



European
University
Institute

DEPARTMENT
OF POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL
SCIENCES

Weber in the Balkans

Contested party–state relations in reforming the
civil service in Albania and FYR Macedonia,
2000–13

Nisida Gjoksi

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

[Florence, 17 May 2018

European University Institute
Department of Political and Social Sciences

Weber in the Balkans
Contested party–state relations in reforming the civil
service in Albania and FYR Macedonia, 2000–13

Nisida Gjoksi

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social S
of the European University Institute

Examining Board

Professor László Bruszt, formerly EUI/ Scuola Normale Superiore
Professor Hanspeter Kriesi, European University Institute
Professor Isabela Mares, Columbia University
Professor Jan-Meyer Sahling, Nottingham University

© [Nisida Gjoksi, 2018]

No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior
permission of the author

Researcher declaration to accompany the submission of written work
Department of Political and Social Sciences - Doctoral Programme

I Nisida Gjoksi certify that I am the author of the work *Weber in the Balkans: contested party-state relations in reforming the civil service in Albania and Fyr Macedonia 2000-13* I have presented for examination for the Ph.D. at the European University Institute. I also certify that this is solely my own original work, other than where I have clearly indicated, in this declaration and in the thesis, that it is the work of others.

I warrant that I have obtained all the permissions required for using any material from other copyrighted publications.

I certify that this work complies with the Code of Ethics in Academic Research issued by the European University Institute (IUE 332/2/10 (CA 297).

The copyright of this work rests with its author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This work may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. This authorisation does not, to the best of my knowledge, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that this work consists of 116.189 words.

Signature and date:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Nisida Gjoksi', written in a cursive style.

25 February 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents.....	i
Abstract.....	iv
Acknowledgments	v
List of Tables and Figures.....	viii
Introduction.....	1
Puzzle.....	2
Problems In Conventional Ideas On State Reform.....	5
Conceptual problems.....	5
Theoretical problems.....	7
A New Framework to Assess the ‘Hybrid’ Nature of Administration.....	11
Two-dimensional space in levels of politicization and professionalization	11
Explanation of Party Organizational and Electoral Logics.....	13
Scope conditions	13
Party incentives in the party building process	14
The two rationales of parties in advancing civil service reform.....	15
Case Selection	17
Measurement and Data	20
Roadmap.....	21
CHAPTER 1: RETHINKING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE THROUGH A NEW FRAMEWORK .	23
Introduction	23
Problems in Current Literature with the Weberian Template	28
A Two-Dimensional Framework for Assessing Administration.....	38
Defining politicization.....	40
Defining professionalization.....	47
Four outcomes in the state-building process relating to politics and administration relations ..	49
Measurement and Data	53
Implications for the Study on Administrative State Reforms	55
Conceptual implications.....	58
Methodological implications.....	59
Conclusion.....	62
CHAPTER 2: DEVELOPMENT OF STATE ADMINISTRATION THROUGH THE LOGIC OF	
POLITICAL PARTIES	65
Introduction	65
Problems in Current Literature.....	68
Restrictive scope conditions of party–state relations	74
Argument: Party-Building and State Reforms	77
Different scope conditions in state building in new democracies	77
Assumptions on party building dilemmas and state building outcomes.....	80
Two party rationale in recruiting political loyalists and experts	82
Hypotheses.....	85
Organizational Rationale and Levels of Politicization.....	86
Distinction between old and new parties in the post-communist setting and beyond	88
Causal mechanism: why would new parties rely more on political loyalists?	92
Electoral Rationale and Levels of Professionalization	93

The role of social structure in political competition over identity versus socio-economic issues	94
Causal mechanism: why can governments deflect on public good provision?.....	97
Conclusion	98
CHAPTER 3: VALIDATING THE NEW FRAMEWORK ON BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE	101
Introduction	101
Method of Validation: Factoranalysis	103
Mapping Results Across Two Indexes	106
Differences across countries and ministries in politicization.....	107
Differences across levels of politicization in the hierarchy of the civil service	110
Difference in levels of politicization and professionalization combined	114
Conclusion	120
CHAPTER 4: ALBANIAN CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS, 2000–13	122
Introduction	122
Operationalization of Political Interference in Recruitment and Dismissal	123
Three Cycles of Civil Service Reforms	128
Launch of reform: 1996–99.....	128
First period of reform: 2000–05	132
Second period of reform: 2005–09 and 2010–13	141
Third period of reform: 2013 onwards	155
Conclusion	157
CHAPTER 5: PARTIES’ ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES AND CIVIL SERVICE REFORM	
PROGRESS	161
Introduction	161
Different Party–State Relations in Civil Service Reform	163
When it all began: The Democratic Party’s relations in state administration in transition, 1992–	
97	165
First period: The Socialists in government as state builders with some deficits, 2001–05	166
Second period: The non-reformed Democrats purging the state and levels of politicization,	
2005–09	170
Third period: the pragmatic solution of Democratic Party and Socialist Movement for	
Integration in 2009–13	175
Re-building the state: the reformed Socialists back in power and relaunch of civil service	
reforms 2013–17	178
Summary: Differences in Party Reliance on Political Loyalists for Different Political Services...	180
Competing Explanations on Parties and Levels of Politicization	183
Party system competitiveness.....	184
Polarization in ideological differences and alternation in government	185
Differences in Parties’ Resources Matter	190
Why parties matter for state reforms in Albania	191
What resources matter for dependence on patronage among young and old parties.....	193
Conclusion	200
CHAPTER 7: ELECTORAL DIFFERENCES OF PARTIES IN CIVIL SERVICE REFORM PROGRESS	
.....	202
Introduction	202
A Snapshot of Variation in Levels of Professionalization	206
Cycles of civil service reforms in Macedonia 1997–2010	209
Alternative Explanations	220
Administrative relations in Albania and Macedonia in the democratization period	220
Administrative legacies.....	221
Political Competition and Europeanization	226

Electoral Pressure on Government Performance	229
Which nature of political competition matters for levels of professionalization	230
Differences in Albanian and Macedonian government performance in 2006–10	237
Conclusion.....	243
CONCLUSION.....	247
Puzzle.....	247
Rethinking Party–State Relations.....	249
Conceptual implications and evidence from the Western Balkan cases	249
Theoretical implications and evidence	251
Empirical implications and applicability of the party–state analytical framework	262
Policy Implications	264
Future Research on Party–State Relations	267
Appendix : Chapters	269
Appendix chapter 1 and 3	269
Appendix chapter 4.....	272
Appendix chapter 5	274
Appendix chapter 6.....	276
List of Interviews	281
List of Data Sets.....	283
List of References	284

ABSTRACT

What drives politicians to adopt and implement civil service reforms differently? What explains the variation in politicization and professionalization in the state bureaucracy across countries and across governments? Why do certain incumbents politicize less the state administration and others professionalize more? This thesis answers these questions by contributing to the literature of post-communist studies, comparative politics and political economy in two ways. The thesis first unpacks outcomes that stand between the patrimonial and Weberian bureaucracy along a two-dimensional framework on levels of politicization and professionalization, in order to explain the political incentives and circumstances that explain this variation.

Challenging current explanations on state reform as a by-product of political competition or historical legacies the thesis argues that political parties' incentives play a central role in reforming bureaucracies. More precisely, I argue that while, politicization, in terms of political hiring and firing, is a function of resources' needs of parties to strengthen their own organizational survival, professionalization is a function of the electoral pressure on parties to deliver public good. The incentives political parties face to provide more effectively public goods and the incentives to use state resources for organizational needs might combine in various ways, yielding different combinations of professionalization and politicization in bureaucratic design.

To explore this argument, the dissertation examines levels of politicization and professionalization in Albania and Macedonia¹ over time in the period between 2000-2013. The dissertation finds that Macedonia in contrast to Albania ended up in a highly incompetent administration because of parties' usage of ethnic salience in order to electorally win, without the need to deliver on public good. Conversely, Albania developed a comparatively more competent administration, as incumbents had to deliver some public good in order to maintain power in comparison to competitors. Interestingly, in both countries, levels of politicization varied across time and across sectors based on party organization age, showing that older parties have lower need to use state patronage for organizational survival and hence were more capable of improving the state bureaucracy.

¹ Used interchangeably in this thesis for Former Yugoslav Republic(FYR) of Macedonia.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Writing the thesis is like solving the puzzle of a mosaic painting: one has to know every single piece of it in grand detail in order to know how it fits together in the bigger picture. The beauty of the final work, relies exactly in the balance between the details needed and the bigger story that comes through once the pieces are connected. Above all it is the passion, enthusiasm and commitment that one has taken from this journey in exploring every and single piece of this mosaic that determines the final work. At the very end, one reaches the stage of confidence and self-reliance by creating his 'own' master piece.

Stemming originally from Albania, I always wanted to understand better why some countries are trapped in underdevelopment while others not. This question had interested me since my high school and it led me to pursue the studies of Economics with my majors in Development Economics. While all development oriented questions fascinated me, I decided to pursue this intellectual interest through a PhD later on. Therefore, having finalized this PhD particularly from European University Institute, represents a professional and personal achievement, I have both strived for a long time.

The past six years have been difficult and at the same time enriching in contributing both to my own personal growth and intellectual development.

In this period, I am particularly thankful to European University Institute (EUI), which has rendered this research possible and offered a solid and unshakable intellectual grounding throughout my PhD. Additionally, I am thankful to the various scholars who read and commented on my work during conferences, workshops, exchange and teaching periods at EUI, London School of Economics, Maastricht and Columbia University.

In the first period of the dissertation, I particularly am most grateful to Adrienne H eritier' valuable advice on methods and research design, who guided me in establishing my case studies. In this direction, I am as well particularly thankful to the guidance given back then from Max Weber Fellows and now established professor, as Tina Freyburg, Brad Epperly and Bes Ceka. All of them were patiently answering all my open questions, as we spent hours discussing on all possible theoretical and methodological aspects of my PhD. During conferences at London School of

Economics, in this early stage of my research I am particularly thankful also to Innes Abby, who back then commented carefully on my work.

Faced with lack of data in levels of politicization of civil service in the Western Balkans, I am extremely thankful to Jan Meyer- Sahling, who has provided with the access to dataset based on expert survey from a SIGMA-OECD project on the management of the central government bureaucracy in Western Balkan states. Such data constitutes one of the building blocks of my research. Having access to such dataset gave me a fresh start in my PhD project, as well as many new ideas for future venues of research. I am thankful to Jan Meyer Sahling, for making this research possible with his terrific work on data collection in this region, where so much more needs to be explored and for never tiringly listening and commenting on my work.

I also conducted many interviews in my fieldwork in Albania, Macedonia, Brussels and Paris and talked to some 100 individuals, both from civil service, politics, media and as well as international organizations. Gathering data in practices of political hiring and firing within bureaucracies in Albania and Macedonia has been an extremely sensitive topic for many to talk openly about it, and as well a challenging one in relation to obtaining objective evaluations. Particularly grasping the causes of politicization in civil service, has proved to be further demanding. More than often during fieldwork, I have been faced with reluctance to provide information, un accessible archives, as well very biased opinions on the topic. Therefore, I am thankful to those civil servants in Albania and Macedonia, who took the time and the courage to explain in depth how politics impacts their careers, life and jobs, without losing patience during long hours of discussions. Without their contribution, my research would have not been possible.

Additionally, without the help, support and encouragement of my supervisor Laszlo Bruszt, I would have been lost so many times on the way. He supported from the very start to the very end this research and I am extremely thankful to him and the confidence he had brought up during this PhD. His dynamic approach in pushing me forward in ‘thinking big’ in my research have always inspired me to take example and continue to do so. Similarly, thankful I am to one of the most fascinating and interesting scholars I have met by far, for whom I have a deep intellectual admiration, Philippe Schmitter. He was one of the few who truly knew my case studies and had a thorough knowledge on history and politics of Albania. I will not forget the encouraging e-mails, during my difficult moments of fieldwork, and as well during my last moments of finishing the thesis.

At the later stages of my work, I am thankful particularly to other scholars in this field, who have given comments to my theoretical framework and chapters, like Jacoby Wade, Jan Meyer Sahling, Hanspeter Kriesi, Anna Grzymala Busse, Milada Vaduchova, Michael Ting and Isabella Mares. During my exchange period at Columbia University, I could as well further refine and confront once more the ideas with John Huber, Michael Ting and Isabella Mares. I am particularly thankful to Michael Ting who met me in bi-weekly basis in order to advance my theoretical ideas on the party relationships to the civil service. I am extremely thankful to Isabella Mares, who introduced me to further scholars with similar research background and without her support, my fellowship at Columbia University would not have been possible.

Indeed, during this PhD I have travelled and lived in many countries, from Florence, to Berlin, Brussels, New York, Maastricht, Lisbon, London, Albania and Macedonia. Therefore, I am even more thankful to all my friends who made such travels possible and who could be a strong support.

I am so thankful to Andrea Gilli, Mauro Gilli, Davide Vampa, Lorenzo Cecchi, and Simon Watmough who have accompanied me from the start of this PhD, both in reading various drafts from the early start, commenting on my work, discussing for hours the research, as if it was theirs. I am particularly thankful to Andrea Gilli, who has never stopped to surprise me in his creative mind and as well iron patience in reading and commenting my work. I am deeply thankful to the same friends and many more like Maja Spanu, Davide Vampa, Lorenzo Cini, Lydie Cabane, Juliane Renz, Marion Guerrero, Andrea Warnecke, Lukas Schemper, Lucia Rubinelli who have always been ready to give me strength and emotional support and accompanied me in this process with their friendship.

Above all I am particularly thankful to my family, my mother, and partner, Thierry Dias Coelho who deserve special attention for their unconditional support that has been given to me until the last moments of finalizing this thesis. There are no words to describe the emotional strength they have represented in such erratic life path. I dedicate particularly this work to my partner, a great scholar and my dearest friend, Thierry Dias Coelho, who has supported me emotionally and professionally and who could not make it to experience the end of my PhD. He has been an outstanding scholar, who until the last moments of my PhD and his life, encouraged me to continue and finish up despite the difficult circumstances. He has been an example to follow on a human and professional level.

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Two dimensions of bureaucratic structure: politicization and professionalization

Table 2: Variation across ministries and countries in index of politicization

Table 3: Ranking of countries per ministry compared by the total mean of the index of politicization

Table 4: Country level: Distinction across various top civil service levels in index of politicization

Table 5: Hierarchical Level: Ranking of countries across various top civil servant levels

Table 6: Sectoral Level: Distinction across levels by the index of politicization

Table 7: Ranking of sectors for each level in the civil service in index of politicization

Table 8: Country differences in components of political practices behind politicization

Table 9: Levels of professionalization across countries

Table 10: Categories of bureaucratic structure in South Eastern Europe

Table 11: Formal effectiveness in civil service recruitment and dismissals and political interferences in these two areas

Table 12: Outcome categorizations in levels of politicization: effective institutions and political interferences in recruitment and dismissals

Table 13: Summary of political interference in civil service recruitment and dismissals in Albania 2000–13

Table 14: Puzzling party–state relations: main findings on 3 periods of parties and variation

Table 15: Overview of parties' organization age along organizational resources in Albania

Table 16: Macedonia' performance in civil service reform from 2000-2010

Table 17: Party state relations in Albania and Macedonia: civil service reform outcomes and overview on explanations

Figure 1: Relationship between politicization and competence

Figure 1.1: Albania

Figure 1.2: Macedonia

Figure 2: Contrast spaces in models of administrative state structure

Figure 3: Typology of politics-administration relations between levels of politicization and professionalization

Figure 4: Operationalization of politicization

Figure 5: Operationalization of professionalization

Figure 6: Re-thinking the Nature of the Administrative State: Post-Communist State-Building through Bureaucratic Design

Figure 7: Summary of argument: Two incumbency rationale on levels of politicization and professionalization

Figure 8: Party organizational effect on levels of political hiring and firing in state administration

Figure 9: Electoral pressure to provide public good and levels of professionalization

Figure 10: Sectoral variation within countries in levels of politicization in South Eastern Europe

Figure 11: Components of political hiring and firing

Figure 12: Levels of politicization and levels of professionalization across countries

Figure 13: Political interferences: Number of Temporary Contracts and Successful Examinations

Figure 14: Open Competition: Number of Temporary Contracts and Number of Candidates

Figure 15: Political interference in recruitment and dismissal procedures

Figure 16: Ratio on number of rejected appeals and appeals in favor to civil servants in relation to overall number of solved cases of appeals

Figure 17: Type of appeals from 2000–12

Figure 18: Distribution of financial resources across parties

Figure 19: Albania and Macedonia: variation in administrative outcomes between levels of politicization and expertise across ministries in 2010

Figure 19.1: Albania and Macedonia: Administrative levels of politicization and expertise in 2010

Figure 20: Democratization paths in Albania and Macedonia from 1990-2015

Figure 21: Polarization on socio-economies issues: Party standing on redistribution and deregulation

Figure 21.1: Polarization on socio-economic issues: Party standing on state intervention and deregulation

Figure 22: Polarization of party standing between multiculturalism and religious principles in politics

Figure 22.1: Polarization on party standing between urban vs rural interests and support of ethnic minorities

Figure 22.2: Polarization on party standing between support of ethnic minorities and nationalism

Figure 23: Ideological differences in the party system in Albania and Macedonia

INTRODUCTION

Why do some countries succeed in civil service reforms by establishing a professional and impartial state administration and others fail? Why does political hiring and firing in state administration sometimes lead to incompetence and sometimes to reinforced professionalism? Why do some parties choose to hire and fore more political loyalists in administration, while others elect to improve administrative capacity by investing in expertise? The transformation of the state administration in post-communist countries provides both an opportunity to rethink the ‘Weberian’ de-politicized and professional bureaucracies as the only template for state effectiveness in public good provision and a chance to fundamentally recast our understanding of the relationship between political parties, society and the state administration.

When it comes to new democracies, the political influence of parties on the state administration is crucial if we are to fully understand how the latter works. This is fundamentally neglected in the existing literature in the field. In the party building process parties face *multiple dilemmas* they need to find solutions for and the state administration supports parties in two ways. Because parties want to establish continuous organization, the state and its officials represent a key *resource* for mobilizing support for party organizational continuity², and at the same time state professional capacity is *a means* of parties’ chance of electoral survival through governmental performance in public good or private good provision³. Therefore, two parties’ rationale matter in order to understand outcomes in bureaucracies: Do they hire and fire politically to secure the political services and resources needed to safeguard *organizational endurance* or to rely on more professional administrators to provide public goods and out-mobilize opponents for *electoral survival*? The core claim of the thesis is that understanding the different parties’ rationale in reforming or less bureaucracies for their own *organizational* and *electoral* concerns becomes crucial in explaining how those affect civil service reform progress in the balance between politicization –political hiring and firing- and professionalization- administrative expertise- of bureaucracies. The underlying differences in organizational resources of parties and differences in electoral cleavages explain, why incumbents were incentivized differently to reform or not administration

² Hagopian (1996); Mainwaring (1999); Greene (2007); Dargent and Muñoz (2011); Grindle (2012) and Gingerich (2013).

³ Mainwaring (2006) has argued state capacity has a powerful impact on government performance, which in turn affects governing parties’ electoral performance.

and why democracy alone could not explain the variation in outcomes between professional and de-politicized administration. The combination of the two-party rationale instead allows to shed better light why and how incumbent parties improve bureaucracies and others not. The thesis provides a novel theoretical framework that advances both an answer on such party dilemmas and as well a new way on how to think about outcomes in bureaucracies in young democracies.

PUZZLE

The question of civil service reform is fundamental. The vital task of building well-functioning states in the democratizing world hinges necessarily on the success or failure of such reform efforts. The fall of communist regimes at the end of the Cold War left the leaders of these countries – now tasked with charting a new course at home and abroad – facing several daunting internal challenges. For this purpose, the reform of their state bureaucracies played a pivotal role. In fact, without an impartial and professional state administration, political, economic and social transformation was unlikely to succeed. An independent public sector is a necessary condition for a consolidated democracy.⁴ It is important to reach successfully the transformation from a one-party to a multi-party system, it is fundamental to establish a market economy,⁵ lower corruption,⁶ maintain a regulatory framework for business,⁷ maintain the rule of law⁸ and finally, build trust in civil society and legitimize the state structure. Only based on such a state administration can programmatic political representation work in a democracy.⁹ Therefore, an impartial public administration is a *sine qua non* condition for a separation between state bureaucracies and politics, with broader implications for societal, economic and political development.

Based on such well-established relevance, the main challenge in state-building¹⁰ in the democratizing world has been to transform state bureaucracies according to the Weberian template of a de-politicized and professional administration. Starting from the early mid-1990s,

⁴ Linz and Stepan (1996).

⁵ Evans and Rauch (1999); Evans (1995).

⁶ Dahlström *et al.* (2011).

⁷ Nistoskaya and Cingolani (2014).

⁸ O'Donnell (2004).

⁹ Hagopian (2014); Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007).

¹⁰ State building through civil service reforms allows us to understand how the nature of administration and public authority is exercised as it entails the separation of powers between party organizations and bureaucracies. It does so in two ways: 1) by establishing a formal-legal framework in personnel policy through adoption of civil service laws regulating the meritocratic procedures of recruitment and; 2) by delegating authority in personnel policies to state central management units Meyer-Sahling (2001).

with the support of international actors like the EU, the World Bank, the IMF, UNDP, NATO and OCSE, post-communist countries tried to reform their state bureaucracies. Particularly the Western Balkans have received substantial external aid in state-building.¹¹ Domestically, the peculiarity of the post-communist transformation, is that parties had the double strategic role of acting as agent in shaping their own organizations as well as simultaneously building state institutions¹². The main challenge for political parties in building such states has consisted in putting an end to communist era practices of filling the administration with political loyalists inherited from the *nomenklatura* system,¹³ while simultaneously building professional capacity.¹⁴

Building democracies has therefore meant simultaneously building Weberian states - or states approaching as far as possible Max Weber's ideal type – by withdrawing such party influence and building professional, skilled officials capable to serve the citizens through effective public good provision. According to the standard Weberian template, adoption of civil service laws and procedures should have happened in a uni-directional way, reflecting a change from higher levels of state politicization- political hiring and firing- to a de-politicised and professional state personnel.¹⁵ Such reforms would *succeed* where the Weberian template of a de-politicized and professional administration was implemented. On the contrary, they would *fail* if political parties continued to exercise party influence in practice. However, the reality in post-communist countries has been quite different one: Leviathan was built on ‘paper’ and laws, but practices of political hiring and firing in administration and levels of expertise diverged substantially.¹⁶

Two pieces of *puzzling* evidence come as a surprise to practitioners and academics in the field. In many new democracies, particular in Southeastern Europe (SEE), it seems like the Weberian professional bureaucracy has remained something of a ‘messiah’ that politicians promise to voters, but that somehow never arrives. The *first* surprise has been that the state administration after transition has not necessarily developed linearly and synchronically from less politicization¹⁷ to higher professionalization after the adoption of civil service recruitment systems. Weberian rule-based administration remains a rarity in post-communist contexts¹⁸ and beyond. While this is a trend in all new democracies, the gap is even more pronounced in

¹¹ Elbasani 2009; Mendelski (2013); Vaduchova (2008).

¹² Grzymala Busse (2002); O’Dwyer (2007).

¹³ O’Dwyer (2007).

¹⁴ Ganev (2001).

¹⁵ Goetz and Wollmann (2001); Fritz (2007).

¹⁶ Gajdushek (2007); Meyer Sahling (2006b).

¹⁷ Understood here as politically motivated hiring and firing of officials in civil service.

¹⁸ Goetz and Wollman (2001).

countries such as the Western Balkans, where there is a ‘chronic’ disrespect for formal rules (also read in levels of corruption).¹⁹

The countries in the region have outperformed the Eastern European countries in establishing on paper and laws their ‘leviathan state’. However, chronic disrespect for laws²⁰ has made it hard to assess the extent to which politicization and professionalization have combined in bureaucracies. Indeed, while the gap in levels of politicization between the two regions persists equally high, the gap in levels of professionalization has diminished²¹. It seems that the Weberian ideas have reached the Balkans, but their administrations took on a ‘hybrid’ form in administration between rational–formal bureaucracy and patrimonial features in recruitment and dismissals. Despite formal civil service rules, different levels of political hiring and firing have persisted as practices. And so have such practices co-existed differently with levels of professionalism across governments and ministries. Formal bureaucratic insulation through civil service laws and procedures has not necessarily decreased politicization²² nor has increased professionalization within the state administration.

The *second* surprising finding to both academia and practitioners, is that the multiple outcomes between politicization and professionalization in bureaucratic structures cannot be explained by the factors the existing literature asserts are crucial for reform progress. Neither the progress made in the democratization process through institutionally robust political competition²³, nor Europeanization conditionality²⁴ nor inherited administrative legacies²⁵ can explain the diversity in outcomes. According to this literature, once certain conditions are in place bureaucratic professionalization should have been an unrelenting process of bureaucratic improvement. However, countries performed very differently in civil service reform progress, indeed, much of this process was not synchronically developing with democratic consolidation, or through path-dependency of the administrative past, or European integration progress. Much of the incentives on reform reversals, despite institutionally robust political competition like in

¹⁹ Kitschelt. (1999) views levels of corruption, as well highly correlated to the discretion and interference of politicians in state administration.

²⁰ Elbasani (2009); Meyer- Sahling (2012); Mendelski (2013).

²¹ Based on data on World Government Effectiveness data, in 1996 CEE Average was 65 and SEE Average WGI was 29, and in 2015 that gap has closed down as the CEE Average is 70 and the SEE has augmented to 55.15.

²² Meyer Sahling (2006b, 2012).

²³ Grzymala-Busse (2007); O’Dwyer (2006).

²⁴ Vaduchova (2008); Dimitrova (2005); Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005); Elbasani (2009); Giandomenico (2014); Börzel and Pamuk (2012); Mendelski (2014).

²⁵ Nunberg (1999); Verheijen (2000, 2010); Meyer-Sahling (2009, 2010); Kitschelt (1999).

Hungary and Poland, remain a theoretical mystery to this literature.²⁶

When looking at these developments the theoretical and conceptual limitations of the existing literature appears clear in two directions: the literature is deterministic in predictions of how reform should happen and reform progress in formal insulation of bureaucracies has led to different combination of politicization and professionalization.

Such puzzling evidence that politicization is not always antithetical to expertise within bureaucracies, impugns on state views and the rationale that explain such divergence. Despite the prevalence of such 'hybrid' cases in administration, we know little about their performance, as the literature falls short in explaining the conditions under which this divergence happens and the incentives underpinning it. But real improvement will require a new approach in both conceptual framework and as diagnosis of success and failure in state building. However, before the new framework is proposed, I first outline how the existing literature has impeded analysis of the multiplicity of bureaucratic outcomes that fall in between politicization and professionalization.

I then challenge such views with a new framework. Once such conceptual clarification is complete, the question remains: why have some countries reformed, others reversed and why does politicization not decrease synchronically with an increase in professionalization within a bureaucracy?

PROBLEMS IN CONVENTIONAL IDEAS ON STATE REFORM

This thesis takes issue with three conventional views in literature on bureaucracies and post-communist studies that have impeded a better understanding of the empirical diversity of state reforms in democratizing countries, as well as the *circumstances* and *incentives* under which civil service reform happens. I first present the core claims presented in the literature and the evidence that reveals its limitations.

Conceptual problems

The *first* assumption is conceptual and relates to the view that a well-functioning state must have a Weberian professional administration. Contemporary analysts have seen civil service

²⁶ For similar critique See Innes (2013).

reform success in terms of movement towards the Weberian ideal type, seen as optimal for delivering public goods.²⁷ Conversely, those that are more distant from this template (i.e. patrimonial bureaucracies)²⁸ are less effective. Further it assumes that politicization is synonymous with bureaucratic pathologies like ‘clientelism’, and ‘patrimonialism’.²⁹ In this Weberian template, politicization has been perceived as hindering impersonal office loyalty and competence, thus undermining the functioning of the state in public good provision.³⁰

To be precise, the evidence shows that state politicization has not hindered competence³¹ in a bureaucracy and therefore state capacity in public good provision.³² The state administration resembles rather a ‘hybrid’ nature of Weberian bureaucracy with patrimonial features, with different layers of patronage³³ and a civil service system in one bureaucracy.³⁴

The second assumption I take issue with is the view that the state possesses a unitary, cohesive structure. Evidence shows that state structures vary substantially in institutional quality between agencies that resemble ‘island of excellence’³⁵ existing alongside with those that resemble ‘islands of clientelism’.

In sum, conceptually, these two different views although not empirically justified have led to the mis-conceptualization of outcomes in what is success and failure and have particularly prevented us to understand reality. Certainly, Weberian ideal-type administrative concepts are useful in distinguishing certain cases of bureaucratic success among OECD countries (e.g., Germany) and failure in certain non-OECD ones (e.g., African states). But they have nevertheless hindered our understanding of how different ‘hybrid’ bureaucracies can be from one another (Brazil,³⁶ India,³⁷ Columbia and Chile,³⁸ other South East Asian countries and – most relevantly – post-communist countries) as well as we know little how they actually work in practice.

²⁷ This view derives from the classical works of Weber (1978) but finds resonance in most of the literature in political science. Chapter 1 reviews the literature in political science that holds this view.

²⁸ Shefter (1994).

²⁹ Geddes (1994); Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007).

³⁰ Chapter 1 reviews the literature in political science that holds this view, some indicative works that test this in new democracies are Fortin (2011); Evans and Rauch (1999); and for older democracies see Lewis (2008).

³¹ Schneider (1991); Dargent (2015); Gajdushek (2007).

³² This idea is observed elsewhere in new democracies as in Brazil, Schneider (1991), in Africa, Von Hau (2007).

³³ Here understood as discretion of parties to hire and fire officials in the civil service.

³⁴ Schneider (1991); Grindle (2013); Gajdushek (2007); Vom Hau (2012); Dargent (2015); Lewis (2008).

³⁵ Geddes (1994); Goetz and Wollman (2001).

³⁶ Schneider (1991).

³⁷ Sabharwal and Berman (2013).

³⁸ Thorp and Durand (1995, p.17).

Methodologically, such templates and their rule-based indicators, have prevented effective analysis of how civil service reforms combine political loyalty and expertise in their outcomes. Assuming the state as unitary has filtered out all the variation across the state agencies. In other words, the evidence proves that politicization does not necessarily harm competence; the two can co-exist. Additionally, the conclusion that insulation leads politicians not to interfere in merit recruitment across agencies equally follows that is highly doubtful. Therefore, the conventional approach leaves us poorly equipped to actually distinguish true ‘success’ from ‘failure’ in ‘hybrid’ bureaucracies that are not formalistic and do not function administratively according to strict legal norms.

We must and can do better to assess reforms, but a new framework is needed that provides us with the right indicators and criteria to assess bureaucracies in new democracies, beyond the Weberian template. However, before I introduce the new framework in assessing such hybrid bureaucracies, I also take issue with the explanatory side of state reforms.

Theoretical problems

Conceptually, the political science literature has conflated the ways that politicization and professionalization combine in state reform outcomes. This in turn leads to a theoretical obscuring of the underlying political rationales that matter in the ‘politics’ of state reforms in democratizing countries. Despite their importance for democratization and the nature of bureaucracies and the state, we know very little about how party and state development happens in new democracies and how does party building affect state building outcomes and vice versa³⁹. While we know that party systems are still weak in many new democracies⁴⁰, the factors that shape different paths of party development in new democracies where the parties and state bureaucracies coincides as in the case in post-communist context, Latin America and US state building, remain unexplored empirically and theoretically.

The institutionalist and historical strands in the literature view the civil service reform progress as happening quiet *deterministically* once certain conditions are in place. These conditions include political competition, EU conditionality and financial assistance, or certain administrative legacies. I claim that this literature is not well suited for studying institutionally uncertain contexts, such as unconsolidated democracies, or where party building coincides with

³⁹ A concern raised as well in Levitsky et al (2016); Mazzuca and Munck (2014).

⁴⁰ Levitsky et al (2016).

state building. In fact, in the case of post-communist countries it underestimated the role that political parties ended up playing in amending public sector reforms. The lack of theorization on parties stems also from the contextual peculiarity under which parties develop in post-communist context. How societal structure and genetic structure of parties matter for the subsequent evolution on state reforms in new democracies remains untheorized upon and not well understood in new democracies, as most of the literature is based on the West-European parties.⁴¹

Theoretically, evidence in civil service reforms in post-communist context questions the determinism of institutionalist literature in post-communist studies on two grounds. First, I take issue with the view in institutionalist⁴² literature in bureaucratic professionalization, that incumbents can irreversibly ‘lock in’ impartial civil service reforms in a competitive game⁴³ and that civil service reforms serve as an ‘insurance’ against short-term political battles. These assumptions are problematic as they drew on *scope conditions* developed in the Western context to assume such reforms were irreversible. Civil service must be embedded in stable socio-economic coalitions and protected legally through an independent judiciary if parties’ arbitrariness in administration is to be diminished. I claim that there is no reason to assume this in light of evidence in post-communist context. Instead, in a political system where the rules of the game are highly uncertain,⁴⁴ and where the state is less protected socio-economically⁴⁵ and legally against party arbitrariness,⁴⁶ parties find it much easier to reverse reforms. Therefore, effective ‘lock-in’ of reforms in new democracies is not possible,⁴⁷ as parties play a higher strategic role in reversing them⁴⁸. When the judiciary and socio-economic actors don’t play such roles, civil service reforms therefore do not serve as ‘institutional insurance’ for incumbents. Accordingly, the institutionalist assumption that reforms will be pursued to prevent opponents from exploiting the state administration in the future does not hold. Rather, every party in power faces a strong demand to politicize. The ‘insurance mechanism’ in such unpredictable environment, is not the right lens to make us understand incentives on reform. This leads me to the second

⁴¹ Diamond and Gunther (2001).

⁴² Grzymala-Busse (2006); O’Dwyer (2006); Vaduchova (2008).

⁴³ The idea goes back to Moe (1985), but is reconfigured as well in Grzymala-Busse (2006). Berliner and Ehrlich (2015) provides an overview of the literature.

⁴⁴ O’Donnell et al (1986); Schedler (1998).

⁴⁵ Hellmann (1998).

⁴⁶ Epperly (2012).

⁴⁷ For a similar critique see Ting and Huber (2015).

⁴⁸ Meyer-Sahling (2009a) show the case on how civil service reforms are unsustainable in post-communist context in Central and Eastern European countries and reforms are reversed. Meyer Sahling (2012) shows how institutionalization of civil service reforms in South Eastern Europe, diverges from formal rules.

criticism.

The second mistaken view in the literature when explaining civil service reform progress is that all incumbents in a competitive game have the same *incentives* to undertake reform, as they are exposed to the same consolidated party structures with similar organizational resources.⁴⁹ Such conditions depart from Western context of ‘Golden Age’ of Party systems where parties were all disciplined organizations and faced voters in rising socio-economic conditions and had all the same pluralistic incentive to reform bureaucracies.⁵⁰ The basic point is that all parties are assumed to be democratically committed, thus to perceive the same benefits from civil service reform in a competitive electoral game where they face a credible opposition. Democratic commitment might or might not be a trait of party elites. However, the assumption that parties have all similar organizational resources and face same societal structures, is quite a restrictive view in light of a much more diverse empirical *reality*, both on party and societal structure in a post-communist context. In democratizing countries, where some political parties are the heirs of organizations in power for decades while others are the by-product of clandestine or semi-clandestine struggles, the political panorama is more heterogeneous than depicted in the literature

In post-communist context and Latin America, parties have this dual strategic role, in both shaping own organizations and as well shaping the state institutions much more arbitrarily. This represents a whole new context of theorization on party and state development very different from the Western context, where bureaucracies existed prior to democracy and hence parties could not reshape them. Indeed, Shefter (1994) distinguished only about two type of parties, inside and outside genesis of parties to bureaucracy and hence demand on patronage. However, party emergence and adaptation has different societal and institutional underpinnings⁵¹, as it as well has different legacies from authoritarian and communist rules. Party patronage and the relationship with the state has as well very different forms and scopes⁵². Therefore, change of political parties and adaptation needs to be studied more specifically to this type of context.

⁴⁹ Grzymala-Busse (2006); O’ Dwyer (2007); Innes (2013); Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2013); Meyer-Sahling (2006).

⁵⁰ Innes (2013).

⁵¹ For a review see Levitsky et al (2016).

⁵² See Levitsky et al (2016).

In such context, party building is not a consolidated process yet.⁵³ Its outcomes vary substantially in terms of how parties are structured and rely on the state,⁵⁴ as well as how programmatic they are.⁵⁵ Some political parties may represent ethnic minorities, others may be connected to the former elites, while others may have their strongholds in some specific geographical areas or industries. If parties vary in organizational resources, so it is thinkable that parties that are better endowed with material and organizational resources to win elections and survive organizationally will be less dependent on state resources, less compelled to politicization, and more incentivized to advance a well-functioning civil service.

Therefore, the literature has downplayed the role political parties might end up playing for shaping nature of bureaucracies in such an unpredictable environment, as they do not provide us with much information on the party rationale on state reform. The causal mechanisms on ‘institutional insurance’ is less useful in explaining incentives for reform. In sum, conflating conceptually how politicization and professionalization combine in state reform outcomes, has obscured theoretically the underlying political rationales that matter so much in the ‘politics’ of state reforms. Imparting theoretically from party state relations in the West, as well restrictive *incentives* on reform, has privileged an overly deterministic way of thinking about how reform actually happens. I take issue with the institutionalist¹ literature in bureaucratic professionalization, which has obscured the conditions and causal mechanisms that explain the *incentives* and circumstances under which reform from a spoil system to a merit system occurs.

The balance of this chapter supports these conceptual and theoretical contentions in three steps. First, challenging the Weberian template as the only template of successful state reforms and that politicization always harms competence, I offer a new conceptual framework that serves as a remedy to the mis-conceptualization problems in state-building by distinguishing better between politicization and professionalization in multiple outcomes. In this I show that the two can be assessed also across ministries, allowing to uncover the variation across state agencies within the state administration. Second, challenging the deterministic view in the literature on reform progress, I provide a novel answer by taking a ‘party agency’ perspective on civil service reform and explain how two different party rationales determine how politicization and professionalization combine to produce multiple outcomes. Further, I discuss how I will explain this party agency perspective in state reforms by applying it to cases in the Western

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Dargent 2016; Levitsky et al (2016).

⁵⁵ Hagopian (2014).

Balkans in Albania and Macedonia, exploring the variation that is observed there and providing the empirical strategy. Finally, I provide a road map for what is to come in this dissertation.

A NEW FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS THE ‘HYBRID’ NATURE OF ADMINISTRATION

I advance a new analytical framework to remedy both the conceptual and theoretical problems that have hitherto impeded understanding of the empirical diversity of state reform outcomes in new democracies. As indicated, the evidence above shows how levels of politicization and professionalization can grow apart. This is particularly true in the SEE region, where there is a chronic disrespect of laws.

Two-dimensional space in levels of politicization and professionalization

I claim that the lack of dialogue between the literature on public administration and the literature on post-communist studies represents a missed opportunity to refine concepts and indicators on how to assess state reforms. *Conceptually* this has produced the view that state capability in public good provision is only improved by adopting the Weberian template and that politicization harms competence. But this is empirically hard to justify in new democracies. *Methodologically*, the lack of dialogue has resulted in a plethora of different indicators that measure different attributes of civil service progress, from formal institution building,⁵⁶ to levels of politicization,⁵⁷ to administrative state effectiveness⁵⁸, merit recruitment⁵⁹. This measurement problem has led to inaccurate (and I argue, thus, controversial) categorization of countries as either ‘bad’ and ‘good’ performers⁶⁰. For that we need a new framework that distinguishes better how politicization can combine differently to levels of professionalization tipping the balance towards more successful and capable states or less capable states.

The thesis offers a remedy for such conceptual and methodological problems by providing a new framework that differentiates outcomes in a two-dimensional space between levels of *politicization* (extent of political loyalty in personnel decisions) and levels of *professionalization* (extent of competence), leading to four outcomes: professional

⁵⁶ Grzymala-Busse (2006).

⁵⁷ Meyer Sahling (2006b).

⁵⁸ O’Dwyer (2007).

⁵⁹ Dahlstroem *et al.* (2011); Evans and Rauch (1999).

⁶⁰ Chapter 1 and 2 discuss this in more depth.

administration (low politicization and high professionalization), patronage-led administration (high politicization and high professionalization) clientelism-led administration (high politicization and low professionalization), mediocracy-led administration (low politicization and low professionalization). I understand politicization as the conscious choice of politicians and not only parties to strategically influence the hiring and firing of officials in all positions that were considered to fall within the scope of civil service based on both political loyalty and party loyalty criteria in exchange for political services. Therefore, the focus of such definition includes not only practices of political hiring and firing within the positions defined as civil service, but as well practices of diminishing the scope of civil service by excluding senior ranks. In contrast to most existing studies⁶¹, this definition views politicization as a ‘contractual’⁶² agreement between politicians and bureaucrats. Here, politicians gain the loyalty of bureaucrats to provide political services,⁶³ and loyalists are rewarded with careers, a salary and a job, or even other benefits.⁶⁴

Measuring professionalism accurately is important. A managerial definition presents it as the *ability* of officials to implement policies with professional integrity. Other literatures add further content to the concept,⁶⁵ defining professionalization as administrative capability and state capacity,⁶⁶ professional integrity, or ‘organizational competence’.⁶⁷ To directly measure the accumulation of expertise within the administration, procedures like formal examinations in the selection process are less helpful. Particularly in a democratizing context such procedures are either deformed in practice,⁶⁸ or examinations are of so low quality,⁶⁹ that a procedural approach does not prove to be reliable in measuring competence and skill. Rather, we need measures that pick up the individual educational traits of personnel and their policy expertise, beyond examination rules, that is closest to the managerial understanding of professionalization.⁷⁰ Professionalization is operationalized here as the extent of officials’ English skills, university

⁶¹ Most of the definitions view politicization as the discretion of politicians to hire and fire politically without anything in return (Kopecky *et al* 2016). Chapter 2 delves into depth in these definitions. However, the view that politicization of civil service represents a transaction between politicians and bureaucrats resonates most with Hood and Lodge (2006).

⁶² Hood and Lodge (2006).

⁶³ Oliveros (2013) claims that these services can range from political activism and electoral support, to providing certain targeted policies to politicians for their clients.

⁶⁴ Similar to Grindle (2013) definition and Hood and Lodge (2012) who see politicians and bureaucrats in an exchange relationship with each other.

⁶⁵ Page (2010).

⁶⁶ Fukuyama (2013).

⁶⁷ Vom Hau (2012).

⁶⁸ Chapter 3 shows in depth how formal examination procedures are deformed in practice.

⁶⁹ Sundell (2012).

⁷⁰ Hicklin and Godwin (2009).

degree, PhD degree and having an educational background that is relevant to the policy in question.⁷¹ That is a different and independent dimension to politicization that is measured along the phenomena or electoral turnover of officials, party loyalty, depth of political appointments and political contacts influencing hiring and firing of administrators.⁷²

The thesis validates the two-dimensional framework through factor analysis based on the new democracies of the Western Balkan cases using original evidence from Meyer-Sahling's (2010) expert survey dataset. Based on factor analysis, results confirm that politicization and professionalization are two independent dimensions in bureaucratic evolution, and that they indeed combine differently across countries and ministries, despite similar civil service rules being in place.

EXPLANATION OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL AND ELECTORAL LOGICS

We currently know little about why parties have had different incentives to improve or not bureaucracies and which mechanism and rationale explain parties' incentives to politicize- hire and fire politically- and professionalize- invest in expertise- in the state administration. The thesis provides an answer to this puzzle by developing two party rationales on how civil service reforms can develop differently between politicization and professionalization. It takes a party agency perspective in why would parties need more political loyalists rather than professional officials, explaining civil service reform progress in levels of politicization and professionalization.

Scope conditions

In a post-communist context, civil service reforms are less constitutionally⁷³ and socio-economically protected from constituencies,⁷⁴ meaning parties can subvert and more easily reverse civil service reforms. This institutional context has facilitated political parties' predation on the state administration – and their co-opting of personnel for patronage purposes – without much popular or institutional resistance.⁷⁵

Parties can reverse civil service reform outcomes of de-politicization and

⁷¹ The decision to focus on those indicators is mostly data-driven.

⁷² Meyer Sahling and Veen (2013).

⁷³ Ganev (2001).

⁷⁴ Hellmann (1998).

⁷⁵ Ganev (2001).

professionalization in two ways. They can hire and fire politically in the state administration without being sanctioned by a strong independent judiciary.⁷⁶ Additionally, they can reverse or subvert reform in levels of professionalization⁷⁷ with less ‘popular resistance’ Two key legacies of communist times are that societies are disengaged from politics¹ and interest groups and socio-economic coalitions are less stable in their demands for effective policy consistency over time.⁷⁸ As a result the pressure from outside groups to professionalize administration is much lower.⁷⁹ Hence, parties coming in and out of power can more easily adapt state institutions – through politicization or professionalization – depending on their electoral and party organization needs. This explains generally why levels of politicization are much higher in new democracies, while the state has low capacity. Acting against such scope conditions, parties face two organizational imperatives and goals.⁸⁰

Party incentives in the party building process

Where party organization-building happens before state-building, it is only reasonable to expect that parties’ organizational concerns influence their incentives to politicize or professionalize- and therefore advance or hinder the quality of the state administration. Hence the incentive to pursue reforms cannot be treated as given, but instead varies with party dependence on state resources for survival. Recall that parties have two different goals in the party-building process – organizational endurance and electoral survival⁸¹ – and that in the formation and development phase they have two different organizational imperatives⁸² along which they develop. For incumbent parties, the state administration and its employees represent both a *resource* that can be exploited for organizational survival and a *means* to provide public goods to out-mobilize the electorate against opponents.

Based on these two party-building goals and the nature of state administration transformation, we know that if parties rely on political loyalists, instead of civil servants, the former can be more useful as they can provide parties with political service and resources.⁸³ We

⁷⁶ Epperly (2012).

⁷⁷ Ganev (2001).

⁷⁸ Epperly (2012), Hellman (1998).

⁷⁹ Hellman (1998).

⁸⁰ Kitschelt (1989).

⁸¹ Levitsky et al (2016).

⁸² Kitschelt (1989).

⁸³ Oliveros (2013); Ting *et al.* (2012).

know that politicians can use bureaucracies along politicized systems as a tool of patronage in order to maximize their re-election, provide them generally with different political services,⁸⁴ aimed at building their organizations, or as a tool to solve collective action problems in terms of effective policy making and public good provision, designed along civil service systems.⁸⁵ Additionally, we also know that a good and effective bureaucracy has policy consequences that impact parties' electoral support. Parties need professional administration to produce effective public goods.⁸⁶

Political parties therefore stand before *two dilemmas* when structuring personnel in their state reforms. Do they hire and fire politically in order to get political services and resources needed in order to secure *organizational survival* or do they rely on more professional administrators to provide public goods to out-mobilize opponents for *electoral survival*? That is the existential question parties raise when they need to reform the state. I claim that these organizational and electoral needs in the party-building process affect differently parties' incentives in hiring and firing political loyalists or in relying on experts, with clear consequence for progress in civil service reform. However, parties do not have identical electoral and organizational needs. Both the organizational structure and resources of parties vary, and so do electoral tactics to provide public good vary with social structure. I claim that variation in parties' organizational resource needs leads to variation in levels of politicization in administration. Further, I claim that variation in incumbents' electoral pressure to deliver public good in order to win elections, affects levels of expertise in administration.

The two rationales of parties in advancing civil service reform

On the first rationale, parties differ in terms of *organizational resource scarcity*. Parties do not have all the same organizational resources and it is younger rather than the older parties (usually communist party successors) that are therefore more dependent on state resources and party patronage. Younger parties are therefore more inclined to political hiring and firing in the state. Political loyalists, rather than civil servants, are more valuable to younger parties as they can act as 'administrative capital'⁸⁷ and provide support to parties in the form of political services to mobilize further resources.

On the *second rationale*, we know that higher pressure to deliver public good towards

⁸⁴ Oliveros (2013).

⁸⁵ Ting and Huber (2015).

⁸⁶ Bezes (2012).

⁸⁷ Hale (2006, 2009).

incumbents would lead them to rely more on professionals to deliver policy. However, the *electoral tactics* of parties to outcompete each other on public good or not, depends on the underlying societal structure. Hence, certain socio-economic cleavages, render redistributive politics and public good provision electorally more beneficial⁸⁸ than in ethnic cleavages where parties can outbid electorally based on targeted identity policies that reward voters with improvements on identity representation⁸⁹. Because parties are acting strategic,⁹⁰ in socio-economic cleavages, the propensity of parties to outcompete on economic issues and converge on identity-based issues is higher, and so their electoral pressure to provide public good to outcompete opponents increases, leading to higher levels of professionalization.

In contrast, in identity cleavages, the propensity of parties to polarize on identity and converge on socio-economic issues increases, and so electoral pressure to provide public good to outcompete opponents decreases, leading to lower levels of professionalization. Instead incumbents can deflect much easier on the role of governing responsibly, by playing the ‘ethnic card’ and providing various identity-based policies that satisfy voters on their identity issues, in order to outcompete opponents. I claim that socio-economic cleavages rather than identity cleavages shape political competition around distributable socio-economic policies, that allow incumbents through policy deliverability towards public good to gain an electoral advantage. This is less possible, when non-distributable issues as such as identity issues are of concern to voters. This explains why they are willing to vote incumbents, despite non-performance.⁹¹ *Differences in social structure between identity and social-economic cleavages, conditional on parties’ electoral incentives to strategically polarize competition on identity rather than socio-economic issues, lower electoral incentives and pressure to deliver on public good in order to outcompete opponents and therefore levels of professionalization.*

Civil service reform progress is an outcome therefore of how parties survive organizationally in the long term and how they outcompete each other electorally based on the societal structure. The combination of the two rationales provides a better understanding of why and how parties improve bureaucracies and when they do not. Bureaucratic reform is a political project and not some grand technocratic or legalistic mission to enhance administrative coherence. As a result, if administrations work well it is simply because they are compatible with

⁸⁸ Ting and Huber (2015).

⁸⁹ Corstange (2013).

⁹⁰ Tavits and Letki (2014).

⁹¹ Tavits and Potter (2015); Rikker (1982). The further literature shows how voters articulate publicly identity demands, even when they conflict with personal and private material interests: For an overview of this literature see Corstange (2013).

the political rationale of power in a political system that requires them to be this way. Political parties can transform and improve bureaucracies for the better the more they are reliant on own resources, and the more, they outcompete each other on socio-economic rather than identity issues. If party building is trapped in organizational scarcity and ethnic representation, the state bureaucracies have a harder time to improve.

These two rationales and the new conceptual framework on bureaucratic outcomes, provide a useful tool to understand which party incentives and factors determine how civil service reform progresses between politicization and professionalization, by explaining the diversity in the hybrid nature of bureaucracies. This framework allows to grasp better the more universal and continuous manifestation between politics and administration in outcomes. It corresponds best to what Max Weber saw an unavoidable organizational conflict within bureaucracies: 'historical reality involves a continuous, though for the most part latent, conflict between chiefs and their administrative staffs for appropriation and expropriation in relation to one another'.⁹² This constant appropriation and expropriation is manifested in the party state relations. It constitutes an enduring source of tension within bureaucracies not only in democratizing countries, but as well in a modern democracy: the extent to which states serve only certain elites or the broader citizenry.⁹³

Distinguishing in multiple outcomes between political loyalty and expertise provides a useful tool to assess bureaucratic nature. In young democracies, this tension is imminently linked to both parties' organizational and electoral concerns. Therefore, understanding such concerns, sheds light on how civil service reform progresses between loyalty and expertise in shaping bureaucratic outcomes. The 'Hamlet' question of the political parties, is raised every time parties enter power in an administration: Do they hire and fire politically in order to get political services and resources needed in order to secure *organizational survival* or do they rely on more professional administrators to provide public goods to out-mobilize opponents for *electoral survival*? That is the question, this thesis attempts to answer.

CASE SELECTION

The thesis adopts a most *similar case research design* to compare civil service reform outcomes in politicization and professionalization across Albania and Macedonia (and within

⁹² Weber (1922).

⁹³ Olsen (2008); Stillmann (1997); Svava (2001); West (2005).

the cases) I justify this case selections as the countries provide puzzling variation in bureaucratic reform in light of the literature.



First, the two countries offer the most strikingly different kind of hybrid administration (see Figure 1.1 and 1.2). In Macedonia politicians hire and fire in administration based on party loyalty along ethnic lines for their own patronage purposes and invested little in professionalization, resembling more the *clientelism*-led administration. In contrast Albania, has outperformed all other countries in levels of professionalization, but show still high levels of politicization. Party loyalty in civil service penetrates down to the lower levels, resembling more the *patronage-led administration*. While corruption levels in both countries in 2016 have been high,¹ Albania has seen an improvement in fighting corruption and greater administrative effectiveness than Macedonia. Various governance indicators have improved in Albania, whereas Macedonia has substantially deteriorated, particularly from 2006 onwards. It is as well in this period the EU relations with Macedonia come to a halt.

Second, this variation is puzzling in light of the institutionalist literature. Neither administrative legacies, nor political competition, or EU relations can explain why Macedonia has performed worse than Albania to this extent. Administrative legacies would have predicted the opposite as Albania came from a totalitarian communist regime with much more fused party state relations, whereas Macedonia had more formal rational bureaucratic governance structures inherited from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Levels of political competition in the first decade after transition¹ can't explain why Macedonia – with its higher score in party system institutionalization,¹ similar party-system competitiveness,¹ and better score in democratic regime – performed worse than Albania and backslide to an illiberal path in the second decade. EU financial assistance and progress in EU relations can't account for why Macedonia did not adapt to EU pressure to insulate its bureaucracy, but rather increase politicization, especially given its granted EU candidate status in 2005, almost a decade earlier than Albania's in 2014.

Figure 1: Relationship between politicization and competence

Figure 1.1 Albania

Figure 1.2 Macedonia



Source: Meyer Sahling dataset (2010)

In order to prove the argument on the two different party rationales, I proceed in a two-step empirical analysis.

First, in order to prove the organizational rationale of parties on levels of politicization, it chooses similar cases of parties with a country like Albania. In this it makes sure to have both variation in levels of politicization as well as differences in party organization age within Albania across different incumbents and across four ministries in the period between 2000-2013. Additionally, tracing levels of politicization not only at the government but as well ministerial level, allows us to test for robustness on party organizational effect. Finally, such political parties are ‘most similar cases’ as they are exposed to the same administrative legacies within the state, the same levels of economic development, and the same EU conditionality to reform. This permits a better exploration of the party determinants on civil service reform.

Second, in a cross-country comparison it examines variation in levels of professionalization through the differences on electoral cleavages affected through electoral pressure on delivery of public good in Albania and Macedonia. As aforementioned the countries have been selected as they represent similar set of cases where incumbents have been exposed to similar socio-economic conditions, EU external incentives and levels of political competition, but very different societal structures. Albania is an ethnically homogenous country, with almost 98% of the population of Albanian ethnic origin. Macedonia is ethnically divided. Some 64.2%

of the population is ethnically Macedonian, 25.2 % Albanian, 3.9% Turk, and the rest are other ethnic groups. This set of cases that are similar in all factors, but different in social structure and different in civil service levels of professionalization, allow to better test how incumbents electoral strategies of providing public good vary so that they affect institutional quality of bureaucracies when in government.

MEASUREMENT AND DATA

In order to test the conceptual framework, I rely on an expert survey dataset (2010) by exploring in depth the outcomes between politicization and professionalization in the Western Balkans across 7 countries and ministries. The *politicization index* measures both political hiring and firing through the following indicators: (1) depth of political appointees (the extent of political or ministerial influence in recruitment across administrative levels); (2) turnover of civil servants; (3) the extent of political appointees with a party background (hinting at political loyalty), and; (4) the extent of political contacts (relevance of political networks and turnover after elections, hinting at intensity of politicization). The *professionalization index* more directly measures capacity in policy by focussing on qualifications and education, such as % of University degree, % of PhD degree, % of English skills and % expertise compatibility of official with the field of policy sector.

Second, in order to show variation in levels of politicization and how merit recruitment were over time constrained, I build on 13 years of archival data from the Albanian Civil Service Commission and Department of Public Administration. Here I show both qualitatively how formal civil service procedures were circumvented in practice, as well as provide descriptive statistics that show the extent of political interferences in merit recruitment and dismissals. For that I develop own indicators that hint to such political interferences in two domains *recruitment* and *dismissals* through following indicators, as extent of temporary contracts, number of candidates participating in examination procedures, extent of finalization of merit recruitment. Political interference in politically motivated dismissals are analysed based on appeals such as extent of appeals, extent of appeals decided in favour to civil service, extent of appeals against wrongful application of disciplinary measure and other procedures.

Additionally, I substantiate the argument on the formal circumventing of rules and the extent of different levels of politicization through a variety of other data gathered in fieldwork. Here, I draw on government documents and reports, parliamentary reports, and interviews

providing a thick description on how levels of politicization vary in Albania over time. Furthermore, to substantiate the argument regarding the two different party rationales, and to test the organizational and electoral pressure on levels of politicization and professionalization, I use both qualitative and quantitative data.

I operationalise party organization age along organizational resources of political parties in Albania. I measure organizational resources based on five criteria: (1) inherited voter loyalty and inherited base, (2) organizational expansion territorially (3) organizational coherence in routines and practices, (4) professional staff; (5) organizational longevity. I rely on archival records, interviews, party programs, auditing of finance reports, in order to assess the differences in organizational resources between political parties and show such different parties that ruled in power had different motivations. To further prove the mechanism, I mostly rely on 28 interviews with civil servants, NGOs and politicians in Albania.

I operationalize electoral pressure to provide public goods as high if polarization of political competition is based on socio-economic issues and low if it is polarized along identity issues. I choose as socio-economic issues state intervention and regulation to show the distinctions between left and right, and then identity issues, such as multiculturalism versus nationalism, as well de-centralization issues and ethnic minority issues. Then I substantiate the argument with EU Commission and NGO reports on government performance in Albania and Macedonia and interviews conducted in the two countries. In order to test the alternative argument on political competition and ideological difference, I build on a variety of sources from Inter-Parliamentary Union data set on elections, Chappell Hill Expert survey data set on political parties in the Western Balkans and as well Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) dataset.

ROADMAP

The thesis is sub-divided in two parts and consists of eight chapters. The first part outlines the conceptual problem and provides a new framework for assessing the quality of state reform outcomes. Then it outlines the theory, by discussing the literature and providing the alternative answer based on the two party rationale. The second part tests both the conceptual framework and the theory by providing evidence on Albania and Macedonia nature of bureaucracies.

Chapter, 1 focusses on the conceptual debate regarding state reforms and the need to

re-think outcomes beyond the Weberian dichotomous typology of highly politicized versus highly professional state administration. It then builds on the limitations exposed by the debate, and provides a conceptual and methodological remedy that allows a much better assessment of the multiple state reform outcomes between politicization and professionalization, and tests it empirically with data from the Western Balkans. Chapter 2 challenges current strand that explain state reform and offers an alternative answer that reflects better on the role of political parties on civil service reforms, and how organizational and electoral parties' constraints explain multiple outcomes between politicization and professionalization. By doing so it critically reviews the two main strands that have explained civil service reform progress, by showing their limitations in explaining state reform outcomes in a post-communist context as they underplayed the role political parties play. Chapter 3 presents evidence across seven countries of Southeastern European countries and across ministries for 2010, by using factor analysis as a method to test the two dimensional framework on bureaucracies. Chapter 4 provides evidence from three civil service reform cycles between 2000-13 in Albania and how reforms have been implemented by being more or less politically constrained in recruitment and dismissals. Chapter 5 provides evidence to test the main argument on the organizational rationale of political parties in the Albanian case of civil service reform from 2000-13, by distinguishing how organizational resource scarcity matters for levels of politicization across three parties. Chapter 6 illustrates the Albanian and Macedonian cases of civil service reforms in levels of professionalization, by providing further evidence of how societal structure conditions political competition in a way that polarizes between socio-economic and identity issues and how this affects electoral pressure to provide public good, leading to variation in levels of professionalization.

CHAPTER 1: RETHINKING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE THROUGH A NEW FRAMEWORK

BUILDING PUBLIC AUTHORITY BY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN POLITICAL LOYALTY AND COMPETENCE IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

'The existence of the state is essential for economic growth; the state, however, is the source of man-made economic decline'
(Douglas North 1990)

'States are a fabric of ordered tension between a variety of competing forms of authority, each with different myths of legitimacy and principles of allegiance'
(Marenin 1988)

'Although politics sets the tasks for administration it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices'
(Wilson 1887)

INTRODUCTION

Transforming state bureaucracies from a highly politicized administration to a professionalized one stands at core post-communist state building attempts through the lens of civil service reforms (particular patterns of recruitment and selection). Such lens provides a much clearer understanding on the *kind* of state that emerges in its wake. Administrative positions can be occupied either by professional civil servants or political appointees (or a mix of the two), with profound implications for the quality of the state in serving the public or only a narrow political or economic elite. Whereas politicized and spoil systems in administrations are associated with states serving narrow elite, professional and impartial civil service in administrations are rather associated with legitimate states that serve the broader citizenry.

However, reforms in bureaucratic staffing in new democracies often result in substantial variation in the extent to which the politicization of careers through political hiring and firing undermines or not administrative expertise. What has been neglected in the study of post-communist state building has been an analysis of bureaucratic structures by distinguishing between politicization (political hiring and firing) and professionalization, whereby competent officials are

appointed to posts. Precisely how these two features of civil service personnel systems (i.e. political loyalty and expertise) combine to produce particular outcomes in bureaucratic development in the democratizing world is understudied, and thus poorly understood. The existing literature fails to account for bureaucratic reform transformation along levels of politicization and professionalization as distinct attributes to the process of bureaucratic modernization, leading to diverse bureaucratic reform outcomes.

The reason for that is the lack of dialogue between the literatures on public administration and post-communist studies, as they have missed the opportunity to refine conventional wisdoms on what constitutes success and failure in administrative outcomes. Therefore the transformation of the state administration in post-communist countries provides an opportunity to rethink the 'Weberian' de-politicized and professional bureaucracies as the only template for state effectiveness in public good provision. The chapter takes the *Weberian template of dichotomy* in bureaucratic typology and the assumption of the unitary view of the state to task. The conventional view according to the existing literature on bureaucracies is that those closer to Max Weber's ideal type, professionalized and de-politicized, are also more effective in delivering public goods. Conversely, those that are more distant from this model, i.e. they are politicized and automatically more incompetent and corrupt, and therefore are less effective: they are called patrimonial. The *unitary state assumption* has reinforced the approach of studying the state as a set of formal laws through formal legal rational bureaucracy, where once civil service reforms are implemented uniform institutional outcomes between politicization and professionalization are assumed to occur. Both such classical perspectives impeded a better understanding of such diversity of outcomes in public administration between politicization and professionalization as two distinct phenomena of bureaucratic modernization in democratizing world.

This chapter's aim therefore is twofold: first it challenges the two classical perspectives on bureaucracies and post-communist studies by claiming that such unitary view on the state along the Weberian templates on administration falls short in explaining the diversity of cases at best and are misleading at worst. Second, it aims to bridge this lack of dialogue by integrating the literature on bureaucracies, executive politics and post-communist studies. In doing so it offers a new framework in assessing bureaucratic structures along these two different dimension- politicization and professionalization- that improves methodologically and conceptually the current literature in assessing 'mixed' outcomes for the population of cases in a democratizing world.

While such distinction in the Weberian templates proves useful in accounting for the variation in state administration and state effectiveness in public good between developed OECD

countries (e.g. Germany) and developing ones (e.g African states), many ‘hybrid’ cases do not fit these categories. There is a large population of countries having mixed features between patrimonial and Weberian legal bureaucracies,⁹⁴ with highly politicized civil service and professional bureaucracies still performing essential functions of the state.⁹⁵ Therefore, the Weberian template of de-politicized and professional administration is not the only one conducive to state effectiveness in public good. Additionally, the static view of the unitary state with cohesive and consolidated bureaucratic structures influential in analysis of state transformation has filtered out the diversity of outcomes bureaucratic modernization can yield between politicization and professionalization across an administration. Indeed, evidence shows that ‘islands of excellence’ or ‘pockets of efficiency’ can co-exist with ‘islands of clientelism’, rendering even more difficult the unitary categorization in good performing and bad performing administration. Post-communist cases, particularly the Southeastern European cases of Albania and Macedonia, are part of this population. The population of such cases is indeed geographically broad, however, incorporating new democracies from Latin America to East Asia and beyond. Despite this importance existing literatures hardly ‘see’ these intermediate cases, by still upholding the view that highly politicized administration are mutually incompatible with professionalization and therefore, ineffective in public good provision⁹⁶

As a result, the Weberian templates and the unitary view on bureaucracies fall short in accounting for the diverse ‘hybrid’ administrative cases at best. They are seriously misleading at worst, as we are led to believe that *politics* is evil per se in cases where politicization persists in administration and that is detrimental to creating a capable administration. As shown above these assumptions are not empirically founded.

The implication of the Weberian template conflating politicization and professionalization into one single dimension of bureaucratic modernization is also reflected in the *methodological* weakness in categorization of countries into ‘bad’ and ‘good’ cases. A plethora of indicators is offered that do not allow to measure distinctly the two phenomena from each other. Systemized concepts that have operationalized the *Weberianess* in administration offer *unreliable* and *invalid* indicators: unreliable because they measure ‘rules’ as indication of success and progress in a context where civil service rules are not implemented or subverted and levels of political hiring and firing

⁹⁴ In the literature this corresponds to as well concepts as neo-patrimonial type of administrations, where we have a mixture between ‘personal rule’ (Roth 1968) and ‘legal hierarchical bureaucracy’ (Erdmann and Engel (2007), Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), Clapham (1985)).

⁹⁵ Daarden (2008).

⁹⁶ Evans and Rauch (1999), Lewis (2008), Dahlström *et al.* (2012), Nistoskaya and Cingolani (2014).

co-exist with such formal rules; or they offer *invalid* indicators that conflate the two dimensions into one single indicators- e.g., formal procedures of recruitment and selection measure hint to both undue political influence and as well, abilities and professionalism.

In this chapter I address this twin-problem of conceptual and methodological problem around the unitary Weberian template. Building on recent literature on bureaucracies and the recent work on political appointments, the thesis advances a number of claims that clarify and address these problems by offering a new conceptual framework. First, I challenge the view that politicization stands always negatively to professionalization in a process of bureaucratic modernization and therefore state capacity. Instead I claim that within a state bureaucracy under reform, levels of politicization do not always forego professionalization within one administration as usually assumed and consensually agreed in the literature on bureaucracies and post-communist studies. Therefore I provide a two-dimensional conceptual framework in understanding bureaucratic modernization by analyzing separately levels of politicization from levels of professionalization in reform outcomes, yielding four different types: patronage-led administration (high politicization and high professionalization), clientelism-led administration (high politicization and low professionalization), mediocracy-led administration (low politicization and low professionalization), and responsible administration (low politicization and high professionalization).

Second, conceptually such framework adds two additional outcomes to the Weberian template, as it shows that politicization does not deterministically decrease once civil service laws are in place and authority of civil service is delegated to central civil service agencies. Rather the two can combine differently in *mediocracy-led* administration and *patronage-led* administration, although laws are in place. Certainly, politicization of personnel in the form of ‘clientelism’ and ‘patronage’⁹⁷ can have a deleterious effect that on democracy, economic development and effectiveness in public good provision. Nevertheless, politicization can – under certain circumstances – *reinforce* professionalization in administrative outcomes. Existing empirical research provides clear evidence of this in developing and democratizing countries.⁹⁸ Therefore, such framework corrects for the classical view that political hiring and firing indicates automatically a spoil-system of administration that presumes to be corrupt, incompetent and likely ineffective in

⁹⁷ Allocation of public offices as a reward for party political support, see (Kopecký *et al.*(2008), Grzymala-Busse (2006)).

⁹⁸ Vom Hau (2012).

public good provision.⁹⁹

Third, this deserves therefore to be investigated separately across time, countries and ministries. This framework allows to assess how politicization and professionalization can combine within one administration, nuancing better how the two combine differently across administrative bodies. Finally, challenging current measures on *Weberianess* such as *rule-based* indicators -formal civil service laws, rules on examination, career stability - this framework disentangles indicators that hint to *incentives* of bureaucrats to comply with public or politicians interest through practices of politicization from their *abilities* to do so by assessing close to the individual traits of education of officials. The implication of this new framework are crucial for analysts in the field. It allows to distinguish between bad cases of politicization and good cases when accompanied with expertise, as well as change the current perspective on post-communist state building being a uni-directional incremental process leading to convergence to a Weberian model of professional and depoliticised administration. As the framework shows, bureaucratic modernization process politicization and professionalization are two aspects that can vary differently across time countries and within an administration. Therefore, this framework corrects for the view in post-communist studies and wider literature on development studies that Weberian convergence is simply born out empirically once civil service laws and procedures are exported into developing state. Evidence just disconfirms this and this framework offers an analytical lens to remedy these views.

The chapter is divided in four parts. The first outlines the various conceptual and operationalization problems of systematized concepts of *Weberianess* in the literature, by claiming that various works build on the dichotomy that is less useful in distinguishing between the diversity of outcomes in bureaucratic reform in reality. The second section focuses on the new framework by providing a definition of the two dimensions in bureaucratic structures such as politicization and professionalization and the four resulting outcomes in nature of administration. The third section discusses the indicators used and the data. The fourth section outlines the implications of this framework for both conceptual and methodological for the literature on post-communist studies.

⁹⁹ Darden (2008).

PROBLEMS IN CURRENT LITERATURE WITH THE WEBERIAN TEMPLATE

A thorough review of all sociological-economic and political science approaches show that they all retain Max Weber's dichotomous typology - professional and depoliticized vs. incompetent and politicized administration. The summary is presented in Figure 2. Each of these approaches have built directly or indirectly on Max Weber's work. In doing so, they suffer from three limitations in accounting for the empirical diversity of hybrid cases. First, they hardly see the intermediate cases between the two ideal types in the Weberian template. Second, they view political hiring and firing as hindering the impersonal conduct of office and therefore, the accumulation of technical expertise and third they all imply that mostly the professional and depoliticized administration is the only one conducive to state effectiveness and public good provision.

First, this literature hardly sees the *intermediate cases* where politicization combines with professionalization as well this literature. The sociological strand represented through the work of Max Weber and the Neo-Weberian scholars view the state, based on Max Weber's definition as a specific organization with a set of institutions and dedicated personnel.¹⁰⁰ Max Weber then established an historical continuum of ideal-type states from the 'patrimonial' at one extreme to the normatively superior 'modern' (i.e. rational-bureaucratic) at the other.¹⁰¹ The 'modern' bureaucracy of the state in Weber's work is cast as an ideal-type whereby the administration is structured in terms of formal-rational bureaucracy¹⁰² and viewed as a successful case of organization of the state for economic development and common good provision. In contrast, in a patrimonial administration staff are selected based on traditional ties with direct dependence in 'patrimonial recruitment'.¹⁰³ This renders them mostly incompetent and not professionally qualified, as technical qualifications are less needed to rule the state. Their dependency affects their incentives to comply

¹⁰⁰ Weber (1978).

¹⁰¹ The distinction between bureaucracy and patrimonial administration consists in two dimension as they as well are linked to different forms of legal authority and as well state power. The first contrasts the form of organization, divisions of jurisdiction, management activities and the content of offices. The second assesses the characteristics of administrative staff and how they relate to the personal ruler. In rational-legal bureaucracy staff have: a) a clearly defined sphere of competence subject to impersonal rule; b) a regular system of appointment based on free contract, technical qualification (tested by examination/diploma) and orderly promotion according to seniority and or achievement (no career system); d) technical training as a regular requirement; e) fixed salaries paid with money(Weber (1978), p. 220-229).

¹⁰² A formal bureaucracy is based on a legal, hierarchical structure and experts' authority deriving from legal constitutional rules, with a clear legal 'jurisdiction' of a bureau. It is hierarchically and rationally organized in a chain of command from higher to lower instances of decision making. Additionally, there is impersonal office holding upon written impersonal rules, where the obligation 'Pflicht' towards the office is to manage and not 'own' it, and office holding and activity is a 'vocation' based on rules and clear competencies that regulate the official careers according to technical qualification and experience. (Weber (1978), p.957).

¹⁰³ Weber (1978).

with the ruler's interest, there being no legal-formal statements of purpose in their office that they can follow independently.¹⁰⁴ However, these concepts are less useful in general in understanding administrative types in democratizing world, where we observe a formally rational and hierarchical administrative structure but with high degree of political appointments, even at lower levels. However, such work has been influential for all other approaches in the study of a bureaucracy, as well for analysts and practitioners in the field.

The Neo-Weberian strand uphold this distinction, with the exception that they extend the Weberian approach. Peter Evans' *Embedded Autonomy* (1995)¹⁰⁵ defined two important attributes of the state influencing its transformative role in market economies: *bureaucratic coherence* and *connectedness*. Evans' concept of 'embedded autonomy' combines measures of the characteristics of state-society relations with Weberian internal structures of the bureaucracy. *Bureaucratic coherence* builds on Weberian characteristics – e.g. merit examination, promotion and tenure – to define a coherent and cohesive professional and politically neutral administration affecting state autonomy, necessary for state effectiveness in production of the common good. In addition, *embeddness*¹⁰⁶ is required, and this is given through the *connectedness*¹⁰⁷ of bureaucracies in strong and dense relations with private sector actors that reinforces state capacity to be effective in transforming economies, by informing bureaucrats of the better policies. The state that is embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies can act developmentally¹⁰⁸. The values here are *collaboration* in successful cases where autonomous bureaucracies are given or *collusion*, in case of politicized administrations. The combination of these two aspects of the state leads to a continuum of state outcomes in a one-dimensional space between two extremes: from predatory connected

¹⁰⁴ Hence, according to Max Weber '[l]oyalty to the office (*Amtstreue*) is not an impersonal commitment (*Dienststreue*) to impersonal tasks which define its extent and content, it is rather a servant's loyalty on a strictly personal relationship.' Weber (1978), p. 1031.

¹⁰⁵ This book came as a response to the neo-utilitarian vision of the state developed in the 1980s used in public choice theories, who have failed to take institutions seriously and have prescribed the recipe of having a 'minimalist state' in developing countries. The concepts of 'embedded autonomy' leading to a developmental state is an advance over dichotomies between 'state versus market' or 'state versus society' in economic transformation, because it 'softens the direct link between bureaucratic autonomy and state capacity in being effective.

¹⁰⁶ 'Embeddness is difficult to describe empirically and it remains not well operationalized in Evans work. Other authors have specified then better the links between bureaucratic coherence and the reinforcing effect such coherence has on building dense ties with the private sector. In Schneider (1991), three mechanisms matter on how coherence affects more pro-active ties with the state: meritocratic procedures lead to selection of professional officials enhancing the ability to collect and possess information from outside actors, promotion by merit, exact *reciprocity* and make *credible longer-term commitments of policies* (p.16) Long tenure permits extended interaction with business and allows personal *trust and networks* to develop

¹⁰⁷ In this second dimension, *embeddness* or *connectedness* ideas build on the work of Gerschenkron (1962) and Hirschman (1989) on state society relations, who try to define that entrepreneurship and a certain type of state intervention triggering private initiative and contributing actively in inventing the entrepreneurial class plays also a role.

¹⁰⁸ Evans (1995).

with failed cases to developmental states associated to successful cases.¹⁰⁹ These works reinforced the consensus on the dichotomy of politicized versus professional Weberian bureaucracies as exclusive in contributing differently to state capacity and not mutually reinforcing in state capacity. However, in new democracies socio-economic class and coalitions are not stable and autonomous, but as well directly linked to political elites. Therefore, the assumption that only the impartial bureaucrat's connectedness with society is effective for the public good seems to be a limited view of reality. In many new democracies, bureaucrats' connectedness with social ties runs mostly through patronage networks of political parties that are beneficial to both political elite but as well to socio-economic groups (eg. Brazil).

The only few works that do not reflect on the organizational links between politics and administration are the *economic approaches*, depicted here through the public choice theories and new public management ideas. As they remain less useful in predicting what is a successful and less successful case in the administration of the state, they do not say much on how politics administrative divisions are -or should be- organized optimally. Rather common to these various strands in economic approaches and differently from the sociological one, is the critical view they have on the state organized along a bureaucracy as the guardian of the public good.¹¹⁰ Here, states are sorted in a bi-nominal categorization: at one end, the predatory state¹¹¹ and at the other the absence of a predatory state.

Niskanen's work¹¹² is emblematic here in its criticism of Weberian approaches. Contra Weber, Niskanen asserts that career orientation reinforces bureaucrats interest in maximizing their own power and prestige by demanding ever-more policy outputs and programmatic feather-beading. Misallocation of state resources is thus driven by bureaucrats' self-interest in expanding their own power, both in terms of pecuniary benefits and prestige within a bureaucracy, leading to sub-optimal social outcomes.¹¹³ However, Niskanen provides no guidance in defining the opposite

¹⁰⁹ Hence, the presence of one of the conditions, either connectedness with organized social groups of the state or the insulation of state through a coherent bureaucracy is not a sufficient condition in economic transformation. Both state autonomy related to bureaucratic coherence (merit instead of political ties) and connectedness (dense ties with private sector) allows states to act developmental, as the mirror image of an 'predatory state', with no autonomy through incoherent bureaucracies (high political loyalist and incompetent) that makes a state work only for certain elites. Intermediate cases that show a different degree in embeddness and autonomy- that is a state with high autonomy and low embeddness, for example India and a state that is less autonomous through politicized bureaucracies and more embedded in its ties with private sector, Brazil- lead to partial results in economic development.

¹¹⁰ Hay *et al.* (2005).

¹¹¹ The definition of the state in these strands remains very vaguely defined, in terms of its positive attributes.

¹¹² While hierarchy, career orientation, bureau specialization and other elements are recognized as necessary for efficient bureaucratic organization in general, Niskanen challenges the notion that they are efficient in providing optimal results in terms of public goods Niskanen (1971).

¹¹³ He claims that 'it is *impossible* for anyone bureaucrat to act in public interest, because of the limits on his information and the conflicting interest of others regardless of his personal motivations' Niskanen (1971), p.39

reference category to the ‘budget maximizing bureaucracy’ that is predatory on state resources. Nor does he give an account of the socially optimal level of bureaucratic output in any case. Hence, questions on recruitment of bureaucrats remain out of focus. In this public choice theorists challenge the Weberian assumptions that serving the common good and bureaucrats’ self-interest can be so readily aligned in a bureaucracy (depoliticized and career orientation), however how does the state still manage to be effective in policy making although its bureaucrats are self-interested as according to Niskanen, remains a conceptual mystery. In line with the Weberian criticism , *new public management*¹¹⁴ turn in public administration literature relies on a strict division between politics and administration in both the policy formulation and implementation phases. The *managerial approach* challenges the requirement of strict rules based and career orientation in civil service, asserting that alternatives like performance orientation and training – as well decentralization of personnel management authority to relevant agencies – will increase competence. The old rule-driven civil service system, which was primarily designed to prevent political hiring and firing rather than to boost the management of the state administration,¹¹⁵ was thus displaced. However, none of the economic approaches is useful in predicting much on the templates about how politics and administration can relate in contributing to an effective administration.

The final approach is the *political science* approach. Its core strength – in contrast to the classical approaches reviewed above – is that it focused almost entirely on the mixture between politics and administration within a civil service system. Two strands are distinguished here the one on *political development* and the other focussing on *party politics*. Mostly the political development strand views variation in administrative type based on variation in politics between clientelistic and patronage-based politics.¹¹⁶ Kitschelt and Wilkinson define how in different political regimes, differences in politician-voters linkages result in different forms of state administrations. This strand relies on the classic dichotomous Weberian conceptualization; clientelistic linkages within a political regime are based on patrimonial and politicized administration, whereas programmatic linkages between politicians and voters, based on professional and de-politicized administration, correlate with effective (i.e. democratic) politics.¹¹⁷ However, the concept of patronage and clientelism have very different meaning and the implications for the set-up of the administration that remain not well defined in these works.¹¹⁸ However, mostly they are used interchangeably,

¹¹⁴ Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011); Hood (2001); Osborne and Gabler (1992); Hood, (1995), Neuhold *et al.*(2013).

¹¹⁵ Wilson (1887) and Weber (1978) assume a strong dichotomy in politics administration through civil service systems.

¹¹⁶ Chandra (2007), Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007).

¹¹⁷ Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007).

¹¹⁸ Ibid. Drawing on Clapham (1985, p. 11-12) distinguish between clientelism and patronage. While clientelism is ‘the politically motivated distribution of favors not to individuals but essentially groups’ patronage refers to the

without distinguishing how different types of political exchange between clientelism and patronage would affect levels of politicization or professionalization in administrative reform outcomes.

Clientelism and patronage concepts are related to the exchange of all sorts of goods and favors from state and non- state resources. While clientelism entails an exchange of the patron to the clients for receiving political support with individual benefits, patronage is viewed as a sub-type of clientelistic exchange and is mostly associated to the discretion of the patron to exchange a specific type of good, that is the public-sector jobs in exchange for political support with more of a collective benefit.¹¹⁹ The literature on *party politics* observes that the successful and failure cases in the administration relate to the extent to which parties use their power to appoint and penetrate the state administration. Hence, the scope and depth of patronage is linked to institutional outcomes in administration. While the recent works delve most in the motivation of party patronage they do not necessarily reflect consequences of those for different motivations for levels of professionalization. Therefore the distinction here is between successful cases where patronage is lacking and cases where patronage is present in administration determining political appointments. Nevertheless, very few works have linked the study of politics to that of the administration in terms of consequences of patronage for personnel decision in an administration.

A *second thematic* limitation in all these strands is that with the exception of a handful of recent works in political science, they all assume explicitly or implicitly that politicization will ultimately hinder professionalization in the bureaucratic modernization process. According to Max Weber, professionalization and state strength is rooted in the rules and methods of selection, promotion, tenure and in the ‘ethos’ of a bureaucrat. ‘Politicization’ is seen as having deleterious effects on both this ‘ethos’ and the impersonal commitment to undertake the functional tasks of the office irrespective of politicians’ interests. It is also seen as producing inferior technical

relations of individuals and bigger groups. Hence, they make a distinction between the recipients ‘individual’ (land office, service) and ‘collective benefits’ (roads, schools) (p. 107). Other distinguish the two not in terms of the type of goods, but rather in the extent to which state resources or not-state resources are used at the discretion of politicians for their own political purposes. Patronage is associated as one sub type of a clientelistic exchange (Oliveros 2013). In the former, only incumbent politicians place jobs in administration in exchange for political support. In clientelistic exchange, also non-incumbents distribute more than just state jobs to supporters, and this is even further linked with any type of material goods. Kopecký *et al.* (2011), narrow down the understanding of patronage as the discretion of parties to provide public sector jobs in public sector and semi-public sector positions. Kopecký and Mair (2006) therefore narrow down the definition of party patronage not as a mean of exchange in a patron client relationship, which they claim is more linked to clientelism for electoral vote, but rather as a resource of party organization to control both policy implementation and strengthen their own power. In this understanding, patronage is not linked to electoral calculations of parties, but just incumbency and governing purposes.

¹¹⁹ Oliveros (2013), Müller (2006), Kopecký *et al.* (2016) views this less and an exchange but rather as simply the discretion of parties to appoint official in public sector positions (p. 6)

expertise¹²⁰. Moreover, because tenure and promotion lead to the career stability to build expertise, political appointments create fluctuations and loss of such knowledge as well interruption of career structures that create the right 'esprit de corps'. Finally, according to Weber politicization erodes the hierarchy principle, as political appointees do not derive their authority from their superiors, but from outside of the bureaucracy. As a result, politicization is negatively associated with professionalization. All the rest of the approaches build strongly on such claim. Except economic approaches that offer no alternative model and some political science approaches that prove useful in showing that logics of party politics provide good theoretical reasons to believe that there is variation in the way politicization combines with levels of professionalization within an administration.

The *third limitation* in all three strands is the substantial differences in theorizing about the implications of these different types of bureaucracies on state effectiveness in public good provision. The most useful ones are the sociological and political science approaches whereas the economic approaches reflect little on the organizational links between politics and administrations. The sociological approaches agree that bureaucratic insulation with connectedness with societal actors leads to better policies and economic development. However, they rely too strong on the dichotomy of politics-administration relations to imply that only a de-politicized and professional administration leads to more effective state. As the discussion on Evans' (1995) above made clear, politicization of administration can lead to very poor outcomes in terms of public goods provision (i.e. Zaire), while it need not do so in other cases (i.e. Brazil). Therefore, connectedness with society though a politicized state does not always lead to a clientelistic state as was the case in Zaire, but as well to states that are effective, as in Brazil. What Evans (1995) might have missed in such conceptualization is that politicized administrations, although undermining impartiality, can still be combined with different levels of expertise in administration capable to connect to outside actors. And if politicization is combined with low levels of expertise (e.g. as in Zaire), it thus clear how the connectedness of the state with society facilitates predatory behavior instead. Where politicization comes with high expertise (as in Brazil), a more developmental state can emerge.

Additionally, indeed Evans shows that a de-politicized administration and less connected state to societal groups (e.g. India) performs less well than the case of a politicized administration that is well connected with society (e.g. Brazil). Therefore, if Evans were to distinguish between

¹²⁰ Weber claims that politicians have no *ex-ante* mechanisms to screen who is the best and second, *ex-post* they would evaluate officials based on experience in services rendered to them rather than technical qualification. Hence, such skills would be less needed to build up administrative expertise (Weber (1978)).

politicization and professionalization within the state organization, he would probably not strictly claim that impartiality is a necessary condition for the state bureaucracy to be rightly connected with society and improve economic development, but that levels of expertise and bureaucratic skill are needed more than impartiality to create the right connections with society in order to implement more effective policies. Hence, the focus on expertise and understanding technical skill in administration has gone unmeasured and more presumed for the fact that politicization most probably implies low levels of bureaucratic skill.

In sum all these approaches share a common assessment that the starting point for conceptualizing administration is in dichotomous Weberian terms that as shown falls short in grasping the diversity of outcomes between politicization and professionalization in an administration in a democratizing context. The ‘Weberian dichotomy’ has thus prevented analysts from seeing how political appointments in a bureaucracy can co-exist with professionalization and affect effectiveness in public administration.

However, there are empirical and theoretical reasons that show that both politicization does not need to hinder competence and that the Weberian professional and de-politicized administration is not the only template conducive to state effectiveness.

Evidence supports the view that political hiring and firing breaks formal authority and impersonal loyalty to the office. However, political appointments do not break the command of decision making (i.e. hierarchy principle needed for effective functions of the state) in new democracies and have not necessarily undermined professionalism or produced highly incompetent administration.¹²¹ Despite this, politicization does hinder certain principles of impersonal management and organizational loyalty to the office and more generally the principle of a rule-based authority. However, this has not led to the break-down of careers and professionalism and therefore, led to towards an equilibrium of ineffectiveness in administrative capacity.¹²² Various works in democratizing countries show that career structures are stable despite politicization, due to stable careers in certain policy areas with revolving doors in and out of the public administration. Additionally, such intense politicization serves the purpose in offering predictability in an administrative environment where there is a lack of a legal and rule-based administration that would take care of that.¹²³

¹²¹ Grindle (2012), Schneider (1991), Gajduschek (2007), Dargent (2015).

¹²² Darden (2008).

¹²³ Schneider (1991).

Other studies confirm the link between high politicization and state effectiveness in Brazil,¹²⁴ Colombia and Chile¹²⁵ where pervasive movements in and out of the bureaucracy have been instrumental in aligning interests of politicians through political loyalists to other socio-economic groups. Hence, such political appointees who were experts informed better macro policy goals and created joint projects of transformation in establishing networks with society and business community. In doing so, they as well build their own careers though not through merit procedures and career stability in administration, but political appointments and politically motivated promotion. Hence, such appointees were still eager to perform well in the eyes of politicians, due to own career concerns in certain policy sectors¹²⁶. The different functions of political appointees in high-capacity states is poorly understood, although Schneider (1991) offers some initial insight based on the Brazilian bureaucracy, building a typology of different appointees and their skills. What is clear is that the assumed negative effect of politicization on professionalization and the capacity of the state to provide public goods need serious re-evaluation.

Finally, also currently the literature on political science shows that there are good theoretical reasons to assume that political appointments can be accompanied with professional criteria. Indeed, different views prevail on what it is that motivates politicization and this provides theoretical grounds for asserting that politicization can be sometimes accompanied by professionalization and in other cases not. First, Kopecký and his colleagues¹²⁷ recognize explicitly that politicization does not necessarily exclude professional criteria in appointments of political loyalists.¹²⁸ Professional criteria (alongside other considerations) clearly factor in political appointments and parties retain the discretion to choose which criteria will apply. Second, some consider the motivation for politicization to be control over policy making,¹²⁹ while others consider it to be solely about exchange between politicians and bureaucrats to ensure the political services of the latter.¹³⁰ We could infer that if politicization is driven by a policy motivation and as a strategy for gaining more control over policy making rather than an as pure electoral and reward strategy for gaining more votes, the implication of that for the administration could be politicization to be

¹²⁴ Schneider (1991).

¹²⁵ Thorp and Durand (1997), p.17.

¹²⁶ Evans, (1995); Schneider (1991).

¹²⁷ Kopecký and Mair (2011); Kopecký *et al.* (2016).

¹²⁸ Kopecký *et al.* (2016);

¹²⁹ Kopecký and Mair (2012), Kopecký *et al.* (2016), Spirova (2008), Müller (2006).

¹³⁰ Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), Oliveros (2015), Grzymala-Busse (2004a, 2004b, 2007), O'Dwyer (2006).

accompanied by professionalism¹³¹. Third, other works contend that the true motivation behind political appointments is best ‘read off’ the position in the hierarchy of an agency where most of the action is taking place.¹³² In other words, which levels and positions are most politically influenced provides a hint to the underlying motivation. If higher levels are affected then it is mostly a policy motivation, and if middle and lower levels are most affected, patronage purposes are driving politicization.¹³³ Finally, because politicians ‘cannot have it all’ and the focal point in the trade-off tends to be between loyalty and competence, some studies theorize that those agencies that require highly ‘technical qualification’ are less likely to be politicized than other less technical agencies.¹³⁴ Hence, one can claim that because of such different motivations behind political appointments and because bureaucracies have policy consequences, politicization that aims for more policy control can be accompanied with levels of expertise in administration, rather than in those cases when politicization serves only as an electoral reward. In all these works, the idea is that political appointees who are loyalists but as well competent can deliver more effectively policies.

To sum up, all the various approaches reviewed here, they all view civil service and patronage systems as different systems in appointment and therefore different systems of incentives and actions of officials to act on public good. They all view mostly with some exceptions of some works in political science approaches, that in a bureaucratic modernization process, politicization undermines levels of professionalization. However as evidence show above there is no reason to do so. According to recent works in party politics and executive politics we would infer that only political appointments that have as a motivation policy control and are constrained at the upper levels of the hierarchy are compatible with competence and therefore, professionalization and provision of public services. All other forms of politicization are more clientelism driven in terms of serving the party or the individual politician to get political support. In order to remedy such limitations, I offer an alternative framework to the Weberian template that takes in consideration better the current evidence on democratizing countries and integrates recent insight of party politics that prove to be useful for such conceptual debate.

¹³¹ Kopecký *et al.* (2016); see also Müller (2006) and Lewis (2008), Kopecký *et al.* (2007), Kopecký and Mair (2011).

¹³² Müller (2006), Lewis (2008).

¹³³ Müller (2006) distinguishes between different types of patronage appointees, such as ‘service patronage’ linked to provision of jobs at low and middle-level positions in exchange for political services within the administration. ‘Power patronage’, in contrast, is related more to appointments at key ‘high level’ positions in administration, but in that case for greater control over the policy implementation process.

¹³⁴ Lewis (2008).

Figure 2: Contrast Spaces in models of administrative state structures

	Contrast spaces in models of administrative state structure	
	Ideal type and its characteristics	Opposite ideal types
	<i>Bureaucracy</i>	<i>Patrimonial administration</i>
Sociological Concepts (statist concept)		
Max Weber (1922)	- technical competence - formal-rule based loyalty	- social status - personal loyalty
Neo-Weberians	<i>Developmental State</i> - technical competence	<i>Predatory State</i> - lack of technical competence
- Evans (1995)	- rule-based loyalty - connections with entrepreneurs	- lack of rule based loyalty - lack of connections with entrepreneurs
Public Choice	Predatory State	Absence of predatory State
- Niskanen (1971)	(n.a)	(n.a)
Economic concepts	<i>Bureaucracy</i>	<i>Managerial Administration</i>
New Public Management	- (See Max Weber)	- managerial competence
- Osborne and Gabler (1992)		- performance based loyalty
Political Development	<i>Bureaucracy</i>	<i>Patrimonial Administration</i>
- Kitchelt and Wilkinson (2007)	- (See Max Weber)	- (See Max Weber)
Political Science Concepts	<i>Party Patronage</i>	<i>Absence of party Patronage</i>
Party Organization	- connection with politicians	- lack of connections with politicians
- Kopecky Mair and Spirova (2012)		
Quality of Government	<i>Good government</i>	<i>Bad Government</i>
- Teorell and Rothstein (2008)	Impartiality in exercise of power - professional standards - absence of political connection - formal selection, promotion procedure	Partiality in exercise of power - lack of professional standards - political connection - lack of formal selection, promotion procedure

A TWO-DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING ADMINISTRATION

I claim that politicization does not need to hinder competence in an administration and therefore the two require separate analysis and distinction. The distinction is needed in order to understand the role of these appointees for both politicians and for the citizens.

Frist, conceptually speaking, just because there is high politicization in an administration we cannot conclude that all political loyalists simply because they follow politicians' interest, don't have incentives to provide effectively policies and services for the public good and are corrupt. Hence, political loyalty alone cannot inform us about the type of loyalty bureaucrats exhibit towards politicians. We know, based on literature on party patronage and clientelism, that political loyalists in administration serve politicians in several ways by rendering back different political services. Particularistic distribution of targeted policies is one, as is conditional welfare transfer.¹³⁵ Higher control over policy implementation¹³⁶ helps maintain the party leadership, reinforce the enlarging the governmental coalition, and bargaining with elective officials' are others.¹³⁷ That can be done for the party alone or for the politician. Second, nor do high levels of politicization imply that such appointees are all incompetent and lack the ability to implement policies. As aforementioned, we know from the party politics literature¹³⁸ that politicization can combine with levels of competence (i.e. when some administrative competence is required in order for loyalists to actually deliver what politicians require of them). The two can be compatible or not, and we need to measure then separately such different incentives reliably, by focusing on different kind of politicization that entail different measures, as we need to focus more on educational traits of abilities of bureaucrats.

Based on politics of service bargain¹³⁹ we know that politicians and bureaucrats stand in a relationship of mutual benefit. The politics of what politicians want and what bureaucrats provide in exchange stand at the core of variation in the nature of administrations. Distinguishing between measures that hint at different type of incentives and abilities of bureaucrats to determine the nature of an administration is crucial. Different incentives to comply with politicians' interests alone by serving narrowly his interests or the incentives of bureaucrats to comply and provide for the public good are determined from recruitment based on political loyalty. Second, different

¹³⁵ Weitz and Shapiro (2012), Oliveros (2013).

¹³⁶ Müller (2007).

¹³⁷ Oliveros (2013, p. 46); Kopecký and Mair (2006); Scherlis (2007); Wilson (1961).

¹³⁸ Kopecký *et al.*, (2016).

¹³⁹ Hood and Lodge (2006).

abilities to implement effectively policies, are determined from competence and policy expertise of bureaucrats. Hence, politicization informs us on the incentives of bureaucrats, while professionalization on the abilities of officials to implement policies.

Reflecting on different *kinds* of politicization requires a focus on measuring directly a number of key variables in practices of party influence on personnel decisions, intensity of turnover of officials, depth across the hierarchy all of which can provide better information on what kind of politicization prevails. There are three main kinds: policy motivation where political hiring and firing is done for control over policies;¹⁴⁰ patronage motivation where political hiring and firing can be done for corruptive policies, but as well for particularistic distribution of target policies;¹⁴¹ and clientelistic politicization that is done purely for electoral support, activism, reward and mobilization.¹⁴²

These three *forms* of politicization entail *different type incentives* of officials to comply with politicians' interest by as well effectively delivering public good or less so. If politicians expect appointees to support them in electoral rallies and electoral mobilization, incentives of bureaucrats to comply just with politicians is high, as in the case of clientelistic administration. Likewise, if a politician's political services are compatible with some public good provision as in the case of patronage-led politicization, incentives are to serve both the public and politicians' interest. Finally, where incentives to provide public good are high, politicians expect some control and better-informed policies.

These different type of politicization, as well require different type of skills and qualifications among officials as well as criteria on how to detect them empirically. We expect levels of competence are needed in cases will differ depending on whether appointees are required simply to support further electoral mobilization, provide a vote in election time or possibly manage policies either to distribute better target policies or conditional cash transfers, or support better implementation of policies in a more 'noble' version of politicization. Before we understand their interaction and how politicization can combine with professionalization in providing different kinds of bureaucratic nature, I first review which definitions from the literature are most suitable.

¹⁴⁰ Lewis (2008), Müller (2006), Kopecký *et al.* (2016).

¹⁴¹ Weitz - Shapiro (2008).

¹⁴² Oliveros (2013).

Defining politicization

There are different ways in defining what constitutes the politicization of the public service that hint at a diversity of related practices associated with political intervention in public administration, as well related to other concepts such as clientelism, patronage or even corruption, as mentioned in Chapter 1. Three strands are relevant to review in their definition of politicization based on executive politics, party politics and public administration literature, based on which I then better integrate them into a definition of politicization.

The first one from the school of executive politics defines them as practices of political appointments based either in positions that are legally allowed or not covered by civil service law,¹⁴³ or positions nominally within the scope of civil service law. Politicization is looked upon either as the ‘addition of political appointees on top of existing career civil service employees *or* the practice of placing loyal political appointees into important bureaucratic posts formerly held by career professionals or taking out of the scope of civil service officials.¹⁴⁴ Hence, both the *addition* of political appointees and *penetration* through replacement of civil servants with political appointees are defined as forms of politicization. Stahlberg (1987) defines politicization ‘as party political *favoritism* in recruitment and promotion of civil servants’¹⁴⁵ by focusing on three main characteristics. First, ‘politicization may be portrayed in terms of extent, how many positions are filled politically’. Second, by ‘how deep in the administrative hierarchy ... politicization extend[s] its influence’. Third, ‘in terms of intensity of politicization [which] is defined as “how blatant is the patronage and the disregard for normal recruitment procedures”.¹⁴⁶ The more a political party penetrates in the hierarchy by replacing civil service posts, and the higher the disregard of procedures, the higher the levels of patronage-led politicization.

Lewis also defines politicization as the simple penetration and increase in number of political appointments,¹⁴⁷ but leaves it open for empirical scrutiny as to whether this is done for policy or patronage purposes. He views politicization as ‘efforts to increase or decrease the number of appointees’ and then he further claims that this ‘may or may not increase to the extent to which an agency’s work is politicized’.¹⁴⁸ This proxy excludes aspects of political manipulation

¹⁴³ Lewis (2008).

¹⁴⁴ This definition is based also on further other works Dunn (1997), Hecl (1977), Lewis (2005), Stahlberg (1987), Suleiman (2005).

¹⁴⁵ Stahlberg (1987, p.368).

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ Lewis (2008), p. 2 and Lewis (2012) p.43.

¹⁴⁸ Lewis (2012), p. 45.

of recruitment procedures such as how intense the replacement of civil service is based on party loyalty, or how blatant ‘patronage’ is as a phenomenon of politicization, hinting at different types of politicization, as done so in Stahlberg’s definition (1987). Therefore, the former authors’ definition is less useful in understanding new democracies.¹⁴⁹ It is Stahlberg’s (1987) definition that the framework presented here finds most useful. Incidentally, this also finds reflection in Meyer-Sahling and Veen’s (2013) definition, presented in the section discussing operationalization.

The second definition chosen is based on the party politics literature and views politicization as synonymous with party patronage. In the party politics literature, politicization is defined as party motivated or politically motivated appointments in administration. Kopecký *et al.* (2016) defines politicization as:

‘exclusively concerned with the ability of political parties to appoint individuals to (non-elective) positions in the public and semi-public sector, including posts in core civil service, foreign embassies, state-owned companies or regulatory agencies, and the practical exercise of this ability.’¹⁵⁰

This approach is thus mostly linked to party patronage concepts. While they do not exclude the professional criteria, they still focus in their definition only on one type of politicization based on party loyalty.

Two critiques arise from these definitions. First, what different *kind* of politicizations¹⁵¹ are affected by parties for what purposes, and how this affects penetration of influence in a hierarchy is discarded. Müller’s (2006) distinction between ‘service patronage’ and ‘power patronage’ is more helpful in this direction. Politicization for policy purposes occurs at the highest level of a bureaucracy, while for patronage purposes more at mid and lower levels¹⁵². The way to

¹⁴⁹ Lewis (2008) proves less useful for three reasons: measuring only the extent in number of political appointment, without regarding the replacements of civil servants, does not distinguish on the intensity of party patronage every party comes to power. Second, the definition of politicization excluding party loyalty criteria does not assess politicization in its different typology and character. Third, it measures politicization in the legally allowed scope of political appointments, which does not look at the replacements of civil service with political appointments that is the most relevant aspect in post-communist bureaucracies.

¹⁵⁰ Kitschelt *et al.* (2016), p. 418.

¹⁵¹ Lewis (2008) distinguishes between policy and patronage purposes, the former as an exchange for more control over policies, while the latter is understood as an exchange for either ex ante provided political support (support in electoral campaign).

¹⁵² The mechanism is also a different one. ‘Service patronage’ occurs because politicians appoint officials whom they trust to those areas they consider important for administration in order to align bureaucrats’ actions in

distinguish that would be to include criteria that assess the civil servants links with parties as well as those where only political contacts matter. The prevalence of the former over the latter would hint to the patronage aspect behind politicization.

Second, Kopecký et al (2016) viewed politicization as the *discretionary* power of parties to appoint officials, but excludes the *transactional* aspects related to politicization that renders it similar to clientelistic or patronage concepts. However, other authors in party politics show politicization at the top can become ‘a pre-requisite for both allocating political loyalists at the highest echelons in order to control policy implementation and as well in order to ask those trustees to render them all sorts of other political services’.¹⁵³ Those can include *favours* related to personal (self-enrichment) or political corruption (related to financing of politics), clientelism (related to manipulation of bureaucratic regulative and distributive authority of targeted public programs, or distribution of economic rights to supporters) and other forms of pork-barrel politics. Hence, allocation of jobs in administration based on party loyalty, can be both done in exchange for electoral services provided *ex ante* – related to political services during campaigning and election times—but as well *ex post* and even more important acting as a trustee for all other sorts of political favours and support.

The third definition based on public administration works, understands and defines politicization along the *formal procedural rules*. They focus on political influence over senior ranking appointments in following components: who makes the recruitment and promotions, what rules are in place for remuneration, promotions and training and what criteria are used for appointments and examinations. Meyer-Sahling’s concept of ‘formal political discretion’ determines who has the formal decision-making authority in personnel decisions (government versus administration) and which procedural constraints exist on the exercise of this decision-making authority¹⁵⁴. These two determine if there is high or low formal political discretion in civil service laws, therefore enabling or constraining politicization, understood as the political discretion embedded in such laws. In Peters and Pierre¹⁵⁵ politicization is defined broadly as ‘the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion and disciplining of members of the public service’.¹⁵⁶ In these definitions, we have less of an understanding of the conscious choice

implementation of policies with politicians’ policy preferences. In contrast, ‘power patronage’ is more associated to the distribution of jobs in the public administration as an exchange for the client’s political support ‘outside’ the job. The power patronage definition is closest to the clientelism concepts presented in Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007).

¹⁵³ Oliveros (2013) p.48

¹⁵⁴ Meyer-Sahling (2006).

¹⁵⁵ Peters and Pierre (2004).

¹⁵⁶ In further works of Neuhold *et al.* 2013, Peters (2013) further disaggregates this definition into further six different categories, in order to understand the interaction of politics and administrative relations. Amongst other

of politicians to replace civil servants with political loyalists through recruitment and dismissals, but more of politicization as derived in the formal rules and who *de jure* can use more formal or less formal discretion in personnel decision. Again, the growing evidence is that politicization is not about the formal rules alone, but about the deliberate practices of politicians in influencing recruitment that is established in recent works in democracies¹⁵⁷ and democratizing countries.¹⁵⁸

What is politicization?

Based on these three different understandings, the thesis tries to integrate better executive politics with the party politics by defining politicization *as the conscious choice of politicians and not only parties, to strategically influence the hiring and firing of officials in all senior positions and those covered by the scope of civil service, based on both political loyalty and party loyalty criteria in exchange for political services*. This understanding is closer to both party politics literature in works represented through Kopecký *et al.* (2016), and to those on executive politics and political appointments represented in Lewis (2008), Stahlberg (1978), Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2013), and it is less so with the de-jure formal approach to understanding politicization in Peter and Pierre (2004) and Meyer-Sahling (2006), Page (1992).

The definition on politicization in this thesis broadens and combines the party politics and executive politics literature in the following directions. First, it integrates the party or political contact motivation into one definition of politicization as this is done in the party politics literature and it leaves it to empirical scrutiny to assess which one prevails most in reality. Hence, this makes it possible to show which countries have party loyalty criteria as a dominant feature in personnel decisions and where political contacts across parties matter more than single party affiliations. This matters again for us to better understand the incentives of bureaucrats.

Second, it broadens the definition on politicization provided in Lewis (2008) that was narrowly defined as a number of political appointees in two ways: first by integrating better the aspects configured in Stahlberg (1987) and Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2013) as turnover after

processes he refers to direct political intervention in the nomination of civil servants ('direct politicisation'), the nomination of highly professional but as well political loyalists 'professional politicization', the use of additional controlling structures such as cabinets 'redundant politicization', even the influence of the social sector on the nomination of career civil servants. The categories both encompass forms where politicization is a conscious choice by politicians as well where it results from structural features of the political system (Neuhold *et al.* 2013, p.4).

¹⁵⁷ Lewis (2008), Ennser- Jedenastik (2015).

¹⁵⁸ Grindle (2012), Hagopian (2013).

elections and depth of political appointments in positions within the scope of civil service and not outside its scope as done in Lewis (2008). This reflects better the post-communist context where politicians' influence in personnel runs down to the lower level position in the administrative hierarchy and does not restrain itself to the formally allowed positions of political appointees.

Third, the extent to which recruitment is influenced by loyalty to party or political contacts combined with the penetration of influence in the hierarchy of an administration allows for analysis of the various *kinds* of politicization. We may thus decipher whether politicization is limited to the top or if it runs through until the lower levels, irrespective of whether the 'trustee' has been placed for clientelistic purposes like allocation of jobs for vote exchange, or for more support in rendering other political services,¹⁵⁹ or for more control over public policies and its outcomes.¹⁶⁰ For all these purposes, a trusted loyalist rather than a career civil servant is needed. These different motivations should not change the definition and therefore the criteria that inform the definition of politicization, that is politicization is done always strategically in order to gain something in return on both politicians' and bureaucrats' side. Analyzing how far it penetrates and accounting for party loyalty, would allow us to better understand the patronage component in such politicization practices. This leads me to the next point.

Fourth, my definition views politicization as a 'contractual' agreement between politicians and bureaucrats, where politicians gain loyalty, and loyalists are rewarded with careers, salary and a job, or even other benefits.¹⁶¹ In contrast, Kopecký *et al.* (2016) provides a definition in politicization as just the abilities of parties to hire and fire without receiving anything in return. I claim that politicization usually happens strategically because of the *ex-ante* political services that those officials provide to politicians or because of the expected political service officials can still provide *ex-post* once appointed by the politician. There is the benefit of the provision of political support that is related to providing those 'jobs to the boys' for some support inside or outside the job. From a bureaucrats' perspective rendering political services during elections either in expectation of getting the job (*ex-ante*), and provision of political service after getting the job (*ex-post*), are both possible and should be included in understanding politicization as a strategic choice of politicians in getting something in return, both on the politicians' and bureaucrats' side.

¹⁵⁹ Stokes (2007).

¹⁶⁰ Kopecký, Scherlis and Spirova (2008), Kopecký *et al.* (2016).

¹⁶¹ Also similar to Grindle (2012)'s definition and Hood and Lodge (2012) who see politician and bureaucrats in an exchange relationships which other.

Therefore, politicians gain political services of various types either rendered in past or promised in the future through hiring and firing in the state administration. In contrast to Kopecký *et al.* (2016), who views politicization close to the party patronage concepts without any motivation on receiving services in return, I claim that there is a *transactional and reciprocal* dimension to the *discretionary*¹⁶² component in this definition of politicization that is common to broader concepts of patronage and clientelism.¹⁶³ By appointing loyalists rather than relying on the civil service,¹⁶⁴ politicians seek either more control over certain policies, or more political support in all sorts of forms, or simply for corruptive behaviour or a combination of these forms.

However, the understanding of politicization in this thesis is distinguished from the aforementioned definitions in three ways. First, in this thesis politicization is focused only on the exchange of jobs between politicians and bureaucrats in central state administration positions, excluding any other type of clientelistic goods (all sorts of vote-buying strategies). Second, its benefits are beyond the individual patron-client relationship. Hence, the benefit and what politicians receives in return by influencing the job in the state administration is much more than those generally understood as ‘clientelistic’ in Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007). Here what is typically meant is a job in exchange for a single vote. Third, it is also wider than just the corruptive behavior in abusing public authority for private interests. The understanding given to politicization is as a source with much wider implications for maintaining and gaining political power for political parties’ organization, where political appointees can render them back both resources and political services. More on the theoretical link between political parties and politicization, will be introduced in Chapter 2. Finally, similarly to Kopecký *et al.* (2016), these appointments do not exclude by definition merit and professional qualifications. Similarly, different forms of politicization can combine differently with levels of professionalization, affecting the different type on ‘execution of power’ towards public good provision or more towards political interests.

¹⁶² Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007)

¹⁶³ Oliveros (2013) shows how patronage, clientelism and corruption concepts have in common the transactional component, where job or something else is done in exchange for some political interest.

¹⁶⁴ Hence, politicians hire and fire, always in order to receive something in return, either higher compliance with certain policy views, or control over certain policy outcomes, or more support from those officials during electoral times, or even more control over public authority to favor certain groups or simply enrich themselves linked to ideas of state capture. In all this they politicize in order to receive something in return that goes beyond the individual benefit and electoral benefit only.

What politicization is not

First, this thesis concentrates on how civil servants are recruited in practice, not on their tasks or on their political sympathies, as well as all other practices in redefining or decreasing the scope of civil service. Hence, political loyalty is not an exclusive criterion, but professional criteria can inform appointment decisions, altogether affecting the incentives and actions of bureaucrats to maintain the professional integrity needed in affecting public good provision. However, the thesis does not focus on the extent to which those political appointees fulfil professional criteria, but rather capture indirectly the extent to which professional characteristics of bureaucrats prevail in those administrations despite political appointments. The combination of the two is expected to lead to the four outcomes presented later on in Figure 3.

Second, as there exist various other forms of politicization of public administration, I understand politicization as political intervention in who is recruited and dismissed based on political affiliations within the scope of civil service by replacing those officials in civil service with political loyalists but as well the strategic influence of the very scope of civil service by taking senior ranks out of the scope of civil service. Hence politicization is linked directly to patterns of recruitment and not patterns of influencing behaviour or attitudes without replacements. This is a different form than other understandings in the literature that define politicization as political or societal influence of the *behavior and attitudes of public servants* through other forms of political or societal intervention affecting the tasks and agency decision making and not through recruitment.¹⁶⁵

Therefore, I rather focus on *de facto* extent of politically motivated recruitment and dismissals in positions that are nominally and legally within the scope of civil service. However, I also understand politicization as the strategic influence of politicians to exclude positions that were meant to be covered by the scope of civil service. The understanding of politicization is related to the attitudes and behaviour tied to the expectations following political recruitment or positions, rather than any other forms used.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981), Peters (2013) come with a six group categorization in the politicization.

¹⁶⁶ I drew inspiration though the works of Stahlberg (1987).

Finally, the difference in the concept of politicization to ‘clientelism’ is here the explicit usage of ‘state resources’ or positions in administration and therefore positions within the scope of civil service in return for political support or extracting policies authority away from the responsibility of the administration towards those of politicians. It is different from clientelism in two ways. First, its benefits are beyond the individually targeted ones and it is not only purely linked to vote-buying phenomena for electoral support (i.e., exchange of jobs in order to secure votes). Stokes (2007) mentions patronage involves large rewards it is exchanged not for a single vote, but for a broader electoral support.¹⁶⁷ Second, it includes other political services rendered *ex-ante*. These can include as helping with campaigns, attending rallies, monitoring elections, and granting favours to voters. Moreover, it includes services rendered *ex-post*, such as directing certain policies to certain target groups or favouring certain groups over others in public decision authority. This makes it most similar and a prerequisite for some types of corruption and some types of clientelism. Third, it has implications for gaining broader electoral or political support through targeted public good provision as well.¹⁶⁸

Therefore, this definition is similar to party patronage in allowing us to view politicization as a form of providing jobs in administration for more control. It broadens its understanding by including all service rendered in exchange for political or policy support in all what comes with that job position and the public authority of the state tied to that job position. The benefits are reciprocal for both, those who receive the jobs and those who provide them.¹⁶⁹

Defining professionalization

Professionalization is understood mainly as the establishment of merit rather than political loyalty in various recruitment and selection procedures. Focusing mostly on the ‘selection method’,¹⁷⁰ the literature distinguishes between characteristics of political appointees and career civil servants, assuming that the latter are more competent than the former.

The competence mechanism of such definitions as in Evans and Rauch (1999) and Dahlström *et al.* (2011) is reflected in various civil service procedures and rules that hint at a ‘closed career system’. Such a system uses career-based incentives and socialization of norms to create

¹⁶⁷ Stokes (2007, p.15).

¹⁶⁸ Stokes (2007).

¹⁶⁹ Mazzucca and Munck (2014).

¹⁷⁰ Evans and Rauch (1999), Dahlström *et al.* (2011); Nistoskaya and Cingolani (2014)

the ‘esprit de corps’ (and superior technical expertise) than is found in systems of political appointments. Neshkova and Kostadinova (2012) define the competence mechanism as ‘the establishment of a competent civil service that maintains professional integrity in the formulation and implementation of public policies’.¹⁷¹ As claimed the selection method based on formal procedures, decides on what criteria are bureaucrats selected political loyalty or merit.¹⁷² Hence, such measures are mostly about understanding political neutrality rather than the actual competence or abilities of officials.

Additionally, as shown in the previous chapter, closed systems of civil service have been criticized by the managerial approaches to public administrations. Those works have claimed that indicators on seniority and therefore public administration experience do not always adequately capture expertise in an administration¹⁷³ and even less so in terms of effective policies towards citizens. Additionally, the definition of expertise remains vague: is expertise linked to a particular policy area, or rather procedural competence (e.g. public affairs, legislative relations, information technology)?¹⁷⁴ Therefore, the measurement of competence is a difficult task.¹⁷⁵ However, despite these confusions and difficulties, there are at least two universally accepted truths: i) there is substantial variation in managerial abilities (quality) of officials in agencies; and (ii) this variation has a systematic effect on policy outcomes.¹⁷⁶ It is still unclear if education traits and greater training or even subject area expertise are related to higher organizational competence.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, there is widespread consensus that the more officials are professional the higher the managerial quality is in an organization leading to policy success.

This chapter therefore defines professionalization closest to the managerial quality definition: the *abilities of officials to implement policies with professional integrity*. This is also defined in various literature as most similar to concepts of capabilities and state capacity¹⁷⁸ and professional integrity or ‘organizational competence’.¹⁷⁹ The accumulation of expertise within the administration is less understood on procedures such as formal examination procedures in the selection process, but based more on individual educational traits of personnel and their policy expertise. This definition is closest to the other works measuring expertise approaches in

¹⁷¹ Neshkova and Kostadinova (2012 p. 325).

¹⁷² Dahlström *et al.* (2011)

¹⁷³ Maranto (1992), Osborne and Gabler 1990

¹⁷⁴ Lewis (2010).

¹⁷⁵ Lewis (2010).

¹⁷⁶ Hicklin and Godwin (2009).

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Fukuyama (2013).

¹⁷⁹ Vom Hau (2012).

bureaucracies¹⁸⁰ closest to individual traits on education of officials and subject area expertise. However, it is not to be used interchangeably with concepts on state capacity, as the latter one includes various other related phenomena.¹⁸¹

Four outcomes in the state-building process relating to politics and administration relations

I claim that the quality of the bureaucracy is understood in this thesis in the combination of levels of politicization in positions within the scope of civil service (also political neutrality) and professionalization within one administration yielding four different outcomes. The point of using these definitions of politicization and professionalization is to capture best the goals of post-communist civil service reform in separating the interests of bureaucrats and politicians and improving bureaucrats' abilities to implement policies. Politicization is defined as the conscious choice of politicians and or parties, to strategically influence the hiring and firing of officials in positions within the scope of civil service based on both political loyalty and party loyalty criteria in exchange for political services. Professionalization is defined as the establishment of a competent civil service that maintains professional integrity in the formulation and implementation of public policies. In contrary to the single dimension in the distinction of politicized versus professionalized administration, the two dimensions combined lead then to the following typology (see figure 3): responsible administration (high professionalization, low politicization), patronage-led administration (high professionalization, high politicization), clientelism-led administration (low professionalization, low politicization), mediocracy-led administration (low politicization, low professionalization).

Politicization and competence can combine therefore differently at the aggregated administrative level for the following reasons. Political loyalists might also be experts, when certain political services are asked more than others. If political appointees need to provide political support in administrations to contribute to better implementation of policies, politicians would target the higher bureaucratic levels¹⁸² of the civil service with higher policy making authority than lower levels with more executing power. In this case we expect political appointments not to

¹⁸⁰ Meier and O'Toole (2002) construct a managerial quality definition by including, salary, education and experience. Gajduschek (2007) also includes education traits and seniority in administration as indicators of expertise.

¹⁸¹ For an overview of the various dimensions on state capacity see Fukuyama (2013).

¹⁸² Müller (2007).

forego expertise. However, if they need to distribute particularistic goods for political gain (like targeted welfare policies or conditional transfers) they would target the middle level.¹⁸³ In both cases, political loyalty and competence are characteristics that can be compatible. In contrast, in cases where political appointees are supposed in helping parties with electoral mobilization, or simply corrupt activities, the lower levels of bureaucracies would be more the target.¹⁸⁴ Works show that politicians politicize more the lower or middle levels of a bureaucratic hierarchy that have more executing, and decision-making authority than broader policy making authority. It is expected that such political services do not require a lot of skill. As a result, politicization foregoes competence or not, conditional on what politicians want from such public-sector employees¹⁸⁵ and therefore what type of services such officials offer back to politicians.

If politicization is constrained only at the highest ranks, where political contacts rather than party loyalty matters more and civil service careers are stable, and bureaucrats are competent, then politicization serves the more control over policy-making,¹⁸⁶ leading to a *responsible type of administration*. The *responsible-led* administration is closest to the Weberian template, allowing certain political appointees to be allocated only at the higher echelons of the administration and at the top of the civil service career, whereas the levels of expertise and professional integrity in implementation of policies is high. This type of administration is most prevalent in more established democracies. Politicization is mostly done to optimally align policies with citizens' needs. Political responsiveness through control of political appointments does not hinder competence and therefore provision of public services. Rather it is done to better improve the implementation of policies.

If politicization is constrained more at upper level and middle levels based on party loyalty with high intensity and turnover, and bureaucrats are somehow competent, then political appointments serve particularistic distribution of target policies towards voters. Corruptive practices are not excluded here, but political appointees need some policy management competence and expertise to deliver those services. In *patronage-led administration*, extensive political hiring and firing of civil servants that serve politicians with political services is still associated with administrative functioning through professionalization that is capable of public good provision. This shows that rendering political services as well as implementing professionally certain policies can coincide, particularly in the cases where politicians hire appointees to direct certain policies

¹⁸³ Weitz - Shapiro (2012).

¹⁸⁴ Oliveros (2013).

¹⁸⁵ Lewis (2008), Kopecký, *et al.* (2008).

¹⁸⁶ Müller (2007).

towards target groups.¹⁸⁷

Figure 3: Typology of politics-administration relations between levels of politicization and professionalization

		Levels of professionalization: The degree of ability to provide for the public good			
Indicators	1. Responsible bureaucracy		2. Patronage-led bureaucracy		
	High Competence	Low politicization (only at the top)	High-Competence	High-medium politicization (top and middle level)	
		Politicization at the top Low intensity High Political Contacts Stable Careers		Politicization at the middle-level Medium intensity High-Medium party loyalty Unstable careers	
	University degree: >90% English skills: 50-69%	No political appointments Low Turnover >10% Some Pol. contacts 30-49%	University degree :>90% English skills: 50-69% Expertise:	Grey area Turnover 30-49% Pol contacts: 30% Party experience:	
Indicators	3. Mediocrity-led bureaucracy		4. Clientelism-led bureaucracy		
	Low Competence	Medium-low politicization (only at the top)	Low Competence	High-politicization (low level)	
		Politicization at the top-middle level Low Intensity No party or political contacts Stable careers		Politicization until the low level High Intensity High party loyalty Unstable careers	
	University degree :>90% English skills: 10-49%	Grey- area Turnover >10% Pol. contacts >10% Party experience: >10%	University degree :>90% English skills: 30-49% PhD Degree:	Political Turnover 30-49% Pol contacts: 50-69% Party experience:	
		Levels of politicization- incentives to comply with politicians' interests or public good			

The *patronage-led* bureaucracies are not like the *responsible* ones, in terms of being strict rule-based and formal-rational bureaucracies. They entail a high level of professional integrity, career structures that oriented eventually around sectoral policies in and outside the administration. Further works show how political appointees maintain professional integrity,¹⁸⁸ and how career structures can still be predictable although not in a hierarchical fashion within an administration. Such bureaucracies resemble a 'highly dense web of patronage networks',¹⁸⁹ where 'predictability and certainty on bureaucracies does not derive from the strict formal organization of bureau, but through the intense personal networks'.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ Weitz - Shapiro (2008); Oliveros (2013).

¹⁸⁸ Grindle (2012), Schneider (1991), Gajduschek (2007).

¹⁸⁹ Gryzmala - Busse and Loung (2002 p. 3).

¹⁹⁰ Schneider (1991, p.45).

This corresponds to similar works that have shown how non-formal organization of bureaucracies, based more on high levels of political appointments can still produce effective states.¹⁹¹ Administrations instead are institutionally very porous and vary differently across ‘islands of excellence’,¹⁹² ‘pockets of efficiency’¹⁹³ and other ‘islands of clientelism’, allowing the administration to function overall well, but only in certain sectors more than others. We could imagine the Brazilian bureaucracy and those in many post-communist countries fitting in this category.

In contrast, if politicization penetrates until down to the lower level, with high party loyalty and unstable careers, and administration shows little competence then eventually the mechanism behind such appointments is that politicians want appointees to deliver corruptive activities and services based on electoral mobilization and activism resembling a more *clientelism-led administration*. The combination in outreach of politicization in a bureaucratic hierarchy from top to the lower levels, is combined with blatant patronage informing political appointment and dismissals and low levels of competence. In *clientelism-led* administration, politicization is combined with low administrative functioning and low professionalism in implementing public policies. Many African countries like Zaire, or as well highly politicized structures of the state where professional integrity and administrative functioning is valued less would fit in this category.¹⁹⁴ Those cases are well described in the literature as being predominantly captured from the political elite in serving only their self-interest without any need to deliver for citizens and where professional integrity and expertise is quite low.

In the case of *mediocracy-led* administration, there is a low level of politicization or patronage based hiring and firing within the administration that serves with political goods, but as well it operates under a low level of professionalism, showing that absence of political hiring and firing in this case can still be combined with lack of professionalism in one administration. Many diverse cases in Southeast Asia would fall under this categorization as combining somehow strong legacies on rule of law principles through ancient and colonial rule, and therefore a strong role of central bureaucracies. However, in these cases the low role of politics in recruitment is combined with a mediocre elite of bureaucrats that barely manages societal outcomes,¹⁹⁵ showing very different constellations from the patronage-led one with high professionalism as an institutional outcome.

¹⁹¹ Daarden (2008), Schneider (1991).

¹⁹² Goetz (2001).

¹⁹³ Geddes (1994), Evans (1995).

¹⁹⁴ Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), Vom Hau (2012).

¹⁹⁵ Sabharwal and Berman (2013), Evans (1995).

Assessing politicization in practices of party influence, intensity of turnover, depth across the hierarchy, would provide better information on what kind politicization prevails, policy, patronage or clientelistic, and hence, if incentives of bureaucrats to comply with politicians or public good prevail to perform which tasks and service.

MEASUREMENT AND DATA

To measure politicization and professionalization I draw on Jan Meyer-Sahling's (2010) expert survey data collected in seven Southeastern European cases over seven ministries.¹⁹⁶ I build two indexes, one on politicization and one on professionalization to demonstrate the cross-country and cross-ministerial variation in Southeastern Europe. However, in lack of variation over time, in levels of politicization, I use a second empirical strategy. I offer another framework that I have inductively developed in measuring levels of politicization as the gap between adopted civil service procedures and institutions on one hand, and practices of political influence on recruitment and dismissal on the other, hinting to variation over time in politicization in different governments in Albania.

Figure 4: Operationalization of politicization

Operationalization: Politicization
Appointment practices¹⁹⁷ (Extent of politicization)
Range or Depth of political appointments: Scale 1–3 Coding: 1= mainly political appointments, 2 = mixture between political and non-political, 3 = mainly political appointments
1.Until which level does the influence of ministers and prime minister in personnel policy matter?
Intensity of politicization: Scale 1–6 Coding:1= less than 10%; 2= 10–29%; 3= 30–49% 4=50–69%; 5=70–80%; 6=90%
2. What is the extent of turnover by change partisan government?
3.Party loyalty: How important are party affiliations in personnel policy?
4.Political contacts: How important are political contacts in personnel policy?

This chapter operationalizes politicization in recruitment and dismissals using the indicators on Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2013) in CEEs (see Figure 4). The practices of politicization measured in the politicization index in Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012) hint at the same understanding and definition of Stahlberg (1987). There are indicators that hint at how deep politicization penetrates the civil service hierarchy (*range*) and other three indicators that hint

¹⁹⁶ More information on the expert survey and the data gathered is shown in Appendix Chapter 2. The data were validated with further interviews and questions for Albania and Macedonia.

¹⁹⁷ This is mostly similar to the works of Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2013)

at *intensity* of political hiring and firing:¹⁹⁸

The four components are presented in Figure 4 and can be summarized as following: The *range* of politicization is described through: (1) depth of political appointees- extent of political or ministerial influence in recruitment across levels of civil servants; the *intensity* of politicization is described through the following indicators: (2) turnover of civil servants; (3) the extent of political appointees with party background experience hinting at party loyalty, and; (4) the extent of political contacts- relevance of political networks and turnover after elections- hinting at intensity of politicization.

Figure 5: Operationalization of professionalization

Operationalization of professionalization
Competence in outcomes: Scale 1–6 Coding:1= less than 10%; 2=10–29%; 3=30–49% 4=50–69%; 5=70–80%; 6=90%
Education indicators: University degree, PhD degree, English language skills, - At which extent have civil servants a <u>university degree</u> ? - At which extent have civil servants a <u>PhD degree</u> ? - What proportion is fully proficient in <u>English</u> ?
Policy Expertise indicators: Scale 1–3 Coding: 1 = no policy expertise, 2 =medium policy expertise, 3= high expertise
Which university subjects are most common among current senior officials in the Ministry X? (Law, Economics/Finance, Engineering, Natural Science, Political Science). ¹⁹⁹

Professionalization is measured less procedurally in terms of extent to which bureaucracies are ‘closed regulate systems’ and guarantee seniority and tenure, as these indicators have received wide criticism for not really measuring professionalism(see Figure 5).²⁰⁰ Nor does it measure it through the extent of examination procedures, because they conflate the principle of open competition and ‘undue influence’ with that of competence²⁰¹ but rather more directly along the individual expertise such as % of University degree, % of PhD degree, % of English skills and % experts compatible with the sector. Again, these indicators are mostly used in the managerial definitions on quality of management.²⁰² I test how these two are interrelated in my cases.

In order to have a reliable and valid indicator on politicization, four experts per ministry were asked to give opinions based along these empirical phenomena, which hint at politically

¹⁹⁸ see Appendix Chapter 1 and 3, the information under “Expert Survey and dataset information”.

¹⁹⁹ In the original dataset, this question has been asked to rank the top five subjects most common to a ministry, where 1 is equal to the most common and 5 to the least common. I have transformed the rank variable into an interval one, by defining for the 7 ministries the four most “appropriate” subjects.

²⁰⁰ Maranto (1998 , 2002), Grindle (2012), Sundell (2012).

²⁰¹ Sundell (2012).

²⁰² Hickling and Godwin (2009).

motivated appointments at the top civil servant levels. Questions had to be answered separately for all top civil servant levels in the ministerial hierarchy, across seven ministries within one country and across the seven Southeastern European countries.²⁰³

Across the two indexes, each subcategory was weighted equally, giving them a maximum score of 5 points. A country could thus receive a maximum of 25 points; these scores were standardized to 100. The same procedure was repeated for the index on competence. The results and indicators together with the description of outcomes are presented in the next section. There are four possible outcomes along these two dimensions that were then shown in Figure 3 – from the ideal-type 1, where bureaucrats' careers are de-politicized and professional, to the other extreme represented in type 4, with high politicization and low levels of professionalism. Where in section two, bureaucratic professionalization was a continuous variable between these two ideal types, this conceptualization complements the level of politicization with the degree of competence which opens up two other possible outcomes: high politicization and high competence (type 2) and no politicization and low competence (type 3). The four types of outcomes are explained in Figure 3.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY ON ADMINISTRATIVE STATE REFORMS

As recognized in the literature, the statist strand and the literature on public administration has ignored seriously the 'dramatic changes of the post-communist administrative state' and the ways it challenges current assumptions of the state and the current models on analysing success or failure in nature of administration in serving the public or the private good through civil service reform. Post-communist studies, have then failed to enrich these strands with their evidence. As a result of this lack of dialogue, the literature on state bureaucracy and neo-statist literature have been influential in studying and assessing outcomes in post-communist state building through civil service reform as summarized in Figure 6 below.²⁰⁴ The Weberian bureaucratic model (Point 2.1 in Figure 6) has led to certain expectations both about the state building *process* (Point 2.2) and

²⁰³ See Appendix Chapter 1 and 3, Table 1.

²⁰⁴ In Figure 1, column one shows the assumption on the analysis of the state and its administration, the state as unitary intentional actor and the state organized along the Weberian bureaucracy in order to be successful (see figure 1 point column 1, point 1 and 2). Both of them have created expectations on institutional outcomes in post-communist state building (see figure 1 column 2 point 2.1 and 2.2 and 2.3) and how state building through civil service reform should happen (see figure 1 column 2 point 2.4) and are contradicted in light of empirical evidence (see figure 1 column 3 point 2.2 and 2.5). Therefore, I offer a new framework that is presented preliminarily in column four in Figure 1, and will be elaborated in the next chapter more in depth.

outcomes (Point 2.1). The one-party state administration found during communism, had recruitment and remuneration procedures based on party loyalty or the *nomenklatura* system. This classical bureaucracy template that was also only partially successful in the West²⁰⁵ created two expectations when adopted in the case of post-communist countries.

First, with regard to the process, once civil formal service laws would be ‘dumped’ into the party patronage-networked state, the Weberian and rational legal bureaucracy with its own procedures and jurisdiction should have changed incrementally and uniformly ‘under-bureaucratized behavior’,²⁰⁶ such as political hiring and firing that should have been substituted by regulations of civil service systems. The extension of formal meritocratic procedures in recruitment and remuneration and delegation of authority in personnel policies to state central management units was expected to change practices of politically motivated hiring and firing, so called ‘politicization’ and in a second step, increase level of competence inside bureaucracies-‘professionalization’ (Point 2.2).²⁰⁷

Second, with regard to state reform *outcomes*, politicization is rather conceptualized in current concepts in the literature on bureaucracies as shown in section three, as hindering the process of accumulation of expertise and the expectation is of a convergence with the Weberian model of a bureaucracy. Deviations in administrative reform outcomes from the reference category of a Weberian meritocratic model have been therefore discarded as ‘dysfunctional’.²⁰⁸ Therefore, this new framework on assessment of bureaucratic structure, rethinks current template of the Weberian administration, the static view on unitary state and therefore revises the one-dimensional view on bureaucratic modernization process built on such templates, in order to better account for the empirical diversity in outcomes of reforms (Column 4 in Figure 6).

²⁰⁵ Goetz and Wollmann (2001) also claim that the Weberian model is per an idealized version of a bureaucracy that has worked best only in certain European countries like Germany, but not in others.

²⁰⁶ Schneider (1991) uses this term to explain the Brazilian bureaucracy and the dense web of political appointments that render it still an effective state administration in implementation of policies.

²⁰⁷ Gajduschek (2007).

²⁰⁸ Goetz and Wollmann (2001).

Figure 6: Re-thinking the Nature of the Administrative State: Post-Communist State-Building through Bureaucratic Design

<p><i>Assumption on state</i></p> <p>Neo-statist literature</p>	<p><i>How statist theories affected state building projects</i></p> <p>Expectations on state building through civil service reform</p>	<p><i>How evidence on post- communist state building challenges the 'thinking' on the state</i></p> <p>Post-communist evidence on state building challenges</p>	<p><i>A new framework on the nature of the administrative state</i></p> <p>Correctives on state -building outcomes through</p>
<p>2. State: unitary agent</p>	<p>2.1 State is an intentional autonomous actor</p> <p>2.2 State <i>dismantling</i> rather than <i>rebuilding</i> public authority through bureaucratic design</p>	<p>2.3 State is not a unitary autonomous agent: 'multiple-center' of authority building</p> <p>2.4 State is influenced from different actors across different sectors</p>	<p>2.5 Accounting for sectoral variation, more that across state variation</p>
<p>3. State acts through a cohesive organization</p>	<p>3.1 <i>Outcomes:</i> Classical 'bureaucracy model' (civil service rules) creates professional and depoliticized administration</p> <p>3.2 <i>Outcomes:</i> Politics –administration nexus: strict division between administrative and political sphere</p> <p>3.3 <i>Process:</i> State building is a linear, incremental one-dimensional process from patrimonial to bureaucracy</p> <p>3.4 <i>Process:</i> Lower politicization leads to professionalization, through civil service rules incrementally</p>	<p>3.4 <i>Outcomes:</i> State is a 'bricolage' between the patrimonial and bureaucracy type , little is known on 'quality', 'capacity'</p> <p>3.5 <i>Outcomes:</i> Co-existence between patronage and civil service system</p> <p>3.6 <i>Process:</i> State building is a non- linear, non-incremental process leading to a variety of outcomes</p> <p>3.7 <i>Process:</i> Politicization persists and does not forego professionalization</p>	<p>3.8 <i>Outcomes:</i> Four different types of administration: patronage, clientelism-led, mediocracy, and professional administration</p> <p>3.9 <i>Outcomes:</i> Dual nature of the administration: political loyalty (state quality) and competence (state capacity) as separated dimensions</p> <p>3.10 <i>Process:</i> State building: Two-dimensional process, leading to a combination of political loyalty and merit</p> <p>3.11 <i>Process:</i> Politicization can combine with professionalization</p>
<p>4. State: common set of formal Laws and formal institutions</p>	<p>4.1 Adoption of formal civil service laws change practices of politicization and increase competence</p>	<p>4.2 Co-existence of formal and informal practices weaken their effectiveness formal laws</p>	<p>4.3 Discrepancy between formal rules and practices: Civil service procedures do not decrease political appointment, or increase competence</p>

Conceptual implications

By distinguishing between politicization and professionalization in this new framework, I contribute *conceptually* and *methodologically* to what the relevant dimensions in bureaucratic structure are and how to measure them. In doing so, I challenge *conceptually* the following conventional views: (i) contemporary works on bureaucratic structure that view politicized administration as a failure for state effectiveness and professional administration as a success case for public good provision, by adding two more possible outcomes and viewing politicization as reinforcing competence in administration; (ii) the understanding of successful cases of reform progress only along the template of the rule-based Weberian administration, by showing that professional and politicized administration can lead as well to public good provision, (iii) the unitary view of the insulated bureaucratic state by showing that politicization and professionalization combine differently across state agencies; (iv) viewing the state building process and the bureaucratic modernization one, as one-dimensional linear process, where politicization and professionalization are two aspects of a single process of bureaucratic modernization that move synchronically and unidirectional from less politicization to more professionalization (all is depicted once more in Figure 6).

The contributions are therefore several. First, such new framework allows to account better for outcomes in the post-communist state-building. By distinguishing between politicization and professionalization independently of each other, it can better evaluate the ‘mixed’ outcomes that shed much-needed light on the population of cases that exhibit hybridity in administrative features, by as well showing where politics does not come at the cost of bureaucracy, or vice versa. Indeed, it corrects the uni-directional view we had on the bureaucratization process from less politicization to more professionalization but allows to test how the two combine differently. Evidence in post-communist countries show that civil service rules of merit recruitment and promotion have remained not well institutionalized.²⁰⁹ Therefore, the administrations in various post-communist countries have still mixed results with a dual nature between political appointment practices and civil service rules of recruitment and promotions in a bureaucracy. The politics-administration nexus has been hard to uphold in reality as predicted in the literature,²¹⁰ particularly where the rule of law within the state is weak. Therefore with such template, we can better understand when politicization undermines or not professionalization within an administration and across which sectors it does so

²⁰⁹ Grindle (2012) shows that overall in democratizing countries, Meyer-Sahling (2011) and (2013) shows that particularly for the post-communist population of cases in Central Eastern and SEE, civil service rules were not effective in de-politicizing the state civil service, Kopecký and Mair (2011) and Kopecký *et al.* (2016) show how party patronage persists still in various democracies and new democracies across different ministries.

²¹⁰ Olsen (2008).

more.

Second, this framework also allows to study reform outcomes beyond the static view of the unitary state: the institutional porosity of the state in different agencies, where multiple actors shape its structures need an analytical tool that allows to assess different outcomes that the state building can have across different state institutions. This is reflected in the civil service laws that do not lead to uniform outcomes across different executive bodies. Post-communist studies show how a ‘functional politicization’ in certain ministries more than others prevail, whereas certain actors that control economically significant sectors play more control than other actors who control less vital sectors.²¹¹ Therefore, such framework would allow to grasp how levels of political hiring and firing can combine differently with levels of expertise within an administration.

Methodological implications

Finally, having a ‘hybrid’ public administration organized between the patrimonial and the Weberian administration poses a *methodological* problem of which traits of these ‘intermediate cases’ matter in measuring in order to assess if reforms have led to improvement or regress in administration.²¹² Indeed works in post-communist studies use different yardsticks to measure reform progress, from formal institution building²¹³, to administrative effectiveness²¹⁴, to levels of politicization²¹⁵, or to establishment or *rule-based* merit recruitments and career stability²¹⁶. Dahlström et al. (2011) confirms that closed rule-based civil service systems are not necessarily the most professionalized,²¹⁷ while the understanding of professionalization is the same as de-politicization. In contrast, Meyer-Sahling and Veen claim that levels of politicization encompass a great deal more than just recruitment based on political loyalty²¹⁸. Depending on which yardstick one uses, authors arrive at controversial results of good and bad performers across post-communist countries. This

²¹¹ Gryzmala-Busse and Loung (2002, p. 533)

²¹² Mazzucca and Munck (2010), Fortin (2011).

²¹³ Gryzmala-Busse’s (2007) tracks then effectiveness of reforms in development of formal institutions of oversight and monitoring, discretionary expansion of state administration employment and appropriation of privatization profits and unregulated/regulated subsidies based on lax party financing rules. (Grzymala-Busse 2007, 2). The institutional development she looks are ‘ombudsmen, national auditing offices, securities and exchange commissions, and legislations defining and protecting the status, job security and career structure of civil servants’ (p.25)

²¹⁴ O’Dwyer (2007),

²¹⁵ Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2013)

²¹⁶

²¹⁷ A finding that corresponds generally with the managerial literature that criticizes rule-based bureaucracies as highly inefficient ones that do not attract highly qualified officials

²¹⁸ Party-motivated dismissals, the role of political parties or political contacts in recruitment, as well as depth of political influence in the hierarchy of civil service also must be considered.

inconsistency can be remedied, by recognizing the fact that rules can co-exist with different levels of politicization and professionalization within one administration, and disentangling their measurement would be conducive to a more complete picture on progress of administrative reforms. This framework just does this.

Therefore the framework contribution is twofold. First, it challenges *methodologically* such works that use that one single indicator to hint to both de-politicization and professionalization of administration. Civil service rules do not hint at which direction levels of politicization or professionalization will evolve, nor how the two will relate to each other. Using one single indicator of professionalization, as Evans and Rauch (1999) and Dahlström *et al.* (2011) have, conflates these two different phenomena, rendering such indicators *invalid* to measure reform progress.²¹⁹ The reason for that is that formal examination procedures and recruitment take care of two different goals practically: first, separating interests of politicians and bureaucrats affecting bureaucrats' incentives to comply less with politicians' interests and rather with the goals of department²²⁰, and second, recruiting the "best" and most qualified one affecting their abilities.²²¹ Measuring those two with one indicator as some authors currently do, provides *invalid* information in assessing failure and success of reforms.

However measuring only levels of politicization as in the case of Meyer-Sahling's and Veen (2013), without assessing expertise also leads to incomplete evaluation in reform progress within one administration. Hence, by either conflating professionalization with levels of politicization in one indicator, or not measuring them separately, we are then left with even less valid information on the levels of expertise actually reached once civil service reforms are adopted in an administration. Measures on expertise of bureaucrats should not be confounded, with measures of recruitment patterns based on political loyalty or civil service rules. Patterns of *recruitment* are consequential for the type of *incentives* of bureaucrats to comply with politician's or public interest. The extent to which bureaucrats are qualified or less so hints rather to abilities to implement policies. This new framework takes better consideration of these distinctions: it offers more *valid indicators* that use separate measures for professionalization from politicization in order to hint at which direction and

²¹⁹ Dahlström *et al.* (2011) collapses politicization and professionalization into one single index of professionalization, and views politicization as negatively related to professionalization by distinguishing between two kind bureaucracies – politicized and professional administrations.

²²⁰ We know, however, that based on which criteria employees are recruited and selected *ex-ante* –political loyalty vs. merit – is consequential for their actions *ex post*. Different criteria of recruitment matter in creating both 'different systems in the chain of incentives and therefore accountability in actions of bureaucrats towards compliance with political interests vs. public interests.

²²¹ However, such measures as well include *abilities of bureaucrats* to implement effectively policies if candidates pass the open competition. Expertise relates to *abilities* of officials in both having the right skills and knowledge in effectively managing policies.

outcomes in levels of politicization and professionalization combine in an administration before validating progress.

Second, the new framework and its measures challenge *methodologically* those systematized concepts that operationalise the Weberian template by using indicators that measure progress based on *rule-based* recruitment and career stability through tenure. These existing indicators are *unreliable* in accounting for real progress for two reasons: On one hand, they can't predict the extent to which such civil service rules and merit recruitment procedures contribute in selecting the best qualified candidate in new democracies. Many of these examination methods are so easy that many candidates will be able to pass them. As Sundell has shown, examination procedures are not always the best method to sorting the best applicants, particularly in democratizing countries.²²² On the other hand, because civil service rules are subverted or violated in practice despite their adoption, particularly so in democratizing context, formal insulation of the civil service through laws may not actually protect officials from parties' practices in hiring and firing them. Evidence shows that civil service reforms have been *reversed* even at the formal level, even after they have been adopted, or they have been *subverted* or *circumvented* or in the worst case *violated* at the implementation level. Therefore, levels politicization and professionalization are differently combined, despite adoption of civil service laws.

The South Eastern European countries mostly belong to this group. As will be shown in Chapter 4 in the case of Albania, politicians circumvent these examination rules and find other ways to make political appointments: for example by dismissing civil servants temporarily in 'waiting lists' or simply violating examination procedures of open competition by pre-selecting the right candidate, or hiring political loyalists based on temporary contracts. Meyer-Sahling shows²²³ for post-communist countries, and Grindle²²⁴ for Latin American cases, that civil service formal examination procedures persist in administrations with practices of political hiring and firing. However, the extent to which such practices prevail more often than not go unmeasured.²²⁵ Hence, formal institution building alone does not allow us to understand the institutionalization of those rules and extent of politicization needs to be studied on the ground separately. Implications of these conceptual and methodological problems are that we cannot distinguish if merit recruitment are superior to political appointments for competence, if we don't measure more directly extent of politicization and extent of expertise. Focusing only on civil service laws and rule-based *methods of selection* tells us little about

²²² Sundell (2012).

²²³ Meyer Sahling (2012) shows empirically that countries have high discrepancy between adoption of civil service rules and persisting levels of political hiring and firing in the Western Balkans.

²²⁴ Grindle (2012)

²²⁵ Meyer Sahling and Veen (2013).

the real outcomes in de-politicization of recruitment, or professionalization in terms of expertise improvement in administrations.

Therefore, the current framework offers more *reliable* indicators by assessing practices for politicization that are close to empirical practices similarly to Meyer-Sahling's and Veen (2013). Additionally it adds indicators on levels of professionalization that are close to the individual traits of education of officials, beyond the formal merit recruitments or examination procedures. By doing so it disentangles measures that hint to 'absence of undue influence over the recruitment process', from the measures that indicate 'the presence of mechanisms which find the best candidate'²²⁶. The combination of the two attributes is crucial in establishing cases of success and failure.

Using the new framework would overcome the controversial results various authors arrive at when categorizing countries in post-communist countries. Analysts have thus mistakenly used formal institution building as an indicator of progress. However, as the Hungarian case has shown, although countries may succeed in formal institution building, this misses the underlying levels of politicization of the state. Moreover, the poor performance of the Czech Republic has been wrongly attributed to the absence of clear civil service laws.²²⁷ Yet, as O'Dwyer finds, the Czech Republic has performed in levels of professionalization even better than other countries that have had civil service laws, and lower levels of professionalization, such as Poland.²²⁸ If we were to use the new framework, we would eventually categorize Czech Republic as high politicization and high professionalization and Poland as medium politicization and medium professionalization and Slovakia as high politicization and low professionalization. This distinction beyond civil service rules is crucial in order to better derive what drives differently these two phenomena in the bureaucratic modernization process that matter most for describing outcomes of reforms.

CONCLUSION

In the absence of a solution based on normative theory and in light of conflicting views of scholars on what the relationship between politics and administration ought to be,²²⁹ this framework allows us to grasp the continuous manifestation and the tense relationship between political authority and the career administrative personnel in outcomes of civil service reforms. It does so by analyzing

²²⁶ Sundell (2012).

²²⁷ Grzymala -Busse (2006)

²²⁸ O'Dwyer (2002, 2006)

²²⁹ Boateng (2014), West (2005), Olsen (2008)

levels of political hiring and firing separately from levels of expertise. It therefore corresponds best to what Max Weber saw as an unavoidable organizational conflict within bureaucracies: ‘historical reality involves a continuous, though for the most part latent, conflict between chiefs and their administrative staffs for appropriation and expropriation in relation to one another.’²³⁰ Bureaucratic design is a relevant lens in understanding state building in democratization period.

In this chapter, I have taken issue with two aspects of the literature on state bureaucracy, both of them preventing to describe and explain the empirically observable diversity in the outcomes of state reforms. The literature associates a well-functioning state with a professional and depoliticized administration, while politicization to bureaucratic pathologies like ‘clientelism’ and ‘patrimonialism’. The state has been analysed as unitary and cohesive ‘whole’. Therefore, levels of political hiring and firing and expertise were understudied in combination with each other in most of the analyses, because traditional concepts of bureaucracy view politicization as antithetical to the principle of impersonal office loyalty and inferior to rule-based formal authority in creating ‘technical expertise’. Therefore, I challenge these two views with the new conceptual framework.

First, I challenge the view that the rule-based Weberian bureaucracy is the only successful template to professionalization of the state and therefore capacity to effectively deliver public good. I have offered therefore, a new framework that differentiates outcomes in a two-dimensional space between levels of *politicization* (extent of political loyalty in personnel decisions) and levels of *professionalization* (extent of competence), leading to four ideal types. This provides a richer space in outcomes than the Weberian categories, as most work conflate these two dimensions into one-single dimension distinguishing only between the politicized versus professionalized administration. I claim that politicization can reinforce professionalization in the case of *patronage-led* administration or undermine competence in the *clientelism-led* administration or the two of them might be less crucial ending up in *mediocracy-led* administration. Second, it allows to assess the state in the combination of politicization and professionalization across ministries. Indeed, levels of politicization vary substantially within a bureaucracy across ministries.

Methodologically, it refines the relevant dimensions in a bureaucratic structure not to be distinguished between *rules* versus *political loyalty*, but *political loyalty* versus *expertise*. The former distinction is configured in all systemized concepts that build on such distinctions, such as the works of Evans and Rauch (1999), the Quality of Government Institute research on ‘impartiality concepts’

²³⁰ Weber (1978)

of bureaucracies,²³¹ as well as the most recent works distinguishing between two-dimensional spaces on bureaucratic structures such as ‘closed versus private’ and ‘professional versus politicized’ bureaucracies. It therefore complements these works conceptually, by separating the analysis of levels of politicization (rules or practices) and professionalization. Methodologically, it provides then various indicators on both dimensions measuring more outcomes rather than procedures and at different unit of analysis, across countries and ministries. I have measured reform progress in the state not solely based on the criteria of civil service *rules*, but in contrast to current indicators I also distinguished better between practices of politicization and abilities (competence) of officials.

This two-dimensional framework corresponds with various works in party politics, executive politics, and as well with works on comparative politics on bureaucratic development in new democracies. Works in executive politics, party politics explore both the various forms of politicization – patronage and policy motivation– the latter one not always incompatible with levels of competence, while distinguishing between the two helps in the conceptualization of outcomes. Additionally, the party politics literature has theoretically shown that patronage appointments include both political and merit criteria.²³² Current empirical works and historical works explore the ‘positive externalities’ of patrimonialism or political authority influencing personnel decisions in administrations in line with broader goals of societal and economic development.²³³ Some work in post-communist countries and in the context of developing countries show that administrations can rest on politicization of civil service – both in similar understanding with concepts of clientelism, such as receiving a job in exchange of rendering political services– is not incompatible with both professionalization²³⁴ and public good provision.²³⁵

²³¹ Rothstein and Teorrell (2008).

²³² Kopecký *et al.* (2016), Kopecký and Mair (2013).

²³³ Vom Hau (2012).

²³⁴ Gajduscsek for Hungary, Schneider (1991) for Brazil

²³⁵ Kelsall and Booth (2010)

CHAPTER 2: DEVELOPMENT OF STATE ADMINISTRATION THROUGH THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL PARTIES

ORGANIZATIONAL AND ELECTORAL PARTY RATIONALES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.

(James Madison, Federalist No. 51).

Successful politics is about attaining and retaining power.

(Bueno de Mesquita, 2005)

INTRODUCTION

The thesis is interested in shedding light on the broader questions of party building and its impact on state-building in the democratization process. Transforming state bureaucracies from a high politicized administration to a professionalized administration stands at the core of such state building attempts through civil service reforms²³⁶ across new democracies. Evidence shows that politicians in post-communist countries²³⁷ and in the Latin American context have invested in expertise and professionalization in co-existence with high politicization of bureaucracies, by changing the organization of bureaucracies. The question I try to answer in this chapter is why do some parties pursue different strategies of politicization and professionalization of bureaucracies? What mechanisms explain levels of politicization and professionalization in the state administration?

To answer these questions two strands have shed light on such conditions: *Historical accounts* – focused more on the Western experience of state building – claimed that bureaucratic reform succeeded when state-building occurred *prior* to party building and universal suffrage.²³⁸ *Institutionalists* have advanced these works and explained reforms contextualized to the peculiarities

²³⁶ Mazzuca and Munck (2014); Geddes (1994).

²³⁷ Gajduschek (2007).

²³⁸ Shefter (1994).

of the post-communist context by focusing on three variables: *administrative legacies* of fused party and bureaucracy relations, *political competition*, and *EU external pressure* to reform bureaucracies in the transition process. However, this literature does less well in explaining outcomes in post-communist state-building. Variations from Southeastern European (SEE) countries show that despite similar levels of political competition and EU conditionality, countries show different types of 'hybrid' bureaucracy, whereby some (e.g., Albania) exhibit politicized and professional administration, while that of others is politicized and incompetent (e.g., Macedonia). Increasing political competition or administrative legacies can't explain why such pluralistic structures have incentivized incumbents very differently in both regions in Central Eastern European countries and SEE to take the state out of politics and invest in improvement of administrative capacities (e.g. Hungary and Poland reversal of reforms). Existing approaches, I argue in this chapter, downplay the role parties' play in shaping bureaucracies in new democracies, neglecting that such incentives to pursue reform vary substantially across party organizations and societal structures in post- communist context.

Challenging such *deterministic* account to view bureaucratic professionalization as a by-product of *stasis, electoral dynamics and external donors' aid* , I offer a novel answer explaining state reforms in levels of politicization of professionalization as consequential to party building process. In such process, I differentiate between the organizational and electoral party incentives to improve or not bureaucracies that matter for shedding light upon how politicization foregoes or not professionalization in civil service, resulting in different kind of bureaucracies. It is therefore imaginable that parties differ in their incentives to rely on expert bureaucrats to deliver policies for electoral survival, from their incentives to rely on political appointees to render them back political services in order to build strong organizations. Holding all other factors constant, the party incentives to hire political loyalists or experts, vary between such organizational and electoral concerns and tactics: *Differences in organizational resources* between younger and older parties affect parties' dependence on state resources and therefore lead to differences in incentives of relying on party patronage, and therefore in different levels of politicization. *Differences in social structure between* identity and social- economic cleavages, affect parties' electoral incentives to *strategically* polarize competition on identity rather than socio-economic issues, lowering party' incentive to rely on professionals and deliver on public good and therefore, lower levels of professionalization.

Understanding state reforms in new democracies between politicization and professionalization as a function of party building process has been lacking in current literature. Indeed, the scope conditions on party state relations and party incentives to reform the state vary substantially across organizational structures in post-communist context and differ from the West-

European context. First, in an institutional context of unconsolidated democracies state where party building and state-building coincide temporally, the state and its civil service is less protected by stable coalitions of socio-economic groups and legally from a strong and independent judiciary. Hence civil service reforms are reversible.²³⁹ In such context, parties have the double strategic role of acting as party builders before building state administrations in many new democracies. Second, party building is not a consolidated process yet and its outcomes vary substantially in terms of a variety of how parties are structured and rely on the state, as well as how programmatic parties are. Hence, rather than passive actors, parties are the principal medium through which substantial institutional choices have been made, leading to multiple outcomes between politicization and professionalization in bureaucracies.

Because such conditions in democratizing countries are different, the literatures lack information on *how the party building processes shape party incentives* differently in the balance between political loyalty or expertise in the organization of the civil service. Despite political parties' importance for democratization and the nature of bureaucracies and the state, we know very little therefore about how party and state development happens in new democracies and how does party building affect state building outcomes and vice versa.²⁴⁰ The relationship between party and nature of bureaucracies' remains a forgotten lens in both old and new democracies in political science,²⁴¹ although it represents a crucial one to understand how the state works. In all this literature the role political parties play for bureaucratic organization and the dilemmas they face in their own organizational development is an understudied phenomena for cases of new democracies where party and state building coincide. This chapter makes an attempt to shed light on the how party building process affects state building outcome, as well as better grasp the party rationale affecting the 'hybrid' cases of administration and civil service reform progress between politicization and professionalization.

The chapter is sub-divided in four parts: the first delineates the current problems in the literature and the second part provides the argument with the two different party rationale for explaining civil service reform outcomes between politicization and professionalization, the scope conditions and hypothesis, the third and fourth part develop the argument on the organizational rationale of parties explaining levels of politicization and the electoral rationale of parties accounting for levels of expertise.

²³⁹ Levitsky (2016).

²⁴⁰ A concern raised in as well in Levitsky (2014) and Mazzuca and Muck (2014).

²⁴¹ Mazzucca and Munck (2014).

PROBLEMS IN CURRENT LITERATURE

In answering the question on why did countries perform so differently in administrative reform outcomes, two strands have been useful as a starting point: historical and institutionalist accounts advancing different conditions that explain bureaucratic professionalization.

The most useful historical explanations, based on Martin Shefter's (1994) claims that only when a bureaucracy is fully developed prior to democracy will there be a 'bureaucratic constituency' protecting the state against abuses of political parties' patronage.²⁴² In the opposite case, where bureaucratic development and democratization coincide, such 'institutional resistance' can't prevent parties' strategies of patronage. With the democratization waves affecting both the West and the rest of the world, however, this important work showed its empirical and theoretical limitations. Empirically, it can't explain why civil service reform succeeded in democratization waves in the absence of such temporal sequence of party and state relations, affecting the Western European context,²⁴³ new democracies in Asia,²⁴⁴ and in the European post-communist context.²⁴⁵ Theoretically, institutional resistance to party patronage through a professionalized and impartial administration seems not to be the mechanism that constrains parties' discretion in hiring and firing in administration.

Other works have developed a better understanding on state building in new democracies, by claiming that rather various conditions in transition context matter more for state reforms. Institutionalists accounts have advanced three key explanatory variables accounting for reform outcomes: *administrative legacies*, *institutionally robust political competition*, and *EU conditionality*.

According to the literature on path dependency, three type of legacies explain the variation in administrative reforms, such as: legacies related to the communist past²⁴⁶, different degree of formal professional bureaucracies inherited from the communist regime²⁴⁷ and legacies beyond

²⁴² This is understood here as hiring and firing based on party loyalty, to reward party supporters with jobs in public administration.

²⁴³ Piattoni (2001).

²⁴⁴ Slater (2011).

²⁴⁵ Grzymala-Busse (2007, p.47).

²⁴⁶ This literature tended either to 'zoom in the negative effects of the communist legacy' (Kitschelt *et al.* 1999) or to hint to the slow progress of reform in CEE visible in all countries to such communist legacies (Nunberg 1999; Verheijen 2000, 2010; Meyer-Sahling 2009, 2010). They accounted through as well a single continuum of variation of outcomes: certain characteristics of the 'communist- type of administration' are opposite to the Weberian rational legal bureaucracies and most similar to 'partocracies' having a lasting impact on post-communist administrative reforms.

²⁴⁷ Kitschelt et al (1999) distinguishes two dimensions in the categorization of communist regime such as the repressiveness of the regime vis-a-vis its citizens and the degree of formal professional and de-politicized administration, the one this thesis is most interested in. The authors then associate how the three different communist regime types such as bureaucratic authoritarian, national –accommodative, and patrimonial communism and mixed types between them, are characterized by high, medium and low degree of bureaucratic professionalization. Based on these works one

communism related to the variation in transition mode²⁴⁸ and first election as a ‘critical juncture’. All of them agree that static legacies deterministically predict the direction on further politicization or professionalization of the state due to certain assumptions. What remains puzzling in light of this literature is the following: First, they cannot explain why countries with the same communist administrative legacies as predicted in Kitschelt *et al.* (1999), performed so differently in levels of politicization and professionalization in the transition period. Second, why some countries (e.g., Baltic States) with similar legacies of communist regime, did better than Central European state (e.g., Czech Republic, Hungary) in levels of politicization,²⁴⁹ or why certain incumbents within the same patrimonial regimes perform better in professionalization than others (e.g., Czech Republic in comparison to Poland).²⁵⁰

Beside the institutionalist explanations on legacies, the literature on ‘Europeanization East’, alternatively views reform success as endogenous to external donors’ aid and conditionality. Three sub-strands matter in order to account for EU effectiveness on institutional reforms: the first one points mainly to the importance of EU pre-accession conditionality in promotion of democratization and institution-building.²⁵¹ The ‘external incentive model’ of the European Union conditionality¹ suggests that the EU can exert stronger influence in pre-accession process and a government therefore automatically adopts EU rules, if the benefits of EU rewards exceed domestic costs of reforms and the closer the country is to the pre-accession process. However, the domestic compliance mechanisms remain obscure. Other authors have provided a more nuanced picture in distinguishing between different characteristics of EU conditionality, and how domestic conditions such as political competition, explain various trajectories in cross-country variation in democratization process. Vaduchova’s (2008) ‘adapting model’,²⁵² explains how EU active leverage,

could hypothesize that the variation in degree of formal professional bureaucratization in communist time, determines and explains variation in civil service reform outcomes in the post- communist period.

²⁴⁸ Meyer- Sahling (2009), claimed that the *mode of transition*, has an impact on public administration reform outcomes. As a result the three values of transition mode distinguishing based on Linz and Stepan (1997) as ‘pacted’, ‘controlled from communist parties’, or ‘controlled from opposition parties’, lead to *high, medium and low reshuffling of personnel in administration in post-communist period*. Reshuffling is understood as a strategy that weakens administrative capacity in higher levels of politicization and lower professionalization.

²⁴⁹ Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2013).

²⁵⁰ O’Dwyer (2007) makes this categorization, as he measures administrative effectiveness.

²⁵¹ Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) and Dimitrova (2005) analysed how more credible EU conditionality in a policy area explains the variation in timing in adoption of civil service legislation across 10 Central Eastern European countries. She claims that variation in EU credibility on reforms- credible threat of exclusion from EU enlargement process and more credible reward for accession- explains why some countries have performed well and others less so.

²⁵² The adapting model predicts that in the first-round pro-reform oriented parties in ‘opposition to authoritarian ruling parties rally around a pro- EU agenda and adapt to it, changing previous policy positions’ (Vaduchova 2008, p.2). It is in the second round, that even those anti-EU political parties that would have no interest in reforming, would ‘adapt their agendas to fit with liberal democracy and EU requirements, realizing that this is the only way to get back into the electoral game. Vachudova (2008, p.2) claims that the party systems of Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Croatia all fit

in contrast to ‘EU passive leverage’, creates such adaptation in institution building, transforming the political landscape and shifting all political parties’ agendas, incentivizing even the anti-EU parties to comply with EU democratic reforms. This second generation of scholars, maintained that there are limits to the EU’ transformative power, due to unfavourable domestic conditions.²⁵³ The third generation of scholars focuses alternatively on the pathologies of Europeanization,²⁵⁴ being very pessimistic and focusing mostly on how the EU undermines rule of law, democracy and good governance.²⁵⁵ The studies, though, remain based on a single case study with little cross-country analysis and they provide less of a theoretical guidance on domestic mechanisms of compliance generalizable across countries. It seems that what this literature lacks are good theories on incentives of parties to politically hire and fire and professionalize administration, particularly, because countries adopt reforms even in absence of credible EU conditionality.

This leads me to the first problematic aspect in those theories that is linked to how reform progress is conceptualized. On the dependent variable side, they mostly focus on the moment of adoption of reform and laws, or implementation of laws without measuring directly the deviation between politicization and professionalization. On the independent variable side, they assume that EU conditionality even when credible and determinate in the rules, would sanction and reward the right actors and this would alter domestic politics and promote the right liberal opposition forces in a competitive political system, where illiberal parties would be voted out of office. However, evidence shows this is not the case.

What remains puzzling in light of this literature are cases like the Macedonian one. The logic of ‘adapting model’ in Vaduchova can’t explain how the existing conservative Macedonian right-wing parties, being formally pro EU, still radicalize the electorate by building power further on ethnic issues during EU pre-accession process, and using ethnic patronage as a tool to further maintain power and win elections. The problematic assumption in those theories is that all incumbents’ preferences in domestic politics vary only based on the extent to which they value EU membership or not. However, evidence firmly contradicts Vaduchova’s argument and shows confirmation explored elsewhere that EU is not the driver but rather the navigator of party politics.²⁵⁶ Hence, the direction of reform is shaped by party incentives and those do not seem to be altered either in a

this model – with the HDZ in Croatia adapting most dramatically in the second round after its defeat in 2000.

²⁵³ Magen and Morlino (2009); Elbasani (2009); Dallara (2014); Giandomenico (2014). These works have focussed rather on domestic obstacles particularly like clientelistic parties (Giandomenico 2014), or the vested interests in maintaining a politicized administration (Elbasani 2009, 2014) in areas of weak rule of law and state institutions as in South Eastern European countries.

²⁵⁴ Börzel and Pamuk (2012); Mendelski (2014).

²⁵⁵ Mungiu-Pippidi (2014).

²⁵⁶ Haughton (2009).

competitive game through simple EU benefits. As a result, I claim that while EU matters for reform in particularly Southeast European countries, the literature provides little theoretical foundation on the government rationale accounting for bureaucratic reform outcomes.

A third explanation, among the institutionalists, on variation in administration has advanced even further the understanding on post-communist state building as a function of democratization process through political competition. The authors view bureaucratic professionalization as a result of different features of political competition such as: party system institutionalization,²⁵⁷ a credible opposition,²⁵⁸ ideologically strong party organization,²⁵⁹ and ideological polarization of party systems.²⁶⁰ All those explanations claim that a more robust and credible political competition, incentivizes incumbents to imposing institutional constraints to their own discretion in patronage in administration, as a long term institutional insurance against short-term exploitation of state resources for political interests.²⁶¹

While according to Grzymala-Busse (2007), ‘state exploitation’ is constrained by the ‘threat’ perceived from the incumbent government to be replaced by an alternative government²⁶² (i.e., a governing alternative, vociferously critical and constantly monitoring government action). This explains according to Grzymala-Busse (2007), why then Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia and Lithuania, self-constrained ‘state exploitation’²⁶³ through a vocal critical and credible opposition party that could replace the incumbent.²⁶⁴ Whereas in Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia and Bulgaria²⁶⁵ this was not the case. However, the presence of such opposition in the first group of countries is *per se*

²⁵⁷ O’Dwyer (2006).

²⁵⁸ Grzymala Busse (2007).

²⁵⁹ Innes (2013).

²⁶⁰ Meyer Sahling (2006a).

²⁶¹ For some over view on the literature see Berliner-Ehrlich (2015).

²⁶² ‘Robust competition’ occurs when “the opposition is clearly identifiable, plausible as a governing alternative, and vociferously critical, constantly monitoring and censoring government action” Grzymala-Busse (2006, p.11). Grzymala–Busse (2006) conceptualized competition not only along electoral outcomes, but also the ability of the opposition to monitor and criticize the government. Index of robust party competition based on: 1) the extent of regeneration of the former ruling communist party into a moderate centre-left bloc; 2) the average number of critical parliamentary questions asked by opposition deputies; and 3) the average seat share of plausible parties in a national parliament since 1989 (Grzymala-Busse 2006, p.14).

²⁶³ State exploitation is defined as ‘the direct extraction of state resources and the building of new channels for such extraction’. She focuses on three dimensions, which are not constitutive elements of the state, but arenas used from parties for their survival such as delaying the formal state institutions of oversight and monitoring, discretionary expansion of state administration employment and appropriation of privatization profits and unregulated subsidies based on lax party financing rules. (Grzymala-Busse 2007, p.2)

²⁶⁴ ‘Robust competition’ occurs when “the opposition is clearly identifiable, plausible as a governing alternative, and vociferously critical, constantly monitoring and censoring government action” (Grzymala-Busse 2007, p.11). Grzymala –Busse conceptualized competition not only along electoral outcomes, but also the ability of the opposition to monitor incumbents’ actions when in government.

²⁶⁵ O’Dwyer (2006) confirms the trend between good and bad performers as well, although he looks only at fewer cases like Slovakia, Poland and Czech Republic, and tests that experience beyond post-communist CEE to Latin America, Africa and Asia.

an outcome of the legacies of strong dissident opposition during communism.²⁶⁶

In contrast, according to O' Dwyer (2006), administrative effectiveness is constrained not only by alternation and credible opposition, but also by an 'institutionalized party system'²⁶⁷ that offers voters both a coherent government with 'manageable number of stable parties with familiar coalition building preferences' and as well a unified credible opposition that can replace it. An under-institutionalized party system (e.g., Poland and Slovakia, but not the Czech Republic), offers no stability in the patterns of partisan political competition, with governments that are incoherent and opposition not credible in offering voters any credible alternative. In such systems voters lack any levers to discipline parties, leading parties to building more patronage and expand the state without the need to invest in administrative effectiveness.

Innes (2013) criticizes the two former works, by showing that levels of politicization serving state capture, are neither a by-product of party system institutionalization nor credible political competition, but derive due to an ideologically weak party organization from the very beginning of state building reforms. Such ideologically weak parties that succumbed to private interests encroaching the state in its patronage system are the real cause of the problem. Finally, Meyer-Sahling (2010, 2013) instead looks at the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, revising Grzymala-Busse's (2007) argument on political competition. Meyer-Sahling (2006) claims that all countries, despite formal civil service law adoption, show discrepancy in levels of politicization, so that is hard to predict how political competition affects the extent of politicization. In order to fill that gap the author looks at Hungary as an interesting case in terms of both success in formal rule adoption but high persisting levels of politicization.²⁶⁸

These works lead to controversial findings²⁶⁹ as they use different yardsticks to measure success of civil state reforms²⁷⁰ as already shown in Chapter 1 and derive different diagnosis on what

²⁶⁶ Grzymala Busse (2002) The first group of countries, where hard-line communists' parties could not prevent the emergence of reformed ex-communist and social democratic party to play the disciplining roles of strong opponents, arrived in transition with an institutionally robust political competition and effective opposition forces holding incumbents accountable and leading to professionalization. In the bad performing countries, that institutional robust party competition was rooted in the weakness of anti-communist opposition and the failure of the communist successor parties to regenerate themselves into a credible moderate central left bloc.

²⁶⁷ According to O' Dwyer (2006) a robust institutionalized competition is defined as no party has to be dominant, and elections should present voters the choice aiming a manageable number of parties with familiar coalition building preferences. The party system institutionalization includes four indicators: (i) multi-partyism (fractionalization), (ii) unfamiliar patterns of coalition –building; (iii) unstable party organizations (electoral volatility, party turnover), (iv) party organizational features (formalized internal structures and rules).

²⁶⁸ Meyer-Sahling (2010).

²⁶⁹ They arrive at controversial findings on categorization of countries into good and bad performers.

²⁷⁰ Grzymala-Busse (2007) measures reform success as formal institution building. She looks at the institutional development she looks are 'ombudsmen, national auditing offices, securities and exchange commissions, and legislations defining and protecting the status, job security and career structure of civil servants' (p.25) development of independent

the main problem is. Collapsing politicization and professionalization into a single dimension of reform outcomes also obscures the different role parties play in promoting professionalization or in hiring and firing politically. Those findings as well show that what seems to be dysfunctional for reform progress in terms of *formal institution-building* understood as de-politicization (Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria) is not dysfunctional for reform progress measured along levels of professionalization (Czech Republic, Poland). On the one hand, O’Dwyer (2006) claims that Czech Republic has the features of a ‘responsible party system’, with higher institutionalization of the party system and accountable governments, affecting levels of professionalization. On the other hand, according to Gryzmala-Busse (2007), the same country lacked a credible opposition, leading incumbents to rely more on patronage and delay formal institutional-building of the state and therefore, lead to higher politicization.

Based on these findings, we arrive to the main puzzling evidence of this thesis, that what incentivizes parties to politically hire and fire in administration is conceptually different from what incentivizes parties to professionalize. Based on these authors work, we can observe that Czech Republic although it encroached the state into a patronage system by increasing politicization according to Innes (2013), it as well professionalized administrations and offered to citizens back some public good according to O’Dwyer (2007).

However, despite that they conflate on the dependent variable side the two different dimensions, on the independent variable side, they all seem deterministic in their views of how bureaucratic professionalization should happen. Indeed in all this literature it seems that party incentives are static and maintained through electoral dynamics of losing power and civil service reforms are irreversible once pluralistic system of political competition is in place. However evidence shows this is not the case: Countries with pluralist competitive party systems, as in Hungary and Poland, have not maintained the right party incentives to de-politicize and professionalize the civil service, but reversed reforms. Second, reforms towards professionalization happened even despite the lack of pluralistic competitive systems or lack of ideologically cohesive parties or despite ideological polarization (e.g. as in some Western Balkan countries). Additionally, as the cases of

formal institutions of oversight and monitoring, likely to constrain the exploitative behavior of parties. O’Dwyer (2006) instead focusses more on administrative reform effectiveness. The author finds out that there is substantial variation between formal laws and practices, where *Runaway state-building* is defined as those cases where administrative expansion in personnel number is not matched with increasing Weberian professionalization. The author defines them as ‘the predictability of civil servants’ career paths; the development of an ethic of professionalism; the emergence of clearly understood (and consistently enforced) boundaries between public and private interests; and the bureaucratic autonomy and independence from party political influence of officials (p.5). He goes on measuring the “Weberianness” of state administrations as political autonomy, separation of office and office-holder, predictable career paths, and a sense of administrative professionalism.

Albania and Macedonia show, despite similar levels of political competition the two countries perform differently, in the latter one resulting in worse bureaucracies than the former. As a result, party incentives remains to be better understood.

While these historical and institutionalists strands with their three key variables, offer interesting rationales on party strategies for reform, the *two shortcomings* they suffer from can explain why their predictions work only under specific empirical conditions and how these limitations contribute not to get the ‘party agency’ right in building state institutions. Both empirically restrictive scope conditions of the literature in party–state relations and restrictive assumptions of party incentives to pursue reforms will be elaborated below, before the thesis offers an alternative answer in explaining civil service reform progress.

Restrictive scope conditions of party–state relations

The main problem in the current theories in accounting for state reforms is that they impart from historical records in Western pluralistic context of party systems and state building,²⁷¹ that do not apply in the post- communist one, when explaining political parties’ rationale in reforming states from a spoil system to a Weberian merit-based civil service. Two assumptions in these theories are problematic, as they are treated as same when applied in a different context. First, it assumed that civil service reforms are irreversible due to *restrictive scope conditions* of party state relations prevalent in old democracies that downplayed the role parties’ play in shaping bureaucracies and contributed to emergence of Weberian administrations. Second, it assumed that *party incentives* on state reform are *constant* in political competition, neglecting that such incentives to pursue reform vary substantially across party organizations and societal structures in post- communist context. However, there is no reason for such assumptions, as evidence contradicts them.

With regard to the first assumption, the literature adopts *restrictive scope conditions* on the genesis of bureaucratic professionalization prevalent in the Western historical context of state building and party politics that are less prevalent in post-communist context of state building. Based on historical, but as well institutionalist predictions on political competition, civil services reforms are irreversible and serve incumbents as an *institutional insurance*²⁷² constraining a political opponent from exploitation

²⁷¹ Innes (2013).

²⁷² The causal mechanisms linking political competition to demonstrative reform in *Leviathan* derives form an older idea on bureaucratic insulation in the wider literature in social science²⁷²: Incumbents *lock in* formal institutions in important areas of party survival and therefore lower state exploitation along two mechanisms: first as an *insurance* and “a way of constraining one’s political opponents from exploiting their access to state resources for their own gain” in

of state resources in long-term. Indeed, this *insurance* hypothesis has become the conventional wisdom argument on the genesis of an independent state judiciary²⁷³ and impartial administration.

However, we need to identify the conditions that facilitated political parties not to reverse civil service reforms in Western context, before we understand how such conditions differed in post-communist context. First, a constitutional arrangement and independent judiciary ensured legal effectiveness and stability in state administration and sanctioned party' wrong doings through spoil system in administration. The politics of state-building process, was structured between political parties and judiciary going after party' arbitrariness and corruptive activities derived from the spoil system. This is a difference between the United States' state building attempt and post-communist state building, where party and state building coincided, but the state administration was much more protected through a strong judiciary in the US system. Second, the administration was embedded in stable socio-economic coalitions with strong business groups, middle-class interests and strong civil society organizations that demanded inter-temporal policy stability and therefore effectiveness in administration. As a result, incumbents had to credibly commit to such socio-economic demands, by insulating bureaucracies and locking in their policies in administrations, in order maintain in future support of those groups.²⁷⁴ Also, the interest groups demanded such long-term policy stability. The party-state relations were *embedded* therefore in some older democracies socio-economically and constitutionally differently to new democracies. As a result, party arbitrariness in the hiring and firing was much lower than in democratizing countries and civil service reforms could be sustained, as the state was legally and socio-economically more protected from parties' discretion into public administration. However such mechanism becomes obsolete in light of evidence in post-communist countries.

With regard to the second assumption, theoretically most of the explanation based on political competition's effect on Weberian bureaucracy, also apply *restrictive assumptions about parties' incentive* to pursue reform. The determinants on parties' strategic choice on reform hinges upon *empirical conditions* prevalent in the West experience of state reforms, such as disciplined and ideological parties committed to democracy, facing voters in rising social and living conditions.²⁷⁵ Parties are treated as consolidated organizations, that adapt all similarly with the state administration,

the long-term. Second, these formal institutions enabled incumbents to constrain themselves, in order to "limit their discretion to extract state resources for fear of adverse publicity and electoral losses" Gryzmala Busse 2006, p.15.

²⁷³ Epperly (2013).

²⁷⁴ Moe (1989).

²⁷⁵ Hence, competitive party systems and underlying socio-economic conditions, sustained 'elite incentives to take the state out of the political game'. However, these are extremely restrictive assumptions of party incentives to pursue reform and consequences for institutional transformation for new democracies that have different underlying conditions.

as they are subjected to the same internal organizational dynamics, exposed to the same material incentives and subjected to the same electoral pressures in a competitive game to deliver public good to voters. Such empirical conditions both on party incentives and socio-economic conditions represented a successful historical record of how Golden Age party systems led to creation of Weberian state.²⁷⁶

Such empirical conditions that sustain pluralistic structures to be conducive to the Weberian state administration, cannot be representative for all times and countries, particularly in a post-communist context. In light of evidence, we have even less of a reason to assume that civil service reform cannot be easily reversed in a post-communist setting or that party incentives on reforms are given²⁷⁷ First, in such context, where the party building and state building coincide, the state administration is less socio-economically and legally protected through the presence of a strong judicial state and stable socio-economic groups.²⁷⁸ Therefore, the parties play a much higher strategic role in arbitrarily reversing civil service reforms. Empirical evidence shows that the propensity of such civil service reform reversals endangering state independence is higher in a democratizing context than in an established democracy.²⁷⁹ However, if civil service reforms can be easily reversed, consequentially, the institutional *insurance* mechanism assumed in literature on political competition, becomes obsolete in unconsolidated democracies. Because the institutional environment is so unpredictable, an ‘unbounded uncertainty’ rather than bounded certainty prevails, incumbents do not count that opposition cannot reverse institutional rules in future. Therefore, a rethinking of scope conditions is therefore needed.

Second, the party building is not a consolidated process yet and its outcomes vary substantially, and incentives are not constant across parties. Hence, party incentives hinging upon strong *disciplined organizations* and *rising social and economic conditions*, as done in the literature, represent a restrictive view on incentives to pursue state reform, where the picture is much more diverse. In democratizing countries, where some political parties are the heirs of organizations in power for decades while others are the by-product of clandestine or semi-clandestine struggles, the political panorama is more heterogeneous than depicted in the literature: some political parties may represent ethnic minorities, others may be connected to the former elites, while others may have their

²⁷⁶ The pluralist critique is similar to Innes (2013).

²⁷⁷ There is wide and rich evidence that shows how reforms can be reversed leading to different levels of politicisation and professionalization in Latin American context, post-communist context, but as well 19th century American state-building process

²⁷⁸ There is wide and rich evidence that shows how reforms can be reversed leading to different levels of politicisation and professionalization in Latin American context, post-communist context, but as well 19th century American state-building process

²⁷⁹ Grindle (2013).

strongholds in some specific geographical areas or industries. Consequentially parties' incentives to improve bureaucracies, capabilities and goals vary dramatically across parties.²⁸⁰ This explains why parties' stance towards civil service reform is not *a constant* linked only to certain empirical conditions. A better re-evaluation of party incentives is therefore needed, particularly on *how variation in party organization building process shapes party incentives* differently in the balance between political loyalty or expertise in organization of civil service. These limitations explored here open up the theoretical space for a new alternative answer.

ARGUMENT: PARTY-BUILDING AND STATE REFORMS

Challenging such *deterministic* account on *stasis*, *political competition* and *EU conditionality*, the thesis provides an alternative answer. The state building outcomes are understood as a consequence to party-building process, where parties play a crucial strategic role for outcomes of bureaucratic reforms. In that. I provide different scope conditions and assumptions on party incentives on state reforms.

By taking a party agency perspective, I claim that the organizational and electoral concerns in such party building process affect party incentives in hiring more political loyalist or rather more experts explains civil service reform progress. Holding all other factors constant, political parties stand before *two dilemmas* in their own party building process when structuring the administration. Do they hire and fire politically to get political services and resources needed to secure organizational survival or rather rely on more professional administrators and provide public goods to out-mobilize opponents' to survive electorally?

But before, we derive the two rationales and different incentives on reforms in the party building process, the chapter first discusses the different scope conditions of this theory, how party building offers the right lenses to understand the different party rationales and how that combines to outcomes on bureaucratic reforms.

Different scope conditions in state building in new democracies

As aforementioned, bureaucratic reforms emerge from very different party state relations in new democracies than in Western context. Parties play an important strategic role in shaping the

²⁸⁰ Tavits and Letki (2014).

direction and outcomes of bureaucratic reforms in new democracies. They have this ‘dual strategic role’ in surviving electorally and organizationally in their own party building process, and at the same time, transforming state administration. Attaining and retaining power is at the heart of politics²⁸¹ for political parties, which simultaneously have had to act as ‘state builders’.²⁸² That double role affects how parties use bureaucracies as a tool of politics affecting how they politically hire and fire within administration and the extent to which they need expertise in policy performance while they govern. Politicians care about the immediate benefit of the policy consequences of their administrative choices, -will it serve the public or the private, will it help gain more political support, rather than aggregate coherence of an administration.²⁸³ In a context where parties are the main architects of ‘state building’ because party and state building coincide, parties can subvert and more easily reverse civil service reforms and political parties’ opportunity structure for patronage is higher. Hence, administration is shaped deliberately from political parties based on their own needs in the party-building process. As a result civil service reform progress is understood as the product of constant clashes of parties between the dilemma of hiring more political loyalists or hiring more experts.

The institutional context in unconsolidated democracies renders civil service reforms more amenable to change than in Western context because civil service reforms are less protected from stable coalitions of socio-economic groups and legally from a strong and independent judiciary. Hence, parties play a greater role in influencing the organization of bureaucracies. Two conditions of party state relations matter therefore to explain bureaucratic reforms.

First, autonomous bureaucracies and rule of law have not been inherited through prior stages of state-building as in the Western context.²⁸⁴ In a context, where party and state building coincide, the lack of a strong judiciary in the state building process to sanction parties’ wrong doing in the administration, allows parties even more to act arbitrarily in the use of state administration for party needs. The legacy of politicized state structures, among other also the judicial branch, through the remnants of the *nomenklatura* system from communist times offered opportunity to elites to use discretion and further exploit the state, without need to give up power.²⁸⁵ Such inherited judiciary has provided little institutional resistance to check and balance the discretion of parties and block

281 De Mesquita (2003).

282 Grzymala-Busse (2002).

283 Lewis (2008).

284 Ganey (2001).

285 Ganey (2001, p.10).

the arbitrariness in influencing the organization of personnel in state administration.²⁸⁶ Such strong role of parties over the state-building process renders the post-communist state building different from other episodes in Western context such as in the US, where party and state building coincided, but the spoil system was sanctioned though a strong judiciary in the US political system.

Second, a lack of stable socio-economic coalition, lowered the pressure towards incumbents to credibly commit to long-term inter-temporal policy stability²⁸⁷ and improve professionalization. Instability on socio-economic coalitions, combined with a non-solid and wealthy middle class,²⁸⁸ lowered the pressure on administrative professionalization. The lack of stable socio-economic coalitions was as well accompanied with demobilized societies and political non-engagement.²⁸⁹ This facilitated political parties to prey on the state and use its resources for own patronage purposes without much popular resistance, and have a ‘weak commitment to programmatic ideals for political opportunism’. Therefore, as Ganev (2001) pessimistically explains, ‘the post-communist drama is about how such historical context gives rise to predatory elites that weaken state structures despite the most popular demand for it.’ Finally, the general institutional environment is much more “uncertain” in unconsolidated democracies than consolidated ones²⁹⁰, and actors do not know whether the regime in its current institutional form will persist in the near future.²⁹¹ This type of pervasive uncertainty also is reflected in the strategic calculations of incumbents’ benefit on such civil service reforms. Incumbents would reform only if they have immediate benefits over any long-term calculations²⁹². These two conditions then explain why bureaucrats are not strategic and they have no autonomous preferences from politicians. Additionally, civil society is weak and the business sector is not well developed to create a voice of its own in politics. Therefore, parties remain the main architects of bureaucracies through civil service reforms in many democratizing countries.²⁹³

In a context where parties are the main architects of ‘state building’ because party and state building coincide, and civil service reforms are less constitutionally and socio-economically protected from constituencies, parties can reverse outcomes between politicization and professionalization in

²⁸⁶ O’Dwyer (2007).

²⁸⁷ Epperly (2013) claims that the ‘intertemporal policy control calculus does not work well in the high-uncertainty environment of emerging democracies’, so he analyses judicial independence (p.37).

²⁸⁸ Hellman (1998) shows how interest groups do not value policy stability in long term over short term benefits of short lived policies as they would do in consolidated democracies.

²⁸⁹ Because those elites faced demobilized societies that have been repressed through the communist regime and were heavily suppressed, a ‘culture of political non-engagement’ as well as skepticism to participate in any political party mobilization strategy (O’Dwyer 2006).

²⁹⁰ O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Bunce (1993); Epperly (2013).

²⁹¹ Schedler (1998).

²⁹² Epperly (2013).

²⁹³ Grzymala-Busse (2002).

administration much more easily. Parties can hire and fire politically in the state administration without being sanctioned from a strong independent judiciary, as they can much more easily legitimize practices of political hiring and firing, due to the inherited *nomenklatura* system. Additionally, they can reverse or subvert reform in levels of professionalization²⁹⁴ with less ‘popular resistance’, as socio-economic coalitions are less stable in their demands for effective policy stability over time.²⁹⁵ This explains generally why levels of politicization are much higher in new democracies, while the state has low capacity.

Acting against such scope conditions, parties face two organizational imperatives and goals. The section below hints to how such goals affect party incentives to rely on political loyalists or experts in administration.

Assumptions on party building dilemmas and state building outcomes

If party-organization building happens before state-building, then we would imagine that what organizational and electoral dilemma parties encounter in the party building process would affect their incentives to politicize or professionalize bureaucracies. On this, we now need to understand what are the party rationale and different incentives and how does public administration play a role for the party building process. In new democracies of Latin America, but as well not in post-communist countries²⁹⁶, party building is a process that is not yet finalized²⁹⁷ The party building process, is defined as the ‘process by which new parties develop into electorally significant and enduring political actors’.²⁹⁸

First, based on the definition of party building process, we derive that parties face *multiple dilemmas* they need to find solutions for and the state administration supports parties in two ways: *one is on organizational endurance*²⁹⁹. They need to develop an own organization in the long-term with a solid party membership, with own internal structure and personnel territorial branches,³⁰⁰ a party brand that sustains partisan attachments,³⁰¹ and its own resources to maintain its activists, rewards its own personnel and minimize the trade-off between responding only to own party members but broaden the electorate base as well. Second, they need to remain *electorally significant* in political

²⁹⁴ Ganev (2001).

²⁹⁵ Epperly (2013), and Hellman (1998).

²⁹⁶ Tavits (2013).

²⁹⁷ Levitsky (2016).

²⁹⁸ Levitsky *et al.* (2016).

²⁹⁹ Aldrich (1995).

³⁰⁰ Levitsky *et al.* (2016).

³⁰¹ Lupu (2016).

competition through *government performance*.³⁰² In these processes, ‘parties are dominated by their office drives’,³⁰³ and so winning elections and controlling the governing apparatus for policies is what maintains party organizations.

However such multiple-dilemmas are not only to be derived based on the party building logics. Additionally, we know from the literature on party formation that the logic of organizational endurance and the logic of competition constitute two very different organizational imperatives parties face in their own formation and development phase³⁰⁴ and for which they have to mobilize resources and build political support. Hence, because the party building is not finalized yet, and because parties face various dilemmas to solve in such process, the *incentives* to pursue bureaucratic reform cannot be assumed as given. These two imperatives on organizational and electoral survival during the party building process are the analytical lens that allow us to better grasp how parties might want to rely on the state resources or not and what are the rationale for reforms.

Second, I assume that the state administration is crucial for these two imperatives parties face in their own organizational development. This is true, first, because parties want to establish continuous organization, the state and its officials represent a key *resource* for mobilizing support for organizational survival.³⁰⁵ At the same time state professional capacity is a *means* of parties’ chance of electoral survival through governmental performance in public good or private good provision.³⁰⁶ Bureaucrats can be a ‘*resource*’ for parties supporting party organizations and their own constituency in the long-term and a ‘*means*’ to support parties’ efforts at delivering the right policies.

Based on these *two goals* in the party building process and how the state administration can transform itself, we know that if parties rely on political loyalists, instead of civil servants, the former can be more useful as they serve parties back with political service and resources that can support to mobilize resources for organizational survival.³⁰⁷ We know that politicians can use bureaucracies that are organized as politicized systems as a tool of patronage to maximize their re-election or provide them with different political services³⁰⁸ to help build their organizations. Politicized bureaucracies, and political appointees, help politicians produce different political services that benefit only

³⁰² Mainwaring (2006).

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, p.396.

³⁰⁴ Kitschelt (1989), Schlesinger (1984).

³⁰⁵ Hagopian (1996); Mainwaring (1999); Greene (2007); Mustillo (2007); Dargent and Muñoz (2011); Morgan (2011); Morgan *et al.* (2011); Grindle (2012); Gingerich (2013).

³⁰⁶ Mainwaring (2006,2007) has argued that state capacity has a powerful impact on government performance, which in turn affects governing parties’ electoral performance.

³⁰⁷ Oliveros (2013).

³⁰⁸ *ibid.*

themselves (organizational or constituency-based) and they support politicians to manage policies through provision of public good in serving citizens or their target groups.

Additionally, we also know that a good and effective bureaucracy has policy consequences towards parties' electoral support. They can also exploit them as a tool to solve collective action problems in terms of effective policy making and public good provision, when structured as civil service systems.³⁰⁹ Parties need professional administration to produce public goods.³¹⁰ Bureaucracies with professional and competent officials are more capable in producing and contributing effectively to policy implementation than ones where no competence prevails. Hence, if parties rely on professional administrators (irrespective of whether they are political loyalists or civil servants) who have policy expertise, the latter can help politicians implement better policies and therefore mobilize wider electoral support. Bureaucracies depending on how they are organized, therefore, serve both purposes of parties.

Two party rationale in recruiting political loyalists and experts

Holding all other factors constant, I claim that those organizational and electoral needs in the party building process, affect differently therefore parties' incentives in hiring and firing political loyalists or in relying on experts and that is consequential for civil service reform progress. However, parties are not exposed to the same electoral and organizational needs. Both organizational structure and resources of parties vary and so do societal structures.

Regarding the *first rationale, differences in organizational resources* between younger and older parties affect parties' dependence on state resources and therefore lead to differences in incentives of relying on party patronage, and therefore affect different levels of *politicization*. The thesis derives this rationale as we know that parties have different organizational resource endowments and we also know that that different organizational resources matter for parties to solve internal and external collective action problems.³¹¹

Empirically, in a post-communist context there is a variety of organizational structure³¹² – and therefore organizational resources – across political parties between new and older established

³⁰⁹ Ting and Huber (2015).

³¹⁰ Bezes (2012).

³¹¹ Levitsky (2016).

³¹² Grzymala-Busse (2002); Tavits (2013).

political parties vary. Usually the successor of the communist parties has more developed organization than new parties born in transition without prior organizational infrastructure.³¹³ Most of the new non-communist parties that emerged in the post-communist transition developed their organizations with their role in public office.³¹⁴ As many of these new parties did not originate from grass-roots social mobilization of societies, they were strongly based on resource generation from state patronage- using public administration for their own survival.³¹⁵ Indeed, in many new democracies, access to state resources served as a ‘substitute to party organization.’³¹⁶ Because parties have variation in organizational resource endowment³¹⁷ to solve such organizational problems, their strategies also vary in the extent to which they politicize the state administration. The significant organizational resource inheritance of older parties means they are less reliant on the state personnel for *resource mobilization* than new parties. The latter one due to organizational resource scarcity are in greater need and thus view the personnel as a ‘resource’ to exploit for their own organizational survival, leading to higher levels of politicization.³¹⁸

Regarding the *second rationale*, we know that *differences in social structure between* identity and social-economic cleavages, increases parties’ electoral incentives to *strategically* polarize competition on identity rather than socio-economic issues, lowering the pressure to deliver on public goods and therefore levels of professionalization. I derive this rationale as we know that societal structure incentivizes rightist parties to strategically mobilize around identity issues for electoral support.³¹⁹ Additionally we also know, though, that in countries where identity cleavages prevail, voters do not hold governments accountable only on socio-economic policy improvement, but rather identity representation.³²⁰

³¹³ Initial party building in the east is dominated by elites from within parliaments who create political parties only after the first free elections Kopecky (1995); Agh (1996); Pridham and Lewis (1996); Zielinski (2002); Van Biezen (2003); Rovny (2014)

³¹⁴ Van Biezen (2003) In Tavits (2013).

³¹⁵ Innes (2013); Hale (2006).

³¹⁶ State as a ‘substitute’ for party organization derives from works in Hale (2006). Such politicians can siphon public money to finance their campaigns, deploy government employees (e.g., hospital workers, army members) as campaigners, recruit candidates from government agencies, and use public buildings as campaign offices.


³¹⁷ *Ibid.*

³¹⁸ Hale (2006) talks of the state as an administrative substitute to a well-organized political party.

³¹⁹ Van Biezen (2003).

³²⁰ Chandra (2004), Horowitz (1985); Huddy (2003); Monroe, Hankin and Van Vechten (2000); Varshney (2003). When ethnic identities matter over material interests, is branded as criminal’ and denounced as ‘desertion, defection, and treason’ (Hirschman 1970, p.17).

Figure 7: Summary of argument: Two incumbency rationale on levels of politicization and professionalization



Parties on the other side use this propensity of voters to instrumentalize identity or socio-economic issues.³²¹ Hence, parties can transform the linkages with the electorate and change political representation, as they transform the way they execute power and distribute policies, by changing the premises to fill the office of the state administration with political loyalists and serving only narrow elites or experts and serve more citizens.

How the state develops between politicization and professionalization depends therefore on how party-building strategies vary, based on these two: (1) parties' organizational need in using administration as a resource of patronage for their own constituency and organizational building affect politicization, and; (2) how variation in electoral pressure to deliver public goods across the

³²¹ Chandra (2004); Tavits and Letki (2014).

societal structure promotes variation in parties strategies to be responsible in governing, leading to professionalization of administration. Civil service reform progress is an outcome therefore of how parties survive organizationally in the long term and how parties outcompete each other electorally within the societal structure. The combination of the two rationales of party survival then allows us to better understand why and how parties improve bureaucracies and others not. Therefore, a patronage-led administration is thinkable in being viable in both programmatic or less programmatic orientation in government. This revises the current literature that views patronage as being opposed to programmatic orientation and as influenced by party organizational strength.³²²

Hypotheses

I argue that party organization strength matters for levels of politicization. I claim that in post-communist setting, usually higher inherited organizational resources render older parties, the successor of the communist parties, less dependent on state resources for own survival and hence will lead to lower levels of politicization.

H1a: Older parties rather than younger ones, have higher inherited organizational resources and will therefore, less depend on state resources and patronage to survive politically

H1b: Younger parties, have lower levels of organizational resources and will therefore, depend less on state resources and patronage to survive politically

I argue that, conditional on ethnic homogeneity or socio-economic cleavages, when political competition is shaped such that parties diverge on economic issues, and converge on identity issues, the electoral pressure for incumbents to deliver public goods will increase, and hence their need to rely on professionals for effective policy making, leading to a more professional bureaucracy.

H2a: In ethnically homogeneous societies, socio-economic centered political competition will lead to higher level of professionalization.

³²² Hagopian (2014).

ORGANIZATIONAL RATIONALE AND LEVELS OF POLITICIZATION

The question here is why do some parties hire and fire more than others? Politicization is understood (as defined in Chapter 1) as the conscious choice of politicians and not only parties to strategically influence the hiring and firing of officials based on both political loyalty and party loyalty criteria in exchange for political services. We know that highly politicized bureaucracies and political appointees in the state administration are the ‘administrative capital’³²³ to parties that need resources and serve political purposes producing certain private goods that benefit the party in power,³²⁴ or as well pursue various primary goals of such parties.³²⁵ Patronage resources represent a crucial resource for party organizations that are in development and have still not well-established organizations. Possible alternatives include public finance³²⁶ or private finance,³²⁷ but most parties in new democracies lack such access to those resources.

Organizational strength matters for the extent to which parties’ organizational resources vary in the present explaining their dependence on patronage in the state administration to compensate for their own resource scarcity. However, the organizational strength and resources between parties vary substantially in new democracies. Older parties possess more resources for solving internal collective action problems (e.g., disciplining through rules and rewarding through careers, party officials to act on party’s interest in legislative and electorate, cultivating a large membership, developing an extensive network of visible local branch offices, and building professional, specialized, and permanent central office staff). They also have greater capacity to solve external collective action problems. These include spreading more easily the party’s message in campaigns through the party brand, responding more to broader electorate and voters’ preferences without losing their members and broadening electoral support through the political experience of officials. Therefore, they are more likely to succeed electorally, survive as significant players in the electoral arena, and behave cohesively in the parliament.³²⁸ New parties, in contrast, must overcome them with a *resource poverty* in all those categories. As a result, I distinguish between those younger parties that need more resources to succeed and endure, and therefore depend on state patronage as a

³²³ Hale (2006).

³²⁴ Ting and Huber (2015).

³²⁵ Bearfield (2009, p.68) distinguishes how patrons, in this case politicians pursue their principle goals by invoking a variety of ‘patronage styles: like *organizational patronage* to strengthen or create political organizations, democratic patronage to achieve egalitarian goals using patronage, *tactical patronage* uses the distribution of public offices to bridge political divisions or cleavages of achieving political or policy goals, *reform patronage*: emerges from those committed to reform by using the existing patronage system to denounce corrupt politicians.

³²⁶ Bruhn (2016), Levitsky (2016).

³²⁷ Barndt (2016).

³²⁸ Tavits (2013, p.200); Ishiyama (2001).

strategy *for further resource mobilization*. On the other hand, we have those parties that are more autonomous along own organizations, to both win elections and expand the support base.

There are *four* ways in understanding *organizational resources*³²⁹ that can solve internal and external collective action problems:³³⁰ (1) voter loyalty, through party membership and party activists who support the party not only at the polls but beyond elections by overcoming external collective action problems; (2) to create a system of compensation, procedures and routines for its members, that discipline and induce participants not only to pursue their own interests, but act on behalf of the party that overcome internal collective action problems;³³¹ (3) to create and routinize organizational activity through territorial infrastructure and local offices to maximize electoral support, and; (4) financial resources to both compensate officials and activists. Hence, internal and external collective action problems can be overcome, if parties offer politicians with organizations, material resources and a brand name.

What is then interesting to further explore is how does *organizational 'age'*, affect through past conditions inherited resources for parties and how does that explain levels of politicization. The idea that the inheritance of pre-existing resources is a crucial determinant of party-building is one of the most robust findings in the parties' literature.³³² The distinction between old and new parties in this case, is shaped from past legacies that determine the extent to which parties can or less rely on own organizational resources. The section below will outline how such organizational resources differ between old and new parties in post-communist settings, and then outline why new parties would rely more than older parties on political loyalists.

³²⁹ Loxton (2016) speaks of organizational resources and authoritarian inheritance along following variables that is similarly to this understanding: (1) a party brand, (2) territorial organization, and (3) a source of cohesion. Two other common forms of authoritarian inheritance are (4) clientelistic networks and (5) a source of party finance. (p.246) Grzymala –Busse (2002), explains that successor of communist parties have both a 'usable past' – historical record of party accomplishments to which elites and 'portable skills' expertise politically and administrative and governing experience gained in previous regimes(p.5). Tavits (2014) operationalizes the party organizational strength along three variables: (1) professionalization of the central organization (2) organizational extensiveness, (3) membership and size activism. She claims that organizational strength contributes in parties' capability of mobilizing voters more effectively than weak organizations.

³³⁰ Aldrich (1995), Schlesinger (1984) and Kitchelt (2000).

³³¹ According to Schlesinger (1984, p.388), the most crucial aspect is the mode of compensation for participants: as Schlesinger claims that the mode of compensation is a means of control for organization, and that it allows to understand the *reciprocal* relations between the workforce being dependent or not for its livelihood on the further maintenance of the organization. Schlesinger therefore claims that parties pay their *participants indirectly*, indeed because of that he claims they have less of stake in the maintenance of an organization if they were to be paid directly. This is of special significance for political parties, as all not only activists but as well candidates and public office holders are paid by *the state* and the party is important in *gaining paid offices*. This I claim is a substantial resource to maintain the party organizational continuity. Indeed, 'payment of staff is a major factor for organizational continuity'.

³³² Loxton (2016).

Distinction between old and new parties in the post-communist setting and beyond

In new democracies, political parties vary dramatically in terms of what Hale (2004) calls their ‘starting political capital’ or ‘the stock of assets they possess that might be translated into electoral success’ and that can be beyond the inherited resources from the authoritarian past. Loxton (2016), claims that ‘some parties are born with large endowments of starting political capital; others are born with little and thus must start virtually from scratch’. The idea that parties born with greater stocks of starting political capital would have a better chance of success than parties born with less is not particularly surprising.³³³ What remains perhaps puzzling is that this could be inherited from authoritarian or communist regimes³³⁴ and that this would render such parties then less reliant on patronage than new established ones, without such resources.

Applied to the post-communist context, there were different *organizational inheritances in resources* between older and new parties that made them self-rely on their own organizational resources rather than state resources. The main and most clear distinction in post-communist parties is between successor of the communist parties, as one with most inherited organizational resources, and those that are borne in transition period. All other parties were almost organizationally non-existent nor fully established with voters and at the same time they had fast access to public office and state resources, without any prior built organizational infrastructure. However, also new parties diverged substantially, as some relied on some patronage resources and newer one had even less. Therefore, parties were strongly based on resource generation from state patronage- using public administration for own survival, as many of these new parties did not originate from social mobilization of societies. Hence, not *organizational resource scarcity*, but advantage on such resources, explains the why the successor of post-communist parties rather than other new parties in transition when in government, lead to lower levels of politicization. This is the puzzling finding that emerges as depicted from Loxton (2016) in the case of Latin America.

The section below will describe then what type of organizational resources differ between old and new parties in order to render the older parties more autonomous from new ones in levels of politicization.

³³³ Loxton (2016).

³³⁴ Grzymala-Busse (2002), Loxton (2016).

Differences in organizational resources between old and new parties

As aforementioned there are *four* ways in *understanding organizational resources'* variation between older and new parties in a post-communist context: (1) voter loyalty (2) party cohesiveness through a system of compensation, procedures and routines for its members and a pool of activists (3) territorial outreach and local branches (4) financial resources.

First, older organizationally established parties have a pool of voters inherited from the past that allow parties to endure electorally without the need to provide selective benefits or state patronage to both withhold membership or broaden their electorate support.³³⁵

Second, older parties have higher sources of party cohesion than new parties. This is manifested in higher discipline and more routines in procedures of selecting both top-leadership that does not stand above the party interest;³³⁶ discipline members to act coherently in the party's interest both at the electorate and in legislature without much abuse of power against party's interest³³⁷ or much need to distribute selective benefits through patronage as a means of compensation. Instead, career structures in party allow to better align those incentives. Additionally, the cohesiveness allows the professional staff and skilled experienced policy innovators to effectively disseminate the party's message both in electorate campaign and as well when in government.³³⁸ Finally, older parties build on a pool of activists that make them as well more cohesive. Party activists that have fought in the trenches together, are more likely to feel a strong affective attachment to the party to develop an ethos of internal discipline and to confer to high levels of legitimacy on party leaders.³³⁹

New parties, more than often lack this source of cohesiveness in disciplining their officials and rewarding them with clear career structures. They also lack personnel with professional skill to deploy the party message cohesively. Party leaders rely instead on patronage resources – party allocation of jobs within the state administration – to create the lack of party cohesiveness,³⁴⁰ usually given in older parties. These political loyalists matter to reward their supporters with positions in

³³⁵ Gryzmala-Busse (2002) talks of the inherited authoritarian past in successor of the communist parties as a 'usable past' of accomplishments in public perception and inherited 'portable skills' in helping them to adapt to new electorate. Loxton (2016) talks of the 'party brand' as an inherited resource, that is valuable for parties to attach to voters and appeal to a wider constituency beyond their loyal followers, as such party brand allows to signal voters that they have a 'history in government' of achievement. Parties without such experience, need build reputation or provide material rewards to prove that they can be credible.

³³⁶ Gryzmala Busse (2002).

³³⁷ Keefer (2015).


³³⁸ Gryzmala-Busse (2002), Loxton (2016).

³³⁹ Loxton (2016, p.2550; Levitsky and Way (2010)

³⁴⁰ On the link between party patronage and party cohesiveness see Hale (2006); Greene (2007), Morgan *et al.* (2011); Dargent and Muñoz (2011); Dargent and Muñoz (2016).

administrations, to build a cohesive pool of activists and as well create incentives for party officials through such compensations³⁴¹. Additionally, they can generate side-payments to act in the party's organizational interest based on the patronage network within the state.

Figure 8: Party organizational effect on levels of political hiring and firing in state administration



Third, older parties have territorial organization through local branches, which new parties lack. The extent to which parties have a territorial organization or rely instead on state patronage to create the coordination between the centre and the subnational linkages, is crucial for new parties. Many authoritarian parties have such an organizational advantage in ‘pre-existing mobilization structures, over new parties that must build that from scratch’,³⁴² which is crucial for ensuring the appeal to a broader electorate. Party patronage is often the binding glue that holds together party organizations at the centre with the subnational level, in many Latin American countries³⁴³. Control of public sector jobs, pork barrel projects, campaign funds, and other public resources allow parties

³⁴¹ In Latin America, public employment has long been an important means of compensating local cadres and activists for party work, see Grindle (2012) in Levitsky (2016).

³⁴² Van Dyck (2016) in Levitsky (2016); Loxton (2016), Le Bas (2016).

³⁴³ Muñoz and Dargent (2016).

to attract and retain the loyalty of local candidates and activists through the distribution of selective benefits'.³⁴⁴ To the extent that party leaders control the vertical flow of such resources, they can maintain subnational linkages by structuring the careers of local politicians.³⁴⁵ It is clear that those organizations that already inherit such territorial cohesion, need less patronage in co-ordination between the central organization and the sub-national organizations together.³⁴⁶

Fourth, parties might vary on their endowment with financial resources to finance electoral campaigns or reward party activists and officials and therefore the need to depend on employment of activists in state administration for generating further financial resources.³⁴⁷ The support of business is likely to provide greater access to financial resources for organizational campaign spending, and might eventually as well render parties less reliant on the state resources. In many authoritarian countries, where business was part of the social coalition backing the old regime, success of authoritarian parties may inherit a reputation as trustworthy allies and have more support from the business.³⁴⁸ Additionally, their 'party brand' as successful governors, might electorally incentivize business to support them more. New parties may lack both such inherited resources than older parties have an in financing electoral campaigns through own ownership, or support from outsiders

Centralized organizations of parties minimize the trade-off between responding to voter's preferences and appealing to new party members and the broader electorate.³⁴⁹ First, centralized bureaucratic structures allow them to solve better organizational dilemmas of internal collective action problems in giving 'credence to claims of professionalism',³⁵⁰ without using patronage as a tool for both compensation of members and activists. Second, those organizations have an inherited personnel structure, size of activists and a group of loyal voters, that allow them better to solve policy and external collection action problems through public good provision, without fearing party membership loss. Third, they build on inherited financial resources and organizational infrastructure through territorial branches, that new parties don't have and that allow older parties to link the

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.189.

³⁴⁵ *ibid.*

³⁴⁶ Muñoz and Dargent (2016).

³⁴⁷ Hale (2006) refers to this phenomenon, but in the literature that is as well understood with corruption in broader ways, or where brokers in administration provide to business sector favours and asking backing for financial rewards in electoral campaigns.

³⁴⁸ Loxton (2016).

³⁴⁹ Grzymala-Busse (2002, p.4).

³⁵⁰ Grzymala-Busse (2002) caims how party cohesion of the successor of the communist parties promoted more party discipline in parliament and rendered them to be formidable parliamentary players in defending their own party agenda. Additionally, party cohesion is as well viewed as a ways to solve internal action problems in disciplining all party officials to act on behalf of the party's interest and not on their own interest, therefore, lowering the extent to which individuals would abuse power against party organization interests (Keefer, 2015).

central and subnational organizations without reliance on the state patronage.

The extent to which parties have organizations that build on voter loyalty in terms of party membership, have well-structured organizations that offer politicians with career structures and build on professional staff by upholding a territorial infrastructure matters therefore for organizational autonomy from state resources, assuming that organizational strength leads to electoral success.³⁵¹ Because of resource scarcity regarding these variables, new parties will rely much more than older ones on state resources once a party enters its state offices.

Causal mechanism: why would new parties rely more on political loyalists?

The *main mechanism* of why new parties affect state political hiring and firing is that variation in organizational resources of parties renders patronage resources differently beneficial to political parties. It is higher for new parties with weak organizations rather than older ones with more autonomous and strong organizations. A newer party can thus substitute for its lack in organizational resources, by hiring political loyalists that would support them to mobilize further resource. As aforementioned there is a variety in the motivations behind political hiring and firing³⁵² in administration, but this thesis focuses on party–state relations, where the administrative state represents a ‘resource’ for parties’ organization-building.³⁵³ Those political appointees represent a *party organisational resource*,³⁵⁴ or an ‘administrative capital’³⁵⁵ that is a crucial for new parties with weak organizations to further use such political loyalists to mobilize even more resources. Therefore, the state administration and such political loyalists serves as resource mobilizers, in lack of own administrative capital for younger parties. They can take the role of activists in broader areas serving political parties with other political service like: broadening party membership³⁵⁶; build stronger territorial organizations through patronage networks acting as brokers and binding glue between

³⁵¹ There are already works that show that in a democratizing and post-communist context, organizational strength leads to electoral success, see Tavits (2014); Ishiyama (2001).

³⁵² Those political appointees can offer politicians various services: first, they can be an *electoral resource* for politicians to hire staff of loyal party supporters as a *reward* for their help in electoral campaign or pre-and election time. Second, they might be as well a *means of control* of the governing apparatus by implementing policies that are ideologically aligned to the government (in case of ideological differences in controversial policy areas), or a *means of control* to produce certain policy outcomes that benefit only party-supporters more similar to pork-barrel politics, and campaign party to get re-elected.

³⁵³ Similarly to works based on Scherlis (2009), Scott (1972, 2006).

³⁵⁴ The distribution of patronage resources, such as the partisan allocation of public jobs, can be a critical source of party cohesion, particularly where programmatic linkages are weak. In Latin America, public employment has long been an important means of compensating local cadres and activists for party work (Grindle 2012).

³⁵⁵ Hale (2006).

³⁵⁶ Muñoz and Dargent (2016).

national and subnational politicians³⁵⁷, accumulation of further financial resources and increase membership and appeal to the broader electorate as well as support in electoral campaigns to gather more votes.

ELECTORAL RATIONALE AND LEVELS OF PROFESSIONALIZATION

The question here is understanding a different rationale then to why do incumbents politicize the administration, by asking why do some new democracies have administrations with higher levels of professionalization than others, irrespective of the extent of political appointees in a bureaucracy? Professionalization is operationalized here as the extent of officials having English skills, university degree, PhD degree and having a compatible education background to the policy expertise.

The argument draws on a variety of literature to make a claim that *differences in social structure between* identity and social- economic cleavages, increases polarization of competition on identity rather than socio-economic issues, by lowering parties' electoral incentives to deliver public goods and therefore levels of professionalization. As a result, variation in societal cleavages reflects in different nature of political competition that in certain point in times, and across countries polarizes either on identity issues, in ethnic divided countries, or socio-economic issues, in ethnic homogenous ones. These two very different types of societal and political cleavages create differences in electoral pressure on incumbents to perform well in government in order to outcompete opponents.

Service or public good provision is an electoral tactic³⁵⁸ and as such poses a need on government to have an expert administration that sub-sequentially improves a better management of policies,³⁵⁹ depending on what basis they compete; namely, interest versus identity. However, incumbents' functional need for competent bureaucracies to provide public goods to voters is not a *constant* (as assumed in the literature), but varies with the nature of that competitive space that constrains incumbents electorally differently to perform well across societal cleavages. Below the role of social structure and the mechanism on levels of professionalization will be explained.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁸ Thachil (2011).

³⁵⁹ Lewis (2008).

The role of social structure in political competition over identity versus socio-economic issues

Social structure in the party building process, matters for how parties form political cleavages and as well defines the underlying nature of political competition. Ethnic cleavages are described sociologically as a non-distributable, non-rival and non-excludable cleavage,³⁶⁰ in comparison to other cleavages such as socio-economic ones. Such cleavages inhibit institutional consolidation.³⁶¹ Rather, in ethnic homogenous countries where economic issues or material interests are distributable, rival and excludable,³⁶² governments' electoral need to deliver on some material and policy interests and provide some public goods to maintain power is higher. However, this tells us little based on which mechanism identity-based cleavages are not conducive to public good provision. Two characteristics are further important in order to explain how societal structure affect different *nature* of political competition, and therefore, pose different *electoral pressures* on incumbents' need to provide public good.

First, we know that *voters* do not vote only based on economic interests, but as well on identity conflict issues that cannot be distributed along the left–right economic policies. Therefore, they do not hold politicians accountable only based on economic performance and programmatic policies that redistribute their economic concerns³⁶³, but as well on identity-enhancing policies. Besides the fact that identity concerns cannot be tackled with economic policies alone, most of the literature on incumbent sanctioning model, assume that voters evaluate governments homogenously only based on economic performance. However, we also know that when economic and identity issues clash on the voter's side, voters are less willing to compromise on identity issues³⁶⁴ and can be more easily distracted from their economic interests by prioritizing former ones. As a result, the voter's propensity to prioritize identity over economic interests and therefore hold governments' accountable more on identity than economic interest co-exists in all societal structures. However, it is more salient in ethnic divided countries than ethnic homogenous countries. Hence, consequently we can think of parties acting and responding differently to such voters' concerns in different national settings.

³⁶⁰ Corstange (2013).


³⁶¹ Elster *et al.* (1998).

³⁶² Corstange (2013) claims that ethnicity acts here as a barrier to class conflict by checking the demand for the redistribution of material resources:

³⁶³ The standard economic voting model posits that citizens make electoral decisions based on their perceptions of economic performance. Voters punish incumbents who fail to deliver acceptable economic outcomes and reward governments that meet their expectations. Downs 1957; Fiorina 1978, 1981.

³⁶⁴ Rikker (1982).

Figure 9: Electoral pressure to provide public good and levels of professionalization



Second, parties on the other hand act *strategic* in manipulating the salience of certain issue-identity or policy concerns – in a competitive space. This has consequences for their need to provide public good and govern well through programmatic policies or simply deliver the ‘ethnic’ card, foregoing the need to govern well. Irrespective of societal cleavages, when faced with inequality,

different parties informed by this propensity of voters to praise ‘values and identities’ over ‘economic issues’, appeal to voters on such issues, depending on what is electorally most beneficial to them.³⁶⁵ Rightist parties appeal more to values and leftist parties to economic issues, irrespective of nature of societal structure.

On the one hand, we know that with growing inequality, the leftist parties have an electoral advantage in appealing on economic issues, as the size of electoral constituencies receptive to their redistributive policies grows. On the other hand, the rightist parties’ non-redistributive policies would become less appealing to voters and will want to instrumentalize instead the ‘value’ or identity-issues salient to voters to still attract voters from the left.³⁶⁶ However, rightist parties will not be equally successful to appeal to voters based on identity issue, where there is no opportunity or social demand for this. The *electoral tactics* of parties to outcompete each other on public good depends on the underlying societal structure.

Third, *societal structure* matters therefore for the extent to which parties will be capable to emphasize identity issues over economic issues, because of such voters’ propensity to be distracted on identity. As a result, parties’ strategic behavior has the potential to shift the *nature of political competition* from interest to value-based issues, only when social structure and therefore societal demand for such identity representation allows to do so (religious or ethnic cleavages).

All these various works, then lead to infer that the *nature of political competition* would be then *qualitatively differently* in an ethnic homogenous from an ethnic heterogeneous country and therefore pose different *electoral pressures* on incumbents need to provide public good leading to administrative improvement based on expertise. The reason for that is that parties are strategic:³⁶⁷ in socio-economic cleavages, the propensity of parties to outcompete on economic issues and converge on value-based is higher, and so their electoral pressure to provide public good increases, leading to higher levels of professionalization. In contrast, in ethnic divided countries, because parties would monopolize the identity issues, they would diverge on ethnic and converge on economic issues, and as well have lower electoral incentives to provide public good.

³⁶⁵ Tavits and Letki (2014).

³⁶⁶ This is possible for parties knowing that when voter’s side are cross-pressure from salient identity and economic issues, identity issues are more difficult to be compromised or distributed through the left economic policies (Riker 1982).

³⁶⁷ Tavits and Letki (2014).

Causal mechanism: why can governments deflect on public good provision?

After showing how societal structure can translate in different nature of political competition- ethnic versus socio economic issues, this section outlines how such different type of competitive space entail different electoral pressure and incentives on governments in relying on experts administration or not in order to win elections. Politicians that have mobilized electoral power on ethnic identity issues rather than socio-economic issues – irrespective of whether this is done so programmatically or through selective benefits in terms of patronage-, can deflect governmental responsibility by playing the ‘ethnic card’³⁶⁸ much more easily, than when wooing for voters only on socio-economic policy or material basis. In the latter case, some government deliverability to the voter’s is expected and in case of lack thereof sanctioned.

This is so for following reasons on the voter’s characteristics. First, voters expect to further ethnic group and ethnic goods that are not material goods. They also expect more ethnic favoritism³⁶⁹ over the common public good, due to their identity-based orientation,³⁷⁰ in a self-reinforcing cycle of ethnic salient competition. Additionally, voters articulate publicly identity demands, even when they conflict with personal and private material interests³⁷¹ and ‘falsify’ their true economic preferences publicly due to social pressure in favour of that identity group solidarity and unity and against selling out and betrayal. The immaterial side of identity issues rather than socio-economic issues, distracts the voters on its real economic interests, when the former are of concern. This increases the ‘information constrains’ on voters’ side to hold governments accountable on effective policy performance. Instead jobs in administration filled by co-ethnic is viewed as a deliverability towards higher identity enhancing political representation,³⁷² although governments discriminate on the same poor voters with lower and less effective delivery on economic interests, due to lack of meritocracy. However, they also integrate a mass of co-ethnic individuals that receive many specific

³⁶⁸ Parties are offered basically a cost-free mobilization strategy on ethnical division and don’t need to use a lot of resources for mobilization Snyder (2000), Additionally, since ethnicity is readily discernible through language, accent, and name (Birnis 2007), and entails persistent groups properties such as networks and language that it is ‘visible and sticky’ (Chandra 2004), it constrains and distracts voters’ on holding government accountable on the real economic interests and as well incentivizes voters to ‘falsify’ their true economic interest and instead plead for ethnic identity representation. Hence, because political competition exacerbates inter-ethnic discrimination, public good provision is an electorally and societal ‘bad; Different parties do not act as cross-ethnic mass mobilizers and over electoral cycles, partisanship sticks to certain ethnic identity group.

³⁶⁹ Chandra (2004).

³⁷⁰ Elster *et al.* (1998) claimed that this cleavage is a non-distributable one.

³⁷¹ Horowitz (1985); Huddy (2003); Monroe, Hankin and Van Vechten (2000); Varshney (2003) in Corstange (2013).

³⁷² Corstange (2013), claims that jobs, if filled by co-ethnics, would be identity enhancing for group members because they generate representation and dignity for that group.

and private benefits such as salary perks, job security and personal prestige.³⁷³

Second, voters don't punish politicians in case of non-delivery of policies or material interests- because ethnic identity groups hold government accountable mostly on ethnic identity representation- extent of ethnic representation in bureaucracies and other targeted policies towards such immaterial interests (e.g. as recognition of language, fulfilment of ethnic quota in in state institutions etc). This explains then why in many cases voters still choose politicians who don't perform well³⁷⁴ and as well, how politicians instrumentalize the voter's propensity by increasing patronage along ethnic lines and viewing the state as divisible among ethnic groups.³⁷⁵

Because voters don't punish politicians on non-police deliverability, and because voters are constrained to sustain ethnic representation more than programmatic representation, parties outcompete electorally based on ethnic representation and face little electoral pressure to rather perform well in government. Instead they can easily deflect on their role of governing well, by playing the 'ethnic card'. This all affects the extent to which competence in public administration is foregone at the cost of hiring and firing politically along ethnic lines in bureaucracies and traps the bureaucratic reform outcomes in high politicization accompanied with low competence among these officials.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented a novel and alternative answer to bureaucratic reforms. Challenging current historical and institutionalist explanations that view bureaucratic professionalization to be *deterministically* explained as a by-product of *stasis*, *electoral dynamics* and *external actors' aid*, this chapters took a party agency perspective in explaining state reform outcomes. It views state building outcomes as an a by-product of party building. State reforms in levels of politicization and professionalization are explained intrinsic to parties' own actions based on their internal characteristics and societal characteristics upon which they compete politically. This chapter has tried to show how party organizational features matter for organizational development of the state administration in terms of political hiring and firing and how societal structure matters for the extent to which electoral pressure to deliver public good shapes levels of professionalization. Therefore, political parties can be considered as *active agents* capable of navigating environmental

³⁷³ Chandra (2004), Corstange (2013).

³⁷⁴ Chandra (2004) looks at why ethnic parties succeed.

³⁷⁵ Hislope (2008).

constraints and influencing their performance through their internal structures³⁷⁶ and societal structures, that sub-sequentially has an impact on bureaucratic structures.

This framework particularly allows to better grasp the party rationale affecting the 'hybrid' cases of administration and civil service reform progress between politicization and professionalization. The argument claims that intra-organizational characteristic based on parties' inherent need on organizational resources, rather than opposition characteristics, voter's characteristics, patterns of alternation, or ideological polarization; explain reliance on parties in patronage resources for organizational survival and therefore levels of politicization. However, political competition does not automatically either lead to more competent and capable bureaucracies. Parties outcompete each other electorally based on different bases (i.e., identity or policy issues). They activate certain issues over others based on voter's characteristics during mobilization phase, and shape sub-sequently the competitive space differently around identity or socio-economic issues, depending on the extent to which societal structure allows parties to activate identity issues over economic issues.

Through this novel framework, the argument sheds light on a long neglected lens in political science literature that is on the relationship between political parties and nature of bureaucracies. By doing so, the framework redefines the scope conditions for the development of different nature of administrations in new democracies between politicization and professionalization. In this it makes several contributions to the literature. First, the organizational rationale of parties provides a more nuanced picture than the current literature in post-communist studies that has assumed that organizational characteristics don't matter (e.g that in post-communist countries, all parties are organizationally weak). One the one hand, it shows that such organizational strength is given among the successors of the post-communist parties and therefore such parties rather than newly emerging ones, politicize the state administration less. On the other hand, the mechanism that parties politicize the state more because of organizational resource scarcity and therefore higher dependency on state patronage, provides a more realistic picture given the highly unpredictable environment and the unconsolidated party building process. Second, the link between electoral cleavages and nature of a bureaucracy in such party building process, has remained unexplored in the current literature and this chapter made a first attempt.

Third, by distinguishing between two rationale, it challenges the literature that views professionalization as a by-product between programmatic and patronage-based political

³⁷⁶ See also Tavits (2013), Grzymala-Busse (2002), Panebianco (1988).

representation.³⁷⁷ Instead, it claims that different determinants affect the pressure to deliver and improve the administration, from the one on organizational need of parties to rely on political loyalists. Hence, the need for capable administration from an incumbent perspective is analytically a very different aspect from the need of patronage. While professionalization of administration can be seen as an *electoral tactic* to out-mobilize opponents by improving substantially administration in order to survive electorally, politicization is a *tactic of resource mobilization* in order to endure organizationally.

³⁷⁷ Hagopian (2014).

CHAPTER 3: VALIDATING THE NEW FRAMEWORK ON BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE

MAPPING POLITICIZATION AND PROFESSIONALIZATION ACROSS MINISTRIES AND COUNTRIES IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

‘Where political appointees invade too far the province of respective career services, there is a threat to substantive effectiveness and invitation to inefficiency and even scandal. Where the political appointees are driven out, there is a threat to the general interest in favor of special interests, to the ‘public’ in favor of self-directed or entrenched bureaucracy

Mosher (1982), p.185.

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 1 the thesis offered a new framework that differentiates civil service reform outcomes in a two-dimensional space between levels of *politicization* (extent of political loyalty in personnel decisions) and levels of *professionalization* (extent of competence) as separate features of the bureaucratic structure. Operationalizing them as distinct dimensions of the bureaucratic structure is crucial, as reform progress can be traced across each independently. In other words, we can track recruitment and dismissal based on political loyalty on the one hand, and professionalization as differences in the ability, education and qualification systems (professionalized versus non-professionalized) on the other. Their combination, leads to four outcomes: professional administration (low politicization and high professionalization), patronage-led administration (high politicization and high professionalization) clientelism-led administration (high politicization and low professionalization), mediocracy-led administration (low politicization and low professionalization).

This Chapter tests therefore the robustness of the two-dimensional approach through factor analysis based on Jan Meyer-Sahling’s expert survey dataset of Southeastern European countries³⁷⁸ across all Southeastern European countries and ministries. The results confirm indeed, that politicization and professionalization are two independent factors that should be assessed for administrative reforms with very different indicators. Indeed all variables such as extent of party

³⁷⁸ See Meyer-Sahling dataset (2010).

loyalty and political contacts affecting civil service appointments and dismissal, depth of political influence in recruitments and turnover of civil servants after elections load all in one dimension that hints to political hiring and firing. Instead indicators of expertise, such as PhD and university degree, extent of English skills, and compatibility of education background and expertise required for the sector among civil servants asked in those ministries, hints to professionalization dimension in reform outcomes. Based on these two factors as explained in Chapter 2 the thesis maps results across countries, ministries by building two indexes one on politicization and one on the professionalization aspect.

This is the first investigative work empirical evidence for Southeastern Europe, as a population of cases that have faced contested civil service reforms, and where civil service laws are chronically disrespected in practices from politicians. Variation along the two indexes of politicization and competence is traced in six countries including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo, across 5 ministries (Ministry of Economy, Health, European Integration, Interior, and Agriculture)³⁷⁹ and four levels of politicization also across different levels in this hierarchy of civil service from senior ranks to lower levels of experts within the ministry. The variation across levels, as already discussed in Chapter 1, will illustrate how blatant patronage is across the hierarchy of the administration and therefore if politicization reaches only the upper or as well the lower levels of civil service. Indeed, the analysis will show as well the *kind* of politicization that prevails in different countries and how does that combine with levels of expertise. The next chapter will then analyze how levels of political hiring and firing vary across different government mandates in the case of Albanian civil service reform from 2000-13, despite adoption of civil service laws and by laws laying out the procedures on merit recruitments.

This chapter is sub-divided in two main parts: in the first part the results and method of factor analysis will be explained. The second part explores first which unit of analysis- countries, sector or levels- in Southeastern Europe has the most significant variation in extent of politicization and professionalization. Then in a second step, this sub-section focuses on how the relationship between political appointments and competence combines across countries and sectors in South-Eastern Europe in yielding the different outcomes conceptualized in this chapter before.

³⁷⁹ Information on the data set, see Appendix on Chapter 1 and 3. The expert survey spans across more than five ministries, but given that data is not available equally for all the countries, I chose to focus only on these five where data is given for these ministries equally except Montenegro that lacks data on Agriculture and Health.

METHOD OF VALIDATION: FACTORANALYSIS

I test the conceptual robustness of this two-dimensional framework additionally through exploratory factor analysis, although empirical results in the section below are illustrated based on index-building. Factor analysis is used here as a purely concept-testing tool³⁸⁰ of validating the two-dimensional concept as latent factor and in showing relevance of measuring them independently and along the associated attributes.

The corresponding variables for the index on politicization and professionalization are measured based data from the Meyer- Sahling's data set on Expert Survey on the management of the central government bureaucracy in Executive leadership in the Western Balkan States for 2010. It includes all 7 Southeastern European countries, such as Albania, Croatia, Kosovo, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and 7 ministries, such as Agriculture, Economy, Environment, European Integration, Health and Interior. For two countries also the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Public administration is included. In each ministry four experts were asked from NGOs, officials inside the government or academia, so we have on average 21 respondents per country and in total, 150 observations. In each ministry and per country, these four different experts could be from inside and outside the government as they were asked estimate the extent to which a certain aspect of personnel management (along the variables no politicization), applied to a given senior civil service position in practice. All questions were estimated on an ordinal scale of an interval from 0–5. The variable on depth of political appointments takes a value of 0 = mainly political appointments; 2.5 = grey area; 5 = mainly political appointments. All the other variables are coded as following: 0= less than 10%; 1= 10–29%; 2= 30–49% 3=50–69%; 4=70–80%; 5=90%.

However, because the unit of analysis is the aggregated ministerial level and the country level, I calculated the mean of values per each variable across the four experts' opinion, which reduces our observation to 45 ones (see for more Appendix on Chapter 4 and as well Chapter 1). Before using factor analysis to the data set and given the amount of variable, I made sure that all eligibility criteria are given for using such method. The unit of analysis was the ministerial level across the 7 countries. All missing data were removed, while the sample size is adequate in relation to the variables used (8 variables for 45 observations, leads to a ratio of 1 to 5.6).

³⁸⁰ Kim and Müller (1978)

When applied to Southeastern Europe, factor analysis confirmed the robustness of the framework conceptually that the dimension of politicization is a distinct phenomenon to the dimension of professionalization. Before using factor analysis to the data set and given the amount of variable, I made sure that all eligibility criteria are given for using such method. The unit of analysis was the ministerial level across the 7 countries. All missing data were removed, while the sample size is adequate in relation to the variables used (8 variables for 45 observations, leads to a ratio of 1 to 5.6). The independence of the two dimensionality of modernization of bureaucracies through the data gathered in the Western Balkans, shows that indicators assessing expertise load into a different and valid factor from the variables loading on the other factor on politicization (with each Factor having an Eigen value of 1 and having a high strength of loading factor with 0.5 or more for each variable into one factor). Table 1 below shows that indicator of political hiring and firing such as depth of political appointment, experience in party politics, turnover after election and salience of political contacts, versus rule-based formal examination and tenure in public administration measure the same latent factor as the factor of politicization.

Table 1: Two dimensions of bureaucratic structure: politicization and professionalization

	Politicization	Professionalization
Depth of political appointment	0.69	-0.10
Experience in party politics	0.76	-0.12
Turnover after election	0.51	0.41
Political contacts	0.79	-0.13
Formal examination	-0.66	0.06
Public administration	-0.62	-0.31
Role of civil service office	-0.41	0.33
English skills	-0.18	0.73
Expertise compatibility	0.26	0.55
PhD degree	-0.01	0.64
University degree	-0.03	0.58

That means that empirical results show that all indicators of competence indeed load into one dimension that is different from the one on politicization, proving therefore that these two criteria should be measured separately when assessing bureaucratic quality. In contrast to Evans and Rauch (1999) and Dahlstroem et al (2011), these results show that formal rules like examination, lie in the same dimensions as the political hiring and firing practices, but load negatively on them.

This contradicts research that uses indicators of formal examination, tenure and career stability, to measure the competence of the bureaucratic system based on rules creating that ‘esprit de corps’. Instead according to these results, professionalization is not about the formal rules in recruitment, but about the various indicators on education, where expertise, PhD degree, university degree and English skills load over 0.6 on levels of professionalization.

By using factor analysis, the data indeed confirm the conceptual framework, that two different factors are essential in measuring bureaucratic structure that is different from the current works.³⁸¹ On the one hand, the factor on political loyalty versus rules hinting at politicization levels and the other one, on levels of professionalization. Interestingly, politicization comprises not only all indicators measuring the depth of political hiring and firing through turnover after election, as well as the experience in party politics, and political contacts loading positively to this factor, but procedural indicators, such as formal examination and tenure in public administration, loading negatively on this factor, hinting at de-politicization on the other extreme.

First, factor analysis proves clearly that the relationship between political loyalty versus rules is a separate dimension to levels of competence and education traits of bureaucrats. Hence, they are independent of each other and can diverge differently. This contradicts most of the literature that assumes that politicization and expertise are highly (and usually negatively) correlated. It remains to be understood how and under which conditions they deviate. This will be explored based on the argument of Chapter 2 in the empirical Chapter 5 and 6.

Second, the findings of factor analysis also confirm the theoretically assumed and empirically well-established negative relationship between politicization and de-politicization through civil service rules and procedures. However, in contrast to the current literature on public administration, the two rather than being exogenous and independent from each other as suggested elsewhere, in the region they seem to be endogenously shaped. We find that formal rules seem to be rather subverted by political hiring and firing practices and hence rather than explaining the trend of de-politicization, indicators of politicization (depth of political appointment, turnover, party characteristics and political contacts) seem yet the most relevant indicators to measure by setting the trend and impact substantially the effectiveness of formal civil service rules in the Southeast European region.

The co-existence of levels of politicization and formal examination procedures, vary across countries, and so does the extent to which rules are effective in constraining political hiring and firing. Indeed, in countries like Albania and Croatia formal rules and politicization co-exist to a high extent as will be shown below. The gap is clear as formal rules are subverted in practice. Chapter 4 shows how practices of politicization, not included in the Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012) index, such as temporary contracts, pre-selection of candidates before examination, dismissals by

³⁸¹ Dahlström *et al.* (2011) distinguish between two other dimensions such as on one hand, closed bureaucratic versus open bureaucratic systems –measuring formal examination, career stability and on the other hand, professionalization- measuring the political versus merit recruitments.

establishing 'waiting lists' for civil servants, are . In the opposite, it seems that in countries with less implementation of those rules, still politicization levels within the civil service are lower. The next section will build an index based on practices of political hiring and firing and expertise and show their divergence across countries and sectors in Southeastern European countries.

MAPPING RESULTS ACROSS TWO INDEXES

This section validates the framework presented in Chapter 1 using the two indexes based on expert survey data for six countries in the Western Balkans and across four ministries for 2010. It also shows the variation and patterns of politicization across different levels and how the four components combine across countries. The data analysis and evidence of the aforementioned framework is divided in two steps.

First, this section shows which unit of analysis – countries, sector, or levels – in Southeastern Europe has the most substantial variation in extent of politicization and professionalization. Then in a second step, this sub-section focuses on how the relationship between political appointments and competence combines across countries and sectors in South-Eastern Europe in yielding the different outcomes conceptualized in this chapter before. It particularly focuses on how different practices of politicization combine to inform us if politicization is based on patronage rather than politicization based on control over policy making. The components that matter are: (1) electoral turnover; (2) outreach of political influence in the hierarchy; or (3) single party loyalty rather than (4) political contacts across parties matter for appointments in civil service administration across ministries.

The cases also show how problematic the current indicators used in Evans and Rauch (1999) on formal merit recruitment are in hinting at professionalization, as they do not capture the extent of de-politicization in practice. The indicator on differences between extent of penetration between higher and the lower level positions, as well as the extent to which party activism matters for careers in civil service in some countries more than others, are better indicators in hinting at the extent to which pure party patronage that renders political activism as a service back informs politicization, rather than simple policy control. This is the first investigative work in post-communist countries and in Southeastern European countries that adapts such a framework in discovering how levels of politicization combine with levels of professionalization empirically across countries and across ministries, in order to better understand what administrations actually really do.

Differences across countries and ministries in politicization

Southeastern European countries have experienced different trajectories in their state transformation process. Hence, de-politicization and professionalization have not been positively correlated as expected, in order to produce the desired Weberian ideal-type outcomes.³⁸² Indeed, politicization as allocation of jobs in public administration based on party loyalty is persistent in these countries. However, less is known on how the two deviate empirically in new democracies. Additionally, while there is no agreement in the literature on the degree of state politicization across countries,³⁸³ it seems that a kind of persistent ‘functional politicization’³⁸⁴ occurring differently also across ministries in the post-communist state has been the case. Indeed, in the transition countries of Southeastern Europe, the devolution of the administrative state after communist that delivers little to its citizens, and where the state is captured from political elites to serve its interests, constitutes a real problem for these societies as it is shown in the broken state society relations and high distrust of citizens towards state institutions.

The findings may be summarized along the following points. First, the highest variation in levels of politicization is not so much across countries, nor across sectors, but across ministries within a country. Figure 10 shows that there is no clear pattern on ministerial variation across countries. However, the countries that have highest levels of politicization like Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia, also have highest level of ministerial politicization. Those stands in contrast to countries that have lower ones like Serbia having the most depoliticized administration, followed by Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.

The results in Table 2 show that the level of variation in the politicization index across countries is lower than the variation of the mean across sectors. The difference in means from the least (Serbia) to the most politicized country (Macedonia) is 21.3, while the mean from the least (Ministry of European Integration) to the most politicized ministry (Ministry of Health) across countries increases to 35.2.

³⁸² Gajdushek (2007), Grindle (2013).

³⁸³ Meyer Sahling (2013).

³⁸⁴ Goetz and Wollman (2001).

Figure 10: Sectoral variation within countries




Table 2: Variation across ministries and countries in index of politicization

Sectoral differences		Country differences		Sectoral differences within countries		
Ministries	Mean	Countries	Mean	Max	Min	
EU	22.2	Macedonia	63.5	97.7	20.6	77.1
Finance	33.8	Albania	48.0	75.1	21.7	53.4
Interior	40.8	Kosovo	45.3	67.1	29.7	37.4
Economy	50.5	Montenegro	37.1	59.5	23.4	36.1
Health	56.1	Croatia	36.9	52.9	23.4	29.5
		BiH-State	36.5	63.3	2.8	60.5
		Serbia	26.8	46.9	2.9	44
Difference	35.2	Difference	21.3	Difference	47.6	

Note: The politicization index has been calculated based on depth of political appointments, turnover, party background experience, political contacts and the values that range from 0–100. The values in differences are calculated as the minimum and maximum difference in values at different unit of analysis.

Second, there is actually a less clear pattern on which country has the highest ministerial variation. Indeed, we observe in Table 2 that the countries performing worse in the politicization index, Albania and Macedonia, also have highest range of the minimum and maximum values of politicization across sectors. However, although Bosnia and Serbia seem to have low levels politicization in comparison to the rest of the countries, a wide distribution of sectoral variation in politicization levels is notable. Then some of the countries performing better in levels of

politicization have lower sectoral variation, like in the case of Croatia and Montenegro. As show in Table 2, the sectoral variation in means of politicization between lowest and highest values in Macedonia is 77 points, followed from BiH with 60.5, Albania with 53.4 points, Serbia 44 point, Kosovo with 37.4, Montenegro 37.4 and Croatia 29.5 points.

Third, the aforementioned analysis shows that performance of politicization at the country levels is somehow not driven from sectoral variation, as countries that perform well like Serbia have still higher variation within sectors as countries that perform less so, as in the case of Kosovo. Based on the results in Table 2, we can observe three group of countries in levels of politicization: the country doing best is Serbia (26.8), followed by a second intermediate group comprising Croatia, BiH and Montenegro (in the range from 36.9, 36.5 and 37.1, respectively) and finally the third group including the worse performing countries like Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia (48.0, 45.3 and 63.5, respectively).

Table 3: Ranking of countries per ministry compared by the total mean of the index of politicization

Ministries	Countries rank across sectors						
Health	Albania	Kosovo	BiH	Macedonia	Croatia	Serbia	
Economy	Macedonia	Albania	BiH	Kosovo	Croatia	Montenegro	Serbia
Interior	Macedonia	Montenegro	BiH	Albania	Serbia	Croatia	Kosovo
Finance	Macedonia	Serbia	Montenegro	Croatia	BiH	Kosovo	Albania
EU	Kosovo	Croatia	Croatia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Serbia	BiH

Note: red= high politicized, orange= medium-high politicized, yellow= medium-low politicized, light green= low politicized, dark green= most meritocratic. The values of the table are measured again the values in table 1.1 in Appendix Chapter 1 and 3.

Fourth, after comparing the mean values per sector and country with the Table 1.1 in Appendix Chapter 1 and 3, the ranking of sectoral levels of politicization are shown demonstratively in Table 3. The pattern across ministries in Table 3 combined with ranking in Table 2, though shows that Ministry of Health (56.1) and Ministry of Economy (50.5), are the most politicized ones, while those of Finance (33.8) and European Integration (22.2) are the least politicized ones across the region.

In sum, we conclude first that the highest variation in levels of politicization is not so much across countries, nor across sectors, but across ministries within a country. However, performance of politicization at the country level is somehow not driven by sectoral variation, as countries have

more de-politicized civil service like Serbia have still higher variation within sectors as countries that perform less so, as in the case of Kosovo. Finally, the sectoral variation shows that Ministry of Health (56.1) and Ministry of Economy (50.5), are the most politicized ones, while those of Finance (33.8) and European Integration (22.2) are the least politicized ones across the region.

Differences across levels of politicization in the hierarchy of the civil service

In Southeastern Europe, where party- building and state building coincide, it is crucial to understand the *kind* of politicization that characterizes its administrations. One central criterion mentioned in the literature is the extent to which high or low levels of administrations are most affected from political hiring and firing. Müller (2006) indeed claims that when politicization reaches the lower levels of a civil service, than party patronage purposes are more visible in rendering services back to parties. However, when it is only constrained in the upper levels, eventually more policy oriented purposes are associated to it. In Southeastern Europe, there is little significant variation for certain levels across countries. The mean top-level politicization across countries scoring 43.11 (as can be seen in the last row of Table 4) does not differ much from the mean of politicization for lower levels (level 4, 50). Also, the Alpha-Cronbach method shows that there is high internal consistency in measuring all levels as one.³⁸⁵ Additionally, Table 6 and 7 illustrate the variation in politicization scores across levels and sectors. Also, here like at the country level, Table 7 shows that a particular level, say level 1, usually the secretary-general level, has no crucial variation on how politicized it is across sectors. This means that higher levels are not politicized more in the Ministry of Economy than the Ministry of European Integration, as they are always more politicized. The difference is rather how far political influence penetrates the ministerial hierarchy.

However, the last column of Table 4, shows substantial within countries difference between level 1 and level 4 in the political hiring and firing. According to Table 4 and 5, there is a general trend of politicization being higher for the upper levels and lower for the lower levels of civil service positions within countries, with some exception of BiH, Montenegro and Kosovo, having higher political influence in the lower levels than upper ones and Macedonia and Kosovo having little differences across levels.

³⁸⁵ The Alpha-Cronbach method is used to indicate if there is consistency in measuring certain indicators as one. Indeed, in all levels there is high consistency across all levels, showing that there is less of a need to measure them independently.

Table 4: Country level: Distinction across various top civil service levels in index of politicization

Score of politicization across four civil service positions within and across countries					
Countries	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Within countries differences ^b
Macedonia	78.99	53.17	60.85	60.87	18.12
Albania	67.65	48.81	43.39	36.02	31.62
Croatia	65.97	39.09	22.75	20.50	45.47
Serbia	57.65	28.33	10.37	10.87	46.78
Kosovo	54.20	40.87	40.74	45.34	8.86
Montenegro	36.47	30.56	36.30	42.61	-6.14
Bosnia- H	35.88	36.11	35.56	40.22	-4.34
Across countries' difference	43.11	24.84	50.48	50.00	

Note: **a:** The index of politicization is calculated as in Table 2 only distinguished per levels. All levels are the top four civil servants' levels defined in the civil service laws in 2010 that usually correspond to Level 1: Secretary General, Level 2 and Level 3 directors and Level 4 specialist level. These levels are defined and protected by civil service laws and no political interference is legally allowed, except in Macedonia where level 1 in 2010 was rendered a political appointee status and reversed to a civil servant in 2014. See Appendix Chapter 1 and 3 on 'Expert survey and dataset' for more information on the various levels outlined in Table 2. **b:** The within-country difference between the higher level such as secretary general and the lower level of specialist in politicization. This serves as an indicator of how blatant patronage is until to the lower levels in the hierarchy. **c:** The cross -country difference for a specific level over countries.

Indeed, while the countries that perform worse, like Macedonia and Kosovo, have the lowest difference between highest and lowest level of civil servants, Albania, Serbia and Croatia show that the higher levels of civil service are more politicized than lower levels, while intermediate performers like BiH and Montenegro, show the reverse picture, with little political influence at the top levels, but rather higher politicization at the bottom of the administration. In Macedonia and Albania, the difference between upper and lower level in the hierarchy scores low respectively 18.12 and 31.6, showing that political influence penetrates almost equally until to the lower levels and there is no big distinction between levels. In Serbia and Croatia this is higher for top than lower level positions, scoring 46.78 and 45.47, resembling more the pattern of established democracies. BiH, Montenegro and Kosovo, though showed the reverse trend, with higher politicization for lower levels than upper levels, as marked in table 6, each scoring: Montenegro -6.14, while in BiH - 4.34 and Kosovo 8.86.

Table 5: Hierarchical Level: Ranking of countries across various top civil servants levels

	Ranking of countries in politicization index			
	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4
High scores	Macedonia	Macedonia	Macedonia	Macedonia
	Albania	Albania	Albania	Kosovo
	Croatia	Kosovo	Kosovo	Montenegro
	Serbia	Croatia	Montenegro	Bosnia
	Kosovo	Bosnia- H	Bosnia- H	Albania
	Montenegro	Montenegro	Croatia	Croatia
Low scores	Bosnia- H	Serbia	Serbia	Serbia

Table 5 summarizes once more the results by ranking the values on politicization scores for each level for countries from the highest to the lowest scores. As we can observe for all levels Macedonia takes the first place followed by Albania across different levels, while Serbia is the best performing one with highest politicization only for level 1, and Croatia for the two levels.

Table 6: Sectoral Level: Distinction across levels of index of politicization

Ministries	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Within sector Difference
Health	78.43	53.59	48.77	43.48	34.95
Economy	55.88	52.78	45.50	47.83	8.06
Interior	51.68	36.31	32.28	21.74	29.94
Finance	60.92	33.53	23.28	17.39	43.53
EU	31.09	19.74	16.93	27.83	3.27
Across sectors Difference	47.34	33.85	31.84	30.44	

Table 7: Ranking of sectors for each level in the civil service in index of politicization

Ranking of sectors in scores of politicization			
Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4
Health	Health	Health	Health
Finance	Economy	Economy	Economy
Economy	Interior	Interior	EU
Interior	Finance	Finance	Interior
EU	EU	EU	Finance

The results on levels politicization for a sector and particular level 1 in Table 7, illustrate that while the Ministries of Finance and Health have higher politicization for the highest level (level 1) in comparison to the lower ones, Ministry of EU, Economy and Interior demonstrate less of a difference (all levels). This shows that the importance of politicization can be different across different levels, however the constellation and difference between higher and lower levels matters less across sectors. Table 8 indeed confirms the sectoral variation remains the same even if we control for variation across levels. The Ministry of Health is the most politicized sector across all levels, while the Ministry of the EU is the most de-politicized one across the various levels. Therefore, I do conceptually take the various levels as one, by taking the mean across them for the simplicity of the argument.

To sum up, despite these differences among different levels, there is a clearly visible trend: countries score usually higher in politicization index for higher positions at both country and sectoral level. Indeed, the Alpha-Cronbach results show that all levels can be treated as one, as there is high internal consistency. However, within-country difference in depth of penetration of politicization in a hierarchy stands in contrast to the patterns of politicization across countries. Recall the country doing best is Serbia (26.8), followed by a second intermediate group comprising Croatia, BiH and Montenegro (in the range from 36.9, 36.5 and 37.1) and finally the third group including the worse performing countries like Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia. However, applying Müller's (2006) framework, that administration with lower levels of politicization rather than top level, shows that patronage is more blatant, relativize that BiH and Montenegro, are doing as well as their low country scores on politicization show.

Therefore, I further distinguish between levels of politicization at aggregated level across countries as the main puzzling variation one could explain in light of theories in the next chapter and their relation to levels of competence. The sectoral variation remains not theorized in this thesis. However, the difference within countries between certain levels also hints though to somehow different kind of politicization: between those where politicization is constrained only at the upper levels (Serbia and Croatia), in contrast to countries that is more visible as well at the lower levels (BiH, Kosovo and Montenegro) and where the distinction in politicization between levels is less visible (Albania, and Macedonia). Such difference in kind of political hiring and firing, needs to be taken more rigorously in the analysis before categorizing the countries' performance. This shows that not only the extent of politicization is lower in Serbia, in comparison to other countries, but that politicization is only constrained at the top. However, integrating the qualitative differences in what stands behind that politicization would render BiH and Montenegro actually less good cases

and Kosovo an even worse case, because patronage in these three countries penetrates right to the bottom of the lower levels of administration. Whereas in Albania and Croatia this is less the case and in Serbia it is completely civil service is almost de-politicized. However, a further analysis on what else stands behind politicization and how does it combine with levels of competence, will allow to categorize better the countries' performance in institutional quality.

Difference in levels of politicization and professionalization combined

The results show that the most politicized countries are though not the least professional administrations in Southeastern European countries. Indeed, here the categorization reverses the qualitative results we would infer if we looked only at levels of politicization: Serbia results to be the best performing country and Albania and Macedonia the worse, with the other countries as intermediates. Instead if we look at levels of politicization and professionalization combined: Serbia has somehow low politicization and medium competence, and Albania high politicization, but as well high competence, Macedonia and Kosovo high politicization and low professionalization and all other countries as intermediate cases. Contrasting the differences between the country means in the politicization index and those of the professionalization index, this chapter categorizes outcomes in the typology outlined in Figure 3, Chapter 1. The chapter first distinguishes between various practices behind levels of politicization and how they vary over countries and then contrasts that to levels of professionalization.

Different kinds of politicization: Disaggregating sub-components across countries

Three groups of countries are identified based on different components of politicization. First, Table 8 on the index of politicization demonstrates that Macedonia (63.47) is the most problematic case as confirmed as well from the findings above. Second, the worst performing countries in levels of politicization are Albania and Kosovo followed by BiH, Croatia, and Montenegro. Third, the best case in low levels of politicization is Serbia. However, these three groups perform differently in the sub-components of politicization such as depth of political appointments, turnover, party linkages and political contacts as criteria of hiring and firing officials. Figure 11 categorizes each component of the politicization index separately by showing the variation across countries.


Table 8: Country differences in components of political practices behind politicization

	Depth of appointments ^a	Turnover ^b	Experience in politics ^b	Political contacts ^b	Overall ^c	Categorization ^d
Macedonia	political	30–49%	50–69%	50–69%	63.47	High
Albania	grey area	30–49%	30–49%	30–49%	48.96	Medium–High
Kosovo	political	30–49%	30–49%	30–49%	45.28	Medium–High
Croatia	grey area	10–29%	30–49%	30–49%	37.07	Medium–Low
BiH	political	>10%	30–49%	30–49%	36.94	Medium–Low
Montenegro	grey area	10–29%	30–49%	30–49%	36.48	Medium–Low
Serbia	non-political	10–29%	10–29%	30–49%	26.80	Low

^a Non-political =0, grey area=2.5, political=5 ^b Less than 10%=0, 10–29%=1, 30–49%=2, 50–69%=3, 70–89%=4 or more =5. A country with the four indicators scaled to a maximum score of 5 could receive a maximum score of 25, which was standardized at 100. ^c The index on politicization varies from 0–100.

^d *no politicization* [All x: 0 - (Mean -SD)], *low politicization* [all x: (Mean - SD)- (Mean - SD/2)], *Medium Low* [all x: (Mean -SD/2) - (Mean + SD/2)], *Medium high politicized* [all x: (Mean + SD/2) - (Mean +SD)], *high politicized* [all x > (Mean + SD)].

Figure 11: Components of political hiring and firing



Note: new political app: depth of political appointments, new turnover: turnover of civil servants after replacement in government, new party experience: the extent to which political party matters as a criterion in hiring and firing; new political contacts: the extent to which broader political contacts rather than a single party matters for hiring and firing in administration.

The worse performing country, Macedonia, has the highest extent of turnover (30–49%) combined with the highest strong links on party activism (50–69%) in personnel decisions, high turnover and depth of political appointments until the lower levels, with little difference between high and lower levels. This country resembles more *clientelism-led* administration, where politicians

hire and fire in administration based on ethnic loyalty for their own patronage purposes and invest little in professionalization. This country is followed by Albania and Kosovo.

Figure 11 illustrates for the second group of countries that the medium politicized countries –Croatia, BiH and Montenegro– show lower levels of turnover of officials to other worse performing countries like Albania and Macedonia, but quite as high levels of party links informing the criteria in personnel decisions. However, the extent to which party links matter in various levels of the hierarchy is different: in Croatia top- civil service positions are more politicized than lower levels, while Montenegro and BiH show the opposite with higher penetration of political influence until middle and lower levels than higher level positions.

Usually, in the literature as described in Müller (2006), when lower levels are more politicized than higher levels, as aforementioned in the literature, patronage-based politicization is more prevalent than politicization based as a mechanism of control over policies focusing most to the higher levels of civil service. If we combine that indicator with the salience of political party and patronage informing the hiring and firing in civil service, we arrive at different conclusions. In Croatia, patronage remains constrained at the higher levels with quiet high levels of turnover after elections for these positions. In BiH and Montenegro although the overall index of politicization is not high, these countries still perform worse than Croatia, as party patronage reaches down to the bottom of the administration and is more stable with little turnover. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a special case, scoring low on all indicators of the ‘intensity’ of politicization, except on depth of political appointments.³⁸⁶ Although the administration has de-politicized position at the top level, the low and middle levels are filled with patronage appointees. This shows more the feature as described in Müller (2006) of ‘power patronage’, which refers to the distribution of public sector jobs in exchange for the client’s support outside the job. Oliveros (2013) claims that political services returned at the high level³⁸⁷ are very different from those at the lower and middle levels.³⁸⁸ Hence,

³⁸⁶ This might be the case because the country cannot change cabinets as easily as in other countries, due to its constitutional provisions based on the Dayton Agreement. The functionality of the state is still under the supervision of the Official High Representative, where changes in government are in these countries difficult to manage.

³⁸⁷ Oliveros (2013) claims that political support of appointees at the *highest level* is both for guaranteeing control over decision- making processes, but as well including maintaining the party leadership, reinforcing or enlarging the governmental coalition, and bargaining with elective officials (Kopecký and Mair (2006); Scherlis (2007); Wilson (1961)). However, the author claims that ‘the same patronage appointee at the highest level can be as well usually a prerequisite for corruption (both for personal and political gains) and different forms of particularistic distribution such as vote-buying and pork-barrel politics’. The work of Weitz-Shapiro (2008, 2012) show the manipulation of targeted public programs for political gain— such as the allocation of welfare benefits, targeted food distribution or conditional cash transfer programs— is considerably facilitated when the public employees involved in the implementation are supporters of the politician who is expected to benefit from the clientelistic exchange. (p. 46)

³⁸⁸ Oliveros (2013) defines that ‘*mid- and low-level patronage* employees are often involved in campaigning, organizing and attending rallies, voting in primaries, mobilizing voters both for primaries and general elections, organizing and/or attending political meetings, providing favors to citizens, distributing material incentives (vote-buying), being party

administrations that show politicization of lower levels, the services those appointees offer are more about electoral mobilization and campaigning such as ‘mobilizing voters both for primaries and general elections, organizing and/or attending political meetings, providing favors to citizens, distributing material incentives (vote-buying), being party polling officials on election day, and other activities’.³⁸⁹ While patterns of politicization like in Croatia resemble more ‘service patronage’ that is allocation of appointees only at the top position. Politicians either want to have more control over policies both for personal and political gains, or use such employees who are political loyalists for both particularistic distribution, such as ‘manipulation of target policies and programs for political gains-where the employee is benefitting from such exchange.

Third, Serbia the country with lowest level of politicization is as well the only country where political contacts across parties rather than a single party loyalty matters more in political hiring and firing in administration. Hence, both low level of political influence in civil service and low salience of party loyalty for recruitment in civil service show how little ‘service patronage’ matters for politicization of the state in this country in comparison to others. Additionally, this is accompanied by the most stable careers of civil service after electoral changes (only 10–29% turnover). Hence, here politicization seems to be more for control over policy rather than any particularistic distribution, as political contacts across parties rather than experience in a political party matter.

Finally, in all the SEE countries, except Serbia, influence of parties seems still the most predominant feature behind political hiring and firing. Albania, Kosovo and particularly Macedonia (scoring 48, 45.3 and 63.5, respectively), have all high levels of politicization with high turnover, high penetration of influence until the lower levels. However, Kosovo, seems to perform even worse than Albania, as its penetration of patronage reaches the lower levels of the administration more than the higher levels.

When we contrast the levels of politicization with those of professionalization, the results show very different trends if we would have focused only on the levels of politicization. Indeed, the performance in levels of politicization and competence in Figure 12, shows this divergence. According to the results in Table 9, the best countries in levels of competence seem to be those having the highest levels of politicization like Albania (scoring 48.57 in professionalization), followed by de-politicized civil service systems like Serbia (34.4), and medium-politicized countries like Croatia (34.3), Montenegro (29.6), BiH (26.4) and Kosovo (24).

polling officials on election day, and other activities” (p. 47)
³⁸⁹ Oliveros (2013)

Figure 12: Levels of politicization and levels of professionalization across countries




Table 9: Levels of professionalization across countries

	University degree	PhD degree	English skills	Expertise	Professional. index 2015	Categorization
Macedonia	>90%	Low	30–49%	Medium	28	Low
Albania	>90%	Medium	50–69%	High	48.57	High
Kosovo	>90%	Low	30–49%	High	24	No
Croatia	>90%	Low	50–69%	Medium	34.3	Medium
BiH	>90%	High	30–49%	Medium	26.4	No
Montenegro	>90%	High	30–49%	Medium	29.6	Low
Serbia	>90%	Low	10–29%	High	34.4	Medium

The combination of all the results across countries shows the following preliminary results. The countries performing worse in levels of politicization, such as Albania and Macedonia, have different levels of competence, the former one high and the latter one low (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2 in introduction and Table 10 below). This demonstrates that while party motivated hiring and firing in administrations, some levels of competence and therefore more effective capacity in public good provision is to be expected more in Albania than Macedonia or Kosovo. As well, the high levels of competence in Albania renders it comparable to that of intermediate countries, which although less politicized than Albania have lower levels of competence. Serbia is the country with lowest levels of politicization and medium levels of competence, followed by Croatia and Montenegro as the intermediate cases. Kosovo and BiH and Macedonia have low levels of competence, out of these three bad cases of professionalization, one of them has high levels of politicization (Macedonia) and two medium levels (BiH and Kosovo).

Table 10: Four categories of bureaucratic structure

	Politicization	Professionalization	Categorization
Macedonia	63.5	28	High–Low (Clientelism-led administration)
Albania	48.9	48.6	Medium–High (Patronage-led administration)
Kosovo	45.3	24	Medium–Low (Clientelism-led administration)
Croatia	37.1	32	Medium–High (Patronage-led administration)
BiH	36.9	26.4	Medium–No (Mediocracy-led administration)
Montenegro	36.5	29.6	Medium–Low (Patronage-led administration)
Serbia	26.8	34.4	Low–Medium High (Responsible to mediocracy-led bureaucracy)

If we had to group the countries according to the conceptualization of outcomes shown in Figure 3, the following would result (Table 10). BiH demonstrates medium levels of politicization with stable patronage appointees at the bottom and relatively low levels of competence, corresponding to type 3-mediocracy led administration outcomes. Serbia is closest to the ideal type of a professional civil service, with low levels of politicization and moderate levels of competence. Croatia and Albania would fall in the second type, with high levels of politicization (more patronage-oriented in Albania and more policy-oriented in Croatia) and high levels of competence. Albania corresponds more to service patronage and Croatia to policy patronage, as turnover is low and politicization is constrained only at the top level. This is followed by Montenegro with medium levels of politicization with stable patronage oriented c and competence. Finally, Macedonia and Kosovo would fall in the fourth type, where competence and politicization are negatively correlated and quite low, showing the administrations functions solely along the party lines and has little capacity to deliver to its citizens. This resembles rather the ‘clientelistic-type of administration’, where administrations work along the ethnic lines and effective policy making is less the feature of this administration.

Methodologically, it is clear that levels of politicization in these countries are not reflected in indicators of formal examination as in Evans and Rauch (1999). As Table 3 in Appendix Chapter 3 illustrates, there is a gap in the answers between the extent to which formal exams are in place and the extent to which they ensure de-politicization in practice. Therefore, more research needs to be done in explaining the variation in levels of politicization by showing the mechanisms and practices on how formal examination is subverted by exploring common practices of exploring levels of political hiring and firing through empirical data.

CONCLUSION

The chapter validated the framework by building two indexes based on expert survey data for six countries in the Western Balkans and across four ministries for 2010. Factor analysis not only showed that the two dimensions, politicization and competence, are the most valid ones, but as well that formal examinations seem not to capture the persisting levels of politicization in the countries. This confirms that while merit and political recruitment in practice vary substantially from rules, levels of competence can co-vary differently with those political appointments. The chapter has presented three main empirical findings. First, country variation in levels of politicization and competence is the most relevant puzzling finding. In some countries, like Albania, politicization and competence are positively correlated, while in Macedonia this is not the case. Second, within-country variation across ministries seems to be higher in countries that perform worse in overall levels of politicization than those that perform better. Third, there is not a substantial difference across levels, showing generally a trend that in worse performing countries, political influence reaches until to the lower level, while in the better performing ones it is only constrained at the upper echelons. Furthermore, the chapter has shown that all SEE countries except Serbia are mostly affected from the party affiliations within one administration. So the variation seems to be in a different *kind* of politicization: in Croatia and Serbia this is constrained only at the top, in the rest of the countries this runs down until to the lower levels in the hierarchy and everywhere except Serbia party loyalty matters, showing that patronage is a blatant feature of the administration.

The summary discussion above opens up two further avenues of research. First, better exploration of what subverts formal rules in practice needs to be better understood and which other criteria can we use. Chapter 4 delves into depth in this. Second, it remains to be tested empirically whether countries that have higher levels of competence – irrespective of whether they are de-politicized (Serbia) or politicized (Albania) – can perform better also in public good provision. Third, these two key features of the state can combine differently in the various parts of the administrative state. The framework offered in this chapter can be applied across political regimes, in order then to explore the factors that could affect the balance between levels of politicization and professionalization within different parts of one administration. For example, what drives the political rationale differently in Serbia from other countries like Croatia and Albania? Why is Macedonia performing so bad despite similar administrative legacies with Croatia and Serbia? Distinguishing between the two offers the possibility to look at the different incentives affecting incumbents differently across time, countries and sectors. More specifically, it allows for the study of the democracy–state nexus and the conditions under which democratization can lead to

functioning professional states and under which it may not.

CHAPTER 4: ALBANIAN CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS, 2000–13

DISCREPANCIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF LEVELS OF POLITICIZATION BETWEEN CIVIL SERVICE PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES

INTRODUCTION

The state does not fully represent a ‘common set of laws’ that manages to change practices, as other practices often prevail over formal ones. The discrepancy between laws and practices is shown best through the analysis of adoption of civil service reforms and the persisting levels of politicization, particularly in Southeast European (SEE) countries. When trying to assess reform success and failure in civil service reforms, measuring formal procedures (i.e. the number of formal examinations) fails to methodologically grasp the phenomenon that is trying to be measured. Such discrepancy seems to be particularly problematic in countries that don’t have a strong legal state with an independent judiciary and rule of law. The problem in bureaucratic evolution in SEE is marked therefore by a chronic disrespect of applied laws from politicians in an administration and various practices that undermine the intention of such procedures. The repeated refrain in assessment reports in the Southeastern European region from both academia and policy makers is the problem of lack of enforcement and implementation of civil service laws, as noticed as well in the Latin American cases.

This chapter focuses on the case of Albania by providing empirical evidence on how the discrepancy of civil service law adoption, implementation and practice diverges through new indicators of politicization. The contribution of this chapter is methodological and empirical. The first section of this chapter introduces new indicators on how to assess political interferences in recruitment and dismissals beyond formal procedures of civil service, for countries have such discrepancy between formal laws and practices in civil service reform outcome. In the absence of data on the index of politicization over time for Albania, I use a second empirical strategy to the one introduced in Chapter 1 (for an overview see Table 11 below). Such indicators, could be used in assessment of civil service in new democracies. The second section traces variation of such indicators over time in three periods of civil service reform in Albania, showing that in the first

period political interferences were moderate in recruitment and dismissals, while in the second, and third they increased substantially. Archival data based on annual reports from 2001-2013 of Civil Service Commission, Department of Public Administration and Parliamentary archival data on Ad-hoc committees for Monitoring Public Administration in 2006 were used.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN RECRUITMENT AND DISMISSAL

I operationalize levels of politicization in this chapter (for an overview see Table 11 below) along two dimensions: establishment of formal civil service laws and implementation in practice in the domains of recruitment and dismissals. I assess the implementation of recruitment procedures and tenure in practices hinting at the extent of political hiring and firing that occurs in the following *three domains*: (1) effectiveness of civil service management agencies in managing meritocratic recruitment procedures; (2) the extent of political interferences in recruitments measured through *direct* political appointments based on temporary contracts and (2.1) *indirectly* through political constraints in recruitment procedures based on finalization of recruitment procedures and the number of appeals against unfair recruitment procedures; (3) political interferences in dismissals measured through appeals of civil servants related to wrongfully applied dismissal and other civil service procedures. In the Table 11, below the chapter summarizes the operationalization of civil service reform outcomes. In so doing it presents the extent to which the civil service procedures have been politically constrained through the by-passing of rules. The final result is the undermining of both open competition and stability of careers.

The *first domain* hints at effectiveness of institutions in being capable to manage civil service procedures. Two indicators show that institutions were capable of implementing procedures (point 2.1): the higher the number of examination procedures in relation to vacancy announcements and number of appointments and number of appeals solved, the more institutions have been effective in ensuring meritocracy in administration.

The second *domain* hints at political interference in recruitment and it measures it in the following way. In order to understand political interference constraining effective recruitment procedures, a group of three indicators are used (point 2.2):

Table 11: Formal effectiveness in civil service recruitment and dismissals and political interferences in these two areas

1. Civil service recruitment and dismissals
1. Adoption of reform: Formal institutional structure
1.1 Are there civil service laws adopted and are there meritocratic recruitment procedures in place for entry and selection that ensure meritocracy?
1.2 Are there formal institutions that manage autonomously civil service procedures and monitor its implementation?
2 Effectiveness of institutions and procedures (extent of politicization)
2.1 Effectiveness of institutions in guarding meritocracy
Are institutions effective in guarding meritocracy over personal loyalty in administrative design?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No. of appeals and solved cases - No. of vacancy announcement and appointments
2.2 Political interference in recruitment
Are recruitment procedures implemented in practice to ensure open competition and constrain political interference in selections of candidates?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No. of examination procedures to no. of announcements - No. of candidates showing up in exams (real competition) in relation to temporary contracts - No. of temporary contracts to announcements - No. temporary contracts to successful finalization of examination - No. of appeals against examination procedures
2.3 Political interference in dismissals
Are civil servants protected from political interference in dismissals?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - % of Appeals rejected and % of pro-civil servants' appeals in relation to solved cases - % Appeals related to dismissals procedures - % Appeals against restructuring related to dismissal

(1) extent to which recruitment procedures are politically constrained, measured through (1.1) average number of candidates showing up in exams – hinting at real open competition; and (1.2) finalization of recruitment procedures; (2) extent of usage of temporary contracts as a direct indicator of political appointments through (2.1) number of temporary contracts in relation to open vacancies indirectly hinting at level of political interference, (2.2) number of temporary contracts in relation to finalization of examination procedures, indicating how political interference affect number of examinations done on a yearly basis; (3) number of appeals against unfair recruitment procedures.

Table 12: Outcome categorizations in levels of politicization: effective institutions and political interferences in recruitment and dismissals.

Reform outcome categorization in political interference	
Low	High
Effective institutions	
Political interference is low Institutions are <i>effective</i> in managing procedures and have enough budgetary and staff resources to function well in ensuring meritocracy	Political interference is moderate Institutions are <i>moderately</i> effective in managing procedures and have <i>some</i> budgetary and staff resources to function well in ensuring meritocracy
Political interference in Recruitment	
Recruitment procedures are effective in ensuring <i>high</i> participation of candidates and <i>high</i> finalization in procedures, with <i>low</i> usage of temporary contract, and appeals	Recruitment procedures are <i>minimally</i> constrained, ensuring still medium to <i>high</i> participation of candidates and <i>high</i> finalization in procedures, with <i>moderate</i> usage of temporary contract, <i>low</i> number of appeals
Political interference in Dismissals	
Restructuring leads to <i>no dismissals</i> of civil servants, but rather re-allocation, whereas procedures of dismissing civil servants are applied properly, with <i>low</i> number of appeals against wrongful dismissals.	Restructuring leads to <i>moderate dismissals</i> of civil servants, whereas procedures of dismissing civil servants are used properly, and there is low to <i>moderate</i> number of appeals.
Political interference in Dismissals	
Restructuring leads to <i>high</i> dismissals of civil servants without justification, whereas dismissals are <i>politically</i> motivated, and there is a <i>high</i> number of appeals against wrongful application of procedures in dismissals.	Restructuring leads to <i>high</i> dismissals of civil servants without justification, whereas dismissals are <i>politically</i> motivated, and there is a <i>high</i> number of appeals against wrongful application of procedures in dismissals.

Temporary contracts are a direct indicator of political appointments, because they have been extensively used by governments as a 'legitimate' channel for entry into administration based on political loyalty. While usually 8–10% of the civil service workforce can be legally hired based on such contracts, the extent of temporary contracting strongly hints at politicization. The extent to which formal procedures have been constrained is then shown in the decreasing number of finalization of formal examination procedures and by decreasing effective competition in the participating number of candidates in recruitment. Hence, the combination of increased number of appeals against unfair recruitment procedures, increased number of temporary contracts and decreased number of finalization of recruitment accompanied with lower effective number of candidates participating in these examinations, hints at higher politicization.

The third domain in order to assess if *dismissals* are politically motivated or not are related to the analysis of appeals with regard to (iv) number of civil servant appeals that have been solved in favor of civil servants claims or number of rejected and invalid cases of appeals from civil service commission, (v) appeals that are related to dismissals because of restructuring of ministries (usually restructuring should not lead to outflow of civil servants) and (vi) appeals related to dismissals because of disciplinary measures (disciplinary measures are also not a tool that should be used to dismiss but rather warn on a poor performance). Based on civil service commission reports in Albania, using disciplinary measures as a way to dismiss civil servants, without exhausting other prior steps, hint to politically motivated replacements of officials. The higher the number of appeals related to disciplinary measures, the more politicization has taken place.

As Table 11 shows, analyzing the progress in adoption and implementation of civil service reform regarding political interference in selection and dismissals requires several things. First, an understanding of whether civil service laws are adopted is needed. Second, there must be a way to observe whether competitive hiring procedures have been routinely used in public administration, whereby central management institutions have announced vacancies and appointed officials according to examination procedures (number of vacancy and appointments). Furthermore, we must be able to ascertain if this was done without any political constraints during the implementation of these procedures. Besides the assessment on the legislative framework shown in point 1 in Table 11 (ensuring meritocracy), point 2 shows how the three types of phenomena combine to demonstrate how procedures are constrained due to political interference.

I distinguish between three outcomes in Table 12 above: low, medium and high politicization. Reform outcomes in levels of politicization vary therefore between the cases when politicization is high if examinations are in place, but recruitment can't be finalized and the number

of political appointments through temporary contracts is high with appeals against examination procedures increasing. All this indicates that although institutions and procedures are in place, they are not very effective in ensuring meritocracy in practice because of political interference. Then on the other extreme politicization is low when formal examination rules are adopted and implemented without any political interference and therefore are effective in ensuring meritocracy in practice. Hence, indicators of finalization of recruitment and number of participating candidates are high, combined with low temporary contracts and low number of appeals, hinting at low political interference in personnel decisions.

The results show that while civil service laws are implemented in secondary legislation and they comply well with European principles of meritocracy in the laws and on paper,³⁹⁰ the merit procedures in recruitment and selecting the best candidate are substantially constrained politically differently through incumbents from 2000–05 and then from 2005–10. The leeway of politicization – particularly in the second cycle of reform– has been through the restructuring of ministries every time a new incumbent is seated. Here, within a mandate new vacancies opened and inherited civil servants are replaced with new, more trusted appointees.

This process sees a combination of hiring political trustees through temporary contracts (rather than employing formal examination procedures) and ‘placing’ the existing office-holders on ‘waiting lists’ (which demotivates them to return to work), or dismissing them based on restructuring and disciplinary measures. Such an approach peaked in 2005 (a year of electoral change) and again in 2009 when elections again saw change, with the Albanian Democratic Party (DP) first ruling alone and later in coalition with the smaller Socialist Movement for Integration (*Lëvizja Socialiste për Integrim*, LSI), a splinter group from the Socialist Party (SP). In the latter case, this affected the turnover of civil servants in the administration much more than in the period before when the Socialists had been in government. The numbers of temporary contracts over time and the number of appeals both increased during the second cycles of civil service reform under the DP led government and then in the second period during the DP–LSI coalition in government. The next section delves into the variation in depth.

³⁹⁰ Meyer Sahling (2013), p.7

THREE CYCLES OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS

The civil service reform is sub-divided in three periods, 2001-2005, 2005-2009, and 2009-2013, where each cycle will be analyzed along effectiveness of state institutions, as well political interferences in recruitment and dismissals. The main focus of analysis is to grasp the variation in politicization of civil service between three periods, and both the launch of reform between 1996-99, as well the period from 2013 onwards, will be outlined shortly to show both the background on how such reforms started, as well the further trend on progress of such reforms after 2013. The data used for such assessment are annual reports of civil service commission and department of public administration, as well as a parliamentary report on monitoring reshuffling of civil servants in Albania.

Launch of reform: 1996–99

Civil service reform in Albania appeared on the government agenda for the first time in 1995–96 with the approval of the first Civil Service Law (CSL) no. 8095, dated 21 March 1996. The institution for the management of the civil service procedures, the Department of Public Administration (DoPA) and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were thereby established.³⁹¹ However, the law was never implemented nor translated into secondary legislation and its central management institutions were not functional. Before the CSL was implemented (until 2000), the DP had already launched the initiative to formally put an end in politicizing the state administration for party purposes. The DP had taken power in 1992, before which time it had been in opposition to the Socialist Party of Albania, the successor of the communist Albanian Party of Labor (APL). However, it did not manage to uphold reform in practice. Indeed, the DP basically reshuffled all the old, inherited bureaucratic elite (which it accused of working for the communists) and replaced it with ‘anti-communists’, thus strengthening its own power by instituting a new elite. In short, in the 1992–98 period, administrative law and procedure and no form of independent supervision of government and administration did exist in Albania.³⁹²

Albania under the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha, was known as the most Stalinist and totalitarian regime in Eastern Europe and one of the most repressive in the world.³⁹³ The Hoxha regime had engaged in gross violations of human and political rights. Albania had over 23

³⁹¹ Council of Ministers decision Nr. 443, 05.09.1994, see Appendix Chapter 4.

³⁹² SIGMA (2004), p.3

³⁹³ Biberaj (1999), p.22-75.

concentration camps, the most militarized regime and tens of thousands of Albanians vanished in prisons and were subjected to other forms of government repression.³⁹⁴ This repressive regime could only be maintained through a party that controlled every space of the state institution through the executive, judicative and legislative branches. No separation of powers between party and state administration was permitted, and the ‘rule of law remained an ‘alien’ to the communist regime and state institutions in Albania. In this period, communists controlled all leading positions and member of the politburo usually held the senior government posts, especially the chairmanships of the Council of Ministers (i.e., the prime minister) and the of ministers dealing with defense and economic matters. Hence, bureaucrats were hired under the labor code and came directly from the party cadre, where Hoxha had ‘succeeded in creating a loyal nomenklatura class in the state.’³⁹⁵

This politburo enjoyed enormous wealth, luxurious living quarters named ‘blloku’ in isolation from citizenry, where they possessed 131 villas.³⁹⁶ During the 45 years of communist rule the communist party hired bureaucrats from the party cadre, and made it loyal to its political interests, in increasing repression and control over the various sectors, and all aspects of life.³⁹⁷ Relying on the controlled bureaucracy of the military police, and mass organizations, the APL fully controlled the state and ensured obedience through ‘its unchallenged monopoly over political power.’³⁹⁸ This highly party-controlled state advanced ‘an unwritten social contract’, whereby the state would provide a basic standard of living and social welfare in return of political obedience.³⁹⁹

The legacies of a politically loyal state administration recruited under a party-controlled labor code and *nomenklatura*⁴⁰⁰ system continued until the new government adopted the CSL. Even though the democratic government introduced the law to end politicization practices, it was not yet ready to establish a truly politically neutral civil service constituency. Hence, the DP that took over government in 1992 continued to draw on the communist labor code. Article 24/1 of the code gave ministers full discretion to hire and fire with no procedures in place to protect employees.⁴⁰¹ The DP argued that no rule of law could be established without the de-politicization of ministers and

³⁹⁴ Ibid, p.84

³⁹⁵ Biberaj (1999), p.73

³⁹⁶ Biberaj (1999), p.75

³⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 24

³⁹⁸ Biberaj (1999), p. 71

³⁹⁹ Ibid, p.27

⁴⁰⁰ The Communist Party established a selected list with officials from which appointees for top-level decisions were selected to administrative key positions.

⁴⁰¹ Elbasani (2009).

government power throughout the country,⁴⁰² excepting parts of the army and the military forces.⁴⁰³ Yet it replaced virtually the entire elite bureaucracy by integrating explicitly anti-communist appointees among various governmental posts.

This purge of the state sought to reduce control of old communist elite so the government could consolidate power. As the Democratic Party was sociologically part of that old elite too, as the APL had had no credible opposition, the attack on the old state elite was therefore even harsher, in order to credibly commit to anti-communist voters and distinguish itself from the old cadres.⁴⁰⁴ Therefore, the replacement of the bureaucrats with new incomers became indispensable in credibly building political power different from the communist one.

The politicization of the state bureaucracy was easily accomplished both legally and practically during the 1992–96 period, precisely because of the old legacies of party control over the state. With no legacy of a strong legal state and where individuals rather than rule of law determined the rule of the Albanian state, the appointment of politically affiliated administrative personnel was straightforward. The DP's management of public administration differed little from old communist practices, although economic and foreign policies charted a new direction for Albania, shifting foreign-policy orientation towards Europe. The party remained strongly identified with the state bureaucracy.

This 'tabula rasa' of the state in reshuffling its administration, without compensating with higher bureaucratic competence, had immense consequences in further weakening of the governing capacity of the state.⁴⁰⁵ This lack of civil service competence underpinned the poor performance of the democratic government. It also led to subsequent disillusionment among citizens and international actors who quickly realized the government would fail to seize the 'window of opportunity' to set Albania on the right path of transformation. The lack of competence was visible in how the government managed its policies and economic reforms. Its commitment to democratic values was called into question as well when it delayed constitutional reforms in 1996.

The miscalculation of the benefit in reshuffling completely the administration became obvious. First, the inexperienced 'democrats' seated in the new administration at the top level faced either a more experienced middle-level inherited and skilled bureaucracy, or pro-communist

⁴⁰² Rilindja demokratike, 26 January 1991, p.6

⁴⁰³ Berisha remained conciliatory towards the military and defense as they were mainly controlled by the communists and likely to carry APL leadership orders.

⁴⁰⁴ Interview Albania no.13

⁴⁰⁵ Elbasani (2009)

apparatchiks, who resisted reform.⁴⁰⁶ Hence, replacing only and mostly the top decision makers and not the lower level, created many administrative blockages. Second, replacing all inherited civil servants with inexperienced and incompetent ones, simply because they represented the old elite, did not make the new elite more capable of governing the state. Berisha seemed to have circumvented himself with a bunch of incompetent civil servants, leading to various failures in economic policies.⁴⁰⁷ This damaged economic transformation, causing a further ‘runaway economy regulated by rapacious groups than by government’⁴⁰⁸

By colonizing the state in this way, the party weakened its administrative capacity and therefore its own governing performance during this period. Indeed, corruption scandals and mismanagement of economic reforms as well as unconstitutional behavior in 1996, revealed the limited democratic values and weak governing capacities of this government. By 1997, this had further led to the mismanagement of the effect of the collapse of pyramid schemes⁴⁰⁹ and incapacities of the state to control its territoriality and the social unrest arising from the pyramid schemes.⁴¹⁰ State institutions ceased to function and economic activity came to a standstill.⁴¹¹ In this period, the discontent of the citizens was then used by the successors of the communists to revolt against that democratic government.

After the turmoil of the 1997 political and economic crisis and before the introduction of the CSL, the socialist party in its first years in government dismissed only 15% of public employees in favor of party loyalists.⁴¹² Many others were said to have left the administration. It was in this critical period that international organizations, particularly the World Bank and the IMF took the lead in supporting Albania the funding and advice on reforming public administration by drafting the legislative framework law⁴¹³ and supporting the relaunch of the civil service reform. Both these institutions put strong loan conditionality on the country to reform its public sector by reducing the size of public administration, increasing revenue collection and increasing allocation for priority

⁴⁰⁶ Biberaj (1999)

⁴⁰⁷ Biberaj (1999), p.200

⁴⁰⁸ *ibid.*

⁴⁰⁹ Treichel (2002) claims that the pyramid schemes in Albania were allowed from the government, where citizens were putting their saving in ‘get rich quick schemes’ which promised high return to some of them offering interest rates of up to 50%. These schemes, operating under the economic concept of Ponzi schemes, usually work well only until there is sufficient supply with savings from citizens, once a saturation point is reached, such schemes cannot pay back. The pyramid schemes collapsed in early 1997, causing an estimated loss of savings about 1 billion \$.

⁴¹⁰ Biberaj (1999), p. 216.

⁴¹¹ Treichel (2002)

⁴¹² Freedom House (1998).

⁴¹³ The World Bank invested, 8.5 Million Dollars in public administration reform supported by a Structural Adjustment Credit approved by the Bank in June 1999. The overall objective was to provide ‘technical resource, training, goods and incremental operating costs’ for the government to implement the reform agenda (World Bank 2000, p.3).

expenditures.⁴¹⁴

At the heart of these reforms' aim were building administrative capacity by decompressing wage structures and creating a more competitive civil service. The main goal of the World Bank was to build effective governing institutions 'capable of both formulating and implementing public policies as responding to the demands of the citizens'.⁴¹⁵ In the joint World Bank–IMF Poverty Reduction strategy public administration reform was mentioned as the main pillar to further combat corruption and strengthen the broken relationship of the state with its own citizens.⁴¹⁶ In this strengthening public administration along the pillar of public financial management and human resource management (HRM) was crucial,⁴¹⁷ in order to create a capable state as the main pillar of economic development and provision of public services like health and education. In 1997, Albania was the first country in the region to introduce the Strategy for State institutions and Public Administration Reform, which was totally funded by donors. The goal was to provide Albania with the strong state it had so far lacked in its democratization path. This objective had been dealt an almost fatal blow by the turmoil in 1997, when pyramid schemes brought the Albanian state to the brink of collapse.

First period of reform: 2000–05

Adoption of reform and civil service law

With a new Socialist Party prime minister in office, public-sector reforms regained the government's attention as it sought to rebuild state institutions and reform the civil service. A new civil service act was thus adopted. The World Bank supported Albania's public-sector reform effort at improving accountability and responsiveness to citizens.⁴¹⁸ A more efficient administration was also promoted through IMF financial assistance for economic transformation after the 1997 crisis. Based on this conditionality, the government drafted a National Strategy for Economic and Social Development and a three-year Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy.⁴¹⁹ With regard to public administration reforms it prioritized mainly two areas of reform: 1) strengthening public financial management (including the management of public expenditures and revenues) and; (2) strengthening

⁴¹⁴ Treichel (2002), p. 17.

⁴¹⁵ World Bank (2000).

⁴¹⁶ IMF and IDA (2002).

⁴¹⁷ World Bank (2000), p. 10.

⁴¹⁸ IMF and IDA (2000).

⁴¹⁹ IMF (2003).

human resource management.⁴²⁰ It is under this strategy that the World Bank supported Albania with poverty reduction strategy credit, and clear conditionality on competitive and transparent civil service recruitment.

The new law ‘on the status of civil servants’ no.8549, dated 11 November 1999, was prepared with the assistance of the World Bank,⁴²¹ Public administration reforms were promoted mainly in the pre-accession process from the European Commission,⁴²² in collaboration with other institution such as OECD–SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Government and Management),⁴²³ USAID (United States Agency for International Development)⁴²⁴ and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe)⁴²⁵ under the guidance of the DoPA.⁴²⁶ Subsequently, in the period 1999–2002 new legislation⁴²⁷ was completed through detailed secondary regulations and further executive decisions specifying the law⁴²⁸. Reform sought, first, to ensure the stability and job security of civil servants and, second, ensure staff professionalism to meet the challenges of reforms. The CSL fulfilled generally-accepted European standards and principles.⁴²⁹ Its scope was somewhat limited horizontally⁴³⁰ but included all staff in central and local administration exercising public authority. It also included the vertical hierarchy⁴³¹ of positions within the central state administration. Through 2004, the law’s scope was widened horizontally to include all agencies and institution

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

⁴²¹ The World Bank supported public administration reform as part of the broader country strategy of development.

⁴²² European Commission funded a project at this stage on Public administration reform, including inter-ministerial relation, reviewing the legal framework, and improving and monitoring and evaluation capacities. This project supported particularly the CSC and DoPA (SIGMA 2002).

⁴²³ OECD SIGMA- Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in Central and Eastern European Countries- on behalf of the European Commission, both monitored and guided the process of reform of salaries and civil service laws.

⁴²⁴ USAID supported mainly the de-centralization process in Albania (SIGMA 2002).

⁴²⁵ The OSCE supports particularly judicial reform.

⁴²⁶ Shapo and Hoxha (2008), p.7.

⁴²⁷ The New civil service Law was adopted with the 3/5 qualified majority rule in the Parliament, a condition set in the constitution of 1998 according to Article 8/12, where civil service laws constitute organic laws and its changes, require not only simple majority but the 3/5 rule of consensus in order to be passed in the parliament. The political reasoning is that in a polarized to party system crucial laws should affecting the functioning of the state should pass this rule.

⁴²⁸ See Appendix Chapter 4, Table 1, for a summary of legislation: eleven executive decisions in were adopted form the government in specifying various aspects of the civil service law.

⁴²⁹ SIGMA (2002), p.1.

⁴³⁰ Article 2 of the law defines its scope including, council of ministers, the ministries, assembly, president’s office, municipalities, regions, and independent constitutional organs such as High state audit, People’s advocate, High Council of Justice, National Council of Radio and Television, Civil service commission. Then three group of institutions are excluded of this scope: first the affiliated institutions to the ministries, and council of ministers, as well as public employees in the education and healthcare; second, the military, diplomatic service, policy, judiciary are totally excludes and third groups refers to the CSL only partially and includes custom administration, public procurement, institute of statistics, and archives(see for more Hoxha and Shapo (2008), p. 11-12).

⁴³¹ The vertical hierarchy starts with the Secretary General, Directors of Department, Directors of General Directorates, Directors of Directorates, Sector Heads, Specialists.

affiliated with the ministries and the Council of Ministers dealing with tax, customs administration, and public procurement.⁴³²

DoPA⁴³³ – the central policy and management unit, reporting to the Prime Minister’s Office – was strengthened. Additionally, the CSC was established as a quasi-judicial institution reporting to the parliament. It was to deal with civil servants’ rights and to monitor the enforcement of the CSL in public institutions. The institutions like DoPA were charged with monitoring, steering and coordinating the whole public administration reform process.⁴³⁴ Managing civil service recruitment in central institutions⁴³⁵ and at the local level was also a central brief. Those independent institutions not covered in the CSL were given the responsibility to manage their own their personnel.⁴³⁶ The CSC serves as both a redress mechanism for civil servants and a guide and monitor of all practices in institutions under the jurisdiction of the CSL.

Recruitment process

The recruitment process was based on open competition procedures and calls for a probationary period before tenure is awarded.⁴³⁷ The principles of publicity and equality of chances for candidates are also recognized. To comply, the ministry or Council of Ministers asks DoPA to announce the vacant positions for which it needs to organize the procedures, hence appointees enter with the ethic of working for a specific institution and not for the state in general.⁴³⁸

The procedure includes the following steps: 1) defining the criteria for job vacancies (usually by the institutions in cooperation with DoPA) and announcement of job vacancies in the two newspapers with the widest circulation; 2) preliminary selection; 3) a written and oral test by an ad hoc committee composed of experts and representatives of institutions or DoPA (The members of the committee prepare the topics for the written examination and in the oral test the experience, academic qualification and publications or specific skills of the candidate are evaluated); 4) selection by the direct superior (usually the secretary-general level of the ministry); 5) appointment by DoPA

⁴³² IMF (2006), p4.

⁴³³ The role of DoPA was to draft the civil service policy reform with regard to recruitment, promotion of the civil service, particularly in shaping the job descriptions and tasks for every job position. This is regulated in the decision number 100 04,02.1998 “Organization of civil servant’s recruitment procedures, and the rules on the content and form on public announcements in media

⁴³⁴ SIGMA (2002).

⁴³⁵ Article 2, of Civil service Law no.8549,

⁴³⁶ CSC (2001), p.12.

⁴³⁷ SIGMA (2002).

⁴³⁸ The position based systems, creates this type of relationship between the civil servant and the state institution,

for the central institutions); 6) the civil servant is placed for a one-year probationary period. The civil service laws hence formally establish all necessary methods and procedures based on meritocratic assessment. At the same time, it does not specifically prohibit temporary contracts, nor regulate their extent.

Implementation in recruitment procedures and effective civil service institutions

In practice, open competition procedures were implemented, substantially diminishing any political consideration in recruitment particularly in the first period of this cycle of reform.⁴³⁹ Indeed, the de-politicization of the civil service remains one of the achievements of this government in the first period, as concluded in the World Bank project completion report that mainly supported civil service reform from 2000 onwards. World Bank reports show that the ‘government provided evidence satisfactory to IDA (International Development Association) that personnel actions in key positions are consistent with objectives of the relevant legislation’.⁴⁴⁰ Such findings demonstrate that no dismissals or appointments have occurred without being in compliance with the procedural due process requirements of the relevant legislation. Additionally, no appointments have been made for persons who are unqualified, a close relative of persons involved in their selection and appointment decision or in violation of the conflict of interest.⁴⁴¹

The turnover of officials remained at 2.7% in 2000–03, with a slight increase in 2003, because of the change of political leadership.⁴⁴² Various international organizations, from the World Bank, to the IMF and the European Commission, recognized the Socialist government’s commitment to constrain politicization and professionalize the administration in the period 2000–04. One of the main consultants of the World Bank project in that period claimed that ‘Albania has made impressive and relatively irreversible progress on several key dimensions of public administration reform between 1999 and 2005’,⁴⁴³ particularly when it comes to de-politicization. Also, a joint IDA–IMF staff assessment of the poverty reduction strategy papers assessed on a yearly basis that the ‘government has successfully implemented a broad structural reform program, including privatization of strategic enterprises, financial sector reform, civil service reform and anticorruption

⁴³⁹ This evaluation stands in contrast to Elbasani (2009) view that does not distinguish between the first periods of reform. The World Bank assessment in 2005, shows that implementation was enforced and hence de-politicization and a creation of a ‘civil service constituency’ was created (Reid 2005, p.9). So do interviews show that the socialist party in this period, despite changes of ministers and prime ministers made attempts to de-politicize and professionalize the state administration. (Interview no.2, no.3, no.4, no.5).

⁴⁴⁰ World Bank (2003).

⁴⁴¹ World Bank (2003), p 11.

⁴⁴² Reid (2005), p.3.

⁴⁴³ Reid (2005), p.2.

initiatives.⁴⁴⁴

Additionally, the 2003–05 period was more difficult for public administration reform, because although civil service was adopted and a constituency established the political environment became less hospitable.⁴⁴⁵ Three prime ministers changed in the period 2002–05, and many internal disputes in the Socialist Party hindered coherent executive government. Indeed, under the Socialist Party, the first prime minister was asked to resign because of corruption scandals. Civil service reform remained a key issue in this fight to not only combat corruption, strengthen the citizens voice mechanism, and many other projects, but for strengthening mainly the Albanian public administration through the EU CARDS program (Community Assistance for Reconstruction and Development) in public procurement, statistical offices, customs and tax administration. Hence ‘civil service reform provided a means of addressing some of the needs, while these needs themselves creates further demands for pushing civil service reforms agenda beyond the initial scope’.⁴⁴⁶ Despite deterioration in 2002–05 period, the period of 1998–2002 was a crucial one in creating a civil servant constituency⁴⁴⁷ and reforms. Despite some irregularities in 2003 this was sustained as one can see from the figures below.

Figure 13 below, shows how implementation of the civil service laws has progressed over time along the indicators on institutional effectiveness in ensuring merit procedures and political interferences in recruitment and dismissals. Such results show an increase in both open vacancies and new recruitment each year were on a rising trend between 2002–04 – both starting at levels of vacancy announcements of 334 in 2002 and rising to 388 and number of finalized examinations from 192 to 377. Hence, we observe in 2004 that the extent of examination reaches the number of opened vacancies, showing a higher performance of DoPA in management of civil service procedures. In the IMF and IDA report, it was mentioned that ‘during 2002 all civil servants went through the testing phase according to legislation⁴⁴⁸ and that in the period substantial improvements in the implementation procedures were made.’⁴⁴⁹

Figure 13: Political interferences: Number of Temporary Contracts and Successful Examinations

⁴⁴⁴ IMF and IDA (2002).


⁴⁴⁵ Reid (2005), p.9.

⁴⁴⁶ World Bank (2003), p 1.

⁴⁴⁷ Reid (2005), p. 11.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁹ IMF and IDA (2004).



Source: Civil Service Commission reports 2000–12 and Department of Public Administration reports 2003–12, Albania. Author's analysis.

When it comes to better understanding the quality and effectiveness on these procedures, the extent of temporary contracts used for hiring, the number of candidates participating in examination procedure and total number of appeals in general and specifically against examination procedures are good indicators of political interference in such procedures.

In this period, we observe, a lower number of temporary contracts, with increases starting only from 2005. The variation before 2002 and after 2003, and the deterioration in various governance indicators in 2003, are also detected in this analysis through the increase in the usage of temporary contracts is shown in the chart below. It is in this period that the prime minister drew on an old executive decree⁴⁵⁰ granting him authority to directly appoint at the ministerial level. Also, European Commission reports confirm that although ‘the use of fair and professional selection procedures appears to be more broadly accepted and implemented, particularly after the changes of government in 2002 at the central level, and after the local elections in 2003 at the local level, ‘..[p]olitical nomination have been still far too frequent.’⁴⁵¹ This has happened particularly in certain sectors more than others, having adverse effects on the EU CARDS⁴⁵² (Community Assistance for Reconstruction and Development) funding supporting, for example, customs administration in this

⁴⁵⁰ Decree Nr. 469 (14.08.1995) provides the appointments and dismissals of Directors in Ministries and other central institution shall be made by the prime minister, at the recommendation of the head of the Ministry or institution within that position exists.

⁴⁵¹ EU COM (2002), 4.

⁴⁵² EU CARDS was the main financial assistance program towards the Western Balkans that had a main focus on institution building.

period.

However, as DoPA reported in 2004, the prime minister released an executive decree⁴⁵³ prohibiting appointments based on temporary contracts. The DoPA assessment at the time showed the number of such contracts has decreased to 38 in 2004 from 94 in the previous year, as shown in Figure 13. As CSC and DoPA reports confirm, that although temporary contracts were used as an appointment strategy, because the prime minister of the socialist party reacted immediately to these provisions, they did not happen to have a negative impact on the finalization of examination procedures.

As we can see in Figure 14, real competition and attractiveness of civil service remained high in this period, as the number of candidates⁴⁵⁴ participating in examination procedures increased from 5.4 in 2001 to 10.4 in 2004, where the temporary contract did not have a negative impact on the real and open competition, as number of applicants actually increased in the period 2001–05, from 5.4 to 10.2. In the period between 2001–05 there was an increase in the salary structure, starting in 2002, with an average increase of 75% in central administration. The unification of the salary system ensured a greater stability within the civil service, accompanied with an increased interest in state employment.⁴⁵⁵ It was in this period that professional capacities have increased as well. Indeed, in this period the implementation of public administration reforms has enabled also structural improvements and an increase in the quality of human resources.⁴⁵⁶

The indicators in Figure 16 and 17, on type of appeals, shows that there are as well fewer complaints and appeals in examination procedures and dismissals related to disciplinary measures⁴⁵⁷ and restructuring overall in the period 2003–05. Indeed, OECD–SIGMA reports and CSC reports confirm that the direct superiors have misused the usage of the disciplinary measures to dismiss civil servants, leading to arbitrariness in this field.

Figure 14: Open Competition: Number of Temporary Contracts and Avg. Number of Candidates


⁴⁵³ Executive degree Nr. 41 29.01.2004 on the implementation of the law on the civil service status, where all ministries were asked to interrupt all temporary contracts standing in contradiction with the civil service law (DoPA 2004, p6).

⁴⁵⁴ This indicator is used in Shapo and Hoxha (2008) used as well as an indicator of real competition, as usually four candidates should appear in examinations according to the civil service law.

⁴⁵⁵ IMF and IDA (2004), p.5

⁴⁵⁶ IMF (2003), p. 16.

⁴⁵⁷ Violation of duty (if it is not a criminal offence described in the Penal Code) may result in the commencement of a disciplinary procedure against a civil servant. In that case the law recognizes the right of the civil servant to be notified of the beginning of the procedure, the causes and evidence; he/she has the right to be heard, to submit counterevidence, and to be assisted by a lawyer in the hearing organized by the direct superior” SIGMA (2006), 7.



Source: Civil Service Commission report 2000–12 and Department of Public Administration reports 2003–12, Albania.

Despite challenges of understaffing, the effectiveness of both DoPA and the CSC in this period have increasingly performed well in coordinating with ministries in HRM and appeals. Indicators above in this period on the number of announcements and finalized examinations show that DoPA has become increasingly important in the deepening of civil service reform. Also, the opportunity to appeal to the CSC has contributed to a decrease in political interferences in dismissals and an increase in stability.⁴⁵⁸ The indicators in Figure 16 below show that the CSC has increasingly managed to solve the appeals addressed to it. Although there were some difficulties in setting up the CSC and enforcing its decision, this institution started to function as an effective redress mechanism after 2002.⁴⁵⁹

However, some deficiencies were in evidence in the implementation of the law. First, the big role of the minister and superiors in choosing among the three best candidates is an informal rule in practice, and contributes to the degradation of the true competitive nature of the system. The complexity of this decision is that the best among the three candidates is not always selected, but that the superiors have chosen a candidate with below-optimal results.⁴⁶⁰ The role of the secretary general is surpassed in these procedures. This discretionary power remains the same legally defined, until the new civil service law was adopted in 2013 that changed the civil service system from an

⁴⁵⁸ IMF and IDA (2004), p.4.

⁴⁵⁹ Reid (2005), p.4

⁴⁶⁰ SIGMA (2006), CSC (2006).

open position- based into a closed-career based system.

Second, the practice of hiring officials based on temporary contracts who should be recruited based on examination procedures grew dramatically in the period of 2005–13.⁴⁶¹ Recruitment under such ‘urgency provisions’ circumvents the regular transparent process but is also partially explained by the fact that ‘competitions need to be organized separately for each vacancy rendering the current recruitment system too uneconomic’.⁴⁶² Although the law did not prohibit or regulate such practices on hiring on temporary contracts,⁴⁶³ they happened based on the usage of the labor code⁴⁶⁴ and were in practice politically used as a channel of appointments based on political affiliation.⁴⁶⁵

However, the extent to which temporary contracts were made in this period was kept under control⁴⁶⁶. As one can see in Figures 13 and 14 above a slight increase of temporary contracts occurred in the politically critical year of 2003 (94 or 16.1% of total civil servants’ appointments) with changes of government in 2002. However, this decreased to 0.1 % as the prime minister issued an order prohibiting these practices.⁴⁶⁷ Only in the next government mandate in 2005, when such practices became the norm by causing almost 80% of replacements of civil servants, did it become clear that temporary contracts were used as a tool to hire and fire in administration. The prime minister then passed a new order in closing down the legal space that did not allow temporary contracts to be beyond 10% of the whole number of civil servants. Additionally, CSC has evidenced that all officials hired based on temporary contracts were then participating in examination procedures and were passing the examination procedures.

Third, the CSC has reported that various procedures have been subjectively influenced. It found that civil servants had been dismissed based on ‘disciplinary measures’ and ‘restructuring reasons not justified in the laws’.⁴⁶⁸ Some examination procedures were annulled by the CSC, due to erroneous implementation. The problems in the selection procedures were: 1) inadequate and manipulated criteria on selection of candidates; 2) the creation of *ad-hoc* committees to involve

⁴⁶¹ CSC (2002).

⁴⁶² SIGMA (2006).

⁴⁶³ Cani (2009), p. 29.

⁴⁶⁴ SIGMA (2006), 6.

⁴⁶⁵ Interview Albanian no.1

⁴⁶⁶ CSC (2002), p.9 shows that temporary contracts were used in the beginning of the civil service reform as a tool to replace fast political appointees, but again

⁴⁶⁷ World Bank (2006), p.97.

⁴⁶⁸ CSC 2000 shows the case where 12 high official of the Supreme State audit, although not covered from the jurisdiction of the CSL, have been dismissed because of ‘restructuring of that institutions’. They should have been returned to their positions in equivalent positions elsewhere, but the Ministry of Local governance has not fulfilled its jurisdiction. There are further cases where institutions do not fulfill their legal obligations.

ministerial figures⁴⁶⁹ 3) poor quality exam content and interview questions and; 4) use of ‘restructuring of institutions’ as a channel to dismiss civil servants,⁴⁷⁰ leading to weakened merit and objectivity.

All these practices again show that political influence in procedures has still somehow persisted, although to a lesser extent than in the subsequent period of reform. Although there were five cabinets in this five-year period, and the Socialist Party had significant internal disputes, it undertook many efforts to coordinate donor aid and introduce reforms. Close collaboration in this period between the Prime Minister’s Office, central management institutions, and the World Bank managed to overcome many would-be ministerial vetoes seeking to increase political considerations in appointments.⁴⁷¹ The performance criteria remained unlinked to the salary system, which is unique to Albania in comparison to other countries. The salary system became more competitive, for all levels in the hierarchy.

Despite some deficiencies in this period there is consensual agreement among various sources that ‘Albania has done remarkably well in meeting these implementation challenges with respect to each of the above three key reform objectives: de-politicization, redress and attractiveness’⁴⁷². CSC reports also show that formal examination has been the chief route for entry to the civil service,⁴⁷³ even as temporary contracting has persisted.

Second period of reform: 2005–09 and 2010–13

The second cycle of civil service reform occurred in two phases. The first in 2005–09 saw the implementation of the old CSL, under the leadership of the DP. The second, in 2009–13, was undertaken by a DP–LSI coalition in government. In both these phases the change of leadership led a much higher turnover of civil servants and reshuffling of the state administration according to the party organization and needs than in the period 2001–05. Meritocratic procedures and levels of politicization were substantially constrained each time, incumbency parties change and in the extent each time the party changed the ministerial portfolio. It was in this first phase between 2005-2009, that many efforts in building a constituency of civil servants serving the state was obstructed.

In the second phase of the implementation of the old CSL, the partial change in government

⁴⁶⁹ CSC (2002, p.6)

⁴⁷⁰ CSL allows according to article 23, that in case of change of institutional restructuring, officials have the right to keep their status of civil service until one year after this and should

⁴⁷¹ Reid (2005).

⁴⁷² Reid (2005), EU COM (2004).

⁴⁷³ CSC (2002), p.8.

(when the LSI joined the DP in office) brought frequent changes in both ministers and the civil service subordinated to them. This was most striking in the ministries overseen by the smaller party. Already in this period, there were consultations with OECD–SIGMA to adopt a new CSL, which had already been on the political agenda of the former SP government, in order to put an end to the ‘position-based civil service system’ and the politicization practices.

Reforms between 2005–09

In 2005, the DP replaced the SP in government, beginning a reversal of many of the latter’s efforts to build a constituency of civil servants. Despite this, in 2006 Albania signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union and developed the medium to long-term National Strategy for Development and Integration (NSDI, 2007–13) to implement European partnership priorities. The NSDI developed 23 sector strategies and 10 cross-cutting strategies. One of these was the development of the public administration that stood under particular loan conditionality of the IMF and World Bank.

The goal of the strategy was to facilitate a ‘*mani pulite*’ (‘clean hands’) government, strengthen rule of law, and make progress in EU and NATO relations.⁴⁷⁴ Despite certain achievements in the first period of 2005–10, during the end of the mandate, the prime minister failed to deliver on what he had promised, losing power at the 2013 election. Freedom House and the media report that during this time ‘two key ministers from the cabinet faced criminal proceedings for corruption scandals in 2008, while the government pressure on the Office of the General Prosecutor and judges increased, particularly when General Prosecutor Ina Rama brought these cases to the court.’⁴⁷⁵ Despite this, though magistrates remained hesitant to decide major corruption cases involving top politicians, because of political pressure and favored rather the use of legal artifices to postpone the process.⁴⁷⁶

The government argued the need on restructuring its public administration by reducing the number of ministries and cutting 20% of the personnel across the board of all ministries.⁴⁷⁷ The conditionality of EU Stabilization and Association processes as well as financial assistance related to EU Community Assistance for Reconstruction Development and Stabilization were not strongly

⁴⁷⁴ Government program of the Democratic Party (2005-2009).

⁴⁷⁵ Freedom House (2009).

⁴⁷⁶ Freedom House (2009). The one understood here was the Minister of Defense, Fatmir Mediu, as explosions at a military ammunition depot near the capital, Tirana (Gërdec), killed 26 persons and injured 300 more, while thousands of houses were destroyed

⁴⁷⁷ SIGMA (2006).

linked to progress in public administration reform.⁴⁷⁸ For example, the EU Stabilization and Association Agreement was signed despite the government's reshuffling and change of administrative personnel from the previous government in 2005. Therefore, consistent with this policy, the EU Commission reports kept silent on the political reshuffling until 2008. In this year SIGMA reports recognized more openly that the democratic government had purged the state, circumvented its laws and public authority, and radically undermined the impartiality of the civil service. In the same period, the judiciary was also substantially politicized. While the government party reintroduced old practices in controlling the civil service, it was in this period that the prime minister also pushed and unified the salary system, by contributing to a yearly increase of salaries in all ranks.

The reshuffling of the government and the opening of vacancies has happened under the government strategy of 'restructuring' the administration. This led to a decrease in number of civil servants from 1667 to 1373 in 2005 and 1359 in 2006. The EU Commission progress reports for these years state that:

The Albanian civil service remains hindered by a pervasive lack of understanding of the need for, or will to implement, a real separation between the political and administrative levels⁴⁷⁹. '[I]n the hiring and dismissal of staff has in some cases occurred without due attention to the Civil Service Law.⁴⁸⁰

While the restructuring of the ministries has been argued from the government as acting according to the law (article 23 of the CSL), this has led to the dismissal of all political appointees of the preceding government, but as well of many professionals who had no significant political party connections.⁴⁸¹ Additionally, the government has tried to amend the 1999 Law on civil service, but failed to do so because it is an organic law that needs a qualified parliamentary majority to be amended.⁴⁸² Additionally, it shifted DoPA from the Council of Ministers to the Ministry of Interior. It was during this time that the:

⁴⁷⁸ Elbasani (2009).

⁴⁷⁹ EU COM (2005), p.13

⁴⁸⁰ EU COM (2006).

⁴⁸¹ World Bank (2006).

⁴⁸² SIGMA (2006).

CSC was threatened to be censure[d] by the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs and by the Plenum of the Parliament on 16 February 2006 (published in the Official Gazette in March) because the CSC had issued critical reports on the way in which the government had been handling the civil service.⁴⁸³

The government could not change the CSL and was driven to politicize the administration for patronage purposes. Therefore, it simply found other ways to marginalize DoPA and CSC, by limiting their enforcement and downgrading the institutional location of the DoPA from the Prime Minister's Office to the Ministry of Interior.

These measures constitute a clear offensive against the public administration, replacing inherited officials and thus the constituency of civil servants trained in the period between 1999 and 2004. In government, the party returned to practices of reshuffling seen when it first entered government in 1992 and replaced the inherited 'communist' bureaucrats with DP loyalists. Nevertheless, in the most recent period politicization of the administration has been more sophisticated and 'cloaked' in effectiveness arguments. Use of a government program and certain articles in the civil service laws that permit retrenchment and 'restructuring' of the public administration have also helped to obscure the underlying motives. However, the deeper analysis of data on civil service shows that the way the law was circumvented or violated regarding dismissals and recruitment clarify that the intention behind the restructuring was not programmatic. Rather, the aim was purely political control of the civil service at higher levels in the interests of the party line.

It is in this period as well that the constitutional court at the request of the Advocate of the People suspended several ministries' restructuring initiatives involving the dismissal of staff.⁴⁸⁴ Many international organizations that had invested in reform like the World Bank, SIGMA, and the EU, criticized the government for disrupting the reforms that the previous government has followed by increasing staff turnover. On 13 April 2006, a group of MPs from the opposition party requested that an *ad-hoc* parliamentary committee of inquiry be set up to investigate, verify and analyze the dismissals carried out in the public administration personnel after the last elections of 3 June 2005 and to define the legal responsibilities of the respective officials. The parliamentary report of this *ad-hoc* committee, mentions the Directive No. 1484 dated 10.10.2005. According to which, the Democratic Party created groups of party members in the center and local branches to develop lists

⁴⁸³ SIGMA (2006), p.2.
⁴⁸⁴ SIGMA (2008).

of people who have contributed in the elections of 3 July, chief of stab, commissioners of election committees and members of all structures dealing with election to be politically appointed in the center or local administration?⁴⁸⁵

Interviews conducted in certain ministries have corroborate the claim that 80% of the inherited bureaucrats were reshuffled between 2005–08.⁴⁸⁶ The CSC annual reports speak of 40%⁴⁸⁷ reshuffling at the ministerial level, and the *ad-hoc* investigative committee on public administration reform of 2005 reports 50%, while at the local level replacements amounted to 100%.⁴⁸⁸ The OECD–SIGMA reports in these years, relying on national sources of information, detected an average of 35% turnover of civil service positions in 2005 with incomers appointed on temporary contracts under the labor code.⁴⁸⁹ This is much higher than when the SP government took over in 1998, where a turnover of only 15% of officials was measured.

Additionally, a World Bank (2006) assessment of the situation in 2005 also confirms this key variation in levels of politicization between the 2000–03 and the 2005 government change particularly in the (adjusted) quarterly turnover rate of civil servants,⁴⁹⁰ amounting from an average of 2.7% (on a quarterly basis), to a four-times higher increase of 10.7% of the turnover of civil servants.⁴⁹¹ Additionally, SIGMA reports claim that 10 out of the 14 secretaries-general were replaced, except one in the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Environment. The SIGMA 2006 report and assessment on the situation in Albania shows that the:

major staff turnover occurred (estimated at between 30% and 35%, depending on the source, between July 2005 and May 2006), which severely damaged the continuity of public services and the stability of the public administration and maintained a tradition of general disrespect for the law.⁴⁹²

This general disrespect for the law became obvious in various areas in this government, beyond the implementation of civil service reform, but as well later on in the politicization of the judiciary and as well on how it had attacked the civil service commission. Indeed, SIGMA describes the situation

⁴⁸⁵ See more Parliamentary Committee (2006), p.40.

⁴⁸⁶ Interview Albania no. 2, no. 8, no. 9, no.10.

⁴⁸⁷ In 2010, the Civil Service Commission talks 45% of the position from 119 in the Ministry of defense.

⁴⁸⁸ Parliamentary Committee (2006).

⁴⁸⁹ SIGMA (2005).

⁴⁹⁰ All turnover rates were converted to quarrel rates by multiplying the four-month rate by 0.75.

⁴⁹¹ World Bank (2006).

⁴⁹² SIGMA (2006), p.6.

back then as:

Many of the civil servants were either dismissed or demoted to lower positions, or they resigned. A large number of those removed from their posts are still registered on the —waiting list. During that period, many recruitment competitions were held, which demonstrates that the right of civil servants on the waiting list to be given priority and offered another position has been largely ignored by the government.⁴⁹³

Three major areas show that the administrative restructuring process in this government has compromised the de-politicization and meritocratic civil service management system in outcomes and implementation of procedures and has created spaces for political interference: (i) retrenchment and restructuring of ministries in order to open new vacancies and dismiss inherited civil servants by using ‘waiting lists’;⁴⁹⁴ (ii) usage of temporary contracts as a resort to fill the new vacant positions and consequently and; (iii) the high number on appeals.⁴⁹⁵

The ‘restructuring’ seems to have been one of a number of political tools used to purge old inherited civil servants, professionally or politically affiliated to the SP, from the previous government. They were placed on ‘waiting lists’ and new vacancies were opened to integrate officials loyal to the DP, who were appointed based on temporary contracts. Both the extent of appointments on temporary contracts to place political loyalists and as well as the extent of non-integrating civil servants dismissed in ‘waiting lists’⁴⁹⁶ show the increase of political influence in hiring and firing of civil servants of this government.⁴⁹⁷ The World Bank criticized the government on two grounds: first, this retrenchment was not providing any effective reduction in the public sector and that it produced no cost savings. Second, DoPA has played a weak role in this process and proved not to be effective in managing human resources. The critical aspects can be summarized as below.

First and as foreshadowed above, the ability to fire civil servants by restructuring ministerial institutions based on article 23 of the CSL and placing them in ‘waiting lists’ by not integrating them again in the civil service within 12 months shows that the government restructuring and retrenchment was not done in order to have a higher functional planning and less costs, but was a

⁴⁹³ SIGMA (2006), p.10

⁴⁹⁴ Placement on the waiting list means that the civil servant is removed from his/her position and paid a salary for one year without being obliged to work (SIGMA 2008).

⁴⁹⁵ World Bank (2006), p 95-98.

⁴⁹⁶ According to the CSC there were only 21 officials out of 361, who returned to their jobs in 2006. (CSC 2006).

⁴⁹⁷ World Bank (2006), p.30; SIGMA (2008), Shapo and Shunsi (2008), CSC (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009).

strategy to control the administration for political patronage. The World Bank report, 'confirms that the decrease in the public administration size, one of the aims of this retrenchment, ended up being not such as high for the general public sector, but was to 80% a retrenchment in the employment reduction of the civil service.⁴⁹⁸ However, as this retrenchment- 361 civil servants were put in 'waiting' lists- was again followed up with the opening of new vacancies- 250 vacancy openings-, the administration as such was not reduced much in size. That means highly trained civil servants and officials were replaced with loyalists who had never worked for the state administration. The World Bank also confirmed that this re-organization did not reflect always the ministerial functional reviews justifying restructuring, therefore causing a professional capacity vacuum.

Second, the restructuring created additional budgetary costs, rather than savings, as the 361 civil servants dismissed on waiting lists were paid for up to 12 months. In this period, the Albanian state and taxpayers paid twice – for one employee in office and one on a waiting list and not working. Despite the availability of qualified officials, new announcements and new appointment were made with the help of DoPA, while the difference in the job descriptions remained vague.

Third, in all those recruitment procedures the CSC annual reports criticize the weak role DoPA effectively played in this process. Indeed, in many of the retrenched positions the open competition and competitive procedures were highly politically constrained. DoPA as an institution was located under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior, and part of the executive has not been autonomous enough to enforce its decision against the executive level and play the strong role the laws (article 9, nr. 1 13.06.2000) had prescribed for it.⁴⁹⁹ For example, 'the pattern followed by the government has been the dismissal of civil servants on grounds of their unsuitability (based on article 23 of the CSL). Additionally, it has placed many civil servants in 'waiting lists' as part of the restructuring of ministries and managed to integrate only 21 from 361 dismissed officials. Finally, the waiting lists should have served as a pool of professional human capital to fill the new job classifications through the restructuring. This was not followed through, while DoPA accepted to open 288 new vacancies, with job description that were best fitted to officials who were hired on temporary contracts.

Therefore, this 'reorganization' did not always reflect the ministerial functional reviews that justified restructuring. Therefore, it has created a professional capacity vacuum. The capacity vacuum

⁴⁹⁸ World Bank (2006), p.30 Additionally, the resulting cut in personnel, out of 615 public employees in 2006 from 102.630 in total, 80% of them were civil servants. While 361 were put in waiting lists, 250 new vacancies were created, resulting not really in a net change in size of public administration at the civil service level.

⁴⁹⁹ CSC (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010) repeatedly show this weakness in the role of DoPa in human resource management.

created with the reduction in civil service personnel and the increase in budgetary costs due to double salaries paid (wait-listed officials and new appointees) – as well as the limited overall reduction in the size of the civil service – proves a point. This ‘restructuring’ was not a government program to produce greater effectiveness. Rather, it was instituted to build political patronage.

Additionally, the appointment of personnel parallel to the formal procedures, and based on temporary contracts undermined the effectiveness of formal recruitment and the attractiveness of civil service as a career. Temporary contracts are not regulated through the civil service but through the labor code. However, when used they contravene the CSL.⁵⁰⁰ The declining number of candidates applying for each open position⁵⁰¹ and the low number successful finalization of merit procedures shows the lack of competitiveness⁵⁰² in the examination procedures. This is because potential candidates consider the temporary incumbent is virtually assured of winning such a competition.⁵⁰³ Third, the increase in the number of appeals, shows that many more civil servants and the old constituency built through the years has complained in these areas. All these indicators that will be explained below, show that the SP government has reshuffled the administration with his own party loyalists in 2005 and has institutionalized these practices then for the years afterwards.

Reforms between 2009–12

Following the 2005–09 reshuffling, the administration stabilized again. At the same time, the government passed further laws on performance and a new salary scheme that also provided a bonus system to encourage a younger generation that had studied abroad to join the civil service. Albanian graduates from foreign universities were actively recruited.⁵⁰⁴ Albania’s deficiency in the separation of powers and identification of the state with the party in power became the main obstacles to the country’s democratization and its integration with the EU.⁵⁰⁵ The EU had in 2005 largely turned a blind eye to this. But the high levels of politicization in the administration as well as the judiciary during the 2005–09 period attracted the attention of international organizations and made public

⁵⁰⁰ SIGMA (2006), p.6.

⁵⁰¹ The temporary contracts also had an effect on the attractiveness of civil service careers, lowering the number of candidates appearing in the selection process: from 2000–2006, the number of temporary contract has moved from 38 to 55, after 2005, peaking at 161 and more, reducing the number of candidates applying to formal positions to 5 and even lower.

⁵⁰² This has led to a decrease in the rate of the number of successful finalization of recruitment procedures to public calls, when public calls have remained the same (from 334 in 2002, to 400 in 2007). For example, the public calls were always something like 20% of the number of civil servants, while from 2000–2005 the number of recruitments has been increasing from 53 to 277 per year, though in 2005–2006 it dropped by 140.

⁵⁰³ World Bank (2006), 97.

⁵⁰⁴ EU COM (2007, 2008).

⁵⁰⁵ Freedom House (2009).

administration the key priority in the European Partnership. On 4 April 2009, Albania (along with Croatia) joined NATO and Prime Minister Sali Berisha from the DP submitted the formal application for EU Membership.⁵⁰⁶

After constitutional amendments to the Albanian electoral system from a mixed to a regional proportional system, the DP could not secure a majority after the election of 28 June 2009 and had to form a coalition with the LSI, under the leadership of Ilir Meta. In 2009, many legislative reforms proposed by the DP and aimed at increasing partisan influence in the civil service were subsequently blocked by the LSI, whose leader in 1999 had been the first prime minister to start civil service reform. However, the DP, under the leadership of Sali Berisha (serving as head of government) still managed to increase partisan influence in the management of the civil service by evading recruitment procedures, shifting the DoPA responsibility away from the Prime Minister's Office to the Ministry of Interior, and undermining the CSC's autonomous legal structure. The institutionalization of these practices in hiring and firing by circumventing civil service law, through usage of temporary contracts affected also the second phase of those reforms.

The second phase of reform occurred in 2009–11. Under the DP–LSI coalition, such practices. It was in these periods as well that the government refused to sign another arrangement with the IMF, which expired in early 2009.⁵⁰⁷ Indeed, only in 2010 did the prime minister of the DP adopt an instruction to reduce the use of temporary contracts to 2.5%. However, as CSC reports show this was never implemented and the parties continued harmful institutionalized practices of politically motivated hiring and firing. The analysis below outlines with data gathered based on the annual civil service commission and DoPA reports.

Implementation of the recruitment procedures and levels of politicization, 2005–12

The SIGMA assessment reports of 2006 state that: 'The Civil service law has been clearly violated'. This has happened differently across different ministries, as both data on expert survey and CSC reports show. Civil servants inherited from the previous socialist government were replaced in 2005 with political appointees under temporary labor contracts. The SIGMA report went on to say: 'Trained managers have been replaced by persons who had never worked in the administration before and who have been appointed on grounds of political patronage, but more often out of sheer


⁵⁰⁶ Economic Intelligence Unit (2009).

⁵⁰⁷ Economic Intelligence Unit (2008).

nepotism, especially for leading positions in ministries and institutions.⁵⁰⁸

The analysis in this section will show the extent to which recruitment and dismissals have been politically influenced leading to a higher level of politicization of the administration during the period 2005–12. Over this period, in both election years and the change in government party in 2005 and in 2009, a higher peak in levels of politicization is observed. While expert survey data will complement this analysis for 2010, levels of politicization in this chapter will be more inferred through a thick description of the data on implementation of examination procedures, temporary contracts, number of appeals and how they all combine in a story of delineating these trends in levels of politicization being higher in these electoral periods after change of political leadership and change in parties. The results show that different parties in government politically constrain more recruitment procedures, whereas the DP in 2005 has shown a higher extent in the politicization level than the previous government ruled by the Socialist Party. The change of government in 2009, when the DP entered coalition with the LSI, saw the levels of politicization increase even more. Based on Meyer-Sahling (2010) expert-survey data, it is then outlined how this new party controlled even more the levels of politicization across the ministries it controlled.

Figure 15: Political interference in merit procedures



Source: Civil Service Commission Reports 2000–11, Albania. Author’s analysis.

Note: An/NR.CS: Ratio of Announcements to Total Number of Civil Servants, TC/CS: Ratio of Temporary Contracts to Total Number of Civil Servants, EX/NRCS: Ratio of Examination to Total Number of Civil Servants, Ratio of Appeals decided in favor of civil servants to Total Number of Civil Servants; Number of participants per examination.

⁵⁰⁸

SIGMA (2006) quoting Mr. Roland Permeti CSC Chairman and CSC members.

Figure 15 summarizes the various indicators hinting at high levels of politicization in year of elections in 2005 and 2009 based on following indicators:

- (i) decrease of number of participants in 2005 from 9 to 6,1 in 2006 and after 2010 decreasing again to 7.5 from 7.7 in 2010;
- (ii) this is accompanied with a decrease of examination procedures in 2005 to 141 from 377 in 2004 and then back again in 2009 to 187 from 274 in 2008, and
- (iii) then an increase of appeals decided in favor to civil servants in 2005 to 188 and 2006 to 477, and total increase of appeals from 307 in 2005 to 702 in 2006, one year after the election; (see Figures 15);
- (iv) accompanied by an increase of appeals against dismissals based on the disciplinary measures and restructuring that happened in 2005 and then again in 2010;
- (v) an increase in temporary contracts (Figure 11).

It is visible that from 2005 until 2007 there is a decrease in the total number of civil servants from 1400 to 1337 at the central government due to restructurings. In this period, we observe a decrease in the number of announcements from 388 in 2004, to 219 in 2005 and then to a slight increase again to 288 and then in 2007 to 400.

Figure 15 above shows various indicators as a ratio to number of civil servants, while Figure 16 shows the same indicators in absolute number. Based on Figure 11 we observe a similar decrease too of the finalization of examination procedures and a lower number in candidates per examination, both indicators hinting at a lower real competition and merit recruitment in 2005.⁵⁰⁹ While the number of civil servants has decreased, one could think that this is the reason why the number of the finalization of examination is lower as well. However, the ratio of the number of announcement to civil servants has remained the same despite the lower number of civil servants. It is the ratio of the successful finalization of the examination that has dropped. Indeed, the number of announcement per number of civil servants adjusted shows an average of 20% over time (see Figure 15).

Nonetheless, the number of successfully finalized examinations seems to fluctuate and drop much quicker in 2005 even when adjusted for the decrease in the total number of civil servants. This drop in the ratio of examination to number of civil servants after the change in government in 2005, from 22% in 2004 to 10% in 2005 and 2006 hints at the levels of political interference that have

⁵⁰⁹ These indicators were borrowed from DoPA reports.

undermined merit procedures. Many competitive procedures in this time could not be finalized, because of the high level of politically motivated appointments based on temporary contracts (see dashed lines).

Figure 11 shows the decreasing trend from 337 successfully finalized examination in 2004 to 141 in 2005 and 140 in 2006. The same is observed for the number of candidates that participate in the examination procedures, where the number drops from 10.2 on average per examination to 9 in 2005 and 6.2 in 2006 with little sign of recovery, shown in Figure 12. Both data and interviews confirm that this was due to a demotivation of potential candidates to even enter the civil service examination in this period, as the shared knowledge was that the high political infiltration through political connections and party loyalists has blocked the open competition and therefore impeded the examination procedures.

As explored elsewhere, appointments based on temporary contracts drastically increased in this period, with negative impacts on merit procedures and open competition. They can be directly understood as political appointments that interfere negatively in the effectiveness of formal procedures. Figure 13 above shows that the total number of temporary contracts rose from 38 in 2004 to 161 in 2005 and then an increased again to 274 out of 288 in 2008 and 2009. In Figure 15, as a ratio to total number of announcements, the ratio increases from 10% in 2004 to 74% in 2005 after the government change from SP to DP and then to 97% in 2009, after the electoral year and where the LSI joined the DP in coalition.

Particularly the number of finalization of examination and temporary contracts are both highly and negatively correlated with the fact that appointments have happened based on temporary contracts.⁵¹⁰ As CSC reports on examination procedures failed to be finalized sometimes in this period, because there was a high reputation that procedures and vacancies were only opened form DoPA in order to basically reintegrate officials who were politically affiliated and appointed on labor contracts. The civil service indeed lost some attractiveness, as the government created that perception that only party connected candidates could win in these examinations.

The change of government in 2009 and particularly the integration of the LSI in government until 2013, created an atmosphere and mentality of 'hidden letters', with name and positions that these people would need to have in certain ministries.⁵¹¹ In this period, the political party reshuffled

⁵¹⁰ Shapo and Shunsi (2008) explore the relationship between number of temporary contracts and successful finalization of examination as being a negative and highly correlated one to a coefficient of -0.86 .

⁵¹¹ Interview no.9, no.12, no.11

most of the officials with its own loyalists.

Other empirical deformation in the effectiveness and the intention of those recruitment procedures was in many cases done by integrating those appointed with temporary contracts to vacancies. Therefore, we observe a constant number of opened vacancies, despite in 2005 many were dismissed. One of the strategies use to deform the procedures was to let a certain candidate win, while others were only ‘pseudo-candidates’,⁵¹² who participated only to fulfill the legal requirement of the minimum number of four candidates per examination as described in the laws. A second strategy was to provide the questions in advance to the winning candidate. This was visible empirically in the results of the examinations and the point difference between the winning candidate from the other ones⁵¹³ made clear that there was interference in the examination procedures.

Finally, also interviewees when asked on the effectiveness of the examination procedures confirmed that while they were always implemented, they did not matter in practice particularly in this period of government, due to prior political decisions on who the winning candidate would be. Hence, while recruitment and examination procedures were implemented, so they were somehow also deformed in their intent to produce merit and open competitions. Then link between the relationship of temporary contracts and reintegration through open vacancies was observed in the civil service commission reports throughout this period and throughout the ministries and the interviews conducted. In the Ministry of Finance, there were 42 positions filled with labor contracts and then 23 examinations organized to upgrade those appointed ones into civil service status.⁵¹⁴

Appeals

Another and last indicator analyzed that hint at increased levels of politicization is also the number of appeals in 2005 and 2009, being much higher than in the period 2000–03. As Figure 16 shows, these have substantially increase in this period, showing that the number of accepted appeals and decided in favor of civil servants start to increase to 61% of the total number of solved appeals in 2005 to 68% in 2005 and decreases then again 2007. There is a trend that the number of appeals and number of temporary contracts correlated highly positively together, while the number of


⁵¹² As interviews confirmed civil servants were dismissed wrongfully in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and appealed to civil service commission. In the meantime, the vacancy was opened and 4 candidates participated in the examination out of 3 were known candidates and one was the supposedly winning candidate who would receive the job. Hence, prior decision of the best candidate rendered the procedures in effective in selecting the best. (Interview Albania no.1, no.2).

⁵¹³ CSC (2007).

⁵¹⁴ CSC (2007) p.14.

finalizations of successful recruitment and number of participants in an examination, both indicators of real competition, have been negatively related. These indicators, therefore, show an increase in the extent of political interference in 2005–09, and 2009–13 in comparison to previous government in the period to 2000–03. In Figure 17, the ratio of the number of appeals to solved cases of appeals from the civil service commission rises in 2005 to 61% from 40% in 2004, while the rejected number of appeals to the total number of solved appeals decreases to 17% in 2005 from 27% in 2004.


Figure 16: Ratio on number of rejected appeals and appeals in favor to civil servants in relation to overall number of solved cases of appeals



Source: Civil Service Commission report 2000–12, Albania.

In Figure 17, we also observe in this period an increase in the disciplinary measure as a way to dismiss civil servants from 113 to 430 and as well due to restructuring from 49 in 2005 to 197 in 2006. The same trend is visible for the period 2009-2013, where there is an increase of appeals too, and particularly the one decided in favor of civil servants. Figure 16 shows how the ratio of appeals to total number has been rising to 57% in 2009 from 36% in 2008 and the rejected ones falling from 39% to 4% in 2009. Figure 17 shows the type of appeals against dismissals based on disciplinary measure is highest (84) in 2010 increasing to 172 in 2011 and the one on restructuring increases from 1 in 2009 to 50 in 2010.

Figure 17: Type of appeals from 2000–12



Source: Civil Service Commission report 2000–12, Albania.

In Figure 17, we also observe in this period an increase in the disciplinary measure as a way to dismiss civil servants from 113 to 430 and as well due to restructuring from 49 in 2005 to 197 in 2006. The same trend is visible for the period 2009–2013, where there is an increase of appeals too, and particularly the one decided in favor of civil servants. Figure 16 shows how the ratio of appeals to total number has been rising to 57% in 2009 from 36% in 2008 and the rejected ones falling from 39% to 4% in 2009. Figure 17 shows the type of appeals against dismissals based on disciplinary measure is highest (84) in 2010 increasing to 172 in 2011 and the one on restructuring increases from 1 in 2009 to 50 in 2010.

Third period of reform: 2013 onwards

After the government reshuffling in the second period of reform (2005–10), the implementation of the old CSL entered a last phase of implementation through the DP-LSI coalition government in 2010–13. In this last phase, the change of government and partial change of political leadership particularly in the ministries ruled by the smaller party have seen a very frequent change in both the ministers as well as the civil service subordinated to them. Already in this period, there were however consultation with SIGMA to adopt a new CSL to put an end to the ‘position based system’ that was doomed to be uneconomic and the civil service remained fragmented in its

recruitment between labor code and CSL procedures.

The political stalemate in this period was caused by the boycott of the Socialist Party in opposition and accompanied by various rallies and demonstrations against this coalition, which created delays in passing various legislative packages. Amongst these was the new CSL, which had to be adopted as a pre-condition set from the EU in order for Albania to receive ‘candidate status’. A new government that formed in 2013, led by the Socialist Party in coalition with the LSI adopted a new CSL and the new administrative reforms were passed. It has been in this period that Albania received candidate status. This political stalemate in blocking the progress of EU–Albania relations was used by the then opposition to send a strong signal to the EU, that support for the DP could not be tolerated any longer.

The period after 2013 has once again seen improvements in Albania in all the indicators related to corruption, good governance, and rule of law. The government has also passed two packages – one relating to administrative reform and the other judicial reform – thus displaying the higher credibility of this government. These actions indicate the current government’s commitment to not only pay lip service to the EU, but to implement in practice long awaited reforms. Administrative reshuffling has certainly occurred in the period since the latest wave of reforms began, but to a lesser extent.

SIGMA and the EU Commission had steered the government to adopt the new Civil Service Law during Albania’s pre-accession process as a precondition to eventual candidate status. The new legislation offers an improvement to the recruitment and career systems that remained under the old CSL fragmented between labor legislation through temporary contracts and civil service career features. The high political interferences gave little chances of promotion and higher discretion in personalization in both selection and promotion of the best candidates through the superior. The new CSL offers a more structured career system. How ministries appoint new staff are pre-determined according to long-term planning in each ministry, based on its particular organizational chart. Then recruitment occurs on a needs-only basis, from a ‘pool’ of potential candidates and the superiors and ministers have no influence on this.

CONCLUSION

This chapter analyzed civil service reform adoption and implementation in Albania from 1995–13, the results of which are summarized in Table 13. It distinguished three cycles of reforms, where its implementation varied over time and across different governments, resulting in differences in levels of political hiring and firing in practice. While civil service reform entered the government agenda for the first time in 1995, it was not until 1999 that the reforms were re-launched from the Socialist Party, in line with international standards. New legislation was completed through detailed secondary regulations. DoPA – the central policy and management unit, reporting to the Prime Minister’s Office – was strengthened and a Civil Service Commission—reporting to the Parliament—was established to deal with the functions of appeal resolution and the supervision of compliance with the civil service legislation. The recruitment process was based on open competition procedures, and in various indicators of political hiring and firing, like number of civil service appeals on dismissals and temporary contracts were very low. In practice, open competition procedures were implemented. Although there were six cabinets in this five-year period, and the Socialist Party had many internal disputes, it undertook many efforts to coordinate donor aid and introduce reforms. Close collaboration between the Prime Minister’s Office, central management institutions and the World Bank in this period managed to overcome many would-be ministerial vetoes seeking to increase political considerations in appointments.

Table 13: Summary of political interference in civil service recruitment and dismissals in Albania 2000–13

Reform outcome categorization in political interference		
2000–2005	2005–09	2009–2013
Political interference is moderate	Political interference is high	Political interference is high
Effectiveness of institutions		
Institutions are <i>moderately</i> effective in managing procedures and have <i>some</i> budgetary and staff resources to function well in ensuring meritocracy	Institutions are moderately effective in managing procedures, but have <i>low</i> budgetary and staff resources to function well in ensuring meritocracy	Institutions are moderately effective in managing procedures, but have <i>low</i> budgetary and staff resources to function well in ensuring meritocracy
Political interference in Recruitment		
Recruitment procedures are <i>minimally</i> constrained, ensuring still medium to <i>high</i> participation of candidates and <i>high</i> finalization in procedures, with <i>moderate</i> usage of temporary contract, <i>low</i> number of appeals	Recruitment procedures are substantially constrained, leading to <i>low</i> participation of candidates and <i>low</i> finalization in procedures, with <i>high</i> number of temporary contracts, and <i>high</i> number of appeals.	Recruitment procedures are substantially constrained, leading to <i>low</i> participation of candidates and <i>low</i> finalization in procedures, with <i>high</i> number of temporary contracts, and <i>high</i> number of appeals
Political interference in Dismissals		
Restructuring leads to <i>moderate dismissals</i> of civil servants, whereas procedures of dismissing civil servants are used properly, and there is low to <i>moderate</i> number of appeals.	Restructuring leads to <i>high</i> dismissals of civil servants without justification, whereas dismissals are <i>politically</i> motivated, and there is <i>high</i> number of appeals against wrongful application of procedures in dismissals.	Restructuring leads to <i>high</i> dismissals of civil servants without justification, whereas dismissals are <i>politically</i> motivated, and there is <i>high</i> number of appeals against wrongful application of procedures in dismissals.

However, this process was then reversed in the second and third period of reform. In 2005–09, the DP replaced the Socialist Party in government, beginning a reversal of many of the previous efforts to build a constituency of civil servants. It has used loopholes left in the law to increase its political influence in appointments. Such loopholes included the lack of a ban on temporary contracts, and the ability to fire civil servants by restructuring of ministerial institutions. Secondly, the appointment of personnel parallel to the formal procedures, and based on temporary contracts, has undermined the effectiveness of formal recruitment. The declining number of candidate applications per open position has led to a failure of their successful finalization and lack of competitiveness in the examination procedures.

When the DP and the LSI formed a new government from 2009–13, it put wage reform back on the government agenda. In practice, the salary levels increased yearly by 3% for various job categorizations from 2005 onwards, while salaries for similar position across ministries became more unified. Additionally, the increase of salary levels made these positions more competitive with careers in the private sector, but more for the middle and low-level salaries than for the higher levels.

In 2009, the DP and LSI, continued to exercise partisan influence across the civil service, to the point that politicization become problematic particularly for the ministries controlled by the younger party, LSI. Additionally, in this period formal reforms introduced from previous socialist government, were subverted in practice. The DP managed to increase partisan influence in the management of civil service by evading recruitment procedures, shifting responsibility for DoPA away from the Prime Minister's Office to the Ministry of Interior, and undermining the CSC's autonomous legal structure. In this period, open competition in recruitment was highly constrained in terms of reduced numbers of finalizations of official and formal recruitment, high numbers of political appointments at all levels of the civil service through temporary contracts, and reduced numbers of candidate participation in the examination process. In this period, also both the number of civil servant' appeals and complaints against dismissals increased substantially in comparison to former governments.

It was only then in the third period of reform 2013 onwards, with a government shift from the Democratic to the Socialist Party, in coalition with the Socialist Movement for Integration, that civil service reform was relaunched, again from the party who had launched civil service reform for the first time in 1999, by breaking the routine and practices of patronage appointments in the civil service. New legislation that combined career and position-based systems was introduced and a series of legislative acts sealed the administration by reducing the

influence of ministers in the recruitment and dismissal process. This legislation further offered a more structured career system, where the discretion of politicians to influence personnel decisions were legally closed down. It remains to be observed in practice if such new laws will sustainably be implemented in practice.

CHAPTER 5: PARTIES' ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES AND CIVIL SERVICE REFORM PROGRESS

EVIDENCE FROM CONTESTED CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS IN ALBANIA, 2009–13

INTRODUCTION

By taking a party agency perspective, this chapter tests then first hypothesis on party rationale for levels of politicization raised in Chapter 2. The first claim to be tested is whether *organizational scarcity on resources* between younger and older parties when in government affects their dependence on state resources differently and therefore, their higher incentives to rely on party patronage, leading to higher levels of politicization in bureaucracies.

To do that, the chapter uses two different tests of case comparisons in Albania. First, it compares how the Socialist Party (SP, successor of the communist party)-led government (2001–05), the Democratic Party (DP)-led government (2005–09) and the DP–Socialist Movement for Integration (*Lëvizja Socialiste për Integrim*, LSI) coalition government (2009–13) performed differently in civil service reforms and levels of politicization. These three parties will also be the main focus of this analysis. The DP and SP are the bigger parties and have alternated in power regularly. They have had the higher share of ministerial portfolios in government, and have thus set the trend on levels of politicization in bureaucracies.

Second, the chapter traces the party-organizational effect at the ministerial level, by also comparing four ministries over the period 2009–13. The political parties are *most similar* as they are exposed to the same administrative legacies within the state, the same level of economic development, and the same EU conditionality regarding reform. By holding other factors constant, this allows me to better test the determinants of party incentives to rely on political loyalists and therefore the progress of civil service reform on de-politicization.

The findings seem to hint that in environments where parties are not ideologically cohesive and ideology does not drive government behavior, organizational resource scarcity drives parties' incentives to rely differently on political loyalists in two ways. First, because levels

of politicization are lower when the SP is government (2001–05 and 2013 onwards) than when the DP rules alone (2005–09) or in coalition with the LSI (2009–13), show that the parties differ. Levels of politicization are higher in those ministries ruled by the younger LSI rather than the older DP. Second, to explain this difference evidence in Albania disconfirms the assertion that parties' ideological polarization or electoral vulnerability explains different parties' incentives for de-politicization.

The evidence shows three things. First, the parties that politicize less (such as the SP) are rather very richly endowed. This endowment includes a large group of political activists who are better paid, an inherited pool of voter loyalty, higher procedural commitment and internal democracy and higher organizational extensiveness and presence through branches at the local level. They have little reliance on external funds, especially from the state. Younger parties like the DP, and LSI differ substantially. Their professional staff is smaller and less well paid and the parties have lower organizational extensiveness, less cohesive structures and internal democratic methods through internal routines and procedures. They have more subsidies either from the state or private enterprises.

Second, there are differences in organizational resources, both in human and material terms, between the two younger parties – the DP and the LSI. The main ones are that the LSI has an even lower margin of voter loyalty than the DP and the SP, higher personalization of party life to the leader and higher financial dependency on outside private enterprises like media. However, these parties do not differ much on other criteria than on types of organizational resources. Therefore, as we also know that DP and LSI, being organizationally poorer than the SP, when they have entered the state administration, they politicized the state more. Interviews hint at the finding that the younger the party, the bigger the appetite for state resources.

Third, interviews showed that younger parties use loyalists as activists for the party to reward voters through patronage, to help and support in electoral campaigns, but as well to distribute pork and further particular targeted policies towards business. The DP used political loyalists more as activists, compared to the LSI, which acted almost as a 'business firm' in providing both pork and positions in administration as a reward. In contrast, these interviews seem to hint that the SP has a different approach towards civil servants, and has not replaced massively based on electoral reward or for activism purposes.

Irrespective of type of political service political loyalists renders back, it is clear that organizational scarcity drives the dependency of parties on state resources. Therefore, younger

parties need the state administration, a resource to substitute or compensate their lack, to both endure organizationally and electorally. This is also proven across ministries.

By building on government and parliamentary documents gathered through field work and 28 interviews conducted in Albania with politicians and civil servants and NGOs, I show how party organizational resources matter for levels of politicization across the three government mandates and ministries. All these indicators hint at the fact that older organizations that are more endowed with voters, professional staff and material resources have a resource buffer that makes them less hungry for state patronage.

The chapter is divided in three sections. The first provides an analysis of how different parties in government are accompanied by different degrees of progress in civil service reform, by building on the variation explored in Chapter 4. In a context of party building prior to state building, and where societal and business actors do not pressure parties to push for reform, it is organizational differences in resources that drives parties in government to depend on the state. The second section tests alternative arguments and concludes that parties' ideological differences or the establishment of pluralistic structures matter less in understanding party incentives in a context where such pluralism is weakly developed, or ideological differences between communist and anti-communist or left and right matter less for politicization. The third section shows precisely how parties' organizational differences in resources drives parties in government to depend on the state. Indeed, there are clear differences in the level of resources possessed by parties dependent on age, whereby older parties have more and younger ones, fewer. The key resources are as follows: inherited organizational resources such as voter loyalty, organizational cohesiveness through procedures and routines, professional staff, longevity of the organization beyond the current leader, and state resources.

DIFFERENT PARTY–STATE RELATIONS IN CIVIL SERVICE REFORM

As Chapter 4 has shown, even after 20 years of democracy, Albanian politics rotates around two political poles. In the centre-left stands the SP, which is the reformed communist Party of Labor. In the centre-right stands the DP, the first anti-communist party of the new era. While these parties have ruled with other smaller parties, since 2005 a splinter party emerged from the SP, the LSI. It has become quite crucial in providing stability in governing by forming coalitions with both the DP (2009–13) and the SP (2013–17). It is in these alternations, that this

thesis finds a different approach as well of how parties relate to the state, in showing a divergence between these three parties that were in government in the different *extent* and *form* of reliance on political loyalists. While Chapter 4 hints more at the extent of politicization, this section complements the analysis with what stands behind such politicization and what type of parties have ruled in government.

The analysis below focuses on three periods of party–state relations over 13 years, to show the difference in extent and form of politicization between parties. As civil service reforms were adopted first in 2000 and were relaunched a new in 2013, I also include the analysis before 2000 and after 2013 to make comparisons of the main trend of politicization of parties over time. I first look at civil service reforms in the first period, when the SP-led government was in power (2001–05), and compare levels of politicization with the second period of reform when the DP (2005–09) was in government to analyze and compare it then to the third period of the coalition between the DP and the LSI (2009–13). Finally, I illustrate the relaunch of civil service reform under the SP and LSI-led coalition from 2013 onwards.

By focusing in the period between 2001–13, I show two types of variation. The first is that when the Socialist Parties were in power (2001 and 2013–17), reforms of the state progressed more and levels of politicization were lower than when the DP ruled alone (2005–09) or in coalition with the LSI (2009–13). Second, when the DP shared power with the LSI (2009–13), politicization increased. Finally, variation in politicization is not only in terms of extent but as well different types of services parties have relied on through loyalists. The DP has relied more on political loyalists for political activism than the SP, while the LSI has used them both for political activism and for electoral reward purposes. Based on interviews and archival research I find that the SP motivation in the first period (2001–03), was more linked to some type of pork-barrel politics and distribution of favorable treatments for business policies or political self-dealing (elite nepotism). This changed in the SP II period in government (2013–17) where the old elite has been broken and politicians have refrained from such practices leading to low levels of political hiring and firing.

This section summarizes those finding and provides additional information on the programmatic orientation of parties in government. The section is sub-divided chronologically; the four parts mirror the periods of party–state relations from 1992–2013 onwards. The next section summarizes shortly these variations and tests alternative accounts for these differences based on the literature presented in Chapter 2, before then it shows that they are less useful and provides evidence that proves the organizational rationale of parties in Chapter 2.

When it all began: The Democratic Party's relations in state administration in transition, 1992–97

Albania is often treated as the 'most difficult case' of regime change.⁵¹⁵ While the first decade was marked by deep state and economic reforms in overcoming communist legacies, the second decade represented a more stable, but difficult, path in building state institutions and preparing for the European accession process, accompanied by internal party transformation. It is since 2013 onwards that politics has reversed. Albania is now undertaking major reform both of state institutions and to facilitate the EU accession process. It is in this second period of party–state relations that I am most interested, particularly the years 2000–13.

The first decade of reforms and party–state relations were depicted as chaotic, difficult and ambiguous, combining the tendencies of authoritarian leadership in the DP and a weak administration. The DP, born from the eruptive student protests in December 1990, undertook a comprehensive 'shock therapy' of political and economic reforms. It claimed to be the only force that could bring Albania out of its communist dark past.⁵¹⁶ While Albania was seen as a 'rising star' in economic reforms, it showed very soon in the 1997 political crisis that it remained a very weakly built state. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the DP reshuffled the administration and replaced the old inherited bureaucratic elites during 1992–97. Although data are missing for this period, both interviews and other works on the Albanian state, hint at the incapability of the DP to replace the old elite with a new and more competent one, therefore explaining some of its later failures in economic policy.⁵¹⁷ As a party of the anti-communist forces, it included the old educated urban elite, and focused more on North rural Albania as its core constituency including former big landowner and political persecuted prisoners.

Both economic and democratic expectations of voters and the international community were crushed when a crisis in 1997 almost led to state collapse. The government under non-effective control of pyramid schemes swallowed-up the meagre savings of Albanians, and around one third of GDP,⁵¹⁸ and the crisis led the country to almost a state collapse, almost five years later after the first pluralistic elections in 1992. Albania became a state dependent on

⁵¹⁵ BTI (2006), p.1.

⁵¹⁶ Kajsiu (2010).

⁵¹⁷ Biberaj (1997), p.200.

⁵¹⁸ BTI (2006).

international donor aid to survive. Given the chaotic situation in the country, the SP won elections in 1997 and in 1998 an international effort to strengthen weak institutions and stabilize checks and balances led to substantial constitutional reforms. However, after this turmoil incumbents in Albania have politicized the state administration very differently over the period from 2001–13.

First period: The Socialists in government as state builders with some deficits, 2001–05

Albania came out of the political and economic turmoil caused through the ‘pyramid crisis’ of 1997. In the same year, the Socialists won power with an overwhelming majority of 101 out of 140 seats in the parliament. The SP did not represent the ‘best alternative’,⁵¹⁹ as it had not reformed sufficiently for voters and the international community. However, they represented the only credible alternative to the DP⁵²⁰ and had promised to compensate voters for their losses as they targeted against their usual support base – the underprivileged⁵²¹ and the poor. They achieved a second consecutive term in 2001, winning 52% of the seats in parliament⁵²² (73 out of 140). With 13 seats from the smaller parties it formed a broadly left-wing government and had the chance to evolve its left-wing electoral program.⁵²³

In this period, the SP also under the leadership of its Chairman, Fatos Nano, a representative of the old elite, was reforming its statute and re-generating its structures, elite and policies⁵²⁴ towards more democratic commitment. Nano wanted to show that although a representative of the old, he was more capable of liberal reforms than the DP, which had established itself as an anti-communist force. Although the party was ideologically left, due to IMF and liberal forces, they had to carry on with the privatization process and also committed to a World Bank programme of poverty reduction.

The party was still in need of internal reforms and new opposing factions emerged in this period in government. Prime Minister Ilir Meta, leading the new reformist wing within the SP, was a rival to Fatos Nano, who despite still embracing the new representatives, also

⁵¹⁹ Bogdani and Loughlin (2007) p.129.

⁵²⁰ Bogdani and Loughlin (2007).

⁵²¹ Economic Intelligence Unit (2001).

⁵²² OSCE (2001) remarks that there were irregularities in the voting in these elections, that did not put into question the victory but the extent of the victory of the SP

<http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/albania/13560?download=true>

⁵²³ Progni (2013) p. 212.

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.*

appointed many representatives of the old communist system in government.⁵²⁵ For that he was criticized a lot. Such disputes emerged and persisted within the SP until the end of that government mandate, diminishing particularly the image of the political party. In 2005 Meta would take eight deputies out of the SP and form his own political party, the LSI.

These two rival factions within the SP caused four ministers to resign and led to the resignation of the Meta government in 2002.⁵²⁶ Allegations of corruption further fuelled the tension. Due to diverging factions and disputes within the party, six different governments ruled Albania between 2001 and 2005. The two mandates in the Meta government (2001–02) were replaced by the ‘Majko’ government (2002), followed by two governments led by Nano (2002–05).⁵²⁷ But under the effective and liberal leadership of the chairman⁵²⁸ the party embraced rather than cleared out internal opponents. Nano managed to hold the party stable by satisfying internal voices so as to avoid early elections. Additionally, with a multi-party coalition government containing smaller parties, Nano wanted to show that under the SP, Albania could have both governmental responsibility that proclaimed pluralism,⁵²⁹ as well policies of compromise and moderation within the diverse factions in the SP.⁵³⁰ This was particularly crucial, after many tumultuous years of authoritarian practices of politics from the first decade that fell under the electoral burden of the DP.

Despite the instability, the governments of the SP and all three prime ministers in this period, had committed particularly to re-build a bureaucratic constituency by adopting civil service reforms, but as well cleaning the state from corrupt activities and establishing further rule of law and undertake major reforms related to economic privatization.⁵³¹ The Meta government was praised from the international community particularly for its state-building effort. Particularly, Meta, had spoken, of the need to ‘end politicization of the administration and stop the practice of appointing civil servants based on personal loyalty instead of ability’.⁵³² The Majko government had committed to a ‘clean hands’ approach in the administration against appointments and corruption and had asked the Prosecutors’ Office to investigate allegations in the press of companies that had been favoured over others in the award of contracts in electricity

⁵²⁵ Bucpapaj (2004), p. 178.

⁵²⁶ Economic Intelligence Unit (2002a) and (2002b) p.13.

⁵²⁷ Economic Intelligence Unit (2004) p.7.

⁵²⁸ Progni (2013).

⁵²⁹ Schmidts-Hekke (1997), pp.7-9 in Bucpapaj (2004).

⁵³⁰ Economic Intelligence Unit (2000), p. 7.

⁵³¹ The part of the institutional reforms were as asked in the loan conditionality of IMF based on Economic Intelligence Unit (2000) p. 17.

⁵³² Economic Intelligence Unit (2000), p.8.

sector.⁵³³ The consolidation of public administration, rule of law and anti-corruption reform remained key to also to the Nano government.

As Chapter 4 shows, under this government the first Civil Service Law (CSL) was adopted and widened in its scope.⁵³⁴ The institutions guiding the Department of Public Administration (DoPA) and Civil Service Commission (CSC) reported to the Prime Minister office. The turnover of officials remained at 2.7% from 2000–03, with some slight increase after 2003, but that was brought under control. The government did not use temporary contracts as a tool of political appointment, or constrain recruitment procedures so that open competition would deteriorate. Real competition and the attractiveness of civil service remained high in this period, as the average number of candidates⁵³⁵ participating in examination procedures increased.

Additionally, the civil service was attracting higher number of candidates showing the real competition in this period, has performed better than from 2005 onwards. In the period between 2001–05 there was an increase in the salary structure, starting in 2002, with an average increase of 75% for the central administration. Such unification of the salary system ensured greater stability within the civil service, accompanied by an increased interest in state employment.⁵³⁶ Finally, there were not many wrongfully implemented dismissals, as the number of appeals remained low in this period. Therefore, both DoPA and CSC, although still not fully capable, increasingly they had managed to deepen civil service reforms. The opportunity to appeal to the CSC contributed to the decrease of the political pressure in the cases of quitting posts and an increase in stability.⁵³⁷

The years 2003–05 were more difficult for public administration reform, because although civil service law (1999) was adopted and a constituency established the political environment became less hospitable.⁵³⁸ Despite all the critique, however, the Socialists differed from the DP in that they did not hire and fire politically for votes, but some type of ‘self-representation of the elite’ on which the old elite and the SP was still partially based.⁵³⁹ Others

⁵³³ Economic Intelligence Unit (2002b), p.13.

⁵³⁴ IMF (2006), p.4.

⁵³⁵ This indicator is used in Shapo and Hoxha (2008) as an indicator of real competition, as usually 4 candidates should appear in examinations according to the civil service law. While this number

⁵³⁶ IMF and IDA (2003), p.5).

⁵³⁷ IMF and IDA (2003), p.4).

⁵³⁸ Reid (2005), p.9.

⁵³⁹ Bogdani and Loughlin (2007).

claimed that the SP ‘politicized more to place ‘their sons and daughters’.⁵⁴⁰ The party had its roots in the educated urban elite, and while it replaced some of the inherited civil servants from the DP period, no political appointments were made without some qualification.

Indeed, interviews show that under the Prime Minister Nano, who provided high political skill to maintain unity despite various factions within the SP at that time, the Albanian state and civil service experienced a much more liberal approach unlike in the previous one with the DP, where civil servants were treated as direct loyalists to the party⁵⁴¹. As one of the interviewees claims ‘the civil servant was a professional and was not treated as an activist’. However, in one of the interview a civil servant claimed that the problem of the Nano government, was that he did not control well the discretion of his ministers, and therefore, the second period of this mandate is that this discretion was used as well for other purposes’ – corrupt and incorrupt activities might have gone unpunished. Hence, despite some irregularities reforms could be sustained, but corruption was flourishing too.

The government was praised and criticized on different levels from international organizations. One of the main consultants of the World Bank project who worked tightly with the government in that period said: ‘Albania has made impressive and relatively irreversible progress on several key dimensions of public administration reform between 1999 and 2005’,⁵⁴² particularly when it comes to de-politicization. Also a joint IDA–IMF staff assessment of the poverty reduction strategy papers assessed on a yearly basis that the ‘government has successfully implemented a broad structural reform program, including privatization of strategic enterprises, financial sector reform, civil service reform and anticorruption initiatives’.⁵⁴³ The match between their governmental commitment and the analysis of the data, show that the SP had a functional interest in promoting civil service reform and establishing professionalism.

However, as levels of corruption remained high, and as some interviews confirm, ‘despite efforts of being ‘clean handed’, although there were not many loyalists serving as party activist for pure electoral interests’,⁵⁴⁴ some of that discretion seems to have been used for favorable treatment of such companies in state policies. Hence, as a well-known analyst claims back then for Albania this was not a ‘defining moment for the Albanian political elite or a sincere

540

Ibid.

541

Interview Albania no.2.

542

Reid (2005), p.2.

543

IMF and IDA (2002).

544

Interview Albania no. 6.

effort to that end'.⁵⁴⁵ The EU praised government efforts in reforming public administration, by extending the CSL at the same time also criticized that the government needed to do much more on corruption and judicial reforms.⁵⁴⁶ The mal-performance in corruption grew and so did the dissatisfaction among voters and the critical voice of the international community towards the lack of transparency under which Nano was governing. After the turmoil and the political crisis of 1997, the SP-led government had provided with the institutional foundation of the state and had built the first stone of civil service. However, the SP led government failed to sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement, as organized crime, judicial independence and the fight against corruption were persistent problems in this problem.

Second period: The non-reformed Democrats purging the state and levels of politicization, 2005–09

The second period of civil service reforms was a less bright phase that lasted for eight years. The first one was characterised by the DP purging the state, by making it almost a substitute for its own organizational scarcity. The second period was characterised as one where the smaller party, LSI, built strongly on the state and used it for strengthening its electoral advantage. In 2005, the victory of the DP was as well a wide disillusionment with the SP and particularly with the figure of Fatos Nano within the SP. While the cleavages of communist and anti-communist sentiment were less impregnated in the societal memory, voters became more preoccupied with issues of mal-governance and corruption in the transition process. Particularly after eight years of the SP in government, 40% of the respondents stated in 2005 that the number one problem they would have liked the government to tackle better than the SP (2001–05) was 'corruption' and 'unemployment'.⁵⁴⁷ The voters were highly dissatisfied with Fatos Nano the chairman of the SP; 56% characterized him as honest, 62% believed that he did not care about people like them and 53% felt angry about him. Thus, they put all hopes that the DP would bring a change: 57% thought of Berisha as honest and 64% thought that he cared about people. The DP thus had an opportunity to reform itself from the past and reposition itself.

The DP strived to avoid a third defeat after eight years being in opposition, and organized the campaign '*Time for change*' by using two electoral tactics. First, Sali Berisha, who was the chairman of the DP had to convince the voters if he wanted to win again, that the

⁵⁴⁵ Radio Free Europe, 8 March 2002, available at <https://www.rferl.org/a/1099040.html>, accessed 23.02.2016

⁵⁴⁶ Economic Intelligence Unit (2004), p.12.

⁵⁴⁷ Ilirjani (2005), p.81.

authoritarian practices related to his party in the period 1992–97 has been overcome. To ‘clean’ the DP from the authoritarian past,⁵⁴⁸ Sali Berisha was keen to portray the DP as a more inclusive pluralist force than it has been before. In the pre-electoral strategy, the DP showed it was willing to collaborate more with both civil society and former allies. He used civil society to show that the latter would draft the party’s general elections programme. Additionally, he managed to co-opt and invite older MPs and founders of the DP (who has left DP back then for lack of internal democracy) to stand as prospective Members of Parliament for the DP.⁵⁴⁹ However, this move was more a ‘tactical short-term manoeuvre than a genuine attempt’ to make the DP more democratic.⁵⁵⁰ Indeed, no new leader had replaced Sali Berisha within the DP and he had a much tighter grip over the party, than Fatos Nano had over SP. Hence, he would only consider changes in the internal power structure of the DP in case of an electoral defeat⁵⁵¹ and indeed he remained chairman until 2013, when the DP lost elections after eight years in office.

The DP’s second goal was to maximize its electoral chances by burnishing its anti-corruption credentials, just as it had emphasized its anti-communist ones in 1992 against the SP, the successor to the old communist party. Thus, the party did little to distinguish itself programmatically but rather ran on a platform of highlighting the SP’s poor performance in government. Even before the election had been called, the DP had organized anti-governmental protests, where people who were disappointed and tired of the performance of the SP, asked collectively for a new beginning with the refrain ‘Nano go!’.⁵⁵² Knowing that voters cared about unemployment and corruption, the DP made anti-corruption its ‘first number one priority’. It blamed all Albania’s ills on ‘state capture’ by private interests as a result of the SP’s failure to properly implement privatization, and the high level of corruption persisting in this period.

The goal of the strategy was therefore to contribute to a ‘clean hands’ government by additionally combining it with what the EU demanded from Albania, such as strengthening rule of law and progressing in EU and NATO relations.⁵⁵³ The tactic of convincing voters that the authoritarian past of the period 1992–97 was over within the DP and defining poverty and corruption as the main issue of that campaign⁵⁵⁴ that concerned most Albanian voters, made the

548 Economic Intelligence Unit (2005a), p.16.

549 Economic Intelligence Unit (2005b), p.17.

550 Economic Intelligence Unit (2005b), p.16.

551 Economic Intelligence Unit (2005a), p.16.

552 Veliaj (2013).

553 Government program of the Democratic Party (2005-2009).

554 Ilirjani (2005).

electoral victory in 2005 possible.

Indeed, the DP won with 40% of the seats and ruled in a broad coalition with other small parties also from the left, controlling 10 out of 14 ministries.⁵⁵⁵ The remaining four were split between the Republican Party (Ministry of defence), the New DP (Ministry of Education and Science), the Agriculture and Environmental Party (Ministry of Environment and Water Management), and the Union for Human Rights (Ministry of Labour and Equal Opportunities).

Difference in levels of politicization between the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party

In 2005, the civil service agenda was not prioritized as it had been under the SP. Nevertheless, the DP committed to a variety of public administration reforms like making the government leaner and more efficient. This was reinforced by IMF financial assistance designed to aid economic recovery. Indeed, it becomes clear that such ‘restructuring’ was nothing other than a new way to dismiss inherited civil servants, as well to hire new ones based on political loyalty. Three types of evidence were presented in Chapter 4 to show that DP was less interested in impartial administration, but rather hinted at the increase of political loyalty in the administration and that much higher levels of political activism were visible than had been the case during the SP-led government.

First, the argument that the government’s goal was to make the administrative apparatus leaner and ‘restructuring’ was needed to make the government most effective does not hold in light of the evidence. Three indicators show that. First, budgetary costs increased due to such ‘restructuring’, as civil servants were dismissed by being put on ‘waiting lists’ and paid for 12 consecutive months, hence increasing overall costs rather than decreasing them. Second, the number of open vacancies increased although civil servants were waiting to get their jobs back. Third, the number of temporary contracts increased. While the government argued that restructuring of the ministries was entirely consistent with the law (Article 23 of the CSL), the process led to the dismissal of all political appointees of the preceding government as well as many professionals who had no significant political party connections.⁵⁵⁶ This all shows that even though it decreased the number of ministries, the ‘restructuring’ was not used for programmatic reasons, but to increase political patronage in administration.

Second, further indicators presented in Chapter 4 showed when replacing the SP in

⁵⁵⁵ Economic Intelligence Unit (2005a).

⁵⁵⁶ World Bank (2006).

government the DP began a reversal of many of the previous government's efforts to build a constituency of civil servants. It did so by using temporary contracts to place new political loyalists, and dismissed old ones by putting on 'waiting lists'. The government used legal loops left in the law to increase its political influence in appointments through temporary contracts, and the ability to fire civil servants by restructuring of ministerial institutions.⁵⁵⁷ The number of temporary contracts increased to almost 90% as a ratio to the total number of new position announcements in administration.

Additionally, the appointment of personnel parallel to the formal procedures, and based on temporary contracts, has undermined the effectiveness of formal recruitment and declined both the number of finalizations in recruitments. It also impacted negatively and indirectly the real competition of such procedures in lowering the number of candidates participating in examinations per open position.⁵⁵⁸ This led to the failure of their successful finalization and lack of competitiveness⁵⁵⁹ in the examination procedures. Finally, the number of appeals against wrongful application of dismissal and recruitment procedures substantially increased. While all these practices showed how politicization occurred, the DP had undermined visibly the guidance role of the two main institutions overseeing and guaranteeing meritocracy within the state administration by downgraded the importance of DoPA's responsibility away from the high-level position under the Prime Minister's Office to the executive level of the Ministry of Interior. The DP also further tried to undermine the CSC's autonomous legal structure. All this rendered effectiveness of these institutions in maintaining meritocracy very hard.

International reports provide a third set of evidence that shows clearly how DP politicized more and for different purposes than the SP-led government. They confirmed variation in the extent to which the DP-led government had purged the state much more than the SP-government, or they provided data that shows clearly that this government did worse than the previous one. The World Bank (2006) assessment confirms this key variation in levels of politicization by showing that 'the (adjusted) quarterly turnover rate of civil servants,⁵⁶⁰

⁵⁵⁷ See Chapter 3.

⁵⁵⁸ The temporary contracts also had an effect on the attractiveness of civil service careers, lowering the number of candidates appearing in the selection process: from 2000-2006, the number of temporary contract has moved from 38 to 55, after 2005, peaking at 161 and more, reducing the number of candidates applying to formal positions to 5 and even lower. See Chapter 3.

⁵⁵⁹ This has led to a decrease in the rate of the number of successful finalization of recruitment procedures to public calls, when public calls have remained the same (from 334 in 2002, to 400 in 2007). For example the public calls were always something like 20% of the number of civil servants, while from 2000-2005 the number of recruitments has been increasing from 53 to 277 per year, though in 2005 -2006 it dropped by 140.

⁵⁶⁰ All turnover rates were converted to quarrel rates by multiplying the four-month rate by 0.75 (World Bank (2006), p 95.

amounted from an average of 2.7% (on a quarterly basis), to a four-times higher increase of 10.7% of the turnover of civil servants⁵⁶¹ In 2006, The EU Commission Progress Report claimed that ‘The Albanian civil service remains hindered by a pervasive lack of understanding of the need for, or will to implement, a real separation between the political and administrative levels’.⁵⁶² In the hiring and dismissal of staff has in some cases occurred without due attention to the Civil Service Law.⁵⁶³

The fourth key set of evidence comes from interviews. These are tremendously interesting from a qualitative standpoint in detailing the difference between the SP and the DP-led governments in pushing for civil service reforms. The Ad-hoc Parliamentary Committee that the SP established to monitor the reshuffling process is of particular interest. It showed that political activism was widespread within the DP-led administration and that the party used the bureaucracy as ‘administrative capital’ to substitute its own organizational scarcity in terms of winning elections.

Therefore, these measures show how the party has deeply purged the public administration and replaced inherited officials and therefore the constituency of civil service that had been trained in the period 1999–2004. The difference is visible both in terms of extent and form. Hence, this party in government showed once again similar practices of reshuffling as it had in 1992 when it took over the government and replaced inherited ‘communist’ bureaucrats with DP loyalists. It had attacked not only the public administration but as well the judiciary, contrary to what the government had promised.

This general disrespect for the law became palpable in various areas in the government beyond the implementation of civil service reform. Indeed, later on it was evident in the politicization of the judiciary and in DP attacks on the CSC. The DP’s civil service performance closely corresponded to the organization of its electoral campaign. This affinity reconfirmed two things. First, the DP remained a weak party incapable of being more inclusive in a pluralistic way. Instead, it was built on strongly personalized leadership and on the state administration to reassert both its organizational and electoral power. Second, it remained unreformed and weakly linked programmatically with voters, evidenced by the single focus of its campaign on the failures of the SP alone. Indeed, while the government performed well in Euro-Atlantic relations – by signing an Stabilization Association Agreement in 2006, submitting the formal application for

⁵⁶¹ World Bank (2006).

⁵⁶² EU COM (2005), p.13.

⁵⁶³ EU COM (2006).

EU Membership,⁵⁶⁴ and rendering Albania a NATO Member in 2009 –domestic performance in policies did not seem to mirror what the government promised to deliver.

Third period: the pragmatic solution of Democratic Party and Socialist Movement for Integration in 2009–13

Party–state relations entered a new phase in 2009–13. During the period, the parties generally looked for pragmatic solutions and had a short-term orientation in power in order to maximize electoral advantage. At the same time, the state administration remained highly politicized. After constitutional amendments to the Albanian electoral system that moved it from a mixed to a regional proportional system, the race between the SP and DP became even more competitive. The DP faced a more credible opposition in the SP now than it had in the past. A reformed SP party structure gave it a new image. Some 70% of the nominees were new and the party had a new chairman Edi Rama, who had replaced Fatos Nano in 2005. On 28 June 2009, the DP under Sali Berisha formed a centre-right coalition, the Alliance for Change (*Aleanca Per Ndryshim*), with 16 smaller parties. For its part, the SP assumed leadership of a centre-left group – the Union for Change (*Bashkimi Per Ndryshim*) – which consisted of the SP and five smaller parties and the LSI coalition led by Ilir Meta, as well some other smaller parties.

While the SP won more votes than the DP, the coalition led by the DP took office. However, DP could not secure a majority after the election of 28 June in 2009 and had to form a coalition with the LSI, under the leadership of Ilir Meta. While this was praised as a pluralistic environment for party government, both parties returned to the state and its administration in a less pluralistic way. The DP had the tightest margin seen since 1991, with a coalition that had 70 votes out of 140, because it had lost many urban voters who were disappointed with the weak DP performance on tackling corruption. Therefore, forming a government with the LSI became crucial for the DP. The LSI asked in return some ministries and one fifth of senior level management in ministries, among others the ministry of Economy and Ministry of Health.⁵⁶⁵ The government remained determined to reform public administration, strengthen rule of law, fight corruption, improve business environment and pursue EU membership.

⁵⁶⁴ Economic Intelligence Unit (2009).

⁵⁶⁵ Economic Intelligence Unit (2011).

Difference between SMI the other parties in levels of politicization

Albania's deficiency in the separation of powers and identification of the state with the party in power became the main obstacle to the country's democratization and its integration with the EU. Three types of evidence hint at the DP's continued practices of hiring and firing. For its part, the LSI politicized more than the DP.

First, only in 2010 did the DP prime minister adopt an instruction to reduce the usage of temporary contracts to 2.5%. However, as CSC reports show this was never implemented and the parties continued in the improper institutionalized practices of politically motivated hiring and firing. The temporary contracts were still very high immediately after elections, as well the number of appeals in favour of civil servants, showed that many were not rightly dismissed in this period. Finally, this then further hindered the examination procedures. Although it is not seen or clear in quantitative number as it was obvious in contrast in 2005, in this period, there were deformations in the procedures, that hint at some type of 'pseudo examinations' with 'pseudo candidates'⁵⁶⁶ that crucially harmed open competition. First, candidates participated only to fulfil the legal requirement of the minimum number of four candidates per examination as described in the laws, but they were organized a priori to examination.⁵⁶⁷ A second strategy was providing the questions in advance to the winning candidate. This was visible empirically in the results of the examinations and the point difference between the winning candidate from the other ones⁵⁶⁸ made clear that there was interference in the examination procedures.

Second, the change of government in 2009 – and particularly the integration of the LSI in government – created the atmosphere and mentality of 'hidden letters or envelopes' (*zarfet*), with name and positions that these people would need to have in certain ministries.⁵⁶⁹ This practice was new as confirmed by one of the interviewees in the ministry overseen by the LSI. In this period, the party reshuffled most of the existing officials with its own loyalists, almost as a reward for electoral votes and activism: 'Providing jobs became like a business deal: one position in administration, one vote, one job against more money, more control more votes and the right policies for the small and business enterprise'⁵⁷⁰. Since the LSI was not programmatically very different from the rest of two parties, it had little grass roots anchoring

⁵⁶⁶ Interview Albania no.1, no. 2.

⁵⁶⁷ Interview Albania no.2, no.8, no.9, no.10.

⁵⁶⁸ Interview Albania no. 10 and no.9.

⁵⁶⁹ Interview Albania no. 9, no.10 and no.12.

⁵⁷⁰ Interview Albania no.12.

and militants to follow it. It is rather instead oriented more towards small and medium enterprises as a clientele, the younger population and all other voters who are dissatisfied with the DP and SP in terms of unemployment. Hence, the party is much more transactional in both getting votes and offering the pork barrel policies needed for its voter with some resemblance of the 'business party model'.⁵⁷¹ Using its discretion in the state administration for both providing jobs to reward electorally, provide the right policies that favor particularly a target group of small and medium enterprises, as well offer jobs for receiving money is not excluded.⁵⁷²

The recent practice, has been confirmed more in this party than the other two parties. Interviewees confirmed that only the LSI was as highly and credibly committed to create the reputation for maintaining electoral promises. Hence, the party premises resembled often the ones claimed in the literature as 'jobs for the boys', and in this case votes for the LSI.⁵⁷³ A snapshot of data gathered in 2010 in the ministries controlled by the LSI show that these have much higher levels of politicization than those controlled from the DP. It was in this period as well the LSI had many corruption allegations and its ministries are the most politicized ones.⁵⁷⁴ The LSI came under trial for various corruption accusations by former ministers, and it had to resign some of its ministers and replace them with new ones. Additionally, Meta had to resign from the post of Deputy Prime minister. However, no prosecution happened and the affair went uncovered.

Albania indeed lacks a track record of prosecuting and convicting those suspected of corruption at all levels, one of the critical points in the EU's rejection of Albania's candidate status.⁵⁷⁵ In the same period, and after Albania had applied in 2009 for membership, the EU in contrast to 2005 blamed the DP-led government for making little progress in key reforms areas such as impartiality of administration, judicial reforms, and corruption. Hence, this time the EU in contrast to the 2005 period where it had signed the SAA despite lack of such progress, increased the pressure towards the government, by putting clear conditions to be fulfilled before it was rendered candidate status. In 2012, EU Commission Progress Report mentions that 'The civil service continues to suffer from shortcomings related to politicization and a lack of meritocracy in recruitment, promotion and dismissal of civil servants. In key sectors, the public administration faces important challenges in fulfilling its tasks, including the management and

⁵⁷¹ See for more on business party model Hopkin and Paolucci (1999).

⁵⁷² Respublica News, 04 November 2015, available at <http://www.respublica.al/2015/11/04/arrestohet-për-korrupsion-zyrtari-i-lsi-në-lushnjë-kërkoj-1-mln-lekë-të-vjetra-për-një>, accessed 23.12.2016

⁵⁷³ Grindle (2013).

⁵⁷⁴ See Appendix of Chapter 5, Graph 1.

⁵⁷⁵ EU COM (2011).

follow-up of assistance programmes and the implementation of legislation aimed at alignment with the EU acquis.’ Indeed, due to lack of such progress, Albania in this period was rejected twice this status.

While the opposition party, SP did not always play a constructive role as it did not recognize the election as being held in a regular manner⁵⁷⁶ and therefore boycotted the parliament and thwarted the adoption of laws requiring a qualified majority. It did not refrain from making it clear that the DP and LSI were a government of ‘thieves’⁵⁷⁷ and not interested in ‘pressing ahead the integration agenda, as this would mean increased external scrutiny over those enjoying the fruits of power’.⁵⁷⁸ However, after EU rejection of candidate status, DP recognised its governmental failure in this area. The SP-led opposition, accepted to return to parliament and pass various packages of legislation that were asked from the EU as a pre-condition to be granted the EU status. A new CSL finally passed in 2013, while its implementation did not start before the new SP government was in power. In this period, however, it is crucial to mention that since DP had not performed already best in 2005–09, and also in elections of 2009 he had a small majority, he focused more on short term objectives to achieve electoral advantage than any long-term substantive improvement in programmatic objectives.

Re-building the state: the reformed Socialists back in power and relaunch of civil service reforms 2013–17

This political stalemate in blocking the progress of EU–Albania relations was used by the opposition to politically send the signals to the EU that support for the DP could no longer be tolerated. The SP drafted a very comprehensive program named ‘National Awakening’ (*Rilindja Kombetare*), which covered a wide variety of topics from ‘healthcare, education, to support for agriculture, measures against poverty and new progressive tax reform’, while it emphasized strongly the state-building efforts from public administration, to judicial reform and anti-corruption. The new centre-left ruling coalition, composed of the Socialist Party and the LSI, had a sizeable majority, controlling 83 out of the 140 seats in parliament. Being more ideologically cohesive and guided from the Prime Minister Edi Rama, the new-look SP (which

⁵⁷⁶ Economic Intelligence Unit (2011) p.9, shows that Edi Rama, while being at the same time Mayor of Tirana during elections, he was defeated in controversial circumstances in the mayoral contest in the capital. Tirana and he remained determined to keep the issues of alleged ballot rigging, at the top of the political agenda until a solution was found that is acceptable to the SPA.

⁵⁷⁷ Economic Intelligence Unit (2010), p.10.

⁵⁷⁸ Economic Intelligence Unit (2011), p.16.

had reformed substantially and adopted a strong pro-EU approach) was set to be a much better steward for all reforms needed in this period.

Civil service reform entered a new cycle with the SP-LSI government. When the first CSL was introduced in 1999 the socialists were in power and the inheritance of old elites was to some extent still in place. In the 2005–09 period the as-yet-unreformed Democrats were in power and in 2009–13 they formed a pragmatic coalition with the LSI. The 2013 CSL provided a more career-oriented and a better institutional infrastructure in allowing the law to better protect meritocracy. The post-2013 period, however, falls outside the analysis and so is only mentioned in passing to show the persisting trend of de-politicization that has been enforced over this time. Implementation of the 2014 CSL began in 2014–15. An EU Commission report in 2013 noted that ‘progress has been made in public administration reform and a major step taken on this key priority with the adoption of the CSL. It now needs urgent implementation to enforce merit-based practice’. An additional EU Commission Report in 2016 claimed that: ‘Albania is moderately prepared in what concerns the reform of its public administration. The implementation of more transparent recruitment procedures of civil servants, as well as the implementation of the public administration reform and public financial management reform strategies have continued. Further progress is key to consolidate achievements towards a more efficient, depoliticised, and professional public administration’.

The new legislation offers an improvement in the recruitment and career systems. In the old civil service law, the open based-position system created little chances of promotion and personalization in both selection and promotion of the best candidates through the superior. The new CSL offered a more structured career system, where recruitments are based on a ‘pool’ of potential candidates who are recruited based on long-term developed organigrams of ministries⁵⁷⁹ ‘introducing important safeguards to facilitate the respect, in practice, of the merit principle’.⁵⁸⁰ This particularly abolishes the possibility of ministers influencing candidate selection, as occurred previously with the rule of the three-best candidates.⁵⁸¹ Additionally, the

⁵⁷⁹ SIGMA (2013), p.11.

⁵⁸⁰ According to OECD SIGMA assessment report, the new civil service law introduced establishes a (1) clear distinction between civil servants, cabinet officials and administrative employees; (2) it creates a CS Top Management Corps whose selection is based on open competition and reasserts the principle of political impartiality; (3) it establishes a classification of civil servants based on job descriptions and reduces the degrees of freedom left in the appointment process; (4) it replaces the former ad hoc committees by permanent selection committees, thus reinforcing the professional character of the selection process, and ensures that only the best candidates will be offered positions in the CS. Finally, it also requires that promotion and lateral transfer be based on open and fair competition, by means of formalised selection processes SIGMA (2014), p11-12.

⁵⁸¹ The old CSL established general rules for recruitment, based on open competition and merit. The minister could choose among the three best candidates, once they passed the formal examination procedures.

institutional structure responsible for ensuring that a professional and de-politicized civil service is in place has changed substantially. The institutional capacity of the DoPA is co-joined through the Ministry of Public Administration in better coordinating the horizontal management of the civil service, as well the CSC as a quasi-judicial institution dealing mainly with appeals of civil servants, has been abolished and instead its duties are delegated to administrative courts.

In sum, while some delayed implementation of the law, caused suspect and doubt of concerns that the government is using that to reshuffle civil servants, levels of politicization as based on assessment of EU reports remained low. However, there are hints that LSI has not changed many of its practices, as the governing between the coalition of the SP and LSI was broken after the SP won an absolute majority at the 2017 elections. Particularly the SP had complained that smaller parties were more interested in having certain ministries and positions for electoral patronage purposes and strengthening their own power, rather than supporting the national government agenda. Since the SP's interest is to push through the EU reform agenda, this led to tensions with the LSI and the subsequent split. The absolute majority won by the SP has seen it taking the lead on EU reform going further.

SUMMARY: DIFFERENCES IN PARTY RELIANCE ON POLITICAL LOYALISTS FOR DIFFERENT POLITICAL SERVICES

Across these three periods, particularly between 2001–13, we can claim that the main differences between these parties have been on the extent to which they rely on political loyalists by constraining politically formal recruitment procedures and for what purposes. While Chapter 4 established the extent to which politicization varies, this chapter emphasizes the purposes of politicization and what political services are rendered back to parties as based on interviews.

Based on this cross comparison we derive three main patterns on how parties and state outcomes relate, as shown in Table 2. First, all these three parties have different organizational origins and histories of organizational development. The SP inherited its organization form the communist past and reformed for the first time in 1999, and then in 2005 and again 2013. The DP was born in the transition context in 1990, and had to build its organization from scratch and reformed itself little in the period under analysis. It also remained more personality and

Hence, the appointments were decided very often on the basis of political affiliation or personal affinity, rather than who is the best. This gap is closed with the new Civil Service Law SIGMA (2014).

leader-oriented and hence coupled its own organizational longevity with the electoral survival of the leader. The third (and youngest) party born in the transition period was the LSI, which grew out of the SP. While it began as a reformist outfit founded by ex-Socialist deputies, it was not clear what its exact agenda was. Since then it has also remained very leader-oriented, with the figure of Ilir Meta dominating the party.

Second, all these three parties with different party organization ages have politicized differently the state in both terms of extent of politicization and in terms of the form of politicization. The SP has politicized less than all other parties both in the first period (2001–05) and even less so when it returned to power with a more reformed structure in 2013–17. The DP in the second period purged the state administration by replacing it with its own loyalists and reversed all civil service reforms the SP had initiated between 2000–05. This party remained consistent with the behaviour it had exhibited towards the state in 1992–97, although in a more moderated form. Nevertheless, it still showed no sign of restraining from party patronage and relying strongly on political loyalists in this period. The younger LMI, which joined the coalitions in 2009–13 and then 2013–17, while small in its electoral size, became indispensable for the two bigger parties to form government, and hence enjoyed greater access to state resources. Therefore, the younger party as established for the period 2009–13 has politicized the state even more aggressively than the DP.

Based on this data we can claim that the SP, DP and LSI differed in terms of *extent* of politicization and *type* of politicization, where the older parties have politicized less and the younger ones more, showing preliminary confirmation of the organizational rationale in Chapter 2. In terms of the different *extent* in levels of politicization between the SP and DP, a variety of data based on interviews, and reports establish this variation. First, the conducted interviews have sometimes in certain ministries confirmed that 80% of the inherited bureaucrats have been reshuffled from the DP in the period between 2005–08,⁵⁸² while other sources like CSC Annual reports speak of 40%⁵⁸³ reshuffling at the ministerial level. Second, the Ad-hoc Parliamentary Committee organized from the SP-led opposition to monitor the reshuffling of administration in 2005 has produced an Audit Report that speaks of 50% reshuffling, while at the local level replacements amounted to 100%. Third, the OECD–SIGMA reports in these years, relying on national sources of information, detected an average of 35% turnover of civil service positions

⁵⁸² Interview Albania no. 10 and no.14

⁵⁸³ In 2010, the CSC talks 45% of the position from 119 in the Ministry of Defense.

in 2005 with new incomer appointed on labor contracts und the labor code.⁵⁸⁴

Table 14: Puzzling party–state relations: main findings in three periods of parties in government and variation in levels of politicization in Albania

	Socialist Party in government 2001-2005	Democratic Party in government 2005-2009	LSI in coalition with DP in government 2009-2013
Party age	Pre-1990; reformed in 1999, factionalized	Born in 1990, few reforms, personal leader	Born in 2005, personal leader
Extent of politicization	SP I: Moderate politicization SP II: Low politicization	Moderate-High politicization	High politicization
Forms of politicization	Pork- barrel politicization	Mostly political activism	Electoral reward, combined with corruption

Note: The categorization is based on Chapter 4: high politicization: medium politicization, low politicization:

This is much higher than when the socialist government took over in 1998, where a turnover of only 15% was measured. The SP as well performed better when in government in using fewer temporary contracts as a way to politicize the state. Moreover, there was a higher number of participants in open competition and greater finalization of recruitment procedures on average than the other two periods (2005–09 and 2009–13). While the DP used ‘restructuring’ of ministries more as a political tool to dismiss both inherited political loyalists but as well civil servants, by increasing temporary contracts, dismissing wrongfully as number of appeals increased.

In terms of different forms of politicization, interviews hint that the SP did rely less on political loyalists as activists for electoral reward, while the DP seemed to have replaced both civil servants more aggressively under this practice.⁵⁸⁵ Concerning the DP, the Audit Public Administration Report (2006) mentions among others, the Directive No. 1484 dated 10.10.2005 according to which the DP created groups of party members in the central and local branches to develop lists of people who had contributed in the elections of 3 July 2005, chief of stab, commissioners of election committees and members of all structures dealing with election to be

⁵⁸⁴ SIGMA (2005).

⁵⁸⁵ Interview Albania no.12, no.4, no.8, no.9, no.11, no.13.

politically appointed in the center or local administration.

Interviews with senior civil servants in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that in the SP government, the ‘civil servants could be treated as professionals and not party activists’.⁵⁸⁶ The LSI relied strongly on politicization as a tool for electoral reward (such as ‘one job one vote’⁵⁸⁷), however politicization also did not exclude favouritism in policies for more corruptive purposes. The LSI seemed to be much more transactional in the relationship with its voters and the clientele it served, exchanging public administration jobs for pure electoral reward or requesting particularistic policy benefits to be distributed to certain firms that financed the party from political loyalists in return.⁵⁸⁸ Both interviews and other government archival sources support the trends developed here. Based on such variation, the next section explores better what explains the different extent of politicization across different parties before introducing an alternative answer to this.

COMPETING EXPLANATIONS ON PARTIES AND LEVELS OF POLITICIZATION

Few works have dealt focused explicitly on explaining levels of politicization. Those that have tend to present three main accounts: 1) ideological polarization between communist and anti-communists parties; 2) alternation in power, and; 3) competitiveness in the party system. I apply each of these to assess their robustness in explaining the variation in levels of politicization between the SP and the DP with the LSI. As I account for their different practices in hiring and firing in administration at different point in times within one country, such political parties are exposed to same administrative legacies within the state, the same socio-economic development and same EU conditionality to reform and allow therefore to better explore the party determinants on civil service reform. This allows then to better test which determinants affect parties’ demand on state resources, such as patronage.

While the literature is not vast for post-communist countries in explaining which party organizational characteristics matter to parties reliance on levels of politicization, evidence in Albania shows why current explanations which take more an externalist approach to parties such as polarization of parties in ideological terms based on Meyer-Sahling (2006a) and party system

⁵⁸⁶ Interview Albania no.2.

⁵⁸⁷ Interview Albania no.9, no.14.

⁵⁸⁸ Gazeta Shqiptare, 12 June 2017, available at <http://www.gsh.al/2017/06/12/birn-serisht-kunder-ilir-metes-gjen-donatorin-qe-fiton-tendera-publike/>, accessed 20.06.2017.

competitiveness⁵⁸⁹, through a credible alternation in power, can't explain why did the SP politicize less than the other parties.

Party system competitiveness

This hypothesis predicts that greater party system competitiveness will see parties constrain each other's access to state resources by withdrawing influence from the state and adopting civil service reforms. The underlying assumptions are that parties are more or less democratically committed, and all have the same organizational resources.⁵⁹⁰ The mechanism is that such civil service reforms serve as institutional insurance for incumbents to both prevent political adversity and future incumbents from accessing state resources. Thus, we should expect even with one country that the higher and the more institutionally robust political competition within the system is, the more parties will insulate bureaucracies.⁵⁹¹

In Albania, we would have expected to observe incumbents like the DP in a moment where the system grew more competitive in 2005 in both marginal vote difference, as well in party system fragmentation,⁵⁹² to have insulated and indeed kept reforms sustainable over its mandate. However, the DP politicized more than the SP did in 2001, when reforms were established the first time, and where the party system had the features of a dominant party system. The SP faced a weak credible opposition in the DP, which was trying to reform from its past. Therefore, the SP should have been less committed to insulate bureaucracies, knowing that weak opponents would reverse them according to these theories.

However, this was not the case and indeed the SP took the lead in such reforms, and despite its own internal crisis, politicized less than the DP. Additionally, based on such accounts we can as well even less explain the evidence, that the DP in 2009, the more electorally vulnerable it got the more it politicized. Evidence shows the opposite of what one would expect. Indeed, in a moment where the DP was electorally vulnerable (it had won only very marginally) and faced a more credible opposition (i.e. the reformed SP), it instead politicized even more than it had when it was more electorally secure and faced a weaker opposition (i.e. in 2005).

The problem in these theories are two-fold. First, they assume that organizational resources are all weakly distributed among parties, and therefore all parties have the same

⁵⁸⁹ Grzymala-Busse (2007).

⁵⁹⁰ Grzymala-Busse (2007).

⁵⁹¹ *ibid*; O'Dwyer (2006).

⁵⁹² See Appendix Chapter 5, Table 1.

demand on state resources and therefore on political loyalists who would provide politicians with resources and political services, if they are facing a credible opposition. In the Albanian case, we see that older and more organizationally stronger parties, irrespective of whether they face a credible opposition (as the DP did in 2001 and an even weaker one in 2013), politicize less than when they were organizationally younger and therefore weaker parties. Hence, that incumbents' incentives seem to be less informed by characteristics of opposition, as parties behave differently despite facing a credible opposition.

Second, civil service reforms are very reversible and they take time to stabilize. Hence, the causal mechanism of *institutional insurance* where parties can reverse reforms, and have different organizational resources, does not hold true. Indeed, the SP introduced reforms not because it assumed that DP would not reverse them, but because the SP could afford to because it needed less political loyalism in the state to survive organizationally and electorally. The externalist view thus offers little insight on party behaviour within the state administration, or why the SP in contrast to the DP politicized more.

Polarization in ideological differences and alternation in government

While the first hypothesis is more apt to test cross- country variation, so we should expect though, that the stronger the polarization of party systems along cleavages on communist and anti-communist, the more political hiring and firing should happen. Additionally, Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2013) present evidence that the type of alternation in government, explains why then some countries in post-communist countries with wholesale alternation in government politicized more (Poland, Hungary and Slovakia) than those where partial and wholesale alternation in government occurred (best are Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and intermediate cases are Czech Republic and Slovenia).

Alternation in power

According to this explanation, we should expect that when the government alternates between very different ideological parties, levels of politicization increase more than in moments of partial alternation. Evidence suggests that this does not occur along the expected patterns. In Albania, in 2001 there was only partial alternation as the SP government ruled together with smaller parties.⁵⁹³ Here we can see that in 2001 when partial alternation happened, politicization was

⁵⁹³ see Appendix Chapter 5, Graph 2.

lower than when full alternation occurred in 2005 in the change of government from two very different ideological parties such as from the SP to DP. However, alternation patterns cannot explain, why then in 2013, the wholesale alternation from DP- LSI coalition back to SP- LSI coalition, did not lead to similar levels of politicization seen in 2005. What incentivizes SP party members to rely more on civil servants and less on political loyalists than when the DP came to power in 2005? Alternation in power therefore, does not explain what incentivizes parties differently to rely on political loyalists.

Ideological difference

The two political poles representing such divides indeed caused various fighting between them as well as creating a highly distrustful approach and environment but not in terms of policy but rather in terms of cliques.⁵⁹⁴ However, evidence shows that ideological distinctions tell us little about party incentives on politicization.

According to the literature,⁵⁹⁵ we would have expected that in countries with high ideological polarization, parties behave all the same and politicize the state every time they enter government. Trying to account for ideological polarization between the communist and anti-communist cleavage, although not measurable in hard data, such cleavages were though not a constant in Albanian politics. While they defined politics between the period 1990–2000, afterwards, they mattered less and new topics emerged. Voters became more preoccupied with issues of mal-governance and corruption in the transition process. However, despite weak polarization between anti and pro-communist forces in 2005, this literature cannot explain why the DP still decided to hire and fire politically in that period in government? Nor can it explain why the SP would be more willing to trust civil servants and replace less the inherited administrators in 2001 in a moment where such cleavages were still more prevalent than in 2005? Hence, it seems that something else than distrust based on regime divides incentivizes parties to hire and fire politically.

But if anti- and pro-communist ideologies cannot explain such outcomes, then let's assume that the strong left–right ideological division might matter. After all, the ideological distinction between the parties might incentivize them to fire inherited bureaucrats with very different ideological views than their own when in government. While these ideological logics

⁵⁹⁴ Veliaj (2013); Zoto (2004).

⁵⁹⁵ Meyer-Sahling (2006a)

would indeed explain the difference between the left-led government and the right-led government, it would be less able to explain why parties of the same ideology would still replace civil servants. Indeed, the two major political groupings, such as the DP and SP, are positioned clearly on the left–right division of the political spectrum, so one could say that if not communist and anti-communists, such left–right polarization explains political hiring and firing.⁵⁹⁶

Evidence shows that ideologies don't define how parties position themselves with voters and how they relate therefore to the state administration. If different ideologies between governments would drive politicization as a way to control more policies, we should have seen the DP replace only the inherited political loyalists that ruled and were indoctrinated with policies under the SP-led ideology but not civil servants. However, the DP replaced both civil servants and political loyalists with its own trustees. Therefore, it is fair to claim that politicization is unrelated to issues of ideological differences but party organizational differences, as the argument below will show.

For ideologies to matter in government's incentives to politicize administration or not, we need three conditions to be fulfilled: (1) parties must be strongly ideologically anchored along socio-economic cleavages with voters; (2) ideologies must be the main predominant determinant in policy making, and; (3) bureaucrats and civil servants must be so autonomous in the position to resist policies. However, all these conditions are not prevalent empirically in Albania and many post-communist countries as well.

First, while parties' manifestos show clearly a left–right divide on paper, these parties do not always implement such distinctive policies as they are constrained by external actors.⁵⁹⁷ Indeed, parties might end up pursuing the same policies so that they have no policy or ideological reasons to distrust civil servants. The left-wing SP when it was in power in 2001–05 pursued many neo-liberal policies of the right to show that it had changed and opened up, by following up on IMF conditionality and pushing forward privatization of companies, as well as tackling poverty by implementing policies that had promised to the underprivileged. In contrast, the right-wing DP in 2005 pursued rather left-oriented policies, in order not to risk losing voters.

⁵⁹⁶ The Socialist Party positioned itself programmatically along the lines of the democratic socialist party, following the tradition of the Western European left and identified with social democratic principles. The democratic party positioned itself as the right-wing party, that provided at the beginning the 'economic shock therapy'. However, overtime, such ideological distinction in blurred as they pursued policies in government so that 'is hard to tell which is on the left and which is on the right'.

⁵⁹⁷ Kajsiu (2010); Bogdani and Loughlin (2007), p.142.

This phenomenon is explained as well elsewhere in post-communist countries,⁵⁹⁸ where leftists pursue more liberal policies and rightist less so. Hence, policy ideological differences might matter less, as parties when in government are so constrained in policy implementation that such determinants don't explain why the DP did not trust more than the SP civil servants in pursuing its policies.

Second, in Albania although parties act differently programmatically, they are not yet strongly anchored socio-economically with voters in distinct left right ideological representation and in terms of policies.⁵⁹⁹ Parties have not built with voters on such strong identities on the left and on the right policies, as in the Western context, hence voters don't identify with the parties the policies they can provide to them distinctly on the left as on the right. As I claimed the right, has remained as an anti-socialist force but at the end provides left policies many times, and the left remains as an anti-right force, but provides right-wing policies.

Evidence shows this discrepancy between parties' policies and ideologies. The SP origins of the main supporters came from the educated and wealthy communist elite living in urban areas, but as well the offspring of the former communist elite, but with a more moderate and open attitude.⁶⁰⁰ Businessmen and the entrepreneurial class, who had benefited from liberalization policies in 1991–2, were also supporters. The latter constituted not only the social base, but as well represented the government.⁶⁰¹ In 1999, as mentioned before, the SP tried to broaden the electorate to include the poor and underprivileged. However, this was hard to achieve because the interests of the wealthy were hard to reconcile with those of the poor programmatically in a moment when the socialists knew that they had to follow the neo-liberal doctrine of international organizations in policies in order reposition themselves anew in the eyes of international actors.⁶⁰² Hence, they positioned themselves through the European future⁶⁰³ by justifying such policies, but remaining weakly anchored to the social base of voters along the 'classical left' ideology spectrum. As a result, they pursued much more neo-liberal policies that were beneficial more to their wealthy original social base than the others. In 2013, this had still not changed, and the European vision is being sold once more to voters on the left and on the right, under that electoral campaign – 'National Awakening' – of the new leader of the SP.

⁵⁹⁸ Kitschelt (1992); Tavits (2014).

⁵⁹⁹ Kajsiu (2010).

⁶⁰⁰ Bogdani and Loughlin (2007); Loughlin (2007, p.142).

⁶⁰¹ Kajsiu (2010, p. 241).

⁶⁰² Tavits (2014).

⁶⁰³ Kajsiu (2010).

In contrast, the DP' social base comprised at its origins the prosecuted and the expropriated land owners in 1992, but as well intellectuals and new business emerging, as such support came for granted to them at the beginning. However, over time the DP not investing in proper organization building a pluralistic way, lost some of its constituencies, and the role of the right in Albanian politics remained at an 'infancy level'.⁶⁰⁴ Over time, the DP 'was unable to constitute 'the people' by articulating positive social identities within it nor by drawing on a neo-liberal ideological universe, as it had started to do in the 1992 era with the 'shock therapy'. Hence, as Kajsiu (2014) claims 'unable to build a vision of society as a whole from specific social groups within it or through signifiers from an ideological universe, Albanian political parties instead emphasized a major threat, embodied by the political opponent, against which they articulate and represent the people'.⁶⁰⁵

Third, neither have bureaucrats such autonomy to resist policies of superiors in such early phases of bureaucratic development. In a country where bureaucrats are rule followers than policy innovators, there is less credible fear among politicians that civil servants won't follow their rule. Interviews show that politicization happens because of more control over policy making authority for preferential treatment in the policy outcome, but as well for electoral reward and electoral activism.⁶⁰⁶

In sum we conclude that first, anti-communist and communist rules matter less in understanding party incentives of politicization. Knowing that parties are not ideologically linked strongly with voters on a left-right division, and because government policies are internationally anyway constrained in what policies to pursue, they might end up implementing the same path. All this renders ideology a weak determinant of party behavior in state administration. Parties indeed are not consolidated structures, and civil servants in such new bureaucracies are not yet as autonomous as in the western context. Indeed, because bureaucracy is not a strong autonomous veto-player. Therefore, the conditions that need to be in place in order for party ideology to matter in explaining parties' relations to bureaucrats are not given in new democracies.

As a result, distrust of politicians towards bureaucrats based on ideational policy towards bureaucracy is not the right mechanism that explains why politicians continue to build on political loyalists in such a context. Because parties have different organizational resources in

⁶⁰⁴ Barjaba (2004).

⁶⁰⁵ Kajsiu (2010), p.240.

⁶⁰⁶ Interview Albania no.2, no.7, no.8.

this party building phase, the organization scarcity of parties' professional staff with administrative capital and material resources, explains rather why some parties have stronger incentives than others to rely on political loyalists. The latter one, can provide them back with the right target policies, and political resources to support them electorally. For all these reasons, politicization for policy reasons driven through ideological difference of parties is less the right lens in understanding the party bureaucracy relations in post-communist context. Instead the battle ground for parties are to have access to state resources. Political loyalists represent such crucial resource for parties' organizational survival.

DIFFERENCES IN PARTIES' RESOURCES MATTER

All these competing alternatives, do not get the 'party agency' right in Albania, as they overemphasize either the role of party ideology for explaining levels of politicization, or assume that parties are consolidated structures with no differences in organizational resources. Because party-building and state building coincide historically, understanding the different parties' rationale in reforming or less bureaucracies for their own organizational and electoral concerns becomes crucial in explaining how those affect civil service reform progress in levels of politicization.

In such a context, evidence shows that parties can reverse reforms as the state is less legally and socio-economically protected and parties play a higher strategic role in shaping bureaucracies. Parties in Albania are not differently constrained ideologically in their strategic behaviour towards the state and levels of politicization, nor are they exposed to different electoral cleavages. Rather in their own party building process, and mutual commitment to state building, parties have very different organizational resources that matter for the extent to which they can afford or not to survive organizationally and electorally without preying on the state as a resource to compensate for own organizational survival. As Gryzmala-Busse (2006) claims 'In a situation where support was as scarce as it was unstable, organizations were barely founded, and few business ties existed, state resources were the most secure source of party support'.⁶⁰⁷

Yet the only parties with a resource base were usually the successors of the communist parties have more developed organizations than new parties born in transition without prior organizational infrastructure. Most of the new parties developed their organizations with their

⁶⁰⁷ Gryzmala-Busse (2006), p.10.

role in public office.⁶⁰⁸ Their aim was to both increase access to state resources by politicizing the administration and its personnel that could render them back political service and mobilize more resources to survive organizationally. Hence, levels of politicization are rather to be derived from organizational resources scarcity of parties that vary with party organization age, between the older successor of the communist party, such as the SP in Albania and the younger parties, such as the DP born in 1990 and the LSI. The evidence in Albania shows a wider pattern, elsewhere in South Eastern Europe, where pluralism is on the making and democracies and state structures are not consolidated yet.

I claim that both organizational differences in resources between parties such as: (1) inherited voter loyalty; (2) organizational coherence based on a more procedural approach; (3) professional staff, and; (4) organizational longevity beyond the personal leader and the provision of state resources. Further these differences explain why older parties, such as the SP, can afford more than younger parties not to depend on state patronage for organizational survival. I show evidence in two stages by first outlining that all parties act under a peculiar socio-economic and institutional condition in Albania that allows them to play a crucial strategic role and then second, the chapter provides evidence on what type of organizational resources older rather than younger parties have that renders younger parties more dependent on state resources and patronage.

Why parties matter for state reforms in Albania

Parties play an important strategic role in shaping the direction and outcomes of civil service reforms in Albania for two reasons. The institutional opportunity structure for parties to shape bureaucracies according to their own party needs is less constrained socio-economically and legally. First, in an institutional environment like in Albania, civil service reforms are more amenable to change, as the state administration is less protected through stable socio-economic coalitions. Parties face less popular resistance in their arbitrariness in state administration to hire and fire politically. NGOs in Albania play less the role of watch dog of government, trade unions are not very active, the business class is not that strongly developed as the economy is weak, and public opinion does not face always an independent media that scrutinizes politicians and informs citizens. Interest group organization of voters is very low⁶⁰⁹ and voters view party membership as strategy to increase their chances of getting a job.⁶¹⁰ Hence, popular resistance

⁶⁰⁸ Van Biezen (2003).

⁶⁰⁹ Jano (2016).

⁶¹⁰ Krasniqi and Hackaj (2015).

and popular demand in well-functioning administration is low.

Second, this is combined with a state institutional structure, where parties' arbitrariness is less sanctioned through an independent judiciary. The high levels of corruption and the accusation of parties of corrupting the state mutually when in government has remained mostly a public debate in Albania, where at the end no one has really known who is more or less corrupt and judges ended up prosecuting no one. Civil service reforms from 2000–13 were indeed very reversible from one government to the other as the analysis above shows. The DP could enter the state and reverse reforms, as could the SP which built twice a civil service constituency that engrains more meritocracy (i.e. in 2001 and 2013).

The Albanian state therefore has seen its structures reformed simultaneously with the ongoing party building process. The parties have had to both redefine their organizations and create state institutions. The institutional and socio-economic conditions allowed parties to play a higher strategic role than assumed so far in civil service reforms and in shaping the nature of bureaucracies. In this process of party building, attaining and retaining power was as much at the heart⁶¹¹ of political parties, as they had to act as 'state builders'⁶¹² in the process of Europeanization process. Civil service reforms were pushed from EU, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Hence, their main dilemma between party and state building, every time in power, could be depicted as one where parties asked if they were to rely more on political loyalist to access more state resources to survive organizationally or rather civil servants? Politicians care about the immediate benefit of the consequences of their administrative choices – if one hires political loyalists or civil servants, which one will serve best the private interest and will help me gain more political support and more resources?

In this dilemma, they were exposed to the same institutional, socio-economic dynamics, and EU conditionality, as they faced similar electoral cleavages. In such an environment where parties are exposed to similar *external constrains*, it remains crucial to understand which internal constrains are similar or different for parties' strategic behavior with the state. As mentioned, parties' ideological differences, are also less crucial in defining party behavior. Because they are not ideologically anchored with voters very strongly, and because they are programmatically constrained in being very different in governmental on policy performance, ideology is less what makes us understand party behavior with the state administration. While they remain committed

⁶¹¹ De Mesquita (2003).

⁶¹² Grzymala-Busse and Loung (2002).

to democracy and the Europeanization project, they have competed against each other with very different organizational resources.

Hence when parties have had to both build their own organizations and act as state builders, the constraints and incentives they have faced to rely on political loyalists and state resources to survive organizationally, were not informed through ideology,⁶¹³ nor voters' demand, but rather based on their organizational resources. In a context, where: (1) ideological differences matter less; (2) organizational resources of parties are very different as parties are not consolidated structures, and; (3) state resources are more beneficial to some than others, parties can shape and reverse more easily reforms based on such organizational resource needs.

What resources matter for dependence on patronage among young and old parties

I distinguish organizational resources based on five criteria: (1) inherited voter loyalty and inherited base, (2) organizational expansion territorially (3) organizational coherence in routines and practices, (4) professional staff, and; (5) organizational longevity.

I claim that *older parties*, or in this case the successor of the communist parties, have higher inherited organizational strength and therefore resources in voter loyalty, organizational structure at the local level, organizational cohesiveness and internal pluralism, as well as professional staff in activists.⁶¹⁴ Younger parties have either *moderate* or *low* organizational resources: *moderate* resources, if they have some: (1) inherited voter loyalty from the past; (2) some organizational extensiveness; (3) a hierarchical organizational structure, but are less internally organized along democratic procedures, and; (4) have some professional staff, but generally lack good policy activists, and (5) organizational longevity is coupled to the survival of the personal leader. Finally, parties have *low* organizational resources if they have: (1) little to no inherited base on voter loyalty; (2) very little penetration territorially; (3) almost no organizational unity and procedures; (4) some professional staff but few activists, and; (5) organizational longevity that is coupled with the survival of the personal leader.

Additionally, to differences in organizational resources, direct state resources and funding provide an additional layer based on which parties receive subsidies from the state to organize their electoral campaigns, and conduct their activities. However, this indicator is rather

⁶¹³ Kajsiu (2010).

⁶¹⁴ Gryzmala-Busse (2007).

an inverse one to the rest: the more parties rely generally on state funding the less they are autonomous and capable of survival. I will depict below how these parties differ in terms of organizational resources.

Organizational and state resources

Organizational strength is very different between the older SP, and the two younger ones, the DP and LSI. The older party has more inherited resources than the other two, making it more autonomous from state patronage in terms of organizational survival. The parties differ on such *organizational cohesiveness* through inherited procedures and routines in both disciplining its member and maintaining professional staff, organizational *longevity* beyond its personal leaders, inherited pool of educated voters, more professional staff.

The DP is anchored among the poorest voters in rural areas as an anti-communist force born in transition. They has less organizational unity anchored in procedures and routines in all its practices. Organizational *longevity* was coupled to the personal leader survival and accompanied by lower professional staff. All these characteristics led this party to use patronage loyalists from the very first moment of inception, but as well later on (in 1992, 2005–09 and 2009–13), in order compensate for its own ‘administrative capital’. Finally, the younger splinter party, LSI, that split from the SP, also once in power (2009–13 and 2013 onwards) built heavily as the DP did, on the state administration. However, the younger party stood under much higher pressure on organizational resources than older parties to survive electorally and organizationally. It needed to build its voters loyalty base, as well expand electoral support.

First, all these three parties have different organizational origins and organizational development. On the one hand, the SP inherited its organization from the communist past and reformed the first time in 1999, and then in 2005 and 2013. On the other hand, the DP emerging in a transition context in 1990, had to build its organization from scratch and reformed little itself in this period of observation, while it remained more personal leader-oriented and hence coupled its own organizational longevity to his electoral survival. The first turnover in leaders happened only in 2013. The third party born in transition period as an internal party, was the youngest one, that took over former deputies from the SP. While it started as a reformist group, it was not clear what the exact political agenda was and since then it also remained very leader-oriented with the figure of Ilir Meta dominating the party.

Inherited voter loyalty

The regime divide of communism and anti-communism in Albania runs deep through society. The origins of the SP were in the educated and wealthy elite inherited from the past. The party has tried since the transition period to both regenerate and, expand its electoral base to as well underprivileged strata.⁶¹⁵ The DP had only existed for one year when it took power from the communists. Rather than being a well-organized party, it was a progressive mass movement, often called a ‘forum party’.⁶¹⁶ Its ranks were ‘composed of the politically persecuted, former political prisoners of the communist system, former big landowners, expropriated by the communist regime, political exiles, workers, peasants, many intellectuals and some offspring of the politically privileged class during the communist rule’.⁶¹⁷ Hence, the party with weak organizations and almost no territorial representation at the initial stages, reached electoral support very quickly, support that was very broad at the same time. The LSI had almost no voter loyalty at its formation in 2005 and had to build that from scratch. It rather built its support as a ‘business firm’ standing in a clear transaction for votes against jobs in administration or other policy favoritism towards supporters.⁶¹⁸ It built strongly on the voters unsatisfied with unemployment and on small and medium enterprises.

Organizational cohesiveness: rules, procedures routines

The parties also differ substantially in terms organizational cohesiveness. In Albania, the SP and DP are more hierarchical and centralized structures while LSI less so. However, the latter two remain somehow leader-oriented.⁶¹⁹ As the successor of the communists, the SP inherited all its organizational structures and the various regulations and the statute that were modified. The SP has a rich tradition in internal organization and regulation,⁶²⁰ much more so than the DP and LSI. Such a tradition is also part of the inherited structures. The party works in a more bureaucratized manner with a more regulated approach than the DP. This organizational cohesiveness and regulated approach it has often given it more a ‘democratic method’⁶²¹ to settle

⁶¹⁵ Bogdani and Loughlin (2007) and Loughlin (2007).

⁶¹⁶ Barjaba (2004).

⁶¹⁷ Zoto (2004, p.85).

⁶¹⁸ Interview Albania no.9, no.11, and no.12.

⁶¹⁹ The role of party leaders in decision making and agenda setting is quasi absolute Krasniqi and Hackaj (2015), p.15.

⁶²⁰ See Krasniqi and Hackaj (2015).

⁶²¹ Zoto (2004), p.84.

internal quarrels, although the leader remains a strong protagonist.

This cohesiveness has allowed to pursue a tactic of non-exclusion of the opposition and co-existence with internal rivals, where such procedures and regulated approach have made it easier to remain pluralistic and facilitate the turnover in political chairmanship of the party. The internal democracy has been therefore particularly functional since 1997. Although ‘it was the members of the DP that started and encouraged the critical debate and the expression of different opinions on every level of decision-making within the party, it was the SP members that created a nascent though fragile democratic tradition within the party’⁶²².

The DP instead worked very differently and particularly since 1997, both in being less

Table 15: Overview of parties’ organizational age and organizational resources in Albania

	Organizational resources		
	Socialist Party	Democratic Party	LSI
Party age	Pre-1990; reformed in 1999, 2013	Born in 1990, little reforms, personal leader	Born in 2005, personal leader
Voter loyalty	Inherited from the old elite, wealthy educated-urban voters	Some inherited in transition, more rural voters	Low, rather business and youth, undecided voters in both regions
Organizational cohesiveness: rules, procedures	High: Inherited organizational cohesiveness and reformed, with dense procedures for internal pluralism	Low: organizational cohesiveness based on procedures, leader over rules and less pluralistic	Low: organizational cohesiveness based on procedures, leader over rules and less pluralistic
Organizational Structure Territorial expansion	Higher organizational coverage, less complex structure, and less local branches	Medium organizational coverage, complex structure with high local branches	N.A.
Professional staff	High size professional staff and activists, with career orientation and highly paid	Moderate to low size of professional staff, but, less well paid and less professional staff	Low professional staff, low paid
Longevity	Organizational survival beyond leader	Organizational survival, one turnover	Organizational survival linked to personal leader
Financial Resources	State resources (60%) Membership 35% Donations	State resources (96%) Membership 4.5%	State resources (31%) Membership 4%
Organizational resources	High	Medium	Low

Source: Author’s analysis.

democratic having less ‘bureaucratized’ activities, and acting as non-inclusive to internal

⁶²² Krasniqi and Hackaj (2015), p.34.

opposition within the party. The party has stayed loyal to the well-known classic minimalist form of party organization, focusing only on the presentation of a basic program, where it is also included the election program, its statute of organization and functioning.⁶²³ Although the DP statute is unequivocal in its intentions to establish an institutional party with a functional internal democracy, the practice is not always close to that regulation.⁶²⁴ Many of its concepts lack detailed regulation as is the case in the SP. The first period with very active party structures has been followed especially ‘after 2005 with periods when the party did function without active leading structures’.⁶²⁵ Between 1997 and 2013 few reforms happened.

The problem is that factional fights and rebellion against authoritarian tendencies began at the top of the DP (1992–97). Five factions indeed separated and found several new parties. The concentration and centralization of power of the DP in the hand of the leader transformed the party from a ‘forum’ party with diverse anti-communist factions, into the ‘Berisha Party’.⁶²⁶ In many of the practices, the DP is seen more ‘autocratic, with little tolerance and dialogue, banning factions and alternative ideas’,⁶²⁷ the style of command rather than bargaining and lack of transparency with decisions not being taken openly. All this has been shown from the beginning of its leadership style. The expulsion of intellectuals from this party, based on different political beliefs⁶²⁸ is just another example of this party tactic.

The LSI, being the youngest party, has a party statute that regulates on paper all decisions and rights, but the party is less hierarchical giving it a light structure. As depicted in the media, this party was created by ex-Prime Minister Meta, formerly from the SP. The issue of internal democracy is a new concept and still under development.⁶²⁹ Its distance between party leadership and members is very small, and its organizational structure are still developing. In this context, the elements of parity and internal democracy of the ‘members in relation to the founder are seen as redundant, formal and sometimes not necessary’. During the 10-year existence of the LSI there has not been any case of announcement of a faction, but there were cases when a

⁶²³ In two periods, 1997 and 2013, the election of the party leader was not made according to the party statute by passing formal process was managed by the former leader (who had already handed his resignation), and by a group of nominated coordinators. In the history of DP there have been only two cases of vote of confidence for the leadership (1995 and 1997) and one case of dismissal of the head of the party through the vote (1995). This the first period with very active party structures has been followed especially after 2005 with periods when the party did function without active leading structures.

⁶²⁴ Krasniqi and Hackaj (2015).

⁶²⁵ Krasniqi and Hackaj (2015).

⁶²⁶ Zoto (2004), p.86.

⁶²⁷ Progni (2013); Bogdani and Loughlin (2007) .

⁶²⁸ Progni (2013).

⁶²⁹ Krasniqi and Hackaj (2015).

group of leading politicians did think otherwise and adopted critical positions towards the official policy of the party (September 2009). At that time, after the debate over its passage from ‘the left’ to ‘the right’, a critical part of the leadership team was side-lined or excluded from LSI.⁶³⁰

Territorial structure

The organizational structure varies between the DP and SP. The latter has higher penetration at the local level and higher organizational coverage. Both are indicators of organizational strength in being capable of reaching out to voters. While centre right parties usually have a shallower organization, in Albania center-right parties have a very complex structure and more interconnected than then left-socialist party, with higher organizational units at the ‘meso-level’ between the national and local level. The local branches at the district level are subordinated to the center level structure, hire and fire party local form center. DP has more local districts (53 party district branches, whereas SP has 37 district party branches and 12 coordination councils at regional or counties level).⁶³¹ This shows how the DP has rather evolved its party organization, similar to how the state structures are built in Albania.

In the SP, this is less dense on such levels, but higher penetration of the party at the local branches. If we take into consideration the voting centers (5301), SP shows a high territorial coverage of 94% whereas DP has only 83%. At the local level, the DP has 4406 sections and 407 group sections, whereas the SP has 4980 sections and 384 municipal assemblies. The SP has as well expanded more the territorial coverage, showing slight increase in the number of basic units – 132 new units or 2.7% in 4 years 2013–17.⁶³² Party structure at the local level is similar and perform a variety of tasks from recruitment to campaign organization voter registration and management of elections.

This difference in territorial structure also shows that the SP has a stronger organizational capacity and can rely on this staff and its activists on these local branches to survive organizationally and electorally. The DP, lacking such structures, has to rely more on the complex organization that is close to the administrative state divisions, through patronage to access more resources and maintain its organization.

⁶³⁰ Krasniqi and Hackaj (2015).

⁶³¹ Jano (2016).

⁶³² Jano (2016, pp.34-37).

Professional staff

There are substantial differences in professional staff and ‘bureaucratized organizational strength’ that represent the most crucial difference as well in resources to understand levels of politicization. There is a substantial difference between the SP, DP and LSI. The SP has in contrast to other rightist parties in post-communist context⁶³³ built a complex organizational structure, with high representation at the ‘meso-level’, rather than at the local level.

Regarding ‘bureaucratic organizational ‘strength’, there are substantial differences between the SP and DP. The SP has a simpler party structure, with a tendency to have more a ‘specialized’ bureaucratic party staff and higher party members. Differences are found in that the SP is run by a higher number of organized party activists, that execute on a voluntary basis a good number of party activities. In party budget of personnel which is an indicator of having a larger and more specialized party staff,⁶³⁴ these two parties show as well substantial differences. SP has spent more on paid officials, than DP, which shows that the SP is more adequately staffed and has both more specialized staff who are better paid than DP. This all results in the party being more capable in using effectively its resources and relying on own party activists to execute activities. This is the strongest finding, besides the organizational structure that shows that DP is organizationally more resources scarce and therefore, once in power relies strongly on ‘administrative capital’ to compensate for its lack of resources. Yet SP has spent more on paid officials, which also mirrors growth in membership, whereas DP drastically has cut spending on party.

Financial Resources

Political parties also vary in the extent to which they rely directly on state resources.⁶³⁵ The distribution of state resources shows that parties can be subsidized up to 90% from the state.⁶³⁶ However a calculation of party finance shows that greater autonomy is shown by lower state funding in the SP (60%), with the DP having the highest at 96%. The LSI takes 31% from the state and 49.46% from the private media enterprise

⁶³³ Enyedi and Linek (2008, p.458).

⁶³⁴ Jano (2016, p.32).

⁶³⁵ The Law on Political Parties divides 70 per cent of annual public political party funding among parliamentary parties in proportion to their seats in parliament; 20 per cent equally among parties that received more than 10,000 votes in the previous parliamentary elections; and 10 per cent proportionally among parties that received more than 1 per cent of votes. (<http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/albania/162426?download=true>)

⁶³⁶ Jano (2016).

Figure 18: Snapshot on distribution of financial resources across parties in 2012

	SP	DP	LSI
	Ratio to Total Funds		
State funds	62%	95%	31%
Non-state funds	38%		68%
Membership funds	35%	4.50%	4%
Rents and ownership	3%	.	.
Donor's fund	N.A.	N.A.	50.54%
Media	.	.	49.46%
Total Fund (in EUR)	1.199.692	710.372	344.138

Source: Finance Audit reports 2013, available at www.kqz.al

It is interesting to observe that membership is quite low in all these parties, reinforcing the notion that the DP has grown with the state, the LSI is searching for alternative resources in the manner of a business firm, and the SP is the most autonomous of all the three in organizational resources.

CONCLUSION

The analysis above shows that the main distinction across the three parties that explains levels of politicization, are organizational resources of the parties. The SP has a higher organizational representation at the local level, higher size of specialized party activists, who are better paid, higher internal democracy and above all, it relies less on state subsidies, and has highest quota of membership funding – 35% compared with the rest of the parties that are only 4 % in the case of the DP and 4.5% in the case of the LSI. This party has proven to act more as a ‘state builder’, while the rest of the parties were more state exploiters.

The other two parties have rather a different structure of resources. The DP seems to be the party that is most dependent on the state, both in terms limited organizational extensiveness at the local level and highest funding generation from the state subsidies in comparison to the other sources. Therefore, the lack of strong local presence combined with low generation of own funding, combined with a lack of professional staff that is not well paid, shows how scarce in resources this party is in comparison to the SP. State employees when this party was in power, fulfilled the role of its activists supporting the party with its electoral and party activities, as it was shown for the period 2009–13, where massive turnover of state officials took place. Hence, the lack of resources and structures, combined with a very personalized

leadership, and weak professional staff that is capable to make the party win elections by not using patronage, has pushed the party to substitute its own resource scarcity when in power with the 'administrative capital' of the state.

The LSI, the youngest of the three, has a weak organization that is strongly linked to the survival of the personal leadership of its chairmanship. Additionally, the party is mostly financed from media enterprise, and is built rather as a 'business firm', that gathers votes by providing jobs or pork to business. Interviews, confirmed that this party is strongly reliant on patronage and access to state resources without having a cohesive organization. It has used its governmental role of king maker to access the state resources to survive organizationally.

The differences between the parties showed that SP did de-politicize the state not because it was electorally vulnerable or because it faced a credible opposition, but because it could afford to electorally survive and endure organisationally without the state resources. Parties that are younger than older ones, politicize more and replace such civil servants even more, because of own *organizational resource scarcity* to ensure organizational survival, in an environment where ideological differences are weak. The comparison between the DP and LSI showed that the LSI politicized even more than DP, because the lower its resources the more it depends on state resources and patronage. Older parties, as shown in the Albanian case, have less organizational pressure to survive by using the state, as they have both more professional staff, higher penetration at the local level with own branches and more capability to govern and win elections. Hence, such parties can 'afford' to rely more on civil servants, and civil servants claimed that such parties once in government deal with them more as 'professionals' rather than 'party activists'.

CHAPTER 7: ELECTORAL DIFFERENCES OF PARTIES IN CIVIL SERVICE REFORM PROGRESS

EVIDENCE FROM CONTESTED CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS IN ALBANIA AND MACEDONIA

INTRODUCTION

This chapter tests how different social structures incentivize parties differently to improve bureaucracies or not. Both countries launched civil service reforms at the beginning of 2000s. Albania ended up in 2010 with persisting levels of politicization, but still some levels of professionalization in its administration. Meanwhile, politicians in Macedonia have progressively increased levels of politicization since 2006, voiding the state administration of its professionalism. Since 2010 the country has further deteriorated in EU relations, democracy scores have dropped,⁶³⁷ corruption levels have increased⁶³⁸ and governance indicators have deteriorated.⁶³⁹ This variation between the two countries is puzzling because Macedonia dismembered from the Yugoslav Federation peacefully, and pioneered in EU relations in the region. Nevertheless, it ended up with even lower state integrity than Albania, the latter being a country that represented one of the most ‘difficult’ democratizers in the region and had become an EU candidate only a decade later than Macedonia in the accession process.

By taking a party agency perspective, the chapter tests all alternative explanations that account for this variation. I provide evidence that disconfirm that Europeanization and party system competitiveness or administrative legacies explain variation in administrative capability in levels of professionalization. Then, I provide evidence to empirically validate that electoral pressure to deliver on effective policies is lower in Macedonia, and higher in Albania, that explains

⁶³⁷ See Figure 25.

⁶³⁸ Macedonia is ranked 90th, scoring in Corruption Perception Index 37, reaching levels it had in the 2000s, whereas Albania, in 2010 scored 87th and in 2016 83th, scoring 39. Transparency International dataset online [<https://www.transparency.org/country/MKD>].

⁶³⁹ Bertelsmann Transformation ranks Macedonia in 2016 in the Management index 5.67, from 6.46 in 2010, whereas Albania has been ranked 5.85 in 2010, 5.42 in 2012 and from 5.60 in 2008.

subsequently the lower levels of professionalization and weak administrative capability due to the different social structures.

According to that main claim, differences in societal structures, conditional on the differential *nature* of political competition between socio-economic or identity issues, are expected to affect different electoral pressure on incumbents in being programmatic and provision of public good, by leading to variation in levels of professionalization. To do that, the chapter uses the most *similar case design* in a cross-country comparison between Albania and Macedonia for incumbency in 2010. The two countries are similar socio-economically, as they both have poorly developed economies, democratized in the 1990s and have been under heightened and similar EU conditionality in the last 17 years. The main difference is that the two countries have very different societal structures, with Albania having an ethnically homogenous population (98% are ethnic Albanians), whereas Macedonia is split between multiple ethnicities. The predominant cleavage is between ethnic Albanians (25.17%) and Macedonians (64.18%). The other major groups are Turks (3.85%), Romani (2.66%) and Serbs (1.78%).⁶⁴⁰

Taking a snapshot in 2010 of the institutional quality in Albania and Macedonia, based on Meyer-Sahling's expert survey (2010), the two countries perform differently. They have high levels of politicization combined with professionalization, while the latter provides the opposite scenario.

Then, I provide evidence in *three* steps to empirically validate the main claim that social structure produces different nature in political competition, explaining why incentive of government in Macedonia rather than Albania has been lower in improving bureaucracies.

First, based on the Chappell Hill Expert Survey Dataset on party standing on various issues, the nature of political competition in Macedonia polarizes on identity issues and converges in socio-economic ones, creating an environment where incumbent's pressure to deliver programmatically on socio-economic issues in order to outcompete opponents is lower. Indeed, the right-wing VMRO DPMNE (*Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity*) and BDI (*Bashkimi Demokratik per Integrim* or DUI, Democratic Union for Integration), radicalizes in 2010 even more the electorate along national identity issues and the opposition has almost to boycott the political system to alternate in power years later. Not so in Albania, where political competition remains polarized on socio-economic and less so on identity issues, and the Democratic Party has little chance to win power on identity issues and is replaced

⁶⁴⁰ Hislope (2013)

regularly by the Socialist Party.

Second, in this period I substantiate the argument further with analysis of government performance and socio-economic indicators of unemployment, inequality and government debt across the two countries. Such different *kinds* of political competition between the party systems in the two countries entails lower electoral pressure on programmatic performance in Macedonia than in Albania. Although the Albanian government in this period did not perform miraculously better in securing the impartiality of state institutions, the right-wing Macedonian incumbency distinctively follows a different line than the Albanian one, by promoting costly nationalistic policies and radicalizing the political environment on identity politics more than the socialist-led government in the previous mandate and by controlling the state apparatus. The nationalistic line of Gruevski – leader of VMRO-DPMNE – prevented the country from becoming a NATO member in 2008. Domestically, the coalition ruled clientelistically by hiring and firing in administration along ethnic lines, and doing little progress in both EU reforms combined with little socio-economic improvement. Albania, right-wing government instead did some good progress in Euro-Atlantic relations becoming a NATO member in 2009, as it further improved the social and living standards seen in unemployment, reduction of poverty and inequality measures more than Macedonia. Consequently, I claim that such different *natures* of political competition in the two countries has entailed higher electoral pressure in Albania and lower pressure in Macedonia on party governments to deliver based on programmatic issues in order to win elections and lower incentives to improve bureaucracies.

Macedonia faces an electorate uncertain on identity issues with deep ethnic divisions and higher opportunity for voters to be ‘distracted’⁶⁴¹ on socio-economic issues and this is not the case in Albania. The clientelistic linkages of VMRO-DPMNE and DUI with voters along ethnic lines, used state administration as a *means* to stay in power through provision of jobs rather than policy effectiveness. The change of strategies in 2008 of the right-wing VMRO–DPMNE in coalition with ethnic Albanian party, DUI, towards higher ethnicization of politics results in identity enhancing policies⁶⁴², where the two parties in incumbency govern clientelistically along ethnic

⁶⁴¹ Tavits and Letki (2014).

⁶⁴² On the VMRO-DPMNE side, the party followed a policy of nation building called, antiquization policy. This led almost to what Hislope (2012) calls a 19th century version of nation-building, where VMRO-DPMNE uses what French Marxist Louis Althusser famously labelled ‘ideological state apparatuses’ to steer the public consciousness into consent for this new hegemony (p.16). DUI instead acted as an ethnic regional party representing Albanians in Macedonia (Georgiev 2007; Siljanovska-Davkova 2005). It made the ethnic quote and representation of Albanians in state administration as the main goal. This political goal of providing Albanians with a sense of higher representation in state institutions was crucial, as they have been excluded from being a part of executive decision making power of the state (Interview no.1).

identity lines and the two ethnic different parties divide the stakes of the state along these patronage lines to deliver to their ethnic communities either minimally with some social benefits to the poor and prestigious jobs in administration, without improving much of the social and living standards of citizens⁶⁴³. Right-wing incumbents in Macedonia, did not need a well-functioning administration to outcompete opponents to stay in power, they could raise the 'ethnic card' instead.

Macedonia distinctively to Albania follows politically costly nationalistic policies, that have halted the EU reform progress. Incumbents would face both lower EU and electoral pressure and could deflect much more easily on programmatic delivery. Since there was little pressure on government to deliver and little need to improve administrative capability as a means of winning power, they just controlled the state administration and the regulation of the state. In face of high unemployment in the country they have rather delivered selective benefits in using administration as an 'employment machine' and provision of some social benefits, contributing minimally to improvement in socio-economic terms. Indeed, voters choose VMRO-DPMNE and DUI, in five consecutive elections, by ending up not having what they needed both in terms of EU reform progress as well as socio-economic improvement. Macedonia, viewed a bloated public sector, followed by nation-building policies in high expenditure in infrastructure and monuments building, and little socio-economic improvement leading to high levels of inequality and highest unemployment rates in the region. The clientelistic machine of the government could be financed based on IMF loans, causing a high indebtedness reaching 60% of the GDP. Voters, 'distracted' by identity issues, ended up having a high economic and democratic price to pay due to national identity uncertainties. Politics just used that for its own benefit.

This was not so in in Albania. Having a different social structure to Macedonia, the country has produced a different kind of political competition between left and right parties standing differently on socio-economic issues and converging on identity issues. Hence, voters have been less distracted on identity issues and have forced incumbents to deliver on some programmatic issues in order to outcompete opponents. In this period the DP-led government under Sali Berisha, still uses party patronage in administration as a resource to compensate for its weak organizational power. However, Berisha had to follow some programmatic orientation as well in what his party promised to deliver both with regard to EU reform targets and to voters and in order to do so, administrative capability in terms of expertise was needed. As a result, it faced a higher electoral pressure to maintain administrative capability as non-delivery would have had a high electoral cost on the government. This restrained political hiring and firing to serve only party activism purposes

⁶⁴³ Hislope (2008, 2012).

and hinder administrative efficiency.

Additionally, due to the nature of political competition being on socio-economic cleavages, alternation in power to the Socialist Party in 2013, led to an increase of programmatic orientation in government over -time in Albania leading further to higher professionalization levels, more than Macedonia. Differences in social structure, conditional on different nature of political competition, provide differences in electoral pressure to deliver and hence incentive to improve bureaucracies. An ethnic divided country, due to parties' strategies in polarizing competition on identity issues and not delivering programmatically, provides higher incentives to parties to trap bureaucracies in institutionally clientelistic equilibrium of high politicization and low administrative capability.

The chapter is divided in three sections. The first section, provides how the two countries have performed differently in levels of politicization and professionalization in 2010, by also showing an except on the path of civil service reforms in Macedonia from 2000–10. The second one tests alternative explanations based on administrative legacies, political competition and Europeanization paths. The third section outlines the variation in nature of political competition and government performance in the two countries.

A SNAPSHOT OF VARIATION IN LEVELS OF PROFESSIONALIZATION

The Macedonian and Albanian civil service reforms were launched in the second decade of democratic reform between 1990 and 2000. The variation lies mainly across time and the degree of bureaucratic professionalization in the two countries, ending up in different *kinds* of bureaucracies. The pattern behind politicization in the various practices remains similar in both countries, as both show high levels of electoral turnover, depth of political appointment in the hierarchy and importance of party activism in recruitments. The variation across time and across countries in levels of politicization is not the most crucial one and will not be explored in this chapter for the sake of keeping the argument coherent. There is a much more crucial variation regarding levels of competence as shown in Chapter 3. Both Albania and Macedonia represent two countries that perform best (Albania) and worse (Macedonia) in these indicators in comparison to the rest of the countries in the region and therefore on how politicization combines positively in Albania but does not in Macedonia.

The civil service reform cycle, however, in Macedonia could be distinguished between the launching of reform from 1997–2002, to the immediate phase after reform from 2002 to 2006 and

the second phase of reform, from 2006 to 2010, showing similar path to the Albanian one. In both countries, civil service reforms performed better when the socialist governments were in power (2001-2006), than when the right-wing ones, led from the DP in Albania in 2005 and from the coalition of right wing ethnic Macedonian VMRO-DPMNE and ethnic Albania DUI (Democratic Union for Integration) in Macedonia in 2006. However, I am most interested in shedding light in the different outcomes in bureaucratic professionalization in the period between 2005–09 in Albania and 2006–10 in Macedonia, as this is mostly puzzling to the literature.


Civil service reforms followed a period of slow progress in administering the law and adopting better legal frameworks under both governments in this period, combined with an increase in levels of politicization. However, from 2008 onwards⁶⁴⁴ Macedonia further diverges away and deteriorates even more in how the party controls all state institutions inclusive civil service, leading not only to higher increase in levels of politicization than in Albania, but as well on lower competence. Right wing-DP led government (2005–09) while it had used politicization as a tool for organizational survival with the state, it has not hired and fired politically without any consideration of competence.

In contrast, the VMRO-DPMNE and DUI-led government in Macedonia replaced all inherited civil servants progressively more after 2008, and DUI continued to build ethnic representation of Albanians by distributing jobs as an identity-enhancing policy. The ethnically divided coalition with strong opposed views on national identity questions, seemed to ‘find the binding glue’⁶⁴⁵ only in dividing the stakes of state administration among party patronage at the cost of meritocracy and competence. The results just show this. In 2010, based on Meyer Sahling (2010) expert survey dataset, the index of show that within the countries across ministries, the Macedonian state appears indeed, to have reached lowest levels of competence and highest level of politicization in the Ministry of Economy, as shown in Figure 19.1. Across ministries, indeed there is as well politicization spread almost equally everywhere, despite the Secretariat for European Affairs (SEA). The Ministry of Health, Interior and Finance were ruled by VMRO-DPMNE and the Ministry of Economy and SEA by DUI.

⁶⁴⁴ Interview no.3 Macedonia.

⁶⁴⁵ Hislope (2008), p.4.


Figure 19: Albania and Macedonia: variation in administrative outcomes between levels of politicization and expertise across ministries in 2010



Graphs by sector

Source: Meyer-Sahling expert survey data set (2010)

Figure 19.1: Albania and Macedonia: Administrative levels of politicization and expertise in 2010



Source: Meyer-Sahling expert survey data set (2010)

The ministry traditionally ruled from Albanian parties, has as well lowest levels of competence. Additionally, then Albanian government seemed to politicize less Ministry of Finance and European Integration and more the Ministry of Economy and Health. The interesting ministry that shows the distinctive influence of party over the state, is regarding the Ministry of Finance that usually is the lease de-politicized and most expert ministry this is not the case in Macedonia. The cross-ministerial variation shows that levels of competence are lower than in Albania generally,

whereas levels of politicization are higher.

The research question is: why do we observe a divergence of civil service reform outcomes between levels of professionalization and as well an increase in politicization levels in Macedonia? Why has Macedonia deteriorated in enforcing bureaucratic professionalization in comparison to Albania in 2010? Before answering this question, I first show the trend in Macedonia in civil service reforms, by hinting that reforms in 2006 onwards deteriorated particularly under the VMRO-DPMNE and DUI led coalition in government.

Cycles of civil service reforms in Macedonia 1997–2010

Civil service reforms⁶⁴⁶ in Macedonia can be distinguished in three periods of the reform cycle, similar to the Albanian ones: the launching of reform from 1997–2002, the immediate phase after reform from 2002 to 2006 and the second phase of reform, from 2006 to 2010⁶⁴⁷.

Launch of reform: 2000–02

Macedonia embarked on civil service reforms in 2000 under the center-right nationalistic government led by VMRO-DPMNE and the Albanian Democratic party, PDSH, one year before the ethnic civil war. In this first phase, they amended four times the newly adopted law and issued various secondary legislation.

The recruitment procedures laid down the rules of selection and entrance in the civil service characterized by an open competition procedure for all job categories. The selection of candidates remained politically constrained though.⁶⁴⁸ Remuneration was based on a position-based salary system that rewards qualification based on education, working experience and seniority. However, the salary classification schemes across job categories were not unified. The civil service management authority (CSA) had little capacity to enforce its authority horizontally and its organizational capacities remained weak⁶⁴⁹.

⁶⁴⁶ It is based on the formal rule adoption as well as their implementation in practice by analyzing the remuneration and recruitments processes: (i) the formal procedures of recruitment and remuneration, (ii) effectiveness of civil service management agencies in implementing procedures; (iii) implementation of such procedures in practice.

⁶⁴⁷ Civil service reforms are based on a legal analysis of laws and their implementation based on release of secondary legislation, primary sources, such as government decrees, government documents, and strategies; as well as secondary sources, like various report from the OECD- SIGMA, domestic think-tanks on the implementation of civil service laws from 2000-2010.

⁶⁴⁸ The central management institutions proposed only the three best candidates and the decisions on the best candidate remained a political one, irrespective of which job category.

⁶⁴⁹ The average budget allocation of the CSA amounted to 450.000 Euro, where 70% of its budget was used only for paying personnel salaries.

The coalition maintained its stability in government even during and also one year after the ethnic tensions and armed conflict in 2001. Under heightened external pressure from European Union and other organizations, the Ohrid Framework Agreement was the peace deal signed that ended the armed conflict, and set the foundation for improving inclusion and representation of civic rights of the ethnic minority of Albanians. This required an adaptation of legislation in the constitution and in the civil service laws (CSL) in reaching such better representation.

Re-Launch of Reform: 2000–06

The next government, composed of the center-left party, such as the SDSM (Social Democratic Union) and the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) resumed the implementation of reforms based on the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) and the further adoption of secondary legislation. In this period, the CSL was again amended more than four times. These amendments entailed the broadening of the scope of the civil service to the sub-national level and the integration of the OFA principle of just and equitable representation of ethnic minorities. Indeed, ‘an analysis on the ethnical composition of the civil service, done in 2002 by the CSA, clearly showed that the Albanians were underrepresented in civil service reaching only 5%.⁶⁵⁰ However this improved over time. In this period, there was an overall will both from civil servants and politicians to eradicate all possible influences in civil service and establish a professional and impartial civil service. The acting Head of CSA describes his attempts in those days as following:

My idea was to professionalize the administration, and I was very radical at this and very revolutionary for the Macedonian administration. They didn’t listen of course because I wanted to eliminate political influence completely from public administration by forbidding civil servants to be members of political parties because the law was saying at that time even now, that they should restrain from political activities during working hours but this is all wrong. This is nothing because if you are member of a party you are doing something, it doesn’t matter from 8 to 4 or afterwards. I wanted to forbid civil servants completely to be members of political parties, but it was not accepted by any party in these years.

The new legislation adopted in 2004⁶⁵¹ stipulated that the recruitment systems should be based on an open competition only for the non-positive discriminated groups. Formally, the procedure

⁶⁵⁰ Interview no.2 Macedonia.

⁶⁵¹ Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No.40/04

suggested competitiveness and merit in the recruitment of the lesser-represented community groups, by requiring the successful conduct of a training exam (based on points)⁶⁵².

Practically however, the 'passive representation' has been highly successful in numerical terms⁶⁵³, but challenges remained in the credibility of meritocratic recruitment systems due to following reasons. First, the legal system already left some loopholes for a 'spoil-system' by not requiring the passage of an exam for the minority groups. Second, the CSA, remaining weakly staffed, could not effectively always organize the trainings needed for the minority groups, even if it was supported from European Union funded projects. Third, there was a discrepancy in education levels between the Albanian and Macedonian candidates, therefore, Albanians had to be somehow discriminated positively. Finally, the process of achieving numerical increase in representation, and as well, managing to integrate them within the hierarchical positions is a difficult and long enduring process that can't be accomplished in one government mandate. This is how the situation between equitable representation and meritocracy from the former head of the CSA:

You cannot improve from 5% to 25% in no time, this takes years. You must educate. You must have a long-term strategy of 10-20 years, you cannot do this overnight. You have hierarchy in the administration, these newly recruited 600 Albanian candidates need with time to advance in hierarchy. Although I achieved the needed representation, when I left, I had 22% Albanian employees, but they were still not satisfied, because in the managerial level, I had less than 20%. As a matter of fact, in the beginning I had only one single person in a managerial position, and the Albanian side complained. Yes, but how can I achieve this, my positions are filled. In order to get a good Albanian here I would have to get rid of a good Macedonian, how do you think I can do it. Unless he resigned.⁶⁵⁴

Finding this balance was hard to achieve as politically the ethnic party wanted to reach its target very quick administratively with lack of capacities and more time needed, results would have taken time and the capacities were weak. On the Albanian side, civil servants did not see this circumvention of meritocracy as problematic, as they legitimized the circumvention of meritocracy in civil service for a higher purpose, that is to include more Albanian representation in the state apparatus⁶⁵⁵. This stood in contrast to the opinions of media and civil society representatives that highly criticized the practices of DUI as being still clientelistic. They claimed that the party is

⁶⁵² Analytica (2011)

⁶⁵³ It contributed to an increase by 6,62% of the Albanian community in the period of 2004-2006.

⁶⁵⁴ Interview no.1 Macedonia.

⁶⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

playing the ‘ethnic card’ too much but still excluding at the same time competent and well qualified Albanians who are not willing to contribute to party activism once in civil service⁶⁵⁶. Indeed, many of the civil society representatives claimed that such practices have demotivated qualified and competent candidates on the Albanian side, to be part of that employment machine.⁶⁵⁷

Nevertheless, during an interview with civil servants at Ministry of Economy, they claimed that the Albanians in Macedonia never had the privilege to serve the state and be part of the state institutions. Hence, the only struggle the Albanians parties have once in government is not so much about programmatic deliverables, but on representation issues. How many Albanians has the party employed in the state is the thing that counts. As the interviewees claimed:

It does not matter if the one who enters the state administration is intelligent, competent, or an expert, important is that Albanians are part of the state. The Albanian universities are as well not of that capacity to produce high qualified human capital at those levels that is needed for public administration to absorb on capacity. Now we have reached the 25% in some ministries, like Ministry of Economy, but still on many others, this is by far not reached.

However, what mattered still to DUI, was not only Albanians, but Albanians who were willing to be activists of the party once in civil service.

Overall, despite the problem of the ethnic representation in Albania foregoing some meritocracy, on the Macedonian side, the public administration in this period (2000–06), as some describe it, if it was politicized it was only done for some more ‘nepotistic purposes’⁶⁵⁸, but not clear party activism, as becomes the case in the following mandate. With all the difficulties, SDSM was under international pressure committed to the cause of reforming public administration as already shown above, by both allowing higher participation of Albanians that wanted to reach equally the size of their population 25% representation.⁶⁵⁹ The extract below shows how politicization in the state was somehow still prevalent, but was not done in order to gain more electoral support and activism, resembling as well the pattern of the successor of the communist party in Albania:

So in between 2003 to 2006 when SDSM was in power and I was at the CSA I can tell you that I never received phone calls from any party official, to ask me to

⁶⁵⁶ Interview no.5 Macedonia.

⁶⁵⁷ Interview no.5, and no.6 Macedonia.

⁶⁵⁸ Interview no.12 Macedonia.

⁶⁵⁹ Interview no. 7 Macedonia, Interview no.5 Macedonia.

‘take care’ of someone. Yes, I was receiving phone calls from the party people even officials, but that was not on the party ground, but on the private ground. If someone was calling, I know he was not calling on behalf of the party, he was calling on behalf of his private interest, asking me some favour for people he would know, but not for party members. In these 3 years at the CSA, I never received organized party influence for employment as it happened later on. It was more nepotism than party influence in terms of party activism, but this was over in 2006.⁶⁶⁰

The remuneration system and allowances for civil servants entered only partially into force in April 2004. The salaries improved slightly more in comparison to the private sector by becoming more competitive. However, the difference in wages across public administration and the high wages of staff not covered by the CSL, obstructed staff mobility and modernization of the public administration and results in uneven quality and higher turnover⁶⁶¹.

Second period of reform: 2006–10

In this last phase of reform, the new government, led by a coalition formed from the center-right party, VMRO-DPMNE and the Albanian party, DUI (Democratic Union for Integration) reversed all reforms one so far not at the formal level but in practice. First, in 2009 the party adopted substantial amendments to the Law on Civil Servants, related to the scope of law, the competencies of CSA, entry requirement and recruitment procedures, mobility and internal competitions, salaries and horizontal career steps.⁶⁶² However, the analysis of the legislative improvements is of less use as practices diverged substantially from it. The coalition undermined previous government efforts towards increasing bureaucratic competence. The new VMRO-led government adopted new selection procedures by excluding the State General Secretary from the open competition procedures and increasing partisan influence. Secondly, while transferring the responsibility of the recruitment of minority groups from the CSA to the Secretariat for the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (SIOFA), they have also dropped the few merit characteristics for the previous recruitment procedures, like the training of potential entrants and the passage of the training exam before entering the civil service system.⁶⁶³

At the practical level, two pieces of evidence show how the civil service was subverted in

⁶⁶⁰ Interview no. 2 Macedonia.

⁶⁶¹ SIGMA (2006a).

⁶⁶² SIGMA (2012a).

⁶⁶³ SIGMA (2007).

practice, and how the two main coalition parties split power through patronage stakes in the public administration. The first piece of evidence relates to how DUI ruled the state administration. Having the main responsibility of the SIOFA under the clear responsibility of the ethnic Albanian party DUI, has given more room to discretion to such party to increase political appointments. Moreover, the SIOFA recruitment plans entailed minority quotas fixed on an annual basis (not constitutionally), which remained poorly coordinated with ministerial needs on new vacancies. This led SIOFA to open vacancies and hire new candidates massively without ministerial demand on such vacancies.

However, because such new recruitments were done without proper needs assessment of the ministries, there was political opposition on the ministerial side to accept the newly recruited candidates. Many ministers refused to hire, as first the criteria of merit and examination was not always guaranteed, second, they had many times no need for such human capital⁶⁶⁴. Numerical number of representation was reached, but many remained not well represented at the highest levels or not integrated at all in the administration⁶⁶⁵. Due to this lack of coordination horizontally between ministerial needs and SIOFA acting as the arm-length of DUI in recruitments, the situation became from an administrative perspective ‘catastrophic’⁶⁶⁶. More and more new ethnic Albanian candidates were hired, without SIOFA managing to redistribute them. The overstaffed administration (that exceeded even the physical capacities of the premises of the state institutions) and the absence of systematized recruitment have led to the ‘practice of ‘home employment’⁶⁶⁷.

Moreover, the budgetary costs were a high financial burden on the Macedonian state, and as well demotivating further the younger Albanian professionals, as many were hired but they were paid to stay at home. As the former head of the CSA explained:

The average salary for a civil servant with taxes is 500 euros. They receive the salaries but they do not know what to do and have to stay at home although they are hired and paid to work for the civil service. I had one case like this, he is now the deputy director of the agency. In 2006, I call SIOFA, and ask about some Albanians on the list because I needed employees and the finance ministry is not allowing to make new hiring. But I knew SIOFA had them on the roster so I told them ‘I’d like to have some’, I told them. So, I integrated a lot of guys from such rosters, but I told SIOFA to give me a ‘white list’ and I would do the

⁶⁶⁴ Interview no.4 and no.6 and no.9 Macedonia.

⁶⁶⁵ MISA (2011, 2011a).

⁶⁶⁶ Interview no. 10, no.6 Macedonia.

⁶⁶⁷ Analytica (2011), p. 5.

selection. I do not want names, I will do my interviews, and I did it personally. I took this guy he is now deputy director of the agency, he was junior associate and he told me that he was already employed for one year but was just sitting at home. He told me: 'I am really frustrated, it's not about money, I receive some money on my bank account for nothing. I want to work and to earn this money.' This has been the situation of integrating Albanians in the state administration.⁶⁶⁸

As already mentioned, on the Albanian side, many competent and professional candidates were excluded⁶⁶⁹. The development of the employment policy of DUI, showed that DUI, used the 'ethnic card' strategy to increase its own influence politically by as well using the bad economic situation and the need of Albanians to be part of the Macedonian state administration and have employment in the state. Finally, as the Albanian and Macedonian relations are societally not solved, the question of representation in administration of Albanians has repercussions on the Macedonian side.

In this period, in contrast to the previous one, every position that was opened on the Albanian side led to the counter strategy on employment of civil servants on the Macedonian side.⁶⁷⁰ This leads me to the *second aspect* that shows, how then on the Macedonian side of the coalition, VMRO-DPMNE increased politicization happened. The implementation of merit-based open competition has been subverted substantially through the appointment of temporary staff.⁶⁷¹ While DUI-led parties had just 5 ministries, the real problem was not caused just by the Albanian side foregoing meritocracy in name of ethnic representation, but how VMRO-DPMNE purged the state administration in this period along its loyalists as not seen in previous governments. The government adopted a regulation in 2006 allowing private personnel agencies to 'lease' their staff to state institutions.⁶⁷²

As one of the interviewees claims 'VRMO- DPMNE wanted a smooth takeover of all portfolios of all policies of everything, so they needed the establishment, so they strategically took over of all the organization of the public administration, and then they started first to employ let's say smaller number of people. In finances, everywhere also in the secretariat, but first in the

⁶⁶⁸ Interview no.2 Macedonia.

⁶⁶⁹ Interview no.4 Macedonia.

⁶⁷⁰ Interview no.2 Macedonia.

⁶⁷¹ Currently there are no data on the exact amount of temporary staff, but this practice has been used increasingly even more in the period from 2008 onwards (Interview no.2 Macedonia).

⁶⁷² This undermines the procedure of open competition because many employees, being already insiders are reintegrated through formal examinations, without passing the open competition procedures. CSA organizational capacities have remained weak in counteracting to this process, as appointments based on temporary contracts are beyond the responsibility of the CSA.

finances. However, in 2006, when they had taken over power one interviewee explained:

They demoted. It was nearly 20%. It was not a big change back then. It was even 10% at the beginning. Just that year. Sigma (2009) explains that the practice of demotion (re-assignment to a lower position) had become the common one and led to an increase in complaints submitted by the civil servants affected by such demotions.⁶⁷³

Through these demotions, civil servants were re-assigned to positions of lower rank and responsibility, freeing the higher positions for other civil servants to fill through 'reassignments'.⁶⁷⁴ The year 2008 onwards counted as the year when everything was reversed. Then there were using simple party lists'.⁶⁷⁵

Sigma (2006a), as the technical body from Brussels responsible for monitoring reforms, evaluates in this period the situation to have deteriorated even further while concluding that:

There is still very little understanding on the part of the political elite that a politicized civil service is contrary not only to the interests of the general public but also to the interests of any government that wants its policies to be professionally developed and successfully implemented.⁶⁷⁶

Then they started to purge the state even more both in the administration at massive levels and always much more aggressively against any principle of impartiality'.⁶⁷⁷ The situation in these periods got very precarious so that the old built institutions and CSA came under pressure just to follow rules.

As already described the situation started in 2006 slowly but after 2008, it increasingly showed that the intention of those parties in power was to use the state as an electoral machine. The former head of the CSA explained how he received certain phone calls and was asked to circumvent the procedures, and how then later one they had to simply recruit new civil servants based on party lists:

Listen guys we have some people who we would like to have employed so let's help them somehow, can we do something? This person passed the exam so let's go smoothly through the interview, that kind of thing. It was very nice at the

⁶⁷³ Interview no. 4 Macedonia.

⁶⁷⁴ SIGMA (2006a), p.19.

⁶⁷⁵ Interview no.3 Macedonia.

⁶⁷⁶ SIGMA (2006a), p.12.

⁶⁷⁷ Interview no.2 and no.1 Macedonia.

beginning in the low level, then the pressure and level was raised. They were not very polite, they started sending requests prior to the exam process until 2008. Then from 2008 they were not asking anymore, they'd come in the morning and tell us at the CSA, these two guys and say to our members of the committee, this is the list of people that needs to pass. It was verbal communication. And then my people started turning to me and asking what do we do? They tried to fight the system as much as we can. But we could not fight because since 2008 the public administration reform was completely forgotten by the government. Since then politicization was introduced then even more openly'.⁶⁷⁸

Additionally, and increasingly over time in the period VMRO-DPMNE introduced the party lists to hire and fire in civil service at their discretion. Examples from the media have shown how VMRO-DPMNE party had used through own orders to hire certain activists in certain ministries, at the municipal level in state owned public enterprises⁶⁷⁹. Another report in the same period showed how important electoral activism in the party has become for having a job in the administration. 'In a recently leaked (highly classified) document by a web portal, containing full personal and contact details of members of a ruling political party that have been secured a work place in the public sector only substantiated the mental perception among the population that political affiliations, are a key criterion to wining oneself a recruitment in the public administration'.⁶⁸⁰ 'The problem of DUI, seemed like the least one in comparison to the right-wing party practices. Hislope (2006) described this situation as "the Macedonian and Albanian political class regularly utilized corruption to grease the wheels of interethnic coalition government".⁶⁸¹ However, it can be claimed that clientelism in administration seemed as well like the "accommodating device"⁶⁸² that 'helped otherwise implacable foes maintain cordial relations'⁶⁸³, without the need though to administer programmatically and without consensually agreeing on how to rule better the government. 'Better that spoils are shared rather than blood spilled, so the reasoning goes'.⁶⁸⁴

The Ombudsman's report later on in 2013 describes the situation at the local level even more deleterious:

⁶⁷⁸ Interview no.2 Macedonia.

⁶⁷⁹ Available as well in the newspaper A1 on 20 February 2014 at the following address: <http://a1on.mk/archives/286347> [accessed 23.05.2015]

⁶⁸⁰ Analytica (2011), p.6.

⁶⁸¹ Hislope (2006), p.10.

⁶⁸² Bayley (1966), p.730.

⁶⁸³ Hislope (2006), p.12.

⁶⁸⁴ Hislope (2006), p.8.

In all these procedures the Ombudsman found illegal actions by mayors, that is not applying the provisions of the Law on Civil Servants in the implementation of assessment procedures for civil servants and procedures of termination of employment, then he determined actions contrary to the provisions of the Labour Law, and incorrect application of the substantive law - the Law on Primary Education and the Law on Secondary Education and failure to conduct legal proceedings provided for early termination of office of principals.⁶⁸⁵

The practices of politicization have been done very openly by attacking state institutions and providing ‘jobs for the boys’ in public administration. The consideration of the administration as a property of the ruling party has produced a weakened administration.⁶⁸⁶ The constant reshuffling of trained civil servants, the replacements of underqualified officials, the imposture of the parties’ rule in the state, has undermined the morale and the professionalism in state institutions. Instead the government remained reliant on a heavy burden of public expenditure, administrative incapability to deal with EU reforms and other accomplishments in market economy and democracy. Policy delivery remained very weak and yet the coalition stayed in power from 2006-2014.

Summarizing these different findings from interviews and other documents and newspaper articles, we can see the political parties had navigated out of the ethnic conflict by building on such identity cleavages and further dividing the state of patronage within the administration.⁶⁸⁷ Hence, there was first the problem that SIOFA is put on the same level as all other ministries and SIOFA recruited people instead of simply acting as a guardian of equity, under the leadership of DUI. While this institutional mechanism helped the Albanian Party DUI to integrate as many ethnic Albanians as possible, the ethnic Macedonian VMRO-DPMNE first politicized the civil service in more ‘hidden ways’ and then went very openly with party lists, asking civil servants to act as activists, or replace old inherited civil servants with its own activists, or even guarantee further votes. VMRO-DPMNE was very selective and increased its party membership in administration by further replacing people, even though they had a considerable electorate.⁶⁸⁸

⁶⁸⁵ Ombudsman (2014), p. 10.

⁶⁸⁶ Analytica (2011).

⁶⁸⁷ Giandomenico (2013); Hislope (2013).

⁶⁸⁸ Interview no.3 Macedonia.

The strategy was to purge the state positions, making Macedonia a country under the strong leadership of authoritarian practices of Gruevski⁶⁸⁹. The administration helped to receive even more votes, on both sides. Hence, the clientelism in administration, was a multiplication of power for both sides a strategy to rule together without programmatic orientation, with disastrous results for the capability administration. Therefore, in this period as well all indicators start to deteriorate in both democratization (Figure 20 below), good governance indicators, and showing an increase in clientelistic practice.⁶⁹⁰

Table 16: Macedonia’ performance in civil service reform from 2000–10

Launch of reform: 2000–02		After reform: 2000–06		Second period of reform: 2006–10	
Recruitment	Dismissals	Recruitment	Dismissals	Recruitment	Practices
No competition; No politically constrained selection; Usage of labor code for recruitment process	Reshuffling of civil service positions	Open Competition, <i>moderately</i> politically constrained, but ethnic minorities positively discriminated and in competition within the group	Little Reshuffling	Open competition, <i>politically constrained</i> (secretary general exempted), temporary contracts and increase in political interferences	High political interferences in recruitment along ‘party lists’; Employment based on quota without meritocratic consideration

The purge of the state received international recognition later on and in 2015, the so-called wire taping scandal or ‘bombs’⁶⁹¹ were published in media openly showing that the politicization had penetrated the state too far in its authority. According to contemporary news article: ‘the content of the tapes reveals a comprehensive, deep, and sophisticated system of corrupt and authoritarian rule, while the conversations are marked with profanity, hate speech, slander and ethnic slurs that are unacceptable in everyday communication’.⁶⁹² The connection of the party reached every corner of the state, from police, to judiciary and state administration.

⁶⁸⁹ Interview no.3 and no.7 Macedonia.

⁶⁹⁰ see Appendix Chapter 6, Graph 5.

⁶⁹¹ The so-called bombs were as well detailed published in Aljazeera and are available at <https://interactive.aljazeera.com/ajb/2015/makedonija-bombe/eng/bomba-02.html> [accessed 23.07.2015].

⁶⁹² see for more Balkaninsight on 23 June 2015 available at <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/blog/gruevski-does-not-deserve-any-more-chances> [accessed 23.07.2015]


ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

The question remains as to why Macedonia has deteriorated in enforcing bureaucratic professionalization in comparison to Albania in 2010. The alternative accounts that are tested here are based on three accounts: administrative legacies, political competition and Europeanization studies. I first show the trend in Macedonia in civil service reforms, by hinting that reforms in 2006 onwards deteriorate particularly under the VMRO-DPMNE and DUI led Government in comparison to Albania. Then I test for all the three explanations before and show how social structure obstructs reform.

Administrative relations in Albania and Macedonia in the democratization period

This section highlights first the general political-administrative relations in Albania and Macedonia by tracing their democratization path along V-Dem indicators on regime type.

Figure 20: Democratization paths in Albania and Macedonia from 1990–2015



The two countries had different communist regimes and different paths of state building from the end of the communist regime. The starting point of transition, as can be seen from Figure 25 above, looked very different for the two countries. The transition period from 1990s until 2010 can be sub-divided in two periods of democratization and institutional reforms. In the first years of the transition, from 1990 until 2000, Albania experienced a slow or even no progress towards democratic consolidation, and in 1997 almost a total collapse of the state. Macedonia, instead, performed better and had the most peaceful transition process in comparison to the other

countries in the region that dissolved from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ)⁶⁹³. This first peaceful period was interrupted by the ethnic conflict in 2001. Therefore, in both countries broad transition problems have been reflected in the countries' transformation of political-administrative relations mostly in the first period of reform from 1990–2000. Albania had higher levels of bureaucratic fusion with civil service than Macedonia before 2000.

This period started in 2000 and was accompanied by a wave of intensive institutional reforms and greater democratization efforts to align to various requirements of international organizations, such as the European Union, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It is in this period, where Albania has done efforts towards democratic consolidation by leaving behind the authoritarian driven regime, through regeneration of the opposition parties. Macedonia saw an improvement in the levels of democratic consolidation in 2001. It has been stagnating since then and from 2006 onward it has experienced various anti-democratic trends, particularly from 2010 onwards, as the graph above shows.

However, it was in this second period of democratic consolidation (2000–10) that the countries embarked on reforms of political administrative relations by introducing civil service reforms. In 2010 they had both pluralistic structures in place and alternation in power to sustain democracy. However, Macedonia backslid in 2006 and Albania has been performing better than Macedonia in insulating its bureaucracy from politics, despite unfavourable conditions owing to its communist past. Macedonia remains a puzzling case in the region, of a country that performed best in the transition period where all the rest was struggling, and reversed to an illiberal path when other countries, in the region were performing better.

The research question is: Why do we observe a divergence of civil service reform outcomes between levels of professionalization and as well an increase in politicization levels in Macedonia? Why has Macedonia deteriorated in enforcing bureaucratic professionalization in comparison to Albania in 2010?

Administrative legacies

Albania and Macedonia's different administrative legacies cannot predict the variation in levels of professionalization. Both legacies based on degree of fusion of party and state relations,

⁶⁹³ Bunce (1999).

as well as mode of transition that was more ‘pacted’ in Macedonia, and less so in Albania, we would have expected Macedonia to have a higher heritage of expertise and as well higher insulation of civil service. In 2010 the data shown both in figure 1.1 and 1.2 at the beginning of this thesis and as well the figures above, prove the opposite. Macedonia ended up with higher politicized administrative structures and lower accumulation of expertise in the state administration than Albania. The evidence below shows that administrative legacies are not useful in predicting outcomes.

First, both countries started from very different degree of party –state relations, due to their different communist regimes: Albania had a totalitarian regime, while Macedonia, as a member of the SFRJ, had a more communist regime that was more accommodating to the nationalities, which implied a higher extent to which civil servant were legally protected in their careers from mandatory party loyalty. Albanian bureaucracy resembled more the patrimonial administration with less legalistic and formal nature in administration and more direct dependence of officials to the Communist Albanian Labour Party. Nepotism was as well strongly combined with party loyalty in advancement of careers⁶⁹⁴. Macedonia, although institutionally much weaker than the rest of the ex-Yugoslav Federation countries had technically a more expert and autonomous administration.

In the SFRJ there was a distinction legally between the functions of the Public Servants distinguishing it from the jobs under the Labour Law. The Law on Public Servants, enacted in 1957, replaced that of 1946, and defined the specific functions of the administration, distinguishing it from the jobs described under the Labor Law⁶⁹⁵. To be a civil servant in Macedonia and the rest of the ex-Yugoslav countries was not tied to mandatory party membership as in Albania, where it was unthinkable not to be a party member. However, although the link between party and state was not as fused as in the Albanian case, still in Macedonia party committees were created from within the civil service, while having close affiliates to the party counted still as the best assurance to becoming a civil servant.⁶⁹⁶ The civil servant position continued to be perceived as a prestigious job and despite political loyalty, there was an overall emphasis on technical expertise.⁶⁹⁷

While the fusion of administration in the past with the party between the two countries,

⁶⁹⁴ Biberaj (1999).

⁶⁹⁵ Sevic (2011).

⁶⁹⁶ Sevic (2011).

⁶⁹⁷ Analytica (2011, p.3).

can't help us understand the variation in bureaucratic reform outcomes, what happens in transition context between party and state relations is even less predictable in light of administrative legacies. The two countries, had different paths in transition convoluted with different problems: in 1997 Albania experiencing almost a state collapse, while Macedonia experiencing almost an ethnic conflict in 2001. In Albania, in 1992 the Democratic Party won power and started the reshuffling in administration already in that period, in Macedonia, that reshuffling did not happen before 1998, with the first- alternation in power from the successor of the communist party SDSM to the right-wing party VMRO-DPMNE (see Table 17 for an overview).

Macedonia in contrast to Albania, therefore had no discontinuation of administrative structures after its succession from Yugoslavia in 1991 until 1998. The administration was more stable and there was no turnover in civil servants in contrast to Albania. In Macedonia, the successor of the communist party – the SDSM led by Kiro Gligorov – created an expert government in the 1990s and helped the country towards transition from communism to democracy. In 1992 the party won elections and ruled Macedonia from 1992–98. It had undisputedly held power silently and kept the old structures within the state administration.⁶⁹⁸ 'Politicization was present from the very beginning after the independence' while civil service reforms were not initiated yet.⁶⁹⁹ The VMRO-DPMNE opposition party that emerged in 1990s, under the leadership of Ljubco Georgievski won power for the first time in 1998. VMRO-DPMNE in 1998 started to reshuffle for the first time the administration and placed its own people, similar to the Democratic Party in Albania that had done that back then in 1992. VMRO-DPMNE, installed their own people and they started employing increasingly more in 1998. 'The number of budgetary positions of civil servants in 1998 was about 50,000, the number of budgetary positions reached 85,000'.⁷⁰⁰ So they almost doubled the public administration with 35,000 new places'.⁷⁰¹

Some interviewees had judged such massive turnover as an unnecessary strategy as the administration inherited levels of expertise, others disagreed and claimed that the state administration needed a new 'esprit de corps'.⁷⁰²

The same happened in 2006, when this party returned to power and ruled together with

⁶⁹⁸ Interviewno.1 Macedonia.

⁶⁹⁹ Interview no.2 Macedonia.

⁷⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰¹ Interview no.2 Macedonia.

⁷⁰² Interview no.3 Macedonia.

DUI. Against the more progressive centre-left SDSM, VMRO-DPMNE won particularly based on more nationalistic rhetoric and the reshuffling started actively on both political party sides. In between 2000–06, SDSM, built a coalition with the Albanian ethnic party that had emerged in such a conflict, DUI, and both tried to pursue a delicate balance between ethnic representation and meritocracy in public administration. In this period, as in the one between 1991–98, little reshuffling and patronage-motivated politicization in administration occurred. Hence the civil service was much less de-stabilized than Albania in terms of patterns of reshuffling (see Table 17).

In contrast, Albania had experienced much earlier administrative reshuffling during the DP-led government and it followed the same pattern in 2005. Despite more favorable legacies in expertise and impartial civil service, Macedonia ends up in 2010 with high levels of politicization and lower levels of expertise than Macedonia. In contrast, the DP-led government in 2005-2010 in Albania although it had experienced a higher level of politicization, the state administration was not completely voided of its professionals. Therefore, legacies from the communist regime, or in patterns of reshuffling in transition context can't explain why Macedonia performed worse in administrative capability than Albania.

Table 17: Party state relations in Albania and Macedonia: Civil service reform outcomes and overview of explanations

Albania	
	1992-97
Administrative Reshuffling	Full reshuffling
Civil service Reform	No Reform
Party system competitiveness¹	Dominant Party
Alternation²	Whole-sale alternation
EU candidacy	
	1997-2001
	Moderate
	Adoption of CSL
	Dominant Party
	Whole-sale alternation
	2001-05
	No reshuffling
	Low politicization
	Two- party system
	Partial alternation
	2003: Launch of SAA negotiation
	2006: Signing SAA
	2005-10
	Full reshuffling
	High politicization
	High professionalization
	Two-party system
	Whole-sale alternation
	2009: Application for EU Membership
..... Macedonia	
	1992-98
Administrative Reshuffling	No reshuffling
Civil Service Reform	No reform
Party system competitiveness	Highly fragmented party system, in a two and half-format
Alternation	No alternation
EU Relations	
	1998-2001
	Moderate
	Adoption of CSL
	Highly fragmented party system, in a two and half-format
	Whole sale alternation
	2000: Launch of SAA negotiation
	2001: Signing SAA
	2000-06
	No reshuffling
	Moderate politicization
	Highly fragmented party system with two bi-polar sub-system of forces
	Partial alternation
	2004: Application for EU Membership
	2005: EU candidate status
	2006-10
	Moderate reshuffling
	High politicization
	High professionalization
	Highly fragmented party system with two bi-polar sub-system of forces
	2006: Whole sale alternation
	2008: No turnover
	2009: EU Commission recommends opening of negotiations

Source: 1: Party system competitiveness for Albania see Appendix Chapter 5, Table 1; for Macedonia see Appendix Chapter 6, Table 1, Graph 4); 2: Alternation see Appendix Chapter 6.

Political Competition and Europeanization

According to the hypothesis based on political competition⁷⁰³, party system institutionalization⁷⁰⁴, or pattern of alternation in power⁷⁰⁵, we would have expected that in 2010, the two countries to converge, or even Macedonia to do even better. Based on competitiveness of party system and democratic consolidation, we can't explain why, right-wing parties reversed and increased politicization without much consideration of merit in personnel selection, endangering state integrity in Macedonia more than in Albania. Finally, Europeanization literature predicts even less why the two countries performed so differently. Macedonia a country that received very fast the candidate status in 2005 and that has been always praised as a fast reformer, has managed to obstruct a last decade of efforts in building a professional civil service by 2010, whereas Albania has slowly built up in its efforts.

First, let's analyse briefly the Europeanization path. Macedonia was one of the pioneers in the region to embark peacefully out of the dismemberment of the SFRJ and initiate the EU pre-accession path. It began its formal process of pre-accession with the European Union in 2000, and it became the first country in the Western Balkans to sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), the first step towards European accession process. Navigating after the conflict of 2001, through the SDSM and DUI coalition in power, Macedonia showed willingness to make the right reforms toward the EU, despite all ethnic conflict problems. However, this path was reversed, when VMRO-DPMNE came to power and seized control over state institutions by fuelling further nationalistic rhetoric and not maintaining a progressive line. This was further accompanied with a rejection of Macedonia to enter NATO, increased tension in the unsolved 'name' issue with Greece, where Greece blocked the accession of the country and the process of the EU came to a halt. The situation within the administration, particularly in the Secretariat of European Affairs, that was contributing for the preparation of the EU accession process was described as below:

There was another spirit in the administration, year after year in that period of time when we were leaders in the region. All of a sudden due to the 'name issue', we are still locked in the similar position like before and we don't have instruments to motivate the administration to see the light at the end of the tunnel. For nine consecutive years we received recommendations but with no start of EU negotiations. All of a sudden, countries that were behind us, for

⁷⁰³ Gryzmala-Busse (2006).

⁷⁰⁴ O'Dwyer (2007).

⁷⁰⁵ Meyer Sahling and Veen (2013).

instance Montenegro now is in the driving seat with the negotiations. Serbia as well, Albania got candidate status. We are still in the same place and it gives you know. It is very demotivating for the civil servants. Especially in the integration, civil servants work, they copy paste the past because nothing new happens. If negotiations are open you can have opening benchmarks here, there everywhere. You will have the clear vision for your future, we are now locked and copy pasting some projects that are not very good and belong to the past.⁷⁰⁶

The Gruevski-led VMRO-DPMNE had won power, by promising voters to bring back somehow the ‘lost’ national identity, that through years of SDSM ruling had been undermined⁷⁰⁷. It seemed as if he built on the fear of ethnic Macedonians that their state was threatened to vanish from the inside due to the multiplicity of other ethnicities, and as well outside, by further pursuing nationalistic policies and provoking the situation not to get solved in the name dispute with Greece. Indeed, in 2009 Macedonia was rejected to become member of NATO, and solving the name dispute with Greece became a condition for the further advancement in the EU relations.

The optimism viewed in some of the Europeanization literature is thus challenged in light of the Macedonian evidence. Many would have predicted that political competition and active EU leverage to throw out the ‘illiberal forces’ for a very long time and build institutions. On the contrary, it seemed as the opposition could not mobilize power and find demand, political parties preyed on the state with the ‘ethnic card’. Figure 20 shows this divergence and deterioration in democratization path in Macedonia in comparison to Albania since 2008.

The opposite was the case in Albania where Euro-Atlantic relations improved over time. European accession was much slower and started to have its transformative effects due to the more difficult path in democratization later with Albania. It made really a change only after 2009. The SAA agreement was signed only in 2006, see Table 17 above, and Albania became a candidate only in 2014. The painful reforms in both judiciary and as well in various areas of rule of law and public administration confronted with a very polarised political system have delayed the country to receive the EU candidate status. Hence, while in 2010, Macedonia had all the doors open to EU, Albania seemed still far from it due to the need on internal reforms.

Despite this, although Albania counted as a difficult case in democratization, progressively political competition and European accession conditionality was leading more to the adaptation expected elsewhere in the literature⁷⁰⁸, by leading as well to higher professionalization of bureaucracies. However, the right-wing government, decided a different path and a more

⁷⁰⁶ Interview no.13 Macedonia.

⁷⁰⁷ Interview no. 11 Macedonia.

⁷⁰⁸ Vaduchova (2008).

nationalistic one. Therefore, in terms of increased European incentives and financial assistance towards the two countries in the pre-accession process, we should have expected, Macedonian politicians to improve their administration, by further implementing than reversing reforms more than in the Albanian case.

In terms of level of competitiveness, the Albanian and Macedonian party systems have grown increasingly more competitive and Macedonia has performed even better in terms of party system institutionalization⁷⁰⁹ having higher scores than Albania. Therefore, the incentive on reform should have been more in the former case. In Albania, (Appendix Chapter 5, Table 1) shows in variety of indicators of political competition, that both the marginal vote-difference between incumbent and opposition parties has grown.

This has as well led the country having a higher fragmentation of party systems, growing from a dominant party system from 1991–2001, to a more fragmented one with the fragmentation index increasing from 1.8 in 1991 to 2.60 in 2001 and 3.81 in 2005. In 2010 Albania had both a higher fragmented party system that rotated between DP and SP, and alternation in power with marginal vote difference decreasing between the two. Macedonia instead started already with a much more institutionalized party system (Appendix Chapter 5, Table 1), with fragmentation varying between 4.4 in 1991 to 4.16 in 2006, as well an organizationally stronger party system (see Appendix Chapter 5, Graph 4 and 5). The party system had as well provided substantial alternation, where both countries, should have not performed so differently. Hence, the indicators on party system competitiveness, like party system institutionalization, party fragmentation, marginal vote difference between incumbent and opposition and pattern of alternation in government don't predict why Macedonia performed worse than Albania.

What we observe though from 2006 onwards is a diminishing role of opposition, (see Graph 3 in Appendix Chapter 5). Particularly from 2008 onwards, an increase in 'clientelistic' linkages with voters, and a deterioration in free and fair elections from this period onwards is to be seen more than in Albania (see Graph 5 Appendix Chapter 5). It is in the same period, as well the right-wing VMRO-DPMNE captures strongly the state administration. Based on this we are tempted to find confirmation of the hypothesis of Gryzmala-Busse (2007). Indicators on party system competitiveness do not hint to this trend. The author claimed, that the less the opposition plays a role, the less state integrity could be guaranteed. However, this does not yet explain yet why does the opposition played less of a role and what were the party strategies that led to the

⁷⁰⁹ O'Dwyer (2006) claimed that the more parties are institutionalized, the more accountable are parties to the voters and hence, the more they will invest in administrative effectiveness.

diminishing role of opposition.

I claim, that what this literature misses is that the electoral strategies of the right-wing parties change when there are different social structures, reflected in different electoral cleavages. The main distinction why Macedonia performs poorly and Albania better in 2010 is that the cleavages have been instrumentalized differently by incumbent parties. As a result, such parties have seized state institutions to succumb to their party control. Hence, the role the opposition plays is affected from such incumbent party strategies rather than exogenously affecting incumbent's incentives. Hence, the *type* of political competition provides us with a better understanding, than just simply the diminishing role of opposition that is a consequence rather than the cause of why right-wing performed better in Albania and less so in Macedonia. The difference is that the right-wing parties did not find demand in Albania, and in Macedonia they could mobilize on identity issues, and hence opportunity structure to prey much easier on the state without delivering much increased as parties polarized competition on identity issues.

As a result, I provide an alternative answer to Grzymala-Busse (2007), by claiming that the *nature* of competition matters more in explaining why incumbents want or not to improve bureaucracies. In my claim, the direction on reforms towards state professionalization is not conditional on competitiveness. Rather the nature of political competition matters to predict its effect on parties' incentives to improve administration. Therefore, this alternative explanation views the role of opposition as a consequence of these incumbents' strategies in relation to social structure and hence the latter one as crucial to understand the electoral pressure to deliver on the public good and professionalization. Below I provide evidence for this claim.

ELECTORAL PRESSURE ON GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

As administrative legacies, Europeanization and political competition indicators can't explain much on the incentives side of parties regarding reform. I claim that electoral cleavages provide us with a better lens on how and why incumbents reverse their strategies away from administrative capability and higher predation towards the state apparatus. Crucial here is not the aspect on politicization but professionalization. A deeper look on how parties polarize competition around which issues – socio economic or identity issues⁷¹⁰ – provides a better hint on incentives of parties to outcompete opponents based programmatic policies or rather prey on the state further by

⁷¹⁰ Tavits and Letki (2014); Tavits and Potter (2014).

playing the ‘ethnic’ and identity card, leading to variation in levels of professionalization.

Which nature of political competition matters for levels of professionalization

I claim that the main difference between Albania and Macedonia, is not only in their social structure, but reflected in a different *nature* of political competition related to the polarization of political competition differently between identity issues and socio-economic issues⁷¹¹. Based on the Chappell Hill expert survey dataset on party positions in the Western Balkans, I show that political competition is much more polarized on socio-economic issues between left and right-wing parties (governing parties) while party standings converge on identity issues in Albania. This stands in contrast to the Macedonian case, where ethnic Macedonian parties diverge much more in identity issues and they converge on socio-economic ones.

I show this in two steps. First, I focus on the party differences on socio-economic issues. I identify how parties in Macedonia stand in contrast to the parties in Albania, by depicting in two dimensional diagrams the party standings on socio-economic issues such as (i) re-distribution vs. state intervention and (ii) de-regulation vs. state intervention, shown in Figure 21 and 21.1. Second, I focus then on the party differences on identity issues. I show how parties in the two countries stand differently on identity issues by depicting in two dimensional diagrams if they support or oppose: i) multiculturalism⁷¹² versus religious principles⁷¹³, ii) urban or rural interests⁷¹⁴ vs. position of support for ethnic minorities⁷¹⁵, iii) position on ethnic minorities vs. position towards nationalism⁷¹⁶. Figure 22 - 22.2 illustrate the findings. The main focus on the Albanian side is on the governing parties, right-wing Democratic Party (DP), the left-wing Socialist Party (SP) and the LSI-Socialist Movement for Integration. On the other hand, the main focus on the Macedonian side is on the ethnic Macedonian parties, left-wing SDSM, right-wing (VMRO-DPMNE) and on

⁷¹¹ The argument on social structure and nature of political competition is borrowed from Tavits and Letki (2014).

⁷¹² This describes the position on integration of immigrants and asylum seekers, and if parties favour multiculturalism or if they favour assimilation.


⁷¹³ This describes the position on role of religious principles in politics, if it strongly favours or opposes it.

⁷¹⁴ This describes the position, of supporting or opposing urban and rural interests.

⁷¹⁵ This describes the position of supporting or opposing the role of religious principles in politics.

⁷¹⁶ This describes the position of parties in promoting or opposing cosmopolitan rather than nationalist conceptions of society.


Figure 21: Polarization on socio-economies issues: Party standing on redistribution and deregulation



Graphs by country

Note: Chappell Hill Data Survey (1) Redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor: 0 = Fully in favor of redistribution; 10 = Fully opposed to redistribution; (2) Deregulation: 0 = Strongly opposes deregulation of markets; 10 = Strongly supports deregulation of markets

Figure 21.1: Polarization on socio-economic issues: Party standing on state intervention and deregulation



Graphs by country

Note: Chappell Hill Data Survey (1) state intervention in the economy 0 = Fully in favour of state intervention ; 10 = Fully opposed to state intervention; (2) Deregulation: 0 = Strongly opposes deregulation of markets; 10 = Strongly supports deregulation of markets

the ethnic Albanian parties such as Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) and Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA). All these parties have been rotating in government together on the Albanian and Macedonian side.

First, Figure 21 shows that in Macedonia the ethnic Macedonian political parties the left-wing SDSM and the right-wing VMRO-DPMNE do not stand strikingly different in pursuing redistributive policies neither so on regulative issues of markets. The Albanian parties in Macedonia, DUI and DPA, don't have such a different political program. However, this stands in contrast to Albania, where the programmatic distance between the main ruling governing parties such as the right-wing DP and left-wing SP, strikingly different. Figure 21.1 shows that Macedonian left and right parties do not stand very differently either on issues of state intervention. Polarization on state intervention is much higher in Albania between the social-democratic SP, than the right-wing DP, at least in terms of what they stands for in their manifesto.

The opposite is revealed based on how parties polarize across the two countries on identity issues. As shown in Figures 22–22.2, the polarization of parties on identity issues like support of nationalist views versus multiculturalism conceptions of the society, or religious issues is much higher than in Albania. In Figure 22, we view that the ethnic Macedonian the left-wing SDSM, opposes religious politics and supports more multiculturalism, whereas the ethnic Macedonian right-wing VMRO-DPMNE opposes multiculturalism as a concept of society and pledges both on nationalist issues. The polarization on the left and right parties in Albania is non-existent on such issues.

Figure 22: Polarization of party standing between multiculturalism and religious principles in politics






Figure 22.1: Polarization on party standing between urban vs rural interests and support of ethnic minorities



Graphs by country

Figure 22.2 Polarization on party standing between support of ethnic minorities and nationalism



Graphs by country

Additionally, we view that ethnic Macedonian parties stand in opposition to the Albanian ethnic minority parties such as DUI and DPA. The latter ones act more like ethnic parties with little programmatic difference. While the cleavage on ethnic division between Albanians and Macedonians is clear based on Figure 22.1, another sub-cleavage among the SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE shows that the former is more pro-urban voters and defending progressive issues of society, while the latter is more conservative by both holding stronger nationalistic views and representing more the rural interests. This means that not only do voters belonging to the Albanian ethnic group vote for Macedonian parties⁷¹⁷ irrespective of what programmatic difference they make, but the Macedonian electoral cleavages are also strikingly different between rural and urban voters, where rural and nationalistic standing have put VMRO-DPMNE in an electorally advantageous position in the last elections in comparison to SDSM.

While the ideological difference that appears in Figure 23 between the left and the right, shows that it has little substance as both programmatically SDSM and VRMO-DPMNE are not different. But above all ‘ethnicity trumps it all’⁷¹⁸, which means that Macedonians are ‘staunch defenders’⁷¹⁹ of ethnic Macedonian interests: ‘They just champion this cause via different


⁷¹⁷ Huber (2011) shows how the electoral cleavages runs clearly through, where 22.9% of the vote of Albanians goes to the DPA and DUI, and 69% is spread between SDSM, VMRO-DPMNE.

⁷¹⁸ Hislope (2013, p.18)

⁷¹⁹ *Ibid.*

discourses'.⁷²⁰ On the one hand, the Social Democrats have inherited the narrative of Macedonian identity from the Yugoslav communists, and thus they stress the Slavic basis of their ethnicity'.⁷²¹ On the other hand, VMRO-DPMNE pursues the so-called antiquization policy, that is an ambitious state-sponsored programme dedicated to cementing the proposition that there is a direct link between ancient Macedonia and contemporary ethnic Macedonians⁷²². These competing discourses over ethno-genesis have heightened emotions and created a climate in which opponents are cast as 'traitors' to the nation. Hence, parties are more polarized on identity issues, than any real ideological differences and the main cleavages is between the Albanian and the Macedonian division.

Figure 23: Ideological differences in the party system in Albania and Macedonia



Source: V-Dem data set

⁷²⁰ *Ibid.*
⁷²¹ Hislope (2013); Vangeli (2011).
⁷²² Hislope (2013)

The main distinction is that Macedonia's party system is built on ethnic cleavages, whereas Albania on socio-economic ones. Hence the voters and parties are structured along ethnic divisions of ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians. Macedonia competitive core of the party system can be best described as a parallel two-party system, in which each of them were rotating among two main ethnic communities, Macedonians and Albanians⁷²³. Albania has no ethnic cleavages, and the party systems is ideologically divided between the DP and SP and the rotation occurs between the two parties in government, while recently LSI has emerged.

In Macedonia, the politically significant parties – that is those parties that affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially – boil down to four. On the Macedonian side, the two main parties are the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO- DPMNE) and the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM). On the Albanian side, we have the Democratic Union for Integration (BDI/DUI) and the Democratic Party of Albanians (PDSH/ DPA). Together, these four parties account for an average of 85 per cent of the vote and an average of 114.5 of the 120 parliamentary (*Sobranje*) seats (the number was raised to 123 in 2011) between 2002 and 2011⁷²⁴. There are controversial views if the Macedonian is an ethnic party system⁷²⁵, or not. However, it is clear that the main cleavage of ethnic Albanian and ethnic Macedonian division is given. Indeed, in Huber's (2011) analysis on Macedonia we could see that Macedonians vote only for certain ethnic Macedonian parties (66.7%) and Albanians (29.7%) voted for the Albanian parties⁷²⁶.

From the figures above we can conclude that the programmatic polarization between left and right parties in Macedonia is not based on socio-economic issues –redistribution and state intervention or deregulation of markets–but who performs best on identity issues. In contrast, in Albania the left parties, PS and LSI, stands much more pro-redistributive policies from rich to poor and pro-state intervention in contrast to the right-wing PD. This is a variation that is filtered out if we would focus only on ideological differences of the party systems (see Figure 26) between the countries. Based on that although parties have these ideologies they still stand differently on identity and socio-economic issues.

⁷²³ Hislope (2013)

⁷²⁴ *ibid.*

⁷²⁵ *ibid.*

⁷²⁶ Huber (2011, p.4).

While party standing does not mean real policy performance, already these differences show differences between parties' linkages to voters in Albania and Macedonia. This confirms the findings elsewhere that countries that have identity cleavages pursue little re-distributive policies from rich to poor⁷²⁷ and that Macedonia is deeply ethnically divided. The Gini coefficient on inequality is highest in Macedonia than Albania.⁷²⁸ As redistribution is less of a beneficial policy to pursue to maximize political support, parties embedded in non-distributable or identity cleavages, have as well fewer incentives to improve the administrative capability, the latter one needed in order to be effective in policy making, in order to win elections. Instead they can rely strongly on patronage and high politicization as a strategy to distribute selective benefits.

Differences in Albanian and Macedonian government performance in 2006–10

Below I will show how the governments in Albania and Macedonia relied differently on administration to perform. In this I will provide shortly an overview of the main successes achieved in Euro-Atlantic relations, as well on more domestic issues. How the governments performed in this period show why politicization and professionalization could combine in Albania more positively and why less so in Macedonia.

The Macedonian government in 2010

Three aspects show that the government did not need a professional administration, as it ruled differently in Macedonia: First, it increased nationalistic policies and rhetoric that allow to do so domestically, with the consequence of blocking the EU accession path. Second, it relied heavily on patronage as an employment machine by increasing the number of public sector by rewarding voters with position in administration. It as well used such political loyalists to control over state policies to distribute pork. Third, it increased financial debt, without an improvement of socio-economic indicators, such as unemployment of youth stayed high, inequality increased, financial debt combined with a big size on public sector employment.

Evidence shows that right-wing VMRO DPMNE ruling 2006–08 and 2011 followed a more radical nationalistic line than the left-wing forces before SDSM (2000–06), with the consequence of increasing the salience of identity politics, by increasing the opportunity to win

⁷²⁷ Huber and Ting (2015); Tavits and Letki (2014).

⁷²⁸ UNDP (2013)

elections by without governing responsibly. When it came to power in the first period between 2006 and 2008, VMRO-DPMNE, ruled together with the Albanian DPA, although it had less votes than DUI (see Table 1 in Appendix Chapter 5 for government and electoral results). In the pre-electoral period of 2006 Gruevski the new leader of VMRO-DPMNE, campaign highlighted not nationalism but economic issues.⁷²⁹ This former finance minister in Georgievski's, former VMRO DPMNE leader's cabinet 'surrounded himself with young professionals committed to attracting investment, reforming the tax code, and stamping out corruption'.⁷³⁰ One got the impression that the old nationalist guard under Georgievski had truly been excised from the party⁷³¹. Indeed, in this period, efforts of Macedonia were praised. Surveys of public attitudes suggest that most voters believe that the 2006-08 government worked hard, and was on the right path in reforming the economy and state institutions⁷³²

There were although provocative nationalistic policy attempts, as Gruevski built in 2007 the airport by naming it 'Alexander the Great', that was criticized as nationalistic rhetoric on the verge of deciding the name dispute with Greece in 2008. That blocked the further EU path of the country. Additionally, the government had attacked the A1 main television by freezing the bank accounts of the TV station. Early elections happened due to the boycott of SDSM-led opposition for undemocratic rule, as they claimed the government had done this as way to silence the media against critical standing towards the government. After 2008, VMRO-DPMNE won again and this time ruled with DUI. From 2008 onwards, Macedonia starts deteriorating in various indicators, as well as nationalistic policies become the main pursued policies of VMRO-DPMNE, that successfully won after that based on such pursue. The electoral campaigns grew more nationalistic in the tone, as the party state relations increasingly fused. So that in 2011 European Commission

ODIHR reported credible allegations of insufficient separation between state and political party, and pressure on civil servants. Political parties campaigned almost exclusively along ethnic lines, reflecting the ethnic polarisation of society. The public broadcaster, contrary to legal obligations and its public mandate, favored the government and strongly criticised the opposition in its coverage.⁷³³

DUI and VMRO- DPMNE seemed to have the agreement on sharing the power to divide the stakes of the state into different spheres of 'patronage'. Indeed, it seemed that dividing the state patronage on both sides to both win elections, but as well control policies over their ethnic

⁷²⁹ Hislope (2013).

⁷³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.16.

⁷³¹ Deliso (2006); Dimitrov (2006).

⁷³² EIU (August 2008, p.4).

⁷³³ EU COM (2011).

communities⁷³⁴, was the only binding glue that hold the coalition together. As Hislope (2006) describes the situations back then in 2006:

The Macedonian and Albanian political class regularly utilized corruption to grease the wheels of interethnic coalition government. Corruption can be regarded as an ‘accommodating device’ that helps otherwise implacable foes maintain cordial relations. Better that spoils are shared rather than blood spilled, so the reasoning goes.⁷³⁵

Three pieces of evidence show that the state administration has not been used for programmatic but rather as a clientelistic mean to enhance identity representation and as well win elections.

First, the state administration was used as electoral machine that was still effective in winning elections without much policy performance. One of the many cases was how civil servants were rewarded with a job in administration because they had guaranteed to present a list of fifteen names of relatives and friends to VMRO-DPMNE to vote for the ruling party, and as well in return of having employed their close ones.⁷³⁶ In the meantime, also DUI built its own patronage in state administration. As interviewees confirmed⁷³⁷ all worked as well with party lists, on who to integrate in the state administration, where party loyalty was the most important criteria than meritocracy and professionalism. The party structures provide party lists of people, voters and activists in the lower levels of local branches, that should be employed and those people are integrated with some minimal screening on competences in various positions.⁷³⁸

Second, the wire taping scandal that came out only in 2015, simply showed how VMRO-DPMNE had controlled the policy apparatus and ministries from Finance to Police (this is why these ministries are as well highly politicized see Figures 1 and 1.1). The combination of the VMRO-DPMNE controlling the state very selectively was combined with voidance of competencies and executive decision-making power of ministries ruled by DUI. Many interviewees confirmed that governing together meant, the ethnic Macedonian side took decisions, and the Albanian side was strongly cross-checked from the Minister of Finance on every decision and many times blocked. Hence, they built patronage on both sides of the coalitions, on the Albanian side to provide the sense that Albanians were represented in the state, without the need to improve

⁷³⁴ Hislope (2006, 2013).

⁷³⁵ Hislope (2006).

⁷³⁶ Natasa Stojanovska, “Kako do 15 sigurni glasaci za VMRO-DPMNE?” [How to get to 15 confirmed voters of VMRO-DPMNE?] A1, 9 May 2011. <http://a1.com.mk/vesti/default.aspx?VestID=137714>. [20 Jul 2011].

⁷³⁷ Interview no.1 and no.2 Macedonia.

⁷³⁸

much of the socio-living standards. Second on the Macedonian side, VMRO-DPMNE seized power by aiming to put the party over the state institutions, judiciary, executive and control state institutions and pursuing nation-building policies. The wire tapping scandals, show how entrenched its power in the state administration has been. Patronage was used even when there was no need to broaden the electorate support based on the VMRO-DPMNE side, as a way to further control of the state in a very authoritarian fashion.⁷³⁹

Third, all this was combined with policies that not necessarily improved the living standards of Macedonians, but just nourished voters in the sense of lost or ‘threatened’ identity⁷⁴⁰. On the ethnic Macedonian side, nationalistic policies, started already in 2006, they were built in the slogan of the ‘Antiquization’ policies, and VMRO-DPMNE had embraced nationalism as a matter of policy and that explains its electoral success. Antiquization policies starting in 2006 and 2008 represented the attempt of nation-building:

Antiquisation is an ambitious state-sponsored programme dedicated to cementing the proposition that there is a direct link between ancient Macedonia and contemporary ethnic Macedonians. It is multifaceted in approach, involving the renaming of public buildings, sports arenas, and highways, the revival of ancient symbols and traditions, the erection of new monuments, the financing of archaeological digs, and the broadcasting of documentaries allegedly proving that today’s Macedonians are cultural, linguistic, genetic, and spiritual descendants of ancient Macedonians. The crowning achievement of the whole programme is ‘Skopje 2014’, an expensive urban renewal plan that will dramatically alter the appearance of the city by refashioning it with a triumphal arch, two new bridges, hundreds of new statues, fifteen new buildings reflecting architectural styles drawn from classical Antiquity, and gigantic statues of Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great.⁷⁴¹

The combination of high public sectors employment, high unemployment in the country, provides leeway for parties to rule in a clientelistic fashion, and providing jobs as an electoral reward. This relationship means that voters chose political representation on a calculation of identity and nationalistic rhetoric, hence many of them do not expect any material goods rendered back.

However, many of them are rewarded directly either through the social benefit or jobs in

⁷³⁹ Interview no. 5 and no. 3 Macedonia.

⁷⁴⁰ Interview no. 6.

⁷⁴¹ Hislope here refers as well to the work of Vangeli (2001).

administration with some material or economic improvement. Indeed, this confirms what is found elsewhere, that as long as voters are ethnically divided, the one that represents their identity issues best, will be chosen, irrespective of economic interest. Hence, the poor are willing to ‘falsify’ their true economic interests in the name of identity issues, where poor strata receive some social benefit to keep them satisfied and the richer receive more the prestigious jobs in administration.⁷⁴² As one of the interviewees claimed that just counting together the number of people who work in administration (estimated 230,000) and pensioners (estimated 300,000), amounts to non-neglectable electoral, support of 530,000, out of a 1.6 million population.

Indeed, this model shows that the Gruevski–VMRO DPMNE ruling with DUI less programmatically by working like a the ‘Ponzi scheme’. It borrowed money from international donors and it pays hence its clientelistic costs without producing any economic added value or improving citizens’ situation.⁷⁴³ This shows a captured state through politicization of administration, where the state apparatus is an employer of people, controlling regulations in the direction it wants.⁷⁴⁴ All this went much against what the citizens might have desired socio-economically in the first place: EU accession was halted due to the unresolved name issue with Greece, economic performance deteriorated. All this led to little investment in economic policies, and as well highest inequality and unemployment indicators of the country in the Western Balkans.⁷⁴⁵

The VMRO- DPMNE’s electoral winning streak has created conditions of ‘state capture’ whereby the distinction between state and party evaporates⁷⁴⁶, whereas winning votes on nationalistic issues has proved successful and voters have paid a high socio-economic price to choose to vote based on identity. The identity policies have been pursued at a high cost for democracy and future of Macedonia into the EU.

Albania government performance in the period 2005- 2010

This stands in contrast to the performance of the DP-led Government in Albania that had a majority and ruled with smaller parties in this period. The Government program aim were to fight corruption, reform the tax system and as well contribute to the Albanian Euro Atlantic relations.

⁷⁴² Corstange (2013).

⁷⁴³ Interview no. 10 Macedonia.

⁷⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴⁵ IMF (2016).

⁷⁴⁶ ICG (2011).

Sali Berisha, the leader of DP and prime minister at that time, announced an ambitious program to address the economic crisis, improve the business environment and fight corruption and organized crime and speed up the country's integration into NATO and the EU. Building on the achievements of the Socialist administration it implemented structural and institutional reforms which resulted in strong economic growth, infrastructures improvements, significant reductions in poverty and unemployment and increased pensions and wages in the public sectors and overhaul of the financial sectors.⁷⁴⁷

During this period, Albania experienced an annual growth of GDP of 7%. Poverty declined to 12.4% from 25.4% in 2002, unemployment fell from 15.8% in 2002 to 12.7% in 2009 and wages in public sector rose by 36.5% between 2005–09. The country's business climate improved markedly with one stop shop registration system, which reduced the time and cost required to open up a business. The World Bank Doing Business report also ranked Albania 82nd. Albania had achieved though very good indicators on Human Development indicators that praised it as one of the countries with high human development for its GNP per capita in 2010⁷⁴⁸, higher than Macedonia.

However, the government although it made anti-corruption the main aim, failed at the end to perform better than the previous government. As already shown in Chapter 4, politicization indeed was high in this period too. There were accusations in the media that links between business and Berisha's family would provide favorable treatments to certain enterprises. Indeed, its programmatic orientation was put into doubt. However, the state was not emptied out of its capacity completely, despite the need on further reform on the area rule of law, anti-corruption and impartiality of institutions. The pressure to deliver on the EU side and such side sending signals to voters at home, maintained in Albania more than Macedonia a higher administrative capability. This shows that professionalization persisted in the period 2005–15 as long as DP was in government despite high levels of political hiring and firing. The government indeed had still to deliver some socio-economic improvement, combined with EU reform.

Berisha's government, despite its patronage practices within the administration, made significant progress in key foreign policy: and advancing the aspiration for Euro Atlantic integration in contrast to Macedonia. He achieved Albanians' membership in NATO in 2009 as

⁷⁴⁷ CSIS (2010)
⁷⁴⁸ UNDP (2013)

the most important event in his country's history since gaining independence. Albanian also assigned in this period the SAA in 2006 and in 2009 it applied for full membership. In November 2009, the EU Commission praised Albanian for progress it had made and authorized the preparation for an assessment of its readiness for membership. The government Berisha had reached though far more international steps than domestic ones, as it still did not manage to eradicate corruption and politicization within the state institutions. Therefore, after 2013 the Socialist Party came to power and provided a new impetus to further EU relation and crucial institutional reforms, by further pushing forward the state building attempts.

While it seems that Albania is slowly coming out of the dark of communism, Macedonia, has reversed towards illiberal ruling and parties have succumbed the state into a different equilibrium between high politicization and low professionalization. Hence, political parties are the actors with highest responsibility towards administrative reforms, and in this case in professionalization. The ethnic cleavages created both an opportunity for right-wing political parties to polarize competition on identity and nationalistic issues to gain electoral advantage. In a state that structures are easily shaped by the political parties, such nationalistic approach towards policies and voters, provides an opportunity for incumbents to prey on the state without improving it or delivering much to voters' socio-economically and voters re-electing them to power due to identity representation that matters to them more than socio-economic improvements.

CONCLUSION

The chapter showed that the puzzling evidence why Albania and Macedonia differed in levels of professionalization could not be explained based on institutionalist account. Rather some of their explanations would have expected the opposite. Administrative legacies of the past with Albania having a higher party control over personnel decisions in administrations, cannot explain, why did Macedonia with more autonomous inherited sphere of civil service ended up with such low levels of competence. Finally, the countries despite similar levels political competition – measured in high marginal vote difference between incumbent and opposition, and high party system fragmentation – could not account either for the VMRO-DPMNE strategies.

The Europeanization literature, similarly to the rest, would have not predicted why Macedonia, instead of Albania, is performing so much worse. The country received earlier an EU perspective than Albania, and higher EU pressure and financial assistance, should have led all

parties to adapt their agenda towards EU and improve institutional reforms. Instead, that adaptation expected reversed with the right-wing government in Macedonia, that played the identity and nationalist card before the EU card. In contrast, Albania despite to weak legacies and a closed political system, adaptation and political competition, leads to incumbents like the SP that followed in power. Therefore, the chapter provided evidence that showed that social structure matters for party agency and its incentives to rely programmatically on government performance and improvement in administration.

The societal and cleavage differences are to understand better in order to infer the party incentives in delivering to voters and therefore build state institutions that work well, or rather obstruct them. Such differences in electoral cleavages and competition explain why Macedonia and not Albania, irrespective of totalitarian legacies and more difficult path of democratization, has performed better in programmatic orientation towards voters and institutional quality. In such an institutional environment where the legal state and the constitutional check and balances have not been around for long time, parties can access power easily by shaping civil service reform between political hiring and firing and expertise. However, what differs between Albania and Macedonia is the higher *electoral opportunity to deflect* on governing well. That is higher in Macedonia, partially due to social structure that signals high opportunity to politicians to distract voters by playing the ethnic card without delivering on socio economic issues, but also due to the higher chances of right- wing parties to have an electoral advantage to mobilize identity instead of socio-economic issues to win elections.

In Macedonia, the VMRO-DPMNE and DUI coalition particularly from 2008 onwards, have radicalized the competitive spaces on identity issues further, preying stronger on the state along clientelism strategies without much electoral pressure to deliver programmatically. They delivered to citizens, either jobs in administration by using the administration as an ‘employment machine’ or some selective benefits, but did not improve their situation socio-economically, both in terms of unemployment that remained high increasing inequality and poverty in the country (i.e Gini co-efficient in Macedonia is 43.2 and unemployment 55.7% while in Albania inequality coefficient amounts to 34.5, and unemployment to 28.3%). They maintained, this clientelistic system by financing it through an IMF credit line that reached 60% of its GDP.⁷⁴⁹ As one of the interviews claimed that: ‘Gruevski works like in the Ponzi scheme, it borrows money and it pays hence its clientelistic costs, without producing any added value. Again the “state capture” through the party happens through politicization of administration where the state apparatus is an employer

⁷⁴⁹ IMF (2015)

of people, controlling regulations in the direction it wants.⁷⁵⁰

This stands in contrast to the Albanian case. In the same context, where party and state building coincide, socio-economic cleavages provide lower electoral opportunity on incumbents to deflect on some deliverability towards voters, as well little chances for right-wing parties to polarize the electorate successfully on such identity issues. Despite high politicization of the administration, politicians in Albania under the DP government in that period could not void the state of its capacity, as they have both the pressure to provide some effective policies to maintain power, and as well deliver towards EU reforms. In Albania, voters care about socio-economic and redistribution issues and are less distracted by identity conflicts, hence parties have less chance to win election consecutively without delivering on some socio-economic policies. They would be as well sanctioned on the international side for such strategies with delays in EU accession. That again would signal voters their mal-performance and would provide an electoral cost domestically to parties. Indeed, the government in Albania performed better in its reduction, by closing the gap of inequality and performing better in unemployment.

Identity uncertainties are more problematic in Macedonia than Albania, as the country stands not only divided in various multiple ethnicities, but ethnic communities feel threatened mutually of dominance of one over the other. Politics play therefore due to such unsolved identity issues, its malign effect on state institution. However, despite this opportunity structure without electoral constrains on incumbents is higher in Macedonia and lower in Albania, nothing is *deterministic* in this prediction. Indeed, all depends on party strategies, however right-wing parties have higher chances due to social structure, to reverse path of reform and to bury state integrity and administrative capability, at the benefit of spoil and pursuit of own narrow interest. This must not be the case, as show in the SDSM, but it is highly so for right-wing governments.

In Macedonia, voters and parties are trapped in national identity issues and so are its bureaucracies in high politicized and low professionalized structure. EU has signalled to Macedonia since a long time the need to reform and meet its benchmarks, particularly since 2008 when Greece vetoed the bid to gain NATO admission at the Bucharest Summit, due to their dispute over the republic's name⁷⁵¹. However, voters have voted the VMRO-DPMNE and DUI, for five consecutive terms, despite clientelistic linkages and the opposition had difficulty to bid them out of government. Only recently, the wire tape scandal, has shown that since 2008, VMRO-

⁷⁵⁰ Interview no.10 Macedonia.

⁷⁵¹ Athens claims that, by calling itself "Macedonia", it appropriates part of the Hellenic heritage and implies a claim against Greece's northern province (ICG 2009).

DPMNE had entrenched its power within the state in clientelistic and corrupt manner. Voters on the other hand, have paid a high price in terms of economy and democracy to vote based on such identity issues whereas such clientelistic and not programmatic ruling, went against their interests both in terms of socio-economic improvement, and EU blockage on reforms

CONCLUSION

PUZZLE

Post-communist state transformation from fused party-state relations to professional and de-politicized state administration has led us to reconsider both what constitutes successful and failed cases of civil service reforms and the conditions under which this happens in the democratization process.

On the conceptual side of bureaucratic reform outcomes, the most *influential* ideas on thinking about nature of bureaucracies and successful cases of civil reforms in democratization period have centred on the Weberian template of a de-politicized and professional administration. Such a template has been viewed as conducive to state effectiveness in delivering public goods. Conversely, cases of reform failure have been depicted as the patrimonial administration, where politicization and incompetence among officials have been associated mostly with corruption and clientelism.

On the theoretical side, the most *influential* ideas on conditions of state transformation of the bureaucratic nature from spoil to merit system have been based either on historical accounts or institutionalist ones. Historical accounts have claimed that the historical sequence of democracy prior to state building⁷⁵² is favourable to bureaucratic professionalization. In contrary, institutionalist accounts stand critically in relation to historical accounts, claiming that conditions in the transition context matter more in explaining state reforms. They have viewed bureaucratic professionalization as a by-product of *stasis* (administrative fusion with the party in the past dependent on the communist regime)⁷⁵³, *electoral dynamics* (institutionally robust political competition⁷⁵⁴), or *external aid* for state building (European conditionality)⁷⁵⁵. The most influential view has been that parties introduce reforms as an ‘institutional insurance’ against political opponents and that democracy through institutional robust political competition would bring about the Weberian template of the state administration. However, the empirical occurrence of those

⁷⁵² Shefter (1994).

⁷⁵³ Kitschelt *et al.* (1985).

⁷⁵⁴ O’Dwyer (2007); Grzymala-Busse (2007).

⁷⁵⁵ Dimitrova (2005); Vaduchova (2008).

ideas in the post-communist context has remained limited.

I have claimed that evidence on civil service reforms in post-communist countries shows the limitation of such conceptual templates and theoretical answers in understanding the 'hybrid' cases of administration that stand between a Weberian bureaucracy mixed with patrimonial features.

Conceptually, the evidence challenges the view that the Weberian template is the only one that leads successfully to state effectiveness and that politicization leads to incompetence. Against the expectation of the Weberian rule-based bureaucratic model, formal bureaucratic insulation has not decreased politicization and neither has political hiring and firing always voided the state from its capacity in terms of professionalization. This positive combination of politicization and competence in outcomes of reform in a bureaucracy, calls into question conceptually the Weberian 'reference' categories.

Theoretically, the institutionalist literature in post-communist studies cannot explain such divergence in politicization from professionalization in state reform outcomes within one bureaucracy in post-communist countries. The problem is partially conceptual, but as well theoretical. Their ideas about bureaucratic professionalization have proved to be too *deterministic* in predicting how reform would happen once certain *conditions* were in place. In particular, they have underplayed the crucial role political parties have in shaping bureaucracies according to their needs in democratizing countries. Second, they have applied *restrictive* assumptions about incentives for reforms, as they have assumed that all parties have the same organizational resources and face a similar societal structure. Evidence based on the post-communist context has once more showed a much more empirically diverse panorama than depicted in this literature, by hinting at the limitations in thinking of reforms as irreversible and of parties as having all the same benefits and incentives to reform.

The *first* surprising finding is that civil service reforms were reversible even in consolidated democratic systems, despite institutionally robust political competition. This evidence suggests that incentives to build well-functioning states were not maintained over time and across countries equally just because democratic pluralistic structures were in place. Therefore, such incentives for non-reform remained a theoretical mystery as shown in the case of Hungary and Poland. The *second* surprising finding is that civil service reforms can be established as well in the absence of pluralistic competitive structures as has been the case in the Western Balkans, through the support of EU conditionality in terms of formal civil

service rule adoption. However, the literatures have not been able to explain the variation in those countries in implementation of such reforms. In this, it has somehow missed an account of why Macedonia did so much worse than Albania in terms of levels of professionalization, despite the fact that Macedonia has had more favourable legacies from the past, as well similar patterns of political competition and earlier EU conditionality on civil service reforms. The puzzle is then even greater when applied more broadly to the rest of the Western Balkan cases.

RETHINKING PARTY–STATE RELATIONS

Based on the debate above, it is clear that practitioners and scholars working on post-communist state-building lack the right tools to distinguish ‘success’ from ‘failure’ in ‘hybrid’ cases of bureaucracies that are not formalistic and where administrative functioning is not governed strictly by law. Additionally, we also know little about why parties have had different incentives to improve or not bureaucracies and which mechanisms and rationales explain parties’ incentives to rely on political loyalists differently from those party incentives to have more professional state administrations. I discuss below the implications with regard to four topics: 1) the conceptual implications for the nature of bureaucracy in ‘hybrid’ cases of administration; 2) the theoretical implications related to party and state development; 3) the empirical implications and applicability of this framework beyond communist countries, and; 4) the policy implications for EU external state-building. Finally, this section concludes with a final note on avenues of future research that will allow us to better understand the party- and state-building process in other younger democracies.

Conceptual implications and evidence from the Western Balkan cases

This thesis has contributed in both directions, by improving conceptually how to define the space of reform outcomes and as well to specify better the circumstances and incentives relating to the party rationales that explain state-building outcomes in the democratization period.

Conceptually, the thesis integrated the role that ‘politics’ plays in state reform outcomes. The new conceptual framework provides a better understanding of how civil service reform can progress asynchronously in outcomes between politicization and

professionalization in the state administration in three ways. First, in doing so, it tries to bridge such dichotomy in the Weberian reference categories by differentiating the multiple outcomes and adding two more: *patronage-led* administration (high politicization and high expertise) and *mediocracy-led* (low politicization and low expertise) administration. Indeed, many Western Balkan cases have resembled the patronage-led administration and the clientelism-led administration (high politicization and low professionalization).

Second, by providing evidence from the Western Balkans, this framework revises the Weberian traditional view that politicization is inferior to rule-based formal authority in creating 'technical expertise'. We could view instead that despite high political appointments, the levels of qualification, both in terms of education level as well compatibility of policy expertise with the ministry can vary substantially across countries and above all across ministries. As a result, evidence shows that 'politics' is not 'evil' per se, and does not always lead to bureaucratic pathologies of mal-functioning. A closer look at the level of professionalization in the administration thus provides a more nuanced picture therefore on reform progress.

Third and finally, evidence has confirmed that the state administration cannot be analyzed as unitary in countries, where the within variation is substantially more significant than across countries in young democracies. Different 'forms' between insulation from politics and administrative capability combine very differently in ministries. A look inside the state bureaucracy reveals even more diverse in outcomes that remain currently conceptually unconsidered and theoretically unexplained.

Methodologically, the current framework can assess better the 'hybrid' type of administrations by using new measures beyond civil service rules and examination procedures. By rather grasping more closely the empirical practices of politicization, such as turnover, political depth, party activism and political contacts, but as well other indicators- temporary contracts, number of finalization of recruitment procedures, number of candidates per competition- allows us to assess more accurately levels of political interferences in personnel decisions. Finally, by focusing on policy expertise and education traits, emphasized most heavily in the managerial literature in public administration, proves a further way forward to gain more precise indicators of abilities and competence. Prior to such a framework we have had no way of knowing when politicization harmed competence and capability in bureaucracies. Nor could we effectively measure outcomes directly when we did suspect that politicization was harmful. Therefore, this conceptual framework and

the new indicators offer a better tool to assess 'hybrid' cases was needed and test how organizationally these bureaucracies fare better or worse to the Weberian template.

Theoretical implications and evidence

After highlighting the limits of the Weberian view through the new framework, the thesis offers a novel theory that explains reform outcomes. To grasp the divergence between politics and administration as a struggle of expropriation between politics and administrative authority in young democracies requires a novel approach. That is, one that can show which rationale moves politics to penetrate deep into the state administration at a certain point, and the one that sees it refraining from doing so at others. The relationship between party and nature of bureaucracies' remains a forgotten lens in analysing the state both old and new democracies in political science,⁷⁵⁶ although it represents a crucial one in order to understand how the state works.

The lack of focus on party development in new democracies is both *empirical* and *theoretical*. *Empirically*, most of the literature is based on a context where bureaucracies were developed prior to party development. Most of the literature is based on West-European parties.⁷⁵⁷ Thus, how societal structure and the genetic structure of parties matters for the subsequent evolution of state reforms in new democracies remains untheorized and not well understood. Party emergence and adaptation has different societal and institutional underpinnings in new democracies,⁷⁵⁸ with their distinctive legacies from authoritarian or communist rule. Party patronage and the relationship with the state also takes on different form and scope.⁷⁵⁹

The scant attention to party development in the literature on new democracies is also *theoretical*. Not only do we know little about how parties and states work together in the democratizing world, we also know little about how parties change and adapt to new conditions, how they can be both agents of transformation by changing their environment and as well institutions that are changed. Therefore, we also know little, as theoretically there

⁷⁵⁶ Mazzucca and Munck (2014).

⁷⁵⁷ Diamond and Gunther (2001).

⁷⁵⁸ For a review see Levitsky (2016).

⁷⁵⁹ See Levitsky (2016).

is a lack of theories on party organization *per se*⁷⁶⁰ that is less well linked with literature on party genesis or formation and transformation. In all this functional role of patronage for party development remains even less understood. Hence, knowing that there is so much at stake here and we know so little, we can and must do better to understand realities.

Consequentially, changes of political parties and adaptation with the state needs to be studied more specifically in this type of context. This thesis has made an effort to shed light on which parameters matter in the organizational development of parties and how that might matter for state transformation. Theoretically, the thesis has tried to solve the aforementioned puzzle about the divergence of levels of politicization within a bureaucracy through a party agency perspective on how bureaucratic outcomes are shaped differently between those two dimensions- politicization and professionalization. Theoretically speaking, the argument challenges the *deterministic* account in the literature on bureaucratic professionalization that sees it as either a by-product of *stasis (administrative legacie)*, electoral dynamics (*political competition*) or external aid (*EU conditionality*). Instead it claims that parties' organizational and electoral concerns during their party building process, inform us on how the bureaucratic development evolves in multiple outcomes between politicization and professionalization.

The wider gap in the literature between party and state development

By offering a novel perspective based on political parties, civil service reform progress is understood in the thesis as close to the *heart of politics*⁷⁶¹ for political parties. Civil service reform is reflected through the party building process; namely, the way that parties attain and retain power explains how they reform state administration in new democracies. In the post-communist context and in Latin America, parties have this dual strategic role to shape their own organizations and as the state institutions at the same time, much more arbitrarily. This represents a whole new context of theorization on party and state development very different from the Western state-building case, where bureaucracies existed prior to democracy and hence parties could not reshape them to their needs.

The thesis distinguishes therefore two different party rationales that explain parties'

⁷⁶⁰ Van Biezen (2003).

⁷⁶¹ De Mesquita (2003).

incentives to politicize differently from parties' incentives to professionalize. In an institutional context where party-building coincides with state-building, I claim that parties' organizational *resource scarcity* explains levels of politicization and parties' electoral incentives to provide public good affect levels of professionalization. On the one hand, levels of politicization in administration will depend on the extent to which they need to rely on state patronage and state resources to survive organizationally. Rather levels of professionalization will depend on the extent to which parties need a well-functioning professional administration to provide public goods to outcompete opponents and survive electorally. On the other hand, because parties are not constrained equally organizationally and electorally in a post-communist context, organizational resources and societal structure are two factors that matter to inform party incentives on improving or not bureaucracies.

First, in young democracies there are different scope conditions of party–state relations than assumed in the literature that render the civil service reform path less predictable. There is no such a linear and straightforward transformation of party- state development, where parties withdraw influence away from spoil towards a merit civil service system, just because civil service laws are in place. The reason for that is that civil reforms are not protected through a strong judicial state against party arbitrariness and there are no stable socio-economic coalitions that pressure incumbents in maintaining administrative capability. Hence, in a context where the legal state does not exist through prior stages of state building, civil service reforms are reversible and parties play a much higher role than predicted in the literature in shaping civil service reform outcomes. Additionally, to this comes the fact that the literature misses out to view the party building process as a non-consolidated and as one where party genesis and structure is very different from the Western context.⁷⁶²

Second, while I correct for such conditions, I also revise the assumption that party incentives are not a *constant* as assumed in most of the institutionalist account. The literature derives incentives on reform from pluralistic conditions where all parties are exposed to same organizational resources, are democratically committed and disciplined and face all the same voters' demand on effective states. Such conditions on the party incentives were tied to the 'Golden Age' of political parties and cannot be claimed to hold true universally across countries, when they did not hold true even across time in the European context of party

⁷⁶² Levitsky (2016).

systems.

The party building process is not consolidated yet and the political panorama is much more heterogeneous and more diverse than depicted in this literature. Therefore, we are in need for a theory that allows us to understand where such *incentives* for state reform derive from, and what factors affect their change. It is not surprising we don't have so far answers, as party development and state development are mostly understood in Western context. The view that parties can change, adapt to new conditions and transform the path of politics, by either politicizing certain cleavages or by having different organisational strengths to do so,⁷⁶³ has gained a focus only recently.

Therefore, as party structures and societal structure vary substantially and the party-building process is not consolidated yet in a post-communist context, we cannot think that political competition drives parties to adapt in the same way towards state reforms.

I provide a completely new explanation about where such incentives on reforms may derive from in a context where party-building and state-building coincide. I claim the incentive on state reforms derives exactly from the dilemmas they face in their own party-building process, at the moment they as well have to decide how to fill the posts of the administration, based on political loyalists or experts. As the goals of the party building process are depicted as enduring organizationally and being electorally significant, the state administration can be a solution to their problems in two ways. In such party building process, the state and its employees represented both a *resource* for poor party organizations that can support parties with diverse political services back and a means to provide better policies to voters.

Indeed, the main question parties raise when they have had to reform states is: do they hire and fire politically in state administration and get back political services and resources to secure *organizational survival* or do they rely on more professional administrators to provide public goods to out-mobilize opponents for *electoral survival*? In an institutional environment where rules are less predictable and parties can reverse civil service reforms, this explanation offers a more realistic perspective than the deterministic view of institutionalists on how parties can affect state reform outcomes.

⁷⁶³ Tavits (2014).

Implications of the two-party rationale: organization and electoral logics of state reform

These two rationales that the novel theory provides have following implications for the literature:

First, because parties do not have all the same organizational resources, *organizational resources scarcity* in younger rather than older parties such as the successor of the communist parties, renders parties' more dependent on state resources and party patronage, and therefore increases levels of political hiring and firing in the state. Political loyalist rather than civil servants, are therefore more valuable to younger parties as they can act as 'administrative capital' and support parties back with political services as well as mobilize further resources.

The new theoretical link on party organizational strength and patronage affecting bureaucracies is unexplored in the literature so far, as most of the works study party organizational strength either as consequential for electoral success⁷⁶⁴ or for programmatic orientation in political representation.⁷⁶⁵ In this process we also know, even less on the functional role of state patronage for political parties and their organizational development.⁷⁶⁶ Generally, in this, it shows that party organization resources based on party organizational age in new democracies have direct effects on de-politicization or bureaucratic insulation.

This hypothesis challenges the literature in following ways. It first provides a more nuanced picture than the literature in political parties, which has assumed that parties' organizational characteristics don't matter (i.e. that in post-communist countries, all parties are organizationally weak). Second, the fact that party organizational age and therefore organizational resources and strength matter for the role parties have as 'state-builders' is a novel link. This comes as a surprise to most of the literature in post- communist studies and as well to some of the literature on party–state development in the Western context. In post-communist studies, scholars hold view that the successor of the communist party would have been the most problematic case and that would be most detrimental to state patronage due to inherited practices and origins with the state bureaucracies. This proves not to be the case, resonating most with the view of some recent studies that show how party organizational strength matters for programmatic politics, irrespective of genesis.

⁷⁶⁴ Tavits (2014).

⁷⁶⁵ Hagopian (2014).

⁷⁶⁶ Levitsky (2016).

Indeed, in this my hypothesis challenges as well the view that the ‘genesis’ of parties and ‘critical experience of party formation’, with the state administration as depicted in Shefter (1994), shapes their demand on patronage path dependently. Instead while genesis matters, it matters in providing us information on the organizational resource endowment rather than the incentives of parties to strongly rely on the state. The successor of the communist parties had to regenerate themselves most in cutting ties with the past more than other parties, and hence underwent organizational transformation. Third, the view that parties can voluntarily indeed surrender patronage because of such internal organizational strength irrespective of their ‘critical experience at the formation’⁷⁶⁷, challenges as well the externalist view that all parties adapt the same to reform when they compete against each other.⁷⁶⁸

Finally, the mechanism that parties politicize more because of organizational resource scarcity and therefore higher dependency on state resources, provides a more realistic picture in a highly unpredictable environment where parties are not yet consolidated structures. In such an uncertain context, where party arbitrariness in the state faces less institutional or popular resistance parties cannot ‘lock in’ sustainably institutional reforms as assumed in literature. Therefore, reforms are introduced not to maximize long-term benefits by serving as an ‘institutional insurance’ as viewed in the literature. Instead, immediate benefit is what matters to parties when they hire and fire politically or invest in expertise in such uncertain institutional environments as young democracies. However, politicization is most beneficial to weakly organized parties. In contrast, civil service reforms are costly to most organizationally weaker parties as reforming would mean not being able to rely on patronage to maximize their organizational survival. Therefore, the parties that build states are those less dependent on them for own organizational survival.

The second rationale provides another logic on incumbent parties that has as well been neglected in the literature. Parties do not face all the same electoral pressure in providing public good across societal structures, particularly so in their party formation process. As aforementioned already, we know that the logic of organizational endurance and the logic of competition constitute two very different organizational imperatives parties fulfil

⁷⁶⁷ Shefter (1994).

⁷⁶⁸ Grzymala-Busse (2006).

in their own formation and development phase⁷⁶⁹ and for which they have to mobilize resources and build political support. The imperative of political competition based on electoral cleavages, informs us more on the need to have a capable administration, where professional administration serves as a means of parties to win elections.

However, capability in administration is also possible when politicization persists, and not only under the rule-based Weberian template. The imperative on organizational endurance based on resources of parties informs us on the resource dependency in state and therefore patronage, the electoral pressure to deliver more on levels of professionalization. Drawing on a variety of literature, the new theoretical link is on how *social structure*, conditional on *nature* of political competition by being more polarized based on *identity or socio-economic* issues, affects levels of professionalization and how capable a state is. The link between such electoral cleavages and nature of bureaucracy in terms of administrative capability has been unexplored so far in literature.

In countries where ethnic identity rather than socio-economic cleavages prevails, parties' face lower electoral pressure to provide public goods to voters to survive electorally. This leads to lower levels of professionalization. In ethnically divided countries, professional officials are less in demand, as governments can rather deflect on their role by playing the 'ethnic card' and win elections. While governing responsibly or not is not the electoral goal *per se*, the policy consequences of a good or bad administration are imminently linked to the electoral chances of parties winning elections, in case they need to provide public good to outcompete their opponents. The electoral pressure on incumbents to provide public goods to outcompete opponents, therefore is higher in ethnically homogenous countries than in ethnically heterogeneous ones. Identity remains a non-distributable cleavage where voters demand identity representation at all costs, and policy effectiveness and improvement of social and living standards matters less.

This challenges the literature that views civil service reform success as a by-product between programmatic or non-programmatic party-effect,⁷⁷⁰ or programmatic and patronage-based political representation.⁷⁷¹ The dimension on programmatic orientation and pressure to deliver public good towards voters is affected rather based on what issues parties

⁷⁶⁹ Kitschelt (1989). Indeed, this fits well with the various definition of parties, as having a functional role as an organization that should endure and as well as one that is rather linked on how to perform in government in winning elections in solving or not collective action problems. See Schlesinger (1984).

⁷⁷⁰ Keefer (2015).

⁷⁷¹ Hagopian (2014).

outcompete each other – on identity or socio-economic issues – rather than on how reliant are they on the state patronage to do so. Indeed, I view the pressure to deliver and improve administration as affected from different determinants than the one that affect levels of patronage and incentives of parties to rely on political loyalists.

I view the need for capable administration from an incumbent perspective as analytically a very different aspect from the need of patronage, because the latter represents more of an organisational need of parties. That can indeed combine or not with programmatic orientation in government, as both patronage and less patronage-based parties might be exposed to the electoral pressure to deliver to voters to win elections. Patronage can co-exist with little effective policy delivery as well. Strong parties can choose also not to deliver. Therefore, understanding where electoral pressure to provide public good derives from makes make us understand the incumbent's incentives to rely more on expertise, and therefore the improvement of the institutional quality in terms of professionalization and expertise in administration. As a result, I claim that electoral cleavages- identity or socio-economic, inform us better on parties' need on professional administration.

Wider implication on democracy-state nexus and state-economy nexus

The novel answer has two broader implications: first it informs the literature on democratization and comparative politics on the state-democracy nexus and the conditions under which democracy leads to which nature of bureaucracies in comparative politics is unsolved; Second, the new analytical framework also informs development studies that not only the Weberian template of administration and state models can lead to higher economic development in developing countries but as well other and more hybrid forms of bureaucracies.

To the first one, more broadly, this novel answer contributes to the literature on the *democracy–state* nexus, that is at an early stage.⁷⁷² Little is known currently under which conditions does democracy contribute to well-functioning state administration, and much more is known rather on how a strong state contributes to democracy.⁷⁷³ This thesis contributes to the literature by better delineating the party rationale for organizational and

⁷⁷² Mazzuca and Munck (2014); Levitsky (2016).

⁷⁷³ Mazzuca and Munck (2014).

electoral survival that shed better light on bureaucratic outcomes. Indeed, in democratizing world, if we need to study bureaucracies, so we need to focus on the political parties and their rationale, in order to understand if democratization is supporting state consolidation or not. In order to understand if democracy becomes a problem to well-functioning bureaucracies or not, this thesis has offered a novel answer that can shed light when democracy contributes to outcomes closer to Weberian template. In a democratizing context, where party building coincides with state building, parties' incentives in shaping and re-directing bureaucratic reforms according to their own organizational and electoral concerns, leads to a deviation in outcomes between politicization and professionalization of administration. Therefore, political parties can be considered as active agents capable of navigating environmental constraints and influencing their performance through their internal structures⁷⁷⁴ and societal structures, that sub-sequentially has an impact on bureaucratic structures.

The empirical evidence presented here provided a deeper understanding on why democracy can become a problem to state bureaucracies (as shown in the case of Macedonia), or when less so (Albania). It has also shown that nothing is *deterministic* either from the past legacies in administration or party genesis or present conditions of transition, but that parties' rationales for survival matter to provide direction in state reforms, understanding the determinants that vary across parties and matter for such rationale shed light on reform outcomes. Political parties can transform and improve bureaucracies for the better the more they are reliant on their own resources in a democratization process, and the more they outcompete each other on socio-economic rather than identity issues. If parties are trapped in organizational resource scarcity and identity representation, the state bureaucracies have a harder time to reform towards professional and impartial administration. Such conditions render bureaucratic development difficult. They can be understood as a combination of two different factors. First, political development of parties differently with bureaucracies affects levels of politicization of civil service. Second, different type of structural cleavages in societies render political competition sometimes a facilitator and sometimes an obstacle to the state integrity.

Second, the implications are then to understand as well broader economic

⁷⁷⁴ See also Grzymala-Busse (2002); Tavits (2013); Panebianco (1988).

development concerns in democratizing countries, on how certain bureaucratic design combine with party incentives contribute to state-led economic development. In Neo-Weberian attempts of state-led development, as in Evans' (1995) works many years ago, the Weberian template still predominates the thinking that such states alone can lead to higher economic development. The World Bank 'good governance' approach towards development countries in the 1990s has shifted this focus and has strongly built on the agenda of 'rule-based' bureaucracy. However, empirically, as we know in many new democracies from the Balkans to the Tropics, Weber looks very different, and politicization has been hard to abolish in state structures, whereas we have observed different performance of administration: the counties that in Evans (1995) we called as intermediate between Weberian and patrimonial performed very differently economically.

Brazil would be categorized closer to patronage-led administration (high politicization and high professionalization), where administration was not only highly linked to politicians, but as well more connected to the business networks leading to higher economic development. The same is observed in Chile and Columbia. However, in other cases where bureaucracies resembled more the *mediocracy* type (low politicization and low professionalization), such cases as India or some South East Asian countries, administrations were insulated from politics, but were as well not well connected to societal and business actors in developing co-jointly economic programs as in the former cases. Although more research needs to be done to come to this conclusion, evidence from the countries already show that those political loyalists in Brazil despite its links to politics have done better in developing economic programs co-jointly with business enterprise.

In contrast, clientelism-led administration would prove the well-established link on such administrations performing not well in terms of economic development and service provision, some cases like in Africa or even some in South Eastern European countries- Kosovo, Macedonia- due to such bureaucratic features (low politicization and low professionalization) are trapped in low state -led development. The main test is to grasp that not all party patronage is 'bad' for these hybrid state bureaucracies if governments are sure to hire professionals and experts that work effectively in policy making. Understanding such hybrid cases and if such patronage led- bureaucracies are more effective than the mediocracy-led ones, remains to be better established in future.

The compatibility of political hiring and firing and effective policy-making needs to

be proven better than currently done in this thesis, particularly the link between individual level data on education, expertise and organizational competence in policy making effectiveness could be best analyzed in certain policy sectors. This framework however has provided some evidence that higher professionalism in administration can read automatically to government effectiveness, as shown in Albania and less in Macedonia. However more needs to be done to prove the link between professional administration and socio-economic indicators. There are indeed many other factors that can intervene between socio-economic outcomes (i.e GDP, Human Development indicators) and professionalization of administration that go beyond the scope of this thesis.

The interaction between political hiring and firing and expertise – particularly the role political loyalists play as experts or as activists for political parties – is still an uncharted territory. Do such political loyalists act the same as civil servants towards their policy role? Are they motivated by career, despite no stable careers in administration? What renders them as effective as civil servants in their policy making role? Does ‘status’, ‘career’ in a policy sector or expertise and knowledge drives them to act effectively as policy makers? There is agreement in the literature, that the role and tasks as well political services political appointees render back to politicians remains to be better understood in future.

Particularly, in countries with such ‘hybrid’ administration there is even more the need to understand how do career structures in administrations where civil service is not stable look like. Are the political services only constrained to political activism, or are they liked and compatible with effective policy making? Are the types of political services political appointees provide linked to the positions that political loyalists occupy? If they occupy higher levels in the civil service that represent higher authority in policy-making, then they might be expected to play a crucial role in as well more effective policies. Conversely, if lower levels are occupied, then they are expected to rather return more patronage-related services, as electoral support, activism etc.

There are currently only few works that have done this so far by focusing only in Latin America,⁷⁷⁵ and that try to distinguish between different types of political appointees where career orientation is still given, as well that distinguish on political services rendered back. The distinction between different political service and the two could be partially confirmed in the Western Balkans, but deeper research is needed in this area.

⁷⁷⁵ Dargent (2015); Schneider (1991).

Empirical implications and applicability of the party–state analytical framework

The analysis of party incentives and nature of bureaucracies offers a better analytical framework on how to analyse macro-processes where bureaucratic transformation and democratization process are intertwined. Those party incentives shed light on the different party organizational and electoral concerns that inform us on how the two dimensions of civil service reform progress develops. These party rationales might explain bureaucratic outcomes on state development across countries, but as well within state across policy sectors. The determinants on sectoral variation in politicization remain to be better established.

Conceptually, the analytical framework was tested across seven Western Balkan countries and ministries for 2010 based on the expert survey data set. The data showed indeed that there are three *key variations* across parties and governments in levels of politicization, across ministries and across countries, that challenge both the Weberian view on state administration where politicization combines with professionalization always negatively, as well the view on the state as unitary ‘whole’. The results indeed hinted to the finding that the most politicized countries are not the least professional administrations in Southeast European countries, while *politicization practices* vary substantially. While some countries like Serbia have de-politicized the civil service most, others like Croatia, Albania and Montenegro show still high levels of political hiring and firing in administration accompanied with high levels of professionalization, followed by very bad cases of civil service reform progress in Macedonia⁷⁷⁶ and Kosovo with high levels of politicization and low levels of professionalization. The theoretical argument stood the test of the comparison in Albania and Macedonia and has the potential to be applicable elsewhere.

Applicability of the analytical framework beyond post-communist countries

The analytical framework established here therefore provides a useful analytical lens to understand party and state development, both in new democracies and beyond. Parties still have an important role in civil service, as is shown even in case of older democracies like the

⁷⁷⁶ Macedonia and Kosovo, with highest levels of politicization - highest extent of turnover combined with the highest strong links on party activism in personnel decisions- and low levels competence and penetration of party influence until the lower levels and low level of competence.

US, where party- building and state-building coincided but as well in cases where parties still play a crucial role in how administrative positions are filled as shown in the Austrian case too. Its applicability elsewhere is justified theoretically in two ways.

First, on the party rationale side, party development with the state administrations can be seen as one of organizational competition on resources and electoral cleavages that embed parties and states, where the state serves as a *resource* to parties and as a *means* which has policy consequences to voters. This remains universal to party and state relations, although the opportunity structures for parties' arbitrariness to influence bureaucracies is enshrined in older democracies, due to both higher embeddedness of the state in a strong judicial legal and socio-economic stability. Again, the determinants might vary, but the organizational resource scarcity and electoral rationale on providing public good, should prevail in determining levels of politicization and professionalization in bureaucracies.

Second, bureaucratic design of personnel is conceptualized here along the most enduring organizational conflict in a state administration in a democracy: that is the organization of the state between administrative professionalism and political responsiveness. As the tension between politics and administration remains a persisting one in a democracy, such framework, allows us to grasp which underlying factors of party and societal structure affect how parties relate to the state administration, by balancing its outcomes between politicization and administrative capability. It remains to be empirically tested then which other factors than the one explored theoretically here affect party organizational and electoral incentives in old from new democracies.

It is imaginable that organizational fusion of parties with state, as described in the cartel party-system,⁷⁷⁷ might also explain the increasing levels of state patronage and reliance of parties on state resources. It is as well imaginable that parties pursue different strategies in mobilizing identity cleavages, beyond ethnicity, but as well race or religion, affecting rightist parties to shift the nature of political competition to diverge on identity-issues and hence, lower incumbent's electoral pressure in providing public good.

⁷⁷⁷ Katz and Mair (1995).

Distinguishing on the dependent variable side better between politicization and competence in outcomes and offering the party rationale that can drive those two differently, provides a more realistic contribution in understanding evolution of bureaucracies. In this, the view that politicization is always evil and deleterious to administration, is wrong for both democracies and democratizing world. The framework diversified better what type of politics with administration is corrupt, and what other type allows programmatic orientation in the state administration. Such conceptualization challenges the view that all politics is evil per se, just because it pursues certain politicians' interest. More needs to be done to understand the link between political loyalism and expertise in administration.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

As European Union plays a major role in public administration in the Western Balkans, the thesis conceptual and theoretical findings contribute in three ways for EU policies in institution-building. First, better benchmarks along political interference and the skills of officials could be used by the EU to monitor civil service reform progress towards acceding countries, but as well towards other outsider countries as part of the European Neighborhood policy. Second, stronger focus on political parties' reform and creating ownership on state reforms in the democratizing world by tackling the incentives on reform and combining better public administration reform with reform of political parties would be needed. Third, leveraging further public administration reform to an 'own chapter' might result in more effective pressure for the EU on external state building. However, the most sustainable one and the most difficult is building professional political elites, by also reforming parties.

There are currently two main weakness in the Enlargement policy towards the countries in reform of public administration: The first main weakness of the EU enlargement policy in institution building is that public administration has still not a 'unified model' of public administration, it does not result into a legal-binding area of accepted legal *acquis communautaire* to be applied to both EU and non-EU countries. The second main weakness is that the EU has a technocratic approach in advancing public administration reform in these countries as in measuring progress. As we know and this thesis has shown, administrative improvement is not a technocratic or legalistic project but a political one. Hence, without the right incentives in place, reforms will not be sustained. However currently the EU does not tackle the incentive side and measures progress in rules and

procedures in these countries. The OECD-SIGMA uses indicators that show compliance with laws formally, as well formal institutional building, when it comes to civil service reforms. Levels of politicization and hiring and firing go unmeasured. As this thesis has shown, politicians are quite innovative in new democracies in finding new mechanisms on how to circumvent laws and procedures.

On a yearly basis, EU Member States invest substantial amounts through the EU financial assistance (CARDS in 2002–06, IPA from 2006 onwards) towards the Western Balkan countries in building the civil service, training its capacity etc. Indeed, civil service laws are in place, institutions too, but all this remains very ineffective if parties reshuffle administration and bring in incompetent officials by replacing the old trained ones. Every time there is a new government and reshuffles, the administrative skill is lost. The lack of the domestic binding character in the EU policies, combined with a legalistic approach in reform of public administration, renders impartiality in public administration a hard to reach endeavor and pretty much dependent on domestic conditions. The methodological and theoretical findings of this thesis could contribute in three ways on how EU could make a better change in the countries.

First, the EU could complement the assessment on rule-based indicators, also with other indicators that hint to practices of political hiring and firing. Chapter 4 showed ways how this can be measured. The divergence between rule and practices in measuring outcomes simply show that indicators need to better assess practices. In the countries, once laws are implemented, their effectiveness on the ground goes more than often unmeasured, which leaves the EU clueless on the countries progress in this area of reform. Particularly increasing efforts that would measure not only politicization but as well come indicators on competence, although difficult, would provide better information on real progress. OECD-SIGMA could apply and reflect more on the measurement of reform outcomes along these two dimensions and develop better benchmarks in this area.

Therefore, in the absence of a binding legal policy for domestic compliance, better measurement of practices and debate around those indicators, would be the first strategy to pursue and create better transparency in what happens within the administration. Since enforcing the rule of law and impartiality in administrations in weak democratizing states takes a long time, reforms could be monitored in the combination of politicization and competence, rather than only on *rule-based* civil service, in order to hint to progress and in the meantime, advance in the EU accession process. Since politicization is hard to eradicate

in these countries, measuring additionally administrative expertise would allow to be less strict on formal rule compliance but on the real substantial ingredients needed for administrative capability. Also, such monitoring should happen more often and be more tied to criteria on sustainability of reform than currently done.

If the EU wants to have a real impact, it can pursue three paths: (1) tackle party–state development in a more cohesive approach than done currently by investing in both elite and state-building; (2) building stronger conditionality in lack of an ‘*acquis communautaire*’ in this area, which starts with better measurement on reform outcomes, and; (3) better conditionality on non-removal of trained civil servants with EU financial assistance. While the first measure would take in the long term the maintenance of right incentives, the second, and the third would as well help constrain party arbitrariness in administration.

First, the current technocratic and formalistic approach of EU policy in formal institution building and compliance of laws, discards politics. Hence, the way the EU approaches public administration reform, does not tackle the core problem to state reforms: wrong incentives. One of the main empirical relevant finding of this thesis are that as long as parties are not reformed, the state administration will not work effectively for the common good and that laws will be less maintained in practice. Indeed, parties are the most ‘distrusted’ institutions in the Western Balkans, and viewed as the most corrupt ones, while the state society relationship is a broken one.

Therefore, if the EU wants to make a real change it needs to collaborate more with certain party rather than others. So the ‘right allies’ in sustaining bureaucratic professionalization and leveraging reforms, are the organizationally stronger parties. As the thesis has shown those ones that have stronger organizations are less inclined to patronage politics. Second, training party elites and supporting professional staff in parties to sustain more state reforms becomes even more crucial as exercising EU conditionality only on the impartial state institutions. Because parties act in this double role as party builder and state builder, without the right party incentives, the state can’t be built. So the EU must sustain reforms on both sides. Elite building is therefore as crucial as state-building in countries if laws were not only to be adopted formally. Without such parties, the battle on resources of the state for party survival, will not take the state out of politics and the ‘Leviathan’ will be built on paper, but not concretize to become a real functioning apparatus that serves the citizens.

Second, leveraging public administration reforms to an own 'acquis' is an option that would be most effective in ensuring domestic compliance, proposals to European Council could be advanced in this area with the argumentation that without impartial administration, the consolidation of democracy is at risk. Despite the current used argument that there is no universal and acceptable model of public administration already among EU Member States, legal requirements on principles of neutrality and competence could be the defining dimensions of a common model, as the basis for a functioning democracy and economy. Progress in such reforms should be even more strongly tied to advancement in EU accession, like on judicial reform. Political wrongdoings like hiring and firing of civil servants based on party loyalty could be both sanctioned either in terms of withdrawal of financial assistance or in delaying the country advancement to the EU. Therefore, public administration reform because of its relevance for also other areas like economic development and democratization, should be leveraged to as an important building block of EU accession countries, as judicial reforms. In the meantime, the EU could do much better in both measuring the right phenomena (politicization and expertise), in order to draw better and more informed conclusion on progress of reforms. It could as well adopt a much higher conditionality in sustaining civil servants in administrations without

FUTURE RESEARCH ON PARTY–STATE RELATIONS

We also know that political scientists have long argued that democracy is 'unworkable'⁷⁷⁸ or even 'unthinkable'⁷⁷⁹ without them, and that there is a specific normative model of democratic government that remains not always empirically given in the actual practices of parties. Additionally, we also know the importance that functioning states have for both sustaining the development of strong parties and the wider democratic and economic development of a country. However, since the study of Shefter (1994), and some more recent institutionalist agenda in post-communist studies represented through the works of Grzymala-Busse (2006), little has been done in understanding the party and state building process in new democracies.

⁷⁷⁸ Aldrich (1995, p.3).

⁷⁷⁹ Schattenschneider (1942, p.1).

Indeed, how does the party building and state building processes mutually affect each other is even remains somehow of a theoretical mystery⁷⁸⁰ to current literature. Under which conditions of party building can we claim that the nature of bureaucracies transforms from a spoil system to merit and professional based system? What party rationale matter? Does party weakness prove always to be disastrous for state administration? What role does the state play for the parties? All these are relevant questions that are waiting for answers. This thesis made a first attempt in this direction, in showing under which conditions of democracy and political competition do incumbents improve bureaucracies and how transformation of the state happens. It showed that nothing is deterministic and that parties play a crucial role in state transformation.

Much more needs to be done. The evidence currently confirms that organizational scarcity of parties renders the battle for state resources a fierce one among different parties and that state resources remain crucial in such context for parties' organizations. As well we know that the state has been a key resource for party organizations in new democracies, also state capacity remains crucial to parties. However, we still need to understand better if reliance on patronage renders parties stronger or weaker over time. If the state acts as a 'substitute' to their organization and leaves parties weak, or if the state makes them stronger and more self-reliant over time.

All these rationales help us understand as well when the state can be taken out of 'politics'. As the, the sectoral variation across countries shows the empirical diversity in party and state relations within one bureaucracy, we need even more to understand where does this variation stems from. Hence, given the importance of a well-functioning state for economy, society and democracy, the party -bureaucracy analytical framework presented in this thesis, offers a useful lens that can help us shed further light on the conditions under which parties build Weberian states. A provisional answer built on organisational resources and electoral cleavages has been offered to explain different party incentives on state reform, that remains to be tested elsewhere. With so much at stake in a democratizing world, we surely must do better than we have so far.

⁷⁸⁰ Some exceptions are Hale (2006); Levitsky (2016); Tavits (2013).

APPENDIX : CHAPTERS

APPENDIX CHAPTER 1 AND 3

Dataset information

The data on the expert survey try to replicate some of the work done by Evans and Rauch (1999) to identify features of bureaucratic structures that decrease politicization and increase professionalization of bureaucracies. The corresponding variables for the index on politicization and professionalization are measured based on the Meyer- Sahling's data set on Expert Survey on the management of the central government bureaucracy in Executive leadership in the Western Balkan States for 2010. The expert survey was conducted between October 2010 and March 2011. It includes all 7 Southeastern European countries, such as Albania, Croatia, Kosovo, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and seven ministries, such as Agriculture, Economy, Environment, European Integration, Health and Interior. For two countries also the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Public administration is included. All indicators are cross-sectional for 2010, with the exception of two indicators that measure the political influence over personnel procedures over time (i.e there are only two indicators such as turnover and a general variable on the influence of politicians on personnel recruitments for the ministries in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010). For all measures the data are available for all different positions in the ministry. However, I use only the cross-sectional variables.

Table 1: Top civil servants' levels with management positions, as defined in civil service laws

	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4
Albania	General Secretary	Director General	Dir of Department	Head of Sector
BiH	Secretary of Ministry	Assistant Minister	Head of Department	Head of Service/Org Unit
Croatia	Secretary-General	Director of Directorate	Head of Sector	Head of Depart & Head of Unit
Kosovo	Permanent Secretary	Director of Department	Deputy Director of Department	Head of Division
Macedonia	State Secretary	State Advisor	Head of Department	Deputy Head of Depart & H of Unit
Montenegro	Secretary	Assistant (Deputy) Minister	Head of Department	Deputy Head of Department
Serbia	Secretary-General	Assistant Minister	Head of Department	Head of Section

This survey studies has data only for 4 levels of civil service from senior ranks to specialists by defining them from a managerial and legal status perspective, demonstrated in Table 1. Civil service law protects all of these levels. The only exception where the State Secretary is not protected by law is in Macedonia. However, the legal status form a civil servant to a political appointee has changed only recently. These four levels are comparable across the

Western Balkan countries and across ministries. The only exception is in the Ministry of European Integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, where instead of four only three levels are accounted as the top civil service.

In each ministry four experts were asked from NGOs, officials inside the government or academia, so we have on average **21** respondents per country and **in total, 150** observations. In each ministry and per country, these four different experts could be from inside and outside the government as they were asked estimate the extent to which a certain aspect of personnel management (along the variables no politicization), applied to a given senior civil service position in practice. All questions were estimated on an ordinal scale of an interval from 0–5. The variable on depth of political appointments takes a value of 0 = mainly political appointments; 2.5 = grey area; 5 = mainly political appointments. All the other variables are coded as following: 0= less than 10%; 1= 10–29%; 2= 30–49% 3=50–69%; 4=70–80%; 5=90%.

However because the unit of analysis is the aggregated ministerial level and the country level. Therefore, I calculate the mean of values per each variable across the four experts’ opinion, which reduces our observation to 45 ones..

Categories of politicization and competence calculated along the Standard Deviation within countries and the whole mean

Table 1.1 Categories for politicization

Categorization of levels of politicization	
Range	
High politicization	> 64.3
Medium high	53.7 – 64.33
Medium politicization	32.5 – 53.74
Low politicization	21.9 – 32.5
No politicization	0 – 21.9
SD	21.1
Mean	43.1


Table 1.2: Categories for competence

Categorization of levels of competence	
Range	
High competence	> 77.4
Medium high	63.8 – 77.4
Medium competence	36.7 – 63.8
Low competence	23.2 – 36.7
No competence	0 – 21.9
SD	27.2
Mean	50.3

Calculating the index of politicization and professionalization

The index on politicization was measured at the country, ministerial level, and at different levels across the hierarchy of top civil servants. Following the work of Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2013), I multiplied all variables ranging from 0–5 by 5, to produce a maximum country score of 25. I took the average of various politicization dimensions across the four levels, and then standardized them all at 100. The reason, why I did that is justified when observing the frequency tables that demonstrate across the variables that higher levels are usually more politicized than lower levels. This observation holds true for all sub-components of the index. Additionally, when running the Alpha-Cronbach tests, all these variables demonstrated very high score, usually above the 0.7 criteria of high scale reliability. Therefore, the four levels could be used as one measurement level, without changing much on the theoretical leverage. The professionalization index instead was not measured across different levels, therefore I multiplied all variables ranging from 0–5 by 5 to produce a maximum country score of 25, and standardized them all at 100.

Table 3: Formal merit recruitment (exams) and politicization index



Source: Meyer –Sahling dataset

APPENDIX CHAPTER 4

Table 1: Summary of civil service legislation and related executive decisions and orders from 2000–13

Civil Service Legislation Over Time – Implementation

First cycle of reform: 2000–04

- Law Nr. 8549, dated 11.11.1999, ‘The Status of Civil Servant’.
- Decision Nr. 231, dated 11.05.2000, the Council of Ministers, ‘On Approval of the Civil Service and the Probation Period’.
- Decision Nr. 342, dated 07.14.2000, ‘On parallel movement and promotion civil servant’.
- Decision Nr. 306, dated 13.06.2000, ‘On civil service discipline’.
- Decision Nr. 355, dated 07.07.2000 ‘ On the organization of files and Registry personnel’.
- Decision Nr. 315, dated 23.06.2000, ‘On the establishment and functioning of the Institute Training of Public Administration and Civil Servant Training’.
- Decision Nr. 360, dated 14.07.2000, ‘On release from service’.
- Decision Nr. 196, dated 06.04.2001, the Council of Ministers ‘On some changes in Decision No. 231, dated 11.05.2000’, the Council of Ministers, ‘On Approval of the Civil Service and the Probation Period’.
- Decision Nr. 221, dated 16.05.2002, the Council of Ministers ‘On some additions and changes in Decision No. 231, dated 11.05.2000, the Council of Ministers’, ‘On Approval of the Civil Service and the Probation Period’, as amended by Decision Nr. 196, dated 04.06.2001, the Council of Ministers.
- Decision Nr. 325, dated 21.02.2003, ‘On the position, duties and responsibilities Secretary General in the Ministry’.
- Decision Nr. 242, dated 16.04.2004 ‘On some amendments to Decision Nr. 315 dated 23.06.2000, the Council of Ministers ‘On the establishment and functioning of the Institute Public Administration Training and Training of Civil Servants’.
- Instruction Nr. 1, dated 13.06.2000, ‘On the Structure of the classification of jobs in civil service, respective methodology and generalizing description of the role of Secretary in this service’.
- Instruction No. 2, dated 07.07.2000, ‘On the System of Annual Performance Assessment Individual Civil Servant’.


Second cycle of reform 2000–12

- Decision Nr. 292, dated 06.05.2005, 'On amendments and additions to the Decision Nr. 315, dated 23.06.2000', 'On the establishment and functioning of the Training Institute Public Administration and Civil Servant Training change'.
- Decision Nr. 838, dated 13.02.2006, the Council of Ministers, 'For a change Decision Nr. 231, dated 11.05.2000, the Council of Ministers 'On Approval Civil Service and the Probation Period', as amended.
- Instruction No. 5, dated 19.12.2007, ' On Amendments to the Instruction Nr. 2, dated 07.07.2000 'On the System of Individual Annual Performance Appraisal of Civil Servants'.
- Instruction Nr. 6, dated 19.12.2007, ' On Amendments to the Instruction Nr. 1, dated 13.06.2000, 'On Job classification structure in the civil service, the relevant methodology and description generalized role of the Secretary General in this service'.
- Instruction Nr. 4, dated 30.06.2010, ' On an addition to Nr. 1, dated 13.06.2000, 'On the Structure of job classification in the civil service, the respective methodology and generalizing description the role of the Secretary General in this service change'.
- Instruction No. 5, dated 30.06.2010, for an additional Instruction No. 1, dated 13.6.2000 to Council of Ministers 'On the order of the structure of the civil service works, respective methodology and generalizing description of the role of secretary overall service.
- Order no. 174, dated 01.10.2010, the Prime Minister, 'On some measures to improve enforcement civil service legislation in the ministries and the apparatus of the Council of Ministers'.
- Instruction of the Department of Public Administration, 'On the Activities of representatives Department of Public Administration Committee ad hoc testing'.

Source: Department of Public Administration homepage, access 20.09.2015, www.dap.gov.al

APPENDIX CHAPTER 5

Graph 1: Ministerial variation in levels of politicization for the coalition period of Democratic Party and Socialist Movement for Integration in 2010





Source: own index building, see Chapter 2 on index building.

Note: The graph shows that the two ministries, Ministry of Economy and Ministry of Health, both ruled by Ministers of the LSI party, have much higher levels of politicization than the Ministries of Finance and Interior, ruled by the Democratic Party.

Graph 2: Alternation in power

Graph 3: Party ideologies left-right division



Source: V-Dem Dataset

Source: Chappell-Hill Party survey

Table 1: Party system in Albania in 1990-2011 and levels of political competition

Albania	(Incumbent)		1st Winner		Opposition (2 nd biggest party)		Executive	Marg. vote difference	ENP P	Classification
	Name	votes	(%)	seats	Name	votes				
1991	PPSH	56.2	67.6	67.6	PD	38.7	30.0	-	1,8	Dominant party system
1992	PD	62.1	65.7	27.1	PS	25.7	27.1	612.591	1.97	Dominant party system
1996	PD	55.5	87.1	7.1	PS	20.4	7.1	-	1.31	Dominant party system
1997	PS	52.7	65.2	18.7	PD	25.8	18.7	-	2.18	Dominant party system
2001	PS	41.5	52.1	32.9	PD	36.8	32.9	75.523	2.60	Dominant party system, not competitive
2005	PD	7.7	40.0	30.0	PS	8.9	30.0	16616	3.81	Two party system competitive
2009	PD	40.2	48.6	46.4	PS	40.9	46.4	10.123	2.21	Two party system, competitive

Note: own calculation. Abbreviations: PS: Socialist Party of Albania (1991); Labour Party of Albania (1991); PPSH; PD: Democratic Party of Albania; PR: Albanian Republican Party; LSI: Socialist Movement for Integration; PDI: Party for Justice and Integration; PBDNJ: Unity for Human Rights Party; PKD: Christian Democratic Party of Albania; PSD: Social Democratic Party of Albania; PAA: Agrarian Environmentalist Party (1991-2002); Agrarian Party of Albania, PA); PDR: Reformed Democratic Party; AD: Democratic Alliance; PBK: National Front Party; PDK: Christian-Democratic Party of Albania; BLD: Liberal Democratic Union (1997); Social Democratic Alliance, ASD).

Table 1: Indicators of political competition and classification of party system in Macedonia

Macedo	1.st Winner ⁷⁸¹		Opposition (2 nd biggest party)		Executive	Mar. Vote Diff	EN PP ⁷⁸²	Classification
	(%) votes	(%) seats	(%) votes	(%) seats				
1990	VMRO-	VMRO-	SDSM	SDSM	1991-1992: Non-partisan 1992-1994: SDSM, RSM- LP, SPM, PPD	-	4.4	Highly fragmented party system, an half-format
	DPMNE	DPMNE	21.9	26				
	14.4	32	-	-				
	PDP	PDP	-	-				
1994	SDSM	SDSM	n.a	n.a	1994-1998: SDSM	122,462	3.20	Highly fragmented party system, in a two and half-format
	30.8	48	-	-				
	PDP	PDP	-	-				
	8.3	8.3	-	-				
1998	VMRO-	VMRO-	SDSM	SDSM	1998-2002: DPMNE, DA, PDSH (PDA)	32,832	3.96	Highly fragmented party system, in a two and half-format
	DPMNE	DPMNE	25.1	23				
	28.1	41	PDP/ PDP/DPA	9.2				
	PDP	PDP	-	-				
2002	SDSM	SDSM	VMRO-	VMRO-	2002-2004: SDSM, LDP, BDI	198,163	3.05	Highly fragmented party system with two bi-polar sub-system of forces
	40.5	50	DPMNE	DPMNE				
	DPA	DPA	24.4	23				
	5.2	5.8	BDI	BDI				
2006	VMRO-	VMRO-	SDSM	SDSM	2004-2006: SDSM, LDP, BDI 2006-2008: VMRO- DPMNE, LPM, SPM, PDSH (PDA), NSDP	86,109	4.16	Highly fragmented party system with bipolar sub-system of forces
	DPMNE	DPMNE	23.2	27				
	32.5	38	BDI	BDI				
	DPA	DPA	12.1	12				
	7.5	9.2				43,261		

⁷⁸¹ For every winner, there is the sub-division of number of votes and seats per biggest ethnical parties from the Macedonian and the Albanian side.
⁷⁸² Fragmentation of party system is calculated based on the formula of Laakso and Taguepera (1979).


1.st Winner ⁷⁸³		Opposition (2nd biggest party)	Executive	Mar. Vote Diff	EN P	Classification			
(%) votes	(%) seats	(%) votes	(%) seats	(%) votes	(%) seats				
2008	VMRO- DPMNE 48.4 BDI 12.8	VMRO- DPMNE 53 BDI 15	SDSM	SDSM 23.6 DPA 8.3	SDSM 23 DPA 9.2	2008-2011: DPMNE, SPM, BDI	248,217 44,965	2.80	Fragmented party system with a dominant block within the Macedonian side
2011	VMRO- DPMNE 39.2 BDI 10.3	VMRO- DPMNE 46 BDI 12	SDSM	SDSM 32.8 DPA 5.9	SDSM 34 DPA 6.5	2011- SPM, BDI	72,020 49,150	2.91	Highly fragmented party system with bipolar sub-system of forces

Notes: VMRO-DPMNE (2006-2008) and SDSM (2002-2008) ran in broad alliances with several minor parties. VMRO-DPMNE and DP boycotted the 2nd round of the elections in 1994. Abbreviations: VMRO-DPMNE: Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity; SDSM: Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (1990: League of Communists of Macedonia-Party for Democratic Renewal, SKM-PDP; 1994: Alliance for Macedonia, SZM); BDI: Democratic Union for Integration; PDSH: Democratic Party of Albanians; PEI: Party for European Future; PPD: Party for Democratic Prosperity; LDP: Liberal-Democratic Party; NSDP: New Social Democratic Party; SPM: Socialist Party of Macedonia (1990: Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Macedonia, SSPNM); LPM: Liberal Party of Macedonia; DOM: Democratic Renewal of Macedonia; DS: Democratic Union; VMRO-NP: People's Party; DA: Democratic Alternative; NDP: National Democratic Party; LP: Liberal Party (1990: Union of Reform Forces of Macedonia, SRSM); DP: Democratic Party; PDP: Democratic People's Party.

Source : central electoral commission


⁷⁸³ For every winner, there is the sub-division of number of votes and seats per biggest ethnical parties from the Macedonian and the Albanian side.

Graph 2: Alternation in power in Albania and Macedonia 1991-2014



Source: V-dem dataset


Graph 3: Role of opposition Albania and Macedonia 1991-2014



Source: V-dem dataset


Note: Role of opposition: Values 1: if as of December 31 there is a legislature that was at least in part elected by voters facing more than one choice. 0: if the above is not true OR, only in presidential systems, if it is true BUT either the chief executive is not elected OR was elected unopposed (unless there was consensus among all parties; as in Chile 1891, 1910).

Graph 4: Party system institutionalization



Note: V-Dem Dataset: Party institutionalization refers to various attributes of the political parties in a country, e.g., level and depth of organization, links to civil society, cadres of party activists, party supporters within the electorate, coherence of party platforms and ideologies, party-line voting among representatives within the legislature. A high score on these attributes generally indicates a more institutionalized party system.

Graph 5: Party organization strength and programmatic orientation



Source: V-dem dataset **Note:** Extent of **political parties that run for national office have organizations**, local branches. Values: No parties. 1: Fewer than half of the parties. 2: About half of the parties. 3: More than half of the parties. 4: All parties. **Party linkages clientelism vs. programmatic:** 0: Clientelistic. Constituents are rewarded with goods, cash, and/or jobs. 1: Mixed clientelistic and local collective. 2: Local collective. Constituents are rewarded with local collective goods, e.g., wells, toilets, markets, roads, bridges, and local development. 3: Mixed local collective and policy/programmatic. 4: Policy/programmatic. Constituents respond to a party's positions on national policies, general party programs, and visions for society.

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Interviews in Albania

1. Interview no.1 Albania- 23 May 2012. Specialist in Department of Public Administration,
2. Interview no.2 Albania- May 2012. Senior Civil Servant, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 24
3. Interview no. 3 Albania- May 2013. Secretary General Civil Service Commission, 23
4. Interview no.4 Albania- Administration Reform, 23 May 2014. Independent legal consultant in Public
5. Interview no. 5 Albania- Reform, 25 May 2013, and 2014. Independent legal consultant in Civil Service
6. Interview no.6 Albania- 2015. Member of Parliament, Democratic Party, 26 May
7. Interview no.7 Albania- Member of Parliament, Socialist Party, 27 May 2015.
8. Interview no.8 Albania- Department Ministry of Finance, 28 May 2014. Senior Civil Servant, Director of the Budget
9. Interview no.9 Albania- 2014. Senior Civil Servant, Ministry of Health, 30 May
10. Interview no.10 Albania- May 2014. Civil Servant, Ministry of European Integration, 30
11. Interview no.11 Albania- for Integration, Historian and ex- Member of Socialist Movement
12. Interview no.12 Albania- Mediation. Program Director at Institute for Democracy and
13. Interview no.13 Albania- Department. Professor in University of Tirana, Economics
14. Interview no.14 Albania- Senior Civil Servants, Ministry of Economy.

Interviews in Macedonia

15. Interview no.1 Macedonia - May 2015. Senior civil servant in the Ministry of Economy, 23
16. Interview no.2 Macedonia- May, 2015 Senior civil servant and former head of CSA, 24
17. Interview no.3 Macedonia- Director of European Policy Institute, 25 May 2015.
18. Interview no.4 Macedonia- Editor in TV Shenja, 26 May 2015.
19. Interview no.5 Macedonia- Administration Reform, 27 May 2015. Researcher at Analytica, Specialisation in Public
20. Interview no.6 Macedonia- Good Governance, 27 May 2015. Researcher at Institute for Policy Research and
21. Interview no.7 Macedonia- Macedonia, 28 May 2015. Secretariat of Social Democratic Union of
22. Interview no.8 Macedonia- and Administration, 29 May 2015. State Secretary of Ministry of Information Society

23. Interview no.9 Macedonia- Senior civil servant, Ministry of Finance, 30 May 2015.
24. Interview no.10 Macedonia- Director of Open Society Foundation, 15 June 2015.
25. Interview no.11 Macedonia- Member of Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity, 10 June 2015.
26. Interview no.12. Macedonia- Former employee of CSA, 25 May 2015.
27. Interview no.13 Macedonia- Civil servant of Secretariat of European Affairs, 27 May 2015.

LIST OF DATA SETS

Meyer-Sahling expert survey data set, 2010

Expert survey from a SIGMA-OECD project on the management of the central government bureaucracy in Western Balkan states. (access upon author's request).

V-Dem Data set, v.7.1, July 2017, [Varieties of Democracy]

<https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-7/>.

IPU PARLINE database

Inter- Parliamentary Database on Electoral results.

www.ipu.org

Chappell Hill Expert Survey of EU candidates, 2014.

<https://www.chesdata.eu/our-surveys/>

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Aberbach JD. Putnam and Rockman B.A. [1981]. *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*. Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press.
- Aberbach JD., Rockman B.A. [1988]. "Mandates or mandarins? Control and discretion in the modern administrative state". *Public Administration Review*, 48(2): 606–612.
- Agh, A. [1996]. "From nomenclatura to Clientura." in Geoffrey Pridham and Paul G. Lewis, eds., *Stabilising Fragile Democracies: New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Aldrich, J [1995]. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Analytica [2011]. 'Politicization in the Macedonian Public Administration', Analytica Policy Report, July.
- Bardi, L, Bartolini, S. and Trechsel. A. [2014]. *Responsive and Responsible? The Role of Parties in Twenty-First Century Politics*. Vol. 37.
- Barndt, W. [2014]. "Corporation-Based Parties: The Present and Future of Business Politics in Latin America." *Latin American Politics & Society* 56 (3): 1–22.
- Bayley, D. [1966] "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation," *The Western Political Quarterly*, v.19, n.4, (Dec. 1966): 719-732; J.S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, v.61, n.2, (1967): 417-427.
- Bearfield, [2009]. 'What is patronage? A critical re-examination'. *Public Administration Review*, vol.69(1): 64-76.
- Berliner, D. and Ehrlich, A. [2015] Competing for Transparency: Political Competition and Institutional Reform in Mexican States, *American Political Science Review*, Vol.109(1).
- Bezes, Ph. [2012]. The Macro politics of Managerialism: Revisiting Weberian Perspectives in Lodge, M and Weigrich, K. "Executive politics in times of crisis". Palgrave Macmillan.
- Biberaj, E. [1999]. *Albania in Transition: The rocky road to democracy*, Nations of the modern world: Europe.
- Bielasiak, J [2005] "Party Competition in emerging democracies: representation and effectiveness in Post-Communism and Beyond." *Democratization* 12, no. 3: 331–56.
- Birch, S. [2003] *Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Birnie, J. [2007]. *Ethnicity and Electoral Politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge university Press.

- Boateng, J. [2014]: ‘*Complementarity in politics –administration relationship: interpersonal trust between political appointees and career public managers in state government*’, PhD thesis, University of Akron.
- Bogdani, M. and Loughlin, J. [2007]. *Albania and the European Union: the tumultuous journey towards integration and accession*. I.B.Tauris.
- Börzel, T.A. and Pamuk, Y. [2012]. Pathologies of Europeanization. Fighting Corruption in the Southern Caucasus. *West European Politics* 35(1),79-97.
- Brady, Henry and Collier, David [2004]. *Rethinking social inquiry: diverse tools, shared standards*, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield publishers.
- Bratton, M. and van de Walle, N. [1994]. “Neo-patrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa”. *World Politics*, 46(4): 453–489.
- Bratton, M. and van de Walle, N. [1997]. *Democratic Experiments in Africa. Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bruhn, K [2016]. ‘Money for Nothing? Public Financing and Party-Building in Latin America’ in Steven Levitsky, James Loxton, Brandon Van Dyck and Jorge I. Domínguez. *Challenges of party-building in Latin America*, NY New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Bruszt, Laszlo and McDermott, Gerald A. [2008]. “Transnational integration regimes as development programmes”, Center for European Studies Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper Series, n.67.
- Valerie, B and Csanadi, M.[1993], “Uncertainty and the Transition: Post-communism in Hungary,” *East European Politics and Societies* 7 (Spring 1993).
- BTI [2016] — Albania Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016.
- Barjaba, K. [2004]. *Albania’s democratic elections, 1991-1997: analyses, documents and data*. Berling: Ed..Sigma
- Bunce, V. [1999]. *Subversive institutions: The design and the destruction of socialism and the state*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cani, E. (2009). *Analize e legjislacionit per marredheniet e punes ne administraten publike ne Republiken e Shqiperise*. AKSES, Tirana. Albania.
- Chandra, K [2004] *Why ethnic parties succeed: patronage and ethnic head counts in India*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chandra, K [2007]. *A theory of voters and elite behaviour in patronage democracies*, in Kitschelt, H. and Wilkinson S., *Patrons Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic accountability and political competition*, Cambridge U: Cambridge University Press.
- Charron, N. and Lapuente, V. [2011]. “Opening the Darkest Box: Explaining Variation in Government in non-Democracies” *Studies of Comparative International Development*. 46(4).
- CSC (2001). *Civil Service Commission Annual Report for Albania*.

- CSC (2002). Civil Service Commission Annual Report for Albania.
- CSC (2003). Civil Service Commission Annual Report for Albania.
- CSC (2004). Civil Service Commission Annual Report for Albania.
- CSC (2005). Civil Service Commission Annual Report for Albania.
- CSC (2006). Civil Service Commission Annual Report for Albania.
- CSC (2007). Civil Service Commission Annual Report for Albania.
- CSC (2008). Civil Service Commission Annual Report for Albania.
- CSC (2009). Civil Service Commission Annual Report for Albania.
- CSC (2010). Civil Service Commission Annual Report for Albania.
- CSC (2011). Civil Service Commission Annual Report for Albania.
- CSC (2012). Civil Service Commission Annual Report for Albania.
- Clark, P. and Wilson, J. [1961] "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations" *Administrative Science Quarterly*. Vol. 6, No. 2 (Sep., 1961), pp. 129-166
- Clapham, C. [1985]. *Third World Politics*, London: Helm.
- Corstange, D. [2013] 'Ethnicity on the Sleeve and Class in the Heart: when do people respond to identity and material interests?' *British journal of Political Science*, vol. 43 (4).
- CRPM [2010]. *Ten years after the Ohrid framework agreement*, Policy brief. No.19, Center for research and Policy making, Skopje.
- CSIS [2010]. *Western Balkans Policy review*. A report of the CSIS Lvrentis Lavrentiadis Chair in Southeast European studies. Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
- Dahlström, C. and Lapuente, V. [2011]. *Myths of corruption prevention, what is [not] good with a Weberian bureaucracy*, Working paper, Quality of Government institute. University of Gothenburg.
- Dahlström, C., Lapuente, V and Teorrel, J. [2011]. "The Merit of Meritocratization: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of Corruption." *Political Research Quarterly*, 65(3): 656-668.
- Darden, K. [2008]. "The integrity of corrupt states: graft as an informal state institution", *Politics and Society*, 36(1): 36-59.
- Dargent, E. and Muñoz, P.[2011] 'Patronage, Subnational Linkages, and Party-Building : The Cases of Colombia and Peru' in in Steven Levitsky, James Loxton, Brandon Van Dyck and Jorge I. Dominguez. *Challenges of party-building in Latin America*, NY New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Dargent [2015]. *Technocracy and Democracy in Latin America: The experts running the government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- De Mesquita, B., Smith, A. Siverson, R. and Morrow, J. [2003] *The logic of political survival* Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT press.
- DoPA (2002). Annual Report of Department of Public Administration. Albania

- DoPA (2003). Annual Report of Department of Public Administration. Albania.
- DoPA (2004). Annual Report of Department of Public Administration. Albania.
- DoPA (2005). Annual Report of Department of Public Administration. Albania.
- DoPA (2006). Annual Report of Department of Public Administration. Albania.
- DoPA (2007). Annual Report of Department of Public Administration. Albania.
- DoPA (2008). Annual Report of Department of Public Administration. Albania.
- DoPA (2009). Annual Report of Department of Public Administration. Albania.
- DoPA (2010). Annual Report of Department of Public Administration. Albania.
- DoPA (2011). Annual Report of Department of Public Administration. Albania.
- DoPA (2012). Annual Report of Department of Public Administration. Albania.
- DoPA (2013). Annual Report of Department of Public Administration. Albania.
- Diamond, L. and Gunther, R. [2001]. *Political parties and Democracy*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London.
- Dimitrova, A. [2002]. “Enlargement, institution-building and the EU's administrative capacity requirement,” *West European politics*, 25(4): 171-190.
- Dimitrova, A. [2005]. “Europeanization and civil service reform in Central and Eastern Europe,” in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (eds.) [2005], 71-90.
- Dunn, D. [1997]. *Politics and administration at the top: Lessons from down under*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Durkheim, E. [1986], *Durkheim on Politics and the State*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Economic Intelligence Unit [2000]. Quarterly Report January on Albania.
- Economic Intelligence Unit [2001]. Quarterly Report on Albania.
- Economic Intelligence Unit [2002a]. Quarterly Report January on Albania.
- Economic Intelligence Unit [2002b]. Quarterly Report April on Albania.
- Economic Intelligence Unit [2004]. Quarterly Report May on Albania.
- Economic Intelligence Unit [2005a]. Quarterly Report February on Albania
- Economic Intelligence Unit [2005b]. Quarterly Report May on Albania
- Economic Intelligence Unit [2008]. Quarterly Report May on Albania.
- Economic Intelligence Unit [2008]. Quarterly Report on Albania.
- Economic Intelligence Unit [2009]. Quarterly Report on Albania.
- Economic Intelligence Unit [2010]. Quarterly Report on Albania.
- Economic Intelligence Unit [2011]. Quarterly Report November on Albania.
- Elbasani, A. [2009] ‘EU Administrative Conditionality and Domestic Downloading - The Limits of Europeanization in Challenging Contexts’, KFG Working paper.

- Elbasani, A. [2014]. 'EU Administrative conditionality and domestic obstacles slow, hesitant, partial reform in post-communist Albania' in Arolda Elbasani *'European Integration and Transformation in the Western Balkans'*: Routledge.
- Elster, J., Offe, C. and Preuss, U. K. [1998]. *Institutional design in post-communist societies: rebuilding the ship at sea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ennsner-Jedenastik, L. [2014]. "Party Politics and the Survival of Central Bank Governors", *European Journal of Political Research*, 53(3): 500-519.
- Ennsner-Jedenastik, L. [2015a]. "Credibility versus control: Agency independence and partisan influence in the regulatory state". *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(7): 823–853.
- Ennsner-Jedenastik, L. [2015b]. "The Politicization of Regulatory Agencies: Between Partisan Influence and Formal Independence." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 26(3): 507-518.
- Enyedi, Z and Linek, L [2008] 'Searching for the right organization: ideology and party structure in East Central Europe', *Party politics*, vol 14(4).
- Epperly, B. [2012] 'Political competition and judicial independence in non-democracies', PhD Thesis in University of Washington Seattle, WA.
- Epstein, R.A. and Sedelmeier, U. [2011]. "Beyond conditionality: international institutions in post-communist Europe after enlargement", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(6): 795-805.
- Erdman, G. and Engel, U. [2007]. "Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered: Critical Review and Elaboration of an Elusive Concept", *Commonwealth and comparative politics*, 45(1): 95-119.
- EU COM (2001), *Stabilisation and association report*,
- EU COM (2002), *Stabilisation and association report*, 4 April, SEC (2002) 339.
- EU COM (2004), *Stabilisation and association report*, SEC (2004) 374 /2.
- EU COM (2005), *Progress report Albania*, SEC (2006), 9 November, SEC (2005) 1421.
- EU COM (2006), *Progress report Albania*, SEC (2006), 8 November, SEC (2006) 1383.
- EU COM (2008), *Progress report Albania*, 5 November, SEC (2008) 2692.
- EU COM (2009), *Progress report Albania, 14 October*, SEC (2009) 1337.
- EU COM (2010), *Commission Opinion on Albania's application for membership of the European Union*, 9 November 2010, COM (2010) 680.
- EUCOM (2011), *Progress report Albania*, 12 October, SEC (2011) 1205.
- EUCOM (2013), *Progress report Albania*, 16 October, SWD (2013) 414.
- Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D., Skocpol, Th. [1985]. "Bringing the state back in", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Evans, P. [1995]. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Evans P. and Rauch, J. [1999]. "Bureaucracy and growth: A cross-national analysis of the effects of the 'Weberian' state structures on economic growth", *American Sociological Review*, 64(5): 748-65.
- Evans P. and Rauch, J. [2000]. "Bureaucratic structures and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries", *Journal of Public Economics*, 75(1): 49-71.
- Fortin, J. [2011]. "Is there a necessary condition for democracy? The role of state capacity in Post- communist countries", *Comparative Political Studies*, 45 (7): 903-930.
- Fukuyama, F. [2013]. What is governance?, *Governance*, Vol 26 (3).
- Freedom House, Country Report [1998]: Albania available at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=389&year=2006>, accessed 28 September 2013.
- Freedom House, Country Report [2009]: Albania available at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=389&year=2009>, accessed 28 September 2013.
- Fritz, V. [2007]. *State-building: A comparative study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia*, Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Gajduschek, G [2007] 'Politicisation, professionalisation, or both? Hungary's civil service system'; *Communist and Post- Communist Studies*, vol 40(3).
- Ganev, V. [2001]. "The separation of party and state as a logical problem: a glance at the causes of state weakness in post-communism", *East European Politics and Societies*, 15(2): 389-420.
- Geddes, B. [1994]. *Politician's Dilemma: Building state capacity in Latin America*. California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy.
- George, A. and Bennet, A. [2005]. *Case Studies and Theory development*, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Georgiev, G. [2007]. "Political Parties in Macedonia: Democracy or Efficiency Dilemma " In Karasimeonov, G. (ed.) *Reshaping the Broken Image of Political Parties: Internal Party Democracy in South Eastern Europe*, Sofia: Gorex Press. pp. 154-173
- Gerschenkron, A. [1962]. *Economic backwardness in historical perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.
- Giandomenico, J [2014] 'EU conditionality as a transforming power in Macedonia: evidence from electoral management'. in Arolda Elbasani 'European Integration and Transformation in the Western Balkans': Routledge.
- Gingerich [2013] *Political Institutions and Party directed Corruption in South America: stealing for the team*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goetz, K. H. [2001]. 'Making Sense of Post-Communist Central Administration Modernization, Europeanization or Latinization?' *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8(6): 1032-51.

- Goetz, K. H., and Wollmann, H. [2001]. 'Governmentalizing Central Executives in Post-Communist Europe: A Four-Country Comparison', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8(6): 864–87.
- Government Program of the Democratic Party of Albania (2005-2009), Albanian Parliament.
- Greene, K. [2007] 2007. *Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Grindle, M. [2012]. *Jobs for the boys: Patronage and the state in comparative perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Grindle, M [2013] 'Jobs for the boys: Patronage and the state in comparative perspective', Harvard University Press.
- Grzymala-Busse, A.-M, and Loung, P.J [2002]. "Reconceptualizing the state: lessons from post-communism", *Politics & Society*, 30(4):529-554.
- [2003]. "Political Competition and the Politicization of the State in East Central Europe", *Comparative Political Studies*, 36(10): 1123-1147.
- [2004a]. *Post-Communist competition and state development*, Program on Central & Eastern Europe, Working paper series no.59, Department of Political science, University of Michigan.
- [2004b]. "Political competition and the post-communist state: Rethinking the Determinants of State Corruption". Paper prepared for at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science, Chicago.
- [2007]. *Rebuilding Leviathan: party competition and state exploitation in post-communist democracies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Guy, P. and Pierre, P. [2004]. *Politicization of the civil service in comparative perspective: the quest for control*, London - New York: Routledge.
- Hagopian, F.[1996]. *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hagopian, F [2014]. 'Reorganizing interests in Latin America in the Neo-Liberal Age' in Peter A. Hall, Jacoby Wade, Jonah Levy, Sophie Meunier: *Politics of representation in the global age: identification, mobilization and adjudication?*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Hay, C., Lister, M., and Marsh, D. [2005]. *The State: Theories and Issues*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hale, H. [2004]. "Yabloko and the Challenge of Building a Liberal Party in Russia." *Europe-Asia Studies* 56 (7): 993–1020.
- [2006]. *Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Haughton, T. [2009]. Driver, Conductor or Fellow Passenger? EU Membership and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 25:4, 413-426

- Hecklo, H. [1977]. *A government of strangers: Executive politics in Washington*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Hellmann, J. [1998] *Winners take it all: the politics of partial reform*. National Council for Soviet and East European Research, Harvard University.
- Hicklin, A. and Godwin, E. [2009]. “Agents of Change: The Role of Public Managers in Public Policy.” *Policy Studies Journal*, 37(1): 13-20.
- Hindmoor, A. [2005]. Public Choice. In: Hay, C., Lister, M., and Marsh, D.. *The State: Theories and Issues*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
- Hirschman, A. [1989]. “Reactionary rhetoric.” *The Atlantic Monthly*, May:63–70.
- Hopkin, J and Paolucci, C. [1999] “The business firm model of party organization ; cases form Spain and Italy,” *European Journal of Political Research* 35 307-339.
- Hood, C. and Lodge, M. [2012]. *Politics of public service bargains rewards, competency, loyalty and blame*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hood, C. [1995]. “The ‘New Public Management’ in the 1980s: Variations on a Theme.” *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 20(2/3): 93-109.
- Hood, C. [2001]. “Public service managerialism: onwards and upwards, or ‘Trobriand cricket’ again?” *Political Quarterly*, 7(3): 300-309.
- Hodder, R. [2014]. *High Level Political Appointments in the Philippines: Patronage, Emotion and Democracy*. Springer, University of Plymouth.
- Horowitz, D. [1985]. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Hislope [2003]. Political Corruption and Interethnic Coalitions: The Crisis in Macedonia. Paper prepared for workshop “The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace: Insights from the Balkans,” Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, May 6, 2003.
- [2008]. “Corrupt exchange in divided societies: the invisible politics of stability in Macedonia”, in Orenstein, Bloom and Lindstrom (eds.), 142-161.
- [2012] “Macedonia” in Sten Berglund, et al. (eds.), *Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe*, (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2012).
- Huber, Sh. [2011]. ‘*Measuring ethnic voting: the political context and the politicization of ethnicity*’, paper presented at “Democracy and Representation: Conference, Department of Political Science at the University of Rochester” October, 2010, Rochester, New York.
- Huddy, L.[2001].From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory. *Political Psychology* 22 (1):127–156.
- ICG (2011) ‘*Macedonia : Ten years after the conflict*’. Europe and Central Asia, Europe Report N°212 – 11 August 2011. International Crisis Group.
- Ilijani, A [2005]. Political Choice in Albania. The 2005 Albanian Parliamentary elections. *Albanian Journal of Politics*, I (1): 75-86.
- IMF and IDA [2002]. *Joint Staff assessment of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*, Prepared by the Staffs of the International Monetary Fund and the International Development Association.

- [2004] *Albania: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* Progress Report IMF Country Report No. 04/204
- IMF [2003]. *Albania: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* Progress Report IMF Country Report No. 03/164.
- IMF [2006]. *Albania: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* Progress Report IMF Country Report No. 06/23.
- IMF [2016]. 'Being Poor, Feeling Poorer: Inequality, Poverty and Poverty Perceptions in the Western Balkans'. IMF Working paper 1631. [tp://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp1631.pdf](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp1631.pdf)
- IMF [2015]. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia IMF Country report No.15/242. <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15242.pdf>
- ICG [2011]. "Macedonia. Ten years after the conflict". International Crisis Group Nr. 122. 11 August.
- Innes, A. [2013]. The political economy of state capture in central Europe. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52 (1). pp. 88-104.
- Ishiyama, J. [2001]. Party Organization and the Political Success of the communist successor Parties. *Social Science Quarterly*, vol 82 (4), p:844-864.
- Jacoby, W. [2006]. "Inspiration, coalition, and substitution: external influences on post-communist transformations", *World politics*, 58(4): 623-651.
- [2008]. "Minority traditions and post-communist politics: how do IGO's matter?" in Orenstein, Bloom and Lindstrom (eds.) [2008a], 56-76.
- Jano, D. [2013]. Organization of political parties in Albania in Katarzyna Sobolewska-Myslik, Beata Kosowska – Gastol, Piotr Borowiec 'Organizational structures of political parties in Central and Eastern European countries, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu.Poland.
- Katz, R. and Mair, P. [1995]. "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: the emergence of the cartel party", *Party Politics*, 1(1): 5-31.
- Kajsiu, B. [2010]. Down with politics! The crisis of representation in Post-Communist Albania , *East European Politics & Societies* 24(2):229-25
- Keefer, Ph. [2015] Political Parties and the Politics of the Quality of Government in Carl Dahlström and Lena Waengerud "Elites, Institutions and the quality of government", in Executive Politics and Governance series, Palgrave Macmillian.
- Kelsall, T. and Booth, D. [2010]. "Developmental patrimonialism? Questioning the orthodoxy on political governance and economic progress in Africa" Africa Power & Politics Working Paper n°9.
- Kim, J.-O, & Mueller, Ch.W. [1978]. Introduction to factor analysis: What it is and how to do it. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Kitschelt, H. [1989]. "The logics of Party formation: ecological politics in Belgium and West Germany", Cornell University Press.

- [1992], The formation of party systems in East Central Europe. *Politics and Society* 20 (1) , 7-50.
- Kitschelt et al. (1999). *Post Communist Party systems: competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kitschelt, H. [2000]. Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities, *Comparative Political Studies*, 33(6-7).
- Kitschelt, H and Wilkinson, [2007]. *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kitschelt, H. and Wilkinson S. [2007]. *Patrons Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic accountability and political competition*, Cambridge UK: Cambridge university Press.
- Kopecký, P. [1995]. Factionalism in parliamentary parties in the Czech Republic: A concept and some empirical findings. *Democratization*, vol. 2 (1).
- Kopecký, P. and Mair, P. [2006]. “Political parties and patronage in contemporary democracies: an introduction,” Paper presented at the ECPR workshop “Political parties and patronage”, Nicosia: 25-30 April.
- Kopecký, P. and Mair, P. [2011]. “Party patronage in contemporary Europe: principles and practices”, *EUI Working Papers, RSCAS*, n°41.
- Kopecký, P., Mair, P. and Spirova, M. [2011]. *Party patronage and party government in European democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kopecký, P., Meyer-Sahling, J. Panizza, F., Scherlis, G., Schuster, C., and Spirova, M. [2016]. “Party patronage in contemporary democracies: Results from an expert survey in 22 countries from five regions”, *European Journal of Political Research*, 55 (2): 416-431.
- Kopecký, P., Scherlis, G. and Spirova. M. [2008]. *Conceptualizing and measuring party patronage*, Col. Lomas de Santa Fe: Committee on Concepts and Methods, Working paper (Political concepts series) n°25.
- Kopecký, P., Spirova, M. and Scherlis, G. [2011]. “Beyond the cartel party? Party Patronage and the nature of parties in new democracies”, Paper prepared for the Joint IPSA/ECPR conference, Sao Paolo, Brazil.
- Kopecký, P. [2011]. “Political competition and party patronage: public appointments in Ghana and South Africa”, *Political Studies*, 59(3): 713-732.
- Krasniqi, A. and Hackaj, A. [2015]. *Albanians and the European social model: Internal democracy in Albanian political parties*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Lapiente, V. and Nistotskaya, M. [2009]. “To the short sighted victor belong the spoils: Politics and Merit Adoption in Russia”, Paper prepared for the 2008 PSA conference, Swansea.
- LeBas, A. [2011]. *From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Levitsky, L. and Way, L. [2010]. *Competitive authoritarianism, Hybrid regimes after the Cold War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Levitsky, s., Loxton, J., Van Dyck B., Dominguez, J.I. [2016] *Challenges of party building in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lewis, D. [2005]. "Staffing Alone: Unilateral Action and the Politicization of the Executive Office of the President, 1988-2004." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35(3):496-514 (2005).
- Lewis, D. [2008]. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lewis, D., Hollibaugh, G. E. and Horton, G.[2010]. "Presidents and Patronage." (with Gary E. Hollibaugh, Jr. and Gabe Horton), *American Journal of Political Science* 58(4): 1024-1042 (2014).
- Lewis, D and Wood, A. K.. [2012]. Chap 2 p.14 "Agency Performance Challenges and Agency Politicization," Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Working Paper # 06-2012.
- Lewis, D. [2011]. "Presidential appointments and personnel", *Annual review of Political Science*, 14: 47-66.
- Lewis, D. E., Hollibaugh, G.E. and Horton, G. [2014]. "Presidents and Patronage." *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4): 1024-1042.
- Linz, J.J. and A. Stepan. [1997]. "Toward Consolidated Democracies," in Diamond L. et al. (eds.) *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 14-34.
- Lijphart, A. [1977]. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Loxton, J. [2016] *Authoritarian Successor parties, and the new right in Latin America in Levitsky, s., Loxton, J., Van Dyck B., Dominguez, J.I. [2016] Challenges of party building in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lupu, N. [2016] . *Building party brands in Argentina and Brazil*, in Levitsky, s., Loxton, J., Van Dyck B., Dominguez, J.I. [2016] *Challenges of party building in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mainwaring, G. O'Donnell, & J. S. Valenzuela [1992]. *Issues in democratic consolidation: The new South American democracies in comparative perspective*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Mainwaring, S. [1999]. *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- 2006. "The Crisis of Representation in the Andes." *Journal of Democracy* 17(3): 13–27.
- Mair, P. [2000]. "The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems". *West European Politics*, 23 (4): 27-51.

- Mair, P. [2008]. "Representative versus responsible government". Max Planck Institute for the study of societies MPIfG Working Paper 09/8.
- Mann M. [1986]. *The Sources of Social Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Maranto, R.[1998]. "Thinking the unthinkable in public administration: A case for spoils in the federal bureaucracy". *Administration and Society*. Vol. 29(6).
- [2002]. Praising civil service but not bureaucracy. A brief against tenure in the U.S. civil service. *Review of Public Personnel Administration*, Vol.22(3).
- Marenin [1998] "The Nigerian state as process and manager : a conceptualization" *Comparative Politics* vol. 20(2).
- Massey, A. [2011]. *International Handbook on Civil service systems*, Edward Elgar Publishing, USA.
- Maxfield, S. and Schneider, B. R. [1997]. *Business and the State in Developing Countries*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Mazzucca, S. and Munck, G [2014]. "State or democracy first? Alternative perspectives on the state-democracy nexus", *Democratization*, 21(7): 1221-1243.
- McGregor, E. and Solano, P. [1996]. Data Requirements and Availability, in: Bekke, H., Perry, J. and Toonen, T. (eds.), *Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective*. Bloomington: Indianapolis [1996], 44-49.
- Meier, K. and O'Toole, L.J. [2002]. 'Public Management and organizational performance: the effect of managerial quality', *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 21(4): 629-643.
- Mendelski, M. [2009]. "The impact of EU on governance reforms in post-communist Europe : a comparison between first and second wave candidates". *Romanian Journal of Political Science* 9(2).
- Mendelski , M.[2014]. "They have failed again! Donor-driven promotion of the rule of law in Serbia". *Südosteuropa* 61 (1), 79-113
- Meyer-Sahling, J.-H. [2006a]. "The rise of the partisan state? Parties, patronage and the ministerial bureaucracy in Hungary," *Journal of communist studies and transition politics*, 22(3): 274-297.
- [2006b]. "The Institutionalization of Political Discretion in Post-communist civil service systems: The Case of Hungary", *Public Administration*, 84(3): 693-716.
- [2006c], "De-Politicization Through the Backdoor? EU Integration, Administrative Reform and Party Patronage in East Central Europe", Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions Workshop 6: Political Parties and Patronage. Nicosia/Cyprus, April 2006.
- [2009a]. Sustainability of civil service reforms in Central and Eastern Europe five years after EU accession, Paris: OECD, Sigma paper n°44.
- [2009]. Varieties of legacies: a critical review of legacy explanations of public administration reform in East Central Europe, in "International review of administrative sciences", 75(3): 509-52

- [2010]. “In search of the shadow of the past: Legacy Explanations and Administrative Reform in Post-Communist East Central Europe”, in, Painter, M. and Peters, G. (eds). *Tradition and Public administration*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- [2012]. “Civil service professionalization in the Western Balkans”, SIGMA Papers, No.48. OECD.
- [2013]. “Governing the Post-Communist State: Government Alternation and Senior Civil Service Politicisation in Central and Eastern Europe.” *East European Politics*, 28(1): 1-19.
- MISA [2011]. Annual Report on the data from the 2011 public servants registry. Ministry of IT Society and Administration. Republic of Macedonia. http://www.mio.gov.mk/files/pdf/en/AnnualReportPublicServants_2011.pdf
- MISA [2011a]. Annual Report of the civil servants registry data for 2011. Ministry of IT Society and Administration. Republic of Macedonia. <http://www.mio.gov.mk/files/pdf/en/AnnualreportoftheCivilServantsregistrydata.pdf>
- Moe, T. [1985]. “The politicized presidency.” In Chubb J. and Peterson P. (eds.), *The New Direction in American Politics*. Washington: The Brookings Institution.
- Moe, T. [1997]. Moe, T. M. (1997). “The positive theory of public bureaucracy,” in Mueller, D.C. (ed.) *Perspectives on Public Choice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 455–480.
- Mosher, F. (1982). *Democracy and the public service*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Müller, W. C. [2006]. “Party Patronage and Party Colonization of the State.” In Katz, R. S. and Crotty, W. (eds.), *Handbook of Party Politics*. London, Sage: 189–194.
- Müller, Wolfgang C. 2007. “Political Institutions and Linkage Strategies.” In Hebert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (eds.), *Patrons, Clients, and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. New York, Cambridge University Press: 251\275.
- Mungiu-Pipidi, A. [2014] - *The Anticorruption Frontline. The Anticorruption Report vol. 2* (editor), Barbara Budrich Publishers
- Neshkova, M. and Kostadinova, T. [2012]. “The Effectiveness of Administrative Reform in New Democracies.” *Public Administration Review*, 72(3): 324-333.
- Neuhold, C, Vanhoonacker, S, Verhey L [2013]. *Civil servant and Politics: A delicate balance of civil service systems*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian.
- Niskanen, W. [1971]. *Bureaucracy and representative government*. Chicago Aldine.
- Nistotskaya, M. and Cingolani, L. [2014]. “Bureaucratic structure, Regulatory Quality, and Entrepreneurship in a comparative perspective”, *Quality of Government Institute Working paper series n°8*, Gothenburg.
- North, D [1990]. *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Nunberg, B. [1999]. *The State after Communism: Administrative Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe*, Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Offe, C. [1997]. *Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience*, Cambridge: MIT Press.
- O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, Ph.C., Whitehead, L. [1986]. *Transitions from authoritarian rule: comparative perspectives*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- O'Donnell, G. [2004]. "Why the rule of law matters". *Journal of Democracy*. 15(4).
- O'Donnell, G. [2010]. *Democracy, agency and the state: theory with comparative intent*, Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press.
- O'Dwyer, C. [2004]. "Runaway State Building: How Political Parties Shape States in Post-communist Eastern Europe", *World Politics*, 56(4): 520-533.
- [2006]. *Runaway state-building: patronage politics and democratic development*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Olsen, J.P [2008]. "The ups and downs of bureaucratic organization", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11: 13-37.
- Oliveros, V [2013]. *A working machine Patronage jobs and political services in Argentina*, PhD thesis, Graduate School of Arts and Science, Columbia University
- Olson, M. [1965] *The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups*. Harvard University Press.
- Orenstein, M., Bloom, S. and Lindstrom, N. [2008]. *Transnational Actors in Central and East European Transitions*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. [1992]. *Reinventing Government: how the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the Public Sector*. New York: William Patrick.
- OSCE [2001]. *Albania parliamentary elections, Final Report, O 24 June - 19 August 2001: Final Report*.
- Ombudsman [2014]. *Annual Report on the level of respect, promotion and protection of human rights and freedoms for 2013*. Skopje, March: file:///Users/gjoksi/Downloads/Macedonia_OM_Annual%20Report_2013_EN.pdf
- Page, E. [1992]. *Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power*, author, 1st edition Wheatsheaf and University of Tennessee Press, 1985; 2nd edition Simon and Schuster, 1992.
- Page, E. C. [2010]. 'Bureaucrats and expertise: elucidating a problematic relationship in three tableaux and six jurisdictions', *Sociologie du Travail*, 52 (2): 255-273.
- Panbianco, A. [1988] *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Parliamentary Committee [2006]. *Audit report on Public Administration and civil servant dismissals*. Ad-hoc Parliamentary Committee of Public Administration. Albanian Parliament.

- Peters, G. [2013]. "What is it and why should we care?" In Neuhold C. et al. [2013]. *Civil servant and Politics: A delicate balance*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Peters, B.G and Pierre, J. [2004]. 'Politicization of the civil service in comparative perspective: the quest for control', Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, London and New York.
- Piattoni, S. [2001]. *Clientelism, Interests and Democratic representation: the European Experience in historical and comparative perspective*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. [2011]. *Public Management Reforms: A Comparative Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pridham, G. and Lewis, P. [1996]. "Introduction: stabilizing Fragile democracies and Party system development." in Geoffrey Pridham and Paul G. Lewis, eds., *Stabilizing Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Progni, L. [2013] *Pardesyte e bardha: Te fshehtat e atyre qe cmontuan diktaturen*.
- Reid, G (2005) *The political economy of civil service reform in Albania*, Washington DC: World Bank report.
- Riker, William H. 1982. *Liberalism against Populism*. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press
- Roth, G. [1968]. "Personal rulership, patrimonialism, and empire-building in the new states', *World Politics*, 20(2): 194–206.
- Rothstein, B. and Teorrell, J. [2008]. "Defining and measuring quality of government". Published in Sören Holmberg & Bo Rothstein: *Good Government: The Relevance of Political Science*. Edward Elgar Press 2012
- Rovny, J. [2014] *Communism, Federalism, and Ethnic minorities: Explaining party competition patterns in Eastern Europe*. *World Politics*. Vol, 66(4).
- Rueschemeyer, D. and Evans, P. [1985]. "States as Promoters of Economic Development and Social Redistribution," in Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D., and Skocpol, T. [1985], *Bringing the State Back In*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; pp. 3-43.
- Sabharwal, M. and Berman, E.M. [2013]. *Public Administration in South Asia: India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan*. Taylor and Francis Group.
- Shapo, Zh. and Hoxha, A. [2008] , *Review of Civil Service Law Implementation Challenges in Albania*, Institute of Contemporary Studies, Public Administration International, Tirana, Albania.
- Schattschneider, E.E. [1942] *Party Government; American government in action*. New Brunswick.
- Schedler, A. [1998]. "What Is Democratic Consolidation?" *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 9(2).
- Shefter, M. [1994]. *Political parties and the state: the American historical experience*. Princeton University University.

- Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. [2005]. "Introduction: conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe," in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (eds.), *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1-28.
- Schimmelfennig F. and Sedelmeier U. (eds.) [2005]. *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Schimmelfennig, F. [2011]. "EU political conditionality after the 2004 enlargement: consistency and effectiveness", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(6): 918-937.
- Schlesinger, J. [1984]. On the theory of party organization. *The Journal of Politics*, vol.46(2).
- Schneider, B.R [1991]. *Politics within the state: elite bureaucrats and industrial policy in authoritarian Brazil*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh.
- Scott, J. [1972] *The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia. The Journal of Asian Studies*. Vol. 32, No. 1
- Scott, J. [2005]. "Patronage Regimes and American *Party Development* from 'The Age of Jackson' to the Progressive Era." *British Journal of Political Science* .vol.36(1).
- Seidman, H. and Gilmour, R. [1986]. *Politics, Position and Power: From the Positive to the Regulatory State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sevic, Z. [2011]. "Government and the State, Politicians and Civil Servants: Politico-Administrative Relationships in Yugoslavia." 15 Jul 2011.
- Silberman ,B.S. [1993]. *Cages of reason: The rise of the rational state in France, the United States, and Great Britain*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Slater, D. [2008]: 'Can Leviathan be democratic? Competitive elections, robust mass politics and state infrastructural power'. *Studies of Comparative International Development*, 43(3-4): 252-272.
- Slater, D. [2008]. "Can Leviathan Be Democratic? Competitive Elections, Robust Mass Politics, and State Infrastructural Power." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 43 (3-4).
- SIGMA (2002). *Civil Service Assessment Republic of Albania*, Sigma Balkans Reports.
- SIGMA (2005), *Civil Service Assessment Republic of Albania*, Sigma Balkans Reports.
- SIGMA (2006). *Public Service Assessment Republic of Albania*, Sigma Balkans Reports.
- SIGMA (2006a). *Assessment Report for Republic of FYR of Macedonia*.
- SIGMA (2008). *Public Service Assessment Republic of Albania*, Sigma Balkans Reports.
- SIGMA (2010). *Assessment Report for Republic of FYR of Macedonia*.
- SIGMA (2007). *Assessment Report for Republic of FYR of Macedonia*.
- SIGMA (2012). *Assessment report for Albania*.
- SIGMA (2012a). *Assessment report FYR of Macedonia*.

- Siljanovska-Davkova, G. [2005]. "Organizational Structures and Internal Party Democracy in the Republic of Macedonia" in Karasimenov, G., *Organizational structures and Internal Party Democracy in South Eastern Europe*, Sofia: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 26-62
- Skocpol, T. [1985]. "Bringing the State Back In: Current Research," in Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D., and Skocpol, T. [1985], *Bringing the State Back In*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Snyder, J.L. [2000]. *From voting to violence: Democratization and nationalist conflict*. New York: Norton.
- Stahlberg, K [1987]. 'The Politicization of Public Administration', *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 53(3): 363–82.
- Stillman, R. [1974]. *The rise of the city manager*. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press.
- Storajova, V. and Emerson, P. [2009]. *Party Politics in the Western Balkans*, Routledge Research in Comparative Politics.
- Svara, J. (2001). The myth of the dichotomy: complementarity of politics and administration in the past and future of public administration. *Public Administration Review*, 61 (2), pp. 176-183.
- Stokes [2007] "Political Clientelism." In Carles Boix and Susan Stokes (eds.), *Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 604\627.
- Suleiman, E. [2005]. *Dismantling democratic states*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sundell A. [2012]: "What is the best way to recruit public servants", *Quality of Government Working Paper Series* n°7.
- Svara, J.H. [2001]. 'The myth of the dichotomy', *Public Administration Review*, 61(2): 176–183.
- Taylor B. [2011]. *State building in Putin's Russia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tavits, M.[2013]. *Post-Communist democracies and party organization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tavits, M. and Letki, N [2014]. "From Values to Interests? The Evolution of Party Competition in New Democracies". *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 76 (1).
- Tavits, M and Potter, J. [2015] *The Effect of Inequality and Social Identity on Party Strategies* *American Journal of Political Science*, vol.59(3).
- Thachil, T. [2011]. "Embedded Mobilization: Non-state Service *Provision* as *Electoral* Strategy in India." *World Politics*. 63: 434–469.
- Ting, M., Folke, O., Hirano, Sh.[2012]. *Elections and Reform: the adoption of civil service systems in the U. S. States*.
- Huber, J.D. and Ting, M [2015]. "Civil Service and Patronage in Bureaucracies". Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Conference. http://www.columbia.edu/~mmt2033/politics_personnel.pdf.

- Thorp, R and Durand, F. [1995]. 'A historical overview of business-state relations: Colombia, Peru and Venezuela compares.' In Maxfield and Schneider [1995]. *Business and the state in developing countries*.
- Tolchin, M. and Tolchin, S. [2011]. *Pinstripe Patronage: Political Favoritism from the Clubhouse to the White House and Beyond*. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers.
- Treichel, V. [2002]. *Stabilization policies and structural reforms in Albania since 1997- Achievements and Remaining Challenges*. IMF Policy Discussion Paper.
- UNDP [2013]. *UNDP Human Development Report*. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/hdr2013_en_complete.pdf
- Vachudova, M. [2008]: *Tempered by the EU? Political parties and party systems before and after accession*, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15:6, 861-879
- Van Dyck, B. [2016]. *The paradox of adversity: New left party survival and collapse in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina*, in Levitsky, s., Loxton, J., Van Dyck B., Dominguez, J.I. [2016] *Challenges of party building in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Vangeli, Anastas (2011), 'Nation-Building Ancient Macedonian Style: The Origins and the Effects of the So-Called Antiquization in Macedonia', *Nationalities Papers* 39 (1), 13–32.
- Verheijen, T. [2000]. "Administrative capacity development: a race against time?", Den Haag: Scientific Council for Government Policy, Working document no. 107.
- [2007]. "Administrative capacity in the new Member States, the limits of?" Working Paper n°115, Washington: World Bank.
- [2010]. "The New Member states of the European Union: Constructed and Historical Traditions and Reform Trajectories" in Painter M. and Peters, G. (eds) [2010]. *Tradition and Public administration*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Van Biezen, I. [2003] *Political Parties in New Democracies, Party Organization in Southern and East- Central Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Velijaj, M. [2013]. *Political polarization in Albania: Factors, circumstances, impacts during the transition period towards democracy 1991-2013*. Lambert Academic Publishing.
- Vom Hau, M [2007]. *State capacity and inclusive development: new challenges and directions*. ESID Working paper No.02.
- Vom Hau, M [2012]. "State Capacity and Inclusive Development: New Challenges and Directions." *Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre Working Paper n.2*.
- Vu, T. [2010]. "Studying the State through State Formation." *World Politics*, 62(1), 148-175.
- Weber, M. [1922]. *Economy and Society* . University of California Press.
- Weber, M. [1978]. *Economy and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . [1962]. "Bureaucracy" in *From Max Weber: essays in sociology*, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, New York: Oxford University

- Weiss, J. [1995]. Reviewed Works: *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector* by David Osborne, Ted Gaebler. *The Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 20(1).
- Weitz-Shapiro, R. [2008]. Choosing clientelism. Political competition, poverty, and social welfare policy in Argentina. PhD. Dissertation. Columbia University.
- Weitz-Shapiro, R. [2012]. "What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism." *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(3): 568-583.
- West, W. [2005]. "Neutral competence and political responsiveness." *The Policy Studies Journal*, 33 (2): 147-160.
- Wilson, W. (1887) 'The Study of Administration', *Political Science Quarterly*, 2, 197–222.
- Wilson [1961]. Wilson, James Q. 1961. "The Economy of Patronage." *Journal of Political Economy* 69(4): 369–380.
- World Bank [2000]. Project appraisal document on a proposed credit to Albania for a public administration reform project. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit. World Bank report, Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank. [2003]. Albania - Poverty Reduction Support Credit Project. Washington, DC: World Bank. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/880201468740386050/Albania-Poverty-Reduction-Support-Credit-Project>.
- World Bank. [2006]. Albania-Public Administration Reform Project. Project Appraisal Report No. PID8780.
- Reid, G. (2005). The political economy of civil service in Albania. World Bank report.
- Yesilkagit K. [2010]. The future administrative tradition: Tradition as Ideas and Structure, in Painter, M. and Peters, G. [2010]. *Tradition and Public administration*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Zielinski, J [2002]. "Translating social Cleavages into Party systems: the significance of new democracies." *World Politics* 54, no. 2: 184–211.
- West, W. (2005). Neutral competence and political responsiveness. *The Policy Studies Journal*, 33 (2), pp. 147-160.