



Democratic Efficacy and the Varieties of Populism in Europe

Working Paper

Between Normalisation and Polarisation

Media populism in comparative perspective

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Abstract

This working paper investigates the relationship between the media landscape and populist parties and leaders. It assumes that in the scientific literature three distinct aspects of populism have been mainly addressed by scholars, namely, populism expressed by populist political parties and leaders (studied, for instance, through the analysis of election manifestos), populism among citizens (studied using opinion surveys), and populism within the media (usually investigated through content analysis of media coverage). Accordingly, this research focus on this latter dimension in order to shed light on the relationship between journalism and populism. Based on the literature developed by Mazzoleni (2003), Krämer (2014), and Jagers and Walgrave (2007), the working paper aims at identifying and operationalising the so-called “media populism” in media outlet, as well as the social and political factors that prompt journalists to contrast or favour populism. The empirical analysis, including six EU countries (Czechia, France, Italy, Poland, Spain, and Slovakia), combines an original expert survey (aimed at measuring the level of populism by the media in each national context) and in-depth interviews with journalists about news media perception and reaction to populism in politics. General results suggest that the media landscape is witnessing a process of normalisation of populism in news coverage. This happens mainly by the inclusion of people-centrism and anti-elitism as a simplified way of accomplishing the information and control functions typical of political journalism. The expert survey data also suggest that a process of polarisation between news outlets is occurring. This polarisation takes place particularly with respect to outgroup ostracism: some news outlets support this orientation, while others actively act to counter it. In the second part of the paper, the authors stress, by means of in-depth interviews, that populism is in the eye of the beholder. Populism can be conceived as positive (rarely) or negative (often), and in any case it is perceived as a normative concept. “Populism” is therefore a typical word and concept in political competition, not only for political actors but also for journalists and news outlets. The interviews also suggest that populism is becoming a constitutive element of contemporary political journalism. The relationship between journalism and populism is characterised by forms of parallelism, polarisation or normalisation: all these processes lead to the inclusion of populist frames and claims within mainstream media outlets’ political coverage.

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1. Introduction

In the last few years, the concept of populism has been widely used by scholars in the field of political science and communication. Populism is a contentious concept *per se*. Nonetheless, most scholars agree on a minimal definition, according to which populist discourse relies on the juxtaposition of a “good people” with a series of “bad elites”. Moreover, in the case of right-wing populists, the people’s values, their identities and rights are considered to be endangered not only by the elites but also by the action of a series of “outgroups” that are said to receive preferential treatment by the elites (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015; Kriesi 2014; Mudde 2004, 2007, 2014; Taggart 2000; Canovan 1999). While most scholars argue that these elements – the people, the elites and the outgroups – are the core of populism, there has been a still ongoing debate regarding whether it should be interpreted as an ideology (Taggart 2000; Mudde 2004, 2007; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017; Stanley 2008), a political strategy (Weiland 2001, 2017) or a type of communication (Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Moffitt and Tormey 2014; Moffitt 2016; Aslanidis 2016; de Vreese et al. 2018).

Relying on this definition, three distinct aspects of populism have been mainly addressed by scholars: (i) first, populism expressed by political parties and leaders that is studied through the analysis of election manifestos, political discourses and parliamentary activity to assess the relevance of the key elements of populism (e.g. Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Hawkins 2009; Cranmer 2011; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Engesser et al. 2016); (ii) second, the spread of populism among citizens, studied using opinion surveys in order to assess populist attitudes and the determinants of the populist vote (e.g. Stanley 2011; Hawkins, Riding and Mudde 2012; Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014; Elchardus & Spruyt 2016; Hameleers and De Vreese 2020; Norris and Inglehart 2018; Tsatsanis, Andreadis & Teperoglou 2018); (iii) third, the relevance of populism within the media that is usually studied through content analysis of media coverage in order to assess the role of media as both source of information and communication channel (e.g. Bos, Van der Brug and De Vreese 2010; Bos and Brants 2014; Akkerman 2011; Rooduijn 2014; Wettstein et al. 2018).

While the first two branches of literature have a consolidated tradition in terms of operationalisation and findings, the last one has been developed more recently from the seminal studies of Mazzoleni (2003, 2008), Krämer (2014) and Jagers and Walgrave (2007) conceiving populism as political communication style. In particular, literature investigating media populism focused on how and how much populist parties’ stances are spread through the media – i.e. populism “through the media” (Esser, Stępińska and Hopmann 2017). Only a few studies, instead, have empirically addressed the dissemination of populist stances directly by the media (Stępińska, 2020), and even fewer have adopted a comparative approach.

Therefore, we do not have yet sufficient empirical evidence to draw conclusions on the relationship between populism and the media. Indeed, several questions remain unanswered: What is the relationship between journalism and populism? How can we operationalise and measure “media populism”? How relevant is it within the media? Which are its elements that are the most prevalent? How do news outlets counter populism, or, on the contrary, favour it? Which are the historical, social, and political factors that help one outcome or the other?

This work contributes to filling this gap through an original expert survey aimed at measuring the level of populism by the media in each national context and in-depth interviews with journalists about news media perception and reactions to populism in politics.

2. Case studies

This study includes six European countries: Czechia, France, Italy, Poland, Spain and Slovakia. Three of them belong to Western, and three of them to Eastern Europe. In order to explain commonalities and differences among communication practices and the patterns in the way in which journalism works in different contexts, we follow the typology of media systems by Hallin and Mancini (2004).

Hallin and Mancini's framework is built on four dimensions (see also Brüggemann et al. 2014) *political parallelism* (the extent to which coverage is shaped by journalist's political affiliation, political bias, public broadcaster's dependence on the government), *journalistic professionalism* (autonomy of the profession, be it political or economic, strength of professional norms, presence of an ethic of public interest), *media market* (inclusiveness of the press market) and *role of the state* (extent and direction of state interventionism).

Three models were originally conceived by Hallin and Mancini: 1) the *Mediterranean polarised pluralist* model, characterised by a low reach of the daily press, high political parallelism, weak professionalisation, and strong state intervention made of particularistic interests and clientelist relationships; 2) the *Northern European democratic corporatist* model, characterised by a high reach of the press market, relatively high degrees of political parallelism, strong professionalisation, and strong state intervention, in the form of strong public service broadcasters and subsidies for the press; 3) the *North Atlantic liberal* model, characterised by a high reach of the press market, low degrees of political parallelism, a highly professionalised journalism, and a weak role of the state.

Of our six countries, three (France, Italy, and Spain) were included in the original research of Hallin and Mancini. (2004) and can be considered as belonging to the first model (*Mediterranean polarised pluralist*). However, Czechia, Poland and Slovakia were not part of the original study but were included in subsequent research on the topic.

Regarding the Polish system, according to Dobek-Ostrowska (2012) it has many characteristics of the polarised pluralist model and can be understood as a hybrid of the polarised pluralist and liberal models, with a few elements of the democratic corporatist model and the country's post-communist legacy.

The system is characterized by a small circulation of daily newspapers and the central position of the electronic media. The media, above all the press, strongly focus on political life, and external pluralism and the tradition of commentary-oriented journalism are important. Instrumentalization of the public broadcasting media by the government and political parties is evident. Journalistic professionalism is at a lower level than in the Democratic Corporatist or the Liberal model. Relationships between the media and political elites are characterized mainly by conflicts over the autonomy of journalism. The state plays a significant role as the owner of public radio and television (Dobek-Ostrowska 2012, 49).

According to Castro Herrero and colleagues' (2017) analysis of media systems in Central European countries, Poland and Czechia (together with Croatia and Slovenia) belong to the "Central cluster" (lower scores of foreign ownership, higher scores for PSB). The clusters' high levels of ownership concentration, which come with the highest levels of ownership regulation, are also remarkable. On the contrary, Slovakia belongs to a different cluster (a cluster including also Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania): the Northern one, characterised by the lowest levels of political parallelism, the highest levels of press freedom, and the highest levels of foreign ownership. The countries in this cluster also feature the highest levels of journalistic professionalism and online political information use and the lowest levels of ownership concentration.

Moreover, these countries have widely experienced relevant and articulated forms of political populism. In all the cases analysed, populist parties represent a significant share of the political offer, ranging from

around 17% in Spain to over 50% in Poland and Italy. Populist parties are relevant actors both as opposition and government actors. France is an exception as populists are only in opposition (see Table 1).

Table 1. Models of media system and relevance of political populism¹

Country	Model of media system	Populist parties		
		Results in the 2019 EE	In power	In opposition
Czechia	Central	38.7%	ANO KSČM (ext. support)	SPD
France	Mediterranean/Polarised pluralist	29.6%		RN LFI
Italy	Mediterranean/Polarised pluralist	57.8%	M5S Lega	FdI
Poland	Central	50.0%	PiS	Konfederacja
Slovakia	Northern	20.6%	OL'aNO Sme Rodina	ĽSNS
Spain	Mediterranean/Polarised pluralist	16.3%	Podemos	VOX

In short, these case studies offer a privileged perspective to study the relationship between populism and the information system both from the point of view of the variety of journalistic models, the relevance of populist parties in the national political arena, and their geographical origin (Western and Eastern Europe).

3. Aims and methods

The general aim of the working paper is to have a deeper understanding of the relationship between journalism and populism and to map the possible reactions of media outlets to populism.

The first part of the research operationalised and measured the concept of media populism to assess **how relevant media populism is among mainstream media and which key elements are most prevalent**. This aim has been carried out through a comparative expert survey asking scholars to rate the level of populism of the most relevant news outlets in a given country.

A second part of the research was aimed at understanding in which **ways different news outlets reacted to the growing relevance of populism** in terms of journalistic norms, professional values, and editorial practices. This goal has been carried out through in-depth interviews with journalists from the most relevant news outlets in each country.

¹ Votes is the sum of the results achieved in the 2019 European elections by the populist parties in each country. In detail, the parties considered as populists were: ANO 2011 (ANO: 21.2%), Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (KSČM: 6.9%), Svoboda a přímá demokracie (SPD: 10.6%) in Czechia; La France Insoumise (LFI: 6.3%), Rassemblement National (RN: 23.3%) in France; Fratelli d'Italia (FdI: 6.4%), Lega (34.3), Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S: 17.1) in Italy; Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS: 45.4%), Konfederacja 'Wolność i Niepodległość' (Konfederacja: 4.6%) in Poland; Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko (ĽSNS: 12.1%), Obyčajní Ľudia a nezávislé osobnosť (OL'aNO: 5.3%), Sme Rodina (3.2%) in Slovakia; Unidas Podemos (UP: 10.1%), VOX (6.2%), in Spain. This table shows whether populist parties were in power or in opposition when the empirical research was conducted, i.e. from March to October 2021. See also Report 7.4 for more details.

Comparative expert survey

The expert survey resulted in an original comparative dataset on media populism across the main news outlets. The survey was administered between June and July 2021. Experts were contacted through email and received a maximum number of three reminders, respectively two, four and six weeks after the first invitation. The questionnaire was in English, administered through Limesurvey. Selected experts are scholars affiliated to a university or academic research centre, matching at least one of the following criteria: (a) having published research (of any type, but preferably peer-reviewed articles) about populism or media studies/journalism or political communication; (b) describing her/his expertise on these topics on her/his official webpage or CV; (c) holding a chair in political communication, public opinion, media studies or journalism in a Department of Politics or Communication.

The total number of experts who were contacted is 2,739. Besides the countries included in this paper (**Czechia, France, Italy, Poland, Slovakia and Spain**), the survey also covered countries from North and South America (Canada, US, Brazil), Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, UK), Central and Eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Turkey), East Asia and Oceania (Japan and Australia). Overall, we collected answers provided by 466 experts (the average response rate was 17%). As regards sociodemographic characteristics, the experts within the sample are in line with previous expert surveys in similar fields (i.e. CHES, POPPA, NEGex): they have an average age of 46 years, 33.26% are female; lean towards the centre-left, from a political point of view ($M=3.76/10$, $St. dev.=1.73$). Overall, a large majority of experts declared that the questions that were asked in the questionnaire fall within their competencies (A lot: 19.7% and Quite a lot: 63.7%).

The objects assessed by experts are the main relevant news outlets in each national context. Unlike political parties – usually limited in number and for which it is easy to define some thresholds (i.e. having seats in national parliament) – identifying which are the relevant news outlets in each country required relying on national meta-experts. Meta-experts are leading scholars in the field of populism, political communication or media/journalism studies who provided the list of news outlets to be assessed. These news outlets were selected relying on the combination of two criteria: (i) diffusion, in terms of circulation or audience; (ii) and political orientation in terms of political parallelism with a party or political field (i.e. left, centre, right). Meta-experts were asked to indicate at least 4 and at most 10 news outlets: the final news sources selection ranges from 6 to 10 news outlets for each country.² The lists provided by meta-experts were finally validated and complemented through comparison with the Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021.

Considering only countries for which at least three different experts provided independent evaluations, the dataset counts 346 news outlets in 34 countries (38 national or subnational contexts). Table A1 in the Appendix reports the number of invitations, responses and news outlets evaluated in each country.

Following the minimal definition of populism (Mudde 2004; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017; Taggart 2000; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015), we operationalised media populism as a multidimensional concept based on people-centrism, anti-elitism and outgroup exclusion. The questionnaire administered to experts was organised around a set of items focusing on these three dimensions, asking the experts to evaluate the orientation of a given news outlet with regard to people-centrism, anti-elitism and outgroup ostracism. The experts' opinions were measured using a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (very little) to 6 (very much).

The set of proposed items was:

² Italy is the only exception. In this county, 11 news outlets were selected.

People-centrism

P1 – Thinking of the following news outlets, how much is the ‘will of the people’ positively emphasised when reporting about political news?

P2 – Thinking of the following news outlets, how much are ordinary people positively emphasised when reporting about political news?

Anti-elitism

E1 – Thinking of the following news outlets, how much is the establishment described as ruining the country when reporting about political news?

E2 – Thinking of the following news outlets, how much is the establishment described as self-interested when reporting about political news?

Outgroup ostracism

O1 – Thinking of the following news outlets, how much are migrants described as worsening our society when reporting about political news?

O2 – Thinking of the following news outlets, how much are migrants described as taking advantage of the welfare state when reporting about political news?

While using expert ratings to measure social or political phenomena is increasingly common, it has also frequently been the object of methodological critiques (e.g. Budge 2000), most notably when it comes to the consistency of ratings across experts. The reliability of the measures of the expert survey (namely, the agreement of the experts in evaluating the levels of populism of each news outlet) has been tackled by means of a technique developed by Steenbergen and Marks (2007). It is based on a variance component analysis, which subdivides the variance accounted by the expert and by the outlets across items. In general, we assume that a variance between experts below 20% is satisfactory (Steenbergen and Marks 2007). In our questionnaire, this threshold is 1 for the six items assessing media populism (1-6 scale). Reliability was calculated in each country for these items, for a total of 266 measures. As presented in Table A2 in the Appendix, most of the scores are largely reliable. However, there are also 37 measures that slightly exceed the threshold (between 1 and 1.2 on a scale of 1-6), while 8 exceed the threshold by a larger margin (between 1.3 and 1.6). All in all, we consider the measures provided in the dataset reliable since the experts have shown to have largely understood the questions in the same way and answered consistently.

In-depth interviews with political journalists

In order to understand the relationship between populism and journalism, each country team conducted several in-depth interviews, ranging from a minimum of 7 (Spain) to a maximum of 24 (Slovakia) with an average of 8 interviews for the other countries. This quantity of interviews, dictated by resource constraints, made it necessary **to select the journalists to be interviewed as privileged witnesses of the functioning of the national media system.**

In other words, instead of considering the individual journalist as a source and a unit of analysis mainly linked to the media outlet in which he or she works, **each journalist was considered as a source of information to understand and evaluate the dynamics of the relationship characterising populism and journalism in a given country.** This research design allowed for an exploratory study in which journalists were selected from within the most relevant news media (Table 2). The questions included three main topics: journalists’ perceptions of populism, media responses to populism and the reasons for the relationship between journalism and populism in each country.

Two underlying dimensions structured the interviews: **proximity to populism** (high/low) and **relevance of populism**. The first dimension (proximity to populism) aims to assess how ideologically and politically close news outlets are to the populist views, i.e. whether they can be considered as active actors in *promoting* populists and populist stances (high proximity) or, on the contrary, in *opposing* them (low proximity). In both cases, this proximity may be intentional, resulting from an explicit decision to endorse or reject populism/populists, or unintentional, as a consequence of media logic and to increase the audience.

The second dimension (relevance of populism) aims at assessing how relevant populism and/or populist actors are within journalistic activity and reporting. This includes whether populism is a central topic constantly and substantially covered (high relevance) or, on the contrary, is a matter of interest only when something relevant or that breaks the routine happens around it, or just because it helps to increase audience (low relevance). Obviously, the relevance of populism for journalists may depend on the relevance of populist actors within national political field.

Table 2. Number and main features of interviewees by country

Country	N.	Type of media					
		TV	Radio	Press	Online	Professional association	Other
Czechia	9	1	1	5	2	/	/
France	8	2	/	5	1	/	/
Italy	8	3	/	4	/	1	/
Poland	8	1	1	3	1	2	/
Slovakia	24	4	2	7	9	/	2
Spain	7	1	/	3	2	1	/
Total	64	12	4	27	15	4	2

The combination of these two dimensions resulted in four ideal-types of the relationship between news outlets and populism (Table 3). These ideal-types and their content try to link studies about journalism and professional norms (Hanitzsch 2011; Mellado 2015; Mellado et al. 2020) with our narrow perspective on journalism and populism (Aalberg et al. 2017; Reinemann et al. 2019).

Populist opponent

News outlets from this group show a low and discontinuous relevance of populism together with critical attitudes towards populism and are driven by an interventionist orientation. Journalists in this cluster emphasise the importance of advocating social change, influencing public opinion and setting the political agenda. In this respect they consider populism as a threat to democracy and promote forms of countering populism when they deem it necessary.

Populist facilitator

The main characteristic of news outlets in this group is their opportunist view of journalism's role in society and their pragmatic view about the need for reaching large audiences. These journalists consider politics like any other topic to be selected and framed according to their potential to attract the widest possible audience. They may be close to populist actors, but their interest in populism is driven not by political proximity but by economic considerations: populism is often popular and therefore is over covered.

Detached observer

News outlets in this group perceive the role of journalists as detached observers playing a relevant role in the democratic system and providing the audience with essential political information. From this perspective, they are less interested in reaching a large audience at any cost. This allows them to cover populism and populists in a standard “objective” (i.e. “neutral”) way, like any other political phenomenon or actors.

Populist disseminator

News outlets in this group share a positive assessment of populism and a high level of involvement with populism. Often, they themselves are sources of populist statements and promote statements or campaigns on issues akin to those promoted by populist parties (i.e. blaming the entire elite as the *casta* or the system).

Table 3. Typology of the relationships between populism and news outlets

	<i>High proximity</i>	<i>Low proximity</i>
<i>High relevance</i>	Populist disseminator	Populist facilitator
<i>Low relevance</i>	Populist opponent	Detached observer

4. Comparative findings from expert survey³

Focusing on the six countries included in this research, the comparison shows two main trends (Table 4). On the one hand, data suggest that a process of **normalisation of journalistic discourse/coverage around the key elements “people” and “elite”** is occurring in all countries analysed. The median values related to people-centrism have a medium-high value in all countries accompanied by a generally low level of standard deviation: this means that there are no substantial differences between news outlets within a given country. A similar situation is shown for anti-elitism: also in this case the median values are at a medium-high level. However, the standard deviation indicates that the differences between the news outlets are larger than in the previous case. The information and watchdog functions typical of political journalism are obviously connected to the two key elements of populism, the defence of citizens (people) and the control of government action (elites). However, what the data seem to suggest is that these two functions tend to be partially replaced by more simplistic and immediate forms that adopt the populist frames of people-centrism and anti-elitism.

On the other hand, there is a **process of polarisation of the journalistic discourse/coverage towards the key element “outgroup” among the news outlets within a given country**. In this case, the standard deviation is systematically higher than for the previous two key elements: this means that the differences between differently oriented news outlets are generally large. Not surprisingly, right-wing oriented media outlets score higher on “outgroup ostracism” compared to left-oriented ones. However, these data show that right-wing oriented media outlets are not only critical of the immigration issue, but tend to adopt and promote outright populist frames on this issue.

Broadening the perspective to all 34 countries included in the experts’ survey, the type of media system is another possible lens through which to read the data on media populism. The basic idea is to verify if there is a correlation between the three components of media populism and the characteristics of media systems (Figures 1-3). We classified countries based on the classic distinction proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004). In addition, we also classified Eastern and Central European countries in a

³ The comparative expert survey and the subsequent analysis were carried out by the University of Turin team.

specific model,⁴ while Albania, Brazil, Japan, Serbia, and Turkey were included in a residual category. Results show that Western countries exhibit a similar pattern, suggesting that populism has now become a constitutive feature not only of political life, but also of their news media landscape. In particular, “the people” have the highest score followed by “the elites”: these **data seem to confirm the centrality of the “us versus them” frame with the exaltation of the virtues of the people more relevant than the discrediting of the elites**. The exclusion of the outgroup is instead the component with the lowest score and is certainly affected by the different weight of the migration issue among countries. Eastern and Central European countries show an opposite pattern in relation to the “us versus them” dichotomy: again, the two components are the most relevant, but the use of anti-elitism is more pronounced than people-centrism.

In sum, this findings suggest that, although media populism is globally widespread and a certain degree of people-centrism, anti-elitism and ostracism of the outgroup thus seems to be a constitutive feature of contemporary political journalism, the underlying drivers are different between Western and Eastern countries in Europe.

Table 4. News outlets orientation toward key elements of populism by country (median value and standard deviation)

	<i>People-centrism</i>		<i>Anti-elitism</i>		<i>Outgroup ostracisms</i>	
	Median	St.Dev.	Median	St.Dev.	Median	St.Dev.
Czech Republic	3.3	0.5	3.5	0.5	3.2	1.0
France	3.6	0.5	2.8	0.8	3.5	1.3
Italy	4.0	0.9	2.6	1.2	2.3	1.3
Poland	3.7	0.3	3.6	0.6	2.6	1.0
Slovakia	3.4	0.5	3.9	0.5	3.0	1.1
Spain	3.5	0.4	3.1	0.4	2.9	1.0

Figure 1. Conditional mean on people-centrism on news media by type of media system

⁴ For the sake of simplification, in the statistical model these countries have been calculated in a single model instead of distinguishing them into Eastern, Central and Northern following Herrero et al. (2017).




Figure 2. Conditional mean on anti-elitism on news media by type of media system





Figure 3. Conditional mean on outgroup ostracism on news media by type of media system



5. Comparative findings from interviews⁵

In this section, our aim is to understand the relationship between journalism and populism and to map and summarise the possible reactions of journalism, and in particular of the main news outlets present in each country, to populism. This relationship is part of a larger social process, in which both changes in journalism and the political game must be considered, as well as the historical legacy of each country. In this section, we will first present a summary of the results of the interviews, based on three main subjects (the perception of populism, news outlets' reaction to populism and the reasons for the relationship). In the second place, we will try to identify the main patterns emerging from the case studies and link them to this typology.

Perception of populism

What is journalists' perception of populism? In their view, does it represent a threat or an opportunity for democracy? As in the academic literature, there is not a single answer to this question, and much depends on journalists' normative orientations.

Populism is considered mostly negatively by **Czech** journalists, for its ideological and value emptiness. As regards political actors, are especially considered as populists president Miloš Zeman, former prime-minister Andrej Babiš and radical right-wing politician Tomio Okamura. According to journalists, each one has its preferred outlet, even though with different degrees of cooperation (especially in the past

⁵ This part of the research was carried out by the national teams: UNITO, AMU, UL, UB, SKAMBA, CU.

years private TV Barrandov and TV Prima were in favour of president Miloš Zeman; Parlamentní listy website supported Tomio Okamura; while MAFRA, the media group owned by the prime minister Andrej Babiš, continues to support its owner).

In **France**, for journalists, populism is a vague, labile and volatile term that can be applied, as a matter of style, to many French politicians (e.g. also the president Macron). This is also due to the presidential system and its push towards personalisation. Two political actors are considered genuinely populist: the Rassemblement National (and its leader Marine Le Pen) and La France Insoumise (Jean-Luc Mélenchon). This is because they are the only two actors who mobilise the people in opposition to an elite, and thus in their case populism is not only a matter of style.

In **Italy** most interviewees have no problems defining populism, and they define it in both negative and positive ways, recognising the complexity of the phenomenon. When defined as negative, it is considered as a way for politicians to gain consensus, and to simplify complex issues. When seen as positive, as a way to counter the detachment of the elites. There are no clear dividing lines among journalists belonging to different outlets. The two main populist actors recognised by journalists are Lega (in particular the leader Salvini) and the Movimento 5 stelle. Each populist actors have its preferred news outlet (like every faction in Italy). As for the populists, they are La Verità and Libero for Salvini and Il Fatto Quotidiano for the M5S. But interviewees point out that *every* newspaper, in reality, is an echo chamber for populism (see below).

In **Poland** a negative view of populism is dominant among Polish journalists. Populism is characterised by a division between “us” and “them” that has as an outcome polarisation. Populism creates political divisions and does not allow democratic compromise. At a discursive level, populism make use of emotions and of some “linguistic clichés” that are used both by populists and journalists. A positive view of populism is shared by a minority: it encompasses the fact that populism can include citizens in the public debate and foster “realistic” debates against a backdrop of elites disconnected from the real problems of citizens.

When asked to define populism, **Spanish** journalists’ tendency is to highlight features related to their profession: the content of the populist message, their use of emotions, the way in which populists give simple solutions to complex problems. All interviewees when asked to define populism focus on the right-wing party Vox. There is not a positive connotation of the concept of populism, except for conservative media that state that populism brought some problems, denied by the other politicians, to the forefront.

In **Slovakia** journalists see populism by and large negatively. The most shared feature of populism among journalists is the belief that populists just follow general public opinion, offering simple solutions and empty promises (thus populism is seen as a form of demagoguery). This would be motivated by their desire to please general opinion with the aim to get power. Some interviewed journalists considered all politicians to be more or less populists. However, more specifically, journalists acknowledge the presence of two strong populist parties in power (OĽaNO and Sme Rodina) and two in opposition in the country: Smer-SD and the radical populist right-wing party, Kotlebovci-ĽSNS.

In sum, journalists’ definition of populism is **normative**, depending on the concrete political actor that they have in mind. It is a definition mostly **negative**. In some minority cases, some virtuous features of populism are acknowledged.

Media outlets’ responses to populism

Which are media outlets' responses to populism? Do they support and contribute to spread populism, do they counter populism, or treating populist actors like other actors?

The media scene in **Czechia** is split between those who oppose populist politicians and those who support them: populism is thus a divisive factor in the media landscape. Public media are considered as neutral and balanced, because they have to give space to all relevant actors, even though this neutrality could lead to the spread of extremist visions ("five minutes for the Jews, five minutes for Hitler"). On the contrary, the private ones rather follow the media logic and the search for sensationalism, and this led to a decrease in professionalism and quality, and to excessive attention given to populists. On the one hand, the media need populists because the coverage of these actors increases audience; populists, on the other hand – although they tend to construct a narrative of victimhood, play the underdog role, and sometimes refuse to provide interviews with some media – need readership. According to journalists, to counter populism, the media should do fact-checking and be more critical, but this runs counter to the media logic.

In **France**, on the one hand, journalists are seen as by populists as part of the elite that populist actors want to counter, especially those in the mainstream national media (seen by populists as part of the "system"). But, on the other hand, populists need the media to be legitimised and to be accepted to be part of the system. For instance, an interviewee recalls that Marine Le Pen, when offered interviews, never refuses. In sum: they need each other. As for their relationships, some news outlets treat populists like other actors, trying also to convince them to participate in their shows, others (the leftist ones) build a sort of *cordon sanitaire*, and do not invite or interview them, especially Marine Le Pen.

Italian journalism and populism share a convergence of interests because (on the media outlets' side) populism increases audience and (on the part of politicians) populist actors want and need to appear in the media. However, the balance of power leans towards populism. Journalists fail to play the fourth estate role in Italy, both for structural reasons (see below) and perhaps also due to opportunistic behaviour (if populists will be in power in the future, then journalists will have benefits). Journalists and populists behave in the same way: both search for immediate consensus, in terms of votes or audience. It is for this reason that every newspaper is an echo chamber for populism. Irrespectively of their orientation, journalists are aware of the mechanisms at play.

As the **Polish** media system is characterised by a high degree of political parallelism, the way in which journalists treat populism and react to it depends on the political orientation of the media outlet. The situation is complicated by the fact that populists are currently in government in the country. Therefore, public national radio and tv stations are perceived as supporting the current populist government, as well as the radical right-wing media. Some media outlets contrast populism and therefore the populist government ("If a government is populist, a fight against populism is equal to fight against government"). On the one hand, they try to be critical, to do fact-checking, to filter and select information and to avoid a tabloid style close to the populist style. On the other hand, they cannot avoid covering the government and do not ignore the fact that there is a convergence between the populist style and the tabloid one, that increases the audience.

In **Spain**, the simplicity of populists' messages and their emotional charge led them to adapt to the style of news media. The media have systemic incentives to cover populism. At the same time, in Spain media outlets do not perform their role of watchdog. They face a tension between their duty of reporting and not being a megaphone for populists (that is to say, there is a trade-off between pluralism and propaganda). Among the interviewees a non-extreme position prevails: no outlet wants to support openly populists and to disseminate their claims, and a vast majority is not prepared to counter populism in the sense of a *cordon sanitaire*. The majority of outlets, however, tend to treat Vox differently from the others. In this sense they "counter" populism by using journalism's ethical codes (fact-checking); by unveiling their lies, and by the creation of "strong" newspapers.

In **Slovakia**, the majority of outlets, be they commercial or public service media, treat populists like every political actor, that is to say equally and impartially (neutral approach). Yet, there are some liberal mainstream media that, together with some media programmes, seem to challenge populists (e.g. pay more attention to the preparation of interviews, and conduct interviews with them in a more challenging way). Some alternative media, although they do not necessarily openly support populists, for commercial and/or ideological reasons provide some coverage of populist parties and leaders, especially if they are in opposition. Conservative media outlets also occasionally show some affinity to populists, especially of foreign origin, but they see those actors primarily as “conservative” politicians. Since they share the same political orientation, they tend to be less critical towards them.

To sum up, in most cases, we see a convergence of goals (Mazzoleni 2003; 2008) between journalism and populism. They do not share the same political goals but obviously have common interests in cooperation: populists need journalism to be legitimised, or visible; journalism needs populism to secure a large audience.

The most extreme case in terms of **parallelism** is that of Italy, where every news outlet is considered as an echo chamber for populism, and journalists acknowledge the fact that the balance of power between the two leans towards populism. In Spain also, the media are said to fail to play the watchdog role. No one wants to openly support populists and to disseminate their claims, and no one wants to counter populism in the sense of a *cordon sanitaire*. The most **polarised** situation is that of Poland, where populists are in power and where public national radio and tv stations are perceived as supporting the current populist government, as well as the radical right-wing media, while on the contrary some media outlets oppose populism and therefore the populist government. A similar division can be also found in Czechia, although there the public media are considered neutral and balanced by essentially all the journalists interviewed regardless of their professional background. In France some journalists treat populists like other actors (**normalisation**), trying also to convince them to participate in their shows, while others (the leftist ones) build a sort of *cordon sanitaire*. On the contrary, in Slovakia journalists treat populists like any other actor.

In sum, two countries are characterised by parallelism (Italy and Spain), two by polarisation (Czechia and Poland) and one by normalisation (Slovakia). France stands between polarisation and normalisation.

Reasons for the relationship between journalism and populism

In recent years, large media outlets previously owned by foreign investors were bought by wealthy **Czech** businessmen linked to politics (e.g. Babiš, who later became PM). This led to a growth in politicisation, to increased job insecurity (due to the financial difficulties of small media outlets) and to a decline in the quality of journalists’ work, because major business groups also involved in politics control newspapers and their editorial content, often leaning towards populism. These factors can be seen as the cause of the Czech situation of increased **polarisation**. Journalists are caught between the increasing relevance of social media for political communication and outlets’ owners linked to populism: according to one interviewee, in Czechia either you buy your media, or you do away with them and use social media to reach your audience. However, it must be said that although journalists are sometimes criticised by public authorities, the media landscape is free and there is strong protection of journalists and their independence compared with other neighbouring countries.

For some **French** journalists, populists (in particular, journalists refer to Marine Le Pen) cannot be excluded from reports, because they have become as legitimate a part of the system as the other political players (they participate in elections, win seats, etc.). This kind of **normalisation** of populism in France

has been to the benefit of the far right. The reason for the difficult relationship between populists and the media is that populists want journalists to be just megaphones, and journalists try to defend their independent role. This creates conflict, sometime even of a violent nature with activists of populist parties during the field reports.

In **Italy** the main reason for the **close relationship** between populism and journalism lies in the lack of “pure publishers”, that is to say media entrepreneurs active only in the media sector. Historically, in Italy journalists do not fulfil their watchdog role. In Italy there is a crisis of journalism, both in terms of credibility and in economic terms. Therefore, news outlets have to “follow the money”. Populists are compatible with media logic and generate audience. The outcome is that the media need populism and these actors have a disproportionate visibility. But journalists do that **not only in the case of populism**: this is typical of every phenomenon that breaks the routine.

There are mainly two reasons for the relationship between populism and journalism in **Poland**. The first is political: the **political parallelism and political polarisation** characterising the country, worsened by the fact that populists are currently in power in the country. Therefore, each actor has its preferred newspaper, including populists, and media users are aware of that. The second reason is that populist style resonates with a popular/tabloid style of communication, and it attracts audience attention. Populists are therefore attractive to the people. For this reason, journalists face a dilemma between audience and quality content.

In **Spain** there is a lack of trust in the media and populists take advantage of the situation. The economic crisis made the profession more precarious and led to a loss of quality and to an incentive to cover populists, that make audience. The technological revolution and social media offered populists a tool ready to be used and made them the perfect candidates to take advantage to a new style of news reporting. The reason why there is not a shared and general *cordon sanitaire* towards populism in Spain, and of the lack of a watchdog role, is the recent **democratic transition**. Historically, to ensure democracy and **pluralism**, journalists do not criticise the government and do not exclude anyone from reporting.

In **Slovakia** the neutral approach to populism is enabled by the high level of media freedom guaranteed by the government as well as private owners. Paradoxically, the free and fair media system characterised by “the lowest levels of political parallelism, the highest levels of press freedom, and the highest levels of foreign ownership, the highest levels of journalistic professionalism”, did not prevent the rise of populism in the country. The media, while covering corruption and scandals, unwittingly created “a window of opportunity” for the populists. Moreover, online alternative media, and, in particular, Facebook, enable populist politicians to reach the population directly.

In sum, the reasons for the parallelism that characterise Italy and Spain are similar and have to do with the **historical legacy** of the two countries. On the one hand, in Italy there is a lack of “pure publishers”, that is to say media entrepreneurs active only in the media sector; on the other hand, to ensure democracy and pluralism after the recent transition, journalists in Spain do not criticise the government and do not exclude anyone from reporting. In both cases, this results in the lack of the watchdog role. Journalists acknowledge also in both cases an economic crisis in the sector, a precarisation of their jobs that can lead journalists to “follow the money” and increase their audience with the coverage of populism. We can therefore say that their interest in populism is due not only to political but especially to economic considerations. Like other similar subjects that break the routine, populism does attract audience.

As mentioned, Poland in particular and to some extent also Czechia are characterised by **polarisation**. Therefore, each actor has their preferred newspaper, including populists. In Poland, populists are

currently in power in the country, and the fight against populism is equated with the fight against the government: each news outlet plays its role based on its political preferences. On the contrary, in Slovakia, the neutral approach to populism is enabled by the high level of media freedom guaranteed by the government as well as by the presence of private owners.

Finally, in France the situation is divided between journalists that counter populism with a *cordon sanitaire* (the leftist ones with respect to the RN) and a sort of democratic **normalisation** according to which it is impossible to exclude populists that are represented in the assemblies from reports.

6. Conclusion

The empirical evidence from the expert survey and the in-depth interviews provides some indications on the relationship between journalism and populism that can be summarised as follows:

- 1) Expert survey data suggest that a process of **normalisation of populism in news coverage** is underway. This occurs mainly through the inclusion of people-centrism and anti-elitism as a simplified way of accomplishing the information and control functions typical of political journalism.
- 2) The expert survey data also suggest that a second process – **a process of polarisation between news outlets** – is occurring. This polarisation takes place particularly with respect to outgroup ostracism: some news outlets support this orientation, while others actively act to counter it.
- 3) In-depth interviews show not only that **populism** is in the eye of the beholder, but also that its meaning **can be positive (rarely) or negative (often) and is in any case normative**. “Populism” is therefore a typical word and concept in political competition, not only for political actors but also for journalists and news outlets.
- 4) The interviews also suggest that **populism is becoming a constitutive element of contemporary political journalism**. The relationship between journalism and populism is characterised by forms of parallelism, polarisation or normalisation: all these processes lead to the inclusion of populist frames and claims within mainstream media outlets’ political coverage.
- 5) These two sources of data together confirm that the relationship between journalism and populism can be usefully described in terms of **populist disseminator, populist opponent, populist facilitator and detached observer**. Although further studies should be conducted to provide an accurate picture at the level of individual news outlets, this working paper has revealed **important differences between countries**. The news outlets of **Italy and Spain** are best described as examples of “**populist facilitator**”. **Left-wing media in France and pro-opposition media in Poland**, on the other hand, are typically cases of “**populist opponent**”. **Poland’s pro-government news outlets and Czechia’s news outlets owned by populists** clearly play the role of “**populist disseminator**” (sometimes fostering forms of disinformation). Finally, **Slovak news outlets and Czechia’s public news media** are examples of “**detached observers**”.

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Appendix

Table A1. Invitations, responses and number of news outlets evaluated by country

	N Invitations	N Responses	Response rate	N News Outlets Evaluated
Albania	11	4	36.4%	10
Australia	73	10	13.7%	9
Austria	80	20	25.0%	9
Belgium Flemish	101	13	12.9%	7
Belgium French	26	3	11.5%	9
Brazil	45	7	15.6%	9
Bulgaria	23	8	34.8%	10
Canada English	62	9	14.5%	9
Canada French	58	6	10.3%	9
Croatia	36	7	19.4%	8
Czechia	65	19	29.2%	10
Denmark	97	7	7.2%	8
Estonia	36	3	8.3%	9
Finland	76	8	10.5%	8
France	122	20	16.4%	10
Germany	125	20	16.0%	10
Greece	42	11	26.2%	10
Hungary	33	9	27.3%	10
Ireland	26	6	23.1%	10
Italy	91	35	38.5%	11
Japan	43	10	23.3%	8
Lithuania	51	7	13.7%	7
Netherlands	103	7	6.8%	7
Norway	110	8	7.3%	8
Poland	73	19	26.0%	10
Portugal	63	12	19.0%	10
Romania	111	21	18.9%	9
Serbia	14	3	21.4%	10
Slovakia	168	9	5.4%	10
Slovenia	30	4	13.3%	9
Spain	123	37	30.1%	10
Sweden	71	8	11.3%	9
Switzerland French	60	7	11.7%	8
Switzerland German	40	8	20.0%	10
Switzerland Italian	22	5	22.7%	6
Turkey	40	12	30.0%	10
UK	116	18	15.5%	10
US	273	46	16.8%	10
	2,739	466	17.0%	9

Table A2. Reliability measures: Between-coders variance component

Country		People1	People2	Elite1	Elite2	Outgroup1	Outgroup2	LR
Albania	coeff.	0.518	0.186	0.423	0.294	1.245	0.333*	0.534
	S.E.	(0.256)	(0.245)	(0.218)	(0.196)	(0.515)	(0.184)	(0.398)
	Obs.	40	40	40	30	30	20	30
Australia	coeff.	1.089	0.810	0.659	0.845	0.982	1.051	1.223
	S.E.	(0.292)	(0.256)	(0.208)	(0.279)	(0.278)	(0.297)	(0.363)
	Obs.	77	69	76	53	68	65	68
Austria	coeff.	0.528*	0.489**	0.625*	0.634*	0.506***	0.533**	0.968
	S.E.	(0.161)	(0.124)	(0.126)	(0.143)	(0.103)	(0.107)	(0.227)
	Obs.	151	155	152	140	150	151	161
Belgium Flemish	coeff.	0.581*	0.620*	1.150	1.113	1.027	1.102	1.280
	S.E.	(0.153)	(0.149)	(0.252)	(0.249)	(0.221)	(0.246)	(0.353)
	Obs.	77	82	72	71	76	70	79
Belgium French	coeff.	0.550	0.350	0.777	0.277	0.000	0.214	0.562
	S.E.	(0.351)	(0.246)	(0.340)	(0.270)	(0.523)	(0.420)	(0.496)
	Obs.	28	18	16	14	14	13	23
Brazil	coeff.	1.321	1.548	1.026	0.672	0.889	1.256	1.106
	S.E.	(0.378)	(0.429)	(0.370)	(0.254)	(0.323)	(0.401)	(0.358)
	Obs.	51	49	35	34	28	30	50
Bulgaria	coeff.	1.194	1.316	0.978	0.481	0.926	0.865	1.831
	S.E.	(0.341)	(0.384)	(0.309)	(0.232)	(0.284)	(0.268)	(0.566)
	Obs.	75	66	67	68	67	70	79
Canada English	coeff.	1.210	0.895	0.494*	0.740	0.863	0.511*	0.615
	S.E.	(0.302)	(0.247)	(0.150)	(0.191)	(0.216)	(0.140)	(0.224)
	Obs.	66	67	66	65	64	64	65
Canada French	coeff.	0.723	0.564	0.999	1.029	0.988	1.033	1.671
	S.E.	(0.291)	(0.223)	(0.322)	(0.323)	(0.325)	(0.328)	(0.571)
	Obs.	45	45	46	43	45	45	44
Croatia	coeff.	0.917	1.059	0.654	0.457	0.621	0.936	1.233
	S.E.	(0.317)	(0.348)	(0.230)	(0.191)	(0.240)	(0.291)	(0.415)
	Obs.	48	48	48	48	48	48	56
Czechia	coeff.	0.495*	0.556*	0.782	0.741	0.763	0.634	1.494

	S.E.	(0.142)	(0.159)	(0.188)	(0.224)	(0.181)	(0.173)	(0.322)
	Obs.	139	107	106	91	108	98	126
Denmark	coeff.	1.252	0.737	0.976	0.730	0.822	1.035	0.608
	S.E.	(0.355)	(0.230)	(0.287)	(0.254)	(0.249)	(0.305)	(0.360)
	Obs.	52	52	51	51	51	51	52
Estonia	coeff.	0.000	0.764	0.409	0.000	0.148	1.665	0.827
	S.E.	(0.420)	(0.417)	(0.303)	(0.093)	(0.479)	(0.701)	(0.800)
	Obs.	19	19	19		19	19	19
Finland	coeff.	0.762	0.878	0.461*	0.720	0.586	0.631	1.560
	S.E.	(0.218)	(0.249)	(0.165)	(0.212)	(0.181)	(0.207)	(0.456)
	Obs.	48	46	49	47	49	43	48
France	coeff.	0.822	0.931	0.852	1.017	0.496**	0.657	0.636
	S.E.	(0.167)	(0.187)	(0.167)	(0.213)	(0.114)	(0.145)	(0.175)
	Obs.	129	138	129	120	132	123	168
Germany	coeff.	0.639*	0.722	0.875	0.569*	0.685	0.660*	0.884
	S.E.	(0.138)	(0.142)	(0.169)	(0.127)	(0.134)	(0.139)	(0.202)
	Obs.	142	137	142	137	140	126	157
Greece	coeff.	1.127	1.110	0.633	1.057	1.059	1.294	0.513
	S.E.	(0.273)	(0.268)	(0.185)	(0.257)	(0.267)	(0.303)	(0.304)
	Obs.	104	101	103	102	99	101	103
Hungary	coeff.	0.269	0.586	0.389	0.725	0.377*	0.490*	0.702
	S.E.	(0.326)	(0.220)	(0.292)	(0.259)	(0.161)	(0.171)	(0.259)
	Obs.	60	57	59	59	58	57	57
Ireland	coeff.	1.372	0.599	1.387	0.822	1.002	1.050	1.305
	S.E.	(0.404)	(0.194)	(0.412)	(0.276)	(0.363)	(0.387)	(0.490)
	Obs.	51	54	51	44	34	34	46
Italy	coeff.	0.703*	0.830	0.744	0.838	0.632**	0.681*	0.686
	S.E.	(0.107)	(0.127)	(0.112)	(0.121)	(0.0940)	(0.106)	(0.135)
	Obs.	290	269	296	278	291	267	340
Japan	coeff.	0.710	0.804	0.847	0.703	0.943	0.713	1.115
	S.E.	(0.194)	(0.220)	(0.230)	(0.215)	(0.241)	(0.199)	(0.407)
	Obs.	60	55	57	57	54	54	55
Lithuania	coeff.	0.958	0.348	0.856	0.800	0.695	1.037	1.888
	S.E.	(0.302)	(0.217)	(0.311)	(0.270)	(0.230)	(0.314)	(0.640)

	Obs.	42	41	43	42	38	38	35
Netherlands	coeff.	1.130	0.569	1.044	0.924	0.234	0.171*	0.483
	S.E.	(0.335)	(0.236)	(0.304)	(0.285)	(0.177)	(0.153)	(0.564)
	Obs.	39	42	37	36	34	34	42
Norway	coeff.	1.100	0.482*	1.322	1.257	0.821	0.747	0.749
	S.E.	(0.315)	(0.174)	(0.337)	(0.353)	(0.215)	(0.244)	(0.309)
	Obs.	43	44	52	42	50	34	48
Poland	coeff.	0.695	0.731	0.388*	0.258	0.515**	0.787	0.920
	S.E.	(0.156)	(0.153)	(0.179)	(0.236)	(0.112)	(0.166)	(0.235)
	Obs.	178	169	180	167	163	156	173
Portugal	coeff.	0.908	0.967	0.650	0.906	0.921	0.799	1.492
	S.E.	(0.211)	(0.217)	(0.157)	(0.206)	(0.210)	(0.185)	(0.346)
	Obs.	120	118	120	119	120	117	120
Romania	coeff.	0.566*	0.841	0.984	1.002	1.107	1.119	0.898
	S.E.	(0.146)	(0.162)	(0.181)	(0.182)	(0.215)	(0.203)	(0.272)
	Obs.	173	173	164	164	133	131	146
Serbia	coeff.	1.621	0.457	0.000	0.0370	0.849	1.075	0.841
	S.E.	(0.699)	(0.299)	(0.000)	(0.225)	(0.612)	(0.673)	(0.674)
	Obs.	30	28	18	17	15	16	30
Slovakia	coeff.	0.902	0.533	0.738	0.652	0.659	0.792	0.396
	S.E.	(0.243)	(0.176)	(0.226)	(0.179)	(0.191)	(0.233)	(0.404)
	Obs.	80	78	76	76	77	64	69
Slovenia	coeff.	0.231	0.631	0.167	0.318*	0.798	0.592	0.081
	S.E.	(-0.333)	(-0.417)	(-0.386)	(-0.16)	(-0.363)	(-0.327)	(1.270)
	Obs.	30	21	20	21	26	23	26
Spain	coeff.	0.930	1.032	0.878	0.961	0.855	0.973	0.770
	S.E.	(0.124)	(0.132)	(0.125)	(0.134)	(0.111)	(0.131)	(0.120)
	Obs.	323	316	304	302	322	315	354
Sweden	coeff.	0.688	1.138	0.424**	0.834	0.655	0.879	1.324
	S.E.	(0.206)	(0.294)	(0.135)	(0.227)	(0.189)	(0.230)	(0.434)
	Obs.	61	65	66	65	62	64	64
Switzerland French	coeff.	0.566	0.000347	0.444	0.329	0.966	1.310	1.228
	S.E.	(0.293)	(0.205)	(0.245)	(0.363)	(0.277)	(0.405)	(0.431)
	Obs.	37	42	40	38	38	33	39

Switzerland German	coeff.	0.660	0.543	0.853	0.588	0.440*	0.347*	0.000
	S.E.	(0.198)	(0.180)	(0.246)	(0.196)	(0.148)	(0.159)	(0.426)
	Obs.	53	54	54	53	54	53	56
Switzerland Italian	coeff.	0.440	0.697	0.960	0.514	0.537	0.610	0.000
	S.E.	(0.206)	(0.244)	(0.326)	(0.268)	(0.290)	(0.327)	(0.000)
	Obs.	23	22	22	18	23	14	18
Turkey	coeff.	1.005	1.164	0.410	0.586	0.769	0.839	0.824
	S.E.	(0.265)	(0.265)	(0.280)	(0.283)	(0.213)	(0.257)	(0.279)
	Obs.	105	101	95	96	85	81	105
UK	coeff.	0.822	0.923	0.745	0.801	0.459**	0.309***	0.789
	S.E.	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.169)	(0.112)	(0.110)	(0.215)
	Obs.	138	135	134	134	140	140	156
US	coeff.	0.825	0.877	0.811	0.893	0.717**	0.672**	1.069
	S.E.	(0.102)	(0.105)	(0.0981)	(0.106)	(0.0871)	(0.0818)	(0.141)
	Obs.	391	379	388	383	371	354	410
