

‘This outcome gives me no pleasure. It is extremely painful for me to be the instrument of their fate’: White House Policy on Rhodesia during the UDI Era (1965–1979)

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Abstract

This article offers an insightful analysis of presidential policy towards Rhodesia during the UDI era of 1965 to 1979. I provide an informative account of the stance adopted by the differing presidential administrations towards Salisbury and highlight the shifting alignment of the global and domestic dynamics that shaped decision-making. I also explore the complex relationship between pragmatism and morality in formulating policy and consider intriguing questions over the competing visions within Washington of what constituted pragmatism or morality during the era of decolonisation.

Keywords: US foreign policy, Rhodesia, Cold War geopolitics, racial equality, human rights

Introduction

On November 11, 1965, the white minority Rhodesian Government formally signed the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom. It was the first unilateral break by a British colony since the U.S. Declaration of Independence nearly two centuries before in 1776. Indeed, the wording of the Rhodesian proclamation was clearly modelled on the original U.S. counterpart. Rhodesia, a self-governing colony in southern Africa desired full independence from London and following exhaustive negotiations had finally opted to take the matter into its own hands. In his statement immediately following the declaration, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith asserted that ‘In the lives of most nations there comes a moment when a stand has to be made for principle, whatever the consequences. This moment has come to Rhodesia...and in the spirit of this belief we have this day assumed our sovereign independence.’ Internationally, however, the Rhodesian decision was almost universally condemned including by the United States.¹

From the Rhodesian perspective a number of factors led to the decision to defy London. The majority of white Rhodesians considered decolonization and majority rule in Africa as an erroneous policy symbolic of the decay of the once proud British Empire. On a pragmatic note, the fact that many newly emergent African states descended into one party dictatorships or spiralled into vicious bloodletting and ethnic conflict further hardened the resolve of the white community to stand their ground against the tide of Black Nationalism. The populist Rhodesian Front government was vehemently anti-communist and held to a ‘Manichean world view’ in which the stirrings of African nationalism within their country stemmed from communist

¹ National Archives London (hereafter TNA), PREM 13/545, Salisbury to Commonwealth Relations Office (hereafter CRO), No.1707, November 11, 1965; TNA, PREM 13/545, Salisbury to CRO, No.1708, November 11, 1965 and C. Watts, *Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence: An International History*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 39.

subversion as opposed to genuine political grievances. In the view of white Rhodesia, communism was insidiously spreading throughout Africa and London was doing little to prevent it. It therefore became incumbent on the Rhodesians themselves to have the determination and fortitude to say ‘so far and no further.’²

It is also clear, however, that the UDI represented the determination of the white community to retain their power and privilege in an ‘independent’ Rhodesia. The Rhodesians having built a economically viable modern nation, benefited, for the most part, from a privileged existence paying little tax and enjoying a high quality of life. Indeed, in 1965, the capital, Salisbury, boasted more swimming pools than any U.S. city of a comparable size. In November 1965, Time magazine commented that ‘Few communities in the world can match the sun-drenched affluence that Rhodesia’s hardy settlers have achieved for themselves.’ It was also increasingly obvious that the white Rhodesians had no intention of giving it away. Smith himself privately stated that ‘The white man is the master of Rhodesia...He has built it and intends to keep it.’³

While the question of Rhodesia has been considered in the broader literature of U.S. foreign relations, there is a comparative paucity of research regarding direct bilateral relations with Salisbury especially in terms of examining policy through the lens of the specific presidential administrations. The literature that does examine bilateral relations with Salisbury is frequently too expansive to offer an in-depth analysis of the rationale behind each individual president’s approach to the Rhodesian crisis.

Black White and Chrome by Andrew DeRoche offers an overview of U.S. relations with Rhodesia/Zimbabwe between 1953 and 1998 but does not exclusively focus on the UDI era and the inherent challenges that the rebellion posed for the individual presidential administrations both domestically and internationally. Carl Peter Watts provides an insightful analysis of the global responses to UDI. His book, though, is predominantly an international history that covers the British, Commonwealth, and UN reactions as well as the U.S. approach in the immediate aftermath of the rebellion. In *Jimmy Carter in Africa*, Nancy Mitchell provides a discerning account of President Carter’s approach towards Rhodesia. She offers an insightful portrait of Carter himself, as well as examining the broader makeup and functioning of his administration but her book is primarily restricted to the Carter era.⁴

A further weakness in the existing historiography is that much of the literature seeks to examine the Rhodesian issue primarily through the use of a specific lens. A good deal of the literature has either been defined by race-centric narratives or Cold War binaries. While the use of race or geopolitics as the primary categories of historical analysis can be illuminating, especially when such variables impacted other dynamics shaping policy, nevertheless, the use of such a

² TNA, PREM 13/545, Salisbury to CRO, No.1708, November 11, 1965; D. Lowry, “The impact of anti-communism on white Rhodesian political culture.c.1920s-1980,” in *Cold War in Southern Africa. White power, black liberation*, ed. S. Onslow (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 90 and 97-101 and I. Smith, *Bitter Harvest. Zimbabwe and the Aftermath of its Independence*, (London: John Blake, 2008), 107-108.

³ Time Magazine, Vol 86 No.19, November 5, 1965 40-48 and R. Good, *The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 4.

⁴ A. DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953-1998*, (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2001); N. Mitchell, *Jimmy Carter in Africa*, (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2016) and Watts, *Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence*.

restrictive lens not only colors the interpretation of the source base but also tends to discount or marginalize other determinants that influenced decision making.⁵

In contrast in this work I have sought to provide a critical study of the competing ideological and pragmatic viewpoints which sought to shape United States policy towards Salisbury. An exploration of presidential actions during the UDI era exposes the inherent tension between these underlying forces but also reveals that the relationship between the differing approaches was fluid and varied according to the respective occupants of the Oval Office as well as the changing international and domestic background which confronted them. Moreover, an analysis of U.S. actions towards Rhodesia reveals the broader struggle between pragmatism and morality in U.S. foreign relations as well as the differing interpretations of what constituted a pragmatic or moral approach.

The ‘Rhodesia Lobby’

Rhodesia enjoyed considerable support among the U.S. public, notably among white Americans and conservatives. Many conservatives empathized with Ian Smith based on the perception of a mutual desire to throw off the yoke of British colonial rule. The fact that the UDI declaration clearly mirrored the U.S. Declaration of Independence served to further reinforce this narrative. Future U.S. Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), while working as a television commentator observed on November 17, 1965 that it was ‘a good thing there was no United Nations at the time when Patrick Henry and some other rebellious souls decided to declare the independence of a new nation back in 1776.’⁶

The vehement anti-communism of the Rhodesians, whether genuine or false propaganda disseminated to garner support, also resonated across America. In the Vietnam era, a time when traditional U.S. allies in Europe, including the United Kingdom, were disappointingly uncooperative, many conservatives were angered by U.S. hostility towards a Western oriented anti-communist stronghold in southern Africa. The Rhodesian offer of ‘tangible help’ in Vietnam further reinforced the perception of Salisbury as an ally in the global fight against communism.⁷

⁵ T. Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003); G. Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun: The United States and The War against Zimbabwe*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); P. Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); E. Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) and O. Westad, *The Global Cold War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

⁶ Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (hereafter LBJL), WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Letter to Johnson from Margaret L. Clarkin et al, December 30, 1965; LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Letter to Johnson from Ottis L. Snipes Jr., June 21, 1966; LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Letter to Johnson from Bruce L. Odou, January 9, 1967; LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Letter to Johnson from Spencer McCallie, January 9, 1967; LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Letter to Johnson from Wesley Bolin, March 1, 1967; Cory Library (hereafter CL), Rhodesia/Zimbabwe Papers (Unprocessed) (hereafter RZP), Cabinet Memoranda 1968 71-143, Box 2/007 A, Remarks by Dean Acheson before the American Bar Association, May 24, 1968; Richard Nixon Library (hereafter RNL), WHCF, Box 63, CO 135 South Africa, Paper to Henry Kissinger from Dean Acheson, April 30, 1969; Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun*, 101-105 and 144 and A. Lake, *“The Tar Baby” Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 109.

⁷ LBJL, NSF, Box 97, “Rhodesia, Vol. 2 (3 of 3),” Rhodesia/Zambia Situation Report (hereafter RZ SitRep) No.21, February 16, 1966; LBJL, NSF, Box 97, “Rhodesia, Vol. 2 (3 of 3),” RZ SitRep No.22, February 17, 1966; LBJL, NSF, Box 97, “Rhodesia, Vol. 2 (3 of 3),” RZ SitRep No.23, February 18, 1966; LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Letter to Johnson from Robert Wyckoff, March 3, 1966; LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO

Proponents of Salisbury also highlighted the shared frontier culture of both nations and applauded what they saw as the Rhodesian achievements in building a viable economy and Western democracy in the heart of a wild and primitive continent. These accomplishments were viewed as a Rhodesian version of ‘Manifest Destiny’ comparable to the conquest of the U.S. West. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, an unofficial yet influential adviser to President Richard Nixon, was according to his biographer, Douglas Brinkley, a forthright supporter of Ian Smith as he viewed Salisbury as a ‘beacon of European light in a dark continent’.⁸

On the questions of racial equality and political representation it was pointed out that Salisbury should not be criticized for the imperfections in its political system given that it took Washington itself nearly two hundred years to give equal rights to all citizens of the United States. It was further argued by supporters of Salisbury that the black Rhodesians were simply not ‘civilized’ enough to take on the responsibility of governing a modern democratic nation. Such figures pressed for Salisbury to be given time to resolve the racial inequalities without external pressure. As stated by Helms, ‘African tribes in the back bushes of Rhodesia...have no knowledge of or appreciation for civilized society. If that absurd position had prevailed in 1776, the American Indians would own and be running America today.’⁹

It is important to note that there was a distinctly dark side to this argument. Segregationists especially in the Deep South held similar racist positions to the Rhodesian Government. Many of Rhodesia’s most vocal supporters, such as Senators James Eastland (D-Mississippi), Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina) and Jesse Helms hailed from former Confederate states not only supported Salisbury on racist grounds but further feared that if the ‘White Redoubt’ were to collapse in southern Africa this could spell the end of white supremacy in Dixie.¹⁰

The Rhodesian UDI also occurred at a key point in U.S. political history. By the mid 1960s the domestic conservative movement was transitioning from a primarily Sunbelt social movement into a national political driving force. In 1964, only one year before the Rhodesian UDI, Barry Goldwater, a U.S. Senator from Arizona and an uncompromising conservative triumphed in the Republican presidential primaries. Despite his defeat in the national election his victory in the primaries was indicative of the increasing power of social conservatism. Importantly, while many conservatives opposed the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts and sought to limit the pace of racial change at the national level such figures shifted away from the previously embraced overtly racist language and policies.¹¹

250 Rhodesia, Commentary of KPOL, Los Angeles, California and CL, RZP, Cabinet Memoranda 1967 69-157, Box 2/007 A, Note from G. B. Clarke, May 12, 1967.

⁸ CL, RZP, Cabinet Memoranda 1968 71-143, Box 2/007 A, Remarks by Dean Acheson before the American Bar Association, May 24, 1968; RNL, WHCF, Box 63, CO 135 South Africa, Paper to Kissinger from Acheson, April 30, 1969; RNL, WHCF, Box 63, CO 124 Rhodesia, The Dallas Morning News, March 14, 1970 and D. Brinkley, *Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years 1953-1971*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 316.

⁹ RNL, WHCF, Box 63, CO 124 Rhodesia, The Dallas Morning News, March 14, 1970 and Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun*, 144.

¹⁰ J. Carlson, *George C. Wallace and the Politics of Powerlessness: the Wallace Campaigns for the Presidency, 1964–1976*, (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 1981) J. Crespino, *Strom Thurmond’s America*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2013) 54, 71 and 193 and Eddie Michel, “The Luster of Chrome: Nixon, Rhodesia and the defiance of UN sanctions”, *Diplomatic History*, 42 (1) 2018, 148.

¹¹ C. Bogus, *Buckley: William F. Buckley Jr. and the Rise of American Conservatism*, (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2014), B. Goldwater, *The Conscience of a Conservative*, (Whitefish, Montana: Literary Licensing, LLC, 2011), Crespino, *Strom Thurmond’s America* and R. Perlstein, *Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus*, (New York Nation Books, 2009), ix-x.

Salisbury clearly strived to align the actions of the white Rhodesians in the framework of the transitioning conservative movement within the United States. The conservative movement was characterized by a belief in ‘traditional’ social values, limited government and a vehement anti-communism. Rhodesia, though its propaganda outlet, the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington, published periodicals which avoided overtly racist language or inferences and portrayed Rhodesia as a harmonious multi-racial bedrock of Western civilization in Africa that needed time to evolve and remedy the imbalances within its society.¹²

On a geopolitical level, the United States also retained close strategic and economic ties with de facto Rhodesian allies Portugal and South Africa. Both Lisbon and Pretoria were vehemently anti-communist and the United States benefited from close military ties with both nations. Portugal was a key NATO ally while South Africa monitored Soviet activities in the south Atlantic as well as providing facilities for both U.S. aircraft and naval vessels. The apartheid state also hosted an important NASA tracking station at Hartebeesthoek, near Johannesburg. Washington also possessed substantial economic ties with South Africa and the Portuguese Territories. South Africa was also a major supplier of minerals, including chromium and uranium, which were vital components of a number of U.S. industries including nuclear power generation, chemical manufacturing and the space program. The respective presidential administrations were therefore cognizant of the need to avoid actions against Rhodesia which could damage broader relations with the white controlled states of the region.¹³

Rhodesia itself also possessed a range of strategic materials notably chrome that were important to the U.S. on economic and strategic grounds. Prior to the Rhodesian UDI, Salisbury had been a major supplier of metallurgical chrome ore to the United States. The chromium was a vital component in the manufacture of numerous essential products including stainless steel and was used in electric power generation, chemical manufacturing and by NASA in the space program. As U.S. chrome supplies dwindled access to the mineral wealth of Rhodesia became an increasingly important political issue in terms of relations with Salisbury.¹⁴

¹² University of Pretoria Library (hereafter UPL), Afrikaner Collection, Rhodesian Commentary, Vol. 1, No. 5, March 21, 1966; UPL, Afrikaner Collection, Rhodesian Commentary, Vol. 1, No. 6, April 4, 1966; UPL, Afrikaner Collection, Rhodesian Commentary, Vol. 4, No. 20, October 1970; RNL, WHCF, Box 63, CO 135 South Africa, Paper to Kissinger from Acheson, April 30, 1969; RNL, WHCF, Box 63, CO 124 Rhodesia, Letter to Clark Mollenoff from James Eastland, March 19, 1970; RNL, NSC Country Files, Box 743, Rhodesia vol. 2, Letter to Nixon from Strom Thurmond, April 15, 1970; UPL, Afrikaner Collection, Rhodesian Commentary, Vol. 4, No. 20, October, 1970; Carnegie Mellon University Digital Library (hereafter CMUDL), H. John Heinz III Collection, Legislative Assistants' Files -- 1970-1991, Rhodesian Viewpoint, June, 1978; Bogus, *Buckley*, Carlson, *George C. Wallace and the Politics of Powerlessness* and Crespino, *Strom Thurmond's America*.

¹³ LBJL, Department of State Administrative History (hereafter DSAH), Box 4, Chapter 10 (The United Nations) Sections A and B (1 of 2); LBJL, NSF, Box 76, “Africa General, Vol. 2 (3 of 4),” Memo to Ambassadors and certain Principal Officers from G. Mennen Williams, May 10, 1965; LBJL, NSF, Box 76, “Africa General, Vol. 3,” Memo for Johnson from Robert Komer, November 23, 1965; RNL, NSC Institutional (“H”) Files, Box H-144, NSSM - 39 2 of 3 (1 of 2), Response to NSSM 39, August 15, 1969 and Lake, “*Tar Baby*” Option, 62.

¹⁴ RNL, NSC Institutional (“H”) Files, Box H-214, NSDM-47, Memo for Nixon from Maurice H. Stans, May 15, 1970 and Michel, “*The Luster of Chrome*”, 146-147.

Opposition to Salisbury

In contrast, liberals and civil rights groups advocated a very different approach towards Salisbury. Political figures including, Congressmen Donald M. Fraser (D-Minnesota), Charles Diggs (D-Michigan) and Senator Gale McGee (D-Wyoming) advocated for a policy of hostility towards Rhodesia, based in part on the historical opposition of the United States to European imperialism. A number of political or religious groupings including the Catholic Association for International Peace, the National Council of Churches and the United States Youth Council all denounced the Rhodesian action as an attempt to perpetuate white supremacy and supported a strong stance against Salisbury. It was pointed out that the Rhodesian UDI was not undertaken to give a suppressed indigenous population the right to govern their own affairs and instead represented the desire of an entrenched white minority to remain in political control of the nation beyond the end of formal colonial rule.¹⁵

The fact that UDI represented the continuation of white minority rule led to comparisons being drawn with the domestic struggle of African-Americans to achieve equal rights. African-American civil rights leaders including Dr. Martin Luther King, A. Philip Randolph and Andrew Young viewed the refusal of the Smith regime to grant equal rights to all its citizens and its rejection of majority rule as a flagrant example of racial discrimination and a direct parallel with the struggle against Jim Crow laws in the southern states. In an interview in 1977 Andrew Young, then U.S. Ambassador to the UN stated; ‘I know Ian Smith and John Vorster. I learned about such men at my mother’s knee.’¹⁶

As the African-American vote grew in electoral importance, Washington became increasingly cognizant, on a pragmatic level, that policies which overtly or even covertly supported white supremacy overseas would antagonize a key sector of the domestic electorate. African-American political influence became especially pronounced following the presidential election of 1976 in which Jimmy Carter won ninety-four percent of the black vote which proved critical in his electoral triumph. Indeed, the Carter era represented the rise of African-American influence of both domestic and foreign policy. In the words of Young ‘the hands that picked the cotton finally picked the president.’¹⁷

¹⁵ LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Letter to Johnson from Bishop Reuben H. Mueller and R.H. Edwin Espy, November 12, 1965; LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Letter to Johnson from Joseph A. Fallon, December 9, 1965; LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Statement of the World Order Committee Catholic Association for International Peace on Southern Rhodesia, December 22, 1965; LBJL, NSF, Box 77, “Africa General, Vol. 5 (2 of 3),” Letter to Johnson from Frank E. Moss, August 24, 1967; RNL, NSC Country Files, Box 743, Rhodesia Vol 2, Memo for Nixon from Kissinger, May 10, 1972; Gerald Ford Library (hereafter GFL), Stanley S. Scott Papers 1971-1977 Box 3, Black Caucus – Meeting with the President, August, 1974: General (1), Letter to Stanley S. Scott from Charles C. Diggs Jr. August 14, 1974 and Lake, *The “Tar Baby” Option*, 217.

¹⁶ LBJL, WHCF, Box 7, EX CO 1-1 Africa, Telegram from A. Philip Randolph and Donald S. Harrington to Johnson, November 11, 1965; LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Telegram to Johnson from Roy Wilkins, November 12, 1965; LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Telegram to Johnson from Martin Luther King Jr, December 16, 1965 and N. Mitchell, “Terrorists or freedom fighters? Jimmy Carter and Rhodesia,” in *Cold War in Southern Africa*, ed. Onslow, 191.

¹⁷ LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, “Africa General, Vol. 2 (2 of 4),” Memo to McGeorge Bundy from Komer, January 6, 1965; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, “Africa General, Vol. 2 (2 of 4),” Memo for Rusk from Bundy, January 7, 1965; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, “Africa General, Vol. 2 (2 of 4),” Memo to Komer from Rick Haynes, March 25, 1965; GFL, Stanley S. Scott Papers 1971-1977 Box 3, Black Caucus – Meeting with the President, August, 1974, Washington Post, August 13, 1974; GFL, Stanley S. Scott Papers 1971-1977 Box 3, Black Caucus – Meeting with the President, August, 1974, Memo from Stan Scott, August

In terms of geopolitical outlook, it was highlighted by both liberals and some so called ‘Cold Warriors’, that the continued existence of white minority rule in southern Africa provided Moscow, Peking and later Havana, due in part to their lack of ties to Salisbury or Pretoria, an opportunity to align themselves as the true allies of black African aspirations to the detriment of Western interests. In the words of President Lyndon Johnson’s National Security Council Staffer Robert Komer, the communists were able to pose as ‘the apostles of decolonization’. Moreover, the longer the minority governments remained in power the greater the opportunities for communist sway over the leadership of the liberation groups.¹⁸

By the mid 1970s, it was contended that the mounting intensity of the Rhodesian Bush War combined with the increasing communist aid to the liberation movements dictated that the pragmatic approach was to accelerate the process of majority rule. These concerns were heightened following the failed U.S. intervention in Angola in which the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), backed by Soviet military aid and Cuban combat troops, defeated the factions favored by Washington. Angola gave Moscow and Havana a vital foothold from which to expand their influence in southern Africa and the increasingly embattled regime in Salisbury appeared to be the most viable target for further communist meddling.¹⁹

It was also argued, especially by Africanists in the State Department and at the U.S. Mission to the UN that Washington needed to retain prestige and protect interests in the newly independent African states. As noted by Assistant Secretary of State for Africa during the Johnson era, G. Mennen Williams, not only did Africa’s huge land mass and air space have great strategic importance but African nations offered lucrative markets for export and possessed a large free world percentage of certain minerals critical to U.S. interests. It was further highlighted by that the extent of U.S. influence in black Africa was intrinsically linked to the stance that Washington took on the issues of primary interest to the Africans themselves notably the ending of white minority rule in southern Africa.²⁰

21, 1974; Jimmy Carter Library (hereafter JCL), RAC Project Number NLC-18-4-6-1-1, Memo for the Vice-President et al., February 5, 1977 and DeRoche, *Black White and Chrome*, 244-245

¹⁸ LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, “Africa General, Vol. 1 (1 of 3),” CIA Special Report, June 19, 1964; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, “Africa General, Vol. 2 (2 of 4),” CIA Special Memo December 1, 1964; LBJL, NSF, Box 8, National Intelligence Estimates File, “60/70, Africa”, National Intelligence Estimate Number 60/70-65, April 22, 1965; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, “Africa General, Vol. 2 (2 of 4),” Memo to Johnson from Komer, June 16, 1965 and LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, “Africa General, Vol. 1 (3 of 3),” Memo to Rusk from Thomas L. Hughes.

¹⁹ GFL, Dale Van Atta Papers 1975-1978- Intelligence Chron File, Box 12, National Intelligence Bulletin, February 27, 1976; GFL, NSA Memoranda of Conversations 1973-1977, Box 18, MemCon, March 4, 1976; GFL, NSC Institutional Files 1974-1977, Box 44, NSSM 241– United States Policy in Southern Africa (1), Memo to Kissinger from Monroe Leigh, March 5, 1976; GFL, NSA Country Files for Africa 1974-1977, Box 5, Rhodesia, INR Afternoon Summary, March 8, 1976; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-18-4-6-1-1, Memo for Walter Mondale et al, February 5, 1977; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-18-4-6-1-1, Memo to Cyrus Vance, February 5, 1977; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-31-23-4-2-6, CIA Report August, 1977; Z. Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983) 139-140 and H. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, (London: Simon and Schuster, 1999) 903 and 908.

²⁰ LBJL, NSF, Box 3, Files of Edward K. Hamilton, Memo for Johnson from Komer, December 6, 1965; LBJL, NSF, Box 8, National Intelligence Estimates File, “60/70, Africa”, National Intelligence Estimate Number 60/70-65, April 22, 1965; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, “Africa General, Vol. 2 (3 of 4),” Memo to Ambassadors and certain Principal Officers from G. Mennen Williams, May 10, 1965; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, “Africa General, Vol. 3,” Strengthened Africa Program; GFL, NSA Country Files for Africa 1974-1977, Box 5, Rhodesia, Memo for Ford from Kissinger, GFL, NSA Memoranda of Conversations 1973-1977, Box 19, NSC MemCon, May 12, 1976 and Watts, *Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence*, 186.

Interestingly the rise of the human rights movement in the early 1970s gave greater impetus to both opposing visions regarding policy towards Salisbury. On one hand liberals and even some moderate Republicans increasingly pushed for an immediate transition to majority rule in Rhodesia highlighting the fact that the right of a population to choose how it is governed was considered among the most vital of human rights and therefore the Rhodesian Government operated in clear violation of the political rights of its citizens. Furthermore, the racial discrimination inherent in Rhodesian society represented a further affront to the basic human rights of black Rhodesians.²¹

A number of conservative figures, however, highlighted the human rights of the white Rhodesian minority, notably the potential loss of their political and property rights in a black ruled state. Proponents of Salisbury also observed the ‘hypocrisy’ of condemning Rhodesia for its lack of adherence to human rights when the vast majority of black-ruled African nations were one party dictatorships where the citizens, black or white, possessed even less political rights and freedoms.²²

It is important to note, when comparing the policies of the presidential administrations towards Salisbury, the changing international and domestic backdrop in which they operated. On the global stage, the shifting geopolitics of the Cold War, decolonization and the rise of a global human rights movement all impacted White House decision making on Rhodesia. Domestically, the Rhodesian UDI era, also spanned a period of social and political change within the United States impacting on the presidential outlook towards southern Africa.

Lyndon B. Johnson

On November 11, 1965, the day of the UDI, President Lyndon B. Johnson and his senior advisers were gathered at his ranch near Austin, known as the Texas White House. During the tortuous negotiations that preceded UDI the White House had repeatedly assured London of the backing of Washington and scolded Rhodesia for its insistence on minority rule. As UDI became increasingly likely, Johnson sent a personal message to Smith urging him to ‘avoid a

²¹ GFL, WHCF, Box 4, TA, Letter to Florence Lauckner from Ron Nessen, June 30, 1976; The American Presidency Project, , <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5886> Gerald R. Ford: "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at Tyler Junior College, Tyler, Texas.," April 28, 1976; GFL, NSA/NSC Meeting File, 1974-1977, Box 2, Minutes of NSC Meeting, May 11, 1976; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-18-4-6-1-1, Memo for Mondale et al., February 5, 1977; JCL, Carter Presidential Papers: Cabinet Secretary and Intergovernmental Affairs, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Human Rights, International Box 40, Letter to Carter from Johnny Ford, May 11, 1979; JCL, WHCF, Box CO-50, CO 129, Letter to Carter from Coretta Scott King, May 25, 1979; JCL, Carter Presidential Papers: Cabinet Secretary and Intergovernmental Affairs, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Human Rights, International Box 40, Letter to Carter from Lionel J. Wilson, May 29, 1979 and JCL, NSA Staff Material-North/South Funk, Box 119, Zimbabwe, Letter to Jimmy Carter from George Meaney, June 7, 1979.

²² LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 77, “Africa General, Vol. 5 (3 of 3),” Memo for Walt W. Rostow from Benjamin H. Read, June 9, 1966; LBJL, Records of the Democratic National Committee, Box 89, B-4150, Chicago News, June 3, 1966; Economic Sanctions against Rhodesia, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives Ninety-Second Congress June 17 and 22, 1971, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 45; GFL, WHCF Country Files, Box 4, CO 1-1 Africa 1/1/76-1/20/77, Letter to Ford from Harold P. Stern, April 28, 1976; GFL, NSA Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger 1974-1976, Box 34, April 23-May 7-Africa TOSEC (13), Cable to Kissinger May, 1976; GFL, WHCF Country Files, Box 4, CO 1-1 Africa 1/1/76-1/20/77, Sun-Sentinel, Boca Raton, Florida; GFL, WHCF Country Files, Box 4, CO 1-1 Africa 1/1/76-1/20/77, The Indianapolis Star, May 1, 1976 and GFL, Michael Raoul-Duval Papers, Election Campaign Papers: Gergen, David, Box 16, Kissinger Trip to Africa, New York Times, May 11, 1976.

course which...would inevitably break the strong ties of friendship and understanding which have bound our countries together in war and peace.' Immediately following UDI, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, declared unequivocally that the White House deplored the Rhodesian action and the United States would not recognize the rebel regime. Despite his opposition to the UDI, the approach of the Johnson administration towards Rhodesia was characterized by a form of cautious hostility.²³

The position developed by LBJ represented a balancing act between the various global and domestic dynamics pushing for a punitive response to the UDI and the factors limiting the level of coercion that Washington could exert over Salisbury. On a personal level, as president, Johnson opposed white supremacy whether it existed in the Mississippi delta or the veld of southern Africa. The president was also aware of the increasing African-American interest in achieving racial justice in southern Africa as demonstrated by the establishment of a permanent black pressure group to influence foreign policy by the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa in spring of 1965.²⁴

Globally, the Johnson administration was disquieted by the growth of communist interest in and effect on African affairs. The early Sixties witnessed a startling increase in communist economic and military aid to the newly independent black nations and liberation movements. While intelligence reports indicated that there was little danger of broad communist expansion on the continent the continued presence of the 'White Redoubt' in southern Africa, however, provided an opportunity for communist meddling. LBJ was also influenced by the need to rely on Afro-Asian diplomatic support at the UN and protect economic interests in the newly independent African states. The White House was further aware that the extent of U.S. influence in black Africa was intrinsically linked to the stance that Washington took on the issue of white minority rule.²⁵

²³ Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1964-1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, MemCon, October 26, 1964; TNA, PREM 13/85, MemCon Patrick Gordon Walker and Rusk; LBJL, NSF, Box 1, Files of Ulric Haynes, "Chrono (3 of 3)", Memo for Komer from Haynes, April 22, 1965; FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Memo from Haynes to Bundy, April 29, 1965; FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Telegram from the Department of State to the ConGen Salisbury, September 29, 1965; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 97, "Rhodesia, Vol. 1 (1 of 3)," Telegram from Rusk to ConGen Salisbury, October 29, 1965; . Lake, "The Tar Baby" Option, 79-81 and Watts, *Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence*, 170 and 173-174.

²⁴ LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, "Africa General, Vol. 2 (2 of 4)," Memo to Bundy from Komer, January 6, 1965; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, "Africa General, Vol. 2 (2 of 4)," Memo for Rusk from Bundy, January 7, 1965; ; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 77, "Africa-Letters from the President to African Leaders, "The American Promise"," Remarks of Johnson to Congress, March 15, 1965; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, "Africa General, Vol. 2 (2 of 4)," Memo to Komer from Haynes, March 25, 1965; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 77, "Africa-Letters from the President to African Leaders, "The American Promise"," Letter to Hendrik Verwoerd, May 8, 1965 and LBJL, NSF, Box 1, Files of Ulric Haynes, "Chrono (1 of 3)", The President's concern for Africa.

²⁵ LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, "Africa General, Vol. 2 (3 of 4)," CIA Report, April 16, 1965; LBJL, NSF, Box 8, National Intelligence Estimates File, "60/70, Africa", CIA National Intelligence Estimate 60/70-65, April 22, 1965; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, "Africa General, Vol. 2 (3 of 4)," CIA Memorandum, April 30, 1965; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, "Africa General, Vol. 2 (4 of 4)," Memo to Johnson from Komer, June 16, 1965; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, "Africa General, Vol. 3," Memo to Johnson from Komer, November 23 1965; LBJL, NSF, Box 3, Files of Edward K. Hamilton, Memo to Johnson from Komer, December 6, 1965 and LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, "Africa General, Vol. 1 (3 of 3)," Memo to Rusk from Hughes.

The Johnson administration, however, was also cognizant of the need to avoid extreme actions which would damage relations with Portugal and South Africa, the de facto allies and trading partners of the isolated regime in Salisbury. Indeed, both nations routinely violated bilateral embargos and UN sanctions on commerce with Rhodesia. While the White House expressed grave concerns over the actions of Lisbon and Pretoria, the administration avoided more radical measures including wider trade embargos on South Africa and the Portuguese Territories or the use of force to ensure compliance with sanctions as Washington wished to avoid precipitating an economic or military confrontation with Lisbon or Pretoria which could only be to the detriment of broader Western geopolitical goals.²⁶

As noted earlier, the Rhodesian UDI also occurred at a time when the domestic conservative movement was developing into a national political driving force. Rhodesia enjoyed considerable support among both conservatives both at the grassroots level and on Capitol Hill. Presidential correspondence reveals widespread backing for Salisbury and criticism of the U.S. Government's hostility towards a 'friendly' nation. A plethora of pro-Rhodesian interest groups also sprung up post UDI including most notably the Friends of Rhodesian Independence which by June 1967 claimed 122 branches with 25,000 members.²⁷

In Congress, while a number of liberal figures such as Congressman Donald M. Fraser (D-Minnesota) and Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) urged LBJ to take tough measures against Salisbury there also existed an influential pro Rhodesia Lobby on Capitol Hill. This included not only southern conservatives such as Senator Eastland and Representative Joe Waggoner (D-Louisiana) but also figures such as Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) and Congressman Harold R. Gross (R-Iowa). While race certainly played a role for some in explaining their support for the Rhodesians, others questioned U.S. aggression against an anti communist pro Western nation. Given the support that Salisbury enjoyed among the public and on Capitol Hill, including conservative Democrats, Johnson feared that any radical steps taken against Salisbury could stimulate greater domestic support for the increasingly influential conservative movement.²⁸

As pointed out by Horne, the White House also had grave concerns that a violent split along racial lines in southern Africa could inflame political and social ethnic tensions in the United States itself in the aftermath of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts. In the spring of 1965, the meeting of the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa to create a permanent

²⁶ LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 97, "Rhodesia, Vol. 1 (2 of 3)," CIA Memo No. 30-65, December 21, 1965; TNA, PREM 13/1137, From Cape Town to Foreign Office, February 15, 1966; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 97, "Rhodesia, Vol. 2 (3 of 3)," Memo for Johnson from Komer, February 17, 1966; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 97, "Rhodesia, Vol. 2 (3 of 3)," RZ SitRep, February 18, 1966; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 97, "Rhodesia, Vol. 2 (3 of 3)," RZ SitRep, March 15, 1966 and RNL, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Box H-144, NSSM - 39 2 of 3 (1 of 2), Response to NSSM 39, August 15, 1969.

²⁷ LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Letter to Johnson from Margaret L. Clarkin et al, December 30, 1965; LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Letter to Johnson from Ottis L. Snipes Jr., June 21, 1966; LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Letter to Johnson from Bruce L. Odou, January 9, 1967; LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Letter to Johnson from Spencer McCallie, January 9, 1967; LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Letter to Johnson from Wesley Bolin, March 1, 1967; Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun*, 101-105 and Perlstein, *Before the Storm*, ix-x.

²⁸ LBJL, NSF Country Files, "Rhodesia, Vol. 2 (3 of 3)," RZ SitRep, February 26 to March 1, 1966; LBJL, NSF Country Files, "Rhodesia, Vol. 2 (3 of 3)," RZ SitRep, March 2, 1966; LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Letter to Johnson from Durwood G. Hall, January 5, 1967; LBJL, WHCF, Box 65, CO 250 Rhodesia, Letter to Johnson from H.R. Gross, January 5, 1967; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 77, "Africa General, Vol. 5 (2 of 3)," Memo for Johnson from Hamilton, August 16, 1967 and LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 77, "Africa General, Vol. 5 (2 of 3)," Letter to Johnson from Frank E. Moss, August 24, 1967.

black pressure group to influence U.S. foreign policy was viewed with alarm and concern by the administration. It was feared that the appearance of an 'ethnic lobby' on Africa could lead to a segregated approach to foreign policy.²⁹

The response of the Johnson administration to Rhodesia, therefore, was defined by a form of cautious hostility. Following the UDI, the White House undertook a series of punitive measures including a comprehensive arms embargo and bilateral sanctions that mirrored British actions. Washington also supported the imposition of selective UN sanctions in 1966 and further comprehensive sanctions in 1968. Significantly, the United States actually adhered to UN sanctions which was not the case with many Western allies, the USSR and even a number of black African nations.³⁰

The White House, though was not prepared to support more radical actions including the use of Chapter 7 measures of the UN Charter against Salisbury, as this could potentially include the use of force. The administration feared this could lead the Rhodesian crisis to spiral into a wider racial conflict with devastating consequences and also provoke domestic racial tensions threatening the progress made by the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts. Johnson also opposed broader sanctions against South Africa, which continued to serve as a conduit for Rhodesian trade, as the White House believed such measures could threaten Western interests and potentially cause an economic or even military confrontation with Pretoria.³¹

Richard M. Nixon

The inauguration of Richard Nixon led to a distinct shift towards closer ties with Rhodesia. Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger clearly empathized with Salisbury. For Nixon the fact that the white Rhodesians had built a pro-Western democratic nation with a strong economy was impressive of itself. That fact that it had been achieved in a region, which in his view was characterized by dictatorial, often Marxist oriented leaders dependent on foreign aid packages and frequently troubled by violent unrest meant that they deserved U.S.

²⁹ LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, "Africa General, Vol. 2 (2 of 4)," Memo to Bundy from Komer, January 6, 1965; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, "Africa General, Vol. 2 (2 of 4)," Memo to Rusk from Bundy, January 7, 1965; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, "Africa General, Vol. 2 (2 of 4)," Memo to Komer from Haynes, March 25, 1965 and Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun*, 15.

³⁰ LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, "Africa General, Vol. 2 (2 of 4)," Memo to Bundy from Komer, January 6, 1965; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, "Africa General, Vol. 2 (2 of 4)," Memo to Rusk from Bundy, January 7, 1965; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 76, "Africa General, Vol. 2 (2 of 4)," Memo to Komer from Haynes, March 25, 1965; LBJL, NSF, Box 97, "Rhodesia, Vol. 1 (3 of 3)," Memo to Ball from Hughes, November 16, 1965; LBJL, NSF, Box 3, Files of Edward K. Hamilton, Memo to Johnson from Komer, December 6, 1965; FRUS, Vol. XXIV Africa, 567th Meeting of the NSC, January 25, 1967 and Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun*, 15.

³¹ LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 97, "Rhodesia, Vol. 2 (1 of 3)," Memo from the Under Secretary of State to Rostow, December 22, 1966; LBJL, Papers of Henry Fowler, Box 40, Rhodesia, Rhodesian Transaction Regulations, Department of Treasury, March 11, 1967; FRUS, Vol. XXIV Africa, Memo Joseph Sisco to Rusk, Washington, March 8, 1968; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 97, "Rhodesia, Vol. 2 (1 of 3)," Memo for Rostow from Benjamin R. Read, April 7, 1968; LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 97, "Rhodesia, Vol. 2 (1 of 3)," Report on Southern Rhodesia, May 9, 1968; FRUS, Vol. XXIV Africa, Memo from Nicholas Katzenbach to Johnson, May 28, 1968 and LBJL, NSF Country Files, Box 97, "Rhodesia, Vol. 2 (1 of 3)," Executive Order 11419, July 29, 1968.

respect not hostility. Indeed, many of Rhodesia's most vocal supporters, notably former Secretary of State Acheson and Senator Eastland, enjoyed close ties to the White House.³²

Furthermore, Nixon, in part influenced by racial prejudice, had little interest in black African liberation or indeed black Africa at all. Nixon repeatedly snubbed Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda during his visits to Washington as well as emissaries from the Organization of African Unity. In the view of Kissinger, the former colonial nations of Africa deserved little respect because of their lack of political tradition, immature economies and weak militaries. On one notable occasion in September 1971, during a private conversation with the President, when Kissinger referred to the African delegation accompanying Mauritanian President Moktar Ould Daddah as 'savages' Nixon erupted with laughter.³³

Closer ties with Salisbury also complimented other aspects of Nixonian foreign relations. On a conceptual level, the foreign policy of the Nixon years, as shaped by Kissinger, was characterized by a preoccupation with the balance of power with the United States at the apex of a multipolar pyramid of nations. Kissinger believed that in such a system both of the two superpowers would feel less directly threatened by each other's every action and also U.S. leverage would increase as anti-communist regional allies could voluntarily shoulder responsibility for their area of the globe. Indeed, the Nixon Doctrine of 1969 advocated the pursuance of strategic interests through military and other aid to friendly governments. These governments could include unpalatable regimes provided they had distinctively anti-communist credentials. In sub-Saharan Africa this meant closer ties with the 'White Redoubt'.³⁴

Nixon's approach to white minority rule in southern Africa also paralleled his domestic 'Southern Strategy'. As part of his campaign for the presidency Nixon sought to win over white voters in the southern states, traditionally a stronghold for the Democratic Party, by assuring conservatives he would slow federal enforcement of civil rights laws and appoint pro-southern justices to the Supreme Court. In the election of 1968, while much of the Deep South voted for the American Independent party candidate and segregationist George Wallace, a number of southern states, including Florida, South Carolina and Virginia voted for Nixon providing him with the Electoral College margins he needed for victory.³⁵

Nixon himself was also reluctant on ideological grounds to push forced integration on segregated communities in the South and elsewhere. As President, Nixon opposed instant integration as fraught with social tensions. In both Dixie and southern Africa Nixon adopted a

³² RNL, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Box H-145, NSSM - 39 3 of 3 (2 of 4), Minutes of the NSC Meeting, December 17, 1969; RNL, WHCF, Box 63, CO 135 South Africa, Paper to Kissinger from Acheson, April 30, 1969; FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Africa, Telegram from Kissinger to Brent Scowcroft, September 20, 1976; Crespino, *Strom Thurmond's America*, 54, 71 and 193, Flower, *Serving Secretly*, 150, Kissinger *Years of Renewal*, 903,998 and 1001, Michel, "The Luster of Chrome" 148 and Smith, *Bitter Harvest*, 201.

³³ FRUS, Vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, MemCon between Nixon and Kissinger, September 28, 1971; A. DeRoche, "KK, the Godfather, and the Duke: Maintaining Positive Relations between Zambia and the USA in Spite of Nixon's Other Priorities", *Safundi* 12:1 2011, 97; H. Kissinger, *White House Years*, (London: Simon and Schuster, 1979) 69, Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978) 283 and J. Suri, "Henry Kissinger and the Geopolitics of Globalization," in *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in perspective*, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2010) ed. N. Ferguson et al., 186.

³⁴ M. Lawrence, "Containing Globalism. The United States and the Developing World in the 1970s," in *The Shock of the Global*, ed. Ferguson et al., 209-210, Suri, "Henry Kissinger and the Geopolitics of Globalization," 173-184 and Kissinger, *White House Years*, 69.

³⁵ Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun*, 7.

nuanced slant on racial discrimination criticizing racism in public yet opposing actions leading to meaningful change.³⁶

Access to Rhodesian chrome also influenced the perspective of the White House. U.S. adherence to the UN sanctions on Rhodesia had led to a growing dependence on chrome ore from the Soviet Union. This dependency on the preeminent geopolitical rival was not only criticized on the obvious strategic grounds but also for economic reasons as Soviet chrome was more expensive and of poorer quality. By 1969, the scarcity of chromium was beginning to cause concern to several government departments' including Commerce and the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP).³⁷

In April 1969 Kissinger ordered a review of U.S. policy towards southern Africa which highlighted the important strategic and economic interests in the white controlled states. The White House was also urged by a number of departments including Defense, Commerce and the OEP to move towards closer ties with Pretoria and Salisbury. On January 28, 1970, Nixon issued National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 38, a policy of closer ties with the white ruled states which included maintaining tangible interests, quietly relaxing bilateral relations with South Africa and emphasizing 'communication' with Salisbury. This shift horrified liberals in the State Department but in the words of Nixon; the United States 'must analyze where our national interest lies and not worry too much about other peoples' domestic policies.'³⁸

The question of the continued presence of the U.S. Consulate in Salisbury was demonstrative of the new approach. Following the Rhodesian move to become a republic in March 1970, London requested Washington to cut all formal ties with Salisbury. Nixon, though, initially decided to maintain a Consular Mission, stating privately 'If we have a mission in Hungary, we'll have one here.' It was only after strong diplomatic pressure from the British Government that Nixon eventually agreed to close the Consulate.³⁹

In the case of chrome, however, Nixon was quite prepared to defy both London and the international community by openly violating UN sanctions. In August 1970, Nixon approved an application from Union Carbide to import 150,000 tons of chrome ore under the 'hardship exemption' which accompanied the domestic implementation of the UN embargo. In

³⁶ Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, 439-440.

³⁷ RNL, NSC Country Files, Box 743, Rhodesia, Memorandum to Kissinger from G. A. Lincoln, June 16, 1969; RNL, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Box H-214, NSDM-47, Memo to Nixon from William Rogers, April 29, 1970; RNL, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Box H-214, NSDM-47, Memo to Kissinger from Lincoln, May 1, 1970; RNL, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Box H-214, NSDM-47, Memorandum to Nixon from Maurice H. Stans, May 15, 1970 and Michel, "*The Luster of Chrome*", 146-147.

³⁸ RNL, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Box H-026, NSC Meeting 12/17/69 (NSSM 39) (3 of 3), To Rogers et al. from Kissinger, April 10, 1969; RNL, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Box H-144, NSSM - 39 2 of 3 (1 of 2), NSC Study in Response to NSSM 39, August 15, 1969; RNL, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Box H-145, NSSM - 39 3 of 3 (2 of 4), Minutes of the NSC Meeting, December 17, 1969 and RNL, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Box H-145, NSSM - 39 3 of 3 (2 of 4), Memo to Rogers et al. from Kissinger, NSDM 38, January 28, 1970.

³⁹ RNL, NSC Country Files, Box 743, Rhodesia, Memo for Nixon from Rogers, July 17, 1969; RNL, NSC Country Files, Box 743, Rhodesia, Memo for Kissinger from Roger Morris, July 21, 1969; RNL, NSC Country Files, Box 743, Rhodesia, Memo for Nixon from Kissinger, July 22, 1969; RNL, NSC Country Files, Box 743, Rhodesia Vol. 2, Memo for Kissinger from Theodore L. Eliot Jr.; RNL, NSC Country Files, Box 743, Rhodesia Vol. 2, Memo for Nixon from Rogers, March 6, 1970; RNL, NSC Country Files, Box 743, Rhodesia, Telegram from Embassy London to Rogers, March 6, 1970; RNL, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Box H-214, NSDM-47, To Rogers et al from Kissinger, March 9, 1970 and RNL, NSC Country Files, Box 743, Rhodesia Vol. 2, Statement by Secretary of State Rogers, March 9, 1970.

November 1971, Nixon signed the Military Procurement Act into law. A controversial clause known as Section 503 or the Byrd Amendment after its author Senator Harry F. Byrd allowed chrome imports from 'free world' Rhodesia if the U.S. was importing chrome from the 'communist' Soviet Union. While it was a Congressional decision, as publicly highlighted by the White House, in private, Nixon was determined that the amendment should succeed. He told Kissinger; 'I am for the Byrd Amendment...we want to continue to buy that chrome.' Indeed, Nixon was so infuriated by UN criticism that he even threatened to cut off financial support to the international organization.⁴⁰

In contrast to the consternation in London and at the UN the passage of the Byrd Amendment was celebrated by the Rhodesian Government. The legislation provided much needed foreign exchange and was a huge psychological boost to the embattled Smith regime. In December 1971, the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington held a Christmas party at which the invitees revelled in the success of Section 503. Apparently there was even a special festive song entitled the '503 Club Marching Song' to the tune of 'O Tannenbaum'. Indeed, by the fall of 1972 the Rhodesian Minister of Mines, I.B. Dillon noted the tangible benefits of the traditional U.S. chrome market having being reopened by the Byrd Amendment.⁴¹

The White House was also satisfied with abortive Home-Smith Agreement of November 1971 between Salisbury and London over a 'return to legality'. Nixon offered no criticism of the fact that it preserved white power and was delighted that it would allow the U.S. to resume control over \$56 million dollars of investments, allow the legal importation of chrome and strategically provide overflight and landing rights. His only concern was the negative geopolitical implications of a legal but still pariah white controlled Rhodesia.⁴²

Gerald R. Ford

On August 9 1974, as a result of the widely publicized Watergate scandal, President Nixon resigned from office, his successor, Vice President Gerald Ford, entered the Oval Office with a genuine commitment to fairness and decency that opposed any form of racial discrimination. In the case of Salisbury, Ford's moral belief in the need to achieve racial equality combined with the changing geopolitical realities on the ground in southern Africa led to a major U.S. diplomatic initiative to end the UDI and achieve majority rule in Rhodesia.

Domestically the White House sought to meaningfully engage with African-Americans. Within days of taking office, Ford, at his own request, organized a meeting with the Congressional Black Caucus. In the words of its chairman, Charles Rangel (D-NY) the

⁴⁰ RNL, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Box H-214, NSDM-47, Memo for Nixon from Kissinger, July 23, 1970; FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, To Rogers et al from Kissinger, August 7, 1970; RNL, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, Box H-188, NSSM 142, Memo for Nixon from Rogers, November 16, 1971; RNL, NSC Country Files, Box 743, Rhodesia Vol. 2, Memo for Nixon from Kissinger, November 16, 1971; FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, MemCon Nixon, Kissinger and Bob Haldeman, November 18, 1971 and Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option*, 199-213.

⁴¹ RNL, NSC Country Files, Box 743, NSC Country Files, Rhodesia Vol. 2, Memo for Kissinger from Eliot; CL, RZP, Cabinet Memoranda 1972 101-135, Box 2/011 (A), Memo from I.B. Dillon, September 15, 1972 and Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option*, 214 and 226.

⁴² Memorandum to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence from Kissinger, National Security Study Memorandum, Rhodesia, November, 1971, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, NSSM 142, Box H-188, Nixon Library, Memorandum for Kissinger from David D. Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and Chairman of the NSC Inter-departmental group for Africa, December 22, 1971, NSC Institutional ("H") Files, NSSM 142, Box H-188, Nixon Library and Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option*, 156.

invitation was indicative of the seriousness of Ford to ‘open his administration to the advice and counsel of those of us who represent people whose views and needs were ignored by the Nixon administration.’ The new approach of the White House to engage with African-Americans was further observed by the press in Washington DC. It was also significant that the primary item on the agenda at the presidential meeting with the Black Caucus was U.S. foreign policy in Africa.⁴³

It is clear that Ford’s dedication to racial justice extended beyond America itself and constituted a new moral approach to the issue of white rule in Rhodesia. Public pronouncements placing the United States on the side of ‘majority rule’ on moral grounds were mirrored by a private determination to achieve a just settlement. The White House therefore publicly endorsed the repeal of the Byrd Amendment. Nevertheless, there were limitations at this point, as to how much pressure Ford was prepared to exert on legislators as any attempt at repeal aroused strong opposition especially from Republicans and among grassroots conservatives. In the fall of 1975, following the rejection of the proposed repeal bill by the House of Representatives both opponents and supporters of the Byrd Amendment believed that a lack of strong presidential action had led to the failure of repeal.⁴⁴

Greater intervention in Rhodesia came when moral considerations aligned with geopolitical concerns. In Angola, following the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule, an escalating civil war and overt Soviet meddling led the White House to approve a covert CIA program supporting the anti-communist groups and Washington privately encouraged Pretoria to intervene militarily. The hopes of the White House, though, were thwarted by the unexpected intervention of Cuban troops and a cut off of Congressional funding. Strategically, in the aftermath of Vietnam the failed intervention once again made Washington appear weak especially when contrasted with the ability of Moscow and Havana to project their power globally. The exposure of cooperation with apartheid South Africa also undermined U.S. claims to be a supporter of black liberation.⁴⁵

⁴³ GFL, Stanley S. Scott Papers 1971-1977 Box 3, Black Caucus – Meeting with the President, August, 1974, Washington Post, August 13, 1974 and GFL, Stanley S. Scott Papers 1971-1977 Box 3, Black Caucus – Meeting with the President, August, 1974, Memo from Stan Scott, August 21, 1974.

⁴⁴ GFL, NSA Country Files for Africa 1974-1977, Box 5, Rhodesia, Memos to Ford from Kissinger; GFL, Congressional Relations Office, Congressional Mail File, 1974-77 Box 13, Byrd, Harry (1), Letter to Jerald F. ter Horst from Harry F. Byrd, August 22, 1974; GFL, David R. MacDonald Papers, 1973-78, Box 18, Hearings on Rhodesian Chrome (2), H.R.1287, 94th Congress 1st Session, March 18, 1975; GFL, David R. MacDonald Papers, 1973-78, Box 18, Hearings on Rhodesian Chrome (1), Statements of David R. McDonald and Alan Polansky before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations, June 19, 1975; GFL, NSA Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977 Box 19, MemCon, April 12, 1976; The American Presidency Project, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5886>, Gerald R. Ford: "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at Tyler Junior College, Tyler, Texas.," April 28, 1976 and GFL, NSA/NSC Meeting File, 1974-1977, Box 2, Minutes of NSC Meeting, May 11, 1976 GFL, WHCF, Box 4, TA 1, Letter to Florence Lauckner from Press Secretary Ron Nessen, June 30, 1976 and DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 207-209.

⁴⁵ GFL, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 4, Tanzania, Memo to George S. Springsteen Jr. from Jeanne W. Davis, May 8, 1975; FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, NSSM 224, May 26, 1975; FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa Paper, June 13, 1975; FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, Memo for the Record, July 14, 1975; FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, Report by the Working Group on Angola, October 22, 1975; FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, Memo, November 14, 1975; FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, MemCon, December 18, 1975; FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, Memo from William Colby to Kissinger, December 23, 1975; P. Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, Pretoria*, (Albertyon, South Africa: Galago Press, 2003), 295 and 300-306, 316-317, 332 and 340-345 and Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 794-795, 815-816 and 826-832.

The White House feared the development of a similar situation in Rhodesia. It was believed that unless decisive action was taken to provide a negotiated solution then this could lead to a wider racial war in the region, bringing in South Africa and Cuba and leading to the potential creation of a radicalized Marxist bloc in southern Africa. Such an outcome would place the United States in the unenviable position of intervening militarily on behalf of the white regimes or acquiescing to another communist takeover. An active role, however, in achieving the establishment of a moderate black government would remove the rationale for communist involvement and Washington would be seen as a friend of black liberation.⁴⁶

On April 27, 1976, in Lusaka, Zambia, Secretary of State Kissinger stated that ‘the United States is wholly committed to help bring about a rapid, just and African solution to the issue of Rhodesia’ and stressed that facilitating a solution where ‘blacks and whites live together in harmony and equality is a moral imperative of our time.’ Over the following six months he engaged in his famous ‘shuttle diplomacy’ with London, Pretoria and the Frontline states. Under pressure from both Kissinger and South African Prime Minister John Vorster, Smith agreed to what became known as the ‘Five Points’ including a constitutional conference with the Nationalists. While the subsequent Geneva Conference failed to bring the parties together Kissinger’s actions nevertheless initiated a process that culminated in an end to the UDI. He had not only coerced Smith into publicly endorsing the principle of majority rule but for the first time brought the power and prestige of the U.S. Government into actively seeking a resolution to the Rhodesian problem.⁴⁷

It is worth noting the differing motivations of Secretary of State Kissinger and President Ford. Kissinger retained a great degree of empathy for the white Rhodesians. In a telegram to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, he stated that ‘This outcome gives me no pleasure. It is extremely painful for me to be the instrument of their fate-which could turn out to be disastrous. That they have accepted it with good grace only makes it harder.’ In spite of his sympathy for white Rhodesia, however, the Secretary of State did not allow his personal

⁴⁶ FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, Telegram from the Department of State to Embassy Zaire, February 18, 1976; GFL, Dale Van Atta Papers 1975-1978-Intelligence Chron File, Box 12, Intelligence Documents, National Intelligence Bulletin, February 27, 1976; GFL, NSA Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977, Box 18, MemCon, February 26, 1976; GFL, NSA Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977, Box 18, MemCon, March 4, 1976; GFL, NSC Institutional Files 1974-1977, Box 44, NSSM 241 (1), Memo to Kissinger from Monroe Leigh, March 5, 1976; GFL, NSA Country Files for Africa 1974-1977, Box 5, Rhodesia, INR Afternoon Summary, March 8, 1976 and Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 903-904 and 908.

⁴⁷ GFL, WHCF Country Files, Box 4, CO 1-1 Africa, Address by Kissinger, Lusaka, Zambia, April 27, 1976; GFL, NSA Memoranda of Conversations 1973-1977, Box 20, MemCon, June 23, 1976; GFL, NSA Memoranda of Conversations 1973-1977, Box 20, MemCon, July 13, 1976; FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, MemCon, September 4, 1976; GFL, NSA Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger 1974-1976, Box 38, HAK Messages for the President, Memo for Ford from Scowcroft, September 5, 1976; FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, MemCon, September 6, 1976; FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, MemCon, September 16, 1976; GFL, NSA Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger 1974-1976, Box 38, HAK Messages for the President, Memo for Ford from Scowcroft, September 15, 1976; GFL, NSA Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger 1974-1976, Box 38, HAK Messages for the President, Memo for Ford from Scowcroft, September 17, 1976; GFL, NSA Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger 1974-1976, Box 38, HAK Messages for the President, Memo for Ford from Scowcroft, September 18, 1976; FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, Telegram from Kissinger to Scowcroft, September 20, 1976; GFL, NSA Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 14, Switzerland-State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE-NODIS (28), Telegrams from U.S. Mission Geneva to Kissinger, December, 1976 and Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 964-969 and 973-975, 983-986, 990-995 and 999-1001.

feelings to interfere with the realpolitik of the Cold War. In his view, the geopolitical reality remained that unless the U.S. could force majority rule in Salisbury then the door stayed open for further Cuban and Soviet expansion in southern Africa. If the white Rhodesians needed to be the sacrificial lamb to prevent the spread of communism in the region then he was prepared to wield the knife.⁴⁸

In contrast, Ford believed that achieving majority rule in Rhodesia was a moral imperative and White House should 'continue to do what is right'. In fact the issue was so important to Ford that he was prepared to countenance a domestic backlash which would imperil his own presidential election campaign. Indeed, domestically, many Americans were furious at what appeared to U.S. connivance in the destruction of a vehemently anti-communist pro-Western government. In a particularly worrying development for the White House many leading Republicans expressed dissatisfaction with the Secretary of State. Rival Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan decried the Ford policy as promoting a 'massacre' in Rhodesia, indeed reports from the South African Embassy in Washington informed Pretoria that Dr. Kissinger's Africa trip swung the conservative wing of the Republicans in favor of Reagan. Nevertheless, the president stated that it was important to do what was morally right regardless of the domestic political consequences.⁴⁹

It is important to note, however, that Ford's vision of majority rule in Rhodesia did not exclude the possibility of the white population retaining a degree of control of the levers of power under a black leader. The White House was also highly suspicious of the aims of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) leadership, especially Robert Mugabe, who was viewed as an intransigent bully determined to establish a Marxist oriented dictatorship with no viable future for the white Rhodesian population.⁵⁰

Jimmy Carter

The election of Jimmy Carter would prove to be a pivotal moment for Rhodesia as the new administration played a critical perhaps even irreplaceable role in bringing an end to UDI. Ian

⁴⁸ GFL, NSA Memoranda of Conversations 1973-1977, Box 19, MemCon, April 21, 1976; FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, Telegram from Kissinger to Scowcroft, September 20, 1976 and Smith, *Bitter Harvest*, 201.

⁴⁹ GFL, NSA Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977, Box 19, MemCon, April 12, 1976; GFL, WHCF Country Files, Box 4, CO 1-1 Africa, Letter to Ford from Harold P. Stern, April 28, 1976; GFL, WHCF, Box 43, CO 124 Rhodesia, Letter to Ford from Herbert J. Denton Jr., April 29, 1976; GFL, WHCF Country Files, Box 4, CO 1-1 Africa, *The Indianapolis Star*, May 1, 1976; GFL, WHCF Country Files, Box 4, CO 1-1 Africa, Letter to Ford from Chas E. Thomson, May 6, 1976; GFL, NSA/NSC Meeting File 1974-1977, Box 2, Minutes of NSC Meeting, May 11, 1976; GFL, WHCF, Box 43, CO 124 Rhodesia, Letter to President Ford from John J. Schumann Jr., August 27, 1976; GFL, WHCF, Box 43, CO 124 Rhodesia, Resolution of State Committee of the New York Conservative Party, September 18, 1976; GFL, NSA Memoranda of Conversations 1973-1977, Box 20, MemCon, September 29, 1976; GFL, NSA White House Situation Room, Box 2, Evening Reports from the NSC Staff, Evening Report, October 5, 1976; DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 214 and Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 903-904.

⁵⁰ GFL, NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa 1974-1977, Box 6, South Africa-Telegrams from SECSTATE-NODIS (4), From Embassy Pretoria to Kissinger, November, 1976; GFL, NSA Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 14, Switzerland-Telegrams to SECSTATE-NODIS (15), From U.S. Mission Geneva to Kissinger, November, 1976; GFL, NSA Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 14, Telegrams to SECSTATE-NODIS (21), From U.S. Mission Geneva to Secretary of State, November, 1976; GFL, NSA Memoranda of Conversations 1973-1977, Box 20, MemCon, December 13, 1976.

Smith himself termed it the ‘disaster of Carter’. The vehement opposition of Carter to the Rhodesian regime was guided primarily by his deeply held moral belief in the importance of democracy and human rights, shaped in part by his childhood in the Deep South. The new administration, including Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Andrew Young, attached central importance to human rights when formulating foreign policy. In the view of the White House the refusal of Salisbury to grant equal rights to all its citizens was a violation of the basic human rights of the Zimbabwean people.⁵¹

Even before taking office, Carter had determined that he would not only seek to bring majority rule to Rhodesia but actively use U.S. power to achieve this objective. Unlike Gerald Ford, Carter had little empathy for the white Rhodesians viewing Smith and the Rhodesian Front as no different to the Jim Crow era racists in the Deep South. The new administration also insisted that any deal and subsequent election must include and be acceptable to all parties including both ZANU and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU).⁵²

Human rights was also reinforced by the geopolitical and electoral considerations of the late 1970s. In the view of Carter and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, the continuing conflict in Rhodesia created a volatile tinderbox in Africa providing fertile conditions for the steadily increasing Soviet and Cuban influence in the region. The Cuban military presence in Africa was of particular concern following Havana’s successes in Ethiopia and Angola. In addition, as noted by Brzezinski, perceived U.S. indifference to communist involvement could lead to greater fear and intransigence on the part of the South Africans both in terms of maintaining apartheid but also in brokering any Rhodesian deal.⁵³

The White House was also swayed by the domestic factors of maintaining the increasingly important African-American vote. In the presidential election of 1976, Carter had won ninety-four percent of the black vote while Carter won every southern state except Virginia, the majority of white voters in those states had opted for Ford and the Democratic victory had thus been achieved on the back of the black vote. The White House was also increasingly cognizant that the stance Washington took towards ending white minority rule in Africa was perceived as reflecting its own stance towards domestic racial concerns. Indeed many black civil rights

⁵¹ JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-18-4-6-1-1, Memo for Walter Mondale et al, February 5, 1977; Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Avalon Project Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Inaugural Address of Jimmy Carter, January 20, 1977, avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/carter.asp; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 48 and 139, Mitchell, “Terrorists or freedom fighters?” in *Cold War in Southern Africa*, ed. Onslow, 178 and 191, Smith, *Bitter Harvest*, 221 and Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices. Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983) 256-257.

⁵² JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-18-4-6-1-1, Memo for Mondale et al, February 5, 1977; Mitchell, “Terrorists or freedom fighters?” in *Cold War in Southern Africa*, ed. Onslow, 191 and B. Jones, *Flawed Triumphs: Andy Young at the United Nations*, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996), 60.

⁵³ JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-18-4-6-1-1, Memo for Mondale et al, February 5, 1977; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-18-4-6-1-1, Southern African Developments No.101, February 5, 1977; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-128-12-7-4-5, Memo for Carter from Vance, April 5, 1977; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-SAFE 17 A-13-26-1-2, CIA Analysis July 2, 1977; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-31-23-4-2-6, CIA Report August, 1977; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 139-140 and A. Lake, “Africa in a Global Perspective,” *Africa Report* Volume 23, No. I (January-February, 1978), 44.

figures, including those close to the White House such as Coretta Scott King, were some of the most implacable foes of white Rhodesia.⁵⁴

Carter's early actions included Presidential Directive 5 which made the achievement of majority rule in Rhodesia a major foreign policy objective. Congress, following heavy lobbying by the White House passed legislation which circumvented the Byrd Amendment and the UN Security Council passed a U.S. and British sponsored resolution which expanded sanctions against Rhodesia to include overseas offices such as the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington.⁵⁵

On the broader diplomatic level, in partnership with the British, Washington pressured Rhodesia to accept the Anglo-American Plan which proposed an immediate transition to majority rule. British Foreign Secretary David Owen was particularly eager for U.S. help stating in his memoirs 'Africa needed American strength and American commitment.'⁵⁶

The White House refused to support the Rhodesian 'Internal Settlement' signed on March 3, 1978 which represented a compromise deal between Smith and the moderate black leaders. The Carter administration, despite domestic pressure, viewed the agreement as unrepresentative of majority rule and did not believe U.S. recognition would end the conflict or prevent further communist involvement.⁵⁷

Carter then rejected the Rhodesian offer to send official observers to the subsequent April 1979 elections which chose the Government of National Unity (GNU). On June 7, again despite strong domestic pressure Carter found negatively against recognition of what became known as Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and the lifting of sanctions. CIA reports indicate that the decision not only ended Salisbury's hopes of gaining international recognition but also damaged support for the GNU inside Rhodesia itself.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-18-4-6-1-1, Memo for Mondale et al, February 5, 1977; JCL, WHCF, Box CO-50, CO 129, Mitchell, "Terrorists or freedom fighters?", in *Cold War in Southern Africa*, ed. Onslow, 179 and DeRoche, *Black White and Chrome*, 244-245.

⁵⁵ JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-132-3-8-6-7, Presidential Directive 5 to Mondale et al, March 9, 1977; JCL, WHCF, Box CO-50, CO 126, White House Bill Signing - H.R. 1746, March 18, 1977 and JCL, WHCF, Box CO-50, CO 126, UNSC Resolution 409, UN Security Council, May 27, 1977.

⁵⁶ JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-7-11-6-2-4, Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, February 7, 1977; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-15-44-1-11-4, Memo for Carter from Vance, May 3, 1977; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-1-2-3-55-5, Memo to Carter from Brzezinski, May 19, 1977; JCL, Plains File, Box 37, Secret Service 2/77-11/80 through State Department Evening Reports 7/77, Memo for Carter from Vance, June 8, 1977; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-5-13-4-14-3, Memo for Carter from Brzezinski, August 2, 1977; JCL, NSA Staff Material-North/South Funk, Box 119, Zimbabwe: 4-10/77-7-11/79, Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement, September, 1977 and D. Owen, *Time to Declare: Second Innings*, (London: Politico's, 2009), 173 and 186.

⁵⁷ JCL, NSA Staff Material-North/South Funk, Box 119, Zimbabwe, 11/77-2/78, Memo for Brzezinski and David Aaron from Henry Richardson, January 5, 1978; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-37-31-1-10-1, CIA Assessment, March 23, 1978; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-31-75-5-7-3, CIA Assessment, April, 1978; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-5-4-20-9, Memo for Carter from Brzezinski, February 21, 1978; JCL, RAC Project Number, NLC-16-101-2-17-2, Letter from Carter to General Obasanjo, March 1, 1978; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-128-13-6-12-6, Memo for Carter from Vance, March 15, 1978 and Vance, *Hard Choices*, 283-288.

⁵⁸ JCL, NSA Staff Material-North/South Funk, Box 119, Zimbabwe, 10/78-3/79, Testimony by Richard M. Moose before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 7, 1979; JCL, Plains File, Box 39, State Department Reports, 3/79, Memo for the President from Vance, March 15, 1979; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-132-186-2-6-1, CIA Assessment, April 2, 1979; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-20-22-2-9-4, Policy

Carter's decision on the GNU was an important factor in changing British thinking. Initially, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had indicated a willingness to consider recognition. Following the White House decision, however, Thatcher informed Salisbury that all party participation was necessary for recognition and the removal of sanctions. Thatcher, was an avowed advocate of the 'special relationship' and on a pragmatic level, was also aware that U.S. support was vital for any settlement.⁵⁹

At the subsequent Lancaster House Conference which ended UDI the White House, played an important role in assisting the United Kingdom in attaining the final agreement. The U.S. ambassador in London, Kingman Brewster, maintained contact with all sides and insisted on the important condition that all parties be treated equally during the ceasefire. One notable contribution related to the possibility of financial aid to an independent Zimbabwe. When the conference turned to the controversial question of potential land redistribution and how it could be financed the discussions became a deadlocked impasse. Notably the Patriotic Front (of ZANU and ZAPU) vehemently rejected the idea that a majority rule government would be required to compensate white property owners for land that it believed had been stolen from the indigenous African population. Although Carter was reluctant to commit to this issue, the fact that Washington offered the possibility of aid to pay off the white landowners allowed the Patriotic Front to end the stalemate as opposed to merely backing down. Ambassador Brewster, also assured the British that the United States would co-operate in a multi donor development effort for Zimbabwe subject to a successful settlement.⁶⁰

The British were well aware of the significant contribution that the White House made to the successful outcome of the Lancaster House Conference. On December 17, 1979 at a State Dinner in Washington, Thatcher offered her gratitude to Carter and Secretary of State Vance observing that without their aid the settlement 'may never have reached success.'⁶¹

Following the transitional period and all party elections Zimbabwe formally gained independence from Britain on April 18, 1980 and Mugabe took office as Prime Minister of the new nation. In Washington, Carter immediately extended formal diplomatic recognition to

Review Committee Meeting, April 12, 1979 and JCL, NSA Staff Material-North/South Funk, Box 119, Zimbabwe, 6/79, Department of State, Sanctions: Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Decision Explained, June, 1979.

⁵⁹ JCL, NSA Staff Material-North/South Funk, Box 119, Zimbabwe, 4/79, Memo for Aaron from Jerry Funk, April 26, 1979; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-31-127-4-10-2, Summary of Margaret Thatcher, May, 1979; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-28-16-1-1-2, Summary of Lord Carrington, May 11, 1979; JCL, NSA Staff Material-North/South Funk, Box 119, Zimbabwe, 5/79, MemCon, May 21, 1979; JCL, Plains File, Box 39, State Department Reports, 7/79, Memo for Carter from Vance, July 17, 1979; M. Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, (London: Harper Collins, 1993), 72-73 and P. Baxter, *Rhodesia: Last Outpost of the British Empire 1890-1980*, (Johannesburg: Galago Press, 2010), 480-482.

⁶⁰ JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-8-89-3-3-2, CIA Assessment, October, 1979; JCL, NSA Brzezinski Material, Box 50, Presidential Determinations 8/79-5/80, Memo for Carter from Vance, November 13, 1979; JCL, NSA Brzezinski Material, Box 50, Presidential Determinations 8/79-5/80, Memo to Vance from Carter, November 14, 1979; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-16-20-5-29-6, To Vance from Embassy Maputo, November 15, 1979; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-16-20-5-3-4, To Vance from Embassy Dar-es-Salaam, November 15, 1979; JCL, NSA Staff Material-North/South Funk, Box 119, Zimbabwe, 7-11/79, Memo for Carter from Brzezinski, November 23, 1979; JCL, RAC Project Number NLC-133-115-3-12-0, Memo for Vance from Denis Clift, December 11, 1979; *Southern Rhodesia. Report of the Constitutional Conference, Lancaster House, London, September-December 1979*, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, January 1980)

http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ZW_791221_LancasterHouseAgreement.pdf,

J. Davidow, *A Peace in Southern Africa: Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), 65 and D. Ottaway, "Africa: U.S. Policy Eclipse," *Foreign Affairs* 58 (3), 1980, 642.

⁶¹ Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (hereafter PPPUS), Jimmy Carter, 1979, Book II June 23 to December 31 1979, Visit of Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom, December 17, 1979.

Zimbabwe. The White House was clearly elated at having finally resolved the longstanding Rhodesian problem. Secretary of State Vance expressed great encouragement at the outcome and praised Mugabe for his 'statesmanship' while U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Young, later observed that making a contribution to the creation of political and racial harmony in Zimbabwe was his most gratifying achievement during his tenure at the UN.⁶²

President Carter, himself, commented that the arrival of majority rule would bring a sense of dignity to a people who had for too long been subjugated to racial oppression and been deprived of their basic human rights. He further stated his belief that Mugabe had become 'one of our strong and potentially very good and loyal friends.'⁶³

Conclusion

Examining U.S. relations with Rhodesia, through the lens of the Oval Office, provides us with a better grasp and awareness of the pressure points which guided foreign policy during the 1960s and 70s. White House decision making regarding Salisbury demonstrates the changing geopolitics of the Cold War, the shifting patterns of global power, the rise of human rights, domestic race relations, economic concerns and the importance of strategic raw materials on foreign policy. The various presidential administrations, however, differed greatly in how they prioritized and sought to manage the confluence of these determinants.

President Lyndon Johnson opposed the UDI due to his opposition, at least after he entered the Oval Office, to white supremacy, combined with the pragmatic need to retain prestige and protect interests in black Africa for strategic, economic and diplomatic reasons. Geopolitically, however, Johnson recognized that the avoidance of harsh measures against Salisbury would allow the continuance of close strategic and economic ties with Salisbury's de facto allies in Lisbon and Pretoria and domestically feared the political and social repercussions of taking an overly hostile approach to Salisbury. Johnson therefore adopted a dual strategy, on the one hand, public opposition towards Salisbury combined with limited diplomatic and economic actions in order to demonstrate support for racial equality and preserve interests in independent Africa. On the other hand, avoidance of any strong measures or the subversion of such actions that could derail relations with Portugal and South Africa or threaten Johnson's domestic objectives.

In the case of Richard Nixon, his administration's policy towards Salisbury was characterized by a pragmatic real politik with little, if any, consideration for the morality of ending white supremacy in southern Africa. On an ideological level, Nixon and Kissinger empathized with Salisbury and Rhodesia's pro-Western and anti-communist stance appealed to the White House. Nixon was also aware of the growing need for access to the mineral wealth of Rhodesia, especially chrome, on economic and strategic grounds. NSDM 38 moved Washington towards a policy of closer ties with the 'White Redoubt' although, the White House avoided full normalization of relations with Rhodesia to prevent damage to broader strategic and trade interests in the Third World. When geostrategic and economic interests coincided, though, as was the case with obtaining access to Rhodesian chrome, then Nixon demonstrated no qualms

⁶² PPPUS, Jimmy Carter, 1980-81, Book I January 1 to May 23 1980, U. S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe: Nomination of Robert V. Keeley, April 18, 1980; Baxter, *Rhodesia*, 508 Jones, *Flawed Triumphs*, 73 Vance, *Hard Choices*, 301.

⁶³ PPPUS, Jimmy Carter, 1980-81, Book I January 1 to May 23 1980, Remarks at Democratic Congressional Campaign Dinner, March 26, 1980; PPPUS, Jimmy Carter, 1980-81, Book I January 1 to May 23 1980, Briefing for Civic and Community Leaders, April 30, 1980 and DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome*, 287.

in placing Washington in direct violation of UN sanctions and incurring the ire of both London and black Africa in order to achieve his objectives.

During the era of President Gerald Ford, for the first time moral and pragmatic objectives linked together leading to a distinct shift in policy towards Salisbury. Ford himself entered the White House with a sincere commitment to fairness and morality both domestically and globally. While Ford was initially unwilling to challenge conservatives in his own party on a red flag issue, when Cold War considerations coincided with the cause of racial equality, then the administration demonstrated no qualms in placing the power and prestige of Washington behind the goal of ending UDI. While the Geneva Conference failed to provide a breakthrough, Smith's public endorsement of majority rule and the important role played by the United States in bringing all parties together nevertheless initiated a process that culminated in an end to UDI.

President Jimmy Carter, indisputably played a crucial role in ending the UDI era. Carter vehemently opposed white minority rule on ideological grounds. Geopolitically, the White House viewed Salisbury's domestic policies as the causal factor of the violence in southern Africa and providing fertile conditions for greater Soviet and Cuban expansion. Domestically, the administration was well aware of the need to maintain the support of the African-American population. Under Carter, the diplomatic power of the United States was placed entirely behind the principle of majority rule, Congress prevented the further importation of Rhodesian chrome and together with London the administration pressured Salisbury to accept an end to minority rule. Carter's rejection of the Internal Settlement and subsequent Government of National Unity rang the death knell of white control in Salisbury.

The case of Rhodesia encapsulated the shifting U.S. approach to foreign relations during the 1960s and 1970s and revealed the broader factors that shaped decision making. These international and domestic dynamics at times intersected with each other but equally often competed and jockeyed for supremacy. Furthermore, using Rhodesia as an illuminative lens exposes the interaction between pragmatism and morality in formulating foreign policy during the UDI era as well as the competing visions of what constituted a pragmatic or moral approach.