# REVIEW ARTICLE

HANS DRIESCH RE-VISITED AFTER A CENTURY:

ON "LEIB UND SEELE – EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ÜBER DAS PSYCHOPHYSISCHE GRUNDPROBLEM"

Stefan Gruner

LEIB UND SEELE

Eine Untersuchung über das psychophysische Grundproblem

von

HANS DRIESCH

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INTRODUCTION.

Long before Alan Turing laid the foundations of the ongoing artificial intelligence project with all its computer-scientific and philosophical consequences and side effects,[1] we can find in a short but intellectually dense booklet by the German biologist, bio-and-psycho-philosopher and philosopher of science, Hans Driesch, the following noteworthy remark: 'It is conceivable that once a great technician of the future might reproduce the internal state of a brain at one moment; according to our doctrine there would not be 'on the other side' any corresponding state of a conscious having.'[2] The ongoing philosophical disputes about the possibility or impossibility of 'strong artificial intelligence', with well-known participants such as John Searle and Roger Penrose, provides sufficient reason and motivation to look once again at what Hans Driesch had told us approximately a century ago. From his many books and essays I have chosen "*Leib und Seele – Eine Untersuchung über das psychophysische Grundproblem*" (1st:1916, 3rd:1923) for this review,[3] specifically because of that book's persistent relevance for the ongoing discourses in the philosophy of computing and AI. These contemporary AI-philosophical discourses are –at least in part– characterised by the occasional *re-emergence* of *naive* mapping models for mental and mechanical 'states' which Driesch had convincingly refuted already two decades before the first Turing-equivalent freely programmable digital computers were electro-mechanically or fully electronically implemented – long before the linguist Searle came up with this famous 'Chinese Room' argument,[4] and long before mathematical physicists like Penrose attacked the position of 'strong' AI by means of an intellectual pincer manoeuvre with Gödel's incompleteness theorems on the one flank and quantum physics on the other.[5]

Unlike the self-proclaimed anti-metaphysicists during Driesch's life-time (such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, members of the Viennese Circle, etc.), who all attempted to 'overcome' metaphysics (without being ultimately able to achieve that goal), Driesch did not shy away from metaphysics in a suitable, modern, science-compatible style. Metaphysics is classically, at least since Christian Wolff,[6] divided into

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[1] See, for example, the journal: *Minds and Machines.*

[2] My own translation from the German original: "Leib und Seele" (3rd ed.), 2nd part, sect. I.2, p. 90.

[3] In its English translation the book has appeared as "Mind and Body", which is very unfortunate for two reasons: first of all, the positions in the title have been swapped –in Driesch's original book title the body comes first, whereas in the English title the body comes last– and secondly, the 'mind' is something completely different from what Driesch understands a 'soul'. The correct English translation of the book title *would* have been: 'body and soul' (because the 'soul' is *not* the 'mind'), such that I shall mostly refer to the book as *Leib und Seele* in the remainder of this review article.

[4] John Searle: *Minds, Brains, and Programs*. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, pp. 417-424, 1980.

[5] Roger Penrose: *The Emperor's New Mind*, 1989.

[6] Christian Wolff: *Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia*, 1730.

two parts: *general* versus *special* metaphysics. General metaphysics (in its classical definition) deals with *being-as-such insofar it is* (i.e.: pure ontology), whereas special metaphysics deals with *being insofar as it shows itself to particular realms of philosophical inquiry*.[7] A list of *examples* of special metaphysics includes:

- Theoretical theology (Being insofar it is God),
- Transcendental logics and psycho-philosophy (Being insofar it is Think-Soul),
- Philosophy of nature (Being insofar it is Material Substance and Process),
- Philosophical anthropology (Being insofar it is Human),
- Theoretical biology (Being insofar it is Life),[8]

whereby all these special metaphysics are still 'abstract' and 'general' and 'philosophical' enough to distinguish themselves from the *particular sciences* (which have historically 'emerged' out of those metaphysics) dedicated to those topics: in the particular sciences the methods of inquiry are to a larger extent empirical (than in the purely rational metaphysics) and already *take* a number of *basis concepts for granted* (e.g.: 'life') which would still be in need of philosophical clarification in some special metaphysics which is conceptually positioned 'on top of' its corresponding particular science.

Having started as an empirical biologist by education, Driesch soon became a 'fully-fledged' philosopher and special metaphysicist,[9] with noteworthy contributions especially to the metaphysics of life (bio-philosophy) and the metaphysics of mind and soul (psycho-philosophy) – thereby always in full awareness of the latest empirical findings in the corresponding particular sciences: biology and psychology. A number of publications on Ethics –something Heidegger explicitly refused to produce– completed Driesch's philosophical oeuvre. Around the age of 40, in February 1906, Driesch was appointed as 'Gifford Lecturer' (Scotland) on the topics of theoretical biology and philosophy. In spite of his early Gifford appointment (as well several further positions and honorary awards of international prestige, invited lectures in China and Japan, etc.), Driesch was and remained to some extent ignored in his German-speaking *heimat* land. For example, Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (1927) does not mention Driesch at all, although both Heidegger and Driesch were –to some extent, and in their own particular way– Husserlians, although both of them were working on related topics – see particularly $10 in 'Sein und Zeit',[10] and although the works of both Driesch and

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[7] Ernst Vollrath: *Die Gliederung der Metaphysik in eine Metaphysica generalis und eine Metaphysica specialis.* Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 16/2, pp. 258-284, 1962.

[8] Not to be confused with the practical *Lebensphilosophie* which deals with the matters of everyday human existence.

[9] Hans Driesch: *Wirklichkeitslehre – Ein metaphysischer Versuch*, 1916 (1st), 1922 (2nd).

[10] Martin Heidegger: *Die Abgrenzung der Daseinsanalytik gegen Anthropologie, Psychologie und Biologie*, s10 in *Sein und Zeit*, 1927.

Heidegger pointed to a considerably large number of the same 'external' authors as literature references – see, for comparison, the Appendix at the bottom of this review. Also Popper's *Logik der Forschung* (1935) does not provide any reference to Driesch at all, although Popper's work was declared by its sub-title to be an "epistemology of the modern *natural science*" in general,[11] *not* alone of physics in particular (to which modern natural science Driesch had already made significant contributions as experimental biologist), although it had been Driesch who had founded and established the discipline of Theoretical Biology and had coined the notion of a 'biological system' within that new discipline, and although Driesch had already five years before Popper published a book on philosophy of science and epistemology of research.[12] As a matter of fairness I ought to add that Driesch's work was generally well received among –for example– faith-bound philosophers of Catholic confession.[13] Because of his democratic and pacifist political attitude, Driesch was pressured by the NS regime to resign from his academic chair during the 3rd Reich, and died during the 2nd World War in Leipzig, 1941; the epitaph "*His Life was Wisdom, and Goodness*" was inscribed on his tombstone.[14] Ten years after the 2nd World War, the German Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Dictionary of Philosophy) of 1955 lists Driesch very briefly a as *neo-vitalist*,[15] (in contrast to the classical vitalism of 1750-1850 before materialism became dominant), but does not mention at all Driesch's many contributions to various other branches of philosophy, in particular: the philosophy of perceiving and knowing (epistemology), the philosophy of mind, the science-philosophy of psychology, moreover moral philosophy and philosophical ethics, in which Driesch's initial biological theme does not stand in the foreground of attention.

> *idealism* ↔ materialism ↔
> **vitalism**

Fig.1: the two different opponents of materialism.

Driesch was, like Bergson (whom he cited several times), a 'critical' –not a naive–

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[11] Karl Popper: *Logik der Forschung – Zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft. Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen*, Weltauffassung 9, Springer Publishers, 1935.

[12] Hans Driesch: *Philosophische Forschungslehre*, 1930.

[13] An affirmative reference to Jesus can be found in chapter 3g) of Driesch's book *Die Logik als Aufgabe*.

[14] "Sein Leben war Weisheit und Güte" – see P.: *Hans Driesch*, Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 74/1, p. 107, Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät der Universität Innsbruck, 1952.

[15] Johannes Hoffmeister (ed.): Vitalismus, p. 649 in *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe*, 1955 (2nd).

vitalist. "These critical vitalists" [Driesch and Bergson] "distinguished from 'naive' vitalists who posit as the source of life a spiritual force or soul, understand nature as more than a machine and in principle beyond calculation, even as they remain committed to scientific knowledge".[16] Thus, though not anti-scientific, critical vitalism is anti-reductionist – in contrast, for example, to the epistemological 'atomism' advocated by the Viennese Circle, and in stark contrast to Wittgenstein's wrathful attitude of 'explaining away' almost all interesting philosophical problems as so-called 'pseudo-problems' in his 'therapeutic' anti-philosophy. After a *critical* 'History and Theory of Vitalism' was written by Driesch already before the First World War,[17] our book of interest on *Leib und Seele* reconfirms this critical attitude in a differentiating and self-distinguishing footnote to pages 104-105, in which Driesch refuted the *inappropriate conflation* of psychological and nature-theoretical issues committed by other "so-called" vitalists. Closely related to this issue is the philosophical 'school' and theme of *psychovitalism –not* to be confused with the epistemological doctrine of psychologism (Wundt, Lipps, Ziehen: see Appendix)– as a special 'branch' of Neovitalism in which philosophical notions like life-force and soul-force are systematically integrated.[18] Psychologism as a doctrine or 'school' was not only rejected by the phenomenologists (Husserl) and Logicists (Frege), but also by critical vitalists like Driesch who, only a few years after Leib und Seele, dedicated a whole book (not merely an essay) to *The Crisis in Psychology* (1925).

RECAPITULATION OF THE BOOK *LEIB UND SEELE*.

What I am reviewing in the following is the *2nd edition* (3rd imprint) of *Leib und Seele*, which adds to the *only critical* treatise of the *1st edition* a *constructive part* which had not been part of the 1st edition. In other words: whereas the 1st edition of *Leib und Seele* merely attempted a refutation of competing theories on the matter at hand, the 2nd edition also presented Driesch's own philosophical counter-theory against those erstwhile refuted theories. Early critiques of Driesch's *Leib und Seele* book, which were published in the English as well as in the German language already in the 1920s, can

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[16] Alan van Wyk: *What Matters Now?* Cosmos and History 8/2, pp. 130-136, 2012.

[17] H. Driesch: *The History and Theory of Vitalism.* Revised and in part re-written for the English edition, authorised Translation by C.K. Ogden, Macmillan & Co. Publ., 1914.

[18] A critical remark by Driesch against naive psychovitalism as a too naive pseudo-alternative against materialism can be found in a footnote to chapter 6a) of his book *Die Logik als Aufgabe.*

still be easily accessed in the public domain.[19] Driesch himself conceded in his foreword of *Leib und Seele* that a treatise on the body-soul-problem belongs to the most difficult tasks in philosophy by-and-large, as it requires prior knowledge in logic,[20] psychology, the natural sciences, and especially also in 'phenomenology'. But, as Driesch stated in his foreword, these difficult efforts are well worth the while, because they are located at the centre of questions concerning the very essence of 'human being', and –as we might add, at present they are perhaps also at the centre of the 'trans-humanist' questions of the 21st century concerning the possibility of 'artificial intelligence' and 'artificial life'.

If we 'abstract away' from the details of Driesch's elaborations, his book *Leib und Seele* can be recapitulated as follows.

FIRST PART.

Chapter I.

First, Driesch summarizes the 'usual doctrine' (with its several variations) of the 'psycho-physical parallelism' – a doctrine of *dualism* about two separate 'realms' of existence: body and soul. In Driesch's own summary, the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism would assert that everything psychical can be *completely* 'mapped' (without residue) onto what is physical, and what is 'physical' is ultimately nothing more than a mechanical or energetic or electro-dynamic system. Driesch then continues to analyse a number of different philosophical vantage points from which that doctrine can be beheld: 'genuine *metaphysics*' (in which it is possible to accept that doctrine), his own *Ordnungslehre* (in which it is possible to 'speak about' that doctrine in a modal way of 'considerable possibilities'), however *not* in philosophical systems such like *Berkeley*'s ("esse est percipi") in which already the problematic question concerning 'psycho-physical parallelism' cannot be meaningfully formulated. Thereafter Driesch raises the question whether this 'psycho-physical parallelism' can be treated *in rebus*, or whether this problem can be treated only in the realm of concepts, words and 'postulates' – at which point Driesch enters into an excursion through his *Ordnungslehre* ('doctrine of order') which we might nowadays call a 'system of semantics'. Anyway, the goals are: to treat the given problem as a problem *in rebus*, and to check the doctrine of 'psycho-

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[19] A review by Julius Schultz: *Annalen der Philosophie* 3/1, pp. 124-126, 1923, judges Driesch's intended phenomenological anti-dogmatism in *Leib und Seele* as "itself dogmatic". A review by Percy Hughes: *The Journal of Philosophy* 26/7, pp. 192-195, 1929, claims that Driesch's is a "method of enquiry that neither enriches philosophy nor clarifies science". A review by G. Watts Cunningham: *The Philosophical Review* 38/2, pp. 182-184, 1929, offers some words of praise for the book's main intent, but complains that "there is too much of a tendency exhibited here to lean upon the barren argument from analogy".

[20] Driesch's notion of 'logic' differs strongly from our current notion of 'logic'; see below for further details.

physical parallelism' both with regard to its factual correctness and even with regard to the mere possibility of its correctness. Then follows a string of arguments against what Driesch called 'categorial dogmatism' – i.e.: any doctrines which would *stipulate* a 'necessary truth' of the psycho-physical parallelism on the basis of any metaphysical principles that are to be believed 'universally' without any further justification concerning relevant details or specific differences. By contrast, Driesch wants to tackle the given problem on the basis of (Husserl's) phenomenology, i.e.: by means of a 'gazing turn towards the things themselves',[21] whereby the 'things themselves' in question are here: the things *psychical* (soul) and the things *physical* (nature). Then, after another excursion into his *Ordnungslehre* concerning the semantics of the term 'soul', Driesch posits the question of concern: What can we 'see' when we 'gaze' at the 'essential structure' of whatever we may 'experience',[22] and does the result of such gazing –in comparison against the 'structure' of what is mechanical– allow us to accept the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism?

Chapter II.

After having posited this question, Driesch presented an excursion into the history of ideas (history of philosophy) with a summary of historic arguments in favour or against that doctrine, and criticized all of them –the historic 'pro' arguments as well as the historic 'contra' arguments– as being more or less insufficient for some or other philosophical or empirical reason.

Chapter III.

In order to 'approach the things themselves' according to the doctrine of phenomenology, which are here: the things psychical ('soul'), Driesch then went into a long excursion through the field of scientific (empirical) psychology as far as it was known to him in those days, thereby citing and commenting various results published by German-writing psychologists of the era such as Kries, Schwarz, Becher, or

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[21] *'Gazing'* is my own translation of Driesch's German term *'schauen'*, which comes close to the original meanings of the Greek *theoria* and Latin *speculatio*. However, because of to the semantic shifts in the connotations of the terms 'theory' and 'speculation' during the past centuries, I have decided *not* to use the term 'speculation' in my translation of the phenomenological 'schauen' – hence: 'gazing', which is however *not* a physical *looking* by means of the organic eyes; it is –so to say– a philosophical looking with the philosopher's 'inner eye' or the 'eye of the mind'.

[22] Driesch's German word for 'experience' is *erleben*, (not 'erfahren'). The German language recognizes a subtle difference between the notions of 'erleben' and 'erfahren'; both translate to the English 'experience' in which translation that subtle difference gets lost. For the sake of clarification: the *erleben*-type of experience is more subjective-internal, whereas the *erfahren*-type of experience is more objective-external.

Liebmann – see the complete list of names in the Appendix of this review.

Chapter IV.

In his earlier essay on 'The Soul as an Elementary Factor of Nature' (1903), Driesch had already presented an attempt against the problem of psycho-physical parallelism, namely in the context of the doctrine of the '*so-called* vitalism'.[23] There, Driesch had presented a philosophy of the human 'action' from a mainly naturalist point of view – human actions as 'natural events'– without paying much attention to the things psychical (soul). There he had used the argument of the human actions for two purposes –in defence of vitalism as well as against psycho-physical parallelism– because: *"a necessary consequence of the usual parallelism is the doctrine of an ubiquitously un-interrupted chain of mechanismic causality; who, however, denies the consequence of a doctrine must logically also deny its premises"*.[24] Now, however, Driesch re-visits his philosophy of human actions from a new vantage point in order to give it a psycho-philosophical 'twist': the purposeful human action is now beheld from the viewpoint of the soul rather than as 'natural event'. This chapter also contains some particularly interesting remarks on what is the 'essence' of a 'machine' – a question that is of continued interest in the philosophy of 'trans-humanism' (as well as in the philosophy of computing). For example: *"Surely there are the brain and the nervous system, and surely they are essentially important; and both of them might be –although it seems unlikely, because of the regulative capacities of the brain functions– considered as an 'innate machine' in a purely physiological sense. However, this 'machine' –in the widest sense of the term, namely in a fixed prescribed arrangement of physical-chemical determinants of Becoming ("factors of nature") – would then not alone be all that is essential in that context, and whatever comes in addition as being essential cannot be a machine. Because the capacity to individually select individual incident stimuli for further usage, for the purpose of anything that the carrier of such capacity had received accidentally during the arbitrary course of his own history, cannot be reconciled with the notion of what is a machine"*,[25] and subsequently Driesch

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[23] The critical phrase 'so-called' appears in Driesch's original text.

[24] My own translation from the German original; the argument is obviously presented in Modus Tollens. Indeed, Driesch uses Modus Tollens quite often as a logical tool of argumentation throughout the reviewed book.

[25] My own translation from the German original. Computer scientists –such as myself– may notice that Driesch's notion of 'machine' is a classical-mechanismic notion: he had to use this mechanismic notion of 'machine' in order to point out the deficiencies of the doctrine of mechanism which he intended to criticize. By contrast, the notion of a Turing machine (in computer science) goes beyond what Driesch had conceptualized as 'machine'; the Turing machine possesses a 'memory' tape such that its future 'behaviour' depends indeed on what the machine has 'remembered' in its past. However, Alan Turing published his ideas much later than Driesch, such that we cannot in fairness accuse Driesch of having 'ignored' non-mechanismic 'machine' notions in his arguments against the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism.

asked and challenged the engineers of the future *"to construct a machine which is able to occasionally tell lies".*[26] In consequence, said Driesch, the acting human being is indeed a 'thing of nature' (not above or beyond nature), but nevertheless a 'thing of nature' of a very special kind which is not the kind of the mechanismic machine; the specific difference between the one and the other must be understood in terms of the soul: *"Have not I myself on many occasions emphasised that the realms of my soul and of nature are strictly separated realms..., and that the concepts of nature may never be conflated with psychological concepts...? And nevertheless it may be stated that human actions as natural events can be understood with help of those above-mentioned concepts that stem from Phenomenology and Psychology... Thus, not on the basis of those concepts, but rather with their help we understand those physical matters".*[27] In other words: *"There is not 'soul' which causes effects into 'nature', rather there are natural determinants of becoming which work so as if they were soul-ish".* In the summary of Chapter IV, Driesch is convinced that his philosophical analysis of the human action excludes as its result any mechanismic doctrine in this specific realm of life – once more a refutation argument in Modus Tollens.

Chapter V.

Next, Driesch embarks on a long voyage through the area of psychology as it was known to him in his own historic era. The chapter carries the title: "The Doctrine of the Composition of what is Psychical"[28] and discusses various topics at the interface between empirical psychology and theoretical psychology, psycho-philosophy, philosophy of mind and epistemology, such as: what is "I", how do I "perceive", how do I "know", what is "in" the mind when I "think", etc. The main argument of this chapter states that whatever is psychical comprises a great manifold of 'mental elements' – a manifold much greater than the comparatively smaller manifold of the things natural. Hence there can be *no bijective* (1:1) 'mapping' between the things mental and the things natural, in contrast to what the 'usual' doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism (according to Driesch) had proclaimed – Modus Tollens in application again.

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[26] In other –more recent– words: a machine that would be able to pass the notorious 'Turing test'. By contrast, Driesch's own explicitly mentioned example of a 'machine' in Chapter IV of *Leib und Seele* was a 'phonograph' of the type we can nowadays admire in museums. More than a decade later, in 1935, Driesch published a book specifically on that topic: *Die Maschine und der Organismus*, Barth Publ.

[27] My own translation from the German original. Notice the hermeneutical connotations in Driesch's notion of 'understanding' as *'verstehen'*.

[28] German: *Die Lehre vom Bau des Psychischen.*

Chapter VI.

Driesch closes the first part of his book with some further 'outlook' remarks about the wider applicability of his 'argument of the different manifolds' also in other fields of philosophy and ethics; those remarks need not be recapitulated in this review.

SECOND PART.

The impossibility of psycho-physical parallelism in its traditional forms (refuted as described above) leads to the question: which doctrine *can* reasonably be accepted as a substitute instead? As the (refuted) classical psycho-parallelism had been a *dualist* doctrine: will the acceptable substitute be a *monist* doctrine, or will it still be dualist in a different form? Would the acceptable doctrine perhaps be the 'classical' competitor doctrine of the 'mutual psycho-physical inter-action'? The argument towards Driesch's final conclusion of his book *Leib und Seele* takes the following turns.

Chapter I.

In this chapter, Driesch briefly outlines a theory of 'my body' as a natural body, its senses, its functions – with several references to the notions of 'entelechy' and 'psychoid' which Driesch had developed in some of his earlier 'vitalist' publications;[29] thereby the 'psychoid' is (simply put) the 'entelechy' in-so-far as it relates specifically to the above-mentioned human actions. Consequently, the question concerning the relation between a 'psychoid' and its human brain re-arises, but must now *not* be answered in any of the previously refuted manners. This chapter also contains Driesch's above-mentioned assertion: *"It is conceivable that once a great technician of the future might reproduce the internal state of a brain at one moment; according to our doctrine there would not be 'on the other side' any corresponding state of a conscious having"*, which Driesch sets out to justify further in the subsequent chapters of the Second Part.

Chapter II.

This chapter presents Driesch's analysis of the *meaning* of the term 'my soul', i.e.: *"whether or not this term can actually signify anything with clarity"*.[30] However, unlike the body, the soul is not anything visible – hence an acceptable *notion* of 'soul' must be 'constructed' from philosophical 'first principles' which Driesch claims to find in the Husserlian methods of phenomenological 'gazing' – see above. In the remainder of this

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[29] *Philosophie des Organischen.*

[30] Here we can see in Driesch's writing an early example of a style of philosophising which later became the dominant style particularly in the Anglo-American philosophy after its so-called 'linguistic turn'.

second chapter, Driesch goes into many further details of meta-psychology (philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind, epistemology, gnoseology, and the like) which leads him eventually –partly on the basis of literature citations, partly by phenomenological 'introspection'– to the following quasi-definition: *"Gazing I see that my Self, in its discontinuous There-Being, has a continuous foundation within the continuous time, and this is what I call my soul"*.[31] In other words, it is all only *"as if"* – the introspective 'gazing' method of phenomenology does not permit any firmer assertions: *"What 'is' now the soul? A specific realm of Being, which we mean by way of reference as a non-immediate object, which behaves like if it would exist independently for itself as this specific one"*.[32] By analogy, the same also holds for the notion of 'nature'. On these premises, the chapter eventually 'jumps' –not fully convincingly– to the conclusion that soul and nature are entirely separate realms of being: *"Not can there be found any inter-active becoming nor causation between them"*.[33]

Chapter III.

This chapter, titled "The True Parallelism", consequently grapples with the still unanswered question about how body and soul, or brain and 'psychoid', may now finally be related to each other – on the basis of the above-stated premises that 'no interactive becoming nor causation' can be found between the 'entirely separate realms' of body and soul, and that everything 'appears' only 'quasi as if' to the 'gazing I' of the phenomenologist philosopher. The fact *that* such a mysterious relation must somehow be established is thereby a necessary consequence of the vitalist refutation of the

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[31] My own translation from the German original. I have called the statement of above a '*quasi*-definition', (*not* a 'definition'), because of its deep immersion in a 'hermeneutic circle': the phenomenologically 'gazing I' postulates a notion of 'soul' on the basis of a likewise postulated notion of 'continuous time', which soul is then somehow accepted as a really effective 'driver' of the I and the Self. What was 'prior', the hen or the egg – the I or the soul?

[32] My own translation from the German original. Nowadays readers may notice the following similarity between Driesch's phenomenology and the later language-philosophy after the Anglo-American 'linguistic turn': both styles of philosophizing are ultimately unable to penetrate the veil between the philosopher and his external reality, albeit for different reasons: the phenomenologist is confined to the limits of the I in its solipsist 'gazing', whereas the language philosopher cannot escape the prison the walls made of words. In Driesch's philosophy we can already find an early 'mixture' of both styles – hence his frequent and almost self-apologetic usage of the un-assertive phrases: "it is as if", or: "it appears as if".

[33] Hence, Driesch *cannot* so easily be dubbed a 'psycho-vitalist', in contrast to E. Becher who appears in Driesch's list of references. For comparison see also the entry "Psychovitalism" in the German *Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe* (2nd: 1955), in which E. Becher is mentioned, too. Driesch himself complained in a footnote to his Chapter III that he had often been misunderstood in this context, possibly due to some shortage of conceptual clarity concerning the specific differences of the terms 'psychical' and 'psychological'.

concept of mechanismically fully determined living (especially: human) bodies.[34] Driesch is honest enough at this point to speak openly (against the explicitly anti-metaphysical attitude of his own philosophy-historic era from Nietzsche to Heidegger and Wittgenstein) of metaphysics: *"my soul, in-so-far as it provides me with Conscious-Having, is metaphysically at the same time the same Something which causes effects into nature, as a factor of nature, in a non-mechanismic manner. In this ultimate insight, therein that I let my soul be the same as a certain Nature-Something of non-mechanismic kind, resides what is metaphysical in my arguments – without which any type of 'parallelisation' would lack its deepest meaning".*[35] In summary Driesch can only 'hint' somewhat mysteriously at the following phenomenological-psychological-natural triple-parallel correlations, which he regards as *different aspects* or different representations of what is ultimately one:

Phenomenological Aspect	Psycho-Philosophical Aspect	Nature-Philosophical Aspect
This my introspective state of Conscious-Having	The state of my soul as a specific quasi-independent realm of Being	The state of the non-mechanistic facture of nature which influences the Becoming of my body

The chapter concludes with a non-exhaustive list of examples in order to illustrate several other correlations between the phenomenological and the psychological aspects of various 'mental things'.

Chapters IV, V, VI.

Similar to Chapter VI of the first part, Driesch did not finish his elaborations with the foregoing 'highlight' conclusion of his main argument; again he felt obliged to add a flurry of minor details and repetitive extra-explanations which appear as somewhat 'tedious' and 'pedantic' when beheld from the vantage point of the present. In those three add-on chapters after the conclusion of his main argument, Driesch wrote comparatively about what we would nowadays call 'related work', including references to Lipps and Scheler, to the neo-Kantian Rickert, Husserl, Bergson, the psycho-philosopher Wilhelm Wundt, etc.; he also included brief remarks about some similarities and differences between humans and animals, and the like. Today I can

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[34] If I may permit myself to utter one semi-serious tongue-in-cheek pun at this point: It appears to be as if it is difficult to be an anti-mechanismic vitalist *and* assertion-withholding phenomenologist at the same time.

[35] My own translation from the German original.

only *guess* that those 'pedantic' add-on-chapters IV, V, VI of the second part might perhaps have been written specifically in response to some academic conversations or collegial disputes which Driesch might have had in his 'daily business' as a chair professor and visiting professor to various German and overseas universities in those years.

ADDITIONAL READING-HINTS.

Driesch's particularly in its 'constructive' second part somewhat 'enigmatic' book on *Leib und Seele*, which I have recapitulated in the foregoing sections of this review, can be understood considerably better through background knowledge from Driesch's older *Ordnungslehre*, to which his *Logic as Task* booklet provides a summary-overview with some additional motivating and explaining comments. It is therefore in order at this point to browse cursorily through the pages of Driesch's *Logic as Task*,[36] in order to provide the readers of this review with some (hopefully helpful) advice for a better understanding of *Leib and Seele* a century after its publication. All in all both books, *Ordnungslehre* and *Logic as Task*, make it reasonably clear that 'soul' is not understood by Driesch as anything 'metaphysical', because, according to Driesch,

- no philosophy of knowledge (*Erkenntnislehre*, epistemology) is to be had without metaphysics (or in other words: knowledge about external entities outside the "I" must always have metaphysical components),
- whilst the *Ordnungslehre* (in which 'soul' is postulated as a philosophical concept) is not metaphysics itself but rather some –so-to-say 'mind-clearing'– preparatory exercise (propaedeutic) before any further metaphysics can be

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[36] To avoid any misunderstanding it is important to recall at this point that Driesch's notion of 'logic' differs fundamentally from what we understand as 'logic' now, a century after Gottlob Frege. Driesch's notion of 'logic' was still the 'classical' philosophical notion of 'logic' from the long era before Frege, in which 'logic' had been understood as something which we might nowadays call '*conceptual semantics*': some somehow sensibly or meaningfully ordered system of concepts and notions and categories with their various relations among each other, sub-concepts (more specific) and super-concepts (more general), the meaningful (semantic) 'unfolding' of new concepts out of already given concepts, their material 'contents' in relation to various ontic or ontological realms, and the like. Hegel, for example, held such a notion of 'logic', too. By contrast: what we call 'logic' nowadays was in Driesch's era still known as 'logistic' –Driesch himself had used that term in his *Ordungslehre*– which, in turn, has nothing to do with the usual current meaning of 'logistic': Whereas 'logistic' in Driesch's era was –like 'logic'– derived from the Greek *logos*, nowadays 'logistic' is derived from the French *logis* = accommodation to which also the English words 'lodge' and 'lodging' are related. In *Leib und Seele* Driesch did not mention his 'logic' with emphasis, however his 'logic' booklet highlights with great clarity the *methodological premises* on the basis of which all of his later books –including *Leib und Seele*– were written.

started.[37]

In short: there had been a noteworthy *development-in-thought between Driesch the biologist and bio-philosopher* from the era of his Scottish Gifford Lectures, *and Driesch the Husserlian phenomenologist thereafter.*[38] If these philosophical differences between those 'two Drieschs' (a number of continuities notwithstanding) are not properly taken into account –in his *Ordnungslehre*, for example, Driesch had referred to his own earlier philosophy of the Gifford era as '*popular* philosophy', which implies a subtle self-accusation (of naivety)– then misunderstandings are coming to loom at every corner also as far as Driesch's book *Leib und Seele* is concerned. Indeed, *Leib und Seele* was still written by Driesch in the habitus of his *pre*-metaphysical *Ordnungslehre* whereby –due the above-mentioned absence of metaphysics– *nothing* can (yet) be *known* about the *"as-if"*-existence of souls as independent external entities.[39] In current terms, Driesch's *Ordnungslehre* may be regarded as a work of 'semantics' rather than of the philosophy of nature in its traditional sense. Driesch stated in a preface that his *Ordnungslehre* was both inspired by (the motifs and deficiencies of) Kant's system of 'categories' (in which notions appear to the rational mind as 'necessarily given'), as well as by (the motifs and deficiencies of) Hegel's system of 'dialectics' (in which notions are intended to 'evolve' out of each other). All in all, Driesch was thus one of the very last 'systematic' philosophers of German language after Kant and Hegel before 'systematic' philosophizing as a whole fell by-and-large out of fashion due to its notorious pitfalls and infeasibilities.

From Driesch's *Logik als Aufgabe* I now 'extract' very briefly and concisely a few key statements which support and clarify my remarks of above. Driesch, citing Augustine and Descartes, considers the 'triune' sentence *"I am aware of something"*, the meaning of which needs to be clarified, as the starting point of all philosophy, and its clarification

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[37] From this perspective we can compare Driesch's motivating intent 'behind' his *Ordnungslehre* with Kant's motivation 'behind' his well-known *Prolegomena zu einer jeglichen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können*. Driesch's and Kant's motivations and purposes seem to be very similar at this particular point although their actual books are, of course, very different; in his Ordnungslehre Driesch gives several references to Kant.

[38] We may compare that to Heidegger's *Kehre*, or to Wittgenstein's turn-away from his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* towards his later *Untersuchungen*.

[39] By comparison: this *not* identical with the spirit-realism professed by the well-known Austrian physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who had in 1943 concluded: Because my body functions as pure mechanism according to the laws of nature, and because I know from my own experience that I myself am the one who coordinates my body's motions, there must exist a Person-I which coordinates the motions of my atoms in accordance with the laws of nature. *Formally-structurally* the arguments by Driesch and Schrödinger are very similar; however Schrödinger has metaphysically reified what Driesch had qualified with his phenomenological "as-if". The earlier (naive-'popular') 'Driesch the bio-philosopher', with his Aristotelian 'entelechy', however, might as well have argued as Erwin Schrödinger (without the qualifying "as-if").

as the genuine 'philosophia prima'. During its very first clarification, which is still un-methodological, arises the possibility of a conceptual 'philosophy of order' which Driesch used to call 'logic' in the widest possible pre-Fregean sense of the term; (we nowadays might perhaps call it 'natural semantics'). The question of knowledge does not yet arise at that point: a 'metaphysical' theory of knowledge (epistemology) becomes possible only after the clarifying preparatory 'philosophy of order' has come to its conclusion; at this early point we do not yet 'know' anything when we understand the term 'knowing' in the sense of all classical epistemology. We already possess a 'mysterious anticipation' of the possibility of 'order', which anticipation is irreducible (i.e.: cannot be analysed to any lower-level components) and which the 'philosophy of order' merely brings explicitly into the light of our philosophical awareness.[40] This pre-knowledge is mysteriously given to us – we simply 'find' it, without our own doing in our awareness, and we already use this 'tacit'[41] knowledge while making it philosophically explicit. The un-methodological quasi-'method' of producing the 'philosophy of order' is the 'gazing' introspection which Husserl had called phenomenology, from which any further philosophical results are obtained – including even the laws of conclusion ('logic' in the strict sense of the term) which can then be used in all further processes of philosophical thinking. Phenomenology is thus the foundation of both the preparatory 'philosophy of order' and the –systematically much 'later' positioned– (special, particular) science of (empirical) psychology. Driesch's philosophy has thus, in his own words, a 'methodologically solipsist' basis. All this, however, is not to be confused with any classical 'psychologism' at the basis of philosophy,[42] because this would already pre-suppose some naive-realist metaphysics from which the beginning of the preparatory 'philosophy of order' is still a long way off. Equally dogmatic, according to Driesch, would be any doctrine of 'consciousness as such' or 'absolute consciousness' assumed at the very beginning of the process of philosophizing. By means of the pre-methods and methods described above, the philosopher 'posits' all the relevant philosophical fundamental notions (such as: 'thought', 'idea', 'abstraction', 'order', 'category', 'logical conclusion', 'classification',

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[40] In the language of Gadamer we could call this situation a 'hermeneutic cycle'. Driesch was fully aware of the cyclicality of this initial situation, although he did not yet possess the keywords of the later Gadamer's transcendental hermeneutics.

[41] if I may use the later Polanyi's term at that point for the sake of clarification.

[42] Psychologism was a popular 'school' of philosophy in the late 19th century when the particular science of psychology began to separate itself from philosophy as a new science in its own right. The doctrine of psychologism stated that the science of psychology is the foundation-science of and for all other sciences, philosophy also included. Husserl and Frege –in their own different ways– were the most prominent anti-psychologists in those days.

'time', 'becoming', 'nature', 'soul', 'causality', 'free will', 'goodness', and the like), which appear to the 'gazing I' *as if* they were authoritatively *postulated as correct and consistent* by and from some mysterious external source to which the 'gazing I' does not possess any immediate gnostic access.[43] As soon as those fundamental notions are *'labeled'* by some specific order-*'signs'* as 'had', they can later be used and re-used for further intellectual or scientific purposes. Thereby, 'correctness' and 'consistency' belong to the preparatory 'philosophy of order' and must be sharply distinguished from the notion of (external) 'truth' which belongs to a (later) external-metaphysical epistemology – i.e.: *after* the 'break-through' into a world-realm beyond the walls of the methodological solipsism. In this context, Driesch also distinguished as sharply as possible between thought-objects of 'first' (immediate) and 'second' (mediated) order, whereby the latter ones can be 'meant by' the first ones as (semantic) reference objects.[44] To the phenomenologically 'gazing I' those second-order reference objects –including notions like 'nature' or 'soul'– are *meant to denote* something which *appears* to the 'gazing I' *as* something *quasi*-independent and *quasi*-external.[45] Those thought-objects of first order are order-philosophically grouped by Driesch into a ('posited') philosophical realm of pure 'there-being' (phenomenology), whilst the thought-objects of second order (which can function as semantic reference objects to those first ones) are grouped into the three following ('posited') further philosophical realms: 'nature' (philosophy of nature and natural sciences), 'soul' (psycho-philosophy, philosophy of mind, scientific-empirical psychology), and 'the absolute' (metaphysics and philosophical ontology – *not* to be confused with the preparatory-philosophical *Ordnungslehre* itself):[46] *"My soul –so says*

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[43] Here is another 'hermeneutic cycle': Something mysterious seems to 'force' the 'gazing I' of the order-philosopher to posit (or postulate) conceptually the notion of 'soul', which can *later* –metaphysically– be connected semantically with that mysterious something as the postulated notion's object of reference. In the 'pure' philosophy of order, however, this semantic link is not yet explicitly possible and methodologically not yet allowed.

[44] Driesch himself did not use the terms 'semantics' and 'reference object'; I have decided to use these terms interpretively, such as to make those complicated thoughts of Driesch better understandable for contemporary readers.

[45] Remember that Driesch had been a biologist, an 'empirically' working natural scientist, before he became an academic professor of philosophy with Husserlian inclinations. Thus he had to be careful not to discredit the objectivity of his earlier empirical-scientific results by his later methodologically solipsist philosophy.

[46] On the basis of some anti-platonist versus platonic-idealist considerations, Driesch refused to 'dedicate' a separate quasi-independent order-philosophical realm to the science of Mathematics. These arguments do not appear strongly convincing to me – Driesch simply 'feels' through phenomenological introspection that the realm of 'soul' appears as if quasi-independent and external, whilst the field of Mathematics does not appear to 'deserve' its own quasi-independent philosophical realm. To me it seems as if Driesch was so worried about being dubbed a 'Platonist' or 'idealist' by his contemporary academic community (as much

the I– has fabricated those thoughts for me and 'posited' them 'before' me, such that they are now my 'pre-suppositions' in the wide sense of that term", wrote Driesch.[47] Moreover, this preparatory order-philosophical notion of 'soul' is at that point still independent from the *scientific* question concerning the two relations between 'soul' and *consciousness* (psychology) on the one hand, and 'soul' and *brain* (physiology) on the other hand, whereby also the 'I' and the 'soul' must not be conflated with each other. Only after all those foregoing considerations, said Driesch in *Die Logik als Aufgabe*, we may carefully and non-naively state that *"if I willfully wish to do so, then my 'soul' –or, alternatively, in nature-philosophical terms: my 'psychoid' or my 'acting entelechy'– is doing something according to which also my body is doing something or changes itself"*. This connection, however, remains a 'miracle' that can only be 'accepted' from the perspective of the philosophy of order which does not know any deeper-probing tools by means of which this 'miracle' could be further analysed anyhow. In that context Driesch also stated that the philosophical position of *monism* would be a desirable 'ideal' towards which any 'complete' philosophy of order should aspire – however: such a desirable monist well-ordering of everything can never be complete because the stream of appearances, to which the phenomenologically 'gazing I' is permanently exposed, contains undeniably many elements of '*randomness*' which defy their once-and-for-all-fixed ordering. Thus, because of the non-eliminable presence of random contingencies, the gazing 'I' *feels compelled* to assume a philosophical position of *Aristotelian dualism*.[48] Last but not least: is it possible at all for the phenomenologically gazing 'I' to break through the barrier of the *'as-if'* that Driesch has so often and so strongly emphasized? Is it possible that the posited order-concepts have a genuine semantics, with genuine reference objects beyond the 'I'? Such 'meta-physical' and 'meta-psychial'[49] type of recognition *would* be able to 'explain' my-self to me, *would* be able to 'explain' to me the 'deep' nature of my processes of experiencing. However, both Driesch's *Ordnungslehre* and *Die Logik als Aufgabe* end with this possibility-

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as he did not want to appear as a 'naive realist') that he shied away from applying his own method to its full consequence at that specific point concerning the ontological status of Mathematics.

[47] My own translation from the German original, wherein I have tried to replicate Driesch's pun with the German word 'Vorstellung' which is typically translated into English as 'imagination', not as 'pre-supposition'. Alas, the Latin-English word 'imagination' completely lacks the connotation of something 'standing' in front of me or 'before' me (or my 'inner eye'), which is clearly the intent of the German word 'Vorstellung'.

[48] Note, however that this 'Aristotelian dualism' is still of a merely methodological (not: ontological) kind as long as the philosophy of order refrains from making any firm ontological assertions about an ego-independent external reality.

[49] Driesch distinguished clearly between the two terms 'psychical' and 'psychological', and complained that their sloppy conflation has led elsewhere to much confusion, including many misunderstandings of his own philosophy.

question, without any attempt to answer it.

CONCLUSION.

In summary of this review of *Leib und Seele* it seems fair to make the following concluding remarks. Though Driesch is mainly known as a 'neo-vitalist' and is, as such, often associated with his early philosophy of life (bio-philosophy), substantial parts of Driesch's oeuvre are dedicated to the philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of 'logic' (in the widest possible pre-Frege'ian sense of the term), Husserl'ian phenomenology, philosophical epistemology, metaphysics, and the like. The reviewed book, *Leib und Seele*, belongs to that later part of Driesch's oeuvre, too – it is *not* a book in the field of bio-philosophy. Thereby Driesch distinguishes clearly between the two realms of 'soul' (mind) and 'nature' (body), because of this distinction he cannot simply be dubbed a 'psycho-vitalist'. However, this apparent dualism is *not* an *ontological* dualism with reference to any naive-realist external reality; it is a methodological dualism in the context of Driesch's pre-metaphysical 'philosophy of order' or 'logic' which we would nowadays rather call it a kind of philosophical 'semantics'. Hence, the order-philosophically stipulated notion of 'soul' may not be naively identified with the vitalist-Aristotelian 'entelechy' as an entity in and of the realm of 'nature' – although it might *appear* to the phenomenologically 'gazing I' *as if* it were so. Due to the phenomenological 'epoché' (as explained by Husserl) the 'gazing I' may not so quickly 'jump to conclusions' about external reality beyond the 'gaze'. In this philosophical attitude of a methodological (not: ontological) solipsism, Driesch combines phenomenological introspections with formal-logical conclusions (often in Modus Tollens) throughout large parts of his book, *Leib und Seele*. The *empirical un-observability* of the invisible mind (soul, spirit, and the like) makes this philosophical undertaking very difficult, and Driesch's chosen method of reasoning does *not* appear as prima-facie absurd under such circumstances. Nevertheless the 'destructive' first part of *Leib und Seele* –written against older positions of 'psycho-physical parallelism' from the history of philosophy– appears more plausible and more convincing than the 'constructive' second part of *Leib und Seele*, in which Driesch had given himself the task of clarifying his own position against past views that had been refuted; to refute something with formal-logical rigour is always easier than coming up with something new that is not only new but also plausible and defensible.

To present *students* of philosophy I can recommend Driesch book *Leib und Seele* because of its beautifully sober rigour of argumentation, which is painfully absent in so much of contemporary 'post-modern' philosophy in which 'impressions' and 'feelings' and mere opinions have very often been substituted for deep and genuine philosophical thought. To recent *philosophers of 'trans-humanism', robotics and 'artificial intelligence'* I can

recommend *Leib und Seele* for its un-broken relevance to the 'mysterious' question concerning the 'deep essence' of *person*-hood.[50] To the entire community of philosophers I can recommend, for all these reasons, revisiting Driesch's philosophy, from various perspectives and vantage points, a century after its formulation. Perhaps Driesch did not find what he had been looking for – but a genuine seeker he surely was.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.

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[50] Already in 1972 the German theologian and philosopher of religion, Wolfhart Pannenberg, had remarked that 'personhood' can only be ascribed to something which is not entirely predictable or 'computable' – vice versa: whatever is entirely predictable in residue-less determinism cannot be accepted as 'person'. This thought by Pannenberg of 1972, which currently is of great relevance in the field of 'intelligent robotics', appears as if it were an 'echo' of Driesch's *Leib and Seele* in which, too, the human person is eloquently circumscribed as something which is ultimately 'mysterious' (in Driesch's German original: *geheimnisvoll*). Even the apparently so ruthlessly neo-positivist logicist Wittgenstein found himself compelled to hint at a mysterious 'silence' in the final statement of his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

APPENDICES.

For the sake of 'utility' for contemporary readers, I add the following appendices to the above review. These appendices provide a wider array of information on context, and are not in all cases specific to Driesch's *Leib und Seele* which was the topic of the review.

A: Driesch's Historical Context shared with Phenomenology and Philosophy of Science.

The reviewed book "***Leib und Seele***" (1916 / 1923) shares ideas with the following books:

- With Heidegger's "**Sein und Zeit**" (1927): Bergson, Hartmann, Husserl, Kant, Lotze, Rickert, Scheler, Simmel.
- With Popper's "**Logik der Forschung**" (1935): Bergson, Husserl, Kant, v.Kries, Reininger, Stumpf.

However, neither Heidegger (1927) nor Popper (1935) referred back to Driesch (1923).

B: References to Other Authors in the Reviewed Book "Leib und Seele": Photo-Copy from the Original.

Namenverzeichnis

Ach 50.
v. Aster 71.
E. Becher III, 21, 26f., 98.
Beneke 98.
Bergson 27, 96, 110.
Berkeley 5.
Busse III, 41.
Carr 110.
Edinger 35.
Ehrenfels 27.
Eisler III.
B. Erdmann III.
O. Ewald 105.
Exner 28.
Fechner 3.
E. v. Hartmann 102.
N. Hartmann 105.
Husserl 14, 28, 59, 71, 88, 109.
Kant 4, 48, 53, 80f., 84.
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Malebranche 18.
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Rehmke 53.
Reininger 99.
Rickert 20, 107.
Scheler 34, 107.
K. C. Schneider 35.
J. Schultz 65.
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Simmel 4, 81.
Spinoza 3.
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C: Driesch's Explicating Self-References in the Reviewed Book "Leib und Seele".

Title (in alphabetical order)	Year (ed.)	Reference Information
Das Problem der Organischen Form	1919	Schaxels Abhandlungen zur Theoretischen Biologie 3, pp. 57-61
Die Logik als Aufgabe: Eine Studie über die Beziehung zwischen Phänomenologie und Logik, zugleich eine Einleitung in die Ordnungslehre	1913	
Logische Studien über Entwicklung: Zweiter Teil	1919	Sitzungsberichte der Akademie Heidelberg 18, pp. 16--
Ordnungslehre: Ein System der nicht-metaphysischen Teiles der Philosophie, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Lehre vom Werden	1912	
Philosophie des Organischen	1909 (1st), 1921 (2nd)	German version of the Gifford Lectures
The Problem of Individuality	1914	
Wirklichkeitslehre: Ein metaphysischer Versuch	1916 (1st), 1922 (2nd)	
Wissen und Denken	1919	

D: Several Examples of Early Driesch-Reviews by English-writing Reviewers (during Driesch's own Life-Time).

Reviewer	Topic	Year	Publication Details
anonymous	*The Problem of Individuality*	1914	The American Journal of Psychology 25/3, pp. 459-560
Alexander, H.B.	*Der Mensch und die Welt*	1929	The Philosophical Review 38/2, pp. 189-194
Alexander, H.B.	*Die sittliche Tat: Ein moral-philosophischer Versuch*	1929	The Philosophical Review 38/2, pp. 189-194
Calkins, M.W.	*The Crisis in Psychology*	1926	The Philosophical Review 35/4, 374-377
Cooley, W.F.	*The Problem of Individuality*	1915	The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 12/6, pp. 161-164
Cunning-ham, G.	*Mind and Body*	1929	The Philosophical Review 38/2, pp. 182-184
Eastwood,	*The Science and Philosophy*	1909	International Journal of Ethics

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Eastwood, M.L.	*The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*	1910	International Journal of Ethics 20/4, pp. 494-498
Farber, M.	*Professor Driesch on Philosophical Methods of Procedure*	1932	The Journal of Philosophy 29/24, pp. 655-663
G.C.S.	*Selbstbesinnung und Selbsterkenntnis*	1941	The Journal of Philosophy 38/9, pp. 249-250
G.S.	*The History and Theory of Vitalism*	1921	Isis 3/3, pp. 439-440
Garret, H.E.	*The Crisis in Psychology*	1926	The Journal of Philosophy 23/1, pp. 17-20
Gerould, J.H.	*A Rational Vitalism – Die Localisation morphogenetischer Vorgänge*	1899	The American Naturalist 33/396, pp. 967-972
H.L.F.	*Philosophische Gegenwartsfragen*	1934	The Journal of Philosophy 31/1, p. 24
Hughes, P.	*Mind and Body*	1929	The Journal of Philosophy 26/7, pp. 192-195
Jennings, H.S.	*Driesch's Vitalism and Experimental Indeterminism*	1912	Science (New Series) 36/927, pp. 434-435
K.M.D.	*The Case for and against Psychical Belief*	1928	The American Journal of Psychology 40/1, p. 151
Larrabee, H.A.	*Die Philosophie der Gegen-wart in Selbstdarstellungen*	1929	Books Abroad 3/2, pp. 162-163
Lovejoy, A.O.	*The Meaning of Driesch and the Meaning of Vitalism*	1912	Science (New Series) 36/933, pp. 672-675
Lovejoy, A.O.	*The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*	1909	Science (New Series) 30/778, pp. 761-766
McG., V.J.	*Die Maschine und der Organismus*	1936	The Journal of Philosophy 33/21, pp. 582-583
McG., V.J.	*Die Überwindung des Materialismus*	1935	The Journal of Philosophy 32/24, pp. 668-669
Morgan, T.H.	*The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*	1909	The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6/4, pp. 101-105
Muscio, B.	*The History and Theory of Vitalism*	1914	International Journal of Ethics 25/1, pp. 122-123
Muscio, B.	*The Problem of Individuality*	1915	International Journal of Ethics 25/3, pp. 420-422

Neal, H.V.	*The Problem of Individuality*	1915	The Harvard Theological Review 8/3, pp. 408-412
Oakeschott, M.	*Ethical Principles in Theory and Practica*	1931	The Journal of Theological Studies 32/127, pp. 326-327
Oakley, H.D.	*Professor Driesch's Attempt to combine a Philosophy of Life and a Philosophy of Knowledge*	1920-1921	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series 21, pp. 161-179
Oakley, H.D.	*Wirklichkeitslehre: Ein metaphysischer Versuch*	1921	Mind 30/119, pp. 346-353
Perry, C.M.	*Der Mensch und die Welt*	1929	Books Abroad 3/2, pp. 163-
Perry, C.M.	*Ethical Principles in Theory and Practice*	1932	International Journal of Ethics 42/3, pp. 334-335
R.M.Y.	*Driesch's Naturbegriffe und Naturteile*	1905	The American Naturalist 39/466, p. 747
Spaulding, E.G.	*Driesch's Theory of Vitalism*	1906	The Philosophical Review 15/5, pp. 518-527
Spaulding, E.G.	*The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*	1909	The Philosophical Review 18/1, pp. 63-69
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Sumner, F.B.	*The History and Theory of Vitalism*	1916	The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13/4, pp. 103-109
Tennant, F.R.	*Man and the Universe*	1930	The Journal of Theological Studies 32/125, p. 86
Toll, C.H.	*The Problem of Individuality*	1916	The Philosophical Review 25/2, pp. 192-197
Tyrell, G.N.M	*Psychical Research*	1934	Philosophy 9/34, p. 248
Woodger, J.H.	*Man and the Universe*	1930	Journal of Philosophical Studies 5/17, pp. 114-117
Yerkes, R.	*Mind in Nature – Die Seele als elementarer Naturfaktor*	1903	The American Naturalist 37/441, pp. 627-629

E: List of Antiquarian Driesch Originals in the Library of the University of Pretoria

Book Title (in alphabetical order)	Year (ed.)	Topic Classifier	Book ID
Die Logik als Aufgabe: Eine Studie über die Beziehung zwischen Phänomenologie und Logik, zugleich eine Einleitung in die Ordnungslehre	1913 (1st)	160 (old: 116.1)	1314485
Leib und Seele: Eine Untersuchung über das psychophysische Grundproblem	1923 (3rd)	146.3316	2427570
Ordnungslehre: Ein System der nicht-metaphysischen Teiles der Philosophie, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Lehre vom Werden	1912 (1st)	146.331.6	1314484
The Crisis in Psychology	1925 (1st)	146.331.6	2450283
The History and Theory of Vitalism	1914 (1st)	146.331.6	1358053
The Science and Philosophy of the Organism	1929 (2nd)	146.331.6	1358046