

*How the couple is observing the couple observing*

*A new model for qualitative process research*

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

In my youth I believed that there is a kind of order, beauty, and honesty in the world of things, in the world of natural events. Such promises, in a climate of incessant fabrications of a totalitarian regime, busy to control and falsify the everyday, were irresistible, so, I was founding myself becoming a physicist. Mathematics and physics, essentially dealing with relations and transformations in their core, helped me a lot in the years to come, mostly as I got closer to other fields of knowledge, which, before the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989, were barred or forbidden, namely psychology (erased as academic discipline in 1980) and psychoanalysis (outlawed, as in any dictatorship).

In Cinema, as screenwriter and film director, I learnt the weight of detail and authenticity, that make possible to build up stories from characters and relations while characters and relations emerged from these stories. Yet, psychoanalysis allowed me eventually to discovered order, beauty, honesty, creativity, and passion beyond the world of things and images. And something more, the meaning of relating, the ‘what’ and ‘how’ from making ‘order out of chaos’.

In its core the present study deals with the idea of relation and relations between relations. How relating transforms an analytic session, from less to more sense. In fact, observing a transformation, while part of it, so the observed change acquires meaning, the ‘what’ that allows and performs transforming and acquiring sense, is a ‘relation’, i.e., a mutual interaction with temporal dimensions, like histories in and potentialities of a here and now.

Change, transformation, learning, and growth, or their failure as ‘what’, as events, are speaking invariably about interrelating, about relations, if ‘why’ or ‘how’

matters. Therefore, from this point of view, the domain under study set by our facts, cannot be the patient alone, or the analyst alone. The area of reality where such an event, i.e., a relation, can be ‘found’ cannot be but within the life of the couple.

### **1.1.REHABILITATION AND “TALKING CURE”**

In the present study, “How the couple is observing the couple observing”, a fundamentally new approach is proposed. Probing if and eventually how the analytic couple participates in the complexities of the analytic process, new topics and issues are revealed, that point far beyond the areas of “talking cure”.

What is reprocessed in detail in the psycho-therapeutic process, in terms of authenticity and opening to the other, is of fundamental importance, not only for psychoanalytic treatment in the narrower sense, but also for many other fields of social activity, e.g., in counseling, in therapies of a different kind, in medical care, but also in educational contexts. (Ahrbeck 2006, 2010)

If the therapeutic process is envisaged as transforming through relating, seen as mutual interrelated processes, then other interrelated forms of interaction, unfolding within a relational field, as learning (e.g., Hillenbrand 2008), i.e., creating educational contexts (or counseling, support, or other forms of therapeutic interventions), could benefit from the proposed non-linear perspective, in that the role of the couple (or of the group) can reveal new details and dimensions in the observational field.

In the late fifties Balint (1956/1964) recognized that much work of family physicians (most of the time in contact with transient states of illnesses) is taken up with psychological issues. Such issues weights more in rehabilitation science and practice, whether it is about coping with disability or about rehabilitative processes in learning, support, counseling, and therapy. Nowadays, when medical practice evolves

towards algorithms, AI, and ever new technologies, equally important is the progression and evolution of relating, of carefully listening to patients, who, now as then, “present themselves to their doctors with overt or covert emotional problems” (Balint et al. 1969, p.251). Learning or counselling encounters similar problems within a world moving towards less actual relating and more mediate interaction.

Psychoanalysis followed a path that begun as one-person psychology, within which only “the patient” provided the ‘material’. Such view revealed an understanding of the why, what, and how of a specific form of mental suffering. A view that asks for more as many recognized in the last decades. What was absent in such perspective and proved that it cannot be escaped but with large (theoretical and practical) costs, was the role of the others in and through the previously “why, what, and how”, including in these others the analyst, either in generating or in containing and transforming mental pain.

Step by step, e.g., considering countertransference or intersubjectivity or the relationship as a basic factor, the conceptualization of the analytic process evolved and arrived at focusing onto communicative practices, thus on detail and process. A new and enlarged perspective has been established, which offers new answers to old challenges. A view which is emerging from within considering the social dimension of interaction. In this way *relating* arrived to occupy the core of the contemporary conceptualizations. As such a new way of understanding the “overt or covert emotional problems” takes place.

The same evolution of perspective (equating a moving of the accent from one to two-person psychologies), seen as a parallel process, applies to the broad areas of rehabilitation and social sciences. Learning, if seen as driven through relating, it could receive a new angle regarding the ways such specific interaction unfolds, i.e., a move from one state to another emerges from and within relating. Considering relating as a



factor, the relation itself contributes to *how* the process unfolds. The sketched path from ‘patient’ to ‘relating’ in psychoanalysis, can be seen as a synecdoche for the rehabilitation field, where knowing the other matters. And even so, we just begun to clarify what a relation is. That is to say that communicative processes, including verbal interaction, within our practices, are only insufficiently clarified.

Understanding a disability (somatic, cognitive, relational, psychic), is the first step in approaching it and such reparatory understanding asks a particular form of relating. It is a widely recognized desideratum that professionals enter into a dialogue with the persons concerned (e.g., Iben, 1988), take them seriously as persons in relation to them and adjust to their inner situation<sup>1</sup>. Relationship work has become a central keyword. It is often demanded and its importance is emphasized, but it is easily overlooked how difficult it is to form relationships in a human and rehabilitative way (Ahrbeck 2006, 2010).

We know today that normal and abnormal are states on a continuum, and not a valency isolated by clear boundaries. Even so, when a disabled child is born, the difficult socio-cultural realities of the family welcoming the child, are hard to imagine. And here, more than in any other field, the social dimension becomes evident.

Relating with another makes our own limits visible to ourselves. When asking “how does someone cope with a disability?” and considering more than one side of the situation, we encounter the one living within a world shaped by one’s disability (shaped also by the others in and by how they are situating themselves) and the one providing support or treatment. Sometimes we face what we already know and hope to avoid, giving course, most of the time unknowingly, to attempts of control, or to

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<sup>1</sup> Such encounters evoke strong counter-transferential responses as mentioned above (e.g., Alvarez and Reid, 1999; Corbett 2014; Korff Sausse 2017) while the transferential movements are filled with unspoken, and not thinkable histories.

eliminate this disabled otherness, that stirs up our own ‘disabilities’ (e.g., Corbett 2014) and arouse an “uncanny strangeness” (Korff Sausse, p. 84). An experience that asks so much work in making it invisible, either as groups of professionals or as individuals. Dealing with “monitoring, understanding, negotiating, and preventing controlling or enmeshed modes of relating, which tend to emerge around disability.” (Watermeyer and Swartz 2008, p. 607) equates unfolding a form of relating within which the potentialities of transformation can manifest.

The knowledge of the social dimension of interaction has expanded immensely in recent decades, but at the same time it has also become clear where more research is needed, where answers and new questions expect to be found.

As will be shown in this study a form of impairment, a stigma (hirsutism), permeates any level of relating, it sets the person in a position of shaping one’s identity in such a way that hiding it becomes definitory. A dysfunctional body, an undeveloped mind, or a mind swept by chaotic developments that dissolve any boundaries, all create a prison house built from anxieties and solitude, yet even if we know that “psychoanalytical psychotherapy is proving to be a valuable treatment for mildly, severely, profoundly and multiply handicapped children and adults and those with dual diagnosis” (Sinason 1989, p.1), the psychotherapeutic help is seldom available.

Speaking about disabilities one opens a field where low self-esteem and solitude are provided in large quantities by the illness and by the environment. Disability is something more than just a need for medical and psychological help, it is also our response to these needs<sup>2</sup>. There are no differences in *how* a person is suffering this or that, (e.g., rejection, control, exclusion), there are differences in *why* these happen, and how and why a history becomes exiled into the areas of not thinkable.

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<sup>2</sup> Corbett (2014) speaks about a “disability transference”, which is “a phenomenon that affects the capacity of the therapist to process thought.” (p.84)

And the contribution of others cannot be minimised, thus a disability is a form of experience that is belonging to a personal, relational, and social conjoining areas.

Addressing “relating” as central cannot escape the realities of various forms of segregating the relationship between who provides care and the cared for, basically a professional defence, which is an important way of dealing with the fact that this work “arouses strong and conflicting feelings: pity, compassion and love; guilt and anxiety; hatred and resentment of the patients who arouse these feelings; envy of the care they receive.” (Menzies-Lyth 1960, p.440) Cutting the links, building ‘ships of fools’ are, as in many other situations, anxiety driven, as “disability evokes anxiety in the observer, which tends to cloud and distort relationships” (Watermeyer, 2012 p.395).

And talking, as in ‘talking cure’, helps (e.g., Sinason 1989, 1991; Beail, 1998; Alim, 2010; Korff Sausse and Scelles, 2017), could provide support and growth. A psychodynamic approach is “proving to be a valuable treatment for mildly, severely, profoundly and multiply handicapped children and adults and those with dual diagnosis” (Sinason 1989, p.1).

Counseling and therapy are genuinely rehabilitative tasks; psychosocial impairments often require psychotherapeutic treatment (Ahrbeck 2006, 2010). The knowledge about this has expanded immensely in the last decades, but at the same time it has become clear where important research gaps exist. These gaps are mainly related to micro-processes in counseling and therapy and to the question of how the therapeutic relationship unfolds and under which conditions.

This is the point of departure for the present work, which thus takes on the character of basic research.

## **1.2. THE ANALYTIC COUPLE, DYAD OR UNIT?**

The role of the analytic couple, in how it was understood and considered in our praxis, was negligible for many decades. Dyadic events or intersubjective enterprises weren't privileged subjects in clinical or theoretical conceptualizations, until recently.

The beginning in our field was unidimensional and unidirectional. Everything was ascribed to the patient (or to the therapist "method"), i.e., one dimension and one direction. Recognizing these as limitations or even as methodological failures, we learnt that "the therapist matters" (e.g., Luborsky et al 1997), and so bidirectionality became something that permeated our understanding regarding process.

When getting close to the session, looking at the material in detail, it appears that there is something more in how the events unfold. A "talking cure" as process, involves more than one mind, more than one voice, and the subjects of the couple, of the analytic fields (Baranger and Baranger 2008, 2009), of the dyads (Stern, 1985; Tronick et al 1998; Tronick 2007; Sander 2008) or of the analytic thirds (Ogden 1994; Benjamin 2004) are areas of description and conceptualization that imply more than the analyst and the patient as parts within the analytic process. All these conceptualizations are pointing at something emerging from interaction, something enfolded within interaction, that in its turn is ongoingly changing the way analyst and patient interact. And many of these conceptualizations expect empirical evidence.

In a dyadic view there are a patient and an analyst, their actions are generating the analytic couple. The couple is enfolded in what they do. In a triadic perspective the couple emerges from relating, and so relating makes a reality, thus generates observable differences in how things unfold while acting onto the patient, the analyst and how they interact. If the analytic couple as unit provides differences in the session, if there are invariants and patterns, then these and other events of the couple ask for

*new models*, i.e., new metaphors, for making *observable* this new layer. Is the analytic process influenced by what and how the analytic couple is? About how the analytic couple evolves? Reformulating: to whom we should credit the *authorship* of such patterns? If the analytic couple is a source of pattern, then it follows that overlooking how and what they are building up together and what role play this making, has a significant provider of sense left out of our observational field.

### **1.3. FROM TAILOR MADE CATEGORIES TO THE FINE GRAIN OF INTERACTION IN PROCESS RESEARCH.**

The process research begun early, emerging naturally from an initial more speculative and romantic move (e.g., Freud and Breuer 1895/1966; Ferenczi 1928), but in the last decades is searching for firmer empirical grounds. Yet these first methodologies, that are set on empirical grounds, mainly based on proposing simple categories to be found in the material (e.g., CCRT<sup>3</sup>, CMP<sup>4</sup>, PERT<sup>5</sup>, etc.), were devised for answering to various questions, e.g., transference, still have their nonnegligible limitations.

It should be noted that process research presents two opposing tendencies in its development (e.g., Buchholz 2019b, p.788), one moving towards reducing the complexity of interaction while the other enriches the complexity, making possible to observe significant patterns and forms of interaction otherwise left outside awareness,

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<sup>3</sup> Central Conflictual Relational Theme, e.g., “The assessment of transference by CCRT Method” Luborsky and Christoph, in Strupp et al (1988) pp.99-109

<sup>4</sup> Central Maladaptive Patterns In “Problem-Treatment-Outcome Congruence: A Principle whose time has come” in Strupp et al (1988) pp.1 -14

<sup>5</sup> In “A Scheme for Coding the Patient’s Experience of the Relationship with the Therapist (PERT): Some Applications, Extensions, and Comparisons” in Strupp et al (1988) pp.67-98

e.g., the role of the analyst. After the efforts of many, the “influence of the therapist on the whole process could no longer be ignored” (Buchholz, op. cit. p.806), and step by step complexity reducing strategies were not so promising any more. The absence of detail makes room for devising categories, at the same time, the same idea of devising categories assumes that a (central relationship) pattern (or whatever other invariant) is consistent across different relationships, also in different interactions within the same relationship, that evaporates the huge number of details.

Regarding the absence of detail, there is more, this time the case is represented by the *specificity* of such detail. Other psychological variables, as well as validity research, suffer from the lack of idiographic information, according to Desmet et al (2020, p.2), and proposing a metric (e.g., CCRT’s - wish, response from other, response of self, is a metric as well as Strupp et al’s CMP’s “action categories” (1) acts of self, (2) expectations about others’ reactions, (3) acts of others toward self, and (4) acts of self toward self, or Hoffman and Gill PERT, that employs classes of communication that are coded so to track allusions to the transference), the authors assert, validity, in capturing a psychological characteristic, fades out, as considering that it is not sufficient to “investigate its relationship with other metrics” it needs to be investigated “the relationship between the measurement outcomes and the qualitative, idiographic descriptions of the characteristic concerned.” (p.2). Regarding the lack of detail and the absence of idiographic information they assert that “this neglect is responsible for the gap between research and practice.” (Desmet et al 2020, p.2).

It should be noted that the imports made in the last decades from various other fields (e.g., linguistics, pragmatics, cognitive linguistics, and sociology) opened the complex field of process research to the complexity of the session, an evolution in detection and utilisation of the fine grain of interaction, that arrived to set the interactional context in a more appropriate position.

It is clearly visible a constant adaptation to the clinical realm of methodologies, methods of inquiry, that originally belonged to other domains, like linguistics and sociology (e.g., Conversation Analysis, e.g., Peräkylä 1997, 2008, 2013; Peräkylä et al 2008; Peräkylä and Sorjonen 2012; Buchholz 2014, 2016, 2021; Buchholz and Kächele 2013, Buchholz, Spiekermann and Kächele 2015) or hard sciences (e.g., Physics, Complexity and Nonlinear dynamic systems theory, e.g., Tronick 2007; Sander 2008; Galatzer-Levy 2017; Seligman 2005) so research and new conceptualizations are creating new and more sophisticated instruments.

The promising results of such efforts are already apt to challenge various one-person psychology clinical concepts or basic principles (e.g., Stern, 1971, 1985 – Freud’s “pleasure principle”, e.g., 1911, see *infra*) and theoretical convictions (e.g., Neutrality, Buchholz 2019), as well as uncovering significant events (e.g., “The study of interactive surface showed something unexpected: it was the patient who directed the therapist’s activities.” Buchholz 2019, p.808) to balance the new hermeneutical vs. empirical debate (e.g., Stern D.B. 2013) in favoring an observational stance, in building up a proper observational field, i.e., sharable with others and so able to be probed. As such, interaction arrives to occupy core of process’ conceptualizations. In his early work, “The first relationship” (1977), Stern shows that the infant is an active stimulus seeker and “build-up of excitement clearly can be pleasurable” (p.84), a finding that did not confirmed Freud’s assumptions (e.g., Freud 1911/1958), that the infant is “needing protection from external stimuli or at best as a passive recipient of stimulation” (p.70) and “that tension build-up is aversive and only tension reduction is pleasurable” (p.85)

Long decades passed for psychoanalysis and process research in attributing only to the patient the place where the analytic process happens (e.g., Buchholz 2019 p.801), until considering that the analyst matters (e.g., Luborsky et al., 1997), or

changing the strategy of research so single case analysis (e.g., Kächele et al. 2009) and interactional approaches, which provided new understandings of process, and eventually that “interaction” or “relation” matters, or that there is more than “interpretation” within promoting change (BPSCG, Stern et al. 1998), etc..

As mentioned before, the path opened by employing the methodological perspective and the tools provided by Conversation Analysis, surfaces as a prominent development. Conversation Analysis has as purpose to “explicate the methods that members of a culture use in accomplishing everyday activities” (Pomerantz, 1990 p.231), yet, it has its own limitations, regarding the questions the clinical practice would ask. The main limitation in approaching the material from a CA perspective is that even if it offers detailed findings regarding interaction “it has nothing to say about the clinical significance of any particular feature of the talk.” (Lepper and Mergenthaler 2007, p.577). Interdisciplinarity seems to be again the answer.

Coming back to ‘counting and coding’, in employment of predetermined categories, for fitting a complex event, e.g., a session or a fragment of a session, within a prearranged set, what steps forward is the lack of detail. In this type of approach that tries to match various categories of interactional sequences with an alive moment of interaction, we arrive at misplacing the complex detail of relating, so sensitive to fine movements. In some cases, the detail of moment-by-moment interaction even vanishes, and the role of the context is minimised.

CCRT, the Core Conflictual Relationship Theme<sup>6</sup>, developed by Lester Luborsky (1977), is one example of a “simplicity belief”. In this methodology a central relationship pattern is understood as a mental representation of interpersonal relationship, along with associated wishes and affects. By selecting categories (e.g.,

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<sup>6</sup> CCRT (and CA, and other) is presented in detail in the Chapter 3, Literature review, 3.2. Process research.



“what the patient wanted from the other people, how the other people reacted, and how the patient reacted to their reactions.” (Luborsky, 2018 p.44), CCRT simplifies the complexity of process, which is desirable, but eliminates the fine grain of detail, and many are lost in this way. Same limitations can be seen in Strupp et al’s CMP or Hoffman and Gill’s PERT, or other (linear) counting and coding methodologies.

The author(s) of CCRT describes this limitation and what is lost through it as avoiding “complex and possibly unreliable methods of scoring” but doing so “we may have forgone some subtle therapeutic factors” (Luborsky and Crits-Christoph 1998/2019 p.704). Within the preestablished sequence, i.e., “i) the wishes, needs or intentions: W; b) the responses from other: RO; and iii) responses of Self: RS.” (Luborsky, 1998/2019, p.91) CCRT, specially designed to focus on recurring relational themes, establishes a “relational episode” within what proves to be a monologic perspective, i.e., the patient *or* the therapist, which it is failing to adopt a two-person, a dialogic or an interpersonal view. From the present point of view, “relation” within a one-person perspective have at least one lose end.

An example for underlying the place of a single detail, within the speech exchange flow, is needed. The case of “yes, *but*...” can illustrate the complexity of what such subtle move is accomplishing in searching for various ends (see *infra*), as in above formulation ‘it simplifies, but loses the detail’.

The dialogical use of “yes, but” received attention from discourse or conversational analysts (e.g., Pomerantz 1984; Antaki and Wetherell 1999) and it is qualifiable as a conversational device for transforming agreement in argument, or disagreement. “But” or “nevertheless” (as well as “oh”, “well”, “okay”, “don’t know”, “nevertheless”, “because”, “now”, “then”, etc.), are qualified as markers (e.g., Pomerantz 1984; Schiffrin 1987), which, according to Schiffrin (1987), “are devices that work on a discourse level: they are not dependent on the smaller units of talk of

which discourse is composed” (p.37), and, from Maschler (1994) perspective, all markers are metalingual (pp. 349-352). The “meta” in his description indicates that there is something involving *how* the participants interact, *how* context evolves and not only with the ‘*what*’, with the content of dialogue. They escape monological categories. Within Bateson’s “theory of play and fantasy” (1972), concerning metacommunication, a marker as “but”, or a construction as “yes, but”, could indicate constrains of interpersonal relations in the discourse (e.g., Maschler 1994 p.328). And this implies a perspective that focuses on interaction, thus on the here and now. It should be underlined that the idea of “constrains of interpersonal relations” does not fit in a monologic approach, it asks, at least, a dialogical one.

Focusing on detail, on the moment-to-moment development of interaction, (and “yes, but” is just one example in many), can offer a level of understanding that a “one-person psychology” or a “tailor-made category” cannot answer to.

Regarding “yes, but”, argument or disagreement cannot belong to *one* person but is born as an interchange between two or more persons. It is a dialogically constructed device; it emerges from interaction and belongs to both participants.

The following fragment is extracted from a larger fragment from “Therapeutic Collaboration. How does it work?” by Lepper and Mergenthaler (2007). Originally it is employed to illustrate a break, a disturbance in between patient and therapist.

T13: People do, you know, everybody, everybody can find everybody you know frustrating, irritating at times and . . .	[proposition]
P14: <b>Well</b> , it’s mainly I suppose (33) my family that I would find fault with.	[concession]
T15: Mmm.	
P16: <b>But</b> then you see, I tend to, which again I, it, I suppose is wrong. I bottle it inside.	[reprise]
T17: Yeah.	
P18: Very often, rather than have a row.	

(Lepper and Mergenthaler 2007, p.582)

The short fragment presents a disagreement, the therapist asks the patient to agree with “everybody can find everybody frustrating” and the patient disagrees.

Pomerantz (1984) underlines two features regarding disagreements, or dispreferred actions, “delaying the stated components of an action being performed and/or producing weakly stated components of that action” (p.75).

The interactional structure of “yes, but” was further developed in “Show Concessions<sup>7</sup>”, where Antaki and Wetherell (1999) proof that within the “yes, but” dialogical forms there is an *invariant* “proposition – concession – reprise” structure, which is described as i“) a challengeable proposition – followed by ii) a concession, a concessionary marker plus evidence against proposition – and iii) reprise, prefaced by ‘but’ (or other “contrastive conjunction”) plus a “recognizable version of proposition” (p.17). This “category”, it is important to underline, belongs to both in its making, it is jointly made.

In ‘T13’ it can be recognized a challengeable proposition. It is followed by a ‘well’, a concession (or a delay), and a ‘but’, yet the reprise seems to be different from the pattern described by Antaki and Wetherell (1999). However, the above structure it is recognizable with a twist. In ‘T13’ the therapist makes a general assertion, that functions as proposition, it employs an ‘everybody’. Following that “everybody”, the patient, in ‘P14’ builds a ‘concession’, “my family”, and in ‘P16’, the reprise, uses an ‘I’. Yet the ‘I’ is employed as an opposition, as a polar pair of the therapist’s generalizations, the negative of ‘everybody’, an “I got angry with nobody”.

If trying to fit the larger sequence, from which the fragment was cut off, within a sequence of CCRT categories, we can write in terms of wishes “to be distant and avoid conflicts”, W, that, as response from the other, RO, gets “understanding and accepting”, and response of the self, RS, probably the sequence will fit the patient within “unreceptive”. Yet the intricacies of the little fragment are lost.

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<sup>7</sup> “show” as in “someone makes a show”

Moving towards detail, Lepper and Mergenthaler (2007) describe the actions performed in T13 as a mitigation. A mitigation “reflexively marks the act in which it occurs as a potentially or actually threatening act” (Caffi, 1999, p. 885 quoted in Lepper and Mergenthaler 2007, p.583). The authors qualify it as such, inferentially, “you”, “me”, and “them” are all under “the indexical everybody, and “everybody” experiences “angry feelings.”” (p.583). What does this mitigation is underlined by authors as “regulating the affective distance” between therapist and patient, “by moving away from “you” and “me” and tacitly marks the potential of his utterance as threatening.” (p.584) From their point of view, in P14, the patient brings an agreement (which here is qualified as concession).

Lepper and Mergenthaler move in their analysis from one’s doings to the other’s doings. If the *structure* is considered, i.e., “proposition – concession – reprise”, it becomes visible that they occupy their places in filling the structure with content, i.e., they disagree, while the content of their dialogue refers to disagreement. Looking at what they do *and* what they say, following patient line 14 “... my family that I would find fault with” while finding faults with him, i.e., disagreeing with therapist, the patient upgrades the therapist from “someone” to “family” (it builds a ‘paradox’ – it gets him closer while distancing, see Buchholz 2007). It results joining what one does and what other does, in forming a unit, e.g., filing a dialogical structure with content. Trying to find what the couple is doing in this “yes, but” form, i.e., linking the content of their dialogue with the action performed through their speech, it can be said that the couple *enacts the content*, they do what they say, while the two speakers construct jointly the three-part structure of “yes, but”. And from such jointly achieved end rises one issue regarding *coding*, if there is a ‘wish’ or a ‘need’ it can’t be attributed to *one*. If there is raised the question of equating a ‘response of the other’ or ‘to self’ with an element from the set of categories, their actions, as they are jointly built, ask for more.

As such a dialogical-doing conflicts with the request of fitting in a monological-category. In fact, the above “constraints of interpersonal relations” are rising the same issue regarding coding, from this point of view a *marker* marks the inapplicability of mapping the material onto the coding set, without losing much, e.g., the contextual production of meaning. As such, not losing the eye for details, (e.g., CA methodology), it can be proved that clinical relevance and more precision in detail can be brought where they belong, together.

#### **1.4.PROCESS AND RELATION**

If the couple partakes in the process of the therapeutic change as an autonomous entity, then this participation should provide observable outcomes, i.e., emergence of pattern.

So, can we find in the data evidence of a “process<sup>8</sup>” that involves the couple as unit? We can say that if there are sequences of events of the session (i.e., belonging to the couple) while unfolding they generate more order, then the entity producing them (i.e., the couple) is self-organized. If there are in these “sequences of events” new observable levels generated by/in the couple for preserving its boundaries while evolving, i.e., adapts to the changes occurred in the environment, then yes<sup>9</sup>, we deal with an autonomous entity able to evolve. A triadic perspective is necessary for observing a self-directing and self-organizing<sup>10</sup> entity, that is creating and continuing a certain organization, i.e., that has an “identity”.

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<sup>8</sup> “The basic idea of process involves the unfolding of a characterizing program through determinate stages.” (Rescher 2000, p. 26)

<sup>9</sup> One such event is organizing narratives and narratives from narratives of the couple, i.e., bi-personal narratives, that emerge from the sentence level of interaction.

<sup>10</sup> A process by which a structure or pattern emerges in the situation (i.e., analytic session) without specifications from the outside environment.

Speaking of boundaries, we are implicitly speaking of forms and processes, and, in our environment, a silence or an utterance<sup>11</sup> or a riddle or a narrative are forms, (i.e., arrangements of events acquiring boundaries in observer ↔ environment interaction), and processes unfolding so patterns emerge in the observational field, e.g., events having recognizable boundaries, building up the evolving environment.

What happens *after* when the session is over? Or, from a different area of experience: “After a symphony is finished, all the notes are gone, what remains? The relationships.” (Sergiu Celibidache, in Fischer et al. 1986, quoted in Boenn 2018, p.11) So, it follows, a relationship is not an entity from which music emanates, but the very domain for its manifestation<sup>12</sup>.

Setting “the relationships” as the answer of “what is → what remains” (including transference as the reverse of it: “what remains → what is”), while questioning the reality of such maker, i.e., the couple, followed “is it so?”, “what facts?”, “how are they produced?”, etc. as a study to be done. If the analytic couple is autonomous, then we should be able to distinguish sequences of events showing that

- A. These events are generated by the analytic couple and belong to the couple’s environment (i.e., the session)
- B. They unfold in such a way that ‘more order’ emerges in the session. As the emergent levels are discernable (according to A), then these sequences of transformations (order → more order), which imply more than one level of manifestation<sup>13</sup>, are organizing the session, i.e., the couple *adapts* to (its own) fluctuations.

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<sup>11</sup> “A sentence is an abstract theoretical entity defined within a theory of grammar, while an utterance is the issuance of a sentence, a sentence-analogue, or sentence-fragment, in an actual context.” (Levinson, 1983 p.18)

<sup>12</sup> Accordingly, the well-known dictum “hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences” (Breuer and Freud 1893, p.7) equates a painful relationship.

<sup>13</sup> As in: “...utterances → narratives → bi-personal narratives...” (see Chapter 5)

In the above “A” and “B” preconditions for showing that we deal with an autonomous entity, “order” equates the outcome of a (self-organized) system of *relations*. Even if obvious it should be noted that order or noise are not a given, but they are achieved. In this system (the analytic couple) “relations” are *doings*, outcomes of interaction (e.g., Enfield 2013, p.9), that are

- i. Enabling the inclusion of all the system’s components into the system, generating as such the *relational content* for existence of the couple (i.e., generates or severs links in between components)
- ii. Create the conditions of the system to function as a system, generating as such the *relational context* for the manifestation of the couple (i.e., generate the background onto which these links arrive to make meaning)

More order equates more links, a growth of complexity, i.e., the fabric of relations becomes denser, and as main result new levels are created through relating.

An ever-changing environment and adapting to it involve a continuous production of sense (the environment is made of verbal interactions), while failing to adapt produces noise. New constrains imply new solutions, interactional deficits and limitations ask for new resources, new forms that answer to these involve new forms and new links emerging from and for them.

A relation implies considering two or more “presences” and what happens with them, as well as how these happenings unfold. Bateson (1979) describes a “relationship” as a “product of a double description” (p.132). Considering ‘presence’, how is modulated (noticed and regulated) the ongoing difference between one presence and the other, and what constitutes such difference represent the stuff from which relating emerges. Bateson, employing binocular vision as an analogy, considers each party as a “monocular view” of what is happening and together they are “giving

a binocular view. This double view is the relationship” (op. cit. p. 132), yet what needs to be considered is that “presence” is temporal in nature.

If ‘relating’ is described as modulating one’s presence in and through the presence of another, we arrive in no time at a circular definition in a linear conceived world. In fact, understanding that ‘relating’ cannot occur outside of considering the making of a new level of the ‘here and now’, and as Bateson analogy proposes, this is happening by adding (i.e., creating) of a new dimension to and from the flux of (intersubjective) events. This natural emergent occurrence of a new dimension, i.e., creating of a new dimension of reality, is the ‘what’ that frees the previous description from the confines of circularity.

Moving up from a view established onto linearity of process to the surface of interaction and an understanding of multiple dimensions of intersubjective events, then relating can be seen as a process and it can be described by intersecting a couple of mutual emergent fluxes building up a ‘surface’: unfolding modulating presence which enfolds relating and unfolding relating that enfolds modulating presence.



## 1.5. DATA

Silences, phonemes, tones, rhythms, words, sentences, turns, narratives, and narratives of narratives are the components of what is defined here as the “environment”, built up from identifiable forms which in and through interaction are performing stable forms. These distinctions drawn in the couple’s environment represents our “data”, they are constituting traces of the events of a session, and through recording and transcribing they are open to analysis as they were generated and not as they were remembered, and this makes a difference.

Teller and Dahl’s (1986) set the data of psychoanalysis in the words of the session, for them if one records and transcribe these words, “re-searching” them “one is rewarded with the discovery of patterns and structures that are indeed there to be found, that are not merely invented or arbitrarily imposed on unwilling data.” (p. 765)

Transcripts of recorded sessions<sup>14</sup> (“the data of psychoanalysis” - Teller 1988, p.166) provide reliable data, even if today we are still employing vignettes to show this or that, even if it is known that such form of evidence is tributary to so many flaws. Merton Gill’s (1994/2000) consideration: “process research should be done with some kind of recording of the original exchange. I believe that transcripts of audio recordings will suffice.” (p. 152) proved to be appropriate.

If every part of the session acquires equal importance in our understanding, each word, each breath, and each silence, then memory alone cannot be the tool for finding evidence. Lustman (1963), describes the lack of evidence (while we do have plenty of hypotheses) by the lack of reliable data: “I consider it peculiar that analysts

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<sup>14</sup> And even so, Kächele (1992) observes that “tape recording within the psychoanalytic community was anathema for many and is still for most” (p. 4), three decades later the observation is still accurate.

who everyday deal with the vagaries of memory would trust their own memories in terms of scientific data” (quoted in Wallerstein and Sampson, 1971 p.19).

Kächele et al (2009) note that “through the introduction of the tape recording in the psychoanalytical situation a new research paradigm was created.” (p.13) A new viewpoint and a new criterion emerged from it, that can be described by the following: “The methodological step that could make psychoanalysis an observational science is not to look behind the surface but onto the surface.” (Buchholz et al. 2015)

An “observational science” is not yet here, (e.g., Buchholz et al 2015; Fonagy 1999/2002), but “a detailed examination of the procedural infrastructure of the conversation can provide observational evidence” (Lepper, 2009, p. 1090).

Observational evidence and data “coloured from the onset by abstract meta-psychological point of view” (Thomä and Kächele, 2007) are poles apart, not citing the Babel of our idioms, “where: (1) the same words name different concepts; (2) the same concepts are named by different words; (3) there are a number of words only validated within the context of a given frame of reference” (Aslan 1989, p. 13).

How “objectivity” is conceived, equates setting what means ‘observation’ as doing or what becomes observation in this or that referential. As such, trying to see what and how is happening in a session, trying to delimitate a shape of things done, to set a conceptual background or a system of reference within which these shapes are discernible, one can ask: there is one “session”, one “process”, one “interaction”, one “analytic couple” or there are many? A lucid observer can say that there are so many “objectivities”, so many contexts whilst “there is more than one drive theory, more than one ego psychology, there are many versions of the object relations theory, and, of course, the number of self-psychological theories and relational theories nearly equals the number of theorists writing them down.” (Buchholz 2017, p.193)

The classical perspective focused onto the patient, held the analyst as an “objective” observer. An objectivity that considered that the observer doesn’t influence the observed or that the act of observation wouldn’t change them both. As such, “reality” was just one. But this wasn’t enough. The analyst as subject of its own observations (e.g., Heimann 1950; Little 1951; Racker 1948, 1957), that is a “new” objectivity, and a new hermeneutic, came into foreground with the advent of countertransference in the mainstream of theory and technique. And these are just a couple of perspectives. Nowadays, either relation or mutuality with their own realities, or process views or the new place research gained, a place that evolved from a research-free perspective towards an “evidence based” one, all shape and enact various ‘objectivities’, prone to be developed further.

“Conversation”, “onto the surface”, implies that an utterance is an action, a doing. The dichotomy hidden/evident is outdone in this view. There is no “geography” recommending maps of meaning in such referential. Such “cartography” has no territories drawn in advance, as the environment is built through interaction, thus changes continuously. If observation matters, then the referential is set *onto the surface*, so “meaning is made”.

As such, the form that this process acquires is

- i) the session as “content” in the session as “context” (conversational) or
- ii) a mind offers the context of manifestation for another mind.

The “methodological step” proposed above could offer a way towards *observing* our events, so facts would be delimited through observational evidence.

### 1.5.1. THE GERMAN SPECIMEN CASE. AMALIA X - DR. THOMÄ

Amalia X is an exception to the fact that “little of our scientific literature consists of case histories intended simply to serve as raw material, accounts rendered as free of bias as possible in order to be analyzed further or studied by others.” (Michels, 2000).

The raw material I employed in this study belongs as well to the analytic couple Amalia X - Dr. Thomä, namely the recorded/transcribed sessions 98<sup>th</sup>, 99<sup>th</sup>, and 152<sup>nd</sup>. They provide through their (recorded) work *the German specimen case* (Thomä and Kächele, 1992; Kächele, Schachter, and Thomä, 2009). Considering Luborsky and Spence (1971, p.426) two folded criteria for “specimen case”, Amalia X answers to both, it is (i) a sample of psychoanalytical work, (ii) recorded and transcribed so made visible and accessible.

Accessibility and visibility for one session, (e.g., session 152 as specimen hour – e.g., Dahl et al. 1988), or for several sessions or for an entire analysis (see infra-2.2.2. Ulm process research group), offer the possibility to disentangle perception and wish and so open new attitudes regarding analytic process.

Amalia X was “the focus of objective and methodologically sophisticated research, leading to findings and discoveries” (Kächele et al 2006, p. 823) and besides this it should be mentioned that such opening do “strengthens the interdisciplinary foundation of psychoanalysis.” (Kächele 2006, p. 812). The session 152<sup>nd</sup> is probably one of the most explored sessions in the last decades and was qualified as an excellent example of psychoanalytical process and technique (e.g., Albani et. al. 2002a; Jimenez et al 2006; Akhtar 2007).

In “The German Specimen Case. Amalia X: Empirical Studies” (Kächele et al 2006) we learn that Amalia X was born in 1939, and at 35 years old she begun a

psychoanalytic treatment with Dr. Helmuth Thomä (517 sessions). The outcome was qualified as having good results.

One can see in the sessions that, for Dr. Thomä, Amalia's competing wishes, phantasies, anxieties and conflicts arrived to be uncovered and addressed in a gentle and empathic manner. Amalia's life story is documented in detail in many works, (e.g., Levy, Ablon and Kächele, 2012; Kächele, Schachter and Thoma, 2009; Kächele et al., 2006; Thoma and Kächele, 1992), here is presented only a short description in a long quote regarding the motive for asking analysis, and a short profile of her. Thomä describes Amalia's reason for analysis (Thomä and Kächele, 2007) as generated by "severe restrictions on her self-esteem" (op. cit. p.79), that entailed depression. Amalia suffered from the "severe strain resulting from her hirsutism", that stigmatized her. On relational plan, other impediments to a rich relational life, according to Dr. Thomä, were due to compulsion neurosis and anxiety neurosis. She "was hard-working in her career, cultivated, single and quite feminine despite her stigma." (op. cit.p.79)

For Dr. Thomä (1997) session 152<sup>nd</sup> is an example of "the patient's identification with the function of the analyst", a complex process in the way structural changes arrive to be achieved. Akhtar (2007) in "Diversity without a fanfare", underlines Thomä's equanimity, his "respect for restraining and modulating the desire to interpret" (p. 697), and that under the understanding that "development is not once and for all; it is constant, ongoing, and often subtle" (p. 697). Commenting the material presented by Thomä at New Orleans (1994), i.e., Amalia X sessions 152/153, Akhtar adds that "Dr. Thomä advances a working stance that accommodates discipline and spontaneity, tradition and freedom, and by implication, both the prose and the poetry of our clinical enterprise." (p. 698).

## 1.6. NEXT LEVEL EVENTS

What kind of events are supposed to be found? Bion, while at the Tavistock on July 5<sup>th</sup>, 1978, describes the following one:

“The child had drawn a picture and told me it was a house and a tree.

On the other side of the piece of paper was a meaningless scribble, but if I held that picture up to the light, then the meaningless scribble shone through the paper and the picture was quite different; it was somebody watering a plant.” (Bion, 2014, Vol IX, p. 65)

“Somebody watering a plant” is a *next level (emergent) event*, neither on one side nor on the other side of the paper. For achieving this, i.e., observing a next level event, it is hypothesized that we need to keep the fabric of speech in the light of the couple, i.e., keeping both sides of the paper as *one* paper. It should be noted that “somebody watering a plant” is also data enfolded in the data.

On one side of speech events expected to be found, we have an action (speaking) on the other side of speech event we have another action (listening) and keeping both in the same light we arrive at “somebody watering a plant” on the fabric of speech. This *next level event* should include *how* a conversation event, seen as observational tool, functions for a conversational event, how “‘words’ are observed through ‘words’”. Another example is found in Thomä’s (1997) description of his *new* understanding of the here and now of transference:

“(…) I had missed a transference interpretation about a day-residue of a dream. Amalia had picked up my idiosyncratic speech acts, which were far from being as clear, distinct and short as an interpretation should be! Quite often I look for the most fitting words, starting anew,

changing sentences halfway etc. In Amalia's dream, a drunken man was stammering and expressed himself in a strange way." (p.22)

The dream of a drunken man while being understood by Thomä in the above terms can be seen as "somebody watering a plant" which is present on both sides of relating, of being with. A realization of something that was there, in front of them.

As such, when asking "what is this?" if completely new, unseen by then, a *new* metaphor needs to be added, if this something arrives to make sense. In the above example is the Thomä's *new* understanding, that is "transference interpreted in the view of plausibility in the here and now" (Thomä 1997, p.22).

"Plausibility in the here and now" is a source for a new metaphor, which affords new events (i.e., new realities) to be discriminated in the environment (Buchholz, 2014). Thomä's understanding of Amalia's understanding was a *next level event*, a bi-personal one even if not a couple's event in the here and now.

Without Thomä's understanding, the above event couldn't be qualified as a next level event. One hypothesis regarding such event is that we can observe it if the *observing tool* has the same "dimension" as the event searched for. The "stammering drunken man" could be a regular occurrence. How can we "see" it?

For 'observing' a couple's event, methodologically, we employ the couple doings (the session) mirrored onto the couple doings (the session). In fact, an event that points at another event from a different time of the session, that provides a functionally equivalent form (as in the case of the drunken man character), is the first step towards a possible representation build up onto observation.

From the description "observation necessitates presence" follows: i) I cannot observe a yesterday event, I can remember it. ii) I cannot observe a tomorrow event, I can imagine it. But I need *both* for adapting to what is, i.e., a theory and a hypothesis so to say. So, we arrive at iii) a "present interaction" along with "memory" and

“expectation” is what shapes “observing”, which is a “here and now” being. A development of “metaphor ↔ observer ↔ environment”. In different words to “observe” implies “making oneself present” (“theory ← observation → hypothesis” as unit, or “metaphor ← making a distinction → expectation” as *unitary* event). An example: In telling the story of Katarina, in *Studies on Hysteria* (1893/1895), Freud describes such an everyday event:

“I was so lost in thought that at first I did not connect it with myself when these words reached my ears: ‘Are you a doctor, sir?’ (...) Coming to myself I replied: - ‘Yes, I’m a doctor: but - how did you know that?’” (p. 125)

That can be read as: to answer to another, one has to come back to oneself. Observing is a doing, that is performed by the participants, including the couple. Observing is an event happening with and to both, one asks for being seen while seeing. If segregating observer and observed, if not considering it as an event happening with and to both, then “observation” cannot describe the happening of that interaction, e.g., one cannot come back to oneself. That is to say “... the therapist as a ‘causal agent’, who does therapy by ‘applying interventions’, eliminates the therapist’s presence.” (Buchholz, 2020 p. 187) Thomä’s example of “plausibility in the here and now” asserts a similar “making oneself present” idea.

If the observer is segregated from observed, no meaning emerges, is a way to freeze the whole process<sup>15</sup>. Like in “if the patient is silent then resistance is at work” if unquestioned then leads to ‘*applying interventions*’. This idea is avoiding the entire semantic of silence (e.g., Gill, 1991 or Goffman’s “the natural home of speech is one

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<sup>15</sup> Implicit in this is the idea that an “event” is a wanderer in a field of meanings. It means also *what* the analytic couple arrives to do with that event in relation with other events (i.e., *how*).



in which speech is not always present” – 1964, p.135), and the complexities of context and relating. In such a case, of applying interventions, an absence of speech entails an absence of presence, done for avoiding understanding of the present moment.

A rigid approach (noted and labelled by mapping the event onto a “theory”), equates with forgetting that we deal with *operational concepts* (Loewald, 1971). An operational concept, e.g., resistance, repetition, or transference, is an organizing principle, “gradually distilled out of the events when investigated in a certain perspective” (Loewald, op. cit.). That is, an underlying structure of ideas (or beliefs) regarding *how* something works, a puzzle.

Accordingly, observing equates making distinctions within the observational field, from which meaning is made. The environment and delimitating a “fact” or making a “field of observation” implies i) an observer who is open to, makes oneself present to, ii) a corpus of data, and iii) a set of tools for transforming these data, a mapping device, a metaphor<sup>16</sup>.

The previous idea, of “meeting of minds” either as a description of “joint attention” (Bruner, 1985) or as engine for “mutual understanding” (Loewald, 1979), both are involving a mutual engagement, and Freud’s discovery that wish and perception “partially coincide” (Bateson, 1951 in Ruesch and Bateson, p.200) is to be considered, at least when “observation” is questioned.

In this study, a *meeting of minds* is a “system of reference” (SR) in addressing the question of “interaction” (previously we were employing another frame, i.e., a mind observes another mind). In a “talking cure”, the domain where ‘change’ happens, we can employ either this system of reference – “*by words*” or a different SR, which is “conversation” - “*in words*”. A system of reference, either “meeting of minds” or

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<sup>16</sup> “Chaos: making a new science” Gleick (1987) quotes Robert Shaw as saying: “you don’t see something until you have the right metaphor to perceive it” (p. 262)

“conversation” allows a sense to emerge by unfolding of a “metaphor ← making a distinction → expectation” performance.

While noting a major controversy regarding subjectivity, which is set in between “hermeneutics” and “science”, a controversy which is qualified as responsible for the absence of a research paradigm, Buchholz and Kächele (2013) advance an invitation to consider the conceptualization of *process* within the “social patterns of relating and affiliating” (p.25). We witness a new step forward regarding process considering these interactive encounters, or couple’s works, as part of the process of change. As such considering the social dimension Buchholz and Kächele (2013) advance the following definition:

“Psychoanalysis and its clinical facts are locally produced, naturally organized, reflectively accountable, ongoing in practical achievement, always, only, exactly and entirely, by participants’ work in and during sessions - this is the fundamental phenomenon.” (p. 24)

We see in the above definition a movement from a pair of activities (patient - analyst) to a sequence of dyadic doings, of participants’ work. In “conversation” we met an intersubjective created world, or even a couple as unit, a temporary generated and shared field of doings. This shared field invites observation to provide distinctions while making them. Asking “who” produces, organizes, etc. the answer is “participants”. Is the analytic couple one of them?

One criterion for delimitating the domain is given by the “observable” events and a proper order of actions, i.e., observation leads to description and eventually to explanation. As such it is worth borrowing the Conversation Analysis’ methodological standard: “observing something and reporting about it in such a fashion that other people can in principle independently check up on it” (Wilson, 2012 p.219).”

## 1.7. ARITHMETIC OF THE COUPLE

In the following it is proposed a form of condensing the works of the couple, according to what they mutually accomplish or what they are doing together. The model answers what happens with the couple through a set of four descriptive equations, which are emerging from *how* interaction unfolds.

A couple could function, regarding the order acquired, within a continuum of potential outcomes. These can be written in a simple form, as a base, from which a continuum could be created. So, an “arithmetic of the couple” (Buchholz, personal communication, July 13<sup>th</sup>, 2020) could be formulated as following:

a)  $1 + 1 = 0$

b)  $1 + 1 = 1$

c)  $1 + 1 = 2$

d)  $1 + 1 = 3$

The range of the above set covers the whole spectrum of “order making” that begins at “no order”, travels the lands of rigid transformations and ends at “more order created”, i.e., from destruction to creation of links.

The “+” and “=” employed in the above equations are designating processes, links. The set of four equations satisfies the conditions (i. and ii.) presented in subchapter 1.2. regarding the relational content and relational context. The 0, 1, 2 and 3 describe them, they label *how* the system works and offers the context for understanding *what* “+” means for this or that couple. “+” plays as a variable link, i.e., expecting a content which is provided by how “1 + 1” unfolds or what “1 + 1” enfolds.

In different words the analyst and patient mutually define themselves in/by relation, through what they jointly build and develop through relating, either towards or against or away from each other. These are seen as evolutions of the *couple*

(relations as content, as *what*) as well as the relational domain that the couple generates (produced through *how* the actions of the couple unfold).

As such we deal in a) with a couple that unfolds its doings in such a way that each member annihilates the other's potential, so the couple is seen in the business of noise making. The zero stays for noise (no order, no links allowed to emerge, no meaning making), qualifies "+" as noise making, and so we deal with a relational context that cannot feed the emergence of links<sup>17</sup> but their continuous severance if there are ones. Such couple makes the contact of the couple with the reality of the couple an impossibility. The domains of psychotic breakdowns or severe trauma belong to this form, the subjects annihilate themselves in a mutual self-deception or self-annihilation.

In "b" the links are generated within/by the couple in such a way that the system advances so one participant of the couple is visible while the other vanishes (a "1" becomes a "0"). In terms of how the couple behaves we can say that the couple makes "invisible" one of its components, as in a form of control (e.g., masochistic) one is engulfed in the other and vanishes in a symbiotic or narcissistic movement or orchestrates various politics (i.e., the couple uses power plots as organizers of interaction). That is " $1 + 1 = 1$ ". There is no growth, no conflict, no individuation but stagnation. Perversion, seduction, or control is employing such a domain and pattern.

Moving further, to c) we encounter a couple into which both constituents are equivalent in strength, in dominance, etc. Rivalry is a proper denomination of such equation. There is no change, no progress, or no regress either (as in b), there is making of "stagnation" or achieving "rigidity" through a lot of work, the "tug of war" balance

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<sup>17</sup> In Bion's parlance (e.g., *Catastrophic Change* 1966, in 2014 Vol. VI, pp.28-43) we deal here with a parasitic couple, in "b" we encounter the couple organized by a symbiotic link, a commensal is seen in "d".

or “tense indifference” as production of relating. In this equation the “politics of the couple” are ways through which “power struggles” generate rigid lack of progression. So, “ $1 + 1 = 2$ ” describes the struggle to achieve an absence of change. It describes a “neurotic” couple if we describe neurosis as the manner a couple turns on itself for not adapting to environment.

In terms of potential transformations, we encounter all possibilities described above (‘a’, ‘b’ or ‘d’) either growth (“d”) or decompensation, regress (“a” and “b”). “ $1 + 1 = 2$ ” as a description of “rivalry” or “conflict” (i.e., participants set on polar positions) involves also avoiding intimacy (when participants share one side). If “intimacy” arrives to manifest through the couple’s works, then we see a movement from c) to d), a transformation of the “pair of opponents” in a “creative couple”.

Thus, we arrive at “d”, at “ $1 + 1 = 3$ ”. This equation is a way of describing “something more” (e.g., The Process of Change Study Group, Stern et al, 1998), the “plus” that is created by how the analytic couple evolves, or how the patient *and* analyst create a new level of existence, the analytic couple as creative being.

The fourth situation, “d”, describes in the most succinct way what the present research probes. That is the analytic couple has the potential of “making distinctions” in the environment of the couple (observing), that brings adaptation and growth.

Comparing “c” with “d” implicit in the difference is that “creativity” ( $2 \rightarrow 3$ ) implicates “intimacy<sup>18</sup>”, the stuff from which “being with” is made of, whilst “rigidity” implicates “conflict” or “control”.

A note regarding the equations above, following the doings of the analytic couple, we arrive at a pair of classes that build up the four equations. That is the couple

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<sup>18</sup> Balint’s (1968) “harmonious interpenetrating mix-up” (p. 66) circumscribes a description of intimacy. For Akhtar (2019) “intimacy, by definition, means psychological integrity, interactional transparency, emotional truthfulness and mutual trust”. (p.15)

behaves building up “symmetrical links” (based on similarities) and the couple behaves generating “complementarity links” (based on differences). Considering first and last equation, “a” and “d”, the principle at work is “symmetry”. Both members of the couple are either subtracting (something less, noise production) or adding (something more, meaning making) to the couple, yet for such unfolding to happen (either in negative or in positive unfolding) the couple needs to be symmetrical. Thus what “organizes” the couple is “symmetry”.

The second and third equations describe actions of the couple under the organizing principle of “complementarity” (e.g., Sullivan<sup>19</sup>, 1953; Bateson, 1979), the participants are turning against, one is adding, the other subtracting (in second equation, b) or both are adding *and* subtracting (in the third one, c).

If “rivalry” describes what the couple does to itself, each member of the couple tries to obliterate the other (subtracting) while affirming oneself (adding), the engine of such unfolding of actions is simultaneity of availability of a specific “reason”. So, each member of the couple tries to change a “c” either into a “b” (conflict → control) (or into a “d”, conflict → cooperation).

Competition, as a benign form, is arising through simultaneity of availability for each member of a set of limited (needed or wanted) elements. Within such system the limited number of elements, i.e. the prize, for which the competitors are contending is what matters most. In the case of conflict what matters most is eliminating the other. Thus, the couple presents a situation in which both parts are each the negative of the other. Domination – submission, dependence - nurturance (b) or rivalry, conflict, competition (c) are the examples of such practices, which are acting as organizers in

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<sup>19</sup> Sullivan (1953) describes complementary relationships pairs (control/affiliation), unfolding in patterns of friendly submissiveness meeting with friendly domineeringness, in generating a harmonious balance.

providing structure and function. As such the couple in symmetrical composition either heads up for destruction or for growth while in complementary positions it heads up for control or conflict (rigidity).

These descriptions differ from those made by Bateson (1979), who identified symmetry as “those forms of interaction that could be described in terms of competition, rivalry, mutual emulation, and so on,” and complementarity as “interactional sequences in which the actions of A and B were different but mutually fitted each other (e.g., dominance-submission, exhibition-spectatorship, dependence-nurturance)” (p. 208). In Bateson’s perspective what defines “symmetry” includes the third equation, (c). In his definition symmetry and complementarity are qualified by the “signs” the actors acquire in and by interaction, while contrasted with the other (doing the same or doing different actions – a what).

In the current description symmetry and complementarity are attributes describing *how* the couple achieves a specific *what* of the couple, a pattern, or a new level of organization (adding or subtracting). So, on one side is “what the participants are doing?” on the other side we answer to “how and into what the couple evolves?”.

If we don’t consider simultaneity of availability of “resources” (and only succession) then “c” would enter the other class (of symmetry principle) and the implicit oscillation that keeps the couple stagnant is silenced. Yet, what defines the situation that the couple performs is an “either – or” situation, for both at the same time. Considering the dialectics promoted by symmetry-complementarity, a new description of the “doings of the couple” results.

### 1.7.1. A DRIFTING SILENCE

In the beginning of the session 98<sup>th</sup> from the German specimen case, Amalia is recounting a couple of dreams, one which was forgotten and remembered after the previous session, and the second one that was dreamed the night before the session (Transcript of the entire 98<sup>th</sup> session is found in Annex 4). The last night dream is the main subject of Amalia's associations, the forgotten dream is also present.

583. P: no, I rather believe, that is, the ashamedness is there, (-) for  
584. the last time I, (.) when I (.) think back,  
585. was quite embarrassed when it came about the dreams, (---) yes,  
586. I was quite embarrassed by that I guess. (2.0) and just because  
587. you sat at the table as well, you know, (---) that's rather the  
588. way I see it. (1.5) that I was ashamed of my  
589. mother. (1.0) or of myself, in this case that's the same.  
590. (10.0)  
591. (P sighs)  
592. (5.0)  
593. T: in the, in the forgotten dream piece there is a another  
594. uh, (-) piece (-) of the loss of control, that would be, uh, (---)  
595. the topic remaining between this and the protein- uh, -  
596. P: yes.  
597. T: the (-) protein excretion.  
598. P: uh, (1.2) that was loss of control? you mean in the forgotten  
599. piece with the hairs?  
600. T: no, in the forgotten piece which you now, uh, remember or  
601. which you remembered afterwards, that is that the mother loses control.  
602. P: oh no, oh no, then I did, then I recounted that, uh, (-) too  
603. quickly. no, the forgotten piece was (---) the one with the  
604. hairs.  
605. T: I see.  
606. P: when I stood in front of the mirror and had this wet hair.  
607. T: mh. ah, that piece.

(Transcript/Translation J. Bergmann)

There are several levels embedded in this fragment, a form<sup>20</sup> echoes another form that echoes another form..., a sequence, i.e., “a course of action implemented through talk” (Schegloff 2007, p.9), that generates a layering effect, through the links produced in mirroring, i.e., sequences replicating sequences. An effect that emerges in

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<sup>20</sup> Arrangements of actions in a particular sequence, e.g., “recollection → embarrassment → silence” is a form.



and from the content context interaction<sup>21</sup>. In the following are considered what one does, what the other does, and what they do as a couple.

a) Amalia is intermingling one feeling of shame related to telling dreams with the feeling of shame regarding “mother is losing control”<sup>22</sup> from the dream told, a feeling embedded within a feeling (shame). Thomä’s presence (lines 593/601) offers the reason why (now or/and then), as such Amalia answers to “by whom?” (Thomä) and “for whom?” (Mother) is this embarrassment felt then and now. As such Amalia forms a pair (Mother and Thomä), intermingling several characters (from the dream and from the session). Regarding that embarrassment (in the dream) and this embarrassment (in the session), either one engenders a “silence” or a “stillness” within their interaction (e.g., lines 590-592), part of “recollection → embarrassment → silence” form (it can be said that the couple is producing a momentary lapse of words, while embarrassment is a factor of relating).

“Losing control” (the theme approached by Thomä) engenders for participants either “conflict” ( $1 + 1 = 2$ ) or “subjugating” ( $1 + 1 = 1$ ), i.e., on the complementary side of the arithmetic, and, as Amalia is sliding into silence, through this silence she conveys an echo of a dreamt “ $1 + 1 = 1$ ” form, as in realizing (lines 588/589): I was ashamed of my mother. (1) or of myself, in this case that’s the same.

“Losing control” entails “subjugating”, following Amalia’s description of no difference, of erasing limits, of a “ $1 + 1 = 1$ ”. What characterizes such interaction is doing “overpowering”, so “losing control” is in the end a form of “performing

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<sup>21</sup> Focusing on a specific verbal action, and considering the question “what does it mean?”, it can be distinguished: 1) What is Amalia or Thomä saying? (Literal meaning) 2) What is Amalia or Thomä intending to communicate? (Conveyed meaning) 3) What is Amalia *and* Thomä trying to do? (Mutual meaning).

<sup>22</sup> The fragment from the dream: (173-179) “... then my mother started and that was really peculiar. my mother (1.5) spoke (-) in an incredibly explosive and aggressive (.) way, thereby also railing against these facilities”

control”. The moment of silence conveys either the feeling of sinking under the spells of a subjugating feeling, e.g., shame, that surges and takes her over ( $1 + 1 = 1$ , second “1” is mother), or an accumulation of a need to control her object, to take over the object (also a  $1 + 1 = 1$ , second “1” is Thomä), or both<sup>23</sup>.

b) Thomä in his turn “echoes” her, a mirror into which he is engaging several layers of now and then (that dream and this dream, the forgotten dream with the last night dream, a losing control with another losing control), a double reflection, in content and form. His doings with dreams mirror her doings with feelings.

A former dream is summoned (i.e., protein excretion), that opens the subject of “a lost part” within the main “losing control” theme, that is linked with the forgotten dream, recollected today (i.e., Amalia looks at herself in the mirror, sees empty spots as from behind), which also has a “lost part” in it (e.g., strands of hair), i.e., Thomä begins to build up a “complex facility” of “lost parts” → “losing control” or of forgotten emotional experiences. In fact, “performing control” equates *erasing*, generating lost parts, thus his relating of dreams appears to address a “losing control”, a “ $1 + 1 = 1$ ” by attempting a cooperation, a “ $1 + 1 = 3$ ”, yet arrives at “losing the dreams”. Thomä is setting himself within these “conjoining dreams” on the verge of confounding them (detected and employed forthwith by Amalia), as such, a new layer emerges, he is apparently “losing the dreams” when talking of “losing control”. So, ‘linking lost parts’ becomes ‘a part of lost links’<sup>24</sup>.

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<sup>23</sup> If hirsutism is considered, it can be hypothesized that there is a more subtle layer manifest, i.e., that experience extends into the life of the couple, into this experience, shaping it for knowing it.

<sup>24</sup> As will be clear Thomä, from a dyadic view, addresses “losing control” or anger, while the couple, in a triadic view, enacts “embarrassment” or “shame”. i.e., they are re-making the previous “recollection → embarrassment → silence”, setting in motion the reverse of what he is speaking about, i.e., “losing control” → “lost parts”.

c) Amalia is straightaway “repairing” the “mistake” by clarifying what dream and when was made (the question from line 598 could generate confusion, and it does), bringing all in the present of interaction, collapsing all the layers proposed by Thomä into a layer of now, by playing that this misunderstanding is *her* doing (appropriating this misunderstanding she occupies the place of the object, abandoning herself as subject, as such submits Thomä’s attempt to developing a link to failure) as she didn’t pause in between (so no distinction) which in fact is not the case. The symmetrical trial is reshaped into a complementary unfolding of relating. Collapsing the layers and severing the potential links in a sudden and subtle move (598/599) cannot be seen as a form of cooperation, of a symmetric “ $1 + 1 = 3$ ”, e.g., as in continuing other one’s lines of thinking, enriching, or elaborating onto them. At this time Amalia is taking his ‘place’ by taking the blame, as she is trading an “embarrassment” for “blame”, while and by rerouting the couple for a different relational flux, e.g., “ $1 + 1 = 1$ ”.

If the outcome is considered (‘linking lost parts’ becomes ‘a part of lost links’), Amalia promotes and achieves a *form of control* that mimics “cooperation”. What she does is a semantic flattening, severing links for “constructing” a “no-construction site”.

Thomä’s planned “facilities” became, within her re-routing of the relational field, remains of a forgotten blueprint. His “verbal facilities” are not allowed to be built, they are converted in “psychological remarks”<sup>25</sup>, devoid of intended effect.

Silence, as part of a more complex form of interaction, i.e., “recollection → embarrassment → silence”, drifts in between, from one to the other, indicates that a

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<sup>25</sup> Thomä as a character at the table (See Annex 3 lines 152-171) “always passed some kind of psychological remarks (P laughs) ... and these were always accepted by all and, and however, mostly it were very odd things. you said, (--) were these plans, were these plans made by a woman (---) and then the guy of the local council said yes. And then you said, yes this was deducible...”

complex progression is unfolding. Are Amalia and Thomä as couple re-staging a part of the dream? Is this an “enactment of content” by the analytic couple?

The partial outcome is that Amalia arrives with Thomä to remake a state described in the dream (lines 174 - 176), and, at the same time, to perform “repairing mother’s image” (lines 178 - 184):

171. P: (...) army facility. (---) and (-) then my mother started and that  
172. was really peculiar. my mother (1.5) spoke (-) in an incredibly  
173. explosive and aggressive (.) way, thereby also railing against these  
174. facilities, I can’t put it differently and I was getting more and more  
175. quiet and (-) it was becoming more and more peculiar and (3.0) I  
176. then I just said nothing anymore and the peculiar just is, (---) in  
177. the cold light of the day, I guess I actually did, (---) well, we spoke  
178. of, of control and of all these things. (---) somehow, I transferred  
179. that to my mother in the dream, didn’t I, (---) projected it onto her  
180. in a way and didn’t want to be the one losing control, (-) as my  
181. mother would never be so, (1.0) uhm, in such a council and stuff,  
182. well, she can be very explosive, but (-) in such a circle she certainly  
183. wouldn’t be that way. (---) it’s certainly not her nature (2.0) rather  
184. (-) if she felt familiarly comfortable then she would explode.

(Transcript/Translation J. Bergmann)

The above details qualify the fragment from 583 to 607 as a plausible next-level-event, i.e., a content of one (e.g., the dream and the comments from the above quoted fragment) is enfolded by the couple, enacting it. What supports such assertion?

i) In the first movement (lines 171-184) Amalia builds a form, subsequently Thomä employs the same form (lines 593 – 604), linking an event of a former session with a similar event of today. In terms of couple’s doings this recursive move is a *mirroring*, a single move.

ii) When Amalia attempts to “repair” the so-called misunderstanding or misplacement of dreams, there is an *interruption* followed by a *reversed* analytic game, i.e., she is “repairing” his thinking, his understanding. The arrangement of actions stays the same (“recollection → embarrassment → silence”), as such a new *mirroring*, more complex, is what characterizes their doings as a couple.

Within and through their changing places, it can be hypothesized that a subtle form of “control” is at work (complementarity), yet it is installed within performing the opposite relational form (cooperation, symmetry). The previous form “recollection → embarrassment → silence” (that lowers the level of order) when changing the referential (from dyadic to triadic perspective) converts the sequence into a new form, “mirroring → enactment of content → interpreting”, (that rises the level of order). The previous paradox (i.e., cooperation thus control) vanishes.

iii) It can be stated that the feeling of embarrassment journeys, moves from one level to the next. From Amalia to Thomä, it arrives to manifest as a happening of the couple. In the same flux of transformations, part of such enactment of content, is silence, drifting in between as well. Changing places must do something with this state that travels and links one relational sequence with the next one.

Thomä enters an embarrassing situation, as such Amalia is ‘repairing’ him as she did with the dream mother – performing “the object enters an embarrassing situation → the subject is repairing it through taking the blame onto herself”.

So “Amalia repairs mother’s image” offers the blueprint for “Amalia repairs Thomä’s confusion” (which is a recursion, thus the couple performs a mirroring, instilling the mother role for Thomä). It is notable that in the dream Amalia “explodes” and afterwards mother bursts in resentment, in the session Amalia feels embarrassed and this is followed by Thomä who enters an embarrassing situation. And that while the feeling (embarrassment) and the acting (exploding) have a common denominator, or a common experiential shape, i.e., both are installed in an abrupt way and have a slow return to an ease.

So, some questions arise: Is the analytic couple twinning in their doings the pair formed from Thomä and Mother (as shaped by Amalia)? Is there a more complex mirroring at work (i.e., enactment of content has in its turn layers as well), that makes

from a pair (in the dream) a source of pattern, of organization, for another pair (from the session)? If Thomä is silenced (thus the form is completed), and he is, after Amalia continues to clarify what and when (following Amalia's explanations there are 14 seconds of silence in Thomä's speech, lines 634 – 643 below), then the previous equation, "subjugation entails silence" which is " $1 + 1 = 1$ ", becomes a plausible description for what they are setting into motion, i.e., a "recollection → embarrassment → silence" form.

608. P: that was the forgotten piece, yes. however, I didn't make a pause  
and, and(.) and the one with the mother (.) and the table-
609. T: yes.
610. P: (-) was something totally different. this was a dream that I-
611. T: yea, mh.
612. (2.3)
613. P: had yesterday night. and the one with the protein, that already  
dates back much (-) longer.
614. T: mh, okay, mh.
615. (14.0)
616. and in the hair dream, you had your hair, your scalp hair as you, you  
have it, just wet
617. P: yes.

(Transcript/Translation J. Bergmann)

As much as Amalia underlines his confusion, e.g., "something totally different", Thomä slips into silence, first for 2,3 s. and afterwards he gives course to 14 s. within his strand of talk. This slipping into silence mirrors Amalia in performing "more and more quiet and (-) it was becoming more and more peculiar". This interruption is also followed by changing his previous course, i.e., linking, now he tries to clarify himself and let Amalia to supply the answers. A new form of relating emerges. This form answers also to the previous question regarding pairs, combined in a transfer of pattern from one to the other. Thomä - Mother pair functions as "content" within Amalia and Thomä sequence, so the couple unfolds in this intricate way an "enacting of content".

There is a "recollection", performed by the couple (they act as she acts with mother image), that entails a sudden introduction of a disturbing event (limits erased

through confusion, semantic layers are flattened), which is followed by a silence, instead of nurturing an emergent sense.

The form “recollection  $\rightarrow$  embarrassment  $\rightarrow$  silence” (in one person psychology), if transmuted into an isomorphic bi-personal sequence of actions becomes: “mirroring  $\rightarrow$  erasing limits  $\rightarrow$  silence”. In terms of “couple’s doings” the following sequence of events could be a description of what actions are performed by Amalia and Thomä:

A) Mirroring<sup>26</sup> (at content level, Amalia  $\rightarrow$  Thomä),

B) An interruption occurs feeding a reversed mirroring<sup>27</sup> (shaping the context, they change places) which is more complex (i.e., new links emerge),

C) So through “changing places” the couple *acts* in “mirror” (AB  $\rightarrow$  BA) enacting content (Thomä and Mother  $\rightarrow$  Amalia and Thomä)

In a view of who does what (segregating patient and analyst from the analytic couple), the “a, b, c” from above, “cooperation” and “cooperation is demoted to control”<sup>28</sup> seems to share the same interactional area, which is a paradoxical move.

In the couple’s view the sequence advances, through recursion, in transmuting a dream-event that generates a session-event (the object enters an embarrassing situation  $\rightarrow$  the subject is repairing it through taking the blame onto oneself) into *how* they interact (enactment of content, linking a then with a now) following the blueprint

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<sup>26</sup> Feelings of shame of telling dreams into feelings of shame felt *in* dreams which progresses towards mirroring dreams of losing control into dreams of losing control (protein excretion with today’s dream). Contents that reflect each other and actions that reflect each other.

<sup>27</sup> A situation from a dream is mirrored in the couple doings, as the analyst is getting more and more quiet, in a changing places situation, i.e., taking Amalia’s place *from the dream* in what would be an embarrassing situation, while Amalia is moving in his place, *from the session*. Amalia performs a repair by taking the blame, now and as then.

<sup>28</sup> Amalia relating with Thomä moves out of feeling shame, as she is the active part of the scene, one who interrupts, who corrects, who repairs, who explains.

of another “couple”, eventually such move leading (much later in the session) towards *interpreting* the dream (See Chapter 5).

Mirroring, interruption, reversed mirroring or reverse functioning, i.e., changing places, are doings, happenings of the couple in the environment generated by the couple. The A, B, C describes what and how the couple evolves in the bit of interaction from session 98<sup>th</sup>, e.g., a dream event and an earlier event from the session are restaged in the relational field by *how* they interact in the here and now.

An assumption can be advanced: There is a *content* of an experience (here is given by the dream, embarrassment) that arrives to be the *context* of a new sequence of events that mirrors the former one in a bi-personal making of meaning. If so, then the couple bears *causal relevance* within transformational processes unfolding through interaction, while “the causal relevance is a matter of whether X - be it physical, mental or psycho-physical - MAKES A DIFFERENCE to the occurrence of Y, or AFFECTS THE INCIDENCE of Y” (Grünbaum, 1984, p. 72).

Saying these, probing that the couple matters, or probing that the couple bears causal relevance within the transformational processes, equates a work for revealing a new dimension of interaction (that needs to be verified empirically for) and so advancing a step in further conceptualizing the complexities of relating, thus of process.



## 2. MAIN QUESTION

If the couple bear causal relevance in the transformation processes or if “ $1 + 1 = 3$ ” describes an event of the session, these equivalent formulations involve the creation of a new level of manifestation, a new dimension.

Primary data are analytic sessions, they provide the observational field. The analytic couple’s *environment* is made of silences, rhythms, words, utterances, and narratives. Under “order making” view (not an interior-exterior one), the above ideas should acquire observable boundaries, i.e., evidence, in how the flux, made from silences, words, and utterances, is shaped, in how the flux unfolds.

The “ $1 + 1 = 3$ ” implies a “sum”, that is more than the active parts, as happening and outcome of such relational event, i.e., an entity emerges from relating. And, also, it marks a development, a growth. As the environment is in continuous flux, and as the couple is assumed to contribute to moving from less towards more order, then the same couple needs *to adapt* as well to the transformations of such environment.

For adapting to one’s environment there are needed at least a couple of actions performed: *observation* (i.e., making distinctions into one’s environment) and *transforming* these observations for better fit to what is (i.e., changing according to environmental variations). The necessary and sufficient condition, for the couple to acquire boundaries, is then to “adapt to environment”. So:

***Is the analytic couple able to make distinctions in its own environment<sup>29</sup> and transform for adapting<sup>30</sup>?***

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<sup>29</sup> i.e., To observe, while the environment is created by the doings of the patient, analyst, and the analytic couple.

<sup>30</sup> i.e., To work through these observations, thus creating a new environment for the couple by changing into a different entity, evolving or regressing.

Why the field opened by the research question really matters? If there is another “participant” at the analytic process beside the patient and analyst<sup>31</sup> (i.e., the analytic couple) that is not considered, then there is an entire field of events that rests out of observation and understanding. A positive answer to the question adds an extra-dimension to the understanding and conceptualization of the analytic process.

Considering the works of the analytic couple under this heading, this will add an extra-dimension (i.e., observables) to the understanding and study of process. As such, next to *bi-directionality* of process it is advanced here that we need also to consider simultaneity next to succession, or the *bi-dimensionality* of process. If an interpretation (i.e., the analyst matters) as relational act makes “meaning out of noise” and feeds transformation, then “ $1 + 1 = 3$ ”, as next level relational event, answers to “how change happens?” (i.e., the analytic couple matters). The implicit hypothesis here is that the rise of complexity equates a better relating.

This “adapting to environment” needs a specific methodology, under which “observing” needs to offer the grounds, thus, to open whatever assertion to empirical verification, to test it against the events of the session.

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<sup>31</sup> We can add the setting, the analyst theories and patient theories, the analytic community, amongst many other items. Yet these ask for evidence.

### 3. REVIEW OF PSYCHOANALYTICAL LITERATURE

This chapter presents a summary overview regarding the idea of the couple as unit and a review of process research background.

The first subchapter brings in the foreground the third as it is conceptualized by Freud in his perspectives over Oedipus complex and some post-Freudian conceptualization of triadic processes, while the second subchapter addresses the idea that the analytic couple can be regarded as a unitary entity. The third one, focused on process research, addresses some methods and methodologies developed in the field of process research and the reason why a new tool is needed for studying the participation of the couple at how the elements of the session build up a session. The implicit idea is that data comprises contributions from many sources, which also include the analytic couple as part of such assembly of processes.

The hypothesis saying that the couple is a unitary entity is not new. There are several authors that approached relating, or the analytic process, they are counting in *both* participants. As in Winnicott's (1960) "there is no such a thing as a baby" (p.587). Yet, the causal relevance of the couple within the process of change is far less conceptualized. There are some notable accounts of such couple's events, which support the main hypothesis, even we can find several situations when the idea followed here is stated in a different form.

Even so, *showing* that the couple can make distinctions and that these are employed in meaning making ask for evidence or at least partial evidence.

### 3.1. FREUDIAN AND POST FREUDIAN OEDIPEAN GRAMMARS

Maybe Oedipus complex is the most well-known conceptualization within the Freud's work. It is also the first psychoanalytic theory that has a triadic base. It begun with the puzzle of hysteria and 'talking cure', in the context of Freud's self-analysis, and arrived at a description of triangular dynamic that is envisaged from a bipartite model of the mind. In the letter to Fliess, from October 15 (1897), Freud draws the first draft of what he would later call the Oedipal Complex:

“Being totally honest with oneself is a good exercise. A single idea of general value dawned on me. I have found, in my own case too, [the phenomenon of] being in love with my mother and jealous of my father, and I now consider it a universal event in early childhood...” (Freud 1897, p.272)

With Freud's struggles of understanding hysterics, suffering was eventually attributed a meaning. In a field that begun to adapt and employ the idea of unconscious mentation, early on, neurosis arrived to be linked to one's "reminiscences". In different words, the theory 'mental suffering arises out of an excess of repression' if translated into therapeutic task then it befitted 'remove the repression'. But Freud's conceptualization of the mind works added something more to the idea of removing repression, an unexpected twist. Within the realms of psyche, for Freud became clear that sexuality is something that we suffer, as we are driven by it, thus the meaning of mental suffering was regarded as sexual.

Later, the body offered a first semantic field within which many answers emerged, covering an area extending from the richness of hysteric's symptoms and dreams to the worlds of defenses, transferences, repetitions, and enacting. The erotogenic map telling the story of the complex journey from infantile towards adult

sexuality, from polymorph to genital, along with the subsequent stadial transpositions of the capitals of pleasure. Freud's chart answered to how the infant move from the oral unique oneness into the mother-child dyad, towards the thirdness of oedipal struggles for the passage into the intricacies of adult sexuality through the gates of transformations of puberty, when repression does its works, setting the organization of the early childhood loving and hating movements within the domains of the unconscious. A complex psycho-sexual bi-phasic journey of a stadial progression, from the helplessness of orality heading stage by stage towards a second phase, activated with the arrival of puberty (e.g., Green 2004, p.101).

As such, in between early infancy and latency, whilst oedipal struggles are inaugurated into the child psyche, one witnesses a new arrival – the third. The father emerges from being a substitute for (e.g., Lebovici, 1982) to become a partner to mother. With this move a triangulation happens, within which ambivalence of desire plays a major part (e.g., Freud 1905/1953b). Oedipus complex merges into a new organization various loving and hating emotional movements, and such intricacies have a history while (re)making a history, at the same time the mother of infancy acquires in this transformation a life of her own. The father as well. She occupies a new place, has new meanings. Mother eventually arrives to be external to the child.

As such the Oedipus complex becomes part of structuring one's mind, e.g., the emergence of the Super-Ego, and it is a factor in transformation of the drives (e.g., Chasseguet-Smirgel 1999, p.473), providing new grounds for development of thought.

Step by step the vicissitudes of sexuality and aggressivity (and eventually destruction, i.e., the death drive) arrived to expound the vicissitudes of growing up, of relating and of mental pain.

In "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality" (1905/1953b) Freud sees Oedipus complex as unconscious and universal in its occurrence. In "A special type of

choice of object made by men” (1910/1957b) Freud introduces the name of the complex, describing the little boy as he

“... begins to desire his mother herself in the sense with which he has recently become acquainted, and to hate his father anew as a rival who stands in the way of this wish: he comes, as we say, under the dominance of the Oedipus Complex.” (p.170)

Oedipus complex for Freud becomes a matrix of psyche. In 1908 (1959c) it was qualified as “the nuclear complex” while later in “A child is being beaten” Oedipus complex became “the actual nucleus of the neuroses” (Freud, 1919/1955c, p.193). The above mentioned ‘excess of repression’ for neurotic symptoms acquired new levels of detail, being linked to early childhood trauma and to traumatic disruptions of normal Oedipal resolution. Reality changes as the child’s mind changes, and regarding this evolution Oedipus complex doesn’t answer only to one’s orientation of desire or hostility but to the structure of one’s mind as well. It is an unconscious “narrative” which is ordering generations and kinship, sexual difference and follows an unconscious relational grammar emerging from the continuous conflicting movement of murderous and incestual movements with their corresponding prohibitions. And it involves three entities.

Triadic processes can be found either in subsequent theories following Freud’s one person psychology (e.g., Arieti 1964, Green 2004), or in the new dyadic perspectives emerging either within the field of development (e.g., Stern 1977, 1985) or in the advances constituting the relational, intersubjective, or interpersonal psychoanalysis that opened the understanding of the clinical events under a the two-person psychology.

Thirds and tertiary processes were subject of several conceptualizations before the times of intersubjective or relational turning points (e.g., Ogden 1994). A notable

and early contribution is made by Arieti (1964), who's explorations on creativity led to re-evaluate the relationship between primary and secondary processes, and so 'creativity' is seen as a move from primary processes towards tertiary ones, these processes are seen as resulting from the Freudian primary and secondary interactions. As such the interrelating basic processes are seen as feeding the emergence of a new one and opened a path towards considering a new (conscious and unconscious) dimension.

He proposes a new basic process, the "tertiary process", as defining "the appropriate matching of a secondary process mechanism with a primary process mechanism that a product of creativity emerges, that a primitive or faulty form of cognition is transformed into an innovation." (p.58)

Arieti concludes that the three basic processes (primary, secondary, and tertiary) present a common characteristic: "the ability to differentiate similarities from manifold experience." (p. 67) Similarity is a semantic operation and so Arieti's idea sets the primary, secondary, and tertiary processes out of energetic views and fits them within a meaning making unfolding of transforming experience, in a creative way.

Considering that recurrence feeds recognition thus regularities, or invariable patterns (p.67) Arieti, for a bit, mirrors his own idea of tertiary processes onto itself and oneself. He asks: "Have I myself been caught in the very problem with which I was groping?" (p.68) I note this as very few authors ask themselves if the very subject, they write about, doesn't, in its turn, 'write' a different mirroring story. And when dealing with 'creativity' while proposing a new point of view, such circularity is at work anyway.

We can see such vicissitudes of a novel conceptualization earlier, when Freud hypothesised Oedipus complex. Writing about it, Freud observes that a triadic unfolding in an oedipal manner 'needs' a dichotomy, a loved and a hated one. Yet,

conceptualizing Oedipus, he arrives, in “Three Essays” (1905), to assert that recognition of Oedipus complex “has become the shibboleth that distinguishes the adherents of psychoanalysis from its opponents.” (p.226) The world was divided between friends and foes. Apparently, the same oedipal triangulation regulates the dynamic emerging within an (emerging) group, that was (is?) haunted by the ghost of the father demanding revenge whenever his ear was poisoned by his brother.

It seems that the ‘politics of the family’, highlighted by Freud, are not confined to ‘family’ but they are organizers of larger entities, as triangularity can map unlimited relational surfaces. The social dimension of Oedipus complex cannot escape one’s observation, as the move from one to two to three involves more than an energetic complexification of a drive world, it necessitates the establishment of social dimensions of the subject, under the bipolar transformation of a dyadic relationship into a triadic one, process that unfolds under the dialectics of “intimacy” vs. “politics”.

Coming back to conceptualisations of tertiary or triadic forms, Green (1972) pictures a similar “tertiary process” as Arieti’s one, which is linking primary and secondary processes, a link that functions as a “go-between”, as a transitional process. For Arieti this is the milieu where creativity emerges, for Green is a transitional domain. It should be noted that these tertiary processes are considered to belong to the (one could say ‘infinite’) domains of the non-observable (Green 1972, p. 409). For Green (2004) the tertiary processes “vacillate between fantasies and ideas” whilst the outcome “enables the analytic process to progress toward achievement of insight.” (p.108)

The tertiary, in Green’s conceptualization, is the outcome of modifying a dualistic formulation (e.g., binding/unbinding or primary process/secondary process) and happens by considering a new (emerging) aspect. And from here, symbolization, seen as “two parts of a broken unity are reunited; and the overall result can be



considered not only as the rebuilding of a lost unity, but also as the creation of a third element that is distinct from the other two split-off parts.” (Green 2004, p. 107) offers the blueprint for developing the idea of an “analytic object”. Such blueprint recognizes the semantic nature of frame and relating, even if relating is still set on the domains of one-person psychology.

Caruso (in Frank-Rieser 2013) a couple of decades earlier (1954/55), in proposing a theory of symbolisation advances an analogous idea, for him each act of communication creates a symbol, “a “third” - a new third - between the two interacting subjects. This third entity encloses the realities of both subjects and their relationship as a symbol and as a new reality” (Frank-Rieser 2013, p.27). From here the path towards an “analytic object” is open. Unfortunately, Caruso’s conceptualizations regarding symbolization were not known by the French author.

With the hypothesis of an “analytic object” Green brings his ideas of tertiary processes, as interrelating processes, towards a new level, moving from the domains of drives to the idea of relation. In a Winnicottian manner Green situates “the analytic object” “neither on the patient’s side nor on the analyst’s, but in the meeting of these two communications in the potential space which lies between them, limited by the setting which is broken at each separation and reconstituted at each new meeting.” (Green, 1986/2005, p.48) But to address ‘relating’ from a unidimensional perspective the French author advances an hypothetical split of the analyst and of the patient, they are seen as union of two parts (splitting experience and communication), each part described as the double of the other and so arrives to assert that “one can see that the analytic object is formed of two doubles, one belonging to the patient and the other to the analyst.” (Green, 1986/2005 p. 48).

If considering the ‘double’, then the question of an infinite regression occurs, e.g., in mirroring when a similarity occurs in the field of experience (e.g., empathy),

as it is hardly conceivable how communications meet whilst experiences does not. Even if he is considering relating as a distinct process or entity (e.g., Green 1972, 2004) Green ‘solves’ the potential move from ‘personal’ to ‘bi-personal’ through the advised split within the subject.

The move from one to two to three persons psychology conjectured by Green (2004) is expertly kept in the unidimensional world of drives. Within this perspective the emerging object asks with necessity “the establishment of homologous and complementary relations between the patient and the analyst.” (Green 1986/2005, p.48) yet in its creation, the analytic object is never free in whatever result, and “it cannot claim objectivity, it can claim a homologous connection with what escapes our understanding either in the present or in the past. It is its own double.” (p.48)

Either Arieti (1964) or Green (1972, 1986/2005, 2004) begun their similar ideas from considering new conceptualizations of interrelating primary and secondary processes. Arieti hypothesizes the emergence of a third process, Green sets in the field of splitting and creation of doubles the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of tertiary processes, that when no object is present what emerges is “an internal mirroring of the self to oneself. All this seems to show that the capacity for reflection is a fundamental ‘given’ of the human.” (Green 1986/2005, p. 49)

## **3.2. THE COUPLE AS UNIT**

### **3.2.1. DYADIC SYSTEMS THEORIES**

Daniel Stern's "Interpersonal world of the infant" (1985) represents a paradigm shift in the way early development is conceptualized. From the very beginning of his research (e.g., Stern, 1971) Stern was interested in the idea of bidirectional regulation, of mutual regulation, of how each partner in the dyad affects the other. The value of the micro-analysis, of observing instant-by-instant interactive events, probe the value those "momentarily small events that make up our worlds of experience" (Stern, 2004 p.9), and they are sources of careful descriptions and timing of events that are parts of a new understanding of the social communication in infants and mothers, as well as in patients and analysts.

In his earlier paper "The goal and structure of mother infant play" (1974) Stern provides a "how" to his goal, of fitting the theory to observations while expanding them, that is "by providing a more fine-grained view of the instant-by-instant interactive events which make up the mother-infant relationship" (p. 402)

In his early work, "The first relationship" (1977), Stern view over infancy diverge strongly from Freudian traditions. Research shows that the infant is an active stimulus seeker and "build-up of excitement clearly can be pleasurable" (p.84), a finding that did not confirmed Freud's speculations, that the infant is "needing protection from external stimuli or at best as a passive recipient of stimulation" (p.70) and "that tension build-up is aversive and only tension reduction is pleasurable" (p.85)

Stern probes that "Mother and infant, like all humans, socially interact in a split-second world. Our social behaviours flash by and are perceived more rapidly than we generally imagine." (Stern 1977, p. 106) while the structure of these interactions

informs *how* we think about them. The simple stimulus-response chain cannot answer to “how”, and so mutuality and anticipation are providing answers.

For his model of the first dyad (which applies quite well to the analytic dyad), Stern proposes the metaphor of waltz – “where both partners know the steps and music by heart and can accordingly move precisely together, as against the tennis match analogy of the stimulus-response chain” (op. cit. p. 107) a metaphor that implies that in relation the partners in waltz expect the movement of the other, they anticipate. Stern (1985) developed the concept of expectancies further, to define early infant procedural representations, or “RIGS” (representations of interactions generalized), and together with Hofer, Daft and Dore (1985) described a reciprocal dyadic process in which each partner is “changing with the other”, as sensing and anticipating both moment-to-moment processes (a process which is distinguished from empathy and attunement). Stern argues, in “Self/Other differentiation” (1995) that

“...the infant perceives intentions in the self and the other, that he or she ‘sees past’ the specific overt behaviours in order to read in them the intentions that organize these behaviours.” (p. 420)

And from here the next natural step that Stern takes, while providing a reason why, is “Organizing the perception of the dyadic behavioural flow into units of intentions has the great advantages of efficiency, rapidity, and flexibility in reading what is happening.” (op. cit. p. 423).

Moving towards “relationship” one important observation needs to be underlined. Stern (1995) argues that “infants may process units of interpersonal, motivated, goal-directed behaviour (such as a micro-regulation) in a global fashion as a “proto-narrative envelope” (1995, p. 425). What is this proto-narrative envelope?

Stern describes that we are dealing with goal-directed motivated acts. These enacted intentions that micro-regulate the interaction, according to Stern, occur in a

“moment”. The former “vitality affect” from “The interpersonal world of the infant” (1985) became a decade later the “subjective temporal feeling shape” that has as features crescendos, fading, explosions, growing, attenuations, etc. And they are providing the temporal architecture of an enacted intention.

And the next link, that Stern makes, interconnects the above temporal feeling shapes with narratives through their features. The movement from enacted intention towards its realization “...generates a subjective dramatic line of tension, a contour of excitement (the temporal feeling shape), which also happens to be an essential feature of a narrative like structure”. (Stern, 1995, p. 425)

As such, speaking about “experience” we should remember this *temporal feeling shape*, and the idea that it unfolds in a narrative like structure. A question arises – is this temporal feeling shape a dyadic being? That is to say - Is this narrative like structure also a form that the couple acquires? Stern answers: “What appears to belong to the infant objectively and subjectively also belongs to the dyad”. (op. cit. p. 426) and this is one aspect that moves from observing one towards observing the couple, this narrative like structure.

For Stern, a new entity emerges, a “self-with-a-self-regulating-other” in the “mutual regulation of joy, other affects, attachment, love, and many meaning systems and beliefs, this entity of a self-regulatory-other becomes a large part of the interactive experience.” (op. cit. p. 428). It should be underlined that this “self-regulating-other entity” “is determined by the way we narrate our experience to one another” (op. cit. p. 428), i.e., “self-regulating-other entity” becomes a narrative construct of culture.

The basic assumption here as well as in the consulting room is that “change is based on lived experience” (Stern 2004, p. 11). This is a radical departure from “past” and its influence. The “present moment” occupies the central stage if detail, sequence, anticipation, and simultaneity matters. The “present moment contains the essential

elements to compose a lived story” that is “a special kind of story that is lived as it happens” (2004, p. 77).

For Stern “narrative” is a format (e.g.,1992), a structure of experience, and a “lived story” which all are experiences that are narratively formatted. Setting the narrative in a privileged place can be seen also in the works of Schafer (1992) or Spence (1982). Yet what Stern does is to identify the form of a “moment” which is lived in a sequence that links a build-up, a climax, and a resolution (Labov, 1973).

For Stern the narrative is the basic way of perceiving and organizing motivated human behaviour (2004, p. 78). If this is so, then “I know that you know that I know” becomes a story, or a plot. That can be read as “two minds create intersubjectivity” while “intersubjectivity shapes the two minds”. What should be mentioned in this context is that “dyadic intersubjectivity requires some kind of recursive participation in or representation of the other’s mind” (Stern 2004, p. 109)

Acknowledging the crucial role of the context in “two-way intersubjectivity”, which is a special form of relating, Stern adds that there is a recursive or reiterative process at work in this form of being with. Even if a “relationship” is viewed by Stern as determined by all past interactions, a relationship is more than the sum of these past events (Stern, 1977, p.117). Past counts in as “continuity or historicity is the crucial ingredient that distinguishes an interaction from a relationship” (1985, p.90).

Implicit in this “more than the sum” is that beside determinism<sup>32</sup> we need to consider emergence, or process (e.g., in the light of Complexity<sup>33</sup>), and the present

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<sup>32</sup> Determinism, defined as “... the viewpoint that evolution is governed by a set of rules that, from any particular initial state, can generate one and only one sequence of future states” (Prigogine 1997, p.201)

<sup>33</sup> Complexity designates the ensemble of branches as System Theory, Thermodynamics of Nonequilibrium Systems, Dynamic Systems Theory, Fractals, Synergetics, Chaos Theory, etc. that approaches far from equilibrium systems, or so-called chaotic systems.

moment. A process unit, defined as “the smallest unit in which a temporally dynamic interactive event with a beginning, middle, and end can occur.” (Stern 1977, p. 122) send us towards recognizing what is a criterion for autonomy (like a sentence, or a narrative). For Stern the entire process of forming relations (i.e., past stimulus-response chain) never stops, is always expanding, changing, reforming (op. cit. p. 132)

These ideas and findings moved further through developing the dyadic systems theory. Beebe and Lachmann (2002) are a couple of researchers that continued the line opened by Stern and Sander, amongst others.

The “dyadic system theory” proposes that interactional regulation of emotion and the participants’ self-regulation of emotion are systemically linked, and in the last decades it has been supported by empirical studies. Storytelling and bodily responses to the shared “emotional load” of the stories, suggest that a dyad is generated through interaction, that a couple can be seen as a (temporary) unit, and that the “emotional load” contributes to the creation of such dyadic being. (e.g., Voutilainen et al., 2011)

Luis Sander is a notable and influential theorist of dyadic systems (Lyons-Ruth, 2000 p. 85). He too understands the infant and his mother as *one* living system (2007), a researcher who did consider and documented the role of the “system” (i.e., the dyad) in how the system evolves.

Researching the infant-mother dyads, he proposes “recognition” and “process of recognition” as conceptual tools that address the core of such self-organizing system, the dyad. Eventually, step by step, this process is the base onto which the child becomes aware that another person is aware of what he is aware within himself. The “process of recognition” (Sander, 2008) is:

“(…) a key moment of connection that occurs within a framework of recurrent meeting - becoming a “now” moment that changes organization. It is the now moment of knowing and being known in the

governing of a hierarchical self-organizing systems process that brings coherence or wholeness to a dyadic system in the process of increasing its inclusiveness of complexity.” (p.232)

Sander’s influential work produced many valuable results and fed many ideas that followed his pioneering findings. His approach, importing elements from dynamic systems theory and the place rhythm and self-organization arrived to acquire in his work, were seminal for others, (e.g., Benjamin’s rhythmic analytic third, 2018).

Such research of infant mother dyads provides later the how, “the local level” of psychoanalytical process, arrived to describe data, which is “the second-by-second interchange between patient and therapist consisting of relational moves composed of nonverbal and verbal happenings...” (BCPSG, 2005 p. 694)

Edward Z. Tronick, like Sander, made a move from clinical observation towards clinical theory, starting also from a mutual regulation model (a bidirectional regulation of a communicative system – Cohn and Tronick 1988) conceptualized in a dynamic systems frame. Along with this model he is advancing a hypothesis, stating that the patient and the analyst create a dyadic state of consciousness (Tronick et al, 1998, p. 298; Tronick 2009), a singular state of organization, in that “their states’ of consciousness become dyadic and expand to incorporate elements of consciousness of the other in a new and more coherent form.” (op. cit. p. 296).

For Tronick “through interactions, the infant makes meaning about the nature of him or herself and his or her relations to other people and the world” (Tronick 2013, p.55) and linking the Mutual Regulation Model (MRM) with Dyadic Expansion of Consciousness (DEC) he generates a dynamic system inspired framework. First model answers to regulating the system moment by moment and shapes development while the second gives an account of social-emotional development.



Privileging observation over theory, in a field that shows overtheorizing, (an idea elaborated also by Fonagy (2006) and supported by Cooper (2015), Stamenova and Hinshelwood (2018), etc.) Tronick's research supports the idea that the events of the session are understandable in interaction, and not in a one-person referential. "As meaning-making open systems, humans are governed by the operating principles of dynamic, open biological systems that fulfil those principles by making meaning with mutual regulatory communicative processes." (Tronick, 2013, p.57)

Tronick hypothesizes that "the social-emotional exchanges of mothers and infants (and of all humans) have the potential for expanding each individual's state of consciousness with powerful experiential and developmental consequences." (Tronick 2007, p. 407) Tronick's works provide an entry to *how* the analyst and patient forms a couple, and evolves, yet the influence of the new emergent unit over the parts, how the couple reverberates in either one, or the autonomy of such entity and the effects of it are still open, even if attended within his developments (e.g., Tronick 2007).

### **3.2.2. THE ANALYTIC FIELD**

From a different pool of theories and different means of conceptualization, based on clinical concepts, Baranger M. (1993) alludes to the same phenomena of mutuality and emergence of a new form of organization when she says, "There is no such thing as perception without an object, or without another subject" (p. 15) a point of view which surfaces from the earlier conceptualization of the analytic field (Baranger M. and Baranger W., 1969/2008).

For the authors this field is "our immediate and specific object of observation. Since observation by the analyst is both observation of the patient and a correlative self-observation, it can only be defined as observation of this field." (p.796)

Observation and the environment into which distinctions are made, are set within the analytic situation. Also, this field is not an “observant” one.

The field open by the South American analysts of French origin, is closer to transference-countertransference phenomenology and its vicissitudes than to the analytic couple as entity. Even so they begin from: “At first sight, it is a field of communication, where things are said and listened to, and where other things are transmitted and received in a nonverbal way.” (M. Baranger and Baranger, 2009 p.6)

And from here, from this first sight, under the clinical concept of projective identification (Klein, 1946) and unconscious phantasy (Isaacs, 1943/1952) they arrive to a bi-personal conceived *fantasy* that gives birth to a new structure, that involves the intrapsychic of the participants, but it cannot be:

“... considered to be the sum of the two internal situations. It is something created between the two, within the unit that they form in the moment of the session, something radically different from what each of them is separately.” (Baranger and Baranger, 2008 p.806)

This “something radically different” is born from a bi-personal fantasy/phantasy. From this perspective the analytic field is an ecology (*maybe* valid). How about the “local level”, “our immediate and specific object of observation”? This object is “bi-personal made”, like transference-countertransference, it has extra-dimensions. It should be mentioned that in how this field is conceptualized research and clinical treatment are not disentangled, they coincide.

How this analytic field could be operationalized (i.e., what methodology?) so an independent observer checking up upon this or that claim (i.e., providing evidence or partial evidence) would get an answer?

In the case of “analytic field” we deal with a clinical concept (projective identification, inferred) that under the organizing workings of an unconscious

phantasy (as well out of any observational field) they open a new conceptual field. Their workings give birth to a new entity (an inferential or a clinical being) and it seems that the analytic field still needs a way of getting in the open from “clinic-as-research” (a praxis) and “clinic-is-research” (a categorization) entanglement. There should be variables in/of the session that will provide observational support for the “analytic field”, or “second look” (i.e., contra-transferential indicators when an impasse/bastion is happening) or “bastion”. This last concept, “bastion”, a dyadic enterprise as well, is characterized as a symbiotic phenomenon, “both participants in the analytic situation use transference and projective identification and reciprocally ‘castle’ subject and object” (Baranger, Baranger and Mom 1982/2009, p.79) and “it is the most conspicuous clinical sign of the repetition compulsion - that is, of the death instinct.” (op. cit. p.88). All these are pointing at something that equates a dyadic enterprise, achieved by both participants and generating a new level of manifestation. Yet one could ask – if “bastion” is a dyadic event, then how “death instinct” is made visible by its presence as an instinct is not something that emerges in interaction, as it has a different essence? Keeping this intermingled one with two person psychologies apart, the “analytic field” proposes a view over “analytic process” that involves events that belong to *both* participants, which are emerging as autonomous events of the session. The assumption in the above comments is that if something is real then there are traces of its manifestation in the observational field (afforded by the session as event), providing direct or/and indirect observables. Is this *field* as third providing observables for third parties?

### 3.2.3. ANALYTIC THIRDS

The next object event, also evolving from a conceptual and clinical field, i.e., waiting for methodologies, it is a dyadic (clinical) experience, also fueled by “projective identification”. It is an emerging (unconscious) entity forming a triad. Thomas Ogden (1994) conceptualizes it through what he denominates as “the intersubjective analytic third” and sets this entity as the ground of the analytic process.

“The analytic third is a creation of the analyst and analysand, and at the same time the analyst and analysand (*qua* analyst and analysand) are created by the analytic third (there is no analyst, no analysand, and no analysis in the absence of the third)” (p. 17).

Ogden’s “Analytic third” shares with Baranger’s “Analytic field” many aspects, most notably the need for research of what their theories advance (Wilson’s “other people can in principle independently check up on it” quoted earlier is obviously put into parentheses).

But the idea of an “analytic third” (Ogden’s or Benjamin’s one) comes closer to “analytic couple” as an autonomous entity, than the “analytic field”. Ogden (2004) arrives to assert that “an intersubjective dialectic of recognizing and being recognized serves as the foundation of the creation of individual subjectivity.” (p.192). Even if Ogden’s concept brings an answer to the idea that “one can no longer simply speak of the analyst and the analysand as separate subjects who take one another as objects.” (1994, p.3) both “projective identification” and its younger relatives “the analytic third” and “analytic field”, are waiting evidence provided by third parties.

The main issue regarding such entity is its attributed quality of “subjectivity”. It can be so, in a logic of similar gives birth to similar. This new entity can be but a living one, if emergence doesn’t change the nature of what coalesce into a new entity,

and *maybe* (again we are in a maybe domain) it is endowed with subjectivity (how can we know?). Is “intentionality”<sup>34</sup> a characteristic of such subjectivity? What processes are involved in generating such subjectivity? Ogden (1994) asserts that “The analytic process reflects the interplay of three subjectivities: that of the analyst, of the analysand, and of the analytic third.” (p.17). But to probe the quality of “subject” of the “third” visits the fields of not yet available methodologies, like the previous “analytic field”.

One of “third’s” main attributes, according to Ogden, is that the analyst and the patient are created by this subjectivity while it gets generated by them. And if so, then we need to move towards a “three-person psychology” or “three-subjective” one.

Next to the above entity introduced by Ogden in the psychoanalytic literature, is “the third” and its variations which are proposed and employed by Jessica Benjamin (2004, 2018). Even if different than Ogden’s third, the idea of an intersubjective function (that include all the “analytic thirds” introduced by Benjamin) is referring the analytic situation to an unconscious doing, or an unconscious life, created *conjointly* by the psychoanalytic couple. Jessica Benjamin (2018) circumscribes it as a relationship, a function and not as an ‘entity’:

“Thus, I consider it crucial not to reify the Third, but to consider it primarily as a principle, function, or relationship (as in Ogden’s (1994) view), rather than as a “thing” in the way that theory or rules of technique are things.” (Benjamin, 2018 p.23)

She conceptualizes this third as a process that evolves, acquiring facets, even it has a negative Third, yet “the only usable Third, by definition, is one that is shared.” (op. cit. p. 27) in that “action-reaction characterizes our experience of complementary

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<sup>34</sup> Endowed with the capability of “wishes” or “anxiety”, or with the ability of “thinking thoughts” and “dreaming dreams”?

twoness, the one-way direction; by contrast, a shared Third is experienced as a cooperative endeavour.” (p.31)

In a way the Third, as Benjamin conceptualizes it, is a relationship and at the same time the organizing principle of such relationship, it has a sort of transitional features, of being created *and* discovered (op. cit. p.31) Mutuality is one factor that contributes decisively to the birth of this Third. She describes: “Mutual recognition is what happens when we share and reciprocate knowing.” (op. cit. p.75)

Drawing more on the findings coming from infant mother dyadic system theories and relational theory Benjamin’s Third (in its multiplicities – moral, rhythmic, intersubjective, etc.) involves as core features two-way directionality, mutuality, recognition, mutual accommodation, rhythm and intersubjective relating. Intersubjective relating offers the grounds for the third as form to “operates in all moments in which a tension is held mutually rather than through splitting of opposites in complementary relations.” (op. cit. p. 76)

Intersubjective relating as part of building up a Third (i.e., a form cut out from an environment) involves complex emergence of form and process. Thus, such Third must do something with “transformation” of something, e.g., emerging from an intricate web of processes. So, what place occupies “relating” in devising a Third? For Benjamin the relationship, regardless of content, is the medium for change (p.81).

If relating and change are so connected (i.e., generating new forms) then the dynamic of relating rises the degree of complexity so an emerging level arrives to manifest, and these intricacies of relating and change are needed to describe an ordinary interaction, i.e., two people talk to each other. Another factor that participates at this is rhythm, according to Benjamin, rhythmicity and its vicissitudes are factors in building up thirdness, as well it “constitutes the basis for coherence in interaction between persons” (p.30).

Recognition (that plays an important role in Ogden's third as well or in Sander's conceptualizations) involves knowing and being known, a "moment of meeting" (e.g., Sander, 2008).

Drawing "distinctions *and* similarities" is what one needs for the complex process of recognition. Recognizing implies observing a similar into a difference, building up a link between then and now and concluding, in comparing and substituting, i.e., an action for and from another action.

### **3.2.4. CONVERSATION AND INTERACTION**

From the lands of clinical theories, next step is to focus onto research and research founded findings. A point of transition between the "analytic couple" as entity, and process and process research (next subchapter).

We can recognize dyadic doings in the findings made while researching the micro-levels of interaction, like those conducted from a situationist perspective regarding the analytic process (e.g., Buchholz, Spiekermann and Kächele, 2015), which arrive at the observation that "empathy operates as co-production" (p.890). An observation which is based on "interaction engine" (i.e., the sequence of turns). We can see the analyst, the patient and a "dance", a something (i.e., a process) that acquires meaning only if we consider how the *couple* "moves".

The idea that the analytic couple arrives to perform as unit, is implicit in assertion that empathy operates as co-production, or in "dancing insight" (e.g., Buchholz and Reich, 2015). More support is provided if we move towards other studies that come from recruiting Conversation Analysis and other qualitative linguistic tools in investigating the "surface" of interaction, under the awareness of "interaction is the 'deeper layer' than language is." (Buchholz et al. 2015).

One example is the case of Common Ground (Buchholz, 2016) conceptualization, from which emerge a view from where shared expectations and mutual knowledge are playing a part while building the very play into which they are unfolding. Common Ground (CG) is co-produced by the participants, e.g., “by directing attention to a common perceptual object in our common environment” (p. 135). In this perspective

“Transforming the perceptual into a conversational object is an act of conversation. It informs both speakers that they have joint attention (Bangerter, 2004; Tomasello, 2003) and for at least one moment they have created a Common Ground. This opens a horizon to project further activities. Thus, although “Common Ground” sounds like a piece of territory it is meant as an activity.” (p. 135)

The above description acquires in linguistics a different language that describes the shared resource which is build up while and by being employed:

“Common Ground is a resource that speakers exploit in inviting and deriving pragmatic inference, as a way to cut costs of speech production by leaving much to be inferred by the listener” (Enfield, 2006, p. 401 quoted in Buchholz, 2016 p. 136).

In “Conversational errors and Common Ground activities”, Buchholz presents the following overview of Common Ground (CG) activities:



CG - level	Object	Conversational operation	Sources for both interactants
1. Perceptual	Objects in perceptual environment	Transformation into a conversational object	Joint attention
2. Conversational	Objects in conversation	Reference to conversational objects	Some fusion of perception, memory and cognitive inference
3. Linking	Linked objects	Linking of the type A:B = A:C or A:B = C:D where A, B, C, and D are conversational objects	Analogical reasoning
4. Metaphorical-creational	Creating a new metaphorical object	Creating a new metaphor for the common relational activity	Creativity

(After Buchholz 2016 - Fig. 1 Schema for Common Ground Activities)

If we consider “conversation” as “event” and remember the pair of conditions for considering the analytic couple under the lens of “order as outcome of a system of relations”, it results that i) CG activities are a multilayered set of doings that ii) feeds the growing complexity of interaction (from perception towards creativity) which inherently leads towards, iii) the emergence of new levels.

New levels (as in the sequence “objects” → “metaphorical objects”) imply emergence and emergence of a new “author”, seeing the implicit “analytic couple” in it, that onto such CG dynamics (e.g., “establishment of CG” ↔ “dispersing of CG” oscillations) modifies the participants ways of perceiving/thinking while creating new understanding of the shared reality.

If we look at the above categories listed by Buchholz, the couple of categories advanced in the introduction (i.e., making distinctions in the environment or observing and transforming these observations) are describing with less detail the path “perception → creation” described in the above table, and we could suppose that they move the system under “less order → more order”. To whom “more order” belongs? The answer sends us neither to the patient, nor to the analyst (we are in CG domains)

but to both, to what would be the “analytic couple as autonomous entity”. The fourth level (metaphorical-creational) needs some extra comments, as it is the most complex and comprises while making the very domain of change, of transformative events of the session. Buchholz (2007) asserts that “what moves us are human paradoxes – contradictions that on a certain level appear to be inextricable – that are articulated by metaphor.” (p. 164) Accordingly, psychotherapy in its workings implies analysing the metaphor, followed by “changing the metaphor when it becomes obsolete and outdated” (Buchholz 2007, p. 167) <sup>35</sup>. This process fuels the transformative mechanisms and growth, active at the micro-dimensions of interaction (e.g., Buchholz et al. 2015; Buchholz 2016) or the macro dimensions of analysis (e.g., Buchholz 2007).

Keeping the micro-analytics as way of approaching the session, there are more findings, like those resulting from Peräkylä’s (2008) joint perspective between Conversation Analysis and intersubjectively oriented psychoanalysis, while such view endorses that ““mind as experienced,” “mind as expressed,” and “mind as understood” cannot be strictly separated” (p. 115).

This outlook, keeping the above comments regarding the “doing of order” while CG complexifies enough so a new level gets created (one such doing is turning the couple onto itself, so the level created is self-reflection), links experiencing, expressing, and understanding to jointly achieved performances. Such idea promotes the hypothesis that empathy and intuition are facets of the same relational medal.

In our case experiencing, expressing, and understanding share “common grounds” with joining, merging, linking, and creating and all actions are part of the emergent “environment” of the couple, emergent from the couple’s doings.

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<sup>35</sup> Analysing metaphors and transforming them equates, in a triadic view, the process described in the Introduction by “theories of observation” and “observing theories” as unitary unfolding, i.e., a theory is a metaphor.

The research of Tronick, or Stern, or Sander in the world of infants and mothers that involves systems and complexity or employing CA in the study of analytic sessions (e.g., Peräkylä et al., 2008; Peräkylä and Sorjonen, 2012; Lepper, 2009; Buchholz, Spiekermann and Kächele, 2015; Buchholz and Kächele, 2017) offer evidence to substantiate some ideas about dyadic (analytic) beings and their complex doings. Conversation Analysis will be treated in more detail in the next chapter.

Moving from theory towards observation is a risky procedure, so many times gave birth to dead ends regarding evidence, as such keeping observation, or keeping “onto the surface” (Buchholz et al, 2015) referential, is a step to be taken.

We already know that “the therapist matters” (e.g., Luborsky et al. 1997), but what about the analytic couple? If we are speaking about dyads, about mutuality, about dialogues of the unconscious, about co-creation and co-production, about many ways of describing couple’s doings, then we should ask ‘what the analytic couple as entity does to the levels from which emerges’, how the couple influence the process.

Mutuality implies “both as one”, while the couple’s perspective, the couple’s doings, involves “one from both” exhibiting a specific way of evolving. These perspectives cannot be independent, yet what can be gained is the answer of “what and how the couple organizes its parts while is structured by them?”

If there is an *autonomous* process that involves both analyst and patient, then we enter the field of “process” while questioning what the couple does to its components while being built by them (e.g., Common Ground, being with, intersubjective relating, dyadic states, mutuality, etc.).

### 3.3. PROCESS RESEARCH

One of the first analysts recommending the idea of process encompassing our practices was Ferenczi (1928) who says that “Analysis should be regarded as a process of fluid development unfolding itself before our eyes rather than as a structure with a design pre-imposed upon it by an architect” (p.90) and his invitation of looking forward is still actual, unfortunately *too* actual. “Rather than a structure” makes the above description a relative of the definition of process, as the one employed at the beginning of the present study (e.g., Rescher, 2000).

Looking forward equates curiosity, research, creativity, in short: to open oneself towards the unknown. We should be accustomed with this. Kächele et al. (2009), Hinshelwood (2013), Fonagy (2015), Kernberg (2016), are just a few who attest the supposed habit as not quite a description but an ideal.

Before Ferenczi, the paradigm of process was instated in Breuer’s work with Anna O (Hinshelwood, 2013 p. 14). Here we met the sequence: symptom → hypnotic catharsis → symptom modification, and Freud with Breuer elaborated a theory (of psychic energy, Hinshelwood op. cit. p. 14), even if “process models of a psychoanalytic treatment are not theoretical, abstract matters; they are factually more or less part of the day-to-day work of the psychoanalyst.” (Kächele et al. 2009, p. 14)

Process idea brought together analysts and they founded research groups (and generating process paradigms) that evolved in the last century, beginning with the well-known Menninger Psychotherapy Research Project (1954) where we find many eminent researchers, e.g., Wallerstein, Kernberg, and at the beginning of Menninger Project, Luborsky, who moved and developed the Penn Psychotherapy Project (1967).

As early as 1963, the bases for Ulm Process Research Group were set by Helmuth Thomä and Horst Kächele, which was the inception of what will become “a

long-standing endeavour to study the homeland of psychoanalysis “the Psychoanalytic situation”. (Kächele and Thomä 1993, p.109)

In the 70’s Mount Zion Research Group (later San Francisco Psychotherapy Research Group) was established by Joseph Weiss and Harold Sampson, also, in the 70’s and 80’s, at the University of Illinois, Merton Gill developed PERT - Patient’s Experience of the Relationship with the Therapist.

Along with these notable developments and realizations in the field of research, we encounter many other researchers developing tools either influenced by these research groups (like Boston Research Group following Luborsky) or evolving independent from them (e.g. Jones and Ablon Psychotherapy Q-set, Teller and Dahl developing FRAME - Fundamental Repetitive and Maladaptive Emotion Structures, Bucci’s dual code model for mental representations, Strupp et al.’s Cyclical Maladaptive Patterns - CMP, or Horowitz’s Configurational Analysis).

In the following, from the above process research methodologies, will be presented in more detail Luborsky’s CCRT - Core Conflict Relationship Theme, Ulm Process Research group’s multilevel approach, and a short overview of Conversation Analysis, a complex tool employed in the last decades for researching the analytic process. In the end follows the review of Bühler’s concept of deixis (1934), that is considered able to provide a view over interaction, intersubjectivity and process, equating to set the “social” in the core of language use.

### 3.3.1. CORE CONFLICTUAL RELATIONSHIP THEME - CCRT

In 1975 Luborsky notices that attending to the patient's narratives of interaction provides most of his clinical inferences. A particular class of narratives gathered more attention, those that generate a view over the recurrent aspects of interaction (e.g., Luborsky et al 1994 p. 172) – the central relationship pattern. “The CCRT is the central relationship pattern, script, or schema that each person follows in conducting relationships.” (Luborsky and Crits-Christoph, 1998/2019 p.43)

The central relationship pattern contained three components of relationship narratives: “What the patient wanted from the other people, how the other people reacted, and how the patient reacted to their reactions.” (Luborsky et al 1994). This is, in short, the framework from which CCRT developed. CCRT evolved under the following four assumptions (Luborsky et al 1994):

“(1) an especially informative database for extracting the CCRT consists of the narratives about relationship episodes (RE) told during the session, (2) CCRT can be reliably extracted from the relationship episodes, (3) that the CCRT is usefully based on a frequency-across-narratives criterion rather than on a salience criterion derived from an estimate of the special clinical significance of particular narratives, and (4) that the pattern that is extracted really is a significant one that underlies the apparent variety of the patient's relationship episodes.” (p. 173)

These assumptions, and the hypothetical sequence of interactions between three independent components ( $W \rightarrow RO \rightarrow RS$ <sup>36</sup>), based on a conflictual dichotomy,

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<sup>36</sup> “i) the wishes, needs or intentions: W; b) the responses from other: RO; and iii) responses of Self: RS.” (Luborsky, 1998/2019, p.91)

(wishes conflict with responses) arrives to be at “the first reliable central relationship pattern measure when judged from psychotherapy sessions.” (Luborsky and Crits-Christoph 1998/2019 p.742) and “it has demonstrated that narratives offer a viable road to both the conscious and unconscious basic conflictual relationship patterns.” (op. cit. p. 856)

In CCRT there are two phases, a) locating and identifying the relationship episodes and b) extracting the CCRT from episodes (e.g., Luborsky et al. 1994)

“A relationship episode (RE) is a part of a session that is a relatively discrete episode of explicit narration about relationships with others or with the self.” (Luborsky and Crits-Christoph, 1998/2019 p. 73) which is endowed with a beginning, a middle and an end. These episodes are located and marked off on the transcript by an independent judge. The judges starting from each relationship episode need to identify in each one: (a) the wishes, needs, or intentions: W; (b) the responses from others: RO; and (c) the responses of the self: RS. Luborsky and Crits-Christoph (1998/2019) describe that the judges infer the wishes between two levels “the level of virtually direct expression by the patient, in which the judge stays close to the literal wording used by the patient in the transcript” and the second level, “of moderate inference from what the patient says.” (p. 94)

A preliminary CCRT formulation, after reviewing the scores, by sequencing each type of component across relationship episodes, “to find the theme or themes that apply to the most relationship episodes. The most frequent of each type of component constitutes the preliminary CCRT formulation.” (p. 95) And here we find the reason why for “conflictual” in CCRT - “The most recurrent components of the episodes point to where the main conflicts lie.” (p.96)

In the original form of the CCRT (Luborsky, 1977), categories were fashioned to suit each patient in a scoring system, a tailor-made set. The decision to use all

scorable components, connected or not, is based, as Luborsky (1997) explains, on the need for simplicity of scoring. Under the headings of i) Wishes, Needs, Intentions (“I wish, need, or intend in relation to the other person ...”) ii) Responses from Others (“The other person becomes ...”) iii) Responses of Self (“I become...”) CCRT method, which was designed for measuring interactional units, has a set of standard categories, with an initial number of 35 categories for 1), 30 categories for 2) and 31 for 3), a number that was reduced to a total of 24 for all three categories, a set of eight categories/clusters for each (8, 8, 8). (See Luborsky and Crits-Christoph 1998/2019 pp. 150-155).

In CCRT-LU, a development of Luborsky’s method (the German version), is richer in the number of categories and was developed using elements of predicate logic (unary and binary predicates) (e.g., Albani et al. 2002b) as well as theoretical and empirical sources. The German researchers moved further, modifying the method by using statistical contingency analysis on a very large sample of relationship episodes that produced seven “repetitive relationship patterns”. So, the “central relationship patterns” became “a more appropriate model for long-term treatment transference development than the notion of a single CCRT.” (Kächele and Thomä, 1993 p. 123)

CCRT provides “... the successful translation of a key clinical concept into a key clinical-quantitative operational measure of the clinical concept.” (Luborsky and Crits-Christoph 1998/2019, p. 879) The revealed pattern equates to what Freud (e.g., 1912/1958) designates as transference.



### **3.3.2. ULM PROCESS RESEARCH GROUP MULTILEVEL APPROACH**

“Since 1968 the Department of Psychotherapy of the University of Ulm has focused on the development of a methodology for psychoanalytic process research.” (Kächele et al. 2009, p.341) While “therapeutic process” was seen as “the entire path travelled jointly by patient and analyst between the initial interview and termination” (Kächele 1988, p. 65), and a process model was and is understood not an abstract model but something that is “part of every analyst’s day-to-day practice” (Kächele and Thomä 1993, p.111), a new view evolved under a heuristic oriented techniques (searching, finding and discovery) generating a model to investigate the best possible conditions for change to occur (Kächele 1988, p. 69). So, one general aim was given by the need of: “descriptive investigations of the process of interaction of what goes on in the analyst and in the patient and how their unconscious fantasies are expressed verbally and nonverbally.” (Kächele and Thomä 1993 p. 112)

Making a (necessary) distinction between clinic and research, moving against “one of the famous claims of analytical work is that research and treatment coincide<sup>37</sup>”, Kächele and Thomä (1993) arrived, in spite of methodological and epistemological difficulties, to the conclusion “that many of the crucial concepts of psychoanalysis relate to domains that surface in verbal manifestations” (p.111) Substantiating the idea that “for scientific investigations, it is not enough to rely on the memory of the analyst” (op. cit. p.110), and that a concept cannot be studied but in the analytic interaction, data for approaching ‘the surface of verbal manifestations’ consist of audio-recordings of the session. The taped sessions were (and still are) a solution to get as close as

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<sup>37</sup> “In its execution research and treatment coincide” (Freud, 1912/1958 p. 114)

possible to the psychoanalytic dialogue, which becomes available for systematic analysis of reliable data.

Audio-recordings are the “data” available for repeated observation and analysis, and also, they are opening up to evaluation the findings based on these observations and interpretations of the session, acknowledging the imperative from: “Clinical findings need to be tested by empirical research.” (Kächele et al. 2009 p. 3) and the after-effects of not having data: “psychoanalysts are frequently forced to fall back upon either the indirect evidence of clinical observation or an appeal to authority.” (Fonagy 2000, p.227)

At Ulm “the study of single cases and their evaluation concerning the manifold aspects” (Kächele et al. 2009 p. 341) is a solution to the many issues asking for dialogue and answers. That is to say for research, while knowing that “further methodological progress can only be reached by overcoming the weak points of present research techniques.” (op. cit. p. 350)

Following Freud (1912/1958), the authors underline that evenly hovering attention and free association offer to psychoanalytical process its methodological specificity, and “the impact of these rules on both parties sets in motion a process that transforms covert processes within the patient (transference dispositions) into relationship patterns between patient and the analyst.” (Kächele 1992, p.3)

The Ulm Process Research Group’s aim “was to establish ways to describe systematically long-term psychoanalytic processes in various dimensions and to use descriptive data to examine process hypotheses” (Kächele and Thomä 1993, p. 117).

At the same time disregarding “the subjective position in which all theoretical approaches are regarded as equal in therapeutic potency” (Kächele et al. 2009, p.15) this position implies a concept of process that could work for long-term as well as for short-term therapies.

The research project has ‘focused on four psychoanalytic process research cases on which systematic time series of recorded sessions were transcribed and stored’ (Kächele and Thomä 1993, p. 115). The model is based on “focal concept”, assimilating into it the findings of systematic therapy research, and is organized “along poles that stretch from the traditional case history to very formalized methods, which correspond to qualitative approaches and hard-nosed quantitative methods” (Kächele et al. 2015 p.371)

The authors define psychoanalytic therapy as “a continued, timely, not limited focal therapy with changing focus” (Thomä and Kächele, 1987 p. 347), while “focus” “refers to the major interactionally created theme of the therapeutic work, which results from the material offered by the patient and the analyst’s efforts at understanding.” (op. cit. p.350). Focus arrived “to be seen as the least common multiple, which was understood clinically by the concept of prevailing transference” which is “(...) a structure that extends over a longer period of time and involves a longer sequence of sessions.” (Kächele et al. 2015 p. 371)

Defining “transference neurosis” as “an interactional representation in the therapeutic relationship of the patient’s intrapsychic conflicts” (Thomä and Kächele, 1987, p.331) the authors view “the concrete arrangement” of it as “a function of the analytic process.” (op. cit. p.331) The “form” is unique for each dyad, so psychoanalysis can be seen as a historical science. A view supporting the task of “...a descriptive enterprise, as a job to develop tools with which to describe the vast amount of verbal transactions that make up a psychoanalytic treatment.” (Kächele 1992, p.3)

In a bottom-up *and* top-down way of approaching data, the steps taken by Ulm Process Research Group begun with improving the traditional case study developing a systematic time sampled clinical description, and from here to rating approaches for reducing “interpretation” as a variable of the previous qualitative or mixed methods,

the next step in approaching the complexity of the data was to grip the raw material (verbatim records) with the help of computer assisted procedures. So, they arrived at a four-level approach:

1. clinical case study (ordinary clinical description);
2. systematic clinical description (analysis of audio recordings to identify characteristic themes belonging to various phases of treatment);
3. guided clinical judgement procedures (using conceptual themes under manual guided clinical judgement)
4. computer-assisted and linguistic text analysis.

A multilevel approach that reflects “that the tension between clinical meaningfulness and objectification cannot be creatively solved by using one approach only” (Kächele et al. 2009, p.19) a perspective that lets us see that the basic function of binocularity, i.e., a solution for gaining depth, it is germane for approaching the complex realities of the treatments. The first level, clinical case study based on the “good memory of the analyst”, brings the idea that “the use of vignettes to illustrate a point is not a convincing means for explaining.” (Kächele and Thomä 1993, p. 118)

As such a systematic and cross-sectional description was developed, which “requires establishing chief headings under which the material is to be categorized.” (Kächele et al. 2009, p.152), i.e., pre-sets under ‘objective description’ constraints, which involve only what was manifest in the dialogue and “will focus on determinations that can be made from the recordings by an uninvolved third party.” (Kächele et al., op. cit. p. 152).

As such the data (verbatim transcribed sessions) provided the sample (a couple of series of contiguous groups of 5 sessions that started the blocks of 50 session and contiguous groups of 5 sessions that started the blocks of 25 sessions)

Moving away from the “clinical narration”, the clinical descriptive step (by third parties) procured a reliable perspective of what happened. The assumption made is that “repeated descriptions in fixed time intervals capture the decisive process of change that have occurred” (op. cit. p. 372) The systematic description is structured according to the following: a) The patient’s symptoms; b) The patient’s external situation; c) Ideas from extra-analytic reference persons; d) The analytic situation from the patient’s perspective; e) The analytic situation from the analyst’s perspective; f) The patient’s psychodynamics (Thomä et al. 1973, quoted in Mergenthaler, 1985 p.2)

There are several cases studied through such multiple approaches (Christian Y, The Student, Amalia X, Franziska X and Gustav Y, e.g., Kächele 1992). For Amalia X with the above sample criterion (in the multilevel approach there is a longitudinal CCRT-LU), the systematic description made clear the orderly progress of analysis. The rearrangement of qualitative data “by concatenating all of the transference descriptions, and by doing this, one can gain a good view regarding the development of major transference issues” (Kächele 1992, p. 5).

The unconscious process that arrives to be distinguishable within such systematic sampling, arrives to this or that “form” as outcome of the negotiation between needs and wishes of the patient and how the analyst handles these “perturbations” (e.g., Kächele and Thomä 1993, p. 114)

In this negotiation a growing importance acquires “narrative”, an interactional event which is also occupying the core of CCRT and makes one wonder “what role narrative plays?” not only in these larger units but in those “momentarily small events that make up our worlds of experience” (Stern, 2004 p.9).

Reducing complexity, through systematic sampling and systematic description, lets one to see that “At any given point in treatment, the relationship between the patient and the analyst is couched in a narrative pattern that clinicians are

very apt to spot.” (Kächele et al. 2015, p. 273) And from here, from narrative accounting, through systematic investigation and sampling which is giving shape to a systematic clinical description, the accounts generate a new understanding of the data, identifying phases in the course of treatment and ways the specific dyad (Amalia X and Thomä) concatenates these phases. The results of systematic sampling and description, in the case of Amalia X, are showing that the negotiations between patient and analyst evolve from more passive voice towards a more active voice in treatment.

Systematic clinical description is a mixed mode of approaching data, a clear progress from previous ordinary clinical case presentation, that evolved towards more objective measures, feeding up a process of evidence finding. The “Guided Clinical Judgments Procedures” is a move towards gaining more detail than the previous “systematic clinical description”. “This is achieved by selecting theoretical concepts for which observational referents can be specified.” (Kächele 1992, p.8)

Transference, Core conflictual relationship theme (CCRT) (e.g., Kächele et al. 2009, pp. 278-297), anxiety, working-alliance, changes in self-esteem (op. cit. pp. 245-256), suffering, emotional insight (op. cit. pp. 238-245) or cognitive changes during psychoanalysis, were preferred concepts, for which manual guided clinical judgements were developed and applied.

In the case of Amalia X, one in many clinical judgement procedures, followed L. Neudert manual for scoring the patient’s types and intensities of suffering. The chart resulted shows two phases within the analysis. In Phase One it is described Amalia’s suffering from her own deficiencies and Phase Two was dominated by the expressed sufferings from reactions in the environment (including the analyst).

This guided clinical judgement illustrates that those phases of process, and the conceptual dimensions are not independent, there are no “universals”, in the way causal connections would provide, “Hypothetically assumed causal connections

between symptoms and their unconscious causes follow statistical probabilities and therefore cannot be deduced from scientific laws.” (Kächele et al. 2009, p. 21) An aspect that underlines the close relation between data and the tools employed in questioning (e.g., Can be distinguished phases of process? Are these supporting the “ongoing, temporally unlimited focal therapy with a changing focus”? etc.). The idea, substantiated by research, that causal connections cannot be deduced is an important finding, that underlines the conflict between a state of facts and a ongoingly search for universals that begun before Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, 1900/1953a). What should be underlined is that “all results of these techniques of studying psychoanalytic dialogues underscore the dyadic nature of the process. Whatever microsystem is analysed, one finds dyadic dependencies and specifics within dyads” (Kächele et al. 2009, p.13)

The fourth level, namely “Computer assisted and linguistic analysis of the text”, is a further step, “a tool to tackle the manifold problems that are tied up with rating systems.” (Kächele and Thomä 1993, p. 120) and has as objective “(...) to develop a descriptive tool for the identification of focally determined phases in analytic treatments.” (Kächele, 1988 p. 72)

“Computer assisted and linguistic analysis of the text”, regarding description and identification, produced studies in long-term transference trends (Kächele et al. 2009), changes in latent meaning and redundancy in patient’s and therapist’s language (Mergenthaler and Kächele, 1985, 1988), classification of anxiety themes (Grünzig and Kächele, 1978), cognitive changes during psychoanalysis (Leuzinger-Bohleber and Kächele, 1988) or changes of latent meaning structures (Mergenthaler and Kächele 1985) amongst other many studies there is notable the attention gathered by the realization that “conversational and discourse analytical methods was crucial

moving the pragmatic use of language as speech on empirical grounds.” (Kächele et al. 2009, p. 335)

Both axes (computing and pragmatics) are offering promising tools, which are evolving quickly (e.g., computing) or providing powerful methodologies (e.g., Conversation Analysis), first one able to handle large amounts of data while the second providing access to minute details and valuable findings. A path was drawn for psychoanalytical process research needs to start from clinical experience that provides a kind of trial and error regarding the observational tools employed, “Once we are able to go beyond clinical descriptions, we may be in a better position to decide which model of process fits the data best.” (Kächele, et al 2015 p. 377)

On this base, of new observational tools, the fourth level, “Computer assisted and linguistic analysis of the text”, is a solid and developing source of answers, i.e., evidence, regarding process, in the line of: “Only the systematic examination of the process generates demonstrable statements that can also withstand the critical view of outsiders.” (Kächele et al. 2009, p.398)

The computer assisted content analysis was also employed for developing models, as the Therapeutic Cycle Model (TCM) (Mergenthaler, 1997; 1998), or The Ulm Text bank. The Ulm Textbank and the Ulm Textbank Managements System evolved from gathering of large amounts of data, having several goals (e.g., Kächele et al. 2009, pp. 341-351). “The primary purpose of the Ulm Textbank is to serve as a foundation for empirical research into the psychoanalytic process.” (Mergenthaler, 1985 p.46)



### 3.3.3. CONVERSATION ANALYSIS

Conversation analysis (CA) arose from the fields of sociolinguistics (Goffman, 1964) and ethnomethodology<sup>38</sup> (Garfinkel, 1967) and was initially developed by Harvey Sacks (1992) and his colleagues (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974) at the University of California in the 1960s and early 1970s (Peräkylä et al. 2008, p. 12; Buchholz and Kächele 2013 p.9).

In “A simplest systematics for the organization of turn taking for conversation” Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) assert that turn taking might be a basic form of organization of conversation. Turn-taking “appears to have an appropriate sort of general abstractness and local particularization” (p.700). In this article Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson presented a model, i.e., set of rules, for a ‘turn-construction component’ and a ‘turn-allocation component’ (pp. 702-703), i.e., the system for conversation, and with these a research methodology opened.

The model provides “a systematic basis for speaker-change and its recurrence” (op. cit. p.706) as well as in “one party speaks at a time” it deals with occurrence of overlapping. It should be underlined that each turn we take is devised to *do* something, including overlapping. The ordering of speakers is locally controlled (i.e., turn by turn) governed by two features of the system “a) single turns are allocated at a time, and b) for each such allocation, a series of options is provided each of which can provide for different next speakers” (op. cit. p. 708)

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<sup>38</sup> Originally a technique based on direct observation, which became “the study of the means (methods) that people (ethno) use in their everyday lives to recognize, interpret, and classify their own and others’ actions” (Gobo and Marciniak 2016, p. 110)

In the architecture of dialogue turns at talk are incrementally built out of a succession of turn constructional units (TCU) such as sentences, clauses, phrases and single words. Each TCU is a coherent and self-contained utterance (i.e., autonomous in the context of that conversation). It arrives to completion and establishes a context recognizable transition relevant place (TRP) where a change of speaker may or may not happen. Completion also involves ellipsis, or forms of implying this or that, that will let a single word or a silence to convey/generate a TRP.

Here the turn-allocation component or technique enters the frame, under two distinct groups “(a) those in which next turn is allocated speaker’s selecting next speaker; and (b) those in which a next turn is allocated self-selection.” (p. 703)

Sacks (1984, p.21) underlines that sociology can be a natural observational science, and such statement needs a research program to be supported. A research program, built up on the above model, that generated several empirical findings, which are underlined by Sacks in “Notes on Methodology” (1984):

- “The detailed ways in which actual, naturally occurring social activities occur are subjectable to formal description.
- Social activities - actual, singular sequences of them - are methodical occurrences. That is, their description consists of the description of sets of formal procedures persons employ.
- The methods persons employ to produce their activities permit formal description of singular occurrences that are generalizable in intuitively nonapparent ways and are highly reproducibly usable.” (op. cit. p.21)

In CA the raw material (data) consists of video or tapes, transcribed so, as in the previous chapter, we find again the idea that “tape recordings and transcripts based on them can provide for highly detailed and publicly accessible representations of

social interaction” (Peräkylä, 1997, p. 203) and “serves as a control on the limitations and fallibilities of intuition and recollection” (Heritage and Atkinson, 1984 p.4). And that while enhancing “the range and precision of the observations that can be made” (op. cit. p.4). Accessibility and detail as well as the presence of means for verification that this is (or it could be) what one claims to be, is another shared idea.

“Conversation Analysis (CA) began with observations, claims, and analyses whose proper analytic locus is action formation / recognition” (Schegloff 2017 p. 435)

Schegloff and Sacks (1973) in “Opening up closings” while shaping this ethnomethodological field, offer a reason why: “to explore the possibility of achieving a naturalistic observational discipline that could deal with the details of social action(s) rigorously, empirically, and formally.” (p.289)

CA’s core is *action* and *sequentiality* (Heritage 2004, 2016; Schegloff 2007) which implies that any utterance derives its meaning from its sentential position. Actions, paraphrasing Austin (1963), are those “things we do through words”, and while sequence is “a course of action implemented through talk” (Schegloff 2007, p.9) *interaction* is defined as:

“the contingently connected sequences of turns in which we each ‘act’,  
and in which the other’s - our recipient’s - response to our turn relies  
upon, and embodies, his/her understanding of what we were doing and  
what we meant to convey in our (prior) turn.” (Drew 2012, p. 131)

In CA all interactions are considered as displaying a structure, while the referential is settled “in words” and not “by words”, or “within” subjects. A structure erected on a turn-to-turn basis (see, e.g., Schegloff 2007). In CA “the primary objects of study are the structures and practices of human social interaction *per se* - not interaction as a carrier of other social phenomena” (Peräkylä 2004, p.3)

Each speaker plays his/her part into the conversational structure in his/her turn. The part is dependent on what has been previously said also by how has been interpreted his/her interlocutor's preceding turn. In a circular manner his/her turn offers the following context while a sum of turns builds a pattern (Sacks et al., 1974).

Interactional order is conceptualized within CA in terms of sequentiality of talk, based on "why that now?" and "what's next?" and on the difference between prior and next action. First action is initiating, constraining, and projecting further actions and the second retrospectively responding to it (Schegloff, 2007). From here, step by step, one arrives at "there is order at all points" (e.g., Sacks, quoted in Jefferson, 1984 p.197), arrival granted under Conversation Analysis tools.

A basic structure is the "adjacency pair" which "consist of sequences which properly have the following features: (1) two utterance length, (2) adjacent positioning of component utterances, (3) different speakers producing each utterance." (Schegloff and Sacks 1973, p. 295)

Regarding sequentiality and "adjacency pair", the "sequential implicativeness" answers to "how larger parts of talk are related and organized?". Any utterance in interaction, including those which are not produced as an element of an adjacency pair, "proposes a here-and-now definition of the situation to which subsequent talk will be oriented" (Heritage and Atkinson, 1984, p. 5). Schegloff and Sacks (1973) named this generic property of utterances their "sequential implicativeness." Sequential implicativeness means that "an utterance projects for the sequentially following turn(s) the relevance of a determinate range of occurrences (be they utterance types, activities, speaker selections, etc.). It thus has sequentially organized implications." (Schegloff and Sacks 1973, note 6 p. 296) In different words the domain enlarges considerably beyond the limits of adjacency pair itself.

Sidnell (2012) regarding “action formation / recognition”, as research inductive process (circularity is avoided through generating new levels of meaning), implies as first step “noticing of some distinctive bit of behaviour in social interaction” in naturally occurring occasions of everyday interaction. This is followed by finding out *other* instances of everyday interactions and the analyst “in the process, begins to identify the boundaries of the phenomenon of interest.” From here a collection is assembled and so “the analyst can begin to describe the practice or phenomenon in terms of its generic, context-independent properties.” (p. 78)

Under the assumption that all types of social interaction exhibit organized patterns of stable, recurrent operational features (as we can see in Sidnell quoted above or in Sacks’ (1984, p. 24) – “order at all points”) CA provides a passageway to empirical research, opening to observational of analytic interaction. CA was recognized as a valuable tool in psychotherapy research (e.g., Peräkylä et al. 2008, Peräkylä and Sorjonen, 2012; Buchholz and Kächele 2013), and the empirical emphasis on the CA, under the constrain of naturally occurring data, resonates with the above fourth level from Ulm model, as Kächele et al. (2009) put it: “it is obvious that such tools would be of high relevance to psychotherapy as an exquisite dialogic enterprise.” (p.335) Another ‘reason why’ is captured in the observation that employing the data with an *inductive* mind frame, while setting observation in the core of our inquiry, we arrive to see that “what psychoanalysis *is* begins to be defined in terms of what psychoanalysts *do*. To apply CA-methods to psychoanalysis endorses that line of thinking.” (Buchholz and Kächele 2013, p. 6 italics in original).

So, what needs to be underlined is the idea of practice, of identifying what actions like asking, telling, requesting, offering, inviting, complaining, announcing, etc. and to describe those practices devised for accomplishing them. But what is “practice”? In the CA “practice” is defined as

“any feature of the design of a turn in a sequence that (i) has a distinctive character, (ii) has specific locations within a turn or sequence, and (iii) is distinctive in its consequences for the nature or the meaning of the action that the turn implements.” (Heritage 2016, p. 212)

As CA does not commit to pre-existing theories and instead adopts an open-minded approach to the exploration of interaction, uncovers practices and discovers patterns of interaction of which therapists may be unaware (Peräkylä 2013). Such patterns of interaction can be seen in “reasoning” as doing, a process of meaning finding / meaning making from an everyday situation. Freud (1913/1958) while mirroring analysis into the game of chess for describing both the rules of the analytic game and learning the game of analysis (p. 123) ‘reasons’ from within the medical model.

The game is organized by turn taking (e.g., associations → interpretations → associations → ...) along with other set of rules (i.e., the analytic frame) that function as a grammar of it. These happenings unfold within the doings (e.g., verbal interaction) of a pair of “players”. In fact, the game (either chess or analysis) is made of a couple of players (i.e., who) and their playing the game (i.e., what) within the frame (i.e., how) set by the rules of the game. In this well-known Freudian analogy, a dyadic view is not taken, that is considering the change within *how* the play changes (or plays) the very players playing the game of analysis. The dynamic of the dyad should answer to how and what the dyad does.

In CA it is shown (e.g., Livingston, 2006; 2017) that *reasoning* is “domain specific” and “appears as a worldly type of thing that belongs to, and is part of, an activity.” (Livingston 2017, p.9). There are no reasons to considering the verbal interaction during the session, (i.e., the who, what, how and for what of the doings of the session), as not “domain specific”. While exploring the game of checkers

Livingston, in “Ethnographies of Reason” (2017), notes that “reasoning seems to belong particularly to the game” (p.8), it isn’t a “universal reasoning that is applied to” but “it’s a type of reasoning indigenous to, living within, and sustained by the practices of cross board play” (p.8). Noting that skill and reasoning are related, Livingston underlines that “reasoning” involves perception, as such a skilled player sees the checkerboard differently than others, “look at it in terms of how the checkers ‘work together’” (p.9). This *working together*, the dyadic enterprise, is what makes a difference, including the chess game, and observing and understanding interaction. Interaction is the very compass employed so to playing chess against himself one is not “get lost among the paradoxes of self-reference.” (Buchholz, 2020 p. 167).

Either the process unfolding in the session or the process emerging from the meeting of a couple of practices, looking at this piece of interaction on the surface of the session as preserved by recordings/transcriptions. It should be underlined that what is meaningful and how meaning arrives to be made is provided by data, as turn taking itself and not by the investigator. As such “CA concerns itself with the ‘procedural infrastructure of interaction’, where a procedure is a tool for “achieving a joint understanding of what is going on” (Schegloff, 1992, p. 1338)”. (Lepper 2009 p.1078)

When the focus is set onto “the second-by-second, or utterance-by-utterance, unfolding of psychotherapeutic sessions” (Peräkylä et al. 2008, p. 7), the game offers access not only to the “game” but to the players playing the game as well, and answers to how subjects design “talk”: “Utterances that arise from what happened just before and create conditions for what can happen next form social actions.” (op. cit. p. 13)

Here we can find the place where Karl Bühler’s (1934) theory of language turns to help, and what recommends such view is that these “social tools” in their use we find intentionality, purposeful use in communicating, as such “language is a tool, an

instrumental auxiliary, by means of which one person can communicate something about something to someone.” (Hörmann1986, p.81)

### 3.4. ORGANON MODEL AND DEIXIS

Karl Bühler’s model of triadic semantic function of language (Fig. 2) and the concept of deictic field are close to the development of the present model. “One - to the other - about things: these are three points among which this model establishes relationships.” (Hörmann, 1986 p. 81) As such, according to Hörmann (op. cit.), Bühler discriminates amongst three types of relations in speech:

1. To the one who says it
2. To the one who hears it
3. To what is being spoken about (p.81)

Besides these, the assumption made by Bühler that fantasy and reality are indistinguishable, both are a road open towards “affect ↔ cognition” mutual engenderment, or “empathy ↔ intuition”, or towards “embodiment ↔ thinking” co-creation (see infra) as well as questioning the couple as entity.




Fig. 2

Organon Model (Bühler, 1934/1982 p.34)



As asking about the session we need to have a “model” for what a session is. Language and its functions need the same treatment. A well-known object, that arrives to be without any definition is a sure path towards confusion, and in the case of language these are more so, as we are using language to try a definition of language. Bühler’s model of the triadic semantic function of language is shown in Fig. 2 above.

The *organon model* emerges from Bühler’s pragmatic thesis that “What human language does is threefold: profession, triggering and representation.”<sup>39</sup> (Bühler, 1918 in Bühler 1934/1990 p. 35). These aspects are seen from within speech, from within the phenomenon, as such “representation, expression, and appeal are, according to Bühler, the three characteristic accomplishments of language.” (Hörmann, 1986 p. 82) Even if symbolic forms are usually regarded as externalizations of internal, individual senses of self, an observational field is most needed, while in this field the subjective and personal event arrives to objective and even conventional expressions.

Speech context is introduced by Bühler in terms of interlocking fields. Bühler argues that natural languages have one deictic field (Zeigfeld) and many symbolic fields (Symbolfelder). A symbolic field covers “all type of relations between the lexical elements which are important for the interpretation of a given utterance, syntagmatic and paradigmatic.” (Auer, 1988/2000 p. 266) We recognize that in this model the “what” is organic paired with “how”, the verbal and extraverbal aren’t divorced, but both are part of how we speech our speech. So, is it this model suited for approaching “objects and state of affairs” as language use events? That is to “A → AX”, to a recursive building up of a domain? If human thought is seen as relational

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<sup>39</sup> “Today I prefer the terms expression (Ausdruck), appeal (Appell) and representation” (op. cit. p.35)

and recursive, and as simultaneous present to both participants, it is making an event of the couple.

Bühler proposes three types of deixis, categorized by their use: i) “demonstratio ad oculos”, ii) “anaphoric deixis”, and iii) “deixis am phantasma”. It should be noted that the structure of “demonstratio ad oculos” includes reference (it is anchored in the environment) and has intent and subjectivity.

“If human cognition is fundamentally intentional in the sense of being about or directed towards something, reference is a form of shared intentionality in which the cognitive focus of two or more persons is aligned and jointly focused. In deictic reference, this directing of attention is accomplished by relating an object of reference to some aspect of the event of speaking - the indexical Origo (Bühler 1934 /1990) - via a ground.” (Sidnell and Enfield, 2017, p.217)

Bühler’s deictic system illustrates a complexification of content, context, and form, from the cooccurrence of object and deictic sign (i) to a displacement of object and sign (ii and iii). First, we need to ask where are they manifest while pointing to? Bühler’s answer runs along the lines that these are occurring in the deictic field, in respect to the “Origo” (*here, now, I* – see *infra*).

Deictic events are distinguished from other “language-as-a-system” events, through the participation of what they mean of “non-linguistic” events (which from this point open the world of objects and state of events to itself). For Bühler, “The two fields, the deictic field (of things) and the symbolic field of language, are thus bound together (...) by a third, namely by the contextual deictic field.” (op. cit. p.140) and he underlines the relation between these layers, between these systems, as “symbolic” being emergent from “deictic”, while emergence stands for something that can be seen as separate from the processual deictic field generating the new system, the symbolic:

“One of the essential characteristics of the symbolic system of language is its deliverance from the deictic field, so that the elements (words, as parts of the sentence) gain their meaning from the symbolic field (*Symbolfeld*) and its syntactical forms. Thus, within the symbolic system, language’s relationship with the world, or the symbol-world relationship, *can seem* to be severed.” (Bühler, op. cit. p.435)

This “deictic context” as concept seems to propose a link between presence, perception and speech. The very tools we employ in what we designate as “talking cure”, in establishing verbal interactions as well as for establishing domains of implicit relational understanding (Stern et al., 1998). First deixis is *Demonstratio ad oculos*:

“The arm and finger gesture of man, to which the index finger owes its name, recurs when the signpost imitates the outstretched “arm”; in addition to the arrow symbol, this gesture is a widespread sign to point the way or the direction.” (Bühler, 1934/1990 p.93).

“*Demonstratio ad oculos*” characterizes those representations (word or gesture) which are bound to the perceptual or situational context, belongs to the actual and concrete context of communication, i.e., “factual pointing”. One example, regarding an “action system” needed for orientation in the environment, one “... opens his mouth and begins to speak deictically, he says, for example, *there! is where the station must be*, and assumes temporarily the posture of a signpost.” (op. cit. p. 145)

“*Demonstratio ad oculos*”, qualifies as the earliest use of deixis (West, 2013 p.24; Sidnell and Enfield, 2017). Ontogenetically it employs either gestural indices, or verbal ones (separately or conjoined). Before words, pointing at objects or persons are gestures that communicate, at least for the caretakers, the needs or wishes of the infant.

This “deictic field” is dependent on the perceptual field of the subjects and acquires organization through interaction. In “Communication: The Social Matrix of

Psychiatry” Ruesch and Bateson (1951) describe the same form as the contextual deictic field: “The mutual recognition of having entered into each other’s field of perception equals the establishment of a system of communication.” (p.35)

Open to and build upon sensorium, the events of this deictic field are subjected to achieve higher levels of manifestation, of transformation (i.e., more complex). Blushing could qualify for such an event, if seen as a communication event. The context will clarify if the “action” response is conveying “shame”, “excitement”, “pleasure” or “fury”, amongst many other functions such a ‘signposting’ would potentially point to. So, “other optical or acoustic cues can be used instead of the finger gesture, and all of them can be replaced by indirect situational evidence or conventional interpretational clues.” (Bühler, op. cit. p.127)

If emotion is seen as pertaining to this deictic field (i.e., “it points to ↔ it demonstrates”), in the dimension of “I”, Trevarthen’s (1979) observations of young children interacting with their mothers, answer to *how* structure is acquired by the couple, how the “Origo” is encoded as they are building up “protoconversations”. Research shows that such exchanges are following a turn taking structure, a turn taking of emotional expressions towards one another. Stern (1985) and Tronick (2007) underline another organizer of interaction, the “emotional attunement” between mother and infant, either while they are mirroring each other (in intensity and valence) or when such process is hindered (still face paradigm) showing intentions and expectations in these protoconversations, equating that “the linguistic “code” rests on a nonlinguistic infrastructure of intentional understanding and common conceptual ground, which is in fact logically primary” (Tomasello, 2010 p. 58).

In this field, of an oriented body generating a “coordinate system”, where left and right, up and down, front and back, are well determined, the perceptual and the deictic are overlapping, and the relations between subjects and their perceptions are

organized. Even more, some time before “joint attention” captured researchers’ attention, Ruesch and Bateson (1951) assert that mutuality is at work in how *presence* is modulated by the participants:

“The perception of the perception, as we might call this phenomenon, is the sign that a silent agreement has been reached by the participants, to the effect that mutual influence is to be expected.” (p.35)

Deictic expressions have a shifting meaning, depending on when, where and by whom they are used, while “mutual influence is to be expected”. An inhabitant of this deictic field, mentioned above, which is seen as an emergent form of interaction, is “joint attention” (e.g., Bruner 1983; Tomasello 2019). Joint attention comprises three basic components i) the actor, ii) the addressee and iii) an object of reference. To communicate the actor and the addressee must jointly focus their attention on the same entity or situation, and that this attending to the same “object” is recognized by both partners (Bruner 1983, Eilan 2005, Tomasello 1995, 1999, 2019).

“Demonstratio ad oculos” qualifies as the means to assume the point of view of another person, which is present, knowing him, cognizance that self can assume a listener role. This is still “demonstratio ad oculos”. One’s perspective and that of another, match. The perceptual experience can define the other’s point of view while triangulation can occur.

Anaphoric deixis is the second form delineated by Bühler. Anaphora is, simply put, the way a word in a sentence point to other sentence(s) around it. It is a “recourse to what has been said or anticipation of what is yet to be said in the context, whether the reference is explicitly formulated or not.” (Bühler1934/1990, p.189) Getting closer to what anaphora does or how it works, what defines it is the linking, making of interconnections of a present verbal occurrence either to a verbal expression or to any

previous event, no matter the domain of manifestation of such former event. “In the phenomenon of anaphora, developing speech turns back towards itself (op. cit. p.140)

“Seen from a psychological perspective every anaphoric use of deictic words presupposes one thing: that the sender and the receiver *have the flow of speech in front of them* and can reach ahead and back to its parts.” (Bühler 1934/1990, p.138, italics in original)

Anaphoric deixis is a speech event that involves embedding, while “Here, Now, I” makes from it a creature of moment and place and situation, a state of “wandering”, almost a free associative walk. Anaphora, as seen by Bühler, “transforms the context itself into a deictic field” (op. cit. p.439). As in prior form of deixis, anaphoric deixis makes a field, an “universe of discourse” that is emerging from language use and embedment and points to language use and embedment.

For Buhler the third type of deixis, *deixis am phantasma*, implies many operations, that we also met in our consulting room, on daily basis. He asks: “how it is possible to guide and be guided when oriented on something absent?” (p.142)

The conclusion he arrives to “how” is a description of what builds up the core of *deixis am phantasma*: “it turns out that the role played by this orientation is transferred in toto to “imagined space”, to the realm of the somewhere or other of pure phantasy, the realm of the here and there of memory.” (p. 142) A place or an imagined place becomes an “object” of *observation* through language. We can witness events to which the patient or ourselves will point to, that may never happen, that are employed to convey a particular meaning of what is. The established contiguity between the location of the speaker (Origo) and the absent object or event, is what arrives to perform a different role in analysis. Like a dream, or other such beings summoned to enter the fabric of the session.

## 4. FROM A DYADIC PERSPECTIVE TO A TRIADIC ONE.

### CONCEPTUALIZING THE MODEL

#### 4.1. MATHEMATICAL MODELLING?

It is a truism to assert that mathematics is not well-liked amongst research minded psychoanalysts or theoreticians. There are several exceptions, like Mate-Blanco's (1975) study: "Unconscious as Infinite Sets. An essay in Bi-logic". Another example can be found in how Dynamic Systems Theories (DST) or Complex Systems (CS) are employed, nowadays recognized as a potential source of answers (e.g., Galatzer-Levy 2017), even if they are employed mainly as sources of metaphor and analogies. But mathematics is not quite popular.

The following description is easily recognizable for any practicing psychoanalyst: "a process in which relationships of one kind are interwoven with relationships of other kinds, while this whole is organized by relationships of yet different kinds" (Bohm and Peat 1987, p.147). Yet this description is meant to answer to "what a mathematician does". Maybe the rift is not so big after all.

In employing mathematics as algebra, algorithms, complex systems, topology, or dynamic systems theories what is obvious is that "data" or "facts" of psychoanalysis should be settled, as mathematics needs an answer to "what are the facts?" in the first place. Asking: "is there a mathematics of relating?" or "is there an algebra of interaction?" in these questions it is implicit that if there is an answer or not, then it would have the issues regarding *facts* settled.

What facts are well defined so to provide the raw data? There is an interaction that has as "visible" trace a recording. This recording provides a transcript, i.e., access to their talk, and to what they are doing through this talk, as in: "They examine what

is talked about and they examine the context in which it is talked about: that is, who they are for each other.” (Levenson 1983, p. 8). As said, this is data.

The psychoanalyst Edgar Levenson (1978), asserts that the psychoanalytical process is a language process, “which allows for, indeed requires, the synthesis of these two paradoxically oppositional aspects of therapy; the aspect of meaning and the aspect of experience.” (p.6) Levenson proposes a linguistic discourse algorithm of three steps:

1. “The establishment and definition of the therapeutic frame.
2. The elaboration and enrichment of implicate and explicate order in the patient’s life.
3. The elucidation of this order in the therapist–patient relationship.”

(Levenson, 1983 pp. 54-55, quoted in Foehl, 2008 p.1240)

Within Levenson’s algorithm, even if dealing with ontological concepts, what is implicit in it is “the use of language”, so the sequence is a blueprint for linguistic discourse. Yet implicate and explicate order ask a different approach, as within this perspective the *interdependence of relations* becomes a way of observing the world, replacing the deterministic order of things with order understood as “neither solely in the subject nor solely in the object, but instead in the cycle of activity that includes both.” (Bohm and Peat 1987, p. 149).

This change of perspective makes the transformation from similar and different as characteristics of order, given by succession, to “similar differences and different similarities” (op. cit. p 149) within the elaboration and elucidation as doings, and brings simultaneity into consideration as well. One can see this move of accent in Levenson’s idea of “enactment of the content”, that is “the therapist formulates a truth, and in the process of telling the truth, the therapist participates with the patient around the truth that he is telling the patient.” (Levenson, 1978, p.4).



The idea of “generative order”, that leads to “implicate order” (used by Levenson in assembling his algorithm), is introduced by David Bohm, one of the most noteworthy physicists of the last century. His contributions, then seen as unorthodox, extent from Quantum Theory to Philosophy to Neuropsychology.

Generative order involves “similar differences and different similarities”, and within this “order” the whole doesn’t emerge from accumulation of detail, but this kind of order is captured in the process of unfolding of a glimpse of a whole, emphasizing, as a feature of generative order, that “a process of creation may begin from some broad encompassing overall perception.” (Bohm and Peat 1987, p. 160)

Implicate order (or enfolded order) is encompassed by the generative one. The essential feature of enfolded order is “the simultaneous presence of sequence of many degrees of enfoldment with similar differences between them.” (op. cit. p. 174) Implicate order, sometimes tacitly acknowledged, of parts enfolding the whole, contrast with an “explicate or unfolded order, in which similar differences are all present together, in a manifest and extended form” (op. cit. p. 174), and it should be noted that in this view, echoing the hermeneutic circle, it is understood that “Language is also an enfolded order. Meaning is enfolded in the structure of the language, and meaning unfolds into thought, feeling, and all the activities” (Bohm and Peat 1987 p. 185). An example given by Bohm (1987, pp. 172-174), a simple experiment, consists of an ink drop situated in glycerine, which is filling the interstice between two glass cylinders that can be turned. Turning one cylinder the ink droplet becomes invisible, “lost” in the movements of the ensemble. No order is visible, is hidden within movement. Reversing the movement, the ink droplet is re-established as from nothing. After the first movement the droplet is enfolded into the glycerine (an order while dissipated) with the reverse movement the droplet unfolds (a different kind of order). The invisible droplet stays for the implicate, the visible for the explicate order.

In Levenson's algorithm the "analytic frame" while established is the milieu for manifestation of order through relating, and "the elaboration and enrichment of implicate and explicate order in the patient's life" involves how parts are enfolding the whole and how unfolding allows the manifestation of a particular event.

Within the algorithm this dialectic of order is hypothesized that travels from the life of the patient to the life of the analytic couple, a (hi)story making a (hi)story. As such, the implicate order lets "parts" (or sequences of interaction) with many degrees of enfoldment to evolve, while this hidden order arrives to be manifest by unfolding of process in actual interaction.

#### **4.1.1. THE COUPLE AS PARTICIPANT**

How looks the above algorithm when the couple is seen as part, as generator of the analytic process? The environment is constituted from silences, phonemes, tones, rhythms, words, sentences, turns, narratives, and narratives of narratives. If the couple is part of the process, then the above algorithm is different. The 1<sup>st</sup> step, "frame", needs to be a set of dynamic relations that organizes the couple's environment (and not a rigid set of instructions for thinking and feeling). It plays as an underlying dynamic structure of and for verbal interaction. The 3<sup>rd</sup> step, "the elucidation of this order in the therapist-patient relationship" needs to accommodate the participation of the couple, while the 2<sup>nd</sup>, in a similar way, needs to consider the participation of more than one world (e.g., of the patient), as making a multileveled reality (that includes the couple's environment as well). The adjustments to the 2<sup>nd</sup> step need to be made considering the adjustments of the 3<sup>rd</sup> and vice versa.

"Elucidation" implies the transformation of an unknown into something recognizable, it is "solving a puzzle" or "adapting to what happens" whilst "what is

happening” is waiting for a meaning to emerge so adaptation arrives to happen. And this process begins from making distinctions in the environment, where the very “elucidation” happens.

If the couple is part of “elucidation” process, then we deal with a basic level of structuring the environment (of the analyst and patient, e.g., elaboration and enrichment), with a level emerging from it (e.g., the couple’s participation to elaboration and enrichment) and with the interaction between these levels. If the couple participates, then we should meet at this level and in how the levels interact, an “enactment of content”, whilst the “content” is provided by “relating” and so the levels are interconnected.

As such the 3<sup>rd</sup> step, if the couple is considered as part of the “elucidation”, then such participation considers therapist–patient relationship as the “what” from which the couple evolves, and, at the same time, the couple as a basic factor in “how” such relationship evolves into new forms of relating. So, third step could be the elucidation of this order in the therapist–patient relationship under enactment of content by the analytic couple.

What would be “enactment of content” at the couple’s level? In short it will be the base onto and from which a “next level event” emerges, a new level that generates change in relationship, e.g., transforming indifference into intimacy.

The modified algorithm has the second step: The elaboration and enrichment of implicate and explicate order in the patient’s life, enfolding the couple’s environment, and the third one as: The elucidation of this order in the therapist–patient relationship, while the couple’s enactment of content provides context within which the therapist–patient relationship is transformed. So, the algorithm becomes: “frame” → “elaboration and enrichment” → “enacting of content” → “next-level-event”.

#### 4.1.2. AMALIA 152<sup>ND</sup> SESSION - WINDOW OPENING EPISODE

The modified algorithm presented in the previous chapter establishes the following flux: “frame” → “elaboration and enrichment” → “enacting of content” → “next-level-event”. An example can probe the plausibility of such flux.

The fragment is extracted from the session 152<sup>nd</sup> (the session’s transcript is in Annex 3). It is a turning point in the relational field built by them along the session (see Chapter 5.12). From here on they move to higher levels of openness, of intimacy.

A few moments before the fragment presented below, Amalia, from a seemingly ‘we are not together’, arrives to say that (line 290) “... you didn’t really mean that objectively, but simply that – I think you laugh too little”. This utterance makes use of an ‘I’, which is the ‘I’ of the speaker as seen by the other, as seen by the speaker. It is a recursive ‘I’, traveling back to ‘me’ through a ‘you’, which implies with necessity a recursive “you”, swinging in an alike movement<sup>40</sup>.

Recursion refers to a procedure, operation or an action that calls itself (see Chapter 4.5. Recursion). Structurally, recursion is defined as a constituent that contains a constituent of the same kind, an event embedded in an event of the same type.

In terms of content, she assumes by delivering an answer to an implicit, an unasked question, i.e., what is in Thomä’s head<sup>41</sup>. She tries to make an opening, and, by the same move she is closing Thomä, by seeing a sort of indifference to what he says, setting her “we are not together” state into his sayings, i.e., projecting.

In this, if the algorithm is attended, while observing the couple’s doings, then this recursive ‘I’ and “you” follow a “blueprint”, re-producing a couple’s recursive

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<sup>40</sup> The theme of “identification with the analyst”, can be one attribute of this utterance delivered by Amalia, in the larger context of the session, while she acts as a researcher, that has as counterpart a nun like approach to relating.

<sup>41</sup> This theme occurs in 152<sup>nd</sup> session on many occasions, shaped in various forms.

movement. Earlier the couple oscillates<sup>42</sup>, there is a “hide-and-seek”, a fluctuation that happens from the very beginning of 152<sup>nd</sup> session. This “hide-and-seek” built recursive events before this interaction and plays as ground onto which the “parts” or “figures” in their dynamic let us perceive an enfolded order of the couple, a “we”.

A fluctuating “we” unfolds into an “I” and “you”, dancing so one counter-acts the other’s steps, but within this ongoing counteracting there are enfolded the ground’s fluctuations. Neither in what one does nor in what the other does, but in their ‘dance’ the enfolded order lives.

According to the algorithm this hide-and-seek, entails how “I” and “you” are developing their interaction, i.e., how “we” unfolds<sup>43</sup> into an “I” and “you” (i.e., elaboration and enrichment of Amalia’s story).

Is the couple participating at “elucidation” (i.e., production of sense)? At a different level of organization, if “I” and “You” are regarded as providing “content<sup>44</sup>”, then, in the fragment that follows, the couple “enacts the content” of this journey of an “I” through an “you” back to oneself, echoed into an “you” through an “I” back to oneself (that should provide an elucidation, an “opening”, a new “we” that emerges through how the couple changes the very relation from which emerges). The fragment:

276. A: and I do really do think, I don’t laugh enough. uh, and uh – your father didn’t laugh enough.  
277. P: he doesn’t laugh at all.  
278. A: and that is, there you have a negative model, uh  
279. P: the most my father does is smile.  
280. A: right.  
281. P: he laughs when I can’t laugh.  
282. A: um-hmm.  
283. P: but almost – as a rule that’s the way it is.  
284. A: um-hmm.  
285. P: that is, when he laughs, I don’t feel like it anymore. I feel like anything but that / / / / couldn’t we open the window

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<sup>42</sup> e.g., when Thomä tries to get closer she moves away, and when she wants to play Thomä gets serious.

<sup>43</sup> Even more, as it is shown in Chapter 5, the whole fragment as part enfolds the session as whole, acts like a “dream thought” for the session.

<sup>44</sup> Like my story or my point of view contrasted with your story.

286. A: yes.  
287. P: it's so muggy today  
288. A: true.

(Transcript/Translation J. Bergmann)

Interaction is shaped through transforming 'what is now', while 'what is now' mirrors something of 'what was then', a transferential move one can say (see 5.12.). A swinging pattern that echoes the earlier "I and you". There is a double reflexion: i) on small scale from few moments ago<sup>45</sup> and ii) on larger scale a picture of Amalia's receiving an "I don't care about you" share, when father was the doer of indifference.

Freud (1912/1958) defined transference as "stereotype plates" (p.99). Representations of early relationship patterns, which structure the perceptions of current relationships. A reoccurrence of some negative feelings (I don't matter for father) from negative feelings (I don't matter for you) is an indicator of a transference movement, a "stereotype plate".

But there is more. In 303, Thomä's "I do really do think, I don't laugh enough", stays as an *opening*. Installs a new line of interaction. Also, it is a "what he really thinks", that answers to Amalia's request for "what he really thinks". It has more than one layer, i.e., a new line of interaction, and is an opening of himself, i.e., an answer that didn't close but opens how they continue.

She responds to this opening, and, in few moments, Amalia opens the consulting room's window (a symbolic → deictic movement of the couple, see Chapter 3.3. and 4.5.). This action is mirroring what Amalia arrives to feel now, in recollecting the feelings she felt then, whilst Thomä performs an opening, a recognition of her needs. Later in the session the theme of "one is recognized" is restated, as Amalia shares her desire to perform a hole in the analyst's head, felt as a place of balance, of

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<sup>45</sup> Amalia was performing a tense "indifference", an "I don't care" about me, about you, arriving at a plan of "taking the veil" of isolation, of monastery, see Chapter 5.

peace (see 5.12). The theme surfaces again and again, as part of the link built by the couple in between “I don’t care” and “I do care” as states belonging to and emerging from the relational field they nurtured and changed with each move.

Thomä’s “I don’t laugh enough” can be qualified also as a thinking about what he thinks, a movement in a symbolic field addressing a relational one. What Thomä conveys here is “if not laughing then laughing is not”. He reflects on and comments about their relation, about me and you, a mirroring of what is happening into what is happening. Amalia answers, (not only) to what Thomä says or does, describing a former pattern, with “if laughing then not laughing”. It is a reversed recursion, an  $A \rightarrow A^{-1}(X)$ , at content level at least, that onto it another field is open, for performing a new recursion, as she moves to open the window.

Moving from a state of (mis)understanding to a new state of understanding implies a ‘new relational air’. A “new relational air” describes the milieu that allows the move that links “doing indifference”, as stereotype plate, from which a harsh atmosphere is an appropriate description (as in  $1 + 1 = 1$  forms of control by not laughing in humiliating the other), with “I do care”. What allows such transformation to unfold needs to emerge from a background onto which restaging a former oppressive relational pattern is transformed through the works of the couple into an opening. Seen as an unfolding, as doing “understanding”, this equates making of links in between participants that are mirroring links in between their “stories” and vice versa. And this involves creativity, a transformation that can be described in the line highlighted by Buchholz (2019a) “This repetition of “many times” is important. It does not belong to “repetition compulsion”. It is a creative process of producing a critical mass of events that then, suddenly, change and jump into another kind of dynamic process.” (p. 190)

Making links involves a specific dynamic of the couple, e.g., cooperation. In the current example those spoken are linked with those performed through this linking. There are successions of mirroring (me and you, now and then, this relation that relation), complexification of the mirrored images and, subsequently, a level stepping<sup>46</sup> to a new level of relating, a “jump into another kind of dynamic process”. These doings, here described as performed by the couple, have an underlying “me and you”, before and from which they are becoming “we” doings.

Following the above, the algorithm “frame” → “elaboration and enrichment” → “enacting of content” → “next-level-event” acquires plausibility.

The background of frame is present, onto it the analytic game unfolds. As soon as Thomä’s opening manifests within interaction, his new attitude changes the game, it transforms Amalia’s expectations. From here Amalia enters the game of ‘elaboration and enrichment’ (277-285), that is followed by ‘enacting of content’.

Amalia’s opening is followed by Amalia opens the window that gathers within many semantic layers (e.g., mirrors analyst opening), and, following it, all the above arrive at “287. P: *It’s so muggy today* 288. T: *True*”, qualifiable as a next level event.

We can hypothesize that within this analytic game, “elaboration” feeds “elucidation” through “enacting of content”, so they are building a ‘new relational air’ from which and onto which a next-level-event emerges.

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<sup>46</sup> As will be shown a level-stepping is achieved through recursion.



### 4.1.3. IT'S SO MUGGY TODAY

In “Amalia opens the window” she is *doing* something without words but significant for what she says (like a child talking and drawing at the same time). A body movement participates into a linguistic dimension (e.g., Buchholz 2007, p.173), it signifies and participates at building up semantic layers. This doing is changing its functions within the couple perspective, moving from ground to figure. While the former figure (what she says and what he says) joins the function of the ground, the figure “opening the window” (possibly) mirrors what the couple does.

This last move is a way of describing through showing, a “muggy” state of mind asks fresh air. As a form of deixis (see 3.3), this recursion involves employing the environment, as provider of a “vocabulary”, and “searching for fresh air” involves Thomä as “environment”.

If “laughing” is seen as a “fresh air” and “muggy” equates the emblem of an oppressive “if laughing then not laughing”, then “if muggy then fresh air” (mirrors Thomä’s “laughing is good”) is a reverse of Amalia’s remembrance. A recursive move, entangling symbolic and deictic in the couple, and becomes “getting closer together” through an opening.

As such, “window opening” is “if not laughing then laughing”, thus a reversed recursion, that links all levels into a single event. Evident in this action is the simultaneous manifestation of several semantic layers.

There is one level, and from it, and context contingent, other semantic layers emerge. So, ‘what is meant’ emerges from events and how these events are shaped into a specific flux (content ↔ context), i.e., ‘what is meant’ is enfolded in the flux of doings. Accordingly, there are several levels accomplished by a specific action “X”, e.g., a verbal event, considering the question “what does it mean “X”?”, (i.e., “X” can

stay for Amalia or Thomä as doer, conceivably X could stay for Amalia *and* Thomä as doer, as in “Amalia is opening the window” or “it’s so muggy today”): i) At content level<sup>47</sup>: What is X saying? (Literal meaning) ii) at contextual level<sup>48</sup>: What communicates X? (Speaker meaning) iii) And from these two, within content context dynamic<sup>49</sup>, and emerging from this dynamic<sup>50</sup>: What is achieved? (Mutual meaning).

All these “semantic” acts are performed by participants unceasingly, in speech *and* listening. If the couple is participant in the production of sense, then there are events qualifiable as cooperation, organizing and self-organizing, performed by the couple. In the example, if the window opening is seen as a couple’s event, then it is a movement from part to whole (enactment of content) which implies a level stepping (upwards), but also, we can see how fluctuation of the couple unfolds into parts, into “I and you” stories of relating told by *both* participants through relating, which is also a level stepping (downwards), as in the figures drawn onto the couple relational fabric “I see you” while doing “I via you back to me”, eventually becomes an “I see myself”.

These levels are hierarchically organized. They interact and through interaction they evolve. Such development happens in sequence, as in above example “it’s so muggy today”, the sequence is offering the context for understanding each content at each level. Saying that “it’s so muggy” after “he laughs when I can’t laugh” lets us see the implicate from what she communicates by “window opening” to Thomä. She

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<sup>47</sup> Amalia’s “it’s so muggy today” is pointing at the “quality off the air”

<sup>48</sup> Amalia’s “it’s so muggy today” can represent an oppressive state of mind, a symbolic communication by which this ‘muggy’ stays for that ‘muggy’, recruiting from context a relational form and from it a new semantic layer emerges.

<sup>49</sup> Amalia’s “it’s so muggy today” qualifies as accepting Thomä’s earlier offer. Interrelating the deictic and symbolic contexts generates a mutual knowledge (she knows that he knows that she knows that he knows, etc.), that implies a new level.

<sup>50</sup> We can extend these to consider explicate and implicate order, as explicit meaning, implicit meaning and at the third level, described as creating new meaning through modulating relating.

makes an opening in the consulting room (later in the session Amalia and Thomä speak about a hole in the analyst's head), and so an embedding of a meaning into "window opening" as interaction is providing the new layer.

In a dyadic perspective the sequence can be seen as a conversation fragment within which Amalia and Thomä use unconsciously tacit skills for: i) cooperation, ii) common organizing, equating a sense of sharing together and iii) self-producing context entailing a surplus of meaning. (Buchholz and Kaechele 2013, p.10) which in a triadic view becomes "elaboration and enrichment" → "enacting of content" → "next-level-event".

Embedding, next to succession, as form of achieving a specific level of organization, asks a continuous formation of new links in between levels. Thus, *simultaneity* is a necessary level (literal, contextual and mutual happenings, as these levels interact, thus shaping each other) within which organization needs to be considered. In this way when trying to approach "order" we need to consider a double dimension of process, in succession and simultaneity.

#### **4.1.4. ORDER – SIMILAR AND DIFFERENT**

If "order" is the topic of inquiry, the association of regular and irregular events, then of similarities and differences (and "similar differences and different similarities") their density and form, i.e., how they are describing the set, provide an answer. It should be specified that absence of pattern is synonymous with noise, i.e., noise equates the absence of predictability within a maximum degree of variance. It is an absence of links, within a set built from non-identical units.

Accordingly, a set made from identical units brings a complete predictability, also an absence of variance. The unpredictable chaotic movements of molecules in a fluid or the immobility and predictability of atoms in a crystal are a pair of examples.

We deal neither with fluids nor with crystals. The environment is made from linguistic events. There are patterns and there is noise assembling this semantic “universe”. As such, “order” in such environment implies both, similarities, and differences, but more important than that are their transformations, e.g., noise into pattern. At the same time, we deal with similar and different, which are answers in comparing an “object” with another one, thus, we deal with an observer, an environment and a pair of events manifesting in this environment and “observed”, i.e., compared. Comparing an event with another event is an operation. Considering again the fluid and the crystal first one gives us a sequence of different “objects”, a sequence of differences, whilst the second a sequence of similarities. Noting with “d” an observable difference and with an “s” an observable similarity, in the first case we arrive at a set of relations  $F = (d, d, d, \dots)$  and in the second case  $C = (s, s, s, \dots)$ .

#### **4.1.4.1. LEVELS WITHIN VERBAL INTERACTION**

In a semantic field we can perform a similar “questioning”, regarding the *content* of a pair of verbal interaction events. This meaning and that meaning, are they similar or different<sup>51</sup>? The reason for comparing this event with that event (e.g., an utterance, a narrative) in terms of content in a specific context, rests in approaching a complex system (the session) regarding the level of “order”. If the system evolves from

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<sup>51</sup> The model proposed and developed here is inspired from “*On the Physical Interpretation and the Mathematical Structure of the Combinatorial Hierarchy*” (Bastin et al, 1979).

less towards more order, then there is an inherent production of meaning. If “meaning” is the “what and how”, described by content, context, and  $\text{content} \leftrightarrow \text{context}$ , then in the focus of searching is placed a *set of relations*. In searching how “order” progresses, unfolding a production of meaning or regresses into making of noise, we change the focus from content, context, and  $\text{content} \leftrightarrow \text{context}$  towards relations between relations, or relations embedding relations.

It is needed also to define fluctuation, which involves the environment, the event, and the observer. A *fluctuation* is a movement back and forth from what would be a referential level, or a ground level, which is established either by a first occurrence or other chosen factors. In the previous binary systems, a fluctuation is the interplay of s and d (or int. and ext. or other pairs as symmetry and complementarity, or anxiety and desire). In the first case (the fluid) there are but fluctuations whilst in the second (the crystal) there are none.

Before drafting the model, we need to look at how “similar” as relation and “different” as relation (the events, environment and observer are parts of this description) are behaving within a specific set of relations. Similar and different are the basic relations that describe “order”, or in different words the basic operation is discrimination (see next chapter). We need to approach similar and different as elements within a new set, with only two elements,  $\{s, d\}$ . (The only values for now are similar noted ‘s’ or different noted ‘d’)

If we define “+” within  $\{s, d\}$ , and within this notation, “+”, will preserve “comparing” as operation in between *relations* (or discrimination as it is called in the next Chapter), then “s + s” equates comparing a relation of similarity with another relation of similarity. And they cannot be different. If we compare a relation of similarity with a relation of difference, this cannot be similar, while a relation of difference compared with a relation of difference, differences cannot be different, they

are similar. Questioning how these relations are building up a set of relations, we arrive at describing a basic mathematical operation called *symmetric difference*<sup>52</sup>. We can write it in a “s” / “d” notation as such:  $s + s = s$ ;  $s + d = d$ ;  $d + s = d$ ;  $d + d = s$ . This set of equations can answer to an environment established (a *what*) by serious and playing, deictic and symbolic, discovered and created, or contain and contained, evolves in terms of order, thus “symmetric difference” is asked to answer to *how* order is created.

A different approach is in the case of inside and outside. A differentiation is needed, as our psychoanalytic metaphors are most of the time spatial, e.g., “talking of an ‘underworld’ or of depth psychology, we are conceiving psyche on a spatially vertical level” (Buchholz 2007, p.164). If “order” is inquired (i.e., what *and* how) then symmetric difference gives an answer, if “where” is investigated (that gives us a geometry in the end), then we arrive at a different picture<sup>53</sup>. If “a” and “b” belong to this second described environment (thus they signify an “interior” and an “exterior”), under a “from to where” question the *relations* between “a” and “b” will be: i)  $int + int = int$ , ii)  $int + ext = ext$ , iii)  $ext + int = int$ , iv)  $ext + ext = ext$ . The second and third equation say that “where” a movement or link begins and “where” a movement ends matters, so from interior to exterior is an exterior and vice versa, from exterior to interior the arrival is an interior. The other two equations are evident.

If symmetric difference is applied to an environment defined (a *what*) by inside and outside, serious and playing, deictic and symbolic, discovered and created, contained, and contained, its logic describes “*how*” interaction evolves within a

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<sup>52</sup> Or addition modulo 2:  $0 + 0 = 0$ ;  $1 + 0 = 1$ ;  $0 + 1 = 1$ ;  $1 + 1 = 0$ . Modular arithmetic (or clock arithmetic) is a system where numbers when they attain a certain value, called “modulus”, resets itself to zero every time the value is bigger than N (modulo N) in a binary system  $N=2$  (in a 24-hour system after 24 follows 0). The notation was introduced by the mathematician Carl Friedrich Gauss in 1801.

<sup>53</sup> “We frequently conceive of the psyche with metaphors of space.” (Buchholz 2007, p.164)

specific “*what*”, designating the *level of order* that the evolving domain acquires. In between “what and how” and “where”, the “operation” for transmuting plays a major part. Sometimes a process arrives to be described in terms of what and how, yet the metaphors are from inside outside domain. So, if *order* matters (in sequence *and* embedment, or in succession *and* simultaneity) then the logic of symmetric difference offers a *binary* view, or an answer in s and d.

#### 4.1.5. DISCRIMINATION

Everything starts from a *single binary process*, called “*discrimination*” (Bastin et al, 1979 p.455). Discrimination, by definition, is the *elementary* act or operation, comparing one element with another under “are they similar or different?”, the result of which consists of two different strings (first element “a” and second “b” coalesced by the observer through discrimination). Are they similar or different (Fig. 3)?

	a	b
a	S	D
b	D	S

Fig. 3 Discrimination as operation

In the session, seen as concatenation of relative autonomous elements (e.g., utterances or narratives), discrimination produces a set of concatenated labels. A sequence a, b, c, d, e, f ... (letters stay for each actual utterance) will provide a sequence of labels representing pairs of utterances, s, d, s, d, d, s ... under “are they similar or different?”. The step from micro to macro is made by the how the sequences

of labels concatenate and where the differences and similarities are settled by the session, i.e., the “form” they acquire, by an actual interaction.

A note regarding “similar”. Here “similar” and “functionally equivalent”, as descriptions are interchangeable (Buchholz, personal communication, July 12, 2020). Functionally equivalent as in the exchange “hello” and the response “good morning”. Even if “different” in the wording they are functionally equivalent, they execute the same conversational function, i.e., “greeting”. As such “*are these functionally equivalent or different?*” provides in our case the mapping, the “discrimination” as operation and makes a step forward to “similar differences and different similarities”, underlining the “function”, what something does.

The opposite is also important: “Is this your pen?” that is addressed by someone who needs it to sign a paper and so is asking permission to use it, is different from the same question a mother asks so to make her child to pick up the pen from the ground, or a “good morning” in the middle of the day that equates a “wake up” and not a “greeting”, addressed as one sleeps to what is happening.

In the example from session 152<sup>nd</sup>, Amalia provides several utterances that are functionally equivalent. First pair is 522/524 “P: he doesn’t laugh at all” and “P: the most my father does is smile”, these utterances are functional equivalent, as well as the following pair: 526/530 “P: he laughs when I can’t laugh” and “P: that is, when he laughs, I don’t feel like it anymore.”

And, on a different level, and from a different conceptualization an example about *what* one speaks and *how* one speaks, as mirroring actions, is found in Buchholz (2007): “One moment she evades in a communicative situation with me, the next moment is all about a bodily escape from her father. The form of movement is the same in both instances.” (p.170)



The elements, as said above are *relations*, which follow the actual relations in how they unfold. In fact, what is preserved through this model is similarity and difference as *relations* in their concatenation, and how complexity grows or declines in the session, that is an explicate order.

#### 4.1.6. CREATION OF NEW LEVELS

If “content” is the “what” assembling new contents, as seen in describing “what does it mean muggy?”, then there are levels, and they are assembling hierarchies. The sequence from phonemes, to words, to utterances, to narratives is also a hierarchically organized sequence, obtained through concatenation. What is needed for “symmetric difference” and “discrimination” to describe levels and hierarchies?

Until now we have an operation (discrimination) and a pair of relations, similar and different, *s* and *d*, that starting from questioning the “session” provides a “description” of *how* these relations between elements concatenate. A string of utterances produces under discrimination a string of labels. As seen above these strings of labels can be further processed, as they are also governed by symmetric difference. As such we can have a string, with several elements that can be “compared” with another string. There is not yet a hierarchy provided. In the move from utterance to narrative the “observer” draws a new boundary by recognizing it. And such movement needs to be mirrored by the representational system. Is it so?

Starting with just two elements, *a* and *b*, we arrive at one special case, which is in fact a *basis* for the searched move, of one level up. A base is that set of elements able to provide unique “descriptions” (or identities) for each element<sup>54</sup>. That is, we

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<sup>54</sup> Like the orthogonal axes *x*, *y* and *z* which is able to uniquely describe any volume, surface, line or point. They assemble a base for a tridimensional space.

have two elements that through symmetric difference they will not result in creating a null element<sup>55</sup>, but result in an element that belongs to the subset (i.e., a discriminately close subset, DCsS, see Annex 1). They are the elements onto which the representation of such hierarchy is built. This is the basis onto which a new level can emerge. How? The elements a and b, the specified set, give a set of three independent<sup>56</sup> elements: [a], [b] and [a + b]. And here we have potentiality of describing the next level, that in its turn feeds the next level and so on. As we define the two elements, that give a basis of three, these three elements are the *new set* for the next level, which arrives at a basis of seven elements (see infra). In this move “the entities at the new level represent all combinatorially possible concatenations of entities at the previous level, starting with a given set.” (Bastin et al 1979, p.454).

The procedure (that involves all *independent* combination of elements) stays the same and recalled equates *moving up* one level. The next level arrives starting from the three elements a, b and c (the previous level) that generate a set of seven independent elements (next level up): [a], [b], [c], [a, b, a + b], [b, c, b + c], [c, a, c + a], [a, b, c, a + b, b + c, c + a, a + b + c]. This is the basis for the next level up (the third one). The hierarchy in this formalism is limited to just four steps (see Bastin et al 1979), the first one is given by [a, b], the second one has [a, b, a + b] as basis and emerges from the first one. The next level, the third one, requires 127 elements as basis, and the last possible step, according to the theory employed, asks  $10^{38}$  elements. These sets form a group, having symmetric difference as operation. (See Annex 1)

Is this relevant? Through discrimination the strings of labels describe i) how the content of the compared events (i.e., relations) are assembled (relations between

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<sup>55</sup> In the current notation (s, d) a null element is a sequence made of s's (e.g.,  $x + y = [s, s, s, s, s, \dots]$ ).

<sup>56</sup> So, all the elements from the set are a combination of them.

relations), in ii) building a hierarchically organized environment which is following the original environment *organization*. As such if “order” evolves within how the session evolves, then the representation of the session answers in kind. If utterances are questioned, the similar  $\leftrightarrow$  different heartbeat of the session is preserved, in the representational environment. If this new environment of labels evolves and how it evolves, then this evolution mirrors how the session evolves regarding any fluctuation of interaction at content level.

Setting the utterance level as *context* then it will behave as an explicate order for the narrative, the implicate one. “Utterances”, seen as relatively autonomous events, inherently “enfold” the narratives, kept within the concatenation of utterances. If the “narratives” set the level of observation, then the “unfolding” presents the “utterances”. These eventually could arrive at mirroring Levenson’s algorithm, but there is more. The step from micro to macro is made by the *how* the sequences of labels concatenate and where the differences and similarities are settled by the session.

Drawing boundaries (i.e., observer is part of observation) generates new levels, e.g., level L<sub>2</sub> (narratives) born from L<sub>1</sub>(utterances). Inherently the complexity grows, if the next level, e.g., L<sub>2</sub>, is populated with more than the null element. A narrative, as the next level, if 1<sup>st</sup> level is given by utterances, will have 7 elements as basis. A rising in complexity (observable) equates a meaning making process which eventually is arriving and creating next level (as well observable). The binary system and the sequence of labels answers to how relations interrelate, starting from content, while context emerges from how these sequences evolve describing *patterns of relating*.

These patterns are unfolding within an environment defined (a *what*) either by inside and outside, serious and playing, deictic and symbolic, contained and contained, and its logic, for each level, describes *how* interaction evolves.

## 4.2. OBSERVATION AND REFERENTIAL

The idea that the couple participates as a distinct unit to the making of meaning evolved from studying the moment-to-moment exchange processes. Examining *order* as outcome of mutual influence and regulation, of interaction, this requested ultimately a triadic perspective. Within this view the process is assembled by events performed by i) the patient, ii) the analyst, and iii) by the analytic couple.

If there are doings performed by the couple, then, implicit in this “emerging from relating” unit, is a new level of reality expected to provide observables. Seen as a processual entity, the couple needs to be part of the answer to “how order increases?”, as order entails process. In the complex dynamic of interaction, it is conceivable the making of pattern out of noise, as spontaneous emergence of structure, it is possible to create structure where is absent, yet noise engendering a next level is not. Next asks for an initial. This means that within a disordered environment, even if a pattern can be produced by just one, a next level implies a *joint participation*, i.e., a qualitative transformation, so, the creation of a new layer must be a mutual endeavor.

But is such an event observable? In observer observed relation (i.e., if seen as unidimensional, unidirectional) there it is not possible to *observe* a formation of a next level if any distinction is constrained in terms of former level. We can limit observation by setting a “system of reference” that neglects a dimension or a sense and create infinite series or disorganized movements. Employing geometry to provide an analogy, then the previous equates the idea that a volume has no identity in a world of surfaces, or a surface has no identity in a world of a line, of a segment, and, in either case, there are necessary endless sets of descriptions. A cube will imprint or will set a mark onto a surface in infinite varieties of dimensions and shapes, as segments, triangles, squares, or rectangles, if we describe the “meeting” between them, i.e., a

section of the cube. In three dimensions a cube is just a cube, it has an “identity” so to say, if rotating, moving it from here there, it stays the same. The unconscious dimension of mentation is another example. Unknowingly overlying perceiving and wishing as entangled doings onto “pure observation”, or vice versa, is prone to develop most incongruous distinctions.

A next-level-event equates that observing, as meaning making, moves towards a doing performed by a *pair* of observer/observed subjects, by a couple, that arrives to engage in what would be labelled in one-person psychology as self-observation, in making distinctions (by the couple) in the environment (created also by the couple).

This environment is always changing, and one can see (i.e., searching for and finding evidence) that in this continuous fluctuation it acquires more order. If the analyst *and* patient answer to *how* interaction change from moment to moment, then, on the next level, the couple shapes how change unfolds. A first level of organization (e.g., interaction changing forms) feeds the emergence of a new level of organization (e.g., forms of change, forms of transformations). If so, then the environment as well asks more than one level, i.e., the couple provides *observables* in the new representational system which needs to be bidimensional as well (yet to be devised). For probing the participation of the couple at making of order, dyadic sequences of events (i.e., changing patterns) need to feed the emergence of a “surface”, onto which patterns of change unfold. Subsequently the representational domain asks a readjustment, not just a boundary setting, a new area discovered through observing in a linear world, but a qualitative transformation that allows a new field of observation, i.e., a new way of observing.

As the position of an object cannot be defined by itself, neither order can survive outside of context. The place of an object in a sequence, and the transformation of a sequence by aggregation of objects, are context dependent and context making,

and sides of a unitary event, like frame and psychotherapy or, in a non-verbal environment, architecture and music. These aspects are asking an amended view of process, from a linearity, “ $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow D \dots$ ”, towards a *surface*:




Fig. 4

What would it mean “bidimensional” when language events are studied? A representation of speaking as a “verbal interaction surface”, methodologically, sets “conversation” or “talk” in an atypical situation, if seen as “sequential” only. But if a “word” (or an utterance, or a narrative) is something done, it begins by being voiced in relation with another. The other doing that completes a “word”, is “listening”, the other’s doing. For a “word” to move from intention to realization, voicing *and* listening need to be paired as *one* action, a link within a larger link. And listening is not successive, it is an “at the same time” action. It is noticeable that “at the same time” underlines the importance of “now”. A “now” that extends over the edges of an instant, extension provided by presence, by making oneself present.

In short, the events of the session are building a flux which is happening in succession *and* simultaneity as well. Both count and evolve through interaction, as in Fig. 4 the horizontal is representing the concatenation of doings (succession) and the vertical the emerging levels of manifestation (i.e., simultaneity, embedment)

### 4.3. FROM DYADS TO TRIADS IN INTERACTION

Saying that “talking cure” is a procedure where “talking” is “cure” implies considering a transformative turn in understanding the nature of such talking. At the same time, if seen either as transformative action or as a transformative experience through relating, then we deal with “experiencing relating” (being in a couple) and “relating experiences” (becoming a couple) as interlinked movements.

This implies that speech is performed on more than one level, i.e., on more than one dimension, and asks with necessity to make a difference between many potential forms of talking. This is needed as not all talking is cure, sometimes is quite the opposite (e.g., Laing, 1965; Bateson 1972), or even talking is employed for not talking at all or a silence conveys more than a word can carry. It follows that there is something in *how* this talking happens, that qualifies it as cure.

Many will say that “talking cure” is not only an “exchange of words” (e.g., Freud 1916-1917/1963, p.16). Even so, it belongs to the domains of the obvious that the patient and analyst talk. In many situations there is a progress that must have something to do with this talking, e.g., the so loud mental pain is quieter in time, less and less words, and less and less silences are needed for it. Research shows that this is the case for “talking cure”, even if an “equivalence paradox” (Buchholz 2019b, p.809) is still seen in paralleling one work with another, whilst the compared theories are founded on ideas that discard each other.

If “order” is selected as a factor for describing how interaction unfolds, in that more or less “order” is an outcome of interaction, then what will add a triadic perspective? Also, one needs to ask what will be lost if not considered?

If a such perspective is taken, then it can be said (and shown) that as an explanatory principle (Bateson 1972, p.47) or as foundational theory (Marx et al, 2017

p.3), the “talking cure” benefits from a new *active* member, the couple. The basic level for describing *how* order is made, is with three co-authors.

Considering the following definition: “A talking cure is something going on between human persons, between people thinking about thinking people, and thinking while talking.” (Buchholz and Dimitrijevic 2018, p.73), then from such description, one arrives inevitably at a triadic referential.

In this view thinking is *embedding* thinking, and this implies a recursive social structure of interaction. If considering the recursive social structure, recursion generates a level where thinking (and talking) mutually creates while created by the other thinking process (other’s thinking), a sequence of mirroring events is unfolding, step by step. Such recursive movement enfolds a relational level emerging from adapting to what happens. As talking provides observables, it can be said that an event, e.g., an utterance, is mirrored into another utterance that in its turn is mirrored into...

This process of *mirroring*, of what happens echoed into a happening, involves forms from a field made of observations<sup>57</sup> and beliefs<sup>58</sup> (i.e., contents, thinking and talking) reflected into while creating forms within a field of observations and beliefs<sup>59</sup>, in their turn reflected... each step of one *creates while created by* the other, which is mirrored into and mirrors within. In this succession and embedding (or simultaneity), in terms of actions, they are building up a surface of interaction. This dance of

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<sup>57</sup> Dynamic or variable links between observer and observed, also a mirroring, outlining observing as a happening into a happening.

<sup>58</sup> Rigid links between ideas, that moulds observation or even transforms it into preconception and extinguishes observing, if imposed on the observer (e.g., dogma).

<sup>59</sup> It should be noted that a shared system of beliefs entails similar forms of feeling and thinking, and eventually, generates a cohesiveness, a boundary, but if elasticity is lost, it becomes a dogma.



reflexions enfolds what “people thinking about thinking people” is, i.e., a creative process<sup>60</sup>.

So, this mirroring can be considered either an infinite recursion, or as *generating* a new level of manifestation. In the following description of successfully communication there is an ad infinitum unfolding circumscribing ‘mutual knowledge’:

“In the process of communication, the ‘sender’s’ communicative intention becomes mutual knowledge to ‘sender’ (S) and ‘receiver’ (H), i.e., S knows that H knows that S knows that H knows (and so ad infinitum) that S has this particular intention. Attaining this state of mutual knowledge of a communicative intention is to have successfully communicated.” (Levinson 1983, p.16)

In different words if [a, b], then either we deal with an unlimited sequence [a, b, a, b, ...] or we deal with a next level event, that requests a description made under [a, b, a + b] basis, and note that “a + b” is co-participating at *describing*. Thus, it asks a new level of description as well. This level echoes the next level from the actual interaction, that is *the couple as unit*, “a + b”. So, we can select either an infinite sequence or a new participant that brings everything into a new dimension. As asserted before, the second choice opens a workable reality. Thus, benefits from a triadic view.

The idea, as underlined in the previous subchapters, is that if “order” is explored, as dynamic state of the system, that is “symmetric difference” describes *how*

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<sup>60</sup> If the field is made mostly of observations, and belief plays a lesser part, then this creative process is fuelled by a *real relationship*, i.e., “each is genuine with the other and perceives and experiences the other in ways that befit the other.” (Gelso 2009, pp. 254-255). Empathy or intuition are a couple of examples for real relationships recursions. If the relationship turns into a transference movement, then empathy and intuition become projections, thus they are turned into not knowing or avoiding knowing, and the other arrives to be “falsified”.

the constituents of the environment evolve, a pair of elements  $[a, b]$  gives birth to a triadic base  $[a, b, a + b]$  in *describing* the first level of such emerging hierarchy.

If order has such an author, then the couple as unit should make distinctions in the environment. And this can be shown, probed. So, in  $[a, b, a + b]$ , a “couple-as-unit” as processual form, a next level event, is making itself present into while creating a mutual environment (e.g., if considering the couple, then speech *and* listening are joined, they are a single event), i.e., the couple makes distinctions. From and by these distinctions, new levels of organization emerge, enfolded within the couple participation, while this “environment” makes distinctions into us, e.g., “we are a different person with and for each individual patient.” (Buchholz 2020, p.177) to which we need to add “with and for each form of the couple”. And this is recognizing an idiom (Bollas 1989; 1992, p.59) of the couple this time, an “intelligence of form”, or a “logic of form” (Bollas, 1995 p.41) that organizes the life of the encounter, the life of the couple that reverberates in each participant.

Anticipating, “experiencing relating” (being in a couple) and “relating experiences” (becoming a couple) are actions, making visible a recursive structure, *observable* in the cycle of activities performed, if allowed to unfold onto a surface.

Through the nature of recursion, as order making device (See Chapter 4), the mutual generating actions are feeding while creating a next level, which in turn transforms the actual interaction. For patient and analyst this domain of existence, this next level of experience is “the analytic couple”, as emergent entity from relating.

How it is experienced relating as whole (the couple-as-unit,  $a + b$ ) is enfolded within how relating experiences, as parts, unfolds ( $a$  and  $b$ ), and vice versa, how the sequence of relational events is continuously shaped by the couple as unit, describes the unfolding of the recursive social structure. To explore it a triadic view is needed, and one potential event in such perspective, as seen in the previous examples, would

be “the couple enacts contents”. As such the link between experiencing relating and relating experiences manifests within a new level, created through interaction.

Even more, implicit in this dynamic of mutual influence is that if “resisted” then an effort is expended continuously for moving *against* this link, as in avoiding presence or performing confusion, or control, etc. How such “move against” is shaped makes visible what mental pain is manifest and how the participants (the patient, the analyst, and the analytic couple) deal with it, e.g., paranoid, or depressive anxieties. And vice versa, it is plausible that a particular observable path asks a specific constellation of anxieties if avoidance or noise making is at work. A form presupposes a specific content, and a content asks a specific form. This *form* in terms of “order” could be described in [a, b, a + b] basis, for the first level of description and, at this level, any description implies the couple-as-unit.

In the couple-as-unit view this link (form ↔ content) and how it evolves makes visible either the forms of transformations (in sequence and embedded) or of rigidity or of instability as *performed* by the couple. In different words, these transformations or this rigidity or this instability emerge either from the patient, from the analyst and from couple’s flux of interactions shaped through the couple interactions (experiencing relating ↔ relating experiences is a new descriptive element needed).

The flux in [a, b, a + b] is shaped under “less order → fluctuations → more order”, or “separate” → “separate ↔ together” → “together”, or “I or You” → “I and You” → “We”. This “less order → fluctuations → more order” is the form that eventually allows “the understanding (conscious and unconscious) of behavior through relationship” (Bateson 1979, p.133) to enter the field of observable events.

Such form of knowing is implicit in questioning under [a, b, a + b] basis, and is enfolded in *how* the couple acts. “Knowing through relating”, or creation of next level events (see Chapter 1.4.), asks the presence of the couple as co-author of the

transformation contained within “less order → fluctuations → more order”. In short, the couple builds up an enfolding order from which the unfolding one produces the sequences of events, the session.

How about the opposite of order, noise? Defining noise as the absence of order, one example of it is the aftermath of an untruth, as a factor of relating, as an action performed. In telling a lie one is *doing* something to the very recipient of that lie, like severing a link with what is, or making a link with what is not, or both<sup>61</sup>. A belief or a dogmatic stance has the same vocation, nothing new is allowed to emerge. In either case the recipient is not able to be present to what is. In the case of a couple made from a liar and a lied, the result of a lie is that there are fewer links or potential links disponible for the couple itself. The link between observer and environment is prevented or even severed (including the couple as observer).

Evidence, i.e., what is prevented, is but solving a complex<sup>62</sup> “puzzle”, building the link between an expectation and a realization, i.e., an interpretation. An expectation always plays a part, as in “perception of the other always includes an attribution of meaning” (Buchholz 2020, p.180), that enters a process of ongoing reworking (i.e., meaning emerges from a relational field that modulates perception). This reworking is prevented. The doing, lying being lied as couple action, sketches what is in the one-person psychology described by “self-harm” (e.g., performing “subjugation”) or “self-deception” (e.g., performing “control”). In either case a specific content is enacted by the couple, that moves *against* creativity, against itself. One is confined from being present to what is, whilst the other maintains this confinement. In such case the couple enacts “confinement”, and this performance is done through “noise making”, through less and less order, e.g., building a state of solitude.

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<sup>61</sup> The following are valid for “one is deceiving oneself” as well.

<sup>62</sup> i.e., Interwoven, self-organizing, emergent, and processual.

Confinement is made by severing links or preventing making new links, e.g., something that is acting on him or her is making no sense (as seen above “thinking” and “the other’s thinking” are engendering each other). If there are fewer links, then this stays for less order and consequently for more noise. As such the previous description of process eventually is reversed, if the making of noise surpasses the making of sense, then it will flow under: “more order → fluctuations → less order”.

An example of making “order”, in its earliest forms, is found in Tomasello (2019). He shows that nine months old infants “begin to engage with people and objects together triadically - they begin “triangulating” with others on the entities and situations around them.” (p.56) From dyadic to triadic there is an obvious production of links, thus a production of order. What needs to be underlined is that

“The engagement here is not only triadic—the infant and adult are sharing attention to an external entity or situation—but, in addition, it has a kind of recursive social structure. (...) It is not that the infant engages in this kind of recursive thinking explicitly, but that the underlying structure of joint attention means that they both know together that they both are attending to the same thing. They are sharing experience.” (Tomasello, 2019 p. 56)

This aspect, of making oneself present, is a factor in devising next level events, in how they emerge, and it should be a what achieved through the workings of the analyst, of the patient *and* of the couple, within the analytic frame.

What could be lost if not considering the couple? If it takes three to tango, then a whole set of events is disconnected and the first casualty in this subtraction will be *observation*, as relational being, and from here follows the primacy of theory over observing.

These processes described above are not confined to the analyst consulting room, in Tomasello's (2019) example it is not about "therapy" at all. So, what distinguishes "the couple observing the observing couple" in the consulting room from any other life circumstances?

The answer comes in pointing at the context that makes possible the events in the form we call analysis. That is the analytic frame. There are unnumerable contents, and relations in between them, there are unnumerable relational nuances and shapes, yet the ground, asks stability for feeding variance, and eventually qualitative change. Within the sequence "frame" → "elaboration and enrichment" → "enacting of content" → "next-level-event", the frame settles the first level of context. Rules make the roles.

Until now the analytic frame was left aside in this Introduction, but this complex assembly of guides and rules of conduct plays a its part. As one example, speaking of intersubjectivity, the "rules" are exactly what "enable an intersubjective exchange to take place." (Thomä and Kächele 1987, p.217).

From here if "intersubjectivity" or mutuality or "joint attention" matters, then the context within which theories of observation (how distinctions are drawn into environment) and observation of theories (what distinctions) meet (and install infinite varieties of forms) needs "rules". Rules "create an identity of meaning, because they ensure that phenomena following the rules can be sought out as constants from among the multitude of events." (Thomä and Kächele 1987, p.216)

Considering only the meeting of two practices, namely "free-association (↔ free-floating attention)" and "neutrality", if a triadic point of view is taken, then what arrives to occupy the foreground is free-association *and* neutrality meeting into a unitary process.

Staying a little longer on this idea, even if asks separate research, defining the analytic frame in terms of practices as how and what happens in “experiencing relating” and “relating experiences” or in the meeting between “theories of observation” and “observation of theories”, etc. the roles are set by building up a stratified (thus multi-dimensional) process (e.g., Desmet et al. 2020). If new levels and new dimensions are not considered such pairing will feed circularities and will generate infinite series of elements in the semantic field, or antinomies, and the semantic field recruited or devised for making sense from what is happening, becomes flattened. This move, implicit here, from one dimension to bidimensionality (or even to tridimensionality and so on) needs in its turn rules, and these rules provide means for devising new forms of description of what happens, i.e., “labels” and “metaphors”. If considering Buchholz and Kächele (2013) above quoted description of analytic process, then it can be said that the social dimension of interaction is or must be a source of these rules (or it qualifies as context provider). From here a triadic perspective qualifies as a potential source of new observation, that coalesce into unitary “objects” various infinite series of recursion, or “mise en abyme” forms of mirroring (i.e., an image contains a smaller copy of itself), building infinite layers of embedding in self-referential movement.

Coming back to non-directivity, thus to free-association and neutrality, an underlying relational field becomes observable if such pairing is considered. Thomä and Kächele (1987) list some features of “neutrality”:

“The call for neutrality refers to various areas: with regard to work on the material offered by the patient, the analyst should not pursue his own advantage; with regard to therapeutic ambition, the analyst should renounce suggestive techniques; with regard to the problem of goals, the analyst should not pursue his own values; and finally, with regard

to the problem of countertransference, the analyst should reject any secret satisfaction of his own instinctual wishes.” (pp.220-221)

Each point listed above has its counterpart within unfolding of a free associative process, an advantage asks a detriment, a suggestion asks control of other's thinking, a system of value contrasts, conflicts or falsifies another system of values, a secret is an attack to openly relating, that feeds eventually confusion and evading from what is, from the here and now. Spontaneity is gone, an intimate relation becomes an impossibility, and the contact with what is happening vanishes as well. Any of the previous descriptions of non-neutral attitudes or doings or agendas, is obliterating, along with free association, the “ $1 + 1 = 3$ ”, the potential new level of manifestation, the couple as unit, by fostering various forms of conflict, control, or annihilation. The last point in the above list addresses also what is usual defined through “abstinence”, which so is absorbed in a larger concept.

Free-association and neutrality as practices define in and through their meeting a set of roles that arranges, at each moment, what is each one supposed to do (whilst the other offers the context, e.g., listening), and how. One without the other subdues analytic observation to applying procedures and so evading understanding of what is happening.



### 4.3.1. TALKING CURE AND CHANGE

Marx et al (2017) in describing a framework for analyzing “talking cure” they describe four basic components of “talking cure models”. They begin from describing the work as: “Some kind of linguistic activity aims at some kind of experiential problem state of the patient and transforms the problem state in a curative way.” (p.3)

In this formula they distinguish “i) a foundational theory<sup>63</sup>, ii) an experiential problem<sup>64</sup>, iii) a curative linguistic activity<sup>65</sup> and iv) a change mechanism<sup>66</sup>.” (p.3)

Applying the model to the current hypothesis we can say that i) the “foundational theory” of process is “if {a and b} then {a, b, a + b}” (or if two then three)<sup>67</sup> that is a prerequisite if “order” matters and describes the potential path “less order → fluctuations → more order”.

The “experiential problem”, seen from the couple’s perspective, should involve the vicissitudes encountered in the evolution of the *link* between “experiencing relating” (being in a couple) and “relating experiences” (becoming a couple). The *gap* from an actual state and a potential equilibrium<sup>68</sup> is a measure for such “experiential problem” and equates a gap in the “participatory knowledge” (see Buchholz, 2007 p.169), or in knowing through relating, a distance between one and oneself that manifests in and by relating, in and by being with.

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<sup>63</sup> Defines how linguistic activity can affect and transform experience

<sup>64</sup> Defines the problem or pathology of the patient.

<sup>65</sup> Defines linguistic activities that are supposed to effectuate a curative transformation of the experiential problem state.

<sup>66</sup> Defines the processes and effects involved in such transformations.

<sup>67</sup> Winnicott’s “there is no such a thing as a baby” (1960, p.587) is “if one then two”.

<sup>68</sup> Equilibrium is understood as *no gap* between “experiencing relating” and “relating experiences”, a no gap follows the state of making themselves present to what is.

How one doing (“experiencing relating”) and the other (“relating experiences”) are mutually shaping each other appraises about the nature of the link at work. *How* this link evolves describes the “experiential problem”<sup>69</sup>.

From a different perspective, the previous equates the mutual co-creation of the implicate (the whole or experiencing relating) and the explicate order as interacting for giving birth to a specific environment, which are informing about *what* and *how* is built within and by the couple’s works.

Simply put, this “what” can be paranoid, whilst “how” is performing control, (the couple unfolds for producing rigidity or a dogmatic environment, so no change ensues), or confusional by performing subjugation (the couple unfolds for annihilating the capability of the couple for making meaning) or depressive by performing isolation (the couple unfolds for producing less and less closeness and, eventually, a no couple). In all these forms or in any combination of them, there is no “ $1 + 1 = 3$ ”, and this lack says an “experiential problem” is manifest. When the couple cannot evolve, when cannot become creative, when no new levels of existence emerge, how and what this couple does define the “experiential problem” at work. In  $\{a, b, a + b\}$  referential the “*what*”, the form of interaction, and *how* the link unfolds (e.g., annihilation, subjugation, control, conflict, rigidity, instability, etc. or cooperation and growth if equilibrium is attained<sup>70</sup>) cannot be segregated but in feeding paradoxes.

The third point, linguistic activity (a happening that provides the environment, enfolding change mechanisms) and the fourth, change mechanisms (a happening within the environment, emerging from linguistic activities, i.e., on different level), are, in the present model, levels of activities mutually shaping each other.

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<sup>69</sup> See Chapter 4.4, for obsessional and hysteric as forms of interaction, which become *observables* in the data.

<sup>70</sup> In different “words”:  $1 + 1 = 0$ ,  $1 + 1 = 1$ ,  $1 + 1 = 2$  and  $1 + 1 = 3$

This integration results inherently from the nature of the environment and of observation made in this environment, in and from it. An utterance mirrors another one. These utterances and the link between them are part of environment, it builds it, and, at the same time, they are an act of observation, it is making a distinction into this environment. It is creating a link, an event that manifests so order rises, again and again. A distinction is drawn through this mirroring, i.e., a similar event is created, and this similarity creates structure, e.g., rhythm, a happening that adds something more to what happened, while embedding it.

As such, *how* the environment is shaped (e.g., mirroring) characterises also *what* environment is created. *How* is shaped and *what* shape happens to emerge cannot be segregated. Therefore, linguistic activity (what) and change mechanisms (how) are making a unitary movement if a bi-dimensional environment generates the ground. Considering a view established by interior exterior, we need them separated, considering order, or surface, they merge into a unit<sup>71</sup>.

As such a “linguistic activity” addressing an “experiential problem” for transforming it, in a triadic view can be described<sup>72</sup> employing {a, b, a + b} referential as: a shape shifting “we” emerges from a fluctuating “I” and “you”, while “I” and “you” are adapting through change (or fail to adapt) to this shape shifting “we”. An ongoingly multi-level process that evolves in such a way that the form “less order → fluctuations → more order” is attained (or reversed if transforming the experiential problem, or adapting to what is happening, fails). Thus, from cooperation, organizing

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<sup>71</sup> In short these are seen under symmetric difference as  $s + d = d$ ;  $d + s = d$ , and in interior exterior arithmetic we have  $\text{int} + \text{ext} = \text{ext}$  and  $\text{ext} + \text{int} = \text{int}$  (the “+” indicates where the movement begins and where it ends). First view implies a similar result the second a difference when pairing the binary elements that form the base of the representational system.

<sup>72</sup> A description is the outcome of how and what results from a doing, observing, which is relating with another doing, the environment.

and self-organizing (e.g., Buchholz and Kaechele 2013, p.10) as descriptors of {a, b} (i.e., dyadic perspective), considering “linguistic activity ↔ change mechanisms” dialectic, in a recursive social structure perspective, the new descriptors, in a {a, b, a + b} referential, are: mirroring, complexification, and creation of next-level-events for and by new levels of relating (or the opposite, if noise is the what).

A triadic perspective involves recognizing the reality of relating and relating as reality making. The experiential problem is in how such “reality” is faced, and what and how relating evolves answers to “transforming” or “elucidating” it.

If considering Marx et al. description, then moving from {a, b} towards {a, b, a + b} referential, results that this move entails a *change* in what and how “talking” becomes cure. A new dimension, if populated with more than the null element, cannot let the environment unchanged, as well as what creates such environment. An abstract formulation would be “the couple is attaining new levels of implicate and explicate order through fluctuations, in mirroring, complexification, and creation of next-level-events”. Closer to the session, to our practice, this can be reformulated as: The emerging couple is able to enact contents<sup>73</sup> within the analytic frame. It evolves by transforming these contents recursively, so new forms of relating or new contexts are attained. These allow new meanings for those enacted contents; new meanings equate new forms of relating, that equate change. Therefore, new ways (new what’s and how’s) of experiencing emerge. In short, the couple emerges from relating and arrives to recursively change the relation from which emerges. These are waiting for proof, thus empirical evidence. The present study is a part in providing them.

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<sup>73</sup> Content produced by patient, analyst or by the analytic couple.

## 5. REPETITION AND RECURSION

### 5.1. REPETITION AND COMPULSION TO REPEAT

Repetition has a long history. And history has the odd property of going forgotten. As early as 1893, in “Sketches for preliminary communication”, Freud (1966) wrote “The constant and essential content of a (recurrent) hysterical attack is the return of a psychical state which the patient has already experienced earlier - in other words, *the return of a memory*.” (S.E. Vol. I p. 152 italics in original). Step by step, “reminiscences” were set as “explanatory principle” of mental suffering in hysteria.

From these beginnings, developing under the direction of suggestion and hypnosis, to “Neurotica”, to dream interpretation, to children play, to transference, to death drive, we see “repetition” travelling a long journey, attaining more and more significance, that arrives at “Ontogenesis may be considered as a repetition of phylogenesis insofar as the latter has not been varied by a more recent experience.” (Freud, 1905/1953b, S.E., VII p. xii). The concept evolved, it came back again and again, so to say, and eventually, in “Beyond the pleasure principle” (1920/1955d), the concept re-emerged and from here on “repetition” and “compulsion to repeat” were advanced as basic factors, postulated as a fundamental drive. This “time and time again” form nurtured the idea of a death drive (e.g., Freud, 1923/1961), the silent generator of chaos.

As such we find “repetition” in Freud’s work occupying the very core of aetiology. Symptoms are, counting in Freud’s sexual theory of aetiology, repetitions. Accordingly, an analyst’s task then is to trace back what “returns” in the present experience, while the idea of “time and time again” and “meaning making” were

entangled by the Freudian theory once more. Freud wrote in the “The sense of symptoms” from his “Introductory lectures” (1916-1917/1963), that:

“The task is then simply to discover, in respect to a senseless idea and a pointless action, the past situation in which the idea was justified and the action served a purpose.” (1916-1917/1963, S.E., XVI p. 269)

Holowchak and Lavin (2018) in their study regarding repetition, compulsion to repeat and death drive underline nine claims Freud made regarding hysterical symptoms (1908/1959a, S.E., IX pp. 163–65) Among these the following two “... (2) substitutes that are produced by conversion “for the associative return of these traumatic experiences,” and “(6) symbols that correspond to a return of an archaic mode of sexual satisfaction, a mode real in infancy and that has been repressed” (Holowchak and Lavin, 2018 p.18), say that repetition informs symptom formation.

But we find repetition in a different position as well. Jokes, language, and children play were interlinked by Freud, who in “Jokes and their relation to the Unconscious” (1905/1953b) wrote

“In doing so they come across pleasurable effects, which arise from a repetition of what is similar, a rediscovery of what is familiar, similarity of sound, etc., and which are to be explained as unsuspected economies in psychological expenditure.” (S.E. VIII p. 128)

The place “repetition” arrives to take outside symptom formation and illnesses is obvious in “repetition of what is similar” and “rediscovery of what is familiar”, as an engine of learning, actually of “learning from experience”. Repetition is linked to mental pain, yet repetition is linked to pleasure as well (e.g., S.E. vol. VIII p.121).

Could these “time and time again” forms follow in fact different paths? In one side of “repetition” we find “learning” (thus “novelty”) through “rediscovery of what is familiar”, on the other we find “a senseless idea and a pointless action”.

From the previous perspective over repetition, Freud's views evolved, and he arrives to the following hypothesis: repetition, might serve an "impulse to work over in the mind some overpowering experience so as to make oneself master of it" (1920/1955d, S.E. XVIII, p.16). And, from here, as noted above, the foundation for the repetition compulsion arrives to be set in the "urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things" (1920/1955d, S.E. XVIII p. 36) – or "repetition" became a death instinct.

Repetition and return of the same has also other entities in the Freudian theory. *Nachträglichkeit* is another concept that implies a "time and time again" form of experience. In descriptive terms *Nachträglichkeit* will be the process by which "a memory is repressed and became a trauma only much later" (Freud, 1895/1966, p. 256) or "experiences which occurred in very early childhood and were not understood at the time, but which were subsequently understood and interpreted" (Freud, 1914/1955b, p.149). Thomä and Cheshire observe that "Freud did not define *Nachträglichkeit* as a technical concept in its own right" (1991, p. 407).

Freud employs *Nachträglichkeit* first as an inhabitant that has its place into the domain of memory and refers "not to memory in general, but to the small class of memories associated with the unpleasure of a childhood experience-fantasy". Schachter's (2002) observation regarding the relation between the two views runs along the following set of mutual excluding states of facts:

"If we accept the general application of memory-retranscription, as described by the concept of *Nachträglichkeit*, then we can't continue to hold on to the 'historical' interpretation of 'transference' and vice versa." (p.126)

So, we witness a static (a reminiscence altering a here and now) versus a dynamic (unfolding a transference in the here and now).

For Thomä and Cheshire, from a systemic reprocessing perspective, Nachträglichkeit is described as a series of experiences ( $E_1, E_2, \dots E_n$ ) which occur at distinct times ( $T_1, T_2, \dots T_n$ ) and cause changes in the dynamic ‘state’ of the system at and after those times. What is deferred or what is postponed in Nachträglichkeit? A causal effect, according to Thomä and Cheshire.

## **5.2. A DIFFERENTIATION IN “TIME AND TIME AGAIN”**

Repetition, as expected, has many definitions, and, from multiplication of these in ways that bring contradiction, paradox or similar outcomes, repetition arrives to become an ill-defined concept (Buchholz, 2019a p.87). Even more, considering (for a bit) the concept as non-problematic, we recognize that

“Repetition is a concept of such generality that one quickly gains the impression that it is, in one way or another, applicable to most if not all phenomena and processes of life, biological and psychological.”  
(Loewald 1971, p.59).

Approaching repetition, under the same constrain of “everyday”, Buchholz (2019a) distinguishes several levels of confusion, or potential confusions, in understanding repetition. From my point of view, we can admit that in discussing repetition as “time and time again” sequence of events there is no clear distinction between “syntax” and “semantics” of events, not speaking about “pragmatics”.

Buchholz (2019a) asks, in “Re-petition in (therapeutic) conversations”, along the following lines: “We cannot clearly distinguish: is it an observation, or a concept used to describe an observation?” and with these questions, step by step, Buchholz arrives to ask: “And what if we might find that what appears to be a repetition under many other relevant aspects is none under others?” (p. 89)



And, indeed, while trying to find our way out from the intricacies of data, with the help of theories at hand, we arrive exactly at this point: it is, and it is not repetition. Not quite a comfortable position when one tries to bring evidence, or to answer to simple questions, like “what is this?”, “why this now?”, etc. As such, starting from everyday situations, from approaching what is and what is not “repetition”, Buchholz (2019a) arrives to say: “My general finding is that repetition is hard to find.” (p. 104)

It is the “speaker ↔ listener” who makes a given aspect relevant (i.e., decreasing polysemy and potentiality to distinctiveness and use) for the “speaker ↔ listener”. They reduce for each other the inherent complexity of an utterance according to a specific shared point of view (situatedness), in a specific acquired context (contingency). Assuming that “the word, if it is not an acknowledged falsehood, is bottomless” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 127), then we ongoingly decrease “the microworld of the word” (Bakhtin, 1986 p. 127), to a specific interactional valence (through situatedness and contingency). As such, we can say that there is “editing” at work *for* and *in* the action that is *performed* through saying what is said, in doing things (e.g., Austin, 1963). Implicit is that editing is not random, there is sense in what meaning is made by decreasing the microworld of a syntagma through interaction. What makes such “editing” from “repetition”? Is it possible to say that “this” is similar or equivalent with “that”, when the “context” contributes to “this” or “that”, e.g., asks a specific reduction of the “microworld of the word”, thus *acting* onto the observer as well?

Recognition is a happening in an observational field (tempered with phantasies as we all know). It is a doing performed by an observer and it is facing “syntactic and semantic anomalies” which are part of the context and content as well, through repetitions and recursions. Thus, “editing” is giving course in a fluctuating verbal environment to a “putting together” under the same “form” of at least a couple of events, or objects as well, a *what*, as to *how* fluctuations unfold, or get paired into units

(stammering, stumbling or hesitations as fluctuations are examples of repeating *or* recursive events). A fluctuation is a *deviation*, having an again and again form, from a sequential flux having a beginning → a middle → an end.

Methodologically, we should consider fluctuations not as ‘noise’, but if recursion gets involved, as an event pointing at another event. It is a way of devising a form (content ↔ context) for dealing with surprise and novelty, as said before. In this pointing at, and by it, they are/become carriers and makers of form and meaning (belongs to deictic *and* symbolic fields). This underlines the idea that “impression” and “selection” in editing are functions for making “impressions” and “selections”, of transport for making and finding a similarity through level stepping. In this link we find why “repetition resemble metaphors” (Buchholz, 2019a, p. 104).

Comparing an event,  $E_1$  with another event,  $E_2$ , if *we* recognize an identity, or a “repetition of what is similar” or a “rediscovery of what is familiar”, then *we* draw a distinction. Comparing an event with another event, in succession, implies that something is now, and something is/was then, or both are/were then, so “repetition is an observer’s concept (between-stories) and not observable (in-stories)” (Buchholz, 2019a p. 104). Keeping the observer “objective”, or *out* of his observations, we arrive at:  $E_1 = E_2$ . This is repetition. But there is another side, with the observer *in*.

The events are related through the observer, he or she observes through doing “operations” (e.g., perceiving ↔ comparing). The second event (this) is seen (e.g., compared, substituted – i.e., edited) in relation to the first one (that), as a re-occurrence of it (re-occurrence is an observer labeling of the event). This “re-occurrence” qualifies thus as a transformation (e.g., substitution) through relating the two events (“this” looks like “that” changes both “this” *and* “that” by relating). This is putting in relation a “second event” (i.e., manifest in the environment) that “resembles” (i.e., an observer’s event) with the first occurrence (usually a trace of it, also belonging to the

observer). This “second event” is “evaluated” with that “first” occurrence, which arrives to be *embedded* in it:  $E_1 \rightarrow E_2(E_1)$ . That is, we re-write the formula for recursion. If the same sequence from above is identified in the couple doings we can assume that a similar process is at work,  $E_1 \rightarrow E_2(E_1)$  and it follows that a similar sequence of processes unfolds in the couple’s environment. An environment of the couple emerges from coalescing a couple of environments, as such the dimensions should be different, i.e., higher.

The above formula describes the observer way of qualifying a sequence of events while present, or making itself present to. It designates what is needed (even if not sufficient) for acquiring “evidence” and the feeling of “this is so”. So, a “time and time again” structure of experience (i.e., observer related) qualify as part of an “evidence” making device.

A mirror is an example of repetition, if not curved. Ideologies as well, as change is not allowed. We can qualify a tic or a verbal tic, or stammering, or a vinyl playing again and again over a scratch, as repetitions. An actor playing a part is a recursive move, as well as any grammar, which is a *recursive* employed form. Editing is at work, choices of decreasing microworlds are ongoingly performed.

Grammar provides rules for communication to generate shared meanings, that need to be repeated indefinitely. Contrary, an ideology provides rules for not understanding, that need to be conformed to, so nothing changes. Recursion entails difference from similar (or similar from difference – e.g., a curved mirror), which is generated in communicating with another employing similar forms and elements (e.g., Chomsky, 1980 pp. 221-222). What distinguishes such polarization is *the production of meaning*, emerging or vanishing through *how* we arrive to interact. If “more meaning” or “if less meaning” arrives to be the outcome of whatever language exchange event, such outcome is providing a criterion for differentiating repetition

from recursion. Repetition and recursion are basic in constructing and recognizing cadence or monotony, harmony, rhythms or disharmonies and noise.

In practice “most clinicians at least implicitly believe in the centrality of the recurrent manifestations and the influence of both conscious or unconscious fantasies in patients’ lives.” (Dahl, 1988 p.59) while recurrent manifestations are ‘observables’ in words and by words as well. Verbal interaction, speech exchange in its complexities, by sequencing with or without changing the degree of depth, uses iteration and recursion for structuring the exchange, the form of the sentence or of the text (e.g., Fitch, 2010; Hulst van der, 2010; Corballis, 2011/2014; Beckstead, 2015; Levinson, 2013, 2014). Several researchers even try to present recursion as the main property of the human language (e.g., Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch, 2002).

In terms of “time and time again” recognition makes assemblies of events (i.e., sequential, and embedded arrangements of processes), and in these doings we differentiate two classes of sequences. This is done considering *meaning making* as differentiating factor:

- i) Repetition as stagnation or obliteration of meaning making and
- ii) Recursion as accruing meaning and depth, through sequences of events, either merging into a (new) unit (e.g., rhythms) or generating new forms.

Accordingly, when approaching a sequence of events, we can delineate between “what is one doing” or “what is the couple doing” through what is achieved. That is adding or subtracting meaning to or from interaction.

Regarding ‘equivalences’ and ‘differences’ – as units for finding pattern, in the following couple of descriptions there is a similar pattern, flowing under the form: “the bodily happenings are projected into communication as metaphors.” (Buchholz 2007, p. 170), there is a “horror at pleasure” or “removing for replacing”, one in simultaneity the other in succession.

a) Freud describes Ratman as such: “His face took on a very strange composite expression. I could only interpret it as one of horror at pleasure of his own of which he himself was unaware.” (Freud 1909/1955a, p. 166)

b) Second sequence: Ratman felt compelled to remove a stone from the middle of the road, because the carriage with his lady in it would be driving on the same road some hours later. A few minutes later occurs to him that this idea was absurd - and he was compelled to go back and replace the stone in its original position.

In Buchholz (2007) conceptualization (mental kinetics) these illustrates “what is bodily movement in one scene has its equivalent in the other scene, yet in a different medium, the medium of communication.” (p.170) Changing the medium yet preserving the pattern equates a recursion and, in a different referential, a metaphorical projection (Buchholz, 2007). Recursion implies difference not only similarity, making a link in between one part of the “environment” and another, both autonomous, and recognizable as such for an observer.

### **5.3.REPETITION OR ITERATION**

Repetition, in a couple’s environment, is a device employed to generate or maintain constancy. “No change” is the play engaged by the couple, played in such a way that through these doings they maintain a flat line of interaction. In language, the stuff from which the environment is made off, “iteration yields flat output structures, repetitive sequences on the same depth level as the first instance” (Karlsson, 2010, p. 45). The simple formula to describe repetition is “ $A \rightarrow A$ ”. So, there is no transformation achieved, there is no depth gained through reiterating an event, in this time and time again there is no gain in complexity.

Re-finding an object or avoiding change, as an again and again structure of

experience, has compulsion to repetition as organizing principle, that “represents a compulsion to seek a perceptual identity between present and past” (Modell, 1990, p. 63) while “effects the suspension of any retrogressive or progressive movement” (Lichtenstein 1974, p. 70).

In avoiding change that is different from “object constancy”, as doings (rigidity vs. recognition), some object qualifies as the same object (it never is as we change continuously) through repetition (thus, we should subtract the *difference* from an experience, erasing a part of ‘now’, i.e., devising a reminiscence). Here we find another side of “repetition is a selection” (Buchholz, 2019a p.101). Some traits of the event are repeated, some are not. Also, in “repetition is a selection”, we can see how perception and wish overlaps, even in some instances they are indistinguishable. A good example is the way a crystal stays in its structural iteration of the same type of units, conjoined. Another one could be a list of groceries or a list of categories of iteration, as well as an unnoticed transference (i.e., no links emerge) seen as re-production of pattern.

From “how we don’t arrive to see”, what follows, as a reverse, is that for observing a reality, to distinguish what is, one needs imagination and creativity (either one diverges profoundly from building up a “reminiscence”). That “re-finding” an object is an act of communication, it is a co-construction. Such a participation in “re-finding” is another reason for moving beyond “repetition”, as “relationship, in contrast to sameness, identity, or ‘symbiotic fusion, I’ implies difference, presupposes differentiation” (Loewald, 1979 p.502).

An example, from Giovacchini’s (1982) “A Clinician’s Guide to Reading Freud”, implies an obvious time and time again movement. It is considered here as repetition. A dream that arrives to shape the analytic interaction (enacted), it arrives to

be unknowingly staged. A performance, involving the patient and the analyst, that slips to both. We enter an again and again, without building more order, more meaning.

“During analysis, a 27-year-old woman patient of mine dreamed that she was at a dance. The setting was hazy, but she was able to see the grey suit worn by a man who asked her to dance. They danced around the room, and suddenly her partner steered her to a corner and pressed himself against her. She could feel his erect penis. Inasmuch as I often wore grey suits and the transference was clearly erotic, I believed this dream was an obvious allusion to her sexual feelings towards me. I also knew she was struggling with and defending herself against her impulses. Wishing to pursue this theme, I asked her to free-associate to the dream because she was inclined to pursue other seemingly unrelated topics. She hesitantly considered some of the dream elements, such as its haziness. I then directed her attention to the man in the grey suit. She was silent for approximately a minute and then became, what seemed to me, tremendously anxious. She finally reported a sensation of intense dizziness, feeling that the couch was spinning furiously. Gradually these feelings subsided, and she continued talking but made no reference whatsoever to the dream. I became immensely curious and had to interrupt her and ask her about the dream. She naively answered: ‘What dream?’ To my astonishment, she had forgotten it completely. I then repeated the dream to her and was able to help her remember it. Once again, I brought her attention to the man in the grey suit, and once more she felt the couch spinning and totally wiped the dream from her memory. I tried a third time and with the same results. As she experienced these spinning sensations, she described a vortex that was

sucking her thoughts into it. Certainly, the memory of her dream seemed to be pulled into the hidden recesses of her mind.” (Giovacchini 1982, p.13)

In this narrative we encounter, as said, a sequence of repetitions. This also is an instance of a doing that points at a doing, a deictic field emerging from a contextual deictic field, a couple that “acts as a signpost”. The dream telling is one element, that first was performed by the patient and subsequently, by the analyst. The second telling becomes a “deixis am phantasma”, pointing to an absent object, that vanishes from the “flow of speech in front of them”, for the patient *her* dream becomes something absent, but it is something made by her, which is now at the analyst. She points at something by forgetting it, a detail that is not present in the mind of the analyst that focuses only on the dream to find. Curiosity sets the agenda of finding, while forgetting sets the agenda of re-finding.

There are no “symbolic” links generated in between, there are no insights, or a working through the dream towards “solving” but it generates a new “puzzle” so to say. We can recognize but “deictic” movements, only “language games” with now and then for “experiencing those spinning sensations”, a pointing at something.

The first movement of this ‘dancing’ sequence begun after dream telling with a “wishing to pursue this theme”, while the patient “was inclined to pursue other seemingly unrelated topics”. In the second episode of “dream telling”, the analyst tells the dream under the heading “I became immensely curious and had to interrupt her and ask her about the dream”. In these episodes we encounter an  $A \rightarrow A$  movement. Nothing emerges, but someone tells a dream to the very dreamer of that dream.

So, considering that “the mind is inside”, maybe we can say that the “memory of her dream seemed to be pulled into the hidden recesses of her mind”.



How about considering that a “mind is what we do”<sup>74</sup>? Or observing what they say and how they say it? Are they sharing a misunderstanding by generating it? Is there a fight generated by who owns the floor, while one speaks wishing the other forgets him/herself? Who leads the dance? As in “wishing to pursue this” versus “she was inclined to pursue other” or in “I became immensely curious” versus “she had forgotten it completely”? We can just speculate, as we have a narrative of a narrative. But the movements are quite clear. No self-reflection, no self-knowledge emerges from this pattern of relating, not in this fragment of the session. Here we recognize what Buchholz (2019a) asserts when he arrives to qualifies “repetition” as “re-petition”:

“The repetition is a call for a response. There is petition in this kind of re-petition, which is addressed to an absent recipient. It is the non-present addressee who does not answer. This lack of response motivates the repetition. It is the appeal to the “non-present object” that creates the repetition.” (p.101)

But what can be said about the couple? How the couple moves in this deictic field and what it does with it? Is a similar entailing a similar, an “A → A” movement?

We have a first movement “A”, a dream is told/listened, which is reinstated giving course to an again, and again, and yet again. Through the rules of the game something “unseen”, how we dance together, is made “visible”. The story of the couple could be hypothesized that runs along the lines of making “*a sucking thoughts vortex*”.

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<sup>74</sup> C. S. Peirce and L. Wittgenstein (e.g., 1953) are the main exponents of “meaning is use”. In the “language games” we “play” within “meaning is temporal” as well as “evidence is process”. Accordingly, “evidence”, “truth”, “meaning” as well as “lie”, “falsehood” or “illusion” are all doings and these entail pragmatic consequences, including “mind is use”, or “is what we do” as Schafer (1973) puts it, as pragmatic consequence entailed by pragmatic consequences.

It is what the couple *generates* through how they “dance”, and we can say that the couple is creating a new “event”, an “ $A \rightarrow AX$ ”.

And in the case of the couple, this “sucking thoughts vortex” is created, shown through the recursive movements of the couple, creating an experience (maybe) needed to be shown thus shared. It enacts the content of their dancing. It is avoiding understanding; it is “we do not meet even if we dance” a possible description of such “vortex”. This movement of devising a “sucking vortex” is acquired by the couple, even if passes unobserved.

The dream travels from telling the dream, to forgetting the dream, to re-making the dream, embodying it. We witness an unfolding of an event through relating, while curiosity  $\leftrightarrow$  forgetting interplay can be seen as *one* process which organizes dialectically the re-staging of the dream.

Therefore, the fragment is about how a dream travels from being an event of one to arrive in a relational sequence of happenings at being an event of an analytic couple. Also, it is a story of not arriving at a meaning.

## 5.4. RECURSION

One of the main characteristics of recursion was indicated by Wilhelm von Humboldt, that is to “make infinite employment of finite means” in language (1836/1999, p. 91) while we should note that “language is a special system of communication that can talk about itself” (Foerster von, 2014, p. 116).

Recursion is closely linked with the notion of returning (Latin: *recursio* – going or running back), of re-examining, reflecting and self-reflecting, growing, induction, developing by gaining new levels of complexity, learning from experience, and feedback amongst other relatives.

Considering the environment from Bernfeld's (1941) account "The psychoanalyst's model is the most banal event of every-day life. He simply conducts a conversation with the object of his observation" (p.290), or, considering that the environment is a meeting of minds (e.g., Loewald, 1979 p.165) in conversation *creating* the very conversation they are meeting into. This relation (verbal interaction or meeting of minds) satisfied by an entity A:  $A = \{ . . . . . \}$  is "recursive" if and only if:

- a. (Self-reference) there is an element of permanence (circularity) in it: its right-hand side contains, in some way, the entity A that is present in the left-hand side;
- b. (Level-stepping) there is an element of change (transformation) in it: sterile infinite regress—the danger of all impredicative definitions of type a) is avoided by the entity being present, in the right-hand side, in a somewhat different way from the left-hand side. (Sawada & Caley 1993, p. 3)

(Self)-reflexivity implies recursion, and vice versa – we can say that where there is recursion there is reflexivity as well. If in "thinking about thinking" it is easy to see that recursion involves level stepping (or it can do that if recursion is not demoted to repetition as in various forms of control), so, in identifying a recursive sequence, can we say that such sequence is evidence for reflexivity? If self-reference and level-stepping are involved, then we can assert while showing that.

Also, it should be noted that recursion is related with any inductive reasoning in that arriving at a "truth" implies a sequence of elements and their pattern.

All these processes offer, along with a distancing from the here-and-now (e.g., through the new created levels embedding former levels from which they emerge) a simultaneous immersion in the here-and-now, that says recursion allows for depth and complexity to grow and allows us to transcend the here-and-now context to return to our past and plan future actions (Beckstead, 2015, p. xiii).

Haine and Kuteva (2007) define recursion by:

- i) The presence of embedding, recognizing it when
- ii) “Some constituent occurs within another constituent of the same type” (p. 265).

Addressing recursion in language, they assert that “Once there is a linguistic expression for relations such as between less inclusive and more inclusive, part and whole, one social role and another, or possessee and possessor, the way is cleared for recursion to enter.” (p. 269)

Recursion, in its descriptions, could be a ‘rule’ (e.g.,  $A \rightarrow AX$ , where “X” can be any category) that *produces* an environment for its own reapplication. We recognize the idea of creating a “reality” as in the case of “metaphor”. So, is recursion part of “observing” (a “metaphor in action”)? Language use implies that “to describe a situation is at the same time to create it” (Marshall, 1998 p. 204), which echoes the reality making of metaphors.

A set of rules, like  $A \rightarrow AX$ , or  $A \rightarrow A [B]$  or  $A [B] \rightarrow A [B [C]]$  or any combination of them (see *infra*), e.g., rules of a game, produces its own environment. It generates the context (i.e., environment) for playing the game. Regarding the above question, perception and recursion are closely interlinked, even if we count only that “... remembering is generative, not preservative: it is not a matter of preserving a representation but rather of constructing [...] a new representation of a past episode.” (Michaelian, 2016 p.64) Generating the ‘perceptual field’ (or a deictic field) equates recursion, either understood as a building process of being present, or creating an extra level of relating in between observer, environment and the event.

Change does not occur but in transforming, one can say by creativity (e.g., Loewald, 1971). Recursive structures are complex and develop continuously since they contain large or even infinite hierarchical levels, yet they are ‘simple’, since this infinity can be achieved under and represented by very simple rules. (Martins and Fitch

2014, p.15) On the other hand, next to creativity, we should address reflexivity, or self-reflexivity, as pertaining to the field of recursion. ‘Self-reflexive’ refers to the presence of an ongoing relationship between a subject and oneself, e.g., aware of our own feelings, thinking about our own thoughts.

How is a couple reflexive or how does it become reflexive? If a couple enacts the content from which emerges then there is recursion. A question that opens the relational field (e.g., the analytic relationship) and its dynamic in terms of couple’s processes to debate. A simple approach is to distinguish in the unfolding sequences recursions. A couple that submits oneself to becoming self-reflexive, implies a couple that produces recursive structures, forms that reoccur so a transformation happens, like complexification by level stepping. So, what kind of recursions do encounter? Heine and Kuteva (2007, pp. 264–266) distinguish various kinds of recursion in language as:

a)  $A \rightarrow A X$  (where “X” can be any category) produces an environment for its own reapplication.

b)  $A \rightarrow A [B]$  is a construction that is structurally derived from another construction  $[A]$  which is of the same type, where B is embedded in A.

c)  $A [B] \rightarrow A [B [C]]$  Recursion can but need not be productive. The output (to the right of the arrow) can form the input of another application of the same rule.

Also, starting from embedded recursion (b) they subsequently distinguish: Direct recursion (rules like  $A \rightarrow AB$ ) vs. indirect recursion ( $A \rightarrow B$ ,  $B \rightarrow A$ ); Counting recursion (yielding AABB) vs. mirror recursion (yielding ABBA); and Simple recursion (with only once application cycle) vs. productive recursion (with an unlimited number of iterations).

The logic of recursion, i.e.  $A \rightarrow AX$ , is found in contingency, comparison, intuition, retrospection, introspection, dialogue, empathy, i.e., reflective thinking.

Freud (1900/1953a) provides many examples of arriving recursively at a solution, starting with dream analysis. By linking the idea that *dreams have meaning to a dream is a fulfilment of a wish*, Freud (e.g., 1900/1953a) opened a new way of questioning, besides providing an answer. He did that, starting with Irma's dream (1900/1953a) by employing the unpredictability of associations to the elements of the dream for addressing the unpredictability of the dream, in the solving process.

An unknown that is employed to unveil another unknown from which the first one emerged. So, pairing these actions we find pattern. This move, initiated by Freud, was a radical one.

In another example, drawn also from *The Interpretation of dreams* (1900/1953a), we can see the works of time and time again as meaning-making tool in the pair made by *Non vixit* dream (p. 421) and the interpretation of it. Both events (the dream and the interpretation) are in two parts while making an all-inclusive event.

*Non vixit* is a dream about the interpretation of dreams, subjected to interpretation. It is an example of how it is interpreted that is mirroring the content that waits to acquire sense, i.e., an enacting of content.

Elke Siegel (2007) asserts that in this dream about dream interpretation the dreamer interpreter "has to come to terms with the revenant" (p.122) while the revenant "comes to stand in for the process of repetition, of return, for the importance of the past for the present." (p.117) The 'revenant' that organizes the dream and dream's interpretation, can be seen at work in Freud's words "As I have said, I shall return to this dream later" (1900/1953a, p. 425), i.e., a second part of interpretation of a dream in two parts about dream interpretation. And in the return to the '*Non vixit*', Freud notes that in the "dream there was an inconspicuous interpolation which I overlooked at first" (op. cit. p. 513). The 'overlooked interpolation' equates

something expecting a working through to be done, a return while the *content* of such expected meaning was inhabited by a ‘revenant’, the one that returns.

Donald Spence (2015) advances the idea that narratives are building recursions. As such, from his perspective, a unique operator generates narrative recursive patterns, and, along with these, a feeling of uncanniness. For Spence “a recursive solution to a particular narrative carries with it the same sense of conviction generated by a deductive proof.” Even if he observes that while “the subject of the story becomes the teller” (p.188) and the narrative becomes “impossible complex”, Spence searches and finds an “if  $\rightarrow$  then” mapping device, i.e., an operator. Freud’s interpretation of the dream about the Botanical Monograph is a first example. “All the time he is describing the botanical content of the dream, Freud is approaching it in a botanical manner.” (p.190) This resembles “the revenant” issue (qualifiable as recursive operator in Spence’s terms) from *Non vixit* dream, or other recursive events as Freud’s primary recursion - self-analysis (p.206). So, in the Botanical Monograph dream “the underlying recursive operator in the dream takes the following form: treat everything as it is a botanical specimen, and when in doubt, dissect.” (p. 195)

Spence gives another example from his clinical practice, the story that Spence’s patient learned, and recounts repeatedly, is that ‘uncontrolled anger leads to rejection’. The devised operator is ‘anger  $\rightarrow$  rejection’. Such operator determines the shape of the associations, and, according to Spence, it reduces the complexity of the events under study (p.190).

Recursion, a movement under the form  $A \rightarrow AX$ , is a description of an observation, thus is not separable from an observer. As underlined above  $A \rightarrow AX$  is a formula covering both metaphor and deixis. When recursion involves and grows from a “mutual recognition of having entered into each other’s field of perception” (Ruesch

1951, op. cit.), the outcome is a deictic context, the basis for and emerging system of communicating while and by using it.

Generating an experience to share an experience is not uncommon at all, e.g., a surprise. “Surprise” or “novelty” gives birth to fluctuations, it is something asking for adaptation and various oscillations would inscribe their traces in the data, for many potential outcomes. Thus, a new “metaphor” could be recruited through devising it within the interactional field.

The idea that a metaphor “never ‘represents’ a reality, it generates reality” (Buchholz et al 2015, p.892), says a lot about metaphors *and* interaction. Including this domain addressed here, the couple’s environment. Metaphor equates access to reality; thus, it is a *relational event* and a *cognitive operation* (e.g., Buchholz, 2014).

Recursion (and emergence), in a couple’s field, equates “metaphor” in “one speaker at a time” world. It sets boundaries while and by making a link. Two separate events while having different or slightly different contents, share the same form. A link (i.e., the isomorphism) between two separate events builds up a next level event (a next level event, i.e., a new reality layer). This similarity (metaphor/recursion) generates a difference through level stepping (a reality/a next level event). Following the just opened path (metaphor → reality) such description of what a metaphor/recursion does leads one to suggest that “metaphor” is along with “observing” and “hypothesis” feed the emergence of a new entity, a next level unit.

Building up ideologies, or symptoms, also employs metaphors, e.g., slogans devised so thinking is avoided, yet the outcome of such “metaphor” is a lie or more, misapprehension. In fact, in any *dogmatic* shaped environment, we deal with a procedure of severing links, which promotes rigidity (e.g., wooden language) or even worse, and has as outcome a lesser adaptation to reality or even a falsification of an



entire social reality. From a couple's perspective we deal here either with first or second equation from the arithmetic of the couple ( $1 + 1 = 0$ ;  $1 + 1 = 1$ ).

The first perspective is growing up from spontaneity and creativity and the words entering the game of metaphor are enriching their semantic depth. In the second case the opposite is achieved, so control or subjugation arrives to have a rhetoric while the semantic of such discourse narrows towards an absurd caricature of meaning.

Counting in the deictic field, we can say that a metaphor is a procedure that generates a symbolic  $\leftrightarrow$  deictic field, and this new field, created through relating, is as well autonomous. The "symptom" or an "ideology" moves in the opposite direction, e.g., conversion, that generates forms in a "deictic field", imported from a symbolic one, or even emptying both fields from any potential emergent meaning.

Within deictic symbolic complementarity, considering the potential transformations of interaction, the field made through relating with one's environment can be polarized at one end in such a way that a form manifests and evolves within deictic  $\rightarrow$  deictic transformations, and at the other end the subject is caught into symbolic  $\rightarrow$  symbolic complex manoeuvres, while the deictic vanishes from any potential transformations. One has no words while the other has but words.

If *repetition* is a proper description of what happens, i.e., what one does is done so no change happens, we recognize in the first category the hysteric's ways of relating while in the second the obsessional. No novelty is created, but a perpetuation of an identical. In the first one there is the reign of an unchangeable emotional anarchy whilst in the second the tyranny of dogmatic stagnation.

## 5.5. RECURSION, DEIXIS AND THINKING ABOUT THINKING

When inquiring about interaction, as in “what kind of relation?” and “how this relation evolves in time?”, deictic and symbolic, as complementary pair, are describing the level and the mode of interaction (what and how).

Regarding “what and how”, a sequence either unfolds so a linear flux happens, as in “now this now that”, or a circular flux unfolds, as in “again and again” ways, or a combination of both. In “again and again” mode there is another complementarity, specified earlier, formed by repetition and recursion.

In our work building up a relational form that installs a rigid immobility or an emotional instability or a form able to create new levels of relating or any combination of them are incessant possibilities. These are imprinting specific evidence within and onto *conversation*, making visible how the couple is cultivating rigid forms, or how it engages in noise making for dissolving itself, or how it builds a dynamic field feeding the creation of ever new levels. Each one implies deictic and symbolic intricacies, interactions, transmutations, and transformations, within which repetition and recursion are organizers.

In the previous chapter, confining the possible transformations to “deictic → deictic” or “symbolic → symbolic”, these limitations of potential transformations described ways of building up either a fluid anarchy or a dogmatic rigidity under the works of repetition, as forms of interaction with/within the environment, forms that obstruct evolution and preserve an identical. Besides the previous potential transformations, considering also “deictic → symbolic” or “symbolic → deictic”, unfolding so recursion is a proper description of an again and again, it is expected to find next level events, or we-events, as they emerge from coalescing into a unit two

complementary ways of relating. These transformations equate transmuting one mode into another with *adapting* to what is.

From a different point of view (i.e., meeting of minds) within a research driven perspective, Fonagy and Target in “Playing with Reality” (e.g., 2007, or Target and Fonagy, 1996), describe an analogous complementarity at work. From the beginning “psychic reality” implies that “the dialectical relationship between what is external and internal emerges in the child’s discovery of his own mind.” (Fonagy and Target 2007, p.921). Fonagy and Target write later (2007) that “external reality is invariably transmitted via subjectivities.” (p.920). They delimitate a dual mode of experience within their investigation of development of “psychic reality” (i.e., of relating external situation with internal experiences) first, a “psychic equivalent mode” and, the second, the “pretend mode”:

- (a) “...in a serious frame of mind, the child expects the internal world in himself and others to correspond to external reality, and subjective experience will often be distorted to match information coming from outside (*psychic equivalence mode*)
- (b) while involved in play, the child knows that internal experience may not reflect external reality, but then the internal state is thought to have no relationship to the outside world, and to have no implications for it (*pretend mode*)” (Target and Fonagy 1996, p.459 italics in orig.)

For these authors, a third state of mentalization, or reflective mode, allows that the mental states to be experienced as representations (p.459). Mentalization “facilitates integration of the pretend and psychic equivalence modes.” (Target and Fonagy 1996, p.460) A reflective mode, “integration of the pretend and psychic equivalence modes” equates in the current study “*adapting* to what is”.

While considering deictic and symbolic as modes of interaction between subject and environment, an unimpeded integration of both will allow all potential transformations to flow as needed, as asked by relating, i.e., not confined to single transformations (e.g., besides deictic  $\rightarrow$  deictic or symbolic  $\rightarrow$  symbolic, there is deictic  $\rightarrow$  symbolic and symbolic  $\rightarrow$  deictic) so adaptation to what is could happen.

Rewriting the above modes of experiencing (“as if” and “for real”) by employing deictic and symbolic as basis, relating with the environment is explicit. The advantage for this new basis is offered by the “*observability*” of the events.

This also provides support for equating level stepping, e.g., the process of transmuting deictic into symbolic and vice versa, with *adapting* to what is happening (i.e., as doings performed in/by the couple).

In a “pretend mode” it can be said that the deictic predominates, whilst in the “psychic equivalent mode” symbolic forms of interaction predominate and everything is “for real”, even if the pretend mode, the “as if” or the private reality, for the quoted authors, “is separated from the shared external world” (Fonagy and Target 2007, p.927). This “separation” of a “private reality” needs to consider that the environment provides the “utterances”, e.g., playing, as the deictic field involves the environment in building up what is communicated. Fonagy and Target are making a similar distinction, i.e., how one employs what is “out there” to represent what is “in here”.

As such, an “as if” mode needs to employ the environment, so a mind state is shared or at least presented. We need a “malleable” environment for an accurate “as if” form, and a “malleable” symbolic system for “psychic equivalent mode”, so “for real” stays unchanging. In a symbolic field (Bühler) or in “psychic equivalent mode” (Fonagy and Target), what offers the vocabulary is “in here” and grammar is subjected to fit and represent what is “out there”. What and how this is described, where is made the distinction so to say, needs to be *unvarying*. As such *variation*, or change, through

*level-stepping*, generates *constancy*. “In here” offers the “rules” in deictic field and “out there” is part of the very game is played, including language games. The grammar of environment is subjected to fit what is “in here”.

Levenson (2017) touches a similar area of describing an interaction when he asserts that there are two kinds of psychoanalysts, “those who believe that the essence of psychoanalysis is the *detoxification of fantasy* and those who believe that the essence is the *demystification of experience*.” (Levenson, 2017 p.132)

In the first category what characterizes the understanding of what hurts, is that “the therapist believe that people are made ill by their fantasies, by the symbolic distortions of a reality” (op. cit.132) while in the second perspective one understands the pain of the other believing “that people make people sick; the patient has been damaged by real experience, which has been mystified, dissociated, and depreciated.” (op. cit. p.133). It should be underscored the role “believing” plays.

Coming back to the current subject, employing repetition and recursion as complementary pair, while questioning “feeling about feeling” it could be shown that is generating either a fluid anarchy of emotions (deictic → deictic) or new paths of relating if “reflecting” is involved (deictic → symbolic), i.e., next level events.

Recursion, for this next level events, is *sine qua non*, through building up onto a malleable environment, within a deictic field (so feeling travels from “in here” to “out there”). How about “thinking about thinking”, the symbolic fields, in our data?

Under “what role plays recursion or repetition?” the material probes more clearly<sup>75</sup> how through recursion new levels are created that feed a new understanding, e.g., within more intimate relating, while repetition builds up static forms of interaction, e.g., rigid, or obsessional patterns.

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<sup>75</sup> Later, in the next chapters, there are other instances that show this, but here is presented a short exemplification of the role played by recursion and repetition.

In different words if we keep the subject and the environment as parts joined into a unit, then what results from the assumption that recursion produces new levels whilst repetition is a factor in building up rigidity or no change, is that through an “again and again” form of interaction, the outcome could be a more or a less order. Which means that the subsequent elaborations of this provide: i) a “unit” engaged in creating sense within new levels of intimacy or ii) an unstable form of relating heading towards distancing or even separation (dissolving the initial “unit”) or iii) a rigid form of relating heading towards an obstinate immobility (If we count also a “unit engaged in destruction of meaning” we find the initial arithmetic of the couple)

In the following fragment, extracted from Amalia X, session 152<sup>nd</sup>, the issue of repetition is addressed. In the introduction (Opening Window episode) and in the following Chapters there are presented fragments from 98<sup>th</sup>, 99<sup>th</sup>, and 152<sup>nd</sup> session where recursion plays a decisive part.

*Mainly repetition,  $A \rightarrow A$*

- 89. P: but really, usually I don't do this. not to be frightened
- 90. at all anymore
- 91. T: like in the dream?
- 92. P: yes. ((5 sec))
- 93. yes ((5 sec)) yes, somehow, I have to - it seems to me as if-
- 94. well, has the time come that in my thought' I think- hm- that
- 95. sometimes I do think during the last days in which monastery
- 96. I should take the veil. idiotic, so idiotic, and it doesn't
- 97. help at all when I say it to me.
- 98. T: mhm.
- 99. ((10sec))
- 113. P: I am really happy when I can go to school in the morning. there
- 114. I don't have any time for crap like that.
- 115. ((8 sec))
- 116. P: somehow, I fight against it with routine but -
- 117. also with pondering, of course, but as soon as I start
- 118. pondering everything seems to be messy.
- 119. I don't know, I really don't know. therefore I think
- 120. I am crazy and then I think, I have feelings of guilt and
- 121. then I think, I have uh during the six years, not at all
- 122. I don't know, everything is so far away, all of a sudden.

Transcript/translation J. Bergmann

It seems that there is an incipient collaboration event (lines 89 – 93), but it is followed immediately by a countermovement. The outcome of such operation is that Amalia moves further from herself.

In the short fragment there are two parts, one addressing “the veil” (from 102 to 110) and the other is a sequence of thoughts about Amalia’s thoughts (from 116 to 122). In the veil issue we met the following form: She thinks (107-108, A) and she thinks about what she thinks (109, B) and arrives at presenting an “ $A \rightarrow B$ ” in how she thinks (109-110), disqualifying the previous work.

In terms of content there is one idea (going to the monastery) that is disqualified or pondered (i.e., idiotic) and this disqualification doesn’t work as expected, which in fact is repeating the very disqualification she spoke about, re-instating it. Repetition is at work, i.e., a form entails the same form for no change, everything stays on the same level. In the couple perspective they are building up a confusion, a state of disorganization (i.e., less order)

The second part of the fragment (from 116 to 122) follows in the footsteps of the previous one. There is routine (thus no thinking, no need for adapting to what is) and pondering. “She doesn’t know” offers a reason for pondering, so she is crazy, she is guilty, which are qualifications of herself that performs the same function as “idiotic” from the previous fragment. There is advanced one idea, A, followed by a disqualification of it, B, and an evaluation of this through disqualifying again, yet this third move evaluation of, an “ $A \rightarrow B$ ”, is performed at a different level, i.e., step by step Amalia is more incoherent, at the end everything is far away, suddenly.

This pondering, set into motion by “she doesn’t know”, helps but for generating a confusion (118 – *seems to be messy*), as such she arrives *to make* a “she doesn’t know” or to make a “confusion”, in short, she displays in *how* she speaks the very content of *what* she is speaking about. In the first part of the fragment (monastery)

a description unfolds. In the next step we witness how she arrives to feel and shows that something doesn't help, fails to ponder, everything becomes messy.

In the flux, from the first to the second fragment, a deictic field emerges. An again and again within which a form points at a similar form (advancing one idea, disqualifies the idea, evaluates, and disqualifies again), and in relating nothing new emerges. The environment (sequences of utterances) is more and more disorganized (121-122), this pointing at what is happening now with her thoughts through what she is doing with them, is a form of *repeating* - the previous movement is reinstated in form for reaching the same outcome, no change.

There is a fleeting move within a "symbolic field" performed by Amalia and Thomä (104-105), but, subsequently, we can observe how, in an anaphoric pointing at, a "deictic field" emerges while and through a repeated form, for a regressive movement, i.e., for less meaning. The level of coherence from 106 to 110 is higher than the level of coherence from 116 to 122, – e.g., the utterances in the second part are more and more elliptical.

In conclusion, in this sequence there is a "pointing at", observable in the material, which happens between parts of the fragment and between content and form, e.g., Amalia describes a state of confusion and at the same time her speech mirrors the state described and becomes quite disjointed. Even so, there is no "symbolic → deictic" or "deictic → symbolic" fully attained transformations.



## 6. METHODOLOGY, MODEL AND VERIFICATION

### 6.1. INTRODUCTION

In the following it is shown, in a single-case proof, that the analytic couple, while and through ongoingly building its own conversational (thus interactional, relational) domains of existence and development, becomes a *self-observational* entity, i.e., that makes distinctions in the environment for and while adapting to it.

Counting in Loewald's (1986) observation, it is "impossible, to treat transference and countertransference as separate issues." (p. 276) then a relational event, i.e., jointly created, enfolds layers of not-separate events. If so, an intervention is unfolding with one "author" of something that is dyadic or triadic. An unconscious event unfolding within a relational field, speaks about something *unitary* made by a couple of "authors", i.e., a dyadic or a triadic event. It takes three for describing what two are doing.

If we render the idea from the main hypothesis, we arrive at describing a sequence of embedded processes. "They talk to each other", paraphrasing Freud (1926/1959b, vol. XX p.187), provides the environment, and the same doing, talking, inscribes the distinctions in the environment. So, a new form of organization is a necessary condition and an outcome. A new dimension needs to be considered; a new level, in that the environment enfolds the very "talking to each other".

As the environment is made from language use, e.g., speech (i.e., talking *and* listening as unitary event), then observing (i.e., making a distinction in the environment) is a language use event, e.g., a couple observes a narrative of one (i.e., makes a distinction in the session) through a narrative made by the couple that mirrors the first one in it (i.e., the sequence of events flows as  $A \rightarrow AX$ ).

Emergence is defined here as the spontaneous appearance of new layers of this environment from what and how the links are made or dissolved, in the first case providing new directions of development, new meanings so occurring from unpredictable patterns of interaction, new forms of relating between the participants, which are non-deducible from the previous forms of relating (or from the “biography” of one or the other) but grow from the history of the couple unfolding in the potentialities of the couple. In the second case, i.e., of destruction of links, the outcome of it is the uniformity of noise, the frozen constancy of chaos.

## **6.2.SPEAKING AND LISTENING AS SURFACE EVENT**

If transference *and* countertransference are forming a unitary event, we arrive to mirror this idea in considering that “speaking *and* listening” are building up a unit. The reverse is even more plausible, as Enfield shows that

“...any sequence of ‘communicative action and subsequent response’ is by nature a unit, not a conjunct. The sequence cannot be derived from independently established concepts ‘communicative action’ and ‘response’. This is because neither may be defined without the other”.

(Enfield 2013, p. 28)

The couple is (less, equal or) more than the sum of its parts, but the difference, this “more than” (or “less than”) does it make an observable difference in the data? The question, the problem, is ‘problematic’ (if emergence is traded for causality), as the sum of parts implies that the couple vanishes when “parts” are asked what they do or what they are. And what vanishes matter, namely those “mutual processes of shared communicative attunement” (Orlinsky et al., 2004). So, the couple is neither more nor less than the couple (a tautology) (segregating “what” and “how”) or a couple

emerges<sup>76</sup> from and simultaneous enfolds the interactions (circularity). This last view counts that “what one does and how one does it are complementary and inseparable.” (Norcross and Lambert, 2019 p.4). For these authors “treatment methods are relational acts”, and if we question the “treatment methods” the entity generated by relating into which relating happens, i.e., keeping both sides of the paper as one paper, feeds the production of “next level events”.

### 6.3. CONVERSATION AS MATRIX

Usually quantitative or qualitative research investigates what the patient does, or what the analyst does, but the functional unit “free association *and* free-floating attention” implies that we should also ask “what the *couple* does?” and along with this we should question - “how can we observe this doing of the couple?”. As any event (i.e., any autonomous entity) happens in the speaker *and* in the listener.

Conversation is a surface event onto which ‘distinctions are drawn’. The description made by Buchholz (2019a): “The stuff a clinical situation is made of is conversation.” (p.87) involves more than succession, in this description simultaneity plays its part as well (not only in a couple’s perspective).

Making a distinction in what is happening is a happening as well, so embedding is part of the process. Even more, in such perspective we are in a bidimensional conceptualization of process, moving from unidimensional to multi-dimensional counts in that “Psychological phenomena are intrinsically multi-dimensional (i.e., they cannot be reduced to unidimensional characteristics).” (Desmet et al 2020, p. 2)

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<sup>76</sup> i.e., develops in a form out of its surroundings, an epigenesis.

As a first step, this implies the existence of a *surface* made from “succession ↔ simultaneity” sets of events (that generates a *now*), describing the actions of the session, namely speech *and* listening.




Fig. 5

“They talk to each other” in succession ↔ simultaneity

In Fig. 5 on the horizontal axis, of *succession*, we have the sequence of utterances, on the vertical axis we met the same sequence, made from autonomous elements, that builds up the second dimension of *simultaneity*. The same element co-exists at the same time in speech and listening, and, as the same element, e.g., an utterance, occurs in two “places” at the same time, the simplest form to operationalize this would look like the above form of progression, a “here and now” of the couple.

The a, b, c, ... are distinguishable elements, like utterances, or turns or narratives or plots or bi-personal narratives or even larger units that have a beginning linked to an end. Above the red line that *centers* the “now” of verbal interaction, we met the “past”, below the red line there is what follows, the “future” verbal and extraverbal interaction, and so they are creating a *here and now* of the couple with specified margins or boundaries.

Making a distinction in such *environment*, implies boundaries inscribed by the couple in the fabric of language use through language use. There are no actions

(including to make a distinction, to observe) in a relational void, in different words, this or that doing is shaped into a meaningful pattern according to whom (i.e., subject) and how (i.e., metaphor) makes that distinction, while being part of it. Thus, “presence” is a factor that when absent from relating creates “repetition”.

So, considering the theme of the present study what would it mean that “the couple makes itself present” to something? An emotional experience that travels through a narrative is the “what”. A new narrative form, born from the works of the couple, is a distinction drawn in the environment. If mirroring the first one (in form, content or form *and* content), i.e., how, then this pair of events mirroring each other represents the manifestation of “the couple makes itself present”. Segregating how something emerges and what is done through, such parting eludes that emerging and mirroring are sides of the same process.

What qualifies as “making a distinction” is how the environment is changed through recursion. As such, for the couple, “making a distinction” inscribes boundaries, is building up sequences of relational events generated by the couple.

Regarding metaphor and presence, this implies devising an “operational definition” (an observer’s instrument) of “metaphor  $\leftarrow$  making a distinction  $\rightarrow$  expectation”. Making a distinction is a *relational occurrence* (observer  $\leftrightarrow$  environment) that employs at the same time a *relational occurrence* (i.e., metaphor  $\leftrightarrow$  expectation).

If the session provides the data, and if the description answers to how the interaction (verbal and extraverbal) develops into a session, and if the “object” under questioning is seen under “speaking  $\leftrightarrow$  listening” as unitary event, then we should be able to show that:

i) There is recursion. We should be able to see (observe) how autonomous elements (sentences, narratives, couple’s narratives) become a base from which

emerges a recursive structure, a form describing a “how” regarding the unfolding of verbal interaction. That is a first level of surface of “speaking ↔ listening”.

ii) There is level stepping. The continuous creation of links in between evens, e.g., through building up rhythmical structures for new contents, are generating in their turn new levels and new patterns of interaction, new recursion, rhythms, ... We witness a complexification of rhythmical structures from which emerge other rhythmical structures, i.e., patterns and patterns of patterns of interaction, narratives, and bi-personal narratives i.e., a third level of verbal interaction surface, that can be called “we-events”.

#### **6.4. THE UTTERANCE AS UNIT**

A session develops into something resembling with a semantic labyrinth. Better said, a semantic labyrinth ongoingly complexifying<sup>77</sup>, or patterns and forms that are asking for meaning while making meaning, utterances that “make meaning as they unfold, not after they are finished” (Brazil, 1995 p.17). When asking how, we encounter the prerequisite of considering a *double dimension* of interaction (e.g., listening ↔ speaking or succession ↔ simultaneity). An utterance has a beginning and an end, manifest in *both* participants in dialogue.

If “speaking ↔ listening” is a unitary object, if an event of the session is a “joint construction”, from the very beginning we deal with a dual constructed entity. Even more, considering that “speaking is rather a constituent part of a shared interactive and cultural practice into which the movements and schemata of the body get inscribed with various emphases.” (Buchholz 2007, p.174) adding the new

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<sup>77</sup> Or the reverse, collapsing the richness of relating into noise, decompensate in a chaotic environment.

dimension (listening) we can say (thus show) that a session emerges from a self-reflecting duet. This self-reflecting equates, for the couple, what on a different level is “self-understanding” and opens up observation to a new level, that is to “social dimension”.

“Understanding would seem to be an act that involves some sort of mutual engagement, a particular form of the meeting of minds. As applied to self-understanding, it would involve the mutual engagement of different mental levels.” (Loewald, 1979 p. 165).

Is this applicable to the analytic couple as unitary entity? Setting ‘communicating’ as paradigm, relating is neither inside nor outside, as any event that is generating its own context of existence while evolving through change. These doings arrive to be registered in the verbal domain of the analytic couple probing with our “words” (i.e., methodologies and theories) how that couple unfolds its own “words”. Thus, the observer attempts to make sense with his or her “words” ( $A \rightarrow B$ ) how a specific couple’s language “make infinite employment of finite means” (von Humboldt op. cit.) an “ $A \rightarrow B$ ” and an “ $A \times B$ ” (that embeds  $A$  in  $B$  and  $B$  in  $A$ ). A pairing that preserves the dimensionality of interaction of the couple, so to say.

Reflexivity (or self-reflexivity) understood as the couple is reflecting the couple entails recursion, expectations, and memory as well. Saying “this is an observation” – i.e., drawing a distinction in the environment, implies:

- i) Reoccurrences of, (and/or embedding events in) similar events
- ii) Transforming the event.

First step in devising the model is setting the sequences of (autonomous) events of the session in relation with sequences of events of the session born from them, following the entanglements of the events which are building up the session. As such we can use the session as event to *code* and build up the “map” onto which we can

transport it, so “coding” and other operations will behave according to the data.

A creative recursive move that can be seen as a couple’s action can be seen in Sacks’ description of “doing together to do together” (Sacks 1992, p. 147), which Buchholz and Kächele (2017) comment “It describes the observation of doing something together and the immediate self-observation to do together. While people do together, they observe their doing together.” (p.165) *Observing* such nonlinear event, “doing together to do together”, we need a similar “tool” i.e., multidimensional.

Data are under the form of a *trace* of verbal interaction (recorded → transcribed). What is a *word* in this view? (i.e., what, and how does it mean?) Shaped into speech *and* listening by speech *and* listening, a word is a non-autonomous object-event. A word is not a ‘constant conjunction’ of form and meaning (e.g., Bakhtin, 1986; Grice 1975, 1989). It can be seen as an ongoing acquirement of meaning, a fluctuation in the relational field establishing a fleeting sense, a momentary state of order, that arrives to be changed step by step by the participants, towards more or less “order”, towards a stable or a fluid (even chaotic, i.e., nonsensical) semantic status.

An utterance, unlike a word, is endowed with autonomy even if it is multidimensional and acquires new meanings with any slight change of context. Autonomy makes a difference. Auer (2015) designates a sentence as “a self-contained linguistic unit” (p.27). A sentence or an utterance, if speaking listening are considered, has a beginning and an end, and this is what qualifies it as a suitable autonomous or self-contained parameter. An utterance is a co-authored variable of the session and is offering a good segmentation criterion. An utterance is an *observable*.



## 6.5. BUILDING A SENTENCE SCORE

In constructing the model there is needed: i) a notational system for the elements of the session ii) an operation, a mapping from one environment (the session) to another (the notational system as group under symmetrical difference as operation). The operation is discrimination<sup>78</sup>. The question that defines this operation is: are these units similar (functionally equivalent) or different?

The question addresses a relation between elements, and from it a specific organization of the session is revealed. As said in the previous chapter, this map should accommodate what happens in succession and in simultaneity as well. Similar/different and successive/simultaneous are pairs of complementary relations in between elements that can describe the session, they offer the architecture of the “map”.

Applying the model to several sessions, became evident that the new object affords some answers. This object is employed for showing *how* the session complexifies, as it makes visible some transformations at work in this expansion.

An utterance, as unit, is seen as having a side on the speech part of interaction and the other on the listening part. Combining them into a single event and noting it as such we arrive to describe *one* event, as performed by the analytic couple.

Everything begins with a question and develops according to a specific operation. A sequence of sentences becomes a story (or disorganizes and becomes semantic noise), an event feeding another (larger) event (e.g., phonemes → words → sentences → narratives → couple’s narratives → ...)

In terms of quantification the session could provide the units, if turned on itself, while everything relates with everything. The autonomous elements (a sentence, a

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<sup>78</sup> It should be noted that is a basic operation, that is present in infants and neonates (e.g., MacFarlane, 1975)

narrative) are the session's heartbeats. The autonomous elements, sentences, and narratives, provide the elements that build up the matrices, mirroring the session onto itself. As one example, a single pair of sentences from Amalia X, 98<sup>th</sup> session - (a) P: I keep on dreaming of my mother, (2.s) (b) this woman appears again, and again.

First sentence (a) and second sentence (b) are *functionally equivalent*, as such, we encounter a recursion in terms of content. Such operation keeps content and context together and promotes a bi-dimensional perspective as in speech-listening pair. For each "similarity" the elements are coded with "s" and for difference we code with "d".

So, representing the first and the second sentence in the sequence, we have: a, P (2s), and b. Next step is considering the a and b in both dimensions, keeping the operation. That is the other complementary pair of relations. That is "a" is present in what is spoken, and, at the same time, in what is listened. On the horizontal (fig. 6) we have the first dimension, of what is said – a, b on the vertical of what is listened, a, b (we omit here the pause P).

	a	b
a	s	s
b	s	s

Fig. 6

Discrimination generates a sequence of labels (s - similar/d - different), while the matrix is built considering that speech and listening are forming a single event. The labels are descriptions of the pair of relations between one utterance and another utterance in speaking listening, between a sequence of utterances organizing a narrative and another sequence of utterances organizing a new narrative, and so on. We arrive at a  $2 \times 2$  matrix that constitute an arrangement of elements following the original source. Following the session, we can see *how* order is acquired while new levels of interaction

are emerging from recursion. Labels are but signposts for showing *how* interaction unfolds. It is a transformation of a symbolic into deictic and back to a symbolic level.

## 6.6. AMALIA'S SENTENCE SCORES

My data are verbatim transcripts of tape-recorded psychoanalytic sessions. The sentence score is a representation, a form of the session, which was coded in s's and d's. The form in s's and d's, is obtained by comparing the sentences, substituting them with labels, while answering to: are they different or functionally equivalent?

For moving forward some details regarding “functionally equivalence” are needed beside the details presented in the Introduction. In describing an event we need to set the context or a level of reality where this event manifests and at which such or such description refers to. Even more “reasoning is domain specific” (Livingston 2006, p.9), as well *observing* is “domain specific”. As it is not possible to compare a totality of attributes with a totality of attributes, then there is always a selection in comparing or measuring, i.e., the question asked is part of selecting how the event is seen, also expectation participates to the boundaries inscribed within the event. A selection sets boundaries within a domain and such selection defines the event and observing the event. And if such boundaries are set within data by the very makers of data (e.g., language use), the fuzzy equivalences are the very what that provides islands of order making and patterns of creating more order within the system.

As such, if “order” is the subject of description, then we open the observational field to finding *equivalences*, resulted from comparing this with that function, this with

that content. When setting the domain of observation at language level<sup>79</sup>, and verbal interaction provides the data, a fuzzy identity of elements in their doings (i.e., ‘functional equivalence’) describe how order emerges from interaction. Coming back to data and model, we take a fragment from Amalia’s 98<sup>th</sup> session, as first example for transformations of form in succession ↔ simultaneity:

*First movement*

1. T: I was delayed by a phone call,
2. can you stay a little longer?
3. P: I can, yes.
4. T: yes.

The session begins with a trade in the time of the session. Analyst and patient agree on something regarding shifting a time. The labelling will have two values, s and d, where ‘s’ signifies functionally equivalent (*similarity*) and ‘d’ signifies *difference*:

	1	2	3	4
1	s	d	d	d
2	d	s	d	d
3	d	d	s	s
4	d	d	s	s

Fig. 7. First movement.

In this form so written what is under the diagonal is a *potential* (Fig. 7), what is above constructs the *history* of this bit of interaction. First position in the matrix (line 1 x column 1) noted with (s) indicates that 1 = 1. The second, (line 1 x column 2) indicates that the content of the first utterance (1) is different than the content of the second utterance (2), also they perform different functions, one informs, the other requests, therefore is noted with ‘d’. In the case of ‘3’ and ‘4’ the labels are s’s, as they both agree, both contribute to *closing* this piece of interaction. As such ‘3’ and ‘4’ are

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<sup>79</sup> There are more complications ahead, as observing language is through language, but this feeds antinomies only if the richness of levels created through language use are flattened into one single layer, e.g., conveying information.

considered as functionally equivalent. This “s” asks for further clarifications. Why the pair formed by “3” - “I can, yes” and “4” - “Yes” qualifies for a functional equivalence status? Amalia’s answer closes the request, i.e., Thomä’s question/request is answered, and the second “yes” performs acknowledging the agreement while closing the ‘deal’, a second closing. One “yes” is a yes to the deal, Amalia acknowledges and confirms it. The second “yes” is a yes to the yes to the deal, acknowledges and confirm. So, is this second ‘yes’ different from the first one? Sharing function, it is not, there are equivalent. Amalia’s short answer could be seen in other ways. If she asks for her time, for the floor, then ‘yes’ – ‘yes’ is an agreement in terms of the rules of the game, i.e., of the frame. It is the same kind of ‘s’ that results in pairing - “this is mine” followed by “yes, this is yours”. But again, there is an equivalence. A ‘closed deal’ has a confirmation in line ‘5’ below (it has also other functions), where it is also announced something ‘discharged’.

### *Second movement*

5. P: today there’s no cousin coming.
6. (31.0) P<sub>1</sub>
7. Well, I keep on dreaming of my mother,
8. (2.0) P<sub>2</sub>
9. this woman appears again, and again
10. (9.5) P<sub>3</sub>
11. she is always there like my shadow
12. (2.0) P<sub>4</sub>
13. or like my tray or
14. (--) I don’t know what.
15. (3.0) P<sub>5</sub>
16. (P sighs)
17. (33.0) P<sub>6</sub>
18. P: and the other day (-) on the dream with the snakes,
19. P<sub>7</sub> (1.5)
20. I said, there is one piece missing. (--)
21. T: mh.
22. P: very peculiar, the piece was (-) actually the one that I could remember best the next morning.
23. T: mh.
24. P: I remember it now
25. and that it came into my mind at midday,
26. after I had been here with you, (-) again.
27. (2.0) P<sub>8</sub>
28. T: mh.

Labelling the fragment as described above, we arrive at a matrix, representing this piece of interaction, i.e., a ‘*sentence score*’. For comparing this matrix with the following ones, the empty squares from Fig. 8 below designate ‘d’s’. The reason for omitting is the comparing this matrix with the following ones, so (without d’s) it is an easier way for noticing the similarities of form. The diagonal, where the elements ‘meet’ with themselves is a ‘timeline’. An element, e.g., an utterance, or a pause, has two coordinates, one on “succession” (the action mapped through labelling is speech) ‘axis’, the horizontal reproducing the sequence of utterances (designated by the number), the other on “simultaneity”, the vertical comprises the same set of actions.

	5	P <sub>1</sub>	7	P <sub>2</sub>	9	P <sub>3</sub>	11	P <sub>4</sub>	13	14	P <sub>5</sub>	16	P <sub>6</sub>	18	P <sub>7</sub>	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	P <sub>8</sub>	28
5	s																							
P <sub>1</sub>		s				s		s				s												
7			s		s		s		s															
P <sub>2</sub>				s																				
9			s		s		s		s															
P <sub>3</sub>		s				s						s												
11			s		s		s		s															
P <sub>4</sub>		s						s			s				s								s	
13			s		s		s		s															
14										s														
P <sub>5</sub>								s			s				s								s	
16											s													
P <sub>6</sub>		s				s		s				s												
18														s										
P <sub>7</sub>								s			s				s								s	
20																s								
21																	s		s					s
22																		s						
23																	s		s					
24																			s					
25																				s				
26																					s			
P <sub>8</sub>								s			s				s								s	
28																	s							s

Fig. 8  
Second movement as matrix of labels (all empty squares are d’s)

The horizontal (stays for succession, following the sequence of spoken utterances) we have the sequence of autonomous elements 5, P<sub>1</sub>, 7, P<sub>2</sub>, 9, P<sub>3</sub>, 10, ... as

they follow in the session. The vertical (which represents the elements in simultaneity) we have the same events, in the same order as on horizontal 5, P<sub>1</sub>, 7, P<sub>2</sub>, 9, P<sub>3</sub>, 11, ... The diagonal is made of “s’s” as each element corresponds to itself. As we move away from diagonal each square represents a position where an element is compared with another element (are they functionally equivalent or not?) and the relation in between is qualified accordingly (the empty squares are in fact noted with d, as said above).

The red/blue s’s are the parts that in the development of the session enter recursion. The left corner (blue) has several pairs labelled with “s”. In the table we note with ‘s’ the squares correspond for line ‘5’ and column ‘7’ or line ‘7’ and column ‘5’ (the meeting points in the matrix that equate the pairing under discrimination, any square in the matrix is a representation of “are they functionally equivalent or not?”). Thus, in the matrix, there are ‘5’ and ‘7’, Well, I keep on dreaming of my mother, / this woman appears again, and again; and ‘9’ and ‘11’: she is always there like my shadow / or like my tray or...; and ‘20’, ‘22’ and ‘27’ – analyst’s “mh”.

Some clarifications are needed here. Why ‘5’ and ‘7’ qualify as functionally equivalent? In terms of actions, Amalia reports something, and this something has a content that refers to ‘mother’. Both are ‘reports about’ and their content refers to ‘mother’. More than that, the content is reiterated and, through reiterating, is set into showing it, presenting the content through how the content is conveyed. She speaks about an ‘again and again’ reiterating it, it is making an ‘again and again’ from it. A subtle mirroring of what is conveyed through how is conveyed. Amalia gathers, by performing a reiterated report, a new meaning regarding this “again and again” of mother. It is a complaint regarding a previous ‘time’ (or a previous ‘moment’ of the session), which reiterated moves it from ‘then’ into a “here and now”, an ‘again and again’ happens now, by setting it into “how” she reports. As such, there is something regarding Amalia’s mother (from the dream) that equates something from Thomä

(from the session). Speculating, considering that the reverse of a ‘too much of a presence’ is an absence, through reiterating, through making and ‘again and again’ about an ‘again and again’, she complains about i) ‘too much of mother’ and, at the same time, about ii) an ‘absence’, a ‘no Thomä’ (the previous phone call). As such in the beginning of the fragment, she is announcing an “absence” (the cousin, line 5), and subsequently Amalia comments about it, by ‘how’ she complains about a “too intrusive mother”. Coming back to equivalences and labelling in ‘5’ and ‘7’ (as well in line ‘9’ and ‘11’) Amalia reports, and reports about ‘mother’. What she does (both are reporting about or/and complaining about) and the content of her utterances (both are about mother) qualifies the pair of autonomous elements as functionally equivalent, thus they acquire through comparing an ‘s’.

The procedure employed above is i) identifying the ‘function’ performed; ii) searching if, in the specific context, the content is or becomes common or not (e.g., mother, woman, shadow, tray, I don’t know<sup>80</sup> - are coalesced within a single semantic domain); iii) comparing this function and content of this autonomous element with that function and content of that element (are they functionally equivalent?).

If function (f) and content (c) overlap, then we can note the pair under equivalence through discrimination. Moving further in the fragment, other elements ask for elucidation, how are they employed in representing the session within these matrices? The pauses here are not empty semantic events (e.g., Reik 1968; Gill, 1991; Akhtar 2021; Buchholz, 2021; Buchholz et al. 2021). They “are a part of communicative practice, not its antithesis.” (Buchholz 2021, p.253). Even if sometimes they build up a relational emptiness, such emptiness is happening now.

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<sup>80</sup> Is this sequence of attributes equating mother with a shadow, with a tray or with an unknown, allowing a glimpse of a theory about femininity entertained now by Amalia? Or is a ‘description’ of how she feels as a neglected woman?



Happening now a pause conveys/creates something, i.e., emptiness is not noise. Within such wordless event it is conveyed or made a meaning, or a previous one is rejected or altered, while and by changing the context and so creating new events through not speaking, i.e., a silence *does* an action.

Following the procedure (i.e., function and content referred to discrimination). One can say that being pauses, absences of speech, they are equivalent. So, do they perform equivalent actions? As such it is needed to discriminate between pauses, e.g., P<sub>1</sub> (31 sec) and P<sub>2</sub> (2 sec) are different. The difference can be summarized as: P<sub>1</sub> performs a brake, at the level of interaction, e.g., in 30 seconds Amalia and Thomä way of relating change from talking to not talking, from interacting through speech through interacting through silence. While P<sub>2</sub> performs a continuation, it is not a brake in interacting. The first and the third pause are in the same category, as they are achieving a similar action, they are interactions through silence, again they are labelled as functionally equivalent, and different from the second pause.

We can say about the *content* of these silences as doings (e.g., P<sub>1</sub>, P<sub>3</sub> compared with P<sub>2</sub>, P<sub>5</sub> or P<sub>7</sub>) but that they fit into two types: first one is a break in communication, i.e., are communicating a disruption to the other (e.g., P<sub>1</sub>), it is a movement within interaction from words to no words, while the second one is a break in speech (e.g., P<sub>2</sub>), letting the speech to follow. First one happens in *relating* with the analyst, the other one in *talking* while producing an idea, a report, a complaint, etc., preserving relating within and through the verbal interaction. At the level of one type of silence communicates a distance or a distancing, the other is not.

*What* is said also regards a rejection, i.e., setting a distance from the upsetting object, thus the *context* created by the form of speech, that is what Amalia does with *how* she tells, i.e., she is fed up with her mother, through breaking communication with her analyst, seems to conjoin a double rejection, a 'no' (mother) with another 'no'

(silences as distance). Again, there is a move from something reported, e.g., in the dream, which arrives to be installed into a happening, what and how Amalia reports are heading towards the same end, e.g., generates distancing.

We can see in this sequence, if silences occupy the foreground, i.e., as performed events, a reiteration of a mirroring. There is a doing (e.g., reporting and rejecting thus installing distance) achieved in a specific manner (i.e., long silences installing a distance in between them). A content arrives to be mirrored by an action, i.e., by how the context is modulated. There is an ‘again and again’ that builds-up a negative (mother, this woman, shadow, tray, I don’t know), there is with each step a devaluation of qualifying mother (i.e., this woman = shadow = tray) for acquire “distancing”, and an ‘again and again’ in the sequence of silences, performing ‘acquiring distance’ within relating with Thomä, and even an ‘again and again’ if linking “setting aside” from line 5 (the cousin) with line 20, “forgetting” (the forgotten dream piece), both installing a “distance” between subject and object.

In terms of content, there is a ‘no’ in the beginning of sequence, and afterwards a reiteration of rejecting (in line 20 there is ‘something missing’ that emerge following a long pause, which is a reverse of the beginning, when an absence in speech follows reporting that someone is set aside, forgotten). But mirroring doesn’t end here, on this level, in between these autonomous elements.

Comparing this fragment and the next one (the dream telling), one can ask: is it a beginning of a recursion here, through all these instances of mirroring? Is the “dream” manifesting before “telling the dream”?

### *Third movement (first dream)*

- 29. P: namely, I don’t know any more when exactly,
- 30. I just think before this snake story (-) during the exam scene
- 31. (--) I stood there
- 32. and, and I had a completely wet head (--) and
- 33. (1.5)
- 34. I don’t know,

35. whether I (-) whether I, uh, had washed hair.  
 36. anyway, (-) I had at the back (-) very huge spots as,  
 37. it wasn't like shaved but (.)  
 38. somehow there were very huge holes in the hair  
 39. it was so terrible,  
 40. and I stood in front of the mirror  
 41. and looked at them and was (.) really horrified.  
 42. (1.8)  
 43. enormous (.) wholes and then these wet strands,  
 44. it was awful. (-)  
 45. this was the piece, that slipped my memory.  
 46. (2.5)  
 47. that actually terrified me,  
 48. like I said, most (-) the next morning.  
 49. (7.0)

	29	30	31	32	P	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	P	43	44	45	P	47	48	P
29	s					s															
30		s																			
31			s																		
32				s			s														
P					s									s				s			
34	s					s															
35				s			s														
36								s		s					s						
37									s												
38								s		s					s						
39											s		s			s			s		
40												s									
41											s		s			s			s		
P					s									s				s			
43								s		s					s		s				
44											s		s			s			s		
45															s		s				
P														s				s			
47											s		s			s			s		
48																				s	
P																					s

Fig. 9 Third movement, first dream

In the above matrix the s's occur within a single strand of action – Amalia is recounting a forgotten dream. From the 29<sup>th</sup> to the 49<sup>th</sup> line there is one action, i.e., she performs a dream-telling, as such what brings an 's' here an 's' there reflects the

content of each autonomous element, as each autonomous unit belongs to the same strand of actions.

As such the first pair, i.e., 29 and 34 lines, qualifies for an equivalence, given by “I don’t know”, 32 and 35 equates having “wet head” with having “washed hair”, 36 and 38 and 43 are addressing “huge holes in the hair”, whilst the sequence formed by the lines 39, 41, 44 and 47 are equating, under overlapping meanings, “terrible” with “horrificed” with “awful” and with “terrified”<sup>81</sup>.

As such within “Amalia recounts a dream” the reoccurrence of content sets equivalences. Each ‘s’ is set counting the previous procedure (i) identifying the ‘function’ performed (here dream telling); ii) searching if, in the specific context, there are common contents; iii) comparing this autonomous element with that autonomous element (are they functionally equivalent?).

We have arrived at a distribution of s’s within the matrix, a “form”. The configuration obtained points at the ‘form’ obtained in the second movement. The correspondence between the matrix from Fig.9 and the matrix from Fig. 8 (p.185) is showing a complex movement achieved by how they interact, i.e., by the couple.

The distribution of functional equivalent pairs from this part of the session mirrors in reverse the distribution of functional equivalent pairs from the previous segment. As such this distribution, while constituting a specific pattern, points at the previous pattern. It is a complex deictic form. This reflexion generates more structure (i.e., more links in between this part and that part, and more symmetry). One

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<sup>81</sup> That is, she reiterates the impression she had, the strong negative feeling resulting from looking in the mirror. Same procedure of sequencing “qualities” or “impressions” we recognize from the sequence “mother – this woman – shadow - tray”, there Amalia employs it for generating distancing, but here seems to be devised for making an impression, i.e., for getting closer.

assumption is that the “form” (the arrangements of functional equivalent elements in succession and simultaneity) reoccurs as soon the “dream” reoccurs.

The forms of the matrices of the second and third movement could be qualified as a recursion. The blue & red / red & blue elements from Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 compared show a reversed recursion. An  $A[B[C]] \rightarrow C[B[A]]$  is the recursive movement that they build together.

A different recursion can be seen in that a forgotten dream is initially shared through silences; a forgotten event shared through an absence of words. In the score of the dream the ‘story’ is told by what is said and the ‘story’ is told also by the lack of speech ( $P_2 \rightarrow P_6$ ).

Content of the dream is also remarkable, in terms of telling something through an absence of telling. In what way? A subtle movement is occurring here, we deal with an unsaid that preannounces an image that makes an impression onto the dreamer through what it is not there, e.g., “somehow there were very huge holes in the hair”.

Cannot be random that such “image” first is forgotten, then is conveyed initially through how Amalia is not talking, through the huge holes in the fabric of words. And, on top of this sequence of doings, we should remember the issue of hirsutism that made such a mark onto Amalia’s emotional thus relational life. Here we can have a glimpse of the real complexity of interaction, maybe the most complex yet the most common practice, regarding “about what our praxis is engaged into?”.

Coming back to form, this isomorphism underlined above shows that the movement inscribed in one and the movement inscribed in the second when compared they confirm that recursion is at work.

Considering that the deictic field is a couple’s field, this field hosts a recursion. The couple’s deictic field, if recursion is the step-by-step progression of the session as event, then it may feed the emergence of a new level of relating. The idea that Amalia

could tell the dream before telling the dream is supported by this reoccurrence of distribution of s's within the matrix.

Also, a question arises from this sequence of forms: Are we witnessing a couple's process? We met a recurrent pattern that sends us to assuming that an ordered kind of interaction belongs to the couple as silent participant within the shaping of interaction. The field where such pattern forming could be set in place, is a deictic and symbolic field interacting. So, it follows that there is coexisting a field formation into which Amalia points at a complex experience, and by and for it the couple is creating a here and now experience?

Is this reoccurrence of form a way the *couple* organizes 'an experience'? Or a way or elaboration and enrichment enfolded in the couple working through of the interactional event represented by the dream? Is it: i) a recursion, that entails ii) a development of interaction that entails iii) a difference, i.e., a level stepping? A third reoccurrence of such form could bring more clarity regarding these issues. At the end of the session the dream comes again into their interaction and occupies the foreground of their dialogue. Is the couple continuing the recursive construction of the session?

## 6.7. SNOW WHITE SEQUENCE

Here is another sequence extracted from session 98<sup>th</sup>, addressing the forgotten dream. The dream arrives in the foreground again. Segmentation is made starting from utterances, combining *what* is said (simultaneity, content → context) with *how* is said (succession, context → content).

This time the dream narrative follows a moment of misunderstanding. Amalia clarifies the analyst regarding which dream and when. She arrives to recount the

dream. In the first sequence the dream was preannounced by how she was talking about her mother. The ‘wholes’ in the speech mirrored the wholes occurring later in the dream. Bühler’s views over this kind of issue offer a suitable description:

“All knowledge formulated in language may have access to a supplement from a source that does not flow into the channels of the symbolic system of language but still produces genuine knowledge”  
(Bühler 1990, p: 286).

Now, in this reoccurrence of the dream, she employs ‘wholes’ (pauses) and the dream narrative into one single piece of verbal interaction. The result is a new recursion of the first two instances that were the subject of previous Chapters, giving the matrices from Fig. 8 (p.185) and Fig. 9 (p.190).

Here is the fragment:

- 671. large tufts or (-) wholes or (-)
- 672. let’s put it that way. in any case
- 673. (1.2) (P<sub>1</sub>)
- 674. I was in my apartment
- 675. and stood in front of the mirror
- 676. and (-) I just did,
- 677. (1.5) (P<sub>2</sub>)
- 678. I don’t know, (-)
- 679. in principal you need a second mirror for (-) looking behind, but
- 680. (1.8) (P<sub>3</sub>)
- 681. it was just one mirror to look in,
- 682. only one mirror.
- 683. (4.0) (P<sub>4</sub>)
- 684. and the peculiar,
- 685. when I am thinking about it now, is, (--)
- 686. that I (-) actually saw just me from behind in the mirror
- 687. (--) although I stood, (2.0) (P<sub>5</sub>) openly (1.5) (P<sub>6</sub>) in front of it.
- 688. (4.5) (P<sub>7</sub>)
- 689. I don’t know whether mirrors have a meaning (P laughs).
- 690. (1.5) (P<sub>8</sub>)
- 691. well, mirror, mirror on the wall, uh-
- 692. yes. (-) sure.

[illegible]

Fig. 10 Snow White Sequence

With Fig. 10 a new  $A \rightarrow AX$  manifests, adding to the previous recursion in an  $ABC \rightarrow CBA \rightarrow ABC$ . In terms of form (also addresses the dream, thus content plays a role as well) this sequence mirrors the one from third movement, the dream telling (thus is a reverse mirroring of the second one). The form obtained after identifying what is functionally equivalent in the narrative, is mirroring the first couple of forms, with several (minor) differences.

There are several pairs that build the form from Fig. 10. Like 671, 681 and 682 (the function is reporting the dream, the content is I stood in from of a mirror) that qualify as functionally equivalent. Also, the pauses in speech, that here, as in the first



fragment, build up a specific pattern. They are also considered equivalent in the sequence. Line 287 is split in three parts noted all with '287' as we have one utterance and two pauses splitting it, as such the line needs to be represented in more than one 'raw' x 'column'.

The interpretation given by the Analyst – “mirror, mirror on the wall” addresses both moments questioned here, the first movement Amalia wants to evade, to escape her mother, as well as the dream itself, a second movement, which both built the Snow-white theme, that arrives to be completed with Thomä’s interpretation.

In terms of content, we can find even more. If the first piece (impressions about Amalia’s mother) is re-taken in the second one (the dream) then “mirror, mirror on the wall” qualifies as an *interpretation* referring the classic fairy-tale of jealousy and envy to the dream and to the here and now of the session. And here, in this subtle import made by Thomä, these aspects of “I want to get rid of her” are opening the sequence: “mirror → hair issues → negative feelings” or “mirror → hair issues → envy/jealousy”, if we consider Thomä’s interpretation. A sense *jointly* achieved.

Within “mirror → hair issues → envy/jealousy” it is condensed both the second movement, when Amalia gives course to a distancing from “mother, woman, shadow, tray”, as well the third fragment, when the consulted mirror effects a new distancing, as Amalia feels “terrible, horrified, awful and terrified” (a sequence that equates mother with mirror, through performing the same pattern of ‘negative feelings generate a distancing’) and the sequence formed by assembling these movements under recursion arrives to be coalesced all into a single idea, by Thomä’s interpretation, “mirror, mirror on the wall”. It is notable Amalia’s reaction from 692 (yes, sure) which is an abrupt distancing. Still reflecting on the relation between episodes, i.e., how they concatenate and what such sequence builds, then it can be seen that the equation “mother → distance”, assembled in the second movement, is

followed by, in the dream-telling episode, “negative feelings → distance” (Amalia distances herself first by forgetting this part of the dream and then by shaping the sequence - terrible, horrified, awful and terrified, she distances herself again), and afterward, in the Snow-white episode, it becomes “mother = negative feelings” (Thomä’s interpretation that links the above into a single strand) shows another aspect supported by the current model. The sequence of episodes functions as an “emotional syllogism” so to say, which is built up by the couple. This third ‘equation’ cannot but add a new semantic layer to “mother”, or to “mother = analyst” (i.e., to the current transference – countertransference movements within 98<sup>th</sup> session), enriching the understanding of the events of the session with new potential meanings of what they achieve, of what the analytic couple achieve, in their overcoming of such relational heritage that Amalia possessed, which shaped her life.

The former assumption that recursion is part of a more complex process that self-organizes the couple doings in and by the couple doings, receives support. Comparing the current matrix (Fig. 10, p.195) with the previous ones (Fig. 8, p.185 and 9 p.190) in all the “dream” is a character that plays a leading part, there is an equivalence at work in terms of form (arrangements of ‘s’s’) of these matrices.

With this last step in the sequence, we can note that whenever the dream is subject that offers content for their interaction the equivalent autonomous elements get organized into a form that reoccurs. This correspondence between a “content” and a “form”, that arrives to manifest through how Amalia and Thomä interact, due to its complexity and precision of manifestation, is far from random. Recursion, in this case, feeds the transformation in the meanings that the sequence built. This new observation that when “the forgotten dream” surfaces in interaction then an equivalent form emerges, is remarkable regarding *how* structure complexifies. The path that links the forgotten dream manifest through what is *not* said with interpreting the dream brings

a succession of forms of interaction embedded in forms of interaction which confirm the hypothesis that recursion is employed for making meaning by this couple.

Within the model, in the session 98<sup>th</sup>, words are or, better said, become the background for a figure of silence that, in the next move it turns around, so silences offer the background. In this complex figure-ground interplay, we witness “what meaning” is conveyed by “how such meaning is made”, e.g., we witness how a “forgotten dream” is conveyed through “how silences are shaped” by the couple. A figure that shows onto the canvas of words how Amalia and Thomä welcome a forgotten through an unsaid and arrive to interpret it.

Silences or pauses play a part which is far from being semantic irrelevant. An interactional event that moves beyond the view that silence is “the most powerful resistance” (Freud 1912/1958, p.112) on the part of the patient or “a powerful symptom” (Dimitrijevic 2021, p.152) on the part of the analyst.

This role, observable in speaking-listening, is heading towards presenting complex forms of organizations of interaction. Here, in the 98<sup>th</sup> session, through the current model, a figure of silence enters the category of observables.

In 98<sup>th</sup> session, while and through considering the couple as unit, we can see that words are building up the canvas for *figures of silence*, and vice versa as recursion builds up structure. We also can see within such complex forms in searching for a rhythmic expression, that *how* the analytic couple behaves is not random at all. There is no pattern in chaos. So, we can say that in the 98<sup>th</sup> session we meet a particular *form of silence*. A form that preannounces a content, it begins a recursion. Through this expectation of content “forgetting” is surpassed, it manifests, and the couple conveys a new semantic layer while making it. In this session we can see that Amalia and Thomä are employing this kind of talking through how the silences are assembled into a jointly made foreground background interplay.

Now the foreground is occupied by something unsaid that eventually leaves the foreground for being occupied by what is said. In this change of what occupies the foreground and what slips in becoming a background, a relationship between a form and another form is achieved. And this relation is shaped so recursion is a proper description of it. We can see this comparing fig. 9 (p.190) with fig. 10 (p.195), when the same shape is achieved by the couple through *how* they interact. It is notably that reversing this foreground background interplay the “form” is also reversed.

When investigating a “silence”, usually we see what and how the patient or what and how the analyst does with or within this or that silence (e.g., Akhtar 2021, pp.128-135). We can recognise forms of silence that can suit Akhtar’s classifications (structured, unmentalized, defensive, enactive, symbolic, contemplative, or regenerative silence) or even we can assume that these silences could be a transitional object (Spelman, 2021 p.176).

In terms of recursive doings something forgotten is conveyed through something unsaid. An absence points at an absence. As such pauses and silences are part in building up a complex recursion, of an absence summoned into an absence which evolves into a presence, i.e., a dream. This recursion involves a creation of a new kind of deictic field that cannot exist but in and through the works of the couple.

## 6.8. PUZZLES IN SPEECH AND LISTENING

Looking at the matrices drawn above, made of labels, they ask some further clarifications. In building up the matrices it is considered that the 's' here describing this relation between this utterance and that utterance and the 's' there emerging from that pair of utterances, are building up a unitary set, and so any  $A \times B$  form is assembled from homogenous elements. Can we say that these figures of talking and listening, or these figures of silence are made from homogenous elements?

It is the same level, the same operation then we can say that it is homogenous. How about the next level, narrative level? Labelling (i.e., discrimination as operation) and mapping (i.e., in succession simultaneity) for a sequence of narratives follows the same path. Is this sequence of labels, that map these narratives, building up a homogenous matrix as well? Here besides the "functional equivalent" there are other labels, describing what role plays this sequence or that sequence of utterances in the narrative. Is this  $A \times B$  form as well homogenous?

And we need to move even further if we anticipate a description of an "ecology of the session". Can we compare a form<sup>82</sup> that emerges from labelling the interrelating utterances, a matrix of labels with another form, made from labels which are describing narratives or narrative elements relating with narrative elements, or even a whole session mapped in their turn onto a matrix of labels?

In different words is this matrix of labels at utterance level functionally equivalent with this matrix of labels at a narrative level?

For these problems I found that one of Turing's ideas fits quite well the searched for answers. Alan Turing, a pioneer in computing, cryptanalysis,

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<sup>82</sup> Dealing with processes and events, "forms" are arrangements of events acquiring boundaries in observer environment interaction, thus they are/become autonomous.

mathematical biology and artificial intelligence, in one of his last articles, “Solvable and Unsolvable Problems” (1954), provides a resolution regarding the above methodological issue – in our case is how to build up a coherent set employing a particular operation (discrimination), a set which is evolving, i.e., progressing, stagnating or regressing.

Turing (1954/2004) has addressed a converting procedure, using the puzzle as a ‘simple’ object. The puzzle is endowed with ‘internal’ rules, that could be transformed from an initial state of ‘disordered configuration’, which sets the problem for the subject solving the puzzle, into a final state, ordered, i.e., reaching the solution.

It should be noted that a puzzle in a couple’s worlds is made from bidimensional action events (or we-events, or next level events). In this case *order* and *disorder* are given by the relationship between the puzzle, its rules and a ‘player’, since ‘values’ of each puzzle’s configuration from disorder to order gets sense only through a player playing the game.

In our case we can find a form (e.g., a sequence of doings) that is acquired through sequencing reoccurrences of the same type and informs, through relating with, about other form acquired through interaction (e.g., speech - listening).

Turing describes a ‘systematic procedure’ (SP) or a puzzle as *a sequence of symbols* in a row. In our case we can set “labels” that will stay for sentences or other autonomous entities as in the above matrices, while a, b, c or X, Y are labels for sentences or pairs of sentences or matrices. In this process some basic relations are preserved. The beginning state of the *solving* and the end of it are observables, as well as all the steps taken in between. Regarding the previous procedure, Turing advances the following rule, or theorem of conversion, which relates a puzzle, an existent solution and another ‘unsolved’ puzzle:

“Given any puzzle we can find a corresponding substitution puzzle which is equivalent to it in the sense that given a solution of the one we can easily use it to find a solution of the other” (op. cit. p.588)

For *solving* the puzzle, finding the path from one state to another, whilst any *puzzle* (i.e., any Systematic Procedure) is a *sequence of symbols* in a row, the rules of the puzzle (i.e., grammar) should be explicit. What processes (i.e., forms of relating, rules) occur in ‘*solving a puzzle*’? In a “*puzzle world*” there are: *counting, copying, comparing, and substituting* (Turing, 1954 p.589).

Considering a “session” as the source of “puzzles”, like dreams, relational riddles or puzzling interactions, is the patient/analyst/couple employing a “puzzle through another puzzle” when facing such events? A sequence points at another sequence, a mirroring, a reversing, a level stepping, that feeds a creative move while growing from it, so potential levels could arrive to be materialized. As seen in the above examples from session 98<sup>th</sup>, there are many forms of pointing at, that happens in deictic and symbolic fields. As such, asking if within that pair if a and b are functionally equivalent (or not) we have a sequence mapped onto a binary set of values (s and d). A first puzzle. A next pair, similar question a new answer. They are equivalent and substitution is immediate. The questioning and mapping as “solution” qualify the “substitution”. From here, step by step, we arrive at building up a matrix of “puzzles” and all the elements constituting the matrix are homogenous.

An example that seems to fit the above descriptions and conditions - namely “solving” the riddle of the dream of Irma’s injection (Freud, 1900/1953a). In finding the solution to the riddle presented by the dream, Freud employed another “puzzle”, his associations. Is it so? Are we witnessing in Freud’s solving the riddle of dreams “a puzzle through another puzzle” procedure? There are two sets, and the solutions were found in between, the dream as set, and the other set, of associations, which is born

from it. They are equivalent (the second web of relations mirrors the first one) and so one can provide the solution to the other. One is a “riddle” waiting for a solution, the second one trails the first. This set of associations, a new riddle so to say, it is born from the first one and is mapping the dream riddle into a web of new relations and events, and while is building up a web of relations mirroring a web of relations, a new level emerges. Interrelated a “solution” to the riddle is provided, and so “when the work of interpretation has been completed, we perceive that a dream is the fulfilment of a wish” (Freud, 1900/1953a p. 121). The “interpretation” runs along “given a solution of the one we can easily use it to find a solution of the other” (Turing, op. cit.)

In Irma’s dream we met “a subject is facing an unknown” on more than one level (in the dream world and in interpreting the dream), and such embedding a situation in a similar one is also part of “interpreting”.

Such situation has several potential actions available to deal with it. One of these actions is “transforming an unknown into something recognizable”, and in this case a “puzzle through another puzzle” interrelates one level of manifestation (dreaming) with another one (associating), and that while “facing an unknown” at one level is embedded in “facing an unknown” at another one. Even here, in approaching the specimen dream from 23<sup>rd</sup> 24<sup>th</sup> July, we deal with a bi-dimensional set of actions (sequence and simultaneity), sequence and embedding are at work, mirroring each other. Same can be said about transference-countertransference movements, or other well-known patterns of relating. But succession and simultaneity (e.g., embedding) are present without doubts. Yet the second dimension is forgotten, most of the time.

In the current level, the succession simultaneity aspect of interaction offers the base from which we can investigate the session. The labeling and subsequent mappings as operations are forms that follow the session. All the units considered in labelling within the current model are autonomous (utterances, narratives, narratives of



narratives, etc.), they acquire boundaries within the environment they generate for an observer. Autonomy, discrimination, and the forms (matrices) that result from labelling in succession simultaneity, are qualities that allow to see “how” and into “what” the relations between elements evolve, while keeping “how” and “what” as “unit”. If segregating the levels, then “how” and “what” are also segregated, so any qualitative jump is erased. Turing’s theorem lets us employ “equivalence” for counting, copying this form or comparing, and substituting this form with that form. A puzzle through another puzzle stays as a device employed for making meaning from an experience, a pattern discovery while a pattern forming is at work so to say.

In fact, the theorem allows that any (pair of) functionally equivalent elements to build a single set, and so all “equivalences” can be treated unitary. Functionally equivalence operates not only in succession, but also in between levels so a “meaning” or a “solution” at one level is projected at a different one (which so can be expanded or contracted within a homogenous semantic domain). The matrices of labels are homogenous. This idea is in the core of the model devised here.

## 6.9. INTERACTION AS INTERPRETATION

We move to Session 99<sup>83</sup> for observing another type of transformation. What can be seen more clearly here than in the session 98 is that a feeling initially of one (Amalia's) generates oscillations in the couple, and eventually are worked through.

So, are interpretations made just *in* words? Can we conceive as *form of interpretation* (i.e., arrangements acquiring boundaries while making meaning) something that is constructed along the line of “relating” → “different form of relating”? If so, as the couple doesn't speak in words by through them, interpretive activity could be *performed* by the couple as well. If more order is produced by *interaction*, then the meaning generating / generated by the new levels of organization could be qualified as “interpretation”, as a deictic form of acquiring joint knowledge.

Such reading of “*interpretation*” is different from the “mirror, mirror on the wall” from session 98, it “does not flow into the channels of the symbolic system of language but still produces genuine knowledge” (Buhler, 1934/1990 p.286).

In the following we encounter an *interpretive interaction*; we have a dream with a dance and a verbal interaction that could be qualified as verbal dance.

In the matrix below (Fig.11) there are the lines from 122 to 133, the dream.

- 122. P: (-) and (---) I don't know any more,
- 123. I was dancing (1.0)
- 124. Or was a (standard) dance,
- 125. I don't know it anymore. (---)
- 126. and suddenly I looked down on me
- 127. and then up from here I didn't wear anything. (1.5)
- 128. so the lower body was bare and the legs as well (1.1)
- 129. and; (--)I found myself actually pretty nice,
- 130. though I (.) looked as I always
- 131. and (1.0) and then I also danced with a man and
- 132. suddenly he didn't wear anything downwards anymore either.
- 133. T: mh. (--)
- 134. and I was actually really shocked by that. (1.2) but (-)
- 135. I seem to remember, (-)

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<sup>83</sup> The transcript and translation were made also by Jörg Bergmann.

136. so (.) danced apart from each other,  
 137. (2.0) that I could look at myself just as he could. (3.5)  
 138. this really cracked me up.

There is the first puzzle, the dream. Later in the session they arrive to interact in such a way that that their interaction mirrors, in *how* these actions unfolds, the ‘*what*’ reported, the dance from the dream-telling. The pairing of the events reported from the dream with the verbal interaction has in subtext the equation established in seeing dancing as interacting in a ‘world’ generated by an emotional experience (i.e., the dream), while talking as interacting in generating a world permeated by emotional experiences. The common factor, the emotional experience, that so gets transformed, allows the alleged link. When a link between a ‘peculiar’ state is made with a state of attunement, in fact we describe through this path a transformative process. At the same time, within the model if the link belongs to unfolding of process (i.e., in content and function), the role of recursion is again of generating new layers through interaction.

	122	123	124	125	126	127	128	129	130	131	132	133
122	s			s						s		
123		s	s									
124		s	s									
125	s			s						s		
126					s							
127						s	s				s	
128						s	s				s	
129								s				
130									s			
131	s			s						s		
132						s	s				s	
133												s

Fig. 11. Amalia reports a dream

Here is the second fragment of the session:

599. T: mmh.  
 600. P: and on Friday I just could not so-  
 601. T: yes, that's why the Friday session was so, uh, (-) a bit  
 602. P: dull.  
 603. T: uh-. (--)  
 604. P: it was really-  
 605. T: it was something uh (-) was (-) uh –  
 606. P: and the thing before the weekend was hard.  
 607. T: mh. (2.0)  
 608. was arduous and it was-  
 609. P: yes.  
 610. T: not really clear what was actually going on, wasn't it?  
 611. it was, (-) obviously it already had to do with the fact, that you  
 612. P: reprimanded.  
 613. T: was plagued by something, plagued by something.  
 614. P: yes, I was completely unable to connect with you.  
 615. T: mh.  
 616. P: everything was so-  
 617. T: mh. (--)  
 618. P: I was really (1.2) dashed to the ground.  
 619. T: mh.  
 620. (1.0)  
 621. P: I couldn't do anything about it.

	599	600	601 /2	602	604	605	606	607	608	609	610	611 /2	613	614	614	
599	s				s											
600		s	s													
601/2		s	s													
603				s												
604	s				s	s					s					
605					s	s						s				
606							s					s				
607								s								
608									s							
609										s						
610					s						s					
611						s	s					s				
612													s	s		
613													s	s		
614/15															s	
																s

Fig. 12

As soon as we compare the matrices, we arrive to notice the symmetry that the two figures display when compared (Fig. 11 and 12) the second movement installs a recursion of the first one, a mirroring.

In this second fragment, they recognize and agree the difficulty of last session, something they made then is something they mend now. If this movement, this dialogue, is linked with the dream, it adds layers of meaning through making this reparation of yesterday. Through recognition and accord, they built a new level of relating, showing a path that links a peculiar with known state (i.e., a transformation). The level of intimacy they acquire within this strand of interaction is higher. It can be said that they arrive to think and feel together, and a resonance within the couple is the ‘what’ which allows such event is at work. I chose ‘resonance’ as description of an event that results in amplifying what each part adds to the couple they form, amplified by the other part. Also, ‘resonance’ is something that belongs to the couple, it describes the state of the couple. As such, from interacting ‘apart from each other’ they arrive to interact in harmony, while they are building up a unitary flux of talking.

After Thomä says that it “was plagued by something” (line 613), Amalia’s answer (line 614) is describing in most succinct way the transformation they acquire here: “I was completely unable to connect with you” equates “plague”, which is a description of something producing mental pain. Both describe the state of last time and recognize how it was openly. They are connected. This pairing of function and content qualifies the ‘s’s’ they acquire in the sequence.

They talk in such a way that each one completes the other sentences. Is this transformation of a ‘what’ through a ‘how’ qualifying as ‘interpreting’? If ‘interpreting’ also equates transformation of a relational state (e.g., peculiar) through creating new layers of relational field (e.g., resonance), then yes, it is. Their *doings* are ‘interpreting’ Amalia’s dream, it transforms a peculiar into intimacy while they are

waltzing in words the new meanings of intimacy and acceptance into the couple by the couple working through. This implies that Amalia and Thomä arrive at equivalent perceptions of what is, that they do not inhabit different realities, they are present to each other. In the second table (Fig. 12) the form is acquired if we accept that 601 and 602 (or 611 and 612) form *a sentence spoken by the two of them*. If it is accepted, then the second form becomes a recursion of the first, and as said above through speaking together they interpret Amalia's 'dream', a recursion occurs, and new meanings are acquired, which is to say that there is a moment of attunement<sup>84</sup>, however there is "something more" than sharing affect.

In the present perspective some questions emerge: what is defined as "impasse" seen in "intersubjective silence" could be regarded as a form of resistance of the analytic couple? Accordingly, is it possible to see the "verbal dance" from above as a form of insight as a happening of the couple? Are they creating a new meaning within and by modulating the deictic field through the works of the analytic couple?

This piece of interaction is an instance of recursion, as joint action, and comparing the above example with the one borrowed from Giovacchini (1982), the first dream of a dancing couple while shaping the experience of the analytic couple no depth and no self-knowledge emerged. The couple avoided knowing through repetition, by making a device for further confusion.

In Amalia's case, a different kind of oneiric → relational event occurs. It is not avoided through repeating. A puzzle re-emerges so through recursion a new form of relating is created in the couple by the couple. Here not only curiosity drives the analyst

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<sup>84</sup> Stern defines attunement as "intersubjective sharing of affect" (Stern, 1985, p. 141).

*but knowing through relating* is *what* resolves the oneiric formulated puzzle what moves them forward towards speaking as they speak.

This new level of intimacy (the deictic context created by the couple from the couple's doings) which can be seen in the fragment, is what (possibly) lacks in Giovacchini's example and qualifies the interaction as repetitive.

The two forms acquired in narrating the dream and in commenting the Friday session (i.e., 98<sup>th</sup>), bring a confirmation of the Snow-White interpretation, a history of negative (envy, jealousy, hiding from murder), while the *dancing dream* represents the end of the story tale, completing the hide and seek in mirrors with a dance.

The difficulty of not being in tune is resolved by becoming a single narrator of themselves. So, it can be hypothesized that within and by this recursion the extra meaning attained by the couple is the "what" for transforming the awkwardness resented by Amalia regarding *intimacy* or 'nakedness' that precedes this bi-personal 'interpretation', this verbal waltz.

The first puzzle was the dream. The "solution" of this puzzle is an interpretation acquired through solving another puzzle emerging from the first one. We observe the same form recurring, the form of the dream restaged in the piece of dialogue. We could say that this *recursion* is the outcome of a process performed by *the couple*, as neither Amalia nor Thomä could be presumed as the author of such move. It is part of the process which is transforming the "dream" (interpreting).

The movement from fear of intimacy (i.e., the awkwardness felt in the dream and while she was sharing it) towards enjoying intimacy (seen in these emerging bi-personal narrations), these recursions draw the path between expecting towards realization of "order", they offer an answer to the dream.

We can observe in the session that each interactional strand, permeated with emotion and fueled by it, begins at a level of organization (low – e.g., the dream) and

arrives at a different level of organization (higher – e.g., the waltz). A movement from “dddd<sup>85</sup>” → “sdds” is a move towards a higher level of order, generated through mirroring and enactment of content. A higher level of order implies new links, new contents thus these feed new solutions to former puzzles. Considering the outcome, we can ask: is this a way of saying that this is an “insight” of the couple? That a qualitative transformation happens? This development materializes onto and from a deictic context, so “insight” is achieved through modulating both a symbolic and a deictic field that feed each other. Here we find necessary to recall Fonagy and Target’s conceptualization an “as if” and “for real” feeds each other, one becoming the background for the other. A form within which the couple observes the couple.

The dream becomes one event of the session, as such “interpretation” arrives to be a modulation of presence, attained through *how* interaction unfolds, through *how* the couple evolves achieving and upholding “knowing through relating”.

We witness here a continuous modification of structure, a more complex way of relating - from sharing dream stories to re-presenting them together, which equates a more complex perceptual-motoric-emotional schemata. A dance that evolves into a verbal dance that equates an insight in the couple’s deictic ↔ symbolic field.

As such one answer is that within the analytic couple, through recursion, a content, Amalia’s dream, becomes a form of the couple, i.e., the couple “enacts a content”. How couple from the dream shapes their interaction establishes a “form” to how the analytic couple brings meaning into this first puzzle. And this can happen only if the couple makes distinctions in the couple created environment, in the couple’s actions, i.e., the couple observes the couple and by and from it, a new layer of relating emerges.

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<sup>85</sup> A movement from a fluid amalgamation (dddd...) towards structure, where similarities appear and offer a new level of organization (sdds...), i.e., more order.



### 6.9.1. DREAMS AND PRACTICES OF THE COUPLE

Peräkylä and Bergmann (2020), approaching dream telling from a Conversational Analytic angle, ask, “what kind of conversational practices do the participants employ in creating meaning for objects and events in a dream?<sup>86</sup>” (p.925)

One observation that the authors make is that in the “post narration space” there is an oscillation between “the dream” and “real world” experience. This generates the locus of meaning attribution, is the frame of reference<sup>87</sup>. The moves in-between “the dream” and “real world” performed by patient and analyst “are not just any topical leaps, but rather, in them, the participants display inherent connections between the two worlds.” (op. cit. p. 929).

These movements, shaped as sequential routes, are mappings of dream world onto real world and vice versa, a world mapped onto the dream canvas. The authors differentiate three practices of meaning attribution: “(1) unilateral assertions; (2) meaning attribution through redescription; and (3) merging of the referential worlds.”

“Unilateral assertions” are defined as “one of the parties plainly asserts a real-world meaning of something that occurred in the dream” (p.931) the authors characterize it as a “rather straightforward translation, as a meaning equivalence” (p.942), the second practice, “redescription”, involves a stage of preparation, providing a semantic “anchor point” so meaning attribution arrives to be made. The practice is described as such: “the analyst characterises an event or scene in the real world or in the dream, in a way that brings up a particular aspect of it.” (p. 932) transforming the

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<sup>86</sup> The answers provided form the basis for addressing another question: “what is the therapeutic task of the creation of meaning for a dream?” (p.925).

<sup>87</sup> Through a detailed analysis Peräkylä and Bergmann arrive at showing that “the meaning of dreams can be created” (op. cit. p.946).

described scene into “one that affords explicit linkages to be made between the dream and the real world.” (p.932). The third practice, “merging”, “the same expressions, or the same referents, belong to both. More specifically, an object or a figure that initially belongs to the dream gets inserted into the description of the real world.” (p.938) and in this “route of meaning creation” there is more than a translation or a transformation, as in the previous paths, there is a transmutation, as “the therapist locally collapses two epistemic realms.” (p.942).

Now, changing the system of reference from the sequence of actions performed utterance by utterance to a new sequence of actions performed by the analytic couple, we can see that other “practices” are emerging.

Looking at the examples from the session 98<sup>th</sup> and 99<sup>th</sup> one particularity steps forward. Namely that the “dream” arrives *to structure* the interaction in such a way that the couple builds up a deictic field which is mirroring the oneiric field from which emerges. The couple is creating a new semantic layer, a symbolic → deictic field which functions as an interpretative bi-personal doing. A form that qualifies as “mirroring the dream”.

We can see how the interplay content ↔ context or deictic ↔ symbolic gets a bit more complex when a dream world is summoned within talking. In the session 98<sup>th</sup> we can see how a forgotten dream dwells into an unsaid, in the session 99<sup>th</sup> the dream of Amalia dancing with a man, arrives to acquire new layers of meaning through how the analytic couple dance *with* and *in* words, and, as we will see, in the session 152<sup>nd</sup> a dream provides the interactional architecture of an entire session.

The couple arrives to “interpret” the dream in each of these examples, whereas “interpreting” is understood as ongoingly creating new semantic fields from deictic ones and deictic fields from symbolic ones, that both rise the level of order, an oscillation unfolding for adapting “what is happening” to “what is happening”. In the

Snow-white fragment we can see that therapist Thomä arrives to put into words something that the couple has shaped already, through folding a deictic field for a new symbolic one. In fact, “mirror, mirror on the wall” describes a “what”, a content (an emotional experience) but also a “how”, a context within which such meaning can emerge (the couple is mirroring the dream, first, a forgotten through an unsaid, then a recollection of something lost, and finally transforming the previously unsaid into an open verbal interaction, an alliance).

The interplay “succession ↔ simultaneity” provides a different “how” and “what”. Besides translation, transformation, and transmutation as events of a turn taking system dealing with a dream, we should consider the actions that the couple performs with and within it, as mirroring, complexification, and level stepping through recursion, through something pointing at something emerging from it  $(A \times B) \rightarrow (A \times B) \times X$ . The new deictic field evolves from an absence pointing at an absence and arrives at a presence pointing at a presence. From something “unknown” towards something named, i.e., “mirror, mirror on the wall”.

When an event (e.g., a dream) travels from one to arrive at becoming a *happening* of a couple, a new dimensionality is called to accommodate a *next level event*, devised by the analytic couple. New dimensions  $(1 \rightarrow 2)$  feed and create new levels, emerging from this “personal → bi-personal” movement, through the interplay deictic symbolic that is, as seen, shaped by the couple.

## **6.10. BI-PERSONAL NARRATIVES**

A narrative tells and shows a story, communicates by means of the characters seen as flesh and blood, or as acoustic beings or paper beings (Barthes, 1966) and it is “the representation of at least two real or fictive events or situations, in a time sequence neither of which presupposes nor entails the other” (Prince, 1982, p. 4).

We should also count in that “all narrating is a narrating of something that is not narration, but a process in life.” (Müller 2011, p. 78). Damasio (2000) argues, regarding narratives and telling stories, that they are the building blocks of knowing. Narratives are sequels of mapping one’s experience in such a way that it is sharable: “Telling stories precedes language, since it is, in fact, a condition for language...” (Damasio 2000, p. 189).

This sequence, “story-telling (as potential) → telling stories (as performance)”, gets installed in this perspective as the foundation required towards achieving language-use. So, when addressing ‘interaction’ and ‘verbal interaction’, we are dealing (in Damasio’s views) with the ‘equation’: “storytelling” → “language use”.

Narratives from ‘interacting as storytelling’ are messy, as they emerge from a wobbling verbal interaction, into and from which they acquire boundaries.

A session is an event, into which other events find place and context while generating context and place for other events. Amongst these there are narratives, explicit or implicit ones, personal and bi-personal ones, whilst “narrating is representing, a re-presenting of events which are not sensually perceivable to the listener.” (Müller 2011, p. 67)

Regarding multiple ‘tellers’, i.e., a narrative in forming while is generated through interaction, Prince’s description of a minimal story can be helpful. A minimal story (e.g., Prince, 1973 pp. 16-37, 1980, 1982) is composed from three segments:

**A. a departure state, B. a transformative event, C. an arrival state.**

A story can be shared by one teller, or it can be created in interaction, and in the case of the analytic interaction A or B or C could be occupied, as maker, either by patient or analyst or by both.

In Jefferson (1980, 1988) analysis of “sequential organization of troubles-talk” there are two polar developments of “trouble-talk”. She proposes as complementary actions organizing interaction “attending to the trouble” and “attending to business as usual” (Jefferson 1988, p. 419). Jefferson (1988) proposes the following sequence of events: “A) Approach, B) Arrival, C) Delivery, D) Work-up, E) Close-Implicature, F) Exit” (p.430). In the “attending to the trouble” A → F sequence we recognize a step-by-step progression from exposition of the trouble to transformation of it by an affiliation response, and, the third step, the arrival, by attending to the trouble the trouble-recipient makes the trouble-teller to have a visible different state (e.g., release from trouble or anxiety). The transformative event (B) here is assembled by “D” and “E” from the above sequence, and from couple’s perspective they are *one* action.

Another equivalent form with Prince’s ABC, also in the fields of CA as in the above example, can be found in Peräkylä (2019) who advances a model of the sequential organization of psychotherapy interaction, that moves in this viewpoint from “surface”, while “the momentary relation get transformed through sequentially organized actions” (p.271), towards “experience”. The model develops the idea that “transformation comes from the understanding that adjacent turns are tightly linked, and that this linkage involves a constantly updating display of the interactants’ understandings of each other’s actions.”, accordingly, “we can consider the sequence of adjacent turns as a vehicle of a transformation of experience” (p.266).

The sequence proposed by Peräkylä’s model is: “Prior action” → “Target action” → “Response” → “Third position” (p.261) Target action is envisaged as *any*

*distinguishable* action, while “prior action creates affordances and/or relevancies for the target action” (p.262). We can see in the prior action what in Prince’s model is a departure state, A. Peräkylä describes the third unit of the sequence, “Response,” as what the target action makes relevant, “while the “third position action” involves what the producer of the target action (usually the therapist) does in “response to the response,” i.e., what he or she makes out of the response.” (p.262) The relation “Target action” and “Response” if seen from a couple’s perspective, i.e., as unit, is a *transformative event* performed by the couple. Attaining a ‘third position’ then a bi-personal narrative becomes “a vehicle of a transformation of experience”.

Observing the session so “the use of perspective-taking in the turn-by-turn unfolding of the clinical setting to show how a therapist and a patient gradually co-construct a shared narrative.” (Knox and Lepper 2014, p.37) have several ways to be achieved. Here narrative is employed “as a means of intersubjective communication in the interaction of therapist and patient” (op. cit. p.46). A told narrative (e.g., patient’s story) and a bi-personal narrative (patient *and* analyst) cannot be segregated.

As such, telling a story through relating so a story emerges from *how* relating unfolds, speaks about a dyadic being, that speaks and listens<sup>88</sup>.

One example of a ‘bi-personal story telling’, is found in Buchholz and Reich (2015). It is not just the situation in which ‘one tells a story to another’ as such sharing one’s experience with someone else or re-living that experience in being with another. It is one tells a story to avoid re-living it. Yet the *common* narrative event that occupies the central stage generates a difference. In a way we can say that a report of yesterday

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<sup>88</sup> Following the main hypothesis, a development of it is that the analytic couple becomes a storyteller within “knowing through relating” and “knowing through relating” happens while the analytic couple becomes a storyteller of the actual events, of the here and now.

gets transformed into a narrative of what is happening, but in its present form it is a dually created story. The departure state (i.e., performing affect isolation) is described by the authors as: “there is no narrative tension, no story preface, no climax of narration, no coda.” (p. 9) Originally the example is employed to illustrate a movement from affect isolation towards an alignment, by recovering the emotion of speech and feeling, and the authors are showing that “the prosodic dimension of speech is independent from what we say with words”. (Ibid, p. 9) Even so, *how* the words get together is also a variable that could tell a story, e.g., by telling a story. The following piece of interaction is extracted from “the 28<sup>th</sup> session conducted by a female therapist with a patient suffering from obsessive-compulsive ideas that overweight naked men might exhibit their penises in front of her.” (Buchholz and Reich 2015, p.8):

- 1 ((recording in progress))
- 2 (31)
- 3 ?:: ((slight cough))
- 4 (6)
- 5 P: I managed to while away the hours really well yesterday (2) and (3) I don't remember (-) having any obsessive thoughts? (2) nor when I was somehow driving home (2) and then (2) <I was at HOME for some time> and um (2) then I drove to Landsberg with a (girl)friend (3) a:nd (-) there we met two kind of :: (1) old friends of ours and went to the swimming pool for a bit and (1) after the weather wasn't so good then um (1,5) went into town for a bit as well >got something to eat< and then um (..) an ice-cream afterwards an::d (1,5) yeah and I was really (1) able to unwind again.
- 6 (4)
- 7 P: well, I::
- 8 T:°>mhm<°
- 9 P: didn't notice, that somehow something was coming (2) something somehow was creeping up on me, that was all
- 10 T: °good°
- 11 P: somehow really=really far away
- 12 (15)
- 13 T: strictly speaking you didn't while away the hours, you actually SAVOURED them!
- 14 P: yeah exactly haha ((laughs)) that's right! that was bad wor(h)d(h)ing [ haha((laughs))

According to the previous formula, Prince's ABC, the couple narrates, neither the patient, nor the analyst, but the couple, thus the interaction is building up a story, a narrative, as a relational field within which a relation unfolds. One hides what was felt, the other recognize this feeling, and what is felt, while recognized, arrives to link,

giving meaning to what is said *and* lived. From the couple perspective this doing can be seen as the couple absorbs and subsequently transforms an isolation in and through relating. A story that grows from the deictic context of the session, from the here and now of the patient and analyst in the here and now of the patient and analyst.

We have one state, the departure, which has as manifestation an insipid and colourless voice, a voice that participates in creating the atmosphere of the session, she is “reporting”, but with the line 13 the therapist introduces affective experience in her reformulation that brings affect (back?) in the patient.

It seems that we eventually deal with a narrative, through recovering of what was lost or creating what wasn’t there, represented as: report → reformulation → affect → dialogue. The form belongs to the session. The boundaries are there, waiting to be recognized.

## **6.11. 152<sup>ND</sup> NARRATIVES**

If we look at the couple as unit, a narrative acquires boundaries through and within speaking *and* listening referential, and so is a couple’s event that takes shape into and by shaping the environment, i.e., by how the couple self-organizes.

The sense a story makes is a *happening*, not something deposited into a listener or into the couple. We can see that when noticing that the story production (talking) adapts itself to “the reference partner to whom the story is told.” (Boothe et al, 1999) and even more, it is more than that, the listener contributes to the story itself (e.g., Goodwin 1984; Schegloff 1987).

In “Rhythm and Blues – Amalie’s 152 session”, Buchholz, Spiekermann and Kächele (2015) starting from quoting Rycroft (1956) who “shows that psychoanalytic conversation is a two-level endeavour: to *talk to* and to *talk about* the patient.” (in



Buchholz et al 2015, p.885) add another level, they assert that the “analytic conversation” asks for a three-level model, adding a new level: “an object level which we could term the ‘*narrative level*’ and the meta-level of ‘aboutness’ then is implemented by psychoanalytic activities.” (p.885, italics added)

Anywhere narratives arrive to shape their form, characters<sup>89</sup> emerge, as inhabitants of these never empty narrative worlds. They emerge through speaking *and* listening, while speaking *and* listening gets shaped by these characters, e.g., the analytic couple as *character* of the story told by the couple. The story is enfolded within the character and its relational world, while the unfolding story makes the character to emerge.

On narrative level, an ABC delineates a form *on the surface of data*. A “character”, as event of the analytic dialogue, is like a word in a sentence. It has a specific purpose (i.e., a specific relational meaning) and acquires a “form<sup>90</sup>”, but this meaning and form emerge from how and what the streams of narrated actions involving this “character” materialise *on the surface of interaction* (i.e., a relational meaning, as the “forgotten dream” as character, or “mother”, from session 98).

And these are in speaking *and* listening, thus in the here and now, thus a character, any character, is a bi-personal creation. A relational form, emerging through narrating (e.g., a character, an atmosphere, an impression of a time past), is shaped on the interactional surface built by speaker *and* listener. In this ‘here and now’ we can recast the idea that “the mind is making use of the body in order to communicate

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<sup>89</sup> e.g., the dream mother, that gets paired with Thomä in session 98<sup>th</sup> by Amalia and this pair arrives to supply the form of the couple, i.e., how Amalia and Thomä arrive to relate.

<sup>90</sup> i.e., the relational field of the story provides the boundaries of each character, i.e., the relations established between characters and their dynamic unfolding are building up their paper or acoustic worlds and selves.

something, to tell a story” (McDougall, 1989 p. 16) by keeping count of Buchholz’s (2007) finding, that language “absorbs and extends the body” (p.173).

With this new sense it can be said that a “character” “absorbs and extends” the storyteller by “making use” of the listener, into one single event, a bi-personal one (from and by which any character of the session emerges).

This story, of ‘absorbing and extending’ *and* ‘making use’, happens in the here and now, session after session, moment after moment. We had seen that either in “opening window” episode or in the sequence of “dancing in words” from the session 99<sup>th</sup>. Implicit in the above comments, regarding a character, is that such an acoustic being needs a story to live through it, and a story within the session is a bi-personal achievement.

The “joy” of yesterday is “created” by patient and therapist together, as seen in the example from the previous subchapter. Reinstating the feeling, as action, made that the “character”, the “I”, recounted by the patient<sup>91</sup>, to arrive at being whole, emerging from a hollow image of an “I” from yesterday. And this restitution is what makes visible ‘absorbing and extending’ *and* ‘making use’ of a bi-personal narration.

Thomä and Kächele (1987) “stage model” (or metaphor) brings into focus the “role enactment” and “role responsiveness” (e.g., Sandler 1976) as actions. Accordingly, their interplay devises an account of what is going on, e.g., “the psychoanalytical situation permits continuous trial action to take place so that both participants can move from the stage to the auditorium quickly and easily and can thus

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<sup>91</sup> Exhibited in *how* she is telling the story, the presented “I” stays for a yesterday “I”. A question: is the other character “the exhibitionist”, a doppelgänger of this “I”? The tension between a told self and a performative self (e.g., Deppermann et al, 2020) can be envisaged as the fabric from which a bi-personal narrative emerges as an ongoing mutual positioning. Representational and performative positioning as discursive practices or characters and their roles within a story are the entry point for a clinical *and* conversational approach.

observe themselves.” (p.95). As “both are virtually on the stage and in the audience at the same time.” (Thomä and Kächele, 1987 p. 95) the previous bi-personal creation of “characters” seems to answer to this double situatedness, that even if addresses less than ‘absorbing and extending’ *and* ‘making use’, circumscribes the same phenomenology. Implicit in both perspectives is that if we move upwards one level, i.e., from utterance to (bi-personal) narration, the previous pair “succession ↔ simultaneity” asks similar privileges.

A “narrative” as an event of the couple moves beyond conveying an experience, a “there and then”, so the storyteller and the listener are casted in quasi-stable roles so the variables, i.e., the characters of the story, acquire a ground onto which are moulded (we know that the listener shapes as well the story, thus there is a dynamic of narration fed by interaction, by presence). The time of the story is found also in the here and now of the couple, so each “character” is a happening. But also, in this process of moulding, the teller-listener are acted upon by their own creations, they are, at this next level, ‘absorbing and extending’ *and* ‘making use’ of their makers, as can be seen in the case of “father” from window opening episode, in the Introduction (a larger fragment is approached again in this chapter). Father surfaces within Amalia’s story of laughing, but this character evidently acts upon both, it becomes the “organizer” of how the interaction flows. Also evident is that Thomä’s empathic recognition meets Amalia’s need of being recognized, an encounter that allows Amalia and Thomä to transform the “ $1 + 1 = 1$ ” of rejection into a “ $1 + 1 = 3$ ” of an “opening”.

If empathy is described as “the vehicle by which human beings, (...), can create their own environment with respect to the other’s state, context and situatedness.” (Buchholz 2014, p.14) then narrating is “empathic” (e.g., Boothe et. al.1999, p. 259), it creates a *link* in between the roles played in the dyad, whilst is generating through relating its own domain of existence (as any recursion does).

In a triadic perspective, an empathic stance is the ground onto which couple's creativity can emerge, so a next level event can be fed by how the environment is created anew. Again, the opening window episode provides a good example for such a move, of recognition from an empathic stance, that generates a move towards "1 + 1 = 3" that, as it is shown later, involves recursions on utterance level as well as on narrative one, feeding the emergence of next level events.

We need to recognize that they are *making an experience*, a narrative in a couple's perspective is a "here and now" being, and this changes a lot the "description" of what *the couple* does. A shaping of the present moment by both so a past is summoned and semantically enriched and transformed within this re-experiencing it through narration with another.

### **6.11.1. NARRATIVES IN THE HERE AND NOW**

Narratives constitute autonomous events, they are constructed by the couple, and evolve generating next-level-events as well, qualified as narratives of narratives, a fabric made of complex interactions building up new levels of meaning. According to Prince's definition, we can have utterances building up ABC's, or such form of a sequence could be devised from ABC's where each "A" or "B" or "C" is a narrative, an ABC, which brings even more the question of 'absorbing and extending' *and* 'making use' of the "now"<sup>92</sup>, of the present moment. As such, contrary to CCRT (e.g., Dahlbender et al. 1998, p.409), the question "why this now?" asks with necessity answers (in succession *and* simultaneity). It addresses what the couple is doing and achieving in interaction by narrating.

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<sup>92</sup> The link between body and the feeling of time is beyond the scope of the current study, yet it is a subject that can be approached in such triadic perspective.

In the following it is probed that the narrative makes from the verbal ground of the session (the symbolic layer) a deictic field. A field that in turn is employed to shape the verbal interaction, to build up a new common ground. As such, the previous “absorbing and extending” *and* “making use” (or “role enactment” *and* “role responsiveness” from a different perspective) seen in succession ↔ simultaneity need to be called as part of the couple’s doings as well.

We can see these transmutations ‘symbolic → deictic’ ‘deictic → symbolic’ as an ongoing process, aggregated from small pieces of interaction, as well as emerging in and from larger parts of analysis. Such mirroring is describing a process that points at another process. A narrative that points at a narrative, being part of it, is a complex form of deixis. One such example is found in the session 99<sup>th</sup>, dancing in words mirrors the content of the dream, and it is a couple doing that unfolds in an ABC form that points at a narrative, at an ABC (the dream), that provides the form and part of the content. The new content made through relating functions as a meaning made by them, as an interpretation. Likewise, in narrating as doing, a similar ‘symbolic → deictic’ transmutation ensues, as in the case of utterances, considering that “telling a story produces nearness.” (Boothe et. al. 1999, p.261), nearness is a doing performed, and telling - listening stories is one way of achieving nearness, silence is another. Storytelling generates nearness (in the end intimacy is a bi-personal story), yet nearness in its turn needs to request a storytelling, it requests sharing the (his)stories for knowing, which in the end is making a (hi)story. The implicit level-stepping, from the previous description, asserts that a (hi)story is a tool for knowing oneself, which is emerging from being with another.

The apparition of a new level implies that complexity rises, as well as order move in the sense of less towards more order. In mirroring we move from fluidity to a structure. Creativity in this progression is a *sine qua non*. We can observe that

acquiring more order happens as the level of relating moves towards more intimacy. The hypothesis, as presented earlier, is that more complexity equates better relating. These developments of negotiating the issues of intimacy, are observable under the headings of analysis vs. monastery complementary themes, dialectically articulated.

One answer to the question of how this session grows in complexity is by merging autonomous structures, for embedding former structures and levels in creating their own domain of existence. Topic gives the segmentation criterion.

### 1. *The Thursday appointment*<sup>93</sup>

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A: let me just recall that</li> <li>2. Monday is our next.</li> <li>3. P: five o'clock.</li> <li>4. A: five o'clock,</li> <li>5. that was it -.</li> <li>6. P: right, and the Thursday, we hadn't settled yet</li> <li>7. A: Thursday.</li> <li>8. P: you didn't say anything about it yet,</li> <li>9. because at first, I thought I couldn't make it.</li> <li>10. But I don't have Extension Course then.</li> <li>11. A: ok, so Thursday then, uh yes,</li> <li>12. uh – six-thirty would be best for me then.</li> <li>13. or five-thirty?</li> <li>14. P: I don't care.</li> <li>15. A: uh.</li> <li>16. P: whichever you like.</li> <li>17. A: five o'clock. so five-thirty then.</li> <li>18. P: um-hmm.</li> <li>19. A: ok?</li> <li>20. P: um-hmm.</li> </ol> | <p>There is an agreement (1 – 4), followed by, “we hadn't settled”. This event plays the role of a transformative event, initiated by Amalia. She changes the previous agreement into not yet decided, and that beginning with 6. In the end she suddenly moves towards “I don't care”. In this sequence we encounter the following actions done by the couple: settled → unsettled → indifference or decided → undecided → uncertain</p> |
|---|---|

The session begins with a short scheduling issue, regarding the Monday and Thursday appointments). Just after the agreement, we see a sort of displayed interest in sorting out the next appointment, which is shortly followed by a stated indifference.

Buchholz et al (2015) describe the above fragment as “sharing a common project”, which is equivalent with a ‘doctor-nurse’ control game:

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<sup>93</sup> Transcribed/translated by Michael Buchholz

“The nurse in a submissive position suggests to the doctor what he should propose and when he finally directs the nurse to do this it appears as if it were his original idea. His authority is protected – and this is an aspect operating here, too.” (p.88)

The session begins with a “1 + 1 = 1”, a control game from couple’s view, seen in the way Amalia initiates and responds, shaping the little story of a yes dissolving into a no. Here we find a first case “I care ↔ I don’t care” oscillation that unfolds into a bi-personal narrative, shaped by the interactional sequence: “agreement → disagreement → indifference”. With this movement the couple assembles the first bi-personal narrative unit of the session, an ABC (agreement as departure, we hadn’t settled yet as transformative event, and I don’t care as arrival), which seems to have a form previously seen in both the 98<sup>th</sup> and the 99<sup>th</sup> session, an ambivalent form, one that resembles a play, i.e., rehearsing for later, or a prologue in form and function.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	21
1	s																			
2		s	s	s																
3		s	s	s																
4		s	s	s																
5					s															
6						s		s												
7							s				s									
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Fig. 13 Making an Appointment.

An interest that is immediately recruited for being reversed and eventually an “intense” indifference, an “*I don’t care.*” We will meet this form in other sequences, as in “analysis vs. monastery” theme, while curiosity (analysis) is burned down (by shame) into and by indifference (monastery).

## 2. *The dream. First thread*

15. ((2 min))	
16 P:((moaning))	First ABC (21 - 35)
17 P: I dreamed last night,	
18 this morning, (just as) (.)	A - Someone comes
19 the alarm went off.	B - dead hands
20 I had been murdered by a dagger.	C - She feels
21 T: mhm.	embarrassed
22 P: that is actually it was- (.5s) like in a movie (1.2)	Second ABC (38 –
23 and I had to lie prone very long,	44)
24. and I had the dagger in the rear	A - Someone comes
25. and, then many many people came, (A)	B - takes something
26 and, I don’t remember exactly,	C - She feels (...?)
27 holding the hands completely quiet,	
28 somehow (as if dead) (B)	Third ABC (44 –
29 T: mhm.	52)
30 P: I was very embarrassed	A - Someone comes
31 that my skirt slipped up so high in the rear (C)	B - takes something
32 T: mhm.	C - appalling
33 P: and then a colleague came, (A’)	
34 clearly visible from XY,	
35 that was my first job,	
36 and he then pulled out the dagger from the back	
37 and took it with him. (B’)	
38 and I know that it was like a souvenir then. (C’)	
39 and then came a young couple, (A’’) –	
40 I only remember that he was a negro.	
41 and then they cut my hair	
42 and actually they wanted to make a wig out of it	
43 I think. (B’')	
44 and I found this really appalling. (C’')	
45 just everything down	
46 and they in fact started to cut.	
47 and, then I got up, -	
48 and went to the hairdresser.	
49 and there I still had ( )	
50 rang ( ) and I woke up	

Moving from one sequence to another we notice a move from one puzzle to another. First predicate of the dream: Amalia is on the ground lying there with a dagger in her back. If we look at how the dream telling goes on, we can see that this first dream situation, or pattern (while lying down, someone comes, takes something that



acts as a transformative action, and she subsequently experiences an intensely negative feeling) is repeated in form (given by the sequence of actions and their content), either with her colleague, who takes the trophy dagger, or with the couple, who cut her hair for a wig. In the first part of the dream, she feels embarrassed, while in the third she finds the wig issue appalling.

The dream, staging embarrassment, and other negative feelings, evolves under a progression of steps: i) a disturbing event, ii) a peak of experience iii) a more disturbing event, a succession that iv) eventually fades out.

This dream sequence has a recursive shape ‘high → peak → higher’, while each “peak” (being seen, stripped, robbed) as she is “dead”, cannot be concealed. It should be noted that embarrassment as happening follows the same shape. She cannot fight against, cannot conceal it as she is in plain sight, and all are for a painful end, time and time again. The sexual component of uneasiness cannot be missed, a hypothesis which attains support by the way the session evolves (in content and context), e.g., she is invoking the safety of a monastery.

We witness Amalia, as a character in her dream, that tells the story of her state after a breaking point occurred, after failure of keeping a vertical stance one can say.

The wig, the knife or the eyes of the others are doing each the same kind of harm to Amalia – a reaction of awkwardness, of uneasiness.

Is there a conflict in between a moral or a dogmatic stance versus an autonomous or independent attitude? The later “monastery vs. analysis” battle that flow under “unfulfilled expectations ↔ embarrassment” confirms this idea.

The hands, the dagger, and the hair – what do they have in common? Someone takes something from Amalia (her quiet hands, or the dagger, or her hair).

A strong negative feeling ensues from each one of these trophy-taking events. Maybe the knife taken stays for a conquest or a triumph that maybe implies, from Amalia's part, (again) feeling ashamed or humiliated as a counterpart of triumph.

The form of the dream has been shaped into a recursive flow:  $ABC \rightarrow A'B'C' \rightarrow A''B''C''$ . Where  $A'B'C'$  and  $A''B''C''$  follow a first narrative sequence:

- i) Departure state (someone arrives)
- ii) Transformative event (takes something from Amalia)
- iii) Arrival state (Amalia experiences a negative emotional reaction)

What part does this sequence ( $ABC \rightarrow A'B'C' \rightarrow A''B''C''$ ) plays? Is the dream recruited by the 'session' in how the form of the session gets more complex?

Just in passing we should note that these three forms are the reverse of her session's 'pattern' – where she comes to the session, places herself on the couch, takes or gains something from this encounter for her, and, as in this very session, a good feeling ensues (which makes a pointing at the session, as deictic context, thus while in the session there is a recursion in the here and now of a here and now).

Comparing and substituting we arrive at the following matrix:

	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	D
A	s			s			s			
B		s			s			s		
C			s			s/d			s	
A	s			s			s			
B		s			s			s		
C			s/d			s			s/d	
A	s			s			s			
B		s			s			s		
C			s			s/d			s	
D										s

Fig. 14

On the underlying level, i.e., the sentence level, from which this form (Fig. 14) gets organized (Fig. 13 p.226) we find no remarkable structure; it has a form that doesn't resonate with the narrative one, which acquires a rich structure, a rhythmical form.

On the sentence level there is a moment that could imply that the *I care* ↔ *I don't care* from the appointment piece still operates as the form of interaction. A sequence that resembles “unfulfilled expectations ↔ embarrassment” alluded above. In the dream she gets up and goes to the hairdresser.

It is clear in the first piece of interaction where we find also an “agreement → disagreement → indifference”. And indifference implies “rejection” of both, qualifying as a “solution that maintains the problem” while employing it.

We can hypothesize that an emotional experience is keeping Amalia in a state of rejection through building up a ‘tense’ indifference, as in *I don't give a damn* from a later moment, that reoccurs as the session evolves.

So, if “control” becomes the subject of what is done by “agreement → disagreement → indifference”, or the “doctor nurse” as  $1 + 1 = 1$  control device, then we encounter the same sequence of actions, which is a way of organizing the events.

The dream telling unfolds under the same pattern, and the form occurs again and again, and this way of unfolding, i.e., recursive, adds evidence to the idea that the “dream” is for the session what “embarrassment” is for the dream, as well as an expected “going to the hairdresser”. Is it “shame” and outdoing it a working through, a doing of the couple?

“Control ↔ Intimacy” can fuel either pattern or noise, and these vicissitudes of the session could let us see what the “couple” does with this “dream”, or this “feeling” arriving at “interpreting” the dream, e.g., session 99.

In the dream she is under the most effective device for “control”, she is murdered by a dagger. What the couple does with “control”, enfolded within “agreement → disagreement → indifference”, shows that to transform it the couple needs to “observe” it, to bring more meaning into it (in one-person psychology equates to interpret it), and recursion is part of this action performed, it answers to “how” a meaning emerges from a sequence of doings that arrives to be transformed.

We encounter a movement from deictic context, generated by Amalia’s body, to a symbolic one. It can be said, paraphrasing Buchholz (2007, p.172) regarding language use, that symbolic absorbs and extends the deictic and deictic absorbs and extends the symbolic. An action that points to another equivalent action that points to an equivalent action, and these reoccurrences build up a new symbolic form that encompasses a feeling, i.e., embarrassment.

Buchholz et al (2015) detect this first move and comment about reiterating the reason *why* Amalia is there (hirsutism) as common ground activity, so “going to a hairdresser in the dream precisely reformulates her reason to go to analysis.” (p.891) Buchholz et al. comment adds some backing regarding the idea that stigma and embarrassment occupy the core of the dream.

Yet this dream telling has its own moves, that fell also under “agreement → disagreement → indifference”. As unfolding of an action pattern, Amalia arrives (lines 70-71 see *infra*) at rejecting Thomä, and this happens again and again:

P: it seems to me that you perhaps now expect from me, but- I don’t give a damn.

T: hm. what do you mean expect - about the dream, or what?

And from here to an “I don’t care” (line 100, see *infra*), again instating “solutions that maintain the problem”, as such the couple re-achieves “distance”. Solutions that maintain the problem could be a synonym to “giving up”, an invitation made by her condition for so long time. In terms of couple’s doings, there is

cooperation. But we find rejection making as well, an ongoing oscillation, a fluctuation in the relational field.

### 3. *Skipjack. Second thread of dream presentation*

60 T: Actually you could get up then,  
 61 [when you wanted to go to  
 62 P: [oh yes,  
 63 I was alive the  
 64 T: [the hairdresser, uh.  
 65 P: [entire time, you know.  
 66 T: ja, mhm, mhm, mhm, ja.  
 67 P: I had to- (.)  
 68 I just have to-  
 69 yesterday evening I saw that Don Juan by Max Frisch.  
 70 and there were also quite a few dead people,  
 71 but- it really was like on stage.  
 72 and it was very embarrassing for me and very- like-  
 73 all the people, who arrived all the time.  
 74 and at the beginning I had the feeling it is for real,  
 75 but- I don't remember how- whether it hurt or-  
 76 the dagger in the back could- and it really stuck in ((smiling)) it.  
 77 there was no at all-  
 78 he just pulled it out. ((Bells ringing)) skipjack.  
 79 ((50 sec))

The little attempt made by the analyst that steps in 60 is immediately opposed by Amalia, the overlapping indicates not an agreement but more of a “let me build up”, “let me flow”.

We enter the next “agreement → disagreement → indifference” form. This seems to continue the trend already established in the appointment sequence. The little moment, begun by the analyst, makes Amalia react to his attempt. A new character enters Amalia's associations, don Juan. Someone who seduces and abandons, in Max Frisch's play, don Juan, amongst other things, attempts to enter a monastery, to abandon the world. The idea of triumph is implicit in don Juan's plan of conquering the ultimate prey, a narcissistic outcome for a narcissistic blueprint.

Yet what follows is offering but weak connections with the souvenir episode of the dagger extracting moment, when “triumph” was a hypothesis. We have a moment of getting closer that is sunk into a disorganized state of relating, and eventually arrives at rejection through an indifferent attitude regarding whatever is opposed to by Amalia (the skipjack element equates *I don't care*, they don't care, and the monastery issue implies detachment from shame, and laughing as well, see *infra*).

Is it a don Juan move? Is this “agreement → disagreement → indifference” a seduction game? What follows is but a slight move into more order (comparing matrix from fig.13 p.226 with the one from fig.15 p.235).

Amalia here and in the following sequences, through self-criticism (or self-deprecation), is mainly inviting disagreement rather than agreement in next turn (e.g., Pomerantz, 1978), thus she builds up a distance from Thomä. This is not an “out of the blue” event. Self-critical equates here, and in several other instances of 152<sup>nd</sup>, a way of extracting herself from the relationship with Thomä by a rigid transmutation, into a corrosive relationship between Amalia with herself, e.g., from doctor nurse to skipjack. It builds a hide-and-seek.

Also, the idea of seduction as precursor of abandonment plays a part in it. A monastery promises the solitude of triumph in the detriment of satisfaction, pleasure, joy, and other sharable forms of positive feelings.

If “monastery” bears evidence for “seduction” as a power game (which is settled on opposite part of intimacy) then the rigid transmutation acquires a potential new layer in this don Juan game, that qualifies ‘God’ as the ultimate conquer. A paradox seems to emerge within this hide and seek.

Buchholz’s idea (2007) that “what moves us are human paradoxes” which “are articulate by metaphor.” (p.164), is a promising theory of change and process, grounded in conceptual metaphor theory.

It should be noted that what is a paradox for *one*, becomes *a form of relating* subjected to be transformed by the works of the couple in a triadic perspective as seen in the fragments from 152<sup>nd</sup> session.

One paradox (e.g., a defeat is a victory) emerges and manifests within the sessions, it is enacted by the couple, so a “form of movement is the same in both instances” (Buchholz, 2007 p.171).

This indicates, from current perspective, that a complex recursion is at work, thus the couple is involved as in the above examples. The paradox, e.g., ‘a defeat is a victory’, joins a complementary pair (e.g., control, competition, or conflict). If this recursion of a “ $1 + 1 = 2$ ” (e.g., catch me if you can) is seen, then through observing and transforming, it is symmetrized, it becomes a  $1 + 1 = 3$ , i.e., moving out from a complementary form of relating (catch me if you can) and creating a symmetrical one, through building a next-level-event.

As such, from the couple’s perspective a *paradox* is a relational complementarity ( $1 + 1 = 1$ ;  $1 + 1 = 2$ ) forming a puzzle within the couple, i.e., arrives to be enacted, and so is asking to, or waiting to be symmetrized ( $1 + 1 = 3$ ) (which in Buchholz’s parlance equates analysing the metaphor and changing it).

4. *Amalia doesn’t know what she is doing. The monastery vs. analysis theme begins.*

65. P: hm, it seems to me a that you perhaps now expect from me,
66. but- I don’t give a damn.
67. T: hm. what do you mean expect
68. - about the dream, or what?
69. P: yes –
70. suddenly it occurred to me.
71. T: yes.
72. P: I am just afraid
73. that during the last time I don’t at all know, what I am doing
74. T: mhm.
75. P: not about the dream (I’ve read)
76. T: yeah.
77. P: anyway, I am so confused.
78. Though I intentionally wear what I usually wear,
79. and paint my lips
80. T: mhm.
81. P: in order not to get out of custom
82. but for the time being I have on the table –
83. and it’s getting worse
84. and suddenly I thought now you sell your car,
85. you don’t need it any more - and
86. you also don’t need to go to the theatre any more -
87. T: mhm.
88. P: all that is devil’s work.
89. Also in German classes you don’t teach English and geography.
90. if possible you don’t have anything to do with all that. / /
91. it’s exactly like ten years before. down to the last detail.
92. ( ) I don’t care either.
93. ((20 sec)

	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82
65	s																	
66		s																
67			s															
68				s														
69					s		s			s		s				s		
70						s		s										
71					s		s											
72						s		s										
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74					s					s		s			s			
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79										s					s			
80					s											s		
81																	s	
82																		s

Fig. 15

This moment of interaction mirrors the beginning of the session establishing an appointment followed by an “I don’t care”, a movement that implies another “yes ↔ no”, “I am interested” ↔ “I don’t care”. An equivalence is not easily recognizable if compare the matrices, yet there is a significant overlapping in terms of form. So, it can be asked: this time what are they negotiating, what ‘timing’? Looking at what the couple does in the first “game”, it is a  $1 + 1 = 1$ , described as a “doctor-nurse” shape of controlling the other through submissiveness, the game from this fragment keeps the form in the domain of equivalences. A moment of indifference is followed by an implicit rejection and a long description, one can say this is how confusion works its works in this piece of interaction. We can see in this fragment that a  $1 + 1 = 1$  is still operative. Is it a way Amalia says if “I don’t care” then “I lose my compass”?

A movement of making *contact* followed by creating *separation*, including a ‘rejection’ of oneself, either of what she wears or painting her lips, or what she has, so ‘nothing changes’, like ten years ago. From “agreement → disagreement →



indifference” we move to “indifference → dismissal of oneself → confusion”, a kind of “bad → worst” succession. It is as Amalia realizes the role played by appearance and conformism as something consuming her from within. So, “doctor nurse” can be seen as moving towards “aggressor victim”.

An equivalent journey from bad to worst is present in the dream, while a feeling travels from embarrassment to humiliation. If we represent the above form, *contact* ↔ *separation* concatenation through fluctuation, on a more general than narrative level, describing the actions of each sequence (1, 2, 3, and 4) then we have: i) Next appointment, ii) Dream telling. iii) Continues the dream telling. iv) She doesn’t know. Each element of the set, composed by the sequences cut out from the session, follow the interactional sequence: “agreement → disagreement → indifference” or “Approaching → Disorganization → Rejection.” The representation in “succession ↔ simultaneity”, (A – approaching, D – disorganization, R – rejection), is:

	A	D	R	A	D	R	A	D	R	A	D	R
A	s			s			s			s		
D		s			s			s			s	
R			s			s			s			s
A	s			s			s			s		
D		s			s			s			s	
R			s			s			s			s
A	s			s			s			s		
D		s			s			s			s	
R			s			s			s			s
A	s			s			s			s		
D		s			s			s			s	
R			s			s			s			s

Fig. 16

In Fig. 16 we encounter the expanded binary form of the dream, while approaching, disorganization and rejections are forms of relating, actions. Also, it reveals a symmetry, with a simple rhythm, in “succession ↔ simultaneity”. As the

matrix resonates with the form of the dream, can we say that the sequence gets organized by an equivalent (i.e., recurrent) emotional experience? Maybe.

Keeping the current system of reference, the dream and the sequence having a similar representation, this equivalence of form that links one level with another one offers grounds for hypothesizing that a content enters a transformative process. If the “what” that generates a sequence is a *form* ↔ *content* unit, keeping stable the “form” (“how”) implies a change on the level of content (new meanings are added).

The devil’s work, or ‘dogma’ as explanatory principle, is at work (later dogma settles the principle of paternal indifference). She rejects the other, herself, and goes back to (formal) rejecting reality for a world split in good and evil, governed by dogmas. She is setting the stage for the ‘monastery’ theme, i.e., by recreating or re-staging old solutions, e.g., abstentions in a new sensual world, while monastery arrives to equate a maternal absence or a triumph of the seducer, or both. These dream expansion concatenations – these macro-sequences open a new level of interaction. At the level of *content* this acquires evidence, step by step. *Form* follows as well.

## **6.12. WE DON’T HAVE MATCHES. FAILING TO MEET.**

In the following I will employ the model in presenting a different course of relating, if comparing to the one presented previously, i.e., Amalia and Dr. Thomä. The material is also recorded, and the transcript is published in “The initial interview in psychiatric practice” (Gill et al, 1954 pp. 250-256). The material was selected since in it there is no emergence of a couple, there is no creation of next level events.

The 46 T. and 47 P. below are employed for giving the context of what happens just before the episode analyzed, which in fact follows a longer part unfolding the same theme, where the patient links his headaches with father’s death, or at least tries to.

In this case the model is employed in what would be a meeting where there is manifest a lack of understanding and a failing of an authentic relating, manifest in the therapist part or interaction. The therapist fails to open oneself to what comes from the patient in several moments. What consequences can be seen within the model?

46. T.: You feel as though you're responsible for your father's death?

47. P.: ... In a way (*Clears throat*) Not... ah... dat I really feel responsible, but in a sort of a way I feel a lil'guilty. That's all. That I did somethin' wrong. 'Cause I always knew he was sick, but yet I didn't put it in my head to... to work continuously. I mean and when I lost him, I lost... I lost the best buddy in the world. He done everythin' for me. Every time I was in a lil'trouble he'd get me out of it if... it's annuder fact that my fader would... had a lil'... had a lil'drag around the city. He was... an'I knows... in udder words, he was a kind of a smart man. He never told nobody his business 'bout bein' sick. That's why he never went nowhere. But he was in politics, an' he had a little pull around the city. Everytime I get... like I get pinched for going t'ru a ... t'ru a stop sign or a red light, you know, he... he'd get me out of it, or things like that. When I lost him, I just lost all my hopes in udder words. You know what I mean, that he was everythin' to me. I liked 'im a lot as my father. But I don' think that should be the cause of these headaches. Maybe it could be, but I don't think it should be... (*short pause*) I'd like t' ask you a question, Doc. Could... could... ah... havin'... well let's say havin' too many intercouses would be the cause of this here? I mean not now. This is about three years ago when I was fooli' around a lot.

T.:

1. Tell me a little bit more about that
2. and then I will be able to answer to you.

P.:

3. Well I... I met a married woman one time, t'ru a friend of mine.

T.:

4. About three years ago?

P.:

5. It was about two and a half years –
6. when I started getting' these headaches.
7. Until then I never had a headache in my life.
8. Maybe one.
9. That's all.

10. I take her out a few times

11. an' I didn't do nuttin'.

12. After, I finally I started foolin' around with her.

13. Well I was goin' at it quite often wid her,

14. intercoursing with her. An' in fa...

15. I was going too much at it. Wha...

T.:

16. What do you mean by "too much"?

P.:

17. In udder words... ah... havin' intercoursing wid her.

18. After we go about, let's say ... like that about seven, eight months,

19. really goin' at it very strong, t  
 20. hat's when I got this.  
 21. In udder words, I go out in the john an' I passed out.  
 22. I went in the pool-room an' I just passed out,  
 23. after about seven months of fooli' around wid her.  
**T.:**  
 24. is her husband living?  
**P.:**  
 25. Yeah.  
**T.:**  
 26. Was she living with her husband?  
**P.:**  
 27. Yeah.  
 28. An' I was always on edge everytime I took her out.  
**T.:**  
 29. Where did you have these intercourse spreets?  
**P.:**  
 30. In my car.  
**T.:**  
 31. Were you going out with your girl at that time?  
**P.:**  
 32. No. I wasn't goin' out steady at all. (*Pause*)  
 33. Is it all right if I smoke, Doc?  
**T.:**  
 34. Sure.  
**P.:**  
 35. Smoke? (*Offers therapist a cigarette*)  
**T.:**  
 35. (*Shakes head negatively*) (*Short pause*)  
 36. All these occurred after your father was dead.  
**P.:**  
 37. Yeah. That's right.  
 38. After he passed away.  
 39. Becha I ain't even got a match (*half-laugh*)  
**T.:**  
 40. (*Therapist look in pockets for matches*)  
**P.:**  
 41. Ah, it's all right if you ain't got any.  
 42. Ain't go ... don't have to smoke.

The fragment under analysis begins with an impossible task assumed by the therapist (e.g., Gill et al, 1954 p. 253), of answering to patient question. As such it can be said that either we deal with setting a trap by the therapist, of controlling the patient, a  $1 + 1 = 1$ , by offering something known as not possible, or is falling into a trap himself. The general aspect of this fragment can be resumed as:

Lines 1 – 23: The patient shares a new idea about how he got his headaches. Now, as well as in the previous idea, he says: strong emotions (e.g., guilt) cause pain. An idea that offers the grounds for turning against himself (again, he is guilty of too much fooling around). Lines 24 – 32. The Therapist enters a quiz for finding out some facts about fooling around, questioning under a nuance of moralizing, or even blaming (op. cit. pp. 255-256), while missing the point of patient idea of equating emotion with pain, e.g., mourning a loss, and offering a reason why he turns against himself. Lines 32 – 42. The patient, after they fool around, feels to light a cigarette. No matches are available in either one's pockets.

In the fragment there is no recursion at work, even if the patient enters a game of developing the histories of his headaches, these are not met with understanding and a subsequent working through by the therapist. The only reoccurring forms are due to the patient, who tries to convey something again and again. At the end of the fragment there is one episode, of lighting the cigarette, the no matches.

This episode contains the whole piece; in a condensed form it is repeating it. As with the window opening from Amalia (see Introduction, and next Chapter), here is also a need, yet this time is not recognized and not answered through understanding of what is going on. There is no level stepping occurring, and no recursion.

Yet in the interview there are a series of episodes (as the one presented above) that can be seen as reproducing a pattern, a request for help, a promise, a leaving from relating, an absence. The squares of s's, that occur within the matrix, are generated by how the patient talks or by the repetitive questioning from the part of the therapist.

As complexity is not rising following interaction, i.e., few new links are generated, it is plausible to see these episodes only as a sequence of repetitions, devised mainly for not openly relating. Just one, the patient, brings content within the couple, whilst the other seems to avoid taking this content, while asking for more

The matrix of this piece of interaction looks like:

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	
01	S																																										
02		S																																									
03			S																																								
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Fig. 17 No matches

Looking at Levenson’s algorithm (1983) presented in Introduction (i.e., i) establishment and definition of frame, ii) the elaboration and enrichment of implicate and explicate order in patient’s life, as well as iii) the elucidation of this order in therapist-patient relationship) the couple performs not quite well, if trying to match the

piece of interaction with the steps of the algorithm. We met the first and the second point (partially) achieved. But is also evident that the ‘elucidation’ presents a progression from a level of understanding (i.e., knowing through relating) towards a lower level, making room for a nuance of blaming. The patient tries again and again to reach the therapist and they fail. There is no symmetry achieved within the matrix, there is just a set into acting of the relational episode (the smoke episode), as in Giovacchini’s example, we deal with a repetition, of content and actions, that the couple arrives to enact. In both examples there is visible a connection between the level of relating and the density of recursions, between repetition and emptying the content from the potentiality of generating new sense.

The modified algorithm proposed, for the couple, are as well not matched. The sequence “frame” → “elaboration and enrichment” → “enacting of content” → “next-level-event” stops at the third step. The couple performs a mirroring on several levels: first level - the patient asks for being listened, he is in pain, he needs to get answers about himself, and does that while sabotaging himself. He asks for ‘light’. If transference-countertransference is considered, then we can assume that what happens is a staging within the works of the couple of “losing the one” who “Every time I was in a lil’trouble he’d get me out of it if”, i.e., a mourning waiting to be mourned.

How they play the game of matches (it is hard to believe that both forgot completely the contents of their pockets yet is plausible to assume that they use their empty pockets to communicate an emptiness) mirrors how they just relate through talking. Also, this need for a light can be seen as a request of being buddies, i.e., the absent father enters the game from a different angle. If deixis is considered, then there is an *ad oculos* transformed within playing ‘lighting a light’ as anaphoric deixis. This “no matches” points at that “no understanding, no buddies”. The patient is open (i.e., elaborates and enriches) yet receives an interrogation, not a dialogue meant to further

elaborate from achieving understanding together. In the squares that concatenate between line 12 and line 25 it is visible that the level of order rises, yet this happens by *how* the patient adds new contents to the same subject, enriching. In ‘form’ (i.e., following the arrangements of actions, *asking for ‘light’* → *asking for light*) the answer given by patient *and* therapist, could be ‘there is no light to light one’s ‘cigarette’’, that qualifies as ‘enacting content’.

At a different level, regarding the content of interrogation, i.e., fooling around, as it gets nowhere it qualifies as a “fooling around”, and so lighting a cigarette after ‘fooling around’ is a soft ironically constructed and bitter ‘no matching’, an enactment of content at couple’s level, a content just provided by the patient, and could answer to the ‘affair’ of interrogations about, while enacting, a ‘too much fooling around’.

The implicate, either in this game, or in the previous idea of ‘losing father gave me headaches’, the ‘lost father waiting for mourning’ is one of the layers enfolded. At the level of the couple, we met a no matching as doing, as performance, that can be seen as ‘the couple enacts content’, i.e., no matches in one’s pocket, and as recursion is not fueled by therapist’s understanding of the here and now, the next level event cannot be created through relating.

Things, like one’s words, are in one’s pocket, when we need, we just reach to take them. We know without thinking that they are there, or they aren’t, e.g., matches. In this communicating, through showing empty pockets, it seems that we observe a free “association with objects” (Bollas 2009) as being performed by the couple.

Like in Giovacchini’s example, when the couple builds a “sucking thoughts vortex” from an absence (e.g., curiosity sunk in forgetting), in this fragment the couple builds up a “no light to light” device, also from an absence, mirroring a sequence of absences, of empty pockets. A device belonging to both.



The lack of experience of the student conducting the interview is found as the main cause, in the views underlined by Gill and others (e.g., the comments at pp. 253 - 269). According to them (e.g., T. 74), the student “is clearly operating in the framework of finding the patient blameworthy. The patient accepts the blame” (op. cit. p. 269). The same movement is present in many other places of this first interview, a game of blaming in the atmosphere permeated by self-blaming.

In Giovacchini’s example it seems that the device the couple builds is meant for dealing with shame, here guilt seems to need a ‘no light to light’ built by the couple. The patient’s offer, a cigarette, and his tacit request, answered without words, is a balance oscillating from a  $1 + 1 = 2$  towards a needed  $1 + 1 = 3$ , that is answered with a  $1 + 1 = 1$ , with an unrecognized form of control to avoid probably the overloading of feelings, that in the end arrives at less order, at fewer achieved links.

With this short example the failing of relating shows that has its own traces, and these give birth to reenactments of patterns of avoiding, of no level stepping, as no recursion is at work. In this example is even more clear that context and content at each level (patient, therapist, and analytic couple) need to be considered when asking what means this sequence. In the next subchapter, the window opening from Introduction offers a new layer of  $1 + 1 = 3$ .

## 6.13. WINDOW OPENING AND A CONCLUSION

Here we meet again “laughing”, the polysemic entity from Chapter 4 (Ch. 4.1.2, 4.1.3.)<sup>94</sup> approached in a larger context this time, and the second fragment, “*The peace I have here*”, presents an ‘arrival’ for the entire session.

In both situations, from the first fragment, presented below, “laughing” represents a either a “form of feeling” in “doing together” or, “laughing” has quite a different shape of such “form of feeling” when “doing together” is absent. The theme “laughing” evolves step by step, while anaphoric, am phantasma and ad oculos forms of deixis occurs and reoccurs, which involve various levels of pointing at, feeding recursion, and unfolding through recursion.

### 16. *You laugh too little*

- |  |              |   |
|--|--------------|---|
| 276. P: but since Sunday absolutely nothing has been possible anymore.   | A            | – |
| 277. A: well, because since Sunday you’ve obviously been making a special effort, uh not to, uh get uh, inside here. | departure    |   |
| 278. not to go after my neck and uh, -   | state        |   |
| 279. and try uh, - to -  |              |   |
| 280. P: measure your head.   |              |   |
| 281. A: measure it,  |              |   |
| 282. take it in your hand,   | B            | - |
| 283. and uh – take with you what’s inside, in there and -  | transformati |   |
| 284. P: could well be because I stopped over the laughing.   | ve event     |   |
| 285. A: because you, excuse me?  |              |   |
| 286. P: over the laughing.   |              |   |
| 287. A: over the laughing, um-hmm.   |              |   |
| 288. P: you’d asked me what, to my mind, you’re, laughing about sometimes, right.                                    |              |   |
| 289. A: yes.   |              |   |
| 290. P: and that’s just precisely the point.   |              |   |
| 291. A: um-hmm, yes.   | C Arrival    |   |
| 292. P: where I would like to get inside you, at least when you laugh.   | A            |   |
| 293. A: um-hmm, um-hmm.  |              |   |
| 294. P: and when you don’t laugh.  |              |   |
| 295. I mean, when you say, that you laugh too little,  |              |   |
| 296. you didn’t really mean that objectively,  |              |   |
| 297. but simply that - I think you laugh too little.   |              |   |
| 298. A: oh no, that + isn’t how I meant that. -.   |              |   |
| 299. P: no, + that wasn’t it?  |              |   |
| 300. Later I said. -.  | B            |   |

<sup>94</sup> Transcript/translation J. Bergmann

301. A: + or laugh too little.  
 302. P: often I would be expecting you, to laugh. +  
 303. A: no, that I uh, hm. well you like to laugh.  
 304. and you do laugh a lot here,  
 305. but not uh. C  
 306. P: I laugh -.  
 307. A: or rather, - you used to laugh a lot here, but not, at the moment -.  
 308. P: true. I certainly laugh more often than you. A  
 309. A: yes, + yes.  
 310. P: as far I can + see here. B  
 311. A: yes, yes, mm-hmm.  
 312. well you see I think it's a very good thing, that you can laugh, C  
 313. and uh, since you might get the idea from my – not uh, - laughing too, ...  
 314. that it wouldn't be good  
 315. – that it isn't good, to laugh.  
 316. that's the reason why I uh – really said, and  
 317. I said, I don't laugh enough.  
 318. P: So that's it.  
 319. A: and I do really do think, I don't laugh enough.  
 320. uh, - and uh – your father didn't laugh enough.  
 321. P: he doesn't laugh at all.  
 322. A: and that is, there you have a negative model, uh-  
 323. P: the most my father does is smile.  
 324. A: right.  
 325. P: he laughs when I can't laugh.  
 326. A: um-hmm.  
 327. P: but almost – as a rule that's the way it is.  
 328. A: um-hmm.  
 329. P: that is, when he laughs, I don't feel like it anymore. I feel like anything but  
 that / / / couldn't we open the window  
 330. A: yes.  
 331. P: it's so muggy today  
 332. A: true.

There are several levels, as mentioned in the introduction. First one regards the construction of a deictic context for the couple, by the couple. Others follow.

The sequence “You laugh too little” shows in the beginning a level of cooperation that echoes the one attained in session 99, when Amalia and Thomä arrive to dance in words. Here we find, in the lines 279 – 280, the two of them completing each other, speaking together one sentence. Lines 279/280/281/283 are all describing the movement of “Amalia knows Thomä” (e.g., to measure, to take what is inside are metaphors sequencing the same idea) But is followed immediately by a turnaround

move (line 284), that echoes the former oscillating pattern of relating, yet both movements await the new level they are about to achieve.

Anticipating, the whole 276 → 332 sequence involves a recursion performed by the couple at the level of form (first level), within this mirroring there is another one, the sequence 276 → 301 is mirrored into 301 → 332 (see *infra*), while the content as well is mirrored by the patient and by the analyst (second level). The equivalences are found as in the previous examples. What is remarkable in this piece of interaction is that the “narrative” is matched by how the elements in the matrices are building up recursive forms.

The first recursion (or mirroring) apparently reinstates the game played either when the skipjack offers the theme, or the monastery recalled the seduction of ultimate conquest and the subsequent triumph. That is “agreement → disagreement → indifference” seems to be unfolding again, but this form arrives to mean through this ‘recursion within recursion’ something else, indifference is allowed to be transformed into relating, care, empathy.

It can be hypothesized, in a dyadic perspective, that this happens also through letting the shadow of grief to be casted onto herself, from within Thomä’s holding and containing her. The previous caustic misery, set into a repetition for more than a third of the session, gets replaced by a work of mourning, which in a triadic perspective is a working through of the couple, that allowed this complex recursive move. A new semantic layer is created by both, one into which Amalia allows Thomä to care, to know within and by relating.

So, this complex move is eventually, in a subtle way and by the contribution of the couple, transformed and absorbed by Amalia, who, step by step, arrives to care about Thomä, and to feel joy instead of triumph.

We also encounter a narrative recursion (a third level), within the flux of the fragment unfolds as  $ABC \rightarrow ABC \rightarrow ABC$ . All these recursions operate at a level unfolding under  $A \rightarrow AX$ , that mirrored onto itself becomes an  $A \rightarrow (A \rightarrow AX) X$  form of interaction.

Window opening can be qualified also as a transference countertransference movement (i.e., the experience of the relationship, Gill 1982). It shows *how* the couple, by keeping the form of interaction fixed (as the forms are mirroring each other), achieves a change, a variance within the relational field.

Beside words, these things or these actions unfolding within a co-generated relational field, which either have an “evocative processional potential”, is met here, and either laughing as subject or window opening as associating through actions and things, transport in the here and now something that is made visible through an absence (as the matches from previous example), they ‘speak’ about something that isn’t or/and wasn’t, and they are “so important precisely because they are no longer present: we may be a long way from home.” (Bollas 2009, p. 50).

In a way the story runs like ‘it is the same’ (form) thus ‘it is different’ (action content), an unfolding that elicits the subject of transference or the transference theme unfolding in the now of interaction.

So, from 276 to 301:

	76	77	78	79/80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01
76	s																								
77		s																							
78			s																						
79/80				s	s																				
81				s	s	s	s																		
82					s	s																			
83					s		s																		
84								s																	
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Fig. 18

Looking at the above matrix (Fig. 18) and comparing it with the next one (Fig. 19) we can see that in negotiating laughing and “what does it mean” we encounter a recursion of form in between the first and the second half of the fragment, while the second fragment has also two recursive moves (the red and the blue parts of the matrix). The second instance (the red part) points at the first instance, the third form points at the previous two, while getting richer in elements (the blue part in Fig. 19).

There is the same theme unfolding, but there are two stances, and within this theme unfolding it is encountered a recursion, a similar form is reoccurring that allows a new layer of meaning, a new form of relating to emerge through it. On small scale (utterances) there are several forms of mirroring, yet on a larger scale the fragment

presents a symmetry of how they negotiate, explain, and understand this “laughing too little”, or “not laughing” or “laughing together”. From 302 to 332

	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
02	s				s																										
03		s	s																												
04		s	s																												
05				s																											
06	s				s																										
07						s																									
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29																													s	s	s
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31																														s	
32																													s		s

Fig. 19

The red and the blue are also a mirroring, a recursive move that in this case follow the unfolding of narratives they built. The blue part of the matrix shows more elements (the first, the second and the third set of elements present a growing in number of elements, thus of links or of order achieved).

In the fragment there is a sequence of narratives, mentioned above, an  $ABC \rightarrow A'B'C' \rightarrow \dots A''B''C''$  which reinstates being separate vs. being together while constructing a new narrative. As said, the sequence of ABC's and the reoccurring units

of s's, build a resonance between levels. There is a first level (utterances) and a second level (narratives) reflecting each other. They are negotiating the meaning of '*I laugh too little*' while the narrative the couple builds is an opening up of Amalia's need of laughing together, of "being with", which is in no time 'suffocated' by a past imbued with disruptive episodes of not being together or even more, of not being able to accomplish such "doing together".

In terms of narratives the sequence of ABCs is building up a new and more complex narrative, a more complex ABC, and as shown below, this creates a new deictic field that is accommodating the emergence of new symbolic fields. This provides evidence to the idea that relating feeds the emergence of the couple, which in turn arrives to change the flux of relating.

The new bi-personal narrative, as said, having the father as source of pattern, can be condensed as: A: "Amalia declares: We grow apart as not laughing any more. You don't care, just notice it"; B: Thomä recognizes: "I didn't laugh, he didn't laugh, but laughing is good."; C: Amalia realizes that "He laughs so I could not even breath".

In terms of couple's doings (i.e., co-constructed actions), we can rewrite the previous as: A: Confusion thus Separate; B: Clarification; C: Realization thus Together.

The previous observed recursion (this sequence of utterances mirrors that sequence of utterances) offers the ground for the next level (of observation), i.e., "narratives", and, at this new level, how the couple behaves echoes the previous noted recursion. But here the recursive move manifests as a *self-referential* move of the analytic couple, which is the analytic couple pointing at the analytic couple, (a new deictic context emerging, this time, from a shared symbolic system) in terms of doings, and the change of relating ensues.



The A and C from above are building up a recursive move, within the narrative flux. A has as opposite pair of doings C (C is an  $A^{-1}$ ), which qualifies as a mirrored recursion ( $AB \rightarrow BA(X)$ ). So, with this “C is pointing up at A”, within this self-referential move of the couple a complex deixis manifests, and it generates a new domain of manifestation, inexistent up to this sequence.

Onto this deictically generated field the couple adds a new relational layer to the here and now of interaction, as such the level of intimacy rises (see next fragment, “*The peace I have it here*”). The symbolic fields allowed to emerge are also notable.

Here, as in the session 98<sup>th</sup> or 99<sup>th</sup>, in these layers of recursions echoing each other, i.e., of mirroring levels, it is manifest what in a one-person psychology is self-reflection, thus these instances from 152<sup>nd</sup> or previous, in the session 98<sup>th</sup>, the Snow-White episode, it can be seen how the couple observes the couple observing, through multiple recursions building up semantic layers that arrive to change step by step the content of their actions, i.e., they create new forms of relating.

Such change brings more order (the level of utterances mirrored in the level of narratives produces more links in between, a rise in the number of active links implies more order in the interactional field), more meaning is generated from how they arrive to relate, from *how* the couple moves into a self-reflecting couple, so to say.

Step by step an ecology of intimacy is built. The pair in their doings, of being together vs. being separate, could be seen as the emotional engine for building up the narrative sequence. The next part, close to the end of the session, is an example of the “arrival” at which they point at from opening the window episode on.

27 “*The peace that I have here*”

555. P: I'd even like to be able to, take a walk in your head.  
556. A: right, um-hmm.  
557. P: I would like! that.  
558. A: yes, um-hmm.  
559. P: and I'd even like to have a bench.  
560. A: right, right.  
561. P: not just in the park. - and, well I think it's easier – to understand all the things, that I would like.  
562. A: right, more peace in the head too uh -.  
563. P: right.  
564. A: the peace that I have here! I have some peace here, right, that is, that's what you're after isn't it.  
565. P: yes. earlier I was thinking, when you die, then you can say, “I had a great place to work.” that is so funny.  
566. A: with a view of the cemetery.  
567. P: ok, then, - not funny! not looking at it as a cemetery, not at all.  
568. A: yes.  
569. P: rather that we always had such beautiful light there and and the leaves.  
570. A: um-hmm.  
571. P: now it almost sounds corny but, in a way, I was thinking, in any case I can say, - cemetery, or - / / - / / just. - - -  
572. A: so, with that peace, I don't know if it's associated with convent for you. But that sort of peace, that– you uh, a peace, that is there and uh– one that is even greater. and which, at the same time would no longer make it necessary, uh for you uh, uh – to make a hole somewhere and then have to get in through it -.  
573. P: uhuh.  
574. A: to find your own peace, right?  
289. P: there's no hole to be made. I have the feeling, - as if the door to it were really open already.  
290. A: um-hmm.  
291. P: and all I have to do is walk right in.  
292. A: the door uh, to what?  
293. P: well, to that peace.

The game they play in this fragment is a turning from Thomä's interpreting stance to providing the background for Amalia to play games, to share her thoughts with him, the funny thoughts. The turning point here is the new 'place', infused with meanings by Amalia, meanings subsequently developed by Thomä, i.e., the *cemetery*. Peace and cemetery go hand in hand like love and death (or love and dreams as 'cemetery' means initially a dormitory).

The comment made by Thomä (a view of the cemetery) seems to grow from the entire monastery business, as an interpretation of several themes of the session, condensed in: “earlier I was thinking, when you die, then you can say, ‘I had a great place to work’. that is so funny”. Beyond the fast rejecting, of “with a view of...”, Amalia seems to apprehend the interpretation.

Thomä’s ‘playful’ way of listening made Amalia hear herself. In it the couple does “funny” or “playful” so to say. Hearing herself makes from the previous reaction a boundary recognized and employed further to feed recognition. She points at what she hears in Thomä’s words, namely herself, and rejecting what she hears points at how she was earlier, i.e., she is oscillating. But this doesn’t sojourn long in the lands of “no” and from here to there, to further up, is a together.

This movement seems to condense many other movements shaped under an earlier form, “ $A \rightarrow A(X)$ ”, Amalia either takes “the veil” or takes “seeing a view”, this time her eyes are unobstructed by a dogma veil. In “cemetery” both are coming together. In few steps Amalia went from “not funny” to “I can say cemetery”.

This oscillation points at many other (larger) pieces, yet this time comes with a clear understanding. As in the case of “dancing dream” from session 99 here we witness a transformation of a conversation with oneself (i.e., dreaming) that shapes relating, that in its turn shapes conversation towards self-reflection, of a dream into “interacting the dream”. There, in the session 99<sup>th</sup>, we encounter a “dancing couple”, here we encounter a “dead and alive” (e.g., then you can say, “I had a great place to work” ...) or “love and death”. Shame and self-reflecting are both employing deictic and symbolic fields, either here or in the dancing dream interaction. In session 99<sup>th</sup> we recognize the couple, here they move even further, e.g., Amalia employs the workings of the couple to give up the veil, i.e., to see/hear herself.

Self-reflecting Amalia is seen here as a couple achievement. The couple self-reflection is seen as the canvas onto which Amalia arrives to see and hear herself (a movement distinguishable in the previous fragment), i.e., a self-reference installs eventually a self-reflection. In a different view this equates knowing through relating.

Something is preserved (a form, a content, an oscillation) and through recursion gets transformed. “ $A \rightarrow A(X)$ ” (e.g., “doing together to do together”) describes how the interaction unfolds, how the sequence develops. In any fragment, for re-finding an “A”, this “A” must be kept by both<sup>95</sup> (by the couple) and employed in building up a “B”, and through what they do and what they achieve they are setting the arrival, e.g., an understanding, a peace.

As the level of complexity rises (through recursion the structure is more and more complex, the functions that each recursive element acquires through interaction and exhibits new levels and new connections, i.e., the number of links is higher the number of levels is higher, the production of meaning through interaction (i.e., drawing distinctions and transforming them) is reached while setting a new departure point, a new “A”. And these are done by the couple.

The ‘tense indifference’ from the beginning of the session arrives at “you laugh too little”, where it starts to become ‘care’. Amalia and Thomä as couple build up a new deictic field, and from here they build up an “idyllic place”, which turns up to be a cemetery.

A story that becomes a plot, that is employed further for getting closer. Thomä survives the dagger of dogma and monastery, so the couple arrives to build up puns. Such movement of the couple gives to Amalia the resources needed to surviving shame thus she arrives at seeing/hearing/accepting herself.

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<sup>95</sup> Their story becomes a (her/his)story and marks a history of what happened in the now, a succession ↔ simultaneity interactional object

The couple observes a “narrative form” through a “narrative form”, an anaphoric movement built in sequence, through absorbing it into how the couple unfolds their interaction. It is as if a semantic gets imprinted into a relational shape, and vice versa – a “what” imprinted in “how” they interact and at the same time a “how” that shapes a “what”.

In other words, the couple observes an autonomous unit through a recursive movement, the couple “makes a distinction” by re-producing a form (e.g., a narrative, a sentence) and a link emerges through recursion.

An “observation”, a distinction drawn in the environment, equates a form which grows isomorph with that form or/and that form... within this isomorphic growing making a distinction is made, that feed more links, more levels emerge through interaction, and these are probed, there are recursions that create more ‘order’ in the session.

Getting closer to conclude this comment, it can be said that *solving a puzzle* by the *couple* starts from making distinctions and using them to link an interactional form with another interactional form, eventually these linking processes become a transformation, which involves a self-reflecting couple, a recursion within a recursion, a mirroring within mirroring (e.g., *You laugh too little*).

More than in Turing’s formula, a puzzle through a similar puzzle, in the session the couple becomes the very puzzle, while providing an answer, e.g., they arrive to make puns from the whatever ambivalence manifests within relating. So, in self-referential movements it solves the unknown that disturbs Amalia by absorbing it, enacting it and so the couple arrives to recognize it. Laughing as a maker of intimacy is what they arrive to re-discover, by this production of a next-level event.

We can see the inherent oscillations, or fluctuations in the relational field, as part of the process and that they are heading towards more order, towards a recursive

production of new links, new semantic layers. Even if for Amalia “all of her affective and cognitive processes were marked by ambivalence” (Kächele et al. 2006, p. 891), there is more than just changing the signs, but in how the session evolves, how a sudden ‘no’ emerges from a previous ‘yes’, ambivalence should be a factor.

Self-referential movements performed by the analytic couple implies a continuous production of meaning, i.e., making distinctions, through linking a state of a less organized relational field with a state of a more organized one through a “what” of the couple that gets imprinted in “how” the couple acts.

The couple is building up a deictic field from a symbolic one through self-reflection, while this later field is employed to complexify the former one. As in the path from “no funny” to “funny”, to enjoying. The former searched for triumph is gone, the place is taken by funny, by joy and eventually by peace. The hairdresser has got an address, with a bench.

Here, in these movements, it is observable a ‘searching for the very meaning the analytic couple is making’, or a ‘finding a solution while employing it’ (e.g., ‘solving’ a puzzle, Turing, 1954), like peace, funny or the resulting joy. Neither of these equate “shame”, nor triumph.

A solution of a ‘puzzle’ (the grim monastery puzzle has as a solution the funny cemetery with a bench), of a growing matrix of symbols in a deictic field, i.e., in *succession* ↔ *simultaneity*, equates a search for an answer through a new puzzle, engendered through making of symmetry and organization through recursion.

The end of the session displays a way of relating that is situated on the opposite side of the “I don’t care” from the beginning, it is a form of dialogue that qualifies the session as progressing from declining knowing-through-relating towards accepting and employing it for a new level of relating, e.g., a higher level of intimacy.

In the above we can observe within the model that the form of a dream is found in how the “narratives” done by the couple concatenates. It is a recursive move acquired by the couple, at a higher level of organization than before, where the same procedure is employed, there is mirroring, complexification, and a creation of a next level event. They built a rhythmic structure, which in terms of doing together they mirror in structure the dream.

In the sequence “You laugh too little” there are found even more levels of recursion, that interact and support each other. We encounter in “you laugh too little” a transference movement in terms of form and content, that follow and set a mirroring in between levels (utterance level, narrative level) while an interpretation emerges from a symbolic → deictic transformation performed by them, while the new meanings are a departure for what they will elaborate together.

In different words there are sequences of “ $1 + 1 = 1$ ” → “ $1 + 1 = 2$ ” → “ $1 + 1 = 3$ ”, a progression on the level of relating, that move from “doctor nurse games” to “monastery analysis” to the games of “intimacy, acceptance and understanding of the bench with a view”.

So, in “you laugh too little” the next-level-event is feeding a transformative move that changes, from this point on, the relational air thus the interaction. Also, this sequence plays as an ‘arrival’ form of what the couple builds earlier (through fluctuating, mirroring, enacting of content, complexification) in the session.

In the sessions 98<sup>th</sup> and 99<sup>th</sup> it was shown that utterances concatenate building up recursive forms that through “enacting of content” (e.g., they arrive to do what they are talking about), complexify and recall earlier contents so the couple establishes a strong correspondence form ↔ content.

In the session 98<sup>th</sup> the forgotten “unknowns” were established through form (the sequence from the beginning of the session shaped through silences, shaping a

first puzzle, a too much mother), content (the forgotten dream, following the first puzzle and building a new one, looking into a mirror, and as any mirror involves 'beauty', 'shame', and in Amalia's case 'hair') and form and content at the end of the session (as such the couple is building up a structure → it is installing an expected content that changes the previous content → arrives at interpreting, solving the puzzle, as a form of relating, "mirror, mirror, on the wall" that brings mother, mirror and the negative of their 'hide-and-seek').

Same pattern, an emotional experience (Amalia's dream) arrives to shape their interaction is found in the session 99<sup>th</sup>, where how they are relating, how they are dancing in words, arrives to play the role of "interpreting", i.e., a puzzle through another puzzle (i.e., enacting of content → next-level-event). That is, they move from an unknown towards something distinguishable, and this move equates as interpreting or as solving a puzzle through employing another puzzle. As such, the move enacting of content → next-level-event brings evidence for the algorithm borrowed from Levenson and adapted for the couple.

The model devised here mirrors the growth of complexity of the session, opens the session to be turned on itself, so the session provides units for the session, and ways of comparison, substitution, ..., and most important is how the couple arrives to self-reflection, i.e., how it generates ways of solving the everyday puzzle.



## 6.14. RESULTS – CONNECTIONS WITH PREVIOUS CONCEPTUALIZATIONS

A triadic perspective enlarges the view regarding process in terms of dimensionality and dynamic. In Stern's views, the mutual regulations (1971), as first example, could be expanded to considering the contribution of the dyad itself to the unfolding of regulation within the dyad. This aspect, resulting from the current study, is elaborated neither in his work nor in Sander's (e.g., 2008) nor in Tronick's (2007) developments, even if an implicit dimension can be found in their work. As such the idea that the couple contributes to the process, not as background or context, but as participant, offers answers regarding how change and growth happens, adding to the insights and developments of dyadic theories a new layer, a new dimension.

A new dimension makes from Sander's "moments of recognition", in a triadic view, a *sine qua non* within a creation of next-level-event. What is "more" and different from Sander's conceptualization, regards the observation that the analytic couple while making distinctions in the environment and contributing to transforming it, these moments of recognition (e.g., Amalia and Thomä in session 152, *The peace I have here*), their realization, are part of the making of a next level event (i.e., an accomplishment of the patient, analyst, and analytic couple).

In the 'reciprocal dyadic process' (Stern et al 1985), in which each partner is "changing with the other" (see Chapter 3), considering a change of dimensionality, i.e., the contribution of the couple to the changing process, implies a new dynamic of process, and the new perspective could bring more detail to the moment by moment unfolding of such "waltz", it takes three for dancing. We have seen Amalia and Thomä

in waltzing as couple (e.g., session 99 or 152) towards new levels of intimacy, and that happens with the contribution of the couple they formed.

Regarding Buchholz's (2007) theory of process and change, i.e., when a patient is "in the grasp of metaphor" (Buchholz et al., 2015, p.893) analysing and changing the obsolete and outdated metaphor (Buchholz 2007, p.167) promotes growth, from a triadic perspective, becomes: "through enacting of content" (the patient's paradox becomes a form of relating, unfolding within the works of the couple) the couple arrives to transform, by making a next-level-event, complementarity into symmetrical form of relating (i.e., it gives course to a  $1 + 1 = 1$  or a  $1 + 1 = 2 \rightarrow 1 + 1 = 3$ ).

In considering a triadic perspective there is a step forward, as these movements can be observed onto the surface of interaction. In fact, it probes the two-fold task (analysing and changing the metaphor) and supports a potential development in the line of researching of "knowing through relating". And this involves the "narrative" into it. Yet, contrary to CCRT or other methodologies proposing categories, which are paying attention to 'narratives', the attention for detail (borrowed from CA) and naturalistic data, that answers to "here and now" events, is a step forward in the common effort in conceptualizing the theory of change starting from what is happening. The "proto-narrative envelope" that Stern is hypothesizing (1985, p.425) (or the narrative dimension of self) and the bi-personal narratives, the narrative forms evolving from how the couple unfolds its actions within patient and analyst interaction, ask for more research, yet it seems that the ideas are pointing at the intricacies or the relation between emotion and narration. Also, in Stern's conceptualizations (2004, p.109) there is present the idea of recursion (e.g., in moving from 'unconscious phantasy' to a 'proto-narrative envelope' Stern's underlines the role of 'repetition'), he asserts that in a "dyadic intersubjectivity" a sort of recursive participation is required.

How and what accomplishes recursion, and how recursion is needed for moving from one level to a next one, i.e., changing the dimensionality of process, implies a more complex idea of intersubjectivity, one which resembles with Ogden's (1994) or Benjamin's (2007) conceptualizations, i.e., the analytic third, where an autonomous participant to the process is envisaged by both theoreticians.

Bringing the "analytic third" close to the idea of "analytic couple" as an autonomous entity, the second character needs no projective identifications (as in the case of Ogden's Third or in Barangers' Analytic field), as it arrives to be a character inhabiting an *observational* field. It has boundaries, and these are shaped through recursion. Moving from a clinical concept (projective identification, analytic field) towards an observational event, is a most needed and natural development, is a step that brings on the surface something that can be probed this time.

Buchholz's (2007) theory of process and change (see 6.11), i.e., analysing and changing metaphors, if changing dimensionality of process, and considering the couple as participant (i.e., able to give course and employ metaphorical projections) in succession *and* simultaneity, these metaphors will unfold in more than one dimension, so they can be seen as multi-layered, able to generate meaning on the 'vertical' as well. Embedding through relation within relating, seen in 'enacting of content' → 'next-level-events' creation, could offer new *objects* of observation, so embedding *and* sequencing in the complex world of metaphors could be a valuable development of such promising theory.

In all these conceptualizations the triadic perspective, and the model proposed, while bringing back an observational field, it makes room for complexity to enter our domain of practice and research. I believe that setting observation (thus verification) in proper a place is a step forward towards new questions, i.e., new fields. The model devised provides a systematic procedure, and the object resulting from it is a

*representation* of the session, a sequence of labels isomorph with the flux of verbal interaction.

Other developments, that can be glimpsed from the current findings, are the potential links between the couple doings and a “temporal feeling shape” (Stern, 1985) and from here towards the concept of “now” or a “now moment” (Stern, 2004), or the function that “time” could acquire for Common Ground (Buchholz, 2017), in that such a process can be seen as a temporal object. Speaking about time, we can see clearly that there is rhythm, emerging from recursive manifestations of forms and contents (e.g., Session 98<sup>th</sup>, 152<sup>nd</sup>) which is transformed through interaction.

Interpreting seen as a patient, analyst, and couple achievement, i.e., a double dimension of process in the here and now, brings in the foreground the fabric of relations between relations. If meaning has the also the couple as maker, i.e., “the analytic couple is causally relevant” for the creation of order, then it is conceivable that a new “hermeneutic” is enfolded in what are relations emerging from relations, in the creation of structure and function from the dynamic of transformations of structure and function, in and by the flux of interactions. If relating is the “what”, the “stuff” from which the couple is “made of”, the analytic couple as “observant and interpretive entity” is a necessary condition that answers to “how” order is created. Keeping “what” and “how” together involves a set of actions that need a “surface of doings” onto which boundaries emerge.

The specificity of the model resides in employing the session to code the session. This happens under the operation “discrimination” applied to the autonomous elements of the session (e.g., sentences, narratives) resulting in generating sequence of labels (ready to receive meaning from how relating unfolds). This reduces the complexity, yet it is preserving the basic relations in between elements and arrives to represent in a binary mode the relations between relations.

The model is prone to evolve towards more complex and abstract formalizations<sup>96</sup>, as discrimination as operation (that employs the pair similar different, or works under the fields of “order”) can be employed for producing more complex tools (e.g., combinatorial algebras, Parker-Rhodes 1961; Bastin et al. 1979).

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<sup>96</sup> It can be shown that rhythms and other autonomous elements are organized by a specific algebra (i.e., combinatorial), which could be employed for further conceptualizations.

## **7. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS**

### **7.1.MAIN FINDING. THE COUPLE MATTERS**

In the present study it was hypothesized that the couple can make distinctions in its own environment and adapt to how the environment evolves. In different words, in a one-person psychology formulation, the couple observes and adapts to what is.

From a process perspective this idea represents that the analytic couple contributes as co-participant to what and how the session's events unfold, and, as emergent from relating, is, at the same time, causally relevant for the change processes unfolding through relating. As the environment is also a couple's doing, the distinctions drawn into it, beside enacting of content, while generating new layers of meaning, it is shown that these distinctions arrive eventually to self-reflection, i.e., the couple arrives to make distinctions regarding couple's doings, the couple arrives to mirror the couple (see Chapters 5.7. and 5.12.).

As such the formula "people thinking about thinking people" (Buchholz and Dimitrijevic 2018, p.73), in a triadic perspective, i.e., with a different dimensionality, becomes: the couple is self-reflecting the couple. The couple is mirroring onto itself for transforming itself, a process that feeds the emergence of new forms of relating, thus of feeling and thinking, generating growth through adapting to what is.

This evolution of process involves each participant, and so, adds new dimensions to the relational field, and new levels within each one's reality while the shared environment changes, and so develop into more rich and more complex realities, step by step, as noted in the arithmetic of " $1 + 1 = 3$ ". If investigating "change", then we should count that the new "participant" arrives to play a nonnegligible part. This pair of doings, observing and adapting, gives course to a

sequence that flows under the form: less order → fluctuations → more order. The encompassing field of rehabilitation deals with a similar form of unfolding, by and for creating through dialogue such a new environment, new reality (e.g., Iben, 1988).

The evidence that i) the couple is observing, ii) the couple is observing the couple observing, and iii) feeds forms of transformation, is provided by data, following the theoretical model proposed in the Introduction and developed, while tested, in the Chapter 5. This provided empirically evidence for the advanced hypotheses.

For this specific couple, Amalia and Dr. Thomä, while mirrored onto itself, it is shown that there are distinctions made by the analytic couple and so, by ‘observing’ the couple arrives at generating new levels of organization, i.e., next-level-events.

Recursion as a form of unfolding events, shows that the couple Amalia and Dr. Thomä, can i) copy an event of the couple (what) ii) by building up another instance (an equivalent form) of the copied event (how), and iii) substitute an event of one by an event of the couple (involving i. and ii., i.e., ‘what’ *and* ‘how’).

This set of doings implies that the couple incessantly “solves puzzles”, adapts to its own environment, transforms an unknown into a recognizable thus a meaningful event. In short, it makes meaning. Even if there are many assumptions that consider the analytic couple as a factor of change, showing that the analytic couple produces order and feeds change through self-reflection is new.

Recursion, as form of experience, generates a specific context where a new content emerges from interaction or a former unknown absorbed into the works of the couple acquires a semantic shape, a recognition, in generating meaning out of noise. Saying that the couple matters tantamount that recursion is a basic activity of the couple (either in the dyadic “people thinking about thinking people” or in “the couple is self-reflective” of a triadic perspective).

Moving from a dyadic towards a triadic perspective over an interactional surface becomes a necessary step in conceptualizing the process in terms of “who participates into the making of meaning?” and “how is this achieved?”.

It is shown that the couple is generating more order, new levels, and these new levels, emerging from such pattern making interactions, e.g., mirroring, are contributing to this “less → more” development. Evidence is found that couple enacts and transforms a content, arrives at “interpreting” it, and, in the data, we can observe, *how* this happens (i.e., recursion → complexification → creation of new levels).

The couple is able to deal with the events of the session, generating links (narrating, mirroring, settling fluctuations, feeding while creating next-level-events through recursion, and so engendering rhythmic developments of interaction) and the outcome is that the level of organization is higher. This rising of the level of organization, in a semantic field (not forgetting that all the above are settled in a verbal interaction environment), equates meaning making acts. And even more, we can see *how* the forms, while preserved by the works of the couple, get transformed (i.e., within recursive actions building up complex rhythms).

We can *observe* how order is generated, by jointly achieved transformations, under “ $(A \times B) \rightarrow (A \times B) (X)$ ” forms. These transformations are neither random nor imposed by outside “forces” onto the analytic couple. It is an (observable) instance of self-organization of the couple. As such a couple “observes” a sequence of utterances through a mirrored sequence of utterances, a “narrative form” through a symmetric shaped “narrative form” (e.g., session 98<sup>th</sup>, 99<sup>th</sup> and 152<sup>nd</sup>), a pattern through another mirroring pattern born from it (e.g., session 98<sup>th</sup>), a “character” through a bi-personal created “twin character” or a pair of “characters” through a symmetric shaped pair of “characters” (e.g., session 98<sup>th</sup>, Amalia “repairs” Mother → Amalia “repairs” Thomä).



As such, we can say, as tested, that the couple *performs* a subtle transformation from an emotional experience of one participant to undergoing it within the couple, into a new emotional experience, and which arrives to transform the original emotion or the manifest relational reminiscences into more adapted forms of interaction, e.g., into knowing oneself through another<sup>97</sup>. Within the model it can be seen how various *contents*, manifest in one (e.g., Amalia's dreams<sup>98</sup> or Amalia's reminiscences of a time past<sup>99</sup>), travel so they arrive to be set within the couple's working through, to be transformed, probing the capability of the couple to assimilate emotional experiences and to transform them, within and by interaction, into more stable forms (producing rigidity, conflict or even chaos are other potential paths). This is part of what was called "enactment of content", while the content is an emotional experience or a remembrance of a time past (see 5.6, 5.7 and 5.9., i.e., sessions 98<sup>th</sup> and 99<sup>th</sup>). The path from indifference to caring or understanding, or from shame and isolation to trust and intimacy are but few examples from what we can see in the sessions employed here.

These confirm, this time empirically, that the analytic couple qualifies as an autonomous entity (for this case, estimated to be explored in other couples and other forms of therapy as well), and in this instance one can observe that the couple contributes positively to the making of meaning, to transforming noise into pattern.

I can say, based on these findings, that "the couple really matters". It is source of process and form. It counts if "change" and "growth" are explored and must be considered as an active "participant" to any relational shape emerging within interaction from interaction. This represents the most significant finding of this study.

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<sup>97</sup> E.g., Session 152<sup>nd</sup> "You laugh too little" → "The peace I have here"

<sup>98</sup> Sessions 98<sup>th</sup>, 99<sup>th</sup> and 152<sup>nd</sup>

<sup>99</sup> Session 152<sup>nd</sup> "You laugh too little"

## 7.2. SECONDARY FINDINGS

Most of the following findings involve the works of *recursion*, either on building up rhythmic structures (on utterance or narrative level) or in transforming deictic in symbolic fields or vice versa. Recursion becomes a basic operation, in observing as well in transforming. The observation, supported by the current model, that the couple builds up recursive forms equates the couple can make distinctions within the session.

If a couple enacts the content from which emerges then there is recursion, and sequences of ‘forms’ building up simple or productive or embedded recursions, the logic of  $A \rightarrow A(X)$  that creates its own domain of reapplication, became visible within the model employed here. Turing’s “solving a puzzle through a puzzle of the same type” can be *observed* in how recursion adds forms for producing new contents (i.e., a dialectics of interaction that ‘solves’ various unknowns by creating meaning out of noise, by employing fluctuations for attaining equilibrium).

Considering the participation of recursion as organizer of interaction is not new, including rhythmicity and recognition, both play a role as explicative principles in Sander’s (2008) and Benjamin’s (2018) conceptualizations.

“Repetition” itself has a long history in psychoanalysis, providing for ‘negatives’ an explicative principle, yet *how* recursion shapes the context so new meanings emerge and *how* the couple employs recursion and embedding to shape the content context interplay are new. Recursion or repetition in the current study are observables and provide a basis for conceptualizing forms of processes that previously were not disclosable, they couldn’t acquire boundaries as no domain was available to draw them, mainly due to setting the one-dimensionality of interaction as norm.

From here another significant finding emerged. The present study probes that there is an *observable* relation between form and content. Considering the double dimension of verbal interaction, the form and content of speech and listening arrived to be interconnected within and through the works of the couple. In session 98<sup>th</sup> we can witness the progression through recursion of balancing silences, forms of interaction and couple's work in a complex production of meaning which involves levels of production situated in Amalia's, Thomä's and couple's works. There is empirical evidence for asserting that we have correspondences "form → content" and "content → form".<sup>100</sup> There are reoccurrences of "form ↔ content", i.e. fluctuations employed for transforming and adapting to change through change<sup>101</sup>. Without them the previous noted progression, from one level of production and organization towards another level (emerging from it) that is presenting a higher level of organization, will not provide observables. These can offer a base for further development within the larger field of rehabilitation, where constancy and fluctuation play an important role.

In a symmetric difference organized world (i.e., the analytic couple Umwelt) the logic of production of sense is different from a "geometry" as potential source of laws to produce sense from the events of the session.

Equivalence as characteristic of the employed relation (functional equivalent or different?) implies that *transitivity* is at work, a characteristic that was shown as manifest and part of shaping interaction (e.g., in the session 98, the sequence:

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<sup>100</sup> Like in the 98<sup>th</sup> session, when "first narrative" → "dream telling" → "Snow-white interaction sequence", or the 99<sup>th</sup> "dancing" sequence of "a dream forthcoming a state of relating" that arrives at "relating forthcoming a state of a dream" or in the sequence "*You laugh too little*" from 152<sup>nd</sup>.

<sup>101</sup> We can see these in the Snow-White fragment (4.3.8.) or in the dancing dream sequence (4.3.9.), or in 152<sup>nd</sup>, the sequence 16 - "*You laugh to little*". Transference-countertransference as event in/of the session qualifies as object for further research, considering the "more" added by the contribution of the analytic couple into how the dynamic of interaction is shaped.

preannouncement of the forgotten dream → the forgotten dream → Snow-white episode).

An “equivalent form” → “equivalent content” as a reoccurring state of facts cannot be randomly achieved, as there are no patterns in chaos. Also, the sequences of recursions in session 98<sup>th</sup> and 152<sup>nd</sup> shows a building up of complex rhythms, within “experiencing relating” (being in a couple) and “relating experiences” (becoming a couple) which are making observable through their dialectic a recursive structure allowed to unfold, which can be seen but onto a ‘surface’. Stating “that form preannounce this content” or “this content shapes such form”, as assumptions (i.e., “characters” of the session), these while tested (e.g., in session 98<sup>th</sup> or 99<sup>th</sup>) provided a ground for further investigating the ‘surface of interaction’ so defined, moving from the world of sentences (i.e., with a specific dynamic form ↔ content) to the worlds of narratives and bi-personal narratives (i.e., with a different dynamic form ↔ content). And here this relation between form and content could open a new observational path towards other instances, either in the directions of the micro worlds of the complexities of voice and interaction or in macro worlds of an entire analysis.

In the session 152<sup>nd</sup> an empathic stance and the subsequent enfolded understanding of what happens, are made visible. Here, as in session 99<sup>th</sup>, it can be observed that there is a correlation between complexification and intimacy<sup>102</sup>. The opposite situation, described in the example “No matches”, shows that growing an emotional distance entails a decrease in complexification, thus an absence or an impossibility of a next-level-event, even if the couple performs an enacting of content, producing the conditions for moving forward. As in Giovacchini’s example, repetition and not recursion is what drives the couple, a backwards movement towards becoming

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<sup>102</sup> Intimacy is an obvious jointly achieved state of facts, an opening that happens within and through relating, from which the analytic couple emerges.

strangers again, in building up a no emergent meaning, while the couple builds up either a “sucking thoughts vortex” or “empty pockets”, i.e., enacting the content.

A rise in the density of links qualifies as production of meaning through jointly achieved doings. Results that all forms of relating that reduce the “distance” between analyst and patient, (e.g., empathy, intuition, or intimacy) correlate with the *density of recursions*.

The end of the sessions 98<sup>th</sup> (dancing in words) or 152<sup>nd</sup> (making puns) are showing it. This implies “making empathy” or “making intuition” as corresponding to a mutual production of links, is emerging under a mutual re-conception of the environment, that parallels an implicate source of order. So, is empathy (or intuition) a next-level-process? Is the couple part in such doings?

The session or parts of the session and the representation of them are setting the stage for what is termed (following Turing, 1954), a relation between a puzzle and a similar puzzle derived or born from it. Like the dream of a drunken man seen as a character dreamt by Amalia which comments the idiosyncrasies of Thomä, or the dance sequence from the session 99<sup>th</sup> that both mark forms onto the relational fabric of the couple’s doings. Enacting of content by the couple becomes evident. What such observation provides is the base for a much more detail in the study of transference countertransference.

Considering Levenson (1987) description “transference must involve the reenactment, between patient and therapist, of what is talked about. *It is what is done about what is said.*” (pp. 209-210, italics in the original) then recursion, as performed by the couple, when they do what they talk about, can provide access to an observable stratification of transference countertransference dynamic organization, and so to more fine-grained descriptions of transference strata within the field of the session. If considering a triadic view, the description of transference countertransference cannot

be unaffected. The gains obtained at the level and detail of observation, acquired by considering a new dimension of interaction, provide (or should provide) a ‘surface’ of description of any sequence of events, including the transferential sequences of events. As the couple is causally relevant, considering such presence within the analytic process cannot let the unfolding events and their descriptions obeying the previous linearity. What would it mean a “transferential surface” other than i) building up a “then into now” and ii) a “now into now” onto the grounds of iii) “enacting of content” while creating iv) a “next-level-event” provided by the couple itself? Recursive patterns of a “now into now” are new observable events, that can be seen in the recurrent forms within the matrices of verbal interaction written in a binary form (s and d). Asking “what are transferences?” as Freud did in the postface to Dora (Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria 1905/1953b, p. 116) the first answer of a “then into now” needs to be completed with a “now into now” movements, of relational events waiting to acquire sense while acquiring it. The previous quoted “*what is done about what is said*” is also an answer to “how” meaning is generated within a triadic perspective, how the couple enacts a specific emotional movement and participates at transforming it, making it and its subsequent transformations a sequence of recursive events of the session. Considering relating as reality making, a “reminiscence” is but a relational event, so “mental pain” is the present witness of a relational occurrence. It follows that a next-level-event emerging under “order through fluctuations” cannot be only a “then into now” transformation, but at the same time a “now into now” one (in different words acquiring sense is a *creative* endeavor performed also by the couple).

This content context interplay, linking the two levels of observation, shows that the “figure ground” dynamics is a process that happens on the bi-dimensionality of process, i.e., on the “vertical” of verbal interaction as well, from sentence to

narrative to bi-personal narratives, and not only in sequence. “Order at all points” (Sacks 1992, vol. I, p. 484) can be said that folds a second dimension within interaction, the extended “now” of interaction. Recursion *and* embedding are parts of and feed this making of order. We can observe that driving ‘this doing’ and ‘that doing’ in mirror, is devised by both.

A representation of the data under “are they functionally equivalent or different?”<sup>103</sup> provides a simple bi-dimensional form, and onto it inferences can be made. The proposed algorithm “frame → enacting of content → next-level-event” shows that is an accurate description of transforming an unknown into something recognizable, communicable. These developments answer to searching for an ecology, linking the minute detail of interaction with the constitution of larger sequences, uncovering any particular “ecosystem”, i.e., any couple, that can be expended in the field of rehabilitation to other types of interaction or even to groups.

To discover the limitations and to explore the potentials of the present qualitative model, is needed to apply the model to sequences of sessions or even larger portions of an analysis, for this couple and for other analytic couples, and other types of therapy, or non-clinical interactions. And to larger number of participants as well, e.g., small groups, considering a revision of dimensionality. So, frame and its fundamental role can be probed (empirically). If frame offers the grounds, then the differences and similarities between this interaction and that interaction can provide further results.

Another finding, resulting from pursuing the main assumption, is that the density of utterance level recursions scales inversely with the density of narrative level recursions when a distance is kept unmodified, or raises in time. The density of

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<sup>103</sup> A composed operation, that has as constituents counting, copying, comparing, and substituting (e.g., Turing, 1954)

utterance level recursions scales directly with the density of narrative level (e.g., *You laugh too little*) when the distance is lowered, i.e., when intimacy rises.

A conclusion, to how these levels evolve and interact, is that for feeding variance (adding content) at one level the complementary level needs to provide structure (adding context). In both situations (i.e., scales directly or inversely) the previous conclusion holds, and the interrelation content context, either seen in “enacting content” or in “variance ↔ structure interrelation” provides recognizable elements in a triadic perspective. But this needs more research.

The “dance” deictic ↔ symbolic asks also for more research, in the light of causally relevance attained by the couple. The correspondence of the present study with Fonagy and Target research (e.g., 2007) invites moving towards observable events and developing further the model, as “mirroring” and “reflective mode” (see Chapter 4.5.) seems to share more.

A couple making distinctions into the couple’s environment (unfolding a deictic ↔ symbolic fluctuation) equates the couple *observes* the couple and *adapts* to the couple’s environment.

The incessant production of recursive patterns, which are part of generating next level events, of solving puzzles, becomes clear for this couple with each step linking the minute detail of interaction with the ecology of the session. In both examples where repetition is at work (Giovacchini and the Student Therapist) the ecology of producing meaning is traded for obscurity, for confusion and distance.

The path from deictic to symbolic and the reverse of it, “the transformation of a thought into an experience” (Freud 1916-1917/1963, p. 129), can be seen in what Amalia does or what Thomä does, but most important for the study is what and how the analytic couple is able to arrive to such complex transformations.



Maybe the most evident movements of such transformations are seen when the couple arrives to transform an emotional experience (either the dance from session 99<sup>th</sup>, or the “embarrassment” from session 152<sup>nd</sup>) into a new emotional experience, i.e., a new “story”. Such transformations, while emerging from interaction, are providing the necessary ‘what’ in generating next level events. We witness a transformation of one’s narrative into a different one, emerging from it. In different words Bateson’s idea that “we think in stories” (1979, p. 14) applies also to the couple. This can add more to the level of detail regarding the surface of transferential events of the session, mentioned above, and a direction to approach “how the couple” participates to transforming an unknown into something recognizable.

The object “bi-personal narrative”, as a “character” of the session, emerges from their doings, it acquires a meaningful shape while making meaning through shape shifting<sup>104</sup>, through a transformational event.

A “bi-personal narrative” shapes sequences of actions, and feed next-level-events. In between recursion and next-level-events, in the examples, there are either a re-cognition of emotional experience that becomes a part of co-constructing a lost authenticity (e.g., Chapter 6.10, line 13, “... you actually savoured them”) or transforming an avoidance through overlapping into a here and now through overlapping experiences, segregating them for coalescing back, so new levels of relating emerge (in “you laugh too little”), or the opposite, building up from the “dance of forgetting and curiosity” a “sucking thoughts vortex” (Chapter 4.3.), achieving this new object through ‘enacting of content’ by the couple, without creating a next-level.

Silence shapes the couple’s actions as well, e.g., while employed for conveying a forgotten dream. Also, silence is part of building up rhythmical structures (or

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<sup>104</sup> From such object to Tronick’s dyadic state hypothesis can be drawn a direct line.

interpretations of forgotten elements). It can be said even that they are creating a form expecting a content, which develops from the very content shaped through silences, a deictic symbolic movement performed through recursion. Considering the present system of reference, a sequence of silences arrives to shape through *how* they interact the very *what* of interaction. A *what* that manifests as ‘a form that expects a new content’ to be linked with the present one (e.g., mother and mirror). How Amalia and Thomä arrive to interact makes from “silence” more than resistance, benign regression, or interpersonal negotiation with the analyst (Frankel 2021, p.156) amongst many other potential functions of silence (e.g., Dimitrijevic and Buchholz, 2021). A sequence of silences unfolding as a “doing together to do together” becomes a semantic event with a specific purpose, it communicates a *what* (a forgotten event, an absence then) through *how* sequencing units of silence structures the environment (no speech, an absence). In the session 98<sup>th</sup> the complex arrangement of words and silences preannounces a forgotten through *how* silences are shaping interaction, engaging a content by creating a context, i.e., a sequence of absences revealing in sequence a forgotten event. Mirroring of forms confirms this, while recurrence reveals the meaning made by the works of the couple.

It can be seen that “frame → enacting of content → next-level-event” emerges onto fluctuation deictic ↔ symbolic at interactional level. A detail that opens a door towards “order through fluctuation” phenomenology, potentially building a bridge in between methodologies, allowing enquiring our events with new tools. The natural world and the semantic fields of interaction share this “order through fluctuations”, and this cannot be neglected. It represents an area from which new methodologies could emerge, opening our field to interdisciplinarity and to verification of whatever hypothesis we employ, while evidence itself is inscribed within the domains of process.

It makes one wonders if not beside the “psychology of the patient” and the “psychology of the analyst”, that feed what and how is a silence in that time of the session, we do not deal also with the “psychology of the couple” that seems to promise revealing a rich observational field.

What needs to be underlined is that “evidence as process” *belongs* to the session as complex sequence of events while or if pursued by an observer. Belongs to what constitutes data. The boundaries that show that ‘this is that’ ask a model, to be mapped and employed for further conceptualizations (further mappings) by an observer. But boundaries are there, they are neither set by an external theory searching for evidence, nor imposed arbitrarily by an observer.

The complexity of (verbal) interaction, (or the intricacies of transference-countertransference events unfolding in the sessions), shows that recording transcribing and researching the session starting from such material do not “destroy the very object of the research” (Perron 1999/2002, p.7). Observation in its proper place is a most expected leaving from a non-alignment stance. If words and unconscious mentation are linked (e.g., Freud, 1915/1957, Appendix C) then a recording of what is said should offer more than destroying the ‘object’.

The tool proposed in this study can be employed for finding various “blind spots” and co-constructed impasses that can be revealed by questioning “what the couple does?” (e.g., Giovacchini’s and Therapist Student examples).

Another assumption is that there is a possible comparison on these new grounds between various forms of interaction (e.g., CBT vs. Psychoanalysis) that could provide, in terms of *how* the couple transforms the events of the couple, a differentiation. Also, avoiding recognizing transference events (in a world where therapies are longer and longer), the model could provide an answer to what

consequences follow to such conceptual position (i.e., frame differentiation), what difficulties and what potential impasses.

Frame, e.g., “free association ↔ neutrality”, could provide an answer, yet it cannot be the only one, due to the complexity of processes compared. It is reasonable to expect new levels, thus a new dimensionality, in the making of meaning.

When reducing the dimensionality of “form” from two to one an “equivalence paradox” (Buchholz, 2019b p.809) may result, as such, the “equivalence” could be addressed and examined in terms of forms, installing a new perspective in terms of differences, of couple’s doings reconsidering dimensionality and frame.

An event or a sequence of events seen from a triadic view (patient, analyst, and the analytic couple), that uncovers sequences in terms of “order” and “order making”, could bring difference. This is a study that could be done even at the degree of detail present in the current model.

Are other explanations possible that could circumvent the couple as participant? How about: the analyst technique<sup>105</sup> shapes the interaction? Could be an alternative explanation? This aspect, Thomä’s technique, enlightens many, as well as those factors regarding hirsutism, depression, ambivalence, and other traits about we learnt regarding Amalia’s reasons for being in analysis. Without Thomä’s ways of understanding and how is he dealing with an incipient issue at a particular moment, no such events of the couple could emerge, but same applies to Amalia.

When both speak the same speech (e.g., session 99<sup>th</sup>) there is clear evidence that *both* generate the “interpretation” through *how* they speak within the dancefloor made of words. There is something more than Thomä’s technique, which includes it

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<sup>105</sup> Keeping in mind that in Thomä’s “technique” a crucial thing is “interaction”, as such one pays attention to the patient’s experience, and to his own experience within the interactional flux of the session (see Introduction 1.3.1.)

into. The events are clear, their concatenation as well, and an explanation considering their doings is that they do that “interpreting” through assembling into the deictic field a form that answers to the anaphoric form installed within the symbolic field by the dream. As such, results that “presence” (unfolds deictic → symbolic conversions) is shaped through relating, while “relating” (unfolds symbolic → deictic conversions) emerges from becoming present to what is.

Comparing the present model with other models and methods, the difficulties related to making judgments of similarity and difference (e.g., same action or same wish or same defence) are not at the same level of inference. Here we deal mainly with “on the surface of the session”, which is built up by the couple through voicing silences and words on the canvas of listening, whilst we deal with a “meeting of minds” in other models, with few exceptions (e.g., Conversation Analysis). Contrasting the categories from CCRT, ‘s’ and ‘d’ are labels, resulting from discriminating between autonomous elements, they transcribe the complex organization of the session, and the result can be verified. They are not “recognized” according to a specific task performed by a coder, (e.g., CCRT, PERT, CMP), but they are provided by the material under a minimum theoretical load. On the surface an utterance has an observable beginning and arrives at an end, in the “meeting of minds” referential, thoughts are always second thoughts, i.e., inferences.

I am concluding this study while knowing that there are so many details, interconnections, puzzles, alive moments, and subtle movements that still wait. Amalia and Dr. Thomä prove how much alive and how immense complex is a session. They generously offered to all of us access to a slice of their life. Which in fact is so much.

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The aim of the present study is to test the idea that the analytic couple is an autonomous entity. Observing, defined as making distinctions in one's environment, is seen as an action performed by the analyst, the patient and by the analytic couple. The main question addresses how the analytic session unfolds in a triadic view: *Is the analytic couple able to make distinctions in its own environment and transform for adapting?*

The review of psychoanalytical literature shows that analytic objects, dyadic entities, analytic fields, or analytic thirds ask for (further) research. A mathematical inspired modelling approach is employed, that starts from: “are they functionally equivalent or different?”. The new model provides a binary written ‘form’, governed by “symmetric difference”, while *any* autonomous entity is bidimensional, involving the speaker *and* the listener.

It is shown that *observing* involves *recursion*. So, “observing” as performed by the couple is ongoingly devising new distinctions in the environment, as sequences of utterances mirroring sequence of utterances. Recursion and complexification answer to how the couple makes new distinctions and transform them, adapting to what is. The couple unfolds under “less order → fluctuations → more order” and confirms the form of process: “recursion → complexification → next-level-events”. It is shown that next-level-events emerge from self-reflecting sequences of actions. What such view means equates showing (empirically) if such view provides observables, and how such observables are meaningful regarding the analytic process. In their turn, these point at the encompassing field of rehabilitation.

Der Zweck der vorliegenden Studie besteht darin, die These zu überprüfen, ob das analytische Paar eine selbstständige Einheit ist. Die Beobachtung, definiert als Etwas, das einen Unterschied im Umfeld des Anderen macht, ist eine Handlung, die vom Analysten, dem Patienten und dem analytischen Paar durchgeführt wird. Die zentrale Frage beschäftigt sich mit der Art und Weise, in der sich die analytische Sitzung aus einer triadischen Perspektive entfaltet: *Kann das analytische Paar in seinem eigenen Umfeld einen Unterschied machen und sich zum Zweck der Anpassung verwandeln?* Eine Überprüfung der psychoanalytischen Literatur zeigt, dass analytische Objekte, dyadische Einheiten, analytische Felder oder analytische Dritte, weiterer Recherche bedürfen. Es wird eine mathematisch modellierte Herangehensweise benutzt, die davon ausgeht: “sind diese funktionell äquivalent oder unterschiedlich?”. Das neue Modell bietet eine binär geschriebene ‘Form’, von “symmetrischer Differenz” bestimmt, während *jegliche* selbstständige Identität zweidimensional ist, der Sprecher *und* der Zuhörer. Es wird gezeigt, dass *Beobachtung* mit *Rekursion* verbunden ist. “Beobachtung”, so wie diese vom Paar ausgeübt wird, gestaltet permanent neue Unterschiede in dem Umfeld, als Folge der Äußerungen, die Abläufe von Äußerungen widerspiegeln. Rekursion und Komplexifikation beantworten wie das Paar neue Unterschiede macht und diese “Beobachtungen” umwandelt und sich auf das was vor sich geht, anpasst. Das Paar entfaltet sich demnach: “weniger Ordnung → Schwankungen → mehr Ordnung” und bestätigt die theoretisierte Form des Prozesses: “Rekursion → Komplexifikation → Vorgänge auf der nächsten Ebene”. Paar zeichnet Unterschiede im seinem Umfeld auf, indem es sich selbst widerspiegelt. Es wird gezeigt, dass Vorgänge auf der nächsten Ebene aus einer Abfolge von selbstgespiegelten Vorgängen hervorgehen. Eine derartige Herangehensweise bedeutet, (empirisch) zu zeigen, ob diese Perspektive beobachtbare Elemente bietet und wie diese für die Art und Weise, in der der analytische Vorgang betrachtet wird, von Bedeutung sind. Diese deuten auf das umfassende Feld der Rehabilitation.

## Annex 2

### Selbstständigkeitserklärung

#### Statement of authorship

Ich erkläre ausdrücklich, dass es sich bei der von mir eingereichten Arbeit um eine von mir selbstständig und ohne fremde Hilfe verfasste Arbeit handelt.

I expressly declare that the work I have submitted was written independently and without external help.

Ich erkläre ausdrücklich, dass ich sämtliche in der oben genannten Arbeit verwendeten fremden Quellen, auch aus dem Internet (einschließlich Tabellen, Grafiken u. Ä.) als solche kenntlich gemacht habe. Insbesondere bestätige ich, dass ich ausnahmslos sowohl bei wörtlich übernommenen Aussagen bzw. unverändert übernommenen Tabellen, Grafiken o. Ä. (Zitaten) als auch bei in eigenen Worten wiedergegebenen Aussagen bzw. von mir abgewandelten Tabellen, Grafiken o.Ä. anderer Autorinnen und Autoren die Quelle angegeben habe.

I expressly declare that all sources used in the abovementioned work – including those from the Internet (including tables, graphic and suchlike) – have been marked as such. In particular, I declare that I have, without exception, stated the source for any statements quoted verbatim and/or unmodified tables, graphics etc. (i.e., quotations) of other authors.

Mir ist bewusst, dass Verstöße gegen die Grundsätze der Selbstständigkeit als Täuschung betrachtet und entsprechend geahndet werden.

I am aware that violations against the principles of academic independence are considered deception and are punished accordingly.

Datum

Date

March 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2022

Unterschrift Doktorand/in

Signature of doctoral student

## ANNEX 3

### TRANSCRIPT CONVENTIONS<sup>106</sup>

#### I. Temporal and sequential relationships

Overlapping or simultaneous talk is indicated in a variety of ways.

[ Separate left square brackets, one above the other on two successive lines with utterances by different speakers, indicates a point of overlap onset, whether at the start of an utterance or later.

] Separate right square brackets, one above the other on two successive lines with utterances by different speakers indicate a point at which two overlapping utterances both end, where one ends while the other continues, or simultaneous moments in overlaps which continue.

= Equal signs ordinarily come in pairs – one at the end of a line, and another at the start of the next line or one shortly thereafter. They are used to indicate two things:

(1) If the two lines connected by the equal signs are by the same speaker, then there was a single, continuous utterance with no break or pause, which was broken up in order to accommodate the placement of overlapping talk.

(2) If the lines connected by two equal signs are by different speakers, then the second followed the first with no discernible silence between them or was “latched” to it. A single equal sign indicates no break in an ongoing piece of talk, where one might otherwise expect it, e.g., after a completed sentence.

(0.5) Numbers in parentheses indicate silence, represented in tenth of a second; what is given here in the left margin indicates 0.5 seconds of silence. Silences may be marked either within an utterance or between utterances.

(.) A dot in parentheses indicates a “micropause,” hearable but not readily measurable without instrumentation; ordinarily less than 0.2 of a second.

#### II. Aspects of speech delivery, including aspects of intonation

The punctuation marks are not used grammatically, but to indicate intonation.

. The period indicates a falling, or final, intonation contour, not necessarily the end of a sentence.

? Similarly, a question mark indicates rising intonation, not necessarily a question,

, A comma indicates “continuing” intonation, not necessarily a clause boundary. The inverted question mark is

used to indicate a rise stronger than a comma but weaker than a question mark.

:: Colons are used to indicate the prolongation or stretching of the sound just preceding them. The more colons, the longer the stretching. On the other hand, graphically stretching a word on the page by inserting blank spaces between the letters does not necessarily indicate how it was pronounced; it is used to allow alignment with overlapping talk.

- A hyphen after a word or part of a word indicates a cut-off or self-interruption, often done with a glottal or dental stop.

word Underlining is used to indicate some form of stress or emphasis, either by increased loudness or higher pitch. The more underlining, the greater the emphasis.

word Therefore, underlining sometimes is placed under the first letter or two of a word, rather than under the letters which are actually raised in pitch or volume.

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<sup>106</sup> These are reproduced from Sidnell (2009) *Conversation Analysis. Comparative Perspectives*.



WORD Especially loud talk may be indicated by upper case; again, the louder, the more letters in upper case. And in extreme cases, upper case may be underlined.

° The degree sign indicates that the talk following it was markedly quiet or soft.

°word° When there are two degree signs, the talk between them is markedly softer than the talk around it.

Combinations of underlining and colons are used to indicate intonation contours:

\_: If the letter(s) preceding a colon is/are underlined, then there is an “inflected” falling intonation contour on the vowel (you can hear the pitch turn downward).

: If a colon is itself underlined, then there is an inflected rising intonation contour on the vowel (i.e., you can hear the pitch turn upward)

↑ The up and down arrows mark sharper rises or falls in pitch

↓ than would be indicated by combinations of colons and underlining, or they may mark a whole shift, or resetting, of the pitch register at which the talk is being produced.

> <

< > The combination of “more than” and “less than” symbols indicates that the talk between them is compressed or rushed.

< Used in the reverse order, they can indicate that a stretch of talk is markedly slowed or drawn out. The “less than” symbol by itself indicates that the immediately following talk is “jump-started,” i.e., sounds like it starts with a rush.

hhh Hearable aspiration is shown where it occurs in the talk by

(hh) the letter h – the more h’s, the more aspiration. The aspiration may represent breathing, laughter, etc. if it occurs inside the boundaries of a word, it may be enclosed in parentheses in

.hh order to set it apart from the sounds of the word. If the aspiration is an inhalation, it is shown with a dot before it.

### III. Other markings

(( )) Double parentheses are used to mark transcriber’s descriptions of events, rather than representations of them: ((cough)), ((sniff)), ((telephone rings)), ((footsteps)), ((whispered)), ((pause)), and the like.

(word) When all or part of an utterance is in parentheses, or the speaker identification is, this indicates uncertainty on the transcriber’s part but represents a likely possibility.

(lit/bit) Where alternate hearings are possible these are enclosed in parentheses and separated by a back slash.

( ) Empty parentheses indicate that something is being said, but no hearing (or, in some cases, speaker identification) can be achieved.

## ANNEX 4

### THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE COMBINATORIAL ALGEBRA

The elements of the hierarchy are (e.g., Bastin et al, 1979 pp. 453 - 460):

i. Elements: groups of N-tuples  $x = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$  where  $x_k$  can take the values s or d.  $x_i$  labels a relation between a “word” and another “word”, a “utterance” and another, or a “narrative” and another narrative. Elements are labels for relations.

ii. Operation within the group of N-tuples: *Symmetric difference* (or addition modulo 2) “+” is defined in this group as follows:  $s + s = s$ ;  $s + d = d$ ;  $d + s = d$ ; and  $d + d = s$ . (a symmetric difference between similar is similar, between similar and different is different, and between two different is a similar<sup>107</sup>)

iii. Discrimination, D, defined as an operation between two elements of the group, under symmetric difference, that has the following form:

$$D(x, y) = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) + (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n) = (x_1 + y_1, x_2 + y_2, \dots, x_n + y_n)$$

iv. A discriminately close subset, DCsS, is defined as a subset such as the symmetric difference of two N-tuples belonging to the subset always gives us a different N-tuple that also belongs to the subset, i.e., for all  $x, y$  from the subset  $z = (x + y)$  is in the subset.”

With these basic elements (1 – 4) we can construct a combinatorial hierarchy.

Level  $L_1$  is represented by columns of dimension  $n=2$ . Arbitrarily selecting  $e_1$  and  $e_2$  as basis elements, three DCsS can be formed,  $(e_1)$ ,  $(e_2)$ , and  $(e_1, e_2, e_1 + e_2 = e_3)$ <sup>108</sup>.

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<sup>107</sup> We are in a binary world, a yes or no, a black or white, so according to discrimination, a “d” + “d” equates a double negation, what is obtained is a “s”.

<sup>108</sup> Generally, for  $n$  basis elements, there are  $2^n - 1$  DCsS, where the basis elements, through successive discrimination, *generate all the other elements* of the discrimination system we are considering. (Bastin et al 1979, p. 454)

$$e_1 = \begin{pmatrix} s \\ d \end{pmatrix}; e_2 = \begin{pmatrix} d \\ s \end{pmatrix} \text{ and } e_3 = \begin{pmatrix} d \\ d \end{pmatrix}$$

The second level,  $L_2$ , is obtained by using three DCsS at  $L_1$  to form the basis elements for  $L_2$ . Since there are three basis elements,  $e_1 = \begin{pmatrix} s \\ d \end{pmatrix}; e_2 = \begin{pmatrix} d \\ s \end{pmatrix}$  and  $e_3 = \begin{pmatrix} d \\ d \end{pmatrix}$ , there are  $2^3 - 1 = 7$  DCsS at  $L_2$ , as seen above. They are represented here by  $2 \times 2$  matrices (i.e., one level up):

$$e_1 = \begin{pmatrix} s & d \\ d & d \end{pmatrix}, e_2 = \begin{pmatrix} d & d \\ d & s \end{pmatrix}, e_3 = \begin{pmatrix} d & d \\ s & d \end{pmatrix}, e_4 = \begin{pmatrix} s & d \\ d & s \end{pmatrix}, e_5 = \begin{pmatrix} d & s \\ s & d \end{pmatrix}, e_6 = \begin{pmatrix} s & s \\ d & d \end{pmatrix}, e_7 = \begin{pmatrix} d & d \\ s & s \end{pmatrix}$$

These, in turn, serve as basis elements for  $L_3$ , where there are 127 DCsS, and similarly for  $L_4$  where there are 127 basis elements and  $2^{127} - 1 \approx 10^{38}$  DCsS. The previous formulas are limiting the hierarchy at level four (see Bastin et al 1979 for proof).

## ANNEX 5

### SESSION 152<sup>ND</sup> TRANSCRIPT

#### 1. *The Thursday appointment*<sup>109</sup>

1. A: let me just recall that (a) Monday is our next (b').
2. P: five o'clock (b).
3. A: five o'clock (c), that was it (d') -.
4. P: right, and the Thursday, we hadn't settled yet (e)
5. A: Thursday. (f)
6. P: you didn't say anything about it yet, (g) because at first, I thought I couldn't make it (h). But I don't have Extension Course then (i).
7. A: ok, so Thursday then, (j)  
uh yes, uh – six-thirty would be best for me then.(k) or five-thirty?(l)
8. P: I don't care. (m)
9. A: uh. (n)
10. P: whichever you like. (o)
11. A: five o'clock. so five-thirty then. (p)
12. P: um-hmm. (q)
13. A: ok? (r)
14. P: um-hmm. (s)

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<sup>109</sup> Transcribed/translated by Michael Buchholz and Jörg Bergmann

## 2. *The dream. First thread*

15. ((2 min))  
16. P:((moaning))  
17. P: I dreamed last night, (a) this morning, (just as) (.)  
18. the alarm went off. (b) I had been murdered by a dagger. (c)  
19. T: mhm. d  
20. P: that is actually it was- (.s5) like in a movie e(1.2) and I had  
21. to lie prone very long, f and I had the dagger in the  
22. rear g and, then many many people came, h-(A)  
23. and, I don't remember  
24. exactly, i holding the hands completely quiet, j  
25. somehow (as if dead) (B)k  
26. T: mhm. l  
27. P: I was very embarrassed m that my skirt slipped up so high  
28. in the rear n(C)  
29. T: mhm.  
30. P: and then a colleague came, o (A') clearly visible from XY, p  
31. that was my first job, q and he then pulled out the dagger  
32. from the back r and took it with him. s (B') and I know that it was  
33. like a souvenir then.t (C') and then came a young couple, u (A'') - I  
34. only remember that he was a negro. v and then they cut my  
35. hair w and actually they wanted to make a wig out of it x  
36. I think. y(B'') and I found this really appalling. z (C'') just  
37. everything down aa and they in fact started to cut. ab  
38. and, then I got up, ac - and went to the hairdresser.ad and  
39. there I still had ae ( ) rang ( ) and I  
40. woke up af

## 3. *Skipjack. Second thread of dream presentation*

- 50 T: Actually you could get up then, a [when you wanted to go to  
51 P: [oh yes, c I was alive the  
52 T: [the hairdresser, uh.b  
53 P: [entire time, you know.d  
54 T: ja, mhm, mhm, mhm, ja.e  
55 P: I had to- (.) f I just have to- g yesterday evening I saw that  
56 Don Juan by Max Frisch. h and there were also quite a few  
57 dead people, i but- it really was like on stage. j  
58 and it was very embarrassing for me and very- like-k all the  
59 people, who arrived all the time. l and at the beginning I had  
60 the feeling it is for real, m but- I don't remember how- whether  
61 it hurt or n- the dagger in the back could- and it  
62 really stuck in ((smiling)) it. o there was no at all-p  
63 he just pulled it out. q ((Bells ringing)) skipjack. r  
64 ((50 sec))

## 4. *Amalia doesn't know what she is doing. The monastery vs. analysis theme begins.*

65. P: hm, it seems to me a that you perhaps now expect from  
66. me, b but- I don't give a damn. c  
67. T: hm. what do you mean expect d - about the dream, or what? e  
68. P: yes f - suddenly it occurred to me. g  
69. T: yes. h

70. P: I am just afraid i that during the last time I don't at all know, j  
 71. what I am doing k  
 72. T: mhm. l  
 73. P: not about the dream (I've read) m  
 74. T: yeah. n  
 75. P: anyway I am so confused. o Though I intentionally wear what I  
 76. usually wear, p and paint my lips q  
 77. T: mhm. r  
 78. P: in order not to get out of custom s but for the time being I have  
 79. on the table t - and it's getting worse u and suddenly I thought v  
 80. now you sell your car, w you don't need it any more x - and  
 81. you also don't need to go to the theatre any more y -  
 82. T: mhm. z  
 83. P: all that is devil's work. aa Also in German classes you don't  
 84. teach English and geography. ab if possible  
 85. you don't have anything to do with all that. ac / / it's exactly  
 86. like ten years before. down to the last detail.ad  
 87. ( ) I don't care either. ae  
 88. ((20 sec))

## 5. *Monastery versus Analysis*

89. P: but really, usually I don't do this. a) not to be frightened  
 90. at all anymore b  
 91. T: like in the dream? c  
 92. P: yes. ((5 sec)) d  
 93. yes ((5 sec)) e yes, f somehow I have to g - it seems to me as if-  
 94. well, has the time come that in my thought g' I think- hm- that h  
 95. sometimes I do think during the last days in which monastery i  
 96. I should take the veil. k idiotic, l so idiotic, m and it doesn't  
 97. help at all n when I say it to me. o  
 98. T: mhm. P  
 99. ((10sec))

## 6. *I fight against with routine*

100. P: I am really happy a when I can go to school in the morning. b there  
 101. I don't have any time for crap like that. c  
 102. ((8 sec)) d  
 103. P: somehow, I fight against it with routine but - e  
 104. also with pondering, of course, f but as soon as I start  
 105. pondering g everything seems to be messy. h  
 106. I don't know, i I really don't know. j therefore I think k  
 107. I am crazy l and then I think, m I have feelings of guilt n and  
 108. then I think, o I have uh during the six years, p not at all  
 109. I don't know, q everything is so far away, r all of a sudden. S  
 110. T: what came to your mind with the dream a short while ago. a  
 111. [which you didn't want to tell. b  
 112. P: [well, shit c  
 113. T: pardon me? hm? d  
 114. P: just something which perhaps can be found in a ( ) book. e  
 115. T: by, by-f  
 116. P: just something which perhaps can be found in a textbook. g

117. T: well, what's in there? h  
 118. P: ((laughing)) you know that, don't you? i  
 119. T: no, no, no j  
 120. P: no, k of course not, l since you don't know which textbooks I read m  
 121. T: hm, hm. n  
 122. P: oh God. no, o I am feeling kind of (.) filth. p  
 123. T: hm. r  
 124. ((18 sec))

7. *"I got up in the end... the dream can help me in any way?"*

125. P: well do you think that a) that the dream can help me in any way? b)  
 126. T: well, c) it is- a an uh hm- inertia, d) an- you  
 127. were just complaining e) that you don't get any further, that you  
 128. uh,- f) it's depicted in the dream, isn't it. g)  
 129. P: uh, but there I got up in the end h)  
 130. T: yes i)  
 131. P: I already told you, skipjack j)  
 132. T: But you went to the hairdresser k)  
 133. P: like one of these skipjacks l)  
 134. T: hm. m)  
 135. P: who shakes off everything n) and visits the hairdresser, o) knows  
 136. nothing better to do, p) neither to the police, r)

8. *"Film scenery" and "real streets"*

137. P: however I am not sure, q I think there was police around. r  
 138. on the one hand it  
 139. was a film scenery s [and on the other hand actually  
 140. T: [yes t  
 141. P: real streets!, u in reality. v then I hear the people  
 142. coming and staring. w now I just don't get any further. x I get  
 143. deeper and deeper into it. y and the ( ). First it was the clock z  
 144. now it is the car, aa and it goes on like that. ab

9. *"Are you dead or are you not dead?"*

145. T: and in your dream you even were hit, ac so uh,  
 146. are you dead ad or are you not dead. ae  
 147. P: but that's it right now. af  
 148. T: mhm. mhm. ag  
 149. P: there is nothing at all ah with which I have fun. ai I just do  
 150. everything mechanically. aj the school, too, ak isn't really, just  
 151. mechanically. al or when I am somewhere, a I act rather  
 152. hyper. am hyper, that is, an is a bit exaggerated but, ao  
 153. at least a bit overwrought. ap and in me someone is watching all  
 154. the time aq and censoring and says wrong, (ar) everything's wrong (as)  
 155. ((50 sec))

10. *"I would like to rush at you and grab your neck"*

156. P: right now I would believe every silly thing. More than that two  
 157. times two is four

158. T: mhm. Also. Then when it-  
 159. P: ()  
 160. T: I sit behind of you and say to everything “wrong, wrong”  
 161. P: My, you know, sometimes I have the feeling that I would like to  
 162. rush at you, grab your neck, and hold you tight, and  
 163. T: hm.  
 164. P: then then I think, “He can’t take it and will suddenly fall  
 165. over dead”  
 166. T: hm.  
 167. P: and then I see, that you, too, somehow burn, or or  
 168. I can’t really express it adequately, I don’t know, what I am  
 169. going to see or to feel then  
 170. You can’t take it, that I, uh  
 171. P: yes  
 172. T: can’t bear it, can’t bear you, and  
 173. P: yes, that I hold on to you.  
 174. T: mhm.  
 175. P: this, uh, is demanding too much of you.  
 176. T: mhm.  
 177. P: more like that, is.  
 178. T: hm.

### 11. *“Fight to the finish”*

179. P: and that, that you, too, start to wobble somehow, a  
 180. and to falter, b and that you- or sometimes I honestly ask  
 181. myself, c is it really so fundamental d and so cruel  
 182. as it comes across for me. d  
 183. T: mhm. e  
 184. P: because right now I f  
 185. T: so it’s a kind of a fight to the finish, with a knife. g  
 186. P: yes, you can say that h  
 187. T: uh, in order uh to reveal the dream i  
 188. P: probably, yes j  
 189. T: mhm. k

### 12. *“Into the monastery”*

190. P: and actually so so bad, because- well because because  
 191. I went already through a rather similar thing, dreamed,  
 192. uh,- and the consequence was that I, left.  
 193. in all these years after I left this monastery entirely  
 194. T: mhm.  
 195. P: I never never had serious doubts that this was the  
 196. T: hm.  
 197. P: right thing to do, and now after such a long time, it  
 198. thrusts ().  
 199. T: mhm. Instead of the fight to the finish with a knife into the monastery  
 200. P: pardon me?  
 201. T: uhm, instead of the fight to the finish with a knife -.  
 202. P: yes  
 203. T: into the monastery  
 204. P: exactly, nerve-racking.

205. A: and then you would be assured, that then you'd, at least know, that, uh, I, uh, how shall I say it, I've out – held out, that, uh, I've been able to take it, that you, uh, that you, uh, um, that I've come through it intact. Because you, somewhere there's this concern there, that I won't be able to take it. Is he, is he really strong enough, that he uh.
206. P: no, that's not what I was hoping.
207. A: that he, well, that nothing will happen, that you won't
208. P: I don't find that appropriate.
209. A: um, that you won't draw me into it too.
210. P: into this delusion, you mean, in my mind.
211. A: um-hmm, um-hmm.
212. P: or make a scene, or -.
213. A: yes, yes. Um-hmm.
214. P: I don't know.
215. A: right.
216. P: but it's also a kind of distancing, a kind of -.
217. A: of course. but as to distancing, but the first thing is to know, if something is going to break off, or, could, or if it, it uh, it'll be able to take it. or if a branch will break, break off, right, somehow there's a feeling – perhaps mixed up in this as well, that you'd like to take something with you, that you'd like to break off a branch.
218. P: yes.
219. A: break off a piece.
220. P: yes, it's your neck.
221. A: my neck? mm. mm. my head.
222. P: mm, um-hmm.
223. A: um-hmm.

13. *“Preoccupied with your head”.*

224. P: that's something I'm, often preoccupied with, your head.
225. A: will it stay on? You're preoccupied with my head often, really often.
226. P: yes, yes, incredibly often.
227. A: what is it about it for you -.
228. P: oh, from the beginning I've been thinking, measuring it from every angle.
229. A: yes, um-hmm.
230. P: and, - and, uh, it is really peculiar.
231. A: um-hmm.
232. P: sometimes, when you're sitting there on your chair, and I'm waiting, for you to set an appointment.
233. A: yes.
234. P: then each time it looks completely different, sometimes.
235. A: um-hmm.
236. P: seems it comes out different every time.
237. A: yes.
238. P: though I go over it inch by inch with my eyes.
239. A: um-hmm.
240. P: from back to front and from - the bottom. – and sometimes just like a wild goose chase, looking for my head.
241. A: hm.
242. P: It's almost like a cult with me.
243. A: hm.
244. P: with your head. It's so funny / / /
245. A: um-hmm.
246. P: with anybody else I'm more likely to notice what they're wearing.
247. A: right.
248. P: without having to look directly at them.
249. A: um-hmm.



250. P: with you, though, it's just too tall an order. Afterwards I wonder sometimes, why I didn't see that.  
 251. A: um-hmm.  
 252. P: on your head something always -.  
 253. A: um-hmm.  
 254. P: it just fascinates me. What's in it too, of course.

#### 14. *"I like to get inside"*

255. A: yes, yes, a if you keep it intact for yourself, b if it – stays there and you, uh, c then it's, you don't have it. d he takes it with him, e then it's, uh.  
 256. P: then it's off. f  
 257. A: it's off, right. g and then, uh – then the convent is a way out, right. h But just a way out, that's all. i  
 258. P: another head. j  
 259. A: in that case yes, k and then – you might not have taken along what. m  
 260. P: no. o  
 261. A: what you – would like to take along with you, p not taken out q  
 262. P: most of all what I'd still like to get inside of r  
 263. A: hmm. get inside -? s  
 264. P: I still want to. t  
 265. A: or put inside? u  
 266. P: get inside, v - get inside. w  
 267. A: get inside, x ok, um-hmm.y  
 268. P: you see? z that's so hard to say in front of a hundred eyes. aa  
 269. A: yes. ab  
 270. P: believed – what I could get out by getting inside. ac  
 271. A: right. what has got inside of you then, right. ad  
 272. P: that too, yes, ae that's right.af  
 273. A: that then you, uh would actually have what you want, ag to have the knife, ah and uh, to be able to really get inside yourself - too. ai in order to get something out, aj that would – or to get more out. ak  
 274. P: right and now, al - up till now I always thought that, am that would be possible, to some extent. An  
 275. A: um-hmm.ao

#### 15. *"You laugh too little"*

276. P: but since Sunday absolutely nothing has been possible anymore. a A – departure state  
 277. A: well, because since Sunday you've obviously been making a special effort, uh not to, b - uh get uh, inside here. c not to go after my neck and uh, - and try uh, - to -e.  
 278. P: measure your head. e  
 279. A: measure it,f take it in your hand, g and uh – take with you what's inside, in there and - h  
 280. P: could well be because I stopped over the laughing. i B -  
 281. A: because you, excuse me? j transformative event  
 282. P: over the laughing. k  
 283. A: over the laughing, um-hmm. l  
 284. P: you'd asked me what, to my mind, you're, laughing about sometimes, right. m  
 285. A: yes. n  
 286. P: and that's just precisely the point. o  
 287. A: um-hmm, yes. p  
 288. P: where I would like to get inside you, at least when you laugh. q  
 289. A: um-hmm, um-hmm. r

290. P: and when you don't laugh. s I mean, when you say, that you laugh too little,t you didn't really mean that objectively,u but simply that – I think you laugh too little. v C Arrival  
A
291. A: oh no, that + isn't how I meant that. -. w
292. P: no, + that wasn't it? x Later I said. -. y
293. A: + or laugh too little. z
294. P: often I would be expecting you, to laugh. +aa
295. A: no, that I uh, hm. well you like to laugh. ab and you do laugh a lot here, ac but not uh. ad
296. P: I laugh -. ae
297. A: or rather, - you used to laugh a lot here, but not, at the moment -.af
298. P: true. I certainly laugh more often than you. ag
299. A: yes, + yes. ah B
300. P: as far I can + see here. ai
301. A: yes, yes, mm-hmm. ah well you see I think it's a very good thing, that you can laugh,aj and uh, since you might get the idea from my – not uh, - laughing too,ak that it wouldn't be good al – that it isn't good, to laugh.am that's the reason why I uh – really said, an I said, I don't laugh enough.ao C
302. P: So that's it. ap
303. A: and I do really do think, I don't laugh enough. aq uh, - and uh – your father didn't laugh enough. ar A
304. P: he doesn't laugh at all. as B
305. A: and that is, there you have a negative model, uh-at
306. P: the most my father does is smile. au C
307. A: right. av ...
308. P: he laughs when I can't laugh. ax
309. A: um-hmm. ay
310. P: but almost – as a rule that's the way it is. az
311. A: um-hmm. ba
312. P: that is, when he laughs, bb I don't feel like it anymore. bc I feel like anything but that / / / bd couldn't we open the window be
313. A: yes. bf
314. P: it's so muggy today bg
315. A: true. bh

## 16. Dogmas

316. P: I don't know. a uh, it seems to be completely quiet, doesn't it? B (loud noises) (pause 10sec.) c you remember, some time back, some months ago anyway, when we talked about –d well what was it? e it was about dogmas. f
317. A: um-hmm. g
318. P: or rather about being dogmatic is what it was. h and I was saying that i you, - are not dogmatic. j
319. A: mm-hmm. k
320. P: or rather you're not - determined - by dogmas. l
321. A: um-hmm. m
322. P: is that how it went? n
323. A: hm, by textbooks. o
324. P: right. p
325. A: um-hmm. q
326. P: and-well.–of course, I do wonder sometimes, r which leads me to a little bit of a worry. s
327. A: mm-hmm. t
328. P: is he really doing Freud, u and if not what is it v
329. A: mm-hmm. w
330. P: I don't have enough training to x/(laughs) y but I'd put that in parentheses z
331. A: um-hmm. aa

332. P: and then – well of course when it comes to dogma ab I can't help thinking of the church.  
ab
333. A: um-hmm. ac
334. P: and the Bible and - and that's when this business about laughing came to me.ad also, that  
you're basically sitting there and laughing at me, you see. af
335. A: um-hmm. ae
336. P: maybe turning something in such a way that, ah I'll believe in it. aj
337. A: um-hmm. ak
338. P: but,-oh—to me, the way I read the Bible al, I don't feel that, am it's so dogmatic at all. an
339. A: + right, yes. ao
340. P: of course, + - I know that. -. ap
341. A: um-hmm. aq
342. P: oh, I really don't know any more. -. ar
343. A: shall I put it up, ok? as
344. P: oh yes, please. at
345. A: um-hmm. Au

### 17. *"Like a wall"*

346. P: because I. -.
347. A: yes?
348. P: because I. -.
349. A: um-hmm.
350. P: it's uncomfortable to have it up. and then I'm so far away. Like a wall.
351. A: yes, yes, um-hmm. right, you were wondering if I really, - why I do Jung, and not Freud, uh or,  
more Freud than Jung. Well uh, it's not that I do it, it's not for, - I don't believe it's for dogmatic  
reasons. but I do believe that, your interest in my head is not just a matter of – being interested in  
masculinity, in my masculine head and in a principle. but that you also may very well be concerned with  
something -, very concrete, that you were thinking of earlier in connection with the knife. it wasn't, it's  
no accident that your friend spoke of shrunken heads.
352. P: yes. but I find that, that's just the reason I broke off that train of thought.
353. A: right..
354. P: because, because at the moment it seemed so silly to me.
355. A: right, right.
356. P: and so far-fetched. -.
357. A: right.
358. P: given what I felt at that moment. -.
359. A: um-hmm.
360. P: uh, - my wishes and desires.
361. A: yes, right.
362. P: and, heaven only knows what all.
363. A: um-hmm.
364. P: and then I thought, if this isn't the darnedest thing. I'm getting really mad.
365. A: right.
366. P: and now if we're moving from a head to a shrunken head,
367. A: um-hmm
368. P: then I, I could just really. -.
369. A: yes?
370. P: I'm very sorry, but. -.
371. A: right, yes, um-hmm.
372. P: uh, - oh well.

### 18. *"I am not at home just now"*

373. A: right, right. right, right mm, mm. you know what is in your head, don't you, and.
374. P: I really don't know that at the moment. -.
375. A: really?
376. P: uh, I'm absolutely not at home just now, in mine.
377. A: um-hmm.
378. P: or let's say I don't feel at home. if I know it, then what will tomorrow bring? let me think back a minute, that's right I was just on dogma and on, - your head. -.
379. A: um-hmm.
380. P: and if you want to move down all the way to my boot. -. (laughs) I find that really grotesque.
381. A: really?
382. P: I'm sorry, but. -.
383. A: that's right, that's right.
384. P: of course, now you can put all kinds of, / / / on it! All the same I have the fear. or what do I mean fear? one always has the ulterior motive of course, what - / / /. (groaning) well, I don't know, I'm sitting here on the bench, and if I try to catch my breath then it'll squeak-.
385. A: um-hmm.
386. P: Pardon me, but now I'm finally beginning to realize that, you are worried, that you've made me lose my train of thought now I've completely lost it. Now I'll try.-.
387. A: um-hmm. hm. (very loud noises)

### *19. Cloverleaves*

388. P: (laughs), that is one, one of those cloverleaves. you're trying to catch me at my tricks, and you think, maybe by starting with something harmless but it really is your head.
389. A: well, no, that's just. -.
390. P: / / sometimes no body at all, really true?
391. A: yes, yes, um-hmm.
392. P: though I did notice earlier, that you're wearing / / / /
393. A: yes.
394. P: and you very rarely do, I think.
395. A: um-hmm.
396. P: a tie with red and blue on it right.
397. A: you're right.
398. P: but, -.
399. A: there's still plenty of time.
400. P: so, when did I get here at quarter to?
401. A: yes.
402. P: but there are uh, there are really I told you that a while back, for me there are people, with whom - who just don't have, whom I don't find very.
403. A: um-hmm, um-hmm.
404. P: let's say, - who simply cease to interest me.
405. A: right, it, after all it's - really. -.
406. P: I'm just going to shut the window excuse me. (gets up, shuts window)

### *20. "You mean, that's what I think, right?"*

407. A: after all what you're really concerned with— so very much umm,
408. umm — is thoughts, and umm uh, what is in the head.
409. P: yes.

410. A: and what's in the head is, uh, what you think, what I think and uh. -.
411. P: right, right.
412. A: and even more with getting through the thoughts to what you are and what I am.
413. P: you mean, that's what I think. right?
414. A: yes of course, of course.
415. P: um-hmm. Sometimes I measure your head, as if I wanted to bend your brain, and. -.
416. A: um-hmm, um-hmm.
417. P: I probably know the hills on your forehead better than.
418. A: right.
419. P: anything at all. -.
420. A: yes, yes.
421. P: perhaps I even want to know the age of your head, and. -.
422. A: um-hmm.
423. P: a lot of things.
424. A: yes, yes.
425. P: for example I have pictures, from the forum, that you're in a few times and, when I look at your head. - I mean, I haven't done that for a long time now.
426. A: right.
427. P: there was a time. when I used to do that a lot. and each time it might seem completely different to me in a picture.
428. A: um-hmm.
429. P: I would discover something completely different.
430. A: yes.
431. P: and there was an awful lot of envy involved, of your head.
432. A: um-hmm.
433. P: a tremendous amount.
434. A: yes, and, yes.

## 21. *Sweet dreams*

435. P: now I'm getting back (laughing) / / / / / when I think of the dagger again, and of certain sweet dreams I had.
436. A: um-hmm.
437. P: but, - oh, - excuse me.
438. A: but, - don't you see, why should I have to take one of your, uh, - why, that's degrading, what you - are putting into my - m - mouth.
439. P: into you head, + you mean?
440. A: into my + thoughts, rather. That's uh, -. uh, humiliating, the idea that I uh, already know it, that I'm already categorizing it when you express envy that I already, know what - what you're jealous of. more like it, right?
441. P: well, that just came out that way, because earlier you had. -.
442. A: that's right, that's right, that's right.
443. P: uh, - wanted to move down lower, right?
444. A: yes, um-hmm.
445. P: with those shrunken heads. It wasn't me who made them after all.
446. A: no.
447. P: and God knows they never fascinated me. but. -.
448. A: um-hmm.
449. P: but it did fascinate me back then with \*72 that she - uh, right, / / / has a take hold approach.
450. A: um-hhm, um-hmm.
451. P: you can certainly say that in this case.
452. A: yes. yes, and taking hold was the also the issue with - with you, grabbing me by the neck, right.
453. P: yes.
454. A: and how I wouldn't be able to take it right?

455. P: yes I was afraid of that.  
 456. A: um-hmm, um-hmm.

22. *“A very old fear”*

457. P: that is a very old fear. that you won't be able to take it after all my father could never take anything.  
 458. A: yes.  
 459. P: you wouldn't believe how soft my father was.  
 460. A: um-hmm.  
 461. P: he couldn't take a thing.  
 462. A: but then that makes it all the more important to find out if my head is still really hard because that increases, uh, how hard your hold can be. Because if the head is hard, then it should still be – in fact it should be easier, easier, to get – to find out, just exactly how hard it really is, you see.  
 463. P: yes, and you can take hold harder, and.  
 464. A: exactly.  
 465. P: right.  
 466. A: um-hmm, um-hmm, um-hmm.  
 467. P: and fight better, right to the knife.  
 468. A: right. and then there would be something positive, one might say, to that dogmatism. -.  
 469. P: right.  
 470. A: something to be gained from it. namely, that it isn't so easy – to knock over. that it holds firm to something right.  
 471. P: right. that it holds firm.  
 472. A: um-hmm.  
 473. P: right and then? uh, sometimes; I've got the damndest sort of feeling / / /  
 474. A: um-hmm.  
 475. P: that though I get the sense not being able to be knocked over.  
 476. A: um-hmm.

23. *“I am jealous of your head”*

477. P: yet still in a way it did get knocked over.  
 478. A: yes.  
 479. P: as I was telling you I'm jealous of your head.  
 480. A: um-hmm.  
 481. P: really awfully. It's been pretty bad sometimes.  
 482. A: yes.  
 483. P: and then I've; and there have been other heads I've - measured.  
 484. A: um-hmm, um-hmm.  
 485. P: but that was – maybe a a long time ago at the university.  
 486. A: yes.  
 487. P: there was a time like that with me.  
 488. A: yes.  
 489. P: and now it's come back again, set off by you.  
 490. A: um-hmm.  
 491. P: and I feel like making just a little bit of a hole in your head  
 492. A: um-hmm.  
 493. P: cutting a hole in your head. and. -.  
 494. A: um-hmm, yes.  
 495. P: so I can, put some of my thoughts in.  
 496. A: um-hmm.

497. P: that came to me recently, whether I couldn't perhaps exchange, a bit of your dogma for mine.  
 498. A: mm, mm.  
 499. P: the way, the way - uh – the way you, at least as I picture it, put your dogma into mine.  
 500. A: yes, yes.  
 501. P: then it was easier to say this all of this about the head than. -.  
 502. A: yes.

24. *"Stay on with us"*

503. P: I was already on that you see on, Wednesday.  
 504. A: um-hmm. and that way also that way the intensification of your idea of entering the convent would be a way of challenging me to a fight  
 505. P: um-hmm.  
 506. A: in order, to a fight, uh where you would be taken hold of too not just hold on yourself trying to see how, how  
 507. P: yes.  
 508. A: how much I can take but where I finally! get a chance too! – to show in a fight just how! much it matters to me that you don't go to the convent  
 509. P: to my mother  
 510. A: but are preserved for life in this world.  
 511. P: well yes, possibly. I don't know.  
 512. A: stay on with us here so that you can give me your ideas too, that can fill my my head with my with your thoughts more and  
 513. P: oh I see.  
 514. A: and, and can give me really uh – fruitful, fruitful ideas.  
 515. P: you know today I was thinking, sitting at home in the afternoon is really a bad thing. I'm going to get out of here.  
 516. A: mm.  
 517. P: and sit down a half an hour early in your hallway although I rather hate that.  
 518. A: um-hmm, um-hmm, mm.

25. *Convent coming back and going away*

519. P: and now it's actually come to that point. that I just quickly came here and then (sighing) as I was walking through the park, I began to think I, I should really go to the convent.  
 520. A: um-hm.  
 521. P: I should really go to the convent or  
 522. A: mm.  
 523. P: there really is something unnatural about it at the moment I can't bear the sight of my students anymore and, someday I'd really just like to spend half a day lying down staring up at the ceiling and, - and who knows maybe ponder or meditate or simply somehow - oh – how shall I say it rise to another plane really get away from this whole scene.  
 524. A: yes.  
 525. P: of course, some of my colleagues are feeling the same way too.  
 526. A: um-hmm.  
 527. P: as though it were a general atmosphere colouring everything but, now I can't just blame it on the holidays, or on, (sighing) I don't know, the school year or anything. I, thought on Monday you'd fall apart or, how shall I put it?  
 528. A: yes.  
 529. P: yes, I certainly / / / a lot -. that I transferred from me onto you. and then I was thinking,  
 530. A: well, mm, mm.

531. P: you must be in a quite a tizzy now or be pretty badly upset.
532. A: um-hmm, um-hmm.
533. P: what with, the convent coming back.
534. A: right, right.
535. P: when you were living along so peacefully, and -.
536. A: upset yes but precisely uh, don't you see, because you, uh, because I hope I might hold on to you. and, and perhaps now after all there
537. P: no because you because because it it seemed to me as if everything that you had done here, were nonsense and and and hadn't helped at all right?
538. A: um-hmm.
539. P: it just showed I - uh - right, could be outdone.
540. A: right, right what I wanted to say now it's; now it seems to me that after all you have found uh, a - uh solution to it yourself in that you are willing,
541. P: yes.
542. A: isn't that right, and -.
543. P: um-hmm.
544. A: and you can put that in there. but of course, you don't want - hm - a little hole. and you don't want to put in just a little either but a lot.
545. P: I suppose so right.
546. A: you've made a timid attempt, but -.
547. P: I suppose so.
548. A: to, to test the stability of my head, to see, just how big or little to make the hole isn't that right.
549. P: um-hmm.
550. A: but you would like to make a big one.
551. P: um-hmm.
552. A: and have easy access.
553. P: um-hmm.
554. A: not difficult access you'd like, with your hand, uh to be able to actually touch what is there not just see it with your eyes. With your eyes you don't see well anyway if a hole is just small isn't that so. with your eyes you don't see a lot either right if it's just a little hole right. so uh, I believe you'd like to make a rather large one uh -.

26. *"The peace that I have here"*

555. P: I'd even like to be able to, take a walk in your head.
556. A: right, um-hmm.
557. P: I would like! that.
558. A: yes, um-hmm.
559. P: and I'd even like to have a bench.
560. A: right, right.
561. P: not just in the park. - and, well I think it's easier - to understand all the things, that I would like.
562. A: right, more peace in the head too uh -.
563. P: right.
564. A: the peace that I have here! I have a some peace here, right, that is, that's what you're after isn't it.



565. P: yes. earlier I was thinking, when you die, then you can say, "I had a great place to work." that is so funny.
566. A: with a view of the cemetery.
567. P: ok, then, - not funny! not looking at it as a cemetery, not at all.
568. A: yes.
569. P: rather that we always had such beautiful light there and and the leaves.
570. A: um-hmm.
571. P: now it almost sounds corny but, in a way I was thinking, in any case I can say, - cemetery, or - / / / - / / just. - - -
572. A: so with that peace, I don't know if it's associated with convent for you. But that sort of peace, that- you uh, a peace, that is there and uh- one that is even greater. and which, at the same time would no longer make it necessary, uh for you uh, uh - to make a hole somewhere and then have to get in through it -.
573. P: uhuh.
574. A: to find your own peace, right?
575. P: there's no hole to be made. I have the feeling, - as if the door to it were really open already.
576. A: um-hmm.
577. P: and all I have to do is walk right in.
578. A: the door uh, to what?
579. P: well, to that peace.
580. A: to that peace, um-hmm.
581. P: I really wouldn't have to drill a hole.
582. A: um-hmm.
583. P: that's simply the uh.
584. A: the door to the convent?
585. P: yes!: that makes it so awfully clear to me that
586. A: yes.
587. P: at the moment.

## 27. *The will and the ability to change something*

588. A: um-hmm. but it would also let you, uh, just, uh. then you could spare me and yourself, right, you
589. P: right, I could leave you outside, and
590. A: right.
591. P: and then you could keep your dogmas.
592. A: yes.
593. P: then I wouldn't want, really to fight with you.
594. A: um-hmm.
595. P: that's true. / / or tear your neck off.
596. A: yes, but then you wouldn't fertilize my, dogmas with yours, would you?
597. P: no + I'd be against the enemy again, wouldn't I.
598. A: or move mine closer + move mine closer
599. P: I'd have two! fronts. like just before.
600. A: um-hmm.
601. P: + and that way -.
602. A: move + mine, with these incursions into the mind your incursions into my mind, into my head. it would seem that you do, uh, have the will and the ability to, uh, change something.

603. P: yes.  
 604. A: um-hmm.  
 605. P: yes. yes, perhaps another attempt to run away? I'll have to tell you about that on Monday, all the things that come with that.  
 606. A: um-hmm.  
 607. P: or rather all the things that still keep coming with that.  
 608. A: um-hmm.  
 609. P: no matter where I am, standing in the bathroom, or at my desk.

## 28. Really

610. A: um-hmm, right. right. so Monday then?  
 611. P: in the afternoon. really. Good bye. (end) –

## ANNEX 6

### AMALIE X / Session 98

P: Patient

T: Therapist

Transkription of the entire session

00:22

- 1 T: ich bin am Telefon aufgehalten worden, können Sie etwa s länger  
 2 I was delayed by a phone call, can you stay a little  
 3 bleiben?  
 4 longer?  
 5 P: ich kann, ja.  
 6 I can, yes.  
 7 T: ja.  
 8 yes.  
 9 (1.0)  
 10 P: heute kommt keine Cousine.  
 11 today there's no cousin coming.  
 12 (31.0)  
 13 tja, ich träum immer wieder von meiner Mutter, (2.0) die Frau  
 14 well, I keep on dreaming of my mother, (2.0) this woman appears  
 15 taucht dauernd auf.  
 16 again and again.  
 17 (9.5)  
 18 sie ist dabei wie mein Schatten (2.0) oder wie meine Ablage oder  
 19 she is always there like my shadow (2.0) or like my tray or  
 20 (-- ich weiß nicht wie was.  
 21 (-- I whatever.  
 22 (3.0)  
 23 (P seufzt)  
 24 (P sighs)  
 25 (33.0)  
 26 und neulich (-) bei dem einen Traum mit den Schlangen, (1.5)  
 27 and the other day (-) on the dream with the snakes, (1.5)  
 28 da hab ich gesagt, da fehlt ein Stück.  
 29 I said, there is one piece missing.  
 30 (--)  
 31 T: mh.  
 32 mh.  
 33 P: ganz seltsam, das Stück war (-) eigentlich dasjenige, das ich am

34 very peculiar, the piece was (-) actually the one that I could  
 35 **Morgen noch am allerbesten wußte.**  
 36 remember best the next morning.

37 **T: mh.**  
 38 mh.

39 **P: erinnere mich jetzt und daß mir dann mittags, nachdem ich bei**  
 40 I remember it now and that it came into my mind at midday, after  
 41 **Ihnen gewesen war, (-) wieder einfiel.**  
 42 I had been here with you, (-) again.  
 43 **(2.0)**

44 **T: mh.**  
 45 mh.

46 **P: und zwar, ich weiß nicht mehr wo es dazwischen war, ich glaub**  
 47 namely, I don't know any more when exactly, I just think  
 48 **eben vor dieser Schlangengeschichte (-) bei der Prüfungsszene,**  
 49 before this snake story (-) during the exam scene,  
 50 **(--) da stand ich und, und hatte ganz nassen Kopf (--) und**  
 51 (--) I stood there and, and I had a completely wet head (--) and  
 52 **(1.5) weiß nicht, ob ich (-) ob ich, eh, gewaschenes Haar hatte.**  
 53 (1.5) don't know, whether I (-) whether I, uh, had washed hair.  
 54 **auf jeden Fall, (-) hatte ich dann hinten (-) ganz große Stellen**  
 55 anyway, (-) I had at the back (-) very huge spots  
 56 **wie, es war nicht wie rausrasiert aber (.) es war irgendwie ganz**  
 57 as, it wasn't like shaved but (.) somehow there were very  
 58 **große Löcher im Haar. es war ganz schrecklich und ich stand vor**  
 59 huge wholes in the hair. it was so terrible and I stood in front  
 60 **dem Spiegel und hab mir das angeguckt und war (.) also richtig**  
 61 of the mirror and looked at them and was (.) really  
 62 **entsetzt. (1.8) ganz riesengroße (.) Löcher und dann diese**  
 63 horrified. (1.8) enormous (.) wholes and then these  
 64 **nassen Strähnen, es war also scheußlich. (-) das war das Stück,**  
 65 wet strands, it was awful. (-) this was the piece,  
 66 **das mir ausgefallen war. (2.5) das mich eigentlich am Morgen,**  
 67 that slipped my memory. (2.5) that actually terrified me,  
 68 **wie gesagt, am meisten (-) auch erschreckt hat.**  
 69 like I said, most (-) the next morning.  
 70 **(7.0)**  
 71 **und gestern hab ich (--) eben wieder geträumt und meine Mutter**  
 72 and yesterday I (--) just dreamt again and my mother  
 73 **dabei war. und es war deswegen so merkwürdig, (3.0) erstens Mal**  
 74 was there. and it was so peculiar because, (3.0) first of all  
 75 **war es ähnlich Wie heute nacht, ich krieg aber das heute nacht**  
 76 it was similar to the last night, but I can't recall that of  
 77 **nicht mehr zusammen, ich weiß nur noch, daß sehr viel (.) ehm,**  
 78 last night anymore, I only still know, that much (.) uhm,  
 79 **(1.2) Lautes und Unzufriedenes vorkam. (---) auf jeden Fall**  
 80 (1.2) loud and discontented occurred. (---) in any case  
 81 **saßen wir da an einem Tisch und (1.0) es ging um diese Anlage**  
 82 we were sitting at a table and (1.0) it was about these army  
 83 **der Bundeswehr hinter unserem Garten zu Hause und (--) die haben**  
 84 facilities behind our garden at home and (--) they have  
 85 **da 'ne riesengroße Panzeranlage und das macht natürlich einen**  
 86 a very huge reinforcing system and that makes of course  
 87 **schrecklichen Lärm (1.2) und wir hatten uns damals im**  
 88 a terrible noise (1.2) and at that time we had reacted against  
 89 **Gemeinderat gewehrt, aber (-) das hatte alles leider keinen**  
 90 it in the local council, but (-) it was not worth doing  
 91 **Wert.**  
 92 so.

93 T: das ist eh, Realität, +also das ist jetzt hinter-  
 94 that's uh reality, +so it's behind-  
 95 P: Was ich jetzt schnell sage, ja.+  
 96 what I'm just saying, yes.+  
 97 T: hinter ihrem Hause, ehm, vielmehr hinter Ihrer Wohnung.  
 98 behind your house now, uhm, in fact behind your apartment.  
 99 P: ja, zur Terrasse, ja hinter dem Garten.  
 100 yes, towards the back porch, yes behind the garden.  
 101 T: ein Panzer- Panzerübungsplatz;.  
 102 a tank- military training area;.  
 103 P: ach nein, das ist eine, (-) eine Großgaragenanlage für etwa  
 104 no, it's a, (-) it's a huge garage facility for about  
 105 hundertzwanzig Panzer.  
 106 hundred-twenty tanks.  
 107 T: aha.  
 108 I see.  
 109 P: und dann noch die (.), ehm, (.) damals, das ist 'ne richtig  
 110 and then the (.), uhm, (.) at that time, it's a real nice  
 111 schöne Südlage, die man da-  
 112 south facing house, that you-  
 113 T: wo, in, in ?  
 114 where, in, in ?  
 115 P: in \*45. ja.  
 116 in \*45. yes.  
 117 T: ach so, in \*45.  
 118 I see, in \*45.  
 119 P: jaja, das ist nicht hier, da wär ich nicht reingezogen.  
 120 yeayea, it's not here, I would not have moved in then.  
 121 T: ja, mh.  
 122 yes, mh.  
 123 P: und, (1.5) ja und wir saßen da jetzt an dem braunen Tisch, und  
 124 and, (1.5) yes and we were sitting on a brown table, and  
 125 zwar saßen Sie oben (-) und meine Mutter  
 126 you were sitting on the one side (-) and my mother  
 127 Ihnen gegenüber unten.  
 128 on the other side facing you.  
 129 T: mh.  
 130 mh.  
 131 P: und an der Breitseite saß ein Mann, der (.) Bürgermeister oder  
 132 and at the short end there was a man sitting (.) major or local  
 133 Gemeinderat sein- (-) also repräsentierte, jemand den ich nicht  
 134 councillor- (-) representing, somebody I didn't  
 135 kannte (1.2) und dem gegenüber saß ich. (--) und neben mir saß,  
 136 know (1.2) and I was sitting opposite to him (--) and,  
 137 ah ja, 'ne ganz (-) junge (.) Kollegin von uns. (1.8)  
 138 oh yes, a very young colleague of us were sitting beside me (1.8)  
 139 und ich weiß nur noch, (-) daß da so ein Gespräch war  
 140 and I only remember, (-) that there was a kind of conversation  
 141 und daß dann die junge Kollegin anfing (---) kurz was zu sagen  
 142 and that the young colleague then started (---) briefly saying  
 143 und dann hab ich was gesagt und, (.) und ich bin dann einfach so  
 144 something and then I said and, (.) and then I really just  
 145 richtig explodiert, (2.0) eben gegen diese Bundeswehrranlage und  
 146 exploded, (2.0) just against these army facilities and I spoke  
 147 hab da von Lärmmessung gesprochen. (---) mehr weiß ich nicht  
 148 of noise annoyance. (---) I don't remember  
 149 mehr. (--) blieb aber dann ganz ruhig (---) und dann fing, (--)  
 150 more. (--) but then I remained calm (---) and then, (--)  
 151 ach ja, dann haben Sie Was gesagt, (-) Sie sagten immer so

152 oh yes, then you said something, (-) you always passed some kind  
 153 **psychologische Bemerkungen (P lacht).**  
 154 of psychological remarks (P laughs).  
 155 **T: hm.**  
 156 hm.  
 157 **P: und die werden von allen immer angenommen und, und.**  
 158 and these were always accepted by all and, and.  
 159 **T: mh.**  
 160 mh.  
 161 **P: es waren aber zumeist ganz komische Sachen.**  
 162 however, mostly it were very odd things.  
 163 **T: hmhm.**  
 164 hmhm.  
 165 **P: Sie sagten, (--) haben diese Pläne, hat diese Pläne eine Frau**  
 166 you said, (--) were these plans, were these plans made by a  
 167 **gemacht (---) und dann sagte dieser Gemeinderatsmensch ja. und**  
 168 woman (---) and then the guy of the local council said yes. and  
 169 **dann sagten Sie, ja das kann man dann ableiten, (-) also diese**  
 170 then you said, yes this was deducible, (-) well this army  
 171 **Bundeswehrranlage. (---) und (-) dann fing meine Mutter an und**  
 172 facility. (---) and (-) then my mother started and that was  
 173 **das war ganz seltsam. meine Mutter (1.5) hat (-) unheimlich**  
 174 really peculiar. my mother (1.5) spoke (-) in an incredibly  
 175 **explosiv und aggressiv und (.) laut gesprochen und hat dabei**  
 176 explosive and aggressive (.) way, thereby also railing against  
 177 **also auch gegen diese Anlage geschimpft, kann gar nicht anders**  
 178 these facilities, I can't put it differently  
 179 **sagen und ich werde immer stiller und (-) es wurde immer**  
 180 and I was getting more and more quiet and (-) it was becoming  
 181 **merkwürdiger und (3.0) ich hab dann überhaupt nichts mehr gesagt**  
 182 more and more peculiar and (3.0) I then I just said nothing any  
 183 **und das Merkwürdige ist eben, (---) so bei Tag besehen,**  
 184 more and the peculiar just is, (---) in the cold light of the day,  
 185 **denk ich ich hab eigentlich, (---) wir sprachen ja von, von**  
 186 I guess I actually did, (---) well, we spoke of, of  
 187 **Kontrolle und von all diesen Dingen. (--) ich hab dann irgendwie**  
 188 control and of all these things. (--) somehow I transferred that  
 189 **das da auf meine Mutter übertragen in dem Traum, nicht, (---)**  
 190 to my mother in the dream, didn't I, (---)  
 191 **irgendwie auf die projiziert und wollte das selber wohl nicht**  
 192 projected it onto her in a way and didn't want to be the  
 193 **sein, die da die Kontrolle verliert, (-) denn meine Mutter würde**  
 194 one losing control, (-) as my mother would never be  
 195 **nie so, (1.0) ehm, in so einem Gremium und so, sie kann schon**  
 196 so, (1.0) uhm, in such a council and stuff, well, she can be  
 197 **sehr explosiv sein, aber (-) in so einem Kreis würde sie es ganz**  
 198 very explosive, but (-) in such a circle she certainly wouldn't  
 199 **bestimmt nicht sein. (---) es also ganz sicher nicht ihre Art**  
 200 be that way. (---) it's certainly not her nature  
 201 **(2.0) mehr so, (-) wenn sie sich familiär wohl fühlt, dann würde**  
 202 (2.0) rather (-) if she felt familiarly comfortable then she  
 203 **sie explodieren.**  
 204 would explode.  
 205 **T: mh.**  
 206 mh.  
 207 **P: oder wenn sie sich irgendwo zu Hause fühlt, aber (-) so war der**  
 208 or if she feels at home, but (-) but the circle just wasn't the  
 209 **Kreis ja nicht, daß sie da, (--) und das ganze war auch in dem**  
 210 way that she, (--) and the whole thing was in the garden

211 **Garten glaub ich. (1.2) ich mein beinahe, es war zuhause, im, im**  
 212 I guess. (1.2) I rather think it was at home, in, in the open  
 213 **Freien. (3.1) da fehlt noch ein Stück. (2.3) aber das,**  
 214 air. (3.1) there is still another piece missing (2.3) but that,  
 215 **(.) aber was ich jetzt gesagt hab, ist schon das, was mir**  
 216 (.) but what I just said really is what actually came into  
 217 **eigentlich dazu einfel, nicht, daß ich eben (-) irgendwie (-)**  
 218 my mind on that, isn't it, that I just (-) somehow (-)  
 219 **für mich 'ne Entlastung suchte und das meiner Mutter in die**  
 220 looked for a relief for me and laid it at my mother's  
 221 **Schuhe schob (-) für mein Explodieren oder für mein (-)**  
 222 door (-) my exploding or my (-)  
 223 **Kontrollverlieren oder wie man das nennen möcht. (2.0) das war**  
 224 loosing control or whatever you want to call it (2.0) it was  
 225 **erschreckend, wie sie losplatzte.**  
 226 terrifying how she burst out.  
 227 **(9.0)**  
 228 **und heute nacht, das weiß ich nicht mehr, es war irgendwas mit**  
 229 and last night, I don't know it any more, it was something about  
 230 **Schildern. (---) aber das ist mir jetzt völlig weg. (2.0) da**  
 231 signs. (---) but that is totally gone now. (2.0) it  
 232 **ging es auch so um (2.4) um irgendetwas (-) heftig, (--)**  
 233 also was about (2.4) about something (-) fiercely (--)  
 234 **Umkämpftes.**  
 235 disputed.  
 236 **(7.0)**  
 237 **T: und im Traum hat, eh, Ihre Mutter auch meine, (-) eh,**  
 238 and in the dream, uh, your mother took up my, (-) uh,  
 239 **psychologischen Brosamen aufgegriffen, eh-**  
 240 psychological crumbs, uh-  
 241 **P: (lacht) das, ja ich glaube, das eine, also ich hab noch so im**  
 242 (laughing) that, yes I think, that one, well I still have at  
 243 **Hinterkopf, daß alle einig waren, wenn Sie**  
 244 the back of my mind, that everybody agreed when you said  
 245 **was sagten.**  
 246 something.  
 247 **T: mhm.**  
 248 mhm.  
 249 **P: das waren immer so psychologische Kommentare.**  
 250 it always were a kind of psychological remarks.  
 251 **T: ja.**  
 252 yes.  
 253 **P: und die wurden da (-) eifrig benickt oder.**  
 254 and those were (-) eagerly affirmed or.  
 255 **T: hmhm.**  
 256 hmhm.  
 257 **P: ich kann's nicht mehr genau sagen.**  
 258 I can't say it exactly any more.  
 259 **T: mh.**  
 260 mh.  
 261 **P: naja, sie war, (-) sie war zwar eh, (-) entgegen diesem**  
 262 well, she was, (-) she was in fact uh, (-) against this  
 263 **Gemeinderatsmenschen -.**  
 264 local council guy -.  
 265 **T: mh.**  
 266 mh.  
 267 **P: der da eben dieses dumme Projekt, (-) was wirklich ein dummes**  
 268 who did this stupid project, (-) which is really a stupid  
 269 **Projekt ist (--) und das sich auch hinterher als sehr dumm**

270 project (--) and proved to be very stupid afterwards  
 271 **rausgestellt hat, auch für die Bundeswehr, eh, (--) das hat sie**  
 272 also, for the army, uh, (--) and she just  
 273 **(--) eben bekämpft, nicht.**  
 274 **(--)** fought against, didn't she.  
 275 **T: hmhm.**  
 276 hmhm.  
 277 **P: aber Sie sagten eigentlich mehr so bürgerfreundliche (.)**  
 278 but you actually said rather citizen-friendly (.)  
 279 **Kommentare, nicht.**  
 280 comments, didn't you.  
 281 **T: mh.**  
 282 mh.  
 283 **P: warum die Pläne allerdings 'ne Frau gemacht haben mußte, weiß**  
 284 however, why the plans must have been made by a woman, I really  
 285 **ich auch nicht. (1.0) vermutlich waren das dumme Pläne und,**  
 286 don't know. (1.0) probably the plans were stupid and,  
 287 **(1.2) und Sie haben irgendwie rausgekriegt, die können nur von**  
 288 (1.2) and you found out they only can be made by  
 289 **'ner Frau sein. (1.0) weiß auch nicht warum, wie ich da drauf**  
 290 a woman. (1.0) don't know why, how I get this  
 291 **komm. (1.8) das find ich wirklich nicht.**  
 292 idea. (1.8) I really don't think that way.  
 293 **(3.0)**  
 294 **(p seufzt)**  
 295 (p sighs)  
 296 **(7.0)**  
 297 **sie denken was dazu, nicht. (---) und Sie**  
 298 you are contemplating on that, aren't you. (---) and you are  
 299 **warten bis ich was sag.**  
 300 waiting till I say something.  
 301 **T: ja bei den psychologischen Kommentaren, eh, die man eben nickend**  
 302 yes, with regard to the psychological comments, uh, that were  
 303 **aufgegriffen hat, eh, dachte ich, eh, da der Vater**  
 304 taken up nodding, uh, I thought, uh, since the father is  
 305 **fehlt, wie weit man eben ihn hat auch reden lassen und eh, und**  
 306 missing, to what extent you let him talk and uh, and nodded  
 307 **genickt hat, um ihn zufriedenzustellen.**  
 308 in order to please him.  
 309 **P: so war's aber nicht.**  
 310 but it was not like that.  
 311 **T: mh.**  
 312 mh.  
 313 **P: ehm, (.) wenn wenn mein Vater also jetzt von der Realität her**  
 314 uhm, (.) if if my father were, now in real,  
 315 **dabei wär, nicht**  
 316 present, you know  
 317 **T: ja.**  
 318 yes.  
 319 (-)  
 320 **P: dann nickt man.**  
 321 then you would nod.  
 322 **T: mhmh.**  
 323 mhmh.  
 324 **P: ich möchte ihn eigentlich nicht zu -.**  
 325 actually I don't want him to -.  
 326 **T: heute nicht mehr, aber vielleicht -.**  
 327 today, not any more but maybe -.  
 328 **P: nein, -**

329 no, -  
330 **T: hat man ihn früher reden lassen, damit er (-) zufrieden war.**  
331 in the past you let him talk so that he was happy.  
332 **P: ehm, (-) nein, das war eigentlich nie so.**  
333 uhm, (-) no, it has never been that way.  
334 **T: hmhm.**  
335 hmhm.  
336 (-)  
337 **P: bei uns. früher hat man ihm widersprochen.**  
338 with us. we used to contradict him.  
339 **T: mhmh.**  
340 mhmh.  
341 **P: und heute, (-) weil, (-) tat ich's böse, weil ich früher ihn**  
342 and today, (-) because, (-) I did it out of spite, because I  
343 **ernster genommen hab noch, (-- ) aber heute (.) würd ich ihn eher**  
344 used to take him more seriously, (-- ) but today (.) I'd rather  
345 **reden lassen. (2.0) ehm, (-) bei ganz bestimmten Themen (.) laß**  
346 let him talk. (2.0) uhm, (-) as regards certain topics (.) I let  
347 **ich ihn heute (.) bewußt (-) absichtlich (-) reden, da kann er**  
348 him talk (.) wittingly (-) intentionally (-) then for all I care  
349 **von mir aus sagen, was er will, (-- ) aber wenn's eben, (.) hm,**  
350 he can say whatever he wants, (-- ) but if there's just, (.) hm,  
351 **(.) Unvorhergesehenes gibt, da kann schon sein , daß ich**  
352 (.) something unexpected, then it's entirely possible, that I  
353 **(drauf/trotzdem) reagiere noch, (1.0) heute wär's eher,**  
354 respond (to that/nevertheless), (1.0) today it's rather the case  
355 **daß man ihn reden läßt. (1.0) aber das mit den Kommentaren war**  
356 that you let him talk. (1.0) but as regards the comments it was  
357 **anders, es war, (-- ) weil wenn ich sage, man hat genickt und,**  
358 different, it was, (-- ) because when I say, it was nodded and,  
359 **und natürlich (2.5) dummes Zeug zu sagen, die Pläne hat 'ne Frau**  
360 and sure (2.5) to say stupid things, the plans were made by a  
361 **gemacht oder so, (-) aber das ging gar nicht um den Inhalt, (-)**  
362 woman or so, (-) but it wasn't about the content at all, (-)  
363 **eh, was Sie da sagten, sondern es ging einfach darum, (-) daß**  
364 uh, of what you said there, but it was just about, (-) that  
365 **Sie immer wieder, (2.0) also mich erinnert's nicht an an die**  
366 you repeatedly, (2.0) well it reminds me of of the  
367 **Rolle meines Vaters, weil (---) wenn Sie was sagten,**  
368 the role of my father, because (---) when you said something,  
369 **war das immer so (.) auflöckernd und (.) richtig und, und hat**  
370 it always was so (.) loosening and (.) right and, and it  
371 **wieder (1.8)'nen Knopf in den Zopf gemacht oder (-) ein Türchen**  
372 (1.8) unravelled a knot or (-) opened another little  
373 **aufgemacht, also so empfind ich's noch, ja. (1.0) ich weiß halt**  
374 door, well, that is how I perceive it, yes. (1.0) I can  
375 **noch jetzt wörtlich, das mit der Frau, aber (-- ) das spielt ja**  
376 remember word for word the part with the woman, but (-- ) that  
377 **gar keine so große Rolle, es waren noch mehr solche**  
378 doesn't play an important role, there were still more of such  
379 **Sätze. (1.5) nee, der Vater ist ganz, (-) meine Vaterfigur**  
380 sentences.(1.5)no, the father is completely,(-) I don't think  
381 **ist es glaub ich nicht. (-) weiß nicht. (3.0) es war nicht so,**  
382 it's my father figure. (-) don't know. (3.0) it was not like  
383 **daß man Sie hat reden lassen und genickt hat, ganz so war das**  
384 everyone let you talk and nodded, it wasn't entirely like  
385 **nicht.**  
386 that.  
387 **(9.0)**



388 **und meine Mutter ist ja auch gegen diesen Gemeinderatsmenschen**  
 389 and my mother explosion was directed against this local council  
 390 **explodiert, nicht gegen Sie.**  
 391 guy, not against you.  
 392 **(8.0)**  
 393 **(P seufzt)**  
 394 (P sighs)  
 395 **(9.0)**  
 396 **es paßt Ihnen nicht, daß ich da jetzt (-) den Vater rausgenommen**  
 397 it doesn't suit your book that I've taken out the father  
 398 **hab.**  
 399 now.  
 400 **T: warum paßt mir das nicht?**  
 401 why doesn't it suit my book?  
 402 **P: ich, ich hatte so das Gefühl, Sie waren so ganz still.**  
 403 I, I just had a feeling, you were so completely quiet.  
 404 **T: mh.**  
 405 mh.  
 406 **P: so anders still als vielleicht sonst, ich weiß nicht.**  
 407 so differently quiet than Usual. I don't know.  
 408 **T: mh.**  
 409 mh.  
 410 **P: oder bild ich mir das ein.**  
 411 or is just in my head.  
 412 **T: mhmh.**  
 413 mhmh.  
 414 **(2.6)**  
 415 **ja es ist, ehm, (2.0) un- (-- ) unklar, nicht, es ist-**  
 416 yes it's uhm, (2.0) not (-- ) not clear, isn't it, it's-  
 417 **P: ja.**  
 418 yes.  
 419 **T: es ist, eh, es ist eh diese-**  
 420 it is, uh, it is uh this-  
 421 **(15.0)**  
 422 **P: es war eher so, (-) irgendwie von mir empfunden, (1.2) ich hab**  
 423 it was more like, (-) somehow perceived by me, (1.2) I was  
 424 **mich gefreut in dem Traum, daß Sie dabei waren und, (-) und war**  
 425 happy in the dream, that you was there and, (-) and was  
 426 **dann eben (-- ) sehr schockiert, als meine Mutter anfang da (--)**  
 427 then just (-- ) extremely shocked when my mother started (--)  
 428 **T: mhmh.**  
 429 mhmh.  
 430 **P: zu explodieren. drum bin ich auch ganz still geworden.**  
 431 exploding. and that is why I became so completely tired then.  
 432 **T: ah ja.**  
 433 I see.  
 434 **P: hab auch zu ihr nichts mehr gesagt.**  
 435 didn't say anything more to her.  
 436 **(4.0)**  
 437 **an sowas erinnere ich mich auch.**  
 438 something like this I remember as well.  
 439 **(3.5)**  
 440 **es gibt ja auch so Gefühle, nicht, im Traum,**  
 441 well, there are such feelings, aren't they? in the dream,  
 442 **irgendwie (1.3) ist 'ne Atmosphäre.**  
 443 somehow (1.3) it's an atmosphere.  
 444 **(9.0)**  
 445 **weil ich ja aus dem Zimmer lauf, wenn mein Vater irgendwo**  
 446 because I run out of the room when my father shows up

447 **auftaucht, (1.5) freu ich mich gar nicht sehr da drüber jetzt.**  
448 somewhere, (1.5) then I'm not very happy about it at all now.  
449 **(2.5)**  
450 **ich hab ja eigentlich (.) von Familie so sehr die Nase voll**  
451 actually I am really (.) fat up with family for the time  
452 **momentan.**  
453 being.  
454 **T: also der Kontrollverlust der Mutter war für, ehm, eigentlich**  
455 so, the mother's loss of control was for, uhm, actually  
456 **schon im Traum.**  
457 already in the dream.  
458 **P: ja eigentlich nein. (---) ja das find ich auch (-)**  
459 yes not really. (---) yes, that was what I thought as well (-)  
460 **und, und ich meine immer, es war eigentlich meiner oder-**  
461 and, and I always think, it actually was my or-  
462 **T: mh.**  
463 mh.  
464 **P: oder ich hab das so manipuliert, ich wollt es nicht zugeben, daß**  
465 or I manipulated it in that way, I didn't want to admit, that  
466 **ich eigentlich (-) die Kontrolle verliere, denn ich hab ja auch**  
467 I am actually (-) losing control, because I started  
468 **explosiv angefangen, nicht. (1.0) eh, (-) und hab da ja eben was**  
469 explosively, didn't I. (1.0) uh, (-) and I did say something,  
470 **(.) gesagt, eben von Lärmbelästigung und so (1.2) und hab dann,**  
471 well (.), about noise nuisance and so (1.2) and then I,  
472 **ehm, (1.8) eben (-) jemand (-) gehabt, der das dann für mich**  
473 uhm (1.0) just (-) had (-) somebody who then kept on doing  
474 **weiter (.) übernahm und, und konnte mich dann damit auch**  
475 this (.) for me and, and hence I could stay out of  
476 **raushalten, nicht. (1.2) so, irgendwie so, so kam mir das jetzt**  
477 this, couldn't I. (1.2) so, somehow, that is how it seems to me  
478 **hinterher vor.**  
479 now afterwards.  
480 **(11.4)**  
481 **denn, (.) denn ich komm auch auf das, weil ich (1.8) eben**  
482 because, (.) because I have this idea, because I'm (1.8) just  
483 **momentan wirklich so, (1.8) so sehr genug hab von Familie und,**  
484 really so tired, (1.8) of family at the moment and,  
485 **und(-) weil ichs auch (-) in Gedanken nicht wissen will und (--)**  
486 and(-) because I (-) in thoughts I don't want to know it and (--)  
487 **möglichst nicht nach Hause denke, weil, (1.5) ach (-) es hat mir**  
488 I don't think of at home if possible, because, (1.5) well (-) I  
489 **jetzt wirklich gelangt.(1.4) und (-) drum denk ich eben, ich hab**  
490 really had enough of it. (1.4) and (-) that's why I think, I  
491 **meine Mutter bloß benützt. (1.5) ich sagte ja schon als Ablage**  
492 just used my mother. (1.5) as I already said, as my tray  
493 **(2.5)**  
494 **und so als mein zweites Ich, (1.0) als mein schlechtes zweites**  
495 and in a way as my alter ego, (1.0) as my bad alter  
496 **Ich.**  
497 ego.  
498 **(5.0)**  
499 **weiß nicht wie ich drauf komme.**  
500 don't know any more why I hit on that idea.  
501 **(1min, 5sec)**  
502 **T: na dann kann die Mutter etwas, was, eh, Sie sagen**  
503 well then the mother is capable of something that, uh, you say  
504 **schlechtes, eh, Ihr zweites Ich, aber die Mutter kann ja etwas,**  
505 something bad, uh, your alter ego, but the mother is capable of

506 was, (--) kann ja explodieren, was eh, eh, (---)  
 507 something that (--) capable of exploding, which uh, uh, (---)  
 508 Sie eh (---) eher, eh, gehemmt unterdrücken, nicht, oder eh, es  
 509 you uh (---) rather, uh, stifle, don't you, or uh, that might be  
 510 ist vielleicht deshalb, daß die Mutter da auftaucht. (2.5) denn  
 511 the reason why the mother appears there. (2.5) because  
 512 Sie haben sich ja, oder haben Sie sich geschämt (--) für sie.  
 513 you did feel, or you felt ashamed (--) for you.  
 514 P: ja, irgendwie, (--) es war mir peinlich.  
 515 yes, somehow, (--) I was embarrassed.  
 516 T: mh.  
 517 mh.  
 518 P: ja, (--) ja.  
 519 yes, (--) yes.  
 520 (1.5)  
 521 P: ich wollt sie eigentlich zurückhalten, aber ich, ich (-) weiß  
 522 I actually wanted to withhold her, but I, I (-) don't  
 523 auch nicht, ich hab's nicht getan. (---) in Wirklichkeit hätt  
 524 know, I didn't do it. (---) in reality I would certainly have  
 525 ich ihr sicher irgendwo die Hand genommen oder so, (1.0) eh,  
 526 taken her hand somewhere or so, (1.0) uh,  
 527 oder was gesagt. (1.8) nein, mir war's peinlich. (1.2)  
 528 or would have said something. (1.8) no, I was embarrassed. (1.2)  
 529 ganz ehrlich gesagt.  
 530 to be completely honest.  
 531 (3.0)  
 532 und ich kann schon explodieren, (---) kann ich schon.  
 533 and I am able to explode, (---) I really am.  
 534 (3.0)  
 535 T: ja, da gab es mal mit 'ner Schülerin, nicht, diese, (1.0)  
 536 yes, there was something with a student, wasn't it, this, (1.0)  
 537 eh, wo Sie so kurz waren oder was, was Sie nachher gern-  
 538 uh, when you was so short or what you afterwards would like to-  
 539 P: na ich (.) bin nicht explodiert bei der Schülerin, sondern (-)  
 540 well I (.) didn't explode in front of the student, but (-)  
 541 ich hab vor der Klasse -  
 542 I said in front of the class -  
 543 T: ah ja.  
 544 I see.  
 545 P: (.) zu ihr gesagt, sie soll nicht-  
 546 (.) to her, she should not-  
 547 T: ja so war's, ja.  
 548 right, it was that way, yes.  
 549 P: sie hat abgeschrieben. ich war ganz ruhig geblieben, sie war  
 550 she cribbed. I remained completely calm, she  
 551 explodiert und (---) eh, ich hab das eben vor der Klasse  
 552 exploded and (---) uh, I just did that in front of the  
 553 gemacht. (3.0) und, und, und sie war dann gekommen und hat vor  
 554 the class. (3.0) and, and, and then she came and yelled in front  
 555 der ganzen Klasse (1.2) mich angeschrien. (2.0) in der Schule  
 556 of the whole class (1.2) at me. (2.0) at school  
 557 explodier ich eigentlich ganz, ganz arg selten. (2.0) entweder  
 558 I actually explode very, very rarely. (2.0) either  
 559 weil ich mir Vorher die Sachen überlegt hab oder (1.8) weil ich  
 560 because I reflected about the things before or (1.8) because I  
 561 Schreien wahnsinnig dumm finde. (1.8) ich hab mal 'nen Lehrer  
 562 consider yelling stupid. (1.8) I once had a  
 563 gehabt, der schrie immer und der, (1.0) ich weiß nicht, da hat  
 564 teacher who always yelled and who, (1.0) I don't know, then

565 sich immer so alles bei ihm verändert. (---) er kriegte so 'nen  
 566 everything always completely changed (---) he then got such a  
 567 **komischen Kopf und das fand ich so lächerlich und (---) das war**  
 568 queer head and I found that so ridiculous and (---) that was  
 569 **(-) ein ganz schlimmes Beispiel. (1.0) ich schrei höchstens zu**  
 570 (-) a really bad example. (1.0) when I yell then only at  
 571 **Hause. (2.0) ganz kurz, aber dann (---)**  
 572 home. (2.0) only for a short moment, however, then (---)  
 573 **sehr explosiv.**  
 574 in a very explosive way.  
 575 **(10.0)**  
 576 **in den Ferien bin ich zweimal explodiert.**  
 577 during the school holidays I exploded two times.  
 578 **(5.0)**  
 579 **doch, das kann ich schon.**  
 580 yes, I am capable of that.  
 581 **(6.5)**  
 582 **nein, ich glaub eher das ist, das Schämen ist drin, (-) denn**  
 583 no, I rather believe, that is, the ashamedness is there, (-) for  
 584 **ich hab mich letztesmal doch, (.) wenn ich so (.) zurückdenke,**  
 585 the last time I, (.) when I (.) think back,  
 586 **ziemlich geschämt als das mit dem Träumen da war, (---) war mir**  
 587 was quite embarrassed when it came about the dreams, (---) yes,  
 588 **glaub ich doch ziemlich peinlich. (2.0) und eben weil**  
 589 I was quite embarrassed by that I guess. (2.0) and just because  
 590 **Sie da an dem Tisch mit saßen, nicht, (---) so eher**  
 591 you sat at the table as well, you know, (---) that's rather the  
 592 **seh ich das. (1.5) daß ich mich dann eben für meine Mutter**  
 593 way I see it. (1.5) that I was ashamed of my  
 594 **geschämt hab. (1.0) oder für mich selber, das ist in dem Fall**  
 595 mother. (1.0) or of myself, in this case that's the  
 596 **eins.**  
 597 same.  
 598 **(10.0)**  
 599 **( P seufzt)**  
 600 (P sighs)  
 601 **(5.0)**  
 602 **T: das in dem, in dem vergessenen Traumstück steckt da ein weiteres**  
 603 in the, in the forgotten dream piece there is a another  
 604 **eh, (-) Stück (-) Kontrollverlust, nicht, das wäre das, eh, (--)**  
 605 uh, (-) piece (-) of the loss of control, that would be, uh, (--)  
 606 **Thema, das verbindende zwischen dem und dem Eiweiß- eh, -**  
 607 the topic remaining between this and the protein- uh, -  
 608 **P: ja.**  
 609 yes.  
 610 **T: der (-) Eiweißausscheidung.**  
 611 the (-) protein excretion.  
 612 **P: eh, (1.2) das war Kontrollverlust? in dem vergessene Stück mit**  
 613 uh, (1.2) that was loss of control? you mean in the forgotten  
 614 **den Haaren meinen Sie jetzt?**  
 615 piece with the hairs?  
 616 **T: nein, in dem vergessenen Stück, was Sie jetzt, eh, erinnert oder**  
 617 no, in the forgotten piece which you now, uh, remember or  
 618 **was Sie danach erinnert haben, nämlich daß die Mutter die**  
 619 which you remembered afterwards, that is that the mother  
 620 **Kontrolle verliert.**  
 621 loses control.  
 622 **P: oh nein, oh nein, dann hab ich das, dann hab ich das, eh, (-) zu**  
 623 oh no, oh no, then I did, then I recounted that, uh, (-) too

624 **schnell erzählt. nein, das vergessene Stück war (--)** das mit den  
 625 quickly. no, the forgotten piece was (--) the one with the  
 626 **Haaren.**  
 627 hairs.  
 628 **T: ah ja.**  
 629 I see.  
 630 **P: als ich da vor dem Spiegel stand und so nasse Haare hatte.**  
 631 when I stood in front of the mirror and had this wet hair.  
 632 **T: mh. ah, das war das Stück.**  
 633 mh. ah, that piece.  
 634 **P: das war das vergessene Stück, ja. na ja, ich hab da keine Pause**  
 635 that was the forgotten piece, yes. however, I didn't make a  
 636 **gemacht und, und (.) das mit der Mutter (.) und dem Tisch-**  
 637 pause and, and(.) and the one with the mother (.) and the table-  
 638 **T: ja.**  
 639 yes.  
 640 **P: (-) das war ganz was anderes. das war ein Traum, den ich-**  
 641 (-) was something totally different. this was a dream that I-  
 642 **T: jaja, mh.**  
 643 yea, mh.  
 644 **(2.3)**  
 645 **P: gestern Nacht hatte. und das mit dem Eiweiß, das liegt ja schon**  
 646 had yesterday night. and the one with the protein, that already  
 647 **viel (-) länger zurück.**  
 648 dates back much (-) longer.  
 649 **T: mh, jawohl, mh.**  
 650 mh, okay, mh.  
 651 **(14.0)**  
 652 **und der Haartraum, da hatten Sie Ihre Haare, Ihre Kopfhaare wie**  
 653 and in the hair dream, you had your hair, your scalp hair as you  
 654 **Sie sie haben, naß eben**  
 655 you have it, just wet  
 656 **P: ja.**  
 657 yes.  
 658 **T: und eh, (.) haben Sie, eh, (-) aufgesteckt oder-**  
 659 and uh, (.) you had, uh, it pinned up or-  
 660 **P: nein, nein, nein. einfach, (.) einfach ehm naß und, und**  
 661 no, no, no. just, (.) just uhm wet and, and  
 662 **T: mh.**  
 663 mh.  
 664 **P: (-) runterhängen, so wie sie hängen.**  
 665 (-) hanging down, as it hangs.  
 666 **T: ja.**  
 667 yes.  
 668 **P: und hinten fehlten, also ich (.) ich weiß nicht, wie viel (-)**  
 669 and at the back, well I (.) I don't know, how many (-)  
 670 **große Büschel oder (-) Löcher oder (-) wie man sagen will. auf**  
 671 large tufts or (-) wholes or (-) let's put it that way. in  
 672 **jeden Fall (1.2) war ich da in meiner Wohnung und stand da so**  
 673 any case (1.2) I was in my apartment and stood in  
 674 **vor dem Spiegel und (--)** hab das eben, (1.5) ich weiß nicht, (-)  
 675 front of the mirror and (--) I just did, (1.5) I don't know, (-)  
 676 **an sich braucht man ja einen zweiten Spiegel für (-) nach hinten**  
 677 in principal you need a second mirror for (-) looking  
 678 **gucken, aber (1.8) es war eben ein Spiegel zum Reingucken, nur**  
 679 behind, but (1.8) it was just one mirror to look in, only one  
 680 **ein Spiegel.**  
 681 mirror.  
 682 **(4.0)**

683 und das Merkwürdige, wenn ich jetzt so dran denke, ist ja, (--)  
 684 and the peculiar, when I am thinking about it now, is, (--)  
 685 daß ich (-) eigentlich in dem Spiegel nur mich hinten gesehen  
 686 that I (-) actually saw just me from behind in the mirror  
 687 hab, (--) obwohl ich mein ich stand so, (2.0) offen so (1.5) vor  
 688 (--) although I stood, (2.0) openly (1.5) in front of  
 689 dem.  
 690 it.  
 691 (4.5)  
 692 ich weiß nicht, ob Spiegel 'ne Bedeutung haben (P lacht).  
 693 I don't know whether mirrors have a meaning (P laughs).  
 694 (1.5)  
 695 T: na, Spieglein, Spieglein an der Wand, eh-  
 696 well, mirror, mirror on the wall, uh-  
 697 P: ja. (-) sicher.  
 698 yes. (-) sure.  
 699 T: daran haben Sie gedacht, eh, auch. (--) oder was haben Sie?  
 700 that was what you thought of, uh, too. (--) or what did you do?  
 701 (---)  
 702 P: an das hab momentan nicht gegriffen, ich sag, ich weiß außer dem  
 703 for the time being I haven't touched that, I say, I know apart  
 704 (---) den Spiegel als als (.) Selbsterkenntnis und so weiter.  
 705 from (---) the mirror as as (.) self-awareness and so on.  
 706 T: mh.  
 707 mh.  
 708 (1.0)  
 709 P: was man halt so bei uns interpretiert, sonst  
 710 as it is commonly interpreted with us, apart from that  
 711 weiß ich nichts.  
 712 I don't know anything.  
 713 (11.0)  
 714 oder eben das Spieglein an der Wand.  
 715 or just the mirror on the wall.  
 716 (1.5)  
 717 T: ja, denn grade diese Stellen, die, eh, fehlenden, (---) die  
 718 yes, because just these spots, the, uh, missing ones, (---) the  
 719 Stellen, an denen die Haare fehlten, das war ja nicht schön,  
 720 spots where the hair was missing, well, that was not nice,  
 721 nicht, das-  
 722 wasn't it, that-  
 723 P: nein.  
 724 no.  
 725 T: also die haben Sie gar nicht schön gesehen im Spiegel, das war  
 726 so you didn't consider them nice in the mirror, that was  
 727 (--)  
 728 P: ganz häßlich.  
 729 very ugly.  
 730 T: häßlich.  
 731 ugly.  
 732 P: oh ja. und dann noch das nasse Haar dazu, war also richtig  
 733 oh yes. and then also the wet hair, it was very  
 734 schlimm.  
 735 awful.  
 736 T: mh.  
 737 mh.  
 738 P: bloß merkwürdig, ich hatte gar nicht dunkle Haare, ich hatte so  
 739 just weird, I didn't have dark hair, I had  
 740 blonde Haare. (---) und so ganz versträhnt. es sah also  
 741 blonde hair. (---) and so completely straggly. it just looked

742        **scheußlich aus. (1.8) und es muß irgendwie ganz lang gewesen**  
 743        awful. (1.8) and it must have been very long somehow,  
 744        **sein, denn (---) es hat mir doch ziemlichen Eindruck gemacht.**  
 745        as (---) it made an considerable impression on me.  
 746        **(3.0)**  
 747        **und ich weiß auch nicht, ob da noch andere Leute dabei waren,**  
 748        and I don't know either, whether there were other people there,  
 749        **ich glaub nicht.**  
 750        I don't think so.  
 751        **(6.5)**  
 752        **ja, es war kein eigenes Begucken, ganz bestimmt nicht.**  
 753        yes, it was no looking at oneself, certainly not.  
 754        **T: mh.**  
 755        mh.  
 756        **(1min 10se)**  
 757        **T: wobei dann die Stellen, wo was fehlt, besonders eben augenfällig**  
 758        but then the slots where something is missing become especially  
 759        **werden, nicht.**  
 760        obvious, don't they.  
 761        **(--)**  
 762        **P: mh. (1.5) ja, ich überlegte grad, (1.0) warum Sie fragten,**  
 763        mh. (1.5) yes, I have been just wondering, (1.0) why you asked  
 764        **ob ich die auf (.) aufgesteckt hatte.**  
 765        whether I wore it (.) pinned up.  
 766        **T: ja, ob Sie sich schön machen, eh, wollten.**  
 767        yes, whether you wanted to pretty, uh, yourself.  
 768        **P: ach so, ob ich mich frisierte.**  
 769        ah, whether I did my hair.  
 770        **T: ob Sie sich frisierten.**  
 771        whether you did your hair.  
 772        **P: ach so. (1.5)(P lacht) was soll ich da aufstecken? (1.0) ja.**  
 773        I see. (1.5) (P laughs) what should I pin up there? (1.0) yes.  
 774        **T: ja, so mit mit Wickel und so halt.**  
 775        well, with curlers and so.  
 776        **P: ach so, du liebe Zeit. (P lacht)**  
 777        I see, dear me. (P laughs)  
 778        **(4.5)**  
 779        **nein, nein. war nicht (-) es war nicht so.**  
 780        no, no. was not (-) it wasn't like that.  
 781        **T: Sie waren, es war eben ein-**  
 782        you were, it just was an-  
 783        **P: es war so wie nach einem Regenguß.**  
 784        it was like after a rain shower.  
 785        **T: häßliches Bild, eigentlich eher**  
 786        awful picture, actually rather  
 787        **P: ja ja.**  
 788        yea yea.  
 789        **T: und die fehlenden Haare waren eben-**  
 790        and the missing hairs were just-  
 791        **P: ja, das war das Schlimme. (1.2) richtige Löcher.**  
 792        yes, that was the bad thing about it. (1.2) real wholes.  
 793        **(8.5)**  
 794        **und ich glaub, das war nach diesen (.) Prüfungs (--) geschichten**  
 795        and I think it was after these (.) exam (--) stories  
 796        **und vor dieser Schlange. (--) oder den Schlangen, es waren ja**  
 797        and before this snake. (--) or the snakes, cause there were  
 798        **mehrere.**  
 799        several.  
 800        **(4.5)**

801 **ich mein ich war da auch (2.0) in meiner Diele gestanden und-(-)**  
 802 I mean at that point I stood (2.0) in my hallway and-(-)  
 803 **zuerst war das draußen im Freien da mit diesen (--)**  
 804 first it was out outside in the open air with those (--)  
 805 **theaterähnlichen Bänken, (---) diese Prüfungen (-) und die**  
 806 theatre-like benches, (---) these exams (-) and the  
 807 **Kollegen (-) und die Schüler (1.2) und nachher mit den Haaren**  
 808 colleagues (-) and the students (1.2) and then afterwards with  
 809 **stand ich dann-**  
 810 the hairs I stood-  
 811 **(8.5)**  
 812 **ja, es war ganz genau der Punkt, (---) ein bißchen dunkel**  
 813 yes, it was exactly the point, (---) a bit dark  
 814 **(3.8)**  
 815 **und auch genau der Spiegel noch.**  
 816 and also exactly the mirror.  
 817 **(1min, 5sec)**  
 818 **T: (unverständlich)**  
 819 (incomprehensible)  
 820 **(1.3)**  
 821 **P: die Frau eh (--)** wie heißt sie, \*62 ist doch gar nicht da oder?  
 822 the woman uh (--) what's her name, \*62 is not there, isn't she?  
 823 **T: doch.**  
 824 yes she is.  
 825 **P: ah ja.**  
 826 I see.  
 827 **(1.5)**  
 828 **T: war sie vorhin nicht da, als Sie kamen?**  
 829 was she not here when you came in?  
 830 **P: nein, ich hab nicht geklopft, nein, ich dachte nur Freitag, aber**  
 831 no, I didn't knock, no, I thought only Fridays, but  
 832 **das, (---) das ist falsch.**  
 833 that, (---) that is wrong.  
 834 **(3.5)**  
 835 **T: war es, vielleicht war sie einmal nicht da am Freitag.**  
 836 it was, maybe once she wasn't there on Friday.  
 837 **P: ja, ja, ich habe, eben, sie war krank und das hab ich-**  
 838 yes, yes, I just did, she was sick and that I did-  
 839 **T: mmh.**  
 840 mmh.  
 841 **(15.0)**  
 842 **merkwürdig, nicht zuviel Haare haben Sie da, sondern zuwenig,**  
 843 strange, there you don't have too many hairs, but too few,  
 844 **nicht, eh (---) grad eh, im Gegensatz zu der-**  
 845 do you, uh (---) precisely uh, as opposed to the  
 846 **P: andern Misere.**  
 847 other misery.  
 848 **T: zur Misere, wenn Sie sich sehen, daß Sie eh, Ihren Körper sehen**  
 849 to the misery, when you see yourself, that you uh, see your body  
 850 **P: ja, das war ja am Kopf und ich hatte ja auch ziemlich**  
 851 yes, it was at the head and I had considerable  
 852 **Haarausfall (--)** zu Beginn des Studiums.  
 853 hair loss (--) at the beginning of my university studies.  
 854 **T: mh.**  
 855 mh.  
 856 **P: damals.**  
 857 at that time.  
 858 **T: ah ja, mh.**  
 859 I see, mh.



860 **P: was auch mit dieser (---) Hormongeschichte zusammenhängt, (1.0)**  
861 which was also connected (---) with this hormone issue, (1.0)  
862 **bis ich sie dann (-) alle runterschnitt. (2.5) das war damals**  
863 till I then (-) cut off them all. (2.5) it was already at that  
864 **schon 'ne ganz schlimme Sache. und das gab schon Löcher.**  
865 time a very bad thing. and it already caused wholes.  
866 **T: mh.**  
867 mh.  
868 **P: keine solchen wie dann.**  
869 not of that kind like then.  
870 **T: ja, ja.**  
871 yea, yea.  
872 **P: aber es gab schon, (--) ja, eben lichte Stellen.**  
873 but there were already, (--) yes, just thin spots.  
874 **T: mh.**  
875 mh.  
876 (1.8)  
877 **P: naja mit 'ne ganz böse Sache. (1.5) also nicht, (.) die gingen**  
878 well, a very ugly affair. (1.5) so not, (.) they shed  
879 **so (---) büschelweise aus.**  
880 (---) in tufts.  
881 **T: mh.**  
882 mh.  
883 **P: nein. (---) permanent.**  
884 no. (---) permanently.  
885 **T: ich hab die Hormongeschichte, ich hab's vergessen, was Sie mal**  
886 I've the hormone issue, I've forgotten what you once  
887 **mit Hormongeschichte-**  
888 the hormone issue-  
889 **P: ja, das ist eben, ehm, wie die, wie die, (--) na, (-) Mediziner**  
890 yes, it's just, uhm, like the, like the, (--) well, (-) medics  
891 **(.) oben gesagt haben.**  
892 (.) up there said.  
893 **T: ach da, jetzt, eh.**  
894 ah there, now, uh.  
895 **P: daß es mit dem Haarwuchs am Körper genau so eben mit dem, mit**  
896 that the growth of hair on the body is precicely as  
897 **dem Haarausfall am Kopf**  
898 the hair loss at the head  
899 **T: mh.**  
900 mh.  
901 **P: hormonell bedingt ist.**  
902 hormone-based.  
903 **T: mh.mh.**  
904 mh.mh.  
905 (1.8)  
906 **P: das ging eigentlich so mit Hand in Hand.**  
907 that went hand in hand.  
908 (12.0)  
909 **insofern ist es, (.) eh, (-) nicht merkwürdig (1.0) diese,**  
910 in this respect it is, (.) uh, (-) not peculiar (1.0) these,  
911 **diese (---) Haar(-)löcher.**  
912 these (---) hair(-)wholes.  
913 **T: mh.**  
914 mh.  
915 (---)  
916 **P: in meinem Empfinden, nicht, gibt's die natürlich schon-**  
917 on my perception, you know, of course there's-  
918 **T: also die oben meinten, daß die, da der damalige Haarausfall eh-**

919 so they up there meant that the, as the former hair loss uh-  
920 **P: mh.**  
921 mh.  
922 **T: während der, eh, also im Studium.**  
923 during the, uh, well the university studies.  
924 **P: ja.**  
925 yes.  
926 **T: daß der mit eh, ebenso hormonell bedingt war wie-**  
927 that it was uh, just as hormone-based as-  
928 **P: ja.**  
929 yes.  
930 **T: der, eh-**  
931 the, uh-  
932 **P: Haarwuchs.**  
933 growth of hair.  
934 **T: der Haarwuchs.**  
935 the growth of hair.  
936 **P: ja. (-) ja.**  
937 yes (-) yes.  
938 (3.5)  
939 **das heißt, ich meinte das und das wurde nur nicht widersprochen.**  
940 well, I thought so and it was not contradicted.  
941 **T: ja, ja.**  
942 yes, yes.  
943 **P: weil (-) wir davon auch natürlich (.) sprachen und, eh, (-) ich**  
944 because (-) we of course (.) talked about it and, uh, (-) I  
945 **war früher mal bei einem Frauenarzt, eben wegen dem Haarausfall,**  
946 once I was at a woman's doctor's, just because of the hair loss,  
947 **weil (-) der Internist eigentlich nicht viel tun konnte und**  
948 because (-) the internist actually couldn't do much about it and  
949 **der Hautarzt schon gar nicht und, (-) und der hat da, (.) eben**  
950 the dermatologist even less and, (-) and he then, (.) gave  
951 **so einen (-) Hinweis gegeben und (-) mir damals die Babypille**  
952 such a (-) hint and (-) the birth control pill then  
953 **(1.0) und meinte, das würde doch vielleicht etwas regulieren.**  
954 (1.0) and he meant it would maybe regularize it a bit.  
955 (4.5)  
956 **das war damals noch im Kloster. (1.2) da war's dann auch nochmal**  
957 that was still at the time in the monastery. (1.2) then it was  
958 **ziemlich schlimm, nicht. (-- ) als ich dann diese Haube hatte und**  
959 also quite bad, you know. (-- ) when I had this bonnet and  
960 **und (-- ) einfach nicht genug (.) Luft (1.3) da war das dann auch**  
961 and (-- ) just not enough (.) air (1.3) then it cropped up  
962 **nochmal (1.8) mit dem Haarausfall. (2.8) kann natürlich auch mit**  
963 once more (1.8) with the hair loss. (2.8) of course it might also  
964 **(unverständlich).**  
965 (incomprehensible).  
966 (2min, 13 sec)  
967 **T: mh.**  
968 mh.  
969 (6.0)  
970 **P: hm.**  
971 hm.  
972 (1min, 40 sec)  
973 **T: im Traum wußt ich mehr zu sagen als heute in der**  
974 in the dream I had more to say than today in the  
975 **Stunde oder?**  
976 session, didn't I?  
977 **P: (lacht)**

978 (laughs)  
 979 **(4.0)**  
 980 **ich kann, ich kann nicht mehr erwarten als drin ist.**  
 981 I can, I cannot expect more than it is possible.  
 982 **T: mh.**  
 983 mh.  
 984 **P: mh.**  
 985 mh.  
 986 **(3.0)**  
 987 **P: ich hab zwar auch nicht, (1.3) meine Mutter hat ja den Hauptteil**  
 988 well, I don't have, (1.3) my mother provided for the main  
 989 **bestritten.**  
 990 part.  
 991 **T: mh.**  
 992 mh.  
 993 **(---)**  
 994 **P: na, ich habs eben (---) im Kopf mit meiner Uhr gehabt.**  
 995 well, I just had (---) my clock in mind.  
 996 **T: ah ja. mh.**  
 997 I see. mh.  
 998 **(---)**  
 999 **P: und, (-) und überlegt, (-) ob sich's lohnt.**  
 1000 and, (-) and was thinking, (-) whether it's worth it.  
 1001 **T: mh,mh.**  
 1002 mh, mh.  
 1003 **P: sozusagen. (---) weil ich einfach nicht mehr weiß, (2.8)**  
 1004 so to speak. (---) because I just don't know any more, (2.8)  
 1005 **was sie angefangen haben.**  
 1006 what you started.  
 1007 **(3.0)**  
 1008 **(P seufzt) (---) irgendwie (4.0) na ja.**  
 1009 (P sighs) (---) somehow (4.0) well.  
 1010 **P: hmh.**  
 1011 hmh.  
 1012 **T: mh.**  
 1013 mh.  
 1014 **P: kann nicht mehr anfangen.**  
 1015 cannot start any more.  
 1016 **T: mh.**  
 1017 mh.  
 1018 **P: Wiedersehen.**  
 1019 goodbye.  
 1020 **T: Wiedersehen. (Ende)**  
 1021 goodbye. (end)

