638	P<0.001
Tur.Wst.COOP	Tur.Igo.CONF	-0,2215	P<0.05
Tur.Wst.COOP	Tur.Lam.CONF	-0,2534	P<0.05

Turkey's behavior to the Middle East is the most interconnected dyad to Turkey's relations with other regions in a mutually reinforcing manner. Turkey's cooperation with Middle East positively correlates with cooperation to five other regions, (Afr, Igo, Lam, Weu, Wst) and negatively correlates with conflict towards non-State actors and W.Europe. Moreover, Turkey's conflict to Middle East positively correlates Turkey's conflict to sub-Saharan Africa: whenever Turkey cooperates with one, it also cooperates with the other, whenever it conflicts one it also conflicts with the other.

The second most interconnected dyad is Turkey and W.Europe. Turkey's cooperation to W.Europe is positively correlated with Turkey's cooperation to Asia, the Middle East, E.Europe and IGOs. Similary, conflict to W.Europe is positively correlated with conflict to E.Europe, and negatively correlated with cooperation to Asia and the Middle East.

The third most interconnected dyad is Turkey and Asia. In addition to its association to the Middle East and W.Europe, Turkey's cooperation to Asia is positively correlated with Turkey's cooperation to non-state actors. Turkey's conflict to Asia is negatively correlated with cooperation to Latin America, Eastern Europe and foreign non-state actors, positively correlated with Turkey's conflict to IGOs. In general, whereas Turkey's affairs with other regions are more related to Turkey's cooperation to W.Europe and

M.East than its conflict towards them, Turkey's affairs with other regions are more related to Turkey's conflict to Asia than its cooperation to Asia. ın other words, whereas cooperating with the Middle East and Western Europe is associated with more cooperation or less conflict with several other regions, whereas conflict to Asia is associated with more cooperation or less conflict to other regions.

The level of mutual reinforcing of other regions are more or less similar. In addition to its association with the cooperation towards the Middle East, Turkey's cooperation to non-European West is negatively correlated with Turkey's conflict to IGOs and Latin America. Turkey's conflict to non-European West is also positively correlated with Turkey's conflict to Latin America.

Turkey's conflict to E.Europe is negatively correlated with cooperation to non-state actors and positively correlated with conflict to W.Europe. Turkey's cooperation to Eastern Europe is positively correlated with its cooperation to Western Europe, and negatively with conflict to Asia. Turkey's cooperation to non-state actors is positively correlated with Turkey's cooperation to Asia, and negatively correlated with Turkey's conflict to Asia and E.Eastern Europe. Turkey's conflict to Non-State actors is negatively correlated with Turkey's cooperation to the Middle East.

6.3. Conclusion

In all years between 1995-2000, and 2002-2006 events generated about Turkey surpasses the average (1,36 % and 1,23 % respectively). Therefore,

these two periods are the more likely candidates for periods of "Turkey's activism." The lowest points are 1994 (0,76 %) and 2008 (0,77 %).

However, some of "Turkey's activism" is composed of Turkey's domestic affairs. In terms of foreign relations, only the periods 1995-1998, 2000 and 2003-2006, Turkey is especially active in foreign affairs.

Turkey's proactivism, (defined as showing more initiative than foreign actors) was prominent in 2000-2003, 2006, and 2008-2012. Combined, Turkey is both active and proactive in foreign affairs in years 2000, 2003 and 2006 only.

Almost one third of all Turkey-related international event is between Turkey and a Western European country. Second most important region is the Middle East and North Africa, comprising of one fifth of Turkey's international affairs. Other Western countries comprise 12 %. Therefore, historically Turkish foreign affairs have been mostly Western oriented (44% in total).

In the first five years of AKP rule, more than half of Turkey's international relations were with Western countries. Relations with the Middle East were also prominent, yet not significantly more than before. When Turkey focused on its relations with Western Europe, relations with Asia and Eastern Europe seem to have lost prominence, but relations with the Middle East have not. Relations with non-European West and the Middle East were also not particularly dichotomous.

In the second five years of AKP rule, prominence of Western Europe in Turkey's foreign affairs decreased, but it still occupied the first position. The Middle East has still been the second, but its prominence increased significantly.

The findings suggest that there is not a trade-off between the Middle East and Western Europe, or between the Middle East and the non-European West. There is not a trade-off between Turkey's relations with W.Europe and Non-European West, either.

There seems to be a trade off between sub-Saharan Africa on the one hand and WST/WEU on the other however. There is also a trade-off between Eastern Europe and Asia, on the one hand Asia and the Middle East, on the other.

CHAPTER 7

FINDINGS 2: DOMESTIC PROCESSES AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In the previous chapter, a general picture of Turkey's foreign afairs was given. This chapter deals with more domestic level explanations about Turkey's axis shift. The first part deals with Turkey's restructuration of its foreign affairs on the basis of its historical and religious identity and focus on Turkey's relations with previously-Ottoman countries and Muslim countries. The second part looks at foreign affairs by Turkey's non-state actors, and compares them across geographical regions and specific countries. Third part deals with changing Turkish civil-military relations and its association with Turkey-Israeli affairs. The fourth part deals with domestic terrorism and its relationship to Turkey's foreign affairs with specific regions. The chapter concludes by a summary of the findings.

7.1.   Islam and Neo-Ottomanism in Foreign Policy

In Turkish foreign policy literature, some observers claimed that religion and a common (Ottoman) identity is the most important

determinant in explaining Turkey's foreign relations. They state that Turkey's increasing relations with its neighbors is an ideological and identity-based restructuring of Turkish foreign policy principles. They point to the sources of this identity restructuration as Islamist ideology and a revived interest in Ottoman past, and argue that in practice, such a mindset has led to solidarity with neighbours on the basis of Islamic values.[378]They point to two groups of actors, which are defined as the focus of Turkey's religion-identity based activism: predominantly Muslim entities and countries that were previously under Ottoman rule.

Therefore, testing religion/identity based arguments necessitates looking into two groups of states separately and comparing them against each other. The following table shows Turkey's volume of interaction with predominantly Muslim[379] countries and non-state groups in AKP and pre-AKP periods.

Table 15 Turkey's Affairs with Predominantly Muslim entities

%	PRE-AKP (1991-2002)	AKP (2003-2012)	TOTAL (1991-2012)
MOS.TUR	20,5	16,8	18,51
TUR.MOS	20,5	22,3	21,50
NMOS.TUR	29,9	31,2	30,62
TUR.NMOS	29,1	29,6	29,37
TOTAL	100,0	100,0	100,0

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[378] Soner Çağaptay "Is Turkey Leaving the West?" *Foreign Affairs*, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65661/soner-cagaptay/is-turkey-leaving-the-west?page=show

[379] Based on UN data. MOS includes a) states whose population is at least 50 % Muslim(e.g.Nigeria), b)sub-state ethnic groups who are at least 50% Muslim(e.g.Chechens in Russia, Turks in Germany), c) un-affiliated ethnic groups who are at least 50% Muslim (e.g.Kurdish, Arab) d) sub-state Muslim groups (e.g. Muslims in France). NMOS includes all other ethnic, religious groups and states.

On average, 60% of Turkey's all foreign interactions occurs between Turkey and a Non-Muslim group or state, whereas 40% occurs between Turkey and a Muslim group or state. Before 2002, the ratio was 59% to 41%, and after 2003, approximately 61% to 39%. Therefore, there is no major difference in terms of Turkey's overall interaction with Muslim entities compared to its interactions with Non-Muslim entities between AKP and pre-AKP periods. Turkey's behavior to *both* Non-Muslim and Muslim entities increased under AKP, whereas Muslims' behavior to Turkey decreased, and Non-Muslims's behaviour increased.

Table 16 Turkey's Affairs with predominantly Muslim and Non-Muslim Entities

%	2003-2007	2008-2012
MOS.TUR	14,94	20,00
TUR.MOS	19,23	27,45
NMOS.TUR	34,07	26,51
TUR.NMOS	31,75	26,05
TOTAL	100,00	100,00

A comparative look at first and second half of AKP periods shows a more differentiated picture. In both periods, more than half of all Turkey's foreign interactions were with Non-Muslim entities. However, in the first half, 34 % of Turkey's all foreign interactions were with a Muslim entity (6 points less than average). This lower level of interaction was mostly due to decreasing Muslim entity behavior (3,5 points less than average). But, Turkey's behavior to Muslim entities was also approximately 2 points less than average. In the second half, 47% of Turkey's all foreign interactions was with a Muslim entity (7 points higher than average). In this second half

Muslim entity behavior superseded the average by 1,5 points, whereas

Turkey's behavior to Muslim entities superseded the average by 6 points.

Turkey's relations with Muslim entities are highly reciprocal both in

terms of conflict and cooperation. (TUR.MOS.COOP, MOS.TUR COOP

r(85)= 0.5940, p< 0.001 and TUR.MOS.CONF, MOS.TUR CONF r(85)=

0.5077, p< 0.001.) Nevertheless, Turkey's behavior to Muslim entities

oscilliates more than Turkey's behavior to Non-Muslim entities.

(TUR.MOS.CONF TUR.MOS COOP r(85)= 0.4748 p<0.001,

TUR.NMOS.CONF TUR.NMOS COOP r(85)=0.3254 p< 0.01). Turkey's

cooperative behavior to Muslim entities also positively correlates with

Turkey's cooperative behavior to Non-Muslim entities (TUR.MOS:COOP,

TUR.NMOS.COOP, r(85)= 0.4981, p<0.001) which suggests that Turkey tries

to balance its cooperative relations with respect to them. Turkey conflictual

behaviors to two groups are not associated. (TUR.MOS.CONF,

TUR.NMOS.CONF r(85)= 0.1631.)

Muslims' cooperative behavior to Turkey is negatively correlated

with Turkey's cooperation to Non-Muslim entities, (MOS.TUR.COOP,

TUR.NMOS.COOP r(85)= -0.3316, p<0.01. A partial cross-correlation

analysis shows that 3 quarters after Muslim cooperation to Turkey increases,

Turkey's cooperation to Non-Muslim entities decreases.[380] But, Turkey's

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[380] Cross correlational analysis is the correlation between two time series. The cross-correlation test of two time-series data involves calculating the coefficient r by time-shifting the one data set relative to the other data set (correlating past values of one data-set with current values of the other). Each shift is called a "lag." As such, it helps to identify, to what extent one time-series data set can predict the future variation in the other set.

decreasing cooperative behavior to Non-Muslim entities increases Muslim cooperative behavior after 8 quarters.

But Muslims' cooperative behavior to Turkey positively correlates with Non-Muslim entities cooperation to Turkey MOS.TUR.COOP, NMOS.TUR.COOP r(85)= 0.2970. A cross-correlation analysis shows that Non-Muslim entities cooperative behavior follows Muslim entities cooperation after 3 quarters, not vice versa.

Moreover, Turkey's cooperation to Muslim entities is positively correlated with Non-Muslims' cooperative behavior to Turkey. TUR. MOS.COOP, NMOS.TUR.COOP r(85)= 0.3880.

When Muslims cooperate with Turkey, this leads to increasing cooperation from Turkey to Muslims, as well as increasing cooperation from Non-Muslims to Turkey. Turkey, trying to balance its cooperation levels, increases its cooperation to Non-Muslims as well. However, positive feedback from Muslim entities makes Turkey less interested in cooperation with non-Muslim entities. Moreover, Turkey's increasing cooperation to Non-Muslims negatively effects Muslim cooperation to Turkey in 2 years. The whole cycle is a 3 years-long negative feedback loop. While initial Muslim cooperation to Turkey boosts Turkey's all foreign relations in less than a year, the negative feedback on Muslim cooperation happens 2 years after the initial boost.

There is a strong relationship between Turkey's behaviour to Muslim countries and countries that were previously under Ottoman rule. Part of

this, of course, relates to the fact there are 30-countries which are both previously Ottoman and Muslim.[381] Since these two groups strongly overlap, one way to test them is to separate previously Ottoman countries into predeominanly Muslim and non-Muslim, to see the effect of religion.

Table 17 Turkey's Behaviour to Previously Ottoman Countries vs. Predominantly Muslim Countries

Partial Correlation	Tur.Ott. Conf	Tur.Ott. Coop	Tur.Mos. Conf	Tur.Mos. Coop
Tur.Ott.Conf	1	0.3332	0.8682	-0.1898
Tur.Ott.Coop	0.3332	1	-0.3239	0.8486
Tur.Mos.Conf	0.8682	-0.3239	1	0.3249
Tur.Mos.Coop	-0.1898	0.8486	0.3249	1

To understand whether Turkey focuses more on Muslim countries within previously Ottoman countries or not, Turkey's overall activity level (both cooperative and conflictual) with respect to Non-Muslim and Muslim countries are comparatively analyzed.

On average, 45 % of Turkey's all foreign interactions occur between Turkey and a previously Ottoman state. In 1991- 2002, the ratio was 47 %, whereas after 2003, it is 44 %. Therefore, although there is no major difference, compared to its interactions with other countries, Turkey's overall interaction with previously Ottoman countries were higher in pre-AKP periods. Nevertheless, Turkey's behavior to previously Ottoman-

[381] Countries previously under Ottoman rule are defined as countries whose current territories -in part or as a whole -were under direct or indirect Ottoman rule for a period. As such, they are Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Turkish Cyprus, Egypt, Eritrea, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Macedonia, Moldova, Nagorno Karabakh, Omman, Palestine, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudia Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Sudan, South Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, Yemen and Yugoslavia as well as North Africa and ethnic Arabs.

Muslim countries increased by 3 points under AKP, whereas its behavior to Non-Muslim previously Ottoman countries decreased by 2,5 points. Previously Ottoman/Muslim countries' behavior to Turkey however, decreased by 2 % under AKP, compared to pre-AKP period. In consequence, Turkey has become more proactive towards previously Ottoman/Muslim countries, whereas it became less proactive towards previously Ottoman Non-Muslim countries.

Table 18 Turkey's Behaviour to Previously Ottoman and non-Ottoman Countries before and after AKP

%	PRE-AKP [1991-2002]	AKP[2003-2012]	1991-2012
Non-Ottoman to Turkey	26,19	27,79	27,06
Turkey to non-Ottoman	26,98	28,46	27,78
Ottoman/Muslim to Turkey	14,16	12,02	12,99
Turkey to Ottoman/Muslim	12,02	15,32	13,82
Ottoman/Non-Muslim to Turkey	10,05	8,26	9,07
Turkey to Ottoman/Non-Muslim	10,61	8,15	9,27
TOTAL	100	100	100

Turkey's foreign affairs with previously Ottoman countries shows a stark change from the first half to the second half of AKP rule. In the first period, only 37.45 % of Turkey's all foreign interactions are with a previously Ottoman country, 60% of which was with a Muslim one. In 2008-2012, 54.14 % of all foreign interactions are with a previously Ottoman country, 65 % of which was with a Muslim one. Therefore, in the second half, relations with previously Ottoman Non-Muslim countries also

increased compared to the first period, yet the increment in relations with

Muslim countries were more than non-Muslim ones.

Table 19 Turkey's Behaviour to Previously Ottoman Countries under AKP

| %	2003-2007	2008-2012
Non-Ottoman to Turkey	31,34	21,93
Turkey to Non-Ottoman	31,20	23,93
Ottoman/Muslim to Turkey	10,01	15,34
Turkey to Ottoman/Muslim	12,50	19,98
Ottoman/Non-Muslim to Turkey	7,66	9,24
Turkey to Ottoman/Non-Muslim	7,28	9,58
TOTAL	100	100

Figure 23 Volume of Turkey's Behaviour to Previously Ottoman Countries

1991-1995 shows a limited engagement with previously Ottoman

countries, yet Turkey had balanced its attention between both Muslim and

non-Muslim countries.

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In 1996, 2003 and 2007 there are dramatic increases in Turkey's level of activity towards previously Ottoman/Muslim countries. The surge in 2003 is probably due to war in Iraq, marking this period as the one in which Turkey is most active with respect to previously Ottoman Muslim countries. From 2011 onwards Turkey consistently focused more on Muslim countries, probably due to Arab unprisings in the wider region. Turkey's behavior to Muslim and non-Muslim countries previously under Ottoman rule have been balanced in all other periods.

Overall, it can be argued that there are a few differences with respect to Turkey's relations with previously Ottoman countries between AKP and pre-AKP periods. Although Turkey's behavior level was more or less in parallel to other countries' behavior to Turkey in all periods, AKP governments have been more responsive to behaviours from the Muslim countries. A cross-correlation between number of monthly behaviours from previously Ottoman countries to Turkey and number of monthly behaviours from Turkey to previously Ottoman/Muslim Countries, shows that an increase in Turkey's volume of behavior mostly follows an increase in their behavior, not vice versa. In other words, increasing level of interaction is mostly initated by previously Ottoman/Muslim countries, not Turkish government. During the AKP period, however, the responsiveness of Turkey has increased, compared to pre-AKP period. This is especially true for post-2011.

Figure 24 Cross correlation between the volume of Previously Ottoman/Muslim countries behaviour to Turkey and the volume of Turkey's behaviour to previously Ottoman/Muslim countries under AKP


Figure 25 Cross correlation between the volume of Previously Ottoman/Muslim countries behaviour to Turkey and the volume of Turkey's behaviour to previously Ottoman/non-Muslim countries under AKP

As stated previously, Turkey's cooperative behaviour to Non-Muslim countries, and Muslim cooperation to Turkey constitutes a 3 years-long negative feedback loop. To see whether there is a similar pattern in volume of behaviors in Turkey's affairs with Non-Muslim and Muslim countries, which were both previously under Ottoman rule, further analysis is needed. When Turkey's volume of behavior to previously Ottoman-Non-Muslim countries increases, the volume of behavior by previously Ottoman-Muslim countries decreases in 3 months. Tur.OttNMos.n (t), OttMos.Tur.n (t+3), $r(253) = -0.208$, $p<0.001$). After 29 months, the impact turns into positive and the volume of behavior by previously Ottoman-Muslim countries increases. (Tur.OttNMos.n (t), OttMos.Tur.n (t+29), $r(227) = 0.243$, $p<0.001$). The impact of increasing volume of behavior by previously Ottoman-Muslim countries on Turkey's behavior to previously-Ottoman non-Muslim countries is positive and much stronger, (Tur.OttNMos.n (t+24), OttMos.Tur.n (t), $r(232) = 0.361$, $p<0.001$).

Turkey's relations with previously Ottoman/Muslim countries are reciprocal both in terms of conflict and cooperation. (TUR.OTTMOS.COOP, OTTMOS.TUR COOP $r(85)= 0.5945$, $p< 0.001$ and TUR.OTTMOS.CONF, OTTMOS.TUR CONF $r(85)= 0.4930$, $p< 0.001$.) Turkey's relations with previously Ottoman/non-Muslim countries are more reciprocal in terms of cooperation. (TUR.OTTNMOS.COOP, OTTNMOS.TUR COOP $r(85)= 0,8631$, $p< 0.001$) yet less reciprocal in terms of conflict (TUR.OTTNMOS.CONF, OTTNMOS.TUR CONF $r(85)= 0,3430$, $p< 0.001$.),

Turkey's behavior to previously Ottoman/Muslim countries oscilliates more than Turkey's behavior to previously Ottoman/Non-Muslim countries (TUR.OTTMOS.CONF TUR.OTTMOS COOP r(85)= 0.4722 p<0.001, TUR.OTTNMOS.CONF TUR.OTTNMOS COOP r(85)= 0.3788 p< 0.001). Turkey's cooperative behavior to previously Ottoman/Muslim countries also positively correlates with Turkey's cooperative behavior to previously Ottoman/non-Muslim countries, which again suggests that Turkey tries to balance its cooperative relations with respect to them. (TUR.OTTMOS COOP, TUR.OTTNMOS COOP r(85)= 0.3025 p< 0.01)

Table 20 Partial Correlations for Turkey's Relations with Previously Ottoman Countries

	OttMos.Tur.COOP	OttMos.Tur.CONF	OttNMos.Tur.COOP	OttNMos.Tur.CONF	Tur.OttMos.COOP	Tur.OttMos.CONF	Tur.OttNMos.COOP	Tur.OttNMos.CONF
OttMos.Tur.COOP	1	0,2593	0,2257	0,1234	0,5945	-0,1473	-0,2621	0,0953
OttMos.Tur.CONF	0,2593	1	0,0329	0,0839	-0,0094	0,4930	-0,1055	0,0367
OttNMos.Tur.COOP	0,2257	0,0329	1	0,3492	-0,1939	0,0710	0,8631	-0,2378
OttNMos.Tur.CONF	0,1234	0,0839	0,3492	1	-0,0862	0,1063	-0,1121	0,3430
Tur.OttMos.COOP	0,5945	-0,0094	-0,1939	-0,0862	1	0,4722	0,3025	-0,0404
Tur.OttMos.CONF	-0,1473	0,4930	0,0710	0,1063	0,4722	1	-0,1473	0,0643
Tur.OttNMos.COOP	-0,2621	-0,1055	0,8631	-0,1121	0,3025	-0,1473	1	0,3788
Tur.OttNMos.CONF	0,0953	0,0367	-0,2378	0,3430	-0,0404	0,0643	0,3788	1

Time-lagged analysis (partial cross correlation) shows that when previously Ottoman/non-Muslim countries increase their cooperation to Turkey, Turkey's cooperation to previously Ottoman-Muslim countries increase in 3,5 years. Although Turkey and Ottoman/Muslim countries are

cooperatively reciprocal within the same quarter, over long run (2-4 years), Turkey's increasing cooperation to them leads to decreasing cooperation from them. Their decreasing cooperation leads to decreasing cooperation from Turkey to Non-Muslim Ottoman countries in 3 years, which leads to decreasing previously Ottoman/Non-Muslim cooperation to Turkey in 0,5-1,5 years. The whole cycle is a negative feedback loop, composing of another feedback loop between previously Ottoman/Non-Muslim cooperation, Ottoman/Muslim cooperation and Turkey's cooperation to previously Ottoman/Non-Muslim countries (see figure). Apparently, Turkey is less able to balance its relations with Non-Muslim and Muslim countries within previously Ottoman territories, than it is with the whole world. Predominantly Muslim countries' negative reaction to Non-Muslim coooperation to Turkey restricts Turkey's cooperation to Non-Muslim countries.


Figure 26 Negative feedback loops in Turkey's cooperation with previously Ottoman/Muslim countries and previously Ottoman/non-Muslim countries

In sum, there is a change in Turkish foreign affairs under AKP with respect to Muslim and Ottoman countries. However, the timing of change is around 2007-2008, rather than at the beginning of AKP rule. Turkey has been more engaged with previously Ottoman countries after 2007, and it was more engaged with Muslim countries within previously Ottoman countries. This increase is only partially a result of growing interest on the part of Muslim countries interest in Turkey. Although triggered by Muslim entities cooperation, Turkey seeked their cooperation more than they seek Turkey's. In sum, Turkey has become more responsive to Muslim entities, both within and outside of previously Ottoman geography in the second half of AKP rule.

7.2.   Sub-State Actors and Foreign Policy

There is a growing literature about the increasing prominence of Turkey's civil society in foreign affairs. The recent literature suggests that the non-state actors have gained a more prominent place in Turkey's foreign affairs.[382] It has been argued that with the democratization and Europeanization process, the business, research centers and other domestic non-state actors have become increasingly active in foreign matters. Nevertheless, the extent and depth of non-state involvement in foreign

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[382] Sedat Laçiner, "Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikasının Felsefesi, Fikri Altyapısı ve Hedefleri" in Osman Bahadir Dincer, Habibe Özdal and Hacali Necefoğlu (eds) *Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası: Uluslararası IV. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri* (Ankara:USAK, 2010). Altay Atlı, "Businessmen as Diplomats: The Role of Business Associations in Turkey's Foreign Economic Policy"*Insight Turkey* 13, no.1 (2011): 109-128; Öniş, "Multiple Faces" ; Kemal Kirişçi, "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 29-57; İbrahim Kalın, "Turkey and the Middle East: Ideology or Geo-politics?", *Private View* (2008): 29.Mustafa Kutlay, "Economy as the 'Practical Hand' of 'New Turkish Foreign Policy': A Political Economy Explanation", *Insight Turkey* 13 no. 1 (2011): 67-88.

policy matters has not been definitively laid out and their independence from state behavior has been questioned.[383]

To see their overal weight in Turkish foreign affairs, I have aggregated all events in four actor groups: Turkish government, Turkish rebels, Turkish civil actors and foreign actors. The following graph shows Turkish rebels' and Turkish civil actors share in Turkey's foreign behavior. Events are not aggregated in terms of type, but counted on a quarterly basis to see overall initiative taken by Turkish non-state actors towards the world.

On average, Turkish civil actors' foreign behaviour consitutes 13,0 % of Turkey's all foreign behaviour, whereas Turkish rebels behaviour constitutes 3,1 %. Before AKP, the ratio was 11,6 % and 3,6 % respectively. Under AKP (2003-2012), civil actors' share rose to 14,7 %, Turkish rebels share decreased to 2,6 %. Therefore, arguments about an increasing prominence of Turkey's civil actors in Turkey's foreign affairs are confirmed by data. Nevertheless, a comparative look at first and second half of AKP's term reveals that the increasing prominence of civil actors compared to Turkish government and rebels is more visible in the first five years: Between 2003-2007 the average civil actor share in Turkey's foreign behavior was 16,5%, whereas Turkish government's and rebels' were 81,7 % and 1,9 % respectively. In the second half, the shares were closer to the average: 83,6 % by Turkish government, 13,0 % by Turkish civil actors and 3,3 % by Turkish rebels.

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[383] Semra Cerit-Mazlum and Erhan Doğan, eds., *Sivil Toplum ve Dış Politika* (İstanbul: Bağlam, 2006)

In general, there is a high level of congruence between Turkish government's and Turkish civilians' behavior to foreign actors. There is a very strong positive correlation between Turkish civilians conflictual behavior to foreign actors and Turkish government' conflictual behavior to foreign actors, $r(85)= 0,3587$, $p < 0.001$, and there is a strong positive correlation between Turkish civilians' cooperative behavior to foreign actors and Turkish government's cooperative behavior to foreign actors, $r(85)= 0,2969$, $p<0.01$.

Figure 27 Turkey's Non-State Actors in Foreign Affairs

To compare Turkish civil actors geographical orientation with Turkish government's orientation, behaviour by each is grouped under nine geographical/political regions. The primary target of Turkish civil actors foreign behaviour is Western Europe. Compared to Turkish government, civil actors are more engaged with Western Europe, foreign non-state actors, intergovernmental organizations, and Latin America, less engaged with the Non-European West, the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

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FOREIGN BEHAVIOR by TURKISH CIVIL ACTORS

Afr 1%
Eeu 9%
Igo 5%
Mea 13%
Nst 15%
Weu 37%
Wst 11%
Asa 9%

Figure 28 Foreign Behaviour by Turkish Civil Actors

FOREIGN BEHAVIOR BY TURKISH GOVERNMENT

Afr 1%
Eeu 10%
Igo 4%
Mea 22%
Nst 11%
Weu 29%
Wst 14%
Asa 9%

Figure 29 Foreign Behaviour by Turkish Government

To see whether there is congruence between Turkey's civil actors' behavior and Turkish government's behavior, cooperative and conflictual behaviors of both to regions are compared. When all other dyads are controlled for, civil actors' cooperative behavior is positively correlated with Turkish government's cooperative behavior to foreign non-state actors, sub-Saharan Africa, Intergovernmental organizations and Western Europe.

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Turkey's civil actors' conflictual behavior to foreign actors is also positively correlated with Turkish government's conflictual behavior to the Middle East, Latin America, intergovernmental organizations, non-European West and foreign non-state actors. An interesting association is found with respect to relations with Western Europe and Africa: in both cases, Turkish government's conflictual behavior to these regions is *negatively* correlated with Turkish civil actors' conflictual behavior to them. In other words, whenever Turkish government's conflictual behavior to Western Europe increases, Turkish civil actors' conflictual behavior to Western Europe decreases, and whenever Turkish government's conflictual behavior to sub-Saharan Africa increases, Turkish civil actors' conflictual behavior to sub-Saharan Africa decreases. Therefore, against these two groups of foreign actors, Turkish government and civil actors' act in harmony when it comes to cooperation, yet behave particularly differently in terms of conflict. Whenever they cooperate, they cooperate together, whenever one of them conflicts, the other decreases its conflict. Turkish government's and civil actors' behavior are most harmonious against intergovernmental regions and foreign non-state actors. There is no relationship between their behaviors to either Asia or Eastern Europe. Whenever one of them behaves conflictually against Non-European West, the Middle East or Latin America, the other also behaves conflictually to the same foreign actor, while there is no such association in terms of cooperation.

Table 21 Congruence in Turkish Government's and Turkish Civil Actors'

Behaviour[384]

Dyad1	Dyad2	Partial correlation (n=87)
Turgov.Nst.COOP	Turoth.Nst.COOP	0,7094***
Turgov.Igo.COOP	Turoth.Igo.COOP	0,5545***
Turgov.Afr.COOP	Turoth.Afr.COOP	0,3018**
Turgov.Weu.COOP	Turoth.Weu.COOP	0,2368*
Turgov.Mea.COOP	Turoth.Mea.COOP	0,1805
Turgov.Asa.COOP	Turoth.Asa.COOP	0,1373
Turgov.Wst.COOP	Turoth.Wst.COOP	0,07
Turgov.Lam.COOP	Turoth.Lam.COOP	0,0246
Turgov.Eeu.COOP	Turoth.Eeu.COOP	-0,1817
Turgov.Mea.CONF	Turoth.Mea.CONF	0,4323***
Turgov.Lam.CONF	Turoth.Lam.CONF	0,4223***
Turgov.Igo.CONF	Turoth.Igo.CONF	0,4168***
Turgov.Wst.CONF	Turoth.Wst.CONF	0,3748***
Turgov.Nst.CONF	Turoth.Nst.CONF	0,2873**
Turgov.Eeu.CONF	Turoth.Eeu.CONF	0,0457
Turgov.Asa.CONF	Turoth.Asa.CONF	-0,0757
Turgov.Weu.CONF	Turoth.Weu.CONF	-0,3245**
Turgov.Afr.CONF	Turoth.Afr.CONF	-0,3375**

In conclusion, in terms of activity level, the share of civil actors in foreign affairs has increased particularly in years 2003-2007 compared to later and previous periods. In terms of congruence between civil actors and government, there is cooperative congruence with respect to foreign non-state actors, sub-Saharan Africa, Intergovernmental organizations and Western Europe, whereas there is conflictual congruence with respect to the Middle East, Latin America, intergovernmental organizations, non-European West and foreign non-state actors.

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[384] *** p< 0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

According to data, despite the occasional peaks in late 2003 and 2004, Turkish non-state actors have not been particularly active in foreign affairs. While their impact on government's policy formulation might have increased, their foreign behavior did not significantly increase.

7.3. Civil Military Relations and Turkey-Israel Relations

Recently, Turkey's relations with Israel have taken significant turns compared to the trend in late 1990s. Observers argued that Turkish-Israeli relations have been deteriorated especially after AKP came to power. Turkey's relationship with Israel has always been cumbersome, but with the military cooperation agreements in late 1990s, cooperation reached an all time peak. However the relations took an all time low when Israeli military tried to stop Turkish flagged Mavi Marmara aid flotilla to Gaza, an operation ended up with death of nine Turkish nationals in June 2011. [385] Prime Minister Erdoğan's criticisms concerning Israeli policy in the West Bank and Gaza and Israeli attack on Gaza aid flotilla have created setbacks between the countries. [386] Consequently, Turkey-Israeli relations have been regarded as where the most dramatic shifts in Turkish foreign policy can be witnessed. [387]

Several explanations have been made about the reasons for this shift. Some pointed out that the positive public opinion in Turkey towards

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[385] Tarık Oğuzlu "The Changing Dynamics of Turkey–Israel Relations: A Structural Realist Account" Mediterranean Politics 15, no 2, (2010): 273-288

[386] Stephen F. Larrabee, "Turkey Rediscovers Middle East" Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (2007): 110

[387] Joshua Walker "Learning Strategic Depth: Implications of Turkey's New Foreign Policy Doctrine" Insight Turkey 9, no. 3 (2007): 32- 47

Palestinians makes Turkish decision-makers especially sensitive to level of conflict between Israel and Palestine, which makes its mark on Turkish-Israeli relations.[388] Therefore, these studies imply that on a behavioural level, whenever Israeli aggression towards Palestinian actos increases, Turkish government's conflict with Israel would increase. Other scholars however, look at other -Turkey's domestic- dynamics in explaining volatility in Turkey-Israel relations. Bacik claims that Israel-Turkey relations lack material (economic) infrastructure: "The history of bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel shows no significant level of interdependence." [389] He claims that this lack leads to a lack of social basis: Turkey-Israeli relations suffer from insufficient number and capacity of domestic actors who favor better and deeper relations with Israel.[390] Therefore, Turkey-Israeli relations take place in a mostly discursive sphere.

Some other analysts however argued that there were indeed domestic actors who favored deeper relations with Israel: Turkish military, secularists, Kemalists. etc.[391] Accordingly, the decreasing prominence of military in Turkish politics was linked to Turkey's increasing tensions in its relations with Israel. It has been argued that Turkey's cooperation with Israel, has been engineered and cultivated by Turkish military, who were willing to acquire Israeli military technology, and Israeli authorities who are in search

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[388] Saziya Burcu Giray "Turkish Policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" in *Muslim Attitudes to jews and Israel:The Ambivalences of Rejection, Antagonism, Tolerance and Cooperation,* Moshe Maoz ed. (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012): 174.

[389] Gökhan Bacık "Turkish-Israeli Relations after Davos: A View from Turkey" *Insight Turkey* 11, No. 2 (2009): 31-41

[390] Gökhan Bacık, "The Limits of an Alliance: Turkish-Israeli Relations Revisited," *Arab Studies Quarterly* Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer 2001), p. 33, 52.

[391] Hakan Yavuz "Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate" *Journal of Palestine Studies* 27, No. 1 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 22-37.

of more friendly and secular nation in a hostile neighborhood.[392] Therefore, a less prominent role for Turkish armed forces in Turkish politics might have led to a reduced level of cooperation between Turkey and Israel, and later to revival of formerly underplayed grievances.

On a behavioral level, such an argument would mean that relations between Turkish government, Turkish military and Israel are interrelated. To understand the precise nature of this interrelationship, Turkish actors are grouped under three headings: Turkish government, Turkish military and others. Others are excluded from the analysis to focus on behaviours between/by the government and the military. All actors from Israel are grouped under single category.

Event types are aggregated in four categories on a quarterly basis: Firstly, as conflict or cooperation, then as verbal and material. Then, each type of event is assigned a numerical value; Material Cooperation 2, Material Conflict 2, Verbal Cooperation 1 and Verbal Conflict 1. For each dyad, separate scores are obtained for cooperation and conflict within a quarter year.

Figure 30 shows behaviours of all Israeli actors towards Turkish government. On average, Israel's quarterly cooperation score is 4,4, quarterly conflict score is 0,9. Turkish government's cooperation score is 5.0, conflict score is 1.9. Therefore, on average Turkish government is both more cooperative and more conflictual towards Israel, than Israel is to Turkish

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[392] Amikam Nachmani "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie" *The Middle East Quarterly* 5, no.2 (1998):19- 29.

government. There is not much difference in Turkish government's cooperative behavior to Israel before and after AKP (4,78 and 5,35), as well as between AKP's first and second five year in rule (5,05 and 5,65). Both Israel's and Turkish government's conflictual behavior towards each other increased under AKP, particularly in the 2007-2012 period.

Table 22 Turkey-Israel Relations 1991-2012

Average quarterly scores	Isr.Turgov. COOP(W)	Turgov.Isr. COOP (W)	Isr.Turgov. CONF (W)	Turgov.Isr. CONF (W)
AVERAGE 1991-2012	4,45	5,05	0,93	1,94
AVERAGE 1991-2002	4,48	4,78	0,57	1,39
AVERAGE 2003-2012	4,43	5,35	1,35	2,58
AVERAGE 2003-2007	4,25	5,05	0,75	1,25
AVERAGE 2007-2012	4,60	5,65	1,95	3,90

Figure 30 Israel's Behaviour to Turkish Government

Figure 31 Turkish Government's Behaviour to Israel

Table 23 provides a closer look at the material and verbal actions from
Turkish government to Israel. In 1991-2012, 83,1 % of Turkish government's
all behavior to Israel has been verbal, whereas 16,9 % was material. In the
same period, 20,6 % of Turkish government's all behavior to Israel was
conflictual, 79,4 % was cooperative. Under AKP, composition of material
and verbal actions did not change very much (85,1 % and 14,9 %), yet
conflictual behavior rose to 28,6 %, and cooperative behavior decreased to
71,4 %.

In the first five years of AKP rule, material behavior was 11,5 % and
only 19,5% of all TFB to Israel was conflictual, making the period most
cooperative period since 1991. In other words, there was more cooperation,
yet it was mostly discursive. In the second five year, material behavior rose

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to 17,5 %, whereas conflictual behavior also rose to 35,0 %, making it the most conflictual period. Most of the conflict was again discursive, yet share of material conflict was more than ever.

Table 23 Material and Verbal Actions from Turkish government to Israel

%	CONF.MAT	CONF.VERB	COOP.MAT	COOP.VERB	TOTAL
1991-2012	7,3	17,5	8,5	66,7	100,0
1991-2002	5,8	14,8	11,1	68,3	100,0
2003-2012	8,7	19,9	6,2	65,2	100,0
2003-2007	2,7	16,8	8,8	71,7	100,0
2008-2012	12,9	22,1	4,3	60,7	100,0

To probe whether changing dynamics of Turkey-Israel relations is related to Turkish civil-military relations, two types of analysis are made: Firstly, partial correlations between Turkish government's and Turkish military's relations with Israel are computed to see level of congruence between Turkish government and Turkish military in their behavior to Israel. Secondly, partial correlations between Turkish civil-military relations and Turkish government-Israel relations are computed to see to what extent Turkish government's relations with Israel are related to Turkish civil-military relations.[393]

The two Turkish actors' behaviors to Israel are not very congruent. Turkish government's conflictual behaviour to Israel is positively correlated with Turkish military's cooperative behavior to Israel (Turgov.Isr.CONF, Turmil.Isr.COOP, r(84)= 0,3466). Partial cross correlation analysis shows Turkish government's conflictual behaviour to Israel follows Turkish

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[393] All other possible dyads are controlled for, except Isr.Turmil.CONF, since this dyad did not have any events since 1991 (singular).

military's cooperative behavior to Israel. Turmil.Isr.COOP (t), Turgov.Isr.CONF (t+3), r(81)= 0, 261). However, Turkish government's conflictual behaviour to Israel is negatively correlated with Israel's cooperative behavior to Turkish military, (Turgov.Isr.CONF, Isr.Turmil.COOP, r(84)= -0,3576). Turkish government's decreasing conflictual behaviour to Israel follows Israel's increasing cooperative behavior to Turkish military. (Turgov.Isr.CONF (t), Isr.Turmil.COOP(t-3) r(81)= -0.243.)

Turkish government's conflictual behavior to Israel seems to be related to cooperation between Israel and Turkish military. When Israel is more cooperative towards Turkish military, Turkish government becomes less conflictual towards Israel; when Turkish military is more cooperative towards Israel however, Turkish government becomes more conflictual to Israel. Therefore, Israel's cooperative initiative towards the military seems to have a mollifying effect on Turkish foreign policy towards Israel. Turkish military's initiative on the other hand, if it is not responded in kind and volume by Israel, has a negative effect.

The relationship between Turkish civil-military relations and Turkish government-Israel relations is also interesting. When Turkish government cooperates less with Israel, Turkish military cooperates more with the Turkish government, (Turmil.Turgov.COOP , Turgov.Isr.COOP r(84)= -0,3791). The effect has a longitudinal dimension, too: Turkish government's cooperation to Israel at quarter t is negatively corrrelated with Turkish military's cooperation to Turkish government at quarter *t+12*,

Turgov.Isr.COOP (t), Turmil.Turgov.COOP (t+12), r(62)= -0.243. In other words, Turkish military's increasing cooperation to Turkish government follows Turkish government's decreasing cooperation to Israel.

Turkish military's cooperation to Turkish government is also positively correlated with Israel's cooperation towards Turkish government (Turmil.Turgov.COOP, Isr.Turgov.COOP r(84)=0,4202). There is no significant association between two dyads longitudinally. Therefore, with partial cross correlation alone, it is not possible to ascertain whether changing domestic behavior of Turkish military precedes or follows Israel's international behaviour.

Turkish military's conflict to Turkish government is also negatively (albeit not very significantly) correlated with Israel's cooperation towards Turkish government (Turmil.Turgov.CONF, Isr.Turgov.COOP, r(84)= -0,1974, p<0.1). The association is stronger in the long run when Turkish military's conflict to Turkish government is lagged. Isr.Turgov.COOP (t) Turmil.Turgov.CONF (t+13), r(71)=- -0.250; indicating domestic behavior of the military follows Israel's behavior. But there is also a loop, a negative feedback of Turkish domestic affairs' on Israel's behavour at t-19. More precisely, 19 quarters after Turkish military increases it conflictual behavior to Turkish government, Israel decreases its cooperation to Turkish government. (Turmil.Turgov.CONF (t-19), Isr.Turgov.COOP (t) r(65)= -0.234, p<0.05).

Figure 32 Turkish civil-miltary relations and Israeli cooperation

Therefore, two dyads make a loop of 8 years in total: when Turkish military increases it conflictual behavior to Turkish government, this leads to Israel's decreasing cooperation in 5 years. Israel's decreasing cooperation to Turkish government, in turn leads to increasing conflict from Turkish military to Turkish government in 3 years.

All in all, it can be argued that in Turkish military's behavior in Turkish civil-miltary relations is not just a function of relations between the two. It is also shaped by Turkish government's behavior towards Israel. Turkish government's behavior to Turkish military however, is both shaped by Israel's and Turkish military's behavior. Two domestic actors behavior to Israel is not congruent, which explains the erratic association. Whenever Turkish military receives Israeli cooperation, Turkish government is more cooperative to both Israel and Turkish military. When Turkish military shows more initiative in cooperating with Israel, this disrupts Turkish government's behavior to both Israel and Turkish military.

When we look at the government side on Turkish civil-military relations, we see that Turkish government's cooperation to Turkish military is negatively correlated with Israel's conflictual behavior towards Turkish government. Turgov.Turmil.COOP(t), Isr.Turgov.CONF(t), r(85)= -0,2011, p<0.1. However, the partial cross correlation between dyads is longitudinally erratic. Changing domestic dynamic seems to precede Israel's behavior by 4 years, yet the association is positive, rather than negative (Turgov.Turmil.COOP$_t$ Isr.Turgov.CONF (t+16), r(68)= 0.236, p<0.05). In other words, Turkish government decreases its cooperative behavior to Turkish military at the same time as Israel increases its conflict to Turkish government. Yet, 4 years after Turkish government decreases its cooperative behavior to Turkish military, Israel decreases its conflict to Turkish government, too. Israel's decreasing conflictual behavior coincides with Turkish government's increasing cooperation to Turkish military, and the loop continues in an up-down manner.

Figure 33 Turkish civil-military relations and Israeli Conflict

7.4.   Terrorism and Turkish Foreign Policy

One of the domestic processes that most significantly affect Turkey's foreign affairs is Turkey's domestic terrorism.[394] To understand this relationship, this part is divided into severeal sections.

The first section provides a description of findings with respect to domestic terrorism in Turkey and identifies basic patterns. Since domestic terrorism refers to Turkish rebels' relations with both civil actors and Turkish government, it focuses on Turkish rebels' (all non-governmental armed groups) relations with Turkish government (including the military), on the one hand and Turkish civilians on the other.

The second section deals with the relationship between Turkish government's affairs with Turkish rebels and Turkish foreign policy in general. In other words, all foreign actors are aggregated under one group.

The third section delves into the association between Turkey's domestic terrorism and Turkey's foreign affairs on a deeper level. Turkish government and Turkish civilians were treated as if they were one actor to ease analysis. Hence, the focus is on Turkey's foreign *affairs,* rather than on Turkish foreign *policy.*

In all sections, despite different actor and target aggregations, event types are aggregated in four categories on a quarterly basis: Firstly, as

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[394] Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkish Foreign Policy", Larrabee "Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East", Öniş, "Multiple Faces", Kalın "Ideology or Geopolitics?"; Kemal Kirisci, "The Kurdish question and Turkish foreign policy," 277-314.

conflict or cooperation, then as verbal and material. Then, each type of event is assigned a numerical value; Material Cooperation 2, Material Conflict 2, Verbal Cooperation 1 and Verbal Conflict 1. For each dyad, separate scores are obtained for cooperation and conflict within a quarter year. The scores are adjusted to overall AFP news output for each quarter.

7.4.1. Domestic Terrorism in Turkey

The following graphs show Turkish government's and rebels' conflictual and cooperative behaviours towards each other. Turkish government has been more conflictual to Turkish rebels than they were to Turkish government in 1995-1998 and 2007-2008. As shown in the previous sections, these periods are also where Turkish government is particularly less proactive in foreign affairs. Therefore, there seems to be a negative relationship between terrorism and foreign policy proactivism. The following two graphs show Turkish government's and rebels' conflictual and cooperative behaviour towards each other. Compared against Turkish civilians, most of Turkish rebels' interaction is with Turkish government, and most of such interaction is of conflictual nature, as expected.

Turkish government's behaviour to Turkish rebels is not osciliatory: Turgov.Turreb.COOP, Turgov.Turreb.CONF r(85)= 0,1929, p<0.1 Turkish civilians' behaviour to Turkish rebels is also not osciliatory: Turoth.Turreb.COOP, Turoth.Turreb.CONF r(85)= 0,1707, p>0.1. Turkish rebels' are less osciliatory to Turkish government (Turreb.Turgov.COOP, Turreb.Turgov.CONF r(85)= 0,3524, p<0.001) than they are to Turkish

civilians: (Turreb.Turoth.COOP, Turreb.Turoth.CONF r(85)= 0,4402, p<0.001). Osciliation happens when the osciliating actor perceives the relationship as embedded with both grave risks and lucrative opportunities.

Figure 34 Conflict between Turkish Rebels and Turkish government

Figure 35 Cooperation between Turkish Rebels and Turkish government

The relationship between Turkish government and Turkish rebels is not conflictually reciprocal: Turgov.Turreb.CONF, Turreb.Turgov.CONF $r(85) = 0.1688$; but cooperatively reciprocal: Turgov.Turreb.COOP, Turreb.Turgov.COOP, $r(85) = 0.4363$, $p<0.001$. There is no immediate conflict response from Turkish rebels to Turkish government's aggressive behaviour, but the response is delayed by 7 quarters: Turgov.Turreb.Conf(t-7), Turreb.Turgov.Conf$_t$, $r(78)=0.289$, $p<0.01$. Interestingly, there is also a weak positive correlation between Turgov.Turreb.CONF and Turreb.Turgov.COOP $r(85)=0,2087$, $p<0.1$. Partial cross correlation shows no longitudinal association, as to which dyad may precede the other.

It is highy likely that coercive behaviour from Turkish government does not lead to further conflict from Turkish rebels immediately but actually induces –albeit slightly- more cooperation from Turkish rebels at the time. In the longer run (app.2 years), however, Turkish rebels respond by conflict.

The relationship between Turkish civilians and Turkish rebels shows a reverse pattern: it is not cooperatively reciprocal, Turoth.Turreb.COOP, Turreb.Turoth.COOP $r(85)= 0,1568$; but conflictually reciprocal, Turoth.Turreb.CONF, Turreb.Turoth.CONF $r(85)= 0.4138$, $p<0.001$. Partial cross correlation shows the association is negative between Turkish civilians conflict at quarter t-1 and Turkish rebels conflict at quarter t. Turoth.Turreb. CONF(t-1), Turreb.Turoth.CONF$_t$, $r(84)= -0.372$, $p<0.001$. In other words, within the same quarter, conflict from one side induces conflict from the other side; but one quarter after Turkish civilians increased their conflict,

Turkish rebels decrease their conflict. They do not escalate, but back down in the face of increasing adversity from Turkish civilians.

Figure 36 Conflict between Turkish rebels and Turkish civilians

Although there is no contemporaneous cooperative reciprocity between Turkish civilians and Turkish rebels, partial cross correlation shows longiditunal effects of each on another. Their cooperative behaviour to each other constitute a 3 year loop: Turkish civilians' cooperation to Turkish rebels induces Turkish rebels' cooperation in 8 quarters (Turoth.Turreb. COOP(t-8), Turreb.Turoth.COOP(t), r(77)= 0.239, p<0.05. However, 3 quarters after Turkish rebels' increasing cooperation, Turkish civilians reduce their cooperation to Turkish rebels (Turoth.Turreb. COOP(t+3), Turreb.Turoth.COOP (t), -0.290, p<0.01). It is possible to read the loop beginning from Turkish rebels' behavioural change: Turkish rebels decrease their cooperation, 3 quarters later Turkish civilians increase their

cooperation, 8 quarters later Turkish rebels increase their cooperation, 3 quarters later Turkish civilians decrease their cooperation, so on... The loop implies that Turkish civilians are hesitant in cooperating with rebels when initiative comes from the other side, and their response time is shorter than them.

Figure 37 Cooperation between Turkish rebels and Turkish civilians

7.4.2.   Relations between Turkish Government and Turkish rebels and Turkish Foreign Policy

The following table presents the significant partial correlation values about the relationship between Turkish government's affairs with Turkish rebels and Turkish government's foreign activity.

Table 24 Partial Correlations between Turkish government's affairs with Turkish rebels and Turkish Foreign Policy

Domestic Dyad	International Dyad	28th degree Partial Cor. Coefficient	Significance level
Turgov.Turreb.CONF	Turgov.NonTur.CONF	0,3789	0.001
Turgov.Turreb.COOP	NonTur.Turgov.COOP	0,3083	0.01
Turgov.Turreb.COOP	Turgov.NonTur.COOP	-0,1833	0.1
Turreb.Turgov.CONF	NonTur.Turgov.COOP	-0,2423	0.05
Turreb.Turgov.CONF	Turgov.NonTur.CONF	0,1952	0.1

Turkish government's conflictual behavior to foreign actors is positively correlated with Turkish government's conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels. In other words, Turkish foreign policy becomes more conflictual whenever Turkish government acts aggressively against Turkish rebels. (Turgov.NonTur.CONF(t+16), Turgov.Turreb.CONF (t) r(69)= 0.236, p<0.05) Accordingly, Turkish government 's cooperative behavior to Turkish rebels is positively correlated with foreign actors' cooperative behavior to Turkish government, suggesting cooperative gestures from foreign actors encourage Turkish government to cooperate more with Turkish rebels. (NonTur.Turgov.COOP(t-10), Turgov.Turreb.COOP(t), r(75)= 0.267, p<0.05).

There is a negative correlation between Turkish rebels' conflictual behavior to Turkish government and foreign actors' cooperative behavior to Turkish government, indicating increasing terrorism in Turkey might diminish foreign support for Turkish government. Since partial cross correlation shows no longitudinal effect, the relationship can be interpreted in reverse order, i.e., increasing cooperation from foreign actors to Turkish

government may encourage Turkish rebels to act less aggressively towards Turkish government.

After analyzing Turkish government's relations with Turkish rebels and its relations with all foreign actors in general, in the following section different agreegations are used to asses the association between Turkey's domestic terrorism on the one hand and Turkey's foreign affairs on the other.

7.4.3.   Domestic Terrorism and Turkish Foreign Affairs

In the first section, domestic terrorism is measured by relations Turkish rebels relations between Turkish government on the one hand, and its relations with Turkish civilians, on the other. In the second section, only Turkish government's relations with Turkish rebels and foreign actors are dealt with. This section uses a different aggregation: Turkish government and Turkish civilians are treated as if they were one single actor to ease the analysis of the associations between their relations with different foreign actors on the one hand, and Turkish rebels on the other. All in all, 9 groups of foreign actors, and 2 groups of domestic actors (Turgoth=Turgov+Turoth and Turreb) were made. Turkish rebels' relations with foreign actors are excluded from the analyses. As such, 22 dyads were created (See Table). With each dyad, event types are aggregated into four categories: Firstly, as conflict or cooperation, then as verbal and material. Then, each type of event is assigned a numerical value; Material Cooperation 2, Material Conflict 2, Verbal Cooperation 1 and Verbal Conflict 1. For each dyad, separate scores

are obtained for cooperation and conflict within a quarter year, which incrased number of dyads to 44 (=22x2). All in all, when partial correlations were computed between any two dyads, the variations by all other dyads (42) are controlled for.

Table 25 Number of International and Domestic Dyads

Source	Target	Event Type	TOTAL
Foreign Actor(9)	Turgoth(1)	CONF/COOP(2)	18
Turgoth(1)	Foreign Actor(9)	CONF/COOP (2)	18
Domestic Actor(2)	Domestic Actor(2)	CONF/COOP (2)	8
	TOTAL NUMBER OF DYADS		44

The following table shows the significant partial correlations of 42nd degree between Turkey's international affairs and Turkey's domestic terrorism. Turkey's conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels is mostly associated with Turkey's relations with foreign non-state actors. Whenever, Turkey increases its conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels, it also increases its conflictual behavior to foreign non-state actors. Non-state actors on the other hand, reduce their conflict to Turkey. Indeed, their decreasing conflict precedes Turkey's increasing conflict against rebels. (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF (t+1), Nst.Turgoth.CONF (t) r(84)=-0.248, Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+2), Nst. Turgoth.CONF(t) r(83)=-0.226, Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+3), Nst.Turgoth. CONF(t) r(82)=-0.264.), i.e. 1-3 quarters before any operation against Turkish rebels, Turkey experiences lower levels of conflict from foreign non-state actors. This is probably due to Turkey's coercive strategies against foreign non-state actors 2 quarters before increasing their conflictual behaviour against the rebels. Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t), Turgoth.Nst.CONF (t-2)= 0.287.

Table 26 Significant partial correlations of 42nd degree between Turkey's domestic terrorism and Turkish foreign affairs

		Domestic Dyad		International Dyad	Partial cor. coef. 42nd degree	Sign.Level
TURGOTH	CONF	Turgoth.Turreb.CONF	FOREIGN	Asa.Turgoth.CONF	-0,2914	p<0.01
		Turgoth.Turreb.CONF		Asa.Turgoth.COOP	-0,2737	p<0.05
		Turgoth.Turreb.CONF		Igo.Turgoth.COOP	0,2488	p<0.05
		Turgoth.Turreb.CONF		Lam.Turgoth.CONF	-0,2364	p<0.05
		Turgoth.Turreb.CONF		Nst.Turgoth.CONF	-0,2477	p<0.05
		Turgoth.Turreb.CONF	TURGOTH	Turgoth.Afr.CONF	-0,3030	p<0.01
		Turgoth.Turreb.CONF		Turgoth.Asa.COOP	0,2612	p<0.05
		Turgoth.Turreb.CONF		Turgoth.Igo.COOP	-0,3611	p<0.001
		Turgoth.Turreb.CONF		Turgoth.Mea.COOP	0,2259	p<0.05
		Turgoth.Turreb.CONF		Turgoth.Nst.CONF	0,4806	p<0.001
		Turgoth.Turreb.CONF		Turgoth.Wst.COOP	-0,2233	p<0.05
	COOP	Turgoth.Turreb.COOP	FOREIGN	Afr.Turgoth.COOP	-0,2309	p<0.05
		Turgoth.Turreb.COOP		Eeu.Turgoth.COOP	0,2626	p<0.05
		Turgoth.Turreb.COOP		Igo.Turgoth.CONF	-0,2234	p<0.05
		Turgoth.Turreb.COOP		Lam.Turgoth.COOP	0,2258	p<0.05
		Turgoth.Turreb.COOP		Mea.Turgoth.COOP	0,4419	p<0.001
		Turgoth.Turreb.COOP		Nst.Turgoth.CONF	-0,2389	p<0.05
		Turgoth.Turreb.COOP		Weu.Turgoth.COOP	-0,2554	p<0.05
		Turgoth.Turreb.COOP		Wst.Turgoth.COOP	-0,2366	p<0.05
		Turgoth.Turreb.COOP	TURGOTH	Turgoth.Eeu.COOP	-0,2791	p<0.01
		Turgoth.Turreb.COOP		Turgoth.Weu.COOP	0,2569	p<0.05
		Turgoth.Turreb.COOP		Turgoth.Wst.COOP	0,2329	p<0.05
TURREB	CONF	Turreb.Turgoth.CONF	FOREIGN	Asa.Turgoth.CONF	0,3580	p<0.001
		Turreb.Turgoth.CONF		Igo.Turgoth.CONF	0,2161	p<0.05
		Turreb.Turgoth.CONF		Igo.Turgoth.COOP	-0,2599	p<0.05
		Turreb.Turgoth.CONF		Mea.Turgoth.COOP	-0,2127	p<0.05
		Turreb.Turgoth.CONF		Nst.Turgoth.CONF	0,4445	p<0.001
		Turreb.Turgoth.CONF		Weu.Turgoth.CONF	-0,2380	p<0.05
		Turreb.Turgoth.CONF		Weu.Turgoth.COOP	0,2733	p<0.05
		Turreb.Turgoth.CONF	TURGOTH	Turgoth.Afr.CONF	0,2189	p<0.05
		Turreb.Turgoth.CONF		Turgoth.Igo.COOP	0,2980	p<0.01
		Turreb.Turgoth.CONF		Turgoth.Nst.CONF	-0,4727	p<0.001
		Turreb.Turgoth.CONF		Turgoth.Nst.COOP	0,4021	p<0.001
		Turreb.Turgoth.CONF		Turgoth.Weu.COOP	-0,2888	p<0.01
		Turreb.Turgoth.CONF		Turgoth.Wst.CONF	0,3620	p<0.001
	COOP	Turreb.Turgoth.COOP	FOREIGN	Eeu.Turgoth.CONF	-0,2215	p<0.05

There is also a positive correlation between Turkish rebels' conflictual behavior to Turkey, and foreign non-state actors' conflictual behavior to Turkey. The association is also long term: partial cross correlation shows non-state conflict comes 1 year after Turkish rebels' increasing conflict. Turreb.Turgoth.CONF(t-4), Nst.Turgoth.CONF(t) r(81)=0.234, p<0.05) Whenever Turkish rebels increase their conflictual behavior, Turkey reduces its conflict to non –state foreign actors, and increases its cooperation to foreign non-state actors. The associations imply that Turkey seeks foreign non-state actors' cooperation when faced with increasing aggression from Turkish rebels through peaceful strategies but actually receives more conflict from them. Only after guaranteeing their cooperation through coercive strategies, Turkish government takes action against Turkish rebels.

Turkey's conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels is associated with Turkey's affairs with intergovernmental organizations. Turkey's conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels positively correlated with intergovernmental organizations' cooperation to Turkey and negatively correlated with Turkey's conflictual behavior to intergovernmental organizations. In other words, whenever Turkey makes operations against rebels, it reduces its conflict to IGOs, and IGOs increase their cooperation to Turkey. Partial cross correlation analysis shows that IGOs' cooperation to Turkey begins to increase 2 quarters before Turkey's operations against rebels, and decreases 5 quarters after the operations. (Igo.Turgoth.COOP(t-2), Turgoth.Turreb.CONFW(t) r(83)= 0.250, p<0.05 and Igo.Turgoth.COOP(t+5), Turgoth.Turreb.CONFW(t) r(80)= -0.269, p<0.05)

Whenever Turkey faces increasing rebel aggression, it cooperates more with IGOs but IGO's cooperation to Turkey decreases, and IGOs conflictual behavior to Turkey increases. Partial cross correlation analysis suggests that IGOs' conflictual behavior leads to lower levels of conflictual behavior from Turkish rebels in the long run. (Turreb.Turgoth.CONF(t+6), Igo.Turgoth.CONF(t) r(79)=-0.303, p<0.01) Turkey's cooperation with Turkish rebels is negatively correlated with IGO's conflict to Turkey.

The associations imply that Turkey seeks IGOs cooperation around the time of increasing rebel aggression. But IGOs immediate respond is usually reprimand. This reprimand alone seems to have a reductive effect on Turkish rebels' aggression. But when it comes to Turkey's retaliation against rebels, Turkey guarantees IGOs' cooperation, acts against rebels, after which IGO's cooperation to Turkey again reduces.

The third most important set of foreign affairs with respect to Turkey's domestic terrorism is Turkey's relations with Western Europe. Actually, in terms of longitidunal effect, Western Europe-Turkey relations are the most important set of foreign affairs with respect to Turkey's domestic terrorism.

There is no contemporaneous association between Turkey's conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels and WEU-Turkey relations. Yet, increasing WEU cooperation, decreases Turkey's conflictual behaviour to Turkish rebels in 1 and 5 quarters (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+1) Weu.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(84)= -0.294, p<0.01 and Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+5) Weu.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(80)= -0.266, p<0.05). WEU's increasing level of

conflict and Turkey's conflict to Turkish rebels is associated in a 15 months-long loop. Increasing WEU conflict to Turkey leads to Turkey's increasing conflictual behavior against Turkish rebels in the next quarter (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+1) Weu.Turgoth.CONF(t) r(84)= 0.308, p<0.01.). Turkey's increasing conflictual behavior against Turkish rebels, in turn leads to increasing Weu conflict to Turkey in a year. (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t-4) Weu.Turgoth.CONF(t) r(81)= 0.234, p<0.05.)

Turkey's conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels has also long term associations with Turkey's behavior to Western Europe. Turkey's cooperative behavior to Western Europe precedes Turkish government's conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels by 1 and 5 quarters. (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+1) Turgoth.Weu.COOP(t) r(84)= 0.219, p<0.05 and Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+5) Turgoth.Weu.COOP(t) r(80)= 0.272, p<0.05). Nevertheless, in the long run, (app. 2 years) Turkey's cooperative behavior to Western Europe leads to lower levels of conflictual behavior by Turkey against Turkish rebels. (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+9) Turgoth.Weu.COOP(t) r(76)= -0.231, p<0.05). Turkey's conflictual behavior to Western Europe, also leads to lower levels of conflictual behavior by Turkey against Turkish rebels. (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+1) Turgoth.Weu.CONF(t) r(84)= -0.223, p<0.05)

Turkey's cooperative behavior to Turkish rebels has also contemporaneous and long term associations with Turkey's behavior to Western Europe. Turkey's cooperation with Turkish rebels is negatively correlated with W.Europe's cooperation to Turkey. In the very long run

(app. 6 years) however, increasing cooperation from Turkey to Turkish rebels leads to increasing cooperation from Western Europe. (Turgoth. Turreb.COOP(t-23) Weu.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(62)= 0.266, p<0.05).

Turkey's cooperation with Turkish rebels is positively correlated with Turkey's cooperation to W.Europe. In 2 quarters, however, Turkey's increasing cooperation to W.Europe leads to decreasing cooperation from Turkey to Turkish rebels (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t+2), Turgoth.Weu.COOP(t) r(83)=-0.223, p<0.05). Turkey's cooperation with Turkish rebels and W.Europe's conflictual behavior to Turkey constitutes an approx. 8 years (31 quarters) long loop. W.Europe's increasing conflictual behavior to Turkey leads to increasing cooperation from Turkey to Turkish rebels in 5 quarters, (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t+5), Weu.Turgoth.CONF(t), r(80)= 0.255, p<0.05), which in turn leads to increasing conflict from W.Europe to Turkey in 26 quarters (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t-26), Weu.Turgoth.CONF(t), r(59)=0.262, p<0.05).

Turkish rebels' behavior to Turkey has also contemporaneous and long term associations with Turkey's relations with Western Europe. Turkish rebels' conflictual behavior to Turkey is negatively correlated with Turkey's cooperation to W.Europe. Partial cross correlations show increasing cooperation from Turkey to Western Europe leads to lower levels of conflict from Turkish rebels to Turkey in 5 and 20 quarters (Turreb.Turgoth.CONF (t+5), Turgoth.Weu.COOP(t) r(80)=-0.273, Turreb. Turgoth.CONF(t+20) Turgoth.Weu.COOP(t) r(65)=-0.243). Lower levels of conflict from Turkish rebels to Turkey, in turn leads to higher levels of cooperation from

W.Europe to Turkey in 9 quarters (Turreb.Turgoth. CONF(t-9), Weu.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(76)=-0.284), although Turkish rebels' conflictual behavior to Turkey is also positively correlated with W.Europe's cooperation to Turkey within the same quarter and in 5 quarters. (Turreb.Turgoth.CONF (t+5) Weu.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(80)= 0.248). In 5 years, long term, the two is also positively correlated. (Turreb.Turgoth.CONF(t+20) Weu.Turgoth.COOP (t) r(65)= 0.265.)

Turkish rebels' conflictual behavior to Turkey is negatively correlated with W.Europe's conflictual behavior to Turkey. The effect of W.Europe's increasing conflictual behavior to Turkey leads to lower of conflict from Turkish rebels to Turkey in 5 quarters.(Turreb.Turgoth.CONF(t+5) Weu.Turgoth.CONF(t) r(80)= -0.244)

There is no contemporaneous association between Turkish rebels cooperative behavior to Turkey and WEU-Turkey relations. Yet, there are significant associations over the longer term. Turkish rebels increasing cooperation to Turkey leads to lower levels of conflict and higher levels of cooperation from Turkey to W.Europe in 19 quarters (Turreb.Turgoth. COOP(t-19) Turgoth.Weu.CONF(t) r(66) = -0.322, Turreb.Turgoth.COOP(t-19) Turgoth.Weu.COOP(t) r(66)= 0.248). Higher levels of conflict from W.Europe to Turkey, leads to lower levels of cooperation from Turkish rebels to Turkey in 3 quarters, (Turreb.Turgoth.COOP(t+3) Weu.Turgoth. CONF(t) r(82)= -0.257, p<0.05) but higher levels of cooperation from Turkish rebels to Turkey in 4 quarters. (Turreb.Turgoth.COOP(t+4) Weu.Turgoth.CONF(t) r(81)= 0.237, p<0.05)

Turkish rebels conflictual behavior to Turkey is negatively correlated with M.East's cooperation to Turkey. There is no long term association between the two. Turkey's conflict to Turkish rebels is positively correlated with Turkey's cooperation to the Middle East. Partial cross correlations shows that Turkish government increases its cooperation to the Middle East 7 quarters before its operations against Turkish rebels. Turgoth.Turreb. CONF(t+7), Turgoth.Mea.COOP(t) r(78)= 0.225

Higher levels of Middle Eastern cooperation to Turkey leads to lower levels of Turkish rebels conflict to Turkey in 13 quarters. In other words, over the long run, Middle Eastern cooperation decreases terrorist aggression in Turkey. (Turreb.Turgoth.CONF(t+13), Mea.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(72)= -0,242.) Higher levels of Turkish conflict to Middle East in turn leads to lower levels of cooperation from Turkish rebels to Turkey in 8 quarters (Turreb.Turgoth.COOP(t) Turgoth.Mea.CONF(t-8) r(77)= -0.262)

Turkey's cooperation with Turkish rebels is positively correlated with M.East's cooperation to Turkey. There is no long term association.

Although there are no long term associations between Turkey's and Turkish rebels cooperation with each other on the one hand and Turkey-Middle Eastern affairs, there are significant long term effects of cooperation between Turkey's and Turkish rebels on Turkey-Middle Eastern relations. Higher levels of Turkey's cooperation to Turkish rebels leads to higher levels of Turkey's conflict to the Middle East in 2 quarters, but lower levels of conflict to Middle East in 4 quarters (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t) Turgoth.Mea.CONF(t+2) r(83)= 0.223 and Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t)

Turgoth.Mea.CONF(t+4) r(81)=-0.290). Higher levels of Turkey's cooperation to Turkish rebels leads to lower levels of Middle East conflict to Turkey in 2 quarters(Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t) Mea.Turgoth.CONF(t+2) r(83)= -0.244).

Higher levels of Turkey's cooperation to Turkish rebels lead to increasing Turkey cooperation to Middle East in 13 quarters. (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t) Turgoth.Mea.COOP(t+13) r(72)= 0.327.

Higher levels of Turkish rebels' cooperation to Turkey leads to increasing Middle eastern conflict in 8 quarters (Turreb.Turgoth.COOP(t) Mea.Turgoth.CONF(t+8) r(77)=0.318) , but lower level of Middle Eastern conflict in 15 quarters. (Turreb.Turgoth.COOP(t) Mea.Turgoth.CONF(t+15) r(70)= -0.269) Higher levels of Turkish rebels' cooperation to Turkey leads to lower levels of Turkish cooperation to Middle East in 19 quarters. (Turreb.Turgoth.COOP(t) Turgoth.Mea.COOP(t+19) r(66)=-0.241).

Turkey's conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels is positively correlated with Turkey's cooperation to Asia. Partial cross correlation shows, higher levels of Turkish cooperation to Asia leads to lower levels of Turkish conflict to Turkish rebels in 18 quarters. (Turgoth.Asa.COOP(t), Turgoth.Turreb. CONF(t+18) r(67)= -0.271, p<0.05) By 30 quarters however, Turkey's conflictual behavior to rebels increases (Turgoth.Asa.COOP(t), Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+30) r(55)=0.292, p<0.05). Unlike with Middle East then, Turkey does not proactively seek Asian cooperation before operations against Turkish rebels, but it only tries to cooperate with Asian countries around the time of operations. Turkey's conflictual behavior to Turkish

rebels is also negatively correlated with Asia's both conflictual and cooperative behavior to Turkey, and it follows slightly lower levels of Asian cooperation (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF (t), Asa.Turgoth.COOP (t-2) =-0.213, p<0.05.) Turkey's attempts at cooperation are met with hesitance by Asian countries, even though not with outright conflict. Turkey's conflict to Turkish rebels has no long-term associations with Asian conflict to Turkey.

Moreover, Turkish rebels conflict to Turkey is positively correlated with Asia's conflict to Turkey. The contemporaneous association is very strong (p<0.001) but there is no long-term association inbetween.

Turkish rebels conflict to Turkey is positively correlated with Turkey's conflict to Non-European West. The long term association is negative, though. In other words, higher levels of Turkish conflict to Non-European West leads to lower levels of rebel conflict in 3 and 7 quarters. Turreb.Turgoth.CONF(t+3), Turgoth.Wst.CONF(t) r(82)= -0.305,p<0.01, Turreb.Turgoth.CONF(t+7), Turgoth.Wst.CONF(t) r(78)= -0.265, p<0.05). But, higher levels of Western conflict to Turkey also leads to higher levels of rebel activity in 3 quarters, (Turreb.Turgoth.CONF (t+3), Wst.Turgoth.CONF (t), r(82)= 0.237, p<0.05).

Turkey's conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels is negatively correlated with Turkey's cooperative behavior to Non-European West. Partial cross correlation shows higher levels of Turkish cooperation to the Non-European West leads to lower levels of Turkish conflict against the rebels. Turgoth.Wst.COOP(t-3), Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t), r(82)=-0.325, p<0.01.).

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Turkey's cooperative behavior to Turkish rebels is positively correlated with Turkey's cooperative behavior to Non-European West, but negatively correlated with Non-European West's cooperation to Turkey. Higher levels of Turkish cooperation to rebels leads to higher levels of Turkish cooperation to Non-European West (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t-12). Turgoth.Wst.COOP(t), r(73)= 0.309, p<0.01) and Non-European Western cooperation to Turkey in 3 years (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t-12) , Wst.Turgoth.COOP(t)r(73)= 0.243, p<0.05), but lower levels of Non-European Western cooperation to Turkey in 13 quarters (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t-13) , Wst.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(72)=-0.347, p<0.01), and lower levels of Turkish cooperation to Non-European West in 6 years (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t-24), Turgoth.Wst.COOP(t), r(61)=-0.299, p<0.05). In other words, Turkey's reconciliation attempts effect Turkish foreign affairs with Non-European West in a positive manner in the mid-run (3 years) but soon after 3 years, Western cooperation to Turkey decreases, in 6 years Turkish cooperation to West decreases.

Turkey's cooperative behavior to Turkish rebels is positively correlated with Eastern Europe's cooperative behavior to Turkey and negatively correlated with Turkey's cooperative behavior to E.Europe. Partial cross correlation shows higher levels of Turkey's cooperation to Turkish rebels leads to more cooperation from EEU to Turkey in 4 quarters, and 10 quarters Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t), Eeu.Turgoth.COOP(t+10), r(75)= 0.337, p<0.01 and Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t), Eeu.Turgoth.COOP(t+4), r(81)= 0.311, p<0.01) , but it leads to less cooperation from Turkey to Eeu in 10

quarters. (Turgoth.Eeu.COOP (t+10), Turgoth.Turreb.COOP (t), r(75)=-0.336, p<0.01).

Turkish rebels cooperation to Turkey is negatively correlated with E.Europe's conflict to Turkey. In the long run, however, higher levels of conflict from Eeu to Turkey leads to higher levels of Turkish rebels cooperation in 13 quarters. (Turreb.Turgoth.COOP(t+13), Eeu.Turgoth.CONF(t) r(72)= 0.291, p<0.05). Turkey's cooperation to Turkish rebels is negatively correlated with Turkey's cooperation to Eeu. Lower levels of Turkish cooperation to Turkish rebels leads to higher levels of Turkish cooperation to Eeu in 10 quarters. (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP (t-10), Turgoth.Eeu.COOP(t), r(75)= -0.336, p<0.01). Turkey's cooperation to Turkish rebels is also positively correlated with Eeu cooperation to Turkey. The association is stronger in the long run. Higher levels of Turkish cooperation to Turkish rebels lead to higher levels of Eastern Europe cooperation to Turkey in 4 and 10 quarters. (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t-10), res.Eeu.Turgoth.COOP r(75)=0.337, p<0.01; Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t-4), res.Eeu.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(81)=0.311, p<0.01)

Turkey's cooperative behavior to Turkish rebels is negatively correlated with Sub-Saharan Africa's cooperative behavior to Turkey. Turkey's cooperation to Turkish rebels leads to lower levels of sub-Saharan African cooperation to Turkey in 3 years. (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t-12), Afr.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(73)=-0.257, p<0.05) Turkey's conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels is also negatively correlated with Turkey's cooperation to sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, increasing conflict from Turkey to Turkish

rebels leads to increasing conflict from Turkey to Africa in 5 quarters. (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t-5) Turgoth.Afr.CONF(t) r(80)= 0.241)

Turkish rebels conflict to Turkey is positively correlated with Turkey's conflict to sub-Saharan Africa but there is no long term association inbetween.

Turkey's conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels is also negatively correlated with Latin American conflict to Turkey. Higher levels of Latin American conflict to Turkey leads to lower levels of Turkish conflict to Turkish rebels in 2 quarters (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+2), Lam.Turgoth.CONF(t), r(83)= -0.250, p<0.05) but in the very long run (app.6 years), it leads to higher levels of Turkish conflict to Turkish rebels (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+25), Lam.Turgoth.CONF(t), r(60)= 0.361, p<0.01).

Turkey's cooperation to Turkish rebels is positively correlated with Latin American cooperation to Turkey. There is interesting loop in between: Higher levels of Turkish cooperation to Turkish rebels lead to lower levels of Latin American cooperation in 5 quarters, (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP (t-5), Lam.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(80)= -0.290), but to higher levels of Latin American cooperation in the next quarter (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP (t-6), Lam.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(79)=0.293). Higher levels of Latin American cooperation, in turn, leads to lower levels of Turkish cooperation to Turkish rebels in 1 and 4 quarters (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP (t+1), Lam.Turgoth.COOP (t) r(84)= -0.253 and Turgoth.Turreb.COOP (t+4), Lam.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(81)= -0.243).

7.5.   Conclusion

The findings presented in this chapter reveal that domestic level factors such as identity, and interrelationships between sub-state actors are important in shaping Turkish foreign affairs.

Despite Turkey's efforts to balance its cooperation with respect to Muslim and non-Muslim entities, Turkey's improving relations with Non-Muslims elicits negative reaction from Muslims. Conversely, Turkey's relations with non-Muslim entities however, is positively effected by its improving relations with the Muslim entities.

Contrary to the widespread opinion, Turkey's overall interaction with previously Ottoman countries were higher in pre-AKP periods, compared to its interactions with other countries. However, there is a significant change between periods before and after 2007. Turkey has become signficantly less proactive towards previously Ottoman and Muslim countries in the first five years of AKP rule, but significantly more proactive in second five years.

The findings also confirm the arguments about increasing prominence of Turkey's civil actors in Turkey's foreign affairs under AKP. A comparative look at first and second half of AKP's term reveals that the increasing prominence of civil actors in foreign affairs is largely confined to the first five years of AKP rule. In their foreign affairs, Turkish civil actors behave more independently toward Western Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. Compared to Turkish government, civil actors are more engaged with Western Europe, foreign non-state actors, intergovernmental

organizations, and Latin America, less engaged with the Non-European West, the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

The findings in this study also revealed that the relationships between sub-state actors in Turkey are also particularly related to Turkey's foreign affairs. Among innumerable possibilities, this chapter provided two examples as heuristic case studies. The first analysis dealt with Turkish civil-military relations and Turkey-Israeli relations, whereas the second focused on the association between domestic terrorism and Turkey's foreign affairs.

On average Turkish government is both more cooperative and more conflictual towards Israel, than Israel is to Turkish government. There is not a significant difference in Turkish government's cooperative behavior to Israel before and after AKP, as well as between AKP's first and second five year in rule. Both Israel's and Turkish government's conflictual behavior towards each other increased under AKP, particularly in the 2007-2012 period.

Israel's cooperative initiative towards the military seems to have a mollifying effect on Turkish foreign policy towards Israel. Whenever Turkish military receives Israeli cooperation, Turkish government is more cooperative to both Israel and Turkish military. Turkish military's cooperative initiatives towards Israel on the other hand, has a negative effect on Turkish government's behaviour to Israel. When Turkish military shows more initiative in cooperating with Israel, this disrupts Turkish government's behavior to both Israel and Turkish military. The findings also show that Turkish government's decreasing cooperation to Israel leads to

Turkish military's increasing cooperation to Turkish government. In sum, relations with Israel is more important when Israel becomes a foreign policy target, as both the government and the military recalibrate their behaviour to each other according to the other's behavior to Israel.

The most important findings in this chapter are about the dynamics of domestic terrorism and its association with Turkey's foreign affairs. A closer look at the relationship between rebels and Turkish government reveals that coercive behaviour from Turkish government induces –albeit slightly- more cooperation from Turkish rebels at the time. But, it induces ever more conflict in the long run: It takes approximately 2 years for rebels to fight back.

Turkish government's coercive strategies towards against Turkish rebels negatively effects Turkish foreign policy in general: when the government acts aggressively against Turkish rebels, Turkish government's behaviour to foreign actors are also become more conflictual both immediately and in the long run. Cooperative gestures from foreign actors on the other hand encourage Turkish government to cooperate more with Turkish rebels.

There is also a negative correlation between Turkish rebels' conflictual behavior to Turkish government and foreign actors' cooperative behavior to Turkish government, indicating either

A) increasing terrorism in Turkey might diminish foreign support for Turkish government. OR

B) increasing cooperation from foreign actors to Turkish government may encourage Turkish rebels to act less aggressively towards Turkish government.

In either way, foreign cooperation to Turkey is anti-thetical to domestic terrorism in Turkey.

A more in-depth analysis, which focus on specific foreign agents show that domestic terrorism in Turkey affects and is effected differently by Turkey's relations with different regions.

Whenever rebels' aggression in Turkey increases, Western Europe reduces its conflict and increases its cooperation to Turkey. However, foreign non-state actors, Asia and IGOs increase their conflict, while both IGOs and the Middle East also decrease their cooperation.

Turkey's foreign behavior is also associated with increasing rebel aggression. Whenever, rebel aggression increases Turkey increases its conflictual behavior to sub-Saharan Africa and Non-European West, and reduces its cooperation to Western Europe. Conversely, Turkey reduces its conflictual behaviour to non-state actors, while it increases its cooperation to both IGOs and non-state actors.

At times of operation against rebels, Turkey seeks Asian, Non-European Western and Middle Eastern cooperation. It also reduces its conflict to sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, the Middle East and Non-European Western countries do not offer immediate cooperation to Turkey.

Asia, on the other hand, responds by decreasing its both cooperative and conflictual behavior, suggesting it refrains from taking sides in the matter.

Higher levels of Turkish conflictual behavior to rebels are also associated with lower levels of Turkish cooperation to IGOs and Non-European West, but higher levels of conflictual behavior against non-state actors. IGOs increase their cooperation to Turkey, whereas non-state actors and Latin America decrease their conflict.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION: PROPOSING A NEW MODEL

> When the blind men had each felt a part of the elephant, the king went to each of them and said to each: "Well, blind man, have you seen the elephant? Tell me, what sort of thing is an elephant?"[395]

In the third chapter, it has been argued that every theory is based upon observation of facts. Yet, as evident in the epistemological discussions about the relationship between facts and values, facts are not universal, nor do they speak for themselves. In this chapter, I propose a model of data, based on longitudinal observations about Turkey's foreign and domestic affairs. Following rules of "abduction", the model offers several concepts and proposes relations between those concepts in explaining a mid-sized power's foreign affairs. The model employs a standpoint perspective, in the sense that foreign affairs of a mid-power are conceptualized through putting Turkey at the centerpoint.

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[395] Udana, 68-69, quoted in Randy Wang, "Parable of the blind men and the elephant" http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~rywang/berkeley/258/parable.html

The first part conceptualizes foreign affairs and domestic affairs as a complex web of interrelated nodes and explains the characteristics of the system. It also provides an overview of how volume of a country's foreign behavior is related to volume of foreign actors's behavior on the one hand, and its domestic affairs, on the other. It argues that increasing domestic responsiveness to foreign actors' behavior may help explain why a country is more active in foreign affairs in some periods, while not in others. It also clarifies the distinction and the relationship between proactivism and activism.

The second part explains how and why a foreign policy change is instigated from a decision-making perspective, and explains how governments' capability to modulate intermestic and international nexus shape the outcome. It proposes that a mid-sized country's domestic affairs are linked to its relations with foreign actors, based on its specific problems of social cohesion.

The third part takes foreign policy change as an explanatory variable and argues that if succesfully employed, such a foreign policy change leads to power accumulation. The fourth part explains how the model can be applied to various issues of Turkish foreign affairs. The next three parts deal with theoretical, methodological and policy implications of the study respectively. The chapter concludes by a summary of the study's potential contributions to community building in Turkish IR.

8.1. Foreign and Domestic Affairs as a Complex System

A country's foreign and domestic affairs constitute a complex web of interactions, each having repercussions for other interactions. Theoretically, these interactions are not only between states, but in every level of analysis. In some cases, interaction between two individuals may be as influential as interactions between two states.

The most important characteristic of these systems is that the major explanatory variable is not the individual agent or its properties, whether it is an individual or a country, but the relations of that agent with other agents. In other words, a complex system is a relational construct, where the relations between actors, which effect relations between other actors, are more meaningful entities for explanation than individual actors' properties, such as being capitalist, democratic, "Western" or communitarian. These properties are relevant to the explanation to the extent they reflect upon their behaviours toward other agents. Therefore, a complex system is shaped by the behavioural patterns, rather than pre-defined properties of agents.

In a complex system, each relationship of the agent is considered a separate "node". Each node is composed of relations between at least two agents. The nature of these agents can be various: individuals, sub-state or non-state groups based on profession, class, ethnicity or religious/secterian affiliation, states, IGOs, etc. Therefore, the agents whose behaviours are conventionally excluded from the analysis of *foreign policy,* are indeed endogenous to a complex system of *political (domestic and foreign) affairs*.

Moveover, their relations with foreign agents and other domestic agents have important repercussions for *foreign policy*.

A bilateral relationship, i.e. a "node", has several properties. One is the volume or density of relations. Denser relations occur where two agents are geographically proximate, identity-wise close, or historically connected. It is measured by either comparing the volume of interactions between two agents in a period to previous periods, or comparing it against the volume of relations between other agents in the same period. Density also has another dimension. A relationship is symmetrically dense if an agent's behaviour is met in volume by the other agent. It is asymmetrically dense, if one agent's volume of behavior significantly surpasses the volume of the other agent. Symmetrically dense relationships imply the agents are interested in and capable of responding to each other, whereas an asymmetrically dense relationship implies one of the agents is more interested in or capable of responding to the other. A dense relationship, whether it is symmetrical or not, does not automatically refer to a peaceful relationship between two agents, however.

The second property of a relationship is the reciprocity. Reciprocity is when behavior of one agent to another is met in kind. As opposed to theoretical constructs which posit cooperation and conflict as mutually exclusive and dichotomous, in a complex system of affairs, conflictual and cooperative interaction can be dense at the same time. The relationship can be conflictually reciprocal, cooperatively reciprocal, neither or both. Theoretically, one agent's interaction with the other may be symmetrically dense, but it may be only conflictually reciprocal, only cooperatively

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reciprocal, neither or both. In practice however, a symmetrically dense relationship usually involves some form of reciprocity, since a dense relationship with no reciprocity would mean a highly erratic, if not outright chaotic, relationship.

The third property of the interaction is the presence of osciliation in one agent's behavior toward another. Oscilliation refers to cases where an agent's conflictual and cooperative behaviors to another agent are contemporenous. The oscilliating agent has a mixed perception of the other agent: either it could not decide whether cooperation or conflict is more productive towards that agent, or relations with the other agent raise disagreement within the ingroup. Therefore, osciliation happens when the osciliating actor perceives the relationship as embedded with both grave risks and lucrative opportunities.

Lastly, any interaction between two actors may have feedback loops i.e. contemprenous or time-lagged feedback mechanisms that either inhibit or facilitate the original interaction. The loops are, by definition, either short term or long term repercussions of any interaction over itself, and closely related to historicity in domestic and foreign affairs. More often than not, longer loops exist between agents, which have a long history of interaction, i.e. when the relationship between two actors is historically mature enough to allow for wider intricacy and deeper integration.

The facilitating feedback mechanisms are called positive feedback loops, whereas inhibiting feedback mechanisms are negative feedback loops.

Positive feedback loops happen when an agent's (A) cooperation is contemprenous with or leads to lesser conflictual behavior from the other agent (B) or A's conflictual behavior is contemprenous with or leads to lesser cooperative behavior from B. "Positive" implies the reinforcing effect of one's behavior over the other's behavior.

Positive feedback loops imply the issues of contention and cooperation between two agents are either the same, or closely interlinked. Cooperation in one issue, leads to less conflict in another or the same issue. If A's cooperation leads to less conflict from B, but B's cooperation does not lead to less conflict from A, then A and B have different perceptions of the relationship. The conflict reducing or increasing agent is usually the one who perceives the issue more interlinked than the cooperation reducing or increasing partner, since conflict is mose costly than cooperation in most cases. Absence of positive feedback loops implies the issues are compartmentalized.

Negative feedback loop happens when an agent's (A) cooperative behavior to another agent (B) cohappens with or follows B's conflictual behavior to A or when A's conflictual behavior cohappens with or follows B's cooperative behavior to A. "Negative" implies the dampening effect of the original behavior over the other's behaviour. Thus, negative feedback loop means the original behavior is responded with an opposite type of behavior. If B's conflict leads to A's cooperation, it means A complies to B's force or threat, if B's cooperation leads to A's conflict, then it means A suspects B's behavior.

The negative feedback loops imply one agent perceive the intent of the other agent in opposition to its behavior. A conflictual behavior is perceived as an assertive demand for cooperation, whereas a cooperative behavior is interpreted as having ulterior motives. Therefore, negative feedback loops point to issues of mistrust. Absence of negative feedback loops implies there is a certain level of clarity and directness in a relationship.

Any relationship between two agents can have a combination of the above attributes, depending on the complexity of the relationship. The most complex relationships have all of them, whereas less complex relationships have only some. More complex a relationship, it is more likely that the bilateral interaction between those two agents will have repercussions for both agents' relationships with third parties.

If an agent's relationship with another agent has repercussions for its relationship with a *third agent*, then these two nodes form a *nexus*. The first node can have a reinforcing, or inhibiting effect on the second node. The greater the number of nexus, the more complex is the whole system.

A country's foreign and domestic affairs constitute a complex system, which consists of many diverse, autonomous but interdependent nodes, linked with other nodes. It is an evolving system, in the sense that past interactions have a longitidunal effect on future interactions, emanating from country's willingness to adapt. Closed societies, in which interactions between domestic and foreign agents are restricted by either the government, or by outside agents (embargo, isolation, etc.) have fewer

nexus, and become less adaptive to their environment. In the long run, this lack of adaptation leads to a failing society. A self-inflicted isolation is usually to evade the repercussions of any node on others, and reduce the number of *nexus* to control the overall system, but it ends up in severely limiting the adaptive mechanisms of the country in question. This is why policies like embargoes, political isolation, denial of membership to IGOs are inflicted as a form of punishment by outside agents. Yet, if the end purpose is to change the behaviour of the isolated agent, more interaction, rather than less interaction, is more efficient.

The nexus in question can be threefold, a *domestic nexus* is when there is a link between a sub-state agent's behavior to another sub-state agent, and its behavior to a third sub-state agent. The majority of social sciences are devoted to study the nodes and the domestic nexus these nodes form. Since the focus of this study is foreign affairs, purely domestic nexus are left out of the analysis. An *intermestic nexus* is the link formed between a domestic node, and an international node. The study of foreign policy looks at this sort of nexus, by studying two-level games, intermestic policy, role of media, public opinion and bureaucracy in foreign policy decision-making, etc. But most of these studies focus on deliberate, calculated behaviors, i.e. policies and positions directed at some specific goal. Accordingly, they focus on the deliberate negotiations between a sub-state actor and the decision-making authority about a specific issue area, one the one hand, and that authority's negotiations with a foreign decision-making authority about the same issue; hence the two-table metaphor. However, intermestic affairs often have four tables in question, not two: in addition to the "domestic" and "foreign" table

of the decision-maker, the sub-state actors in country A have relations with sub-state actors in country B, which are increasingly unmodulated by either decision-maker in a globalized world. This form of relations are studied under diaspora politics, immigration studies, MNCs, advocacy groups and global terrorism under "transnational studies." As such, this sort of phenomena are conceptualized, but not succesffully integrated into models that account for foreign affairs. The last table, on the other hand, is under-theorized. It is the relationship between one foreign governmental actor and one domestic non-governmental actor. Even when there is no direct "intermeddling in domestic affairs", foreign states may form relationships with domestic constituencies, in ways the domestic decision-makers may or may not modulate. Public diplomacy is a case in point.

Complex systems are usually at the edge of chaos, with multiple actors more often unknowingly influencing their target's other affairs. Complex systems are consequences of human action, but not of human design. Therefore, the effect may not be built through deliberate negotiations, with specific purposes in mind. For example, theory of soft power, conceptualizes the *positive* effect of *peaceful* domestic or foreign affairs of a country on its other foreign affairs. Of course, a country does not always conduct its domestic affairs with generating a positive image on foreign audience as a purpose in mind: the positive foreign repercussions are a welcome side-effect. Nevertheless, theory of soft power conceptualizes only presence and absence of positive repercussions, and falls short of conceptualizing the negative impact.

The last nexus is the *international nexus*. The international nexus is the link between an agent's relationship between two foreign actors. In other words, it is the link between two international nodes. Systemic level theories of international relations, such as structural realism and liberalism, refer to this type of nexus, especially in explaining alliances, balances of power, and working of international organizations, and international regimes. However, most of these theories refer to properties of individual agents in explaining their relationships. For example, democratic or capitalist peace refer to economic and social systems of individual societies in explaining their relationship to each other, whereas structural realism's explanatory variable is power, defined as material capabilities. Therefore, they are explaining foreign behavior in relation to properties of individual agents, not interaction. Other systemic theories such as constructivism or English School are more prone to explaining relations between two agents based on their previous relations, but do not particulary dwell on how one set of relations effect another set of relations. There are of course an abundance of studies as to how relations with one superpower have affected a country's relations with the other superpower especially in the context of the Cold War. Concepts such as balance-of-threat and bandwagoning, reactivism/passivism[396], international clientalism, dependency offer such explanations.

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[396] See Kent E. Calder "Review Article:Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State" World Politics 40, no.4 (1988): 517-541 for an explanation of how Japanese foreign economic policy is dependent upon its foreign relations with the US.

The nexus, whether they are domestic, intermestic or international can be mutually inhibiting or reinforcing. Inhibitive nexus exist when an agent's affairs with another agent are associated with opposite behaviors between the first and a third agent. Reinforcing nexus exist the when an agent's affairs with another agent is associated with similar behaviors between the first and a third agent.

Conceptualizing domestic and foreign affairs as a complex system allows for looking at each part of "the elephant" in an all-encompassing manner: not only specific issue areas, not only deliberate calculated behavior, not only governmental actors, not only a single level of analysis, not only positive impacts. It allows for not only focusing on empirically prominent relationships and their attributes, but analytically possible attributes of and associations between those relationships. Therefore, it portrays the wider system of affairs each domestic and foreign interaction of an agent is embedded within. As with all complex systems, the whole foreign-domestic affairs system is not definable by a few characteristics, since there are multiples nodes and several nexus between them, each having particular characteristics.

8.2.   Foreign policy change

The model depicts all political affairs of a country as a complex system. As stated earlier, the whole system is a consequence of human action, but not human design. Most of the change in the system is evolutionary: emergence and development of nodes and nexus is a part of reciprocal and recursive processes instigated by increasing movement of

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goods, people and ideas around the world. In other words, in the age of globalization, the complex systems are naturally prone to more interconnectedness. Nevertheless, the agents can modulate parts of the system through behavioral and discursive strategies. These strategies can be twofold. Either the agent manipulates one node of the existing nexus to create a desired outcome in other node of the nexus, or the agent may attempt to establish a previously non-existant nexus between two nodes.

The first strategy, i.e. drawing on historically established connections between nodes, is less risky, but the outcome is more limited. For example, based on previous experiences, the primary agent may become more cooperative or conflictual towards a particular agent to modulate not only that second agent's, but also a third agent's behavior. The first step of triggering of nexus usually begins with identifying the targeted node, and its extant and/or possible domestic, intermestic or international nexus. The triggering of the nexus can follow numerous ways.


Figure 38 Intermestic and international nexus in foreign policy change

For example, the primary agent may take a specific action towards a domestic agent, and use it as a catalyst to change the behavior of the foreign

actor. If the nexus is successfully analyzed and triggering is properly carried out, the consequences of foreign response can be used as a catalyst to change the primary agent's other international or domestic nodes. For example, Turkish government may seek reconciliation with certain ethnic groups to garner a cooperative attitude from international actors. Alternatively, the triggering can start with a change in the primary agent's behavior to a foreign actor, which would either generate a change in the domestic or international node of the primary agent. Following the previous example, the consequences of the positive international response could then be used to increase cooperation with business groups and other foreign agents.

The second course of strategy, i.e. establishing a previously non-existant nexus, takes a longer to time and effort to implement, and the consequences of the strategy are both wider and less prone to full control. The foreign partners should both be interested and capable of affecting and be affected from the primary agent's other affairs. If not, capacity or interest building beforemath is essential in successful cross-linking.

A succesful establishment of a nexus, which brings about intended consequences, can bring about changes in the overall system in two ways. First, establishment of a nexus creates more interdependence: the political affairs of the agent become more sensitive to each other. The learning process associated with the triggering, increases the involved agents' belief in continual improvement at the domestic and foreign spheres through more interaction, and results in more integration and adaptation. Secondly, the involved agents also become more capable at engagement and participation, and thus more prone to strategically triggering or establishing other nexus.

This second consequence, however, poses great risks if the intended consequences are not achieved. In other words, if a nexus is built between two domestic nodes, but the triggering is ill done so as it does not lead to eventual improvement in domestic or foreign affairs, the attempt may turn into an uncontrolled chain reaction because of the related recursive loops. Especially with respect to intermestic nexus, failure in strategic triggering may turn domestic responsivity into domestic vulnerability to foreign affairs.

8.3.   Power Accumulation by Exercise: Helical Model

These attempts at modulation and manipulation are mostly directed at mitigation of problems the agent faces in domestic and international domains. For mid-powers like Turkey, the grand objective is usually resolution of domestic problems of *social cohesion,* i.e. large discrepancies in income, social and economic development, ethnic, religious or ideological tension, gender inequality, and inequality in rights and freedoms. Since most mid-powers have limited resources (money, time, manpower, knowledge) to deal achieve social cohesion, the modulation of especially intermestic nexus are paramount in addressing them: the triggering of intermestic nexus allows the agent to utilize foreign agents resources in an indirect manner, by triggering them use *their* resources, in a way which would improve cohesion in domestic sphere. For example, addressing a domestic economic problem with an international cultural exercise (for example holding olympics), is more efficient than addressing it by a domestic and economic measure (such as lowering taxes).

No matter the exact pathway of change, the most important rule in a successful strategy is to manipulate the chain reaction so that it would have an alleviating affect on the domestic social cohesion problem as immediately as possible. Multi-step loops and/or longer loops have diminishing returns, because the feedback from foreign agents is usually weaker in volume and tone than primary agent's foreign behavior. Moreover, it takes several months and/or years to address the domestic problem. If the loop is multi-step, or very long, the foreign feedback loses its impact.

A second concern is to cross-link the nodes with different scopes. What the primary agent is most capable of, should define the initial triggering node and its scope. One or more scopes of a social, military, economic, cultural nature can be effective in triggering a certain nexus. For better results, if the expected change in the domestic node is one of four scopes, the change in the international node should be determined as one of other three scopes, preferably the one in which the primary agent has more to offer to the foreign agent. For example, the cross linkage of domestic security problems (target node) with foreign economic relations is more efficient than crosslinking domestic security problems with foreign security relations. Similarly, cross linkage of domestic security problems with foreign economic relations is more efficient than crosslinking domestic security problems with foreign cultural relations, if the primary agent is more capable of offering economic benefits than cultural benefits.

The third concern is to choose the right partner in addressing the domestic problem. The foreign partners should both be interested and capable of affecting and be affected from the resolution of the domestic

problem. And of course, the foreign agent shold also be interested in what the primary agent is able to offer. If not, capacity or interest building beforemath is essential in successful cross-linking.

Problems of social cohesion are very common and in most cases, protracted in the developing world: democracy, terrorism, development, infrastructure, etc. While a few of these countries are almost completely overwhelmed by these problems due to their limited resources, others still show limited success in overcoming these problems despite their considerable resources.

Accordingly, these developing countries' influence in foreign affairs is also limited. In most cases, they are considered important partners, or pivotal players in a select few regional and international issues, but they do not have wider regional or global influence.

Problems of social cohesion are leakages of power; they drain energy and resources. As long as these problems are not addressed efficiently, the country cannot fully involve in international affairs: they cannot reciprocate, nor become active or proactive. When proactivity comes at the times of not particularly active periods, it is meant to redress what is missing inside.

Therefore, resolution of domestic problems not only leads to a more cohesive society, which "works towards the well-being of all its members, fights exclusion and marginalisation, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers its members the opportunity of upward mobility." [397] but

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[397] OECD, *Perspectives on Global Development 2012: Social Cohesion in a Shifting World*, OECD

also more influence in international affairs. As such, solving domestic problems is also the key to power build-up.

In 21st century, most domestic problems (indeed, almost all of them) have an international, or global aspect to it, which constrains individual states to solve them by their own means. The reciprocal and recursive processes, which cut across domestic and international relations, offer alternative venues for resolution of such conflicts. Triggering feedbacks from international domain leads to mutual changes of behaviour in domestic sphere and alleviates the social cohesion problem. With each successful triggering, the agent becomes more powerful in the international domain.

This model of power accumulation defines power as a constant exercise, as opposed to acquisition of resources such as money, manpower, technology or knowledge. The best indicator of power, is not volume of such resources, but volume of behavior. Because as long as such resources are not reflected in behavior, i.e. when resources are accumulated, but not manifested behaviorally, power fades. Projection of those resources, however, generates more resources, in the sense that repercussion of the initial behavior may trigger change in the behaviour of others.

This power accumulation model is based on interlinkages between domestic and international spheres, hence inherently helical: the inside/outside cross-linking makes it cyclical, whereas resolution of social cohesion problems leads to a vertical power build-up. Keeping the momentum in carefully weaving issues and actors is paramount in power

accumulation. Immediate full-scale success with respect to one specific

foreign policy goal is not as much relevant to power build-up as the

constancy and subsequent linkage to domestic sphere. Constant

maneuvering and investment in building linkages with various means is

crucial. Even when the immediate costs of an international node are high in

comparison with its immediate benefits, the same action may be rational

when looked at in terms of its effect on domestic social cohesion.

8.4.   Turkish Foreign Affairs as a Complex System

Turkey's periodic attempts a more active foreign policy is illustrative

of complex system and may provide more clues about different dynamics at

play when a mid-sized power tries to expand its influence in foreign affairs.

Activism, i.e. increase in the density of foreign activity, occurs because of

two reasons: either there is increasing foreign interest to the country in

question, or the country increases its foreign behaviour. Over the last 22

years, Turkey had two distinct periods of foreign policy activism: 1995-1999

and 2002-2006. The first period was mainly instigated by foreign behaviour,

whereas the second was mostly due to Turkey's own initiative. The lowest

points of 1994, 2001 and 2008 need further clarification.

In an interdependent world, economic crises are the major reasons

why a country's foreign activity diminishes. Interestingly, not only domestic

but also economic crises in other regions, which do not directly affect the

country in question also hinders its foreign policy activism. When a

country's initiatives are not met in volume by foreign actors, country's

behaviour diminishes eventually because of decreasing levels of positive feedback from foreign actors.

Another hindering factor for foreign policy activism is increasing *domestic responsivity* to foreign behaviour. Domestic responsivity is defined as the country's level of domestic responsiveness to foreign behaviour. Operationally, it can be measured as the ratio of volume of domestic behavior to volume of foreign behavior within a specific time period. For an open society in a globalized world, domestic responsivity is a constant phenomenon, increasing year after year. As the country in question is becoming more integrated to the rest of the world, the domestic responsivity to foreign behavior increases. Nevertheless, if domestic behaviour is measured by news, increasing domestic responsivity would also imply less social cohesion.[398] Accordingly, one can attempt at "abduction"[399] and argue that increasing domestic responsivity means that governments are more constrained in responding to international behaviour more actively.

In Turkish case, one can test this argument by measuring variation of Turkish foreign behaviour by domestic responsivity, defined as Turkish domestic affairs/foreign actors' behaviour to Turkey (TDA/FBT). There is a *negative relationship* between domestic responsivity and TFB. It seems to be phenomenon of post-1998 period. In the pre-1998 period, there is no

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[398] Good developments, or peaceful domestic affairs in a foreign, mid-power country rarely make international news. Mustapha Masmoudi "New World Information Order" *Journal of Communication* 29, no.2 (1979): 172-179. Pamela J. Shoemaker, "News and newsworthiness: A commentary." *Communications* 31, no.1 (2006): 105-111.
[399] See pp.39-47.

correlation between them, r(71)= -0.03. In the post-1998, correlation is r(176)= -0.32, p< .001.

Whether the foreign actors' behaviour is positive (e.g. demands for cooperation, visits, verbal support) or negative (.e.g. international terrorism, threats, denounciations), when volume of foreign actors' behaviour surpasses that of the mid-sized power, as happened to Turkey in second half of 1990s, it can be said that the country comes under international pressure, and behaves reactively rather than proactively. While this pressure compels the country to be more active, it also hinders country's proactivism. Considering the reinforcing relationship between FBT and TDA, Turkey would possibly experience a *domestic pressure* at the same time. In other words, in higher levels of domestic responsivity, increasing foreign actors behaviour leads to even denser domestic behaviour, which leads to *decreasing* TFB. Since FBT has an independent *increasing* effect on TFB, the resulting TFB is a combination of FBT and "TDA's responsivity towards FBT".

Figure 39 Interrelationships between Foreign Behavior to Turkey, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey's Domestic Affairs

Figure 40 Domestic Responsivity and Turkish Foreign Behaviour

The argument that there is a strong positive relationship between FBT and TDA, is valid for all periods. But the fact that their ratio leads to decreasing TFB is a post-1998 phenomenon.

It is probably not a coincidence that 1999-2001 is a turning point for Turkey's foreign policy *proactivism*. Although not particularly active, Turkey has become more proactive in this period, and continued to be so. Whereas increasing domestic responsivity decreases the likelihood of being more active, it actually leads to higher chances of being proactive.

This conclusion is in parallel to this study's arguments about foreign policy change in a mid-power's complex system. A less powerful agent is the one, which is swayed by international behavior. Although, the decision-making authority tries to overcome the international and domestic pressure,

their room for maneuver is usually hindered by this double pressure. A succesful triggering of nexus - in Turkish case, this seems to be careful planning and manipulation of foreign relations, which led to capturing of PKK leader Ocalan, and ultimately alleviated Turkey's domestic terrorism-was a key factor for the decision-making authority to take the upper hand.

Turkey has managed to modulate several intermestic nexus in the post-1998 period. Capture of Ocalan, and subsequent alleviation of domestic terrorism, was used to trigger its relations with Syria, Greece and more importantly Iraq. At around the same time, Turkey addressed its vulnerabilities in financial sector through collaboration with IMF, and at least partially overcome the economic hindrances on its foreign interaction. Turkey's increasing collaboration with its neighbours, in turn generated a capacity in Turkey's economic actors, which expanded their activities into previously overlooked regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa. Flourishing of relations with Africa, in turn led to Turkey's election as a non-permanent member of UN Security Council, with majority of sub-Saharan African votes. Turkish decision-making authrorities relied on discursive practices such as highlighting common history, religion in establishing all these nexus. These practices were strengthened through constant interaction, encouraging movement of people and goods. Turkish fears of Islamic fundamentalism are remedied by opening up trade with its Muslim neighbours, showing Turkish entrepreneurs how Islam may not be a liability but an asset.

Despite Turkey's expansion of foreign interest in this period, relations between Turkey and the Western Europe constituted the primary node of all

Turkey's foreign affairs system. Turkey's EU membership prospects encouraged Turkish decision-making authorities to take steps in addressing Turkey's long-term social cohesion problems: normalization of civil-military relations, redefinition of national security, expanding rights and freedoms to ethnic and religious groups, are among many. In many ways, the relations between the EU and Turkey's domestic affairs resembled a boomerang, rather than a bow-string. Turkey threw the boomerang to EU, making it an anchor in addressing its domestic problems. The positive feedback from EU is used as a justification for adressing even more controversial issues. As long as the feedback is strong and supportive, Turkey decided to throw it again to the same foreign actor. When the feedback is not as strong or negative, Turkey decided to throw it to another actor.

An important difference of post-2007 period, is the change in Turkey's choice of foreign partners. The continuing effects of global economic crisis, which crippled foreign feedback from Turkey's traditional partners such as EU, might have led to such change. Accordingly, several issues of social cohesion around 2007, –such as disagreements over presidency elections and straining of civil-military relations with Ergenekon indictments- were dealt with without any intermestic triggering, and resulted in a markedly less active and less proactive foreign policy in the this period.

From 2007 onwards, Turkey has become increasingly less successful in triggering intermestic nexus. Two examples may be illustrative of the steps taken and reasons for failure.

Claims of genocide against Ottoman Armenians during WWI have been debilitating Turkey's foreign affairs for forty years. A powerful Armenian diaspora, and their efficient lobbying in the US, as well as in Western Europe, hindered Turkey's relations with these actors. Accordignly, Turkey saw the problem as a predominantly international one, which Turkey unsuccessfully tried to negotiate with the third parties, which were usually states with a considerable number of Armenian citizens, such as France and the USA. The attempts at resolution failed because, the issue remained an outside issue for Turkey, mostly an issue of prestige in Western eyes, whereas it was a domestic one, with important stakes for Western counterparts, who responded to their domestic constitutuencies' demands by bashing Turkey. These two factors, seriously diminished Turkey's leverages, as the main framework the issue is dealt with, was designed to fit Western states, and diaspora.

Understanding these disadvantages, Turkey tried to domesticize the issue: in the aftermath of murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, Turkish politicians make Armenian issue a problem of Turkish and Armenian people, so that they could vocalize an indigeneous interest in its solution. As the second step, Turkey linked this domestic demand to its relations with Armenia. It also changed the scope of the issue from diplomatic and military (geopolitical, legal) to cultural and economic by opening organizing sports events and encouraging trade. By granting economic rights to minority foundations (including Armenians), it tried to show its Turkey's goodwill in resolution of the both domestic and international problem. With these steps, the issue become a domestically

important issue, with Turkey's citizens' well-being at stake and one in which Western intervention is less relevant in its solution. And most importantly, it became a less complicated (with less actors) more managable (one-to-one) problem, which can be addressed with more sophistication. Nevertheless, the foreign feedback from Armenia was particularly weak, and later on outright negative, which hindered the international node of the nexus. With such insufficient feedback, the domestic node also remained untriggered; the resolution process with respect to Armenian minority has also stagnated. The main reason for such a weak foreign response was the lack of organic link between Armenia and Turkish Armenian minority. Cultivation of interest between two agents could have helped this otherwise well-designed strategy to work more efficiently.

Another less successful attempt at triggering in this period was linking Turkey's problem of discrimination against Alevi minority and the Turkey-Syria relations. Turkey pursued a simultaneous effort to remedy domestic discrimination by introducing the "Alevi Opening," and to improve Turkey-Syria relations.

The Alevi issue was a blind spot in the policy agenda of governing AKP until the second half of 2007.[400] After the elections in July, the AKP government showed signs of new attitude toward Alevi community, which culminated in a process of dialogue in the second half of 2008.[401] In

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[400] Kose, Talha. "The AKP and the "Alevi opening": understanding the dynamics of the rapprochement." *Insight Turkey* 12.2 (2010): 143-165.

[401] Soner, Bayram Ali, and Şule Toktaş. "Alevis and Alevism in the Changing Context of Turkish Politics: The Justice and Development Party's Alevi Opening." *Turkish Studies* 12.3 (2011): 419-434.

December 2008, Minister of Culture, Ertuğrul Günay, apologized to Alevi citizens as the representative of the state for the past victimhood that the ancestors of Alevis had suffered:"Alevis had experienced many painful experiences such as the Sivas and Maraş events in the past. As a representative of the state I would like to apologize."[402] A series of workshops were organized to discuss demands and problems of Alevi community with civil society leaders. The workshops were completed in 2010. In December 2011, the Turkish Prime Minister apologized for the killingsin Dersim (today Tunceli) in the late 1930s, an Alevi-Kurdish populated region: this was the first official recognition and apology for the events. [403]

Addressing Dersim meant addressing discrimination against Alevi and Kurdish community simultanously. If Dersim is discussed in an open way, this would not only increase social cohesion in Turkey, but also Turkey would be more confident in addressing problems in its neighbourhood, which are ethnic and religious tensions which are endemic in the region. In Syria, the ruling elite and the society belong to different Alevi and Sunnite sects respectively. There is a substantial Kurdish population in Syria as well.

In parallel to its Alevi Opening, Turkish government also opened upto Syria. The major venue was trade. In 2007, a Free Trade Agreement was signed between parties. Consequently, bilateral trade volume tripled by 2010. Visa regime was abolished in 2009, which boosted movement of

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[402] "Bakan Günay'dan Aleviler için tarihi çıkış," Milliyet, December 24, 2008.
[403] Zeynep Alemdar, and Rana Birden Çorbacıoğlu. "Alevis and the Turkish state." *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 10.4 (2012): 117-124.

people from both sides. Turkey also helped Syria to break its international isolation, mediating the brokering peace talks between Syria and Israel in 2008. Turkish Armed Forces held joint military manoeuvres with Syrian Army in 2009.

The cultivation of Syria-Turkey relations, was focused on pragramtic concerns, and seldom complemented by a focus on human rights and democratization. Consequently, the start of uprisings in Syria against the regime in 2011 caught Turkish government by surprise. In time, the bilateral relations experienced a drastic change from cooperation to condemnation. Turkish government weighed down and blamed Syrian regime for sectarianism against its Sunnite subjects, and considered a military operation against Syrian regime. The highlighting of sectarianism, rather than human rights and democratization in Turkish government's framing of the conflict in Syria, heightened criticism against Turkish government, because at this time the Alevi opening in Turkey also slowed pace. Moreover, Turkish government also failed to convince Sunnite majority in Turkey that crimes against their Sunnite brethren in Syria need immediate military response from Turkey. Turkish society was unwilling to pay such high costs in search for peace and democracy in a neighbouring country.

Not only for Syria, but also for other countries swept by Arab uprisings in of 2011-2012, Turkish domestic responsivity was not sufficient. Domestic responsivity declines since 2010, and Turkish foreign behavior did not increase in 2012. 2012 signals beginning of a trend, a return to pre-1998 pattern, where Turkey conducted its foreign affairs with less concern over domestic repercussions.

Therefore, in both Armenian and Syrian cases it seems that the organic link between domestic agent and foreign partner was missing. Cross-linking through a superficial delineation of ethnic and religious identities across borders are not only insufficient for a nexus to be built-up, but may prove to particularly detrimental to resolution of social cohesion problems. A more successful strategy would be to anchor resolution of the domestic issue to a more capable and interested foreign partner, and use the positive domestic repercussion for projection in other bilateral relations.

It is no coincidence that relations between Turkey and the Western Europe constitute the primary node of all Turkey's foreign affairs system, it is densest dyad with most of the attributes present. Turkey's relationship with Western Europe is associated with Turkey's behavior to all other agents as well as its domestic affairs. Hence, despite strong-willed attempts at opening upto new regions and distant actors, Turkish foreign affairs is historically entrenched in its European connection. Futher expansion of Turkey's geographical interest as well as successful management of complexity in domestic and foreign affairs is embedded in Turkey-Europe connection.

The relationship with the Middle East is a strong candidate for several emerging nexus. Despite the richness of historical and cultural common ground, the relations suffer from two dynamics. First, there is a lack of contemporary organic link between socities, whose cultivation require a long-term commitment. Secondly, whereas the Middle Eastern countries are important partners in trade, they are less capable in providing feedback for resolution of Turkey's domestic social cohesion problems.

Relations with non-European West are not as complex as relations with the Middle East or Western Europe, but they are capable at providing an anchor for Turkey's other affairs. Relations with Asia and Eastern Europe, despite increasing interdependence, remains peripheral to Turkey's power build up, since they have a mostly uncomplex, tit-for-tat character. Turkey's relations with respect to sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America are in the initial phase and mostly cooperative.

8.5. Theoretical Implications

The basic theoretical implication of this study is that for non-Western IR community, novel conceptualizations are not only possible but also politically and scientifically necessary. Non-Western conceptualizations are possible: there are already a number of studies, which successfully based their conceptualizations on standpoint epistemologies and local experiences. They are politically necessary to overcome the inequality in disciplinary International Relations and international relations, and they are scientifically necessary because non-Western conceptualizations offer alternative and objectivity-increasing viewpoints for describing and understanding international phenomena.

The success of any novel conceptualization, on the other hand, is based on the level of wider engagement with the theory, model, and concepts in the wider discipline. Disinterest, not refusal, is the main reason why any novel conceptualization becomes stillborn. The structural reasons aside (such as availability of funding, attitudes of other scholars, the number and efficiency of communication channels), the homegrown theorist's main

strategy should be to clarify his/her concepts and the relationships inbetween as much as possible, so that scholars with different social and political backgrounds have less difficulty in understanding, and evaluating them. This, of course, necessitates rigor, not only in data collection methods, but also theory-building methods, which are given seldom attention in IR curricula. Since the objects of theory-building are ideas, the graduate IR students, in addition to rigorous theoretical and methodological training, should also be trained in philosophy of science, with an eye to seek ways to build original concepts.

This study's main purpose was of course to arrive at a homegrown conceptualization of Turkish foreign affairs. The helical model, defines an agent's relations as a complex system, composed of domestic and foreign relations, which are linked to its other domestic and foreign relations. The model offers an operationalizable definition of how globalization is experienced by individual and collective agents, and is embedded in a globalization perpective.

Secondly, the model offers not only more prominent, but also possible connections between an agent's domestic and international affairs. As such, in addition to (state-to-state) foreign policy, (state-to-society) domestic policy, (non-state-to-non-state) transnational relations, undertheorized engagement of domestic groups with foreign governments, and engagement of governments with foreign sub-state groups, are also offered as integral parts of an agent's environment. Therefore, the model is an improvement upon Putnam's two-level game model of foreign affairs.

Thirdly, in terms of ontology, the model's main focus on relations and behaviours rather than individual agents. Obviously, the model is not state-centric, but it does not rule out importance of states as central actors whose web of relations is still more complex than any other type of agent. Action, whether it is verbal or material, rather than properties of agents, is the ontological basis of the model. Consequently, the model does not reitretate the politically infused pre-defined conceptions such as "the democratic", " the free", "the authoritarian", "the West." Any researcher who uses the model can define the agent in question differently; identify the behavioral patterns and their relationship to other patterns based on his/her own definition. The only essentialist argument intrinsic to the model is that "the agent is the one who engages with another."

In relation to its ontological basis, the model also accounts for why and how a foreign policy change occurs. Most of the change is a natural evolution of complex system. As the agents become more interconnected, the complexity of the system increases, and new nexus are formed. These nexus can also be dependent on time, i.e. any node is a function of its own past(feedback loops), *and* when it is a part of nexus, it is effected by the past changes in other nodes. Therefore, the model also accounts for historicity of relations. Foreign policy change can also be modulated by agents, through carefully analyzing pre-existing nexus and manipulating nodes, or by forming new nexus through establishing linkages between previously un-linked nodes. The deliberate foreign policy change is usually intended to alleviate problems of social cohesion in the collective agent.

Finally, the model accounts for power accumulation. The model defines power as an exercise, as opposed to traditional views of power as material or ideational resources. In other words, power is defined as projection of resources to relations with other agents and more importantly it is accumulated through using the outcomes of the behavioral change as a catalyst in manipulating other nodes, domains, and spheres of interaction. In the model, the mere accumulation of material and ideational resources does not lead to power accumulation. A moderately powerful agent is the one who is able to influence the nodes it is part of, whereas a great power is the one who is able to use its resource projection to influence nodes between a second and third, even fourth agent. As such, the power conceptualization is also relational, the more the number of cascades from one node to another, the more powerful the agent. Power accumulation is also conceptualized as the result of foreign policy change. Solving social cohesion problems through foreign behavior, stops leakages of power resources, and makes the agent more capable at successful and purposeful modulation of its other foreign affairs.

8.6.   Methodological Implications

The data collection method used in the study, the event data, is a quantitative tool to mathematically summarize Turkish domestic and foreign affairs. The ultimate purpose of this study was to seek patterns in behavior: the method proved useful in clarifying concepts and identifying relationships between them. Once the patterns, trends and orientations are identified, any point of shift with respect to them generated causal

questions, which in turn instigated formation of new conceptual tools. Therefore, TFAED can be useful for exploring new venues for generating theoretical frameworks for other scholars as it was for current author. However, even when novel conceptualizations are not sought, the merits of event data –and of course similar large-N quantitative methods- are still numerous.

Firstly, the TFAED has the potential to answer, in a quantitative manner, various fundamental questions about Turkey's foreign affairs. Since detailed generic codes are produced with respect to actors, and coding categories are extensive, researchers are able to regroup data in diverse ways –according to actor types, event types, timespans--which makes it possible to test various hypotheses and compare them with each other. So, other students of Turkish foreign and domestic affairs can also benefit from the dataset.

The dataset enables researchers to arrive at general observations regarding Turkey foreign policy behaviour in a more reliable manner. What is the nature of Turkey's relations with Country X/ Region Y, cooperative or conflictual? Has such cooperation/conflict been military, economic or cultural? Is cooperation with Country X greater than cooperation with Country Y? Is conflict with Country X physical or verbal?

When the data are grouped according to timespan, it could help the researchers to make historical comparisons, with respect to the behaviours of the same actor. It is possible to support or refute arguments about change in Turkish foreign policy before and after important events, like the *Mavi*

Marmara incident, the War in Iraq, the 2003 and 2007 general elections, the 2005 beginning of EU membership accession talks, etc. Moreover, some less dramatic yet equally important time periods can be identified.

Thirdly, research questions about Turkey's domestic inter-actor cooperation and conflict can be analyzed over time and across various domestic groups, as well as their relations with foreign actors. Tests for dependence between domestic and foreign relations can be made to see if any domestic relations affect or are affected by foreign relations.

In addition to these benefits, the dataset can be improved in a multitude of ways, which would help deal with more detailed questions in a more reliable manner. For example, with adjustments in filtering programs, various other news sources can be used to enrich the dataset. A major improvement would be to devise a textual analysis program that would process Turkish-language news reports. Of course, such an endevaour would necessitate a team of computer scientists and linguists, as well as IR scholars.

Secondly, the program can be updated to include not only news reports, but also other textual data, which can be analyzed in terms of sentiment and tone in addition to behaviour. Twitter and Facebook feeds, and reader comments on news reports are all canditates for such an analysis. The analysis of sentiments and tone can help to understand the attitudes of individuals even before such attitudes materialize in behaviour.

On a related plane, in addition to partial and cross correlation used in ths study, more complex and elaborate statistical models can be applied to

data to predict future course of events. Such predictive capability may prove beneficial to policy-makers to devise strategies for coping with potential crises and problems.

Fourthly and more obviously, the dataset should be improved by focusing on agents other than Turkey. For the purposes of this study, only actors from Turkey are identified and given separate codes. The foreign actors are not given codes as specific as those of Turkish actors, which limits the extent of questions that can be answered. For example: How a Turkish agent interacts with civilians from Country A in comparison to governmental actors from Country A, can be asked, but cannot be reliably answered unless all actors in Country A are identified and given proper codes. A systematic and in-depth study of non-Turkey agents, however would help to compare Turkey with other agents. Since the current dataset only includes Turkey's affairs, it is not possible to compare, for example, Turkey-Germany relations, and Greece-Germany relations. A systematic collection of all relevant data (e.g. about Germany and Greece) would greatly improve and support comparative case studies. A long-term, comparative project with this purpose in mind would train several graduate students and can also act as a community-building initiative.

8.7. Policy Implications

The model suggested in this study offers a few insights about how to conduct foreign policy. But before any such suggestions, the basic assumptions of the model should be given.

Firstly, the model is based on a worldview, which depicts globalization as the irresistible systemic force that shapes all domains of human activity. Even when agents are successful at hindering globalizational effects, the long-term implications of such hindering are grave. The severity comes from the limits imposed on agent's capability to adapt to its environment. Isolation, whether intended or imposed, leads to failed, rogue or tyrannical societies. It is no coincidence that these societies are less connected to world than the rest.

Globalization is a tough teacher, though. Increasing communication and transportation connects simple individuals, corporations, states but also armed groups, illegals, etc. As the connection increases, states are more pressured to keep up with the growing demands.

Although this systemic impact is not reversible, it can be modulated. The model proposes that agency, is all the way more important. Dialectically, the growing power of agents is the reason why systemic impact is so hard to resist. The primary agent is the state, but it loses its prominence, more so in international affairs then in domestic affairs as democratization lags behind globalization.

The less powerful is either swayed by the globalization impact, unable to foresee or manage the relationship between foreign and domestic affairs, or through (self or other-imposed) isolation, implodes onto itself under grave domestic problems. The more powerful is the one who successfully manages to weave its domestic and foreign affairs so that taking action in one domain ultimately alleviates the problem in the other domain.

From a mid-power's perspective, road to power build-up is to enhance domestic and international connections. Relations with high profile, small states are as much important as relations with distant superpowers. Isolation should be avoided at all costs. More communication and less infringement with the civil society are crucial. Especially civil society's engagements with the outside world should be encouraged no matter their ideological position is. Each and every sort of connection with each and every foreign actor is crucial to increase the number of possibilities for future linkages.

The second step is for a mid-power is to focus one's energy into alleviating domestic problems through foreign action. Choosing right foreign partners, cross- linking spheres of action and careful analysis of previous reactions are paramount in building successful strategies which would result in increasing social cohesion. The domestic and regional problems with highly contentious parties are opportunities for projecting power resources, but they are equally risky if the wrong partner, wrong course of action is taken and the final outcome is detrimental rather than alleviating.

8.8.   Implications for the Discipline

Turkish International Relations (IR) is a growing discipline both in terms of the number of researchers working within it and the broadness of subjects being covered. Over the last decade in particular, along with Turkey's increasing level of interaction with its neighboring regions and beyond, there have been numerous studies to decipher what has been going

on in Turkish foreign affairs. Despite the increasing number and breadth of these studies, one can still ask whether such growth may actually lead to theoretical development. A 2008 study on Turkish IR describes the community's engagement with theory as "complex and uncomfortable,"[404] and argues that there are few if any Turkish IR scholars who engage in "pure theory."[405]

Present study revealed that theory development and communication between researchers are intimately related. For cognitive scientific progress, in addition to individual studies and theories, a consensus—albeit temporal—among researchers should be established at a) the axiological level, consisting of claims about aims and objectives of the discipline; b) the methodological level, involving claims about the proper procedures for data collection and analysis, and c) the empirical level, including claims about theoretical entities as well as assertions about directly observable events.[406] Such a "shared framework" signals a "professional agreement" and eases communication within a scientific community. Therefore, theoretical development and intra-disciplinary communication are mutually reinforcing.

A growing collection of independent unrelated works, as in the case of Turkish IR, is seldom productive for theory formation, or disciplinary

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[404] Ersel Aydınlı and Julie Mathews, "Periphery Theorizing for a Truly International Discipline: Spinning IR Theory out of Anatolia", Review of International Studies 34, 4 (2008): 693-711.

[405] Pure theory consists of grand theories that account for large number of phenomena with no reference to specific regions or areas.

[406] Larry Laudan, *Science and Values: The Aims of Science and their Role in Scientific Debate*, Pittsburgh Series in Philosophy and History of Science (University of California Press, 1986).

community building. In Turkish IR, there is not enough communication within the community, let alone work being done in a cohesive research program.[407] With such limited communication and collaboration, there seems little common background, hence no constructive consensus among researchers.

Such limited communication comes hand in hand with a uniform reliance on qualitative methods. Within the Turkish IR community, there is an actual, yet probably unintentional, convergence towards using qualitative methods. Such convergence, however, cannot be called a consensus because it is not based on deliberate discussion and open agreement. According to one senior scholar, quantitative methodologies are not given enough importance and, consequently, the distance between the global IR and Turkish IR communities is growing.[408] This same scholar also claims that because of conceptual and methodological diversity, studies by the Turkish IR community are very much alike, even repetitive of each other. On the other hand, another scholar criticizes the compulsory statistics classes that are required in some undergraduate programs, and compares their necessity for IR research to that of taking an accounting class.[409] In a separate study, Kurubaş also states that overreliance on historical methods, which mostly consist of chronological descriptions of events, impedes engagement with theory.[410]

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[407] Mustafa Aydın,"Türkiye'de Uluslararası İlişkiler Çalışmaları ve Eğitimi Toplantı Tutanakları, Türkiye'de Uluslararası İlişkiler Eğitiminin Dünü, Bugünü," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 2, no.6 (2005): 28.

[408] Duygu Sezer, *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 2, 6 (2005): 35-36.

[409]" Kamer Kasım, *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 2, 6 (2005): p. 116.

[410] Ersel Aydinli, Erol Kurubas and Haluk Ozdemir, *Yöntem, Kuram, Komplo Türk Uluslararası*

Overall, it seems that the Turkish IR community is not organized around long-term research programs, as a part of which findings are discussed, compared, refuted or confirmed and accumulated in a constant and consistent manner. Despite the increasing number and breadth of studies, the Turkish IR community remains a fragmented community, both scientifically—in terms of the theories used—as well as socially. The discussions and increasing number of platforms aside, the current level of collaboration and communication is still insufficient to overcome such fragmentation.[411] In the words of one scholar, without collaborative "hands-on practice" of scientific research, it is almost impossible to overcome the divides in the community. Such collaboration, however, requires long-term commitment to specific research questions, agendas and paradigms.

The stakes in overcoming this fragmentation are even higher when one looks at the picture from the perspective of core / periphery balance of power in both academia and in the real world.[412] It can be argued that inequalities in academia, in terms of theoretical and methodological development between the Western and the non-Western worlds, are in parallel to inequalities in global politics.[413] Such an argument is based on the

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İlişkiler Disiplininde Vizyon Arayışları (Ankara: Asil Yayın Dağıtım, 2009).
[411] Aydınlı and Mathews, "Periphery Theorizing", p. 709.
[412] Steve Smith, "International Relations and international relations: The Links Between Theory and Practice in World Politics", *Journal of International Relations and Development* 6, No. 3, (2003): 233-239.
[413] Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin, "Still Waiting after all these Years: 'The Third World' on the Periphery of International Relations," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 6 (2004): 249; Mohammed Ayoob "Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism*" International Studies Review* 4, no. 3 (2002): 27-48; Arlene Tickner "Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World*" Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 32, no. 2 (2003): 295-324; Arlene Tickner and Ole Waever, *International Relations Scholarship Around the World* (New York: Routledge, 2009); Hayward Alker and Thomas Biersteker, "The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future Archeologist of International Savoir Faire", *International Studies Quarterly* 28, no. 2

idea that theories that have dominance in International Relations also serve to reinforce power in international relations and vice versa .[414] As Ayoob points out, IR theory and international practice have reinforced each other so much that "[a] monopoly over the construction of theoretical knowledge depicts fundamentally the problem of inequality in both international relations and International Relations. It shapes the thought patterns of policymakers and analysts alike across much of the globe."[415]

Reducing fragmentation, improving communication, and constructing original theory are all keys to a disciplinary community's academic and social improvement.[416] One step in that direction would be to build up the empirical foundations upon which synchronized theoretical development can be based. The discipline would benefit from the addition of new research using quantitative methodologies, as well as long-term research and training programs that would focus on theory development. The virtual non-existence of coordinated research programs within Turkish IR, and seldom participation of individual Turkish IR researchers in global research programs, necessitates such an action. Quantitative methods such as Event Data Analysis could contribute not only to the scientific accumulation of knowledge about Turkish foreign affairs, but also to the

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(1984): 121-42; Şennur Özdemir "Bilgi Sosyolojisi Açısından 'Doğu' ve 'Batı'" *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 1, no 1 (2004):61-92; Howard Wiarda "The Ethnocentrism of the Social Science Implications for Research and Policy" *The Review of Politics* 43, (1981):163-197; Tony Smith "Requiem or New Agenda for Third World Studies" *World Politics* 37, no.4 (1985): 532-562.

[414] Arlene Tickner "Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World" *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 32, no. 2 (2003): 295.

[415] Mohammed Ayoob "Inequality and Theorizing."

[416] ErselAydınlı and Julie Mathews, "Türkiye Uluslararası Ilişkiler Disiplininde Özgün Kuram Potansiyeli: Anadolu Ekolü Oluṣturmak Mümkün mü?", *Uluslararası Ilişkiler* 5, no. 17 (2008): 161- 187; Ersel Aydinli, Erol Kurubas and H. Özdemir, *Yöntem, Kuram, Komplo Türk Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplininde Vizyon Arayışları*, (Ankara: Asil Yayın Dağıtım, 2009).

generating of new hypotheses, which could in turn eventually lead to new theoretical constructions. More importantly, employing quantitative methodologies might offer a venue through which the Turkish IR community can overcome its current fragmented state and achieve a more cohesive and progressive research agenda.

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APPENDIX

CAMEO EVENT CODE LIST

Version: 1.1b3 (January 2013)

CAMEO EVENT CODE	AGGREGATION
01: MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT	COOP.VERB
010: Make statement, not specified below	COOP.VERB
011: Decline comment	COOP.VERB
012: Make pessimistic comment	COOP.VERB
013: Make optimistic comment	COOP.VERB
014: Consider policy option	COOP.VERB
015: Acknowledge or claim responsibility	COOP.VERB
016: Reject accusation, deny responsibility	CONF.VERB
017: Engage in symbolic act	COOP.VERB
018: Make empathetic comment	COOP.VERB
019: Express accord	COOP.VERB
02: APPEAL	COOP.VERB
020: Appeal, not specified below	COOP.VERB
021: Appeal for material cooperation	COOP.VERB
0211: Appeal for economic cooperation	COOP.VERB
0212: Appeal for military cooperation	COOP.VERB
0213: Appeal for judicial cooperation	COOP.VERB
0214: Appeal for intelligence cooperation	COOP.VERB
0215: Appeal for military cooperation	COOP.VERB
022: Appeal for diplomatic cooperation or policy support	COOP.VERB
023: Appeal for material aid, not specified below	COOP.VERB

0231: Appeal for economic aid	COOP.VERB
0232: Appeal for military aid	COOP.VERB
0233: Appeal for humanitarian aid	COOP.VERB
0234: Appeal for military protection or peacekeeping	COOP.VERB
024: Appeal for political reform, not specified below	COOP.VERB
0241: Appeal for leadership change	COOP.VERB
0242: Appeal for policy change	COOP.VERB
0243: Appeal for rights	COOP.VERB
0244: Appeal for change in institutions, regime	COOP.VERB
025: Appeal to yield	COOP.VERB
0251: Appeal for easing of administrative sanctions	COOP.VERB
0252: Appeal for easing of political dissent	COOP.VERB
0253: Appeal for release of persons or property	COOP.VERB
0254: Appeal for easing of economic sanctions, boycott	COOP.VERB
0255: Appeal for international involvement (not mediat.)	COOP.VERB
0256: Appeal for target to deescalate military engage.	COOP.VERB
026: Appeal to others to meet or negotiate	COOP.VERB
027: Appeal to others to settle dispute	COOP.VERB
028: Appeal to others to engage in or accept mediation	COOP.VERB
03: EXPRESS INTENT TO COOPERATE	COOP.VERB
030: Express intent to cooperate, not specified below	COOP.VERB
031: Express intent to engage in material cooperation, not specified below	COOP.VERB
0311: Express intent to cooperate economically	COOP.VERB
: Express intent to cooperate militarily	COOP.VERB
0313: Express intent to cooperate judicially	COOP.VERB
0314: Express intent to cooperate on intelligence	COOP.VERB
032: Express intent to engage in diplomatic cooperation such as policy support	
	COOP.VERB
033: Express intent to provide material aid, not spec below	COOP.VERB
0331: Express intent to provide economic aid	COOP.VERB
0332: Express intent to provide military aid	COOP.VERB
0333: Express intent to provide humanitarian aid	COOP.VERB
0334: Express intent to provide military protection or peacekeeping	COOP.VERB
034: Express intent to institute political reform, not spec. below	COOP.VERB
0341: Express intent to change leadership	COOP.VERB
0342: Express intent to change policy	COOP.VERB
0343: Express intent to provide rights	COOP.VERB
0344: Express intent to change institutions, regime	COOP.VERB
035: Express intent to yield, not specified below	COOP.VERB
0351: Express intent to ease administrative sanctions	COOP.VERB

0352: Express intent to ease popular dissent	COOP.VERB
0353: Express intent to release of persons or property	COOP.VERB
0354: Express intent to ease economic sanctions, boycott	COOP.VERB
0355: Express intent to allow international involvement (not mediat.)	COOP.VERB
0356: Express intent to deescalate military engagement	COOP.VERB
036: Express intent to meet or negotiate	COOP.VERB
037: Express intent to settle dispute	COOP.VERB
038: Express intent to accept mediation	COOP.VERB
039: Express intent to mediate	COOP.VERB
04: CONSULT	COOP.VERB
040: Consult, not specified below	COOP.VERB
041: Discuss by telephone	COOP.VERB
042: Make a visit	COOP.VERB
043: Host a visit	COOP.VERB
044: Meet at a "third" location	COOP.VERB
045: Engage in mediation	COOP.VERB
046: Engage in negotiation	COOP.VERB
05: ENGAGE IN DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION	COOP.VERB
050: Engage in diplomatic cooperation, not specified below	COOP.VERB
051: Praise or endorse	COOP.VERB
052: Defend verbally	COOP.VERB
053: Rally support on behalf of	COOP.VERB
054: Grant diplomatic recognition	COOP.VERB
055: Apologize	COOP.VERB
056: Forgive	COOP.VERB
057: Sign formal agreement	COOP.VERB
06: ENGAGE IN MATERIAL COOPERATION	COOP.MAT
060: Engage in material cooperation, not specified below	COOP.MAT
061: Cooperate economically	COOP.MAT
062: Cooperate militarily	COOP.MAT
063: Engage in judicial cooperation	COOP.MAT
064: Share intelligence or information	COOP.MAT
07: PROVIDE AID	COOP.MAT
070: Provide aid, not specified below	COOP.MAT
071: Provide economic aid	COOP.MAT
072: Provide military aid	COOP.MAT
073: Provide humanitarian aid	COOP.MAT
074: Provide military protection or peacekeeping	COOP.MAT
075: Grant asylum	COOP.MAT
08: YIELD	COOP.MAT

080: Yield, not specified below	COOP.MAT
081: Ease administrative sanctions, not specified below	COOP.MAT
0811: Ease restrictions on political freedoms	COOP.MAT
0812: Ease ban on parties or politicians	COOP.MAT
0813: Ease curfew	COOP.MAT
0814: Ease state of emergency or curfew	COOP.MAT
082: Ease political dissent	COOP.MAT
083: Accede to requests or demands for political reform not specified below	COOP.MAT
0831: Accede to demands to change leadership	COOP.MAT
0832: Accede to demands to change policy	COOP.MAT
0833: Accede to demands to provide rights	COOP.MAT
0834: Accede to demands to change institutions, regime	COOP.MAT
084: Return, release, not specified below	COOP.MAT
0841: Return, release persons	COOP.MAT
0842: Return, release property	COOP.MAT
085: Ease economic sanctions, boycott or embargo	COOP.MAT
086: Allow international involvement, not specified below	COOP.MAT
0861: Receive deployment of peacekeepers	COOP.MAT
0862: Receive inspectors 0863: Allow for humanitarian access	COOP.MAT
087: De-escalate military engagement, not spec. below	COOP.MAT
0871: Declare truce, ceasefire	COOP.MAT
0872: Ease military blockade	COOP.MAT
0873: Demobilize armed forces	COOP.MAT
0874: Retreat or surrender militarily	COOP.MAT
09: INVESTIGATE	COOP.MAT
090: Investigate, not specified below	COOP.MAT
091: Investigate crime, corruption	COOP.MAT
092: Investigate human rights abuses	COOP.MAT
093: Investigate military action	COOP.MAT
094: Investigate war crimes	COOP.MAT
10: DEMAND	CONF.VERB
100: Demand, not specified below	CONF.VERB
101: Demand material cooperation, not spec. below	CONF.VERB
1011: Demand economic cooperation	CONF.VERB
1012: Demand military cooperation	CONF.VERB
1013: Demand judicial cooperation	CONF.VERB
1014: Demand intelligence cooperation	CONF.VERB
1015: Demand military cooperation	CONF.VERB
102: Demand diplomatic cooperation such as policy support	CONF.VERB

103: Demand material aid, not specified below	CONF.VERB
1031: Demand economic aid	CONF.VERB
1032: Demand military aid	CONF.VERB
1033: Demand humanitarian aid	CONF.VERB
1034: Demand military protection or peacekeeping	CONF.VERB
104: Demand political reform, not specified below	CONF.VERB
1041: Demand leadership change	CONF.VERB
1042: Demand policy change	CONF.VERB
1043: Demand rights	CONF.VERB
1044: Demand change in institutions, regime	CONF.VERB
105: Demand target yield, not specified below	CONF.VERB
1051: Demand easing of administrative sanctions	CONF.VERB
1052: Demand easing of political dissent	CONF.VERB
1053: Demand release of persons or property	CONF.VERB
1054: Demand easing of economic sanctions, boycott	CONF.VERB
1055: Demand international involvement (not mediat.)	CONF.VERB
1056: Demand de-escalation of military engage.	CONF.VERB
106: Demand meeting, negotiation	CONF.VERB
107: Demand settling of dispute	CONF.VERB
108: Demand meditation	CONF.VERB
11: DISAPPROVE	CONF.VERB
110: Disapprove, not specified below	CONF.VERB
111: Criticize or denounce	CONF.VERB
112: Accuse, nor specified below	CONF.VERB
1121: Accuse of crime, corruption	CONF.VERB
1122: Accuse of human rights abuses	CONF.VERB
1123: Accuse of aggression	CONF.VERB
1124: Accuse of war crimes	CONF.VERB
1125: Accuse of espionage, treason	CONF.VERB
113: Rally opposition against	CONF.VERB
114: Complain officially	CONF.VERB
115: Bring lawsuit against	CONF.VERB
116: Find legally guilty or liable	CONF.VERB
12: REJECT	CONF.VERB
120: Reject, not specified below	CONF.VERB
121: Reject material cooperation, not spec. below	CONF.VERB
1211: Reject economic cooperation	CONF.VERB
1212: Reject military cooperation	CONF.VERB
1213: Reject judicial cooperation	CONF.VERB
1214: Reject intelligence cooperation	CONF.VERB

1215: Reject military cooperation	CONF.VERB
122: Reject request for material aid, not specified below	CONF.VERB
1221: Reject request for economic aid	CONF.VERB
1222: Reject request for military aid	CONF.VERB
1223: Reject request for humanitarian aid	CONF.VERB
1224: Reject request for military protection, peacekeeping	CONF.VERB
123: Reject demand for political reform, not specified below	CONF.VERB
1231: Reject request for leadership change	CONF.VERB
1232: Reject request for policy change	CONF.VERB
1233: Reject request for rights	CONF.VERB
1234: Reject request for change in institutions, regime	CONF.VERB
124: Refuse to yield, not specified below	CONF.VERB
1241: Refuse to ease administrative sanctions	CONF.VERB
1242: Refuse ease popular dissent	CONF.VERB
1243: Refuse to release of persons or property	CONF.VERB
1244: Refuse to ease economic sanctions, boycott	CONF.VERB
1245: Refuse to allow international involvement (not mediation)	CONF.VERB
1246: Refuse to de-escalate military engagement	CONF.VERB
125: Reject proposal to meet, discuss, negotiate	CONF.VERB
126: Reject mediation	CONF.VERB
127: Reject plan, agreement to settle dispute	CONF.VERB
128: Defy norms, law	CONF.VERB
129: Veto	CONF.VERB
13: THREATEN	CONF.VERB
130: Threaten, not specified below	CONF.VERB
131: Threaten non-force, not specified below	CONF.VERB
1311: Threaten to reduce or stop aid	CONF.VERB
1312: Threaten to boycott, embargo, or sanction	CONF.VERB
1313: Threaten to reduce or break relations	CONF.VERB
132: Threaten with administrative sanctions, not spec below	CONF.VERB
1321: Threaten with restrictions on political freedoms	CONF.VERB
1322: Threaten to ban political parties or politicians	CONF.VERB
1323: Threaten to impose curfew	CONF.VERB
1324: Threat to impose state of emergency or martial law	CONF.VERB
133: Threaten political dissent	CONF.VERB
134: Threaten to halt negotiations	CONF.VERB
135: Threaten to halt mediation	CONF.VERB
136: Threaten to halt international involvement (not medit.)	CONF.VERB
137: Threat with repression	CONF.VERB
138: Threaten force, not specified below	CONF.VERB

1381: Threaten blockade	CONF.VERB
1382: Threaten occupation	CONF.VERB
1383: Threaten unconventional violence	CONF.VERB
1384: Threaten conventional attack	CONF.VERB
1385: Threaten attack with WMD	CONF.VERB
139: Give ultimatum	CONF.VERB
14: PROTEST	CONF.MAT
140: Engage in civilian protest, not specified below	CONF.MAT
141: Demonstrate or rally, not specified below	CONF.MAT
1411: Demonstrate or rally for leadership change	CONF.MAT
1412: Demonstrate or rally for policy change	CONF.MAT
1413: Demonstrate or rally for rights	CONF.MAT
1414: Demonstrate for change in institutions, regime	CONF.MAT
142: Conduct hunger strike, not specified below	CONF.MAT
1421: Conduct hunger strike for leadership change	CONF.MAT
1422: Conduct hunger strike for policy change	CONF.MAT
1423: Conduct hunger strike for rights	CONF.MAT
1424: Hunger strike change in institutions, regime	CONF.MAT
143: Conduct strike or boycott	CONF.MAT
1431: Strike or boycott for leadership change	CONF.MAT
1432: Strike or boycott for policy change	CONF.MAT
1433: Strike or boycott for rights	CONF.MAT
1434: Strike or boycott for change in institutions, regime	CONF.MAT
144: Obstruct passage or block, not specified below	CONF.MAT
1441: Obstruct passage for leadership change	CONF.MAT
1442: Obstruct passage for policy change	CONF.MAT
1443: Obstruct passage for rights	CONF.MAT
1444: Obstruct passage for change in institutions, regime	CONF.MAT
145: Engage in violent protest, riot, not specified below	CONF.MAT
1451: Violently protest for leadership change	CONF.MAT
1452: Violently protest for policy change	CONF.MAT
1453: Violently protest for rights	CONF.MAT
1454: Violently protest for change in institutions, regime	CONF.MAT
15: EXHIBIT MILITARY POSTURE	CONF.MAT
150: Exhibit military or police power, not specified below	CONF.MAT
151: Increase police alert status	CONF.MAT
152: Increase military alert status	CONF.MAT
153: Mobilize or increase police power	CONF.MAT
154: Mobilize or increase armed forces	CONF.MAT
155: Mobilize or increase cyber-forces	CONF.MAT

16: REDUCE RELATIONS	CONF.MAT
160: Reduce relations, not specified below	CONF.MAT
161: Reduce or break diplomatic relations	CONF.MAT
162: Reduce or stop material aid, not specified below	CONF.MAT
1621: Reduce or stop economic assistance	CONF.MAT
1622: Reduce or stop military assistance	CONF.MAT
1623: Reduce or stop humanitarian assistance	CONF.MAT
163: Impose embargo, boycott or sanctions	CONF.MAT
164: Halt negotiations	CONF.MAT
165: Halt mediation	CONF.MAT
166: Expel or withdraw	CONF.MAT
1661: Expel or withdraw peacekeepers	CONF.MAT
1662: Expel or withdraw inspectors, observers	CONF.MAT
1663: Expel or withdraw aid agencies	CONF.MAT
17: COERCE	CONF.MAT
170: Coerce, not specified below	CONF.MAT
171: Seize or damage property, not specified below	CONF.MAT
1711: Confiscate property	CONF.MAT
1712: Destroy property	CONF.MAT
172: Impose administrative sanctions, not specified below	CONF.MAT
1721: Impose restrictions on political freedoms	CONF.MAT
1722: Ban political parties or politicians	CONF.MAT
1723: Impose curfew	CONF.MAT
1724: Impose state of emergency or martial law	CONF.MAT
173: Arrest, detain	CONF.MAT
174: Expel or deport individuals	CONF.MAT
175: Attack cybernetically	CONF.MAT
18: ASSAULT	CONF.MAT
180: Use unconventional violence, not specified below	CONF.MAT
181: Abduct, hijack, take hostage	CONF.MAT
182: Physically assault, not specified below	CONF.MAT
1821: Sexually assault	CONF.MAT
1822: Torture	CONF.MAT
1823: Kill by physical assault	CONF.MAT
183: Conduct suicide, car, or other non-military bombing, not specified below	
	CONF.MAT
1831: Carry out suicide bombing	CONF.MAT
1832: Carry out vehicular bombing	CONF.MAT
1833: Carry out roadside bombing (IED)	CONF.MAT
184: Use as human shield	CONF.MAT

185: Attempt to assassinate	CONF.MAT
186: Assassinate	CONF.MAT
19: FIGHT	CONF.MAT
190: Use conventional military force, not specified below	CONF.MAT
191: Impose blockade, restrict movement	CONF.MAT
192: Occupy territory	CONF.MAT
193: Fight with small arms and light weapons	CONF.MAT
194: Fight with artillery and tanks	CONF.MAT
195: Employ aerial weapons, not specified below	CONF.MAT
1951: Employ precision-guided aerial munitions	CONF.MAT
1952: Employ remotely piloted aerial munitions	CONF.MAT
196: Violate ceasefire	CONF.MAT
20: ENGAGE IN UNCONVENTIONAL MASS VIOLENCE	CONF.MAT
200: Engage in unconventional mass violence, not specified below	CONF.MAT
201: Engage in mass expulsion	CONF.MAT
202: Engage in mass killings	CONF.MAT
203: Engage in ethnic cleansing	CONF.MAT
204: Use weapons of mass destruction, not specified below	CONF.MAT
2041: Use chemical, biological, or radiological weapons	CONF.MAT
2042: Detonate nuclear weapons	CONF.MAT